Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 2012 WI 59

Docket Number: 2010AP001551-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 59 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1551-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Douglas Meier Williams, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 

 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT   
 
COUNTY: 
ROCK   
 
JUDGE: 
JAMES P. DALEY 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (Opinion filed).    
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER and BRADLEY, J.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs filed by 
Stephen P. Hurley, Dean A. Strang, Marcus J. Berghahn and 
Hurley, Burish, & Stanton, S.C., Madison and Jonas B. Bednarek 
and Bednarek Law Office, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by 
Stephen P. Hurley. 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Judicial Court Commissioners and Wisconsin Family 
Court Commissioners’ Association, Inc. by Jon P. Axelrod, Joseph 
A. Ranney, John C. Gardner, and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Jon P. Axelrod. 
 
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2012 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1551-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF3468) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Douglas Meier Williams, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Rock County, James P. Daley, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is an appeal of a 
decision of the Circuit Court for Rock County that the court of 
appeals has certified to us.  The certification asks us to 
determine whether circuit court commissioners are prohibited 
from issuing warrants because doing so involves the exercise of 
judicial power, which Douglas Meier Williams argues is vested 
solely in courts and elected judges by Article VII, Section 2 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Williams asserts that the search 
warrant that was issued for his home by a circuit court 
commissioner was invalid as beyond the lawful authority of court 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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2 
 
commissioners, and that the evidence obtained upon the execution 
of the warrant should be suppressed.  Williams' argument focuses 
on the 1977 repeal of Article VII, Section 23, of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, which specifically referred to the assignment of 
certain judicial powers to "persons," which he asserts included 
court commissioners.  Williams asserts that by repealing Section 
23 and adopting other sweeping changes to the court system in 
1977, the voters of Wisconsin chose to vest "the judicial power" 
solely in elected judges and therefore, any exercise of such 
power by unelected persons, such as circuit court commissioners, 
violates the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶2 
Under Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b) (2007–08),1 circuit 
court commissioners are granted specific statutory authority to 
issue search warrants.  No challenge was made to the warrant 
except the contention that the circuit court commissioner was 
without lawful authority to issue it.  Accordingly, the 
questions presented herein reduce to whether § 757.69(1)(b), 
which grants circuit court commissioners the power to issue 
search warrants, is unconstitutional. 
¶3 
Throughout Wisconsin's history, including before the 
ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution, non-judges have been 
authorized by statute to issue search warrants.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the issuance of a search warrant is not an 
exercise of "[t]he judicial power," as that phrase is employed 
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1 The search warrant at issue in this case was issued in 
2008.  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2007–08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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3 
 
in Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Instead, issuance of a valid search warrant requires that the 
individual be authorized by law to issue the warrant, that he or 
she be neutral and detached, and that the warrant be issued only 
upon a showing of probable cause.   
¶4 
Because 
we 
also 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.69(1)(b), which allocates the power to issue search 
warrants to circuit court commissioners, does not impermissibly 
intrude upon "[t]he judicial power" granted to the courts by 
Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, we hold 
that § 757.69(1)(b) is constitutional.  Therefore, the circuit 
court 
commissioner's 
search 
warrant 
was 
validly 
issued.2  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Williams' 
motion to suppress. 
I.  BACKGROUND3 
¶5 
This matter began when officers from the Beloit Police 
Department, the Rock County Sheriff's Department, and the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice responded to a drug complaint at 
2181 Shopiere Road in Beloit.  The home was owned and occupied 
by Williams.  Two Beloit police officers, Andrew G. Arnold and 
Rafael De La Rosa, made contact with Williams at his home, after 
which Williams granted verbal consent to the officers to view a 
marijuana growing operation inside the house. 
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2 Because we so conclude, we need not reach the issue of 
whether the good faith exception would apply to allow admission 
of evidence obtained by the search warrant at issue. 
3 The underlying facts are not in dispute.   
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2010AP1551-CR   
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4 
 
¶6 
While viewing the interior of the house, the officers 
observed numerous marijuana plants throughout the living area 
and the basement.  However, when the officers sought written 
consent to search the premises, Williams refused.  Officer 
Arnold then swore out an affidavit in support of a search 
warrant for Williams' residence, specifying the particular 
structures to be searched and the intended objects of the 
search.  
¶7 
Upon review of Officer Arnold's affidavit, a Rock 
County Circuit Court Commissioner issued a search warrant for 
Williams' residence and associated out-buildings and vehicles.4  
Officer Arnold and other officers then conducted the search, 
which returned 87 marijuana plants, various growing equipment 
and drug paraphernalia, cash, and several firearms.  Williams 
was charged in Rock County Circuit Court with violations of Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)3 (manufacturing tetrahydrocannabinol [THC], 
1,000–2,500 grams), § 961.42(1) (maintaining a drug trafficking 
place), and  Wis. Stat. § 139.95(2) (dealer in possession of a 
controlled substance without a tax stamp). 
¶8 
Subsequently, 
Williams 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b), which grants 
circuit court commissioners the power to issue search warrants.  
He asserted that issuing the search warrant was an invalid 
exercise of the judicial power under Article VII, Section 2 of 
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4 Williams does not allege that there was any defect in the 
search warrant other than it was issued by a court commissioner. 
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2010AP1551-CR   
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5 
 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Williams also filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained upon execution of the search 
warrant.  Williams alleged, in support of his earlier motion to 
suppress, that the issuance of the warrant was unconstitutional 
and that the evidence was therefore inadmissible.  The Rock 
County Circuit Court heard argument and denied Williams' 
motions.  The court held that the constitutional provisions at 
issue did not bar court commissioners from issuing search 
warrants, and that their issuance is a properly delegated 
ministerial task.  The court also concluded that even if 
constitutional infirmities existed, the good faith exception 
would allow admission of the evidence obtained by execution of 
the warrant.  
¶9 
In accordance with a subsequently negotiated plea 
agreement, 
Williams 
pled 
no 
contest 
to 
the 
charge 
of 
manufacturing THC; the other two charges were dismissed.  The 
court sentenced Williams to four years probation with six months 
conditional jail time, as well as forfeitures and costs.  The 
court stayed Williams' incarceration pending appeal.  Williams 
timely appealed.  The court of appeals certified the appeal, and 
we accepted the certification.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 We are asked to interpret the meaning of "[t]he 
judicial power" under Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
to 
decide 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.69 
delineating court commissioners' powers is an unconstitutional 
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2010AP1551-CR   
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6 
 
vesting of the judicial power in court commissioners.  The 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
the 
determination of the constitutionality of statutes are questions 
of law that we review independently of the circuit court.  
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, 
¶14, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700.  
¶11 In 
addition, 
statutes 
are 
presumed 
to 
be 
constitutional.  See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  Therefore, when presented with a 
challenge to a statute's constitutionality, we will indulge 
every presumption to sustain the law and will resolve any doubt 
in favor of constitutionality.  See Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 
68, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385.  Accordingly, a party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute faces a heavy 
burden and must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute 
violates the constitution in order to prevail.  See id. 
B.  Statutory Authorization for Search Warrants 
¶12 When interpreting statutes, we typically begin with 
the language chosen and "[i]f the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110; see Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 
N.W.2d 141 (1976).  Where statutory language is ambiguous, we 
may turn to extrinsic sources to aid our interpretation.  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46–47. 
¶13 We begin with the statutory provision that sets out 
the authority of circuit court commissioners, Wis. Stat. 
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2010AP1551-CR   
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7 
 
§ 757.69.  The relevant portion of that statute, § 757.69(1)(b), 
provides in part: 
(1) A circuit court commissioner may: 
. . .  
 
