Case Title: Matter of Rigolosi

Citation: 107 N.J. 192, 526 A.2d 670

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1987-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
107 N.J. 192 (1987) 526 A.2d 670 IN THE MATTER OF VINCENT P. RIGOLOSI, AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued September 23, 1986. Decided June 10, 1987. *193 Thomas J. McCormick, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of Office of Attorney Ethics. Morrill J. Cole argued the cause for respondent (Cole, Schotz, Bernstein, Meisel & Forman, attorneys). PER CURIAM. This matter arises out of an attempt to bribe a state policeman into dropping charges against a criminal defendant with ties to organized crime. The proposed means of effectuating the ruse was through the filing of a false police report and the failure of the policeman to identify the defendant. In the present case, the Honorable Charles Joelson, sitting as a Special Ethics Master (the Master), made detailed findings of fact, which were reviewed by the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB). Other facts are recounted in the companion case, In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168 (1987), and in State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 650 (1984). For our purposes, we shall summarize some of the background information. Respondent was a long-time friend and business partner of Donald Conway in a building in Hackensack in which their respective law offices were located. He also was a friend of the Barcellona family and had performed legal services for Joseph Barcellona, who owned the Surf Club in Ortley Beach, Dover Township, and Joey's Place, a restaurant in Clifton. In addition, respondent was an old friend of Joseph Lazaro, who was Joseph Barcellona's cousin and the nephew of Sam Lazzara. Lazaro also was a sergeant in the state police and a friend of another state trooper, Denis McDowell. *194 Around 3:00 a.m. on July 19, 1981, Philip Lombardo, Jr. became involved in an altercation at the Surf Club with McDowell, who was off-duty. McDowell filed charges against Lombardo for possession of tear gas, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4, simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, and resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2. At the time, Lombardo threatened McDowell by asserting that he was a member of an organized crime family, subsequently identified as the Vito Genovese family. McDowell arrested Lombardo, who retained Conway as his lawyer. On July 21, Lazaro called McDowell and asked him to come to Barcellona's apartment at the Surf Club. While at the apartment and before Barcellona arrived, Lazaro told McDowell that Lombardo was "a member of the Vito Genovese family" and McDowell understood "that there might be some danger to my family." The next evening, July 22, 1981, Barcellona called McDowell to set up a meeting on July 24. McDowell reported the events to a superior in the State Police, who advised him to record future conversations with Barcellona. Barcellona and Lazaro met on July 24, 1984, with McDowell in Barcellona's apartment at the Surf Club to discuss the strategy for the dismissal of the charges, including the filing of a misleading report of the altercation with Lombardo. McDowell recorded Lazaro's statement that Lombardo's father has "been in the * * Vito Genovese family for a long, long time." Lazaro related that Alfred Grecco (sometimes known as Al Washnick) had approached Barcellona and said, "Joe, if you could do this for us, anything the kid [McDowell][1] wants, he's got. We're talking five, ten. You name it, whatever." As summarized by the Special Ethics Master, Without including every detail of the July 24 conversation, the Special Ethics Master concluded Later that night, at 2:15 a.m., McDowell called Lazaro and said he could "make a soft report that would leave, give them a lot a loopholes." McDowell added, however, that he wanted "assurance" from Lombardo, Sr. "that whatever story we agree on he [Lombardo, Jr.] sticks to." Thereafter Grecco paid $5,000 to Lazarra, who delivered it to his nephew, Barcellona, who, in turn, gave it to Lazaro. On July 25 Lazaro paid $5,000 to McDowell, who gave $100 back to Lazaro. In exchange for the payment, which was to be followed by another $5,000 when the charges were dropped, McDowell who had delayed filing his initial report, which was detailed and identified Lombardo as the assailant was to file an altered report that would enable him to decline to identify Lombardo. On July 20, 1981, after he was retained by Lombardo, Conway consulted respondent, whom Conway knew to be friendly with Barcellona. Conway, who was contemplating a countersuit against Barcellona and the Surf Club, told respondent that Lombardo's father was a "mobster * * * of some importance in that area." Respondent immediately called Barcellona to introduce him to Conway in order to resolve the matter amicably. In addition to acting as "peace maker," respondent was motivated by Lombardo's threat of retribution against Barcellona. Conway and Barcellona first met on July 22 in respondent's office. According to respondent, he learned at that time that there were factual differences between Lombardo's and McDowell's versions of the altercation. For example, Lombardo *196 contended he hit McDowell with a styrofoam coffee cup, but McDowell asserted that it was with a container of mace. Barcellona stated that it was for McDowell to decide whether to withdraw the complaint, and that he would ask Lazaro, who had an apartment in the Surf Club, to approach McDowell. Barcellona subsequently stated at the July 24 meeting with McDowell and Lazaro that respondent had assured him he could talk with Conway on the 22nd because Conway was a friend who would not "put anything on paper." Barcellona quoted respondent as saying, "and the guy [Conway] actually begged me to say anything that could be done. He says I mean anything." Although respondent denied making any such remarks to Barcellona, the Special Ethics Master resolved the conflict against respondent. At the conclusion of the meeting, Conway, Barcellona, and respondent agreed to meet again at respondent's office on July 28. According to respondent, in a telephone conversation on that date, however, Barcellona told him that the meeting was "not necessary" because Barcellona had spoken to Lazaro, "and everything is going to be O.K., or he [Barcellona] may have said, and McDowell is going to withdraw the charges." Respondent then related that information to Conway. Between July 28 and August 19, respondent stated he had no further involvement in the matter, in part because he was away from his office from August 13-18 due to the death of his brother-in-law in an automobile accident in Nevada. In respondent's absence, the plot proceeded. On July 28, McDowell showed Lazaro his altered report with "a lot of grey area about whether or not I [McDowell] was sure that the guy I grabbed was the guy that squirted me." The next night, July 29, McDowell met with Lazaro and Barcellona, who compared the altered version with a copy of the initial report, the original of which McDowell said he had shredded. When confronted on August 16 with tapes of conversations with McDowell, Lazaro confessed his wrongdoing. He agreed *197 to assist the State Police in their continuing investigation by taping future conversations. We concur with the statement of the DRB, based on the findings of the Special Ethics Master, that the evidence is "insufficient to prove respondent knew of, assisted or encouraged in advance the change by McDowell of his initial report * * * or the bribery of McDowell." But there is more, and respondent's subsequent conduct places him, if not in the center, alongside those in the web of deceit. Which brings us to the events of August 19, 1981. As summarized by the DRB: Later on August 19, respondent received another call from Barcellona, who asked that respondent and Conway meet with him and Lazaro that evening. The four met at Joey's Place and, pursuant to his agreement with the State Police, Lazaro recorded the conversation. Respondent's role as an adviser to the other conspirators becomes apparent from their conversation that evening in the upstairs room of Joey's Place: When Lazaro returned, Rigolosi read the report to the others, during which Conway stated, "[a]ll right, we're in good shape." In response to an inquiry from Lazaro at the conclusion of the reading of the report whether "the line-up is a good idea ...", Rigolosi responded, "that becomes more consistent. That report, that's what I was askin ya earlier is his failure to identify in a lineup consistent with what he says happened that night. If that's what he says happened that night." Conway said, "[t]his is fine," and Rigolosi responded, "[t]he line-up (inaudible) might not be bad." At the conclusion of the dinner meeting, respondent left with Lazaro. As explained by the DRB: The Master found that "the content of the conversation casts a dark shadow" on respondent's explanation that he accepted the telephone call in order to get rid of Lazaro. The DRB report continues: Both the Master and the DRB found that respondent violated various provisions of the former Disciplinary Rules, which were in effect in 1981. Those Rules have since been succeeded by the current Rules of Professional Conduct, which are substantially similar to the former rules. Like the Master and the DRB, we evaluate respondent's conduct under the Disciplinary Rules, indicating also the comparable provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct now in effect. Both the Master and the DRB found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3), which provides that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law;" DR 1-102(A)(4), which provided that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;" and DR 1-102(A)(5), which provided that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." In reaching that result, the Master found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent, although he did not know in advance of the attempt to persuade McDowell to alter his report or of the attempt to bribe McDowell, The DRB joined in that conclusion and concluded further that Finding that "[r]espondent failed miserably in his obligations as a responsible member of the bar," three members of the *205 Board recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two years. Three other members of the Board found substantial factors in mitigation of respondent's conduct. In this regard, the DRB report states: The remaining three members of the DRB disqualified themselves from participating in the matter, with the result that the voting members of the DRB were evenly divided whether respondent should be publicly reprimanded or suspended. This matter inevitably enlists a comparison to the companion case, In re Conway, supra, 107 N.J. 168. Both attorneys became implicated in events initiated by others. Both were indicted for alleged criminal conduct, and Conway was convicted of conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, and tampering with a witness, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a(1), (2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. Respondent was acquitted of all charges. Conway, although he had not previously represented Lombardo, was acting as his attorney with respect to criminal charges. Respondent, who had previously represented Barcellona, was not acting as his attorney, but as an unpaid mediator. Conway's role in fixing the case against Lombardo was active; respondent's role consisted of that of an intermediary between Barcellona and Conway. He restricted himself to advising and counselling Barcellona, Lazaro, and Conway. The abiding question is whether respondent may be distinguished from Conway, whose disbarment is virtually compelled by his criminal convictions for conspiracy and *206 tampering with a witness. Those convictions "conclusively establish that [Conway] was an active co-conspirator and actual participant in the criminal scheme to alter and use the falsified police report and to have the arresting police officer give false testimony with respect to the identification of [Conway's] client." In re Conway, 107 N.J. at 664, supra. At the outset, we recognize that the same reasoning does not apply to respondent, who was acquitted of all criminal charges. Nonetheless, we recognize also that "[a]cquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct." In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 418 (1962). Accord In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 (1972) (attorney indicted for bribing a police officer was disbarred notwithstanding acquittal of criminal charges because of insanity); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178, 184 (1976) (despite acquittal on criminal charges, court found evidence clearly and convincingly linked respondent to bribery and ordered disbarment). The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding, as distinguished from a criminal prosecution, is not so much to punish a wrongdoer as it is to protect the public from an untrustworthy lawyer. In re Pennica, supra, 36 N.J. at 418-19. Significantly, the standard of proof is different. In a criminal prosecution, the charges must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but in a disciplinary proceeding, they need be proven only by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 419. Thus, our task is to determine from an independent review of the record, notwithstanding respondent's acquittal of the criminal charges, whether it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, DR 1-102(A)(3); RPC 8.4(b); engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, DR 1-102(A)(4); RPC 8.4(c); and engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, DR 1-102(A)(5); RPC 8.4(d). Our review of the record leaves us with no doubt that respondent has violated those Rules. The proof, most of it *207 from respondent's own mouth, reveals, as the Master found, "that respondent joined and participated in a conspiracy in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2." Although the DRB agreed with the Master's conclusion that respondent "joined and participated in the scheme," its decision turned not on respondent's role as a co-conspirator, but on his knowledge "that there was a criminal scheme afoot to thwart the administration of justice * * *." Because respondent was an officer of the court, the DRB concluded that "[a]t the very least, respondent should have unequivocally informed Lazaro that he wanted no part of this activity." Notwithstanding that the DRB was "unanimous in its conclusion that respondent's misconduct warrants public discipline," three members voted in favor of a public reprimand. Noting that this was the only disciplinary proceeding against respondent in his twenty-seven years as a lawyer, they viewed the misconduct as consisting "of a single incident fostered by a misguided attempt to mediate possible cross complaints and adverse civil consequences to a long time friend and client. There was no pecuniary gain to respondent." These members were understandably impressed by "[r]espondent's reputation in the legal and civic community and his years of service to the community and his profession * * *." We share that impression. Respondent has served as county counsel for Bergen County, mayor of the City of Garfield, president of the Bergen County Bar Association, and assistant secretary of the State Constitutional Convention of 1966. He has also served as the attorney, prosecutor, or public defender for various municipalities and other public bodies. Citizens, clients, attorneys, and public officials have written numerous letters on his behalf. For these reasons, three members of the DRB recommended a public reprimand. Notwithstanding those mitigating factors, we have a different view of the appropriate sanction. Our difference follows not from any lack of appreciation of respondent's participation in civic, political, and governmental activities. Rather, the point of difference is our perception of the significance of respondent's *208 role in the attempt to bribe the state trooper into filing a false report. Our perception differs also from that of the three members of the DRB who thought respondent should be suspended. Although they recognized "[r]espondent knowingly participated in and aided the completion of a scheme to subvert the criminal process," they viewed him as a spectator, not a participant. Hence, they focused on his obligation as an officer of the court to declare his disassociation from the scheme and to inform appropriate law enforcement authorities. Our reading of the record leads us to conclude, however, that respondent played a more sinister part. He was not just an innocent bystander or dupe. We need not dwell on his motivation for participating in the scheme. His own words spoken at the table in the upstairs room of Joey's Place make clear not only that he was aware of the alteration of the police report but also that he counselled his co-conspirators. At various times he spoke at the meeting, introducing his comments with such phrases as: These are not the words of a spectator, but those of a participant. They do not reflect doubt or dismay at the prospect of dismissal of criminal charges through improper means, but a desire to further that result. That respondent knew of the bribe is made painfully clear from his question to Lazaro when they were alone in the car, whether the payment of money from Grecco to Lazzara to Lazaro to McDowell was handled "clean enough." Respondent's "only reason" his words for asking the question was to be sure that McDowell had not heard his name. *209 We conclude that for disciplinary purposes, respondent cannot be distinguished from Conway. We will never know why the jury in the criminal case convicted Conway and acquitted Rigolosi. Perhaps the previously mentioned differences in their roles, when measured against the standard applicable in criminal cases, that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, led the jury to acquit respondent. The standard applicable in disciplinary cases, that the culpability of the defendant must be established by clear and convincing evidence, however, is lower. We have no doubt that this standard has been met. As in Conway, Before the Master, respondent testified that at the time of the events in question he was familiar with In re Friedland, 59 N.J. 209 (1971), and sought to adhere to its dictates. If respondent was familiar with that opinion, his conduct reflects not an adherence to, but a betrayal of, the admonitions in that opinion pertaining to the ethical obligations of an attorney seeking a dismissal of a criminal case when the defendant and the complainant have reached a settlement of a related civil claim. In Friedland, we stated, "[i]n the future, should an attorney wish to have complaints dismissed by his client he must first go before the prosecutor and a judge and make a full and open *210 disclosure of the nature of the charges and the terms, if any, under which the dismissal is sought." 59 N.J. at 220. Rather than complying with that requirement, respondent and Conway sought to procure a dismissal not by making "a full and open disclosure" of the charges and terms of the dismissal, but by corrupting the complainant into lying to the prosecutor and the court. Respondent's conduct reveals a flaw running so deep that he can never again be permitted to practice law. This is not a case of a novice who had not yet had opportunity to develop a sense of ethics. Respondent was an attorney steeped in the ways of law, government, and politics. No amount of good works can save someone who, with all the knowledge and experience that he accumulated, "poisons the well of justice." As with Conway, Our dissenting colleague accepts the fact that respondent knew of the scheme to falsify the police report and recognizes that respondent's dereliction requires serious discipline. In stopping short of disbarment, however, the dissent is ambivalent whether to accept the well-established principle that a "criminal acquittal does not itself preclude the imposition of an ethical sanction when the totality of the circumstances plainly mainfests an unethical, although not criminal, violation," post at 211, or to follow its own desire "to err on the side of the jury on the crucial question of whether respondent joined in the corrupt scheme," post at 211. We do not share the doubts of the dissent. The law is clear that a criminal acquittal does not exonerate an attorney from discipline, and the facts lead clearly and convincingly to the result that respondent was part of the conspiracy. *211 Respondent's participation was not limited to one meeting on August 19, 1981. His familiarity with some of the participants Conway, Lazara, and Barcellona went back years and covered a variety of personal, professional, and business transactions. Lombardo was, or claimed to be, part of the Genovese family, and, as the dissent states, Barcellona, respondent's friend and sometimes client, wanted to settle a score with that family. Furthermore, respondent's role was not limited to the events of August 19, 1981. His involvement began in July and extended into the month of September. Knowing that $5,000 had been paid to bribe a State policeman to file a false report, respondent counselled the co-conspirators on how best to arrange for dismissal of the criminal charges that were the subject of the report. His conduct, which involved dishonesty, fraud, and deceit, and which was prejudicial to the administration of justice, reflects his unfitness to practice law. Under the circumstances, we have no alternative but to order the disbarment of respondent. He shall reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs, including the costs of transcripts. So ordered. O'HERN, J., dissenting. I dissent from the judgment of disbarment in this case primarily for the reasons I stated in In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168 (1987), also decided today. Here, as there, I find an important factor in my judgment to be the uneven application of our precedent in similar disciplinary cases. But here we do more than depart from precedent. We disbar an attorney exonerated by a jury of any criminal involvement in the corrupt scheme detailed in Conway, supra, 107 N.J. 168. I recognize that a criminal acquittal does not of itself preclude the imposition of an ethical sanction when the totality of the circumstances plainly manifests an unethical, although not *212 criminal, violation. In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401 (1962). But when the central issue of ethical failure is so closely intertwined with the jury's finding of innocence on a single, crucial factual issue, respect for the meaning of trial by jury compels me not to impeach the jury's verdict. For here, as in Conway, the dominating event is the meeting of August 19, 1981, requested by Sergeant Lazaro, at the direction of his superiors in the State Police, to solicit involvement of the lawyers in advancement of the bribery scheme that had been unearthed. At the secretly taped meeting, Sergeant Lazaro, a childhood friend of respondent Rigolosi, feigned to present McDowell's proposed testimony. The jury must have believed that Rigolosi, although knowing McDowell was changing his story, did not know that McDowell had been bribed to change his story and that discussion of McDowell's story was not aiding and effectuating the act of bribery. On the other hand, it is obvious and incontestable, as the Special Master and the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) found, that respondent knew that grave ethical questions surrounded the use of such testimony. We have disciplined attorneys even for suggesting that the processes of justice are for sale. In re Milita, 99 N.J. 336 (1985). We expect lawyers to adhere to conduct that does not permit even inferences of dishonesty. Respondent had to know that his involvement in this episode, however motivated, could not help but be seen as casting doubt upon the integrity of the criminal judicial process. Hence, discipline is in order but what discipline? Even respondent's most troubling statement to Lazaro on the way home after the August 19th dinner "was that handled clean enough, that ah, you know?" evokes the ethical ambiguity that our cases have sought to dispel. Does that ambiguity demonstrate the total failure of character that is the premise for disbarment in the absence of conviction of serious crime? It is not possible to read the transcript of these proceedings or of the trial without some sense of doubt in reaching the conclusion that respondent must be disbarred. There is no *213 unerring evidence that demonstrates that defendant has an utterly "unsalvageable professional character," or is "beyond the pale of professional rehabilitation." In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 376, 377 (1985). So uncertain were the State Police investigators of the meaning of the August 19, 1981, meeting and conversations that they believed it was necessary to gain further evidence to demonstrate criminal involvement. On this aspect of the case, the DRB agreed "with the finding of the Special Ethics Master that the proofs were insufficient to show that respondent knew of, assisted or encouraged in advance either the change by McDowell of his initial report or the bribery of McDowell." It was not until Lazaro spoke to Rigolosi on the way home after the August 19th meeting that respondent had to know that a corrupt plan was unfolding. Hence the State Police continued to call respondent to try to enmesh him further in the disposition of the case. It is quite clear that during the September 2, 1981, solicitation respondent refused to speak to Sergeant Lazaro until Conway came upstairs. By this time the lawyers were obviously suspicious of the conduct of Sergeant Lazaro. The Chairman of the DRB questioned whether the conversation showed anything other than respondent "trying to distance himself and unload Luzzaro [sic]." What exactly did that conversation prove? Did the respondent, knowing of the evil intentions of Lazaro, fail to act in accordance with law or ethical duty? The jury acquitted respondent of failure to act in accordance with law. But the Special Master found, and the DRB concurred, that respondent "joined and participated in the scheme, although it may have originally been contrived by others." This finding is plainly inconsistent with the jury verdict. As noted, since all panels agree that Rigolosi had no prior knowledge of the bribe, the crucial question is what did respondent do after the night of August 19, 1981? The predicate for the DRB's conclusion was this: If that is the finding, what is the appropriate degree of discipline that we should impose upon an attorney who does not take affirmative steps to prevent the imposition of a fraud upon a tribunal. To my knowledge this is the first time that we have undertaken to measure the meaning of the duty imposed upon a non-party lawyer. Cf. In re Yaccarino, 101 N.J. 342 (1985) (client's disclosure of his plan to destroy evidence to other attorneys permits client's attorney to reveal evidence of criminal plan to proper authority). Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(2) requires an attorney to reveal information necessary to prevent his or her client from committing "a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal." Even in that direct context attorneys are told to be watchful that they not adopt "the role of judge or jury to determine the facts," United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3rd Cir.1977), lest the client be deprived of independent advocacy. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, ___, 106 S. Ct. 988, 1006, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123, 149 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Rule poses a challenge for attorneys: In some cases the fraud is transparent, making the choice clear; in others it may not be so. It is easy for us to conclude that respondent should have turned everyone in now that we know that McDowell was bribed. How then should we approach the issue of discipline under this Rule? So uncertain is our precedent that the DRB was divided in its judgment of the appropriate discipline. Three members of the Board recommended two years of suspension. But the report also stated: Hence, I am even more troubled by the inconsistency of our precedent than in Conway. How strange it must seem that our most respected board of attorney discipline should fall so far from the Court's mark. This respondent has been found innocent of crime. In the span of cases that preceded the Verdiramo *216 decision,[2] in In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50 (1983), an attorney convicted of misusing another's property was given a three-year suspension; in In re Rosen, 88 N.J. 1 (1981), an attorney convicted of attempted subornation of perjury was suspended for three years; and in In re Mirabelli, 79 N.J. 597 (1979), an attorney who pled guilty to a charge of bribery was given a three-year suspension. I point out this precedent not because it commends itself to being followed, but because of the inconsistency it displays. As I explained in Conway, I have arrived at this judgment by a different route from that of the other members of the Court. But even if I approached this question as does the majority, I would assign a pre-eminent value to the meaning of trial by jury. In cases like this, when the State has candidly acknowledged its use of State officials to engage others in the commission of crime (and I imply no criticism of that regrettably necessary means of law enforcement), it may be better to err on the side of the jury on the crucial question of whether respondent joined in the corrupt scheme. There is no pristine truth in this case. There are no heroes: not the moonlighting State Police officer; not the veteran State Police sergeant who passed the bribe on to the young State trooper, not the bribers, and regrettably not respondents Conway or Rigolosi who knew that McDowell was changing his story. There is blame enough for all concerned. Although innocent of the plan to bribe, both attorneys could not help but know that with the admitted overtones of organized criminal activity (Conway's client, Lombardo, injected this issue into the case by threatening McDowell with reprisals), the last thing that could be tolerated was any suggestion of acquiescence in wrongdoing or favoritism. Lawyers know the only way to deal *217 with such matters. See In re Friedland, 59 N.J. 209 (1971). Hence I regard the ethical infraction as grave, and therefore view it as warranting a three-year suspension. For disbarment Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI 4. Dissenting Justice O'HERN 1. It is ORDERED that VINCENT P. RIGOLOSI of HACKENSACK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1959, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective July 1, 1987; and it is further ORDERED that VINCENT P. RIGOLOSI be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further ORDERED that respondent comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs. [1] As an aid to comprehension, unclear references to various individuals will be supplemented with an identification of those individuals. [1] I am not too sure of the relevance of the DRB's reference to this provision. The law has always carefully circumscribed criminal culpability for inchoate crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1d provides a defense for one who has previously participated in and subsequently renounced a criminal attempt, not a duty; 2C:5-2f(3) is to the same effect for one who has participated in criminal conspiracy. The finding here is that defendant had not previously participated in a criminal conspiracy. More to the point is N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (obstructing administration of law or other governmental function), although that section does not apply to "failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions." (Emphasis added). [2] In In re Verdiramo, 96 N.J. 183 (1984), I concluded that the Court had adopted a clear precedent, applicable to cases occurring after that date, that conviction of serious crimes, particularly those involving dishonesty, would almost invariably warrantment disbarment. However, the Rigolosi incident occurred before the decision in Verdiramo.