Case Title: Lakes v. U.S. Bank Trust

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 85

Docket Number: 79324

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
on

 

137 Nev., Advance Opinion 8S
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DANIEL LAKES, AN INDIVIDUAL, No. 79324
Appellant,

vs. :
U.S. BANK TRUST, TRUSTEE FOR FILED i
LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION

TRUST, DEC 30 2021
Respondent. oO

Appeal from a district court summary judgment quieting title
in a real property action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Ronald J. Israel, Judge.

Affirmed.

Hartwell Thalacker, Ltd., and Doreen M. Spears Hartwell and Laura J.
‘Thalacker, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Ballard Spahr LLP and Maria A. Gall and Joel E. Tasca, Las Vegas;
‘McGuire Woods LLP and Gilbert Charles Dickey and Stephanie J. Peel, Los
Angeles, California, and Washington, D.C.,

for Respondent.

Fennemore Craig, P.C., and Leslie Bryan Hart and John D. Tennert III,

Reno,
for Amicus Curiae Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.

u-3110

 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION
By the Court, CADISH, J.:

By statute, a homeowners’ association (HOA) obtains a lien
afforded superpriority status for a portion of delinquent HOA assessments.
When the HOA properly forecloses on that lien, it extinguishes the first deed
of trust on the property. The first deed-of-trust beneficiary can protect its
interest therein, however, by tendering the superpriority portion of the
HOAs lien before the foreclosure sale. While appellant questions whether
that happened here, the undisputed evidence confirms that it did, such that
no issue of fact exists as to the first deed of trust's survival.

However, appellant also challenges the district court’s decision
quieting title in favor of respondent, the first deed of trust holder, arguing
that respondent cannot enforce its first-priority interest in the property
because the assignment evidencing its status as the first deed-of-trust
beneficiary was not recorded until after appellant recorded his grant,
bargain, and sale deed showing the interest he obtained in the property
from a successor in interest to the purchaser at the HOA’s foreclosure sale.
We are not persuaded by appellant's proposed reading of the recording
statute, Appellant acquired only the interest in the property that was
conveyed to him when he purchased it, and because of the superpriority
tender, he took the property subject to the first deed-of-trust lien recorded
years before the HOA foreclosure sale. The fact that the deed-of-trust
‘assignment was recorded after appellant recorded his deed does not affect
respondent's right to enforce its lien because the assignment does not

change the status of appellant's title, which was always subordinate to the

 

 
om

 

interest secured by the first deed of trust. As the district court properly
quieted title in respondent's favor, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2007, a borrower purchased the underlying property
through a loan secured by a first deed of trust duly recorded with the Clark
County Recorder. In May 2007, Freddie Mac purchased the loan. In 2008,
the HOA recorded a lien for $625.04 in delinquent assessments. ‘The
following month, the lender's nominee recorded an assignment of the deed
of trust to Freddie Mac’s loan servicer, Oewen Loan Servicing, LLC. That
same month, the HOA recorded a notice of default and election to sell the
property listing the amount owed as $1,668.57. In April 2015, the HOA
recorded a notice of foreclosure sale stating that the property was in default
under the lien for delinquent assessments recorded in 2008. Ocwen
tendered $3,241.52 to satisfy the superpriority portion of the lien, which the
HOA accepted, but the HOA nevertheless foreclosed on its lien in August
2015. Over the next five months, the property was transferred three more
times, with the final conveyance made to appellant Daniel Lakes in January
2016, by a grant, bargain, and sale deed, which expressly provided that his
interest was subject to any claims, encumbrances, or liens. Lakes recorded
his deed in January 2016. In the meantime, in December 2015, respondent
U.S. Bank Trust acquired the loan from Freddie Mac. In May 2016, Ocwen
assigned the first deed of trust to U.S. Bank Trust. Ocwen recorded the
assignment in the Clark County Recorder's Office that same month.

Both parties sought to quiet title. The district court granted
U.S. Bank Trust's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lakes
took title to the property subject to U.S. Bank Trust's first deed of trust
because the superpriority tender cured the default, such that the ensuing
foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. The district court

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also rejected Lakes's argument that title should be quieted in his favor as a
bona fide purchaser because he lacked notice of U.S. Bank Trust's interest
in the property. In so doing, the court concluded that “Lakes’ argument that
USS. Bank's interest in the Deed of Trust is void and unenforceable as to
him pursuant to N.S. § 111.325 is without merit because the timing of the
Assignment is immaterial to the HOA Sale not extinguishing the Deed of
‘Trust.” The district court certified its order as final under NRCP 54(b). On
appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that U.S.
Bank Trust's failure to record its assignment of the deed of trust before
Lakes recorded his grant, bargain, and sale deed created a genuine issue of
material fact as to Lakes’s status as a bona fide purchaser. We granted U.S.
Bank Trust's petition for review under NRAP 40B.
DISCUSSION

