Case Title: Noetzel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-466

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-466 
____________ 
 
BARRY A. NOETZEL, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
November 10, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
Barry A. Noetzel appeals his judgment of conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction, see 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and for the reasons below affirm 
Noetzel’s conviction and sentence of death. 
BACKGROUND 
While serving a life sentence at Mayo Correctional Institution, 
Noetzel joined with his cellmate, Jesse Bell, in developing a plan to 
murder corrections officer James Newman, whom they disliked, and 
a fellow inmate, whom they would select at a later date.  They 
 
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reduced their plan to writing in the following twelve steps, which 
they titled “Countdown To Extention” [sic]: 
1. Get on vegan diet 
2. Get multiple tools 
3. Get diagram of area 
4. Find a gofer  
5. Baby powder? 
6. Patience!!!! 
7. Pick a dick sucker 
8. Background check on dick sucker 
9. Pick a date 
10. Commence dry runs - rehearsals 
11. Exicute [sic]! 
12. Work on spelling!! 
 
In accordance with their plan, Noetzel and Bell got on a vegan 
diet, which allowed them greater access to the area of the kitchen 
where Officer Newman worked.  They used other inmates to scout 
the layout of the kitchen, drew a diagram of the area where Officer 
Newman worked, and obtained pieces of metal and fence, which 
they sharpened into weapons.  They also selected their fellow 
inmate Donald H. Eastwood, Jr., to kill because they believed him 
to be homosexual and a child molester. 
On June 26, 2019, after Noetzel lured Eastwood to his and 
Bell’s cell, Noetzel stabbed Eastwood in the eyes using their 
homemade weapons while Bell restrained and manually choked 
 
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Eastwood.  Noetzel hung up a sheet to prevent anyone from seeing 
inside the cell, and after confirming Eastwood was dead, Noetzel 
and Bell covered Eastwood’s body with a blanket and hid the body 
under a bunk in the cell.  They also cleaned up Eastwood’s blood 
with a towel and hung up a note in their cell that read, “GOD 
HATES FAGS[.]  FAGS HATE GOD!  KILL ALL FAGS AND CHO-
MOES!  (And Any C.O.’s Who F*ck with You!).” 
Noetzel and Bell then went to the prison’s dining area, where 
they attempted to stab Officer Newman to death with another of 
their homemade weapons.  Other officers intervened in the attack 
on Officer Newman, who was seriously injured but survived; 
apprehended Noetzel and Bell in the dining hall; and discovered 
Eastwood’s body in Noetzel and Bell’s cell, after Bell told a 
corrections officer that there was a dead “chomo” in his cell, with 
“chomo” being prison slang for “child molester.” 
Both Noetzel and Bell subsequently waived their Miranda1 
rights and provided detailed confessions to law enforcement.  As the 
 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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trial court’s sentencing order accurately reflects, with respect to the 
first-degree murder of Eastwood, Noetzel 
admitted that, after luring Mr. Eastwood to [the] cell 
[Noetzel shared with Bell], [Noetzel] stabbed Mr. 
Eastwood in the left eye, and his codefendant [Bell] 
grabbed Mr. Eastwood from behind and began to “choke 
him out.”  Mr. Eastwood did not immediately die, so 
[Noetzel] attempted to stab him in the right eye while 
[Bell] continued to “choke out” Mr. Eastwood.  At some 
point during the attack, Mr. Eastwood began to question 
the attack or beg for his life.  Additionally, when [Bell] 
initially released tension on Mr. Eastwood’s neck, Mr. 
Eastwood seemingly gasped for air.  This caused [Bell] to 
continue to strangle Mr. Eastwood even after he fell to 
the ground.  Eventually, Mr. Eastwood succumbed to 
these injuries and died. 
 
Consistent with Noetzel’s description of the killing, the medical 
examiner testified that Eastwood’s cause of death was “sharp force 
trauma to the left eye and brain[,] with neck compression,” that the 
manner of death was homicide, and that the puncture wound to 
Eastwood’s left eye—which was “badly wounded” and “basically just 
a bloody pulp”—would have been “particularly painful.” 
Noetzel and Bell were jointly indicted on October 29, 2019, in 
a five-count indictment for the first-degree premeditated murder of 
Eastwood; the attempted first-degree murder of Officer Newman 
with a weapon; and conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder of 
 
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Officer Newman.  In the fourth and fifth counts, Noetzel and Bell 
were each indicted, respectively, on one count of possession of a 
weapon by an inmate. 
Noetzel Requests to Exercise His Right to Self-Representation 
and to Plead Guilty 
 
 
At Noetzel’s first appearance and arraignment, after appointed 
counsel entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf, Noetzel personally 
addressed the trial court, stating that he would like a speedy trial, 
that he “want[ed] to enter a plea of guilty right now,” and that he 
wanted to represent himself and waive his right to counsel.  The 
presiding judge informed Noetzel that he was filling in for the trial 
judge, and that it would be up to the assigned judge to conduct the 
Faretta2 hearing required by Noetzel’s unequivocal request for self-
representation.  The presiding judge also told Noetzel, “[I]f you want 
to put that in writing, that you want to represent yourself, by all 
means, do that,” so that the assigned judge could “consider [it] at 
the appropriate time.” 
 
 
2.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 
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Thereafter, Noetzel put his pro se requests in writing, filing a 
demand for speedy trial, a motion to proceed pro se, and a motion 
to discharge appointed counsel.  Noetzel then filed a pro se “notice 
of inquiry” and a pro se motion to compel a hearing.  In addition, 
Noetzel filed a pro se letter questioning why no hearing had been 
held on his motion to proceed pro se; in the letter, Noetzel reiterated 
that he had “attempted to enter a plea of guilty on all charges” at 
his arraignment.  Noetzel’s pro se letter explained his strategy: 
I fully understand the dictates of Faretta and am 
knowingly and intelligently waiving my right to counsel.  
Thereafter, I will be entering a plea of guilty to preserve 
judicial resources and bring closure to all parties 
concerned with the outcome of this case. 
 
 
Following Noetzel’s pro se filings, three proceedings relevant to 
the issues raised in this appeal occurred: (1) a motion hearing, at 
which the trial court granted Noetzel’s request for self-
representation, found Noetzel competent, and accepted Noetzel’s 
guilty plea, (2) a bench penalty-phase proceeding that occurred 
after an expert evaluated Noetzel and found him competent, and (3) 
a final penalty-phase hearing that occurred after the presentence 
investigation (PSI). 
 
