Case Title: Cross v. Arkansas Livestock and Poultry Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Don CROSS v. ARKANSAS LIVESTOCK and POULTRY
COMMISSION; and Jack Gibson, Individually and
as Head of the Arkansas Livestock and Poultry
Commission

96-304                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 28, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- movant's burden to obtain ruling -- issue not addressed.
     -- Because it was the movant's burden to obtain a ruling on
     his motion for partial summary judgment on a due process
     claim, the supreme court would not address the issue on
     appeal.

2.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- doctrine discussed. --
     Article 5, Section 20, of the Arkansas Constitution provides
     that the State "shall never be made defendant in any of her
     courts"; the supreme court has consistently interpreted this
     constitutional provision as a grant of sovereign immunity and
     a general prohibition against awards of money damages in
     lawsuits against the State and its institutions; the doctrine
     of sovereign immunity is rigid, and the immunity may be waived
     only in limited circumstances; sovereign immunity is
     jurisdictional immunity from suit; where the suit is one
     against the State and there has been no waiver of immunity,
     the trial court acquires no jurisdiction.

3.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- exceptions. -- The supreme
     court has recognized exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign
     immunity where an act of the legislature has created a
     specific waiver of immunity and where the State is the moving
     party seeking specific relief; obviously, where the State is
     the moving party, it is prohibited from raising sovereign
     immunity as a defense to any counterclaim or offset.

4.   Constitutional law -- sovereign immunity -- trial court lacked jurisdiction
     to hear claim -- dismissal affirmed. -- The supreme court construed
     Ark. Code Ann.  19-4-1614(a) (Repl. 1994), concerning
     judicial awards under federal laws, to provide nothing more
     than a means for the payment of such judgments against the
     State; the court did not interpret that section as creating a
     waiver of the State's immunity from suit in its own courts;
     the supreme court concluded that the trial court lacked
     jurisdiction to hear appellant's claim pursuant to the
     doctrine of sovereign immunity; hence, it affirmed the
     ultimate dismissal of the claim with prejudice.

5.   Officers & public employees -- immunity from damage awards -- trial court
     had jurisdiction to hear claim against appellee director. -- With the
     exception of those persons covered by liability insurance, if
     any officers and employees of the State of Arkansas act
     without malice and within the scope of their employment, they
     are immune from an award of damages in litigation; the supreme
     court concluded that on the face of appellant's complaint, in
     which he alleged that appellee executive director of appellee
     commission intentionally deprived him of employment "without
     just cause and for personal motives and thus interfered with
     [his] employment" with appellee commission, the trial court
     had jurisdiction to hear the claim against appellee, both in
     his individual capacity and as executive director of appellee
     commission.

6.   Torts -- interference with contractual relationship -- elements. -- No
     contractual relationship need exist between parties in order
     to maintain an action for tortious interference; the elements
     of tortious interference that must be proved are: (1) the
     existence of a valid contractual relationship or a business
     expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on
     the part of the interfering party; (3) intentional
     interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of
     the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to
     the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted;
     the first element of the tort may be proved by demonstrating
     either a valid contractual relationship or a business
     expectancy.

7.   Torts -- interference with contractual relationship -- appellee director
     was not third party in position to interfere with appellant's continued
     employment -- commission may act only through its officers. -- The
     supreme court held that, notwithstanding the fact that the
     trial court erroneously found that a contract must first exist
     in a tortious-interference action, appellant's claim must
     ultimately fail because appellee executive director was not a
     third party who was in a position to interfere with
     appellant's continued employment with appellee commission;
     appellee executive director and appellee commission were one
     and the same in undertaking the act of terminating appellant's
     employment; the commission cannot act on its own; rather, it
     may act only through its officers.

8.   Torts -- interference with contractual relationship -- role of third party.
     -- The principle has long endured in the law that a third
     party who intentionally and with malice interferes with the
     contractual relations of another incurs liability for his
     action in tort; underlying the tort of interference is the
     premise that a person has a right to pursue valid contractual
     and business expectancies unmolested by the wrongful and
     malicious intermeddling of a third party; it would hardly seem
     logical to hold that a party to an alleged contract or
     business expectancy had tortiously interfered with the other
     party's rights by terminating the contract or business
     relationship; in such an instance, the more appropriate action
     would be one for breach of contract.

9.   Appeal & error -- summary judgment affirmed on different basis. -- The
     supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
     granting summary judgment to appellee executive director,
     noting that it would sustain the trial court's decision if it
     is right, even though it may do so on a different basis. 


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; John Ward,
Judge; affirmed.
     Diana M. Maulding, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Arnold M. Jochums, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Don Cross appeals the order of the Pulaski County
Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Appellees Arkansas
Livestock and Poultry Commission and Jack Gibson, Executive
Director of the Commission, and dismissing Appellant's due process
claim arising out of his discharge from the Commission and his
claim for tortious interference against Gibson.  We affirm.  
                  Facts and Procedural History
     Appellant was discharged from the Commission by Appellee
Gibson on May 24, 1994, after having worked for the state agency
for approximately nine years.  Appellant filed a complaint against
the Commission and Gibson, individually and as Executive Director
of the Commission, in the circuit court on November 8, 1994.  The
complaint alleged that Appellant had a property interest in his
continued employment with the Commission and was entitled to notice
and a hearing prior to his termination, pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that,
additionally, Gibson had tortiously interfered with his contractual
rights to continued employment with the Commission.  Appellant
sought relief from Appellees in the form of reinstatement of his
employment, back pay, restitution of pension benefits, and damages
for emotional distress.  Appellant also sought punitive damages for
his claim against Gibson.  
     Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but the
trial court denied the motion.  Appellees then filed a motion for
summary judgment and, after hearing argument from both sides, the
trial court granted the motion and dismissed both claims with
prejudice.  Appellant appeals the decision of the trial court on
both claims.  Additionally, in the trial court, Appellant sought
partial summary judgment against Appellees on the due process
claim, but there is no indication in the abstract that the trial
court ever ruled on Appellant's motion.  As it is the movant's
burden to obtain a ruling on his motion, we will not address this
point of appeal.  Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Allen,
326 Ark. 1023, 934 S.W.2d 527 (1996).
               Claim Against the State Commission
     Before we address the merits of Appellant's points of appeal,
we must first address Appellees' argument that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5, Section 20, of the
Arkansas Constitution of 1874 to hear Appellant's claim against the
state agency.
     Article 5, Section 20, of the Arkansas Constitution provides
that, "[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any
of her courts."  This court has consistently interpreted this
constitutional provision as a grant of sovereign immunity and a
general prohibition against awards of money damages in lawsuits
against the State of Arkansas and its institutions.  See, e.g.,
Smith v. Denton, 320 Ark. 253,