Case Title: Wardell v. McMillan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wardell v. McMillan1992 WY 190844 P.2d 1052Case Number: 91-66, 91-67, 91-68Decided: 12/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Mack 
WARDELL, as Conservator of Neal Wardell, a minor, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
Jon 
McMILLAN, M.D. and Stan Peters, M.D., Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
Stan 
PETERS, M.D., Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
Mack 
WARDELL, as Conservator of Neal Wardell, a minor, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Jon 
McMILLAN, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
Mack 
WARDELL, as Conservator of Neal Wardell, a minor, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, ParkCounty, Hunter Patrick, 
J.

 
 
James E. 
Fitzgerald, Sharon A. Fitzgerald, and A.G. McClintock of Fitzgerald Law Offices, 
Cheyenne, and Donald W. Molloy of Molloy Law Offices, Billings, MT, for plaintiff.

 
 
William F. 
Downes, Jeffrey C. Brinkerhoff, and Jon B. Huss of Brown and Drew, Casper, for defendant McMillan. 

 
 
Robert M. 
Shively and Rex O. Arney of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for defendant 
Peters.

 
 
John E. 
Stanfield of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, and George Santini of 
Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for amicus curiae Wyoming Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Mack Wardell, as the 
conservator of Neal Wardell, a minor, filed medical malpractice suits against 
Jon M. McMillan, M.D. and Stan Peters, M.D. Wardell alleged that the doctors 
negligently treated his son, Neal, and proximately caused his quadriplegia. 
Following a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict favorable to the doctors, 
and the court entered a judgment. On appeal, Wardell asserts that the trial 
court denied him a fair trial by: (1) unduly restricting jury selection; (2) 
erroneously instructing the jury that medical professionals are presumed to have acted with due care; 
and (3) improvidently denying Wardell's motion in limine to exclude references 
at trial to prior settlements.

 
 

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

 
 

[¶3.]     Wardell raises the 
following issues on appeal:

 
 
            
     I. Did 
the trial court erroneously restrict plaintiff's jury selection? 
Specifically:

 
 
                        
     A. Did 
the trial court err when, although it called two alternate jurors, it failed to 
afford each side an additional peremptory challenge, as required by Rule 47(b), 
W.R.C.P.?

 
 
                        
     B. Did 
the trial court err in giving the two defendants twice the number of peremptory 
challenges afforded plaintiff when defendants were allied and, in fact, 
presented a coordinated and mutually supportive defense?

 
 
                        
     C. Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to excuse for cause two 
potential jurors who were biased against plaintiff and in favor of the 
defense?

 
 
                        
     D. Did 
the trial court err in failing to permit plaintiff to voir dire on the alleged 
"lawsuit crisis?"

 
 
            
     II. Did 
the trial court err in instructing the jury that the defendants were presumed to 
have acted with due care, even though

 
 
                        
     A. 
Plaintiff presented a prima facie case of negligence; and

 
 
                        
     B. 
Plaintiff's preponderance burden of proof was properly set forth in other 
instructions?

 
 
                        
III. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's motion in limine to 
exclude references to plaintiff's prior settlements with a non-party and a 
former party, where defendants did not contend that either of those entities had 
any proportionate fault with respect to plaintiff's injuries?[1]

 
 

[¶4.]     The doctors restated 
the issues in separate briefs. The issues as rephrased by McMillan are 
illustrative:

 
 
            
A. Was the jury selection fair?

 
 
                        
     1. Was 
the failure to grant an extra peremptory challenge for the alternate juror error 
and, if so, was it harmless error?

 
 
                        
     2. Did 
the trial court properly give each defendant three peremptory 
challenges?

 
 
                        
     3. Did 
the trial court properly refuse to excuse jurors Wasmuth and Brown for 
cause?

 
 
                        
     4. Did the trial court 
properly restrict voir dire concerning the alleged "lawsuit 
crisis"?

 
 
            
B. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that the defendant 
doctors were entitled to a presumption of reasonable care which could be 
overcome by expert testimony? 

 
 
            
C. Did the trial court erroneously grant Plaintiff's request to inform 
the jury of settlements with others, or did the Plaintiff invite 
error?

 
 

[¶5.]     In a separate 
cross-appeal, McMillan raises the following issue:

 
 
                        
     1. Did the trial court err in 
issuing its October 31, 1990 Protective Order denying Defendant/Appellant Jon M. 
McMillan the ability to fully discover the expert opinions and testimony of a 
treating physician?

 
 

[¶6.]     Peters raises the 
following issue in another separate cross-appeal:

 
 
                        
     1. Did 
the trial court err in issuing its October 31, 1990 Protective Order denying 
Defendant/Appellant Stan Peters the ability to fully discover the expert 
opinions and testimony of a treating physician, Dr. E. Larry 
McCleary?

 
 
Background

 
 

[¶7.]     On May 13, 1987, Neal 
Wardell fell on a rock while he was playing at school. After recess, Neal 
complained of pain between his shoulder blades and experienced difficulty 
holding a pencil. School authorities summoned an ambulance. The ambulance 
transported Neal to Cody's WestParkHospital. At the hospital, 
Peters, an emergency room physician, and McMillan, an orthopedic surgeon, 
examined Neal. While he was under the care of McMillan and Peters, Neal 
underwent numerous radiographic studies. The x-rays failed to demonstrate any 
apparent fractures, dislocations, or other abnormalities of the cervical spine. 
Despite the lack of radiographic evidence of an injury, Neal progressively lost 
neurological functioning. The doctors decided to transport Neal by helicopter to 
St. Vincent's Hospital in Billings, Montana. Neal arrived at St. Vincent's during 
the evening hours of May 13, 1987, and was placed into the care of James 
Johnson, M.D. Neal's condition continued to deteriorate at St. Vincent's, and 
Neal was transported to Children's Hospital in Denver, Colorado, on May 14, 
1987. At Children's Hospital, Neal was treated by Robert Hendee, Jr., M.D. and 
by E.L. McCleary, M.D. Neal was released from Children's Hospital as a 
quadriplegic.

 
 

[¶8.]     Wardell filed a 
negligence action against McMillan and WestParkHospital on May 12, 1989. 
He alleged that McMillan was negligent in failing to immobilize Neal's neck, in 
performing a range-of-motion test, and in permitting Neal to move about when he 
knew or should have known that Neal had suffered a spinal cord injury. On 
November 13, 1989, Wardell filed a separate action against Peters. He alleged 
that Peters was negligent for substantially the same reasons as he cited in the 
complaint against McMillan and the hospital. These cases were consolidated for 
trial by a court order filed on January 19, 1990.

 
 

[¶9.]     In addition to filing 
civil actions, Wardell filed a claim with Big Horn County School District No. 1 
pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Wardell alleged that the school 
district was negligent in failing to maintain a safe playground. The school 
district and the hospital settled the respective claims alleged against them 
prior to trial.

 
 

[¶10.]  Jury selection began on November 13, 
1990, and the trial began on November 15, 1990. Wardell presented expert 
testimony to support his theory that Neal's injuries were proximately caused by 
negligent medical treatment. The doctors, in turn, presented expert testimony to 
support their theory that "the die was cast" when Neal fell on the playground; 
i.e., the fall, and not the subsequent medical care, caused Neal's paralysis. On 
December 7, 1990, the jury returned a special verdict, finding no negligence by 
McMillan, Peters, the school district, the hospital, or Dr. Johnson. Wardell 
appeals.

 
 
Jury 
Selection

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
47(b)2

 
 

[¶11.]  Wardell claims that the trial judge 
committed reversible error by denying him his right to an additional peremptory 
challenge to be used against alternate jurors as was required by W.R.C.P. 47(b). 
Specifically, Wardell contends that his right to a fair trial was implicated 
when he was forced to use his statutory allotment of three peremptory challenges 
against a panel of fourteen prospective jurors. We agree.

 
 

[¶12.]  The record discloses that the trial judge 
informed trial counsel prior to jury selection that fourteen prospective jurors 
would be seated in the jury box. Trial counsel were to proceed with voir dire as 
if they were qualifying fourteen jurors. Trial counsel, but not the jurors, knew 
in advance that those individuals seated in positions three and thirteen would 
be the alternate jurors. Upon being advised of the jury selection process, 
Wardell objected as follows:

 
 
            
     [COUNSEL 
FOR WARDELL]: Well, I understand what the Court's doing. Let me say I have an 
objection insofar as I may be required to use both of my peremptory challenges 
on people who are going to be alternates, and all the more reason I need 
more.

 
 
            
     THE 
COURT: That can be possibly true for any party to the 
case.

 
 
            
     [COUNSEL 
FOR WARDELL]: I see that, Your Honor. But knowing in advance[] that three and 
thirteen will be alternates, I would much prefer to be able to exercise an extra 
challenge to the alternate because[,] as it is, I am being permitted to use my 
three statutory challenges on a panel of fou[]rteen, when in fact only twelve 
will most likely try the case.

 
 
            
     THE COURT: If I granted that, then 
I would have to grant each of the other parties the opportunity to do the same 
thing.

 
 
            
     So the 
objection is noted on the record and overruled.

 
 
Wardell 
again objected to the procedure near the end of the jury selection 
process:

 
 
            
     [COUNSEL 
FOR WARDELL]: I am now going to exercise my third peremptory challenge. I am 
being forced to use it on the alternate, therefore, not getting three peremptory 
challenges. I am going to exercise it on Mrs. Kaelberer. I also at this time, if 
I were afforded equal number of defense challenges, would strike Mr. Daniels, 
who has been treated by the doctors. I would strike Mrs. Miller, who has been 
reported to us to have a bias against Mormons, and the Wardells are obviously a 
Morm[o]n family, and Mr. Klentz, who expressed concern about whether he can be 
fair to our side.

 
 

[¶13.]  The trial judge erred as a matter of law 
in overruling Wardell's objection and in denying his request for an additional 
peremptory challenge. Once the trial judge exercised his discretion to invoke 
W.R.C.P. 47(b) for the purpose of seating alternate jurors, the parties were 
entitled to an extra peremptory challenge as a matter of law. The trial judge 
was afforded no discretion. The plain language of W.R.C.P. 47(b) bore this 
out:

 
 
            
     (b) Alternate juror. - Immediately prior to 
the selection of the jury, the court may direct that one (1) or two (2) jurors 
in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate 
jurors. . . . If either one (1) or two (2) alternate jurors are called each 
party is entitled to one (1) 
peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law. The 
additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an alternate juror, and 
the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not be used against the 
alternates.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) W.R.C.P. 47(b), by affording an extra peremptory challenge, was designed 
in part to protect from dilution the litigants' statutory right to have three 
peremptory challenges in the event the trial judge decided to seat alternate 
jurors.

