Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Peter J. Thompson

Citation: 2014 WI 25

Docket Number: 2011AP002458-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2458-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Peter J. Thompson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Peter J. Thompson, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THOMPSON 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
       
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Peter J. 
Thompson, pro se. 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief by 
Robert G. Krohn and Roethe Pope Roethe LLP, Edgerton.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2458-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Peter J. Thompson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Peter J. Thompson, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.   Complaint dismissed. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Peter J. Thompson, pro se, 
appeals Referee James Curtis's report concluding that Attorney 
Thompson engaged in professional misconduct warranting a public 
reprimand.  Under the facts presented, we conclude Attorney 
Thompson did not violate the rules of professional conduct as 
alleged in the complaint.  However, we remind lawyers to proceed 
with caution when considering disclosure of confidential client 
information in response to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Attorney Thompson was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1974.  When this case commenced, he had practiced 
law for 34 years and had never been the subject of a 
disciplinary action.  This misconduct proceeding stems from a 
letter that Attorney Thompson sent to the circuit court judge 
presiding over a postconviction proceeding in which Attorney 
Thompson's former client, Derek C., alleged that Attorney 
Thompson 
rendered 
him 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.  
Accordingly, Derek C.'s underlying criminal proceeding is 
relevant to the pending allegations of misconduct. 
¶3 
In October 2006 the State Public Defender's Office 
(SPD) appointed Attorney Thompson to represent Derek C., who was 
charged with one felony count of first-degree sexual assault of 
a child under the age of 13.  The criminal complaint alleged 
that Derek C. had sexually assaulted his five-year-old nephew 
while babysitting the boy during a specific school snow day in 
December 2005. 
¶4 
Attorney Thompson and Derek C. appeared for a court 
status conference on March 21, 2007, and requested a jury trial.  
Trial was scheduled to commence July 10, 2007.  In early June 
2007 Attorney Thompson and Derek C. appeared for a final 
pretrial conference.  At the conference, Derek C. provided 
Attorney Thompson with a handwritten note describing a potential 
alibi defense and naming several possible witnesses.  Attorney 
Thompson received the note after the deadline for filing a 
notice of alibi defense. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
On June 20, 2007, Attorney Thompson moved the court to 
shorten the time for filing an alibi and filed the alibi 
defense.  In July 2007 Derek C.'s case went to trial.  As will 
be discussed, Attorney Thompson opted not to use the alibi 
defense at trial.  Derek C. was convicted. 
¶6 
In September 2007, prior to sentencing, Attorney 
Thompson withdrew as counsel.  On or about September 24, 2007, 
Attorney Richard Schaumberg was appointed as successor counsel.  
Attorney Thompson gave Attorney Schaumberg relevant portions of 
Derek C.'s file. 
¶7 
On January 30, 2008, Derek C. and Attorney Schaumberg 
appeared for the sentencing hearing at which Derek C. was 
sentenced to 10 years of incarceration and seven years of 
extended supervision.  Attorney Schaumberg filed a timely notice 
of intent to pursue postconviction relief. 
¶8 
In March 2008 the SPD appointed Attorney David Leeper 
to represent Derek C. as appellate/postconviction counsel.  On 
July 7, 2008, Attorney Leeper filed a motion for a new trial on 
behalf of Derek C., alleging that Attorney Thompson rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶9 
The 
Machner 
hearing 
was 
scheduled 
to 
commence 
October 14, 2008.1  On September 16, 2008, Attorney Leeper filed 
several motions asking the trial court to make rulings in 
advance of the Machner hearing.  He asked the court to deem 
                                                 
1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
4 
 
Attorney Thompson an adverse witness, contending that Attorney 
Thompson 
had 
been 
unresponsive 
and 
uncooperative 
during 
postconviction proceedings, and asked the court to remove the 
district attorney from the case.  He asked the circuit court to 
"summarily" decide the motions before the Machner hearing. 
¶10 Attorney Thompson was concerned that the circuit court 
would rule on Attorney Leeper's motions before the Machner 
hearing and limit his opportunity to testify.  On September 24, 
2008, Attorney Thompson wrote to the Honorable Jon Counsell, the 
judge presiding over Derek C.'s postconviction proceeding.  
Attorney Thompson requested the court's permission to address 
"certain motions and assertions that Attorney Leeper has been 
making" and asked the court to permit Attorney Thompson "a 
chance to respond to these and other issues by the close of 
business on Monday, September 29th."  The record reflects that 
Attorney Thompson received a communication from court staff, 
indicating that Attorney Thompson could respond. 
¶11 Attorney Thompson then sent the September 29, 2008 
letter that forms the basis of the OLR's complaint. 
¶12 The 
parties 
dispute 
whether 
ensuing 
events 
are 
relevant.  We summarize them briefly.  The Machner hearing 
commenced on October 14, 2008.  Before Attorney Thompson 
arrived, Attorney Leeper sought and received a sequestration 
order.  Attorney Thompson was not present at the time and was 
not specifically subject to the sequestration order.  The 
Machner hearing did not finish that day and Attorney Thompson 
was not called to testify. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
5 
 
