Case Title: Livingston v. Va. Dep't of Transp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101006

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Present:  All the Justices 
 
GEOFF LIVINGSTON, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 101006 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
     June 7, 2012 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Robert J. Smith, Judge 
 
 
Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeowners or renters 
(collectively Plaintiffs) in Fairfax County's (County) 
Huntington subdivision brought this inverse condemnation suit 
against the County and the Virginia Department of 
Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a 
severe storm in the summer of 2006.  The circuit court 
dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding in relevant part that a 
single occurrence of flooding cannot support an inverse 
condemnation claim under Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  We disagree and reverse. 
I. 
A. 
 
Because this case arises from a demurrer, we recite the 
facts as they are alleged in the Plaintiffs' second amended 
complaint.  Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 Va. 166, 169, 695 
S.E.2d 537, 539 (2010).  On June 25, 2006, the Plaintiffs were 
homeowners or renters in Huntington, which is located along the 
southern bank of Cameron Run, a tributary stream of the Potomac 
2 
 
River, near the County's border with the City of Alexandria.  
That evening, a storm produced "long periods of precipitation 
with high intensity downpours," causing significant flooding.  
In less than two hours, the flow depth of Cameron Run increased 
from just under 2 feet to almost 14 feet.  The storm created 
the second-highest water flow in the channel since 1953.1 
 
The floodwaters, blocked on the north by the concrete mass 
of the Capital Beltway, overwhelmed the southern bank of 
Cameron Run and engulfed much of Huntington.  Floodwater backed 
up through storm and sanitary sewers and filled the basements 
of many of the Plaintiffs' homes with sewage-laced water.  The 
flood damaged the Plaintiffs' homes and personal property. 
 
The Plaintiffs allege that the June 2006 flood was caused 
by the acts or omissions of the County and VDOT.  During its 
construction of the Beltway in the early 1960s, VDOT's 
predecessor, the Virginia Department of Highways, straightened 
a curved section of Cameron Run and relocated it roughly 1,150 
feet closer to Huntington.2  The straightening and relocation 
reduced Cameron Run to 38% of its natural width. 
                                                 
 
1 The highest flow was created by Hurricane Agnes in 1972. 
 
2 From the time of the Beltway's construction until the 
June 2006 flood, VDOT owned the land on which Cameron Run was 
relocated.  The Huntington homes were built several years 
before the relocation of Cameron Run and construction of the 
Beltway. 
3 
 
 
VDOT built the Beltway to the immediate north of the 
relocated Cameron Run.  To create a base for the Beltway in 
what had been a marsh and wetlands, VDOT removed the natural 
"sponge" for floodwater by adding solid fill and draining the 
remaining water with vertical "sand wicks."  The presence of 
the Beltway on the northern edge of the relocated Cameron Run 
also created a berm, which forced water south during flooding 
and "eliminat[ed] the conveyance potential beyond the north 
bank of the stream." 
 
The Plaintiffs allege that their homes would not have 
flooded in 2006 had VDOT not, in the early 1960s, relocated 
Cameron Run, filled in portions of the watershed marshes to 
construct the Beltway, narrowed the channel's natural width, 
and built the Beltway in such a way as to serve as a concrete 
wall blocking any northern flow of water from the channel. 
 
The Plaintiffs further allege that the flood damage was 
"amplified" by the County's and VDOT's acts or omissions after 
the relocation of Cameron Run and construction of the Beltway.  
They allege that most of their homes would not have flooded at 
all, and those few that did would have suffered only minor 
damage, if the elevation of the June 2006 flood had not been 
significantly raised by the accumulation of sediment in the 
relocated Cameron Run due to the County's and VDOT's failure to 
dredge or otherwise maintain the channel, VDOT's construction 
4 
 
of the U.S. Route 1 Interchange in the Cameron Run Watershed, 
and the encroachment on the Cameron Run flood plain caused by 
commercial and other development approved by the County. 
 
According to a 2007 report prepared by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, 5 to 6 feet of sediment accumulated in the relocated 
Cameron Run between 1965 and 1999.  This sedimentation 
contributed to the severity of the June 2006 flood, decreasing 
the capacity of the channel to transport water to the Potomac 
River and away from Huntington.  The Corps report concluded 
that without such sedimentation, flood elevations in Huntington 
would have been 1.2 to 2 feet lower.  The County and VDOT were 
aware, by way of multiple reports and memoranda, of the 
sedimentation and the increased risk of flooding it posed, but 
did not undertake any dredging or maintenance of the relocated 
Cameron Run.  As early as 1966, the County adopted an ordinance 
for a regulated 100-year floodplain for the channel.  In 1970, 
VDOT's resident engineer circulated a memorandum in which he 
acknowledged the danger of sedimentation in the relocated 
Cameron Run but disavowed VDOT's responsibility for dredging 
it.  In the wake of the June 2006 flood, VDOT continued to 
insist that it had no duty to maintain the channel.  Rather, 
VDOT asserted, "each locality is responsible for the 
maintenance of the natural and relocated Cameron Run Channel 
5 
 
within its jurisdictional limits, despite the fact that the 
subject reach of Cameron Run is within VDOT's [r]ight-of-way." 
 
The Corps report also found that the construction of the 
Route 1 Interchange, part of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge 
construction project, contributed up to 1 foot to the water 
level during the June 2006 flood and that commercial 
development within the Cameron Run floodplain contributed 
another 2.5 to 5 inches.  Such development included the 
Huntington Metro Rail and Station, completed in 1983, and Jones 
Point, a 100-acre development located adjacent to Cameron Run 
containing residential apartment towers and several commercial 
buildings.  A metal retaining wall was constructed along 
Cameron Run for Jones Point, with a large amount of fill 
brought in to elevate that development out of the floodplain. 
B. 
 
