Case Title: State v. Palmer

Citation: 438 P.2d 876, 73 Wash. 2d 462

Docket Number: 39739, 39741

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1968-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
73 Wn.2d 462 (1968) 438 P.2d 876 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ROBERT H. PALMER, Appellant. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. FLOYD RAY PHILLIPS, Appellant.[*] Nos. 39739, 39741. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. March 28, 1968. EVANS, J.[] The defendants, Palmer and Phillips, were separately charged by information with the crime of armed robbery. Palmer was charged with robbery while acting in concert with Floyd Ray Phillips, and Phillips was charged with robbery while acting in concert with Robert H. Palmer. The two cases were consolidated for trial, and each *464 defendant appeals from judgment and sentence based upon a verdict of the jury finding him guilty as charged. There was ample evidence to support the verdict of guilty as to each defendant. Neither defendant challenges the sufficiency of that evidence. Both defendants assign as error the court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence. January 9, 1967, at approximately 3:15 p.m., the manager of Safeway store No. 225, located in Walla Walla, Washington, was robbed of approximately $547 in United States currency. The police were immediately notified, and investigating officers arrived at the scene within a few minutes, where they interviewed the victim and other eyewitnesses. As a result of information they received at the scene, the officers relayed to other law enforcement agencies within the area the information that the automobile used in the robbery was a 1965 Ford, brown, with a dirty white top, which had clothes hanging in the back. The possible license number prefix was "A" or "R." Two men were involved in the robbery. One of them was described as having black hair, wearing a red sweater and dark trousers, and the other was described as "being in his 20's." [1] The report of this robbery and the above description were received by Walla Walla County Deputy Sheriff James Shannon, who immediately drove to the approach to the Snake River bridge which connects Walla Walla County and Franklin County. Approximately 45 minutes after receiving the description of the suspects and car, Deputy Sheriff Shannon observed the approach of a 1965 Ford, two-door, brown, with a cream-colored top, with clothes hanging in the back. It had Arizona license plates. There were two men in the car, one, a man approximately 23 years of age, and the other, wearing a red jacket. Deputy Sheriff Shannon immediately called for assistance from the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. Two Franklin County officers were in the area and came to his assistance. The 1965 Ford was stopped. The defendant Palmer, who was driving, and defendant Phillips, who was also in the front seat, were ordered from the automobile and searched. At *465 this time, Deputy Sheriff Shannon observed a dollar bill on the floor in the rear of the automobile in front of the back seat. A search of the automobile was begun. The hood of the car was lifted and, between the battery and the fender, a .45 caliber automatic pistol and a brown paper sack containing currency were discovered. The motion to suppress the gun, the sack of currency, and the dollar bill is without merit. Clearly, the officers had probable cause for making the arrest. State v. Bellows, 72 Wn.2d 264, 432 P.2d 654 (1967). It is equally clear that these items were seized as an incident to that lawful arrest. State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955, 959, 425 P.2d 913 (1967). Before the search of the car had been completed and because of a traffic hazard which was being created by curious motorists at the scene of the arrest, the 1965 Ford was moved to the Franklin County Sheriff's Office, 2 1/2 miles from the scene of the arrest. The trip took approximately 5 minutes. At the sheriff's office, the trunk of the automobile was immediately opened, where clothing was found which fit the description of that worn by the robber. In the clothing was found a note, which at the trial was offered as the same note which was handed to the manager of the Safeway store by the robber. In support of their motion to suppress the clothing and the note found in the trunk, defendants rely upon Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777, 84 Sup. Ct. 881 (1964). However, a careful analysis of Preston, in the light of Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 Sup. Ct. 788 (1967), clearly indicates that Preston does not apply to the present factual situation. In Cooper v. California, supra, the court, in discussing and distinguishing the Preston case, states, at 61: The court then continues: [2] In Cooper, the officers were required by state law to seize the car. In the present case the officers had a right to seize the car as an incident to a lawful arrest. In Cooper, the officers were required to retain the car in their custody until forfeiture proceedings were concluded and they had a right to search it while in their custody. In the present case, the officers had a right to retain the car in their custody as evidence until the robbery proceedings were concluded. They also had a right to search it while in their custody. We hold that any evidence discovered in that search could properly be used in proof of the crime for which they were arrested. Whether Preston would prevent its use as evidence