Case Title: 2-H Ranch Co., Inc. v. Simmons

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5729

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2-H Ranch Co., Inc. v. Simmons1983 WY 13658 P.2d 68Case Number: 5729Case Number: 5729Decided: 02/09/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
2-H RANCH COMPANY, INC., 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), and CHARLES R. SPRATT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ROBERT C. 
SIMMONS, EVA F. SIMMONS, ROBERT C. MAY, AND ILA M. MAY, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS), 
and PETER W. DeWITT AND LINDA G. DeWITT, APPELLEES (INTERVENORS). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

Charles R. 
Spratt, Laramie, 
on brief, for 
appellant.

No appearance for appellees.

Before ROONEY*, C.J., RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE[fn**], JJ., and 
GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal1 from the district court's denial of 
2-H Ranch, Inc.'s (appellant's) motion to set aside a sheriff's sale of sixty 
residential lots belonging to appellant located in the City of Buffalo, Johnson 
County, Wyoming. The 
sheriff's sale was conducted pursuant to a writ of execution issued on what was 
purported to be a judgment entered against appellant by the district 
court.

[¶2.]     We will reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     Appellant presents two 
issues for our review:

"1. When two parties 
stipulate that one shall have a lien on the property of the other, can the lien 
be foreclosed by sale?

"2. Should a Sheriff's 
sale of real property be set aside when the sale fails to conform to statutory 
requirements?"

We need only 
address appellant's first issue to dispose of this appeal.

[¶4.]     The dispute that led to 
this appeal began when the Simmonses and the Mays (appellees) filed suit against 
appellant for breach of contract. Appellees alleged that appellant breached an 
agreement it had entered with appellees in which appellant sold several house 
lots located in an as yet unimproved subdivision of Buffalo to appellees with 
the understanding that public sewer and water service would be installed within 
thirty to sixty days after the sale. Appellees complained that they relied on 
that understanding in making their purchase since without the promised 
improvements appellees could not obtain the building permits required to 
commence construction of residences on their lots. Appellees complained that the 
sewer and water service was never installed in the subdivision and, as a result, 
they were harmed financially due to their inability to build homes on the lots. 
Appellant denied making any agreement with appellees to install sewer and water 
service in the subdivision.

[¶5.]     The trial of this suit 
began on October 27, 1981. After the trial had begun, but before the court had 
heard the case, a recess was called during which a settlement agreement was 
reached between the parties. On December 22, 1981, the district court entered 
what is purported to be a judgment in the matter. It 
provided:

"JUDGMENT

"THIS MATTER CAME ON for 
hearing on October 27, 1981 in the District Court for Johnson County, Wyoming. The plaintiffs were represented by 
Blair Klein, Esq., and the defendants were represented by Charles R. Spratt, 
Esq.

"Prior to commencement of 
trial, Blair Klein moved the Court for an order premitting [sic] him to withdraw 
as counsel for the plaintiff Jolue Hook and that she be dismissed from the 
action as a plaintiff without prejudice. In support of this oral motion, Mr. 
Klein testified that he had been unable to contact Mrs. Hook and that attempts 
to located [sic] Mrs. Hook by the other plaintiffs had also been unsuccessful, 
and therefore he could not effectively represent her. Following arguments of 
counsel, the Court found that the motion should be 
granted.

"After commencement of 
the trial, the parties met during a recess and following negotiations advised 
the Court that they had reached an agreement for settlement of the action. The 
parties stipulated and agreed as follows: 

"1. That the defendant, 
2H Ranch, Inc., would refund to the plaintiffs Robert C. Simmons and Eva F. 
Simmons all monies paid by them for the property which was purchased from the 
defendant corporation, together with interest at the rate of 15% per 
annum.

"2. That the defendant, 
2H Ranch, Inc., shall receive from the plaintiffs, Robert C. Simmons and Eva F. 
Simmons, a good and sufficient warranty deed free from encumbrance or defect to 
the following described real property:

"Lots 1, 2, and 3 of 
Block 77 of the North Burlington Re-subdivision to the City of Buffalo, Wyoming 
according to the official plat thereof.

