Case Title: Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 85

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 85 
Docket: 
BCD-15-404 
Argued: 
April 5, 2016 
Decided: 
June 7, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
PATRICIA GRANT et al. 
 
v. 
 
FOSTER WHEELER, LLC, et al. 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  Patricia Grant and the Estate of Edward Grant (the Estate) appeal from 
summary judgments entered against them in the Business and Consumer Docket 
(Murphy, J.) on their complaint for negligence; failure to warn of defective, 
unreasonably dangerous goods; and loss of consortium.  The judgments were 
entered upon the motions of New England Insulation Company (NEI); Foster 
Wheeler, LLC; Warren Pumps, LLC; and Imo Industries, Inc.  Because the Estate 
was unable to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case that any of the 
named defendants’ products were a proximate cause of the injuries, we affirm the 
summary judgments. 
 
2 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
 
[¶2]  Viewing the summary judgment records in the light most favorable to 
the Estate, the following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.  
See Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 18, 116 A.3d 466 (stating the 
rule that on review of entry of a summary judgment, the record is considered in the 
light most favorable to the nonprevailing party). 
 
[¶3]  Edward Grant worked for Bath Iron Works from August 19, 1964, to 
June 9, 1970, and again from August 24, 1978, to February 1, 1994.  During 
Grant’s first period of employment, asbestos was a common component of the 
insulation and other materials used at Bath Iron Works, including use in the 
construction and renovation of ships. 
[¶4]  In the course of his employment, Grant worked in a variety of 
positions, including as a ship cleaner.  Cleaning included sweeping up debris—
sometimes including asbestos—that resulted from construction and maintenance 
activities.  Grant worked as a ship cleaner from February 1966 to January 1967 and 
again from January 1969 to June 1970.   
[¶5]  Before his death, Grant testified at a deposition that he believed that he 
was exposed to asbestos as a cleaner between 1966 and 1967, during which time he 
recalled sweeping up asbestos resulting from pipe covering work.  Grant testified 
that he was unsure if he was exposed to asbestos at other times. 
 
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[¶6]  NEI sold Bath Iron Works insulation manufactured by Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corporation1 called “Kaylo pipe covering,” which contained asbestos 
fibers and was used to insulate ships’ pipes.  Foster Wheeler manufactured boilers 
and air ejectors.  Warren Pumps manufactured pumps.  Imo Industries is the 
successor to DeLaval, which manufactured pumps and turbines. 
 
[¶7]  In April 2011, Grant died of lung cancer.  His cancer was caused by 
exposure to asbestos.   
[¶8]  The complaint, later amended, was filed in the Superior Court 
(Sagadahoc County) in March 2012, alleging negligence, violation of 14 M.R.S. 
§ 221 (2015) (defective or unreasonably dangerous goods),2 and loss of 
consortium.  The amended complaint named fifteen defendants, including NEI, 
                                         
1  Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation declared bankruptcy as a result of asbestos-related litigation, 
and it was not named as a defendant in this action.  A trust was established to compensate persons 
exposed to and injured by Owens-Corning products, and Patricia Grant made a claim for compensation 
from that trust. 
2  Title 14 M.R.S. § 221 (2015) states, in full: 
     One who sells any goods or products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably have 
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods, or to his property, if the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without significant change in the condition in which it is sold. This 
section applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product and the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller. 
 
4 
Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries.3  The case was transferred to 
the Business and Consumer Docket in January 2013.  See M.R. Civ. P. 131. 
 
[¶9]  In July 2014, NEI, Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries 
filed separate motions for summary judgment supported by statements of material 
fact.  See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b), 56(b), (h)(1).  The Estate opposed each motion, 
responded to the statements of material fact, and offered additional statements of 
material fact.  See M.R. Civ. P. 7(c), 56(c), (h)(2).  Each defendant replied.  See 
M.R. Civ. P. 7(e), 56(h)(3).  Four sizeable summary judgment records were 
generated.  The parties dispute whether the plaintiffs had established a prima facie 
case that Grant ever breathed asbestos from the defendants’ products.4 
 
[¶10]  The court entered summary judgment in favor of NEI, Warren Pumps, 
Foster Wheeler, and Imo Industries on each of the Estate’s claims.  Upon motions 
                                         