in support of a criminal charge other than the one for which the defendants were arrested is not before this court. *467 We find no error in the refusal of the court to grant defendants' motions to suppress evidence obtained in the search of the car trunk. Both defendants sought a change of venue, alleging that adverse newspaper publicity prevented them from having a fair trial. The day following the robbery, under the heading "Suspects Caught," two articles appeared on the front page of the Walla Walla Bulletin. These articles contained a recital of the circumstances of the robbery from the viewpoint of the victims and eyewitnesses, and a recital of some of the circumstances of the arrest of "two suspects," who were identified as "Robert H. Palmer, 38 and Floyd R. Phillips, 19, both of Phoenix, Ariz." The portion of the articles to which defendants object is as follows: The two newspaper articles appeared January 10, 1967. The trial commenced approximately 10 weeks later, March 20, 1967. In the voir dire examination of the jurors, 9 of the 12 jurors were asked about the newspaper articles, and the remaining 3 were asked if they could sit as fair and impartial jurors. Each juror stated either that the articles were not read by him or that they were read but would have no bearing on his deliberation. Defendant Palmer sought a change of venue on the additional claim that many citizens of Walla Walla County were prejudiced against him because of his bad reputation in the community. Defendant Phillips sought a separate trial on the same ground, namely that if he was required to be tried jointly with Palmer, he, Phillips, would be prejudiced by Palmer's bad reputation. *468 To support these contentions, a former employer, and two sisters and a brother of Palmer testified that they knew of Palmer's bad reputation in the community. Because of that reputation and the newspaper reports of Palmer's arrest, three of them expressed the opinion, and one of them assumed, that Palmer could not receive a fair trial in Walla Walla County. Their testimony, however, disclosed that Palmer had been in the community only once for a visit 4 years previously, and had not lived in the community for 8 years before that visit. While the witnesses were understandably aware of Palmer's past conduct, their fears that the whole community was equally informed and, therefore, prejudiced against Palmer, were not borne out in the voir dire examination of the jurors. Neither defendant points to anything that transpired in the examination of prospective jurors, or at any other time, which indicates that any juror was prejudiced by reason of anything that he had either read or heard. Defendant Palmer sought a separate trial upon the additional claim that Phillips' plea of mental irresponsibility was antagonistic to Palmer's general denial of the crime. Only the bare claim is made, and defendant Palmer does not attempt to point out in what particular the two pleas are antagonistic or how Palmer was prejudiced. The mere fact that evidence may be admissible against one defendant and not against another is not in and of itself proof that two defendants cannot have a fair trial if tried together. State v. Courville, 63 Wn.2d 498, 387 P.2d 938 (1963). Furthermore, all that the jury knew of such a plea came from a remark by counsel for defendant Phillips, in his opening statement, to the effect that a plea of mental irresponsibility would be presented. However, by reason of rulings made by the trial court, no such plea was ever presented to the jury. [3] A change of venue in a criminal case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Hawkins, 70 Wn.2d 697, 425 P.2d 390 *469 (1967). The rule is the same as to the question of separate trials to joint defendants. State v. Courville, supra. We find no abuse of discretion of the trial court in denying the motions of either defendant for a change of venue or for a separate trial. Defendant Phillips assigns as error the refusal of the court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine Phillips to determine whether or not he was legally sane at the time of the commission of the acts charged and at the time of trial. This issue was presented to the trial court in the form of an affidavit of counsel for defendant Phillips as follows: The incidents set forth in the above affidavit were not otherwise explained, and counsel for Phillips points to no conduct of Phillips within his personal knowledge from which either he or the court could draw any conclusion as to the mental condition of Phillips. Judge Tuttle stated that the defendant Phillips had appeared before him on at least two different occasions and *470 did not show any signs of being psychotic. Judge Tuttle concluded that the defendant Phillips had not presented sufficient evidence to warrant the appointment of a psychiatrist for examination purposes. Following the trial and conviction of the defendant Phillips, and in support of his motion for a new trial, his counsel urged as additional grounds for the appointment of a psychiatrist the fact that defendant Phillips took the stand during trial, contrary to the advice of his counsel, and denied committing the robbery, and later signed an affidavit admitting the robbery and exonerating defendant Palmer. Counsel also stated that Phillips was suspected of having homosexual tendencies, and contended that these additional factors cast further doubt upon defendant's rationality and indicated that he may have been insane at the time of trial. We agree with the trial