Case Title: R & G, LLC v. RCH IV-WB, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1111433

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 03/22/2013 
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Southern Reporter. 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
1111433 
R & G, LLC, 
et a l . 
v. 
RCH IV-WB, 
LLC 
Appeal from Baldwin C i r c u i t Court 
(CV-09-900753.80) 
STUART, J u s t i c e . 
R & G, LLC, 
George D. Copelan, S r . , 
Gilman H a c k e l , and 
R o b e r t Yarbrough ( h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o c o l l e c t i v e l y as " t h e 
a p p e l l a n t s " ) a p p e a l t h e 
$1,350,296 judgment e n t e r e d a g a i n s t 
1111433 
them and i n f a v o r of RCH IV-WB, LLC ("RCH"), by t h e B a l d w i n 
C i r c u i t C o u r t . 
We 
a f f i r m . 
I . 
I n 
J u l y 
2005, Wolf Bay P a r t n e r s , L.L.C., 
e x e c u t e d 
a 
p r o m i s s o r y note w i t h Wachovia Bank i n t h e o r i g i n a l 
p r i n c i p a l 
amount of $2,550,000. 
That note was s e c u r e d by a mortgage on 
two p a r c e l s of p r o p e r t y i n B a l d w i n County and g u a r a n t e e d by 
each of t h e a p p e l l a n t s , as w e l l as by GDG 
P r o p e r t i e s , LLC, 
D a v i d W. Mobley, and George D. Gordon ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o 
c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e a p p e l l a n t s as "the d e f e n d a n t s " ) . 
By 
w r i t t e n 
agreement 
of 
t h e 
p a r t i e s , 
t h e 
amount 
of 
t h e 
i n d e b t e d n e s s 
was 
s u b s e q u e n t l y 
i n c r e a s e d 
t o 
$2,933,718. 
Wachovia Bank t h e r e a f t e r a s s i g n e d i t s i n t e r e s t i n t h e note and 
mortgage t o RCH Mortgage Fund IV, LLC. 
Wolf Bay P a r t n e r s s u b s e q u e n t l y d e f a u l t e d on i t s 
payment 
o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e terms of t h e p r o m i s s o r y n o t e , and RCH 
Mortgage Fund IV a c c o r d i n g l y 
commenced f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e e d i n g s 
on t h e p r o p e r t y s e c u r e d by t h e mortgage. 
On A p r i l 14, 2009, 
RCH, 
a newly c r e a t e d 
a f f i l i a t e 
of RCH 
Mortgage Fund IV, 
p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y a t a f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e f o r $2,000,000, 
and RCH Mortgage Fund IV t h e r e a f t e r a s s i g n e d RCH a l l 
o f 
i t s 
2 
1111433 
r i g h t s under the l o a n . 
In June 2009, RCH sued t h e d e f e n d a n t s , 
s e e k i n g 
t o r e c o v e r 
$1,046,572 
a l l e g e d l y 
s t i l l 
due on t h e 
p r o m i s s o r y n o t e , p l u s i n t e r e s t a c c r u i n g a t a r a t e of $305.25 
per 
day, 
a f t e r t h e p r o c e e d s of t h e f o r e c l o s u r e 
s a l e 
were 
a p p l i e d t o t h e debt. 
A 
bench 
t r i a l 
was 
h e l d , 
a t 
which 
t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s 
c h a l l e n g e d t h e e v i d e n c e p u t f o r t h by RCH i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e 
f o r e c l o s e d - u p o n mortgage had been p r o p e r l y 
a s s i g n e d 
t o RCH 
Mortgage Fund IV by Wachovia Bank. 
The d e f e n d a n t s a l s o argued 
t h a t i t was improper f o r RCH Mortgage Fund IV t o s e l l t h e 
f o r e c l o s e d 
p r o p e r t y 
as a 
s i n g l e 
u n i t 
i n s t e a d 
of as 
two 
s e p a r a t e p a r c e l s and t h a t RCH Mortgage Fund IV a c c e p t e d an 
a l l e g e d l y u n c o n s c i o n a b l y low p u r c h a s e p r i c e a t t h e f o r e c l o s u r e 
s a l e . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t u l t i m a t e l y e x c l u d e d t h e e v i d e n c e put 
f o r t h by RCH i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e mortgage had been a s s i g n e d t o 
RCH Mortgage Fund IV and s e t a s i d e t h e f o r e c l o s u r e and s a l e 
because, 
f o r a l l t h a t 
appeared, 
t h e wrong 
p a r t y 
— 
RCH 
Mortgage Fund IV as opposed t o Wachovia Bank — 
had c o n d u c t e d 
the f o r e c l o s u r e and s a l e . 
