Case Title: State v. Eisner

Citation: 626 P.2d 10, 95 Wash. 2d 458

Docket Number: 47100-2

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1981-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
95 Wn.2d 458 (1981) 626 P.2d 10 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. AUGUST JOSEPH EISNER, Petitioner. No. 47100-2. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. April 2, 1981. *459 Joseph R. Schneider (of Sensney, Davis, McCormick & Schneider), for petitioner. Curtis Ludwig, Prosecuting Attorney, and Ray Whitlow, Deputy, for respondent. DOLLIVER, J. Defendant was charged with first degree statutory rape of his niece, A.A. There were no witnesses and Eisner denied the charge. The State's case was therefore dependent upon the testimony of A., who was 5 years old at the time of trial and 4 at the time of the alleged rape. Defendant's defense was largely dependent upon his own testimony. On October 6, 1978, a pretrial competency hearing was held. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel were permitted to ask questions. At the end of the hearing, A. was adjudged competent to testify. At the jury trial when A. testified, the court first questioned her to put her at ease and determine her ability to recall and tell the truth. The prosecutor then questioned her at length. She testified defendant had touched her vaginal area and "teached me about sex." Even after repeated attempts by the prosecutor, however, A. did not testify to acts sufficient to support a first degree rape conviction. She would speak only of "other stuff" and "what I told you guys about." She ended the direct examination by declaring she had truthfully told everything that had happened. After direct examination, the court invited the prosecutor to ask A. leading questions. He declined. Cross-examination followed with no redirect. After the cross-examination, the court questioned A. and was able to elicit a description of acts sufficient to prove the *460 State's case. Immediately after the judge's examination, the court recessed. The recess was 40 minutes earlier than usual. Next morning, with no further questions or remarks, the State rested. Appellant was convicted of first degree statutory rape. In an unpublished split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted defendant's petition for review and reverse the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Following the prosecutor's inability to get A. to describe the "other stuff" the trial court took over the questioning as follows: Const. art. 4, § 16 concerns charging juries, and reads: [1, 2] Although article 4, section 16 appears on its face to be concerned only with the giving of jury instructions, its object has been held to be "to prevent the jury from being influenced by knowledge conveyed to it by the court of what the court's opinion is on the testimony submitted." *462 State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250, 60 P. 403 (1900). State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 523-24, 145 P. 470 (1915), stated: In the more recent case of State v. Jacobsen, 78 Wn.2d 491, 495, 477 P.2d 1 (1970), we said: (Citations omitted.) Only last year we again reviewed the applicability of Const. art. 4, § 16: (Citations omitted.) Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wn.2d 127, 141, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980). [3, 4] While a trial judge may, of course, question witnesses (Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., supra), and ask clarifying questions (State v. Brown, 31 Wn.2d 475, 197 P.2d 590, 202 P.2d 461 (1948)), "it must [not] appear that the court's attitude toward the merits of the cause [is] reasonably inferable from the nature or manner of the court's statements." State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 267, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). The questions of the trial court went far beyond clarifying questions to a witness. It is clear from the report of proceedings that at the end of the prosecutor's examination there was evidence sufficient to prove the crime of indecent liberties but not the crime of first degree statutory rape. The facts in this case show a clear violation of Const. art. 4, § 16. Therefore, in order for the error to be held harmless, "the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967); State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). This we cannot do. Without the questions of the court to A. and the answers they evoked, the record is insufficient to prove defendant committed first degree statutory rape. The prosecutor did not prove the case; the court did. We are mindful of the heinous nature of the crime alleged as well as the extreme youth of the prosecutor's *464 only witness. While these are persuasive factors, they are outweighed by the necessity to maintain constitutional safeguards for all, the innocent and the guilty alike. Reversed. BRACHTENBACH, C.J., and ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, UTTER, HICKS, WILLIAMS, DORE, and DIMMICK, JJ., concur.