Case Title: MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS V SECRETARY OF STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119274

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 29, 2001  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBECK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
 No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
The issue here is whether 2000 Public Act 381 is exempt  
from the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution.  
Having granted leave to appeal and heard oral argument, this  
Court finds as follows:  
 
 
(1)  The power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution  
“does not extend to acts making appropriations for state  
institutions . . . .” Const 1963, art 2, § 9.  
(2)  2000 PA 381 states that “one million dollars is  
appropriated from the general fund to the department of state  
police . . . .” MCL 28.425w(1).  
(3)
 
An 
appropriation 
of 
$1,000,000 
is 
an  
“appropriation,” and the Department of State Police is a  
“state institution.”  
(4) Therefore, the power of referendum of the Michigan  
Constitution does not extend to 2000 PA 381.  
Accordingly, consistent with Const 1963, art 2, § 9 and  
an unbroken line of decisions of this Court interpreting that  
provision,1 the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the relief  
sought in the complaint for mandamus is granted.  The May 21,  
2001 declaration by the Board of State Canvassers of the  
sufficiency of the petition for referendum on 2000 PA 381 is  
vacated and defendant Secretary of State and the Board of  
State Canvassers are directed that 2000 PA 381 is not subject  
to referendum for the reasons set forth herein.  
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(4), the clerk is directed to  
issue the judgment order in this case forthwith.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with  
1 Co Rd Ass’n v Bd of State Canvassers, 407 Mich 101; 282 
NW2d 774 (1979); Co Rd Comm’rs v Bd of State Canvassers, 391 
Mich 666; 218 NW2d 144 (1974); Good Roads Federation v State 
Bd of Canvassers, 333 Mich 352; 53 NW2d 481 (1952); Moreton v 
Secretary of State, 240 Mich 584; 216 NW 450 (1927); Detroit  
Automobile Club v Secretary of State, 230 Mich 623; 203 NW 529 
(1925).  
2  
 
TAYLOR, J.  
3 
 
 
 
                                          
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBECK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
CORRIGAN, C.J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result and reasoning of the majority  
opinion.  I write to emphasize that the intervening defendant  
retains a direct remedy, the initiative process. Under our  
state constitution, this remedy is available even when the  
Legislature has made an appropriation to a state institution.  
I also wish to emphasize that the Legislature’s  
subjective 
motivation 
for 
making 
a 
$1,000,000 
appropriation 
in  
2000 PA 381—assuming one can be accurately identified1—is  
1  
The 
parties 
and 
amicus 
curiae 
have 
asserted  
(continued...)  
  
 
irrelevant. Intervening defendant contends that despite the  
appropriation in 2000 PA 381 and the plain language of Const  
1963, art 2, § 9, the act is subject to the referendum process  
because the “purpose” of the appropriation, as purportedly  
revealed by the legislative history, was to evade a  
referendum.
 This argument is misplaced. 
This Court has  
repeatedly held that courts must not be concerned with the  
alleged motives of a legislative body in enacting a law, but  
only with the end result—the actual language of the  
legislation.  See Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 383­
384; 183 NW2d 796 (1971); C F Smith Co v Fitzgerald, 270 Mich  
659, 681; 259 NW 352 (1935); People v Gibbs, 186 Mich 127,  
134-135; 152 NW 1053 (1915).  
Our cases follow Justice Cooley’s powerful exposition of  
this doctrine in his seminal work on constitutional law. It  
is as persuasive to us as it was to our predecessors:  
The validity of legislation can never be made 
to depend on the motives which have secured its 
adoption, whether these be public or personal, 
honest or corrupt. There is ample reason for this 
in the fact that the people have set no authority 
over the legislators with jurisdiction to inquire 
into their conduct, and to judge what have been 
their purposes in the pretended discharge of the 
legislative trust.  This is a jurisdiction which 
they have reserved to themselves exclusively, and 
they have appointed frequent elections as the 
occasions and the means for bringing these agents  
1(...continued) 
contradictory positions regarding the legislative motive for 
the appropriation in 2000 PA 381.  It is a dubious proposition 
to suggest that a legislative body comprised of individual 
persons can have a single motivation for enacting any piece of 
legislation. 
Even assuming that such a motive could be 
ascertained, there is no testimonial record in this original 
action.  Accordingly, we have no means by which to decide 
these disputed claims regarding legislative motivation.  
2  
 
to account.  A further reason is, that to make 
legislation depend upon motives would render all 
statute law uncertain, and the rule which should 
allow it could not logically stop short of  
permitting a similar inquiry into the motives of 
those who passed judgment.  Therefore the courts do  
not permit a question of improper legislative 
motives to be raised, but they will in every 
instance assume that the motives were public and 
befitting the station. They will also assume that 
the 
legislature 
had 
before 
it 
any 
evidence  
necessary to enable it to take the action it did 
take. [Cooley, Constitutional Law, pp 154-155.]  
3  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBECK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
YOUNG, J. (concurring).  
I join and fully concur in the admirably concise majority  
opinion.
 I write separately to provide the rationale and  
analysis for my conclusion that 2000 PA 381 is exempt from the  
referendum power of art 2, § 9 of our 1963 state constitution  
and why I take exception to the constitutional exegesis  
offered by my dissenting colleagues.  
I. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT  
There is no gainsaying that 2000 PA 381 has become the  
focus of a heated debate among various segments of Michigan’s  
citizens; Justice Cavanagh’s dissent is generous in providing  
his own extensive personal views on the public controversy  
surrounding 2000 PA 381.  However important, this political  
issue–the merits or demerits of the underlying act–is not  
before this Court.  The sole question we are to decide in this  
case is a legal one: Is 2000 PA 381 subject to the referral  
process under the provisions of art 2, § 9?  If it is, 2000 PA  
381 will not become effective until the next general  
election–if a majority of the voters then approve it. Const  
1963, art 2, § 9; MCL 168.477(2).  If the stated limitation on  
the people’s referral power contained in art 2, § 9 applies,  
the act is not subject to the referendum process at all.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
In December 2000, the Legislature enacted 2000 PA 381,  
MCL 28.421 et seq., which modifies the standards for the  
issuance of concealed weapons permits.  The effective date of  
the law is July 1, 2001.  
Intervening defendant is a group that filed with  
defendants Secretary of State and Board of State Canvassers a  
petition, signed by approximately 260,000 Michigan voters,1  
1According to a letter written by Christopher Thomas, 
Director of Elections for the Department of State, an  
effective 
referendum 
petition 
requires 
151,136 
valid  
signatures (comprising five percent of voters in the last 
gubernatorial election).  Approximately 260,000 signatures 
appear on the petition filed by defendants.  Once the Board of  
Elections has declared the sufficiency of a referendum 
petition, the effectiveness of the law that is the subject of 
(continued...)  
2  
 