 
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I. THE MOTION HEARING 
 
The Trial Court Conducts a Faretta Inquiry and Grants 
Noetzel’s Request for Self-Representation 
 
 
On January 21, 2020, the trial judge assigned to Noetzel’s 
case held a hearing on Noetzel’s pro se motions.  At the hearing, 
Noetzel personally addressed the court and listed his requests, 
namely that he wished to discharge counsel, represent himself, 
enter a plea of guilty on all charges, demand a speedy trial, “waive 
all [of his] rights to a jury,” and be sentenced by the trial court. 
 
The trial court first addressed Noetzel’s request to invoke his 
right to self-representation by conducting a Faretta inquiry.  The 
lengthy inquiry included explanations by the trial court of the 
advantages of counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation, 
all of which Noetzel indicated that he understood.  Noetzel’s 
responses to the trial court’s questions went beyond simple “yeses” 
and “noes.”  For example, in response to the trial court’s question 
as to whether Noetzel had “any questions about the dangers and 
disadvantages of representing [himself]” that the trial court had 
explained, Noetzel responded, “Oh, what does it say, a lawyer that 
represents himself has a fool for a client.”  Noetzel then stated that 
 
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he was “still prepared to go forward with it,” even though he 
understood it was “[c]ompletely inadvisable” to proceed on his own.  
In response to follow-up questions by the trial court as to why he 
wanted to represent himself despite knowing it was inadvisable to 
do so, Noetzel explained that he wanted to quickly plead guilty 
because, “I am guilty.  There’s no, if and buts about it.  I did what I 
did.  Got no problem with it.”3 
During the Faretta inquiry, the trial court also questioned 
Noetzel as to whether he had “ever been diagnosed and/or treated 
for any mental illness or disorder.”  Noetzel responded, 
“Depression.”  The trial court followed up by asking Noetzel if he 
was taking any medication, and when Noetzel said he was not “at 
this moment,” the trial court questioned whether Noetzel had been 
prescribed medication.  When Noetzel said yes, the trial court asked 
 
 
3.  Other examples of Noetzel’s level of engagement with the 
trial court during the Faretta inquiry include that Noetzel appeared 
to banter with the trial court in discussing the potential deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea or conviction, stating “I really like the 
United States of America, sir,” and in discussing the possible 
consequences of a conviction if a sex-offender statute applied to any 
of his prior convictions, stating, “I like that law and I don’t fall 
under it.” 
 
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Noetzel to explain why he was not taking his prescribed medication, 
and Noetzel said that he “wanted to have a clear mind before I got to 
this point.”  Then, the following exchange occurred between Noetzel 
and the trial court: 
THE COURT: Okay.  Does the medication cloud 
your mind? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, but I just wanted to 
make sure I didn’t have anything in my system because I 
knew that this was going to be one of the questions that 
would be asked. 
THE COURT: All right.  So does the medication help 
you to understand or hinder your ability to understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: It’s a low grade -- I don’t 
remember the name of it, it’s in my file, for depression, 
but it’s also for back pain because I have chronic back 
pain, but because it’s a psych med, it’s registered that 
way. 
THE COURT: All right. . . .  [T]hen I assume, if 
there is an effect, it would cloud your ability to 
understand, affect your ability negatively to understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: It doesn’t? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Does it enhance your ability to 
understand, the medication? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, it just kind of keeps me 
calm. 
THE COURT: Okay.  But -- 
THE DEFENDANT: There’s no positive or negative 
to it except for what I take for my back. 
THE COURT: But it doesn’t affect your ability to 
understand or comprehend anything about what’s taking 
place? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
 
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THE COURT: Do you feel that you’re fully capable 
currently as you sit here now without your medication to 
understand and comprehend everything that you and I 
are talking about? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
 
The trial court then moved on to additional lines of inquiry, 
including whether, if Noetzel were permitted to represent himself, 
he would accept standby counsel.  After the trial court explained 
the role of standby counsel, Noetzel said he understood and 
confirmed his desire for standby counsel. 
Before ruling on Noetzel’s request for self-representation, the 
trial court inquired of the State and Noetzel’s then-appointed 
defense counsel as to whether either suggested further lines of 
inquiry.  Defense counsel suggested that the trial court should use 
the procedure followed in another recent capital case, where the 
trial court “appointed a couple of doctors to evaluate [the defendant] 
to make sure that he was competent to make the decisions to 
represent himself.”  Counsel’s suggestion prompted the following 
exchange: 
THE COURT: Okay.  And there’s no reason, though, 
to do that before the Court making a determination 
whether Mr. Noetzel understands what’s taking place 
here today in his request to represent himself? 
 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I’ve not seen any 
reason personally to doubt that Mr. Noetzel is competent 
to make the decision to represent himself, but I’m not an 
expert. 
THE COURT: Certainly.  And I understand that.  
Mr. Noetzel, what [counsel] is saying and what I’m going 
to do, whether I allow you to represent yourself at this 
stage or not, is appoint an expert to have you evaluated 
just to ensure.  I don’t see any reason to believe in any 
way that you’re incompetent to proceed. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: But I’m going to have that evaluation 
done out of the abundance of caution because of the 
severity of the possible sentences here.  Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
 
Following this exchange, the trial court granted Noetzel’s 
request for self-representation and appointed the public defender’s 
office as standby counsel. 
The Trial Court Makes Additional Findings Regarding Self-
Representation, Renews the Offer of Counsel, Accepts Noetzel’s 
Guilty Plea, and Finds Noetzel Competent 
 
Immediately after ruling that Noetzel could represent himself, 
the trial court addressed Noetzel’s request “to either demand a 
speedy trial or enter a plea,” and explained to Noetzel that he could 
demand a speedy trial if he wanted to go to trial, but that if he 
wanted to plead guilty, he would be “giving up [his] right to a trial.”  
Noetzel stated, “I would like to plead guilty.”  The trial court then 
 
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recessed so that Noetzel could read the offer of plea that the State 
had prepared.  When the hearing resumed, the State represented 
that Noetzel had read and signed the offer of plea form. 
 
Before addressing Noetzel’s plea, the trial court made the 
following, additional ruling with respect to Noetzel’s request for self-
representation: 
Mr. Noetzel, I already advised you, if I didn’t, that 
I’m going to allow you to represent yourself.  Mr. 
Marshburn and his office, the Office of the Public 
Defender, will be appointed at your request only as 
standby counsel and that the decisions that you’ll be 
making with [sic] be yours.  If you have any questions 
you don’t want to ask me, you can ask Mr. Marshburn. . 
. .  And that I do find it to be freely and voluntarily 
entered, and knowingly as well. 
 
