Case Title: LLOYD L. COHEE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-57

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
LLOYD L. COHEE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 50110 P.3d 267Case Number:  04-57Decided: 04/15/2005
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
LLOYD L. 
COHEE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Richard R. Jamieson of Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James 
Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J. 
Ret.

 
 
 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      An 
eighty-three-year-old man was sentenced to the penitentiary for aggravated 
vehicular homicide and he appeals, alleging abuse of discretion in the district 
court's rejection of a plea agreement, in its refusal to consider probation, and 
in its sentencing him to prison.  We 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The appellant 
raises the following issues:

 
 
            
1.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by rejecting the parties' 
plea agreement?

 
 
            
2.         
Did the district court violate the appellant's right to due process of 
law by not allowing enough time to hear his motion to 
reconsider?

 
 
            
3.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to consider 
probation?

 
 
            
4.         
Did the district court violate the appellant's rights under Article 1, § 
15 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
            
5.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing the appellant 
to prison?

 
 
[¶3]      The State adds 
the following issue for our consideration:

 
 
            
6.         
Did the appellant's guilty plea waive the issues that involve matters 
preceding entry of that plea?

 
 

 
 
[¶4]                              
We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
            
"Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo.1997).  A 
sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the 
defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.'  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo.1997).  An error warrants 
reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.  The party who is appealing 
bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial.'  Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted); see also, Robinson v. Hamblin, 
914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo.1966)."

 
 

Lee v. 
State, 2001 WY 
129, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 13 (Wyo.2000)).  In imposing 
sentence, trial courts have broad discretion to consider a wide range of factors 
about the defendant and the crime.  
Halbleib v. State, 7 P.3d 45, 47 (Wyo.), cert. denied 531 U.S. 968, 121 S. Ct. 404, 148 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2000) (quoting Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 
371 (Wyo.1989)); Mehring [v. State, 860 P.2d 1101,] 1115 
[Wyo.1993)].

 
 

Bitz v. 
State, 2003 WY 
140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  "The abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review reaches the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's 
choice."  Martinez v. 
State, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 394, 396 (Wyo. 2002).  It is an abuse of discretion for a 
sentencing judge to premise a sentence upon a mistaken reading of the law.  Jones v. State, 2003 WY 154, ¶ 
11, 79 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, 
¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1233, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2002)).  Furthermore, the record should "be 
reasonably clear with respect to the findings of the district court in its 
sentencing decision, in order that meaningful appellate review can be 
achieved."  Id. at ¶ 12, 79 P.3d  at 1025.

 
 

 
 
[¶5]      On December 12, 
2002, while driving intoxicated, the appellant caused a motor vehicle accident 
that killed Kevin Johnson.  The 
appellant was charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003), which offense is a felony punishable 
by not more than twenty years imprisonment.  At the time of the accident, the 
appellant was eighty-two years old.

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered a plea of not guilty at 
his arraignment in district court.  
Subsequently, however, the appellant changed his plea to guilty pursuant 
to a plea agreement containing the following terms:  (1) a guilty plea; (2) a joint 
sentencing recommendation of eight to ten years imprisonment; (3) suspension of 
that sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2003); (4) the length 
of any county jail sentence to be argued by the parties; and (5) supervised 
probation for a period of seven years, with certain conditions:  Intensive Supervision Probation, house 
arrest, electronic monitoring, travel restrictions, alcohol consumption 
restrictions, driving restrictions, and counseling.1  The district court deferred acceptance 
of the plea agreement pending receipt of a presentence investigation 
report.

 
 
[¶7]      At the outset of 
the scheduled sentencing hearing, the district court indicated that it might 
reject the plea agreement because it was too lenient.  The parties defended the agreement as 
being appropriate, given the appellant's age.  Nevertheless, the district court 
rejected the plea agreement, for the following reasons:  (1) the seriousness of aggravated 
vehicular homicide as an offense; (2) the aggravating factors of the specific 
incident, including eyesight problems, excessive alcohol consumption, driving on 
the wrong side of the road, other near accidents, and prior offenses; and (3) 
the wrong message would be sent by a lenient plea agreement.  The appellant responded by withdrawing 
his guilty plea, and the matter was again scheduled for 
trial.

