Case Title: HURLBUT v VOLLSTEDT CO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12929 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 HARRY L. H U R L B U T . , ' , P l a i n t i f f , -vs - VOLLSTEDT KERR C O M P A N Y , Employer, and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY C O M P A N Y , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Marra and Wenz, Great F a l l s , Montana Joseph R. Marra argued, and Charles R. Johnson argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Richard J. Conklin argued, White Sulphur Springs, Montana Submitted: May 8, 1975 Decided : m g 8 - 1 . . 7 9 z Filed : ,IN 2 2 1 9 B M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. The Division of Workmen's Compensation of the Depart- ment of Labor and Industry denied the claim of one Harry L. Hurlbut. Appeal was taken t o the d i s t r i c t court, Meagher County which reversed the ~ i v i s i o n s ' holding and awarded Hurlbut $3,696, plus benefits of $66 per week and medical costs. This appeal i s from the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment. Harry L. Hurlbut, hereinafter referred t o a s claimant, about 59 years old, had been employed by the lumber m i l l of the Vollstedt Kerr Company, hereinafter referred t o a s t h e Company, of White Sulphur Springs, Montana, f o r ten years p r i o r t o the alleged accident. The l a s t eight of those ten years claimant was employed a s superintendent. The Company policy was not t o operate t h e m i l l when the temperature was too cold f o r the men and the machinery, usually when t h e temperature was around -5O~ahrenheit or below. In t h e l a t t e r part of December 1972, temperatures i n White Sulphur Springs 0 were a s low a s -30 Fahrenheit and caused the m i l l t o be shut down f o r more than a week. O n the afternoon of January 5, 1973, the temperature rose t o around -12' F. and Dick Vollstedt, owner of the Company, ordered claimant t o s t a r t up the m i l l the next day. Claimant protested t h a t i t was too cold and they should "play it by ear". Nevertheless, Vollstedt ordered t h a t the m i l l commence operation the next morning. Claimant began contacting men t o report f o r work the next day; some by telephone and some personally. The next morning, January 6, 1973, claimant arrived a t the m i l l o f f i c e a t about 6:20 a.m. and waited i n h i s o f f i c e f o r telephone c a l l s from %he employees t o determine how many men would report. The 0 temperature i n the o f f i c e was 50 t o 55' F. and claimant had h i s coat on. The outside temperature was -6O F., with low wind velocity. While s i t t i n g i n the o f f i c e claimant became dizzy, he went ourside t o see i f a l i t t l e fresh a i r would help, but then became nauseated. H e went home and h i s wife drove him t o the hospital where h i s doctor diagnosed the problem a s a myocardial infarction, which simply means t h a t an area of the heart muscle dies by reason of the occulsion of a heart blood vessel supplying t h a t area. This diagnosis was subseqeuntly confirmed by laboratory t e s t s . Z4r. Hurlbut made application f o r compensation f o r h i s myocardial infarction (commonly termed a heart a t t a c k ) , t o t h e ~orkmen's Compensation Division. H i s claim was denied and sub- sequently he petitioned the Division f o r a hearing. Hearing was held wherein claimant and h i s attending physician, Albert V. J e l l e n , M.D., gave testimony. The hearing examiner denied the claim on the grounds t h a t claimant "did not i n f a c t s u f f e r an accidental injury a r i s i n g out of and i n the course of h i s employment." Appeal was taken t o the d i s t r i c t court which entered judgment f o r claimant. Defendants Vollstedt Kerr Company and I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity Company appeal from t h a t judgment. The issue before t h i s Court i s whether the workmen's Compensation ~ i v i s i o n ' s findings, conclusions and order were supported by credible evidence and subsequently whether the dis- t r i c t court was j u s t i f i e d i n refersing the ~ i v i s i o n ' s findings, conclusions and order a f t e r taking evidence? Claimant's argument a t the Division hearing and the d i s t r i c t court hearing was t h a t t h e lumber m i l l had never before been operated i n weather a s cold a s it was the morning of January 6 , 1973. There i s some c o n f l i c t i n regard t o the temperature t h a t morning, but the record discloses the temperature was between -SO and -10' Fahrenheit. Claimant maintains t h i s condition con- s t i t u t e d an "unusual s t r a i n " because it was a unique, new, d i f f - erent and unusual demand placed upon claimant by the Company. Any injury, t o be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, must meet the d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements of the s t a t u t e . Section 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, defines injury a s I I a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, or unusual s t r a i n , resulting i n e i t h e r external o r i n t e r n a l physical harm, and such physical condition a s a r e s u l t therefrom and excluding disease not traceable t o injury 9~ * a*" Thus, there a r e two elements i n the s t a t u t e which must be met (1) there must be a tangible