The 
t r i a l c o u r t made no r u l i n g on 
the d e f e n d a n t s ' o t h e r arguments because i t s 
f i n d i n g t h a t RCH 
Mortgage 
Fund 
IV 
was 
the 
wrong 
p a r t y 
t o 
conduct 
t h e 
3 
1111433 
f o r e c l o s u r e and s a l e made d o i n g so u n n e c e s s a r y . 
RCH a p p e a l e d 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment t o t h i s C o u r t , and, on August 12, 
2011, i n 
RCH IV-WB, LLC v. Wolf Bay P a r t n e r s , L.L.C., 78 So. 
3d 395, 399 ( A l a . 2011), we h e l d 
t h a t RCH's e v i d e n c e o f 
mortgage assignment s h o u l d have been c o n s i d e r e d by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , we " r e v e r s e [ d ] t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment 
and remand[ed] t h e case f o r p r o c e e d i n g s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h [our] 
o p i n i o n . " I d . 
I t 
appears 
t h a t , 
f o l l o w i n g 
our remand, 
a 
s t a t u s 
c o n f e r e n c e was h e l d on December 19, 2011; 
however, t h e r e c o r d 
c o n t a i n s no t r a n s c r i p t i o n o f t h a t h e a r i n g . 
On J a n u a r y 6, 
2012, RCH 
f i l e d a post-remand b r i e f 
w i t h t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t , 
a r g u i n g t h a t , i n l i g h t o f t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n 
RCH IV-WB, 
t h e r e was n o t h i n g f o r 
t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t t o do b u t c o n f i r m t h e 
amount o f t h e f i n a l judgment t o be e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f RCH. 
RCH f u r t h e r argued t h a t t h e arguments made by t h e d e f e n d a n t s 
i n 
t h e i r p l e a d i n g s and a t t h e bench 
t r i a l 
t h a t RCH Mortgage 
Fund IV had a c t e d 
i m p r o p e r l y 1) by s e l l i n g t h e f o r e c l o s e d 
p r o p e r t y as a s i n g l e u n i t i n s t e a d o f as s e p a r a t e p a r c e l s and 
2) by a c c e p t i n g an a l l e g e d l y u n c o n s c i o n a b l y low 
p u r c h a s e p r i c e 
were u n s u p p o r t e d by Alabama law. 
4 
1111433 
RCH's J a n u a r y 6 b r i e f was s e r v e d on a l l 
the d e f e n d a n t s ; 
however, none of them f i l e d a r e s p o n s e . 
Two months l a t e r , on 
March 5, 2012, the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s f i n a l judgment i n 
f a v o r of RCH, 
s t a t i n g : 
" T h i s case i s on remand from the Alabama Supreme 
C o u r t . 
"On the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , the c o u r t f i n d s t h a t 
the 
s a l e 
of 
the 
2 
d i s t i n c t 
p r o p e r t i e s 
en masse 
i m p a i r e d the a b i l i t y 
of the d e b t o r ( s ) t o redeem the 
p r o p e r t y because d e b t o r was 
u n a b l e 
t o redeem 
one 
p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t redeeming b o t h p r o p e r t i e s . 
"However, b o t h p r o p e r t i e s were encumbered under 
one mortgage. 
That mortgage i n c l u d e d an independent 
c l a u s e 
t h a t p r o v i d e d t h e mortgagee w i t h the 
s o l e 
d i s c r e t i o n t o s e l l a l l encumbered p r o p e r t y e i t h e r as 
an e n t i r e t y or i n s e p a r a t e p a r c e l s . 
The mortgagee 
chose t o s e l l i n one 
p a r c e l . 
"Judgment f o r the 
p l a i n t i f f 
and 
a g a i n s t the 
d e f e n d a n t s 
i n the amount of $1,046,572.31, 
p l u s 
i n t e r e s t o f $303,723.75." 
