Case Title: Marchand v. Dep’t of Corr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11949

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11949 
 
MARK MARCHAND  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION & another.1 
 
 
 
August 11, 2016. 
 
 
Correction Officer.  Public Employment, Assault pay benefits. 
 
 
 
On January 21, 2008, while working for the defendant 
Department of Correction (department), the plaintiff, Mark 
Marchand, sustained a knee injury when he intervened to protect 
a fellow employee from an assault by an inmate.  As a result of 
the injury, Marchand began to receive workers' compensation 
benefits, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, as well as assault pay, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58.  On November 19, 2010, after a 
hearing, the department's acting commissioner determined that 
Marchand was medically unfit for duty and separated him from 
employment as of that date.  Although Marchand continued to 
receive workers' compensation benefits until July 4, 2013, the 
department stopped paying assault pay as of the date of 
Marchand's separation from employment.2 
 
 
Marchand then commenced this action against the department 
and the Commonwealth's Executive Office of Health and Human 
Services, Division of Human Resources, seeking a declaration 
that he was entitled to continue receiving assault pay for so 
                                                 
 
1 Executive Office of Health and Human Services, Division of 
Human Resources. 
 
 
2 Marchand initially received benefits pursuant to G. L. 
c. 152, § 34 (temporary total disability), from January 21, 
2008, until July 10, 2008, and then, from July 11, 2008, until 
July 4, 2013, received benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 35 
(partial disability). 
2 
 
 
long as he was receiving workers' compensation benefits -- that 
is, until July 4, 2013.  A judge in the Superior Court agreed.  
He allowed Marchand's cross motion for summary judgment; denied 
the defendants' motion; and ordered that judgment enter 
declaring that Marchand was entitled to assault pay retroactive 
to November 19, 2010, and continuing through July 4, 2013.  The 
Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, in a memorandum and order 
issued pursuant to its rule 1:28.  See Marchand v. Department of 
Correction, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2015).  We allowed the 
defendants' application for further appellate review. 
 
 
The single question before us is whether a Commonwealth 
employee entitled to receive assault pay pursuant to G. L. 
c. 30, § 58, fourth par., is entitled to continue receiving such 
pay even after he separates from employment so long as he is 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits pursuant to G. L. 
c. 152, or whether his right to assault pay ceases with his 
separation from employment.  The Appeals Court has previously 
interpreted the relevant provisions of G. L. c. 30, § 58, to 
mean the former.  See Moog v. Commonwealth, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 
925, 927 (1997).  We conclude, however, that the latter is the 
better interpretation -- in short, that assault pay is 
contingent on continued employment. 
 
 
When a Commonwealth employee injured in the course of 
employment is entitled, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, to workers' 
compensation benefits, G. L. c. 30, § 58, provides a means for 
the employee to continue to receive full pay while absent from 
work as a result of the injury.  Generally, as set forth in 
first three paragraphs of § 58, the injured employee may use 
accrued sick leave to receive full pay.3  Pursuant to the fourth 
                                                 
 
3 The first three paragraphs of G. L. c. 30, § 58, provide: 
 
 
"Any employee of the commonwealth eligible to receive 
workers' compensation under [G. L. c. 152] who sustains 
injuries while in the employ of the commonwealth and who 
has sufficient sick leave credits accrued shall be granted 
leave of absence with pay for each working day he is absent 
from his duties because of such injuries until he returns 
to work or until the case has been approved by the 
industrial accident board. 
 
 
"Workers' compensation for such period shall be 
refunded to the state treasurer or spending agency of the 
commonwealth.  The payment by the industrial accident board 
for such period shall constitute the total refund and the 
3 
 
 
paragraph of § 58, however, when the employee is injured as a 
result of an act of violence by a patient or prisoner in his 
custody, i.e., as a result of an "assault," the employee will 
receive full pay "without such absence being charged against 
available sick leave credits."4  Assault pay is, in other words, 
intended to be a substitute for the use of accrued sick leave. 
 
 
There is no question, as the Appeals Court rightly noted in 
the Moog case, that assault pay and workers' compensation are 
related benefits.  See Moog, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 926.  There 
also is no question that the assault pay provision in paragraph 
four of § 58 represents a "special provision for certain injured 
State employees" entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
under G. L. c. 152.  See Moog, supra.  As the department 
suggests,5 however, that "special provision" is just that -- 
special -- and is an exception to the general rules set forth in 
the section's first three paragraphs.  The statute essentially 
provides an added benefit to an employee assaulted in the course 
of his or her employment, and recognizes that, in such 
circumstances, the employee should not have to use sick leave to 
                                                                                                                                                             
employee shall be credited with the proportionate part of 
sick leave credits represented by the workers' compensation 
paid by the industrial accident board. 
 
 
"If the industrial accident board refuses to accept 
jurisdiction over the case the employee shall not be 
granted leave with pay in excess of his accumulated sick 
leave credits or vacation leave." 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 30, § 58, fourth par., is the assault pay 
provision and provides: 
 
 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, an 
employee who, while in the performance of duty, receives 
bodily injuries resulting from acts of violence of patients 
or prisoners in his custody, and who as a result of such 
injury would be entitled to benefits under said [G. L. 
c. 152], shall be paid the difference between the weekly 
cash benefits to which he would be entitled under said 
[G. L. c. 152] and his regular salary, without such absence 
being charged against available sick leave credits, even if 
such absence may be for less than eight calendar days' 
duration." 
 
 
5 For ease of reference, we refer to the defendants 
collectively as "the department." 
4 
 
 
maintain full pay.  Sick leave, however, is a benefit provided 
only to employees, and it reasonably follows that when an 
employee separates from employment, the assault pay benefit, 
connected, as it is, to sick leave, ceases.  Nothing in the 
statute requires or suggests otherwise.  That the now-former 
employee who had been receiving assault pay continues to receive 
workers' compensation benefits after separation from employment 
is of no moment -- those benefits continue for all former 
employees who are otherwise entitled to them, regardless of 
whether the employee was entitled to assault pay.6 
 
 
The department properly stopped paying Marchand assault pay 
benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58, as of the date of his 
separation from employment.  Accordingly, summary judgment for 
                                                 
 
6 Our conclusion that assault pay ceases with separation 
from employment is based on our interpretation of G. L. c. 152, 
§ 58.  The department also argues that continued payment of 
these benefits postemployment is problematic because it could, 
in some circumstances, result in the employee receiving more 
than one hundred per cent of his or her salary.  This argument 
was not a factor in our decision.  We have previously concluded, 
while considering the assault pay provision of § 58 in a 
different context, that 
 
"[i]t would not be unreasonable for the Legislature to 
provide such a comprehensive benefit for employees who are 
exposed to an occupational risk of violent injury.  It 
appears that it is the Legislature's objective to ensure 
that employees injured by the violence of prisoners or 
patients do not suffer any loss as a result of such 
injury." 
 
DaLuz v. Department of Correction, 434 Mass. 40, 49 (2001).  In 
the DaLuz case, we concluded that a partially disabled 
employee's assault pay is not "reduced by the amount of the 
injured employee's earning capacity."  Id.  In so doing, we 
recognized that this could create an anomaly because a partially 
disabled employee might recover more than a totally disabled 
employee, or might earn more than his regular salary if he or 
she obtained other employment.  Id.  Although our decision here 
does not create any such anomaly, the point remains that, in 
drafting the assault pay provision, the Legislature saw fit to 
provide a "comprehensive" benefit to a certain class of 
employees -- those who sustain injuries as a result of acts of 
violence of patients or prisoners in their care -- and that 
certain anomalies may yet result. 
5 
 
 
the plaintiff is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry 
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Kirk G. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
Gregory F. Galvin for the plaintiff.