  
requesting a referendum on the new law.  Although the Board of  
Canvassers initially, by a two-to-two vote, declined to  
certify the petition on the basis that the law may not be  
subject to referendum, on May 21, 2001, the board certified  
the petition. 
Approximately 230,000 valid signatures 
supported the petition (80,000 more than the number 
required).2 
On March 23, 2001, plaintiffs–two organizations that  
lobbied for the law and three individuals who want to apply  
for concealed weapons permits–filed a complaint for mandamus  
in the Court of Appeals, seeking to prevent the Board of State  
Canvassers from proceeding with the canvass of the petitions.  
Plaintiffs argued that 2000 PA 381 is not subject to  
referendum because it contains an appropriation to a state  
institution, the Department of State Police, and the Michigan  
Constitution 
provides that “[t]he power of referendum does not  
extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions  
. . . .” Const 1963, art 2, § 9.  
As stated, plaintiffs contended that two provisions in  
2000 PA 381 make appropriations for a state institution within  
1(...continued) 
the petition is suspended until a vote at the next general 
election, November 2002 in this case.  Const 1963, art 2, § 9; 
MCL 168.477(2).  
2On May 16, 2001, intervening defendant filed its own 
mandamus action, asking the Court of Appeals to require the 
Board of Canvassers to certify the petition.  However, the 
Court of Appeals opinion in the instant case was issued on the 
same day, just before the filing of intervening defendant’s 
complaint.  After the Board of Canvassers met for a second  
time and voted to certify the petition, the parties informed 
the Court of Appeals that the second mandamus action was moot.  
3  
 
the meaning of art 9, § 2.  The first, § 5v of the act, (1)  
creates a concealed weapon enforcement fund in the state  
treasury, (2) allows the state treasurer to receive money or  
other assets from any source for deposit into the fund and to  
direct the investment of the fund, (3) provides that money in  
the fund at the close of the fiscal year shall remain in the  
fund and not lapse to the general fund, and (4) directs the  
Department of State Police to expend money from the  
enforcement fund only to provide training to law enforcement  
personnel in connection with the act.3  The second, § 5w(1) of  
the act, provides that “[o]ne million dollars is appropriated  
from the general fund to the department of state police for  
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001" for such activities  
as distributing free safety devices to the public and creating  
and maintaining a database of individuals applying for a  
concealed weapons license.4  
3MCL 28.425v.  
4MCL 28.425w(1) provides:  
One million dollars is appropriated from the 
general fund to the department of state police for 
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001 for all 
of the following:  
(a) Distributing trigger locks or other safety 
devices for firearms to the public free of charge.  
(b) Providing concealed pistol application 
kits to county sheriffs, local police agencies, and 
county clerks for distribution under section 5.  
(c) The fingerprint analysis and comparison 
reports required under section 5b(11).  
(d) Photographs required under section 5c.  
(continued...)  
4  
 
Plaintiffs further argued that defendants Secretary of State  
and the Board of Canvassers had a threshold duty to determine  
whether the petition on its face meets the constitutional  
prerequisites for acceptance and canvassing, and that, until  
this determination was made, canvassing should cease.  
In an order dated April 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals  
granted People Who Care About Kids permission to intervene and  
accepted the amicus curiae brief of the Michigan Association  
of Chiefs of Police.  The panel then dismissed plaintiffs’  
complaint for mandamus, holding–on a ground not raised by the  
parties–that  
the 
matter 
is 
not 
ripe 
for 
this 
Court’s  
consideration.  The Board of State Canvassers has  
not completed its canvass of the referendum  
petitions. 
MCL 168.479.[5]  
4(...continued) 
(e) Creating and maintaining the database 
required under section 5e.  
(f) Creating and maintaining a database of 
firearms that have been reported lost or stolen. 
. . .  
(g) 
Grants 
to 
county 
concealed 
weapon 
licensing boards for expenditure only to implement 
this act.  
(h) Training under section 5v(4).  
(i) Creating and distributing the reporting 
forms required under section 5m.  
(j) A public safety campaign regarding the 
requirements of this act.  
5MCL 168.479 provides:  
[a]ny person or persons, feeling themselves 
aggrieved by any determination made by said board, 
may have such determination reviewed by mandamus, 
certiorari, or other appropriate remedy in the 
(continued...)  
5  
On plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal, this  
Court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for plenary  
consideration of the complaint for mandamus.6  463 Mich 1007­
1008 (2001).  
On remand, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs’  
request for mandamus, holding that “2000 PA 381 is not an act  
making appropriations for state institutions as contemplated  
by Const 1963, art 2, § 9,” and that it therefore was subject  
to referendum. 246 Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).  
We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal  
from the decision of the Court of Appeals.  464 Mich ___  
(2001).7  
III. CONTROLLING RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION  
Of 
preeminent 
importance in addressing the matter at hand  
is an understanding of the particularized rules of textual  
construction that apply to constitutional provisions. “Each  
5(...continued) 
supreme court.  
6We stated in our remand order that  
[t]his controversy is ripe for review because it is 
not dependent upon the Board of Canvassers’  
counting or consideration of the petitions but 
rather involves a threshold determination whether  
the petitions on their face meet the constitutional 
prerequisites for acceptance. . . .  All of the  
information necessary to resolve this controversy, 
i.e., whether 2000 PA 381 constitutes a law which 
is excepted from the referendum process under Const 
1963, art 2, § 9, is presently available.  
7We indicated in our grant order that the only issue for 
our consideration was “whether 2000 PA 381 is an act making an 
appropriation for a state institution for the purposes of 
Const 1963, art 2, § 9.”  
6  
  