On A p r i l 4, 2012, H a c k e l and Yarbrough moved the t r i a l c o u r t 
t o 
a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e i t s judgment p u r s u a n t 
t o 
R u l e 
5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., 
and a l s o asked the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t f o r 
l e a v e t o submit a response t o RCH's J a n u a r y 6 b r i e f and t o 
s t a y e x e c u t i o n of the judgment. 
On June 12, 2012, the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
d e n i e d 
t h a t 
m o t i o n , 
and, 
on 
J u l y 
24, 
2012, 
the 
a p p e l l a n t s 
f i l e d t h e i r n o t i c e of a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t . 
5 
1111433 
I I . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t o r i g i n a l l y e n t e r e d a judgment f o l l o w i n g 
a bench t r i a l ; 
t h a t judgment was r e v e r s e d on a p p e a l , and, 
on 
remand, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a new judgment. The ore tenus 
s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w 
g e n e r a l l y a p p l i e s t o judgments 
e n t e r e d 
f o l l o w i n g a bench t r i a l . 
See, 
e.g., 
B o a r d o f Sch. 
Comm'rs o f 
 
M o b i l e 
Cnty. v. Weaver, 99 So. 3d 1210, 1216 ( A l a . 
2012) 
("Because t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e a r d o r e tenus e v i d e n c e d u r i n g t h e 
bench 
t r i a l , 
t h e o r e tenus 
s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w 
a p p l i e s . " ) . 
However, i n t h i s a p p e a l , t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d , 
and t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' argument r a i s e s o n l y a q u e s t i o n o f 
law. 
We r e v i e w q u e s t i o n s o f law 
de novo. 
R u t t e n b e r g v. Friedman, 
97 So. 3d 114, 134 ( A l a . 2012) ("Although t h e o r e tenus 
s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , because t h i s 
i s s u e 
p r e s e n t s a q u e s t i o n o f law and does n o t concern a d i s p u t e d 
i s s u e o f f a c t , our r e v i e w i s 
de novo."). 
I I I . 
B e f o r e 
we 
c o n s i d e r 
t h e m e r i t s 
o f t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' 
arguments, we f i r s t c o n s i d e r RCH's argument t h a t t h i s 
a p p e a l 
i s 
u n t i m e l y and s h o u l d 
t h e r e f o r e be d i s m i s s e d . 
When RCH 
i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n by f i l i n g a c o m p l a i n t i n 
June 2009, t h e 
6 
1111433 
case was d o c k e t e d as case number CV-2009-900753.00 (emphasis 
added). 
F o l l o w i n g t h i s C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n r e v e r s i n g the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s 
judgment 
and 
remanding 
the 
case 
f o r 
f u r t h e r 
p r o c e e d i n g s , the 
t r i a l c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y a s s i g n e d the case a 
new s u f f i x , CV-2009-900753.80. (emphasis added). N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
when RCH 
f i l e d i t s post-remand 
b r i e f on J a n u a r y 6, 2012, i t 
was stamped as b e i n g f i l e d i n case number CV-2009-900753.00. 
On A p r i l 4, 2012 — 
30 days a f t e r the e n t r y of the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s March 5, 2012, judgment i n f a v o r of RCH — 
H a c k e l and 
Yarbrough 
f i l e d 
a motion a s k i n g the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t t o 
a l t e r , 
amend, or v a c a t e i t s judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) . 
That 
m o t i o n , however, was 
f i l e d i n case number CV-2009-900753.00. 
The 
n e x t day, 
A p r i l 
5, 2012, 
H a c k e l and Yarbrough 
r e f i l e d 
t h e i r R u l e 59(e) motion i n case number CV-2009-900753. 
80. 
RCH 
now 
argues t h a t t h a t A p r i l 5 motion was u n t i m e l y because 
a 
motion t o a l t e r , amend, or v a c a t e a judgment must be 
f i l e d 
"not l a t e r t h a n t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r e n t r y o f the 
judgment," 
and H a c k e l and Yarbrough's 
A p r i l 5 motion was 
f i l e d i n case 
number CV-2009-900753.80 on the 3 1 s t day a f t e r 
the judgment 
was 
e n t e r e d . 
R u l e 5 9 ( e ) . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , 
RCH 
a r g u e s , 
t h a t 
u n t i m e l y R u l e 59(e) motion d i d not t o l l the 42-day p e r i o d f o r 
7 
1111433 
f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l , 
and the n o t i c e of a p p e a l f i l e d 
by 
the a p p e l l a n t s on J u l y 24, 
2012 
— 
141 days a f t e r the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s 
March 
5 judgment — 
was 
u n t i m e l y , 
thus making i t 
n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s C o u r t t o d i s m i s s 
the a p p e a l . 