To recover for the damage to their homes and personal 
property resulting from the June 2006 flood, the Plaintiffs 
sued the County and VDOT.  In their second amended complaint, 
the Plaintiffs allege that the County and VDOT damaged their 
homes and personal property for public use without just 
compensation, in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  That section, in relevant part, 
guarantees "that the General Assembly shall not pass any law 
. . . whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for 
6 
 
public uses, without just compensation."  Va. Const. Art. I, 
§ 11. 
 
Both the County and VDOT demurred.  VDOT's demurrer 
presented several grounds for dismissal:  that the Plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they did not own or rent their homes 
when VDOT relocated Cameron Run and built the Beltway;3 that the 
Plaintiffs failed to identify or allege a specific appurtenant 
right connected to their homes that VDOT damaged when it 
constructed the Beltway; that VDOT was not responsible for 
commercial development in the Cameron Run Watershed, including 
the construction of the Huntington Metro and Jones Point; that 
the Plaintiffs' homes were not damaged for public use; and that 
the Plaintiffs could not recover for damage to their personal 
property. 
 
The circuit court sustained the County's and VDOT's 
demurrers.  In its letter opinion, the circuit court framed the 
question presented — which it considered to be one of first 
impression — as follows:  "[D]oes a single occurrence of 
temporary flooding state a cause of action for inverse 
condemnation?"  To answer this question, the circuit court 
analyzed several of our cases involving multiple occurrences of 
                                                 
 
3 VDOT also raised this issue as a plea in bar of the 
statute of limitations, which was pending when the circuit 
court sustained the demurrers; hence it is not a part of this 
appeal. 
7 
 
flooding as well as several federal cases construing the 
Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution in a flooding 
context.  It reasoned that 
the distinction between taking and damaging is [not] 
dispositive.  As I understand the law, the 
distinction that is dispositive is the episodic 
nature of the event — not the legal terminology that 
describes the result of the event.  An allegation of 
a one[-]time event that results in a taking is no 
more compensable than a one[-]time event that results 
only in damage. 
 
Concluding that the June 2006 flood was "an extraordinary 
event," the circuit court went on to hold that "a one[-]time 
episode of flooding does not state a cause of action for 
inverse condemnation" under Article I, Section 11.4  It 
accordingly dismissed the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint 
with prejudice. 
C. 
 
We granted the Plaintiffs' petition for appeal as to VDOT 
but not as to the County.  The Plaintiffs assign error as 
follows: 
The trial court erred in sustaining [VDOT's] 
demurrer[] when it concluded that a single occurrence 
of flooding cannot state a cause of action for 
damaging under Article I, [Section] 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
                                                 
 
4 The circuit court also sustained the County's demurrer on 
the ground that the County "did nothing more than acquiesce in 
the construction of the Beltway."  The Plaintiffs did not 
challenge this ruling. 
8 
 
 
We also granted VDOT's assignments of cross-error, which 
state: 
1. The trial court erred in not sustaining VDOT's 
Demurrer on the alternative grounds that [the 
Plaintiffs] lacked standing to seek compensation 
under Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia 
Constitution because they did not own or rent the 
subject properties when the Beltway was 
constructed. 
 
2. The trial court erred in not sustaining VDOT's 
Demurrer on the alternative grounds that [VDOT] 
was not responsible for the dramatic urbanization 
of the Cameron Run Watershed after the Beltway was 
completed more than 50 years ago. 
 
3. The trial court erred in not sustaining VDOT's 
Demurrer on the alternative grounds [that the 
Plaintiffs] did not allege that their property was 
damaged "for a public use." 
 
4. The trial court erred in not sustaining VDOT's 
Demurrer on the alternative grounds that [the 
Plaintiffs] cannot recover for damages to personal 
property, business losses or repair costs in an 
inverse condemnation action. 
 
(Some internal quotation marks omitted.) 
 
II. 
 
We review de novo the circuit court's sustaining of VDOT's 
demurrer.  Lee v. City of Norfolk, 281 Va. 423, 432, 706 S.E.2d 
330, 334 (2011).  In conducting our review, we accept as true 
the facts alleged in the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint 
and give the Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from those facts.  Station #2, 280 
Va. at 169, 695 S.E.2d at 539.  This is because "[a] demurrer 
9 
 
tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in pleadings, not 
the strength of proof."  Lee, 281 Va. at 432, 706 S.E.2d at 334 
(quoting Augusta Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mason, 274 Va. 199, 
204, 645 S.E.2d 290, 293 (2007)).  "To survive a challenge by 
demurrer, a pleading must be made with 'sufficient definiteness 
to enable the court to find the existence of a legal basis for 
its judgment.' "  Hubbard v. Dresser, Inc., 271 Va. 117, 122, 
624 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2006) (quoting Moore v. Jefferson Hospital, 
Inc., 208 Va. 438, 440, 158 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1967)). 
III. 
A. 
 
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia 
confers upon a property owner a right to just compensation if 
the government takes or damages his property for public use.  A 
property owner may enforce this constitutional right through an 
inverse condemnation suit.  Kitchen v. City of Newport News, 
275 Va. 378, 386, 657 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2008).  For the 
government to take or damage property within the meaning of 
Article I, Section 11, it need not "actually invade or disturb 
the property"; rather, it need only "adversely affect[] the 
[property owner's] ability to exercise a right connected to the 
property."  Id. (quoting Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond, 
267 Va. 598, 602, 594 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2004)).  A suit for 
inverse condemnation, then, "is an action seeking redress for 
10 
 
the government's action in limiting property rights the 
[property owner] holds."  Id. at 386, 657 S.E.2d at 136-37 
(quoting Richmeade, 267 Va. at 603, 594 S.E.2d at 609). 
B. 
 
The Plaintiffs assert that the circuit court erred by 
holding that a single occurrence of flooding cannot support an 
inverse condemnation claim.  They contend that a taking and a 
damaging are distinct concepts under Article I, Section 11; and 
that, accordingly, "[p]roperty can be taken without being 
damaged, and property can be damaged without being taken."  So, 
they argue, "while the injury caused by a one-time event is not 
compensable as a taking, it is compensable as a damaging." 
 
