Case Title: Edelstein v. City & County of SF

Citation: 

Docket Number: S102530

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 11/7/02 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
MICHAEL EDELSTEIN et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S102530 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A093007 
CITY AND COUNTY OF 
) 
SAN FRANCISCO, 
) 
 
) 
San Francisco 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 308057 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
The question presented by this case is whether former section 13.102 of 
article XIII of the Charter of the City and County of San Francisco (repealed  
Mar. 5, 2000; hereafter section 13.102), by prohibiting write-in voting in runoff 
elections for municipal offices, violated the free speech clause of the California 
Constitution (art. I, § 2, subd. (a)).  We conclude it did not. 
 
In Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703 (Canaan), this court struck 
down, as violative of the free speech clauses of both the state and federal 
Constitutions, San Diego’s prohibition on write-in voting in its municipal general 
elections.  However, in Burdick v. Takushi (1992) 504 U.S. 428 (Burdick), the 
United States Supreme Court later upheld, against a federal constitutional 
challenge, Hawaii’s total ban on write-in voting. 
 
The California free speech clause is broader and more protective than the 
First Amendment free speech clause.  (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of 
 
 
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Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367.)  However, the fact that our provision 
is worded more expansively and has been interpreted as being more protective than 
the First Amendment in some respects does not mean that it is broader in all its 
applications.  (Los Angeles Alliance, at p. 367.)  Generally, when we interpret a 
provision of the California Constitution that is similar to a provision of the federal 
Constitution, we will not depart from the United States Supreme Court’s 
construction of the similar federal provision unless we are given cogent reasons to 
do so.  (People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 844.)  And, specifically, “[i]n 
analyzing constitutional challenges to election laws, this court has followed closely 
the analysis of the United States Supreme Court.  [Citations.]”  (Canaan, supra, 40 
Cal.3d at p. 710.)  That is what this court tried to do in Canaan.  The Canaan court 
anticipated, correctly, that the high court would review a challenge to a restriction 
on write-in voting under the standard it had announced in Anderson v. Celebrezze 
(1983) 460 U.S. 780 (Anderson).1  However, even though the Canaan court voiced 
the right standard, it got the wrong answer, at least as far as the federal Constitution 
is concerned, as Burdick revealed. 
 
Given that Burdick upheld a total ban on write-in voting, plaintiffs cannot, 
and do not, contend that San Francisco’s ban on write-in voting in runoff elections 
violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Anderson/Burdick 
standard.  Instead, plaintiffs claim the free speech clause of the California 
Constitution provides greater protection for write-in candidates and voters than does 
the free speech clause of the federal Constitution.  However, plaintiffs have entirely 
                                             
 
1  
In Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. 780, as was explained in Canaan, “the court 
struck down Ohio’s early presidential candidate filing deadline, finding the state’s 
interest in the early deadline to be insufficient to justify its adverse effects on 
independent political candidates, parties, and voters.”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d 
at p. 712.) 
 
3
failed to supply us with cogent reasons, and we have discovered none ourselves, to 
conclude that disallowing write-in voting in runoff elections violates the free speech 
clause of the California Constitution.  Because San Francisco allows write-in voting 
in its municipal general elections, we need not reach the question whether a total 
ban on write-in voting would offend the state Constitution.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
At the General Election held on November 6, 1973, San Francisco voters 
approved Proposition D, a measure amending the election provisions of the San 
Francisco charter to provide, in the event no mayoral candidate received a 
majority of the votes cast, for a runoff contest between the two candidates 
receiving the highest number of votes.  In the ballot pamphlet, the proponents of 
Proposition D argued that its adoption was necessary to ensure that the mayor 
would in the future be elected by a majority of the voters.  “The office of Mayor is 
now chosen by a plurality vote.  Under this archaic voting system mayors in San 
Francisco may be voted into office by support of a very small minority of the 
voters—even a scant twenty percent or less.  This is made possible because of the 
increasing number of candidates who run for the office of Mayor.  Under the 
present system San Francisco has elected a Mayor representing a majority vote 
only five times in the last eleven mayoral elections.”  (S.F. Ballot Pamp., Gen. 
Mun. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1973) pp. 60-61.) 
 
The runoff provision, which was codified in section 13.102, was 
subsequently amended to include almost all elective offices in San Francisco.  
Although the text of section 13.102, at the time of the election in question, did not 
expressly so provide,2 both as a matter of local elections practice and in the 
                                             
 
2  
Section 13.102 then provided:  “If no candidate for any elective office of 
the City and County [excepting offices not relevant here] receives a majority of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
4
opinion of the city attorney, the section has been interpreted as prohibiting write-in 
voting for mayor. 
 
This lawsuit by two plaintiffs—Michael Edelstein, a would-be write-in 
candidate for mayor, and Richard Winger, a registered voter who supported his 
candidacy—was filed on the eve of the 1999 mayoral runoff election.  In their 
complaint for declaratory relief, plaintiffs contended that section 13.102 burdened 
the unfettered right of electors to vote for the candidate of their choice by writing 
in his or her name on the ballot and therefore ran afoul of the free speech provision 
of the California Constitution.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).)  Ballots issued to 
voters by Patricia Fado, the city’s then director of elections, did not provide space 
for write-in candidates, the complaint alleged, and were treated as void if altered 
by any writings on them.  Moreover, plaintiffs alleged, the defendant director 
refused to accept plaintiff Edelstein’s write-in candidacy for mayor.  
 
Complaining of the inability to run for the office of mayor as a write-in 
candidate, and the reciprocal inability of municipal electors to choose a mayoral 
candidate by writing in his or her name on the ballot, plaintiffs sought, 
unsuccessfully, emergency preelection injunctive relief from the superior court, 
the Court of Appeal, and this court prior to the December 1999 mayoral runoff 
election.  Following the election, the San Francisco City and County Superior 
Court granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and this appeal 
ensued. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the cause for entry of a final 
judgment granting appropriate declaratory relief in favor of plaintiffs.  Under the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
the votes cast at an election for such office, the two candidates receiving the most 
votes shall qualify to have their names placed on the ballot for a municipal runoff 
election.” 
 