 
 
provision of a State Constitution is the direct word of the  
people of the State, not that of the scriveners thereof,”  
Lockwood v Nims, 357 Mich 517, 565; 98 NW2d 753 (1959) (BLACK,  
J., concurring), and therefore “[w]e must never forget that it  
is a Constitution we are expounding,” id., quoting McCulloch  
v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 407; 4 L Ed 579 (1819).  
Our 
primary 
goal 
in 
construing 
a 
constitutional  
provision–in marked contrast to a statute or other texts–is to  
give effect to the intent of the people of the state of  
Michigan who ratified the constitution, by applying the rule  
of “common understanding.”  Recently, in People v Bulger, 462  
Mich 495, 507; 614 NW2d 103 (2000), we explained the rule of  
common understanding:  
In construing our constitution, this Court’s 
object is to give effect to the intent of the 
people adopting it. . . . “Hence, the primary 
source for ascertaining its meaning is to examine  
its plain meaning as understood by its ratifiers at  
the time of its adoption.”  
[Citations omitted; 
emphasis supplied.]  
I agree with Justice Cavanagh’s reliance on Justice  
COOLEY’s explanation of the rule of “common understanding”:  
A constitution is made for the people and by 
the people.  The interpretation that should be 
given it is that which reasonable minds, the great 
mass of the people themselves, would give it.  “For  
as the Constitution does not derive its force from  
the convention which framed, but from the people 
who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is  
that of the people, and it is not to be supposed 
that they have looked for any dark or abstruse 
meaning in the words employed, but rather that they 
have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the 
common understanding, and ratified the instrument 
in the belief that that was the sense designed to 
be conveyed.” 
[Federated Publications, Inc v 
Michigan State Univ Bd of Trustees, 460 Mich 75, 
85; 594 NW2d 491 (1999), quoting 1 Cooley, 
Constitutional Limitations (6th ed), p 81 (emphasis  
7  
 
  
added).]  
See also American Axle & Mfg, Inc v Hamtramck, 461 Mich 352,  
362; 604 NW2d 330 (2000); Highway Comm v Vanderkloot, 392 Mich  
159, 179; 220 NW2d 416 (1974); Traverse City Sch Dist v  
Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971);  
Michigan Farm Bureau v Secretary of State, 379 Mich 387, 391;  
151 NW2d 797 (1967); Lockwood, supra at 569.  
As expounded by Justice COOLEY and this Court, the “common  
understanding” principle of construction is essentially a  
search for the original meaning attributed to the words of the  
constitution by those who ratified it.  This rule of  
construction acknowledges the possibility that a provision of  
the constitution may rationally bear multiple meanings, but  
the rule is concerned with ascertaining and giving effect only  
to the construction, consistent with the language, that the  
ratifiers intended.  Thus, our task is not to impose on the  
constitutional text at issue here the meaning we as judges  
would prefer, or even the meaning the people of Michigan today  
would prefer, but to search for contextual clues about what  
meaning the people who ratified the text in 1963 gave to it.  
Our analysis, of course, must begin with an examination  
of the precise language used in art 2, § 9 of our 1963  
Constitution. See American Axle, supra at 362. 
Art 2, § 9  
provides, in relevant part:  
The people reserve to themselves the power to 
propose laws and to enact and reject laws, called 
the initiative, and the power to approve or reject 
laws enacted by the legislature, called the  
referendum.  The power of initiative extends only 
to laws which the legislature may enact under this 
constitution. 
The power of referendum does not  
8  
 
extend to acts making appropriations for state 
institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds  
and must be invoked in the manner prescribed by law 
within 90 days following the final adjournment of 
the legislative session at which the law was 
enacted.  To invoke the initiative or referendum, 
petitions 
signed 
by 
a 
number 
of 
registered 
electors, 
not 
less 
than 
eight 
percent 
for  
initiative and five percent for referendum of the 
total vote cast for all candidates for governor at 
the last preceding general election at which a 
governor was elected shall be required.  
No law as to which the power of referendum 
properly has been invoked shall be effective  
thereafter unless approved by a majority of the 
electors voting thereon at the next general 
election. [Emphasis supplied.]  
As is apparent from the text of art 2, § 9, the people’s  
right of referral is expressly limited. 
The limitation  
relevant here is the first: There is no right of referral for  
“acts 
making 
appropriations for state institutions.”  There is  
no dispute here that the Department of State Police is a  
“state institution” within the meaning of art 2, § 9.  Nor is  
there any dispute that 2000 PA 381 “allocated” one million  
dollars 
of 
public 
funds 
to 
the 
state 
police 
for  
responsibilities that the act requires the state police to  
perform.  The contested issue is whether the million-dollar  
allocation made in 2000 PA 381 constitutes an “appropriation”  
within the meaning of art 2, § 9.  
IV. APPLICATION  
A. WAS THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARTICLE 2, SECTION 9  
LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT OF REFERRAL AT THE TIME OF RATIFICATION DIFFERENT  
FROM THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE?  
The majority construes the language of art 2, § 9 in a  
plain and natural manner.  Thus, it concludes that 2000 PA 381  
is an act making an appropriation to a state institution and  
9  
 
