Case Title: Elizabeth J. Neumont, Et Al. v. State Of Florida, Monroe County, Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-1204

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1204 
____________ 
 
ELIZABETH J. NEUMONT, et al.,  
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[September 27, 2007] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
The appellants seek to invalidate a Monroe County ordinance limiting the 
use of homes as vacation rentals.  We must decide what kind of changes to a 
proposed ordinance during the enactment process are “substantial or material” so 
that the process must start from scratch.  Reviewing the case on appeal from a 
summary judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
certified a question to us.  We have exercised our discretionary jurisdiction to 
answer it.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
hold that the changes to an ordinance during the enactment process are only 
“substantial or material” if they change the ordinance’s general purpose. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County enacted Ordinance 
No. 004-1997 on February 3, 1997.  The ordinance restricts the use of residential 
properties throughout Monroe County as vacation rentals, defined as rentals of 
fewer than twenty-nine days.  The ordinance’s purpose is to prevent the diversion 
of scarce residential housing to vacation rental use.  Violations result in criminal 
penalties. 
  
The County first advertised the ordinance on November 7-9, 1996.  The 
advertisement included the ordinance’s title: “Modifying the existing prohibition 
on tourist housing including vacation rentals in all land use districts.”  The 
advertisement stated that a first public hearing was scheduled for December 10.  At 
the time, a draft of the ordinance, dated September 17, 1996, was available to the 
public. 
At the December 10 hearing, the board of county commissioners considered 
a new draft dated that same day that was distributed to the board during the 
hearing.  It differed from the advertised draft in several respects:   
(a) the original draft proposed a ban on vacation rentals throughout the 
County, while the new draft took a district-by-district approach; 
 
(b) the original draft allowed an option to create sub-districts where vacation 
rentals would be permitted, while the new draft eliminated that option; 
and  
 
 
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(c) the new draft included a more-complex licensing system for vacation 
rentals than did the original draft.   
 
Based on the input received at the hearing, the board ordered additional changes. 
On January 11, 12, and 16, 1997, the County advertised a notice of a second 
public hearing.  This advertisement again stated the title of the ordinance, which 
was the same as the original title except in one respect.  It stated, “Modifying the 
existing prohibition on tourist housing including vacation rentals in all residential 
districts” (instead of “land use districts”). 
The second hearing was held on February 3.  At that hearing, the board 
considered a new draft of the ordinance dated January 29, which had been 
distributed to the public on January 31.  At the second hearing, the board also 
considered an “Errata Sheet,” which included additional changes to the proposed 
ordinance. 
After four and half hours of public debate, the board approved the January 
29 draft with the proposed changes in the errata sheet.  There were three main 
differences between the December 10 draft and the final version: 
(a) The December 10 draft permitted vacation rentals in sparsely settled 
residential districts while the final ordinance prohibited them; 
 
(b) 
 The December 10 draft addressed vacation rentals in commercial fishing 
districts, while the final ordinance did not; and 
 
(c) The December 10 draft did not refer to the Commercial Fishing 
Residential District, while the final ordinance prohibited vacation rentals 
in that district. 
 
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The Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Neumont, et al., own property in Monroe County, 
which they used for short-term vacation rentals.  They sued Monroe County in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, challenging the 
ordinance based on state and federal law.  The various claims sought declaratory 
relief as to the ordinance’s validity, injunctive relief to halt its effect, and 
compensation for damages resulting from its enforcement.  Count X asserted that 
the ordinance was void because the changes made during the enactment process 
were “substantial or material,” thereby requiring the process to begin anew. 
The district court certified a class of plaintiffs, see Neumont v. Monroe 
County, Fla., 198 F.R.D. 554 (S.D. Fla. 2000); and later dismissed several counts.  
See Neumont v. Monroe County, Fla., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  
After discovery and several rounds of summary judgment motions, the court 
upheld the ordinance, granted summary judgment for Monroe County on Count X, 
and dismissed the remaining claims.  Neumont v. Monroe County, Fla., 280 F. 
Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2003).  Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that federal courts “address questions of federal 
constitutional law only as a last resort.”  Neumont v. Florida, 451 F.3d 1284, 1285 
(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Save Our Dunes v. Ala. Dep’t. of Envtl. Mgmt., 834 F.  
2d 984, 989 (11th Cir. 1987)).  The court further noted that a state law 
determination on Count X “may remove the need to decide certain questions of 
 
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federal constitutional law.”  Id.  Therefore, the circuit court certified to us the 
following question: 
Whether, for purposes of Florida Statutes section 125.66(4)(b), a 
“substantial or material change” in a proposed ordinance during the 
enactment process (that is, the kind of change that would require a 
county to start the process over) is confined to a change in the 
“original general purpose” of the proposed ordinance, or whether a 
substantial or material change includes (1) a change to the “actual list 
of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning 
category,” or (2) a change necessary to secure legislative passage of 
the ordinance?   
 
Id. at 1287.  The question is one of first impression in Florida. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Plaintiffs argue that Monroe County modified the proposed ordinance 
several times during the process, and that because the changes were “substantial or 
material,” the enactment process should have been restarted.  They argue that after 
every change to the ordinance, the proposal should have been readvertised and new 
public hearings held.  Monroe County concedes that a substantial or material 
change to a proposed ordinance would require such action.  That requirement 
derives from a 1982 Florida Attorney General opinion concluding that “if any 
substantial or material changes or amendments are made during the adoption 
process, the enactment process . . . must start anew, with full compliance with the 
reading and notice requirements contained [in the statute].”  See Op. Att’y. Gen. 
Fla. 82-93 (1982).  This conclusion is consistent with that of other authorities.  See 
 
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5 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 16.88 (3d ed. 1996) 
(“An ordinance amended after its publication is not rendered void if the ordinance 
as amended does not vary from the substance of the original ordinance.”).  The 
County argues, however, that the changes to this ordinance were not substantial or 
material because they did not alter the ordinance’s general purpose.  Therefore, the 
only issue we must consider is what kind of changes to a proposed ordinance are 
“substantial and material” so as to require the process to be restarted. 
The parties propose three possible definitions of “substantial or material 
change.”  These are: a change to the actual list of permitted, conditional, or 
prohibited uses within a zoning category; a change necessary to secure legislative 
passage; and a change in the original purpose of the ordinance.  For the reasons 
explained below, we hold that the last definition—a change in the ordinance’s 
original purpose—is most consistent with the statutory requirements for enacting 
an ordinance and best furthers the public’s interest in efficient and responsive local 
government. 
In the following sections we (A) review the Monroe County zoning system 
in general and Ordinance No. 004-1997 in particular; (B) analyze the requirements 
for enacting ordinances listed in section 125.66, Florida Statutes (1995); (C) adopt 
a definition of “substantial or material change”; and finally (D) apply that 
 
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definition to this case.  We conclude that the general purpose approach is the 
proper standard. 
A.  The Monroe County Zoning System and Ordinance No. 004-1997 
We first review the Monroe County zoning system.  The Monroe County 
Code (MCC) defines twenty-three categories of land use districts.1  Each category 
serves a different purpose.  For example, an Urban Commercial District is 
“intended to serve retail sales and service, professional services and resort 
activities.”  Monroe County, Fla., Code § 9.5-203 (2007).  An Urban Residential 
District is intended “to provide areas for high-density residential uses.”  Id. § 9.5-
204.  Each district also has permitted, conditional, and prohibited uses.  For 
example, in the Urban Commercial District, “recreational uses [are] limited to: 
bowling alleys, tennis . . . courts . . . [and] swimming pools.” Id. § 9.5-232(a).  In 
the Commercial Fishing Village Districts, commercial fishing is a permitted use, 
but wireless communications facilities are a conditional use, subject to certain 
conditions. 
                                          
 
1. These are: urban commercial; urban residential; urban residential mobile 
home; urban residential mobile home-limited; suburban commercial; suburban 
residential; suburban residential (limited); sparsely settled residential; native 
area; mainland native area; offshore island; improved subdivision; destination 
resort; recreational vehicle; commercial fishing area; commercial fishing village; 
commercial fishing special; mixed use; industrial; maritime industries; military 
facilities; airport; park and refuge; and conservation.  Monroe County, Fla., Code § 
9.5-202 (2007). 
 
 
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The use at issue here was vacation rentals.  The ordinance defined vacation 
rentals as short-term leases of fewer than twenty-nine days.  The ordinance permits 
vacation rentals in certain districts. 
As noted above, during the enactment process, the County considered 
several versions of the ordinance.  Between the first published notice in November 
1996 and the final public hearing in February 1997 the County altered the list of 
land use districts where vacation rentals were permitted.  For example, the original 
version permitted them in the Sparsely Settled Residential Districts, while the final 
version did not.  The original version did not mention the Commercial Fishing 
Residential District, while the final version prohibited vacation rentals there.  
Finally, the original version addressed vacation rentals in 22 of the 23 Commercial 
Fishing Districts, but the final version did not refer to them. 
B. Section 125.66, Florida Statutes 
 
Article VIII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution authorizes counties to 
enact local ordinances: “The board of county commissioners of a county . . . may 
enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances.”  Section 125.66, 
Florida Statutes (1995), establishes the procedures by which ordinances may be 
enacted:  “In exercising the ordinance-making powers conferred by s.1, Art. VIII 
of the State Constitution, counties shall adhere to the procedures prescribed 
herein.”  § 125.66(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).  Section 125.66 imposes detailed notice 
 
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and hearing requirements depending on the type of ordinance proposed.  Three 
subsections are particularly relevant here: (1) section 125.66(2), governing the 
“regular enactment procedure” for ordinances that do not involve land use districts; 
(2) section 125.66(4)(a), governing ordinances that change the zoning map 
designation for parcels of fewer than ten acres; and (3) section 125.66(4)(b), 
governing ordinances that change the zoning map designation of parcels larger 
than ten acres, or which change the list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses 
within a zoning category.  We review each of these subsections below. 
1. Section 125.66(2): the Regular Enactment Procedure 
Section 125.66(2) governs the enactment process for the vast majority of 
county ordinances.  It provides in relevant part: 
(2)(a) The regular enactment procedure shall be as follows: The 
board of county commissioners at any regular or special meeting may 
enact or amend any ordinance, except as provided in subsection (4), if 
notice of intent to consider such ordinance is given at least 10 days 
prior to said meeting by publication in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county.  A copy of such notice shall be kept 
available for public inspection during the regular business hours of the 
office of the clerk of the board of county commissioners.  The notice 
of proposed enactment shall state the date, time, and place of the 
meeting; the title or titles of proposed ordinances; and the place or 
places within the county where such proposed ordinances may be 
inspected by the public.  The notice shall also advise that interested 
parties may appear at the meeting and be heard with respect to the 
proposed ordinance.   
 
 
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§ 125.66(2), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added).  Thus, section 125.66(2) requires 
that notice of a proposed ordinance be published at least ten days before the 
commission meeting at which the ordinance will be considered.  The notice must 
include the title of the proposed ordinance and “the place or places within the 
county where such proposed ordinance may be inspected by the public.”  § 
125.66(2), Fla. Stat. (1995).  Thus, when enacting most ordinances, counties must 
allow the public to inspect drafts of all proposed regular ordinances before their 
enactment.   
2. Section 125.66(4)(a): Changes to the Zoning Map  
Designation of Parcels of Land Involving Fewer than Ten Acres 
 
 
Section 125.66(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), prescribes the procedures to 
be followed in enacting zoning changes affecting fewer than ten acres of land.  
That section states in relevant part: 
(a) In cases in which the proposed ordinance . . . changes the 
actual zoning map designation for a parcel or parcels of land 
involving less than 10 contiguous acres, the board of county 
commissioners, in addition to following the general notice 
requirements of subsection (2), shall direct its clerk to notify by mail 
each real property owner whose land [will be affected] . . . .  The 
notice shall state the substance of the proposed ordinance or resolution 
as it affects that property owner . . . . 
   
§ 125.66(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added).  This subsection requires 
compliance with the notice requirements of subsection (2), described above, and 
requires that counties mail to each property owner affected by the proposed 
 
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ordinance a summary of the proposed ordinance explaining how the proposed 
ordinance will affect them. 
3. Section 125.66(4)(b): Ordinances That Change the List of  
Permitted, Conditional, or Prohibited Uses Within a Zoning Category 
 
The last category of procedures applies, among other areas, to ordinances 
that change the list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning 
category.  Monroe County Ordinance 004-1997 falls within this category.  Section 
125.66(4)(b) provides in relevant part: 
(b) In cases in which the proposed ordinance or resolution 
changes the actual list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses 
within a zoning category . . . the board of county commissioners shall 
provide for public notice and hearing as follows: 
 
1. The board of county commissioners shall hold two advertised 
public hearings on the proposed ordinance or resolution.  At least one 
hearing shall be held after 5 p.m. on a weekday, unless the board of 
county commissioners, by a majority plus one vote, elects to conduct 
that hearing at another time of day.  The first public hearing shall be 
held at least 7 days after the day that the first advertisement is 
published.  The second hearing shall be held at least 10 days after the 
first hearing and shall be advertised at least 5 days prior to the public 
hearing.   
 
2. The required advertisements shall be no less than 2 columns 
wide by 10 inches long in a standard size or a tabloid size newspaper, 
and the headline in the advertisement shall be in a type no smaller 
than 18 point.  The advertisement shall not be placed in that portion of 
the newspaper where legal notices and classified advertisements 
appear.  The advertisement shall be placed in a newspaper of general 
paid circulation in the county and of general interest and readership in 
the community pursuant to chapter 50, not one of limited subject 
matter.  It is the legislative intent that, whenever possible, the 
 
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advertisement shall appear in a newspaper that is published at least 5 
days a week unless the only newspaper in the community is published 
less than 5 days a week.  The advertisement shall be in substantially 
the following form: 
 
NOTICE OF (TYPE OF) CHANGE 
 
The (name of local government unit) proposes to adopt 
the following by ordinance or resolution: (title of 
ordinance or resolution). 
 
A public hearing on the ordinance or resolution will be 
held on (date and time) at (meeting place).   
 
§ 125.66(4)(b) (1995) (emphasis added).   
 
Section 125.66(4)(b) contains several important provisions.  It requires that 
counties hold two public hearings on all proposed ordinances that change the list of 
permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category.  The hearings 
must be advertised in a newspaper of general circulation.  Subsection (4)(b) also 
contains precise details about the form of the advertisement and its placement 
within the newspaper edition.  Unlike the regular enactment procedure described in 
subsection (2), however, subsection (4)(b) does not require that drafts of proposed 
land use ordinances be made available for public review.  Also unlike subsection 
(4)(a), subsection (4)(b) does not require that counties provide notice of the 
substance of the proposed ordinance or its effect on property owners, and does not 
require counties to comply with the provisions of subsection (2).  In fact, 
subsection (4)(b) permits counties to provide notice of ordinances that change the 
 
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permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category by their title 
only.  This distinction will be important in deciding which definition of 
“substantial or material change” we should adopt.   
C. Defining a “Substantive or Material Change” 
 
As noted above, the parties propose three possible definitions of “substantial 
or material change”:  (1) a change to the actual list of permitted, conditional, or 
prohibited uses within a zoning category; (2) a change necessary to secure 
legislative enactment; and (3) a change in the original purpose of an ordinance.  
Plaintiffs argue that we should adopt one of the first two definitions, while the 
County advocates for the third.  We first consider the Plaintiffs’ proposed 
definitions, ultimately rejecting them.  We then discuss why the County’s 
definition best suits the purposes behind the statutory requirements and the orderly 
and democratic process of local government. 
1. Any Change to the List of Permitted, Conditional, or Prohibited Uses 
 Within Any Zoning Category 
 
Plaintiffs propose that any change to the list of permitted uses within any 
zoning category requires the process to restart.  They derive this standard from the 
language of section 125.66(4)(b).  Plaintiffs argue that any change substantial 
enough to trigger the enactment process—that is, a change to the list of permitted, 
conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category—is substantial enough to 
 
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require a restart when the change is made during that process.  We disagree.  What 
triggers the requirements of section 125.66(4)(b) is not the “substantial” nature of 
the proposed ordinance, but the fact that it changes the list of permitted, 
conditional, or prohibited uses.  For purposes of the restart requirement, however, 
the term “substantial” refers to the importance of the change, not to the effect of 
the ordinance itself.   
The Plaintiffs’ proposed standard would be prohibitively restrictive.  As the 
County argues, such a standard would require a restart whenever, due to input from 
either staff or a member of the public at a public hearing, the County in any way 
changed the list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning 
category.  Thus, for example, if in this case the original proposed ordinance 
permitted vacation rentals in twenty of twenty-three districts, but due to public 
input the County changed the ordinance to permit vacation rentals in only nineteen 
districts, the entire process would have to start over again.  If, at another public 
hearing, the County decided to permit vacation rentals in only eighteen districts, 
the process would have to start yet again.  This cycle could potentially repeat itself 
forever, or at least for an extended period of time.  It would render any proposed 
land use ordinance almost impossible to amend and would result in ironic 
consequences: far from allowing greater public input into the decision-making 
process, it would discourage counties from changing a proposed ordinance as a 
 
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result of public input, as such change would delay the enactment process.  This 
would substantially diminish the role of the public in modifying a proposed 
ordinance.  The purpose of the public hearings that section 125.66(4)(b) requires is 
to provide a forum for public comment so that proposed ordinances may be 
modified after input from citizens who may be affected by the ordinance.  Under 
the Plaintiffs’ proposed standard, however, even slight changes to the list of 
permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses to accommodate citizen concerns would 
require the entire process to start over.  Such a standard would provide 
commissioners with a strong incentive to ignore public commentary and give 
unmerited weight to the original version of a proposed ordinance.  We therefore 
reject this definition of a substantial or material change. 
2.  Any Change Necessary to Secure Legislative Passage of an Ordinance 
Plaintiffs also argue that a substantial or material change includes “any 
change necessary to secure legislative passage of the ordinance.”  Plaintiffs assert 
that such a change is a “cause-in-fact” of passage, and therefore is necessarily a 
“substantial factor.”  Such a test would be both over- and under-inclusive, 
however.  Many changes necessary to ensure passage might not be substantial or 
material, whereas some substantial changes might be made for reasons other than 
securing legislative approval.  Such a test would also require a subjective and 
speculative determination of every county commissioner’s intent when voting to 
 
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adopt a county ordinance.  Such a standard would be neither workable nor 
consistent with the letter and purpose of the statute. 
3. The General Purpose Standard 
Monroe County advocates instead for a definition of “substantial or material 
change” based on the ordinance’s general purpose.  The County argues that only 
changes that alter the original purpose of a proposed land use ordinance should 
require the enactment process to begin anew.  We believe such a standard would be 
faithful both to the text of section 125.66 and to the public interest.  This standard 
derives from the Florida Attorney General Opinion cited above, which states that 
“amendments can be made during passage of an ordinance when the amendment is 
not one changing the original purpose.”  Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 82-93 (emphasis 
added).  As previously noted, section 125.66(4)(b) requires that the county 
advertise only the title of the proposed land use ordinance.  It seems reasonable, 
then, that only changes to the ordinance that would render the advertised title 
inaccurate or misleading should require the enactment process to begin anew.  
Consider, for example, a proposed ordinance that seeks to change the 
permissibility of public swimming pools in various land use districts throughout 
Monroe County.  The title of the proposed ordinance might be noticed as: 
“Regulation of public swimming pools in all land use districts throughout Monroe 
County.”  If during the enactment process the proposed ordinance was changed so 
 
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that it also affected the list of land use districts where bowling alleys would be 
permitted, this would render the title inaccurate.  Such a change would require the 
enactment process to start over because the ordinance’s title would no longer be 
accurate.  This rationale is consistent with a general purpose test, since the title of a 
proposed ordinance is an expression of its general purpose.  If a change renders the 
title inaccurate, then it has very likely altered the general purpose of the proposed 
ordinance as well.   
A general purpose test is consistent with relevant Florida cases.  See Webb 
v. Town Council, 766 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“The law is well 
settled that notice must adequately inform as to what changes are proposed, and the 
actual change must conform substantially to the proposed changes in the notice.”); 
Love Our Lakes Ass’n v. Pasco County, 543 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) 
(same); Williams v. City of North Miami, 213 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) 
(same).   
In this case, even if the enactment procedures had begun anew, the public 
would not have received meaningful notice of the changes because none of them 
rendered the title inaccurate.  If the enactment process had started over, and the 
ordinance had been re-noticed, the title would still have read: “Modifying the 
 
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existing prohibition on tourist housing including vacation rentals in all districts in 
Monroe County.”2 
Of the three proposed definitions, the general purpose approach also best 
serves the public’s interest in efficient and responsive local government.  As 
explained above, the two definitions Plaintiffs offer contain serious practical 
difficulties.  A definition premised on changes to the general purpose of a proposed 
ordinance allows the county commission to adopt changes based on input received 
at public hearings without compromising the public’s right to receive adequate 
notice of proposed changes. 
By requiring that counties publish the title of proposed ordinances in a 
newspaper of general circulation, section 125.66(4)(b) places the public on notice 
that the availability of a particular land use might be altered throughout the county.  
The two-hearing requirement allows the public to voice their concerns.  Interested 
citizens may attend the hearings and advise the county commission on how to treat 
that land use within each of their respective districts.  The commissioners may then 
use the input they receive from the public to modify the list of zoning categories 
where the land use at issue will be permitted, conditional, or prohibited.  As one 
                                          
 
2.  We do not suggest that the title of the ordinance will always be the only 
indicator of an ordinance’s general purpose.  There may be cases where changes to 
the ordinance may not render the title inaccurate but may alter its general purpose.  
In this case, however, the ordinance’s general purpose remained the same 
throughout the process. 
 
 
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amicus curiae in this case described the process, “choices can be made, minds can 
be changed, citizens can be heard, and so long as the original purpose of the 
ordinance is not altered, the ordinance can evolve and change without the local 
government having to renew the notice and hearing process.”  Of the three possible 
definitions presented in the circuit court’s certified question, the general purpose 
approach is the most practical and provides the greatest benefit to the public. 
D. Applying the Standard to Ordinance No. 004-1997 
We now apply the general purpose standard to the ordinance.  The first title 
notified the public that the County was considering a change in the permissibility 
of vacation rentals in all land use districts.  The second advertised title provided 
notice to all residential property owners that vacation rentals in those districts 
might be restricted.  Ultimately, Ordinance No. 004-1997 only prohibited vacation 
rentals in residential land use districts.  Because the actual changes enacted by the 
ordinance conformed substantially with the notice provided to the public, we hold 
that the ordinance satisfies the general purpose test.  Although the advertised title 
was modified between the first and second hearings, the first advertised title 
provided notice to all zoning districts in Monroe County, whereas the second 
advertised title only provided notice to residential zoning districts.  Because the 
enacted ordinance only affected residential zoning districts, the change in the 
advertised title was not substantial or material.  Both titles put residential district 
 
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residents on notice of the zoning change that was ultimately adopted.  Our opinion 
might differ if the second advertised title had broadened, rather than limited, the 
scope of the ordinance. 
Plaintiffs argue, however, that various changes were made during the 
enactment process, and that drafts of the proposed changes were not made 
available to the public until the last minute.  As noted in the previous section, 
section 125.66(4)(b) does not require that counties provide drafts of proposed 
ordinances for public review.  They are required only for regular ordinances, which 
are governed by section 125.66(2).  Therefore, changes to the drafts cannot form 
the basis for requiring the enactment process to begin anew. 
As noted above, section 125.66(4)(b) requires that counties provide notice 
only of a proposed ordinance’s title.  Given that title notice is all that is required, 
restarting the enactment process would have accomplished little.  The changes to 
the proposed ordinance all related to the regulation of vacation rentals in Monroe 
County.  See City of Hallandale v. State ex rel. Zachar, 371 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1979) (“The title need not be an index to the contents.  It is not necessary 
that it delineate in detail the substance of the statute.”); see also A.B.T. Corp. v. 
City of Fort Lauderdale, 664 F. Supp. 488, 490-91 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (same).  
 
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Nothing in the enacted ordinance rendered the advertised title misleading or 
inaccurate.  Thus, there was no need to restart the enactment procedure.3 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that a change in the general purpose of a 
proposed ordinance is the definition of “substantial or material change” most 
compatible with the text of section 125.66(4)(b).  The general purpose test strikes 
an effective balance between providing the public with adequate notice and 
permitting the efficient modification of proposed ordinances in response to public 
input.  Having answered the certified question, we return this case to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 04-13610 
 
Eric Grant, Sacramento, California, Harold E. Wolfe, Jr., and William H. Pincus, 
West Palm Beach, Florida, and James H. Hicks of Hicks, Brams and Motto, West 
Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
                                          
 
 
3.  Plaintiffs also argue that the County’s procedures in enacting the 
ordinance violated due process.  That issue, however, is for the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals to decide. 
 
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for Appellants 
 
Edwin A. Scales, III of GrayRobinson, P.A., Key West, Florida, Monterey 
Campbell, III of GrayRobinson, P.A., Lakeland, Florida, and Robert B. Shillinger, 
Jr., Chief Assistant County Attorney, Office of County Attorney Monroe County, 
Florida, Key West, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Harry Morrison, Jr., General Counsel and Rebecca A. O’Hara, Deputy General 
Counsel, Florida League of Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, and Virginia 
Saunders Delegal, General Counsel, Florida Association of Counties, Inc., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae