Case Title: City of Suffolk v. Board of Zoning

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021981

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: ALL THE JUSTICES 
 
THE CITY OF SUFFOLK EX REL. 
STEVE HERBERT, ZONING ADMINISTRATOR 
FOR THE CITY OF SUFFOLK, ET AL. 
 
 
 
        OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 021981 
          JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
        JUNE 6, 2003 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS FOR 
THE CITY OF SUFFOLK, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The City of Suffolk ("the City") appeals the judgment of 
the Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk affirming the 
determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals for the City of 
Suffolk ("BZA") that certain land use rights became vested with 
respect to a parcel of land owned by Etheridge Manor Corporation 
("Etheridge").  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the trial court's judgment. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
In 1985, Etheridge purchased a tract of approximately 164 
acres in the City of Suffolk ("the Property").  In conjunction 
with an adjoining landowner, Etheridge planned to develop the 
combined tracts of 310 acres as a planned unit development known 
as King's Landing.  In June 1988, at the request of Etheridge 
and the adjoining landowner, the Suffolk City Council rezoned 
the 310 acres from "Rural Residential" to "Planned Development 
Housing" ("PD-H") and approved the Master Land Use Plan 
Etheridge submitted for the development.  The Master Land Use 
Plan reflected a mixed-use and mixed-density development 
including medium and high-density residential areas, as well as 
commercial parcels. 
 
The adjoining landowner encountered financial difficulties, 
including foreclosure, which delayed a joint development of the 
project.  Etheridge decided to proceed independently and engaged 
an engineering firm to review the development options for the 
Property in 1993. 
 
In 1994, Etheridge requested that approximately 10 acres of 
the Property be rezoned from "PD-H" to "General Business."  At 
the same time, Etheridge submitted amendments to the 1988 Master 
Land Use Plan to change the proposed residential development 
areas from mixed density to low density for the remaining 154 
acres of the Property.  In August 1994, the Suffolk City Council 
approved the rezoning of the 10-acre parcel, reduced the density 
for the remaining 154 acres to four units per acre, and approved 
the Amended Master Land Use Plan.1  
                     
 
1 The 1988 Master Land Use Plan, and the 1994 amended 
version, which continued to identify the project as King's 
Landing, show the general location of primary roads, recreation 
areas, waterways, and entrances to state highways.  Neither plan 
contained specific details as to lot locations, curb, gutter, 
utilities, residential streets, or storm drainage facilities.  
The rezonings and land use plans did fix the number of available 
residential units on the Property. 
 
 
2
 
In 1995, Etheridge submitted a preliminary recreation plan 
and a traffic impact analysis based on a full residential 
development of the Property, which the City approved.  In 1996, 
Etheridge submitted a preliminary subdivision plat for part of 
the remaining 154 acres of the Property (designated as 
"Planter's Station at King's Landing Section 1, 2 and 3" 
("Planter's Station")).2  The Suffolk Planning Commission 
approved this preliminary plat in March 1996, and granted 
extensions of time for submission of the final Planter's Station 
plat to April 1998.  The extensions were requested to 
accommodate the engineering design for the entire Property 
relating to sewer, water, storm drainage, and related items 
since the Planter's Station portion was part of an integrated 
infrastructure for the whole Property. 
 
In 1997, Etheridge deeded 1.1 acres of the Property, 
without compensation, to the Virginia Department of 
Transportation ("VDOT") for road improvements adjacent to the 
Property.  In April, 1998, Etheridge filed a final plat for 
Planter's Station, but no action had been taken on it before 
enactment by the City of the Uniform Development Ordinance 
("UDO") on September 1, 1999. 
                     
 
2 Planter's Station was to be an entrance to King's Landing 
and the first section to be built out. 
 
 
3
 
The City's enactment of the UDO changed the zoning 
classification of land throughout the city of Suffolk.  The UDO 
effectively rezoned all of the Property, other than the 10-acre 
commercial section, from "PD-H" to "Commerce Park" and "Office-
Institutional." 
 
