Case Title: Angell v. Hallee

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 10 
Docket: 
Cum-10-587 
Argued: 
September 13, 2011 
Decided: 
January 31, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
CHRISTINE S. ANGELL 
 
v. 
 
RENALD C. HALLEE 
 
 
SILVER, J. 
[¶1]  Christine S. Angell appeals the entry in the Superior Court 
(Cumberland County, Cole, J.) of a judgment on the pleadings in favor of 
Renald C. Hallee.  Angell alleges that Hallee sexually abused her during her 
childhood, while he was a priest at St. John’s Parish in Bangor in the 1970s.  
Angell argues that the court erred in imposing a burden on her to allege and prove 
that the statute of limitations was tolled.  We agree and vacate the judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we review the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case Angell.  See Tornesello v. 
Tisdale, 2008 ME 84, ¶ 2, 948 A.2d 1244.  Angell was born in 1961.  She alleges 
that Hallee’s abuse occurred from approximately 1970 to 1973, when she was 
 
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between about eight and twelve years old.  Angell filed her complaint on 
March 25, 2010, including claims against Hallee for negligence, sexual assault and 
battery, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, clergy malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty.  
She brought a claim against both Hallee and the Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Portland for fraudulent concealment and sought punitive damages from both 
defendants.  
[¶3]  Hallee and the Bishop asserted the statute of limitations as an 
affirmative defense and moved for judgment on the pleadings.  Angell opposed the 
motions based in part on the tolling of the limitations period during Hallee’s 
absence from and residency outside Maine.  Hallee’s answer admits he is a resident 
of Massachusetts.  Angell argues that she should be permitted discovery to 
determine whether and for what periods Hallee was absent from Maine and resided 
out of state after the cause of action accrued against him.  Neither party submitted 
an affidavit in support of or opposition to the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings; the trial court decided the issue solely on the pleadings. 
[¶4]  The court granted Hallee’s and the Bishop’s motions and entered 
judgment in their favor on all counts.  Angell timely appealed.  The parties later 
entered into a stipulation dismissing the Bishop with prejudice from the underlying 
action and the appeal.   
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  There are two issues raised by this appeal: (1) whether a limitations 
period is tolled pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 866 (2011) while a defendant is absent 
from and resides out of state but is nevertheless amenable to service of process by 
means other than publication, and (2) which party has the burden of proof with 
respect to whether the limitations period has been tolled and the procedural issues 
associated with the burden of proof.  We review de novo the trial court’s decision 
regarding the interpretation of the tolling statute.  See Baker v. Farrand, 
2011 ME 91, ¶ 21, 26 A.3d 806.  
[¶6]  Currently there is no limitation on actions based on sexual acts toward 
minors; the statute provides that “[a]ctions based upon sexual acts toward minors 
may be commenced at any time.”  14 M.R.S. § 752-C (2011).  However, at the 
time the alleged conduct occurred, from 1970-73, Angell’s claims were governed 
by a two-year statute of limitations applicable to assault and battery.  14 M.R.S.A. 
§ 753 (1965);1 see Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, ¶¶ 2, 4 n.1, 
701 A.2d 370.  The cause of action was tolled until Angell’s eighteenth birthday in 
                                         
1  Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 753 (1965) has since been amended, but not in any way that affects this appeal.  
P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 1 (effective Aug. 1, 1988) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 753 (2011)).   
 
 
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1979.  See 14 M.R.S.A. § 853 (1965);2 1 M.R.S. § 72(11-A) (2011); Harkness, 
1997 ME 207, ¶ 4 n.1, 701 A.2d 370.  Therefore, in the absence of tolling, Angell’s 
last day for commencing the action would have been on her birthday in 1981.  
1 M.R.S. § 72(11-A); 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 753, 853; Tesseo v. Brown, 1998 ME 155, 
¶¶ 5-7, 712 A.2d 1059.  
[¶7]  Starting in 1985, the Legislature amended the statute of limitations 
several times, extending and eventually eliminating the limitations period for 
claims involving sexual acts toward minors.  14 M.R.S. § 752-C; P.L. 1985, 
ch. 343, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 1985) (enacting a six-year limitations period on 
claims based on sexual acts toward minors); P.L. 1989, ch. 292 (effective 
Sept. 30, 1989) (adding a three-year discovery period); P.L. 1991, ch. 551, § 1 
(effective Oct. 9, 1991) (extending the limitations period to twelve years and the 
discovery period to six years for claims not barred by the previous statute of 
limitations); P.L. 1999, ch. 639, § 1 (effective Aug. 11, 2000) (eliminating the 
limitations period altogether for claims not barred by the previous statute of 
limitations).  Therefore, if Angell’s claims were tolled from the date in 1981 when 
they would have expired to the date in 2000 when the limitations period was 
eliminated, or at least during the periods between those dates when without tolling 
                                         
