Case Title: JOBE v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106504

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOBE v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY  JOBE v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY 2010 OK 50 Case Number: 106504 Decided: 06/29/2010 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. JORDAN J. JOBE, Plaintiff/Appellee v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV ¶0 The Department of Public Safety revoked the appellee's driver's license for a period of three years pursuant to the mandate of THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED, THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS REVERSED AND THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY STANDS REINSTATED. A. DeAnn Taylor, Deputy Chief Legal Counsel, Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellant Wiley L. Williams, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Rick Powell, Foshee and Yaffe, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Plaintiff/Appellee OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it affirmed the district court's order that reduced a driver's license revocation period from three years to a single year. We answer in the affirmative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Jordan J. Jobe's (motorist, licensee or Jobe) driver's license for a three-year period for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) following his third alcohol-related offense committed within five years. Motorist claimed a one-year revocation should have been applied because the third DUI arrest occurred more than five years after the first "revocation commenced" within the meaning of that phrase in 47 O.S.Supp.2006 §6-205.1.2 ¶3 The quoted phrase is central to the controversy before us. We are called upon to ascertain when a revocation takes effect under the terms of §6-205.1 for the purpose of computing the length of the revocation period applicable to a motorist's 2007 DUI offense. ¶4 The critical facts are undisputed. Motorist's first DUI arrest took place on July 30, 2002. He refused to submit to a state chemical test. On July 31, 2002 his driver's license was seized and he was served an officer's affidavit and notice of revocation. The officer's affidavit was usable as a temporary license with full driving privileges. ¶5 Motorist's second DUI arrest occurred on February 18, 2003. A mandatory one-year revocation of his driving privilege followed effective March 20, 2003. He was issued another restricted driver's license which remained in effect during the entire revocation period. ¶6 The third DUI arrest occurred August 30, 2007. When motorist failed the blood alcohol test the next day,6 his driver's license was seized and he was served an officer's affidavit and notice of revocation.7 His timely request for an administrative hearing operated to stay DPS's revocation order.8 Following the hearing on November 9, 2007, DPS sustained the three-year revocation of Jobe's driving privilege and ordered that revocation take effect December 10, 2007.9 ¶7 Motorist brought an appeal to the district court only from that portion of the November 9 order which revoked his driving privilege for a period of three years. ¶8 The trial court agreed the revocation period should be reduced to one year. According to its decision, a revocation "commences" either at the time of arrest or no later than thirty days after the "notice of revocation" is served on licensee. The trial court found that DPS records incorrectly show October 22, 2002 as the commencement date of the first revocation. The trial court changed the date for the beginning of the third revocation period from December 10, 2007 to September 30, 2007 (i.e., thirty days from the date motorist was served notice of revocation following his third arrest on August 30, 2007). ¶9 DPS brought an appeal from the trial court's order. It claimed the trial court erred in finding (a) that it had jurisdiction to determine the commencement date of the first revocation and in finding (b) that revocation commences either at time the arresting officer serves the motorist notice of revocation or, at the latest, 30 days thereafter. DPS further argued that the manner in which the trial court construed relevant statutes operates to render them constitutionally infirm. The Court of Civil Appeals' Opinion And The Parties' Arguments on Certiorari ¶10 The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) (a) affirmed the trial court's reduction of the revocation period from three years to a single year, but (b) vacated that part of its order which determined the commencement date of the 2002 revocation. According to COCA, Jobe's first DUI-related revocation commenced July 31, 2002, the date he was required to surrender his driver's license, which occurred more than five years before the arrest date that brought about the 2007 revocation. COCA held the trial court had jurisdiction to hear motorist's appeal from the 2007 revocation and found unpersuasive DPS's argument that the trial court's construction of the relevant statutes renders them constitutionally infirm. ¶11 DPS claims COCA has misinterpreted the law by erroneously determining that a license revocation commences when a person is required to surrender his driver's license, even though the actual termination effect may be stayed during the appeal