Case Title: Commonwealth v. Caliz

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12932

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12932 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRAULIO CALIZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 4, 2020. - February 23, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Imprisonment, Credit for time served.  Practice, Criminal, 
Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 1, 2017. 
 
 
Motions for a new trial and to receive jail credit, filed 
on April 1, 2019, were considered by Constance M. Sweeney, J., 
and a motion for reconsideration was also considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Molly Ryan Strehorn for the defendant. 
 
John A. Wendel, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, Anthony D. Mirenda, Caroline S. Donovan, 
Christopher E. Hart, Samuel C. Bauer, Emily J. Nash, & Rachel 
Davidson, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant, Braulio Caliz, argues he is 
entitled to mandatory credit for time he served on a drug 
2 
 
conviction that was vacated after the now-infamous scandal at 
the State Laboratory Institute in Amherst at the campus of the 
University of Massachusetts (Amherst lab) came to light.  See 
generally Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 
480 Mass. 700, 705-722 (2018).  We disagree, concluding that the 
defendant is not entitled to receive mandatory credit for time 
served on a prior, wholly unrelated charge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holmes, 469 Mass. 1010, 1012 n.3 (2014).1 
 
Background.  This case involves the intersection of the 
defendant's convictions with one of the biggest scandals in the 
Commonwealth's justice system in decades.  To begin, the 
defendant pleaded guilty in the Superior Court on October 23, 
2012, to one count of possession with intent to distribute a 
class A substance (G. L. c. 94C, § 32), one count of possession 
with intent to distribute a class B substance (G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A), and one count of distribution of a class A substance 
(G. L. c. 94C, § 32).  He was sentenced to two concurrent 
sentences of from three to four years in State prison.  The 
substances in the case were analyzed at the Amherst lab on 
February 15, 2012, and the certificates of drug analysis (drug 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
certificates) were signed by chemist Rebecca Pontes (Pontes 
case).2 
 
The following January, chemist Sonja Farak was arrested on 
charges of tampering with evidence, possession of cocaine, and 
possession of heroin.  An investigation led by Assistant 
Attorney General Anne Kaczmarek ensued.  During 2013 and 2014, 
Kaczmarek and other officials withheld key information from 
attorneys representing defendants whose convictions were called 
into question by Farak's misconduct, as well as from a Superior 
Court judge assigned to review the matter.  In October 2014, key 
information relating to when Farak's drug use began finally came 
to light.  While interested parties argued over the implications 
of this revelation, the defendant served the remainder of his 
sentence on the Pontes case and was released from custody on 
June 3, 2015. 
 
On June 26, 2017, a different Superior Court judge held 
that Farak's misconduct "created a problem of systemic 
magnitude" and that both Kaczmarek and Assistant Attorney 
                     
 
2 On April 3, 2013, while serving that sentence, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors -- assault and 
battery (G. L. c. 265, § 13A [a]) and disturbing a correctional 
institution (G. L. c. 268, § 30) -- and was sentenced to 
eighteen months in the house of correction on the first charge, 
and three months on the second charge.  Each were concurrent 
with each other as well as with his sentences in the Pontes 
case. 
4 
 
General Kris Foster had committed a "fraud upon the court" by 
withholding material records about Farak's drug use.  
Commonwealth vs. Cotto, Superior Court No. 0779CR00770 (Hampden 
County June 26, 2017).3  However, the judge found only that the 
accuracy of drug certificates signed by Farak herself were in 
question.  Id. 
 
Soon thereafter, on June 28, 2017, the defendant was 
arrested for possessing and selling heroin (2017 case).4  On 
February 27, 2018, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession 
with intent to distribute a class A substance (G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32 [a]) and possession with intent to distribute a class B 
substance (G. L. c. 94C, § 32A [a]), among other charges.5  The 
                     
 
3 After that decision, an unrelated 2012 drug possession 
case against the defendant in the Holyoke Division of the 
District Court Department was dismissed with prejudice.  In his 
brief, the defendant identifies the chemist in that case as 
Farak.  For that case, the defendant had been sentenced to sixty 
days in a house of correction on the possession charge, and 
thirty days (concurrent) on a trespassing charge. 
 
 
4 The defendant has not raised any concerns about the 
accuracy of the certificates of drug analysis in the 2017 case. 
 
 
5 The defendant had been indicted as a subsequent and 
habitual offender, but pleaded guilty only to so much of the 
charges as alleged he was a first-time offender.  The predicate 
offenses for the subsequent and habitual offender indictments 
were the Pontes case, as well as a 2005 case in the Superior 
Court where the defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution 
of a class A substance. 
5 
 
judge sentenced him to from five to seven years in State prison 
on each charge, to be served concurrently.6 
 
On October 11, 2018, we decided Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs., 480 Mass. at 729, ordering the vacatur and dismissal 
with prejudice of thousands of drug convictions that relied on 
substances tested at the Amherst lab -- not only by Farak 
herself, but also by other chemists -- during certain periods of 
Farak's employment.  The egregious misconduct by both Farak and 
the assistant attorneys general warranted the "very strong 
medicine" of dismissal with prejudice of all convictions tainted 
by governmental wrongdoing.  Id. at 725.  On December 13, 2018, 
the Pontes case against the defendant was consequently dismissed 
with prejudice. 
                     
 
6 The defendant also pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, 
(G. L. c. 268, § 32B) and disorderly conduct (G. L. c. 272, 
§ 53); he received a thirty-day sentence for each misdemeanor, 
to be served concurrently with each other and with his sentences 
on the drug charges. 
6 
 
 
Fewer than four months later, on April 1, 2019, the 
defendant filed a motion for jail credit in his 2017 case.7,8  He 
argued that equitable principles and basic notions of fairness 
required credit for the time he served on the now-vacated Pontes 
case, and he contended that the level of governmental misconduct 
at the Amherst lab was an "equally compelling" circumstance to 
actual innocence.  See Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1012 n.3.  The judge 
denied the defendant's motion, finding that the defendant was 
not entitled to credit because government misconduct at a drug 
laboratory was not equally compelling to actual innocence. 
 
After timely notice of appeal, the case was entered in the 
Appeals Court.  We transferred the case to this court sua 
sponte. 
 
Discussion.  If a defendant is held in custody before 
trial, G. L. c. 279, § 33A, and G. L. c. 127, § 129B, mandate 
                     
 
7 The defendant initially requested 1,013 days of jail 
credit, but later recalculated it to 717 days after the 
Commonwealth disputed the number.  In a motion to reconsider, 
the defendant provided documentation from the Department of 
Correction indicating he had served a total of 1,262 days for 
the Pontes case.  Of that number, 545 days also went toward 
concurrent sentences for still-valid convictions for two 2013 
misdemeanors.  See note 2, supra.  The Commonwealth does not 
dispute the recalculated number of 717 days. 
 
 
8 On that date, the defendant also filed a motion for a new 
trial, which was subsequently denied.  The defendant later 
included the denial of the motion for a new trial in his notice 
of appeal, but he did not mention it in his brief.  The issue is 
therefore waived. 
7 
 
that he or she be credited with those days spent incarcerated 
toward the sentence eventually received.  Where there is no 
controlling statute, we have looked to "considerations of 
fairness" to determine whether a defendant is owed credit toward 
a conviction.  Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1011. 
 
