Case Title: Shoemaker v. Smith

Citation: 353 Md. 143

Docket Number: 44/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Diane Shoemaker, et al. v. Judee G. Smith, et al.
No. 44, Sept. Term, 1998
(1)
Malice necessary to defeat immunity under State Tort Claims Act is “actual’
malice -- ill will, improper motive, intent to injure.
(2)
Finding that force used by defendant in effecting a seizure was reasonable and not
excessive for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not equate to finding of no malice
for purposes of Tort Claims Act.
(3)
Appealability of interlocutory order denying motion for summary judgment raising
defense of qualified immunity.
Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County
Case No. CA95-727
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 44
September Term, 1998
______________________________________
DIANE SHOEMAKER, ET AL.
v.
JUDEE G. SMITH, ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:  March 10, 1999
The immediate issue before us is a procedural one — whether the Court of Special
Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal from an interlocutory order denying their
motion for summary judgment, upon a finding that the appeal did not fall within the
collateral order doctrine.  The motion for summary judgment was based on a claim of
immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (Maryland Code, § 12-105 of the State
Government Article and § 5-522 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article), and, to
resolve the procedural issue, we need to determine the standard of “malice” for purposes of
§ 5-522 and consider the effect of certain findings made by Judge Alexander Williams, of
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in a related action.  We shall
affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit had its genesis in an investigation by personnel of the St. Mary’s County
Department of Social Services (DSS) and the county Sheriff’s Department into possible child
abuse allegedly perpetrated by Danny Smith against his three children, Donna, Ben, and
Travis.  The investigation culminated in an attempt, on June 17, 1992, by Sheriff’s Deputies
Diane Shoemaker, Mickey Bailey, and Robert Hall and DSS social worker Monica Bankins,
to remove Ben and Travis, then ages 15 and 10, respectively, from their home.  During the
removal operation, the boys, who did not want to leave and who resisted, were forcibly
restrained, handcuffed, threatened, driven away, and detained without benefit of counsel for
several hours at a police station.  Not until their lawyer arrived and took charge of them were
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they presented to a court and released to their parents.  All proceedings with respect to them
were eventually dismissed.  Through their mother, Judee Smith, the boys filed two lawsuits
— one in U.S. District Court and this one in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County.  The
Federal action was dismissed against all defendants.  The only defendants before us, as
petitioners in this appeal, are Sheriff’s Deputies Shoemaker and Bailey.
On October 31, 1991, Ms. Bankins received a call from one Cathy Meyers, who was
then serving as a psychotherapist for Donna, and who apparently reported the prospect of
sexual abuse of Donna by her father.  Ms. Bankins and Deputy Shoemaker interviewed
Donna that same day.  Although Ms. Bankins said that Donna did not give them a lot of
information at that time, Bankins’s notes indicate that Donna accused her father of having
touched her in the vaginal area and having tickled her between the legs.  She also recounted
having been hit by her father with a leather strap while she was in the bathtub.  When those
events occurred is not clear.  Donna, then 17 years old, had been in out-patient therapy for
a number of years and, on two earlier occasions, had been hospitalized for psychiatric
problems.  There is some reference in the record to a protective service investigation that had
been closed about five years earlier, but there are no details with respect to the investigation.
The next day, Ms. Bankins and Deputy Shoemaker interviewed Mrs. Smith, who
described Donna as a “real discipline problem” and “very angry,” but acknowledged that she
and her husband did spank.  Ms. Bankins had Mrs. Smith sign a service agreement to follow
through with counseling with Cathy Meyers and not to use belts or any type of corporal
punishment on Donna.  There is no evidence that the Smiths repudiated or failed to comply
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with that agreement.  Within a week, after a further interview with Donna, Ms. Bankins filed
a CINA (child in need of assistance) petition in the juvenile court, and Donna was removed
from the home.  She eventually ended up at Sheppard-Pratt Hospital in Baltimore.  At the
time, in November, the focus was entirely on Donna, although Ms. Bankins developed some
concern about Ben and Travis as well, simply because they were siblings in the same
household.  She told Mrs. Smith at the shelter hearing for Donna that she wanted to talk to
the boys, but Mrs. Smith, believing that Donna was fabricating her story of abuse, felt that
such an interview was not necessary.
In conjunction with the CINA case, Donna and her parents were evaluated by Dr.
Nicholas Kirsch, a psychologist.  In his report of December 23, 1991, Dr. Kirsch recounted
Donna’s charge of sexual abuse by her father, including vaginal penetration.  Although he
made clear that the tests he administered could not determine conclusively whether sexual
abuse had occurred or, if it had occurred, who the perpetrator was, the results were
“consistent with a personality system severely damaged in certain areas due to severe
psychological terror and abuse.”  The test results, he said, were highly suggestive of a
dissociative disorder, possibly multiple personality disorder “that are perhaps always the
result of chronic sexual and/or physical abuse during childhood.”  Dr. Kirsch reported
inconclusive results with respect to both parents.  It was “virtually impossible” to determine
whether Mr. Smith physically or sexually abused Donna.  The test results were consistent
both with a profile for known offenders and with a healthy, well-adapted profile but
appeared “to lend most support to the hypothesis that the probability of Mr. Smith
 Travis attended the Lexington Park Christian School.  The pastor of the church, who
1
apparently acted as principal of the school, stated in an affidavit that when Ms. Bankins and Deputy
Shoemaker came to interview Travis, he informed them that he needed 24 hours to consult with the
parents, that he spoke with the parents, who informed him that they were not opposed to the
interview but wanted someone to sit in on it, that the pastor agreed to do so, but that neither Ms.
