Case Title: Bishop & Associates, LLC v. Ameren Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95658

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
BISHOP & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC95658 
  ) 
AMEREN CORPORATION, UNION 
  ) 
ELECTRIC COMPANY d/b/a  
 
  ) 
AMEREN MISSOURI, AMEREN 
  ) 
SERVICES COMPANY, JAMES  
  ) 
ARMISTEAD, MICHAEL WRIGHT, 
  ) 
and RICHARD GEORGE, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondents. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty, Judge  
Bishop & Associates, LLC (B&A), filed a multi-count action against Ameren 
Corporation, Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri, Ameren Services Company 
(collectively, Ameren), and James Armistead, Michael Wright, and Richard George 
(collectively, the supervisors) alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, 
defamation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious 
interference with a business expectancy.  The suit arose after Ameren terminated its 
relationship with B&A, which provided commercial plumbing services at several of 
Ameren’s facilities.  The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Ameren and 
Opinion issued June 27, 2017
2 
 
the supervisors on all counts.  B&A appealed, asserting that independent contractors have 
a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and that the circuit 
court erroneously entered summary judgment on its claims of breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and tortious interference with a business 
expectancy.   
 
The circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Ameren and 
the supervisors.  Missouri does not recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy for independent contractors.  Missouri courts have 
always described the public policy exception as a narrow exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine.  And although this Court expanded the exception to contract 
employees alleging wrongful discharge, this Court has never applied the public policy 
exception outside the context of an employer-employee relationship.  This is consistent 
with most jurisdictions that have addressed whether independent contractors have a cause 
of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and is supported by the fact 
that independent contractors are not as susceptible to coercion as at-will or contract 
employees. 
 
Likewise, the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment on B&A’s 
claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Because the 
purchase order expressly permitted Ameren to cancel the agreement with B&A at any time 
for any reason, there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Furthermore, despite B&A’s claims to the contrary, Missouri case law does not 
support a breach of contract claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  
3 
 
 
Finally, the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment on B&A’s 
tortious interference with a business expectancy claim.  While B&A asserts that evidence 
in the record displays the supervisors’ personal animus toward Mr. Bishop, such evidence 
does not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the supervisors were acting 
out of personal, as opposed to corporate, interests.  Therefore, B&A has failed to produce 
facts to establish the supervisors acted in their own self-interest and cannot prove an 
absence of justification for purposes of tortious interference.  Accordingly, this Court 
affirms the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Factual and Procedural Background  
 
B&A is a limited liability company specializing in commercial plumbing.  B&A 
employs Robert Bishop as a master plumber and drain-layer.  In 2002, B&A entered into a 
purchase order with Ameren to “provide backflow testing on a schedule[d] basis and 
emergency service and/or preventative maintenance on an as-needed basis” at several of 
Ameren’s facilities in Missouri and Illinois.  The purchase order was non-exclusive, and 
Ameren could cancel it at any time for any reason by giving B&A 30 days advance written 
notice.  At all times, B&A served Ameren as an independent contractor.     
Mr. Bishop performed the majority of the plumbing services at Ameren’s facilities.  
He prepared reports containing photographs and commentary related to each job he 
performed.  In the reports, Mr. Bishop identified potential environmental and 
contamination issues at Ameren’s facilities.      
In 2005, Ameren and B&A entered into a “flex-time” arrangement in which B&A 
performed routine and recurring maintenance at several of Ameren’s facilities.  Under the 
4 
 
arrangement, Ameren received a reduction in labor and equipment costs in exchange for 
B&A being allowed to schedule the maintenance during gaps or slow periods in B&A’s 
schedule.  Following the flex-time arrangement, nearly 100 percent of B&A workload was 
allocated to Ameren.   
 
