Case Title: MATLACK v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-42

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MATLACK v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.2002 WY 6044 P.3d 73Case Number: 01-42Decided: 04/15/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

GLENDA 
H. MATLACK, 

Appellant(Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

MOUNTAIN 
WEST FARM BUREAU

MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY,

a 
Wyoming corporation, 

Appellee(Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
C. John Cotton, Gillette, Wyoming  

Representing 
Appellee:

            
S. B . Freeman, III of Bormuth & Freeman, LC, Cody, Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Glenda Matlack 
sold land adjoining her home to Susan Moore, and a dispute over the ownership of 
a water well on the boundary between their properties resulted.  Ms. Moore took matters into her own 
hands and pulled the well casing onto her property, thereby damaging Ms. 
Matlack's property.  When Ms. 
Matlack sued, Ms. Moore made a claim under her homeowner's insurance 
policy.  Ms. Moore's insurer refused 
coverage for her intentional acts.  
Ultimately, the two neighbors settled their dispute by assigning Ms. 
Moore's claims against her insurer to Ms. Matlack.  The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the insurer on the breach-of-contract and bad faith claims because the 
policy provided no coverage for intentional acts.  We affirm.

 

 

 

[¶2]      Ms. Matlack 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

            
Issue 
No. 1:  Did the lower court err in 
holding that there was no duty to defend the Original Complaint, which included 
claims for trespass, wrongful damage to personal property and real property, and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress?

 

            
Issue No. 2:  Did the lower 
court err in holding that, as a matter of law, the conduct of the insured was 
intentional, and that there was no occurrence under the 
policy?

 

            
Issue No. 3:  Did the lower 
court err in holding that there was no duty to defend the Amended 
Complaint?

 

            
Issue No. 4:  Did the lower 
court err in its determination regarding bad faith?

 

Mountain 
West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company phrases the issues 
as:

 

            
1.  Whether the District Court erred in determining that the 
insurance policy did not provide coverage for the judgment entered by the 
District Court in accordance with the stipulated agreement of the parties in the 
underlying case?

 

            
2.  Whether the District Court erred in its determination that 
the Appellee did not breach its duty to defend the original complaint filed in 
the underlying case?

 

            
3.  Whether the District Court erred in its determination that 
the Appellee did not breach its duty to defend the amended complaint filed in 
the underlying case?

 

            
4.  Whether the District Court erred in its determination that 
the Appellee did not breach its covenant of good faith and fair dealing to its 
insured?

 

In her 
reply brief, Ms. Matlack sets out these additional issues:

 

            
Issue No. 1:  Do allegations 
and/or findings of punitive damages automatically invoke the intentional act 
exclusion?

 

            
Issue No. 2:  Given the 
record in this case, is MWFB's position regarding the duty to defend and 
coverage contrary to Wyoming law?

 

            
Issue No. 3:  Does MWFB 
concede the application of INA v. Spangler, 881 F. Supp. 539 (USDC, D. 
Wyo. 1995)?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In 1994, Ms. 
Matlack sold to Ms. Moore one of two tracts she owned in a subdivision in 
Campbell County.  At the time of the 
sale, one common water well located "almost precisely" on the boundary served 
both tracts.  The parties agreed to 
share in the maintenance and operational costs of the well.  Neither the agreement nor the warranty 
deed mentioned conveyance of the well to Ms. Moore.  After the sale, the parties began 
haggling over ownership and operation of the well.  Both parties sought to drag the state 
engineer's office into the fray which resulted in each of them receiving a 
certificate of title from that office at different times.  After becoming aware of the parties' 
dispute, the state engineer's office bowed out claiming it was a civil matter to 
be resolved by the courts.  
Negotiations between the parties ensued with both parties being 
represented by counsel.  Ms. Moore 
ultimately notified Ms. Matlack of her intent to physically hook on to the well 
casing and pull it onto her own property.  
Not surprisingly, Ms. Matlack responded by denying Ms. Moore permission 
to trespass onto her property to accomplish the task.  Undaunted by her neighbor's position, 
Ms. Moore plowed ahead, started up her backhoe, dug out around the well, hooked 
on to the casing, and pulled it in her direction.  None of these facts were disputed. 

