Case Title: Jane E. Chen v. John J. Warner

Citation: 2005 WI 55

Docket Number: 2003AP000288

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 55 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP288 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Jane E. Chen,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
John J. Warner,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 112 
Reported at:  274 Wis. 2d 443, 683 N.W.2d 468 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 6, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood   
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Mason   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Linda Roberson, Holly J. Slota and Balisle & Roberson, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Linda Roberson. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by James 
Kurth, Wausau, Kent A. Tess-Mattner and Schmidt Rupke Tess-
Mattner & Fox, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by Kent A. 
Tess-Mattner. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 55 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports. 
No.  2003AP288  
(L.C. No. 
98 FA 386) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Jane E. Chen,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John J. Warner,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 6, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of 
the circuit court for Wood County, James M. Mason, Judge. The 
circuit court granted Jane E. Chen's (the mother's) motion to 
amend the child support portion of a divorce judgment to require 
John J. Warner (the father) to pay $4,000 per month in child 
support.  The circuit court rejected the father's argument that 
                                                 
1 Chen v. Warner, 2004 WI App 112, 274 Wis. 2d 443, 683 
N.W.2d 468. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
2 
 
the mother's actions constituted "shirking" and declined to use 
the mother's earning capacity rather than her actual income in 
determining whether to award child support.   
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order that the mother's decision to forgo employment outside the 
home to become an at-home full-time child care provider was 
reasonable and did not constitute shirking.  We affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶3 
Two issues are presented.  The first is the correct 
standard of appellate review applicable to the circuit court's 
determination of reasonableness.  The circuit court determined 
that the mother's failure to return to work was reasonable and 
did not constitute shirking.  We conclude that the proper 
standard of appellate review of a circuit court's determination 
of reasonableness in a child support shirking case is that an 
appellate court should independently determine the issue of 
reasonableness, giving appropriate deference to the circuit 
court.   
¶4 
The second issue is whether the circuit court erred in 
determining that the mother's decision to forgo employment 
outside the home and become an at-home full-time child care 
provider was reasonable under the circumstances.  Examining the 
issue of reasonableness independently as a question of law, yet 
giving appropriate deference to the circuit court, we conclude 
that 
the 
mother's 
decision 
was 
reasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances.  A number of factors weigh on this conclusion.  
The parents agreed that, if feasible, it was better for the 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
3 
 
children to have a parent at home full time instead of having 
both parents working full time or part time outside the home.  
The mother was unable to find part-time employment within 
commuting distance of the home.  The father was able to make 
additional expenditures for the children without an impact on 
his standard of living or his short-term or long-term financial 
health. 
I 
¶5 
The material facts are undisputed.  The case at bar 
arises out of a post-divorce motion to modify child support.  
The mother and father, both physicians, were divorced in 1999 
after an 18-year marriage.  They have three children, born in 
1991, 1993, and 1995. 
¶6 
The judgment of divorce incorporated the parties' 
agreement.  It provided for joint custody and equal physical 
placement.  The children spent alternating weeks with each 
parent.  The judgment provided that neither party would pay 
child support to the other; each would be responsible for the 
children's daily expenses when they were in his or her care.2  
Reasonable clothing expenses and other mutually agreed-upon 
expenses incurred on behalf of the children were equally 
                                                 
2 The agreement was somewhat inartfully drafted to provide 
for a waiver of child support.  Divorcing parents cannot "waive" 
child support.  They cannot give up the children's present and 
future rights to receive child support.  Waivers of child 
support are void as against public policy.  See Ondrasek v. 
Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 695-97, 462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
4 
 
divided.  The father, however, was to pay $400 per child per 
month into a fund for the children's future education.     
¶7 
At the time of the divorce, both parties were employed 
full time at the Marshfield Clinic.  The mother earned $19,670 
per month, or $236,000 per year.  The father earned $21,371 per 
month, or $256,452 per year.  Both parents worked outside the 
home during the marriage. 
¶8 
After the divorce, the mother sought to reduce her 
employment to be more available for the children, who were of 
school age or nearing it.  Both parents apparently agree that it 
is in the best interests of their children to have, if feasible, 
child care provided by a parent.  The father testified at the 
child support modification hearing that, when possible, it was 
important to have a parent at home full time with the children 
rather than have someone else care for the children.  
¶9 
The mother voluntarily left her full-time position at 
the Marshfield Clinic in May 2000 when she was unable to reduce 
her schedule there to part time.   
¶10 Leaving her position was not a rash decision.  Prior 
to terminating her employment, the mother had consulted with a 
financial advisor and was advised that from her $1.1 million 
savings, she could expect an annual income of about $110,000.  
This sum was significant, but was less than the income she 
earned as a physician.  The estimate of $110,000 was based on 
stock market returns over the past 50 years.  The mother's 
estimated budget was $7,000 per month, or $84,000 per year. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
5 
 
Because her expected income exceeded her budget, the mother did 
not seek child support from the father. 
¶11 The stock market decline in 2001 took a toll on the 
mother's investment income.  That year she earned only $32,000.  
In response to the income decline, the mother began to look for 
employment and began invading her assets in order to meet her 
and the children's expenses.  The job search failed to yield any 
part-time opportunities within commuting distance of her home, 
although she could have obtained alternating-week work in 
distant communities.  She did not want to live away from home 
during alternate weeks, so she declined to pursue those 
opportunities.  
¶12 In 2002, the mother filed a motion to amend the 
divorce judgment to require the father to pay child support.  
She asserted a substantial change in circumstances to justify a 
child support award.  Her income had diminished substantially; 
the father's income had increased.      
¶13 Had the mother continued employment at the Marshfield 
Clinic, she would have been earning $415,000 per year.  The 
father was earning $472,000 per year when the motion was filed 
in 2002, nearly twice what he earned at the time of the divorce. 
In addition, his employer contributed $73,000 per year to his 
retirement plan. The father had assets of $1,218,185, not 
including securities.  He was eligible for nine weeks of paid 
vacation per year and two weeks of paid meeting time.  He 
maintains three residences.   
No. 
2003AP288   
 
6 
 
¶14 The father's monthly budget was $8,400, leaving him 
with discretionary income of $12,000 per month.  The mother 
requested $4,000 per month in child support based on a monthly 
budget of $7,000. 
¶15 The circuit court ordered the father to pay child 
support in the amount of $4,000, but excused him from his 
obligation to pay $1,200 per month into the children's education 
fund.  Thus, the net effect of the circuit court's order is to 
require the father to pay an additional $2,800 per month for the 
children's support. 
¶16 Not working outside the home full time has enabled the 
mother to spend significantly more time with the children.  This 
increased time with the children also includes periods during 
the weeks when the father has placement of the children.  She 
shepherds the children to medical appointments, attends their 
school 
activities, 
does 
volunteer 
work 
at 
the 
school, 
communicates more with their teachers, transports the children 
to their various extracurricular activities (tae kwon do, 
ballet, knitting, dancing, piano lessons), and monitors their 
participation in all their endeavors.   
¶17 The record is also replete with evidence of the 
father's involvement in the children's lives. 
¶18 By all accounts, the children were doing well and 
their needs were met before the mother left employment at the 
Marshfield 
Clinic, 
and 
they 
have 
continued 
to 
do 
well 
thereafter. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
7 
 
¶19 The father argued in the circuit court and on appeal 
that the mother's termination of employment in 2000 and her 
refusal to seek part-time work outside the Marshfield area were 
unreasonable and amounted to shirking her obligation to support 
their children.  
II 
¶20 Before we decide the two issues presented, we must 
explain the legal principles involved in the present case.  This 
is a child support modification case.  The father asserts that 
in determining child support the circuit court should have used 
the 
mother's 
earning 
capacity, 
not 
her 
actual 
earnings.  
Obviously, in the present case there is a significant difference 
between the two numbers.  A circuit court would consider a 
parent's earning capacity rather than the parent's actual 
earnings only if it has concluded that the parent has been 
"shirking," to use the awkward terminology of past cases.  To 
conclude that a parent is shirking, a circuit court is not 
required to find that a former spouse deliberately reduced 
earnings to avoid support obligations or to gain some advantage 
over the other party.  A circuit court need find only that a 
party's employment decision to reduce or forgo income is 
voluntary and unreasonable under the circumstances.   
¶21 The parties, the circuit court, the court of appeals 
and this court agree that the mother's decision to reduce her 
income from employment outside the home was voluntary.   
¶22 The focus of the parties' dispute is whether the 
mother's decision to forgo employment outside the home to become 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
8 
 
an at-home full-time child care provider was reasonable under 
the circumstances. If the mother's decision was reasonable, the 
circuit court's order increasing child support will be affirmed.  
If the mother's decision was unreasonable, the circuit court's 
order must be reversed.  The circuit court determined that the 
mother's decision was reasonable under the circumstances.  The 
court of appeals agreed. 
 
