Case Title: Commonwealth v. Kostka

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11766

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11766 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTOPHER KOSTKA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 3, 2015. - June 17, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Contempt.  Practice, Criminal, Contempt.  Constitutional Law, 
Search and seizure.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid  Search and 
Seizure, Buccal swab, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  
Evidence, Buccal swab, Relevancy and materiality, Third-
party culprit. 
 
 
 
 
Adjudication of contempt in the Superior Court Department 
by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., on April 9, 2013. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
John H. Cunha, Jr. (Charles Allan Hope with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Ursula A. 
Knight, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
William Trach, Laura Carey, P.R. Goldstone, & Chauncey B. 
Wood, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The Commonwealth seeks to compel Christopher 
 
 
2 
Kostka1 to provide a saliva sample from which it may obtain 
Christopher's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).  The Commonwealth 
filed a motion in the Superior Court to compel the taking of a 
saliva sample, arguing that a DNA sample is necessary in order 
to determine whether Christopher is the identical or fraternal 
twin of his brother, Timothy Kostka, who has been indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree and armed home invasion.2  
Christopher is not a suspect in that case.  A judge of the 
Superior Court allowed the Commonwealth's motion and ordered 
Christopher to provide a buccal swab;3 Christopher refused to 
comply, and a judgment of contempt was entered against him.  
After the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, Commonwealth v. 
Kostka, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 72-73 (2014), we granted 
Christopher's application for further appellate review.   We 
conclude that the Commonwealth has not made the requisite 
showing, see Commonwealth v. Draheim, 447 Mass. 113 (2006), to 
support the compelled production of a DNA sample from an 
                     
1 Because the brothers in this case share a last name, we 
refer to them by their first names. 
 
2 According to the Superior Court docket sheet, the case 
against Timothy Kostka has been continued by agreement until 
September 14, 2015. 
 
3 "A buccal swab . . . test involves the rubbing of a swab 
on the interior surface of the cheek to obtain cells that are 
then evaluated . . . for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis."  
Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78, 79 n.4, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
825 (2000). 
 
 
 
3 
uncharged third party in a criminal proceeding and, accordingly, 
that the judgment of contempt must be reversed.4 
Background.  In support of its motion, the Commonwealth 
submitted affidavits from Boston police criminalist Joseph Ross5 
and Boston police Detective Philip J. Bliss.  We summarize the 
factual assertions contained in those affidavits, which the 
Commonwealth intends to establish at trial.  On April 16, 2012, 
at approximately 10 A.M., the victim, Barbara Coyne, was found 
in her bedroom, bleeding profusely.  She was transported by 
ambulance to a hospital, where she died at 10:37 A.M.  The 
medical examiner determined the cause of death to be homicide by 
"sharp force object," that is, by stabbing; the victim suffered 
multiple wounds, some of which appeared to be defensive.  
Evidence collected from under the victim's fingernails was 
tested and found to be consistent with a mixture of DNA from two 
or more individuals, including that of the victim.  At the time 
the Commonwealth filed its motion, no other potential 
contributors to the DNA under the victim's fingernails had been 
                     
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
5 Joseph Ross did not conduct any of the testing in this 
case, and submitted his affidavit based on a review of the 
Boston police crime laboratory file. 
 
 
 
4 
identified by scientific testing.6 
Police investigation revealed evidence linking Timothy to 
the crime.  A police expert determined that a bloody fingerprint 
on an item in the victim's living room, and two fingerprints 
recovered from items in the victim's bedroom, matched Timothy's 
fingerprints.  Videotape retrieved from a nearby store showed an 
individual who looked like Timothy engaged in a transaction near 
the lottery machine at approximately 10:03 A.M.  According to 
the State Lottery Commission, winning tickets cashed at that 
store at that time were consistent in game and book number with 
lottery tickets that had been found in the victim's living room.  
In addition, when Timothy was booked in connection with a 
separate matter, he had scratches on his body.  Bliss stated in 
his affidavit that the scratches were "consistent with contact 
from another" and "could provide a source of DNA such as the 
biological matter collected at autopsy from the swab of [the 
victim's] right hand fingernail." 
The investigation also revealed that Timothy and his 
brother Christopher are twins.  A DNA profile is unique to each 
                     
