Case Title: State v. Thomas

Citation: 205 N.W.2d 717

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1973-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
205 N.W.2d 717 (1973) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Larry Ray THOMAS, Appellant. No. 54527. Supreme Court of Iowa. March 28, 1973. *718 Richard A. Knock, Cedar Falls, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Allen J. Lukehart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David Dutton, Black Hawk County Atty., for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES, UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. This matter is here because defendant says the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty to the crime of robbery with aggravation, committed in violation of section 711.2, The Code, 1966. We affirm the trial court. While the charge against defendant was pending, he filed a motion asking that his competency to stand trial be determined by a hearing under chapter 783, The Code, 1966. This motion was granted, and a jury found defendant competent. The case was then set for trial. On the day trial was to begin, defendant appeared before the court and stated his desire to enter a plea of guilty. Defendant's attorneywho also represents him herevigorously objected and recommended that the court reject the plea. After interrogation by the court, defendant was permitted to plead guilty. Thereafter, again over the objections of his attorney, he was sentenced to a term not to *719 exceed 25 years in the penitentiary, as provided in section 711.2, The Code, 1966. Defendant seeks a reversal on the single assignment his guilty plea was invalid because there were circumstances before the trial court raising a reasonable doubt as to his competency. He relies strongly on Hickey v. District Court of Kossuth County, 174 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1970) and State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969). The issue, then, is whether there were circumstances present which made it incumbent upon the trial court to demand further demonstration of defendant's competency before accepting the proffered plea. Although one might think otherwise, the issue is confused, rather than clarified, by the determination of defendant's competency to stand trial by the aforementioned proceeding under section 783.1, The Code, just a month before the guilty plea was entered. This finding gives rise to defendant's principal complaintthat the trial court took the jury verdict as conclusive on the question of his competency to enter a guilty plea. Defendant insists this violates the Sisco precepts, which require the trial court to personally make a determination of the validity of the plea when it is tendered and which forbid delegation of that obligation to anyone else, including a jury. In Sisco we said: In case there still remained any uncertainty about the trial court's duty, we added this at 169 N.W.2d, page 549: Defendant would liken this case to Hickey v. District Court of Kossuth County, supra, but we believe the two are easily distinguishable. In Hickey we held the trial court erred in accepting a guilty plea without a prior determination of defendant's competency under circumstances which raised a reasonable doubt of his mental capacity to "understand the nature of the proceedings against him and appreciate the consequences of his guilty plea." (174 N.W.2d at 410.) In Hickey there was evidence defendant had been committed to a mental hospital from which he had not been discharged. The record was virtually silent as to the nature of his mental illness, the treatment rendered, or his condition at the time of his plea. On those facts, we held further investigation to establish defendant's mental competency was obligatory before his guilty plea could be taken. In the Hickey case we spelled out the reasonable doubt which must exist in order to require such a prior determination. We said at 174 N.W.2d, pages 409 and 410: * * * * * * We do not believe the present case falls factually within the Hickey rule. In the case at bar defendant's competency was submitted to a jury under section 783.1, The Code; in Hickey it was not. In the case at bar the trial court had the benefit of medical reports which were made available by stipulation of counsel; in Hickey this was not true. Here, too, the nature of defendant's illness was described, its effects detailed, and several medical opinionsconflictingconcerning the extent of his recovery were expressed; none of this was true in Hickey. The most troublesome problem confronting us is the effect to be given a competency determination under section 783.1 when a guilty plea is later tendered. Defendant says the trial court treated it as conclusive, and we agree this is true. Defendant then argues this is the type of delegation of the trial court's duty which Sisco expressly forbids, and again we agree. We hold such a determination is a factor to be considered, but is not controlling. Returning momentarily to our Hickey opinion, we observe we were there concerned principally with the import of section 783.1, but we neither announced nor implied that was the only course open to the trial court. In fact we clearly indicated the contrary by this language at 174 N. W.2d, page 410: While at first glance there may appear to be some conflict between the constitutional requirements of due process laid down in Sisco and the statutory provisions of section 783.1 emphasized in Hickey, we believe they are entirely reconcilable and consistent. If conflict does exist, it must, of course, be resolved in favor of the Sisco standards, since we have declared them to be vital to due process. By this somewhat circuitous route we return to our immediate problem. Does the fact the trial court erroneously considered the jury determination of defendant's competency as binding demand a reversal? We hold it does not. *721 When constitutional safeguards are involved, we are obliged to make our own evaluation of the totality of the circumstances under which rulings on those rights were made. If we find a defendant's constitutional rights were not infringed, he is not entitled to reversal. Our task, therefore, is to examine all the circumstances before the trial court to determine if there then existed reasonable doubt as to defendant's competency to plead guilty to the crime of which he stood accused. Under varying factual situations we have announced our obligation to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances upon which a waiver of constitutional rights depends. Of course, a guilty plea waives a number of those rights, as pointed out in State v. Sisco, supra, and State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa 1971). As support for this rule, see State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa opinion filed March 28, 1973); State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Iowa 1971); State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Iowa 1970); and State v. McClelland, 164 N.W.2d 189, 196 (Iowa 1969). We have reviewed the record and carefully examined the transcript of proceedings at the time the plea was entered and also when sentence was pronounced. We have already said the jury verdict of competency is entitled to consideration. We also recognize the rule that a person's mental condition, once shown, is presumed to have continued until the contrary appears. State v. Allan, 166 N.W.2d 752, 758 (Iowa 1969); Davidson v. Piper, 221 Iowa 171, 174, 265 N.W. 107, 109 (1936); In re Brigham's Estate, 144 Iowa 71, 81, 120 N.W. 1054, 1058 (1909); 1 Jones on Evidence, section 3:83 (Sixth Ed. 1972); 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 56 (1945). Of course the finding of competency was for the limited statutory purpose set out in section 783.1, but it is that very limited purpose with which we are concerned. By agreement of counsel, the court also had before it the conflicting medical reports of doctors who had treated defendant and who had testified at the competency trial. Further the interrogation of defendant by the trial court reveals nothing to suggest his inability to understand the charges against him or appreciate the consequences of his plea. We set out the important parts of that interrogation: * * * * * * The trial court then accepted defendant's guilty plea, and we believe it properly did so. We find no basis for the argument that there were circumstances raising a reasonable doubt as to his competency to plead guilty. Perhaps we should mention we have not disregarded the fact defendant refused the urgent advice of his attorney, which he apparently feels is of great significance. However, the decision on how to plead belongs to defendant. Section 777.12, The Code. We said in State v. Rife, 260 Iowa 598, 602, 149 N.W.2d 846, 848 (1967) that the decision how to plead is "one for the defendant." We repeated that statement with apparent approval in the recent cases of State v. Kelley, 195 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Iowa 1972) and Walker v. Brewer, 189 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Iowa 1971). The fact that he did not agree with counsel does not suggest incompetency. In view of our conclusion defendant entered a valid plea of guilty, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.