 
 
[¶8]      Following the 
aborted sentencing hearing, the appellant filed a motion seeking reconsideration 
of the decision to reject the plea agreement.  The appellant's attorney advised the 
court that "about a half a day" would be required to hear the motion.  The judge responded as 
follows:

 
 
THE 
COURT: Okay.  I did just take a quick look at 
that.  I don't see it in the file 
here today; I think it's probably being processed.  But I had a couple of 
impressions.

 
 
            
One is I don't know that the question of the Court's accepting or not 
accepting a plea agreement is an evidentiary matter.  My understanding under the rule is that 
the parties can propose a plea agreement and the Court, based upon the record, 
the plea, and the presentence investigation can either accept or reject the plea 
agreement.  And I attempted to do 
that under the rules.  And so that's 
a concern I have I don't know that it's an evidentiary matter subject to a 
burden of proof or a showing as to why a judge should or should not accept a 
proposed plea agreement in a particular case.

 
 
            
The second impression I have is that I'd be glad to take a look at any 
error you think that I may have made, especially procedurally or with respect to 
the exercise of my judicial discretion.  
So I'd be glad to give you a hearing and an opportunity to be heard, but 
I have that threshold concern.

 
 
            
And my thought would be maybe I'd be willing to hear argument.  Like I say, if I have done something 
improperly, I'd sure be glad to reconsider where I landed.  But in cases such as this, I think the 
majority of district judges in the State when taking a plea will not be bound by 
plea agreements and especially in matters that may have sensitivities and 
difficulties such as this case.

 
 
            
And my very strong impression was that I did not like the limitations 
imposed upon me as to the sentencing options in this case, the limited suspended 
sentence that was proposed.  There 
was question in my mind as to whether any restitution would be required.  There was no fine.  I mentioned at the hearing the Court 
cannot order Intensive Supervised Probation based upon feedback I received from 
Probation and Parole.  Those 
limitations alone cause me some significant concern as to the plea 
agreement.

 
 
            
So with those things said, why don't you submit your request for a 
setting, and then I'll take a look at it.  
And I don't know if we can give you half a day.  And like I say, I don't think it's an 
evidentiary matter, but I'd sure want to give you an opportunity to be heard on 
it; okay?  Just submit a request for 
setting with what time you think is necessary.

 
 
[¶9]      Following up on 
the judge's suggestion, the appellant filed a written request for a three-hour 
hearing.  The district court's 
Notice of Setting, however, granted only a fifteen-minute hearing.  At the hearing, the appellant argued 
that, given the opportunity to present evidence in support of the plea 
agreement, he would have produced witnesses, including the probation and parole 
agent who prepared the presentence investigation report and the appellant's 
counselor, both of whom supported the agreement.  The district court once again denied the 
appellant's request, on the ground that W.R.Cr.P. 11 leaves the matter of 
accepting or rejecting a plea agreement to the discretion of the trial court, 
and does not contemplate an evidentiary hearing.  The district court then denied the 
motion for reconsideration.

 
 
[¶10]   Less than two months after the 
motion for reconsideration was heard and denied, the appellant filed a request 
for another change-of-plea hearing.  
On February 4, 2004, he entered a "cold plea" of guilty to the charged 
offense.2  The district court accepted the plea and 
went directly to sentencing, at the request of the parties.  Relying primarily on the presentence 
investigation report and the victim impact statements and letters already 
submitted, the State called only the victim's wife as a witness.  The State then recommended a sentence of 
incarceration for a period of 24 to 120 months.

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant called two 
witnesses:  the probation and parole 
agent who prepared the presentence investigation report and the administrator of 
the assisted living facility where the appellant was residing.  In argument, the appellant addressed 
concerns the district court had made known in rejecting the plea agreement, 
including restitution, a fine, and the Intensive Supervision Program.  The appellant then recommended 
suspension of a five to fifteen year sentence of incarceration, with ten years 
of supervised probation.

