Case Title: Ex parte Robert Baker and Sheila Baker. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Robert Baker and Sheila Baker v. Larry Heath Miller) (Jefferson Circuit Court: DR-09-1733; Civil Appeals : 2100988). Writ Quashed. No Opinion.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120298

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:12/20/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120298
____________________
Ex parte Robert Baker and Sheila Baker
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Robert Baker and Sheila Baker
v.
Larry Heath Miller)
____________________
1120530
____________________
Ex parte Kenneth Cooper and Barbara Cooper
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Kenneth Cooper and Barbara Cooper 
v. 
Larry Heath Miller)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, DR-09-1733;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2100988)
PER CURIAM.
1120298 -- WRIT QUASHED. NO OPINION.
1120530 -- WRIT QUASHED. NO OPINION.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, and Main, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
Bryan, J., recuses himself.*
________________________
*Justice Bryan was a member of the Court of Civil Appeals
when that court considered this case.
2
1120298, 1120530
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Larry Heath Miller was awarded attorney fees from Robert
Baker and Sheila Baker and Kenneth Cooper and Barbara Cooper
after the Bakers and the Coopers intervened in a dispute
between Miller and his wife during divorce proceedings
concerning custody of their child. The Bakers and the Coopers
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After granting
the Bakers' and the Coopers' petitions for the writ of
certiorari, 
the 
Court 
requested 
supplemental 
briefing 
from 
the
parties as to whether Ex parte Handley, 460 So. 2d 167 (Ala.
1984), upon which the trial court appeared to rely for its
award of attorney fees, should be overruled.  All parties
1
responded in the negative. The Court now quashes the writs.
Because I believe that Handley dangerously misconstrued the
nature of equitable power and because I believe "'"[o]ur duty
is to  enunciate the law on the record facts"'" even though
"'"none of the parties declaimed the applicable law,"'" Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
960 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335,
The Court also invited an amicus curiae brief from the
1
Alabama Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers, which declined because the attorneys on both sides of
this case were members of that chapter.
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1357 n.20 (Fed. Cir. 2002), quoting in turn Empire Life Ins.
Co. of America v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir.
1972)), I respectfully dissent.  
2
I. Facts and Procedural History
Andrea Miller ("the wife") filed for divorce from Larry
Heath Miller ("the husband"). The husband counterclaimed for
It is true that this Court ordinarily is "disinclined to
2
overrule controlling precedent when it is not invited to do
so." Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs., 849 So. 2d 914,
926 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis added), but that does not mean that
it is improper to do so. On the contrary, 
"'"[a]ppellate review does not consist of supine
submission to erroneous legal concepts even though
none of the parties declaimed the applicable law
below. Our duty is to enunciate the law on the
record facts. Neither the parties nor the trial
judge, by agreement or passivity, can force us to
abdicate our appellate responsibility."'" 
Hodurski, 899 So. 2d at 960 (quoting Forshey, 284 F.3d at 1357
n.20, quoting in turn Empire Life Ins. Co., 468 F.2d at 334
(emphasis added)). See also Travelers Indem. Co. of
Connecticut v. Miller, 86 So. 3d 338, 347 (Ala. 2011)
(overruling a case while expressly noting that the Court had
not been asked to do so); Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood Co., 42 So.
3d 104, 112 (Ala. 2010) (Lyons, J., concurring specially)
(noting that this Court had overruled a case without being
asked); and Ex parte Carter, 889 So. 2d 528, 533 (Ala. 2004)
(overruling cases the petitioner attempted to distinguish but
did not ask the Court to overrule, along with several other
cases). 
In 
this 
case, 
because 
Handley 
forms 
the
jurisprudential basis for the erroneous decision below, I
believe this Court is free to overrule Handley even without
the request of the parties in this case to do so. 
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divorce and requested that the trial court order the wife to
pay his attorney fees. The wife's father and stepmother,
Kenneth 
Cooper 
and 
Barbara 
Cooper 
("the 
maternal
grandparents"), 
moved 
to 
intervene 
and 
petitioned 
for 
custody,
alleging 
unfitness, 
instability, 
alcohol 
abuse, 
and 
drug 
abuse
by both the husband and wife. The trial court granted their
motion to intervene.  Subsequently, the husband's mother and
stepfather, Robert Baker and Sheila Baker ("the paternal
grandparents"), also moved to intervene and petitioned for
custody for similar reasons. The trial court granted the
paternal grandparents' motion to intervene as well. 
Upon the final judgment of divorce, the trial court
awarded sole custody of the child to the husband, awarded
visitation to the mother and to the maternal grandparents and
the 
paternal grandparents, 
and required the 
maternal
grandparents and the paternal grandparents each to pay $5,000
in attorney fees to the husband's attorneys. In his objection
to the maternal grandparents' motion to intervene, 
the 
husband
had claimed that he was unable to pay his attorneys and had
requested attorney fees from the maternal grandparents to
defend against their petition for custody. The husband also
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testified at trial that he was unable to pay his attorneys.
The trial court's order did not specify the legal basis for
awarding attorney fees to the husband. 
The maternal grandparents and the paternal grandparents
(collectively 
"the 
grandparents") 
appealed 
but 
challenged 
only
the award of attorney fees. The Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court without an opinion.
The maternal grandparents and the paternal grandparents then
petitioned separately for a writ of certiorari, which this
Court granted and now quashes.3
II. Standard of Review
"This Court has stated that '"[t]he determination of
whether an attorney fee is reasonable is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed ...
absent an abuse of that discretion."'" Beal Bank, SSB v.
Schilleci, 896 So. 2d 395, 400 (Ala. 2004) (quoting State Bd.
of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 896 (Ala. 2002), quoting
in turn Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1992)).
The paternal grandparents filed their petition for
3
certiorari review first, and we granted their petition. The
maternal grandparents later petitioned for certiorari review.
We granted that petition and consolidated their petition with
the paternal grandparents' petition. 
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However, "'"[q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo."'"
Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97 So. 3d 114, 134 (Ala. 2012)
(quoting Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 455, 457 (Ala. 2006),
quoting in turn Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.
2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004)). 
III. Discussion
"'"In Alabama and most other jurisdictions, the general
rule is that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation are
not recoverable as damages, in [the] absence of a contractual
or statutory duty, other than [by] a few recognized equity
principles."'"  Tolar Constr., LLC v. Kean Elec. Co., 944 So.
4
2d 138, 152 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Burnham,
Klinefelter, Halsey, Jones & Carter, P.C., 674 So. 2d 1287,
1290 (Ala. 1995), quoting in turn Highlands Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Elegante Inns, Inc., 361 So. 2d 1060, 1065-66 (Ala.
1978)). In Handley, this Court held as a matter of first
impression that a trial court "has equitable authority to
grant a natural mother attorney's fees for successfully
This Court has used the phrases "recognized grounds of
4
equity" and "special equity" interchangeably with "recognized
equity principles." See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810
So. 2d 667, 679-80 (Ala. 2001) (using the phrase "special
equity"); Ex parte Martin, 775 So. 2d 202, 206 (Ala. 2000)
(using the phrase "recognized grounds of equity"). 
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defending an attempt by paternal grandparents to gain custody
or visitation rights to minor children." Handley, 460 So. 2d
at 168. I will first examine Handley, and then I will evaluate
it by the common-law rules of equity that this Court is bound
by statute to respect. § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975 ("The common
law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the
Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall,
together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of
decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to
time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature."
(emphasis added)).  
A. Ex parte Handley
As stated above, Handley stands for the proposition that
a trial court has equitable authority to grant a natural
mother attorney fees for successfully defending an attempt by
grandparents to gain custody of minor children. In Handley,
the 
paternal 
grandparents 
sought 
custody 
of 
their
grandchildren, claiming that it was not in the children's best
interests to remain with the mother. Handley, 460 So. 2d at
168. The mother counterclaimed, seeking reasonable attorney
fees. The trial court denied the grandparents' request for
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custody and awarded the mother attorney fees. The Court of
Civil Appeals reversed the award of attorney fees to the
mother. Id. 
On certiorari review, this Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals, holding as a matter of first
impression that a trial court has equitable authority to award
attorney fees to a mother who has successfully defended
against a custody action brought by the grandparents. 460 So.
2d at 168, 170. This Court reasoned that such a rule was
equitable because "[i]n order to defend her right to the
continued custody of her children, which the trial court
determined was in their best interest, the mother was
completely justified in having counsel to aid her." 460 So. 2d
at 169. The Court also cited Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525, 205
So. 2d 903 (1968), which upheld an award of attorney fees from
one spouse to another in a divorce proceeding. The Handley
Court reasoned that the award in Brock "did not turn so much
on the relationship of the parties as it did on the fact that
the mother found it necessary to hire counsel and resort to
judicial proceedings to get relief." 460 So. 2d at 170. The
four dissenters, however, argued that the Court's reliance on
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Brock was misplaced and accused the majority of creating a new
rule as a policy matter instead of recognizing a rule in
equity. 460 So. 2d at 170-71 (Torbert, C.J., dissenting,
joined by Faulkner, Almon, and Shores, JJ.).
B. The Metes and Bounds of Equitable Power
The question whether a trial court has equitable
authority to award a prevailing parent attorney fees from
unsuccessful intervening grandparents turns on the true
meaning of equity. Sir William Blackstone defined equity in
this manner: 
"But, lastly, the most universal and effectual
way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when
the words are dubious, is by considering the reason
and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the
legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases,
the law itself ought likewise to cease with it. An
instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero,
or whoever was the author of the treatise inscribed
to Herennius. There was a law, that those who in a
storm forsook the ship, should forfeit all property
therein; and that the ship and lading should belong
entirely to those who staid in it. In a dangerous
tempest all the mariners forsook the ship, except
only one sick passenger, who by reason of his
disease was unable to get out and escape. By chance
the ship came safe to port. The sick man kept
possession, and claimed the benefit of the law. Now
here all the learned agree, that the sick man is not
within the reason of the law; for the reason of
making it was, to give encouragement to such as
should venture their lives to save the vessel: but
this is a merit, which he could never pretend to,
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who neither staid in the ship upon that account, nor
contributed any thing to it's [sic] preservation.
"From this method of interpreting laws, by the
reason of them, arises what we call equity; which is
thus defined by Grotius, 'the correction of that,
wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is
deficient.' For since in laws all cases cannot be
foreseen or expressed, it is necessary, that when
the general decrees of the law come to be applied to
particular cases, there should be somewhere a power
vested of defining those circumstances, which (had
they been foreseen) the legislator himself would
have expressed. And these are the cases which,
according to Grotius, 'lex non exacte definit, sed
arbitrio boni viri permittit.'"5
1 
William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries 
*61-62 
(footnotes 
omitted).
Thus, Blackstone's understanding was not that equity gave a
judge the power to create a new rule when injustice existed;
rather, it gave a judge the power to correct an application of
the law when the letter of the law contradicted the spirit of
the law. Blackstone was very concerned about the danger of the
former view. He continued:
"Equity thus depending, essentially, upon the
particular circumstances of each individual case,
there can be no established rules and fixed precepts
of equity laid down, without destroying its very
essence, and reducing it to a positive law. And, on
the other hand, the liberty of considering all cases
in an equitable light, must not be indulged too far;
"The law does not define exactly, but trusts in the
5
judgment of a good man." Black's Law Dictionary 1844 (9th ed.
2009). 
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lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the
decision of every question entirely in the breast of
the judge. And law, without equity, though hard and
disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public
good, than equity without law: which would make
every judge a legislator, and introduce most
infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as
many different rules of action laid down in our
courts, as there are differences of capacity and
sentiment in the human mind."
Id. at *61-62.  
6
United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence
6
Thomas has cited this passage in making a similar point: 
"Throughout his discussion, Blackstone emphasized
that courts of equity must be governed by rules and
precedents no less than the courts of law. '[I]f a
court of equity were still at sea, and floated upon
the occasional opinion which the judge who happened
to preside might entertain of conscience in every
particular case, the inconvenience that would arise
from this uncertainty, would be a worse evil than
any hardship that could follow from rules too strict
and 
inflexible.' 
[3 
William 
Blackstone,
Commentaries], at 440. If their remedial discretion
had not been cabined, Blackstone warned, equity
courts would have undermined the rule of law and
produced arbitrary government. 'The judiciary's
powers would have become too arbitrary to have been
endured in a country like this, which boasts of
being governed in all respects by law and not by
will.' Ibid. (footnote omitted); see also 1 id., at
61-62." 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 127-28 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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Blackstone went on to say that judges could use equitable
power when "some collateral matter arises out of the general
words, and happens to be unreasonable." 1 Blackstone, at *91.
By the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries, equity cases
were usually limited to cases involving property, as well as
cases concerning fraud, trusts, "deliver[ing] from such
dangers as are owing to misfortune or oversight," and cases
where more specific relief was required. Id. at *92.
Nevertheless, there was one anchor that held equity in its
proper place so that it did not drift into the realm of the
legislature, and that anchor was the legislature's 
intent 
(or,
as Blackstone called it, "the cause which moved the legislator
to enact it"). 
Blackstone's definition of equity carried over into
American jurisprudence. Shortly after our country's founding,
and within a decade of Alabama's admission to the Union as a
state, Noah Webster defined "equity" as follows: 
"In jurisprudence, the correction or qualification
of law, when too severe or defective; or the
extension of the words of the law to cases not
expressed, yet coming within the reason of the law.
Hence a court of equity or chancery, is a court
which corrects the operation of the literal text of
the law, and supplies its defects, by reasonable
construction, and by rules of proceeding and
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deciding, which are not admissible in a court of
law. Equity then is the law of reason, exercised by
the chancellor or judge, giving remedy in cases to
which the courts of law are not competent."
Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
(1828). 
Likewise, Justice Joseph Story's treatise on equity
reflected Blackstone's view. Story described the jurisdiction
of an equity court this way: "Perhaps the most general, if not
the most precise, description of a Court of Equity, in the
English and American sense, is, that it has jurisdiction in
cases of rights, recognized and protected by the municipal
jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
cannot be had in the Courts of Common Law." 1 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in
England and America § 33 (14th ed. 1918) (emphasis added;
footnotes omitted). Story also recognized that it was an
erroneous view of equity to fail to distinguish between the
"general sense of equity, which is equivalent to universal or
natural justice ... [and] its technical sense, which is
descriptive of the exercise of jurisdiction over peculiar
rights and remedies." Id. at § 34 (emphasis added). The United
States Supreme Court 
has 
shared Justice Story's concerns about
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the danger of failing to distinguish between the two senses of
equity:
"'If, indeed, a Court of Equity in England did
possess the unbounded jurisdiction, which has been
thus generally ascribed to it, of correcting,
controlling, moderating, and even superseding the
law, and of enforcing all the rights, as well as the
charities, arising from natural law and justice, and
of freeing itself from all regard to former rules
and precedents, it would be the most gigantic in its
sway, and the most formidable instrument of
arbitrary power, that could well be devised. It
would literally place the whole rights and property
of the community under the arbitrary will of the
Judge, acting, if you please, arbitrio boni judicis
and, it may be, ex aequo et bono, according to his
own notions and conscience; but still acting with a
despotic and sovereign authority.'" 
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., for the Court)
(quoting 1 Joseph Story, supra at 19). 
These principles also have been recognized in Alabama
jurisprudence. This Court has stated:
"At the adoption of the Code, that system of
equity jurisprudence and jurisdiction which, prior
to the American revolution, had been built upon wide
and rational foundations in England, was part of our
system for the administration of justice, except so
far as it had been affected by our statutes .... But
no part of the Code repeals that system of equity
jurisprudence and jurisdiction, which it is conceded
on all hands, formed part of our system when the
Code was adopted."
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Waldron v. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629, 633 (1856) (emphasis added).
In addition to this Court's explicit recognition in
Waldron 
of 
Alabama's 
adoption 
of 
England's 
equity 
jurisdiction
and jurisprudence as it existed before the American
Revolution, this Court has also recognized the fundamental
principles of that system as discussed by Blackstone and
Story. See Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 287, 224
So. 2d 638, 641 (1969) ("Our decisions do hold that equity
jurisdiction cannot be invoked ... when complainant's remedy
at law, either by way of action or defense, is plain,
adequate, and complete."); Smith v. Roney, 182 Ala. 540, 543-
44, 62 So. 753, 754 (1913) ("It is, of course, a truism that
the system of equity jurisprudence was formed for the purpose
of supplementing the law and of furnishing remedies for wrongs
for which the law was, by reason of the unbending and
inflexible character of its rules, unable to furnish a remedy.
It therefore soon became a truism that, as a general rule, a
court of equity would withhold relief to any suitor who
possessed, for his particular wrong, a plain and adequate
legal remedy.");  Saltonstall v. Gordon, 33 Ala. 149, 151
(1858) (citing Justice Story's treatise for the proposition
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that equitable jurisdiction over fraud 
cases 
requires 
that the
defrauded party must have a legal right, not just a moral
right, to know the concealed information); and Henry v.
Thompson, Minor 209, 233 (Ala. 1824) (opinion of Saffold, J.)
(applying 
"equitable 
construction" 
to 
a 
statute 
by
interpreting it according to its "true spirit and design").
Thus, the principles espoused above by Blackstone and Story
are not new to Alabama's equity jurisprudence but, rather,
provide the foundation for that jurisprudence.
C. Was Handley a Proper Exercise of Equitable Power?
With these principles in mind, I turn to the question
whether Handley was decided correctly. 
Handley could 
have been
decided correctly under only one of two circumstances: if it
was decided on a recognized ground of equity, Tolar Constr.,
944 So. 2d at 152, or if it was a new application of true
equitable power. Recognized grounds of equity include the
common-fund doctrine, the substantial-benefit doctrine,
contempt, and bad-faith litigation. John F. Vargo, The
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured 
Person's
Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567, 1579-87 (1993); see
also State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d at 897 (citing
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Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
275 (1975) (listing the same exceptions)). None of these
grounds were at issue in Handley; therefore Handley cannot be
justified 
by 
the 
recognized-grounds-of-equity 
exception 
to 
the
American rule, which provides that, subject to certain
exceptions, "all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear
their own attorney's fees." Black's Law Dictionary 98 (9th ed.
2009).
The final question is whether Handley was a new
application of true equitable power. As discussed above,
equitable power is the power to apply a rule according to its
spirit when the letter of the rule, by reason of its
universality, goes beyond the spirit of the rule. 1
Blackstone, at *61-62. At common law, a party would typically
bear his own fees unless a court of equity found that the
losing party acted in an abusive manner or a common-law court
was authorized to grant fees by statute. Vargo, supra, at
1570-71. Thus, the common-law rule "mirror[s] the American
Rule where the 'loser' is not responsible for the attorney's
fees of the 'winner.'"  Id. at 1571. Thus, it appears to have
7
The modern English rule that the loser pays the winner's
7
fees did not develop until after America gained independence.
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been stated correctly that the purpose of the American rule is
to treat attorney fees "as an element of court costs." 20
C.J.S. Costs § 137 (2007).  Because each party must pay his or
8
her own costs, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the
American rule to require intervening grandparents who lost to
pay the attorney fees of the parent who won. Thus, Handley was
not a proper application of equitable power. 
The grandparents mention briefly for the sake of argument
that it might be possible to construe §§ 30-2-50 through -52,
Ala. Code 1975, as granting a trial court authority to award
attorney fees to a parent from a third party. (See
petitioners' brief, at 8.) If these statutes could be
See id.
It has also been said that the purpose of the American
8
rule "is to avoid stifling legitimate litigation by the threat
of the specter of burdensome expenses being imposed on an
unsuccessful party." 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 55 (2005). See
also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (arguing "in support of the American
Rule" that one should not be discouraged from prosecuting or
defending against a suit because of the uncertainty of
litigation, that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from
defending their rights for fear of paying their opponents'
fees, and that determining "reasonable attorney's fees" in
every case would unduly burden judicial administration).
Although these arguments present the positive benefits
conferred by the American rule, these arguments do not explain
why the rule exists.
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equitably 
construed 
in 
the 
manner 
described 
by 
the
grandparents, then Handley could be upheld. Those statutes
provide:
"Pending an action for divorce, the court may
make an allowance for the support of either spouse
out of the estate of the other spouse, suitable to
the spouse's estate and the condition in life of the
parties, for a period of time not longer than
necessary for the prosecution of the complaint for
divorce."
§ 30-2-50, Ala. Code 1975.
"If either spouse has no separate estate or if it is
insufficient for the maintenance of a spouse, the
judge, upon granting a divorce, at his or her
discretion, may order to a spouse an allowance out
of the estate of the other spouse, taking into
consideration the value thereof and the condition of
the spouse's family."
§ 30-2-51(a), Ala. Code 1975.
"If the divorce is in favor of either spouse for
the misconduct of the other spouse, the judge trying
the case shall have the right to make an allowance
to either spouse out of the estate of either spouse,
or not make an allowance as the circumstances of the
case may justify, and if an allowance is made, the
misconduct of either spouse may be considered in
determining the amount; provided, however, that any
property acquired prior to the marriage of the
parties or by inheritance or gift may not be
considered in determining the amount."
§ 30-2-52, Ala. Code 1975. 
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These statutes have been construed to allow an award of
attorney fees "as expense money on like principles as alimony
pendente lite." Smith v. Smith, 57 Ala. App. 615, 330 So. 2d
439 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).  In Blackstone's example of the
9
ship, the purpose of the law was to encourage the sailors to
preserve the ship. 1 Blackstone, *61-62. In this case, the
purpose of §§ 30-2-50 through -52, Ala. Code 1975, is to
preserve the marital obligation of support. 
The Handley Court rejected the proposition that attorney
fees arising out of divorce proceedings rest on the existence
of a marital relationship and instead focused on the necessity
of the parent to hire counsel. Handley, 460 So. 2d at 169-70.
However, in light of the discussion above, it is clear that
the Handley Court was mistaken. At best, the Handley Court
confused the jurisprudential sense of equity -- applying the
law according to its purpose -- with the generic sense of
One of the cases cited in Smith was Ex parte Smith, 34
9
Ala. 455 (1859). However, Ex parte Smith held that courts of
equity historically had authority to grant attorney fees from
one spouse to another independent of the previous versions of
§§ 30-2-50 through -52, Ala. Code 1975. 34 Ala. at 458-59. The
basis of this historical equitable rule was the marital
relationship. Id. See also Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332,
334, 87 So. 2d 626, 628 (1959) (citing Ex parte Smith).
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equity, which is synonymous with natural justice.  See 1
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Story, supra, at § 34. However, the more likely explanation is
that, as the Handley dissenters argued, Handley was a policy-
based decision. See Handley, 460 So. 2d at 170-71 (Torbert,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525,
205 So. 2d 903 (1968), upon which the majority heavily relied,
did not support the majority's argument that 
necessity instead
of the marital relationship was the basis for awarding
attorney fees and concluding that "[t]he decision to award
attorney fees in a case such as this is a reflection of a
change of policy by this Court and should be recognized as
such").
Therefore, because Handley was not justified by the
equitable principles on which it was supposedly based, it
should be overruled. 
IV. Conclusion
Ex parte Handley, 460 So. 2d 167 (Ala. 1984), was not
only an aberration from true equity jurisprudence but was also
an attempt by this Court to make new law, which we are
I express no opinion as to whether a parent has a moral
10
right to have an intervening third party pay that parent's
attorney fees.
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constitutionally forbidden from doing. Art. I, § 43, Ala.
Const. 
1901 
("[T]he 
judicial 
[department] 
shall 
never 
exercise
the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to
the end that [the government of this state] may be a
government of laws and not of men."). Moreover, Handley's
misunderstanding of equity has the potential to "destroy all
law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the
breast of the judge," which would "make every judge a
legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion; as there
would then be almost as many different rules of action laid
down in our courts, as there are differences of capacity and
sentiment in the human mind." 1 Blackstone, at *62. My hope is
that the Court will be more open to overruling Handley upon a
direct challenge in the future. However, because I believe
that "[o]ur duty is to  enunciate the law on the record facts"
even though "none of the parties declaimed the applicable
law," Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.
2d at 960, and because I believe that enunciating the law on
the factual record of this case would require overruling
Handley, I respectfully dissent.
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