After the City adopted the UDO, Etheridge requested a 
determination by the City's Zoning Administrator that it had 
vested rights in the PD-H zoning for the 154 acres.  The Zoning 
Administrator determined that Etheridge had vested rights in the 
Planter's Station section, but not in the remaining portion of 
the 154 acres ("the Remainder"), which was the bulk of the 
Property.  In effect, this determination meant that Etheridge 
could not develop the Remainder as residential property, but 
only as an office or commerce park, despite its contiguous 
location to Planter's Station. 
 
Etheridge appealed the Zoning Administrator's decision to 
the BZA, which reversed the Zoning Administrator's determination 
and held that Etheridge had vested rights in the PD-H zoning 
designation for the Remainder.  The trial court granted the City 
a writ of certiorari pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314 to review the 
BZA decision. 
 
The trial court affirmed the BZA's decision finding that 
the 1988 rezoning was a "significant affirmative governmental 
act" under Code § 15.2-2307 upon which Etheridge reasonably 
 
4
relied in good faith.  The trial court further found that 
Etheridge had expended substantial funds in diligent pursuit of 
the project and that those expenditures were for development of 
the entire Property.  This appeal by the City follows. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision of a board of zoning appeals is 
presumed to be correct on appeal to a circuit 
court; the appealing party bears the burden of 
showing that the board applied erroneous 
principles of law or that its decision was 
plainly wrong and in violation of the purpose and 
intent of the zoning ordinance.  Bd. of Zoning 
App. v. Bond, 225 Va. 177, 179-90, 300 S.E.2d 
781, 782 (1983); Allegheny Enterprises v. 
Covington, 217 Va. 64, 67, 225 S.E.2d 383, 385 
(1976).  A circuit court decision affirming a 
board of zoning appeals determination is also 
accorded this presumption of correctness on 
appeal to this Court.  Natrella v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 451, 456, 345 S.E.2d 295, 
299 (1986). 
 
Masterson v. Bd. of Zoning App., 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 
732-33 (1987). 
 
Our standard of appellate review is well established.  A 
circuit court's judgment is presumed to be correct and we will 
not set that judgment aside unless it appears from the record 
that the judgment is plainly wrong or unsupported by the 
evidence.  Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 
419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992); Code § 8.01-680. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
5
 
Prior to 1998, this Court's decisions had determined when 
landowners acquired vested rights in uses of their property 
where the zoning status of that property was changed to prohibit 
a previously permitted use. 
Privately held land is subject to applicable local 
zoning ordinances whether enacted before or after the 
property was acquired.  Generally, landowners have no 
property right in anticipated uses of their land since 
they have no vested property right in the continuation 
of the land's existing zoning status.  However, in 
limited circumstances, private landowners may acquire 
a vested right in planned uses of their land that may 
not be prohibited or reduced by subsequent zoning 
legislation. 
 
Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Systems, Inc., 256 Va. 206, 
210, 501 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998) (internal citations omitted). 
 
In 1998, the General Assembly enacted substantial changes 
to Code § 15.2-2307 that established certain criteria which, 
when satisfied, conclusively vest property rights in a landowner 
regardless of changes in an otherwise applicable zoning 
ordinance. 
[A] landowner's rights shall be deemed vested in 
a land use and such vesting shall not be affected 
by a subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance 
when the landowner (i) obtains or is the 
beneficiary of a significant affirmative 
governmental act which remains in effect allowing 
development of a specific project, (ii) relies in 
good faith on the significant affirmative 
governmental act, and (iii) incurs extensive 
obligations or substantial expenses in diligent 
pursuit of the specific project in reliance on 
the significant affirmative governmental act. 
 