 
Next, the trial court asked whether Noetzel was “withdrawing 
[his] speedy trial demand and wanting to enter a plea,” and Noetzel 
confirmed that was correct.  The trial court then renewed the offer 
of counsel, which Noetzel rejected.  Before accepting Noetzel’s plea, 
the trial court explained the consequences of pleading guilty to all 
four of the charges, including that the penalty Noetzel would receive 
for the first-degree murder of Eastwood would be either life in 
prison without parole or death.  The trial court further apprised 
Noetzel that, by pleading guilty, he would be waiving his 
 
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constitutional rights to remain silent, to a jury trial, and to confront 
witnesses, all of which Noetzel indicated he understood but wanted 
to waive and plead guilty.  Noetzel confirmed that no one had 
promised him anything or threatened him in exchange for his plea; 
said that he was pleading guilty “[b]ecause I am guilty”; and further 
said that he did not require additional time to consider his strategy 
because he had already had “210 days to ponder” “the charges 
against [him] and any defenses that [he] might have.” 
Noetzel also confirmed that he had no objection to the factual 
basis offered by the State for the four offenses to which he sought to 
plead guilty; with respect to the first-degree murder of Eastwood, 
the factual basis was, “[T]he defendant was an inmate at Mayo 
Correctional Institute and did kill a fellow inmate by the name of 
Donald Eastwood by premeditated murder . . . in Lafayette County, 
Florida.” 
 
Before accepting Noetzel’s plea, the trial court inquired as to 
whether there were any further suggested lines of inquiry.  Noetzel’s 
now-standby counsel responded, “Again, Your Honor, I would say 
this should all be done with the caveat that he hasn’t been 
evaluated by an expert.”  The trial court stated, “That’s what I plan 
 
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to do,” accepted Noetzel’s guilty plea, and also found Noetzel 
competent, ruling as follows: 
Mr. Noetzel, I’m going to accept your plea.  I find it to be 
freely and voluntarily made.  There are facts to support 
it.  And it’s all done with the cautionary issues that I’ve 
raised here with you regarding representing yourself and 
waiving your right to have an attorney present and 
represent you throughout the proceeding, and it’s done 
knowingly, intelligently.  I do find you to be at this point 
in time to be competent and intelligent and alert and the 
plea is accepted. 
 
After accepting Noetzel’s plea and finding him competent, the 
trial court explained that it was going “to have [Noetzel] evaluated to 
make sure that [he is] competent to proceed” and reiterated that 
this was being done “out of [an] abundance of caution.” 
The Trial Court Orders a Competency Evaluation and the 
Expert Finds Noetzel Competent to Proceed 
 
In accordance with its ruling at the January 21 motion 
hearing, the day after the trial court granted Noetzel’s request for 
self-representation, accepted his guilty plea, and found him 
competent, it appointed Dr. Umesh M. Mhatre “to assess and 
evaluate [Noetzel] concerning his competency to stand trial and/or 
negotiate a disposition of his case.”  Consistent with the trial court’s 
oral pronouncement that the evaluation was being ordered “out of 
 
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the abundance of caution because of the severity of the possible 
sentences here,” not because of bona fide reason to doubt Noetzel’s 
competency, the appointment order states that the evaluation was 
being ordered based on “concerns raised by the Court, the State, 
and the Defense concerning the gravity of [Noetzel’s] decisions” to 
discharge counsel and waive his right to a jury trial. 
Dr. Mhatre reviewed the arrest reports and Noetzel’s records 
from the Department of Corrections (DOC), examined Noetzel on 
February 1, 2020, and found him competent to proceed.  In 
addressing Noetzel’s “Competency to Proceed,” Dr. Mhatre’s written 
report includes this finding: “The patient understands the nature of 
charges against him and has already pled guilty.  He has released 
his attorney because he wants to represent himself in the 
sentencing phase.”  The “Medical and Psychiatric History” portions 
of the report indicate that Noetzel “did not know what medications 
he is currently receiving,” that Noetzel “denies having any inpatient 
psychiatric care,” but “has received outpatient treatment in the 
Department of Corrections,” and that Noetzel “acknowledges having 
low moods, insomnia, and anhedonia” and “states that his prison 
lifestyle is what’s making him depressed.”  The report notes that Dr. 
 
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Mhatre’s review of Noetzel’s DOC records revealed that Noetzel “has 
a past diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder and was on Trileptal 
300 mg twice a day and Effexor 150 mg a day.” 
Additionally, the “Mental Status Examination” portion of Dr. 
Mhatre’s report includes these findings: 
During the interview, [Noetzel] was polite, 
respectful, and provided a lot of spontaneous 
information.  He was quick to acknowledge his problems 
with his bad temper and impulsive behavior.  He admits 
having a past history of depression because of his prison 
lifestyle, but the medications definitely seem[] to have 
helped. 
There was no evidence to auditory, visual, tactile, 
olfactory, or kinesthetic hallucinations.  He is oriented to 
time, place, person.  His memory is intact for immediate, 
recent, remote events.  There were no signs of pressured 
speech, flight of ideas, or thought blocking. 
The patient is currently not suicidal or homicidal.  
His insight into his problem is adequate and his social 
judgment is significantly impaired. 
 
Dr. Mhatre’s report lists the following as his “Impression” of 
Noetzel’s mental health: (1) major depressive disorder; (2) history of 
substance abuse; and (3) antisocial personality disorder.  With 
respect to “Recommendations,” the report states that Noetzel 
“acknowledges that the medications have helped him and he wants 
to stay on them as long as he needs to.  He knows without the 
medications his condition could deteriorate.” 
 
