Case Title: The People v. Michael Figueroa The People v. Mark Ochoa

Citation: 

Docket Number: Case No. 22

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 22  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Mark Ochoa,
            Appellant.
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No. 23  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Michael Figueroa,
            Appellant.
Case No. 22:
Carol A. Zeldin, for appellant.
Jason S. Whitehead, for respondent.
Case No. 23:
Rosemary Herbert, for appellant.
Jason S. Whitehead, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
Following a joint trial, defendant Mark Ochoa was
found guilty of one count of robbery in the second degree, and
defendant Mark Figueroa was convicted of two counts of robbery
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in the second degree and one count of criminal possession of a
weapon arising from events that occurred in January of 2003.
Fernando Cruz had taken his video game console to
Madeline Ruballo's sixth-floor apartment, meeting up with
defendants.  According to later testimony, the four of them
spent the night smoking crack cocaine.  At some point, Cruz
decided to take his console and leave.  As Cruz approached the
door, Figueroa pulled out a box cutter, reached for the console,
and demanded that Cruz give it to him.  Cruz and Figueroa began
struggling and ended up on the sixth-floor landing.  Ochoa then
allegedly pulled Cruz's jacket over his head, causing his wallet
to fall to the floor.  Figueroa took the console and fled, with
Ochoa following.  Cruz claimed over $200 was taken from his
wallet as well. 
Following their arrest, defendants were charged, on an
"acting in concert" theory, with the crimes of robbery in the
first degree, robbery in the second degree (two counts), robbery
in the third degree (two counts) criminal possession of a weapon
in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property
in the fifth degree. 
Cruz and Ruballo testified at trial, and were
subjected to vigorous cross-examination by defense counsel, who
were able to elicit several inconsistencies in their testimony. 
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No. 022
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Defense counsel impeached Cruz with false statements he had made
in his two appearances before the grand jury, and confronted
Ruballo with statements to police that she later admitted were
untrue.  The prosecutor's redirect examination of those
witnesses forms the basis of one of the issues raised on this
appeal. 
The other issue involves the trial judge's handling of
a note he received from the foreperson an hour after the jury
had reached its verdict.  
Prior to the judge's receipt of that note, the jury
had sent three other notes either asking for further instruction
or advising the court that it was deadlocked.  In each of those
instances, the court ensured that defendants and counsel were
present, read the note aloud, and then addressed its substance 
before the jury.  The day of the verdict, the court received two
more notes.  The first, which was written at 1:25 p.m., stated,
"Have reached a verdict."  The second, a personal note from the
foreperson, was written at 2:20 p.m. and stated, "Your Honor, I
do not feel comfortable reading this verdict."  
The judge met with the foreperson without informing
defense counsel beforehand.  However, immediately afterward, in
open court, the judge explained:
"The Court has received two notes, one they
reached a verdict, which you know.  You. . .
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No. 022
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gentlemen saw one personal note from the
foreperson that he doesn't feel comfortable
reading the verdict.  For the record, the
court asked the foreperson to come down, he
sat right here and the foreperson was
inquired into why he didn't feel
comfortable.  He said, well, he didn't want
to have to go through and have to say what
the verdict was, never telling me [the
court] the verdict.  I told him the way it
works.  The clerk asks him and say [sic],
Have you reached a verdict.  Yes.  As to the
first count on Mr. Figueroa, guilty or not
guilty.  As to the first count on Mr. Ochoa,
and I explained to him how it goes and all
he had to do is answer guilty or not guilty. 
And then he seemed relieved and he said,
'Oh, okay, fine.'"
After being shown the foreperson's note, neither
defense counsel voiced an objection to the manner in which the
court addressed the juror's concern.  Following the verdict,
defense counsel requested that the jury be polled, and the
foreperson stated that the verdict as to each defendant was his
verdict.  On appeal, both convictions were affirmed.   