¶23 The test of reasonableness under the circumstances is  
derived from the case law.  In Balaam v. Balaam,3 one of the 
early intentional shirking cases relating to alimony and child 
support, this court declared that the paying spouse should be 
afforded "a fair choice" of a means of livelihood as well as the 
ability to pursue what the spouse honestly feels are the best 
opportunities, even though the present financial return may be 
reduced from prior employment.  The court further said that 
"[t]his 
rule 
is, 
of 
course, 
subject 
to 
reasonableness 
commensurate with [the spouse's] obligations to [the] children 
and [the former spouse]."4  The phrase "subject to reasonableness 
commensurate with a spouse's obligations to the children" has 
been 
repeated 
in 
numerous 
shirking 
cases, 
including 
                                                 
3 Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 187 N.W. 867 (1971). 
4 Id. at 28. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
9 
 
unintentional shirking cases.5  The phrase "commensurate with a 
spouse's obligations to the children" does not explicitly refer 
to 
obligations 
of 
financial 
support; 
it 
includes 
other 
obligations, such as child care.         
 
¶24 In several cases the court of appeals has stated 
that a circuit court may consider a spouse's earning capacity 
when determining a support obligation to a child if it finds a 
spouse's job choice voluntary and unreasonable under the 
circumstances, omitting the words "commensurate with [his or 
her] obligations to the children."6  This court has cited at 
least one of these cases with approval.7 
 
¶25 Whether 
the 
shirking 
test 
is 
phrased 
as 
"voluntary and reasonable" or with the additional language 
"commensurate 
with 
the 
obligations 
to 
the 
children," 
an 
examination of the discussions and decisions in the cases 
demonstrates that they are the same.  The rule derived from the 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 97 Wis. 2d 111, 119, 293 
N.W.2d  160 (1980); Kelly v. Hougham, 178 Wis. 2d 546, 554-55, 
504 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993); Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 128, 
136-38, 501 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1993); Van Offeren v. Van 
Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 492, 495-97, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 
1992); In re R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d 849, 853, 422 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
6 See, e.g., Finley v. Finley, 2002 WI App 144, ¶12-15, 256 
Wis. 2d 508, 
648 
N.W.2d 536; 
Sellers 
v. 
Sellers, 
201 
Wis. 2d 578, 587, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996).   
7 See 
Rottscheit 
v. 
Dumler, 
2003 
WI 
62, 
¶21, 
262 
Wis. 2d 292, 664 N.W.2d 525 (citing Sellers with approval and 
noting that shirking may exist when a payer makes a voluntary 
and unreasonable decision about his or her employment). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
10 
 
cases is that "[a] parent remains obligated to make reasonable 
choices that will not deprive his or her children of the support 
to which they are entitled."8  The cases uniformly state, in one 
way or another, that in considering a spouse's conduct in 
voluntarily reducing his or her income, a court applies a test 
of reasonableness under the circumstances.9  The case law 
recognizes 
that 
the 
words 
"subject 
to 
reasonableness 
commensurate with a spouse's obligations to the children" mean 
that a court balances the needs of the parents and the needs of 
the child (both financial and otherwise, like child care) and 
the ability of both parents to pay child support.   
¶26 Furthermore, Wis. 
Stat. § 767.25(1m)(d) 
and 
(e)10 
provide that a court may modify the amount of child support 
                                                 
8 Modrow v. Modrow, 2001 WI App 200, ¶21, 247 Wis. 2d 889, 
634 N.W.2d 852. 
9 See, e.g., Edwards, 97 Wis. 2d at 121 (examination of 
individual equities in each case is required); Finley, 256 
Wis. 2d 508, ¶¶13-15 (test in shirking is reasonableness); 
Sellers, 
201 
Wis. 2d at 
587 
(test 
in 
shirking 
is 
reasonableness); Kelly, 178 Wis. 2d at 557 ("[R]easonableness of 
the conduct is the standard . . . ."); Smith, 177 Wis. 2d at 
138-39 ("[T]he payor's earning capacity may be considered when 
the payor's termination of employment resulting in lower 
earnings is voluntary and unreasonable."); Van Offeren, 173 
Wis. 2d at 492, 498 ("[R]easonableness of the conduct is the 
standard" in determining whether to consider a parent's earning 
capacity rather than actual earnings.); R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d at 
853 (circuit court may structure child support order considering 
needs of both the father and the child).  See also Rottscheit, 
262 Wis. 2d 292, ¶21 (shirking may exist when a payer makes a 
voluntary 
and 
unreasonable 
decision 
about 
his 
or 
her 
employment). 
10 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
11 
 
payments under the percentage standard if, after considering the 
listed economic factors, "[t]he desirability that the custodian 
remain in the home as a full-time parent," and "the value of 
custodial services performed by the custodian if the custodian 
remains at home," the court concludes that the percentage 
standard is unfair to the child or to any of the parties.  Thus 
the legislature has explicitly recognized that in establishing 
financial child support obligations a circuit court considers 
the desirability and value of child care services performed by a 
custodian.    
¶27 The circuit court, the court of appeals, and the 
parties 
all 
applied 
a 
test 
of 
reasonableness 
under 
the 
circumstances in the present case.  So do we. 
¶28 We now turn to the standard of appellate review of the 
circuit court's ruling on the reasonableness of the mother's 
decision to forgo employment outside the home to become an at-
home full-time child care provider. 
III 
 
¶29 Determining the standard of appellate review is a 
question of law that this court decides independently of the 
court of appeals, but benefiting from its analysis. 
 
¶30 In arguing about the standard of appellate review 
applicable here, each parent relies on a different line of 
cases, and the court of appeals relies on a third line of cases.  
The father points to a line of cases in which an appellate court 
independently 
reviews 
a 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
of 
reasonableness when the facts are undisputed.  The mother points 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
12 
 
to a line of cases in which an appellate court reviews a circuit 
court's determination of child support for an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  The court of appeals in the present case relied 
on yet another line of cases, in which the appellate court gives 
deference to a circuit court's determination of reasonableness.    
¶31 The father rests his position that an appellate court 
determines the reasonableness of a parent's decision to forgo 
income independently of the circuit court (and without deference 
to the circuit court) on Ozaukee County v. Flessas, 140 Wis. 2d 
122, 409 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1987), and other non-family-law 
court of appeals cases.11  The Flessas case deals with 
reasonableness in the context of a laches defense.  The court of 
appeals appears to have determined in these cases that when the 
facts are undisputed or the evidence is documentary and the 
circuit court has to determine reasonableness, that is, whether 
the facts satisfy the legal standard, appellate review of the 
circuit court's ruling on reasonableness is a question of law 
that the court of appeals determines independently without 
deference to the circuit court.12  
                                                 
11 Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶29, 266 
Wis. 2d 124, 
667 
N.W.2d 751 
(involving 
question 
of 
reasonableness in dispute over liquidated damages in contracts 
setting); Garcia v. Regent Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 287, 303, 481 
N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992) (summary judgment involving question 
of reasonableness in dispute over insurance coverage). 
12 In Ozaukee County v. Flessas, 140 Wis. 2d 122, 409 
N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals, relying on 
Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 525, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983), 
held 
that 
weight 
should 
be 
given 
to 
a 
circuit court's 
conclusions when factual and legal determinations are so 
intertwined.   
No. 
2003AP288   
 
13 
 
¶32 In contrast, the mother analogizes the determination 
of the reasonableness of a parent's decision to forgo employment 
outside the home and become an at-home full-time child care 
provider to the run-of-the-mill child support modification 
cases.  She argues that in those cases a circuit court's 
decision to modify child support after divorce is discretionary 
and will not be overturned absent an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Discretion is properly exercised when the decision 
reflects a rational reasoning process based on the application 
of the correct legal standard to the facts.13  The mother urges 
us to apply the erroneous exercise of discretion standard of 
appellate review to the reasonableness determination in the 
present child support modification case.14 
¶33 The court of appeals takes a third approach to the 
standard of appellate review of the reasonableness of a parent's 
decision to forgo employment outside the home to become an at-
home full-time child care provider: It "accord[s] 'appropriate 
deference' to circuit court determinations of the reasonableness 
of decisions to reduce or forgo income."15 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Abitz v. Abitz, 155 Wis. 2d 161, 174, 455 
N.W.2d 609 (1990). 
14 The mother's approach is supported by Finley, 256 
Wis. 2d 508, ¶¶13-15, in which the court of appeals concluded 
that basing maintenance on the spouse's actual earnings rather 
than imputed earnings is a discretionary decision to be reviewed 
for erroneous exercise of discretion. 
15 Chen, 274 Wis. 2d 443, ¶13. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
14 
 
