Case Title: Jane A. Beard v. Lee Enterprises, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003393

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3393 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Jane A. Beard, individually and as surviving 
spouse of Charles R. Beard,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Lee Enterprises, Inc., The LaCrosse Tribune, and 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  213 Wis. 2d 485, 570 N.W.2d 911 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 9, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 10, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
LaCrosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Mulroy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurring (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by John P. Stuber and Sauer, Becker, Flanagan & Lynch, 
Ltd., LaCrosse and oral argument by John P. Stuber. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Gregory J. Egan, Gerard O’Flaherty and Parke O’Flaherty, LTD., 
LaCrosse and oral argument by Gregory J. Egan and Gerard 
O’Flaherty. 
 
2 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3393 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jane A. Beard, individually and as  
surviving spouse of Charles R. Beard,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Lee Enterprises, Inc., The La Crosse  
Tribune, and Liberty Mutual Insurance  
Co.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
APR 9, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   Jane A. Beard seeks review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision affirming the summary 
judgment entered by the Circuit Court for La Crosse County, 
Michael J. Mulroy, Judge, which dismissed her negligence suit 
against The La Crosse Tribune, Lee Enterprises, Inc., which owns 
the newspaper, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, their 
insurer (collectively “The Tribune”).  On appeal, Beard argues 
that Anthony Kropelin, a minor at the time, was employed by The 
Tribune and that he was working in a street trade, as defined 
under Wis. Stat. § 103.21(1)(1991-92),1 during prohibited hours 
when he was involved in a head-on collision that killed Beard’s 
                     
1 All statutory references are to the 1991-92 version of the 
statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 96-3393 
 
2 
husband, Charles.  Beard contends that as Anthony’s employer,  
The Tribune is absolutely liable for allowing him to work in 
violation of the child labor laws. 
¶2 
Based 
on 
the 
statutory 
scheme regulating 
street 
trades, Wis. Stat. §§ 103.21 to 103.31, as well as related 
statutes, in particular Wis. Stat. § 102.60(7), we conclude that 
the legislature envisioned some degree of knowledge, actual or 
constructive, on the part of the employer about an alleged 
employment relationship with a minor involved in a street trade 
before liability can attach.  Because there is a factual 
question 
whether 
The 
Tribune 
had 
knowledge, 
actual 
or 
constructive, that Anthony was delivering materials for The 
Tribune, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment.  
I. 
¶3 
We first set forth the facts of the case.  According 
to portions of his deposition testimony, Anthony Kropelin, who 
was sixteen at the time in question, frequently accompanied his 
father, Douglas, to The Tribune to pick up bundles of newspapers 
from employees at The Tribune’s distribution center.  Douglas 
had a bundle delivery agreement with the newspaper for which he 
was paid by The Tribune on a per trip basis for his distribution 
No. 96-3393 
 
3 
services.2  Anthony often assisted his father in delivering the 
bundles for which Douglas paid him.  
¶4 
Shortly before midnight on Thursday, July 9, 1992, 
Anthony and a friend drove his father’s van to The Tribune to 
pick up the bundles of newspapers.  He “talked to the guys at 
the distribution tower for a while,” and then received his 
bundles and delivered them.  At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 
10, 1992, Anthony returned to The Tribune to pick up bundles of 
the paper’s Sunday supplement for his father to deliver to the 
route carriers for the upcoming Sunday edition.  At that time, 
Anthony also picked up the Friday morning newspapers for his 
brother, James, who was a carrier for The Tribune, and then 
delivered the papers to the houses on James’s carrier route.3  
Anthony finished that delivery at approximately 4:00 a.m. 
¶5 
After finishing James’s route, Anthony began to drive 
back home with the Sunday supplements still in the van.  At 
approximately 4:15 a.m., Anthony struck a vehicle driven by 
                     
2 Under the agreement, Douglas was not required to purchase 
the newspapers he distributed, or collect money for the papers 
from the individual carriers, merchants or vending machines to 
which he distributed the papers.  Rather, each Friday Douglas 
consulted with the north side distribution manager to update the 
number of bundles to be delivered and to whom.  Any complaints 
or requests regarding his delivery were funneled through the 
distribution manager.  Douglas considered the people to whom he 
distributed the bundles to be The Tribune’s customers. 
3 James’s route was part of another carrier’s route.  James 
asked customers to pay The Tribune for the papers and The 
Tribune gave him a percentage of that amount collected.  A 
street trades permit was filed with The Tribune for James, but 
not for Anthony. 
No. 96-3393 
 
4 
Beard’s husband, Charles.  Charles died as a result of injuries 
suffered in the accident. 
¶6 
In July 1993, Beard, as a surviving spouse, executed a 
Pierringer4 agreement releasing Anthony from liability.  Beard 
then filed suit against The Tribune.  In her amended complaint, 
she alleged absolute liability for illegally employing a minor 
during prohibited hours, common law negligence for using a minor 
lacking sufficient age, experience, maturity or training to 
perform such work, and liability for Anthony’s negligence under 
the theory of respondeat superior. 
¶7 
The Tribune filed a motion for summary judgment which 
the circuit court granted.  The circuit court found that:  (1) 
at best, Anthony was in an employment at the time of the subject 
collision; (2) the Pierringer release acts to bar all claims 
against The Tribune based upon either vicarious liability or 
respondeat superior; and (3) there is no independent cause of 
action in favor of a third-party based upon a violation of the 
child labor laws.  The court dismissed the case and Beard 
appealed. 
¶8 
A majority of the court of appeals affirmed.5  The 
majority determined that without any evidence that The Tribune 
exercised control over the method or route of Anthony’s travel 
                     