5
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to do so.  However, in 
light of Burdick, the Court of Appeal aptly suggested that “this case might serve as 
the vehicle for the California Supreme Court to examine the current vitality of 
Canaan, a task we are constrained from undertaking.”   
DISCUSSION 
 
Plaintiffs’ brief in this court obliquely raises the preliminary question 
whether this case is moot. 
 
I. 
Mootness 
 
On March 5, 2002, after this court granted review, San Francisco voters 
adopted Proposition A, a charter amendment replacing San Francisco’s system of 
holding a runoff election when no candidate receives a majority of the votes in the 
general election with a system of instant runoff elections accomplished by ranked 
choice voting.  The digest of Proposition A in the voter information pamphlet gave 
the following explanation of the instant runoff voting method:  “With this method, 
each voter would have the opportunity to rank at least a first, second, and third 
choice among the candidates for each office.  The votes would be counted in 
rounds.  If one candidate received more than 50% of the first-choice votes in the 
first round, then that candidate would be elected.  If no candidate received more 
than 50% of the first-choice votes, the candidate who received the fewest first-
choice votes would be eliminated.  All voters whose first choice was eliminated 
would have their vote transferred to their second-choice candidate.  This process 
of transferring votes to the voter’s next-choice candidate and eliminating 
candidates with the fewest votes would be repeated until one candidate received  
 
6
more than 50% of the votes.”  (S.F. Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec.  
(Mar. 5, 2002) p. 37.)3 
 
In calling our attention to Proposition A, plaintiffs imply, although they do 
not expressly claim, that the question presented by this case is moot because San 
Francisco will no longer be holding what we may refer to as conventional runoff 
elections.  However, as defendant points out, Proposition A, by its terms, provides 
for the possibility that San Francisco may hold a conventional runoff election in 
December 2002.  In the event that no candidate for certain offices receives a 
majority in San Francisco’s general election in November 2002, then San 
Francisco shall hold a conventional runoff election in December 2002, “[i]f the 
Director of Elections certifies to the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor no later 
                                             
 
3  
Defendant requests that we take judicial notice of three items of 
information:  (1) the portions of the San Francisco voter information pamphlet for 
the March 5, 2002, Primary Election that dealt with Proposition A; (2) the  
San Francisco results of the March 5, 2002, Primary Election; and (3) the portions 
of the California voter information pamphlet for the March 5, 2002, Primary 
Election that dealt with state Proposition 43 (right to have vote counted).  We 
grant all three requests, although the relevance of Proposition 43 is not clear.  (See 
People v. Snyder (2000) 22 Cal.4th 304, 309, fn. 5 [taking judicial notice of ballot 
arguments for proposition]; Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court 
(2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1424, fn. 2 [taking judicial notice of election 
results].) 
 
Plaintiffs request that we take judicial notice of the 1998 New York Times 
Index.  The index apparently references a news article that recounts the facts 
surrounding an election in Tennessee in which one candidate murdered the other.  
It is questionable whether the reporting concerning this out-of-state election—
which plaintiffs presumably want to use to show the usefulness of write-in 
candidacies—would constitute “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably 
subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by 
resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. 
(h).)  We might determine that an article resides in the New York Times Index, but 
that would not mean that the truth of the article had been shown with “reasonably 
indisputable accuracy.”  We deny the request. 
 
7
than July 1, 2002 that the Department of Elections will not be ready to implement 
ranked-choice balloting in November 2002 . . . .”  (S.F. Voter Information Guide, 
supra, text of Prop. A, p. 46.)   
 
Moreover, defendant has furnished us with a copy of a letter, dated July 1, 
2002, from Jon Arntz, Acting Director of the Department of Elections of the City 
and County of San Francisco, to Mayor Willie L. Brown.  In the letter Mr. Arntz 
informs the mayor that the Department of Elections will be unable to implement 
ranked-choice balloting in November 2002.  The reasons for the delay, Mr. Arntz 
explains, are that the necessary software is still being developed, the Secretary of 
State’s certification of the software will have to be obtained, the software must be 
tested by the department, and voter education materials must be developed. 
 
Finally, even if Proposition A could have been implemented in time for the 
next mayoral general election, the question presented by this case would not have 
been moot.  “ ‘[I]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is 
likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue 
even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the 
matter moot.’  (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23.)  We have frequently 
exercised such discretion to resolve constitutional issues pertaining to election 
laws raised by candidates in elections that were held before decision could be 
reached.  (Johnson v. Hamilton (1975) 15 Cal.3d 461, 465; Knoll v. Davidson 
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 335, 344; see also Storer v. Brown (1974) 415 U.S. 724, 737, fn. 
8.)”  (Libertarian Party v. Eu (1980) 28 Cal.3d 535, 539-540.)  The question 
presented by this case is of broad public interest and it is likely to recur, if not in 
San Francisco elections, then in elections in other charter cities.  In an amicus 
curiae brief filed in support of defendant, the Cities of Los Angeles, Monterey and 
Redlands point out that charter cities have plenary power under the California 
 
8
Constitution over their municipal election procedures (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, 
subd. (b)), that other charter cities besides San Francisco have chosen to exercise 
that authority by disallowing write-in voting in their runoff elections, and that yet 
other charter cities may choose to do so.4 
II. 
Elections Code Section 15340 
 
Plaintiffs contend section 13.102 violates not only the free speech clause of 
the California Constitution, but also section 15340 of the Elections Code (section 
15340). 
 
