Case Title: Kljun v. McCloud

Citation: 2019-Ohio-1334

Docket Number: 2017-1576

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Kljun v. McCloud, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1334.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1334 
KLJUN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. MCCLOUD,1 ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Kljun v. McCloud, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1334.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2017-1576―Submitted January 30, 2019―Decided April 11, 2019.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. CA-17-105340, 2017-Ohio-7724. 
_________________ 
{¶ 1} This cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
{¶ 2} The court orders that the opinion of the court of appeals may not be 
cited as authority except by the parties inter se. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ. 
                                          
 
1 Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B), Stephanie McCloud, the current administrator of the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation, is automatically substituted for Stephen Buehrer, the former administrator, 
as a party to this action. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ. 
_________________ 
 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 3} I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of this appeal as 
improvidently accepted, and I would reverse the judgment of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals.  The Eighth District’s decision erroneously broadens the law-of-
the-case doctrine.  In doing so, it dictates how the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation (“BWC”) must pay certain partial-disability-compensation benefits, 
even though neither the trial court nor the court of appeals has addressed any 
statutory basis for that dictate.  The issues presented here implicate matters of 
public and great general interest that justify this court’s discretionary review.  See 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.02(A)(3). 
Facts and procedural background 
{¶ 4} At its core, this case is about whether the BWC can refuse to issue 
payments for partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) as lump-sum 
payments.  In 2012, as part of the Mid-Biennium Budget Review, the General 
Assembly amended R.C. 4123.57(B), 2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 487 (“H.B. 487”), to 
state that “the compensation payable per week to the employee is the statewide 
average weekly wage as defined in [R.C. 4123.62(C)] per week and shall be paid 
in installments according to the following schedule.”  R.C. 4123.57(B) also 
provides, “Compensation paid in weekly installments according to the schedule 
described in this division may only be commuted to one or more lump-sum 
payments pursuant to the procedure set forth in” R.C. 4123.64.  By comparison, 
while the prior version of R.C. 4123.57(B), 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 7, 151 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 1019, 1080, likewise described “the compensation payable per week 
to the employee,” it did not state that compensation “shall be paid in installments.”  
Nor did it mention lump-sum payments. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 5} Plaintiffs-appellees, Jeffrey Kljun, Reginald D. Humphrey, Robert 
Grable, Michael J. Dunlap, Jonathan J. Marazza, and Louis A. Cataldo Sr. 
(collectively, “claimants”)—each of whom alleges that he sustained a compensable 
workplace injury involving the loss of use of one or more limbs, appendages, or 
organs that entitled him to benefits under R.C. 4123.57(B)—filed this action for a 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendant-appellants, the 
Administrator of BWC and the Industrial Commission of Ohio (collectively, “the 
state”).  In Count I, the claimants requested a declaratory judgment that the H.B. 
487 amendments to R.C. 4123.57(B) violate the Ohio Constitution’s one-subject 
rule, which states, “No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be 
clearly expressed in its title,” Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 15(D).  In Count 
II, the claimants requested a permanent injunction prohibiting the state from 
“enforcing any aspect of H.B. 487 that is found to violate the Ohio Constitution.” 
{¶ 6} On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that H.B. 
487 did not violate the one-subject rule, and it granted summary judgment in favor 
of the state. 
{¶ 7} The claimants appealed and raised a single assignment of error—that 
the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it determined that H.B. 487 did not 
violate the one-subject rule.  The Eighth District thoroughly discussed the 
claimants’ one-subject challenge.  Although it acknowledged that the claimants had 
also sought a permanent injunction against enforcement of the invalid provisions 
of H.B. 487, the court of appeals did not otherwise address the claim for injunctive 
relief.  Kljun v. Morrison, 2016-Ohio-2939, 55 N.E.3d 10, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (“Kljun 
I”).  The Eighth District sustained the claimants’ assignment of error, held that the 
amendment to R.C. 4123.57(B) violated the one-subject rule, and reversed the trial 
court’s judgment.  It remanded the case “with instructions for the trial court to enter 
judgment, as a matter of law,” in the claimants’ favor.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} On remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the claimants.  
The journal entry declared the H.B. 487 amendment to R.C. 4123.57(B) 
unenforceable.  But the entry also enjoined the state “from refusing to issue lump-
sum payments of loss benefits due once the claim is finalized.”  Cuyahoga C.P. No. 
CV-13-803120 (Sept. 13, 2016). 
{¶ 9} The state appealed and challenged the trial court’s judgment granting 
injunctive relief.  The state argued that the trial court had exceeded the scope of the 
appellate mandate from Kljun I by enjoining it from refusing to issue lump-sum 
payments of benefits.  The state claimed that the trial court’s judgment erroneously 
prohibited BWC from complying with R.C. 4123.57(B) as it existed prior to the 
passage of H.B. 487. 
{¶ 10} The claimants responded to the state’s arguments in the court of 
appeals by arguing that the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibited the state from 
challenging the trial court’s judgment for injunctive relief because the state could 
have pursued that issue in Kljun I.  The Eighth District agreed: “Our decision in 
Kljun I disposed of the issue that [the state raises].  Accordingly, the law of the case 
precludes [the state’s] attempt to revisit the ‘injunction issue’ in this appeal and 
precludes any modification to the trial court’s judgment.”  2017-Ohio-7724, ¶ 12 
(“Kljun II”). 
{¶ 11} This court accepted a discretionary appeal to consider the contours 
of the law-of-the-case doctrine and its application in this case. 
Analysis 
{¶ 12} The Eighth District held that the trial court “properly followed the 
law of this case” when it enjoined the state from refusing to issue benefits under 
R.C. 4123.57(B) in lump-sum payments.  Id. at ¶ 8.  I disagree. 
{¶ 13} The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that “the decision of a 
reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions 
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing 
January Term, 2019 
 