2  Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 853 (1965) has since been amended to make it applicable to actions brought 
pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 752-C (2011).  P.L. 1985, ch. 343, § 2 (effective Sept. 19, 1985) (codified at 
14 M.R.S. § 853 (2011)). 
 
 
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the claims would no longer have been viable, Angell’s claim is not barred even 
though she did not file or serve it on Hallee until 2010.   
[¶8]  The purpose of a finite limitations period is “to provide eventual repose 
for potential defendants and to avoid the necessity of defending stale claims.”  
Dowling v. Salewski, 2007 ME 78, ¶ 11, 926 A.2d 193 (quotation marks omitted).  
The tolling statute is intended to prevent abuse of the statute of limitations by 
defendants who, in the absence of the tolling statute, could leave the state for the 
duration of the limitations period, then return and assert the statute of limitations as 
a defense to an action.  Connolly v. Serunian, 138 Me. 80, 82-83, 21 A.2d 830 
(1941).  The tolling statute states in relevant part:  “If a person is absent from and 
resides out of the State, after a cause of action has accrued against him, the time of 
his absence from the State shall not be taken as a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action.”  14 M.R.S. § 866.  We have held that “mere 
absence is not sufficient and . . . must be accompanied by the establishment of a 
residence outside of the state.”  Patten v. Milam (Patten I), 468 A.2d 620, 622 
(Me. 1983).  
[¶9]  In a majority of jurisdictions, a state’s tolling statute is not applied to 
any stretches of time within the limitations period when the plaintiff with 
reasonable effort could have found and served the defendant even though the 
defendant was absent from and resided outside the state.  See Patten v. Milam 
 
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(Patten II), 480 A.2d 774, 777 (Me. 1984); Kenneth J. Rampino, Annotation, 
Tolling of Statute of Limitations During Absence From State as Affected by Fact 
That Party Claiming Benefit of Limitations Remained Subject to Service During 
Absence or Nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1163-64 (1974).  We have not 
previously had to decide whether to adopt this interpretation of the tolling statute.  
In Patten II, we held that the long-arm statute then in effect, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A 
(1980),3 did not render the tolling statute inapplicable when the only reasonable 
means of service was by publication.  480 A.2d at 777.  We noted that “[t]here is a 
substantial body of law in other jurisdictions which supports the proposition that 
notwithstanding a defendant’s absence from the state, the limitations period is not 
tolled if he remains amenable to service of process under modern long-arm 
extensions of in personam jurisdiction.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  We left 
open the possibility that the limitations period may not be tolled if other forms of 
service are available to the plaintiff.  Id.  We now adopt the majority rule and 
interpret the tolling statute as follows: 14 M.R.S. § 866 does not operate to toll the 
limitations period for any portion of the period during which the plaintiff could, 
through reasonable effort, find and serve the defendant by any means other than 
                                         
3  Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980) has since been amended but not in any way that affects this 
appeal.  P.L. 1995, ch. 694, § D-14 (effective Oct. 1, 1997) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2011)).   
 
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publication.  See Patten II, 480 A.2d at 777; Siegemund v. Shapland, 
307 F. Supp. 2d 113, 116 (D. Me. 2004).   
[¶10]  The defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense that 
the statute of limitations bars the action and therefore must prove facts affecting 
the tolling of the limitations period such as whether and when the plaintiff, with 
reasonable effort, could have effected service.  See Patten II, 480 A.2d at 776.  
The plaintiff does not have the burden to allege facts in the complaint in 
anticipation that the defendant will assert a defense based on the statute of 
limitations.  See id.  In Patten II, we noted that “the allocation of the burden of 
proof on the issue of tolling assumes substantial significance” when the record is 
scant: 
The issue presented in this case is: who has the burden of proof when 
the issue of tolling has been generated by the plaintiff in response to a 
facial attack on the complaint?  We conclude that, once generated, the 
burden of proof remains on the defendant to support all aspects of his 
affirmative defense.  It is [the] defendant’s burden in this case to 
prove that in spite of his absence from the state, the statute did not 
toll. 
 