VDOT does not dispute that a single occurrence of flooding 
could give rise to a compensable damaging under Article I, 
Section 11, but it has a different view of the circuit court's 
holding.  According to VDOT, the circuit court did not hold 
that a single occurrence of flooding could never support an 
inverse condemnation claim; instead, it held that the June 2006 
flood could not support the Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation 
claim because it was "an extraordinary event." 
 
In support of its reading of the circuit court's holding, 
VDOT points to the court's reliance on our decision in American 
Locomotive Company v. Hoffman, 105 Va. 343, 54 S.E. 25 (1906).  
There we considered whether a railroad was liable for damages 
11 
 
to a property owner for building two culverts that were 
allegedly inadequate to "carry off" the water from a nearby 
stream.  Id. at 344-45, 54 S.E.2d at 25-26.  The property owner 
claimed that the improper design and construction of the 
culverts led to multiple "overflows" onto his property.  Id.  
In addressing the rights and obligations of riparian owners, we 
said: 
Where bridges, culverts, etc., are constructed across 
water courses by railroad companies, municipalities, 
or other corporations, or by individuals, due care 
must be taken not to obstruct the natural flow, 
including that at seasons of either low or usual high 
water, and the failure to do so will render the 
offender liable for injuries to landowners caused by 
the penning back of the waters and the overflow of 
their lands; but such structures need not be 
constructed in such a manner as to permit the 
unobstructed flow of the water course in times of 
unprecedented and extraordinary freshets. 
 
Id. at 350, 54 S.E.2d at 27 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  The circuit court 
quoted this language in its letter opinion just before 
announcing its holding. 
 
To the extent that the circuit court held that a single 
occurrence of flooding cannot support an inverse condemnation 
claim, it erred.  We find nothing in Article I, Section 11's 
text or history that limits a property owner's right to just 
compensation for a damaging to only multiple occurrences of 
flooding.  Further, our case law holds that a single occurrence 
12 
 
of flooding can support an inverse condemnation claim.  In 
Hampton Roads Sanitation District v. McDonnell, 234 Va. 235, 
360 S.E.2d 841 (1987), we said that a property owner could 
bring a new inverse condemnation suit against the City of 
Hampton Roads each time it discharged sewage onto his property.  
Id. at 239, 360 S.E.2d at 844.  We explained:  "[T]he original 
discharge of sewage in 1969 did not produce all the damage to 
the property.  The discharges were not continuous; instead, 
they occurred only at intervals.  Thus, each discharge 
inflicted a new injury for which [the property owner] had a 
separate cause of action."  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The circuit court also erred insofar as it held that the 
June 2006 flood could not support the Plaintiffs' inverse 
condemnation claim because it was "an extraordinary event."  We 
have said that "[w]hether an extraordinary flood is an 'act of 
God' is a mixed question of law and fact" and that the 
defendant bears the burden of "prov[ing] the existence of 
circumstances permitting exemption from liability."  Cooper v. 
Horn, 248 Va. 417, 425, 448 S.E.2d 403, 407 (1994).  But we 
have never addressed whether damages caused by an act of God 
are compensable under Article I, Section 11.  Other States with 
similar constitutional provisions have held that such damages 
do not give rise to an inverse condemnation claim.  See, e.g., 
Schrader v. State, 213 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Iowa 1973) (holding 
13 
 
that a public body that constructs an improvement need not 
condemn for the possibility of an act of God); Aasamundstad v. 
State, 763 N.W.2d 748, 758 (N.D. 2008) (noting that North 
Dakota recognizes "an act-of-God defense" to a claim for the 
taking or damaging of private property).  But we need not — and 
do not — decide that question today, for the June 2006 flood 
was not an act of God under the facts alleged by the 
Plaintiffs.5 
 
An "act of God" is defined in our precedents as "[a]ny 
accident due to natural causes directly and exclusively without 
human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by 
any amount of foresight and pains, and care reasonably to have 
been expected."  City of Portsmouth v. Culpepper, 192 Va. 362, 
367, 64 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1951) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  "To relieve one of liability because a 
flood is, in law, an 'an act of God,' it must appear that the 
act of God was the sole proximate cause of the injury."  
Cooper, 248 Va. at 425, 448 S.E.2d at 408 (some internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  And "[i]t has been held 
in Virginia since 1849 that all human agency is to be excluded 
from creating or entering into the cause of mischief, in order 
that it may be deemed an Act of God."  Culpepper, 192 Va. at 
                                                 
 
5 VDOT is, of course, free to prove otherwise should the 
case proceed to trial. 
14 
 
367, 62 S.E.2d at 801 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
The storm that led to the June 2006 flood was no doubt 
severe, but it was not unprecedented — Hurricane Agnes in 1972 
produced a greater water flow in the relocated Cameron Run.  
That the channel would at times be subjected to heavy water 
flows, then, was not unforeseeable.  More importantly, however, 
the Plaintiffs allege that the June 2006 flood was the result 
not of natural causes but of human agency:  Had VDOT not 
allowed several feet of sediment to accumulate in the relocated 
Cameron Run, they claim, "the vast majority of [their] homes 
would not have been flooded at all, and those few that did 
would have suffered only minor flooding."  The Plaintiffs 
allege, moreover, that VDOT's resident engineer recognized as 
early as 1970 that sediment accumulating in the channel could 
lead to flooding but denied VDOT's responsibility for dredging 
it. 
 