Lakes argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether Oewen tendered enough to cover the superpriority amount of the
HOAs lien. While the record does not contain documentation expressly
stating the superpriority amount, we may nonetheless infer from
admissible evidence in the record that Oewen tendered enough to satisfy it.
‘See Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC (Diamond Spur), 134 Nev.
604, 606, 427 P.3d 113, 117 (2018) (stating that, as explained in prior
decisions, “{a] plain reading of [NRS 116.3116(2) (2012)] indicates that the
superpriority portion of an HOA lien includes only charges for maintenance
and nuisance abatement, and nine months of unpaid [common expense]
assessments”). Here, the HOA’s notice of delinquent assessments stated
that the borrower owed $625.04 in assessments. Thus, the superpriority
amount of the HOA’s lien could not exceed $625.04. See NRS 116.3116(2)
(2013) (describing the superpriority component of an HOA's lien as “the
assessments for common expenses...which would have become

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due . . . during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action
to enforce the lien” (emphasis added)); Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray
Eagle Way v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 133 Nev. 21, 26, 388 P.3d 226,
231 (2017) (recognizing that under the pre-2015 version of NRS 116.3116,
serving a notice of delinquent assessments constitutes institution of an
action to enforce the lien). Ocwen tendered $3,241.52, which the HOA
accepted.! Thus, the district court properly determined that the tender,
which was in excess of the superpriority portion of the HOA’s lien as shown
on the notice of delinquent assessments, cured the default as to that portion
ofthe lien such that the ensuing foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first
deed of trust. Diamond Spur, 134 Nev. at 606-09, 427 P.3d at 118-21; see
Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005)
(reviewing de novo a district court order granting summary judgment); ¢f.
Prop. Plus Invs., LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 133 Nev. 462,
467, 401 P.3d 728, 731-32 (2017) (observing that an HOA must restart the

foreclosure process to enforce a second superpriority default).

‘Although Lakes asserts that his declaration stating that he paid past
due fees and assessments after acquiring the property creates an issue of
fact as to whether Ocwen's payment satisfied the HOA’s superpriority lien,
the declaration does not state when those past due fees and assessments
accrued or what they covered. Also, because the HOA conveyed alll of its
rights, title, and interest to the purchaser at the HOA foreclosure sale, any
fees and assessments that were unpaid when Lakes acquired the property
must have accrued after the foreclosure sale, such that they would not be
part of the superpriority lien that precipitated the foreclosure sale at issue
here. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005) (providing the standard to survive summary judgment); Cuzze v.
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 602-03, 172 P.3d 131, 134
(2007) (explaining the moving and opposing parties’ respective burdens of
production and persuasion on summary judgment).

 
Relying on NRS 111.825, Lakes argues that if the first deed of
trust survived the foreclosure sale, the district court nevertheless erred in
quieting title in U.S. Bank Trust's favor because he recorded his grant,
bargain, and sale deed showing his interest in the property before Ocwen
recorded the assignment of the deed of trust to U.S. Bank Trust, making
the deed of trust unenforceable. We disagree.

NRS 111.325 provides that unrecorded conveyances of real
property, as defined by NRS 111.010 and required to be recorded by NRS
111.315, “shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith
and for a valuable consideration, of the same real property, or any portion
thereof, where his or her own conveyance shalll be first duly recorded.” The
statute does not speak to the precise question at issue, i.
who acquires the beneficial interest in the first deed of trust by post-
foreclosure assignment may enforce its interest therein when another party

., whether a party

 

who purchased the property downstream from the foreclosure sale (which
was void as to the interest secured by the deed of trust) records his grant,

bargain, and sale deed before the recording of the deed-of-trust assignment,

 

Construing the statute in accordance with reason and in a way that
harmonizes legislative purpose and policy, we conclude that it does not
apply to allow Lakes to avoid all indebtedness on the property, including
the duly recorded first deed-of-trust lien. Pascua v. Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, 135 Nev. 29, 31, 434 P.3d 287, 289 (2019) (“[W]here the
statutory language does not speak to the issue before us, we will construe it
according to that which reason and public policy would indicate the
legislature intended.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).

Here, Lakes does not qualify as a subsequent purchaser under
NRS 111.325 because Ocwen assigned the first deed of trust to U.S. Bank

 

 
‘Trust roughly four months after Lakes obtained his subordinate interest in
the property via the grant, bargain, and sale deed. His interest was
subordinate because when he purchased the property in 2016, it was
‘encumbered by a secured creditor's senior lien, as evidenced by the duly
recorded first deed of trust. On the date of the foreclosure sale, the HOA
owned no interest beyond its subpriority claims for assessments and related
fees. The purpose of the recording statute is to protect those who honestly
believe they are acquiring a good title. See SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. First
Horizon Home Loans, 134 Nev. 19, 22, 409 P.3d 891, 893 (2018) (“The very
Purpose of recording statutes is to impart notice to a subsequent
purchaser.”); Allison Steel Mfg. Co v. Bentonite, Inc., 86 Nev. 494, 497, 471
P.2d 666, 668 (1970) (“Recording statutes provide ‘constructive notice’ of the
existence of an outstanding interest in land, thereby putting a prospective
purchaser on notice that he may not be getting all he expected.”); see Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Casey, 52 N.E.3d 1030, 1035 (Mass. 2016) (observing that
the state's recording statute “requires that a mortgage be recorded . .. in
order to provide effective notice to anyone beyond the parties to the
mortgage transaction and those with actual notice of it”).

‘A post-foreclosure, off-record deed-of-trust assignment is not
material to Lakes's title because the deed-of-trust lien recorded in 2007 was
enforceable against the property when Lakes purchased his interest in
2016. The property was not sold to Lakes free and clear of all claims, liens,
and encumbrances. And his deed reflects that. Lakes purchased title
subject to the recorded first deed-of-trust lien, and neither the assignment

toU.S. Bank Trust in May 2016 nor the statutory requirement for recording

the assignment change Lakes's interest in the property from what he
acquired in January 2016. Cf. Kapila v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 184 F.3d

 

 
1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the owner of a mortgage
interest may transfer its interest after the mortgagor files for bankruptcy
because “the perfected mortgage is neither actually nor potentially the
property of the debtor,” who holds only legal title, rather than an equitable
interest, in the mortgaged property). Thus, applying NRS 111.325 to these
facts, Lakes and U.S. Bank Trust do not have conflicting claims to the same
interest because Lakes's interest in the property was always subordinate to
the first deed-of-trust lien, which remained unsatisfied. The fact that the
beneficiary of the first deed of trust may subsequently assign its interest to
another party does not affect that interest. In that regard, the unreleased
first deed of trust, recorded in 2007, provided notice of the first-priority lien,
no matter who the beneficiary. It is impossible for a bona fide purchaser to
exist under these circumstances, as any purchaser would have constructive
notice of the deed-of-trust lien, see NRS 111.820, and could not assume the
lien was satisfied absent a record of satisfaction, see NRS 106.260-.270, or
until ten years after the maturity date, see NRS 106.240.

As the district court found, U.S. Bank Trust's deed-of-trust lien
is enforceable under NRS 106.210, which governs recording requirements
for deed-of-trust assignments. That statute provides that such assignments
must be recorded before the assignee may exercise the power of sale? NRS
106.210 (requiring that “any assignment of the beneficial interest under a
deed of trust must be recorded” to be enforced, and “the trustee under the
deed of trust may not exercise the power of sale pursuant to NRS 107.080

2Although Lakes relies on Allen v. Webb in his supplemental reply
brief as supporting his interpretation of NRS 111.325 and his status as a
bona fide purchaser, Allen is inapposite because it addressed the recording
of a new deed of trust, not a post-foreclosure assignment of an already
recorded deed of trust. 87 Nev. 261, 264, 485 P.2d 677, 678 (1971).

 

 
unless and until the assignment is recorded”). NRS 111.325 and NRS
106.210 complement each other, as the former allows avoidance of
unrecorded instruments against subsequent bona fide purchasers for
valuable consideration. The fact that the deed-of-trust assignment here was
not recorded until after Lakes took title simply affects who could enforce it
at that time, not whether Lakes was on notice of its existence. Lakes was
not induced into purchasing the property as a result of U.S. Bank Trust not
recording the assignment until May 2016, and he was not prejudiced by U.S.
Bank Trust's post-foreclosure recordation of its assignment, as the first
deed of trust, no matter who owned it, was unreleased when the HOA
foreclosed on its subordinate lien. Cf. Smith v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 1552, 1558-
59 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that purchaser at foreclosure sale under a
second mortgage was not “without notice” of a mortgage assignee's interest
in the first mortgage, such that he could benefit from Florida's recording
statute, because he had implied actual notice of that interest from the
original lender's recording of the first mortgage); Bank W. v. Henderson, 874
P.2d 632, 637 (Kan. 1994) (reasoning that a bank that failed to record its
assignment of a first-priority mortgage until after a subordinate lienholder
foreclosed in 1991 did not “hold a secret equity by virtue of its failure to
record its assignment,” because the underlying first mortgage, duly
recorded in 1973, gave effective notice of a superior lien, and it “mattered
not who actually owned the first mortgage; it was enough that [others] had
notice of it”)
CONCLUSION
Given that U.S. Bank Trust recorded its assignment before it

counterclaimed to quiet title, and because Lakes does not qualify as a
subsequent purchaser under NRS 111.325, the district court properly

 

 
concluded that U.S. Bank Trust may enforce its deed-of-trust lien in
accordance with NRS 106.210. We therefore affirm the summary judgment
in favor of U.S. Bank Trust.

‘We concur:

pAcrtct, Cd. ade

Hardesty Parraguirre