Case Title: State v. LaMar

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2128

Docket Number: 19981983

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LAMAR, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128.]  
Criminal law — Aggravated murder of five prison inmates during 
prison riot — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 1998-1983 — Submitted November 14, 2001 — Decided May 15, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lawrence County, No. 95CA31. 
__________________ 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
The appellant, Keith LaMar, was convicted of murdering five 
prison inmates during the infamous April 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio 
Correctional Facility (“SOCF”) in Lucasville.  The trial court sentenced LaMar to 
death for four of these murders.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
I.  Factual Background 
{¶2} 
On the afternoon of April 11, 1993, a group of Muslim inmates 
seized control of cellblock “L” (“L-Block”) at SOCF.  The rioting inmates took 
several guards hostage and locked inmates considered “snitches” into various cells 
in the L-6 section of L-Block.  The Muslim inmates maintained control of unit L-6 
while two other dominant groups—the Aryan Brotherhood (a racist group of 
white inmates) and the Black Gangster Disciples (a prison gang)—controlled 
other units within L-Block. 
{¶3} 
On the day of the riot, LaMar was an SOCF inmate serving a 
sentence of eighteen years to life for a 1989 murder conviction.  LaMar, who was 
not a Muslim, did not plan or participate in the prison takeover and was in the 
prison recreation yard when the riot began.  But after the commotion began, 
LaMar and two other inmates, Louis Jones and Derek Cannon, went back inside 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
L-Block to check the personal belongings in their respective cells.  When the three 
were unable to get back outside because the Muslims had closed access to and 
from L-Block, LaMar said to Jones and Cannon, “Ain’t no need in us staying in 
here getting caught up in something we’re not a part of.  Let’s kill all the snitches 
and get out to the yard.” 
{¶4} 
LaMar approached Cecil Allen, a leader of the Muslim group of 
inmates, and asked, “if we kill the snitches, could we be let out to the yard so we 
don’t be a part of this?”  Allen consulted with the Muslim leadership and returned 
a few minutes later to tell LaMar that the “orders has [sic] been granted to kill the 
snitches.” 
{¶5} 
After Allen granted permission to “kill the snitches,” LaMar, 
Jones, and Cannon walked around the L-Block corridor to enlist other inmates to 
help them.  Eventually, the group recruited Hiawatha Frezzell (a.k.a. 
“Pittsburgh”), Eric Scales (a.k.a. “Tiger”), Derrick Mathews, Rasheem Matthews, 
Albert Young (a.k.a. “Da-Da”), and Gregory Curry to join the newly formed death 
squad.  LaMar’s group proceeded to unit L-2, where they retrieved bats, shovels, 
and weight bars to use as weapons.  The men also wore masks fashioned from T-
shirts, towels, and bandannas. 
{¶6} 
After arming and disguising themselves, LaMar and his group 
returned to L-6.  Inmate Timothy Grinnell was operating the console that 
controlled the cell doors within L-6.  LaMar led his group to the upper tier of the 
cellblock and instructed Grinnell to open a cell occupied by Andre Stockton.  
After Grinnell complied with the demand, LaMar and Curry entered the cell and 
beat Stockton with a shovel and a baseball bat.  Other members of the group 
dragged Stockton from the cell and participated in the beating. 
{¶7} 
After beating Stockton, the group went downstairs to the lower tier 
of L-6.  LaMar yelled at Grinnell to open the cells occupied by inmates Ellis 
January Term, 2002 
3 
Walker and Darrell Depina.  After Walker refused to comply with LaMar’s 
command to come out of the cell, LaMar and Curry dragged him to the main floor 
of the cellblock and beat him repeatedly.  Other members of the death squad also 
participated in Walker’s beating.  LaMar then ordered Depina out of his cell.  
When Depina refused, LaMar entered the cell and hit him several times before 
dragging him to the main floor, as he had done with Walker.  LaMar continued to 
beat Depina with a baseball bat, striking him several times.  Other members of 
LaMar’s group joined in beating Depina, who died from his injuries. 
{¶8} 
When LaMar finished beating Depina, he ordered Grinnell to open 
a cell occupied by Bruce Vitale.  When Vitale refused to come out of the cell, 
LaMar hit him on the head with a shovel.  LaMar continued beating Vitale on the 
head and at one point knocked a tooth out of Vitale’s mouth.  Vitale tried to 
defend himself by crawling under the bed, but LaMar and Curry dragged him out 
of the cell and continued the beating, joined by other members of the death squad.  
At one point, LaMar told Jones, “I didn’t bring you all in here to stand around,” 
when he noticed that Jones was not participating in the assault.  Vitale was still 
alive when the group left him but died after Frezzell and another member of 
LaMar’s group stabbed and beat him again. 
{¶9} 
LaMar continued on to a nearby cell occupied by Thomas Taylor, 
another suspected snitch.  Before LaMar could order Taylor’s cell opened, a 
Muslim inmate named Harris intervened and told LaMar that Taylor was under 
Muslim protection.  LaMar angrily pushed Harris out of the way, saying, “If he 
[Taylor] is in there, he’s a snitch.  Fuck it.  Kill him.”  After Taylor told LaMar 
that he was not a snitch, LaMar agreed to spare Taylor’s life, but only if Taylor 
would kill Albert Staiano, who was locked in an adjacent cell.  To save his own 
life, Taylor agreed.  LaMar ordered Taylor’s and Staiano’s cells opened and 
commanded one of the other inmates to give a baseball bat to Taylor.  Staiano 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
tried to run from his cell, but fell to the ground when Frezzell tripped him.  Taylor 
hit Staiano over the head several times with the baseball bat and then, after the bat 
broke, with a fire extinguisher.  Other death-squad members, not including 
LaMar, joined in the assault and stabbed Staiano repeatedly.  When the beating 
ended, LaMar ordered Taylor to return to his cell.  Taylor eventually pleaded 
guilty to involuntary manslaughter for his role in Staiano’s death. 
{¶10} The death squad’s next stop was a cell occupied by Michael 
Trocadero and four to five other inmates.  LaMar ordered Grinnell to open the 
cell, but Grinnell refused, saying that the Muslim leadership did not want those 
inmates killed.  As LaMar and his group began to leave L-6, it passed the cell of 
William Svette, an elderly inmate who used a walker to move himself around.  
Svette, who appeared to have been beaten earlier, cursed the death squad with 
obscenities and racial epithets.  On LaMar’s order, Grinnell opened Svette’s cell, 
where LaMar and Curry beat Svette over the head with a baseball bat and a 
shovel.  LaMar started to leave the cell but returned to beat Svette again after 
noticing that Svette’s legs were moving. 
{¶11} Svette remained alive after the death squad left his cell.  A short 
time later, on Grinnell’s instructions to make sure all of the victims in L-6 were 
dead, inmate Eric Girdy struck Svette across the head twice more with a baseball 
bat.  Svette continued to live after Girdy’s beating and was still alive after inmate 
Robert Bass, on orders from one of the Muslim inmates, dragged Svette’s body to 
a ramp near a prison recreation area.  Svette eventually died after yet another 
inmate, Freddie Frakes, beat him yet again with a baseball bat. 
{¶12} After finishing their rampage, LaMar and the others left L-Block 
and joined the large contingent of inmates gathered in the recreation yard.  Many 
of the participants in the L-6 killings remained together and discussed what had 
January Term, 2002 
5 
transpired.  During this time, LaMar saw inmate Dennis Weaver in the recreation 
yard and told Curry, “I wish Weaver was in there.  I’d have killed him, too.” 
{¶13} Early the following morning, law enforcement officers surrounded 
the approximately three hundred inmates gathered in the recreation yard and 
herded them to a gymnasium on the SOCF grounds, where the inmates were 
handcuffed and taken to various cells around the prison.  LaMar occupied a cell in 
K-Block with nine other inmates: Scales, Frezzell, Weaver, William “Geno” 
Washington, Jeffrey Mack, Michael Childers, Ricky Rutheford, William Bowling, 
and John Malveaux.  These ten inmates remained in the cell without incident for 
the rest of the day. 
{¶14} The next day, however, tensions began rising in the cell.  LaMar 
and Scales began harassing Weaver, accusing him of being a snitch and telling 
him that “all snitches should be killed.”  Weaver denied being a snitch and urged 
his fellow cellmates to protest what he perceived as mistreatment of the inmates 
who were not involved in the riot.  LaMar became incensed by Weaver’s 
comments, yelled “shut up, snitch,” punched Weaver in the face, and relegated 
him to a corner of the cell.  Scales and Mack also joined in the attack on Weaver.  
LaMar later ordered that Weaver, Malveaux, Bowling, and Childers be tied up. 
{¶15} Later that day, LaMar announced to the cellmates that “I want Mr. 
Weaver dead.  I want that snitch dead right now.”  LaMar then accused Bowling 
of being a snitch and threatened to kill Bowling if Bowling did not kill Weaver.  
LaMar untied Bowling, handed him some string, and watched Bowling choke 
Weaver.  LaMar also threatened Rutheford, who then aided Bowling in the assault 
by holding Weaver’s feet.  LaMar became impatient with Bowling’s progress and 
told Childers, “[I]f you want to live, if you ain’t no snitch, then you help kill him.”  
LaMar then untied Childers, who complied with LaMar’s order by choking 
Weaver, using the ropes with which LaMar had tied Childers’s wrists.  When 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
Childers began hitting and kicking Weaver, LaMar told him to “just strangle him” 
because LaMar wanted “to make it look like he hung hisself.”  LaMar aided 
Childers by stuffing toilet paper and pieces of plastic down Weaver’s throat in an 
effort to silence him.  Weaver eventually died while Childers was choking him. 
{¶16} After Weaver died, LaMar instructed Bowling and Malveaux to 
move the body to a corner of the cell.  He also ordered them to tie a string from a 
cell mattress around Weaver’s neck “and hook it to the coat hook to make it look 
like a suicide.”  And before corrections officers removed Weaver’s body, LaMar 
instructed everyone in the cell to tell them that Weaver had killed himself. 
{¶17} The grand jury indicted LaMar on nine counts of aggravated 
murder for his role in the deaths of Depina, Vitale, Staiano, Svette, and Weaver.  
Five of the aggravated-murder counts alleged that LaMar killed each of the 
victims with prior calculation and design.  R.C. 2903.01(A).  The remaining 
counts charged LaMar with murdering Depina, Vitale, Staiano, and Svette while 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping.  R.C. 2903.01(B).  In addition, 
the grand jury charged LaMar with four death-penalty specifications attached to 
the first eight counts of the indictment: R.C. 2929.04(A)(4) (murder committed in 
a detention facility); (A)(5) (prior murder conviction); (A)(5) (murdering two or 
more victims); (A)(7) (murder committed while committing or attempting to 
commit kidnapping).  The ninth count, charging Weaver’s murder, alleged only 
three of these specifications; it did not charge LaMar with the kidnapping 
specification.1 
                                          
 
1. 
The indictment did not include any counts relating to the assaults on Stockton and 
Walker. 
 
January Term, 2002 
7 
{¶18} At trial, LaMar testified on his own behalf and denied committing 
any of the five murders.  LaMar testified that he was in the recreation yard when 
the riot began and went back inside L-6 briefly to get his personal belongings.  
LaMar explained that while inside, he spoke briefly with Allen after Grinnell had 
accused LaMar of trying to “get guys out the cells.”  According to LaMar, Allen 
did not believe Grinnell and allowed LaMar to leave the cellblock.  LaMar 
testified that he returned to the recreation yard and never went back into L-6 that 
day.  He told the jury that he stayed in the recreation yard until the early morning 
hours of April 12, when corrections officers and state troopers surrounded the 
yard and ordered the inmates into the gymnasium.  LaMar’s alibi testimony was 
corroborated by four inmate witnesses who each testified to having seen and 
talked to LaMar in the yard during the early stages of the riot. 
{¶19} LaMar also testified to the events surrounding Weaver’s murder, 
which took place after officers placed the two men, along with eight others, in a 
holding cell in K-Block.  LaMar stated that he and Scales argued with Bowling 
about the distribution of food and admitted to punching Bowling in the face.  He 
denied, however, tying up other inmates or assaulting Weaver.  According to 
LaMar, Bowling tied up Childers and started punching Weaver after Weaver came 
to Childers’s defense.  LaMar testified that Bowling then grabbed Weaver around 
the neck in a “half Nelson” until Weaver lost consciousness.  Bowling then untied 
Childers, who also choked Weaver until Weaver died.  LaMar admitted lying to 
investigators about the events leading to Weaver’s death, but said that he lied 
because he didn’t “want nothing to do with it.” 
{¶20} Two defense witnesses corroborated LaMar’s account of Weaver’s 
murder.  Inmate Cory Perkins, who was in an adjacent cell, testified that he heard 
Bowling call Weaver a “snitch.”  Perkins also testified that he heard someone else 
in the cellblock suggest that Weaver be killed.  William Washington, who was in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
the K-Block cell with LaMar and Weaver, also corroborated LaMar’s story by 
identifying Bowling and Childers as the inmates who killed Weaver.  According 
to Washington, LaMar did not touch Weaver, did not order anyone to hurt 
Weaver, and did not say anything about Weaver.  On cross-examination, however, 
the prosecution impeached Washington with a prior statement in which he 
identified LaMar as one of Weaver’s assailants. 
{¶21} The jury returned guilty verdicts on all the charges and 
specifications alleged in the indictment.  Following the penalty-phase 
proceedings, the jury recommended the death penalty for the murders of Depina, 
Vitale, Svette, and Weaver.  For Staiano’s murder, the jury found that LaMar 
should be sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after thirty years.  
