Case Title: Shirley D. Anderson v. City of Milwaukee

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP001030

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-1030, 94-2162 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Shirley D. Anderson, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  199 Wis. 2d 479, 544 N.W.2d 630 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 28, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Miech & Jacqueline D. Schellinger 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Rudolph M. Konrad, deputy city attorney with whom 
on the briefs were Michael G. Tobin, assistant city attorney and 
Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
Thomas M. Pyper and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Madison and 
oral argument by Thomas M. Pyper. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire 
Silverman, assistant legal counsel, for the League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Shirley D. Anderson, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 28, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
Shirley D. Anderson, 
 
           Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
           Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The City of Milwaukee ("City") 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals,1 
which affirmed a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County.  The court of appeals held that the City had 
waived, by omission, the $50,000 liability damage limitation 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) (1991-92)2 when it failed to plead 
                     
1  Anderson v. City of Milwaukee, 199 Wis. 2d 479, 544 
N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1996).  
2  Section 893.80(3) provides in relevant part:   
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
2 
it as an affirmative defense in its answer, and failed to raise 
it in motions after verdict.  The court of appeals further held 
that the City is not immune under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)3 from 
liability for the design of a walkway it constructed, owned, and 
maintained, because the City has a ministerial duty to comply 
with Wis. Stat. § 101.11,4 the safe-place statute.  We conclude 
that the $50,000 damage limitation cannot be waived by omission. 
  Instead, the damage limitation may only be expressly waived by 
a public entity in situations such as outlined in Stanhope v. 
Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979), where the 
purposes of the damage limitation statute are met.  We further 
conclude that, in this case, the City waived the discretionary 
immunity defense of § 893.80(4) by failing to plead it as an 
                                                                  
[T]he amount recoverable by any person for any 
damages, injuries or death in any action founded on 
tort 
against 
any . . . governmental 
subdivision . . . and 
against 
their 
officers, 
officials, agents or employes for acts done in their 
official capacity or in the course of their agency or 
employment . . . shall not exceed $50,000. 
All future references are to the 1991-92 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
3  Section 893.80(4) provides in pertinent part: "No suit 
may be brought against any . . . governmental subdivision . . . 
or against its officers, officials, agents or employes for acts 
done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions."  Accordingly, the City is afforded 
immunity under this statute for discretionary acts.  See Estate 
of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 300, 550 N.W.2d 103 
(1996).   
4  Section 101.11(1) provides in relevant part: "Every 
employer and every owner of a place of employment or a public 
building now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair 
or maintain such place of employment or public building as to 
render the same safe." 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
3 
affirmative defense.5  Therefore, we do not reach the issue of 
whether the City has a ministerial duty to comply with the safe-
place statute.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
I. 
¶2 
On July 8, 1989, Shirley D. Anderson ("Anderson") was 
shopping at the Fondy Farmer's Market when she tripped and fell 
on a raised line of bricks located on the market's walkway.  The 
City constructed, owned, and maintained the market.  Anderson 
broke her knee as a result of this incident.         
¶3 
On October 6, 1989, Anderson filed what she designated 
as a "notice of circumstances and claim" with the City, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  Anderson made a claim for 
$200,000, but further stated:  
 
To the extent it is determined that Ms. Anderson's 
claim is limited to the $50,000 amount set forth in 
section 893.80(3), Stats., Ms. Anderson hereby makes 
claim for the full $50,000 without waiving her right 
to claim the full amount of her compensatory damages 
should Wisconsin law entitle her to recover such 
amount.   
(Respondent's Appendix at 206.)  The City did not respond to the 
claim; therefore, it was deemed denied under § 893.80(1)(b) 
after the passage of 120 days. 
¶4 
On July 11, 1990, Anderson filed suit in the circuit 
court, alleging that the City had violated Wis. Stat. § 101.11, 
                     
5  It is not inconsistent for this court to hold that the 
damage limitation under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) cannot be waived 
by omission, but the discretionary immunity defense under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) can be waived by omission.  These two defenses 
are distinct because discretionary immunity is an affirmative 
defense, whereas the damage limitation is not.  See infra pp. 
13-15, 16 of this opinion. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
4 
the safe-place statute, by negligently designing, constructing, 
maintaining, and repairing the walkway.  On August 3, 1990, the 
City filed an answer denying the allegations and pleading the 
affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and failure to 
mitigate damages.  The City did not raise the Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) damage limitation or the Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
discretionary immunity defense in its answer, or in any pre-
trial motions. 
¶5 
On January 31, 1991, Anderson filed an offer of 
settlement of $25,000 with the City.  The City refused the 
offer, and the case proceeded to trial. 
¶6 
A jury trial was held from June 29, 1993 to July 2, 
1993, before the Honorable Robert J. Miech.  At the close of the 
evidence, the City moved for a directed verdict on the basis 
that it was immune from liability for the design of the walkway 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), because this constituted a 
discretionary act.  The circuit court denied the motion.   
¶7 
The City also objected to special verdict question 
one, submitted by Anderson, which provided: "Was the City of 
Milwaukee negligent by failing to design, construct, maintain or 
repair the Fondy Mall walkway as safe as the nature of the 
walkway would reasonably permit?"  The attorney for the City 
stated: "The only objection I have to [the special verdict] is 
the question concerning number one, to construct, maintain and 
all the rest of the stuff.  I think negligence with respect to 
maintenance is all we need in this case and I don't think 
anything else is relevant."  (R. 47 at 48-49.)  The circuit 
court noted this objection, but the question was not changed.  
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
5 
On July 2, 1993, the jury found the City negligent and ordered 
compensatory damages of $443,600.87. 
¶8 
On July 22, 1993, the City filed a motion after 
verdict, requesting the circuit court to: (1) change the jury 
answers finding the City negligent; (2) reduce the jury award of 
damages to "reflect an appropriate sum of money which under the 
evidence fairly constitutes" Anderson's losses; and (3) set 
aside the verdict because it was perverse, contrary to the law, 
and contrary to the evidence.  The City never contacted the 
circuit court to request a hearing on this motion.  Accordingly, 
the motion was considered denied under Wis. Stat. § 805.16(3) 
after the passage of ninety days. 
¶9 
On November 16, 1993, Anderson submitted a proposed 
judgment for the full verdict amount of $443,600.87 to the 
circuit court.  On November 19, 1993, the City sent a letter to 
the circuit court in which it objected to the proposed judgment 
based on the damage limitation under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3).  
The City also enclosed a proposed judgment for $50,000.  On 
March 18, 1994, the circuit court entered judgment on the 
verdict pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.16(3) because the ninety-
day period for motions after verdict had expired.  The circuit 
court 
therefore 
signed 
Anderson's 
proposed 
judgment 
for 
$443,600.87.6 
¶10 On April 25, 1994, the City filed a motion for post-
verdict relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§  806.07(1)(d) and (h), 
asking the circuit court to vacate the judgment on the grounds 
                     
6  On April 6, 1994, costs were taxed against the City, 
along with interest in accord with Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4), and 
added to the judgment for a total sum of $618,492.55. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
6 
that it was void as a matter of law based on the $50,000 damage 
limitation under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3).  The circuit court, the 
Honorable 
Jacqueline D. 
Schellinger 
presiding, 
denied the 
motion.  The circuit court determined that the judgment was not 
void because the City waived the damage limitation.  The circuit 
court further concluded that the City was not entitled to 
equitable relief because it failed to raise the issue in a 
timely fashion.7 
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order 
of the circuit court.  The court of appeals determined that the 
damage limitation under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) is not a 
jurisdictional requirement; therefore, it may be waived by 
omission if a party does not properly raise it.  Anderson v. 
City of Milwaukee, 199 Wis. 2d 479, 491, 544 N.W.2d 630 (1996). 
 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the City had 
waived the damage limitation by its omission in failing to plead 
it as an affirmative defense, and failing to raise it in motions 
after verdict.  Id. at 491-92.  In addition, the court of 
appeals concluded:  "Once the City exercised its overall 
discretion and decided to design and construct the farmer's 
market, it had to comply with the safe-place statute mandates." 
 Id. at 493.  The court of appeals therefore held that the City 
is not immune from liability under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) for 
the design of the walkway because the City has a ministerial 
duty to comply with the safe-place statute.  Id. at 494. 
II. 
                     
