Case Title: Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 111438

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
JOHN CASEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF ORA CASEY, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 111438             JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
    March 2, 2012 
MERCK & CO., INC. 
 
UPON QUESTIONS OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
 
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of 
Virginia and our Rule 5:40, we accepted the following certified 
questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit: 
 
(1)  Does Virginia law permit equitable tolling of a 
state statute of limitations due to the pendency of a 
putative class action in another jurisdiction? 
 
 
(2)  Does Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(E)(1) permit 
tolling of a state statute of limitations due to the 
pendency of a putative class action in another 
jurisdiction?  
 
Background 
 
On September 15, 2005, a putative class action, Wolfe v. 
Merck & Co., was filed in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Tennessee.  The putative class included 
"[a]ll persons who consume or have consumed FOSAMAX, whether 
intravenously or by mouth."  The representative plaintiffs in 
the class action asserted claims of strict liability, 
negligence and medical monitoring against Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Merck).  
 
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The Wolfe putative class action was transferred to the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which 
consolidated certain Fosamax cases.  The Southern District of 
New York denied class certification and dismissed the Wolfe 
class action on January 28, 2008.  
 
Prior to the dismissal of the Wolfe putative class action, 
four plaintiffs, all residents of Virginia, filed individual 
state law based actions against Merck in the Southern District 
of New York, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction.  All 
four plaintiffs allegedly suffered from osteonecrosis of the 
jaw as a result of taking Fosamax.  The district court noted 
that "[i]t is undisputed that all four plaintiffs filed suit 
more than two years after the latest possible date that they 
sustained their respective alleged injuries," and that Virginia 
law applied to the claims.  
 
Merck moved for summary judgment, alleging that the four 
plaintiffs’ actions were untimely under Virginia's two-year 
statute of limitations for personal injuries.  In response, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the Wolfe putative class action, which 
was filed within the two-year limitation period, tolled the 
running of the Virginia statute of limitations on their 
individual actions because they would have been members of the 
proposed class had certification been granted.  The district 
 
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court granted Merck's motion, finding that the pendency of the 
Wolfe putative class action did not toll Virginia's limitations 
period for the four plaintiffs' state law claims.  
 
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The Second Circuit determined 
that Virginia law governed whether the Wolfe putative class 
action tolled the running of the statute of limitations on the 
plaintiffs' individual claims, and asked this Court to 
determine whether Virginia law permits equitable or statutory 
tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations due to the 
pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction.  
Facts 
 
The relevant facts, as set forth in the certification 
order, are not in dispute.  Merck manufactures Fosamax, a 
prescription drug that falls within a class of drugs known as 
bisphosphonates, which are used to treat bone conditions such 
as osteoporosis.  Fosamax, a nitrogenous bisphosphonate, has 
allegedly been linked to osteonecrosis – bone death – of the 
jaw. 
 
The four plaintiffs were prescribed and consumed Fosamax.  
Rebecca Quarles was diagnosed with osteonecrosis of the jaw and 
failure of dental implants in 2003 and sued Merck in 2007.  
Dorothy Deloriea was prescribed and took Fosamax in 1999, 
developed osteomyelitis and osteonecrosis of the jaw in 2004, 
 
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and filed her complaint against Merck in 2008.  Ora Casey began 
taking Fosamax in 2000 and was diagnosed with osteonecrosis of 
the jaw in 2004.  She died in 2007 and her estate initiated 
this action in 2008.  Roberta Brodin was prescribed and took 
Fosamax in 2001 and was diagnosed with osteonecrosis of the jaw 
in 2005.  She initiated her action in 2007. 
The plaintiffs' complaints against Merck assert 
exclusively Virginia state law claims:  strict liability, 
failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, and 
negligence in the design, testing, development, manufacture, 
labeling, marketing, distribution and sale of Fosamax.  As a 
result, it is agreed that Virginia law governs the question of 
whether the filing of the putative class tolled the running of 
the statute of limitations on their claims.  
Analysis 
The two certified questions of law relate to Virginia's 
statute of limitations for personal injury actions.∗  "[T]he 
applicability of the statute of limitations is a purely legal 
question of statutory construction."  Conger v. Barrett, 280 
Va. 627, 630, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010). 
                     