In determining whether credit is due, we have weighed the 
competing concerns of "dead time" and "banked time."  Holmes, 
469 Mass. at 1011.  "Dead time" refers to "time spent in 
confinement for which no day-to-day credit is given against any 
sentence."  Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 21 n.4 (1998).  
"Familiar equitable principles" of justice and fairness weigh 
heavily against "a prisoner having served bad or dead time for 
which no credit is given."  Manning v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 372 Mass. 387, 396 (1977).  "Banked 
time" refers to using time already served on an earlier 
conviction toward a new, unrelated conviction.  Holmes, supra.  
A defendant generally cannot "bank time" toward a future 
conviction that is not substantively or temporally connected to 
the prior offense.  See id. at 1012; Manning, supra at 395.9  
Animating this prohibition is the concern that mandatory "banked 
                     
 
9 Concerns of "banked time" are not implicated if the two 
sentences are continuous.  See Manning, 372 Mass. at 395 
(defendant entitled to credit where valid sentence was from and 
after vacated sentence).  See also Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1012 n.2 
(distinguishing Manning because from and after sentences were 
"related"). 
8 
 
time" is considered akin to authorizing "a line of credit for 
future crimes," effectively "grant[ing] prisoners license to 
commit future criminal acts with immunity" (citation omitted).  
Holmes, supra. 
 
In Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1013, we balanced the competing 
concerns of "dead time" and "banked time," and held that when 
the two convictions were unrelated and separated by a period of 
liberty, "the need to prevent abuses associated with banking 
time outweigh[ed] any concern about unfairness arising from dead 
time."  We left open, though, "the possibility of allowing 
credit for time served on a completed sentence for an unrelated 
crime where there is actual innocence or some other equally 
compelling circumstance."  Id. at 1012 n.3.  We have not yet 
found any circumstances as compelling as actual innocence. 
 
The defendant argues that the misconduct by people in the 
Attorney General's office delayed his access to justice, and 
thus is as compelling as actual innocence.  He notes that if 
those in the Attorney General's office had initially conducted 
an adequate investigation of Farak, the extent of her misconduct 
would have come to light within the first three months of his 
sentence on the Pontes case.  Moreover, if the Attorney General 
had conceded error when the fraud first came to light and 
informed potential defendants of the implications, he might have 
9 
 
been spared eight months of incarceration.  Instead, he served 
the full sentence before it was eventually vacated. 
 
We have previously recognized the egregiousness of 
misconduct at multiple levels of government in connection with 
the Amherst lab scandal.  See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 
480 Mass. at 723.  We do not, however, accept the defendant's 
invitation to equate the government misconduct here with actual 
innocence.10  Instead, as we have previously cautioned, 
"[r]emedies for prosecutorial misconduct should be tailored to 
the injury suffered and should not unnecessarily infringe on 
competing interests."  Id. at 725, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 199 (1985).  We have already taken into 
account the prosecutorial misconduct when crafting the 
appropriate remedy.  Compare Bridgeman v. District Attorney for 
the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 300 (2017) (case-by-case 
adjudication after misconduct by chemist at drug laboratory), 
with Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., supra at 725 (harsher 
                     
 
10 It is important to note that the certificates of drug 
analysis in the Pontes case were not signed by Farak herself, 
and the drugs were analyzed before summer 2012, the time by when 
it was clear that Farak had stolen from her colleagues' samples.  
Nevertheless, we vacated and dismissed the case with prejudice 
in order to protect the integrity of the criminal justice 
system, because the extent of Farak's misuse of other chemists' 
standards was not entirely clear.  But the veracity of the 
certificates in the Pontes case was less in doubt than in other 
of the vacated cases. 
10 
 
sanctions than those in Bridgeman warranted where prosecutorial 
misconduct accompanied misconduct by chemist).  In crafting this 
remedy, we did not infringe on the balance between dead time and 
bank time struck by Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1012-1013.  Thus, we 
hold the defendant is not entitled to mandatory credit in this 
case.11 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the Superior Court's order denying 
the defendant's motion for credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
11 In circumstances where a defendant has served dead time, 
he or she may seek to pursue a civil claim for compensation for 
an erroneous felony conviction under G. L. c. 258D, if the 
defendant qualifies under that statute. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  Although I concur with the 
court's decision, I write separately to stress that credit 
should not be afforded as a result of dead time, even in the 
case of actual innocence.  A person should never feel at liberty 
to commit a crime with the knowledge that he or she may avoid 
incarceration as a result of credit for past jail time, 
irrespective of the source of that credit.  See Commonwealth v. 
Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 25 (1998).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Holmes, 469 Mass. 1010, 1011-1012 (2014).  Although the 
circumstances giving rise to dead time may represent serious 
injustice inflicted against a defendant, that defendant has 
other recourses available and should not be afforded an open-
ended credit for time served.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477, 480 (1994) (establishing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as recourse for 
unconstitutional conviction).  See also Guzman v. Commonwealth, 
458 Mass. 354, 355-357 (2010) (establishing G. L. c. 258D as 
State recourse for wrongfully incarcerated people); 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1495, 2513 (granting compensation for wrongful 
incarceration).  I would close the escape hatches left open in 
Holmes completely and put to rest the idea that a person can 
ever be credited jail time to be used to mitigate a future 
sentence for an unrelated crime. 
2 
 
 
 
The court in Holmes strongly foreclosed the use of banked 
time1 in most cases.  Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1011-1013.  However, 
it declined to decide whether an earlier conviction vacated on 
the ground of actual innocence or another "equally compelling 
circumstance" may justify the use of banked time to offset a 
sentence for a future, unrelated crime.  Id. at 1012 n.3.  The 
court did not explain why it felt such an escape hatch could be 
appropriate, but I suspect it did so out of respect for the 
significant weight carried by such an injustice as incarceration 
despite actual innocence.  I share the court's respect for that 
weight, but I do not believe it outweighs the strong public 
interest in the threat of incarceration acting as a consistent 
deterrent against crime. 
 
There are a few, limited circumstances in which the 
application of dead time against a different sentence is 
appropriate.  See Miller v. Cox, 443 F.2d 1019, 1020-1021 (4th 
Cir. 1971).  For example, a defendant who has one sentence from 
a string of consecutive sentences vacated may apply his or her 
time served for the overturned sentence against his or her 
remaining sentences.  To allow so does not interfere with the 
                     
 
1 "Banked time" and "dead time" are defined slightly 
differently, but are closely related.  Dead time is the time a 
person spends incarcerated that cannot be attributed to any 
sentence.  Banked time is the application of dead time against a 
different future sentence.  See Holmes, 469 Mass. at 1011.  The 
two refer to different concepts but largely are inseparable. 
3 
 
 
sentencing scheme and does not additionally punish the 
defendant.  Id. at 1020.  Similarly, a defendant whose sentence 
is overturned but who is immediately resentenced for the same 
crime may apply time served during the overturned sentence to 
the new sentence because such a procedure is essentially just an 
administrative modification of the original sentence.  Id. at 
1020-1021.  These exceptions are appropriate because they are 
restricted to situations where the defendant is serving a 
sentence for the same or a related crime for which he or she 
served the dead time.  Id. 
The application of dead time in this case would be entirely 
different because it involves a credit for a future crime that 
is unrelated to the sentence for which the time was initially 
served.  See Miller, 443 F.2d at 1021-1022.  See also Manning v. 
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 372 Mass. 
387, 395-396 (1977).  Allowing such a credit is inappropriate 
because it would give anyone who held it license to commit 
potentially serious crimes without fear of significant 
repercussion.  See id. at 395; Miller, supra at 1021. 
 
Defendants who actually are innocent but who serve dead 
time for crimes they did not commit are the victims of injustice 
and are deserving of recourse.  However, a jail credit for 
future use is not appropriate, as it defeats the purposes of 
sentencing and creates a public safety risk.  See Miller, 
4 
 
 
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1992) 
(defining traditional purposes of sentencing as retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).  As noted 
above, alternatives are available.  The availability of these 
remedies precludes the need for banked time to be available as 
sought in this case, or even in the case of actual innocence.