Case Title: Rose v. Rose

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rose v. Rose1993 WY 57849 P.2d 1321Case Number: 92-143Decided: 04/14/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert C. 
ROSE,

 Appellant 
(Respondent),

v. 

Rosalie K. ROSE and 
Brenda Pscholka, as distributees under

 the Last Will and Testament of James 
Clifford Rose, deceased, 

Appellees 
(Petitioners).

Appeal from District 
Court, Goshen County, John T. Langdon, J.

John J. Maier of 
John J. Maier Law Offices, Torrington, for 
appellant.

Donald P. 
Prehoda, Jr. and Jeff Anthony of Corthell & King, Laramie, for 
appellees.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a declaratory judgment action in which the district court invalidated an 
attempted modification of ownership of a certificate of deposit (CD). The 
original owner of the CD (now deceased) requested that the issuing bank add the 
name of his nephew, Jeffrey Rose, as joint owner. However, only the "Register 
Copy" of the CD, on file at the bank, was altered. Following the original 
owner's death, his estate brought this action to declare the CD modification 
invalid and to establish the estate's ownership of the CD. The district court 
ruled in favor of the estate.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
several issues:

A. Whether, under the 
applicable law of the State of Wyoming, the change of ownership of CD No. 9598 
on March 27, 1990, made by the agreement of James Clifford Rose, the sole owner, 
and the Lingle State Bank, which added Jeffrey Rose as an owner with right of 
survivorship along with James Clifford Rose, was effective as between James 
Clifford Rose and the Bank, the issuer of the CD? 

B. Whether the evidence 
properly before the trial court was sufficient to support that court's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law?

C. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying material portions of appellant's Objection to Petition 
for Declaratory Judgment and Demand for Removal of 
Attorney?

D. Whether the trial 
court erred when it required appellant to proceed with the trial without 
adequate opportunity to answer, obtain discovery or prepare for 
trial?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      On January 10, 
1983, James Clifford Rose (decedent) purchased a six month CD from the Lingle 
State Bank (Bank). Decedent was named as the sole depositor (owner) on the CD. 
The terms and conditions of the CD provided for automatic renewal for successive 
six month terms if the owner did not present the CD for payment on the maturity 
date. In addition, the front side of the CD was stamped "Not Transferable" and 
"Not Negotiable" in large, bold type. The terms and conditions of the CD 
provided:

Payable to the depositor 
upon presentation and surrender of this certificate, properly endorsed, on a 
maturity date. * * * This Certificate and any right hereunder may not be 
transferred or assigned without the written consent of this 
institution.

[¶5]      Upon issuance of 
the CD, decedent took possession of the original CD and the Bank retained a 
copy, boldly printed with "Register Copy," for its own records. The Bank's copy 
was not an exact duplicate of the original CD because it did not include a copy 
of the reverse side of the original CD. The reverse side of the original CD 
contained spaces for a date and several signatures under the caption 
"ENDORSEMENT," as well as a number of contractual terms.

[¶6]      On March 27, 
1990, decedent and his brother, Rich Rose, went to the Bank and, in the presence 
of the Bank president, decedent attempted to modify the ownership of the CD. 
Decedent, allegedly intending to place ownership of the CD in his own and his 
nephew's names as joint owners with rights of survivorship, had the Bank type, 
"and Jeffrey Rose WROS," after decedent's name on the face of the Bank's 
"Register Copy." Decedent, then, initialed and dated the type-written 
modification on the "Register Copy." The original CD, however, was never altered 
in any manner to signify the attempted modification of 
ownership.

[¶7]      After decedent's 
death, his wife, Rosalie Rose, and his son, Robert Rose, were named as personal 
representatives of decedent's estate. An attorney (estate's attorney) was hired 
by Rosalie Rose to represent the estate and decedent's will was admitted to 
probate. While administering the will, the estate's attorney discovered the 
attempted CD modification and brought a declaratory judgment action, against 
Jeffrey Rose, to declare the modification void and include the CD in the estate. 
On December 23, 1991, Jeffrey Rose executed an assignment of all his rights and 
interests in the CD to Robert Rose - the co-personal representative of the 
estate.

[¶8]      A number of 
pleadings were then filed by Jeffrey Rose and Robert Rose, alleging that Jeffrey 
Rose should be dismissed from the suit and replaced by Robert Rose because of 
the assignment of interest in the CD. In addition, Robert Rose filed a special 
appearance, as decedent's heir and beneficiary of decedent's will, to object to 
the declaratory judgment action and to have the estate's attorney removed from 
the action.

[¶9]      At a hearing on 
January 15, 1992, the district court dealt with all of the outstanding motions. 
As a result of the hearing, the district court entered an order which (1) 
substituted Robert Rose for Jeffrey Rose, (2) changed the parties named in the 
action to Robert Rose as the respondent and Rosalie Rose and Brenda Pscholka - 
both beneficiaries under decedent's will - as petitioners, and (3) denied Robert 
Rose's motion to remove the estate's attorney and Robert Rose's objection to the 
petition for declaratory judgment. 

[¶10]   On January 31, 1992, a trial on the 
issue of the validity of the attempted CD modification occurred. On May 28, 
1992, the district court entered an order, accompanied by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, which voided the attempted modification of the CD and 
awarded ownership of the CD to decedent's estate. Robert Rose appeals from that 
order.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Appellant, Robert Rose, argues that 
the 1990 modification of the "Register Copy" of decedent's CD was valid because 
it is governed by ordinary contract law and not by the law of negotiable 
instruments, as was applied by the district court. Appellant is correct in 
stating that this particular CD is not a negotiable instrument because it is not 
"payable to order or to bearer." See Spratt v. Security Bank of Buffalo, Wyo., 
654 P.2d 130, 135 n. 2 (Wyo. 1982). However, as is evident from the decision 
letter of the district court, the law of negotiable instruments was not the sole 
basis for the district court's decision.

[¶12]   In part, the district court based 
its decision on the law of inter vivos gifts. The transaction which occurred 
concerning this CD properly falls within the common law principles of inter 
vivos gifts. See NeSmith v. Ellerbee, 203 Ga. App. 65, 416 S.E.2d 364 (1992) 
(which utilized inter vivos gift principles to void an attempted transfer of 
ownership of certificates of deposit).

[¶13]   A valid inter vivos gift requires 
the presence of three elements:

(1) a present intention 
to make an immediate gift; (2) actual or constructive delivery of the gift that 
divests the donor of dominion and control; and (3) acceptance of the 
gift.

National Crude, 
Inc. v. Ruhl, 600 P.2d 716, 719 (Wyo. 1979). The district court's decision, 
invalidating the attempted CD ownership modification, is correct because no 
"actual or constructive delivery" was properly accomplished. 
Id.

[¶14]   In discussing delivery for purposes 
of an inter vivos gift, we have said:

"It is generally held 
that an actual delivery is necessary for the consummation of a gift either inter 
vivos or causa mortis when the subject of the gift is capable of manual 
delivery; otherwise, there must be such a delivery as the nature and situation 
of the subject sought to be given reasonably permits, and this delivery must 
clearly manifest the donor's intention to divest himself of title and 
possession. It is usually considered sufficient if the donor has put it in the 
power of the donee to take possession, or if the donee can take possession 
without committing a trespass."

Carey v. 
Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 873 (Wyo. 1979) (emphasis in original omitted) (quoting 
38 Am.Jur.2d Gifts § 20 at 823). Applying these principles, the Carey court held 
that several written gift agreements were sufficient to evidence an enforceable 
inter vivos gift. Carey, 603 P.2d  at 877. In finding that proper delivery had 
occurred, that court considered the written gift agreements as contracts and 
found that each agreement successfully accomplished constructive delivery. Id. 
at 876.

[¶15]   The general nature of a certificate 
of deposit has been described as follows:

A certificate of deposit 
ordinarily constitutes in effect a promissory note. And certificates of deposit 
have been said to be contracts. Due to the nature of a certificate of deposit 
and the law relating thereto, the purchaser has a right during his lifetime to 
change the certificate and cause it to be payable to different parties or even 
to cash it in. A certificate of deposit, even if nonnegotiable, can be 
assigned.

5B Michie on 
Banks and Banking § 313, at 384-85 (1991 Repl.Vol.) (footnotes omitted). 
Previously, this court demonstrated agreement with the notion that a certificate 
of deposit is simply a promissory note. Wightman v. American Nat. Bank of 
Riverton, 610 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Wyo. 1980). We also agree that certificates of 
deposit are inherently contractual and those certificates of deposit which are 
not negotiable instruments covered by the Uniform Commercial Code shall be 
construed in light of general principles of contract law.

[¶16]   In light of the precepts which 
guide us in determining delivery for purposes of inter vivos gifts and the 
contract principles which govern certificates of deposit, we conclude that the 
attempted modification of decedent's CD is not enforceable. Because of the 
express terms and conditions of the CD, delivery, actual or constructive, did 
not occur when the Bank added "and Jeffrey Rose WROS" to its "Register 
Copy."

[¶17]   The original CD expressly provided 
that the certificate is, "[p]ayable to the depositor upon presentation and 
surrender of this certificate, properly endorsed, on a maturity date." 
(Emphasis added.) On the reverse side of the original CD, specific spaces were 
provided for proper endorsement. As circumstances exist today, as well as 
immediately after the attempted modification, neither Jeffrey Rose nor Robert 
Rose - after assignment - could present and surrender the original CD with 
proper endorsements. Decedent, while alive, always retained possession of the 
original CD in a safe deposit box and the CD was never altered to show the 
change in ownership nor endorsed by the decedent or Jeffrey 
Rose.

[¶18]   Clearly, decedent, while alive, 
retained full control and dominion over the disposition of this CD. After 
altering the "Register Copy" on March 27, 1990, decedent could have retrieved 
the original CD, endorsed it and presented it to the Bank for payment on the 
next maturity date. The Bank, based on the express terms of the CD, would have 
been obligated to honor the request and cash the CD. Thus, the donee, Jeffrey 
Rose, never had the power to take possession of the CD and there was no 
delivery, actual or constructive.

[¶19]   Therefore, we affirm the district 
court's decision voiding the attempted addition of Jeffrey Rose as joint owner 
of the CD and declaring that the CD belongs to decedent's estate because the 
actions taken by decedent failed to accomplish the necessary elements of a 
proper inter vivos gift.

[¶20]   Appellant's second claim of error 
alleges that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
not supported by evidence in the record. Appellant's argument is cursorily 
presented through bald assertions without any citation to pertinent authority. 
As we have held many times before, we will not consider arguments which are not 
cogently presented and supported by cited authority. Matter of Adoption of BBC, 
831 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶21]   Next, appellant argues that the 
district court erred in denying appellant's motion to disqualify the estate's 
attorney. Appellant claims that the estate's attorney should have been 
disqualified due to a conflict of interest. The alleged conflict stems from the 
fact that the appellant was a co-personal representative of decedent's estate, 
beneficiary of decedent's will and the defendant in this declaratory judgment 
action all at the same time. Rule 1.7 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys at Law governs conflicts of 
interest.

[¶22]   Recently, the Court of Appeals of 
Idaho, addressing Rule 1.7, expressed several general maxims to be followed when 
reviewing the denial or grant of a motion to disqualify. Weaver v. Millard, 120 
Idaho 692, 819 P.2d 110 (1991). They said:

The decision to grant or 
deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the discretion of the trial court. 
* * *

* * * * * 
*

The moving party has the 
burden of establishing grounds for disqualification. * * * The goal of the court 
should be to shape a remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the 
integrity of the judicial process. * * * Whenever possible, courts should 
endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the 
client.

Id. 819 P.2d  at 
114-15. We agree that these principles, set out in Weaver, correctly capture the 
intent of the Rules of Professional Conduct and are an appropriate standard for 
this court to follow when reviewing the denial or grant of a motion to 
disqualify. 

[¶23]   In light of these principles, we 
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
appellant's motion. The district court was correct in its assessment that 
any conflict of interest, which may have existed, was caused by appellant's 
acceptance of Jeffrey Rose's assignment of the CD and not by any action or 
inaction of the estate's attorney.

[¶24]   Appellant's final argument claims 
insufficient time to answer the complaint and to prepare for the trial because 
the district court denied his motion for a continuance. Appellant claims that he 
had only sixteen days to prepare for trial because he was not made a named party 
until January 16, 1992 and the trial occurred on January 31, 1992. However, 
appellant's time-table does not accurately reflect the realities of the 
situation.

[¶25]   On December 23, 1991, appellant 
accepted assignment of whatever interest Jeffrey Rose held in the CD and then on 
December 26, 1991, appellant filed several motions in this action. Hence, on 
December 26, 1991, not January 16, 1992, appellant was aware that he would have 
to answer the complaint. We hold that appellant had ample time to answer the 
complaint and prepare his case.

[¶26]   The district court's judgment is 
affirmed.