"upon tender of such 
payment by the defendant, 2H Ranch, Inc.

"3. That such payment 
shall be due and payable within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, and 
if not paid in full shall constitute a lien against the assets of the defendant, 
2H Ranch, Inc.

"4. That the total sum 
due and owing from the defendant, 2H Ranch, Inc. to the plaintiffs Robert C. 
Simmons and Eva F. Simmons, is as follows:

"(A) The sum of $28,500 
together with simple interest at the rate of 15% per annum from May 15, 
1979.

"(B) The sum of $1,091.25 
together with simple interest at the rate of 15% per annum from September 18, 
1979.

"(C) The sum of $1,094.00 
together with simple interest at the rate of 15% per annum from August 20, 
1980.

"(D) That such payment 
shall be made by certified or cashier's check payable to `Robert C. Simmons, Eva 
F. Simmons, and Blair Klein'.

"5. That the last two 
payments (`B' and `C' above) are reimbursement to the plaintiffs Robert C. 
Simmons and Eva F. Simmons for realtor fees paid in further transfers made by 
plaintiffs Robert C. Simmons and Eva F. Simmons to the plaintiffs Robert C. May 
and Ila M. May. All plaintiffs agree to cooperate with the defendant, 2H Ranch, 
Inc., to obtain refunds from the realtors to whom these payments were made, 
however, it shall be the burden of the defendant 2H Ranch, Inc. for payment of 
any legal costs in maintaining any action for such 
refunds.

"6. That with 
the tender of payment by 2H Ranch, Inc. in accordance with the terms set forth 
above, the delivery of the aforesaid warranty deed, and the cooperation of the 
plaintiffs in obtaining a refund from the realtors, this action shall be 
dismissed with prejudice to all parties, and each party shall bear his or her 
own costs." (Emphasis added.)

[End]

The foregoing 
"judgment" was a separate document, signed by the district judge and dated the 
22nd day of December, 1981.

[¶6.]     On February 25, 1982, 
appellees filed a precipe for execution requesting that the clerk of the 
district court issue a writ of execution against the property of the appellant 
located in Johnson County, Wyoming. The clerk of court, that same day, issued a 
writ of execution on the aforementioned "judgment" of December 22, 1981, for 
$43, 245.45 plus $12.61 interest per day from February 25, 1982. It directed the 
Johnson County Sheriff to execute against the property of appellant located in 
Johnson County, Wyoming. See §§ 1-17-101 and 1-17-308, W.S. 1977. The sheriff 
proceeded to levy execution upon sixty lots owned by appellant in Buffalo. See § 
1-17-310, W.S. 1977. On February 26, 1982, the sheriff, pursuant to § 
1-17-316(a), W.S. 1977, appointed three disinterested property owners to 
appraise the sixty lots upon which he intended to levy execution. On March 1, 
1982, the appraisers returned an appraisal of $259,000 for appellant's sixty 
lots. The sheriff then proceeded to advertise the sixty lots belonging to 
appellant for sale. The property was to be sold to the highest bidder at public 
vendue on March 29, 1982. On the day of the sale, only one bid - a bid of 
$135,500 - was received. That bid was well below the two-thirds of appraised 
value required by § 1-17-316(c), supra, for a valid sale. The bidder then agreed 
to leave his $135,500 bid open for ten days. 

[¶7.]     On March 30, 1982, the 
sheriff reconvened the appraisers he had appointed previously, advised them that 
the only bid received for appellant's property had been for $135,500, and 
requested that they reappraise appellant's property. They did so, and, on that 
same day, returned an appraisal of $135,500 for appellant's sixty lots. The 
sheriff and appellees then, still on March 30, 1982, moved that the district 
court confirm the sheriff's sale of appellant's property for $135,500. The 
motion for confirmation was set for hearing on April 6, 1982. Appellant's 
attorney, by his own account, received notification of the pending motion 
hearing on the evening of April 5, 1982, and was, therefore, unable to be 
present for the April 6 hearing. The confirmation hearing was held as scheduled, 
and, after the district court, pursuant to § 1-17-321, W.S. 1977, found that the 
sale was made in all respects in conformity to the Code of Civil Procedure, it 
confirmed the sale.

[¶8.]     On May 10, 1982, 
appellant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.2 to set aside the sheriff's sale. 
After a hearing on the motion, the district court denied appellant's motion on 
June 29, 1982; this appeal followed.

[¶9.]     Appellant's first 
argument is that the judgment entered by the district court would not permit the 
issuance of the writ of execution against its property; therefore, the entire 
execution and sale procedure was conducted without authority and should have 
been set aside. We agree with that contention. The judgment entered by the 
district court on December 22, 1981, is certainly a curious document; though so 
labeled, it is not a judgment and we cannot hold that it is under the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure. It does not provide the basis for the ultimate 
disposition of appellant's property.

[¶10.]  Rule 54(a), W.R.C.P. provides a 
definition of the term judgment as used in the rules of civil 
procedure:

"(a) Definition; form. A judgment is the final 
determination of the rights of the parties in action. `Judgment' as used in 
these rules includes a decree. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. A 
direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a 
judgment, is an order." (Emphasis added.)

Rule 58(a), 
W.R.C.P., enlightens us further when it states: "* * * All judgments and orders 
must * * * specify clearly the relief 
granted or order made in the action." (Emphasis added.) The purpose behind 
requiring that a judgment be the final determination of the rights of the 
parties in an action is one of judicial as well as financial economy in that 
such a rule prevents multiple appeals in the same suit, Jacobson v. Wickam, 36 Wyo. 522, 257 P. 7 (1927) (decided under the then existing Code of Civil Procedure); it prevents 
piecemeal litigation in the appellate courts. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 
65 S. Ct. 631, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945). Using the same definition of judgment as the 
one appearing in Rule 54, W.R.C.P., this court in Jacobson v. Wickam, supra, said: "It is 
at least doubtful whether the Code contemplates more than one judgment in the 
same action against the same parties." A judgment should be the final 
determination of an action and thus should have the effect of terminating the 
litigation. 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2651 
at 10 (noting Catlin v. United 
States, supra). That view is in accord with what Rule 54(a), W.R.C.P. 
provides.

[¶11.]  At this point, however, we note that some 
courts have authorized and upheld conditional judgments. 10 Wright & Miller, 
supra, at 13 (discussing Rule 54(a), F.R.C.P.). Conditional judgments are 
judgments that do not become effective unless the conditions they contain have 
been complied with or that may be defeated or amended by the performance of a 
subsequent act or occurrence. In Re 
Roney, 139 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943). Conditional judgments, however, are not 
final or appealable judgments under Rule 54(a), F.R.C.P., until all 
contingencies have been removed. Id. at 177; 10 Wright & Miller, supra at 
14. Likewise, under Rule 54(a), W.R.C.P., where a judgment is defined as a final 
determination of the rights of parties to an action, a conditional judgment 
cannot be held to be a judgment until the contingencies contained within it have 
been removed.

[¶12.]  The so-called judgment in this case 
merely reports the terms of an agreement reached between the parties and states 
that if those terms are lived up to, the action would be "dismissed with 
prejudice to all parties." It is at best a conditional judgment that never had 
its conditions met. The terms of the agreement were not met since appellant 
failed to return the purchase price and other monies to the appellees within 
sixty days as required by the agreement. With appellant's failure to pay within 
the agreed period, the contingency that the dismissal of the action was 
predicated upon became impossible; therefore, dismissal of the action under this 
judgment could never occur. The contingency required for the judgment to be 
effective could never be removed. Under its own terms, this judgment could never 
take effect to grant the only relief it purported to grant - dismissal with 
prejudice.3 The rights of the parties to the 
original suit remained unresolved by the district court; therefore, there was no 
judgment as defined by Rule 54(a), W.R.C.P., entered in this 
case.

[¶13.]  Without a judgment, it logically follows 
that there could be no writ of execution properly issued since such a writ is 
issued to enforce a judgment, § 1-17-308, supra. Further, since appellant's 
property was sold pursuant to a writ of execution issued on a nonexistent 
judgment, it follows that the sheriff's sale was not conducted in conformity 
with the Code of Civil Procedure as required by § 1-17-321, supra, and should 
not have been confirmed by the district court.

[¶14.]  The district court was not without 
jurisdiction to enter a judgment in this case, it simply did not enter a 
judgment. Therefore, rather than being faced with a judgment that is void for 
lack of jurisdiction on the part of its rendering court, or a judgment that is 
voidable as being erroneous, we are faced with what can only be termed a 
nonexistent judgment. In determining how to deal with a nonexistent judgment and 
its effect on the execution and sale of appellant's property, we turn to the law 
governing execution on void judgments because, although one is technically 
different from the other, the concepts are analogous. A void judgment is 
essentially a nullity; it is entitled to no force or effect. Olson v. Leith, 71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342 (1953); Wunnicke v. Leith, 61 
Wyo. 191, 157 P.2d 274 (1945). Likewise, a nonexistent judgment can certainly 
have no force or effect.

[¶15.]  An execution issued on a void judgment is 
itself void; and acts, such as the sale of property performed thereunder, are 
also void. Wunnicke v. Leith, supra; 
see also, 30 Am.Jur.2d, Executions § 10. It logically follows that an execution 
issued on a nonexistent judgment and any acts performed thereunder can have no 
effect; the subsequent acts taken on a nonexistent judgment must be void. To 
hold otherwise would be to give effect to the nonexistent judgment, and that 
would be unconscionable. We refuse to give any effect to a nonexistent judgment; 
therefore, we hold that the execution sale and subsequent confirmation of the 
sale were void for lack of statutory authority to conduct and perform the 
same.

[¶16.]  As noted earlier, appellant's motion to 
set aside the sheriff's sale was properly brought under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. 
(See fn. 2.) In particular, we find Rule 60(b)(4), W.R.C.P., to be applicable 
here in that it deals with void judgments; therefore, we set out our standard of 
review. In Emery v. Emery, Wyo., 404 P.2d 745 (1965), this court had occasion to discuss Rule 60(b)(4), W.R.C.P., and 
chose to follow the precedent established under the similarly worded federal 
rule - Rule 60(b)(4), F.R.C.P. This court held that courts, when confronted with 
a Rule 60(b)(4), W.R.C.P. motion, have no discretion to grant or deny relief 
when the judgment has been resolved to be void. When confronted with a Rule 
60(b)(4), W.R.C.P. motion and a void judgment, courts must relieve the parties 
from such judgment. Once a judgment is determined to be void, there is no 
question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is made under Rule 
60(b)(4). 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862 
at 197.

[¶17.]  Since the sale of appellant's property 
and the subsequent judicial confirmation were void for the foregoing reasons, we 
hold that the district court had no discretion to deny appellant's requested 
relief. Appellant, in his motion, specifically called the district court's 
attention to the fact that the sheriff's sale was improper.4 The district court, therefore, 
erred in denying appellant's motion.

Although, as we 
noted at the beginning of our opinion, our decision on appellant's first issue 
disposes of the case, we feel compelled to address appellant's second issue 
which questions the peculiar reappraisement procedure used by the sheriff. It is 
proper for us to address questions which are bound to arise again if left 
unresolved. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas 
Ass'n v. State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163 (1982). In reviewing the statutes 
governing enforcement of judgments by execution, § 1-17-301, et seq., W.S. 1977, 
we are unable to find any authority for the reappraisal procedure used by the 
sheriff in this case. Several statutes deal with the appraisal of property 
subject to execution sale. Section 1-17-316, supra, provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) The officer who 
levies execution upon lands and tenements shall call an inquest of three (3) 
disinterested property owners who are residents of the county where the lands 
taken in execution are situate and administer to them an oath to view and 
impartially appraise the property levied upon. The property owners shall return 
to the officer as soon as possible a signed estimate of the value of the 
property.

"(b) When the officer 
receives the return, he shall promptly deposit a copy with the clerk of the 
court from which the writ issued and immediately advertise and sell the real 
estate as provided by law.

"(c) If upon the return 
it appears that two-thirds of the appraised value of the lands and tenements 
levied upon is sufficient to satisfy the execution with costs, the judgment on 
which the execution is issued shall not operate as a lien on the residue of the 
debtor's estate to the prejudice of any other judgment creditor. No tract of land shall be sold for less than 
two-thirds of the value returned in the appraisal except as expressly authorized 
by law." (Emphasis added.)

Section 
1-17-337, W.S. 1977, provides:

"When real estate taken 
on execution is appraised and is twice advertised and offered for sale but 
remains unsold for lack of bidders, the court from which the execution issued on 
motion of the plaintiff or defendant shall set aside the appraisement and order 
a new appraisement to be made, or set aside the levy and appraisement and award 
a new execution to issue. When the real estate or any part thereof has been 
three (3) times appraised and thereafter twice advertised and offered for sale, 
and remains unsold for lack of bidders, the court may direct the amount for 
which the property shall be sold."

Section 
1-17-338, W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent part:

"When premises are 
ordered to be sold and having been twice advertised and offered for sale remain 
unsold for lack of bidders, on motion of the plaintiff or defendant the court 
from which the order of sale issued shall order a new appraisement * * 
*."

[¶18.]  None of the aforementioned statutes 
provide for the extraordinary reappraisal procedure followed by the sheriff. To 
allow the sheriff to seek a reappraisal to fit the bid, which is obviously what 
occurred here, would make the judicial protection afforded a judgment debtor's 
property by the statutes a farce. We could not condone such a procedure. The 
statute clearly allows for reappraisal of a judgment debtor's property, §§ 
1-17-337 and -338, supra, or the setting of a sales price by the court, § 
1-17-337, supra; but, in instances where those procedures are applicable, 
safeguards are provided to protect the interests of the judgment debtor. The 
procedure followed by the sheriff provides no such safeguards and was done 
totally without justification or authority. It was 
improper.

[¶19.]  Our decision in this matter in no way 
attempts to decide any rights between the parties to the original action. We 
only reach those issues raised by appellant that called to our attention the 
shocking disregard of rules and procedure that we have 
addressed.

[¶20.]  Reversed and remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this decision and opinion.

GUTHRIE, Justice, Retired, 
concurs in the result.

1 This case was decided on 
appellant's brief alone since appellees failed to submit a brief and appellant 
waived oral argument.

2 Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part:

"On motion, and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (4) 
the judgment is void; * * * or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within one (1) year after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding as 
provided in sections 3-3801 [§ 1-16-401], 3-3805 [repealed, § 1, ch. 188, Laws 
1977], and 3-3810 [§ 1-16-408], W.C.S. 1945, or to grant relief to a party 
against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by 
publication as provided in section 3-3802 [§ 1-16-402], as amended. * * 
*"

3 Although we determine 
that the judgment in this case never took effect, the first portion of that 
judgment, dismissing one of the originally named plaintiffs, will be treated as 
an order of dismissal as to that party and as such effectively dismisses that 
party without prejudice. Rule 54(a), W.R.C.P.

4 The pertinent paragraph 
in the motion states:

"6. That the sale 
resulted from a lien against the petitioner's [appellant's] property, but that 
the procedure to foreclose a lien was not followed, and the sale is contrary to 
Wyoming 
law."