Case Title: Ball v. Melsur Corp.

Citation: 161 Vt. 35, 633 A.2d 705

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
BALL_V_MELSUR_CORP.92-487; 161 Vt. 35; 633 A.2d 705

[Filed 24-Sep-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-487


 Albert L. Ball & Jeanette Ball               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Windham Superior Court

 Melsur Corporation                           May Term, 1993


 James L. Morse, J., specially assigned

 Frederic deG. Harlow and Martha Anne Wieler of Harlow Liccardi &
   Crawford, P.C., Rutland, for plaintiffs-appellees

 Sheila C. Files and Douglas Richards of Richards & Files, P.C.,
   Springfield, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
           Specially Assigned


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Melsur Corporation appeals an adverse judgment
 in a personal injury case and seeks a new trial.  Defendant claims that:
 (1) the administrative judge for the trial courts committed reversible error
 when he denied defendant's motion for recusal; (2) the trial court committed
 reversible error when it allowed plaintiffs to present evidence of certain
 OSHA/VOSHA standards and their alleged violation; (3) the jury verdict was
 a result of passion, caprice, prejudice, compromise, or some other
 consideration; and (4) the trial judge demonstrated prejudice in favor of
 plaintiffs when he engaged in a pattern of rulings in their favor throughout
 the trial.  We affirm.
      On February 12, 1987, plaintiff Albert Ball was injured while he was
 delivering fine sawdust, called wood flour, to defendant.  Plaintiff was

 

 employed by Allen-Rogers, Ltd., as a truck driver.  Allen-Rogers was one of
 several companies that delivered wood flour to defendant.
      On the date in question, plaintiff backed his truck up to defendant's
 loading dock, parked it, and went inside the plant.  A metal dockboard was
 placed between the loading dock and the rear of the truck by an employee of
 defendant, whose responsibility was to unload the sacks of wood flour with a
 forklift.  In the course of unloading the wood flour, the forklift became
 stuck on the dockboard.  Plaintiff was asked to help dislodge the forklift.
 In response, plaintiff picked up a piece of wood, and using it as a lever,
 placed it under the forklift and began prying the forklift upward.  The
 piece of wood slipped and plaintiff fell backward into a cement wall,
 thereby injuring his back.
      Plaintiffs claim that the forklift operator had not been adequately
 trained in forklift operation and that it was unsafe to ask plaintiff Albert
 Ball to attempt to pry or push the forklift when it was stuck.  They also
 alleged that the dockboard did not conform with specific OSHA/VOSHA
 regulations.  Defendant denied any negligence and filed a motion in limine
 seeking a pretrial determination that plaintiffs be precluded from
 introducing any evidence at trial of the alleged OSHA/VOSHA violations.
      When the case was originally scheduled to be tried, the presiding
 judge for the Windham Superior Court was not available.  Both parties
 requested the administrative judge for the trial courts to specially assign
 the case for trial in early August of 1992 if a judge was available.  James
 L. Morse, a justice on this Court and former superior court judge, had
 agreed to an assignment in the Windham Superior Court because of the
 unavailability of the presiding judge.  When the justice was assigned this
 case, he recalled that plaintiffs' attorney had filed an ethical complaint

 

 against him with the Judicial Conduct Board some six or eight years earlier,
 which was resolved when the Board dismissed the complaint.  The justice
 asked not to be assigned to the case, out of concern that plaintiffs'
 attorney might believe the assignment was done solely because of the prior
 complaint.
      Sometime prior to the scheduled trial date, counsel for plaintiffs
 contacted the administrative judge to inquire why Justice Morse had decided
 not to preside over this case.  Counsel understood from the clerk of the
 court and the administrative judge that the justice's decision was based on
 the prior ethical complaint.  The attorney then wrote to Justice Morse on
 July 28, 1992, stating that he felt such a decision was unwarranted since
 the Conduct Board had vindicated the justice.  Plaintiffs' counsel went on
 to say that he felt that the request for reassignment showed that the
 justice bore a grudge against him for filing the complaint.
      In response, Justice Morse drafted a letter to dispel the attorney's
 misapprehension and accepted assignment as trial judge of the case.  This
 letter was hand delivered at a pretrial conference three days later, on the
 first day of trial.  In addition to Justice Morse's letter, copies of all
 prior communications were also hand delivered to defense counsel at the
 pretrial conference.
      On the second day of trial, defendant filed a motion for recusal
 alleging that "past events which occurred between Justice Morse and attorney
 Harlow" required it.  This motion was denied.  The trial judge later vacated
 his ruling and referred the motion to the administrative judge pursuant to
 V.R.C.P. 40(e).(FN1) The administrative judge heard oral arguments on the

 

 motion for recusal at the end of the third day of trial and denied the
 motion.
                                     I.
      Defendant argues that the administrative judge for the trial courts
 committed reversible error when he denied defendant's motion for recusal of
 the trial judge.  Before turning to the merits of defendant's claim,
 however, we must identify the appropriate standard of review to apply to the
 administrative judge's decision.  Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial
 Conduct establishes the general rule for disqualification of judges,
 providing that "[a] judge shall disqualify himself in a proceeding in which
 his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."  A.O. 10, Canon 3C(1).
 This standard is met "whenever a doubt of impartiality would exist in the
 mind of a reasonable disinterested observer."  State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483,
 492,