Case Title: Pohlabel v. State

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
one

 

128 Nev, Advance Opinion |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MICHAEL KEVIN POHLABEL, No. 55403
Appellant,

is FILED
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, .,
Respondent. AN 282012

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty
plea, of felon in possession of a firearm, Fourth Judicial District Court,
Elko County; Andrew J, Puccinelli, Judge.

Affirmed,
Frederick B. Lee, Jr., Public Defender, and Alina M. Kilpatrick, Deputy

Public Defender, Elko County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Mark Torvinen,
District Attorney, and Robert J. Lowe, Deputy District Attorney, Elko
County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

Michael Pohlabel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of NRS 202.360. In doing 20, he reserved the right
to argue on appeal, as he did unsuccessfully in the district court, that his
conviction violates the right to keep and bear arms secured by the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 1, Section

12-0074

 
110) of the Nevada Constitution. Because we reject Pohlabel’s argument
that, despite his felon status, he has a constitutional right to possess a
black powder rifle, we affirm.

L

‘The conviction underlying this appeal grew out of a traffic stop
in rural Nevada, During the stop, the police spotted a rifle in the back of
the car, Pohlabel told police the rifle was his and that he was taking it
with him on a fishing trip. ‘The rifle was an in-line black powder rifle
Seven years earlier, Pohlabel had been convicted of two felony counts of
possession of a controlled substance.

NRS 202,360(1)(a) makes it a felony for a convicted felon to
“own or have in his or her possession ... any firearm.”! Charged with
violating this statute, Pohlabel moved to dismiss. In support of his
position, Pohlabel presented expert testimony concerning black powder
rifles (they must be loaded by hand each time a shot is fired, take at least
45 seconds to load, and are hard to conceal) and argued that, given their
limitations, black powder rifles pose little threat and should not, and
constitutionally cannot, be forbidden to nonviolent felons like himself.

While federal law prohibits felons from possessing firearms, it excludes

'Gallegos v, State, 123 Nev. 289, 163 P.3d 456 (2007), invalidated
paragraph b of NRS 202.360(1) as unconstitutionally vague because it did
not define “fugitive from justice.” This holding does not affect the
paragraph at issue here, NRS 202.360(1)(a). In refusing to incorporate
federal definitions into NRS 202.360, however, Gallegos implicitly rejects
Pohlabel’s argument that we should read into NRS 202.360(1)(a) the
federal definition of “firearm,”

 

 
   

antique and muzzle-loading replica firearms, including black powder rifles
like Pohlabel's, from its ban, See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), (16)(C) (2006). To
Pohlabel, the fact that federal law permits what Nevada law forbids when
it comes to felons possessing black powder rifles demonstrates the lack of
basis for, and unconstitutionality of, Nevada law.

‘The district court denied Poblabel’s motion to dismiss.
‘Thereafter, Pohlabel pleaded guilty but reserved the right to challenge the
constitutionality of his conviction on appeal. Pohlabel has remained out of
custody pending appeal.

T

A
Pohlabel summarizes his argument as follows:
Because the constitutions of the State of Nevada
and the United States make the right to bear arms
fundamental, any restriction of the right is subject
to strict scrutiny, placing the burden on the State
to show that any restriction of the right is
“narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling state
interest.” Keeping felons from possessing black
powder rifles does not survive strict scrutiny
because they take too much time to load, can only
hold one bullet at a time, and are not easily
concealable on the person.

(Footnotes omitted.) In Pohlabel's view, “[iJt would be easier to rob a
liquor store or mug a tourist with a bow and arrow than a black powder
rifle”

Pohlabel's argument, however well-articulated, makes a fatal
mistake: It assumes that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms
applies to felons on equal terms with other citizens. This assumption is
insupportable. The Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia_v.

 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), lays to rest the argument that the Second
Amendment only protects gun rights associated with militia service. But
the core individual right Heller recognizes—the “right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,” id, at
635—categorically, or at least “ id, at 627 n.26, does not
extend to felons, jd, at 626-27. And judged by its text and the evident
understanding of the voters who adopted it in 1982, Article 1, Section
11() of the Nevada Constitution similarly disqualifies felons from the
right to keep and bear arms. Applying the de novo review appropriate to
constitutional challenges, Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d
878, 879 (2007), we therefore reject Pohlabel's strict scrutiny approach and

   

yresumptively,”

uphold the constitutionality of NRS 202.360(1)(a).

B
‘The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.
Heller holds, based on “both text and history, that the Second Amendment

confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms,” unconnected from

 

 

militia service, for the “core lawful purpose of self-defense” in the home.
554 U.S. at 595, 630. Two years after Heller, McDonald v, Chicago. 561
US. __, 130 8. Ct, 3020 (2010) (plurality opinion), declared that “the
right to keep and bear arms fis) among those fundamental rights

 

necessary to our system of ordered liberty,” id, at _, 190 S. Ct. at 3042,
and that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller,” making it
applicable to the states. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.

 

 
on a

 

Heller characterizes the Second Amendment as guaranteeing
“the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added). It contrasts this
category of citizens, whose gun rights the Second Amendment protects
(the “law-abiding” and “responsible”), with “felons and the mentally ill,”
whom the government may prohibit from possessing firearms:

Like most rights, the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited. From
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases,
commentators and courts routinely explained that,
the right was not a right to keep and carry any
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever
and for whatever purpose. .... [Nlothing in_our
opinion_should_be_taken_to_cast_doubt_on

longstanding _prohibiti sseesion of

firearms by felons and the mentally ill.

Id. at 626 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Court explains that its list
of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Id. at 627 n.26, McDonald reiterates that “the right to keep
and bear arms is not ‘a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose” and that neither
Heller nor McDonald “cast{s} doubt on such longstanding regulatory
measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill.” 561 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S.
at 626).

 

Heller's declaration that the government can prohibit felons,
categorically, from possessing firearms cannot be dismissed as dicta. The
opinion conditioned Heller's right to keep a loaded handgun in his home
on him not being “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment
rights,” 564 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added)—that is, he qualified for the

 
one ae

 

relief the Court granted him only “if he is not a felon and is not insane.”
Id. at 631. Heller's statement about felon-disqualification thus is not
dicta; it limits the very relief Heller won, See United States v. Barton, 633
F.8d 168, 172 (8d Cir. 2011) ("the Supreme Court's discussion in Heller of
the categorical exceptions to the Second Amendment was not abstract and
hypothetical; it was outcome-determinativo"); United States v. Rozier, 598
F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir, 2010) (‘{t]o the extent that... Heller limits
‘ion of firearms by law-abiding and qualified
individuals, it is not dicta"); United States v. Vongxay, 694 F.3d 1111,
1115 (8th Cir. 2010) (under Heller, “felons are categorically different from
this holding
is not dicta because if Heller proved to be a felon or insane, he wa
“disqualified” from Second Amendment protection); see also United States
xv. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 90 n.5 (3d Cir, 2010) (collecting cases and
noting that “there is dicta and then there is dicta, and then there is
Supreme Court dicta” (quoting Schwab v, Crosby, 451 F.3d 1908, 1325
(11th Cir, 2006)

We recognize, as the Third Circuit did in Marzzarella, that
Heller's footnoted reference to felon-dispossession laws, among others,

the Court's opinion to posse:

 

 

the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arm:

 

