Case Title: Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Daphne Automotive, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1110840, 1110857

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:12/06/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
_________________________
1110840
_________________________
Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., d/b/a Bob Tyler Toyota
v.
Daphne Automotive, LLC, d/b/a Eastern Shore Toyota, and
Shawn Esfahani
_________________________
1110857
_________________________
Fred Keener
v.
Daphne Automotive, LLC, d/b/a Eastern Shore Toyota, and
Shawn Esfahani
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-10-900230)
1110840; 1110857
SHAW, Justice.
In these consolidated appeals, Pensacola Motor Sales,
Inc., d/b/a Bob Tyler Toyota ("BTT"), one of two named
defendants below, appeals in case no. 1110840 from a judgment
entered on a jury verdict in favor of Daphne Automotive, LLC,
d/b/a Eastern Shore Toyota ("EST"), and Shawn Esfahani, the
plaintiffs below, on the plaintiffs' claims seeking damages
for slander.  In case no. 1110857, Fred Keener, an employee of
BTT and a codefendant, similarly appeals from the judgment
against him and in favor of EST and Esfahani.
Facts and Procedural History
In December 2007, Esfahani, who was born in Iran but who
is a United States citizen, opened EST, an automobile
dealership selling Toyota vehicles, in Daphne.  Esfahani
serves as both owner and manager of EST.  EST is a direct
competitor of BTT, which has, since 1997, operated a Toyota-
brand automobile dealership in 
Pensacola, 
Florida.  
Bob Tyler,
president and sole owner of BTT, had competed with Esfahani 
for a new Toyota dealership that was to be opened in Baldwin
County.  The record suggests a history of "bad blood" between 
Esfahani and Tyler in that in 2010 they were also involved in 
2
1110840; 1110857
federal litigation related to alleged "cybersquatting" by EST
based on EST's online advertising practices; EST successfully
defended against BTT's claims.   
Esfahani 
ultimately 
learned 
of 
slanderous 
statements 
made
about him and/or EST by employees of BTT, including, in an
apparent effort to discourage potential customers from
purchasing from EST, BTT's agents' purportedly informing
customers that Esfahani and/or EST "are engaged in illegal
activity, are terrorists, or otherwise support terrorist
organizations." More specifically, BTT and its employees
purportedly 
referred to EST as "Middle Eastern Shore 
[Toyota]"
or "Taliban Toyota." 
In January 2010, EST and Esfahani sued BTT and Keener in
the Mobile Circuit Court, seeking damages based on claims of
slander 
per se, slander per quod, 
and intentional 
interference
with business relationships. As a result of the alleged
slanderous 
remarks by the defendants or their 
agents, 
Esfahani
and EST alleged that they "ha[d] been deprived of public
confidence that they had prior to said acts ... and [their]
business reputation has been damaged and the business has lost
profits and has otherwise been devalued." 
3
1110840; 1110857
The matter ultimately proceeded to a jury trial, during
which, 
according to the trial court, the evidence 
demonstrated
the following:
"The 
evidence 
at 
trial 
showed 
repeated 
instances
of defamation by the Defendants.  Pastor Michael
Bonham testified that BTT salesman Joe Carp[ ]
1
repeatedly told Bonham and his wife, Barbara Bonham,
that ... Esfahani ... was from Iraq, was 'funneling
money back over there to his family to help fund
terrorists,' and that Esfahani was 'hoping to try to
get [Carp's brother who was serving in the military
over there] in harm's way.' ...
"Mrs. Bonham test drove two vehicles with ...
Carp.  During both test drives, Carp made comments
'over and over, about ... well, at least I'm not a
terrorist [a]nd he would say something about Middle
Eastern Shore Toyota [and, again,] at least I'm not
a terrorist.' ... Between test drives, Carp
reiterated: 'You do understand that the owner over
there is from Iraq and that he indeed is shipping
money back over there to help pay for terrorists?'
... Throughout the Bonhams' visit to BTT, Carp
repeatedly asserted that Esfahani and [EST] were
terrorists or otherwise funded terrorism.
"As the Bonhams were leaving the dealership,
Carp introduced them to Defendant Fred Keener, BTT's
new car sales manager.  Keener unsuccessfully tried
to close a deal with the Bonhams.  When they could
not come to terms on price, Keener advised the
Bonhams: 'You do know that the owner from over there
at [EST] is from Iraq and that we refer to that ...
as Little Iraq and ... the owner over there is
sending money back to his family over in Iraq to
fund terrorists.' ... Both Bonhams also testified
Carp's employment was terminated by BTT before the
1
underlying complaint was filed.
4
1110840; 1110857
that Keener attempted to dissuade them from even
visiting EST by questioning their patriotism:
'You're a patriotic American, aren't you? ... well,
you need to think about that then' and 'you just
need to keep all that in mind'; and, 'remember your
American patriotism ...' ...
"Despite the efforts of Keener and Carp, the
Bonhams did visit EST, but not before debating the
propriety of shopping at EST. Pastor Bonham
testified the Bonhams had significant misgivings
about EST.  Once at EST, however, the Bonhams' 
fears were allayed, and they decided to buy a car.
While Ms. Bonham was signing the paperwork, Carp
called the Bonhams' cell phone to re-engage in
purchase negotiations.  When Pastor Bonham informed
him the Bonhams had decided to buy a car from [EST],
Carp responded: 'I can't believe you're funding
terrorists through that organization like that.  You
know he's from Iraq and you know he's sending money
over to his family and you're trying to kill my
brother.' ...
"Pastor Bonham reported this conversation with
Carp to EST management.  After [Esfahani and EST]
had received a number of reports that BTT salesmen
were making slanderous statements about them (most
notably, but not solely, from the Bonhams),
[Esfahani and EST] sent BTT a cease and desist
letter on July 31, 2009.  [Esfahani and EST]
specifically cited Carp's conduct and demanded a
retraction.  By letter dated August 24, 2009, BTT'S
attorney responded to [Esfahani and EST's] letter
stating BTT had 'made a determination that one of
the employees might have made an inappropriate
remark and swiftly disciplined the employee.'  BTT's
'swift discipline' turned out to be warning Carp
that he would be fired the next time he slandered
EST.
"... 
Esfahani 
testified he 
filed 
this lawsuit 
in
January 2010 because [BTT and Keener] continued
making slanderous statements even after the July 31,
5
1110840; 1110857
2009, cease and desist letter.  Testimony from
another witness, Ms. Linda Hurst, suggests BTT may
have 
actually 
increased 
its 
assault 
against
[Esfahani and EST].  Ms. Hurst testified that in
March or April 2010 she and her husband shopped [at]
BTT. ...  When the Hursts informed their salesman
that they intended to shop other dealers, including
EST, the salesman responded:  'You don't want to go
over there.  That guy is a terrorist and he supports
terrorists. 
He 
sends 
all 
of 
his 
money 
to
terrorists.' ... This unknown BTT salesman was
neither Carp nor Keener. ...
"Patricia Gibson worked at BTT for about eight
months in 2007-2008. ... She testified that BTT
salespeople regularly referred to EST as 'Taliban
Toyota' and told customers indicating an interest in
buying a vehicle from EST that [Esfahani and EST]
were terrorists 'supporting the Taliban.' ...  The
BTT sales team also made these statements in sales
meetings.  And, if a salesman could not close a deal
with a customer, he was instructed to tell the
customer that 'Esfahani was supporting the Taliban
and they shouldn't send their money over there....'
...  These types of defamatory statements were 'a
common practice' among salesmen and sales managers
and were made by Keener 'like on a daily basis....' 
"Josh Wilson, a veteran BTT salesman (since
2006) testified by deposition that he frequently
heard BTT salesmen refer to [Esfahani and EST] as
'Taliban Toyota' and that this term was used
throughout BTT by Keener -- on the sales floor, in
the sales meeting area, and at the sales managers'
station in the sales tower.  Wilson also heard
Keener refer to [Esfahani and EST] as 'Middle
Eastern Shore Toyota' and 'terrorists,' and he
testified that Keener used this kind of language to
get salesmen to discourage customers from ever even
visiting EST.  Shortly after [Esfahani and EST]
presented Wilson's testimony at trial, BTT fired
Wilson.
6
1110840; 1110857
"[Esfahani and EST] also adduced testimony from
Bob Tyler (BTT's sole owner) and Verne Hilt (BTT's
general manager) that Keener (or the sales manager
on duty at the time), was required to talk to every
customer before he or she left the dealership. ...
Hilt also testified that Keener was responsible for
'train[ing] the salespeople on what to say when
talking to a customer.' ...  And, Bob Tyler admitted
BTT's practice of 'loading the salesman's lips,'
i.e., telling the salesmen what to say to customers.
...  The clear implication of this evidence is that
every customer who visited BTT's dealership since
2008 until at least March 2010 has heard, either
directly from Keener or from a salesman whose 'lips
were loaded' by Keener, that [Esfahani and EST]
support terrorism and are actively involved in
promoting attacks against the United States and its
citizens."
 
In addition, Esfahani and EST offered testimony from an
economist who specializes in the automobile industry, Dr.
Ernest H. Manuel, Jr., Ph.D., who, by means of a "lost profits
analysis," opined that, as a result of the slanderous comments
by the defendants, EST had suffered damage in the form of lost
sales 
totaling 
approximately 
$7.1 
million. 
 
Esfahani 
testified
that, in his estimation, not only was  Manuel's estimate of
EST's losses conservative, but he had also personally been
damaged by BTT's and Keener's conduct in excess of that
amount.
At the conclusion of the four-day trial, the jury found
for Esfahani and EST against both BTT and Keener on the
7
1110840; 1110857
remaining slander claims.   Specifically, as to his slander
2
per se charge against both BTT and Keener, the jury awarded
Esfahani $1,250,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in
punitive damages; as to the slander per se and slander per
quod claims of EST against both BTT and Keener, the jury
awarded EST $1,250,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000
in punitive damages.  The trial court entered  judgment
accordingly.  
BTT and Keener filed various postjudgment motions seeking
relief from or an amendment of the trial court's judgment or
a new trial and/or a remittitur of the jury's damages awards. 
After the time for ruling on those motions was extended by
agreement of the parties, see Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the
At the close of Esfahani and EST's case, upon BTT's
2
renewal of, among other motions, its motion seeking a "summary
judgment" as to the intentional-interference-with-business-
relations claim included in the complaint, Esfahani and EST
voluntarily withdrew that count.  Further, at the close of all
the evidence, Esfahani and EST dismissed the slander per quod
claim as to Esfahani, individually, with regard to both BTT
and Keener. Thus, the claims presented for the jury's
consideration included the slander per se claims of both
Esfahani and EST and the slander per quod claim of EST.   
8
1110840; 1110857
trial court, following a hearing, entered a lengthy order
denying the motions in full.  Both BTT and Keener appeal.3
Discussion
On appeal, BTT and Keener contend that the trial court
erred in failing to grant them a new trial based on certain
alleged evidentiary errors they maintain resulted in the
jury's allegedly erroneous award of excessive damages. 
Alternatively, BTT and Keener maintain that they are 
entitled,
under the guideposts set out in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and the factors articulated in
Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989), to a
remittitur of both the jury's compensatory-damages and
punitive-damages awards to Esfahani and EST. 
I.  Evidentiary Rulings
Standard of Review
"'"'The standard applicable to a
review of a trial court's rulings on the
admission of evidence is determined by two
fundamental principles.  The first grants
trial judges wide discretion to exclude or
Although BTT and Keener filed separate notices of appeal
3
and separate briefs to this Court, the content of their
respective briefs appears, for the most part, virtually
indistinguishable.
9
1110840; 1110857
to admit evidence.'"  Mock v. Allen, 783
So. 2d 828, 835 (Ala. 2000) (quoting 
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Thompson, 726 So.
2d 651, 655 (Ala. 1998)). ...
"'"'The second principle "is that a
judgment cannot be reversed on appeal for
an error [in the improper admission of
evidence] unless ... it should appear that
the error complained of has probably
injuriously affected substantial rights of
the parties."'"  Mock, 783 So. 2d at 835
(quoting Wal–Mart Stores, 726 So. 2d at
655, quoting in turn Atkins v. Lee, 603 So.
2d 937, 941 (Ala. 1992)).  See also Ala. R.
App. P. 45.  "The burden of establishing
that an erroneous ruling was prejudicial is
on the appellant." Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Ryan, 589 So. 2d 165, 167 (Ala.
1991).'
"Middleton v. Lightfoot, 885 So. 2d 111, 113–14
(Ala. 2003) (emphasis omitted)."
Wood v. Hayes, 104 So. 3d 863, 870 (Ala. 2012).
A.  Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Previous Federal
Litigation
Keener initially contends that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence concerning the prior "cybersquatting"
litigation initiated by BTT against Esfahani and EST in
federal court.  The trial court concluded that "the excluded
evidence, if admitted, would have likely resulted in undue
delay and waste of time on this case" and that it was, thus,
"properly excluded under Rules 402 and 403, [Ala. R. Evid.]." 
10
1110840; 1110857
Keener argues that the exclusion of the referenced
evidence "[kept] the jury from hearing about [EST and
Esfahani's] 
alleged 
improper 
advertising 
techniques." 
(Keener's brief, at 42.)  In support of his assertion that the
exclusion of the evidence amounted to error, Keener points to
Rules 401 and 402, Ala. R. Evid., which generally allow for
the admission of "[a]ll relevant evidence" unless otherwise
excluded.  Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid.  Keener maintains that
"evidence of the issues raised in the cybersquatting lawsuit
was clearly relevant" as a possible "motivation for [EST and
Esfahani's] filing of the instant litigation" and that
"[e]vidence of [EST and Esfahani's] reputation was certainly
relevant and material" as a defense to their slander claims. 
(Keener's brief, at 42, 43.)  He further argues that the
evidence would have aided jurors in understanding the
competitive nature of the automobile sales industry.
According to EST and Esfahani, this issue was not
preserved for review.  Specifically, they contend that Keener
did not attempt to introduce this evidence at trial.  When
there is no indication in the record that a trial court's
ruling on a motion in limine was absolute or unconditional,
the proponent of the contested evidence must attempt to admit
11
1110840; 1110857
the evidence at trial and obtain a specific adverse ruling in
order to preserve the issue for appellate review.  Evans v.
Fruehauf Corp., 647 So. 2d 718, 720 (Ala. 1994); Bush v.
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 175, 177-78
(Ala. 1991); and State v. Askew, 455 So.2d 36, 37 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1984).  Although the trial court did grant EST and
Esfahani's pretrial motion in limine seeking to exclude any
reference to the prior federal litigation, Keener does not
contend  that he attempted to admit the contested evidence at
trial and received an adverse ruling.  Thus, for all that
appears, this issue has not been preserved for review.4
B.  Admission of Alleged Hearsay
Both BTT and Keener contend that the trial court erred in
permitting 
the 
introduction 
of 
inadmissible 
hearsay 
testimony. 
See Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid. ("'Hearsay' is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."), and Rule 802, Ala. R. Evid. ("Hearsay
is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by
We further question whether the challenged evidence was,
4
as Keener maintains, relevant.  Specifically, we note that EST
and Esfahani were apparently 
successful in the federal action.
12
1110840; 1110857
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama or by
statute.").  More specifically, according to BTT and Keener,
the allegedly inadmissible evidence 
"consisted 
of 
hearsay 
evidence 
through 
...
Esfahani's testimony that unnamed employees of EST
told him that unnamed customers of EST told them
that unnamed employees of BTT told these unnamed
customers slanderous statements regarding EST and/or
... Esfahani. ... It also consisted of testimony
from Linda Hurst as to what an employee of EST told
her that unnamed customers of BTT had told him. ..."
(BTT's brief, at 48; Keener's brief, at 46.)  Both BTT and
Keener include selected excerpts of testimony they say
demonstrate the multiple levels of hearsay inherent in the
challenged testimony.  Further, 
BTT 
and Keener clearly dispute
the trial court's finding
"that the challenged testimony was, by definition,
not 'hearsay' because it was not offered to prove
the truth of the matters asserted within the
statements testified to:  that [EST and Esfahani]
were terrorists, part of a 'Taliban Toyota'
terrorist organization responsible for funding or
otherwise supporting terrorism in the Middle East,
including the Taliban and terrorists in Iraq."
Other than the argument that the identified statements
were clearly offered to demonstrate the truth of the matter
asserted, i.e., "that an employee of BTT made slanderous
statements 
regarding [EST and Esfahani]," they do not 
identify
any actual authority demonstrating that, in reaching its 
13
1110840; 1110857
conclusion quoted above, the trial court erred.  (BTT's brief,
at 52; Keener's brief, at 49.)  Instead, in support of this
claim, BTT and Keener rely solely on Armstrong v. HRB Royalty,
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Ala. 2005), which, they say,
represents "[t]he reported decision that is closest to the
facts of this case."  (BTT's brief, at 53; Keener's brief, at
50.)  There is no discussion of those purportedly comparable
facts or application of those facts to the trial court's
conclusion here, nor is there a pinpoint citation to the
portion of Armstrong where the district court purportedly
rejected the rationale embraced by the trial court in this
case.   There is also no discussion in BTT's and Keener's
5
original briefs as to whether any of the challenged statements
were permitted as one of the many noted exceptions to the
hearsay rule.  
Armstrong arose in the context of a franchise dispute and
5
hinged upon resolution of a motion in limine seeking to
exclude the admission of the terms of a settlement offer
extended by one party to the other in prior litigation between
the parties.  The district court considered Rule 408, Fed. R.
Evid. (concerning an offer to compromise), Rule 402, Fed. R.
Evid. (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible), and Rule 403,
Fed. R. Evid. (relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is outweighed by its potential prejudice).  As
EST and Esfahani observe, neither slander nor hearsay figure
in Armstrong. 
14
1110840; 1110857
In any event, the challenged testimony was cumulative of
testimony given by numerous other witnesses, whose testimony
BTT and Keener do not challenge.  As the trial court noted in
its order denying the defendants' postjudgment motions:
"[A]ny attempt by Defendants to show that the
admission of this evidence affected the result of
the trial would fail.  At trial, in addition to the
testimony of ... Esfahani, [EST and Esfahani]
offered the testimony of Pastor and Mrs. Barbara
Bonham, Linda Hurst, Josh Barlow, Patricia Gibson
and Josh Wilson, each of whom testified to repeated
and significant slanderous statements which qualify
as slander per se.  Accordingly, if the testimony
challenged by [BTT and Keener] were considered
hearsay, it was merely cumulative of this other
testimony proving [BTT and Keener's] defamatory
statements (to which no such error is or can be
attributed).  Cf., e.g. Thompson v. State, 527 So.
2d 777 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (refusing to overturn
Court's admission of hearsay as such was cumulative
of other admissible evidence on the same issue).
"Moreover, 
Bob 
Tyler, 
BTT's 
sole 
owner, 
admitted
these statements were made by BTT employees. His
defense was that such statements were not harmful
because they were not believable."
Therefore, BTT and Keener fail to demonstrate either that the
trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting the
challenged testimony or that the alleged erroneous admission
of any of the statements "probably injuriously affected
[their] substantial rights."  Wood, supra.  
C.  Exclusion of Financial Evidence
15
1110840; 1110857
BTT and Keener next contend that the trial court erred in
excluding from evidence at trial Esfahani's personal tax
returns as well as tax returns from a Hyundai dealership also
owned by Esfahani and in preventing the questioning of
Esfahani regarding personal losses he had sustained in the
stock market.  According to BTT and Keener, this ruling
prevented them from countering Esfahani's damages claims by
demonstrating that "any alleged decline in the sales of EST
was the result of a decline [in Esfahani's personal] financial
situation."  (Keener's brief, at 52.)  Relying on Rules 401
and 402, Ala. R. Evid., they argue that all the excluded
evidence was "relevant to the issue of whether or not
[Esfahani and EST] had sufficient financial resources to
effectively 
operate 
[EST]" 
and 
was, 
thus, 
improperly 
excluded. 
(BTT's brief, at 56; Keener's brief, at 54.)
Esfahani argues -- and BTT and Keener fail to dispute --
that Esfahani's personal tax returns were, in fact, 
ultimately
introduced into evidence, because they were included on a disk
containing all the information reviewed by the damages expert
retained by EST and Esfahani and the disk was admitted into
evidence at trial.  Therefore, any challenge with respect to
the exclusion of those particular documents is without merit.
16
1110840; 1110857
Finally, this Court is unconvinced that either Esfahani's
personal tax returns and evidence of his personal financial
losses or evidence pertaining to the financial status of a
separate business entity owned by Esfahani were, as BTT and
Keener argue, relevant to the issues below.  Specifically,
nothing before us suggests that EST was not a properly formed
corporate entity, separate from and independent of any other
corporate entity owned by Esfahani.  Additionally, the record
reflects that Esfahani made no claim based on any alleged
damage to his Hyundai dealership as a result of BTT's and
Keener's conduct and that his individual claim excluded any
recovery for special damages.  Thus, there is nothing
indicating that the trial court erred in evaluating the
relevancy and admissibility of the challenged evidence.
D. Alleged Evidentiary Errors related to the
testimony of Dr. Ernest Manuel, Jr., Ph.D.
BTT and Keener raise claims of error with regard to the
trial court's admission of the testimony of Manuel, the
damages expert retained by Esfahani and EST: that Manuel was
improperly allowed to testify as to opinions based on facts
that were inadmissible or that were not in evidence and that
Manuel's testimony was due to be excluded based on the alleged
17
1110840; 1110857
failure of Esfahani and EST to timely supplement Manuel's
initial report.  There is no merit to these claims for several
reasons.
1. Procedural History Related to these Issues
The record shows that BTT and Keener moved the trial
court to exclude Manuel's testimony on numerous grounds,
including the ground that a 62-page supplemental report from
Manuel was produced after the discovery deadline established
by the trial court's scheduling order; alternatively, BTT and
Keener requested that they be allowed to re-depose Manuel. 
The trial court denied the motion to exclude but ordered that
they be afforded the opportunity to re-depose Manuel. 
After this second deposition, BTT and Keener moved the
trial court, pursuant to Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., to exclude
Manuel's testimony and reports as a discovery sanction on
grounds that EST and Esfahani had failed to properly
supplement their expert's disclosures and had produced
Manuel's supplemental reports "less than one month before the
scheduled trial date and after ... the extended discovery
deadline."  (BTT's brief, at p. 4.)  This motion was also
denied.
18
1110840; 1110857
At trial, BTT continuously objected to Manuel's testimony
on the ground that Manuel was purportedly basing his opinion
on facts and/or information that had not been admitted into
evidence; the trial court, citing Rule 703, Ala. R. Evid.,6
denied BTT's objection but allowed a continuing exception. 
BTT also objected to portions of Manuel's testimony on the
ground that the opinion stated by Manuel
 
"was based on information that Dr. Manuel got from
somebody else's opinion about what may happen in the
future.  That opinion testimony is not from an
expert qualified in this court. ..."
The trial court similarly denied that objection by BTT based
on its conclusion that Rule 703 permitted an expert to testify
as to all "information perceived by or made available to
[him]" and noted that "if [BTT had] a problem with the
information [Manuel] perceived or that's been made available
to him, [BTT] would be permitted to attack that on cross[-
examination]."  Thereafter, as mentioned in Part  I.C., supra,
a disk purportedly containing the entirety of the information
Rule 703, Ala. R. Evid., provides that "[t]he facts or
6
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to the expert at or before the hearing."
19
1110840; 1110857
relied on by Manuel was entered into evidence by agreement of
the parties.  
2. Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, BTT and Keener contend that certain facts
relied upon by Manuel were not in evidence or were not 
admissible and that the trial court thus erred in permitting
his testimony.  In support of this claim of error, BTT and
Keener rely on authority stating that Rule 703 did not alter
the rule requiring that the information upon which the expert
relies must be in evidence.  See, e.g., Ex parte Deardorff, 6
So. 3d 1235, 1242 (Ala. 2008) ("It is clear that under Alabama
law the State must introduce into evidence the information
upon which an expert relies." (citation omitted)); Ex parte
Wesley, 575 So. 2d 127, 129 (Ala. 1990).  Specifically, the
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 703, citing C. Gamble,
McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 127.01(5) (4th ed. 1991), state: 
"Rule 703 leaves unaffected the preexisting Alabama law
requiring that the facts or data relied upon by the expert,
and gotten by the expert other than by firsthand knowledge,
generally must be admitted into evidence." However, that same
note explains that facts about which an expert testifies and
that may be made known to him or her outside the hearing
20
1110840; 1110857
"include[] data presented to the expert by means other than
personal 
perception, such as through the opinions, records, 
or
reports of others."  Id.  The note further explains that "the
Alabama case law generally precluding an opinion based upon
the unadmitted records or reports of others does recognize
exceptions."  Id.  (emphasis added). 
BTT and Keener point to data purportedly relied upon by
Manuel, including prior studies of how dealers react to new
dealers in the market, data supporting a damages model,
"registration data," projections as to automobile industry
growth, "discount rates," and "etc.," as not having been 
admitted into evidence.  There is no discussion in BTT's and
Keener's briefs as to whether the disk entered in evidence
containing "all" of Manuel's data, as mentioned in Part I.C.,
supra, contained this data.  Further, there is no discussion
as to whether Manuel's testimony fell within one of the
recognized exceptions in Rule 703 and mentioned above. 
Finally, and most importantly, there is no discussion of how
the failure to admit this allegedly missing data prejudiced
BTT and Keener.  Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. ("No judgment may be
reversed ... on the ground of ... the improper admission or
rejection of evidence ... unless in the opinion of the court
21
1110840; 1110857
to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an
examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the
error complained of has probably injuriously affected
substantial rights of the parties.").  Instead, we have a list
of data, an assertion that the data was not in evidence, and
a conclusion that reversible error therefore occurred.  This
is not sufficient to convince this Court that the trial court
exceeded its discretion in allowing Manuel's testimony. 
BTT and Keener separately point to "the Auto Pacific
Projections" as data relied on by Manuel, which, they argue,
was neither "properly admitted" into evidence nor admissible. 
(BTT's brief, at 58; Keener's brief, at 56.)  They cite Rules
701 and 702, Ala. R. Evid., as support for their contention
that the evidence represented opinion testimony from other
than a qualified expert.
BTT's and Keener's briefs assert, but do not demonstrate,
that the "Auto Pacific Projections" were opinions and were not
competent data upon which Manuel could rely as a basis for his
testimony.  There is no discussion as to how the projections
Manuel purportedly relied upon were faulty, incomplete, or
unreliable.  No authority is cited demonstrating that such
evidence is inadmissible.  BTT and Keener also fail to counter
22
1110840; 1110857
Esfahani and EST's contention that the evidence was merely
cumulative of other data reviewed and discussed by Manuel. 
See Leiser v. Raymond R. Fletcher, M.D., P.C., 978 So. 2d 700,
705 (Ala. 2007) (holding that erroneous admission of merely
cumulative evidence is harmless).  Nothing demonstrates that
the trial court exceeded its discretion on this issue.
Finally, BTT and Keener argue that the trial court erred
in failing to exclude Manuel's testimony and reports as a
discovery sanction.  This Court has repeatedly 
recognized 
that
a trial court has broad and considerable discretion in
controlling the discovery process.  See, e.g., Ex parte Vulcan
Materials Co., 992 So. 2d 1252, 1259 (Ala. 2008). The
authorities cited by BTT and Keener emphasize the "absolute
duty" imposed upon parties by Rule 26(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. (and
by the scheduling order entered by the trial court in this
case), to properly and timely supplement discovery when
appropriate.  As BTT and Keener also acknowledge in their
briefs to this Court, however, that rule provides no explicit
sanction should a party fail to supplement, and the Committee 
Comments to that rule suggest both that sanctions for
violating the rule will typically be imposed only "sparingly"
and in "limited instances" and that the options, at the trial
23
1110840; 1110857
court's discretion, in such cases include "'exclusion of
evidence, continuance, or other action, as the Court may deem
appropriate.'" (BTT's brief, at 63; Keener's brief, at 67)
(quoting Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 26, Ala.
R. Civ. P. (emphasis added)).  
BTT and Keener cite nothing showing that the trial
court's 
actions here, 
which denied the requested exclusion but
alternatively permitted BTT and Keener the opportunity to re-
depose Manuel on the allegedly untimely supplementation,
exceeded the latitude afforded it.  Moreover, although they
cite federal caselaw establishing a four-factor test to be
applied in evaluating the propriety of sanctions pursuant to
Rule 26, there is no discussion or argument actually applying
those factors to the circumstances presented here.  Instead,
they reference –- solely by means of citation to other
authorities -- only the time when they initially learned of
the withheld information and the alleged willfulness behind
the purported failure to timely supplement.
The trial court resolved this particular claim in its
order denying the postjudgment motions of BTT and Keener as
follows:
24
1110840; 1110857
"The Court rejected each of [BTT and Keener's]
arguments [challenging the admission of testimony
from Manuel] prior to or during the trial.  The
Defendants have offered nothing new to their
previously rejected arguments.  The Defendants
retained an expert but declined to call him to
challenge 
Dr. 
Manuel's 
methodology 
or 
damage
calculations.  Moreover, [BTT and Keener] elected
not to request a special verdict form which would
have required the jury to assess damages separately
for slander per se (for which damages are presumed)
and slander per quod (for which the Plaintiff must
show special, monetary damages).  Consequently, the
jury rendered a general verdict in favor of [EST] on
claims of slander per se and slander per quod.  The
Court cannot now speculate on how the jury
apportioned [its] verdict, if at all, and [BTT and
Keener] could not show, if they tried, that the
admission of Dr. Manuel's opinion affected the
damages assessed for slander per quod.  Regardless,
the Court expressly finds that [Esfahani and EST]
presented 
more 
than 
sufficient 
testimony 
and
evidence to support the jury's verdict even if all
compensatory damages could be apportioned to the
slander per quod claims."
(Emphasis added.)  BTT and Keener do not address the trial
court's findings, as set out above, or counter its conclusion
that, given the general nature of the jury's verdict, they
cannot demonstrate the prejudice necessary to support a
finding of reversible error, even assuming that Manuel's
testimony and reports were improperly admitted.  They are,
therefore, due no relief on this claim. 
II.  Excessiveness of Damages Awards
A.  Compensatory Damages
25
1110840; 1110857
Although BTT and Keener maintain that this case presents
an issue of first impression for this Court, namely "the
amount of proof necessary for an award of substantial damages
in a slander action," the standard for reviewing a jury's
damages award in an action involving claims of slander per se
is well established.  (BTT's brief, at I; Keener's brief, at
1.)  As both BTT and Keener acknowledge, this Court has
previously explained:
"'[D]amage is implied by law when spoken words are
found to be slander per se.'  Anderton v. Gentry,
577 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Ala. 1991), see also Sunshine
Invs., Inc. v. Brooks, 642 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala.
1994).  Words found to be slander per se 'relieve
the plaintiff of the requirement of proving "actual
harm to reputation or any other damage" in order to
recover nominal or compensatory damages.' Nelson v.
Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1092 (Ala.
1988), quoting W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of
Torts § 112, at 788 (5th ed. 1984)."
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Daugherty, 840 So. 2d 152, 157
(Ala. 2002) (emphasis added).
1.  Esfahani
BTT and Keener initially appear to contend that evidence
presented by Esfahani, which was aimed at establishing both
damage to his reputation and mental anguish suffered by him as
a result of the slanderous statements made by BTT and Keener,
was insufficient to sustain the jury's compensatory award. 
26
1110840; 1110857
They cite, in support of that claim, cases aimed at
establishing the quality of the evidence necessary to
establish actual damages.  Those cases, however, excepting
Daugherty, supra, appear inapposite in that they do not
involve a finding of slander per se and a corresponding award;
instead, they concern, generally, the sufficiency of evidence
to sustain a jury's award of mental-anguish damages.7
In Daugherty, this Court reiterated the general rule
"that when a defamatory statement is slanderous per se, the
law infers injury to reputation and the plaintiff is relieved
of the requirement of proving actual harm to reputation or any
other damage."  840 So. 2d at 160.  Nonetheless, we analyzed
See, e.g., Slack v. Stream, 988 So. 2d 516, 532-33 (Ala.
7
2008) (declining to remit mental-anguish-damages award on
plaintiff's claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and
intentional interference with a business contract); Kmart
Corp. v. Kyles, 723 So. 2d 572, 579 (Ala. 1998) (concluding
that 
jury's 
$100,000 
compensatory-damages 
award 
on 
plaintiff's
claim of malicious prosecution was not supported by the
evidence); Sperau v. Ford Motor Co., 674 So. 2d 24, 41-42
(Ala. 1995) (affirming 
trial 
court's remittitur of damages for
mental anguish in consideration of evidence adduced at trial
of plaintiff's fraud-based claims); and Warren v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 739 So. 2d 1125, 1132-33 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)
(affirming the trial court's summary judgment as to the
plaintiff's claims of libel and slander based 
upon plaintiff's
failure to produce substantial evidence of actual malice of
defendants, who were public officials, in making the subject
statements).
27
1110840; 1110857
the defendants' argument that the jury's compensatory-damages
award was not supported by the evidence.  We noted, as does
the trial court here, that based upon the applicable
presumption, the jury's award was not assumed to be based
solely on the plaintiff's testimony aimed at establishing
resulting mental anguish.  840 So. 2d at 162.  We then
recounted the plaintiff's evidence concerning the suffering
allegedly experienced and concluded that, even had the entire
award been intended as recompense for the plaintiff's mental
anguish, 
the award was "sufficiently grounded" in the 
evidence
to be sustained.  840 So. 2d at 163.  
Here, the jury clearly returned a verdict in favor of
both Esfahani and EST and against BTT and Keener on the claim
of slander per se. As the trial court noted in its
postjudgment order:
"[BTT 
and 
Keener's] 
arguments 
for 
the
excessiveness of ... Esfahani's compensatory damages
award centers on two related assumptions that are
contrary 
to 
the 
law: 
(1) 
the 
verdict 
for
compensatory damages in favor of ... Esfahani was
based entirely, mostly or even partly on the mental
anguish he suffered, and (2) ... Esfahani would be
required to prove mental anguish damages at all in
order to recover compensatory damages.
"Contrary to [BTT and Keener's] argument,
general damages that are presumed to flow from
defamation per se include the loss or impairment of
28
1110840; 1110857
reputation and/or standing in the community and
mental anguish or suffering.  Daugherty, 840 So. 2d
at 182.  The Plaintiff need not prove any mental
anguish since it is assumed to flow from the very
nature of the defamatory words spoken in a per se
case."
(Emphasis in original.)  
In light of the applicable standard discussed in
Daugherty, Esfahani need not 
have presented evidence of either
damage to his reputation or mental anguish, because both were
presumed.  Regardless, as in Daugherty, Esfahani did present
evidence establishing the fear and worry –- for his safety and
the safety of his business and his family –- that he had
experienced after being repeatedly linked to terrorist
activity.  See Daugherty, 840 So. 2d at 163 ("'Mental anguish
includes anxiety, embarrassment, anger, fear, frustration,
disappointment, worry, annoyance, and inconvenience.'")
(quoting Horton Homes, Inc. v. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44, 53 (Ala.
2001)).  He further explained the political persecution that
led him to leave Iran and come to the United States as a
teenage refugee and the resulting horror he felt on being
accused of both funding terrorism and of being an enemy of the
country he loves and is proud to call "home."  According to
Esfahani's own testimony, his fears in this regard were so
29
1110840; 1110857
strong that he considered selling his businesses and moving
his family to Spain.  Additionally, as touched on previously,
Esfahani, without objection, estimated the value 
of the 
damage
to his personal reputation as "be[ing] in excess of 7.2
million dollars." 
We need not engage in any discussion of society's
attitude toward and opinion of terrorists and terrorist
activity and how allegations of such activity may have
impacted Esfahani.  As Esfahani and EST note, BTT and Keener
fail to identify authority mandating a different result than
that reached by the trial court.
2.  EST
BTT and Keener similarly challenge the amount of the
jury's compensatory-damages award to EST.  More specifically,
they argue that "[t]he award of compensatory damages to EST is
excessive and based on speculation as to the amount of lost
sales."  (BTT's brief, at 80; Keener's brief, at 80.)  In
support of this claim, they allege that EST failed to present
evidence of actual damage to its reputation and that the only
evidence of any actual lost sales and profits came from
Manuel, whose testimony they maintain was speculative.
30
1110840; 1110857
As discussed above, Manuel's testimony was properly
admitted into evidence at trial.  He indicated that EST had
suffered $7.1 million in damage.  Such evidence supports the
jury's award of $1,250,000 in compensatory damages on EST's
slander per se and slander per quod claims, which was
significantly less than the lost profits to which Manuel
actually testified.
As the trial court noted, nothing suggests that the
majority of the compensatory-damages award to EST was related
to EST's slander per quod claim.  Instead, EST also asserted
–- and proved -– the same slander per se arguments advanced by
Esfahani; therefore, the damage to its reputation, which
resulted in a compensatory-damages award in an amount
identical to that awarded to Esfahani, was both similarly
presumed and, as discussed above, demonstrated by the
evidence.  See, e.g., Daugherty, 840 So. 2d at 157. 
Finally, in Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 506 So.
2d 317 (Ala. 1987), this Court provided the following 
explanation with regard to a lost-profits analysis:
"'The rule in Alabama concerning proof
of lost profits was set forth in Paris v.
Buckner Feed Mill, Inc., 279 Ala. 148, 149,
182 So. 2d 880, 881 (1966), by Justice
Simpson:
31
1110840; 1110857
"'"... In order that it may be a
recoverable element of damages,
the loss of profits must be the
natural and proximate, or direct,
result of the breach complained
of and they must also be capable
of ascertainment with reasonable,
or 
sufficient, 
certainty, 
or
there must be some basis on which
a reasonable estimate of the
amount of the profit can be made;
absolute certainty is not called
for or required." (Emphasis added
[in Morgan v. South Central Bell
Telephone Co., 466 So. 2d 107
(Ala. 1985)].)
"'This general rule is applied in most
states, and is referred to as the rule of
"reasonable certainty."  The United States
Supreme Court, in Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 U.S. 555,
51 S. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1931), stated
that this rule precludes only those damages
not resulting from the wrong, allowing
damages stemming from the wrong but
uncertain in amount.'
"Morgan v. South Central Bell [Telephone Co.], [466
So. 2d] at 115-16 [(Ala. 1985)]."
506 So. 2d at 327.  "The holding in Morgan is that Alabama
jury verdicts awarding lost profits will be affirmed if the
plaintiff provides a 'basis upon which the jury could, with
reasonable certainty, calculate the amount of profits which
were lost as a result of' defendant's wrongful actions."  Id.
32
1110840; 1110857
Here, despite engaging in a thorough and sifting cross-
examination aimed at undermining Manuel's calculations, BTT
and Keener fail to demonstrate that the estimations of Manuel,
who they conceded was an expert in the field, as to the 
business EST likely lost as a result of BTT's and Keener's
slander is unreasonable. 
B.  Punitive Damages
Finally, BTT and Keener contend that, in the absence of
a new trial, they are entitled to a remittitur of the jury's
punitive-damages awards to Esfahani and EST based on alleged
excessiveness.  BTT and Keener urge this Court that an
evaluation 
of the challenged awards pursuant to the 
guideposts
set forth in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996), and the factors outlined in Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989), called for -- and that
the trial court therefore erred in failing to order -- a
reduction of the jury's punitive-damages awards.
As recently reiterated by the Court of Civil Appeals in
Tanner v. Ebbole, 88 So. 3d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), the
requisite analysis includes consideration of the following
factors:
33
1110840; 1110857
"The Gore guideposts are: '(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2)
the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'  State
Farm [Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell], 538 U.S.
[408] at 418 [(2003)] (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at
575). The Hammond–Green Oil factors are:
"'"(1) 
the 
reprehensibility 
of 
[the
defendant's] conduct; (2) the relationship
of the punitive-damages award to the harm
that actually occurred, or is likely to
occur, from [the defendant's] conduct; (3)
[the 
defendant's] 
profit 
from 
[his]
misconduct; 
(4) 
[the 
defendant's] 
financial
position; (5) the cost to [the plaintiff]
of the litigation; (6) whether [the
defendant] has been subject to criminal
sanctions for similar conduct; and (7)
other civil actions [the defendant] has
been involved in arising out of similar
conduct."'
"Ross v. Rosen–Rager, 67 So. 3d 29, 41–42 (Ala.
2010) (quoting Shiv–Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d
299, 317 (Ala. 2003) (paraphrasing the Hammond–
Green Oil factors))."
88 So. 3d at 870-71.
  
In connection with BTT's and Keener's postjudgment
motions, the trial court heard and evaluated the evidence
presented by BTT and Keener, which was aimed at establishing
each of the Gore guideposts and the Hammond-Green Oil factors. 
As reflected in its postjudgment order, following a lengthy
34
1110840; 1110857
analysis, the trial court ultimately concluded that "each
factor under Hammond, Green Oil, Gore, and State Farm [Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.  v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)] (to the
extent it applies in this case), weighs against a finding of
excessiveness and supports the propriety of the Jury's
punitive damages assessment." The trial court further
explained its decision declining to reduce the punitive-
damages awards:
"The Court finds that [BTT's and Keener's]
slanderous 
attacks 
on 
[Esfahani's 
and 
EST's]
reputations are deserving of Alabama law's '"most
severe condemnation, its highest blameworthiness and
its most deserving culpability,"' [Tanner v.]
Ebbole, [88 So. 3d 856, 873 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)
(quoting with approval,  Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010))].  The record, when viewed as a whole, 'makes
it probable that the jury's verdict was motivated by
a legitimate concern for punishing and deterring'
the Defendants, rather than by bias, passion or
prejudice.' TXO [Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443,] at 468-69 [(1993)].  The Court deems
the amount of the punitive damages awards to be
appropriate and reasonable based on the culpability
and 
reprehensibility 
of 
[BTT's 
and 
Keener's]
conduct, and to serve the dual purposes of (a)
making clear that [BTT's and Keener's] conduct was
especially reprehensible, and (b) discouraging or
deterring 
[BTT 
and 
Keener] 
and 
others 
from
conducting themselves similarly in the future." 
BTT and Keener correctly note that this Court "review[s]
the trial court's award of punitive damages de novo, with no
35
1110840; 1110857
presumption 
of 
correctness." 
 
Mack 
Trucks, 
Inc. 
v.
Witherspoon, 867 So. 2d 307, 309 (Ala. 2003) (citing
Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d 1, 24 (Ala. 2001)). 
See also § 6-11-23, Ala. Code 1975 ("No presumption of
correctness shall apply as to the amount of punitive damages
awarded by the trier of the fact.").  The trial court's
application of the Gore guideposts and the Hammond and Green
Oil factors is also reviewed de novo.  See Akins Funeral Home,
Inc. v. Miller, 878 So. 2d 267, 271 (Ala. 2003).8
1.  Economic Impact
First, BTT and Keener contend that EST and Esfahani
demonstrated little to no economic impact as a result of the
slanderous statements.  BTT and Keener rely, in making this
statement, 
on the supposition that Manuel's testimony that EST
likely lost approximately $7,000,000 in sales was entirely
speculative.  The record clearly refutes this claim.  
Although, as BTT and Keener argue, and, as mentioned
previously, the jury obviously discounted the figures quoted
by Manuel, there was, nonetheless, evidence of a negative
For the sake of simplicity, we have reviewed the factors
8
as they are identified by BTT and Keener in their briefs and
have considered each in the order presented in those briefs. 
36
1110840; 1110857
economic impact on EST's sales.  BTT and Keener, therefore, do
not demonstrate that this factor supports the requested
remittitur.
2.  Amount of Compensatory Damages/Disparity
BTT and Keener next argue that the 2:1 ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages in this case also requires
remittitur.  Although BTT and Keener inexplicably note that
"Alabama courts have previously held that punitive damages
awards that exceed ten times the amount of a compensatory
damage award are subject to higher scrutiny," those cases are
clearly inapplicable here.  (BTT's brief, at 84; Keener's
brief, at 89.)  Further, although they appear to contend that
the award here should also be subjected to heightened scrutiny
"because the compensatory award itself contains an element of
punitive damages," they fail to cite any authority supporting
their claim.  (BTT's brief, at 84-85; Keener's brief, at 89.) 
They similarly fail to cite any case involving similar facts
or comparable conduct that would illustrate that the jury's
award is disproportionate; in fact, neither BTT nor Keener
appears to pursue a disparity argument despite including that
phrase in the applicable subheading for this issue.
37
1110840; 1110857
With regard to this particular guidepost, the United
States Supreme Court has 
"noted that the 'most commonly cited indicium of an
unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is
its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff,' and ... '[t]he principle that exemplary
damages must bear a "reasonable relationship" to
compensatory damages.'  BMW, 517 U.S. at 580, 116
S.Ct. at 1601.  The Supreme Court rejected the
notion that a purely mathematical formula could mark
the constitutional line:
"'Of course, we have consistently
rejected 
the 
notion 
that 
the 
constitutional
line is marked by a simple mathematical
formula, even one that compares actual and
potential 
damages 
to 
the 
punitive 
award....
Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages
may properly support a higher ratio than
high compensatory awards, if, for example,
a particularly egregious act has resulted
in only a small amount of economic damages.
A higher ratio may also be justified in
cases in which the injury is hard to detect
or the monetary value of noneconomic harm
might have been difficult to determine....
In most cases, the ratio will be within a
constitutionally 
accepted 
range, 
and
remittitur will not be justified on this
basis.'
"517 U.S. at 582-83, 116 S.Ct. at 1602-03.
(Citations and emphasis omitted.)"
Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 529 (Ala.
1997).
Here, the punitive damages are exactly twice the jury's
compensatory-damages award and are actually less than the
38
1110840; 1110857
actual compensatory damages claimed by EST and Esfahani.  BTT
and Keener cite no authority demonstrating that, in light of
the 
present 
facts, 
the 
punitive-damages 
award 
is
disproportionate 
and 
constitutionally 
infirm. 
 
Further, 
as 
the
Court of Civil Appeals has previously observed, we have upheld
substantial 
punitive-damages 
awards 
when 
the 
evidence
demonstrates a pattern and practice of such behavior by the
defendant.  See Mercy Med. v. Gray, 864 So. 2d 354, 365 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002) (and cases cited therein).  We therefore find
that the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages,
given the facts, is reasonable.
3.  Guilt for the Same or Similar Incidents 
BTT and Keener also argue that they are entitled to a
remittitur because, they say, nothing suggests that they were
guilty of the same or similar conduct in the past.
Contrary to this argument, and as the trial court noted,
"[t]he 
evidence indicates that the defamatory conduct here was
not a case of a few isolated incidents of a rogue salesman or
of salesmen making false statements about a competitor in
passing."  Instead, Esfahani and EST "offered testimony from
former and present BTT employees that BTT's slanderous
statements were part of BTT's company policy for competing
39
1110840; 1110857
against EST" and "that these sales practices were still being
used even after this lawsuit was filed."  Therefore, the
record 
clearly 
contains 
evidence 
indicating 
"similar
incidents."   See Johnson, 701 So. 2d at 529 ("[R]epeated
9
misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance
of malfeasance.").
Although BTT and Keener cite Johnson, they fail to
actually explain how our remittitur of the punitive-damages 
award in Johnson mandates a similar result here.  In Johnson,
this Court ultimately remitted the jury's punitive-damages 
award upon reconsideration and review of the case as directed
by the United States Supreme Court in light of its opinion in
Gore.  701 So. 2d at 534.  BTT and Keener, however, fail to
Although Keener testified below and argues again on
9
appeal that the slanderous statements attributed to him
represented a single, isolated incident, testimony from other
witnesses suggested otherwise.  Indeed, as the trial court
observed, "[t]he testimony of ... Tyler and ... Keener in this
litigation was overwhelmingly 'fraught with contradictions,
inconsistencies, evasions, convenient memory lapses, efforts
to blame others and lies.'"  It is well established that any
credibility determination was solely the province of 
the 
jury. 
See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 650 So. 2d 534, 535 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1994) ("'The weight and probative value to be given to
the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the
resolution of conflicting testimony are for the jury's
determination.'" (quoting Brown v. State, 588 So. 2d 551, 559
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991))).
40
1110840; 1110857
acknowledge the multiple considerations influencing that
decision.  Instead, they simply argue that because the facts
demonstrated repetitive instances of the tortious behavior in
Johnson and the defendants, there, obtained a remittitur, BTT
and Keener must be entitled to the same.  That is not the law, 
and this factor also does not weigh in favor of remittitur.
4.  Attempts to Remedy the Wrong
BTT and Keener next contend that because they received
only one –- allegedly limited -- complaint referencing the
slanderous statements before Esfahani and EST initiated the
underlying litigation and because BTT purportedly immediately
questioned the employee referenced in that complaint, they
"took ... appropriate steps to remedy the alleged wrong." 
(BTT's brief, at p. 87.) 
The trial court rejected this claim as follows:
"Following the jury's verdict, BTT has taken no
corrective action to protect [Esfahani and EST] from
similar conduct in the future. Instead, BTT
continues 
to 
focus 
on 
non-harassment 
and
discrimination and hostile work environment and
typical internal employee law issues and training.
Most significantly with respect to this punitive
damages factor, BTT still has no written policy
against 
making 
defamatory 
statements 
about 
a
competitor.
"'Q. 
Have 
you 
done 
anything
specifically because of the verdict?
41
1110840; 1110857
"'[Tyler]:  I don't think. 
"'Q. You can't think of anything
sitting here today, that you would have
changed in how you addressed this entire
issue? 
"'[Tyler]:  I don't think.'
"[BTT's and Keener's] abject failure to take
corrective action or attempt to remedy the wrong
through retraction (which was demanded in the
cease-and-desist letter) or through taking any
corrective actions even after a significant verdict
shows a failure to acknowledge their wrongs and a
propensity toward recidivism. Cf., [Tanner v.]
Ebbole, [88 So. 3d 856, 871 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)]
(finding the failure to issue any retraction after
getting a cease and desist letter relevant to
reprehensibility)."
Although the trial court rejected application of this
particular factor in favor of a remittitur on the basis of
BTT's and Keener's postjudgment failures, a review of their
pretrial conduct produces a similar result.  As Tyler
testified, some type of minimal internal investigation aimed
primarily at Carp, the employee named by Esfahani and BTT in
the July 2009 cease-and-desist letter, who was under the
direct supervision of Keener, did occur.  Further, BTT
employees were allegedly instructed that such slanderous
statements were prohibited.  However, the evidence suggests
that the slanderous statements continued after those initial
42
1110840; 1110857
efforts without further investigation by or repercussion from
BTT.  Further, Tyler's testimony reflected that, sometime 
before trial, it became apparent to him that the slanderous
statements had, in fact, occurred as Esfahani and EST had
alleged. 
Despite that knowledge, 
neither Keener nor BTT 
issued
a retraction.  Thus, this factor also does not weigh in favor
of a reduction of the jury's punitive-damages award.
5.  Opportunity to Remedy the Wrong
BTT and Keener maintain that the July 2009 cease-and-
desist letter represented the only opportunity presented to
them to remedy the wrong of which they were accused but that
it contained insufficient information to allow them to do so. 
The evidence recounted above, however, indicates that this
conduct was an ongoing practice of BTT and its agents.  BTT
received and Keener learned of the cease-and-desist letter in
July 2009; Esfahani and EST filed the underlying litigation
approximately six months later in January 2010.  Within that
time frame, and even after the filing date, as set out above,
despite BTT's learning that the allegations made by Esfahani
and EST apparently were true, the slanderous statements 
continued.
6.  Degree of Reprehensibility
43
1110840; 1110857
BTT and Keener acknowledge, as the trial court also
observed, that this particular factor, namely the degree of
reprehensibility of their conduct, is the single most
important factor in the remittitur analysis.  See Gore, 517
U.S. at 575.  BTT and Keener attempt to lessen the
reprehensibility 
of 
their 
self-claimed 
"moderately"
reprehensible conduct by comparing it to the tortious conduct
of defendants in other cases, by noting the lack of any
resulting physical harm, and by arguing that Esfahani and EST
are not members of a class typically regarded as financially
vulnerable.
As demonstrated by its postjudgment order, the trial
court clearly disagreed.  Specifically, it applied the
following 
criteria 
and 
considerations 
established 
in 
the 
State
Farm and Green Oil cases, supra, for gauging the degree of
reprehensibility:
"(A)
The type of harm caused (physical as
opposed to economic)....;
"(B) 
The degree of the Defendants' awareness of
any hazard his conduct caused or was likely
to cause, or whether Defendants' conduct
showed an indifference to or reckless
disregard of the health or safety of
others....;
44
1110840; 1110857
"(C)
Whether 
the 
Plaintiff 
had 
financial
vulnerability....;
"(D) 
Whether the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and,
the existence and frequency of similar past
conduct....;
"(E) 
The duration of the conduct....; and 
"(F) 
Whether the harm resulted from intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit or was a mere
accident; and any concealment or 'cover up'
of the hazard or acts of the Defendant
...."
The trial court conducted a lengthy analysis of each of
the foregoing factors; we include only a brief sampling of its
conclusions as to each:
(A)
Type of harm: "Compounding this special
difficulty of proving actual damages, and
likely a primary reason for the personal
reputation's 'unusually high protection,'
is the fact that damage to reputation, once
done can never be completely undone.  In
Ledbetter, the Middle District of Alabama
declared that 'one's good reputation is
hard to obtain and even harder to regain
(if it can be) once damaged. ... By
[slandering 
Ledbetter's 
name 
and
reputation], United sowed seeds of doubt in
the community about Ledbetter's reputation
that can never be uprooted.' Ledbetter v.
United Ins. Co. of America, 845 F. Supp.
844, 849 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (emphasis added).
See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 344, n. 9 (1974) ('an opportunity
for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm
of defamatory falsehood.  Indeed, the law
of defamation is rooted in our experience
45
1110840; 1110857
that the truth rarely catches up with a
lie....') (emphasis added); [Lawnwood Med.
Ctr., Inc. v.] Sadow, 43 So. 3d [710] at
731-32 [(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)] (jury
'could 
rationally 
have 
equated 
the 
slanders
to feathers loosed in the wind, with no one
ever knowing where they all landed or whom
they touched.  The effects could be seen as
insidious 
and 
unknowable') 
(emphasis
added)."
(B)
Degree of defendants' awareness: "The
Ebbole court found that, being engaged in
the same business as Plaintiff, the
Defendants 'were well aware of the hazard
their conduct was likely to cause....' 
Here, the evidence shows that [BTT and
Keener] repeatedly defamed [Esfahani and
EST], 
[BTT's] 
nearest 
Toyota 
competitor, 
by
smearing them in a manner that can only be
viewed as purposely intended to create a
hazard.  The Court cannot fathom a worse
trifecta of crimes of which to accuse a
businessman and his business than treason
and funding terrorism and the murder of
American 
soldiers, 
particularly 
considering
Esfahani's 
national 
origin, 
the 
demographic
makeup of the vehicle market here and the
wars in the Middle East."
(C)
Plaintiffs' 
financial 
vulnerability: 
"While this factor is not applicable, the
Court notes that the Plaintiffs raise a
good point that perhaps an appellate court
can review in the future as supporting
reprehensibility under an analysis which
considers 
more 
than 
just 
financial
interests.... Defamation per se presents a
particular vulnerability, not raised in
cases like Gore and State Farm: the
vulnerability 
of 
one's 
reputation 
to
certain targeted defamatory accusations.
Here, the reputation of a business owned by
46
1110840; 1110857
an American businessman originally from
Iran 
is 
especially 
vulnerable 
to 
a
competitor's defamatory accusations of
terrorism and funding terrorism in the
Middle East. That is, ...  Esfahani's
Iranian origin was used by [BTT and Keener]
to give an 'air of credibility' to such
slanderous statements."
(D)
Isolated 
incident 
or 
repeated 
actions: 
"The
evidence indicates that the defamatory
conduct here was not a case of a few
isolated incidents of a rogue salesman or
of salesmen making false statements about
a competitor in passing. ... [Esfahani and
EST] ... offered testimony from former and
present 
BTT 
employees 
that 
BTT's 
slanderous
statements were part of BTT's company
policy for competing against EST."
(E)
Duration of conduct: "[T]he Defendants'
reprehensible 
conduct 
insofar 
as 
the
defamation per se continued from at the
latest early 2008 until at the earliest
March 2010, or at the least two years. 
This is a significant length of time for an
all-out attack on the reputation of
[Esfahani and EST]."
(F)
Intentional 
conduct 
or 
accident: 
"The 
Court
notes ... that the factor of a concealment
or cover-up of [BTT's and Keener's] actions
causing harm to [Esfahani and EST] is
supported by the ... moving targets
presented by the testimonies of Keener and
... Tyler, as well as the convenient memory
lapses, 
evasions, 
contradictions 
and
inconsistencies 
running 
through 
their
testimonies in their pre-trial, trial and
post-trial testimonies. ...[A]n abundance
of evidence exists to establish the
significant extent of the [BTT's and
47
1110840; 1110857
Keener's] animosity and resentment toward
[Esfahani and EST]."
Although BTT and Keener maintain that the testimony
establishing their slanderous statements, as reported by EST
and Esfahani's witnesses, were isolated incidents, the
evidence suggested otherwise.  Further, though EST and
Esfahani were able to identify merely a handful of BTT
customers who personally heard the remarks, there are
potential untold numbers of others about whom Esfahani and EST
never learned.  See Ebbole, 88 So. 3d at 872 (explaining that
Alabama's presumption of damage in cases of per se defamation
stems from the fact that "'[i]t would frequently be difficult
to prove any pecuniary injury from slander, and always
impossible to establish its full extent.'" (quoting 
Johnson v.
Robertson, 8 Port. 486, 489 (Ala. 1839))).  Further, as the
trial court emphasized, the nature of 
these 
particular remarks
render them reprehensible –- especially in today's political
climate.  Therefore, this factor, too, weighs against a
reduction of the jury's punitive-damages award.  
7.  BTT's and Keener's Profit
BTT and Keener note that a punitive-damages award should
be aimed at removing any profits the defendants gained from
48
1110840; 1110857
their tortious conduct.  See Ross v. Rosen-Rager, 67 So. 3d
29, 44 (Ala. 2010) ("'"[I]f the wrongful conduct was
profitable to the defendant, the punitive damages should
remove the profit and should be in excess of the profit, so
that the defendant recognizes a loss."'") (quoting Green Oil,
539 So. 2d at 223, quoting in turn Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062 (Ala. 1987) (Houston, J.,
concurring specially)).  Both BTT and Keener argue that this
factor requires a reduction of the punitive-damages award
because, they say, there is no evidence suggesting that they
actually profited from the slanderous statements aimed at
Esfahani and EST.
Contrary to their arguments, the trial court concluded
that this factor, too, weighs against remittitur:
"From the Defendants' actions, it can be
inferred under Alabama law that they intended to
profit from their misconduct.  In Ledbetter v.
United Ins. Co. of Am., 845 F. Supp. 844, 849 (M.D.
Ala. 1994), the Defendants made slanderous remarks
about 
Ledbetter, 
a 
former 
United 
sales
representative, to Ledbetter's former customers in
an effort to discourage those customers from doing
business with Ledbetter.  The court held that under
the circumstances 'it can be inferred that United
profited from its action.'  Id. 845 F. Supp. at 849
(emphasis added)."
49
1110840; 1110857
BTT and Keener do not produce any authority demonstrating
that the trial court erred with regard to the foregoing
finding.  Although it might have been difficult for Esfahani
and EST to demonstrate the precise profits BTT and/or Keener
gained, their intent to profit from their actions is
indisputable. 
8.  BTT's and Keener's Financial Postures
Neither BTT nor Keener advances any argument that the
potential impact 
of 
the jury's punitive-damages award on their
respective financial postures justifies remittitur.  
9.  Criminal Sanctions
BTT and Keener appear to believe that a remittitur is due
because, they contend, 
the punitive damages awarded far exceed
the criminal sanctions they could have faced if prosecuted for
the same conduct at which the punitive-damages award is aimed
–- which they indisputably have not been.  See Gore, 517 U.S.
at 583.  They rely, however, solely on a statute this Court
has previously declared unconstitutional as support for the
extent of the criminal sanctions they say could be legally
imposed.  Regardless, as noted previously, "[t]here is no
evidence indicating that [either BTT or Keener] has been
subject to any criminal sanctions for similar conduct;
50
1110840; 1110857
therefore, this factor does not require a remittitur." 
Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 319 (Ala. 2003)
(citing Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So. 2d 1204 (Ala.
1999)).
10.  Other Civil Actions
Finally, Keener maintains that because he has not been
sued in the past for similar conduct, the lack of any
comparable civil actions against him supports his request for
a remittitur.  Keener misunderstands this factor.  As with the
previous factor, it is precisely because "[t]here is no
evidence indicating that [Keener] has been subject to any
other civil actions based on similar conduct ... [that] this
factor does not require a remittitur."  Id.
In consideration of the foregoing, BTT's and Keener's
contentions that at least eight of the applicable factors
demonstrate the excessiveness claimed and mandate a reduction
of the jury's punitive-damages awards are without merit. 
Instead, it appears that only a single factor, namely the
absence of any particular financial vulnerability of the
targets, supports BTT and Keener's request.  Therefore, the
requisite analysis overwhelmingly supports an affirmance of
the jury's 
punitive-damages 
awards.  The trial court correctly
51
1110840; 1110857
denied BTT and Keener's request for a new trial and
appropriately refused to remit the jury's punitive-damages
awards.
Conclusion
In consideration of the foregoing, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
1110840 -- AFFIRMED.
1110857 -- AFFIRMED.  
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main,
Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
52