Case Title: State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky

Citation: 1996-Ohio-340

Docket Number: 19961482

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, Judge. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky (1996),   Ohio St.3d     .] 
Prohibition preventing judge from continuing further proceedings in a 
divorce action where one of the parties dies prior to the scheduled 
commencement of trial -- Writ granted, when. 
 
(No. 96-1482 -- Submitted September 10, 1996 -- Decided November 13, 
1996.) 
 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
In December 1994, John C. Litty, Jr. filed a divorce action against his wife, 
relator, Carol-Lou Wolverton Litty, in the Mahoning County Court of Common 
Pleas.  Respondent, Judge John J. Leskovyansky, is presiding over the case.  On 
January 5, 1996, during the pendency of the divorce action, relator filed an 
affidavit of bias and disqualification regarding Judge Leskovyansky with the court 
pursuant to R.C. 2701.03.  Relator requested that Judge Leskovyansky be 
disqualified from the divorce action and that another judge be assigned.   
 
On January 8, 1996, John C. Litty, Jr., the plaintiff in the divorce action, 
died.  At the time of the decedent’s death, trial in the divorce action had not 
commenced, and the issues in the case had not been presented to Judge 
Leskovyansky for determination.  On January 11, Judge Leskovyansky, on his 
 
2
own motion, dismissed the divorce case because of the plaintiff’s death. On 
January 16, the Chief Justice ruled that relator’s affidavit of disqualification 
concerning Judge Leskovyansky was moot due to the January 11 dismissal of the 
divorce case.   
 
In February 1996, the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Probate 
Division appointed the daughter of the decedent, Brenda Dobson, executor of his 
estate.  In March 1996, Dobson filed a motion to substitute herself, in her capacity 
as executor of the decedent’s estate, as the plaintiff in the previously dismissed 
divorce case and to revive the divorce action. Dobson’s motion was “for the 
purpose of dividing the property in the divorce action.”  In May 1996, Judge 
Leskovyansky issued the following entry: 
 
“Pursuant to [Civ.] Rule 60(A) the court, having dismissed this action in 
error, does hereby reinstate the same and must await the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio with regard to the pending affidavit for disqualification filed 
previous to the death of plaintiff by the defendant.”     
 
Shortly thereafter, relator instituted this action for a writ of prohibition 
preventing Judge Leskovyansky from continuing further proceedings in the 
divorce case. This court granted an alternative writ and issued a schedule for the 
 
3
presentation of evidence and briefs.  76 Ohio St.3d 1407-1408, 666 N.E.2d 567-
568. 
____________________ 
 
John V. Heutsche Co., L.P.A., and John V. Heutsche, for relator. 
 
James A. Philomena, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Linette 
S. Baringer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In her various propositions of law, relator asserts that she is 
entitled to extraordinary relief in prohibition.  In order for a writ of prohibition to 
issue, relator must establish that (1) Judge Leskovyansky is about to exercise 
judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) if 
the writ is denied, relator will suffer injury for which no other adequate remedy 
exists.  State ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 540, 660 N.E.2d 458, 461. 
 
Judge Leskovyansky initially contends that relator has not established the 
first requirement for the issuance of a writ of prohibition because he has already 
exercised judicial power by reinstating the divorce case. However, where an 
inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, 
 
4
prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction 
and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.  State 
ex rel. Smith v. Frost (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 656 N.E.2d 673, 676; State 
ex rel. Tollis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Appeals (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 145, 148, 
532 N.E.2d 727, 730.  In addition, Judge Leskovyansky intends to exercise further 
jurisdiction in the divorce action by dividing the property of relator and the 
decedent.  
 
As for the remaining requirements of a writ of prohibition, prohibition will 
not lie where relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State 
ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 555, 653 N.E.2d 
366, 369.  Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.  State ex 
rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 
22, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1306. 
 
Relator asserts that a writ of prohibition should issue because Judge 
Leskovyansky patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to revive and 
 
5
proceed with the divorce action.  Relator claims that the death of the plaintiff in 
the divorce action divested the common pleas court of jurisdiction over the case. 
 
