Case Title: Hemming v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 129658

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jonathan Hemming v. State of Maryland, No. 48, September Term, 2019.  Opinion by Greene, 
J.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW — JOINT OR SEPARATE TRIAL OF SEPARATE CHARGES —
BIFURCATION 
 
The Court of Appeals held, as a matter of law, that the trial court did not have discretion under 
Maryland Rule 4-253(c) to bifurcate the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited 
person counts from the remaining counts of the indictment—with the counts being decided by 
different factfinders within a single trial.   
 
CRIMINAL LAW — JOINT OR SEPARATE TRIAL OF SEPARATE CHARGES —
BIFURCATION 
 
The Court of Appeals held that a trial court has the discretionary authority under Rule 4-253(c) 
to bifurcate possession of a regulated firearm counts, from other counts, into a singular two-
phased trial in which the jury first hears evidence relating to the other charges, deliberates as to 
the defendant’s guilt, and then hears evidence pertaining to the possession of a regulated firearm 
by a prohibited person counts and determines a defendant’s guilt as to those charges.   
 
CRIMINAL LAW — JOINT OR SEPARATE TRIAL OF SEPARATE CHARGES —
BIFURCATION 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s 
motion to bifurcate counts in a hybrid judge/jury trial proceeding, because the court did not 
maintain the discretion under Rule 4-253(c) to permit the procedure.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 48 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
______________________________________ 
  
JONATHAN HEMMING 
 
 
 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Greene, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 26, 2020 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 129658-C 
Argued: February 7, 2020 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-07-06 14:28-04:00
 
In the instant appeal, we are asked to review the trial court’s denial of Petitioner 
Jonathan Hemming’s motion to bifurcate two counts of possession of a regulated firearm 
by a prohibited person from the remaining counts in an indictment.  This case presents an 
opportunity for the Court to consider a unique procedural occurrence, previously examined 
by this Court in Galloway v. State, where a trial judge bifurcates the possession of a 
regulated firearm by a prohibited person charges from the remaining charges and 
determines a defendant’s guilt as to the firearm charges.  371 Md. 379, 383, 412, 809 A.2d 
653, 656 (2002).  This results in a hybrid judge/jury trial in which the judge determines the 
defendant’s guilt with respect to the charge of possession of a regulated firearm by a 
prohibited person and the jury determines guilt as to the remaining charges (the “bifurcated 
hybrid trial procedure”).  As represented by Mr. Hemming, the procedure would essentially 
encompass a single trial split between the two factfinders.  Our primary inquiry towards 
this end is whether the relevant Maryland Rule permits this procedure.  For the reasons 
stated below, we hold that the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure split between two 
factfinders is not permitted under Maryland Rule 4-253(c) and is inconsistent with our 
holding in Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 824 A.2d 123 (2003).  Further, we approve of the 
Joshua-style bifurcated criminal jury trial, under which the bifurcation of possession of a 
regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts from other charges is permitted, if a 
defendant’s guilt as to all of the charges is determined by the same factfinder.  See United 
States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 2016, investigators from the Montgomery County Police Department’s Special 
Investigations Division (“SID”) wanted to speak with Mr. Hemming concerning an 
ongoing investigation.1  At the time, Mr. Hemming had an open warrant stemming from 
his failure to appear before the District Court of Maryland for a drug possession offense. 
 
On May 18, 2016, based on the open warrant, several SID officers began surveilling 
Mr. Hemming at his home in Gaithersburg by setting up a perimeter around the residence.  
The SID officers observed Mr. Hemming exit his home with a female companion, who was 
later identified as his wife.  The pair entered a gray Honda Civic and left the residence with 
the SID officers in tow.  As later testified to by Sergeant Bullock, the SID “case agent” 
instructed the officers to perform a “soft arrest” on Mr. Hemming.2    
 
The SID officers followed Mr. Hemming from his residence to a commercial 
property located on Comprint Court off of Shady Grove Road in Montgomery County.  On 
                                                          
 
1 The SID officers who eventually made contact with Mr. Hemming are Sergeant Charles  
Bullock, and Detectives Don Oaks and Volpe.  Detective Volpe’s first name is not 
contained within the record.  As recognized by the Court of Special Appeals, his name was 
incorrectly transcribed as “Bolpe” throughout the second volume of trial transcripts.   
 
According to Sergeant Bullock, the SID unit is a unique unit that only becomes involved 
in certain cases when its assistance is required by detectives of its own division, the major 
crimes division, or police from another jurisdiction.  
  
2  Sergeant Bullock contrasted a “soft arrest” from a “hard block” or “hard takedown” style 
arrest.  He indicated that a soft takedown is one in which police make contact with a 
suspect, inform him of the arrest warrant, converse with the suspect, and attempt to get the 
suspect to surrender peacefully.  Whereas, under the “hard” approach, SID officers “block 
all sides of the car[,]” command the subjects inside the vehicle to exit, and “put them on 
the ground and effect the arrest.”    
 
- 3 - 
 
Comprint Court, Mr. Hemming parked the vehicle “face-in” in front of an office building.  
He and his wife exited the vehicle and entered the building and remained inside for 
approximately a half an hour to forty minutes before returning to the vehicle.  That day, 
Sergeant Bullock was accompanied by eight other plainclothes SID officers.  Each of the 
officers wore outer carrier vests, neck badges, and arm bands indicating that they were law 
enforcement officers.  The SID officers also wore two or more forms of identification 
indicating that they were, in fact, police officers.   
Detective Volpe parked his vehicle, a pickup truck, in the space directly behind the 
Honda Civic in which Mr. Hemming and his wife were traveling.  The SID officers then 
observed Mr. Hemming and his wife returning to the vehicle, with Mr. Hemming entering 
the driver side and his wife entering the passenger side of the vehicle.  Within seconds of 
the couple returning to the vehicle, the SID officers performed the “soft arrest” technique 
detailed by Sergeant Bullock.  To initiate the stop, the SID officers turned on the headlights 
of their vehicles and momentarily sounded a siren to indicate a police presence.  Detective 
Volpe then backed his pickup truck into the rear bumper of the Honda, blocking the vehicle 
into the parking space.   
Thereafter, Sergeant Bullock and Detective Oaks approached the driver’s side of 
Mr. Hemming’s vehicle on foot, with Detective Oaks in the lead and Sergeant Bullock in 
tow.  Detective Oaks approached Mr. Hemming and informed Mr. Hemming that he was a 
police officer, the officers had a warrant for Mr. Hemming’s arrest, and they desired to 
speak with Mr. Hemming.  According to the officers, Mr. Hemming initially seemed 
compliant.  Mr. Hemming attempted to get out of the vehicle, and Detective Oaks moved 
- 4 - 
 
away from the driver’s side door of the car to allow Mr. Hemming to exit.  Suddenly, as 
Mr. Hemming was exiting, he got back in the vehicle and attempted to close the driver’s 
side door.   
In response, Detective Oaks put himself between the vehicle and its driver’s side 
door to block Mr. Hemming from closing it.  Detective Oaks began struggling with Mr. 
Hemming and attempted to remove him from the vehicle.  Thereafter, Sergeant Bullock 
entered the rear passenger seat of the vehicle and attempted to assist Detective Oaks in 
gaining control of Mr. Hemming.   
During the fracas, Detective Oaks noted that Mr. Hemming retrieved a “black 
cylindrical object” from inside the vehicle and held it in his left hand.  Unbeknownst to 
Detective Oaks at the time, the object Mr. Hemming was holding was actually an 
improvised firearm colloquially referred to as a “zip gun.”3  While the improvised firearm 
                                                          
 
3 A “zip gun” is “the name applied to a single-shot, crude, home-made firearm” that is 
generally “unreliable, and usually more dangerous to the shooter than to his intended 
victim.”  Bruce Barak Koffler, Zip Guns and Crude Conversions—Identifying 
Characteristics and Problems, 61 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 520, 520 (1969).  
As later testified to by the State’s firearm expert, Ronald K. Davis—an officer with the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives—the improvised firearm that Mr. 
Hemming held was “an improvised firearm that’s designed to fire [twelve] gauge 
ammunition[.]”  He also testified that the firearm was constructed from a length of pipe 
with a “standard pipe plug” fashioned onto the end of it.  The pipe plug held the shotgun 
shell and had a hole drilled through its center, which the shooter would use to ignite the 
primer on the shell by striking it with a thin metal object.  He testified that he had test fired 
the improvised firearm and it was operable.   
 
- 5 - 
 
was pointed towards Detective Oaks’ head, Mr. Hemming began striking the bottom of it 
with a long thin metal object.4  
As Detective Oaks and Sergeant Bullock attempted to gain control over Mr. 
Hemming, Detective Volpe removed Mr. Hemming’s wife from the vehicle.  He then 
entered the vehicle, through its passenger side, to assist the two other officers with Mr. 
Hemming.  While assisting Detective Oaks and Sergeant Bullock, Detective Volpe noticed 
a metal tube in Mr. Hemming’s left hand and “a 12-penny nail” in his right hand that Mr. 
Hemming was attempting to insert into the bottom of the pipe.  Detective Volpe warned 
his fellow officers of the device.      
After briefly struggling with Mr. Hemming, Detective Oaks beckoned his 
colleagues to use a taser gun to subdue Mr. Hemming.  As a result, Detective Volpe tased 
Mr. Hemming.  After tasing Mr. Hemming, the officers were able to remove Mr. Hemming 
from the vehicle.  Despite this, Mr. Hemming continued to struggle with the officers as 
they attempted to handcuff him.  Nonetheless, the officers were eventually able to gain 
control of Mr. Hemming, handcuff him, and effectuate an arrest.  Upon Mr. Hemming’s 
arrest, the officers uncovered a second improvised firearm in Mr. Hemming’s rear pant 
pocket.5  The officers also recovered several twelve-gauge 00 “buckshot” shells from the 
                                                          
 
4 Detective Oaks later testified that Mr. Hemming struck the improvised firearm with a 
screwdriver or metal rod.  The State’s expert witness on firearms later identified the object 
that Mr. Hemming used to strike the bottom of the zipgun was a jeweler’s screwdriver.   
5 Mr. Davis testified that the improvised firearm recovered from Mr. Hemming’s rear pant 
pocket was not a “firearm” because “it was missing a critical part, the barrel.”   
 
- 6 - 
 
vehicle and one from the improvised firearm Mr. Hemming had brandished during the 
struggle with the SID officers.6   
Subsequently, Mr. Hemming was charged by indictment with two counts of 
attempted first-degree murder (counts one and two), two counts of attempted second degree 
murder (counts three and four),7 two counts of first-degree assault (counts five and six), 
two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence (counts seven and 
eight), possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug crime (count 
nine), possession of ammunition by a person who is prohibited from possessing a regulated 
firearm (count ten), two counts of possession of a regulated firearm after having been 
convicted of a crime of violence (counts eleven and twelve), and resisting arrest (count 
thirteen).  On February 5, 2018, the Circuit Court for Montgomery Count held a trial in the 
matter.   
At the start of trial, Mr. Hemming moved to bifurcate counts nine through twelve, 
the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and ammunition counts,8 from 
the remaining counts.  He suggested that counts one through eight and thirteen be decided 
by a jury and that the trial judge determine his guilt as to the possession of regulated firearm 
                                                          
 
6 Mr. Davis also testified that twelve gauge 00 shells contain nine thirty-three caliber pellets 
and are generally used for big game hunting but are occasionally used as an anti-personnel 
load in the law enforcement context.   
 
7 Mr. Hemming was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder and first-
degree assault, in reference to both Sergeant Bullock and Detective Oaks as victims.   
 
8 For simplicity’s sake, we hereinafter refer to these counts as “possession of a regulated 
firearm by a prohibited person” without specific reference to the count concerning the 
possession of ammunition.   
- 7 - 
 
by a prohibited person counts in a singular hybrid judge/jury trial.  Mr. Hemming’s counsel 
indicated that Mr. Hemming was willing to waive his right to a jury trial on the possession 
of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts.  Mr. Hemming urged the court to 
bifurcate the counts based on the premise that bifurcation would ameliorate any potential 
prejudice that may result from the jury hearing evidence of his prior conviction or a 
stipulation concerning his disqualification from possessing regulated firearms.   
In response, the State argued that bifurcation of the charges was inappropriate based 
on the potentiality of legally inconsistent verdicts between the jury and judge.  In particular, 
the State argued that, if the jury acquitted Mr. Hemming on counts seven and eight, i.e., 
use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and the trial judge found Mr. 
Hemming guilty on counts nine, eleven, and twelve, the trial judge’s decision could be 
overturned on appeal as an inconsistent verdict, due to the prohibition against examining 
the jury’s reasoning underlying its verdict.  The State indicated that the possibility of 
inconsistent verdicts was compounded by the fact that the case involved two improvised 
firearms.  Mistakenly, the State argued that the operability of the firearm may become an 
issue and that counts nine, eleven, and twelve required operability as an element.9   
After reviewing this Court’s decision in Galloway v. State, the trial court denied Mr. 
Hemming’s motion to bifurcate.  The trial judge commented that he found “no authority” 
under Rule 4-253(c) to bifurcate multiple counts in a singular hybrid judge/jury trial and 
                                                          
 
9 This assertion was made in error, because we have held that conviction under Public 
Safety Article (“PS”) § 5-133(c) does not require an operable firearm.  Moore v. State, 424 
Md. 118, 122, 34 A.3d 513, 515 (2011). 
- 8 - 
 
denied Mr. Hemming’s motion “in light of the potential of inconsistent verdicts that [has] 
been represented by the State[.]”  The trial court contemplated that utilizing a stipulation, 
under Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 824 A.2d 123 (2003), that indicated Mr. Hemming was 
prohibited from possessing regulated firearms would be “as least prejudicial as possible.”    
After the court denied Mr. Hemming’s motion, the State and Mr. Hemming agreed 
to stipulate that Mr. Hemming was a “prohibited person.”  Based on events occurring after 
the trial judge’s denial of Mr. Hemming’s motion to bifurcate, the stipulation informed the 
jury that “the defendant was previously convicted of a crime that disqualifies him from 
possessing a regulated firearm.”  Mr. Hemming’s counsel noted that, although ordinarily, 
he would only be willing to stipulate that a defendant was a prohibited person, he was 
willing to advise the jury that Mr. Hemming had previously been convicted of a 
disqualifying crime.  This is so because he had indicated that Mr. Hemming had previously 
been convicted of a crime during his opening statement (having stated in opening remarks 
that “[Mr. Hemming] has some prior records.  He’s going to tell you about that.  He’s not 
hiding anything.”).   
At trial, Mr. Hemming testified that the building off of Comprint Court that he and 
his wife visited was a neurologist’s office.  He stated that his wife had previously been 
diagnosed with a neurological condition.  According to Mr. Hemming, that day, if his wife 
received a negative prognosis, they had planned to drive to another location and commit 
suicide.  He testified that he was in possession of two improvised firearms, because, under 
their agreed suicide pact, they would each use one of the weapons to end their lives.  In 
contrast to Mr. Hemming’s testimony, Detective Dimitri Ruvin, an investigator who 
- 9 - 
 
requested SID’s involvement, testified differently as to Mr. Hemming’s reason for 
possessing the improvised firearms.  Detective Ruvin testified that, after his arrest, Mr. 
Hemming informed him that he possessed the devices because “some people [were] not 
real happy with [him].”   
The jury found Mr. Hemming guilty of attempted first-degree murder of Detective 
Oaks, first-degree assault on Sergeant Bullock, two counts of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a crime, possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person, 
possession of ammunition by a person who is prohibited from possessing a regulated 
firearm, and resisting arrest. The court sentenced Mr. Hemming to life in prison, plus an 
additional forty years imprisonment. 
Mr. Hemming then appealed the circuit court’s judgment to the Court of Special 
Appeals.  Mr. Hemming presented three issues for the intermediate appellate court’s 
review, one in which Mr. Hemming challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
undergirding his convictions, one concerning a sentencing issue, and one relevant to the 
issue presently before us: 
Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the counts 
charging possession of a regulated firearm by a disqualified person and 
possession of ammunition by a person who is disqualified from possessing a 
regulated firearm, with those counts being tried by the court, and the 
remaining counts being tried by the jury in a single trial? 
 
Hemming v. State, 624, SEPT.TERM, 2018, 2019 WL 2881019, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
July 3, 2019), cert. granted, 466 Md. 215, 217 A.3d 1131 (2019).   
The Court of Special Appeals did not determine, however, whether a trial judge in 
a criminal case has authority to apply the hybrid judge/jury trial procedure because it 
- 10 - 
 
concluded that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in denying Mr. Hemming’s 
motion to bifurcate.  Id. at *5 (“We are not compelled to decide whether a circuit court 
judge has the discretion to bifurcate the decision-making function in a single trial procedure 
as we conclude that if the trial judge had that discretion here, he properly exercised it to 
deny Hemming’s bifurcation request.”).  Primarily, the intermediate appellate court noted 
that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in denying Mr. Hemming’s motion to 
bifurcate based on the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.  Id. at *6.  Accordingly, the Court 
of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, vacated the sentence on count 
seven and remanded that count for re-sentencing based on an issue irrelevant to the instant 
appeal.    
Mr. Hemming then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted 
on October 9, 2019.  Hemming v. State, 466 Md. 215, 217 A.3d 1131 (2019).   
Galloway v. State 
 
In Galloway v. State, the trial court utilized the bifurcation procedure that Mr. 
Hemming urges this Court to now expressly authorize.  371 Md. 379, 383, 809 A.2d 653, 
655 (2002).  In that case, Mr. Galloway was charged with several counts including 
“attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, use of a handgun in the commission of 
a felony or crime of violence, carrying a handgun (counts 1 through 7) and possession of a 
firearm after having been convicted previously of a crime (counts 8 and 9).”  Id. at 382, 
809 A.2d at 655.  Mr. Galloway requested that the jury determine his guilt as to counts one 
through seven and that, after the jury returned its verdict on counts one through seven, the 
trial judge determine his guilt as to counts eight and nine.  Id. at 383–84, 809 A.2d at 656.  
- 11 - 
 
After deliberating, the jury found Mr. Galloway not guilty on counts one through seven.  
Id. at 384, 809 A.2d at 656.  The next day, the trial judge found Mr. Galloway guilty as to 
counts eight and nine—the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts.  
Id.   
 
On appeal, we were asked to determine whether, based on principles of Double 
Jeopardy, the inconsistent verdicts rendered by the judge and jury were improper.  Id. at 
384, 809 A.2d at 656–57.  The procedure utilized in Galloway was identified as a “unified 
proceeding with a hybrid decision, part jury trial and part court trial.”  Id. at 388, 809 A.2d 
at 659.  Ultimately, we held that the inconsistency between the trial court and jury’s 
verdicts was impermissible and reversed the circuit court’s judgment.  Id. at 416–17, 809 
A.2d at 676.  Because of the unique procedural posture of Galloway, our resolution of the 
inconsistent verdict issue did not require us to determine whether the bifurcated hybrid 
judge/jury trial procedure is authorized by Maryland law.  Id.  
 
Although we did not specifically analyze the bifurcation of possession of a regulated 
firearm by a prohibited person charges in a hybridized judge/jury trial in Galloway, this 
issue permeated the Court’s discussion.  The Majority, in assessing whether the procedure 
is authorized within the State, commented, 
[t]he procedure utilized by the circuit court, i.e., the bifurcation of the 
decision making function between a jury and a judge in respect to different 
counts of a single indictment in a single trial is not expressly authorized in 
Maryland, or anywhere else as far as our research has revealed.   
 
Id. at 385, 809 A.2d at 657.  Moreover, the Galloway Majority left open the question of 
whether the hybrid judge/jury trial procedure is permitted under Maryland law: 
- 12 - 
 
We note that the present case is an instance of a hybrid jury/bench trial on 
the merits.  In an appropriate case we might necessarily be faced with an 
initial question of whether a trial judge has the discretion to grant the single 
trial procedure used in the instant case.  We shall not resolve that issue in this 
case, as the case can be fully resolved on other important issues.  Our 
declining to address this specific bifurcation issue, should not be construed 
as any approval or disapproval of the procedure.   
 
Id. at 396–97, 809 A.2d at 664 (footnotes omitted).   
 
The entire Court, however, was not in agreement.  The Concurring Opinion in 
Galloway contended that the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure is one method to limit the 
potential prejudice a defendant experiences based on the introduction of evidence 
concerning a prior disqualifying conviction:   
Because of the potential for prejudice, on motion or by agreement, the court 
may sever the CIP [criminal-in-possession] count for later trial, which could 
be before a different jury or, if the defendant waives a jury, before a judge. To 
avoid separate trials, which could require the empaneling of a new jury and 
a repetition of much of the evidence presented to the first jury, the court may 
take the intermediate step, as was done in United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 
844 (3d Cir.1992), of bifurcating the CIP charge—allowing the jury to 
consider only the current substantive charges first, and then, after it renders 
a verdict on those charges, having that same jury hear the additional evidence 
and then consider the CIP charge . . . . As the Joshua court pointed out, not 
everyone agrees that the bifurcation approach is a good one, even where the 
jury ends up hearing all of the charges. 
 
Id. at 418, 809 A.2d at 677 (Wilner, J., concurring).  Judge Wilner also noted that such 
prejudice may be overcome where a defendant enters a stipulation as to his or her 
prohibited status.  Id.  Judge Wilner also left open the possibility of dual factfinders, as 
suggested by Mr. Hemming in this case.  Id.  (“Presumably, the bifurcated CIP charge 
could later be heard by the judge, provided the defendant agrees to waive his right to have 
the jury consider it.”).   
- 13 - 
 
The Dissenting Opinion specifically endorsed the procedure and commented that 
the Court should “hold that implementation of the simultaneous-trial procedure, although 
not traditional, strikes an appropriate balance between the twin concerns of prejudicial 
joinder and judicial economy, and is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant.”  
Id. at 423–24, 809 A.2d at 680 (Harrell, J., dissenting).   
In Galloway, this Court invited the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (the “Rules Committee”) to examine and study the bifurcated hybrid trial 
procedure, make a recommendation, and to consider any necessary modification to the 
associated Maryland Rules.  Id. at 397 n.14, 809 A.2d at 664 n.14 (“[W]e shall notify [the 
Rules Committee] of this issue in order that the Rules Committee may study it, and if it 
deems appropriate, make recommendations to the Court.  In that process there will be 
adequate opportunity for concerned entities to participate and make their views known in 
the study process.”).  Since Galloway, this Court has not considered a case under a similar 
procedural posture.  Based on the Court’s comments in Galloway, the Rules Committee 
later considered proposing amendments to this Court concerning the procedure but 
ultimately declined to do so.  See infra at 20–22.     
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We have previously determined that, in terms of Rule 4-253, a trial court’s decision 
to sever or join the trials of multiple criminal defendants or multiple counts is ordinarily 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
State v. Hines, 450 Md. 352, 366, 148 A.3d 1247, 1255 (2016); Galloway, 371 Md. at 395, 
809 A.2d at 663 (“[T]he decision to join or sever charges ordinarily lies within the sound 
- 14 - 
 
discretion of the trial court.”); McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 608, 375 A.2d 551, 554 
(1977).  “[O]rdinarily, where only one defendant is involved, the judge may order two or 
more offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or any combination of them, [to] be tried 
together if the offenses are of the same or similar character.”  Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 
597, 607, 569 A.2d 684, 689 (1990) (citing Graves v. State, 298 Md. 542, 544, 471 A.2d 
701, 702 (1984)).   
To guard against potential prejudice in the trial, as a matter of law, “[i]f it appears 
that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents, or 
defendants, the court may, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, order separate 
trials of counts, charging documents, or defendants, or grant any other relief as justice 
requires.”  Frazier, 318 Md. at 607, 569 A.2d at 689.  Conversely, at a jury trial of a 
defendant charged with similar but unrelated offenses, he or she is entitled to a severance 
where the defendant establishes that the evidence as to each individual offense would not 
be mutually admissible at separate trials of the offenses.  Id. at 608, 569 A.2d at 690.    
Under Rule 4-253(c), a trial judge may remedy prejudicial joinder, in addition to 
severing counts, by “grant[ing] any other relief as justice requires.”  Accordingly, when we 
review a trial court’s decision to sever, based upon allegations of prejudicial joinder, for 
abuse of discretion under Rule 4-253(c), we implicitly recognize that the decision whether 
or not to permit bifurcation of counts would be ordinarily reserved to the trial court’s 
discretion.  See Galloway, 371 Md. at 422–23, 809 A.2d at 679 (Harrell, J. dissenting).   
In Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 709, 824 A.2d 123, 133 (2003), we held that the 
defendant was not entitled to a severance of the possession of a regulated firearm by one 
- 15 - 
 
previously convicted of a crime of violence charge from the remaining charges because the 
bases of the crimes were one and the same.  As to the propriety of the bifurcation of the 
criminal proceeding in Carter, we held that in a jury trial, the trial judge does not have the 
discretion to allow bifurcation of the elements of the possession of a regulated firearm by 
a prohibited person charge to prevent the jury from considering an element of that charge, 
even if the defendant requests that the trial judge decide the felony element and the jury 
decide the possession element.  374 Md. at 709–15, 824 A.2d at 133–36.  We explained 
that the jury is entitled to know the criminality of the defendant’s alleged conduct and the 
State should be allowed to present evidence of all elements of the offense of possession of 
a regulated firearm by a person previously convicted of a disqualifying crime to the jury.  
Id.  Moreover, we held that when the defendant requests, in a possession of a regulated 
firearm by a prohibited person case, to stipulate or admit he was convicted of a 
disqualifying crime, the trial court must accept the stipulation or admission and the name 
or nature of the previous conviction should not be disclosed to the jury.  Id. at 720–21, 824 
A.2d at 139–40.  The trial judge is directed to inform the jury that the defendant admits the 
conviction of a crime for which he or she is prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm 
under the law.  Id. at 720, 824 A.2d at 140.   
We review legal issues de novo.  Nesbit v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72, 
854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004) (citing Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 
(2002)).  It is well settled that when interpreting the Maryland Rules of Procedure, we apply 
that same principle as if we were interpreting a statute or contract.  Tate v. State, 459 Md. 
- 16 - 
 
587, 608, 187 A.3d 660, 672 (2018) (citing State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 67, 18 A.3d 60, 
46 (2011)).   
 
DISCUSSION 
All of the charges filed against Mr. Hemming were closely related and arose from a 
singular incident.  He did not request the traditional severance of the charges and demand 
separate trials.  Instead, prior to trial, Mr. Hemming moved to bifurcate count 9 (possession 
of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug crime), count 10 (possession of 
ammunition by a person who is disqualified from possessing a regulated firearm), and 
counts 11 and 12 (two counts of possession of a regulated firearm after having been 
convicted of a crime of violence) from the remaining counts.  Under this procedure, “the 
jury would decide the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to counts 1 through 8 and 13, and 
the court would decide guilt or innocence on counts 9 through 12, [intending] to avoid the 
prejudice that would flow from a stipulation that Mr. Hemming was prohibited from 
possessing a regulated firearm because of a disqualifying conviction.”  Thus, the question 
before this Court is whether the trial judge had discretion under Maryland Rule 4-253(c) to 
bifurcate separate counts between the judge and jury in a single trial.  We shall hold that 
Maryland Rule 4-253(c) does not permit the trial judge to bifurcate separate counts between 
the judge and jury for a single trial.  The Rule, however, does permit the trial judge to 
bifurcate counts between the same fact finder, subject to the sound discretion of the trial 
- 17 - 
 
judge.  Accordingly, the burden rests upon Mr. Hemming to establish that the trial judge’s 
denial of the motion to bifurcate was an abuse of discretion.   
Under Rule 4-253(c), a Trial Court Does Not Have Discretion to Bifurcate 
Separate Counts Between Judge and Jury in a Single Hybridized Trial.   
 
The primary issue in the instant appeal is whether a trial judge has the discretion, 
under Maryland Rule 4-253(c), to bifurcate the possession of a regulated firearm by a 
prohibited person count from the remaining charges—with the counts being decided by 
different factfinders within a singular proceeding.  Rule 4-253(c) does not expressly 
authorize the hybrid bifurcated trial procedure, and no Maryland or federal court has 
adopted the procedure.  Moreover, permitting the hybrid judge/jury trial would create a 
host of potential procedural problems.  Therefore, we ultimately conclude that a trial court 
does not maintain the discretion, under Rule 4-253(c), to bifurcate possession of a regulated 
firearm by a prohibited person counts from other charges—with the former being decided 
by the judge and the latter by a jury.  
First, we review the statutory framework under the Public Safety Article (“PS”) 
concerning the underlying offenses at issue in the instant appeal.  PS § 5-133, formerly 
Article 27 § 445, restricts certain classes of individuals from possessing regulated firearms.  
There are several ways that an individual may be prohibited from possessing regulated 
firearms—including prior convictions of a drug crime or crime of violence.  See PS § 5-
133(b).  Generally, to convict a defendant of possession of a regulated firearm by a 
prohibited person, the State must prove that a defendant was previously convicted of a 
- 18 - 
 
disqualifying crime as an element of the offense.  See Carter, 374 Md. at 709–10, 824 A.2d 
at 133.   
Despite this, a defendant has a “clear and compelling . . . interest in avoiding [the] 
introduction of prior crimes evidence.”  United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992).  This interest exists because, “the introduction of evidence of a prior conviction 
has the potential for grave mischief because of its tendency to ‘divert[ ] the attention of the 
jury from the question of the defendant’s responsibility for the crime charged to the 
improper issue of his bad character.’” United States v. Bowie, 142 F.3d 1301, 1305 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995)).   
In other words, with the introduction of evidence pertaining to a criminal 
defendant’s prior convictions, “[t]he primary concern is that prior crimes evidence 
“weigh[s] too much with the jury and ... overpersuade[s] them as to prejudge one with a 
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”  
Dockery, 955 F.2d at 53.  The concern over the potential prejudice a defendant may 
experience from the introduction of evidence concerning a prior conviction must be 
balanced with the “standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by 
evidence of its own choice.”  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186, 117 S. Ct. 644, 
653, 136 L.Ed 2d 574 (1997).  The joinder of possession of a regulated firearm by a 
prohibited person charge with other counts “must be informed by a respect for the special 
problems created by the introduction of other crimes evidence, and that it consequently 
will behoove prosecutors and trial judges to proceed with caution when situations similar 
- 19 - 
 
to this one face them in the future.”  United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985).  Next, we review the Maryland Rule primarily at issue.   
Rule 4-253, titled “Joint or Separate Trials,” permits joint trials of offenses and 
defendants: 
(a) Joint Trial of Defendants. On motion of a party, the court may order a 
joint trial for two or more defendants charged in separate charging 
documents if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an 
offense or offenses. 
 
(b) Joint Trial of Offenses. If a defendant has been charged in two or more 
charging documents, either party may move for a joint trial of the charges. 
In ruling on the motion, the court may inquire into the ability of either 
party to proceed at a joint trial. 
 
Md. Rule 4-253(a)–(b).  The question presented in this case, however, centers around the 
provision of Rule 4-253(c), which empowers a trial court with the discretionary authority 
to remedy prejudice arising from certain types of joinder.  The Rule, in pertinent part, 
provides,  
[i]f it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of 
counts, charging documents, or defendants, the court may, on its own 
initiative or on motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging 
documents, or defendants, or grant any other relief as justice requires. 
 
Md. Rule 4-253(c). 
Although a trial judge may “order separate trials of counts[,]” the Rule does not 
specifically contemplate the bifurcation of counts between two separate finders of fact 
- 20 - 
 
within a singular trial—our principal concern here.10  Mr. Hemming contends that the 
language of Rule 4-253(c), empowering a court to “grant any other relief as justice 
requires” encompasses the bifurcation of counts in a hybrid court/jury trial.  In contrast, 
the State argues that this Court has only interpreted this language to subsume limiting 
instructions or the redaction of evidence.  See State v. Hines, 450 Md. 352, 370, 148 A.3d 
1247, 1257 (2016).  In assessing whether a joinder of counts or defendants was improper, 
our primary concern is potential prejudice that may befall a defendant.  Id. at 369, 148 A.3d 
at 1256.  Such an inquiry requires that we utilize a “balancing approach” in which we 
consider “the likely prejudice caused by the joinder . . . [and] considerations of economy 
and efficiency in judicial administration.”  Id. (quoting Frazier, 318 Md. at 608, 569 A.2d 
at 689).   
In the wake of Galloway, the Rules Committee considered the bifurcation issue.  
The minutes of the Rules Committee’s January 9, 2004 meeting (“Rules Committee 
Minutes”) reveal that the Rules Committee contemplated modifying Rule 4-252 
(concerning mandatory motions in the circuit court) to include subsections (a)(6) which 
                                                          
 
10 In the sphere of criminal procedure, bifurcation in Maryland has been extremely limited 
in its application.  Rule 4-314 permits, where a defendant pleads not guilty, not criminally 
responsible by reason of insanity (“NCR”), and elects a jury trial, a trial court to bifurcate 
the NCR and innocence phases of the trial in a “bifurcated . . . single continuous trial in 
two stages.”  Rule 4-314(b)(1); see also State v. Marsh, 337 Md. 528, 537–38, 654 A.2d 
1318, 1322–23 (1995); Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 685, 547 A.2d 1054, 1064 (1988).  
Previously, former Rule 4-343 required the bifurcation of the guilt or innocence and 
sentencing phases in capital cases.  See Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 608, 616 A.2d 392, 
399 (1992).  In 2013, the General Assembly amended several provisions of the Criminal 
Law Article repealing the death penalty.  Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 472, 157 A.3d 272, 
273 (2017).  Notably, there is no other Rule of Criminal Procedure that authorizes 
bifurcation in the context of the case at bar.   
- 21 - 
 
contemplated “[a] request for bifurcation of counts between the jury and the judge” and 
subsection (h)(4) which concerned “[b]ifurcation of counts between the jury and the court.”  
The following Reporter’s Note accompanied the proposed amendments to Rule 4-252: 
The Criminal Subcommittee considered the issue of hybrid jury/bench trials 
as directed by the Court of Appeals in the case of Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 
379 (2002).  The Subcommittee recommends changing Rule 4-252 by adding 
new subsections (a)(6) and (h)(4), which allow the Court to grant a motion 
to bifurcate the counts in a criminal case, so that some counts are considered 
by the jury and some by the judge.  The Subcommittee is also proposing to 
add a sentence to the Committee note at the end of the Rule which clarifies 
that the new subsection allowing bifurcation of the counts does not apply to 
cases with multiple defendants. 
 
Rules Committee Minutes at 44.  Under the proposed changes to Rule, subsection (h)(4)  
 
required that,  
 
[i]f the court grants a motion to bifurcate the counts between the jury and the 
court, the court shall question the defendant to make sure that the defendant 
voluntarily waives the right to seek relief later because of inconsistent 
verdicts between the court and the jury or because the jury is unable to reach 
a verdict.  The court shall enter a written order assigning the appropriate 
counts to the court and to the jury for decision.  If the judge defers the judge’s 
verdict until the jury verdict comes in, and then the jury is unable to arrive at 
a verdict, the judge may nonetheless enter a verdict.  The judge may return a 
verdict before the jury does so.   
 
Id. at 43.   
The Chair of the Rules Committee suggested that the proposed new language of 
Rule 4-252 read as follows: “If the court grants a motion to bifurcate the counts between 
the jury and the court, the court shall enter a written order assigning the appropriate counts 
to the court and to the jury for a decision[.]”  Id. at 45.  Nonetheless, the Chair recognized 
that an amendment to the Rule was likely unnecessary, given the availability of a 
stipulation under Carter: 
- 22 - 
 
The Chair commented that after Galloway, the Honorable Lynne Battaglia, 
Judge of the Court of Appeals, had authored an opinion, Carter v. State, 374 
Md. 693 (2003), holding that if the defendant has committed a prior crime, 
such as possession of a firearm, which impacts a later trial on another charge, 
bifurcation of the charges in the later trial is not necessary.  However, the 
jury is entitled only to know that the defendant’s prior crime was one that 
prohibited further possession of a firearm, but not all of the details of the 
prior crime.   
 
Id. at 45.   
Several members of the committee, including Judge McAuliffe, expressed concern 
over the portion of the amendment that required defendants to waive any right to later 
complain of inconsistent verdicts.  Id. at 44–45.  Other members of the Rules Committee 
noted that bifurcation may be unnecessary with the availability of severance.  Id. at 46.  In 
contrast, some members suggested that severance may not be a practical alternative in all 
cases.  Id.  With these concerns established, the Rules Committee ultimately declined to 
submit a recommendation to amend Rule 4-252.  The Rules Committee remanded the issue 
to the “Criminal Subcommittee” for additional review, study, and to make 
recommendations regarding the procedure.  Id.  The Criminal Subcommittee did not 
suggest additional modification of the Rule to expressly permit the procedure.  Therefore, 
the Rules Committee’s reluctance to recommend that the Court of Appeals amend the 
Maryland Rules to expressly permit the procedure, coupled with the comments of the 
Chairman in light of our opinion in Carter, suggests the Committee did not view that the 
adoption of the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure would be necessary or advisable.  
Bifurcation of Trial and the Carter Stipulation    
- 23 - 
 
As Rule 4-253(c) expressly empowers a trial court to sever counts and, according 
to Mr. Hemming authorizes bifurcation in a hybrid trial, we must examine the definitions 
of “severance” and “bifurcation” to better ascertain the implications of these terms. 
Unfortunately, some courts have “blended the issue of severance of one count from 
another, with the issue of bifurcation of the elements of a single count.”  Carter v. State, 
145 Md. App. 195, 221, 802 A.2d 460, 475 (2002), reversed 374 Md. 693, 824 A.2d 123 
(2003); see, e.g., United States v. Mangum, 100 F.3d 164, 170–72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(discussing severance of counts and bifurcation of elements within a single count and 
blending the two distinct concepts).   Generally, “bifurcation is the separation of the legal 
issues or elements for a cause of action for separate trials, ordinarily by the same jury.”  
Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting 
Devices Defeat the Jury’s Role, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 505, 511 (1995).  Whereas, severance 
involves “the separation of issues or parties for trial by different juries.”  Id.   
Despite the immediate relative clarity, not all definitions of severance and 
bifurcation indicate that they differ in terms of whether the severed or bifurcated counts 
are considered by the same factfinder.  To this end, Black’s Law Dictionary more broadly 
defines the term “bifurcate” as “[t]o separate into two parts, esp. for convenience.  Multiple 
aspects of litigation, such as discovery, motions, defense, trial and jury deliberations, may 
be bifurcated to save time, reduce jury confusion, or achieve other benefits, with or without 
the same jury hearing both bifurcated parts.”  BIFURCATE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019).  Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “severance”, within the context of 
criminal procedure, as “[t]he separation of criminal charges or criminal defendants for trial, 
- 24 - 
 
as when codefendants have conflicting defenses so that prejudice might result to one or 
more of them.”  SEVERANCE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  Based on these 
definitions alone, a question remains as to whether the bifurcation of charges between 
separate finders of fact is permissible.  Thus, we look to federal precedent for guidance in 
our interpretation of Rule 4-253(c).   
Rule 4-253(c) is patterned after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) 14 
and both standards are “merely a restatement of the test applied at common law.”  
McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 608, 375 A.2d 551, 554 (1977); see also Simmons v. State, 
165 Md. 155, 165–66, 167 A. 60, 64 (1933).  Therefore, we shall briefly examine federal 
decisions addressing bifurcation under FRCP 14.  To support his position, Mr. Hemming 
relies on decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Ninth 
Circuits.  These cases are generally distinguishable from the question before us in the 
instant appeal.   
 
For example, in Joshua, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
analyzed an appeal in which the defendant moved to sever a charge of “possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon[,]” and the State acquiesced in his motion.11  976 F.2d at 846.  
Although the court denied the defendant’s motion to sever, the court ordered a bifurcated 
proceeding under which the jury first heard evidence and deliberated on three substantive 
counts, and then heard evidence and deliberated on the possession of a firearm by a 
                                                          
 
11 We refer to the crime as “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon[,]” because the 
controlling federal statute differs slightly from its Maryland counterpart.  See Joshua, 976 
F.2d at 846; 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e).  
  
- 25 - 
 
convicted felon count.12  Id.  The procedural posture in Joshua is distinct from the one 
considered by the Court in Galloway and proposed by Mr. Hemming, because the jury 
heard evidence as to all the counts within the indictment and deliberated on them.  Unlike 
here, the defendant in Joshua argued that the court erred in granting bifurcation and 
denying his motion to sever the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count.  Id. at 
847.   
In rejecting the defendant’s arguments, the Joshua court concluded that “the 
procedure adopted by the district court . . . strikes an appropriate balance between the 
concern about prejudice to the defendant and considerations of judicial economy.”  Id. at 
848.  The court explained that, under the procedure, “[t]he defendant’s criminal past is not 
made known to the jury until after [it has] reached a verdict with respect to the other 
charges. At the same time, this procedure is considerably more efficient than conducting 
an entire new jury trial on the weapon possession charge at a later date.”  Id.  Implicitly, 
the court suggested that bifurcation of the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited 
person counts, from remaining charges, is preferable to severance in terms of judicial 
economy.  Id.  Moreover, in that case, the government and defendant agreed to a stipulation 
that informed the jury that the defendant was a convicted felon.  Id. at 846.  We note here 
that Judge Wilner, in his concurrence in Galloway, advocated for the possibility of a 
Joshua-style bifurcated trial.  Galloway, 371 Md. at 419, 809 A.2d at 677 (Wilner J., 
                                                          
 
12 The defendant in Joshua was indicted on four counts: armed bank robbery; use of a 
firearm during a crime of violence; receipt of a firearm with an obliterated serial number; 
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Joshua, 976 F.2d at 846.   
 
- 26 - 
 
concurring).  As discussed below, the catchall language of Rule 4-253(c) permits 
bifurcation in this manner—as long as all charges are decided by the same factfinder. 
 
Mr. Hemming also cites to United States v. Nguyen as the Ninth Circuit’s 
endorsement of the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure.  88 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 1996).  In that 
case, a defendant was charged with two indictments, one of which involved a possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon count.  Id. at 814.  Before the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, the government moved to try the two indictments 
together.  Id.  The defendant moved to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon count, and the district court denied his motion.  Id.  On the issue of trying the two 
indictments together, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a]lthough severance or bifurcation is the 
preferred alternative, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
consolidating Nguyen’s two cases and ordering that the two indictments be tried together.”  
Id. at 818.   
 
As to the defendant’s arguments concerning bifurcation, the court concluded that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.  Id.  The court reached its 
conclusion after reasoning that the defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced 
by the joinder of the counts.  Id.  Moreover, the court found that two limiting instructions 
given by the district court to the jury, informing it that the evidence of the defendant’s prior 
convictions should not be considered in deliberating on whether the defendant possessed 
the firearm, were sufficient to ameliorate any potential prejudice.  Id. at 817–18.  
Nonetheless, because the defendant’s motion was denied, the case contains no specific 
- 27 - 
 
reference to a hybrid trial procedure, with the jury deciding some counts and the judge 
deciding the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts.   
 
In United States v. Jones, another case relied upon by Mr. Hemming, the defendant 
argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to sever the possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon count from the remaining charges.  16 F.3d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1994).  
In that case, two trials were held.  Id.  In the first, the defendant was charged with “armed 
bank robbery, bank robbery involving an assault, and use of a firearm during a crime of 
violence[,]” which ended in a hung jury and “resulted in a mistrial.”  Id.  Before the second 
trial, the government added two additional counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon—one charge relating to a firearm the defendant allegedly used during the robbery 
and the second relating to a firearm the defendant possessed upon arrest.  Id.   
 
The defendant moved to sever both of the possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon counts, but the trial court denied his motion with respect to the count relating to the 
firearm used in the bank robbery and granted it with respect to the remaining possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon count.  Id. at 489.  Although the trial judge gave a limiting 
instruction to the jury, informing it that the evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction 
should not be considered in determining his guilt as to the other counts, the Jones court 
concluded that “the judge reminded the jurors repeatedly that Jones was a convicted 
felon[.]”  Id. at 492–93.  In addition, the Jones court concluded that the government merely 
added the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon counts “solely to buttress its case 
on the other counts.”  Id. at 492 (citing United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985)).  Although the court specifically held that the defendant experienced prejudice 
- 28 - 
 
from the introduction of evidence concerning his prior disqualifying crimes, it ultimately 
did not find these grounds dispositive.  Instead, the court reversed the defendant’s 
convictions and remanded for a new trial under principles of “retroactive misjoinder[.]”  
Id. at 493.13    
 
Although the Jones court commented that “[c]ourts have held that joinder of an ex-
felon count with other charges requires either severance, bifurcation, or some other 
effective ameliorative procedure[,]” the court did not consider the bifurcation of counts in 
a hybrid judge/jury trial.  Id. at 492 (citing Joshua, 976 F.2d at 848; Dockery, 955 F.2d at 
50).  As noted above, none of the cases cited by Mr. Hemming represent instances in which 
possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts were bifurcated and 
decided by the trial judge, where the remaining counts were determined by a jury.  His 
                                                          
 
13 The court explained that,“‘[r]etroactive misjoinder’ arises where joinder of multiple 
counts was proper initially, but later developments—such as a district court’s dismissal of 
some counts for lack of evidence or an appellate court’s reversal of less than all 
convictions—render the initial joinder improper.”  Id. at 493 (citation omitted).  The 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count considered in Jones, with reference to 
the firearm the defendant allegedly used during the robbery—the possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon count that the trial court refused to sever—required the government 
to establish that the firearm traveled through interstate commerce.  Id. at 492; 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 922(g)(1); see also United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1993) (commenting 
that § 922(g)(1) “prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm in or affecting 
commerce.”).  Because the Jones court held that there was insufficient evidence that the 
firearm entered into commerce, the court concluded that,  
 
[t]he jury learned that Jones had a prior felony conviction as part of the 
government’s proof on count four.  Having vacated the latter count, we must 
remand for a new trial on the robbery, armed robbery, and § 924(c) counts 
because, in retrospect, the jury should never have heard evidence of the 
vacated count.   
 
Id. at 493.   
- 29 - 
 
reliance on these decisions is therefore unavailing and insufficient to compel us toward a 
more expansive interpretation of Rule 4-253(c)’s reference to “any other relief as justice 
requires.”   
 
In fact, our research reveals no federal precedent authorizing the bifurcated hybrid 
trial procedure.  Several decisions involve situations where possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon counts were bifurcated from other counts, but all counts were considered 
by the same jury.  United States v. Lee, 549 F.3d 84, 88, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2008); Joshua, 976 
F.2d at 847; United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1978).  In contrast, several courts 
have considered the bifurcation of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon counts from 
other counts but have not discussed whether the counts would all be heard by the same 
factfinder.  See Jones, 16 F.3d at 489; United States v. McCode, 317 Fed. Appx. 207, 212 
(3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 504 Fed. Appx. 207, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Amante, 418 F.3d 220, 224 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005).   
Several federal appellate circuits have also held that a defendant is not entitled to 
have the elements of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charges bifurcated.  
United States v. Belk, 346 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (bifurcation of the element of prior 
conviction); United States v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 482 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); United 
States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 
1220 (3d Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Fields, 507 Fed. Appx. 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Baker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
1994).  In the alternative, courts have held that where a “single offense of being a felon in 
- 30 - 
 
possession” is charged, a defendant is not entitled to bifurcation.  See United States v. 
Moore, 376 F.3d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Baker, 1 F.3d at 959).   
 
In Carter, we addressed the authority of a trial judge to bifurcate elements of a 
criminal charge to prevent the jury from considering a particular element of that charge.  
We acknowledged various authorities that determined that “bifurcation of a trial by 
dividing it along the lines of the elements of the crime charged” would lead to serious 
problems.  Carter, 374 Md. at 710-12, 824 A.2d at 134. In that case, the defendant argued 
that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to bifurcate the elements of the possession 
of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person count.14  374 Md. at 709–10, 824 A.2d at 133.  
In reliance on the federal precedent mentioned above, the Carter Court held that a trial 
court may not bifurcate the elements of a possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited 
person charge, and “conclude[d] that the proper approach is that which encourages the 
entirety of the charge to be heard by the jury.”  Id. at 713, 824 A.2d at 135–36.   The Carter 
Court emphasized that the one factor that militates against bifurcation of the elements when 
trying a defendant on criminal-in-possession charges is ensuring that the jury understands 
the criminality of the alleged conduct.  Id. at 714.  Thus, it is clear that the Carter Court 
would not have supported a criminal trial procedure that permitted the elimination of an 
element of a charge from the jury’s consideration. 
                                                          
 
14 The Court of Special Appeals has pointed out, in reliance upon our decision in Carter, 
that bifurcation of the elements of the offense of possession of a regulated firearm by a 
person previously convicted of a crime of violence is improper, even if the parties 
stipulated to the procedure.  See Nash v. State, 191 Md. App. 386, 401–02, 991 A.2d 831, 
840 (2010).   
 
- 31 - 
 
 
As detailed supra, under Rule 4-253(c) a defendant, for example, must demonstrate 
that he or she was or will be unduly prejudiced by the joinder of counts to permit the 
severance of counts or any remedy under the Rule’s authorization to grant “any other relief 
as justice requires.”  See McKnight, 280 Md. at 607–08, 375 A.2d at 553–54.15  We have 
advised that “[i]n any given case of similar offense joinder . . . the trial judge must balance 
the likely prejudice caused by the joinder against the important considerations of economy 
and efficiency in judicial administration.”  Id. at 609–10, 375 A.2d at 555.  The Court of 
Special Appeals has previously noted that there are two identifiable issues relating to the 
presentation of evidence demonstrating a defendant’s prior convictions.  One of these 
issues is based on an evidentiary foundation and the other on principles of misjoinder: 
The joinder/severance problem is a classic aspect of the law of criminal 
procedure. Unlike the merely evidentiary issue of when, in the course of an 
ongoing trial, to admit evidence of ‘other crimes’ or ‘other bad acts,’ the 
joinder/severance issue must be resolved, of necessity, pretrial. The 
evidentiary problem, by contrast, may arise randomly throughout the course 
of a trial. 
 
Solomon v. State, 101 Md. App. 331, 336, 646 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994) (citation omitted).  
Although these two issues are distinct procedurally and in application, the required 
analyses overlap to the extent that—in both situations—courts often consider potential 
prejudice to a defendant.  This concern for the potential prejudice a defendant may face 
permeates a court’s analysis on the evidentiary issue:   
Thus, ‘other crimes’ evidence, even though independently and substantially 
relevant to some contested issue, may be excluded if its probative value is 
                                                          
 
15 At the time of McKnight, Rule 4-253 was Rule 745.  The two Rules contained identical 
provisions and our prior interpretations of Rule 745 offer guidance in our interpretation of 
Rule 4-253.  State v. Edison, 318 Md. 541, 546 n.1, 569 A.2d 657, 659 n.1 (1990).   
- 32 - 
 
exceeded by potential jury hostility or unfair prejudice.  The leeway of this 
discretion lies in the direction of excluding otherwise admissible evidence.  
A decision to admit other crimes evidence which is clearly incorrect ‘on this 
question of balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be 
corrected on appeal as an abuse of discretion.’ 
 
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 641, 552 A.2d 896, 901 (1989) (citations omitted). 
The bifurcation issue that we examined in Carter is procedurally distinct from that 
of the instant appeal—bifurcation of the elements of a possession of a regulated firearm by 
a prohibited person count.  See Carter, 374 Md. at 709–13, 824 A.2d at 133–35.  In that 
case, the defendant, Mr. Carter, was charged with unlawful discharge of a firearm within 
Baltimore City, possession of a regulated firearm by one previously convicted of a crime 
of violence, and possession of a regulated firearm by a person under twenty-one years of 
age.  Id. at 697, 824 A.2d at 126.  Before the trial court, Mr. Carter moved to have the court 
bifurcate the elements of the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person 
charge.  Id. at 709–10, 824 A.2d at 133.  Under the procedure suggested by Mr. Carter, the 
jury would determine only whether Mr. Carter possessed a regulated firearm, and if the 
jury found Mr. Carter possessed the regulated firearm, “only then would [the jury] have      
. . . to determine the other elements of the charge, whether Carter had a qualifying 
conviction.”  Id. at 710, 824 A.2d at 133.   
Ultimately, we disagreed with Mr. Carter’s contention that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to bifurcate the elements of the possession of a regulated firearm by a 
prohibited person count.  Id. at 713, 824 A.2d at 135–36.  The Court based its holding on 
federal precedent and concluded that “the proper course is to require a trial judge, when 
the defendant elects a jury trial, to allow the State to present evidence of all the elements 
- 33 - 
 
of a criminal-in-possession charge.”  Id. at 715, 824 A.2d at 136.  The Court explained its 
reasoning in stating,  
[a]lthough we, too, understand the dangers of introducing evidence of a 
defendant’s previous conviction where the jury is considering a similar 
crime, we conclude that the proper approach is that which encourages the 
entirety of the charge to be heard by the jury. We are most persuaded by the 
predominant reasoning of the courts in Collamore and Gilliam. The jury’s 
role in deciding guilt or innocence involves more than merely finding 
innocuous facts; rather, it requires a judgment about an individual’s behavior 
based on an established code. This determination cannot be reached reliably 
without a full appreciation of the criminality of one’s behavior. The jurors 
must know, therefore, why they are being asked to subject an individual to 
criminal punishment for possessing a firearm when, generally, such an act is 
not illegal. When the jury does not understand that the defendant may not 
possess a firearm because of a previous criminal conviction, its ability to 
carry out its role is impeded. 
 
Id. at 713–14, 824 A.2d at 135–36.  The Court did, however, devise a method whereby a 
defendant’s exposure to potential prejudice stemming from evidence of a prior 
disqualifying conviction may be limited or ameliorated.   
 
At trial, Mr. Carter offered to stipulate that he was previously convicted of a felony 
or crime of violence—and was therefore prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm—
in an attempt to minimize the potential prejudice he would experience from the jury hearing 
evidence of his prior conviction.  Id. at 701–02, 824 A.2d at 128–29.  Although the court 
agreed to only inform the jury that the charge against Mr. Carter was “possession of a 
firearm after being convicted of a crime of violence[,]” the State refused Mr. Carter’s 
request to stipulate and sought to introduce evidence that Mr. Carter had previously been 
convicted of “robbery with a deadly weapon.”  Id. at 702, 824 A.2d at 129.  The trial court 
- 34 - 
 
ultimately permitted the State to introduce evidence that Mr. Carter was previously 
convicted of “robbery with a deadly weapon.”  Id.   
 
Before this Court, Mr. Carter argued that “because he was willing to admit the prior 
conviction, the State had no reason to introduce, and the court should not have admitted 
evidence that the prior conviction was for robbery with a deadly weapon.”  Id. at 715, 824 
A.2d at 137.  Mr. Carter contended that the jury should have only been informed that he 
was previously convicted of a felony or a crime of violence.  Id.  Relying primarily on Old 
Chief, the Carter Court recognized the implicit perils of presenting evidence to a jury that 
a defendant has been previously convicted of a crime.  Id. at 716–17, 824 A.2d at 137–38 
(citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181–82, 117 S. Ct. at 650–51). 
 
Agreeing with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Old Chief, the Carter Court 
ascertained that, “the name and nature of a previous conviction, although ‘technically 
relevant,’ ‘addresse[s] no detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would 
not [be] covered by the stipulation or admission [of that element].’”  Id. at 720, 824 A.2d 
at 140 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186, 117 S. Ct. at 653).  We concluded that, where 
a defendant offers to stipulate or admit that he or she was previously convicted of a 
disqualifying crime, the trial court must accept such a stipulation.  Id. at 722, 824 A.2d at 
141.  We commented that, “in such situations, the name or nature of the previous conviction 
should not be disclosed to the jury.”  Id. at 720, 824 A.2d at 140.  More specifically, we 
held that,  
when the defendant admits or the parties stipulate to the previous-conviction 
element of a charge under Section 445(d), the trial judge should inform the 
jury that the defendant admits that he or she has been convicted of a crime 
- 35 - 
 
for which he or she is prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm under 
the law. The judge should not describe the previous conviction with any more 
particularity or by using the categories of crimes under Section 445 (such as 
‘crime of violence’ or ‘felony’).       
     
Id. at 772, 824 A.2d at 141.   
 
In Carter, the trial judge permitted “the State to introduce evidence that Mr. Carter 
previously had been convicted of ‘robbery with a deadly’ weapon.”  Id. at 721, 824 A.2d 
at 140.  The admission of this evidence unduly prejudiced Mr. Carter by possibly luring 
the jury “into a sequence of bad character reasoning.”  Id.  Consequently, the trial judge’s 
refusal to strike the unnecessary language that characterized the prior conviction by its 
statutory categories of crimes under the relevant statutes, presently codified as PS § 5-
133(b)–(c)(1), created a high potential for unfair prejudice to Mr. Carter and warranted our 
reversal of his convictions.  Id. at 720–22, 824 A.2d at 140–41.  Accordingly, the Court 
announced a rule of exclusion of unnecessary evidence to limit undue prejudice to the 
defendant.   Id. at 722, 824 A.2d at 141.   
Unlike the Supreme Court in Old Chief, the Carter Court promulgated a per se rule, 
under which the State is not permitted to object to such a stipulation and, if requested by a 
defendant, the trial court must grant or accept the stipulation.  Id. at 720–21.  Therefore, 
any defendant charged with the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person is 
legally entitled to a stipulation that informs the jury that he or she is simply prohibited from 
possessing a regulated firearm, and disclosing no further detail regarding any prior 
convictions, if the defendant requests it.  See id. at 772, 824 A.2d at 141.   
- 36 - 
 
 
Mr. Hemming recognizes the ameliorative effect of a Carter stipulation.  In fact, at 
trial, Mr. Hemming entered a stipulation that he “was previously convicted of a crime that 
disqualifies him from possessing a regulated firearm.”  As noted above, Mr. Hemming’s 
counsel was willing to advise the jury that Mr. Hemming had a prior conviction, because 
he referenced Mr. Hemming’s prior arrests during his opening statement.  Clearly, although 
this stipulation noted a prior conviction, it was permissible under Carter, as it did not 
“describe the previous conviction with any more particularity” than necessary and did not 
use “the categories of crimes under Section 445.”  Id.  Therefore, the stipulation that Mr. 
Hemming entered into aided in limiting the potential prejudice he would have faced from 
the introduction of evidence concerning his prior disqualifying convictions under our 
interpretation of Carter.    
Despite the ameliorative effect that a Carter stipulation may have, prejudice is only 
one component of our analysis under Rule 4-253(c).  As noted above, we aim to strike an 
appropriate balance between the prejudice a defendant may face and the concerns of 
judicial economy and efficiency.  See McKnight, 280 Md. at 610, 375 A.2d at 555.  A 
Carter stipulation is generally preferable in terms of judicial economy and efficiency.  The 
bifurcated hybrid trial procedure advocated by Mr. Hemming would require a two-phase 
trial, with a different factfinder presiding over each portion of the trial.  Whereas, a Carter 
stipulation involves a singular trial, in which the factfinder is merely informed that the 
defendant stipulates that he or she is prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm.  A 
Carter stipulation is the procedurally simpler method to address the potential prejudice 
inherent in cases involving charges of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited 
- 37 - 
 
person and appears to be preferable to bifurcation in terms of judicial economy.  See Carter, 
374 Md. at 722, 824 A.2d at 141.   
Furthermore, Mr. Hemming argues that it “makes no sense to hold . . . that a trial 
judge has discretion to protect the defendant from unfair prejudice by severing the criminal-
in-possession counts from the other counts, but lacks discretion to do so by bifurcating the 
same counts between judge and jury in a single trial.”  This assertion, however, overlooks 
the standards applicable to severance under Rule 4-253(c).16  A separate standard—at least 
initially—governs a trial court’s analysis on severance.  Mr. Hemming discounts the issue 
of a defendant’s partial waiver of his or her right to a jury trial.  In situations where counts 
are severed, a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial and elect a bench trial in one 
trial and not do so in the other.  Simply put, severance would obviate the need for an 
impermissible partial waiver of a defendant’s right to be tried by a jury.  See infra at 38–
39.  Moreover, Mr. Hemming fails to identify any cases in which a trial court has severed 
possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts from other counts, 
suggesting, in most cases, such counts are jointly tried.  Accordingly, we find unpersuasive 
Mr. Hemming’s argument, that a trial court’s power to sever counts is inconsistent with a 
                                                          
 
16 In situations where a defendant is charged with multiple offenses, “the judge may order 
two or more offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or any combination therefore, to 
be tried together if the offenses are of the same or similar character.”  Frazier, 318 Md. at 
607, 569 A.2d at 689 (citing Graves v. State, 298 Md. 542, 544, 471 A.2d 701, 702 (1984)).  
Where a defendant is “charged with similar but unrelated offenses” a defendant must 
establish “that the evidence as to each individual offense would not be mutually admissible 
at separate trials” to warrant severance.  McKnight, 280 Md. at 612, 375 A.2d at 556.  Only 
after taking into consideration these tenets, a trial court must balance the prejudice caused 
by joinder with “considerations of economy and efficiency in judicial administration.”  
Frazier, 318 Md. at 607, 569 A.2d at 689; McKnight, 280 Md. at 608, 375 A.2d at 554.       
- 38 - 
 
trial court’s lack of authority to bifurcate possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited 
person counts in a hybrid trial procedure—involving two factfinders.   
We next turn to the potential procedural problems generated by the bifurcated 
hybrid procedure.  The procedure would require an impermissible “partial waiver” of a 
defendant’s right to a jury trial that would complicate a trial judge’s determination as to 
whether a defendant has been sufficiently advised of and properly waived his or her right 
to a jury trial.  Second, in certain situations, the hybrid bifurcated trial procedure may 
generate the potentiality of inconsistent verdicts between judge and jury as recognized by 
this Court in Galloway.   
Rule 4-246 sets forth the procedure through which a defendant may waive his or her 
right to a jury trial.  The rule provides that, 
(a) Generally. In the circuit court, a defendant having a right to trial by jury 
shall be tried by a jury unless the right is waived pursuant to section (b) 
of this Rule. The State does not have the right to elect a trial by jury. 
 
(b) Procedure for Acceptance of Waiver. A defendant may waive the right to 
a trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial. The court 
may not accept the waiver until, after an examination of the defendant on 
the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the 
attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, the court 
determines and announces on the record that the waiver is made 
knowingly and voluntarily. 
 
Md. Rule 4-246.  The Rule does not specifically empower a defendant to elect a jury trial 
with respect to some counts of a charging document and waive it with respect to other 
counts.  See Galloway, 371 Md. at 398–99, 809 A.2d at 665.  Further, “[w]e have generally 
considered the waiver of the right to be tried by a jury to be a waiver in respect to the entire 
merits trial, not portions of the trial.”  Id. (citing Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 131, 622 
- 39 - 
 
A.2d 950, 953 (1987)).  We have treated a defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial to 
be “an either/or selection.”  Id.  As noted by the Galloway Majority, this Court has 
previously held that, in the context of a not criminally responsible plea, a defendant’s 
waiver of his or her right to a jury trial on the defendant’s guilt or innocence “inevitably 
encompasses a waiver of jury rights as to criminal responsibility.”  State v. Marsh, 337 Md. 
528, 539, 654 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1995); Galloway, 371 Md. at 399, 809 A.2d at 665–66.17   
The Committee Note to Rule 4-246 supports this conclusion in its language that “the 
court should seek to ensure that the defendant understands that: . . . unless the defendant 
waives a trial by jury, the case will be tried by a jury.” (Emphasis added).  The singular 
description contained within the Committee Note supports our prior interpretation of Rule 
4-246—an interpretation under which a defendant is not entitled to waive his right to jury 
trial only with reference to specific charges.  As noted by the State, our principal inquiry 
in assessing a defendant’s waiver of his or her constitutional right to trial by jury was 
whether the waiver was “knowing and voluntary[.]”  Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 316, 
893 A.2d 1018, 1034 (2006) (citing Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 377–80, 825 A.2d 1055, 
1063 (2003)).  The bifurcated hybrid trial procedure urged by Mr. Hemming would 
complicate a trial judge’s assessment of whether a defendant’s jury trial waiver is knowing 
and voluntary.  Specifically, the procedure would complicate this process as it involves 
                                                          
 
17 Nonetheless, in situations where a defendant enters pleas of guilty and NCR, the 
defendant may have the NCR portion of the trial determined by a jury—assuming he or 
she does not waive his or her right to a jury trial.  See Md. Rule 4-314(a)(4).    
- 40 - 
 
two factfinders considering different counts.  We find this additional level of complication 
untenable.   
  
Furthermore, the bifurcated trial procedure, suggested by Mr. Hemming, generates 
the issue of potentially inconsistent verdicts between the judge and jury.  In Galloway, the 
Majority noted that although “convictions based on inconsistent jury verdicts are 
tolerated[,]” this principle does not hold in situations where “a judge is involved in 
rendering one of the inconsistent verdicts.”  371 Md. at 401, 415, 809 A.2d at 667, 675 
(citing Williams v. State, 117 Md. App. 55, 70–71, 699 A.2d 473, 481 (1997)).  
Accordingly, the Court fashioned a rule under which any inconsistency in a combined 
verdict of a jury and trial judge is impermissible.  Id. at 416, 809 A.2d at 676.18   
As noted supra at n.18, unlike Galloway, Price and its progeny focused on 
inconsistent jury verdicts and did not consider inconsistent verdicts rendered between judge 
and jury.  As explained by the Galloway Court, “[i]f this Court were to approve the 
inconsistent verdicts rendered by the trial judge, it would be authorizing a practice that 
would permit the State to achieve a judgment of conviction that overrides a jury’s finding 
                                                          
 
18  At the time of Galloway, inconsistent verdicts between judge and jury were 
impermissible, but inconsistent jury verdicts were “tolerated[.]”  371 Md. at 401, 809 A.2d 
at 667.  Our jurisprudence concerning inconsistent jury verdicts has evolved over time.  
Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 29, 949 A.2d 619, 630 (2008) (holding that inconsistent jury 
verdicts are categorically impermissible).  In McNeil v. State, we limited the per se rule of 
Price.  426 Md. 455, 459, 44 A.3d 982, 984 (2012) (distinguishing between a legally and 
a factually inconsistent verdict, and holding the latter is permissible in criminal trials).  
More recently, in State v. Stewart, we rejected this distinction.  464 Md. 296, 304, 305, 211 
A.3d 371, 376 (2019) (holding that the permissibility of an inconsistent jury verdict 
depends on “whether the jury verdict on its face indicates that the jury failed to follow the 
trial court’s proper instructions on the law governing the charged offenses”). 
- 41 - 
 
of acquittal.”  Galloway, 371 Md. at 416, 809 A.2d at 675.  As demonstrated by the 
Galloway Court, the procedure has the potentiality to elevate one trier of fact’s verdict over 
the other—a potentiality that ultimately could undermine confidence in the criminal justice 
system.  See id. at 406, 809 A.2d at 670 (noting that “such matters would undermine the 
historic role of the jury as the arbiter of questions put to it”) (quoting Hoffert v. State, 319 
Md. 377, 384–85, 572 A.2d 536, 540 (1990)).  Therefore, despite the evolution of our 
jurisprudence on the permissibility of inconsistent jury verdicts, the Galloway Court’s 
holding that inconsistent verdicts between judge and jury are impermissible remains good 
law and further supports our holding in the instant appeal—as a potential procedural pitfall 
unique to the bifurcated hybrid trial procedure.  
In addition to the several federal decisions, Mr. Hemming cites to various 
distinguishable decisions from other states involving the bifurcation of possession of a 
regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts under the hybrid trial procedure.  The only 
decision Mr. Hemming relies upon which directly contemplates the bifurcated hybrid trial 
procedure is one by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.19  State v. Knight, 266 Conn. 658, 
661–62, 835 A.2d 47, 50 (2003).  In that case, the court considered “a procedurally unique 
                                                          
 
19 Mr. Hemming also cites to decisions by appellate courts from other states.  However, 
these cases fall into either one of two categories.  First, some of these cases considered 
bifurcation of counts where all counts were decided by a jury.  See State v. Foust, 482 
S.W.3d 20, 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015); Lawson v. State, 264 P.3d 590, 599 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2011); Morales v. State, 143 P.3d 463, 465 (Nev. 2006); Chapple v. State, 866 P.2d 
1213, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Hendrickson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 362, 365–66 (Ark. 
1994).  Second, the remaining case cited by Mr. Hemming did not identify whether the 
bifurcated counts would be heard by the same factfinder.  Hines v. State, 801 N.E.2d 634, 
635 (Ind. 2004).   
- 42 - 
 
criminal trial, wherein two counts of the criminal information were decided by the jury and 
a third count was decided separately by the court.”  Id. at 660, 835 A.2d at 49.  The 
defendant was charged with murder, carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, and 
possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person; the latter charge being decided 
by the trial court.  Id. at 658, 835 A.2d at 47.  The jury found the defendant not guilty of 
carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, but the trial judge found him guilty on the 
possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person count.  Id.  The defendant entered 
into a stipulation that he did not maintain a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, so, in 
reference to the firearm offenses, the judge and jury were both tasked only with 
determining whether the defendant possessed the firearm.  Id. at 662 n.8, 835 A.2d at 51 
n.8.   
On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court’s verdict 
was impermissibly logically inconsistent with that of the jury, and therefore, reversal was 
required.  Id. at 670, 835 A.2d at 55.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut considered our 
holding in Galloway, that inconsistent verdicts between jury and judge are impermissible, 
and rejected the proposition.  Id. at 673–74, 835 A.2d at 56–57.  Undoubtedly, Knight 
demonstrates that the potentiality of inconsistent verdicts, under the bifurcated hybrid trial 
procedure, is a substantial issue.  For this reason, under our prohibition against inconsistent 
verdicts between jury and judge enunciated in Galloway, we recognize that a Carter 
stipulation is a more appropriate methodology of ameliorating a defendant from undue 
prejudice that avoids the potential pitfalls associated with the bifurcated hybrid trial 
procedure.   
- 43 - 
 
A Carter stipulation is one method through which a defendant may limit the 
potential prejudice stemming from the introduction of evidence establishing the 
defendant’s legal status.  The bifurcated hybrid trial procedure Mr. Hemming urges us to 
adopt carries with it a host of procedural issues including, a defendant’s “partial waiver” 
of his or her right to a jury trial and the potential for inconsistent verdicts.  A Carter 
stipulation is preferable in terms of judicial economy and efficiency over the hybrid trial 
procedure.  Furthermore, we find no Maryland or federal cases contemplating or endorsing 
the hybrid trial procedure.  Although some federal cases have mentioned the bifurcation of 
possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts, none have contemplated 
the bifurcation of counts between two different factfinders in a single hybrid trial.  
Accordingly, Mr. Hemming’s suggested hybrid bifurcated trial procedure lacks any 
surrounding jurisprudential support justifying its application.  Therefore, we hold that a 
trial court does not maintain the discretion, under Rule 4-253(c), to bifurcate possession of 
a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts, from other charges, in a singular trial 
split between two different factfinders.   
Finally, we acknowledge, however, that Md. Rule 4-253(c), does permit a trial 
judge, in the interest of justice, to order a bifurcated proceeding in a criminal jury trial to 
limit or ameliorate the potential prejudice to the defendant who is tried on multiple counts 
which include charges of possession of a regulated firearm by a person previously 
convicted of a disqualified crime.  Many courts have left it to the trial judge to exercise his 
or her discretion to weigh the potential prejudice to the defendant against the interests of 
judicial economy when deciding to bifurcate criminal proceedings.  See Foust, 482 S.W.3d 
- 44 - 
 
at 47; Lawson, 264 P.3d at 599; Williams, 504 Fed. Appx. at 212; McCode, 317 Fed. Appx. 
at 212; Morales, 143 P.3d at 465; Hines, 801 N.E. at 635; Nguyen, 88 F.3d at 815; Joshua, 
976 F.2d at 847; Jones, 16 F.3d at 492; Hendrickson, 871 S.W.2d at 365–66; Chapple, 866 
P.2d at 1217.  We note that the prejudice complained about must be more than the same 
potential for prejudice that every criminal defendant faces when multiple counts are tried 
together.  See Joshua, 976 F.2d at 848.    
A bifurcated trial procedure similar to the trial in Joshua is permitted under Md. 
Rule 4-253(c) where the trial judge, in the sound exercise of judicial discretion, determines 
that justice requires “other relief” because a party will be unfairly “prejudiced by joinder 
for trial of counts, charging documents or defendants.”  We offer some guidelines.  For 
example, in those situations, the bifurcated counts will be decided by the same jury.  Thus, 
the jury will first hear evidence and deliberate on the counts that do not relate to or require, 
as an element of the offense, proof of a defendant’s prior disqualifying conviction.  In the 
next phase of the trial, the jury will hear necessary evidence of the defendant’s prior 
convictions consistent with our decision in Carter, 374 Md. at 722, 824 A.2d at 141, and 
deliberate on charges such as possession of a regulated firearm by one with a prior felony 
conviction, possession of a regulated firearm by one with a disqualifying conviction; 
possession of ammunition by a prohibited person; and similar charges.  In the context of 
bifurcated proceedings, generally, all of the charges against the defendant will arise out of 
the same, uninterrupted series of transactions.  As such, the bifurcated trial will be a highly 
efficient way to try the case within the trial judge’s discretion.  Henceforth, a trial of those 
- 45 - 
 
offenses to which a defendant’s legal status or prior conviction is irrelevant are insulated 
from the jury’s deliberations on the criminal-in-possession counts.   
 
A Joshua-style bifurcated proceeding, like the Carter stipulation, can be an effective 
procedure to limit or ameliorate the potential prejudice in a trial involving possession of a 
regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts that are included within a multicount 
charging document.  Like the Carter stipulation and the limiting jury instruction, 
bifurcation is a tool available to the trial judge to limit or ameliorate potential prejudice.  A 
Joshua-style bifurcation proceeding does not present the problems created by a hybrid 
jury/judge trial—partial waiver of the right to a jury, inconsistent verdicts between judge 
and jury, and a trial court’s verdict topping that of the jury.  Further, Joshua-style 
bifurcation prevents the jury from hearing evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions 
while the jury is deliberating on the counts that are unrelated to that defendant’s prior 
involvement with the criminal justice system.  See Joshua, 976 F.2d at 848.  The 
procedure’s ameliorative effect is apparent and substantial.   
Notably, in the Joshua case, the defendant had the benefit of both a bifurcated 
proceeding and a stipulation to ameliorate the unfair prejudice resulting from the 
defendant’s prior conviction.  976 F.2d at 846.  We caution that a defendant seeking a 
bifurcated criminal trial with respect to multiple counts that include charges like a person 
prohibited to possess a firearm or ammunition because of his or her age, mental health, or 
criminal behavior must first comply with the Maryland Rules of Procedure.  A motion, 
timely filed in advance of trial, is necessary to allow the trial judge sufficient time to look 
forward in planning the course of the anticipated trial.  Accordingly, the motion to bifurcate 
- 46 - 
 
should be in writing and filed within the 30-day mandatory motion period prescribed by 
Rule 4-252(a)(5) for motions to sever.  
Mr. Hemming’s second question presented in the appeal sub judice is whether the 
trial judge abused its discretion in denying his motion to bifurcate.  As we have determined 
that a trial judge does not maintain the discretion under Rule 4-253(c) to bifurcate 
possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person counts from other charges in a 
hybrid trial procedure, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that it did not have 
the authority for such a bifurcation.  The trial judge’s ruling on the motion was reasonable.  
Moreover, Mr. Hemming did not request a Joshua-style bifurcation proceeding.  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hemming’s 
motion.  Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. 
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER. 
 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/48a19cn.pdf