 

[¶4]      Ms. Matlack 
alleged damages including disconnection of her home from the well, damage to the 
integrity of the well casing, the cost of drilling a replacement well, and 
emotional distress.  She filed the 
predictable complaint claiming trespass, wrongful damage to and\or conversion of 
personal property, wrongful taking of and\or damage to real property, negligent 
infliction of emotion distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
civil conspiracy, and punitive damages.  
Ms. Moore, faced with the consequences of her action, tendered the matter 
to her insurance carrier, Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
(Mountain West), under her homeowner's policy.  Mountain West responded within days of 
receiving the claim by denying both coverage and any duty to defend under the 
circumstances alleged in the complaint which in its opinion constituted 
intentional acts.  Eight and a half 
months later, Ms. Matlack amended her complaint by adding a cause of action 
entitled "negligence," relying on the exact same facts.  The trial court issued a decision letter 
granting summary judgment in Ms. Moore's favor on all claims except negligence, 
trespass, and punitive damages.  Ms. 
Moore's counsel provided the amended complaint, the summary judgment decision 
letter, and a letter from Ms. Matlack's attorney offering to settle for the 
$100,000 policy limits to the insurer.  
Mountain West claimed it did not receive the information for several 
months.  Upon review of the amended 
complaint, which now claimed negligence, Mountain West agreed to provide a 
defense but reserved its right to claim no coverage existed for damage cause by 
Ms. Moore's intentional acts.  
Facing trial on the remaining claims, Ms. Moore and Ms. Matlack settled 
their differences by stipulating to a judgment against Ms. Moore for 
$110,678.11, which included $19,763.95 for punitive damages, an assignment to 
Ms. Matlack of Ms. Moore's rights and claims against her insurer, and an 
agreement the judgment would only be satisfied through any recovery from the 
insurer.  

 

[¶5]      Mountain West 
filed a declaratory judgment action against Ms. Matlack, seeking a determination 
that the policy did not provide coverage for the stipulated damages.  Ms. Matlack counterclaimed for breach of 
contract for failure to defend and provide coverage and for insurance bad 
faith.  The trial count granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mountain West on coverage and all of Ms. Matlack's 
counterclaims.  Ms. Matlack 
appealed.

 

 

 

[¶6]      

Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which has 
been asserted by the parties.  We 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were 
employed and used by the lower court. We do not accord any deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law. 

 

Baker v. 
Pena, 2001 
WY 122, ¶6, 36 P.3d 602, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001) (citations 
omitted).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      The fundamental 
question presented in this appeal is whether the insurance policy issued by 
Mountain West to Ms. Moore provided coverage for damages resulting from these 
intentional acts.  Section II of the 
policy describes the terms under which Mountain West contracted to provide 
coverage.  Those terms unambiguously 
state Mountain West will pay up to the limit of liability in the policy for any 
property or bodily injury damages the insured is legally liable for as a result 
of an "occurrence" caused by the insured.  
The specific language of the policy provides in 
part:

 

COVERAGE 
F - Liability

 

If a 
claim is made or suit is brought against any insured for damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage 
applies, we will:

 

1.  Pay up to our limit of liability for the 
damages for which the insured is legally liable; 

 

. . 
. .

 

COVERAGE 
M - Damage to Property of Others

            

We will 
pay for property damage to property of others caused by an insured, at 
replacement cost, up to $500 for any one occurrence.

 

 By the clear language of the policy, 
coverage is limited to damages from an "occurrence."  As set out in the definitions in the 
policy:

 

Occurrence 
means an unexpected and unintended accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions, which result in bodily injury or property damage during 
the policy period.  All bodily 
injury or property damage resulting from a common cause shall be considered the 
result of one occurrence.

 

In 
addition to the clear terms limiting coverage to accidents, the policy 
specifically excluded coverage for intentional acts, actions arising out of an 
insured's violation of a criminal law, and punitive 
damages.