court that these additional factors added nothing significant to the factors which were the basis of Judge Tuttle's earlier refusal to appoint a psychiatrist. On the other hand, at this stage of the proceedings, Judge Jordan, who had observed Phillips throughout several days of trial, was of the opinion that Phillips was sane. [4] In State v. Peterson, 90 Wash. 479, 482, 156 Pac. 542 (1916), the court stated: .... We agree with the trial court that the showing made as to the mental condition of Phillips was not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt of Phillips' mental responsibility either at the time of the crime charged or at the time of trial, and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a psychiatrist to examine Phillips. Defendant Phillips assigns as error the court's dismissal of his plea of not guilty by reason of mental irresponsibility. January 23, 1967, Phillips entered a general plea of not guilty to the offense of armed robbery. March 7, 1967, Phillips filed a special written plea in the following form: *472 [5] Attached thereto was the affidavit of counsel for Phillips, above set forth, containing the request for appointment of a psychiatrist. RCW 10.76.020 provides: After the state had presented its evidence and rested, counsel for Phillips, in his opening statement, announced to the jury that he had interposed a plea of not guilty by reason of mental irresponsibility. At this point, the prosecuting attorney objected, the jury retired, and in their absence the prosecuting attorney submitted to the court that the special plea of mental irresponsibility was inadequate and should be stricken because it did not allege whether the mental irresponsibility still existed. Counsel for Phillips orally moved for permission to amend the special plea of mental irresponsibility. The motion was granted. However, when the written amended plea was filed, it appeared that counsel for Phillips still relied solely upon the allegations in the affidavit, above set forth, filed previously in support of his request for a psychiatric examination. Since no additional facts relating to the mental condition of Phillips, either at the time of the offense charged or at the time of trial, were presented, the amended plea was stricken by the court as *473 not meeting the statutory requirements for a delayed plea of mental irresponsibility. We find no error in the rulings of the trial court that the original plea of not guilty by reason of mental irresponsibility and the delayed plea of mental irresponsibility be stricken as not meeting the requirements of RCW 10.76.020. State v. Biondic, 47 Wn.2d 593, 288 P.2d 845 (1955). Defendant Phillips assigns as error a comment made by the court immediately after the jury had been selected. The court stated to the jury: A motion for mistrial was made by counsel for Phillips. The court offered to correct the instruction, but counsel did not accept this offer, and later, on the same day, both defendants consented to separation of the jury. Under these circumstances, we find that the court's misstatement of the law was not of such a nature as to constitute reversible error. Defendant Palmer assigns as error the court's denial of his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. This motion is based upon an affidavit submitted by defendant Phillips following judgment and sentence. The affidavit reads as follows: /s/ Floyd R. Phillips *474 [6] In State v. Peele, 67 Wn.2d 724, 732, 409 P.2d 663 (1966), we stated: In the present case the state produced strong and convincing evidence of guilt of defendant Palmer. An eyewitness identified him as being at the scene of the robbery, wearing clothing which matched the clothing he was wearing at the time of his arrest 45 minutes later. The automobile he was driving matched the description of the automobile observed at the scene of the robbery. Discovered in that automobile was a .45 caliber pistol, identified as identical to the gun used in the robbery; a bag containing money, identified as the bag taken in the robbery; and a note identified as the note used in the robbery. Defendant Palmer admitted that the note was in his handwriting, but testified that he had written it several years before this particular robbery. Under these circumstances, the uncorroborated statement of his accomplice Phillips cannot be held to be of such significance and cogency that it would probably change the result of the trial. No assignment of error is made by defendant Phillips to the sentence which was imposed. However, in the interest of avoiding future litigation, if possible, we note that the sentence imposed upon Phillips is as follows: RCW 9.95.010 provides: [7] The law does not provide a maximum term for the crime of robbery. It was incumbent upon the court to fix the maximum term of defendant Phillips within the range between "not more than twenty years" and "not more than life imprisonment." To fix a "maximum" term of "not less than twenty years" fixes no maximum term within the meaning of RCW 9.95.010. In re McNutt v. Delmore, 47 Wn.2d 563, 565, 288 P.2d 848 (1955), holds: As to defendant Phillips, the case is remanded with instructions to the trial court to correct the erroneous sentence imposed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. As to the defendant Palmer, the judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., WEAVER, NEILL, and McGOVERN, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 438 P.2d 876. [] Judge Evans is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.