Case Title: Bank of New York v. Carson

Citation: 2015 WI 2015

Docket Number: 2013AP000544

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 2015 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP544 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The Bank of New York Mellon, fka The Bank of New 
York, as  
Trustee for CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed 
Certificates, Series  
2007-13, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Shirley T. Carson, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Bayfield Financial LLC and Collins Financial 
Services, 
          Defendants.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 205, 841, N.W.2d 573) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 153 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 17. 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 23, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jane V. Carroll 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur. 
(Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Valerie L. Bailey-Rihn, Katherine Maloney Perhach, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison and Milwaukee; and James W. 
McGarry, Keith Levenberg, and Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston and 
Washington. Oral argument by Valerie L. Bailey-Rihn. 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by April 
A.G. Hartman, Jeffrey R. Myer, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, 
Inc. Oral argument by April A.G. Hartman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief by Grant F. Langley, city attorney; 
Danielle M. Bergner, deputy city attorney; and Kail J. Decker, 
assistant city attorney, on behalf of the City of Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief by Catherine M. Doyle, Amanda E. 
Adrian, and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., on behalf of 
the Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP544 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV1330) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Bank of New York Mellon, fka The Bank of 
New York, as Trustee for CWABS, Inc. Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-13, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Shirley T. Carson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Bayfield Financial LLC and Collins Financial 
Services, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 17, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. Petitioner, Bank of New York 
Mellon ("the Bank"), seeks review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals that reversed the circuit court's denial of 
Shirley Carson's motion to amend a judgment of foreclosure on 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
2 
 
her former home.1  She requested that the court find the property 
to be abandoned and that it order a sale of the property upon 
expiration of five weeks from the date of entry of the amended 
judgment.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
erroneously determined that it was without authority to grant 
the motion.  
¶2 
The Bank asserts that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 (2011-12)2, 
the statute governing foreclosure of abandoned properties, does 
not require it to sell a property after it obtains a judgment of 
foreclosure and the redemption period has passed.  It maintains 
that the statute is permissive, not mandatory, and that it 
cannot be required to sell a property.  The Bank further 
contends that even if the statute does mandate that the Bank 
sell the abandoned property after the redemption period, it 
provides no deadline for doing so.  Thus, the Bank concludes 
that it is free to execute on its judgment at any time within 
five years after rendition of the judgment, and the circuit 
court is without authority to order it to sell the property at a 
specific time. 
¶3 
Based on the statute's plain language and context, we 
conclude that when the court determines that a property is 
abandoned, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes the circuit court to 
                                                 
1 Bank of New York v. Carson, 2013 WI App 153, 352 Wis. 2d 
205, 841 N.W.2d 573 (reversing judgment of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, Jane V. Carroll, judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
3 
 
order a mortgagee to bring the property to sale after the 
redemption period. We further conclude, consistent with the 
purpose of the statute, that the circuit court shall order the 
property to be brought to sale within a reasonable time after 
the redemption period.  The circuit court's determination of 
what constitutes a reasonable time should be based on the 
totality of the circumstances in each case.  
¶4 
In this case, the circuit court did not reach the 
issue of whether the property had been abandoned.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court for such a determination and further proceedings.  
I 
¶5 
In 2007, Countrywide Home Loans loaned $52,000 to 
Carson.  As security for the debt, Carson mortgaged her home on 
Concordia 
Avenue 
in 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. 
 
After 
Carson 
defaulted on her payments, Countrywide and Carson entered an 
agreement modifying the terms of the loan.  Subsequently, Carson 
again defaulted on the loan payments. 
¶6 
The 
Bank, 
as 
trustee 
for 
Countrywide, 
filed 
a 
complaint against Carson, seeking a judgment of foreclosure and 
sale of the mortgaged premises.  Attempts to serve Carson at the 
Concordia Avenue property were unsuccessful.  In his affidavit, 
the process server observed that the house appeared to be 
vacant.  On his first visit he reported that the garage had been 
boarded, that the snow was not shoveled, there were no 
footprints in it, and there was no furniture in the house.  
Notes from his successive visits state that the snow was still 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
4 
 
not shoveled and there were still no footprints around the 
house. 
¶7 
 Thereafter, 
the 
Bank 
published 
notice 
of 
the 
foreclosure action in a local newspaper.  Carson, who was 
physically and financially unable to care for the property, did 
not file an answer or otherwise dispute the foreclosure.  In 
April 2011, BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, apparently a loan 
servicer for Countrywide, filed a City of Milwaukee Registration 
of Abandoned Property in Foreclosure form for the property.3 
¶8 
The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the 
Bank.  It determined that Carson owed the Bank $81,356.59.  
After acknowledging that the property was not owner occupied, 
the court directed that the property "shall be sold at public 
auction under the direction of the sheriff, at any time after 
three month(s) from the date of entry of judgment."  The 
judgment also enjoined both parties from committing waste on the 
premises and specified that in the event the property is 
abandoned by the defendants, the Bank "may take all necessary 
steps to secure and winterize the subject property." 
¶9 
After the judgment was entered, the Bank did not take 
steps to secure the property.  It was repeatedly burglarized and 
                                                 
3 "Loan servicers are the entities that collect payments for 
mortgages, provide billing and tax payments to the homeowners, 
and have sole control over the modification of a loan."  Andrew 
Peace, Coming Up for Air: The Constitutionality of Using Eminent 
Domain to Condemn Underwater Mortgages, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 2167, 
2178 n.82 (2013). 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
5 
 
vandalized.  At one point someone started a fire in the garage.  
Despite an order from the City of Milwaukee Department of 
Neighborhood Services to maintain the property, the Bank did not 
do so.  Carson received notices of accumulated trash and debris, 
as well as notices of overgrown weeds, grass, and trees.  The 
City imposed approximately $1,800 in municipal fines on her and 
she made payments of approximately $25 per month toward the 
fines. 
¶10 By November 2012, more than 16 months after the 
judgment of foreclosure was entered, the Bank had not sold the 
property and had no plans to sell it.  Carson filed a motion to 
amend the judgment to include a finding that the property was 
abandoned and an order that the sale of the premises be made 
upon expiration of five weeks from the date of entry of the 
amended judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 846.102.4   
¶11 In support of her motion, Carson referenced the 
affidavit from the process server indicating that the house 
appeared vacant.  She produced her own affidavit stating that 
she had terminated her utility accounts, that the property had 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102(1) states: 
In an action for enforcement of a mortgage lien if the 
court 
makes 
an 
affirmative 
finding 
upon 
proper 
evidence being submitted that the mortgaged premises 
have been abandoned by the mortgagor and assigns, 
judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10 
except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall 
be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date 
when such judgment is entered.   
No. 
2013AP544   
 