Section 15340 provides:  “Each voter is entitled to write the name of any 
candidate for any public office, including that of President and Vice President of 
the United States, on the ballot of any election.” 
Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ argument, that section 15340 guarantees 
the right of San Francisco voters to cast write-in votes in a runoff election, fails 
because the right to run as a write-in candidate in a city runoff election is not a 
matter of statewide concern and, accordingly, the constitutional “home rule” 
provision (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subds. (a), (b)) exempts a charter city like San 
Francisco from complying with section 15340.   
                                             
 
4  
On May 17, 2002, we received an application by the Cities of Los Angeles, 
Monterey and Redlands for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of 
defendant.  The application was late, the reply brief having been filed on April 4, 
2002.  Counsel for amicus curiae explained that he was seeking permission to file 
the brief late because he had been required to handle other complicated, time-
sensitive matters.  The application for permission to file the amicus curiae brief 
was granted on May 22, 2002.  On May 29, 2002, we received plaintiffs’ motion 
to strike the application to file the amicus curiae brief.  Plaintiffs asserted (a) that 
the application by amicus curiae was at least 43 days late, and (b) that the 
application did not acknowledge it was late.  Neither assertion was true.  On  
June 4, 2002, we received plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the granting of the 
application to file the amicus curiae brief.  Both of plaintiffs’ motions—the motion 
received on May 29, 2002, and the motion received on June 4, 2002—are denied. 
 
9
Section 5, subdivision (b) of article XI of the California Constitution 
provides in part:  “It shall be competent in all city charters to provide, in addition 
to those provisions allowable by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State for:  
. . . (3) conduct of city elections and (4) plenary authority is hereby granted, 
subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide therein or by amendment 
thereto, the manner in which, the method by which, the times at which, and the 
terms for which the several municipal officers . . . shall be elected or appointed 
. . . .”  We applied this constitutional provision in Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 389, which concerned partial public funding of city elective offices.  We 
explained that California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 1, established a framework “for resolving municipal-affairs and 
statewide-concern questions under subdivision (a) of article XI, section 5.  When 
the local matter under review ‘implicates a “municipal affair” and poses a genuine 
conflict with state law, the question of statewide concern is the bedrock inquiry 
through which the conflict between state and local interests is adjusted.  If the 
subject of the statute fails to qualify as one of statewide concern, then the 
conflicting charter city measure is a “municipal affair” and “beyond the reach of 
legislative enactment.”  . . .  If, however, the court is persuaded that the subject of 
the state statute is one of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably 
related [and “narrowly tailored”] to its resolution, then the conflicting charter city 
measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro tanto and the Legislature is not 
prohibited by article XI, section 5[, subdivision] (a), from addressing the statewide 
dimension by its own tailored enactments.’ ”  (Johnson v. Bradley, supra, at 
p. 399, fn. omitted, quoting California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., supra, at p. 
17.) 
 
10
In this case, however, we need not apply this framework for resolving 
municipal-affairs and statewide-concern questions.  Prohibiting write-in voting in 
runoff elections would not violate section 15340 even if San Francisco were not a 
charter city.  Section 15340 gives voters the right to write in the names of 
candidates in “any election.”  In the election in question, the San Francisco 
mayoral election of 1999, voters had the opportunity to write in the names of 
candidates once, in the first round of voting; they simply did not have the 
opportunity to do so a second time, in the runoff.  This satisfied section 15340, 
because there was a single election, although there were two rounds of voting. 
III. 
Canaan and Burdick 
 
Although this court grounded its decision in Canaan on article I, section 2, 
subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, as well as the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 715, 727), we 
observed that, “[i]n analyzing constitutional challenges to election laws, this court 
has followed closely the analysis of the United States Supreme Court.  
[Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 710.)  Following this practice, the Canaan court correctly 
anticipated that a prohibition on write-in voting should be reviewed under the 
standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson, supra, 460 
U.S. 780.  (Canaan, at pp. 712-715; see Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 433-438.)  
 
Under the Anderson standard, as the high court reiterated in Burdick, “the 
rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon 
the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected 
to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state 
interest of compelling importance.’  Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992).  
But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, 
 
11
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify’ the restrictions.  Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788; see also id., at 788-789, n. 9.  
We apply this standard in considering petitioner’s challenge to Hawaii’s ban on 
write-in ballots.”  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 434.) 
 
Although this court in Canaan and the United States Supreme Court in 
Burdick voiced the same standard—the Anderson standard—in reviewing the 
constitutionality of bans on write-in voting, they came to different conclusions.  
They came to different conclusions as to the ultimate constitutional question 
because they reached different conclusions as to a preliminary question—whether 
a ban on write-in voting is a severe restriction on voting rights or is only a 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction.  The Canaan court concluded that San 
Diego’s ban on write-in voting in municipal general elections constituted such a 
“drastic” restriction on the “fundamental rights of candidacy and voting” that San 
Diego had the burden of demonstrating that “less drastic” alternatives would not 
have advanced the interests that led it to adopt the ban, a burden the court found 
San Diego had failed to carry.  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 719, 724.)  The 
Burdick court, on the other hand, concluded that Hawaii’s total ban on write-in 
voting “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices and 
to associate politically through the vote,” and that the “legitimate interests asserted 
by the State are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that the write-in voting 
ban imposes upon Hawaii’s voters.”  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 439, 440, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
A.  This Court’s Interpretation of Anderson in Canaan 
 
The Canaan court relied on the following explanation by the Anderson 
court of the standard announced in that case:  “ ‘Constitutional challenges to 
 
12
specific provisions of a State’s election laws . . . cannot be resolved by any 
“litmus-paper test” that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.  [Citation.] 
Instead, a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that 
parallels its work in ordinary litigation.  It must first consider the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must identify and 
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule.  In passing judgment, the Court must not only 
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must 
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.  Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a 
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.  
[Citations.]  The results of this evaluation will not be automatic; as we have 
recognized, there is “no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.” 
[Citation.]’  (Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 789-790.) ”  (Canaan, supra, 40 
Cal.3d at p. 712, fn. omitted.) 
 
Petitioners contended, and the Canaan court agreed, that San Diego’s 
prohibition on write-in voting affected two important rights.  “One is the right of 
candidates to pursue public office.  The other, and more fundamental right, is that 
of the voters to cast their ballots for the candidates of their choice.  Both rights are 
of constitutional dimension.  Both are curtailed by a ban on write-in voting.”  
(Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 714.) 
 
