Case Title: Jamerson v. Coleman-Adams Construction

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091685

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, Millette, and 
Mims, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
KEVIN JAMERSON 
 
v.  Record No. 091685 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COLEMAN-ADAMS CONSTRUCTION, 
 
    SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 
INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 
James W. Updike, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, Kevin Jamerson asks us to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court dismissing his personal injury 
action because it was filed beyond the statutory limitation 
period provided by Code § 8.01-250.  We conclude that the steel 
platform and pole which collapsed causing the injuries sustained 
by Jamerson are not “equipment, machinery or other article” 
under Code § 8.01-250 but ordinary building materials.  Because 
Code § 8.01-250 provides a five-year period of repose for claims 
based on alleged defects in ordinary building materials, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
FACTS 
 
In 1997 the Moneta Volunteer Fire Department sent out a 
request for bids for the construction of a new fire station.  
Coleman-Adams Construction, Inc. (Coleman-Adams) submitted a 
bid, which was accepted.  Construction began in the spring of 
1998.  In October, Ricky Tuck, Chief of the Fire Department, 
informed Charles Evans, vice-president of Coleman-Adams, that 
 
the fire station needed a quicker means of access from the 
second floor to the fire truck and equipment bay located on the 
first floor than the single staircase contained in the original 
building plans.  Evans and Tuck agreed on the placement of a 
platform and pole on the second floor that would allow 
firefighters to access the truck and equipment bay from the 
second floor of the fire station. 
 
Evans sought a price quote or bid for a three foot by five 
foot grating platform with rails and a three inch diameter pipe 
with brace plate and brace angles with all steel prime painted 
from Virginia Steel & Building Specialties (Virginia Steel), the 
subcontractor providing structural and miscellaneous steel for 
the fire station project.  Tina Fleshman, vice-president of 
Virginia Steel, responded with a price quote of $820.00, which 
Evans accepted.  The platform and pole were designated as a 
change order to the contract between Coleman-Adams and Moneta.  
Moneta accepted and paid for the change order.  Virginia Steel 
prepared detailed shop drawings based on the requirements 
submitted by Coleman-Adams, constructed the platform and pole, 
and delivered the platform and pole to Coleman-Adams at the 
Moneta fire station site.  Coleman-Adams installed the pole and 
platform in late December 1998 or early January 1999. 
 
On November 4, 2006, Kevin Jamerson, a volunteer 
firefighter with the Moneta Volunteer Fire Department, was 
 
 
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standing on the platform for the slide pole and was injured when 
the platform collapsed causing him to fall to the concrete floor 
approximately 20 feet below.  Jamerson filed a complaint seeking 
damages of $10 million from Coleman-Adams and Virginia Steel 
alleging that their negligence in designing, manufacturing, and 
inspecting the platform and pole installed in the fire station 
caused his injuries.  Coleman-Adams and Virginia Steel filed 
pleas in bar asserting that Jamerson’s action was barred by the 
five-year statute of repose contained in Code § 8.01-250.  
Following an ore tenus hearing, the trial court sustained the 
pleas in bar and dismissed Jamerson’s complaint, ruling that the 
platform and pole were ordinary building materials subject to 
the five-year statute of repose.  We awarded Jamerson an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Jamerson raises two assignments of error in this appeal.1  
Initially, Jamerson claims that the trial court erred because it 
applied “its own test” in determining whether the pole and 
platform were machinery or equipment.  Jamerson also asserts 
that applying the correct analysis established in our prior 
cases, the pole and platform are equipment for purposes of Code 
§ 8.01-250 and therefore claims based on defects in the pole and 
platform are not barred by the five-year statute of repose.  We 
disagree. 
                                                 
1 Jamerson withdrew a third assignment of error. 
 
 
The test that Jamerson asserts the trial court created was 
that, to qualify as equipment, the item in question had to “do 
something.”  However, a review of the record does not support 
Jamerson’s assertion that the trial court created and applied 
such a definitive test.  The court used that phrase as part of 
its analysis when considering the function of the pole and 
platform insofar as they became “an integrated part of the 
entire construction.”  The trial court considered all the cases 
decided by this Court relating to whether an item was equipment 
or machinery for purposes of the statute, and how the factors 
identified in each of those cases applied in this case.  
Accordingly, we reject Jamerson’s assertion that the trial court 
created and applied a new test in resolving the issue in this 
case. 
 
We next turn to Jamerson’s argument that application of 
this Court’s prior cases compels the conclusion that the 
platform and pole qualify as equipment.  We begin with a review 
of our prior cases.  Prior to 1973, the predecessor to Code 
§ 8.01-250, former Code § 8-24.2, prohibited suits against 
persons designing, planning, supervising construction or 
constructing any improvement to real property based on defects 
or unsafe conditions of such improvement five years after the 
performing or furnishing of such services or construction.  In 
1973, the General Assembly amended the statute by excluding from 
 
 
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the five-year repose period manufacturers or suppliers of 
equipment or machinery that was installed in or became a part of 
the real property.  1973 Acts ch. 247.2  The General Assembly, 
however, did not define “equipment or machinery” for purposes of 
the statute.  Consequently, this Court has been required to 
develop a body of jurisprudence to determine whether an item 
installed in a structure or part of real property as an 
improvement was equipment or machinery for purposes of the 
statute of repose. 
 
In the first case addressing the 1973 amendment, Cape Henry 
Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 
(1985), this Court determined that the 1973 amendment was 
intended to create a distinction between “those who furnish 
ordinary building materials, which are incorporated into 
construction work outside the control of their manufacturers or 
suppliers, at the direction of architects, designers, and 
contractors, and, on the other hand, those who furnish machinery 
                                                 
2 This amendment was adopted in response to a federal 
district court case which concluded that a jute-picking machine 
installed in a factory constituted an improvement to the realty 
and therefore an action based on negligent manufacture or design 
of the machine brought 14 years after the machine was installed 
was barred by the five-year statute of repose.  Cape Henry 
Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 599-600, 331 
S.E.2d 476, 478-79 (1985)(explaining that the 1973 amendment to 
former Code § 8-24.2 was adopted in response to and to change 
the rule of Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 
350, 354 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff’d via unpublished opinion (4th 
Cir. March 8, 1972)). 
 
 
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or equipment.”  Id. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480.  The former 
category is entitled to the five-year statute of repose; the 
latter category is not.  Id.  Subsequent cases likewise have 
focused on whether the item or items in question were ordinary 
building materials or equipment and machinery: Baker v. 
Poolservice Co., 272 Va. 677, 636 S.E.2d 360 (2006); Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 537 S.E.2d 580 
(2000); Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics, Inc., 255 Va. 368, 498 
S.E.2d 911 (1998); and Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 236 
Va. 305, 374 S.E.2d 17 (1988).3  Further, while definitions of 
equipment or machinery found in other parts of the Code or 
administratively adopted regulations, see, e.g., Virginia 
Uniform Statewide Building Code § 202.0 (1996 ed. 1997) 
(defining “equipment” and “structure”), may be helpful in some 
circumstances, they, nevertheless, cannot adequately address in 
every instance the distinction we found the General Assembly 
made between ordinary building materials and equipment and 
machinery for purposes of the application of the statute of 
repose. 
As reflected in these cases, we have identified various 
characteristics of the items in question, which, in a specific 
                                                 
3 In Baker, we rejected suggestions that we abandon the 
“ordinary building materials doctrine” finding that the doctrine 
is not the result of “flagrant error or mistake . . . and [we] 
consider it part of the settled jurisprudence of the 
Commonwealth.”  Id. at 689; 636 S.E.2d at 367. 
 
case, led to the determination that the items were or were not 
ordinary building materials.  Nevertheless, we have not held any 
single characteristic or set of characteristics as determinative 
of the issue.  Each case has been and must be decided based on 
its own circumstances. 
 
Here, Jamerson reaches his conclusion that the platform and 
pole are equipment by taking factors cited in previous cases and 
applying them to his version of the facts.  In considering 
Jamerson’s contentions, we consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party prevailing below but review de novo the 
ultimate question whether the platform and pole are equipment or 
machinery within the meaning of Code § 8.01-250.  Caplan v. 
Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 225, 563 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2002). 
 
Jamerson, relying on the discussion of warranties attaching 
to equipment in Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 
480, contends the pole and platform are equipment because 
Virginia Steel warranted the pole and platform.  However, the 
“warranty” reflected in the record, was not a written warranty 
with terms but a policy of Virginia Steel to stand behind its 
work.  Furthermore, this “warranty” was never communicated to 
Coleman-Adams or Moneta.  This is not the kind of “independent 
manufacturer’s warranties” which this Court in Cape Henry Towers 
considered as a reason why materialmen who provide equipment and 
 
 
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machinery were excluded from the five-year statute of repose.  
Id. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480. 
 
Similarly, Jamerson asserts that the pole and platform were 
subject to “close quality control” by Virginia Steel, of the 
type characteristic of equipment.  Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 
602, 331 S.E.2d at 480; Cooper, 260 Va. at 593-95, 537 S.E.2d at 
589-90; Luebbers, 255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913.  The “close 
quality control” alleged by Jamerson involved the fact that the 
person welding the steel had passed a test qualifying him to 
weld structural metals and that the welds were inspected by 
Virginia Steel and Coleman-Adams.  However, the record shows 
that the inspection of the pole and platform was a “review,” not 
the type of quality control process associated with equipment 
and machinery discussed in Cape Henry Towers and its progeny. 
 
Next Jamerson argues that the plans as well as the 
installation instructions for the pole and platform were 
provided by Virginia Steel and therefore make the pole and 
platform equipment.  Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 602, 331 
S.E.2d at 480, Cooper, 260 Va. at 595-96, 537 S.E.2d at 590, 
Luebbers, 255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913.  Again, Jamerson’s 
characterization is not supported by the record.  The record 
does show that Virginia Steel prepared the shop drawings for the 
job but the shop drawings were prepared based on the dimensions 
provided by Coleman-Adams following Moneta’s request for the new 
 
 
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access point and agreement regarding the adaptation of the 
original plan to accommodate the plan.  The “installation 
instructions” on the shop drawings upon which Jamerson relies 
consisted only of suggested types of bolts that could be used to 
install the platform. 
 
Jamerson maintains that the pole and platform were not 
assembled at the construction site, and thus, were like the 
switchgear and circuit breakers held to be equipment in Cooper, 
260 Va. at 595-96, 537 S.E.2d at 590.  However, while the 
location of the parts assembly was discussed in Cooper, the 
decision was grounded on the determination that the switchgear 
and circuit breakers were not “‘essential to the existence of 
the piers’” to which they were attached but comprised the 
electrical system for submarines docked at the pier.  Id. at 
595, 537 S.E.2d at 590.  Accordingly, they were not ordinary 
building materials incorporated into the pier structure.  Id.  
In this case, the pole and platform were a means of access 
essential to and integrated into the Moneta Volunteer Fire 
Department structure. 
 
Finally, Jamerson argues that the pole and platform were 
specially designed for the fire department, were not “fungible” 
or mass-produced, characteristics of the items determined to be 
ordinary building materials in Baker, 272 Va. at 691, 636 S.E.2d 
at 368, and Luebbers, 255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913.  The 
 
 
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unique nature of an item, however, does not per se preclude the 
item from characterization as an ordinary building material.  
Many items in a structure may be of a customized item or design, 
but still ordinary building materials for purposes of Code 
§ 8.01-250.  For example, a non-standard ramp, door, or set of 
stairs built to certain specifications to allow access to or in 
a home does not by virtue of that one-of-a-kind nature transform 
these ordinary building materials into machinery or equipment.  
In this case, the pole and platform’s function, like that of the 
ramp, door, or stairs, when incorporated into the building 
structure was to provide access within the building. 
 
In summary, for the reasons stated, we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in holding that the pole and platform 
were ordinary building materials incorporated into the 
structure.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court dismissing Jamerson’s complaint as time-barred under 
Code § 8.01-250.4 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, concurring. 
 
For more than a generation, lawyers and judges have 
struggled with the meaning of the undefined, judicially-created 
                                                 
4 Based on this holding we need not address appellees’ 
assignments of cross-error. 
 
term “ordinary building materials.”  Because I believe the time 
has come to return to first principles, i.e. the plain language 
of the statute, I concur with the result in this case without 
joining the majority opinion. 
 
Confusion about the term is apparent from the number of 
times this Court has grappled with Code § 8.01-250.  Six 
opinions in 25 years have attempted to illuminate what the Court 
means by “ordinary building materials.”  Yet, since that term 
does not appear in the statute and evades clear definition, we 
have created more heat than light. 
 
The unnecessary complexity in our jurisprudence is evident 
from the argument of counsel in this case and the majority 
opinion, which strives to provide direction along the confusing 
path.  Is there a warranty?  If so, is it a written “warranty 
with terms” or merely a “policy” to stand behind the work?  Is 
the work subject to “close quality control?”  Has the person 
performing the work passed a test qualifying him to do so?  Is 
there an “inspection” of the work or merely a “review?”  Are 
there “plans” or “installation instructions?”  If so, by whom 
were they provided?  Are shop drawings sufficient?  Where was 
the work assembled?  Is the work “essential to the existence” of 
the structure?  Is it “integrated into” the structure?  Is the 
work “specially designed and unique” or is it “fungible and 
 
 
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mass-produced?”  Is the work from a “customized design?”  What 
is the “function” of the work? 
No wonder the majority opinion warns “we have not held any 
single characteristic or set of characteristics determinative of 
the issue.  Each case has been and must be decided based on its 
own circumstances.”  But therein lies the fault – in cases laden 
with complex facts, an analysis that itself is more complex than 
the plain language of the statute requires and is overly 
dependent on circumstances offers scant useful legal guidance. 
 
Before outlining the development of “ordinary building 
materials” jurisprudence, it is helpful to trace relevant 
aspects of the legislative history of Code § 8.01-250 to show 
why the jurisprudence got off track.  The original statute, 
enacted in 1964 as Code § 8-24.2, applied generally to all 
improvements to real property.
1 
                                                 
1 It read: 
 
No action to recover damages for any injury to 
 
 
 
 
 
property, real or personal, or for bodily injury
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective 
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property, nor any action for contribution or 
indemnity for damages sustained as a result of
said injury, shall be brought against any person
performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of 
such improvement to real property more than five
years after the performance or furnishing of such 
services and construction.  This limitation shall 
not apply to actions against any person in actual 
 
 
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In 1971, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia interpreted that statute in Wiggins v. 
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), 
aff’d No. 71-1952 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 1972) (unpublished).  The 
plaintiff in Wiggins was injured by a 14-year-old machine on his 
employer’s premises that was “an essential component of . . . 
[the] manufacturing process” and “affix[ed] . . . to a heavy 
concrete foundation . . . by means of heavy hold-down bolts.” 
Id. at 351.  The federal court held that the machine, which was 
“permanently affixed to an existing building” by the occupant 
solely for its business use, was an improvement to real property 
for purposes of the statute.  Id. at 353-54. 
 
The Courts of Justice Committee of the House of Delegates 
sharply disagreed with the Wiggins court and took the highly 
unusual step of publishing a brief “report” explaining this 
disagreement: 
It is the opinion of this committee that Virginia 
Code section 8-24.2 was never intended to cover 
or apply to manufacturers or suppliers of any 
equipment, machinery or articles whether or not 
they become an improvement to real property.  It 
is the further opinion of this committee that the 
decision in Wiggins v. Proctor and Schwartz, 330 
           
                       
                                                                                                                          
 
possession and control as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the 
defective and unsafe condition of such improvement 
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or 
damage for which the action is brought. 
 
1964 Acts ch. 333. 
 
 
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F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), constitutes an 
erroneous interpretation of section 8-24.2.  I
is therefore the decision of this committee that 
the passage of HB 1476 [enacted as 1973 Acts of 
Assembly chapter 247] is necessary to correct the
misinterpretation of the said section by the 
Federal Court in the 
t 
 
Wiggins Case and to aid a
guide other courts in the proper interpretation 
of this section of the Code in all other cases 
whether now pending or hereafter instituted. 
nd 
 
use of Delegates Committee for Courts of Justice, Committee 
Ho
Report on HB 1476 (Feb. 5, 1973), reprinted in Cape Henry 
Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 604, 331 
S.E.2d 476, 481 (1985). 
 
The 1973 enactment referenced in this report added the 
following sentence to the statute: 
This limitation shall not apply to the 
t or 
ise. 
 
73 Acts ch. 247.  
Based upon this legislative and judicial history, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the underlying statute is general in 
its application to “improvements to real property” with specific 
exclusions for “the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or 
machinery or any other articles which are installed in or become 
                                                
manufacturer or supplier of any equipmen
machinery or any other articles which are 
installed in or become a part of any real 
property either as an improvement or otherw
2
19
 
 
2 In 1977 the statute was reenacted as Code § 8.01-250 but 
not substantively changed when Title 8 was recodified as present 
Title 8.01.  1977 Acts ch. 617. 
 
 
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a part of any real property either as an improvement or 
otherwise.”3 
In particular, there is nothing in the statutory language 
or the committee report indicating a legislative intention for 
courts to deconstruct complex buildings piece-by-piece and 
judicially label each component as an “ordinary building 
material” covered by the statute or, by process of elimination, 
determine that somehow it is extraordinary and therefore not 
covered.  Yet that is the result of our jurisprudence. 
Beginning with Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum 
Company, 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985), this Court has 
declined the opportunity to define the narrow and specific terms 
used by the General Assembly.  Rather, this decision is where 
the judicially-created term “ordinary building materials” first 
innocuously appeared: 
[T]he General Assembly, in 1973, determined that 
it was inadvisable to continue to extend the 
protection of the statute to manufacturers and 
suppliers of machinery and equipment, and . . . in 
response to Wiggins, removed the statutory 
protection from such parties.   
 
In 1973, when the General Assembly 
contemplated narrowing the ambit of the statute, 
it had full opportunity to go further and remove 
                                                 
3 This Court has held that the term “or other articles” in 
Code § 8.01-250 has no independent meaning apart from machinery 
or equipment. Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum 
Company, 229 Va. 596, 603, 331 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1985).  There is 
nothing in the statute or legislative history that lends support 
to a contrary conclusion. 
 
its protection from manufacturers and suppliers 
of ordinary building materials incorporated into 
improvements to real property. 
 
Id. at 601, 331 S.E.2d at 479.  The Court then attempted to 
structure a definition or set of defining factors for this 
judicially-created term.  Ordinary building materials “are 
incorporated into construction work outside the control of their 
manufacturers or suppliers, at the direction of architects, 
designers, and contractors.” Id. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480.  The 
Court further distinguished ordinary building materials from 
machinery and equipment by noting that the latter are “subject 
to close quality control at the factory and may be made subject 
to independent manufacturer’s warranties, voidable if the 
equipment is not installed and used in strict compliance with 
the manufacturer’s instructions.”  Id.  Presumably, by negative 
inference, ordinary building materials are not necessarily 
subject to such quality control, warranties or instructions. 
 
However, as the foregoing legislative history demonstrates, 
it was not necessary to start down the “ordinary building 
materials” path.  The General Assembly had attempted to correct 
a simple error using simple and unambiguous, though undefined, 
terms. 
 
Three years after the Cape Henry decision, this Court 
decided Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 236 Va. 305, 374 
S.E.2d 17 (1988).  In Grice, two children died from smoke 
 
 
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inhalation, from a fire allegedly caused by a malfunctioning 
electric panel box that was installed in their residence more 
than five years before the action was filed.  The Court applied 
the factors set forth in Cape Henry to find the electric panel 
box and its component parts were “ordinary building materials” 
even though arguably within the definition of “equipment” as set 
forth in the Uniform Statewide Building Code and the National 
Electric Code.  Id. at 307-09, 374 S.E.2d at 17-19.  In finding 
that an electric panel box and its component parts were ordinary 
building materials and were not equipment, and thus covered by 
Code § 8.01-250, the opinion relied upon the following 
reasoning: 
[T]he quality and quantity of the component parts 
of an electrical panel box and the instructions 
for assembling, wiring, grounding, and installing 
the unit during construction of a particular 
building are determined by the plans and 
specifications provided by the architect or other 
design professional and [n]o instructions are 
received from the manufacturer.  
 
Id. at 309, 374 S.E.2d at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
This complex formulation, recited as a summary of the facts upon 
which the parties had agreed in that case, is confusing at best.  
It stands in stark contrast to the legislature’s use of the 
simple term “equipment” for which a workable definition easily 
could be formulated. 
 
 
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The Court’s next foray down the “ordinary building 
materials” path was a decade later in Luebbers v. Fort Wayne 
Plastics, Inc., 255 Va. 368, 498 S.E.2d 911 (1998), in which it 
found that an in-ground swimming pool was subject to Code 
§ 8.01-250 since it was composed of ordinary building materials 
and was not machinery or equipment.  While few could argue with 
that holding, the Court again chose not to confine its analysis 
solely to the legislature’s terms – “machinery” or “equipment” – 
based upon commonly-accepted definitions, and again relied upon 
the complex and confusing “ordinary building materials” 
rationale.  Id. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913. 
 
This Court in Luebbers reasoned that the component parts of 
the swimming pool were (1) “interchangeable . . . with component 
materials made by other manufacturers;” (2) were purchased “in 
bulk” by distributors for use in construction “according to the 
dimensions and shapes desired by particular customers;” (3) were 
“merely” warrantied from “defects of workmanship” and “defective 
welding” though the manufacturer “exercises no oversight over 
the construction of the pools;” and (4) were subject to 
“specification guides and installation manuals as general 
guides” though they “did not address the construction” of 
specific swimming pools.  Consequently, the materials were 
“fungible components” and “generic” and thus were ordinary 
 
 
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building materials rather than equipment.  Id. at 373, 498 
S.E.2d at 913. 
 
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 537 
S.E.2d 580 (2000), electrical components, i.e. switchgear and 
circuit breakers, attached to a pier at Norfolk Naval Base 
exploded, seriously injuring two workers and killing a third.  
The Court painstakingly recited the “ordinary building 
materials” jurisprudence but ultimately held that the electrical 
components in fact were “equipment” as contemplated by Code 
§ 8.01-250.  Id. at 595-96, 537 S.E.2d at 590. 
 
In the most recent case, Baker v. Poolservice Company, 272 
Va. 677, 636 S.E.2d 360 (2006), the plaintiff’s assertions 
foreshadow this concurrence: 
Baker . . . contends the Court’s “extra-statutory 
ordinary building materials doctrine” does not 
follow the text of Code § 8.01-250 and has caused 
considerable confusion.  Consequently, Baker 
urges the Court to reconsider the . . . doctrine 
applied in Cape Henry Towers . . . and later 
cases, which Baker asserts has expanded the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-250 to persons not 
expressly covered by the text of the statute. 
 
Id. at 687, 636 S.E.2d at 366 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted).  This Court in Baker declined to set aside the 
ordinary building materials doctrine based upon the principle of 
stare decisis.  Id. at 688-89, 636 S.E.2d at 367. 
 
However, stare decisis does not compel adherence to 
precedents whose application reveals the infirmity of the legal 
 
 
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doctrine they enunciate.  See, e.g., Harmon v. Sadjadi, 273 Va. 
184, 197, 639 S.E.2d 294, 301 (2007) (quoting Nunnally v. Artis, 
254 Va. 247, 253, 492 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1997)). 
The majority tacitly acknowledges this infirmity in its 
opinion: 
As reflected in [the Cape Henry line of cases], we 
have identified various characteristics of the items 
in question, which, in a specific case, led to the 
determination that these items were or were not 
ordinary building materials.  Nevertheless, we have 
not held any single characteristic or set of 
characteristics as determinative of the issue.  Each 
case has been and must be decided based on its own 
circumstances. 
 
 
The majority opinion effectively concedes that, to 
paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart’s famous quip, the Court 
cannot define an ordinary building material but “know[s] it when 
[it] sees it.”  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring).  In short, this circumstantial 
approach to Code § 8.01-250 has proven to be unworkable, as 
shown by the frequency of these cases and the complexity of the 
analysis. 
 
“[S]tare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within 
the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and 
difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential 
system that is not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion,’” 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) 
(quoting The Federalist, No. 78, p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. 
 
 
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-21- 
 
Hamilton)), and “any departure from [it] demands special 
justification.”  Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).  
But stare decisis “is not an inexorable command.”  McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3063 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Unworkability is a traditional justification for 
departing from precedent.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S., ___, 
___, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009).  “Beyond workability, the 
relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle 
of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the 
reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision 
was well-reasoned.”  Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010) (quoting Montejo, 556 
U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2088-89). 
 
While the Cape Henry decision is twenty-five years old, 
1985 hardly can be considered antiquity in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia.4  Moreover, the reliance interests at stake here are 
minimal, if not non-existent:  the majority concedes that the 
ordinary building materials doctrine provides no consistent 
legal criteria for its application.  The weight of these factors 
– unworkability, antiquity and reliance – weigh strongly in 
favor of setting aside the ordinary building materials doctrine.  
                                                 
4 This Court traces its origin at least to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals created in 1776.  Va. Const. art. XIV (June 29, 
1776), reprinted in 1 William Waller Hening, The Statutes at 
Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from the 
First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 50, 54 (1823). 
 
 
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Thus, a clearer rule for applying Code § 8.01-250 would be more 
beneficial than tenacious reliance on the status quo. 
The reductio ad absurdum of ordinary building materials 
jurisprudence is found by analyzing the primary product of steel 
manufacturers and fabricators.  Surely structural steel – beams, 
joists, trusses, etc. – that forms the skeleton of large 
commercial structures is an ordinary building material and not 
equipment or machinery.  After all, it serves the same function 
as off-the-shelf lumber or bricks in residential structures.  
But would it pass the ordinary building materials analysis under 
our jurisprudence?  Surprisingly that is a close call, with only 
one factor undisputedly in its favor. 
Structural steel for most commercial construction is 
custom-designed and not fungible or mass-produced, is subject to 
manufacturing and fabricating to exacting tolerances and minute 
specifications, i.e. close quality control, is subject to 
multiple inspections, and is subject to manufacturer’s and 
fabricator’s warranties.5  The only factor that unreservedly 
                                                 
5 See ADF Int'l, Inc. v. Baker Mellon Stuart Constr., Inc., 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22597 at *7 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (discussing 
“detail drawings” and fabrication of structural steel down to 
“the size, shape, dimension, angles, bolt holes and connection 
of each steel member”); Sterling Millwrights, Inc. v. United 
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 49, 54 (1992) (same); Quality Auditing Co. v. 
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 498, 500 (2000) (discussing American 
Institute of Steel Construction, Inc. Quality Certification 
Program); Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 
1094, 1096 (1996) (contractual warranty for structural steel). 
 
 
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would cause structural steel to be characterized as an ordinary 
building material is the common-sense realization that it is 
“essential to the existence” of the structure. 
 
But, if the ordinary building materials analysis were to be 
left behind, what would replace it?  Returning to first 
principles, as with all legislative enactments we must look to 
the plain language of the statute.  We should begin with the 
clear language of the predecessor to Code § 8.01-250 prior to 
1973.  The statute of repose applied generally to all 
improvements to real property.  After 1973, this limitation was 
constrained to exclude machinery and equipment – terms that are 
not difficult to define or understand.  We also benefit from the 
Courts of Justice Committee’s report and by knowing the narrow 
and specific problem the legislature wanted to solve – the 
erroneous holding in Wiggins.  
Machinery clearly includes the Wiggins scenario:  that 
which is supplied by the user of the building for the processes 
performed therein and which is not related to the function of 
the building qua building – manufacturing machinery, printing 
presses, large computers, and the like.  Equipment, though not 
defined in Code § 8.01-250, is defined for construction purposes 
generally in the venerable Uniform Statewide Building Code – the 
bible for the construction industry.  Essentially, it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
articles subject to the work performed by the mechanical 
construction trades:  “Plumbing, heating, electrical, 
ventilating, air-conditioning and refrigeration equipment, 
elevators, dumbwaiters, escalators and other mechanical 
additions or installations.”  Virginia Statewide Building Code 
§ 202.0 (1996 ed. 1997).  This Court may borrow the definition 
of a term from another Code section, particularly when the 
substantive context of the terms, i.e. construction of 
buildings, is identical.  Where the terms of a section of the 
Code are ambiguous and the Court looks for guidance in resolving 
the ambiguity, “we are not confined to the language of that 
section, but can look to other sections of the Code where the 
same terms are employed.”  First Nat’l Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 
495, 504, 39 S.E. 126, 129 (1901). 
 
Ideally the General Assembly would define these terms, as 
suggested in the legislative report on the 1973 amendment, “to 
aid and guide . . . courts in the proper interpretation” of Code 
§ 8.01-250.  But in the absence of legislative definitions, 
lawyers and judges would benefit from clarified jurisprudence 
that relies primarily on the plain language of terms the General 
Assembly actually used rather than a confusing term created by 
the judiciary. 
 
 
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