¶34 The court of appeals relied on Van Offeren v. Van 
Offeren16 for its standard of appellate review.17  The Van Offeren 
case involved a post-divorce motion for temporary elimination of 
child support and maintenance payments.18  The question was 
whether 
William 
Van 
Offeren's 
decision 
to 
terminate 
his 
employment at Johnson Wax was reasonable.  The Van Offeren 
court, citing Flessas (which was, in turn, based on this court's 
decision in Wassenaar v. Panos19), concluded that although the 
application of a legal standard, here reasonableness, to the 
facts is a question of law determined independently by an 
appellate 
court, 
when 
a 
legal 
conclusion 
is 
extensively 
intertwined with factual conclusions, an appellate court should 
give appropriate deference to the circuit court,20 but that the 
circuit court's decision is not controlling.21  
 
¶35 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
"interpret[ed] [the Van Offeren] standard of review to mean that 
                                                 
16 Van 
Offeren 
v. 
Van 
Offeren, 
173 
Wis. 2d 482, 
496 
N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992). 
17 See also Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d at 587 ("The issue whether 
Kelly's job choice is unreasonable presents a question of law.  
However, we will give appropriate deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusion because it is so intertwined with factual 
findings supporting that conclusion.") (citation omitted). 
18 Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 487. 
19 Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 331 N.W.2d 357 
(1983). 
20 Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 492-93. 
21 Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 525. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
15 
 
if the circuit court reached a conclusion that a reasonable 
court could reach based on the record before the court, [the 
court of appeals] will defer to that conclusion.  Deferring to 
circuit court determinations in family law cases is the norm, 
and [the court of appeals] see[s] no reason to deviate in this 
instance."22   
¶36 In affirming the circuit court, the court of appeals 
stated its holding in light of its application of the Van 
Offeren standard of appellate review as follows: "We hold only 
that, in this case, a reasonable trial judge could determine 
that [the mother's] decision to forgo part-time work——work that 
would take her away from the children every other week——was 
reasonable in light of [the father's] ability to pay child 
support and the benefits to the children."23   
¶37 The father contends that the court of appeals' holding 
and its interpretation of Van Offeren, as we have set them forth 
above, deviate from Van Offeren and the case law on which Van 
Offeren is based.  We understand the father's concern.  The 
court of appeals' interpretation of Van Offeren could be viewed 
as incorrectly equating the Van Offeren standard of appellate 
                                                 
22 Chen, 274 Wis. 2d 443, ¶13. 
23 Id., ¶52. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
16 
 
review with the erroneous exercise of discretion standard of 
appellate review.24   
¶38 But there is a difference.  An erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard is more deferential to the circuit court's 
ruling than the Van Offeren/Wassenaar standard of appellate 
review.  The Van Offeren/Wassenaar standard recognizes the issue 
of reasonableness as a question of law, but one in which an 
appellate court should give "appropriate deference" to the 
circuit court's ruling.  Of course, no case law has or can 
define "appropriate" or quantify the deference due the circuit 
court.  All one can say is that an appellate court gives weight 
to the circuit court's decision. 
¶39 We must decide which of these three possible standards 
of appellate review applies to a circuit court's determination 
of 
reasonableness 
in 
a 
shirking 
case. 
 
Determining 
the 
appropriate standard of review depends on the function of 
appellate review and the institutional strengths of trial and 
appellate 
courts. 
 
An 
appellate 
court's 
independent 
                                                 
24 For 
cases 
stating 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
has 
not 
erroneously exercised its discretion if the circuit court's 
decision falls within a range of reasonableness, see, e.g., 
State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 542, 363 N.W.2d 
419 (1985) ("An appellate court will not find an [erroneous 
exercise] of discretion if the record shows that the circuit 
court exercised its discretion and that there is a reasonable 
basis for the court's determination."); Lewandowski v. Preferred 
Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 78, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966) 
(Because "reasonable [people] may differ, the trial court's 
determination 
[under 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard] will be upheld if it falls within a range of 
reasonableness."). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
17 
 
determination of an issue is appropriate when uniformity is 
needed or when an issue is of such importance that review by a 
multiple-judge collegial appellate court is needed.25  Uniformity 
is important for giving courts and litigants clear guidance on 
legal principles.  
¶40 Deference to a circuit court ruling is appropriate 
when the circuit court is in a better position to decide an 
issue than an appellate court.  The circuit court is closer to 
the evidence, sees and hears the witnesses, and decides more 
cases on the issue.  The value of uniformity may be limited 
because no two fact situations are alike.26  In those situations, 
deference to the trial court is appropriate.      
¶41 Although the question of reasonableness is a question 
of law, we do not adopt the independent standard of appellate 
review for the reasonableness of a parent's decision to forgo 
employment outside the home and become an at-home full-time 
child care provider.  A decision on reasonableness in this 
context is closely intertwined with the facts.  A circuit court 
                                                 
25 Cook v. Chicago, 192 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1999). 
26 Cook, 192 F.3d at 697 ("That is, Judge X might have 
decided the same case differently from Judge Y, but since the 
same case is highly unlikely ever to recur, no conflict between 
X and Y is likely."); Bergersen v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 
109 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A] fact-finder closer to the 
evidence may still have a superior 'feel'; [but] the value of 
precedent is limited, since the next shake of the kaleidoscope 
will produce a different fact pattern."); Trinity Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶46, 261 
Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789; State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
194, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998); State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 
234-35, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
18 
 
is closer to the evidence, and a determination of child support 
is ordinarily within the discretion of the circuit court.  If an 
appellate court were to independently decide the question of 
reasonableness in the present case, it might usurp the circuit 
court's role as fact finder and the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion.   
¶42 In rejecting the independent standard of appellate 
review for evaluating the reasonableness of a parent's decision 
to forgo employment outside the home to become an at-home full-
time child care provider, we do not adopt the erroneous exercise 
of discretion standard of appellate review.  In shirking cases, 
a circuit court's ruling on reasonableness, a question of law, 
should be subject to more heightened appellate scrutiny than the 
highly deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard of 
review.  A level of deference between the two standards of 
appellate review——independent review and erroneous exercise of 
discretion——recognizes the appellate court's goal of reducing 
the risk of error on this question of law.  And even though no 
two shirking cases are apt to be alike, this level of appellate 
review may help achieve a level of uniformity across cases, 
thereby guiding litigants and courts.27   
 
                                                 
27 Evan Tsen Lee, in the article Principled Decision Making 
and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed 
Questions Conflict, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235 (1990), has described 
the difficulty of determining the standard of appellate review 
of the question whether the rule of law as applied to the 
established facts was violated as follows:  
Perhaps the conflict [about the standard of appellate 
review] is so difficult to resolve [in such a case] 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
19 
 
 
¶43 Given 
these 
 
considerations, 
we 
adopt 
the 
Van 
Offeren/Wassenaar 
standard 
of 
appellate 
review 
for 
the 
reasonableness of a parent's decision to forgo or reduce income 
from employment outside the home.  We adopt this standard 
because the legal question of reasonableness in a shirking case 
is a question of law (ordinarily suitable for independent 
appellate determination) that is intertwined with the facts 
(ordinarily suitable for appellate court deference to the 
circuit 
court). 
 
Concerns 
of 
judicial 
administration——
efficiency, accuracy, and precedence——make this standard of 
appellate review appropriate.  
IV 
 
¶44 With appropriate deference to the circuit court's 
ruling, we now determine the reasonableness of the mother's 
decision to forgo employment outside the home to become an at-
home full-time child care provider. 
                                                                                                                                                             
because, from the perspective of the appellate court, 
it seems to sit precisely at the midpoint between the 
Scylla of allowing errors to go uncorrected and the 
Charybdis 
of 
judicial 
inefficiency. 
 
Too 
much 
deference and the court fails to fulfill its duty to 
ensure that justice is done; not enough deference and 
it will be sucked into a whirlpool of unending review 
of fact patterns too peculiar to recur. 
Id. at 236. 
For a discussion of the concerns of judicial administration 
in determining the appropriate standard of review for a trial 
court's application of law to fact, see United States v. 
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-05 (9th Cir. 1984). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
20 
 
¶45 While a family is intact, the parents' choice of 
employment, child care, and standard of living are left to the 
parties, as long as the children's basic needs are met.  Upon 
divorce, however, courts are plunged into the divorced parents' 
personal lives to ensure that the interests of minor children 
are protected.  
¶46 A divorced parent who voluntarily leaves gainful 
employment outside the home, for however good a reason, may be 
subject to judicial inquiry into that parent's responsibility to 
furnish child support.  A divorced parent may voluntarily 
terminate employment but may not do so if the conduct inures to 
the detriment of child support.28  There is a limit to the 
unemployment or underemployment of a parent when the other 
parent "is presented the bill for the financial consequences."29    
¶47 When a divorced parent decides to forgo employment 
outside the home to render at-home full-time child care (but not 
for the purpose of avoiding a support obligation), the circuit 
court and the appellate courts must carefully analyze and weigh 
the 
significant 
conflicting 
interests 
in 
determining 
the 
reasonableness of the parent's decision.  A court must weigh the 
right of a parent to make such a choice, while keeping in mind   
the public's interests that children be adequately cared for, 
that the financial needs of the children be met, and that the 
                                                 
28 Modrow, 247 Wis. 2d 889, ¶21.  
29 Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d at 586. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
21 
 
financial burdens of child care be apportioned fairly between 
the parents.    
¶48 If it determines that a parent's decision to forgo 
employment outside the home to provide at-home full-time child 
care is unreasonable, a court can impose an obligation on that 
parent to support a child by imputing income to the parent based 
on that parent's earning capacity.   
¶49 The dissent in the court of appeals in the present 
case 
advocates 
disfavoring 
a 
parent's 
decision 
to 
forgo 
employment outside the home to become an at-home full-time child 
care provider.30  We do not adopt a position favoring or 
disfavoring a parent's decision to forgo employment outside the 
home to become an at-home full-time or part-time child care 
provider.  The case at bar is not one in which the circuit court 
or this court makes a policy determination that it is in the 
best interests of children to have a parent be a full- or part-
time at-home child care provider or have both parents be wage 
earners.  The determination of the reasonableness of a parent's 
decision to forgo employment outside the home to provide full- 
or part-time at-home child care depends on several factors.  We 
recognize, however, that there is no list of factors that 
automatically proves decisive in shirking determinations.31  
                                                 
30 Chen, 274 Wis. 2d 443, ¶60 (Dykman, J., dissenting). 
31 Wallen v. Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d 217, 225, 407 N.W.2d 293 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
22 
 
¶50 The factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a parent's decision to forgo employment 
outside the home, become an at-home full-time child care 
provider, and increase the support obligation of the other 
parent include, but are not limited to, the following: the 
number of children at home and their ages, maturity, health, and 
special needs; the availability of child care providers; the 
financial needs of the children; any detrimental effect on the 
child's support level if a parent is a full- or part-time at-
home child care provider; the age and mental and physical 
condition of the parents; the educational background, training, 
skills, prior employment, and wage earning history of each 
parent; the earning potential of the parent who forgoes 
employment outside the home and that parent's efforts to find 
and retain employment; the status of the job market; the assets 
and income of each parent and the available resources if a 
parent is an at-home full- or part-time child care provider; the 
hardship and burden on the parent employed outside the home 
caused by the other parent's decision to forgo employment; and 
any other factors bearing on the needs of the children and each 
parent's ability to fund child support.32        
                                                 
32 For discussions of these factors, see Lewis Becker, 
Spousal and Child Support and the "Voluntary Reduction of 
Income" Doctrine, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 647 (1997); Elizabeth 
Trainor, Annotation, Basis for Imputing Income for Purpose of 
Determining Child Support Where Obligor Spouse is Voluntarily 
Unemployed or Underemployed, 76 A.L.R. 5th 191 (2000). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
23 
 
¶51 The gender of the parent forgoing employment outside 
the home to provide at-home full- or part-time child care is not 
a relevant factor.33  
¶52 The record in the present case supports the circuit 
court's determination that the mother's initial decision to 
terminate employment was reasonable.  At the time of her 
decision, the mother was advised by a professional financial 
advisor that she could expect investment income of about 
$110,000 per year, an amount sufficient to support herself and 
fund her share of the children's support.  The children would 
get the same level of support; no additional financial burden 
would be placed on the father.   
¶53 The question then becomes whether it was reasonable 
for the mother not to take full- or part-time employment as a 
physician when the income from her investments fell.  It is this 
decision that precipitated the mother's child support motion and 
prompted the father's shirking allegation.   
¶54 The circuit court properly recognized that shirking 
does not require a finding that a party's income reduction was 
done in bad faith or with improper motive.34  Shirking can be 
found even when the party reducing his or her income acts with 
the best intentions.  The father does not assert that the 
                                                 
33 Cf. Forester v. Forester, 174 Wis. 2d 78, 88-89, 496 
N.W.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1993) (wife's earning capacity as a 
surgical technician used to determine husband's maintenance 
obligation). 
34 Roberts v. Roberts, 173 Wis. 2d 406, 411, 496 N.W.2d 210 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
24 
 
mother's decision to remain unemployed was motivated by anything 
other than the children's best interests.   
¶55 The circuit court concluded, and we agree, that a 
parent's decision to provide at-home full-time child care may 
but does not, in and of itself, amount to shirking.35  As the 
circuit court explained, if the father is right that the 
mother's forgoing income from employment outside the home to 
become an at-home full-time child care provider is automatically 
unreasonable, then every arrangement in which one parent 
predominantly 
attends 
to 
the 
children 
while 
the 
other 
predominantly attends to an income-producing job is shirking.  
Furthermore, as the circuit court stated, under the father's 
theory it would no longer be appropriate to impute economic 
value to child care or homemaking services, as our statutes 
permit.36    
¶56 The father agreed at trial that if a family unit "can 
do it," that is, if it is feasible, it is preferable for the 
                                                 
35 In Roberts, 173 Wis. 2d at 411-12, a mother's decision to 
be an at-home full-time child care provider for a child of a 
second marriage was determined to be shirking; her support 
obligation to the children of a prior marriage was determined on 
the basis of her earning capacity, not on her actual earnings.  
The court determined that it had to balance the interests of the 
children and the mother and concluded that the mother's election 
to forgo employment was detrimental to the support needs of her 
other children.  No such detriment to the children exists in the 
instant case.     
36 Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(d) (in property division a 
circuit court may consider the contribution of each party to the 
marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party's 
contribution in homemaking and child care services). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
25 
 
children to be with a parent rather than with someone else and 
that it is preferable to have a parent available as a full-time 
at-home child care provider rather than have one parent or both 
parents as part-time at-home child care providers.  The father's 
briefs now seem to assert that the children might have greater 
opportunities had their mother continued to earn her substantial 
salary.   
¶57 The circuit court properly considered the benefits to 
the children resulting from the mother's decision not to be 
employed outside the home.  The father does not dispute the 
mother's accounting of her child-related activities, nor does he 
argue that the children do not benefit from her greater 
involvement in their lives.  Rather, he argues that the benefits 
are not so great as to render reasonable her decision not to be 
employed outside the home in the face of her dwindling and 
inadequate investment returns.  The father argues, and the 
mother does not dispute, that the children were doing well when 
both parents worked full time outside the home and that the 
children have no special needs or disabilities.  Further, the 
father points out that the mother worked full time before the 
children were of school age and now stays home full time while 
they are in school.  The usual practice, he contends, is for a 
parent to stay home while the children are very young and return 
to work when they start school.   
¶58 The father makes good points, but we conclude, as did 
the circuit court, that the benefits to the children in the 
present case are a factor to be weighed in favor of the mother's 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
26 
 
decision not to be employed outside the home.37  This factor 
favoring the mother is not, however, determinative of the case.      
¶59 This case presents the issue of whether it is fair to 
the father and to the children, in light of the mother's legal 
obligation to support the children, for a court not to impute to 
the mother her earning capacity, thereby increasing the father's 
child support obligations.   
¶60 The father's key point is that the reasonableness of 
the mother's decision to be an at-home full-time child care 
provider should not be based solely on the fact that the father 
can afford to pay child support.  We agree with the father.  The 
father's ability to pay was not the circuit court's sole basis, 
nor is it our sole basis, for determining the reasonableness of 
the mother's decision.  The father's ability to make increased 
expenditures for the children is but one factor to be weighed in 
determining whether it was reasonable for the mother to forgo 
employment outside the home to become an at-home full-time child 
care provider.  Ability to pay and the effect of a support 
                                                 
37 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.25(1m)(d) 
provides 
that 
in 
modifying the amount of child support from the percentage 
standard, a circuit court must consider the desirability of the 
custodian's remaining at home as a full-time parent. 
The court in no way suggests that dual-income families are 
somehow providing less of a benefit for their children or are 
otherwise doing their children an injustice.   
No. 
2003AP288   
 