4  See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 
(1963). 
5  At the appellate level, Beard has abandoned her claim of 
liability against The Tribune under the theory of respondeat 
superior.  The court of appeals did not address it.   
No. 96-3393 
 
5 
home, he was acting outside the scope of his employment; 
therefore, The Tribune could not have violated, or be held 
liable for violations of, the child labor laws.  Beard v. Lee 
Enterprises, Inc., No. 96-3393, unpublished slip op. at 7 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Sept. 25, 1997).  The majority noted that without 
employer control, Anthony could not be an employee of The 
Tribune even under the street trades law.  Id.  As to Beard’s 
common law negligence claim, the majority determined, as a 
matter of law, that The Tribune could not be held liable for 
permitting Anthony to deliver newspapers before 5:00 a.m. 
because he was a minor, licensed to operate a motor vehicle at 
any time under Wis. Stat. § 343.06(1).  Beard, unpublished slip 
op. at 9.  Beard petitioned this court for review. 
II. 
¶9 
Next, we set forth the standard of review.  We review 
summary 
judgment 
rulings 
independently 
using 
the 
same 
methodology as that used by the circuit court.  Grams v. Boss, 
97 Wis.2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  A motion for 
summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶10 This case involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.21, and related statutes.  Statutory interpretation and 
the application of a statute are questions of law that we review 
independent of the circuit court and court of appeals.  Colby v. 
Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996). 
III. 
No. 96-3393 
 
6 
¶11 The case before us concerns an alleged violation of 
the child labor laws.  An employer who violates the child labor 
laws is absolutely liable for injuries resulting from the 
violation.  D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 640, 329 N.W.2d 
890 (1983); see also Ludke v. Burck, 160 Wis. 440, 443, 152 N.W. 
190 (1915).  Absolute liability is proper if the plaintiff can 
prove that:  (1) the employer violated the statute at or about 
the time of the injury; and (2) the injury occurred.  Huebner, 
110 Wis. 2d at 640.  The injured party must also be within the 
protected class of people, i.e., the minor, other employees or 
frequenters.  McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing, Co., 104 Wis. 2d 414, 
427, 312 N.W.2d 37 (1981); see also Wis. Stat. § 103.65. 
¶12 In order for there to be a violation of the child 
labor laws, there must be an employer/employee relationship.  
Beard argues that under the street trades definition in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.21(1), 
The 
Tribune 
had 
an 
employer/employee 
relationship with Anthony.  Section 103.21(1), provides: 
 Every minor selling or distributing newspapers or 
magazines on the streets or other public place, or 
from house to house, is in an “employment” and an 
“employe,” and each independent news agency or (in the 
absence of all such agencies) each selling agency of a 
publisher or (in the absence of all such agencies) 
each publisher, whose newspapers or magazines [the 
minor] sells or distributes, is an “employer” of the 
minor.  Every minor engaged in any other street trade 
is in an “employment” and an “employe,” and each 
person furnishing [the minor] articles for sale or 
distribution 
or 
regularly 
furnishing 
[the 
minor] 
material 
for 
blacking 
boots 
is 
[the 
minor’s] 
“employer”. 
No. 96-3393 
 
7 
¶13 When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature.  Sullivan v. 
Waukesha County, 218 Wis. 2d 458, 464, 578 N.W.2d 596 (1998).  
In determining legislative intent, we first look to the language 
of the statute to determine whether its meaning is clear.  Lake 
City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 163, 558 N.W.2d 
100 (1997).  If the language is clear, we are prohibited from 
looking beyond such language to ascertain its meaning.  Id.  If, 
however, the statute is ambiguous, this court must look beyond 
the statute’s language and examine the scope, history, context, 
subject matter, and purpose of the statute.  State v. Sweat, 208 
Wis. 2d 409, 415, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997), quoting UFE, Inc. v. 
LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  
¶14 A statutory provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds 
could differ as to its meaning.  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 416.  
“Ambiguity can be found in the words of the statutory provision 
itself, or by the words of the provision as they interact with 
and relate to other provisions in the statute and to other 
statutes.”  Id.  When construing a statute, the entire section 
and related sections are to be considered in its construction or 
interpretation.  Id.; State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 
313 N.W.2d 819 (1982).  
¶15 Beard urges that under Wis. Stat. § 103.21(1), an 
employment relationship existed between Anthony and The Tribune 
through Anthony’s distribution of the paper’s newspaper bundles. 
 We agree that § 103.21(1), standing alone, clearly creates such 
No. 96-3393 
 
8 
an employment arrangement.6  However, ambiguity in a statute can 
be created by the interaction of two separate statutes, as well 
as by the interaction of words and structure of a single 
statute.  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 417.   
¶16 We conclude that 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.21(1) becomes 
ambiguous when read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 103.21 to 
103.31, 
and 
related 
statutes, 
particularly 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.60(7).  Section 103.21(1) makes no reference to knowledge, 
actual or constructive, on the part of the employer.  Yet two 
other statutes governing street trades, Wis. Stat. §§ 103.25 and 
103.27, seem to require some degree of knowledge on the part of 
the employer.7  Section 103.25(1) requires the employer to obtain 
a street trade permit before a minor may be employed or 
                     
6 Under Wis. Stat. § 103.21(1), a minor (Anthony) who 
distributes newspapers (in bundles) in a public place or from 
house to house is an “employe,” and is in an “employment” 
relationship with either the independent news agency (none), a 
selling agency (none) or the publisher (The Tribune) of the 
newspapers the minor (Anthony) distributes.  The provider (The 
Tribune) of the newspapers is the “employer.” 
7 Statutes which are contained in the same chapter and 
assist in implementing the chapter’s goals and policy should be 
read in pari materia and harmonized if possible.  State v. 
Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982); Lake City 
Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 165-66 n.11, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997).  In pari materia refers to statutes relating 
to the same subject matter or having the same common purpose.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).  As a rule of statutory 
construction, in pari materia requires a court to read, apply 
and construe statutes relating to the same subject matter 
together.  Id.  The child labor laws are to be viewed as one 
cohesive enactment, McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 104 Wis. 2d 
414, 427, 312 N.W.2d 37 (1981), and should be read in pari 
materia.   
No. 96-3393 
 
9 
permitted to work, and § 103.27(1) and (2) obligates the 
employer to keep a record on file for each minor authorized to 
work in a street trade.  Knowledge is implicit in the 
requirement that an employer obtain and keep a record on file 
for each minor employed in a street trade.  Because § 103.21(1) 
makes no mention of knowledge, we conclude that it is ambiguous. 
  
¶17 Again, when the language of the statute is ambiguous 
when construed in light of related statutes, this court looks to 
the “scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the 
statute.”  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 417.  We conclude, based on the 
scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.21(1), 
implicit 
in 
the 
employer/employee 
relationship involving a publisher, or an intervening agency, 
and a minor involved in a street trade, is some degree of 
knowledge, actual or constructive, on the part of the employer 
as to whom it is employing. 
¶18 There is no explanation in the legislative drafting 
record whether knowledge, actual or constructive, on the part of 
the employer is relevant to finding an employee/employer 
relationship under Wis. Stat. § 103.21(1).  However, the origins 
of this statute, and related provisions, combine to show that 
the legislature intended to allow for an employer to establish 
that the minor was employed without the employer’s actual or 
constructive knowledge.   
¶19 Earlier case law specifically held that knowledge, 
actual or constructive, was not required for a violation of Wis. 
No. 96-3393 
 
10
Stat. § 103.05 (1931) (the old permit statute).  Milwaukee News 
Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 224 Wis. 130, 143, 271 N.W. 78 (1937). 
 Milwaukee News involved a worker’s compensation claim by a 
minor who was injured while riding in the truck of an employee 
of the news company during the delivery of newspapers.  Id. at 
133.   
¶20 The court found that the minor was an assistant or 
helper of the news company’s employee, and as such was entitled 
to the payment of all benefits by the employer as was the 
employee who the minor assisted.  Id. at 142.  The court 
determined that the employer was liable for double compensation, 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.60 (1931), for allowing a minor of permit 
age, who had no permit under Wis. Stat. § 103.05 (1931), to 
assist an employee of the employer.  Milwaukee News, 224 Wis. at 
143.  The court concluded that an employer may violate § 103.05 
“if he but permits a minor who has no permit . . . to deliver 
any merchandise; and neither the absence of intent to illegally 
employ or permit such minor to work, nor of actual or 
constructive knowledge of the lack of such a permit constitutes 
an excuse in law . . . .”  Milwaukee News, 224 Wis. at 143.   
¶21 Milwaukee News was decided in January 1937. By March 
1937, 
legislation 
was 
proposed 
specifically 
relating 
to 
newsboys.  The newspapers sought to create a new subsection (7) 
to Wis. Stat. § 102.60 (1935) that would exempt publishers and 
distributors of newspapers from liability if the corporation 
(person, firm) “took reasonable precaution to see that the 
requirements of chapter 103 in regard to street sales by minors 
No. 96-3393 
 
11
were complied with.”  1937 S.B. 379.  Section 102.60(7) was not 
adopted under the final version of the bill approved in May 
1937.  See § 1, ch. 162, Laws of 1937 (adding newsboys as 
employes covered under the worker’s compensation law). 
¶22 However, by July 1937, the addition of subsection (7) 
to Wis. Stat. § 102.60 (1935), relating to compensation for 
minors who are illegally employed in street trades, was 
approved, albeit with slightly different language.  See § 2, ch. 
401, Laws of 1937 (creating new regulations for street trades to 
provide coverage for minors working as newsboys).  Section 
102.60(7) read: 
The provisions of subsections (1) to (6) of section 
102.60 shall not apply to employes as defined in 
subsection (6) of section 102.07 [street trades] if 
the agency or publisher shall establish by affirmative 
proof that at the time of the injury the employe was 
not employed with the actual or constructive knowledge 
of such agency or publisher.  [Emphasis added.] 
Section 2, ch. 401, Laws of 1937.  By allowing affirmative proof 
from the employer that the minor was not employed with the 
actual 
or 
constructive 
knowledge 
of 
the 
employer, 
this 
subsection as enacted directly contravenes the decision in 
Milwaukee News, and appears to be in direct response to that 
decision.   
¶23 While Wis. Stat. § 102.60(7) (1995-96) still allows 
affirmative proof that the minor was not employed with the 
actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, it appears 
that the child labor laws (ch. 103), which are the basis for a 
§ 102.60 claim, do not. 
No. 96-3393 
 
12
¶24 Apparently conflicting provisions of law should be 
construed so as to harmonize them and thus give effect to the 
leading idea behind the law.  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 422 
(harmonizing Wis. Stat. §§ 973.20 and 939.74).  Reading Wis. 
Stat. § 103.21(1) in harmony with Wis. Stat. § 102.60(7), the 
worker’s compensation statute applicable to minors who are 
illegally employed, we conclude that an employment relationship 
between a minor involved in street trades and the agency or 
publisher employer does not exist under § 103.21(1) when the 
minor was employed without actual or constructive knowledge of 
the agency or employer.  This comports with the legislature’s 
desire to protect the minor, other employees and frequenters 
from the unregulated employ of minors in hazardous occupations, 
see Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 636; McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 427, 
without imposing an impossible burden on the publishers of 
newspapers. 
¶25 In addition, it is unreasonable to assume that the 
legislature intended to allow the employer to present an 
affirmative defense for an unwitting violation of the child 
labor laws in response to a worker’s compensation claim, but not 
for other alleged violations.  
¶26 This interpretation is also consistent with other 
provisions relating to street trades which must be read in pari 
materia.  As previously explained, Wis. Stat. §§ 103.25(1) and 
§ 103.27(1) & (2) obligate the employer to obtain and keep a 
record on file for each minor employed in a street trade.  These 
provisions imply actual knowledge on the part of the employer.  
No. 96-3393 
 
13
However, an employer cannot simply ignore unpermitted minors and 
claim that because no street trades permit was filed, it had no 
actual knowledge.  Rather, we conclude that as with Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.60(7), 
constructive 
knowledge, 
if 
proven, 
may 
be 
sufficient as well. 
¶27 If we were to hold an employer absolutely liable based 
on 
a 
relationship 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.21(1), 
without 
requiring some degree of knowledge on the part of the employer, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 103.25 and 103.27 would be rendered superfluous 
and absurd situations would result.  Both outcomes are to be 
avoided.  State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 678, 563 N.W.2d 
528 (1997); Lake City Corp., 207 Wis. 2d at 162.  For these 
reasons, we conclude that knowledge, actual or constructive, is 
implicit in the employer/employee relationship involving a 
publisher, or an intervening agency, and a minor involved in a 
street trade under § 103.21(1), on the part of the employer as 
to whom it is employing.   
¶28 In this case, there is conflicting testimony as to the 
degree of knowledge, if any, that The Tribune had relating to 
Anthony’s distribution of newspapers and newspaper bundles.  
Anthony stated that on the night of the accident, he talked with 
the guys at the distribution tower for a while before he 
received and delivered the bundles.  The Tribune however did not 
have a street trades permit for Anthony on file, nor did it pay 
Anthony for his work.  Because there is a factual question 
whether The Tribune had knowledge, actual or constructive, that 
Anthony was delivering materials for his father or brother, we 
No. 96-3393 
 
14
conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the circuit court’s judgment. 
 
IV. 
¶29 If it is determined that the Tribune had knowledge, 
additional questions will need to be answered, such as whether 
The Tribune violated the statute at or about the time of the 
injury.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 640.  If The Tribune did, then 
the street may be Anthony’s place of employment and Charles 
Beard, a third party, may be within the protected class of 
people under the child labor laws.  McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 
427.  Because there is a distinct possibility that these 
questions will arise and because the parties have thoroughly 
briefed the issues, we will address them in the interest of 
promoting judicial efficiency and prompt adjudication.  Hedtcke 
v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 478-79, 326 N.W.2d 727 
(1982). 
A. 
¶30 Even if The Tribune had actual or constructive 
knowledge of Anthony’s employment, there still is a question 
No. 96-3393 
 
15
whether Anthony was working in violation of the child labor laws8 
at or about the time of the accident.  Courts have approved of 
broad definitions of scope of employment.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 
at 636; see also Leora v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. 
Marie Ry. Co., 156 Wis. 386, 393, 146 N.W.2d 520 (1914) (minor 
who was injured while on the way to repair railroad track need 
not actually be engaged in conduct, rather when he left for the 
scene of repair he was then engaged in track repair which is a 
violation of the statute).  However, this is a factual question 
to be decided by a jury.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 636.  
Accordingly, we conclude that whether there was a child labor 
law violation and whether that violation occurred while Anthony 
was acting within the scope of his employment are factual 
questions which should also be determined by a jury and not 
decided on summary judgment. 
B. 
¶31  This brings us to the last issue which must be 
decided:  whether Charles, a third party, is within the 
protected 
class 
of 
people 
under 
the 
child 
labor 
laws.  
                     
8 The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 
(DILHR) has determined reasonable hours of employment for minors 
as well as prohibited types of employment.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 103.24 and 103.65.  Beard points to two possible violations: 
 (1) Wis. Admin. Code § IND 71.04(3)(now § DWD 271.04(3)) which 
prohibits minors 16 or 17 years of age to be employed before 
5:00 a.m. if delivering newspapers, nor after 9:00 p.m. on days 
preceding school days and not later than 11:00 p.m. on days not 
preceding 
school 
days; 
and 
(2) 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ IND 
70.06(13)(now § DWD 270.06(13)) which prohibits minors employed 
as motor vehicle drivers unless the driving is, inter alia, 
occasional and incidental to the minor’s employment.   
No. 96-3393 
 
16
McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 427.  If he is not, then whether The 
Tribune knowingly employed Anthony in violation of the child 
labor laws and whether Anthony was within his scope of 
employment at the time of the injury would not be pertinent.   
¶32 As this court explained in McGarrity, the child labor 
laws were enacted to prevent minors from being employed or 
permitted to work in hazardous occupations in order to protect 
minors, and to protect fellow workers and frequenters who may be 
injured as a result of a minor’s employment in hazardous 
occupations.  McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 427.  The legislature 
has specifically empowered the Department of Industry, Labor and 
Human Relations (DILHR)9 to promulgate rules regulating the 
employment of minors to protect the minor, other employees and 
frequenters.  Id.   
¶33 Beard argues that Charles was a frequenter of the 
highway—Anthony’s argued place of employment.  Because the child 
labor laws were intended to protect the public as a whole, Beard 
insists upon a broad interpretation of the term frequenter in 
the context of driving because driving is not limited to one 
place like other hazardous activities.  In contrast, The Tribune 
maintains that Charles was a member of the general public who 
would not fall within the protected class of persons sought to 
be protected by the child labor laws.  
                     
9 As of May 13, 1997, the Department of Industry, Labor and 
Human Relations (DILHR) was changed to the Department of 
Workforce Development (DWD).  1997 Wis. Act 3, §§ 151, 230.   
No. 96-3393 
 
17
¶34 A frequenter is defined as “every person, other than 
an employe, who may go in or be in a place of employment or 
public building under circumstances which render such person 
other than a trespasser.”  Wis. Stat. § 101.01(2)(d).10  Charles, 
a person who was not a Tribune employe, was driving on a public 
highway when he was struck by Anthony’s vehicle.  Clearly, he 
was neither in a public building, nor was he a trespasser. 
¶35 At issue then is what constitutes Anthony’s place of 
employment and was Charles a frequenter within that place of 
employment at the time that he was struck by the vehicle.  A 
place of employment is “every place, whether indoors or 
out . . . where either temporarily or permanently any industry 
trade or business is carried on, or where any process or 
operation, directly or indirectly related to any industry, trade 
or business, is carried on, and where any person is directly or 
indirectly employed by another for direct or indirect gain or 
profit . . . .”  Wis. Stat. § 101.01(2)(f).  
¶36 Courts 
have 
approved 
of 
“a 
broad 
view 
of 
the 
definition of places of employment” in the case of minors.  
Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 636.  In Huebner, the court affirmed the 
jury’s verdict that a minor’s employment, to assist in threshing 
oats—a legal activity—included assisting with the forage wagon—
which was designated as dangerous for minors.  Id. at 635-36.  
Similarly, in Leora, 156 Wis. at 393, a minor, who was legally 
                     
10 In 1995, these definitions were recreated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.001 (1995-96) and made applicable to chs. 103 to 106 
(1995-96).  See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 3746.   
No. 96-3393 
 
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employed as a section hand on the railroad, also helped to 
maintain and repair an assigned section of the railroad track—a 
prohibited activity.  Although the minor was injured as the crew 
traveled by handcar to the point where the repairs were 
necessary, the court found that the crew entered upon its work 
when it embarked on the handcar for the scene of repair and was 
then engaged in track repairing.  Id.   
¶37 While these cases are not directly on point, they are 
instructive.  In both cases, the court refused to construe the 
child labor provision narrowly to limit the employer’s liability 
to only injuries directly related to the prohibited task because 
to do so would defeat the statute’s purpose—to protect children 
from the dangers attendant upon certain extremely hazardous 
occupations, dangers which children do not usually appreciate.  
Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 636; Leora, 156 Wis. at 393.   
¶38 In this case, Anthony was employed in a street trade—
he delivered bundles of newspaper supplements to carriers, 
merchants and vending machines and he delivered the newspaper to 
homes on his brother’s carrier route.  When the employment at 
issue is a street trade (which may or may not involve 
significant driving), by its very definition,11 it follows that 
                     
11 A street trade is defined in Wis. Stat. § 103.21(6) as: 
[T]he selling, offering for sale, soliciting for, 
collecting 
for, 
displaying 
or 
distributing 
any 
articles, 
goods, 
merchandise, 
commercial 
service, 
posters, circulars, newspapers or magazines, or the 
blacking of boots, on any street or other public place 
or from house to house.  [Emphasis added.] 
No. 96-3393 
 
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the place of employment is the public place in which the 
deliveries occur.  In this case, the public street is where the 
operations related to street trades were carried on, and where 
Anthony was employed by The Tribune for profit.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.01(2)(f).   
¶39 A place of employment is to be safe and must protect 
the life, health, safety and welfare of every frequenter of such 
place 
of 
employment. 
 
McGarrity, 
104 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
426.  
Frequenters are protected because they may be injured as a 
result of a minor’s employment.  See id. at 426-27.  Other 
drivers might be harmed by a minor engaged in a street trade 
which involves driving.  It is reasonable, therefore, to 
classify such other drivers as frequenters, to the extent the 
minor is present and is engaged in a street trade in violation 
of the child labor laws.   
¶40 In this case, if it is determined that:  (1) The 
Tribune had actual or constructive knowledge of Anthony’s 
employment; (2) The Tribune violated a child labor law; (3) such 
violation occurred at or about the time of the injury; then we 
conclude that the public highway could be Anthony’s place of 
employment and Charles, who was driving on the public highway, 
could be a frequenter intended to be protected by the child 
labor laws to the extent that Anthony was present and may have 
been engaged in the distribution of newspapers—a street trade.  
If there was a violation of the child labor laws when the 
accident occurred and Charles was within the protected class of 
No. 96-3393 
 
20
people, The Tribune would be liable for any injuries stemming 
from that violation.12  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 637. 
¶41 We recognize that there are cases stating that a 
highway is not a “place of employment”; however, these cases 
were decided within the context of alleged safe place statute 
violations.  See e.g., Padley v. Village of Lodi, 233 Wis. 661, 
662-63, 290 N.W. 136 (1940); Herrick v. Luberts, 230 Wis. 387, 
389, 284 N.W. 27 (1939).  If we were to interpret place of 
employment in the context of street trades in a similar manner, 
we would effectively eviscerate street trades law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.21-103.31, and its purpose of protecting minors and 
others.  When construing statutes, courts must presume that the 
legislature intends for a statute to be interpreted in a manner 
that advances the purposes of the statute, not defeats those 
purposes.  Verdolijak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 
635, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996).  Therefore we must presume that the 
legislature enacted 
the 
child labor 
laws—including 
street 
trades—to prevent minors from being employed in hazardous 
occupations in order to protect minors, fellow workers, and 
frequenters at the minor’s place of employment which in the 
context of a street trade includes a street or other public 
place.  McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 427. 
                     
12 If a minor is working in violation of the child labor 
laws, any contributory negligence of the minor is not a factor. 
 See D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 642-44, 329 N.W.2d 890 
(1983).  Rather, contributory negligence has no application in 
an absolute liability case against the employer.  Id. at 644.   
No. 96-3393 
 
21
¶42 A street trade is defined in Wis. Stat. § 103.21 as 
the selling or distributing of articles on any street, other 
public place or house to house.  Section 103.21(6).  Where a 
word or phrase is specifically defined in a statute, its meaning 
is as defined in the statute, and no other rule of statutory 
construction need be applied.  Fredricks v. Industrial Comm’n, 4 
Wis. 2d 519, 522, 91 N.W.2d 93 (1958).  It is only when a word 
or phrase is used and is not specifically defined therein that 
common and approved usage of such word or phrase and other 
accepted rules of statutory construction apply.  Id.  Because 
§ 103.21 defines a “street trade” as occurring in a public 
place, we are limited to this definition.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that when determining the “place of employment” for a 
minor engaged in a street trade, the public places limitation 
under the safe place statutes does not and cannot apply.  
V. 
¶43 The concurrence agrees with all but one of the 
conclusions reached by the majority, that is the question of the 
employer’s liability.  See concurrence at 6-8.  We would hold an 
employer absolutely liable whether an illegally employed minor 
injures him/herself, another employe or a frequenter; the 
concurrence would not.  Instead the concurrence would only hold 
an employer absolutely liable where the illegally-employed minor 
injured him/herself.  See concurrence at 3-4, 5. 
 
¶44 The concurrence’s position appears to be inconsistent 
regarding the employer’s liability based on the sheer luck of 
who is injured.  Such a premise would undermine the legislative 
No. 96-3393 
 
22
purpose for enacting the child labor laws—to protect the minor, 
other employees and frequenters from bodily injury caused by 
minors engaged in hazardous employment, Wis. Stat. § 103.65(1), 
McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 427, and to subject the violator to 
criminal penalties, Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 645.   
VI. 
 
¶45 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
knowledge, 
actual 
or 
constructive, is implicit in an employer/employee relationship 
involving a publisher, or an intervening agency, and a minor 
involved in a street trade under Wis. Stat. § 103.21(1), on the 
part of the employer as to whom it is employing.  In this case, 
there is a factual question whether The Tribune had knowledge, 
actual or constructive, that Anthony was delivering its bundles 
and 
newspapers. 
 
If 
this 
question 
is 
answered 
in 
the 
affirmative, there are several other issues, as heretofore 
mentioned, which must be determined before The Tribune can be 
held absolutely liable.  We therefore reverse the judgment, and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
96-3393.awb 
 
1 
¶46 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   While I agree 
with the majority that a genuine issue of material fact exists 
concerning Andrew Kropelin's employment status, I do not agree 
with the majority that an affirmative answer to that question 
results in absolute liability for Lee Enterprises.  The majority 
opinion is correct that this court has in the past determined 
that a violation of the child labor laws can impose absolute 
liability on the employer.  Majority op. at 6; D.L. v. Huebner, 
110 Wis. 2d 581, 640-41, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).  However, the 
majority opinion incorrectly concludes that absolute liability 
automatically results from a violation of the child labor laws 
regardless of who is injured.  That is not, until today, the law 
of this state.   
¶47 The majority opinion confuses negligence per se with 
absolute liability.  Based on our prior cases, negligence per se 
rather 
than 
absolute 
liability 
is 
the 
proper 
analytical 
framework in this case.  This seemingly minor detail carries 
with it significant practical consequences.   
¶48 Negligence per se and absolute liability are related 
legal concepts in that they both generally stem from violations 
of statutorily imposed standards of care and they both reduce 
the elements that a plaintiff must prove to successfully assert 
a negligence claim.  In a typical negligence action, the 
plaintiff must prove four elements prior to recovery:  (1) the 
defendant had a duty to the plaintiff (2) that it breached (3) 
causing (4) the plaintiff's injury.  Nelson v. Davidson, 155 
Wis. 2d 674, 679, 456 N.W.2d 343 (1990).  Any liability a 
96-3393.awb 
 
2 
defendant faces after a plaintiff proves these four elements is 
then reduced by the comparative negligence attributed to the 
plaintiff.  Wis. Stat. § 895.045.   
¶49 Negligence per se results from the violation of a 
statute in which the legislature has decreed the appropriate 
standard of care.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 640; W. Page Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 229-30 (5th ed. 1984) 
(hereinafter "Keeton, Law of Torts").  In such cases, when a 
fact finder concludes that a party has violated the statute, 
duty and breach are "conclusively determined." Keeton, Law of 
Torts at 230; see also Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 640.  However, 
"[n]egligence per se is not liability per se" and the plaintiff 
must still prove that the defendant's breach of its duty was a 
substantial cause of the plaintiff's injury.  William L. 
Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of 
Statute, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 105, 111 (1948); Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 
at 640.  Similarly, the defendant retains the ability to 
minimize or neutralize the finding of negligence with a showing 
that the plaintiff's negligence was equal to or greater than 
that perpetrated by the defendant.  Keeton, Law of Torts at 230. 
¶50 While absolute liability is also the result of a 
statutory violation, its consequences are significantly more 
severe than negligence per se.  In these instances, a statutory 
violation results not only in a legal conclusion that the 
defendant breached a duty, but also in a similar conclusion that 
the breach was the cause of the plaintiff's injury.  Huebner, 
110 Wis. 2d at 640.  Where absolute liability is the standard, a 
96-3393.awb 
 
3 
defendant cannot minimize its liability as the plaintiff's own 
contribution to his or her injury is not considered.  Id.  The 
relevant inquiry is thus reduced to (1) Did the defendant 
violate the statute, and (2) Was the plaintiff injured?  Id. 
¶51 Because of its potency, absolute liability is a rarity 
in the law.  It will exist only in those limited circumstances 
where the legislature has "so clearly intended to protect a 
particular class of persons against their own inability to 
protect themselves."  Keeton, Law of Torts at 230; Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 483, cmt. e, f. 
¶52 The cases in which we have held an employer absolutely 
liable for a violation of the child labor laws occurred where 
the child was the person injured.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 588-
91 (child injured in farm accident); Reiten v. J. S. Stearns 
Lumber Co., 166 Wis. 605, 606, 165 N.W. 337 (1918) (child 
injured in lumber company accident); Green v. Appleton Woolen 
Mills, 162 Wis. 145, 155 N.W. 958 (1916) (child injured in 
factory accident); Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473, 
479-81, 140 N.W. 84 (1913) (child injured in factory accident); 
Sharon v. Winnebago Furniture Mfg. Co., 141 Wis. 185, 124 N.W. 
299 (1910) (child injured in ripsaw accident); see also Tisdale 
v. Hasslinger, 79 Wis. 2d 194, 197-98, 255 N.W.2d 314 (1977); 
Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Industrial Commission, 254 Wis. 
308, 309, 35 N.W.2d 910 (1949). 
¶53 Conversely, this court has employed the negligence per 
se standard in those cases where the illegally-employed child 
injured another.  McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 104 Wis. 2d 
96-3393.awb 
 
4 
414, 422-23, 312 N.W.2d 37 (1981) (non-employee injured by child 
employed in violation of the child labor laws); see also 
Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 641 n.11.  Contrary to the majority 
opinion, our precedent compels us to apply the negligence per se 
standard because the injured party here is not the allegedly 
employed minor. 
¶54 Aside from it being our law for nearly ninety years, 
applying absolute liability when the child is injured and 
negligence per se when the child injures another furthers 
laudable public policy.  In the exceptional cases where absolute 
liability is imposed, it is only so because that class of 
persons is deemed unable either to provide for its own safety or 
appreciate the danger of its actions.  Prosser, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 
at 118-20; Keeton, The Law of Torts at 230.   
¶55 Much like a child is deemed legally incapable of 
consenting to sexual contact, Wis. Stat. § 948.02, a child is 
also legally incapable of contributing to his or her injury when 
employed in violation of the child labor laws.  As a result, 
this state has determined that the employer who illegally 
employs a child cannot benefit from that child's ignorance or 
inexperience contributing to his or her own injury.  Huebner, 
110 Wis. 2d at 640-42; Sharon, 141 Wis. at 190.  The child labor 
laws exist because the legislature considers certain activities 
too dangerous for children.  See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 270.06 
(May 1997).  An illegally employed child who is then injured in 
the course of that employment only proves the legislature's 
point.  To allow the employer to mitigate its liability by 
96-3393.awb 
 
5 
arguing that the child's actions are responsible for his or her 
own injurycontending in essence that the statute was all too 
correctperversely turns the child labor law on its head.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 483, cmts. c, e, f (1964). 
¶56 Those same considerations are not present when, as in 
this case, someone other than the illegally employed child 
suffers the injury.  An adult such as Beard certainly was not 
within a class of persons legally incapable of contributing to 
his injury.  But for the fact that Beard was killed by a child, 
the majority would hardly suggest that any negligence on his 
behalf should not factor into the liability calculation.13  I see 
no reason in either law or policy to relieve him of that burden 
in this case. 
¶57 The above analysis compels me to conclude that under 
these facts Lee Enterprises could not be held absolutely liable. 
 At best, it could be held negligent per se.  Before such a 
                     