process. DPS urges that in this case the critical period would be calculated from October 22, 2002 (the date when Jobe's driving privileges became restricted) to August 30, 2007 (the arrest date preceding his third revocation). The three-year revocation period would hence apply because the first (2002) revocation took effect within five years of the third (2007) arrest. II STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶12 The dispositive issue on certiorari presents a question of statutory construction: when does a driver's license revocation take effect (i.e. "commence" within the meaning of ¶13 Statutory construction presents a question of law III THE REVOCATION PERIOD OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE BEGINS (i.e. COMMENCES) PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF A. The Statutory Scheme Governing Motorist's 2007 Driver's License Revocation ¶14 When a valid driver's license has been surrendered or seized for an alcohol-related offense under the implied consent laws, the arresting officer is required to issue to the arrestee a dated receipt which serves as a temporary driver's license. ¶15 According to the pertinent terms of ¶16 The Legislature defines "revocation of driving privilege" as "[t]he termination by formal action of the Department of a person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways. Such action shall include the requirement of the [licensee's] surrender to the Department of said person's driver license." ¶17 A timely written request for an administrative hearing will operate to stay the DPS revocation order until disposition is effected. B. The Point in Time When Motorist's Driving Privilege Is Legally Lost or Restricted Is the Point When A License Revocation Becomes Effective Pursuant to the terms of 47 O.S.Supp.2006 §6-205.1 ¶18 Based on our review of the statutory scheme that governs drivers' license revocations in implied consent cases, we conclude that the Legislature intended the revocation period to begin and become effective at the point in time when the licensee begins to suffer the actual loss of driving privilege or from the imposition of restrictions on the driving privilege during the applicable revocation period. Administrative acts by which a licensee is arrested for DUI, given notice of the revocation's effective date and is issued a temporary driver's license upon the seizure or surrender of a valid driver's license are but preliminary steps to the actual loss of a licensee's unrestricted permission to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways. These mark points in time that stand anterior to the actual loss of driving privilege. They cannot be counted for the purpose of determining the beginning date of one's prior revocation pursuant to ¶19 If either an administrative or a judicial proceeding should prolong the point in time when a revocation becomes effective, the license is not deemed revoked until the effected stay expires and the licensee loses the driving privilege under the affected license or a new driver's license is issued that is burdened by statutory restrictions during the revocation period. ¶20 For the purpose of determining the effective date of the motorist's 2002 DUI revocation, we can count only the time during which the licensee suffers from the loss of or the imposition of restrictions on his driving privilege. DPS's July 31, 2002 notice of revocation was to be effective in 30 days. By motorist's timely request for an administrative hearing a stay stood interposed by operation of law to suspend the effectiveness of the statutory 180-day revocation period. Motorist's revocation thus became effective on October 22, 2002 by his own act of withdrawing the hearing request, together with the agreement to a 180-day revocation beginning October 22, 2002 as well as by acceptance of a restricted driver's license on that date. Because the first revocation became effective October 22, 2002 and the arrest for the third revocation occurred on August 30, 2007, the latter revocation took place within the statutory five-year period authorized by law for imposition by DPS of a three-year revocation pursuant to the terms of IV SUMMARY ¶21 A revocation period, pursuant to the terms of 47 O.S.Supp. 2006 §6-205.1, begins and becomes effective at the point in time when the licensee suffers from the actual loss of driving privilege or from the imposition of restrictions on the licensee's driving privilege during an applicable revocation period. If the point in time when a revocation is effective is prolonged either by an administrative or a judicial proceeding, the license is not deemed revoked until the stay expires and the licensee loses the driving privilege under the license or a new driver's license is issued subject to statutory restrictions. ¶22 Because motorist's first DUI revocation became effective October 22, 2002 and the arrest date preceding his third DUI revocation took place August 30, 2007, the latter date occurred within the statutory five-year period for authorized imposition of a three-year revocation pursuant to the terms of 47 O.S.Supp.2006 §6-205.1. ¶23 The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated, the district court's order is reversed and the order entered by the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety stands reinstated. ¶24 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR FOOT