Case Title: Berry v. Commerce Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13089

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13089 
 
RUSSELL BERRY  vs.  COMMERCE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     September 8, 2021. - October 25, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.  Police, Injury on duty, Training 
program.  Public Employment, Police.  Municipal 
Corporations, Police.  Agency, Scope of authority or 
employment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 7, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by Raffi N. Yessayan, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Mark C. Darling for the defendant. 
 
Claudine A. Cloutier for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case concerns the question whether a 
police officer, who was a certified firearms training 
instructor, was acting "within the scope of his office or 
2 
 
employment" under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (act), G. L. 
c. 258, § 2, when his personal vehicle struck and seriously 
injured a fellow officer during a paid lunch break following the 
morning session of a day-long, mandatory firearms training held 
on town-owned property.  The tortfeasor, who acknowledged that 
he had been driving too fast when he approached the range in his 
vehicle on his way back from purchasing lunch, stopped the 
vehicle momentarily; he then accelerated, spinning rocks and 
gravel, before heading toward a picnic table where the victim 
was sitting.  Applying the brakes, he caused the vehicle to 
slide and, ultimately, to strike the victim.  Although the 
injured officer was found to have been injured "in the 
performance of his duty" for purposes of receiving compensation 
under G. L. c. 41, § 111F, we conclude that the conduct of the 
officer who struck him, which involved unsafe and, at the least, 
grossly negligent driving with no motivation to benefit his 
employer, did not fall within the scope of his employment under 
common-law principles of vicarious liability, respondeat 
superior, and agency.  Accordingly, the immunity provision of 
the act provides no defense to the tortfeasor's automobile 
insurer, the defendant Commerce Insurance Company (Commerce). 
1.  Background.  The following facts are drawn from the 
parties' consolidated statement of material facts and are either 
not in dispute or viewed in the light most favorable to 
3 
 
Commerce, the party against which summary judgment entered.  See 
Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 371 (1982). 
The incident occurred on June 12, 2017, at a firing range 
on property owned by the town of Raynham.  At the time of the 
incident, Officer Shawn Sheehan was a fourteen-year veteran of 
the Raynham police department, and also a certified firearms 
instructor, as he had been for approximately seven years.  
Maintaining that certification was a job requirement. 
That morning, Sheehan and a fellow officer met at the 
police station to collect rifles and ammunition necessary for 
the day's training.  Sheehan placed the equipment in his pickup 
truck and drove to the firing range, approximately three and 
one-half miles away.  Sheehan was being paid eight hours of 
overtime to conduct the training.  When they reached the range, 
the officers assembled tents over picnic tables at the end of 
the range, near a storage container that held other training 
equipment, such as targets and warning flags. 
The plaintiff, Officer Russell Berry of the Raynham police 
department, attended the mandatory, day-long training, as all 
officers were required to do annually.  He was paid eight hours 
of overtime to attend.  During the training, officers did not 
wear their uniforms, although those being trained wore duty 
belts to hold their pistols.  The officers at the training were 
"on duty" but did not expect to leave the training to respond to 
4 
 
calls other than for a "large-scale emergency," if one were to 
occur.  For that reason, Sheehan testified at his deposition, 
the officers had a portable police radio at the range. 
After the morning training session, the officers broke for 
a paid lunch break.  Some officers left the range to get 
sandwiches for the group that stayed behind.  Sheehan also left 
the range to buy lunch at a nearby store.  He drove his pickup 
truck, which was insured by Commerce.  While Sheehan retained 
ultimate responsibility for the security of the rifles and 
ammunition being used in the training, he delegated oversight of 
these items to the officers who remained at the range.  Sheehan 
testified that the lunch was a "working lunch" during which 
officers would engage in further discussion about firearms, and 
that he remained "on the clock" during the lunch break. 
When Sheehan returned approximately ten minutes after 
leaving, Berry, who had remained at the range, was seated at one 
of the picnic tables; the tables were located on the range side 
of the storage container opposite the parking lot, and away from 
the access road.  Sheehan drove his truck directly onto the 
range, intending to park toward the back of the container where 
other officers sometimes parked rather than in the parking lot.  
Sheehan testified that, as he pulled into the range, he drove 
"faster than [he] should have," coming in "a little hot, 
spinning the rear tires."  He acknowledged that he "stopped, and 
5 
 
then sped up, spinning rocks or gravel" and heading toward the 
picnic table, where Berry sat.  Sheehan applied the brakes, and 
the truck slid and struck Berry, pinning his leg between the 
truck and the picnic table.  For his misconduct, Sheehan was 
suspended for five days without pay. 
Berry sustained severe injuries to his leg and incurred 
medical bills in excess of $130,000.  As a result of his 
injuries, Berry received leave with pay under the statutory 
analogue to the workers' compensation act, G. L. c. 152, for 
police officers and firefighters injured "in the performance of 
[their] duty," G. L. c. 41, § 111F.  See Corbett v. Related Cos. 
Northeast, 424 Mass. 714, 719-720 (1997). 
Berry submitted a written demand letter to Commerce, 
claiming that Sheehan's liability was clear and that Commerce, 
as Sheehan's automobile insurer, was responsible for payments to 
cover Berry's damages.  Commerce denied coverage on the ground 
that Sheehan was a public employee who had been acting "within 
the scope of his . . . employment" at the time of the accident 
and, thus, was immune from tort liability under G. L. c. 258, 
§ 2.1  Berry then commenced the present action against Commerce 
 
1 General Laws c. 258, § 2, provides, in relevant part: 
 
"Public employers shall be liable for . . . personal 
injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any public employee while acting within the 
 
6 
 
in the Superior Court seeking a judgment declaring that Sheehan 
was not immune under the act.  See G. L. c. 231A, § 1.  On cross 
motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge entered 
judgment in favor of Berry, after concluding that Commerce, as 
Sheehan's insurer, was liable for Berry's injuries because 
Sheehan was not acting within the scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Summary judgment is appropriate where 
there is no material issue of fact in dispute, and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Kourouvacilis 
v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991); Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  Our review 
of a decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo.  
Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637 
(2012).  When parties have filed cross motions for summary 
judgment, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
 
scope of his [or her] office or employment, in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances . . . .  The remedies provided by this 
chapter shall be exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the 
public employer or, the public employee or his [or her] 
estate whose negligent or wrongful act or omission gave 
rise to such claim, and no such public employee or the 
estate of such public employee shall be liable for any 
. . . personal injury . . . caused by his [or her] 
negligent or wrongful act or omission while acting within 
the scope of his [or her] office or employment" (emphasis 
added). 
7 
 
the party against whom summary judgment was entered."  
Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 330 
(2021), citing Miramar Park Ass'n, Inc. v. Dennis, 480 Mass. 
366, 377 (2018). 
 
Pursuant to the act, public employees who commit negligent 
or wrongful acts or omissions "while acting within the scope of 
[their] office or employment" are immune from liability.2  G. L. 
c. 258, § 2.  In interpreting this phrase, we apply the common-
law test, which is based on principles of vicarious liability, 
respondeat superior, and agency,3 and which "considers whether 
 
2 The judge characterized Sheehan's conduct as "horseplay."  
As Commerce maintains, the immunity provision of the act covers 
grossly negligent conduct so long as the conduct occurred within 
the scope of employment.  See Monahan v. Methuen, 408 Mass. 381, 
392 (1990) (public employees "are immune from personal liability 
for their allegedly grossly negligent conduct").  The act does 
not provide immunity to public employees for intentional torts.  
See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c). 
 
3 These three concepts are interrelated.  Vicarious 
liability is the "imposition of liability on one person for the 
actionable conduct of another, based solely on a relationship 
between the two persons."  Black's Law Dictionary 1084 (6th ed. 
abridged, 1991).  Respondeat superior is a type of vicarious 
liability in which the employer is held liable for the acts of 
the employee committed within the scope of employment.  1 S.M. 
Speiser, C.F. Krause, & A.W. Gans, American Law of Torts § 4:3 
(2021).  Respondeat superior arises from the agency relationship 
between an employee and an employer; the employee (or agent) 
acts on behalf of the employer (or principal), who is presumed 
to have the authority to control the agent's actions.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 1.01 & comment b, 2.04 
comment b (2006) ("Functionally tied though the doctrine is to 
tort law, [respondeat superior] has long been classified as an 
element of agency doctrine"). 
8 
 
the act was in furtherance of the employer's work."  Clickner v. 
Lowell, 422 Mass. 539, 542 (1996).  See Burroughs v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 874, 877 (1996), quoting Kansallis Fin. 
Ltd. v. Fern, 421 Mass. 659, 666 (1996) ("The scope of 
employment test asks the question:  is this the kind of thing 
that in a general way employees of this kind do in employment of 
this kind"). 
 
Commerce is correct that an act may be within the scope of 
employment even though it is tortious.  See Restatement (Third) 
of Agency § 7.07 (2006).  See also Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Comm'n, 402 Mass. 687, 695 (1988), quoting Kent v. Bradley, 480 
S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) ("If the act complained of 
was within the scope of the servant's authority, the master will 
be liable, although it constituted an abuse or excess of the 
authority conferred.  The master . . . is justly held 
responsible when the servant, through lack of judgment or 
discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence 
of passion aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes 
beyond the strict line of his duty or authority and inflicts an 
unjustifiable injury on a third person"). 
Still, not all tortious conduct committed by an employee in 
connection with his or her work is within the scope of that 
employee's employment.  See Lev v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 
457 Mass. 234, 239 (2010) (nursing home chef was not acting 
9 
 
within scope of his employment where he drove home intoxicated 
from work meeting during which he consumed alcohol and then 
caused accident); Clickner, 422 Mass. at 543-544 (officer who 
became intoxicated during golf outing was not acting within 
scope of employment even though he was answering work-related 
telephone call at time he crashed town-owned vehicle into 
plaintiffs).  See also Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 
56 (1st Cir. 2010) (computer forensics specialist employed to 
aid in criminal investigations acted in furtherance of his own 
agenda and not within scope of employment when, on his way home 
from work, he engaged in car chase, unholstered his gun, made 
threatening gestures, and drove in dangerous manner, striking 
motorcyclist with government-owned vehicle issued to specialist 
to permit him to respond efficiently to emergencies).  Compare 
McIntyre v. United States, 545 F.3d 27, 40-42 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(Federal agent's deliberate leak to two organized crime 
informants that victim also was cooperating with authorities, 
although criminal act and in violation of agency policy, was 
within scope of employment, as it was at least partially 
motivated to benefit agency by maintaining relationship with 
organized crime figures); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Business 
Incentives, Inc., 398 Mass. 854, 860-861 (1986) (employee's bad 
faith and willful interference with contractual relations, 
10 
 
motivated by self-interest, fell within scope of employment 
where intent was, at least in part, to serve employer). 
Regardless of whether the act resulting in injury is 
tortious, we determine whether it falls within the scope of the 
employee's employment by considering three factors, each of 
which must be met to sustain the conclusion that the employee's 
conduct fell within the scope of the employment:  (1) "whether 
the conduct in question is of the kind the employee is hired to 
perform"; (2) "whether it occurs within authorized time and 
space limits"; and (3) "whether it is motivated, at least in 
part, by a purpose to serve the employer."  Clickner, 422 Mass. 
at 542.  See Wang Labs., Inc., 398 Mass. at 859-860 
(acknowledging that, although two factors favored finding that 
employee's conduct occurred within scope of employment, third 
factor must also be met to sustain that conclusion).  See also 
Pinshaw, 402 Mass. at 694-695 (noting that "[t]he issue is [the 
employee's] motivation" after concluding that other factors were 
satisfied); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(2) (1958) 
("Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if 
it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the 
authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a 
purpose to serve the master"). 
 
Here, only the second factor -- whether the conduct 
occurred within authorized time and space limits -- clearly 
11 
 
favors Commerce.  Specifically, the accident occurred at the 
firing range on town-owned property, during a paid lunch break 
following the morning session of a day-long mandatory firearms 
training in which Sheehan, a certified firearms instructor, 
participated as part of his position with the Raynham police 
department.4 
The circumstances concerning the first factor -- whether 
the conduct in question was of the kind the employee is hired to 
perform -- are mixed.  On the one hand, viewed in the context of 
the entire day, Sheehan was conducting mandatory firearms 
training as part of his employment with the police department.  
See Clickner, 422 Mass. at 542 (reviewing employee's course of 
conduct during entire day in evaluating whether conduct was kind 
he was hired to perform); Wang Labs., Inc., 398 Mass. at 860 
(reviewing employee's employment responsibilities generally in 
connection with first factor).  All officers, including Berry, 
were mandated to attend such training annually.  Both Sheehan 
and Berry were being paid overtime to be at the range, were on 
 
4 Contrary to Commerce's contention, this case does not 
involve the "going and coming" rule or any exceptions thereto.  
That rule provides that injuries sustained by an employee 
traveling to or from work do not occur within the course of 
employment.  Lev v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 457 Mass. 234, 
238 (2010), citing Mosko v. Raytheon Co., 416 Mass. 395, 399 
(1993).  Here, the conduct at issue occurred when Sheehan was on 
town property at the range, rather than when he was traveling to 
or from the range. 
12 
 
town-owned property, and were using police department equipment.  
Even the time spent leaving the range to buy lunch was paid 
time, and a permitted part of the training day.  Further, 
Sheehan testified that the lunch was a "working lunch" during 
which officers would receive informal instruction and take turns 
setting up and preparing for the afternoon session.  Sheehan 
also retained the ultimate responsibility (albeit one that he 
delegated to fellow officers during the ten minutes he was away 
from the range to get lunch) for oversight of the equipment. 
On the other hand, Sheehan's conduct -- approaching the 
range too fast in his truck, stopping, then proceeding toward 
Berry, spinning his tires in the gravel, and braking and causing 
his truck to slide into Berry –- was not part of the duties that 
Sheehan, as a firearms instructor, was hired to perform, and 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that his employer 
approved or ordered the conduct.  See Merlonghi, 620 F.3d at 57 
("Clearly, [the employee] was not employed to create 
confrontational altercations with private citizens while driving 
home from work"); Burroughs, 423 Mass. at 877-878 (National 
Guard member was not engaged in kind of conduct he was employed 
to perform while bartending because activity was "neither 
explicitly nor implicitly ordered or even requested by his 
supervisors"). 
13 
 
Regardless of the determination as to the first factor, 
consideration of the third factor -- whether the conduct was 
motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
employer -- compels the conclusion that Sheehan was not acting 
within the scope of his employment.  His unsafe driving was not 
motivated, even in part, by a purpose to serve his employer.  As 
Sheehan acknowledges, nothing in the dangerous game5 of driving 
fast toward the picnic table, behind the storage container where 
officers were present, slamming on his brakes, and skidding 
toward the officers furthered the interests of the town.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 235 comment c ("The fact that 
an act is done in an outrageous or abnormal manner has value in 
indicating that the servant is not actuated by an intent to 
perform the employer's business").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 462 (1983) (collecting cases where 
employee's tortious conduct was within scope of employment, 
i.e., it was in response to interference with employee's ability 
to perform work functions); Levi v. Brooks, 121 Mass. 501, 505 
(1877) ("The test of the liability of the master is, that the 
act of the servant is done in the course of doing the master's 
work, and for the purpose of accomplishing it").  See, e.g., 
 
5 Berry testified that Sheehan had engaged in similar 
conduct earlier in the day, that time without any injuries.  For 
purposes of summary judgment, we do not rely on Berry's 
testimony. 
14 
 
Clickner, 422 Mass. at 544 (officer who used town-owned vehicle 
to drive from day-long golf outing where he became intoxicated 
was not acting in furtherance of employment even though he was 
answering work-related telephone call at time he crashed vehicle 
into plaintiffs).6  The egregious nature of Sheehan's misconduct 
had no employment-based purpose, taking what otherwise might 
have been a close case and firmly placing it outside the realm 
of the immunity of the act. 
Commerce contends that a determination that Sheehan was not 
acting "within the scope of his employment" for purposes of the 
act, see G. L. c. 258, § 2, cannot be reconciled with the 
determination that Berry was injured "in the performance of his 
 
6 By contrast, we have held that an employee's tort 
committed, at least in part, to further the employer's interest 
falls within the scope of employment.  See Orasz v. Colonial 
Tavern, Inc., 362 Mass. 881, 881 (1972) (assault on patron by 
employee was committed "to maintain order and decorum," which 
ultimately was "for the purpose of accomplishing the work of the 
defendant"); Suckney v. Bert P. Williams, Inc., 355 Mass. 62, 64 
(1968) (finding that battery was in response to picket 
demonstration, which interfered with employee's ability to 
deliver beer he was transporting); Hobart v. Cavanaugh, 353 
Mass. 51, 53 (1967) (battery was in response to employee's 
frustration with victim's delay in putting gasoline in his 
truck, impeding his ability to meet employer's deadline 
demands); Thompson v. Beliauskas, 341 Mass. 95, 98 (1960) 
(forcible ejection of patron who refused to leave café was 
within scope of employment because employee was acting under 
instructions of employer). 
 
15 
 
duty" under G. L. c. 41, § 111F.7  Commerce urges us to apply the 
same standard to the act as is applied to G. L. c. 41, § 111F, 
and the workers' compensation statute, G. L. c. 152, § 26.8  We 
repeatedly have declined to do so.  See, e.g., Lev, 457 Mass. at 
239 n.6 ("tort liability under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior is viewed differently from an injured employee's 
entitlement to benefits under the workers' compensation act"); 
Clickner, 422 Mass. at 543 n.4 (differentiating between 
"worker's compensation analysis" and "imputed tort liability 
under respondeat superior principles" in case interpreting act).  
In doing so, we have acknowledged that the test used in workers' 
compensation cases "is much broader than the 'scope of 
employment' test applied to determine whether a master is liable 
for a servant's negligent acts."  Fredette v. Simpson, 440 Mass. 
263, 266 (2003).  See Mulford v. Mangano, 418 Mass. 407, 410 
(1994) (rejecting narrow "scope of employment" test used in tort 
 
7 Berry's eligibility for leave without loss of pay is not 
before us. 
 
 
8 The wording of G. L. c. 41, § 111F ("in the performance of 
his [or her] duty"), and the workers' compensation act, G. L. 
c. 152, § 26 ("arising out of and in the course of his [or her] 
employment") are comparable.  See Wormstead v. Town Manager of 
Saugus, 366 Mass. 659, 663 (1975). 
 
16 
 
cases in favor of broader standard used in workers' compensation 
cases).9 
 
The different treatment is grounded, at a minimum, in the 
different purposes of the statutes.  Like the workers' 
compensation statute, G. L. c. 41, § 111F, aims "to prevent any 
deprivation of pay, either in time or value, during the period 
of an officer's incapacity.  The provision reflects an intention 
that an incapacitated officer receive leave 'without loss' of 
ordinary compensation."  Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 237 
(2007), quoting id.  Liability for workers' compensation 
benefits has been broadly construed against the employer to aid 
the injured employee.  See, e.g., Roberge's Case, 330 Mass. 506, 
509 (1953). 
The purpose of the act is different; the act creates "a 
comprehensive and uniform regime of tort liability for public 
employers," Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 
Mass. 509, 534 (1998), and places public employers in the same 
position as private employers vis-à-vis their liability for the 
conduct of their employees, making apt the application of 
traditional principles of vicarious liability, respondeat 
 
9 For this reason, Commerce's reliance on Wormstead, 366 
Mass. at 662-663, which addressed the question whether G. L. 
c. 41, § 111F, applied to an officer who was injured while 
driving back to the police station following a paid lunch break, 
is misplaced. 
17 
 
superior, and agency, see G. L. c. 258, § 2 ("Public employers 
shall be liable for . . . personal injury . . . caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee 
while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or 
employment, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances").  Commerce has 
provided no persuasive argument to deviate from the established 
approach of using separate analyses for claims under the act and 
workers' compensation claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.