Case Title: Johnson v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-050


Carol Johnson                                Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Washington Superior Court

Robert Johnson                               May Term, 1990


Alan W. Cheever, J.

         Cheney, Brock & Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Valsangiacomo, Detora, McQuesten, Rose & Grearson, Barre, for defendant-
           appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


              DOOLEY, J.   Carol (plaintiff) and Robert (defendant) Johnson were
divorced in December, 1988 by the Washington Superior Court following a
sixteen-year marriage.  At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was thirty-
nine years of age and defendant was thirty-eight years of age.  Defendant
appeals from the trial court's property distribution and maintenance award
orders.  We affirm.
     The parties met while they were college students and were married
several years later in August of 1972.  At the time the parties married,
plaintiff was a school teacher and defendant was a medical student.
Plaintiff paid for part of defendant's second-year tuition and all of his
         third- and fourth-year tuition.  The parties moved to Vermont in 1976 so
that defendant could complete his residency at the University of Vermont.
From the time the parties moved to Vermont, plaintiff has been a full-time
homemaker, although she is certified to teach and has occasionally been
employed as a substitute teacher.  Defendant has enjoyed a very successful
career as a physician.  The parties have three children, ages eight, eleven
and thirteen.
     Plaintiff became emotionally and physically involved with another man
in April 1987.  Defendant first realized there was a problem with the
marriage in July 1987 when plaintiff told him that she was not sure whether
she loved him.  Plaintiff's affair was inadvertently made known to defendant
in August 1987 by a minister to whom plaintiff had made the admission.  At
that time, defendant suffered from emotional difficulties, but has since
undergone therapy and is now able to maintain a full work schedule.  The
trial court found that plaintiff was at fault for the breakup of the
marriage.
     At the time of the divorce proceedings, the trial court found that
defendant's estimated earnings were $165,000 ($120,000 base salary and the
remainder in bonuses) plus an additional amount contributed to his pension
and profit-sharing plan for a gross income of approximately $210,000.  In
addition to his salary, defendant also receives health and dental
insurance, disability insurance, a car purchased by the corporation, ten
weeks of vacation, and various other benefits.  As a result of this income,
the court found that during the marriage, the parties enjoyed an above-
average standard of living:
         They skied, purchased high quality clothing, enjoyed
         superior diet, dined out frequently, acquired many
         material possessions, lived in an above-average
         neighborhood, had excellent housing, and enjoyed a
         sufficient income so that plaintiff did not need to work
         outside the home.  The plaintiff was available for full-
         time homemaker services, including meeting the
         children's needs for their growth and development by
         actively participating in their lives and schedules.

Aside from defendant's income, the court also found that the parties had
significant assets, including personal property, defendant's profit-
sharing and pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and their home.
     The court granted the divorce on the ground that the parties had lived
separate and apart for a period in excess of six months and a resumption of
marital relations was not reasonably probable, in accordance with 15 V.S.A.
{ 551(7).  The court accepted the parties' stipulation with respect to the
children and ordered that legal and physical responsibility be shared,
although plaintiff was to exercise physical responsibility for the majority
of the year.  Furthermore, defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff child
support in the amount of $625 per child per month until the children become
of age or terminated their secondary education.  The court then divided the
marital estate in half, with plaintiff and defendant receiving assets with a
value of $257,500 and $261,000 respectively.  Finally, plaintiff was
awarded rehabilitative maintenance in the amount of $1,500 per month for
ten years.
     Defendant raises four issues on appeal:  (1) the trial court erred in
awarding plaintiff rehabilitative maintenance because the uncontroverted
evidence shows that she voluntarily chooses not to support herself through
appropriate employment; (2) the unalterable ten-year period fixed for the
rehabilitative maintenance was an abuse of discretion; (3) the failure to
terminate the maintenance upon remarriage was an abuse of discretion; and
(4) the court's even distribution of the marital estate, in light of its
maintenance award, was an abuse of discretion.
     Defendant's first three arguments relate to the maintenance award.  The
trial court may award maintenance, either permanent or rehabilitative in
nature, if the spouse seeking the award: "(1) lacks sufficient income,
property, or both . . . to provide for his or her reasonable needs, and (2)
is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment at
the standard of living established during the marriage or is the custodian
of a child of the parties."  15 V.S.A. { 752(a).  If the court determines
that either spouse is entitled to maintenance pursuant to { 752(a), it must
then arrive at the amount and the duration of the award considering, among
others, the seven factors enumerated in { 752(b).  The trial court has
considerable discretion in ruling on maintenance and the party seeking to
overturn a maintenance award must show that there is no reasonable basis to
support it.  Klein v. Klein, 150 Vt. 466, 472,