Case Title: DOUGLAS ANTHONY SHORT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0014

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
DOUGLAS ANTHONY SHORT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 52205 P.3d 195Case Number: S-08-0014Decided: 04/13/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DOUGLAS 
ANTHONY SHORT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric 
M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
seeks review of the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss based on 
the State's alleged violation of his rights under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers (IAD).  We affirm, 
although for different reasons than those relied upon by the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Should the 
district court have dismissed with prejudice the Felony Information because the 
appellant was not brought to trial within the period provided by the 
IAD?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      A convenience 
store in Campbell County, Wyoming, was robbed at gunpoint on July 11, 2005.  After an ensuing investigation, a Felony 
Information was filed charging the appellant with aggravated robbery and with 
conspiring to commit aggravated robbery.  An arrest warrant was filed on May 1, 
2006.

 
 
[¶4]      On May 23, 2006, 
the appellant was arrested on drug charges in Weld County, Colorado.  The Colorado authorities initiated a 
National Crime Information Computer check and discovered the Wyoming arrest 
warrant.  Although the record is not 
clear in this regard, it appears that the appellant initially refused to waive 
extradition to Wyoming, because the Wyoming prosecutor subsequently obtained a 
governor's warrant pursuant to the Uniform Extradition Act found at Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-3-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 
2007).1

 
 
[¶5]      On July 26, 2006, 
the appellant appeared in a Colorado court, where he pled guilty to, and was 
sentenced for, the Colorado charges.  
At the same time, he was served with the governor's warrant and waived 
extradition to Wyoming.  The 
Colorado sentence ordered the Colorado Department of Corrections to honor the 
governor's warrant.  Rather than 
being transferred to Wyoming, the appellant began serving his Colorado 
sentence.2  While it is, once again, unclear in the 
record, either the governor's warrant was withdrawn, or the Wyoming prosecutor 
simply decided not to pursue it upon receiving advice from the Wyoming Attorney 
General's Office that, once the appellant began serving his Colorado sentence, 
"the extradition process is no longer applicable to him," but, rather, "the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainer (IAD) is now the proper method by which to seek 
custody . . . ."3

 
 
[¶6]      Whatever it is 
that may have happened in the interim, the appellant, apparently with the 
assistance of Colorado authorities, prepared a packet of IAD documents, 
including his Request for Final Disposition of Detainer and Colorado's Offer to 
Deliver Temporary Custody.  The 
papers appear to have been prepared on November 5, 2006, and signed on November 
21, 2006.  This paperwork was 
processed through the Colorado Department of Corrections and was mailed to the 
Wyoming prosecutor on January 3, 2007.  
He received it on January 8, 2007.  
Responsive IAD forms were signed by the prosecutor and judge on January 
30, 2007, and were mailed to Colorado by an assistant attorney general on 
February 9, 2007.  The appellant 
arrived in Campbell County, Wyoming, on February 22, 2007.

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant 
almost immediately filed a demand for speedy trial, but soon thereafter, due to 
his attorney's scheduling conflict, moved to continue his preliminary hearing 
and waived his right to a speedy preliminary hearing.  The preliminary hearing was re-scheduled 
from March 1, 2007 to May 4, 2007.  
The appellant was bound over to district court, where, two weeks before 
trial, he filed the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-5-10 [sic] 
that is the focus of this appeal.  
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion.  The jury trial began on June 25, 2007. 
 The appellant was found not guilty 
of aggravated robbery, but guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. 
 This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      The applicable 
standard of review is as follows:

 
 
            
To the extent the issue raised is a question of statutory interpretation, 
our review is de novo.  Wyodak Resources Development Corporation v. 
Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2002 WY 181, ¶ 9, 60 P.3d 129, [135] (Wyo. 
2002).  When a matter has been the 
subject of a bench trial (or evidentiary hearing) before the district court, we 
review the factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and the 
legal conclusions de novo.  Union Pacific Railroad v. Trona Valley 
Federal Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1203, [1205] (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
            
In construing statutes, our aim is to effectuate legislative intent.  Director of Office of State Lands & 
Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003).  If the language is sufficiently clear, 
we do not resort to rules of construction.  
Id.  We apply our general rule that we look 
to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is 
unambiguous.  Id.  We also construe a statute so as to give 
effect to all of its provisions.  Id.

 
 
            
With regard to the IAD specifically, it is a federal law subject to 
federal construction.  Knox v. Wyoming Department of Corrections 
State Penitentiary Warden, 34 F.3d 964, 966 (10th Cir. 1994).  United States Supreme Court 
interpretations of the IAD are thus binding on state courts.  State v. Reed, [668 N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 
2003)].  The IAD is a remedial 
statute and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes, including a 
speedy trial and the expeditious and orderly disposition of charges.  Corbin v. Superior Court of the State of 
Arizona, 155 Ariz. 365, 746 P.2d 937, 939 (1987).  However, it also has strict procedural 
requirements that must be followed.  
Id.

 
 

Odhinn 
v. State, 
2003 WY 169, ¶¶ 13-15, 82 P.3d 715, 719-20 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶9]      This Court will 
affirm the district court's decision on any legal ground appearing in the 
record.  Armstrong v. Hrabal, 2004 WY 39, ¶ 56, 
87 P.3d 1226, 1244 (Wyo. 2004); Jones v. 
State, 602 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The IAD is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-15-101 et seq (LexisNexis 
2007).  It is a fairly complex 
uniform law, structured around enumerated "articles."  For purposes of the present discussion, 
it will be sufficient for us to summarize the pertinent provisions of the 
pertinent articles.  At the outset, 
we will note that the stated purpose of the Act is to "encourage the expeditious 
and orderly disposition of" charges pending against persons incarcerated in 
another jurisdiction.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-15-101 (Article I).  The 
IAD is intended to "be liberally construed so as to effectuate its 
purposes."  Id. (Article IX).

 
 
[¶11]   The IAD contemplates the generation 
of its processes either by the state wherein charges are pending, or by the 
person incarcerated in another jurisdiction against whom those charges are 
pending.  Id. (Articles III and IV).  If the proceedings are initiated by the 
state, the person must be brought to trial within 120 days of that person's 
arrival in the receiving state.  Id. (Article IV(c)).  If the proceedings are initiated by the 
person against whom the charges are pending, the person must be brought to trial 
within 180 days of delivery of his request for disposition.  Id. (Article III(a)); Odhinn, 2003 WY 169, ¶ 19, 82 P.3d  at 
721; Green v. State, 784 P.2d 1360, 
1362-63 (Wyo. 1989).  The IAD's 
"hammer" is contained in Article V(c):

 
 
            
(c)  If the appropriate 
authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in 
the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the 
basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the 
periods provided by this act, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where 
the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order 
dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease 
to be of any force or effect.

 
 
[¶12]   We first must determine whether the 
180-day period of Article III or the 120-day period of Article IV should be 
applied in our analysis.  In their 
arguments below, the parties agreed that the appellant had initiated the IAD 
proceedings and that the 180-day period applied.  Not until he filed his Brief in this 
Court did the appellant contend that Wyoming authorities had initiated the IAD 
procedures, leading to application of the 120-day period.  We will apply the 180-day period of 
Article III, for two reasons:  
first, that is consistent with the factsthe request for disposition was 
initiated by the appellant; and second, we will not consider arguments that were 
not made below.4  Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 22, 105 P.3d 1049, 1063 (Wyo. 2005); Davis v. 
City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶13]   As noted above, the 180-day period 
begins to run when the prisoner has "delivered to the prosecuting officer and 
the appropriate court" his request for disposition. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 
(Article III(a)); Odhinn, 2003 WY 
169, ¶ 18, 82 P.3d  at 720.  That 
requirement makes two dates significant in our analysis:  November 21, 2006, the date the 
appellant gave his IAD paperwork to Colorado officials for forwarding to 
Wyoming, and January 8, 2007, the date that paperwork was received by Wyoming 
officials.  In denying the 
appellant's motion, the district court applied the following 
reasoning:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  All right.  The Court is going to deny both of those 
motions.  The constitutional 
challenge, it seems to me, is fairly straightforward in this particular 
matter.  We've had some recent cases 
that construed this, and the more problematic analysis, when I looked at this 
last night, was the IAD analysis, and I wondered about that at the time, but now 
that I have the State's chart, it seems to me that the  while I understand the 
defense's argument, it seems to me that as a sovereign there's only so much that 
Wyoming can do.  Wyoming can only 
act when it knows it has to act, and it did that here.

 
 
            
I have some difficulty essentially assigning Colorado's actions to 
Wyoming.  I'm going to find that the 
start date for this, in fact, was January 8th, the date that the State got 
notice.  And even under that, if we 
take that analysis from January 8th, then the issue of preliminary hearing 
almost becomes moot, because we're going to be trying this case within 180 days 
anyway.

 
 
[¶14]   If the 180-day period is computed 
from November 21, 2006, it expired on May 20, 2007.  If the 180-day period is computed from 
January 8, 2007, it expired on July 7, 2007.  The jury trial began on June 25, 
2007.  Thus, the trial was timely 
held according to the State, but not so according to the appellant.  Were these the only pertinent facts, stare decisis would compel us to agree 
with the appellant because there is no justification in the record for the delay 
from November 21, 2006 to January 8, 2007.  
As we concluded in Odhinn, 
2003 WY 169, ¶¶ 22-23, 82 P.3d  at 722-23, the prosecutor is better situated to 
bear the brunt of delays caused by the custodial state than is the 
prisoner.  In our case, however, the 
appellant delayed the Wyoming proceedings by seeking a continuance of the 
preliminary hearing.  That motion 
delayed the hearing from March 1, 2007 to May 4, 2007a delay of 64 days.  The appellant has provided no facts from 
which we could conclude that the length of the delay was unreasonable, or that 
it should not be attributed to him, thereby tolling the 180-day period.  See Id., 2003 WY 169, ¶ 25, 82 P.3d  at 
723.  Consequently, the jury trial 
was timely commenced under IAD analysis.5

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶15]   Under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 (Article III), the jury trial must commence within 
180 days of the date that the prisoner has delivered his request for disposition 
to the prosecutor and court of the charging state.  Unreasonable time delays caused by the 
custodial state do not toll the statutory period.  The period is tolled, however, for any 
amount of time attributable to the prisoner's conduct that renders him 
unavailable for trial.

 
 
[¶16]   We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Many 
of the documents relied upon by the parties in their briefs do not appear to be 
part of the district court record, except as attachments to the appellant's 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which motion was filed on March 4, 2008, 
after the case was already on appeal.  
Similarly, many of the dates relied upon by the parties, and relied upon 
in this opinion, have been derived from a demonstrative exhibit used by the 
prosecutor during his argument at the motion hearing, and do not otherwise 
appear in the record.  That exhibit 
is in the record.  In any event, 
neither party disputes the basic facts or the significant 
dates.

 
 

2The 
appellant alleges in his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence that on June 13, 
2006, he filed in the Wyoming court a "Writ of Habeas Corpus," seeking 
extradition to Wyoming, that on July 25, 2006, he was served with the governor's 
warrant, and that in an effort to obtain transfer to Wyoming thereunder, he 
entered into a plea agreement in Colorado under the assumption that, once he was 
sentenced there, he would be transferred to Wyoming.  While this information helps fill in 
some of the chronological and procedural gaps in this story, it appears in the 
record only in the form of argument.  
It has not been raised in such a way as to alter our review of the record 
facts.

 
 

3This 
advice was sent in a letter from an assistant attorney general to the prosecutor 
on August 3, 2006, to follow up on a conversation that took place between them 
on August 1, 2006.

 
 

4We 
find ourselves compelled yet again to comment upon the paucity of documentation 
in this record.  The IAD does not 
apply unless "a detainer has been lodged against" a person who "has entered upon 
a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 (Article III; 
see also Article IV).  "A detainer is a notification filed 
with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he 
is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.'"  Odhinn, 2003 WY 169, ¶ 4 n.1, 82 P.3d  at 
717 n.1 (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 436 n.3, 101 S. Ct. 703, 706 n.3, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1981)).  Apparently, nobody below questioned 
whether Wyoming had "lodged a detainer" for the appellant in Colorado.  However, no document so entitled, 
initiated by Wyoming authorities, appears in the record, and the prosecutor's 
demonstrative exhibit does not mention a detainer initiated by Wyoming.  Everyone, including the prosecutor, two 
Wyoming judges, the appellant, defense counsel, and the Colorado authorities, 
acted as if such had been done, so we will do the same.  Reading the appellate briefs, we are 
fairly certain that we did not miss something in the record.  In its brief, the State simply 
pronounces that "[a]t some point in time after Appellant was sentenced in 
Colorado, Campbell County filed a detainer with the Colorado Department of 
Corrections."  The appellant's brief 
is more certain as to what happened, claiming that he "was subject to a detainer 
at the time he consented to the Governor's Warrant," and that "[t]he actual 
document constituting the detainer is attached hereto as Appendix H."  Appendix H is headed "MESSAGE FROM CCIC 
GREELEY/WELD COUNTY," and appears to be the NCIC "hit" that uncovered the 
existence of the Wyoming warrant.  
The closest thing to a detainer found in the record, and that is because 
it repeats the word "detainer" throughout, is the paperwork prepared by the 
appellant, with the assistance of the Colorado authorities, and signed on 
November 21, 2006.  Without deciding 
what, if anything, constituted the detainer in this case, we will accept the 
facts as seemingly agreed upon by the parties below.  That is, we will assume that a detainer 
was lodged against the appellant by Wyoming in Colorado some time before he 
signed and sent his Request for Final Disposition of 
Detainer.

 
 

5Article 
VI of the IAD specifically provides that the time periods of both Articles III 
and IV are tolled during times in which "the prisoner is unable to stand 
trial."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 
(Article VI).  A delay in circuit 
court waiting for a preliminary hearing obviously delays the setting of a trial 
in district court.