27 
 
obligation on the obligor parent's finances are always important 
considerations in determining child support.38   
¶61 Certainly, if a working parent's income were low, that 
factor would weigh against a finding that the other parent's 
decision to forgo employment outside the home was reasonable.  
The converse should also be true. 
¶62 In the present case the father's ability to make 
increased expenditures for the children is unusually high.  As a 
result, the effect of increased support of $2,800 on the 
father's standard of living and financial picture is negligible. 
The father had monthly discretionary income of $12,000, over and 
above his monthly expenses and retirement savings.  He could pay 
the court-ordered increased child support of $2,800 a month 
without any significant impact on his finances.  Unlike the 
dissent in the court of appeals in the present case, we would 
not require the mother to liquidate her assets before requiring 
the father to increase child support obligations that he can 
easily meet from his annual income.39  
¶63 The father makes several other arguments challenging 
the circuit court's order.  First, he asserts that a decision 
                                                 
38 See Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m)(b) (in modifying the amount 
of child support from the percentage standard, a circuit court 
considers 
"[t]he 
financial 
resources 
of 
both 
parents"); 
§ 767.25(1m)(bp) (in modifying the amount of child support from 
the percentage standard, a circuit court considers "[t]he needs 
of each party in order to support himself or herself at a level 
equal to or greater than [the federal poverty level].").  
39 Chen, 274 Wis. 2d 443, ¶¶61-62. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
28 
 
favoring the mother would be inconsistent with the Sellers and 
Van Offeren cases.  The father claims that the circumstances in 
those cases, in which a parent was determined to be shirking, 
were less extreme than those surrounding the mother's decision 
in the present case.  We disagree with the father. 
¶64 In Sellers,40 Jane and Kelly Sellers were married for 
14 years and had two minor children at the time of divorce.  The 
parties shared physical placement.  The circuit court calculated 
child support on the basis of the husband's earning capacity 
because 
his 
job 
choice 
was 
unreasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances.41  The court of appeals affirmed.  The husband had 
been a laborer at a paper mill, earning $25,000 to $30,000 per 
year, and several years before the divorce he had changed to a 
job in which he earned $13,000 to $17,000 per year.  
¶65 Sellers is unlike the present case.  In Sellers, after 
the divorce, the wife, the higher wage earner, did not have 
sufficient income to provide an appropriate standard of living 
for the family.  Accordingly, although giving some deference to 
the husband's preferred employment, the circuit court concluded 
that the husband's continued employment at the lower-paid job 
was unreasonable and that the husband's earning capacity would 
be used in determining child support obligations.   
                                                 
40 Sellers v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
41 Id. at 588. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
29 
 
¶66 In 
Van 
Offeren,42 
William 
Van 
Offeren 
left 
his 
employment to start a business that would, he hoped, secure 
greater income in five to six years.  The husband knew that the 
projected earnings from the new business would be zero the first 
year and that the children would be adults before the business 
brought in income sufficient for child support.  The circuit 
court held (and the court of appeals agreed) that as a child 
support obligor, he should have first secured a "comparable" 
source of income before leaving a job with a lucrative salary.43  
The circuit court refused to reduce the husband's support 
obligations.  
¶67 The father asserts that the mother, like William Van 
Offeren, took a risk, relying on the risky stock market to yield 
a future income stream that was not comparable to her past 
employment earnings.  Her potential earnings as a physician were 
four times her projected investment income.  
¶68 The facts of Van Offeren are different from those in 
the present case. The mother here was not reducing her income to 
zero; the mother's plan anticipated substantial income for child 
support.  Moreover, William Van Offeren's child support payments 
were essential to support the children; his failure to pay child 
support forced his former wife to depend on contributions from 
                                                 
42 Van 
Offeren 
v. 
Van 
Offeren, 
173 
Wis. 2d 482, 
496 
N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992). 
43 Id. at 497. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
30 
 
friends, relatives, the church, and federal and state assistance 
to provide for the children.44  
¶69 We conclude that the holding in the present case is 
consistent with the Sellers and Van Offeren cases.   
¶70 Second, for the first time, the father argues that the 
children will suffer by the mother's decision to forgo paid 
employment outside the home.  He argues that the court has 
terminated the father's obligation to contribute to the trust 
accounts for the children's post-high school education, thereby 
effectively forcing the children to subsidize their mother's 
early retirement and diminishing the children's funds for post-
high school education.  We disagree with the father.  The 
mother's decision to forgo employment outside the home to become 
an 
at-home 
full-time 
child 
care 
provider 
was 
reasonable 
considering the present interests of the children and the other 
factors present in the case at bar.  Further, nothing prevents 
the father from voluntarily continuing to pay $1,200 per month 
toward the children's education fund.  
¶71 Third, the father contends that if the mother's 
decision to forgo employment outside the home to become an at-
home full-time child care provider is held to be reasonable, 
such a decision is poor public policy in that it encourages 
high-income parents to race to early retirement or to resign 
their positions.  We are not persuaded by this argument.  
Retiring or resigning is not a decision made easily.  A person 
                                                 
44 Id. at 490. 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
31 
 
who has devoted a significant amount of time and effort in 
building a career does not readily relinquish job satisfaction, 
income, lifestyle, retirement security, and status.  The mother 
testified that leaving her job was a very difficult decision for 
her, as it most likely would be for anyone with the training and 
income level both parents have been able to achieve.   
¶72 Fourth and finally, the father argues that if the 
mother's decision to forgo employment outside the home to become 
an at-home full-time child care provider is held to be 
reasonable, this court would create uncertainty in the law of 
shirking by implying that a different analysis applies to high-
income families and low-income families.  This argument seems to 
be based on the circuit court's considering the father's high 
income as a factor that weighs in favor of a finding that the 
mother's decision is reasonable.   
¶73 This concern is unfounded.  No court——not the circuit 
court, not the court of appeals, and not this court——has created 
a separate shirking analysis for high-income families.  The same 
rule 
is 
applied 
in 
each 
case: 
reasonableness 
under 
the 
circumstances.  Reasonableness is a fact-dependent (as well as 
legal) 
decision. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
must 
determine 
the 
reasonableness of the alleged shirker's reduction in income 
based on all the circumstances of the parties, including the 
income and ability to pay of the parent from whom child support 
is sought. 
   
¶74 Financial status is always important in determining 
child support obligations. A high-income parent may have 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
32 
 
different financial obligations than a parent of more modest 
means.  For example, Wisconsin Administrative Code ch. DWD 40, 
which defines the percentage-of-income standards to be used in 
awarding child support, sets forth a reduced percentage standard 
that the court may use for high-income payers.45  Further, cases 
have held that it is proper to deviate from the percentage 
standards in high-income family situations.    
¶75 In Ayres v. Ayres, 230 Wis. 2d 431, 602 N.W.2d 132 
(Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals held that the circuit 
court had properly deviated from the percentage standard when 
application of the standard to a high-income parent would have 
resulted in a child support award of $130,000 per year.46  Such a 
large award would far exceed the amount needed to support the 
children at the standard of living they would have enjoyed had 
the parties remained married.47  
¶76 We must have "one rule for rich and poor, for the 
favourite at court and the countryman at plough,"48 and the 
father is correct in pressing this point.  Nevertheless, the 
application of a single rule to all persons may yield different 
consequences for each person.  If it did not, a circuit court 
would not, in determining child support, be required to examine 
                                                 
45 See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 40.04(5) (Dec., 2003).   
46 Ayres, 230 Wis. 2d at 433. 
47 Id. at 433-34. 
48 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 194 (Thomas I. 
Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1947) (1690) (quoting The Second 
Treatise of Civil Government, ch. XI, ¶142).   
No. 
2003AP288   
 
33 
 
the circumstances of each case.  Anatole France best expressed 
in a single sentence the myth of absolute equality in law, 
writing of "the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich 
and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the street, and 
to steal their bread."49 
¶77 Giving appropriate deference to the circuit court and 
examining the issue of reasonableness under the circumstances 
independently as a question of law, we conclude that the circuit 
court correctly concluded that the mother's decision to remain 
unemployed to be an at-home full-time child care provider was 
reasonable under the circumstances, given the parents' agreement 
that, if feasible, it was better for the children to have a 
parent at home full time than to have both parents working full 
time or part time outside the home; the benefit to the children 
in the instant case of having an at-home full-time child care 
provider; the mother's inability to find part-time employment 
within commuting distance of the home; and the father's ability 
to make the additional expenditures for the children without an 
impact on his standard of living or his short-term or long-term 
financial health.   
¶78 We do not set forth a general rule that it is always 
reasonable for a parent to terminate employment to become an at-
home full-time child care provider when the other parent has the 
ability to support the children.  We merely conclude that, under 
                                                 