In Ochoa the Appellate Division rejected defendant's
argument that the prosecutor's redirect examinations of Cruz and
Ruballo constituted improper bolstering and further concluded,
as to the foreperson's note, that counsel's failure to object or
seek other relief from the court relative to the ex parte
communication with the foreperson constituted a waiver of that
argument (see People v Ochoa, 57 AD3d 342, 343-344 [1st Dept
2008]).  One justice dissented and subsequently granted
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No. 022
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defendant leave to appeal to this Court. 
In Figueroa, the Appellate Division addressed the
juror note issue and held, as to the court's ex parte
communication with the foreperson, that its action was
ministerial and therefore neither defendant nor defense counsel
had a right to be present, and, in any event, counsel "was
required to request a further inquiry of the foreperson or
otherwise preserve a claim of error" (People v Figueroa, 48 AD3d
324, 325-326 [1st Dept 2008]).  A Judge of this Court granted
leave.  We now affirm in both appeals. 
Improper Bolstering Claim
The trial testimony of the two individuals who were
present at the time of the crimes, and who testified against
defendants, were not a model of consistency.  Neither Cruz nor
Ruballo wanted the police to know that they had been smoking
crack cocaine with defendants the night of the incident.  On
cross-examination by defense counsel, Cruz conceded that he
testified before the grand jury that the robbery occurred as he
and Ruballo walked into the building, that a bat was used during
the incident, and that he had never associated with defendants
prior to the incident - all of which was untrue.  In an attempt
to explain the inconsistency between his trial testimony and
grand jury testimony, Cruz testified that he was "confused" by
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certain of the questions asked of him before the grand jury.  
On redirect examination, the prosecutor sought to
question Cruz about what he was "confused" about during his
grand jury testimony.  Counsel for Ochoa objected, stating that
the prosecutor could not rehabilitate Cruz with a prior
consistent statement.  The trial court overruled the objection,
and allowed the prosecutor to ask Cruz whether, at the time of
his grand jury testimony, he was "confused" about what item he
possessed on the day of the incident, whom he visited that day,
how he was injured and who injured him.  
We conclude that these questions on redirect were
addressed to matters raised by defense counsel on cross-
examination, and "did no more than to explain, clarify and fully
elicit a question only partially examined by the defense"
(People v Regina, 19 NY2d 65, 78 [1966]; see Prince, Richardson
on Evidence § 6-501 [Farrell 11th ed]).
The prosecutor's redirect examination of Ruballo was
also proper.  Defense counsel elicited testimony from Ruballo
that she lied in her written statement to police when she stated
that defendants followed her and Cruz into the building and
mugged them, that one of the perpetrators took $50 from Cruz,
and that Figueroa pushed her during the encounter.
On redirect, the prosecutor sought to clarify what was
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correct and incorrect about the statements.  Ochoa's counsel
objected that a prior consistent statement could not be elicited
except upon a claim of recent fabrication.  Over defense
counsel's objection, the prosecutor elicited from Ruballo that
the name on the statement was hers, and that the pedigree
information, the apartment address and where the altercation
occurred was correct.  She also testified that, relative to the
statement, the names of the perpetrators and the victim were
correct, but that she lied when she stated that $50 had been
taken, when she said that she and Cruz were attacked upon
entering the building, and when she told police that Cruz pushed
her.  
The prosecutor's redirect examination did not
constitute impermissible bolstering, as she was seeking merely
to fill in the gaps that defense counsel left during cross-
examination, after defense counsel implied that Ruballo's entire
statement to police was a lie.  "Where only a part of a
statement is drawn out on cross-examination, the other parts may
be introduced on redirect examination for the purpose of
explaining or clarifying that statement" (People v Torres, 42
NY2d 1036, 1037 [1977] citing Regina, 19 NY2d at 70). 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the prosecutor to ask Ruballo to clarify which parts of
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her statement she claimed were true, and which were not true.