 
is thus exempt from the referral power.  To read the limiting  
language of art 2, § 9 in any other manner would incorporate  
into that constitutional provision a meaning that is not  
apparent on its face.  Accordingly, unless we are able to  
determine that this provision had some other particularized  
meaning in the collective mind of the 1963 electorate, we must  
give the effect to the natural meaning of the language used in  
the constitution.  
Justice 
Cavanagh 
asserts 
that 
the 
common 
understanding 
of  
art 2, § 9 is different from the plain meaning given to this  
constitutional provision by the majority. Those who suggest  
that the meaning to be given a provision of our constitution  
varies from a natural reading of the constitutional text bear  
the burden of providing the evidence that the ratifiers  
subscribed to such an alternative construction.  Otherwise,  
the constitution becomes no more than a Rorschach8 exercise in  
which judges project and impose their personal views of what  
the constitution should have said.9  
8A Rorschach test is a personality and intelligence test 
that requires a subject to “interpret” inkblots.  Webster’s  
New Collegiate Dictionary, 1977, p 1006.  
9The difference between my approach and that of the 
dissents is that I believe I have an obligation to establish 
from available historical evidence whether the “common  
understanding” 
diverged from the plain meaning of the language 
in the constitution.  Because the dissents offer no such  
proofs, and presumably believe them to be unnecessary, it 
appears that the dissents believe that they can “intuit” the 
common understanding they prefer. 
Given their intuited  
conclusion about the people’s understanding, the dissents 
ignore the art 2, § 9 limitation on the power of referral. 
Justice Cavanagh’s dissent concludes that the limitation, if 
given effect, could not have been intended by the people 
because it causes a “constitutional invalidity.”  Slip op p 9. 
(continued...)  
10  
Interestingly, no one–not the dissents, the parties, or  
even the amici curiae–has attempted to provide a scintilla of  
historically based evidence that provides support for the  
belief that in 1963 the people of this state understood the  
limiting language of art 2, § 9 to mean something other than  
what it naturally and plainly says.  The reason for this  
omission is simple: There is not much historical background on  
the provision to report in the first instance.  Moreover, that  
which exists fails to demonstrate that the people attributed  
a meaning other than the construction the majority gives to  
art 2, § 9.  
Within the limited time constraints occasioned by the  
exigencies of having to decide this case by the July 1, 2001,  
effective date of 2000 PA 381, we have searched for evidence  
that the common  understanding is that proposed by Justice  
Cavanagh.  We have found no such historical evidence in the  
record of the constitutional convention, at the time of our  
constitution’s ratification, or in contemporaneous news  
articles that provide support for the dissent’s asserted  
“special” common understanding of art 2, § 9.  
Indeed, one might expect that the framers of our 1963  
Constitution–the 
participants 
of 
the 
constitutional 
convention  
that drafted the constitutional text that was eventually  
ratified–would have provided some gloss on or construction of  
9(...continued) 
This is pure tautological reasoning.  A constitutional  
provision that contains its own limitation cannot be  
“invalidated” when one gives the limitation its natural  
import.  
11  
 
the intended meaning of the art 2, § 9 limitation on the right  
of referral. In point of fact, the framers provided none.  
Surprisingly, 
during 
the 
entire 
constitutional  
convention, 
excepting 
references 
to 
the 
convention’s  
successive 
procedural approvals of the provision at issue, the  
framers never discussed the substance of art 2, § 9.10  
Especially 
important, nothing in the convention record has any  
bearing on what the framers, much less the public, “commonly  
understood” 
about 
the limitation on the referral power created  
by 
the 
constitutional 
language 
selected–“acts 
making  
appropriations for state institutions.”  
Particularly 
noteworthy in this regard is the “Address to  
the People” accompanying Const 1963, art 2, § 9.  The address,  
officially approved by the members of the constitutional  
convention, provides the text of each provision of the  
proposed constitution the people ratified in 1963 and a  
commentary, written in simple language, explaining the import  
of each provision and any changes the proposed constitution  
made to comparable provision of the 1908 constitution.  That  
address was widely distributed to the public before the  
ratification vote.11  The address was intended as a vehicle to  
10See 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, 
p 758; 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 
2390-2392, 2418, 2779, 2927-2928,  
11Because the “Address to the People,” or “Convention 
Comments,” constitutes an authoritative description of what 
the framers thought the proposed constitution provided, this 
document is a valuable tool in determining whether a possible 
“common understanding” diverges from the plain meaning of the 
actual words of our constitution.  See Regents of the Univ of 
(continued...)  
12  
 
 
  
 
educate the public about the proposed constitution.  
Significantly, 
in 
the 
“Address 
to 
the 
People”  
accompanying Const 1963, art 2, § 9, the framers advise the  
people that this provision constitutes only a “revision” of  
Const 1908, art 5, § 1, and that the revision “eliminat[es]  
much language of a purely statutory character.”  2 Official  
Record, p 3367.  The address also notes that the revision  
“specifically 
reserves 
the 
initiative 
and 
referendum 
powers 
to  
the people [and] limits them as noted . . . .”12 Id. (emphasis  
added).
 There is no further reference to the art 2, § 9  
“limits” on the power of referral or any explanation regarding  
how those limitations were expected to function in practice.  
Thus, the 1963 constitutional record provides no basis  
for concluding that the people were led to believe (or  
actually entertained the notion) that the art 2, § 9  
limitation 
on 
the 
right 
of 
referral–“acts 
making  
appropriations for state institutions”–meant or was intended  
to mean anything other than what it plainly says.  Similarly,  
11(...continued) 
Mich v Michigan, 395 Mich 52, 60; 235 NW2d 1 (1975) (“[t]he 
reliability of the ‘Address to the People’ . . . lies in the 
fact that it was approved by the general convention . . . as 
an explanation of the proposed constitution.  The ‘Address’  
also was widely disseminated prior to adoption of the  
constitution by vote of the people”).  
12Equally of interest is the actual language of the two 
limitations of art 2, §  9 on the power of referral. 
The  
first 
precludes 
referrals 
concerning 
“acts 
making 
appropriations to state institutions” while the second  
precludes referrals concerning acts addressing “deficiencies 
in state funds.”  Other than the meaning suggested by the 
words of the clause itself, we have no greater understanding 
of what the framers, much less the people, understood the 
second limitation to mean than we do of the first.  
13  
 
 
 
 
I have been unable to locate (and no one has provided to the  
Court) any contemporaneous news articles or other documents  
circulated in the public domain that suggest that the public  
in 1963 had a specific or “common” understanding of art 2, §  
9 that diverged from the natural and plain meaning of its  
text.13  
The absence of any evidence from the 1963 constitutional  
convention record or other contemporaneous articles in the  
public domain suggesting support for some kind of special  
“common understanding” about art 2, § 9 consistent with the  
dissents’ view (or any other) ought to be conclusive.  In the  
absence of evidence on this point, this Court should accord  
the language in question its natural, plain meaning.  
B. JUSTICE CAVANAGH’S ASSERTED “COMMON UNDERSTANDING” THAT  
“APPROPRIATIONS” MEANS “GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS” IS ALSO AT VARIANCE WITH  
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION  
13While 
in 
1963 
the 
question 
of 
government 
by 
plebiscite–direct action by the citizens through initiative 
and referendum as opposed to indirect action through their 
elected representatives–was a commonplace fact of American 
political life, in 1913, this was still a startlingly radical 
proposition and one rarely embodied in state constitutions of 
the era.  In 1913, only a dozen or so states recognized a 
popular right of referendum and initiative. 
Detroit Free  
Press, March 22, 1913.  
The public record concerning the 1913 amendment that 
incorporated the precursor of art 2, § 9 into the 1908 
constitution also fails to establish that the people then 
understood 
the 
“acts 
making 
appropriations” 
limitation 
to 
mean 
something other than what the language plainly suggests. We  
have been unable to locate from any source the actual 1913 
amendment ballot language approved.  Neither the Detroit Free  
Press nor The Detroit News Tribune did more than respectively 
advocate the rejection or adoption of the amendment.  See,  
e.g., Detroit Free Press, March 22, 1913; The Detroit News  
Tribune, March 18, 1913.  We have found no historical basis  
even for a “vicarious” common understanding of the kind 
asserted by Justice Cavanagh grounded in the ratification of 
the 1913 amendment.  
14  
 
Lacking 
any 
evidence that the citizens believed they were  
ratifying a provision that meant something quite different  
from that of the plain language of art 2, § 9, Justice  
Cavanagh nevertheless presumes that this must have been the  
case.  He is able to so conclude because he is convinced that  
the natural construction the majority gives to art 2, § 9  
produces an “absurd result”:14  
I am confident that the constitutional right 
of referendum, in this narrow context, should not 
be taken away by so transparent an artifice.  
Justice COOLEY’s “great mass of the people” would,  
if 
asked, 
surely 
suppose 
that 
“acts 
making 
appropriations for state institutions,” which deny 
the people’s reserved power of referendum, are 
general 
appropriations bills containing substantial 
grants to state agencies. Those grants would have 
to ensure the viability of the agencies, or, as the 
Court of Appeals put it, support the agencies’ 
“core functions.” 246 Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ 
(2001).
 The people of Michigan, I am certain, 
never intended to authorize the 2000 lame duck  
Legislature’s legerdemain. [Slip op at 9.][15]  
I believe that Justice Cavanagh’s presumption is  
unfounded because (1) it is not grounded in an assessment of  
what the voters in 1963 understood art 2, § 9 to mean, and (2)  
it does not give sufficient weight or meaning to the expressly  
stated competing language and values embodied in our  
constitution or the differences between the power of  
initiative and referral.  
14In a different context in which this Court was  
construing a statute, we rejected the “absurd result” mode of 
construction. People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 155-160; 599 
NW2d 102 (1999).  
15Justice Cavanagh also suggests that acts making grants 
that “ensure the viability of [state] agencies” or grants that 
“support the agencies’ ‘core’ functions” would also preclude 
a referendum. Of course, Const 1963, art 2, § 9 contains no 
textual support for either of the two tests.  
15  
 
 
In this regard, it is important to consider the  
relationship between the constitutional power accorded to the  
Legislature, Const 1963, art 4, § 1, and the specific means  
chosen in the initiative and referendum provisions that check  
the power of the Legislature.16  Without question, art 4, § 1  
gives the Legislature plenary power to enact laws for the  
benefit of Michigan citizens.  Equally clearly, art 2, § 9  
provides a means for citizens directly to challenge  
Legislative action or inaction.  I believe that it is a matter  
of constitutional significance that the initiative power  
contains no limitation (save procedural requirements such as  
those concerning when the initiative process can be commenced  
and the number of people who must support it), but that the  
referendum power is expressly limited by two substantive  
restrictions–an exception to the power of referral for acts  
“making appropriations for state institutions,” and an  
exception for those acts enacted to “meet deficiencies in  
state funds.”17  
Stated otherwise (leaving aside momentarily the question  
16“The legislative power of the State of Michigan is 
vested in a senate and a house of representatives.”  Const  
1963, art 4, § 1.  
17As noted, the current provision carries forward the 
language of Const 1908, art 5, § 1, that the referendum power 
does not extend to “acts making appropriations for state 
institutions and to meet deficiencies in state funds.”  Art 2, 
§ 9 uses the disjunctive “or” between the two categories of 
nonreferable items, as opposed to the conjunctive “and” in the 
art 5, § 1 version of the provision in the 1908 constitution. 
We need not speculate about the possible meaning of this word 
change, because our only concern in this matter is with 
respect to the first limitation category.  
16  
 