“Both these rights,” the Canaan court observed, “are of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 
the comparable provisions of our state Constitution (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 2).  It 
is necessary, then, to examine the ‘character and magnitude of the asserted injury’ 
 
13
to those fundamental rights imposed by San Diego’s ban on write-in voting.  
(Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 789 .)”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 715, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
San Diego’s ban on write-in voting, in the Canaan court’s view, affected 
the more fundamental right to vote in two ways.  “First, it may very well prevent 
the candidate preferred by the majority of voters from winning election.  This is 
especially likely in situations such as this case, where significant political changes 
occurred in the interim between the primary and the general election.  (See 
Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 790-791, fn. 11.)  [¶]  Second, it prevents 
individual voters from casting ballots for their preferred candidates, whether or not 
those candidates have any chance of winning election.  ‘A write-in ballot permits a 
voter to effectively exercise his individual constitutionally protected franchise.  
The use of write-in ballots does not and should not [] depend[] on the candidate’s 
chance of success.’  (Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes (S.D. Ohio 1968) 290 
F.Supp. 983, 987, affd. in part, mod. in part sub. nom., Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 
393 U.S. 23, italics added.)”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 716-717, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
The City of San Diego advanced several justifications in support of its 
prohibition on write-in voting.  “Specifically, they claim that the ordinance is 
necessary to assure that (1) candidates meet charter qualifications, (2) candidates 
have displayed a willingness to serve, (3) the public will have adequate time to 
investigate and evaluate the candidate’s abilities, experience, credentials, and 
capacity for the office, and (4) the candidate elected will receive a majority of the 
votes.  Respondents also claim that write-in voting would disrupt the scheme for 
election of the city council.”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 718.)   
 
14
 
The Canaan court found that “none [of the proffered justifications] 
warrants the drastic method selected to achieve its ends.  Quite simply, a total ban 
on write-in voting is a grossly overbroad means to achieve the stated goals.  In 
order to warrant burdening the fundamental rights of candidacy and voting, 
respondents must demonstrate that there are no less drastic alternatives to a 
prohibition on write-in voting.  [Citation.]”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 719.)  
“It is clear,” the Canaan court added, “that the Anderson balancing test requires 
consideration of whether less drastic alternatives are available to achieve the 
governmental interests at stake.  (Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 789; Smith v. Bd. 
of Election Com’rs for City of Chicago [(N.D. Ill. 1984)] 587 F.Supp. [1136,] 
1146, 1150; Libertarian Party of South Dakota v. Kundert [(D.S.D. 1984)] 579 
F.Supp. [735,] 739-740.)”  (Canaan, at p. 719, fn. 13.)  
 
San Diego, the Canaan court concluded, had failed to carry its burden of 
demonstrating that there were no less drastic alternatives to a prohibition on write-
in voting.  “A balancing of the rights of the candidates and voters against the 
interests asserted by respondents leads to the conclusion that San Diego’s 
prohibition on write-in voting is unconstitutional.  A ban on write-in voting 
burdens the right to be a candidate for public office and the fundamental right to 
vote for the candidate of one’s choice.  None of the justifications posited by the 
city is sufficient to outweigh the injury to these constitutional rights.  Further, a 
ban on write-in voting is not the least restrictive alternative available to achieve 
the city’s goals.”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 724.) 
 
B.  The High Court’s Application of Anderson in Burdick 
 
As previously explained, the Hawaii ban on write-in voting upheld in 
Burdick was broader than either the San Diego ban invalidated by the Canaan 
court or the San Francisco ban we review now.  Hawaii did not permit write-in 
 
15
voting in any of its elections (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 430-432), whereas 
San Diego permitted write-in voting in primary elections, but not in general 
elections or recall elections (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 707-708), and  
San Francisco permitted write-in voting in municipal general elections, but not in 
runoff elections.   
 
“The appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that a state law burdens 
the right to vote,” the Burdick court explained, “is set forth in Anderson.”  
(Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 438.)  Again, the Burdick court restated the 
Anderson standard as follows:  “Under this standard, the rigorousness of our 
inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which 
a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Thus, as 
we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the 
regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling 
importance.’  Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992).  But when a state 
election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ 
upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.  Anderson, 
460 U.S., at 788; see also id., at 788-789, n. 9.”  (Burdick, at p. 434.)  “Applying 
[the Anderson] standard, we conclude that, in light of the adequate ballot access 
afforded under Hawaii’s election code, the State’s ban on write-in voting imposes 
only a limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices and to associate 
politically through the vote.”  (Id. at pp. 438-439.) 
 
The Burdick court analyzed Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting as one aspect 
of the state’s overall ballot access system.  To obtain a position on Hawaii’s 
general election ballot, the court explained, a candidate had to participate in the 
state’s open primary, and there were three methods that enabled a candidate to 
 
16
appear on the primary ballot:  the filing of a party petition, the established party 
route, and the designated nonpartisan ballot.  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 435-
436.)  This system, the court found, “provides for easy access to the ballot until the 
cutoff date for the filing of nominating petitions, two months before the primary.  
Consequently, any burden on voters’ freedom of choice and association is borne 
only by those who fail to identify their candidate of choice until days before the 
primary.  But in Storer v. Brown, we gave little weight to ‘the interest the 
candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early 
decision to seek independent ballot status.’  415 U.S., at 736.  Cf. Rosario v. 
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 757 (1973).  We think the same reasoning applies here 
and therefore conclude that any burden imposed by Hawaii’s write-in vote 
prohibition is a very limited one.”  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 436-437, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
The Burdick court “turn[ed] next to the interests[—avoiding unrestrained 
factionalism and preventing party raiding—]asserted by Hawaii to justify the 
burden imposed by its prohibition of write-in voting.  Because we have already 
concluded that the burden is slight, the State need not establish a compelling 
interest to tip the constitutional scales in its direction.  Here, the State’s interests 
outweigh petitioner’s limited interest in waiting until the eleventh hour to choose 
his preferred candidate.”  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 439, italics added.)   
 