6 
 
been vandalized, that the doors and windows on the house had 
been boarded, and that the garage had been damaged by fire.  She 
also produced the form the loan servicer filed with the City of 
Milwaukee registering the premises as an abandoned property, 
violation notices from the City indicating that there was trash 
and debris on the property, a copy of the complaint record from 
the City, and a re-inspection fee letter from the City. 
¶12 The circuit court denied Carson's motion.  It observed 
that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 did not specifically grant it 
authority to order the Bank to sell the property at a specific 
time.  It explained "I can't find anywhere in the statute [Wis. 
Stat. § 846.102] that I have the authority to grant the relief 
that [Carson is] requesting."  The court further noted that the 
statute contemplates that the redemption period be elected by 
the mortgagee, not the borrower, and questioned whether a 
mortgagee could be compelled to execute a judgment when someone 
else is seeking the order.  Accordingly, it stated, "I'm 
specifically finding that I don't have the authority . . . so 
the motion is denied on those grounds." 
¶13 Carson 
appealed, 
arguing 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 846.102 the circuit court did have the authority to order sale 
of the property upon expiration of the redemption period.  The 
court of appeals agreed with Carson.  Bank of New York v. 
Carson, 2013 WI App 153, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 205, 841 N.W.2d 573.  
It determined that "the plain language of the statute directs 
the court to ensure that an abandoned property is sold without 
delay, and it logically follows that if a party to a foreclosure 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
7 
 
moves the court to order a sale, the court may use its contempt 
authority to do so."  Id., ¶13.  Accordingly, it reversed the 
circuit court and remanded the case.  Id., ¶16. 
II 
 
¶14 This case presents two issues.  First, we are asked to 
determine whether Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes a circuit 
court to order a mortgagee to bring a property to sale.  Second, 
we are asked whether a court can require a mortgagee to bring a 
property to sale at a certain point in time.  Both questions 
require us to determine the scope of authority granted to the 
circuit court by Wis. Stat. § 846.102.  Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law that we review independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, 
¶21, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462. 
¶15 Our goal in statutory interpretation is to determine 
what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, 
and intended effect.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the 
statutory language.  Id., ¶45.  "Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.   
¶16 In seeking to give a statute its intended effect, we 
are cognizant that "[a] statute's purpose or scope may be 
readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
8 
 
surrounding or closely-related statutes——that is, from its 
context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole."  
Id., ¶49.  Thus, statutory language is interpreted "in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes."  Id., ¶46.   
¶17 Where the statutory language is ambiguous we turn to 
extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to help us 
discern the meaning of a statute.  Id., ¶51.  "[A] statute is 
ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed 
persons 
in 
two 
or 
more 
senses." 
Id., 
¶47 
(citations omitted).   
III 
¶18 We begin with the language of the statute at issue.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 governs actions for enforcement of 
mortgage liens on abandoned properties.5  Under the statute, if 
the court makes an affirmative finding that a property has been 
abandoned, it shall enter a judgment stating that "the sale of 
such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 
weeks from the date when such judgment is entered."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102(1).  It states: 
 
(1) In an action for enforcement of a mortgage lien if 
the court makes an affirmative finding upon proper 
evidence being submitted that the mortgaged premises 
                                                 
5 The language of the statute and its placement within 
chapter 846 indicate that it governs only foreclosure actions 
initiated by mortgagees. 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
9 
 
have been abandoned by the mortgagor and assigns, 
judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10 
except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall 
be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date 
when such judgment is entered. Notice of the time and 
place of sale shall be given under ss. 815.31 and 
846.16 and placement of the notice may commence when 
judgment is entered.  
Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) (emphasis added).   
¶19 The statute further permits entities other than the 
mortgagee to present evidence that a property had been abandoned 
and describes what type of evidence should be considered: 
(2) In addition to the parties to the action to enforce 
a mortgage lien, a representative of the city, town, 
village, or county where the mortgaged premises are 
located may provide testimony or evidence to the court 
under sub. (1) relating to whether the premises have 
been abandoned by the mortgagor. In determining 
whether the mortgaged premises have been abandoned, 
the 
court 
shall 
consider 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, including the following:  
(a) Boarded, closed, or damaged windows or doors to 
the premises.  
(b) Missing, unhinged, or continuously unlocked doors 
to the premises.  
(c) Terminated utility accounts for the premises.  
(d) Accumulation of trash or debris on the premises.  
(e) At least 2 reports to law enforcement officials of 
trespassing, vandalism, or other illegal acts being 
committed on the premises.  
(f) Conditions that make the premises unsafe or 
unsanitary or that make the premises in imminent 
danger of becoming unsafe or unsanitary. 
Wis. Stat. § 846.102(2). 
¶20 The plain language of the statute grants the circuit 
court the authority to order a bank to sell the property.  
No. 
2013AP544   
 
10 
 
Indeed, under the statute the court's judgment must include a 
requirement that the property be sold. It provides that if the 
court makes a finding of abandonment then "judgment shall be 
entered as provided in s. 846.10 except that the sale of such 
mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks 
from the date when such judgment is entered."6  Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102(1) (emphasis added). 
¶21 Generally, "the word 'shall' is presumed mandatory 
when it appears in a statute."  Karow v. Milwaukee Cnty. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978); see 
also Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 3 Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 57:2 (7th ed. 2008) ("'Shall' is 
considered presumptively mandatory unless there is something in 
the context or the character of the legislation which requires 
it to be looked at differently.").  We have previously 
interpreted "shall" as mandatory when used in Wis. Stat. ch. 
846.  GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 478, 572 
N.W.2d 466 (1998). 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.10 states, in relevant part:  
 
(1) 
If the plaintiff recovers the judgment shall 
describe the mortgaged premises and fix the amount of 
the mortgage debt then due and also the amount of each 
installment thereafter to become due, and the time 
when it will become due, . . . and shall adjudge that 
the mortgaged premises be sold for the payment of the 
amount then due . . . and when demanded in the 
complaint, direct that judgment shall be rendered for 
any 
deficiency 
against 
the 
parties 
personally 
liable . . .  . 
(2) 
 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
11 
 