 
of what the people understood in 1963 the art 2, § 9 term  
“appropriations” meant), it appears unchallenged that “acts  
making appropriations” are always subject to nullification by  
initiative, but such acts are exempted from the referral  
power. Because exercise of both the referral and initiative  
powers may result in the nullification of a law enacted by the  
Legislature, one may well ask: Why, when the people enacted  
two provisions that are clearly intended as checks on the  
constitutional power of the Legislature, would the people  
substantially limit their power of referral, but not their  
power of initiative?  Based upon the structure of these  
provisions, the answer appears obvious that the people feared  
more 
the 
circumstance 
of 
preventing 
acts 
involving  
“appropriations” from becoming law (the referral power) than  
they feared a nullification vote on the very same bill after  
it became effective.  Otherwise they would not have imposed an  
exception to their power of referral.  
Justice Cavanagh asserts that the “appropriations”  
limitation on the people’s referral power could only have been  
intended to mean “general appropriations bills containing  
substantial grants to state agencies.”  Slip op at 9. 
I  
question why that conclusion is justified, particularly given  
that even the dissent notes the framers’ drafting precision  
concerning matters involving the general budget. See slip op,  
pp 7-8.  I wholeheartedly agree with Justice Cavanagh that the  
framers 
intended 
to 
improve 
and 
increase 
legislative  
accountability 
for 
legislative 
general 
budgeting 
processes 
and  
were very precise in their draftsmanship to accomplish this  
17  
 
 
 
goal.  See, e.g., Const 1963, art 4, § 31 (general  
appropriation 
bills, 
priority, 
statement 
of 
estimated  
revenue).18
 Justice Cavanagh assumes, without providing  
support, that the people believed that only general  
appropriation acts were referenced in art 2, § 9.  
Concerning art 4, § 31, in the Address to the People the  
framers advised:  
This is a new section designed to accomplish 
two major purposes:  
1. 
  To focus legislative attention on the 
general appropriation bill or bills to 
the exclusion of any other appropriation 
bills, 
except 
those 
supplementing 
appropriations for the current year’s 
operation.  
2.  To require the legislature (as well as 
the governor by a subsequent provision) 
to set forth by major item its own best 
estimates of revenue.  
The 
legislature 
frequently 
differs 
from  
executive estimates of revenue.  It is proper to 
require 
that 
such 
differences 
as 
exist 
be  
specifically set forth for public understanding and 
future judgment as to the validity of each. [2 
Official Record, p 3375.]  
18Const 1963, art 4, § 31 provides:  
The general appropriation bills for the succeeding 
fiscal period covering items set forth in the budget 
shall be passed or rejected in either house of the 
legislature before that house passes any appropriation 
bill for items not in the budget except bills  
supplementing appropriations for the current fiscal 
year’s 
operation. 
 
Any bill requiring an appropriation to 
carry 
out 
its 
purpose 
shall 
be 
considered 
an  
appropriation bill.  One of the general appropriation 
bills as passed by the legislature shall contain an 
itemized statement of estimated revenue by major source 
in each operating fund for the ensuing fiscal period, the 
total of which shall not be less than the total of all  
appropriations made from each fund in the general 
appropriation bills as passed.  
18  
 
 
Thus, the people were specifically advised in 1963 that the  
focus of this provision was to ensure accountability for the  
making of the entire state budget.  A reciprocal provision  
applicable to the Governor, art 5, § 18,19 was also added in  
1963.  These were entirely new provisions added to the 1963  
constitution whereas the language of art 2, § 9 was carried  
forward from the 1913 amendment to the 1908 constitution.  The  
1908 constitution had no provisions comparable to art 4, § 31  
and art 5, § 18.  
The point is that, contrary to Justice Cavanagh’s  
suggestion, none of these general budget provisions added in  
1963 were connected by the framers to the older language of  
art 2, § 9.  More important for our purpose of discerning  
whether there was a “special” common understanding of art 2,  
§ 9 as the dissent supposes, it is noteworthy that the framers  
19Const 1963, art 5, § 18 provides:  
The governor shall submit to the legislature 
at a time fixed by law, a budget for the ensuing 
fiscal period setting forth in detail, for all 
operating funds, the proposed expenditures and 
estimated 
revenue 
of 
the 
state. 
Proposed 
expenditures from any fund shall not exceed the 
estimated revenue thereof.  On the same date, the 
governor shall submit to the legislature general 
appropriation 
bills 
to 
embody 
the 
proposed 
expenditures and any necessary bill or bills to 
provide new or additional revenues to meet proposed 
expenditures.  The amount of any surplus created or  
deficit incurred in any fund during the last 
preceding fiscal period shall be entered as an item 
in the budget and in one of the appropriation 
bills.  The governor may submit amendments to 
appropriation bills to be offered in either house 
during consideration of the bill by that house, and 
shall submit bills to meet deficiencies in current  
appropriations.  
19  
clearly never communicated to the people that the new general  
budget provisions had any bearing on other legislative acts,  
such as 2000 PA 381, that merely made an appropriation of  
public funds to a state institution.  In short, the general  
budget provisions of the 1963 constitution do not appear to be  
related to other kinds of bills that simply “appropriate” for  
purposes other than the general budget process.20  
Most important to my conclusion that Justice Cavanagh is  
simply wrong in supposing that art 2, § 9 refers to general  
appropriation bills is the fact that art 4, § 31 provides a  
definition of “appropriation bill,”21 and only this category  
of bills is tied to the annual budget process.  Thus, had the  
framers intended that the art 2, § 9 “appropriations”  
limitation on the right of referral mean “a general  
appropriations bill” as urged by the dissent, then I believe  
that the framers would have done two things that they clearly  
did not do.  First, I think the framers would have used in art  
2, § 9 the art 4, § 31 definition of “appropriation bill.”  
Second, I believe the framers would have advised the public in  
the Address to the People of the relationship between the  
newly 
added 
general 
budget 
provisions 
(including 
the  
20The 
constitution 
also 
explicitly 
recognizes 
a  
nonbudgetary 
form 
of 
appropriation 
acts, 
those 
that  
appropriate public money for local or private purposes. See  
art 4, § 30.  The point is, the constitution does not purport, 
as intimated by the dissent, to limit or define legislation 
that makes an appropriation as only those acts that concern 
general appropriations.  
21“Any bill requiring an appropriation to carry out its 
purpose shall be considered an appropriation bill.”  Art 4, § 
31.  
20  
 
 
 
 
definition of appropriation bill) and the older language of  
art 2, § 9 limiting the power of referendum.  
When it is so apparent throughout the 1963 constitution  
that the framers sought to clarify the budget-related  
appropriations 
process, 
I 
think 
that 
the 
above-noted 
omissions  
underscore 
that 
the 
kind of “appropriations” referenced in art  
2, § 9 have nothing to do with those referenced in art 4.  
Further, there is no evidence of which we are aware that in  
1963 the people had a contrary “common understanding.”  
Moreover, greater assurance that there was no “common  
understanding” contrary to the plain language of art 2, § 9 is  
derived from the controversy that culminated in this Court’s  
split decision in Todd v Hull, 288 Mich 521; 285 NW 46 (1939).  
In Todd, this Court was called upon to determine whether 1939  
PA 322 was properly given immediate effect pursuant to Const  
1908, art 5, § 21,23 notwithstanding that, by giving the act  
221939 PA 3 abolished the Michigan Public Utilities 
Commission, created the Michigan Public Service Commission, 
and appropriated $10,000 from the general fund for the purpose 
of setting up the MPSC.  
23That provision of our 1908 constitution–which contained 
language identical to that appearing in the 1908 version of 
art 2, § 9–provided that  
the legislature may give immediate effect to acts  
making 
appropriations 
and 
acts 
immediately 
necessary for the preservation of the public peace, 
health or safety . . . . [Const 1908, art 5, § 21 
(emphasis supplied).]  
Compare this “immediate effect” provision language with that 
of Const 1908, art 5, § 1 (the predecessor to Const 1963, art 
2, § 9):  
[T]he people reserve to themselves the 
(continued...)  
21  
immediate effect, the Legislature had encroached upon Const  
1908, art 5, § 1 (the precursor of Const 1963, art 2, § 9.  
Four members of the Todd Court agreed, with little  
explanation, with the plaintiffs’ assertion that 1939 PA 3 was  
not in the category of “acts making appropriations” within the  
meaning of art 5, § 21.  However, four other justices observed  
that  
[t]here is no question but that the act makes an 
appropriation.  An act making an appropriation as 
used in the Constitution is a legislative act which 
sets apart or assigns to a particular purpose or 
use a sum of money out of what may be in the 
treasury of the State for a specific purpose and 
objects,–an act authorizing the expenditure of 
public funds for a public purpose. [Todd at 531.]  
Regarding 
the 
referral 
question, 
these 
four 
justices  
additionally opined that  
[t]he claim that plaintiffs are entitled to a 
referendum is effectually disposed of by the  
language of the Constitution itself because if the 
legislature had a right to give the act in question 
immediate effect, then it negatived the idea of a 
referendum. [Todd, supra at 535.]  
The significance of Todd is not that it conclusively  
23(...continued) 
power to . . . approve or reject at the polls 
any act passed by the legislature, except acts 
making appropriations for state institutions 
and to meet deficiencies in state funds.  
* * *  
The second power reserved to the people 
is the referendum.  No act passed by the 
legislature shall go into effect until 90 days 
after the final adjournment of the session of 
the legislature which passed such act, except 
such acts making appropriations and such acts 
immediately necessary for the preservation of 
the public peace, health or safety, as have 
been given immediate effect by action of the 
legislature. [Emphasis supplied.]  
22  
 
construed the same language at issue in this case. The fact  
is, Todd–a split decision–has no precedential value.  Todd is  
nevertheless highly relevant because it involves a claim,  
similar to the one made here, that the Legislature’s inclusion  
of an appropriation in 1939 PA 3 was a “mere subterfuge,” Todd  
at 531, to place it within the category of acts that could be  
given immediate effect and thus be immune to referendum.  
Todd demonstrates that the people were aware in 1963 that  
the Legislature had exercised what it believed to be its  
appropriation prerogative in such a fashion as to diminish the  
people’s right of referral. Notwithstanding, the people did  
not seek to change the constitutional referral language to  
preclude the Legislature from capriciously exercising its  
power of appropriation.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Determining the people’s “common understanding” of a  
relatively obscure constitutional provision ratified nearly  
forty years ago is admittedly a challenging deductive  
enterprise–one that must be grounded in the available  
evidence.  Above all, it is not a psychic exercise. On the  
basis of the evidence we have independently sought, I conclude  
that there is no reliable evidence that the people commonly  
understood anything other than what art 2, § 9 plainly says:  
that the people’s power of referral is precluded concerning  
any act that makes an appropriation for a state institution.  
Accordingly, 2000 PA 381 falls within the category of “acts  
making appropriations for state institutions” and is thus not  
23  
 