In sum, no matter which way the circuit court's holding is 
read, it was in error.  Our review, however, is not at an end, 
for VDOT urges us to affirm the circuit court's judgment on one 
or more alternative grounds.  See Shilling v. Baker, 279 Va. 
720, 728, 691 S.E.2d 806, 811 (2010).  We address those grounds 
below and find that none demands affirmance of the circuit 
court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint. 
15 
 
IV. 
A. 
 
We begin with VDOT's claim that the Plaintiffs lack 
standing to maintain this inverse condemnation suit.  VDOT 
argues that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek relief 
under Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia for 
damages caused by the relocation of Cameron Run and 
construction of the Beltway, because they did not buy or rent 
their homes until many years after those public improvements 
were completed.  The Plaintiffs, however, do not allege that 
their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's 
relocation of Cameron Run and construction of the Beltway.  
Rather, they allege that their homes and personal property were 
damaged by VDOT's operation of — and, in particular, its 
failure to maintain — the channel in the years following its 
relocation.6  The Plaintiffs claim that, had VDOT not allowed 
several feet of sediment to accumulate in the relocated Cameron 
                                                 
 
6 At oral argument, counsel for the Plaintiffs clarified 
that their inverse condemnation claim arises solely from VDOT's 
failure to maintain the relocated Cameron Run: 
 
We believe as we understand it that Cameron Run, the 
new channel, the concrete channel, as it was designed, 
very well may have completely mitigated the 2006 flood 
if it had been maintained.  So it is the operation of 
this public use, not the construction of it, though 
obviously if it hadn't been constructed, it would 
never have been operated. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
16 
 
Run, "the vast majority of [their] homes would not have been 
flooded at all, and those few that did would have suffered only 
minor flooding."  Hence we confine our analysis to whether the 
Plaintiffs have standing under Article I, Section 11 to seek 
relief for damages resulting from VDOT's operation of, and 
failure to maintain, the channel. 
 
In general terms, we have explained the concept of 
standing as follows: 
 
A party has standing if it can show an immediate, 
pecuniary, and substantial interest in the litigation, 
and not a remote or indirect interest.  The concept of 
standing concerns itself with the characteristics of 
the person or entity who files suit.  The point of 
standing is to ensure that the person who asserts a 
position has a substantial legal right to do so and 
that his rights will be affected by the disposition of 
the case.  In asking whether a person has standing, we 
ask, in essence, whether he has a sufficient interest 
in the subject matter of the case so that the parties 
will be actual adversaries and the issues will be 
fully and faithfully developed. 
 
Westlake Props. v. Westlake Pointe Prop. Owners Ass'n, 273 Va. 
107, 120, 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
 
When the Plaintiffs bought or rented their homes, they 
acquired a bundle of rights, including the rights to possession 
and enjoyment.  See City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, 255 Va. 
395, 400, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1998).  And those rights were 
undoubtedly impaired when the June 2006 flood filled their 
homes with sewage-laced water.  Since an inverse condemnation 
17 
 
claim arises when "the government's action . . . limit[s] 
property rights the [property owner] holds" at the time of the 
action, we conclude that the Plaintiffs have standing under 
Article I, Section 11 to seek relief for damages caused by 
VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocated 
Cameron Run.  Kitchen, 275 Va. at 386, 657 S.E.2d at 136-37 
(quoting Richmeade, 267 Va. at 603, 594 S.E.2d at 609); see 
also Swift & Co. v. City of Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 120, 52 
S.E. 821, 825 (1906) ("It is the direct disturbance of a right 
which the owner had enjoyed in connection with his property 
that gives the right of action." (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
B. 
 
We now turn to VDOT's argument that the Plaintiffs' 
inverse condemnation claim must be dismissed because the 
Plaintiffs fail to identify or allege a specific appurtenant 
right connected to their homes that VDOT damaged when it 
constructed the Beltway.  According to VDOT, the word "damaged" 
in Article I, Section 11 does not encompass physical damage to 
tangible property, but only damage to intangible property 
rights.  Relying on our decisions in Board of Supervisors of 
Prince William County v. Omni Homes, Inc., 253 Va. 59, 481 
S.E.2d 460 (1997), and Richmeade, VDOT contends that property 
is damaged in the constitutional sense only when "an 
18 
 
appurtenant right connected with the property is directly and 
specially affected by a public use and that use inflicts a 
direct and special injury on the property which diminishes its 
value."  Omni Homes, 253 Va. at 72, 481 S.E.2d at 467. 
 
We reject VDOT's limited view of the word "damaged" in 
Article I, Section 11.  Our recognition in Omni Homes and 
Richmeade of the constitutional right to recover for damage to 
an appurtenant right to property does not exclude the right to 
recover for physical damage to property itself.  City of 
Lynchburg v. Peters, 156 Va. 40, 49, 157 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1931) 
(noting that the word "damaged" was added to Article I, Section 
11's predecessor to cover "cases where the corpus of the 
owner's property itself, or some appurtenant right or easement 
connected therewith, or by the law annexed thereto, is directly 
(that is, in general if not always, physically) affected, and 
is also specially affected (that is, in a manner not common to 
the property owner and to the public at large)" (citation 
omitted)); Lambert v. City of Norfolk, 108 Va. 259, 265, 61 
S.E. 776, 778 (1908) ("The meaning of the word 'damaged' was 
neither enlarged nor restricted by the Constitution.  It must, 
therefore, have been used in the same sense and with the same 
meaning that it had at common law — not damage to the feelings, 
tastes or sentiments, but physical damage to the corpus or to 
some right of property appurtenant thereto.").  We have 
19 
 
therefore allowed recovery in cases in which only physical 
damage to property itself was alleged.  E.g., Jenkins v. County 
of Shenandoah, 246 Va. 467, 469-70, 436 S.E.2d 607, 608-09 
(1993) (water discharge from drainage easement); McDonnell, 234 
Va. at 238-39, 360 S.E.2d at 843 (sewage discharge); Burns v. 
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 218 Va. 625, 626, 238 
S.E.2d 823, 824 (1977) (water discharge from sewer); Morris v. 
Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 203 Va. 196, 197, 123 S.E.2d 398, 
399 (1962) (water damage); Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel 
Dist., 196 Va. 477, 478, 84 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1954) (same). 
 