Bankins nor Deputy Shoemaker ever followed up.  According to Pastor Dyer, they knew that he was
available and that Ben and Travis were also available.
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committing sexual or physical abuse is in the moderate-high range relative to the general
adult male population.”  As to Mrs. Smith, he said it was unlikely that she would consciously
allow abusive relationships in her family, but he then opined that she had a personality
profile “with a higher than average chance of accommodating the sort of chronic but
secretive abuse that is alleged in this case.”  Dr. Kirsch recommended that Donna not reside
or have unsupervised visits with her father.
Her concern heightened by Dr. Kirsch’s report, Ms. Bankins, together with Deputy
Shoemaker but without any advance notice to Mr. or Mrs. Smith, attempted to interview Ben
and Travis at their schools on January 6, 1992.  Travis’s school refused to permit the surprise
interview.   The investigators succeeded in talking with Ben for about five minutes before
1
Mr. Smith arrived and terminated the interview.  During the brief conference, Ben told Ms.
Bankins and Deputy Shoemaker that Donna was lying and that she used to make up stories
about him.  On January 21, 1992, Deputy Shoemaker, along with other law enforcement
officers, entered the Smith home in order to execute a search warrant.  The record before us
does not reveal who issued the warrant, on what basis, or what the officers were searching
for.  What is relevant is what occurred in the home, and, for that, we may take as fact, for
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purposes of this appeal, the finding by Judge Williams:
“Several officers entered through the front door, however, others
entered through a door in the downstairs area where they found
Benjamin and Travis playing.  The officers ordered the boys to
go upstairs, to sit with their hands in their laps in plain sight, not
to move and not to speak.  When Benjamin asked questions
about what was going on and Travis began to cry
uncontrollably, [Officer] Hall and other officers threatened that
if they were not quiet the officers would handcuff them and take
them to a boys’ home.  Eventually Hall, Shoemaker and other
officers left the Smith home with Mr. Smith in custody.”
Several events followed this intrusion into the home.  Mr. Smith was arrested, held
for an hour or so, and then released.  In February, Ms. Bankins and the county attorney
representing DSS filed CINA petitions against Ben and Travis.  The petitions alleged (1) that
“[b]ased on the parents interference with the lawful police investigation of abuse within the
family, it was impossible to rule out physical or emotional abuse of the younger sibling in
the house when a report of abuse was made regarding an older child in the family,” (2) “[a]
report of corporal punishment of [the children] with use of a belt,” (3) a “[s]tatement by the
father that admits the use of corporal punishment,” and (4) the “inability of the mother to
keep the children safe.”  It is not clear what, if anything, came of the CINA petitions.  An
attorney, David Densford, was appointed by the court to represent the children.  Because of
the publicity and intrusions, the Smiths sent the boys to stay for a while with their
grandparents in Texas.  The authorities, though informed of that fact, made no attempt to
have the children returned or to pursue matters in Texas.  According to Travis, they remained
in Texas for two months and then returned to their parents’ home.
 It is not clear why Ms. Bankins was particularly concerned at that point.  In her deposition
2
(continued...)
-6-
Contemporaneously with the CINA petitions, Mr. Smith was charged criminally with
a variety of offenses committed against Donna, including rape, sexual offenses, and child
abuse.  Those charges were dismissed in August, 1993 after a trial that resulted in a hung
jury.
In March, 1992, Ms. Bankins received a Report of Suspected Child Abuse from Dr.
Joyanna Silberg, a therapist for Donna at Sheppard-Pratt Hospital.  Donna had recounted to
Dr. Silberg episodes of Satanic rituals through “the church” occurring at different parents’
homes, including her home.  She described children between three and eleven years old
being placed on a table and poked with sticks and needles by a man in a black robe.  These
rituals, she said, occurred in at least four churches in various States.  Donna expressed
concern for the safety of her “brother” but did not indicate whether her concern was for Ben,
for Travis, or for both of them.  By June, the boys had returned from Texas; indeed, the
record indicates that they returned near the end of April.  On June 9, Ms. Bankins had
another interview with Donna at Sheppard-Pratt.  She taped the interview, but, by the time
of her deposition in December, 1995, much of the tape had been erased.  Donna apparently
expressed concern that Travis might be in danger of ritualistic abuse associated with the
upcoming summer solstice, “where there are certain types of either sexual acts or physical
acts that take place.”  Donna’s concern, in Ms. Bankins’s words, “increased the imminent
danger” for Travis.2
(...continued)
2
testimony, she said that it was not until June 15 that Donna informed her that the boys had returned
from Texas.  The implication is that, on June 9, she still believed Ben and Travis were in Texas and
there is no indication that she anticipated their return at that time.
 In her report on Travis, Dr. Davis stated that the children were referred for testing by Sharon
3
McKinley, from the county DSS.  Ms. McKinley was identified as Ms. Bankins’s supervisor, who
accompanied her on her June 9 visit to interview Donna and with whom she conferred before deciding
to remove the children from their home.  There is a wider dispute and some ambiguity with respect
to the psychological evaluations.  Ms. Bankins complained that the parents were uncooperative in
having Ben and Travis evaluated and that several appointments were made that were not kept.  Dr.
Davis, on the other hand, stated in her report on Travis that the parents had consented to the
evaluation and simply asked that the appointments be made through the children’s attorney, Mr.
Densford.  Ms. Bankins also claimed that, at the time the children were removed from the home, on
June 17, she was unaware that they had been evaluated by Dr. Davis.  Dr. Davis’s report is undated
and does not indicate to whom it was sent or when it was sent.  The testing occurred on June 10,
1992.  It appears that Ms. Bankins may have been unaware that the evaluation had occurred because
the arrangements were made through Mr. Densford.  It appears clear, however, that Ms. McKinley
knew that Dr. Davis had been retained to perform the evaluations.  When she became aware of Dr.
Davis’s conclusions is not revealed in the record.
-7-
On June 10 — the day after Ms. Bankins’s conversation with Donna — Ben and
Travis were evaluated by Dr. Nancy Davis, a psychologist.  Although petitioners contend in
their brief that Dr. Davis was hired by the parents, her report states clearly that the children
were referred by DSS, a statement confirmed by Ms. Bankins in her deposition testimony.3
Ben told Dr. Davis that hers was his fourth psychological evaluation and, though
cooperative, he was angry at having to be tested again.  He denied the stories being told by
Donna.  Dr. Davis reported that his behavior during the evaluation and his responses to the
personality and intelligence tests “are not consistent with the type of behaviors usually found
in adolescents who have been abused.”  She said that the results did not rule out the
possibility that he may have been abused but that it was unlikely that he had experienced
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significant abuse over any length of time.  As to Travis, Dr. Davis made clear that the
evaluation was to determine the probability of sexual and ritualistic abuse occurring in the
home.  Although she found Travis to have experienced a great deal of stress resulting from
his move to Texas, having his house searched by the police, and having Donna, with whom
he was close, removed from the home after making allegations of abuse, Dr. Davis did not
believe that he had been ritualistically or sexually abused “in a long-term, traumatic way.”
She recommended only that Travis participate in individual therapy to help him deal with the
trauma in his family and regain a more positive self-image; she made no recommendation
that he, or Ben, be removed from the home.
On June 15, Ms. Bankins learned that Ben and Travis were back with their parents.
The next day, after discussing the matter with Ms. McKinley, she decided to remove them
from their home, for fear that they were in imminent danger of ritualistic abuse in
conjunction with the summer solstice.  This fear emanated, according to Ms. Bankins, from
Donna’s revelations and from Dr. Silberg’s report, which, itself, mostly recounted Donna’s
statements.  Ms. Bankins conceded that she made no effort to contact the parents, the two
boys, any neighbors, the pastor,  Mr. Densford, or Dr. Davis.  Instead, Ms. Bankins or Ms.
McKinley arranged for Deputy Shoemaker to assist them in the removal the next day.  When
asked whether her decision would have been altered had she known of Dr. Davis’s
conclusions, Ms. Bankins said, “I’m not sure.”
There are two provisions in the Maryland Code permitting a child to be removed from
his or her home on an emergency basis.  Section 3-814 of the Courts and Judicial
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Proceedings Article, which is part of the Juvenile Causes law, permits a law enforcement
officer or other person authorized by the juvenile court to take a child into custody upon
reasonable grounds to believe that the child is in immediate danger from his or her
surroundings and that removal is necessary for the child’s protection.  That law also requires,
however, that, with all reasonable speed, the child be returned to the parents or taken to a
place of shelter care designated by the court.  Section 5-709 of the Family Law Article
permits a DSS agent to enter the household if the agent (1) has previously been denied the
right of entry, and (2) has probable cause to believe that a child is in serious, immediate
danger.  With the assistance of a law enforcement officer, the agent may remove the child
without prior approval by the juvenile court if the agent believes that the child is in serious,
immediate danger.  If the child is removed, DSS must have the child thoroughly examined
by a physician.
It is evident that Ms. Bankins intended to act pursuant to § 5-709, rather than § 3-814.
Her intent was to seize the children and take them from Lexington Park, in St. Mary’s
County, to the Psychiatric Institution for Montgomery County, where they “would be
evaluated both physically and psychologically to see if there were any indications of child
abuse.”  It appears that Ms. McKinley had made arrangements with the Psychiatric Institute,
although the record is silent as to why they chose that facility, many miles away.
On the morning of June 17, Ms. Bankins and Ms. McKinley rendezvoused with
Deputy Shoemaker and two other sheriff’s deputies.  The plan was for Ms. McKinley to go
to the door, present Mrs. Smith with a “limited custody sheet” which is neither in the record
 Those statements were taken from Ben’s deposition.  Judge Williams, for purposes of ruling
4
on a motion to dismiss, took as fact that Shoemaker “unsnapped the buckle on her gun holster and
told the boys to stop.  She then put her hand on the gun and told the boys that if they did not shut up
their barking dog that she was going to shoot the dog.”
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nor explained in the record, and for Deputy Shoemaker and Deputy Bailey to seize the boys,
put them in a car, and drive them to the Psychiatric Institution.  The operation did not go as
planned.  Ben was eating breakfast.  When he saw Ms. Bankins rush into the house, he called
for his brother and fled.  As he ran out of the door, he saw Deputy Shoemaker with her hand
on her pistol, as if getting ready to draw the weapon.  The dog was barking, and Deputy
Shoemaker yelled at Ben that if he did not quiet the dog, she would kill it.   Ben ran to the
4
gate in the back, where he encountered two deputies, who ordered him to stop.  They seized
him, pushed him to the ground, pulled his arms behind him, and handcuffed him.  When he
yelled at them, they tightened the cuffs.  Finally, he was put in a squad car.  Travis, barefoot
and still in his pajamas, was playing with a friend when Ben yelled for him to run.  He also
fled, but was captured by Deputy Shoemaker, handcuffed, and put in the squad car.  Judge
Williams added in his recitation of the facts:
“Both boys were crying and screaming for their parents.  When
Benjamin began to kick the back of the front seat, one of the
deputies indicated that, ‘if you don’t shut the f[___] up we’re
going to take you to a mental hospital.’  Later, when Benjamin
refused to calm down, Bailey indicated that, ‘if you don’t shut
up I’m going to slap you in a straightjacket.’”
With Ben and Travis handcuffed in the back of the car, Ms. Bankins and Deputy
Shoemaker headed for the Psychiatric Institute.  Ben stated that he wanted to talk with his
 The record does not establish whether it really was not possible to make an outgoing call.
5
There is evidence that Mr. Densford was able to call to the station and speak with either Deputy
Shoemaker or Ms. Bankins, so it would seem that the telephone was not entirely inoperable.
-11-
lawyer, Mr. Densford, but, according to Judge Williams, Shoemaker responded that he would
not be permitted to do so until he “settled down and talked to them nicely.”  When Ben asked
where they were being taken, Shoemaker said “that he did not need to know.”  At some point
along the way, apparently when they were already in Charles County, Deputy Shoemaker
received radio instructions to turn around and proceed instead to a police outpost.  When
they arrived at the outpost, Deputy Shoemaker removed the cuffs from Travis but left Ben
shackled.  Ben again asked to call Mr. Densford but was told that the telephone at the police
station was inoperable.   Judge Williams found that, while at the post, the boys were told that
5
they were being held for their own good and that they were removed from their home
because their father abused them.  Ms. Bankins expressed concern that she would be sued
over what occurred, but Deputy Shoemaker responded that she (Shoemaker) “would cover
for her.”  The group remained at the outpost for several hours until Mr. Densford arrived.
He directed that Ben’s handcuffs be removed, eventually took charge of the boys, and took
them to court for an emergency hearing.  The court released them to their parents.  They
never were examined by a physician, as required by Family Law Article, § 5-709.
At some point in 1994, Mrs. Smith, on behalf of Ben and Travis, filed a four-count
complaint in U.S. District Court, charging Ms. Bankins and Deputies Shoemaker, Hall and
Bailey with a violation of the boys’ civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Deputies Shoemaker, Hall,
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and Bailey with assault, Deputies Shoemaker and Hall with battery, and all four defendants
with false imprisonment and violations of the Maryland Constitution.
In October, 1995, the court dismissed the action against Bankins, finding, essentially,
that, in removing the boys, she acted  under the authority of Family Law Article, § 5-709,
did not use excessive (or any) force, and did not deprive the boys of procedural or
substantive due process.  All claims against Deputy Hall were also dismissed, largely on the
ground that there was no allegation that he used any force against the boys.  Only the Federal
claims against Shoemaker and Bailey based on their use of excessive and unreasonable force
and the State law claims against them were kept alive, apparently to permit further discovery.
In August, 1996, the court disposed of the remaining claims by granting Shoemaker’s
and Bailey’s motion for summary judgment.  With respect to the Federal claim under § 1983,
the court applied the objective test required by Supreme Court jurisprudence in an excessive
force case, namely, whether the officers’ actions were “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.”  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct.1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. 2d
443, 456 (1989).  Against that standard, the court found that the officers’ conduct, under the
circumstances, was objectively reasonable and that the force applied was not excessive.
Concluding that they had a legal basis upon which to remove the children, the court found
that the force used to achieve that result was appropriate and justified.  As that ruling
exhausted the Federal claim, the court exercised its discretion and dismissed the pendant
State law claims.  No appeal was taken from the court’s final judgment.
-13-
Mrs. Smith and her husband, for themselves and the two boys, had filed this action
in St. Mary’s County in June, 1995, but kept the case dormant during the pendency of the
Federal action.  In Counts I and II, they charged all defendants with violations of Articles 24
(due process) and 26 (unlawful seizure) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; in Count III
(mislabeled Count II), Ben and Travis charged Hall, Bailey, and Shoemaker with assault; in
Count IV (mislabeled Count III), the boys charged Hall and Shoemaker with battery; and in
Count V (mislabeled Count IV), the boys charged all defendants with false imprisonment.
The claims against Hall and Bankins were dismissed by stipulation.  The remaining
defendants — Shoemaker and Bailey — moved for summary judgment on the alternative
grounds that (1) they were entitled to immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act; (2) the
plaintiffs’ claims were not cognizable under the Declaration of Rights; (3) their claims were
barred by collateral estoppel, based on the Federal court judgment; and (4) the defendants’
acts were performed with legal justification and were supported by probable cause.  The
court granted summary judgment with respect to Counts I and II — the Constitutional claims
— on the basis of collateral estoppel, but it denied the motion with respect to the common
law claims embodied in Counts III, IV, and V.  Those claims, the court held, had not been
ruled upon by Judge Williams, and they were therefore not barred by collateral estoppel.
The court also concluded that there were facts in dispute relevant to whether Deputies
Shoemaker and Bailey committed the torts and acted with malice.
Notwithstanding the interlocutory nature of the court’s ruling, Deputies Shoemaker
and Bailey noted an appeal, claiming the right to immediate appellate review under the
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collateral order doctrine.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected that claim and dismissed the
appeal as not allowed by law.  We granted certiorari to consider whether the intermediate
appellate court erred in dismissing the interlocutory appeal and, contingently, whether the
circuit court erred in denying petitioners’ motion for summary judgment as to the common
law claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment.  We shall affirm the appellate
judgment dismissing the appeal and need not, therefore, rule on the correctness of the circuit
court ruling.
DISCUSSION
Nature of Immunity Available to Petitioners
Section 12-105 of the State Government Article provides that “State personnel” have
the immunity from liability described in § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.  Section 12-101(a)(6) includes a county deputy sheriff within the meaning of “State
personnel.”  Deputies Shoemaker and Bailey therefore have the immunity provided for in §
5-522(b), with respect to the open common law claims.
Section 5-522(b) grants immunity to State personnel “from suit in courts of the State
and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of [their]
public duties . . . and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State
or its units have waived immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article
. . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  Under § 12-104 of the State Government Article, read in
conjunction with § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the State has
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waived its immunity in tort actions, subject to certain money limits and subject to the caveat
that immunity is not waived for the tortious act or omission of State personnel that is not
within the scope of their public duties or that is made with malice or gross negligence.  It is
clear from these provisions that Deputies Shoemaker and Bailey have no immunity under the
statute for conduct committed with “malice or gross negligence.”  The immunity available
to them, therefore, is a qualified, not an absolute, one.  The plaintiffs have not contended that
the deputies acted with gross negligence; the key is whether they acted with malice.
The thrust of petitioners’ case, both as to appealability under the collateral order
doctrine and as to the substantive correctness of the ruling denying their motion for summary
judgment, is that, in concluding that they did not use excessive or unreasonable force, Judge
Williams effectively held that they did not act with malice, and that his ruling collaterally
estopped the plaintiffs from asserting otherwise.  Thus, through application of collateral
estoppel, they regard the lack of malice, and with that lack their entitlement to statutory
immunity, established as a matter of law.  The statutory immunity, in their view, conferred
not just an immunity from ultimate liability but also the right not to be forced to trial, and
that is what gives them the right to an immediate appeal.
At one time, the qualified immunity available to most Executive Branch officials
charged under § 1983 was in the nature of a “good faith” immunity that had both objective
and subjective components.  That immunity would be defeated if the official “knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the
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malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.”  Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 409 (1982),
quoting from Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214,
225 (1975) (emphasis in Harlow).
The Harlow Court found, from experience, that the subjective component exacted too
high a price by forcing government officials, in too many instances, to devote time and
energy in defending non-meritorious litigation, diverting their attention from their official
duties.  Observing that immunity under § 1983 was generally available only to officials
performing discretionary functions, the Court noted that “the judgments surrounding
discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s experiences,
values, and emotions,” and that those variables “explain in part why questions of subjective
intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, 457
U.S. at 816, 102 S. Ct. at 2737, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 409.  The subjective element of good faith,
or lack of malice, was thus incompatible with the desire that insubstantial claims should not
proceed to trial — that “bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”  Id. at 817-
18, 102 S. Ct. at 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 410.  Accordingly, the Court eliminated that element
from the calculus and re-articulated the remaining objective element.  The new standard for
immunity under § 1983 was stated thusly:  “government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
-17-
would have known.”  Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d at
410.  On summary judgment, the Court continued, “the judge appropriately may determine,
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time
an action occurred.”  Id.  The good or evil intentions of the official play no direct role in this
analysis.
The public interest in deterring lawless conduct, the Court declared, was sufficiently
protected by the singular objective test:  “Where an official could be expected to know that
certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to
hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action.
But where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights
are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken ‘with
independence and without fear of consequences.’” Id. at 819, 102 S. Ct. at 2739, 73 L. Ed.
2d at 411, quoting in part from Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967).
A similar approach was taken when the § 1983 complaint is grounded on Fourth
Amendment violations arising from excessive force used by officers in seizing a person.  In
Graham v. Connor, supra, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443,
456, the Court expressly rejected the four-part guideline test established in Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S. Ct. 462, 38 L. Ed. 2d 324
(1973), one prong of which was whether the force was applied maliciously or sadistically
for the purpose of causing harm.  Instead, the Court declared that, as in other Fourth
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Amendment contexts, “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective
one:  the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.”  Id.  The Court continued that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a
Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an
officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”  Id.
It restated the principle at the conclusion of its opinion:  “The Fourth Amendment inquiry
is one of ‘objective reasonableness’ under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like
‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.”  Id. at 399, 109 S.Ct. at 1873,
104 L. Ed. 2d at 457 (emphasis added).
Judge Williams, as noted, applied the Graham v. Connor standard, as the remaining
§ 1983 complaint against Deputies Shoemaker and Bailey was based on the alleged use of
excessive and unreasonable force.  That is not the test for determining qualified immunity
under the State Tort Claims Act, however.  Unlike the judicially-fashioned purely objective
tests for immunity under § 1983, the General Assembly has made clear that State personnel
do not enjoy immunity under § 5-522(b) if they act with malice.  The question posed by
petitioners is whether the State and Federal standards effectively are the same — whether
an allegation of malice, for purposes of § 5-522, is necessarily rebutted as a matter of law
upon a finding that the defendant acted reasonably and without excessive force.
The fallacy in petitioners’ argument lies in the fact that, in adopting a purely objective
test for purposes of § 1983, the Supreme Court has clearly and expressly eliminated malice,
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which it regarded as the embodiment of subjectivity, from the immunity doctrine.  In
enacting the State Tort Claims Act, the General Assembly just as clearly and expressly
retained the subjective element for immunity purposes.  In doing so, it has provided a greater
separation between substantive liability and immunity and simply struck a different balance.
The Legislature has decided that, when State personnel act maliciously, they, and not the
State, must bear the risk.  The predominant and laudable public policy is to discourage State
personnel from acting with malice in the performance of their public duties.  In order to side
with petitioners, we would have to act inconsistently with that policy and either read the
caveat of malice out of the statute or define the word “malice” in such a sterile way that it
would have no real meaning. 