3  Seven defendants were individually dismissed from the action between 2012 and 2015.  Each 
dismissal was uncontested or with the Estate’s consent, and two were on the Estate’s motion.  Not subject 
to individual dismissals were NEI, Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, Imo Industries, Air & Liquid Systems 
Corp., Aurora Pump Company, Bayer Cropscience Inc., and Rapid-American Corp.  Air & Liquid 
Systems Corp., Aurora Pump Company, Bayer Cropscience, and Rapid-American have not participated in 
this appeal. 
4  NEI also argued that its duty to warn Edward Grant of any danger present in Kaylo was relieved by 
the sophisticated user doctrine, an affirmative defense not yet recognized in Maine.  See Townsend v. 
Chute Chem. Co., 1997 ME 46, ¶ 11 n.4, 691 A.2d 199 (declining to reach the issue).  NEI argued that 
Bath Iron Works was the end user of Kaylo and that Bath Iron Works was a sophisticated user of asbestos 
products.  See Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 24-31 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying 
Massachusetts law).  Although the trial court granted summary judgment to NEI on this ground and 
others, we need not reach this issue today, as we conclude that summary judgment in favor of NEI was 
appropriate on other grounds. 
 
5 
by those four defendants, the court entered a final judgment in the matter pursuant 
to M.R. Civ. P. 54.  The Estate timely appealed.   
II.  LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
 
[¶11]  The Estate argues that the court erred when it entered summary 
judgments in favor of NEI, Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries.  
 
[¶12]  “We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, 
and consider both the evidence and any reasonable inferences that the evidence 
produces in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary 
judgment has been granted in order to determine if there is a genuine issue of 
material fact.”  Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484.  
“A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit, and a 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a fact-finder must choose between 
competing versions of the truth, even if one party’s version appears more credible 
or persuasive.”  Angell v. Hallee, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 17, 92 A.3d 1154.  However, 
“when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or even if the 
probabilities are evenly balanced, a defendant is entitled to a judgment.”  Crowe v. 
Shaw, 2000 ME 136, ¶ 10, 755 A.2d 509.   
[¶13]  “When the moving party is the defendant, the burden rests on that 
party to show that the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for each 
element of the cause of action.”  Budge, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484.  “When 
 
6 
the material facts are not in dispute, we review de novo the trial court’s 
interpretation and application of the relevant statutes and legal concepts.”  
Remmes, 2015 ME 63, ¶ 19, 116 A.3d 466. 
 
[¶14]  A claim for negligence and a claim for violation of section 221 both 
require proof of causation.5  “A prima facie case of negligence requires a plaintiff 
to establish . . . an injury to the plaintiff that is proximately caused by a breach of 
[a] duty” owed to the plaintiff by the defendant.  Mastriano v. Blyer, 2001 ME 134, 
¶ 11, 779 A.2d 951 (citation omitted). 
 
[¶15]  “Evidence is sufficient to support a finding of proximate cause if the 
evidence and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence indicate 
that the negligence played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing 
the injury or damage and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence.”  Crowe, 2000 ME 136, 
¶ 10, 755 A.2d 509.  “The mere possibility of such causation is not enough, and 
when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or even if the 
probabilities are evenly balanced, a defendant is entitled to a judgment.”  Id. 
                                         
5  Without proof of causation on the negligence and section 221 claims, Patricia Grant’s loss of 
consortium claim is also foreclosed.  Although the loss of consortium claim is an independent, statutorily 
created action ultimately aimed at compensating a person’s injuries that resulted from his or her spouse’s 
injury, Patricia Grant’s claim necessarily arises from tortious conduct committed against Edward Grant.  
See Steele v. Botticello, 2011 ME 72, ¶ 17, 21 A.3d 1023; Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 
(Me. 1986).  Thus, without proof that any of the defendants caused Edward Grant’s injury, Patricia Grant 
cannot recover for loss of consortium. 
 
7 
[¶16]  To establish a prima facie case in personal injury asbestos litigation, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate both product nexus, meaning that the plaintiff was 
exposed to the defendant’s asbestos-containing product, and medical causation, 
meaning that such exposure was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s 
injury.  See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1206-07 
(Cal. 1997).   
[¶17]  Jurisdictions differ as to what amount of product exposure a plaintiff’s 
evidence must demonstrate to survive summary judgment.  Compare, e.g., Welch 
v. Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“It is enough, 
however, to reach the jury that [the plaintiff] show that he worked with, or in close 
proximity to, the defendants’ asbestos products.”), with, e.g., Henderson v. Allied 
Signal, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 724, 727 (S.C. 2007) (expressly adopting the “frequency, 
regularity, and proximity test” announced in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning 
Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986)).   
[¶18]  In Lohrmann, an asbestos personal injury case, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held: “To support a reasonable inference of 
substantial causation from circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of 
exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of 
time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”  782 F.2d at 1162-63.   
 
8 
[¶19]  In the present case, referencing prior trial court opinions, the trial 
court applied a test that is less burdensome to a plaintiff.  In order to demonstrate 
product nexus, the trial court required the plaintiff to show “[t]hat the defendant’s 
asbestos-containing product was at the site where the plaintiff worked or was 
present, and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was 
being used.”  (Emphasis in original) (quoting Mahar v. Sullivan & Merritt, Inc., 
No. BCD-CV-10-21, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS 129, at *9 (July 31, 2012)).  The 
court required the plaintiff to “prove not only that the asbestos products were used 
at the worksite, but that the employee inhaled the asbestos from the defendant’s 
product.”  (Quoting Mahar, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS 129, at *9). 
[¶20]  Because we conclude that the Estate has not offered evidence to 
satisfy even the less burdensome standard applied by the trial court, we need not 
decide whether Maine should utilize the greater Lohrmann standard.  Utilizing the 
less burdensome standard applied by the trial court, we turn to the Estate’s 
evidence regarding the individual defendants. 
III.  APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS TO THE FACTS 
A. 
New England Insulation 
 
[¶21]  Edward Grant worked as a cleaner from February 1966 to 
January 1967 and again from January 1969 to June 1970.  Bath Iron Works began 
using Kaylo pipe covering sometime in 1967 and discontinued its use after 1973.  
 
9 
The Estate has produced evidence that NEI sold Kaylo pipe covering to Bath Iron 
Works on three instances in 1969.  There is no evidence that NEI sold Kaylo to 
Bath Iron Works during the first timeframe when Grant worked as a cleaner.  It is 
only during the second timeframe—January 1969 to June 1970—that Grant might 
have been exposed to asbestos from Kaylo sold by NEI.  Therefore, we examine 
what admissible evidence the Estate has offered to show that Grant swept up 
asbestos debris and might have inhaled asbestos fibers after pipe coverers had 
installed Kaylo between January 1969 and June 1970. 
[¶22]  Before his death, Grant was deposed for his workers’ compensation 
claim pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 
see 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 901-950 (LEXIS through PL 114-152).6  There, Grant testified 
that when he worked as a cleaner from January 1969 to June 1970, he did “mostly 
all painting.”  He testified that his only memory of cleaning up asbestos debris was 
when he first worked as a cleaner, from February 1966 to January 1967.  He stated 
that when he did do “cleaning” in 1969-1970, “it seemed different” than the 
cleaning he had done before, and he did not recall working near pipe coverers.   
                                         
6  Enacted in 1927, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act has been amended since 
Grant filed his claim pursuant to it.  See Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927); see, e.g., Pub. L. No. 
111-5, sec. 803, 123 Stat. 187 (2009) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(F)).  Because neither the Act nor 
Grant’s workers’ compensation claim is relevant to this appeal, we cite the current iteration of the Act. 
 
10 
[¶23]  In support of its claim, the Estate offered the testimony of several 
witnesses who worked at Bath Iron Works in 1969 and 1970 to attempt to 
demonstrate that Grant’s memory was wrong and that he swept up asbestos that 
might have come from Kaylo pipe covering in 1969 or 1970. 
[¶24]  The first witness opined in reports and at deposition that Grant likely 
would have been directed to perform cleaning duties during January 1969 to June 
1970 after insulation was installed by pipe coverers.  His opinion was based upon 
his knowledge that Bath Iron Works undertook conversion projects during that 
timeframe and that most of the people in Grant’s department were needed to clean 
up after those projects.  The witness also testified, however, that most people either 
“generally” cleaned or “generally” painted, although there was some 
“cross-pollination.”  The witness testified that he could not remember Grant 
personally, and he could not testify to seeing Grant working at any particular time. 
[¶25]  The second witness worked in the same department as Grant, and he 
estimated that there were 600 people in that department.  The second witness 
testified that he had been exposed to asbestos from cleaning up pipe covering 
debris while working in that department, but he had no recollection of working 
alongside Grant or seeing Grant working near any particular equipment.  The 
second witness testified that their department’s primary role was painting and 
cleaning. 
 
11 
[¶26]  A third witness testified that he had worked in Grant’s department, 
and thought it was possible that he and Grant worked on the same crew.  He 
testified that cleaning up asbestos fibers and dust from pipe covering insulation 
was one of the “main things” their department did.  The third witness remembered 
seeing Grant sweeping a ship’s passageway on one occasion sometime between 
1966 and 1968, but he could not be more specific.  The time period referenced 
necessarily would have been during Grant’s 1966-1967 period of employment as a 
cleaner, before NEI sold Kaylo to Bath Iron Works.   
 