Neither Omni Homes nor Richmeade alters this well-
established precedent.  In Omni Homes, the property owner 
complained of interference with an alleged appurtenant right to 
property, not physical damage to property itself.  253 Va. at 
63-65, 481 S.E.2d at 461-62.  In particular, the property owner 
alleged that Prince William County's purchase of adjoining land 
affected the property owner's ability to secure higher zoning 
classification for planned development.  Id.  In that context, 
we observed that "Virginia law holds partial diminution in the 
value of property compensable only if it results from 
dislocation of a specific right contained in the property 
owner's bundle of property rights."  Id. at 72, 481 S.E.2d at 
467 (citing Lambert, 108 Va. at 268, 61 S.E. at 778-79). 
20 
 
 
Similarly, in Richmeade, the property owner claimed that 
the City of Richmond denied a request to vacate streets, 
thereby hindering the property owner's ability to develop two 
parcels as a single development.  267 Va. at 600, 594 S.E.2d at 
607.  Relying on Omni Homes, we explained that "[t]o take or 
damage property in the constitutional sense does not require 
that the sovereign actually invade or disturb the property.  
Taking or damaging property in the constitutional sense means 
that the governmental action adversely affects the landowner's 
ability to exercise a right connected to the property."  Id. at 
602, 594 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Omni Homes, 253 Va. at 72, 481 
S.E.2d at 467).  When such a right connected to the property is 
adversely affected by governmental action, we continued, "the 
measurement of that compensation may be based on a decline in 
the value of the subject property."  Id. at 603, 594 S.E.2d at 
609. 
 
In both Omni Homes and Richmeade, it is clear that we 
addressed only whether an alleged appurtenant right to property 
had been damaged within the meaning of Article I, Section 11.  
And in doing so, we did not contemplate recovery for physical 
damage to property itself or limit a property owner's 
longstanding right to recover for such damage in an inverse 
condemnation suit. 
 
21 
 
C. 
 
VDOT also contends that the Plaintiffs' inverse 
condemnation claim must be dismissed because VDOT was not 
responsible for the dramatic urbanization of the Cameron Run 
Watershed that occurred after the Beltway was completed or the 
construction of the Huntington Metro and Jones Point.  We agree 
with VDOT that it cannot be held liable for the damage to the 
Plaintiffs' homes caused by these later developments; its 
liability is limited to the damage caused by its operation of 
(including its failure to maintain) the relocated Cameron Run.  
But it is for a jury — not us — to determine the cause of the 
damage to the Plaintiffs' homes.  Heldt, 196 Va. at 483-84, 84 
S.E.2d at 515 (concluding that it was for the jury to determine 
from the evidence whether flood damage to the plaintiff's 
buildings was attributable to the defendant's "construction of 
the tunnel [or] to other causes," such as the plaintiff's 
failure to install "gutters and downspouts [on the buildings] 
as required by the city ordinance"). 
D. 
 
VDOT further argues that the Plaintiffs' inverse 
condemnation claim must be dismissed because they do not allege 
that their homes were damaged for public use.  According to 
VDOT, the government's obligation under Article I, Section 11 
to pay just compensation for a damaging is only triggered when 
22 
 
the government "engage[s] in an affirmative and purposeful act 
that devotes private property or a related property right[] to 
public use."  The Plaintiffs, VDOT argues, "d[o] not allege 
that [it] relocated Cameron Run onto [their] properties or 
[that it] intentionally pumped water on their properties."  
"Rather," VDOT maintains, "all that [the Plaintiffs] allege[] 
is that the June 2006 Flood was caused by the public use of the 
Beltway, and that VDOT should be required to pay just 
compensation because the public benefits from the Beltway." 
 
We reject VDOT's narrow reading of Article I, Section 11.  
There is nothing in that section's text or history that limits 
the government's constitutional obligation to pay just 
compensation to only damages caused by its "affirmative and 
purposeful" acts.  Moreover, we have recognized that the 
government's failure to act can give rise to a compensable 
damaging under Article I, Section 11.  Jenkins, 246 Va. at 471, 
436 S.E.2d at 610. 
 
In Jenkins, the owners of two residential subdivision lots 
filed an inverse condemnation suit against Shenandoah County 
and others, alleging that their lots had been damaged by 
spillover from a stormwater drainage channel.  Id. at 468-69, 
426 S.E.2d at 608-09.  The owners claimed that the subject 
drainage easement constituted a public use and presented 
evidence at trial that Shenandoah County's drainage channel was 
23 
 
part of a water discharge system that served to divert water 
onto their lots.  Id. at 470, 426 S.E.2d at 609.  They also 
presented evidence that the spillover occurred because the 
drainage channel was not constructed in accordance with the 
original subdivision plans that had been submitted to 
Shenandoah County for approval and that had been approved by 
VDOT.  Id. at 469, 426 S.E.2d at 609.  Shenandoah County argued 
that, although it owned the drainage easement, it had no duty 
to maintain the easement and that the owners' suit was barred 
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Id. at 468, 436 S.E.2d 
at 608.  The circuit court agreed and ruled that Shenandoah 
County was shielded by sovereign immunity.  Id.  The owners' 
suit was therefore dismissed.  Id. 
 
We reversed.  First, we held that Shenandoah County was 
not entitled to sovereign immunity because an action brought 
under Article I, Section 11 is not a tort but a contract 
action, and thus not barred by sovereign immunity.  Id. at 470, 
436 S.E.2d at 609.  Then we considered whether the owners had 
made out a prima facie claim for a damaging.  Id.  Shenandoah 
County argued that they had not because it "took no steps with 
respect to the maintenance, construction or supervision or 
operation of the drainage easements."  Id.  We disagreed, 
holding that Shenandoah County's drainage easement was a public 
use under our precedents and that the County's failure to 
24 
 
maintain it did not "absolve the County of liability" under 
Article I, Section 11.  Id. at 470-71, 436 S.E.2d at 609-10.  
When Shenandoah County "accepted the dedication of the 
easement," we explained, "the County also accepted the burden 
of maintaining it in the manner necessary to protect the 
servient estates."  Id. at 471, 436 S.E.2d at 610. 
 
