Case Title: Franklin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 427, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES E. FRANKLIN, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 427, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0512002190  
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 13, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
June 28, 2007 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of June 2007, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
A Superior Court jury convicted the appellant James Franklin 
of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, driving without a 
license, and failure to have a valid insurance card, but acquitted him on the 
charge of carrying a concealed deadly weapon.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Franklin as a habitual offender to a total period of two years at 
Level V incarceration followed by a six-month period of probation, plus 
fines.  This is Franklin’s direct appeal from his convictions and sentence.  
 
2
(2) 
Franklin was represented at trial by court-appointed counsel.  
After the notice of appeal was filed, Franklin filed an affidavit requesting 
leave to dismiss his counsel and to represent himself on appeal.  We 
remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a hearing on Franklin’s 
request.  The Superior Court determined that Franklin’s request to waive his 
right to counsel on appeal was made intelligently and voluntarily with full 
knowledge of the hazards of self-representation.  After the matter was 
returned from remand, this Court granted Franklin’s request to exercise his 
right to self-representation and dismissed his counsel.  
(3) 
Franklin filed his pro se opening brief on appeal, which raises 
three issues for the Court’s consideration.  First, Franklin contends that the 
Superior Court erred when it permitted the charge of possession of a deadly 
weapon by a person prohibited to be tried with the other three counts of the 
indictment.  Second, Franklin asserts that the Superior Court erred in 
denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing and in failing to void the 
search warrant affidavit.  Finally, Franklin argues that he was deprived of his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.  We will not 
address Franklin’s ineffectiveness claim, however, for the first time on direct 
appeal.1 
                                                 
1 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
 
3
(4) 
With respect to the two remaining claims, we find the record at 
trial fairly supports the following version of events leading to Franklin’s 
arrest:  On December 3, 2005, Dover Officer Jennifer King stopped a 1993 
Ford Crown Victoria after receiving a stolen vehicle report.  Franklin was 
driving the vehicle, and his girlfriend, Rose Smith, was in the front 
passenger seat.  Officer King asked both occupants to step out of the vehicle.  
Upon doing so, Officer King observed a knife fall to the ground near Smith.  
Upon being arrested on suspected auto theft, Franklin was given his Miranda 
rights and then made a statement to Officer King.  During the course of the 
interrogation, Franklin told Officer King that the knife was “ours.”  He later 
stated that the knife was “mine.”  Franklin told Officer King that the glove 
compartment on the car was broken, so the knife had been on the front seat.  
Franklin apologized for the knife being in the car. 
(5) 
Rose Smith was the only defense witness.  She testified that the 
knife was hers and that she believed the knife had fallen out of her coat 
pocket when she stepped out of the vehicle. Smith further testified that she 
already had pled guilty to a charge of carrying a concealed deadly weapon as 
a result of the December 2005 arrest.  During the State’s rebuttal, Officer 
King testified that she also had taken a statement from Smith on December 
3, 2005 and that Smith had never indicated that the knife had fallen out of 
 
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her coat pocket.  Officer King also testified that Smith stated that the knife 
was on the car seat and that it was “ours.” 
(6) 
Franklin’s first contention on appeal is that the Superior Court 
erred in trying all four charges in one proceeding.  In essence, Franklin 
asserts that the charge of possession of a deadly weapon by a person 
prohibited should have been severed from the other charges because proof of 
that charge required admission into evidence of Franklin’s prior felony 
conviction, even though Franklin did not take the stand and testify.  Because 
this argument was not raised below, we review it on appeal for plain error.2  
To be plain, the alleged error must be so clearly prejudicial to Franklin’s 
substantial rights as to have jeopardized the fairness of the trial 
proceedings.3 
(7) 
We find no plain error in this case because no prejudice to 
Franklin’s rights has been shown.  Of the four charges against him, Franklin 
did not dispute the two motor vehicle charges, and the jury acquitted him of 
the charge of carrying a concealed deadly weapon.  We find the evidence on 
the record with respect to the fourth charge, possession of a deadly weapon 
by a person prohibited, more than sufficient to support the jury’s guilty 
                                                 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
3 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
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verdict.4  Thus, even if that charge had been tried separately from the other 
three charges, we find that the outcome for Franklin would have been no 
different.  Moreover, we find the jury’s acquittal of Franklin on the charge of 
carrying a concealed deadly weapon clearly indicates that the jury followed 
the trial judge’s instruction not to draw any improper inference from 
Franklin’s prior felony conviction.5  
 (9) 
Franklin’s next argument relates to an inconsistency between 
the trial testimony of the arresting officer, Jennifer King, and a statement she 
made in the probable cause affidavit.  King’s probable cause affidavit stated 
that she located the knife during a search of the front seat of the vehicle.  At 
trial, however, King testified that she found the knife on the ground where it 
fell after Smith exited the vehicle.  Defense counsel confronted King about 
this inconsistency during cross-examination. 
(10) Franklin argues that this inconsistency is evidence that King 
lied in her probable cause affidavit and was grounds for a mistrial. We 
                                                 
4 In determining on appeal if there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, 
this Court must determine “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 1999). 
5The trial judge instructed the jury, in part, that, “You may use [evidence of 
Franklin’s prior conviction for robbery] only as it is relevant to your deliberations 
concerning the charge of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited.  You 
may not use this evidence to infer a predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit 
crimes.” 
 
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disagree. Alleged inconsistencies in a witness’ statements go only to the 
weight to be accorded to the witness’ testimony, not to its admissibility.6 
The jury is the sole judge of a witness’ credibility and is responsible for 
resolving conflicts in the testimony.7  In fulfilling its duty, the jury must 
consider all of the evidence but is free, in its discretion, to accept part of a 
witness’ testimony while rejecting other parts.8  In this case, defense counsel 
cross-examined King regarding the inconsistency between the probable 
cause affidavit and her trial testimony.  The jury was free to accept King’s 
trial testimony as credible.  The jury’s verdict will not be set aside merely 
because it is based upon conflicting evidence.9   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
6 See generally Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Del. 1997). 
7 Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982). 
8 Id. 
9 Zutz v. State, 160 A.2d 727, 729 (Del. 1960).