Case Title: Williams v. State

Citation: 363 N.E.2d 971

Docket Number: 1275S363

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
363 N.E.2d 971 (1977)
Lonnie David WILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 1275S363.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 15, 1977.
*972 Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Peter W. Bullard, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Walter F. Lockhart, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PRENTICE, Justice.
Appellant, Lonnie Williams, appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition by which he sought to withdraw guilty pleas upon two counts of first degree murder, and to plead anew. The guilty plea proceeding occurred on March 29, 1971, and the appellant was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment.
The sole issue to be considered is whether it must appear on the face of the record of guilty plea proceedings occurring after June 2, 1969 that the defendant was fully advised concerning the constitutional rights which are waived by entering a plea of guilty.
In its findings of fact, the court below stated that the transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings are silent as to the advice given Williams concerning his right to confront his accusers and his privilege against self-incrimination. However, relying upon evidence extrinsic to the record of the guilty plea proceedings, the trial court found that from advisement by counsel, Williams knew that he had a right to trial by jury and that witnesses would be called to testify against him and further found that he independently knew of his right to trial by jury and procedures of trial. Upon this basis the trial court concluded that Williams was advised "either by the court or through advise (sic) of counsel, of all three of his Boykin constitutional rights, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses and privilege against self-incrimination." The trial court further concluded that the guilty pleas, therefore, had been made "knowingly, intelligently and understandingly," and Williams' petition was denied.
In Avery v. State (1976) Ind., 355 N.E.2d 395, this Court was faced with the identical issue. Justice DeBruler said in that case:
June 2, 1969, is a date of significance because it is when the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. *973 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, which imposed the duty to establish a record of guilty plea proceedings sufficient to show that the guilty plea was voluntary and that an informed and understanding waiver of federal constitutional rights had occurred.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed with instructions to grant the petition.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER and HUNTER, JJ., concur.
PIVARNIK, J., dissents with opinion.
PIVARNIK, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion in this cause for the reason that it requires a higher standard of review of the trial court's actions than the Boykin case, the basic authority relied upon by the majority, has established. It must be kept in mind that we are dealing here with a guilty plea entered after Boykin, but before the effective date of Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1975).
The Boykin case was based on a record that showed an absolute lack of any information from which the court could conclude that the appellant had knowingly, intelligently and understandingly entered his plea of guilty, or had been informed of any of his constitutional rights.
In this case the record shows that a plea bargain was entered into by the parties and was presented to the court at the time of the entry of the guilty pleas. It further shows both that the court inquired of the defendant as to whether or not he understood that he could have a jury trial, and that defendant had counseled with his attorney before taking the step of entering a guilty plea. It is true that the record does not show that the court advised the defendant of every constitutional right that he had, but the Boykin case does not require this.
The language of the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals is significant in United States v. Frontero (5th Cir.1971) 452 F.2d 406. In that case, advices by the court on a plea of guilty by co-defendant Kelly were similar to those in this case in that the court did inform the defendant that he had a right to a jury trial which he was waiving, and inquired of him whether he knew what the results of his guilty plea were. The Court of Appeals stated in that case:
The Frontero case cited above was decided after the Boykin case and prior to amendment of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, which Rule now requires that the court give specified instructions and explanations to the defendant upon receiving a guilty plea. Among these specified instructions are the waivers contended in this cause, namely the right against self-incrimination and the right to face witnesses. Our state courts have a similar obligation since July 26, 1973, by enactment of the General Assembly. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1975). There is no question, under both Rule 11 in the federal courts and the enactment of the General Assembly in 1973, that it is the duty of trial courts to give specified advisements to the defendant on entering a guilty plea. A failure to do so will now require the ordering of a new trial by this court. The problem arises on those causes before the enactment by the Indiana General Assembly, but after the Boykin decision.
In North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 the Supreme Court of the United States enunciated the standard for determining the validity of guilty pleas as follows:
Federal Circuit Courts are in accord with this interpretation of Boykin. See Kloner v. United States (2nd Cir.1976) 535 F.2d 730; Davis v. United States (3rd Cir.1972) 470 F.2d 1128; Wade v. Coiner (4th Cir.1972) 468 F.2d 1059; Fontaine v. United States (6th Cir.1975) 526 F.2d 514, cert. denied 424 U.S. 973, 96 S. Ct. 1476, 47 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1976); United States v. Dorsynski (7th Cir.1973) 484 F.2d 849, rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S. Ct. 3042, 41 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1974); Todd v. Lockhart (8th Cir.1974) 490 F.2d 626; United States v. Sherman (9th Cir.1973) 474 F.2d 303; Stinson v. Turner (10th Cir.1973) 473 F.2d 913. See also State v. Turner (1971), 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763, 765:
Finally, in United States v. Journet (2nd Cir. 1976) 544 F.2d 633, 635, the Court of Appeals said in determining the standard prior to the amendment of Rule 11 (characterized by the court as the old rule),
*975 The United States Supreme Court is apparently in accord with this standard of review in cases before the new federal Rule 11. It recently denied certiorari in a case wherein defendant claimed that a federal district judge had to advise that entering a guilty plea amounted to a waiver of the right to confrontation and the privilege against self-incrimination. Birchfield v. United States (10th Cir. August 25, 1976) 45 U.S.L.W. 3386, cert. denied 429 U.S. 1073, 97 S. Ct. 810, 50 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1977).
In the case before us we have a situation where the record shows that the parties were before the court on a plea bargain arrangement entered into by the parties. The record further shows that the court discussed the plea with the defendant and determined that he was willingly and intelligently entering that plea, that his confessions were put into evidence to provide prima facie evidence to the court that a crime had been committed, and that the court accepted his guilty plea following all of this. I feel that this meets the constitutional safeguards and standards provided for in the Boykin case, and that the majority opinion sets a higher standard than either the Supreme Court of the United States or other courts following the Boykin decision have set.