Case Title: Gardner v. Jefferys

Citation: 178 Vt. 594, 2005 VT 56, 878 A.2d 259

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gardner v. Jefferys (2004-022); 178 Vt. 594; 878 A.2d 259

2005 VT 56

[Filed 04-May-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 56

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-022

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 2005

  Sheldon Gardner	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Washington Superior Court
                                       }	
  William Jefferys III, Susan          }
  Jefferys, George Soules and          }
  Janice Soules	                       }	DOCKET NO. 569-9-00 Wncv

                                                Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiff Sheldon Gardner appeals the superior court's
  determination that a restrictive covenant in his deed runs with the land to
  the benefit of adjacent landowners, defendants George and Janice Soules and
  defendants William and Susan Jefferys.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  In 1957, William Jefferys Jr. and his wife Ena, the parents
  of defendant William Jefferys III, purchased approximately two hundred
  acres of farm land in Fayston, Vermont known as the Strong Farm.  Beginning
  in 1966, the elderly Jefferys began selling off parcels of the farm.  In
  1969, plaintiffs Sheldon and Carin Gardner purchased, by warranty deed, a
  ten-acre parcel of undeveloped land from the Jefferys.  The deed contains a
  restrictive covenant providing that a specified

    part of the premises . . . shall forever be and remain open and
    free of all buildings and structures, except the right to
    construct on said open land a private swimming pool, and/or tennis
    court, and, the usual fences and structures appurtenant thereto
    and such other buildings and structures as meet the approval, in
    writing of the Grantors herein, their heirs and assigns.

       ¶  3.  The provision further states that rights secured therein are
  "to be enjoyed by the Grantors, their heirs and assigns."  In 1975, the
  Jefferys conveyed a five-acre parcel of land to Karin Souminen, who, in
  turn, sold the parcel to George and Janice Soules in 1987.  The Soules
  moved to Vermont and began to reside on the property in 1990, after they
  constructed a house there.  Their property is located above the Gardners'
  land.  In 1979, the elderly Jefferys conveyed the remainder of their
  Fayston property to their son, William Jefferys III, and his wife, Susan.
   
       ¶  4.  In the late summer and early fall of 1999, the Gardners wrote
  to William and Susan Jefferys twice requesting approval to build a
  two-story structure within the area restricted by the above-quoted
  covenant.  The Jefferys gave the Soules a copy of the request.  In June
  2000, one month after the Gardners obtained a permit to build a
  fifteen-foot accessory structure in the restricted area, the Soules wrote
  the Gardners a letter advising that they were interested parties to the
  restrictive covenant.  In September 2000, after receiving a letter from the
  town zoning administrator informing them that the posts and net placed on
  their open field were more similar to a temporary badminton or volleyball
  net than a permanent tennis court requiring a permit, the Gardners filed a
  declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the effect of the
  restrictive covenant in their deed.  The Soules responded by filing a
  counterclaim.

       ¶  5.  In May 2001, the Gardners began constructing a shed in the
  restricted area.  Shortly thereafter, the superior court granted the
  Soules' request for a preliminary injunction halting the construction.  In
  the fall of 2001, the Gardners began planting white pines in the restricted
  area directly in the Soules' view.  The Soules sought to enjoin the
  Gardners from planting the trees, but, following a hearing, the superior
  court denied the request for a preliminary injunction.  In July 2003,
  following four days of a hearing on the merits of the declaratory judgment
  action, the superior court ruled that the benefit of the restrictive
  covenant ran with the land and was enforceable by both the Soules and the
  Jefferys, and that the Gardners had violated the covenant by commencing
  construction of the proposed shed and by planting trees in the restricted
  area.  Accordingly, the court enjoined the continued existence of the shed
  and the trees.  Further, the court prohibited the Gardners from allowing
  plants or crops in the restricted area to exceed six feet in height.  On
  appeal, plaintiff Sheldon Gardner argues that the superior court erred (1)
  by concluding that the restrictive covenant runs with the land to the
  benefit of the Soules and the Jefferys; (2) by requiring him to ensure that
  vegetation in the restricted area does not exceed six feet in height; and
  (3) by determining that the restrictive covenant prohibits him from
  constructing the proposed shed and planting the trees.
        
       ¶  6.  Plaintiff first contends that the restrictive covenant does
  not run with the land to the benefit of defendants because the parties
  intended the covenant to bind only the grantors, their heirs and assigns,
  and neither the Soules nor the Jefferys are heirs or assigns of the
  grantors.  We do not find this argument persuasive.  Four requirements must
  be met for a restrictive covenant to "run with the land" so that successor
  property owners may enforce its burdens and benefits: (1) the covenant must
  be in writing; (2) the parties to the covenant must have intended that the
  covenant run with the land; (3) the covenant must "touch and concern" the
  land; and (4) privity of estate must exist between the parties.  Rogers v.
  Watson, 156 Vt. 483, 487, 594 A.2d 409, 411 (1991).  Plaintiff argues only
  that the second requirement is not met in this case.  Intent that a
  restrictive covenant is to run with the land may be either express or
  implied, and may be shown by extraneous circumstances.  Id. at 488, 594 A.2d  at 412; see Welch v. Barrows, 125 Vt. 500, 504,