¶13 On October 21, 2008, the circuit court issued an order 
rejecting Attorney Leeper's request that the court limit 
discussions between the district attorney and Attorney Thompson.  
Attorney Leeper sought leave to appeal this nonfinal order and 
the court of appeals accepted review.  The Machner hearing was 
continued pending appeal. 
¶14 In February 2011 the court of appeals ruled that a 
circuit court has authority to issue a sequestration order 
prohibiting the prosecutor from discussing witness testimony 
with defense counsel.  The court directed the circuit court, on 
remand, to clarify whether it intended its sequestration order 
to include Attorney Thompson. 
¶15 On remand, Judge Counsell ruled that Attorney Thompson 
was not subject to the sequestration order, noting that trial 
counsel in a Machner hearing should have the opportunity to 
prepare for the hearing. 
¶16 In April 2012 Attorney Leeper withdrew as counsel for 
Derek C.  Court records indicate that Derek C.'s postconviction 
motion was denied on January 7, 2013. 
¶17 Returning to the matter now before this court, the OLR 
filed a disciplinary complaint against Attorney Thompson on 
October 24, 2011.  The complaint alleged that the September 29, 
2008 letter to the court violated four ethical rules: 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
6 
 
(1) Attorney 
Thompson 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.6(a)2 
by 
revealing information relating to a former client without 
the client's informed consent (Count One); 
(2) Attorney Thompson violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1)3 by 
using information relating to a former client to the 
disadvantage of such client (Count Two); 
(3) Attorney Thompson violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(2)4 by 
revealing information relating to the representation of a 
former client (Count Three); and 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.6(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that 
are 
impliedly 
authorized 
in 
order 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
representation, and except as stated in pars. (b) and (c)." 
3 SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) states as follows: 
 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
 
(1) use 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client, or when the information has 
become generally known. 
4 SCR 20:1.9(c)(2) provides as follows: 
 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly 
represented 
a 
client 
in 
a 
matter 
shall 
not 
thereafter:  
 
. . . .  
 
(2) reveal 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation except as these rules would permit or 
require with respect to a client. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
7 
 
(4) Attorney 
Thompson 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.16(d)5 
(declining or terminating representation) (Count Four). 
¶18 The OLR sought a public reprimand and payment of 
costs, which total $10,304.44 as of December 13, 2012. 
¶19 The court appointed Referee James G. Curtis who 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 14, 2012.  Following 
post-hearing 
briefing, 
the 
referee 
issued 
a 
report 
and 
recommendation dated August 2, 2012.  The referee concluded that 
the OLR had proven Counts One through Three of the complaint, 
but failed to prove Count Four.  The referee recommended the 
court publicly reprimand Attorney Thompson and impose costs. 
¶20 Attorney Thompson appeals.6  We will affirm a referee's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.16(d) states: 
 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
6 The OLR does not appeal the referee's conclusion that 
Attorney Thompson did not violate SCR 20:1.16(d) (Count Four).  
On January 9, 2013, Attorney Thompson moved to stay the court's 
decision pending a decision in another matter pending before the 
OLR, together with a motion for leave to file a supplemental 
appendix.  We denied the motion to stay on March 12, 2013; and 
we accept the supplemental appendix. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 71, 
740 
N.W.2d 125. 
 
We 
consider 
the 
referee's 
conclusions of law de novo.  Id. 
¶21 We accept the referee's findings of fact and reject 
Attorney Thompson's challenge to several of the referee's 
factual findings.  While there are some discrepancies between 
the referee's findings and Attorney Thompson's own perspective 
on 
events, 
the 
discrepancies 
are 
either 
of 
minor 
legal 
significance or do not bear on the allegations of ethical 
misconduct.  We accept the referee's factual findings and 
consider the legal conclusions and recommendation for public 
discipline. 
¶22 What can a lawyer permissibly disclose in response to 
a former client's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?  
When a defendant charges that his or her attorney has been 
ineffective, the defendant's lawyer-client privilege is waived 
to the extent that counsel must answer questions relevant to the 
charge of ineffective assistance.  State v. Flores, 170 
Wis. 2d 272, 277-78, 488 N.W.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1992); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(4)(c) (the lawyer-client privilege is waived 
"[a]s to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty 
by the lawyer to the lawyer's client or by the client to the 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
9 
 
client's lawyer").7  The question also implicates the lawyer's 
continuing duty of confidentiality.8 
¶23 Supreme court rule 20:1.6, the confidentiality rule, 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
(a) A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
reveal 
information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, except for disclosures 
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation, and except . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
(c) A lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
. . . .  
 
(4) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or 
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation of the client; . . . . 
SCR 20:1.6(a) and (c)(4). 
¶24 The published comment to SCR 20:1.6 further informs a 
lawyer's decision to disclose confidential client information in 
                                                 
7 We deem unpersuasive the OLR's reliance on In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against O'Neil, 2003 WI 48, 261 
Wis. 2d 404, 661 N.W.2d 813, where we concluded an attorney 
violated SCR 20:1.6 by disclosing his client's file and 
discussing its contents with the police department without 
obtaining client waiver.  That case did not involve allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
8 The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-
lawyer relationship has terminated.  SCR 20:1.6, ABA cmt. [18]. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
10 
 
response to an exception set forth in SCR 20:1.6(c).  The 
comment states, as relevant here: 
Paragraph 
[(c) 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
rule] 
permits 
disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one 
of the purposes specified.  Where practicable, the 
lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to 
take 
suitable 
action 
to 
obviate 
the 
need 
for 
disclosure.  In any case, a disclosure adverse to the 
client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
necessary 
to 
accomplish 
the 
purpose.  If the disclosure will be made in connection 
with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be 
made in a manner that limits access to the information 
to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know 
it 
and 
appropriate 
protective 
orders 
or 
other 
arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the 
fullest extent practicable. 
SCR 20:1.6, ABA cmt. [14]. 
¶25 It is undisputed that Attorney Thompson did not have 
the consent of Derek C., informed or otherwise, directly or by 
counsel, to send the letter to the court.  However, absent 
consent, 
SCR 
20:1.6(c) 
authorizes 
disclosures 
a 
lawyer 
"reasonably believes necessary" to "respond to allegations in 
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the 
client."  SCR 20:1.6(c)(4).  The question then is whether 
Attorney Thompson's letter of September 30, 2008 transcended the 
boundaries of permissible disclosure in this case.  We conclude 
it did not. 
¶26 The context in which Attorney Thompson opted to send 
the letter is of critical importance to our determination. 
¶27 Attorney 
Thompson 
found 
his 
client, 
Derek 
C., 
uncooperative during their initial meetings.  Derek C. was not 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
11 
 
forthcoming when asked about possible defenses.  At one point 
Derek C. suggested that the victim's older brother, who 
allegedly witnessed the sexual assault, would change his story.  
Attorney Thompson became concerned that Derek C. intended to 
suborn perjury.  Indeed, he later disclosed that much of his 
trial strategy was influenced by his efforts to manage this 
aspect of Derek C.'s defense.  Some six months after commencing 
representation and only a few weeks before trial, Derek C. 
provided him with a possible alibi defense.  Attorney Thompson 
duly filed a motion to extend the time for filing an alibi 
defense, 
investigated 
the 
matter, 
interviewed 
the 
named 
witnesses, and concluded the proffered alibi defense was not 
viable.  He thus opted not to use the alibi defense at trial.  
He withdrew as counsel prior to sentencing. 
¶28 The interactions between successor counsel, Attorney 
Leeper, 
and 
Attorney 
Thompson 
also 
influenced 
Attorney 
Thompson's decision to send the letter to the court.  Between 
May and September 2008, Attorneys Leeper and Thompson exchanged 
a series of e-mails in which Attorney Leeper repeatedly 
requested the case file maintained by Attorney Thompson, 
including billing statements.  Attorney Leeper asked questions 
about the trial proceedings and alluded to a likely ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  Attorney Leeper repeatedly asked 
to meet with Attorney Thompson.  Attorney Leeper also contacted 
the SPD for assistance obtaining the file.  The SPD, in turn, 
contacted Attorney Thompson to confirm whether he had given 
Attorney Leeper the file. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
12 
 