In February 2009, Michael Wright, the superintendent of building services for 
Ameren, sent Mr. Bishop an email stating that, due to the current economic conditions,   
Mr. Bishop should not perform any of the “yearly flex-time maintenance” at Ameren 
facilities without first getting permission from Mr. Wright.  The email further stated          
Mr. Wright would consider the merits of having such maintenance performed on a case-
by-case basis.  
 
In January 2010, Mr. Bishop proposed to Ameren a three-year contract in which 
B&A would provide a two-man work crew onsite 40 hours per week.  The proposed cost 
was $720,000 per year.  Ameren rejected the proposed contract.   
 
In May 2010, Mr. Bishop requested a meeting with James Armistead, a building 
maintenance supervisor, to discuss the proposed contract and additional concerns              
Mr. Bishop had about the “new direction” Ameren was taking in bidding out plumbing 
projects.  Mr. Bishop prepared a letter detailing his concerns, including the reduction in 
business B&A received from Ameren and the potential risk and liability Ameren could 
incur by hiring other contractors and handymen who were less focused on preventative 
maintenance.  Attached to the letter was a report Mr. Bishop compiled identifying 
plumbing and contamination problems at several of Ameren’s facilities.  Mr. Bishop also 
5 
 
sought meetings with high-ranking Ameren officials to discuss the report and what B&A 
could do to prevent Ameren from incurring such liabilities.   
 
On July 13, 2010, Mr. Bishop arrived at the Ameren facility in Alton, Illinois, to 
perform non-emergency maintenance services.  Mr. Bishop was instructed to leave the 
facility because he did not notify Ameren in advance that he would be performing any 
maintenance that day.  The following day, Mr. Wright emailed Mr. Bishop and reminded 
him he needed to contact management personnel before arriving to perform maintenance 
at Ameren facilities.  Mr. Bishop responded it was the first he had been informed of the 
need to call ahead and it would not be beneficial for B&A if the maintenance had to be 
scheduled in advance.   
On July 29, 2010, Ameren gave notice to B&A that Ameren was terminating its 
contract with B&A.  B&A subsequently contacted the St. Louis County Department of 
Public Works and the United States Environmental Protection Agency and gave them a 
copy of the report detailing contamination and plumbing problems at Ameren facilities.  
In 2012, B&A1 filed a four-count petition against Ameren, Mr. Armistead,               
Mr. Wright, and Richard George, another of Ameren’s building maintenance supervisors.  
B&A alleged Ameren wrongfully discharged B&A in violation of public policy because of 
Mr. Bishop’s repeated reports to high level officials that documented environmental and 
public safety hazards at Ameren facilities.  In the alternative, B&A alleged Ameren 
                                              
1 In the original petition, Mr. Bishop and his wife, Kara Bishop, were also named as 
plaintiffs.  Ameren and the supervisors subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the petition 
as to the Bishops because they lacked the legal capacity to sue.  The circuit court sustained 
the motion, in part, and dismissed all claims alleged by Ms. Bishop and two of the counts 
alleged by Mr. Bishop.    
6 
 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated its 
relationship with B&A.  B&A also alleged the supervisors defamed B&A and tortiuously 
interfered with its business expectancy by making statements that B&A was overly 
expensive, performed unnecessary work, used excessive equipment and turned everything 
into a project to benefit itself.  
Ameren and the supervisors moved for summary judgment, alleging they were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all counts.  The circuit court sustained Ameren’s 
summary judgment motion.  B&A appealed.  After an opinion by the court of appeals, the 
case was transferred to this Court.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.    
Standard of Review  
 
This Court reviews summary judgment de novo.  Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 
327, 328 (Mo. banc 2016).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine 
dispute about material facts and, under the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Mo. banc 2016).      
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when it establishes:  
(1) facts that negate any one of the claimant’s elements facts, (2) that the non-
movant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able to produce, 
and will not be able to produce, evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact 
to find the existence of any one of the claimant’s elements, or (3) that there 
is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to 
support the movant’s properly-pleaded affirmative defense. 
 
ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 
banc. 1993) (emphasis omitted). 
 
 
7 
 
The Public Policy Exception Does Not Extend to Independent Contractors 
In its first point, B&A asserts the circuit court erred in sustaining Ameren’s 
summary judgment motion because the cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy should be extended to independent contractors.  In Fleshner v. Pepose 
Vision Institute, P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. banc 2010), this Court adopted the public 
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.  The at-will employment doctrine 
provides that “at-will employee[s] may be terminated for any reason or no reason.”  Id. at 
91.  Under the public policy exception, an at-will employee has a cause of action in tort for 
wrongful discharge if he or she has been terminated “for refusing to violate the law or any 
well-established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in the constitution, 
statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules created by a governmental 
body” or “for reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or public authorities.”  
Id. at 92. 
 
In Keveney v. Missouri Military Academy, 304 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Mo. banc 2010), 
this Court held contract employees also can pursue a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy.  The Court provided three reasons for expanding the wrongful 
discharge cause of action to contract employees: (1) “[a]n employer’s obligation to refrain 
from discharging” employees who refuse to violate public policy “does not depend on the 
terms” of an employment contract; (2) the remedy for breach of contract is distinct from 
the remedy in tort for wrongful discharge; and (3) “[a]llowing contract employees to pursue 
a claim for wrongful discharge places at-will and contract employees on the same footing 
while also encouraging employers to refrain from coercing employees into a dilemma of 
8 
 
choosing between their livelihoods and reporting serious misconduct in the workplace.”  
Id. at 102-03.     
 
B&A asserts that it is, likewise, logical to extend the wrongful discharge cause of 
action for violation of public policy to independent contractors.  Missouri courts, however, 
have always described the public policy exception as a “narrow” exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine.  See Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Mo. 
banc 2013); Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Mo. banc 2010); 
Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 91; Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 872 (Mo. App. 
1985).  And although in Keveney, this Court extended the public policy exception to 
contract employees, it did not extend the public policy exception outside of the employer-
employee relationship.   
The circuit court granted summary judgment in part because no employer-employee 
relationship existed between B&A and Ameren.  In doing so, the circuit court relied on 
Farrow.  In Farrow, a nurse alleged wrongful discharge against her employer, the hospital, 
and her supervisor, a doctor.  407 S.W.3d at 587.  This Court found the circuit court 
properly entered summary judgment on the nurse’s wrongful discharge claim against the 
doctor because a “wrongful discharge cause of action requires an employer/employee 
relationship.”  Id. at 595 (internal quotation omitted).  Because the doctor was the nurse’s 
supervisor and not the nurse’s employer, no employer-employee relationship existed 
between the nurse and the doctor; therefore, she could not bring a wrongful discharge cause 
of action against the doctor.  Id.    
9 
 
 
Although Farrow did not involve an independent contractor, its reasoning reflects 
that Missouri courts view the wrongful discharge cause of action in the context of an 
employer-employee relationship.  This is consistent with several other jurisdictions that 
have confined the wrongful discharge cause of action to situations involving employment 
relationships.  See MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 166 (N.J. 1996); New Horizons 
Elecs. Mktg., Inc. v. Clarion Corp. of Am., 561 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); 
Abrahamson v. NME Hosps., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).  
In refusing to extend the wrongful discharge cause of action outside the employment 
relationship to independent contractors, other jurisdictions have focused on the inherent 
differences between employees and independent contractors: 
Independent contractors typically have greater control over the way in which 
they carry out their work than employees, and businesses assume fewer 
duties with respect to independent contractors than employees.  Thus, the 
independent contractor status provides the hiring party and the worker with 
an alternative relationship that gives each more freedom and flexibility than 
the employer-employee relationship.   
 
Sistare-Meyer v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Metro. L.A., 58 Cal. App. 4th 10, 16-17 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted); see also Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 
634 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Iowa 2001).  Likewise, a disparity in bargaining power traditionally 
exists between employers and employees in an employment relationship.  Harvey, 634 
N.W.2d at 684.  In explaining the need for the public policy exception, Missouri courts 
have recognized this disparity in bargaining power.  See Keveney, 304 S.W.3d at 103; 
Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 878.  That disparity is not present between independent contractors 
and their customers; therefore, independent contractors are not as susceptible to coercion 
as at-will or contract employees.    
10 
 
While B&A acknowledges the distinctions between independent contractors and 
employees, it insists this Court must recognize that some independent contractors need 
such protections, especially in situations such as B&A’s in which the contractor has a 
continuing relationship with the client and is devoting a substantial portion of its work to 
one customer.  But the fact remains that, as an independent contractor, B&A had the 
freedom to work for customers other than Ameren.  Instead, B&A chose to devote the 
majority of its time to Ameren.   
 
B&A also acknowledges that the majority of jurisdictions to address the issue have 
refused to extend the wrongful discharge cause of action to independent contractors. 
Nevertheless, it relies on two cases it contends exemplify state courts allowing independent 
contractors or other non-employees the right to sue for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy.  See D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 927 A.2d 113 (N.J. 2007); 
Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 963-64 (N.H. 1996).  But B&A’s reliance 
on D’Annunzo and Harper does not support the extension of the wrongful discharge cause 
of action under Missouri common law.  
 
In D’Annunzio, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed whether an independent 
contractor fit within the definition of “employee” under New Jersey’s codified wrongful 
discharge cause of action – the Conscientious Employee Protection Act.  927 A.2d at 114.  
The act defines employee as “any individual who performs services for and under the 
control and direction of an employer for wages or other remuneration.”  Id. (quoting 
N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(b)).  The court determined that, because the act was intended to be broad, 
remedial legislation, it must construe the term “employee” liberally.  Id. at 119.  It then 
11 
 
concluded the plaintiff, although labeled as an independent contractor, presented evidence 
that the company had sufficient control over his day-to-day activities and, thereby, was an 
“employee” for purposes of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act.  Id. at 123.  The 
court’s holding in D’Annunzio, therefore, is limited to application of New Jersey’s codified 
wrongful discharge cause of action and does not support the extension of Missouri’s 
common law wrongful discharge cause of action.   
 
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s holding in Harper was specific to 
the statutory relationship between a physician and a healthcare organization.  674 A.2d at 
966.  In Harper, a health maintenance organization terminated its provider agreement with 
a physician without cause.  Id. at 963-64.  The physician brought suit on grounds the 
contract provision allowing for the termination of the provider agreement without cause 
violated public policy.  Id. at 964.  On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
explained the relationship between the physician and the health maintenance organization 
was not, strictly speaking, an employer-employee relationship; nor was the surgeon acting 
as an independent contractor for the healthcare organization.  Id. at 965.  Rather, the 
physician was a “preferred provider” of healthcare for the health maintenance 
organization’s customers, and such relationships were controlled by statute to ensure they 
were “fair and in the public interest.”  Id. at 965-67.  The court reasoned that, because the 
public has a substantial interest in the relationship between physicians and health 
maintenance organizations, “public interest and fundamental fairness demand that a health 
maintenance organization’s decision to terminate its relationship with a particular 
physician provider must comport with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and may 
12 
 
not be made for a reason that is contrary to public policy.”  Id. at 966.  Therefore, the court 
concluded, if a physician’s relationship with a healthcare maintenance organization “is 
terminated without cause and the physician believes that the decision to terminate was, in 
truth, made in bad faith or based upon some factor that would render the decision contrary 
to public policy, then the physician is entitled to review of the decision.” Id. 
It follows that, like D’Annunzio, Harper was tailored specifically to the statutory 
relationship at issue.  Harper, therefore, does not support the extension of the public 
exception doctrine to independent contractors. 
Given the distinctions between independent contractors and employees and that the 
public policy exception is a narrow exception Missouri courts have applied only in the 
employer-employee context, the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy cause of 
action does not extend to independent contractors.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not 
err in granting summary judgment on B&A’s wrongful discharge claim.2   
Ameren Did Not Breach the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 
In its second point, B&A asserts the circuit court erroneously entered summary 
judgment with respect to its claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  “Under Missouri law, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every 
contract.”  Arbors at Sugar Creek Homeowners Ass’n v. Jefferson Bank & Trust Co., 464 
S.W.3d 177, 185 (Mo. banc 2015).  “[T]here can be no breach of the implied promise or 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing where the contract expressly permits the actions 
                                              
2 Due to this Court’s disposition of point I, this Court need not address B&A’s third point 
in which B&A asserts the circuit court erred when it dismissed its claim for punitive 
damages under the wrongful discharge cause of action.   
13 
 
being challenged, and the defendant acts in accordance with the express terms of the 
contract.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
The purchase order provides that Ameren “does not guarantee any minimum or 
maximum quantities and may cancel this order at any time for any reason by thirty (30) 
days advance written notice to” B&A.  Under the express terms of the purchase order, 
Ameren had the right to cancel its agreement with B&A at any time for any reason by 
providing advanced written notice.  B&A does not dispute that Ameren provided adequate 
advanced written notice.  It follows that Ameren was acting in accordance with the express 
terms of the contract when it terminated its relationship with B&A.   
B&A, nevertheless, relies on Bishop v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 129 S.W.3d 
500 (Mo. App. 2004), for the proposition that a cause of action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists when the defendant alleges a violation of 
public policy.  B&A’s reliance on Bishop is misplaced.  
In Bishop, an agent sued the insurance company for wrongful termination and 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after the insurance company 
canceled its agency contract with the agent.  Id. at 502.  The circuit court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the insurance company.  Id.  In affirming the summary judgment, the 
court of appeals recognized that, in Missouri, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
implied in every contract; nonetheless, Missouri also follows the at-will employment 
doctrine, which makes “the reason for an employee’s termination . . . inconsequential and 
irrelevant, unless the firing violates public policy.”  Id. at 505-06.  It then explained that 
“Missouri law concerning at will employees may not be circumvented by an employee who 
14 
 
alleges a contract of good faith and fair dealings between the employer and employee.”  Id. 
at 506.  The court of appeals concluded the gravamen of the agent’s claim was he was 
wrongfully terminated and the “employment at-will doctrine cannot be so easily subverted” 
by masking his wrongful termination claim as a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.  Id. at 507.  
 
Bishop, therefore, stands for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot avoid the 
deficiencies in a wrongful discharge claim by reframing it as a claim of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Bishop does not establish that Missouri 
law supports a breach of contract claim for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy.3  Consequently, the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment on 
B&A’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim because the fact 
that Ameren’s actions were expressly permitted by the purchase order negates any claim 
by B&A that a breach occurred.     
 
 
                                              
3 B&A also relies on two federal cases for the proposition that, “[u]nder Missouri law, a 
plaintiff properly pleads a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
when he alleges the defendant’s action violated public policy or a statute.”  Kmak v. Am. 
Century Cos., 754 F.3d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Smith v. City of Byrnes Mill, Mo., 
No. 4:14-cv-1220-SPM, 2015 WL 4715948, at *6 (Mo. E.D. Aug. 7, 2015).  Kmak and 
Smith, however, rely on an erroneous interpretation of the court of appeals’ holding in 
Bishop.  To successfully plead a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant “exercised a judgment conferred by the express 
terms of the agreement in such a manner as to evade the spirit of the transaction or so as to 
deny [the plaintiff] the expected benefit of the contract.”  Mo. Consol. Health Care Plan v. 
Cmty. Health Plan, 81 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Mo. App. 2002). 
 
