Case Title: Vega v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13182

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13182 
 
JORGE L. VEGA  vs.  COMMONWEALTH (and a consolidated case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 4, 2022. - July 11, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Constitutional Law, Preventive detention.  
Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees.  Firearms.  
Practice, Criminal, Hearsay.  Evidence, Hearsay, Relevancy 
and materiality. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 26, 2021, and June 15, 2021. 
 
 
Following transfer to the Appeals Court, the cases were 
heard by Sydney Hanlon, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted applications for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey A. Garland, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also 
present) for Jorge L. Vega. 
 
Mackenzie Slyman & Abigail H. Salois, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. 
 
Darren T. Griffis, for Bob Nuah, was present but did not 
argue. 
 
1 Bob Nuah vs. Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
Joshua M. Daniels & Lisa J. Steele, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell, for Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
LOWY, J.  These cases concern whether a person charged with 
unlawful possession of a firearm may be held without bail under 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, which provides for the pretrial detention 
of defendants deemed a danger to an individual or the community.  
The statute applies only to defendants accused of the criminal 
activity specified in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1), including 
unlicensed possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  A 
defendant accused of a listed criminal activity may be held 
before trial if a judge finds by clear and convincing evidence, 
after a hearing, that "no conditions of release will reasonably 
assure the safety of any other person or the community."  G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (3). 
The defendants here were charged with unlicensed firearm 
possession pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and held before 
trial on the ground of dangerousness.2  They argue that including 
unlicensed firearm possession as a predicate offense violates 
substantive and procedural due process.  They also assert that 
 
 
2 Although Jorge L. Vega and Bob Nuah commenced these 
actions by filing petitions in the county court, for 
convenience, we refer to them as the defendants. 
3 
 
there was insufficient evidence of their dangerousness.  We 
disagree with both arguments and therefore affirm.3 
 
Background.  The following facts are taken from the 
evidence that the Commonwealth presented in support of its 
motions to detain the defendants on the ground of dangerousness. 
1.  Jorge Vega.  On May 8, 2021, at approximately 3 A.M., 
Boston police officers were positioned at a barricade to block 
nonresidents from entering a housing development in response to 
complaints about all-terrain vehicles driving loudly in the area 
when Jorge Vega approached the barricade in a car.  An officer 
signaled with his hands and verbally commanded Vega to stop.  
Vega looked at the officer but drove through the barricade 
toward the end of the dead-end street.  He stopped when officers 
followed.  Vega told officers in response to their inquiry that 
he did not have his driver's license with him.  The officers 
ordered a tow truck for the car and, during an inventory search 
of the vehicle, found a loaded firearm in the glove compartment. 
 
A criminal complaint issued against Vega out of the Boston 
Municipal Court.  The complaint charged Vega with possessing a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), among other 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice. 
4 
 
crimes.4  The Commonwealth moved for pretrial detention based on 
dangerousness pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  At a hearing on 
the motion, the judge considered the testimony of a police 
officer involved in the seizure of the firearm and the arrest of 
the defendant, a police report describing the incident, other 
documentation related to Vega's arrest, the dockets of other 
judicial proceedings against Vega, and police reports regarding 
two of the other proceedings.5 
These other proceedings against Vega involved firearm and 
ammunition possession.  According to the police report about the 
incident leading to one of the pending cases, police recovered 
nine rounds of ammunition from one of Vega's pockets after he 
went to an emergency room with a gunshot wound.6  According to 
the police report about the incident leading to the other 
pending matter, officers learned that Vega was in possession of 
a firearm while he was wearing a global positioning system (GPS) 
 
4 The defendant also was charged with possessing a loaded 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); possessing 
ammunition without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1); resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B; failing to 
stop for police, G. L. c. 90, § 25; failing to have a driver's 
license in his possession while operating a motor vehicle, G. L. 
c. 90, § 11; and driving with a suspended license, G. L. c. 90, 
§ 23. 
 
5 The judge also considered body camera footage from the 
arrest and a paystub showing Vega's employment. 
 
6 Vega later pleaded guilty in that case and was sentenced 
to thirty days in a house of correction. 
5 
 
monitoring bracelet.  The officers found Vega in a car's rear 
passenger's seat; after Vega got out of the car, they saw a 
firearm on the floor beneath the car's rear passenger's seat.7  
The defendant was out on bail in that case on the condition that 
he maintain a curfew of 8 P.M. to 7 A.M when he was arrested in 
the current case at around 3 A.M. 
After reviewing the evidence, a Boston Municipal Court 
judge granted the Commonwealth's motion and ordered that Vega be 
detained on the ground of dangerousness.  Vega filed a petition 
for review in the Superior Court.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (7).  
A Superior Court judge denied the petition after a hearing at 
which the parties presented substantially the same evidence as 
they had in the Boston Municipal Court.  Vega then filed a 
petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
exercising the power provided by that statute, permitted the 
defendant to obtain appellate review and transferred the matter 
for consideration of the merits to a single justice of the 
Appeals Court, who denied Vega's petition.8 
 
7 Vega later pleaded guilty in that case.  He was sentenced 
to eighteen months in a house of correction and three years of 
probation. 
 
8 The single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court 
transferred the matter to a single justice of the Appeals Court 
pursuant to our Order Regarding Transfer of Certain Single 
 
6 
 
Vega appealed from the single justice's decision, and we 
granted his application for direct appellate review. 
2.  Bob Nuah.  Worcester police officers responded to a 
call of a possible gunshot shortly after midnight on May 2, 
2021.  They found four people, including Bob Nuah, sitting in a 
parked car.  There was a bag containing a firearm underneath the 
front passenger's seat and one round of ammunition in the glove 
compartment.  The firearm had been reported stolen. 
A criminal complaint issued against Nuah out of the 
District Court.  The complaint charged Nuah with, among other 
things, possessing a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a).9  The Commonwealth moved to detain Nuah pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
 
Justice Matters During the COVID-19 Pandemic, first par., No. 
OE-144 (June 8, 2020), citing G. L. c. 211, § 4A, and G. L. 
c. 211A, § 12.  See Fadden v. Commonwealth, 376 Mass. 604, 608 
(1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979) (although Supreme 
Judicial Court may not delegate general superintendence power to 
Appeals Court or single justice of Appeals Court, "the single 
justice of [the Supreme Judicial Court] may in a proper case 
exercise the power of general superintendence by allowing 
interlocutory review . . . and then transfer the case to a 
single justice of the Appeals Court for decision on the 
merits"). 
 
9 Nuah also was charged with possessing a loaded firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); possessing ammunition 
without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1); and receiving stolen property of a value not 
exceeding $1,200, G. L. c. 266, § 60. 
7 
 
In support of its motion, the Commonwealth presented Nuah's 
criminal record, police reports and other documentation about 
the arrest in the current case, and police reports about other 
incidents involving Nuah.  Several of the reports about the 
other incidents listed Nuah as being a member of the "Family 
Over Everything" gang.  In one of the incidents described in the 
reports, police officers in North Carolina found multiple 
firearms, including one that had been reported stolen, in a car 
that Nuah was driving. 
For his part, Nuah submitted during the dangerousness 
hearing several letters of support from friends and community 
members. 
A District Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion 
and ordered that Nuah be detained as a danger to the community.  
The judge based this decision on, among other reasons, "[t]he 
defendant's reputation" of being "[g]ang affiliated."  Nuah 
petitioned for Superior Court review of the District Court order 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A (7).  A Superior Court judge 
denied the petition after the parties presented the same 
evidence as they had in the District Court.  In a memorandum of 
decision and order, the judge relied on, among other things, 
Nuah's numerous encounters with police and Nuah being "a known 
gang member in the city of Worcester." 
8 
 
Nuah then filed a petition for relief in the county court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A single justice of the Supreme 
Judicial Court permitted the defendant to obtain appellate 
review and transferred the matter for consideration of the 
merits to a single justice of the Appeals Court, who denied the 
petition.10 
Nuah appealed from the single justice's decision, and we 
granted his application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the 
decisions of the single justice of the Appeals Court for clear 
error of law or abuse of discretion.  See Boisvert v. 
Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 1027, 1028 (2021) (addressing appeals 
from single justice of Supreme Judicial Court); Rule 1.0 of the 
Rules of the Appeals Court, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 
1001 (2020) (petitions transferred from single justice of 
Supreme Judicial Court to single justice of Appeals Court 
proceed as do petitions before single justice of Supreme 
Judicial Court).  Where an appeal "concerns a request for bail 
relief, we also consider the propriety of the underlying bail 
order."  Boisvert, supra, citing Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 
Mass. 691, 697, S.C., 478 Mass. 361 (2017).  "In reviewing both 
the single justice's judgment and the bail judge's order, we 
 
10 The same single justice of the Appeals Court denied the 
petitions in Vega's and Nuah's cases. 
9 
 
. . . consider the legal rights at issue and independently 
determine and apply the law, without deference to their 
respective legal rulings."  Boisvert, supra, quoting Brangan, 
supra. 
2.  Constitutionality of including unlicensed firearm 
possession as a predicate offense.  General Laws c. 276, § 58A, 
provides for the pretrial detention based on dangerousness of 
defendants accused of certain criminal activity.  Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 772 (1996).  Subsection (1) lists 
the relevant criminal activity.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 453 
Mass. 707, 711 (2009).  According to that subsection, and as 
relevant here, the Commonwealth may move for detention based on 
dangerousness if a defendant is "arrested and charged with a 
violation of paragraph (a) . . . of section 10 of chapter 269," 
which penalizes possession without a license of a firearm not in 
one's residence or place of business.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  
The issue presented is whether including that crime as a 
predicate offense violates substantive or procedural due 
process.11 
 
a.  Substantive due process.  Substantive due process 
"prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks 
 
11 Two other firearm possession crimes also are included in 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  Those crimes are not at issue here. 
 
10 
 
the conscience' or interferes with rights 'implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty'" (citations omitted).  Aime v. 
Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993), quoting United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).  "[T]he nature of the 
individual interest at stake determines the standard of review 
that courts apply when deciding whether a challenged statute 
meets the requirements of the due process clause."  Aime, supra.  
Where, as here, freedom from physical restraint before trial is 
involved, we apply strict scrutiny, and a statute will be upheld 
only if it furthers a legitimate and compelling government 
interest and is "narrowly tailored" to further that interest.  
Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 125 (2003), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004), quoting Aime, supra, and citing 
Commonwealth v. Querubin, 440 Mass. 108 (2003).  See LeSage, 
petitioner, 488 Mass. 175, 181 (2021) ("To comply with the 
requirements of substantive due process and satisfy strict 
scrutiny, government conduct that infringes on a fundamental 
right must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling and 
legitimate government interest"). 
The government has a legitimate and compelling interest in 
preventing extremely serious crime by arrestees.  See Salerno, 
481 U.S. at 749-750.  This does not mean that all statutes 
allowing for pretrial detention on the ground of dangerousness 
are constitutional.  Indeed, in Aime, 414 Mass. at 668, 682, we 
11 
 
held that a predecessor to the current dangerousness statute was 
unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it applied to 
"any arrestee" rather than "only to individuals who have been 
arrested for a specific category of serious offenses."  The 
Legislature then enacted a dangerousness statute that applied 
only to defendants accused of certain criminal activity, and we 
concluded that that statute satisfied substantive due process.  
See Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 773, 778, 786-787. 
The version of the statute at issue in the Mendonza case 
did not list unlicensed firearm possession as a predicate 
offense.  See Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 786-787.  See also St. 
1994, c. 68, § 6, inserting G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  Our reasoning 
there is, nevertheless, helpful here because we observed that 
for a predicate offense to satisfy substantive due process it 
must present a "menace of dangerousness."  Mendonza, supra at 
787.  This means that if unlicensed firearm possession presents 
a menace of dangerousness, then including it as a predicate 
offense furthers the legitimate and compelling government 
interest of preventing extremely serious crime by arrestees.  We 
conclude that unlicensed firearm possession is a dangerous 
menace. 
A then Justice of this court explained in 2009 why 
unlicensed firearm possession is dangerous to the community: 
12 
 
"When a handgun or automatic weapon is involved, the 
purpose of the firearm is to injure or kill; there is no 
other reason for that weapon's existence. . . .  The risks 
associated with the possession of any firearm quite clearly 
are increased when those firearms are unlicensed.  It is 
generally understood in the Commonwealth that there are 
licensing requirements applicable to firearms, and that it 
is unlawful to violate them.  That the owner or user of an 
inherently dangerous instrumentality subject to licensure 
chooses not to abide by licensing requirements suggests 
powerfully that that person has obtained the weapon for an 
unlawful purpose that involves violence or the threat 
thereof.  This is nothing more than common sense. . . .  
The fact that some otherwise law-abiding individuals may 
possess unlicensed firearms due to neglect or mistake does 
not alter the basic nature of the act in most situations or 
reduce the danger of death or serious personal injury that 
accompanies the use of the great majority of firearms that 
have not satisfied licensing requirements. . . .  [A] fair 
reading of the statute would reject the pretense that a 
firearm is some neutral piece of equipment that is harmless 
in and of itself, and would recognize at a minimum the 
deadly sequence that so often follows on the possession of 
an unlicensed firearm." 
 
Young, 453 Mass. at 718-721 (Cowin, J., dissenting). 
The menace of dangerousness posed to individuals and 
communities by the possession of illegal firearms has only 
worsened over the past thirteen years.12  The daily onslaught of 
 
12 See, e.g., Gramlich, Pew Research Center, What the Data 
Says About Gun Deaths in the U.S. (Feb. 3, 2022), https:// 
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/02/03/what-the-data-says-
about-gun-deaths-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/N8UJ-TJLF] ("The 
45,222 total gun deaths in 2020 were by far the most on record, 
representing a 14% increase from the year before, a 25% increase 
from five years earlier and a 43% increase from a decade prior. 
. . .  On a per capita basis, there were 13.6 gun deaths per 
100,000 people in 2020 -- the highest rate since the mid-1990s 
. . ."); Thebault, Fox, & Ba Tran, 2020 Was the Deadliest Gun 
Violence Year in Decades.  So Far, 2021 Is Worse, Wash. Post 
(June 14, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation 
/2021/06/14/2021-gun-violence/ [https://perma.cc/5ZLQ-AFGL]. 
13 
 
young people being shot, and the prospect of mass shootings, 
including in schools, has become too familiar a part of the 
modern news cycle.  To be sure, these shootings are not all 
committed by individuals who illegally possess firearms.  But 
certainly the fact that a firearm is illegally possessed 
increases the likelihood that it will be used illegally. 
This is why the Legislature consistently has penalized 
illegal firearm possession.  See Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 396 
Mass. 840, 842 (1986) ("The history of Massachusetts gun control 
legislation in this century shows an unwavering legislative 
intent that one may lawfully carry a firearm only if he [or she] 
has a license or qualifies for a specific statutory 
authorization"); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 919 
(1976) (upholding constitutionality of G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a], 
as amended by St. 1975, c. 113, § 2, because, among other 
reasons, "the Legislature could conclude . . . that harsh, 
inflexible penalties are needed to serve as a deterrent and that 
the need for deterrence, in light of the potential danger 
created by the unlawful carrying of a firearm, should be the 
primary, if not the sole, objective of the statute"); 
Commonwealth v. Bartholomew, 326 Mass. 218, 219 (1950) ("The 
intent of [G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended by St. 1937, c. 250, 
§ 1,] . . . is to protect the public from the potential danger 
incident to the unlawful possession of [dangerous] weapons").  
14 
 
See also United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001) ("While it is possible 
to commit violent crimes without possession or use of a gun 
. . . , guns are without doubt the most potent and efficient 
instrument for violent crime. . . .  Possession of a gun greatly 
increases one's ability to inflict harm on others and therefore 
involves some risk of violence"). 
Adding unlicensed firearm possession to the dangerousness 
statute was a further way to address the threat of this crime.  
See State House News Service (House Sess.), May 26, 2010 
(statement of Rep. Eugene L. O'Flaherty) ("The city is impacted 
every year by homicides, carnage on our streets attributable to 
gangs, drugs and people in possession of illegal guns.  This 
provides a tool long overdue to . . . tackle the issue of 
illegal handguns and the carnage they are causing across the 
state"); State House News Service (Sen. Sess.), Nov. 18. 2009 
(statement of Sen. Mark C. Montigny) ("I think we should simply 
say that when there's an unlawful possession of a firearm, you 
may very well do something dangerous with it"). 
In sum, common sense and legislative intent demonstrate 
that unlicensed firearm possession is a dangerous menace. 
 
Our decision in Young does not militate against this 
conclusion.  In that case, we stated that unlicensed firearm 
possession "lacks" a "menace of dangerousness."  Young, 453 
15 
 
Mass. at 716.  However, we did so in the context of a statutory, 
not constitutional, analysis. 
When we decided the Young case, the dangerousness statute 
did not list unlicensed firearm possession as a predicate 
offense.  Id. at 710.  But it did contain a residual clause 
(recently held unconstitutionally vague, see Scione v. 
Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 232 [2019]) for felonies that "by 
[their] nature involve[] a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person of another may result."  Young, 453 Mass. at 
710, quoting G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1), as amended through 
St. 1996, c. 393, § 5.  The issue presented was whether 
unlicensed possession of a firearm fell within that residual 
categorical clause.  Young, supra at 711-712.  We concluded that 
it did not, reasoning that unlicensed firearm possession was "by 
its nature" a "passive and victimless" "regulatory crime."  Id. 
at 714.  We observed that "inquiry into the 'nature' of the 
felony examines the legal elements comprising the felony, not 
the factual predicate giving rise to a complaint or indictment."  
Id. at 715.  To support our conclusion, we stated that 
unlicensed possession of a firearm "lacks the 'menace of 
dangerousness' inherent in the crimes specifically included in 
[G. L. c. 276,] § 58A (1)."  Id. at 716, quoting Mendonza, 423 
Mass. at 787. 
16 
 
Despite holding that unlicensed firearm possession did not 
fall within the residual clause, we suggested that the 
Legislature could include the offense as a predicate if it 
wished to do so.  Young, 453 Mass. at 715 n.11 ("Where the 
elements of a felony do not require proof that the defendant 
actually disregarded the safety and well-being of others, any 
determination concerning the substantiality of the connection 
between the felony and the risk of physical force against 
another properly lies with the Legislature" [emphasis added]); 
id. at 716-717 ("In holding that unlicensed possession of a 
firearm is not a predicate offense for purposes of [G. L. 
c. 276,] § 58A, we are not unmindful of the dangers relating to 
unlicensed possession of firearms.  Nevertheless, in the absence 
of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we cannot rewrite 
or torture the statute's language to include this offense" 
[emphasis added]).  It presumably was in response to this 
language in the Young case, which was released in 2009, that the 
Legislature decided in 2010 to add unlicensed firearm possession 
as a predicate offense.  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 125. 
We did not intend in the Young case to invite the 
Legislature to enact an unconstitutional statute.  Indeed, we 
were not confronted in Young with a constitutional issue at all; 
we were confined to examining the "nature," or elements, of 
unlicensed firearm possession in applying the categorical 
17 
 
approach to the residual clause of the dangerousness statute, 
rather than considering the crime's practical consequences.  See 
Young, 453 Mass. at 715.  Now that we are presented with the 
constitutional issue, we may look beyond the crime's elements to 
its impact on society.  See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding 
constitutionality of Federal dangerousness statute because, 
among other reasons, it "operates only on individuals who have 
been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious 
offenses," and "Congress specifically found that these 
individuals are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous 
acts in the community after arrest").  As discussed above, from 
a practical perspective unlicensed firearm possession does 
present a menace of dangerousness.  Including it as a predicate 
offense, therefore, furthers the legitimate and compelling 
government interest of preventing extremely serious crime by 
arrestees. 
The inclusion of unlicensed firearm possession as a 
predicate offense is also narrowly tailored to that interest.  
The Legislature did not list as a predicate offense every weapon 
crime included in G. L. c. 269, § 10.  Other provisions in that 
section criminalize, for example, carrying certain knives, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (b); and unlicensed possession of ammunition, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h) (1).  The Legislature appears to have made a 
18 
 
reasoned decision that these crimes are not sufficiently 
dangerous to be included as predicates. 
Moreover, certainly not every defendant charged with 
unlicensed firearm possession should be held pretrial.  Such a 
charge allows the Commonwealth to move for a dangerousness 
hearing at which a judge will determine whether the defendant 
should be held.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1)-(3).  The ultimate 
determination as to whether conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community, as well as all subsidiary findings, must be based on 
clear and convincing evidence.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3), (4), 
second par.  That means that not only must there be clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant is dangerous, but also 
there must be clear and convincing evidence that no conditions 
of release will reasonably assure the safety of society.  "The 
hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first 
appearance before the court."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), second 
par.  Although the Commonwealth may move for a continuance, id., 
any such motion may be granted only upon good cause shown, and 
"[t]he judge should . . . make a specific finding that such 
cause has been shown and what such cause is."13  Mendonza, 423 
 
13 The showing of good cause is constitutionally required 
before a defendant can be held upon the Commonwealth's motion 
for up to three business days without an adjudication of 
 
19 
 
Mass. at 792.  And a defendant held pretrial on the ground of 
dangerousness "shall be brought to a trial as soon as reasonably 
possible."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3).  The statute's framework, 
therefore, provides several safeguards to protect against 
pretrial detention of individuals who may be released safely. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that unlicensed firearm 
possession as described in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), presents a 
menace of dangerousness and that its inclusion as a predicate 
offense is narrowly tailored to the Commonwealth's legitimate 
and compelling interest in preventing extremely serious crime by 
arrestees.  See Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 787.14 
b.  Procedural due process.  The Commonwealth violates the 
Federal and State Constitutions' guarantees of procedural due 
process when it "tak[es] away someone's life, liberty, or 
property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give 
 
dangerousness.  Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 773; G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (4), second par.  Good cause not only means that there is 
good reason for the Commonwealth not to be prepared at 
arraignment to go forward with its motion to detain; the 
Commonwealth must at least present a proffer to the judge that 
indicates a likelihood of satisfying the significant burden 
necessary to preventatively detain an individual presumed 
innocent of the crime charged. 
 
14 We do not intend this holding to affect our jurisprudence 
in other areas of the law that address the nature of unlicensed 
firearm possession.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 
Mass. 508, 528 (2017) (in felony-murder context, "possession of 
an unlicensed firearm is not inherently dangerous" "[a]s a 
matter of law").  These other areas are not before us. 
20 
 
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so 
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement."  Johnson v. 
United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).  See Scione, 481 Mass. 
at 232.  The defendants assert that G. L. c. 276, § 58A, is 
unconstitutionally vague if unlicensed firearm possession is 
included as a predicate offense because the factors that the 
statute provides for deciding whether an individual is a danger 
to the community, see G. L. c. 276, § 58A (5), are difficult to 
apply to "regulatory" crimes that do not involve danger.  As 
discussed above, however, we do not see unlicensed firearm 
possession as simply a regulatory crime, but rather as a 
dangerous crime like the others listed in G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (1).  With respect to these other crimes, we have observed 
that the dangerousness statute "directs the courts to the 
factors that bear on the rational determination" of 
dangerousness.  Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 788.  We are not 
convinced that these factors are so difficult to apply to the 
dangerousness inquiry when unlicensed firearm possession is the 
predicate offense as to be unconstitutionally vague.15 
 
15 The factors are as follows:  "the nature and seriousness 
of the danger posed to any person or the community that would 
result by the person's release, the nature and circumstances of 
the offense charged, the potential penalty the person faces, the 
person's family ties, employment record and history of mental 
illness, his reputation, the risk that the person will obstruct 
or attempt to obstruct justice or threaten, injure or intimidate 
 
21 
 
3.  Dangerousness inquiry.  As discussed above, if a 
defendant is charged with criminal activity listed in G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (1), then "[a] judge may order pretrial detention 
if he or she finds[, after a hearing,] that the Commonwealth has 
established by clear and convincing evidence that 'no conditions 
of release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person 
or the community.'"  Scione, 481 Mass. at 227, quoting G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (3).  A judge must consider a number of enumerated 
factors in addressing this question.  See note 15, supra.  The 
judge's subsidiary factual findings, as well as the judge's 
ultimate determination as to whether conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community, must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3), (4), second par. 
Additionally, "[t]he rules concerning admissibility of 
evidence in criminal trials shall not apply to the presentation 
 
or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate a prospective 
witness or juror, his record of convictions, if any, any illegal 
drug distribution or present drug dependency, whether the person 
is on bail pending adjudication of a prior charge, whether the 
acts alleged involve abuse as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1], 
or violation of a temporary or permanent order issued pursuant 
to [G. L. c. 208, §§ 18, 34B; G. L. c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A, 
§§ 3, 4, 5; or G. L. c. 209C, §§ 15, 20], whether the person has 
any history of orders issued against him pursuant to the 
aforesaid sections, whether he is on probation, parole or other 
release pending completion of sentence for any conviction and 
whether he is on release pending sentence or appeal for any 
conviction."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (5). 
22 
 
and consideration of information at the hearing and the judge 
shall consider hearsay contained in a police report or the 
statement of an alleged victim or witness."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (4), second par.  Any hearsay evidence must be "reliable," 
and "when hearsay is offered as the only evidence of the alleged 
violation, the indicia of reliability must be substantial."  
Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 34-35 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 118 (1990).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Nick N., 486 Mass. 696, 706 (2021) ("as in 
Durling, if hearsay is admitted at Wallace W. proceedings, it 
must be reliable, and 'the indicia of reliability must be 
substantial' when hearsay is the only evidence offered").16 
Here, there was both live witness testimony and documentary 
evidence regarding dangerousness in Vega's case, and the 
Commonwealth relied in Nuah's case exclusively on hearsay 
evidence.  We conclude that the District Court, Boston Municipal 
Court, and Superior Court judges did not err in relying on this 
evidence, and especially the detailed police reports, in 
deciding by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of 
release would reasonably assure the community's safety.  See 
 
16 At a Wallace W. hearing, the Commonwealth attempts to 
prove that a juvenile potentially excluded from the Juvenile 
Court's jurisdiction pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 52, has 
committed a prior offense and is, therefore, properly before the 
court.  See Nick N., 486 Mass. at 699-700; Wallace W. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789 (2019). 
23 
 
Garcia v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 1005, 1005-1006 (2018).  See 
also Abbot A., 458 Mass. at 36, quoting Commonwealth v. Maggio, 
414 Mass. 193, 199 n.3 (1993) ("'detailed police reports' 
constitute '[r]eliable, factually detailed hearsay . . .'"). 
In Vega's case, the live witness testified from personal 
knowledge that police had found a firearm in Vega's car, and a 
police report about the incident stated that the firearm was 
loaded.  The documentary evidence also showed that Vega had two 
other firearm and ammunition possession cases pending, one of 
which arose from Vega presenting to a hospital emergency room 
with a gunshot wound and ammunition in his pocket and the other 
of which arose out of an incident that occurred while he was 
subject to GPS monitoring.  All of the relevant police reports 
were detailed and based on officers' personal observations as 
well as, in the emergency room case, an interview with a nurse.  
See Durling, 407 Mass. at 121-122 (police reports had 
substantial level of reliability where they were "factually 
detailed" and "relate[d] primary facts [that the officers 
observed personally], not mere conclusions or opinions").  The 
documentary evidence, including a case docket, also showed that 
Vega had been arrested in the current case while in violation of 
a curfew imposed as a condition of his pretrial release in one 
of his pending matters. 
24 
 
In Nuah's case, there was documentary evidence with a 
substantial level of reliability that Nuah was in a car with a 
firearm that had been reported stolen and a round of ammunition 
in the current case, and that he had a pending case involving 
possession of multiple firearms, including a firearm that had 
been reported stolen.  The police reports about the arrests in 
the current case and the other pending case were detailed and 
based on officers' first-hand observations. 
In sum, the live testimony and reliable hearsay evidence in 
Vega's case, and the hearsay evidence with a substantial level 
of reliability in Nuah's case, was sufficient to support the 
District Court, Boston Municipal Court, and Superior Court 
judges' conclusions that Vega and Nuah should be held on grounds 
of dangerousness.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (5) (in analyzing 
dangerousness, judge must consider, among other factors, "the 
nature and seriousness of the danger posed to . . . the 
community that would result by the person's release," "the 
nature and circumstances of the offense charged," and "whether 
the person is on bail pending adjudication of a prior charge"). 
Nevertheless, the judges in Nuah's case should not have 
relied on the minimal evidence that Nuah was a gang member.  The 
only evidence presented that Nuah was affiliated with a gang 
appears to have been brief mentions of that purported fact in 
various police reports without any factual support or indication 
25 
 
as to the source of the information.17  This was insufficient 
evidence to prove Nuah's gang membership by clear and convincing 
evidence.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), second par.  Cf. Diaz 
Ortiz v. Garland, 23 F.4th 1, 15-22 (1st Cir. 2022) (addressing 
unreliability of Boston police department's gang database); 
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 469-470 (2019) 
(witness "lacked a basis in personal knowledge for concluding 
that the defendant was a member of the Walnut Park gang").  The 
judges should not, therefore, have considered Nuah's purported 
gang membership as a factor in favor of a dangerousness finding. 
The Superior Court judge in Nuah's case also referenced 
that the defendant had "had numerous encounters with law 
enforcement."  Mere interaction with police does not weigh in 
favor of finding a defendant dangerous.  That a police report is 
generated about an encounter with an individual does not mean 
that the individual did anything wrong.  For instance, one of 
the police reports about Nuah that the Commonwealth presented as 
evidence of his dangerousness described Nuah as a passenger in a 
car that was stopped, resulting in a verbal warning to the 
 
17 Three police reports referencing Nuah's purported gang 
membership stated merely, "Gang affiliation: FOE (Family over 
everything," "Gang affiliation: FOE," and "ACTIVE GANG MEMBER:  
Family Over Everything (FOE)."  A fourth police report stated 
that police "received information from patrons enjoying [a 
festival] that several young gang affiliated males loitering in 
[the area] were carrying guns in their backpack and believed to 
be gang members."  One of the young men was Nuah. 
26 
 
driver.  This interaction with police says nothing about whether 
Nuah violated the law, let alone whether he did so in a 
dangerous manner.  The mere existence of a police report is 
especially unhelpful in the dangerousness calculus for people of 
color, such as Nuah, who are disproportionately searched by 
police.  See Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741, 
769-770 (2021) (Budd, C.J., dissenting) ("'[A]nyone's dignity 
can be violated' by an unconstitutional search; however, 'it is 
no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of 
this type of scrutiny'" [citation omitted]). 
Despite these errors, and for the reasons described above, 
the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, and Superior Court 
judges ultimately did not err in concluding that no conditions 
of release in Nuah's case would reasonably assure the 
community's safety, and the single justice did not abuse her 
discretion in denying the defendants' petitions. 
Conclusion.  Because unlicensed possession of a firearm is 
a constitutional predicate offense under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (1), and because there was no abuse of discretion in the 
determinations that Vega and Nuah should be held on the ground 
of dangerousness, the orders of the single justice of the 
Appeals Court denying their petitions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
WENDLANDT, J. (concurring, with whom Gaziano, J., joins).  
I agree with the court that the inclusion of unlicensed 
possession of a firearm outside the home or place of business, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), as a predicate offense to the 
determination whether to detain an arrestee as a danger to an 
individual or the community under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, does not 
violate due process.  I write separately because I would decide 
the constitutional question exclusively on the basis of the 
Legislature's determination that inclusion of this offense as a 
predicate to the dangerousness determination serves the 
legitimate and compelling State interest in preventing crime by 
arrestees insofar as the Legislature specifically has found that 
these arrestees are far more likely to be responsible for 
dangerous acts in the community after arrest, ante at    .  See 
Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 715 n.11 (2009) ("any 
determination concerning the substantiality of the connection 
between the felony and the risk of physical force against 
another properly lies with the Legislature"). 
In view of the limited appellate record, I am disinclined 
to rely on so-called judicial "common sense," see ante at    , 
quoting Young, 453 Mass. at 719 (Cowin, J., dissenting), which 
is hampered by our inability to conduct the type of broad-based 
and extensive fact finding through means available to the 
Legislature; it can lead to the awkward result that today's 
2 
 
court finds it is common sense that unlicensed firearm 
possession is a dangerous menace while yesterday's did not.  See 
Young, supra at 716. 
 
In my view, the Legislature's learned determination is 
sufficient to add the offense as a predicate to the 
dangerousness determination.  Together with the required 
procedures, findings, burdens, and time constraints set forth in 
the dangerousness statute, as described by the court, ante 
at    , I agree with the court that the statute is narrowly 
tailored to the compelling State interest.