Case Title: State ex rel. Chapnick v. E. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1585

Docket Number: 20010090

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Chapnick v. E. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 93 Ohio St.3d 
449, 2001-Ohio-1585] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CHAPNICK, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. EAST 
CLEVELAND CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT AND 
CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Chapnick v. E. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 449.] 
Schools — Appeal from court of appeals’ grant writ of mandamus, compelling 
East Cleveland City School District Board of Education to issue an 
employment contract to relator and to pay him all back pay and benefits 
to which he is entitled, dismissed as moot — Denial of relator’s request 
for attorney fees affirmed. 
(No. 01-90 — Submitted September 19, 2001 — Decided October 17, 2001.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
78088. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  From September 1990 through July 2000, appellant and 
cross-appellee, East Cleveland City School District Board of Education (“board”), 
employed appellee and cross-appellant, Stephen Chapnick, in the position of 
business manager under a series of two-year contracts.  These contracts contained 
the caption “Administrator’s Contract” and included the following language: 
 
“WHEREAS, the Board of Education has determined it necessary to 
contract for the employment of an administrative officer pursuant to Section 
3319.02, Ohio Revised Code, * * * the Board of Education has approved such 
recommendation and has authorized this contract.” 
 
While employed as a business manager for the district, Chapnick 
performed various duties, including negotiating, preparing, and executing 
contracts concerning food, transportation, maintenance, and security services, and 
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recommending the hiring, termination, and discipline for classified staff, which 
included food service workers, transportation employees, custodial staff, and 
maintenance employees. 
 
Chapnick’s last contract with the district covered the period from August 
1998 through July 2000.  The board did not give written notice of its intention not 
to reemploy Chapnick on or before the last day of March 2000 as required by 
R.C. 3319.02(C) in the contractual employment of certain school administrators. 
 
After the board failed to reemploy Chapnick, he filed a complaint in the 
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.  In the complaint as subsequently 
amended, Chapnick requested a writ of mandamus to compel the board to employ 
him for a term of two years commencing in August 2000 and ending in July 2002 
at the same salary plus any increments to which he may be entitled, a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the board from transferring him to a position of lesser 
responsibility during the two-year period, and an award of reasonable attorney 
fees. 
 
The parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the court of appeals 
subsequently granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to issue an “other 
administrator’s” employment contract to Chapnick pursuant to R.C. 3319.02 and 
to pay him all back pay and benefits to which he is entitled.  The court of appeals 
also denied Chapnick’s requests for a writ of prohibition and for attorney fees. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon the board’s appeal and 
Chapnick’s cross-appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Appeal 
 
In its appeal, the board asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting 
the writ of mandamus because Chapnick was not entitled to notice under R.C. 
3319.02 and he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Amicus 
curiae Ohio School Boards Association filed an appellate brief in support of the 
board’s appeal. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
By letter dated June 12, 2001, however, the board informed Chapnick that 
it had voted to reinstate him to the business manager position, to compensate him 
for back pay for the period from August 1, 2000, to credit him with a year of 
service for his pension, and to suspend his contract without pay pending 
termination.  On June 20, Chapnick moved to dismiss the board’s appeal as moot 
because of the board’s reinstatement of him. 
 
We grant Chapnick’s motion and dismiss the board’s appeal as moot.  
According to Chapnick, the board has now afforded him the extraordinary relief 
in mandamus that the court of appeals ordered.  See Miner v. Witt (1910), 82 Ohio 
St. 237, 92 N.E. 21, syllabus; cf. State ex rel. Jones v. O’Connor (1999), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 426, 704 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (“Mandamus does not lie to compel an act that 
has already been performed”).  Nor is any exception to the mootness doctrine 
implicated here.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 229, 231, 729 N.E.2d 1182, 1185.  The board, in fact, did not file any 
timely response opposing Chapnick’s motion. 
 
Therefore, the board’s appeal is moot and is dismissed. 
Cross-Appeal 
 
In his cross-appeal, Chapnick asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
denying his request for attorney fees.  Chapnick claims that he is entitled to 
attorney fees because they constitute damages related to his mandamus action 
under R.C. 2731.11 and the board’s bad faith necessitated his prosecution of the 
writ action. 
 
Chapnick’s assertions are meritless.  His attorney fees are not recoverable 
as damages under R.C. 2731.11.  State ex rel. Murphy v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 61 
Ohio St.2d 312, 313, 15 O.O.3d 386, 387, 401 N.E.2d 923, 924; State ex rel. 
Grosser v. Boy (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 184, 185, 75 O.O.2d 228, 347 N.E.2d 539, 
540; State ex rel. Gerchak v. Tablack (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 222, 226-227, 690 
N.E.2d 93, 96. 
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Regarding Chapnick’s remaining contention, “ ‘[t]he general rule in Ohio 
is that, absent a statutory provision allowing attorney fees as costs, the prevailing 
party is not entitled to an award of attorney fees unless the party against whom the 
fees are taxed was found to have acted in bad faith.’ ”  State ex rel. Kabatek v. 
Stackhouse (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 55, 55-56, 6 OBR 73, 74, 451 N.E.2d 248, 249, 
quoting State ex rel. Crockett v. Robinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 363, 369, 21 
O.O.3d 228, 232, 423 N.E.2d 1099, 1103.  Chapnick did not introduce any 
evidence or argument in the court of appeals to support his contention that the 
board acted in bad faith.  Murphy, 61 Ohio St.2d at 313, 15 O.O.3d at 387, 401 
N.E.2d at 924.  Further, no evidentiary hearing on the motion is required.  See, 
e.g., In re Removal of Osuna (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 339, 342, 688 N.E.2d 42, 
44 (“[T]he trial court followed the overwhelming weight of authority in Ohio in 
deciding that a hearing is not always necessary before overruling a motion for 
attorney fees”). 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
denying Chapnick’s request for attorney fees. 
Appeal dismissed in part 
and judgment affirmed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Dinn, Hochman, Potter & Levy LLC and Steven B. Potter, for appellee and 
cross-appellant. 
 
Baker & Hostetler LLP and Tom A. King, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Bricker & Eckler LLP and Kimball H. Carey, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Ohio School Boards Association. 
__________________