Case Title: State v. Giard

Citation: 178 Vt. 544, 2005 VT 43, 871 A.2d 976

Docket Number: 2004-034

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Giard  (2004-034); 178 Vt. 544; 871 A.2d 976

2005 VT 43    

[Filed 23-Mar-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 43

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-034

                             DECEMBER TERM, 2004

  State of Vermont                   }    APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }    District Court of Vermont,
       v.                            }    Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
                                     }    
  Shawn Giard                        }
                                     }    DOCKET NO. 460-9-03 Cncs

                                          Trial Judge:  James R. Crucitti

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶ 1.    Defendant Shawn Giard appeals from a district court order
  suspending his automobile operator's license following a civil license
  suspension hearing pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205.  We reverse. 

       ¶ 2.    On September 8, 2003, at approximately 9:30 p.m., defendant
  struck an oncoming vehicle while backing onto a busy road from his
  driveway.  After checking on the other motorist and leaving his license
  with her, defendant left the scene and proceeded to the home of his wife,
  from whom he was separated.  A third party witness to the accident called
  the Colchester police department, and two officers arrived at the scene
  shortly after the accident.  No witness to the accident reported any
  suspicion that defendant was intoxicated at that time.  The first officer
  located defendant at his wife's home at approximately 9:50 p.m., spoke with
  defendant about the accident, and observed defendant's damaged truck.  The
  second officer arrived at the residence at approximately 10:06 p.m. 

       ¶ 3.    Defendant was drinking a beer when the first officer arrived,
  and he continued drinking in the presence of the police until the second
  officer asked him to stop several minutes after his arrival.  After
  questioning defendant about the accident and his drinking, the officers
  took defendant into custody at approximately 10:30 p.m. for operating a
  motor vehicle while intoxicated.  At the police station, defendant
  submitted to a breath test and registered a BAC level of 0.188% at 11:12
  p.m.
        
       ¶ 4.    The testimony and evidence presented at the civil suspension
  hearing yielded an unclear picture of how much alcohol defendant consumed
  on the evening of the accident.  On direct examination, defendant testified
  that he drank two sixteen-ounce beers and one twelve-ounce beer earlier in
  the evening prior to the accident, approximately between the hours of 7:00
  and 8:30 p.m.  Defendant further testified that he consumed a minimum of a
  quarter-pint of vodka and five twelve-ounce beers between the time he
  arrived at his wife's home and the time he left in police custody.  On
  cross examination by the State, defendant testified that he drank a maximum
  of seven twelve-ounce beers and nearly a half-pint of vodka.  Defendant's
  wife testified that she witnessed him drink at least four beers while at
  her house.  According to police affidavits, defendant claimed to have
  consumed between four and seven beers and roughly a half pint of vodka
  after arriving at his wife's home.  No one witnessed him drink the vodka,
  and, although defendant advised the officers that he threw the bottle into
  the woods behind his wife's home, they did not attempt to locate it. 

       ¶ 5.    During the hearing the State called an expert chemist,
  Theodore Manazir, and asked him to calculate the BAC levels of a 165-pound
  male who had consumed alcohol in three hypothetical situations.  In the
  first, the male consumed 44 ounces of beer from 7:00 to 8:45 p.m., then
  operated a vehicle at 9:15.  Mr. Manazir calculated a BAC at 9:15 of
  approximately 0.068%.  The second hypothetical was limited to
  post-operation consumption-assuming that the male consumed 84 ounces of
  beer and 5 ounces of vodka between 9:30 and 10:25 p.m., Mr. Manazir
  calculated an approximate BAC of 0.185% at 11:13 p.m.  The third
  hypothetical combined the first two, assuming that the male consumed 44
  ounces of beer from 7:00 to 8:45 p.m. and 84 ounces of beer and 5 ounces of
  vodka between 9:30 and 10:25 p.m.  In this instance, Mr. Manazir calculated
  the BAC to be approximately 0.253% at 11:13 p.m.  Notably, Mr. Manazir did
  not calculate defendant's BAC at the time he was driving the car based on
  his BAC of 0.188% from the breath test at 11:12 p.m.,(FN1) nor did the
  State present any direct evidence to relate back defendant's BAC level to
  the time he operated his vehicle earlier that evening or to contradict
  defendant's testimony regarding his pre-accident consumption of alcohol.

       ¶ 6.    Finding defendant's testimony untruthful, the district court
  decided in favor of the State based on the evidence presented, including
  the testimony of Mr. Manazir, and the presumption contained in 23 V.S.A. §
  1205(n):

       In a proceeding under this section, if there was at any time
       within two hours of operating, attempting to operate or being
       in actual physical control of a vehicle an alcohol
       concentration of 0.08 or more, it shall be a rebuttable
       presumption that the person's alcohol concentration was 0.08
       or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate or
       being in actual physical control.

        
       ¶ 7.    On appeal, this Court must reverse the decision if the
  district court's factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or if
  its conclusions are not supported by the findings.  Spaulding v. Butler,
  172 Vt. 467, 475,