∗ Code § 8.01-243(A) provides: "every action for personal 
injuries, whatever the theory of recovery . . . shall be 
brought within two years after the cause of action accrues." 
 
 
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The plaintiffs contend that Virginia law permits equitable 
tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations based upon the 
filing of a cross-jurisdictional putative class action.  
Plaintiffs also argue that the pendency of a putative class 
action in another jurisdiction statutorily tolls Virginia's 
statute of limitations under Code § 8.01-229(E)(1).  Merck 
responds that Virginia law does not permit equitable tolling of 
a statute of limitations, and that Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) does 
not provide for tolling due to the pendency of a putative class 
action in another jurisdiction. 
Certified Question (1) 
It is well-established that "statutes of limitations are 
strictly enforced and must be applied unless the General 
Assembly has clearly created an exception to their 
application."  Rivera v. Witt, 257 Va. 280, 283, 512 S.E.2d 
558, 559 (1999).  A statute of limitations may not be tolled, 
"or an exception applied, in the absence of a clear statutory 
enactment to such effect."  Arrington v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. 
Co., 250 Va. 52, 55-56, 458 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1995).  "[A]ny 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the enforcement of the 
statute."  Id. at 55, 458 S.E.2d at 290-91.  
Given these principles, there is no authority in Virginia 
jurisprudence for the equitable tolling of a statute of 
limitations based upon the pendency of a putative class action 
 
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in another jurisdiction.  Certified Question (1) is answered in 
the negative. 
Certified Question (2) 
 
Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) provides that "if any action is 
commenced within the prescribed limitation period and for any 
cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits, 
the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part 
of the period within which such action may be brought, and 
another action may be brought within the remaining period."  
The plaintiffs contend that Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) statutorily 
tolled the statute of limitations for plaintiffs’ claims during 
the pendency of the putative class action.  The plaintiffs 
assert that this Court's decision in Welding, Inc. v. Bland 
Cnty. Serv. Auth., 261 Va. 218, 541 S.E.2d 909 (2001), 
indicates that Virginia should recognize cross-jurisdictional 
putative class action tolling.   
In Welding, the plaintiff originally filed a breach of 
contract action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia, but that court found it 
lacked jurisdiction because of a forum selection clause in the 
contract between the parties.  Id. at 222, 541 S.E.2d at 911.  
Subsequently, the same plaintiff filed suit in Virginia state 
court on the same cause of action.  Id.  This Court stated 
"[t]here is no language in Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) which limits 
 
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or restricts its application to a specific type of action or 
precludes its applicability to actions filed in a federal 
court."  Id. at 224, 541 S.E.2d at 912.  This Court also noted 
that "[t]he term 'action' refers to civil litigation in both 
the state and federal courts."  Id.  Therefore, Code § 8.01-
229(E)(1) tolled the running of the statute of limitations on 
the plaintiff's action and its suit in Virginia was timely 
filed.  Id. at 226, 541 S.E.2d at 913. 
 
It is clear that under Virginia law, an action filed in a 
foreign jurisdiction may trigger tolling under Code § 8.01-
229(E)(1).  See id. at 224, 541 S.E.2d at 912.  There is no 
particular type of action that must be filed and no particular 
jurisdiction in which that action must be brought for the 
commencement of an action to trigger tolling under Code § 8.01-
229(E)(1).  However, for tolling to be permitted, the 
subsequently filed action must be filed by the same party in 
interest on the same cause of action in the same right.  See 
McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 198 Va. 612, 619, 95 
S.E.2d 201, 206 (1956), overruled on other grounds by Harmon v. 
Sadjadi, 273 Va. 184, 192-93, 639 S.E.2d 294, 299 (2007) 
(permitting tolling where "the real party in interest remained 
the same; the suit was instituted in the same right; and the 
cause of action was the same"). 
 
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Welding differs from the instant case because it concerns 
a situation where the same plaintiff initially sued in federal 
court on the same cause of action he subsequently pursued in 
state court.  The plaintiff in both actions was clearly the 
same.  Whereas, in the instant matter, it is undisputed that 
the four plaintiffs were not named plaintiffs in the putative 
class action that they claim triggered the tolling.  They were 
merely members of a putative class that included every single 
American who took Fosamax, whether he or she sought a refund, 
medical monitoring or an award for personal injury. 
 
For the filing of an action to toll the statute of 
limitations from running on a subsequently filed action 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-229(E)(1), there must be identity of 
the parties in the two lawsuits.  In other words, for the 
statute of limitations to be tolled for a subsequent action, 
the party who brought the original action must be the same as 
the plaintiff in the subsequent action or a recognized 
representative of that plaintiff asserting the same cause and 
right of action.  See McDaniel, 198 Va. at 619, 95 S.E.2d at 
206.  We must rely upon Virginia law to determine if this 
identity of parties and rights exists. 
"An individual or entity does not acquire standing to sue 
in a representative capacity by asserting the rights of 
another, unless authorized by statute to do so."  W.S. Carnes, 
 
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Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 383, 478 S.E.2d 295, 
300 (1996).  "Our jurisprudence is clear that when a party 
without standing brings a legal action, the action so 
instituted is, in effect, a legal nullity," and thus cannot 
toll the statute of limitations.  Harmon, 273 Va. at 193, 639 
S.E.2d at 299; see also Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 232 
Va. 98, 107, 348 S.E.2d 252, 258 (1986) (holding original 
motion for judgment filed by plaintiff who lacked standing "did 
nothing to toll the running of the statute of limitations" as 
to the second suit brought by subsequent plaintiffs with 
standing); Braddock, L.C. v. Board of Supervisors, 268 Va. 420, 
426, 601 S.E.2d 552, 555 (2004) (action brought by party 
lacking standing was a "nullity" that could not be resurrected 
by adding parties with standing).  In essence, to toll the 
statute of limitations, the plaintiff in the first suit must 
have legal standing to assert the rights that are at issue in 
the second lawsuit. 
 
A putative class action is a representative action in 
which a representative plaintiff attempts to represent the 
interests of not only named plaintiffs, but also those of 
unnamed class members.  See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974).  Virginia jurisprudence does 
not recognize class actions.  Under Virginia law, a class 
representative who files a putative class action is not 
 
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recognized as having standing to sue in a representative 
capacity on behalf of the unnamed members of the putative 
class.  Thus, under Virginia law, there is no identity of 
parties between the named plaintiff in a putative class action 
and the named plaintiff in a subsequent action filed by a 
putative class member individually.  See Fowler v. Winchester 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 266 Va. 131, 136, 580 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2003) 
(noting plaintiff could not be "substantially the same party" 
as the plaintiff in the first suit because she was not 
qualified as a personal representative anywhere); Brake v. 
Payne, 268 Va. 92, 95, 597 S.E.2d 59, 60 (2004) (holding a 
plaintiff without standing and a proper plaintiff are not suing 
in the same right).  Consequently, a putative class action 
cannot toll the running of the statutory period for unnamed 
putative class members who are not recognized under Virginia 
law as plaintiffs or represented plaintiffs in the original 
action.  See Harmon, 273 Va. at 198, 639 S.E.2d at 302.   
We hold that Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) does not toll the 
statute of limitations for unnamed putative class members due 
to the pendency of a putative class action in another 
jurisdiction.  Certified question (2) is answered in the 
negative. 
Conclusion 
 
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For these reasons, this Court holds that Virginia 
recognizes neither equitable nor statutory tolling due to the 
pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction. 
 
Certified questions answered in the negative.