Case Title: People v. Kirchner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86049

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 86049-Agenda 3-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
WILLIAM BRADLEY KIRCHNER, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	During the early morning hours of August 8, 1997, Charles
Brewer, his wife, Doris Jean Brewer, and their daughter Bonnie
Brewer were fatally stabbed at their home in rural Douglas
County. A jury found defendant, William Bradley Kirchner, guilty
of the first degree murders of the three Brewers. The same jury
determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. After
hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the jury found that
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty. The circuit court of Macon
County sentenced defendant to death. Defendant's death sentence
has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons
that follow, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentence.

BACKGROUND
	In August 1997, Charles and Doris Jean Brewer lived in a
house outside the small towns of Garrett and Atwood,
approximately 28 miles east of Decatur. On August 8, 1997, a
postal worker found Charles Brewer's body outside of the
Brewers' house.
	When the police responded to the postal worker's 911 call,
they observed a trail of blood leading from the front yard of the
house, across the driveway, and around the side of the house,
where Charles Brewer lay. Mr. Brewer had a fatal stab wound to
the front of his neck. Police also found a cigarette butt with
defendant's DNA on it in the front yard.
	There were no signs of forced entry to the Brewer house.
Inside the front door, in the living room of the house, was Mrs.
Brewer's body. Mrs. Brewer had 16 stab wounds to her face, head,
and neck. Under one of these wounds, her skull had been
fractured. Like her husband, Mrs. Brewer was in her sixties and
had mobility problems.
	Bonnie Brewer's body was found in the bathroom of the
Brewers' house. Bonnie, who was in her late thirties, had been
staying with her parents while recuperating from jaw surgery. She
had been stabbed or cut 20 times and had wounds to her face,
neck, head, legs, arms, and hands. The tip of a knife was found
embedded in her skull. There were black scuff marks on the floor
of the bathroom.
	Mr. Brewer's wallet was found in the bathroom, and Mrs.
Brewer's and Bonnie's purses were in the kitchen. Mr. Brewer had
cashed a check for $100 on August 7, but there was no money in
the wallet, purses, or anywhere else in the house. Also missing
from the house was a beige table top telephone the Brewers kept
in the living room. Police learned that three calls had been made
from the Brewer house shortly after 3 a.m. on August 8.
	There were only a few fingerprints on surfaces in the Brewer
house. The State's fingerprint expert testified that none of these
fingerprints matched fingerprint samples from the three Brewers,
defendant, or his friends Dyno Warner, Randy Merriman, and
Chris Brown.
	Several witnesses testified that, at the time of the Brewer
murders, defendant was looking for money to pay a drug dealer to
whom defendant owed money. Defendant had purchased crack
cocaine three times from this dealer in Decatur on August 7, 1997.
The first two times, defendant paid for the drugs. The third time,
however, defendant bought about three grams of crack cocaine and
did not pay the dealer. Around 10 p.m., the drug dealer followed
defendant and his friend Randy Merriman to a house in Atwood,
where defendant had indicated that he could obtain the money he
owed. Defendant was driving his girlfriend Vicki Cox's blue 1990
Oldsmobile. The dealer waited outside the house with Merriman
for some time, but did not see defendant exit the house and
eventually returned to Decatur. Before the dealer left, he told
Merriman to tell defendant to "have [his] money or [he would]
kick his tail."
	Defendant left the house in Atwood without being seen by the
drug dealer or Merriman and drove with Jeff Peeler and Chris
Brown to their friend Dyno Warner's house in Garrett. Warner
testified that they all smoked crack cocaine at his house and that
defendant used a knife Warner owned to cut the cocaine. Warner
further testified that defendant said he owed some money to
someone waiting in Atwood and asked Warner if he knew of
anyone who would buy some drugs. Warner replied that he knew
a girl who might want to buy drugs. Warner testified that
defendant paced back and forth, mentioned his need for money
several times, and said he would do whatever was necessary to get
money. Warner further testified that defendant asked him if he had
any handguns "for money," but Warner refused to give him a
handgun.
	According to Warner's testimony, defendant then left his
house with Peeler and Brown. Defendant returned to Warner's
house with Merriman around midnight. Defendant again "said that
he needed money and he would do anything it took to get it," and
asked Warner if he knew anyone who would buy drugs. Warner
said that he knew someone who might be interested in buying
drugs. Defendant, Warner, and Merriman drove to the gas station
where this person worked, but they did not obtain any money from
her.
	Warner stated that, after they returned to his house, defendant
paced for a while and then exited the house, saying he would be
back. Warner and Merriman watched television. Twenty minutes
after defendant left, Warner noticed that his knife, the one
defendant had used to cut cocaine, was missing from the place
where Warner had hidden it under a pillow on the living room
couch. Warner hid the knife from defendant after he observed
defendant put the knife in his pants.
	Warner further testified that, after an hour, defendant returned
to Warner's house and asked Warner to go to the back door.
Warner estimated that defendant returned at about 1:30 a.m. or 2
a.m., but he was not sure of the time. Outside, the lighting was
poor, but Warner saw spots on defendant's shirt. Defendant asked
Warner for a garden hose and towel and used water from the hose
to rinse his head and face. He vomited, swore, and yelled, "What
have I done." Defendant was frantic and asked Warner for a pair
of shorts. Warner gave defendant a pair of his shorts and asked
defendant if he wanted any shoes, but defendant declined the offer.
Defendant removed the blue jeans, T-shirt, and black boots he was
wearing and threw them into a fire that was burning in a pit in
Warner's backyard. Before burning his jeans, defendant
transferred a roll of money from the jeans to the shorts.
	Warner then asked defendant for his knife, and defendant
gave it to him. According to Warner, there were maroon spots on
the sheath, there was blood all over the knife, and there was a
white hair on the knife. In addition, the tip was missing from the
knife. The tip was not missing when defendant had used the knife
to cut cocaine on August 7. Defendant told Warner that he had
stabbed a dog. After defendant changed clothes, he and Merriman
drove to Decatur.
	Warner admitted that, during the evening of August 8, he
threw the knife into the Kaskaskia River because he knew it had
been used in a crime and did not want "anything to come back" to
him. Warner stated at trial that he had been charged with
obstruction of justice but that he had been given no promises with
respect to this charge in exchange for his testimony.
	Merriman's description of defendant's activities was
consistent with Warner's. Merriman testified that defendant left
Warner's at about 3 a.m. on August 8. After about an hour,
Merriman heard a car, and Warner went outside. Twenty to 30
minutes later, Merriman followed Warner outside. He saw Cox's
car parked in front of Warner's house. In the back of the house,
defendant was rinsing his head with a garden hose. Defendant told
Merriman to stay by the car because he had been sick. Later,
Merriman saw defendant and Warner talking next to a fire in the
backyard. Defendant was wearing shorts and a T-shirt instead of
the jeans, T-shirt, and work boots he had worn before leaving
Warner's house.
	Merriman further testified that, after defendant changed his
clothes, he and defendant drove to Decatur in Cox's car. Merriman
fell asleep in the car but awakened to see defendant throwing a
beige table top telephone into Lake Decatur. When Merriman and
defendant arrived in Decatur, defendant bought alcohol and
cocaine, which he and defendant smoked.
	Merriman also described events that occurred near the time of
defendant's arrest on August 15. Merriman testified that on
August 14, he and defendant learned that Warner had been
arrested. According to Merriman, defendant stated that he would
have to "do" Warner because defendant did not know if Warner
would "talk." Merriman admitted that he did not tell police of
defendant's statement that he would have to "do" Warner until the
week before trial.
	William Hayes testified that, around 6 a.m. on August 8, he
saw defendant and Merriman at a friend's house in Decatur.
Defendant asked Hayes where to buy some crack cocaine, and
Hayes observed defendant buy drugs and alcohol. Defendant
smoked crack cocaine at Hayes' apartment and stole Hayes'
sandals.
	Cox testified that she lived with defendant in August 1997.
During the evening of August 7, defendant took her car. According
to Cox, defendant did not return home the night of August 7 or the
next morning. Merriman returned her car at about 7 a.m. in the
morning of August 8, but Cox did not see defendant until the
afternoon of August 8. Defendant told her that he had stayed at the
house of some friends. When Cox saw defendant on August 7,
defendant was wearing steel-toed black boots and jeans. On
August 8, he was wearing a pair of denim shorts and sandals.
	Cox testified that, on August 14, defendant gave her a
notebook containing the following note:
		"Vicki, baby, listen. You know I love you with all my
heart. Some shit has happened concerning what I told you
about. If a cop comes past, we have been fighting, and I
left for a few days. I will have someone call tomorrow and
tell you where to come. Take Saturday off work. We are
camping. This will all be over in a few days. Please do as
the letter says, okay, baby? I'll explain. Don't tell lawyer
dick nothing. Bring the dog. Bring clothes, coats, my
[C]at boots, and all the money. Bring hamburger and pork
and beans. I love you. Brad. Bring this notepad with this
letter."
Cox gave the notebook to police, who found defendant's prints on
it.
	Jeff Peeler testified that he smoked crack cocaine with
defendant at Warner's house on August 7. According to Peeler,
when Warner said that he knew someone who might be interested
in buying drugs, defendant said, "Well if she don't want to buy
none, we'll just rob her and kill her." Peeler also testified that, on
August 9, defendant asked Peeler for money because, he said, he
owed money for drugs. Defendant also asked Peeler if he had any
knives for defendant to "go rob somebody." Peeler said that he had
no knives.
	With respect to the circumstances of defendant's arrest, Peeler
testified that, during the evening of August 14, he and his wife
drove defendant and Merriman from Atwood to Decatur to buy
drugs. At defendant's request, defendant and Merriman rode in the
trunk of the Peelers' car until they had traveled outside of Atwood.
On their return from Decatur, the Peelers stopped outside of
Atwood to comply with defendant's request that defendant and
Merriman reenter the trunk for the trip through Atwood.
	The next morning, defendant and Merriman accompanied the
Peelers and their children to Tuscola. The Peelers notified police
that defendant was in their car, and police stopped the car.
Defendant was hiding in the back seat of the car with a knife, but
police arrested defendant apparently without incident.
	Police interviewed defendant after his arrest. In a tape-recorded statement, defendant admitted that he had been in
Atwood between 4:30 and 8 p.m. on August 7 but denied that he
was in Garrett on August 7 or 8. Defendant stated that he had put
Cox's daughter to bed around 8:30 or 9 p.m. on August 7 and that
he had spent the entire night with Cox.
	On August 14, 1997, Warner showed police where he had
dropped his knife into the Kaskaskia River. Police recovered the
knife a few feet from this location on August 15. According to the
State's experts at trial, the metal fragment embedded in Bonnie
Brewer's skull matched the knife from the river, and there was
human blood on the knife. In addition, the physician who
performed the autopsies of the Brewers testified that all of their
wounds could have been made with this knife.
	On August 20, 1997, Merriman showed police where
defendant had thrown the telephone into Lake Decatur. Police
recovered the telephone near that location the next day. One of the
Brewers' daughters testified that this telephone looked like the one
her parents kept in their living room.
	Police searched the house defendant shared with Cox. In the
basement was the pair of Warner's shorts that defendant had
borrowed, as well as the sandals he had stolen from Hayes. When
police searched Warner's house, they found a garden hose and a
fire pit in the backyard. In the remains of the fire pit, there was a
towel and two steel toe pieces. The State presented evidence that
the size of the steel toe pieces was consistent with defendant's
shoe size. In addition, defendant's supervisor at the Macon County
Landfill, where defendant worked from December 1996 to May
1997, testified that defendant wore black "engineer" boots with a
black sole.
	Police also searched Warner's car and Cox's car. They found
no evidence in Warner's car. In Cox's car, however, they found
spots of blood on the dashboard. DNA analysis revealed that some
of the blood on the dashboard belonged to defendant. Other blood
on the dashboard was a mixture that included Bonnie Brewer's
blood. In addition, in the glove compartment, there was the front
page of the Decatur Herald and Review from August 9, 1997. The
front page contained a story about the Brewer murders, and a star
was written under the headline. Defendant's fingerprint was found
on this newspaper.
	The defense presented only two witnesses at trial. A police
officer testified that Warner had said that he, not defendant, had
thrown the clothes into the fire pit. A forensic scientist from an
Illinois State Police laboratory testified that, among the hairs
found on Bonnie Brewer's shirt, there was one hair that did not
match the hair samples from defendant, Warner, Bonnie Brewer,
Charles Brewer, or Doris Jean Brewer. Also, among the hairs
found on the towel from the fire pit, there was one hair that did not
match the hair samples from defendant, Warner, Bonnie Brewer,
Charles Brewer, or Doris Jean Brewer. The forensic scientist
testified that he was not given a hair sample from Merriman.
	Following the presentation of this evidence, the jury found
defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Charles Brewer,
Doris Jean Brewer, and Bonnie Brewer. After a hearing, the same
jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty under sections
9-1(b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(11) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(11) (West 1996)).
	At the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing, the State
presented victim impact statements from the Brewers' relatives
and certified copies of defendant's previous convictions. In 1989,
he was convicted of the unlawful use of weapons. In 1992, he was
convicted of disorderly conduct, burglary, intimidation, and
battery. In 1993, he was convicted of residential burglary and theft.
	A deputy sheriff testified that defendant's disorderly conduct
convictions stemmed from bomb threats he had made to a local
elementary school and a local high school. Defendant's burglary
convictions resulted from his burglary of the same local high
school and a service station. The deputy sheriff further testified
that defendant was convicted of intimidation and battery based on
his former girlfriend's complaint that he had beaten her, held her
against her will, and said that if she pressed charges against him,
he would not kill her but would hit her and watch her bleed.
	According to the deputy sheriff, defendant's residential
burglary and theft convictions were based on his entry into the
Lust family residence, which was in Piatt County eight miles from
the Brewer house. Like the Brewer house, it was outside of town
and surrounded by farm fields. In addition, a cigarette butt was
found outside the house, there were no signs of forced entry, and
no fingerprints were found inside the house. When police
interviewed defendant in the course of investigating this crime,
defendant admitted that he had parked his car in the driveway of
the house, his codefendant knocked on the front door, and, when
there was no answer, defendant entered through an unlocked door.
Defendant explained that no fingerprints were found in the Lust
residence because he and his codefendant had worn gloves.
Defendant took money and three handguns from the residence. His
codefendant kept one of the guns, and defendant said that he threw
two of the guns into the Kaskaskia River. Police recovered no
guns from the river but, in 1996, one of the guns defendant said he
had thrown in the Kaskaskia River was recovered by police in
Chicago.
	The State also presented evidence concerning defendant's
behavior in jail while awaiting trial in this case. According to this
evidence, in February 1998, defendant threatened to "blacken" the
eyes of a jail inspector.
	In mitigation, one of defendant's cousins testified that
defendant was small and shy in school, and other children would
tease him. He was tested for a learning disability. He was involved
in BMX bicycle racing, had played Little League baseball until he
was knocked unconscious by a baseball, and had played football
in high school. The death of defendant's infant brother when
defendant was eight or nine years old was very hard on defendant.
Defendant was very close to his cousin's 12-year-old daughter and
supported his cousin during her divorce. He was very artistic and
drew pictures for the children of friends and relatives. In addition,
defendant had a Christian background and changed his nickname
from Patches to Pages after "receiv[ing] God." Another of
defendant's cousins also testified that her daughter was close to
defendant and that defendant had learning difficulties. A relative
of Vicki Cox testified that defendant was good with Cox's
daughter and that the child called defendant "Dad."
	One of defendant's high school teachers testified that
defendant was below-average academically, but he had made a
unique cake decorated like a Jeep in the home economics class she
taught. Defendant's probation officer testified that he had had no
problems with defendant, and defendant had successfully
completed probation for his unlawful use of weapons conviction.
The probation officer also testified that defendant's father and
grandfather were members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and
defendant had helped with fundraisers for this organization.
Defendant's supervisor at the Macon County Landfill testified that
defendant was a good worker, whom the supervisor recommended
be hired full-time. Defendant did not return to work, however,
after May 1997. His girlfriend said that defendant had hurt his
hand, and the supervisor had heard that defendant had been in a
knife fight.
	In addition, several individuals who had contact with
defendant in prison during the early nineties testified on his behalf.
A correctional officer testified that he supervised defendant on a
work crew. According to this officer, defendant was a good
worker, related well to the other inmates and did not cause
problems. The officer had given defendant a good
recommendation so that defendant could transfer to a different
Illinois Department of Corrections facility. A counselor testified
that defendant performed charity work while in prison in
conjunction with a veterans group. The counselor described him
as "one of the very easy people to deal with," who related well to
the other inmates.
	Other individuals testified concerning defendant's behavior in
prison while awaiting trial for the Brewer murders. The pastor of
a church defendant had attended with his parents testified that he
visited defendant in prison six times after 1997, and defendant was
receptive to his visits. According to this pastor, defendant
continued to be distraught over the death of his little brother. A
prison chaplain testified that defendant participated in Bible study
through correspondence. Correctional officers testified that they
had no problems with defendant and that defendant had given
other inmates soap, shampoo, and cigarettes.
	Dr. Jonathan Hess, a neuropsychologist, testified that
defendant had suffered one or more traumatic brain injuries. Dr.
Hess' evaluation of defendant indicated that defendant had
damage to the frontal lobes of his brain and that this damage was
more to the left than the right side of the brain For example,
defendant had a very modest verbal IQ, was poor in solving
sequential thinking problems, and had attention and retention
problems. According to Dr. Hess, the damage to defendant's brain
could have been caused by being hit in the head with a ball, by
falling off of a bike, or by playing football.
	Dr. Hess explained that among the effects of defendant's brain
damage were an inability to control anger, irritability, a volatile
disposition, a quick temper, a susceptibility to rage upon
provocation, a failure to estimate the consequences of actions, and
impulsivity. Dr. Hess further testified that these problems could be
treated with medication.
	After hearing this evidence, the jury found no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.
The circuit court sentenced defendant to death.

ANALYSIS
I. Voir Dire
A. Juror Rentfro
	Defendant first argues that resentencing is required because
the circuit court erred in excluding prospective juror James
Rentfro for cause. During voir dire, Rentfro responded to the
circuit court's questions as follows:
			"THE COURT: Do you have any religious or moral
beliefs that would prevent you from serving in this type of
criminal case?
			JUROR RENTFRO: I don't believe in the death
penalty, let's put it that way.
			THE COURT: In other words, are you basically saying
under no circumstances could you impose the death
penalty?
			JUROR RENTFRO: No.
			THE COURT: Then I will excuse you for cause. You
may step down."
Subsequently, defense counsel requested a side bar, after which
defense counsel was permitted to question the prospective juror.
The following colloquy occurred:
			"[Defense counsel]: Mr. Rentfro, I am just going to ask
you some questions in regard to the last answer you gave.
			JUROR RENTFRO: Okay.
			[Defense counsel]: Do you understand that we are a
society of laws?
			JUROR RENTFRO: Yes, sir.
			[Defense counsel]: And do you also understand the duty
of citizens to follow the law even if they don't agree with
it?
			JUROR RENTFRO: Correct.
			[Defense counsel]: If you are selected as a juror in this
case, Mr. Rentfro, the Judge will instruct you and your
fellow jurors as to the law in this case and that you must
set aside your personal opinions and follow the law. You
would be able to listen to the Judge and follow the law as
he told you that the law applies to the case?
			[State]: I object to leading.
			THE COURT: Sustained as to the form of the question.
			[Defense counsel]: Would you be able to follow the law
as the Judge instructs you and your fellow jurors?
			JUROR RENTFRO: Yes.
			[Defense counsel]: So then, in spite of your personal
feelings regarding the death penalty, would you be able to
fill your duty as a citizen to fairly, without prejudice,
weigh the evidence in this case and follow the law in the
trial, and if there is a sentencing, in the sentencing also?
			JUROR RENTFRO: Yes. To follow the instructions,
yes.
			[Defense counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.
			THE COURT: That gets me back to the original
question. Does your original answer still stand?
			JUROR RENTFRO: Yes, sir.
			THE COURT: Then I will excuse you for cause."
	Defendant argues that the circuit court should not have
excused Rentfro for cause because, viewed in their entirety, his
responses indicated only a "general disbelief in the death penalty
rather than an unambiguous statement that he would automatically
vote against the death penalty." According to defendant, it was a
violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), to excuse Rentfro for cause because he
did not unambiguously state that he would automatically vote
against the death penalty. Defendant asserts that this error requires
a new sentencing hearing.
	Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), and its progeny, prospective jurors
who express only general objections to the death penalty may not
be excluded for cause. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 509-10
(1996). Removal for cause is proper only if " 'the juror's views
would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath." ' " People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 316 (1998), quoting
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52,
105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980). Jurors
who would not vote for the death penalty in any case are not
impartial jurors and may be removed for cause. People v. Jackson,
182 Ill. 2d 30, 58 (1998), citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
726-34, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 500-06, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2228-32
(1992).
	In determining whether a prospective juror should be excused
for cause, the circuit court "need not follow a set formula in posing
questions on voir dire." People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 99 (1996).
A potential juror's remarks must be considered as a whole (People
v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 423-24 (1995)), and the circuit court
may properly remove a prospective juror for cause even if the
individual does not express his or her views with "meticulous
preciseness" (People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 402 (1995)).
However, it must be clear that a prospective juror is willing to "set
aside his or her own beliefs in favor of the rule of law." Taylor,
166 Ill. 2d  at 424; see also People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 54
(1994); People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 386 (1990), citing
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 149-50,
106 S. Ct. 1758, 1766 (1986). Whether to excuse a juror for cause
is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, which is in a
" 'superior position to determine not only from a venireperson's
responses as a whole but also from a venireperson's demeanor
whether that person's views toward capital punishment would
substantially prevent or impair the venireperson's performance of
his or her duties as a juror in accord with the oath a juror is
required to take.' " Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 318, quoting Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d  at 424.
	After reviewing Rentfro's responses, we hold that the circuit
court did not err in excluding Rentfro for cause because of his
opposition to the death penalty. Rentfro initially stated that he did
not believe in the death penalty. Subsequently, he answered "no"
to the circuit court's question, "In other words, are you basically
saying under no circumstances could you impose the death
penalty?" Because of the manner in which the circuit court phrased
this question, we cannot determine from the cold record whether,
by answering "no," Rentfro meant, "I am not saying that under no
circumstances I could impose the death penalty," or whether he
meant, "Under no circumstances could I impose the death
penalty." Immediately after Rentfro answered this question in the
negative, however, the circuit court stated that Rentfro would be
excused for cause. It is clear, therefore, that the circuit court
interpreted Rentfro's answer to mean that he would not impose the
death penalty under any circumstances. The circuit court was in a
superior position to ascertain the meaning of Rentfro's responses,
and deference to the circuit court's judgment is appropriate in
these circumstances. See, e.g., Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 52-56.
	Contrary to defendant's argument, Rentfro's responses to
defense counsel's subsequent questions do not indicate that he
could set aside his personal views against the death penalty and
vote in favor of the death penalty if the law required it. Defense
counsel asked Rentfro, generally, whether he could follow the law
and whether he could set aside his personal beliefs regarding the
death penalty and follow the law. Rentfro responded that he could.
We agree with the State, however, that it is significant that defense
counsel did not explain to Rentfro that the law may require the
imposition of the death penalty under certain circumstances. In
light of this omission, Rentfro's responses to defense counsel's
inquiry do not demonstrate that he could vote in favor of the death
penalty in spite of his personal opposition to it. Indeed, following
defense counsel's inquiry, Rentfro reiterated that he could not
impose the death penalty in any circumstances by reaffirming his
negative answer to the circuit court's earlier question. We decline
to overturn the circuit court's determination that prospective juror
Rentfro's views on the death penalty would substantially interfere
with his ability to serve as an impartial juror.



B. Newspaper Article in Jury Assembly Room
	Defendant argues that he was denied due process of law and
his right to trial by an impartial jury when jurors were exposed to
a prejudicial newspaper article on May 18, 1998, the first day of
jury selection. Prior to voir dire, defendant requested that
prospective jurors be questioned individually outside the presence
of other venirepersons. The circuit court denied this request and
decided instead that, in the interest of time, jurors would be
questioned in panels of four. During the examination of the second
panel of four jurors, a prospective juror revealed that he had read
about defendant's case in a newspaper that was in the jury
assembly room, where prospective jurors waited to be called for
voir dire.
	The circuit court had the newspaper removed from the jury
assembly room, and defendant moved for a mistrial. Defense
counsel stated that he had seen two or three copies of the May 18,
1998, issue of the Decatur Herald & Review in the jury assembly
room. According to defense counsel, the jury pool was tainted by
its exposure to an article on the front page of this issue.
	That article had the headline, "Jury selection begins in triple
slaying," and a picture of defendant in handcuffs and an orange
jumpsuit. The article described, inter alia, the "general feeling of
unease" and fears of Douglas County residents as a result of the
murders, the victims' employment histories and their good
characters, the victims' survivors, the impact of the murders on
Bonnie Brewer's coworkers, defendant's criminal record, and the
State's assertion at a bond hearing that defendant had a " 'great
motivation' " to flee. The article also contained information
Warner had given police, such as the fact that defendant had come
to Warner's house with blood on his clothing and a bloody knife
with a broken tip. The circuit court denied the motion for a
mistrial but stated that it would ask, and permit counsel for both
sides to ask, prospective jurors whether they had read or heard
anything about the case that would prevent them from being
impartial. After defendant's motion for mistrial was denied,
defense counsel made a continuing objection based on the
newspaper article.
	Before and after the defense motion for a mistrial, the circuit
court's questioning of jurors about pretrial publicity was
essentially the same. The circuit court asked prospective jurors
whether "Without saying what [they] might have read or might
have heard, [had they] read or heard anything about this case
before today." If jurors responded affirmatively to this question,
the circuit court asked them whether they could be impartial,
despite what they had read or heard about the case. The circuit
court asked some jurors when they had read or heard about the
case but did not ask the jurors specifically what they had learned
about the case from pretrial publicity.
	Defense counsel and the State also questioned prospective
jurors about their exposure to publicity about the case. Like the
circuit court, neither defense counsel nor the State asked
prospective jurors to give details of what they had read or heard
about the case. Instead, both before and after defendant's motion
for mistrial, the inquiry focused on the timing of the exposure and
the jurors' ability to base their decision only on evidence presented
at trial.
	The circuit court removed jurors who stated that they thought
they could not be impartial based on their outside knowledge of
the case. It did not remove jurors who stated that they had read or
heard about the case but that they could nevertheless be impartial.
Defense counsel used only 5 of defendant's 14 initial peremptory
challenges and none of his three additional peremptory challenges
available for alternate jurors.
	Two of the 12 jurors ultimately selected to serve on
defendant's jury stated that they had not read or heard anything
about the case. Only one of the jurors selected indicated that she
had seen the Herald & Review in the jury assembly room. Juror
Nunn stated that she saw the headlines about defendant's case in
a newspaper that someone had in the jury assembly room and had
read the first paragraph of an article. She asserted, however, that
what she had read would not affect her ability to be impartial. In
addition, she said that she understood that information in the
media was not evidence and that the only evidence she could
consider was that presented in the courtroom. She also stated that
she could keep the newspaper reports out of her mind while
deliberating.
	Three other jurors, juror Althoff, juror Snapp, and juror
Mowery, said that they had seen an article about defendant's case
in the newspaper on May 18, but did not indicate which newspaper
or where they had seen the newspaper. Juror Althoff testified that
he had merely glanced at the article and did not form any opinions
about the case. Juror Snapp testified that she had skimmed the
article but did not remember much of it. All three of these jurors
stated that what they had read would not affect their ability to be
impartial and that they would consider only evidence presented in
court. Juror Snapp further testified that she could keep information
from the newspaper out of her mind during deliberations.
	Juror Smith testified that he had not read anything about the
case, but his mother had asked him if he had read the May 18
newspaper and had told him that the jury was being selected in
defendant's case. According to Smith, he did not know what his
mother was talking about because he does not read the paper. He
asserted that the information he had learned from his mother
would not prejudice him in defendant's case, he understood that
facts in newspaper reports are not evidence, and he could keep
these facts out of his mind in deciding the case.
	Three other jurors, juror Blankenship, juror Jones, and juror
Bailey, read about defendant's case at the time the Brewer murders
occurred but did not read or hear about the case near the time of
trial. Juror Jones stated that, although she had read about the case,
she did not know much about the murders and did not form an
opinion about the case. All three of these jurors said that they
could be impartial despite what they had learned about the case
outside of court, they understood that information presented in the
media was not evidence, and they would decide the case based
only on matters presented in court.
	With respect to the two remaining jurors, juror Bean stated
that she had not read or heard " much" about the case and that this
information would not cause her to be biased against either side.
In addition, she stated that she could put aside what she had
learned outside of court. Juror Muth stated that she had read or
heard about the case when it happened and around the time of trial
but that she could nevertheless be impartial. She had developed an
opinion that "it was very terrible." However, when asked whether
she would put what she had heard aside and listen to the evidence,
she replied, "I would certainly try to, yes."
	Defendant now asserts that he was denied due process of law
and his right to a trial by an impartial jury when jurors saw the
Herald & Review article on the morning that jury selection began.
In particular, defendant claims prejudice based on the newspaper
picture of him in handcuffs, and the information in the article
concerning his prior convictions, the victims' positive attributes,
the impact of Bonnie's death on her coworkers, the fears of
Douglas County residents, and defendant's motivation to escape.
According to defendant, jurors' assertions that they could be
impartial cannot be believed due to the inflammatory nature of this
publicity.
	In addition, defendant contends that the transfer of the case
from Douglas County to neighboring Macon County was
inadequate to reduce the prejudicial effect of publicity, and the
circuit court should have delayed jury selection until jurors who
had not seen the May 18 article could be found. Defendant asserts
that only 10 of the 44 prospective jurors examined stated that they
had not read newspaper stories about the case. Defendant argues
that he must be granted a new trial by a jury not prejudiced by
inflammatory publicity. In the alternative, he requests a new
sentencing hearing.
	Under both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions, a
criminal defendant is entitled to a jury that is impartial, which
means " 'a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the
evidence before it.' " People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 353
(1997), quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 86, 102 S. Ct. 940, 946 (1982). Exposure to publicity about a
case is not enough to demonstrate prejudice because jurors need
not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case.
People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 15-16 (1992), citing Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751, 81 S. Ct. 1639 (1961). This
court has previously recognized that "[c]rimes, especially heinous
crimes, are of great public interest and are extensively reported. It
is unreasonable to expect that individuals of average intelligence
and at least average interest in their community would not have
heard of any of the cases which they are called upon to judge in
court." People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 386 (1984). A juror must,
however, be capable of disregarding his or her impressions or
opinions and decide the case based solely upon the evidence
presented in court. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 547 (1995).
In evaluating a defendant's claim that his jury was prejudiced due
to pretrial publicity, a reviewing court must review the entire
record, including voir dire testimony, to determine independently
whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v. Sanchez,
115 Ill. 2d 238, 263 (1986).
	In an analogous case, People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1
(1992), this court rejected a defendant's claim that he was denied
a fair trial by extensive media coverage in his case. In Sutherland,
as in the instant case, a change of venue was granted to a nearby
county. The defendant argued that transferring the case only 75
miles from the scene of the murder was essentially no change of
venue. The defendant asserted that media coverage of the case
affected residents of the county where the case was tried in the
same way that it had affected residents in the county where the
murder occurred. The defendant observed that 92% of the
veniremen stated that they had read or heard about the case, and
34% of that group stated that they believed the defendant was
guilty and that they could not put aside this opinion. Sutherland,
155 Ill. 2d  at 15.
	This court refused, however, to grant the defendant a new trial
in Sutherland based on pretrial publicity. It noted that the 12 jurors
selected for the case stated that they had not formed an opinion
based on what they had read or heard and that they could decide
the case based only on evidence presented in court. In addition,
this court rejected the defendant's argument that "a juror's good
faith cannot counter the effect of exposure to prejudicial
extrajudicial pretrial information." Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 16.
Although 10 of the 12 jurors had heard about the case, their
awareness of the case was "general" and "minimal," and came
only from local papers. In addition, none remembered information
prejudicial to defendant. Based on these facts, the Sutherland court
concluded that the defense was able to select a fair and impartial
jury, and the change in venue was sufficient to protect the
defendant's rights. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d  at 16.
	As in Sutherland, our review of the record in the case at bar
leads to the conclusion that "the level of awareness of the case on
the part of the venire and the jury ultimately selected was not so
great as to establish partiality and to deny the defendant a fair
trial" (Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d at 263). Of the 12 jurors selected, 10
had read or heard about the case, and the record indicates that their
knowledge was based only on newspaper reports. All of the 10
expressed a willingness to put aside what they knew of the case
and decide it based only on the evidence presented in court. They
also averred that they could be impartial despite what they had
learned of the case outside the courtroom. More than half of the 10
who had read or heard of the case indicated that they had minimal
familiarity with the case, having merely "skimmed" or "glanced"
at newspaper reports. Furthermore, we note that defendant only
used 5 of his 14 peremptory challenges, a factor that, while not
conclusive, weighs against a finding of jury bias. As in Sutherland,
we find that pretrial publicity did not deny defendant a fair trial.
See Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d  at 264-65 (holding that defendant was not
denied a fair trial as a result of pretrial publicity; coverage was
extensive but typical for a case of its nature and not
"unprecedented" in intensity).
	Defendant asserts that the circuit court's failure to ask jurors
precisely what they had read and recalled about the case precludes
a determination that his jury was impartial. He also claims that the
circuit court's failure to grant his request for individual voir dire
prevented defense counsel from making such an inquiry. In
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493, 506,
111 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (1991), however, the United States Supreme
Court approved of voir dire conducted in the manner chosen by
the circuit court in defendant's case. In Mu'Min, as in the instant
case, the circuit court denied the defendant's request for individual
voir dire and instead examined jurors in panels of four. See
Mu'Min, 500 U.S.  at 419, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 501-02, 111 S. Ct.  at
1902. In addition, in Mu'Min, the circuit court refused to ask
jurors questions about the content of pretrial publicity to which
they were exposed. Instead, the court asked jurors whether the
information they had learned outside of court would affect their
abilities to be impartial.
	The Supreme Court approved of this procedure. The Court
explained: "Whether a trial court decides to put questions about
the content of publicity to a potential juror or not, it must make the
same decision at the end of the questioning: is this juror to be
believed when he says he has not formed an opinion about the
case?" Mu'Min, 500 U.S.  at 425, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 506, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1905-08. The Court held that questions about the content of
publicity are not constitutionally required and that the voir dire
conducted was sufficient to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. Mu'Min, 500 U.S.  at 425-32, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 506-10, 111 S. Ct. at 1905-08; see also Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 
at 547-48. Based on this authority, we conclude in the case at bar
that the circuit court was not required to ask jurors to detail their
recollection of media coverage of defendant's case. The voir dire
in this case was sufficient to determine whether jurors could
decide defendant's case based on the evidence presented in court.
	We also reject defendant's argument that pretrial publicity
was so pervasive and prejudicial that it created " 'such a
presumption of prejudice in [the] community that the jurors'
claims that they can be impartial should not be believed' "
(Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 548, quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847, 854, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2889 (1984)).
In support of this contention, defendant relies on this court's
decision in People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377 (1984), in which this
court granted a defendant a new trial on the basis that the jury was
prejudiced by pretrial publicity. The Taylor court described the
media coverage of the case in the county where the crime occurred
and surrounding counties as "unprecedented." Detailed coverage
began on the day of the crime and continued through trial. There
were daily reports on the radio and television, as well as extensive
coverage in two local newspapers. Details about the crime and the
defendant were provided by the media, as well as information that
a codefendant had been released after "passing" a lie detector test,
whereas the defendant "did not pass" and was not released Taylor,
101 Ill. 2d  at 383-84. A public opinion poll conducted by defense
counsel indicated that 378 of 382 registered voters surveyed had
heard of the case, and 72% believed police had arrested the right
person. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 382-83.
	This court held in Taylor that the circuit court erred in
refusing to grant the defendant's challenges for cause and motion
for change of venue based on the pretrial publicity. Although
jurors stated that they could set aside what they had read or heard
about the case and base their verdict only on evidence in the
courtroom, the Taylor court determined that these assertions were
insufficient based on the extent and nature of the publicity about
the case. The record indicated that at least three, and possibly six,
jurors were aware of facts indicating that the defendant had
performed poorly on a lie detector test. The Taylor court held that
the defendant's challenges for cause to five of these jurors were
improperly denied, and the defendant had exhausted his
peremptory challenges. The Taylor court concluded that, although
the jurors may have been sincere in stating that they could
disregard such outside knowledge of the case,
		"[t]he concern is that this information about polygraphs,
by its nature, is unlike other factual details. This is not the
type of information which the average juror can easily
ignore. Its effect is subtle and unconscious, but at the
same time potent. Whether or not the juror is aware of it
or can express his feelings accurately, exposure to this
type of highly inflammatory material is enough to raise
the presumption of partiality." Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 393.
	In holding that the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial
by the denial of his challenges for cause and his motion for change
of venue, the Taylor court repeatedly emphasized the unique facts
of the case. According to the Taylor court, its holding was not
based merely on the sheer volume of publicity or the "bare
potential for bias." Rather, it was based on the documented
"unprecedented volume of publicity" combined with the jurors'
exposure to the polygraph information, which was particularly
persuasive and highly prejudicial. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 395.
	We disagree with defendant that, under Taylor, the jurors'
assertions in defendant's case that they could be impartial despite
what they had learned about the case outside the courtroom should
be disregarded. The record contains no indication that this case
received the "unprecedented" amount of coverage that existed in
Taylor. Evidence in the record of media coverage of defendant's
case is limited to the May 18, 1998, issue of the Decatur Herald &
Review and several newspaper reports in August and September
1997.
	While some of the information in these news reports was
prejudicial to defendant and inadmissible, it was not of the
peculiarly inflammatory nature of the polygraph results disclosed
in Taylor. The newspaper reports about defendant's case generally
described the circumstances of the murders and defendant's arrest,
the charges against defendant and Warner, Warner's description
of defendant's actions on August 8, defendant's criminal record,
fears of Atwood and Garrett residents after the murders, the police
investigation, and the victims' lives before the murders. Unlike the
polygraph details in Taylor, press coverage of these facts in
defendant's case does not require a finding that defendant was
denied a fair trial despite the juror's assertions that they would
decide his case based only on the evidence presented in court. For
example, this court has stated that "[a] juror's knowledge of the
accused's prior convictions for other offenses does not create a
presumption of prejudice." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 547, citing
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589, 95 S. Ct. 2031
(1975). In addition, "[b]ecause television and the media regularly
depict criminal defendants in handcuffs, a juror's viewing a
defendant in handcuffs can no longer be regarded as having a
shocking effect on a prospective juror's sensibilities." People v.
O'Toole, 226 Ill. App. 3d 974, 985 (1992). We hold that the circuit
court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial
based on pretrial publicity. We also decline defendant's request
that we find that the circuit court abused its discretion by not
delaying the trial so that the jury could be selected from a venire
that did not see the article. There was no request for a continuance,
and, as stated, defendant was not denied a fair trial by the jurors
who were selected on May 18 and 19, 1998.
II. Trial
	In addition to his challenges to voir dire, defendant raises
three issues with respect to the guilt-innocence phase of the
proceedings in his case. Defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He claims,
instead, that his convictions must be reversed because (1) the
circuit court refused to order a psychiatric evaluation of Merriman;
(2) the circuit court excluded evidence of Warner's possession of
the murder weapon several months before the Brewer murders;
and (3) the circuit court refused to give an accomplice witness
instruction to the jury.
A. Psychiatric Evaluation of Merriman
	Before trial, defendant requested that the circuit court order a
psychological and psychiatric evaluation of Randy Merriman. In
addition, defendant asked the court to require the State to disclose
Merriman's mental health treatment records. The circuit court
denied defendant's request for an examination of Merriman but
ordered the State to submit records of Merriman's mental health
treatment for an in camera inspection by the court. After
examining the records, the circuit court granted defense counsel's
request to use eight documents for purposes of impeaching
Merriman's testimony. At trial, Merriman testified on direct and
cross-examination concerning his history of substance abuse,
mental illness, and memory problems.
	Defendant acknowledges that the jury was presented with
information concerning Merriman's mental health, but he contends
that "a current psychiatric evaluation was needed to allow the
defense to investigate and possibly present defense evidence to the
jury as to how Merriman's mental problems affected his credibility
as a witness as well as his ability to perceive reality at the time of
the crime." According to defendant, Merriman's credibility was
critical to the State's case against defendant, and the circuit court's
refusal to order an evaluation of Merriman deprived defendant of
his right under the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution to confront witnesses and present a defense.
	A criminal defendant's right to confrontation under the sixth
amendment includes the right to cross-examine witnesses against
him. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 130 (1998), citing Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353, 94 S. Ct. 1105,
1110 (1974). "Any permissible matter which affects the witness's
credibility may be developed on cross-examination." Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 130. However, "[a] defendant's rights under the
confrontation clause are not absolute. Rather, 'the Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.' " (Emphasis in original.)
People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 243-44 (1993), quoting Delaware
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292,
294 (1985). The latitude allowed on cross-examination is within
the sound discretion of the circuit court, and a reviewing court will
not interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion
resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v.
Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1992); People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 194 (1990).
	Because of the information made available to the defendant
through Merriman's mental health treatment records, we cannot
conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying
defendant's request for a psychological and psychiatric evaluation
of Merriman. The defense received copies of records from June
1997 through March 1998. These records, which included
psychiatric and mental health evaluations, indicated that Merriman
had sought treatment for depression and substance abuse several
times in 1997 and 1998. Records of evaluations on June 3, 1997,
and July 30, 1997, showed that Merriman had been diagnosed with
major depression with psychotic features. He had been prescribed
Risperdal and Serzone in May 1997, which improved the
symptoms of his depression. Also according to these records,
Merriman said he had suicidal thoughts, described his thoughts as
"jumbled up," and stated that he had problems with his memory
and concentration. In addition, he reported a history of cocaine
dependence but stated that he had not used cocaine since April
1997.
	In October 1997, Merriman told mental health workers that he
had not used cocaine since April 1997. In December 1997,
however, Merriman sought treatment for substance abuse. At that
time, he admitted smoking $50 of crack cocaine a day and reported
hallucinations of people hiding behind trees in front of his parents'
house. According to the December evaluation, Merriman's use of
drugs appeared to aggravate his psychiatric symptoms. Other
mental health treatment records provided to the defense indicated
that, following Merriman's release from a drug rehabilitation
program in 1998, he relapsed and entered drug treatment again in
February 1998 after using $600 of crack cocaine on one day.
	These records permitted the defense to conduct an effective
cross-examination of Merriman. At trial, Merriman testified on
direct examination that he was a drug addict and that he had been
diagnosed with a severe major depressive disorder with psychotic
features. He stated that he ingested medication for this mental
illness on August 7. Merriman acknowledged that he sometimes
had problems remembering things but asserted that he recalled the
events of August 7, 8, 14, and 15 "pretty well." On cross-examination, Merriman stated that he had been treated for cocaine
addiction in 1997 and 1998 and sought mental health treatment in
1997 on several occasions. He admitted that, on July 30, he had
complained of jumbled thought, bad memory, and hallucinations
and had indicated that his cocaine addiction made his symptoms
worse. He had been on medication since May 1997 and used crack
cocaine on the morning of August 8.
	 As this testimony demonstrates, the defendant was able to
provide the jury with ample information from which to evaluate
Merriman's credibility and ability to perceive and recall the events
surrounding the Brewer murders and defendant's arrest.
Accordingly, the circuit court's refusal to order a psychological
and psychiatric examination of Merriman was not an abuse of
discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant, and
defendant was not denied his rights under the sixth amendment.
B. Exclusion of Evidence of Warner's Possession of the Murder
Weapon
	Defendant also argues that he must receive a new trial as a
result of the circuit court's exclusion of evidence that Dyno
Warner possessed the knife used to kill the Brewers when he was
stopped by police several weeks prior to the Brewer murders. The
State filed a motion in limine, in which it requested that the circuit
court bar evidence relating to the June 20, 1997, police stop of
Warner's car. At the time, Warner was riding in the passenger seat
of the car. During a search of the vehicle, police found the knife
later used in the Brewer murders between the driver's and
passenger's seats. Warner was not arrested or charged as a result
of this stop, but another passenger in the car was arrested for
possession of marijuana. The court granted the motion in limine.
	Defendant argues that evidence that Warner had the knife on
June 20, 1997, was relevant and admissible because it "made it
more probable that he was the one who used the knife to murder
the Brewers ***, and that he was lying about Brad taking the
knife." In addition, defendant asserts that evidence that Warner
had the knife in his car in June 1997 indicated that Warner used
the knife to commit drug offenses instead of merely keeping it in
his home. According to defendant, the exclusion of this evidence
prevented him from asking Warner if, at the time of the murders,
he was also using the knife to get drugs, and prevented defendant
from relying on this evidence to support his theory that Warner
and Merriman rather than defendant killed the Brewers. Defendant
contends that he was thereby denied his rights under the sixth
amendment to confront witnesses and to present a defense.
	It is the function of the circuit court to determine the
admissibility of evidence, and a reviewing court will not reverse
the circuit court's ruling on a motion in limine absent an abuse of
discretion. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999); People
v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 219 (1999). In order to be admissible,
evidence must be legally relevant, that is, it must tend " 'to make
the existence of any fact in consequence to the determination of
the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.' " People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1995), quoting
People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 455-56 (1993). Although a
defendant in a criminal case may offer evidence that tends to show
that someone else committed the offense with which he is charged,
such evidence should be excluded on the basis that it is irrelevant
if it is too remote or too speculative. People v. Whalen, 158 Ill. 2d 415, 430-31 (1994); People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455 (1984).
	In the case at bar, the circuit court properly excluded the
evidence of Warner's possession of the knife as irrelevant to the
murder charges against defendant. Evidence that Warner was in
possession of the knife on June 20 was too remote to demonstrate
that Warner, rather than defendant, possessed the knife at the time
of the Brewer murders. There was no dispute in this case that the
knife used to murder the Brewers belonged to Warner and was in
his possession prior to August 8. Warner testified, however, that
defendant stole the knife from his house on August 8 before
leaving to kill the Brewers. Evidence that Warner possessed the
knife on June 20 did not undermine Warner's claim that defendant
stole the knife.
	Defendant asserts that Warner's use of the knife on June 20
in a drug offense supports a conclusion that he was the one who
used it to obtain drug money from the Brewers on August 8. There
was no evidence, however, that Warner was involved in a drug
offense on June 20. Thus, there is no connection between
Warner's possession of the knife during the traffic stop on June 20
and the Brewer murders on August 8. The conclusion that because
Warner possessed the knife on June 20 he was the one who used
it to kill the Brewers on August 8 is speculative. Accordingly, we
decline to find an abuse of discretion or a constitutional violation
in the circuit court's exclusion of this evidence.
C. Accomplice Witness Instruction
	Defendant also claims error at trial based on the circuit court's
refusal to give the jury the "accomplice witness instruction"
contained in Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17,
which provides:
			"When a witness says he was involved in the
commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony
of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be
considered by you with caution. It should be carefully
examined in light of the other evidence in the case."
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (3d
ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d).
Defendant proposed this instruction at the instruction conference,
but the State objected, and the circuit court refused the instruction.
	The test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice
for purposes of the accomplice witness instruction is whether there
is probable cause to believe that the witness was guilty of the
offense at issue as a principal or as an accessory under a theory of
accountability. People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 144 (1998).
			"Thus, an accomplice-witness instruction should be
given to a jury if the totality of the evidence and the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence
establish probable cause to believe not merely that the
person was present and failed to disapprove of the crime,
but that he participated in the planning or commission of
the crime; if probable cause is established the instruction
should be given despite the witness' protestations that he
did not so participate." People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 315 (1990).
A reviewing court will not overturn a circuit court's refusal to give
an accomplice witness instruction absent an abuse of discretion.
Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 144.
	Defendant argues that the accomplice witness instruction
should have been given because Warner could have been indicted
for the Brewer murders as a principal or under an accountability
theory. Defendant relies on evidence that the murder weapon
belonged to Warner, defendant had asked Warner for a weapon
and had said he would do whatever it took to get money, Warner
helped defendant burn his bloody clothing, Warner threw the knife
into the Kaskaskia River, and Warner did not speak to police for
five days after the murders. Defendant claims that Warner's
actions in covering up the crime suggest a consciousness of guilt
and that Warner's version of events could have been an effort to
frame defendant. In addition, defendant contends that the evidence
of his DNA on the cigarette butt at the murder scene was not
inconsistent with a conclusion that Warner was an accomplice.
According to defendant, Warner could have planted the cigarette
butt at the scene, defendant could have been at the scene after the
murders occurred, Warner could have transferred defendant's
DNA onto the cigarette butt because he and defendant had shared
a crack pipe before the murders, or the cigarette butt could have
fallen out of a car driven by Warner at the murder scene.
Defendant also argues that Warner could have left Bonnie
Brewer's blood in defendant's car.
	After carefully reviewing the record in defendant's case, we
find that the circuit court properly denied defendant's request for
an accomplice witness instruction. Although Warner admitted
helping defendant to conceal evidence related to the Brewer
murders after they occurred, defendant's entitlement to an
accomplice witness instruction was dependent on a showing of
probable cause that Warner aided or abetted defendant in planning
or committing the Brewer murders. There was no such evidence.
	According to Warner's uncontradicted testimony, he did not
give defendant permission to use his knife and was not present at
the murder scene. Based on defendant's statements on August 7
and August 8, Warner may have thought that defendant planned to
commit a crime when he left Warner's house in the early morning
hours of August 8, but mere knowledge that a crime is to be
committed is not enough to show that a witness was an
accomplice. See Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 314. Similarly, admitted
participation in a related but distinct offense, such as Warner's
admission to performing acts that constituted obstruction of
justice, does not make a witness an accomplice. See Henderson,
142 Ill. 2d  at 314. Furthermore, defendant's suggestions that
Warner could have left Bonnie's blood in defendant's car and
could have been responsible for the cigarette butt found in the
Brewers' yard are based on speculation and do not support a
finding that Warner was an accomplice. For example, although the
State's expert testified that the DNA of one person could be
transferred to the lips of another who shared a crack pipe, Warner
was excluded as a source of the DNA found on the cigarette butt.
Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support giving the
accomplice witness instruction, and the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant's request for such an
instruction. See, e.g., Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 144-45. We affirm
defendant's convictions.
III. Sentencing
	Defendant does not challenge the jury's verdict finding him
eligible for the death penalty. He argues, however, that several
errors that occurred during the second stage of his sentencing
proceedings require that his sentence be vacated and that he
receive a new sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that he was
denied a fair second stage sentencing hearing (1) by remarks the
State made during its opening statement and closing argument; (2)
by the circuit court's refusal to permit defense counsel to argue
residual doubt; and (3) by the circuit court's refusal to instruct the
jury as to his potential for rehabilitation.
A. Opening Statements and Closing Arguments
1. Statement Regarding Chicago Homicide
	During the State's opening statement at the second stage of
defendant's sentencing hearing, one of the prosecutors made the
following reference to the recovery of a gun defendant took in his
1993 burglary of the Lust residence:
		"You are going to hear how he took revolvers from that
particular house; how when the heat was on, he threw the
revolvers again into the-a body of water-in this case-by
his own statement, into the Kaskaskia River. That's what
he told police. *** But we are also going to learn that one
of the weapons he said he threw into the river, at that time
the police were unable to recover, was later found during
an investigation in 1996 in Chicago, Illinois into another
homicide, and the weapon itself was used in a homicide."
Defendant made no objection to this argument. Later that day,
however, defense counsel asked the circuit court to bar any
reference to the gun or to what happened to it in Chicago. The
circuit court ruled that the State could present evidence that the
gun was recovered but not that it was used in a homicide in
Chicago.
	Defendant now argues that the State's reference to the
homicide in Chicago was irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial
because it left the jury with the impression that defendant
committed a murder in Chicago or bore some responsibility for it.
As the State observes, defendant has waived this issue for review
by failing to make a timely objection to the portion of the State's
opening statement that he now challenges. See People v. Brown,
185 Ill. 2d 229, 252 (1998). Defendant does not argue that any of
the recognized exceptions to the waiver doctrine apply and does
not claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We, therefore,
decline to address the merits of defendant's argument.
2. Argument That the Jury Could Not Consider Mercy
	Defendant also claims prejudice at the second stage of
sentencing based on the State's argument regarding the jury's
consideration of mercy. During closing arguments at the
aggravation-mitigation stage, defense counsel argued:
			"The last thing that I need to speak to you about is of
mercy. I think certainly many of you may have the desire
to be merciful to Brad, and I think that is sufficient
mitigation. *** Mercy is what we show our enemies. It's
kindness where it's most difficult to be kind. *** And
mercy is mitigation."
In its rebuttal argument, the State responded as follows:
			"Counsel for the defendant talked to you about mercy,
and the Court is going to read to you that 'You are not to
be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.' And
I am not going to suggest to you that -[well] mercy clearly
falls within that. I am not going to suggest-
			[Defense counsel]: Objection.
			THE COURT: The objection shall be overruled. This is
comments of counsel, counsel's argument. I shall allow
counsel to respond.
* * *
			[State]: Mercy falls within the definitions of sentiment,
sympathy or passion. I would suggest to you that her
argument is not based on the law.
			[Defense counsel]: I object.
			THE COURT: The objection shall be overruled. This is
the arguments of counsel, and the Court is going to allow
the arguments.
			[State]: Not based upon the law the Court will read to
you."
The circuit court denied defendant's request that the jury receive
instructions informing it that it could consider mercy in
determining the appropriate penalty at aggravation-mitigation. See,
e.g., Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 235 (defendant's instructions regarding
the jury's consideration of mercy were properly refused); Hope,
168 Ill. 2d  at 46-47 (same).
	Defendant contends that the State misstated the law in its
argument by suggesting that jurors could not consider mercy and
that, when the circuit court overruled defendant's objections to this
argument, it indicated to jurors that the State was correct in
asserting that the defense argument regarding mercy was not based
on the law. According to defendant, he must receive a new
sentencing hearing because "[t]he defense appeal for mercy by any
single juror, resulting in a natural life sentence based on
[defendant's] good prison behavior, his good work record, his
generally non-violent criminal history, and his brain damage was
devastated by the prosecutor's argument in conjunction with the
Court's overruling of the defense objections."
	At oral argument, the State conceded that its argument
regarding mercy at the second stage of the sentencing proceedings
was improper. The State asserts, however, that its argument was
not so prejudicial as to require vacation of defendant's sentence
and a new sentencing hearing.
	Under the precedent of this court, mercy is a relevant
mitigating factor, and the prosecution may not argue that the jury
may not consider mercy. See, e.g., Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 244-45.
Nevertheless, we agree with the State that its argument regarding
the jury's consideration of mercy does not require that defendant
receive a new sentencing hearing. In People v. Hall, No. 86168
(December 1, 2000), this court found that any error resulting from
the circuit court's explanation to the jury regarding its
consideration of mercy at the aggravation-mitigation phase was
harmless. In Hall, the circuit court sustained the State's objections
to defense counsel's argument that the jury could consider mercy.
In doing so, the circuit court stated: " 'Mercy  is, as defined in the
case law, the part that says you can consider it, its defined as that
natural feeling of sympathy for something that may arise from
certain evidence ***. That is a natural reaction. Feeling those
kinds of feelings are appropriate to consider. Showing mercy is a
different thing.' " Hall, slip op. at 22. This court concluded that,
to the extent the circuit court's explanation indicated that mercy
differed from other mitigating factors the jury could consider, it
was error. However, we held that any such error in the court's oral
explanation was harmless in light of the fact that the jury received
proper written instructions at sentencing.
	As in Hall, the jury in defendant's case was properly
instructed according to IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.01 ("You are not
to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling") and No. 7C.06
("Mitigating factors include: *** Any other reason supported by
the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to
death"). A reasonable juror interpreting these instructions would
disregard the emotion of sympathy yet appropriately base his or
her sentencing decision on the mitigating evidence and any
feelings of sympathy or mercy it elicited. Hall, slip op. at 21-22.
Given these instructions, as well as the circuit court's instruction
to the jury that arguments not based on the evidence should be
disregarded, we hold that, under Hall, any error resulting from the
State's argument about mercy was harmless.
3. Argument That Defense Counsel Tried to "Dupe" the Jury
	Defendant also contends that he was deprived a fair
sentencing hearing when, during its closing argument at
aggravation-mitigation, the State accused defense counsel of
deceiving the jury. Defendant bases this argument on two portions
of the State's argument. In the first portion, the State argued as
follows:
		"We go to the Lust house and we find out again he is
wearing gloves. Let me talk to you about duty, about
misdirection in a case. The defendant through his counsel
suggested to you days ago in the guilt phase of this trial
the lack of fingerprint evidence. They say the lack of
fingerprint evidence would show you that there is a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. What did we
finally learn? We learned what we knew all along. That
the lack of fingerprint evidence alone is reason to believe
this defendant is guilty.
			[Defense counsel]: I object, Judge.
			THE COURT: The objection shall be overruled. Both
counsel may make what they consider to be reasonable
inferences of the evidence.
			You may proceed, counsel.
			[State]: He told his co-defendant in the Lust case, put
on your, quote, God damn gloves when they were in the
house. The argument that because there were no
fingerprints in the Brewer house, therefore, it's - there is
a reasonable doubt as to this defendant's guilt, when you
paint it in light of this particular defendant's knowledge
of the use of gloves and how it will not leave prints, is
less than remarkable. It's another example of what I
showed you in People's Exhibit 12,(1) his desire to make
you believe there is something that is just simply not
true."
Subsequently, the State argued:
			"Ladies and gentlemen, just as I suggested to you, the
lack of fingerprint evidence in their earlier argument was
an attempt to dupe you because we now know the truth
about it-
			[Defense counsel]: I object, Judge.
			THE COURT: The objection shall be overruled.
			[State]: -so is the evidence from Ph.D. Hess that he has
a brain injury, and therefore, we should feel sympathy for
him because he got hit in the head with a baseball by his
own statement back in grade school. What else do we
know about that? Is there any evidence that he was in
trouble from the time he was in grade school, from 9 to 12
years of age, until he hit the age of 20 and 21 as he began
to choose to engage in this life of crime?"
	Defendant contends that these arguments were improper and
prejudicial because they diminished defense counsel's credibility
and shifted the jury's attention from the evidence to defense
counsel's objectives. In addition, defendant contends that the
State's comments were inaccurate because the absence of
fingerprint evidence at the Brewer house supported defense
counsel's argument that someone other than defendant committed
the murders.
	Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument.
People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1996). A "prosecutor's
comments in closing argument will result in reversible error only
when they engender 'substantial prejudice' against the defendant
to the extent that it is impossible to determine whether the verdict
of the jury was caused by the comments or the evidence." People
v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 62 (1998). Challenged remarks must be
viewed in the context of closing arguments as a whole. People v.
Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 319 (1997).
	The State may challenge a defendant's credibility and the
credibility of his theory of defense in closing argument when there
is evidence to support such a challenge. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401 (1993). It is well established, however, that " '[u]nless
based on some evidence, statements made in closing arguments by
the prosecution which suggest that defense counsel fabricated a
defense theory, attempted to free his client through trickery or
deception, or suborned perjury are improper. [Citations.]' "
(Emphasis in original.) Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 81, quoting People
v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497 (1983).
	In this case, after carefully reviewing the State's remarks in
context, we find that they were a proper comment on the
credibility of the defendant and his theory of defense rather than
an impermissible attack on defense counsel. In a case involving a
similar argument by the State, People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401
(1993), this court rejected the defendant's contention that the
State's remarks were an improper attack on defense counsel. The
State argued:
			" 'You know, this whole defense of insanity on these
facts would be laughable if we weren't dealing with such
a serious case, such an important case. This whole theory
the defense has concocted to present to you here in court
would be laughable. But it's not laughable.' " Hudson,
157 Ill. 2d  at 442.
This court determined that because these comments did "not
sufficiently refer to defense counsel or attribute any particular
wrongdoing to him," they did not suggest that defense counsel
fabricated a defense. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 443. Instead, this court
decided that the State's argument was a comment on the
credibility of the defendant. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 443.
	As in Hudson, the challenged portions of the State's argument
in defendant's case do not sufficiently refer to defense counsel. In
the first portion of the challenged argument, the prosecutor
attributed "misdirection" to "defendant through his counsel." In
the second portion, the prosecutor stated that "their argument" was
an attempt to "dupe" the jury. A central theme of the State's
argument was that defendant was attempting to present to the
jurors an image of himself that was not the truth. For example, the
State argued that defendant had changed his appearance between
the time of his arrest and the time of trial to become more clean-cut and that, although defendant presented testimony that he
performed well in a high school home economics class, defendant
had made bomb threats to the high school. In this context, we
interpret the challenged comments as a criticism of defendant's
credibility rather than an attack on defense counsel. See also
People v. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430 (1990) (in context, the State's
argument was a comment on the implausibility of the defense
theory rather than an accusation against defense counsel of
fabrication or trickery).
	In support of his argument that the State's remarks require
that he receive a new sentencing hearing, defendant cites several
cases in which this court has found reversible error based on
closing arguments in which the State has accused defense counsel
of trickery or deception. For example, in People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510 (1992), this court held that the defendant was entitled to a
fair trial based on the State's argument that defense counsel was
attempting to trick the jury. In one portion of the argument, the
State argued:
			" 'In reality, ladies and gentlemen, the defense attorneys
in this case, the real defense is to create as much side
issues, to create as much confusion as possible so that
when you go into the jury room, you are diverted from the
real facts, the real issues *** and you chase after all these
loose ends or side issues or side defenses that [defense
counsel] just tried to raise in his closing argument.
			I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the defenses
raised in this case are similar to a smoke screen.' "
(Emphasis in original.) Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d  at 541.
This court found the "smokescreen" argument particularly
prejudicial because the defendant was accused of arson resulting
in the deaths of 10 children. In addition, the fact that the State
made eight "smokescreen" comments distinguished the case from
others in which this court had declined to find reversible error
based on "passing references" to a smokescreen theme. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510; see also, e.g., Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d  at 497 (finding
reversible error based on the State's argument that "defense
counsel had laid down a smokescreen 'composed of lies and
misrepresentations and innuendoes' " and that "all defense
attorneys try to 'dirty up the victim' to distract the attention of the
jury from the defendant's crime"); People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 323 (1977) (finding reversible error based on the State's
argument that " '[defense counsel's] closing argument is
fraudulent' " and that defense counsel did not believe his own
argument).
	Unlike defendant's case, the cases on which defendant relies
involved direct references to defense counsel and repeated
accusations of deceit. By contrast, the challenged comments in
defendant's case were brief and properly directed against the
credibility of defendant and his theory of defense. Thus, under
Hudson, no new sentencing hearing is required.
4. Prohibiting the Defense From Arguing Residual Doubt
	Defendant raises a second argument based on these same two
portions of the State's argument. According to defendant, the
circuit court erred by refusing to permit him to argue residual
doubt as a response to the State's comments about the strength of
the evidence supporting his murder convictions. Defendant asserts
that this error requires resentencing.
	During closing arguments at the aggravation-mitigation stage
of sentencing, the circuit court sustained the State's objection to
defense counsel's residual doubt argument:
			"Now the other thing that is mitigation is any bit of
doubt that remains with you-
			[State]: Objection. Objection if we are going to argue
reasonable doubt. It is an improper argument.
			THE COURT: You may complete your statement, and
I will hear the objection.
			[Defense counsel]: That if there is doubt that remains
with you about what happened-
			[State]: Objection.
			THE COURT: Let her complete her question.
			[Defense counsel]:-on the night in question, then you
can consider that.
			THE COURT: The objection shall be sustained.
			[Defense counsel]: You know, your decision today,
whatever it is, can't be changed. And if in time you learn
something about this that's different, you are going to
have to live with that.
			[State]: Same objection.
			THE COURT: Sustained.
			[State]: I ask that they be instructed on that.
			THE COURT: It shall be stricken."
	Defendant acknowledges that a defendant ordinarily has no
right to argue residual doubt. Both this court and the United States
Supreme Court have held that a defendant is not entitled to present
evidence of residual doubt at the penalty phase of sentencing
proceedings. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-75,
101 L. Ed. 2d 155, 165-66, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2327-28 (1988);
People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 503 (2000); People v. Terrell,
185 Ill. 2d 467, 500-01 (1998); People v. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64,
79 (1996); People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 454-55, (1995).
The rationale for these holdings is that "[r]esidual doubt is not
relevant to the circumstances of the offense or to the defendant's
character and, as a result, is not relevant to the imposition of the
death penalty." Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d  at 79.
	Defendant contends, however, that an otherwise improper
argument may be permitted if it is invited by the other party.
According to defendant, the circuit court in this case erred by
prohibiting defense counsel's residual doubt argument because it
was a proper response to the State's improper argument
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. As defendant observes,
this court has held that otherwise improper argument by the State
will not be considered error when invited by the defendant's
argument. See, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 153; People v. Brown,
172 Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1996); People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d 388, 423-25 (1989). Defendant has provided us with no authority for the
proposition that an improper argument by defense counsel must be
permitted when invited by the State's argument. Even assuming,
however, that in some cases fairness may require that a defendant
be permitted to make such a response to the State's argument, we
do not believe that this is such a case.
	During closing argument at the second stage of sentencing,
the State is entitled to argue that the nature and circumstances of
a defendant's crimes are aggravating. See, e.g., People v. Cloutier,
178 Ill. 2d 141, 168 (1997). Thus, the State was entitled to argue
at the aggravation-mitigation stage in this case that defendant's
previous use of gloves in a burglary and the lack of fingerprint
evidence at the Brewer house suggested that he used gloves when
committing the Brewer murders. The State's comment on the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's convictions,
however, did not pertain to the circumstances of the offense or to
defendant's character or record and were consequently not relevant
to the imposition of the death penalty. See Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d  at
79. Nevertheless, this irrelevant argument by the State did not
require that the circuit court permit defendant to argue residual
doubt.
	The circuit court is able to observe trial proceedings and is in
the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of remarks in
closing argument. People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 168 (1991).
Reviewing courts, therefore, afford the circuit court discretion to
determine the proper character and scope of argument and indulge
every reasonable presumption that the circuit court properly
exercised its discretion. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507
(1993).
	In the case at bar, little, if any, prejudice resulted from the
State's brief reference to the strength of the evidence to support
defendant's convictions, particularly in light of the fact that the
jury had already decided to convict defendant of the Brewer
murders. Thus, we do not believe defendant was denied a fair
sentencing hearing when the circuit court refused to permit him to
respond by arguing residual doubt. As stated, a defendant is not
entitled to argue residual doubt, and we hold that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to make an exception to this
rule in defendant's case as a result of the State's irrelevant
arguments.
B. Failure to Instruct the Jury Regarding Defendant's Potential
for Rehabilitation
	Defendant also claims reversible error based on the circuit
court's refusal, at the second stage of the sentencing proceedings,
to instruct the jury that mitigating factors include that "[t]he
defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship."
IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06 provides in relevant part:
			"Mitigating factors include:
			First: [(Any or all of the following) (The following)] if
supported by the evidence:
* * *
				The defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to
useful citizenship.
			Second: Any other reason supported by the evidence
why the defendant should not be sentenced to death.
			Where there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact
that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically
listed in these instructions does not preclude your
consideration of the evidence."
The instructions proposed by the prosecution followed the
language of IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06, except that no mitigating
factors, such as defendant's potential for rehabilitation, were
enumerated. The prosecution's instruction stated only that
mitigating factors included "any other reason supported by the
evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death."
	At the instruction conference, defense counsel objected to this
omission but did not tender an alternative instruction. The circuit
court overruled defendant's objection and gave the jury IPI
Criminal 3d No. 7C.06 in the form proposed by the State.
	Defendant now contends that the circuit court's failure to
instruct the jury that defendant's potential for rehabilitation was a
mitigating factor violated the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution, as well as article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and
with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."
According to defendant, there was significant evidence of his
potential for rehabilitation, including his charity, good behavior,
and good work record in prison; his artistic talent, his interest in
religion, his positive relationship with his girlfriend's daughter,
and the availability of medication to treat the problems associated
with his brain damage. Defendant asserts that the failure of the
circuit court to instruct the jury to consider his potential for
rehabilitation "diminished, if not eliminated, the jury's
consideration of that type of mitigation" and "handicapped
counsel's ability to advocate the mitigation evidence in those
terms." As a result, defendant argues, he is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing.
	It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on the theory of his case. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at
519. If there is some basis for such an instruction in the evidence,
it is an abuse of the discretion for the circuit court to refuse the
instruction. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d 520, 526 (1991).
	The State asserts that the circuit court properly refused to
instruct the jury concerning defendant's potential for rehabilitation
because the evidence at the aggravation-mitigation stage did not
support such an instruction. However, "[v]ery slight evidence
upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an
instruction." People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132 (1997).
Defendant presented evidence that he was a good worker and had
been involved in charitable activities both in and out of prison; he
had been kind to other inmates and children; and he had sincere
religious beliefs. In addition, Dr. Hess testified that the symptoms
of defendant's brain damage could be treated with medication.
Based on this evidence, we find that the circuit court erred in
refusing defendant's request that the jury be instructed that
mitigating factors included his potential for rehabilitation and
useful citizenship.
	Nevertheless, we disagree with defendant that this error
requires that he receive a new sentencing hearing. "An error in a
jury instruction is harmless if the result of the trial would not have
been different if a proper instruction had been given." People v.
Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 290 (1996). In the case at bar, the circuit
court's instructional error was harmless.
	This court has previously explained:
			"It is well established that at the aggravation/mitigation
stage of sentencing, the sentencer may not be precluded
from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any
constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. [Citations.]
The standard for determining whether jury instructions
violate the protections of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments is ' "whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a
way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally
relevant evidence." ' " Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 517-18,
quoting Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276, 139 L. Ed. 2d 702, 710, 118 S. Ct. 757, 761 (1998), quoting
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316, 329, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1990).
	In defendant's case, although the jury was not specifically
instructed that defendant's potential for rehabilitation was a
mitigating factor, it was instructed that mitigating factors included
"[a]ny other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant
should not be sentenced to death." In addition, both the
prosecution and the defense argued defendant's potential for
rehabilitation to the jury. The State argued that the evidence did
not indicate that defendant could be rehabilitated, while the
defense contended that the evidence showed a "real hope" for
defendant's rehabilitation. Thus, we find no reasonable likelihood
that the jury believed it could not consider evidence of defendant's
potential for rehabilitation and restoration to useful citizenship.
	In addition, this court has held that failing to instruct the jury
at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing to consider a
defendant's potential for rehabilitation and restoration to useful
citizenship does not violate article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970, provided that the jury is instructed that it can
consider "any other reason" why the defendant should not be
sentenced to death. See People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 420-21
(1983).
	Further, defendant had a significant criminal history,
involving bomb threats to schools, burglaries, threats of violence,
and actual violence. He continued to commit criminal offenses,
even after completing sentences of probation and imprisonment.
Ultimately, he approached the Brewer household, apparently at
random, seeking money to support his cocaine habit. In order to
get the money he wanted, defendant brutally murdered an elderly
couple with mobility problems and their daughter, who was
recovering from surgery, in the middle of the night. He stabbed
Charles Brewer, dragged him across the lawn of his house, and left
him lying by the side of his house. He stabbed Doris Jean Brewer
16 times, fracturing her skull, and stabbed Bonnie Brewer 20
times. Given the strength of the aggravating evidence, as well as
the arguments and instructions at the second stage of defendant's
sentencing hearing, we believe that the jury's sentencing decision
would have been the same, even if the circuit court had not failed
to instruct the jury concerning defendant's potential for
rehabilitation and restoration to useful citizenship. Accordingly,
we hold that defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing
on this basis.
IV. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
	Defendant also raises several constitutional challenges to his
sentence. He first argues that this court should hold the Illinois
death penalty statute unconstitutional because current procedural
safeguards are inadequate to minimize the risk that innocent
people will be executed and because it is inevitable that such
executions will occur. These are essentially the same arguments as
those rejected in this court's recent decision in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 211-20 (1998), and we decline to reconsider that
holding. See also People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548 (2000);
People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521 (2000); People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 141 (1999); Brown, 185 Ill. 2d  at 260. This court has also
previously held that the death penalty statute is not
unconstitutional on the basis that it (1) precludes meaningful
consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d
at 177-78); (2) permits the sentencing body to consider the
"vague" aggravating factor of "any other reason" the defendant
should be sentenced to death (see, e.g., Hope, 168 Ill. 2d at 48); (3)
fails to sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily and
capriciously imposed death sentences (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d
at 177-78); (4) gives prosecutors unrestricted discretion to seek
capital punishment (see, e.g., People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 96
(1994)); (5) does not require prosecutors to give defendants pre-trial notice of intent to seek the death penalty (see, e.g., People v.
Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 162 (1998)); (6) provides limited
comparative proportionality review of death sentences (see, e.g.,
People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 351 (1994)); (7) does not require
the sentencing body to make written findings (see, e.g., Emerson,
189 Ill. 2d at 514); (8) permits the sentencing body to consider
nonstatutory aggravating factors (see, e.g., People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 285 (1985)); (9) does not limit aggravating evidence to
matters disclosed before trial (see, e.g., Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 161);
(10) does not place a burden of proof on the prosecution (see, e.g.,
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 173-74); (11) contains language that places
a burden of proof on the defendant (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at
177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998)); and (12)
does not permit the sentencing body to consider the exact range of
sentences available if the death penalty is not imposed (see People
v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 318 (1994)). Defendant has not
persuaded us to overturn these decisions. We also reject his
contention that, together, these features of the death penalty statute
render it unconstitutional. As this court stated in Childress, " '[i]f
all of the individual aspects are constitutional, we stand by the
conclusion that the whole is also constitutional.' " Childress, 158 Ill. 2d  at 318, quoting People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 542-43
(1989); see also, e.g., People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 215
(1997); People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 247 (1993).
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting
Wednesday, March 21, 2001, as the date on which the sentence of
death, entered by the circuit court of Macon County, shall be
carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is
confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Kirchner's murder convictions should not be
disturbed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be
allowed to stand.
	Contrary to the majority, I would hold that the circuit court
abused its discretion when it excused James Rentfro from the jury
for cause. A trial court may not exclude a prospective juror for
cause because the juror voices general religious or conscientious
reservations about capital punishment. Removal for cause is
permissible only if the juror's views would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 316
(1998). That standard does not appear to have been met here.
	Juror Rentfro specifically stated that in spite of his personal
feelings regarding the death penalty, he would be able to fulfil his
duty to weigh the evidence and follow the law as instructed by the
court. Although the court's follow-up question raised uncertainty
about that answer, Rentfro's views are, at most, ambiguous. Based
on the record before us, we cannot say with any certainty what
Rentfro's answer to the follow-up question actually meant.
	The majority resolves the ambiguity by deferring to the trial
judge. In my view, however, such deference is unwarranted under
the circumstances present here. Yielding to the trial judge would
be appropriate only if he saw or heard something not reflected in
the written record. The majority does not explain what that
something might be, and I am at a loss to understand it. No matter
what Rentfro's demeanor might have been, no matter what
inflection his voice might have possessed, the meaning of his terse
response would still be unclear.
	Given the ambiguity created by the trial judge's follow-up
question, the appropriate course would have been to seek further
clarification from Rentfro. Such an approach would not have
caused any undue delay and would have ensured that the jury-selection process was free from taint. To have excluded Rentfro
without taking this simple measure constitutes error, entitling
Kirchner to a new sentencing hearing. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 360-61 (1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
	Kirchner is also entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on
the trial judge's mishandling of the issue of mercy. Our court has
specifically held that a jury may properly consider mercy as a
mitigating factor at a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Buss,
187 Ill. 2d 144, 234-35 (1999). Defense counsel in this case,
however, was not permitted to argue mercy to the jury. When he
attempted to broach the issue of mercy, the trial judge sustained
the State's objections, then gave an explanation to the jury which
suggested that mercy was not an appropriate factor for it to
consider.
	There is no merit to my colleague's assertion that the court's
erroneous oral discussion of mercy was cured by IPI Criminal 3d
No. 7C.06. Under that instruction, mitigating factors which the
jury is entitled to consider include "[a]ny other reason supported
by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to
death." IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. This language has been found
sufficient to advise the jury that it may take mercy into account in
reaching its decision. If IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06 is given, no
separate, additional instruction on mercy is required.  Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 235. Where our court has found IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06
sufficient, however, we have also observed that defense counsel
was allowed to argue for mercy in his closing statement. See
People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 199 (1996); People v.
Pitsonbarger 142 Ill. 2d 353, 405 (1990); People v. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d 238, 269-70 (1986). As previously indicated, defense
counsel here did not have that opportunity. When he argued to the
jury that mercy is a relevant, mitigating factor, "one of those any
other reasons supported by the evidence," the State objected and
its objection was sustained.
	By sustaining the State's objection, the court told the jury, in
effect, that mercy does not fall within the mitigating factors it
could consider under IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. Because the jury
was told that mercy was not one of the mitigating factors defined
by IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06, submitting IPI Criminal 3d No.
7C.06 could not possibly have sufficed to advise the jury that it
could properly take mercy into account as a mitigating factor. To
the contrary, because of the court's ruling on the State's objection
to defense counsel's explanation, the effect of IPI Criminal 3d No.
7C.06, with respect to the issue of mercy, was specifically negated.
After hearing the judge's remarks, no reasonable juror could
would have thought that mercy could still be considered. That is
not harmless error. It is grounds for a new sentencing hearing.
	Even if the foregoing errors did not entitle Kirchner to a new
sentencing hearing, his death sentence could not be allowed to
stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois
death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV)
and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2). Kirchner's sentence of death should therefore be
vacated and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1998). Because Kirchner was found
guilty of murdering more than one victim, the term of his
imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)
(West 1998).
1.      1People's Exhibit 12 was a mugshot of defendant in which his hair
was long. The record indicates that defendant cut his hair before trial.