Case Title: Burns v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 001879

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ. 
 
WILLIAM JOSEPH BURNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record Nos. 001879 & 001880   JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    March 2, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHENANDOAH COUNTY 
Dennis Lee Hupp, Judge 
 
A jury convicted William Joseph Burns of the capital 
murder of Tersey Elizabeth Cooley in the commission of rape 
and/or forcible sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-31, 
statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-90, rape in 
violation of Code § 18.2-61, and forcible sodomy (anal 
intercourse) in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1.1  At the 
conclusion of the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial, the 
jury recommended that Burns be sentenced to death on the 
capital murder conviction, finding that “there is a 
probability that [Burns] would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society” and that his conduct in committing the offense was 
“outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that 
it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery 
to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the 
act of murder.”  The jury also sentenced Burns to 18 years on 
the statutory burglary conviction, and to life imprisonment 
on each of the convictions for rape and forcible sodomy.  
After reviewing the post-sentence report required by Code 
§ 19.2-264.5, the trial court sentenced the defendant in 
accordance with the jury verdicts. 
Burns appealed his non-capital convictions to the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Code § 17.1-406.  We certified that 
appeal (Record No. 001880) to this Court under the provisions 
of Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation with the defendant’s 
appeal of his capital murder conviction (Record No. 001879) 
and the sentence review mandated by Code § 17.1-313.  After 
considering Burns’ assignments of error, the record, and 
argument of counsel, we find no error and will affirm the 
judgments of the circuit court. 
I.  FACTS  
Applying familiar principles of appellate review, we 
will recite the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party before 
the circuit court. 2  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 
662, 529 S.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 
______________________ 
1 The jury found Burns not guilty of forcible sodomy 
(fellatio).  The circuit court granted Burns’ motion to 
strike the evidence with regard to a charge of robbery. 
2 Some of the facts and material proceedings will be 
summarized when addressing specific assignments of error. 
 
 
2
S.Ct. 432 (2000); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 60, 515 
S.E.2d 565, 568 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000).  
We also accord that evidence all inferences fairly deducible 
from it.  Horton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 
S.E.2d 258, 259 (1998) (citing Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). 
A. GUILT PHASE 
During the day on September 20, 1998, Burns was drinking 
heavily at his trailer in Baker, West Virginia.  He resided 
there with his wife, Penny Marlene Cooley Burns, and her two 
sons.  Apparently some home repairs were not going well, and 
Burns became increasingly angry with his wife.  Because Burns 
had previously assaulted and battered Penny on several 
occasions when he was drinking, she became concerned for her 
safety and decided to leave their residence.  She had left 
Burns once before when he was drinking.  On that occasion, 
Penny went to her mother's house in Edinburg, Virginia, and 
stayed there a few days before returning home.3
When Penny left her home on September 20th, she did not 
go to her mother’s home.  Instead, she took a circuitous 
route unfamiliar to Burns to the home of her friends, Amanda 
                     
3 Penny’s mother was Tersey Elizabeth Cooley, the victim 
in this case. 
 
3
and Leonard Funkhouser.4  On the way to their house, Penny 
stopped several times to telephone her mother.  Penny wanted 
her mother to know that Penny had left Burns and would be 
staying at the Funkhousers’ house.  Penny also wanted to warn 
her mother not to let Burns into Cooley’s home if he came 
there.5  However, Penny was never able to reach her mother, 
even after she arrived at the Funkhousers’ residence. 
Around midnight, Burns showed up at the Funkhousers’ 
house and asked Penny to go home with him.  She refused.  
Burns then left but returned about an hour later.  He 
remained outside the Funkhousers’ home in his car until the 
next morning.  When the Funkhousers left for work that 
morning, they did not want to leave Penny alone in their 
home.  So, Leonard took Penny to work with him.  At Leonard’s 
suggestion, Penny then went on a commercial truck run to Ohio 
and Pennsylvania with a friend of Leonard’s.  While in 
Pennsylvania, Penny learned about her mother’s murder during 
a telephone conversation with Penny’s son. 
Around noon on September 21, 1998, Penny’s sister, Linda 
Yvonne Heres, went to the home of her 73-year old mother.  
                     
4 The Funkhousers lived in Fort Valley, Virginia, which 
is about a 45-minute drive from Cooley’s house in Edinburg. 
 
5 According to Penny, when she left Burns the first time, 
he threatened to kill her or her mother if she ever left him 
again. 
 
4
When Linda arrived at Cooley’s home, she discovered that the 
screen on the kitchen door had been pushed in, and she later 
realized that a window pane in the kitchen door had been 
broken.  After Linda entered the house, she yelled for her 
mother but heard no response.  Linda then proceeded into her 
mother’s bedroom and found her mother’s unclothed, dead body 
lying on the floor.6  Cooley’s face was partially covered by a 
mattress that had been pulled from the bed, and her lower 
dentures were lying on the floor about four feet from her 
jaw.  The bedroom was in disarray, and the bedclothes were 
scattered around the room. 
 
Frances Patricia Field, Assistant Chief Medical Examiner 
for the Northern Virginia District Medical Examiner’s Office, 
performed an autopsy on Cooley’s body.  Dr. Field reported 
that Cooley had “multiple injuries about the head,” including 
abrasions and bruises on the right forehead; beside the right 
eyebrow; on the white part of the eyeball; on the right and 
left jaw lines; on the neck; and on the right cheek, chin, 
and mouth.  Cooley also had large bruises on her upper chest 
and lower neck.  Cooley’s inner lips were likewise bruised, 
and Dr. Field testified that the injuries to Cooley’s gums 
and lips were consistent with her dentures having been in 
______________________ 
 
6 Cooley had on only a bra when Linda found her body. 
 
5
place at the time of the assault.  Finally, Cooley sustained 
24 fractures to her ribs. 
 
Dr. Field determined that the cause of death was “blunt 
force trauma to [Cooley’s] chest, with rupture of the heart” 
and compression of the neck.  There was also a tearing of 
Cooley’s pericardium, causing blood to spill out of the heart 
into the chest cavity.  Dr. Field opined that a broken rib 
probably had punctured the heart, although direct force 
applied to the chest might have ruptured the heart.  Because 
bleeding is rapid when the heart is ruptured, Dr. Field 
concluded that death occurred within two to three minutes 
after Cooley’s heart ruptured. 
After Linda found her mother’s body, she called “911.”  
Soon thereafter, the police and rescue squad arrived at the 
scene.  Larry W. Green, Sheriff of Shenandoah County, 
subsequently decided to set up a “traffic-canvassing detail” 
to ascertain if any drivers had traveled through the area 
where Cooley’s house was located between approximately 7:00 
p.m. on September 20th and 11:30 a.m. on September 21st.  As 
Sheriff Green was moving a flare on the roadway south of the 
Cooley residence, a vehicle approached him.  Sheriff Green 
testified that he “was in the center of the road, walking 
with the flare, and, of course, that stopped the car, and 
[he] approached the driver’s side.”  Burns was operating that 
 
6
vehicle.  After Burns stopped and before Sheriff Green could 
say anything, Burns asked, “What’s going on?  That’s my 
mother-in-law’s house.”  Upon realizing that Burns was a 
relative of the decedent, Sheriff Green asked him to speak 
with Garlan Gochenour, a lieutenant with the Shenandoah 
County Sheriff’s Office, who would explain what had happened. 
 
Burns then walked over to a nearby police cruiser and 
got into the right front seat as Gochenour got into the left 
front seat.  Gochenour informed Burns about Cooley’s death 
and then advised Burns of his Miranda rights.  Burns told 
Gochenour that he had not been in the victim’s house within 
the last five days or within the last year.  However, Burns 
admitted that he had driven by Cooley’s home on September 
21st between 1:00 a.m. and 1:30 a.m., but insisted that he 
had merely turned around in the driveway and then proceeded 
to the Funkhouser residence. 
 
Upon realizing that Burns had been at the crime scene 
during the approximate time when the murder occurred, 
Gochenour asked Burns to go to the sheriff’s department to be 
fingerprinted.  Burns agreed and drove his own vehicle to the 
sheriff’s department, where he later was fingerprinted.  
While at the sheriff’s office, Gochenour again advised Burns 
of his Miranda rights, and during subsequent questioning, 
Burns stated that he had been at a gas station near Cooley’s 
 
7
residence at approximately 2:52 a.m. and again at 
approximately 6:35 a.m. on September 21st.  In fact, Burns 
subsequently produced receipts for items that he had 
purchased at the station, and explained that he kept the 
receipts because he was on probation and needed to account 
for every place that he went.  Gochenour also talked with 
Burns about a Physical Evidence Recovery Kit (PERK Kit), and 
Burns agreed to go to the hospital so that samples of his 
hair and bodily fluids could be obtained for the PERK Kit.  
Gochenour and John Thomas, an investigator with the 
Shenandoah County Sheriff’s Office, accompanied Burns to the 
hospital, where the samples were taken. 
On September 26th, Burns returned to the sheriff’s 
office.  After advising Burns of his Miranda rights, 
Gochenour interviewed him again.  This time, Burns admitted 
that he was in the victim’s home on the night of the murder.  
Burns stated that, when he entered the house, he encountered 
a black male who had already murdered Cooley.  According to 
Burns, he killed that man and disposed of the body because 
Burns did not want his wife to find out that a black man had 
raped and murdered her mother.  Burns further stated that, in 
order to advance his cover-up, he cleaned Cooley’s vaginal 
area with soap and water, masturbated, digitally inserted his 
semen into Cooley’s vagina, and “smeared it on the bed.”  
 
8
However, Burns specifically denied inserting his semen into 
the victim’s anus.  At the conclusion of this interview, 
Burns was arrested. 
 
