Case Title: Marvel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 488, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LARRY D. MARVEL,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 488, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0510007925 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 13, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided:     September 20, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 20th day of September 2010, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Larry D. Marvel, appeals from the 
Superior Court’s July 16, 2010 order denying his motion to correct his 
sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  The plaintiff-
appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 
 
2 
judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief 
that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Marvel was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Criminal Solicitation in the Second Degree and Conspiracy in 
the Second Degree.  He was sentenced as a habitual offender on the criminal 
solicitation conviction to life in prison pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§4214(a) and to an additional 2 years at Level V on the conspiracy 
conviction.  This Court affirmed Marvel’s convictions on direct appeal.2  
Thereafter, Marvel filed two motions for correction of illegal sentence and 
one motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61, all of which the Superior 
Court denied.  This Court affirmed all three Superior Court decisions.3 
 
 
(3) 
On this latest appeal, Marvel claims that his sentence is illegal 
because there are “substantive defects within the second and third supposed 
predicate offenses” used as support for his status as a habitual offender.  
Specifically, Marvel contends that the State may not use his previous 
overlapping convictions of Unlawful Imprisonment and Rape in the Second 
Degree as predicate felonies because they were not “each successive to the 
other, with some chance of rehabilitation,” as required by Del. Code Ann. tit. 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Marvel v. State, Del. Supr., No. 548, 2006, Berger, J. (Sept. 18, 2007).  
3 Marvel v. State, Del. Supr., No. 11, 2008, Jacobs, J. (Apr. 23, 2008); Marvel v. State, 
Del. Supr., No. 345, 2008, Jacobs, J. (Sept. 10, 2008); Marvel v. State, Del. Supr., No. 
330, 2009, Holland, J. (July 21, 2009). 
 
3 
11 § 4214.  Marvel also claims that the starting date for his life sentence is 
erroneous, thereby providing him with less credit time than that to which he 
is entitled.   
 
(4) 
Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal 
sentence “at any time.”  On a Rule 35(a) claim of an illegal sentence, relief 
is available when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-authorized 
limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and 
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term 
required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a 
sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.4  A proceeding 
under the Rule is not intended to re-examine errors alleged to have occurred 
before the imposition of sentence.5 
 
(5) 
Marvel’s first claim is that there was insufficient support for the 
Superior Court’s finding that he is a habitual criminal.  The record reflects 
that Marvel was convicted of Grand Larceny in 1973, Unlawful 
Imprisonment in the First Degree and Rape in the Second Degree in 1980, 
and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree in 1990.  Either the 
unlawful imprisonment conviction or the rape conviction qualifies as a 
second conviction for purposes of habitual offender status under Del. Code 
                                                 
4 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
5 Id. 
 
4 
Ann. tit. 11, §4214(a).  As such, the State provided sufficient support for 
Marvel’s status as a habitual offender and therefore his sentence is not 
illegal under Rule 35(a).  Equally meritless is Marvel’s second claim that the 
start date on his life sentence is erroneous.  Marvel must serve the remainder 
of his life in prison.  There is no indication that the start date of his sentence, 
erroneous or not, has any “significant current impact” on him or presents any 
“actual controversy” ripe for consideration by this Court.6        
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice  
                                                 
6 Govan v. State, Del. Supr., No. 256, 2003, Berger, J. (Sept. 24, 2003) (citing Stroud v. 
Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989)).