R.C. 2311.21 states that “[u]nless otherwise provided, no action or 
proceeding pending in any court shall abate by the death of either or both of the 
parties thereto, except actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, for a 
nuisance, or against a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which shall 
abate by the death of either party.”  Although divorce actions are not specified in 
R.C. 2311.21 as actions requiring abatement upon death of one or both parties, this 
court has stated that “[e]ven in the absence of statute, it stands to reason that 
where one or both parties to a divorce action die before a final decree of divorce 
the action abates and there can be no revival [because] [c]ircumstances have 
accomplished the primary object sought.”  Porter v. Lerch (1934), 129 Ohio St. 
47, 56, 1 O.O. 356, 360, 193 N.E. 766, 770 (construing the similarly worded 
General Code version of R.C. 2311.21); see, also, Taylor v. Taylor (July 15, 
1992), Hamilton App. No. C-910126, unreported, 1992 WL 166076 (“[I]t is now 
well settled in Ohio that an action for divorce is one of the exceptional cases 
where abatement results from the death of a party.”). 
 
6
 
Conversely, if a party in a divorce action dies following a decree 
determining property rights and granting a divorce but prior to the journalization 
of the decree, the action does not abate upon the party’s death.  Porter, 129 Ohio 
St. at 56, 1 O.O. at 360, 193 N.E. at 770; Caprita v. Caprita (1945), 145 Ohio St. 
5, 60 N.E.2d 483, paragraph three of the syllabus.  In these circumstances, the 
decree may be journalized by nunc pro tunc entry.  Id. at paragraph four of the 
syllabus; see, generally, 2 Spike, Ohio Family Law and Practice (1994) 688-689, 
Section 21.107. 
 
In the case at bar, Judge Leskovyansky did not decide any of the issues in 
the divorce action prior to the death of relator’s husband.  The decedent died prior 
to the scheduled commencement of trial in the divorce case.  Based on these 
uncontroverted facts, Judge Leskovyansky lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the 
underlying divorce action.  See, e.g., Diemer v. Diemer (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 
54, 62-63, 649 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-1291 (divorce action abated upon plaintiff’s 
death prior to domestic relations court’s commencing proceedings or determining 
any issues, and probate court, rather than domestic relations court, possessed 
jurisdiction to determine rights and liabilities of parties with respect to antenuptial 
agreement); Koch v. Koch (Mar. 4, 1994), Sandusky App. No. S-93-5, unreported, 
 
7
1994 WL 69358 (where trial court had taken no action to finally decide issues in 
divorce action prior to death of one of the parties, nunc pro tunc entry could not be 
used to journalize decisions on those issues and trial court had no further 
jurisdiction to consider divorce case); Hook v. Hook (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 51, 
52-53, 519 N.E.2d 687, 689 (trial court properly dismissed divorce action when 
one of the parties died prior to the commencement of trial). 
 
Judge Leskovyansky vacated his previous dismissal of the divorce case 
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A), which provides that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors arising therein arising from oversight 
or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on 
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.”  Judge 
Leskovyansky contends that he properly exercised his authority to reinstate the 
divorce case pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A). 
 
Civ.R. 60(A) permits a trial court, in its discretion, to correct clerical 
mistakes which are apparent on the record, but does not authorize a trial court to 
make substantive changes in judgments.  Londrico v. Delores C. Knowlton, Inc. 
(1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 282, 285, 623 N.E.2d 723, 725.  The term “clerical 
mistake” refers to a mistake or omission, mechanical in nature and apparent on the 
 
8
record which does not involve a legal decision or judgment.  Id., 88 Ohio App.3d 
at 285, 623 N.E.2d at 725; Dentsply Internatl., Inc. v. Kostas (1985), 26 Ohio 
App.3d 116, 118, 26 OBR 327, 328-329, 498 N.E.2d 1079, 1081.  Judge 
Leskovyansky’s May 1996 entry stated that he dismissed the divorce action “in 
error” because he had not considered the then-pending affidavit of 
disqualification.  This does not indicate any “clerical mistake.”  Instead, it reflects 
a substantive change in Judge Leskovyansky’s judgment.  Therefore, Judge 
Leskovyansky was not authorized under Civ.R. 60(A) to revive the divorce action.  
See, generally, McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 385-386, 
Section 13.34. 
 
Judge Leskovyansky’s May 1996 entry also did not constitute a proper nunc 
pro tunc entry.  While courts possess inherent authority to correct errors in 
judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth, nunc pro tunc entries are 
limited in proper use to reflecting what the court actually decided, not what the 
court might or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.  State ex 
rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163-164, 656 N.E.2d 1288, 1294.  
Since the May 1996 decision does not reflect what Judge Leskovyansky actually 
decided in his previous dismissal entry, he lacked authority to issue the entry 
 
9
vacating the dismissal under his inherent authority to issue a nunc pro tunc entry.  
Id.; see, also, Porter, Caprita, and Koch, supra. 
 