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levels.”  Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).  “ ‘The 
doctrine of law of the case comes into play only with respect to issues previously 
determined.’ ”  Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 
N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 16, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 
L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), fn. 18, see also Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 676 (6th 
Cir.2005) (“the doctrine applies only to issues that have been decided explicitly (or 
by necessary implication) by a court”), citing United States v. Graham, 327 F.3d 
460, 464 (6th Cir.2003).  The law-of-the-case doctrine is a rule of practice, not a 
rule of substantive law, and courts will not apply it to achieve unjust results.  Nolan 
at 3, citing Gohman v. St. Bernard, 111 Ohio St. 726, 730-731, 146 N.E. 291 (1924). 
{¶ 14} The law-of-the-case doctrine ensures consistency of results in a case, 
aids in finally settling the issues, and preserves the structure of superior and inferior 
courts.  Id.  In pursuit of these goals, it compels trial courts to follow reviewing 
courts’ mandates.  Id.  The trial court is bound to carry the appellate court’s mandate 
into execution, and it may not consider questions that the mandate laid to rest.  
Sprague v. Ticonic Natl. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 
(1939).  But the trial court is free to consider other issues.  See Giancola at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 15} Here, the law-of-the-case doctrine did not compel the trial court to 
enjoin the state from refusing to issue lump-sum payments of benefits under R.C. 
4123.57(B).  Nor did it preclude the Eighth District from considering the state’s 
arguments in Kljun II. 
{¶ 16} The Eighth District limited its analysis in Kljun I to the claimants’ 
one-subject-rule challenge.  It thoroughly addressed the one-subject-rule challenge 
and held that “the portion of H.B. 487 that amends the period for paying scheduled 
loss benefits to injured workers under R.C. 4123.57(B) violates the one-subject 
rule” and is unenforceable.  Kljun I, 2016-Ohio-2939, 55 N.E.3d 10, at ¶ 33.  That 
legal ruling became the law of the case for all future proceedings.  But Kljun I did 
not address the practical effect of its ruling. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 17} When a court invalidates a statutory amendment, the statute reverts 
to its previous version.  See Stevens v. Ackman, 91 Ohio St.3d 182, 191, 743 N.E.2d 
901 (2001).  The state and the claimants agree that the pre-H.B. 487 version of R.C. 
4123.57(B) now governs the state’s duties, in light of the Eighth District’s holding 
that the H.B. 487 version of the statute is unenforceable.  The Eighth District did 
not, however, determine in Kljun I what the pre-H.B. 487 version of R.C. 
4123.57(B) required of the state.  It acknowledged that the BWC allowed injured 
workers to be paid scheduled-loss benefits in a lump-sum prior to the passage of 
H.B. 487, Kljun I at ¶ 3, but it also noted that it was a regulation, not R.C. 
4123.57(B), that authorized those payments, id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 18} The state has consistently argued that even if the H.B. 487 
amendments to R.C. 4123.57(B) are unconstitutional, the version of R.C. 
4123.57(B) in effect before 2012 would not prohibit the state from paying 
scheduled-loss benefits in installments.  In opposition to the claimants’ motion for 
summary judgment, the state argued, “[E]ven if th[e] Court should find that the 
amendment of R.C. 4123.57(B) in H.B. 487 violates the ‘one-subject rule,’ th[e] 
Court is without authority to further alter that statute in order to mandate how 
scheduled loss benefits are to be paid.”  The state raised that same argument in 
Kljun I, but the claimants responded that the state’s alternative argument was not 
ripe for judicial determination.  The court of appeals did not address the state’s 
argument regarding its obligations under the pre-H.B. 487 version of R.C. 
4123.57(B).  It simply held that the amended statute was unenforceable.  In short, 
nothing in Kljun I can be read to hold that the pre-H.B. 487 version of R.C. 
4123.57(B) required the state to pay scheduled-loss benefits in lump-sum 
payments.  Accordingly, there is no “law of the case” as to that issue. 
{¶ 19} As part of its application of the law-of-the-case doctrine in Kljun II, 
the court of appeals stated that the state was aware that the claimants sought both 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  The court of appeals, however, conflated the relief 
January Term, 2019 
 
