Case Title: Cochran v. Keeton

Citation: 252 So. 2d 313

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1971-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
252 So. 2d 313 (1971)
In re John W. COCHRAN and Lillie M. Cochran
v.
Paul KEETON and Charles Thompson, individually and d/b/a Keeton and Thompson.
Ex parte Paul KEETON and Charles Thompson, individually and d/b/a Keeton and Thompson.
8 Div. 418.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 9, 1971.
*314 Tompkins & Tompkins, Tuscumbia, for petitioners.
MADDOX, Justice.
Petitioners, Paul Keeton and Charles Thompson, individually, and d/b/a Keeton and Thompson, ask us to review the opinion and judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, and to reverse and remand on the ground that the opinion is contrary to previous opinions of this Court. We granted the writ of certiorari and have reviewed the opinion and judgment rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals, and hereby affirm.
The Court of Civil Appeals recognized that this Court's decision in Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961) was applicable to the fact situation presented before it, but observed:
Being presented with the opportunity to review Druid, we do overrule Druid insofar as it adopts the rule of caveat emptor in the sale by a builder-vendor of a newly constructed house.
We have gone to the original record and files in Druid, and note that in the Druid case, no brief was filed by the purchaser and no argument was made in his behalf when the cause was argued and submitted. We also note that much of the law in this field has developed during the past decade. The modern trend, even in some of the jurisdictions from which this Court cited opinions in Druid is to repudiate the doctrine of caveat emptor in fact situations similar to the one here under consideration.
By affirming the Court of Civil Appeals in this instance, we realize that we have not answered all of the questions which may arise in the future as a result of our action here, but we take this most important first step.
Considerable comment has been made by legal scholars about the new trend toward judicial abolition of the doctrine of caveat *315 emptor in real estate sales. Most scholars question the retention of the rule in view of current day conditions.
Illustrative cases from other jurisdictions which have held a builder-vendor liable on a theory of implied warranty are: Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash.1969); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D.1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.1968); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich.App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970); affirmed, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970). Some jurisdictions, however, still strictly apply the doctrine of caveat emptor but the trend appears definitely to be changing to the view we express here. See Annotation: Defective HomeVendor's Liability, 25 A.L.R.3d 383.
Realizing that this decision changes a long standing rule as to the application of the rule of caveat emptor in the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor, we feel justice will be best served by holding that, except as to this plaintiff-appellant in the instant case, the rule here established shall apply only to cases arising out of future occurrences.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
Affirmed.
SIMPSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD and BLOODWORTH, JJ., concur.
LAWSON, COLEMAN and McCALL, JJ., dissent.
HEFLIN, C. J., not sitting.
COLEMAN, Justice (dissenting).
Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884, was decided by this court June 29, 1961. There, the defendant had appealed from a judgment for plaintiff in an action claiming damages for breach of an agreement "* * * to purchase a house and lot wherein it was implied that the dwelling was of substantial *316 construction and was built in a workmanlike manner. The breach * * * was that the house was not constructed in a workmanlike manner and that water drained from the bathroom facilities and emptied under the house without any drainage, and damage resulted." (Emphasis supplied.) 272 Ala. at 415, 131 So. 2d  at 885.
This court said:
This court then discussed eleven or more cases in support of its declaration of the law and further said:
"* * *
In 1967, a contractor-builder appealed from a judgment for the owner "* * * for breach of a contract made with appellees to construct for them in a good and workmanlike manner a dwelling house * * *." Carter v. West, 280 Ala. 603, 196 So. 2d 718. The contractor relied on Druid Homes. This court affirmed the judgment for the owner and said:
In 1969, plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of voluntary nonsuit in an action "for * * * damages for breach of a contract for the purchase of a house built by the Defendant, Joe J. Bedford, Jr., for the Plaintiffs * * *." Livingston v. *317 Bedford, 284 Ala. 323, 324, 224 So. 2d 873. This court affirmed the judgment favorable to defendant and said:
In Central Stikstof Verkoopkanter, N. V. v. Walsh Steve. Co., 380 F.2d 523, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed a judgment for defendants, rendered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, in a suit for damages to commercial fertilizer stored at the State Docks. Among other things, the Circuit Court said:
In 25 ALR 3rd, p. 419, § 6(c), the annotation cites, in addition to Druid Homes, eighteen cases from nine other states, which follow the view that no implied warranties as to condition, quality, or fitness arise in the sale of real estate. The oldest one of the cases thus cited was decided in 1916, the next oldest in 1930, two in 1932, six from 1952 to 1959, and eight from 1961 to 1968. In one of these cases, the Court of Appeals of Maryland said:
In Skelton v. Weaver, 266 Ala. 335, 96 So. 2d 288, this court quoted from the dissenting opinion of Judge Collier in Bryant v. Simpson, 3 Stew. 339, 343, as follows:
Druid Homes has been the law in Alabama for ten years. The decision is supported by sound reasoning and respectable authority cited in the opinion and 25 ALR 3d 419. This court reaffirmed and followed Druid Homes two years ago, July 3, 1969, in Livingston v. Bedford, supra. I would follow Druid Homes now and reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals in the case at bar.
LAWSON, Justice (dissenting).
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Coleman but would like to make further observations.
As early as 1842, in the case of Cullum v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 4 Ala. 21, this court recognized the distinction between executory and executed contracts for the sale of realty in regard to implied warranties. In the case last cited it was observed:
In Asbury v. Cochran, 243 Ala. 281, 283, 9 So. 2d 887, 889, decided in 1942 in an opinion prepared for the court by the late Mr. Justice Foster, it was said:
In 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 183 (b), page 15, it is said:
The case of Asbury v. Cochran, supra, is cited in support of the language which we have italicized above.
I recognize that the authorities hereinabove referred to deal with the question of title and not with the condition of a structure on real estate; but the rule applies across the board in my opinion and it was so held in the Druid Homes case decided in 1961 and followed in Livingston v. Bedford in 1969. The Druid Homes case and Livingston v. Bedford are both cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Coleman. The Court of Civil Appeals and this court have now cast into the judicial wastebasket two cases, directly in point, decided by this court within the past ten years, apparently on the theory that "Most scholars question the retention *319 of" the "doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate sales." The legal scholars to whom reference is made apparently are the writers of articles appearing in the legal periodicals cited in the court's opinion.
I do not believe that the court's opinion is in harmony with the holdings of the majority of courts in this country (25 A.L.R.3d 383) and yet we are in a more or less cavalier manner departing from principles long embedded in the jurisprudence of this state and which, in my opinion, will create confusion, doubt, and uncertainty in real estate transactions.
The author of the court's opinion recognizes that many questions will have to be answered in future litigation because of the action taken by the court in this case, thereby confronting the seller, the buyer, the practicing attorney, and the trial bench with innumerable problems at which guesses must be made pending future decisions by this court.
The purchaser of a new home may protect himself by requiring covenants in the deed concerning the construction of the house which he is purchasing in the same manner as he must do in order to protect himself in regard to title.