¶22 We acknowledge, however, that although the word 
"shall" suggests that a statutory provision is mandatory, the 
legislature's use of the word "shall" is not governed by a per 
se rule.  See State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707, 470 N.W.2d 
283 (1991).  This court has previously explained that "'[s]hall' 
will be construed as directory if necessary to carry out the 
intent of the legislature."  Id.; see also State ex rel. 
Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶15, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 
155 (court considers legislative intent in determining whether a 
statutory provision is mandatory or directory); State v. Thomas, 
2000 WI App 162, ¶9, 238 Wis. 2d 216, 617 N.W.2d 230 (noting 
that factors to consider in determining whether a statute is 
mandatory 
include 
"the 
statute's 
nature, 
the 
legislative 
objective for the statute, and the potential consequences to the 
parties, such as injuries or wrongs."). 
¶23 The context in which "shall" is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102(1) indicates that the legislature intended it to be 
mandatory.  First, when the legislature uses the terms "shall" 
and "may" in the same statutory section, it supports a mandatory 
reading of the term "shall" as the legislature is presumed to be 
aware of the distinct meanings of the words.  GMAC Mortgage 
Corp., 215 Wis. 2d at 478; Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571; Singer 7 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:3.  In Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102(1) the legislature used both "shall" and "may" 
indicating its intent that the words have different meanings. 
¶24 Second, a comparison with the neighboring statutes 
also suggests that the term "shall" in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 was 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
12 
 
intended to be mandatory.  The statutes on both sides of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
846.102 
address 
mortgage 
foreclosures 
in 
other 
circumstances.  Wisconsin Stat. § 846.101 addresses foreclosures 
on 20-acre properties.7  Wisconsin Stat. § 846.103 addresses 
foreclosures 
on 
commercial 
properties 
and 
multifamily 
residences.8  Under both statutes it is up to the mortgagee to 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.101 states:  
(1) If the mortgagor has agreed . . . to the 
provisions of this section, and the foreclosure action 
involves a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-
occupied at the commencement of the action . . . the 
plaintiff in a foreclosure action of a mortgage on 
real estate of 20 acres or less . . . may elect 
. . . to waive judgment for any deficiency which may 
remain due to the plaintiff after sale of the 
mortgaged premises . . . and to consent that the 
mortgagor, unless he or she abandons the property, may 
remain in possession of the mortgaged property and be 
entitled to all rents, issues and profits therefrom to 
the date of confirmation of the sale by the court.  
 (2) When plaintiff so elects, judgment shall be 
entered as provided in this chapter, except that 
. . . the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be 
made upon the expiration of 6 months from the date 
when such judgment is entered. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.103 provides: 
(1) No foreclosure sale involving real property 
other than a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-
occupied at the commencement of the foreclosure action 
. . . may be held until the expiration of 6 months 
from the date when judgment is entered except a sale 
under sub. (2).  . . .  
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
13 
 
elect whether to seek a foreclosure judgment.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.101 (court enters judgment if mortgagee waives judgment of 
deficiency and permits the mortgagor to remain in possession of 
the property until it is sold); Wis. Stat.  § 846.103 (same).  
In contrast to these neighboring statutes, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 
does not require action by the mortgagee after it has initiated 
a foreclosure proceeding.  It specifically permits entities 
other than the mortgagee to appear and submit evidence of 
abandonment.  Wis. Stat. § 846.102(2).  As the court of appeals 
stated, once a mortgagee has filed a foreclosure action, the 
focus of the proceeding is on the condition of the property, not 
the mortgagee's preference.  Bank of New York, 352 Wis. 2d 205, 
¶12. 
¶25 The 
Bank 
contends 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.103 in Arch Bay Holdings LLC-
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) If the mortgagor of real property other than 
a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-occupied at 
the commencement of the foreclosure action . . . has 
agreed . . . to the provisions of this section, the 
plaintiff in a foreclosure action of a mortgage 
. . . may elect by express allegation in the complaint 
to waive judgment for any deficiency which may remain 
due to the plaintiff after sale of the mortgaged 
premises . . . and to consent that the mortgagor, 
unless he or she abandons the property, may remain in 
possession of the mortgaged property and be entitled 
to all rents, issues and profits therefrom to the date 
of confirmation of the sale by the court. When the 
plaintiff so elects, judgment shall be entered as 
provided in this chapter, except that . . . the sale 
of the mortgaged premises shall be made upon the 
expiration of 3 months from the date when such 
judgment is entered.  
No. 
2013AP544   
 
14 
 
Series 2008B v. Matson, No. 2013AP744, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014), and Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. 
v. Matson, No. 2012AP1981, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 30, 2013), is dispositive on the issue of whether the court 
can require a mortgagee to sell an abandoned property.  In 
Deutsche Bank, the court of appeals determined that the language 
in Wis. Stat. § 846.103 permitted the mortgagee to sell the 
property once the statutory prerequisites were met, but did not 
require it.  No. 2012AP1981, ¶20.  In Arch Bay, the court 
reached the same conclusion when interpreting a judgment 
containing the same language as the statute.  No. 2013AP744, 
¶17. 
¶26 The Bank maintains that because the court of appeals 
determined that the language of Wis. Stat. § 846.103 was not 
mandatory, the same construction should be applied to Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102.  However, as discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 846.103 
and Wis. Stat. § 846.102 are significantly different statutes.9  
See supra ¶20.  Further, Arch Bay and Deutsche Bank are 
unpublished and have no precedential authority.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.23(3)(b).  Although they may be cited as persuasive 
authority, given the above discussion, they do not persuade us 
that the language in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is permissive. 
¶27  Considering the statute's clear language and its 
context, the Bank's argument that it cannot be required to sell 
                                                 
9 We decline to interpret the similar sale language in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 846.101 and 846.103 as it is not at issue in this case. 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
15 
 
a 
property 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
846.102 
is 
unpersuasive.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 mandates that the court order a sale 
of the mortgaged premises if certain conditions are met.  Those 
conditions do not depend on action by the mortgagee alone and 
are not dependent on its acquiescence or consent. 
IV 
¶28 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes 
a court to order a mortgagee to bring a property to sale, we 
turn to consider whether a court can also require a mortgagee to 
bring a property to sale at a certain point in time. 
¶29 Again, we begin with the words of the statute.  It 
provides that "the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made 
upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment 
[of foreclosure] is entered."  Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1).  This 
language is indicative of the time frame a court must impose for 
the sale: "upon expiration of 5 weeks."   
¶30 The Bank asserts that even if Wis. Stat. § 846.102 
mandates that the circuit court order a sale of the property 
after the redemption period, it provides no time limit for the 
sale.  Absent any specific timeline, the Bank contends that it 
has five years to execute its judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 815.04.10   
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 815.04(1)(a) provides: 
    
Upon any judgment of a court of record perfected 
as specified in s. 806.06 or any judgment of any other 
court entered in the judgment and lien docket of a 
court of record, execution may issue at any time 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
16 
 
¶31 We 
decline 
to 
adopt 
the 
Bank's 
argument. 
 
