Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gibson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11990

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11990 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DONALD GIBSON. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     March 8, 2016. - July 13, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of probation, 
Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, Probation 
revocation, Assistance of counsel.  Constitutional Law, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 22, 2006. 
 
 
A hearing on an order to show cause why the defendant 
should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel at a 
probation revocation proceeding was had before C. Jeffrey 
Kinder, J., and a proceeding for revocation of probation was 
heard by Richard J. Carey, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Glynis Mac Veety for the defendant. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  The principal issue in this appeal is whether a 
Superior Court judge properly ordered the forfeiture of the 
defendant's right to counsel in a probation revocation hearing.  
The judge, faced with a defendant who admittedly engaged in a 
pattern of quarrelsome, confrontational, hostile, and 
threatening conduct toward a succession of nine different court-
appointed attorneys over the course of the trial and posttrial 
proceedings, ordered forfeiture on those grounds.  Subsequent to 
the forfeiture order, the defendant appeared pro se at the 
probation revocation hearing.  A different judge found the 
defendant in violation of probation and sentenced him to State 
prison for a term of not less than seven years and not more than 
eight years, from and after the sentence he was then serving.  
The defendant appealed, claiming error in the forfeiture order 
and the probation revocation hearing.  The Appeals Court 
affirmed, Commonwealth v. Gibson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 829, 835 
(2015), ruling that the judge had provided the defendant a full 
and fair opportunity to be heard on forfeiture and that the 
forfeiture order had been warranted based on the defendant's 
pattern of threats to counsel.  The Appeals Court also rejected 
the defendant's claims related to the probation revocation 
hearing.   
 
We granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review to consider whether the forfeiture order, based 
3 
 
on the defendant's pattern of hostile and threatening conduct 
toward counsel, warrants forfeiture under the guidelines we 
articulated in Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 81 (2009).  
Although we appreciate the imperative to force an end to the 
defendant's interference with the timely and fair disposition of 
the probation revocation matter, we are constrained to conclude 
that the forfeiture order must be reversed, as it does not 
comply with the strict guidelines we adopted in Means, supra.  
Therefore, we vacate the forfeiture order based on our 
conclusion that (1) the forfeiture hearing did not meet the 
procedural due process requirements of Means; and (2) the 
defendant's conduct, although egregious in many respects, did 
not warrant forfeiture under the guidelines established in 
Means. 
 
Background.  We describe the details of the proceedings 
leading to the judge's forfeiture order and the subsequent 
probation violation hearing.  In 2006, the defendant was 
indicted on three charges of indecent assault and battery on a 
child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  Six attorneys were 
appointed to represent the defendant during the trial 
proceedings.  The third of these trial attorneys withdrew for a 
number of reasons, including the defendant's written threat to 
counsel that "street justice" would prevail if he were 
convicted. The sixth attorney represented him during trial.  He 
4 
 
was convicted on two of the three indictments in 2008.1  The 
victim was his daughter.  The trial judge sentenced the 
defendant to a term of not less than eight years and not more 
than ten years in State prison on the first indictment, and to 
probation for fifteen years on the second indictment, to run 
concurrently with the sentence on the first indictment.  As a 
condition of probation, the judge ordered the defendant to have 
no contact, direct or indirect, with the victim or the victim's 
mother (his ex-wife). 
 
On September 14, 2011, the probation department issued a 
probation violation notice alleging that the defendant had 
violated the no-contact condition by sending sexually explicit 
letters to the victim from prison.2  Prior to the probation 
revocation hearing and after the appointment of three different 
attorneys to represent the defendant in that matter, a judge 
issued an order to the defendant to show cause why his right to 
counsel should not be deemed forfeited.  On February 27, 2013, 
the day after the issuance of the show cause order, the judge 
                     
 
1 The defendant's convictions were affirmed by the Appeals 
Court in a memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 
1:28.  Commonwealth v. Gibson, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2011). 
 
 
2 The probation department issued additional surrender 
notices alleging that the defendant had written letters to the 
victim on the following dates:  November 27, 2010; June 10, 
2011; March 15, 2012; December 22, 2012; and January 9, 2013. 
5 
 
conducted the hearing and made findings and rulings summarized 
below. 
 
