Case Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12933

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12933 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 3177  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     December 4, 2020. - February 2, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Evidence, Sex offender.  Practice, 
Civil, Sex offender, Standard of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 15, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by Janet Kenton-Walker, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Edward Gauthier for the plaintiff. 
 
David L. Chenail for the defendant. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case concerns the reclassification of John 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3177 (Doe), from a level 
two to a level three sex offender.  The Sex Offender Registry 
Board (board) initiated an upward reclassification of Doe, based 
2 
 
 
in part on charged sex offenses of which Doe has been acquitted.  
After an evidentiary hearing, the board ordered Doe to register 
as a level three offender.  Doe challenges the board's 
determination, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious and 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  Doe argues that we should 
require the board to prove new sex offenses by clear and 
convincing evidence; however, we have recently affirmed that 
subsidiary facts, including new sex offenses, need only be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  We decline to 
reconsider this holding.  Further, based on review of the 
hearing examiner's carefully reasoned and detailed decision, we 
conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting 
the level three upward reclassification, based on the new sex 
offenses, substantial other criminal activity, and multiple 
other risk factors. 
 
Finally, Doe argues that the decision, handed down 
approximately three years after the sex offense charges, is 
improper because it was not based on "new information" and the 
hearing was not held within "a reasonable time."  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (3).  Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, 
we determine that the board's decision was proper because the 
board initiated the reclassification process shortly after 
receiving information of the new sex offense charges, and the 
delays in reaching a final decision were not unreasonable.  We 
3 
 
 
therefore affirm the board's decision to upwardly reclassify 
Doe. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Factual and procedural background.  i.  
Sex offenses and allegations.  There are three main reported 
instances of Doe's sexual misconduct, involving three different 
victims.  First, when Doe was seventeen years old, he sexually 
assaulted a seven year old girl (victim one), rubbing her chest 
and vagina with his hands, and rubbing his penis on her.  On 
March 10, 1993, Doe was found guilty of indecent assault and 
battery on a child under the age of fourteen.  He was sentenced 
to one year of probation, which he did not complete, and 
received a 120-day sentence in a house of correction.  As a 
result of this misconduct, he was classified as a level two sex 
offender in 2003. 
 
Second, in 1995, a fifteen year old girl (victim two) 
reported that Doe, then twenty, sexually harassed and assaulted 
her.  Despite her protestations and attempts to stop him, he 
grabbed her buttocks in a Dunkin Donuts, placed his hands on her 
breasts while they were driving, spit food at her, attempted to 
hug and kiss her, and, while they were outside, touched her 
buttocks and breasts.  All of these acts were committed in the 
presence of victim two's friend, who also made a statement to 
the police.  Doe was charged with two counts of indecent assault 
4 
 
 
and battery on a person age fourteen or older for these actions, 
and acquitted. 
 
Third, in 2015, a thirty-nine year old woman (victim three) 
reported to police that Doe had sexually harassed and assaulted 
her multiple times while she was driving him to work, including 
once when they stopped at a store.1  Doe was charged with three 
counts of indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen 
or older, and was acquitted.2 
 
Victim three reported to police that for the two weeks 
preceding her report, she worked with Doe in order to earn a 
little money, driving Doe and his coworker back and forth to 
assist them in moving wood.  She reported that against her will, 
Doe regularly touched her, rubbed her, and fondled her during 
these rides.  He also made explicit sexual comments and sexual 
advances.  Once, he exposed himself to her. 
 
Victim three also reported that while they were in a store, 
Doe rubbed his semi-erect penis on her backside and grabbed her 
vagina.  Victim three reported that two other people were in the 
car at the time of the store incident, Doe's friend and the 
                                                          
 
 
1 Here, we do not review the entirety of the facts related 
to the 2015 charges, but only those that are relevant to our 
review. 
 
 
2 The incidents giving rise to the charges occurred in two 
different counties, resulting in two different trials.  Doe was 
acquitted of one count on October 14, 2015, and the other two 
counts on May 10, 2016. 
5 
 
 
friend's mother.  Police contacted the mother by telephone, who 
stated victim three had told her that Doe had grabbed her in the 
crotch.  Despite attempts by the police, neither person came to 
the police station to give a written statement.  When police 
viewed the store video recording between the times that victim 
three indicated she was there, they did not see anyone matching 
the description she gave of herself and Doe. 
 
At the first jury trial, victim three testified to similar 
incidents that she reported to the police, and expanded on the 
sexual comments Doe made.  She testified on cross-examination 
that Doe told her he had a man-eating pig and a shotgun on his 
farm, and implied that she felt threatened by his statements.  
The police lieutenant who investigated her complaint testified 
that she was upset and crying when she spoke to him about the 
incidents, and that she did not report anything to him about the 
man-eating pig or shotgun. 
 
At the second trial, in a different county, see note 2, 
supra, victim three again testified to similar details as those 
she reported to the police, expanding on Doe's comments and 
actions.  She testified to the incident at the store and that 
Doe threatened her with his man-eating pig and gun.  She further 
testified that Doe did not pay her for gasoline or the rental of 
a U-Haul truck. 
6 
 
 
 
The friend's mother, who had previously spoken to the 
police, testified that victim three told her about Doe's sexual 
advances but that victim three was vague as to the event in 
which Doe grabbed her crotch and gave three different locations 
for the event.  The witness further testified that victim three 
stated she would "get even with" Doe if she did not get paid for 
the job. 
 
The police officer testified that she was unable to find 
victim three or Doe in surveillance video recordings from the 
store.  A clerk from the store testified that victim three and 
Doe were both customers at the store.  The clerk was unable to 
recall if he was working on the day of the incident but stated 
that he works every morning and had no recollection of any 
confrontation taking place. 
 
Doe's friend, who worked with Doe and rode in the back seat 
of the truck while the assaults took place, testified that he 
did not have any recollection of whether they had stopped at a 
convenience store.  He testified that Doe never touched victim 
three inappropriately. 
 
ii.  Other criminal history.  Doe has in excess of thirty 
adult convictions spanning from 1992 to 2016 for multiple 
7 
 
 
violent and nonviolent crimes.3  He has received nine different 
incarceration sentences in excess of sixty days.4  Three 
different women obtained abuse prevention orders against him, in 
2006, 2015, and 2017.  While incarcerated in 2011, Doe waived 
his parole hearing, stating, "If I wanted parole I would have 
just stayed on probation." 
 
iii.  Procedural history.  In December 2015, based on the 
2015 sex offense charges, the board notified Doe of his duty to 
                                                          
 
 
3 Doe has been convicted of larceny, conspiracy, operating a 
motor vehicle after suspension as a habitual traffic offender, 
possession of a class B substance, distribution of a class B 
substance, conspiracy to violate the controlled substances act, 
failure to register as a sex offender, shoplifting, burning a 
building, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, 
intimidation, threatening, assault and battery, trespassing, 
assault with a dangerous weapon, and malicious destruction of 
property. 
 
 
4 On March 17, 2008, he was sentenced to two years of 
incarceration for failure to register as a sex offender.  On 
August 11, 2008, he received a ninety-day sentence for larceny.  
On July 13, 2010, his probation for a larceny conviction was 
revoked and he was ordered to serve eighteen months.  On April 
9, 2012, he was incarcerated for ninety days for possession of a 
class B substance.  In 2013, he received concurrent six-month 
terms of incarceration for distribution of a class B substance 
(four counts) and conspiracy to violate the controlled 
substances act (two counts).  On June 12, 2013, the plaintiff 
was incarcerated for eighteen months for a violation of 
probation for a conviction of breaking and entering in the 
nighttime with intent to commit a felony.  On September 4, 2014, 
he received a ninety-day sentence for possession of a class B 
substance.  A month later he was sentenced to concurrent 112-day 
terms of incarceration for larceny (three counts) and 
conspiracy.  On January 4, 2017, the plaintiff was convicted of 
receiving stolen property and possession of marijuana and was 
sentenced to concurrent six-month terms of incarceration. 
8 
 
 
register as a level three sex offender.  Doe requested a hearing 
challenging the recommendation, and following the hearing he was 
ordered to register as a level three sex offender on September 
26, 2016.  Doe sought judicial review, after which the case was 
remanded to the board to consider the trial transcripts from his 
criminal trials.  A new hearing was scheduled for January 2018, 
but was delayed until September 2018 due to a procedural error:  
the board did not have a record of the full majority of the 
board's vote to reclassify.  After rectifying the error, on 
October 12, 2018, a board hearing examiner reviewed evidence 
presented as to Doe's sexual misconduct, criminal history, and 
history in the community.  He examined the allegations 
underlying the charges related to misconduct against victim two 
and victim three, and found them sufficiently detailed as to 
render them reliable evidence for use in the proceeding.  He 
then found by clear and convincing evidence that Doe "presents a 
high risk to reoffend sexually, and a degree of dangerousness to 
the public such that a substantial public safety interest is 
served by active dissemination of his sex offender registry 
information," and ordered Doe to register as a level three sex 
offender.  Doe requested judicial review of the order, and a 
Superior Court judge upheld the board's decision on June 19, 
2019.  Doe appealed from the Superior Court's decision, and we 
took the case sua sponte. 
9 
 
 
 
b.  Sex offender reclassification procedure.  The board is 
authorized to seek reclassification of a sex offender.  G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L (3).  Reclassification may be initiated based on a 
number of factors, including receipt of "information indicating 
the sex offender has . . . [b]een investigated for or charged 
with committing a new sex offense" or has "[b]een incarcerated 
for more than [sixty] consecutive days at any time following 
final classification by the Board."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.32(2) (2016).  When the board seeks upward reclassification, 
the offender has an opportunity to respond and to challenge the 
board's recommendation at an evidentiary hearing.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L; 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.06-1.08, 1.32(4) (2016).  
At that hearing, the elements supporting reclassification must 
be established by clear and convincing evidence.  Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
473 Mass. 297, 314 (2015) (Doe No. 380316).  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 1.14(1), 1.32(4) (2016) (procedures same in 
reclassification as in classification).  The offender may also 
seek judicial review of a board hearing decision.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178M. 
 
The board's ultimate determination is comprised of three 
elements that must each be established by clear and convincing 
evidence:  (1) the offender's risk of reoffense, (2) the 
offender's dangerousness as a function of the severity and 
10 
 
 
extent of harm the offender would present to the public in the 
event of reoffense, and (3) the public safety interest served by 
public access to the offender's information.  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 
643, 645-646 (2019) (Doe No. 496501).  An offender is designated 
a level three offender "[w]here the board determines that the 
risk of reoffense is high and the degree of dangerousness posed 
to the public is such that a substantial public safety interest 
is served by active dissemination."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).  
The board's enabling statutes and regulations list a number of 
specific factors that may be considered to determine risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K; 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016). 
 
At a hearing, an examiner "shall consider the relevant and 
credible evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom."  
Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 645, quoting 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.20(2) (2016).  "In determining whether the[] elements have 
been established by clear and convincing evidence, a hearing 
examiner may consider subsidiary facts that have been proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence."  Doe No. 496501, supra at 656. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  A reviewing court 
may set aside or modify the board's classification decision 
where it determines that the decision is in excess of the 
board's statutory authority or jurisdiction, is based on an 
11 
 
 
error of law, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is an 
arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.  Doe No. 496501, 
482 Mass. at 649.  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (describing factors 
for court's review of agency's decision).  The reviewing court 
"shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the 
discretionary authority conferred upon it."  G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7). 
 
b.  Standard of proof for new sex offense.  Doe challenges 
our prior holding that where a sex offense is unproven at a 
criminal trial, a hearing examiner may consider the facts 
underlying the charges "where such facts are proven by a 
preponderance of evidence," the standard used for subsidiary 
facts.  Soe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 252997 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 396 (2013) (Soe).  As we 
expressly stated in Soe, "[a]n acquittal at a criminal trial 
simply means that a jury did not find the defendant guilty of 
the charged sex offense beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not 
demonstrate that the evidence at the classification hearing did 
not warrant a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the sex offender committed the charged offense."  Id.  Doe 
suggests we should heighten the standard of proof to clear and 
convincing evidence to prove the facts of new offenses. 
12 
 
 
 
To support his proposition, Doe argues that a new sex 
offense is "not a subsidiary fact [that is] combined with other 
facts to reach a legal conclusion," but that it is a "legal 
fact" that triggers reclassification.5  This argument is 
incorrect.  The occurrence of a new sex offense is not an 
element that must be proved for reclassification by clear and 
convincing evidence; it is a factor to be considered in 
determining the risk of reoffense and dangerousness.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K; 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33.  Therefore, it is a 
subsidiary fact.  Doe also confuses the board's many bases to 
seek reclassification -- set out in 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.32 
-- with the elements the board bears the burden of proving at an 
evidentiary hearing on reclassification by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Compare G. L. c. 6, § 178L (authorizing board to 
promulgate regulations defining what new information is relevant 
to risk of reoffense as basis to seek reclassification when 
information is received), with G. L. c. 6, 178K (defining 
elements of classification to be proved).  The regulations 
                                                          
 
 
5 Doe originally contended that the board erroneously 
applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the 
elements underlying his reclassification.  The hearing examiner 
correctly applied the clear and convincing evidence standard to 
the elements.  Doe corrected his mistake in a letter to the 
court shortly before oral argument and does not contest that we 
have previously clearly stated that underlying subsidiary facts 
may be proved by the preponderance of the evidence.  See Doe No. 
496501, 482 Mass. at 656. 
13 
 
 
explicitly provide that receipt of information indicating that 
the offender has been "investigated for or charged with 
committing a new sex offense" is just one of many bases for 
seeking reclassification.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.32(2)(a).  
Other bases include conviction of a new sex offense, listed 
separately to differentiate it from mere investigation, as well 
as other grounds unrelated to a new sex offense.  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.32(2)(b).  See also 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.32(2) (list of bases is nonexhaustive). 
 
Further, Doe's challenge is unpersuasive in light of the 
facts and legal analysis in the current case. First, the hearing 
examiner in this case erred in Doe's favor by applying the 
heightened burden of clear and convincing evidence not only to 
the necessary elements of reclassification, but also to proof of 
the new sex offenses.  Second, the board sought to reclassify 
Doe because he was investigated and charged for a new sex 
offense under 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.32(2)(a), not because he 
was convicted of a new sex offense under § 1.32(2)(b).  
Therefore, his argument that he never committed or was convicted 
of the sex offense does not apply to the board's decision to 
initially seek reclassification.6  Third, Doe's upward 
                                                          
 
 
6 Nowhere does Doe challenge the validity of the regulation 
using investigation or charges concerning a new sex offense as a 
14 
 
 
reclassification was based only in part on the new sex offenses.  
His substantial other criminal activity, occurring after his 
original classification and resulting in his incarceration for 
over sixty days, independently justified the board's decision to 
seek upward reclassification and was appropriately considered in 
the hearing examiner's analysis of risk factors.  Numerous other 
risk factors were also properly considered. 
 
Doe's argument that we should overturn our precedent is 
based on our decision in Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. 297.  That 
case, which raised the standard of proof for elements of 
classification to clear and convincing evidence, id. at 298, 
does not support his argument.7  It was decided with the 
knowledge that subsidiary facts are proved by preponderance of 
the evidence, and did not reference or overturn the subsidiary 
fact standard.  Compare Soe, 466 Mass. at 396 (stating in 2013 
that charges may be proved by preponderance of evidence), with 
Doe No. 380316, supra (raising standard of proof for elements in 
2015).  We have considered and upheld the subsidiary fact 
standard since our decision in Doe No. 380316, stating in 2019: 
                                                          
 
basis for seeking reclassification.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.32(2)(a) (2016). 
 
 
7 Doe No. 380316 was relevant to Doe's erroneous contention 
that the hearing examiner applied the preponderance of the 
evidence standard to the elements of reclassification.  Doe's 
brief contains exactly one sentence connecting the case to the 
argument at hand. 
15 
 
 
"In determining whether these elements have been 
established by clear and convincing evidence, a hearing 
examiner may consider subsidiary facts that have been 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  This, too, is 
consistent with the evidentiary rule in criminal cases 
that, although every element needs to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, preliminary questions of fact and 
subsidiary facts need only be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence."  (Quotation and citation omitted.) 
 
Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 656.  While recognizing the 
burdensome nature of sex offender registration, we reiterate 
that, in the interest of accurately determining the risk of 
reoffense and dangerousness to the public, the board may 
consider subsidiary facts that are proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence, including subsidiary facts resulting in 
acquittals, where those facts are nonetheless proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Cf. Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 
301-302 (making exception to stare decisis because of 
substantial changes to law and other developments in time since 
previous decision). 
 
c.  Doe's challenge to the hearing examiner's decision.  In 
addition to challenging the legal standard, Doe also objects to 
the hearing examiner's specific application.  Doe contends that 
there is insufficient evidence to support his classification and 
the board otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously.  See 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  We reject both arguments, concluding 
there was substantial evidence to support the decision and no 
legal error. 
16 
 
 
Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 1 (6).  As we "give due weight to the experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], 
as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it," 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), Doe "bears a heavy burden of 
establishing that the [board]'s decision was incorrect" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Boston Police Dep't v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 483 Mass. 461, 469 (2019). 
 
Doe bases his argument on inconsistencies in victim three's 
accounts of the alleged assault, inconsistencies between her 
statements and those of others, the absence of surveillance 
video evidence, and victim three's motive to lie.8  In addition 
to those inconsistencies already reported in our discussion of 
the hearing examiner's facts,9 Doe emphasizes that victim three 
testified she could not pinpoint specific dates when Doe touched 
her; that she at different times testified to different 
timelines of how long she gave Doe rides and when the touching 
                                                          
 
 
8 Doe does not clarify what motive this is.  We assume it is 
the indication that she was never reimbursed for the rides she 
gave Doe, as the hearing examiner referenced this in his 
decision. 
 
 
9 The inconsistencies were, notably, the absence of victim 
three and Doe in a surveillance video recording, the store 
clerk's testimony that he did not see an incident, and Doe's 
friend's testimony that he never saw any inappropriate behavior 
while riding with Doe and victim three. 
17 
 
 
started; that she maintained she had told the police about the 
shotgun and the man-eating pig, but the police officer testified 
she never mentioned them; that she testified she was "not 
looking to get paid" but told the police officer that she 
expected to be paid; and that she reported the sexual assault 
after Doe failed to pay her. 
 
In this case, the hearing examiner properly considered both 
the trial transcripts and the police reports.  See Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
459 Mass. 603, 638 (2011) (hearing examiner not bound by rules 
of evidence and may admit and give probative effect to evidence 
if it is kind of evidence on which reasonable persons generally 
rely in conduct of serious affairs).  The hearing examiner's 
decision is clear that his finding that Doe did assault victim 
three on multiple occasions was based on her multiple detailed 
and consistent reports about the assaults.  The hearing examiner 
also considered the partial corroboration of victim three's 
statements, and the similarity between the reported assaults on 
victim two and the reported assaults on victim three.  
Importantly, the hearing examiner recognized that the statements 
were not fully corroborated and considered victim three's motive 
to lie before concluding that there was not substantial evidence 
that victim three was being deceptive in her statements to the 
police and in court.  He weighed the entirety of the evidence 
18 
 
 
before him, taking full note of the contents of the trial 
transcripts on which Doe relies and any inconsistencies therein 
with the police reports, and concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to find Doe sexually assaulted victim three.10 
 
After this conclusion, the hearing examiner considered, in 
detail, four high risk factors, eleven risk elevating factors, 
and three risk mitigating factors that he found applicable from 
the regulations' list of risk factors.11  As part of his 
analysis, the hearing examiner appropriately considered Doe's 
                                                          
 
 
10 The hearing examiner found "sufficient evidence under the 
clear and convincing standard to indicate that [Doe] did 
sexually assault [victim three] on multiple occasions."  As we 
have stated, this subsidiary fact need only be found by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 
656. 
 
 
11 The hearing examiner considered the high risk factors of 
Doe's repetitive and compulsive behavior, an adult offender and 
a child victim, Doe's age at his first sexual offense, and 
declining early release in order to avoid community supervision.  
The hearing examiner also considered the risk elevating factors 
of the relationship between Doe and the victims, alcohol and 
substance abuse, commission of a sex offense in a public place, 
an extravulnerable victim, the diversity of the types of Doe's 
victims, the number of victims, Doe's contact with the criminal 
justice system, his history of violence unrelated to sexual 
assaults, his noncompliance with community supervision, his 
hostility toward women, and his less than satisfactory 
participation in sex offender treatment.  Finally, the hearing 
examiner considered the risk mitigating factors of Doe's 
offense-free time in the community, his advanced age, and his 
participation in sex offender treatment, but the hearing officer 
gave the last factor no weight due to lack of documentation 
concerning Doe's participation and progress.   See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016) (listing and classifying risk 
factors). 
19 
 
 
long criminal history, including substance abuse;12 his nonsexual 
violence; his noncompliance with community supervision; and his 
multiple restraining orders from women.  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.33(9)-(13), (15).  Finding that Doe's behavior -- 
including, but not limited to, behavior underlying the 2015 
sexual offense charges -- implicated multiple risk factors, the 
hearing examiner concluded that there was clear and convincing 
evidence that Doe presents a high risk to reoffend sexually, and 
a degree of dangerousness to the public such that a substantial 
public safety interest is served by active dissemination of his 
sex offender registry information.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) 
(c) (elements for level three sex offender classification).  
Reviewing the hearing examiner's detailed decision and the 
reports and transcripts on which it relies, and giving due 
weight to the board's expertise and specialized knowledge, we 
conclude that the decision is supported by substantial evidence.  
See G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  Doe bases his argument on slight 
                                                          
 
 
12 Title 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(9) (2016) provides 
that, because "[d]rugs and alcohol are behavioral disinhibitors 
[that] may increase an offender's risk of reoffense," alcohol 
and substance abuse may be considered "when the sex offender has 
a history of substance abuse, demonstrates active substance 
abuse, or when the offender's substance use was a contributing 
factor in the sexual misconduct."  Victim three testified that 
Doe's offensive touching was worse when he was drunk.  Doe also 
has a lengthy history of substance-related crime.  The hearing 
examiner therefore found Doe's substance abuse to increase his 
risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness. 
20 
 
 
inconsistencies in the records that the hearing examiner 
carefully examined and weighed in his conclusion.  Cf. Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
456 Mass. 612, 622-623 (2010) (case remanded to board where 
board did not consider evidence presented of effect of age on 
recidivism). 
 
d.  Requirement that reclassification be based on new 
information.  Doe also argues that his upward reclassification 
was in violation of G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3), because it was not 
based on new evidence and the board failed to provide Doe a 
hearing within a reasonable time as required by statute.  
General Laws c. 6, § 178L (3), states: 
"The board may, on its own initiative . . . , seek to 
reclassify any registered and finally classified sex 
offender in the event that new information, which is 
relevant to a determination of a risk of re-offense or 
degree of dangerousness, is received.  The board shall 
promulgate regulations defining such new information and 
establishing the procedures relative to a reclassification 
hearing held for this purpose; provided that (i) the 
hearing is conducted according to the standard rules of 
adjudicatory procedure or other rules which the board may 
promulgate, (ii) the hearing is conducted in a reasonable 
time, and (iii) the sex offender is provided prompt notice 
of the hearing . . . ."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
We must read statutory language "with its plain meaning and 
in light of the aim of the Legislature" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019).  The 
statute's plain language is "the principal source of insight 
into legislative intent."  Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. 
21 
 
 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010), 
quoting Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting 
Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009).  Within a statute, "all parts 
shall be construed as consistent with each other so as to form a 
harmonious enactment effectual to accomplish its manifest 
purpose."  Bank of New York Mellon v. King, 485 Mass. 37, 50 
(2020), quoting Anderson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh PA, 476 Mass. 377, 381–382 (2017). 
 
Here, we must interpret the requirements of new information 
and a timely hearing, and their interrelationship.  We have 
previously stated that "[w]e do not consider the 'reasonable 
time' standard to be a rigid one; rather, it requires a 'fair 
consideration of the total circumstances of the case.'  However, 
it does not provide the board with unfettered discretion to 
delay offender-initiated reclassification and termination 
hearings . . . ."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 76819 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 212, 223 (2018), quoting 
School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 363 Mass. 20, 28 
(1973).  The same is true for board-initiated upward 
classifications.  We therefore consider whether the board's 
timing for initiating, conducting, and completing an upward 
classification was reasonable in light of the new information 
that the board was presented.  We conclude that the timing here 
was reasonable. 
22 
 
 
 
Doe alleges that the approximately three-year delay between 
the time of the 2015 sexual assault charges and the 2018 
reclassification hearing at issue violates the time requirements 
in G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3).  However, in this case, the board 
first sought to reclassify Doe in December 2015, two months 
after he was first acquitted of the new sex offenses.  There 
were reasonable explanations for the three-year delay in 
reaching a final decision on reclassification.  Doe's challenge 
to the initial reclassification decision resulted in a remand 
for the board to consider the trial transcripts.  Upon remand, 
the board discovered a procedural error, that there was no 
record of a vote by a majority of the full board to seek 
reclassification of Doe.  This procedural error did further 
delay final resolution, but the board timely rectified the 
error, documenting a vote of the full board less than one month 
after the error was discovered.  A new hearing considering the 
trial transcripts was then held.  There was no evidence of any 
improper motive or other bad faith on the part of the board.13  
In sum, the board acted expeditiously when it received 
information of allegations of new sex offenses against Doe, and 
the delays to finally resolve the reclassification were 
                                                          
 
 
13 There is also no evidence that the error was prejudicial.  
The hearing examiner based his de novo decision on records, 
transcripts, and police reports, all documents that were 
unaffected by the time needed to correct the procedural error. 
23 
 
 
reasonable and not evidence of any bad faith on the part of the 
board. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that the hearing examiner's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.  We 
further conclude that because the board promptly moved to 
reclassify Doe upon receipt of allegations of new sex offenses, 
and there was no evidence of any improper delay on the part of 
the board in its proceeding to reclassify Doe, the board's 
decision comports with the requirements of G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (3), that the decision to seek to reclassify Doe be based 
on "new information" and made at a hearing conducted within a 
"reasonable time."  Therefore, the judgment affirming the 
board's decision to classify Doe as a level three sex offender 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.