happening of a traumatic nature, and (2) t h i s must be shown t o be the cause of physical harm. Aside from the testimony t h a t it was a few degrees colder than normal s t a r t i n g temperature and the m i l l had not previously operated i n temperatures t h a t cold, there was no testimony t h i s imposed upon claimant any duty which was unusual i n kind or amount. The duties performed by claimant on the day before h i s a t t a c k and on the day of the a t t a c k , January 6 , 1973, were duties he had performed f o r the previous eight years a s plant superintendent. Simply opening a m i l l on a day colder than was customary, with no inordinate kind o r amount I 1 of work on h i s p a r t , cannot be said t o c o n s t i t u t e a tangible happening of a traumatic nature." Claimant has f a i l e d t o carry the burden of proof t h a t he was injured, within t h e meaning of the s t a t u t e . Further, there was no proof i n t h e record t h a t the myocardial infarction had any causal connection t o claimant's employment. Claimant's doctor, D r . J e l l e n , t e s t i f i e d there a r e two principal causes of myocardial infarction: (1) a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s , a gradually developing condition t h a t has nothing t o do with trauma, s t r a i n or anxiety; and (2) when a blood c l o t which had previously and gradually formed somewhere inside the heart breaks loose and occludes a heart blood vessel. There was considerable discussion regarding probabilities i n r e l a t i o n co the second cause, the blood c l o t , however, the doctor t e s t i f i e d : "Q. Doctor, can you say with any degree of medical c e r t a i n t y what was the cause of M r . ~ u r l b u t ' s myocardial infarction? A. No, I a m a f r a i d I couldn't. "Q. D o you know whether or not t h i s condition resulted from e i t h e r a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s or a c l o t t i n g ? A. No, no, I wouldn't be a b l e t o t e l l , t o make any statement i n any of these directions because L don ' t know. I I Claimant f a i l e d t o carry h i s burden and therefore cannot qualify under the s t a t u t e f o r benefits. Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 257 P. 270; Landeen v. Toole County Refining Co., 85 Mont. 41, 277 P. 615; Woin v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 99 Mont. 163, 43 P.2d 663; Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated, 162 Mont. 469, 512 P.2d 1304. The findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of the Workmen's Compensation Division a r e presumed t o be correct and i f supported by credible evidence must be affirmed. Section 92-822, R.C.M. 1947; Birnie v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, This presumption can be overcome however. Section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t on an appeal from the Division, the d i s t r i c t court has authority t o determine "* Jc whether o r not the board regularly pursued i t s authority, and whether o r not t h e findings of the board ought t o be sustained, and whether or not such findings a r e reasonable under a l l the circum- stances of the case. I t Section 92-834 a l s o provides the d i s t r i c t court may, upon good cause sho~m, admit additional evidence. Section 92- 835, R.C.M. 1947 and Montana case law holds t h a t i f t h i s addi- t i o n a l evidence i s substantial, the d i s t r i c t court may be j u s t i - f i e d i n reversing the Division even though t h e evidence adduced before the Division c l e a r l y preponderates i n favor of i t s order. Young v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., 138 Mont. 458, 357 P.2d 886; 0 ' ~ e i . l v. Industrial Acc.Bd., 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 688. This Court has repeatedly held t h a t where the appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court i s heard only on t h e Division's c e r t i f i e d record or when the d i s t r i c t court permits additional evidence t o be introduced and the additional evidence i s not important o r adds nothing new t o the case, then the d i s t r i c t court may not reverse t h e Division unless the evidence c l e a r l y preponderates against the findings of the Division. Stordahl v. Rush Imple- ment Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95; Jones v. air's Cafes, 132 Mont. 13, 445 P.2d 923; McAndrews v. Schwartz, 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379, 31 St.Rep. 517; Beatty v. Wellman Power and Gas, Inc., M o n t . Y P.2d , 32 St.Rep. 680. Here, the additional evidence admitted by the d i s t r i c t court shed no new l i g h t on the circumstances surrounding the alleged accident a s t o the cause of the alleged injury. With the exception of testimony r e l a t i n g t o the degree of claimant's d i s a b i l i t y , which was not an issue before t h e court, the additional testimony a t the d i s t r i c t court was merely r e p e t i t i v e of t h a t admitted a t the Division hearing. Such redundant testimony can I t i n no way be said t o c l e a r l y preponderate against the ~ i v i s i o n ' s findings . I I The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s reversed and the order of t h e Workmen's Compensation Division i s affirmed and reinstated. &-/[-- J u s t i c e W e Concur: ." ", Chief J u s t i c e