Case Title: State v. Sarfraz

Citation: 2014 WI 78

Docket Number: 2012AP000337-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP337-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Muhammad Sarfraz, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 348 Wis. 2d 57, 832 N.W.2d 346 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 57  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 22, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 18, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis R. Cimpl 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, JJ., concur. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Jason D. 
Luczak, Raymond M. Dall’Osto, and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown 
LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jason D. Luczak. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2012AP337-CR 
(L.C. No. 
10CF2453) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,    
 
 
v. 
 
Muhammad Sarfraz,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.    
FILED 
 
JUL 22, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.     
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   The petitioner, 
State 
of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision1 
that reversed the circuit court's judgment of conviction against 
the defendant, Muhammad Sarfraz, and remanded the case for a 
new trial.  The court of appeals determined that the circuit 
court had erred by denying Sarfraz's motion to admit evidence of 
a prior sexual relationship with the complainant, I.N., because 
                                                 
1 State v. Sarfraz, 2013 WI App 57, 348 Wis. 2d 57, 832 
N.W.2d 346 (reversing order of the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, Dennis R. Cimpl, Judge). 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
2 
 
the evidence fit within a statutory exception to Wisconsin's 
rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1 (2009-10).2 
¶2 
We hold that the circuit court's refusal to admit the 
proffered evidence of the prior sexual relationship was proper 
under Wisconsin's rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11.  Such 
evidence is admissible only if the following three criteria are 
satisfied: 
1) 
the 
proffered 
evidence 
relates 
to 
sexual 
activities between the defendant and the complainant; 2) the 
evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case; and 3) the 
evidence is of sufficient probative value to outweigh its 
inflammatory and prejudicial nature.  State v. DeSantis, 155 
Wis. 2d 774, 785, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990).  Here, while we agree 
with the court of appeals that the circuit court improperly 
found that the proffered evidence of prior sexual conduct was 
not material, we nevertheless conclude the circuit court 
correctly excluded the evidence because Sarfraz failed to 
establish, under the third DeSantis prong, that the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice.   
¶3 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of 
appeals for consideration of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel and sentencing arguments raised by Sarfraz but not 
previously addressed.      
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4  Most of the facts in this case are disputed.  The 
parties agree on very little.  The State and Sarfraz agree that 
he knew I.N. prior to the charged assault, that I.N. and her 
father lived with Sarfraz when they first emigrated here from 
Pakistan, that they later moved to a separate apartment, and 
that on May 15, 2010, Sarfraz came to I.N.'s apartment.  While 
he was there, both Sarfraz and I.N. sustained knife wounds, and 
I.N. sustained injuries consistent with strangulation.  At some 
point on that date, Sarfraz and I.N. engaged in sexual 
intercourse, and after Sarfraz left, I.N. was found in the 
hallway naked from the waist down, screaming that she had been 
raped.  
¶5 
Apart from these general facts, the parties presented 
vastly different versions of the events that occurred on May 15, 
2010.  The State alleged a forcible rape, while Sarfraz 
maintained that any sexual contact was consensual.  Sarfraz was 
arrested the same day of the alleged attack, after police 
stopped his taxicab.  The State filed a complaint against 
Sarfraz charging him with second degree sexual assault with 
force or violence by use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a), 939.63(1)(b).  Sarfraz pled not 
guilty. 
¶6 
Prior to the trial, Sarfraz moved to admit evidence of 
prior sexual conduct between himself and I.N.  In his motion, 
Sarfraz asserted that the sexual conduct between himself and 
I.N. was consensual.  He further alleged, "on numerous occasions 
in the days and months preceding the date of the alleged sexual 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
4 
 
assault, that he and the victim, I.N., engaged in various forms 
of consensual sexual contact."  He contended that his wife would 
support his allegations by testifying that she caught him in bed 
with I.N.  He also stated that two other acquaintances would 
testify that they observed a flirtatious relationship between 
I.N. and Sarfraz. 
¶7 
The 
circuit 
court 
held 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
regarding Sarfraz's motion on November 29, 2010.  At the 
hearing, 
Sarfraz 
testified 
that 
he 
had 
a 
prior 
sexual 
relationship with I.N.  He stated that initially when I.N. lived 
with him, he would hug her and "grab" her.  As the relationship 
progressed, I.N. would lie in bed with him, where they would 
fondle and masturbate one another, but never engaged in 
intercourse because of their cultural values.  Sarfraz explained 
that in their culture, individuals did not have intercourse 
outside of marriage. 
¶8 
Sarfraz testified that on one occasion, when he was 
lying in bed with I.N., his wife came home and found them 
together.  I.N. and her father moved out shortly thereafter.  
Sarfraz visited I.N. at her apartment on multiple occasions to 
continue the relationship. 
¶9 
Sarfraz's wife, Riffat Sarfraz, also testified at the 
evidentiary hearing.  She corroborated Sarfraz's testimony about 
catching him in bed with I.N.  She stated that she came home 
early one day when her daughter was sick, and when she arrived 
home, she found I.N. in bed with Sarfraz.  Neither one was 
wearing pants.  On another occasion when she came home early due 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
5 
 