15 
 
The Supervisors Did Not Tortiously Interfere with B&A’s Business Expectancy  
 
In its fourth point, B&A asserts the circuit court erred in sustaining Ameren’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to B&A’s claim for tortious interference with 
a business relationship against the supervisors.  “Tortious interference with a contract or 
business expectancy requires proof of: (1) a contract or valid business expectancy; 
(2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) a breach induced or caused 
by defendant’s intentional interference; (4) absence of justification; and (5) damages.”  
Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. banc 1996).   
 
“A defendant cannot be held liable for interfering with a business relationship if it 
has an unqualified right to perform the act.”  Id.  “If the defendant has a legitimate interest, 
economic or otherwise, in the expectancy the plaintiff seeks to protect, then the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant employed improper means in seeking to further only his or 
her own interests.”  W. Blue Print Co. v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 20 (Mo. banc 2012).  
“Improper means are those that are independently wrongful, such as threats, violence, 
trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act 
recognized by statute or the common law.”  Id.   
 
The circuit court concluded there was no competent evidence in the record 
indicating the supervisors’ actions or statements were made to further only the supervisors’ 
own interests as opposed to Ameren’s interests.  B&A asserts that, viewed in the light most 
favorable to B&A, the record supports the conclusion the supervisors were acting in their 
own interest.  In support of its assertion, B&A relies on Stehno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 
186 S.W.3d 247 253 (Mo. banc 2006), for the proposition that evidence showing the 
16 
 
defendant displayed “personal animus” toward the plaintiff is evidence the individual 
defendant was acting out of personal, as opposed to corporate, interests.   
 
But this Court in Stehno did not hold that any evidence of personal animus 
establishes a defendant was acting out of self-interest in interfering with a business 
expectancy. Rather, this Court explained that “satisfying the absence of justification 
element requires a showing the defendant interfered with the business expectancy for 
‘personal, as opposed to corporate, interests.’”  Id. (quoting Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 
S.W.2d 80, 83 (Mo. App. 1992)).   
 
Here, B&A asserts the following facts establish the supervisors acted out of self-
interest: (1) the supervisors were intentionally targeting Mr. Bishop because they did not 
want to hear his reports of illegal conditions that needed to be remedied; (2) Mr. Armistead 
told Mr. Bishop to stop reporting his concerns about environmental violations; 
(3) Mr. George made condescending statements and used abusive language toward            
Mr. Bishop; (4) Mr. Bishop complained Mr. George was refusing to authorize necessary 
work, requesting illegal and improper work, and awarding work to a competitor based on 
Mr. Bishop’s design; (5) Mr. Wright did not share the appreciation of B&A’s diligence and 
protective approach as former Ameren managers had; (6) Mr. Armistead became “pissed” 
B&A reported to Ameren management that he had authorized one of the illegal and 
improper jobs; (7) Mr. Wright was antagonistic and had a “chip on his shoulder” toward 
B&A and (8) Mr. Wright listed getting rid of Mr. Bishop as one of his accomplishments 
for the year.  Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to B&A, they do not 
17 
 
establish the supervisors interfered with B&A and Ameren’s business relationship out of 
self-interest.   
The fact that the supervisors might not have liked Mr. Bishop does not establish 
their interference with B&A and Ameren’s business relationship was for personal, as 
opposed to corporate, interests.  See Eggleston, 838 S.W.2d at 83 (finding the fact that the 
defendants might not have liked the plaintiff did “not convert [the plaintiff’s] discharge as 
an employee at will into an interference for personal, not corporate, reasons”).  Therefore, 
because B&A has failed to produce facts to establish the supervisors acted in their own 
self-interest, B&A cannot prove an absence of justification for purposes of tortious 
interference.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in 
favor of the supervisors.       
Conclusion 
 
Ameren and the supervisors were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on B&A’s 
claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference with a business expectancy.  
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Ameren 
and the supervisors.  This Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
Fischer, Stith, Draper, 
Wilson and Russell, JJ., concur.   
Powell, J., not participating.