13 The 
majority 
contends 
that 
this 
negligence 
per 
se/absolute liability dichotomy "appears to be inconsistent 
regarding the employer's liability based on the sheer luck of 
who is injured."  Majority op. at 21.  The majority seems to 
forget, or at least overlook, the 
fact 
that 
under the 
appropriate negligence per se test Lee Enterprises is hardly 
home free.  It has breached a duty and can do nothing to escape 
that fact.   
Moreover, "sheer luck" cuts both ways.  The majority has 
nothing to say about the fact that under its test persons who 
are injured by an illegally-employed minor do not need to prove 
causation and are absolved from any of their own actions that 
contribute to their injury.  These advantages result only from 
the "sheer luck" of having been injured by an illegally-employed 
minor. 
96-3393.awb 
 
6 
holding however, a court must conclude that the violations of 
these particular statutes impose civil consequences and a fact-
finder must conclude that an employment relationship existed.  
¶58 The violation of a statute does not automatically 
impose civil liability.  This court has said that three 
questions must be answered in the affirmative before the 
violation of a statute will constitute negligence per se. 
 
(1) the harm inflicted was the type the statute was 
designed to prevent; (2) the person injured was within 
the class of persons sought to be protected; and (3) 
there is some expression of legislative intent that 
the statute become a basis for the imposition of civil 
liability. 
Tatur v. Solsrud, 174 Wis. 2d 735, 743, 498 N.W.2d 232 (1993).  
Beard argues that a violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 103.24 and 103.65 
creates negligence per se.  I agree. 
¶59 First, 
these 
particular 
statutes 
and 
the 
administrative rules promulgated pursuant to them regulate the 
type of employment a minor may engage in as well as the hours 
and conditions of that employment.  See, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD chs. 270 & 271 (May 1997).  Rule DWD § 270.06(13) declares 
that driving a motor vehicle on a public highway, except where 
such driving is incidental and done during daylight hours, is a 
dangerous activity for the minor.  Considering that Charles 
Beard was killed in the middle of the night, that injury was of 
the type that the statute was designed to prevent.  See also DWD 
§ 270.05(2) (regulating hours that a minor can work); DWD 
§ 271.04 (same). 
96-3393.awb 
 
7 
¶60 Second, under the administrative code, Beard must 
either be a fellow employee or a frequenter in order to fall 
within the class of persons protected by the statute.  DWD 
§ 270.06.  Like the majority I conclude that because Kropelin 
was engaged in a street trade, the public highway on which he 
was traveling became his place of employment.  Majority op. at 
17-18.  Therefore, at the time of the accident, by driving on 
the public highway Beard was a frequenter and within the class 
of persons protected by the statutes.  Id. at 18-19. 
¶61 Third, I conclude that the legislature has intended 
that a violation of either Wis. Stat. §§ 103.24 or 103.65 gives 
rise to civil liability.  In short, the statutes at issue here 
indicate "such a clear expression of concern for the safety of 
[minor employees, other employees, or frequenters], committed so 
plainly to the responsibility of [employers], that [I] conclude 
that the [employers] so charged are exposed to civil liability 
for their failure to do that with which they are charged."  
Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 271, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981). 
 See also McGarrity, 104 Wis. 2d at 418-19; Wells v. Chicago & 
North Western Transp. Co., 98 Wis. 2d 328, 332-34, 296 N.W.2d 
559 (1980). 
¶62 In sum, I agree with the majority that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists as to whether Anthony Kropelin was an 
employee 
of 
Lee 
Enterprises 
for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
96-3393.awb 
 
8 
§ 103.21.14  Summary judgment was therefore erroneously granted. 
 However, I cannot agree with the majority that a jury's 
                     
14 I also agree with the majority that the interplay between 
Wis. Stat. § 103.21 and 103.25-103.275 suggests that an employer 
must have either actual or constructive knowledge that a minor 
is in its employ.  Majority op. at 8-10.  However, I cannot 
agree with the majority's justifying that conclusion in part on 
the legislature's modification of chapter 102 of the statutes.  
Id. at 10-12.   
96-3393.awb 
 
9 
affirmative answer to that question results in Lee Enterprises 
being absolutely liable to Beard.  Rather, under our long-
standing precedent, a jury's affirmative answer would result in 
Lee Enterprises being negligentbut not necessarily in it being 
liable.  Liability would result only if Beard additionally 
convinced a jury that Lee Enterprises' negligent actions caused 
his injury in greater proportion than any negligent actions of 
his own.  Accordingly, I concur. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
                                                                  
Chapter 102 regulates worker's compensation while chapter 
103 regulates employment.  These are separate concepts in the 
law whose definitions of terms and ultimate purposes need not be 
in harmony.  Statutes should be read in pari materia when they 
are found within the same chapter and concern the same subject 
matter.  Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 
165-66 n.11, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997) (Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) 
and § 236.11); State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 417, 561 N.W.2d 
695 (1997) (different subsections in Wis. Stat. § 973.20); State 
v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) 
(different subsections of Wis. Adm. Code, § AG 110.02).  No 
similar maxim applies to statutes outside of the same chapter or 
subject matter. 
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96-3393.awb 
 
1