See 
M i l l e r 
 
P r o p s . , 
LLC 
v. 
Green, 
95 
So. 
2d 
850, 
851-52 
( A l a . 2006) 
( h o l d i n g t h a t an u n t i m e l y postjudgment motion does not 
t o l l 
the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l and t h a t t h i s C o u r t has 
no 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over an u n t i m e l y 
f i l e d 
a p p e a l ) . 
We agree w i t h RCH 
t h a t the motion f i l e d on A p r i l 5, 
had 
i t been the 
o n l y R u l e 59(e) 
motion 
f i l e d , 
was 
u n t i m e l y 
and 
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o t o l l the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of 
a p p e a l . 
However, we 
r e c o g n i z e 
and g i v e e f f e c t t o the motion f i l e d 
on 
A p r i l 4. 
F o l l o w i n g remand, t h i s case p r o c e e d e d under a 
new 
d o c k e t 
number, 
CV-2009-900753.80 
as 
opposed 
t o 
CV-2009-
900753.00. 
However, the 
r e c o r d 
r e v e a l s 
t h a t , post-remand, 
p a r t i e s on b o t h s i d e s n e v e r t h e l e s s 
c o n t i n u e d 
t o make 
f i l i n g s 
under the o r i g i n a l d o c k e t number — 
CV-2009-900753.00. 
For 
a l l t h a t a p p e a r s , t h o s e f i l i n g s were c o n s i d e r e d 
by the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t , 
which 
has 
a l s o 
g r a n t e d 
the 
a p p e l l a n t s ' 
m o t i o n 
t o 
supplement 
the 
r e c o r d 
i n CV-2009-900753.80 t o 
i n c l u d e 
the 
A p r i l 4 m o t i o n 
f i l e d i n CV-2009-900753.00. 
On 
the b a s i s 
of 
8 
1111433 
a l l 
t h e s e 
f a c t s , we c o n s i d e r t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' a p p e a l t o be 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d because t h e A p r i l 4 motion t o l l e d t h e time f o r 
f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l . 
The t i m e l i n e s s of the a p p e a l h a v i n g been e s t a b l i s h e d , we 
must next c o n s i d e r t h e m e r i t s of t h e a p p e a l . 
The a p p e l l a n t s ' 
o n l y argument on a p p e a l 
i s t h a t t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
v i o l a t e d 
e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e and fundamental n o t i o n s of due 
p r o c e s s by e n t e r i n g a judgment f o l l o w i n g t h i s C o u r t ' s remand 
w i t h o u t 
h o l d i n g a new 
t r i a l . 
We b e g i n by n o t i n g Ex p a r t e 
Edwards, 727 So. 2d 792, 794 ( A l a . 1998), i n which we s t a t e d : 
" ' " I t 
i s the d u t y 
of t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t , on remand, t o comply 
s t r i c t l y w i t h t h e mandate of the 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t a c c o r d i n g t o i t s 
t r u e 
i n t e n t 
and 
meaning, 
as 
d e t e r m i n e d 
by 
t h e 
d i r e c t i o n s 
g i v e n by the r e v i e w i n g c o u r t . No 
judgment o t h e r than t h a t d i r e c t e d 
or 
p e r m i t t e d 
by 
t h e 
r e v i e w i n g 
c o u r t may 
be 
e n t e r e d 
The 
a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n i s 
f i n a l 
as t o a l l 
m a t t e r s 
b e f o r e 
i t , becomes t h e law o f t h e case, 
and must be e x e c u t e d a c c o r d i n g t o 
the mandate, w i t h o u t 
g r a n t i n g a 
new 
t r i a l 
or t a k i n g 
a d d i t i o n a l 
e v i d e n c e 
"'" 
(Quoting Ex p a r t e Alabama Power Co., 431 So. 2d 151, 155 
( A l a . 
1983), 
q u o t i n g 
i n t u r n 5 Am.Jur.2d A p p e a l & E r r o r § 991 
9 
1111433 
(1962).) 
In RCH IV-WB, we c l o s e d by s t a t i n g : 
"[W]e 
r e v e r s e 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment and remand the case f o r 
p r o c e e d i n g s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . " 
78 So. 3d a t 399. 
We d i d not 
s t a t e , 
as d i d the C o u r t of 
C i v i l A p p e a l s i n Matthews 
B r o s .  
C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. v. Stonebrook Development, L.L.C., 854 So. 
2d 
573, 
583 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
2001), when i t r e v e r s e d a judgment 
e n t e r e d 
f o l l o w i n g a bench 
t r i a l , 
t h a t "the judgment of 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
i s r e v e r s e d , 
and 
the cause remanded f o r a 
new 
t r i a l . " 
Thus, the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t d i d not 
i g n o r e any 
s p e c i f i c 
i n s t r u c t i o n s from t h i s C o u r t t o conduct a new 
t r i a l , and, upon 
f u r t h e r r e v i e w , 
i t s a c t i o n s f o l l o w i n g remand were c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h b o t h our 
o p i n i o n 
i n RCH 
IV-WB and 
p r i n c i p l e s 
of 
due 
p r o c e s s . 
"The 
h a l l m a r k s 
of p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s 
are n o t i c e 
and 
'the o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d " a t a m e a n i n g f u l time and i n a 
m e a n i n g f u l manner."'" 
Alabama R e p u b l i c a n 
P a r t y v. M c G i n l e y , 
893 
So. 
2d 337, 
344 
( q u o t i n g Mathews v. E l d r i d g e , 424 
U.S. 
319, 
333 
(1976), q u o t i n g i n t u r n A r m s t r o n g v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 
545, 
552 
(1965)). 
There i s no a l l e g a t i o n i n t h i s case t h a t 
the a p p e l l a n t s were not g i v e n p r o p e r n o t i c e of the 
f i r s t bench 
t r i a l and/or an o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u l l y argue t h e i r case a t t h a t 
10 
1111433 
t r i a l . 
A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t deemed i t u n n e c e s s a r y t o r u l e 
on any arguments made by t h e d e f e n d a n t s a t t h e bench 
t r i a l 
o t h e r than t h e 
mortgage-assignment i s s u e , i t i s 
e v i d e n t 
from 
the 
r e c o r d i n RCH IV-WB 
t h a t 
o t h e r 
arguments were 
f u l l y 
p r e s e n t e d and argued, 
i n c l u d i n g t h e arguments t h a t i t 
was 
improper f o r 
RCH Mortgage Fund IV t o s e l l t h e f o r e c l o s e d 
p r o p e r t y as a s i n g l e u n i t i n s t e a d o f as s e p a r a t e p a r c e l s and 
t h a t RCH Mortgage Fund IV a c c e p t e d an a l l e g e d l y u n c o n s c i o n a b l y 
low p u r c h a s e p r i c e a t 
t h e f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e . 
See Henderson v.  
Henderson, 73 So. 3d 1282, 1284 n. 3 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) 
( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e 
C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s "would t a k e 
j u d i c i a l 
n o t i c e o f t h e r e c o r d s i n 
t h e p r e v i o u s 
p r o c e e d i n g s i n v o l v i n g 
t h e s e p a r t i e s t o 
t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y p e r t a i n e d t o 
t h e i s s u e s 
i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a p p e a l " ) . 
I n f a c t , i n t h e b r i e f 
C o p e l a n , 
H a c k e l , 
and Yarbrough 
f i l e d i n RCH IV-WB, t h e y 
e x p r e s s l y 
adopted t h e s t a t e m e n t o f f a c t s s e t f o r t h by Gordon and GDG 
P r o p e r t i e s i n t h e i r 
b r i e f , i n which t h e y acknowledged 
t h a t 
e v i d e n c e 
was 
o f f e r e d 
a t t h e bench 
t r i a l 
"as t o t h e 
i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e s a l e s p r i c e a t t h e f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e and 
t h a t t h e 
p r o p e r t y s h o u l d have been s o l d i n 
p a r c e l s , i n s t e a d o f 
11 
1111433 
en masse." 
B r i e f o f Gordon and GDG P r o p e r t i e s i n 
RCH IV-WB, 
p. 14. 
Moreover, n o t o n l y were t h e a p p e l l a n t s g i v e n a 
f u l l 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue t h e i r case a t 
t h e 
bench t r i a l , t h e y a l s o 
had 
ample 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue 
t h e i r 
case 
post-remand. 
