Case Title: State v. Heath

Citation: 162 Vt. 618, 649 A.2d 243

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ENTRY_ORDER.92-126; 162 Vt. 618; 649 A.2d 243


[Filed:  11-Aug-1994]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject ot motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-126


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

 Stephen J. Heath                             October Term, 1993


 Walter M. Morris, Jr., J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


              In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

      Defendant, Stephen Heath, was convicted of sexual assault, 13 V.S.A. {
 3252(a)(1)(A), and appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress and his
 motion for a new trial.  We reverse and remand.

      The assault occurred after the victim left a bar in Newport and was
 sitting along the shore of Lake Memphremagog.  Her attackers pulled her to
 the ground and one penetrated her vagina with his penis.  The assault was
 discontinued because of an approaching vehicle.  After showering at the home
 of a friend, the victim reported the assault to the police.  An examination
 of the victim was done at North Country Hospital.  Bodily fluids and hair
 samples were taken for laboratory analysis.  Also taken were the clothes she
 was wearing at the time of the assault.  Examination of the victim's
 underpants turned up an unidentified foreign hair sample.  The victim later
 identified defendant as her assailant.

      Because the State believed that physical evidence would help in
 building its case against defendant, the State sought and obtained a
 nontestimonial identification order for defendant to produce samples of
 bodily fluids and hair.  The samples were produced on November 4, 1990.  The
 analysis of the bodily fluids by the state lab was inconclusive, as was the
 DNA analysis by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

      The analysis of the hair sample from the victim's clothing was on a
 different track.  It, along with hair samples from defendant, was sent to
 the FBI in January 1991.  Despite a series of discovery motions by
 defendant, the FBI analysis was not provided to defendant by the date of
 trial, June 26, 1991.  Consequently, defendant filed a new motion to compel
 production of the analysis on the eve of trial and a motion for continuance
 based in part on nondisclosure of the FBI analysis.  The court failed to
 rule on the motion to compel and denied the motion for continuance.

      At trial, defendant argued that the victim misidentified him as the
 assailant.  The jury rejected this theory and returned a guilty verdict on

 

 June 27, 1991.  After the trial was concluded, an FBI lab report, dated June
 24, 1991, was received and provided to defendant.  The report concluded that
 the defendant's hair samples did not match the hair found in the victim's
 underpants.

      Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the State's failure
 to provide the FBI report.  Analyzing defendant's claim for a new trial as
 based on newly discovered evidence, the trial court held that defendant
 failed to sustain his burden of showing that the FBI hair analysis probably
 would have changed the result of the trial.  On appeal, defendant argues
 that he need not make such a showing under the circumstances.  We agree.

      Criminal Rule 33 authorizes the grant of a new trial "if required in
 the interests of justice."  The standard is intentionally broad so that the
 courts can ensure that trials are fair without necessarily having to pigeon-
 hole the grounds into narrow and specific findings of error.  See United
 States v. Narciso,