The step in the high court’s analysis that we have emphasized—that the 
burden imposed by Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting was slight, and that it, 
therefore, did not have to be justified by a compelling state interest—was critical.  
The majority and dissenting opinions in Burdick turned on this point.  “Although 
the dissent purports to agree with the standard we apply in determining whether 
the right to vote has been restricted, post, at 445-446, and implies that it is 
 
17
analyzing the write-in ban under some minimal level of scrutiny, post, at 448, the 
dissent actually employs strict scrutiny.  This is evident from its invocation of 
quite rigid narrow tailoring requirements.  For instance, the dissent argues that the 
State could adopt a less drastic means of preventing sore-loser candidacies, ibid., 
and that the State could screen out ineligible candidates through postelection 
disqualification rather than a write-in voting ban.  Post, at 450.”  (Burdick, supra, 
504 U.S. at p. 440, fn 10.)   
 
What the Burdick majority said of the Burdick dissenters might be said of 
the Canaan court as well.  That is, like the dissenters in Burdick, the Canaan court 
voiced the Anderson standard.  However, because the Canaan court found that San 
Diego’s restriction on write-in voting did a “serious injury to the right to vote” 
(Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 716), the court required the city to “demonstrate 
that there are no less drastic alternatives to a prohibition on write-in voting” (id. at 
p. 719). 
 
The majority in Burdick reiterated its conclusion:  “[W]hen a State’s ballot 
access laws pass constitutional muster as imposing only reasonable burdens on 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights—as do Hawaii’s election laws—a 
prohibition on write-in voting will be presumptively valid, since any burden on the 
right to vote for the candidate of one’s choice will be light and normally will be 
counterbalanced by the very state interests supporting the ballot access scheme.”  
(Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 441.) 
 
IV.  
Whether the California Constitution Provides Greater Protection  
 
for Write-in Voting than the Federal Constitution 
 
To reiterate:  The California free speech clause is broader and more 
protective than the First Amendment free speech clause.  (Los Angeles Alliance for 
Survival v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 366-367.)  However, the 
 
18
fact that our provision is worded more expansively and has been interpreted as 
being more protective than the First Amendment in some respects does not mean 
that it is broader than its federal counterpart in all its applications.  (Los Angeles 
Alliance, at p. 367.)  Generally, when we interpret a provision of the California 
Constitution that is similar to a provision of the federal Constitution, we will not 
depart from the United States Supreme Court’s construction of the similar federal 
provision unless we are given cogent reasons to do so.  (People v. Monge, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at p. 844.)  And, specifically, “[i]n analyzing constitutional challenges 
to election laws, this court has followed closely the analysis of the United States 
Supreme Court.  [Citations.]”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 710.) 
 
First, we turn to the text of the free speech clause of the California 
Constitution.  Like the First Amendment,5 article I, section 2, subdivision (a) does 
not expressly address voting rights.  “Every person may freely speak, write and 
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this 
right.  A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 2, subd. (a).)6   
 
As for the legislative history of the provision, the original framers of the 
California Constitution adopted the free speech clause “with no debate.  (See 
                                             
 
5  
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”  (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) 
6  
“Although the designation of article I’s free speech clause has changed 
appreciably over the years . . . its language has not.  [Citation.]”  (Gerawan 
Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 489.)  “Thus, the current 
incarnation of California’s free speech clause is virtually identical to the free 
speech clause in the original California Constitution adopted in 1849.  (Compare 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a) with Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 9.)”  (Golden 
Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1024.) 
 
19
Browne, Rep. of Debates in Convention of Cal. on Formation of State Const. 
(1973 ed.) p. 41 (Browne); see also [Should California’s Constitutional 
Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors? (1989)] 17 
Hastings Const. L.Q. [111,] 119 [(Private Actors)].)”  (Golden Gateway Center v. 
Golden Gateway Tenants Assn., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1024.)   
 
Plaintiffs do not discuss the language or the history of the California 
Constitution’s free speech clause, much less its New York antecedent.7  However, 
the fact that the Burdick court upheld a total ban on write-in voting, while the 
Canaan court struck down a less restrictive ban, does not appear to be explainable 
on the basis of differences between the text or history of the free speech clauses of 
the federal and California Constitutions.  Rather, the explanation appears to be that 
the Canaan court simply placed a higher value than the Burdick court on what the 
Burdick court referred to as the “expressive function” of voting (Burdick, supra, 
504 U.S. at p. 438).   
                                             
 
7  
“Many of the framers of the 1849 California Constitution came from New 
York.  (See Browne, supra, at pp. 478-479.)  Not surprisingly, in drafting the free 
speech clause, the framers borrowed from the free speech clause of the New York 
Constitution.  (Browne, supra, at p. 31.)  Because they adopted New York’s free 
speech clause virtually unchanged and with no debate (Private Actors, supra, 17 
Hastings Const. L.Q. at p. 119), the history behind New York’s clause is relevant 
to interpreting California’s free speech clause (see Citizens for Parental Rights v. 
San Mateo County Bd. of Education (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 1, 25-26, fn. 26 
[finding the history behind the New York Constitution relevant to interpreting a 
clause of the California Constitution based on a clause in the New York 
Constitution]).”  (Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn., 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) 
 
In 1892, the Court of Appeals of New York suggested, in dictum, that a 
prohibition of write-in voting would carry with it “the taint of unconstitutionality,” 
but the court did not explain whether it had the federal or state Constitution in 
mind.  (People ex rel. Bradley v. Suaw (1892) 31 N.E. 512, 512 [133 N.Y. 493].) 
 
20
 
As we explained earlier, the Canaan and Burdick courts came to different 
conclusions as to the ultimate constitutional question because they reached 
different conclusions as to the preliminary question whether a ban on write-in 
voting is a severe restriction on voting rights.  The different conclusions the two 
courts reached on this preliminary question largely depended, in turn, on their 
differing assessments of the importance of the expressive function of voting. 
 
The Canaan court assigned a high value to that function.  A ban on write-in 
voting, the Canaan court observed, “prevents individual voters from casting 
ballots for their preferred candidates, whether or not those candidates have any 
chance of winning election.  ‘A write-in ballot permits a voter to effectively 
exercise his individual constitutionally protected franchise.  The use of write-in 
ballots does not and should not [] depend[] on the candidate’s chance of success.’  
[Citations.]  [¶]  There will always be voters whose views, interests or priorities 
are not in any way represented by the candidates appearing on the ballot.  While 
candidates who do represent these voters’ views may have little chance of success, 
it is important in a free society that political diversity be given expression.”  
(Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 717, fn. omitted.) 
 
The Burdick court, on the other hand, assigned the expressive function of 
voting a much lower value.  “[T]he function of the election process is ‘to winnow 
out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates,’ Storer, 415 U.S., at 735, not to 
provide a means of giving vent to ‘short-range political goals, pique, or personal 
quarrel[s].’  Ibid.  Attributing to elections a more generalized expressive function 
would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently.  
Id., at 730.”  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 438.)  The objection to Hawaii’s ban 
on write-in voting, the Burdick court continued, “amounts to nothing more than 
the insistence that the State record, count, and publish individual protests against 
 
21
the election system or the choices presented on the ballot through the efforts of 
those who actively participate in the system.  There are other means  
available, however, to voice such generalized dissension from the electoral 
process; and we discern no adequate basis for our requiring the State to provide 
and to finance a place on the ballot for recording protests against its 
constitutionally valid election laws.”  (Id. at p. 441, fn. omitted.) 
 
Significantly, the dissenting opinion in Burdick, written by Justice 
Kennedy, agreed with the majority on this point.  “I agree with the first premise in 
the majority’s legal analysis.  The right at stake here is the right to cast a 
meaningful vote for the candidate of one’s choice.  Petitioner’s right to freedom of 
expression is not implicated.  His argument that the First Amendment confers 
upon citizens the right to cast a protest vote and to have government officials 
count and report this vote is not persuasive.  As the majority points out, the 
purpose of casting, counting, and recording votes is to elect public officials, not to 
serve as a general forum for political expression.”  (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. 428, 
445 (dis. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) 
 
By focusing on the expressive element of write-in voting, we do not mean 
to suggest that registering a protest is the only practical significance of write-in 
voting, or that write-in candidacies are necessarily quixotic.  For an example of a 
write-in candidacy that was startlingly successful, one need go no further than the 
1999 mayoral general election in San Francisco, the contest that resulted in the 
runoff election under consideration here.  Despite a late start and a relatively small 
campaign budget, write-in candidate Supervisor Tom Ammiano finished second in 
the election for mayor, ahead of former Mayor Frank Jordan, and secured a place 
in the runoff election against incumbent Mayor Willie Brown.  (See Epstein & 
Wildermuth, Ammiano vs. Brown: Write-in Votes Catapult Supervisor into S.F. 
 
22
Runoff, S.F. Chronicle (Nov. 5, 1999) p. A-1; Herscher, Making History: 
Ammiano Campaign Rises from the Grass Roots, S.F. Chronicle (Nov. 4, 1999) p. 
A-25.) 
 
However, if the function of the election process, generally, is to winnow 
out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates, not simply to provide an outlet 
for political expression (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 438), a fortiori, that is the 
function of a runoff election.  Permitting write-in votes even in the runoff would 
defeat San Francisco’s purpose in having a runoff election—to ensure that the 
winning candidate receive a majority of the votes.  Write-in votes could 
perpetually deny anyone a majority.  Indeed, allowing write-in votes in the runoff 
would permit a defeated candidate to continue running—as a write-in candidate. 
 
We conclude that San Francisco’s prohibition against write-in voting in the 
mayoral runoff election was not a severe restriction on voting rights, but rather 
that it imposed only a limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices and to 
associate politically through the vote.  (See Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 439.) 
After all, voters were not denied an opportunity to cast a write-in ballot for the 
candidate of their choice.  They were only denied the opportunity to cast a write-in 
ballot twice.  Indeed, as we noted above, in the 1999 mayoral runoff election, one 
of the two candidates, Supervisor Tom Ammiano, had been a write-in candidate in 
the mayoral general election. 
 
Having decided that disallowing write-in voting in runoff elections imposes 
only a limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices and to associate 
politically through the vote, the remaining question is what weight to give the interest 
that led San Francisco voters in 1973 to adopt Proposition D’s ban on write-in voting 
in runoff elections—ensuring that its mayors were elected by a majority of the city’s 
voters, rather than a plurality.  (S.F. Ballot Pamp., Gen. Mun. Elec., supra, at pp.  
 
23
60-61.)  Plurality rule is not anathema to the federal or state Constitutions.  Indeed, 
our last three presidents have been elected by a plurality of the popular vote.  (See 
Presidential Election Results (2000) <http://www. uselectionatlas.org/ 
USPRESIDENT/GENERAL/pe2000.html [as of Nov. 7, 2002].)  However, given the 
centrality of the concept of majority rule in the founding documents of American 
democracy,8 surely the desire of San Franciscans to have their mayors elected by a 
majority of the voters is, in the language of the high court, “presumptively valid” 
(Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 441). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 13.102 did not violate 
article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution by prohibiting 
write-in voting in runoff elections.  Because San Francisco permitted write-in 
voting in its mayoral general election, we need not reach the question whether a 
total ban on write-in voting would offend the state Constitution.  Canaan v. 
Abdelnour, supra, 40 Cal.3d 703, is overruled to the extent, but only to the extent, 
it is inconsistent with the views expressed herein. 
                                             
 
8  
The brief amicus curiae filed in support of defendant provides a sampling 
of such sentiments.  “In Federalist Paper No. 22, Alexander Hamilton wrote that 
governance by the majority is a ‘. . . fundamental maxim of republican 
government[,] which requires that [the] sense of the majority should prevail.’  
Alexander Hamilton, et al., The Federalist Papers (Mentor Books 1961) at p. 146.  
Addressing the inadvisability of requiring a quorum of more than a majority in a 
legislative assembly, James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper No. 58, that ‘[t]he 
fundamental principle of free government would be reversed.  It would no longer 
be the majority that would rule . . . .’  Id. at p. 361.  Thomas Jefferson held similar 
views.  In a conversation with President George Washington on February 7, 1793, 
Jefferson stated that he ‘. . . subscribe[s] to the principle, that the will of the 
majority, honestly expressed, should give law. . . .’  The Anas (Notes) of Thomas 
Jefferson in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, The Life and Selected Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson (Random House 1944) at p. 130 . . . .” 
 