(b) In criminal matters issue summonses, arrest 
warrants or search warrants, determine probable cause 
to support a warrantless arrest, conduct initial 
appearances of persons arrested, set bail, inform the 
defendant in accordance with s. 970.02(1), refer the 
person to the authority for indigency determinations 
specified under s. 977.07(1), conduct the preliminary 
examination and arraignment, and, with the consent of 
both the state and the defendant, accept a guilty 
plea. 
Upon examination of the words of the statute, we conclude that 
the language used is plain and that the statutory language 
provides for the issuance of search warrants by circuit court 
commissioners.  
¶14 However, the primary question presented in this case 
is whether Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b)'s authorization for court 
commissioners to issue search warrants impermissibly allows 
commissioners to exercise "[t]he judicial power," which Article 
VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution vests in courts 
and, by necessary implication, the judges that serve as 
"courts."  We begin our inquiry by examining the history of 
search warrants to determine whether, at the time of the 
drafting of the Wisconsin Constitution, the issuance of such 
warrants was understood to be part of the judicial power vested 
exclusively in courts.  We then turn to the constitution's 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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8 
 
vesting of the judicial power and the assignment of certain 
powers to court commissioners. 
C.  General Principles of Constitutional Interpretation 
¶15 When 
interpreting 
constitutional 
provisions 
and 
amendments, we look to intrinsic as well as extrinsic sources.  
See Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 568.  In particular, we will look to the 
"plain meaning 
of 
the words in the context used"; the 
"historical analysis of the constitutional debates" relative to 
the 
constitutional 
provision under review; the prevailing 
practices in 1848 when the provision was adopted; and the 
earliest 
legislative 
interpretations 
of 
the 
provision 
as 
manifested in the first laws passed that bear on the provision.  
Id.; see also Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶10.  We also seek to 
ascertain what the people understood the purpose of the 
amendment to be.  See Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶10.  In so doing, 
we give effect to the apparent understanding of the drafters and 
the people who adopted the constitutional provision under 
consideration.  See id.  
D.  History of Search Warrants 
¶16 Our review of the history underlying search warrants 
begins with Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution,5 
which provides: 
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5 Williams does not assert a violation of Article 1, Section 
11 or its federal counterpart, the Fourth Amendment.  We 
nonetheless 
examine 
the 
prior 
interpretations 
of 
these 
provisions to help ascertain the meaning and purpose of search 
warrants. 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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9 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.6 
¶17 We 
have 
previously 
examined 
the 
historical 
underpinnings of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, which demonstrate that the 
primary evil to which the warrant requirement was addressed was 
the issuance of general warrants.  See Custodian of Records for 
the Legislative Tech. Servs. Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶36, 
272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792 (citing Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)).  General warrants were broad grants 
of investigative discretion to executive officers, and permitted 
nearly unrestrained searches of homes and persons, often by 
overly forceful means.  See id.  The adoption of the warrant 
requirement was intended to prohibit such unrestrained searches 
and to ensure that searching officers confine their efforts to 
those locations for which probable cause to search existed.  See 
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
Mich. L. Rev. 547, 558 n.12 (1999).  Therefore, the Fourth 
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6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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10 
 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement 
and 
the 
prohibition 
of 
unreasonable searches and seizures were originally focused on 
the content and specificity of the warrant rather than on who 
was issuing the warrant. 
¶18 As commentators on the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement have noted, early warrants often were issued by 
magistrates, such as justices of the peace, who were responsible 
for a variety of executive and quasi-judicial functions.7  See 
David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail:  Federalist Politics and 
William Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 Cath. 
U. L. Rev. 349, 354 (1996).  These magistrates were distinct 
from judges of courts of record in that magistrates generally 
did not possess formal legal training.  See id.  Notwithstanding 
this distinction, it was understood during the framing era that 
search warrants could be issued by these individuals exercising 
quasi-judicial authority.  See Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the 
Trenches:  Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of 
Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 6 
(2007). 
¶19 In the early days of statehood, Wisconsin also had 
magistrates, such as justices of the peace, who were granted 
statutory authority to issue search warrants.  See Edwin E. 
Bryant, A Treatise on the Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction of 
Justices of the Peace, and the Powers and Duties of Constables 
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7 We use the term "quasi-judicial" to modify functions, 
power or authority to describe actions that do not require the 
power of a court. 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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in Executing Process in the State of Wisconsin 939–42 (1884).  
This practice had prevailed prior to the adoption of the 
constitution and it continued by statute in post-constitutional 
enactments.  See id. at 2.  The primary limitations on these 
officers were that such officers could not issue warrants if the 
authority to do so was assigned exclusively to the local 
municipal courts, and that officers could issue warrants only 
upon a showing of "reasonable cause."  See id. at 940. 
¶20 Moreover, 
where 
the 
constitution 
granted 
these 
officers 
authority 
to 
exercise 
"judicial 
powers," 
the 
constitution also required that the legislature define and 
specify which powers the officers could exercise.  See id. at 
874–75, 939.  Also relevant to the present inquiry, the history 
of justices of the peace in Wisconsin suggests that, like their 
historical counterparts, these magistrates were neither required 
nor expected to possess legal training.  See id. at 1–7. 
¶21 Accordingly, justices of the peace were not understood 
to exercise the same type of judicial power that judges, who 
were trained in the law and who sat as courts of record, could 
exercise.  See id. at 28.  Therefore, although the original 
Wisconsin Constitution provided that some judicial power was to 
be vested in justices of the peace, see Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 2 (1848), such power was of a different sort than that vested 
in the judicial institutions of the state.8  See State ex rel. 
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8 At statehood, the Wisconsin Constitution provided that 
justices of the peace were elected officers, whose election was 
for two year terms.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 15 (1848).   
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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12 
 
Perry v. Wolke, 71 Wis. 2d 100, 106, 237 N.W.2d 678 (1976) 
(discussing that a judge may not act as a court until there is a 
delegation of judicial power to him to serve as part of the 
institution).  Therefore, while magistrates charged by the 
Wisconsin Constitution with exercising "such judicial powers" 
were able to issue search warrants, their powers did not 
historically require the exercise of "[t]he judicial power" 
conferred on courts by Article VII, Section 2. 
¶22 The issuance of warrants by non-judges also was 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Shadwick v. City 
of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).  In Shadwick, the Court examined 
a challenge to an arrest warrant issued by a municipal court 
clerk.  The challenger asserted that issuance by someone other 
than a judge violated the Fourth Amendment's requirement that 
such warrants be issued by "judicial officers."  Id. at 347–48.  
The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
that warrants be issued by a judge, or even someone trained in 
the law.  Id. at 349–50.  In so concluding, the Court examined 
the historical use of the term "magistrate" in the context of 
issuing warrants and determined that nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment or prevailing practice dictated that warrant-issuing 
officials be judges or even judicial officers.  See id. 
¶23 Instead, the Court held that the warrant requirement 
was intended to provide "an independent assurance that a search 
and arrest will not proceed without probable cause to believe 
that a crime has been committed and that the person or place 
named in the warrant is involved in the crime."  Id. at 350.  
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2010AP1551-CR   
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The requirement is not focused as much on whether the warrant is 
issued by a judge as it is on whether the issuer is "neutral and 
detached . . . and . . . capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists for the requested arrest or search."  Id. 
¶24 The Court emphasized that the purpose of warrants 
typically has not been to invoke the authority of the judicial 
branch so much as it has been to serve as a restraint on the 
executive power.  See id. at 350–51.  Accordingly, the neutral 
and detached determination of probable cause was a means of 
preventing unreasonable searches or seizures, rather than an end 
in and of itself.  See id.  Whether the officer issuing the 
warrant is denominated a "judicial officer," therefore, was not 
dispositive of his or her ability to issue a search warrant, 
which required only that the issuer be able to provide a neutral 
and detached determination that probable cause exists for the 
search at issue.  See id. at 351; see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 
§ 4.2(c), at 493 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 235–36 (1983) ("[M]any warrants are——quite properly——
issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of 
laymen.") (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
¶25 Although Shadwick dealt specifically with an arrest 
warrant and the Fourth Amendment, rather than a search warrant 
and an alleged unconstitutional exercise of the judicial power, 
the Court's reasoning is equally applicable in the context of 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  At the 
time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, the legal 
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2010AP1551-CR   
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14 
 
norms prevailing across the nation were well-known to the 
delegates to the convention.  See generally Journal of the 
Convention to Form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin 
(1848) [hereinafter Journal of the Convention].  It is evident 
from the debates that the adoption of Article I, Section 11 was 
relatively uncontroversial, and its parallel with the Fourth 
Amendment has been affirmed by this court numerous times.  See, 
e.g., State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 
N.W.2d 748.  By construing Article I, Section 11 as imposing 
requirements parallel to the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment, we promote clarity in the law of search and seizure 
and provide straightforward guidelines to governmental officers 
who must apply our holdings.  See id., ¶¶20-21. 
¶26 Therefore, we recognize that Article I, Section 11's 
warrant requirement has not mandated a determination of probable 
cause by a judge or a court of record.  Non-judges who are 
"neutral and detached" and are able to ascertain whether 
probable cause exists have been expected to issue search 
warrants in the past, provided that they are authorized by 
statute to do so.  Accordingly, issuance of a search warrant 
does not require an exercise of the judicial power that is 
vested exclusively in courts under Article VII, Section 2.  
Although issuing a search warrant may require some exercise of 
quasi-judicial 
power, 
it 
is 
something 
less 
than 
and 
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2010AP1551-CR   
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15 
 
distinguishable from the power vested in courts and elected 
judges.9 
E.  The Judicial Power 
¶27 Having determined that the issuance of search warrants 
historically did not require the actions of a judge, we turn to 
an examination of the vesting of the judicial power in courts, 
and whether such vesting precludes the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions by unelected officials, such as circuit court 
commissioners. 
 