Therefore, Judge Leskovyansky lacked jurisdiction to vacate the prior 
dismissal and proceed in the divorce action following the death of relator’s 
husband before the commencement of trial.  In these circumstances, the lack of 
jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, rendering the availability of appeal 
immaterial and permitting the court to vacate any prior jurisdictionally 
unauthorized actions like the revival of the divorce case.  See State ex rel. Sullivan 
v. Brigner (Nov. 25, 1992), Montgomery App. No. 13461, unreported, where the 
court of appeals granted a writ of prohibition to prevent a domestic relations court 
from deciding a custody dispute when one of the parties to the divorce action died 
prior to the determination of the case. 
 
Judge Leskovyansky claims that his prior dismissal of the divorce action 
was a nullity because of the then-pending affidavit of disqualification filed against 
him by relator.  Judge Leskovyansky relies on cases which generally prohibit a 
judge from determining a cause or hearing any matter that affects the substantive 
rights of the parties when an affidavit of prejudice has been properly filed.  See 
State ex rel. Lomaz v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
 
10
209, 210-211, 522 N.E.2d 551, 553, fn. 2, which noted, without expressly 
approving, cases supporting the foregoing proposition; Bland v. Graves (1994), 99 
Ohio App.3d 123, 132, 650 N.E.2d 117, 124.  However, not all courts agree that 
an affidavit of prejudice prevents a court from proceeding with the case.  See, e.g., 
Rife v. Morgan (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 843, 850, 667 N.E.2d 450, 454-455 
(“Taking into account the ease with which a disgruntled litigant may file an 
affidavit of disqualification with the Supreme Court, we believe the appropriate 
approach is to posit that a trial judge who proceeds with substantive matters 
pending resolution by the Chief Justice of an affidavit of disqualification does so 
at the risk of those proceedings being held for naught should the Chief Justice find 
the affidavit of disqualification to be meritorious. *** Because we hold that the 
pendency of an affidavit of disqualification does not automatically divest the trial 
court of power to act, even upon substantive matters, and because the Chief Justice 
eventually denied the affidavit of disqualification that was pending on the date of 
the evidentiary hearing, the first assignment of error is overruled.”).   
 
Further, even assuming, arguendo, that the authorities cited by Judge 
Leskovyansky are correct, he was not divested of authority to act in an 
administrative or ministerial capacity.  Lomaz, 36 Ohio St.3d at 211, 522 N.E.2d at 
 
11
553, fn. 2; Evans v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 57, 58, 566 
N.E.2d 704, 706.  As discussed previously, the death of relator’s husband prior to 
adjudication of the issues in the divorce case caused the action to abate and ended 
any jurisdiction that Judge Leskovyansky had over the case except to dismiss it.  
See Porter, Diemer, Koch, and Sullivan, supra.  Consequently, following the 
decedent’s demise, the decision to dismiss the case was a required, ministerial 
decision rather than a substantive ruling requiring the Chief Justice’s decision on 
relator’s affidavit of disqualification. 
 
In addition, Judge Leskovyansky’s May 1996 entry reinstated the divorce 
case until there was a ruling on the “pending” affidavit of disqualification.  
However, the affidavit is no longer pending, since it has been ruled moot by the 
Chief Justice, and Judge Leskovyansky thus lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the 
divorce action.  Judge Leskovyansky concedes that relator’s affidavit of 
disqualification is no longer pending because he argues that if relator wants to 
prohibit him from hearing the divorce action and dividing the parties’ property, 
relator “simply needs to file a second affidavit of prejudice against Respondent 
which will suspend his jurisdiction until either the [Chief Justice] rules on the 
affidavit of prejudice or another judge can be appointed to hear the matter.”   
 
12
 
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, relator has established all of the 
requirements necessary for the issuance of the requested writ.  We grant a writ of 
prohibition preventing Judge Leskovyansky from proceeding with the divorce 
action.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Writ granted. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., not participating. 
 
                                          
 
1   By so holding, we need not address the arguments raised by relator in her first 
and fifth propositions of law that following a voluntary dismissal of the case, the 
court lacks jurisdiction over the matter dismissed, and that since the decedent’s 
daughter has already invoked the jurisdiction of the probate court, the common 
pleas court lacks jurisdiction over the divorce.