Case Title: Perez v. United States Steel Corp.

Citation: 428 N.E.2d 212

Docket Number: 

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 N.E.2d 212 (1981)
Benedicto PEREZ, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 981S264.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 1, 1981.
*213 J.B. Smith, Andrew J. Fetsch, Beckman, Kelly & Smith, Hammond, for appellant.
Douglas F. Stevenson, Robert K. Bush, Rooks, Pitts, Fullager & Poust, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This cause was brought before this Court on the petition to transfer of Benedicto Perez, wherein he sought review of the Court of Appeals' opinion found at Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1981) Ind. App., 416 N.E.2d 864. We have previously granted transfer, vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the cause to the Full Industrial Board of Indiana with directions for the Board to enter the specific findings of basic fact upon which its decision was based. Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
Perez sustained a work-related injury while employed at United States Steel Corporation in 1970. His claim for Workmen's Compensation culminated in the Industrial Board's decision that Perez suffered a twenty percent permanent partial impairment, but was not permanently totally disabled. The focus of Perez's appellate efforts has been his challenge to the Board's conclusion he is not permanently totally disabled. His corollary contention throughout the appellate process has been his challenges to the sufficiency of the findings of fact made by the Board.
On remand, the Board has submitted findings of fact of sufficient specificity and clarity to fully satisfy the penultimate purpose of the fact-finding requirement. The findings "reveal the Board's analysis of the evidence and its determination therefrom regarding the various specific issues of fact which bear on the particular claim." Id. at 33. The findings read in relevant part:
On these basic findings of fact rests the Board's ultimate finding of fact and conclusion of law that Perez has not suffered "permanent total disability," as that term is employed in Ind. Code § 22-3-3-10(b)(3) (Burns 1974). The findings made by the Board, as a quasi-judicial body, are "conclusive and binding as to all questions of the fact." Ind. Code § 22-3-4-8 (Burns 1974).
As we hold these findings of fact to satisfy the purposes of the statutory requirement enunciated in Ind. Code § 22-3-4-7 (Burns 1974), we turn to the focal point of Perez's appeal: whether the evidence supports the Board's findings and conclusion that Perez is not permanently totally disabled.
As explained by the Court of Appeals in its original disposition of Perez's appeal, to establish a "permanent total disability," the injured workman is required to prove he or she "cannot carry on reasonable *216 types of employment." Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1977) 172 Ind. App. 242, 245-6, 359 N.E.2d 925, 927-8, quoting Small, Workmen's Compensation Law of Indiana § 9.4 P. 244 (1950). As Judge Garrard explained:
Consequently, the "reasonableness" of the workman's opportunities are to be assessed "by his physical and mental fitness for them and by their availability." Id.
Perez, as claimant, bore the burden of proving the existence of this condition in order to justify recovery for a "permanent total disability." He therefore appeals from a negative judgment; in our review of that judgment, we will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we examine the record only to determine whether there is any substantial evidence and reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom to support the Board's findings and conclusion. Only if the evidence is of a character that reasonable men would be compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to the decision of the Board will it be overturned. Heflin v. Red Front Cash & Carry Stores, (1947) 225 Ind. 517, 75 N.E.2d 662; Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Savage, (1979) Ind. App., 390 N.E.2d 203; Robinson v. Twigg Industries, Inc., (1972) 154 Ind. App. 339, 289 N.E.2d 733.
Here, the evidence is sufficient to support the Board's findings of basic fact and its finding of ultimate fact and conclusion of law. Dr. R.S. Martino, who initially treated defendant and whose involvement with Perez's treatment was extensive, testified his medical examination yielded no evidence to support Perez's claim. Martino attributed Perez's claimed pains in part to psychological factors, and generally cast doubt on Perez's credibility by relating incidents where he had observed Perez move effortlessly when  consistent with the pain complained of  the movement should have caused distress. The Board, as its findings of basic fact reveal, relied heavily on Martino's testimony, characterizing Perez's declarations "self-serving" insofar as his claim was concerned.
It was Martino's opinion that surgery conducted on Perez's back, wherein scar tissue was removed from an intervertebral disc, served to alleviate the pain which had plagued Perez. During a subsequent examination, he found no orthopedic or neurological abnormalities. He assessed Perez's disability as one of twenty percent permanent partial impairment of the man as a whole; he concluded that Perez was capable of carrying on reasonable types of employment.
As Perez argues, the conclusions reached by Dr. Martino were contradicted by other medical experts. Just as the matter of Perez's credibility was the province of the Industrial Board, however, so also was it the Board's prerogative to resolve the conflicts in the expert testimony. We cannot impinge on the Industrial Board's resolution of these questions. Berryman v. Fettig Canning Corp., (1980) Ind. App., 399 N.E.2d 840. While the fact that Perez has only a seventh grade education might militate against his eligibility for particular types of employment, he offered no evidence regarding the availability (or lack thereof) of "reasonable types of employment." Perez rested his claim on the medical question of his physical capacity to carry on reasonable types of employment; pursuant to the standard of review incumbent upon us, the Board's findings and conclusion in that regard must be upheld. In turn, due to the lack of evidence on other questions relevant to his claim, the medical question is dispositive. Perez's contention that the evidence warrants a result contrary to that reached by the Board and that, as a matter of law, he suffered total permanent disability, must fail.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Industrial Board did not err in its disposition of *217 Perez's claim and the Board is in all things affirmed.
Award affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.