Case Title: Poulos v. HPC, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-284

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Poulos v. HPC, Inc.1988 WY 148765 P.2d 364Case Number: 87-284Decided: 12/08/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
CAROL LEE POULOS, 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SHAWN HOWARD POULOS, DECEASED, FOR AND 
ON BEHALF OF MICHAEL GEORGE POULOS; CAROL LEE POULOS; GEORGE MICHAEL POULOS; 
DEBORAH LEE POULOS; AND STEVEN MICHAEL POULOS, APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

HPC, INC., A DELAWARE 
CORPORATION; HOME PETROLEUM CORPORATION, AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION; WALTER (JACK) 
STEPHEN; NORM STEPHEN; AND RICHARD B. KENNISON, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

MOUNTAIN STATES HOT OIL 
SERVICE, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; S.E.M. CORPORATION, AN OKLAHOMA 
CORPORATION, A DIVISION OF VALMONT OILFIELD PRODUCTS COMPANY, NOW KNOWN AS 
VALMONT EQUIPMENT COMPANY (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Gary L. Shockey 
of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, for appellants.

John James 
(argued), of James & James, Rock Springs, and 
Gary D. Stott and Robert G. Gilchrist of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellees. 

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J. Ret.*

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Carol L. 
Poulos, the personal representative of the estate of her deceased son, Shawn 
Poulos, appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment to all 
appellee-defendants in this wrongful death action. The dispositive issue on 
appeal is whether a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question of 
culpable negligence.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.

[¶3.]     On April 13, 1982, 
eighteen-year-old Shawn Poulos died while cleaning a "frac tank" at a well site 
outside Rock Springs, 
Wyoming. A frac tank is defined as 
"any portable or stationary, high volume holding vessel designed and constructed 
for use in separating, storing or temporarily holding materials used in or 
resulting from fracturing techniques in oil and gas exploration." 8 H. Williams 
& C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law 378 (1987). "Fracturing" is a recovery 
enhancement technique defined as "[a] process of opening up underground channels 
in hydrocarbon-bearing formations, by force, rather than by chemical action such 
as acidizing. High pressure is hydraulically or explosively directed at the rock 
causing it to fracture." Id. at 379.

[¶4.]     At the time of his 
death, Mr. Poulos was employed by Frac Tanks, Inc. (Frac Tanks), a company which 
rented frac tanks to oilfield operators and provided cleaning services for the 
rental tanks. Frac Tanks had two offices, one in Rock 
Springs and one in Evanston. The Rock 
Springs office was managed by appellee Jack Stephen, and his son, 
appellee Norm Stephen, took care of the Evanston office. Appellant Carol Poulos, 
Shawn's mother, was a secretary at the Rock Springs office.

[¶5.]     The tank Shawn Poulos 
was cleaning on April 13, 1982, was one of several which Frac Tanks had rented 
to HPC, Inc. (HPC). The tanks had been used once, and they required cleaning 
before being used again. Frac Tanks usually cleaned the tanks at its shop, but 
for reasons of convenience and economy, Randy Richardson, completions foreman 
for HPC, asked Frac Tanks to clean the rented tanks on 
location.

[¶6.]     On the morning of April 
13, Richard Kennison, Shawn Poulos and Ed Golnitz arrived at the site. Golnitz 
was principally responsible for moving the tanks around the site, but he also 
had tank cleaning experience. Already present at the site were Leslie 
Fotheringham, who drove a hot oil truck for Mountain States Hot Oil, and Randy 
Richardson of HPC. Fotheringham's duties included heating the tanks and 
supplying warm water to the tank cleaners for spraying down the inside of the 
tanks. Richardson, as completions foreman at the well 
site, generally supervised the tank cleaning operation for 
HPC.

[¶7.]     Kennison entered and 
cleaned the first tank. While inside the tank, he was so affected by fumes that 
he later told OSHA investigators that he was "worse than drunk." Richardson, observing 
Kennison's condition, told him to get out of the tank and get some fresh air. 
Golnitz testified that he finished cleaning the first 
tank.

[¶8.]     Richardson was apparently 
concerned about Kennison's reaction to the fumes in the first tank, and he told 
Kennison not to have more than one man in a tank at one time, to switch off 
frequently and not to spend too much time in the tanks. He then left the site 
with other HPC personnel. Kennison entered the second tank and began washing it 
down, and Shawn Poulos followed. Shortly after they entered the tank, Ed 
Golnitz, who was looking into the tank, saw both men collapse. He and 
Fotheringham entered the rear hatch of the tank to rescue the downed men. They 
passed Shawn Poulos, who was sitting in the middle of the tank floor, apparently 
still conscious, and assisted Kennison, who was at the front of the tank and 
appeared unconscious. They managed to get Kennison propped up and placed his 
head in or near the front porthole. By the time they attempted to assist Poulos, 
Fotheringham and Golnitz were feeling the effects of the fumes. Fotheringham 
looked out the porthole, saw that Richardson had returned, and yelled to him for 
help. Richardson 
enlisted the assistance of two truck drivers to help lift Shawn Poulos out of 
the tank. By the time Poulos was removed from the tank, he had stopped 
breathing. Attempts at artificial respiration and CPR were unsuccessful. Poulos 
was taken by helicopter to Rock 
Springs, where he was declared 
dead.

[¶9.]     On April 12, 1984, 
appellant filed this wrongful death action alleging, among other things, that 
appellees were liable as culpably negligent coemployees.1 Appellees initially moved for 
summary judgment on September 6, 1985, and the court denied their motions. After 
further discovery, appellees renewed their motions, and the court granted 
summary judgment in their favor on the day before the scheduled trial. Appellant 
now appeals from the order granting summary judgment.

[¶10.]  Appellant's claims against appellees are 
predicated on the culpably negligent coemployee provision of § 27-12-103(a), 
W.S. 1977, which at the time of the accident provided:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 to 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required 
by this act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees are culpably 
negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an 
employee and his dependents against any other person."

Culpable 
negligence has been discussed by this court in several cases. Recently, in 
Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 
Wyo., 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1986), 
we said:

"In Barnette v. 
Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), we defined 
the term `culpable negligence' as `willful and serious misconduct.' We defined 
the term `willful' in this context as `"such as is done purposely, with 
knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard 
of consequences."' Id., quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 
206, 149 A.L.R. 998 (1943).

"The aggravating factor 
which distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negligence is the actor's 
state of mind. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 34 (5th ed. 1984). In order to 
prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that 
he acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm. Id.State of mind, of course, may be difficult 
to prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish that willful misconduct 
has occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally committed an act 
of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow. Id."

[¶11.]  Applying this definition to the present 
case, we agree with the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Jack Stephen and Norm Stephen, who were not present at the well site when the 
accident occurred. Appellant, in attempting to demonstrate their alleged 
culpable negligence, relies heavily on violations of OSHA regulations concerning 
safety training and equipment. While these asserted violations may constitute 
evidence of ordinary negligence, they do not demonstrate a state of mind 
consistent with culpable negligence, which requires knowledge or obviousness of 
a high probability of harm. Although 
both Jack Stephen and Norm Stephen were generally aware of a possibility of harm 
from tank fumes, there is no evidence to suggest that either man knew the degree 
of danger presented by the particular tank in which Shawn Poulos died. Because 
appellant's evidence, at best, merely demonstrates knowledge of possible harm, we affirm the district 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Jack and Norm 
Stephen.

[¶12.]  We disagree, however, with the district 
court's conclusion that Richard Kennison could not be found culpably negligent. 
Appellant contends that Kennison was Shawn Poulos' supervisor at the well site 
and, with knowledge of a high probability of harm from the tank fumes, failed to 
take steps to ensure Poulos' safety. The record presents genuine issues of 
material fact regarding this claim.

[¶13.]  One factual dispute concerns the question 
of whether Kennison was acting as an on-site supervisor who had the authority to 
make decisions on safety matters. Although Kennison and Jack Stephen denied that 
Kennison was Poulos' supervisor at the site, other evidence contradicts this 
assertion. Kennison had worked for Frac Tanks for a longer period of time than 
Poulos; he had more experience cleaning tanks; his salary was twice as great; he 
was a man in his forties, while Poulos was eighteen years old. Ed Golnitz 
testified that Kennison gave work instructions to Shawn Poulos and Golnitz at 
the cleaning site. When talking to OSHA investigators after the accident, 
Kennison told them that he was the supervisor on the tank cleaning job. This 
responsive evidence is sufficient to structure a genuine issue of 
fact.

[¶14.]  Another factual dispute is whether 
Kennison's conduct rises to the level of culpable negligence. Appellees, relying 
on Bryant v. Hornbuckle, supra, argue that Kennison could not have been culpably 
negligent because, like the employee in that case, he exposed himself to the 
same danger which caused the harm to his co-employee. In Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 
however, the plaintiff failed to present evidence to show that the defendant was 
aware of the risk or that the risk was obvious. That cannot be said of the 
evidence in this case. The record suggests that when he entered the two tanks, 
Kennison became aware of the highly dangerous and harmful nature of the fumes 
contained in them. He admitted that the fumes in the first tank made him "worse 
than drunk," and he apparently encountered even stronger fumes in the second 
tank. The trier of fact could reasonably find a known or obvious risk presenting 
a high probability of harm. The question of Kennison's culpable negligence thus 
presents a genuine issue for trial, and we reverse the summary judgment entered 
in his favor.

[¶15.]  Appellants raise the additional issue of 
whether it is unconstitutional to require a plaintiff to prove intent to do harm 
in order to show culpable negligence. We need not address this issue as the 
district court did not require a showing of intent to do harm in this 
case.

[¶16.]  The summary judgments in favor of Jack 
Stephen and Norm Stephen are affirmed. The summary judgment in favor of Richard 
Kennison is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant's complaint 
also included a claim against HPC, Inc., which was 
settled.