6 According to a supplemental affidavit of the Boston police 
criminalist, which was filed in the Superior Court after a 
single justice of the Appeals Court had issued an order for a 
stay pending appeal from the judgment of contempt, and which the 
motion judge allowed to be made part of the record on appeal 
over Christopher's objection, further testing later revealed 
that Timothy "is partially included and unable to be excluded as 
a possible contributor to the mixture," but that "[a] complete 
DNA profile consistent with Timothy . . . was not detected." 
 
 
5 
individual, except for identical twins, who share the same DNA 
profile.  See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 448 n.6 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 218 n.1 (1991).  
According to both Bliss and Ross, Christopher and Timothy are 
believed to be fraternal, not identical, twins.  Christopher 
testified before the grand jury that he and Timothy are 
fraternal twins.  The Commonwealth also indicated at the hearing 
on its motion to compel that Timothy and Christopher do not look 
alike, and are not of the same height and weight.  Nonetheless, 
at that hearing, the Commonwealth argued that the only way to 
determine definitively whether Christopher and Timothy are 
identical or fraternal twins is by testing Christopher's DNA; if 
the DNA profiles differ, it can be inferred that they are not 
identical twins.  The judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion, 
concluding that the DNA sample was relevant to establishing 
whether the DNA obtained from under the victim's fingernails 
matched Christopher's, and that "[w]ithout such evidence, a fact 
finder at trial may have lingering doubts as to the true 
biological relationship between the twin brothers here and the 
origins of any DNA evidence recovered at the crime scene.  Thus, 
a sample of Christopher['s] DNA will probably provide evidence 
relevant to the question of Timothy['s] guilt." 
As stated, Christopher refused to comply with the order to 
compel and was found in contempt.  See Lenardis v. Commonwealth, 
 
 
6 
452 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Caceres, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. 747, 747-748 (2005) ("A nonparty directed to 
provide evidence . . . can challenge the propriety of the order 
by refusing to comply with it and appealing from any order of 
contempt that results"). 
Discussion.  "A government-compelled buccal swab implicates 
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures."  
Commonwealth v. Draheim, 447 Mass. 113, 117 (2006), citing 
Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 441 Mass. 773, 777 (2004).  While a 
buccal swab, which does not involve penetrating the skin, 
arguably is less intrusive than a blood sample, see Commonwealth 
v. Maxwell, supra at 777 & n.9, "the obtaining of physical 
evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment 
violation at two different levels -- the 'seizure' of the 
'person' necessary to bring him into contact with government 
agents . . . and the subsequent search for and seizure of the 
evidence" (citation omitted).  United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U.S. 1, 8 (1973). 
Where the Commonwealth seeks to obtain a buccal swab from a 
third party who is not suspected of any crime, it bears the 
burden of establishing probable cause that a crime has been 
 
 
7 
committed,7 and showing "that the sample will probably provide 
evidence relevant to the question of the defendant's guilt."  
Commonwealth v. Draheim, supra at 119, citing State v. Register, 
308 S.C. 534, 538 (1992).  Relevance alone, however, meaning 
simply that the evidence "render[s] the desired inference more 
probable than it would be without the evidence," Green v. 
Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 59 (1975), is not enough.  "Additional 
factors concerning the seriousness of the crime, the importance 
of the evidence, and the unavailability of less intrusive means 
of obtaining it are germane."  Commonwealth v. Draheim, supra, 
citing Matter of Lavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 836 (1994).  A judge 
must weigh these factors against the third party's 
constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion.  See id.  
See also State v. Register, supra ("only if this stringent 
standard is met" may intrusion be sustained). 
The Commonwealth maintains that the judge was correct in 
concluding that it has met its burden of establishing that a 
sample of Christopher's DNA probably would produce evidence 
relevant to Timothy's guilt.  The Commonwealth notes that each 
person's DNA profile is unique, except in the case of identical 
twins, see Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 218 n.1 
                     
7 The indictments against Timothy satisfy the first element 
of the Commonwealth's burden.  See Commonwealth v. Draheim, 447 
Mass. 113, 119 (2006) ("Commonwealth's burden to show probable 
cause that a crime has been committed is easily met because the 
defendant has been indicted"). 
 
 
8 
(1991), and if, as expected, it is established that Christopher 
is not an identical twin, a line of possible cross-examination 
at Timothy's trial would be eliminated, and a potential 
third-party culprit defense would be refuted.  Such a result 
also could support the Commonwealth's case-in-chief; assuming 
the DNA found at the scene is determined to match Timothy's DNA 
profile, the Commonwealth's expert would be able to testify that 
it does so uniquely, as no other person will have the same DNA 
profile. 
We do not agree with the judge's conclusion that the 
Commonwealth made an adequate showing.  Its arguments for the 
relevance of Christopher's DNA depend on Timothy being 
identified as a contributor to the DNA found under the victim's 
fingernails.  As noted, when the Commonwealth filed its motion, 
only the victim's DNA had been so identified, and laboratory 
testing had not yet identified Timothy as even a potential 
contributor.  Without evidence that Timothy's DNA was found at 
the crime scene, Christopher's DNA would serve no purpose.  Even 
considering the information set forth in the Commonwealth's 
supplemental affidavit, see note 6, supra, we are not persuaded 
that the Commonwealth has met its burden.8 
                     
8 Christopher argues that it was error to expand the record 
on appeal to include a supplemental affidavit that was not 
before the judge at the time of his decision.  Because of our 
disposition of the case, we do not reach this issue. 
 
 
9 
The supplemental affidavit states, without detail, that 
Timothy is partially included, and is unable to be excluded, as 
a contributor to the DNA found under the victim's fingernails.  
The affidavit does not state conclusively that the profile of 
this DNA matches Timothy's DNA profile.  It also does not 
indicate either the extent to which the DNA does match 
Timothy's, or the likelihood that other people are "partially 
included and unable to be excluded" in the same manner as 
Timothy.  See Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 402 n.2 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 789 
(2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011) ("where '[t]he 
human genome sequence is almost exactly the same [99.9 per cent] 
in all people,' a match of the defendant's DNA profile with the 
DNA found at a crime scene 'says almost nothing about the 
likelihood that the defendant was present at the crime scene 
unless the jury learn from an expert' the mathematical 
probability that another person has this same DNA profile"); 
Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 855 (2010) (holding that 
evidence that certain person could not be excluded as potential 
contributor of DNA should not be admitted without accompanying 
statistical evidence of likelihood that test could not exclude 
other individuals in given population, and concluding that 
introduction of "nonexclusion" DNA evidence without statistical 
explanation of its meaning was prejudicial error).  Indeed, it 
 
 
10 
would appear that any of Timothy's genetic relatives, including 
Christopher (even if he is Timothy's fraternal twin), might be 
so described, as they would share a portion of their DNA with 
Timothy.9  On this record, even certain knowledge that 
Christopher and Timothy are fraternal twins would neither 
establish that only Timothy could be the other contributor to 
the crime scene DNA nor forestall a third-party culprit defense. 
More importantly, Christopher's DNA does not bear on 
Timothy's guilt in the direct and substantial manner as that in 
our prior cases.  The defendant in Commonwealth v. Draheim, 447 
Mass. 113, 116 (2006), for instance, was a woman who allegedly 
raped two teenage boys; following the alleged rape of each 
youth, she gave birth to a daughter.  The Commonwealth sought to 
obtain DNA samples from both daughters in order to determine 
whether the teenagers were their biological fathers.  In that 
case, if paternity were established, the daughters' DNA clearly 
would have provided strong evidence that the defendant had raped 
the complainants.  In Jansen, petitioner, 444 Mass. 112, 114 
(2005), a defendant accused of aggravated rape sought a DNA 
sample from a third party in order to determine whether the 
third party's DNA was present on an object involved in the 
                     