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necessarily available for a one-subject-rule violation—an injunction against 
enforcement of the unconstitutional statutory amendment—with injunctive relief 
that goes on to specify, based on the prior version of the statute, how the state must 
proceed.  The state has not argued that the trial court erred by granting any 
injunctive relief as part of its compliance with the Kljun I mandate; the state argues 
only that the trial court went too far by granting injunctive relief beyond that 
addressed in or required by Kljun I. 
{¶ 20} The claimants argue that when the Eighth District directed the trial 
court to enter judgment, as a matter of law, in favor of the claimants, the trial court 
was required to enter judgment on both counts I and II.  They maintain that the 
appellate mandate “left no room for any further litigation” and that “all that was left 
for remand was the formality of final judgment being entered.”  And they are 
correct insofar as the mandate required the trial court to declare the H.B. 487 
amendments to R.C. 4123.57(B) unenforceable as a result of a one-subject-rule 
violation and to enjoin the state from enforcing the unconstitutional amendments.  
But the trial court’s judgment affords broader injunctive relief than the claimants 
requested in their complaint. 
{¶ 21} The mandate to enter judgment for the claimants on count II required 
the trial court only to enjoin the state from enforcing the H.B. 487 version of R.C. 
4123.57(B), which violated the one-subject rule.  An injunction against “enforcing 
any aspect of H.B. 487 that is found to violate the Ohio Constitution” is the 
complete relief that the claimants requested in count II.  The Kljun I mandate did 
not require the trial court to enter injunctive relief beyond what the claimants 
requested in their compliant. 
{¶ 22} On remand following Kljun I, the trial court entered a judgment for 
injunctive relief beyond that requested in the claimants’ complaint and beyond that 
required by the Eighth District’s mandate.  The law-of-the-case doctrine did not 
compel the trial court to enjoin the state from refusing to issue lump-sum payments 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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under R.C. 4123.57(B) when the court of appeals did not decide what the pre-H.B. 
487 version of the statute required of the state.  Nor did the law-of-the-case doctrine 
preclude the Eighth District from considering the state’s arguments in Kljun II.  The 
Eighth District’s decision in Kljun II sets a dangerous precedent by impermissibly 
expanding the reach of the law-of-the-case doctrine. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} For these reasons, I dissent from the court’s dismissal of this appeal 
as improvidently accepted, and I would reverse the Eighth District’s judgment. 
 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} I dissent from the majority’s entry dismissing this appeal.  Here’s 
why: 
{¶ 25} First, as Justice French explains, the decision below is undeniably 
wrong.  The first appeal did not decide anything but the one-subject challenge and 
no one has seriously argued otherwise.  See Kljun v. Morrison, 2016-Ohio-2939, 
55 N.E.3d 10, ¶ 4, 33-34 (8th Dist.).  There is simply no basis for the broad 
injunctive relief issued by the trial court on remand.  (There is not even an arguable 
basis.) 
{¶ 26} Second, we made the decision to take the case and the parties have 
briefed and argued it to this court.  In granting jurisdiction, we recognized that the 
case presented an issue of public or great general interest.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 
5.02(A)(3).  Nothing about this case has changed since the time we accepted it.  The 
issues continue to be of significant public interest. 
{¶ 27} Dismissal of a case as improvidently accepted is appropriate “where 
a case presented on the merits is not the same case as presented on motion to 
certify.”  Williamson v. Rubich, 171 Ohio St. 253, 259, 168 N.E.2d 876 (1960).  
Such situations tend to arise when the court later discovers that no question of 
January Term, 2019 
 
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general interest remains, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.10, in-depth review reveals that the 
issue has been waived, see State v. Mayfield, 102 Ohio St.3d 1240, 2004-Ohio-
3440, 811 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 5 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring), or the facts of the 
case otherwise prevent the court from reaching the issue presented, see Ahmad v. 
AK Steel Corp., 119 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-4082, 893 N.E.2d 1287 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  None of those circumstances are present here. 
{¶ 28} Third, the majority’s action has the effect of leaving a blatantly 
incorrect result in place.  The majority cannot defend the decision below and 
doesn’t even try to do so.  Implicitly recognizing the wrongness of the appellate 
court’s judgment, the majority even forbids other litigants from citing the decision 
as authority.  But for the claimants in this case and the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation (“BWC”), the majority’s decision has the exact same effect as an 
affirmance. 
{¶ 29} Fourth, it is not clear from the majority’s decision what the BWC is 
to do now.  The judgment affirmed by the court of appeals ordered broadly: 
“Defendants are enjoined from refusing to issue lump-sum payments of loss 
benefits due once the claim is finalized.”  Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-13-803120 (Sept. 
13, 2016).  The majority today leaves that decision in place but says the court of 
appeals’ opinion may be cited only “by the parties inter se.”  So what does that 
mean?  Does the court of appeals’ ruling require lump-sum payments only to the 
seven plaintiffs?  Or do the broad terms of the injunction—which this court leaves 
undisturbed—continue to apply to the BWC in its dealing with all claimants?  I 
certainly don’t know—and it’s a pretty safe guess that the majority’s action will 
give rise to more litigation to sort this out. 
{¶ 30} To put it simply, there is no reason to dismiss this case as 
improvidently accepted.  If the majority wants to leave the court of appeals’ 
decision in place, it ought to at least explain its reasons to the public.  By failing to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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do so, and by issuing a do-not-cite order without reversing the judgment below, 
today’s decision creates uncertainty and invites more litigation. 
 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Plevin & Gallucci Co., L.P.A., and Frank Gallucci III; Paul W. Flowers Co., 
L.P.A., Paul W. Flowers, and Louis E. Grube; Brian, Zwick, Marchisio, Stone & 
Associates and Richard F. Brian, for appellees. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers and Stephen P. Carney, 
Deputy Solicitors, and Jeffrey B. Duber and Christie Limbert, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for appellants. 
_________________