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II. THE BENCH PENALTY-PHASE PROCEEDING 
 
The Trial Court Renews the Offer of Counsel and Renews the 
Competency Finding in Light of the Expert’s Report 
 
The bench penalty-phase proceeding, which subsumed the 
Spencer4 hearing, occurred on February 21, 2020, and was a joint 
penalty phase with Noetzel’s codefendant Bell, who had also 
exercised his right to self-representation, pleaded no contest, and, 
like Noetzel, had waived his right to a penalty-phase jury.  Before 
commencing the penalty phase, the trial court renewed the offer of 
counsel, which Noetzel rejected. 
Before accepting argument or evidence, the trial court again 
addressed the issue of Noetzel’s competency to proceed.  
Specifically, the trial court stated that it had previously found 
Noetzel to be competent to proceed but “[o]ut of the abundance of 
caution,” had ordered him “examined for competency” and had 
since received Dr. Mhatre’s report.  The trial court inquired as to 
whether Noetzel took “any exception to the Court considering [the] 
report . . . and [Dr. Mhatre’s] determination that [Noetzel is] 
 
 
4.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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competent to represent [himself] or competent to proceed,” and 
Noetzel responded that he “was happy with everything [Dr. Mhatre] 
said.” 
Based on the expert’s evaluation, the trial court found that 
Noetzel was “competent to proceed and there’s no indication of any 
sort of mental infirmity or defect that would prevent [him] from doing 
so.”  (Emphasis added.)  Noetzel indicated that he wanted to enter 
the competency evaluation as mitigation, and the trial court 
explained that Noetzel would have the ability to do that.  After 
explaining the penalty-phase proceedings that were to follow, the 
trial court again renewed the offer of counsel, and Noetzel again 
indicated that he was certain he wanted to continue to represent 
himself. 
The Trial Court Conducts the Bench Penalty-Phase Proceeding 
 
Thereafter, the State proceeded with its opening statement, 
arguing that it intended to prove five aggravating circumstances in 
support of imposition of the death penalty: (1) prior violent felony 
based on the contemporaneous attempted murder of Officer 
Newman; (2) under sentence of imprisonment for a felony; (3) 
Eastwood’s murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful 
 
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exercise of any government function or the enforcement of laws 
because Eastwood’s murder prevented him from completing his 
lawful sentence; (4) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); 
and (5) cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (CCP).  Neither Noetzel nor Bell 
presented an opening statement. 
The State presented the testimony of five witnesses, namely 
two corrections officers, both of whom Noetzel cross-examined; two 
investigators to whom Noetzel had confessed; and the medical 
examiner who performed the victim’s autopsy.  The State also 
introduced numerous exhibits including, without objection, certified 
copies of Noetzel’s judgments and sentences.  During the State’s 
case, Noetzel joined Bell in objecting to lines of questions related to 
Officer Newman, based on their joint argument, advanced by Bell, 
that evidence of their attempt to murder Officer Newman should not 
support the application of the prior violent felony aggravator. 
After the State rested, Bell and Noetzel called only themselves 
as witnesses.  Noetzel took responsibility for his actions and 
introduced his competency evaluation into evidence as mitigation.  
Noetzel also made the following statement in response to the trial 
 
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court’s question as to whether he had “anything [he] want[ed] the 
Court to be aware of, any matters in mitigation?”: 
The only thing that’s for mitigation that we’ve 
already gone through that I’ve explained to you when you 
were asking about my competency and I answered all 
your questions. 
Everything is stated quite plainly.  There’s nothing 
more to say, you know. 
I have no regrets for anything I’ve done. 
Talking about my childhood or my family or any of 
those things, I don’t think they have any bearing. 
Everything -- if you have a question, I’ll answer it.  
I’ve got no problem with it. 
And I was quite, you know, happy to say I’m guilty 
for what I did. 
Other than that, I don’t understand the mitigating 
part and other.  You know, talking about regrets, 
problems in childhood, you know, those things are in the 
past, you know.  People who use things, oh, I was beat 
up as a child.  That’s not a mitigating circumstance as 
far as I’m concerned, it’s an excuse.  You know, you did 
what you did.  You knew what you were doing, right or 
wrong.  We all know it. 
 
The State, I’m quite content with that and I think 
you for letting me talk. 
 
As I said, if y’all or anybody else has any questions, 
I’ll answer them. 
 
Following closing arguments, the trial court inquired as to 
whether there was anything further that should occur prior to the 
sentencing hearing, at which point the State asked the trial court to 
order a PSI for both Bell and Noetzel in light of the minimal 
mitigation presented.  Over Bell’s objection that a PSI was not 
 
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required because both he and Noetzel had presented some 
mitigation, the trial court exercised its discretion to “order one 
anyway.” 
 
Noetzel cooperated with the PSI, which contains a “Physical 
and Mental Health” section that denotes Noetzel’s “health status” as 
“good” and includes the following remark: “The subject stated that 
he is in good physical health and does not have mental health 
issues.  He does state that he was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia.” 
III. THE FINAL PENALTY-PHASE HEARING 
 
 
Before commencing the final penalty-phase hearing on March 
13, 2020, the trial court renewed the offer of counsel, which Noetzel 
rejected.  In renewing the offer of counsel, the trial court (1) 
reminded Noetzel of the “long litany of questions” it had gone 
through with him “regarding [his] decision to represent [himself],” 
(2) asked Noetzel whether he recalled those questions and his 
answers and whether he had any questions, and (3) inquired as to 
whether anyone had “threatened or forced” Noetzel to get him to 
reject counsel.  Noetzel indicated that he understood his right to 
counsel and confirmed that he still wished to proceed without 
 
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counsel and that no one had threatened him in regard to his 
decision. 
Next, the trial court asked Noetzel whether he had received a 
copy of the PSI and, if so, whether he had any “additions or 
corrections or points of clarification” to it.  Noetzel confirmed that 
he had received a copy, agreed that the information in it was 
accurate, and stated that he did not have anything to add. 
 
After hearing argument from the State regarding the four 
counts on which Noetzel was to be sentenced, the trial court 
inquired of Noetzel as to whether he had “any further matters in 
mitigation other than those that [he] presented in the penalty 
phase.”  Noetzel stated that he did not have additional mitigation to 
present and that he did not wish to address the court “as far as 
mitigation and recommendation . . . of the sentence.”5 
 
The trial court then proceeded to the sentencing portion of the 
hearing during which it adjudicated Noetzel guilty of each crime to 
which he had pleaded guilty and sentenced Noetzel to death for 
 
5.  This portion of the final hearing constituted additional 
proceedings in furtherance of the requirements of Spencer, 615 So. 
2d at 690-91. 
 
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Eastwood’s first-degree murder, to life for the attempted first-degree 
murder of Officer Newman with a weapon, to thirty years for 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder of Officer Newman, and to 
fifteen years for possession of a weapon in prison, with all 
sentences to run concurrent with one another. 
The Sentencing Order 
 
The trial court’s sentencing order reflects its rulings that 
Noetzel “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel,” 
and that Noetzel’s “guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.”  The order also reflects that the trial court rejected one 
of the five statutory aggravating circumstances argued by the State, 
namely that the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder 
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement 
of laws.  However, the trial court found that the State had proven 
the existence of the other four aggravators it had argued beyond a 
reasonable doubt and assigned each the noted weight: (1) the 
capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a 
felony and under sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (2) the 
defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (great 
 
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weight); (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC) (very great weight); and (4) the capital felony was a 
homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (CCP) (very great weight). 
 