 
 
[¶12]   The district court sentenced the 
appellant to the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections for 
incarceration for a period of not less than thirty-six months and not more than 
seventy-two months.  In doing so, 
the district court considered the totality of the circumstances, the specific 
"sentencing criteria" of deterrence and rehabilitation, the message leniency 
would send to the community, sentencing in comparable cases, and the aggravating 
factors the district court had mentioned in rejecting the plea agreement 
(excessive alcohol consumption, driving on the wrong side of the road, other 
near accidents, and a prior conviction for driving under the influence).  The district court rejected probation 
with the following comments:

 
 
And the 
big factor and the one I mentioned when I rejected the plea agreement in this 
case is that basically a suspended sentence and a term of probation would send 
the wrong message to others that may want to drink and 
drive.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
. . 
.  But I don't think the message can 
be sent to the public that there can be an aggravated homicide by vehicle with a 
.15 blood alcohol, going on the wrong side of the road, and not have a sentence 
of imprisonment imposed.

 
 

 
 
            
Waiver of Issues by Guilty Plea

 
 
[¶13]   The State contends that, by 
entering a "cold plea" of guilty at the second change-of-plea hearing, the 
appellant waived his right to appeal matters that arose prior to entry of that 
plea.  The law in that regard is as 
follows:

 
 
            
A guilty plea prohibits appellate review of all but a few defenses.  Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 
1361-62 (Wyo.1993); Sword v. State, 746 P.2d 423, 425 
(Wyo.1987).

 
 
"When a 
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty 
of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior 
to the entry of the guilty plea."

 
 

Davila 
v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo.1992) (quoting Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 138 
(Wyo.1989) and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 
93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973)).

 
 
            
A guilty plea waives non-jurisdictional defenses.  Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 1361; 
Davila, 831 P.2d  at 205; Sword, 746 P.2d  at 425.  In Davila, 831 P.2d  at 205-06, we 
set forth the difference between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
defenses.  Jurisdictional defenses 
involve the state's power to bring the defendant into court; non-jurisdictional 
defenses are those "objections and defenses which would not prevent a 
trial.'"  Id. 
(quoting Sword, 746 P.2d at 426).  Constitutional challenges to pretrial 
proceedings, including speedy trial violations, are non-jurisdictional 
defenses.  Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 
1362; Davila, 831 P.2d  at 206; Sword, 746 P.2d  at 425.  See also United States v. 
Yunis, 723 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir.1984) and Smith v. United States, 
677 F.2d 39, 40 (8th Cir.1982).

 
 

Smith v. 
State, 871 P.2d 186, 188 (Wyo. 
1994).  See also Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 
147, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶14]   We agree with the State that entry 
of the appellant's second guilty plea acted as a waiver of his right to appeal 
the district court's rejection of the earlier plea agreement, and of his right 
to appeal the limitation of the reconsideration hearing to fifteen minutes.  Preliminarily, we note that the 
appellant has made no suggestion that the second plea was anything but 
voluntary, and the record substantiates that conclusion.  Further, the appellant has not contended 
that the district court's discretionary decisions concerning the plea agreement 
were jurisdictional in nature.  
Indeed, the appellant did not even respond to the State's waiver 
argument.

 
 
            
Refusal to Consider Probation

 
 

[¶15]   The district court's decision 
whether or not to grant probation in any given case is discretionary, and our 
review, therefore, is for the abuse of that discretion.  Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 56, ¶ 
6, 44 P.3d 943, 945 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 
680 (Wyo. 
1988)).  While the district court is not 
obligated to grant probation, it must consider an application for probation and, 
if such is not granted, include a statement in the written sentence expressly 
acknowledging that it considered the application.  Martinez, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d  at 396; 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(D).

 
 
In 
making a determination as to whether probation is appropriate, the sentencing 
judge has discretion to frame and consider, in a reasonable manner, the relevant 
inquiries with respect to the recognized purposes for imposing sentence.  Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374 
(Wyo.1984).  The societal need for 
retribution is a relevant consideration in the imposition of punishment.  Kavanaugh [v. State], 769 
P.2d [908], 915 [(Wyo. 1989)].  Another appropriate consideration is 
whether the imposition of a penitentiary sentence would serve to deter others 
from committing similar crimes.  
Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179 (Wyo.1985).  It is appropriate to impose a sentence 
of imprisonment if probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 
charged offense.  Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183.

 
 

Whitfield 
v. State, 781 P.2d 913, 916 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶16]   The appellant contends that the 
district court's refusal even to consider probation was evidenced by statements 
it made in rejecting the plea agreement, and by the following statement it made 
during the second sentencing hearing:  
"But I don't think the message can be sent to the public that there can 
be an aggravated homicide by vehicle with a .15 blood alcohol, going on the 
wrong side of the road, and not have a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed."

 
 
[¶17]   We will affirm the district court 
on this issue because we believe the appellant has mistaken that court's refusal 
to grant probation for a refusal to consider 
it.  The district court's 
rationale for rejecting the plea agreementthe central focus of which was 
probationwas very similar to its later rationale for incarcerating the 
appellant.  In both instances, the 
district court stated that, under the totality of the circumstances (high blood 
alcohol content, driving on the wrong side of the road, other near accidents, 
and a prior D.W.U.I.), probation would send the wrong message to the 
public.

 
 
[¶18]   Even taken out of context, the 
above-quoted statement of the district court does not say, "I would never grant 
probation in an aggravated vehicular homicide case."  In context, the statement is simply one 
of many giving the court's reasoning for not granting probation in this 
case.  In fact, the transcripts from 
the two hearings reveal the district court's struggle in deciding between 
"leniency"meaning probationand the "right" message.  The facts of this case resemble those in 
which we previously have found a sufficient consideration of 
probation:

 
 
            
This court has stated that no particular amount of consideration of 
probation is required as long as the record reveals the district court did 
consider it.  Beaulieu v. State, 
608 P.2d 275, 275 (Wyo.1980); see also Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179, 
182-83 (Wyo.1985).  We applied this 
rationale in Beaulieu and held that, because a probation plan appeared in 
the presentence report and the defendant requested probation at the sentencing 
hearing, sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the conclusion 
that the district court considered probation.  608 P.2d  at 275.  Similarly, in Burk [v. State, 
848 P.2d 225 (Wyo.1993)], we found sufficient proof that the district court 
had considered probation when it imposed sentences in two cases against the 
defendant.  848 P.2d  at 236.  In the first case, the defense counsel 
argued for leniency and mentioned that other persons involved in the defendant's 
case had received probation.  
Id.  In the second case, the defense counsel 
asked for leniency, the defendant's parents requested that the court grant 
probation, and the presentence investigation report addressed the issue of 
probation.  Id.

 
 

Martinez, 
2002 WY 
10, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d  at 396.  Similarly, the record in the instant 
case clearly shows that the specific issue being addressed by the parties and 
the district court was whether or not to grant probation to the appellant.3  The appellant's accusation that the 
statement in the Judgment and Sentence that probation had been considered was 
"no more than lip service" has no basis in fact.  Furthermore, we previously have 
"recognized that other facts may be even more persuasive than a mere recitation 
that probation was considered."  
Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179, 182 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 
            
Article 1, § 15 of the Wyoming 
Constitution

 
 
[¶19]   Article 1, § 15 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides as follows:  
"The penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation 
and prevention."  The appellant 
contends that his sentence offends this constitutional provision because, 
although setting a sentence to set an example as a preventative measure may be 
appropriate, it is not appropriate in this case because, due to his age and 
medical condition, he will be unable to be incarcerated for an extended period 
of time.  In other words, the 
deterrent effect of incarceration would be lost because the Department of 
Corrections would necessarily remove the appellant from the penitentiary and 
house him in some less restrictive facility.  Further, the appellant opines that an 
equivalent deterrent effect would be produced by incarceration in the county 
jail under a split sentence.

 
 
[¶20]   We will affirm the district court 
on this issue because the appellant's contentions fall far short of identifying 
an unconstitutional sentence.

 
 
[Article 
1, § 15 of the Wyoming Constitution] is not so narrowly drawn that we would be 
justified in concluding that the only factors which the court may consider in 
the imposition of sentence are prevention and rehabilitation.  The provision speaks to the penal code, 
not to sentencing, and we are unable to detect any intent on the part of the 
Constitutional Convention to so limit the discretion of sentencing judges in 
criminal cases.

 
 

Jahnke 
v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 930 (Wyo. 
1984).  Rather, sentencing discretion is 
exercised within the following framework:

 
 
It is 
generally recognized that sentence imposition involves consideration of two 
broad categories:  (1) the crime and 
its circumstances, and (2) the character of the criminal.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
            
And the purpose of the sentence enters into the application of both of 
the two broad categories considered in imposing a sentence.  Although sometimes denominated 
otherwise, it is generally recognized that a sentence is imposed for one 
or more of four purposes:  
(1) rehabilitation, (2) punishment (specific deterrence and retribution), 
(3) example to others (general deterrence), and (4) removal from society 
(incapacitation or protection of the public).

 
 

Wright 
v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1092-93 (Wyo. 1983) (footnote omitted).

 
 
[¶21]   Analyzed within this legal context, 
the appellant's contentions fail for several reasons.  To begin with, the appellant's assertion 
that the district court's general deterrence purpose will be thwarted by a 
truncated sentence is speculative.  
Furthermore, the legitimacy of a criminal sentence's purpose is tested 
when that sentence is imposed; it does not depend upon its success.  A sentence imposed for the purpose of 
general deterrence does not become unconstitutional in the event that it fails 
to serve that purpose.

 
 
[¶22]   The record also reveals that the 
district court imposed a prison sentence because of the retribution aspect of 
punishment, and so as not to depreciate the seriousness of aggravated homicide 
by vehicle, particularly under the circumstances of this case.  It is safe to say that, were it not for 
the appellant's advanced age, the prison sentence would have been much 
longer.  In looking at both "broad 
categories"the crime and the criminalthe district court balanced all the 
factors by imposing a relatively short prison sentence.   That is the epitome of the 
reasonable exercise of discretion, rather than its abuse.

 
 
            
Sentencing the Appellant to Prison

 
 
[¶23]   Although identified separately, 
this issue is treated in the appellant's brief as being merely the "flip side of 
the coin."  That is, the appellant 
alleges that, by rejecting the plea agreement, by refusing to consider 
probation, and by violating Article 1, § 15 of the Wyoming Constitution, the 
district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison.  That allegation requires no additional 
analysis because the very rationale and thought process that resulted in 
rejecting the plea agreement and denying probation resulted in the prison 
sentence.  Permeating all of those 
arguments, of course, is the suggestion that the mere act of sentencing an 
eighty-three-year-old man to prison, in and of itself, is an abuse of 
discretion.  However, we have 
thoroughly reviewed the record, including the presentence investigation report 
and the transcripts from the various hearings, and we simply cannot say that the 
judgment of the district court in that regard was 
unreasonable.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   By pleading guilty to the charged 
offense, the appellant waived his right to appeal the district court's rejection 
of the earlier plea agreement and the district court's time limitation for the 
reconsideration hearing.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation to the 
appellant or by sentencing the appellant to prison.  Neither did the district court abuse its 
discretion or violate the appellant's rights under Article 1, § 15  of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
[¶25]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 is known as the "split sentencing" statute.  It allows for convicted felons to be 
incarcerated in county jails, rather than in prison.  Intensive Supervision Probation is a 
specialized statutory program allowing for community release under close 
supervision.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-1101, et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).

2A "cold 
plea" means there was no plea agreement, and the plea was not "conditional" 
because the appellant did not reserve the right to appeal adverse pretrial 
rulings.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2).

3Although 
the appellant's position is that the district court refused even to consider 
probation, he has presented his arguments in the context of an abuse of 
discretion.  Technically, there is 
no discretion in deciding whether or not to consider probation in 
a case such as this; the exercise of discretion occurs in deciding whether or 
not to grant probation.  
Failure or refusal even to consider probation would be an error of 
law.  Because we have determined 
that the district court did, in fact, consider probation, we need not address 
the fact of a failure or refusal to do so under either 
standard.