Case Title: Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-32

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc.1997 WY 98943 P.2d 405Case Number: 96-32Decided: 07/31/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Lois 
Ann KRIER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Daryl Dean

Krier, Deceased, and for Lois Ann Krier, Timothy 
Krier, and Bonnie

Douglas, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

SAFEWAY STORES 46, INC.; Rodney 
Rusk;

and Maurice W. Brown, Appellees 
(Defendants).

                                  

Appeal from District Court, Laramie County, Keith G. 
Kautz, J.

  

Philip A. Nicholas; Stephen 
N. Goodrich; and Steven K. Sharpe, Nicholas Law Offices, L.L.C., Laramie, for 
Appellants.

 John A. Sundahl and Kay Lynn Bestol, Sundahl, Powers, 
Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, for Appellees Safeway Stores 46, Inc. and Rodney 
Rusk.

 Thomas G. Gorman and Dale W. Cottam of Hirst & 
Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, for Appellee Maurice W. 
Brown.

    Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, 
MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

    TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]          The primary issue on review 
is whether, under the circumstances before us, a landlord or tenant owes a duty 
to protect persons on the property from criminal acts of third parties. In the 
early morning hours on November 25, 1992, Daryl Dean Krier (Krier), an employee 
at the Town and Country Safeway store in Cheyenne, Wyoming, was stabbed and 
killed by a burglar who had entered the store to steal cigarettes. Lois Ann 
Krier, as personal representative of Krier's estate, filed negligence claims 
against the premises lessee Safeway Stores 46, Inc. and the store manager Rodney 
Rusk, among others, also alleging that the owner and landlord of the premises, Maurice W. Brown, failed to 
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that plaintiffs failed to 
establish a duty to protect Krier 
against criminal acts of a third person.

[¶2]          We 
affirm.

I. ISSUES

[¶3]          Appellants, Lois Ann Krier, 
as personal representative of the Estate of Daryl Dean Krier, and for Lois Ann 
Krier, Timothy Krier and Bonnie Douglas (appellants), present the following 
issues for review:

            1. 
Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
owner of the building for claims 
arising out of the death of Dean Krier.

a. 
Does a landlord owe a duty to business invitees or visitors to maintain premises 
leased to others in a reasonably safe condition when the premises are open to 
the public and the landlord retained joint control over common areas and the 
roof?

                        
b. Is there a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the 
landlord was negligent in failing 
to remove a ladder like antenna or in failing to cover or install bars across a 
roof opening?

            2. 
Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
store manager for claims arising 
out of the death of Dean Krier. Is there a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to whether the store 
manager was culpably negligent?

            3. 
Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
lessee of the building for claims 
arising out of the death of Dean Krier.

a. 
Does a lessee owe a duty to business invitees or visitors to maintain premises 
leased by it in a reasonably safe condition?

                        
b. Is there a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the 
lessee was negligent in failing to 
remove a ladder like antenna adjacent to the building, failing to either cover 
or install bars across a roof 
opening, or in failing to install a burglar alarm?

[¶4]          Appellees, leaseholder 
Safeway Stores 46, Inc. (Safeway 46) and store manager Rodney Rusk (Rusk), 
respond with two issues:

            1. Did the 
district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of co-employee Rod 
Rusk, when the Plaintiff was unable 
to present evidence that Rusk had intentionally committed an unreasonable act 
with a state of mind approaching 
intent to do harm in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was 
so great as to make it highly 
probable the harm would follow?

            2. Did the 
district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Safeway Stores 46, 
Inc., when the Plaintiff was unable to 
present any evidence that Safeway 46, a subsidiary of the employer, exerted any 
control over the premises or the operation of the store?

[¶5]          Appellee, landlord Maurice 
W. Brown (Brown), offers the following issue:

Did the District Court err when it granted Summary 
Judgment in favor of Appellee Maurice W. Brown on the grounds that under Wyoming 
law, Appellee Brown had no duty to protect the Appellant's decedent from a 
criminal attack where (1) no special relationship existed between Appellee Brown 
and the Appellant's decedent, and (2) the murder of the Appellant's decedent was 
not foreseeable to Appellee Brown?

II. FACTS

[¶6]          Krier was stabbed to death 
shortly after commencing daily opening preparations at the Safeway grocery store 
located at the Town and Country Shopping Center just outside the city limits of 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. Although scheduled to 
arrive with another employee, Krier went into the store alone when his 
co-employee failed to report to work on time. After clocking in at the rear of 
the store, he encountered a burglar, Charles Ross (Ross), who stabbed Krier and 
fled the building. By the time Krier was discovered, he had died from the wounds 
inflicted by Ross.

[¶7]          The Town and Country Safeway 
store is the largest of several connected stores in the shopping center. Ross 
gained entry to the Town and Country Safeway store by climbing an antenna on the 
north side of the store, and once on the roof, cutting a hole in a fiberglass 
skylight panel to lower himself inside. In an affidavit submitted by appellants, 
Ross stated that this was the second time he had climbed onto the roof using the 
antenna, which he described as having 
"rungs like a ladder that make climbing easy." Ross also stated that prior to 
entering the building, he had "cased out" the store, checking for any indication 
that it was protected by a burglar alarm system.