to a headache, she found Sarfraz and I.N. in the kitchen 
lovingly putting food into each others' mouths.  These incidents 
upset her and she pressured Sarfraz to make I.N. and her father 
move out of the house.  
¶10 At the evidentiary hearing Sarfraz also presented the 
testimony of a co-worker, Azmath Uddin.  Uddin testified that on 
one occasion when he visited Sarfraz's house, he saw Sarfraz 
lying down with I.N. sitting on his lap with his hands around 
her waist.  On another occasion, he observed I.N. hugging 
Sarfraz from behind while he was cooking. 
¶11 In response, the State presented I.N. to testify at 
the hearing.  She stated that she did not have a sexual 
relationship with Sarfraz, and that she had viewed him as a 
brother.  She further stated that she had never touched 
Sarfraz's penis while she was living at his house, that she was 
never alone with him in his bed, and that his wife did not see 
them in bed together.  I.N. and her father moved out after her 
father got a job.  She stated that the only times Sarfraz 
visited her apartment was when he helped with the move and on 
the date of the incident. 
¶12 After receiving the testimony, the circuit court 
determined that a jury could believe there was a sexual 
relationship, despite I.N.'s denial.  It noted that without the 
rape shield law, the evidence would be relevant.  However, to 
fit within an exception to the rape shield law, the defendant 
needed to show materiality.  The circuit court stated that 
masturbation was far different from forcible penis-to-vagina 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
6 
 
intercourse, and it reasoned that the defendant had failed to 
show that the alleged past relationship was material to each of 
the elements of rape.  The circuit court also determined that 
the evidence would be inadmissible under the third prong of the 
DeSantis test.  The circuit court concluded that Sarfraz could 
present evidence about his relationship with I.N., but could not 
present evidence regarding past sexual contact.  Thus, the 
circuit court denied Sarfraz's motion. 
¶13 When the case proceeded to trial, the State again 
presented I.N., who testified that she and her father lived with 
Sarfraz and his family for a couple of months after they moved 
to the United States from Pakistan.  She stated that during that 
time she did not have a romantic relationship with Sarfraz.  She 
and her father moved out after her father started working. 
¶14 I.N. testified that at around 10:30 a.m. on May 15, 
2010, she heard a knock on her door.  When she asked who it was, 
the individual responded "Jim."  I.N. explained that Jim was her 
landlord.  When she opened the door, the person on the other 
side was wearing a mask.  He shoved her into the bathroom, 
choked her and said "I'll kill you."  As the man was pulling a 
knife out of his pocket, I.N. managed to push the mask from his 
face and saw that it was Sarfraz.  Then, Sarfraz held the knife 
up to her neck. 
¶15 As they continued to struggle, Sarfraz set the knife 
on the floor.  I.N. pulled the knife toward her, lifted it up, 
and slashed Sarfraz on the cheek.  I.N. also cut herself on the 
finger.  She testified that blood filled the bathroom floor. 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
7 
 
After Sarfraz took the knife from her, he strangled her harder, 
tried to hit her, and pulled at her breasts.  I.N. continued to 
struggle to get free. 
¶16 I.N. testified that Sarfraz then tied a handkerchief 
around her mouth and told her he was taking her to the bedroom.  
I.N. resisted, trying to pull him toward the front door instead. 
They ended up in the living room. 
¶17 Once in the living room, Sarfraz threw I.N. onto the 
floor, took off her pants and began to fondle her.  I.N. kept 
trying to get away from him but was unable to do so.  Sarfraz 
put a pornographic movie into the DVD player and tried to get 
I.N. to watch it.  She told him she did not want to watch it, 
and he seemed surprised.  I.N. testified that Sarfraz ultimately 
forced her to have vaginal intercourse. 
¶18 I.N. testified that she was afraid Sarfraz was going 
to kill her, and she tried to leave a note for police by writing 
his name in blood on a newspaper.  After Sarfraz left, I.N. went 
into the hallway and screamed for help. 
¶19 The jury then heard testimony about the events of that 
day from I.N.'s neighbor, Syed Abdul Bukari.  He stated that his 
wife had heard loud noises in the hallway and when he went to 
investigate, 
he 
discovered 
I.N. 
standing 
half-naked 
and 
bloodied, crying and yelling that someone had raped her. 
¶20 The State 
also presented testimony from various 
individuals involved in the investigation.  This included 
Officer Cosgrove, who inventoried a newspaper that had the 
letters "S A R" written on it in blood and a pornographic DVD 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
8 
 
that was removed from the DVD machine at I.N.'s apartment.  
There was also a photograph of a file cabinet in I.N.'s 
apartment, which also had the letters "S-a-r" written on it in 
blood. 
¶21 Detective Stojsavljevic testified about recovering 
evidence from Sarfraz's taxicab, including a bloody knife that 
was hidden under the front seat.  The knife was processed and 
analyzed by a forensic scientist from the State Crime Lab who 
testified that it contained DNA from both Sarfraz and I.N.  The 
forensic scientist also analyzed buccal, vaginal, and cervical 
swabs from I.N. as well as swabs from Sarfraz.  She identified 
semen on the swabs from I.N.'s cervix and vagina that matched 
Sarfraz's DNA. 
¶22 The jury also heard testimony from the sexual assault 
nurse who relayed the results of I.N.'s medical exam.  I.N. had 
tenderness at the front of her throat that was "secondary to 
strangulation," a cut on her finger, and a cut on her ankle. 
I.N. also had injuries to her vaginal areas consistent with 
blunt force contact. 
¶23 In addition, the jury was shown photographs taken of 
I.N. on May 15, 2010.  They revealed a three-to-four inch 
scratch on her cheek, injuries to her neck, an injury between 
her breasts, an injured finger, bruises on her elbow, and an 
injury to her ankle. 
¶24 Sarfraz presented a very different version of events 
at trial.  As background, Sarfraz repeated much of what he 
stated at the evidentiary hearing.  He testified that he and 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
9 
 
I.N. had a romantic relationship.  They had previously engaged 
in teasing, touching, hugging, and kissing each other.  The 
hugging and kissing was frequent and intense and had occurred 
when his children were sleeping or away and his wife was out of 
the house.  He testified that he had even brought up marriage 
with I.N., and that I.N. moved out after his wife caught them 
together. 
¶25 Sarfraz testified that he was not wearing a mask when 
he went to I.N.'s apartment.  He knocked on her door, I.N. asked 
who it was, and he responded "me."  Then I.N. opened the door. 
¶26 After entering, Sarfraz hugged I.N.  He went to the 
refrigerator, got a few things, and then sat down and started 
watching television.  I.N. talked to him about her need for 
money and insisted he leave his wife and children.  When he told 
her that he would not leave his wife and children, things "got 
heated."  I.N. was furious.  She grabbed his collar, cried and 
yelled, and hit him with her fist.  He tried to leave, but she 
kept pulling him inside. 
¶27 Sarfraz testified that he suddenly had to use the 
bathroom.  While he was sitting in the bathroom, I.N. entered 
and stabbed his face with a knife.  A struggle ensued and he put 
his hands on her throat to push her away.  He took the knife 
from I.N. and put it in his pocket.  Then they went into the 
living room.  Sarfraz lay down due to pain caused by either 
kidney stones or gall stones.  Throughout this time, Sarfraz's 
pants remained down. 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
10 
 
¶28 Sarfraz then asked I.N. if she knew what kind of 
trouble she could get into if he called the police.  I.N. 
apologized.  After Sarfraz recovered from the pain, I.N. started 
"love talk" and sat on top of him.  She fondled him and told him 
she wanted to have intercourse.  She rubbed herself against him 
and asked him to forgive her.  She then started the pornographic 
DVD and rubbed his penis with her hand. 
¶29 Sarfraz stated that I.N. tried to "make love," but he 
pushed her away and said no.  She continued rubbing his penis 
and asked him to ejaculate on her, which he did.  When Sarfraz 
got up, he began cleaning up the blood and then left.  
¶30 To support his defense, Sarfraz also presented the 
testimony of his wife and Uddin.  Uddin repeated his statements 
from the evidentiary hearing, telling the jury that he had 
observed I.N. sitting on Sarfraz's lap with his arms around her 
waist.  He also told the jury about the time he saw I.N. hug 
Sarfraz while Sarfraz was cooking. 
¶31 Likewise, Sarfraz's wife repeated much of what she had 
stated at the evidentiary hearing.  She told the jury that on 
one occasion she saw I.N. and Sarfraz putting food in each 
others' mouths.  She also told the jury that she saw Sarfraz and 
I.N. in the bedroom together, that this made her upset, and 
afterwards she threw I.N.'s belongings out of the apartment.  
Consistent with the court's instruction, his wife did not 
elaborate on what exactly she saw. 
¶32 The jury returned a guilty verdict and Sarfraz was 
sentenced to ten years' incarceration and five years' extended 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
11 
 
supervision.  Thereafter, Sarfraz moved for post-conviction 
relief, 
alleging 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
and 
entitlement to a new sentence.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  Sarfraz appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred 
in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and 
that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted the rape shield 
law and violated his constitutional rights by excluding the 
evidence of past sexual conduct between himself and I.N. 
¶33 The court of appeals reversed the conviction and 
remanded the case for a new trial.  State v. Sarfraz, 2013 WI 
App 57, ¶1, 348 Wis. 2d 57, 832 N.W.2d 346.  The court of 
appeals disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion that the 
evidence of past sexual conduct was not relevant to a material 
fact in the case, and it stated that the law did not require the 
prior sexual conduct to be the same as that alleged in the 
criminal case.  Id., ¶26.  It determined that the past sexual 
conduct was material to the issue of consent, and the probative 
nature of the past sexual contact outweighed any prejudice to 
I.N.  Id., ¶¶24, 30.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
concluded that the circuit court erred by excluding the 
evidence.  Id., ¶31.  The court of appeals did not address 
Sarfraz's arguments about ineffective assistance of counsel and 
entitlement to a new sentence. 
¶34 The dissent did not agree that the excluded evidence 
was material.  Id., ¶34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  It noted 
that testimony regarding the prior consensual masturbation was 
the only excluded evidence and that other evidence of the 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
12 
 
romantic relationship was admitted at trial.  Id.  The dissent 
also asserted that Sarfraz had not explained how the prior 
consensual masturbation would give I.N. a motive to lie about 
the incident on May 15.  Id., ¶36.  Moreover, the omitted 
evidence had little probative value, as it did not support 
Sarfraz's theory of defense and was too dissimilar to the 
conduct charged.  Id., ¶39. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶35 This issue in this case is whether the circuit court 
properly excluded evidence of prior consensual sexual conduct 
between Sarfraz and I.N.  The exclusion of evidence is subject 
to the circuit court's discretion.  State v. Jackson, 216 
Wis. 2d 646, 655, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998).  We will not find an 
erroneous exercise of discretion unless the circuit court 
"applied the wrong legal standard in the exercise of its 
discretion or . . . the facts of record fail to support the 
circuit court's decision."  State v. Ringer, 2010 WI 69, ¶24, 
326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448. 
III. DISCUSSION  
¶36 Sarfraz argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by excluding evidence of his prior 
sexual relationship with I.N. to support his version of events 
and I.N.'s motive to fabricate the charges.  Sarfraz contends 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
error 
deprived 
him 
of 
his 
constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront 
adverse witnesses.  
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
13 
 
¶37 Defendants are granted the constitutional rights to 
present a defense and confront adverse witnesses under the 
confrontation and compulsory process clauses of Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution3 and the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.4  State v. Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  These rights, which 
have aptly been described as opposite sides of the same coin, 
are "fundamental and essential to achieving the constitutional 
objective 
of 
a 
fair 
trial." 
 
Id. 
(citing 
Chambers 
v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)).  Even so, these rights 
                                                 
3 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
4  The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
14 
 
are not absolute.  "Confrontation and compulsory process only 
grant defendants the constitutional right to present relevant 
evidence 
that 
is 
'not 
substantially 
outweighed 
by 
its 
prejudicial effects.'"  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 657 (quoting 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 646).        
 ¶38 Here, Sarfraz's proffer of past sexual contact with 
I.N. implicates Wis. Stat. § 972.11, Wisconsin's rape shield 
law.5  Under the rape shield law, introducing any evidence 
concerning the complainant's prior sexual history or reputation 
is generally barred "regardless of the purpose."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(c); Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 644.  "The rape shield 
law expresses the legislature's determination that evidence of a 
complainant's prior sexual conduct has low probative value and a 
highly prejudicial effect."  DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 784-85.  
However, § 972.11 sets out three statutory exceptions to its 
broad evidentiary shield, which "encompass those limited factual 
scenarios in which the legislature has determined that evidence 
of a complainant's sexual history may be sufficiently probative 
of a material issue to overcome the prejudicial nature of such 
                                                 
5  Wisconsin's rape shield law was enacted "'to counteract 
outdated beliefs that a complainant's sexual past could shed 
light on the truthfulness of the sexual assault allegations.'"  
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶39, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 
N.W.2d 695 (quoting State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, ¶19, 250 
Wis. 2d 466, 640 N.W.2d 112).  The law is rooted in the 
legislature's determination that evidence of a complainant's 
prior sexual conduct is largely irrelevant "or, if relevant, 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."  State v. 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990); see also 
Carter, 324 Wis.2d 640, ¶39; State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 
784-85, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990).  
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence."  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 657-58; see § 972.11(2)(b)1-
3.       
¶39 Sarfraz sought to admit evidence under the first 
exception, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)1, 
which 
concerns 
"[e]vidence of the complaining witness's past conduct with the 
defendant."  As this court observed in Jackson, "merely offering 
proof of the general type described in a particular exception is 
not enough to defeat the rape shield statute."  Jackson, 216 
Wis. 2d at 658.  The statutory exceptions to the rape shield law 
are also subject to Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11), which provides that 
the circuit court must first determine that the proffered 
evidence is "material to a fact at issue in the case and of 
sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and 
prejudicial nature before it may be introduced at trial."6  See 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b).   
¶40 Thus, 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 972.11(2)(b)1 
and 
971.31(11), evidence of the complainant's alleged past sexual 
conduct with the defendant is admissible only if the defendant 
makes a three-part showing that: "(i) the proffered evidence 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.31(11) operates as an "inverted 
balancing test," in that it reverses the approach of Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03 for weighing the admissibility of evidence.  7 Daniel 
D. 
Blinka, 
Wisconsin 
Practice 
Series: 
Wisconsin 
Evidence 
§ 420.4, at 284 (3d ed. 2008).  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 904.03, 
which requires that evidence be admitted unless the probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, the balancing test in § 971.31(11) is "biased against 
admissibility."  Id.  In other words, the starting assumption is 
that the proffered evidence, absent a showing to the contrary, 
is 
more 
prejudicial 
than 
probative. 
 
Id.; 
Jackson, 
216 
Wis. 2d at 658.   
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
16 
 
relates to sexual activities between the complainant and the 
defendant; (ii) the evidence is material to a fact at issue; and 
(iii) the evidence of sexual contact with the complainant is of 
'sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and 
prejudicial nature.'"  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 658-59 (citing 
DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 785).   
¶41 Under the first step of the analysis, the circuit 
court must be able to conclude from the defendant's proffer that 
a reasonable person could find it "more likely than not" that 
the prior sexual conduct occurred.  See Ringer, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 
¶32; Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 659.  Here, the circuit court 
determined that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than 
not that prior sexual conduct had occurred between Sarfraz and 
I.N.  We agree with the circuit court that a reasonable person 
could find from the testimony of Sarfraz, Riffat, and Uddin that 
it is more likely than not that prior sexual conduct had 
occurred between Sarfraz and I.N.  Because the evidence related 
to I.N.'s prior sexual conduct with Sarfraz, the first prong of 
DeSantis is satisfied.   
¶42 The second step of the DeSantis test requires the 
circuit court to consider whether the proffered evidence is 
material to a fact at issue in the case.  Under this 
"materiality" prong, the court must determine "whether the 
evidence 
is 
probative 
of 
a 
fact 
(or 
proposition) 
'of 
consequence' to the determination of the action."  7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 401.101, 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
17 
 
at 98 (3d ed. 2008).7  Put differently, the test under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01——which sets forth the definition of relevancy in 
Wisconsin evidence law——is "simply whether the evidence has any 
tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable."8  
Blinka, § 401.102 at 101 (emphasis added). Evidence should be 
excluded as "irrelevant" only if it completely lacks probative 
value.  Id. at 102. 
¶43 The substantive law governs the particular elements of 
the crime charged and the facts or propositions that are of 
consequence to the case.  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
785-86, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).9  Therefore, the proponent of the 
evidence must articulate the fact or proposition the evidence is 
                                                 
7 The common law term "materiality" has been replaced in our 
jurisprudence with the concept of consequential facts (or 
propositions).  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 786 n.15, 
576 N.W.2d 30 (1998) (citing Blinka, supra, § 401.101, at 64 
(1991)). 
8 "[E]vidence is relevant if it has the slightest bit of 
probative worth; only evidence that has no value as proof of a 
consequential fact is irrelevant."  22 Wright and Graham, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5165 (1978 ed.).  
"Any tiny increase or decrease in the probability of a fact of 
consequence 
'does 
the 
trick,' 
no 
matter 
how 
slightly 
incremental."  Paul Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence r. 401 
(3d ed. 1985).   
9 Further, 
"the 
terms 
'fact 
of 
consequence' 
or 
'consequential fact' refer not only to the ultimate facts but to 
all links in the factual chain necessary to establish the 
ultimate facts."  Blinka, supra, § 401.101, at 98.  This means 
that the proffered evidence does not need to bear directly on a 
particular element of the crime charged.  Holmes v. State, 76 
Wis. 2d 259, 268, 251 N.W.2d 56 (1977).  Instead, the evidence 
may simply "bear upon any one of countless other factors which 
are of consequence to the determination of the action."  Id.      
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
18 
 
offered to prove.  Id. at 786.  This offer of proof does not 
need to "'be stated with complete precision or in unnecessary 
detail but it should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned 
by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or 
inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt.'"  Jackson, 
216 Wis. 2d at 662 (quoting Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 
284, 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978)).      
¶44 Here, defense counsel argued at the evidentiary 
hearing that the evidence of prior sexual contact was relevant 
to Sarfraz's defense to the charge of sexual assault:   
The whole nature of that relationship existed is 
material to the idea that he would in some way need to 
come to that apartment with a mask and a knife to try 
to get sex from her, which——is what the nature of 
these allegations are. 
And it also goes, I think, a——to whether there was 
consensual sex along the lines that Mr. Sarfraz would 
testify to, that after she attacked him, she——she 
enticed him into a——sexual activity along the lines of 
what he's described in his testimony today, in order 
to placate him. 
That type of consent, I think, is relevant to this 
type of scenario. It may not be in the traditional 
type of situation, but I think it is relevant here. It 
explains the sex. 
It also, I think, a——is central to attacking the idea 
a—that there was forcible entry with a mask and knife. 
All of these things are central to the defense. I 
think we need to be able to put that into evidence in 
order to present a defense for a——Mr. Sarfraz. 
The circuit court was unconvinced by defense counsel's argument 
and found that, because the prior sexual contact between Sarfraz 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
19 
 
and I.N. did not involve violent, non-consensual intercourse, it 
was not material for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11).   
¶45 We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court misapplied the second prong of the DeSantis test to the 
facts of this case and improperly found the proffered evidence 
was immaterial.  The circuit court's reasoning suggests that, in 
order for evidence of past sexual conduct between Sarfraz and 
I.N. to be admissible, it must be of a similar type and nature 
to that charged against the defendant.   
¶46 This narrow interpretation of the second DeSantis 
prong 
is 
unsupported 
by 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b) and our case law.  The exceptions to Wisconsin's 
rape shield law do not require proffered evidence of past sexual 
conduct between the accuser and the defendant to be the same as 
the criminal conduct alleged against the defendant.  If they 
did, the only evidence that could be admitted under one of the 
exceptions to the rape shield law for "past conduct with the 
defendant" would be other instances of forcible sex.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)1.  In fact, to the extent that the rape shield 
law exceptions are designed, at least in part, to guarantee a 
meaningful defense to the accused, the circuit court's reading 
completely defeats such a purpose.    
¶47 Nothing in the rape shield law indicates that it 
should be so narrowly construed.  On the contrary, the exception 
for past sexual conduct in subsection (b)1 has traditionally 
been applied to all types of sexual contact between the 
complainant and the defendant.  See, e.g., Blinka, supra, 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
20 
 
§ 420.4, at 284-85 (the first exception in the rape shield law 
"includes all aspects of the relationship that fall within the 
broad definition of 'sexual conduct,' . . . . The most common 
scenario involves the defense's proffer of prior consensual 
sexual contact in order to prove that the victim also consented 
to the charged conduct.").   
¶48 The proper inquiry under the second prong of the 
DeSantis test is to consider whether the proffered evidence 
"relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. 
Here, 
I.N. 
alleges 
that 
Sarfraz 
sexually 
assaulted 
her.  
Sarfraz's defense is that the sexual contact was consensual.  At 
the evidentiary hearing, Sarfraz's counsel articulated that the 
evidence of mutual masturbation was offered to: (1) undercut 
I.N.'s testimony that Sarfraz gained entry to her apartment by 
pretending to be her landlord, thereby casting doubt on her 
credibility; (2) support Sarfraz's version of events that I.N. 
was angry with him for refusing to leave his wife for her; and 
(3) bolster Sarfraz's claim that the alleged sexual assault was 
consensual and merely represented a progression in their sexual 
relationship.  See Blinka, supra, § 420.4, at 285 ("Most often, 
evidence of prior consensual contact is used to show that the 
victim consented at the time of the assault . . . .")  It is 
clear Sarfraz's counsel established that the proffered evidence 
related to facts consequential to the determination of the case.  
As the court of appeals correctly explained, the fact that "I.N. 
may have masturbated Sarfraz on numerous occasions, both at 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
21 
 
Sarfraz's apartment and at her own, is relevant to the issue of 
whether I.N. consented to sexual contact on May 15, 2010."  
Sarfraz, 348 Wis. 2d 57, ¶27.  Further, "[t]he full scope of 
their 
sexual 
relationship 
is 
relevant 
to 
whether 
it 
is 
believable that Sarfraz attempted to conceal his identity from 
someone who knew him so well in a physical sense."  Id.  
¶49 Moreover, Sarfraz and I.N.'s respective testimony 
offered wildly divergent accounts of their relationship and what 
transpired on the day of the alleged sexual assault.  The 
proffered evidence of past sexual conduct weighs directly on 
their respective credibility, as well as on Riffat's and 
Uddin's, both of whom testified that they witnessed Sarfraz and 
I.N. together in intimate situations.  Without exception, "[a] 
witness's credibility is always 'consequential' within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 904.01."  Blinka, supra, § 401.101, at 
98 (emphasis added).  
¶50 The 
State 
argues 
that 
concluding 
the 
proffered 
evidence is material would undermine, if not overrule, our 
holding in State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646.  We disagree.  In 
Jackson, the defendant initially sought admission of evidence of 
prior sexual conduct with the complainant to show that the 
alleged sexual assault was consensual.  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 
660.  On the first day of trial, however, Jackson changed his 
theory of defense and argued that he never had sexual contact 
with the complainant.  Id. at 652.  Despite this last-minute 
change to his theory of defense, Jackson's counsel argued the 
evidence of past sexual conduct was still material because it 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
22 
 
would touch on the complainant's anger and explain "why human 
beings in this situation might have disagreement concerning what 
happened because of that prior relationship."  Id. at 661-62.  
The circuit court ruled that the evidence of prior consensual 
sexual contact between Jackson and the complainant was not 
material.  Id. at 660.  On appeal, we held that the vague 
proffer by Jackson's counsel of "his undeveloped anger or 
jealousy theory," even if accepted as true, did not "lead to an 
inference that false accusations were leveled in revenge for the 
termination of that relationship."  Id. at 662.  Here, in stark 
contrast to Jackson, defense counsel's proffer provided a 
detailed factual basis to the circuit court describing the 
alleged prior sexual relationship, which included corroboration 
from other witnesses.    
¶51 Thus, we conclude the circuit court erred in finding 
that the proffered evidence of prior sexual conduct was not 
"material to a fact at issue in the case."  DeSantis, 155 
Wis. 2d at 785.  Sarfraz proffered sufficient facts to support 
his defense of consent against the allegation of sexual assault 
and satisfied the materiality requirement of the second DeSantis 
prong.   
¶52 This brings us to the third step in the analysis, 
which asks whether the evidence of sexual contact with the 
complainant has sufficient probative value to outweigh its 
inflammatory and prejudicial nature.  Id.  As noted above, this 
step operates as an inverted balancing test that "initially 
weight[s] the balance in favor of a determination that the 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
23 
 
evidence is inherently prejudicial" due to "the legislature's 
distrust of evidence of a victim's prior sexual history."  
Jackson at 663.  Put differently, the starting assumption is 
that the evidence is prejudicial.  Id. at 658.  Satisfying this 
burden is far more demanding than the showing required under the 
second step of DeSantis.  Unlike the second step, which looks to 
whether the evidence of prior sexual conduct is material (that 
is, whether the evidence has any probative value), the third 
prong asks whether the probative value of that evidence is 
sufficient 
to 
outweigh 
its 
inherently 
inflammatory 
and 
prejudicial nature. 
 Id. at 659.  "Evidence is unduly 
prejudicial when it threatens the fundamental goals of accuracy 
and fairness of the trial by misleading the jury or by 
influencing the jury to decide the case upon an improper basis."  
DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 791-92.   
¶53 Here, the circuit court determined that Sarfraz failed 
to meet his burden under the third DeSantis prong, and we agree.  
We explained in DeSantis that when the proffered evidence of 
prior sexual conduct and the sexual conduct underlying the 
criminal charges at issue are "significantly different," the 
probative value of the proffered evidence "on the issue of 
consent [is] minimal," and "[t]he fact that the prior incident 
was remote in time and dissimilar in circumstances further 
diminishes the value of comparing the two incidents and drawing 
conclusions regarding the complainant's credibility or her 
consent."  Id. at 791.  Indeed, mutual masturbation——which is 
the evidence Sarfraz argues was improperly excluded from trial——
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
24 
 
is profoundly dissimilar in circumstance from non-consensual 
vaginal intercourse following a knife fight.   
¶54 Sarfraz's theory of defense was that the intercourse 
was consensual, and he maintains that the past sexual conduct 
supports this argument.  However, his proffered testimony 
regarding the past sexual conduct provides little probative 
value to support this proposition.  The past conduct Sarfraz 
alleged did not go beyond consensual masturbation.  Sarfraz 
explained that he and I.N. had not had intercourse in the past 
because in their culture one did not have intercourse outside of 
marriage.  That they refrained from intercourse in the past, far 
from suggesting consent, strongly suggests that I.N. would not 
have consented to sexual intercourse on May 15, 2010. 
¶55 The strong presumption that this type of evidence is 
prejudicial lends additional support to the circuit court's 
decision to exclude the evidence.  The legislature enacted the 
rape shield statute in part to protect complainants from the 
embarrassment and humiliation that discouraged victims from 
reporting crimes of sexual assault.  In determining that 
evidence of prior sexual conduct has a highly prejudicial 
effect, the legislature crafted into the rape shield law a 
"balancing test that [assumes], absent an evidentiary showing to 
the contrary, [that] the proferred evidence is more prejudicial 
than probative."  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 658.  The circuit 
court concluded that Sarfraz failed to meet his burden of 
showing that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial nature, and we agree.  Because of the low probative 
No. 
2012AP337-CR   
 
25 
 
value of the excluded evidence, and its highly inflammatory and 
prejudicial nature, we conclude the circuit court's decision to 
exclude 
the 
evidence 
was 
not 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.    
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶56 We hold that the circuit court's refusal to admit the 
proffered evidence of the prior sexual relationship was proper 
under Wisconsin's rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11.  While 
we conclude the circuit court improperly applied the materiality 
prong of the DeSantis test, we nevertheless hold the circuit 
court correctly excluded the evidence because Sarfraz failed to 
establish, under the third DeSantis prong, that the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice.   
¶57 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of 
appeals for consideration of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel and sentencing arguments raised by Sarfraz but not 
previously addressed.      
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the court of appeals. 
¶58 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶59 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur with the majority opinion that the court of appeals 
should be reversed.  I do not agree, however, with the 
majority's conclusions regarding the materiality of the evidence 
in the case at issue.  I write separately primarily because I 
conclude that the evidence at issue was not material, but also 
because I agree with the well-stated reasoning of the dissent in 
the court of appeals.  See State v. Sarfraz, 2013 WI App 57, 
¶¶32-40, 
348 
Wis. 2d 57, 
832 
N.W.2d 346 
(Brennan, 
J., 
dissenting).  Sarfraz's materiality argument turns the rape 
shield law inside out.  Sarfraz basically argues that because 
the victim had previously engaged in consensual masturbation 
with Sarfraz, she therefore must have consented to the violent, 
vaginal intercourse at knifepoint with Sarfaz on May 15.1  
Sarfraz further asserts that this evidence is relevant to the 
victim's truthfulness. 
¶60 Sarfraz's argument undermines the fundamental purpose 
behind the rape shield law: protection of a victim who is 
improperly attacked regarding prior sexual activity.  The rape 
shield law is intended to exclude evidence of prior consensual, 
nonviolent sexual activity especially when, as is the case at 
issue, such evidence is dissimilar from the violent rape 
                                                 
1 The victim steadfastly denies that she ever engaged in any 
sexual activity with Sarfraz because for cultural reasons, she 
would not have engaged in such activity.  The victim further 
denies that she ever had any kind of romantic relationship with 
Sarfraz. 
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
charged.  Sarfraz's argument goes too far and could be viewed as 
unraveling the protections that the rape shield law affords a 
victim of sexual assault.  In a sexual assault trial it is not 
the victim's past that is on trial.  Surely the majority cannot 
be concluding that a defendant need only allege that a previous 
consensual sexual encounter occurred with the victim in order to 
render admissible such otherwise prohibited evidence.  I write 
to confirm that the rape shield law remains intact even after 
the majority's fact-specific determinations in the case at 
issue.  
¶61 In my view, Sarfraz's argument and hence, the majority 
opinion, is flawed in three fundamental respects: (1) the trial 
court made a discretionary evidentiary determination that is 
owed deference; (2) the subject evidence is not material and; 
(3) the probative value of the evidence does not outweigh its 
prejudicial effect.  
¶62 First, we review the circuit court's discretionary 
decision regarding the admission of evidence.  "'This court will 
not disturb a circuit court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.'" 
 
State 
v. 
Jackson, 
2014 
WI 
4, 
¶43, 
352 
Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791 (quoting Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 
67, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191).  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion only "'if it applies an 
improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably 
supported by the facts of record.'"  Id.  I conclude that the 
trial court did not err in either its factual determinations or 
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
the legal standard applied.  I agree with Judge Brennan's 
dissent in the court of appeals that "the trial court applied 
facts from the record to the correct legal standard from 
DeSantis." 
 
Sarfraz, 
348 
Wis. 2d 57, 
¶33 
(Brennan, 
J., 
dissenting) (citing State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 456 
N.W.2d 600 (1990)). 
¶63 Second, the evidence that Sarfraz sought to admit was 
not material.  See id., ¶34.  While the trial court excluded 
Sarfraz's request to introduce testimony that he and the victim 
previously 
engaged 
in 
consensual 
masturbation, 
the 
jury 
nonetheless heard testimony that he and the victim had a prior 
romantic relationship.  Whether acts of mutual masturbation 
occurred or not is of little consequence to the crime charged.  
If the issue is whether the consensual masturbation evidence was 
material, Sarfraz's argument that the evidence is material 
because it goes to truthfulness, misses the mark.  Sarfraz's 
argument 
that 
the 
sexual 
contact 
was 
consensual 
before, 
therefore it must be consensual in the case at issue, likewise 
fails to explain why the complainant would now fabricate a story 
about 
an 
armed 
and 
masked 
entry 
and 
forceful 
vaginal 
intercourse.  I agree with Judge Brennan's dissent that 
Sarfraz's arguments are "'vague arguments and bald assertions' 
without any link to the complainant's motive for lying about 
sexual assault on trial."  Id., ¶36 (quoting State v. Jackson, 
216 Wis. 2d 646, 662, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998)). 
¶64 To the extent that Sarfraz did offer a theory as to 
the complainant's motive for lying about the forceful rape at 
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
trial, that theory was not supported by the evidence that he 
sought to admit. As Judge Brennan's dissent aptly notes, 
however, "that defense theory did not require proof that they 
engaged in consensual masturbation previously."  Sarfraz, 348 
Wis. 2d 57, ¶37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  If the existence of 
a romantic relationship was what Sarfraz thought to be so 
significant to his defense, that evidence was already before the 
jury.  As Judge Brennan's dissent pointed out, the trial court 
did 
admit 
other 
evidence 
of 
Sarfraz's 
prior 
romantic 
relationship with the victim through the testimony of Sarfraz, 
his wife, and a friend.  Id.  In addition, Sarfraz testified 
that the complainant wanted him to marry her, but that he did 
not want to marry her.  Id.  It is less than clear why evidence 
of consensual masturbation would explain why she was angry that 
he would not marry her.  If evidence of a relationship was 
somehow relevant to his defense, the masturbation evidence was 
not required to so establish the fact that they had such a 
relationship.  Moreover, evidence of a romantic relationship was 
already before the jury.  At most, the excluded evidence was 
cumulative to the evidence already before the jury. 
¶65 Finally, as Judge Brennan's dissent stated, "the trial 
court properly weighed the prejudicial effect of the excluded 
testimony against its probative value."  Id., ¶38.  The purpose 
of the rape shield law is to "protect complainants from the 
humiliation 
and 
degradation 
associated 
with 
unfounded 
allegations regarding sexual history."  Id. (quoting DeSantis, 
155 Wis. 2d at 793).  Thus, testimony relating to past sexual 
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
conduct is admissible only if it is both material and the 
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, and since the 
evidence is not material, its probative value does not outweigh 
the prejudicial effect.  I agree with Judge Brennan's dissent 
that even if one were to conclude that the evidence was of some 
marginal materiality, the circuit court was correct to conclude 
that the prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.  Not 
only does the evidence fail to support the defense theory of the 
complainant's motive to lie, it is cumulative to evidence 
introduced at trial and the conduct is "too dissimilar" to the 
conduct in the charged offense to be probative.  As noted in 
DeSantis, the prior sexual conduct must not be remote in time or 
dissimilar in circumstance.  155 Wis. 2d at 790-91.  Here, as 
Judge Brennan stated:  
[T]he 
alleged 
prior 
consensual 
masturbation 
is 
completely dissimilar to the masked, armed, home 
intrusion and forcible sexual assault at trial.  It is 
too dissimilar to pass the DeSantis admissibility 
test.  The prejudice to the complainant from including 
the alleged masturbation evidence, especially when 
there was such a limited probative value to the 
defense theory, is exactly what the rape shield law 
was designed to eliminate. 
Sarfraz, 348 Wis. 2d 57, ¶39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  I 
agree. 
¶66 Both Jackson and DeSantis instruct that the rape 
shield law presumes both "low probative value and a highly 
prejudicial effect" when a defendant wishes to introduce 
evidence of prior consensual sex in the past in order to 
establish consensual sex with respect to the offense charged.  
DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 784-85; Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 658; 
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
see also State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 643-44, 456 
N.W.2d 325 (1990).2  Sarfraz likewise failed to demonstrate that 
his confrontation right or his right to present a defense were 
violated.  See Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1990 
(2013); State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, 250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 
N.W.2d 112. 
¶67 If 
anything, 
evidence 
of 
a 
previous 
loving, 
consensual, romantic relationship would more likely predict 
future similar conduct rather than the violent, forceful, bloody 
events of May 15.  Simply stated, Sarfraz did not show how the 
prior, nonviolent, consensual relationship would predict a 
future violent episode or impact on the victim's truthfulness.  
In short, the dissimilarity of the prior acts is at odds with 
the materiality or probative value and admissibility of the 
subject evidence.  The circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in excluding the subject evidence. 
¶68 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
                                                 
2 State v. Pulizzano addresses a different exception under 
the rape shield law.  155 Wis. 2d 633, 643-44, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990).  Notably, Sarfraz's offer of proof was insufficient 
under that exception as well. 
No.  2012AP337-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1