24
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
1 
C O P Y  
 
 
EDELSTEIN v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
S102530 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the City and County of San Francisco’s (San 
Francisco) ban on write-in voting in its December 1999 runoff election is 
constitutional.  I arrive at that result through a different route.  The majority would 
overrule Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703 (Canaan) “to the extent, but 
only to the extent, it is inconsistent with the views expressed” in the majority 
opinion.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  The extent to which Canaan is overruled by 
the majority is unclear.  I disagree that Canaan should be overruled and would 
instead distinguish it from the present case, as explained below. 
As the majority recognizes, the United States Supreme Court’s holding that 
a complete ban on write-in voting does not contravene the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution (see Burdick v. Takushi (1992) 504 U.S. 428 (Burdick)) 
does not compel the conclusion that such a ban, or even a more limited ban, would 
pass muster under the California Constitution’s free speech clause, article I, 
section 2, subdivision (a).  The meaning of this clause is derived not only from the 
distinctive text and history of the clause, or from our present discernment of its 
purposes and contours, but also from previous judicial interpretations of the 
clause.  Thus, our natural starting point for determining whether a write-in ban in 
runoff elections violates the free speech clause is Canaan, which considered a 
similar, although not an identical, question. 
2 
The Canaan court adopted into California law the federal constitutional 
balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of election law articulated in 
Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983) 460 U.S. 780 (Anderson).  “ ‘Constitutional 
challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws . . . cannot be resolved 
by any “litmus-paper test” that will separate valid from invalid restrictions. 
[Citation.]  Instead, a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process 
that parallels its work in ordinary litigation.  It must first consider the character 
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must identify 
and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule.  In passing judgment, the Court must not only 
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must 
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.  Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a 
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.  
[Citations.]  The results of this evaluation will not be automatic; as we have 
recognized, there is “no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.”  
[Citation.]’ ”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 712, fn. omitted, quoting Anderson, 
supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 789-790.)  Applying this test, the Canaan court then 
invalidated a scheme prohibiting write-in voting for the San Diego mayoral 
contest in a general election occurring five months after the primary election. 
The majority does not disagree with the test, only its application.  In their 
view, the Canaan court gives too much importance to the “expressive function” of 
voting and not enough importance to what the Burdick court identified as “[T]he 
function of the election process . . . to winnow out and finally reject all but the 
chosen candidates.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, quoting Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. 
3 
at p. 438.)  Because the Canaan court overvalued this expressive function, the 
majority concludes, it correspondingly undervalued a local government’s 
legitimate interest in having a winning candidate chosen by a majority of the 
voters.  This analysis has an appealing simplicity.  But as majority itself seems to 
recognize at points, it is overly simple. 
Although the Canaan court, to be sure, articulated an interest in the 
“expressive function” of write-in voting, it addressed another concern more 
fundamental to the basic purpose of the electoral process.  In Canaan, the 
petitioner sought to advance his write-in candidacy for the general mayoral 
election after one of the two candidates who had qualified for that election, the 
incumbent mayor, was indicted for numerous felonies.  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d 
at pp. 708-709.)  This predicament was central to the Canaan court’s holding: “If 
the candidate who has represented an individual’s interests and views is forced to 
withdraw from the campaign, alters his or her positions or is indicted for alleged 
felonies, [an] individual may feel compelled to become a candidate in order to fill 
the void.  Rather than ‘doing violence’ to the election process, the availability of a 
write-in candidacy provides the flexibility to deal with unforeseen political 
developments and may help ensure that the voters are given meaningful options on 
election day.”  (Id. at pp. 718-719, italics added.)  Stated in other terms, “it is 
possible that the ban on write-in voting in this case may have prevented the 
election of the candidate who enjoyed the support of the majority of . . . voters.”  
(Id. at p. 722, italics omitted.) 
While the relative importance of the “expressive function” of voting is 
debatable, the importance of preventing this kind of widespread 
disenfranchisement is not.  Moreover, as the majority recognizes, the very election 
we are considering, the San Francisco mayoral election of 1999, is a testimony to 
4 
the power of a write-in candidacy.  One of the candidates who qualified for the 
runoff election, Tom Ammiano, was himself a write-in candidate.   
Thus, one of the essential concerns of Canaan, as it was of the dissent in 
Burdick, is not just that voters will be unable to express dissident views through 
write-in votes, but that potentially large numbers of voters will be effectively 
disenfranchised, deprived of “the opportunity to cast a meaningful ballot.”  
(Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. 428, 447 (dis. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  In Burdick, the 
dissent identified this threat of disenfranchisement as coming from Hawaii’s total 
ban on write-in voting combined with other ballot restrictions and the one-party 
system then virtually in effect in that state.  (Id. at pp. 446-448.)  In Canaan, the 
primary/general election scheme, which narrowed the field to two candidates in 
the general election, combined with the write-in ban, deprived a large number of 
voters of a meaningful choice when circumstances turned one of the candidates 
into an indicted felon.  Such disenfranchisement “strike[s] at the heart of 
representative government.”  (Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 555.) 
Against this interest in preventing widespread disenfranchisement, the 
majority evokes a countervailing state interest in ensuring that the winning 
candidate obtains a majority of votes cast.  As the majority recognizes, this 
interest, while not illegitimate, is not very substantial.  Indeed, all of our 
nonmunicipal elections  for President, the United States Congress, for California 
statewide office and for the California Legislature  have no such voter-majority 
requirement.  It has been proven time and again that elected representatives can 
function effectively in a democracy even if they were elected by less than a 
majority of the votes cast.  And although the majority quotes James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton and other of this country’s founders as generally endorsing 
the importance of majority governance (maj. opn., ante, at p. at 23, fn. 8), the 
5 
requirements of election by a majority of voters is nowhere found in the 
Constitution they helped draft and ratify.   
Moreover, the goal of achieving a voter majority can often, if not always, 
be achieved without a write-in ban.  The restriction on the number of candidates 
on the ballot to two in a runoff election, as mandated by Proposition D (Charter of 
City & County of S.F., former art. XIII, §  13.102, repealed Mar. 5, 2000), will 
generally ensure that the winning candidate obtains a majority of votes cast 
without such a ban.  This is because write-in candidates generally do not receive a 
high proportion of the vote, perhaps because of the inconvenience of casting write-
in votes and the marginal political position that write-in candidates usually 
occupy.  For example, the March 5, 2002, San Francisco election results that we 
judicially notice (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 6, fn. 3) reveal that in contested 
elections the write-in votes virtually never exceeded 2 percent, and in most cases 
even 1 percent, of the votes cast.  Therefore, unless there is deep and widespread 
discontent among voters with the two qualifying candidates for municipal 
elections and/or a very close election, write-in candidates usually will not prevent 
the winning candidate from obtaining a majority.  Indeed, the amicus curiae brief 
by the Cities of Los Angeles, Monterey and Redlands in support of San Francisco 
acknowledges that none of these three cities has banned write-in voting in runoff 
elections and that only 5 of 105 charter cities have, to their knowledge, enacted 
such a ban.  The fact that runoff elections can generally perform their 
“winnowing” function without prohibiting write-in voting makes the City’s 
interest in such prohibition that much less compelling. 
Nonetheless, a write-in ban in runoff elections is not without justification.  
Given that municipal elections in California are nonpartisan (Cal. Const., art. II, 
§ 6), the major political parties are not able to perform their traditional function of 
6 
choosing a single candidate to represent them in the general election and of 
organizing voting constituencies, thereby reducing voter fragmentation.  (See 
Pomper, The Contributions of Political Parties to American Democracy in Party 
Renewal in America in Theory and Practice (1980) pp. 5-6 [political parties serve 
to aggregate diverse interests].)  The advocates of Proposition D expressed 
concern that San Francisco mayors were being or could be elected by “a very 
small minority of the voters  even a scant twenty percent or less.”  (S.F. Ballot 
Pamp., Gen. Mun. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1973) pp. 60-61.)  In other words, a municipality 
with a history of political fractiousness may legitimately conclude, as San 
Francisco has, that without a write-in ban, severe voter fragmentation may persist 
into the runoff stage of a nonpartisan election, leading to the selection of mayoral 
candidates who are less able to govern because they have received a small 
proportion of the vote.  Stated in these terms, San Francisco’s interest in 
preventing this type of fragmentation appears somewhat weightier than the mere 
abstract interest in having a winning candidate receive 50 percent or more of the 
vote. 
Therefore, we have on one hand, the potential that a write-in ban will 
severely impact the electorate’s ability to choose viable candidates, particularly 
when circumstances change drastically after a qualifying election, and on the other 
hand, San Francisco’s legitimate if not compelling interest in having its candidates 
elected by a majority of votes cast.  Balancing these interests, I conclude that in 
this case, unlike in Canaan, the balance tips in favor of upholding the write-in 
prohibition, because the potential for disenfranchisement due to changed 
circumstances between the first and second elections is diminished by the brevity 
of the interval between them.  Simply stated, the possibility of changed 
circumstances that would effectively eliminate one of the two chosen candidates is 
7 
significantly smaller within the six-week period at issue in this case than within 
the five-month period at issue in Canaan.   
Furthermore, as stated above, a court “ ‘must not only determine the 
legitimacy and strength of each of [the state’s] interests; it also must consider the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ ”  
(Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 712, quoting Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 
789-790.)  In Canaan, we indicated that a write-in ban might be justified by the 
“important and legitimate interest in voter education’ ” (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d 
at p. 720) but that prohibiting write-in candidates who did not enter the contest 
more than five months prior to the general election was excessive: “ ‘ “Given 
modern communications, and given the clear indication that campaign spending 
and voter education occur largely during the month before an election’ ” 
([Anderson, supra, 460 U.S.] at p. 797 . . .) it is unnecessary to impose a cutoff 
date some five months before the general election.”  (Canaan, supra, 40 Cal.3d at 
p. 720; see also Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. 780, 797-798 [excessive to require 
filing for Ohio’s presidential ballot seven months before the election].)  In light of 
the recognition in Canaan and Anderson that most campaign activity occurs in the 
month prior to an election, and in light of the practical realities of mounting an 
election campaign, San Francisco’s six-week period between the general and 
runoff elections seems close to the minimum necessary for a meaningful campaign 
in which the two qualifying candidates can be closely scrutinized.  It would be an 
exercise in judicial overreaching for a court to insist on a shorter interval. 
I therefore conclude that the election scheme at issue in this case, by 
minimizing the interval between the general and runoff elections, burdens the 
electorate’s interest in choosing candidates of choice no more than was reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the legitimate goal of reducing voter fragmentation.  In 
8 
this respect, it differs significantly from the election scheme at issue in Canaan.  
On that basis, and without overruling Canaan, I would hold that San Francisco’s 
write-in prohibition in runoff elections is constitutional. 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Edelstein v. City & County of  S.F. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 93 Cal.App.4th 460 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S102530 
Date Filed: November 7, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: David A. Garcia 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
J. Michael Schaefer for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
 
Dennis J. Herrera and Louise H. Renne, City Attorneys, Therese M. Stewart, Chief Deputy City Attorney, 
Thomas J. Owen, Randy Riddle, Ellen Forman, and K. Scott Dickey, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendant 
and Respondent.   
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Patricia V. Tubert Claudia Culling and Anthony Saul 
Alperin, Assistant City Attorneys for Cities of Los Angeles, Monterey and Redlands as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
 
 
J. Michael Schaefer 
3030 Swenson St., No. 103 
Las Vegas, NV 89119 
(800) 792-6711 
 
 
Therese M. Stewart 
San Francisco City Attorney’s Office 
City Hall 
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlet Place, 3d Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94102-4682 
(415) 557-4711