The word “malice” has been a troublesome one in the law, because it has been used
in many different contexts and, as a result, has been defined in different ways.  See
discussion in Bowden v. Caldor, 350 Md. 4, 23-25, 710 A.2d 267, 276-77 (1998).  In an
attempt to provide some guidance, the courts began to distinguish between “actual malice,”
which connoted an evil intent, ill will, an improper motive, or an intent to harm, and “implied
malice,” which involved a range of conduct more culpable than simple negligence but less
pernicious than “actual malice.”  As noted by us in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md.
701, 728-29 n.5, 664 A.2d 916, 930 n.5 (1995), however, even those terms admitted of some
ambiguity and overlap.  Except through a brief statement in one case, we have not defined
the word “malice” for purposes of § 5-522, but it is clear from that statement, as well as from
our analogous case law, that it embodies the very subjective element discarded by the
 In Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 445, 298 A.2d 156, 161 (1972), decided before the
6
enactment of the State Tort Claims Act, when only common law governmental immunity existed, we
noted that “[w]e have never been called upon to decide that quality of malice or the means of its
proof necessary to forestall governmental immunity.  If it be some affirmative showing of ill will,
improper motivation, or evil purpose, the undisputed facts might well reveal its total absence prior
to trial and permit the assertion of the qualified immunity.”  In Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 274,
170 A.2d 220, 221 (1961), and State, Use, Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 114-15, 151 A.2d 137,
140 (1959), we held that a warden had no liability for injuries to a prisoner absent an allegation and
showing of “malice or evil purpose.”
-20-
Supreme Court for purposes of § 1983.   The Court of Special Appeals has correctly reached
6
that conclusion in a number of cases.
In Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467 (1991), we considered an
“excessive force” complaint against a State police officer who pleaded immunity under § 5-
522 (then codified as § 12-105 of the State Government Article).  Our focus was principally
on the first condition to immunity — whether the defendant was acting within the scope of
his duties — but we addressed the plaintiff’s allegation of malice as well.  The defendant had
thrown rocks at the plaintiff’s car and then savagely assaulted him.  We held:
“These facts set forth by the plaintiffs directly showed malice.
When someone, without provocation or cause, throws rocks at
two other persons, he is obviously demonstrating ill will towards
those persons.  Wrestling another to the ground, pulling his hair,
and hitting him in the face, again without cause or provocation,
is certainly malicious conduct.  When one person states that he
is going to kill another, he clearly harbors actual malice toward
the victim.”
Id. at 261, 587 A.2d at 474 (emphasis added).
The term and concept of “actual malice” has an historic meaning in Maryland law that
is in full keeping with the “ill will” noted in Sawyer.  In Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, supra,
 As noted in Bowden, special or additional standards have been devised for punitive damages
7
in defamation and certain other torts.  The standard for most torts, however, is the kind of “actual
malice” described above, which is in keeping with the function of punitive damages to punish for
“egregiously bad conduct.”  Bowden, 350 Md. at 22, 710 A.2d at 276, quoting from Owens-Corning
v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-38, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1996).
-21-
339 Md. 701, 728-29 n.5, 664 A.2d 916, 930 n.5, we noted that the term “actual malice”
referred to conduct “characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and
deliberate wrongdoing, ill will or fraud . . . .”  We contrasted that concept of “actual malice”
from “implied malice,” which, in earlier cases, had been defined to describe conduct that was
grossly negligent or involved a wanton or reckless disregard of another’s rights, or, in a
malicious prosecution case, actions taken without probable cause.  For purposes of
determining the allowability of punitive damages, it is the evil or wrongful motive, intent to
injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill will, or fraud that normally must be present,
not merely gross negligence or wanton or reckless conduct.  See Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia,
325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997);
Bowden v. Caldor, supra, 350 Md. 4, 23, 710 A.2d 267, 276.7
The Court of Special Appeals has long applied that, or some similar, standard of
“actual malice” in defining “malice” for purposes of public official immunity under common
law or under State and local tort claims laws.  See, for example, Arrington v. Moore, 31 Md.
App. 448, 464, 358 A.2d 909, 918, cert. denied, 278 Md. 729 (1976), and Leese v. Baltimore
County, 64 Md. App. 442, 480, 497 A.2d 159, 179, cert. denied, 305 Md. 106, 501 A.2d 845
(1985) (actual malice needed to defeat official immunity requires “an act without legal
-22-
justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose
being to deliberately and wilfully injure the plaintiff); Davis v. DiPino, 99 Md. App. 282,
290-91, 637 A.2d 475, 479 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 337 Md. 642, 655 A.2d 401
(1995); Nelson v. Kenny, 121 Md. App. 482, 487, 710 A.2d 345, 348 (1998).
This, we believe, is the appropriate test — the one that the Legislature intended to be
applied.  For one thing, the fact that it is an alternative to gross negligence, which also will
defeat the qualified immunity, indicates clearly that the Legislature conceived of malice as
something beyond the merely reckless or wanton conduct that would be embodied within
gross negligence.  That conception of malice, moreover, provides a reasonable measure of
protection to the State, to State personnel, and to those injured by the conduct of State
personnel.  It may well be in this case that, if the trier of fact concludes that petitioners acted
reasonably and without excessive force, it will return a judgment in their favor on the merits.