We 
acknowledge that the word "upon" in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is 
ambiguous as "upon expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such 
judgment is entered" could be read to mean any time after the 
five weeks but before the five years.  It could also be 
interpreted to mean immediately upon expiration of five weeks or 
something in between.  In discerning the answer to our inquiry, 
we examine here the context of the statute, its legislative 
history, and the purpose of the statute.  
¶32 When considered in light of its neighboring statutes, 
the context of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 suggests that the 
legislature intended a prompt sale.  Wisconsin Stat. § 846.101, 
addressing 20-acre properties, provides that if the mortgagee 
waives judgment of deficiency and permits the mortgagor to 
remain in the property until it is sold, the court shall enter a 
judgment that the property be sold after the expiration of six 
months from the date of the judgment.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 846.103, addressing foreclosures of commercial properties and 
multifamily residences, provides that the mortgagee waives 
judgment of deficiency and permits the mortgagor to remain in 
the property until it is sold, the court shall enter a judgment 
                                                                                                                                                             
within 5 years after the rendition of the judgment. 
When an execution has been issued and returned 
unsatisfied in whole or in part other executions may 
issue at any time upon application of the judgment 
creditor. 
 
 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
17 
 
that the property be sold after the expiration of three months 
from the date of the judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 846.103(2). 
¶33 The statute at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102, prompts faster sales with fewer requirements for 
abandoned premises than its neighboring statutes.  It provides 
that upon finding abandonment, the court shall enter a judgment 
that the premises shall be sold after the expiration of five 
weeks.  Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1).  Unlike its neighboring 
statutes, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not contain the requirements 
that the mortgagee waive deficiency judgment and permit the 
mortgagor to remain on the premises in order for the court to 
order a sale.  When viewed in light of its neighboring statutes, 
the loosened requirements in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 evince an 
intent to ensure a prompt sale of the property.     
¶34 The contrary statutory intent asserted by the Bank is 
unconvincing.  Referencing the redemption periods in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 846.101, 846.102 and 846.103, the Bank contends that the 
purpose behind the statute is to create delay so that defaulted 
borrowers will have one last chance to retain their properties.  
However, the Bank's assertion ignores the differences between 
Wis. Stat. § 846.102 and those neighboring statutes.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 846.102 addresses properties that have been abandoned, 
properties which borrowers no longer have an interest in 
retaining.  Thus, the policy concern of creating a delay does 
not appear to be implicated. 
¶35 The legislative intent for a prompt sale is also 
supported by the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 846.102.  
No. 
2013AP544   
 
18 
 
In 2011, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 was amended to shorten the 
redemption period for abandoned properties from two months to 
five weeks, to add subsection (2) permitting the city, town, 
village, 
or 
county 
to 
provide 
testimony 
or 
evidence 
of 
abandonment, 
and 
to 
indicate 
what 
sort 
of 
evidence 
of 
abandonment a court should consider.  2011 WI Act 136, §§ 1r, 2 
(enacted Mar. 21, 2012).  The Act was introduced as 2011 Senate 
Bill 307 with bipartisan support.  Four individuals spoke at the 
public hearing on the bill: its sponsor, a representative of the 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
a 
representative 
of 
Legal 
Action 
of 
Wisconsin, and a representative of the Wisconsin Bankers 
Association. 2011 Senate Bill 307, Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Financial Institutions and Rural Issues, 2011 
Regular Session, Nov. 30, 2011.  Each individual referenced that 
the bill's intent was to help municipalities deal with abandoned 
properties in a timely manner.11 
¶36 Two 
of 
the 
speakers 
explained 
that 
abandoned 
properties were a significant problem in Milwaukee.  Such 
properties increase the crime rate and have a destabilizing 
impact on neighborhoods.  This testimony echoes researchers' 
findings that home abandonment leads to blight: 
Abandoned homes substantially decrease the value of 
neighboring properties, which in turn lowers the tax 
revenue cities can collect to help alleviate the 
                                                 
11 The 
hearing 
can 
be 
viewed 
online 
at: 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/ArchiveList.aspx?
cm=152. 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
19 
 
blight caused by abandonment.  Moreover, abandoned 
homes become public nuisances, such as fire hazards, 
that can endanger the community. 
Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders 
Responsible 
for 
the 
Rise 
in 
Foreclosures 
and 
Abandoned 
Properties, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1169, 1171.12 
¶37 Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 846.102 as permitting sale 
at any time within five years after judgment is entered would 
exacerbate the problem that the statute was meant to ameliorate.  
Such an interpretation would allow mortgagees to initiate 
foreclosures, but fail to bring the properties to sale for an 
extended period of time, leaving the properties in legal limbo.13   
¶38 Multiple studies have remarked upon the negative 
impact of such a scenario.  For example, a study by the 
                                                 
12 The City of Milwaukee submitted an amicus brief detailing 
the scope of the City's abandoned property problem.  It noted 
that there are currently 4,900 vacant buildings in the City.  
According to the City's records, approximately 400 of those 
4,900 properties are currently in some stage of mortgage 
foreclosure. 
Abandoned properties in Milwaukee are a magnet for crime 
and create unsafe conditions.  The City explained that since 
2011, its police department has responded to at least 2,025 
burglaries, 93 aggravated assaults, 84 robberies, 44 sexual 
assaults, 36 sudden deaths, and 7 homicides at vacant buildings.  
Further, the City's fire department reported a 163% increase in 
the number of fires occurring in vacant residential buildings 
between 2005 and 2012. 
13 Various terms are used to describe this situation, 
including: "abandoned foreclosure," "bank walkaway," "zombie 
title/property," 
and 
"limbo 
loan." 
See 
Judith 
Fox, 
The 
Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures are Reentering the 
Market Through Debt Buyers, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 25, 31 
(2013). 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
20 
 