49 Anatole France, The Red Lily 91 (Frederic Chapman ed., 
Winfred Stephens trans., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1925). 
No. 
2003AP288   
 
34 
 
the facts of this case, as a matter of law, and giving deference 
to the circuit court's ruling, the mother's decision to forgo 
employment outside the home to become an at-home full-time child 
care provider was reasonable and that the circuit court 
correctly concluded that the mother was not shirking her 
obligation to support the children. 
* * * * 
¶79 In sum, we conclude that the proper standard of 
appellate 
review 
of 
a 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
of 
reasonableness in a child support shirking case is that an 
appellate court should independently determine the issue of 
reasonableness, giving appropriate deference to the circuit 
court.  We conclude that in the present case, under the 
particular circumstances of the parties, the circuit court 
properly concluded that it was reasonable for the mother to 
forgo employment outside the home and become an at-home full-
time child care provider.  We affirm the court of appeals' 
decision affirming the circuit court's order that the father pay 
$4,000 per month to the mother as child support. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2003AP288.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶80 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  Although I agree 
with much of Justice Butler’s dissent, I write separately to 
expand 
upon 
the 
deficiencies 
in 
the 
majority’s 
shirking 
analysis.  First, I do not believe that an ex-spouse's income is 
an appropriate consideration when determining whether the other 
parent is shirking.  Cf. Majority op., ¶60.  As noted by Justice 
Butler, the proper test for shirking is whether the parent's 
voluntary decision to reduce income is reasonable in light of 
that person's legal obligation to provide financial support to 
his or her children.  Justice Butler's dissent, ¶¶106-08.   
¶81 As each parent has an independent obligation to 
provide 
financial 
support 
for 
his 
or 
her 
children, 
see 
Rottscheit v. Dumler, 2003 WI 62, ¶31, 262 Wis. 2d 292, 664 
N.W.2d 525, one parent's voluntary decision to forego income 
should not be rendered reasonable merely because the other 
parent has the financial ability to make up the difference.  The 
focus of a shirking analysis is not on the other parent's 
earning capacity but on the reasonableness of the alleged 
shirker's decision in light of his or her obligation to 
financially support the children:  "Shirking is established 
where the obligor intentionally avoids the duty to support or 
where the obligor unreasonably diminishes or terminates his or 
her income in light of the support obligation."  Van Offeren v. 
Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 492, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 
1992)(emphasis added).  The decision to voluntarily forgo income 
is thus "subject to reasonableness commensurate with his [or 
No.  2003AP288.jpw 
 
2 
 
her] obligations to his children . . . .  Id. at 495 (quoting 
Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 28, 187 N.W.2d 867 (1971)).   
¶82 I also disagree with the majority that a parent's 
subjective belief as to what is in his or her children's best 
interest plays any role in determining the reasonableness of his 
or her decision to voluntarily forgo income.  Cf. majority op., 
¶56.  The circuit court's decision as to the amount of child 
support owed represents the determination as to what level of 
financial support is in the children's best interest.  Doerr v. 
Doerr, 189 Wis. 2d 112, 128-29, 525 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1994).  
Reasonableness of a decision to forgo income is determined "in 
light of the support obligation."  Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 
492 (emphasis added).   
¶83 Moreover, while a decision to completely forgo income 
may be deemed reasonable if such a decision represents a long-
term, prudent career move and is likely to substantially 
increase the parent's earning capacity, the fact that such a 
decision is not related to any desire to increase future earning 
capacity reflects its unreasonableness.  Doerr, 189 Wis. 2d at 
130-32; Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 498.  As Justice Butler 
correctly indicates, Dr. Chen's decision to forego income in 
this case was not related to any desire to increase her earning 
capacity; indeed, she plans on returning to her previous line of 
work once her children are adults (by which time her legal 
obligation to financially support them will end).  Justice 
Butler's dissent, ¶¶93-94.   
No.  2003AP288.jpw 
 
3 
 
¶84 That Dr. Chen desires to spend more time with her 
children is certainly laudable; however, her decision to be more 
involved in her children's lives should not relieve her of her 
legal obligation to financially support them.  Given that Dr. 
Chen's decision to forgo employment was not related to a desire 
to increase her earning capacity, I would conclude that her 
decision to "retire" early to spend more time with her children 
was reasonable so long as she was able to meet her child support 
obligations.  While she initially was able to meet her legal 
obligation 
to 
financially 
support 
her 
children 
through 
investment income, that is no longer the case.50  Dr. Chen's 
decision to remain unemployed while unable or unwilling51 to 
independently 
fulfill her 
legal obligation 
to 
financially 
support her children and her attempt to force Dr. Warner to 
finance her early retirement are objectively unreasonable under 
the facts of this case.   
¶85 Finally, I wish to emphasize that contrary to the 
majority's assertion, majority op., ¶49, concluding that Dr. 
Chen's decision to remain unemployed is unreasonable is not 
tantamount to adopting a rule disfavoring a parent's decision to 
                                                 
50 See Sellers v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 588, 549 
N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996)("Because Kelly was not required to 
maximize his earning capacity, he enjoyed the luxury of pursuing 
private 
interests 
without 
regard 
to 
compensation. 
 
That 
situation no longer exists.").   
51 I agree with Judge Dykman that Dr. Chen's refusal to 
invade her $1,691,000 estate to support her children should be 
considered 
in 
assessing 
whether 
her 
decision 
to 
remain 
unemployed is reasonable.  Chen v. Warner, 2004 WI App 112, ¶62, 
274 Wis. 2d 443, 683 N.W.2d 468 (Dykman, J., dissenting).   
No.  2003AP288.jpw 
 
4 
 
stay at home with his or her children.  Rather, it is merely a 
reaffirmation of the principle that divorced parents retain the 
freedom to pursue a career of their choosing, so long as that 
decision is reasonable in light of their legal obligation to 
financially support their children.  Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 
496-97.  Dr. Chen has every right to stay at home with her 
children.  However, the law should not force her former spouse 
to finance that decision if she is unable to meet her legal 
obligations to provide financial support for her children.   
¶86 I would conclude that Dr. Chen's decision to remain 
unemployed in light of her decreased investment income and legal 
obligation to financially support her children constitutes 
shirking and would therefore reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals.  Accordingly, I dissent.   
 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶87 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that Jane E. Chen’s (the mother’s) decision to reduce 
or forego income was reasonable and did not constitute shirking 
in the context of a modification of the child support portion of 
a divorce judgment that required John J. Warner (the father) to 
pay $4,000 per month in child support.  I agree with the 
majority that the proper standard of review normally requires an 
appellate court to independently review reasonableness, while 
giving appropriate deference to the trial court.  Majority op., 
¶3.   
¶88 However, because the circuit court misapplied the 
shirking analysis, no deference is warranted in this matter.  In 
addition, because the majority merely pays lip service to the 
proper standard for shirking, I would reverse the court of 
appeals decision52 and remand the matter to the circuit court for 
a determination of whether the mother’s employment decision is 
unreasonable "in light of her child support obligations."  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶89 The mother and father, who are both millionaires, 
divorced in 1999.  The divorce judgment, which incorporated 
their marital settlement agreement, provided for joint custody 
and equal physical placement.  The judgment provided that 
neither would pay child support and that each parent would be 
responsible for the children’s daily expenses when the children 
                                                 
52 Chen v. Warner, 2004 WI App 112, 274 Wis. 2d 443, 683 
N.W.2d 468. 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
2 
 
were with that parent.  Other than an education fund the father 
contributed to each month, expenses were to be equally divided.   
¶90 At the time of the divorce, both parents were employed 
as physicians at the Marshfield Clinic.  The mother, a clinical 
anesthesiologist and administrative physician, earned $236,000 
per year, while the father, a neuroradiologist, earned $256,452 
per year.  The mother worked on average in excess of 60 hours 
per week, which included her on-call requirements.   
¶91 Although 
the children were 
doing 
extremely 
well 
before, up to and after the divorce, the mother testified at the 
child support modification hearing that she felt that the 
children were not seeing either herself or their father enough 
and were being raised by surrogates.53  This, the mother felt, 
was not fair to the children.  When asked if she perceived the 
children were experiencing any "stresses or changes" during the 
divorce, the mother did not respond, except to say that she 
attended courses on what kind of effects divorce has on 
children.  She did state, however, that she determined it was 
more desirable to be available for her children on a more 
regular basis.  When asked if the medical literature supported 
"whether or not it's desirable to have a parent available for a 
child," the father stipulated that it's in the children's best 
interests to have regular supervision provided by their parents, 
when possible. 
                                                 
53 The mother also agreed that the children do not have 
special needs. 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
3 
 
¶92 Shortly after filing for divorce in the summer of 
1998, the mother asked Marshfield Clinic to reduce her work 
schedule to part-time.  Apparently, the clinic delayed answering 
her request. 
¶93 During 1999, the first year after the divorce was 
finalized, the mother noted that given the equal placement 
agreement she was seeing the children half the time.  In 
addition, she stated that she had not made it to any of her 
preschooler's or kindergartener's events and had only made it to 
one of her first grader's field trips.  She said the children 
were extremely disappointed at her absences.  When the children 
asked why she was not in attendance, the mother said she did not 
have a good answer for being at work.   
¶94 In 2000, the mother pressed Marshfield Clinic for an 
answer regarding part-time employment, accusing the clinic of 
not supporting family values.  After the clinic made clear it 
could not offer her part-time employment, the mother decided her 
children's needs took precedence over her personal career goals.  
Because her children "weren't going to be young forever" and 
needed somebody to be there for them, she retired in May 2000 at 
the age of 43.  She testified that she thought she had no 
alternatives within her profession to continue working and still 
have more time for her children.  Once her children are 
"launched," however, she plans on returning to work. 
¶95 During retirement, the mother is now very involved 
with the children's lives.  She stated she is extremely active 
in the children's school activities:  she volunteers in each of 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
4 
 
their classrooms and has participated in nearly all the class 
field trips as a driver or chaperone.  She is also very involved 
with the children's social activities.  She takes them to all 
their lessons, and she carefully monitors the children's friends 
and families.   
¶96 Before retiring, the mother consulted with a financial 
advisor.  Based on her savings of $1.1 million, the financial 
advisor told her that she could anticipate an annual interest 
income of $110,000.  As her budget was $84,000 per year, she did 
not seek child support from the father at that time.   
¶97 In 2001, due to a decline in the stock market, the 
mother earned only $32,000.  During that time, she spoke to a 
recruiter at Marshfield Clinic about part-time employment.  
Although there were no current positions available, the mother 
submitted an application should there be any openings.  She 
testified she also spoke with a "locum tenens company," the 
medical profession's equivalent of 
a 
temporary 
employment 
agency, but no part-time positions were available within a 
reasonable commuting distance.  Although she almost secured 
part-time employment in March 2002 at a hospital in Eau Claire 
when she was fortuitously there for her significant other's 
surgery,54 those arrangements fell through.   
                                                 
54 As an aside, the mother also conceded that she lives with 
this significant other.  This person is also not employed and 
has 50-50 placement of his two teenage children, though he 
spends most of his time with the children at his lake house.  
During 2001, this significant other had taxable income of 
roughly $5,000.  The mother stated she had no idea how the 
significant other made ends meet. 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶98 Thus, all told, the mother submitted two applications 
for part-time employment:  one at Marshfield Clinic and another 
at a hospital in Eau Claire.  The mother also admitted that 
despite living in Marshfield, she did not look for part-time 
employment in Wausau, Neillsville, Wisconsin Rapids, or Stevens 
Point.  In addition, she conceded that she did not file any 
applications with the locum tenens companies for part-time 
employment, because, apparently, they first require an opening 
before they accept applications.  Regardless, the mother 
asserted that she could make $108,000 per year if she worked 
part-time. 
¶99 In 2002, after failing to find a part-time job close 
to home and after using some of her savings, the mother filed a 
motion to amend the divorce judgment, seeking child support from 
the father.  He was then earning $472,000 per year, with assets 
of over $1.2 million and his employer contributing to a 
retirement plan.   
¶100 The mother requested $4,000 per month in child support 
based on her monthly budget of $7,000.  The father argued that 
the mother’s termination of employment in 2000 and her refusal 
to seek part-time work were unreasonable and amounted to 
shirking her obligation to support their children.   
¶101 The circuit court agreed with the mother, and ordered 
the father to pay child support in the amount of $4,000 per 
month.  The circuit court concluded that "even if [the mother] 
became completely unable to provide financial support for the 
minor children of the parties, even if [the mother] were 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
6 
 
shirking, it would not follow that the children would not be 
entitled to [the father's] support."  The court proceeded to 
find that the mother's retirement did not constitute shirking. 
¶102 The court noted that when the mother retired, there 
was no concern about support money given her financial adviser's 
advice.  That the market fell, the court concluded, did not 
transform the mother's benevolent decision to retire into 
malevolent shirking.  The court observed that the mother 
attempted to find part-time employment, but was unsuccessful.  
The court then turned attention to the father.  Noting that the 
father's income has doubled since the divorce, the court found 
that Warner could afford to pay the $4,000 child support the 
mother sought. 
¶103 In setting the amount, the court did not excuse the 
father from contributing $1,200 to the children's education 
funds. 
 
Because 
child 
support 
was 
imposed, 
the 
marital 
settlement agreement provided that the father's obligation to 
pay into the fund was rendered null and void.   
II 
¶104 The general rule regarding the level of child support 
is that it "must be established according to the needs of the 
custodial 
parent 
and 
children 
and 
the 
ability 
of 
the 
noncustodial parent to pay."  Roellig v. Roellig, 146 Wis. 2d 
652, 657, 431 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1988).  However, this general 
rule is subject to a "shirking" exception.  If a parent is 
shirking, courts will refuse to modify child support obligations 
based on the parent's actual earnings and will instead look to 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
7 
 
that parent's earning capacity.  Voecks v. Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d 
184, 188, 491 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1992).  While shirking 
usually arises to disadvantage a payor, it applies equally to a 
payee, or in this joint custody case, to one who seeks to become 
a payee.  See Finley v. Finley, 2002 WI App 144, ¶¶12-13, 256 
Wis. 2d 508, 648 N.W.2d 536.   
A 
¶105 The 
proper 
articulation 
and 
application 
of 
the 
standard for determining if a parent is shirking has been lost 
in this case.  Citing Sellers v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 549 
N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996), the circuit court determined that 
shirking "requires a showing of a person’s voluntary55 and 
unreasonable employment decision."  The court of appeals in 
Sellers did indeed use that terminology in describing shirking.  
Id. at 587.  It indicated that shirking occurs where a court 
finds "the employment decision both voluntary and unreasonable 
under the circumstances."  Id. at 587 (citing Van Offeren v. Van 
Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992)).  The 
majority has accepted the "unreasonable under the circumstances" 
terminology as the appropriate shirking test.  Majority op., 
¶¶22-27.  Unfortunately, that language from Sellers misstates 
the correct test, and has apparently taken on a life of its own.   
¶106 As the court of appeals stated in Van Offeren, 173 
Wis. 2d at 496, shirking normally implies a finding of intent to 
avoid support obligations.  When a voluntary reduction in income 
                                                 
55 It is undisputed that the mother voluntarily retired from 
Marshfield Clinic. 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
8 
 
is 
well-intended, 
however, 
it 
is 
proper 
"to 
assess 
the 
reasonableness of that decision in light of the person’s support 
or maintenance obligations."  Id. (emphasis added).  Accord, 
Kelly v. Hougham, 178 Wis. 2d 546, 555, 504 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 
1993), Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 128, 136, 501 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. 
App. 1993); In re R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d 849, 853, 422 N.W.2d 890 
(Ct. App. 1988).  Indeed, our court has indicated that whether a 
person 
decides 
to 
reduce 
one's 
income 
is 
subject 
to 
reasonableness commensurate with one's support obligations to 
both children and former spouse.  Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 
20, 28, 187 N.W.2d 867 (1971).  The court of appeals in Van 
Offeren did not interpret reasonableness with the cosmic focus 
of what is reasonable "under the circumstances."    
¶107 The test's focus is much narrower.  It is the mother 
who bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of her 
reduction 
in 
income 
commensurate 
with 
her 
child 
support 
obligations.  See Kelly, 178 Wis. 2d at 556; Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 
at 134.  Contrary to the majority’s assertion, "commensurate 
with a spouse’s obligations to the children" does refer to 
obligations of financial support.  See majority op., ¶23.  
Shirking is established where the obligor intentionally avoids 
the duty to support or unreasonably terminates his or her income 
in light of the support obligation.  Compare majority op., ¶23, 
with Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 492.  And child support is 
"designed to maintain children, insofar as possible, at the 
economic level they would have enjoyed had there been no 
divorce."  See Sommer v. Sommer, 108 Wis. 2d 586, 590, 323 N.W. 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
9 
 
