Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Halliburton-Cohen

Citation: 2005-Ohio-3956

Docket Number: 20041808

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Halliburton-Cohen, 106 Ohio St.3d 98, 2005-Ohio-3956.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. HALLIBURTON-COHEN. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Halliburton-Cohen, 
 106 Ohio St.3d 98, 2005-Ohio-3956.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Charging clearly excessive fee — Failure to promptly 
refund unearned fees — Six-month suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2004-1808 — Submitted March 2, 2005 — Decided August 17, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-113. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Kim M. Halliburton-Cohen of Columbus, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0023389, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1982.  On January 30, 2002, we suspended respondent’s license to practice for 
one year for professional misconduct, including failure to timely account for and 
return client funds, but we stayed the suspension on conditions.  See Columbus 
Bar Assn. v. Halliburton-Cohen, 94 Ohio St.3d 217, 2002-Ohio-640, 761 N.E.2d 
1040.  As one condition of the stay, respondent was placed on a monitored 
probation. 
{¶2} 
On December 16, 2003, relator, Columbus Bar Association, 
charged respondent with additional violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the cause and made findings of misconduct and a 
recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶3} 
The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent had 
violated DR 2-106(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a clearly excessive 
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fee) by charging a “lost opportunity” fee to a client attempting to terminate her 
marriage.  The client, Ruth Guldmann, had retained respondent in October 2002 
and, under a fee contract, had agreed to pay $1,500 of the retainer directly to 
respondent for this purpose.  Respondent charged the lost-opportunity fee after 
showing the contract to her monitoring lawyer, who, according to respondent, 
made no comment. 
{¶4} 
Respondent’s letter of engagement provided: 
{¶5} 
“As we discussed, my services are billed on an hourly basis with 
time being charged in tenths of an hour, or six minute blocks.  My hourly rate is 
$250.00 an hour.  The initial retainer for the matter described above is Three 
Thousand Five Hundred ($3,500.00).  Upon retention, a fee of One Hundred 
Dollars ($100.00) is assessed to the client for the opening of a file, and One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1500.00) is assessed to the client for the lost 
opportunity cost to the attorney for her immediate and permanent inability to 
represent any other party in the case.  The remaining funds will be deposited in 
the attorney’s trust account and will be billed against at the hourly rate described 
for services rendered.” 
{¶6} 
The board found that once Guldmann had consulted respondent, 
respondent was ethically foreclosed from any other representation in the case 
because of the parties’ adverse interests and the fact that Guldmann’s husband had 
his own lawyer.  Respondent thus had no employment opportunity to lose by 
agreeing to represent her client. 
{¶7} 
On October 29, 2002, Guldmann paid respondent $3,625, which 
represented the $3,500 retainer and $125 for an initial consultation, and 
respondent deposited this sum in her trust account.  On October 31 and November 
4, 2002, respondent wrote two checks to herself totaling $1,500 from the trust 
account, identifying these amounts as earned fees.  Respondent testified before 
the panel that although she had not actually reviewed her time records or billed 
January Term, 2005 
3 
her client, she believed that she had performed $1,500 of work and was justified 
in paying herself this money. 
{¶8} 
Later in November 2002, respondent and Guldmann agreed that 
Guldmann should retain new counsel.  Guldmann also asked respondent either to 
refund the amounts paid under their fee contract or to participate in relator’s fee-
arbitration program.  Respondent agreed to the fee arbitration; however, 
Guldmann moved out of the country without arbitrating the dispute. 
{¶9} 
Guldmann filed her grievance against respondent on November 9, 
2002.  Respondent did not receive notice of the grievance until December 17, 
2002.  Around November 15, 2002, respondent delivered to her client a check for 
$1,900 as a refund of her retainer.  The $1,900 check represented the $3,625 
initial fee, less $125 for the initial consultation, $100 for opening the file, and the 
$1,500 that respondent had already paid herself. 
{¶10} In late December 2002, respondent produced an invoice for 
Guldmann showing charges of $1,327.30 for her services.  Thus, based on 
respondent’s own accounting, her client was still due $172.70.  Respondent has 
offered to repay this amount. 
{¶11} In addition to the stipulated misconduct, the board also found 
respondent in violation of DR 2-110(A)(3) (requiring a lawyer who withdraws 
from employment to promptly refund unearned fees).  Although respondent 
claimed that she had earned the $1,500 she took in fees, the board was skeptical.  
The board, adopting the panel’s findings, noted that respondent had not actually 
accounted for her billable hours at the time of payment, she did not produce 
records of her charges for more than a month afterward, and her records did not 
show that she had earned her entire fee.  The board also noted that respondent has 
yet to repay the $172.70 she had overcharged. 
Sanction 
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{¶12} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
reviewed the aggravating and mitigating features of respondent’s case.  See 
Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In aggravation, the board found that respondent had a prior 
record of discipline for her failure to return unearned fees, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(a), although the board also acknowledged a favorable final report of her 
monitored probation.1   The board found no other aggravating factors. 
{¶13} In mitigation, the board found that respondent had been 
forthcoming and cooperative during the disciplinary proceedings, and the parties 
had stipulated to her good character apart from the events at bar.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (e).  Respondent has also stopped charging a lost-
opportunity fee, and although the board found no violation of DR 1-104’s notice 
requirement in the portion of her letter of engagement concerning her lack of 
professional liability insurance, respondent has changed her standard letter of 
engagement in an attempt to highlight that notice. 
{¶14} Although the parties agreed that the appropriate sanction is a 
public reprimand, the panel recommended a six-month suspension, stayed on 
conditions.  Among the conditions were the requirements that respondent refund 
$172.70 to her former client, commit no further misconduct, and pay all costs of 
this proceeding.  The board adopted the panel’s recommendation. 
{¶15} Upon review, we agree that respondent violated DR 2-106(A) as 
found by the board.  Relator’s counsel argued that respondent’s lost-opportunity 
fee resembled the nonrefundable retainers that we have criticized in the past.  See 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Klos (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 486, 692 N.E.2d 565, and 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Schultz (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 383, 643 N.E.2d 1139.  
                                                 
1. This report was never filed with this court, and  respondent’s probation was never terminated.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D). 
January Term, 2005 
5 
Respondent did not accept this fee in combination with a contingent fee, as was 
done in Klos and Schultz; however, she did consider it earned upon receipt and 
not as security for fees or an advance on expenses.  We have found that such 
retainers are appropriate “only in very limited circumstances, such as an 
engagement to remain available and forgo employment by a competitor of the 
client.”  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Okocha (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 3, 6, 697 
N.E.2d 594. 
{¶16} Here, as the board found, respondent had no employment 
opportunity to lose.  There was no agreement for respondent to remain available 
in case Guldmann needed to retain her services again.  And after she was retained, 
respondent was ethically bound to represent her client’s interests as against the 
spouse’s interests, see, generally, DR 7-101(A), and to charge for her legal 
services only in accordance with DR 2-106(B).  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Schram, 98 
Ohio St.3d 512, 2003-Ohio-2063, 787 N.E.2d 1184; Klos, 81 Ohio St.3d 486, 692 
N.E.2d 565.  Thus, as respondent now concedes, her lost-opportunity fee had no 
relation to any legal services she might have performed or been precluded from 
performing and, therefore, constituted an excessive fee. 
{¶17} We also find that respondent violated DR 2-110(A)(3), and, 
accordingly, we overrule respondent’s objection to this determination.  Evidence 
established that although respondent must have known by the end of December 
2002 that she still owed her client $172.70, she never contacted the client, for 
whom she had a recent e-mail address, to find out where to send the money.  
Moreover, when asked why she failed to return this fee at the hearing, respondent 
had no credible explanation for her inaction.  The board thus justifiably found the 
challenged misconduct. 
{¶18} For these reasons, respondent is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for six months; however, this suspension is stayed on the conditions 
that she refund $172.70 to her former client within 30 days of our order and 
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commit no further misconduct during the stayed suspension period.  If respondent 
fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will be lifted, and she will serve the 
entire six-month suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Lance Tibbles, Stanley D. Ross, and Bruce Campbell, Bar Counsel, and 
Jill M. Snitcher McQuain, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
 
Anthony M. Heald, for respondent. 
______________________