Case Title: State ex rel. Hemsley v. Burnham Unruh

Citation: 2011-Ohio-226

Docket Number: 20101482

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Hemsley v. Burnham Unruh, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-226.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-226 
THE STATE EX REL. HEMSLEY, APPELLANT, v. BURNHAM UNRUH, 
JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Hemsley v. Burnham Unruh, Slip Opinion No. 
2011-Ohio-226.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent common pleas court judge from proceeding 
on violations of community control — Judge did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to act — Court of appeals’ dismissal of 
complaint for writ affirmed. 
(No. 2010-1482 — Submitted January 19, 2011 — Decided January 25, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 25445. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the court of appeals 
dismissing a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent appellee, Summit 
County Court of Common Pleas Judge Brenda Burnham Unruh, from proceeding 
on alleged violations of community control.  Because Judge Burnham Unruh does 
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not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to do so, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} In 1998, appellant, Greg H. Hemsley, pleaded guilty to felony 
offenses of grand theft, theft, and misuse of credit cards, and the common pleas 
court accepted the plea.  Judge Burnham Unruh sentenced Hemsley to an 
aggregate term of 18 months in prison. 
{¶ 3} In March 2005, Judge Burnham Unruh granted Hemsley’s motion 
for judicial release, suspended the remainder of his prison sentence, and placed 
him on community control for three years upon certain terms and conditions, 
including that the court would “consider transfer of supervision to North Carolina, 
with a plan of supervision and treatment, regular monthly payments made toward 
restitution, regular reporting to the Summit County Adult Probation Department, 
and verification of regular employment provided.”  Hemsley moved to North 
Carolina with the permission of the court and the Summit County Probation 
Department. 
{¶ 4} On March 4, 2008, Judge Burnham Unruh extended the period of 
Hemsley’s community control by an additional two years.  By letter dated January 
13, 2010, the common pleas court notified Hemsley that he would be arraigned on 
January 28, 2010, for alleged violations of community control, including traveling 
to Mexico in 2010 without the permission of the sentencing judge or his Summit 
County or North Carolina probation officers.  Hemsley pleaded not guilty to the 
charges, and Judge Unruh continued the hearing on the alleged violations to April 
22. 
{¶ 5} At the April 22, 2010 hearing, Hemsley was served with an 
amended charge alleging new violations of his community control, including 
leaving the country and traveling to Mexico around January 6, 2010, without his 
North Carolina supervising probation officer’s approval.  Hemsley moved to 
dismiss the charges for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the term of 
January Term, 2011 
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community control had expired.  Judge Burnham Unruh denied the motion and 
rescheduled the hearing. 
{¶ 6} Hemsley filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Summit 
County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Burnham Unruh from 
conducting a community-control-violation hearing and taking any further action 
in the case.  The judge filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the court of 
appeals granted. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court on Hemsley’s appeal as of right. 
{¶ 8} Hemsley asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his 
prohibition complaint and failing to grant the writ.  Dismissal of the prohibition 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is 
appropriate if, after presuming the truth of all factual allegations of the complaint 
and making all reasonable inferences in Hemsley’s favor, it appears beyond doubt 
that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary writ 
of prohibition.  Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 883 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 9} Prohibition will not issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief 
has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Mosier v. 
Fornof, 126 Ohio St.3d 47, 2010-Ohio-2516, 930 N.E.2d 305, ¶ 2.  “In the 
absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general 
subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant 
v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 10} For the following reasons, the judge does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to conduct the community-control violation 
hearing in Hemsley’s criminal case. 
{¶ 11} First, the common pleas court has basic statutory jurisdiction to 
proceed on the charged statutory violations.  “If the court imposing sentence upon 
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an offender sentences the offender to any community control sanction * * *, and 
if the offender violates any condition of the sanctions, any condition of release 
under a community control sanction imposed by the court, violates the law, or 
departs the state without the permission of the court or the offender’s probation 
officer, the public or private person or entity that operates or administers the 
sanction or the program or activity that comprises the sanction shall report the 
violation or departure directly to the sentencing court * * *.”  R.C. 
2929.15(A)(2)(b).  Under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1), “[i]f the conditions of a community 
control sanction are violated or if the offender violates a law or leaves the state 
without the permission of the court or the offender’s probation officer, the 
sentencing court may impose upon the violator one or more of the [specified] 
penalties,” including a prison term.  The common pleas court was the sentencing 
court for Hemsley and the Summit County Probation Department charged him 
with violating the conditions of his community-control sanction and with leaving 
North Carolina without the permission of either the court or his probation officer. 
{¶ 12} Second, the expiration in March 2010 of the five-year period of 
community control for Hemsley did not divest the common pleas court and Judge 
Burnham Unruh of subject-matter jurisdiction over the community-control-
violation hearing.  Hemsley relies on former R.C. 2951.09, which provided that at 
the termination of the probation period, “the jurisdiction of the judge or 
magistrate to impose sentence ceases and the defendant shall be discharged.”  140 
Ohio Laws, Part V, 7136, 7561.  In Davis v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 549, 751 
N.E.2d 1051, we held that this provision prevented a common pleas court from 
revoking a criminal defendant’s probation and sentencing him after his 
probationary period had expired even if the revocation proceeding was initiated 
before the probationary period expired.  “Discharge is required [under this 
provision] even if the alleged probation violation occurred during the 
probationary period and could have resulted in a valid probation revocation and 
January Term, 2011 
5 
imposition of sentence if it had been timely prosecuted.”  Id. at 551, citing Kaine 
v. Marion Prison Warden (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 454, 455, 727 N.E.2d 907. 
{¶ 13} Former R.C. 2951.09, however, was repealed effective January 1, 
2004, before Hemsley was placed on community control.  149 Ohio Laws, Part V, 
9484, 9485.  And although under R.C. 2951.011, former R.C. 2951.09 would 
apply to “a person upon whom a court imposed a sentence for a misdemeanor 
offense prior to January 1, 2004, and a person upon whom a court, on or after 
January 1, 2004, and in accordance with law existing prior to January 1, 2004, 
imposed a sentence for a misdemeanor offense that was committed prior to 
January 1, 2004,” the underlying offenses for Hemsley were felony offenses.  
Therefore, former R.C. 2951.09 and Davis are inapplicable to Hemsley.  Cf. State 
v. Young, Montgomery App. No. 23679, 2010-Ohio-4145 (applying former R.C. 
2951.09 to a misdemeanant who was sentenced on an underlying offense of petty 
theft before the statute was repealed).  Because R.C. 2951.09 was not applicable, 
the court was authorized to conduct proceedings on the alleged community-
control violations even though they were conducted after the expiration of the 
term of community control, provided that the notice of violations was properly 
given and the revocation proceedings were commenced before the expiration.  See 
State v. Breckenridge, Franklin App. No. 09AP-95, 2009-Ohio-3620, ¶ 7; State v. 
Semenchuk, Ross App. No. 10CA3140, 2010-Ohio-4864, ¶ 6-7. Here, the charge 
of violating community control was filed and the proceeding on the charges 
commenced before Hemsley’s community control expired in March 2010. 
{¶ 14} Finally, it is unclear whether Hemsley’s community control was 
tolled pursuant to R.C. 2951.07, which provides that “[i]f the offender under 
community control absconds or otherwise leaves the jurisdiction without 
permission from the probation officer, the probation agency, or the court to do so, 
or if the offender is confined in any institution for the commission of any offense, 
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the period of community control ceases to run until the time that the offender is 
brought before the court for its further action.” 
{¶ 15} Based on the foregoing, Judge Burnham Unruh does not patently 
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed on the charges that Hemsley 
violated his community control, and Hemsley has an adequate remedy by way of 
appeal and motion for stay of the court’s judgment pending appeal to raise his 
jurisdictional claim.  Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals dismissing Hemsley’s complaint for extraordinary relief in prohibition.  
We also deny Hemsley’s request for oral argument. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
_____________________ 
 
Bartek Law Office, Dennis J. Bartek, and Natalie M. Niese, for appellant. 
 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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