. . . . 
 
The issue of tolling involves inquiry into a defendant’s residence and 
changes in residence over a period of time.  The relevant facts are 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and considerations 
of fairness and convenience strongly support placing the burden of 
proof on the defendant once the issue has been generated.  Once the 
plaintiff made a showing of the absence of [the] defendant from the 
 
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state, the burden was on [the] defendant to prove that in spite of his 
absence the statute did not toll.   
 
Id.  
[¶11]  Just as the plaintiff, in her complaint, does not have an initial burden 
to rebut a prospective statute of limitations defense, a defendant asserting that the 
statute of limitations has run does not have an initial burden of rebutting any 
potential claim of tolling.  Once the defendant has successfully raised the statute of 
limitations defense, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that 
would support the tolling.  Here, the plaintiff has done that by alleging that Hallee 
was not in Maine during the operative times.  Thus, the burden moves to Hallee to 
demonstrate either (1) that he was in Maine (we note that he does not dispute her 
allegations that he was out of Maine), or (2) that Angell could have located him 
with reasonable effort and had him served.   
[¶12]  The procedural posture of this case is different from Patten I, 
468 A.2d at 621-22, and Patten II, 480 A.2d at 775-76, but the burden nevertheless 
remains with the defendant here as it did in the Patten cases.  In the Patten cases, 
the plaintiff generated the issue of tolling by submitting an affidavit in opposition 
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Patten I, 468 A.2d at 621.  When matters 
outside the pleadings are presented, the court must treat the motion as one for 
summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56.  Likewise, we have held that a 
 
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motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the affirmative defense that the 
statute of limitations bars the action is “a facial challenge to the timeliness of 
plaintiff’s complaint,” properly considered under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b).  Chiapetta v. 
Clark Assocs., 521 A.2d 697, 700 (Me. 1987) (quotation marks omitted).  
However, if there are “facts not appearing in the complaint that toll the statute,” the 
motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 56.  Id. at 
700-01. 
[¶13]  In this case, Angell alleged in the complaint and Hallee admitted in 
his answer that he currently resides in Massachusetts, but neither party has 
submitted an affidavit in support of or opposition to Hallee’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.  Had Hallee filed an affidavit alleging that during the relevant 
times between 1981 and 2000 he was amenable to service, recognizing his burden 
of persuasion on the issue, Angell could have responded with her own information, 
or with a request for discovery on that limited issue.  Such a request would have 
been appropriate pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(f), which states that a party opposing 
summary judgment must be allowed adequate opportunity to conduct discovery or 
otherwise develop evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion.  
S. Portland Police Patrol Ass’n v. City of S. Portland, 2006 ME 55, ¶¶ 11-12, 
896 A.2d 960.  Hallee refused to be deposed without a court order in advance of 
the court’s decision on the motion for judgment, so Angell has not had the 
 
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opportunity to discover facts that bear upon the statute of limitations and tolling.  
This case is at the pleadings stage.  Once the parties have had discovery on issues 
pertaining to the statute of limitations defense and tolling, either party may present 
the issue in a motion for summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56, if 
appropriate.  
 
The judgment is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Sumner H. Lipman, Esq., and Keith R. Varner, Esq., Lipman, Katz & 
McKee, P.A., Augusta, for appellant Christine S. Angell 
 
Peter J. DeTroy, Esq., Russell B. Pierce, Jr., Esq., and Darya I. Haag, Esq., 
Norman, Hanson & Detroy, LLC, Portland, for appellee Renald C. Hallee 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Keith R. Varner, Esq., for appellant Christine S. Angell 
 
Russell B. Pierce, Jr., Esq., for appellee Renald C. Hallee 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-132 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY