Case Title: Mari v. Rawlins Nat. Bank of Rawlins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mari v. Rawlins Nat. Bank of Rawlins1990 WY 60794 P.2d 85Case Number: 89-192Decided: 06/04/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH A. MARI, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE RAWLINS NATIONAL BANK 
OF RAWLINS, WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

C.M. Aron and 
Patricia Simpson of Aron & Hennig, Laramie, for 
appellant.

Wade E. Waldrip 
of Williams, Kelly & Waldrip, Rawlins; David D. Uchner and Carole Shotwell, 
Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      Judicial 
restraint requires this court to address the question of whether the issues 
asserted in this appeal have become moot to the end that any resolution of those 
argued issues would constitute an advisory opinion only. In his appeal, Joseph 
A. Mari (Mari) asserts error in the granting of summary judgment with respect to 
several claims that he set forth in an amended counterclaim in an action to 
recover a judgment on a promissory note and to foreclose the mortgage securing 
the note. After the pleadings of the parties were filed and the summary judgment 
had been entered on the amended counterclaim, Mari's interest in the property, 
which was the subject of the foreclosure action, was transferred to his wife by 
virtue of a divorce decree in the state of Colorado. We are satisfied that the 
transfer of Mari's interest in the property mooted his contentions of wrongful 
foreclosure that serve as the foundation for the several claims asserted in his 
amended counterclaim. Because the issues now are moot, we dismiss this appeal 
without resolving the asserted questions of law presented by the parties. The 
effect of our dismissal of this appeal is that the trial court's dismissal of 
the action, which caused its order granting the summary judgment to become 
final, must stand.

[¶2]      In presenting his 
appeal, Mari urged the following issues in his brief:

"1. Is a promissory note 
ambiguous where the amount payable is stated as two different amounts, in three 
places, to wit:

"(a) The debtor owes 120 
payments of $288.00 each, which totals $34,560.00; and,

"(b) The total payments 
due under the note are $34,560.00; and,

"(c) The debtor owes 
$25,000.00 plus 9 3/4% interest for 10 years, `when the entire unpaid balance 
shall become due and payable,' such that the stated interest rate would not 
amortize the debt without a balloon payment at the end of the $34,560.00 in 
scheduled payments, yet the note makes no mention of such a balloon 
payment?

"2. In a dispute over 
payment of a promissory note, is the amount due and owing a material fact under 
Rule 56, W.R.C.P.?"

Responding as 
appellee, the Rawlins National Bank (Bank), rephrased Mari's contentions in this 
way:

"A. Is the following 
language contained in a promissory note on a commercial loan 
ambiguous?

"Principal and interest 
payable in equal monthly installments of $288.00 each, to be applied first to 
interest and the balance to principal, commencing September 10, 1975, and 
continuing on the same day of each succeeding month thereafter until August 10, 
1985, when the entire unpaid balance shall become due and payable.

"B. Did the district 
court properly grant summary judgment in this case?"

[¶3]      The events that 
culminated in this case began on August 27, 1975. On that day, Mari, a resident 
of Colorado, obtained a commercial loan from the bank to finance the purchase of 
certain Wyoming real property to be owned jointly by Mari and his wife. Mari 
executed a promissory note in the amount of $25,000 with interest accruing at 
the rate of 9 3/4% per year. This note was secured by a mortgage on the property 
which was executed by both Mari and Mrs. Mari even though she was not a party to 
the loan.

[¶4]      The issues Mari 
endeavors to present evolve out of the terms relating to the note, which was 
drafted by the bank, as they appear on the face of the note:

"Borrower agrees to pay 
this note as follows: Principal and interest payable in equal monthly 
installments of $288.00 each, to be applied first to interest and the balance to 
principal, commencing September 10, 1975 and continuing on the same day of each 
succeeding month thereafter until August 10, 1985, when the entire unpaid 
balance shall become due and payable."

Identical 
language is included in the mortgage documents.

[¶5]      The note contains 
the following summary of the transaction, but this information is not included 
in the mortgage:

"1. Proceeds                         
            
$25,000.00 

2. Other Charges, 
Itemized 

Atty. Fee - Prep. Mtg. 
          
25.00 

Recording Costs                   
9.00 

3. Amount Financed (1 
& 2)             
25,000.00 

4. Finance Charge                            
9,500.00 

5. Total of Payments 
                        
$ 34,560.00"

The fourth item 
manifests a substantially reduced finance charge over that which would be 
correct if computed at the annual rate of 9 3/4%. In fact, the $9,560 more 
closely approximates interest that would be payable at 6 3/4%.

[¶6]      Mari, as he 
affirmed through the argument of his counsel, concedes that the discrepancy is 
an error, but his contentions are that the summary of the transaction serves the 
function of a disclosure and should control and, further, that the party 
responsible for the error, the bank, should bear the brunt of its own mistake. 
He insists that the bank should be willing to accept the total of payments as 
they are so stated to pay the balance of the note in full. He insists that any 
other resolution amounts to fraud. The bank's position is that it was never 
intended that the scheduled payments should pay the note in full. Instead, the 
bank argues that the language included on the note and the mortgage, "when the 
entire unpaid balance shall become due and payable," controls this situation and 
that the clear implication of this language is that the parties agreed to a 
balloon payment on August 10, 1985 to pay the remaining balance due after 
application of the regularly scheduled payments by Mari. The bank, any error in 
the summary notwithstanding, also claims that the balance that is due includes 
the finance charge computed at the agreed rate of 9 3/4%.

[¶7]      Mari made the 
installment payments described in the note, but he refused to make any 
additional balloon payment. The bank, considering the refusal to amount to a 
default in payment of the amounts due under the note, decided to initiate an 
action against Mari to recover the balance due on the note and to foreclose the 
mortgage on the property. The bank's complaint was filed on February 21, 1986. 
It demanded payment of the alleged balloon payment on the note plus additional 
interest and the costs of its action, or, in the alternative, it requested 
foreclosure of the mortgage given as security for the note. Mari answered and 
filed a counterclaim. On January 22, 1988, with appropriate leave of court, he 
filed an amended counterclaim in which he asserted, in addition to the defense 
of payment, various tort and breach of contract claims. On July 13, 1988, the 
district court awarded a summary judgment to the bank with respect to Mari's 
counterclaim, ruling that there were no genuine issues of fact in regard to any 
of the claims asserted and that the bank was "entitled to proceed with its 
action herein for judgment on the note and foreclosure." Because the summary 
judgment order did not contain the requisite language to constitute it a final 
order pursuant to Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P., that summary judgment was not 
appealable.

[¶8]      Not long after 
the entry of the summary judgment, the critical event with respect to the 
disposition of this case occurred. Mrs. Mari sought, and was granted, a divorce 
in Colorado. The Colorado court divided the Mari's property, and Mari was 
ordered to convey his interest in the mortgaged Wyoming property that is the 
subject of this action to his ex-wife. He refused to do so, and the Colorado 
court then, by order, directed the clerk of court to execute a surrogate deed on 
behalf of Mari to Mrs. Mari. That deed has been recorded in Carbon County, 
Wyoming, and Mrs. Mari is the owner of record of the subject 
property.

[¶9]      Mari sought to 
avoid that conveyance by filing an action in Wyoming naming the Colorado clerk 
of court, a Colorado resident, as a defendant and contesting the propriety of 
the clerk's action in executing the surrogate deed. That case was dismissed 
because there was no personal jurisdiction over the Colorado clerk of court. 
Mari v. Green, 767 P.2d 600 (Wyo. 1989). So far as this record discloses, Mari 
has taken no other action to contest the title of his ex-wife to the subject 
property.

[¶10]   After the property was awarded in 
the divorce, and the title was conveyed to her, Mrs. Mari settled the action 
with the bank by reaching a compromise with respect to the amount still due and 
owing under the promissory note, and the bank agreed to dismiss its foreclosure 
action. The district court ruled that no claims remained before it to be 
resolved, and it entered an order dismissing the action. Mari then filed his 
notice of appeal. As we have indicated, he contends that the discrepancies 
between the two sections of the promissory note that are quoted above establish 
an ambiguity that is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to the intent of the parties and that the genuine issue of material fact 
makes the summary judgment entered by the district court erroneous.

[¶11]   We introduce the subject of 
mootness by recalling that a litigant must be the real party in interest to have 
standing to institute an action against another party. Rule 17(a), W.R.C.P.1 See Wyoming Wool Marketing 
Association v. Urruty, 394 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1964); Larsen v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447, 
226 P.2d 177 (1951); Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 202, 97 P.2d 667 (1940). 
The converse of that proposition is that the suit that is filed or defended by a 
party who is not the real party in interest must be dismissed. Spriggs v. 
Pioneer Carissa Gold Mines, Inc., 378 P.2d 238 (Wyo. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 855, 84 S. Ct. 117, 11 L. Ed. 2d 82; reh. denied 375 U.S. 936, 84 S. Ct. 334, 
11 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1963). This requirement benefits the courts and the defendant in 
a civil action. It eliminates unnecessary actions and assures the defendant that 
only those actions brought by the party entitled to assert them will be 
prosecuted, thus protecting the defendant from the vexation of a multiplicity of 
actions, with the possible burden of multiple recoveries, all emanating from the 
same cause. See Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 531 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1975); 
Larsen.

[¶12]   The requirement of a real party in 
interest is jurisdictional and, as such, it can be raised at any time and by any 
entity, including the court on its own motion. It would be entirely appropriate 
for this court to raise that question in an appeal. Greenough; Urruty; Gardner 
v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1962).

[¶13]   The real party in interest has been 
described as "`one who has an actual and substantial interest in the subject 
matter, as distinguished from one who has only a nominal interest, having 
reference not merely to the name in which the action was brought, but to the 
facts as they appear of record.'" Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 97 P.2d  at 669. See 
also Greenough. Furthermore, that party "`must be the present owner of the right 
sought to be enforced'" and must be the "`party who would be benefited or 
injured by the judgment or the "party entitled to the avails of the suit."'" 
Weber, 97 P.2d  at 669. See also Greenough. "`"Interest", within the meaning of 
this rule, means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by 
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or 
mere incidental interest.'" Weber, 97 P.2d  at 669.

[¶14]   The facts demonstrated by the 
record in this case would justify the conclusion that had Mrs. Mari received the 
property by virtue of the conveyance from the clerk of court in Colorado prior 
to Mari's answer and his amended counterclaim, Mari would not have been the real 
party in interest. He qualified, under the rule, as a real party in interest at 
the time the suit was commenced, and his standing to continue as a party in the 
action is protected by Rule 25(c), W.R.C.P. Erb v. Erb, 573 P.2d 849 (Wyo. 
1978). As of this time, however, Mrs. Mari is the record, and actual, owner of 
the property that had been mortgaged to the bank. She has reached a settlement 
with the bank with respect to the amount allegedly owed on the promissory note, 
and the foreclosure action has been dismissed. We recognize that, at oral 
argument, counsel asserted that the real estate records in Carbon County with 
respect to ownership of the property are in error because the county clerk had 
no authority to enter a deed signed only by an agent of the court in Colorado. 
The provisions of Rule 70, W.R.C.P., make that position highly suspect but, in 
any event, this case offers no avenue for resolving title to the property. For 
our purposes, title is vested in Mrs. Mari. Her ownership of the property now 
makes Mrs. Mari "`the present owner of the right sought to be enforced'" and the 
"`party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment'" or the "`"party 
entitled to the avails of the suit,"'" Weber, 97 P.2d  at 669, in any action 
involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on the property.

[¶15]   That ownership now serves to invoke 
the doctrine of mootness. This court, many times, has said that "a reviewing 
court will dismiss a case when, pending appeal, an event occurs which renders a 
cause moot and makes a determination of the issues unnecessary." Gulf Oil 
Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 693 P.2d 227, 233 
(Wyo. 1985), citing Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming, 620 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1980); Schwartz, State ex rel. v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 
350, 157 P.2d 993 (1945). The mootness doctrine has been applied by this court 
in a good number of cases. Foster v. Wicklund, 778 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989); Graham 
v. Wyoming Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission, 737 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 
1987); In Interest of AJ, 736 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1987); Walker v. Board of County 
Commissioners, Albany County, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1982); Northern Utilities, Inc. 
v. Public Serv. Commission, 617 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1980); Cheever v. Warren, 70 
Wyo. 296, 249 P.2d 163 (1952). A corollary of that proposition is that 
"[a]ppellate courts will not hand down decisions which cannot be given effect or 
which pertain to matters that may arise in the future." Gulf, 693 P.2d  at 233; 
Northern Utilities, 617 P.2d 1079; Belondon v. State ex rel. Leimback, 379 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1963).

[¶16]   The doctrine of mootness serves 
interests that are substantially the same as those that are protected by the 
real party in interest rule. Rule 17(a), W.R.C.P. It protects the courts by 
serving as a basis to terminate unnecessary actions, while at the same time 
advancing the interests of our rule that the court does not render advisory 
opinions. Foster; Oukrop v. Wyoming Board of Dental Examiners, 767 P.2d 1390 
(Wyo. 1989); Gulf; Northern Utilities, 620 P.2d 139; Miller v. Wallace, 430 P.2d 335 (Wyo. 1967); House v. Wyoming Highway Department, 66 Wyo. 1, 203 P.2d 962 
(1949); Welch v. Town of Afton, 64 Wyo. 49, 184 P.2d 593 (1947). It also serves 
to protect parties from the burdens of defending against actions in which no 
judgment can be given effect, and the only product of which is the academic 
resolution of a question of law. We decline to do that in this 
instance.

[¶17]   The temptation is significant to 
dispose of this case on the merits. There seems no reason to conclude that the 
district court did not correctly dispose of those claims asserted in Mari's 
amended counterclaim. When treated together, the documents seem rather clear and 
forthright and support the proposition that the bank was entitled to the 
payments that Mari had made and also to a balloon payment, thus repaying the 
bank according to the terms of the instruments. We resist that temptation, 
however, and adhere to the conservative rules of jurisprudence served by the 
mootness doctrine. Mari's claims against the bank all depend upon a conclusion 
that the bank, erroneously and contrary to law, proceeded with an action to 
foreclose the mortgage and to collect the balance due on its note. The bank has 
dismissed its foreclosure action, and it did that because of a settlement of its 
claims on the note entered into by Mrs. Mari, the record owner of the property 
in question. Under the circumstances, there is no way that Mari's claims against 
the bank could be prosecuted any further, which is tantamount to saying that 
there is no way a judgment on those claims could be given effect. We are 
satisfied that the issues presented in this appeal have become moot, and the 
appeal, for that reason, must be dismissed with costs to the 
appellee.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 17(a), W.R.C.P., 
provides as follows:

"(a) Real party in 
interest. - Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express 
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the 
benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name 
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought; * * 
*. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; * * *."