 [¶8]        Appellants filed suit against 
numerous defendants, including Safeway 46, store manager Rusk, and the owner of 
the premises, Brown. Appellants claimed that despite Safeway 46's and Brown's 
knowledge that the presence of the 
antenna and the vulnerable condition of the skylight created a foreseeable 
danger from criminal actions of third parties, they did nothing to alleviate the 
danger. Appellants' claims against Krier's co-employee Rusk centered on 
allegations that Rusk was culpably negligent in failing to ensure that more than 
one person was present during the opening and closing of the store. The facts 
relating to the individual appellees 
will be presented in greater detail in the discussion portion of this 
opinion.

 [¶9]        Each appellee filed a motion for 
summary judgment which appellants opposed. After lengthy briefing, the 
submission of substantial supporting material, and oral argument, the district 
court issued its decision letter granting summary judgment in favor of all 
appellees on November 29, 1995. An order granting summary judgment was entered on December 14, 1995, 
and this appeal followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 [¶10]     Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when a review of the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party reveals no triable issues of material fact and judgment is warranted as a 
matter of law. Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting 
Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 342 (Wyo. 1989)). In determining whether summary judgment 
is proper, the non-moving party is entitled to have the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences accepted as true. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 714.  On appeal, this court is required to 
review the record de novo to determine whether the trial court erred in 
concluding that an absence of genuine 
issues of material fact justified summary judgment. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

[¶11]       Although summary judgment is 
not favored in negligence actions, it is appropriate when the plaintiff is 
unable to establish the existence of a duty on the part of a defendant. Newberry 
v. Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County, 919 P.2d 141, 144 (Wyo. 1996) 
(quoting Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 550-51 (Wyo. 1995)); Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 
204 (Wyo. 1995). In this case, the district court determined that as a matter of 
law, appellants failed to establish that Brown or Safeway 46 owed a duty to 
protect Krier from Ross' criminal acts.

    A. SAFEWAY 
46

[¶12]       Safeway 46 is a corporation 
created as a result of the leveraged buy-out of the old Safeway corporation in 
1986. While the original Safeway corporate structure conducted its entire 
operation essentially through one 
company, the new corporate structure created first, second and third tier 
subsidiaries organized generally along national, regional, and local geographic 
areas. The separation of the old Safeway into subsidiaries was to enable the 
sale of individual subsidiaries, if necessary, and to limit certain types of 
liability. Thus, the old Safeway corporation was transformed into many 
corporations, including the new parent 
corporation, Safeway, Inc. (new Safeway) and its third tier subsidiary, Safeway 
46.

[¶13]       On November 26, 1986, the 
new Safeway entered into an Administrative Services Agreement with Safeway 46 
which provides, in relevant part:

E. The Acquisition [of old Safeway] does, however, 
change the structure of some domestic asset ownership and operations in the New 
Safeway Group as compared with the pre-Acquisition Old Safeway Group 
organization. * * * The assets and operations of certain of the Old 
Safeway retail divisions have been 
transferred to groupings of subsidiaries. * * *

            F. * * * the 
parties hereto desire to preserve in the New Safeway Group the centralized 
administrative and management 
services as formerly provided by Old Safeway * * *.

            * * 
*

            1. * * 
*

        
    (a) * * 
*

        
    In consideration 
of the [services] charge * * * New Safeway hereby agrees to provide to the 
First Tier, Second Tier and Third 
Tier subsidiaries various centralized administrative and 
management services * * 
*.

Appellants also submitted 
documentation that the assets and profits for the Town and Country Safeway store 
were reported to governmental authorities as assets and profits for Safeway 
46.

[¶14]       At the culmination of the 
transfer from the old Safeway to the new Safeway, Safeway 46 was assigned all 
right, title and interest in the lease agreement between Brown and the old 
Safeway for the Town and Country Safeway store premises. The assignment from the 
old Safeway to Safeway 46 provides, in part:

                
ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION

            * * 
*

            Assignee [Safeway 
46] hereby accepts said assignment and covenants with Assignor [old 
Safeway] and the lessor [Brown] of 
said Lease * * * that Assignee * * * hereby assumes and will 
henceforth perform or cause to be 
performed all of the obligations of every nature contained in said 
Lease             and 
Related Agreements * * *.

[¶15]       In turn, the lease for the 
Town and Country Safeway store premises provided that the common areas were for 
the joint use of all tenants, their customers, invitees and employees. While the 
lease requires the lessor to maintain the common areas at his own expense and to 
keep the building structure, including the roof and skylights, in good repair, the lease also permits 
Safeway 46 to "make such repairs, alterations and improvements to the leased 
premises" and "install in the leased premises such fixtures and equipment" as 
Safeway 46 deems desirable.

[¶16]       Appellants argue that this 
documentation establishes Safeway 46 as the lessee in possession and control of 
the Town and Country Safeway store premises, creating a non-delegable duty to 
Krier to maintain the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition. Appellants contend that Safeway 46 breached its duty 
by failing to cover or install bars across the skylights, failing to direct that 
the antenna be removed, and failing to install a burglar alarm. In support of 
this argument, appellants urge the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
344 (1965) (Torts § 344), which provides:

            
Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third Persons or 
Animals

            A 
possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business 
purposes is subject to liability to 
members of the public while they are upon the land for such purpose, for 
physical harm caused by the 
accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or 
animals, and by the   failure of the possessor to exercise 
reasonable care to 

                        
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, 
or 

                        
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or 
otherwise to protect them against 
it.1

  

Thus, under the law proposed 
by appellants, liability for criminal acts of third persons will be imposed, 
under limited circumstances, on one who is "a possessor of land." A "possessor 
of land" is defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328E (1965) as 
follows:

            
Possessor of Land Defined

            A 
possessor of land is

                        
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it 
or

                        
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control 
it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, 
or

                        
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no 
other person is in possession under 
Clauses (a) and (b).

[¶17]       Although Safeway 46 is named 
as the tenant on the lease, title ownership of the premises is not the 
determinative factor in ascertaining whether one is in possession with intent to 
control the land. See Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989). 
Title ownership may be indicative of the right to possession and control, but it is the actual exercise 
of such rights which is relevant to the determination of liability for criminal 
acts of third parties. Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 813, 815 
(Iowa 1994); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 183 Mich. App. 675, 455 N.W.2d 390, 
392 (1990) (franchisor not possessor of franchisee's 
premises); J.M. v. Shell Oil Co., 922 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Mo. 1996); Rummel 
v. Edgemont Realty Partners, Ltd., 116 N.M. 23, 859 P.2d 491, 494 
(N.M.App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709, 858 P.2d 85   
         (N.M. 
1993).

            [T]he 
duty to provide protection arises, under the appropriate circumstances, from the 
defendant's "power of control or 
expulsion that his occupation of the premises gives him over the conduct of a 
third person who may be present." * 
* * The logical inverse of this reasoning is that, absent a 
defendant's occupation of a 
premises, no potential control or ability to oust a third party exists; 
therefore, the defendant would not 
be liable for failure to provide security when he did not control the premises 
upon which a third party assaulted 
a plaintiff.

LaFleur v. 
Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp., 751 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. App. 1988) (quoting 
Morris v. Barnette, 553 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977)). In Ortega, 902 P.2d  at 202, we described the common law rationale for imposing premises 
liability on the tenant, rather than a landlord, as 
follows:

            
Tenants' rights were best protected by the common law view that a 
landlord's lease to a tenant was a conveyance of the premises for the term of the 
lease.  From that view, the tenant 
was the owner and occupier 
subject to all the responsibilities of one in possession and burdened 
with maintaining the             
premises in a reasonably safe condition to protect persons who came upon 
the land.

  (Emphasis added and footnote 
omitted.)

[¶18]       The uncontested facts 
demonstrate that even were we to adopt the law urged by appellants, Safeway 46 
was not "a possessor of land" as envisioned within the parameters of Torts § 344 
or Wyoming case law. Safeway 46 has no employees, no bank accounts, and does not 
pay bills. The new Safeway assumed all responsibility for hiring and maintaining personnel, 
policies, and security.2 Rent for the premises was paid on 
the new Safeway's checks and all communications regarding the condition of the 
property after the lease assignment were between the new Safeway's employees and 
Brown. The evidence conclusively established that the new Safeway physically occupied 
and exercised total control of the premises at all times following the lease 
assignment. Further, the Administrative Services Agreement does not provide for 
any control by Safeway 46 over the new Safeway's use of the premises. Therefore, 
assuming arguendo that a duty to protect 
Krier from third party criminal acts existed, and that such duty was breached, 
Safeway 46 cannot be held liable for any failure on the part of the new Safeway 
or Brown to maintain the premises in a safe condition. Brookins v. United 
States, 722 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-20 (E.D.Pa. 1989); Johnson v. Urena Service Center, 227 A.D.2d 325, 642 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898-99 (1996).

[¶19]       Neither can liability attach 
to Safeway 46 on the basis of an "agency" theory. Appellants contend that 
Safeway 46 "hired" the new Safeway to operate the grocery store on behalf of 
Safeway 46.  In Wyoming, the test 
for a principal/agent or employer/employee relationship is the principal's right 
to control the agent or employee. As we stated in Holliday v. Bannister, 741 P.2d 89, 95 (Wyo. 1987):

            
Agency is a fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control and consent. There is no presumption that an agency exists. True v. Hi-Plains Elevator 
Machinery, Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 991 (1978). In Wyoming, the overriding element in determining 
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is dependent on whether the employer has a 
right to control the details of the work whereby liability is sought to be established. Noonan v. 
Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 (1986) * * *.

See also J.M., 922 S.W.2d  at 
764. While the new Safeway clearly acted on behalf of Safeway 46, in that all 
profits generated by the Town and Country Safeway store were reported as 
belonging to Safeway 46, appellants 
presented no evidence that Safeway 46 had a right to control the new Safeway in 
its daily operations which generated those profits. The Administrative Services 
Agreement specifically stated that centralized administrative and management 
services provided by the old Safeway would be preserved in the new Safeway. 
There is no provision which allows Safeway 46 to monitor or direct the 
activities of the new Safeway nor is there any evidence that Safeway 46 in fact 
did so.  Consequently, the materials 
before us fail to establish any factual issue regarding the essential elements 
of possession and control.

    B. 
BROWN

[¶20]       Appellants' claim that the 
district court erred when it found that Brown's duty, as a landlord who retained 
joint control of the antenna and roof, encompassed only the duty to safely 
maintain the structural integrity of the areas under his control, not the duty 
to "police" the premises. In support of their argument, appellants again rely on Torts § 344 cmt. 
f. Appellants also direct us to Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and 
Tenant § 17.3 (1977) (Landlord and Tenant § 17.3) and case law from other 
jurisdictions.

[¶21]       In Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 805 at 760-61 
(1970)), we held that when the landlord retains possession and control of the 
premises or a portion thereof, it is his duty to "`exercise reasonable care to 
keep safe such parts of which he so reserves control * * *'." Appellants assert that Brown 
breached the duty because the condition of the property was "unsafe" due to the 
foreseeable risk engendered by the vulnerability of the skylights coupled with a 
"ladder" to the roof. Landlord and Tenant § 17.3 cmt. l 
provides:

            Parts 
of Leased Property Retained in Landlord's Control Which Tenant is Entitled to 
Use.

            A landlord who 
leases a part of his property and retains in his own control any other part the 
tenant is entitled to use as 
appurtenant to the part leased to him, is subject to liability to his tenant 
and others lawfully upon the leased 
property with the consent of the tenant or a subtenant for 
physical harm caused by a dangerous 
condition upon that part of the leased property retained in the 
landlord's control, if the landlord 
by the exercise of reasonable care could have:

            (1) 
discovered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein; 
and

            (2) 
made the condition safe.

            * * 
*

            l. 
Criminal intrusion. For the purpose of this section, the unreasonable risk of 
harm from criminal intrusion 
constitutes a dangerous condition, so that where the landlord could by the 
exercise of reasonable care have 
discovered the unreasonable risk of criminal intrusion and could have made the 
condition safe from such unreasonable 
risk of criminal intrusion, he is subject to liability for physical harm caused 
by criminal intrusion if he has not taken the necessary precautions. As regards 
parts of the property retained in the landlord's control, common entranceways, 
fire escapes, halls and other approaches to the leased property are included. In 
addition, other parts of the property, such as door locks on the entrance to the tenant's apartment or 
office, may be effectively retained in the landlord's control in the sense that the landlord is the only 
one with the authority to make necessary changes in order to avoid unreasonable 
risk of harm.

  (Emphasis added.)

[¶22]       Again, assuming that the 
duty imposed by Torts § 344 and the duty found in Landlord and Tenant § 17.3 are 
adopted as law in Wyoming, appellants fail to raise material facts which 
encumber Brown with the duty to secure 
the skylight or remove the antenna.

 [¶23]     The essential concept of 
possession and control found in Torts § 344 is also part and parcel of Landlord 
and Tenant § 17.3 cmt. a, which provides:

            The 
rule stated in this section does not apply to any part of the leased property 
specifically transferred to the 
tenant under the lease with regard to which the landlord retains a right to 
inspect, to repair, or to enter for 
some other purpose. These parts of the leased property are not considered to 
remain             under 
the landlord's control.

[¶24]       Appellants argue that 
Brown's "joint control" over the roof and skylight is sufficient. We disagree. 
The lease agreement states, "Lessor agrees to keep the building structure on 
the leased premises (including, without limitation, the roof, * * * 
skylights * * *) * * * in good repair * * *." (Emphasis added.)  
This language specifically transfers 
control of the entire building, including the roof, to the tenant, retaining in 
the landlord only a duty to repair. The record clearly establishes that Brown 
provided regular structural maintenance of the roof, but otherwise provided 
repairs only at the request of the Town and Country Safeway store employees. 
There is no allegation that Brown refused a request to provide additional 
security to the roof and skylights. Therefore, Brown did not retain control of 
the roof for the purposes contemplated by Landlord and Tenant § 
17.3.

 [¶25]     This leaves the antenna, located 
in the common areas used for the benefit of the shopping center tenants and 
their invitees.  Appellants contend 
that Brown knew or should have known that the antenna was an "invitation" to criminal activity and 
the tragic result to Krier a foreseeable consequence of its 
presence.

[¶26]       The district court's 
determination regarding Brown was twofold.  
First, the district court found that no duty could be imposed upon Brown 
absent a "special relationship" not found in the landlord/tenant context. The 
district court further found that the criminal acts of Ross were not 
foreseeable.

[¶27]       In Ortega, 902 P.2d  at 202, 
we stated that Wyoming follows the common law rules in the landlord and tenant 
relationship. The district court's requirement of a "special relationship" 
follows the common law rule that persons in possession or control of business 
premises face no tort liability for on-premises criminal attacks against non-trespassers, even though there 
exists a duty to protect those appropriately on the premises from unreasonable 
risks of harm. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 895 
(Tenn. 1996) and cases cited therein. In support of this rule, some courts 
reasoned that a criminal act constituted 
an intervening cause of harm that precluded landowner liability, while others 
held that such a duty would unfairly burden the landlord. Cook v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507, 508 (D.C.App. 1976) (not insurer); Nappier v. 
Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (Mo. App. 1984) (general); Goldberg v. 
Housing Authority of City of Newark, 38 
N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291, 296 (1962) (fairness  later disavowed in Butler v. Acme 
Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141, 1144-45 (1982)); Davis v. Allied 
Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963, 965 (Okla. 1976) (not insurer  later 
distinguished in residential landlord/tenant context in Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 460 (Okla. 1986)).

  

[¶28]       However, in Ortega, 902 P.2d  
at 203 (quoting Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Alaska 1994)), we also 
noted that "[t]he common law `is but the accumulated expressions of the various 
judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between 
individuals with respect to private disputes.'" The common law rule precluding the 
landlord's liability in the absence of a special relationship clearly has 
undergone a change in recent years, with the vast majority of jurisdictions 
finding a duty to protect those lawfully on the premises from criminal acts of 
third parties under limited circumstances.

 [¶29]     The evolution of the law in this 
area begins with the premise that a "relationship" approach is inadequate for 
the reality of criminal conduct on business premises. However, a duty based 
solely on the landlord/tenant 
relationship imposes an undue burden on landlords. On the other hand, if the 
relationship between a landlord and a business invitee does not impose a duty to 
protect against criminal acts, landlords have no incentive to implement even 
modest security measures which would allow easily preventable crimes to occur. See Uri Kaufman, When 
Crime Pays: Business Landlords' Duty to Protect Customers From Criminal Acts 
Committed on the Premises, 31 S.Tex.L.Rev. 89, 94 (1990). The resolution of this problem has not been 
unanimous.

 [¶30]     A small minority of jurisdictions 
continue to require a special relationship between the parties, such as an 
innkeeper/guest and common carrier/passenger, to impose a duty to protect from 
criminal acts of third parties. Because the commercial landlord/business invitee 
relationship is not included, no duty is 
imposed unless a specific criminal activity is known to be imminent. Folmar v. 
Marriott, Inc., 918 P.2d 86, 88 (Okla. App. 1996) (rejecting second portion of 
Torts § 344 cmt. f, duty to guard arises only when business invitor knows or has 
reason to know that criminal acts are occurring or are about to occur).3 Thus, the "special relationship" 
threshold has been abrogated by all but one or two jurisdictions in favor of an 
analysis based on the control of the 
premises and the landlord's superior knowledge of the likelihood of criminal 
acts. While a relatively large number of decisions have been handed down, there 
is still much confusion as to when such 
duty should arise and how far it should reach. See 43 A.L.R.5th Landlord's 
Liability for Failure to Protect Tenant From Criminal Acts of Third Person, 
207-518 (1996).

[¶31]       Some jurisdictions have 
expanded the "special relationship" test to include a duty created by "special 
circumstances" or "special facts exception." Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. Gosa, 686 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Ala. 1996); Broadus v. Chevron USA, Inc., 677 So. 2d 199, 202 
(Ala. 1996); Thiele v. Rieter, 838 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Mo. App. 1992). The "special facts exception" 
includes two possible theories of liability: "(1) an intentional infliction of 
injury by known and identifiable third persons; or (2) frequent and recent 
occurrences of violent crime against persons on the premises by unknown 
assailants." Thiele, 838 S.W.2d  at 443.  "Special circumstances" exist only when a person knew 
or should have known of a probability of conduct by third persons that 
would endanger the plaintiff. Broadus, 677 So. 2d  at 202 (quoting Saccuzzo v. 
Krystal Co., 646 So. 2d 595, 596-97 (Ala. 1994)).

 [¶32]     Other jurisdictions espouse a 
"prior similar incidents" test, under which the court considers the proximity, 
time, number and types of prior criminal incidents and then determines if there 
was a foreseeable likelihood of the 
particular harm befalling the plaintiff in light of the prior acts. Polomie v. 
Golub Corp., 226 A.D.2d 979, 640 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (1996); McClung, 937 S.W.2d  
at 899; Ann E. Phillips, Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating the Employer's 
Role, 44 Buffalo L.Rev. 139, 169-70 (Winter 1996). This approach has been criticized on 
several grounds, most notably because it contravenes public policy and notions 
of fairness by allowing one "free" crime in all instances, thus providing no 
incentive to take preventative measures until the first victim is denied 
recovery. Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 679, 472 S.E.2d 504, 
506 (1996); McClung, 937 S.W.2d  at 899-900.

  [¶33] 
  Another criticism of the 
"prior similar incidents" test has been the conflicting determinations regarding 
the requisite "similarity" of a previous incident. Courts have disagreed on 
whether the prior incident must involve personal injury, the relevant proximity 
in time of the prior incident and the necessary proximity in location. Cf. 
Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525 (Del. Supr. 1987) (no limitation 
to consideration of only personal violence crimes because property crimes may 
turn violent if chase ensues); Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Div. of Nat. Steel Corp., 217 Ill. App.3d 46, 
159 Ill.Dec. 951, 954, 576 N.E.2d 874, 877 (1991) (twenty incidents on lot in 
last three years were property crimes, murder was first and only crime of 
personal violence); Martinko v. H-N-W Associates, 393 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Iowa 
1986) (experience with criminal activity at defendant's malls in other cities and states not 
relevant); Erichsen v. No-Frills Supermarkets of Omaha, Inc., 246 Neb. 238, 518 N.W.2d 116, 119-20 (1994) (may 
consider acts occurring in "fairly contiguous area," and criminal acts that 
occur near the premises give notice of risk that crime may travel); and Dwiggins 
v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) (one robbery five years 
earlier insufficient).

 [¶34]     In response to the criticisms 
leveled at the "prior similar incidents" test, many courts adopted a "totality 
of the circumstances" test. This test allows the court to consider all of the 
surrounding circumstances, including the nature of the business and its location 
as well as prior similar incidents.  
First espoused in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653, 659-61 (1985), many courts followed California's lead. Killebrew, 472 S.E.2d  at 506; Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506, 510 
(1990); Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364-65 (1988); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 253 Kan. 
540, 856 P.2d 1332, 1339 (1993); Small 
v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1987), aff'd, 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 
1989); Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, 711 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App. 1986), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 735 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1987).

 [¶35]     Upon closer review, however, it 
becomes apparent that courts continue to struggle with an appropriate legal 
standard to determine the foreseeability of criminal acts as a prerequisite to 
duty. The "totality of the circumstances" test has also received its share of 
criticism. The standard has been held to being "too broad a standard, effectively imposing an 
unqualified duty to protect customers in areas experiencing any significant 
level of criminal activity." McClung, 937 S.W.2d  at 900. See also Ann M. v. 
Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 863 P.2d 207, 
215 (1993) and Erickson v. Curtis Inv. 
Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Minn. 1989). Noting the difficulties inherent in 
both the "prior similar incidents" and the "totality of the circumstances" 
tests, recent cases have adopted and applied a fourth test which combines the 
elements of both standards. "The balancing approach acknowledges that duty is 
a flexible concept, and seeks to balance 
the degree of foreseeability of harm against the burden of the duty to be 
imposed." McClung, 937 S.W.2d  at 901. See also Ann M., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 863 P.2d  at 215. The adoption of a "balancing approach" was most recently 
articulated in McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 902:

            A 
business ordinarily has no duty to protect customers from the criminal acts of 
third parties which occur on its 
premises. The business is not to be regarded as the insurer of the safety of 
its customers, and it has no 
absolute duty to implement security measures for the protection of its 
customers. However, a duty to take 
reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has 
reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from 
past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are 
reasonably foreseeable, either 
generally or at some particular time.

            In 
determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of 
harm must be balanced against the 
commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect against that harm. 
In cases in which there is a high 
degree of foreseeability of harm and the probable harm is great, the burden imposed upon defendant may be 
substantial. Alternatively, in cases in which a lesser degree of foreseeability is present or the 
potential harm is slight, less onerous burdens may be imposed. * * *

            As a practical 
matter, the requisite degree of foreseeability essential to establish a duty 
to protect against criminal acts 
will almost always require that prior instances of crime have 
occurred on or in the immediate 
vicinity of defendant's premises. Courts must consider the location, 
nature, and extent of previous 
criminal activities and their similarity, proximity, or other relationship to 
the crime giving rise to the cause 
of action. To hold otherwise would impose an undue burden upon merchants.

  (Footnote omitted.) See also Ann M., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 863 P.2d  at 215 and Sharp, 796 P.2d  at 
509-10.

[¶36]       Where this court has 
considered whether a duty should be imposed, we too have balanced numerous 
factors to aid in determining whether such an imposition is appropriate. Ortega, 
902 P.2d  at 204; Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1098-99 (Wyo. 
1987). However, under even the broad "totality of the circumstances" test, appellants did not present 
facts which are sufficient to establish that Brown should have foreseen the 
criminal acts against Krier.

[¶37]       Appellants must show that 
Brown knew or should have known that there was a likelihood that the antenna 
would be used for criminal entry through the skylight, which would result in 
physical injury to someone on the premises. The admissible facts established by 
appellants demonstrated that in the twenty years 
preceding Krier's death, there 
was no record of prior burglaries through the skylight and only one witness 
recalled such an entry, occurring more than twenty years before the incident at 
issue.  There were two armed 
robberies and two burglaries between 1975 and 1989. None of these events, more 
than three years prior to Krier's death, 
resulted in physical harm to anyone on the premises.

[¶38]       Appellants submitted the 
affidavit of a Laramie County, Wyoming deputy sheriff that stated the store was 
located in a "high crime area." Relevant police records from 1987 through the 
time of Krier's death indicate three fights in the Town and Country Safeway 
store parking lot, three calls to deal with transients, one suicide, one call regarding a suspicious vehicle, 
and two domestic relations incidents.

[¶39]       In 1987, five years prior to 
Krier's death, Brown was struck by a would-be thief attempting to break into his 
car in the parking lot near the Town and Country Safeway store. The assailant 
knocked Brown down and ran away. Appellants also note that in 1990, Brown 
installed a burglar alarm in his office above the hardware store in the shopping center and upgraded 
the alarm system at the Supermarket Liquors, located on the south side of the 
Town and Country parking lot area.

[¶40]       Police reports regarding the 
liquor store reveal that in 1990, two years prior to Krier's death, the liquor 
store manager was assaulted by an intoxicated customer, several teenagers from 
Colorado broke the front window and stole a case of beer, and someone broke into 
an outdoor coke machine. There was also an attempted break-in by a transient at a vacant 
building south of the liquor store in 1991. Again, none of these events resulted 
in serious injury to anyone on the premises.

[¶41]       It is undisputed that a few 
years before Krier's death, an antenna was removed similar to the one used by 
Ross but located on the south side of the building. Appellants present no 
evidence that there was any threat of criminal activity or any attempted 
break-ins resulting from unauthorized access from the antenna which was removed. Neither do they present any 
evidence that the remaining antenna created a similar problem prior to Krier's 
death.

[¶42]      Appellants presented no evidence 
that the Town and Country Safeway store had expressed any concerns to Brown 
regarding the safety of the roof or parking area. Neither did appellants 
present any evidence that those in the 
building were concerned for their safety.

[¶43]       In sum, assuming the facts 
in the light most favorable to appellants, the evidence established five 
break-ins or robberies at the Town and Country Safeway store in twenty-two 
years, none of which resulted in 
personal injury. There was absolutely no evidence that Brown knew or should have 
known that the antenna used by Ross was used for unauthorized access to the roof 
prior to Krier's death. Even under the totality of the circumstances, this 
evidence is insufficient to establish that Brown knew or should have known of the existence of general 
criminal activity which would create an unreasonable risk of danger to Krier if 
the antenna remained in place. See Rowe, 126 Ill.Dec. at 528, 531 N.E.2d  at 1367 
(three burglaries investigated in one year with no sign of forced entry, 
defendant advised locks should be changed and knowledge that master key was missing raised 
material issue of fact as to foreseeability of risk to business tenant); 
Erichsen, 518 N.W.2d  at 120 (ten occasions in previous sixteen months of 
thefts, purse snatchings and robberies on or near parking lot were sufficient to 
establish material issue of risk to 
customer robbed and assaulted in parking lot); Doud v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 
109 Nev. 1096, 864 P.2d 796, 800 (1993) (Hilton's knowledge of numerous 
criminal activities on the premises of its casino and in the parking lots 
was sufficient to support constructive notice of risk of assault); Small, 403 N.W.2d  at 413 (poor lighting, admitted 
knowledge of serious problems with vandalism and theft added to testimony of 
chief of security that more security requested annually but denied and admission 
by hospital representative that hospital had been very fortunate that no 
previous assault had occurred were sufficient to establish duty to protect from rape and murder in 
parking lot); and McClung, 937 S.W.2d  at 904 (police records for seventeen 
months prior to abduction from parking lot reflected 164 criminal incidents, 
including bomb threat, fourteen burglaries, twelve reports of malicious 
mischief, ten robberies, thirty-six auto thefts, ninety larcenies, and one 
attempted kidnapping on adjacent parking lot and nearby competitors provided 
outdoor security measures, manager of store testified he would not hold sidewalk 
sales or place merchandise outside of store established risk of harm 
foreseeability).

    C. RUSK  CO-EMPLOYEE 
LIABILITY

 [¶44]     Appellants also claim that Rusk 
was culpably negligent as shown by several aspects of his conduct. Appellants 
identify Rusk's failure to request a burglar alarm; failure to request that 
Brown remove the antenna; and failure to 
request bars or some other covering for the fiberglass skylight. Appellants 
allege that the import of Rusk's inaction is compounded by his deliberate 
failure to ensure that the new Safeway procedures, which required that more than 
one employee be present when opening and closing a store, would be followed. The new Safeway's Denver, 
Colorado Division Store Policy Manual states: "It is Division policy that no one 
will be permitted to work alone." The reason for the policy is stated in the 
Store Policy Manual as follows:

The purpose of establishing store opening and closing 
procedures is to protect our employees from bodily harm that could be inflicted 
during an armed robbery or the interruption of a burglary. Statistics show the 
majority of robberies occur early in the morning or at closing time. Being alert 
to these possibilities and 
following established procedures will minimize the risks.

[¶45]       Rusk was the store manager 
at the Town and Country Safeway store from 1979 through 1994, and was 
responsible for all operations at the store. On the morning that Krier was 
killed, Rusk originally had scheduled Krier to work alone. At the last minute, 
however, Rusk scheduled another employee, Louis Salazar (Salazar), to be present with Krier during opening. 
As was his habit, however, Salazar was late for work and Krier proceeded to 
enter the grocery store alone.  
Appellants contend that Rusk's knowledge of Salazar's habitual tardiness, 
his knowledge that Krier's usual site check of the building would not discover 
an entry through the roof, and Rusk's chronic failure to follow the two-man 
policy present factual issues regarding Rusk's degree of 
negligence.

[¶46]       For appellants to prevail on 
their claims against Rusk, they must show that Rusk was culpably negligent. Copp 
v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Wyo. 1993). We have defined culpable 
negligence as the intentional commission 
of "`an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk 
that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow.'" Smith, 
893 P.2d  at 716 (quoting Baros, 780 P.2d at 343). Willful misconduct is 
distinguished from ordinary negligence by the actor's state of mind. "`In order 
to prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate 
that he acted with a state of mind that 
approaches intent to do harm.'" Smith, 893 P.2d  at 714 (quoting Baros, 780 P.2d 
at 343).

[¶47]       Assuming the facts in the 
light most favorable to appellants, the record does not reveal a disputed issue 
of material fact that Rusk held the necessary state of mind reaching culpable 
negligence. Rusk testified in deposition that he was not aware he had any 
responsibility for the antenna or security for the roof, believing that Brown was responsible for those areas. 
Neither did he understand that his position entailed the authority to demand a 
burglar alarm. While his actions may have been less than reasonable, his 
reliance on the judgment of others does not amount to evidence of "willfulness." 
See Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Wyo. 
1989).

 [¶48]     Similarly, the failure to follow 
safety procedures may constitute evidence of ordinary negligence, but they do 
not demonstrate a state of mind consistent with culpable negligence, which 
requires knowledge or obviousness of a high probability of harm. McKennan v. 
Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Wyo. 1995) 
(quoting Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988)).  
Awareness of a possibility of harm is insufficient. Appellants must show 
that Rusk knew there was a high probability that Krier was in danger of bodily 
harm. There is absolutely no evidence that any Town and Country Safeway store 
employee had been threatened with harm, 
let alone seriously injured or killed, while opening a Cheyenne Safeway store 
prior to Krier's tragic confrontation. We in no way condone Rusk's cavalier 
attitude toward his responsibility to his co-employees, nor do we approve of the 
fact that he continued to schedule solitary employees to open the store after Krier's murder. However, we must 
find, as a matter of law, that there is insufficient evidence to establish Rusk 
had a state of mind "approach[ing] an intent to do harm" prior to Krier's 
murder. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 714 (quoting Baros, 780 P.2d at 
343).

V. CONCLUSION

[¶49]       Safeway 46 was not in 
possession or control of the Town and Country Safeway store premises for the 
purpose of imposing a duty to protect from criminal acts of third persons. 
Likewise, Brown did not have possession 
and control of the roof of the Town and Country Safeway store other than for 
maintaining the structural integrity of the building. Neither did Brown have a 
duty to remove the antenna located next to the Town and Country Safeway store 
because, even under the broadest of standards, the criminal acts resulting in Krier's death were not reasonably 
foreseeable.  Finally, appellants 
failed to raise a material issue of fact which would support the claim of 
culpable negligence against Rusk.

[¶50]       Summary judgment is 
affirmed. 

        

FOOTNOTES
   
1 Comment f:

    Duty to police premises. 
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily 
under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the 
acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, 
know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of 
conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the 
safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of 
any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his 
past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or 
criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some 
particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to 
provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable 
protection. 

   
2 The new Safeway, as Krier's 
employer, is immune from suit in this instance pursuant to the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-104 (1997).  

3 We have 
recognized that in the situation where a proprietor has reason to know of a 
specific imminent harm to a patron from a known third party, a duty exists to 
take reasonable steps to   protect that patron from the harm. Hanna 
v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 532 (Wyo. 1995). The discussion in this case, 
however, addresses the duty to prevent an "unreasonably dangerous   condition" of the premises when it is 
reasonably foreseeable that harm from criminal activity is likely if no measures 
are taken to remedy the condition. To apply the same standard in 
both   situations would preclude any liability 
in circumstances where the landlord does not know precisely when the harm will 
occur, even though the landlord knew that harm was likely. We decline to equate 
this case to those where the landlord or business owner has an opportunity to 
directly intervene at the time of the criminal activity.