N o t a b l y , 
t h i s i s 
n o t 
a case where t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a 
judgment 
i m m e d i a t e l y 
f o l l o w i n g 
our 
remand; 
r a t h e r , 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
t h r e e and o n e - h a l f months went by a f t e r 
t h i s 
C o u r t i s s u e d i t s c e r t i f i c a t e o f judgment i n 
RCH IV-WB b e f o r e 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t h e l d a s t a t u s c o n f e r e n c e . 
Some t h r e e weeks 
l a t e r , RCH 
f i l e d and s e r v e d upon t h e a p p e l l a n t s i t s p o s t -
remand b r i e f . 
However, f o r a l l t h a t appears, t h e a p p e l l a n t s 
d i d 
n o t h i n g 
d u r i n g 
t h i s 
t i m e , 
a 
c o u r s e 
o f a c t i o n 
t h e y 
m a i n t a i n e d 
f o r a n o t h e r 
two months 
u n t i l t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t 
e n t e r e d 
i t s judgment. 
A f t e r one more month e l a p s e d , t h e 
a p p e l l a n t s f i n a l l y s u b m i t t e d t h e i r 
f i r s t post-remand 
f i l i n g , 
a Rule 59(e) m o t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e t h e judgment 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d on remand. 
Under t h i s s e t 
o f f a c t s , 
we cannot agree t h a t t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t i n 
any way d e n i e d t h e 
a p p e l l a n t s due p r o c e s s by e n t e r i n g i t s post-remand judgment 
and t h e r e a f t e r d e n y i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' Rule 59 motion. 
The 
12 
1111433 
a p p e l l a n t s had over s i x months t o f i l e a post-remand b r i e f or 
m o t i o n ; however, t h e y took no 
a c t i o n i n t h a t r e g a r d . 
"The 
f a c t t h a t [the a p p e l l a n t s ] d i d not a v a i l [themselves] of t h i s 
o p p o r t u n i t y 
[to argue t h e i r case] does not show t h a t 
[they 
were] not g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y . " 
D i l l a r d v. Southern S t a t e s  
F o r d , 
I n c . , 541 
So. 2d 483, 
485 
( A l a . 1989). 
We 
f u r t h e r 
note 
t h a t 
the 
c a s e l a w 
s u b m i t t e d 
by 
the 
a p p e l l a n t s i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r argument i s i n a p p l i c a b l e . 
In 
b o t h Ex p a r t e 
P l u m b l i n e 
C o n s t r u c t i o n , 
I n c . , 
992 
So. 
2d 
746 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
2008), and Coker v. Farmers M u t u a l Exchange, 
425 
So. 
2d 
489 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1983), the 
C o u r t of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s 
r e v e r s e d 
the 
judgments 
of 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t s 
a f t e r 
t r i a l s were c o n d u c t e d w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g the n o t i c e r e q u i r e d by 
R u l e 40, A l a . R. C i v . P. 
In t h i s case, however, t h e r e i s no 
a l l e g a t i o n t h a t the bench t r i a l was c o n d u c t e d i n v i o l a t i o n of 
R u l e 40; r a t h e r , the a p p e l l a n t s d e s i r e a new 
t r i a l on remand. 
As e x p l a i n e d s u p r a , however, a new 
t r i a l was 
not r e q u i r e d 
by 
e i t h e r 
our 
o p i n i o n r e v e r s i n g the judgment and remanding 
the 
case or by p r i n c i p l e s 
of due 
p r o c e s s . 
13 
1111433 
IV. 
RCH sued the a p p e l l a n t s s e e k i n g a d e f i c i e n c y b a l a n c e owed 
a f t e r a f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e . 
F o l l o w i n g a f u l l bench t r i a l on the 
i s s u e s , the t r i a l 
c o u r t e n t e r e d a judgment i n f a v o r o f t h e 
a p p e l l a n t s ; however, 
t h i s C o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y r e v e r s e d 
t h a t 
judgment i n RCH IV-WB and remanded the case. 
A p p r o x i m a t e l y 
s i x months a f t e r t h e case was remanded t o i t , the t r i a l 
c o u r t 
e n t e r e d a new judgment i n f a v o r of RCH. 
For the r e a s o n s s e t 
f o r t h h e r e i n , t h a t judgment i s hereby a f f i r m e d . 
AFFIRMED. 
Moore, C.J., and P a r k e r , Murdock, and Wise, J J . , 
c o n c u r . 
14