1.  The succession of posttrial appointed counsel.  On 
September 29, 2011, the court appointed an attorney from the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services to represent the defendant 
at the probation revocation hearing.  On March 19, 2012, this 
attorney filed a motion to withdraw with an affidavit detailing 
the defendant's threats to file a complaint against the attorney 
with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) unless counsel adopted 
the defense strategies proposed by the defendant.  A judge 
allowed the motion to withdraw and, on March 30, 2012, appointed 
a second attorney to represent the defendant.  On June 21, 2012, 
this attorney filed a motion to withdraw, citing a breakdown in 
the attorney-client relationship, and further specifying the 
defendant's conduct in an impounded affidavit.3  A second judge 
allowed the motion to withdraw.  On June 28, 2012, that judge 
considered the defendant's motion for appointment of a third 
postconviction attorney and allowed the motion.  During the 
course of the hearing, however, the probation officer reminded 
the judge that the matter had been pending since 2011 and opined 
that the delay was caused by the withdrawal of the defendant's 
                     
 
3 Although this affidavit is not included in the record, we 
assume that the judge reviewed it, as he referenced the 
defendant's misconduct toward each of the attorneys who moved to 
withdraw from representation of the defendant. 
6 
 
two prior attorneys.  The defendant's newly appointed counsel 
then assured the judge that despite this history, he would be 
able to "take care of" the defendant.  The following exchange 
took place between the judge and the defendant: 
 
Judge:  "You know what, [counsel]?  I know you'll be able 
to take care of him, because if you can't take care of him, he's 
going to have to take care of himself. 
 
 
"Mr., Mr. . . . I'm talking to you, Sir.  So look at me and 
listen. 
 
 
"I, I read prior counsel's affidavit and I was troubled by 
the contents of her affidavit.  You will not get another 
attorney appointed to represent you, do you understand me, Sir?" 
 
 
Defendant:  "If they don't do me justice, I can't keep them 
on.  So, that's why I had to . . ." 
 
 
Judge:  "Do you understand?  It's a yes or no.  Do you 
understand?" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Yes." 
 
 
Several months later, on September 4, 2012, the defendant 
filed a motion for the appointment of a fourth attorney.  The 
third attorney, who earlier had expressed optimism about his 
ability to represent the defendant, filed a motion to withdraw 
on September 10.  On September 13, 2012, a third judge held a 
hearing during which he allowed the motion to withdraw but 
ordered that the attorney serve as standby counsel for the 
probation revocation hearing.4  The relationship between counsel 
and the defendant apparently deteriorated even further, as 
                     
 
4 The record does not contain a transcript of this hearing.  
We rely on the docket for the outcome of the hearing. 
7 
 
counsel filed a second motion to withdraw on February 26, 2013.  
In response to this second motion to withdraw, that judge issued 
an order to show cause why the defendant should not be deemed to 
have forfeited his right to counsel.  The judge then appointed a 
different attorney to represent the defendant at the show cause 
hearing scheduled for the following day.5 
 
On February 27, 2013, the day after the issuance of the 
show cause order, the judge held the hearing, at which he 
considered two issues:  whether to allow counsel's motion to 
withdraw; and if so, whether the defendant's conduct warranted a 
forfeiture of the right to counsel.  As to the first issue, the 
judge inquired of the defendant whether he wished to be heard on 
counsel's motion to withdraw.  The defendant replied that he had 
no desire to have counsel withdraw, but he admitted that he had 
threatened to report counsel to the board.  According to the 
defendant, he believed the threat to report counsel to the board 
and to the office of the Attorney General was appropriate 
because counsel's legal advice to cease writing letters to the 
victim in violation of his probation was causing him "undue 
stress."  In particular, the defendant complained that counsel 
had lied in advising that the defendant could be subject to 
"life in prison" as a consequence of the charge of which he was 
                     
 
5 The record is not clear as to whether this attorney was 
appointed on the issuance of the show cause order or whether 
counsel was appointed on the day of the hearing. 
8 
 
convicted.6  He also disagreed with counsel's advice that the 
victim did not wish to have contact with him and that his 
letter-writing to her was a violation of probation.  Last, the 
defendant expressed frustration that although he had other 
reasons to be dissatisfied with counsel, he was unable to 
articulate those reasons at that time because he had been 
"diagnosed with a brain tumor deep in [his] brain that's . . . 
inoperable [causing him to have] a little trouble . . . putting 
things into words."  After noting that much of the defendant's 
recitation was consistent with counsel's affidavit in support of 
the motion to withdraw, the judge allowed the motion and 
proceeded to the forfeiture issue. 
 
In commencing this stage of the hearing, the judge signaled 
his awareness of the obligation to grant an evidentiary hearing 
on whether, by engaging in the apparently undisputed pattern of 
threats against a succession of appointed counsel, the defendant 
forfeited his right to counsel for the probation revocation 
hearing.  At the judge's invitation, counsel -- who minutes 
earlier had been allowed to withdraw from representation of the 
defendant -- detailed the reasons for his motion to withdraw.  
According to counsel, the motion was prompted by a letter from 
                     
 
6 As clarified at the hearing, counsel explained to the 
defendant the ramifications of a sexually dangerous person 
proceeding, under which a person convicted of a sex crime could 
be civilly committed for life.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). 
9 
 
the defendant threatening to file complaints against him with 
the board and the office of the Attorney General.  In response 
to questioning from the prosecutor and the defendant's newly 
appointed counsel, the attorney disclaimed any knowledge of the 
defendant's mental health issues except for what he had been 
told by the defendant in the days preceding the hearing.  He 
acknowledged, however, that over the course of his 
representation, the defendant had engaged in conduct against his 
advice, including sending the letters to the victim, and that 
the defendant's behavior was not "logical" and "not in his best 
interest." 
 
Neither the defendant's new counsel nor the prosecutor 
presented evidence at the hearing.  Defense counsel, however, 
advised the judge that he had met with the defendant "for over 
an hour in the back and [he] was not able to get very far."  
Counsel described the defendant as being "highly agitated."  
Without directly addressing the merits of the forfeiture issue, 
counsel expressed concern with the propriety of forfeiture given 
what appeared to be the defendant's current mental state and the 
long-term consequences of a probation revocation hearing without 
the assistance of counsel.7  Counsel repeated what he had been 
                     
 
7 More specifically, defense counsel's caution was prompted 
by the possible consequences of a probation revocation in the 
event the defendant were to become the subject of a sexually 
dangerous person proceeding under G. L. c. 123A. 
10 
 
told by the defendant regarding the recent diagnosis of a "brain 
tumor," raising the possibility that the defendant's conduct was 
caused by a mental disability rather than by purposeful 
oppositional behavior.  Counsel then argued that prior to a 
hearing on forfeiture, the better course was to require that the 
defendant be examined for competency and to determine whether 
the defendant is able to "work with a lawyer," preferably a 
mental health attorney certified by the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services. 
 
The judge inquired about competency evaluations of the 
defendant "in this case and others" and was informed by the 
prosecutor that the defendant had been examined for competency 
on at least two occasions during the pendency of the trial 
proceedings.8  In both instances, according to the prosecutor, 
the defendant had been found competent. 
 
The judge made findings, commencing with the history of the 
defendant's relationship with the "nine different attorneys"9 who 
had been appointed to represent him over the course of the trial 
and posttrial proceedings.  In reciting this history, the judge 
                     
 
8 The docket reflects that the defendant was evaluated for 
competency in March, 2007; January, 2008; and August, 2008; and 
that the defendant was found competent in each evaluation. 
 
 
9 The docket entries show that six attorneys, five of whom 
withdrew their appearances, were appointed to represent the 
defendant at the trial stage; one attorney was appointed during 
appellate proceedings; and three attorneys were appointed for 
the probation revocation matter. 
11 
 
listed each of the attorneys by name and stated the reason why 
each had been allowed to withdraw from representing the 
defendant.  The judge found that between the arraignment in 2006 
and the trial in 2008, the defendant had been represented by six 
different attorneys, five of whom had been allowed to withdraw 
after the defendant had accused them of unprofessional conduct 
and had threatened to report them to the board.  As to the 
posttrial probation revocation proceedings, the judge found that 
the defendant had been represented by three different attorneys 
who had been subjected to accusations and threats similar to 
those visited upon the trial attorneys, and that the defendant 
had been warned that no further counsel would be appointed to 
represent him.10  Except with respect to one trial attorney who 
had withdrawn in 2007, the judge made no findings that the 
defendant had threatened physical harm to any of the appointed 
counsel.  The judge characterized the defendant's conduct toward 
those attorneys, all of whom are "experienced and skilled" 
criminal defense lawyers, as "egregious."  Last, the judge found 
the defendant "lucid" and "responsive" during the earlier 
exchange regarding counsel's motion to withdraw.  Relying on the 
prior competency evaluations as reported by the prosecutor, the 
judge found that "mental health [was not] a mitigating factor." 
                     