7  The City appealed Judge Meich's judgment and Judge 
Schellinger's order to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals consolidated these appeals. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
7 
¶12 The first issue before us is whether a municipality 
may waive the $50,000 damage limitation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) by omission. Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  E.g., Stockbridge School Dist. 
v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal 
Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996); Hughes v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 
(1996).  "The cardinal rule in all statutory interpretation, as 
this court has often said, is to discern the intent of the 
legislature."  Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978 (quoting Scott v. 
First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 612, 456 N.W.2d 152 
(1990)).  To ascertain the legislature's intent, a court first 
examines the language of the statute itself.  E.g., UFE Inc. v. 
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 548 
N.W.2d 57 (1996).  However, if the statute is ambiguous, a court 
must examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and 
purpose of the statute to determine the legislature's intent.  
E.g., Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 220; Jungbluth v. 
Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  A 
court should resolve statutory ambiguities to advance the 
legislature's basic purpose in enacting the legislation.  UFE 
Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 288 (citing State ex rel. Carkel, Inc. v. 
Circuit Ct. for Lincoln County, 141 Wis. 2d 257, 265-66, 414 
N.W.2d 640 (1987)).  
¶13 Accordingly, we turn to the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3).  Section 893.80(3) provides in pertinent part:  
"[T]he amount recoverable by any person for any damages, 
injuries or death in any action founded on torts against 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
8 
any . . . governmental subdivision . . . shall not exceed 
$50,000 . . . . "  The legislature enacted this statute in 1963 
in response to a decision of this court abrogating municipal 
tort immunity.  See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  
¶14 For almost ninety years prior to 1962, this court held 
that municipalities in Wisconsin were exempt from tort liability 
under the doctrine of municipal tort immunity.  See Hayes v. 
City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 318 (1873) (adopting doctrine of 
municipal immunity), overruled by Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d 26.  When, 
in 
1962, 
the 
court 
abrogated 
this 
doctrine, 
it 
stated: 
"[H]enceforward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts 
is concerned, the rule is liabilitythe exception is immunity." 
 Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39.  The court determined that such 
abrogation was within its province because municipal tort 
immunity was originally a judicially-created doctrine.  Id. at 
30-39.  However, the court noted: 
 
If the legislature deems it better public policy, it 
is, of course, free to reinstate immunity.  The 
legislature may also impose ceilings on the amount of 
damages or set up administrative requirements which 
may be preliminary to the commencement of judicial 
proceedings for an alleged tort.  See, for example, 
the notice provisions and the limitation of the amount 
of damages in sec. 81.15, Stats. 
 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
9 
Id. at 40.8  The court thus placed the doctrine of municipal 
immunity in the hands of the legislature.  See Sambs v. City of 
Brookfield, 66 Wis. 2d 296, 317, 224 N.W.2d 582 (1975). 
 ¶15 The 
legislature 
quickly 
reacted 
to 
the 
court's 
decision in Holytz.  In 1963, the legislature adopted Senate 
Bill 283, which in part limited the amount recoverable by any 
person in a tort action against a public entity to $25,000.9  See 
Laws of 1963, ch. 198.  As this court has indicated: "The 
legislature's goal after Holytz was to delineate the liability 
to which governmental units would be exposed as a result of 
Holytz, to reduce the financial strain, and to enable the 
governmental units to plan for the risk of such liability."  
Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 373, 293 N.W.2d 
504, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). 
                     
8  The legislature's authority to reinstate immunity or 
limit recovery in tort actions against the state arises from 
article IV, section 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
provides:  "The legislature shall direct by law in what manner 
and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."  
Holytz had no effect on the state's sovereign right under this 
constitutional provision to be sued only upon its consent.  See 
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 41, 115 N.W.2d 618, 
625 (1962). 
9  The original bill contained a damage limitation of 
$10,000, but this amount was increased to $25,000 by the 
legislature's adoption of Senate Amendment 4 to 1963 Senate Bill 
283.  See Laws of 1963, ch. 198. In 1979, the legislature 
increased the damage limitation amount to $50,000.  See Laws of 
1981, ch. 63, § 2.   
In addition, the legislature originally codified 1963 
Senate Bill 283 as Wis. Stat. § 331.43.  The legislature changed 
the statutory numbering to Wis. Stat. § 895.43 in 1965, and Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 in 1979.  See Laws of 1965, ch. 66, § 2; Laws of 
1979, ch. 323, § 29.   
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
10
¶16 Since the legislature enacted the damage limitation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), the court has been called upon to 
interpret this statute on several occasions.  For example, in 
Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 66 Wis. 2d 296, 224 N.W.2d 582 
(1975) 
(hereinafter 
"Sambs 
II"),10 
Sambs 
contended 
that 
Brookfield 
had 
waived 
the 
$25,000 
damage 
limitation 
by 
purchasing an insurance liability contract with larger limits.  
In making its determination, the court reviewed its decision in 
Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 
(1963).  The court noted that in Marshall, it held that Green 
Bay had waived the defense of sovereign immunity to the limits 
of a liability insurance contract it had purchased which 
contained a clause providing that the insurer could not raise 
the defense of governmental immunity.  Id. at 315-16.  However, 
the court determined that Marshall was distinguishable because 
it involved a judicially-created doctrine of immunity, not a 
legislatively-created limitation on recoverable damages.  Id.  
The court also emphasized that the insurance policy at issue in 
Sambs II did not contain a clause prohibiting the use of the 
immunity 
defense 
or 
reliance 
on 
the 
statutory 
liability 
limitation.  Id. at 315.  The court therefore concluded that 
Brookfield had not waived the damage limitation by purchasing 
liability insurance with greater limits.   
¶17 The court next considered the waiver issue in Stanhope 
v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979).  The 
                     
10  This case is designated as Sambs II because the same 
case was previously before the court regarding a different 
issue.  See Sambs v. Nowak, 47 Wis. 2d 158, 177 N.W.2d 144 
(1970). 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
11
Stanhopes contended that Brown County had waived the $25,000 
statutory damage limitation by purchasing liability insurance 
with greater limits.  Id. at 846.  The policy at issue also 
contained an endorsement that provided: "It is agreed that to 
the extent legally possible, the Company will not avail itself 
of the defense that the Insured is not liable because of the 
performance of Governmental Functions."  Id. at 847.  In order 
to decide this issue, the court reviewed the legislative purpose 
behind the statutory damage limitation.  The court stated: 
 
[I]t is for the legislature to choose how limited 
public funds will be spent.  It is within the 
legitimate power of the legislature to take steps to 
preserve sufficient public funds to ensure that the 
government will be able to continue to provide those 
services which it believes benefits the citizenry.  We 
conclude that the legislature's specification of a 
dollar limitation on damages recoverable allows for 
fiscal planning and avoids the risk of devastatingly 
high judgments while permitting victims of public 
tortfeasors to recover their losses up to that limit. 
Id. at 842.  The court therefore concluded that a public entity 
can waive the statutory damage limitation to the extent that it 
carries liability insurance with greater policy limits, so long 
as the insurance contract contains a clause that prohibits the 
insurer from using the immunity defense or relying on the 
statutory liability limitation.  Id.  The court reasoned that 
this holding effectuates the legislative objectives behind the 
statutory damage limitation, because the public treasury is 
protected and the injured party is compensated.  Id.  
¶18 This court again considered the statutory damage 
limitation in Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 293 
N.W.2d 504, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980) (hereinafter 
Sambs III).  In Sambs III, Sambs argued that the statutory 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
12
damage limitation violates the Equal Protection Clause because 
it creates an improper subclassification of victims of public 
tortfeasors. The court indicated: "It is the legislature's 
function to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure to 
liability, the need to compensate citizens for injury, the 
availability of and cost of insurance, and the financial 
condition of the governmental units."  Id. at 377.  The court 
therefore held that the statute does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, because the legislature "could reason that a 
maximum should be imposed on the amount recoverable in those 
situations where the burden of unlimited liability may be 
substantial and the danger of disrupting the functioning of 
local government by requiring payment of substantial damage 
awards may be great."  Id. at 377-78.   
¶19 Finally, in Gonzales v. City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 
109, 403 N.W.2d 747 (1987), the court reaffirmed its holding 
that 
a 
public 
entity 
cannot 
waive 
the 
statutory 
damage 
limitation by merely entering into an insurance contract for 
coverage in excess of the liability limit.  The court emphasized 
that "[w]e have previously defined waiver as a 'voluntary and 
intentional 
relinquishment 
of 
a 
known 
right.' 
[Citation 
omitted.]  Intent to waive is regarded as an essential element 
of waiver."  Id. at 128-29.  The court therefore concluded that 
a public entity cannot waive the damage limitation by purchasing 
insurance coverage if the policy contains no express statement 
that could be construed to waive the liability limit.  Id. at 
132. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
13
¶20 This line of cases and the history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) establish several factors that are important to our 
decision.  First, the legislature has the constitutional 
authority to determine the extent of public entities' exposure 
to liability, and the manner in which individuals may bring 
suits against public entities.  It is also the legislature's 
function to determine how public funds should be spent, and to 
evaluate the economic conditions facing other governmental 
units.  Second, the legislature exercised this authority by 
enacting § 890.80(3).  The purposes of this statute are to 
protect the public treasury and enable public entities to 
conduct fiscal planning, while also protecting the public 
interest in compensating injured parties. Third, this court has 
been reluctant to conclude that the damage limitation can be 
waived.  In fact, this court has repeatedly held that the damage 
limitation can be waived only if the legislative purposes of 
§ 893.80(3) are met, and a public entity expressly waives the 
damage limitation.  
¶21 In addition, we conclude that the damage limitation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.08(3) is not an affirmative defense that is 
deemed waived if not raised in a responsive pleading or by 
motion.  The damage limitation is not listed as an affirmative 
defense in Wis. Stat. § 803.02(3).11  Furthermore, although 
                     
11  Section 802.02(3) provides in part: 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
14
§ 802.02(3) explicitly states that affirmative defenses are not 
"limited to the following," the damage limitation does not fit 
within the criteria for determining when a matter not specified 
should be considered an affirmative defense. Specifically, in 
discussing Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which is similar to Wis. Stat. § 802.02(3), Charles Wright and 
Arthur Miller set forth the criteria of policy, fairness, 
probability, and surprise for making this determination.  See 
Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1271 (1990).  The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Snyder v. City 
of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Minn. 1989), indicated that 
the relevant criteria are surprise and fairness when determining 
whether a cap on municipal tort liability is an affirmative 
defense.  The court concluded: 
 
[A]s the cap also does not bar plaintiff's action 
completely 
it 
would 
appear 
Wright 
and 
Miller's 
surprise factor does dictate the cap need not be pled 
as 
an 
affirmative 
defense. 
 
The 
other 
factor 
considered by Wright and Miller is fairness, "a short-
hand expression reflecting the judgment that all or 
most of the relevant information on a particular 
element of a claim is within the control of one party 
or that one party has a unique nexus with the issue in 
question and therefore that party should bear the 
burden of affirmatively raising the matter."  Wright & 
Miller, § 1271.  Evidence adduced at trial, or control 
of that evidence is unaffected by a failure to plead 
                                                                  
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth 
affirmatively 
any 
matter 
constituting 
an 
avoidance or affirmative defense including but not 
limited to the following:  accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration 
and 
award, 
assumption 
of 
risk, 
contributory 
negligence, 
discharge 
in 
bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of a condition subsequent, 
failure or want of consideration, failure to mitigate 
damages, fraud, illegality, immunity, incompetence, 
injury by fellow servants, laches, license, payment, 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, superseding cause, and waiver. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
15
the cap and the plaintiff is, or ought to be, well 
aware of the special nexus between the municipality 
and the damage cap.  Under the relevant criteria by 
commentators Wright and Miller, the cap on municipal 
tort liability is not an affirmative defense . . . . 
 
Id. at 788; see also Mitchell v. State, 596 So. 2d 353, 357 (La. 
Ct. App.) (finding that statutory cap on damages against the 
state  "does not create an affirmative defense; rather, it 
imposes a limitation on liability"), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 680 
(La. 1992).  We agree with the reasoning of the Snyder court, 
and 
likewise 
conclude 
that 
the 
damage 
limitation 
under 
§ 893.80(3) is not an affirmative defense.  
¶22 With all of these factors in mind, we conclude that 
the damage limitation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) cannot be 
impliedly waived by failing to raise it in an answer, during 
trial, or in a post-verdict motion, because this would undermine 
the purposes of § 893.80(3).  However, the damage limitation may 
be expressly waived under circumstances that satisfy the 
purposes of this statuteprotecting the public treasury and 
allowing for fiscal planning.  This is consistent with Sambs II, 
Stanhope, and Gonzales.
12 
III. 
¶23 The second issue before this court is whether the City 
is immune from liability under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) for 
violating Wis. Stat. § 101.11, the safe-place statute, with 
respect to the design of the Fondy Farmer's Market walkway.  
                     
12  Legislative inaction since this court decided Sambs II, 
Stanhope, and Gonzales indicates that the legislature agreed 
with our interpretation of the damage limitation statute.  See 
State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 556, 456 N.W.2d 143 (1990); 
Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470-71, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980). 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
16
However, before we reach this issue, we must determine whether 
the 
City 
waived 
the 
discretionary 
immunity 
defense 
of 
§ 893.80(4). 
¶24 Initially, we conclude that the discretionary immunity 
defense under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) may be waived by omission. 
 Although, at first glance, this may seem inconsistent with our 
holding regarding the Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) damage limitation, 
it is not.  The discretionary immunity defense is distinct from 
the statutory damage limitation because immunity is expressly 
listed as an affirmative defense in § 802.02(3).  Therefore, 
unlike the statutory damage limitation, discretionary immunity 
is an affirmative defense that is deemed waived if it is not 
raised in a responsive pleading or by motion.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.06(2); Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 46, 214 N.W.2d 405 
(1974) 
(holding 
that 
governmental 
tort 
immunity 
must 
be 
specifically raised or deemed waived).13       
¶25 We next must consider whether the City waived the 
discretionary immunity defense by omission in this case.  The 
complaint filed by Anderson clearly stated: 
 
The City of Milwaukee and one or more of its 
departments and/or city employees were negligent in 
the following respects:   
A. Failure to design and construct the Fondy 
Farmer's market in a proper manner to insure that the 
walkway could not result in an uneven surface that 
would trip frequenters. 
(R. 1 at 5) (emphasis added.)  In its answer, the City pled the 
affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and failure to 
                     
13  A court also may permit the amendment of pleadings if 
justice so requires.  See Wis. Stats. §§  802.02(3) & 802.09(2). 
 However, the City made no motion to amend the pleadings in this 
case.  
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
17
mitigate damages.  The City did not plead the affirmative 
defense of discretionary immunity, despite the fact that the 
complaint unambiguously referred to the City's alleged failure 
to comply with the safe-place statute with respect to the design 
of the walkway.  Thus, the discretionary immunity defense under 
§ 893.80(4) is deemed waived. 
¶26 We note that the City failed to raise the immunity 
defense as an objection to testimony concerning the safe-place 
statute and the design of the walkway.  In fact, the 
discretionary immunity issue was never raised until the close of 
the evidence.  At that time, the City contended that the design 
of the walkway was a discretionary matter on the part of the 
City engineer, and therefore the City was immune from liability 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The circuit court denied the 
motion. 
¶27 Before this court, the City has not focused on the 
denial of this motion, but instead has focused on the special 
verdict.  Specifically, the City points to special verdict 
question one, which provided: "Was the City of Milwaukee 
negligent by failing to design, construct, maintain or repair 
the Fondy Mall walkway as safe as the nature of the walkway 
would reasonably permit?"  In its brief, the City states:   
 
The only remedy for the circuit court's error is a new 
trial, because the special verdict question included 
both maintenance and design, and was phrased in the 
disjunctive . . . . Because the question was phrased 
in the disjunctive, there is no way of determining 
what the jury decided. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
18
(Petitioner's brief at 43-44.)14. 
¶28 Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) provides in relevant part: 
"Counsel may object to the proposed instructions or verdict on 
the grounds of incompleteness or other error, stating the 
grounds for objection with particularity on the record.  Failure 
to object at conference constitutes a waiver of any error in the 
proposed 
instructions or 
verdict." 
 
§ 805.13(3) 
(emphasis 
added).  As this court has stated: "[I]n the absence of a 
specific objection which brings into focus the nature of the 
alleged error, a party has not preserved its objections for 
review."  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 456 N.W.2d 797 
(1990) (quoting Air Wisconsin, Inc. v. North Central Airlines, 
Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 311, 296 N.W.2d 749 (1980)); accord Hauer 
v. Union State Bank, 192 Wis. 2d 576, 600-01, 532 N.W.2d 456 
(Ct. App. 1995).   
¶29 In this case, counsel for the City stated:  "The only 
objection I have to [the special verdict] is the question 
concerning number one, to construct, maintain and all the rest 
of the stuff.  I think negligence with respect to maintenance is 
all we need in this case and I don't think anything else is 
relevant."  (R. 47 at 48-49.)  The City did not state its 
objection to "design" with particularity, and thereby failed to 
provide the circuit court with an opportunity to correct this 
                     
14  The City conceded at oral arguments that maintenance is 
a ministerial act that is not subject to the immunity defense of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The City also has not raised the issue 
of whether construction or repair of the walkway are subject to 
the discretionary immunity defense. 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
19
alleged error in the special verdict question.15  While the 
City's failure to raise the affirmative defense of immunity in 
its answer is dispositive, this is another reason for our 
holding that the City waived the discretionary immunity defense 
by omission.  Because we conclude that the City waived the 
discretionary immunity defense, we do not reach the issue of 
whether the City has a ministerial duty to comply with the safe-
place statute.
16 
¶30 In conclusion, we hold that the damage limitation 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) can only be expressly waived by a 
public entity in situations such as outlined in Stanhope, where 
the purposes of § 893.80(3) are met.  The damage limitation 
cannot be waived by omission.  We further conclude that the City 
waived the affirmative defense of discretionary immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), because it did not plead it in its 
answer.17  Thus, the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
purposes of entering a judgment consistent with the $50,000 
damage limitation of § 893.80(3). 
                     
15  In addition, we point out that the City did not object 
to the jury instructions regarding the safe-place statute, which 
referred only to the City's duty to "construct, repair or 
maintain such public building as to render the same safe," and 
did not refer to design.  See Wis JICivil 1904. 
16  Since this determination is dispositive, and since, 
therefore, we do not reach the ministerial dutysafe place 
issue, we emphasize that our decision should not be taken as 
approval of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on that issue. 
17 As previously explained, it is not inconsistent for this 
court to hold that the damage limitation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) cannot be waived by omission, but the discretionary 
immunity defense under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) can be waived by 
omission. See supra pp. 13-15, 16 of this opinion. 
 
Nos. 94-1030 & 94-2162 
 
20
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.