Case Title: State ex rel. Mahoney v. St. John

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-39

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Mahoney v. St. John1998 WY 111964 P.2d 1242Case Number: 97-39Decided: 09/03/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

STATE 
of Washington, ex rel., Sherrill L. MAHONEY, Appellant (Plaintiff-Obligee),

v.

Benjamin F. ST. JOHN, III, 
Appellee (Defendant-Obligor).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Dan S. Wilde, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne; and Eric A. Distad, Deputy Natrona County 
Attorney, Casper, for Appellant(Plaintiff-Obligor).

No appearance for 
Appellee(Defendant-Obligor).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited 
conference.

 

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 [¶1] A Wyoming district court refused to enforce a 
child support order issued by a Washington court which enjoyed plenary 
jurisdiction over appellee. Finding that the federal constitution and Wyoming 
statutes require an opposite result, we reverse and remand with 
instructions.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, the State of 
Washington, upon the relation of Sherrill L. Mahoney, succinctly states the 
issue:

 

I. 
Did the District Court err as a matter of law when it refused to extend full 
faith and credit to the child support order issued in the State of Washington 
and when it determined that the State of Washington lacked in personam 
jurisdiction over the [appellee]?

 

[¶3] Appellee, Benjamin F. 
St. John, III, having failed to submit a brief to this court, must suffer our 
consideration of only those arguments raised by appellant pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
7.11(b).

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] On August 24, 1985, 
Sheree Mahoney (Sheree) was born in Casper, Wyoming, as the issue of Sherrill L. 
Mahoney (Sherrill) and Benjamin F. St. John, III (appellee). Although Sheree was 
produced without benefit of parental wedlock, appellee verbally acknowledged 
fatherhood and visited mother and child regularly during the first several 
months of Sheree's life. Early in 1986, however, Sherrill and Sheree relocated 
to the State of Washington. Although gainfully employed, Sherrill remained 
frequently obliged to secure Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 
Washington during the late 1980's and early 1990's.

 

[¶5] In 1992, the State of 
Washington, upon Sherrill's relation, brought a paternity action against 
appellee, who continued to reside in Casper. Appellee accepted service of the 
paternity petition in Wyoming, but contested the issue until blood tests showed 
a 99.97% probability that he was Sheree's natural father. Perhaps hoping that 
matrimony might be an alternative to a judgment for $17,396.00 in back child 
support and maintenance, appellee summoned Sherrill back to Casper, where the 
two were married in August of 1993.

 

[¶6] The couple and their 
daughter returned to Washington where appellee secured employment and set up 
housekeeping with his wife and daughter. Less than nine months later, however, 
the marital bonds had been irretrievably broken and appellee fled back to 
Casper. Shortly thereafter, Sherrill filed her petition for divorce in 
Washington, achieving personal service upon appellee in Wyoming on July 11, 
1994. Having been personally served in Wyoming pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 4.28.185(1)(f) (West 1988) (hereinafter RCWA), appellee chose to default and 
judgment was entered against him in Washington for $20,628.00 in child support 
arrearages, inter 
alia.

 

[¶7] However, when 
Washington moved to enforce the support obligation in Wyoming pursuant to the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA; formerly the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act or URESA),1 appellee availed himself of a 
Wyoming forum to contest Washington's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over 
a Wyoming resident. The Wyoming district court subsequently held that the 
Washington order was invalid because appellee had not been personally served 
within the boundaries of Washington (predicated upon the district court's view 
that service within our state's boundaries is requisite to an exercise of in 
personam jurisdiction by a Wyoming 
court). The State of Washington, upon the relation of Sherrill, timely brought 
this appeal.

 

                                          
III. DISCUSSION

 

[¶8] The district court 
posed a theoretical question of whether a Wyoming court would have in personam 
jurisdiction if Sherrill and Sheree were Wyoming residents and appellee was a 
Washington resident. The proper inquiry is whether the Washington court had and 
exercised good and sufficient personal jurisdiction over appellee at the time 
the decree and order of support were entered. "We have held that a decree of 
divorce granted by one state having the jurisdiction to do so is entitled to 
full faith and credit, under the constitutional provision, in every other state. 
Matter of Fray, 721 P.2d 1054, [1057] (Wyo. 1986) (citing Johnson v. Muelberger, 
340 U.S. 581, 71 S. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 (1951))." Livingston v. Vanderiet, 861 P.2d 549, 551 (Wyo. 1993). The "constitutional provision" is the so-called full 
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution which requires that 
"[f]ull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const. Art. 4, § 
1.

 

[¶9] This rule of affording 
full recognition of foreign judgments, in reliance upon the full faith and 
credit clause, is consistent with the UIFSA, which requires Wyoming district 
courts to "recognize and enforce * * * a registered order if the issuing 
tribunal had jurisdiction." Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-175(c) (Supp. 1998). A foreign 
order becomes a "registered" order upon filing with a Wyoming district court. 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-175(a).

 

[¶10] The only remaining 
question is whether the Washington court issuing the original support order 
enjoyed personal jurisdiction over appellee. Bearing in mind that appellee 
admits to residing with his wife and child in Washington while gainfully 
employed there, while Sherrill and Sheree continued to live in Washington after 
appellee deserted the marriage, the answer is found at RCWA § 
4.28.185(1)(f):

 

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident 
of this state, who * * * does any of the acts in this section enumerated, 
thereby submits said person * * * to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any said 
acts:

 

                    
* * *

 

(f) Living in a marital relationship within this 
state notwithstanding subsequent departure from this state, as to all 
proceedings authorized by chapter 26.09 RCW [Dissolution of Marriage, etc. 
(including child support)], so long as the petitioning party has continued to 
reside in this state * * *.

 

[¶11] Again, we find that 
the existence of personal jurisdiction pursuant to the foregoing section is 
entirely consistent with multiple expressions of such to be found in both 
states' codifications of the UIFSA. For example, RCWA § 26.21.075(3) (West 1997 
Supp.), in pertinent portion, is a verbatim reiteration of Wyo. Stat. § 
20-4-142(a)(iii) (Supp. 1998):

 

In 
a proceeding to establish, enforce or modify a support order or to determine 
parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident individual * * * if:

 

          
* * *

 

                    
(3) The individual resided with the child in this 
state[.]

 

[¶12] In addition to an 
alternative to the full faith and credit rationale, the foregoing shared 
language eliminates the district court's theory that Wyoming could not exercise 
personal jurisdiction over appellee had he lived with the family in Wyoming 
before fleeing to Washington. To the extent that Duncan v. Duncan, 776 P.2d 758, 
760 (Wyo. 1989) and Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1383-84 (Wyo. 1981) 
counsel a different result, the obiter dicta in the former and the holding in 
the latter were overruled sub silentio by the legislature's enactment of Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-4-142(a)(iii) through 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 148, § 
1.

 

                   
                       IV. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶13] Wyoming's 
interpretation of the full faith and credit clause of the United States 
Constitution requires that we enforce a support order issued by a foreign court, 
so long as that court enjoyed personal jurisdiction over the obligee. 
Washington's assumption of personal jurisdiction over appellee was consistent 
with that state's general laws of jurisdiction as well as the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act as codified by Washington and Wyoming. The judgment of the 
district court is, therefore, reversed, and the case is remanded to the district 
court with instructions to enforce the support order entered by the Washington 
court.

  

FOOTNOTES

  1Adopted by Washington at RCWA §§ 
26.21.010 et seq. (West 1994) and adopted by Wyoming at Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-4-139 
through 20-4-194 (1997 and Supp. 1998) (made retroactive to matters initiated 
under URESA by Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-189 (1997)).