Case Title: Fletcher v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 242, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE FLETCHER, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 242, 2003     
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr.I.D. No. 0111002808  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 8, 2004 
 
 
Decided:     July 2, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 2nd day of July 2004, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) Appellant Andre Fletcher (“Fletcher”) appeals his Superior Court 
conviction of second-degree murder and related charges.  The convictions arise out 
of an incident in which Fletcher admittedly shot Richard Holland,1 but claimed that 
he acted in self-defense.   
(2) Fletcher was convicted of one count each of Murder in the Second 
Degree, Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony, and Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, as a result of a fatal shooting that 
occurred at 1:50 a.m. on November 3, 2001.   
                                                 
1 The victim, Richard Holland, is not related to Justice Randy J. Holland of this Court. 
 
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(3) At trial, Fletcher claimed self-defense, and testified as follows:  Holland 
and two other men tried to rob him at gunpoint.  After an exchange of words, 
Holland pulled out a gun and Fletcher (who had extensive training in the martial 
arts) “charged him.”  Both men struggled over the weapon, bumped into a van, and 
the gun went off twice—“as quick as you can blink.”  On a videotaped police 
interview, however, Fletcher made statements that the prosecution regarded as an 
admission by Fletcher that the second shot was not fired accidentally. 
(4) The State presented two purported eyewitnesses to the shooting.  The 
first, Jerry Taylor, a friend of the victim (Holland), testified that he had planned to 
meet Holland at the place and time of the shooting.  As Taylor approached 
Holland, he saw Fletcher walking up to the victim, who was standing alone.  
Although Taylor did not hear any words being exchanged, he did see the victim’s 
hands go up into the air, and immediately thereafter he (Taylor) heard one gunshot.  
Taylor ducked behind a car, heard a second shot “like seconds afterward,” then 
saw Holland fall to the ground and Fletcher run down the alley. 
(5) The second eyewitness, Marvin Cross, testified that he was sitting in his 
car listening to music in front of the house of his friend, Ivan Simonet, for whom 
he (Cross) was waiting.  Cross testified that although he was not focusing on the 
victim, he saw the events out of the corner of his eye.  When asked if he was under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol at that time, Cross responded “no, probably not 
 
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yet.”  The gunshots and the flash from the barrel drew his attention to the scene, 
which was five or six houses up from where Cross was parked.  Out of the corner 
of his eye, Cross saw Fletcher approach the victim.  It appeared that Fletcher and 
Holland exchanged words, although Cross could not hear the words.  Cross saw the 
victim put his hands out to the sides with palms up, heard the two shots, and then 
saw the victim fall to the ground and Fletcher running right past his car.  The 
police arrived within a few seconds, but Cross drove off without talking to the 
police.  Shortly thereafter, Cross returned and talked with Simonet about the 
shooting.  A few days later, Cross contacted the Wilmington Police and told 
detectives the story recited above. 
(6) The defense contended that Cross was not, in fact, a witness to the 
shooting, but, rather, had obtained information about the shooting from Simonet 
and others in order to “sell” it to the police to seek “a deal” for his wife, who was 
facing criminal charges.  At trial, Fletcher sought to impeach Cross’s testimony 
with evidence that Cross came to the scene only after the shooting and asked 
Simonet what had happened. 
(7) After his conviction, Fletcher was sentenced to a total of 29 years at 
Level 5 incarceration, followed by one year at Level 4.  On appeal, Fletcher claims 
that (i) his due process rights were violated because he was denied access to the 
DELJIS criminal history information of the members of the jury pool;  (ii) the trial 
 
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court erred by sustaining hearsay objections to the conversation between Cross and 
Simonet, and (iii) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included 
offenses of Murder in the Second Degree and Manslaughter.  
(8) Fletcher’s due process claim involves a question of law that is reviewed 
de novo.2  That claim arises out of the following facts:  immediately before the jury 
was selected, the State commented on one juror’s felony conviction and agreed to 
inform the defense if any juror had been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty.  
Fletcher sought a court order affording him equal access to the DELJIS 
information in the State’s possession. The Superior Court denied Fletcher’s motion 
under 11 Del. C. § 8513(g).3  That ruling, Fletcher argues, violated his due process 
rights, by giving the State an unfair advantage in the form of exclusive access to 
potential jurors’ criminal and traffic records.  Fletcher claims that under the two-
pronged test of McBride v. State,4 he was entitled to equal access because (i) the 
                                                 
2 State v. Guthman, 619 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Del. 1973). 
 
3 11 Del. C.  § 8513(g) states: 
 
g) Notwithstanding any law or court rule to the contrary, the dissemination to the 
defendant or defense attorney in a criminal case of criminal history record information 
pertaining to any juror in such case is prohibited. For the purposes of this subsection, 
"juror" includes any person who has received notice or summons to appear for jury 
service. This subsection shall not prohibit the disclosure of such information as may be 
necessary to investigate misconduct by any juror. 
 
 
 
4 477 A.2d 174 (Del. 1984). 
 
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information was not available through other means; and (ii) the State used the 
information in jury selection, as evidenced by its disclosure to the trial court that 
one potential juror had a felony theft conviction.   
(9) The State responds that Section 8513(g) precludes the defense from 
obtaining the DELJIS information, and that therefore, the trial court correctly 
applied the law.  Additionally, the State argues, the McBride test is not satisfied 
here because under McBride, a defendant is not entitled to the juror information 
given the limited discovery available in criminal cases; moreover, peremptory 
challenges are not constitutionally required.  In McBride, the court ruled that the 
defendant had failed to show how nondisclosure of the DELJIS information 
impaired her ability to obtain an impartial jury.  So too (the State argues), Fletcher  
failed to do that here. 
(10) Under 11 Del. C. § 8513(g), a defense attorney is prohibited from 
receiving the information about jurors that Fletcher seeks here.  Nor has Fletcher 
made the showing required by McBride.  Therefore, his first claim of error fails. 
(11) Fletcher next claims that the trial court erroneously sustained hearsay 
objections to certain testimony relating to conversations between Cross and 
Simonet.  This Court reviews admissibility of evidence questions under an abuse of 
 
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discretion standard.5  An abuse of discretion occurs when "a court has . . . exceeded 
the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances,  [or] . . . so ignored recognized 
rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice."6   
(12) Fletcher sought to impeach Cross by showing that after the shooting, 
Cross gathered information from Simonet to “sell” to the Wilmington Police, 
thereby suggesting that Cross was not an eyewitness.  Fletcher’s claim of error 
flows from the following testimony that occurred during Cross' cross-examination: 
Q: Okay.  Who did you talk to? 
A: I can’t say, per se.  I talked to Ivan [Simonet]. 
Q: All right.  What did Ivan tell you? 
A: He didn’t have to tell me anything. 
Q:  I don’t know what he had to tell you.  You said you talked to him. 
     Did he tell you anything? 
 
The State then objected on the grounds of hearsay.  That objection was 
sustained.   
(13) Fletcher also relies upon the following colloquy which occurred during 
Ivan Simonet’s testimony as a defense witness: 
Q: All right.  Now, did you have a conversation with Marvin Cross about the                   
shooting?  You can answer yes or no. 
 
                                                 
5 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055 (Del.1994). 
6 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988). 
 
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A: Yes. 
Q: Okay.  Can you tell us what Marvin Cross said to you or asked you about 
the shooting? 
 
A: Well, when I saw Marvin Cross, he had drove up – 
The State also objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds.  That objection 
was also sustained.   
(14) Fletcher argues that those rulings constituted error, because the 
statements were not hearsay, as they were not being offered for the truth of their 
contents.  Rather (Fletcher claims) the statements were offered to impeach Cross 
by showing that Cross was not a witness to the shooting.  The State responds that 
the statements were “clearly [offered] for the truth” of their contents and that the 
trial court properly sustained the objection.  Moreover, the State argues, admitting 
the statements might have caused jury confusion, because the jury might believe 
that the statements were offered as proof of a fact about the actual shooting.  
(15) Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s exclusion of the 
testimony was error, the error was harmless, because during the direct examination 
of Simonet, Fletcher was able to elicit the very testimony he desired: 
Q: What did you tell Marvin about the shooting? 
A: That a friend of ours -- we call him Fontaine -- had been shot. 
Q: And why did you tell Marvin that? 
 
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A: Because he drove up and asked. 
Q: And he asked you what happened after the shooting occurred?  He asked 
you what happened? 
 
A: Yes. 
For these reasons, Fletcher’s second claim of error also fails. 
(16) Fletcher’s third claim is that the trial court erred by instructing the jury 
on the lesser-included offenses of Murder Second Degree and Manslaughter (in 
addition to the indicted offense of Murder First Degree).  This Court reviews de 
novo a claim that the trial court erred as a matter of law in instructing the jury.7  
 (17) Fletcher asserts that because he presented evidence of self-defense, an 
instruction on a lesser degree of homicide was incompatible with the State’s 
contention that the murder was intentional.  Furthermore, Fletcher urges, there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of recklessness, which is required to 
convict for both of the lesser-included offenses.  The State responds that an ample 
basis for instructing on the lesser-included offense is found in Fletcher’s 
videotaped interview with police, which was presented as evidence at the trial.  We 
agree. 
   
(18) The standard for instructing a jury on lesser-included offenses is 11 Del. 
C. § 206(c), which states “[t]he court is not obligated to charge the jury with 
                                                 
7 Lewis v. State, 626 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. 1993). 
 
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respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the 
defendant of the included offense.”8  Having reviewed the record, we conclude that 
there is a rational basis in the videotaped interview evidence for the trial court to 
have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses.  Accordingly, this claim 
lacks merit as well. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
                       
 
 
 
       Justice 
                                                 
8 11 Del. C. § 206(c).