We are not dealing here with the merits, however, which have yet to be decided, but with the
issue of immunity.  The question raised for purposes of immunity under the State Tort
Claims Act is whether a jury could reasonably find that petitioners’ conduct, given all of the
existing and antecedent circumstances, was motivated by ill will, by an improper motive,
or by an affirmative intent to injure the boys.  As the Supreme Court observed in Graham
v. Connor, supra, that motive or animus may exist even when the conduct is objectively
reasonable.  If it does, there is no immunity under the State Tort Claims Act.
Appealability of Interlocutory Ruling Denying Defense of Qualified Immunity
-23-
The question of whether a defendant claiming sovereign, governmental, or public
official immunity may invoke the collateral order doctrine to obtain immediate appellate
review of an interlocutory order rejecting the immunity defense has been before this Court
and the Court of Special Appeals on a number of occasions in the past few years.  The most
recent definitive discussion of the issue occurred in Artis v. Cyphers, 100 Md. App. 633, 642
A.2d 298 (1994).  We summarily affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in
that case for the reasons cited in its opinion  Artis v. Cyphers, 336 Md. 561, 649 A.2d 838
(1994).
Artis and our earlier per curiam decision in Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 540 A.2d
805 (1988) set forth the governing principles, which are clear and workable.  We may
summarize them as follows.  The right to seek appellate review ordinarily must await the
entry of a final judgment, disposing of all claims against all parties.  There are three
exceptions to that rule in Maryland:  appeals from interlocutory rulings specifically allowed
by statute (see, for example, §§ 12-303 and 12-304 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article and
Article 27, § 776); immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602(b); and appeals
from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.  The only
asserted basis for this appeal is the collateral order doctrine. That doctrine has four
requirements, all of which must be satisfied to permit an immediate appeal from an
interlocutory order:  the order appealed from must conclusively determine the disputed
question; it must resolve an important issue; it must be separate from the merits of the action;
and it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the ultimate final judgment.
-24-
Although disputes may arise with respect to any of the four requirements, appeals
taken from interlocutory orders denying dispositive motions based on immunity most often
raise questions with respect to the first, third, and fourth requirements — whether the
immunity issue has been conclusively resolved, whether it hinges on disputed facts that go
as well to the merits of the claim, and whether, if the immunity is cast as an immunity from
trial, rather than just an immunity from liability, denial of the immunity defense is effectively
unreviewable after the defendant has been forced to undergo the trial.  These are different
issues, even if they sometimes overlap.  Artis dealt principally with the first and third
requirements — whether the immunity issue was conclusively resolved and was separate
from the substantive merits of the case.  Bunting spoke to the fourth requirement.
In Artis, an ambulance driver was sued for negligence in his provision of medical
assistance to a motorist who suffered a heart attack.  In a motion for summary judgment, he
asserted both common law public official immunity and a statutory “Good Samaritan”
immunity protecting persons who render emergency medical assistance, and, when the
motion was denied, he took an immediate appeal, claiming the right to do so under the
collateral order doctrine.  After reviewing both the Maryland and Federal cases dealing with
interlocutory appeals of that kind, the Court of Special Appeals and this Court arrived at two
principal conclusions:  first, that an immediate appeal may not be taken from a ruling
denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on official or governmental
immunity — common law or statutory — unless the immunity issue can be resolved as a
matter of law; and second, that such a situation likely will exist in only three circumstances
 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238, 246
8
(1995), and Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305, 116 S. Ct. 834, 838, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773, 783
(1996), confirming that summary judgment determinations of qualified immunity under Harlow are
appealable “when they resolve a dispute concerning an ‘abstract issu[e] of law’ relating to qualified
immunity . . . — typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was ‘clearly
established . . . .’” Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313, 116 S. Ct. at 842, 133 L. Ed. 2d at 788, quoting in part
from Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317, 115 S. Ct. at 2158, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 249.
-25-
—  (1) when the immunity is an absolute immunity and is not defeated by malice, gross
negligence, or other defense that must be proved or disproved as a matter of fact; (2) when
the immunity is based on the Harlow standard, which, being purely objective in nature,
effectively presents the immunity issue as a matter of law;  and (3) in that rare other case
8
where the applicability of a qualified immunity under State law does not hinge on disputed
facts or inferences and may be resolved as a matter of law.
The appeal in Artis was dismissed because it fell into none of those categories.  The
public official immunity claimed by Artis required a finding that he was a public official, that
he was engaged in discretionary acts, and that his conduct was not grossly negligent.  The
statutory Good Samaritan immunity also depended on his not having been grossly negligent.
On the record presented in that case, those issues hinged on facts and inferences that were
in dispute.  For us to resolve those issues in an appeal from the denial of a motion for
summary judgment would have required that we view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff, even though a trier of fact, not required to take such a slanted view, might
resolve them in a quite different manner and thus properly reach a different legal conclusion.
We approved the holding of the Court of Special Appeals:
 The court added:  “Where the factual issue can be resolved by the court, the parties may take
9
advantage of Md. Rule 2-502 and have the court decide those facts, and with them the legal issue of
immunity, preliminarily.  In that circumstance, immediate appellate review of a ruling rejecting the
qualified immunity defense would be permissible, for it would place the appellate court in no different
position than if it were reviewing the rejection of an absolute immunity defense or a Harlow type of
qualified immunity defense; the issues would be legal ones.”  100 Md. App. at 653-54, 642 A.2d at
308-09.
-26-
“Whether a defendant possesses a qualified immunity is
ultimately an issue of law for the court to determine.  To the
extent that it depends on the resolution of disputed material
facts, however, some of those disputes — the existence of gross
negligence or malice, for example — may be for the trier of fact
to resolve; others — whether the defendant is a public official
and, if so, whether the duty he was performing was
discretionary or ministerial — will be for the court.  To the
extent the issue hinges on factual disputes that must be resolved
by the trier of fact, the court will not be able to resolve the legal
issue on preliminary motion, thereby forcing the defendant to
wait until judgment has been entered.”
Artis v. Cyphers, supra, 100 Md. App. at 653, 642 A.2d at 308 (emphasis added). 9
Artis establishes a clear and workable approach with respect to the first and third
prongs of the collateral order doctrine, one that preserves the respective roles of the trial and
appellate courts and avoids the prospect of the appellate court assuming as fact that which
a trial court could properly find not to be fact.  When a trial court, faced with a motion for
summary judgment laden with disputes of material fact bearing on issues of malice or gross
negligence, resolves those disputes in favor of the plaintiff and denies the motion, the State
qualified immunity issue is ordinarily not conclusively resolved.  In reviewing the evidence
against the appropriate standard of proof, rather than in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
the court may reach a very different conclusion.  Because the determination of malice, in
-27-
particular, involves findings as to the defendant’s intent and state of mind, there is much less
likelihood of it presenting an “abstract issue of law.”
The Artis approach militates against allowing this appeal.  A jury could find from the
evidence presented in the summary judgment record that Deputies Shoemaker and Bailey
acted with malice, with an intent to harm Ben, Travis, or their parents, perhaps out of anger
or frustration over their alleged unwillingness to cooperate with Ms. Bankins and Deputy
Shoemaker in the past or over the children’s resistance and attempt to elude capture.  The
evidence, taken in a light favorable to the plaintiffs, certainly suggests unusually rough
conduct which, even if objectively reasonable, as found by Judge Williams for purposes of
§ 1983, is beyond that which one would normally expect from a neutral and dispassionate
law enforcement officer supposedly engaged in protecting the child victims from threatened
abuse.  A jury could find that Shoemaker’s alleged threat to kill the family dog because it
was barking at the commotion, the foul language supposedly used by her or Bailey, and the
alleged threats to take the children to a mental hospital and put one of them in a straightjacket
were all the product of animus toward the children or their parents.  There is no way that we
can resolve those issues as a matter of law on this record.  That is one reason why the appeal
was properly dismissed.
Bunting provides another, equally compelling, reason why this appeal must be
dismissed.  That case did not involve a defense of public official or governmental immunity,
but did involve an appeal taken under the collateral order doctrine from an interlocutory
ruling.  Bunting moved to dismiss criminal charges against him on the ground that the State
-28-
had violated the “single transfer rule” of Article III(d) of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (Maryland Code, Article 27, § 616D(d)).  Under that rule, if a detainer is lodged
in Maryland against a defendant imprisoned in another State and, pursuant to his or her
request, the defendant is transferred to Maryland for trial on that detainer, the defendant has
a right to be tried on the detainer before being returned to the sending State.  If the defendant
is returned without having been tried, Article III(d) requires that the charges against the
defendant be dismissed with prejudice.  Bunting, incarcerated in a Federal prison in
Pennsylvania, was transported to Maryland pursuant to a detainer filed with the Federal
authorities.  He attended a hearing on preliminary motions made by him but was returned
prior to trial, and he then moved to dismiss the charges, alleging a violation of Article III(d).
The motion was denied, and Bunting appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the
appeal and we affirmed that judgment.
Bunting claimed the right of immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine,
arguing, among other things, that the challenged order denying his motion to dismiss would
not be effectively reviewable if he had to await conviction after trial — that, like the defense
of double jeopardy, the statutory right to have the charges dismissed with prejudice was in
the nature of a right to avoid trial itself.  We rejected his argument, noting that “[i]f all
‘rights’ which could be characterized in this manner were treated like the right against double
jeopardy, the collateral order doctrine would largely erode the final judgment rule.”  Bunting
v. State, supra, 312 Md. at 480, 540 A.2d at 808.  We concluded our per curiam Opinion as
follows:
-29-
“In sum, the idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable after
the termination of trial because it involves a ‘right’ to avoid the
trial itself, should be limited to double jeopardy claims and a
very few other extraordinary situations.  Otherwise, as
previously indicated, there would be a proliferation of appeals
under the collateral order doctrine.  This would be flatly
inconsistent with the long-established and sound public policy
against piecemeal appeals.”
Id. at 481-82, 540 A.2d at 809.
Bunting makes clear that the claimed right of immunity from trial itself does not
suffice to satisfy the “unreviewability” requirement of the collateral order doctrine except
in “extraordinary situations.”  We do not regard the denial of a motion for summary
judgment asserting the qualified immunity of a deputy sheriff charged with maliciously
committing common law torts as an “extraordinary situation.”  When the facts relevant to the
immunity defense are in dispute and need to be resolved based on a full credibility analysis,
the decision as to immunity is only reviewable after that analysis has been completed.
To recapitulate, in order to proceed under the collateral order doctrine, all four prongs
of that doctrine must be satisfied.  Artis makes clear that the third prong — the
conclusiveness of the adjudication — is not ordinarily satisfied unless the immunity issue
can be resolved as a pure issue of law, without the court having to assume any material facts
or inferences that are in dispute.  Even if the Artis standard is met, however, Bunting makes
clear that the fourth prong — unreviewability after final judgment —  is not satisfied except
in “extraordinary situations.”  Through those cases, in contrast to the Federal approach, we
have placed significant limits on immediate appeals from interlocutory orders denying a
-30-
governmental immunity defense.  Petitioners’ appeal was correctly dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.