Case Title: Moreta v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 26, 2024

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSE A. MORETA, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 26, 2024 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1603013733 (N)  
§  
§ 
 
Submitted: April 24, 2024 
Decided: 
May 24, 2024 
 
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Jose A. Moreta, appeals from the Superior Court’s order 
denying his second motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a motion to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Moreta’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
After a seven-day trial in 2018, a Superior Court jury found Moreta 
guilty of murder, attempted murder, and other offenses.  This Court affirmed on 
direct appeal in April 2019.1  Moreta, with the assistance of counsel, filed a timely 
 
1 Moreta v. State, 2019 WL 1752616 (Del. Apr. 16, 2019). 
 
2 
motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court denied the motion, and this 
Court affirmed.2  
(3) 
On June 16, 2023, Moreta filed a letter asserting that he had evidence, 
previously withheld from him, that showed his innocence.  The court determined 
that Moreta was seeking postconviction relief under Rule 61 of the Superior Court 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and, after receiving additional filings from Moreta and 
a response from the State, denied the motion.  The Superior Court held that Moreta’s 
motion was procedurally barred because it was successive3 and filed more than one 
year after the judgment of conviction became final.4  The court further concluded 
that Moreta had not overcome the procedural bars by sufficiently pleading the 
existence of new evidence that creates a strong inference that Moreta is actually 
innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. 5   
(4) 
On appeal, Moreta asserts that he has three items of new evidence that 
satisfy the actual innocence exception to the procedural bars:  (i) an unnotarized 
 
2 Moreta v. State, 2023 WL 3115966 (Del. Apr. 26, 2023). 
3 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(i)(2). 
4 Id. R. 61(i)(1). 
5 See id. R. 61(d)(2) (providing that a second or subsequent motion for postconviction relief “shall 
be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion” pleads with 
particularity either “that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is 
actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted” or “a claim 
that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United 
States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders 
the conviction . . . invalid”); see also id. R. 61(i) (establishing procedural bars to postconviction 
relief and exceptions thereto). 
5 Id. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
3 
“affidavit” purportedly signed by Moreta’s accomplice,6 Joshua Gonzalez, in 2017, 
stating that Moreta did not tell Gonzalez to shoot; (ii) data on Moreta’s cell phone 
that could have been used to show that a phrase that Gonzalez posted on Facebook 
after the shooting7 referred to song lyrics and not the murder; and (iii) purported 
inconsistencies between the testimony of certain witnesses at Moreta’s 2018 trial 
and those witnesses’ testimony at Gonzalez’s 2017 trial.  None of those items 
constitutes new evidence of Moreta’s actual innocence. 
(5) 
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2)(i), a defendant may avoid 
summary dismissal of a successive motion for postconviction relief by pleading with 
particularity that “new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant 
is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was 
convicted.”8  “Satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design, a heavy burden, and 
 
6 See Moreta, 2023 WL 3115966, at *1 (“Gonzalez, with Moreta by his side, fired eight shots down 
North Connell Street in the direction of DeLeon and Serrano, wounding DeLeon and killing 
Serrano. . . .  Although the evidence did not support a finding that Moreta had personally shot 
DeLeon or Serrano, the State argued that Moreta was guilty as an accomplice because Gonzalez 
acted at Moreta’s bidding.”).  Gonzalez was tried separately from Moreta and was convicted of 
murder and other charges.  Moreta, 2019 WL 1752616, at *1 n.2. 
7 See Moreta, 2019 WL 1752616, at *1 (“Two days after the incident, Gonzalez posted on 
Facebook: ‘[f]uckin wit tha gang you'll end up ina box M.O.E.T.  You know what we pop anything 
drop when tha bullets fly by in da hood man you better watch a lot 100 # AllBegan # 
MoneyGateMixTape # FreeC # FreeP.’”); see also id. at *1 n.3 (“The State did not attempt to 
interpret much of the post.  Instead, the State focused on the use of similar hashtags and ‘M.O.E.T.’ 
to connect Gonzalez and Moreta.  ‘# FreeP’ allegedly referred to Moreta, who was incarcerated at 
the time of the post.”). 
8 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(d)(2)(i); see also id. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the bars to 
successive and untimely motions for postconviction relief “shall not apply either to a claim that 
the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs 
2(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule”). 
 
4 
such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.”9  To satisfy this test, “a defendant 
must present additional evidence that was not available at trial and would not have 
been despite the defendant’s exercise of due diligence, thus making it ‘new.’”10  
More specifically, a defendant must show that the “new evidence (1) is such as will 
probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) has been discovered since the 
trial and could not have been discovered before by the exercise of due diligence; and 
(3) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.”11 
(6) 
The affidavit, cell phone data, and testimonial inconsistencies do not 
satisfy that test.  As the Superior Court observed, the affidavit bears characteristics 
that make its authenticity uncertain.  Even accepting the affidavit at face value, 
however, Moreta has not shown that he discovered the affidavit, which is dated June 
15, 2017, after his 2018 trial or that he could not have discovered it before his trial 
or initial postconviction proceedings.  Similarly, Moreta does not explain why he 
would not have known before trial or during the first postconviction proceedings 
that his own cell phone contained song lyrics that corresponded to the words in the 
Facebook post.  Moreover, the record reflects that the State provided the defense 
with extraction reports from Moreta’s cell phones during pretrial discovery.  Finally, 
as to the purported inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony at Moreta’s trial and 
 
9 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1100 (Del. 2021). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
 
5 
Gonzalez’s trial, Moreta did not present this issue to the Superior Court in the first 
instance,12 and we cannot discern how testimony provided during public trials in 
2017 and 2018 could possibly be new evidence. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.   
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
12 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review . . . .”).