As 
with 
our 
other 
inquiries 
here, 
our 
examination begins with the relevant text, Article VII, Sections 
2 and 23 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Article VII, Section 2 
provides: 
The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a 
unified court system consisting of one supreme court, 
a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts 
of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the 
legislature may create by law, and a municipal court 
if authorized by the legislature . . . . 
The provision in the Wisconsin Constitution pertaining to court 
commissioners' powers, Article VII, Section 23, was repealed in 
1977.  Prior to its repeal, Section 23 provided: 
The legislature may provide for the appointment of one 
or more persons in each organized county, and may vest 
in such persons such judicial powers as shall be 
prescribed by law.  Provided, that said power shall 
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9 As demonstrated by our inquiry into the scope of the 
judicial power below, there are many different functions that 
bear on the administration of justice in which judges and other 
persons engage, but only certain of these functions require 
being vested with constitutional authority to finally adjudicate 
disputes between adverse parties.  The issuance of a search 
warrant is not such a function. 
No. 
2010AP1551-CR   
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16 
 
not exceed that of a judge of a circuit court at 
chambers. 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 23 (repealed, 1977).10   
¶28 Williams points to the previous existence of Section 
23 as proof that, subsequent to that section's repeal, court 
commissioners lack "such judicial powers" that Section 23 
previously granted.  He argues that circuit court commissioners 
who now issue search warrants impermissibly exercise "[t]he 
judicial power," which Article VII, Section 2 vests exclusively 
in courts and elected judges.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§§ 4(1), 5(2), 7.  Therefore, Williams maintains, the search 
warrant issued for his home was invalid as an unconstitutional 
exercise of the judicial power by one who is not an elected 
judge. 
¶29 Beginning with the plain language of the relevant 
constitutional provisions, we note the different phrasings of 
the term "judicial power" in Article VII, Sections 2 and 23.  
Section 2 refers to "The judicial power," which is vested in 
courts, whereas repealed Section 23 referred to "such judicial 
powers" that could be exercised by individuals other than 
courts.  Therefore, on the face of the two provisions, there is 
a difference in the language used.  We will construe the 
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10 As may be noted, Article VII, Section 23 speaks of 
"persons" vested with such judicial powers.  Although there is 
no specific mention of court commissioners in Section 23, early 
annotations for that section referred specifically to court 
commissioners, and by 1889, that section was officially labeled 
"Court commissioners." 
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2010AP1551-CR   
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17 
 
provisions 
so 
as 
to 
give 
reasonable 
meaning 
to 
those 
distinctions. 
¶30 Next, we note that former Section 23's grant of 
authority was no greater than "such judicial powers" as could be 
exercised by a "judge of a circuit court at chambers."  This 
provision is relevant to our present inquiry because the power 
of a judge at chambers was a limited power.  As demonstrated by 
our early cases, discussed below, judges at chambers were not 
authorized to exercise the full extent of "[t]he judicial power" 
under Section 2. 
¶31 The power of circuit court judges at chambers (and by 
implication, 
commissioners) 
was 
subject 
to 
legislative 
prescription.  Accordingly, Section 23's judicial power could 
not have been equivalent to "[t]he judicial power" of Section 2 
because equating the two would place the courts, and the 
people's access to the adjudication of disputes, at the 
discretion of the legislature.  This result is not supported by 
the 
language 
or 
subsequent 
history 
of 
the 
relevant 
constitutional provisions, and must be rejected as anathema to 
the 
separation 
of 
powers 
implicit 
in 
our 
constitutional 
structure.  See  State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 825-26, 
266 N.W.2d 597 (1978).  Our interpretation is supported by 
records 
of 
the 
constitutional 
convention, 
contemporaneous 
understandings of the judicial power, legislative enactments 
immediately following the adoption of the constitution, and our 
early 
cases 
interpreting 
the 
relevant 
constitutional 
and 
statutory provisions. 
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18 
 
¶32 Persons other than judges have been authorized to 
perform quasi-judicial functions since before the enactment of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  See Bryant, supra, at 1; see also 
Faust v. State, 45 Wis. 273, 276 (1878).  During the convention 
of 1846, where delegates began the process of drafting the 
State's constitution, a provision similar to what would become 
Article VII, Section 23 was considered for inclusion.  That 
provision read: 
The legislature shall have the power to vest in clerks 
of courts or in other competent persons authority to 
grant such orders and do such acts as may be deemed 
necessary for the furtherance of the administration of 
justice; but in all cases the powers thus granted 
shall be specified and determined. 
Milo M. Quaife, The Convention of 1846 295 (1919).  Although 
this provision was altered before its inclusion in the final 
draft 
of 
the 
constitution, 
its 
presence 
in 
the 
draft 
demonstrates that the delegates were cognizant of the need for 
persons other than judges who could exercise certain powers of 
the judicial branch.  Additionally, the discussions at the early 
convention illustrate that there existed a need for non-judge 
officers to expedite the business of the courts.  For example, 
the initial draft of the constitution would have provided merely 
five circuit court judges, see id. at 502, so the clerks 
contemplated by the provision above could have performed quasi-
judicial functions in the absence of a judge of a court of 
record. 
¶33 In 1848, the constitutional convention at Madison 
adopted the first constitution of the State of Wisconsin.  It 
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19 
 
appears from the limited records of the convention and the 
language of Article VII, Section 23 that that section was not 
intended to assign to those who were not judges the same powers 
as were assigned courts.  Rather, Section 23 was intended to 
allow 
the 
legislature 
to 
assign 
such 
officers 
the 
more 
administrative tasks to be completed on behalf of the courts.  
See Journal of the Convention, at 420–21.  However, Section 23 
was included in the final draft of the Constitution, and there 
is no record of additional discussion, compare id. at 457 with 
id. at 613, so we look elsewhere for further understanding of 
its import. 
¶34 Although the records of the debates of the convention 
are limited, it is evident from those records that the delegates 
to the convention and the respective committees were well-versed 
in the prevailing norms and the relevant terms of art at the 
time.  See generally Journal of the Convention.  Accordingly, in 
interpreting the use of the term "[t]he judicial power" in 
Article VII, Section 2, we look to common understandings of the 
term at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶35 An obvious source to examine is the United States 
Constitution, which also explicitly vests "[t]he judicial power" 
in the Supreme Court, as well as in other inferior courts that 
Congress may establish.  U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1; see State v. 
Beno, 
116 
Wis. 2d 
122, 
135–37, 
341 
N.W.2d 
668 
(1984) 
(acknowledging that the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution 
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20 
 
sought guidance from the federal Constitution).11  Scholars have 
noted that there does not appear to be a clear statement as to 
the 
meaning 
of 
"[t]he 
judicial 
power" 
in 
the 
federal 
Constitution, but that many courts and academics have conceived 
of the principle as either directly analogous to, or closely 
related to, subject matter jurisdiction.12  A conception of the 
term as analogous to jurisdiction is appealing, in that the 
Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall extend 
to" those enumerated classes of cases and controversies listed 
in Article III, Section 2.   
¶36 If 
we 
apply 
this 
concept 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
we 
see 
that 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
2 
vests 
"jurisdiction" in a unified court system.  Jurisdiction has been 
interpreted to mean "the power to hear and determine the 
subject-matter in controversy in [a] suit before [a] court."  
Riggs v. Johnson Cnty., 73 U.S. 166, 187 (1867).  In this sense, 
analogy to the federal Constitution suggests that the judicial 
power is the power to hear and determine controversies between 
parties before courts.13  Under this theory, the judicial power 
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
11 Those involved in drafting Wisconsin's Constitution also 
relied on the constitution of New York for guidance.  See State 
v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶31, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 
N.W.2d 526.  
12 See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual 
Power":  The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of 
Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 705 & n.39 (1998). 
13 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."). 
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is the ultimate adjudicative authority of courts to finally 
decide rights and responsibilities as between individuals.  Cf. 
State v. Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. 441, 443, 217 N.W. 277 (1927).14  
¶37 Our early cases construing judicial powers provide 
further guidance as to the varying nature of those powers and 
demonstrate that, in many instances, "such judicial powers" were 
subject to legislative assignment and limitation.  One early 
case examined whether, under the relevant statutes, a court 
commissioner had the authority to punish for contempt of the 
commissioner's order.  See In re Remington, 7 Wis. 541 (*643) 
(1858).  In Remington, this court examined the powers of 
commissioners under Article VII, Section 23 and, in particular, 
that section's limitation of a commissioner's power to that of a 
"judge of a circuit court at chambers."  See id. at 551-55 
(*653-58).  The court recognized that the power of circuit court 
judges at chambers was subject to legislative modification and 
concluded that the scope of commissioners' powers was narrower 
than the powers afforded a circuit court judge at chambers.  See 
id. at 552-55 (*654–57).  Where chambers' powers were expanded 
without an express expansion of commissioners' powers, the 
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
14 Another court has stated that the powers that must be 
vested solely in courts are those that are "necessary to 
exercise 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
court" 
or 
those 
whose 
diminishment or assignment would "abridge judicial powers or 
interfere with judicial independence."  State v. Umezulike, 866 
So. 2d 794, 801 (La. 2004). 
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commissioners' powers would not be presumed to expand.15  Id. at 
554-55 (*656-58). 
¶38 Our 
cases 
construing 
judicial 
powers 
and 
their 
exercise by persons other than judges demonstrate that just ten 
years after the adoption of Article VII, Section 23, it was 
established law that commissioners' powers were subject to 
modification by the legislature, In re Kindling, 39 Wis. 35, 49-
51 (1875), and that powers not specifically granted would not be 
imputed to commissioners, Perry, 71 Wis. 2d at 106.  Therefore, 
the authorization for "persons," here, court commissioners, to 


15 Similarly, in an early general treatise on pleading and 
practice, David Graham, Treatise on the Practice of the Supreme 
Court of the State of New-York 26-28 (2d ed. 1836), it is noted 
that the powers of a court commissioner, whose powers extended 
(at most) to those of a judge at chambers, were dependent 
entirely on legislative grants of authority.   
Another early Wisconsin case, In re Kindling, 39 Wis. 35, 
46-50 (1875), provides substantial support for an understanding 
of judicial power as having different meanings under different 
circumstances.  The court distinguished between the judicial 
power, which is vested solely in constitutionally established 
courts, and those judicial powers that could be legislatively 
conferred on other officers or on judges when they were not 
acting as a court.  See id. at 58–59. 
Also, in Kindling, counsel for the petitioner stated that 
the power of a judge at chambers was understood at common law to 
extend to "the making of such rules or orders as are necessary 
to speed the causes pending in court, clear away the technical 
obstacles, and thus enable the court to come more speedily to a 
hearing of the merits of the causes."  Id. at 47–48.  
Specifically, counsel noted that, at common law, the power of a 
judge at chambers was "preparatory to an exercise of judicial 
power, that is, the determination of the rights of the parties 
on the merits of the case."  Id. at 48.  This understanding 
seemed to be confirmed by the court.  Id. at 60-61.  
No. 
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23 
 
exercise "such judicial powers" under Article VII, Section 23 
was not intended to invest in commissioners the same type of 
authority as "[t]he judicial power" set out in Article VII, 
Section 2, which is not subject to legislative prescription. 
¶39 Later, in Faust, we again reaffirmed the statutory 
foundation required for commissioners' authority.16  In Faust, a 
criminal defendant asserted that the issuance of the warrant for 
his arrest and his preliminary examination were invalid as 
having been undertaken by a court commissioner who was without 
constitutional or statutory authority to do so.  Faust, 45 Wis. 
at 275–76.  In upholding the commissioner's actions, we relied 
largely on the legislature's explicit grant of such authority in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 176, § 1 (1858).  Id. 
¶40 We also emphasized that before the adoption of our 
state constitution, the 1839 statutes "conferred this power [to 
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
16 After our early cases explaining the statutory foundation 
for court commissioners' powers as being limited to those of a 
judge at chambers, we continued to construe commissioners' 
powers within the constraints of the governing statutory 
provisions.  See, e.g., Potter v. Frohbach, 133 Wis. 1, 6-7, 112 
N.W. 1087 (1907); see also Wis. Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark 
Cnty., 103 Wis. 651, 662, 79 N.W. 422 (1899) (concluding that 
the "term 'judicial power,' which, by sec. 2, art. VII, of the 
constitution, is limited to courts, was clearly intended to 
cover powers similar to those which were exercised by courts in 
the trial of causes prior to the constitution, not matters of 
mere judicial administration, or those things of a judicial 
nature which had previously been exercised by a judge at 
chambers"); Anonymous, 8 Wis. 190 (*388), 191 (*389) (1859) 
(This case was uncaptioned, but is appended with an explanation 
that the opinion was found among the papers of the late Chief 
Justice Edward V. Whiton, and that publication was warranted due 
to "[t]he importance of the point decided."  Id. at 190 (*388). 
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24 
 
issue a warrant] upon the judges of the courts of record in the 
territory, to be exercised both in term time and in vacation.  
This power of arrest and examination of offenders by process 
issued by the judges of the courts of record in vacation, was a 
known power . . . ."  Id. at 276.  Recognizing that the 
constitution had not withdrawn this authority, we held that the 
provision of those powers of judges at chambers to court 
commissioners was valid, as was the commissioner's exercise of 
the assigned powers.  Id.  
¶41 Two subsequent cases provide substantial guidance in 
our understanding of the nature of judicial power and the 
exercise of such powers by persons other than judges.  First, in 
State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 N.W. 896 (1927), we were 
called upon to examine the validity of a search warrant issued 
by a justice of the peace and executed upon the person of the 
defendant.  Id. at 231.  As with court commissioners, the 
authority of justices of the peace was grounded in statute and, 
therefore, they did not possess any powers not expressly granted 
by statute.  Id. at 231-32.  The statutes at that time 
authorized justices of the peace to issue warrants for searches 
of houses or other places, but not for searches of persons.  Id. 
at 232.  From that exclusive statutory enumeration, we concluded 
that the statutory authority of justices of the peace did not 
extend to issuing warrants for the search of persons.  See id. 
¶42 The same year we decided Kriegbaum, we also decided 
Van Brocklin, which involved a challenge to the authority of a 
clerk of court to issue a search warrant.  In holding that 
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25 
 
clerks were authorized to issue search warrants, we relied on 
the statutory grant of power, as well as the distinction between 
different 
uses 
of 
the 
phrase 
"judicial 
power" 
in 
the 
constitution and statutes.  See Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. at 443-
47.  We related a definition of the judicial power that is 
vested exclusively in courts as "the power of a court to decide 
and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between 
persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision."  
Id. at 443 (internal quotation and citation omitted).  This 
power was distinguished from quasi-judicial power that was not 
vested solely in courts and could be exercised by individual 
judges and other officials when a statute permitted it.  Id. at 
444.  The power to issue search warrants, which the clerk of 
court was permitted to employ due to legislative enactment, fell 
within the class of quasi-judicial functions that could be 
exercised by individuals, including non-judges.  Id. at 447.  
Accordingly, we held that the search warrant was valid.  Id. at 
448. 
¶43 Due to the constitutional permission granted to the 
legislature to vest in individual officers certain quasi-
judicial powers and the exercise of the powers of a judge at 
chambers under common law, we conclude that "such judicial 
powers," as described in Wis. Const. art. VII, § 23 (repealed, 
1977), cannot be equivalent to "[t]he judicial power" expressed 
in Article VII, Section 2, which the constitution vests in the 
courts of the State. 
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¶44 The constitutional vesting of the judicial power in 
the courts of the State does not exhaust all powers that may 
appear judicial, nor require that they be exercised by an 
elected official.  For example, while the constitution vests the 
judicial power in specified courts, the constitution also 
contemplates unelected officers exercising a type of judicial 
power.  Specifically, Article VII, Section 2 provides that the 
judicial 
power 
shall 
be 
vested 
in 
municipal 
courts 
"if 
authorized by the legislature."   
¶45 Chapter 755 of the statutes authorizes the creation of 
municipal courts.  Wisconsin Stat. § 755.02 requires that 
municipal judges be elected.  However, no constitutional 
provision requires the election of municipal judges.  See Wis. 
Const. art. VII, §§ 2, 14.  Therefore, were it not for § 755.02, 
municipal judges could exercise "[t]he judicial power" granted 
under Article VII, Section 2 without being elected.  Stated 
otherwise, the constitutional authority to exercise the judicial 
power in a municipal court is not dependent upon being an 
elected judge.  Accordingly, the nonelected status of circuit 
court commissioners does not create a constitutional impediment 
to their statutory authority to issue warrants. 
F.  1977 Amendments 
¶46 Prior to the adoption of the 1977 constitutional 
amendments, Article VII, Section 23 circumscribed the authority 
of the legislature, so that the legislature could not assign to 
court commissioners more power than was allowed to a circuit 
court judge at chambers under the common law at the time of the 
No. 
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27 
 
constitution's 
ratification. 
 
In 
the 
absence 
of 
such 
prescriptions, however, it could be argued that the legislative 
power 
is 
more 
broad; 
indeed, 
"the 
power 
of 
the 
state 
legislature, unlike that of the federal congress, is plenary in 
nature."  State ex rel. McCormack v. Foley, 18 Wis. 2d 274, 277, 
118 N.W.2d 211 (1962).  Therefore, provisions in the Wisconsin 
Constitution serve mainly as brakes on the power of the 
legislature, which may otherwise "exercise all legislative power 
not forbidden by the constitution or delegated to the general 
government, or prohibited by the constitution of the United 
States."  Id. (quoting Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 155 (*195), 
168-69 (*225) (1860)).  Further restriction on the legislature's 
authority to act may be implied from the separation of powers 
between the branches of government.  See Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 
at 826 n.13.  With these principles in mind, we turn to the 
constitutional amendments of 1977 and, in particular, the repeal 
of Article VII, Section 23. 
¶47 In 1977, after many years17 of consideration and study 
of the Wisconsin court system, the legislature passed 1977 
S.J.R. 7, which authorized a vote by the citizens on sweeping 
changes to the State's judicial structure.  In addition to 
creating the intermediate court of appeals and unifying the 
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
17 See, e.g., Wisconsin Legislative Joint Committee on 
Investigation of the Courts, Report of Joint Committee of the 
Legislature of Wisconsin on Investigation of the Organization 
and System of the Courts in Wisconsin 5 (1915) (urging that 
"every step taken in the future should be rather along the line 
of simplifying the court system and making the same flexible"). 
No. 
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28 
 
county courts and circuit courts, the amendment repealed Article 
VII, Section 23, which related to vesting of "such judicial 
powers" in court commissioners. 
¶48 In the early 1970s, when the legislature seriously 
began 
to 
consider 
amending 
the 
constitutional 
provisions 
relating to the courts, the primary concerns had been the 
efficiency of the State's courts and the promotion of uniformity 
within the court system.  See Robert J. Martineau, "Judicial 
Reform in Wisconsin:  Some More Lessons for Reformers," in Court 
Reform in Seven States 87, 88 (Lee Powell ed. 1980).  In 1971, 
in response to urgings by Chief Justice Hallows, Governor Lucey 
created the Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization, 
to study the court system's most pressing needs.  Id. at 88–89.  
After nearly two years of meetings, hearings, and research, the 
Committee submitted a final report to the governor.  See id. at 
89.  That report made numerous recommendations regarding court 
structure, administration, and efficiency.  See id. 
¶49 Relevant to our present inquiry, the Citizens Study 
Committee recommended that the use of personnel other than 
judges be expanded in any judicial structure that would be 
developed. 
 
See 
Citizens 
Study 
Committee 
on 
Judicial 
Organization, Report to Governor Patrick J. Lucey 216–21 (1973).  
The report focused on the wide array of tasks performed by 
judges on a daily basis that "do not require performance by an 
individual with full judicial training."  Id. at 217.  Noting 
the prevalence of "lay judges" throughout the development of the 
common law, the report discussed the roles of these nonlawyer 
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officials who had long been vested with authority to issue 
search and arrest warrants, set bail, and conduct preliminary 
hearings, among other duties.  Id. 
¶50 The Citizens Study Committee report concluded that 
court commissioners, who, in Wisconsin, are required to be 
licensed attorneys, were not being utilized to their full 
potential.  For certain duties, the committee envisioned court 
commissioners as off-hours judicial substitutes, especially in 
the context of pre-trial criminal procedure.  See id. at 220.  
As a means of expanding the use of court commissioners, the 
report recommended that commissioners be placed under the 
authority of the State (rather than counties) and that their 
duties be expanded beyond what was then authorized, to the 
greatest extent allowed by the supreme court, which would 
oversee court commissioners.  See id. at 219.  
¶51 The Report of the Citizens Study Committee became the 
blueprint for the legislative plans for court reorganization.  
See Martineau, supra at 89.  In the early stages of proposed 
court reorganization, the committee's recommendations regarding 
court commissioners did not suggest repeal of the constitutional 
provision relating to court commissioners' powers.  For example, 
an initial 1975 version of the proposed amendments did not 
contemplate any change to Article VII, Section 23.  See Drafting 
File for 1975 A.J.R. 11, Analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
¶52 Soon after the initial drafts, however, Article VII, 
Section 23 was slated for repeal in every subsequent draft of 
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30 
 
the resolution that would become the basis for the 1977 judicial 
reorganization amendments.  In each draft, the drafter's note 
accompanying Section 23 remained the same, providing that "[t]he 
section authorizes the legislature to create an appointive 
office of county court commissioner.  The constitutional 
authorization is repealed; the office continues under statute 
law (e.g. section 252.14)."  Id.  After numerous drafts 
proposing this treatment of Section 23, the legislature passed 
1977 S.J.R. 7, approving the proposed amendments for the second 
time.18  The questions of court reorganization were then put to 
the people of Wisconsin, who approved the amendments in April 
1977. 
¶53 Although the questions presented to voters focused on 
the broader issues of court unification and reform without 
asking specifically about the repeal of Article VII, Section 23, 
relating 
to 
court 
commissioners' 
powers, 
contemporaneous 
legislative and media reports provide insight into the concerns 
and considerations facing voters.  These sources support the 
conclusion that the amendments were intended to maintain the 
validity of court commissioners' exercise of their statutory 
powers.  For example, many newspaper reports during the 
amendment process focused on the congestion of the courts and 
the need for measures to improve administrative efficiency, with 
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
18 The Wisconsin Constitution requires that a proposed 
constitutional 
amendment 
be 
passed 
by 
two 
consecutive 
legislatures 
before 
being 
presented 
to 
the 
people 
for 
ratification.  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  
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31 
 
some reports noting the beneficial effect that expanded use of 
court commissioners could have.  See, e.g., Anita Clark, County 
Courts Bogged Down, Wis. State J., April 17, 1977, at 8. 
¶54 Similarly, informational memoranda relating to the 
proposed amendments and published by the Wisconsin Legislative 
Council recommended that commissioners' powers should continue 
undiminished, or even be expanded, after repeal of Article VII, 
Section 23.  One memorandum notes that the repeal of certain 
obsolete provisions, including Section 23, would have the effect 
of 
"allowing 
the 
Legislature 
and 
Supreme 
Court 
greater 
flexibility 
to 
deal 
with 
the 
issues 
of 
court 
finance, 
calendaring of actions and parajudicial personnel in the 
future."  Wisconsin Legislative Council, Summary and Analysis of 
1975 Enrolled Joint Resolution 13 Relating to the State Court 
System 6 (1976).  Another later memorandum reaffirmed the broad 
powers that court commissioners held, even in light of the 
people's repeal of the constitutional provision relating to 
commissioners' 
exercise 
of 
"such 
judicial 
powers." 
 
See 
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Information Memorandum 78-8, 
Powers and Duties of Family Court Commissioners 2 (April 13, 
1978). 
¶55 Although these reports provide a glimpse into the 
legislative and public conceptions of the effect of the 1977 
amendments, an even clearer picture of how those amendments were 
understood 
can 
be 
found 
in 
the 
legislative 
enactments 
immediately following adoption of the amendments.  Provisions 
enacted by the 1977–78 legislature expanded the powers of court 
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32 
 
commissioners to include duties not previously described.  For 
example, chapter 323, section 13, Laws of 1977, created Wis. 
Stat. § 757.69, which included authorization for commissioners 
to preside at initial appearances, hear petitions for mental 
health commitments, and conduct uncontested probate proceedings, 
in addition to many other duties.  We have recognized that early 
legislative enactments following the passage of a constitutional 
provision provide guidance in interpreting the meaning of that 
provision.  See Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 568.  Therefore, this near-
simultaneous expansion of court commissioner powers lends 
support to the validity of the continuing exercise of those 
powers. 
¶56 Accordingly, in light of the widely recognized need 
for court reform leading up to the 1977 amendments, the people's 
adoption thereof, and the legislature's near-immediate vesting 
of broad efficiency-promoting duties in court commissioners, we 
conclude that the repeal of Article VII, Section 23 did not 
diminish 
the 
role 
or 
authority 
of 
court 
commissioners.  
Therefore, we construe the 1977 amendments and the subsequent 
legislative enactments to give effect to the expressed will of 
the people in repealing Section 23.  See Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
¶10.  To that end, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b)'s 
vesting in court commissioners of the authority to issue search 
warrants 
did 
not 
contravene 
provisions 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution at the time of the 1977 amendments, and it does not 
do so today. 
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¶57 Stated otherwise, the legislative empowerment of court 
commissioners pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b) does not 
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of "[t]he judicial 
power" of the courts.  As discussed previously, there are many 
quasi-judicial 
functions 
that 
bear 
on 
the 
efficient 
administration of justice, and those duties may by legislative 
assignment be undertaken by court commissioners.19   
¶58 From the forgoing, we conclude that the search warrant 
issued for Williams' home was valid.  Williams has not asserted 
that the search warrant was deficient in any aspect, except that 
it was issued by a court commissioner.  Because we conclude that 
commissioners have been validly authorized to issue such 
warrants under Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b), we find no reason to 
overturn the warrant.  As we have noted, Williams faced a 
substantial burden in asserting that § 757.69(1)(b) is an 
unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority, and he has 
failed to meet that burden. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 Throughout Wisconsin's history, including before the 
ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution, non-judges have been 
authorized by statute to issue search warrants.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the issuance of a search warrant is not an 
exercise of "[t]he judicial power," as that phrase in employed 
in Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
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
19 Because we decide based on the applicable statutes, we do 
not reach the issue of whether a circuit court possesses 
inherent authority to delegate judicial powers. 
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34 
 
Instead, issuance of a valid search warrant requires that the 
individual be authorized by law to issue the warrant, that he or 
she be neutral and detached, and that the warrant be issued only 
upon a showing of probable cause.   
¶60 Because 
we 
also 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.69(1)(b), which allocates the power to issue search 
warrants to circuit court commissioners, does not impermissibly 
intrude upon "[t]he judicial power" granted to the courts by 
Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, we hold 
that § 757.69(1)(b) is constitutional.  Therefore, the circuit 
court 
commissioner's 
search 
warrant 
was 
validly 
issued.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Williams' 
motion to suppress. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., and DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did 
not participate.   
 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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¶62 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
instant case requires the court to determine whether one aspect 
of Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b), namely the language that grants 
court commissioners authority to issue search warrants, is an 
unconstitutional delegation of judicial power violating Article 
VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The court is not 
asked to decide, and does not decide, whether all the powers of 
court commissioners set forth in Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b) or in 
§ 757.69 are constitutional.1   
¶63 The question before the court is whether a court 
commissioner's issuance of a search warrant is the exercise of 
judicial power in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶64 Article VII, Section 2 vests judicial power in 
specified courts, not in court commissioners.  To determine the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
legislature's 
authorizing 
court 
commissioners 
to 
issue 
search 
warrants 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.69(1)(b), we must interpret the meaning of the phrase 
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
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.69(1)(b) provides as follows: 
Powers and duties of circuit court commissioners. (1)  
A circuit court commissioner may: 
. . . . 
(b) 
In criminal matters issue summonses, arrest 
warrants or search warrants, determine probable cause 
to support a warrantless arrest, conduct initial 
appearances of persons arrested, set bail, inform the 
defendant in accordance with s. 970.02(1), refer the 
person to the authority for indigency determinations 
specified under s. 977.07(1), conduct the preliminary 
examination and arraignment, and, with the consent of 
both the state and the defendant, accept a guilty 
plea. . . .    
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
"judicial power" used in Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.      
¶65 In interpreting a constitutional provision, the court 
ordinarily 
turns 
to 
three 
sources: 
the 
words 
in 
the 
constitutional provision in the context used; the constitutional 
debates and practices in existence at the time of the adoption 
of the constitutional provision; and the earliest interpretation 
of the constitutional provision by the legislature as manifested 
in the first law passed following adoption.2  This list of 
sources for or approaches to constitutional interpretation is 
not exhaustive. 
¶66 To answer the question presented I look to the three 
sources 
and 
turn 
first 
to 
the 
text 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Article VII, Section 2, as revised in 1978, 
provides:   
The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a 
unified court system consisting of one supreme court, 
a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts 
of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the 
legislature may create by law, and a municipal court 
if authorized by the legislature . . . . 3   
¶67 A court commissioner is not one of the entities in 
which the judicial power of this state vests under Article VII, 
Section 
2. 
 
Court 
commissioners 
do, 
however, 
appear 
in 
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
2 State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 
(1984). 
3 Article VII, Section 2 embodies the separation of powers 
principles inherent in the Constitution that protect each branch 
of government from incursion by the others. 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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3 

legislation as early as 1849.  Wis. Stat. ch. 10, § 75 (1849).  
"Judicial power" is not defined in the constitution. 
¶68 Prior iterations of Article VII, Section 2 similarly 
did 
not 
define 
"judicial 
power" 
or 
vest 
it 
in 
court 
commissioners.  From 1848 until 1966, Article VII, Section 2 
provided in relevant part as follows:   
The judicial power of this state, both as to matters 
of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court, 
circuit courts, courts of probate, and in justices of 
the peace.  The legislature may also vest such 
jurisdiction as shall be deemed necessary in municipal 
courts, and shall have the power to establish inferior 
courts in the several counties . . . .   
¶69 In 1966, Article VII, Section 2 was amended to delete 
justices of the peace from the list of entities in which the 
judicial power of the state is vested, among other changes.  
From 1966 until 1977, Article VII, Section 2 provided in 
relevant part as follows: 
The judicial power of this state, both as to matters 
of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court, 
circuit 
courts, 
and 
courts 
of 
probate. 
 
The 
legislature may also vest such jurisdiction as shall 
be deemed necessary in municipal courts, and may 
authorize the establishment of inferior courts in the 
several counties, cities, villages or towns, with 
limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. . . .    
¶70 "Judicial power," as used in any version of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, has not been clearly defined.  Nothing 
in any of the versions of the Wisconsin Constitution or in the 
drafting history of the 1848, 1966, or 1978 iterations of 
Article VII, Section 2 sheds light on the meaning of "judicial 
power" or on whether the meaning of "judicial power" has changed 
with the amendments to Article VII, Section 2. 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
¶71 While the text and history of Article VII, Section 2 
provide little insight into whether issuing a search warrant is 
part of the constitutional concept of "judicial power," other 
constitutional provisions are more availing.  It is difficult to 
define "judicial power," but determining, on the basis of other 
constitutional provisions and historically accepted practices, 
that certain acts are not part of the constitutional concept of 
"judicial power" may be a more manageable task.4 
¶72 I agree with the majority that the history of the 
warrant requirement found in Article I, Section 11 and the 
closely analogous Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution 
is relevant to deciding the present case.  Nothing on the face 
of Article I, Section 11 or the Fourth Amendment or the history 
of these provisions requires a search warrant to be issued by a 
decision maker vested with "judicial power" as that phrase is 
used in Article VII, Section 2.   
¶73 The Wisconsin Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court have both concluded that an arrest warrant may be 
issued by a non-judge, provided the issuer is neutral and 
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4 The parties attempt to define the constitutional concept 
of "judicial power."  The defendant argues that a court 
commissioner exercises judicial power when he or she "determines 
operative facts or draws legal conclusions that alter a party's 
property or liberty, even pending later review." 
The amicus curiae brief of the Wisconsin Association of 
Judicial Court Commissioners and the Wisconsin Family Court 
Commissioners' 
Association, 
Inc., 
asserts 
that 
court 
commissioners do not perform "core judicial functions because 
their acts are subject to de novo review by circuit court 
judges."  The defendant counters, saying that the very nature of 
a search warrant precludes pre-deprivation review. 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
detached and capable of determining the existence of probable 
cause.5   
¶74 With regard to search warrants, Wisconsin statutes 
provided that magistrates may issue search warrants, without 
defining 
the 
word 
"magistrate."6 
 
"Non-judge 
magistrates" 
apparently issued search warrants.7  But it is not entirely clear 
from the statutes or cases whether court commissioners were 
authorized to, or did in fact, issue search warrants prior to 
the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b).  Although several 
Wisconsin statutes authorize a court commissioner to issue 
arrest warrants, on a cursory examination of several pre-1978 
statutes, I could find no statute that explicitly authorizes a 
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
5 See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 
(1972) (holding that a Florida statute authorizing clerks of 
municipal courts to issue certain arrest warrants did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment); State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 
28 Wis.2d 590, 597, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965) (holding that a 
district attorney could not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement that arrest warrants be issued by a neutral and 
detached magistrate); Bianchi v. State, 169 Wis. 75, 171 
N.W. 639 (1919) (holding that the clerk of municipal court was 
authorized to issue an arrest warrant). 
6 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 1915 § 4839; Wis. Stat. 1923 
§§ 4839, 4840. 
7 See, e.g., State v. Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. 441, 217 N.W. 
227 (1922) (search warrant issued by clerk of a municipal 
court). 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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6 

court commissioner to issue search warrants.8  If court 
commissioners were, in fact, issuing search warrants prior to 
1978, it is important for us to determine whether their 
authority to do so was dependent on the now-repealed Article 
VII, Section 23 of the Wisconsin Constitution, to which I now 
turn.  
¶75 Prior to the 1978 constitutional amendments, Article 
VII, Section 23 authorized the legislature to vest persons in 
each county with such judicial powers as do not exceed that of a 
judge of a circuit court at chambers.  Article VII, Section 23 
provided as follows: 
The Legislature may provide for the appointment of one 
or more persons in each organized county, and may vest 
in such persons such judicial powers as shall be 
prescribed by law.  Provided that said powers shall 
not exceed that of a judge of a circuit court at 
chambers. 
¶76 This constitutional provision does not explicitly 
mention court commissioners.  The original version of Section 23 
did not contain the caption "Court Commissioners."  This caption 
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
8 Nevertheless, statutes prior to 1978 might be interpreted 
as authorizing court commissioners to issue search warrants.  
For example, Wis. Stat. § 954.01(1) (1965) authorized a court 
commissioner and others to issue arrest warrants and stated that 
a court commissioner falls within the word "magistrate" "as that 
word is used in chapters 954-963" of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
Section 963.01, which appeared in Chapter 963, in turn, provided 
that "[a] search warrant may be issued by any magistrate who is 
authorized to issue a criminal warrant."  Piecing these 
provisions together, it appears court commissioners may have had 
statutory authority to issue search warrants.  Additionally, at 
least one pre-1978 case refers to a court commissioner issuing a 
search warrant.  See State ex rel. Bena v. Crosetto, 73 
Wis. 2d 261, 263, 243 N.W.2d 442 (1976).   
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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7 

was later added by the Reviser of Statutes.  See 1889 Statutes 
Annotated. 
¶77 Regardless of whether Section 23 is directed to court 
commissioners, it is not clear what are (or were) the powers of 
"a judge of a circuit court at chambers," as that phrase is used 
in Section 23.9  Several statutes explicitly referred to a judge 
of a circuit court at chambers.10  The State's brief asserts that 
a judge of a circuit court at chambers did not exercise the full 
judicial power constitutionally vested in courts.   
¶78 In other words, according to the State, a judge of a 
circuit 
court 
at 
chambers 
exercised 
some 
but 
not 
all 
constitutional "judicial power."  Thus, the text of Article VII, 
Section 23 might lead one to conclude that the legislature was 
authorized to vest some judicial powers in one or more persons 
who were not judges, and accordingly vested certain powers in 
court 
commissioners. 
 
The 
statutes 
empowering 
court 
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
9 Judge Harry S. Fox, in his article entitled Duties of a 
Court Commissioner, Wis. Bar Bull. Feb. 1957, at 9, noted that 
he had "found no satisfactory definition of those powers [namely 
powers of a judge of a circuit court at chambers], although the 
distinction is generally recognized."  See also In re Potter, 
133 Wis. 1, 2, 112 N.W. 1087 (1907) (putting forth a broad 
definition of the powers of a judge of a circuit court at 
chambers that would allow the judge, especially by legislative 
authority, to exercise at chambers "any power not requiring the 
trial of an action, strictly so called").   
10 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 269.29 (1957) ("Except as so 
provided or otherwise expressly directed a county judge or court 
commissioner may exercise within his county the powers and shall 
be subject to the restrictions thereon of a circuit judge at 
chambers but such orders may be reviewed by the court. . . .); 
Clapp v. Preston, 15 Wis. 543 (1862) (discussing R.S. ch. 132, 
§ 28, which empowered a "circuit judge at chambers to render 
judgment upon a frivolous demurrer"). 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
commissioners do not refer to the Wisconsin Constitution.  I 
therefore do not know whether the legislature considered these 
statutes as governed by Article VII, Section 23 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.       
¶79 I get some guidance from State v. Van Brocklin, 194 
Wis. 441, 
447, 
217 
N.W. 227 
(1927), 
in 
which 
the 
court 
determined that "the authorities . . . indicate that it is not 
generally considered that the issuance of a criminal warrant 
involves 
the 
exercise 
of 
that 
judicial 
power 
which 
the 
Constitution 
commits 
to 
the 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
of 
courts . . . ."  Although the Van Brocklin court ultimately 
rested its decision to uphold the issuance of the search warrant 
by the clerk of a municipal court on Article VII, Section 23, 
the court's reasoning suggests that even in the absence of 
Article VII, Section 23, the court might have upheld the power 
of a municipal court clerk to issue a search warrant.11  
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11 Justice Eschweiler, joined by Justice Crownhart, issued a 
well-reasoned 
dissent 
in 
Van 
Brocklin. 
 
These 
justices 
distinguished an arrest warrant from a search warrant and 
furnished the following interesting information about court 
commissioners, justices of the peace, and Article VII, Section 
23: 
It has never heretofore been even suggested that such 
section 23, Article 7, has ever been looked to in 
support of judicial power other than that in the 
creation of the well-known and long-established office 
of court commissioner. The very guarded exercise 
heretofore of this power to create such subordinate 
judicial office is quite indicative of the idea that 
the Legislature has had a consistent theory favoring a 
very restrictive use of such grant or source of power. 
The number of such officers has always been expressly 
limited, viz. originally by section 75, ch. 10, R. S. 
1849, one to the county, by amendment thereafter, up 
to six per county, except in counties having more than 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
 
¶80 In 1978, Article VII, Section 23 was repealed.  No 
full, ready explanation for the repeal of Article VII, Section 
23 can be found in the history of the 1978 amendment of Article 
VII.  On the one hand, as the defendant argues, the repeal might 
lead one to conclude that the legislature was no longer 
constitutionally able to vest some judicial powers in persons 
who were not judges.  On the other hand, as the State argues, 
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one circuit judge (section 252.14); express statutes 
give county judges the power of court commissioners 
(Laws of 1848, p. 23, § 18; section 252.16); so also 
as to special municipal courts (chapter 651 of 1907, 
section 2523——8, Stats. of 1911); no inferior courts, 
such as a municipal court like the one here in 
question appears to have ever had the power to appoint 
such; their powers are expressly defined (section 
252.15); their fees regulated (section 252.17); no 
illustration is afforded of any single prior instance 
in the state's history where it has been asserted or 
claimed that said section 23, Article 7, Const., 
supra, has been considered as a legislative source of 
power for any other office or officer than court 
commissioner. 
That even such an officer as justice of the peace, of 
constitutional recognition and dignity, takes nothing 
by implication, has been the rule from first to last 
in this state: Cox v. Groshong 1 Pin. 307, 312 (1843); 
State v. Kriegbaum, [194 Wis. 229], 215 N.W. 896 
(1927), and would seem to require a holding that power 
to issue a "warrant" (for so the law here reads) does 
not carry with it the power to perform the judicial 
and twofold duties required for search warrants——the 
one process that is fettered by two constitutional 
provisions. 
In a relatively recent case, the Supreme Court of Utah 
agreed with the dissent in Van Brocklin rather than with the 
majority. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 303 (Utah 1998) 
("[B]ecause a search warrant is an order and the issuer 
possesses the authority to enforce the order, the issuance of a 
search warrant is a core judicial function, which commissioners 
lack the authority to perform.").  
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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the limited material available indicates that the repeal might 
be interpreted as giving the legislature greater flexibility to 
vest more power in the office of court commissioner.12    
¶81 I therefore turn to a third source for interpreting 
the constitution, namely, the earliest interpretation of the 
constitutional provision by the legislature as manifested in the 
first law enacted following adoption of the 1978 constitutional 
amendments.  The legislative enactments at the time of the 
adoption of the 1978 constitutional amendment of Article VII 
included Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b).  Rather than reduce the 
power of court commissioners in light of the repeal of Article 
VII, Section 23, the legislature expanded the powers of court 
commissioners and explicitly included the power to issue search 
warrants. 
¶82 While not determinative of the interpretation of the 
constitution 
or 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
statute, 
the 
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
12 See, e.g., Resource Material on Court Reorganization, 
vol. 
I, 
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
Staff 
Information 
Memorandum 76-2 at 6 (1976-77) ("The amendment also repeals 
constitutional provisions relating to suit tax, terms of court 
and court commissioners, thereby allowing the Legislature and 
Supreme Court greater flexibility to deal with the issues of 
court finance, calendaring of actions and parajudicial personnel 
in the future."); Drafting Files, 1975 Joint Resolution 13 and 
1977 Joint Resolution 7, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis. ("The section [23] authorizes the legislature to create an 
appointive 
office 
of 
county 
court 
commissioner . . . [t]he 
constitutional authorization is repealed; the office continues 
under statute law (e.g. [then] section 252.14."); Citizens Study 
Committee on Judicial Organization, Report to Governor Patrick 
J. Lucey at 217-219 (Jan. 1973) (discussing the advantages of 
utilizing court commissioners to perform a wider range of tasks 
and concluding that the "system of court commissioners, as 
parajudicial personnel, should be retained . . . "). 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
legislative 
interpretation 
of 
an 
amended 
constitutional 
provision through a contemporaneous statutory enactment is 
instructive.  In the present case, the combination of the 
historically accepted practice of non-judges issuing search 
warrants and the contemporaneous legislative enactment Wis. 
Stat. § 757.69(1)(b) following the repeal of Article VII, 
Section 23, persuades me that the majority reaches the correct 
result.   
¶83 Relying too heavily on contemporaneous legislative 
action would be ill-advised in all instances because this court, 
not the legislature, is the final arbiter of the meaning of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Nevertheless, in the present case 
dealing specifically with the power of court commissioners to 
issue search warrants under Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b), there is 
more to support the court's conclusion about this power of court 
commissioners than just a contemporaneous legislative enactment. 
¶84 After examining the history of the texts of Article 
VII, Sections 2 and 23; Article I, Section 11; the numerous 
cases in which non-judges issued warrants;13 and the Wisconsin 
legislative enactments vesting search warrant authority in 
persons who were not judges both prior to and after 1978, I 
conclude, like the majority, that historically the issuance of 
search warrants has not been viewed as an exercise of a judicial 
power that the state constitution commits to the exclusive 
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
13 See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 
(1972); State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 
N.W.2d 391 (1965); State v. Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. 441, 217 
N.W. 277 (1927). 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
jurisdiction of courts and that the repeal of Article VII, 
Section 23 in 1978 did not eliminate the Wisconsin legislature's 
power to authorize court commissioners to issue search warrants. 
¶85 I appreciate the majority's attempt to research 
constitutional 
history 
to 
answer 
the 
question 
presented.  
History is relevant in constitutional interpretation.  However, 
its use poses challenges.  We have relatively little historical 
study of state constitutional provisions and state courts 
generally 
or 
of 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
provisions.14  
Furthermore, there are often different historical narratives, 
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14 Here are some historical materials that might be helpful 
in cases calling for analysis of the Wisconsin Constitution:  
Jack Stark, The Wisconsin State Constitution: A Reference Guide 
(1997); Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence:  A 
History of Wisconsin's Legal System (1999); J. B. Winslow, The 
Story of a Great Court (1912); Alice E. Smith, The History of 
Wisconsin Volume I:  From Exploration to Statehood (1973); 
Richard N. Current, The History of Wisconsin Volume II:  The 
Civil War Era, 1848-1873 (1976); Robert C. Nesbit, The History 
of Wisconsin Volume III:  Urbanization and Industrialization, 
1873-1893 (1985); John D. Buenker, The History of Wisconsin 
Volume IV:  The Progressive Era, 1893-1914 (1998); Paul W. Glad, 
The History of Wisconsin Volume V:  War, a New Era, and 
Depression, 1914-1940 (1990); William F. Thompson, The History 
of Wisconsin Volume VI: Continuity and Change, 1940-1965 (1988); 
M.M. Quaife, Wisconsin:  Its History and Its People (1924); M.M. 
Quaife ed., The Movement for Statehood (1918); M.M. Quaife ed., 
The Struggle Over Ratification 1846-1847 (1918); M.M. Quaife 
ed., The Convention of 1846 (1919); M.M. Quaife ed., The 
Attainment of Statehood (1928); William R. Smith, The History of 
Wisconsin 
(1885); 
Moses 
M. 
Strong, 
History 
of 
Wisconsin 
Territory (1885).  A series of articles by Joseph A. Ranney is 
listed at http://wicourts.gov/courts/history/articles.htm.    
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
and there is the ever-present danger that history can be read 
selectively to support a particular result.15 
¶86 While I concur in the result reached by the majority, 
I do not join the majority opinion because I have reservations 
about its analysis of Wisconsin constitutional history.   
¶87 For example, the majority opinion relies heavily on 
the historical role of justices of the peace for its conclusion 
that certain actors may exercise some judicial power without 
exercising the constitutional concept of "judicial power."  The 
majority opinion reads the pre-1966 constitution as providing 
that only "some judicial power" and judicial power "of a 
different sort" were vested in justices of the peace.  Majority 
op., ¶21.  Yet the pre-1966 constitution, quoted above, vested 
judicial power in justices of the peace in the same sentence as 
it vested judicial power in named courts. 
¶88 The majority opinion seems to rely on the fact that 
the legislature determined the jurisdiction of justices of the 
peace to distinguish "judicial power" vested in justices of the 
peace from judicial power vested in courts.  But the legislature 
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15 For discussions of the use (and misuse) of history in 
constitutional analysis of the federal constitution, see, e.g., 
Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable History, 65 
Md. L. Rev. 171 (2006); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the 
"Original" 
Patent 
Clause: 
Pseudohistory 
in 
Constitutional 
Construction, 2 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 155 (1989); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the 
First Amendment, 44 Hastings L.J. 901 (1993); Lucian E. Dervan, 
Comment, Selective Conceptions of Federalism: The Selective Use 
of History in the Supreme Court's States' Rights Opinions, 50 
Emory L.J. 1295 (2001).  
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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14 

determined the jurisdiction of courts, as well.16  That the 
legislature determined the authority of justices of the peace 
and court commissioners does not tell us whether the issuance of 
a search warrant is within the constitutional concept of 
"judicial power."   
¶89 The majority opinion also looks to the historical 
powers of justices of the peace in other jurisdictions.  
Majority op., ¶18.  The majority opinion describes the justice 
of the peace as being "responsible for a variety of executive 
and quasi-judicial functions."17  The articles cited by the 
majority to support this proposition do not describe the powers 
of the justice of the peace as non-judicial or quasi-judicial.  
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16 See, e.g., Faust v. State, 45 Wis. 273, 275-76 (1878). 
Prior to 1978, Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provided as follows: 
The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal within this state, not 
excepted in this constitution, and not hereafter 
prohibited by law . . . (emphasis added).
Article VII, Section 8 of the present constitution 
provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal within this state and such appellate 
jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may 
prescribe by law . . . (emphasis added). 
17 See majority op., ¶18 (citing David F. Forte, Marbury's 
Travail: Federalist Policies and William Marbury's Appointment 
as Justice of the Peace, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 349, 354 (1996)). 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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
In fact, one article explains that justices of the peace handled 
major civil actions, as well as numerous other matters.18 
¶90 Additionally, the majority's emphasis on the legal 
training of judges and justices of the peace in the 19th century 
and the method of selection also seems to be selective about 
what we know.  Majority op., ¶20.  Few lawyers went to law 
school in the 19th century.  Legal training took place 
predominantly in law offices and therefore would be highly 
varied.  That some persons had legal training or were elected 
does not, in my opinion, answer the question of the authority of 
court commissioners to issue search warrants.        
¶91 For these reasons, I am not persuaded that the history 
of the powers of justices of the peace in Wisconsin or elsewhere 
as set forth in the majority opinion assists us in determining 
whether court commissioners may issue search warrants.   
¶92 I am also concerned by the majority's analogy to the 
United States Constitution to bolster its conclusion that court 
commissioners may issue search warrants.  See majority op., 
¶¶34-36.  The United States and Wisconsin constitutions are 
different with regard to the power of the courts.  There is a 
significant body of law interpreting the phrase "judicial power" 
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18 See 
David 
F. 
Forte, 
Marbury's 
Travail: 
Federalist 
Policies and William Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the 
Peace, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 349, 354 (1996). 
Another article cited by the majority claims it is "likely 
that . . . non-elite judges, like justices of the peace" issued 
search warrants.  See Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: 
Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion 
and Probable Cause, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 6 (2007).  
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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16 
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in the federal Constitution, and interpretation is continuing.19  
All or part of this body of law may not be applicable to the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  
¶93 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
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19 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 
2594 (2012). 
No.  2010AP1551-CR.ssa 
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