Case Title: Cooper v. State

Citation: 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950

Docket Number: CR 83-8

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1983-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
645 S.W.2d 950 (1983) 278 Ark. 394 Bennie COOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 83-8. Supreme Court of Arkansas. February 14, 1983. *951 David J. Potter, Texarkana, for appellant. Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Michael E. Wheeler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. DUDLEY, Justice. This case, which involves criminal sentencing procedures, was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as it involves the interpretation of an act of the General Assembly, Rule 29(1)(c). Sentencing procedures are controlled by statute. Holden v. State, 156 Ark. 521, 247 S.W. 768 (1923). The statute in effect on the date of the commission of the crime is the governing statute. Ark. Const. Art. II, § 17; Easley v. State, 274 Ark. 215, 623 S.W.2d 189 (1981). Here, the appellant pleaded guilty to committing the crime of theft by receiving on January 23, 1978. At that time the sentencing provisions of the then new Criminal Code of 1976 had not been amended, and a trial court could not pronounce sentence and suspend the execution of that sentence. Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980). Suspending imposition of sentence is a procedure by which a defendant who pleads or is found guilty of an offense is released by the court without pronouncement of sentence and without supervision. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-803(4) (Repl.1977). If a defendant violates the terms of his suspension he may be sentenced to imprisonment for any period up to the maximum time which might have been originally imposed. Ark.Stat. Ann. § 41-1208 (Repl.1977). In the case before us, at the time of the commission of the crime, a court could either suspend imposition of sentence or place the defendant on probation but it could not do both at the same time. Jefferson v. State, 270 Ark. *952 909, 606 S.W.2d 592 (1980); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-801(1), (2) (Repl.1977). No one could be sentenced other than in accordance with the Criminal Code. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-803 (Repl.1977). Here, the trial judge entered two orders on the day of sentencing, May 31, 1978. The first is styled "Judgment and Order of Suspended Sentence" and provides that "the Court fixes his punishment at a General Sentence of Five Years in the Arkansas Department of Correction, said sentence to be suspended during good behavior ...." The second is styled "Order" and provides that "Bennie Cooper be and is hereby placed on probation for a period of five (5) years commencing May 31, 1978 ...." Since the trial court at that time could only suspend imposition of sentence and, upon suspension, could not place the defendant on probation, we construe the judgment as a suspension of the imposition of sentence for a period of five years. We note that the end result of this case would be the same even if we construed the two orders as placing the defendant on probation. On January 18, 1980, in a different case, a suspended sentence in federal district court was revoked and the appellant was sentenced to serve one year in the Federal Correctional Institution in Bastrop, Texas. At that time, the prosecuting attorney filed a petition in circuit court to revoke appellant's suspended sentence. A hearing was held, a judgment of sentence was pronounced and a docket sheet entry reflecting sentencing was made, but no order was entered. However, the record before us contains a transcription of the hearing and the docket sheet entries. The record, set out below, reflects pronouncement of a sentence. It is not in conformity with our sentencing rule or statute, A.R.Cr.P. Rule 36.4 or Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2301 (Repl. 1977), and did not clearly set forth the sentence as required, Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 43-2305, 43-2602 and 43-2608 (Repl.1977), but there was no objection by either party and no appeal from the sentence. Thus, the irregularities are waived. The transcription of the hearing is as follows: The docket sheet entries for the hearing reflect: Only one conclusion can be drawn and that is the trial court revoked the suspension. The court could only suspend imposition of sentence so obviously the imposition of sentence was revoked. When that occurred an appropriate sentence could be imposed. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1208(6) (Repl.1977); See also Commentary thereto. While the term imposed is not precisely set out, we interpret the proceedings as imposing a sentence concurrent with the federal sentence which was for one year commencing January 23, 1980. Then, on February 24, 1981, more than one year later and after appellant had been released from federal custody, the prosecuting attorney filed a pleading styled "Petition to Revoke Probated Sentence" and an "Amended Petition to Revoke Probated Sentence." Both petitions refer to the original judgment for theft by receiving. The petitions were heard on February 25, 1982, and the trial court entered a judgment and order of commitment which provides: Appellant contends the sentence is void. The contention is meritorious. This was the second sentence for the crime of theft by receiving committed January 23, 1978. A second sentence cannot be imposed at a subsequent revocation hearing. Easley v. State, 274 Ark. 215, 623 S.W.2d 189 (1981). In addition, the trial court did not have jurisdiction by the time it pronounced the second sentence for, by then, the first sentence had already been put into execution. Once a valid sentence is put into execution the trial court is without jurisdiction to modify, amend or revise it. Shipman v. State, 261 Ark. 559, 550 S.W.2d 424 (1977). The increased punishment at a second sentencing is void for yet another reason. As Justice Douglas stated in discussing double jeopardy, "A person need run the gauntlet only once." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969). Reversed.