Pursuant to our decision in Jenkins, then, the government 
cannot evade liability for a damaging under Article I, Section 
11 by simply choosing not to act when it has a duty to do so.  
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim against 
VDOT does not fail just because it arises from VDOT's 
subsequent operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocated 
Cameron Run, rather than from VDOT's relocation of the channel 
and construction of the Beltway. 
 
We further reject VDOT's contention that the Plaintiffs' 
inverse condemnation claim must be dismissed because, in its 
view, the relocated Cameron Run is not a public use.  According 
to VDOT, the Beltway is the public use, not the channel.  Such 
a narrow view of the Beltway vis-á-vis the relocated Cameron 
Run, in our opinion, ignores the relationship of the two public 
improvements and their respective functions.  The channel is 
necessary to the continued operation of the roadway.  Without 
the relocated Cameron Run to drain water from nearby urbanized 
lands, the Beltway would undoubtedly be even more susceptible 
25 
 
to flooding and, consequently, more frequent closures.  That 
VDOT refused to maintain the relocated Cameron Run and instead 
chose to "tolerat[e] temporary inundation" of the Beltway does 
not diminish the importance of the channel to the continued 
operation of the roadway. 
 
Despite the concerns raised by local officials about the 
accumulation of sediment in the relocated Cameron Run and the 
resulting increase in the risk of flooding to neighboring 
residential developments such as Huntington, VDOT declined to 
maintain the channel.  VDOT made this decision (at least in 
part) because it was willing to accept temporary flooding of 
the Beltway.  In essence, then, VDOT elected to use the Beltway 
and nearby residential developments as makeshift storage sites 
for excess stormwater instead of allocating its resources to 
maintain the relocated Cameron Run. 
 
So viewed, VDOT's choice not to maintain the relocated 
Cameron Run is no different from Hampton Roads' decision in 
McDonnell, 234 Va. at 238-39, 360 S.E.2d at 843, to use private 
property as a storage site for excess discharge from its sewage 
system or the Tunnel District's decision in Heldt, 196 Va. at 
480, 84 S.E.2d at 513-14, to allow water pumped from a 
construction site to flow unabated onto private property.  Like 
Hampton Roads and the Tunnel District, VDOT has asked private 
property owners (the Plaintiffs) to bear the cost of a public 
26 
 
improvement (the Beltway).  This is the type of mischief that 
Article I, Section 11 was adopted more than 100 years ago to 
remedy.  See 1 Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention 699 (J.H. Lindsay ed., Hermitage 
Press, Inc. 1906) ("[I]t is the inherent right and justice of 
the contention that the rights of the private individual . . . 
ought not to be sacrificed to the public welfare, and that it 
is the function of bodies of this sort, in the public interest, 
to impose such restrictions upon legislative power that will 
insure the rights of the private citizen.").  Cf. City Council 
of Montgomery v. Maddox, 7 So. 433, 436 (Ala. 1889) (noting 
that the "injured" clause in the Alabama Constitution was 
adopted "to require the public to bear the burden of municipal 
improvements of this nature made for the public benefit, and 
not to crush the private citizen by imposing upon him alone the 
entire damage which may have been caused to his property"). 
 
We thus conclude that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
alleged that their homes were damaged for public use under 
Article I, Section 11 to withstand demurrer. 
E. 
 
Finally, VDOT contends that at the very least the 
Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim as to their personal 
property must be dismissed.  While VDOT acknowledges that "the 
sovereign prerogative of eminent domain extends to personal 
27 
 
property," it contends that "the General Assembly has not 
extended that power to the [Transportation] Commissioner."  As 
a result, VDOT submits, the Plaintiffs cannot recover under 
Article I, Section 11 for damage to their personal property.7 
 
To make this argument, VDOT relies solely on Burns, in 
which we explained that "[t]he owner whose property is taken or 
damaged for public use has a right to waive all other remedies 
and to sue upon an implied contract that he will be paid 
therefor such amount as would have been awarded if the property 
had been condemned under the eminent domain statute."  218 Va. 
at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825.  The General Assembly, as VDOT 
points out, has only authorized the Commissioner to acquire 
"lands, structures . . . and . . . interest[s] in lands that 
are necessary to construct, maintain, or repair the public 
highways."  Code § 33.1-89(A). 
 
We reject VDOT's contention.  First, Burns cannot bear the 
weight that VDOT ascribes to it.  There the property owners did 
not seek relief for damage to personal property, so we said 
nothing on the issue.  That case, moreover, did not involve a 
                                                 
 
7 VDOT also asserts that the Plaintiffs cannot recover for 
business losses or repair costs.  Plaintiffs, however, make no 
claim for business losses.  As for repair costs, the Plaintiffs 
do allege that they "paid tens of thousands of dollars for the 
costs of restoring their homes," but they do not appear to be 
seeking recovery for those costs. (App. 34, 41-42.)  Instead, 
they appear to be seeking recovery only for the "substantial 
diminished value" of their homes and the "loss of [their] 
personal property." 
28 
 
sudden flood of the magnitude of the one that gave rise to this 
inverse condemnation suit. 
 
