Case Title: McMillian v. Wallis

Citation: 567 So. 2d 1199

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1990-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
567 So. 2d 1199 (1990)
Jackie Stuart McMILLIAN
v.
Ken WALLIS, et al.
89-132.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 15, 1990.
Rehearing Denied September 14, 1990.
*1200 James A. Hall of Parsons & Hall, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
G.R. "Rick" Trawick, Montgomery, for appellees.
*1201 HOUSTON, Justice.
Jackie Stuart McMillian appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants Charles A. Fetner, director of Bryce Hospital; Ken Wallis, commissioner of the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation[1]; and Dr. Cynthia Bisbee, Dr. Humphrey Osmond, and Patricia Scheiffler-Roberts members of the treatment team at Bryce Hospital in charge of David Mayo Stuart, an inmate at Bryce Hospital. (Hereinafter these defendants are collectively referred to as the "Mental Health defendants.")[2] McMillian sued the Mental Health defendants for alleged wrongful and/or negligent release of Stuart from Bryce Hospital, and she sought monetary damages for injuries that she suffered as a result of an assault and battery committed on her by Stuart subsequent to his release. The ultimate issue presented is whether the trial court erred in holding that the defendants were engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function (so as to have substantive immunity) and were therefore immune from suit.
Summary judgment for the defendant is proper when there is no genuine issue of a material fact and the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P. When the defendant has sought a summary judgment, all inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all reasonable doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the defendant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756 (Ala.1986). This case was pending on June 11, 1987; therefore, the applicable standard of review is the "scintilla rule." See, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
Judge J.B. Baird's "Memorandum Opinion" presented, in complete and masterful fashion, the statement of the case, the statement of the facts, and the applicable law pertaining to substantive immunity. Therefore, we adopt the following portions of Judge Baird's opinion as part of our own:
As that order indicates, this Court, in Barnes v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770 (Ala.1988), recognized the fact that the very nature of the mental health profession involved discretion and difficult decision making. Realizing the difficulty in interpreting this discretionary function standard (see Barnes v. Dale, supra; Hickman v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 421 So. 2d 1257 (Ala.1982); DeStaffney, supra; and Bell v. Chisom, 421 So. 2d 1239 (Ala.1982)), this Court must look at the circumstances of each case and focus on the process employed by the defendants in making their decision, in order to decide whether a defendant is immune from liability based on such discretion.
Judge Baird held:
We agree with the trial court's holding that no statutory authority requires the establishment of a hospital review board or requires that a hospital review board review any patient with a history of violent behavior or criminal conduct prior to release from Bryce Hospital. Therefore, we hold, as the trial court did, that the very act of implementing a hospital review board was an exercise of discretionary function. Therefore, we affirm as to Fetner[4] and Wallis.[5]
Thus the remaining issue for our review is whether Stuart's release without review by the hospital review board was an exercise of discretion or whether the decision to release Stuart was constrained by internal procedures that required his referral to the hospital review board prior to his release.
In support of their motions for summary judgment, Dr. Bisbee and Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts stated in their affidavits that "[i]t was a professional decision whether or not [Stuart] should have been presented to the Hospital Review Board prior to release" and that "the procedures did not require that [Stuart] be reviewed by the Board prior to his release." They further stated that, although they did not personally release Stuart from Bryce Hospital, it was their professional opinion that "Stuart was appropriate to be released from Bryce Hospital." Dr. Osmond stated that based on his professional judgment he released Stuart after consultation with the other members of the treatment team and that he was within the discretionary authority *1204 granted to him by the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
Thus Dr. Bisbee, Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts, and Dr. Osmond presented a prima facie showing that their decision not to refer Stuart to the hospital review board was based on their professional judgment, evidencing an exercise of discretion. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Ms. McMillian to come forth with evidence to rebut that prima facie showing.