 
 

[¶14.]  The purpose of W.R.C.P. 47(b) was 
frustrated in this instance. The litigants were forced to make a "Hobson's 
Choice" not contemplated by W.R.C.P. 47(b): They could disregard W.R.C.P. 47(b) 
and exercise their statutory allotment of three peremptory challenges against 
both regular and alternate jurors, or they could use their statutory challenges 
against only the regular jurors and take the risk that an objectionable 
alternate would not be called upon to deliberate the case. Wardell chose the 
former alternative and struck an objectionable alternate juror with a 
statutorily allotted challenge. Under the circumstances, we do not fault him for 
that choice.

 
 

[¶15.]  The doctors do not dispute the fact that 
the parties were not afforded an extra W.R.C.P. 47(b) challenge. Rather, they 
argue, among other things, that the objections Wardell made to the trial judge 
were insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that, in any event, a 
technical violation of W.R.C.P. 47(b) was harmless error absent a specific 
showing of prejudice.

 
 

[¶16.]  This Court has often held that, absent 
plain error, it will not consider an alleged error which was not objected to at 
trial. See, e.g., Monn v. State, 811 P.2d 1004 (Wyo. 1991) (rule applied in criminal context); and Triton 
Coal Company, Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1990) (rule applied 
in civil context regarding jury instructions). W.R.C.P. 463 required a litigant to make known 
to the trial judge, in a timely fashion, the action he requested or his 
objection to the court's action and his grounds therefor. The purpose of this 
rule was to inform the trial judge of possible errors so that he could have an 
opportunity to consider his rulings and to correct them, if necessary. See 5A 
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 46.02 (2d ed. 
1989).

 
 

[¶17.]  Wardell's objections made to the trial 
court fulfilled the purpose underlying W.R.C.P. 46. Wardell objected immediately 
upon learning that the trial judge was going to invoke W.R.C.P. 47(b) for the 
purpose of seating alternate jurors without affording the litigants an extra 
peremptory challenge. He objected again just prior to exercising his third 
statutory peremptory challenge on an alternate juror. Wardell made it abundantly 
clear that he objected to using one or more of his statutory peremptory 
challenges on alternate jurors and that he thought he was entitled to have an 
additional peremptory challenge.

 
 

[¶18.]  The doctors suggest that Wardell's 
objections were insufficient in that W.R.C.P. 47(b) was not specifically cited 
to the trial court. We disagree. Although we encourage counsel to be as specific 
as possible when they are making objections, we find it ill-advised to apply 
W.R.C.P. 46 in a ritualistic fashion. We would be exalting form over substance 
if we were to hold that Wardell's objections in this case were insufficient to 
preserve the alternate-peremptory-challenge issue for appeal. See 9 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2472 
(1971).

 
 

[¶19.]  Having decided that the trial court erred 
and that Wardell's objections were sufficient, we must now decide whether the 
court's failure to afford an extra peremptory challenge as was required by 
W.R.C.P. 47(b) warrants reversal under the circumstances of this case. According 
to W.R.C.P. 61, W.R.A.P. 7.04, and Wyoming case law,4 error is reversible only when 
substantial rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced. See Smith v. Kennedy, 
798 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1990). The appellant is charged with the 
burden of demonstrating the existence of prejudice. Id. He can show prejudice 
by demonstrating that, absent the error, a reasonable possibility exists that 
the verdict might have been more favorable to him. Id.

 
 

[¶20.]  In the instant case, Wardell argues that 
a substantial right - the right to a fair and impartial jury - was adversely 
affected by the error below. He contends that the trial judge's failure to allow 
an extra peremptory challenge affected the composition of the jury. Wardell 
claims that he would have used his third statutory peremptory challenge on one 
of three identified regular jurors, who were allegedly biased against his case, 
had he been afforded an extra W.R.C.P. 47(b) challenge to use on an alternate. 
Wardell argues that he should not be required to show how the improperly 
composed jury actually prejudiced his case because to do so would require 
conjecture and speculation. We agree and hold that the trial court's failure to 
afford the litigants with an extra peremptory challenge for alternate jurors 
under W.R.C.P. 47(b) constitutes reversible error when the error is properly 
preserved at trial and when the denial affects the composition of the jury 
actually called upon to deliberate the case.5

 
 

[¶21.]  Several considerations persuade us to 
apply the reversible-error rule. First, W.R.C.P. 47(b) afforded no discretion to 
the trial judge in granting an extra peremptory challenge to the litigants once 
he made the decision to seat alternate jurors. Cf.State v. 
Jones, 27 Wyo. 
46, 191 P. 1075 (1920) (reversible error to allow prosecution an extra 
peremptory challenge beyond those mandated by statute). Second, it is axiomatic 
that all litigants are entitled to a fair trial. The touchstone of a fair trial 
is the right to have an impartial decision maker. McDonough Power Equipment, 
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984). When the decision maker is to be a jury, 
impartiality is achieved in Wyoming through the exercise of challenges for 
cause and peremptory challenges. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-11-202 to -203 (1988) and 
W.R.C.P. 47(b). A trial court's refusal to excuse a juror for cause upon a 
proper showing of bias or denial of a peremptory challenge afforded by law 
implicates a litigant's substantial interest in, and right to, impanel an 
impartial jury. Cf. Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1020, 105 S. Ct. 2048, 85 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1985) (dilution of defendant's 
statutory allotment of peremptory challenges by trial court's failure to 
properly excuse juror for cause held to be reversible error). Third, requiring 
the complaining party to show the existence of actual prejudice would ask him 
"to discover the unknowable and to reconstruct what might have been and never 
was[; i.e.,] a jury properly constituted after running the gauntlet of 
challenge[s] performed in accordance with the prescribed rule[s] of the game." 
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Cook, 590 S.W.2d 875, 877 
(Ky. 1979). 
Finally, the law generally disfavors any attempt to invade the internal 
processes of a decision maker for the purpose of impeaching a verdict. See 
W.R.E. 606.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-202 (1988)

 
 

[¶22.]  Wardell claims that the trial court 
committed reversible error by granting the allegedly nonantagonistic 
co-defendants, the doctors, three statutory peremptory challenges each, while 
affording Wardell only three challenges. Wardell urges that the error allowed 
the doctors an undue advantage in constructing the jury and denied him the right 
to a fair trial. While we find no error in the trial court's application of 
Wyoming law as 
it stood at the time of its ruling, we feel a more substantive inquiry into, or 
demonstration of, antagonism will be required in subsequent cases.6

 
 

[¶23.]  Section 1-11-202 provides: "In the trial 
of civil cases in the district courts of this state, each side is allowed three 
(3) peremptory challenges." In Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981), a case 
factually similar to this one, the Court was confronted with deciding the 
meaning of the word "side" for purposes of allocating peremptory challenges. The 
Court relied upon authority from Texas and 
Kentucky to 
hold: "[I]n determining whether multiple defendants constitute one side, 
consideration must be given the nature of the claim against them and whether the 
defendants' interests are or may be antagonistic." 633 P.2d  at 171. The 
Distad 
Court found that it was very significant that 
distinct acts of negligence were alleged against the defendants and that they 
could each reduce their respective liability by emphasizing the fault of the 
other. Id. The 
Court went on to state in dicta that, by virtue of Wyoming's comparative 
negligence scheme, it would be rare that multiple defendants would not have 
antagonistic interests. Id.

 
 

[¶24.]  In light of Distad, we cannot say that 
the trial court erred in affording three statutory peremptory challenges to each 
doctor. A separate complaint was filed against each doctor which, although very 
similar to the other, alleged distinct acts of negligence against each doctor.7 The trial judge was also aware that 
this case, like Distad, involved allegations of medical malpractice and that 
principles of comparative negligence would apply. Given this state of facts, 
Distad, in effect, dictated the trial judge's determination of the 
matter.

 
 

[¶25.]  Although the factors identified in Distad 
are to be considered when determining antagonism in the multi-party context, we 
do not believe that they should necessarily be dispositive. Just because the 
acts of negligence alleged against multi-party defendants are in some manner 
distinct and because comparative negligence principles will apply does not ipso 
facto create antagonism between the parties sufficient to justify the allotment 
of extra peremptory challenges. Case law developed in Texas and Kentucky subsequent to the decisions relied 
upon by the Distad 
Court is in accord. See, e.g., Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Memorial Hospital, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (narrowly construing Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1960)); Patterson Dental Company v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979) (expanding the scope of inquiry 
required under Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 
1965)).

 
 

[¶26.]  Anticipating that the question of 
antagonism will arise in the future, we take this opportunity to further define 
what constitutes antagonism under § 1-11-202 sufficient to warrant the allotment 
of extra peremptory challenges among multi-party defendants.8 Section 1-11-202 starts from the 
premise that each "side" to a controversy is entitled to an equal number of 
peremptory challenges. "Side," as that term is understood in the context of 
litigation, means "litigant or a group of litigants having essentially common 
interests." Patterson Dental Company, 592 S.W.2d  at 917. Multi-party defendants 
constituting only one "side" to a controversy are thereby entitled to only three 
peremptory challenges under Wyoming law, unless their interests are 
antagonistic. Distad, 633 P.2d 167; Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and 
Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 1988).9 Multi-party defendants' interests 
are antagonistic when a good-faith controversy exists, vis-a-vis each other, 
over an issue of fact which the jury will decide. See Patterson Dental Company, 
592 S.W.2d  at 918. When such a controversy exists, the defendants constitute 
separate "sides" within the meaning of § 1-11-202 and are entitled to have 
additional peremptory challenges. This result is justified by the rationale that 
certain of the extra challenges will be used to select a jury for the case 
against the other defendant, rather than against the plaintiff. See Daniel J. 
Sheehan, Jr. & Cynthia C. Hollingsworth, Allocation of Peremptory Challenges 
Among Multiple Parties, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 511, 530 
(1979).

 
 

[¶27.]  When, on the other hand, no good-faith 
controversy exists between multi-party defendants and they are yet awarded extra 
peremptory challenges, the single-party plaintiff is placed in a distinct 
tactical disadvantage. The multi-party defendants, having no motive to exercise 
their additional challenges against a co-defendant, are able to pool their 
challenges against the plaintiff. As we have previously recognized, peremptory 
challenges are of substantial importance in constructing a fair and impartial 
jury. Theoretically, peremptory challenges may be used in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. In practice, however, a party exercises peremptory challenges 
to reject jurors perceived to be unsympathetic to his case. To allow 
nonantagonistic, multi-party defendants a two-, three- or four-to-one advantage 
in the exercise of peremptory challenges affords them undue influence over the 
composition of the jury and implicates the single-party plaintiff's right to a 
fair trial.

 
 

[¶28.]  In light of the foregoing, we hold that, 
prior to allotting peremptory challenges under § 1-11-202, the trial judge 
should consider all relevant circumstances to determine whether a good-faith 
controversy exists among multi-party defendants regarding an issue of fact which 
the jury will decide. It would be incumbent upon multi-party defendants seeking 
additional peremptory challenges to assist the trial judge in making this 
determination. An illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of factors to be 
considered would include: (1) whether separate acts of misconduct were alleged 
against the defendants; (2) whether comparative negligence principles applied to 
the case; (3) the type of relationship among the defendants; (4) whether 
cross-claims or third party complaints had been filed and the positions taken 
therein; (5) information disclosed by pretrial discovery; and (6) 
representations made by the parties. See Davenport, 769 S.W.2d 56; Patterson Dental Co., 
592 S.W.2d 914; Rivermeadows, Inc., 761 P.2d 662; and Distad, 633 P.2d 167.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-203 (1988)

 
 

[¶29.]  Wardell contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to excuse jurors Wasmuth and Brown for cause under § 1-11-203. 
Wardell claims that the jurors were legally prejudiced against his case and 
argues that the trial court's refusal to excuse them implicated his right to a 
fair trial by forcing him to expend two peremptory challenges to remove them 
from the jury panel.

 
 

[¶30.]  We perceive little need to address this 
issue on appeal in light of our decision to reverse this case on other grounds 
and the unlikely event that Wasmuth and Brown will again be called upon as 
potential jurors. We have also recently addressed the trial court's role in 
assessing challenges for cause under Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-105 (1987), which adopts 
by reference § 1-11-203. See, e.g., Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1989); and Summers 
v. State, 725 P.2d 1033 (1986).

 
 
"Insurance 
Crisis"

 
 

[¶31.]  Wardell's final contention regarding the 
jury selection process is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
his pretrial motion "to question potential jurors concerning advertising, 
newspaper articles, editorials, and the like with respect to the alleged 
`insurance crisis', the alleged `medical malpractice crisis', and alleged 
`lawsuit abuse.'"10 Wardell claims that the trial 
judge's undue restriction on the scope of voir dire adversely affected his right 
to select a fair and impartial jury. We disagree.

 
 

[¶32.]  Trial judges are charged with the duty of 
seeing that a jury of competent, fair, and impartial persons is impaneled. 
Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257 (1958). To this end, 
the scope and extent of voir dire are generally within the discretion of the 
trial judge. See Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981). The object of 
voir dire is to afford litigants an opportunity to explore whether prospective 
jurors have such biases and prejudices as would interfere with their 
responsibility to fairly decide a case. Schwenke, 768 P.2d  at 1033. A trial 
court abuses its discretion when it limits the scope of voir dire in a manner 
which is unreasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

[¶33.]  This Court has never addressed the issue 
of whether it is appropriate to question prospective jurors regarding the 
prejudicial effects of the alleged "insurance crisis" campaign. We have, 
however, addressed a somewhat analogous issue. In Eagan v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 
505, 21 P.2d 821 (1933), the Court held that a plaintiff was entitled in good 
faith to voir dire prospective jurors regarding their interest in or connection 
with insurance carriers which might become secondarily liable for any judgment 
entered against the defendant. The Court recognized that ordinarily a trial 
judge should guard against counsel's attempts to inject the notion into the jury 
selection process that defendants carry liability insurance. 45 Wyo. at 510, 21 P.2d 821. 
The Court reasoned that such knowledge was generally irrelevant and that it 
could taint the jury's consideration of the merits of the case, both as to 
negligence and as to the amount of damage. Id. The Court, however, justified its holding 
by acknowledging that litigants should be given a reasonable opportunity to 
explore legitimate sources of juror bias for the purpose of selecting a fair and 
impartial jury. 45 Wyo. at 511, 21 P.2d 821. The Court concluded: 
"The rule should be, as we think, that when counsel's conduct and his questions 
in the case are fairly conducive to the accomplishment of a legitimate end in 
the proceedings, if, incidentally, prejudice results therefrom to the adverse 
party, it may not be avoided." 45 Wyo. at 510, 21 P.2d 821. The Court went on to 
note that the scope of inquiry should be narrowly drawn to protect the 
defendant's interest by not having the existence of insurance unduly emphasized. 
45 Wyo. at 
509-13, 21 P.2d 821. The Court indicated that only when the sanctioned inquiry 
was answered in the affirmative could further questions be asked of prospective 
jurors regarding their interest in or connection with a liability carrier. 45 
Wyo. at 512, 
21 P.2d 821.

 
 

[¶34.]  Sister states which have considered the 
propriety of allowing a voir dire inquiry regarding "insurance crisis" 
propaganda have come to varying conclusions.11 Of them, we find the approach 
adopted in Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), to be persuasive and most in line with Eagan. In Borkoski, the 
Montana Supreme Court held that, upon a proper showing of possible prejudice, 
limited good-faith questioning regarding the prejudicial effect of "insurance 
crisis" propaganda should be allowed.12 594 P.2d  at 694. The Borkoski 
court found that the plaintiff's attorney made a proper showing of potential 
prejudice by demonstrating that the very insurance company involved in the case 
had been actively engaged in a national advertising campaign which was both 
designed to prejudice potential jurors against personal injury plaintiffs and 
contemporaneous in time to the drawing of the jury panel. Id. Under those 
circumstances, the Montana Supreme Court held that either of two preliminary 
questions would be appropriate: (1) whether the prospective jurors heard or read 
anything which might affect their ability to sit as impartial jurors; or (2) 
whether the prospective jurors regularly read any magazines or newspapers in 
which it had been demonstrated that the insurance advertisements or articles 
appeared. 594 P.2d  at 695. The Montana Supreme Court cautioned that only in the 
event an affirmative response were received to one of the preliminary questions 
would counsel be entitled to ask limited follow-up questions to determine 
whether the juror believed the advertising and whether it would interfere with 
the juror's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. 594 P.2d  at 
694.

 
 

[¶35.]  We feel that the foundation prerequisites 
outlined in Borkoski strike an appropriate balance between plaintiff counsel's 
desire to discover legitimate sources of juror bias and defense counsel's 
interest in keeping the topic of insurance out of the courtroom. Applying 
Borkoski to the instant case, we conclude that Wardell's pretrial motion and 
supporting exhibits, although comprehensive, failed to demonstrate that the 
alleged "insurance crisis" campaign had been executed in such a pervasive and 
contemporaneous fashion as to create a significant source of prejudice in 
ParkCounty jurors. We hold that 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Wardell's motion to voir 
dire prospective jurors regarding "insurance crisis" 
propaganda.

 
 
Due Care 
Instruction

 
 

[¶36.]  Wardell contends that the trial court 
committed reversible error in giving the following instruction over his 
objection:

 
 
            
     The 
defendants rendered medical services to the plaintiff, Neal Wardell. Each 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of certain presumptions, and in this 
connection you are instructed as follows:

 
 
            
          1. The law 
presumes that each defendant possessed reasonable knowledge and skill according 
to medical standards and that in the service undertaken and rendered by him, he 
discharged his full legal duty to the patient and exercised reasonable care, 
prudence and foresight in applying his skill and learning.

 
 
                        
     2. 
However, this presumption is disputable and may be overcome only by expert 
testimony which, taken together with other evidence, reasonably justifies a 
contrary conclusion.

 
 
                        
     3. This 
presumption continues throughout the trial unless and until the presumption is 
overcome.

 
 
Wardell 
argues, among other things, that the trial court, by instructing the jury as to 
both Wardell's burden of proof and the physicians' presumption of due care, 
misled the jury into believing that Wardell had a double burden of proving his 
case. We agree that the trial court erred in giving the due-care instruction. We 
do not, however, reach the further issue of whether the error warrants reversal 
because of our decision to reverse this case on other 
grounds.

 
 

[¶37.]  The doctors rely primarily upon a 
statement extracted from Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 1981), to support their contention that the due-care 
instruction accurately reflects Wyoming law. In Harris, the Court stated: "A 
physician or surgeon is presumed to have carefully and skillfully treated or 
operated upon a patient." 625 P.2d  at 753. Taken out of context, this statement, 
along with similar statements made in prior cases, would appear to support the 
instruction given in this case. See Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941); and Rosson v. Hylton, 45 
Wyo. 540, 22 P.2d 195 (1933).

 
 

[¶38.]  Harris, Smith, and Rosson were all 
medical malpractice cases wherein the plaintiffs were appealing either an 
adverse summary judgment or a directed verdict. The Court in each case affirmed 
the lower court's ruling on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to establish by 
competent evidence a prima facie case of professional negligence. A careful 
reading of the cases discloses that, in each instance when the alleged 
presumption of due care was mentioned, the Court was merely attempting to 
emphasize the burden of proof placed upon a plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
action. The real point the Court was making in each instance was that a 
presumption of negligence does not exist merely because unfavorable results 
follow medical treatment. The Court did not intimate in any of the cases that it 
intended to create an evidentiary presumption of due care for physicians upon 
which a jury should be instructed. Harris, 625 P.2d 747; Smith, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260; Rosson, 45 Wyo. 540, 22 P.2d 195.

 
 

[¶39.]  Addressing a similar instruction, an 
Arizona court 
captured the irony of literally interpreting language similar to that found in 
Harris:

 
 
            
     If the 
quoted language is intended to create a presumption in favor of a defendant 
physician, it is a strange species of presumption indeed. It does not fit the 
typical description of a presumption in a civil case - that is, a rule that 
shifts the burden of producing evidence to the party against whom the 
presumption operates. Rather, "this presumption" appears to do no more than 
merely restate the familiar rule that the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
the defendant negligent.