The trial court considered statutory mitigating circumstances 
but found that none had been established.  However, it found the 
following three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and assigned 
each the noted weight: (1) the defendant cooperated during the 
investigation of and prosecution for the killing of Mr. Eastwood 
(little weight); (2) the defendant exhibited appropriate courtroom 
behavior (little weight); and (3) the defendant was previously 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (little weight). 
The trial court addressed Noetzel’s previous diagnosis as 
follows:  
According to statements made by the Defendant 
during the preparation of the PSI, he had been diagnosed 
with paranoid schizophrenia.  The Defendant did not 
mention any mental health issues during the penalty 
phase or present evidence to support it.  Additionally, he 
reported being in “good physical health” and was found 
competent not only to proceed but also to waive counsel 
and represent himself. 
 
- 25 - 
Court’s Finding.  Therefore, given the Defendant’s 
complete candor with this Court concerning his 
involvement in the crimes, this Court finds no reason to 
question or doubt this diagnosis.  However, without 
more, a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia cannot 
justify or excuse the Defendant’s conduct.  Nonetheless, 
this Court assigns this mitigating circumstance little 
weight. 
 
 
In sentencing Noetzel to death, the trial court further found 
“that the aggravating factors clearly, convincingly, and beyond a 
reasonable doubt outweigh the mitigating factors.” 
 
Noetzel now appeals. 
 
ANALYSIS 
In this direct appeal, we address three issues.  Noetzel briefed 
two issues in which he challenges—on several grounds related to 
his competency and the sufficiency of the trial court’s Faretta 
inquiry—the trial court’s rulings allowing him to waive counsel and 
represent himself.  Noetzel’s first issue centers on the trial court’s 
handling of his statement during the Faretta inquiry that he had 
been prescribed a “psych med” for depression and chronic back 
pain that he was not taking “at this moment.”  Noetzel’s second 
issue concerns the trial court’s acceptance, as nonstatutory 
mitigation, of his self-disclosure, made during the PSI, that he had 
 
- 26 - 
been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at an unspecified point 
in his past, before an expert found him competent to proceed and 
before the trial court found him competent.  As the third issue, we 
conduct a mandatory review of Noetzel’s guilty plea. 
(1) Competency and the Right to Self-Representation 
 
Noetzel first argues that the trial court erred in granting his 
request for self-representation because it failed to adequately 
inquire into his mental-health status, including by ordering a 
competency evaluation, before allowing him to represent himself.  
He further claims that the trial court failed to “make[] a 
determination of record” that he “does not suffer from severe mental 
illness to the point where [he] is not competent to conduct trial 
proceedings by himself” within the meaning of Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3).6 
 
6.  Noetzel also argues that the trial court failed to find that 
his counsel waiver was “intelligent.”  However, as the State correctly 
argues, the trial court made this finding in its sentencing order, 
ruling as follows: “[A] very lengthy and thorough Faretta inquiry was 
conducted pursuant to the Defendant’s right and decision to 
represent himself.  After it was determined that the Defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, he was 
permitted to represent himself.” 
 
- 27 - 
We review a trial court’s ruling on a request for self-
representation for abuse of discretion, Knight v. State, 211 So. 3d 1, 
15 (Fla. 2016), and where, as here, the errors alleged on appeal 
were not preserved, reversal is warranted only if the defendant 
establishes fundamental error, see Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 
1372, 1374 (Fla. 1994); see also § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“A 
judgment or sentence may be reversed on appeal only when an 
appellate court determines after a review of the complete record that 
prejudicial error occurred and was properly preserved in the trial 
court or, if not properly preserved, would constitute fundamental 
error.”). 
 
Noetzel’s arguments implicate three different standards.  The 
first is the standard for competence to stand trial—i.e., whether the 
defendant has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.”  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quoting 
Solicitor General’s suggestion).  The Dusky standard is the same 
standard of competence required to plead guilty or to waive the 
 
- 28 - 
right to assistance of counsel.  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 
391, 398, 402 (1993). 
The second is the Faretta standard for measuring whether a 
competent defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
The third is the competency standard to conduct trial 
proceedings without assistance of counsel, which is “somewhat 
higher” than the Dusky competency standard.  Woodbury v. State, 
320 So. 3d 631, 646 (Fla. 2021) (citing Wall v. State, 238 So. 3d 
127, 140 (Fla. 2018)).  Specifically, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that states may “insist upon representation by 
counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but 
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they 
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”  
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008); see also Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3) (implementing Edwards); Wall, 238 So. 3d at 
140-41 (“Under Edwards . . . there is a heightened competency 
standard for actually representing oneself at trial; thus defendants 
may be competent to waive counsel yet incompetent to represent 
themselves.”). 
 
- 29 - 
 
As explained below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
under any of these standards because (A) a competency hearing 
was not required; (B) competent, substantial evidence supports the 
trial court’s findings that Noetzel’s waiver of the right to counsel 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under Faretta; and (C) the 
trial court was not required to find that Noetzel suffered from severe 
mental illness to the point that he was incompetent to conduct trial 
proceedings by himself. 
A. Competency 
Noetzel first argues that his disclosure during the Faretta 
inquiry that he had been prescribed a “psych med” for depression 
and chronic back pain that he was not taking “at this moment” 
should have resulted in further inquiry from the trial court.  
Specifically, he contends that the trial court should have ordered a 
competency evaluation and withheld its ruling on his request for 
self-representation pending the results.  However, because a 
competency hearing was not required under the facts of Noetzel’s 
case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
A criminal defendant has the right to not be proceeded against 
while mentally incompetent to stand trial, Pate v. Robinson, 383 
 
- 30 - 
U.S. 375, 378 (1966), and the requirement to inquire as to the 
defendant’s competency is triggered as follows: 
If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the 
court of its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the 
defendant or for the state, has reasonable ground to 
believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to 
proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order 
setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s 
mental condition . . . . 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b). 
In Godinez, the Supreme Court explained that a trial court is 
“not . . . required to make a competency determination in every case 
in which a defendant seeks to plead guilty or to waive his right to 
counsel.  As in any criminal case, a competency determination is 
necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s 
competence.”  509 U.S. at 401 n.13 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 
U.S. 162, 180-81 (1975); Pate, 383 U.S. at 385). 
Moreover, in cases involving criminal defendants with histories 
of mental illness, this Court has recognized that “[n]ot every 
manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand 
trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist 
counsel or understand the charges.”  Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 
904, 913 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d 481, 487-
 
