Case Title: Woodard v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130854

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
TIMOTHY WOODARD 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 130854 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
February 27, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia erred when, after reversing a felony murder conviction 
as not being supported by sufficient evidence, it refused to 
remand to the circuit court for resentencing two felony drug 
convictions, one of which supplied the underlying basis for the 
felony murder conviction. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
Timothy Woodard was separately indicted and charged with 
(1) felony possession of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
("MDMA") with the intent to distribute in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-248, (2) felony sale of MDMA in violation of Code § 18.2-
248, and (3) felony murder in violation of Code § 18.2-33.  
Woodard pled not guilty to the indictments and waived a jury 
trial.  After hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel, 
the circuit court found Woodard guilty of all three felony 
offenses in the indictments.  The felony murder conviction was 
based upon the victim's death caused by ingesting the MDMA 
Woodard sold to the victim. 
 
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During the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth and Woodard 
disputed the appropriate sentencing guidelines.  Woodard's 
contention was that the circuit court should consider sentencing 
guidelines based upon the felony sale of MDMA conviction as the 
primary offense.  This would result in a lower set of guidelines 
than the Commonwealth's proposed guidelines that utilized the 
felony murder conviction as the primary offense. 
Although the circuit court accepted the sentencing 
guidelines submitted by the Commonwealth, the court acknowledged 
Woodard's proposed sentencing guidelines while making its 
sentencing determinations.  The court stated that the sentences 
it imposed deviated in a downward direction from the guidelines 
submitted by the Commonwealth, and deviated in an upward 
direction from the guidelines submitted by Woodard.  The court 
noted that the particular facts of the case warranted deviating 
from both sets of sentencing guidelines. 
The circuit court sentenced Woodard to (1) twenty years 
with twelve years suspended for the felony conviction for 
possession of MDMA with the intent to distribute, (2) five years 
with three years suspended for the felony conviction for sale of 
MDMA, and (3) ten years with six years suspended for the felony 
murder conviction. 
Woodard timely appealed to the Court of Appeals.  Woodard 
assigned error only to the circuit court's determination that 
 
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the evidence was sufficient to support the felony murder 
conviction.1  A single judge of the Court of Appeals, by a per 
curiam order, denied Woodard's appeal.  Woodard v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 2048-11-3 (May 9, 2012).  Upon Woodard's demand for 
panel review pursuant to Rule 5A:15A(a), a three judge panel of 
the Court of Appeals granted Woodard's appeal.  Woodard v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 2048-11-3 (Sept. 25, 2012). 
In both Woodard's Petition for Appeal and Brief of 
Appellant submitted to the Court of Appeals, a section titled 
"Conclusion and Relief Sought" was included.  As part of that 
section in each pleading, Woodard requested as additional relief 
that the Court of Appeals remand the case to the circuit court 
for resentencing of Woodard's felony drug convictions. 
The Court of Appeals reversed Woodard's felony murder 
conviction.  Woodard v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 567, 576, 739 
S.E.2d 220, 224 (2013).  However, the Court of Appeals refused 
to remand the case to the circuit court for resentencing of 
Woodard's two felony drug convictions on the basis that such 
relief was outside of the scope of Woodard's assignment of 
error.  Id. at 576 n.5, 739 S.E.2d at 224 n.5. 
                     
1 Woodard did not assign error to the circuit court's 
rejection of his proposed sentencing guidelines that utilized 
the felony sale of MDMA conviction, rather than the felony 
murder conviction, as the primary offense. 
 
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Woodard timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court.  
This appeal presents one assignment of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred by not remanding the two 
remaining convictions . . . for a new sentencing 
proceeding, after having reversed and dismissed the felony 
murder conviction. 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
"[O]nce a court has entered a judgment of conviction of a 
crime, the question of the penalty to be imposed is entirely 
within the province of the [General Assembly], and the court has 
no inherent authority to depart from the range of punishment 
legislatively prescribed."  Starrs v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 1, 
9, 752 S.E.2d 812, ___ (2013).  However, within that range of 
punishment, a sentencing court has inherent discretion to impose 
the punishment it deems appropriate because "[u]nder our system, 
the assessment of punishment is a function of the judicial 
branch of government."  Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 
496, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (1978).  A court's assessment of 
punishment, when the sentence "does not exceed the maximum 
sentence allowed by statute," is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334, 351, 634 S.E.2d 
697, 706 (2006). 
To the extent we interpret a statute or the Rules of the 
Supreme Court, these are questions of law that we review de 
 
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novo.  Findlay v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 111, 114, 752 S.E.2d 
868, ___ (2013); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 517, 659 
S.E.2d 311, 315 (2008). 
B. 
Woodard's Assignments of Error 
The parties dispute whether Woodard's single assignment of 
error to this Court is sufficient under Rule 5:17(c)(1).  We 
hold that Woodard's assignment of error to this Court is 
sufficient.  See Findlay, 287 Va. at 116, 752 S.E.2d at ___. 
The parties also dispute whether resentencing relief fell 
within the scope of Woodard's single assignment of error to the 
Court of Appeals.  We assume without deciding that resentencing 
relief fell within the scope of Woodard's single assignment of 
error to the Court of Appeals.  See Rule 5A:12(c)(1); see, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Fairbrook Bus. Park Assocs., 244 Va. 99, 105, 
418 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1992) (addressing issues within the scope 
of an assignment of error, and not reaching issues beyond the 
scope of the assignments of error). 
C. 
Whether the Circuit Court Abused Its Discretion in Imposing 
Woodard's Sentences 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when 
imposing Woodard's sentences for his three convictions.  Each 
conviction for a separate felony offense received a separate 
sentence.  The circuit court's soliloquy at the sentencing 
hearing showed that the court considered each felony offense 
 
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separately when deciding the appropriate sentence.  And each 
sentence fell within the range of permissible punishment 
prescribed by the General Assembly.  See Code §§ 18.2-33; 18.2-
248.  Woodard does not otherwise challenge the validity of his 
sentences in and of themselves, and we will not further assess 
the correctness of those sentences. 
D. 
Whether the Discretionary Sentencing Guidelines Present a 
Basis for Remanding the Case for Resentencing 
Woodard argues that the case should be remanded to the 
circuit court for resentencing because, during such a 
resentencing proceeding, the sentencing guidelines will be 
different than during the first sentencing hearing.  This 
argument misapprehends the discretionary nature of the 
sentencing guidelines. 
The General Assembly created within the judicial branch the 
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission.  Code § 17.1-800.  The 
Commission "develop[s] discretionary sentencing guidelines" to 
help achieve the General Assembly's policy goals in punishing 
and deterring convicted criminals.  Code § 17.1-801.  The 
Commission's sentencing guidelines are presented to a trial 
court in all felony cases not involving a Class 1 felony.  Code 
§ 19.2-298.01(A). 
The Commission's sentencing guidelines "are discretionary, 
rather than mandatory."  West v. Director, Dep't of Corr., 273 
 
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Va. 56, 65, 639 S.E.2d 190, 196 (2007).  We underscored this 
point in the context of a Strickland ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim at issue in West.  We held that a counsel's 
deficient performance, resulting in a defendant being convicted 
of two felonies rather than one, did not prejudice the defendant 
to the extent that the two convictions resulted in "an increased 
range of punishment under the sentencing guidelines."  Id. at 
63-65, 639 S.E.2d at 195-96.  Prejudice did not exist because 
the sentencing guidelines are purely discretionary.  Id. at 65, 
639 S.E.2d at 196.  We further concluded that, under Code 
§ 19.2-298.01(F),2 "the fact that the sentencing guidelines in 
West's case may have been different had he been convicted only 
of one, instead of two felonies," could not provide West "any 
basis for post-conviction relief."  Id. 
Applying those principles, we hold that Woodard is not 
entitled to seek relief through a new sentencing proceeding 
because of the fact that the sentencing guidelines with a felony 
murder conviction would be different than the sentencing 
guidelines without a felony murder conviction.  See Code § 19.2-
298.01(F); West, 273 Va. at 65, 639 S.E.2d at 196.  Those 
guidelines are discretionary and are not binding on the circuit 
                     
2 "The failure to follow any or all of the provisions of 
this section or the failure to follow any or all of the 
provisions of this section in the prescribed manner shall not be 
reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction 
relief."  Code § 19.2-298.01(F). 
 
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court's determination of the appropriate sentence.  Indeed, the 
circuit court expressly noted that it was deviating from the 
sentencing guidelines—both the higher range of punishment from 
the Commonwealth's accepted guidelines and the lower range of 
punishment from Woodard's rejected guidelines—in light of the 
particular facts of the case before it. 
III. Conclusion 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion.  Woodard 
suffered no reviewable injury from the fact that the sentencing 
guidelines would have been different had Woodard not been 
convicted of felony murder at the time the circuit court 
sentenced Woodard for his felony drug convictions.  Therefore, 
the Court of Appeals did not err, after reversing Woodard's 
felony murder conviction, in refusing to remand Woodard's two 
felony drug convictions to the circuit court for resentencing.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals did not 
err in refusing to remand Woodard’s case for resentencing of his 
two remaining drug convictions.  However, I believe the Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that the remand and resentencing 
 
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issue was not properly before it, and I would affirm the 
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals without reaching the 
merits of Woodard’s claim. 
 
In his petition to the Court of Appeals, Woodard included 
only one assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his felony murder conviction.  He did not 
assign error to the circuit court’s use of the felony murder 
sentencing guidelines. 
Under Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(i), “[o]nly assignments of error 
assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed by [the 
Court of Appeals].”  In Amin v. County of Henrico, 286 Va. 231, 
235, 749 S.E.2d 169, 170 (2013) (emphasis added), we interpreted 
this requirement and stated that “[o]rdinarily when a party 
fails to comply with Rule 5A:12, the Court of Appeals may refuse 
to consider any assignment of error that is . . . not properly 
included in the petition for appeal.”*  Because Woodard failed to 
assign error to the circuit court’s use of the felony murder 
sentencing guidelines, the Court of Appeals did not err in 
declining to consider that issue. 
                     
* The only exception to this rule that we have recognized 
applies to judgments that are void ab initio.  See Singh v. 
Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51-52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001).  Woodard 
does not argue here that the circuit court’s judgment is void ab 
initio.