Case Title: Matter of Estate of Obra

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Estate of Obra1988 WY 10749 P.2d 272Case Number: 87-198Decided: 01/27/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CARL D. OBRA, DECEASED. BENITA O. MACARAEG, PAULINO 
OBRA, PACIENCIA OBRA, PAULINA BANIQUED, AND ALEJO OBRA, APPELLANTS 
(PETITIONERS),

v.

MARGARET H. 
WILSON, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Appeal from 
the District Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Ron 
Arnold of McCartney & Arnold, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

William A. Swainson, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, 
CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a will contest summary judgment by relatives of the decedent, Carl Obra, who 
devised his modest property, consisting primarily of a small dwelling, to 
Margaret H. Wilson, a friend who had been his 
employer.

[¶2.]     Appellants state the 
issues as:

"1. Did the 
lower court commit error as a matter of law by allowing Appellee to file 
depositions nine days after hearing?

"2. Did the 
lower court commit error as a matter of fact by granting summary judgment in 
spite of Appellants' filed Affidavit?

"3. Did the 
lower court commit error as a matter of law by granting summary judgment on the 
count of undue influence?"

We 
find the summary-judgment procedure utilized to have been improper, but we 
affirm because the procedural irregularity was waived and no evidence of 
prejudice is demonstrated in the record.

FACTS

[¶3.]     Carl D. Obra, an 
immigrant from the Philippines, came to Cheyenne in 1927 and 
resided here since that year. He executed a will on March 17, 1976, which left 
his property to appellants:

"I give, 
devise and bequeath all of my property, real, personal and mixed unto the 
following persons or the survivors of them, share and share alike: Benita O. 
Macaraeg, Binalonan, Pangasinan, Philippines; Paulino Obra, Tacurong, Cotabato, 
Philippines; Paciencia Obra, Tacurong, Cotabato, Philippines; Paulina Baniqued, 
Barriao Lichauco, Tayug, Pangasinan, Philippines; and Alejo Obra, Tacurong, 
Cotabato, Philippines."

[¶4.]     Subsequently, about 
four years after retirement in 1979 or 1980, he executed another will on July 
12, 1984, revoking prior wills and leaving his property to Wilson, who was also 
designated to be the executrix. Shortly after signing this second will, decedent 
was diagnosed as having lung cancer and died June 4, 1985. A petition to admit 
the will to probate without administration was filed and granted, as then 
subjected to the present petition to revoke by appellants as surviving relatives 
who claim that they should inherit under the 1976 will, or alternatively by 
intestacy pursuant to § 2-4-101, W.S. 1977, 1987 
Cum.Supp.

[¶5.]     Devisee Wilson first filed a 
motion to dismiss on October 1, 1985,1 followed by a motion for summary 
judgment on February 5, 1987 without accompanying affidavits or designation of 
existent depositions. The relatives filed their resistance to the motion, 
supported by the affidavit of Pat Vialpando, on June 10, 1987, predating the 
scheduled hearing date of June 15, 1987. The order of dismissal was signed June 
24, 1987. The two depositions which had been taken by appellee on November 19, 
1986, with both counsel participating in examination, were officially filed with 
the clerk of court as reflected by a filing stamp, on June 24, 1987,2 which filing obviously occurred 
concurrently with the entry of the order. That order, in succinct and 
dispositive language provided:

"The 
above-entitled matter coming on before the Court on June 15, 1987, upon the 
motion of defendant for summary judgment,

"The Court 
examined the evidence introduced by the defendant which consisted of the 
depositions of Adolfo J. Torrez, Jr., M.D., and Joyce Fitzhugh and stipulation 
for deposition of Margaret Wilson.

"The Court 
examined the evidence submitted by the petitioners being an affidavit of Pat 
Vialpando.

"The Court 
having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises 
finds generally for the defendant and against the petitioners and determines 
there remains no genuine issue of fact for trial, and it is therefore hereby 
"ORDERED that the petition to revoke probate of the petitioners be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed with prejudice."

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶6.]     The standards to be 
followed in regard to reviewing a summary judgment are established in the 
six-stage analysis in Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 639 (1986). See also 
Williams v. Blount, 
Wyo., 741 P.2d 595, 596 
(1987).

[¶7.]     Recently, this court in 
Davenport v. Epperly, Wyo., 
744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1987), outlined the six stages 
as:

"`1. Legal 
sufficiency of the complaint.

"`2. 
Procedural sufficiency of the motion for summary judgment and attached 
affidavits and deposition material.

"`3. 
Substantive sufficiency of the affidavits to initially support the 
motion.

"`4. 
Procedural sufficiency of responsive affidavits.

"`5. 
Substantive legal issue disposition.

"`6. 
Substantive sufficiency of responsive affidavits.'" Quoting from Cordova v. 
Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d  at 634.

[¶8.]     The first issue 
involves a Stage 2 analysis - the procedural sufficiency of the motion and 
attached affidavits. Clearly, Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.3, Rule 6(d), W.R.C.P.,4 and Rule 302, Uniform Rules for the 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming,5 envision that the supporting 
material be filed with the motion for summary judgment. Wyoming law requires that 
the supporting material must be filed with the motion for summary judgment. 
Atlas Construction Company v. Slater, Wyo., 746 P.2d 352 (1987); Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046, 1047 (1984); DeHerrera v. MemorialHospital of Carbon 
County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342, 1343 
(1979); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 56.14[1]; Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2719. See Hickey v. 
Burnett, Wyo., 707 P.2d 741 (1985), for a case where the material supporting the 
district court's summary judgment ruling was not filed late but was simply never 
filed. Furthermore, an attorney cannot choose simply to ignore the Wyoming rules of civil 
procedure. We have held previously, and must reiterate most strongly, that 
compliance with these rules is mandatory, not optional. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, Wyo., 741 P.2d 1079 (1987). Additionally, a 
movant faced with this situation could have requested an enlargement of time for 
filing6 or moved that the filing be 
permitted where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect as 
outlined in Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P.7 Larsen v. Roberts, supra, 676 P.2d  
at 1047-1048. However, the record is devoid of any request by appellee for 
permission to file late.

"The Rules 
of Civil Procedure provide an orderly process for the determination of 
controversies. They are intended to provide notice to a party of the other's 
contentions, a fair opportunity to discover and develop the entire case and meet 
those contentions, and to avoid surprise - all to the end that a just result is 
more probable. To condone a practice which permits parties to simply ignore the 
rules will defeat their purpose. Thus, where the moving party, as in this case, 
has failed to comply, there is not often a reasonable justification for the 
failure. He is in control of the situation. He can file his motion for summary 
judgment at any time he chooses. Ordinarily he should not file it nor set it for 
hearing until it is ready to be heard. When he undertakes to do otherwise, and 
the decision is against him or the hearing must be vacated, he has only himself 
to blame." 676 P.2d  at 1048.

Thus, we hold there was error in this procedure of accepting supporting 
depositions, filed late in rule contravention, as sufficient to sustain entry of 
summary judgment. Matthews v. Wyoming Department of Agriculture, Wyo., 719 P.2d 216 
(1986). 

[¶9.]     There is no question in 
this case the proper procedure was not followed; however, our inquiry is whether 
this defect was waived by appellants. Objection to the trial court's 
consideration of the depositions in summary-judgment determination at the 
scheduled hearing is not presented to us by anything of record. Appellants could 
have objected at the summary-judgment hearing, moved to strike the depositions 
or deny their consideration, or asked for a continuance of the summary-judgment 
hearing. Lack of knowledge did not exist, since both counsel had participated in 
the noticed deposition inquiry on November 19, 1986 as used by movant appellee 
to secure the testimony of the decedent's doctor as well as of his long-time 
friend. McCloud River Railroad Company v. Sabine River Forest Products, Inc., 
735 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1984). Lacking any recorded action of appellant to 
object to the court's consideration of the depositions and responsive affidavit, 
any formal defects in filing schedule were waived.8 Davenport v. Epperly, supra, 744 P.2d 1110.

[¶10.]  The purpose behind filing evidentiary 
material supporting a motion for summary judgment is to give notice to the 
opposite party, as respondent, in order to afford a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the submitted evidence. Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 445 
(1982); Jankovsky v. Halladay Motors, Wyo., 482 P.2d 129 (1971); CIA, Petrolera 
Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1985). Thus, 
when the movant does not file his material to support his motion, respondent is 
left without facts upon which a response can be engendered. We consider the 
sequence in this case: depositions taken November 1986; motion for summary 
judgment February, 1987; resistance to motion for summary judgment and attached 
affidavit of appellants filed June 10, 1987 being generally responsive to the 
earlier depositions; and then hearing held according to the scheduled assignment 
June 15, 1987 whereby objection to evidentiary consideration by the court of the 
depositions was not made. Objection to the court's examination of factual 
support or opposition to a motion for summary judgment first made on appeal, 
after consideration by the trial court without objection at the scheduled 
hearing is waived. Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV, 
Wyo., 713 P.2d 786 (1986). Prejudice to the interests of the respondent, in addition to waived 
objection, is also lacking. Cf. Nation v. Nation, Wyo., 715 P.2d 198 (1986); Greaser v. Williams, Wyo., 703 P.2d 327 
(1985).

[¶11.]  Considering the presented state of this 
record of a motion for summary judgment which was sufficiently supported at 
hearing to require response, the opposing affidavit of Vialpando also considered 
at hearing must be analyzed to determine whether a creditable conflict on a 
material issue of fact results. Koontz v. Town of South Superior, Wyo., 746 P.2d 1264 
(1987).

TESTAMENTARY 
CAPACITY

[¶12.]  In In re Morton's Estate, Wyo., 428 P.2d 725 
(1967), this court adopted the standard of testamentary capacity formulated in 1 
Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, § 12.21, pp. 606-608 
(1960):

"* * * 
Testator must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory, to 
know, in general, without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of 
which he is about to dispose, and nature of the act which he is about to 
perform, and the names and identity of the persons who are to be the objects of 
his bounty, and his relation towards them. He must have sufficient mind and 
memory to understand all of these facts, and to comprehend these elements in 
their relation to each other; and a charge, in negative form that capacity is 
lacking if testator is not able to know all of these facts, is erroneous, since 
he lacks capacity if he is unable to understand any one of them. He must be able 
to appreciate the relations of these factors to one another, and to recollect 
the decision which he has formed."

This legal standard can be broken down into three elements of 
testamentary capacity. The testator must 
comprehend:

(1) "the 
extent and nature of the estate;"

(2) "the 
identity of the beneficiaries and their relationship, whether by blood or 
circumstances, to the testator;" and

(3) "the 
nature of the testamentary act, that it is a disposition of property to take 
effect at death." 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, supra, p. 
608.

Additionally, Wyoming follows the general rule that a person 
is presumed to be sane and to possess testamentary capacity. In re Faragher's 
Estate, Wyo., 
367 P.2d 972 (1962). The will contestants have the burden to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there is testamentary incapacity, unless 
previous incompetency of the testator has been shown or admitted. In re Morton's 
Estate, supra, 428 P.2d  at 729.

[¶13.]  Since no previous incompetency of Obra 
was shown, the lack of testamentary capacity that appellants claim hinges on 
what importance to give a statement in the Vialpando 
affidavit:

"Prior to 
July, 1984, Carl D. Obra called me and stated that all of his relatives were 
deceased and that he had nobody to leave his property and to pick up his will as 
it was no good anymore. Mr. Obra appeared to believe his relatives to be all 
deceased, and I believed that he had no living relatives. I later learned that 
he had living relatives."

However, this statement does not touch on the dispositive issue of 
testamentary capacity. Clearly, Obra was either mistaken or estranged by 
inattention.9 Such a mistake, 
if it were a mistake, uncoupled with any other irregularities such as false 
representations, In re Holmes' Estate, 98 Colo. 360, 56 P.2d 1333, 1335 (1936), 
or evidence that the conception was an insane delusion, York v. Smith, Fla.App., 
385 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (1980); 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 13.11; Comment, Proof and 
Effect of Mistake as to the Provisions of Wills, 38 Mo.L.Rev. 48 (1973), does 
not mean testamentary capacity is lacking. About all that the record actually 
reveals is that the decedent changed his will by deletion of relatives and the 
substitution of a person, among others also considered, with whom a present 
acquaintanceship was maintained.

UNDUE 
INFLUENCE

[¶14.]  Appellants additionally contested the 
will on an undue-influence basis. The three elements of undue influence are: (1) 
opportunity to control; (2) a condition permitting subversion; and (3) activity 
on the part of the person charged. In re Draper's Estate, Wyo., 374 P.2d 425, 431 
(1962). Clear proof of undue influence is required to render a will voidable. 
Matter of Estate of Wilson, Wyo., 397 P.2d 805, 809 (1964), reh. denied 399 P.2d 1008 (1965); In re Draper's Estate, supra, 374 P.2d  at 
431.

[¶15.]  Appellants presented no evidence 
demonstrating undue influence by Wilson on decedent. The record may indicate 
only an opportunity: one with which Mr. Vialpando, the affiant, was also 
involved, at least initially. More than an opportunity is needed to prove undue 
influence. Matter of Estate of Wilson, supra; In re Draper's Estate, supra. Obra 
had retired from his job with Ms. Wilson over four years prior to executing the 
second will, and, although the depositions reflect they had remained friends, 
actual demonstration of undue influence is not 
shown.

[¶16.]  Chief Justice Blume in In re Nelson's 
Estate, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 246 (1954), sums up 
what apparently was appellants' primary concern in this case: the fact that the 
property was not left to a family member:

"* * * Next 
of kin and relatives, no matter how near they may be, cannot be said to have any 
natural right to the estate of the testator which can be asserted against the 
legally executed will of the latter."

[¶17.]  We conclude that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists in relation to appellants' claim of lack of capacity and 
undue influence. Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 
(1985).

[¶18.]  Finding the summary-judgment irregularity 
waived, and in any event finding no prejudice to the appellants, we 
affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1 Initially 
there was some question whether the appellants had standing to contest the will 
because as citizens of a foreign country they could not acquire real property in 
the state of Wyoming under § 2-4-105(a), W.S. 1977 when the foreign country does 
not allow United States citizens to take real property by succession or 
testamentary disposition. It should be noted that Article XIV, Sec. 14 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 
provides:

"Sec. 14. 
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or 
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to 
acquire or hold lands of the public domain."

A 
hearing was scheduled for October 17, 1985, but the parties were given 30 
additional days each to establish their right to inherit and to rebut same. 
Apparently, no further action was taken on this 
motion.

2 While there 
is no transcript of the summary-judgment proceeding, it is clear from the order 
that the judge relied on the two depositions of appellee in making his decision, 
and it is likely that the judge had been presented the two depositions for his 
review on or before June 15, 1987 when the actual hearing was 
held.

3"The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." (Emphasis 
added.) Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.

4"A written 
motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing 
thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the 
hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the 
court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the 
affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided 
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the 
hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time." 
(Emphasis added.) Rule 6(d), W.R.C.P.

5 "Discovery 
documents shall not be filed except:

* * * * * 
*

"(b) At the time of filing a 
motion for summary judgment the movant shall designate and file relevant 
portions of the discovery documents relied upon. The opponents of a summary 
judgment motion shall designate and file relevant discovery within the time 
allowed by Rule 56, W.R.C.P." (Emphasis added.) Rule 302, Uniform Rules for the 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming.

6 An 
enlargement of time must be requested "before the expiration of the period 
originally prescribed." (Emphasis added.) Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P. Therefore, 
apparently in this situation, a request for enlargement of time to file made on 
the day of the hearing would still have been tardy.

7"(b) 
Enlargement. - When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order 
of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, 
the court, or a commissioner thereof, for cause shown may at any time in its 
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if 
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the 
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure 
to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for 
taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), 72.1, 
73(a) and (g), and 75(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated 
in them. (Rule 7, D.Ct.)" Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P.

8 It is easy 
to understand what occurred at the summary-judgment hearing. Appellants' counsel 
had exposure to the depositions taken nearly nine months before, by 
participation and cross-examination. If he had made objections to consideration 
at the scheduled hearing, the session would undoubtedly have been recessed for 
11 days or more, or the motion would have been denied with leave to refile to 
reset when the appropriate ten-day notice time had expired. Both parties were 
present for a substantive consideration and had available all evidence that they 
had found. Without a transcript of that session, the parties are confined by the 
record as reflected in the terminology of the written order of dismissal, 
approved as to form by appellant:

"The Court 
examined the evidence * * * which consisted of the depositions of Adolfo J. 
Torrez, Jr., M.D., and Joyce Fitzhugh and stipulation for deposition of Margaret 
Wilson. "The Court examined the evidence submitted by the petitioners being an 
affidavit of Pat Vialpando."

Since the stipulation for the deposition of Wilson is reflected but 
nothing further appears in the record, it must be assumed that that deposition 
was never taken, or if taken was never transcribed. The stipulation 
read:

"Plaintiffs 
by and through their attorney, * * * and Defendant Margaret Wilson, by and 
through her attorney * * * stipulate that plaintiffs may depose Margaret Wilson 
at the law office of Mr. Swainson at 10:00 a.m. on April 21, 1987 before a court 
reporter for purposes of discovery in accordance with the Wyoming rules of civil 
procedure."

9 There is an 
old axiom nurtured in practical realism: "If you want the old codger to remember 
you by will, keep in close touch," for in fact, as with older ages of relatives, 
"absence does not make the heart grow fonder." Attention, as the elderly have 
little else, may not be something - it is near 
everything.