Case Title: Busker v. Wabtec

Citation: 

Docket Number: S251135

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JOHN BUSKER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
WABTEC CORPORATION et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S251135 
 
Ninth Circuit 
17-55165 
 
Northern District of California 
2:15-cv-08194-ODW-AFM 
 
 
August 16, 2021 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Kruger, Groban, 
and Jenkins concurred. 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Cuéllar 
concurred. 
Justice Cuéllar filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu 
concurred.   
 
1 
 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION 
S251135 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
California’s prevailing wage law (Lab. Code,1 § 1720 et 
seq.) is a minimum wage provision that generally applies to 
those employed on “public works.”  This case involves two 
questions:  (1) Does publicly funded work on rolling stock, like 
train cars, fall under the statutory definition of “public works”?  
(2) Alternatively, does the work on rolling stock in this case 
qualify as “public work” because it is integral to other activity 
that itself qualifies as public work?  The answer to both 
questions is no. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Southern California Regional Rail Authority operates 
a large train system known as Metrolink.  In 2010, it entered 
into the prime contract with Parsons Transportation Group, Inc. 
(Parsons) to design, furnish, and install a comprehensive 
communications network called Positive Train Control (PTC) to 
prevent collisions and other dangerous train movement. 
The project was publicly funded and cost over $216 
million.  The expansive undertaking included wayside signals, 
systems on locomotives and rail cars, back office servers, a 
communications network, and a centralized dispatching system, 
along with software development and installation.  The system 
required integration of various components located on trains, at 
 
1 Further unspecified section references are to the Labor Code. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
 
wayside sites along tracks, and at centralized control centers.  
While the undertaking was done under a public contract, not all 
aspects of the enterprise necessarily qualify as a public work.  
“Public works” is a term of art defined by statute.2  (See § 1720 
et seq.) 
Only two aspects of the project are at issue here:  field 
work and onboard work.3  Field work included building and 
outfitting radio towers on land adjacent to train tracks.  The 
labor required trenching, driving forklifts, operating cranes, and 
welding.  Onboard work primarily involved installing electronic 
components on the train cars and locomotives themselves. 
Defendant Wabtec Corporation (Wabtec) subcontracted to 
install system components on locomotives and rail cars.  The 
subcontract incorporated various provisions of the prime 
contract, including compliance with applicable prevailing wage 
laws.  Wabtec performed no field work. 
Plaintiff John Busker was one of over 100 Wabtec workers 
assigned to the project.  For approximately two years, he did 
traditional electrical onboard installation.  Wabtec did not pay 
prevailing wages to any of its employees. 
Busker filed a prevailing wage complaint against Wabtec 
with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), a 
division of the Department of Industrial Relations (Department) 
 
2 The prevailing wage law uses the plural term “public works” 
as well as the singular term “public work.”  (See §§ 1720, subd. 
(a)(1) & (2), 1770, 1771, 1772.)  This opinion uses the terms 
interchangeably. 
3 Field work is referred to as “field installation work” in the 
contract.  This opinion uses the abbreviated term to avoid 
unnecessary repetition. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
that enforces California’s labor laws.  (See Alvarado v. Dart 
Container Corp. of California (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542, 555.)  In 
2015, the DLSE issued a civil wage and penalty assessment of 
$6,468,564 against Wabtec for failure to pay prevailing wages.4  
Wabtec requested review by the Labor Commissioner, arguing 
that the prevailing wage law does not apply to the onboard work 
because the law covers only work performed on or to real 
property, not “rolling stock”5 like locomotives and buses.  
 After review, the DLSE vacated the assessment and took 
no further action.  In this case, a DLSE officer testified his 
superior directed him to vacate the assessment because, 
historically, work performed on rolling stock is not covered by 
the prevailing wage law.  The Department never formally 
determined whether the prevailing wage law covers onboard 
work. 
While the review of the assessment was pending, Busker 
sued Wabtec and the project manager6 in state court for failing 
 
4 The assessment consisted of $5,786,349 in wages due plus 
related penalties of $682,215.  The assessment order did not 
contain any factual or legal basis for the DLSE’s finding, aside 
from 
spreadsheets 
containing 
the 
wage 
and 
penalty 
calculations. 
5 The prevailing wage law does not mention “rolling stock.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as “[m]ovable property, 
such as locomotives and rail cars, owned by a railroad.”  (Black’s 
Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 1592, col. 1.)  In the federal “Buy 
America” regulations, rolling stock has a much broader 
definition that includes “buses, vans, cars, railcars, locomotives, 
trolley cars and buses, and ferry boats, as well as vehicles used 
for support services.”  (49 C.F.R. § 661.3 (2021).)  This opinion 
uses the term broadly to encompass all types of conveyances. 
6 We refer to the defendants collectively as Wabtec. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
 
to pay prevailing wages.  Wabtec removed the action to federal 
district court and sought summary judgment urging Wabtec’s 
onboard work was not subject to prevailing wage requirements.  
The court granted the motion, reasoning that only workers 
“employed on [a] project involving fixed works or realty” are 
entitled to prevailing wages.  It also rejected Busker’s other 
argument that the onboard work fell within the scope of the 
prevailing wage law under section 1772 as work done “in the 
execution” of the overall project to install the PTC system.  The 
court concluded that section 1772 still requires the applicable 
contract to be one for “public work,” and the Wabtec subcontract, 
limited to rolling stock, did not qualify.  
Busker appealed and we accepted a request from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to decide a 
question of state law.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(a).)  That 
court posed the question as follows:  “Whether work installing 
electrical equipment on locomotives and rail cars (i.e., the ‘on-
board work’ for Metrolink’s PTC project) falls within the 
definition of ‘public works’ under California Labor Code 
§ 1720(a)(1) either (a) as constituting ‘construction’ or 
‘installation’ under the statute or (b) as being integral to other 
work performed for the PTC project on the wayside (i.e., the 
‘field installation work’).” 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Overview of California’s Prevailing Wage Law 
Economic conditions in the Great Depression prompted 
the passage of prevailing wage laws designed to ensure that 
workers employed on public building programs would be paid 
daily wages commensurate with those prevailing in the local 
area for work of a similar character.  (See Universities Research 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
 
Assn. v. Coutu (1981) 450 U.S. 754, 773–774; Azusa Land 
Partners v. Department of Industrial Relations (2010) 191 
Cal.App.4th 1, 14–15.)  The goal was to give local contractors 
and labor a fair opportunity to work on public building projects 
that might otherwise be awarded to contractors who hired 
cheaper out-of-market labor.  (Universities Research Assn. v. 
Coutu, at p. 774.) 
The prevailing wage law was enacted in 1931 as an 
uncodified measure.  (1931 Act; Stats. 1931, ch. 397, p. 910.)  A 
federal counterpart, the Davis-Bacon Act, was enacted the same 
year.  (40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.)  In 1937, California’s prevailing 
wage law was codified as part 7 of the newly established Labor 
Code.  (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, pp. 185, 241.)   
“The overall purpose of the prevailing wage law is to 
protect and benefit employees on public works projects.”  
(Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985 
(Lusardi).)  “This general objective subsumes within it a number 
of specific goals:  to protect employees from substandard wages 
that might be paid if contractors could recruit labor from distant 
cheap-labor areas; to permit union contractors to compete with 
nonunion contractors; to benefit the public through the superior 
efficiency of well-paid employees; and to compensate nonpublic 
employees with higher wages for the absence of job security and 
employment benefits enjoyed by public employees.”  (Id. at 
p. 987.)  Courts liberally construe the law to fulfill its purpose.  
(City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 942, 949–950 (City of Long Beach).)  
Generally, those employed on public works must be paid 
at least the prevailing rate of per diem wages paid locally for 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
 
work of a similar character.7  (§ 1771.)  A contractor or 
subcontractor that does not pay the prevailing rate is liable for 
the deficiency and subject to a penalty.  (§ 1775.)  The obligation 
to pay prevailing wages has a statutory basis independent of any 
contractual requirement.  (Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 981–
982.)  A contractor must pay prevailing wages when required, 
even if it has not contractually agreed to do so.  (Id. at p. 988.) 
B. 
Onboard Work as “Construction” or “Installation” 
Under Section 1720, Subdivision (a)(1) 
The first question is whether the onboard work done 
exclusively on locomotives and rail cars (rolling stock) falls 
under the definition of “public work.”  An examination of the 
relevant statute establishes that it does not. 
The prevailing wage law has its roots in the Depression 
Era.  Then, as now, when a governmental entity decided to build 
a courthouse in the town square, a great many aspects of that 
project would come into play.  Architects in Los Angeles might 
devise the plans.  Lawyers in San Francisco might draft the 
contracts.  But when it came time to excavate the basement, lay 
the foundation, and raise the walls, local daily wage workers 
would be hired to do the work.  It was their livelihood that the 
 
7 Prevailing wage requirements do not apply to work carried out 
by a public agency with its own labor force or to projects with a 
dollar value of $1,000 or less.  (§ 1771.)  A public entity 
“awarding any contract of public work, or otherwise undertaking 
any public work,” must obtain the local prevailing rate for each 
craft, classification, or type of worker needed to execute the 
contract.  (§ 1773.)  The applicable wage rates must be included 
in the call for bids, in bid specifications, and in the contract or, 
alternatively, those documents must specify that the rates are 
on file in the public entity’s principal office.  (§ 1773.2.) 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
 
prevailing wage law was designed to protect and enhance.  In 
the decades since, the law has been amended a number of times 
to include or exclude certain kinds of work.  It has never been 
modified to embrace work on rolling stock. 
The term of art “public works” is defined in section 1720, 
subdivision (a), which begins by providing, “[a]s used in this 
chapter, ‘public works’ means:  . . . .”  It then sets out eight 
numbered subdivisions that define the term in various contexts.  
(§ 1720, subd. (a)(1)–(8).)  The operative definition here is found 
in section 1720, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter section 1720(a)(1)).8 
Under 
section 
1720(a)(1), 
“public 
works” 
means 
“[c]onstruction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair 
work done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of 
public funds . . . .”9  There are three basic elements to a “public 
work” under section 1720(a)(1):  (1) “construction, alteration, 
 
8 See, e.g., other subdivisions that involve irrigation systems, 
but not their operation (§ 1720, subd. (a)(2)); some street and 
sewer improvements (§ 1720, subd. (a)(3)); laying of carpet 
(§ 1720, subd. (a)(4) & (a)(5)); and tree removal (§ 1720, subd. 
(a)(8)).   
9 Subdivision (a)(1) of section 1720 also contains an exception 
not relevant here and then goes on to discuss the scope of the 
terms “construction” and “installation,” as follows:  “For 
purposes of this paragraph, ‘construction’ includes work 
performed during the design, site assessment, feasibility study, 
and other preconstruction phases of construction, including, but 
not limited to, inspection and land surveying work, regardless 
of whether any further construction work is conducted, and 
work performed during the postconstruction phases of 
construction, including, but not limited to, all cleanup work at 
the jobsite.  For purposes of this paragraph, ‘installation’ 
includes, but is not limited to, the assembly and disassembly of 
freestanding and affixed modular office systems.”   
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
 
demolition, installation, or repair work”; (2) that is done under 
contract; and (3) is paid for in whole or in part out of public 
funds.  (Ibid.)  Busker argues that the onboard work fell under 
this definition as either “construction” or “installation.”  It is 
undisputed that the work was done under contract and paid for 
with public money. 
Familiar principles guide our interpretation of section 
1720(a)(1).  Our fundamental task is to determine the 
Legislature’s intent to effectuate the law’s purpose, giving the 
statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning.  We 
examine that language, not in isolation, but in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole to discern its scope and purpose 
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.  (Coalition 
of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 733, 737.)  “If the language is clear, courts must 
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation 
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not 
intend.  If the statutory language permits more than one 
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such 
as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”  
(Ibid.)  The wider historical circumstances of a law’s enactment 
may assist in ascertaining legislative intent, supplying context 
for otherwise ambiguous language.  (See California Mfrs. Assn. 
v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844.)   
While neither “construction” nor “installation” is explicitly 
defined in the prevailing wage law, City of Long Beach 
considered various definitions of the term “construction.”  (City 
of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 951.)  Those include “ ‘the 
action of framing, devising, or forming, by putting together of 
parts; erection, building’ ” (ibid., quoting 3 Oxford English Dict. 
(2d ed. 1989) p. 794) and “ ‘[t]he act of putting parts together to 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
 
form a complete integrated object.’ ”  (City of Long Beach, at p. 
951, quoting Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 489, col. 
2.)  Because neither definition confines the term “construction” 
to the building of a structure, onboard work could arguably fall 
within these definitions.   
Similarly, dictionary definitions of “installation” do not 
limit that activity to a fixed work on real property.  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary defines one sense of 
“installation” as “the setting up or placing in position for service 
or use.”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 1171, 
col. 1.)  That broad definition could conceivably encompass 
onboard work. 
However, words used in a statute are not considered in 
isolation.  They are construed in context, honoring the statutory 
purpose, and harmonizing statutes relating to the same subject 
to the extent possible.  (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & 
Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387.)  Here, the general 
terms “construction” and “installation” are offered as categories 
of “public works,” a term which itself has a generally understood 
meaning that substantially predates the prevailing wage law.  It 
is that definition that gives context to the Legislature’s use of 
the terms construction and installation.   
Dictionary definitions dating back to the turn of the 20th 
century uniformly define “public works” as fixed works on real 
property.  The term is defined in a 1906 edition as “all fixed 
works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
 
water-works, roads, etc.”10  (6 Century Dict. & Cyclopedia (1906) 
p. 4830, col. 2.)   
The 1925 edition of California Jurisprudence, published in 
the decade before the prevailing wage law enactment, observed:  
“The term ‘public works’ may be said to embrace all fixed works 
constructed for public use or protection.  . . .  In view of the acts 
authorizing public improvements the term probably includes 
bridges, waterworks, sewers, light and power plants, public 
buildings, wharves, breakwaters, jetties, seawalls, schoolhouses 
and street improvements.”  (22 Cal.Jur. (1925) Public Works, §2, 
pp. 74–75, fn. omitted.)  Swanton v. Corby (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 
227, 230, relied upon this definition to hold that installing a two 
-way police radio system did not constitute a public work within 
the meaning of a law requiring competitive bidding.  There, the 
relevant 
statutory 
scheme 
applied 
to 
the 
“ ‘erection, 
improvement, and repair of all public buildings and works 
. . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 229.)  The court concluded the radio system was 
analogous to “furniture and furnishings,” which had “never been 
held to be ‘public works.’ ”  (Id. at p. 230.)  While Swanton did 
not involve the prevailing wage law, it did rely on the 
established common understanding of public works to interpret 
the otherwise undefined terms “ ‘erection, improvement, and 
repair’ ” as work associated with fixed works on real property.  
(Id. at p. 229.)   
 
10 More recently, in the 2002 edition of Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary, “public works” is defined as “fixed 
works (as schools, highways, docks) constructed for public use or 
enjoyment . . . .”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 
1836, col. 3.) 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
 
Busker does not dispute that dictionary definitions of 
public works refer to fixed works on realty.  But he claims those 
definitions are irrelevant, citing the principle that a court 
should not rely on a dictionary definition of a term specifically 
defined in the statute.  (See Hammond v. Agran (1999) 76 
Cal.App.4th 1181, 1189.)  That principle is valid but does not 
assist here.  The dictionary definitions of “public works” are not 
offered in lieu of a statutory definition.  Instead, they provide 
context to the terms “construction” and “installation” used in the 
statute to generally describe kinds of public works.  While 
section 1720(a)(1) has been amended over the years to include 
examples of “construction” and “installation,” nowhere does it 
provide a general definition of the terms, which could have very 
broad meanings if context is ignored.  For example, 
“construction” might be considered to include the building of a 
public ferry boat; “installation” might be conceived as 
downloading software; “alteration” could be read to include 
clothing modification; and “repair” might be applied to 
overhauling a bus.  Nothing in standard dictionary definitions 
would preclude those interpretations.  However, “ ‘ “words have 
no meaning apart from the world in which they are spoken.” ’ ”  
(State of California v. Altus Finance (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1284, 
1296.)  The words say what they say:  their meaning is 
understood from the context in which they are used. 
An examination of the original enactment and later 
codification of the prevailing wage law provides that context.  As 
originally enacted, the prevailing wage law said only that 
certain “construction or repair work . . . shall be held to be 
‘public works’ within the meaning of this act.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 
397, § 4, p. 912.)  The original prevailing wage law did not 
include the terms “alteration,” “demolition,” or “installation.”  
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
 
But the original statutory language did help illustrate the scope 
of public works.  In referring to the relevant “locality” for 
determining the prevailing wage rate, it defined “ ‘locality’ ” as 
the “city and county, county or counties in which the building, 
highway, 
road, 
excavation, 
or 
other 
structure, 
project, 
development or improvement is situated . . . .”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 
397, § 4, p. 912, italics added.)  The italicized words suggest that 
the term “public works” was limited to fixed works situated on 
or attached to land.11  In that context, “construction” and 
“repair” under the law’s original enactment appear limited to 
labor performed on fixed works. 
The prevailing wage law, codified in 1937, continued to 
apply to specified “[c]onstruction or repair work.”  (§ 1720, subd. 
(a), as enacted by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 241.)  However, the 
definition of “locality” for rate determination was simplified to 
refer to the “county in which the public work is done.”  (§ 1724, 
as enacted by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 241.)  While the omission of 
 
11 Although the term “project” might be interpreted more 
broadly, it is part of a list of terms that would generally be 
understood to be limited to fixed works.  Under the principle of 
“noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates) ‘. . . a court will 
adopt a restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a 
more expansive meaning would make other items in the list 
unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item 
markedly dissimilar to other items in the list.’ ”  (People ex rel. 
Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 307.)  To 
interpret “project” as something other than a fixed work would 
render that term markedly different from the other listed items.  
The noscitur a sociis principle, like other canons of statutory 
construction, is merely an aid in ascertaining legislative intent.  
(See People v. Garcia (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1116, 1124.)  While its 
application does not compel an interpretation of “project” that is 
limited to fixed works, it nevertheless supports giving the term 
that more restricted meaning. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
 
terms like “building” or “road” in the definition of “locality” could 
potentially suggest an intent to broaden the scope of “public 
works,” nothing else in the 1937 legislation would support such 
a conclusion.  The codified provision did not substantively 
change the definition of “construction” and “repair” as types of 
“public works.”  (Compare Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 4, p. 912 with 
§ 1720, subd. (a) as enacted by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 241.) 
Indeed, the Legislature gave no indication it intended to 
confer on the terms “construction” or “repair” a more expansive 
meaning when it codified the existing law.  If the Legislature 
had intended such a departure from the well-established 
understanding of the term “public work,” one would expect that 
intent to be reflected in the statutory history, rather than 
requiring divination from a simple modification to an ancillary 
provision.  (See Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 
482.)  In fact, the legislative history points to a contrary 
conclusion.  In 1936, the California Code Commission 
(Commission) prepared a Proposed Labor Code for the 
Legislature’s consideration.  In a note to proposed section 1720, 
the Commission explained that its draft of section 1720, 
subdivision (a) was taken “verbatim” from the analogous 
construction and repair provision in the original 1931 Act.  (Cal. 
Code Com. note, Proposed Labor Code (1936), foll. § 1720, p. 85.)  
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the ultimate codification 
reflected the Legislature’s intent to embrace the established 
understanding of the term “public work” as the context in which 
the terms construction and repair were used. 
Nevertheless, 
Busker 
claims 
that 
subsequent 
amendments establish that the Legislature sought to give 
“public works” a broader connotation than the original common 
usage.  He notes that a 2000 amendment to section 1720(a)(1) 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
 
included preconstruction work within the definition of 
“construction.”  He argues this amendment “evidences . . . the 
Legislature’s intent to give ‘construction’ a broad meaning,” 
citing Oxbow Carbon & Minerals, LLC v. Department of 
Industrial Relations (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 538, 549 (Oxbow).  
The amended language specified that “ ‘construction’ includes 
work performed during the design and preconstruction phases 
of construction including, but not limited to, inspection and land 
surveying work.”  (§ 1720, former subd. (a), as amended by 
Stats. 2000, ch. 881, § 1, p. 6517.)  While the 2000 legislation 
may have enlarged the scope of “construction” to include the 
design and preconstruction phases of a construction project, it 
did not purport to change the settled understanding of the term 
“public work” to cover activity divorced from fixed works on real 
property.  As Oxbow itself recognized, the legislation did not 
purport to define construction but merely explained the scope of 
the term.12  (Oxbow, at p. 548.)   
Nothing in the 2000 amendment signals an intent to 
uncouple the term “construction” from the context of “public 
work.”  The examples of work that are included in 
“construction,” like land surveying, are consistent with a 
definition of “construction” related to land-based activity.  The 
legislative history of the 2000 amendment confirms that it was 
 
12 In 2014, the scope of “construction” in section 1720(a)(1) was 
again amended to encompass “work performed during the 
postconstruction phases of construction, including, but not 
limited to, all cleanup work at the jobsite.”  (Legis. Counsel’s 
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 26, Stats. 2014, ch. 864, italics added.)  
Like the 2000 amendment, the statutory language clarifying 
that postconstruction work falls within the scope of section 
1720(a)(1) does not change the fundamental understanding of 
what public work “construction” entails. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
 
intended to reflect the Department’s existing practice of 
including “construction inspectors and land surveyors among 
those workers deemed to be employed upon public works . . . .”  
(Sen. Com. on Labor & Employment, 3d reading analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1999 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2000, 
p. 2.) 
Busker also contends that the 2001 addition of the word 
“installation” to section 1720(a)(1) signaled an intent to broaden 
the scope of that section.  Again, the legislative history suggests 
otherwise.  The purpose of the legislation was to codify then-
existing interpretations by the Department treating installation 
of fixtures on real property as part of the construction process.  
(Cal. Dept. of Industrial Relations, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. 
Bill No. 975 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Davis 
(Sept. 20, 2001), p. 2.)  The Legislature was concerned that a 
future administration might “rescind the [Department’s] 
precedential determinations” and exclude installation work as 
not “ris[ing] to the level of construction . . . .”  (Id., p. 3.)  Thus, 
the addition of “installation” to section 1720(a)(1) should not be 
interpreted as expanding the scope of public works to rolling 
stock.  Instead, it was merely intended to confirm that the 
installation of fixtures on land is part of the “construction” 
process. 
In 2012, the Legislature again amended section 1720(a)(1) 
to clarify that “[f]or purposes of this paragraph, ‘installation’ 
includes, but is not limited to, the assembly and disassembly of 
freestanding and affixed modular office systems.”  (Stats. 2012, 
ch. 810, § 1.)  Seizing upon the reference to “freestanding” 
systems, Busker contends the Legislature has rejected the 
notion that an “installation” must involve “fixed works or work 
that is ‘affixed’ or ‘bolted’ to realty . . . .”  Busker reads too much 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
 
into the amendment.  The change was enacted to overrule a 
specific line of Department decisions that treated the assembly 
or disassembly of modular office systems as “installation” work 
only if the systems were bolted, secured, or otherwise mounted 
to real property.  (Assem. Com. on Labor & Employment, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1598 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced Feb. 6, 2012, p. 2.)  The legislative history explains 
that the process of assembling freestanding office systems, like 
cubicles, involves work analogous to installing modular walls 
secured to a structure.  (Id. at p. 3.)  The legislation sought to 
eliminate what was viewed as an unwarranted distinction 
between fixed and freestanding modular office systems.  The 
amendment was limited to that aim.  Even after the 2012 
amendment, aside from modular office systems, the Department 
continues to apply the rule that “installation” means “bolting, 
securing or mounting of fixtures to realty.”13 
In his dissent, Justice Liu argues that modular office 
systems are like rolling stock in that they “can be easily moved 
and transported to other locations.”  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
p. 8.)  However, there is no indication that the moveable aspect 
of modular office systems motivated the amendment to section 
1720(a)(1).  The Legislature’s focus was on the nature of the 
work that takes place in a structure, not on the fact the office 
systems could be easily moved.  Regardless of whether a 
modular system is fixed or freestanding, it remains the case that 
 
13 
County-Sponsored 
Messages 
on 
Private 
Billboards, 
Department of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2015-15 (Sept. 
9, 
2016) 
page 3 
 [as of Aug. 16, 2021].)  The Internet 
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number, 
and case name at .   
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
 
office systems are installed in buildings.  The work takes place 
in a fixed structure on land.  The same is not true of installation 
performed on train cars.  Nothing in the 2012 amendment 
suggests the Legislature sought to include rolling stock.  If the 
Legislature had intended the statute to broadly cover all 
installation projects beyond those on real property, it could have 
easily said so. 
Busker contends that if the Legislature intended “public 
works” to refer exclusively to construction projects involving 
fixed works on realty, it knew how to do so.  He points to 
Government Code section 4002, which defines “ ‘public work’ ” 
for purposes of record-keeping requirements to mean “the 
construction of any bridge, road, street, highway, ditch, canal, 
dam, tunnel, excavation, building or structure . . . .”  He also 
cites Public Contract Code section 1101, which defines “ ‘[p]ublic 
works 
contract’ ” 
as 
“an 
agreement 
for 
the 
erection, 
construction, alteration, repair, or improvement of any public 
structure, building, road, or other public improvement of any 
kind.”  According to Busker, the fact that the Legislature defined 
“public work” to mean only certain construction projects on real 
property in the Government and Public Contract Codes shows 
that it did not intend a similar meaning in section 1720(a)(1), 
which omits any reference to fixed works or real property.  The 
contention fails. 
Busker relies on the principle that “ ‘when different words 
are used in contemporaneously enacted, adjoining subdivisions 
of a statute, the inference is compelling that a difference in 
meaning was intended.’ ”  (Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp. 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 334, 343.)  That principle is inapplicable here.  
The definitions he cites are not contained in subdivisions that 
adjoin section 1720(a)(1) or even in neighboring statutes in the 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
 
Labor Code.  Instead, they are found in entirely separate codes.  
They were also not enacted contemporaneously with the 
statutory language at issue here.  Public Contract Code section 
1101 was enacted in 1982.  (Stats. 1982, ch. 1120, § 3, p. 4046.)  
Government Code section 4002’s record-keeping provisions 
derive from an uncodified statute enacted in 1923.  (Stats. 1923, 
ch. 448, § 1, p. 1053.)  The inference Busker seeks to draw is 
unsupported.  
There is no reason to believe the Legislature deliberately 
defined “public works” in the prevailing wage law to distinguish 
it from definitions contained in other codes enacted at different 
times.  Instead of suggesting by implication that “public works” 
as used in the prevailing wage law is broad enough to encompass 
rolling stock, the definitions contained in the Government Code 
and Public Contract Code tend to confirm the common 
understanding that “public works” generally refers to fixed 
works on real property. 
Indeed, within the prevailing wage law, the Legislature 
defined “ ‘[p]ublic works project’ ” in section 1750, subdivision 
(b)(1) to mean “the construction, repair, remodeling, alteration, 
conversion, 
modernization, 
improvement, 
rehabilitation, 
replacement, or renovation of a public building or structure.”  
(Italics added.)  The definition is limited to fixed works.  Section 
1750 speaks to a narrow circumstance to authorize a private 
right of action by the second lowest bidder on a public works 
project when the successful bid was premised upon a violation 
of the law for which the successful bidder was convicted.  
(§ 1750, subd. (a)(1).)  The definition of “ ‘[p]ublic works project’ ” 
in the narrow context of section 1750 was enacted long after the 
1930’s codification of the Labor Code.  Nevertheless, it tends to 
demonstrate that the term “public works” as used in the 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
 
prevailing wage law is still generally confined to work on 
buildings or other structures.  The Legislature may, of course, 
define “public works” more broadly.  But there is nothing to 
suggest the Legislature has thus far intended to expand the 
term as used in section 1720(a)(1) beyond fixed works on land. 
The New York case of De La Cruz v. Caddell Dry Dock & 
Repair Co. (2013) 21 N.Y.3d 530 (De La Cruz) declined to employ 
the common understanding that “public works” is limited to 
labor on land.  (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 5.)  However, 
the particular state law it applied was worded and structured 
differently from California’s statutory scheme.  De La Cruz held 
that New York’s law covers work performed on various boats 
used for public purposes.  (De La Cruz, at pp. 538–539.)  The 
New York court’s holding is, of course, not binding.  Further, its 
analysis provides no assistance. 
First, unlike California’s law, which limits the definition 
of “public works” to defined categories like construction and 
installation (see § 1720 et seq.), New York’s prevailing wage 
scheme contains no definition of “public works.”  (See N.Y. Labor 
Law, § 220(3).)  New York’s law is unique in this respect.  
(Johnson, Prevailing Wage Legislation in the States (Aug. 1961) 
84:8 Monthly Lab. Rev. 839, 841.)  Confronted with a statute 
that did not define the term, the New York court created a three-
pronged test to assess whether a project is subject to prevailing 
wage requirements.  (De La Cruz, supra, 21 N.Y.3d at p. 538.)  
Under the De La Cruz test, New York’s law may apply if the 
“project . . . primarily involves construction-like labor . . . .”  
(Ibid, italics added.)  This definition, focusing not on the specific 
labor but the project for which it is done, sweeps more broadly 
than the expressly defined categories of “public works” in 
California’s prevailing wage law.  Further, the New York court 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
 
focused on its statutory scheme and state constitution, which 
specified that the applicable prevailing wage is based on the 
locality where the “ ‘public work is to be situated, erected or 
used.’ ”  (Id. at p. 535, some italics omitted.)  Whereas a boat 
used for a public purpose would not be described as “ ‘erected,’ ” 
the court observed that the terms “ ‘situated’ ” and “ ‘used’ ” 
could apply.  (Ibid.)  There is no similar language in California’s 
statute defining the locality in which public work is performed.14  
(See § 1724.)  
De La Cruz also purported to rely on federal authority 
detaching the understanding of “public works” from work on 
land.15  (De La Cruz, supra, 21 N.Y.3d at p. 535.)  It pointed to a 
case decided more than a century earlier in which the United 
States Supreme Court concluded it was not bound to read the 
term “ ‘public work’ ” as “confined to work on land.”  (Title 
 
14 It will be recalled that California’s 1937 codification omitted 
the previous use of the term “project” in describing the locality 
in which the work is done.  (See ante, at pp. 12–13; § 1724.)  
15 De La Cruz reviewed dictionary definitions of “ ‘public works’ ” 
from 1891 to 2013.  It observed that “illustrative examples given 
in dictionary entries are frequently fixed structures . . . .”  (De 
La Cruz, supra, 21 N.Y.3d at p. 538.)  The court went on to opine:  
“[I]t is clear that the notion that a ‘public work’ must be attached 
to the land is not part of [the] central meaning” of the term.  
(Ibid.)  However, all of the illustrative examples in the 
dictionary entries quoted in Del La Cruz are fixed works:  
“ ‘[s]tructures (such as road or dams),’ ” “ ‘public buildings, 
roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.,’ ” “ ‘roads, railways, bridges, etc.,’ ” 
and “ ‘schools, highways, docks.’ ”  (Id. at p. 537.)  De La Cruz 
relegated to a footnote a definition that explicitly incorporates 
“ ‘fixed’ ” in the definition of “public works.”  (Id. at p. 538, fn. 5.)  
The dictionary definitions cited in De La Cruz support rather 
than undermine the common understanding that “public works” 
is generally limited to fixed works on real property. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
 
Guaranty & Trust Co. of Scranton v. Crane Co. (1910) 219 U.S. 
24, 33.)  This reliance is tenuous.  Crane did not involve a 
question of prevailing wage entitlement.  Aside from 
acknowledging that “public works usually are of a permanent 
nature,” Crane focused solely on the meaning of the word 
“public.”  (Ibid.)  These points distinguish De La Cruz from the 
question we encounter.  An interpretation that considers the 
history of California’s prevailing wage law along with the 
historical meaning of “public works” supports an interpretation 
that generally limits the term to labor performed on fixed works. 
This interpretation is confirmed in determinations made 
by the Department, which has consistently excluded work on 
rolling stock.  For example, in a 1990 coverage determination, 
the Department’s director concluded that the repair of police 
boats was not a public work, reasoning that the term has been 
construed “as having a restricted meaning as applying to work 
done on fixed works for public use or production.”  (Dept. of 
Industrial Relations, Director Ron Rinaldi, letter to Port of San 
Diego Section Chief Kenneth E. White, June 26, 1990.)  
Similarly, in 1994, a public agency sought prevailing wage 
determinations for contracts involving ship repairs.  The 
Department “determined, consistent with previous court rulings 
and opinions from the Attorney General’s Office, that 
maintenance/repair of rolling stock, i.e. vehicles, vessel[s], rail 
cars, etc., is not covered under the prevailing wage laws.”  (Dept. 
of Industrial Relations, Div. of Labor Statistics & Research 
Chief Dorothy Vuksich, letter to Attorney Madeline Chun, 
March 18, 1994.)  The Department has also declined to apply the 
prevailing wage law to seat installation on rail cars and the 
installation of equipment on police motorcycles.  
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
 
The Department twice concluded that work similar to the 
onboard work here was not covered under the prevailing wage 
law.  One situation concerned the installation and testing of 
equipment on Bay Area Rapid Transit cars.  Another involved 
the installation of a radio system for the Southern California 
Rapid Transit District.  There, work installing the radio system 
“in buildings and other structures” was determined to fall within 
the scope of the prevailing wage law while installation in 
“trains, buses, and other vehicles” was not.  (Dept. of Industrial 
Relations, Industrial Relations Counsel James M. Robbins, 
mem. to Asst. Labor Commissioner Simon D. Reyes, Dec. 28, 
1987, italics added.) 
Attorney General opinions also support excluding work on 
rolling stock.  In 2012, the Attorney General concluded that the 
term “public works” as used in various statutory schemes, 
including section 1720(a)(1), “comport[s] with the common usage 
and ordinary meaning of ‘public works’ as reflected in dictionary 
definitions” that define the term as “ ‘fixed works (as school, 
highways, docks) constructed for public use . . . .’ ”  (95 
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 102, 108 (2012).)  Over 50 years of Attorney 
General 
opinions 
contain 
similar 
reasoning. 
 
(See 
69 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 300, 305 (1986); 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 
153, 154 (1955).) 
The parties strenuously debate how much deference we 
should pay to the Department’s decisions, which do not have 
precedential effect.  (See Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 179.)  It is true that “[d]eference to 
administrative interpretations always is ‘situational’ and 
depends on ‘a complex of factors’ [citation], but where the agency 
has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by 
senior 
agency 
officials, 
that 
decision 
is 
entitled 
to 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
 
correspondingly greater weight.”  (Sharon S. v. Superior Court 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 417, 436.)  
We need not be drawn too deeply into this thicket.  Our 
task is to discern the legislative intent.  In that regard, the most 
pertinent fact is that the Department’s interpretation has been 
long-standing and consistent.  The same is true of the Attorney 
General opinions.  Indeed, Busker cites not a single example in 
which the Department or the Attorney General has ultimately 
concluded that work on rolling stock is covered by the prevailing 
wage law.16   
Of 
course, 
simply 
because 
an 
administrative 
interpretation has endured for decades does not mean it is 
correct.  The ultimate responsibility for the construction of a 
statute rests with the court.  An agency’s interpretation is just 
one of several tools that may assist the court.  (City of Long 
Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 951.)  Nevertheless, 
“ ‘ “[c]onsistent administrative construction of statute over 
many years, particularly when it originated with those charged 
with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to 
great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly 
erroneous.” ’ ”  (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 
1012.)  Here, the long-standing administrative interpretations 
 
16 Busker claims the Department has been inconsistent in its 
approach in this very case, citing the DLSE’s release of this 
assessment only after initially concluding prevailing wages were 
owed for the onboard work.  But that initial assessment was 
quickly vacated because it was found to be inconsistent with 
long-standing policy.  The sequence of events here does not 
indicate that the policy has itself been inconsistent over time.  It 
reflects the Department’s adherence to its established 
interpretation. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
 
are not clearly erroneous but instead are consistent with this 
court’s construction of the relevant statutory language.  They 
are significant because they tend to confirm the common 
understanding of “public works” that excludes labor on rolling 
stock.  There is no indication in the record before this court that 
the administrative construction has vacillated over time or that 
there has been any call for the Legislature to step in and either 
confirm or reject this established approach. 
It might be argued that paying the prevailing wage for 
onboard work serves the general purposes of the prevailing 
wage law.  (See Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 985.)  Of course, 
there are many specific ways to serve that general purpose.  Our 
interpretation is dictated by the relevant language in the 
statutory scheme.  The prevailing wage law has never been 
applied to all work financed by public funds.  The Legislature 
has explicitly limited the protection to labor defined as “public 
work.”  The application of the law will necessarily involve line-
drawing exercises that distinguish between types of work that 
may be similar in many respects.   
Further, there is at least some reason to believe the 
Legislature intended to treat work performed on rolling stock 
differently from that done on fixed works.  One of the primary 
purposes of the law is to protect local labor markets from 
cheaper outside labor.  (See State Building & Construction 
Trades Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
547, 555.)  Paying the prevailing wage to workers constructing 
a public building located in a particular city or county obviously 
serves that purpose.  But work on rolling stock could conceivably 
be performed almost anywhere, then delivered to wherever it 
might be used.  This practical reality raises a question about 
whether the law’s purpose is served by paying prevailing wages 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
 
to workers that may be far away from the location of the 
governmental entity paying for the work.  It also raises 
significant administrative concerns.  Does the law apply to 
someone working on a high-speed rail car in a different state?   
If so, what is the relevant locality for purposes of calculating the 
prevailing wage and including those rates in the bidding and 
contracting process?  (See §§ 1724, 1773, 1773.2.)  At least for 
purposes of the prevailing wage law, the distinction between 
labor performed on fixed works and that done on rolling stock is 
not an arbitrary one. 
 The rule favoring liberal construction is subject to an 
important proviso:  Courts “ ‘cannot interfere where the 
Legislature has demonstrated the ability to make its intent 
clear and chosen not to act [citation].’ ”  (City of Long Beach, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 950.)  For the reasons explained above, 
“construction” and “installation” in section 1720(a)(1) are 
generally restricted to activities associated with fixed works on 
land.  Where the Legislature has expanded the meaning of 
“public works” to activities that do not directly involve 
construction work, like refuse hauling (§ 1720.3) or the delivery 
of concrete (§ 1720.9), it has done so with narrowly defined 
provisions that involve tasks intimately connected to fixed 
works on real property.  The Legislature has had ample 
opportunity to expand the understanding of “public works” to 
include work on rolling stock, but it has not done so. 
C. 
Onboard Work as “Integral” to Field Work 
Busker argues that even if the onboard installation does 
not independently meet the definition of “public work,” it is still 
subject to the prevailing wage law because it is integrally 
related to building the towers on the trackside, which is 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
 
indisputably “public work.”  The Ninth Circuit asked us to 
consider Busker’s argument.  As we explain, the onboard 
installation labor is not transformed into “public work” merely 
because the railcar and locomotive components operate together 
with the towers built on land next to the tracks. 
The Ninth Circuit identified two lines of cases that may 
bear upon the question.  First, it referenced a group of opinions 
that frame the inquiry as whether the work at issue “is 
integrated into the flow process of construction.”  (Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Internat. Assn., Local 104 v. Duncan (2014) 229 
Cal.App.4th 192, 206 (Sheet Metal); see also Williams v. 
SnSands Corp. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 742, 752 (Williams); 
O.G. Sansone Co. v. Department of Transportation (1976) 55 
Cal.App.3d 434, 443–444 (Sansone).)  These cases turn on the 
application of section 1772, which provides:  “Workers employed 
by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract 
of public work are deemed employed upon public work.”  Under 
the approach to section 1772 taken in this case law, coverage 
under the prevailing wage law extends “to activities not 
statutorily defined as ‘public work,’ so long as that labor is 
integrated into construction or other defined public work.”  
(Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co., Inc. (Aug. 16, 2021, 
S253574) __ Cal.5th __, [pp. 6–7] (Mendoza).) 
This body of law cannot aid Busker.  In Mendoza, a 
decision filed concurrently with this opinion, we reject the 
interpretation of section 1772 derived from Sansone, Williams, 
and Sheet Metal.  Mendoza disapproves those cases to the extent 
they interpreted section 1772 to expand the statutory 
definitions of “public works.”  (Mendoza, supra, ___ Cal.5th at 
___ [pp. 29–30].)  Section 1772 simply serves to confirm that the 
protections of the prevailing wage law extend to workers 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
 
employed by contractors or subcontractors.  (Mendoza, at p. ___ 
[p. 16].)  It was not intended to define or expand the categories 
of work that are covered by the prevailing wage law, a function 
adequately served by the provisions that define “public works.”  
Accordingly, because the onboard installation does not qualify 
as a defined “public work,” it is not subject to prevailing wage 
requirements under section 1772.17 
Other cases mentioned by the Ninth Circuit purportedly 
stand for the principle that prevailing wage entitlement may 
arise even if the work at issue does not meet the statutory 
definition.  Under this approach, work that would not otherwise 
qualify may be covered so long as other associated labor would 
constitute public work.  The conclusion fails because the cases 
on which it relies do not support it.  As noted earlier, section 
1720(a)(1)’s definition of public works has three facets.  The 
work (1) entails construction, etc., (2) is done under contract, 
and (3) is paid for, at least in part, by public funds.  
(§ 1720(a)(1).)  The Ninth Circuit points to Oxbow, supra, 194 
Cal.App.4th 538, and Cinema West, LLC v. Baker (2017) 13 
Cal.App.5th 194 (Cinema West).  As discussed below, those cases 
 
17 Although the interpretation of section 1772 is addressed in 
detail in Mendoza, Justice Cuéllar has chosen to critique that 
analysis at length in a separate opinion filed in this case. (See 
generally dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 1–24.)  That is so 
even though the same analysis serves as the basis for the dissent 
in Mendoza, albeit in an abbreviated fashion.  (Mendoza, supra, 
___ Cal.5th at ___ [pp. 1–5] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  It makes 
little sense to reply here to the dissent when the analytical 
framework for the majority’s analysis is contained in a different 
case.  Suffice it to say that the majority analysis in Mendoza 
rejects the critique set forth in Justice Cuéllar’s dissent in this 
case.  To aid the reader, we refer generally to our analysis of 
section 1772 in Mendoza, supra, ___ Cal.5th at ___ [pp. 7–36]. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
 
focus on the public funding question, not the nature of the work 
itself.  Accordingly, they do not support an expanded meaning of 
“public work.” 
Oxbow concerned a petroleum coke facility.  Conveyors 
used to bring coke into the plant were built under a contract 
using public funds.  A separate, privately funded contract was 
used to build a roof over the conveyors.  (Oxbow, supra, 194 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 542–545.)  The question in Oxbow was 
whether the privately funded roof work fell within the scope of 
the prevailing wage law because it was part of a “complete 
integrated object” that included the publicly funded conveyor 
work.  (Id. at pp. 548–550.)  Cinema West considered a similar 
issue.  There, a city entered into an agreement with a private 
developer to build a movie theater complex.  As part of the 
agreement, the city used public funds to build an adjacent 
parking lot.  Theater patrons could use the lot, thus facilitating 
theater development.  (Cinema West, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 197–202, 214.)  The Cinema West court considered whether 
laborers on the privately funded theater complex were entitled 
to the prevailing wage because the theater, together with the 
publicly funded parking lot, formed a “complete integrated 
object.”  (Id. at p. 215; see id. at pp. 210–215.) 
Both Oxbow and Cinema West turned on the phrase “paid 
for in whole or in part out of public funds.”  (Oxbow, supra, 194 
Cal.App.4th at p. 547; Cinema West, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 214–215.)  All the labor at issue in both cases was 
indisputably construction work that built or installed facilities 
on real property.  The only question was what construction work 
could be considered in determining the public funding question.  
Both cases extended prevailing wage protection because, in 
their view, all the construction labor, both publicly and privately 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
 
financed, was done to achieve a “complete integrated object” that 
was paid for in part by public funds.  Neither case is implicated 
here.  (Oxbow, at p. 550; see id. at p. 552; Cinema West, at p. 
215.)  No private funding was used to build the PTC 
communications network. 
The “complete integrated object” test employed in Oxbow 
and Cinema West was derived from City of Long Beach, which 
noted that “construction” involves “ ‘[t]he act of putting parts 
together to form a complete integrated object.’ ”  (City of Long 
Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 951, quoting 3 Oxford English 
Dict., supra, at p. 794, italics added; see Oxbow, supra, 194 
Cal.App.4th at p. 549; Cinema West, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 210–211.)  The City of Long Beach court considered whether 
labor on an animal control facility built with private funds might 
still qualify as “public work” because the city contributed public 
funds toward preconstruction expenses, including architectural 
design, surveying, and other professional fees.  (City of Long 
Beach, at p. 950.)  The city’s contribution was made several 
years before the definition of “construction” was amended to 
include preconstruction activities.  (Id. at pp. 946, 950.)  Like 
Oxbow and Cinema West, the question in City of Long Beach 
revolved around whether labor done under a privately funded 
contract could be considered part of “construction . . . paid for in 
whole or in part out of public funds” under section 1720(a)(1).  
Because, under the statutory definition operative at the time, 
preconstruction labor was not included in the definition of 
“construction,” 
City 
of 
Long 
Beach 
concluded 
the 
preconstruction work could not be considered part of the 
privately funded facility to bring it under prevailing wage 
requirements.  (City of Long Beach, at p. 946.) 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
 
City of Long Beach demonstrates a fundamental 
limitation on the “complete integrated object” test.  An activity 
that may be necessary or integral to complete a structure or 
other fixed work is not considered “construction” merely because 
of that relationship.  In City of Long Beach, the publicly funded 
work was necessary before the privately financed facility could 
be built.  But that necessity did not transform the earlier labor 
into “public work” as it was then defined by statute.   
Here, it is the field work that qualifies as “public work” 
under the statutory definition of construction in section 
1720(a)(1).  That field work could be accomplished without any 
installation labor done under the Wabtec contract.  Indeed, the 
distinction between the two activities is even more attenuated 
than in City of Long Beach.  In that case the actual building of 
the facility could not have proceeded at all without the publicly 
financed preconstruction labor.  Yet, because preconstruction 
labor was not, at the time, included in the definition of 
“construction,” the attempt to meld the two in order to fall under 
the public funding requirement failed. 
It is true that the components installed on trains partner 
with the field work, in the sense that they ultimately function 
together as part of an overall communication system.  But that 
interface does not make the onboard installation integral to the 
completion of the actual construction work.  If “construction” 
included any activity necessary to the operation of a public work, 
that term would bring within its expansive sweep any activity 
necessary to make the public work functional, whether or not 
the activity is related to the construction process.  That 
approach has no discernable limiting principle.  Here, the labor 
of those who wrote the software used in the PTC system, as well 
as those who manufactured the needed computer chips, could be 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
 
considered integral to the field work because the overall system 
would not function without it.  For that matter, the towers built 
on the trackside would be useless without the trains, so 
arguably the initial building of the railcars would be covered. 
Neither Oxbow nor Cinema West suggests that an activity 
is considered “construction” simply because it somehow makes 
other public work functional.  In those cases, it was clear that 
both the publicly and privately funded contracts involved actual 
building or installation on land.  A communication system is not 
like a manufacturing plant or theater/parking complex.  The 
PTC system involves a “completed integrated object” only if 
viewed at an unduly high level of abstraction.  The overall 
undertaking is much broader and more complex than building 
things on land.  It is, instead, a multifaceted communications 
network.  Some components of that system may indeed be 
structures or other fixed works, so that building them might 
qualify as “construction.”  But work that is not otherwise defined 
as “construction” does not become so simply because it plays 
some role in making the overall communications system 
functional. 
For these reasons, the “complete integrated object” test 
does not transform the onboard installation into “public work.” 
Justice Cuéllar’s dissents in both this case and Mendoza 
risk mischaracterization of our holdings.  Like our holding in 
Mendoza, the holding here is quite narrow.  (See Mendoza, 
supra, ___ Cal.5th at ___ [p. 36].)  We merely address the 
questions posed by the Ninth Circuit.  In this case, those 
questions are whether the onboard work is included in the 
definition of public works under section 1720(a)(1), or whether 
it may be so included as “integral” to other qualifying public 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
 
work.  (See ante, at p. 4.)  Because Justice Cuéllar’s dissent here 
has included reference to the Mendoza case as well, we 
emphasize again that nothing we say in either case should be 
read to condone any attempt to ignore the protections or 
obligations of the prevailing wage law. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s question as follows:  The 
onboard work performed under the Wabtec subcontract is not 
itself “public work” because it is not “construction” or 
“installation” involving fixed works on land.  Further, merely 
because the onboard work permits the field work and the 
broader PTC communications system to function does not 
transform it into “public work.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION 
S251135 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
I agree with Justice Cuéllar that plaintiff John Busker is 
entitled to prevailing wage protection under Labor Code 
section 1772 for his work installing electronic components on 
Metrolink locomotives and rail cars.  (Dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., 
post; all undesignated statutory references are to the Labor 
Code.)  I write separately to explain that Busker’s labor is also 
entitled to prevailing wage protection under section 1720, 
subdivision (a)(1) (section 1720(a)(1)). 
Section 1771 generally provides that the prevailing wage 
“shall be paid to all workers employed on public works.”  
Section 1720(a)(1) 
defines 
“public 
works” 
to 
include 
“[c]onstruction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair 
work done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of 
public funds.”  There is no dispute that Busker’s work onboard 
Metrolink trains “was done under contract and paid for with 
public money.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  The question is 
whether his work qualifies as “construction” or “installation” 
work within the meaning of the statute.   
The text, purpose, and history of the prevailing wage law 
indicate that section 1720(a)(1) covers Busker’s onboard work.  
As today’s opinion observes, the ordinary meaning of 
“construction” and “installation” is not limited to fixed works on 
real property and can encompass work done on rolling stock.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  Instead of accepting the ordinary 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
2 
 
meaning of these words, however, the court says “the general 
terms ‘construction’ and ‘installation’ are offered as categories of 
‘public works,’ a term which itself has a generally understood 
meaning that substantially predates the prevailing wage law.  It 
is that definition that gives context to the Legislature’s use of 
the terms construction and installation.”  (Ibid.)   
But this has the analysis backward.  The Legislature 
defined “public works” by reference to the terms “construction” 
and “installation”; it did not define “construction” and 
“installation” by reference to the term “public works.”  Today’s 
opinion seems to ask what the terms “construction” and 
“installation” mean in light of what the term “public works” 
meant before enactment of the prevailing wage law.  But the 
Legislature opted to define what “public works” means by 
including “construction” and “installation” as covered work. 
Citing early 1900s’ dictionary definitions of “public 
works,” the court concludes that the generally understood 
meaning of the term is limited to fixed work on land and realty.  
“It is that definition,” the court says, that informs the terms 
“construction” and “installation.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  But 
courts typically rely on dictionary definitions when a statute 
uses language that is not otherwise defined.  (See, e.g., Outfitter 
Properties, 
LLC 
v. 
Wildlife 
Conservation 
Bd. 
(2012) 
207 Cal.App.4th 237, 244.)  Section 1720, subdivision (a) does 
not leave “public works” undefined; it provides an expansive and 
detailed definition of “public works” using language that, the 
court concedes, is not necessarily tied to land or realty. 
In addition, as Busker notes, the Legislature has used 
different language to define “public works” in other statutes, in 
some cases making clear that the definition is limited to fixed 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
3 
 
structures on real property.  For example, Government Code 
section 4002 defines “public work” as “the construction of any 
bridge, road, street, highway, ditch, canal, dam, tunnel, 
excavation, building or structure.”  The fact that the Legislature 
defined “public work” to mean certain construction projects on 
real property in other statutes suggests it did not intend a 
similar meaning in section 1720(a)(1). 
The court says Government Code section 4002 was “not 
enacted contemporaneously with the statutory language at 
issue here.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  But Government Code 
section 4002 “derive[s] from an uncodified statute enacted in 
1923.”  (Ibid.)  That statute was passed only eight years before 
the original 1931 version of the prevailing wage law.  (Id. at p. 5, 
citing Stats. 1931, ch. 397, p. 910.)  It is reasonable to presume 
that the Legislature was aware of the definition in Government 
Code section 4002 when it adopted a broader definition of “public 
works” in the prevailing wage law.  (Voters for Responsible 
Retirement v. Board of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 779, 
fn. 3 [“the Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws 
existent at the time it passes a statute”].) 
The 1931 version of the prevailing wage law defined 
“locality” as the “city and county, county or counties in which the 
building, highway, road, excavation, or other structure, project, 
development or improvement is situated.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, 
§ 4, p. 912.)  Today’s opinion cites this provision as evidence that 
the Legislature viewed “public works” as tied to land.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 12 & fn. 11.)  But a “project” may be “situated” in a 
city or county without necessarily being tied to land.  The court 
says the Legislature could not have intended “project” to have 
such a broad meaning because it “would render that term 
markedly different from the other listed items.”  (Id. at p. 12, 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
4 
 
fn. 11.)  But that simply assumes the answer to the question 
presented.  If the Legislature intended to restrict public works 
to real property, why did it include a term (“project”) whose 
meaning so naturally extends beyond real property?  The 
Legislature could have easily omitted the term “project” in the 
1931 law but instead chose to include it.  (People v. Valencia 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [“ ‘[a] construction making some words 
surplusage is to be avoided’ ”].) 
It is also notable that other subparts of section 1720, 
subdivision (a) refer to real property whereas section 1720(a)(1) 
does not.  (See, e.g., § 1720, subd. (a)(5) [laying of carpet in 
public buildings]; § 1720, subd. (a)(8) [tree removal work 
performed on land].)  Although subdivision (a)(5) and 
subdivision (a)(8) were not passed contemporaneously with 
section 1720(a)(1), their inclusion in the statute shows that the 
Legislature knows how to limit the definition of “public works” 
to work on land or realty when it so intends.  Further, whereas 
California’s prevailing wage law does not contain an express 
“fixed work” requirement, other states’ statutes do.  (See, e.g., 
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 130/2 [“ ‘Public works’ means all fixed 
works constructed or demolished by any public body, or paid for 
wholly or in part out of public funds”]; Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-4-402(a)(vii) [“ ‘Public works’ means all fixed works 
constructed for public use, whether or not done under public 
supervision or direction, or paid for wholly or in part out of 
public funds or assessment of property owners or rights users”].) 
Even if the Legislature did intend for the words 
“construction” and “installation” to be read in light of the 
general understanding of “public works,” it is evident that 
historical usage of the term “public works” did not exclusively 
apply to fixed works attached to land.  In De La Cruz v. Caddell 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
5 
 
Dry Dock & Repair Co. (2013) 21 N.Y.3d 530, for example, the 
New York high court analyzed dictionary definitions of the 
phrase “public works” from 1891 to 2013 and found that 
“[a]lthough the illustrative examples given in dictionary entries 
are frequently fixed structures, it is clear that the notion that a 
‘public work’ must be attached to the land is not part of [the] 
central meaning” of the term.  (Id. at p. 538.)  Similarly, the 
United States Supreme Court said in Title Guaranty & Trust 
Co. v. Crane Co. (1910) 219 U.S. 24 that although “public works 
usually are of a permanent nature and that fact leads to a 
certain degree of association between the notion of permanence 
and the phrase,” that “association is only empirical, not one of 
logic.  Whether a work is public or not does not depend upon its 
being attached to the soil . . . .”  (Id. at p. 33; see also Housing by 
Vogue, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1981) 
403 So.2d 478, 480 [although all fixed works constructed for the 
state or its subdivisions qualify as public works, the term public 
works is not limited solely to fixed works]; Maurer v. Werner 
(Mo.Ct.App. 1988) 748 S.W.2d 839, 841 [rejecting the view that 
“public works” encompasses only the construction or repair of 
fixed works].) 
The applicability of the prevailing wage law to Busker’s 
onboard work is fully consistent with the statute’s purposes.  
Not only does it further the law’s “ ‘general objective’ ” of 
protecting and benefitting employees on public works; it also 
promotes many of the law’s “ ‘specific goals,’ ” including 
attracting talented workers to public works projects and thereby 
improving the efficiency and quality of such projects, and 
protecting union workers from underbidding by non-union 
workers.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5, citing Lusardi Construction 
Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985 (Lusardi).)  By contrast, 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
6 
 
today’s opinion authorizes contractors to provide different pay 
to workers engaged in virtually identical construction or 
installation tasks, even at the same jobsite, solely on the basis 
of whether the work occurs on a fixed structure. 
The court says “there is at least some reason to believe the 
Legislature intended to treat work performed on rolling stock 
differently from that done on fixed works.  One of the primary 
purposes of the law is to protect local labor markets from 
cheaper outside labor.  [Citation.]  Paying the prevailing wage 
to workers constructing a public building located in a particular 
city or county obviously serves that purpose.  But work on rolling 
stock could conceivably be performed almost anywhere, then 
delivered to wherever it might be used.  This practical reality 
raises a question about whether the law’s purpose is served by 
paying prevailing wages to workers that may be far away from 
the location of the governmental entity paying for the work.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24–25.) 
It is true that “work on rolling stock could conceivably be 
performed almost anywhere, then delivered to wherever it 
might be used.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  But today’s holding 
tips the calculus for public entities by incentivizing them to bid 
down local wages or utilize cheap out-of-market labor to perform 
such tasks.  Why would a public entity choose to have such tasks 
done locally at local wage rates if they can be done at much lower 
wages overseas, out-of-state, or in other regions of California?  
By contrast, in the absence of a wage differential, public entities 
would have less or no reason to favor those workers over local 
unionized workers, consistent with the purposes of the 
prevailing wage law.  (See Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 987  
[“specific goals” of prevailing wage law include “protect[ing] 
employees from substandard wages that might be paid if 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
7 
 
contractors could recruit labor from distant cheap-labor areas” 
and “permit[ting] union contractors to compete with nonunion 
contractors”].)  In other words, requiring public entities to pay 
the prevailing wage for onboard work is precisely what would 
serve the “goal” of the statute:  “to give local contractors and 
labor a fair opportunity to work on public building projects that 
might otherwise be awarded to contractors who hired cheaper 
out-of-market labor.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) 
I see no discussion in the legislative history — and the 
court cites none — explaining why it would make sense to 
exclude construction or installation work performed on rolling 
stock from the scope of the prevailing wage law.  No one disputes 
that if Busker’s electrical installation work had been performed 
on the wayside instead of on individual Metrolink train cars, his 
labor would have been covered under the prevailing wage law.  
By drawing a distinction between identical work performed on 
the wayside versus on rolling stock — even though the same 
underlying tools, processes, materials, skills, and expertise 
would be used to perform that work — today’s opinion attributes 
to the Legislature a limitation that is not evident in the statute’s 
text or legislative history. 
Today’s opinion notes that in 2012, the Legislature 
amended section 1720(a)(1) to clarify that “ ‘ “installation” 
includes, but is not limited to, the assembly and disassembly of 
freestanding and affixed modular office systems.’  (Stats. 2012, 
ch. 810, § 1.)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  “The change was 
enacted to overrule a specific line of [Department of Industrial 
Relations] decisions that treated the assembly or disassembly of 
modular office systems as ‘installation’ work only if the systems 
were bolted, secured, or otherwise mounted to real property.”  
(Id. at p. 16.)  The Legislature “sought to eliminate what was 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
8 
 
viewed as an unwarranted distinction between fixed and 
freestanding modular office systems.”  (Ibid.)  The court says 
this legislative history does not support Busker’s argument 
because “[r]egardless of whether a modular system is fixed or 
freestanding, it remains the case that office systems are 
installed in buildings.  The work takes place in a fixed structure 
on land.”  (Id. at pp. 16–17.) 
But freestanding modular office systems, unlike fixed 
modular office systems, can be easily moved and transported to 
other locations; they are not permanently affixed to structures.  
In that sense, they are similar to rolling stock.  And while 
freestanding modular office systems are typically found in 
buildings or on land, the same is true with respect to rolling 
stock, which is typically found in buildings like train stations or 
on fixed structures attached to land like train tracks.  Further, 
the phrase “includes, but is not limited to” in the 
2012 amendment (Stats. 2012, ch. 810, § 1) suggests that the 
distinction 
between 
fixed 
and 
freestanding 
work 
has 
significance beyond modular office systems. 
Indeed, the legislative history of the amendment explains 
that the reasoning of the Department of Industrial Relations 
(Department) in some cases focused to an inordinate degree on 
whether a construction or installation project was affixed to real 
property, when the proper focus of its inquiry should have been 
on the nature of the workers’ labor.  (Assem. Com. on Labor and 
Employment, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1598 (2011–2012 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 6, 2012, pp. 2–3 (Analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 1598); see also maj. opn., ante, at p. 16 [“the 
Legislature’s focus was on the nature of the work”].)  
Specifically, the Legislature noted that failing to amend the 
prevailing wage law to rebut the Department’s reasoning would 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
9 
 
“mean[] that the intent of [Senate Bill No. 975’s] addition of the 
term ‘installation’ [into section 1720(a)(1)] has not been 
completely effectuated” because “ ‘[t]he tools, processes and 
materials used to build and install “free standing” office 
modular systems are . . . either analogous or identical to those 
used in the construction of interior office walls’ ” and other 
aspects of installing freestanding modular office systems rely on 
the same skills and expertise as installing fixed modular office 
systems.  (Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1598, at p. 3.)  Analogous 
reasoning supports Busker’s claim here.   
Finally, today’s opinion observes that the Department and 
the Attorney General have consistently excluded rolling stock 
from coverage under the prevailing wage law.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 23.)  But Department decisions “do not have precedential 
effect,” and “[t]he ultimate responsibility for the construction of 
a statute rests with the court.”  (Id. at pp. 22–23, citing City of 
Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 942, 951.)  Here, the Department’s interpretation is 
in conflict with the statute’s text and other indicia of legislative 
intent. 
In sum, Busker’s work meets the three elements of “public 
work” set forth in section 1720(a)(1):  His work was performed 
under contract.  It was paid for using public funds.  And his work 
onboard Metrolink trains was “construction” or “installation” 
work, and therefore “public work,” within the meaning of 
section 1720(a)(1).  Busker is therefore entitled to the prevailing 
wage for his onboard labor.  Although courts applying California 
law must abide by today’s contrary holding, the Legislature 
need not.  It may amend section 1720, subdivision (a) to make 
clear that labor that otherwise qualifies as “public work” is not 
exempt from prevailing wage protection simply because it does 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
10 
 
not occur on a fixed structure on land.  Doing so would further 
the purpose of the prevailing wage law as the Legislature has 
long understood it.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
1 
 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION 
S251135 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Cuéllar 
 
Over the years, tens of thousands of Californians have 
been employed on public works — from carpenters to sheet 
metal workers to electricians and a host of other “laborer[s], 
worker[s], and mechanic[s].”  (Lab. Code, § 1723.)1  California’s 
prevailing wage law (§ 1720 et seq.) guarantees these workers 
pay commensurate with those in the local area for work of a 
similar character (§ 1771).  This pay protects them from 
substandard wages that might be paid if contractors could hire 
cheaper out-of-market labor — a purpose that harkens back to 
the law’s Depression-era roots.  (Kaanaana v. Barrett Bus. 
Servs., Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 165–166 (Kaanaana).)  It also 
permits union contractors to compete with nonunion ones; 
benefits the public through the superior efficiency of well-paid 
employees; and compensates nonpublic employees with higher 
wages for the absence of job security and employment benefits 
enjoyed by their public counterparts.  (Id. at p. 166.)  As workers 
have lost influence in the workplace for a variety of economic 
and social reasons (Andrias, The New Labor Law (2016) 126 
Yale L.J. 2, 5–7, 13–40), prevailing wage laws such as 
California’s law have remained a key feature of labor and 
employment.   
 
1  
Further unspecified references are to the Labor Code. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
2 
 
The Legislature determined to whom these prevailing 
wage protections apply:  “to all workers employed on public 
works.”  (§ 1771, italics added.)  Given this broad scope, and the 
prevailing wage law’s critical function, our cases emphasize that 
we must interpret the law liberally.  (City of Long Beach v. 
Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949–
950 (City of Long Beach).)  Over the past decades, the Courts of 
Appeal and the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) have 
fulfilled this obligation in construing section 1772.  That section 
provides:  “Workers employed by contractors or subcontractors 
in the execution of any contract for public work are deemed to 
be employed upon public work.”  (§ 1772.)  The Courts of Appeal 
and the DIR have persuasively interpreted this section as 
providing prevailing wage protection for certain work beyond 
the codified definitions of “public works” (see §§ 1720–1720.9 
[defining “ ‘public works’ ”]):  Work critically related to the 
“execution of” a public works contract.   
The majority breaks with this history for no good reason.  
Here and in the other prevailing wage case we also decide today, 
Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co., Inc. (Aug. 16, 2021, 
S253574) __ Cal.5th __ (Mendoza),2 it radically constricts the 
prevailing wage law’s scope and undoes an established line of 
decisions — all under the rubric of judicial modesty.  Casting 
aside our obligation to construe the law liberally, the majority 
holds that section 1772 does not cover functions or activities not 
expressly defined as “ ‘public works.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27; 
see Mendoza, at p. __ [pp. 1–2].)  Instead, the majority reasons, 
 
2  
Mendoza contains a full discussion of section 1772, and the 
majority here simply incorporates that analysis.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 26–27.) 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
3 
 
the section was originally intended simply to clarify that the law 
extends to workers employed by contractors and subcontractors.  
(E.g., maj. opn., ante, at p. 26; Mendoza, at p. __ [pp. 9–10, 12, 
14].) 
The majority fails to persuade.  It papers over section 
1772’s language.  It overturns decades of legal decisions that had 
established a persuasive, workable framework for interpreting 
and applying the section.  And it presents a strained reading of 
the prevailing wage law’s legislative history.  Its interpretation 
creates odd and pernicious consequences, too:  Workers fall 
outside of the law’s scope even though they perform labor critical 
to building, roadway, and other vital public infrastructure 
projects.  This despite how their labor mirrors or clearly relates 
to covered work for these projects, and undoubtedly falls within 
the heartland of the prevailing wage law’s concern; and even 
though their exclusion contravenes the law’s purpose by, among 
other things, encouraging public works employers to employ 
cheaper workers for labor not defined as “public works,” but 
nonetheless constituting labor as crucial as it is integral to 
public works projects. 
With respect, I dissent. 
I. 
A. 
 
A careful reading of section 1772 readily serves up two 
early hints that it extends prevailing wage coverage beyond the 
codified definitions of public works.  First, the section covers any 
workers “employed . . . in the execution of” a public works 
contract, sweeping broadly in its description of the workers to 
which it applies.  (§ 1772.)  That phrase can naturally be 
understood to cover any activity contributing to and critical to 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
4 
 
the carrying out and completion of the public works project 
being contracted for (see, e.g., Webster's 11th New Collegiate 
Dict. (2003) p. 436 [defining “execute” as “to carry out fully,”  
“put completely into effect,” or “to do what is provided or 
required”]) — even if the activity isn’t under one of the codified 
definitions. 
Second, the section uses the word “deemed” when it 
explains what happens to workers engaged in such integral 
activities.  To wit:  The laborers “are deemed to be employed 
upon public work.”  (§ 1772, italics added.)  To “deem” something 
means to treat it “as if it were really something else . . . or 
. . . has qualities that it does not have.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (11th 
ed. 2019) p. 523, col. 2.)  Lawmakers frequently use the word to 
establish legal fictions, including by positively “deeming” 
something to be what it is not in a statute.  (Id. at pp. 523–524, 
citing Thornton, Legislative Drafting (4th ed. 1996) p. 99.)  Here, 
the word fits logically with section 1772’s description of the 
workers covered; it extends prevailing wage coverage to those 
working “in the execution of” a public works contract — deeming 
their labor “public work” even if it would not ordinarily fall 
within the term’s definitions.   
The majority glosses over these two aspects of section 
1772’s language.  Instead, it presses the argument that the 
language simply clarifies the category of persons entitled to 
prevailing wages by indicating that the law applies to employees 
of contractors and subcontractors performing public work under 
contract.  (See, e.g., Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 8– 
9, 21].)  But that reading promptly turns section 1772 into a fifth 
wheel because of section 1771, which already covers “all workers 
employed on public works” “under contract,” including those 
employed by contractors and subcontractors.  (§ 1771, italics 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
5 
 
added.)  Moreover, the majority ignores the significance of 
“deemed” in the section.  It effectively replaces “deemed” with 
“regarded” or “are,” and thereby contends the word simply 
describes the types of workers covered.  (See Mendoza, at p. __ 
[p. 22].)  But even under this reading, section 1772 would still 
be surplusage.  By definition, workers engaged in construction-
type activities on a publicly funded project are employed on 
“public work,” regardless of whether they work for a contractor 
or subcontractor.  In other words, there is no need to “deem[]” 
such workers to be employed on public work.  (§ 1772.) 
The majority also argues that the statutory structure 
confirms its interpretation.  Not so.  What the majority reasons 
is this:  article 1 of the law, titled “Scope and Operation,” sets 
the scope of the law by carefully defining the “public works” to 
which the law applies, whereas article 2, titled “Wages,” simply 
concerns the wages to be paid to workers covered under article 
1.  (Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 9–10, 20–21].)  
Notice how much this argument depends on article titles — 
titles that don’t fundamentally change a statute’s meaning.  
(DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602.)  The 
language of a statutory provision such as section 1772 cannot be 
ignored simply because it might fit more logically in a different 
part of the Labor Code.  (Cf. Reliable Tree Experts v. Baker 
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 [“[T]he scope of the Prevailing 
Wage Law is not to be ascertained solely from the [definitions 
in] section 1720, subdivision (a)(1).  Section 1771 [of article 2] is 
also a part of the Prevailing Wage Law, and its language 
[covering maintenance work] must be taken into account” (fn. 
omitted)].) 
The majority responds that reading the statutory 
language here to expand coverage places “undue importance” on 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
6 
 
“opaque” text that offers no “limiting principle.”  (Mendoza, 
supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 21–22].)  But section 1772 speaks 
clearly.  It “deem[s]” only those employed “in the execution” of a 
public works contract to be engaged in “public work.”  (§ 1772.)  
This limit ensures that the section covers only work that bears 
an integral relationship with a public works project and the 
underlying covered “public work” activity being performed — as 
defined and constrained by provisions such as section 1720, 
subdivision (a).3   
Also providing a clear limit:  how the prevailing wage law 
defines the type of individual it protects.  “ ‘Worker’ ” as used in 
the law “includes laborer, worker, or mechanic.”  (§ 1723.)  
Pertinent legislative history and DIR job classifications confirm 
that the law has generally applied only to craftspersons and 
manual laborers, many of whom perform construction-related 
tasks.  (See Assem. Com. on Labor and Employment, Rep. on 
Sen. Bill No. 1999 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 18, 
2000, p. 4 [“Historically, workers entitled to prevailing wages 
. . . are blue collar workers”]; see also Office of the Director, 
Director’s General Prevailing Wage Determinations (June 2021) 
Dept. of Industrial Relations 4 [as of Aug. 11, 2021] [providing 
 
3  
Fulfilling a public works contract typically requires a host 
of tasks that don’t bear any real connection to public works.  For 
example, projects may require accounting.  And the Positive 
Train 
Control 
(PTC) 
system 
here 
required 
software 
development.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 30.)  No one suggests 
that these tasks, which are ancillary to covered public work, fall 
within the prevailing wage law’s ambit.   
4  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket number, and case name at . 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
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links to a range of prevailing wage determinations for blue-
collar workers].)  In other words, the language of section 1772 
can, in context, only be understood to cover blue-collar workers 
engaged “in the execution” of a public works contract through 
construction and related trades — just like their fellow workers 
engaged in labor under one of the statutory definitions of “public 
work.”   
B. 
Over more than four decades, the Courts of Appeal and the 
DIR have consistently construed section 1772 as covering 
certain work substantially related to “the execution” of a public 
works contract, even though that work would not otherwise 
meet the statutory definition of public work.  These decisions are 
no surprise given what the statute says — and they don’t bind 
us.  But they deserve serious consideration and offer further 
insight into what the statute means.  (Hoyt v. Board of Civil 
Service Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles (1942) 21 
Cal.2d 399, 402 [the practical construction of a statute by 
decisions of the Courts of Appeal, covering many years, is 
entitled to consideration and should not be overruled unless 
clearly unsupportable]; Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of 
Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 11–13 (Yamaha) [courts defer 
to agency interpretations that are embodied in quasi-legislative 
regulations, are a product of the agency’s expertise and technical 
knowledge of the issue, or constitute long-standing, consistent, 
and contemporaneous interpretations].)  We address them in 
turn. 
1. 
Three appellate decisions have interpreted section 1772.   
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
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8 
 
The first case is O.G. Sansone Co. v. Department of 
Transportation (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 434, 441 (Sansone).  At 
issue was whether the prevailing wage law covered truck 
drivers who delivered building materials to a public works 
highway construction site — delivery work that did not 
represent defined public work.  While Sansone did not explicitly 
resolve whether the drivers fell under section 1772, it effectively 
addressed that question by addressing whether the trucking 
companies that employed the drivers were subcontractors 
within the meaning of the prevailing wage law, including under 
the section.  (Sansone, at p. 441; see Williams v. SnSands Corp. 
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 742, 752 (Williams).)  The court held 
that the drivers qualified for prevailing wages because they 
worked under subcontracts to fulfill “an integral part of” the 
prime contractor’s contractual obligation.  (Sansone, at p. 445.)  
As the court explained, the contract obligated the prime 
contractor to provide the project materials, including aggregate 
subbase for the roadway.  (Id. at p. 443.)  Rather than acquiring 
materials from a standard material supplier, the contractor 
entered into “ ‘borrow agreements’ ” with third parties.  (Ibid.)  
These agreements allowed access to private sites where 
aggregate could be extracted from pits, specifically for use on the 
project.  (Ibid.)  The contractor engaged the trucking companies 
to deliver that material to the project.  (Ibid.)  The truckers did 
no construction; their delivery of necessary materials from a 
dedicated site nonetheless allowed their labor to effectively be 
“deemed” public work.  The court also observed that even 
truckers making deliveries for standard material suppliers — a 
task ordinarily independent of construction activity — might be 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
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9 
 
entitled to prevailing wages if the delivery was “ ‘functionally 
related to the process of construction.’ ”  (Id. at p. 444.)5 
Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 742 embraced Sansone.  
Williams concerned truckers who hauled excess rock and sand 
from construction sites for later use at nonpublic worksites.  
(Williams, at pp. 746–747.)  It explained that the critical aspect 
of Sansone and its own determination was whether the trucking 
represented “an operation truly independent of the performance 
of the general contract for public work, as opposed to . . . work 
that was integral to the performance of that general contract.”  
(Williams, at p. 752.)  Applying this test, the Williams court 
concluded that the rock and sand haulers did not perform 
covered labor under section 1772.  Unlike in Sansone, no 
evidence indicated that the contract or industry custom 
obligated the lead contractor to do the hauling work.  (Williams, 
at p. 753.)  Nor did any evidence indicate the contractor directed 
how the trucking company would deliver the excess materials 
offsite, or how the offsite location would use the materials.  
(Ibid.)  On this record, the removal of materials was “unrelated 
to the performance of the prime public works contract” and was 
“no more an integral part of the process of the public works 
project than the delivery of generic materials to the public works 
site by a [standard] material supplier.”  (Ibid.) 
Finally, we consider Sheet Metal Workers’ Internat. Assn., 
Local 104 v. Duncan (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 192 (Sheet Metal).  
 
5  
Although Sansone refers to the “construction” process (see, 
e.g., Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 444), its principles 
would apply to any other type of activity that qualifies as public 
work.  Going forward, I occasionally use “construction” as an 
umbrella term for all the kinds of labor defined by the statute as 
public work. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
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10 
 
Here the court applied Sansone and Williams to the offsite 
fabrication context.  Sheet Metal explained that the two cases 
“set forth a general framework for considering whether certain 
functions are integral to the performance of a public works 
contract.”  (Sheet Metal, at pp. 205–206.)  Under this framework, 
the court held that certain offsite fabrication work — fabrication 
of sheet metal components at a permanent and independent 
offsite plant — did not qualify for coverage under section 1772.  
(Sheet Metal, at pp. 196–197, 214.)  The public works contract at 
issue concerned the upgrade of a community college’s facilities, 
including its heating and cooling system.  (Id. at p. 196.)  The 
prevailing wage law applied to the workers of the subcontracted 
sheet metal firm who installed components for the system, as 
they engaged in “construction” or “installation” under section 
1720, subdivision (a)(1).  But the law did not apply to the 
workers who fabricated the components at the firm — work not 
covered by the “public work” definitions — because they 
performed labor at a facility too remotely tethered to a 
requirement or term in the public works contract and done 
independently of the offsite construction and not integrated into 
the construction process.  (Sheet Metal, at pp. 211–212, 214.)6 
Three factors emerge from Sansone, Williams, and Sheet 
Metal that help determine whether labor is done in “the 
execution of [a] contract for public work” under section 1772:  
whether the labor  is (1)  functionally related to the construction 
process; (2) integrated into that process; and (3) done to fulfill 
 
6  
I do not rely on Sheet Metal to endorse or develop any 
particular viewpoint about when section 1772 would apply to 
offsite fabrication — a question we needn’t address here. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
11 
 
the prime contractor’s obligation to complete a public works 
aspect of the project. 
Work is functionally related to the execution of the 
construction process if it requires similar labor, skills, or other 
natural relationship to covered work, and if the construction 
could not be completed as contracted for without the work in 
question.  This framework provides a clear limit to prevent 
coverage for ancillary tasks, which may be required under a 
contract that includes public work but in no way impact a 
contractor’s construction obligations. 
To be “deem[ed] . . . public work” under section 1772, labor 
often must be both functionally related to the construction and 
integrated into that process.  (§ 1772.)  The cases provide 
specific, nonexhaustive examples of integration.  Work done at 
an exclusively dedicated facility established solely to supply a 
public works project could be considered as integrated into the 
project.  The facility’s existence and the work done there are 
driven entirely by the needs of the public works construction.  
(See Sheet Metal, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.)  Sansone 
and Williams also posit other examples of integration, including 
where material is delivered and immediately incorporated as 
part of the flow of construction, or when dirt removal is required 
for pipe to be laid.  (Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 444; 
Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 753–754.)  What 
generally unites these differing, fact-specific examples:  Each 
reflects labor that is not unduly attenuated from the actual 
construction work or other defined public work, and instead 
bears a logical connection to the preconstruction, construction, 
or postconstruction process.  Unlike the federal prevailing wage 
law, California’s version does not appear to include a 
geographical limitation.  (40 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) [limiting 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
12 
 
coverage to persons “employed directly on the site of the work”].)  
The integration requirement for section 1772 should not be read 
to impose one.    
Finally, work falling under section 1772 generally fulfills 
the prime contractor’s obligation to complete a public works 
aspect of the project.  If neither the contract nor industry 
practice nor practical circumstances impose such an obligation, 
the work done likely cannot be deemed public work.  (See 
Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 753.)   
These three factors have provided a rubric for applying 
section 1772 — one that’s not only longstanding, but eminently 
administrable.  Applying these factors, Sansome, Williams, and 
Sheet Metal have provided clear guideposts:  They have 
illustrated how courts can construe section 1772 as expanding 
the scope of the prevailing wage law and can carefully apply it 
in a fact-intensive manner — consistent with the law’s purpose 
of protecting workers and our obligation to construe the law 
liberally — without stretching beyond reason what qualifies as 
labor “in the execution of” a public works contract.  (§ 1772.)  Or, 
put differently, without “ ‘interfere[ing] where the Legislature 
has demonstrated the ability to make its intent clear and chosen 
not to act [citation].’ ”  (City of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 
p. 950.) 
The Legislature has not amended or repealed section 1772 
since the Sansone-Williams-Sheet Metal line of cases have been 
on the books.     
The majority nonetheless somehow decides these cases 
impermissibly interfere with the Legislature’s prerogative.  
(Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 21–22, 29].)  It further 
contends that my embrace of these cases essentially calls on 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
13 
 
courts to arrogate legislative power.  (Mendoza, at p. __ [p. 35].)  
Not at all:  Giving full effect to section 1772 based on its 
language and other indicia of legislative purpose is as far from 
a judicial encroachment into the safeguards provided by the 
separation of powers (Mendoza, at p. __ [p. 35]) as Chico is from 
Chula Vista.  What the appellate courts have been doing since 
they started interpreting section 1772 is precisely what we 
rightly expect courts to do when they interpret statutes.  (See 
Gund v. County of Trinity (2020) 10 Cal.5th 503, 511, 514 517–
518.)  By upending decades of authority on section 1772, it would 
seem that it’s the majority that’s interfered.    
2. 
The majority’s departure from settled law becomes even 
more puzzling once we consider DIR coverage determinations. 
The DIR Director has “quasi-legislative authority to 
determine coverage of projects or types of work under 
the prevailing wage laws.”  (§ 1773.5, subd. (d).)  These 
determinations, and the statutory constructions that undergird 
them, merit deference if they represent the DIR’s long-standing, 
consistent, and contemporaneous position.  (Kaanaana, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 178.)  Such is the case here. 
The DIR has dutifully applied the approach in Sansome, 
Williams, and Sheet Metal for effectuating section 1772.  In 
numerous determinations across many years, the DIR has 
applied the factors laid out in these cases to determine whether 
particular types of labor fall under the prevailing wage law by 
virtue of their relationship to defined public work.  (See, e.g., 
Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2008-008 (May 28, 
2008)  [as of Aug. 11, 2021] [applying Sansone and Williams 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
14 
 
to determine that section 1772 did not cover the off-site 
manufacture of components, such as trusses and wall panels, for 
an apartment construction project, but did cover the hauling of 
such components]; Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 
2014-023 
(Nov. 
6, 
2014) 
 [as of Aug. 11, 2021] [applying 
all three cases to conclude that section 1772 covered the 
dismantling and removal of modular classrooms]; Dept. of 
Industrial Relations, PW Case Nos. 2018-028, 2018-031 (May 9, 
2020)  [as of Aug. 11, 2021] [applying all 
three 
cases 
to 
determine 
that 
section 
1772 
covered 
commissioning work to ensure that installed heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning systems performed according 
to design and in conformity with operational needs].) 
Like the Court of Appeal cases they apply, the agency 
decisions tell us something about the scope of section 1772 and 
the practical viability of the more settled interpretation.  It may 
take some judgement to discern whether a particular type of 
labor has a functional or integrated relationship with 
contracted-for public work.  (See Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at 
p. __ [pp. 6–7, 31–32].)  But this challenge is not unique to 
section 1772.  Prevailing wage coverage determinations 
generally require examination of the “totality of the underlying 
facts” and circumstances bearing on the nature of the work at 
issue.  (Oxbow Carbon & Minerals, LLC v. Department of 
Industrial Relations (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 538, 550.)  In 
engaging in this type of careful, holistic analysis under section 
1772, the DIR and courts have proven up to the task, guided by 
a longstanding framework applicable across public works 
projects. 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
15 
 
The majority upends this framework, disapproving of the 
Court of Appeal cases undergirding it and rendering existing 
administrative decisions relying on it meaningless.  (See 
Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 29–30, 33].)  Yet its main 
basis for doing so — legislative history — provides no plausible 
support.   
C. 
Section 1772’s legislative history is quite thin.  The section 
has remained substantively unchanged since the Legislature 
first enacted the prevailing wage law as an uncodified measure 
in 1931 (Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [p. 8]), and no 
materials from then or the law’s 1937 codification offer 
commentary on the section’s meaning (see Cal. Code Com. 
Office, Proposed Labor Code (1936), p. 88).   
The majority nonetheless urges that historical sources on 
section 1772’s original intended purpose mandate reading the 
section narrowly:  as simply clarifying that the law covers 
employees of contractors and subcontractors performing defined 
public work.  (Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 10–20].)  
Discerning this purpose from the section’s spare historical 
materials seems like trying to draw blood from a stone.  And, 
ultimately, the majority’s read of these materials and historical 
context proves strained and doesn’t come remotely close to 
justifying its radical interpretation. 
The majority begins with the original language of section 
1772, which traces back to the 1931 uncodified prevailing wage 
law.  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 910.)  The relevant text 
provided that prevailing wages “shall be paid to all laborers, 
workmen and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the State of 
California, or by or on behalf of any county, city and county, city, 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
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16 
 
town, district or other political subdivision of the said state, 
engaged in the construction of public works, exclusive of 
maintenance work.  Laborers, workmen and mechanics 
employed by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any 
contract or contracts for public works with the State of 
California, or any officer or public body thereof, . . . [or any 
political subdivision] . . . , shall be deemed to be employed upon 
public works.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Section 1772 derives from 
the second sentence, whereas section 1771 derives from the first 
sentence.   
According to the majority:  The first sentence covered 
government workers — those “ ‘employed by’ ” the state on 
public works.  (Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __, fn. __ [p. 11 
& fn. 11].)  And the second clarified that the law also extended 
to nongovernment laborers by “ ‘deem[ing] [them] to be 
employed upon public works.’ ”  (Mendoza, at p. __, fn. __ [pp. 
11–12 & fn. 12].)  The majority draws a similar inference from 
the 1937 codification, which split the two sentences into the 
original versions of sections 1771 and 1772.7  It reasons that 
section 1771 originally covered all those employed on public 
works, including government workers,  and section 1772 “simply 
. . . ensure[d] that those employed by a contractor or 
subcontractor” had “the same protection . . . .”  (Mendoza, at p. 
__ [p. 14].)  The majority acknowledges that the 1974 legislative 
amendment to limit section 1771 to contract work potentially 
renders its reading of section 1772 surplusage, but it attempts 
 
7  
Section 1771 as originally enacted applied “to all workmen 
employed on public works . . . .”  (Former § 1771, added by Stats. 
1937, ch. 90, p. 243.) 
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to sidestep this by urging that the section was not originally 
surplusage.  (Mendoza, at p. __ [p. 16].)   
Yet this sidestep fails.  So does the majority’s 
interpretation more broadly, because it hinges on a premise the 
majority fails to fully substantiate:  that the prevailing wage law 
as originally enacted generally covered government workers.  
That proposition appears debatable at best.  On the one hand, 
the majority correctly observes that the 1931 and 1937 
prevailing wage laws did not expressly exclude government 
workers (Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __, fn. __ [pp. 11, fn. 
11, 15]), and it marshals some support from two Attorney 
General opinions and the early prevailing wage laws of some 
states (Mendoza, at p. __ [pp. 12–13, 16–17]).  And the 1931 Act’s 
use of the phrase “employed by or on behalf of” the state can 
plausibly be read to broadly cover direct government employees 
and contracted-for employees alike.  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, 
p. 910; see Mendoza, at p. __, fn. __ [p. 12, fn. 12].)  On the other 
hand, that phrase can also plausibly be read merely to 
encompass the range of contract workers who engaged in labor 
on public works — irrespective of the precise nature of their 
relationship with the government, a contractor, or a 
subcontractor.  (See Dept. of Industrial Relations, Div. of Labor 
Standards Enforcement, Public Works Manual (May 2018) § 2.2, 
pp. 2–3 [citing, inter alia, Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 
463].)  This view finds support in the express exclusion of 
coverage for government employees in the 1897 precursor to the 
prevailing wage law (Stats. 1897, ch. 88, § 1, p. 90); the absence 
of any discussion of such coverage in our cases addressing the 
uncodified prevailing wage law (see, e.g., Metropolitan Water 
Dist. of Southern California v. Whitsett (1932) 215 Cal. 400); and 
how many states historically limited their prevailing wage laws 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
18 
 
to contract work (Johnson, Prevailing Wage Legislation in the 
States (Aug. 1961) 84:8 Monthly Lab. Rev. 839, 842). 
More importantly, we held in Bishop v. City of San Jose 
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 56 (Bishop) that the prevailing wage law as 
originally enacted did not cover government employees.  
(Bishop, at p. 64.)  Though the majority offers some potentially 
tenable critiques of the decision (e.g., Mendoza, supra, __ 
Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 18–19] [it failed to address how what is now 
§ 1720, subd. (a)(3) appears to cover street, sewer, and 
improvement work not performed under contract]), Bishop 
nonetheless remains equally plausible, if not more so, compared 
to the majority’s view.  That view fails to take into account the 
impetus behind the prevailing wage law:  It emerged to prevent 
“ ‘government contractors’ ” from “ ‘circumvent[ing] locally 
prevailing labor market conditions by importing cheap labor 
from other areas’ ” (State Building & Construction Trades 
Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 555, 
italics added), and one of its main purposes has always been to 
“compensate nonpublic employees with higher wages for the 
absence of job security and employment benefits enjoyed by 
public employees” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 976, 987; see Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 459).  
Under these circumstances, we have reason to think that the 
purpose of the law did not entail covering government workers.   
But suppose the law did apply to these very workers.  The 
majority fails to explain why it would have been necessary to 
include section 1772 simply to clarify that the law also protected 
those employed by contractors and subcontractors.  As originally 
enacted in 1931 and codified in 1937, the prevailing wage law 
unquestionably applied to work done by contract.  In fact, that 
represented the primary focus of the law.  (See Bishop, supra, 1 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
19 
 
Cal.3d at p. 64; Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at pp. 458–460.) 
Even the 1960 Attorney General opinion cited by the majority 
(Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 16–17]) acknowledged 
this reality (35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 3 (1960)).  If the law as a 
whole so obviously focused on contract work, there should have 
been no need to clarify that public agencies could not avoid the 
law by having the work done by contractors instead of their own 
forces.  In other words, the majority not only makes section 1772 
redundant today, but also renders the Legislature’s original 
action in enacting the provision as surplusage. 
Legislatures don’t always manage to write laws that are 
perfectly clear.  But it’s doubtful the Legislature used extra 
words via section 1772 to say nothing new regarding contract 
labor.   
It’s likewise doubtful the Legislature enacted the section 
merely to clarify the types of private workers covered.  According 
to the majority, even if the prevailing wage law did not apply to 
government workers, section 1772 still originally served and 
continues to serve the purpose of removing any doubt that the 
law applies to the gamut of contract workers potentially 
employed on a public works project, from those contracting 
directly with the government to those formally or informally 
employed by a contractor or subcontractor.  (Mendoza, supra, __ 
Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 8–9, 19–20].)  But the majority provides 
nothing in the way of case law, legislative history, or historical 
context to support this alternative view.  Indeed, the precursor 
language to section 1771 swept quite broadly, covering “all 
laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by or on behalf of 
the State . . . engaged in the construction of public works.”  
(Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 910, italics added.)  So too did the 
original version of section 1771; it covered “all workmen 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
20 
 
employed on public works.”  (Former § 1771, added by Stats. 
1937, ch. 90, p. 243, italics added.)  In other words, the 
prevailing wage law did not appear to require any clarification 
regarding the types of private labor covered. 
Finally, even if the majority’s arguments regarding 
section 1772’s narrow purpose make this case close, that is of no 
moment.  The prevailing wage statute’s liberal construction rule 
requires us to select the longstanding, broader interpretation 
offered by Sansone and its progeny.  (City of Long Beach, supra, 
34 Cal.4th at pp. 949–950.)  The majority doesn’t reject this rule; 
it merely pays lip service to it (Mendoza, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. 
__ [p. 4]) and ultimately flouts it in practice.   
D. 
The facts of this case underscore why reading section 1772 
liberally, to cover critical labor beyond defined “public work” 
activities, furthers the purpose of protecting and benefitting 
those employed on public works. 
Plaintiff John Busker performed a range of electrical 
installation tasks for a public works project to create a 
communication system for Metrolink public transit trains.  He 
was a blue-collar worker (cf., e.g., Public Employer’s Guide to 
FLSA Employee Classification § 900), and his work would 
indisputably be covered under the prevailing wage law had it 
been performed on the wayside, rather than onboard rolling 
stock (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 25–26).  In other words, he 
performed the type of work the prevailing wage law targets and 
he fits within the class of workers the Legislature designed the 
prevailing wage law to protect. 
Busker’s onboard labor readily qualifies as “construction” 
and “installation” work within the meaning of section 1720, 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
21 
 
subdivision (a)(1).  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., ante.)  But even if that 
were not so, section 1772 naturally extends coverage to his 
labor.  Reinforcing this conclusion is the framework from 
Sansone and subsequent cases.   
First, the completion of Busker’s onboard work served as 
a necessary component for Parsons, the prime contractor, to 
meet its obligation under the prime contract requiring creation 
of a functional Metrolink rail safety system.  The prime contract 
required Parsons to “deliver[] . . . a fully integrated and fully 
functional PTC System that has been completely tested” and 
shown to reliably perform “under full-scale and full-service 
operation.”  (See also Busker v. Wabtec Corporation (9th Cir. 
2018) 903 F.3d 881, 883.)  Because the onboard work supplied 
equipment for the system, the work had to be completed for 
Parsons to fulfill its contractual duty.   
Second, Busker’s onboard work was integrally related to 
the covered wayside work and the PTC system as a whole.  The 
onboard work occurred on-site at the project’s railyard and 
central maintenance facility.  Moreover, the onboard work 
served as a key component in the completely integrated, fully 
tested system that Parsons had to deliver.  The wayside work 
and the system would both have been useless without the 
onboard work.  Without it, there could be no communication 
between the trains and the wayside locations, and from the 
wayside to the centralized control system.  In other words, 
because the onboard work was inherently tied to the wayside 
work, it cannot be viewed as independent from that work or 
installation of the PTC system as a whole.   
Third, Busker’s onboard work related functionally to the 
covered field work.  It’s not just that the field equipment and the 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
22 
 
PTC system depended on completion of the onboard work.  It’s 
also that the electrical installation tasks Busker performed on 
rolling stock related to analogous installation work being 
performed just a few feet away, along the wayside.  In other 
words, if there was any distinction existed between onboard and 
wayside work for purposes of section 1772, it was a not 
meaningful one:  the two sets of labor appear to involve similar 
underlying tools, processes, materials, skills, and expertise — 
all going toward the same, integrated project.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, 
J., ante, at p. 7.) 
 
Covering Busker’s labor based on this three-part 
framework for applying section 1772 achieves the specific goals 
of the prevailing wage law.  For example, covering workers such 
as Busker helps attract talented craft workers to public works 
projects and thereby improves the efficiency and quality of such 
projects (Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 166) — an especially 
critical goal for a system installation aimed at preventing 
collisions and other dangerous train movements for public 
transportation.  It would also protect union workers from 
underbidding by nonunion workers.  (Ibid.) 
Now consider what the majority’s interpretation will 
encourage contractors to do:  easily circumvent the prevailing 
wage law.  Under its interpretation, contractors can simply 
employ two sets of workers:  one set of workers engaged in 
defined public work and a different set of cheaper workers to 
perform any work that necessarily facilitates and supports 
defined work but does not fall under one of the “public work” 
definitions.  That outcome seriously undercuts the prevailing 
wage law’s effectiveness.  It essentially enables employers to 
section off portions of a public works contract in order to 
circumvent application of the prevailing wage law.  As Busker 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
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23 
 
points out, California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 16100, 
subdivision (b)(6) states that the “awarding body” must 
“[e]nsure that public works projects are not split or separated 
into smaller work orders or projects for the purpose of evading 
the applicable provisions of Labor Code Section 1771.”  
Classifying Busker’s onboard labor as separate or distinct from 
the wayside labor — even though both bodies of work represent 
inherently linked aspects of one unified public works project — 
would do exactly that.   
Indeed, the odd consequences of the majority’s holding in 
this case underscore the wayward nature of its interpretation.  
The idea that the prevailing wage law covers electricians and 
other skilled or manual work at a railyard and alongside a 
railway, but excludes coverage for functionally related, 
integrated, and contractually required work, simply because the 
worker happened to be working on a railcar parked at the 
railyard, strikes me as an arbitrary and implausible 
distinction — and one unsupported by any indicia of the 
prevailing wage law’s purpose. 
In spite of — and perhaps especially because of — the 
majority’s wholly unjustified constriction of section 1772, courts 
and the DIR must still strive to liberally construe the other 
provisions of the prevailing wage law, including its definitions 
of covered “public work.”  Justice Liu’s dissent, which I join, 
offers one potential template for doing so.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., 
ante, at pp. 1–7 [illustrating how the language, legislative 
history, and purpose of section 1720, subd. (a)(1), mean it can’t 
be read as limited to fixed work on land, and to therefore create 
an arbitrary distinction between identical installation work 
performed on the wayside versus rolling stock].) 
BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION  
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
 
24 
 
II. 
Longstanding authority provided a persuasive and 
workable framework for applying section 1772 to cover certain 
labor critical to the “execution of” a public works contract and 
defined “public work.”  The majority here and in Mendoza, 
supra, __ Cal.5th __ upends this established understanding of 
section 1772 without justification.   
 
By eviscerating the scope of section 1772, the majority 
fails to live up to our obligation to construe the prevailing wage 
law liberally.  This failure strikes a heavy blow to the workers 
of our state.  Across public works sites, laborers performing 
tasks vital to the performance and completion of covered “public 
work,” and public infrastructure projects as a whole, now lack 
prevailing wage law protections — even if they represent the 
very type of workers the prevailing wage law is designed to 
apply to, and even if they perform the very type of labor the law 
is meant to cover.   
With respect, I dissent.  I urge the Legislature to amend 
section 1772 to restore the settled understanding of the section 
offered by Sansone and applied by the DIR:  that work “in the 
execution of” a public work contract encompasses labor 
performed in preparation for, in furtherance of, or otherwise 
bearing a critical relationship to defined public work and the 
public works project as a whole, and that such labor is therefore 
subject to prevailing wage protections.  (§ 1772.) 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
I Concur: 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Busker v. Wabtec Corporation 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548) 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S251135  
Date Filed: August 16, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court: 
County:   
Judge:  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Donahoo & Associates, Richard E. Donahoo, William E. Donahoo; 
Foley, Bezek, Behle & Curtis, Thomas G. Foley, Jr., Kevin D. Gamarni; 
Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Holly N. Boyer for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn & Grosboll and Benjamin K. Lunch for 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 6, as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Bush Gottlieb, Lisa C. Demidovich and Jason Wojciechowski for 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 11 as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Altshuler Berzon, Eileen Goldsmith and Zoe Palitz for International 
Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Transportation Workers, Sheet 
 
 
Metal Workers’ Local Union No. 104 as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jones Day, Craig E. Stewart, Eric Tung, Shay Dvoretzky; K&L Gates 
and Todd L. Nunn for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith and Lann G. McIntyre for California 
State Association of Counties, League of California Cities, California 
Association of Sanitation Agencies, California Special Districts 
Association and American Public Transportation Association as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Hanson Bridgett, Adam W. Hofmann and Josephine M. Petrick for 
Southern California Regional Rail Authority as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Stuart B. Esner 
Esner, Chang & Boyer 
234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 975 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(626) 535-9860 
 
Richard E. Donahoo 
Donahoo & Associates, LLP 
440 W. First Street, Suite 101 
Tustin, CA 92780 
(714) 955-5815 
 
Craig E. Stewart 
Jones Day 
555 California Street, 26th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
(415) 875-5714