 
 
Gaston v. 
Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326, 348 (Ct.App. 1978) 
(citations omitted). Accordingly, we view this alleged due-care presumption as 
being merely the flip side of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a medical 
malpractice case. As stated by McMillan: "The burden of proving `that the 
non-existence of the presumed fact [i.e., due care] is more probable than its 
existence,' is the same as the burden of proving defendants' negligence `by a 
preponderance of the evidence.'" Consequently, once the jury has been adequately 
instructed on the plaintiff's burden of proof in a case, it is of no avail to 
further instruct the jury as to the alleged presumption of due care. To do so 
would serve only to confuse the jury. See id.; Richmond v. A.F. of L. Medical Service Plan of Phil., 421 
Pa. 269, 218 A.2d 303 (1966); and Peacock v. 
Piper, 81 Wn.2d 731, 504 P.2d 1124 (1973); but see Crumbley v. Wyant, 188 
Ga. App. 227, 
372 S.E.2d 497 (Ct.App. 1988).

 
 

[¶40.]  A review of the jury instructions given 
in this case discloses that the jury was adequately instructed regarding the 
plaintiff's burden of proof. That being the case, we perceive no reason why 
physicians, to the exclusion of everyone else, are entitled to a due-care 
instruction in a negligence case. Cf. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988) (Wyoming 
Medical Review Panel Act held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds). The 
trial court erred by so instructing the jury.

 
 
Disclosure 
of Settlements

 
 

[¶41.]  Wardell finally contends that the trial 
court erred by ruling that Wyoming's comparative negligence law required 
the pretrial settlements with the hospital and the school district to be 
disclosed to the jury. The doctors counter that Wardell should not be heard to 
complain because he invited the alleged error; i.e., Wardell insisted that the 
jury be informed of either nothing or everything about the settlements. We agree 
with Wardell and disagree with the doctors.

 
 

[¶42.]  We do not believe that the disclosure of 
settlements is required under Wyoming's comparative negligence law. The 
relevant statutory section provides in pertinent part:

 
 
            
     (b) The 
court may, and when requested by any party shall:

 
 
                        
(i) . . . .

 
 
                        
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the 
percentage of fault.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109(b)(i)(B) (1988). This language has been interpreted in practice to 
require that the jury be informed (1) that a plaintiff will not recover any 
damages if he is found to be more than fifty percent at fault, and (2) that each 
defendant is liable for only that portion of the total damage award which 
corresponds to his percentage of fault. See Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 10.01A 
and 10.03A (1988). We believe that § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) is satisfied once a jury 
receives instruction on the points outlined above. The jury should then 
understand the consequences of attributing fault under Wyoming's comparative 
negligence law. The admission of settlement evidence is not necessary to this 
understanding. Therefore, whether or not settlement evidence is to be admitted 
in a particular case must be determined under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. We 
hold that the trial court erred in ruling that disclosure of settlements is 
required by Wyoming's comparative negligence 
law.

 
 

[¶43.]  We have previously recognized that, under 
the doctrine of invited error, a party may not complain of action which he 
induced the trial court to take. Thatcher & Sons, Inc. v. Norwest Bank 
Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1988). The key to 
determining whether this rule of law applies is identifying the party who 
"induced" the allegedly erroneous action. The record discloses that Peters 
requested that the settlements be disclosed to the jury. Wardell's pretrial 
posture was that no mention should be made of the settlements. It was only after 
the trial court ruled to allow disclosure of the settlements that Wardell 
insisted that, to prevent juror speculation, the jury also be informed regarding 
the settlement amounts. The doctrine of invited error does not apply to Wardell 
under these circumstances.

 
 
Discovery

 
 

[¶44.]  The doctors claim on cross-appeals that 
the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a protective order which 
prevented them from deposing one of Neal's treating physicians, Dr. McCleary, 
regarding his expert opinion on the issues of standard of care and causation. 
The protective order limited the scope of inquiry to the factual circumstances 
relating to Neal's condition and treatment at Children's Hospital. The doctors 
assert, however, that they had reason to believe Dr. McCleary's expert opinions 
would be favorable to their cases. They argue that his opinions should be 
discoverable because Wardell waived the patient-client privilege by filing suit. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this 
case.

 
 

[¶45.]  W.R.E. 501 provides in pertinent part: 
"Except as otherwise required by constitution or statute or by these or other 
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the privilege of a witness . 
. . shall be governed by the principles of the common law." The 
physician-patient privilege is not recognized in the common law of Wyoming. See CP v. 
Laramie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (Parental 
Rights of PP), 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982). Rather, the privilege is 
established and defined by Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-101 (Supp. 1992), which provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
            
     (a) The 
following persons shall not testify in certain respects:

 
 
                        
     (i) . . . 
[A] physician concerning a communication made to him by his . . . patient in 
that relation, or his advice to his . . . patient. The . . . physician may 
testify by express consent of the . . . patient, and if the . . . patient 
voluntarily testifies the . . . physician may be compelled to testify on the 
same subject.

 
 
Section 
1-12-101 by its express terms protects only confidential communications made by 
a patient to his physician and advice given by a physician to his patient. 
Similar privilege statutes are generally interpreted as extending the privilege 
to all information secured by a doctor through observation, examination, or 
conversation with the patient, so far as it is relevant. EDWARD W. CLEARY, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 100 (3d ed. 1984). The policy underlying such a 
statutory privilege is to encourage full and frank disclosure between a patient 
and his doctor for the purpose of effective diagnosis and treatment. See 61 
AM.JUR.2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 169 (1981). When a patient 
places his physical or mental condition into contest, the physician-patient 
privilege is waived to the extent that it is relevant to the controversy. See 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986). Under such circumstances, the 
patient can no longer expect to silence his physician relating to the subject 
matter of the litigation. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra at § 103. The waiver, 
however, is not without boundaries. The physician may not discuss the patient's 
condition and treatment with the world at large, but he is bound to disclose the 
relevant circumstances only within the confines of the adversarial process. See 
61 AM.JUR.2D, supra.

 
 

[¶46.]  Wardell concedes that he waived the 
physician-patient privilege by filing suit. He contends, however, that the 
waiver extended to only factual information relating to Neal's condition and 
treatment. Wardell apparently interprets the statutory language, "[t]he . . . 
physician may testify by express consent of the . . . patient," to mean that a 
physician may not offer anything but factual testimony absent the express 
consent of the patient. We do not read the statute so broadly. The language, 
when read with the rest of the statute, refers only to the circumstances under 
which a physician may disclose patient confidences when a waiver of the 
privilege has not been implied by law. The plain language of the statute does 
not prohibit a treating physician from expressing his expert opinion regarding 
issues placed into contest by his patient.

 
 

[¶47.]  Wardell argues alternatively that as a 
matter of public policy this Court should protect the "special relationship" 
which exists between a patient and his physician by prohibiting the physician 
from expressing an expert opinion adverse to the patient's interests. Wardell 
claims that a physician has a fiduciary duty not to act contrary to his 
patient's best interests.

 
 

[¶48.]  W.R.C.P. 26(b)13 governed the scope of discovery in 
civil litigation and provided: "Unless otherwise limited by order of the court 
in accordance with these rules, . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding 
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant . . . [or which] appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to . . . admissible evidence." As is evident, few 
restrictions are placed upon the scope of civil discovery. Only privileged or 
completely irrelevant information is off limits, unless the court orders 
otherwise. In the instant case, we have already determined that Dr. McCleary's 
expert opinions were not privileged, and it was conceded that they were 
potentially relevant. Our question then becomes whether the protective order 
issued by the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion under the rules 
governing discovery. See Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1984). 

 
 

[¶49.]  W.R.C.P. 26(c)14 provided that, upon a motion for 
good cause shown, a trial judge could issue any order required by justice "to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense." The record reveals that Wardell moved the trial court to 
issue a protective order forbidding the doctors from deposing Dr. McCleary 
regarding, among other things, his expert opinions on the applicable standard of 
care and the issue of causation. The trial court issued the requested order on 
the grounds that it furthered the ends of justice and that the information 
sought was privileged.

 
 

[¶50.]  Although Dr. McCleary's testimony was not 
privileged, we do believe that the protective order was issued in the interest 
of justice. Our reasons are several. First, Dr. McCleary was not designated as a 
trial expert by Wardell at the time the protective order was sought, and, 
therefore, it was unnecessary to depose him regarding his expert opinions for 
purposes of cross-examination. See W.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A). Second, Dr. McCleary 
was never "retained or specially employed" by Wardell in anticipation of trial, 
so his expert opinions were not discoverable pursuant to W.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
Third, as a general proposition, we do not believe that a treating physician, 
who may feel that it is ethically inappropriate to testify as an expert witness 
against a patient, should be unnecessarily forced to do so.15 A contrary position would 
needlessly pit physician against patient, potentially destroying a mutually 
beneficial relationship. Finally, the doctors had numerous expert witnesses to 
support their theory of the case. The apparent and primary reason they sought 
Dr. McCleary's testimony was in the hopes that they could argue before the jury 
that Wardell's own physician said no one was at fault. The prejudicial effect of 
such testimony or argument may well outweigh its need in this case. We hold 
that, under the circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 
issuing the protective order.

 
 
Conclusion

 
 

[¶51.]  The trial court committed reversible 
error by failing to afford the parties an extra peremptory challenge as was 
required by W.R.C.P. 47(b).

 
 

[¶52.]  Reversed and remanded for a retrial 
consistent with this opinion.

 
 

CARDINE, J., files 
a specially concurring opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files 
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and GOLDEN, J., generally 
concurs and joins in that portion of Justice Urbigkit's opinion dealing with the 
discovery issue on cross-appeal.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Association filed an amicus curiae brief which addressed the issues 
regarding voir dire on the alleged "lawsuit crisis" and disclosure of 
settlements under Wyoming's comparative negligence law.

 
 

2 Revised effective 
March 24, 1992.

 
 

3 W.R.C.P. 46 
provided:

 
 
            
     Formal 
exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for all 
purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient 
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, 
makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his 
objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the 
absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.

 
 
(Revised effective 
March 24, 1992.)

 
 

4 W.R.C.P. 61 
provides:

 
 
            
     No error 
in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in 
any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for 
vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.

 
 
W.R.A.P. 7.04 
provides:

 
 
            
     Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded.