¶29 Attorney Thompson had already given most of the case 
file to the lawyer who represented Derek C. at sentencing.  
Attorney Thompson later acknowledged his irritation with the 
tendency of appellate counsel to pursue ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims.  He sent the few file materials still in his 
possession to Attorney Leeper and basically advised Attorney 
Leeper to get on with the anticipated ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claim.  The e-mail exchanges between Attorney 
Leeper 
and 
Attorney 
Thompson 
reflect 
the 
two 
lawyers' 
fundamentally different perspectives regarding the viability of 
Derek C.'s alibi defense and the role of trial counsel in 
postconviction proceedings. 
¶30 On July 7, 2008, Attorney Leeper filed the expected 
postconviction motion on behalf of Derek C.  The motion was 
sweeping in its allegations of Attorney Thompson's alleged 
ineffective assistance.  The motion stated: 
 
1. 
Trial counsel did not spend sufficient time 
meeting with the defendant . . . . 
 
2. 
Trial attorney failed to properly prepare 
the defendant to testify. 
 
3. 
Trial counsel failed to investigate and 
explore the defendant's alibi defense. 
 
[4.] Trial counsel withdrew the defendant's alibi 
defense——the only defense the defendant had. 
 
5. 
[Trial] counsel failed to interview, call, 
and prepare crucial witnesses. 
 
6. 
Trial counsel failed to investigate and 
introduce evidence of other incidences of sexual 
assault of the victim. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
13 
 
 
7. 
Trial counsel failed to file the standard 
demand for discovery as provided for by sec. 971.23 
Wis. Stats. 
 
8. 
Trial counsel's failure to make a discovery 
request for exculpatory evidence under sec. 971.23 led 
to the inability to use clearly exculpatory evidence 
effectively. 
 
9. 
Trial counsel failed to prepare a theory of 
the case or present a logical and consistent defense 
to the jury. 
 
10. Trial 
counsel 
never 
made 
use 
of 
the 
presumption that an offer to take a polygraph supports 
the credibility of a witness. 
¶31 Attorney Leeper did not provide Attorney Thompson with 
a courtesy copy of this motion.  Attorney Thompson learned of 
the motion from the district attorney, who contacted him to 
discuss the alibi defense claims. 
¶32 Attorney 
Thompson 
thought 
Attorney 
Leeper 
was 
intentionally 
and 
inappropriately 
excluding 
him 
from 
the 
postconviction process.  He explained his perspective: 
[T]he status of a trial attorney in a Machner hearing 
is not that of just another witness; instead, that 
attorney has a status analogous to that of a necessary 
party to the proceedings, that his knowledge of the 
proceedings and claims against him cannot be limited 
by the court or anyone else in any way, that he has 
standing to assert his rights to be informed and to 
appear, and indeed, that it is even questionable if 
such attorney can properly be sequestered during the 
proceedings. 
¶33 Attorney 
Thompson's 
concerns 
were 
exacerbated 
by 
Attorney Leeper's ensuing motions seeking to declare Attorney 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
14 
 
Thompson as an adverse witness.9  Attorney Thompson felt that 
Attorney Leeper was "acting inappropriately trying to prejudice 
the court and exclude [Attorney Thompson's] proper role . . . ."  
He was disturbed by Attorney Leeper's strategy.  He was 
concerned the court would rule on the motions in advance of the 
hearing.  In this context, he sought and received permission 
from the court to respond to the extensive claims of his alleged 
ineffective assistance.  The fact that Attorney Thompson sought 
and obtained leave of the court to respond to the motions is 
critical to our ruling in this case. 
¶34 Attorney Thompson's six-page, single-spaced letter 
directed to Judge Counsell was thorough in its response and 
admittedly scathing of both his former client and Attorney 
Leeper.  The letter included: 
• 
Thorough discussion of Attorney Thompson's early 
communications with the client with reference to the 
defendant's father. 
• 
Details of an early discussion with the client 
about 
alibi 
defenses, 
informing 
the 
court 
that 
the 
                                                 