- 31 - 
88 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 644 
(rejecting Woodbury’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to 
order a competency hearing where, “[l]ike the defendant in Barnes, 
Woodbury disclosed a history and diagnosis of bipolar disorder, but 
nothing about his behavior in court indicated a present inability to 
understand the proceedings against him or an inability to consult 
with his standby counsel (or with counsel, had an attorney been 
appointed)”); Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20, 29 (Fla. 2010) (holding, 
in the context of rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to move for a competency determination, that a “suicide 
attempt alone” does not raise a “presumption” of incompetency and 
that “the administration of Mellaril, a powerful antipsychotic drug, 
did not necessarily render [the defendant] incompetent”). 
Here, when the trial court questioned Noetzel regarding his 
mental health history during the Faretta inquiry, Noetzel disclosed 
that he had been prescribed a “psych med” for “depression” and 
“chronic back pain” and stated that he was not taking his 
prescribed medication “at this moment.”  The trial court inquired 
further, and Noetzel clarified that his medication does not positively 
or negatively affect his ability to understand, but rather, “just kind 
 
- 32 - 
of keeps [him] calm.”  Noetzel also confirmed that he was “fully 
capable” of understanding and comprehending “everything” that the 
trial court was discussing with him. 
The trial court had the advantage of observing Noetzel in 
person and clearly did not witness anything that caused it to 
question Noetzel’s competency.  Further, a review of the record 
indicates nothing about Noetzel’s behavior—at any point before or 
after the trial court granted his request for self-representation—that 
would arguably demonstrate a present inability to understand the 
proceedings against him or an inability to consult with standby 
counsel as required to trigger a competency hearing.  See Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.210(b); see also Barnes, 124 So. 3d at 913. 
Noetzel’s case sits in stark comparison to a case such as 
Drope, 420 U.S. at 179, where the trial court ignored instances that 
raised a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency, 
including that the defendant had attempted suicide during the trial 
and had engaged in “pronounced irrational behavior” between the 
time of the crime and the trial.  There was no such behavior in 
Noetzel’s case.  To the contrary, Noetzel filed several pro se motions, 
which he followed up with a pro se letter.  During all four of the 
 
- 33 - 
court proceedings—(1) the first appearance and arraignment, (2) the 
motion hearing, (3) the bench penalty-phase proceeding, and (4) the 
final penalty-phase hearing—Noetzel demonstrated that he 
understood the legal issues; he articulated his strategy; he engaged 
with the trial court’s questioning; and his courtroom behavior was 
appropriate. 
Moreover, the trial court ultimately did order a competency 
evaluation even though one was not necessary under the Pate 
standard codified in rule 3.210(b).  Specifically, after inquiring of 
then-appointed defense counsel, who stated that he had “not seen 
any reason personally to doubt that Mr. Noetzel is competent to 
make the decision to represent himself,” the trial court stated that it 
did not “see any reason to believe in any way that [Noetzel was] 
incompetent to proceed.”  Nevertheless, despite finding Noetzel 
competent, the trial court ordered a competency evaluation “out of 
the abundance of caution because of the severity of the possible 
sentences here.”  Thereafter, the expert found Noetzel competent to 
proceed, and the trial court subsequently renewed its competency 
finding based on the expert’s report. 
Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
 
- 34 - 
B. Self-Representation 
A competent criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 
to represent himself at trial.  Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 377-
78 (Fla. 2008).  A defendant’s unequivocal request for self-
representation triggers the trial court’s obligation to hold a Faretta 
inquiry, the purpose of which is to determine whether the waiver of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.  Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 378.  Unlike the competency 
inquiry discussed above, which focuses on “the defendant’s mental 
capacity,” i.e., “whether he has the ability to understand the 
proceedings,” the “purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry” 
under Faretta “is to determine whether the defendant actually does 
understand the significance and consequences of a particular 
decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.”  Godinez, 509 U.S. 
at 401 n.12. 
Regarding the “proper scope” of the Faretta inquiry, this Court 
recently reiterated “that once a court determines that a competent 
defendant of his or own free will has ‘knowingly and intelligently’ 
waived the right to counsel, the dictates of Faretta are satisfied, the 
inquiry is over, and the defendant may proceed unrepresented.”  
 
- 35 - 
Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163, 168 (Fla. 2019) (quoting State v. 
Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. 1997)).  In other words, “there are 
no ‘magic words’ under Faretta.”  Id. (quoting Potts v. State, 718 So. 
2d 757, 760 (Fla. 1998)).  Rather, “[t]he accused must only ‘be made 
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so 
that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open.’ ”  Id. at 167 (quoting Faretta, 
422 U.S. at 835).  On review, the appellate court “will evaluate ‘the 
defendant’s general understanding of his or her rights.’ ”  Id. at 168 
(quoting Potts, 718 So. 2d at 760). 
In Noetzel’s case, the trial court conducted a lengthy Faretta 
inquiry, during which it explained the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation and the advantages of being represented by 
counsel.  Noetzel now faults the trial court for not inquiring further 
into his mental health status, but the record shows that during the 
Faretta inquiry, the trial court continued to question Noetzel until it 
was satisfied that neither mental illness nor Noetzel’s not taking his 
prescribed medication “at this moment” prevented Noetzel from 
understanding the rights being discussed. 
 
- 36 - 
Further, there is no indication in the record that Noetzel failed 
to understand his rights or that he was not exercising his right to 
self-representation with his eyes open.  To the contrary, Noetzel 
admitted that he understood it was completely inadvisable to 
represent himself but explained that he wanted to do so to further 
his strategy to quickly plead guilty because he was guilty and to 
“streamline” the sentencing phase of the proceeding as much as 
possible.7  Noetzel’s disclosure of a mental illness does not preclude 
him from waiving the right to counsel and proceeding pro se.  Cf. 
Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 647-48 (“Given that certain people with 
bipolar disorder function well and act rationally, we see no logic in 
 
 
7.  When the trial court questioned Noetzel as to why he 
wanted to waive a penalty-phase jury, Noetzel explained his 
strategy, in part, as follows: 
 
 
Why mess somebody else’s life up?  I’ve already said 
I’m guilty.  Every investigator that I’ve sat in front of, I’ve 
walked them through step by step how I killed [Eastwood] 
and the reasons that I wanted to kill that officer.  Plain 
and simple, walked them step by step.  I have not 
wavered from what I’ve done. 
 
There’s no sense in bringing a jury involved and 
messing up their lives, having to spend money to pay 
people to come in her and uproot their lives when I can 
just sit here with you and we can streamline this and be 
done with it. 
 
- 37 - 
creating a per se rule or presumption that all individuals with 
bipolar disorder suffer so severely from mental illness that they are 
unable to carry out basic trial tasks without assistance.”). 
Because competent, substantial evidence supports the trial 
court’s finding that Noetzel’s waiver of the right to counsel was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under Faretta, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in granting Noetzel’s request for self-
representation. 
C. Rule 3.111(d)(3) 
 
 
Noetzel also argues that the trial court erred under the 
“somewhat higher” competency standard of rule 3.111(d)(3).  
Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 646.  We disagree. 
Although the technical skill of a criminal defendant to 
represent himself is not part of the Faretta inquiry, “the 
government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the 
trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his 
own lawyer.”  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177 (quoting Martinez v. Court 
of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)).  Thus, the Supreme Court 
held in Edwards that “the Constitution permits States to insist 
upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to 
 
- 38 - 
stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental 
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial 
proceedings by themselves.”  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. 
Following Edwards, this Court amended Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) to “implement the narrow limitation 
upon the right to self-representation recognized in Edwards,” but 
did so “[w]ithout deciding whether Edwards compels states to 
provide additional protection to severely mentally ill defendants.”  In 
re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Crim. Proc. 3.111, 17 So. 3d 272, 274 (Fla. 
2009).  Rule 3.111(d)(3) thus authorizes trial courts to force counsel 
upon a competent criminal defendant who has waived the right to 
counsel and seeks to represent himself at trial in the limited 
instance where the defendant “suffer[s] from severe mental illness 
to the point where [he] is not competent to conduct trial 
proceedings by himself.” 
 
As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to whether rule 
3.111(d)(3) applies to a case like Noetzel’s—where the defendant 
pleads guilty rather than proceed to trial but represents himself, 
with standby counsel, during the penalty phase.  However, we need 
not resolve the open question of whether what happened in 
 
- 39 - 
Noetzel’s case amounts to a defendant “conduct[ing] trial 
proceedings by himself,” within the meaning of rule 3.111(d).  That 
is because, even if the rule applies to Noetzel’s case, our precedent 
clearly establishes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by not forcing counsel upon Noetzel under the rule. 
In Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 647-48, after reviewing the record, 
we rejected the defendant’s argument that his “purportedly erratic,” 
id. at 648, “behavior in court, together with his bipolar diagnosis, 
required the trial court to find that [he] suffered from severe mental 
illness to the point of being incompetent to conduct the proceedings 
by himself,” id. at 647.  Under Woodbury, Noetzel’s case is not even 
close, as there is no “purportedly erratic” behavior.  Indeed, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that Noetzel’s mental illness 
manifested in a way that would have precluded him from 
conducting trial proceedings by himself within the meaning of rule 
3.111(d)(3).  To the contrary, the record shows that Noetzel filed 
various pro se motions, including a motion to compel a ruling on 
his request for self-representation, and addressed them with the 
trial court.  During the bench penalty-phase proceeding, Noetzel 
cross-examined witnesses, objected to one of the State’s exhibits, 
 
- 40 - 
introduced his competency evaluation into evidence, and made a 
statement to the court that aligned with his previously explained 
strategies of pleading guilty because he was guilty and of 
streamlining the penalty-phase proceedings as much as possible.  
During all of the proceedings, Noetzel’s interactions with the trial 
court were appropriate; he had no trouble following what was 
happening or carrying out his previously articulated strategies.  
Moreover, before proceeding with the bench penalty phase, the trial 
court did, in fact, rule that Noetzel was “competent to proceed and 
there’s no indication of any sort of mental infirmity or defect that 
would prevent [him] from doing so.”  (Emphasis added.)  Competent, 
substantial evidence supports that finding.8 
 
8.  Noetzel faults the trial court for limiting the competency 
evaluation that it ordered in an “abundance of caution” to his 
competency to proceed—as opposed to also ordering evaluation of 
whether he suffers from severe mental illness to the point he is not 
competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself within the 
meaning of rule 3.111(d)(3).  However, the Florida Statutes and this 
Court’s procedural rules governing the appointment of experts to 
evaluate competency address mental competence to proceed and 
require experts to detail specific findings regarding the defendant’s 
mental capacity—findings that were made by the expert in this 
case.  See § 916.12, Fla. Stat. (2020); Fla R. Crim. P. 3.211-3.212.  
These provisions do not require additional findings from appointed 
experts regarding the “somewhat higher” “competency standard to 
 
- 41 - 
Accordingly, even assuming that rule 3.111(d)(3) applies, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find that Noetzel 
suffered from severe mental illness to the point of being 
incompetent to conduct the penalty-phase proceedings by himself. 
(2) Noetzel’s Disclosure During the PSI 
In his second issue, Noetzel argues that even if the trial court 
did not initially err by granting his request for self-representation, it 
erred by continuing to allow him to represent himself at the final 
penalty-phase hearing that occurred on March 13, 2020, following 
the PSI.  More specifically, Noetzel claims that because the trial 
court accepted, as nonstatutory mitigation, his self-disclosure 
during the PSI that he had been diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia at an unspecified point in his past, the trial court 
was required to conduct a new Faretta inquiry and revisit the issue 
of competency before accepting Noetzel’s rejection of the renewed 
offer of counsel.  These arguments were not preserved below, and 
we hold that Noetzel has failed to establish an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court, let alone fundamental error. 
 
conduct trial proceedings without assistance.”  Woodbury, 320 So. 
3d at 646. 
 
