Case Title: Allen v. Brown

Citation: 181 Kan. 301, 310 P.2d 923

Docket Number: 40,489

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1957-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 Kan. 301 (1957)
310 P.2d 923
GAIL ALLEN, Appellee,
v.
HARRY N. BROWN and BERNARD BROWN, d/b/a HARRY BROWN MOTORS, Appellants.
No. 40,489

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 11, 1957.
Albert M. Ross, of Kansas City, argued the cause; Joseph Cohen, Charles S. Schnider, John E. Shamberg, Thomas E. Joyce, and Joseph P. Jenkins, all of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for appellants.
J.W. Mahoney, of Kansas City, argued the cause; David W. Carson and John K. Dear, both of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court overruling a demurrer to the petition of the plaintiff.
Throughout this opinion the appellee, Gail Allen, will be referred to as the plaintiff, and Harry N. Brown and Bernard Brown, doing business as Harry Brown Motors, appellants, will be referred to as the defendants.
The plaintiff purchased a new Plymouth automobile from the defendants who were automobile dealers, and after having some difficulty with the automobile brought an action against the dealers and the manufacturer upon an express warranty given in connection with the sale of the automobile.
The appeal before this court does not involve the manufacturer, Chrysler Corporation, and therefore, no reference will be made to the manufacturer with respect to liability pursuant to the warranty.
*303 The pertinent portions of the second amended petition filed by the plaintiff allege:
The document containing the warranty attached to the petition reads as follows:
Included in the written document attached to the second amended petition as a part thereof, and incorporated by reference, is the "Plymouth Owner Service Certificate." The portions material to our discussion herein are as follows:
"1. NEW CAR CONDITIONING:
..............
"4. EXPLANATION OF WARRANTY:
The demurrer challenges the petition on the ground that it does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant automobile dealers. It is unnecessary to unduly burden this opinion with a discussion concerning the liability of the defendant automobile dealers on an implied warranty. In the first place, the written warranty is expressly given in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied. This provision is binding on the purchaser. A mere dealer in machinery or equipment of standard make is not bound by any implied warranty and that is particularly true where, as here, the written terms of the contract of purchase expressly excluded any and all implied warranties. (Harmon v. Coonrod, 148 Kan. 146, 79 P.2d 831; Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206, 91 Pac. 179; Richardson v. G.W. Mfg. Co., 3 Kan. App. 445, 43 Pac. 809; Machinery Co. v. Schierkolk, 95 Kan. 737, 149 Pac. 680; Thresher Co. v. Nelson, 105 Kan. 517, 184 Pac. 982; and Parker v. Hutchinson Motor Car Co., 127 Kan. 765, 274 Pac. 1115.)
Furthermore, plaintiff did not plead an implied warranty upon which a cause of action could be lodged against the defendants.
Reference is made to the foregoing authorities cited and to the case of Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964, and the authorities cited therein, for a full discussion of the Kansas law relative to Sales and Warranties.
The only question before this court, therefore, is whether the petition states a cause of action against the defendants based upon the express written warranty.
The defendants contend that the second amended petition of the plaintiff must be strictly construed. We do not so regard the petition.
The defendants first attacked the petition of the plaintiff by a motion to make definite and certain. The lower court sustained this motion in all its meritorious respects. It did not require the plaintiff to plead that the automobile purchased was a new automobile, and did not require the plaintiff to itemize the damages which plaintiff claims to have amounted to $2,476.00. In other respects the *306 plaintiff complied with the order and the petition was again attacked by a motion to strike, which the lower court sustained. It was argued as a motion to make more definite and certain by agreement of the parties, and the plaintiff complied with the order of the court.
The rules concerning the construction of a petition attacked by a demurrer are well stated in the recent case of Vitt v. McDowell Motors, Inc., 180 Kan. 800, 308 P.2d 115, as follows:
See, also, Byerley v. Braucher, 180 Kan. 816, 308 P.2d 144; Snyder v. Haas, 175 Kan. 846, 267 P.2d 467; Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], Pleading, §§ 33 to 35; and West's Kansas Digest, Pleading, § 34 (4).
In the instant case the meritorious portions of defendants' motions were sustained by the lower court and the plaintiff complied with the orders by twice amending his petition. The petition, therefore, is entitled to a liberal construction in favor of the plaintiff.
It was unnecessary to require that the plaintiff make his original petition more definite and certain by stating whether the automobile purchased was new, since a fair construction of the petition including the document incorporated by reference in complying with the court's order warrants a construction that plaintiff's cause of action *307 is upon the breach of a written warranty involving the sale of a new Plymouth automobile. The attack upon the allegation of damages will be discussed later.
As is often the case in the purchase of a new automobile, the purchaser on discovering mechanical conditions which do not seem to be normal in the operation of the motor vehicle, will return the automobile to the dealer from whom the purchase was made. The particular defect is usually unknown to the purchaser and it is upon the dealer that he relies for discovery of the defect causing the unusual mechanical functioning of the vehicle.
In ordinary and concise language the plaintiff stated facts which describe a new automobile commonly referred to in the automobile industry as a "vibrator". This is neither unusual nor uncommon to the industry. The general cause of the vibrations is known. Some part or parts have been either defectively manufactured or improperly assembled in the construction and manufacture of the automobile. In the operation of an automobile, when these defective parts are rotating rapidly, they are spinning either eccentrically (off center) or concentrically out of balance (improper weight distribution). Both give rise to vibrations. The difficulty lies in locating the precise spot and cause. It may be a defect in the manufacture of the part or parts and it may be a defect in workmanship in the assembly of the automobile. Both are specified and covered by the written warranty.
The purchaser of a new automobile does not know the precise cause, and the dealer with his mechanics may, after calling in the factory experts and representatives, take many months to locate the defect.
Under an express warranty as alleged in the petition, it would place a tremendous burden upon the purchaser of a new motor vehicle to find the precise part or parts of the vehicle which were defective and direct the dealer to replace them or remedy the defect. If the operation of such vehicle is mechanically defective and the automobile is returned to the dealer for the purpose of correcting these defects, it is incumbent upon the dealer to find such defective part or parts and replace them pursuant to the terms of the warranty or to locate the assembly that has been improperly assembled and remedy the defect.
This situation was recognized in a Louisiana case on a "new car guarantee" similar to the warranty in the case at bar, Cobb v. Truett, La. App., 11 So. 2d 120, where the court said:
..............
A similar new car warranty was the subject of litigation between a dealer and the purchaser in Peterson Co. v. Parrott, 129 Me. 381, 152 A. 313, where the court held that paint on an automobile not in good condition and not properly applied constituted "defective workmanship or material" within the warranty and the question of damages by reason thereof should have been submitted to a jury.
Where, as in this case, the express warranty contemplates that the seller's liability for a breach of warranty does not attach until he has had an opportunity to remedy the defects, his failure or refusal to act, where such opportunity is afforded the seller, fixes his liability. Under these circumstances the following is quoted from 77 C.J.S., Sales, § 340, p. 1235:
While the plaintiff did not allege in so many words that he returned the automobile to the dealers within 90 days or before he had driven 4,000 miles, whichever occurred first, he did allege that it was returned to the dealers for service and attempted repair. The defendants raise no question on this point and no motions were directed against these allegations. Under liberal construction the petition on this point is sufficient to withstand a demurrer. The defendants are advised by the petition what the plaintiff claims against them and may plead their defense. Of necessity, the plaintiff's *309 evidence at the trial must establish compliance with the terms of the warranty.
To what extent the plaintiff has been damaged is primarily a question for the jury to determine. The burden of proving damages rests upon the plaintiff. The petition alleged damages to the full extent of the purchase price of the automobile. The plaintiff has further alleged consequential damages resulting from the loss of use of the automobile, inconvenience to himself and time lost. As to the items of damage a petitioner need not plead his evidence.
The law concerning damages where there has been a breach of a warranty in a contract of sale is stated in McNaghten Loan Co. v. Sandifer, 137 Kan. 353, 20 p.2d 523:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach of warranty. In the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount, this is the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery and the value they would have had if they had conformed to the warranty. It is thus clear that consequential damages, if properly pleaded and proved, may be recovered by reason of breach of warranty.
It follows that the plaintiff has stated a good cause of action against the defendants for breach of an express warranty, and the order of the lower court overruling the demurrer should be and hereby is affirmed.