Case Title: Johnson v. Campbell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 982606

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARLON E. JOHNSON, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 982606 
November 5, 1999 
 
CARLA M. CAMPBELL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Thomas H. Wood, Judge 
 
 
Plaintiffs Marlon E. Johnson and Kaheen Sandridge filed 
separate actions against defendant Carla M. Campbell seeking 
recovery of damages as the result of personal injuries allegedly 
received in a motor vehicle accident.  In virtually identical 
motions for judgment, consolidated for hearing below, the 
plaintiffs alleged they were injured while passengers in a motor 
vehicle negligently operated by defendant that left a highway in 
Augusta County shortly after midnight on August 13, 1997, and 
collided with a tree. 
 
Responding, the defendant filed a grounds of defense, 
counterclaim, and motion to dismiss in each action.  The 
plaintiffs filed grounds of defense and demurrers to the 
counterclaims. 
 
In the counterclaims, defendant made the following 
allegations.  During the hours preceding the accident, she 
participated with a group of young persons, including the 
plaintiffs, in a card game at a private residence.  The rules of 
the game required a player who "lost" to consume a specific 
amount of beer. 
 
Defendant was 17 years of age at the time and several other 
participants also were minors.  Plaintiffs Johnson and Sandridge 
were 24 and 21 years of age respectively. 
 
According to the allegations, the plaintiffs "encouraged" 
the minors, including the defendant, to consume beer and use 
marijuana, which they supplied to her, so that defendant's eyes 
became "red and she appeared to be under the influence of 
alcohol."  Subsequently, plaintiffs "prevailed upon" defendant 
to drive her automobile with the plaintiffs as passengers.  At 
the time of the accident, plaintiff Johnson "distracted her by 
making unwanted physical contact," causing her to lose control 
of the vehicle. 
 
In the grounds of defense to the counterclaims and in 
responses to requests for admissions, the plaintiffs admitted 
they participated in the card game.  However, they denied 
encouraging defendant to participate and denied supplying her 
with beer or marijuana. 
 
In the motions to dismiss, the defendant asserted that 
plaintiffs' actions were barred because each "plaintiff's injury 
appears to arise as a consequence of his voluntary participation 
in an illegal act." 
 
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Subsequently, after considering argument of counsel on the 
issues raised in the pleadings, the trial court dismissed the 
motions for judgment and the counterclaims.  The court concluded 
that the plaintiffs voluntarily participated with defendant in a 
card game involving the consumption of alcohol by all players, 
including the minor defendant.  The court noted that simple 
possession of alcohol by a minor is unlawful.  Code § 4.1-
305(A).  The court also noted that plaintiffs rode voluntarily 
with defendant on a trip for their mutual benefit after she had 
consumed alcohol, and that no person under the age of 21 may 
lawfully operate a motor vehicle after she has consumed any 
alcohol, Code § 18.2-266.1(A). 
 
The trial court decided that violations of the foregoing 
statutes by a minor are acts of delinquency and that, by 
voluntarily participating with defendant in the commission of 
these acts, plaintiffs were guilty of contributing to her 
delinquency in violation of Code § 18.2-371.  And, the trial 
court ruled as a matter of law that there was a "causal 
connection" between the illegal conduct and the accident 
requiring dismissal of the actions. 
 
Upon the counterclaims, the trial court concluded that 
defendant's allegations show "she voluntarily operated a motor 
vehicle after consuming enough alcohol and marijuana to be a 
 
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contributing cause" of the accident, and that "[t]his amounts to 
assumption of risk as a matter of law." 
 
The trial court employed an odd procedure; it treated the 
plaintiffs' demurrers to the counterclaims as motions to dismiss 
and the defendant's motions to dismiss as motions for summary 
judgment.  Nevertheless, even though the procedure below was 
unusual, we can reach the merits of the appeal. 
 
The primary appellate issue is whether the trial court 
erred in ruling that any illegal conduct in which the plaintiffs 
may have participated was a proximate cause of the alleged 
injuries as a matter of law. 
 
Virginia permits the employment of the so-called 
"illegality" defense, which is based on the principle that a 
party who consents to and participates in an illegal act cannot 
recover damages from other participants for the consequences of 
that act.  Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Va. 279, 282, 
497 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1998); Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 34, 404 
S.E.2d 721, 722 (1990); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 164-65, 
56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1949).  The consent must be "freely given 
without fraud or duress."  Zysk, 239 Va. at 34, 404 S.E.2d at 
722.  The main premise for the rule is "the idea that courts 
will not assist the participant in an illegal act who seeks to 
profit from the act's commission."  Id.
 
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Repeatedly, this Court has insisted that, before the 
defense can be successful, a causal relationship must be 
established between participation in the illegal act and the 
injuries or damage claimed.  For example, in Lee, in which we 
affirmed the trial court's enforcement of the defense and in 
which the requirement of causation was not an appellate issue, 
we noted that the trial court held that the plaintiff 
voluntarily consented to participation in the illegal act that 
"resulted" in his injuries.  255 Va. at 282, 497 S.E.2d at 329. 
 
In Godbolt v. Brawley, 250 Va. 467, 463 S.E.2d 657 (1995), 
we discussed the illegality defense, although the case was 
decided on other issues.  We said that the participant's 
intentional criminal act was not "the direct cause" of his 
injury and that the facts of Godbolt differed from the facts in 
cases like Zysk and Miller in which there was a direct cause-
and-effect link.  Godbolt, 250 Va. at 472, 463 S.E.2d at 660. 
 
In Miller, the Court said that, when the illegality defense 
is applied in tort actions, the consent or participation in an 
unlawful act by plaintiff precludes recovery for injuries 
sustained "as a result of that act."  190 Va. at 165, 56 S.E.2d 
at 219. 
 
We emphasize the requirement of direct causation, which the 
trial court recognized, because defendant on appeal argues that 
the injury need not be a proximate result of the illegal act.  
 
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Instead, defendant contends, the injury merely must be "an 
ultimate consequence" of the plaintiff's voluntary illegal acts.  
The defendant is wrong, whatever a standard of "ultimate 
consequence" may mean, for the reasons we have just outlined. 
 
Turning to the question whether any unlawful conduct of the 
plaintiffs was a proximate cause of their alleged injuries as a 
matter of law, we conclude that the trial court erred in so 
ruling. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we will assume without deciding 
that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the requisite 
level of "participatory" illegal conduct by plaintiffs is 
present.  At this stage of the proceedings, the facts are in 
dispute concerning whether the plaintiffs merely were present in 
the defendant's company or whether they bought alcohol for 
defendant, supplied alcohol to her, encouraged her to consume 
alcohol, or persuaded her to drive a motor vehicle.  This issue 
must be decided upon a full development of the facts, but we 
will give the defendant the benefit of the doubt on this issue 
at this juncture of the cases. 
 
Given the facts developed thus far, however, many of which 
are disputed, a jury question has been presented on the issue of 
proximate cause.  For example, furnishing alcohol to defendant 
may be too remote an event to constitute proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs' injuries.  See Williamson v. The Old Brogue, Inc., 
 
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232 Va. 350, 353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1986) (individuals, drunk 
or sober, responsible for own torts and drinking intoxicant, not 
furnishing it, is proximate cause of injury).  Indeed, the 
motions for judgment did not claim that defendant's alcohol 
consumption caused the accident; thus, at this stage of the 
proceedings, the trial court erred in making a causal connection 
between defendant's drinking and the accident.  Also, if 
plaintiff Johnson distracted defendant "by making unwanted 
physical contact," as alleged, there is the factual question 
whether plaintiffs' prior illegal acts directly caused their 
alleged injuries.  Consequently, we hold that the trial court 
should not have dismissed the motions for judgment. 
 
Finally, defendant has assigned cross-error.  She claims 
the trial court erred in dismissing the counterclaims.  We 
agree.  Even if the defendant drove the vehicle after using 
drugs and alcohol, as she alleges, and thus may have assumed the 
risk of injury, the question remains whether that conduct was a 
proximate cause of the accident in view of the disputed facts 
about what actually caused her to lose control of the vehicle.  
In other words, may a defendant assume the risk of "unwanted 
physical contact" by driving after consuming intoxicants? 
 
Thus, the judgments of the trial court in these two cases 
will be reversed and the cases will be remanded for further 
proceedings on the motions for judgment and the counterclaims. 
 
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Reversed and remanded. 
 
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