The trial court issued a sentencing opinion in which it agreed with the jury’s 
recommendation and sentenced LaMar to death for the murders of Depina, Vitale, 
Svette, and Weaver.  LaMar appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, 
asserting nineteen assignments of error.  The court of appeals overruled each of 
the assignments and affirmed the convictions and death sentence.  The cause is 
now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
II.  Settled Issues 
{¶22} LaMar presents twenty propositions of law for our review.  
Although R.C. 2929.05 grants a capital defendant an appeal of right to this court, 
we are not required to discuss in opinion form each proposition raised in the 
appeal.  State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 110, 666 N.E.2d 1099.  We 
may therefore summarily overrule those propositions of law that this court has 
previously resolved and address only those issues that warrant discussion.  Id.  
See, also, State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 520 N.E.2d 568. 
{¶23} Accordingly, 
we 
summarily 
overrule 
LaMar’s 
eighteenth 
proposition 
of 
law 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
death-penalty 
January Term, 2002 
9 
proportionality review under R.C. 2929.05.  See, e.g., State v. Smith (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 89, 118, 684 N.E.2d 668; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 
31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We also overrule 
LaMar’s twentieth proposition of law, which challenges the constitutionality of 
Ohio’s death-penalty statutory scheme on various grounds.  We have considered 
all of these arguments and summarily reject them.  See, e.g., State v. Stallings 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 297, 731 N.E.2d 159; State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 357, 371-372, 582 N.E.2d 972; State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 15-
16, 564 N.E.2d 408.  In neither proposition does LaMar offer any arguments that 
this court has not already rejected. 
III.  Pretrial Issues 
A.  Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence 
{¶24} In his first proposition of law, LaMar asserts that the state failed to 
disclose material evidence tending to exculpate him in the murders, thereby 
denying him his constitutional right to a fair trial.  See Brady v. Maryland (1963), 
373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.  Prior to trial, LaMar’s counsel 
asked the state to produce all evidence of an exculpatory nature, as required by 
Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f).  The state’s response did not provide a complete list of 
inmate statements, purportedly because of concerns about the safety of inmates 
who had given statements to law enforcement about the events of the SOCF riot.  
Instead, the state submitted to the trial court an eleven-page document containing 
summaries of inmate interviews. 
{¶25} At a pretrial hearing, the trial court read summaries of inmate 
statements from the bench and, with a few exceptions, did not identify who made 
them.  The contents of the summaries varied widely, ranging from useless 
information (e.g., “He was in a cell adjoining K-2-36 but gave no useful 
information”) to pure speculation (e.g., “He was in an adjoining cell to K-2-36 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
and heard a commotion and thought Weaver hung himself”) to statements with 
exculpatory value (e.g., “he observed Eskridge kill Svette in L-corridor”; “[h]e 
was in an adjoining cell * * * and identified Greg Curry telling Keith LaMar to 
kill Weaver because he was a snitch”).  Many of the statements, however, 
corroborated LaMar’s participation in the killings, while other statements named 
other assailants without eliminating LaMar as a participant. 
{¶26} After reading all of the summaries, the trial court granted a 
continuance to the defense and authorized funds for a second defense investigator 
to conduct additional interviews of inmate witnesses.  The trial court did not, 
however, require the prosecution to provide the full statements (i.e., contents of 
the statement with the name of the inmate who gave it) to the defense.  Instead, 
the court ordered the prosecution to provide the defense with the names of forty-
three inmates who gave statements to law enforcement.  Although the prosecution 
complied with the trial court’s directive and provided a list of forty-three names, it 
did not match the statements with the names supplied. 
{¶27} Suppression by the prosecution of evidence that is favorable to the 
accused and “material either to guilt or to punishment” is a violation of due 
process.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.  Evidence 
suppressed by the prosecution is “material” within the meaning of Brady only if 
there exists a “reasonable probability” that the result of the trial would have been 
different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense.  Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 
514 U.S. 419, 433-434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490; see, also, United States 
v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has stressed, “the adjective [‘reasonable’] is important.  The 
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair 
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Kyles, 514 
January Term, 2002 
11 
U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490; see, also, Strickler v. Greene 
(1999), 527 U.S. 263, 289-290, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286. 
{¶28} Assuming arguendo that the prosecution “suppressed” the 
evidence LaMar complains of within the meaning of Brady,2 we find no due 
process violation.  On the record before us, we find no reasonable probability of a 
different trial outcome had the defense received the full statements.  Many of the 
statements identified LaMar as a participant in the murders.  And statements 
identifying other inmates as participants did not exculpate LaMar because each 
victim had been attacked by multiple assailants.  Cf. State v. Waddy (1992), 63 
Ohio St.3d 424, 433, 588 N.E.2d 819 (holding evidence not to be material within 
the meaning of Brady when the evidence did not eliminate the defendant as the 
perpetrator).  Finally, with respect to murders in cellblock L-6, none of the 
statements assisted LaMar’s alibi defense (i.e., that LaMar was in the recreation 
yard at the time of the killings).  In short, nothing in the contents of the statements 
“could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 
131 L.Ed.2d 490. 
{¶29} As a separate Brady claim, LaMar argues that the trial court should 
have found a Brady violation and granted his motion for a new trial after defense 
                                          
 
2. 
Because the defense knew before trial of the contents of inmate statements and the names 
of the inmates who gave them, there is arguably no Brady violation as a matter of law.  At least 
two federal appellate courts have found Brady applicable only to the discovery after trial of 
information that was known to the prosecution and unknown to the defense.  United States v. 
Gonzales (C.A.8, 1996), 90 F.3d 1363, 1368; United States v. Soto-Alvarez (C.A.1, 1992), 958 
F.2d 473, 477.  See, also, United States v. Clark (C.A.6, 1991), 928 F.2d 733, 738 (no Brady 
violation exists where a defendant knows of essential facts permitting him to take advantage of 
exculpatory information or where evidence is available from another source), citing United States 
v. Grossman (C.A. 2, 1988), 843 F.2d 78, 85, and United States v. Davis (C.A.11, 1986), 787 F.2d 
1501, 1505. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
counsel discovered that the prosecution had provided complete inmate 
statements—the same material the defense had requested at the pretrial hearing in 
LaMar’s case—in the criminal trials of two other SOCF inmates (Derek Cannon 
and Rasheem Matthews).  LaMar argues that the disclosure in these two 
noncapital cases undercuts the prosecution’s proffered reason (i.e., inmate safety) 
for failing to disclose the information in his case.  As we stated above, however, 
the statements were not material to LaMar’s case within the meaning of Brady.  
We therefore reject this argument. 
{¶30} In his final Brady claim, LaMar claims that he should have 
received a new trial in light of evidence the defense discovered after trial.  The 
evidence consisted of (1) Ohio State Highway Patrol summaries of two statements 
given by inmate Willie Kastner to investigators and (2) transcripts of interviews 
conducted by law enforcement officers with inmates David Hackett, Tyronne 
Golphin, Gerald Kelly, William Turner, and Daniel Davidson.  These witnesses 
identified several persons other than LaMar as being involved in the murders of 
Vitale, Staiano, Depina, and Svette.  LaMar further notes that the interviews with 
Hackett and Davidson suggest that Vitale and Staiano may not have been dead at 
the time their assailants left L-6.  Because the state failed to disclose these 
potentially exculpatory statements, LaMar argues that there has been a Brady 
violation warranting a new trial. 
{¶31} We reject this Brady claim for reasons similar to the ones we stated 
above.  While these statements identified other inmates, none of them exonerated 
LaMar.  At best, these witnesses established that there were several persons who 
joined in beating the L-6 victims to death.  The state’s theory all along was that 
LaMar was one of many assailants who participated in murdering the victims in 
L-6.  Therefore, the existence of this evidence does not undermine our confidence 
in the trial outcome. 
January Term, 2002 
13 
{¶32} Finding no Brady violation that would warrant reversal, we reject 
LaMar’s first proposition of law. 
B.  Allegations of a Biased Judge 
{¶33} The trial court’s treatment of the exculpatory evidence complained 
of in the first proposition of law also forms the basis of LaMar’s second 
proposition of law.  Because of the trial judge’s actions, LaMar contends that he 
was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial judge. 
{¶34} It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is 
fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.  See Rose v. 
Clark (1986), 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460; Tumey v. Ohio 
(1927), 273 U.S. 510, 534, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749.  We have described 
judicial bias as “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or 
favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed 
anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an 
open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.”  State ex rel. 
Pratt v. Weygandt (1956), 164 Ohio St. 463, 58 O.O. 315, 132 N.E.2d 191, 
paragraph four of the syllabus; see, also, Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 191, 201, 754 N.E.2d 235.  LaMar argues that the trial judge exhibited 
bias by “actually aid[ing] the prosecution in intermingling names, adding 
irrelevant inmate names and generally obfuscating the information that appellant 
was clearly entitled to.”  We do not agree. 
{¶35} We first note that LaMar did not raise the issue of judicial bias in 
his appeal to the court of appeals.  He has therefore forfeited this claim.  State v. 
Jalowiec (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 220, 224, 744 N.E.2d 163.  Moreover, LaMar 
failed to avail himself of the procedures described in R.C. 2701.03, which allows 
a party to file an affidavit of bias and prejudice with this court seeking 
disqualification of a biased judge. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶36} Even if LaMar had raised this issue before the court of appeals, we 
would find no merit to his contention.  LaMar relies on a general characterization 
of unfairness and bias by the trial court during the March 6, 1995 pretrial hearing 
to support his claim, without referring to any specific evidence of bias.  But 
viewing the transcript as a whole, and taking all of the judge’s comments in their 
proper context, we see nothing to suggest that the trial court harbored a hostile 
feeling of ill will toward either LaMar or his attorneys during the course of the 
trial.  We accordingly reject the second proposition of law. 
C.  Pretrial Discovery 
{¶37} As a branch of his fourth proposition of law (alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct in various respects), LaMar argues that the prosecution improperly 
withheld discovery before trial.3  Specifically, LaMar alleges that the prosecutor 
(1) ignored the trial court’s order to provide transcripts of statements given by 
inmate witnesses, (2) repeatedly refused the trial court’s orders to fully answer 
defense interrogatories in support of the defense’s motion to dismiss on selective-
prosecution grounds, and (3) failed to disclose summaries of inmate statements on 
grounds of “confidentiality” and inmate safety, only to turn them over in other 
cases.  We construe LaMar’s argument, which asserts many of the same claims 
raised in the first proposition of law, as asserting violations of the discovery 
provisions contained in Crim.R. 16. 
{¶38} Violations of Crim.R. 16 by the prosecution may result in 
reversible error only upon a showing that (1) the prosecution’s failure to disclose 
was a willful violation of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would 
                                          
 
3. 
We consider LaMar’s remaining arguments under the fourth proposition of law in Part VI, 
infra. 
January Term, 2002 
15 
have benefited the accused in preparing a defense, and (3) the accused has 
suffered prejudice.  State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458, 653 N.E.2d 
285.  For the reasons we stated in overruling the first proposition of law, LaMar 
cannot establish prejudice because there was no reasonable probability of a 
different trial result even if the prosecution had disclosed the inmate statements 
LaMar complains of.  And as for the prosecutor’s alleged failure to answer 
defense interrogatories relevant to LaMar’s selective-prosecution claim, LaMar’s 
claim likewise fails.  As we shall explain infra in disposing of the seventh 
proposition of law, LaMar did not make a prima facie showing of selective 
prosecution.  Because he did not produce credible evidence of selective 
prosecution, he was not entitled to discovery on the issue.  United States v. 
Armstrong (1996), 517 U.S. 456, 468-469, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687.  We 
accordingly reject LaMar’s pretrial-discovery argument. 
D.  Limitations on Jury Voir Dire 
{¶39} LaMar’s third proposition of law attacks the trial court’s actions 
during jury selection.  He argues that the trial court unreasonably and arbitrarily 
prevented him from “inquiring into proper subjects of voir dire including factors 
affecting credibility, the meaning of the presumption of innocence, defendant’s 
right to remain silent, the burden of proof, and the juror’s ability to follow 
instructions.”  LaMar cites numerous instances from voir dire when the trial court 
sustained prosecution objections to defense counsel’s questions relating to areas 
such as (1) a potential juror’s methods of evaluating a witness’s credibility, (2) 
whether the juror could convict just because LaMar presented no evidence, and 
(3) how a juror would feel if LaMar did not testify at trial.  At one point, the trial 
court fined one of LaMar’s attorneys $50 after the attorney, in apparent 
frustration, complained (in the presence of the jury venire) that he was “not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
getting a fair trial in this case” if he was not allowed to delve into certain areas 
with the potential jurors during voir dire.4 
{¶40} Crim.R. 24 and R.C. 2945.27 afford both prosecution and defense 
counsel the opportunity to conduct reasonable voir dire of prospective jurors.  
Nevertheless, the length and scope of voir dire fall within a trial court’s sound 
discretion and vary depending on the circumstances of a given case.  State v. 
Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 481, 653 N.E.2d 304.  Accordingly, we will 
not find prejudicial error in how the trial court qualified venirepersons “as fair and 
impartial jurors” unless the appellant can show “a clear abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 565, 715 N.E.2d 1144; see, also, 
State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 39, 526 N.E.2d 274.  A trial court does 
not abuse its discretion unless it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably.  
State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144. 
{¶41} We find no abuse of discretion warranting reversal in this case.  
The voir dire limitations cited by LaMar paint an incomplete picture of how the 
trial court conducted the jury-selection process.  At one point, when defense 
counsel expressed concerns that the trial court was limiting his ability to ask 
jurors “what their opinion will be if [LaMar] does not take the stand,” the court 
agreed to allow him to inquire into this area with appropriate questions phrased in 
terms of the jurors’ ability to follow instructions.  The trial court also reconsidered 
its position on objections previously sustained and allowed the defense to “get 
back into that area [of credibility].”  As a result, the defense was allowed to ask 
numerous questions of prospective jurors about their methods of assessing 
credibility, how they would feel if LaMar exercised his right to refuse to testify, 
                                          
 
4. 