 
6
Code § 15.2-2307.  The case at bar presents our first 
examination of the legislative changes to Code § 15.2-2307. 
 
The City avers in this appeal that the trial court was 
plainly wrong in applying the statutory criteria to the record 
evidence in this case.  Specifically, the City contends that 
there was not sufficient evidence in the record that Etheridge 
was "the beneficiary of a significant affirmative governmental 
act . . . allowing development of a specific project."  In the 
alternative, the City argues that Etheridge did not incur 
"extensive obligations or substantial expenses in diligent 
pursuit of the specific project."  We disagree with both 
contentions. 
A.  Significant Affirmative Governmental Act 
 
The trial court found that the 1988 rezoning of the 
Property to PD-H was a "significant affirmative governmental 
act."  The City acknowledges that such a rezoning meets the new 
criteria in subsection (ii) of the second paragraph of Code 
§ 15.2-2307 whereby ”rezoning for a specific use or density" is 
"deemed to be a significant affirmative governmental act."  
However, the City contends that the 1988 rezoning was not for 
"development of a specific project" as required by subsection 
(i) of the Code section's first paragraph.  Therefore, the City 
argues that no "deemed vesting" had occurred. 
 
7
 
The City cites Town of Rocky Mount v. Southside Inv., Inc., 
254 Va. 130, 487 S.E.2d 855 (1997), and Board of Supervisors of 
Chesterfield County v. Trollingwood Partnership, 248 Va. 112, 
445 S.E.2d 151 (1994), for the proposition that development 
plans in great detail are required before a property owner can 
obtain vested rights in a land use classification.  The City 
implies that these cases establish that Etheridge's King's 
Landing project is too vague to be deemed a "specific project" 
under Code § 15.2-2307, although the statute does not define 
"specific project" and the cases never mention that term. 
 
Southside Inv., Inc., Trollingwood Partnership and other 
pre-1998 cases involved determining whether "a significant 
governmental act" had occurred with respect to the properties at 
issue which accorded vested land use rights to the landowners 
despite later zoning changes.  In these cases a controlling 
factor was the issuance of a specific government land use 
authorization, beyond zoning, before vesting of a particular 
land use could be found.  For instance, in Snow v. Amherst 
County Board of Zoning Appeals, 248 Va. 404, 448 S.E.2d 606 
(1994), we held that "[t]he mere reliance on a particular zoning 
classification, whether created by ordinance or variance, 
creates no vested right in the property owner."  248 Va. at 408, 
448 S.E.2d at 608-09.  However, the plain language of current 
Code § 15.2-2307 now makes clear that vested rights accrue when 
 
8
one of the six types of actions listed in the second paragraph 
of that Code section occurs.  Such acts are deemed to constitute 
"significant affirmative governmental acts allowing development 
of a specific project," including "rezoning for a specific use 
or density" as in the case at bar. 
 
In Southside Inv., Inc., the landowner's property was 
rezoned to permit the construction of duplex residences.  In 
reliance on that zoning, the landowner constructed a street and 
utility infrastructure to develop both sides of the street and 
completed duplex construction on one side.  The landowner had 
not filed a site plan to develop the other side of the street 
when the zoning was changed to prohibit duplexes.  We found no 
vested rights in the prior zoning and deemed it dispositive that 
no "site plan or permit for the undeveloped portion of the 
property" had been issued prior to the change in zoning, 
therefore no significant governmental act had occurred as to 
that property.  254 Va. at 133, 487 S.E.2d at 857. 
 
Similarly, the fact that no site plan had been filed, as 
required by the landowner's special use permit, was 
determinative in Trollingwood Partnership and we held that no 
vesting had occurred in the preexisting zoning.  The landowner's 
property was zoned for trailer park use which it was developing 
in sections.  The undeveloped parcel for which vested rights 
were asserted was subject to a special use permit which 
 
9
contained a condition precedent that a site plan be filed.  The 
landowner had not filed a site plan when the zoning changed to 
prohibit a trailer park on the disputed property.  We found that 
no vesting had occurred because the required governmental act, 
approval of the site plan had not occurred.  248 Va. at 115-16, 
445 S.E.2d at 153. 
 
While these cases involved general plans of development, as 
opposed to a detailed ready-to-build plan, that factor was not 
the basis of the Court's decisions.  In Southside Inv., Inc., 
Amherst County Board of Zoning Appeals and Trollingwood 
Partnership we found that the respective property owners had no 
vested rights because no significant government act (as our 
precedent then defined it) had taken place since the subject 
land lacked site plan approval, a special use permit, or 
something similar.  The current statute's reference to 
"development of a specific project" is nowhere mentioned in 
these decisions and this concept was not discussed in our 
holdings.  Any distinction due to the general versus the 
specific nature of a landowner's development plans was unrelated 
to whether a significant governmental act, such as approval of a 
site plan, had occurred. 
 
Nonetheless, the City argues that a "specific project" can 
only be found under Code § 15.2-2307 when "they would have filed 
site plans for the entire property."  No such requirement exists 
 
10
in the statute and, for the reasons just enunciated, neither 
does it derive from our prior precedent. 
 
The record reflects that the BZA and trial court were 
cognizant that the object of the 1988 rezoning was a specific 
tract known as King's Landing; it was not a general rezoning.  
The project was restricted to PD-H zoning and that approval 
specifically limited the number of residential units.  Further, 
through the 1988 and 1994 master land use plans, the highway 
entrances, general roadways, and recreation areas were 
established, as well as designated residential and commercial 
use sections.  The record supports the implied conclusion of the 
trial court and BZA that the rezoning was directed to a specific 
project. 
 
Code § 15.2-2307 now specifically recognizes the type of 
zoning act taken by the City in 1988 as a significant 
affirmative governmental act creating a deemed vesting of land 
use rights.  The record reflects that the zoning was 
specifically directed to an identifiable property and project.  
Thus, there was credible evidence in the record to support the 
trial court and BZA conclusions that the statutory requisite of 
"a significant affirmative governmental act . . . allowing 
development of a specific project" occurred.  Therefore, we do 
not find the trial court's  determination plainly wrong. 
B.  Substantial Expenses in Diligent Pursuit 
 
11
 
The City also assigns error to the trial court's 
determination that Etheridge was "in diligent pursuit" of the 
King's Landing project and incurred "substantial expenses" in 
that diligent pursuit.  We find that the record supports the 
trial court's judgment and therefore do not find it plainly 
wrong. 
(i)  Diligent Pursuit 
 
The City contends Etheridge cannot claim diligence because 
it did practically nothing regarding the project from the 1988 
rezoning until the 1994 rezoning and approval of the amended 
master land use plan.  Had the UDO been adopted in 1994, instead 
of 1999, the City's argument would likely prevail.  However, 
Etheridge's lack of diligence before 1994 is not dispositive 
since the BZA and trial court could consider all of Etheridge's 
development activity prior to the UDO zoning change.  In that 
context, the trial court and BZA correctly found that Etheridge 
was reasonably diligent. 
 
Whether due to the adjoining landowner's financial 
problems, general economic conditions, or whatever reason, 
Etheridge did not begin measurable steps to develop King's 
Landing until 1993, when its engineer evaluated the development 
options.  From that point until adoption of the UDO, Etheridge 
undertook a series of activities to develop the whole Property, 
as the trial court's letter opinion reflects. 
 
12
The record shows a train of regular, although not 
constant, events occurring in the period of some [14] 
years between the purchase of the property and the 
adoption of the UDO.  I am unable to find that the 
evidence fails to support the conclusion of the BZA 
that Etheridge Manor exercised a "good faith, 
reasonable effort" toward the full development of the 
whole tract of land.  I cannot find that the BZA was 
plainly wrong. 
 
In reliance on the 1988 rezoning of the Property to PD-H, 
Etheridge undertook the 1993 engineering analysis and commenced 
development activities with the 1994 rezoning and amended master 
land use plan.  The City approved the revised plan and rezoned 
the Property from high-density residential to an overall density 
of only four units per acre.  Since, at that point, Etheridge 
was proceeding alone, it was necessary to reestablish the 
demarcation of the development from the land of the adjoining 
landowner through a survey and a re-subdivision plat which were 
filed and approved in 1995.  Etheridge also completed a 
comprehensive traffic impact analysis for development of the 
entire Property in 1994, which was reviewed by the City and 
later approved by VDOT.  In 1997, Etheridge deeded 1.129 acres 
to VDOT, without compensation, for road improvements to access 
the Property. 
 
Etheridge undertook to develop a plan for recreational use, 
which the City approved in 1996, to dedicate certain 
recreational areas within the Property.  Etheridge also 
developed the entrance phase, Planter's Station, with the 
 
13
preliminary subdivision plats filed in 1996 and approved by the 
City.  The final Planter's Station Subdivision plat, which 
included sewer, water, and storm drainage tied to development of 
the whole Property, was timely filed on April 17, 1998, but 
never acted upon by the City prior to the adoption of the UDO a 
year and a half later.  Obviously, Etheridge was at a distinct 
disadvantage in efforts to proceed with development of the 
Remainder until the City approved the entrance phase of the 
subdivision. 
 
Since the record reflects credible evidence sustaining the 
trial court's finding that Etheridge diligently pursued 
development of the entire Project (including the Remainder), we 
cannot say its decision was plainly wrong. 
(ii)  Substantial Expenses 
 
The City does not contest the uncontroverted evidence in 
the record that Etheridge expended over $158,000 between 1993 
and 1998 toward development of the Property.  However, the City 
argues that most of these expenditures were limited to the 
development of Planter's Station and that there is no nexus 
between those expenses and the development of the Remainder.  
Therefore, the City maintains the expenditures were not 
substantial and could not vest land use rights in the PD-H 
zoning in the Remainder. 
 
14
 
The trial court made specific findings, both in its letter 
opinion and order, that Etheridge's expenditures for the traffic 
study, conveyance to VDOT, the recreation plan, the engineering 
with regard to certain aspects of the Planter's Station plats, 
and the master land use plan were for the development of the 
entire Property, not exclusively for Planter's Station or the 
10-acre commercial area.  The record reflects credible evidence 
to support this finding. 
 
In particular, the engineer for Etheridge opined, without 
contradiction, that the actions undertaken by Etheridge were for 
the benefit of the entire Property. 
 
The subdivision plats and construction drawings 
depicting Sections 1, 2 and 3 [Planter's Station] are 
designed to serve as part of the entire 480-unit 
project, and their scope greatly exceeds the needs of 
the initial area to be developed.  The pump station is 
designed to serve the entire project.  The BMP is 
larger than required for the initial sections, and is 
designed to tie into a larger system.  The storm 
drainage system is calculated to handle more storm 
draining than that generated by the initial area.  The 
interior road system is designed to serve traffic 
needs exceeding those generated by the initial area. 
 
The City has now changed the zoning on the 
balance of Etheridge Manor's residential property to 
Commerce Park, but has left Sections 1, 2 and 3 zoned 
PD-H.  This makes no sense, since Sections 1, 2 and 3, 
standing alone, cannot be developed in an economically 
feasible manner.  Because of the rezoning that has 
occurred, the infrastructure for Sections 1, 2 and 3 
is overdesigned for those sections alone.  The design 
and layout of Sections 1, 2 and 3 were totally 
dependent on the subsequent residential development 
contemplated by the development plan. 
 
15
 
The City's counsel conceded as much at trial: "Admittedly, 
the infrastructure for those three areas (Planter's Station) was 
built big enough so that they could eventually hook it up to the 
full property when built out." 
 
The record reflects credible evidence that Etheridge's 
expenditures were for development of the Property as a whole and 
verifies the determinations of the trial court and the BZA were 
not plainly wrong.  Accordingly, we find no error in the trial 
court's judgment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The record reflects credible evidence to support the 
findings of the BZA and the trial court that PD-H land use 
rights vested in Etheridge as to the Remainder.  We find that 
neither the trial court nor the BZA was plainly wrong in 
determining that the PD-H zoning was a significant affirmative 
governmental act and that Etheridge incurred significant 
 
16
expenditures in diligent pursuit of the King's Landing project.  
Finding no error, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.3
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KOONTZ join, concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
 
 
Contrary to the language of Code § 15.2-2307, the 
majority's holding permits the creation of a vested property 
right based on general conceptual land use plans accompanying a 
rezoning, rather than on evidence of a "specific project" as 
required by the statute.  In addition, contrary to the statutory 
requirement that a landowner also act in "diligent pursuit" of a 
"specific project" to secure a vested property right, the 
majority allows actions taken five or more years after the 
relevant governmental act to constitute such "diligent pursuit."  
These holdings effectively alter the statute and permit the 
establishment of vested rights that do not comply with the terms 
and conditions provided by the General Assembly in Code § 15.2-
                     
 
3 The City also assigned error claiming the trial court 
erred in finding that approval of the preliminary plat for 
Planter's Station created vested rights in Etheridge as to the 
Remainder.  We do not read the trial court's decision to make 
such a holding.  Neither the trial court's letter opinion nor 
its order indicated any causative nexus between approval of the 
plat for Planter's Station and the vesting of rights in the 
Remainder.  The trial court noted the vested rights of Etheridge 
in Planter's Station were the same vested rights it acquired in 
the Remainder, but there was no cause and effect relationship.  
Accordingly, we do not address this assignment of error as it 
was based on the City's erroneous reading of the trial court's 
decision. 
 
17
2307.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that part of the 
majority's opinion affirming Etheridge's vested rights in the 
portion of the 154-acre tract not covered by the Planter's 
Station subdivision plat. 
 
Code § 15.2-2307 provides, in relevant part that: 
"[A] landowners' rights shall be deemed vested in a 
land use and such vesting shall not be affected by a 
subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance when the 
landowner (i) obtains or is the beneficiary of a 
significant affirmative governmental act which remains 
in effect allowing development of a specific project, 
(ii) relies in good faith on the significant 
affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs 
extensive obligations or substantial expenses in 
diligent pursuit of the specific project in reliance 
on the significant affirmative governmental act. 
 
 
For the purposes of this section and without 
limitation, the following are deemed to be significant 
affirmative governmental acts allowing development of 
a specific project: (i) the governing body has 
accepted proffers or proffered conditions which 
specify use related to a zoning amendment; (ii) the 
governing body has approved an application for a 
rezoning for a specific use or density; (iii) the 
governing body or board of zoning appeals has granted 
a special exception or use permit with conditions; 
(iv) the board of zoning appeals has approved a 
variance; (v) the governing body or its designated 
agent has approved a preliminary subdivision plat, 
site plan or plan of development for the landowner's 
property and the applicant diligently pursues approval 
of the final plat or plan within a reasonable period 
of time under the circumstances; or (vi) the governing 
body or its designated agent has approved a final 
subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development for 
the landowner's property. 
 
 
In the present case, the trial court determined that the 
1988 rezoning was a "significant governmental act," within the 
 
18
meaning of Code § 15.2-2307, and held that Etheridge took 
sufficient steps to secure a vested right in the entire property 
by expending funds relative to the development of that "entire 
tract."  I disagree with the majority's analysis, which largely 
adopts the trial court's reasoning, for three basic reasons. 
 
First, the majority states that the 1988 rezoning was 
"specifically directed" to "an identifiable property and 
project" but does not explain how the rezoning "allow[ed] 
development of a specific project," as required by the language 
of Code § 15.2-2307.  Instead, the majority effectively 
concludes that this statutory requirement was met because the 
1988 rezoning involved a particular tract of land, which was 
depicted in conceptual land use plans. 
 
The 1988 rezoning, however, did not allow development of 
any specific project, but merely changed the zoning of 
Etheridge's property from "Rural Residential" to "PD-H."  
Moreover, this rezoning, on which the majority relies to 
establish a vested right under Code § 15.2-2307(ii), was not a 
"rezoning for a specific use or density" within the meaning of 
that provision because the rezoning did not mandate any 
particular use of the property and did not limit development to 
any specific density.  Instead, the 1988 rezoning permitted a 
wide variety of densities, as illustrated by the 1988 Master 
 
19
Plan (the 1988 plan).*  Further, the 1988 plan showed only 
general locations for various basic types of development. 
 
The General Assembly's intended meaning of the term 
"specific project" is illustrated in the second paragraph of 
Code § 15.2-2307, which provides several examples of actions 
that "are deemed to be significant affirmative governmental acts 
allowing development of a specific project."  On brief and at 
oral argument in this appeal, Etheridge relied on category (v) 
of the second paragraph, with its reference to a "plan of 
development," in support of its vested rights contention.  
Etheridge asserted that the 1994 Conceptual Land Use Plan (the 
1994 plan), which showed only general use categories for the 
property, was a "plan of development" within the meaning of 
category (v).  Thus, Etheridge argued that the 1988 rezoning and 
adoption of the 1994 plan satisfied the statutory requirement of 
demonstrating "a significant affirmative governmental act . . . 
allowing development of a specific project." 
 
The majority does not address category (v), which is 
central to an analysis of this vested rights claim.  With 
respect to category (v), I would hold that neither the 1988 nor 
the 1994 plan qualifies as a "plan of development" under that 
                     
 
*See the attached copy of the 1988 plan. 
 
 
20
category for purposes of demonstrating the existence of a 
"specific project." 
 
Under the terms of category (v), before such a plan can be 
considered evidence of a "specific project," the landowner must 
have "diligently pursue[d] approval of the final plat or plan 
within a reasonable period of time under the circumstances."  By 
their very nature, the 1988 and 1994 plans were conceptual in 
nature and were not subject to further approval as a "final plat 
or plan" detailing the manner in which the property would 
actually be developed. 
 
The conceptual nature of these plans was emphasized by 
Etheridge's planning consultant in an exhibit received in 
evidence in this case.  In that document, the consultant 
observed that the "[l]and uses proposed for the development will 
be generally located as indicated on the [1988] Plan."  Thus, 
Etheridge's own evidence demonstrates that the 1988 and 1994 
plans cannot qualify as a "plan of development" creating a 
"specific project," within the meaning of category (v) in Code 
§ 15.2-2307. 
The only evidence of a "specific project" in the present 
record is the preliminary subdivision plat for Planter's 
Station, which relates to only a portion of Etheridge's entire 
tract.  Manifestly, this plat cannot establish the existence of 
a "specific project" for the remaining portion of the tract not 
 
21
covered by the plat.  Thus, I would conclude that although the 
1988 rezoning was a significant affirmative governmental act 
within the meaning of Code § 15.2-2307, that rezoning was not an 
act that "allow[ed] development of a specific project" 
encompassing Etheridge's entire property. 
 
My second disagreement with the majority's analysis is that 
it effectively accords Etheridge's entire tract the status of a 
"specific project" simply because certain actions taken by 
Etheridge ultimately could benefit the entire tract.  Any such 
benefit to the entire tract is purely conjectural, however, 
because no specific plan has been approved for its development.  
Given the absence of any specific plan of development for the 
entire site, development beyond the boundaries of the 
preliminary subdivision plat may not ever occur in any manner 
now being evaluated by Etheridge.  I cannot conclude that the 
General Assembly intended that the term "specific project" in 
Code § 15.2-2307 be applied in this manner to allow the creation 
of a vested right that is so wholly indefinite in both time and 
scope. 
 
My third disagreement with the majority's analysis is that 
the vested right accorded Etheridge effectively negates the 
statutory requirement that any such right be based on the 
"diligent pursuit" of a "specific project."  In applying the 
term "diligent pursuit," I would assign the word "diligent" its 
 
22
usual and common meaning.  Fritts v. Carolinas Cement Co., 262 
Va. 401, 405, 551 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2001); Murphy v. Norfolk 
Cmty. Servs. Bd., 260 Va. 334, 339, 533 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2000).  
That meaning imparts "steady, earnest, attentive, and energetic 
application and effort."  See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 633 (1993).  The uncontested facts of record show 
that Etheridge did not begin to make any application or effort 
in pursuit of any project until five years after the 1988 
rezoning.  Thus, if Etheridge's actions in 1993 and thereafter 
are sufficient to satisfy the statutory term "diligent pursuit," 
this term will place no practical or meaningful restriction on 
the acquisition of vested rights, in contravention of the clear 
language of Code § 15.2-2307. 
 
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court's 
application of Code § 15.2-2307 was plainly wrong, and that 
Etheridge did not have a vested right in the portion of its 
property not covered by the Planter's Station preliminary 
subdivision plat.  I would enter final judgment reversing this 
part of the trial court's judgment, and affirming the part of 
the court's judgment holding that Etheridge had vested rights in 
the portion of its property included in the Planter's Station 
subdivision plat. 
 
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