In opposition to Dr. Bisbee's, Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts's, and Dr. Osmond's motions for summary judgment, Ms. McMillian submitted the sworn affidavit of John R. Goff, Ph.D., former chief of psychology at Bryce Hospital, Goff's deposition testimony, and the rules and regulations promulgated by Fetner regarding the review of certain patients by the hospital review board prior to their release, which in pertinent part, are as follows:
Dr. Goff stated in his affidavit that "the Review Board was responsible to review the cases of all individuals scheduled for release who had ... violent histories in the community; ... [t]his was a primary function of the board; [t]his was not considered to be a matter of choice by the treating personnel, but was, rather, a requirement of policy; [w]hile a discretionary issue may have been present, that discretionary issue was whether or not the opinion of the Hospital Review Board would necessarily override the treating personnel." Dr. Goff further stated in his affidavit, which was supported by his deposition testimony, as follows:
Without question, the matters material to the issue before us are based almost exclusively on Stuart's hospital records, which could possibly reveal a history of violent behavior that, under the established mandatory procedures implemented for the hospital review board, would have required that the treatment team refer Stuart to that board prior to his release. We have searched the record on appeal for Stuart's hospital records that show a history of violent behavior. However, we found no such medical records or certified copies thereof pertaining to Stuart. Nothing in the record affirmatively shows that Dr. Goff had personal knowledge of Stuart's behavioral history. Thus, without the hospital records themselves, Dr. Goff's affidavit and his deposition testimony purporting to describe the substance or contents of these records constitute inadmissible hearsay. See Rule 56(b), Ala.R.Civ.P.; see, also, Welch v. Houston County Hospital Board, 502 So. 2d 340 (Ala.1987).
However, in Perry v. Mobile County, 533 So. 2d 602, 604-05 (Ala.1988), adopting the language from C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2738 (1983), we held:
This Court may have caused some confusion among the bench and bar as to whether a party must move to strike an affidavit or must object to questions propounded in depositions in order to keep objectionable evidence from being considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Welch v. Houston County Hospital Board, supra; Perry v. Mobile County, supra. We hope to clarify this by this opinion.
In the instant case, Dr. Bisbee, Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts, and Dr. Osmond filed no motion to strike and entered no objections to Goff's affidavit or deposition testimony. No ruling on the matter was invoked. See Perry v. Mobile County, supra. Because they did not call the court's attention to the fact that Goff's affidavit was inadmissible, they waived any objection to our considering the evidence contained in that affidavit. Likewise, because Dr. Bisbee, Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts, and Dr. Osmond did not call the court's attention to the fact that Goff's deposition was inadmissible, under the rationale of Perry v. Mobile County, supra, they waived any objection to our considering the evidence contained in that deposition. Therefore, considering Goff's affidavit and deposition testimony, we hold that Ms. McMillian presented a scintilla of evidence that Dr. Bisbee, Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts, and Dr. Osmond were not exercising a discretionary function and thus were not entitled to the umbrella of substantive, qualified immunity *1206 from liability for their failure to refer Stuart to the hospital review board prior to his release.
Based on the foregoing, we must reverse the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Bisbee, Ms. Scheiffler-Roberts, and Dr. Osmondmembers of the treatment team at Bryce Hospital in charge of Stuartand we remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion as to these defendants. We affirm as to the other defendants.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  As we point out in footnote five, there is no indication in the record that Wallis had any involvement in the events leading to this lawsuit except in his official capacity. He no longer holds the commissioner's office. See Rule 43(b), Ala.R.App.P.
[2]  Originally Ms. McMillian also named Dr. Alan Goodwin, executive director of Indian Rivers Community Mental Health and Retardation Center, as a party defendant, but she later dismissed him.
[3]  Although Ms. McMillian's complaint against the Mental Health defendants contains three other counts, they are not involved in this appeal.
[4]  Ms. McMillian presented no evidence that Fetner had any involvement in the decision not to refer Stuart to the hospital review board or in the decision to release Stuart from Bryce Hospital, other than in his capacity as director of Bryce Hospital.
[5]  Ms. McMillian presented no evidence that Wallis exercised any control over the administrative or clinical functions of Bryce Hospital or had any involvement in the decision to release Stuart from Bryce Hospital, other than in his capacity as commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.