The trial court later revoked this order, which it described as a contempt citation, and 
January Term, 2002 
17 
and their views on the concept of reasonable doubt.  Thus, notwithstanding 
LaMar’s arguments to the contrary, the record shows that defense counsel was 
allowed some latitude to explore these areas.  Viewed in its entirety, we find no 
undue restriction in the manner the trial court conducted voir dire and therefore 
reject LaMar’s third proposition of law. 
E.  Selective Prosecution 
{¶42} In the seventh proposition of law, LaMar contends that he is the 
victim of selective prosecution.  LaMar, who is African-American, argues that the 
trial court should have dismissed the indictment against him on grounds that the 
state chose to prosecute him for capital offenses because of his race.  Although the 
state prosecuted numerous inmates for murders committed during the SOCF riot, 
LaMar states that he was the only inmate charged with capital murder for killing 
other inmates. 
{¶43} The decision whether to prosecute a criminal offense is generally 
left to the discretion of the prosecutor.  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 
464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687.  That discretion is, however, subject to 
constitutional equal-protection principles, which prohibit prosecutors from 
selectively prosecuting individuals based on “ ‘an unjustifiable standard such as 
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ”  Id., quoting Oyler v. Boles 
(1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446.  Although a selective-
prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, a 
defendant may raise it as an “independent assertion that the prosecutor has 
brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.”  State v. Getsy 
                                                                                                                   
returned the $50 to LaMar’s counsel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
(1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203, 702 N.E.2d 866; see, also, Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
at 463, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687. 
{¶44} To support a claim of selective prosecution, “ ‘a defendant bears 
the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others 
similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of 
the type forming the basis of the charge against him, he has been singled out for 
prosecution, and (2) that the government’s discriminatory selection of him for 
prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible 
considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of 
constitutional rights.’ ”  State v. Flynt (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134, 17 O.O.3d 
81, 407 N.E.2d 15, quoting United States v. Berrios (C.A.2, 1974), 501 F.2d 
1207, 1211.  In this case, LaMar has failed to satisfy either prong. 
{¶45} LaMar asserts that out of the more than twenty-five inmates who 
were indicted for homicide offenses relating to the SOCF riot, he was the only one 
charged with capital murder for “killing only inmates.”  LaMar also states that 
four other inmates, at least one of whom was white, were charged with noncapital 
offenses for participating in the same murders for which LaMar was convicted.  
Even accepting these assertions as true, LaMar fails to satisfy the first prong of the 
Flynt analysis because he has not shown that the state has treated him differently 
from other similarly situated individuals.  The state built its case against LaMar on 
the theory that he organized and led a small group of inmates on a murderous 
rampage.  The state presented considerable evidence that LaMar acted in a 
leadership role and participated in all five murders by either beating his victims or 
forcing other inmates to kill.  Because of LaMar’s extensive involvement, we 
cannot conclude that he was “similarly situated” with other inmates charged with 
noncapital offenses. 
January Term, 2002 
19 
{¶46} LaMar also fails to satisfy the second Flynt prong.  There is no 
evidence to suggest that the prosecution singled him out for death-penalty 
prosecution because of his race.  Just two years ago, in fact, this court affirmed the 
convictions of a white inmate who received the death penalty for aggravated 
murders committed during the SOCF riot.  See State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  Although LaMar emphasizes that Robb involved a 
white inmate convicted of killing both an inmate and a corrections officer, we fail 
to see how this distinction matters for purposes of a selective-prosecution 
analysis.  And even if it did, LaMar has done nothing more than make a bald 
assertion of differing treatment motivated by race.  Absent some demonstration of 
an invidious motive, this court will not presume intentional or purposeful 
discrimination from a mere showing of different treatment.  State v. Freeman 
(1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 20 OBR 355, 485 N.E.2d 1043. 
{¶47} Under this proposition of law, LaMar also argues that the trial 
court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on selective-
prosecution grounds without stating its essential factual findings, as required by 
former Crim.R. 12(E) (now Crim.R. 12[F]).  There was no such error in this case, 
however, because LaMar failed to request the findings he now claims were 
necessary.  See State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 179, 672 N.E.2d 640.  By 
failing to invoke the rule, LaMar has forfeited any error.  Id.  We reject LaMar’s 
seventh proposition of law. 
F.  Prejudicial Joinder 
{¶48} In his eighth proposition of law, LaMar argues that the trial court 
should have granted his pretrial motion to sever count nine of the indictment, 
alleging aggravated-murder and death-penalty specifications for Weaver’s murder, 
from the remaining eight counts.  LaMar claims that the Weaver count should 
have been tried separately from the other counts because the allegations relating to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Weaver’s murder “were quite different” from the allegations relating to the deaths 
of the other four victims.  LaMar further contends that he was unduly prejudiced 
by the joinder of all nine counts because “trying these cases together gave the 
benefit to the state of permitting the jury to infer from the evidence presented in 
the deaths of the first four victims that Mr. LaMar was quite capable of directing 
the death of Dennis Weaver two days later.” 
{¶49} “The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under 
Crim.R. 8(A) if the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character.’ ”  
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293.  Crim.R. 8(A) also 
allows joinder of two or more offenses that “are based on the same act or 
transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal 
conduct.”  Notwithstanding the policy in favor of joinder, an accused may move 
to sever counts of an indictment on the grounds that he or she is prejudiced by the 
joinder of multiple offenses.  See Crim.R. 14.  An appellate court will reverse a 
trial court’s decision to deny severance only if the trial court has abused its 
discretion.  Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d 293. 
{¶50} The state may rebut a defendant’s claim of prejudicial joinder in 
two ways.  The first way is by satisfying the “other acts” test.  Id.  If in separate 
trials the state could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as “other acts” 
under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.  Id.  
See, also, State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 259-260, 754 N.E.2d 1129.  
The state may also negate a claim of prejudice by satisfying the less stringent 
“joinder test,” which requires a showing “that evidence of each crime joined at 
trial is simple and direct.”  Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d 293; see, also, 
State v. Torres (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 344, 20 O.O.3d 313, 421 N.E.2d 1288. 
January Term, 2002 
21 
{¶51} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying severance in 
this case because the state satisfied both tests.  Even if the state had tried the 
Weaver count separately from the others, the evidence of LaMar’s participation in 
the L-6 murders would have been admissible under Evid.R. 404(B).  The rule 
allows the admission of other-acts evidence for purposes other than proving that 
the accused acted in conformity with a particular character.  In this case, count 
nine of the indictment contained an R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) specification alleging that 
LaMar had murdered Weaver as part of a “course of conduct” that involved the 
“purposeful killing of or attempt to kill” two or more persons.  Even if this count 
had been tried separately, the state would have had to present some evidence of 
the L-6 murders in order to prove this specification.  Thus, there would have been 
a valid noncharacter purpose for admitting evidence of the other murders.  Cf. 
State v. Wilkinson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 308, 317, 18 O.O.3d 482, 415 N.E.2d 
261 (noting the admissibility of other-crimes evidence when “ ‘ “they are so 
blended or connected with the one on trial as that proof of one * * * tends 
logically to prove any element of the crime charged,” ’ ” quoting United States v. 
Turner [C.A.7, 1970], 423 F.2d 481, 483-484, and United States v. Wall [C.A.7, 
1955], 225 F.2d 905, 907). 
{¶52} Even if we were to hold that evidence of the L-6 murders would 
not have been admissible “other acts” in a separate trial for Weaver’s murder, we 
are satisfied that the evidence for Weaver’s murder was sufficiently “simple and 
direct” to negate LaMar’s claims of prejudicial joinder.  As LaMar’s brief 
acknowledges, the Weaver murder occurred two days after the L-6 murders in a 
different cellblock and was accomplished by strangulation rather than 
bludgeoning.  Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the jury was confused as to 
which evidence tended to show that LaMar killed Weaver and which tended to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
show that he killed the L-6 victims.  See, e.g., Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d at 260, 754 
N.E.2d 1129. 
{¶53} The eighth proposition of law is overruled. 
IV.  Trial Phase Issues 
A.  Gruesome Photographs 
{¶54} In the fifth proposition of law, LaMar contends that the trial court 
prejudiced his defense by allowing the prosecution to admit “gruesome and 
misleading photos” into evidence.  In particular, LaMar challenges the admission 
of Svette’s postmortem photographs.  LaMar contends that Svette’s photographs 
were particularly prejudicial in light of evidence that (1) Svette had multiple 
assailants apart from LaMar’s group and (2) the photos did not depict how Svette 
looked after the death squad left his cell.  LaMar further argues that the prejudicial 
effect of all the admitted photographs was exacerbated by the prosecution’s use of 
them during closing arguments. 
{¶55} “Properly authenticated photographs, even if gruesome, are 
admissible in a capital prosecution if relevant and of probative value in assisting 
the trier of fact * * * as long as the danger of material prejudice to a defendant is 
outweighed by their probative value and the photographs are not repetitive or 
cumulative in number.”  State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 
473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus.  We review a trial court’s 
decision to admit photographs under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  State v. 
Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 513 N.E.2d 267.  We will not disturb a 
trial court’s balancing of the probative value against the prejudicial effect unless 
the trial court has “ ‘clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been 
materially prejudiced thereby.’ ”  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 602, 
605 N.E.2d 916, quoting State v. Hymore (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128, 38 
January Term, 2002 
23 
O.O.2d 298, 224 N.E.2d 126; see, also, State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 
78, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
{¶56} We agree with LaMar that the two Svette photographs he 
challenges here—Exhibits 20H and 20K—were decidedly gruesome.  Each 
depicted Svette’s head split open at the crown, with Exhibit 20K showing a 
portion of Svette’s bloodied brain.  In addition, Exhibit 20H offered a frontal view 
of Svette’s head, allowing jurors to see that Svette’s face was also beaten badly.  
Notwithstanding the nature of the photographs, however, we cannot say that the 
trial court erred in admitting them.  Both photographs supported the forensic 
pathologist’s testimony that Svette had sustained four major blows to the head and 
that any of the four was sufficient to cause death.  Even though there was 
testimony from an inmate witness that Svette’s head “wasn’t that far open” when 
LaMar had finished beating him, the court was well within its discretion to admit 
the photos and afford the jury an opportunity to see the effects of all of the blows 
to Svette’s head, including any inflicted by LaMar.  Inasmuch as LaMar inflicted 
at least one of the major blows that could have been sufficient to cause Svette’s 
death, the photographs helped establish LaMar’s intent to kill by graphically 
portraying the force with which Svette was beaten.  See State v. Tibbetts (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 146, 156, 749 N.E.2d 226. 
{¶57} LaMar also complains about the trial court’s admission of 
mugshot-style photographs showing Svette, Staiano, Depina, Vitale, and Weaver 
while all were still alive.  We reject LaMar’s arguments as to these photos.  Pre-
death photographs are relevant and admissible for purposes of identifying the 
victims.  See State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 325, 686 N.E.2d 245; 
State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 22-23, 535 N.E.2d 1351.  LaMar’s fifth 
proposition of law is overruled. 
B.  Hearsay Testimony 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶58} LaMar’s sixth proposition of law attacks the trial court’s admission 
of “highly prejudicial hearsay evidence.”  Inmate Robert Bass, who witnessed the 
actions of LaMar’s death squad at L-6 on the day of the SOCF riot, testified that 
he heard Allen tell LaMar, “Get your boys together and come on.  Come with 
me.”  The trial court overruled defense objections to this testimony. 
{¶59} Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted within them are generally inadmissible as hearsay.  Evid.R. 801 and 802.  
If a statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, however, it is not 
prohibited by the hearsay rule and will be admissible, subject to the standards 
governing relevancy and undue prejudice.  State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 262-
263, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768.  Accordingly, “testimony which explains the 
actions of a witness to whom a statement was directed, such as to explain the 
witness’ activities, is not hearsay.”  Id. at 262, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768. 
{¶60} In this case, the trial court properly overruled LaMar’s objection 
because Allen’s statement was not offered for its truth.  Rather, the prosecution 
offered it to show that LaMar was the target of Allen’s command.  Allen’s 
comment was therefore admissible as a nonhearsay statement showing that LaMar 
heard Allen’s instruction and acted upon it. 
{¶61} LaMar’s counsel also objected to testimony by Bass about a 
statement made by Cannon.  Bass testified that Cannon asked Bass whether he 
had seen LaMar before the group had embarked on its plan to kill snitches in L-6.  
The trial court properly overruled the hearsay objection because Cannon’s 
question was not a “statement” within the meaning of the hearsay rule.  Evid.R. 
801(A) defines a “statement,” for hearsay purposes, as “(1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an 
assertion.”  (Emphasis added.)  “An ‘assertion’ for hearsay purposes ‘simply 
means to say that something is so, e.g., that an event happened or that a condition 
January Term, 2002 
25 
existed.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 549, 651 
N.E.2d 965, quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence (4th Ed.1992) 98, Section 246.  
Inasmuch as Cannon’s question asserted nothing “because a true question or 
inquiry is by its nature incapable of being proved either true or false,” it cannot be 
hearsay within the meaning of Evid.R. 801.  Id. 
{¶62} We accordingly overrule the sixth proposition of law.   
 
C.  Sufficiency of Evidence 
{¶63} In his ninth, tenth, and eleventh propositions of law, LaMar argues 
that the evidence was insufficient to support several of his convictions.  He 
therefore argues that the trial court should have granted his Crim.R. 29 motions 
for acquittal with respect to Svette’s murder, the course-of-conduct specification 
attached to Weaver’s murder, and the kidnapping specification attached to the 
murders of Depina, Vitale, Staiano, and Svette. 
{¶64} When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal 
conviction, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus; see, 
also, Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 
560.  When conducting this review, we do not weigh the evidence; our inquiry is 
limited to whether reasonable minds could reach the conclusion reached by the 
trier of fact.  See Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 162, 749 N.E.2d 226.  Issues 
concerning the weight given to the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are 
primarily for the trier of fact.  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 
O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
1.  Aggravated Murder of Svette 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶65} In connection with Svette’s death, LaMar was convicted of 
aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B), which at the time of the SOCF riot 
provided: 
{¶66} “No person shall purposely cause the death of another while 
committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping * * *.”  139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 
3. 
{¶67} LaMar insists that the state did not present sufficient evidence 
showing that he caused Svette’s death.  He points to testimony showing that 
others beat Svette and that Svette remained alive after LaMar and his group 
allegedly left L-6 after their rampage.  LaMar also emphasizes testimony attesting 
to the fact that Svette’s postmortem photographs did not accurately depict how 
Svette looked after LaMar and his group beat him.  Because of all these factors, 
LaMar contends that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that he 
“caused the death of William Svette.”  At best, he contends, there was sufficient 
evidence only of attempted murder.  We reject LaMar’s argument. 
{¶68} At least two witnesses testified that LaMar struck Svette’s head 
multiple times with either a shovel or baseball bat.  One of the witnesses added 
that LaMar even went back to Svette’s cell to beat him a second time after 
noticing that Svette was still alive.  Furthermore, the forensic pathologist who 
testified for the state opined that Svette sustained four major blows to his head 
with a heavy object and that any one of those would have independently killed 
Svette.  The jury was well within its province to infer that LaMar had struck one 
of those blows. 
{¶69} The fact that others assaulted Svette and perhaps hastened his death 
does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence to convict LaMar.  Despite the 
actions of inmates Girdy and Frakes, who, according to witness testimony, 
January Term, 2002 
27 
finished Svette off, the evidence at trial supports an inference that LaMar’s actions 
bore a causal connection to Svette’s death.  An offender who has inflicted injuries 
capable of causing death cannot escape culpability for homicide simply because 
intervening assailants have inflicted injuries that also contributed to the victim’s 
death.  See State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 655, 693 N.E.2d 246; see, 
also, People v. Bailey (1996), 451 Mich. 657, 676-678, 549 N.W.2d 325; 
Holsemback v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1983), 443 So.2d 1371, 1381-1382.  Because 
sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that LaMar caused Svette’s death, we 
overrule the ninth proposition of law. 
2.  Course-of-Conduct Specification for Weaver’s Murder 
{¶70} With respect to Weaver’s murder, LaMar argues that the evidence 
is insufficient to support his conviction for one of the capital specifications.  
Specifically, LaMar argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that 
Weaver’s murder “was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful 
killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons.”  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Even 
assuming that he participated in the four murders committed in L-6, LaMar urges 
that “there is no evidence that the Weaver killing was related” to them because 
Weaver’s murder involved “a different scheme and a different mode of operation” 
and took place at a different time.  We are not persuaded. 
{¶71} The “course of conduct” specification applies to multiple murders 
that an offender commits as part of a continuing course of criminal conduct, even 
if the offender does not necessarily commit them as part of the same transaction.  
See State v. Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 304-305, 533 N.E.2d 701.  In this 
case, a reasonable jury could have found that the circumstances surrounding the 
Weaver murder were intertwined with the four murders in L-6 that took place two 
days earlier.  The state presented testimony that LaMar and his group murdered 
the L-6 victims and Weaver as part of a concerted effort to kill “snitches” at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
SOCF, indicating a common motive for all of the killings.  And even though the 
Weaver murder happened at a different time than the other four murders, that fact 
does not preclude a finding of sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the 
course-of-conduct specification.  Conduct taking place over several days may 
satisfy the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) specification so long as the offender’s actions were 
part of a continuing course of criminal conduct.  See, e.g., State v. Dunlap (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316, 652 N.E.2d 988 (two murders, ten days apart, committed 
in two states); State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 444, 650 N.E.2d 
878 (five murders committed in four states during a five-month period).  The tenth 
proposition of law is overruled. 
3.  Kidnapping Specifications 
{¶72} With respect to four of the victims—Depina, Vitale, Staiano, and 
Svette—the jury found LaMar guilty of the death-penalty specification alleging 
that he committed the murders while “committing, attempting to commit, or 
fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping.”  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7).  LaMar contends that there was insufficient evidence of 
kidnapping to support a conviction for this specification. 
{¶73} The trial court instructed the jury on the definition of kidnapping 
set forth in R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), which states: 
{¶74} “No person, by force, threat, or deception * * * shall remove 
another from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of 
the other person, for any of the following purposes: 
{¶75} “* * * 
{¶76} “(3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim 
or another.” 
{¶77} In State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 242-243, 15 OBR 379, 473 
N.E.2d 768, this court considered a constitutional challenge to the validity of the 
January Term, 2002 
29 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification.  The defendant argued that “in virtually every 
aggravated murder the victim will be restrained from liberty for the purpose of 
terrorizing or the infliction of serious physical harm” and that the specification 
therefore violated the constitutional requirement that aggravating circumstances 
adequately distinguish between offenses that are death-eligible and those that are 
not.  See, generally, Godfrey v. Georgia (1980), 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 
L.Ed.2d 398.  This court rejected the argument by interpreting the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification to require proof of something more than a restraint or 
movement incidental to the commission of a murder.  That is, the court held that 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) requires “prolonged restraint, secretive confinement, or 
significant movement apart from that involved in the underlying crime in order to 
justify the application of the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping.”  Maurer, 
15 Ohio St.3d at 243, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768; see, also, State v. Jenkins 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 197-198, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Logan 
(1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 135, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345. 
{¶78} LaMar argues that there was not enough evidence of either 
prolonged restraint, secretive confinement, or significant movement to sustain a 
conviction on the kidnapping specification.  For example, he argues, the evidence 
showed that Depina and Vitale were beaten inside their respective cells and in the 
range immediately in front of the cells.  As to the Staiano murder, LaMar points to 
evidence that Staiano tripped and fell as he tried to escape his cell, after which 
Taylor attacked him.  And with respect to the Svette murder, LaMar argues that 
there was no evidence suggesting that LaMar restrained Svette or removed him 
from his cell.  Accordingly, LaMar contends that any restraint or movement was 
merely incidental to the beatings, distinguishing this case from others in which we 
have upheld convictions for the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶79} If our focus were confined solely to the circumstances immediately 
preceding the murder of each victim, LaMar would have a substantial argument 
that any movement or restraint associated with any of them was incidental, at best, 
to the vicious assaults that caused their deaths.  But beyond the evidence of 
movement incidental to the killings themselves, there was evidence that rioting 
inmates confined their victims in various cells and would not allow them to 
escape to the recreation yard with the nonrioting inmates.  There was evidence 
that Allen, while each victim was locked in a cell, told LaMar and his group to 
“kill the snitches.”  Thus, a reasonable jury could find that the inmates in control 
of L-6 confined suspected snitches for the purpose of terrorizing or inflicting 
serious physical harm.  Cf. State v. Simko (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 483, 488-489, 
644 N.E.2d 345 (finding sufficient evidence to support kidnapping specification 
when defendant restrained and terrorized victim for approximately a half-hour 
before murdering her as she tried to escape); State v. Seiber, 56 Ohio St.3d at 14-
15, 564 N.E.2d 408 (kidnapping specification supported by evidence that, prior to 
shooting the victim, the defendant restrained bar patrons by ordering them on the 
floor and blocking exits).  In turn, a reasonable jury could conclude that LaMar 
assumed control over the victims’ confinement after Allen relayed the order for 
LaMar to “kill the snitches.”  Indeed, there was evidence that LaMar ordered 
Grinnell to open each victim’s cell, supporting the inference that LaMar had some 
measure of control over the physical location and movement of the victims.  
Construing the evidence most strongly in the prosecution’s favor, as we are 
required to do in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry, there was sufficient 
evidence that LaMar was at least an aider and abettor in the victims’ confinement 
and thus capable of being “prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal 
offender” in the kidnappings.  R.C. 2923.03(F); see, also, State v. Bies (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 320, 325, 658 N.E.2d 754.  We therefore conclude that the trial court 
January Term, 2002 
31 
properly overruled LaMar’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on the kidnapping 
specifications. 
{¶80} The eleventh proposition of law is overruled. 
D.  Surprise Testimony 
{¶81} LaMar’s thirteenth proposition of law asserts that the defense was 
unfairly prejudiced by “surprise” testimony on cross-examination by William 
“Geno” Washington, a defense witness.  Washington was one of the ten inmates, 
including LaMar and Weaver, placed in the K-Block cell after corrections officers 
cleared the recreation yard on the morning after the riot began.  On direct 
examination by defense counsel, Washington testified that Bowling and Childers 
had killed Weaver.  He also testified that LaMar did not say anything about 
Weaver, did not order anyone to kill Weaver, and did not touch Weaver.  On 
cross-examination, however, the state impeached Washington with the contents of 
an interview during which he told an investigator, among other things, that LaMar 
was one of the persons responsible for Weaver’s murder.  Washington repeatedly 
denied any memory of making the statement.  LaMar argues that the defense was 
“completely surprised” by Washington’s prior statement and that a new trial was 
therefore warranted. 
{¶82} LaMar’s counsel, citing Washington’s testimony, filed a post-trial 
motion for new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(3).  This rule allows for a new trial on 
the grounds of “surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against.”  To warrant a new trial, the surprise of which the defendant complains 
must have materially affected the defendant’s substantial rights.  A reviewing 
court will not disturb a trial court’s decision granting or denying a Crim.R. 33 
motion for new trial absent an abuse of discretion.  See State v. Schiebel (1990), 
55 Ohio St.3d 71, 76, 564 N.E.2d 54. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
{¶83} LaMar has not met his burden of establishing an entitlement to a 
new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(3).  Although LaMar’s counsel claimed surprise in 
his motion for new trial, he did not raise this issue during Washington’s 
testimony.  A trial court acts well within its discretion to deny a post-trial Crim.R. 
33(A)(3) motion when defense counsel fails to raise the issue of surprise during 
trial.  We accordingly reject the thirteenth proposition. 
E.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
{¶84} In the twelfth proposition of law, LaMar claims that he was entitled 
to a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence.  Following trial, 
LaMar’s attorneys moved for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(6) after two 
inmates, James Were and Derek Cannon, had contacted them with information 
about LaMar’s case. Were signed an affidavit stating that he was present in L-6 at 
the time of the murders and that LaMar did not participate in them. Were also 
stated that other inmates had been “displeased” with LaMar for refusing to 
participate in the riot and “considered him a traitor and coward.”5  Cannon 
provided LaMar’s attorneys with two letters that inmate Anthony Walker had 
written to Rasheem Matthews, an alleged member of the group that attacked the 
L-6 victims.  In one letter, Walker wrote that “LaMar’s trail [sic] starts on 
Monday so try and stay up on it althrough [sic] you no [sic] he’s hit anyway.”  In 
the second letter, Walker told Cannon, “I came from court and Sweat is hit.”  
(“Sweat” was LaMar’s nickname.)  LaMar argues that the new evidence from 
Were and Cannon contradicted several of the state’s witnesses, including Walker 
himself, and therefore raised a genuine issue concerning his guilt. 
                                          
 
5. 
Were was himself found guilty of capital murder for his actions during the SOCF riot.  
See State v. Were (Sept. 30, 1998), Hamilton App. No. C-950908, 1998 WL 682146, reversed 
(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 761 N.E.2d 591. 
January Term, 2002 
33 
{¶85} The decision whether to grant a new trial on grounds of newly 
discovered evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. 
Hawkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 350, 612 N.E.2d 1227.  To warrant the 
granting of a new trial, the new evidence must, at the very least, disclose “ ‘a 
strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted,’ ” and 
must not be “ ‘merely cumulative to former evidence.’ ”  Id., quoting State v. 
Petro (1947), 148 Ohio St. 505, 36 O.O. 165, 76 N.E.2d 370, syllabus.  We find 
no abuse of discretion in this case because the newly discovered evidence forming 
the basis of LaMar’s motion failed to satisfy these standards. 
{¶86} Were’s information was largely cumulative of other defense 
witnesses who likewise testified that LaMar was not present in L-6 at the time of 
the murders.  And his affidavit testimony about other inmates thinking LaMar was 
a “traitor or coward” was speculative.  As such, Were’s testimony on this point 
was of questionable inadmissibility and therefore could not have provided a 
“strong probability” of an acquittal.  Similarly, we see nothing in the Walker 
letters that would have disclosed a strong probability of a different trial result.  
Contrary to LaMar’s arguments, the Walker comment about LaMar being “hit” 
did not suggest that there was perjured testimony at LaMar’s trial.  Walker’s 
comment is reasonably—and perhaps better—construed as a statement of 
Walker’s belief that the state had a strong case against LaMar.  The trial court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the proffered newly discovered 
evidence insufficient to warrant a new trial. 
{¶87} We also find unpersuasive LaMar’s argument that the new 
evidence would have created “residual doubt” about his guilt, thus providing a 
mitigating factor that would have led the jury to choose a life sentence.  Residual 
doubt is not an acceptable mitigating factor in determining the appropriate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sentence in a capital case.  State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 403, 686 
N.E.2d 1112.  The twelfth proposition of law is overruled. 
V.  Penalty-Phase Issues 
A.  Admission of Trial Phase Evidence 
{¶88} In the fourteenth proposition of law, LaMar claims prejudicial error 
in the trial court’s admission in the penalty phase of “all evidence submitted by 
the state in the guilt-innocence phase.”  In LaMar’s view, some of the evidence 
was entirely irrelevant to the issue of whether the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defense 
specifically objected to the readmission of the trial exhibits, including all 
photographs of the victims, demonstrative evidence of the weapons used, and a 
walker that belonged to Svette. 
{¶89} In State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, 
syllabus, this court recited the broad categories of evidence that the state may 
introduce during the penalty phase of a capital prosecution under R.C. 
2929.03(D)(1) and (2).  We held that, subject to applicable Evidence Rules, the 
state may introduce (1) any evidence raised at trial that is relevant to the 
aggravating circumstances specified in the indictment of which the defendant was 
found guilty, (2) any other testimony or evidence relevant to the nature and 
circumstances of those aggravating circumstances, (3) evidence rebutting the 
existence of any statutorily defined or other mitigating factors first asserted by the 
defendant, (4) the presentence investigation report, and (5) the mental 
examination report.  Id. 
{¶90} Under this standard, we find no error in the trial court’s admission 
of the photographs and demonstrative exhibits depicting the weapons used.  These 
items bore some relevance to the nature and circumstances surrounding the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct specification of which the jury found LaMar 
January Term, 2002 
35 
guilty.  As for the admission of Svette’s walker, we find merit in LaMar’s 
contention that this item of evidence has only a tenuous connection, if that, to any 
of the aggravating circumstances for which LaMar was convicted.  We do not, 
however, find that the admission of this item warrants reversal.  The record of the 
sentencing hearing reveals no emphasis whatsoever on the walker or the fact that 
Svette used one.  Thus, based on the record before us, we deem any error in 
admitting this item of evidence to be harmless.  And in any event, this court’s 
independent reassessment can eliminate any possible error in the court’s 
admission of this evidence.  State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 578, 660 
N.E.2d 724.  We accordingly overrule LaMar’s fourteenth proposition of law. 
B.  Improper Penalty-Phase Argument 
{¶91} LaMar’s fifteenth proposition of law alleges that the prosecutor 
engaged in improper argument during the sentencing proceeding.  LaMar argues 
that the prosecutor improperly argued that the jury should evaluate the mitigating 
factors in light of LaMar’s culpability for the murders.  For example, LaMar cites 
a portion of the closing argument in which the prosecutor rhetorically asked the 
jury, “[A]ll of the testimony that you have heard over the last two days, number 
one, is it mitigating?  Does that lessen what he did?  Does that explain what he did 
or justify what he did?”  And even though the trial court sustained a defense 
objection to these remarks, LaMar notes that the prosecutor later continued along 
that same line of argument, telling the jury that “[n]othing was presented that 
mitigated what he did, and any mitigation is greatly outweighed and absolutely 
eclipsed by the aggravating circumstances.”  The trial court overruled LaMar’s 
motion for mistrial following this comment. 
{¶92} As LaMar correctly notes, “mitigating factors under R.C. 
2929.04(B) are not related to a defendant’s culpability but, rather, are those 
factors that are relevant to the issue of whether an offender convicted under R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
2903.01 should be sentenced to death.” State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
239, 242, 527 N.E.2d 831.  Thus, we have held that it is improper for prosecutors 
to make any comment to the jury during the penalty phase that the nature and 
circumstances of the murder are “aggravating circumstances.”  State v. 
Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Nevertheless, LaMar overstates the significance of the prosecutor’s 
comments in this case.  For one thing, the trial court sustained a defense objection 
to the prosecutor’s first foray into questionable argument by instructing the jury to 
disregard the remark about whether the mitigating factors “justify” what LaMar 
did.  We will ordinarily presume that the jury followed such an instruction by the 
court.  See State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 75, 641 N.E.2d 1082.  For 
another thing, the second remark by the prosecutor complained of by LaMar did 
not warrant a mistrial.  The trial court ultimately gave correct penalty-phase 
instructions to the jury, including an instruction that the mitigating factors are 
“relevant to the issue of whether the Defendant should be sentenced to death.”  
Thus, despite whatever complaints LaMar raises about the prosecutor’s argument, 
the trial court cured any defect by essentially instructing that the mitigating factors 
are relevant to the question of whether LaMar should be sentenced to death and 
not simply to the question of whether LaMar’s culpability is somehow reduced.  
We can therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny 
LaMar’s motion for mistrial.  See State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 
656 N.E.2d 623 (noting that the decision whether to grant a mistrial lies within 
trial court’s sound discretion).  And in any event, this court’s independent 
sentence reassessment eliminates the effect of any error in the prosecutor’s 
argument in this particular case.  See State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 
398, 659 N.E.2d 292.  The fifteenth proposition of law is overruled. 
C.  Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
January Term, 2002 
37 
{¶93} In his sixteenth proposition, LaMar takes issue with the jury 
instructions used by the trial court at the sentencing phase.  He asserts that the trial 
court’s instructions prejudiced him by (1) failing to inform the jury that a “solitary 
juror could prevent the death sentence” and (2) placing undue emphasis on jury 
unanimity in returning a penalty verdict.  LaMar’s claims of error are without 
merit. 
{¶94} In State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 
this court held that it is error for a trial court to require a jury to unanimously 
reject a death verdict before considering a sentence of life imprisonment.  Id. at 
160, 661 N.E.2d 1030.  This court reasoned that “R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) contains no 
limiting language as to when a jury may contemplate a life sentence.”  Id.  Thus, 
when the jury cannot unanimously agree on death as the appropriate punishment, 
it can properly consider alternative sentences.  Accordingly, Brooks counseled 
courts in capital cases to instruct the jury that “a solitary juror may prevent a death 
penalty recommendation by finding that the aggravating circumstances in the case 
do not outweigh the mitigating factors.”  Id. at 162, 661 N.E.2d 1030. 
{¶95} In this case, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
{¶96} “You shall make a finding for the sentence of death if you 
unanimously, all 12, find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors as to each given death. 
{¶97} “If you do not so find, you shall unanimously, and that’s all 12, 
make a finding for either a life sentence with parole eligibility after serving 20 full 
years of imprisonment or a life sentence with parole eligibility after serving 30 
full years of imprisonment. 
{¶98} “Verdict forms with these three options will be furnished to you for 
each decedent.  You will consider each death and the aggravating circumstances 
as to that death separately.  The fact that you * * * unanimously agree on a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
sentence as to one death does not require you to impose the same sentence for any 
other death.  You must unanimously decide the sentence for the death of each 
decedent applying the instructions I have just given you and uninfluenced by your 
verdict as to any other death. 
{¶99} “* * * 
{¶100} “With regard to the verdict that you render, all 12 of you, each and 
every one of you must sign in ink on the lines provided for your signature, the 
foreperson signing on the 12th line under which is printed the phrase foreperson. 
{¶101} “Your verdict must be unanimous.” 
{¶102} We reject LaMar’s contention that Brooks requires reversal in this 
case.  The above instruction was virtually identical to the proposed penalty-phase 
instructions that LaMar’s counsel submitted to the trial court.  LaMar thus cannot 
complain of any alleged error in the instructions.  Under the invited-error doctrine, 
a party cannot take advantage of an error that the party invited or induced the 
court to commit.  State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 492-493, 709 N.E.2d 
484. 
{¶103} Even if the invited-error doctrine were not applicable, we would 
still reject LaMar’s argument.  LaMar’s counsel did not object to the penalty-
phase instructions and thereby forfeited all but plain error.  See State v. Lundgren, 
73 Ohio St.3d at 493, 653 N.E.2d 304.  Although this court had not yet decided 
Brooks at the time of LaMar’s trial, that fact did not obviate defense counsel’s 
responsibility to object to instructions that were potentially erroneous.  See State 
v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 394, 721 N.E.2d 52 (collecting cases in 
which this court applied a plain-error analysis to alleged Brooks errors in cases 
tried before Brooks was decided).  There was no plain error in this case. 
{¶104} The instruction given by the trial court is vastly different from the 
one this court rejected in Brooks.  The trial court never instructed the jury that it 
January Term, 2002 
39 
had to unanimously reject the death penalty before it could consider sentencing 
LaMar to life imprisonment.  Accordingly, nothing in the instruction prevented 
the jury from considering a life sentence even if it had not unanimously rejected 
the death penalty.  Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 498, 709 N.E.2d 484; see, also, State v. 
Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d at 294, 731 N.E.2d 159 (upholding similar instruction 
against Brooks challenge); State v. Smith (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 424, 438, 721 
N.E.2d 93 (same).  We reject the sixteenth proposition of law. 
D.  Instructing Jury that Verdict was a Recommendation 
{¶105} In the nineteenth proposition of law, LaMar argues that the trial 
court committed constitutional error by repeatedly informing the jury that its 
sentencing decision would be only a recommendation.  Specifically, LaMar takes 
issue with how the trial court explained the penalty phase to prospective jurors 
before voir dire: 
{¶106} “[D]epending on your decision in the guilt or innocent [sic] 
proceeding, you might then be involved in a second proceeding.  If this second 
proceeding takes place, the jury will have to make a recommendation of sentence 
for the aggravated murder charges.  One of the recommendations could be the 
death penalty. 
{¶107} “If you are selected and if you’re required to make a 
recommendation of sentence and if that recommendation is death, then before that 
sentence may be ordered the Court must independently determine if the 
recommendation is supported with proof of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
{¶108} The trial court used similar language with other panels of 
prospective jurors.  LaMar claims further prejudice from the fact that the jury 
verdict forms also used the term “recommend,” thereby solidifying the concept 
that the jury was not ultimately responsible for a death verdict. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
{¶109} The United States Supreme Court has held that “it is 
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by 
a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”  Caldwell v. Mississippi 
(1985), 472 U.S. 320, 328-329, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.  Accordingly, the 
Caldwell court reversed a defendant’s death sentence because the prosecutor’s 
argument had left jurors with a mistaken impression that Mississippi’s appellate 
courts—and not the jury itself—would be the ones actually responsible for 
imposing a death sentence.  See id. at 331-333, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.  
To establish a Caldwell violation, however, a defendant “ ‘necessarily must show 
that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by 
local law.’ ”  Buell v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2001), 274 F.3d 337, 353, quoting Dugger 
v. Adams (1989), 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435.  LaMar 
cannot show that in this case.  There is no Caldwell error in a case where, as here, 
a trial court’s statements accurately reflect Ohio law and do not induce reliance on 
the appellate review process.  State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 93, 568 
N.E.2d 674; see, also, State v. Davie, 80 Ohio St.3d at 326-327, 686 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶110} Moreover, the penalty-phase instructions belie any claim that the 
jury misapprehended its role in the sentencing process.  The trial court specifically 
instructed the jury during the sentencing phase that it “should not * * * impose a 
greater sentence than is deserved with the thought that the Judge will lessen the 
sentence, nor impose a lesser sentence than is deserved with the thought that the 
Judge will increase the penalty since the Court cannot increase the sentence.”  
This instruction sufficiently informed the jury of its “awesome responsibility” to 
evaluate the “appropriateness of death” without regard to what the court may or 
may not do when the jury has completed its evaluation. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330, 
January Term, 2002 
41 
105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.  Because the trial court correctly explained the 
capital sentencing process in this case, we reject LaMar’s nineteenth proposition. 
E.  Trial Court’s Sentencing Opinion 
{¶111} In his seventeenth proposition of law, LaMar claims that the trial 
court’s sentencing opinion failed to comport with R.C. 2929.03(F), which requires 
a trial court imposing a sentence of death to “state in a separate opinion its 
specific findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors set forth in 
[R.C. 2929.04(B)], the existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating 
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and the reasons why 
the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were 
sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.”  In particular, LaMar contends that 
the trial court weighed several “nonstatutory aggravating circumstances” in 
reaching its decision to accept the jury’s recommendation and impose the death 
penalty. 
{¶112} The trial court’s sentencing opinion accurately recited the 
aggravating specifications that LaMar was found guilty of committing in 
connection with each of the murders for which he was sentenced to death.  LaMar 
takes umbrage, however, with the trial court’s subsequent discussion of the 
circumstances of the murders under a heading entitled, “Aggravating 
Circumstances.”  In this section, the trial court mentioned the non-lethal assaults 
on inmates Andre Stockton and Ellis Walker, noting that “[t]he State elected to 
not charge the Defendant for these assaults, although the evidence was that he was 
a participant.”  The trial court continued with the facts of each murder and 
referred to the fact that both Depina and Vitale had begged and cried for mercy.  
And with regard to Svette’s murder, the court wrote: 
{¶113} “Once the death squad decided to leave L-6, they were confronted 
by an alleged Cleveland Mafia hit man, William Svette, serving his second life 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
sentence for murder.  * * * This time it was really and truly a life sentence, since 
Mr. Svette, age 69, and who walked with a walker, was killed.  * * * Mr. Svette’s 
head was so grossly injured that some pictures were kept from the jury’s view.  
Suffice it to say that one could put his hand directly through the crack in Svette 
[sic] skull to his brain.” 
{¶114} The trial court later added that the rampage of LaMar and his group 
“is indicative of the Defendant’s mental process, his power, control, cruel, violent 
and unremorseful attitude.”  According to LaMar, the trial court effectively treated 
all of these factors as “aggravating circumstances,” meaning that the court 
impermissibly sentenced him to death based on aggravating circumstances not 
listed in R.C. 2929.04(A).  LaMar further notes that there was no evidence 
presented at trial to support the trial court’s recitation of facts about Svette’s 
criminal record.  Accordingly, LaMar contends that the trial court “improperly 
weighed findings on the aggravating side which were not permissible.”  We reject 
LaMar’s contentions. 
{¶115} It is permissible for the trial court to rely upon and cite the nature 
and circumstances of the offense as reasons to support its finding that the 
aggravating circumstances of which the jury found the defendant guilty outweigh 
the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Fautenberry, 72 Ohio 
St.3d at 440-441, 650 N.E.2d 878; State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 512 
N.E.2d 598, paragraph one of the syllabus.  It is sufficiently clear from the 
structure and organization of the sentencing opinion that this was the purpose of 
the trial court’s recitation of the facts surrounding the murders.  The trial court 
discussed the facts of each murder only after it had listed the statutory aggravating 
factors that the jury had found to exist.  We are therefore convinced that the trial 
court knew the difference between statutory aggravating circumstances and the 
nature and circumstances of the offense.  See Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 441, 
January Term, 2002 
43 
650 N.E.2d at 878.  And to the extent the trial court relied upon nonrecord 
evidence about Svette’s criminal record and the fact that Svette required a walker, 
we find nothing that would taint its findings that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating factors. 
{¶116} Under this proposition of law, LaMar also argues that the trial 
court “improperly” analyzed the mitigating factors offered during the sentencing 
phase.  In support of his argument, LaMar cites the following passage from the 
sentencing opinion: 
{¶117} “It is true that the defendant was raised in a [sic] environment 
which suggested that he was destined to get into trouble.  However, the same 
community allowed others to live and work within a community and society in a 
peaceful fashion when they chose to, compelling this court to conclude that the 
defendant functioned as a rational being during the period of time surrounding the 
criminal activity of which he has been convicted.” 
{¶118} Because the trial court openly refuted the notion that LaMar’s 
background carried significant mitigating weight, LaMar contends that the trial 
court did not properly weigh the mitigating evidence, thereby depriving him of an 
individualized determination of whether the death penalty was appropriate in this 
case.  We reject this argument.  Contrary to LaMar’s contention, the passage 
suggests that the trial court analyzed whether LaMar’s background affected his 
mental status in any appreciable manner at the time of the offenses committed, as 
the defense’s mitigating evidence suggested. 
{¶119} LaMar also argues that the trial court failed to consider testimony 
from Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, indicating that LaMar suffered from a borderline 
personality disorder.  LaMar contends that the trial court “wholly discounted” Dr. 
Smalldon’s testimony as mitigating evidence.  We disagree with LaMar’s reading 
of the sentencing opinion on this point.  The trial court specifically mentioned that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
LaMar “has been diagnosed over many years as having a borderline personality 
disorder which manifests itself in antisocial behavior.”  Thus, LaMar’s argument 
is aimed more at the weight the trial court gave to the evidence.  Matters involving 
the weight to be given to mitigating evidence are within the trial court’s domain.  
State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 171, 555 N.E.2d 293.  “The fact that mitigation 
evidence is admissible ‘does not automatically mean that it must be given any 
weight.’ ”  State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 235, 690 N.E.2d 522, quoting 
State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  Moreover, this court’s independent sentence reassessment can 
correct any error in the trial court’s treatment of the mitigating evidence.  Mitts.  
See, also, State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 83, 723 N.E.2d 1019; State v. Fox 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 191, 631 N.E.2d 124. 
{¶120} Finally, LaMar claims that the trial court “wholly failed” to specify 
why the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This contention is simply incorrect.  The trial court’s 
sentencing opinion devoted almost three full pages to weighing the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors.  The seventeenth proposition of law 
is overruled. 
VI.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
{¶121} In the fourth proposition of law, LaMar claims that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct throughout his trial.  To address these arguments, we must 
determine (1) whether the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and (2) if so, 
whether it prejudicially affected LaMar’s substantial rights.  State v. Smith (1984), 
14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  The touchstone of this 
analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  Smith v. 
Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78.  We will not 
deem a trial unfair if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a 
January Term, 2002 
45 
reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty even without 
the improper comments.  State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 739 
N.E.2d 749; see, also, Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d at 15, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883. 
A.  Improper Voir Dire 
{¶122} LaMar claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
jury voir dire.  He first complains that the prosecutor ignored the trial court’s 
request that the attorneys not “get into the facts” and “basically attempted to give 
an opening statement.”  LaMar cites one passage in which the prosecutor told 
potential jurors that “in this particular case Keith LaMar did hands-on killing of 
some of these people.”  The record shows, however, that the trial court sustained a 
defense objection to this statement and admonished the potential jurors not to treat 
such comments as evidence.  Accordingly, LaMar has not shown any prejudice 
flowing from the prosecutor’s remark. 
{¶123} LaMar next claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the 
credibility of witnesses whom the state would call during trial.  For example, the 
prosecutor discussed the credibility of inmate witnesses by telling the potential 
jurors that “most of the people involved at Lucasville, a lot of them are very, very 
decent people that have made mistakes in the past.”  Despite the trial court 
sustaining an objection to this remark, the prosecutor continued this line of 
discussion by adding that “a majority of people in that particular situation did not 
want to be involved.” 
{¶124} “It is improper for an attorney to express his or her personal belief 
or opinion as to the credibility of a witness.”  State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 12, 679 N.E.2d 646.  We do not, however, view the prosecutor’s 
comments as improper vouching for the credibility of the inmate witnesses he 
would call at trial.  Rather, the prosecutor was validly exploring the possibility 
that potential jurors would be predisposed to discredit certain witnesses simply 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
because they were inmates.  A prosecutor may properly try to “ensure that jurors 
would not be biased against his witnesses.”  State v. Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d at 
484, 653 N.E.2d 304.  And even if we believed that the prosecutor’s comments 
were improper, they were harmless error at worst, particularly in view of the fact 
that the defense also relied upon inmate witness testimony. 
B.  Conduct During Opening Statement 
{¶125} During his opening statement, the prosecutor read the indictment 
and recited the results from the autopsies performed on the murder victims.  
LaMar argues that this constituted an improper “attempt to focus the jurors on the 
horror of the crime rather than the evidence.”  We are not persuaded. 
{¶126} As to the prosecutor reciting the autopsy results to the jury, 
LaMar’s counsel did not object, thereby forfeiting all but plain error.  See State v. 
Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 451, 696 N.E.2d 1009.  Even if defense 
counsel had objected, however, the objection would have been overruled because 
there was no error.  In view of the fact that the state admitted the autopsy results 
into evidence, the prosecutor’s remarks about them were nothing more than a fair 
commentary on the facts to be presented at trial. 
{¶127} As for the prosecutor’s reading of the indictment during opening 
statement, the trial court properly overruled defense counsel’s objection.  LaMar 
cites no authority for the proposition that a prosecutor may not read from the 
indictment during opening statement.  Indeed, our precedent suggests that it is not 
improper to do so.  In State v. Graven (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 112, 6 O.O.3d 334, 
369 N.E.2d 1205, for example, this court held that a trial court has discretion in a 
criminal case to let the jury take a copy of the indictment into the jury room.  Id. at 
syllabus.  If it is proper for the jury to read an indictment in the jury room, a 
defendant cannot claim prejudice from a prosecutor’s reading the indictment 
during opening statement.  Further, the trial court instructed the jury that neither 
January Term, 2002 
47 
the opening statement nor the indictment is considered to be evidence of an 
accused’s guilt. 
C.  Inappropriate Comments, Questions, and Arguing with the Court 
{¶128} LaMar also claims that the prosecutor acted improperly by 
questioning trial court rulings on defense objections, asking improper questions, 
arguing with witnesses, and making inappropriate comments.  LaMar first cites 
the prosecutor’s remarks during defense counsel’s cross-examination of two 
prosecution witnesses.  At one point, while the defense was attempting to impeach 
Robert Bass’s testimony with the fact that Bass had reviewed the transcript of his 
prior statement before testifying, the prosecutor interrupted the questioning in an 
apparent attempt to explain the circumstances of Bass’s receiving the transcript.  
Similarly, during the defense’s cross-examination of Thomas Taylor, the 
prosecutor interjected, “I’ll stipulate that I prepared my case and talked to every 
witness” when the defense was inquiring about Taylor’s previous interviews with 
investigators and/or prosecutors.  The trial court admonished the prosecutor not to 
make comments during the cross-examination. 
{¶129} Second, LaMar points to an instance of improper questioning 
during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Cory Perkins, a defense witness.  
LaMar complains of the following exchange, which occurred while the prosecutor 
was questioning Perkins about a statement Perkins had made to investigators 
about the Weaver murder. 
{¶130} “Q.  [by the prosecutor]  What depth or details didn’t you go in that 
you went into with the jury now? 
{¶131} “A.  Well, I mean, to be frank, I told them the same thing I told 
them.  Just different things left out that ain’t really no big thing. 
{¶132} “Q.  What did you leave out?  We’ll decide if it’s a big thing or 
not. 
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48 
{¶133} “MR. CARSON [defense counsel]: Objection, your Honor. 
{¶134} “THE COURT: Sustained.  It’s argumentative.” 
{¶135} LaMar also complains of improper cross-examination when LaMar 
was on the witness stand.  When the trial court instructed the prosecutor to limit 
his cross-examination about LaMar’s boxing career to the fact of whether LaMar 
was in fact a boxer, the prosecutor ignored the admonition: 
{¶136} “Q. [by the prosecutor] You are a heavyweight boxing champion in 
the institution, are you not? 
{¶137} “MR. CARSON: Objection, your Honor.  That’s not the question 
you allowed. 
{¶138} “THE COURT: Overruled. 
{¶139} “A. [by LaMar] I’m a heavyweight boxer.  I tried but I failed, and 
right before the riot took place—well, the riot stopped me from trying again.  To 
answer your question, no, I’m not nor have I ever been a heavyweight champion 
within the institution. 
{¶140} “Q.  You are a boxer, are you not? 
{¶141} “A.  Yeah, that’s correct. 
{¶142} “Q.  And as a boxer, you’re trained to deliver a knockout blow? 
{¶143} “MR. CARSON: Objection. 
{¶144} “THE COURT: Overruled—or sustained.  Excuse me. 
{¶145} “Q: And as a boxer, you have a killer instinct, don’t you Mr. 
LaMar? 
{¶146} “MR. CARSON: Objection. 
{¶147} “THE COURT: Sustained.  Go to a different line of questions.” 
{¶148} LaMar also notes that the trial court “sustained a total of forty-five 
objections in the space of fifty-nine pages of transcript—several more than once” 
during his testimony.  LaMar also complains that the prosecutor continually 
January Term, 2002 
49 
ignored the court’s rulings by continuing improper lines of questioning with 
LaMar and other witnesses. 
{¶149} Upon review of the record, we agree that the prosecutor engaged in 
some improper and unprofessional behavior.  We find no reason for the 
prosecutor to have ignored admonitions by the trial court about improper 
questions.  Similarly, we find it improper for the prosecutor to have interjected 
comments in open court, particularly when he interrupted testimony to make 
statements of fact and essentially testify in place of the witness.  See State v. 
Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 715 N.E.2d 136 (reminding prosecutors to 
“be diligent in their efforts” to “refrain from the desire to make outlandish 
remarks, misstate evidence, or confuse legal concepts”).  That being said, 
however, we disagree with LaMar about the prejudicial nature of the prosecutor’s 
conduct; the misconduct cited by LaMar did not pervade the trial to such a degree 
that there was a denial of due process.  See State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 
402, 410, 613 N.E.2d 203.  The trial court sustained numerous objections by 
defense counsel and, on the state of the record before us, we have no reason to 
believe that the outcome of the trial was affected by the prosecutor’s improper 
comments.  See Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 336, 715 N.E.2d 136. 
D.  Improper Impeachment of the Defendant 
{¶150} LaMar also claims misconduct in the manner in which the 
prosecutor asked questions about his prior conviction for murder.  During trial and 
prior to LaMar’s testimony, the defense had stipulated that LaMar had been 
convicted of murder in Cuyahoga County in 1989 and that, as a result, LaMar was 
incarcerated at SOCF at the time of the murders for which he was on trial.  
Nevertheless, during cross-examination of LaMar, the prosecutor delved into the 
details of LaMar’s prior murder conviction.  The trial court sustained a defense 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
objection after the prosecutor asked LaMar if he had shot his victim “with a gun” 
and “in the heart.” 
{¶151} When an accused testifies at trial, Evid.R. 609(A)(2) allows the 
state to impeach the accused’s credibility with evidence that the accused has been 
convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year.  Under 
Evid.R. 609, the trial court has broad discretion to prohibit questioning about 
more than the “name, date and place of the conviction, and the punishment 
imposed, when the conviction is admissible solely to impeach credibility.”  State 
v. Amburgey (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 115, 116, 515 N.E.2d 925.  Acting within its 
discretion, the trial court sustained an objection to the prosecutor’s line of 
questioning, which in any event consisted of only two questions about the 
circumstances surrounding LaMar’s prior conviction.  We find nothing unduly 
prejudicial about the prosecutor’s conduct in this respect. 
E.  Improper Trial-Phase Closing Argument 
{¶152} In his next claim of misconduct, LaMar alleges improper argument 
during the trial phase.  Specifically, LaMar contends that the prosecutor 
denigrated defense counsel, used gruesome photographs in an unfair manner, and 
implored the jury to return a guilty verdict on a capital specification simply so 
they could proceed to the penalty phase. 
{¶153} As to the denigration of the defense, LaMar calls our attention to 
the following passage of the prosecutor’s closing argument: 
{¶154} “Mr. Toy [defense counsel] told all of you on voir dire that this is 
the first case like this he’s ever handled.  He’s never done this before.  He got very 
excited, and he put on a show. 
{¶155} “Let’s look at the case carefully.  First, let’s look at some of the 
things that have been stressed to you by the Defense.  Have you noticed that they 
always call the Defendant Keith?  Has anybody noticed that? 
January Term, 2002 
51 
{¶156} “[Defense objection overruled.] 
{¶157} “Out of the hundreds or thousands of times that Keith LaMar has 
been referred to by the Defense, almost every time they refer to him as Keith, his 
first name.  They have an angle to present to you in this case, and it’s to call 
him—to humanize him, to call him by his first name.” 
{¶158} This is not the lone instance in which LaMar claims that the 
prosecution denigrated the defense.  LaMar also calls our attention to another 
portion of the closing argument, in which the prosecutor compared his case to that 
of the defense.  Even after the trial court sustained an objection to a comment in 
which the prosecutor accused the defense of having a strategy aimed at criticizing 
the prosecution and its witnesses, the prosecutor continued along this same theme: 
{¶159} “First of all, let’s talk about me.  The Defendant told you on the 
witness stand that I put together a case against him, intimating to you that 
somehow I orchestrated all these witnesses like a puppet master or something and 
got them to come in here and testify against him.  I agree I did prepare my case.  I 
did put together a case; but I put together a truthful case, an honest case. 
{¶160} “The Defendant and the defense attorney implied that I 
orchestrated perjury.  This is totally inaccurate.  It was implied that I know that 
these inmate witnesses came up here and lied and presented it in court anyway. 
{¶161} “* * * 
{¶162} “It was told to you that this was a fiasco and that Sergeant Hudson 
and Sergeant Brink, supervisors in the patrol, were sloppy and unprofessional with 
regard to this entire investigation.  It was criticized by Mr. Toy the way the yard 
removal was handled.  * * *  It’s very easy in hindsight to criticize the efforts of 
somebody else, a professional in that field. 
{¶163} “* * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶164} “But, again, Mr. Toy gets up here with his charts and his pencils 
and his pens and his pointer and tells you that Corrections Officer Clarkson, he 
just really dropped the ball. 
{¶165} “These are good, honest men and women that are trying to do the 
right thing and because of him they have to get up here and get dragged through 
the mud in front of you, a court reporter, a judge, television cameras, and 
everything else.  I guess it’s all part of the job. 
{¶166} “Why is this done?  It’s done to deflect attention away from Keith 
LaMar in the courtroom.  * * * It’s an attack on everything.  What does that tell 
you about their defense?”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶167} It is true, of course, that the prosecution is entitled to some latitude 
and freedom of expression in closing argument.  Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d at 409, 
613 N.E.2d 203.  “Realism compels us to recognize that criminal trials cannot be 
squeezed dry of all feeling.”  Id.  That being said, however, some of the 
prosecutor’s comments exceeded the scope of proper argument.  In the first 
passage cited above, the prosecutor denigrated defense counsel by pointedly 
ridiculing the defense’s apparent effort to remind the jury that LaMar was a 
human being.  This tactic was just as improper as disparaging defense counsel for 
raising objections, which this court has condemned.  See, e.g., id. at 406, 613 
N.E.2d 203.  As for the second passage complained of by LaMar, the prosecutor’s 
juxtaposition of his “honest” case with the defense’s case, particularly when 
viewed in light of the pointed criticism of one of LaMar’s defense attorneys, 
unfairly suggested that the defense’s case was untruthful and not honestly 
presented.  In the context in which they were stated, the prosecution’s comments 
imputed insincerity to defense counsel and were therefore improper.  Id. at 405-
406, 613 N.E.2d 203; State v. Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d at 452, 696 N.E.2d 1009. 
January Term, 2002 
53 
{¶168} The fact that the prosecutor engaged in some improper argument, 
however, does not warrant reversal unless the remarks prejudicially affected 
substantial rights of the accused.  State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 125, 
734 N.E.2d 1237.  In making this determination, we must consider the effect of 
any misconduct in the context of the entire trial.  Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d at 410, 
613 N.E.2d 203.  We must also view the prosecutor’s closing argument in its 
entirety when determining prejudice.  State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 
661 N.E.2d 1068.  Using these standards, we see no basis for reversing LaMar’s 
conviction based on the prosecutor’s comments.  Even though some of the 
prosecutor’s argument was improper, such comments did not pervade the entire 
trial, let alone the closing argument.  We are unconvinced that the result of 
LaMar’s trial would have been different without the few instances of improper 
commentary by the prosecution. 
{¶169} LaMar also complains of the prosecutor’s displaying and 
commenting on photographs of the victims during the closing argument.  LaMar’s 
counsel failed to object to this action by the prosecutor, thereby forfeiting all but 
plain error.  See Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 195, 702 N.E.2d at 866.  There was no 
plain error here.  Although a prosecutor may not use gruesome photographs 
during closing argument in an effort to appeal to the jurors’ emotions, see Keenan, 
66 Ohio St.3d at 407, 613 N.E.2d 203, we see no such effort here.  The prosecutor 
focused his comments on what the photographs proved and did not make any 
emotional appeals to the jury to find LaMar guilty simply on the basis of what the 
photographs showed.  We therefore disagree with LaMar’s contention that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in this respect. 
{¶170} LaMar also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
the trial-phase closing argument when he remarked to the jury, “The Defendant is 
guilty of aggravated murder and specification.  That’s the way, the only way to get 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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to the penalty phase.”  The trial court sustained a defense objection and instructed 
the jury to disregard this comment, which LaMar argues was an improper ploy by 
the prosecution to implore the jurors “to find the specification so they could get to 
the sentencing phase.”  Even if we agreed with LaMar’s characterization of the 
prosecutor’s comment and motive for saying it, we would be unable to find 
reversible error.  The trial court’s curative instruction was sufficient to relieve any 
prejudice.  Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d at 75, 641 N.E.2d 1082. 
F.  Improper Penalty-Phase Closing Argument 
{¶171} In addition to claiming misconduct in the prosecutor’s trial-phase 
closing argument, LaMar also alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during the sentencing proceedings.  He cites the following passages as instances 
of improper argument: 
{¶172} • 
“But there are plenty of people who have lived successful 
lives, have made something of themselves when they were raised in poverty, when 
they were raised by a single parent.” 
{¶173} • 
“Keith LaMar made the conscious choices to kill a friend of 
his by shooting him twice in the heart.” 
{¶174} • 
“The prior purposeful killing, he has killed before; and 
[defense counsel] called that random violence.  I think he used those words to 
you.  There was no randomness in that.  He took a gun and put it to the man’s 
heart and he fired twice.” 
{¶175} • 
“As far as the mitigation, again, I might have heard things 
differently, but I heard that he was a very happy, well-adjusted child from the ages 
of birth to four or five years old.” 
{¶176} • 
“He was already given a chance at a life sentence and look 
what happened.  There may be some mitigation in this case, but it certainly does 
not rise to nearly the level of the aggravating circumstances.  Nothing was 
January Term, 2002 
55 
presented that mitigated what he did, and any mitigation is greatly outweighed and 
absolutely eclipsed by the aggravating circumstances.” 
{¶177} Because defense counsel did not object to any of these comments, 
our analysis is limited to ascertaining whether there was plain error.  We find that 
none of the comments, either individually or in the aggregate, constitutes plain 
error. 
{¶178} In the first comment complained of above, the prosecutor merely 
noted that not everyone with a troubled background similar to LaMar’s has 
committed crimes of this magnitude.  There is nothing wrong with this type of 
argument.  State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 399, 659 N.E.2d 292.  Such comment 
is fair rebuttal to the defense’s argument that the jury should consider LaMar’s 
background to be a significant mitigating factor in determining whether he should 
be sentenced to death. 
{¶179} As for the second and third statements quoted above, we also see 
nothing improper.  One of the aggravating circumstances in this case was the fact 
that LaMar had been previously convicted of murder.  In its penalty-phase closing 
argument, the defense had told the jury to view the prior murder as an act of 
“random violence” that was typical of the environment in which LaMar was 
brought up.  In light of the defense’s comments, the prosecutor’s comment about 
LaMar’s prior offense constituted proper rebuttal. 
{¶180} We also see nothing improper about the last two comments 
complained of by LaMar.  The prosecutor’s argument about LaMar’s childhood 
rebutted defense contentions about LaMar’s upbringing.  Indeed, “the contention 
that the jury is to be carefully fed only that information which reflects positively 
upon the capital defendant [is] ‘ludicrous.’ ”  Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d at 420, 653 
N.E.2d 253, quoting State v. Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 253, 530 N.E.2d 
382.  Similarly, we see nothing wrong with the last comment by the prosecutor.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
In it, the prosecutor merely argues his view on what the outcome of the case 
should be—that the jury should find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  For these reasons, we 
find LaMar’s complaints about the prosecutor’s penalty-phase argument to be 
without merit. 
G.  Pattern of Misconduct 
{¶181} Apart from all of the specific instances of misconduct, LaMar 
complains that the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of misconduct that 
“permeated” the proceedings and deprived him of a fair trial.  LaMar urges that 
we cumulate the above-identified instances of misconduct and conclude that the 
entire trial was so tainted as to warrant reversal and remand for a new trial.  We 
are not persuaded. 
{¶182} Admittedly, we have recognized that there were some instances of 
questionable conduct by the prosecutor.  But none of the instances of misconduct 
cited by LaMar, either individually or collectively, deprived him of a fair trial.  
The prosecutorial actions pinpointed by LaMar were relatively few and far 
between in the context of a trial that took over two weeks to complete.  In 
numerous instances in this case, the trial court sustained defense objections and 
gave curative instructions when necessary.  Cf. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d at 410, 613 
N.E.2d 203 (noting that prosecutor’s conduct can be exacerbated by lack of 
curative instructions and by trial court consistently overruling defense objections 
to misconduct).  Although LaMar may not have received a perfect trial, we 
conclude that nothing in the prosecutors’ conduct deprived him of a fair one.  See 
State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 399, 659 N.E.2d 292. 
{¶183} The fourth proposition of law is overruled. 
VII.  Independent Sentence Review 
January Term, 2002 
57 
{¶184} Having rejected each of LaMar’s propositions of law, we now turn 
to our  statutory duty to independently weigh the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating factors and, in addition, determine whether LaMar’s 
sentence is disproportionate to sentences in similar cases.  See R.C. 2929.05(A).  
Our review at this stage is limited to the four murders for which LaMar was given 
the death penalty.  Id. 
{¶185} The evidence in this case supports the existence of the aggravating 
circumstances found by the jury and the trial court.  LaMar stipulated to the 
existence of two aggravating circumstances: (1) that LaMar was a prisoner in a 
detention facility at the time of the offense and (2) that LaMar had previously 
been convicted of murder.  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(4) and (5).  We further find that 
the evidence in the record proves that LaMar committed each aggravated murder 
as part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of more than one 
person.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Finally, the evidence supports LaMar’s conviction 
of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification attached to the aggravated murders of 
Vitale, Depina, and Svette.  The state’s evidence proved that LaMar was, at the 
very least, a complicitor in the Muslim inmates’ kidnapping of the suspected 
snitches in L-6. 
{¶186} In mitigation, several witnesses testified about LaMar’s troubled 
background.  LaMar, along with his siblings, grew up in a poor neighborhood 
where illegal drug activity and violence were common.  LaMar’s aunt, Carolyn 
LaMar, testified that LaMar lived with a stepfather who was “mean” to him and 
who would beat him for minor transgressions, such as failing to take out the 
garbage or touching his stepfather’s things.  And although LaMar’s mother tried 
to look out for LaMar and his siblings, “she wasn’t there for them because she 
was having her own problems.”  Carolyn also testified about shortcomings she 
perceived in LaMar’s living conditions.  For example, she testified that LaMar 
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and his siblings were not well fed and lived in a house that was inadequately 
heated.  Eventually, while still a teenager, LaMar quit school and moved out of 
the house to live with friends in an apartment, which was located in a 
neighborhood with lots of illegal drug activity. 
{¶187} LaMar’s older brother, Nelson LaMar, also testified for the defense 
and corroborated Carolyn LaMar’s description of their upbringing.  He testified 
that their stepfather was physically and mentally abusive and showed interest in 
the boys’ lives only because of their athletic talent.  According to Nelson, their 
stepfather wanted them to be athletes and would beat them when they did not 
perform well athletically.  Nelson also testified that he introduced his brother to 
drug dealing.  Nelson told the jury that he “taught [LaMar] everything of the 
criminal element.”  At the time of his testimony, Nelson was himself in prison for 
a robbery conviction. 
{¶188} Kim Granger, a former girlfriend who had known LaMar since the 
two were in high school, testified that LaMar did not have a good relationship 
with either his mother or his stepfather.  She described LaMar as a “nice guy” who 
was heavily involved in sports before he started “getting into illegal activities like 
stealing and being in the streets a lot.”  LaMar told her that he did these things 
because he needed money for food and clothing.  Granger, who remained friends 
with LaMar after he went to prison, also testified that LaMar had become “really 
spiritual” and described him as a “compassionate person.” 
{¶189} Charles R. See, a social service administrator with experience 
working with inner-city youth, also gave mitigation testimony for the defense.  
See interviewed LaMar and numerous members of LaMar’s family to familiarize 
himself with LaMar’s background.  See described the area in which LaMar grew 
up as “socially and economically depressed,” but noted that LaMar’s athletic 
talent could have been his “ticket out of the ghetto” if he had received support and 
January Term, 2002 
59 
guidance.  In See’s view, however, LaMar’s mother failed to provide strong 
parental support and LaMar’s stepfather was excessively abusive.  And when 
LaMar eventually moved to an apartment of his own, See noted that he began 
living in one of the “most dangerous areas in the city of Cleveland.”  Based on his 
background and living conditions, See testified that it was “ninety percent 
predictable” that LaMar would become involved in drugs and other illegal 
activities. 
{¶190} Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon, a clinical psychologist, was the defense’s 
final mitigation witness.  He testified that LaMar was “unfailingly polite and 
respectful” during their meetings and described LaMar as “an unusually 
thoughtful, reflective, introspective” person.  Dr. Smalldon noted that LaMar 
denied involvement in the offenses for which he was convicted; this denial was 
unusual, Dr. Smalldon testified, in light of LaMar’s usual disinclination to “shift 
blame onto other people * * * for various illegal things he’s done over the years.” 
{¶191} As for LaMar’s personal background, Dr. Smalldon opined that the 
absence of a stable male role model left a “profound void” in LaMar’s life.  Dr. 
Smalldon noted that LaMar never knew his biological father and that LaMar’s 
stepfather, as well as an uncle, subjected him to “very, very harsh physical 
treatment.”  In turn, the abuse inflicted by LaMar’s stepfather created a feeling of 
“helplessness” in LaMar, particularly because LaMar could not predict when the 
abuse would occur.  In Dr. Smalldon’s view, LaMar was also affected by his 
mother’s “limited repertoire of parenting skills” and the death of another brother 
at a young age. 
{¶192} Dr. Smalldon also testified to the effect that drugs and alcohol had 
on LaMar’s life.  LaMar used and sold marijuana when he was fourteen years old 
and eventually began abusing alcohol, cocaine, crack, and PCP.  According to Dr. 
Smalldon, LaMar developed a serious crack cocaine habit that persisted until he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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went to prison in 1989.  The drugs provided LaMar with a means of “escape” and 
served a “numbing function” that desensitized LaMar from the painful aspects of 
his day-to-day life.  Dr. Smalldon ultimately diagnosed LaMar as drug- and 
alcohol-dependent.  He also diagnosed LaMar as suffering from a “personality 
disorder not otherwise specified but one having antisocial and narcissistic 
features.” 
{¶193} In his unsworn statement, LaMar told the jurors that he was 
disappointed in their verdict but that he did not hold it against them.  He also 
explained that his previous murder conviction resulted from a shootout in which 
he had also been shot.  LaMar expressed some regret about that incident because 
the victim he shot “twice in the heart” had been a childhood friend.  LaMar 
acknowledged that his background had been difficult and added that he had 
instructed his mother not to testify for him because he “didn’t want her to feel that 
she had to justify, you know, or apologize for doing the best that she could.” 
{¶194} In conducting our independent assessment of the appropriateness 
of the death sentence, we must weigh the aggravating circumstances against (1) 
the nature and circumstances of the crime, (2) the history, background, and 
character of the offender, and (3) any applicable mitigating factors enumerated in 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(7).  State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 491, 739 
N.E.2d 749.  Here, the nature and circumstances of the aggravated murders offer 
little to nothing in terms of mitigation.  LaMar was the leader of a death squad 
that brutally beat the L-6 victims simply because they were suspected “snitches.”  
And as to Weaver’s murder, LaMar ordered others to strangle the victim and 
threatened cellmates with physical harm if they did not comply with his orders.  
Moreover, these circumstances convince us that the statutory mitigating factors 
enumerated at R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion, 
January Term, 2002 
61 
strong provocation), and (B)(6) (accused not being principal offender) are 
inapplicable in this case. 
{¶195} As for the evidence relating to LaMar’s background, we 
acknowledge that it is entitled to some weight.  See, e.g., Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 
at 174, 749 N.E.2d 226.  We accord it only modest weight, however, just as we 
have done in other capital cases of defendants with similarly troubled 
backgrounds.  See, e.g., State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 424, 692 
N.E.2d 151.  We also give some weight to Dr. Smalldon’s diagnosis of LaMar’s 
drug addiction.  See Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 493, 739 N.E.2d 749. 
{¶196} The 
remaining statutory mitigating factors are generally 
inapplicable in this case.  Although Dr. Smalldon testified that LaMar suffers 
from a personality disorder, we are unable to conclude that this condition rises to 
the level of a “mental disease or defect” that would trigger the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) 
mitigating factor in light of the absence of testimony that the condition prevented 
LaMar from appreciating the criminality of his conduct.  See, e.g., Tibbetts, 92 
Ohio St.3d at 173, 749 N.E.2d 226.  LaMar’s criminal record rendered R.C. 
2929.04(B)(5) (lack of significant criminal history) inapplicable and we see no 
reason why LaMar’s age at the time of the offenses should trigger the R.C. 
2929.04(B)(4) “youth of the offender” factor.  Finally, the evidence does not 
suggest the existence of any other mitigating factors.  See R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
{¶197} Against the modest mitigating evidence, we weigh the aggravating 
circumstances of which LaMar was found guilty.  In this case, the aggravating 
circumstances are grievous: LaMar, already incarcerated as a convicted murderer, 
was the ringleader in a murder spree that killed five victims.  We further note that 
the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) prior-murder specification is of particular significance.  
As we just recently observed, “the (A)(5) prior-murder circumstance ‘can be even 
more grave than other aggravating circumstances.’ ”  State v. Campbell (2002), 95 
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Ohio St.3d 48, 58, 765 N.E.2d 334, quoting State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
15, 34, 676 N.E.2d 82.  We therefore agree with the jury and the trial court that 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
{¶198} We also find that the death sentence in this case is appropriate and 
proportionate when compared with similar capital cases in which the death 
penalty has been imposed.  See State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 
509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We have affirmed the imposition 
of the death penalty in other cases involving murders committed during the SOCF 
riot.  See State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 750 N.E.2d 90; State v. 
Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  LaMar’s sentence also appears 
appropriate and proportional when compared to other death-penalty cases 
involving similar aggravating circumstances.  See, e.g., State v. Campbell, supra, 
95 Ohio St.3d 48, 765 N.E.2d 334 (aggravated murder committed during a 
kidnapping by an offender with a prior murder conviction); State v. Carter (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595 (aggravated murder committed in a detention 
facility by an offender with a prior murder conviction); State v. Zuern (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585 (aggravated murder in a detention facility); State 
v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (course of conduct involving 
multiple murders); State v. Seiber, 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 564 N.E.2d 408 (aggravated 
murder during a kidnapping). 
{¶199} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm LaMar’s convictions, 
including the sentences of death for the murders of Vitale, Depina, Svette, and 
Weaver. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2002 
63 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
APPENDIX 
{¶200} Proposition of Law No. 1: The suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is 
material to guilt or punishment.  Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 
L.Ed.2d 490. 
{¶201} When a trial court refuses to order the prosecution to provide 
witnesses’ names and their corresponding exculpatory statements it denys [sic] 
appellant a meaningful opportunity to obtain the information thereby denying 
appellant due process as guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions. 
{¶202} The trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for new 
trial under Brady v. Maryland following trial when it was discovered that the state 
had provided the requested information in other cases although claiming it could 
not provide it in Mr. LaMar’s case because they promised inmates confidentiality. 
{¶203} The trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for new 
trial under Brady v. Maryland following trial when it was discovered that the state 
had withheld exculpatory evidence that was not the subject of the information and 
statements discussed in (A). 
{¶204} Proposition of Law No. 2: The Due Process Clause of both the 
federal and state Constitutions entitles an accused to trial before an impartial 
judge. 
{¶205} Proposition of Law No. 3: When a trial court unreasonably and 
arbitrarily restricts a defendant’s voir dire examination prejudicial error occurs in 
that the defendant is denied the right to a fair and impartial jury in violation of the 
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶206} Proposition of Law No. 4: A capital defendant is denied his rights 
to a fair trial, due process and a reliable determination of his guilt and sentence as 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution 
when the prosecutor repeatedly engages in improper argument and other 
misconduct prior to and throughout the trial. 
{¶207} Proposition of Law No. 5: Admission of gruesome and misleading 
photos when their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value denys [sic] 
appellant a fair trial, due process and a reliable determination of his guilt and 
sentence as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  This error was compounded by the trial court’s admission of 
irrelevant photographs lacking any probative value used solely to inflame the jury. 
{¶208} Proposition of Law No. 6: The admission of highly prejudicial 
hearsay evidence in violation of the Ohio Evidence Rules denys [sic] appellant his 
federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial and his right to cross-examine 
witnesses against him. 
{¶209} Proposition of Law No. 7: The trial court erred in failing to grant 
appellant LaMar’s motion to dismiss based on selective prosecution, thereby 
denying Mr. LaMar his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 2, 10 and 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution.  The trial court further erred in failing to require the state to 
properly comply with the defendant’s discovery requests and to state its essential 
findings of fact regarding the denial of this motion on the record. 
January Term, 2002 
65 
{¶210} Proposition of Law No. 8: In a case where the evidence is not 
simple and direct the refusal to sever charges where a jury is likely to confuse the 
offenses, cumulate the evidence and consider one offense as corroborative of 
other offenses, creates prejudicial error which denies a defendant his rights to a 
fair trial as guaranteed by both the Ohio and United States Constitutions. 
{¶211} Proposition of Law No. 9: Appellant’s convictions relating to the 
death of William Svette were based on insufficient evidence as a matter of law 
thereby denying the appellant due process of law.  The trial court erred in failing 
to sustain appellant’s motion for acquittal for the charges relating to William 
Svette, pursuant to Crim.R. 29, as the convictions of the appellant were based on 
insufficient evidence. 
{¶212} Proposition of Law No. 10: Appellant’s conviction of the 
specification alleging that the offense was a part of a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons pursuant to R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5) as applied to the death of Dennis Weaver was based on insufficient 
evidence as a matter of law thereby denying the appellant due process of law.  The 
trial court erred in failing to sustain appellant’s motion for acquittal for the 
specification pursuant to Crim.R. 29, as the conviction of the appellant was based 
on insufficient evidence. 
{¶213} Proposition of Law No. 11: Appellant’s convictions for the 
aggravating circumstance alleging that the offense was committed while the 
offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and either the offender was the 
principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the 
principal offender committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design were based on insufficient evidence as a matter of law thereby denying the 
appellant due process of law.  The trial court erred in failing to sustain appellant’s 
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motion for acquittal for the kidnapping specification on the charges relating to 
Darrell Depina, Bruce Vitale, Albert Staino [sic, Staiano] and William Svette, 
pursuant to Crim.R. 29, as the convictions of the appellant were based on 
insufficient evidence. 
{¶214} Proposition of Law No. 12: The trial court committed prejudicial 
error in failing to grant Mr. LaMar’s motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence thereby denying Mr. LaMar his constitutional rights to due 
process, a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel and a reliable sentencing 
determination as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶215} Proposition of Law No. 13: The trial court erred in failing to grant 
defendant’s motion for new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33(3) [sic, 33(A)(3)], 
thereby denying appellant LaMar his rights to due process, a fair trial, and 
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶216} Proposition of Law No. 14: The trial court committed prejudicial 
error in admitting all evidence submitted by the state in the guilt-innocence phase 
into the mitigation phase as much of the evidence was not relevant to any specific 
aggravating circumstance.  Such error denied Keith LaMar his rights under the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and his 
corresponding state constitutional rights. 
{¶217} Proposition of Law No. 15: The trial court erred in failing to grant 
a mistrial, or in the alternative, to dismiss the jury when the prosecutor repeatedly 
argued inappropriately regarding mitigating factors which acted to deny Mr. 
LaMar the individualized sentencing determination required by the Fifth, Sixth, 
January Term, 2002 
67 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and corresponding 
provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶218} Proposition of Law No. 16: The trial court erred in instructing the 
jury during the sentencing phase by (A) failing to inform the jury a solitary juror 
could prevent the death sentence and (B) in placing undue influence on the 
requirement of unanimity such that Mr. LaMar’s death sentences lack the 
reliability required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section[s] 2, 9, 10, and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶219} Proposition of Law No. 17: The trial court erred when it failed to 
comply with the dictates of R.C. 2929.03 by weighing non-statutory aggravating 
circumstances, by relying on evidence that was not a part of the record, by 
discounting the mitigating factors and by failing to articulate the reasons why the 
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were 
sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.  This failure denied the appellant his 
due process rights as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitution[s]. 
{¶220} Proposition of Law No. 18: The Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 10 and 16, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2929.05 guarantee a convicted capital defendant a 
fair and impartial review of his death sentence.  The statutorily mandated 
proportionality process in Ohio does not comport with this constitutional 
requirement and thus is fatally flawed. 
{¶221} This court, in performing its proportionality review, should 
compare Mr. LaMar’s sentence with other inmate defendant’s sentences received 
for crimes committed during the Lucasville riot.  Such comparison would 
guarantee Mr. LaMar the rights set forth in the U.S. Constitution as well as those 
sought to be protected by the Ohio Constitution and Ohio capital statutory 
framework. 
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{¶222}  In performing this comparison this court will find that from 
initiation of the charges through the trial and sentencing of Mr. LaMar, the 
prosecution selectively sought to impose a heavier penalty on appellant than any 
other inmate accused or convicted of killing inmates.  Such selective prosecution 
cannot withstand scrutiny and accordingly this court will find that Keith LaMar’s 
death sentences are in violation of both U.S. and state constitutional principles. 
{¶223} Proposition of Law No. 19: Repeatedly instructing that a jury’s 
verdict is only a recommendation violates the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section[s] 2, 9, 10 and 16 of 
the Ohio Constitution.  The prejudice an appellant suffers from this constitutional 
violation is further exacerbated by using the term “recommendation” on the actual 
verdict forms. 
{¶224} Proposition of Law No. 20: The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 
16 of the Ohio Constitution establish the requirements for a valid death penalty 
scheme.  R.C. 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.021, 2903.022, 2929.023, 2929.03, 
2929.04 and 2929.05, Ohio’s statutory provisions governing the imposition of the 
death penalty, do not meet the prescribed constitutional requirements and are 
unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied. 
__________________ 
Mark E. Piepmeier, Special Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Breyer, 
Assistant Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Carol A. Wright and Kristin Burkett, for appellant. 
__________________