Second, in City of Richmond v. Williams, 114 Va. 698, 77 
S.E. 492 (1913), we held that a statute "in obedience to" 
Article I, Section 11's predecessor required compensation for 
the costs of moving lumber piled upon the property as a result 
of a partial condemnation.  Id. at 701-03, 77 S.E. at 493-94.  
"[J]ust compensation," we said, "must be awarded for the land 
or other property taken, and damages must be awarded resulting 
to adjacent or other property of the owner, or to the property 
of any other person."  Id. at 702-03, 77 S.E. at 494.  And more 
recently, in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Fugate, 211 Va. 745, 
180 S.E.2d 657 (1971), we observed that, under Williams, 
"compensation for the costs of relocating the personal property 
was constitutionally required" where "personal property [was] 
damaged or required to be removed by public undertaking."  Id. 
at 750, 180 S.E.2d at 660. 
 
In accordance with Williams and Potomac Electric Power, we 
conclude that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an 
inverse condemnation claim under Article I, Section 11 for 
damage to their personal property to survive demurrer.  We 
stress, however, that the Plaintiffs can only recover for 
damage to personal property that was appurtenant to their 
29 
 
homes; for Article I, Section 11's primary focus is the taking 
and damaging of real property. 
V. 
 
When the government constructs a public improvement, it 
does not thereby become an insurer in perpetuity against flood 
damage to neighboring property.  And nothing in today's opinion 
should be read as imposing such an obligation on VDOT.  But 
under our precedents, a property owner may be entitled to 
compensation under Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of 
Virginia if the government's operation of a public improvement 
damages his property. 
 
Because the facts alleged in the Plaintiffs' second 
amended complaint, if taken as true, establish that their homes 
and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and 
failure to maintain, the relocated Cameron Run, we conclude 
that the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse 
condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer.  We thus reverse the 
circuit court's judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, dissenting. 
 
 
Today the Court sanctions what can only be deemed a 
"constitutional tort," based on a theory of causation, not the 
30 
 
principles of condemnation.  Noticeably absent from the 
allegations in this case is a contention, or even facts 
purporting to show, that VDOT exercised its power of eminent 
domain in damaging Plaintiffs' properties.  This deficiency is 
fatal to the Plaintiffs' claim since there is no cause of 
action for inverse condemnation without the exercise of such 
power. 
 
When a property owner brings an action under Article I, 
Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, for the damaging of 
his property for a public use, he is entitled to be paid "such 
amount as would have been awarded if the property had been 
condemned under the eminent domain statute."  Burns v. Board of 
Supervisors, 218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1977).  
"The power of eminent domain is vested in the Commissioner [of 
Highways] by Code § 33.1-89."  Trout v. Commonwealth 
Transportation Commissioner, 241 Va. 69, 72, 400 S.E.2d 172, 
173 (1991).  Pursuant to that section, the Commissioner is 
granted authority to acquire by "power of eminent domain such 
lands, structures, rights-of-way, franchises, easements and 
other interests in lands . . . deemed to be necessary for the 
construction, reconstruction, alteration, maintenance and 
repair of the public highways of the Commonwealth."  Code 
§ 33.1-89(A).  "[F]or these purposes and all other purposes 
incidental thereto," the Commissioner "may condemn property 
31 
 
. . . deemed useful or necessary in carrying out the purposes 
aforesaid."  Id.  "It is elementary, however, that the 
Commissioner can condemn property only for a public purpose," 
and thus, is not empowered to condemn property otherwise.  
Stewart v. Fugate, 212 Va. 689, 691, 187 S.E.2d 156, 159 
(1972).  Accordingly, under Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution, a private property owner is entitled to "just 
compensation" when the Commissioner of Highways takes or 
damages property "for public uses" in the lawful exercise of 
its power of eminent domain as defined by Code § 33.1-89. 
 
Plaintiffs do not allege that VDOT damaged their 
properties in the exercise of its power of eminent domain 
because they do not allege that the use of their properties was 
"necessary for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, 
maintenance [or] repair of the public highways of the 
Commonwealth" or for "purposes incidental thereto." Code 
§ 33.1-89(A).  Rather, Plaintiffs allege that their properties 
sustained flood damage caused by VDOT's failure to dredge or 
otherwise maintain Cameron Run.  The only highway at issue is 
the Capital Beltway, and Plaintiffs do not contend the damaging 
of their properties was necessary, or even useful, for the 
maintenance of the Beltway.1 
                                                 
1 Indeed, VDOT could not have successfully petitioned for 
condemnation of plaintiffs' properties seeking to have just 
32 
 
 
Not only is Plaintiffs' claim insufficient for failure to 
allege that their properties were damaged through VDOT's 
exercise of its power of eminent domain under Code § 33.1-89, 
Plaintiffs fail to allege that their properties were damaged 
for public uses.2  Under Article I, Section 11, "just 
                                                                                                                                                           
compensation determined on the grounds that the flooding of 
Plaintiffs' properties was necessary or useful for the 
maintenance of the Beltway.  Yet, this is the effect of the 
majority's ruling.  If Plaintiffs have a viable cause of action 
for inverse condemnation against VDOT, then VDOT arguably has a 
viable cause of action for condemnation of Plaintiffs' 
properties despite the fact that the damage to their properties 
is not alleged to have been necessary for the maintenance of 
the Beltway.  This fundamental point was stated well by the 
Supreme Court of Oregon in rejecting a similar attempt to 
characterize unnecessary damage as an inverse condemnation 
claim: 
 
Had the defendant district instituted 
condemnation proceedings for the appropriation of 
plaintiffs' lands and in such proceedings alleged 
that said lands were necessary for public use for the 
reason that the district expected in the future to 
fail to maintain its ditches properly and expected to 
allow them to become clogged with vegetation, we 
surmise that no court would have entertained its 
petition.  In other words, the right of eminent 
domain cannot be exercised to permit unnecessary 
damage and waste. 
 
Patterson v. Horsefly Irr. Dist., 69 P.2d 282, 289 (Ore. 1937). 
 
