Case Title: State v. Sexton

Citation: 352 N.C. 336

Docket Number: 499A91-4

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL EARL SEXTON
No. 499A91-4
(Filed 13 July 2000)
1.
Discovery--capital cases--postconviction motion for appropriate relief--retroactivity
of discovery statute
Although defendant filed his motion for postconviction discovery of prosecutorial and
law enforcement investigative files pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) over three years after his
initial filing of a motion for appropriate relief, the trial court did not err in holding that defendant
was retroactively entitled to discovery because on 21 June 1996, defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief, or at least a portion thereof, was pending before the trial court.
2.
Discovery--capital cases--discovery of State’s files--Attorney General’s files not
included
Although defendant is entitled to postconviction discovery of prosecutorial and law
enforcement investigative files pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), the Attorney General’s files
are excluded from those discoverable files because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) limits the files
available to defendants in a postconviction discovery phase to those that relate specifically to the
investigation of the crimes committed or to the prosecution of defendant; (2) the district attorney
is responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases on behalf of the State; (3) the Attorney
General is not a “law enforcement” or “prosecutorial” agency, as specified in N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1415(f) since its role in criminal cases is limited by law to defending the conviction during the
appellate and capital postconviction stages of the case; and (4) the only possible exception,
which is not present in this case, is when the Special Prosecutions Division of the Attorney
General’s office did, in fact, prosecute or participate in the actual prosecution, N.C.G.S. § 114-
11.6.  
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to
review an order entered 30 August 1999 by Stephens (Donald W.),
J., in Superior Court, Wake County, granting defendant’s motion
for discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  Heard in the Supreme
Court 13 December 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valérie B. Spalding,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Irving Joyner and Tracy Barley for defendant-appellee.
ORR, Justice.
The facts and procedural history relevant to this action are
as follows.  Defendant, Michael Earl Sexton, was tried capitally
at the 9 September 1991 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Wake
County, on charges of first-degree murder, first-degree rape,
first-degree sexual offense, first-degree kidnapping, and common
law robbery.  The jury found defendant guilty of all charges. 
After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a
sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction.  The
trial court subsequently entered consecutive sentences of life
imprisonment for the rape conviction, life imprisonment for the
sexual offense conviction, forty years’ imprisonment for the
kidnapping conviction, and ten years’ imprisonment for the
robbery conviction.  On appeal, this Court found no error, and
the United States Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant’s
petition for writ of certiorari.  State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321,
444 S.E.2d 879, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429
(1994).
In an order filed on 1 April 1996, the trial court stated
the procedural history as follows:
6.  On 15 September 1995, defendant filed a Motion
for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing, a
Motion to Submit Physical Evidence for DNA Testing and
a Motion to Appoint Psychological Expert.
. . . .
8.  On 2 October 1995, the State filed a Motion to
Declare Attorney/Client Privilege Waived and to Provide
Access to Defendant’s Case Files, and a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
9.  On 21 December 1995, [the trial court heard]
defendant’s Motion to Submit Physical Evidence for DNA
Testing, and his Motion to Appoint Psychological
Expert, and . . . the State’s Motion to Declare
Attorney/Client Privilege Waived and its Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.  That same day in open court,
[the trial court] denied defendant’s Motions and
allowed the State’s Motions.
10.  On 9 January 1996, defendant filed an Amended
Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing.
11.  On 22 February 1996, [the trial court]
entered a written Order denying defendant’s Motion to
Submit Physical Evidence for DNA Testing and his Motion
to Appoint Psychological Expert, and allowed the
State’s Motion to Declare Attorney/Client Privilege
Waived and its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
. . . .
13.  On 6 March 1996, the State filed its Answer
to Defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief and
Evidentiary Hearing.
14.  On 11 April 1996, the State filed a Motion
for Partial Denial of Defendant’s MAR on the Pleadings
. . . .
The trial court, after making findings of fact, made the
following conclusions of law:
1.  Claims IIB, IIC, IIE and V (5) of defendant’s
Amended Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary
Hearing are DENIED.
2.  The State’s Motion for Partial Denial of
defendant’s MAR on the Pleadings is ALLOWED.
3.  Claims IIA, IID, IIID and IV (4) only of
defendant’s Amended Motion for Appropriate Relief and
Evidentiary Hearing remain for resolution at an
evidentiary hearing.
4.  Defendant is barred from raising any issue in
any subsequent Motion for Appropriate Relief that he
was in a position to raise in the present Amended
Motion for Appropriate Relief but failed to do so.
Defendant petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari on
16 May 1996 seeking review of the denied claims.  This Court
denied that petition on 12 June 1996.  On 15 October 1996, the
trial court resolved the remaining claims against defendant.
This matter arises out of defendant’s motion for
postconviction discovery filed in Superior Court, Wake County, on
8 December 1998, seeking prosecutorial and law enforcement
investigative files.  On 30 August 1999, the trial court entered
an order finding, inter alia, that on the date of the enactment
of N.C.G.S § 15A-1415(f), 21 June 1996, a portion of defendant’s
motion for appropriate relief was still pending.  Thus, the trial
court concluded that, in accordance with State v. Green, 350 N.C.
400, 514 S.E.2d 724, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d
840 (1999), and State v. Basden, 350 N.C. 579, 515 S.E.2d 220
(1999), defendant was entitled to postconviction discovery.  On
1 September 1999, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of
defendant’s entitlement to postconviction discovery in light of
State v. Keel, 350 N.C. 824, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1999), to which
defendant responded on 10 September 1999.  The trial court denied
the State’s motion on 14 September 1999, concluding that its
previous ruling was correct under the mandate of Green and Basden
and that it had “no authority to rule otherwise.”  Following the
entry of the trial court’s order allowing discovery, defendant
notified the State that he also wanted to review the Attorney
General’s files.  The State then petitioned this Court for writ
of certiorari which was allowed on 28 September 1999.
The issue for review is whether the trial court properly
granted defendant’s motion for postconviction discovery under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) and, if so, what that postconviction
discovery right entails.  The State argues that the trial court
erred in granting defendant’s motion for postconviction discovery
in that defendant waited too long to file his motion for
appropriate relief and thus waived his right to postconviction
discovery, and even if defendant is entitled to discovery, the
Attorney General’s files are not subject to postconviction
discovery.  
[1] The State first argues that defendant, by filing his
motion for discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) over
three years after his initial filing of a motion for appropriate
relief, waived his rights to discovery.  Based upon our recent
decision in State v. Williams, 351 N.C. 465, 526 S.E.2d 655
(2000), we disagree.
The legislature adopted N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) effective
21 June 1996.  This statute grants broad discovery rights to
capital defendants whose cases are in postconviction review.  The
text of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) is as follows:
In the case of a defendant who has been convicted of a
capital offense and sentenced to death, the defendant’s
prior trial or appellate counsel shall make available
to the capital defendant’s counsel their complete files
relating to the case of the defendant.  The State, to
the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the
capital defendant’s counsel the complete files of all
law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in
the investigation of the crimes committed or the
prosecution of the defendant.  If the State has a
reasonable belief that allowing inspection of any
portion of the files by counsel for the capital
defendant would not be in the interest of justice, the
State may submit for inspection by the court those
portions of the files so identified.  If upon
examination of the files, the court finds that the
files could not assist the capital defendant in
investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for
appropriate relief, the court in its discretion may
allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) (1999).
In State v. Williams, we held that “[b]ecause the purpose of
[N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f)] is to assist capital defendants in
investigating, preparing, or presenting all potential claims in a
single [motion for appropriate relief], it logically follows that
any requests for postconviction discovery must necessarily be
made within the same time period statutorily prescribed for
filing the underlying [motion for appropriate relief].” 
Williams, 351 N.C. at 468, 526 S.E.2d at 656.  The time frame set
forth for the underlying motion for appropriate relief requires
that such a motion be filed within 120 days of the triggering
occurrence as defined under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a).  Id.
Williams allows for one exception to this rule, which
applies to those defendants who are retroactively entitled to
postconviction discovery based on the decision in Green.  The
Green decision entitles defendants to postconviction discovery if
their motions for appropriate relief had been allowed before or
were still pending on 21 June 1996, the date that N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f) became effective.  “Pending,” as defined by our Court
in Green, “means that on 21 June 1996 a motion for appropriate
relief had been filed but had not been denied by the trial court,
or the motion for appropriate relief had been denied by the trial
court but the defendant had filed a petition for writ of
certiorari which had been allowed by, or was still before, this
Court.”  Green, 350 N.C. at 406, 514 S.E.2d at 728.  In Williams,
we held that the 120-day deadline for filing motions of discovery
under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) would commence 29 June 1999, the day
that our Green opinion was certified, essentially adding the
Green decision as a triggering event.  Williams, 351 N.C. 465,
526 S.E.2d 655.
In the instant case, defendant filed his motion for
appropriate relief on 15 September 1995.  After the trial court
denied portions of that motion for appropriate relief on
21 December 1995, defendant filed an amended motion for
appropriate relief.  In an order dated 1 April 1996, the trial
court denied defendant’s motion as to all but four claims, which
were formally denied on 15 October 1996.  Therefore, on 21 June
1996, the motion for appropriate relief, or at least a portion
thereof, was pending before the trial court.  Because the motion
for appropriate relief was still pending, as pending is defined
in the Green test, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) must be applied
retroactively in this instance.  Therefore, we hold that the
trial court correctly ruled that defendant is entitled to
postconviction discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).
[2] The second question that the State argues relates to
whether the Attorney General’s files fall within the purview of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  The State contends that the Attorney
General is not a “law enforcement” or “prosecutorial” agency, as
specified in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), but rather that its role in
criminal cases is limited by law to defending the conviction
during the appellate and capital postconviction stages of the
case except in limited exceptions that are not present here.  We
agree.
Our Constitution dictates that the Attorney General’s duties
are those “prescribed by law.”  N.C. Const. art. III, § 7(2).  In
cases such as the case sub judice, the Attorney General is
subsequently limited by law to defending the conviction during
the appellate and, when applicable, the capital postconviction
portions of the case.  See N.C.G.S. § 114-2(1) (1999).  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1415(f) limits the files available to defendants in a
postconviction discovery phase to those that relate specifically
to the investigation of the crimes committed or to the
prosecution of the defendant.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  It is the
district attorney who is “responsible for the prosecution of
criminal cases ‘on behalf of the State.’”  State v. Bates, 348
N.C. 29, 38, 497 S.E.2d 276, 281 (1998) (quoting N.C. Const. art.
IV, § 18).  Accordingly, it is the district attorney who shall
“be responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the State of all
criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his district, perform
such duties related to appeals therefrom as the Attorney General
may require, and perform such other duties as the General
Assembly may prescribe.”  N.C. Const. art. IV, § 18 (emphasis
added).
“The Attorney General has no voice in the preparation of the
record on appeal but must take it as he finds it.”  State v.
Hickman, 2 N.C. App. 627, 630, 163 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1968). 
Because the Attorney General does not generally “prosecute” but
instead only defends the State’s conviction when on appeal, we
conclude that the Attorney General’s files do not fall within the
purview of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  Therefore, defendant is not
generally entitled to access to such files in postconviction
discovery by way of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  The possible
exception to this rule would exist when the Special Prosecutions
Division of the Attorney General’s office did, in fact, prosecute
or participate in the actual prosecution.  This occurs only when
attorneys assigned to that division are “requested to [assist in
the prosecution] by a district attorney and the Attorney General
approves.”  N.C.G.S. § 114-11.6 (1999).  This, however, is not
the circumstance in the present case.
For the reasons stated herein, the order of the superior
court to grant defendant postconviction discovery rights under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) is affirmed, but files belonging to the
Attorney General’s office are excluded from those discoverable
files.
AFFIRMED.