 
 

5 The doctors cite 
Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that the 
denial of an extra peremptory challenge does not constitute reversible error. In 
Beard, the federal district court allowed the parties only one additional 
peremptory challenge to exercise against four alternate jurors. F.R.C.P. 47(b) 
required that the litigants be afforded two extra challenges. The Seventh 
Circuit Court found that the error was harmless because none of the alternates 
were called upon to deliberate the verdict. Beard is distinguishable from the 
instant case in that there the court's failure to afford the litigants a full 
allotment of F.R.C.P. 47(b) challenges did not affect the composition of the 
jury deciding the case.

 
 

6 In stark contrast to 
the previous issue, a plethora of case law exists regarding the propriety and 
effect of allowing extra peremptory challenges in the multi-party context. See 
generally Deborah F. Harris, Annotation, Distribution and Exercise of Peremptory 
Challenges in Federal Civil Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 1870, 50 A.L.R.FED. 350 
(1980); Donald E. Evins, Annotation, Jury: Number of Peremptory Challenges 
Allowable in Civil Case Where There Are More Than Two Parties Involved, 32 
A.L.R.3D 747 (1970); and Annotation, Effect of Allowing Excessive Number of 
Peremptory Challenges, 95 A.L.R.2D 957 (1964).

 
 

7 The acts of 
negligence alleged against the doctors were identical with the exception that 
McMillan was alleged to have been negligent by "putting Neal Wardell's neck 
through a range of motion and in applying vertical pressure to his spinal cord," 
whereas Peters was alleged to have "negligently examined and manipulated Neal's 
neck."

 
 

8 The Wyoming Supreme 
Court approved an amendment to W.R.C.P. 47, effective March 24, 1992, which, in 
addition to § 1-11-202, addresses the allocation of peremptory challenges in the 
multi-party context. W.R.C.P. 47(c) now reads as follows:

 
 
            
     (c) Each 
party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or 
several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the making of 
challenges or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit 
them to be exercised separately or jointly.

 
 
The new rule adopts 
the law applicable to the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). The new 
rule does not alter our position that antagonism must be shown among multi-party 
defendants in the single-party plaintiff/multi-party defendant context prior to 
the allotment of additional peremptory challenges. The new rule may, however, 
afford the trial judge more discretion over how many extra peremptory challenges 
are appropriate under the circumstances and over how they should be 
exercised.

 
 

9 In Rivermeadows, 
Inc., a case not involving negligence, the Court began to expand the scope of 
the trial court's inquiry under Distad for the purpose of determining antagonism 
among co-defendants. The Rivermeadows, Inc. Court affirmed the trial court's 
determination that Albrecht and his Wyoming corporation, Rivermeadows, Inc., were 
not antagonistic and not separately entitled to a statutory allotment of 
peremptory challenges. The Court examined pre-trial positions taken by Albrecht 
and Rivermeadows, Inc. to determine that the parties, through common 
counterclaims, cross-claims, and motions, chose to assert an allied or tandem 
defense.

 
 

10 The motion, with the 
supporting brief and exhibits, constitutes an entire volume of the 
record.

 
 

11 For an overview of 
the various approaches taken, see Joanne Rhoton Galbreath, Annotation, Propriety 
and Prejudicial Effect of Trial Counsel's Reference or Suggestion in Medical 
Malpractice Case that Defendant Is Insured, 71 A.L.R.4TH 1025 at §§ 7 & 8 
(1989); and Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence, and Propriety and Effect of 
Questions, Statements, Comments, Etc., Tending to Show that Defendant in 
Personal Injury or Death Action Carries Liability Insurance, 4 A.L.R.2D 761 
(1949).

 
 

12 For recent cases 
adopting identical or similar positions, see, e.g., Sutherlin v. Fenenga, 111 
N.M. 767, 810 P.2d 353 (App. 1991); Babcock v. NorthwestMemorialHospital, 767 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1989); and Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct.App.), 
cert. granted, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).

 
 

13 Revised effective 
March 24, 1992.

 
 

14 See supra note 
13.

 
 

15 When briefing this 
issue, the parties relied primarily upon cases which addressed whether a 
treating physician who voluntarily 
becomes a defense expert should be allowed to testify at trial. The facts of the 
instant case do not raise this issue for our review. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the courts are decisively split.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶53.]  I concur in the result reached in the 
court's opinion but not in the reasons therefor. Appellant Wardell is entitled 
to a new trial because he was allowed three peremptory challenges while 
appellees' side of the case was allowed six and because the trial court refused 
him an extra peremptory challenge for the impanelling of alternate jurors, all 
in violation of W.R.C.P. 47(b). The court's discussion beyond the alternate 
juror peremptory challenge question is advisory and unnecessary to the decision 
in this case. However, having undertaken discussion of these questions, two of 
the court's gratuitous holdings strike me as incorrect.

 
 
PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES

 
 

[¶54.]  The court's analysis of the number of 
peremptory challenges to be awarded multiple defendants is incorrect. Thus, I 
refuse to accept both its dicta applicable to future cases and its resolution of 
the issue as applied to this case. 

 
 

[¶55.]  The majority opinion concludes that 
Wardell received a fair trial, even though the doctors each were given three 
peremptory challenges, for a total of six, to Wardell's three challenges. It 
cites Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981), in support of this decision. 
Distad was correct, insofar as it analyzes the problem of multiple defendant 
peremptory challenges by inquiring into whether the defendants' interests are 
"antagonistic" to one another. However, Distad was incorrect when it held or 
implied that antagonism can be presumed between multiple tort defendants because 
of their conflicting interests in the allocation of negligence percentages, 
stating: "[t]he result of Wyoming's comparative negligence design is that very 
seldom will multiple defendants not have antagonistic interests." Distad, 633 P.2d  at 171. For reasons I will state, it is apparent that the presumption is 
wrong and that Distad should be overruled as to the presumption of adversity 
among defendants.

 
 

[¶56.]  Giving each of multiple defendants the 
statutory maximum number of challenges allows the defendants to exert inordinate 
influence in, and to dominate, the jury selection process. Moore v. Jenkins, 304 S.C. 
544, 405 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991). To allow such an imbalance permits multiple 
defendants to effectively control jury selection. Layne v. GAF Corp., 42 
Ohio Misc.2d 
19, 537 N.E.2d 252, 254 (Com.Pl. 1988). A disproportionate number of strikes 
granted the defendants prevents the plaintiff from meaningfully asserting his 
right to peremptory challenges, which is incident to his right to jury trial. 
George v. BergenPinesCountyHosp., 217 N.J. Super. 548, 526 A.2d 293, 295 (L. 1987).

 
 

[¶57.]  Distad purports to be based on Texas precedent. However, 
as the majority recognizes, language in the landmark case of Patterson Dental 
Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979), and subsequent decisions of the Texas 
courts demonstrate that even they would not sanction a rule as extreme as that 
suggested by Distad. The Distad court found antagonism in the mere fact that 
under Wyoming's comparative negligence scheme, each 
defendant's comparative negligence could be used to reduce that of the other 
defendant(s). As will be seen, this factor could not, in and of itself, justify 
the award of additional peremptory challenges to a defendant under current 
Texas 
law.

 
 

[¶58.]  The Texas Supreme Court stated the 
following in Patterson:

 
 
            
Antagonism does not exist because of differing conflicts with the other 
side; e.g., when a plaintiff sues several defendants alleging different acts or 
omissions against each defendant. Antagonism would exist, however, if each of 
the defendants alleged that the fault of another defendant was the sole cause of 
plaintiff's damage. The existence or non-existence of cross-actions or 
third-     party 
actions is not determinative.

 
 
Patterson, 
592 S.W.2d  at 918 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

 
 

[¶59.]  At the time Patterson was written, 
Texas had in 
place a comparative negligence/contribution among joint-tortfeasors statute. See 
1973 Tex.Gen.L. ch. 28, §§ 1, 2(a). Thus, in cases with multiple defendants, 
each defendant had an interest in seeing his codefendants charged with 
responsibility for a greater percentage of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, the court held that antagonism existed only when each of the 
defendants pointed to the others as the sole cause of the 
harm.

 
 

[¶60.]  Subsequent cases have followed the rules 
set out in Patterson. In American Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson, 732 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 
App. 1987), writ of error refused, n.r.e., the court affirmed a jury verdict 
against a drug manufacturer who challenged the trial court's allocation of 
peremptory challenges. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding nine strikes to the plaintiff and nine, cumulatively, to 
the defendants, even though the manufacturer and the doctor who supplied its 
product to the plaintiff had filed cross-actions against each other. The court 
noted that in these actions, neither defendant alleged that the other was the sole cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries.

 
 

[¶61.]  In Parker v. Associated Indem. Co., 715 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App. 1986), writ of error 
refused, n.r.e., the trial court allotted ten peremptory strikes to the two 
defendant insurance companies, and only six to the plaintiffs. The Court of 
Appeals reversed judgment for the defendants. Although one of the insurance 
companies had filed a cross-action for indemnity and/or contribution from the 
other, neither defendant claimed that the other was the sole cause of 
plaintiffs' damages. The court stated that "[a]ntagonism does not always exist 
even if the parties on the same side may have different conflicts with the other 
side. In this case, the defendants centered their defense on the same issue: no 
insurance coverage * * *." Parker, 715 S.W.2d  at 401. See also Lopez v. Foremost 
Paving, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1986) (holding that granting extra strikes to 
defendants was reversible error); and cf. Lopez v. City Towing Assoc., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. App. 1988), writ of error denied (stating rule that 
antagonism exists when each defendant asserts that the other's negligence was 
the sole cause of the plaintiff's damage).

 
 

[¶62.]  As the majority also recognizes, Distad 
cited Kentucky 
precedent which has since been restrictively interpreted. In a recent case, 
which like this case involved medical malpractice, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
held that interests of the defendants were not antagonistic where the defendants 
shared the same theory of the case. Davenport By 
and Through Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Memorial Hosp., 
Inc., 769 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Ky.App. 1988). The defendants had cited Roberts v. 
Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1960), which this court relied upon indirectly in 
Distad, for the proposition that where defendants in a personal injury case are 
charged with independent acts of negligence, their interests are almost always 
antagonistic because of the possibility of convincing the jury that the other 
defendant was primarily or solely at fault. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
distinguished Roberts, stating that:

 
 
            
The Roberts court's actual words were that defendants charged with 
independent acts of negligence "in most any case of collision of two or more 
vehicles involving a claim by a passenger" will mean that the defendants' 
interests are antagonistic. Roberts was a clear-cut, extreme case of 
antagonistic interests that is inapposite to our facts 
here.

 
 

Davenport, 769 S.W.2d  at 59.

 
 

[¶63.]  to reduce one defendant's liability under 
a comparative negligence scheme by pointing the finger at another creates a 
presumption of adversity between defendants. From these cases I abstract a rule 
that antagonism does not exist merely because percentages of negligence must be 
distributed among defendants. Rather, "pointing the finger" must generally rise 
to a level where each of the defendants claims that the other is the sole cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore, the burden is always on the defendants 
to clearly demonstrate adversity. Positions taken by defendants in pretrial 
procedures should supply significant evidence of the relationship between 
defendants.

 
 

[¶64.]  The majority proposes a multiple-factor 
test to replace the presumption contained in Distad. While I agree with the 
factors the majority proposes, I feel it is important to stress that the 
presence of many or most of them would not necessarily show adversity. The fact 
that separate acts of misconduct are alleged against the defendants, that 
comparative negligence principles apply, and that cross-claims or third party 
complaints have been filed does not necessarily mean that the defendants are 
adverse. Experience teaches that more often than not each defendant defends 
against the claim of plaintiff and is reluctant to and rarely does attack the 
other defendant(s). It is the rare and unusual case in which defendants are 
found to be truly antagonistic.

 
 

[¶65.]  Furthermore, I believe the majority fails 
to take an effective stand as to the defendants' burden of proof on this issue. 
The majority says "[i]t would be incumbent upon multi-party defendants seeking 
additional peremptory challenges to assist the trial judge in making this 
determination." Maj. op. at 1061. I would more clearly state that the defendants 
have the burden of clearly demonstrating 
that their interests are adverse. There is no presumption of adversity in 
favor of defendants; the burden of proof of adversity resides with defendants. 
Failure to carry the burden must result in an equal number of challenges being 
given to the plaintiffs' side and the defendants' side of the 
case.

 
 

[¶66.]  Contrary to what is said in Distad, 
multiple defendants nearly always have one, overriding aim in common: to 
establish that plaintiff cannot 
recover for his or her injuries. It is rare that the defendants are so 
antagonistic that they constitute separate "sides" entitling them to additional 
peremptory challenges under W.S. 1-11-202. Therefore, I would overrule the 
presumption of adversity in Distad, and hold that there is a presumption that 
multiple defendants are not adverse, 
and that this presumption can only be overcome if adversity is clearly 
demonstrated by defendants.

 
 

[¶67.]  I would apply this rule to the facts of 
this case. The defendant doctors in this action were not so adverse that extra 
jury strikes should have been awarded them. Their designations of expert witness 
testimony indicated that the experts planned to testify that it was the boy's fall, rather than another defendant's 
negligence, which caused his injuries. When Dr. Peters identified his 
affirmative defenses in his pre-trial memorandum, none claimed any negligence by 
Dr. McMillan. Perhaps the best statement of the defense of both defendants is found in Dr. Peters' 
pretrial memorandum:

 
 
            
The defendants contend * * * 
that Neal Wardell damaged a spinal cord artery or arteries during the fall in 
the school yard, either by direct damage during impact, or by vasospasm, which 
may result from the release of chemicals triggered by the fall. [Emphasis 
added]

 
 

[¶68.]  In a pretrial deposition, Dr. McMillan 
was asked whether he faulted Dr. Peters in any way for what happened to Neal 
Wardell. He responded "[a]bsolutely not." Defendants' expert witnesses took the 
same position, that they had either not been asked to render an opinion as to 
the other doctor's conduct, or that neither doctor could be faulted for what he 
did or failed to do.

 
 

[¶69.]  As he began voir dire of the jury panel, 
counsel for Dr. McMillan informed the jury as follows:

 
 
            
[T]his child fell in the school yard and as a consequence of that he 
suffered an injury. Now, therein lies the dispute between [counsel for plaintiff]'s side of the case 
and mine. The dispute will center upon a cause, cause of that injury. 
[Emphasis added]

 
 
McMillan's 
counsel thus identified his case as being adverse to the plaintiff's but not to 
Dr. Peters'. As for counsel for Dr. Peters, his position was revealed when he 
stated at voir dire:

 
 
            
I am going to tell you that some of the evidence in this case or the 
evidence that's going to come from the defendants in this case is going to be to 
the effect that what happened to Neal Wardell happened without the fault of either of these two 
gentlemen * * *. [Emphasis added]

 
 

[¶70.]  The attorneys for the doctors also 
cooperated in the voir dire process itself. For example, Doctor McMillan's 
counsel sought to have a juror excused for cause because of derogatory 
statements made to him about Dr. McMillan's handling of the accident. It was 
clear the juror had heard nothing adverse about Dr. Peters. However, counsel for 
Dr. Peters also asked that the juror be excused for cause. Only plaintiff 
objected. Had Dr. Peters been truly adverse to Dr. McMillan, his counsel could 
have joined plaintiff in seeking to avoid a strike for cause of a potential 
juror who had heard adverse information about Dr. McMillan. There were numerous 
other examples of close cooperation between counsel for the defendants during 
voir dire. They cooperated in requesting challenges for cause, joined in each 
others' objections to plaintiff's voir dire questions, and even deferred to each 
other's arguments in chambers. In short, the evidence presented before and 
during voir dire demonstrates that the doctors were aligned rather than adverse. 
They were not entitled to extra strikes. I would apply the principles and 
presumptions I have outlined here, to hold that plaintiff did not receive a fair 
trial because of the allocation of jury strikes.

 
 
INSURANCE 
CRISIS

 
 

[¶71.]  I also disagree with the majority's 
disposition of the "insurance crisis" issue. The majority holds, following 
Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), that a plaintiff concerned 
over adverse publicity about the so-called "insurance crisis," may ask one of 
two preliminary questions: "(1) whether the prospective jurors heard or read 
anything which might affect their ability to sit as impartial jurors; or (2) 
whether the prospective jurors regularly read any magazines or newspapers in 
which it had been demonstrated that the insurance advertisements or articles 
appeared." Maj. op. at 1063. Only if one of these questions is answered in the 
affirmative may the attorney follow up with other 
questions.

 
 

[¶72.]  The experienced trial advocate can 
testify that the first of these questions is useless. It so strongly suggests a 
negative response that it is unlikely any juror would answer it affirmatively. 
No juror wants to admit that he or she may be "prejudiced" or "not impartial." 
This restriction upon voir dire is made more serious by the fact that once a 
negative answer is made, the majority says the inquiry is over. The lawyer is 
not allowed to probe further, even to allow a juror to qualify the negative 
answer by admitting, for example, that he or she has read insurance company propaganda 
but still thinks he or she can be impartial.

 
 

[¶73.]  The question is also much too vague to 
lead inevitably to fruitful inquiry on the insurance crisis issue. Since it does 
not indicate what kind of hearing or 
reading is sought, a juror asked this question would probably not make the 
connection between insurance company advertising and his vote in this specific case. This vagueness could not 
be clarified by the attorney because, again, no follow-up questions would be 
allowed after a negative response.

 
 

[¶74.]  The second question the majority suggests 
is a little more specific, but is also flawed. It assumes that only a regular 
reader of one of the target periodicals will have been affected by the 
advertising or stories on the so-called "insurance crisis." However, the juror 
who does not regularly consult a primary source of insurance company 
advertising or articles on the "insurance crisis" may nevertheless be aware of 
it. The origin of his or her awareness may be so obscure that it could never be 
directly traced to a particular magazine or newspaper. (An ad campaign on such a 
controversial topic which had no such secondary effect would be weak 
indeed!)

 
 

[¶75.]  To give an example of how this 
information influences secondary sources, consider the anecdotal or statistical 
information on the "tort crisis" which has become a part of American dialogue. 
The insurance companies, to bolster their campaign, have chosen to present 
inflammatory examples and misleading statistics regarding jury verdicts. See 
e.g., W. James Kronzer, Jury Tampering-1978 Style, 10 St. Mary's L.J. 399, 409 
(1978). Naturally, some of the more outrageous of these examples have become 
popular among commentators on the American scene and have achieved wide 
circulation outside of their original source.

 
 

[¶76.]  Here is part of a letter, dated February 
23, 1986, from a private citizen to the Laramie, Wyoming Boomerang:

 
 
            
Many competent professionals literally are being driven out of their 
fields by the unpredictable liability in their work, professionals often needed 
badly by the general public.

 
 
            
     What is 
the cause? Who is the culprit? Here are three cases detailed in July 15 '85 
"Forbes" which may help clarify the point:

 
 
            
     [*] A 
41-year-old bodybuilder entered a footrace with a refrigerator strapped to his 
back to prove his prowess. During the race, one of the straps came loose and the 
man was injured. He sued the maker of the strap. Jury award: $1 
million.

 
 
            
     [*] Two 
Maryland men 
decided to dry their hot air balloon in a commercial laundry dryer. The dryer 
exploded, injuring them. They won $885,000 in damages from American Laundry 
Machinery which manufactured the dryer. 

 
 
            
     [*] An 
overweight man with a history of coronary heart disease suffered a heart attack 
while trying to start a Sears lawn-mower charging that too much force was 
required to yank the mower's pullrope. A jury in Pennsylvania awarded him $1.2 million plus 
$550,000 for delays in settling the claim.

 
 
            
     Isolated 
cases of absurdly generous awards? Far from it.

 
 

[¶77.]  An attorney who asked jurors if they 
regularly read Forbes magazine would not "pick up" readers of this letter to the 
editor. More ominously, a prospective juror might never have read one word about 
the insurance crisis, but might have a friend or spouse or employer who had 
shared strong feelings about it with the juror. Or he might know someone in one 
of the professions which has suffered insurance cancellations or premium 
increases and has been told by his or her insurer that it is due to the "lawsuit 
crisis." As the information explosion continues, there are more and more sources 
of information available to the average citizen. Neither of the majority's 
suggested questions would necessarily catch these potential sources of 
bias.

 
 

[¶78.]  Can we really ask a plaintiff's attorney 
to find every printed reference to the "insurance crisis" which a prospective 
juror may have read, and ask the juror about his or her regular readership of 
that individual source? If so, I fear 
we are requiring the attorney to capture the sea in a 
sieve.