 

[¶8]      We have found 
similar language unambiguous and discussed the definition of "accident" in this 
context.  In Reisig v. Union Insurance Company, 870 P.2d 1066, 1069-70 (Wyo. 1994), we stated:

 

            
In determining the question of whether the intentional tort of conversion 
can be considered an "accident," we look only to the allegations of the 
Complaint filed by Rocky Mountain to see if there is alleged a loss "caused by 
an occurrence'" as required by the CGL policy, which incorporates the term 
"accident" in defining "occurrence."  
We previously have defined "accident" in this way:

 

The word 
may be defined as meaning a fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an 
event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly 
through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and 
unexpected by the person to whom it happens; an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, 
unforeseen or unlooked for event, happening or occurrence; 
. . . chance or contingency; fortune; mishap; some sudden and 
unexpected event taking place without expectation, upon the instant, rather than 
something which continues, progresses or develops 
. . . .

 

Wright 
v. Wyoming State Training Sch., 71 Wyo. 
173, 255 P.2d 211, 218 (1953).

 

[¶9]      It cannot be 
seriously argued Ms. Moore's action of hooking on to the well casing and pulling 
it toward her property, thereby causing damage, was accidental.  In an attempt to put as good a light as 
possible on her actions, she claims she mistakenly believed she had a right to 
do so.  That artful dodging is 
likewise unpersuasive. At the time, she was embroiled in negotiations with Ms. 
Matlack through counsel and fully aware of her neighbor's competing claim to the 
well.  In fact, Ms. Matlack made it 
abundantly clear Ms. Moore's actions would be considered a trespass.  

 

[¶10]   In Reisig, the contractor charged with 
conversion for taking and selling equipment in which a lender held a security 
interest made a similar argument claiming he was unaware of the lender's right 
to the equipment.  In that case, we 
found no duty to defend when the complaint alleged such intentional acts as were 
clearly excluded from the definition of "accident."  That holding relied on our earlier 
precedent in First Wyoming Bank, N.A., 
Jackson Hole v. Continental Insurance Company, 860 P.2d 1094 (Wyo. 1993), 
which likewise found a claim that relied upon breach of contract could not 
create a duty to defend on the insurer's part despite the fact the complaint 
contained a cause of action labeled "negligence."  Our analysis must focus on the facts 
alleged in the complaint upon which the cause of action is founded, not on the 
label counsel applied to a particular cause of action.  In First Wyoming Bank, the Robinsons and the Russells 
alleged the bank had agreed to make certain loans and later refused causing 
damages.  Despite a claim for relief 
entitled "negligence," which alleged the bank acted negligently in making the 
representations regarding the loans, the obvious gravamen of the complaint was 
the bank's alleged failure to perform its contract with the Robinsons and the 
Russells.  That breach of contract 
could not rationally be deemed an "occurrence" or "accident" within the 
unambiguous language of the insurance contract.  Likewise, in this case, although counsel 
tried to craft the amended complaint to trigger coverage by adding a claim for 
relief entitled "negligence" claiming Ms. Moore negligently believed she owned 
the well, he could not avoid the obvious fact that Ms. Moore's actions were no 
accident.  Ms. Matlack even admits 
in her brief that the amended complaint was "simply another method of stating 
what was stated in the original Complaint."

 

[¶11]   As support for her argument that 
intentional acts based upon mistake are "occurrences" under the policy, Ms. 
Matlack relies upon Parker v. Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co., 278 S.E.2d 803 (Va. 1981), and Lumber Insurance Companies, Inc. v. Allen, 820 F. Supp. 33 (D. N.H. 1993), 
for the proposition that a trespass is an occurrence under the policy's language 
if no harm was intended.  However, 
both cases involved unintentional trespasses where the insureds were completely 
unaware of the claims to the properties in question.  Those facts bear no resemblance to this 
situation.  In Parker, the insureds, whose deed 
contained no reference to a burial plot being reserved, began constructing a 
silo on the burial plot.  Because 
the facts alleged in the complaint could support a judgment of an unintentional 
trespass which could be covered by the policy, the court found the insurer had a 
duty to defend the claim.  
Similarly, the insureds in Allen built a driveway under the 
mistaken belief they owned an easement allowing them to do so.  Interpreting an insurance policy very 
similar to the one at issue in this case, the court found the meanings of 
"occurrence" and "accident" could potentially cover the insureds' unintentional 
trespass and, consequently, the insurer had a duty to defend.  In determining whether the intentional 
act could constitute an accident, the Allen court cited a two-part test: (1) 
Was the act actually intended to cause the injury that resulted or (2) is the 
act so inherently injurious that it cannot be performed without causing the 
resulting injury?  820 F. Supp.  at 
34.  The court concluded, if an 
insured mistakenly believes he has an owner's permission to enter the property, 
the first part of the test could be met in that no intent to cause injury would 
exist.  It seems to follow that, if 
the insured mistakenly believes he owns the property, no injury would likewise 
be intended.  However, that mistaken 
belief must have some basis in fact, and we believe it goes without saying that 
such belief must be held in good faith.  
A claim of mistaken belief cannot be sustained where parties are 
embroiled in an open and hostile dispute over ownership.  

 

[¶12]   Pursuant to the second part of the 
test, if an injury will certainly follow from the insured's conduct, his conduct 
will not be considered accidental even if he has no intention to injure.  When this part of the test is applied to 
intentional but mistaken conduct, the issue becomes whether the facts support a 
belief that the conduct was authorized.  
If authorized conduct does not injure and the facts support a belief that 
the conduct was authorized, injury is not certain to follow from the insured's 
acts.  Thus, an insured's 
intentional but mistaken trespass or conversion also will survive this part of 
the test if the insured's mistaken belief has a basis in fact because it cannot 
be said under such circumstances that the insured's conduct will necessarily 
result in injury.  820 F. Supp.  at 
35.  As an example, the court in Allen explained that an inadvertent 
straying across an unmarked property boundary to cut trees would constitute an 
accident while deciding to cut trees on property which is clearly marked with no 
trespassing signs would not.  Id.

 

[¶13]   We find this authority 
persuasive.  It follows that, to 
conclude in this case coverage may have existed and, therefore, a duty to defend 
was created, we must find (1) a good faith belief by the insured that she was 
acting with authority or (2) a lack of inherent injury occurred from her 
actions.  We can do neither.  The undisputed facts are that the 
parties agreed to share the cost of operating the well; the warranty deed did 
not convey to Ms. Moore any rights to the well; after the sale was completed, 
Ms. Moore unilaterally sought and obtained a transfer of the well permit to her 
from the state engineer's office and removal of Ms. Matlack from the utility 
account servicing the well, and she began sending bills to Ms. Matlack for her 
use of water from the well; and, while the parties were in negotiations through 
counsel over their disputed rights to the well, Ms. Matlack informed Ms. Moore 
that, if she took any steps to pull the well onto her property, Ms. Matlack 
would consider her a criminal trespasser and yet Ms. Moore proceeded to do so 
anyway.  Whether or not Ms. Moore 
actually believed she owned the well, she was fully aware her neighbor 
strenuously disputed that fact, and, depending on who ultimately was found to be 
correct, she knew she may be acting improperly.  Those facts can hardly be considered as 
demonstrating a good faith belief she was acting with authority.  Further, Ms. Moore's act of pulling the 
well casing, located "almost precisely" on the property boundary, toward her 
property necessarily  damaged Ms. 
Matlack's property including disconnecting her home from the well and destroying 
her water supply.  These facts, 
alleged in the complaint and undisputed by Ms. Moore, do not support an 
unintentional trespass intended to cause no harm.

 

[¶14]   Ms. Moore's stipulation to the 
entry of a judgment which included punitive damages deserves mention.  This court has recognized that a 
trespasser who believes he is authorized to enter another's property but does so 
in the face of the owner's opposition or who should have known of the owner's 
claim to the property is subject to punitive damages.  See Roberts Construction Company v. 
Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171, 1180 (Wyo. 1976); Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255, 274 (1925).  In Hall, an oil company drilled on property 
it believed was covered by a lease, but the owner contended otherwise and made 
his position known.  In that 
circumstance, this court pointed out that, "though an entry is made upon real 
estate under a conviction that the right to do so exists, if it is in fact 
wrongful, and willful injury is done to the plaintiff's property, the defendant 
will be liable for exemplary damages."  
237 P.  at 274.  In this case, 
the parties stipulated to punitive damages demonstrating they agreed the actions 
were of a willful and wanton nature.  
There may well exist other situations in which an action justifying 
punitive damages can also be considered an accident, and we are not holding 
that, any time punitive damages are claimed or adjudged, no coverage or duty to 
defend exists.  We do hold the 
particular facts of this case­­­an intentional trespass with full 
knowledge of disputed ownershipdoes not trigger coverage.

 

 

            

A.        Duty 
to Defend

 

[¶15]   Next, we are faced with the 
question of whether a duty to defend existed in this case even though coverage 
was clearly not available.  Our 
jurisprudence has established an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its 
duty to provide coverage.  Shoshone First Bank v. Pacific Employers 
Insurance Co., 2 P.3d 510, 513-14 (Wyo. 2000).

 

The 
insurer is obligated to afford a defense as long as the alleged claim rationally 
falls within the policy coverage.  
The obligation to defend is an independent consideration in liability 
insurance, and it is invoked by any claim alleged in the complaint that is 
potentially covered under the policy.  

 

Id. 
(citations omitted).  The insurer in 
Shoshone First Bank assumed the duty 
to defend because a claim of invasion of privacy was made which could have 
potentially been considered a "personal injury" under the terms of the policy.1  If the policy potentially covers one or 
more claims, the insurer has a duty to defend all claims, and any doubts about 
coverage should be resolved against the insurer.  Alm v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
369 P.2d 216, 219 (Wyo. 1962).

 

[¶16]   Ms. Matlack argues that, unlike the 
situation in Reisig where we found no 
duty to defend because conversion could not constitute an "accident" as 
contemplated in an insurance policy very similar to the one at issue here, her 
complaint recites various causes of action so that, if her claim for trespass 
were not covered by the policy because it involved an intentional act, other 
claims would arguably give rise to a duty to defend.  In Reisig, the complaint stated only one 
claim for conversion.  A simple 
reading of Ms. Matlack's amended complaint exposes the flaw in her 
argument.  All the causes of action 
rely upon the same factsthe intentional trespass.  Simply because Ms. Matlack sought to 
denominate causes of action as "negligence" or "negligent infliction of 
emotional distress," the facts cannot be magically transformed and thereby 
create a duty to defend.  This court 
rejected a similar argument in First 
Wyoming Bank, 860 P.2d 1094.  
There, the Robinsons and the Russells tried to transform a 
breach-of-contract case into an insured claim by including a cause of action 
entitled "negligence."  However, the 
underlying nature of the dispute was the bank's alleged failure to loan money to 
them as promised; e.g., a breach of contract.  Those facts did not constitute an 
"occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and, consequently, we found no 
duty to defend.  

  

[¶17]   To determine whether a claim is 
rationally covered by the terms of the policy, as we said in First Wyoming Bank, "we analyze the duty 
to defend by examining the facts alleged in the complaint."  860 P.2d  at 1097.  "Therefore, to determine Continental's 
duty to defend the Bank in the Robinson/Russell litigation, we examine the terms 
of Continental's policy and the allegations contained in the Robinson/Russell 
complaint."  860 P.2d  at 
1097-98.  The court then reviewed 
the complaint and found, "Although there is a claim in the complaints labeled 
NEGLIGENCE,' the facts in the complaint do not demonstrate alleged loss 
resulting from negligence or alleged loss caused by an occurrence,' but instead 
demonstrate alleged losses resulting from a breach of contract."  860 P.2d  at 1099.  
Further, the opinion noted that misrepresentation could have been a 
possible claim under the facts alleged but the claim would have required proof 
of an intentional act and would not constitute an "accident" or "occurrence" 
within the meaning of the policy.  
860 P.2d  at 1100.  Finding no 
duty to defend, the court went on to conclude no claim for bad faith refusal to 
acknowledge coverage existed because the issue of coverage was "fairly 
debatable," citing Darlow v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 822 P.2d 820, 823 (Wyo. 1991).  860 P.2d  at 1101.

 

[¶18]   We are faced with the same 
situation here.  Ms. Moore's 
intentional acts, which she performed with full knowledge of the possibility the 
well belonged to her neighbor, could not rationally be covered by a policy which 
limited coverage to "occurrences" or "accidents" and excluded intentional acts 
by the insured.  Consequently, 
Mountain West was justified in initially denying both coverage and a duty to 
defend.  Ms. Matlack argues it is 
significant that Mountain West ultimately assumed the defense after the 
complaint was amended to include a claim entitled "negligence" and the trial 
court denied summary judgment on that claim.  That argument proves the rule that "no 
good deed goes unpunished."  Still 
claiming no coverage existed, Mountain West, in an abundance of caution and most 
likely in fear of the slightest possibility a court might conclude there was a 
potential for coverage, offered to defend with a reservation of rights.  The insurer's decision does not alter 
our conclusion that no coverage was triggered by the facts in the original 
complaint which remained unchanged in the amended complaint and no legal duty to 
defend arose.2 

 

B.        Bad 
Faith

 

[¶19]   The trial court also granted 
summary judgment on the bad faith claim.  
In McCullough v. Golden Rule 
Insurance Co., 789 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1990), we held the appropriate test 
for determining whether there was bad faith is the objective standard of whether 
the validity of the denied claim was not fairly debatable.  To prove a claim for bad faith, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying 
benefits of the policy and (2) the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard 
of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.  789 P.2d  at 860.  To satisfy the first essential 
component, an insured must show that a reasonable insurer under the 
circumstances would not have acted as it did by denying or delaying payment of 
the claim.  Darlow, 822 P.2d  at 824.  Even if a claim for benefits is fairly 
debatable, the insurer may breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the 
manner in which it investigates, handles, or denies a claim.  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 828 (Wyo. 1994). While an insured may 
state claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, the insured does not need to prevail on the contract claim to 
pursue the bad faith claim.  Id.  

 

[¶20]   The facts upon which Ms. Matlack 
relies to prove bad faith are not compelling.  Obviously, the trial court and this 
court have rejected her claim that Mountain West wrongfully denied coverage and 
initially denied its duty to defend.  
The only remaining facts which allegedly show bad faith are Mountain 
West's prompt response to the first complaint, apparently indicating only 
cursory examination of the case; the delay in its response to the amended 
complaint, apparently showing it drug its heels; and the change in its position 
regarding its willingness to defend based upon the amended complaint that Ms. 
Matlack now admits was not substantively different from the first 
complaint.  Reasonable minds could 
not differ as to whether, on the basis of these facts, Mountain West acted 
improperly in the investigation or the handling of the claim. Lewis v. Platt, 837 P.2d 91, 93 (Wyo. 
1992).  Given the limited and 
transparent nature of these facts, the trial court was well justified in finding 
no dispute of material fact concerning bad faith.

 

 

 

[¶21]   No genuine issue as to any material 
fact existed regarding the fundamental issue in this case.  All parties agree Ms. Moore 
intentionally and willfully trespassed onto Ms. Matlack's property despite the 
latter's protestations and in the midst of their negotiations over ownership of 
the well.  Such action cannot 
constitute an occurrence under the unambiguous language of the policy as a 
matter of law.  The trial court was 
correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain West on all 
claims.  

            

[¶22]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1The ultimate 
issue in Shoshone First Bank was 
whether the costs of defense could be apportioned between covered claims and 
those not covered, which issue is not relevant to the issue before us in this 
case.

2Despite discussion by both parties of Insurance Company of North America v. 
Spangler, 881 F. Supp. 539 (D. Wyo. 1995), its rationale is not relevant to 
the issues in this case.  There, the 
court found coverage did exist; the insurer did assume the defense of the claim 
and was simply disputing whether the parties' settlement agreement complied with 
the terms of the policy.