Government 
Accountability 
Office 
determined 
that 
abandoned 
foreclosures create unsightly and dangerous properties that 
contribute to neighborhood decline.  GAO, Mortgage Foreclosures: 
Additional Mortgage Servicer Actions Could Help Reduce the 
Frequency and Impact of Abandoned Foreclosures, GAO-11-93 at 29 
(Nov. 2010).  "[A]s a result of vandalism, exposure, and 
neglect, vacant properties can become worthless. . . . abandoned 
foreclosures that remain vacant for extended periods pose 
significant health, safety, and welfare issues at the local 
level."  Id. at 31.   
¶39 Another study has observed that "[t]he result of these 
abandoned foreclosures has been devastating to cities and 
consumers throughout the country."  Judith Fox, The Foreclosure 
Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures are Reentering the Market 
through Debt Buyers, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 25, 29-30 (2013).  
"With no threat of citation for nuisance violations, and thus 
little incentive to maintain the premises, many lenders very 
well may allow the properties they control to deteriorate."  
Kristin M. Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind on 
their Mortgages, Lenders Playing the Foreclosure Game, and 
Cities Left Paying the Price, 34 S. Ill. U.L.J. 621, 633 (2009). 
Failing to interpret Wis. Stat. § 846.102 as enabling a court to 
require a prompt sale would inhibit its use as a tool to address 
abandoned properties. 
¶40 Because its context and the legislative history of 
Wis. Stat. § 846.102 clearly indicate that the statute was 
intended to help municipalities deal with abandoned properties 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
21 
 
in a timely manner, we decline to interpret it so as to permit 
properties to languish abandoned for five years.  Cf. Waller v. 
Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶108, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 
N.W.2d 764 (construing statute in a manner to further the 
statutory purpose); Bank Mut., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶¶71-76 
(interpreting Wis. Stat. § 846.103 in a manner consistent with 
the statute's goals).  
¶41 In order to give effect to the statute's purpose, we 
interpret the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 that a court 
order an abandoned property to be brought to sale after the five 
week redemption period as a requirement that the court order the 
property to be brought to sale within a reasonable time after 
the redemption period.  Admittedly, what is considered a 
reasonable time will vary with the circumstances of each case.  
The circuit court is in the best position to consider arguments 
and evidence on this issue.  Thus, we leave it to the circuit 
court's discretion to determine, after considering the totality 
of the circumstances, what a reasonable period of time may be 
for each case, in light of the statute's purpose. 
V 
¶42 In this case, the circuit court did not determine 
whether the property on Concordia Avenue was abandoned.  Rather, 
it denied Carson's motion after concluding that it did not have 
the authority to order the mortgagee to bring the property to 
sale as requested by Carson.  Given that we have concluded that 
the circuit court does have such authority, a finding as to 
whether the property has been abandoned is needed here.  Absent 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
22 
 
a finding of abandonment, sale of the property cannot be ordered 
under Wis. Stat. § 846.102.   
¶43 Accordingly, we remand the case to the circuit court 
to determine whether the Concordia property has been abandoned.  
If the court finds that the property has been abandoned, it 
shall consider the totality of the circumstances and, consistent 
with 
the 
statutory 
purpose, 
enter 
an 
order 
stating 
the 
reasonable time after the redemption period in which the 
mortgagee must bring the property to sale. 
VI 
¶44 In sum, based on the statute's plain language and 
context we conclude that when the court determines that the 
property is abandoned, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes the 
circuit court to order a mortgagee to bring a mortgaged property 
to sale after the redemption period.  
¶45 We further conclude, consistent with the purpose of 
the statute, that the circuit court shall order the property to 
be brought to sale within a reasonable time after the redemption 
period.  The circuit court's determination of what constitutes a 
reasonable time should be based on the totality of the 
circumstances in each case.  
¶46 In this case, the circuit court did not reach the 
issue of whether the property had been abandoned.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for such a determination and further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
No. 
2013AP544   
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
1 
 
¶47 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority's decision to affirm the court of appeals.  I do not 
agree with the majority's reasoning in support of this decision.  
In my view, the owner of real property may seek a judicial sale 
of the property when the owner's authority to sell is impeded or 
otherwise in doubt.  Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1)(g).  However, the 
ultimate availability of this judicial "remedy" is dependent 
upon the equities involved, including recognition of the 
"interests in real property" of others.  Wis. Stat. § 840.01.  
For the reasons stated below, I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶48 The 
majority 
opinion 
is 
preoccupied 
with 
an 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102, which is part of the 
chapter on Real Estate Foreclosure.  Chapter 846 is a detailed 
and vitally important chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
Section 846.102, entitled "Abandoned premises," is a significant 
provision within the chapter.  A mistaken interpretation of this 
section is likely to have profound ramifications on real estate 
financing in Wisconsin. 
¶49 The early sections of Chapter 846 set out foreclosure 
procedure in a variety of situations.  Before examining these 
sections, 
I 
believe 
it 
is 
useful 
to 
reiterate 
several 
fundamental principles. 
¶50 A mortgage has been defined as "any agreement or 
arrangement in which property is used as security."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 851.15.  "Wisconsin is a lien-theory state with regard to 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
2 
mortgages.  A mortgage creates a lien on real property but does 
not convey title to the property to the mortgagee (lender)."  
Lawrence Sager, Wisconsin Real Estate Practice & Law 137 (11th 
ed. 2004). 
¶51 In simple terms, a "mortgage conveys an interest in 
the real estate to the lender as security for the debt, while 
the mortgage note is a promise to repay the debt.  Mortgages are 
the most common form of loan instruments in Wisconsin."  Id. 
¶52 The foreclosure provisions of Chapter 846 are invoked 
by mortgagees (lenders) when a mortgagor (borrower) fails to 
repay a debt.  The law provides protections for the mortgagor, 
so that a mortgagee cannot move too quickly against the 
mortgagor, and the mortgagor has a period to redeem the property 
after foreclosure. 
¶53 As a practical matter, a mortgagee invokes the 
foreclosure provisions of Chapter 846 when its loan is not being 
repaid.  However, foreclosure does not transfer ownership of the 
property to the mortgagee.  Thus, the mortgagee does not control 
the mortgaged property after foreclosure, and it may end up 
receiving no payment on its loan until the property is sold and 
the sale is confirmed.  As a result, the mortgagee normally has 
a strong incentive for a prompt sale after foreclosure. 
¶54 The mortgagee is usually entitled to a deficiency 
judgment against the mortgagor in the event that sale of the 
property does not satisfy the debt.  In truth, however, many 
mortgagors do not have the wherewithal to satisfy a deficiency 
judgment.  This is one reason why the mortgagee may waive its 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
3 
right to a deficiency judgment in order to speed up sale of the 
property.  There is no reason for the mortgagee to delay sale of 
the property unless there is a rational economic reason to do 
so. 
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.10 is the basic foreclosure 
statute.  It reads in part: 
 
(1) If the plaintiff recovers the judgment shall 
describe the mortgaged premises and fix the amount of 
the mortgage debt then due and also the amount of each 
installment thereafter to become due, and the time 
when it will become due, and whether the mortgaged 
premises can be sold in parcels and whether any part 
thereof is a homestead, and shall adjudge that the 
mortgaged premises be sold for the payment of the 
amount then due and of all installments which shall 
become due before the sale, or so much thereof as may 
be sold separately without material injury to the 
parties interested, and be sufficient to pay such 
principal, interest and costs; and when demanded in 
the complaint, direct that judgment shall be rendered 
for any deficiency against the parties personally 
liable and, if the sale is to be by referee, the 
referee must be named therein. 
Wis. Stat. § 846.10(1). 
 
¶56 Subsection (2) then reads: 
 
(2)  . . .  No sale involving a one- to 4-family 
residence that is owner-occupied at the commencement 
of the foreclosure action . . . may be held until the 
expiration of 12 months from the date when judgment is 
entered, 
except 
a 
sale 
under 
s. 
846.101 
or 
846.102. . . .  In all cases the parties may, by 
stipulation, filed with the clerk, consent to an 
earlier sale. 
Wis. Stat. § 846.10(2). 
 
¶57 Section 
846.101 
deals 
with 
foreclosure 
sales 
(primarily of residential property under 20 acres) in which the 
mortgagor has agreed to a shorter period of time for sale and 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
4 
redemption (six months) and the "plaintiff" (mortgagee) has 
elected in its complaint to waive its right to a deficiency 
judgment against the mortgagor. 
 
¶58 Section 846.102 permits an even shorter period between 
foreclosure and sale (five weeks) when the court finds that the 
mortgagor has abandoned the property——that is, "relinquishment 
of possession or control of the premises whether or not the 
mortgagor or the mortgagor's assigns have relinquished equity 
and title."  Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1). 
¶59 Section 846.103 relates to "Foreclosures of commercial 
properties and multifamily residences." 
¶60 The mortgagee is the "plaintiff" under these four 
sections.  The mortgagor does not need to sue the mortgagee 
because the mortgagor may stipulate to a sale without initiating 
litigation.  Wis. Stat. § 846.10(2). 
¶61 That the mortgagee is the "plaintiff" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102 is clear from the opening phrase of the section: "In 
an action for enforcement of a mortgage lien . . . ."  The 
mortgagee has the "mortgage lien" on mortgaged property as well 
as standing to enforce the lien; the mortgagor does not have 
either.  Moreover, although § 846.102 does not use the word 
"plaintiff," as surrounding §§ 846.10, 846.101, and 846.103 do, 
§ 846.102 refers back to § 846.10: "judgment shall be entered as 
provided in s. 846.10 . . . ." 
¶62 Any notion that a municipality could bring an action 
under § 846.102 is belied by the language in subsection (2), 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
5 
which limits the role of "a representative" of a municipality to 
providing testimony or evidence of abandonment.1 
II 
¶63 In this case, the Bank of New York brought suit 
against Shirley Carson under Wis. Stat. § 846.101.  The Bank 
waived its right to a deficiency judgment.  The complaint, filed 
January 25, 2011, reads in part: 
 
6. 
The 
mortgagors 
expressly 
agreed 
to 
the 
reduced redemption period provisions contained in 
Chapter 846 of the Wisconsin Statutes; the plaintiff 
hereby elects to proceed under section 846.101 with a 
six month period of redemption, thereby waiving 
judgment for any deficiency against every party who is 
personally liable for the debt, and to consent that 
the owner, unless he or she abandons the property, may 
remain in possession and be entitled to all rents and 
profits therefrom to the date of confirmation of the 
sale by the court. 
¶64 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Mel Flanagan, 
Judge, entered a default judgment (Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment) on June 13, 2011.  The court found that 
"the mortgaged premises . . . shall be sold at public auction 
                                                 