 
 

[¶79.]  In short, each of the questions the 
majority suggests hobbles plaintiff's ability to discover the essential factor: 
whether the juror knows of or has attitudes, feelings, or opinions about an 
"insurance crisis" which may affect his or her ability to render a fair and 
impartial verdict. Therefore, I would allow, at a minimum, the attorney to ask 
the more basic questions which would disclose the knowledge, opinions, and 
feelings of jurors upon any subject that might affect the juror (result in bias 
or prejudice) in arriving at a verdict in the case. This may include knowledge 
of claimed need for "tort reform" or "insurance crisis" if the juror knows of 
it. If the juror has no knowledge of these subjects, the questioning is at an 
end. And of course the correct question is not: "having heard of tort reform, 
are you prejudiced against a plaintiff who sues to recover damage?" The answer 
will always be "no," and no information of value is obtained. The correct 
question is: "how do you feel about tort reform?" The question is open-ended. 
The juror's answer must be more than yes or no. The juror will answer that 
question.

 
 

[¶80.]  The Borkoski court suggests the following 
which, although not the best questions designed to elicit information, are, 
nevertheless, acceptable:

 
 
            
[A]n attorney may inquire whether a prospective juror has heard or read anything to indicate 
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in higher 
insurance premiums for everyone; if so, whether the prospective juror believes 
such materials; and if so, whether that belief will interfere with the juror's 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.

 
 
Borkoski, 
594 P.2d  at 694 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶81.]  It is said that subjects such as the need 
for tort reform, excessive verdicts, the insurance crisis, and others are 
subjects jurors will discuss in the jury room. The question then is whether 
counsel would rather they be discussed openly, in court, so that each counsel 
may assess their impact and effect on a prospective juror's ability to fairly 
decide the case, or would counsel rather not know the answers? Some counsel are 
afraid to hear or unable to deal with the answers. But how otherwise can 
attorneys and litigants effectively exercise their peremptory challenges? I 
would have allowed Wardell to voir dire the prospective jurors on the insurance 
crisis issue.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GOLDEN, Justice, joins on the issue 
regarding the trial court's control of discovery as a third 
concern.

 
 

[¶82.]  I concur in the decision and in the 
dispositive opinion except in ancillary regard involving four distinguishable 
areas. Those differences which do not, however, foreclose concurrence in the 
result, include: (1) use of prejudicial-partial individual trial jurors; (2) 
voir dire expansion to establish or foreclose existence of general juror 
prejudice by institutional advertising campaigns; (3) discovery privilege for 
the litigant's private physician; and (4) instructional advisement to the jury 
for them to be informed about the consequence of their verdict, Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109 (1988).1

 
 
A. 
UNEXCUSED JURORS WHO WERE NOT FAIR AND IMPARTIAL

 
 

[¶83.]  In consideration of the segment 
designated "Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-203 (1988)," it is apparent that the two unexcused 
jurors were in no regard fair and impartial. Our society has sufficient 
potential jurors that no one with an obvious ax to grind need be included within 
the decision making group - the constitutionally required impartial jury. 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 10. This record provides compelling evidence of the existence of both 
the ox and the grindstone.

 
 

[¶84.]  We know full well the power of prejudice 
and predisposition in decision making. Our goal must remain as the majority's 
decision states: "The touchstone of a fair trial is the right to have an 
impartial decision maker." Maj. op. at 1059 (citing McDonough Power Equipment, 
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984)). See also Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255, 262 
(Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting; Lee v. 
State, 743 P.2d 296 (Wyo. 1987); and Redwine v. 
Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257 (1958). For a vivid 
example of juror partiality, see State v. Cady, 248 Kan. 743, 811 P.2d 1130 
(1991).

 
 
B. VOIR 
DIRE TO DETERMINE EFFECT DISFAVORING TORT PLAINTIFFS FROM INSTITUTIONAL 
ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS CONDUCTED BY THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

 
 

[¶85.]  A second area, which in reality reaches 
the same concern, also requires a divergence for me from the majority. The 
segment is entitled "Insurance Crisis." Institutional advertising does not just 
come out of the woodwork or exist for insurance companies to incur expenses to 
offset profits. See, for informational purposes, New York Public Interest 
Research Group, Inc. by Wathen v. Insurance Information Institute by Moore, 140 
Misc.2d 920, 531 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1988), aff'd 161 A.D.2d 204, 554 N YS.2d 590 
(1990). Insurance company institutional advertising has at least a dual 
objective. First, there is a desire to influence legislators. Secondly, and 
perhaps even more pervasive, is the desire to create an atmosphere of juror 
predisposition in order to affect the result of jury verdicts. Id. at 
1012.

 
 

[¶86.]  I recognize the freedoms guaranteed for 
press and in advertising by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the preclusive guarantees provided to Wyoming citizens by Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 20. Within that recognition of the rights of the insurance 
industry to attempt preconditioning through crisis advertising, I am not 
foreclosed from continued interest in requiring fair and impartial decision 
makers to serve on juries.

 
 

[¶87.]  The trouble with the discretion 
application in the majority is to first authenticate the presiding trial judge 
to be an accomplished mind reader to divine what the jury is thinking and 
whether they have, individually, achieved preconditioning from the mass media 
advertising. Without voir dire, the trial judge cannot be factually 
knowledgeable about the effects of this campaign derived from insurance industry 
advertising. We, of course, know there is a general effect. The unknown is 
specificity of what that effect might be on this panel, and more importantly, on 
the individuals within the panel who will be chosen to render the trial 
decision. Informed knowledge by the trial judge about the participants in the 
jury panel is required to provide a basis for any proper exercise of discretion. 
See Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶88.]  Properly exercised discretion requires 
applied reason and attained knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances. 
In Martin, we reiterated Washington case law regarding discretion which was 
first stated in State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775, 784 
(1971):

 
 
            
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.

 
 
The Junker court 
added:

 
 
            
Where the decision or order of the trial court is a matter of discretion, 
it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of 
discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on 
untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.

 
 

Id.

 
 

[¶89.]  In Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2539, Lord 
Mansfield long ago said: "`Discretion, when applied to a court of justice, means 
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humor; it 
must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular.'" Tingley v. 
Dolby, 13 Neb. 
371, 14 N.W. 146, 147-48 (1882). Intrinsic to meet the Lord Mansfield rule, 
essentially restated by the Washington court in Junker and then applied by 
this court in Martin, is access to the facts from which an informed judgment, 
constituting exercised discretion, can be made. See In re Schuoler, 106 Wn.2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103, 1110 (1986) (quoting Junker, 482 P.2d at 784), where the 
court held that discretion is abused when it is "`exercised on untenable 
grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" See also In re Marriage of Tang, 57 Wn. App. 648, 789 P.2d 118 (1990). "The impartiality of the jurors is a question of 
fact to be decided by the trial court upon the basis of proper questioning." 
Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1000 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 

[¶90.]  Recognition of the relevant facts to make 
an informed judgment is required. Matter of Guardianship of F.E.H., 154 Wis.2d 
576, 453 N.W.2d 882 (1990). Similarly, the Nebraska court, in following its early opinion 
in Tingley, added: "`[Discretion] means the application of statutes and legal 
principles to all of the facts of a case.'" Goebel v. Holt County, 172 Neb. 81, 
108 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1961) (quoting Greenberg v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of San 
Francisco, 150 Neb. 695, 35 N.W.2d 772, 776 (1949)). Justice Heffernan 
recognized in McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 
(1971):

 
 
            
     In the 
first place, there must be evidence that discretion was in fact exercised. 
Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making. Rather, the term contemplates 
a process of reasoning. This process must depend on facts that are of record or 
that are reasonably derived by inference from the record and a conclusion based 
on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal 
standards.

 
 
See also 
D.H. v. State, 76 Wis.2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196, 208 (1977). With such dependency 
on the facts for exercised discretion, Rickaby v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health 
& Social Services, 98 Wis.2d 456, 297 N.W.2d 36 (1980), any real decision 
made by the trial court in this case only went so far as to leave the facts, 
which actually existed, undisclosed and unknown. This reaches my continued 
concern about adjudicating from ignorance, see Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 
142 (Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part; 
Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied 498 U.S. 836, 111 S. Ct. 106, 112 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1990), Urbigkit, J., specially concurring; Cutbirth 
v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1267 (Wyo. 1988), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; and Frias 
v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986), and approaches the result recognized by 
Chief Circuit Judge Monroe McKay, "[which] converts a rule into a license." 
United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1530 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied 498 U.S. 856, 111 S. Ct. 155, 112 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1990), 
McKay, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

 
 

[¶91.]  societally divisive subject such as the 
so-called "insurance crisis" is that the result is actually determined in 
application of the imbedded attitude of the trial judge, in application of his 
individual scope of academic exposure, and his individual attitude about the 
communicative effect of the institutionally created mass media subliminal 
advertising. Without voir dire, the trial judge only personifies and 
individualizes to himself how he thinks other people are informed and 
effectively become reactive. Furthermore, in result, any knowledgeable exercise 
of peremptory challenges by litigant's counsel on all sides is unnecessarily 
constrained when the true "bent of mind" of the jurors cannot be factually 
assessed. King v. Westlake, 264 Ark. 555, 572 S.W.2d 841 (1978); Babcock v. Northwest 
Memorial Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1989). See also Borkoski v. Yost, 182 
Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979).

 
 

[¶92.]  A current case which provides thoughtful 
discussion in recognition of modern advertising techniques supports my 
persuasion:

 
 
            
[I]nsurance companies should not be able to hide behind the rule 
prohibiting comments about insurance companies, while at the same time actively 
and substantially engaging in advertising with the motive of influencing 
potential jurors in their favor.

 
 
Kozlowski 
v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 P.2d 854, 860 
(1992).

 
 

[¶93.]  We should now recognize that realism to 
follow the logic and cogency of Justice Bistline's writing in that case by 
analysis that:

 
 
            
The insurance companies have injected the issue of the effect of lawsuits 
on insurance into the public consciousness. Their purpose served by opening the 
door to the "insurance crisis" debate, they cannot now expect to slam it shut in 
the face of plaintiffs who hope to discover the effect of the advertisements on 
the potential jurors in their case. If the tables were turned in this case, and 
the plaintiff's bar had launched a media campaign to increase jury awards in 
Bannock County by showing in graphic detail various personal injuries and the 
long term effect of same on the victims, we are convinced that the defendants in 
this case would demand the opportunity to determine whether any of the potential 
jurors had been biased against defendants in general by the 
exposure.