At Burns’ request, Gochenour again spoke with him on 
September 27th.  After Gochenour informed Burns of his 
Miranda rights, Burns admitted that he had not encountered an 
unidentified black man at Cooley’s house on the night of her 
murder.  Instead, Burns admitted that he broke into Cooley’s 
house by putting his hand through the screen and then 
breaking a window pane in the door.  However, Burns insisted 
that Cooley was already dead when he broke in.  Burns stated 
that, because he thought his wife, Penny, had murdered her 
mother, he decided that he wanted “the crime to lead to 
[him].”  So, he masturbated and digitally inserted his semen 
into the victim. 
 
Karolyn Leclaire Tontarski, a forensic scientist 
employed by the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of 
Criminal Justice Services Division of Forensic Science, 
analyzed the physical evidence collected from Burns, Cooley, 
and the crime scene.  Tontarski reported the presence of 
spermatozoa on vaginal and anal smears taken from the victim.  
Based upon DNA typing results, Tontarski testified that the 
sperm fraction found in the vaginal swab was 1.6 million 
times more likely to have come from Burns than from any other 
 
9
randomly chosen Caucasian individual, 100 million times more 
likely in the Black population, and 18 million times more 
likely in the Hispanic population.  According to Tontarski, 
the sperm fraction in the anal swab was 8.7 million times 
more likely to have originated from Burns than from any other 
randomly selected Caucasian individual, 540 million times 
more likely in the Black population, and 86 million times 
more likely in the Hispanic population.  Tontarski also found 
sperm cells on a sheet and pillowcase recovered from the 
bedroom where Cooley’s body was discovered, on Cooley’s lower 
denture found on the floor of the bedroom, on a washcloth 
found under Cooley’s left thigh, and on several items 
recovered from Cooley’s bathroom. 
B. PENALTY PHASE 
 
At the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence primarily with regard to the issue of 
Burns’ future dangerousness.  To establish that predicate, 
the Commonwealth introduced Burns’ prior convictions for 
felony theft, breaking and entering, malicious destruction of 
property, resisting arrest, battery, assault, disorderly 
conduct, and a third-degree sex offense. 
In addition, Hazel Buckley, Burns’ ex-girlfriend, 
testified that Burns had anally raped her nine times during a 
two-week period.  Buckley stated that she did not report 
 
10
those incidents to the police because Burns had threatened 
her and her daughter. 
Burns offered evidence in mitigation of his offense.  
Members of his family testified regarding the abuse that 
Burns suffered as a child, primarily from his father who was 
an alcoholic.  They also indicated that Burns did not do well 
in school.  A former inmate testified that Burns had been a 
“peacemaker” when they were in jail together.  Similarly, a 
shift supervisor at the Shenandoah County Jail testified that 
Burns was respectful and that Burns had never become violent 
during his incarceration there. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR WAIVED OR DEFAULTED 
Burns filed 46 separate assignments of error, which he 
has reduced to 26 questions presented on appeal.  However, 
Burns failed to brief several of his assignments of error. 
Consequently, they are waived, and we will not consider them 
on appeal.  Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 
S.E.2d 57, 60 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999), 
(citing Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 451, 423 S.E.2d 
360, 364 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993)).7
                     
7 Burns failed to brief the following assignments of 
error:  
No. 2: trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
to make ex parte applications to the court; 
 
11
______________________ 
No. 4:  trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
for the appointment of a DNA expert, forensic pathologist, 
and forensic scientist; 
No. 5: trial court erred in appointing a mental health 
expert under Code § 19.2-264.3:1 rather than under Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); 
No. 6: trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
for a bill of particulars regarding the aggravating factors 
on which the Commonwealth intended to rely in the penalty 
phase of the trial; 
No. 14: trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
for additional peremptory strikes; 
No. 15: trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
for individual, sequestered voir dire; 
No. 21(c-h): trial court erred in failing to strike for 
cause jurors Buchanon, Dellinger, Kruska, Kisamore, Showman, 
and Lin; 
 
No. 26: trial court erred in refusing to declare a 
mistrial based on questions the court asked Penny Burns 
concerning threats made by defendant; 
No. 30: trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
for a mistrial based on the hearsay testimony of Pam Cooley 
concerning a threat made by defendant to kill Penny Burns; 
No. 31: trial court erred in limiting cross examination 
of the forensic scientist, Tontarski; 
No. 33: trial court erred in admitting into evidence 
testimony from Dr. Field that her findings were consistent 
with intercourse in the vagina and anus; 
No. 34: trial court erred in instructing the jurors that 
they “may infer that a person intends the natural and 
probable consequences of his acts,” as contained in 
Instruction No. 6; 
No. 35: trial court erred in allowing members of the 
victim’s family to remain in the courtroom during closing 
argument at the guilt phase even though several of those 
family members were called as witnesses during the penalty 
phase; and, 
No. 36: trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
for a mistrial when the Commonwealth’s Attorney, during 
closing argument, misstated Instruction No. 6 by saying that 
it created a “presumption” and by arguing that defendant was 
a future danger during the guilt phase. 
Burns’ attempt to save these assignments of error by 
relying on his arguments contained in the record does not 
cure his waiver.  See Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 
 
12
 
Similarly in his first assignment of error, Burns 
challenges the constitutionality of the Virginia capital 
murder statute.  However, on brief, he relied solely on his 
memorandum presented to the circuit court with regard to this 
issue.  Burns’ reference to argument that he made in the 
circuit court “is insufficient and amounts to procedural 
default.”  Jenkins, 244 Va. at 461, 423 S.E.2d at 370. 
B. GUILT PHASE 
1. INDICTMENT 
Burns contends that the circuit court erred by failing 
to quash the capital murder indictment on the basis that he 
was denied a preliminary hearing and the indictment was 
multiplicious.  When Burns was arrested on September 26, 
1998, he was charged with first degree murder.  However, 
after he was indicted by a grand jury on two counts of 
capital murder, an order of nolle prosequi was entered with 
regard to the first degree murder charge.  So, Burns never 
had a preliminary hearing.  He now claims that he was 
entitled to that hearing pursuant to Code § 19.2-218 because 
both the capital murder and first degree murder charges arose 
out of the same circumstances.  He also argues that the 
______________________ 
461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 
(1993). 
 
 
13
Commonwealth’s failure to afford him a preliminary hearing 
deprived him of substantive and due process rights. 
 
In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-218 provides that “[n]o 
person who is arrested on a charge of felony shall be denied 
a preliminary hearing.”  As the Commonwealth correctly notes, 
this provision does not apply to the present situation.  
Burns was not arrested on the charges of capital murder; he 
was arrested on the charge of first degree murder.  The 
capital murder charges were brought by a direct indictment.  
“[T]his Court has consistently held that a preliminary 
examination of one accused of committing a felony is not 
necessary where an indictment has been found against him by a 
grand jury.”  Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 30-31, 129 
S.E.2d 22, 27 (1963); accord Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
683, 689, 251 S.E.2d 202, 206, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 
(1979).  Thus, the procedure used to indict Burns, without 
affording him a preliminary hearing, did not violate any of 
his statutory rights.8  Id.
                     
8 There is no constitutional right to a preliminary 
hearing.  Ashby v. Cox, 344 F. Supp. 759, 763 (W.D. Va. 
1972). 
To the extent that Burns suggests that he was entitled 
to a preliminary hearing on the charge of first degree 
murder, that issue is moot.  A nolle prosequi order was 
entered on that charge, and Burns was tried and convicted on 
the indictment. 
 
 
14
 
Burns also contends that the indictment was 
multiplicious because he was charged in one count with three 
separate offenses of capital murder.  Thus, according to 
Burns, the indictment was confusing and caused a 
“multiplication of issues.” 
 
The original indictment contained two counts charging 
Burns with the commission of capital murder.  The first count 
alleged that he committed capital murder in the commission of 
robbery, and the second count alleged that he committed 
capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape 
or object sexual penetration.  The Commonwealth amended the 
first count to allege that Burns “did unlawfully, 
feloniously, willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation 
kill and murder Tersey Elizabeth Cooley, in the commission of 
robbery or forcible sodomy or rape . . . .”9  The defendant 
voiced no objection to that amendment.  The Commonwealth then 
asked that the amendment say “and/or” rather than just “or.”  
When the court asked the defendant if he objected to the new 
wording, his counsel responded, “if I have an objection to 
it, I will file it at a later date.”  The court then stated 
that it would allow the amendment, and the defendant’s 
counsel replied, “I will object to it, subject to me 
                     
9 At the same time, the Commonwealth moved the circuit 
court to “nol-pross” the second count. 
 
15
submitting a motion on that.  If I do not submit a motion, 
then I will waive the objection.” 
In a subsequent order dated October 20, 1999, the court 
granted “the motion over the objection of the Defendant, but 
the Defendant will waive this objection unless he files his 
written objection stating his grounds therefore within two 
(2) weeks of this date.”  Burns never filed the referenced 
objection within the allotted time, but on January 25, 2000, 
he moved for leave to challenge the amendment and to dismiss 
the indictment on the ground that it is multiplicious.  The 
Commonwealth asserts on brief that the motion was never ruled 
on by the circuit court and that Burns’ multiplicity claim is 
therefore waived.  The Commonwealth is wrong.  After a 
hearing during which Burns argued his motion, the court 
denied the motion in an order dated February 4, 2000, and 
noted the defendant’s objection. 
 
However, we agree with the circuit court that the 
indictment, as amended, contained only one charge of capital 
murder and merely provided alternative “gradation”  
offenses.10  Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 487, 491, 464 
______________________ 
 
10 Since the circuit court struck the evidence on the 
robbery charge, neither that offense nor the offense of 
capital murder in the commission of robbery was before the 
jury.  Burns was convicted under Code § 18.2-31(5), which 
 
16
S.E.2d 128, 130 (1995).  The indictment did not contain more 
than one charge in a single count.  See Webb, 204 Va. at 32, 
129 S.E.2d at 28.  The amended indictment also clearly 
notified Burns of the offense for which he was charged.  
Thus, the circuit court did not err in denying Burns’ motion 
to dismiss the indictment on the basis of multiplicity. 
2. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 
 
Burns argues that the circuit court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress evidence.  That motion included all his 
statements to law enforcement officers; physical evidence, 
including DNA testing results, seized from his person and 
residence; and all documents obtained from him.  Burns 
contends that the roadblock was unconstitutional; that his 
statements were not voluntarily made and thus violated his 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); that 
his fingerprints, hair, and samples of bodily fluids were not 
voluntarily provided; and that search warrants issued for his 
personal property at the Shenandoah County Jail and his 
residence were based on misleading information.  We will 
address each of these grounds separately. 
a. ROADBLOCK 
______________________ 
proscribes, in relevant part, capital murder in the 
commission of rape or forcible sodomy. 
 
 
17
 
Burns asserts that the roadblock that Sheriff Green set 
up on the evening of September 21st did not pass 
constitutional muster because the roadblock was established 
at the sole discretion of law enforcement officers at the 
crime scene, there was no plan regarding the particular time 
and place of the roadblock, and there were no neutral 
criteria for carrying out the roadblock.  The Commonwealth 
disagrees and contends that Burns’ argument is flawed because 
Burns voluntarily stopped his vehicle before he reached the 
roadblock rather than actually being stopped at the 
roadblock.  Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that, if 
Burns was stopped, the roadblock satisfied the three-prong 
test enunciated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), as 
adopted by this Court in Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 
337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).  
While we believe that the circumstances under which Burns 
stopped his vehicle as he approached the roadblock was a 
“stop” and thus a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, see 
id. at 349, 337 S.E.2d at 275, we agree with the Commonwealth 
that the roadblock did not violate Burns’ constitutional 
rights. 
 
The constitutional legitimacy of a roadblock, such as 
the one in this case, is determined by weighing “(1) the 
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, (2) the 
 
18
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and 
(3) the severity of the interference with individual 
liberty.”  Id. at 350, 337 S.E.2d at 276.  A roadblock is not 
an unconstitutional infringement on an individual’s privacy 
if it is “carried out pursuant to a plan or practice which is 
explicit, contains neutral criteria, and limits the conduct 
of the officers undertaking the roadblock.”  Simmons v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 203, 380 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1989). 
 
The roadblock at issue satisfies these requirements.  
Sheriff Green decided to establish the roadblock because a 
brutal homicide had been recently committed in the area of 
the roadblock, and because law enforcement officials did not 
know the identity of the perpetrator or whether that person 
was still in the area.  According to Sheriff Green, the 
purpose of the roadblock was to “canvas drivers who were 
passing through the area, to see whether they had seen 
anything or heard anything” during the time period when the 
crime had probably been committed the previous day.  
Certainly, the fact that a murder had occurred was a matter 
of grave public concern, and the roadblock advanced that 
concern by aiding in the investigation of the crime. 
Additionally, Sheriff Green chose the location of the 
roadblock and directed that it be conducted between the hours 
of 7:00 p.m. on September 21st until approximately 11:30 a.m. 
 
19
on September 22nd because he believed that the crime had been 
committed between those hours on September 20th-21st.  He 
also directed that all vehicles be stopped and that the 
operators be asked “if they were through that section during 
those times, and if they were, did they see anything of a 
suspicious nature in or around [the victim’s house].”  If the 
drivers inquired about what had happened, they were to be 
told only that an incident had occurred; they were not to 
receive specific information about the crime.  Thus, the 
roadblock was carried out pursuant to an explicit plan that 
contained neutral criteria, and limited the discretion and 
conduct of the law enforcement officers actually stopping 
vehicles at the roadblock. 
However, our analysis of this issue does not end here.  
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States considered 
the constitutional propriety of a highway checkpoint program 
whose primary purpose was to discover and interdict illegal 
narcotics.  Indianapolis v. Edmond, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 121 
S.Ct. 447, 450 (2000).  After discussing several of its prior 
decisions, see e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543 (1976); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the 
Court stated that “each of the checkpoint programs that we 
have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes 
 
20
closely related to the problems of policing the border or the 
necessity of ensuring roadway safety.”  Edmond, ___ U.S. at 
___, 121 S.Ct. at 454.  Thus, the Court concluded that the 
narcotics checkpoint program contravened the Fourth Amendment 
because its purpose was “to uncover evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing.”  Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court “decline[d] to suspend the usual requirement of 
individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a 
checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of 
investigating crimes.”  Id. at 455.  However, the Court 
recognized that “there are circumstances that may justify a 
law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would 
otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime 
control.”  Id.
The primary purpose of the roadblock that Sheriff Green 
established obviously was not related to policing  the 
borders or ensuring road safety.  Nor was its purpose simply 
to investigate ordinary criminal wrongdoing as was the 
checkpoint in Edmond.  Instead, the roadblock in this case 
was specifically designed to investigate a particular murder 
that had recently occurred in the area where the roadblock 
was placed.  When Sheriff Green decided to set up the 
roadblock, the perpetrator’s identity and whereabouts 
remained unknown.  Law enforcement officers were not stopping 
 
21
vehicles merely to discover evidence of crimes in general.  
Thus, we conclude that the roadblock in this case falls 
within the exigent circumstances recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Edmond and that it, therefore, did not contravene 
the Fourth Amendment.11
b. STATEMENTS AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Burns contends that the circuit court erred by failing 
to suppress his statements given to law enforcement officers 
on September 21st, 26th, and 27th.  He raises specific 
objections with regard to each statement, so we will consider 
them separately. 
Commencing with the September 21st statement, Burns 
claims that Gochenour provided only a “cursory rendition” of 
Burns’ Miranda rights.  Therefore, the record, according to 
Burns, does not show that he sufficiently understood those 
rights to enable him to make a voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of them.  We do not agree. 
                     
11 Even if the roadblock violated Burns' Fourth Amendment 
rights, we believe that any connection between the roadblock 
and the statements and physical evidence obtained from Burns 
was entirely dissipated.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 491 (1963); Warlick v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 
266, 208 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1974).  As will be discussed in 
subsequent sections of this opinion, Burns was not in custody 
when he voluntarily spoke with Gochenour at the site of the 
roadblock.  Nevertheless, Gochenour advised Burns of his 
Miranda rights.  Burns subsequently agreed to go to the 
sheriff’s department and hospital. 
 
22
“Miranda warnings are required only where there has been 
such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in 
custody.’ ”  Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); 
accord Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 745, 529 S.E.2d 
570, 583, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 488 (2000).  
As the circuit court correctly determined, Burns was not “in 
custody” when he talked with Gochenour on the evening of 
September 21st.12  After Burns stopped at the roadblock and 
asked Sheriff Green what was going on, Burns voluntarily got 
into a police vehicle and talked with Gochenour.  Burns 
subsequently agreed to go to the sheriff’s office to be 
fingerprinted.  Even then, he traveled there in his own 
vehicle, which is certainly not an indicia of being “in 
custody.”  After arriving at the sheriff’s office, Burns was 
taken into an office that contained several desks and a 
computer.  It was not an interview room or a cell, and the 
office was not locked.  Thus, even though Gochenour advised 
Burns of his Miranda rights both at the roadblock and again 
upon arriving at the sheriff’s office, we conclude that Burns 
was not in custody at either time.  Consequently, he has no 
basis upon which to allege that the statements obtained on 
September 21st violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 
                     
12 The circuit court also concluded that Miranda rights 
were given to Burns and that he made a voluntary and knowing 
 
23
We reach the same conclusion with regard to Burns’ 
September 26th statement.  Although Burns argues that he was 
not advised of his Miranda rights before he made this 
particular statement, the evidence before the circuit court 
reflects that Burns again was not in custody when he made 
that statement.  Burns had previously agreed to provide some 
receipts to Gochenour in order to document Burns’ activities 
on the night of the murder.  On September 26th, Burns and 
Gochenour talked by telephone, and Burns agreed to bring 
those receipts to the sheriff’s office that evening around 
8:00 p.m.  After he arrived, Gochneour again read Miranda 
rights to Burns, and Burns then signed a written waiver 
acknowledging that he understood those rights and that he 
wished to talk to the law enforcement officers.  During the 
subsequent interview, Burns admitted that he had been in 
Cooley’s residence on the night of her murder and claimed 
that he had killed an unidentified black male whom he had 
encountered there.  Near the end of the interview, Burns 
requested an attorney, and the interview was terminated.  
Burns then asked to use a restroom, after which Gochenour 
arrested him.  Thus, Burns voluntarily came to the sheriff’s 
office that evening and was never in custody until after he 
made the statement. 
______________________ 
waiver of those rights on September 21st. 
 
24
After the interview on September 26th ended, Gochenour 
told Burns that, if he wanted to talk to anyone again, he 
could inform a jailer of that desire.  According to 
Gochenour, he received such a call from a jailer on September 
27th.  After returning to the jail, Gochenour first advised 
Burns of his Miranda rights and then asked Burns if he had 
requested to speak with Gochenour.  The transcript of that 
taped interview reflects that Burns responded affirmatively 
to that question. 
Nevertheless, Burns contends that, when he contacted the 
jailer on September 27th, he did not intend to subject 
himself to further interrogation by a police officer.  
Relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), Burns 
argues that, once he asserted his right to counsel, he could 
not be approached for further interrogation until counsel was 
available to him.  We do not agree with Burns’ argument. 
As the circuit court concluded, Burns initiated contact 
with Gochenour on September 27th.  “If ‘the accused, not the 
police, [reopens] the dialogue with the authorities’, a 
court, upon consideration of that fact and ‘the totality of 
the circumstances’, may reasonably find that the accused has 
made a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his rights.”  
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 583, 423 S.E.2d 160, 
164 (1992) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9 
 
25
(1981)).  Here, the totality of the circumstances, including 
the fact that Burns requested to speak with Gochenour and 
that Gochenour re-advised Burns of his Miranda rights before 
even inquiring whether Burns had made such a request, support 
the circuit court’s conclusion that Burns’ September 27th 
statement was “knowingly and intelligently and voluntarily 
made.” 
In addition to these specific objections to each of his 
statements, Burns also asserts three additional reasons why 
none of his statements “were voluntary in the constitutional 
sense.”  First, he claims that his intellectual functioning, 
psychological problems, recent use of alcohol, and mental and 
physical condition rendered him incapable of voluntarily 
making the statements.  Next, he argues that Gochenour “used 
the prospect of the defendant seeing his wife” as a means of 
pressuring Burns to the point that his ability to function 
was critically impaired.  Finally, Burns claims that 
Gochenour repeatedly asked him to submit to a polygraph 
examination, thus subjecting Burns to increased pressure. 
Again, the record supports the circuit court’s 
conclusion that all of Burns’ statements were made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  Although Burns was declared 
incompetent to stand trial at one point before the trial 
commenced, his competency was restored, and there is no 
 
26
evidence that he was suffering from depression or was 
incompetent when he made the statements to Gochenour.  His 
ability to understand and act voluntarily is further 
reflected by the fact that he requested an attorney at one 
point during the interview on September 26th.  In short, the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Burns’ 
statements were “ ‘the product[s] of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by [their] maker.’ ”  Gray v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163, cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)); accord Yeatts v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 132, 410 S.E.2d 254, 261 (1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992). 
Burns makes the same argument that his fingerprints, 
hair, and samples of bodily fluids were taken in violation of 
his constitutional rights.  He claims that he did not execute 
a written consent or waiver, and that his oral consent to be 
fingerprinted and to provide hair and bodily fluids for the 
PERK Kit was not “voluntarily, intelligently or freely 
given.”  For the reasons that we have already enunciated, we 
do not agree.  We have also recognized that consent to a body 
search may be oral as well as written.  Coleman v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 49, 307 S.E.2d 864, 874 (1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984). 
 
27
Furthermore, according to Gochenour, Burns asked several 
questions about how the bodily fluids would be obtained.  
Those inquiries evidence Burns’ understanding of the PERK Kit 
and what he was being asked to do.  Gochenour also testified 
that, while Burns was waiting at the hospital, Burns stated 
that his stomach was hurting and that he would have to leave 
and come back later if the medical personnel did not hurry. 
When Burns went into the examination room at the 
hospital, Thomas accompanied him into that room.  Thomas 
testified that, when the medical personnel asked Burns to 
remove his underwear, Burns stated that he did not know that 
his underwear would be taken.  At that point, Thomas advised 
Burns, “Well, you know, if you don’t want to do this, you 
don’t have to, we can stop now.”  According to Thomas, Burns 
indicated that he wanted to go ahead and get it over.  Thus, 
the circuit court did not err in refusing to suppress the 
results of the tests conducted on Burns’ fingerprints, hair, 
and samples of bodily fluids. 
c. SEARCH WARRANTS 
Citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), Burns 
argues that the search warrants issued for his personal 
property at the jail and for his residence were based on 
misleading information and that, therefore, any evidence 
seized as a result of those searches must be suppressed.  In 
 
28
the affidavit to obtain the warrants, Thomas included Burns’ 
admission that he had committed a sexual assault against 
Cooley, but failed to mention Burns’ statements in which he 
denied any criminal involvement in Cooley’s murder and 
claimed that he was attempting to cover up the murder to 
protect another individual. 
This argument has no merit.  We agree with the circuit 
court that Burns’ admission regarding the sexual assault 
established probable cause for issuance of the search 
warrants.  Burns offered no evidence at the suppression 
hearing to show either an intention to deceive the magistrate 
or a reckless omission of relevant information.  A police 
officer’s mere negligence “in checking or recording the facts 
relevant to a probable-cause determination” is not enough to 
necessitate further inquiry.  Id. at 170; see also United 
States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990). 
3. EXAMINATION OF INVESTIGATORS UNDER OATH 
 
Prior to trial, Burns moved to examine law enforcement 
officials under oath to determine whether such officials had 
disclosed all exculpatory evidence to the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney.  The circuit court denied the motion but directed 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney to explain the meaning of 
exculpatory evidence to the police officers and ask whether 
 
29
all exculpatory evidence had been given to the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney. 
Burns now claims that “the problem of police-concealed 
exculpatory evidence is pervasive . . . throughout the 
country” and that the court’s failure to grant Burns’ motion 
“impinged on [Burns’] constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel.”  He also asserts the court’s ruling 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and 
due process of law.  This argument is without merit. 
 
First, to the extent that Burns raises an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, such a claim is not cognizable 
on direct appeal.  Johnson, 259 Va. at 675, 529 S.E.2d at 
781.  Second, Burns has offered no authority for the 
proposition that he should have been allowed to examine the 
police investigators under oath merely to determine whether 
they had turned over all exculpatory evidence to the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney.  In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
437 (1995), the Supreme Court of the United States recognized 
that it is “the individual prosecutor [who] has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”  
Finally, Burns admitted that the Commonwealth’s Attorney had 
disclosed all exculpatory evidence in his possession, and the 
 
30
circuit court directed the prosecutor to ensure that the 
investigators had provided all such evidence. 
4. JURY SELECTION 
With regard to jury selection, Burns first claims that 
the trial court erred by precluding him from asking questions 
during voir dire to ascertain potential jurors’ “true 
feelings” about the death penalty.  Both parties submitted a 
list of proposed voir dire questions to the circuit court, 
and the court asked some, but not all, of those questions.  
During Burns’ voir dire of the jurors, his counsel asked 
whether any of them had “any particularly strong feelings for 
or against the death penalty.”  The court sustained an 
objection to the question because it was not asked in 
response to a juror’s specific answer to any previous 
question. 
The circuit court did not err in disallowing this 
particular voir dire question.  We stated in Mackall v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 251, 372 S.E.2d 759, 766 (1988), 
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989), that “either party may 
require prospective jurors to state clearly that whatever 
view they have of the death penalty will not prevent or 
substantially impair their performance as jurors in the 
conformity with their oath and the court’s instructions.”  
However, we held “that a party may [not] inquire what 
 
31
prospective jurors’ views of the death penalty might be.”  
Id.  Furthermore, here, as in Mackall, the circuit court 
repeatedly asked potential jurors such questions as whether 
they would automatically impose the death penalty and whether 
they would consider voting for a sentence less than death, 
that is, life without parole, depending on the evidence.  The 
court’s questions assured “ ‘the removal of those [potential 
jurors] who would invariably impose capital punishment.’ ”  
Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 400-01, 422 S.E.2d 380, 
390 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993) (quoting 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523, 273 S.E.2d 36, 42-
43 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981)). 
 
Burns also challenges the circuit court’s decision to 
strike juror Trina H. Bailey for cause and its refusal to 
strike juror Emma M. Smith for cause.  Concerning juror 
Bailey, Burns argues that she was improperly struck because 
she expressed some doubt about the death penalty.  However, 
the record shows that the circuit court granted the 
Commonwealth’s motion to strike this juror because she 
indicated that she would hold the Commonwealth to a higher 
burden of proof than is required by law because the death 
penalty was at issue in the case.  Burns moved to strike 
juror Smith because she stated, “if [the defendant] did it, I 
feel like that he should get [the death penalty],” and also 
 
32
because her son was a jailer at the Shenandoah County Jail.  
However, Smith stated that she had not discussed the case 
with her son, and, in response to several questions, she 
indicated that she could listen to the evidence and determine 
the appropriate punishment.  When asked if it would be 
difficult for her to vote for life imprisonment if she found 
Burns guilty of capital murder, Smith answered, “Not really, 
no.” 
 
Upon considering the entire voir dire of both jurors at 
issue, see Mackall, 236 Va. at 252, 372 S.E.2d at 767, 
(“entire voir dire examination must be considered”), we find 
no error in the circuit court’s decisions regarding those 
jurors.  The circuit court heard those jurors’ responses and 
observed their demeanor.  Therefore, its findings are 
entitled to great weight and will not be reversed on appeal 
absent a “showing of manifest error or abuse of discretion.”  
Id.  No such showing has been made in this case. 
5. PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE 
Burns asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence certain photographs of the victim’s body, 
specifically Exhibit Numbers 141, 142, 143, and 146.  He also 
challenges the court’s decision to admit into evidence all 
the autopsy photographs of the victim.  In  Burns’ limited 
 
33
argument on this issue, he merely asserts that these 
photographs were prejudicial and cumulative. 
We have repeatedly held that the admission of 
photographic evidence rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court.  See Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 
338, 513 S.E.2d 634, 639, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); 
Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91-92, 501 S.E.2d 134, 
138, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998); Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 459, 470 S.E.2d 114, 126, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996).  We have examined all the 
photographs admitted into evidence and conclude that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion. 
6. TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEOTAPED CONVERSATION 
 
On September 20th, Burns went to the home of his friend, 
Hazel Buckley, between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.  While he 
was there, Burns, according to Buckley, told her that “[h]e 
had done something really bad.”  Buckley testified that Burns 
then stated that he would need to account for his whereabouts 
from about 7:30 p.m. until 12:00 p.m. that evening.  Buckley 
later contacted the police and agreed to assist in the 
investigation of Cooley’s murder by allowing a subsequently 
arranged meeting between her and Burns to be videotaped. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth played the videotape of the 
meeting for the jury and, over Burns’ objection, provided the 
 
34
jury with a transcript of the conversation between Buckley 
and Burns as the tape was played.  On appeal, Burns argues 
that the circuit court erred in allowing the jury to use the 
transcript because it “contained numerous ‘inaudible’ 
references and numerous gaps.”  Burns also claims that the 
transcript highlighted portions of the conversation that were 
prejudicial to him. 
“A court may, in its discretion, permit the jury to 
refer to a transcript, the accuracy of which is established, 
as an aid to understanding a recording.”  Fisher v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 413, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1988), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989).  Burns has not challenged 
the accuracy of the transcript, only its completeness.  That 
fact, coupled with the lengthy cautionary instruction that 
the circuit court gave the jury regarding the portions of the 
transcript that indicated the videotape was inaudible and 
advising the jurors to decide for themselves what was being 
said, persuade us that the court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing the jury to use the transcript. 
7. TESTIMONY REGARDING COOLEY’S POWER OF ATTORNEY 
During cross-examination of Penny’s sister, Linda, Burns 
attempted to elicit testimony regarding why Cooley revoked 
her power of attorney naming Penny as Cooley’s attorney-in-
fact.  The court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection.  
 
35
However, the court allowed cross-examination to establish 
“that there was a new power of attorney, a revocation, and it 
was at the request of Mrs. Cooley.”  Later, during his case-
in-chief, Burns called Kermit L. Racey, Cooley’s attorney, 
and attempted to ask Racey why Cooley had revoked her power 
of attorney.  The court again sustained the Commonwealth’s 
objection.  Burns later proffered Racey’s testimony that 
there were two reasons why Cooley revoked her power of 
attorney.  The first reason was because Penny lived too far 
away to take care of her mother’s needs, and the second one 
was the fact that a judgment had been entered against Cooley 
on a promissory note that Penny had signed by using her 
mother’s power of attorney.  The proceeds of the loan 
evidenced by the note were for Penny’s benefit. 
On appeal, Burns contends that the excluded evidence 
should have been admitted to show that Penny had a motive to 
murder her mother.  However, the jury heard evidence from 
Linda and Racey that Cooley had revoked the power of 
attorney.  Burns also introduced into evidence a notice that 
a judgment entered against “PENNY M. COOLEY & TERSEY COOLEY 
(PENNY COOLEY (BURNS) POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR TERSEY)” in West 
Virginia had been docketed in Shenandoah County.  Thus, we 
conclude that, if there was error in excluding the reasons 
 
36
why Cooley revoked the power of attorney, it was clearly 
harmless. 
8. TESTIMONY CONCERNING BURNS’ PROBATION 
STATUS AND PRIOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE 
 
Prior to trial, Burns filed a motion in limine to 
exclude, during the guilt phase of his trial, references to 
his probation status and to other offenses contained in his 
statements to law enforcement officials.  He specifically 
objected to that portion of his statement to Gochenour where 
Burns stated that he had to keep good records, including 
receipts, because he was on probation.  Burns also objected 
to the statement, attributed to him by Buckley, that he had 
done something “worse than his drug runs, and it was worse 
than anything he had done.”  With regard to each statement, 
the Commonwealth argued that its probative value outweighed 
any prejudice to the defendant.  The circuit court agreed, 
and so do we. 
 
Burns referenced his probation status in an effort to 
create an alibi for himself on the night of Cooley’s murder.  
Similarly, his comment to Buckley reflects his awareness of 
the seriousness of the crime he had committed and the reason 
he needed her help to establish an alibi.  “The 
responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of 
probative value and prejudice rests in the sound discretion 
 
37
of the trial court.  The exercise of that discretion will not 
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse.”  
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990) (citing Coe v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986)).  
We find no abuse of that discretion with regard to this 
issue. 
Burns also argues that the court erred in allowing into 
evidence his wife’s testimony concerning prior episodes of 
violence and threatening conduct, and Burns’ tendency to 
become sexually aggressive when he consumed alcohol.  
However, the court allowed the evidence only for the purpose 
of showing why Penny left her residence on September 20th.  
Furthermore, the jury heard the court’s ruling in open court, 
and Burns did not request the court to give the jury a more 
explicit cautionary instruction.  See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 
240 Va. 26, 40, 393 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1990).  Thus, we find no 
error in the court’s admission of this testimony.  Its 
probative value to explain why Penny left her home on 
September 20th and took a circuitous route to a friend’s 
house outweighed any prejudice to the defendant. 
9. MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS 
While incarcerated awaiting trial, Burns wrote several 
letters to his wife.  Those letters contained incriminating 
 
38
statements by Burns and differing versions of the events 
surrounding Cooley’s murder.  Penny turned the letters over 
to Thomas, who had the letters examined by a handwriting 
expert.  That examination revealed that Burns had written the 
letters. 
Relying on Code § 8.01-398, Burns filed a motion in 
limine to exclude the letters from evidence.  The circuit 
court concluded that “[t]he statute does not prevent a third 
party who is in possession of the letters, and has gained 
that possession lawfully, from testifying.”  Therefore, the 
court denied Burns’ motion, and the letters were introduced 
into evidence during the trial through the testimony of 
Thomas.  Penny did not testify about the letters. 
On appeal, Burns contends that the privilege created in 
Code § 8.01-398 is separate and distinct from the privilege 
granted in Code § 19.2-271.2, and that the former privilege 
applies in any case irrespective of whether the spouse of an 
accused testifies.  According to Burns, the court’s ruling 
eviscerates the marital privilege and renders it meaningless 
with regard to written communications.  We do not agree. 
Code § 8.01-398(A) provides: 
 
 
Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to 
testify for or against each other in all civil actions; 
provided that neither husband nor wife shall, without 
the consent of the other, be examined in any action as 
to any communication privately made by one to the other 
 
39
while married, nor shall either be permitted, without 
such consent, to reveal in testimony after the marriage 
relation ceases any such communication made while the 
marriage subsisted. 
 
As Burns argues, we have construed the privilege embodied in 
this statute broadly to include “all information or knowledge 
privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other 
by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation 
through conduct, acts, signs, and spoken or written words.”  
Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912, 55 S.E.2d 9, 22 
(1949).  However, the plain words utilized in this statutory 
provision limit the privilege to situations where a spouse is 
being examined in an action or is revealing a private 
communication through testimony.  When a statute does not 
contain an express definition of a term, we infer the intent 
of the legislature from the plain meaning of the words used.  
City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362, 467 
S.E.2d 471, 473 (1996).  Consequently, since Penny did not 
testify about the letters or their content, Code § 8.01-
398(A) does not apply to the present situation.  Thus, the 
circuit court did not err in admitting Burns’ letters into 
evidence through the testimony of a law enforcement officer. 
10. COMPETENCY EVALUATION DURING TRIAL 
On the second day of trial during the playing of the 
audio-tape of Burns’ September 26th statement, Burns’ counsel 
 
40
moved, pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1, to have the defendant 
evaluated for his competency to stand trial.13  At that time, 
Burns’ counsel proffered to the court that Burns had advised 
his counsel that he did not want to participate anymore, and 
wanted to leave the courtroom and return to the jail.  After 
hearing argument of both counsel, the court questioned Burns 
about his wish to leave the courtroom.  Burns repeatedly said 
that he did not want to remain in the courtroom even though 
the court advised Burns about the importance of his presence 
at his trial.  The court then decided to recess for about one 
hour and twenty minutes. 
After the recess, Burns returned to the courtroom.  His 
counsel proffered that Burns had expressed his willingness to 
remain in the courtroom throughout the proceedings but that 
Burns had indicated that he was having difficulty 
understanding what was transpiring.  Burns’ counsel then 
moved again for an evaluation under Code § 19.2-169.1.  In 
doing so, counsel quoted from Dr. Stejskal’s June 10, 1999 
                     
13 Prior to trial, the circuit court found Burns 
incompetent to stand trial based on an evaluation conducted 
by Dr. William J. Stejskal, a licensed clinical psychologist.  
Consequently, the court directed that Burns be committed on 
an inpatient basis for further evaluation and for treatment 
to restore his competency.  Approximately four months later, 
the court, after hearing evidence and argument, found that 
Burns’ competency had been restored. 
 
41
report, in which Dr. Stejskal stated that Burns’ “capacity to 
assist in his own defense is marginally intact.” 
Before ruling on the motion for a competency evaluation, 
the court called the jail nurse, Bonnie Sager, to testify as 
a witness.  Sager explained the medications that had been 
prescribed to treat Burns’ anxiety and depression, and to 
help him sleep.  She further stated that she had given Burns 
his medicine at noon that day and that the jail records 
indicated that Burns had been receiving his medications.  
Finally, Sager described Burns as having occasional mood 
changes when he became angry. 
 
The court then denied the motion and made the following 
relevant findings: 
 
 
On June 23rd, 1999, I determined that [Burns] 
competency had been restored, based on the opinion of 
Dr. Stejskal and the psychologist from Central State 
. . . . 
 
 
 
Now, while the psychologist from Central State did 
agree that Mr. Burns suffered from depression and did 
need medication, she had also found, during the course 
of the treatment, that he was malingering—that is, 
acting—for a period of time. . . . [T]here are letters 
from Mr. Burns, or at least one letter, where he admits 
to acting. 
 
 
 
I also note that Dr. Stejskal was appointed to be 
the Defendant’s mental-health expert, and the Defendant 
has already given notice that he does not intend to use 
him in mitigation.  Now, there can be a lot of reasons 
for that, but again, it would indicate to me that this 
problem that we are experiencing today, while it might 
have some background, is fairly sudden. 
 
 
42
 
 
He has prescribed medication.  Dr. Stejskal 
suggested that, in order for him to be competent to 
stand trial, he must be given medication, as needed and 
as prescribed.  We have evidence from the jail nurse 
that he is being furnished all of his medications, as 
prescribed. 
 
 
 
Mr. Burns' conduct in this trial, until this 
morning, until his statement, his audio statement to Mr. 
Gochenour was being played, was alert and attentive, he 
participated.  I saw him, numerous times, talking with 
Counsel during voir dire.  Certainly, he took notes at 
other times.  During the course of this trial, he has 
taken notes and has interacted with Counsel, all of 
those things that I would expect him to do as the 
Defendant in this case. 
 
 
 
He did get upset, visibly upset, as the statement 
was being played, and there could be a whole number of 
reasons for that.  It was obviously stressful to him at 
the time, he was emotional, at times, when giving the 
statement, and that stress may now be recalled.  It may 
be that, hearing his statement today, he perceives it as 
being harmful to his case, and that could be a 
depressing event to anybody.  And, perhaps, hearing the 
statement, and playing it, may bring this whole episode, 
and that, too, may be upsetting to him. 
 
 
 
Now, during the pendency of this case, Mr. Burns 
has written me a number of letters in chambers, all of 
which I have shared with Counsel.  I am now making this 
part of this record, for this purpose: because I think 
those letters indicate that he does understand the 
proceedings against him.  Many of the letters were 
challenging the officers’ statements, as to what he told 
them and how he was treated, which is exactly the 
statements being played here today.  And as I say, there 
are a number of things covered in the letters, but, by 
and large, it would indicate to me that he did indeed 
understand the proceedings against him, and understood 
just how important his own statements may be in the case 
against him. 
 
 
 
Earlier today, when I was asking him questions on 
the record, his responses were inaudible, not 
necessarily nonsensical.  The bits and pieces that I 
 
43
could understand were responsive to my questions.  All 
told, though, they were simply inaudible. 
 
 
 
The other thing I think is worthy of note that the 
attorneys have advised the Court, and Mr. Burns has 
advised the Court, that he has made the request, several 
times, not to be present at the trial.  So his request 
earlier today is consistent with a request made 
pretrial, when there was no immediate question as to his 
competency. 
 
Code § 19.2-169.1 provides, in pertinent part, that 
“[i]f . . . the court finds, upon hearing evidence or 
representations of counsel for the defendant or the attorney 
for the Commonwealth, that there is probable cause to believe 
that the defendant lacks substantial capacity to understand 
the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his 
own defense, the court shall order that a competency 
evaluation be performed . . . .”  Upon our review of the 
record, we do not find probable cause to believe that Burns’ 
mental state deteriorated to the point that he was no longer 
competent to stand trial.  The jail nurse indicated that 
Burns had been receiving his medications, and until the tape 
of his September 26th statement was played for the jury, he 
had actively interacted with his counsel during the 
proceedings.  As the circuit court observed, it is entirely 
understandable that Burns would become upset upon hearing his 
statement to Gochenour.  Also notable is the fact that Burns 
had apparently expressed a desire to his counsel, even before 
 
44
the tape was played, not to be present at his trial.  Thus, 
we conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to 
order a competency evaluation during the trial of this case. 
11. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
Burns argues that the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of the offenses 
of capital murder, rape, forcible sodomy, and statutory 
burglary.  He claims that, because he was allegedly 
intoxicated, and because the Commonwealth’s evidence was in 
conflict regarding Burns’ whereabouts on the night of 
Cooley’s murder, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he committed a willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated murder.  He also claims that there was 
insufficient evidence of penetration to support his 
convictions for rape and forcible sodomy.  Finally, Burns 
concedes that the evidence established that he broke into and 
entered Cooley’s residence, but he asserts that the evidence 
failed to show that he did so with the intent to commit 
murder or rape.  We do not agree with any of Burns’ arguments 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. 
 
As we said earlier in this opinion, we must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and 
afford that evidence all reasonable inferences that are 
fairly deducible from it.  Horton, 255 Va. at 608, 499 S.E.2d 
 
45
at 259.  Under that standard of review, we affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court unless that judgment is without 
evidence to support it or is plainly wrong.  Id.
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the evidence showed that Burns had been drinking prior to 
Cooley’s murder, but, as the circuit court noted in ruling on 
Burns’ motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, Burns 
was not “so intoxicated as to be unable to premeditate.”  He 
drove his vehicle to several different locations on the 
evening of the murder and even asked Buckley to help him 
establish an alibi.  The alleged conflicts in the evidence 
regarding Burns’ whereabouts on the evening of Cooley’s 
murder were matters for the jury to resolve.  As the fact 
finder, the jury was certainly free to reject Burns’ self-
serving statements regarding his activities on that evening. 
 
As to the issue of penetration, Burns’ position 
overlooks the fact that Burns’ sperm were found on the 
vaginal and anal swabs taken from the victim.  In Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 284, 384 S.E.2d 775, 780 (1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990), we found that the 
presence of sperm in the victim’s vagina alone was sufficient 
to support a finding that penetration had occurred.  
Furthermore, Tontarski reported the presence of sperm cells 
on a sheet and pillowcase recovered from the bedroom where 
 
46
Cooley’s body was found, on Cooley’s lower denture found on 
the floor of the bedroom, on a washcloth found under Cooley’s 
left thigh, and on several items recovered from Cooley’s 
bathroom.  As we have already stated, the jury was free to 
reject Burns’ self-serving statements, especially the 
statement that he digitally inserted his semen into Cooley in 
order to cover up the crime. 
 
Finally, with regard to the statutory burglary 
conviction, the evidence already discussed along with the 
evidence detailing the circumstances of Cooley’s murder and 
the wounds inflicted upon her are sufficient to establish 
Burns’ intent to commit murder and/or rape when he broke into 
and entered Cooley’s home.  Intent is frequently shown by 
circumstances or by a person’s conduct.  Hargrave v. 
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974).  
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to support all the 
convictions in this case. 
C. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
1. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE FROM VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
At Burns’ request prior to trial, a subpoena duces tecum 
was issued to a regional director of the Virginia Department 
of Corrections.  The subpoena sought “documents or records 
describing the daily inmate routine, general prison 
 
47
conditions, and security measures at the Red Onion 
Correctional Center and Wallens Ridge State Prison, . . . and 
videotapes” of those facilities.  The Commonwealth moved to 
quash the subpoena, and after a hearing on that motion, the 
circuit court granted the motion.14
During the penalty phase of his trial, Burns attempted 
to introduce evidence concerning the conditions at those 
prisons in rebuttal to the Commonwealth’s evidence of Burns’ 
future dangerousness.  Burns’ counsel reminded the court that 
subpoenas had been issued to the wardens of those two so-
called “super-max” prisons, but since the court had indicated 
that it would grant a motion to quash those subpoenas, 
counsel had obtained newspaper articles from the Internet 
that discussed the security and life of a prisoner at those 
facilities.  Burns’ counsel proffered those articles as “what 
the testimony would show.”  The court adhered to its prior 
decision and did not admit the testimony. 
 
Recognizing that this Court held in Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70, 515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000), and Cherrix v. 
                     
14 At Burns’ request, subpoenas were also issued to the 
wardens of those facilities.  Since the Commonwealth’s motion 
did not cover those subpoenas, the court’s decision likewise 
did not address them.  However, the court indicated that it 
would make the same ruling if a motion to quash those 
subpoenas were before it. 
 
48
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999), that evidence regarding the 
conditions of prison life in a maximum security prison is not 
proper mitigating evidence, Burns offered this evidence, not 
in mitigation, but in rebuttal to the Commonwealth’s evidence 
of Burns’ future dangerousness.  Burns argues that, since the 
only possible sentence for an accused convicted of capital 
murder is either the death penalty or life imprisonment 
without parole, the prison society is the only society to 
which such a defendant can ever pose a “continuing serious 
threat.”  Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C).  Thus, according 
to Burns, evidence regarding the quality and structure of an 
inmate’s life in a maximum security prison, as well as the 
prison’s safety and security features, is relevant evidence 
to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence that a defendant would 
“commit criminal acts of violence” in the future.  Id.  We do 
not agree. 
 
First, we have rejected the argument that a jury’s 
determination, under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and –264.4(C), 
regarding whether a defendant “would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society” is restricted to a consideration of only the prison 
society.  Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 517, 537 
S.E.2d 866, 879 (2000).  Nevertheless, Burns contends that 
 
49
his proffered evidence should have been admitted to dispel 
the misconception that prison life includes such features as 
weekend furloughs, conjugal visits, and unrestricted work 
privileges.  However, the Commonwealth offered no such 
evidence regarding the nature of prison life for a defendant 
convicted of capital murder or any other felony.  Nor did the 
Commonwealth introduce evidence about the number of violent 
crimes committed in prison or the likelihood that a prisoner 
could escape.  Instead, the Commonwealth’s evidence 
concerning Burns’ future dangerousness consisted of his prior 
criminal record and unadjudicated criminal acts.  Thus, 
Burns’ evidence was not in rebuttal to any evidence 
concerning prison life. 
 
Instead, Burns wanted to show, in rebuttal to the 
Commonwealth’s evidence of his future dangerousness, that his 
opportunities to commit criminal acts of violence in the 
future would be severely limited in a maximum security 
prison.  However, in Cherrix, we reiterated the principle 
that the United States Constitution “does not limit ‘the 
traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, 
evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior 
record, or the circumstances of his offense.’”  Cherrix, 257 
Va. at 309, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978)).  Thus, the relevant inquiry is 
 
50
not whether Burns could commit criminal acts of violence in 
the future but whether he would.  Indeed, Code §§ 19.2-264.2 
and –264.4(C) use the phrase “would commit criminal acts of 
violence.”  Accordingly, the focus must be on the particular 
facts of Burns’ history and background, and the circumstances 
of his offense.  In other words, a determination of future 
dangerousness revolves around an individual defendant and a 
specific crime.  Evidence regarding the general nature of 
prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to 
that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of 
future dangerousness such as that presented in this case. 
 
We also note that the cases relied upon by Burns with 
regard to this issue, specifically Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349 (1977), Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 
(1986), and Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), 
are inapposite.  In Gardner, the trial court imposed a 
sentence of death after reviewing the contents of a pre-
sentence report, part of which had not been disclosed to the 
defendant.  Gardner, 430 U.S. at 353.  Skipper involved the 
trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to introduce 
evidence showing his good behavior in jail while awaiting 
trial.  Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4.  The Court in Skipper noted 
that the relevancy of that evidence was “underscored . . . by 
the prosecutor’s closing argument, which urged the jury to 
 
51
return a sentence of death in part because petitioner could 
not be trusted to behave if he were simply returned to 
prison.”  Id. at 5.  Unlike the evidence proffered by Burns, 
the evidence in Skipper was peculiar to that defendant’s 
history and background.  Finally, Simmons required the giving 
of an instruction regarding life without parole when a 
defendant is parole ineligible and future dangerousness is at 
issue.  Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156. 
 
Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s 
decision quashing the subpoena directed to the Department of 
Corrections and refusing to admit evidence about prison life 
in a maximum security prison in rebuttal to the 
Commonwealth’s evidence in this case of Burns’ future 
dangerousness. 
2. CLOSING ARGUMENT OF COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY 
 
During closing argument in the penalty phase of this 
case, the Commonwealth’s Attorney argued that Cooley was a 
modest, private person who had an “animal” enter her life.  
At that point, Burns objected and the court stated, “Hold on, 
Mr. Ebert [the Commonwealth’s Attorney].”  The following 
colloquy then occurred: 
MR. EBERT:  Excuse me.  A person acting like an 
animal.  Excuse me. 
 
THE COURT:  All right. 
 
 
52
MR. EBERT:  A person acting with depravity of mind. 
 
MR. ALLEN [Burns’ attorney]:  I have a motion, Your 
Honor.  And I will make the motion after he finishes.  
Note my objection at this time. 
 
THE COURT:  All right. 
 
MR. EBERT:  Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen.  I 
don’t mean to characterize him as an animal.  But I will 
characterize him as a human being with a depravity of 
mind, a person who acted in a vile, horrible, inhumane 
way, to an innocent person. 
 
 
After the Commonwealth’s Attorney concluded his closing 
argument, Burns argued that the reference to an “animal” was 
improper and prejudicial, and that a mistrial was required.  
He also complained because the court had not admonished the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney at the time he made the statement.  
The court then explained that, although Burns had objected at 
the time, it had not admonished the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
because he had corrected the statement.  For the same reason, 
the court denied the motion for a mistrial.  Burns assigns 
error to that ruling. 
 
Although the Commonwealth argues that Burns procedurally 
defaulted this assignment of error because he did not move 
for a mistrial at the moment “when the objectionable words 
were spoken,”  Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 774, 232 
S.E.2d 778, 781 (1977), we are not inclined to agree.  While 
Burns’ counsel did not specifically move for a mistrial when 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney said that an “animal” had entered 
 
53
Cooley’s life, he did object and advised the court that he 
had a motion that he would make after the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney finished his closing argument.  While the better 
practice would have been to move for a mistrial at that very 
moment, we cannot say under the circumstances of this case 
that Burns’ motion came too late.15  Accordingly, we will 
address the merits of this assignment of error. 
 
In doing so, we are mindful of the principle that “[a] 
trial court exercises its discretion when it determines 
whether it should grant a motion for mistrial.”  Beavers v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993).  “When a motion for mistrial is 
made, based upon an allegedly prejudicial event, the trial 
court must make an initial factual determination, in the 
light of all the circumstances of the case, whether the 
defendant’s rights are so ‘indelibly prejudiced’ as to 
necessitate a new trial.”  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 
78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 
(1990) (quoting LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 
304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 
(1984)).  Unless we find that the trial court’s denial of a 
mistrial is wrong as a matter of law, we will not disturb the 
                     
15 However, Burns never asked the court to instruct the 
jury to disregard the argument of the Commonwealth’s 
 
54
court’s decision on appeal.  Spencer, 240 Va. at 95, 393 
S.E.2d at 619. 
 
In the present case, we cannot say, as a matter of law, 
that the circuit court erred in denying Burns’ motion for a 
mistrial.  By the time that Burns moved for a mistrial, the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney had retracted the reference to Burns 
as an “animal” and had stated to the jury three times, 
“Excuse me.”  Furthermore, despite the court’s explanation 
why it did not admonish the Commonwealth’s Attorney, we 
believe that the court’s initial response to Burns’ 
objection, i.e., “Hold on, Mr. Ebert[,]” was tantamount to an 
admonishment, which the jury heard.  An “admonition of [a] 
trial court in the presence of [a] jury [makes] it known to 
the jury that the court [is] not satisfied as to the 
propriety of [an] argument.”  Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 
Va. 41, 54, 286 S.E.2d 172, 179 (1982).  Thus, we conclude 
that Burns’ rights were not “indelibly prejudiced.”  
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 657. 
3. MENTAL EVALUATION PRIOR TO PENALTY PHASE 
 
Prior to the commencing the penalty phase of the trial, 
Burns moved for an evaluation pursuant to Code § 19.2-300.  
The circuit court denied the motion on the basis that an 
evaluation under that section is to guide the trial judge, 
______________________ 
Attorney. 
 
55
not the jury.  The court advised Burns that he could renew 
his motion at the proper time. 
 
In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-300 provides, that, when 
any person is convicted for 
any criminal offense which indicates sexual abnormality, 
the trial judge . . . shall upon application of the 
attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant, or counsel 
for defendant . . . defer sentence until the report of a 
mental examination conducted as provided in § 19.2-301 
of the defendant can be secured to guide the judge in 
determining what disposition shall be made of the 
defendant. 
 
Although Burns acknowledges that this statute provides for a 
mental evaluation to “guide the judge,” he claims that such 
an evaluation is equally valuable to a jury when it is 
deciding the sentence for a capital murder conviction.  
However, his argument overlooks the plain language of the 
statute.  This provision authorizes a mental evaluation for 
the purpose of guiding the trial judge, not the jury. 
 
Furthermore, Burns renewed his motion for an evaluation 
under Code § 19.2-300 after the jury returned its sentencing 
verdicts, and the court granted it.  Thus, Burns received all 
that he was entitled to under that statute.  Accordingly, we 
will reject his claim. 
4. PENALTY PHASE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Before the jury commenced its deliberations during the 
penalty phase of the trial, the court instructed the jurors 
 
56
that “[t]he words ‘imprisonment for life’ mean imprisonment 
for life without possibility of parole.”  In addition to this 
instruction, the court stressed to the jury that imprisonment 
for life does mean life without parole.  Nevertheless, Burns 
now complains because the circuit court refused his proposed 
Instruction A, which instructed the jury that it could 
“consider as a possible mitigating factor that a sentence of 
life in prison means that the defendant will never be 
eligible for parole[,]” and his proposed Instruction C, which 
instructed the jury that, in determining the question of 
future dangerousness, it “may consider the fact that if you 
set the defendant’s punishment at life imprisonment, he will 
never be eligible for parole.” 
We conclude that the circuit court properly rejected 
these instructions.  Since the jury was instructed that 
imprisonment for life means life without the possibility of 
parole, both of Burns’ proposed instructions were 
repetitious.  See Gray, 233 Va. at 351, 356 S.E.2d at 178. 
Furthermore, we have consistently held that a defendant 
convicted of capital murder is not entitled to a jury 
instruction that emphasizes a particular mitigating factor.  
See e.g. George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 283, 411 S.E.2d 
12, 23 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992); Gray, 233 
 
57
Va. at 351, 356 S.E.2d at 178; LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 595, 304 
S.E.2d at 661.16
D. STATUTORY REVIEW 
1. PASSION, PREJUDICE, AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we must determine 
whether the death sentence in this case was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.  
Upon careful review of the record, we find no evidence that 
any such factor was present or influenced either the jury’s 
or the circuit court’s sentencing decision. 
However, Burns contends that his sentence of death was 
imposed under the influence of passion and prejudice because 
the Virginia death penalty statute is unconstitutional; he 
was not allowed to introduce evidence from prison officials 
to rebut the Commonwealth’s closing argument that, if Burns 
receives life imprisonment, he would pose a continuing danger 
                     
16 The court, sua sponte, asked the parties to address 
the verdict form utilized during the penalty phase of Burns’ 
trial in light of our decision in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. 160, 179, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999).  Upon considering 
the parties’ letter briefs, we conclude that any question 
concerning the verdict form in this case is procedurally 
defaulted because Burns neither raised the issue in the 
circuit court nor assigned it as error before this Court.  
See Rule 5:25; Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 403 n.13, 
519 S.E.2d 808, 816 n.13 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
120 S.Ct. 1970 (2000). 
 
 
58
to the prison staff and could escape from prison;17 and the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney referred to Burns as an “animal” and 
argued to the jury that their decision “will send a message.”  
We do not believe that any of these factors created an 
atmosphere of passion or prejudice that influenced the 
sentencing decision. 
2. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 
Code § 17.1-313(C) (2) requires us to determine whether 
the sentence of death in this case is “excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Pursuant to 
Code § 17.1-313(E), we have accumulated the records of all 
capital murder cases reviewed by this Court.  The records 
include not only those capital murder cases in which the 
death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in which the 
trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the defendant 
                     
17 This argument by the Commonwealth occurred during its 
rebuttal closing argument at the end of the penalty phase.  
At that time, Burns did not object to the argument.  However, 
after the court explained the verdict forms to the jury and 
the jury retired to deliberate, Burns moved for a mistrial on 
the basis that the Commonwealth’s argument was precisely the 
kind of argument that he sought to rebut with his evidence 
concerning the security features of a maximum security prison 
and the nature of an inmate’s life incarcerated in such a 
facility.  Clearly, this motion for a mistrial, unlike the 
first one, came too late.  See Reid, 217 Va. at 774, 232 
S.E.2d at 781.  However, we express no opinion regarding the 
question whether Burns should have been allowed to introduce 
 
59
petitioned this Court for an appeal.  Whitley v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).  In complying with the statutory 
directive to compare this case with “similar cases,” we have 
specifically focused on cases in which a person was murdered 
during the commission of rape and/or forcible sodomy, and the 
death penalty was imposed upon both the future dangerousness 
and vileness predicates.  See, e.g., Cherrix, 257 Va. 292, 
513 S.E.2d 642; Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 
S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987); Coleman 
v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
1091, 254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919 (1979); 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). 
We have also considered cases in which defendants 
received life sentences, rather than the death penalty, for 
capital murder during the commission of rape.  See, e.g., 
Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 339 S.E.2d 186 (1986); 
Keil v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 99, 278 S.E.2d 826 (1981).  
“However, our proportionality analysis encompasses all 
capital murder cases presented to this Court for review and 
______________________ 
that evidence to rebut the Commonwealth’s argument if he had 
made a timely objection. 
 
60
is not limited” to these selected cases.  Overton v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 599, 605-06, ____ S.E.2d ____, ____ 
(2000) (citing Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 522, 331 
S.E.2d 407, 422 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986)).  
Our proportionality review also does not require that a given 
capital murder case “equal in horror the worst possible 
scenarios yet encountered.”  Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 
543, 556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 
(1988). 
The defendant has argued that the sentence of death in 
his case is disproportionate because of his borderline range 
of intellectual functioning,18 the physical and sexual abuse 
that he suffered as a child, his incompetence to stand trial 
at one time, his continued need for medications during the 
trial, and his symptoms of anxiety and depression.  Burns, 
however, fails to address the fact that he broke into and 
entered the home of his elderly mother-in-law, raped and 
sodomized her, and killed her by breaking her ribs in 24 
places and rupturing her heart.  He also wants this Court to 
ignore his lengthy criminal record and his repeated attacks 
on Buckley.  Finally, we have approved the imposition of the 
death penalty for a defendant with a significantly lower IQ 
 
61
than that of Burns.  See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 375, 
387-89, 534 S.E.2d 312, 319-21 (2000) (defendant had IQ of 
59).  Thus, we do not find that any of the factors identified 
by Burns, when considered in light of his prior criminal 
history and the circumstances of this offense, distinguish 
him from other defendants who have received the death 
penalty. 
Accordingly, based on our review of this case and 
“similar cases,” we conclude that Burns’ sentence of death is 
not excessive or disproportionate to sentences generally 
imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders comparable 
to the defendant’s murder of Tersey Elizabeth Cooley. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we find no error either in the 
judgments of the circuit court or in the imposition of the 
death penalty.  We also see no reason to commute the sentence 
of death.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgments of the 
circuit court. 
Record No. 001879 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 001880 — Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
______________________ 
18 Dr. Cathy Williams-Sledge administered an intellectual 
test to Burns.  The results showed that he has a verbal IQ of 
73, a performance IQ of 86, and a full-scale IQ of 77. 
 
62
 
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority 
opinion in this case concluding that the trial court did not 
err in refusing to order a competency evaluation of William 
Joseph Burns upon motion of his counsel during his trial for 
the capital murder of Tersey Elizabeth Cooley and other 
related felony crimes.  I concur in all respects with the 
remainder of that opinion. 
 
Beyond question, the conviction of a legally incompetent 
defendant violates that defendant’s constitutional right to a 
fair trial.  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).  
In that regard, the issue in the present case does not 
involve an insanity defense which would concern Burns’ mental 
state at the time these crimes were committed.  Nor does the 
issue involve a final determination that Burns was, or was 
not, incompetent to stand trial at some point during this 
trial.  Rather, the narrow issue is whether, under the facts 
of this particular case, Burns was improperly denied a 
competency evaluation pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1(A) so as 
to ensure that he received a fair trial.  See Drope at 181-82 
(due process violated when trial court failed to make further 
inquiry into defendant’s competency during trial). 
 
In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-169.1(A) provides that: 
“If, at any time . . . before the end of trial, the court 
finds, upon hearing evidence or representations of counsel 
 
63
for the defendant . . . that there is probable cause to 
believe that the defendant lacks substantial capacity to 
. . . assist his attorney in his own defense, the court shall 
order that a competency evaluation be performed.”  (Emphasis 
added).  The probable cause standard in this statute is the 
familiar objective one requiring less than a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Thus, where the circumstances of a particular 
case would reasonably cause doubt with respect to the 
defendant’s substantial capacity to assist his attorney in 
his own defense, this statute mandates, as is 
constitutionally required, that the trial judge order an 
evaluation of the defendant’s competency.  This statute does 
not give the trial judge the discretion as to whether to 
order that evaluation.  Accordingly, our review of the trial 
judge’s denial of the motion by Burns’ counsel for a 
competency evaluation pursuant to this statute involves 
consideration of the objective circumstances known to the 
trial judge at the time of his ruling, and not the trial 
judge’s subjective beliefs regarding Burns’ competency. 
 
Although reflected only in a footnote in the majority 
opinion, it is significant that prior to Burns’ trial the 
trial judge had found him incompetent to stand trial, and 
that only after approximately four months of inpatient care 
had the trial judge found that Burns’ competency had been 
 
64
restored.  However, Dr. William J. Stejskal, a court-
appointed mental health expert, had opined in his report to 
the trial court that Burns’ capacity to assist in his own 
defense was only “marginally intact,” and that Burns would 
require appropriate antidepressant and anxiety medication 
under “continuing psychiatric care with respect to the 
management of the medications.”  Burns was receiving these 
medications, prescribed by a physician, while in jail so that 
his capacity to assist in his own defense could be 
maintained.  Nevertheless, on the first day of trial it 
became necessary for the trial court to recess so that 
medication could be administered to Burns.  Then on the next 
day of trial, Burns became “visibly upset” while a tape of 
his statement to police was played for the jury.  Again the 
trial court recessed, questioned Burns, and heard evidence 
from the jail nurse that Burns was receiving the prescribed 
medications. 
 
During the trial judge’s questioning of Burns, he gave 
answers that the court reporter noted in some instances as 
“inaudible” and in others as “unintelligible.”  As indicated 
in the majority opinion, the trial judge dismissed this 
distinction in Burns’ answers, finding that Burns’ “responses 
were inaudible, not necessarily nonsensical.  The bits and 
pieces that I could understand were responsive to my 
 
65
questions.  All told, though, they were simply inaudible.”  
In contrast to this conclusion, admittedly based on only 
“bits and pieces” that could be understood, Burns’ counsel 
asserted that “quite clearly, [Burns] is not thinking 
rationally at this time, and his statements are 
incomprehensible.  I am sitting right next to him.” 
 
In denying the motion for a competency evaluation, the 
trial judge expressed in detail his reasons for doing so.  
Those reasons are related in the majority opinion and need 
not be repeated here.  It is apparent that the trial judge 
concluded that because Burns was receiving medication he was 
competent, that he was probably “malingering” or “acting,” 
and that playing the tape of his statement to the police was 
understandably “upsetting” to him.  In short, the trial judge 
simply did not believe that Burns lacked substantial capacity 
to assist his attorney in his own defense.  The trial judge 
may have been right in his conclusions regarding Burns’ 
competency.  No appellate court will ever know for sure, 
however. 
In any event, the trial judge was not called upon under 
the proper application of Code § 19.2-169.1(A) to determine 
Burns’ competency or to deny the requested evaluation upon a 
subjective belief that Burns was “acting” incompetent.  
Rather, the trial judge was called upon to determine 
 
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objectively whether from the undisputed facts there existed 
probable cause to believe that Burns lacked the requisite 
capacity to assist his attorney in his own defense.  Upon a 
showing of that probable cause, the trial judge was 
statutorily mandated to order the requested competency 
evaluation. 
 
In my view, the conclusion that such probable cause was 
established is compelled by the undisputed facts in this 
case.  Burns was known to be only “marginally” competent to 
stand trial when the trial began.  His competency during 
trial depended entirely on the continuing effectiveness of 
the prescribed medications and not merely that Burns received 
them.  On at least one occasion it became necessary to recess 
the trial proceedings so that Burns could be given additional 
medication.  On another occasion, Burns became “visibly 
upset,” another recess was required, and at that time he gave 
“unintelligible” answers to some of the trial judge’s 
questions.  Moreover, Burns’ counsel advised the trial court 
that Burns was not thinking “rationally” and that Burns’ 
statements were “incomprehensible” to him.  Surely, these 
circumstances created a reasonable question whether the 
prescribed medications were continuing to be effective so 
that Burns could maintain substantial capacity to assist his 
attorney in his own defense.  Accordingly, probable cause was 
 
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established on the issue of Burns’ competency and it was 
error for the trial court to deny the motion for a competency 
evaluation as mandated by Code § 19.2-196.1(A). 
 
For these reasons and because the error in this case 
denied Burns his right to a fair trial, I would reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
 
 
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