 
10 The judge's reference was to the comments of a different 
judge who, on June 28, 2012, appointed the third attorney to 
represent the defendant in the probation matter. 
12 
 
 
Based on these findings, the judge ruled that "this is the 
rare case where the defendant has forfeited the right to counsel 
in this probation violation action by his own egregious 
conduct."  More specifically, the judge relied on the pattern of 
hostile and threatening conduct consisting mainly of the threat 
to sue or report counsel to the board, the single threat of 
violence to a trial attorney, and the prior judge's warning that 
no new counsel would be appointed to represent the defendant.  
The judge advised the defendant that the probation revocation 
hearing would be scheduled forthwith and that the defendant 
would proceed pro se. 
 
2.  The probation revocation hearing.  Between the 
forfeiture and probation revocation hearings, a different judge 
held a hearing on three motions filed by the pro se defendant:  
a motion to dismiss the probation surrender notice,11 a motion 
for medical records from Lemuel Shattuck Hospital, and a motion 
for funds for a private investigator.  The motion to dismiss was 
based on the defendant's claim that the letters to the victim 
did not violate the no-contact condition of probation because he 
                     
 
11 The motion to dismiss was based on the defendant's 
allegation that the probation department unilaterally changed 
the condition of probation to entrap him on the probation 
violation.  This allegation arose from a disparity between the 
language of the probation contract prohibiting contact with the 
victim "without permission from the Court" and the trial 
transcript establishing the condition as no contact "without 
[the victim's] express permission." 
13 
 
had the victim's permission to send the letters.  The defendant 
sought medical records to establish a causal relationship 
between his "brain damage" and the letter writing to the victim.  
The basis of the motion for funds for a private investigator was 
to "check any future issues as they arise."  The judge denied 
these and subsequent motions filed by the defendant.12 
 
Over the course of two days, the judge, who was not the 
judge who had conducted the forfeiture hearing, conducted the 
probation revocation hearing, where the sole issue was whether 
the defendant violated the "no-contact" condition of his 
probation by sending letters to the victim.13  On the first day 
of the hearing, the judge ordered that the defendant be 
evaluated for competency during the luncheon recess.  After 
interviewing the defendant and reviewing pertinent court 
records, the court's forensic psychologist opined, "I do believe 
he has a rational and meaningful understanding of what this 
hearing is about.  I believe he understands the gravity and the 
                     
 
12 The defendant filed fourteen subsequent motions, 
including a renewed motion for funds for mental health records, 
a motion for a medical expert, and a motion for permission "to 
have one hour time with [the victim] after final hearing (with 
security present if need be) to make 'peace' with her." 
 
 
13 The judge relied on the no-contact condition as reflected 
in the probation contract, which prohibited contact with the 
victim unless permission was granted by the court.  The 
defendant did not argue that he had sought and received an order 
vacating or modifying this condition, relying instead on an 
asserted permission from the victim. 
14 
 
consequences for him.  And I think, to the best of his ability, 
he is prepared to try to convince the Court about his 
innocence."  The judge accepted the report and resumed the 
hearing. 
 
On the first day of the hearing, the victim and her mother 
testified that the defendant had sent letters to the victim from 
prison and that neither had consented to contact with the 
defendant.  The victim witness advocate testified on the second 
day of the hearing and, in response to the defendant's 
questions, testified that the victim had "told [her] on a number 
of occasions that [the victim] does not want to have contact 
with [him]."  The defendant conceded that he had written letters 
to the victim but asserted two defenses, permission and 
necessity,14 both of which the judge rejected.  At the end of the 
second day of the hearing, the judge found the defendant in 
violation of his probation, revoked the probation, and imposed a 
term of imprisonment. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Forfeiture of the right to counsel.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred on both procedural and 
substantive grounds in ruling that his conduct justified the 
forfeiture of his right to counsel at the probation revocation 
hearing.  The defendant argues that the hearing, held on one 
                     
 
14 Counsel disassociates herself from this argument with 
support from the record.  See Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 
201, 208 (1981). 
15 
 
day's notice, violated his right to due process, in that he was 
deprived of the opportunity to marshal and present evidence in 
opposition to forfeiture.  He also argues that the judge 
erroneously considered conduct at the pretrial proceedings in 
determining that his conduct warranted forfeiture of counsel at 
the probation revocation hearing scheduled to occur seven years 
later.  The Commonwealth counters that the judge's forfeiture 
order was proper given the defendant's pattern of threatening 
conduct toward counsel and because the proceeding involved a 
probation revocation rather than a trial.  We conclude that (1) 
given the timing, the hearing did not meet the procedural due 
process requirement of a "full and fair" opportunity to be heard 
on the issue of forfeiture; and (2) because the defendant's 
posttrial conduct did not involve either threats of violence or 
acts of violence toward counsel, his conduct did not warrant the 
extreme sanction of forfeiture of the right to counsel for the 
probation revocation hearing.  We address each issue in turn. 
 
a.  The forfeiture hearing.  In Means, we outlined the 
requirements of the forfeiture hearing, explaining its 
importance as a predicate to the denial of a defendant's 
fundamental constitutional right to counsel.  There, we said 
that "[b]ecause the consequences of forfeiture of counsel are so 
severe, the sanction of forfeiture should not be imposed until 
the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity at a hearing 
16 
 
to offer evidence as to the totality of circumstances that may 
bear on the question of whether the sanction of forfeiture is 
both warranted and appropriate."  Means, 454 Mass. at 97.  
Beyond the broad command that due process requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, the court in Means further specified 
that (1) the judge should hear evidence regarding the alleged 
conduct that may give rise to a finding of forfeiture; and (2) 
the defendant has the right to "offer evidence, and to cross-
examine witnesses, both as to the allegations of his misconduct 
and the totality of the circumstances that may bear on the 
forfeiture finding, including his mental competency and 
psychological condition, any other mitigating considerations, 
and the willingness of appointed counsel to continue the 
representation."  Id. 
 
The forfeiture proceeding was properly initiated by notice 
"directing the defendant to appear at a hearing to show cause 
why the court should not order forfeiture of his right to 
appointed counsel."  Id.  The hearing, however, was not 
sufficiently protective of the defendant's due process right to 
a "full and fair" hearing where the timing of the hearing, one 
day after the issuance of the show cause order, imposed 
unacceptable limitations on the defendant's right to present 
evidence on the totality of circumstances, including mental 
disability, bearing on the issue of forfeiture.  See id.  At the 
17 
 
very least, the "full and fair opportunity at a hearing to offer 
evidence as to the totality of circumstances" bearing on the 
issue of forfeiture requires an opportunity for the defendant to 
consult fully with counsel and for counsel to marshal evidence 
relevant to the conduct underlying the forfeiture.  Id.  Neither 
of these minimum requirements for a fair hearing was met. 
 
The judge conducted the hearing on one day's notice with 
newly appointed defense counsel.  Counsel, who met the defendant 
for the first time on the day of the hearing, reported that he 
had spoken to the defendant "for over an hour in the back and 
[he] was not able to get very far."15  While we do not intend to 
suggest that a one-day notice is never appropriate, it is 
evident, however, that in the circumstances of this case, where 
a potential defense to forfeiture was the defendant's mental 
disability, the one-day notice was simply too short to 
effectuate the defendant's right to a "full and fair" hearing.  
The defendant was entitled to raise the issue of his mental 
disability in his response to the show cause order, and the 
court was obligated to consider it.  That much is clear from 
Means, 454 Mass. at 97.  Implicit in the right to present a 
defense is a fair opportunity to marshal facts in support of the 
claim.  Counsel, faced with a defendant claiming a serious 
                     
 
15 The defendant was incarcerated at the time of the 
hearing, presumably limiting counsel's options in arranging an 
interview prior to the hearing. 
18 
 
mental disability that surely was suggested by the history of 
his conduct, was obligated to marshal all the relevant facts and 
present the defense on the defendant's behalf.  The mental 
disability defense suggested by counsel's brief interview with 
the defendant likely would require medical records and perhaps 
expert testimony, neither of which was available to counsel 
after the one-day notice of the hearing.16 
 
Further, where forfeiture is at issue, Means imposes an 
affirmative obligation to investigate a defendant's mental 
condition through a competency hearing or waiver inquiry 
"[w]here 'there is some indication of mental disorder or 
impairment sufficient to create a "bona fide doubt" as to the 
defendant's ability to make an informed decision to proceed 
without counsel.'"  Id. at 96, quoting Commonwealth v. Barnes, 
399 Mass. 385, 389 (1987).  The information available to the 
judge from the colloquy with the defendant and from counsel 
regarding the possibility that the defendant might have a mental 
disorder was sufficient to require further inquiry into the 
                     
 
16 The record reflects that, after the forfeiture hearing, 
the defendant attempted to obtain medical records that, he 
indicated, would demonstrate a "cystic brain tumor" and other 
brain damage that affected his behavior.  The motion judge 
denied the defendant's motion for medical records from the 
Lemuel Shattuck Hospital, where the defendant claimed the 
diagnosis had been made.  Thus, it is not possible to say 
whether such records actually exist. 
19 
 
defendant's ability to proceed without counsel.  See Means, 
supra. 
 
Specifically, the judge had invited the defendant to 
respond to counsel's motion to withdraw earlier in the hearing, 
and the defendant alluded to a serious mental condition when he 
told the judge that he had been diagnosed with a "brain tumor" 
that was causing him to have difficulty "putting things into 
words."  Prior counsel testified at the hearing that he was 
unaware of any current mental disorder but acknowledged that he 
had been told of the claimed brain tumor and that the 
defendant's conduct was not "logical" or otherwise in his best 
interest.  Newly appointed counsel reiterated the defendant's 
claim of a brain tumor and appropriately requested that the 
defendant be evaluated to determine if he was competent and 
whether he could work with an attorney before any ruling on 
forfeiture.  Counsel suggested that, if true, this condition, 
rather than a purposeful oppositional behavior, might explain 
the defendant's inability to cooperate with counsel.  Thus, the 
matter of the defendant's mental state, whether it involved 
competency or a mental disability related to the asserted brain 
tumor, was highly relevant to the forfeiture issue. 
 
The judge found that the defendant was "lucid" and 
"responsive" in his exchange with the court regarding counsel's 
withdrawal and that the defendant's mental health was not a 
20 
 
factor weighing against forfeiture.  This finding was based in 
part on competency evaluations that had been completed five 
years earlier.  We doubt the reliability of the prior competency 
evaluations as evidence of the defendant's more recent or then-
current mental condition which, in the circumstances of this 
case, was a required factor in the court's forfeiture analysis. 
 
First, competency and mental illness are distinct concepts, 
each of which may bear on the propriety of forfeiture.  In 
Commonwealth v. Chatman, 473 Mass. 840 (2016), we explained that 
the focus of competency is the defendant's "functional 
abilities" rather than "the presence or absence of any 
particular psychiatric diagnosis."  Id. at 846-847, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 350 (2004).  Thus, the 
competency inquiry is (1) whether the defendant has a 
"sufficient present ability to consult with his [counsel] with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding," and (2) whether he 
has a "rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings."  Chatman, supra at 847, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Harris, 468 Mass. 429, 443 (2014).  On the other hand, we noted 
in Means that a court considering forfeiture should exercise 
caution in applying a "single mental competency standard" in 
determining whether a defendant may be permitted to represent 
himself.  Means, 454 Mass. at 96, quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 
554 U.S. 164, 175 (2008).  We recognized that, as here, a mental 
21 
 
disability or mental illness, quite apart from competency, may 
be a factor in the forfeiture analysis in appropriate cases.  
There, we said that "[m]ental illness itself is not a unitary 
concept.  It varies in degree.  It can vary over time.  It 
interferes with an individual's functioning at different times 
in different ways."  Means, supra, quoting Edwards, supra.  
Thus, while competency is important to the forfeiture issue, it 
is not dispositive. 
 
Second, even if competency were the sole relevant issue, a 
five year old competency evaluation would not suffice to inform 
the required evaluation of the defendant's mental condition at 
the time of the forfeiture order.  Put simply, it was not 
possible, based on the earlier competency evaluation, to 
determine whether the defendant, at the time of forfeiture, had 
a mental disability as he claimed. 
 
To be clear, we agree with the Appeals Court that the 
"judge was not required to credit the defendant's unsupported 
claim that his mental state was impaired by 'a brain tumor deep 
within the center of [his] brain,'" Gibson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 
834, but the judge should at least have given counsel a 
reasonable opportunity to marshal any evidence there might be to 
establish that there was or was not a bona fide issue of 
competency either at that time or when prior counsel withdrew.  
The defendant's mental condition should not have been left to 
22 
 
speculation, particularly when the constitutional right to 
counsel was at risk. 
 
b.  The forfeiture decision.  Although we conclude that the 
forfeiture hearing did not comport fully with the procedural due 
process protections we mandated in Means, we nonetheless address 
the merits of the judge's forfeiture decision.  We do so to 
clarify the nature of the conduct required for forfeiture and to 
emphasize the necessity to determine whether, given the totality 
of the circumstances, forfeiture is in the interests of justice. 
 
In reviewing a judge's forfeiture order, we defer to the 
judge's findings of fact but we conduct an "independent 
determination of the correctness of the judge's application of 
constitutional principle to the facts found."  Means, 454 Mass. 
at 88, quoting Commonwealth v. Currie, 388 Mass. 776, 784 
(1983).  Although a probationer does not enjoy the full panoply 
of rights guaranteed to a defendant in a criminal trial, 
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990), we have 
determined that "whenever imprisonment palpably may result from 
a violation of probation, 'simple justice' requires that, absent 
waiver, a probationer is entitled to assistance of counsel."  
Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 125 (2010), quoting 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 737 (1966). 
 
In Means, 454 Mass. at 92, we articulated the guidelines to 
be applied in ordering forfeiture, explaining that any such 
23 
 
decision is to be made in light of the over-arching principle 
that "[f]orfeiture is an extreme sanction in response to extreme 
conduct that imperils the integrity or safety of court 
proceedings."  The guidelines require consideration of four 
factors:  (1) whether the defendant has had the services of more 
than one attorney; (2) the type of proceeding in which 
forfeiture is ordered; (3) the type of conduct offered as the 
basis for forfeiture; and (4) the availability of a less 
restrictive measure or whether forfeiture is a last resort.  See 
id. at 93-95.  The issue for the judge after hearing all the 
evidence and making findings and rulings is the application of 
the two-part test:  "whether the defendant's conduct was so 
egregious as to warrant the sanction of forfeiture, and, if so, 
in view of the totality of circumstances, whether the sanction 
of forfeiture is in the interests of justice."  Id. at 97. 
 
We glean from the judge's findings and rulings that the 
forfeiture order was grounded largely on his determination that 
over the course of the proceedings, from trial up to and 
including the probation violation hearing, the court had 
appointed nine different attorneys to represent the defendant 
and that seven of those attorneys had been permitted to withdraw 
because of the defendant's pattern of verbally threatening 
conduct against them.  The judge found significant as well that 
the defendant had threatened physical violence against one of 
24 
 
the trial attorneys.  Thus, the judge focused on the first and 
third factors in his forfeiture decision.17 
 
It would be an understatement to say that over the course 
of the seven years between the defendant's arraignment and the 
forfeiture order, the defendant's turbulent relationship with 
his withdrawing attorneys demonstrated an extraordinary 
inability or unwillingness to cooperate with counsel.  
Therefore, we have no quarrel with the judge's frustration with 
what could have been a tactical ploy by the defendant to delay 
the resolution of the matter likely to result in the revocation 
of his probation and the imposition of a State prison sentence.  
And we recognize that cases in which defendants consistently 
find frivolous reasons to withhold their cooperation from 
appointed counsel can and must be dealt with appropriately.  See 
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 389 Mass. 359, 366-367, cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 941 (1983), quoting Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 
278 (1st Cir. 1976) (assistance of counsel not absolute, and 
                     
 
17 Regarding the second factor, we recognize that forfeiture 
of counsel at a probation revocation hearing "does not deal as 
serious a blow to a defendant as would the forfeiture of counsel 
at the trial itself."  Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 82, 94 
(2009), quoting United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 251 n.14 
(3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999).  Nonetheless, 
we need not address the broader question of the types of 
proceedings that might weigh more heavily in assessing the 
validity of a particular forfeiture decision.  In this case, 
where the defendant's liberty interests are at stake in a fact-
dependent probation revocation proceeding, the right to counsel 
attaches with full force. 
25 
 
"refusal without good cause to proceed with able appointed 
counsel is a 'voluntary' waiver").  We conclude, however, that 
the forfeiture order in this case was erroneous for two reasons.  
First, the defendant's conduct, consisting mainly of threats to 
report counsel to the board over a seven-year period, was not 
sufficiently "egregious" to warrant forfeiture.  Second, even if 
the defendant's conduct met the threshold for forfeiture, the 
judge failed to consider whether forfeiture was in the interests 
of justice, the second prong of the two-part test for 
forfeiture. 
 
In elaborating on the particular conduct warranting 
forfeiture, we noted in Means, 454 Mass. at 94, that "forfeiture 
may be an appropriate response to the defendant's threats of 
violence or acts of violence against defense counsel or others."  
We focused more narrowly on conduct involving "threats of 
violence or acts of violence" in deference to the rationale 
underlying the forfeiture doctrine:  a court's ability to 
respond to conduct that "imperils the integrity or safety of 
court proceedings."  Id. at 92, 94.  Violence or threats of 
violence pose obvious threats to the "integrity or safety of 
court proceedings" that must be timely addressed in a firm and 
fair manner.  Id. at 92. 
 
Except for the threat of violence to one trial attorney, 
the defendant did not engage in such conduct in relation to the 
26 
 
attorneys appointed to represent him.  Without question, the 
defendant's conduct created an annoyance of the highest order 
for counsel and an obstacle to the court's effort to efficiently 
dispose of its docket in the interest of public safety.  
However, where the defendant's conduct mainly involved threats 
to file lawsuits or complaints against the attorneys with the 
board, we discern no peril to the "integrity or safety of [the] 
court proceeding[]," such as would likely inhere in a threat of 
violence or an act of violence.  Means, 454 Mass. at 92.  We 
find it significant as well that the one threat of violence 
against an attorney was far removed in time from the probation 
revocation proceeding.  Thus, we adhere to the view expressed in 
Means that violence or the threat of violence is the touchstone 
for a forfeiture order.  See id. at 94.  Because the defendant's 
conduct did not meet this test, the forfeiture order was 
erroneous. 
 
Last, we emphasize that if a judge determines that a 
defendant has engaged in "egregious" conduct that warrants 
forfeiture, he or she must also determine if, given the totality 
of the circumstances, forfeiture is "in the interests of 
justice."  Means, 454 Mass. at 97.  This requirement embodies 
the concern that forfeiture be imposed only as a "last resort" 
and only "when less restrictive measures are inappropriate" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 95.  It is a mandate to look beyond 
27 
 
the defendant's "egregious" conduct to the consequences of 
forfeiture on the defendant's fundamental right to the 
assistance of counsel.  Thus, in any case where forfeiture is 
ordered, the better practice is to clarify for the record that 
all of the guidelines have been appropriately considered and 
that forfeiture is in the interests of justice. 
 
We hasten to add that a judge facing a pattern of hostile 
conduct from an uncooperative defendant is not without a remedy.  
Where a defendant persists in finding fault, without reason, 
with a succession of appointed counsel, the court may in 
appropriate circumstances consider whether to apply the doctrine 
of waiver by conduct.  Means, 454 Mass. at 90, citing 
Commonwealth v. Babb, 416 Mass. 732 (1994) (recognizing "waiver 
of counsel by conduct, occasionally termed abandonment of 
counsel").  The waiver by conduct doctrine requires that the 
judge must first conduct a colloquy with the defendant warning 
the defendant of the consequence that he or she may lose the 
right to counsel if he or she engages in abusive conduct (such 
as threats to sue or complain to the board) toward the 
attorney.18  If the defendant thereafter engages in the conduct 
                     
 
18 In the circumstances of this case, however, this remedy 
was not available to the judge at the forfeiture hearing, as the 
judge at the prior hearing did not conduct a colloquy suited to 
a waiver by conduct.  Although the prior judge had warned the 
defendant that another attorney would not be appointed for him, 
28 
 
about which he or she was warned, the act may be treated as "an 
implied request to proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the 
right to counsel."  Means, supra at 91, quoting United States v. 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
2.  The probation revocation hearing.  On appeal, the 
defendant argues that he is entitled to a new hearing based on 
the judge's error in limiting his right to cross-examine the 
victim and her mother and denying his motion for funds to 
procure certified copies of his medical records and for an 
expert to interpret those records.  In view of our determination 
that the order forfeiting the defendant's right to counsel must 
be vacated and that the matter must be remanded, we bypass these 
issues except to note that where, as here, the defendant's 
mental condition is asserted as a factor in both the forfeiture 
and the violation, the defendant is entitled to a fair 
opportunity to procure and present this evidence on remand. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the forfeiture 
order and the order revoking the defendant's probation are 
vacated.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a 
                                                                  
it does not appear -- at least with sufficient clarity -- that 
this warning was intended to trigger the waiver by conduct rule.  
Rather, it appears more likely that that judge had added the 
warning to encourage the defendant's cooperation with counsel, 
as the warning was given only after the judge had been informed 
of the delay in the probation revocation proceeding caused by 
the withdrawal of two prior court-appointed attorneys. 
29 
 
forfeiture hearing at which the defendant may offer evidence of 
his mental condition as a defense to forfeiture.  Regardless of 
the outcome of the forfeiture hearing, the defendant is entitled 
to a de novo probation revocation hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.