2d 144 (Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added).  Thus, the whole 
purpose of the shirking analysis is to inquire whether a parent 
is 
reasonably 
fulfilling 
his 
or 
her 
financial 
support 
obligations.  In this case, the shirking analysis must focus on 
the mother's 
financial 
circumstances, 
as she 
unilaterally 
terminated her employment, which later impacted her ability to 
provide support for her children in the manner required by the 
divorce judgment.56 
¶108 A 
well-intended 
voluntary 
change 
in 
financial 
circumstances that nonetheless provides a sufficient income to 
meet one's child support obligations may not be unreasonable at 
that particular time.  But just as well-intended employment 
decisions may be unreasonable, Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d at 587, a 
well-intended reasonable decision can become unreasonable.  And 
when that happens, it is up to that parent to then take 
reasonable steps to remedy the situation, commensurate with his 
or her child support obligations.  Just like the father, the 
mother also has a legal obligation to meet her child support 
obligations.  See Rottscheit v. Dumler, 2003 WI 62, ¶31, 262 
Wis. 2d 292, 664 N.W.2d 525; and Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 
497.   
                                                 
56 Even using the proper test, "[t]here is no set list of 
factors which are decisive in a shirking determination."  Wallen 
v. Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d 217, 225, 407 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1987).  
The most common factor associated with a finding of shirking is 
a voluntary or self-inflicted change in financial circumstances, 
such as quitting employment, rejecting job offers, or retiring 
early.  Id. at 226.   
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
10 
 
¶109 Certainly, the mother has the right to make career 
decisions that will diminish the income available for support.  
See Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 498.  However, that right "is 
qualified—not absolute."  Id.  "[T]here must be some limit to 
the degree of underemployment one may elect to choose when the 
former spouse is being presented the bill for the financial 
consequences of the choice."  Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d at 586.  The 
same can be said of voluntary unemployment.  Although the 
interests of the children of divorced parents are at the heart 
of the child support system, "parents have cognizable interests 
too."  Cameron v. Cameron, 209 Wis. 2d 88, 108, 562 N.W.2d 126 
(1997).   
B 
¶110 This is a difficult case, but it requires remand 
because the circuit court did not properly consider whether the 
mother's continued unemployment, not initial retirement, is 
reasonable in light of her child support obligations.57  The 
circuit court's conclusion that the mother was not shirking 
boils down to the following:  (1) her homemaking services are 
valuable; (2) she expected sufficient income; (3) the father has 
                                                 
57 Although not entirely clear, the circuit court seemed to 
conclude that even if the mother was shirking, she could still 
seek child support from the father.  The circuit court stated 
that "even if [the mother] became completely unable to provide 
financial support for the minor children of the parties, even if 
[the mother] were shirking, it would not follow that the 
children would not be entitled to [the father's] support."  
While it is true that the mother may (or may not) be entitled to 
support, the whole point of the shirking analysis is to impute 
earning capacity in order to determine the appropriate level of 
support.   
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
11 
 
sufficient income.58  These points miss the mark on whether the 
mother was shirking after the stock market declined. 
¶111 As explained above, the shirking analysis focuses on 
whether the mother's earning capacity will be attributed to her 
as a result of her employment decisions in light of her child 
support obligations.  Compare R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d at 853-54 
(working 
part-time 
to 
obtain 
college 
degree, 
although 
advantageous to increasing earning capacity and eventual ability 
to support child, deprives child of support to which child is 
entitled), with Kelly, 178 Wis. 2d at 556-58 (temporarily 
reducing 
income 
by 
leaving 
well-paying 
job 
to 
pursue 
postgraduate education was reasonable because future earning 
capacity may benefit children in financial and intangible ways).  
Concluding that her full-time parenting care skills are valuable 
may certainly be a factor in whether the mother's employment 
decision was reasonable in light of her financial child support 
obligations, but it should not come first or necessarily be a 
determining factor.  The court cannot simply ignore the mother’s 
financial obligation to support her children.   
¶112 The circuit court's second point is relevant only as 
it relates to the mother’s initial decision to terminate her 
employment.  It is irrelevant as to her conduct subsequent to 
the market decline.  Once her investments did not return the 
                                                 
58 The majority affirms the order on essentially the same 
grounds, despite advancing an extensive, non-exhaustive list of 
factors that should be considered.  Majority op., ¶50.  These 
grounds do not take into account the mother’s obligation to 
financially support her children. 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
12 
 
expected income, the analysis should focus on what she did 
afterwards.  The record indicates she submitted just two 
applications for part-time work, one of which was at Marshfield 
Clinic.  However, she has not looked for part-time employment in 
many of Marshfield’s surrounding communities, including Wausau, 
Neillsville, Wisconsin Rapids, or Stevens Point.  Although the 
locum tenens company indicated that there is work in Milwaukee 
or LaCrosse, the mother testified that those locations were not 
within a reasonable commuting distance.  In any case, the mother 
has not submitted any applications for part-time work through 
the locum tenens company.  The trial court did not consider the 
mother's actions, except to say that she looked for part-time 
employment.  That is true, as far as it goes.  However, the 
court should gauge her employability.  See Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d 
at 227.  If she is employable, then by the mother's own 
testimony she could be earning $108,000 per year at a part-time 
job. 
¶113 The circuit court's third point must also be viewed 
with deliberative caution.  See Forester v. Forester, 174 
Wis. 2d 78, 496 N.W.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding ex-spouse 
should not be allowed to make a career choice that involves a 
substantial reduction in her earning capacity and simultaneously 
insist that her former spouse maintain her at her accustomed 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
13 
 
standard of living).59  But as far as the third point is 
appropriate, it cuts both ways.  While the father's income has 
doubled since the divorce, the record indicates that had the 
mother continued to work, her income would have doubled too.  
Aside from that, the circuit court also did not consider that 
the mother has sufficient assets to financially support her 
children.  These are all factual circumstances the trial court 
should have considered. 
¶114 The 
majority 
carefully 
adopts 
the 
Van Offeren/Wassenaar60 standard of appellate review in shirking 
cases.  Majority op., Part II.  While I agree that this is the 
appropriate standard of review, we cannot give "appropriate" 
deference 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
determination 
if 
that 
determination is based on an incorrect legal standard.  Under 
the 
Van 
Offeren/Wassenaar 
standard, 
therefore, 
appropriate 
deference here is no deference at all.  We are thus left with 
the options of either conducting a review de novo or remanding 
this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  See 
Cameron, 209 Wis. 2d at 99 ("When there is a failure to make 
findings of fact, we may affirm the judgment if it is clearly 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence, reverse the 
                                                 
59 Although Forester v. Forester, 174 Wis. 2d 78, 496 N.W.2d 
771 (Ct. App. 1993), dealt with maintenance, it has been cited 
with approval in child support cases.  See Smith v. Smith, 177 
Wis. 2d 128, 138, 501 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1993); and Sellers v. 
Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 586-87, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
60 See Van Offeren v. Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 492-93, 
496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992), and Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 
2d 518, 525, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983). 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
14 
 
judgment if it is not so supported, or remand for the making of 
findings 
and 
conclusions."). 
 
Since 
the 
question 
of 
reasonableness is a question of law that is extensively 
intertwined with factual conclusions, unlike the majority, I 
would opt for remand, as a de novo review would necessarily 
require us to make both factual and legal conclusions.  See 
Kenyon v. Kenyon, 2004 WI 147, ¶¶36,39-40, 277 Wis. 2d 47, 690 
N.W.2d 251 (remanding maintenance modification to circuit court 
for consideration in light of new maintenance modification test.  
"[I]t is clear that the circuit court proceeded under an 
incorrect standard of law, and we simply do not know how the 
circuit court would have determined the matter had it applied 
the correct standard. . .").  Id., ¶36.        
III 
¶115 In sum, each parent has a duty to support his or her 
children.  Rottscheit, 262 Wis. 2d 292, ¶31.  That duty is 
continuous 
and 
ever 
evolving. 
 
In 
light 
of 
unforeseen 
circumstances, parents must act reasonably.  But reasonableness 
is not assessed in a vacuum.  The reasonableness of the mother’s 
voluntary decision to terminate employment and her refusal to 
accept or seek meaningful employment after the stock market 
declined must be assessed in light of her obligation to support 
the children.  Neither the circuit court nor the majority 
determined that her decision was reasonable in view of her 
obligation to provide financial support pursuant to the original 
judgment of divorce.  Because the circuit court failed to apply 
the correct legal standard in this matter we cannot give any 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
15 
 
deference to the trial court's conclusions.  Accordingly, I 
would remand this case to the circuit court to apply the correct 
standard. 
¶116 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP0288.lbb 
 
 
 
1