Case Title: Bueno-Hernandez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bueno-Hernandez v. State1986 WY 172724 P.2d 1132Case Number: 86-35Decided: 09/08/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Luis Raul 
BUENO-HERNANDEZ, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Leonard Munker 
and Martin McClain, State Public Defenders, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, 
PDP and Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, and Jeffrey W. Hedger, Student Intern, of 
the Wyoming Defender Aid Program, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen. and John W. Renneisen and Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Luis Raul 
Bueno-Hernandez was found guilty by a jury of attempted second-degree sexual 
assault in violation of §§ 6-1-301(a) and 6-2-303(a)(v), W.S. 1977, and 
sentenced to not less than 18 months nor more than four years in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues on appeal:

"I. WHETHER THE 
PROSECUTION'S USE OF ITS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AMOUNTED TO SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION 
OF AN ETHNIC GROUP FROM THE JURY IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO HAVE THE 
JURY REPRESENT A CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY AS CLOSELY AS 
POSSIBLE.

"II. WHETHER APPELLANT'S 
CONFESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED INADMISSIBLE BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE IT 
WAS NOT VOLUNTARY.

"III. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL FOR NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE.

"IV. WHETHER APPELLANT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED AND TRIED FOR A VIOLATION OF WYO. STAT. § 14-3-105 
(1977) INSTEAD OF A VIOLATION OF WYO. STAT. § 6-1-301(a) (1977) AND § 
6-2-303(a)(v) (1977)."

[¶4.]     On the night of August 
22, 1985, a nine-year-old girl was spending the night at her next-door 
neighbor's house. After watching a movie, the girl went to sleep on the couch in 
the living room. During the night, she was awakened when a man's hand reached up 
from the floor and began fondling her. She looked over the edge of the couch and 
saw appellant, her next-door neighbor's brother, lying on the floor between the 
couch and the coffee table. She got up to tell someone, but, upon looking back 
and seeing that appellant was asleep, she lay back down on the couch. Later, she 
was again awakened by appellant's touches. Several days later, the child told 
her parents what had happened, and appellant was arrested.

I

[¶5.]     Appellant is a Mexican 
national. During voir dire, three members of the venire who were apparently of 
Mexican-American heritage were excluded from the jury by the prosecutor through 
the use of peremptory challenges. In chambers, prior to trial, appellant moved 
for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's systematic exclusion of 
Mexican-Americans violated appellant's right to a fair and impartial jury. The 
trial court denied the motion, noting that no questions were asked of the venire 
members to establish that they were in fact Mexican-Americans. The court noted 
further that it was not prepared to take judicial notice of a Mexican-American 
background solely from the fact that the excluded venire members had Spanish 
surnames. Appellant now raises the claim before this Court that he was denied a 
fair and impartial jury by the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude Mexican-Americans.

[¶6.]     The test for 
determining whether peremptory challenges have been improperly used to exclude 
minorities from a jury was most recently articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 
(1986).1 There the Supreme Court held that 
although a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part 
of persons of his own race, the state may not purposefully exclude members of 
the defendant's race solely because of race. When challenging the jury selection 
process, the burden is on the defendant to prove the existence of purposeful 
racial discrimination.

"[A] defendant may 
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the 
petit jury [by showing first] that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, 
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the 
venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to 
rely on the fact * * * that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection 
practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' 
Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to 
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This 
combination of factors * * * raises the necessary inference of purposeful 
discrimination.

* * * * * 
*

"Once the defendant makes 
a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a 
neutral explanation for challenging [the] jurors. * * * [T]he prosecutor's 
explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for 
cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of 
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's 
race on the assumption - or his intuitive judgment - that they would be partial 
to the defendant because of their shared race. * * * Nor may the prosecutor 
rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive 
or `affirming his good faith in individual selections.'" Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723 (citations omitted).

[¶7.]     In the present case, it 
is undisputed that appellant is a member of a cognizable racial group. However, 
during voir dire no questions were asked to establish the race of the challenged 
venire members. Therefore, the only fact tending to show that members of 
appellant's race were excluded from the jury is that three of those challenged 
had Spanish surnames. Because appellant did not request that the voir dire be 
recorded, he can point to no other relevant circumstances which raise the 
inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude venire 
members because of their race.

[¶8.]     As the United States 
Supreme Court has said:

"We have confidence that 
trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if 
the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
creates a prima facie case of discrimination * * *." Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723.

In the present 
case, the trial court apparently was not persuaded that, because of Spanish 
surnames or other circumstances, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination 
existed.

[¶9.]     Even assuming that this 
Court were to find appellant had established a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination, the prosecutor offered a sufficient neutral explanation for 
challenging the venire members to refute appellant's claim. In chambers, 
following appellant's motion for a mistrial, the prosecutor responded as 
follows:

"[T]he first [juror] 
challenged by the State * * * is known to our office through Mr. Green who had a 
history of dealing with her at Legal Services as has also Mr. Tristani. After 
discussing her in great length we unanimously decided she would not be an 
appropriate Juror in this case even though she does have a four and a half year 
old daughter.

"As to the next Juror * * 
* we knew there might also be a bias against our office because Dennis Grant in 
our office has sued him for collection * * *.

"Finally, * * * the last 
individual challenged by the State * * * is known to our office to be * * * 
anti-law enforcement."

[¶10.]  Thus, the prosecutor offered a specific 
neutral explanation for exercising his peremptory challenges. He did not merely 
state that he challenged the jurors on the presumption that they could not be 
impartial because of their shared race, nor did he merely deny a discriminatory 
motive or affirm his good faith in individual selections. In each case, the 
challenged juror was known to him or his office and, on the basis of that 
knowledge, the prosecutor had a specific reason, unrelated to the juror's 
ethnicity, for exercising a peremptory challenge.

[¶11.]  Under these circumstances and absent any 
record of the voir dire proceedings, we find that appellant has failed to 
establish the existence of purposeful discrimination.

II

[¶12.]  On August 29, 1985, appellant was 
interviewed by Detective John Mugg of the Laramie County sheriff's office and 
Officer Arwin Olson of the Pine Bluffs police department. James Lucero was 
present as interpreter. Before the questioning began, Miranda warnings were read 
to and interpreted for appellant. When appellant indicated that he understood 
his rights and was willing to talk, the officers began questioning him about 
what occurred on the night of August 22, 1985. At first appellant denied even 
touching the child, but approximately half way through the interview he admitted 
that what the child said was true. He described touching the child underneath 
her clothes. He said he attempted to have intercourse with her but was unable to 
penetrate her because she was too young. He described inserting his finger into 
the child's vagina and then going into the bathroom to masturbate. Each of these 
statements was consistent with the child's version of what 
happened.

[¶13.]  On October 9, 1985, appellant filed a 
motion to suppress his statements on the grounds that they were not voluntarily 
or intelligently given. Following a hearing on the motion prior to trial, the 
trial court issued the following decision letter:

"The defendant testified 
that he is 26 years old, he is a Mexican national * * * and had been in Pine 
Bluffs, Wyoming, for approximately six weeks prior to his arrest. * * * The 
defendant was educated in public schools in Mexico through the sixth grade. He 
does not understand, nor does he speak, the English language. He is unable to 
write the English language and is not literate in it. The defendant stated * * * 
that he understands the nature of the charge and understands that the maximum 
sentence that could be imposed is twenty years 
imprisonment.

"[With respect to his 
statements to the police officers, the defendant] indicated that * * * he was 
told he had to talk about the case. The defendant denies that he was advised of 
his right to remain silent [and] states that [his] admission [of guilt] was 
obtained when the police said they would help him. He admits that the police did 
not say how they would help him, although he thought he would get out of jail 
and be sent to Mexico. He does not believe that the tape was on when the police 
said they would help. * * *

"The defendant's 
interpreter * * * testified that * * * the defendant is capable of conversing, 
is capable of understanding, is rational, and is able to express himself in his 
native language. Officer Mugg testified that * * * the tape recording is 
complete except for brief interruptions when the tape was flipped over * * *. 
The officer did not notice fear on the part of the defendant during his 
interview, did not see any confusion on the defendant's part, denies making 
promises to the defendant, denies offering to help the defendant, but admits 
having agreed to tell the district attorney that the defendant was cooperative. 
* *

"Mr. Lucero states that 
he advised the defendant of his rights * * *. Mr. Lucero reflected that he was 
able to communicate well with the defendant in his native language [and that] 
his responses were generally appropriate. The Court has in addition reviewed the 
tapes. At the outset, it is clear that the defendant was fully advised of his 
rights, and that this advice was translated to the defendant by Mr. Lucero. The 
defendant clearly indicated that he wished to talk to the officers. * * * Among 
other things, the defendant was advised: a) things would be a lot easier for the 
defendant if he tells the truth; b) that deputies do not personally condemn 
wrongful acts by the defendant; c) please tell us what you did so that this 
matter can be put at peace; d) please help us; e) tell us why you did this, tell 
us what happened leading up to it; f) we understand you were away from your 
family and that you had been drinking the night that the offense occurred; g) we 
will explain to the district attorney that you were cooperative and did tell us 
what happened, but we can't guarantee what the district attorney will do; h) all 
human beings make mistakes, telling us what you did you will be able to make 
peace with yourself; i) [y]ou should cooperate with us by making a statement in 
order to see that justice is done; j) the officers will be fair to the defendant 
if he will cooperate and tell his side of the story.

"These statements are not 
verbatim, but reflect the tenor of statements made to the defendant by Officer 
Mugg at various time[s] throughout the interview before the defendant eventually 
made incriminating statements to him. At the end of the tape, it is interesting 
to note that after making the incriminating statements the defendant was again 
asked whether or not he had made the statements voluntarily and understood that 
no promises had been made to him by the officers. At that time the defendant 
reminded the officers that they had promised that they would explain to the 
district attorney that he was cooperative; and the officers acknowledged that 
they had made this statement. The defendant was further asked whether or not he 
had any further questions that he wished to have answered concerning the 
interview or matters relating to the investigation. The defendant had no further 
questions. Throughout the taped interview there [were] no discussions of a 
nature which would lead the Court to find that the defendant was assured or told 
that he would be returned to Mexico. At one time during the interview, Officer 
Mugg stated that this is America, not Mexico `only with your help will we find 
the truth.' To this statement, the defendant replied something to the effect 
that he understood that the United States was a country of 
law.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Here the defendant 
was advised of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. State of 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1062 [1602], 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). His rights 
were discussed with him and translated by an individual who is apparently able 
in this regard and well qualified to perform this duty for the sheriff's 
department. There is nothing in the record to indicate that there was any 
failure to understand or failure on the part of the translator to accurately 
reflect what was going on to the accused. The interview was not unduly lengthy, 
and there is no evidence of problems other than the language problems of the 
defendant, his lack of formal education and the fact that he was a Mexican 
national. Listening to the tape of the proceedings, it appears that in every 
respect the answers of the defendant were self protective, were appropriate, and 
reflected an understanding of the nature of the proceedings and the predicament 
in which the defendant found himself to be involved. The testimony of both Mr. 
Lucero and Mrs. Arias reflects that the defendant was well able to make himself 
understood to them and did in fact communicate well in his native 
language."

[¶14.]  On the basis of these findings, the court 
issued an order denying appellant's motion to suppress on November 27, 
1985.

[¶15.]  On appeal, appellant contends that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements for the 
reason that the totality of the circumstances fails to demonstrate that his 
statements were voluntarily or knowingly made. That is, appellant contends that 
when viewed in light of his ethnic background, education and experience, the 
conduct of his interrogators was clearly coercive.

[¶16.]  We recently articulated the standard for 
determining whether statements made by an accused are 
voluntary:

"`The inquiry has two 
distinct dimensions. First the relinquishment of the right must have been 
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice 
rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have 
been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned 
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced choice and 
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the 
Miranda rights have been waived.'" Frias v. State, Wyo., 722 P.2d 135, 142 
(1986), quoting Moran v. Burbine, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986) (citations omitted).

[¶17.]  In the present case, unlike the accused 
in Frias v. State, appellant was given a full suppression hearing prior to 
trial. During that hearing, he presented witnesses and argument in support of 
his motion to suppress. Despite evidence that appellant is a Mexican national 
who came to the United States illegally not long before his arrest and whose 
understanding of the English language and American justice system is limited, 
the trial court found that his statements were voluntary. The court carefully 
considered appellant's background in light of testimony by his interpreters that 
appellant was fully conversant in his native language and capable of 
understanding and responding appropriately to the questions asked. Viewed in 
light of their testimony, the trial court did not find appellant's ethnic 
background or lack of education and experience sufficient to demonstrate an 
unknowing waiver.

[¶18.]  In addition, the trial court listened to 
the tape of the interrogation and the testimony of appellant's interrogators. 
Despite appellant's assertion that he had not been fully advised of his rights 
and had been promised help if he cooperated, the trial court found that the 
Miranda warnings were fully given to and interpreted for appellant, that no 
promises were made other than that the district attorney would be told if 
appellant cooperated, and that appellant had no apparent difficulty 
understanding what was happening.

[¶19.]  The record sufficiently supports the 
trial court's findings. The totality of the circumstances in the present case is 
not comparable to that in Frias v. State. Testimony at the suppression hearing, 
together with the interrogation itself, adequately demonstrates that appellant 
was fully advised of his rights and waived them "`with a full awareness both of 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it.'" Id. at 142, quoting Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct.  at 1141. The 
interrogation was conducted fairly and kindly, without threats, accusations, or 
intimidation. That appellant is a Mexican national of limited experience and 
education is not alone sufficient to establish that his statements were not 
voluntary. Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding his 
interrogation, we find that appellant's statements were voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently made.

III

[¶20.]  In his next claim of error, appellant 
asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a new 
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

[¶21.]  During trial, appellant elicited 
testimony from several witnesses indicating that other Mexican nationals were 
visiting or staying at his brother's home that summer and, from such testimony, 
attempted to raise a doubt in the minds of the jurors as to whether the child 
actually knew who had assaulted her. To refute the misidentification theory, the 
State called Officer Olson who testified that he investigated the house in late 
June and early July following complaints that appellant's brother was housing a 
number of illegal aliens but that appellant's brother informed him in mid-July 
that he was no longer going to allow illegal aliens to stay at his home. The 
State also called the victim's mother who testified that she was not aware of 
anyone living next door on the night of the assault other than appellant, his 
brother, and his brother's wife.

[¶22.]  At the close of the evidence and after 
the instruction conference, defense counsel informed the trial court that he had 
just learned from the prosecutor that an outstanding warrant existed in Colorado 
for the arrest of appellant's brother. He indicated that "[h]ad [he] known that 
[appellant's brother] was hiding out from Colorado [he might] have pursued that 
as an explanation of why [appellant's brother] would have wanted to stop any 
investigation and hide anybody who was living in the house." He then requested 
an opportunity to present evidence of the arrest warrant to the 
jury.

[¶23.]  The trial court denied the request on the 
following grounds:

"At this point we really 
don't know whether or not there was anything in Colorado. It doesn't add to nor 
take away from any of the evidence in this case. It cannot clearly be said to be 
exculpatory. * * * I would rule that placing the information before the Jury 
would simply * * * add to what is already confused, and would not really be even 
giving to the Jury matters that we know would be 
evidentiary."

[¶24.]  Ten days later, appellant filed a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 34, W.R. Cr.P. On January 3, 1986, a hearing on 
the motion was held before the trial court. Appellant called Officer Olson who 
testified he received information a year earlier that there was an arrest 
warrant out for appellant's brother in Colorado. Appellant argued that a new 
trial should be granted because the newly discovered evidence tended to show 
that appellant's brother may have lied to Officer Olson about no longer housing 
illegal aliens in order to stop further investigation which might lead to 
discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant. 

[¶25.]  At the close of the hearing, the trial 
court denied appellant's motion for a new trial on the ground there was not a 
reasonable likelihood that evidence of the outstanding arrest warrant would lead 
a jury to a different result.

[¶26.]  In support of his claim before this Court 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, appellant 
relies in part on the recent United States Supreme Court case of United States 
v. Bagley, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). Appellant's 
reliance is misplaced. Application of the Bagley rule presupposes that the 
prosecutor suppressed evidence favorable to the accused. In the present case, 
appellant points to nothing in the record to demonstrate that the prosecutor 
knew about the arrest warrant prior to the time he informed appellant about it 
or that he suppressed that information. Instead, the record indicates that the 
prosecutor learned about the warrant following the instruction conference and 
immediately informed appellant. Absent evidence that the prosecutor knew about 
and suppressed information favorable to appellant, the Bagley rule does not 
apply.

[¶27.]  In the alternative, appellant claims a 
new trial should be granted under the standard enunciated by this Court in Opie 
v. State, Wyo., 422 P.2d 84 (1967). That standard requires appellant to 
demonstrate:

"(1) That the evidence 
has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want 
of due diligence that it did not come sooner; (3) that it is so material that it 
would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted; and 
(4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in relation to which 
there was evidence at the trial." Id. at 85.

[¶28.]  In the present case, appellant fails to 
demonstrate either that the evidence is not cumulative or that it would probably 
produce a different verdict were a new trial granted. Testimony to refute the 
inference that no one else was staying at the house on the night of the assault 
was elicited from three witnesses during the trial. Officer Thomas Mohren of the 
Pine Bluffs police department who responded to the call testified that two of 
appellant's brothers were at the house when he arrived. In addition, the victim 
testified that there were male Mexican "friends" at the house at various times 
but that she did not know if any of them lived there. Finally, appellant himself 
testified that there were three Mexican nationals living at the house in 
addition to himself and his brother. In light of this testimony, which in itself 
cast doubt upon appellant's brother's assertion that he was no longer housing 
illegal aliens, evidence that he might have been prompted to lie because of an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest is cumulative and is not so material that it 
would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted. We find 
no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for a new 
trial.

IV

[¶29.]  Appellant was charged with violations of 
§§ 6-2-303(a)(v) and 6-1-301(a). Section 6-2-303(a)(v) provides as 
follows:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second 
degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim; * * 
*"

Section 
6-1-301(a) provides in pertinent part:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if:

"(i) With the intent to 
commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission 
of the crime."

[¶30.]  Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion 
to dismiss in which he claimed that he was improperly charged with attempted 
second-degree sexual assault under §§ 6-2-303(a)(v) and 6-1-301(a); that he 
should have been charged with fourth-degree sexual assault under § 6-2-305, W.S. 
1977; and that because fourth-degree sexual assault is a misdemeanor, the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the case. More specifically, 
appellant argued that because the information did not allege actual sexual 
intrusion, an element of second-degree sexual assault under § 6-2-303(a), he 
properly should have been charged with fourth-degree sexual assault under § 
6-2-305 which requires only sexual contact. On appeal, appellant complicates the 
issue further by abandoning his claim that he should have been charged with 
fourth-degree sexual assault under § 6-2-305 and claiming for the first time 
that he should instead have been charged with indecent liberties under § 
14-3-105, W.S. 1977.

[¶31.]  Appellant places the Court in an unusual 
position. It is well established that we will not ordinarily consider matters 
raised for the first time on appeal. Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864 (1984). 
It should be equally clear that we do not ordinarily consider matters that have 
not been briefed or argued before this Court. Jones v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 837 
(1977). Applying these standards to the present case, we might ordinarily 
decline to address both the fourth-degree sexual assault claim asserted before 
the trial court and the indecent liberties claim raised for the first time 
before this Court. However, because each claim in essence challenges the 
appropriateness of the attempted second-degree sexual assault charge and 
resolution of the first issue necessarily disposes of the second issue, we will 
consider appellant's claims.

[¶32.]  It is well established that when an act 
violates more than one criminal statute, the State may prosecute under either so 
long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. Kallas v. 
State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 693, 694-95 (1985), quoting United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204-05, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979). In the present 
case, no claim is made that the prosecutor's decision to charge appellant with 
attempted second-degree sexual assault was discriminatory. Thus, that decision 
is beyond challenge absent a showing that the legislature intended to preclude 
use of the general attempt statute by the enactment of a special statute making 
the attempt a crime. Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 (1984). Appellant 
fails to demonstrate and we are unable to find any such legislative 
intent.

[¶33.]  As defined by § 6-2-301(a)(vii)(A) and 
(B), W.S. 1977, sexual intrusion is:

"(A) Any intrusion, 
however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, 
tongue or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if 
that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of 
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or

"(B) Sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, [anilingus] or anal intercourse with or without 
emission."

[¶34.]  Section 6-2-301(a)(vi), W.S. 1977, 
defines sexual contact as

"touching, with the 
intention of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate 
parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or [of] the 
clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts; 
* * *"

[¶35.]  Given these definitions, neither § 
6-2-303(a) nor § 6-2-305 constitutes a special statute specifically making the 
attempt a crime. On the one hand, § 6-2-303(a) clearly requires actual sexual 
intrusion; on the other hand, § 6-2-305 refers to a broad range of sexual 
contact which may or may not involve an attempt to commit sexual intrusion. 
Appellant's conclusion that "by its very definition fourth degree sexual assault 
is tantamount to an attempt" is clearly mistaken. Fourth-degree sexual assault 
may be committed in numerous ways without any intent or attempt to commit sexual 
intrusion. Because there is no statute specifically making attempted sexual 
intrusion a crime, we find that the general attempt statute applies, and 
appellant was properly charged with attempted second-degree sexual 
assault.

[¶36.]  We turn next to appellant's claim before 
this Court that he should have been charged with taking indecent liberties with 
a minor in violation of § 14-3-105.2 He relies on the prefatory language 
of § 6-2-305, which provides as follows:

"Except under circumstances constituting a 
violation of W.S. 14-3-105, any actor who subjects a victim to sexual 
contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 
6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and 
without causing serious bodily injury to the victim commits sexual assault in 
the fourth degree." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues 
that had the victim not been a minor, his acts would constitute fourth-degree 
sexual assault. Given the prefatory language of § 6-2-305 and the fact that the 
victim in this case was a minor, however, he contends that he should have been 
charged with violating § 14-3-105.

[¶37.]  Appellant's argument presumes a finding 
by this Court that fourth-degree sexual assault would be the only proper charge 
were the victim an adult and that, pursuant to the prefatory language of § 
6-2-305, indecent liberties is the only proper charge because the victim was a 
child. We make no such findings. We have already said that when an act violates 
more than one criminal statute, the State may choose to prosecute under either. 
Kallas v. State, supra. Therefore, it was within the prosecutor's discretion to 
charge attempted second-degree sexual assault.

[¶38.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant claims that 
after Batson v. Kentucky, the reasoning 
employed by this Court in Evans v. State, Wyo., 653 P.2d 308 (1982), is no longer 
controlling. The basis of his claim is that in Evans v. State we relied on Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, reh. denied 381 U.S. 921, 85 S. Ct. 1528, 14 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1965), which was overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. 
Kentucky. 
Appellant's assertion that "the reasoning in Evans did not survive Batson" is 
not entirely correct. The portion of Swain v. Alabama rejected in Batson v. Kentucky concerned the 
evidentiary burden of proof placed on a defendant who claims that the state 
misused its peremptory challenges. Swain v. Alabama required the defendant to demonstrate 
circumstances under which prosecutors in the jurisdiction struck black jurors in 
cases other than the defendant's. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court rejected that 
requirement, holding instead that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of 
purposeful discrimination solely on the facts of his own case. Our holding in 
Evans v. State is unaffected by this change. There we said only 
that:

"Even if a peremptory 
challenge cannot be based upon a group bias, be it race, sex, occupation, 
religion, national origin, or whatever, the rule espoused by appellant 
recognizes as proper a challenge on grounds of specific bias; and here the 
specific reason existed, i.e., the challenges were premised on the juror's 
acquaintanceship with the defendant or members of his family." 653 P.2d  at 310 
(footnote omitted).

We held further 
that "[a]ppellant point[ed] to absolutely nothing in the record to reflect that 
the peremptory challenges * * * were for any reason other than that enunciated 
by the prosecuting attorney." Id. at 311. To this extent, Evans v. State 
remains unaffected by Batson v. Kentucky.

2 Section 14-3-105 
provides:

"Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit 
with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten 
(10) years, or both."