 
2 The majority reasons that the relationship between the 
Capital Beltway, designated by the Plaintiffs as the "public 
use," and Cameron Run is such that maintenance of Cameron Run 
was necessary to the continued operation of the Beltway.  This 
rationale misses the point, which is that the damaging of the 
Plaintiffs' properties must be necessary or useful for the 
maintenance of the Beltway.  In any event, Article I, Section 
11 does not impose upon VDOT the duty to act to prevent damage.  
Such a duty, if it exists, must exist under tort law. 
33 
 
compensation" is guaranteed when private property is "damaged 
for public uses." (Emphasis added.)  It does not provide that 
just compensation is guaranteed when damage to private property 
can be causally traced to a public improvement.  Only when 
private property is taken or damaged for a public use is the 
power of eminent domain exercised.  Or, as this Court has 
stated, the right of recovery arises from "damage done to 
property by an agency clothed with the power of eminent domain 
in effecting a public improvement."  Heldt v. Elizabeth River 
Tunnel Dist., 196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1954) 
(emphasis added).3 
                                                 
 
3 The majority compares the "use" of Plaintiffs' properties 
to the use of the landowners' property in Jenkins v. County of 
Shenandoah, 246 Va. 467, 436 S.E.2d 607 (1993).  In Jenkins, 
the County was using the landowners' property for a drainage 
easement that was alleged to be for the public benefit.  Id. at 
470-71, 436 S.E.2d at 609-10.  Likewise, in Burns, the property 
was used for drainage from a storm sewer alleged to be for the 
public benefit.  218 Va. at 628-29, 238 S.E.2d at 825-26.  See 
also Hampton Roads Sanitation District v. McDonnell, 234 Va. 
235, 237, 360 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1987) (property used for sewage 
discharge from pump station).  In each of these cases, the 
property owners alleged that their properties were being used 
in the operation of the respective public improvements.  In 
this case, Plaintiffs allege their property was damaged by 
VDOT's failure to dredge Cameron Run, not so that the public 
could benefit from Cameron Run. 
 
Moreover, while in each of these cases, the public 
improvements or facilities were deemed to be public uses, in 
none of these cases did the Court address whether the 
landowners were damaged for public uses.  Nor did these cases 
involve the scope of VDOT's power to damage property deemed 
necessary for the maintenance of the public highways. 
34 
 
In holding that Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action 
for a constitutional damaging, the majority has replaced the 
plain language of the Constitution requiring that the claimed 
damages be for public uses with a simple causation requirement.  
The majority describes the constitutional damaging provision as 
entitling a property owner to compensation "if the government's 
operation of a public improvement damages his property."  Yet, 
the Constitution actually states that a property owner is 
entitled to compensation if the property is damaged "for" a 
public use.  The generally accepted definitions of "for" 
include "having as [a] goal or object," "in order to be, 
become, or serve as," "in order to bring about or further," "to 
supply the need of," or "with the purpose or object of."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 886 (1993).  Under 
any of these definitions, it is clear that Plaintiffs do not 
allege that VDOT flooded their lands "for" a public use.  In 
other words, Plaintiffs do not claim that VDOT damaged their 
lands with the goal of, in order to, or to further the 
maintenance of the Beltway.  By re-wording the Constitution to 
entitle property owners to compensation for damage "caused by" 
a public improvement, the majority has eliminated the 
requirement that the damages be "for" a public use, thereby 
35 
 
altering the purpose and scope of Article I, Section 11, and 
enlarging the breadth of the power of eminent domain.4 
Boiled down to its essence, Plaintiffs allege that VDOT 
had a duty under the law to dredge or otherwise maintain 
Cameron Run, and its failure to do so caused the flood damage 
to their properties.  This claim is nothing more than a claim 
for negligence, brought under the guise of the constitutional 
damaging clause.  While it is true that a governmental entity, 
such as VDOT, may commit acts of negligence in exercising its 
power of eminent domain, the acts of negligence alone do not 
constitute a constitutional taking or damaging.5  It is the 
                                                 
 
4 There is an important distinction between establishing 
the cause of the damage, which is a universal requirement for a 
plaintiff seeking recovery for damages under any theory, and 
establishing the nature and purpose of the act giving rise to 
the damage, which determines whether a constitutional damaging 
has occurred.  Under Article I, Section 11, the act of taking 
or damaging a landowner's property must be for a public use. 
 
Under the majority's analysis, however, as long as a 
property owner can prove a causal link between a public 
improvement and the property damage, there has been a 
constitutional damaging, without regard to whether the power of 
eminent domain has been exercised.  Yet, the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain is what distinguishes a claim for 
constitutional damaging from other types of damage claims.  In 
all cases, a plaintiff must prove the defendant caused the 
plaintiff's damages.  In order to recover for a constitutional 
damaging, though, a plaintiff must prove the damage was "for" a 
public use. 
 
5 The fact that a landowner may elect to waive his action 
in tort and bring suit under the contract implied by the 
constitutional damaging provision is beside the point.  See 
Burns, 218 Va. at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825.  The landowner has no 
implied contract claim under the Constitution unless his 
36 
 
exercise of the power of eminent domain that gives rise to a 
claim of constitutional taking or damaging.  In fact, "we have 
consistently adhered to the view that the eminent domain 
provisions in the Virginia Constitution have no application to 
tortious or unlawful conduct."  State Highway and Transp. 
Comm'r v. Lanier Farm, Inc., 233 Va. 506, 511, 357 S.E.2d 531, 
534 (1987); see also Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 660, 79 
S.E.2d 597, 600 (1954) (the Constitution and Code vest the 
Commissioner with the power of eminent domain "insofar as may 
be necessary" for the construction, maintenance, and repair of 
the highways but has no application to unlawful or negligent 
acts).  By allowing ordinary tort claims, which are subject to 
sovereign immunity protections, to proceed as constitutional 
damage claims, the actions permissible against the government 
now appear limitless. 
I would hold that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient 
facts to state a claim for constitutional damaging under 
Article I, Section 11. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
property is damaged through the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain, i.e., for a public use.