[¶27]  This constitutes all of the Estate’s evidence that Grant’s injury was 
caused by Kaylo.  This evidence is too speculative to support a prima facie 
showing that Grant encountered asbestos fibers from NEI-supplied Kaylo in 1969 
or 1970.  None of the witnesses could place Grant in proximity to Kaylo during the 
1969-1970 cleaning period from their own, personal knowledge of his work.  
Given the size of the department, Grant’s own testimony that he almost exclusively 
painted during 1969-1970, Grant’s testimony that when he did clean it was 
different than his prior time in that department (when he remembered sweeping up 
asbestos), and the first witness’s testimony acknowledging that most workers 
generally either painted or cleaned, the evidence is too speculative to allow a fact-
finder to find that Grant swept up asbestos from NEI-supplied Kaylo.  Although 
proximate causation may be proved by circumstantial evidence, the evidence must 
 
12 
support inferences rather than mere speculation.  The evidence regarding causation 
by NEI-supplied Kaylo does not rise above speculation.  See Crowe, 2000 ME 136, 
¶ 10, 755 A.2d 509. 
B. 
Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries 
 
[¶28]  It is undisputed that products—pumps, boilers, turbines, etc.—
manufactured by Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries were present 
on naval ships constructed or converted at Bath Iron Works during the period when 
Grant worked at Bath Iron Works.  Therefore, we examine what evidence the 
Estate offered to demonstrate that these products contained asbestos originating 
with the defendants and that Grant had contact with that asbestos. 
 
[¶29]  The first witness who had testified as to his general knowledge of 
cleaning activities in 1969-1970 also stated in a report that most equipment arrived 
at Bath Iron Works with gaskets and packing already installed, and averred in an 
affidavit that Foster Wheeler’s, Warren Pumps’, and Imo Industries’ gaskets and 
packing contained asbestos.  In addition, Bath Iron Works employees covered the 
products with asbestos, but that covering was not asbestos that originated with 
Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, or Imo Industries products. 
 
[¶30]  Pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 221, the seller of a product is liable for injury 
if the product “is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
significant change in the condition in which it is sold.”  For this reason, our 
 
13 
analysis is confined to the evidence regarding Grant’s potential exposure only to 
the asbestos contained in the products’ original gaskets and packing. 
[¶31]  The only evidence offered regarding Grant’s potential contact with 
asbestos originating with the defendants’ products was the first witness’s statement 
that when ships were constructed or older naval ships were converted “some of the 
asbestos swept up [would] also come from gaskets and packing in the pumps and 
valves.”  That witness had opined that Grant likely would have cleaned up this 
asbestos, as a function of his job in the cleaning department.  The witness testified 
at deposition that he could not be any more specific about a particular 
manufacturer’s product releasing asbestos debris from its gaskets or packing.  He 
also conceded that “the [manufacturers’ original] gaskets and packing may have 
been changed out in a number of cases.” 
[¶32]  The evidence the Estate offered to demonstrate product nexus as to 
Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo Industries does not specifically identify 
any of those manufacturers’ products as a potential source of the asbestos to which 
Grant was exposed.  As with the evidence regarding the Kaylo products, the 
evidence tying Grant’s condition to these products does not rise above speculation 
and is not sufficient to create a prima facie case for causation or liability.7 
                                         
7  Similarly, any claim of a duty to warn on the part of any of the defendants would fail. 
 
14 
C. 
Conclusion 
 
[¶33]  Summary judgment was appropriate on each of Patricia Grant’s and 
the Estate’s three claims as to NEI, Foster Wheeler, Warren Pumps, and Imo 
Industries because the plaintiffs did not offer evidence that was more than 
speculation and that would permit a fact-finder to find that Edward Grant had 
inhaled asbestos from these particular defendants’ products. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Kevin M. Noonan, Esq., McTeague Higbee, PA, Topsham, for 
appellants Patricia Grant and the Estate of Edward Grant 
 
Kip Adams, Esq., and Christopher Tauro, Esq., Lewis Brisbois 
Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for appellee 
New England Insulation Company 
 
Steven F. Wright, Esq., Wright & Associates, P.A., Portland, 
for appellees Foster Wheeler, LLC, and Imo Industries, Inc. 
 
Steven F. Wright, Esq., Wright & Associates, P.A., Portland, 
and Laurie J. Hepler, Esq., Carroll Burdick & McDonough 
LLP, San Francisco, California, for appellee Warren Pumps, 
LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
At oral argument: 
 
Kevin M. Noonan, Esq., for appellants Patricia Grant and the 
Estate of Edward Grant 
 
Kip Adams, Esq., for appellee New England Insulation 
Company 
 
Steven F. Wright, Esq., for appellees Foster Wheeler, LLC, 
Warren Pumps, LLC, and Imo Industries, Inc. 
 
Laurie J. Hepler, Esq., Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP, 
San Francisco, California, for appellee Warren Pumps, LLC 
 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2013-2 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY