Case Title: Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates1992 WY 9824 P.2d 560Case Number: 91-78Decided: 01/24/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charles E. BREDTHAUER and 
Cindy S. Bredthauer, Husband and Wife,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v. 

CHRISTIAN, SPRING, 
SEILBACH AND ASSOCIATES, a Montana Corporation; TSP, a Wyoming Corporation; 
Davis Surveying, a Wyoming Corporation; the Board of County Commissioners of 
Campbell County; Harry Underwood; W.B. Fitch; and B.L. 
Tarver,

 Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

John R. Hursh 
and Maureen T. Donohoue of Hursh & Donohoue, P.C., Riverton, and Larry R. 
Clapp of Clapp & Associates, Casper, for appellants.

Lawrence G. Orr 
and Curtis B. Buchhammer of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for 
appellee Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates.

Robert G. Berger 
of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for appellee TSP.

Gary R. Scott 
and Steven K. Sharpe of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee Davis 
Surveying.

Russell A. 
Hansen, Campbell County Atty., Gillette, for appellee Bd. of County Com'rs of 
Campbell County.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a summary judgment dismissing a negligence action brought by Appellants 
Charles E. Bredthauer and Cindy S. Bredthauer against Appellees Christian, 
Spring, Seilbach and Associates, a Montana corporation; TSP, a Wyoming 
corporation; and Davis Surveying, a Wyoming corporation, for conducting 
erroneous land surveys and against Appellee Board of County Commissioners of 
Campbell County for filing the land surveys even though it knew they were 
incorrect. The district court found the Bredthauers' cause of action accrued 
more than two years prior to the time they filed their complaint.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      The Bredthauers 
present their issue in the form of a declaratory statement:

The Trial Court erred by 
finding that the causes of action against the surveyors and the County accrued 
to the Plaintiff-Appellants on June 9, 1988, and as such barred their claims 
filed on July 2[0], 1990, by operation of W.S. 1-39-113 and W.S. 
1-3-107(a)(i).

[¶4]      The Bredthauers 
purchased a parcel of land in 1977, which became known as the Bredthauer 
Subdivision in May 1981 when the Board of County Commissioners approved the 
subdivision plat. The Bredthauers also purchased a second parcel of land, a 
tract in the Pineview Ranchettes Subdivision, in 1981 and a third parcel in 
1982, which became known as the Bredthauer-West Subdivision when the Board of 
County Commissioners approved the plat in May 1982. Christian, Spring, Seilbach 
and Associates surveyed the first and third parcels in 1976. TSP surveyed the 
Pineview Ranchettes Subdivision in 1977, and the Board of County Commissioners 
approved that survey in 1979.

[¶5]      Problems arose 
over the years concerning the accuracy of the land surveys, but these problems 
were resolved in a manner which permitted the Bredthauers to continue developing 
and selling the lots in their subdivisions. One of these problems involved a 
land survey performed by Davis Surveying indicating the location of a water well 
(the State Engineer rejected a 1984 application for water rights because the 
survey was incorrect).

[¶6]      At a June 9, 
1988, closing on the sale of property in one of the Bredthauers' subdivisions, 
an agent for the title insurance company advised the Bredthauers that he was 
concerned about the survey discrepancies and that he would not issue any more 
title insurance policies for lots within the subdivision until his concerns were 
resolved. Upon the advice of their attorney, the Bredthauers retained a 
professional land surveyor to determine whether a survey problem existed, what 
the problem was, and who was responsible for it. The Bredthauers received the 
following report from their land surveyor on July 28, 1988:

Campbell County 
Abstract's recent decision refusing to issue title insurance is an effort to 
resolve a land possession-surveying problem which has existed for quite some 
time. The original survey of T52N, R73W was executed by the General Land Office 
in 1883. In 1968, a survey was conducted by Frank Luers, a local surveyor, along 
the east Township boundary. His "Plat of Unsurveyed Lands[,"] as filed in the 
Office of the Campbell County Clerk, shows that a problem existed along the 
Township exterior. In 1976, another surveyor, Lawrence Potter, filed "Certified 
Land Corner Recordations" for the section corners along the same Township 
boundary indicating that this same problem existed. In 1976, a survey was 
executed and a map prepared by Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates 
(CSSA). This map titled "Ten Tracts Map" was prepared for Duke Marquiss but is 
not on file at the Office of the Campbell County Clerk. In 1977, CSSA prepared a 
"Record of Survey" map, which detailed the overlaps between the "Ten Tracts Map" 
and the actual section boundaries. This map is not on file in the Office of the 
Campbell County Clerk. The subdivision map for Pineview Ranchettes Subdivision, 
as prepared by TSP was filed in 1979. The BLM Dependent Resurvey of T52N, R73W 
was approved and filed in 1980. Bredthauer Subdivision and Bredthauer-West 
Subdivision plats prepared by Davis Surveying were filed in 1981 and 1982, 
respectively.

[Each of these surveys 
and maps is then described and analyzed by the report.]

In conclusion, the 
problems that now face the Bredthauers should never have occurred. A registered 
land surveyor is charged with locating legal property boundaries and this was 
not satisfactorily done. CSSA p[er]formed a wrong survey and did not correct it 
with a filed plat once found. TSP and Davis perpetuated this erroneous survey 
even though evidence was available that a problem existed. In addition, 
ownership and encumb[]rance reports for Bredthauer and Bredthauer-West 
Subdivisions should have indicated a problem. In order to now correct this 
problem, an accurate survey should be conducted and a plat prepared detailing 
the affected properties. Once completed, new descriptions could be written 
describing the actual possession lines.

[¶7]      The Bredthauers 
lost a sale of property in August 1988 because they could not get title 
insurance for the property, and they filed their complaint on July 20, 1990. The 
district court determined that their claims were barred by operation of Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 1-3-107 (1988)1 and 1-39-113 (Supp. 1991)2 because their complaint was filed 
more than two years after the "discovery" date. The district court selected June 
9, 1988, as the "discovery" date as that was the date on which the title 
insurance agent advised the Bredthauers that he would not continue to issue 
title insurance policies because of the survey discrepancies. The Bredthauers 
contend the "discovery" date was not earlier than July 28, 1988, the date on 
which they received their land surveyor's report.

[¶8]      The issue to be 
decided here was initially joined by means of motions to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). The district court considered matters outside the pleadings and, 
hence, orders of dismissal were entered pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56. The district 
court's orders disposed of only some of the issues and parties to the action, 
but the district court made the requisite certifications pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
54(b). We have ascertained from the record that the district court, at least 
implicitly, furnished reasons for these certifications which demonstrate 
certification would materially aid judicial efficiency. See Alexander v. United 
States, 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990), and Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987). 
We must conduct our analysis in accordance with the review standards applicable 
to summary judgments. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 342 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶9]      Wyoming is a 
"discovery" state, which means the running of the statute of limitations is not 
triggered until such time as the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 
existence of the cause of action. Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 
1989). The question of when the statute of limitations begins to run is one of 
law when the facts, as in this case, are not in dispute. Id.; Poffenberger v. 
Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (Ct.App. 1981). See also Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1985), and Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). We hold that, as a matter of 
law, the Bredthauers' cause of action did not accrue before July 28, 1988, the 
date on which they received their land surveyor's report advising them that the 
surveys conducted by the appellee surveyors were, in its opinion, in 
error.

[¶10]   In reaching this conclusion, we 
have not only applied our own precedents which provide guidance in determining 
when a cause of action accrues, Mills, 768 P.2d 554, but we have also been 
influenced by cases from other jurisdictions which have dealt with this problem. 
In Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991), the appellate court 
determined that a cause of action for professional malpractice (attorney) did 
not accrue until a potential investor withdrew his financial support from a real 
estate development. In that case, a law firm filed a release of a lis pendens in 
the wrong county. The law firm contended that the cause of action accrued when 
the law firm made that filing. The appellate court disagreed and held that the 
appellant suffered no damage until the investor withdrew its financial support 
from the proposed development venture.

[¶11]   In Martin v. Crowley, Wade and 
Milstead, Inc., 702 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), the appellate court held 
that the appellant had no duty to make sure the boundary markers were properly 
located, even though the defects were visible and ascertainable by an easy 
inspection of the land. The land surveyor made his survey in 1973, but the 
owners of the home which was built in accordance with that survey did not 
discover until 1981 that the house was located only six feet, rather than twelve 
feet, from their property line. As a result, the fair market value of their home 
diminished. The appellate court held that dismissal for failure to comply with 
the statute of limitations was improper because, "from the pleadings, involving 
a layman/expert relationship, nothing indicates plaintiffs knew or should have 
known of any reason, until May, 1981, to question defendant's work." Id. at 
58.

[¶12]   In New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. 
v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968), the court, in reversing a summary 
judgment grounded on the statute of limitations, held the plaintiff's 
allegation, that she did not discover the error of the previous land survey 
until a new survey was conducted, precluded the grant of summary judgment. See 
Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990); Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 
483 A.2d 1192 (D.C.App. 1984); State v. Childress, 35 Wn. App. 314, 666 P.2d 941 
(1983); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 253 A.2d 904 (Ct.App. 1969); and 
CURTIS M. BROWN ET AL., EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURES FOR BOUNDARY LOCATION § 4-2 (2d 
ed. 1981).

[¶13]   We hold that the information 
conveyed to the Bredthauers on June 9, 1988, did not result in accrual of their 
cause of action. Under the facts in this case, the first event which would have 
had that effect was the receipt of the report from their land surveyor on July 
28, 1988. We do not need to establish with precision whether it was that event 
or the frustration of a sale of land in August 1988 which was the precise date 
the statute of limitations commenced running. The determination of when a 
limitation period commences involves a balancing of relevant policy 
considerations with the facts of a given case. Mills, 768 P.2d  at 555-56. Prior 
to receiving their land surveyor's report, the Bredthauers' claims would have 
been merely speculative and made on the basis of the title insurance agent's 
concerns. Under the circumstances in evidence here, we are convinced that the 
Bredthauers could properly rely upon the accuracy of existing land surveys until 
they discovered those surveys were unreliable and caused their lands to be 
unmerchantable. Prior to obtaining the resurvey, the Bredthauers could not have 
known the nature or extent of their damages, nor could they have known the cause 
or causes of those damages. They had no sound reason to seek a resurvey until 
and unless the circumstances warranted it. The events which occurred prior to 
July 28, 1988, simply did not put the Bredthauers on notice that a resurvey was 
necessary, as those events did not prevent them from continuing to develop and 
sell their subdivided tracts of land.

[¶14]   The Bredthauers filed their 
complaint on July 20, 1990, less than two years from the date their cause of 
action accrued. The district court's finding that the cause of action accrued 
not later than June 9, 1988, is incorrect as a matter of law.

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1           
Section 1-3-107(a) provides:

(a) A cause of action 
arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified 
professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the 
following times:

(i) Within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action 
may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged 
act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, 
error or omission was:

(A) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(B) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

2           
Section 1-39-113(a) provides:

(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.