Case Title: Jackson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 444, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL JACKSON,  
 
§   No. 444, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr.A. No. IN99-10-1416 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  March 18, 2003 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  April 29, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and 
STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
Robert M. Goff, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
William M. Kelleher, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2 
 
In January 2000, Michael P. Jackson entered a guilty plea to 
trafficking in cocaine.  Jackson’s sentencing was deferred, pursuant to Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 6705 and 6712, in order to allow him the alternate 
opportunity of completing the boot camp program.  After completing the 
six-month first phase of that program, the on-site military-style training, 
Jackson violated the ensuing probation component, rendering him a boot 
camp “failure.”   
Nevertheless, the Superior Court decided to give Jackson a second 
opportunity to succeed at boot camp.  Therefore, rather than ordering 
Jackson to be incarcerated at Level V to serve the mandatory sentence for 
trafficking in cocaine, the Superior Court permitted Jackson to return to the 
first phase of the boot camp program.  After beginning the on-site-military-
style training phase of the boot camp anew, Jackson violated boot camp 
general order number five, resulting in his removal from the program.   
The boot camp commander referred the matter to the Superior Court 
for a final resolution.  After a hearing, the Superior Court ordered Jackson to 
be incarcerated to serve the remainder of his three-year minimum mandatory 
Level V sentence for trafficking in cocaine.  We have concluded that the 
judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
 
3 
Facts 
 
The record reflects that one day, during Jackson’s renewed 
participation in the on-site-military-style training phase of the boot camp 
program, he was assigned to work at the boot camp farm.  While at the farm, 
Jackson remarked to his instructor:  “Sir, it is such a nice day out, it makes 
me want to go home, it makes me want to escape.”  Another cadet had, in 
fact, recently escaped from boot camp.  The instructor interpreted Jackson’s 
comment to be a threat of escape.  The instructor concluded that Jackson’s 
comment had violated boot camp general order number five which provides:  
“I will speak and act with good purpose.”   
The instructor reported Jackson’s comment.  As a result, Jackson was 
removed from the boot camp program.  The charging document which 
caused the hearing be scheduled was a letter from a boot camp counselor to 
the Superior Court.  The letter stated that “Cadet Jackson, while outside the 
secure confines of Sussex boot camp, communicated a threat to attempt to 
escape.”  The letter claimed that Jackson had “jeopardized the security” at 
boot camp and had “disrupted the work crew.”  The letter alleged that 
Jackson’s continuation in the program “posed far too great a security risk” 
and, therefore, he was “dismissed from the program.” 
 
4 
 
On July 3, 2002, Jackson was tried before the Superior Court for a 
violation of his boot camp status.  According to Jackson, his comments were 
made in jest and he did not intend them to be taken literally.  According to 
the instructor, Jackson’s comment concerning escape was the first thing 
Jackson said to him that day.  The instructor described Jackson’s demeanor 
as sullen and depressed.  He could not detect any humor in Jackson’s 
comment. 
The Superior Court found that Jackson’s statement was “very much 
like a bomb threat” and was “against the rules” and “in violation of your 
commitment to boot camp.”  Jackson was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment at Level V, suspended after the three minimum mandatory 
years.   
Valid Rule Violated 
 
On appeal, Jackson’s first argument is that his statement about an 
escape was not barred by any specific rule.  This Court has held “[p]robation 
cannot be revoked in the absence of a violation of an express condition of 
probation or of a condition so clearly implied that the probationer, in 
fairness, can be said to have notice of it.”1  Section 6707 provides: 
                                          
 
1 Liles v. State, No. 105, 1992, 1992 WL 401568, at *2 (Del. Dec. 7, 1992) (Holland, J.) 
(ORDER) (citations omitted). 
 
5 
No offender may participate in the boot camp program unless 
such individual voluntarily enrolls by agreeing to be bound by a 
written contract with the Bureau, which contract shall clearly 
set 
forth 
the 
obligations, 
duties, 
responsibilities 
and 
expectations with which such offender must comply.  A 
representative of the Bureau shall also explain to the offender 
the intended benefits of the program, and the consequences of 
failing the program.2 
 
The record reflects that there are ten general orders at Delaware’s boot 
camp.3  Each of the ten general orders is made known to the boot camp 
cadets upon enrollment.  At issue in this case is general order number five 
which states that:  “I will speak and act with good purpose.”   
There is no doubt that Jackson knew about all of the general orders 
specifically and the other expectations about his conduct, pursuant to the 
agreement he signed upon entry into the boot camp program.  In fact, 
Jackson testified he understood that it was inappropriate to even joke about 
escaping from boot camp.  Moreover, Jackson admitted that in retrospect his 
statement about an escape was irresponsible and “a terrible mistake.”   
Therefore, Jackson’s first argument on appeal is contradicted by his 
own testimony.  Jackson acknowledged that his statement about escaping, 
                                          
 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 6707 (2001).  
3 Those ten general orders are:  “1) I will follow all orders given by all staff at all times; 
2) I will refrain from the use of violence and/or threats of violence; 3) I will not use drugs 
or alcohol; 4) I will tell the truth with compassion; 5) I will speak and act with good 
purpose; 6) I will remain alert and participate in Network at all times; 7) I will adhere to 
the Network Group Contract at all times; 8) I will maintain a positive attitude at all times; 
9) I will maintain a military bearing at all times; and 10) I will remain alert and 
participate in ASAT, Education, and Recreation during all sessions.”   
 
6 
even if in jest, was “not speaking with a good purpose” and, therefore, 
inappropriate in boot camp.  Accordingly, the record supports the Superior 
Court’s determination that Jackson’s reference to escaping violated boot 
camp general order number five. 
 
Jackson’s alternative argument on appeal is that general order number 
five violates his First Amendment rights as guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.  As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “inherent 
in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”4  “Probation restrictions may 
affect fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of 
association if the conditions are primarily designed to meet the ends of 
rehabilitation and protect the public.”5  Accordingly, “[c]ourts have 
consistently upheld imposition of conditions of probation that restrict a 
defendant’s freedom of speech and association when those conditions bear a 
reasonable relationship to the goals of probation.”6  A fortiori, such 
restrictions are valid in this case since the first phase of the boot camp 
                                          
 
4 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).  Accord McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 
1119 (Del. 2002). 
5 United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997). 
6 United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104 
(1995). See also Commonwealth v. LaPointe, 759 N.E.2d 294, 298 (Mass. 2001) (“A 
probation condition is enforceable, even if it infringes on a defendant’s ability to exercise 
constitutionality protected rights, so long as the condition is ‘reasonably related’ to the 
goals of sentencing and probation.”) 
 
7 
program is not probation but is a form of intensive incarceration 
administered by the Bureau of Prisons.7 
The Superior Court properly analogized Jackson’s escape comment to 
a bomb threat.8  In the boot camp setting, a prohibition on speech that 
references an escape from custody bears a reasonable relationship to boot 
camp’s rehabilitative goals and protection of the public.  Consequently, 
Jackson’s First Amendment argument is also without merit.   
Conclusion 
 
We hold that Jackson’s reference to an “escape” was violative of boot 
camp general order number five which states, “I will speak and act with 
good purpose.”  The applicable statute provides that upon a finding that an 
offender has violated “any of the terms or conditions of supervision or 
probation at the boot camp or at level IV or Level III, the court shall proceed 
to sentencing on all charges for which sentencing was originally deferred.”9  
Thus, the Superior Court properly sentenced Jackson to be incarcerated on 
the originally deferred charges.10   
                                          
 
7 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, ch. 67 “Boot Camp Intensive Incarceration.” 
8 See United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2002). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 6712(h).  
10 See id. 
 
8 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.  Pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 18, the time within which a motion for reargument may be filed 
in this matter is shortened to three days from the date of this Opinion.