9 The judge noted that genetic siblings share approximately 
fifty per cent of each other's DNA. 
 
 
 
11 
crime.10  If it were, the defendant would have been able to 
present a third-party culprit defense.  See id. at 119 ("the 
exculpatory value of this factual showing cannot be minimized or 
deemed inconsequential").  By contrast, here, the "importance of 
the evidence," Commonwealth v. Draheim, supra at 119, that is, 
the relevance of Christopher's DNA to Timothy's guilt, is 
attenuated.  The absence of DNA that matched Christopher's would 
not be offered directly to prove Timothy's guilt, but would 
serve only to bolster other evidence pointing to Timothy.  Cf. 
United States v. Noble, 433 F. Supp. 2d 129, 130, 137 (D. Me. 
2006) (denying motion to compel fingerprinting and DNA sampling 
of nonsuspect witnesses, which was sought to "bolster[] their 
credibility as witnesses" in prosecution of acquaintance). 
Nor does it appear that the absence of Christopher's DNA 
would have any significant impact on the Commonwealth's ability 
to present its case.  The Commonwealth has evidence that 
fingerprints found at the scene belong to Timothy; an expert 
could testify that fingerprints are unique even for identical 
twins.  See Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 182 (2014) 
(noting expert testimony that fingerprints of twins "will not 
have the same minutia points").  The Commonwealth also has a 
                     
10 The defendant had some factual basis to believe that the 
third party's DNA was on the object due to the actions of a 
private investigator.  Jansen, petitioner, 444 Mass. 112, 
114-115 (2005). 
 
 
12 
videotape from a store security camera from which, it maintains, 
a jury could conclude that, shortly after the stabbing, Timothy 
cashed in lottery tickets taken from the victim's home.  The 
Commonwealth stated during argument before us that Christopher 
likely will be called as a trial witness.  Christopher could 
testify at trial, as he did before the grand jury, that he and 
his brother are fraternal twins, as well as to any other 
relevant facts within his personal knowledge.  In addition, the 
jury could consider his appearance to decide whether Christopher 
appears identical to Timothy, and also whether there is any 
likelihood that Christopher is the person depicted in the 
security videotape.  By all these means, the Commonwealth is 
capable of meeting its burden of proof, without intruding on the 
constitutional rights of a third party who is not suspected of 
having committed, or of aiding in the commission of, the crime. 
We note also that the Commonwealth's asserted need for 
Christopher's DNA rests in part on speculation that Timothy will 
present a third-party culprit defense, or at least will use the 
fact that he has a twin to suggest doubt as to the source of the 
DNA found under the victim's fingernails.  At this stage, such a 
possibility is mere speculation.  If Timothy were to offer a 
third-party culprit defense based on the brothers' twinship, or 
use that twinship to suggest reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth 
could seek, through a motion in limine, to prevent the issue of 
 
 
13 
twinship from being introduced at trial.11  If Timothy were to 
oppose such a motion, the calculus would be different, and at 
that point, the Commonwealth well might have probable cause to 
support a motion to compel the taking of a buccal swab from 
Christopher.  As stated, to date there is no indication that 
Timothy has any intention of offering such a defense. 
In sum, and having weighed the seriousness of the charges 
against Timothy, as well as the minimally intrusive nature of a 
buccal swab, we conclude that Christopher's DNA has not been 
shown to be sufficiently relevant or important to the question 
of Timothy's guilt or innocence so as to outweigh Christopher's 
constitutional rights. 
Judgment reversed. 
                     
11 To be admissible at trial, third-party culprit evidence 
"must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense 
raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or speculative."  
Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 275 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009).