 

being “presumptively lawful” could mean one of two different things. “On
the one hand, this language could be read to suggest the identified
restrictions’—here, a prohibition against felons possessing any type of
firearm—‘are presumptively lawful because they regulate conduct outside
the scope of the Second Amendment.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91. On
the other hand, it may mean that such restrictions “are presumptively
lawful because they pass muster under any standard of scrutiny.” Id,
Although both readings are reasonable, “the better reading, based on the

 
text and the structure of Heller, is the former—in other words, that these

 

longstanding limitations are exceptions to the right to bear arms.” Id. We
agree. Heller does not treat felons (and the mentally ill) as having
qualified Second Amendment rights but, rather, as “exceptions” to its
coverage. 554 U.S. at 635. This comports with the Heller majority's
categorical approach—and consequent, emphatic rejection of the judicial
balancing advocated by the dissent. Ids se Joseph Blocher,
Categori ind Second Amendment An:

84 N.Y.U, L. Rev. 375, 875, 405 (2009) ("{f}rom its central holding, which
extends broad protection to the ‘individual’ right to bear arms unconnected
from militia service, to its flat exclusions of felons, the mentally ill, and
certain ‘Arms’ from constitutional coverage, the majority opinion in Heller
‘was categorical in its approach’; “[t}he least discussed clement of District
of Columbia v, Heller might ultimately be the most important: the battle
between the majority and dissent over the use of categoricalism and
balancing in the construction of constitutional doctrine”).

Marzzarella suggests “a two-pronged approach to Second
Amendment challenges.” 614 F.3d at 89. First, the reviewing court must
determine “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee.” Id, If it
does not, the inquiry ends. If the challenged law does burden protected
conduct, the court must “evaluate the law under some form of means-end
scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is
constitutional. If it fails, itis invalid.” 1d,

In this case, the Second Amendment inquiry ends with the
first question. Pohlabel is a felon who violated NRS 202.360(1)(a), which

prohibits a felon from possessing “any firearm,” “loaded or unloaded and

 

 
‘operable or inoperable,” NRS 202.360(3)(b), including a black powder rifle.
See Harris v. State, 137 P.3d 124, 128-29 (Wyo. 2006) (Wyoming's felon-
dispossession statute, which, like Nevada's, prohibits felons from
possessing “any firearm,” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102, encompasses black
powder rifl

 

, which meet standard dictionary definitions of “firearm”

 

because they are “capable of firing a projectile by using an explosive as a
propellant” (internal quotation omitted)); NRS 202.2532) (“(fJirearm’
mea

 

any device designed to be used as a weapon from which a projectile
may be expelled through the barrel by the force of any explosion or other
form of combustion"). Although crities of Heller have questioned its
historical analysis of felon-dispossession laws (and whether it makes sense
to apply them to regulatory felonies unknown at common law), see C.
Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L, &
Pub. Pol'y 695, 697, 699-713 (2009), Heller confirms that Nevada can,
consistent with the Second Amendment, prohibit convicted felons from

possessing firearms. Meai

 

end scrutiny, whether strict or intermediate,
does not apply.*

In 90 holding, we recognize but do not credit Pohlabel’s
argument that three features of his case overcome NRS 202.360(1)(a)'s
presumptive lawfulness: (1) his predicate convictions did not involve

*The fact that Pohlabel’s case falls squarely within Heller's list of
“presumptively lawful” exceptions to the Second Amendment distinguishes,
cases like United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), which
applied intermediate scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge by a
misdemeanant convicted of domestic violence, whom 18 U.S.C. § 922(@)(9)
(2006) prohibits from carrying firearms in or affecting interstate

commerce.

 

 
violence,® (2) his record was clean for the seven years that elapsed between
his felony convictions and his arrest for violating Nevada's felon-in-
possession law, and (3) black powder rifles are clumsy and ill-suited to
criminal endeavor. ‘The problem with each of these proffered distinctions
is that none brings Pohlabel, a convicted felon, within the ambit of the
Second Amendment.

Pohlabel's first and second points demonstrate, not so much
the lack of justification for applying Nevada's felon-in-possession law to

him,

 

his arguable eligibility for executive clemency or pardon. But the
statute under which Pohlabel was convicted recognizes that a
rehabilitated felon can have his right to keep and bear arms restored. See
NRS 202.360(1)(a) (it is a felony to possess “any firearms if the
person... has been convicted of a felony..., unless the person has
received a pardon and the pardon does not restrict his or her right to bear
arms” (emphasis added). The statutory scheme commits the
determination, though, to the pardons board; the lost right must be

restored before it can be exercised. NRS 202.360(1)(a) “suggests that [the

 

 

Legislature] clearly intended that [a] defendant clear his status” by having
his rights restored “before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling [the
Legislature's evident] purpose ‘broadly to keep firearms away from the

Because we sustained Pohlabel

 

objection to the State's motion to

supplement the record with Pohlabel’s presentence investigation report,
we express no opinion on, but accept for discussion purposes only, the
accuracy of Poblabel's characterization of his criminal history as
nonviolent. See also United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113,
(3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances did not involve the threat of violence).

 

 
co

 

persons [the Legislature] classified as potentially irresponsible and

dangerous.” Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1980) (quoting
Barrett _v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976). The legislative

judgment “that a convicted felon... is among the class of persons who
should be disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms because of
potential dangerousness is rational.” Id, at 67 (upholding conviction under
federal felon-dispossession law even though the predicate felony was the
result of an uncounseled guilty plea and thus subject to collateral attack)
Under Heller, given Pohlabel's felon status, more is not required. See
United States v, Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 118 & n.1 (noting that “[aJll
ue post-Heller have rejected blanket

challenges to felon in possession laws” (collecting cases)).4

of the circuits to face the is

 

As for the distinction between a black powder rifle and other
types of firearm, Pohlabel's argument is illogical, since Heller focuses on
the right of self-defense and, by Pohlabel's own admission, black powder
rifles take too long to load and are too hard to conceal to be helpful in

“Citing Britt v, State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009), Torres-Rosario
recognizes that the Supreme Court may yet be open to claims that “some
felonies do not indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for
applying a categorical ban” or even “highly fact-specific objections,” such
as the 30 years that had elapsed, crime-free, between Britt's single
predicate conviction and firearm charge. 658 F.3d at 113. However, it
noted that “such an approach, applied to countless variations in individual
circumstances, would obviously present serious problems of
administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id, In our judgment, the
pardon and collateral review avenues, which Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67, and
NRS 202,360(1)(a) require a convicted felon to pursue to successful
conclusion before acquiring a firearm, adequately address the problem
Britt treats, without introducing the uncertainty and administrative
difficulties Torres-Rosario predicts.

10

 
armed confrontations. More fundamentally, unless Pohlabel can bring
himself within the protections of the Second Amendment despite his felon
status—he has not—the heightened scrutiny that would invite judicial
reassessment of ostensibly legitimate, legislative line-drawing does not
obtain. Cf. Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 (rejecting the argument by a felon in

 

possession of a firearm that, notwithstanding Heller's categorical
exclusion of felons from the Second Amendment, he could not
constitutionally be denied the core right to possess a handgun in his home
for self-defense; under Heller, “statutes disqualifying felons from
possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the
Second Amendment”),

While federal law currently permits felons to possess black
powder rifles, that does not mandate that Nevada follow suit. See Harris,

 

187 P.3d at 129 (rejecting argument that the Wyoming Supreme Court
should adopt the federal definition of firearm in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a), when
its legislature did not). The choice as to whether to deny felons the right
to possess any and all firearms, as Nevada has done, or to permit them to
possess antique firearms and black powder rifles, as Congress has done, is

legislative, not judicial. Without a constitutional imperative demanding

 

more exacting review, such distinctions do not invalidate state laws that
differ from their federal counterpart. See 18 U.S.C. § 927 (2006) (‘No
provisions of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of the Congress to occupy the field .. . to the exclusion of the law of
any State on the same subject matter”); United States v, Haddad, 558 F.2d
968, 973 (9th Cir. 1977) (federal gun laws are not “an encroachment on,
but rather a complement to, state regulation”).

 

 
   

G

We turn next to Article 1, Section 11(1) of the Nevada

 

Constitution, which provides: “Every citizen has the right to keep and bear
arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and
for other lawful purpose:

he

 

” Poblabel argues that, despite his felon status,

 

‘a Nevada “citizen” and thus has the right “to keep and bear arms for
security and defense [and] for lawful hunting and recreational use.” ‘The
State counters that the Nevada Constitution only guarantees “lawful”
possession of firearms and that, under NRS 202.360(1)(a), Poblabel's

 

possession of the black powder rifle was unlawful and thus unprotected.
While we conclude that Article 1, Section 11(1), like the Second
Amendment, categorically disqualifies felons from the gun rights it
secures, we do not accept either side’s reading of its text.

“In interpreting [Article 1, Section 11(1)] we, like the United
States Supreme Court, ‘are guided by the principle that {tJhe Constitution
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.” Strickland v. Waymire, 126 Nev. _, __, 285 P.3d 605, 608
(2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 654 U.S. at 576).
“The goal of constitutional interpretation is ‘to determine the public
‘understanding of a legal text’ leading up to and ‘in the period after its
enactment or ratification.” Id, at __, 235 P.3d at 608-09 (quoting 6
Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law §
23.32 (4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010)). When the language of a constitutional,
provision is unambiguous, its text controls, Secretary of State v. Burk,
124 Nev. 579, 590, 188 P.3d 1112, 1120 (2008). Conversely, “fiJf a
constitutional provision's language is ambiguous, meaning that it is

 

susceptible to ‘two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations,’ we

12

 
re

 

may look to the provision's history, public policy, and reason to determine
what the voters intended.” Id. (quoting Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas,
114 Nev. 595, 599, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998).

We begin with the State’s argument that “the rights involved
in Article 1, § 11 are limited to lawful possession” and that because “[tJhe
legislature has made it illegal for felons... to possess firearms,” the
constitutional guarantee does not apply. The State's reading gives the
Legislature the exclusive authority to determine when it is “lawful” to
possess a firearm and when it is not. But this is not what the Constitution
says, “Lawful” does not modify “possession” in Article 1, Section 11(1); it
modifi

 

which itself is limited by appearing at the end of a

 

‘purpose:
list: “Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and
defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful
purposes.” (Emphasis added.) ‘The phrase “other lawful purposes” gives
the Legislature the authority to expand the lawful purposes for which a
citizen may keep and bear arms, but it does not authorize the Legislature
to diminish them. Any other reading would reduce the constitutional
guarantee to nothing more than what the Legislature permits, making it
imply cannot be correct,” United States v, Lopez, 614
U.S. 649, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Article 1, Section 11(1)'s history supports our rejection of the

 

meaningless. This “

State's lax reading of it. Unlike many other states, whose constitutions
have secured gun rights from statehood days, Eugene Volokh, State
Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L, & Pol. 191,
193-204 (2006) (cataloguing state constitutional provisions), the Nevada
Constitution did not guarantee the right to keep and bear arms until 1982,

13

 
when voters overwhelmingly (162,460 to 66,385) approved Article 1,
Section 11(1), as proposed by the 1979 and 1981 Nevada Legislatures. See
Questions to Be Voted Upon in State of Nevada at General Election,
November 2, 1982, Question No. 2 (available at Nevada Legislative
Counsel Bureau Research Library) (hereafter, “1982 Questions to Be
Voted Upon"). The 1982 ballot materials told voters that the amendment,
as proposed, meant that “t]he legislature could not restrict the
enumerated purposes, but could make others lawful.” Id, See also
Hearing on AJ.R. 6 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg.
(ev., January 23, 1979) (the amendment was proposed “so that a future
Legislature could not come in and easily change the law to allow some
type of control [over firearms"); id. (its purpose was to safeguard
individual rights and make it difficult “for a future Legislature ... to
change the law’)

Although we reject the State's po:

 

ion, we are also not
persuaded by Pohlabel's argument that Article 1, Section 11(1)'s reference

to “every citizen” includes him, an unpardoned felon, The word “every” is

 

self-explanatory. However, the word “citizen” is subject to two reasonable,
but inconsistent, interpretations. Because of this ambiguity, it is unclear
whether the voters understood “citizens” to include “felons” when they

adopted Article 1, Section 11(1) in 1982.5

Nevada is one of the 16 states that constitutionally limits the right
to bear arms to “citizens.” The remaining 26 state constitutional
provisions specify state citizens or use the words “people,” “person,”
“individual,” or “men.” See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to
Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 191, 193-204 (2006),

 

 
4

 

One way to read the word “citizen” is as a “generic substitute
”" M. Isabel Medina,
Ruminations on rm : Case Law, Commentary, and the
Word “Citizen,” 11 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 189, 192 (2008). For example, the
Nevada Constitution often uses the words “citizen” and “people”
interchangeably. Compare Article 1, Section 9 (“Every citizen may freely
speak, write and publish ....°) with Article 1, Section 10 (“The people

  

for ‘accused,’ ‘person,’ ‘defendant,’ or ‘individual

shall have the right freely to assemble .. .."). Similarly, the word “citizen”
may be used in reference to a civilian, a person who is not a specialized
servant of the state, Webster's Il New College Dictionary 209 (8d ed.
2005). Seo, o.g., Carrigan v, Commission on Ethics, 126 Nev. _, 236 P.3d
616 (2010) (contrasting elected board members with citizens), rev'd, 564
us 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011); Las Vegas Police Prot, Ass'n v. Dist. Ct,
122 Nev. 230, 130 P.3d 182 (2006) (discussing a citizen’s complaint against
the police board).

A second meaning of “citizen” is “[a] person who... is a

 

 

member of a political community, owing allegiance to the community and
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections; a member of a
civil state, entitled to all its privileges.” Black's Law Dictionary 278 (9th
ed. 2009). Under this definition, “citizenship is a status, which entails
individuals to a specific set of universal rights granted by the state.”
Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement_With
Citizenship Theory, 22 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 53, 69 (2006) (quotation
omitted). Often, these rights align with the “most basic of American
political behaviors—voting and participation in the political process.”
‘Medina, supra, at 202.

15

 
one

 

Because of this ambiguity, it is appropriate to look at the
context and history of Article 1, Section 11(1) in determining whether
“every citizen’ includes felons.

Upon conviction, a felon loses many precious civil rights.
‘Thus, in Nevada, a felon may not vote (see NRS 176A.850; Nev. Const. art.
2, § 1), serve on a jury (NRS 6.010), hold a public office (see, e.g, NRS
253.010), be employed in sensitive positions, such as peace officer or
licensed school teacher (NRS 289.565; NRS 391.033), or, as this case
illustrates, possess firearms (NRS 202.360(1)(a)).* Historically, Nevada's
pardon statutes have referred to these lost rights as rights of “citizenship”
that it takes a pardon (or reversal of conviction) to restore, See 2 Nev.
Compiled Laws § 3797 (1873) (“When a pardon is granted for any offense
committed, such pardon may or may not include restoration to citizenship.
If the pardon include restoration to citizenship, it shall be so stated in the
instrument or certificate of pardon; and when granted upon conditions,
2); 1981
NCL § 11573 (also referring to “restoration of citizenship”); 1973 Nev.

limitations, or restrictions, the same shall be fully set forth

 

 

"Nevada's felon-dispossession statute dates back at least to 1925.
See 1925 Nev. Stat., ch. 47, § 2, at 54 (prohibiting felons from possessing a
“pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed on the
person”). We acknowledge that this provision formerly only applied to
concealable “firearms having a barre! less than twelve inches in length,”
id,, and that NRS 202.360(1)(a) did not prohibit felons from possessing any
firearms until 1985. See 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 160, § 3, at 594, The
Legislature's broadening of the felon-dispossession statute over time does
not alter our conclusion that, as felons are not “citizens” within the
meaning of Article 1, Section 11(1), the state may prohibit them from
possessing firearms, regardless of type. See Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770 and
text accompanying note 4, supra.

16

 
Stat., ch. 804, § 4, at 1845 (same). Although the current version of this

 

statute refers to the restoration of a convicted person's “civil rights,”
including, specifically, the right to bear arms, see NRS 219.090, the
reference to “restoration to citizenship” survives in its companion, NRS
213.080(1), and existed in NRS 213.090 up until 1977, the session
preceding that in which what became Article 1, Section 11(1) was first
proposed. 1977 Nev. Stat., ch. 367, § 1, at 665. ‘This equation—of lost
rights of “citizenship” with the rights an unpardoned felon loses by reason
of his conviction—existed in Nevada law for the century preceding the
addition of Article 1, Section 11(1) to the Nevada Constitution. Since gun
rights are among the rights of “citizenship” or the “civil rights” that a folon
has historically been seen as losing by reason of conviction in Nevada, it is
reasonable to read the reference to “every citizen” in Article 1,
Section11(1) to exclude unpardoned felons.*

This interpretation of Article 1, Section 11(1) comports with
the voter's evident understanding of it. ‘Thus, the voters who approved its
adoption were assured in the ballot materials that “{sjimilar language in
other state constitutions has not been interpreted by the courts to prevent
prohibiting. . .(2) the possession of weapons by convicted felons.” 1982
Questions to Be Voted Upon, Explanation. See also Strickland, 126 Nev.
at __ & n.3, 235 P.3d at 611 & n.B (consulting ballot materials to

"Article 1, Section 11(1)’s use of the phrase “every citizen” where the
Second Amendment uses the more inclusive phrase, “the people,”
simplifies our interpretive task. For a general discussion see Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and
the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1521 (2010).

 

 
disambiguate a Nevada constitutional amendment passed by popular
vote).

 

Finally, the legis

 

tive history also supports our conclusion.
‘Thus, some members of the 1979 and 1981 Legislatures expressed concern
that the proposal that became Article 1, Section 11 could invalidate
Nevada's folon-dispossession law. Hearing on Ad.R. 6 Before the
Assembly Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg. (Nev., February 26, 1979); Hearing
on ALR. 6 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg. (Nev., April 26,
1979); Hearing on AJ.R. 6 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 61st Leg.
(WNev., February 25, 1981); but_see Senate Journal, 61st Leg., at 273
(March 6, 1981) (Senator Neal expressed the view that a felon is not a

 

citizen and would not be allowed to carry a weapon unless he “has gained

 

his citizenship back.”).$ To assuage these concerns, the Senate Judiciary
Committee asked the legislative counsel bureau for a legal interpretation
of the amendment. The legislative counsel offered the opinion that similar
provisions in other states did not prohibit reasonable regulations,
including those that prohibit felons from keeping or bearing arms.
Hearing on A.J.R. 6 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 61st Leg. (March
3, 1981).

*Poblabel argues that the Legislature intended to follow federal law
and did not specifically omit felons from the amendment because federal
law already prohibited felons from possessing guns. Although we agree
that some legislators discussed federal law, we do not find this discussion
particularly helpful. Furthermore, at the time voters approved the
‘Nevada constitutional provision for the right to bear arms, it was still
illegal for a felon to possess a black powder rifle under federal law. 18
S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976).

 

 

 
‘Together, these publicly available materials convince us that
the Legislature and the voters used the word “citizen” in Article 1, Section
11) to refer to those persons who are members of our political community
and that unpardoned felons are not included among those to whom the
Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms,

For these reasons, we affirm.

Pickering