9 One motion entitled, 
"Motion for Rulings Prior to 
Hearing," sought to call Attorney Thompson as an adverse witness 
at the Machner hearing based on allegations that Attorney 
Thompson "refused to turn over the Defendant's trial file until 
appellate counsel pointed out the ethical obligation to do so 
and asked the State Public Defender to intervene.  [Attorney 
Thompson] has also refused to talk with appellate counsel about 
the case and has said he will talk only in response to a 
subpoena." 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
15 
 
defendant had never provided alibi information until the 
end of the June hearing. 
• 
Reference to Attorney Thompson's March letter to 
the 
defendant, 
a 
confidential 
letter 
regarding 
plea 
discussions, and not a part of the court file. 
• 
Describing 
his 
client's 
demeanor 
as 
"calm, 
deliberate, articulate, glib, impenetrable and cocky." 
• 
Disclosing his conversations with potential alibi 
witnesses 
and 
noting 
the 
deficiencies 
in 
their 
recollections.  He dismissed the experts retained by 
appellate counsel, questioning the integrity of their 
conclusions and suggesting that his own opinions on 
truthfulness should be admissible. 
• 
Detailing his response to the director of the 
SPD, claiming that appellate counsel was developing a "new" 
case and telling her about the "exploding alibi" in this 
case.  He stated that another witness, J.S., had perjured 
herself in an affidavit submitted by Mr. Leeper in support 
of the Motion for New Trial. 
¶35 In assessing whether this letter violated SCR 20:1.6, 
the OLR and the referee relied on American Bar Association 
Formal Opinion 10-456, issued on July 14, 2010 (Formal Opinion). 
¶36 The Formal Opinion concludes that a criminal defense 
lawyer accused of ineffective assistance of counsel by a former 
client cannot disclose confidential information to defend 
against the former client's claim of ineffective assistance of 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
16 
 
counsel unless the disclosure is made in a court-supervised 
setting.  The Formal Opinion states: 
[A] lawyer may disclose information protected by the 
rule only if the lawyer "reasonably believes [it is] 
necessary" to do so in the lawyer's self-defense. The 
lawyer may have a reasonable need to disclose relevant 
client information in a judicial proceeding to prevent 
harm to the lawyer that may result from a finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it is 
highly unlikely that a disclosure in response to a 
prosecution 
request, 
prior 
to 
a 
court-supervised 
response by way of testimony or otherwise, will be 
justifiable.   
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 
(2010). 
 
Referee 
Curtis 
deemed 
this 
opinion 
persuasive, 
concluding that "[p]ermitting disclosure of client confidential 
information 
outside 
court-supervised 
proceedings 
undermines 
important interests protected by the confidentiality rule." 
¶37 Defense counsel preparing to respond to a motion 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must be mindful of 
continuing ethical obligations to former clients.  As written, 
however, 
Wisconsin's 
confidentiality 
rule 
does 
not 
limit 
permitted disclosures to a "court-supervised" setting.  We 
decline to impose this restriction on our rule generally or in 
this case specifically.  Moreover, the Formal Opinion issued 
after Attorney Thompson sent the September 29, 2008 letter; this 
ethical guidance was not available to Attorney Thompson when he 
sent the letter. 
¶38 We turn to the question whether it was permissible for 
Attorney Thompson to reveal the contents of the September 29, 
2008 letter.  A lawyer responding to claims of ineffective 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
17 
 
assistance of counsel must limit his or her disclosures to the 
"extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary."  As the 
comment to SCR 20:1.6 cautions, a disclosure "adverse to the 
client's 
interest 
should 
be 
no 
greater 
than 
the 
lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose."  
SCR 20:1.6, ABA cmt. [14].  In addition, as the referee 
correctly observes, it is not enough that Attorney Thompson 
genuinely believed the particular disclosure was necessary; the 
lawyer's belief must be objectively reasonable.  See, e.g., 
SCR 20:1(l) (defining the term "reasonably believes" to mean 
that a lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable). 
¶39 The OLR contends, and the referee agreed, that the 
disclosures in the letter were not objectively reasonable.  The 
OLR asserts: 
Challenging 
a 
client's 
alibi, 
discussing 
conversation[s] with his client's family members, 
commenting on his client's demeanor and integrity, 
dismissing the testimony of potentially favorable 
defense witnesses, etc. directly impugned the client 
and improperly revealed critical information related 
to the representation.  It is difficult to construct a 
more devastating attack by an attorney on his own 
client. 
¶40 The referee agreed.  He deemed the content and tone of 
Attorney Thompson's letter damaging to the former client's 
position and expressed concern that it provided the prosecution 
with a "road map" and undue advantage in the presentation of 
evidence at the Machner hearing.  Indeed, the referee had harsh 
words for Attorney Thompson: 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
18 
 
Mr. Thompson's letter represents his uncontrolled rant 
and musings about his representation of Derek C., and 
the efforts of Mr. Leeper, all in the context of 
Mr. Thompson's 
natural 
tendency 
to 
defend 
and 
vindicate his own conduct in the handling of the 
criminal trial.  Both the content and tone of the 
letter were disparaging and tended to vilify and 
impugn the position of his former client.  While 
Mr. Thompson clearly didn't agree with that position, 
he 
had 
an 
obligation 
to 
refrain 
from 
unfairly 
maligning Derek C.'s position before the Machner 
hearing was ever called to order.  And contrary to 
Mr. Thompson's position, the content of the letter was 
not identical to the content of Mr. Thompson's Machner 
testimony had the 9/29/08 letter never been sent.  
This is because the content of the letter was not 
filtered 
through 
the 
adversary 
process, 
or 
the 
judiciary's role in limiting the extent of the 
defendant's waiver of the lawyer-client privilege. 
¶41 Our rule does not limit permissible disclosures to 
judicially supervised settings so we reject that aspect of the 
referee's statement.  We agree that the tone of the letter is 
abrasive and that Attorney Thompson expresses contempt for both 
his former client and successor counsel.  This angry rhetoric 
pervades Attorney Thompson's appellate brief, as well.  While 
unprofessional, it is not necessarily unethical. 
¶42 We consider the context in which this letter was sent.  
Attorney Thompson was affronted that Attorney Leeper did not 
copy him on the court filings alleging, in extremely broad 
terms, that he rendered Derek C. ineffective assistance and 
seeking to limit his testimony in response to these claims.  The 
referee observed that "[Attorney] Thompson was an important and 
essential witness at the Machner hearing, [but] he did not have 
the status of a 'necessary party.'"  He was no longer counsel of 
record for Derek C.  As such, Attorney Leeper was not required 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
19 
 
to provide him with copies of the postconviction motions.  To 
the extent he thought otherwise, Attorney Thompson was mistaken. 
¶43 Generally, however, it is advisable and a matter of 
professional courtesy for postconviction/appellate counsel to 
provide former counsel with a copy of a motion alleging he or 
she rendered ineffective assistance.  Certainly, Attorney 
Leeper's decision not to provide copies to Attorney Thompson 
contributed to Attorney Thompson's belief that Attorney Leeper 
was improperly seeking to interfere with his opportunity to 
respond to the allegations. 
¶44 The OLR and the referee chastise Attorney Thompson for 
placing the desire to defend his professional reputation over 
the 
interests 
of 
his 
former 
client. 
 
Defending 
one's 
professional reputation is not among the permitted exceptions to 
the confidentiality rule.  The record reflects, however, that 
Attorney Thompson's concerns were not solely for his reputation. 
¶45 As the letter and the testimony at the ensuing Machner 
hearing make clear, Attorney Thompson thought his former client 
intended to suborn perjury; his trial strategy was deliberate 
and reflected an effort to manage this concern.  A lawyer with a 
potentially perjurious client must contend with competing 
considerations——duties of zealous advocacy, confidentiality, and 
loyalty to the client on the one hand, and a responsibility to 
the courts and our truth-seeking system of justice on the other.  
State v. McDowell, 2003 WI App 168, ¶54, 266 Wis. 2d 599, 669 
N.W.2d 204 (citing People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
20 
 
(2001)).  And, as the postconviction court would later observe, 
"[t]he perjury concerns were real."10 
¶46 Part of appellate counsel's strategy appears to have 
been 
to 
vilify 
Attorney 
Thompson 
for 
failing 
to 
pursue 
Derek C.'s alibi defense, then aggressively seeking to limit any 
opportunity for Attorney Thompson to explain the professional 
rationale for his decision.  Attorney Thompson asserts that "a 
petitioner [seeking] relief cannot allege that he was deprived 
of his constitutional rights and then invoke the shield of the 
attorney-client privilege to prevent an accurate determination 
of the merit of his claim," citing Waldrip v. Head, 532 
S.E.2d 380 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. Greenway, 211 S.E.2d 764, 
767 (1975). 
¶47 The postconviction motion was utterly sweeping in its 
criticism of Attorney Thompson's representation of Derek C. at 
trial.  It was foreseeable that responding, even in a limited 
way, to each of the many allegations of misconduct would 
necessitate significant disclosures. 
¶48 Attorney 
Thompson 
was 
required 
to 
limit 
his 
confidential disclosures as reasonably necessary to respond to 
his former client's allegations.  He was not, however, required 
to "fall on his sword" to enable his former client to obtain a 
new trial.  See, e.g., Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, ¶72, 
                                                 
10 We 
take 
judicial 
notice 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
disposition of the postconviction motion.  State v. Copeland, 
No. 2006CF98, Order Denying PostConviction Motions (Clark County 
Cir. Ct., Jan. 7, 2013), Jon M. Counsell, presiding. 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
21 
 
253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 N.W.2d 809 (rejecting the notion that an 
attorney facing a former client's allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel remains under a duty to "vigorously 
represent" the former client).  Rather, the attorney's duty is 
to testify truthfully regarding his or her representation of the 
former client, so that the postconviction court can properly 
evaluate the defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. 
¶49 Finally, we are mindful that Attorney Thompson did 
request and receive the circuit court's permission to address 
"certain motions and assertions that Attorney Leeper has been 
making" and "to respond to these and other issues by the close 
of business on Monday, September 29th." 
¶50 We caution lawyers that a former client's pursuit of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim "does not give the 
lawyer carte blanche to disclose all information contained in a 
former client's file."  See 2011 Formal Op. 16, North Carolina 
State Bar Ethics Opinion (January 27, 2012).  Typically, the 
better practice is to wait for a subpoena and the Machner 
hearing before disclosing confidential client information.  In 
the context of this particular case, we decline to hold that 
Attorney Thompson's letter of September 29, 2008 violated 
SCR 20:1.6(a). 
¶51 The OLR also alleged, and the referee concluded, that 
Attorney Thompson violated SCR 20:1.9(c), entitled "Duties to 
former clients."  The rule provides, as relevant here: 
No. 
2011AP2458-D   
 
22 
 
 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:  
 
(1)  use 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client, or when the information has 
become generally known; or 
 
(2)  reveal 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation except as these rules would permit or 
require with respect to a client. 
(Emphasis added).  Here, the conclusion that Attorney Thompson 
violated SCR 20:1.9 was predicated on a violation of SCR 20:1.6.  
As we have concluded that SCR 20:1.6 did not prohibit the 
disclosure at issue, we likewise conclude that Attorney Thompson 
did not violate SCR 20:1.9. 
¶52 IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed.  No 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2458-D.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I disagree with 
a majority of this court when it opines that the facts here do 
not constitute a violation of the confidentiality rule.   
¶54 A 
fundamental 
principle 
in 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed 
consent or a specific exception, the attorney must not reveal 
information relating to the representation.  This principle is 
essential to the trust that is the hallmark of the attorney-
client relationship.  
¶55 Supreme court rule 20:1.6, the confidentiality rule,   
embodies this fundamental principle.  It promotes competent and 
effective representation by encouraging clients to speak frankly 
with 
their 
attorneys 
while 
protecting 
clients 
from 
the 
disclosure of embarrassing and potentially legally damaging 
information.  It provides in relevant part: 
(a)  A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, . . . except . . . . 
(c)  A lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: . . . . 
(4) . . . to respond to allegations in any proceeding 
concerning 
the 
lawyer's 
representation 
of 
the 
client . . . . 
¶56 Here there is no dispute that the client did not give 
consent.  The issue then becomes whether the attorney's 
disclosure of information falls within the relevant exception in 
sub. (4).  I conclude it does not.  Because the September 29, 
No.  2011AP2458-D.awb 
 
2 
 
2008 letter falls outside of this recognized exception, I 
conclude that there was a violation of SCR 20:1.6.   
¶57 The essence of the majority's analysis is that the  
disclosures were permitted here because the rule does not 
expressly 
limit 
permissible 
disclosures 
of 
attorney-client 
communications to only judicially supervised settings.  ("Our 
rule does not limit permissible disclosures to judicially 
supervised settings . . . ."  Majority op., ¶41; see also ¶51.)  
¶58 Unlike the majority, I think that the only reasonable 
interpretation of sub. (4) is that the disclosure of information 
must be in a court setting, i.e. a judicially supervised 
setting.  Subsection (4) allows for disclosure of information 
"to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of the client."  Under the facts of this 
case, the appropriate proceeding is the Machner hearing, where 
the 
attorney 
responds 
to 
allegations 
of 
ineffective 
representation.1  
¶59 As recognized by the majority, the referee had harsh 
words for Attorney Thompson.  Majority op., ¶40.  The referee 
admonished Thompson for "unfairly maligning Derek C.'s position 
before the Machner hearing was ever called to order."  Id.  Most 
importantly, the referee understood the importance of having the 
communication "filtered through the adversary process, or the 
judiciary's role in limiting the extent of the defendant's 
waiver of the lawyer-client privilege."  Id. 
                                                 
1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. 
App. 1979). 
No.  2011AP2458-D.awb 
 
3 
 
¶60 At a Machner hearing, the disclosure of information is 
subject to a judicial determination of relevance and privilege.  
The judicial proceeding provides a necessary check on the scope 
of the disclosure, assuring that the disclosure of confidential 
information involves only that which is necessary to resolve the 
claim.   
¶61 Even if the majority were correct that disclosure is 
permitted outside of judicially supervised proceedings, it 
appears to me that the breadth of the disclosures in the 
September 29, 2008 letter went beyond the bounds reasonably 
necessary to respond to Thompson's pre-Machner motions.2  
                                                 
2 Findings of Fact 45 of the Referee's Report states: 
The 9/29/08 letter clearly revealed client information 
to the court, and much of it was in the nature of 
confidential information.  There was a thorough 
discussion of Mr. Thompson's early communications with 
the client with reference to the defendant's father 
who "suspected that the children and the victim's 
family were engaged in sexual abuse."  Mr. Thompson 
related an early discussion with the client about 
alibi defenses but informed the court that the 
defendant had never provided alibi information until 
the end of the June hearing.  There is reference to 
Mr. Thompson's March letter to the defendant, a 
confidential letter regarding plea discussions which 
was certainly not a part of the court file.  In 
addressing the defendant's lack of communication and 
cooperation, Mr. Thompson described his demeanor as 
"calm, deliberate, articulate, glib, impenetrable and 
cocky."  Mr. Thompson disclosed his conversations with 
potential alibi witnesses and noted the deficiencies 
in their recollections. He dismissed the experts 
retained 
by 
appellate 
counsel, 
questioning 
the 
integrity of their conclusions and suggesting that his 
own opinions on truthfulness should be admissible.  
Mr. Thompson detailed his response to the Director of 
the State Public Defender, claiming that appellate 
counsel was developing a "new" case and telling her 
No.  2011AP2458-D.awb 
 
4 
 
¶62 The majority states that "[t]he fact that Attorney 
Thompson sought and obtained leave of the court to respond to 
the motions is critical to our ruling in this case."  Majority 
op., ¶33.  However, permission to respond to a motion is not 
permission to go beyond the limits of the confidentiality rule 
embodied in SCR 20:1.6, nor to violate the principles of 
attorney-client privilege.    
¶63 The referee in this case agreed with the assertion of 
the OLR that the disclosures in the letter were not objectively 
reasonable.   The OLR summarized the contents of the September 
29, 2008 letter as follows: 
Challenging 
a 
client's 
alibi, 
discussing 
conversation[s] with his client's family members, 
commenting on his client's demeanor and integrity, 
dismissing the testimony of potentially favorable 
defense witnesses, etc. directly impugned the client 
and improperly revealed critical information related 
to the representation.  It is difficult to construct a 
more devastating attack by an attorney on his own 
client.   
Majority op., ¶39.    
¶64 In arriving at the conclusion that the disclosures in 
the letter were not objectively reasonable, the referee made 
detailed findings of fact regarding the contents of the letter.  
See ¶61 n.2 supra.  There is nothing to indicate that those 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
                                                                                                                                                             
about the "exploding alibi" in this case.  He stated 
that another witness, [] had perjured herself in an 
affidavit submitted by Mr. Leeper in support of the 
Motion for New Trial. 
No.  2011AP2458-D.awb 
 
5 
 
¶65 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.     
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2458-D.awb 
 
 
 
1