Case Title: Sizemore v. Myers

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45118

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  April 16, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

BILL SIZEMORE,					

	Petitioner,					

	v.							

HARDY MYERS, Attorney General,	
State of Oregon,				

	Respondent,			

	and					

VIRGINIA MARKELL and TINA	
TURNER-MORFITT,			

	Intervenors.			

(SC S45118)

	On petition to review ballot title.

	Argued and submitted March 31, 1998.

	Gregory W. Byrne, of Byrne & Associates, P.C., Portland,
argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner.

	Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the response for respondent.  With her on the
response were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Paul B. Gamson, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the response for intervenors.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.*

	GILLETTE, J.

	Petition to review ballot title is dismissed.

	*Graber, J., resigned March 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.

		GILLETTE, J.

		This is an original proceeding to review a ballot
title that has been certified to the Secretary of State by the
Attorney General pursuant to ORS 250.067(2).  Petitioner is an
elector who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of
State concerning the Attorney General's proposed ballot title. 
See ORS 250.067(1) (providing procedure for persons to file
written comments concerning Attorney General's proposed ballot
title); ORS 250.085(2) (requiring elector, who challenges
Attorney General's ballot title, to have submitted such comments
in timely manner).  Petitioner therefore is entitled to seek
modification in this proceeding, unless some other procedural
consideration prevents him from doing so.  See generally ORS
250.085 (prescribing procedures for challenge in Supreme Court to
ballot title).

		Intervenors, the chief sponsors of the proposed
measure for which the present ballot title was prepared, assert
that there is a procedural reason why the present challenge
should not proceed -- that petitioner failed to comply with ORS
250.085(4).  ORS 250.085(4) provides:

		"An elector filing a petition [for review by the
Supreme Court of a ballot title] under this section
shall notify the Secretary of State in writing that the
petition has been filed.  The notice shall be given not
later than 5 p.m. on the next business day following
the day the petition is filed."

Petitioner acknowledges that his notice to the Secretary of State
pursuant to the requirement of ORS 250.085(4) was not timely. 
The Secretary of State did not receive the required written
notice in this case until the second business day following the
filing of the petition to review the ballot title.

		Intervenors assert that petitioner's failure to notify
the Secretary of State in a timely manner creates a
jurisdictional defect that prevents this proceeding from going
forward.  Petitioner and the Attorney General both disagree,
arguing that the requirement of ORS 250.085(4) is not
"jurisdictional."  Petitioner and the Attorney General reason
that, because the requirement of notice to the Secretary of State
is not "jurisdictional," this proceeding may go forward, unless
petitioner's untimely notice prejudiced a party to the
proceeding.(1)

		We agree with petitioner and the Attorney General that
the requirement of notice in ORS 250.085(4) is not, in the usual
sense, "jurisdictional."  Certainly, the statute does not label
the requirement as jurisdictional.  Moreover, the requirement
closely resembles those kinds of procedural requirements that, in
other kinds of cases, are regarded as administrative, rather than
jurisdictional.  See, e.g., McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home,
Inc., 296 Or 653, 656-59, 678 P2d 1222 (1984) (holding that,
under ORS 19.033, timely service of notice of appeal on trial
court clerk or court reporter is not a jurisdictional
requirement).  For the reasons that follow, we nonetheless
conclude that petitioner's failure to comply with the statutory
requirement compels dismissal of the present proceeding.

		Ballot title review proceedings are entirely a
creature of statute.  A party's right to review, the bases on
which it can be obtained, the grounds on which an objection to a
ballot title may be sustained, and the scope of this court's
authority to modify a ballot title are prescribed by statute. 
See generally ORS 250.085 (setting out criteria for, scope of,
and limits on review by Supreme Court of ballot titles for
proposed measures).  Thus, this court's authority to review a
ballot title extends only to those cases in which the statutory
prerequisites to review have been satisfied.  See, e.g., Kane v.
Keisling, 317 Or 1, 853 P2d 1311 (1993) (refusing to consider
challenges to ballot title that had not been made first in
writing to Secretary of State); No Special Rights Committee v.
Keisling, 312 Or 459, 821 P2d 1091 (1991) (committee not an
"elector" and, therefore, not entitled to have ballot title
reviewed; individual who signed objections to proposed ballot
title only in capacity as chairman of committee also not entitled
to have ballot title reviewed).  In denying review in those
cases, this court did not refer to the pertinent provisions of
ORS 250.085 as "jurisdictional."  Instead, the court recognized
the limits on its authority created by the statutory arrangement
and kept itself within those limits.

		This case is no different.  ORS 250.085(4) is precise
in its requirement that a party seeking review of a ballot title
"shall," by 5 p.m. on the next business day following the filing
of the party's petition for review of the ballot title, give
notice of that filing to the Secretary of State.  That
requirement is but one of a series of time-sensitive provisions
in the statute aimed at securing a speedy resolution of the
ballot title challenge, so that the "orderly and timely
circulation of the petition [for the proposed measure]" may
proceed.  ORS 250.085(7); see also ORS 250.085(3) (setting out
timelines for petitioning for review of ballot title).  Reading
the statute in the light of its text, context, and the case law
surrounding it, see PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (describing that process of
statutory interpretation), we find the meaning of ORS 250.085(4)
to be clear.  In order to be entitled to obtain review of a
ballot title, petitioner was required to give timely written
notice to the Secretary of State.  Such notice did not occur. 
The petition for review of the ballot title certified by the
Attorney General must be dismissed.

		Petition to review ballot title is dismissed. 

1. 	No one asserts in this case that there was, in fact,
any prejudice to a party caused by petitioner's failure timely to
file his notice with the Secretary of State within the period
provided in ORS 250.085(4).