1 The principal author of the bill creating subsection (2) 
of Wis. Stat. § 846.102, Senator Glenn Grothman, explained that 
the purpose of the legislation was to shorten the redemption 
period in abandonment cases from two months to five weeks and to 
permit municipalities to present evidence of abandonment.  He 
testified: "The effects of this bipartisan bill will be modest, 
but they are an attempt to better balance the needs of 
municipalities and responsible homeowners while still protecting 
the rights of property owners who may have fallen on hard 
times."  Legislative Council File for 2011 S.B. 307, Letter from 
Sen. Glenn Grothman to Members of the Assembly Committee on 
Financial 
Institutions 
(Feb. 
1, 
2012), 
available 
at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/comtmats/old/11files/sb0307_201112
01084222.pdf. 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
6 
under the direction of the sheriff, at any time after three 
month(s) from the date of entry of judgment."  (Emphasis added.)  
The court also found "THAT NO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT MAY BE 
OBTAINED AGAINST ANY DEFENDANT."  The court determined that the 
mortgagor's indebtedness totaled $81,356.59. 
¶65 The mortgagor made no effort to redeem the property.  
In fact, she abandoned the property, according to an affidavit 
she filed with the court on November 6, 2012. 
¶66 On the same date, the mortgagor filed a motion in the 
original foreclosure case.  The mortgagor brought the motion 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 806.07(g) & (h) and 846.102.  The motion 
sought to reopen the foreclosure judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 and to compel the Bank to sell the mortgaged property 
"upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date of entry of the 
amended judgment" under Wis. Stat. § 846.102. 
¶67 As the majority opinion notes, the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Jane Carroll, Judge, denied the motion.  The 
court "observed that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 did not specifically 
grant it authority to order the Bank to sell the property at a 
specific time."  Majority op., ¶12. 
It explained "I can't find anywhere in the statute 
[Wis. Stat. § 846.102] that I have the authority to 
grant the relief that [Carson is] requesting."  The 
court further noted that the statute contemplates that 
the redemption period be elected by the mortgagee, not 
the borrower, and questioned whether a mortgagee could 
be compelled to execute a judgment when someone else 
is seeking the order.  Accordingly, it stated, "I'm 
specifically 
finding 
that 
I 
don't 
have 
the 
authority . . . so the motion is denied on those 
grounds." 
Id. 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
7 
¶68 The court of appeals reversed.  Bank of New York v. 
Carson, 2013 WI App 153, 352 Wis. 2d 205, 841 N.W.2d 573.  The 
court of appeals criticized the Bank (mortgagee) for not 
maintaining the property.  Id., ¶5.  More important, the court 
of appeals concluded that a mortgagor could rely on Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.102 to compel a sale of the mortgagor's property: 
We . . . conclude that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law when it concluded that only the Bank 
could elect the five-week abandonment period provided 
in 
the 
statute. 
 
The 
trial 
court 
could 
have . . . decided 
to 
amend 
the 
judgment 
to 
a 
foreclosure of an abandoned property as described by 
§ 846.102. 
Id., ¶12.  The court of appeals added: 
 
The statutory language also makes clear that the 
trial court did have the power to order the Bank to 
sell 
the 
property 
upon 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
redemption period. . . .  We conclude that the plain 
language of the statute directs the court to ensure 
that an abandoned property is sold without delay, and 
it logically follows that if a party to a foreclosure 
moves the court to order a sale, the court may use its 
contempt authority to do so. 
Id., ¶13. 
¶69 The majority affirms the court of appeals without 
disavowing these pronouncements.  On the contrary, the majority 
adopts the method of statutory interpretation used by the court 
of appeals, see majority op., ¶¶18, 20, 21, 23, 24, to reach the 
following conclusions: 
 
(1) "The plain language of [Wis. Stat. § 846.102] 
grants the circuit court the authority to order a bank to sell 
the property."  Id., ¶20.  "[I]f the court makes a finding of 
abandonment then 'judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
8 
846.10 except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be 
made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such 
judgment is entered.'  Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) (emphasis 
added)."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 
(2) "The context in which 'shall' is used in Wis. 
Stat. § 846.102(1) indicates that the legislature intended it to 
be mandatory."  Id., ¶23. 
 
(3) "Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not require action by 
the 
mortgagee 
after 
it 
has 
initiated 
a 
foreclosure 
proceeding. . . .  As the court of appeals stated, . . . the 
focus of the proceeding is on the condition of the property, not 
the mortgagee's preference."  Id., ¶24. 
 
(4) "Considering the statute's clear language and its 
context, the Bank's argument that it cannot be required to sell 
a 
property 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 846.102 
is 
unpersuasive.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 mandates that the court order a sale 
of the mortgaged premises if certain conditions are met.  Those 
conditions do not depend on action by the mortgagee alone and 
are not dependent on its acquiescence or consent."  Id., ¶27. 
 
(5) "[W]e turn to consider whether a court can also 
require a mortgagee to bring a property to sale at a certain 
point in time."  Id., ¶28.  "[W]e begin with the words of the 
statute. . . .  This language is indicative of the time frame a 
court must impose for the sale: 'upon expiration of 5 weeks.'"  
Id., ¶29. 
 
 
(6) "[T]he context of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 suggests 
that the legislature intended a prompt sale."  Id., ¶32.  "The 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
9 
legislative intent for a prompt sale is . . . supported by the 
legislative history . . . ."  Id., ¶35. 
¶70 I acknowledge that the majority opinion softens its 
holdings by requiring a court acting under Wis. Stat. § 846.102 
to order mortgaged property to be "brought to sale within a 
reasonable time after the redemption period."  Id., ¶41.  But 
this statement is inconsistent with the majority's overall 
interpretation of the statute. 
III 
¶71 The majority opinion radically revises the law on 
mortgage 
foreclosure. 
 
Under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
a 
lending 
institution like the Bank of New York does not own the property 
upon which it holds a mortgage as security for a debt.  The 
mortgagee's obvious goal is to be repaid on its loan, with 
interest for the use of its money.  When this goal becomes 
infeasible, the mortgagee prudently seeks to minimize its loss.  
Sometimes the mortgagee delays the sale of foreclosed property 
in the expectation that the circumstances for sale will improve.  
The majority opinion substantially impairs the mortgagee's 
ability to minimize or mitigate a loss. 
¶72 The opinion shifts to the circuit court the authority 
to set the date for sale of abandoned property.  It gives the 
court authority to disregard the preferences of the mortgagee as 
to the timing of the sale when the mortgagee files for 
foreclosure under Wis. Stat. §§ 846.10, 846.101, or 846.102. 
¶73 Because of this loss in flexibility, mortgagees are 
likely to act to protect their interests.  For instance, the 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
10 
costs of borrowing money to finance residential real estate 
transactions are likely to go up, and some potential borrowers 
will be denied loans altogether. 
¶74 Under 
the 
new 
regime, 
thousands 
of 
foreclosed 
properties statewide may have to be scheduled for sale within a 
few months of this decision because they have already been held 
by mortgagees without sale for an "unreasonable" period after 
foreclosure. 
¶75 These consequences are not discussed by a majority 
that is a bit too eager to depict mortgage lenders as the source 
of the problem. 
¶76 Knowing what they face if they file for foreclosure 
when the timing is not propitious, many mortgagees may choose 
not to file foreclosure actions.  If mortgagees forego filing, 
leverage will transfer from mortgagees to non-paying mortgagors. 
¶77 Still, 
some 
mortgagors 
may 
wish 
to 
extricate 
themselves from their continuing ownership responsibilities. 
¶78 The majority attempts to preclude a mortgagor from 
becoming a plaintiff under Wis. Stat. § 846.102, majority op., 
¶18 n.5, by suggesting that only a mortgagee may initiate an 
action under Chapter 846.  This is a correct interpretation of 
the chapter.  However, it does not account for Wis. Stat. 
§ 840.03. 
¶79 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.01(1) defines the term "interest 
in real property."2  The definition implicates those who own or 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.01(1) reads: 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
11 
hold title to land (like Shirley Carson) and those with 
"security interests and liens on land" (like the Bank of New 
York). 
¶80 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.03 then provides: 
 
Real property remedies.  (1)  Any person having 
an interest in real property may bring an action 
relating to that interest, in which the person may 
demand the following remedies singly, or in any 
combination, or in combination with other remedies not 
listed, unless the use of a remedy is denied in a 
specified situation: 
 
 
(a) Declaration of interest. 
(b) Extinguishment 
or 
foreclosure 
of 
interest of another. 
 
 
(c) Partition of interest. 
 
 
(d) Enforcement of interest. 
 
 
(e) Judicial rescission of contract. 
(f) Specific performance of contract or 
covenant. 
(g) Judicial 
sale 
of 
property 
and 
allocation of proceeds. 
 
 
(h) Restitution. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), "interest in 
real property" includes estates in, powers under ch. 
702 over, present and future rights to, title to, and 
interests 
in 
real 
property, 
including, 
without 
limitation by enumeration, security interests and 
liens 
on 
land, 
easements, 
profits, 
rights 
of 
appointees 
under 
powers, 
rights 
under 
covenants 
running with the land, powers of termination and 
homestead rights.  The interest may be an interest 
that was formerly designated legal or equitable.  The 
interest may be surface, subsurface, suprasurface, 
riparian or littoral. 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
12 
 
 
(i) Judicial conveyance of interest. 
 
 
(j) Possession. 
 
 
(k) Immediate physical possession. 
(l) Restraint 
of 
another's 
use 
of, 
or 
activities on, or encroachment upon 
land 
in 
which 
plaintiff 
has 
an 
interest. 
(m) Restraint 
of 
another's 
use 
of, 
activities on, or disposition of land 
in which plaintiff has no interest; but 
the use, activity or disposition affect 
plaintiff's interest. 
(n) Restraint of interference with rights 
in, on or to land. 
 
 
(o) Damages. 
 
(2) The indication of the form and kind of 
judgment in a chapter dealing with a particular remedy 
shall not limit the availability of any other remedies 
appropriate to a particular situation. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶81 Section 
840.03 
includes 
in 
its 
listed 
remedies 
"Judicial 
sale 
of 
property" 
and 
"Judicial 
conveyance 
of 
interest."  Mortgagors may seek to secure one of these remedies 
to escape the responsibilities of ownership. 
¶82 As I read the statute, the owner of property may 
"bring an action" for a judicial sale or a judicial conveyance 
of interest.  Although a mortgagor may not be able to serve as 
plaintiff in a foreclosure action under any of the foreclosure 
statutes, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 846.10, 846.101, 846.102, and 
846.103, the mortgagor may be able to invoke the new principles 
this court has discovered in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 when it 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
13 
"brings an action" for judicial sale or conveyance of interest 
under Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1). 
¶83 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.03(1) has been part of Wisconsin 
law for 40 years.  See § 16, Chapter 189, Laws of 1973 (creating 
Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1) (1974)).  It has been interpreted as 
creating substantive rights.  SJ Props. Suites v. Specialty Fin. 
Grp., LLC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. Wis. 2012).  Nonetheless, a 
mortgagor seeking the sale of his or her property or the 
conveyance of his or her property under Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1) 
would heretofore have been required to show that the mortgagor 
was entitled equitably to this remedy, inasmuch as it is clear 
that a defaulting mortgagor does not have the same powers and 
prerogatives as a mortgagee under Wis. Stat. § 846.102. 
¶84 "An action to foreclose a mortgage is equitable in 
nature."  Wis. Brick & Block Corp. v. Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 
327, 
195 
N.W.2d 664 
(1972) 
(citing 
Frick 
v. 
Howard, 
23 
Wis. 2d 86, 96, 126 N.W.2d 619 (1964)); see also Harbor Credit 
Union v. Samp, 2011 WI App 40, ¶19, 332 Wis. 2d 214, 796 
N.W.2d 813; JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Green, 2008 WI App 78, 
¶11, 311 Wis. 2d 715, 753 N.W.2d 536; First Fin. Sav. Ass'n v. 
Spranger, 156 Wis. 2d 440, 444, 456 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1990).  
This equity prevails throughout the proceedings.  GMAC Mortg. 
Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 480, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998).  
The court's discretion should be exercised so that "no injustice 
shall be done to any of the parties."  Strong v. Catton, 1 Wis. 
408, 424 (1853). 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
14 
¶85 Considering equity, a mortgagee may want to delay the 
sale 
of 
mortgaged 
property 
that 
has 
been 
abandoned 
for 
legitimate economic reasons.  Admittedly, the mortgagee might be 
forced to recognize that such a delay will constitute a burden 
on 
the 
mortgagor 
in 
terms 
of 
maintenance 
and 
taxes.  
Consequently, it is not inherently unreasonable for a mortgagor 
to seek relief from such a burden, inasmuch as it is unrealistic 
to expect that a mortgagor will properly maintain and pay the 
taxes on property it has abandoned.  At the same time, however, 
if the mortgagee is expected to assume responsibility for 
abandoned property, the mortgagee must be given reasonable 
options, even if unpalatable, rather than be forced into an 
unwanted sale without the protection of the equitable principles 
upon which mortgage foreclosures rest. 
¶86 The majority opinion alters these principles by its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102.  It forces prompt public 
sales 
despite 
the 
objection 
of 
the 
mortgagee. 
 
This 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not comport with the 
statute's language or its legislative history and will often be 
inequitable 
to 
the 
mortgagee. 
 
Even 
a 
mortgagee 
that 
conscientiously maintains abandoned property may be forced to 
sell it quickly at the direction of the court. 
¶87 I agree that the mortgagor here is entitled to seek 
the statutorily recognized remedy of "sale," but only as 
provided under Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1)(g), prior to the court's 
mistaken interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102.  For the 
reasons set forth, I respectfully concur. 
No. 
2013AP544.dtp   
 
 
 
15 
¶88 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this 
concurrence.