 
 

Id. at 
862.

 
 

[¶94.]  This court, like Idaho in Kozlowski, 
should adopt a rule "which balances the inherent possibility of prejudice from 
evidence of insurance with the recognition that such evidence is relevant to 
show bias." Id.

 
 

[¶95.]  My disagreement is generally not with the 
text of the majority. The problem presented is that without facts, the trial 
judge cannot really exercise discretion if discretion is to be defined as a 
knowledgeable decision based on facts and information. Martin, 720 P.2d 894. 
Unless the trial judge has that knowledge, exercised discretion does not exist 
if he is ignorant of what exposure this particular jury panel has actually 
received and what persuasion, if any, the national or local institutional 
advertising campaign has actually achieved. Without voir dire, decision making 
about jury attitude is essentially either totally conjectural or a judicial 
reflection of an existent predisposition. The issue is not involvement of 
insurance companies, it is prejudice and preordination of the jurors, favorable 
or unfavorable, to the American tort damage and recovery system. The guiding 
light is the constitutional requirement to provide the fair and impartial jury 
guaranteed in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.

 
 
C. 
PRIVILEGE OF THE LITIGANT'S PRIVATE PHYSICIAN TO NOT BECOME AN EXPERT WITNESS 
FOR OPPOSING LITIGANT

 
 

[¶96.]  A third concern results from the broad 
scope of this appeal and the trial court's control of discovery. It should not 
be conceded that a waiver of the statutory privilege of a physician/patient 
relationship extends beyond factual information regarding condition and 
treatment in suits for injury recovery. I do not find that filing a suit for 
bodily injury authenticates making the treating doctor an expert witness for the 
opposing litigant. Again, I do not agree with this discretional resolution to 
justify bypassing the statutory right created for a physician/patient privilege 
against enforced discovery or justifying voluntary testimony without permission 
from his patient. Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-101(a) provides:

 
 
            
     (a) The 
following persons shall not testify in certain respects:

 
 
                        
     (i) An 
attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or 
patient in that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney 
or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the 
client or patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician may be 
compelled to testify on the same subject.

 
 

[¶97.]  The rule that we write here, although 
directed to the physician/patient relationship, will equally apply to the 
attorney/client. I would more decisively control discovery of a litigant's 
lawyer or doctor. We should enforce the statutory preclusion where privilege may 
be involved by holding that a waiver by institution of a lawsuit is limited to 
factual testimony. The waiver should be expanded to permit making a professional 
into a witness during either pretrial discovery or at trial which would require 
any statement of an opinion possibly contrary in text to the interest of the 
client or patient. See W.R.E. 501; Piller By Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 N.J. Super. 
392, 476 A.2d 1279 (1984); cf. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 
Ill. App.3d 
581, 102 Ill.Dec. 172, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 3232, 97 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1987); Philip H. Corboy, Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiff's Physician 
and Defense Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant's Right to a Fair Trial, 
21 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 1001 (1990); and Elizabeth Eggleston Drigotas, Restricting Ex 
Parte Interviews With Nonparty Treating Physicians: Crist v. Moffatt [326 N.C. 
326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990)], 69 N.C.L.Rev. 1381 (1991). Obviously, if plaintiff 
(or defendant) designates his own physician to give an expert opinion, then 
discovery is justified as to what the opinion might be. Lacking that 
designation, I totally fail to find justification for this statutorily precluded 
fishing expedition in discovery and add this only as another reason for 
justification adopted by the court in this regard in present 
decision.

 
 

[¶98.]  I specifically agree with the trial 
court, and the majority of this court in result, regarding the denial of 
discovery directed to asking the treating physician for an expert opinion. I do 
not agree that the denial of realistic and appropriately directed voir dire was 
discretionally justified. This would leave the undisclosed insurance company's 
advertising campaign totally uncontrolled in its intended affect for jury 
education. Consequently, the jury panel membership would be unplumbed regarding 
the right of an injured person to recover when he has been negligently harmed. 
In aspects of this decision not otherwise discussed, I would concur in the 
result and the logical resolution made in this majority's opinion, except for a 
final subject which I find requires additional thought.

 
 
D. 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WITH MULTIPLE LITIGANTS

 
 

[¶99.]  Some additional consideration is due the 
special concurrence of Justice Cardine regarding peremptory challenges. In 
general, I agree with his criticism, analysis and conclusion. I fear, however, 
for prospective analysis in development of the Wyoming law, that we may be 
running very hard to catch the horse to only find that the saddle horse is no 
longer straying from our immediate control.

 
 

[¶100.]            
As noted in the majority opinion, the Wyoming law on peremptory challenges has been 
effectively re-defined by court rule effective March 24, 1992. Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-202 (1988) has been superseded in result by adoption of the identical 
language obtained from federal law provided in 28 U.S.C.S. § 1870 (Law.Co-op. 
1989), applicable to civil cases: 

 
 
            
Peremptory challenges. - Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a 
single party for the making of challenges or the court may allow additional 
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or 
jointly.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
47(c).

 
 

[¶101.]            
The definable charge from Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-202 is to augment trial court 
discretion and direction to the concept advanced by Justice Cardine in his 
special concurrence - essential fairness and numerical equality unless real 
adversity is demonstrated by the party or parties requesting the unequal 
number.

 
 

[¶102.]            
This application has worked fairly consistently for the federal court 
system for an extended time. 9 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2483 at 474 (1971 & Supp. 1992). The criteria is 
exercised discretion, John Long Trucking, Inc. v. Greear, 421 F.2d 125 (10th 
Cir. 1970); the test is sound and reasonable application by the court. Standard 
Industries, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 829, 94 S. Ct. 56, 38 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1973); Albina Engine & Mach. Works, 
Inc. v. Abel, 305 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1962); Globe Indem. Co. v. Stringer, 190 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1951). Finally, 
the trial court's discretion under procedure, statute or rule is considerable, 
but it is not unlimited. Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 852, 105 S. Ct. 172, 83 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1984). It is further noted 
that the augmented responsiveness of the pretrial conference rule now provided 
in W.R.C.P. 16 explicitly invites early decision on multi-party peremptory 
challenge alignment. See Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation, 179 
Mont. 305, 588 P.2d 493 (1978).

 
 
            
     The 
District Courts should seriously consider the use of the pretrial conference as 
the best procedure to be used in resolving questions such as the number of 
peremptory challenges to be allowed each side. If for some rare reason the 
District Court holds no pretrial conference, the question of peremptory 
challenges should be raised [by a litigant] by appropriate written motion filed 
before the commencement of jury selection, and it should set forth all facts and 
references tending to support [that party's] claim of hostility. In any case, 
the opposing party or parties should be given adequate time to respond to the 
claims of hostility.

 
 

Id. 588 P.2d  
at 501.

 
 
E. ADEQUATE 
INSTRUCTION OF THE JURY ABOUT THEIR VERDICT - DUE PROCESS AND WYO. STAT. § 
1-1-109

 
 

[¶103.]            
Following enactment by the Wyoming State Legislature in 1973 of 
comparative negligence, 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28, two amendments followed to 
insert fairness into trial procedure. Each was directed to require jury 
instructions considering the effect of their verdict and are now restated in the 
language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B). This is the "inform the jury of their 
verdict" requirement. That language was intentionally not limited by the 
Wyoming legislature to the fifty-fifty no 
recovery result remaining from the state law of origin, Wisconsin.

 
 

[¶104.]            
I consistently believe and emphatically contend that knowledge improves 
jury results and ignorance increases unjustified accidents or mischance in 
result. See Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1987), Urbigkit, J., specially 
concurring, and Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 
1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. Furthermore, I believe in the plain meaning of 
the statutory language that the jury should be adequately informed. 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. WyomingState Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 
(Wyo. 
1991).

 
 

[¶105.]            
The difficulty exposed in this appeal is that the identical issue now 
exists in another appeal present in this court. Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, Wyoming Supreme Court, Docket No. 91-114. This 
court will have to first address in Haderlie credit for pre-verdict settlements. 
If credit is to be given by some rule of law, the significance of the jury 
instruction is minimized, but not necessarily eliminated. If credit is not 
given, then adequate jury instructions become a concern of paramount importance 
for the jury intent to be reflected properly in its verdict. This is true to 
assure adequate compensation or, conversely, to avoid double 
payment.

 
 

[¶106.]            
I do not concur with the simple denial by the majority opinion of a 
requirement for adequate instructions to inform the jury of the consequences of 
the percentage of fault as it results in actual dollars included in the verdict 
to be payable to a successful plaintiff.

 
 

[¶107.]            
If the credit if not given, my perspective of an adequate instruction 
would advise the jury that if settlement has been made, credit, if any, will be 
given in the final verdict as a matter of law so that the jury should determine, 
without considering settlements, an adequate total verdict and a fair resolution 
of percentage of fault.

 
 

[¶108.]            
If Haderlie should determine that credit will not be given in the final 
judgment for pre-verdict settlements, then the amount of the settlement should 
be included in the jury instructions for the jury's knowledge to determine "full 
recovery." This is necessary in order to avoid either underpayment or payment of 
more than the total damages. Without this instructional assistance, we leave the 
jury with a requirement to speculate about the absence of some actors from the 
active litigative process. Whatever those assumptions might be, e.g., 
settlement, bankruptcy or insolvency, since driven by guess and chance, the 
deliberative process is not provided required knowledge for the result to 
reflect consequent fairness and validity in the entered verdict. The difference 
between a developed assumption by the jury of a last chance or another chance, 
in itself, can produce a monumental difference in the award 
given.

 
 

[¶109.]            
Consequently, as we await the decision in Haderlie, I will continue 
strong disagreement with any prejudgment here as to adequate instructions in 
order for the jury to be "inform[ed] of the consequence of its determination of 
the percentage of fault." Only with adequate instructions for an informed jury 
will the litigative system be able to proceed to reasoned justice instead of 
accident and misassumption from ignorance. Theobold v. Angelos, 40 N.J. 295, 191 A.2d 465 (1963); Greenemeier by Redington v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710 (Colo. 
1986).

 
 

[¶110.]            
Consequently, I concur in the decision with the differences from the text 
of the decision as enumerated.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 
states in part:

 
 
            
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party 
shall:

 
 
            
(i) If a jury trial:

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
            
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the 
percentage of fault.