Juror's Note
Defendants contend that the trial court's failure to
apprise defense counsel of the contents of the note prior to
speaking with the foreperson, allow counsel an opportunity to be
heard as to how to respond to the note, and permit defendants to
be present during the court's communication with the foreperson,
violated CPL 260.20 and 310.30.  The former provision requires,
with certain exceptions, that "[a] defendant must be personally
present during the trial of an indictment."  The latter
provision provides:
"At any time during its deliberation, the
jury may request the court for further
instruction or information with respect to
the law, with respect to the content or
substance of any trial evidence, or with
respect to any other matter pertinent to the
jury's consideration of the case.  Upon such
a request, the court must direct that the
jury be returned to the courtroom and, after
notice to both the people and counsel for
the defendant, and in the presence of the
defendant, must give such requested
information or instruction as the court
deems proper."  
The purpose of the "notice" requirement is twofold. 
First, it ensures counsel's presence when the court responds to
the jury's request for instructions or other information and,
second, it "ensure[s] that counsel has the opportunity to be
heard before the response is given" (see O'Rama, 78 NY2d at 277
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[citations omitted] [emphasis in original]).  Generally, a trial
court's failure to disclose the contents of a juror note, which
effectively prevents defense counsel from meaningful
participation in the proceedings, constitutes "a significant
departure from the organization of the court or the mode of
proceedings prescribed by law." (id. at 279 [citations and
internal quotations omitted]).  
The foreperson's personal note was ambiguous and,
given its language, could have been substantive.  As such, it
may have been more prudent for the judge to follow the
procedures specified in O'Rama before responding to it. 
Nonetheless, we conclude that the judge acted within his
discretion by seeking clarification of the note's meaning before
notifying defense counsel (see People v Lykes, 81 NY2d 767, 770
[1993]).  The substance of the note related only to the
foreperson's concern about the manner in which that verdict was
to be delivered, and thus was nothing more than an inquiry of a
ministerial nature (see generally People v Hameed, 88 NY2d 232,
240-241 [1996]; People v Collins, 99 NY2d 14, 17-18 [2002]),
unrelated to the substance of the verdict (see People v Harris,
76 NY2d 810, 812 [1990]).  As a result, the judge was not
required to notify defense counsel nor provide them with an
opportunity to respond, as neither defense counsel nor defendant
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could have provided a meaningful contribution.
Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division
relative to both appeals should be affirmed.  
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People v Mark Ochoa and Mark Figueroa
No. 22 and 23 
JONES, J.(dissenting) :
Because I believe that the trial court committed
reversible error with respect to the two issues before this
Court, I respectfully dissent.  I will first address the improper
bolstering issue.
The majority, in describing the testimony of Cruz and
Ruballo, states that it was "not a model of consistency."  That
is an understatement.  The witnesses' testimony before the grand
jury and at the suppression hearing, statements given to the
investigating police officers, and prior written statements were
riddled with inconsistencies.  As a result, both witnesses were
impeached when cross-examined by defense counsel, thereby casting
doubt on whether a robbery actually occurred.
Over the objection of the defense, the prosecutor was
permitted to introduce the witnesses' prior consistent statements
under the guise of rehabilitation.  The prosecutor, in the
redirect examination of Cruz, questioned him about his prior
statements which conformed to his trial testimony, asking him
whether those statements were correct.  Even more egregious, the
prosecutor was permitted to go through Ruballo's prior written
statement given to the police "to clarify what's incorrect and
what is correct."  As pointed out in the Appellate Division
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dissent (People v Ochoa, 57 AD2d 342, 347 [1st Dept 2008]), by
characterizing some allegations as false, the prosecutor implied
that the remaining statements were true.
It is well settled that a witness who has been
impeached cannot be rehabilitated by use of a prior consistent
statement, unless the opposing party suggests that the witness's
account is a recent fabrication (see People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d
10 [1993]; People v McClean, 69 NY2d 426 [1987]; People v Davis,
44 NY2d 269 [1978]).  In such a case, a consistent statement made
before the motive to fabricate arose may be admissible (see
McDaniel, 81 NY2d at 16; McClean, 69 NY2d at 428; Davis, 44 NY2d
at 277-278).  As stated by one commentator, "[e]ven when the
witness' credibility is attacked by proof of inconsistent
statements, the witness' credibility cannot be supported by proof
of consistent statements.  The inconsistency is not removed by
the fact that the witness has also made consistent statements,
and consequently the consistent statements may not be shown"
(Richardson on Evidence § 519 [10th ed]).  
In rejecting defendants' claims that the trial court
permitted improper bolstering of the testimony, the majority
calls this redirect examination proper rehabilitation.  In
support of this conclusion, they rely on People v Regina (19 NY2d
65, 77 [1966]) and  People v Torre (42 NY2d 1036, 1038 [1977]),
both of which can be distinguished from the instant case.  In
Regina, the prosecution witness was asked one question to clarify
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an answer given on cross-examination.  On cross-examination, a
detective was asked whether he made any notes "that night," and
he replied "no."  On redirect by the prosecutor, the detective
was asked if he had ever made any notes of the occurrence and he
answered that he had done so three days later.  In Torre, the
Court held that where only part of a statement is drawn out on
cross-examination, the other parts may be introduced on redirect
examination so that the statement may be explained or clarified. 
In the instant case, the court permitted improper
bolstering.  This was not a case of clarifying or explaining a
statement only partially examined by opposing counsel.  This was
an attempt to recast the entire testimony of two witnesses who
had given many versions of the crime and surrounding events.  
The fact that the court permitted such bolstering by
the prosecutor severely prejudiced the defendants and cannot be
viewed as harmless error in a case in which the evidence was not
overwhelming and depended on the credibility of two witnesses who
were admitted drug users and in a place Ruballo described as a
"crack house."  This error standing alone is a basis for reversal
where preserved.
Next I turn to the issue of the juror note.  By
conducting an ex parte conference with a deliberating juror, in
response to the juror's note, without providing prior notice of
the note to counsel, the trial court erred.
CPL 310.30 sets forth the procedure to be followed by
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the court when a note is received from a deliberating jury.  The
instruction is very clear and it would have been very simple for
the court to have followed the dictates of this statute.  The
majority excuses the failure to do so by saying that the judge
acted within his discretion and that this was "nothing more than
an inquiry of a ministerial nature", citing People v Hameed (88
NY2d 232 [1996]).  Hameed was wholly different from the case at
bar.  It involved a juror's inquiry about whether she would be
permitted to attend church while the jury was sequestered. It is
the only case cited by the majority which is clearly a
ministerial inquiry.  None of the other cases relied upon by the
majority are on point. They are cases in which defendant was not
present but defense counsel was present or had an opportunity to
have input in the jury instruction.  In People v Lykes (81 NY2d
767 [1993]), the judge sent a note to the jury seeking
clarification of their inquiry.  Unlike the instant case, both
defendant and defense counsel were given an opportunity to
participate before any instruction was given to the jury.  In
People v Collins (99 NY2d 14 [2002]), the defendant was not
present during the drafting of the verdict sheet but his counsel
was present (see also People v Harris, 76 NY2d 810 [1990] [where
the judge along with the prosecutor and defense counsel went to
the door of the jury room and judge asked whether the request for
the readback of testimony was for the victim]).   
Whether a jury note is a ministerial or substantive
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inquiry can vary depending on the circumstances of the particular
case.  In this case where the note comes one hour after the jury
has announced that it has reached a verdict, following three days
of deliberation and two notes declaring a deadlock, this court
had every reason to believe that the verdict was a problem to at
least one juror. 
In addition, the action taken by the court cannot be
justified by facts which come to light as a result of the
inquiry.  The court's response must be driven by inferences which
can reasonably be drawn before the inquiry is conducted.  Under
these circumstances it was error to fail to treat the note as a
potentially "serious substantive inquiry" and thus apply the
safeguards mandated by People v O'Rama (78 NY2d 270 [1991]).
Accordingly, I would reverse the orders of the
Appellate Division and remit to Supreme Court for retrial.
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In each case:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges
Graffeo, Read and Smith concur.  Judge Jones dissents and votes
to reverse and order a new trial in an opinion in which Chief
Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick concur.
Decided February 16, 2010
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No. 22 and 23
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *  *
In each case:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges
Graffeo, Read and Smith concur.  Judge Jones dissents and votes
to reverse and order a new trial in an opinion in which Chief
Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick concur.
Decided February 16, 2010