- 42 - 
First, with respect to competency, the self-disclosure pertained 
to a diagnosis that occurred at some unspecified point in Noetzel’s 
past, but before the trial court’s interactions with Noetzel, before the 
expert evaluated Noetzel and found him competent to proceed, and 
before the trial court’s competency findings.  The trial court’s 
subsequent acceptance of mitigation in the form of a past diagnosis 
does not change the competency calculus because mitigation 
pertains to “factors in the defendant’s background that would 
mitigate against imposition of the death penalty,” § 921.141(7)(h), 
Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added), whereas competency pertains to 
present ability, see Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.  And, again, as 
addressed under issue 1, there are no manifestations of mental 
illness or other behavior anywhere in the record that give rise to a 
bona fide doubt as to Noetzel’s competence—either to stand trial or, 
assuming rule 3.111(d)(3) applies, to conduct trial proceedings by 
himself.  See Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 482-83 (Fla. 2010) 
(“Once a defendant has been deemed competent, the presumption 
of competence continues throughout all subsequent proceedings.  A 
subsequent competency hearing is only required ‘if a bona fide 
question as to the defendant’s competency has been raised.’ ”) 
 
- 43 - 
(citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 187 (Fla. 
2005)). 
 
Second, the trial court’s crediting of Noetzel’s self-disclosure as 
mitigation did not mandate a new Faretta inquiry before the trial 
court could properly accept Noetzel’s rejection of the renewed offer 
of counsel at the beginning of the final penalty-phase hearing.  Our 
precedent requires that the trial court renew the offer of counsel at 
each subsequent crucial stage of the proceeding.  See Traylor v. 
State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992) (explaining that, under the 
Florida Constitution, “the defendant is entitled to decide at each 
crucial stage of the proceedings whether he or she requires the 
assistance of counsel” and that “the waiver [of counsel] applies only 
to the present stage and must be renewed at each subsequent 
crucial stage where the defendant is unrepresented”); see also Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(5) (“If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the 
proceedings, the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by 
the court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the 
defendant appears without counsel.”). 
However, absent a substantial change in circumstances that 
would cause the trial court to question its original ruling on the 
 
- 44 - 
defendant’s request for self-representation, there is no concomitant 
requirement to revisit Faretta every time the offer of counsel is 
subsequently renewed and rejected.  See Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 
647 n.7 (“We do not suggest that all of these [renewed] offers [of 
counsel] and Faretta inquiries were legally required.  The record 
indicates that the trial court conducted so many inquiries to ensure 
that the offer of counsel was renewed at all critical stages of the 
proceedings.  Nothing in the record suggests that any of the 
inquiries were prompted by new concerns about [the defendant’s] 
behavior or competency.”); see also United States v. Nunez, 137 F. 
App’x 214, 215 (11th Cir. 2005) (“If we were to place upon the 
district court an obligation to reassess its Faretta hearing decision, 
we would do so only on a showing of a substantial change in 
circumstances since the initial hearing.”).9 
In this case, when Noetzel rejected the renewed offer of 
counsel at the final penalty-phase hearing, there had been no 
 
9.  To the extent the First District Court of Appeal held to the 
contrary in Howard v. State, 147 So. 3d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2014), when it stated (emphasis ours) that “[f]ailure to renew the 
offer of counsel at a critical stage and conduct a Faretta inquiry if 
the defendant rejects the renewed offer is per se reversible error,” we 
disapprove Howard. 
 
- 45 - 
change of circumstances that should have caused the trial court to 
question its finding from the January 21, 2020, motion hearing that 
Noetzel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary exercised his right to 
self-representation under Faretta.  Moreover, even though it would 
not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have 
accepted Noetzel’s representation that he wanted to continue pro se, 
the trial court actually did revisit Faretta, at least in part, before 
permitting Noetzel to do so by (1) reminding Noetzel of the “long 
litany of questions” it had gone through with him “regarding [his] 
decision to represent [himself],” (2) asking Noetzel whether he 
recalled those questions and his answers and whether he had any 
questions, and (3) inquiring as to whether anyone had “threatened 
or forced” Noetzel to get him to reject counsel.  Noetzel indicated 
that he understood his right to counsel and confirmed that he still 
wished to proceed without counsel and that no one had threatened 
him in regard to his decision. 
In our view, the trial court did everything right.  It certainly did 
not fundamentally err. 
 
- 46 - 
(3) Guilty Plea 
Because we have rejected Noetzel’s argument that the trial 
court erred by finding him competent to waive counsel and because 
the competency standards for waiving the right to counsel, pleading 
guilty, and standing trial are all the same Dusky standard, it follows 
that Noetzel was competent to plead guilty immediately after his 
counsel waiver.  See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391, 398, 402. 
However, where the defendant’s guilty plea results in a 
sentence of death, our mandatory obligation to review whether 
sufficient evidence supports the first-degree murder conviction, see 
Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5), requires a review of the guilty plea, 
under the following standard: 
“[W]hen a defendant has pled guilty to the charges 
resulting in a penalty of death, this Court’s review shifts 
to the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of that 
plea.”  Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 847 (Fla. 2005) 
(quoting Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 375 (Fla. 2003)).  
Thus, . . . the Court must “scrutinize the plea to ensure 
that the defendant was made aware of the consequences 
of his plea, was apprised of the constitutional rights he 
was waiving, and pled guilty voluntarily.”  Id. (quoting 
Ocha [v. State], 826 So. 2d [956,] 965 [(Fla. 2002)]). 
 
Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 731, 738 (Fla. 2015).  In addition, the Doty 
Court looked to “[t]he factual basis for the plea” to determine that 
 
- 47 - 
there was “competent, substantial evidence to support the 
conviction for first-degree murder.”  170 So. 3d at 739. 
 
Noetzel’s plea satisfies the Doty standard.  The trial court 
advised Noetzel of the constitutional rights that he would be waiving 
by pleading guilty, and Noetzel indicated that he understood.  See 
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397 n.7 (“A criminal defendant waives three 
constitutional rights when he pleads guilty: the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront 
one’s accusers.”) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 
(1969)).  The trial court also reviewed the two possible sentences 
that could result from a guilty plea, namely life in prison without 
the possibility of parole or death, and Noetzel confirmed that he 
understood.  Additionally, the trial court inquired into the 
voluntariness of Noetzel’s plea, and Noetzel stated that no one had 
promised him anything or threatened him in exchange for the plea.  
To the contrary, Noetzel said that he was pleading guilty “[b]ecause 
I am guilty.”  Finally, the factual basis the State provided for the 
plea, to which Noetzel stated he had no objection, is competent, 
substantial evidence to support Noetzel’s conviction for first-degree 
murder.  See Doty, 170 So. 3d at 739. 
 
- 48 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Noetzel’s first-degree 
murder conviction and sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from 
proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct appeal 
cases), I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lafayette County, 
David W. Fina, Judge – Case No. 342019CF000055CFAXMX 
 
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez and Michael 
T. Kennett, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee