Case Title: People v. Coats

Citation: 2018 IL 121926

Docket Number: 121926

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 IL 121926 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket No. 121926) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
LESHAWN COATS, Appellant. 
Opinion filed January 19, 2018. 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and 
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Leshawn 
Coats was convicted of several offenses, including being an armed habitual 
criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2012)) and armed violence (id. § 33A-2(a)). 
The trial court sentenced him to 7 years in prison on the armed habitual criminal 
count, consecutive to a term of 15 years in prison on the armed violence count. 
Defendant appealed, contending that his convictions were predicated on the same 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
physical act of gun possession in violation of the one-act, one-crime rule. The 
appellate court concluded that the one-act, one-crime rule did not prohibit the 
multiple convictions. 2016 IL App (1st) 142028-U. For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
¶ 2 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
In June 2013, Chicago police officer Edwin Utreras was part of a team 
executing a search warrant at a two-flat basement apartment in Chicago. After 
forcing entry into the apartment and detaining four individuals, Utreras and his 
team approached a locked, rear room. They knocked on the door and heard people 
shuffling around inside the room, but nobody answered the door. Utreras’s partner 
then forced entry into the room, where Utreras saw defendant holding a handgun in 
his left hand and two plastic bags in his right hand, which he was placing on a 
window ledge. 
¶ 4 
Utreras recovered a .45-caliber handgun loaded with nine live rounds of 
ammunition, as well as both bags. Inside one bag was a clear bag containing 53 
smaller bags of suspected crack cocaine and one “knotted bag” containing 
suspected crack cocaine. Inside the other bag was a clear plastic bag containing 92 
bags of suspected heroin. Drugs were also recovered in other areas of the room, 
including suspected heroin recovered from the refrigerator. The police also 
recovered cash currency, ammunition, and narcotics packaging materials. The 
contents of the plastic bags were tested. The parties stipulated that a chemist 
verified the contents of the plastic bags defendant was holding, which contained 
over 15 grams of heroin. The parties also stipulated to defendant’s prior convictions 
for robbery and aggravated robbery. 
¶ 5 
The trial court found defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal, 
armed violence, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance (heroin) 
with intent to deliver. The possession counts merged into the armed violence count. 
Defendant was sentenced to 7 years in prison on the armed habitual criminal count 
to run consecutively to a term of 15 years in prison on the armed violence count.1 
1 Consecutive sentences were mandated under section 5-8-4(d)(3) of the Unified Code of 
Corrections where defendant was convicted of armed violence based upon the predicate offense of a 
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¶ 6 
On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that his convictions for both 
armed violence and armed habitual criminal violated the one-act, one-crime rule 
because they were predicated on the same physical act of gun possession. After 
reviewing the claim under the second prong of the plain error doctrine, the 
appellate court affirmed, finding that the offenses did not result from precisely the 
same physical act and that neither offense was a lesser-included offense of the 
other. 2016 IL App (1st) 142028-U, ¶¶ 27-29. 
¶ 7 
In reaching its conclusion that the multiple convictions did not violate the 
one-act, one-crime rule, the court recognized a conflict between the Second District 
decision in People v. Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d 975 (1999), and the Fourth 
District’s decision in People v. White, 311 Ill. App. 3d 374 (2000). 2016 IL App 
(1st) 142028-U, ¶¶ 25-27. The appellate court found White to be more persuasive. 
Id. ¶ 27. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. 
Mar. 15, 2016). 
¶ 8 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 9 
Initially, defendant recognizes that he has forfeited his one-act, one-crime 
argument by failing to raise it before the trial court, but he seeks review under the 
plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider 
an unpreserved error “(1) when ‘a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence 
is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice 
against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,’ or (2) when ‘a 
clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the 
fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, 
regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, 
¶ 48 (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007)). 
¶ 10 
The State maintains that defendant has forfeited his plain error argument 
because he failed to show that the claimed error was clear or obvious. We disagree. 
This court has previously explained that one-act, one-crime violations fall within 
the second prong of the plain error doctrine as an obvious error so serious that it 
violation of subsection (a) of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 
570/401 (West 2012)). 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(3) (West 2012). 
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challenges the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Nunez, 236 Ill. 2d 488, 
493 (2010); see also People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 168 (2009) (protections 
afforded to defendants by the one-act, one-crime rule are integral to maintaining the 
integrity of the judicial process); In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 378-79 (2009) 
(a one-act, one-crime violation “satisf[ies] the second prong of the plain-error 
test”). Thus, despite the forfeiture, we will address defendant’s argument under the 
second prong of the plain error doctrine. 
¶ 11 
We first consider whether a one-act, one-crime error occurred. In People v. 
King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977), this court held that a criminal defendant may not 
be convicted of multiple offenses when those offenses are all based on precisely the 
same physical act. Although this rule is not derived from the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy, we have continued to reaffirm and adhere to it 
over the last four decades based on the prejudice that results when there are 
multiple convictions for precisely the same criminal conduct. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at 
164-68. 
¶ 12 
Whether a violation of the rule has occurred is a question of law, which we 
review de novo. People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 105 (2008). In making that 
determination, this court has long followed a two-step analysis. People v. 
Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996). First, the court ascertains whether the 
defendant’s conduct consisted of a single physical act or separate acts. Id. If it is 
determined that the defendant committed multiple acts, the court then moves to the 
second step and determines whether any of the offenses are lesser-included 
offenses. Id. If none of the offenses are lesser-included offenses, then multiple 
convictions are proper. Id. 
¶ 13 
A. One Act or Several Acts 
¶ 14 
We must first determine whether defendant’s conduct consisted of separate 
physical acts or a single physical act. Defendant maintains that his armed violence 
conviction was carved from precisely the same physical act as his armed habitual 
criminal conviction because they both arose from his act of possessing the 
handgun. We disagree. 
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¶ 15 
The definition of an “act,” as stated in King, is “any overt or outward 
manifestation which will support a different offense.” King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. 
Although defendant is correct that both offenses shared the common act of 
possessing the handgun, under the definition outlined in King, “ ‘[a] person can be 
guilty of two offenses when a common act is part of both offenses’ ” (Rodriguez, 
169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting People v. Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252 (1983))) “or 
part of one offense and the only act of the other offense” (Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d 
at 252). 
¶ 16 
Several examples illustrate this application of King. Most notably, in 
Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and 
home invasion. Although both offenses shared the common act of the defendant 
threatening the victim with a gun, the defendant’s unlawful entry into the victim’s 
bedroom was a separate act that supported the home invasion offense. Rodriguez, 
169 Ill. 2d at 188-89. We explained that, “ ‘[a]s long as there are multiple acts as 
defined in King, their interrelationship does not preclude multiple convictions.’ ” 
(Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 189 (quoting People v. Myers, 85 Ill. 2d 281, 288 
(1981)); see also People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58, 105 (1998) (holding that 
multiple convictions for intentional murder and home invasion were proper 
because, although both involved the same physical act of setting a fire, the physical 
act of entering the dwelling of the victim was a separate act that supported the home 
invasion offense); People v. Marston, 353 Ill. App. 3d 513, 519 (2004) (holding 
that multiple convictions for home invasion and aggravated battery were proper 
despite the common act of striking the victim with a pole where the defendant’s 
entry into the home was a separate act that supported the home invasion 
conviction); Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 252 (holding that multiple convictions for 
residential burglary and home invasion were proper because, despite the one act of 
entry into the victim’s home which served as the basis for both convictions, the 
home invasion offense involved an additional act of intentional injury and, 
therefore, the two offenses were not carved from precisely the same physical act); 
People v. Tate, 106 Ill. App. 3d 774, 778-79 (1982) (holding that multiple 
convictions for home invasion and aggravated battery were proper despite the 
common act of stabbing the victim where the unlawful entry was a separate act 
applicable only to the home invasion offense). 
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¶ 17 
The facts of this case reveal that defendant’s conduct consisted of two physical 
acts: possession of the handgun and possession of the drugs. Although the two 
offenses shared the common act of possession of the handgun, which served as a 
basis for both convictions, defendant’s armed violence conviction involved a 
separate act, possessing the drugs. That act was applicable only to the armed 
violence offense. Since the possession of the handgun was only part of the conduct 
which formed the basis for the separate armed violence conviction, the two 
offenses were not carved from precisely the same physical act. 
¶ 18 
Defendant recognizes our holding in Rodriguez but, nevertheless, maintains 
that the King analysis implicitly requires a determination of whether the offenses 
share a “crucial” act. He articulates the rule as follows: If the two offenses share a 
common act that formed the “crux” or “essence” of the crime, multiple convictions 
cannot stand. Defendant cites decisions from this court that he argues cannot 
otherwise be reconciled without applying this rule, particularly our decision in 
McLaurin. Under defendant’s construction of King, he asserts that the possession 
of the handgun was the “crux” of both offenses and, therefore, both convictions 
cannot stand. We need not consider whether possession was the “crux” of both 
offenses because we reject defendant’s construction of King. 
¶ 19 
In the four decades since King was decided, we have never applied the one-act, 
one-crime rule in the manner defendant urges here. Further, our decision in 
McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58, does not support the adoption of defendant’s “crux” 
theory. In that case, the defendant’s conduct involved entering the victim’s house, 
tying him up, and setting him on fire. The defendant was convicted of several 
offenses including, inter alia, first degree murder, home invasion, aggravated 
arson, and residential burglary. He made several one-act, one-crime assertions 
involving the four convictions. As previously explained, his convictions for murder 
and home invasion could both stand because, although the murder and home 
invasion offenses shared the common act of setting the fire, the additional physical 
act of unlawfully entering the dwelling of the victim supported the home invasion 
conviction. Id. at 105. 
¶ 20 
The defendant then argued that his conviction for residential burglary must be 
vacated because it was predicated on the same unauthorized entry that established 
the conviction for home invasion. We agreed. Although not expressly stated, our 
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reasoning was not based on any determination of the “crux” or “essence” of the 
crimes. Instead, our rationale is evident from reviewing the defendant’s conduct in 
relation to all of the convictions. Under the circumstances, not only did the offense 
of residential burglary share the common act of unlawful entry, there was no 
additional act that could support a separate offense because the act of setting the 
fire had already been attributed to the murder conviction. Id. at 105-06. Similarly, 
the aggravated arson conviction and the murder conviction were both carved from 
precisely the same physical act of setting the fire, and there was no additional 
physical act that could support the separate aggravated arson offense. Accordingly, 
under one-act, one-crime principles, the defendant was properly convicted of two 
offenses for two separate physical acts—the unlawful entry and the setting of the 
fire. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the result in McLaurin is indeed consistent 
with this court’s construction of King and our decision in Rodriguez. 
¶ 21 
Next, defendant asserts that King’s application here is irreconcilable with the 
notion that one cannot be convicted of both intentional and felony murder of the 
same victim despite the fact that felony murder involves a separate act in addition 
to the acts which caused the death—namely, the predicate felony. Defendant 
maintains that the only way to reconcile the inconsistency is to consider the “crux” 
of the crime, which he characterizes as the act or acts which caused the death. 
Again, we need not consider the “crux” of the offenses in one-act, one-crime 
analysis to reconcile King in the felony murder context with its application here. 
¶ 22 
The offense of first degree murder is set forth in section 9-1(a) of the Criminal 
Code of 2012. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2016). In that statute, the Illinois General 
Assembly provided for three ways to commit one offense: intentional, knowing, 
and felony murder. Id. As we have previously explained, the different theories 
embodied in the murder statute are merely different ways to commit the same 
offense. Id.; People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). 
¶ 23 
Although felony murder involves an additional physical act beyond the acts that 
cause the death, the legislature has determined that there is only one offense of 
murder. Under King, felony murder is not a separate offense but, rather, a separate 
theory of the same offense. See King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. Accordingly, a defendant 
cannot be convicted of both the intentional murder and felony murder of the same 
victim. 
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¶ 24 
Defendant is correct that in certain circumstances convictions for multiple 
counts of the same offense can be proper. In those cases, the question for the court 
would be to determine the legislative intent behind the statute and to determine 
whether there is evidence to support multiple violations of the statute. See, e.g., 
People v. Butler, 64 Ill. 2d 485, 489 (1976) (upholding two convictions for armed 
robbery where the defendant threatened the use of force against two people and the 
statute defined the criminal act as being directed against the person); People v. 
Angarola, 387 Ill. App. 3d 732, 740 (2009) (noting that under the forgery statute, 
the legislature recognized that a defendant can be properly charged based on each 
stage of the process, allowing a defendant to be convicted for both the act of 
making the forged document and the act of delivering the forged document). In this 
case, multiple counts of the same offense are not at issue. Thus, those types of 
legislative considerations are not applicable here. 
¶ 25 
Lastly, we are asked to reconcile the two conflicting outcomes in the appellate 
court cases of Williams and White. Again, we need not apply defendant’s “crux” 
theory to analyze these cases. In both cases, the defendants were convicted of 
armed violence predicated on being armed while in possession of a controlled 
substance (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1996)) and unlawful possession of a weapon 
by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). In Williams, the officer found a gun and a bag of 
cocaine in a car where defendant had been sitting. The court held that the 
simultaneous possession of the gun and drugs was a common act that could not 
support convictions for both offenses. Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 978. In White, 
the defendant was arrested while in possession of a gun and cocaine. The court 
disagreed with Williams, concluding that the possession of the gun and the drugs 
were separate acts. White, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 386. 
¶ 26 
Defendant initially maintained before this court that Williams was correctly 
reasoned, but he acknowledged at oral argument that the holding in Williams is 
erroneous. Two separate acts, possession of the gun and possession of the drugs, do 
not become one common act solely by virtue of being proximate in time. People v. 
Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 48 (stating that although defendant’s possession of two 
separate and distinct items of contraband was simultaneous, “that factor alone does 
not render his conduct a ‘single act’ for purposes of the one-act, one-crime rule”). 
Additionally, as we explained in Rodriguez, a defendant can be convicted of two 
offenses even when they share a common act, as long as there is an additional act 
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that can support a separate offense. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 189. As the court in 
White concluded, the defendant’s possession of the gun was an act distinct from the 
defendant’s possession of the drugs which could support the separate offense of 
armed violence. Consequently, based on this court’s precedent, Williams 
misapplied the one-act, one-crime rule. We therefore expressly overrule it. 
¶ 27 
We acknowledge that in White, the court appears to have created some 
confusion in ascertaining what conduct constitutes an “act” under King. The court 
reasoned that “[a]lthough both offenses shared the common act of possession of a 
weapon, armed violence required the additional act of possession of the drugs, and 
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon required the additional element of 
status as a felon.” (Emphasis added.) White, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 386. A felon’s 
status is not an “act” but, rather, a state of being. To clarify, a defendant’s status is 
not factored into the first part of the King analysis to determine whether a 
defendant’s conduct consists of one act or several acts. Nevertheless, the holding in 
White is ultimately correct because the gun possession and the drug possession 
were separate acts. 
¶ 28 
In sum, under the first step in the one-act, one-crime analysis, defendant’s 
conduct consisted of multiple acts. We next consider the second step. 
¶ 29 
B. Lesser-Included Offenses 
¶ 30 
Under the second step in the one-act, one-crime analysis the court determines 
whether any of the offenses are lesser-included ones. The appellate court, applying 
the charging instrument approach, found that the offenses here were not lesser 
included where each charging instrument did not set out the main outline for the 
other offense. 2016 IL App (1st) 142028-U, ¶ 29. Defendant does not challenge 
that finding here. However, in the interest of maintaining a sound body of 
precedent, we note that the appellate court erroneously applied the charging 
instrument approach to that determination, relying on People v. Pena, 317 Ill. App. 
3d 312, 323 (2000). As we have explained, when the issue of lesser-included 
offenses arises in the context of a one-act, one-crime issue where the defendant was 
convicted of both offenses, we apply the abstract elements approach as opposed to 
determining whether an uncharged offense is a lesser-included offense to a charged 
offense using the charging instrument approach. People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161, 
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166 (2010). Nevertheless, employing that approach would not have changed the 
result in this case. Compare 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 2012), with id. 
§ 24-1.7(a)(1). 
¶ 31 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 32 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that defendant’s convictions were 
proper under the one-act, one-crime rule. Accordingly, because we find no error, 
there is no plain error. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
¶ 33 
Affirmed. 
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