 
amenable to the people’s right of referral under art 2, § 9.  
The 
majority’s 
decision 
today 
will 
undoubtedly 
disappoint  
those who passionately believe that 2000 PA 381 represents bad  
public policy. While it will be of no consolation, it bears  
restating that the serious underlying political question is  
not before the Court.  
In 
the 
current 
charged 
political 
environment, 
the 
dissent  
makes an emotionally appealing argument: Why not just let the  
people decide?  Simply answered, the people’s ability to  
decide by the referendum process is not infinite; rather, it  
is circumscribed by the limitations placed in the Michigan  
Constitution.
 While perhaps less satisfying to those who  
oppose 2000 PA 381, our answer is that the people are still  
free to directly challenge the propriety of the legislation by  
initiative.  Const 1963, art 2, § 9; MCL 168.471, 168.472.  
Additionally, if the people believe that the Legislature has  
abused its powers by capriciously precluding their power of  
referral, the traditional means of voter sanction remain  
recall and the ballot box. However, the limitations imposed  
in art 2, § 9 on the people’s right of referral preclude that  
they do so by means of referendum.  
Finally, while it may be attractive to some, I believe  
that the dissenter’s approach is not only at odds with the  
constitution, 
but 
destroys 
the 
Legislature’s 
direct  
accountability to the people for its acts by interposing the  
judiciary as an arbiter of essentially political questions  
that are fundamentally legislative in character.  Consider  
Justice Cavanagh’s tests of what he believes constitutes  
24  
“appropriations” that do preclude referrals under art 2, § 9:  
(1) grants that “ensure the viability of [state] agencies”; or  
(2) grants that “support the agencies’ ‘core functions.”  
(Slip op p 9.)  Exactly how large an “appropriation”  
constitutes one sufficient to ensure the “viability” of a  
state agency or, for that matter, its “core function”? What  
is a state agency’s “core” function, what constitutes its  
“viability,” and who gets to decide these questions–the Board  
of Canvassers, the Secretary of State, the courts?  The  
dissenters are eager to have the courts decide these  
questions.  Perhaps there are members of the public who  
believe that the courts are competent to address these issues.  
I submit that these are Delphic questions that neither a judge  
nor the judicial system itself is best equipped to answer.  
More to the point, the tests the dissenters urge to assess  
whether 
an 
act 
making an appropriation is nonetheless amenable  
to referral despite the express constitutional limitation are  
simply ones made up from whole cloth and which have no basis  
in the text of our constitution.  The judiciary is not  
authorized to create ways of evading the terms of our  
constitution; nor should the courts manufacture tests that  
amount to no more than providing a means of promoting sitting  
judges’ personal preferences to accomplish such goals.  
Neither is a judicial function, and the public should never be  
confused on this issue.  Our courts must refrain from engaging  
in such endeavors because they are beyond our constitutional  
authority and competence.  
25  
 
 
                                          
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBECK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v
 No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).  
The issue before this Court is whether it will act as a  
court of law and read the constitution in accord with its  
plain language, or whether it will effect what many, perhaps  
even most, in this state view as a “good” thing.  The majority  
opinion, in which I fully join, sets forth its analysis simply  
and straightforwardly.  It does so because the constitutional  
issue before us is simple and straightforward. I offer this  
 
  
concurrence only to emphasize the extremely important points  
of 
disagreement 
between the majority opinion, and the opinions  
of the Court of Appeals and my dissenting colleagues.  
I. COURT OF APPEALS  
Concerning the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this  
matter, I offer the following thoughts:  
(1) 
The 
Michigan 
Constitution 
excepts 
from 
the 
referendum  
process “acts making appropriations for state institutions.”  
It may well have been preferable for the constitution instead  
to have excepted from the referendum process: (a) merely acts  
that are necessary in order for the state to “exercise its  
various functions free from financial embarrassment”; (b)  
merely acts appropriating monies without which state agencies  
“would cease to function,” or without which their “continued  
existence” would be in jeopardy; or (c) merely acts that  
pertain to the “core functions,”  or that are not “peripheral  
to the core purpose,” of state agencies.1
 However, the  
constitution did none of these.  Rather, it excepted from the  
referendum process “acts making appropriations for state  
institutions.”  In reading into the constitution these  
1 The Court of Appeals asserts that these alternative 
formulations, each of which it has incorporated in its 
opinion, were set forth by this Court in Detroit Auto Club v  
Secretary of State, 230 Mich 623; 203 NW 529 (1925), in the 
course of our interpreting the predecessor version of the 
current 
Michigan 
Constitution.  However, such language, to the 
extent that it can be discerned at all in Detroit Auto Club, 
was set forth in the altogether different context of  
determining whether the state highway department was or was 
not a “state institution.”  It was not done in the context of  
determining whether an enactment of the Legislature was an 
“act[] making appropriations.”  Furthermore, this Court in 
1925, as in 2001, could not alter the language of the 
constitution, and it did not purport to do so.  
2  
 
 
 
 
  
alternative 
limitations 
upon 
the 
referendum 
process, 
the 
Court  
of Appeals has, without warrant, substituted its own judgment  
concerning how the constitution ought to read in place of the  
judgment of those who actually proposed and ratified the  
constitution.  
(2) In particular, the Court of Appeals has, without  
warrant, substituted its own judgment for that of “We, the  
people of the State of Michigan” who “have ordain[ed] and  
established] this constitution.”2  “This” constitution is one  
that, for better or worse, excepts from the referendum process  
“acts making appropriations for state institutions.”  It is  
not one that excepts from the referendum process a greater or  
a lesser range of legislative acts, depending upon the  
personal preferences of individual judges or the political  
imperatives of the moment.  
(3) In a truly remarkable statement, the Court of Appeals  
asserts:  
[E]ven if we were to conclude that the  
statutory expenditures constituted appropriations 
for state institutions as contemplated by [the 
constitution], we would nevertheless hold that the 
overarching right of the people to their ‘direct 
legislative voice’ . . . requires that 2000 PA 381 
be subject to referendum.  
I would respectfully suggest that the “overarching right of  
the people” is to have the constitution that they have  
ratified given respect and accorded its proper meaning. The  
fundamental flaw in the Court of Appeals statement is evident  
in its very assertion.  Who is to say, for example, that this  
2 Const 1963, Preamble (emphasis added).  
3  
particular “overarching right,” “the right to a direct  
legislative voice,” is more “overarching” than the right of  
the people to have the legislative judgment of their elected  
representatives given effect over the objections of five  
percent of the electorate? 
In truth, in a system of  
constitutional government, we examine the language of the  
constitution 
itself 
to 
determine 
which 
rights 
are  
“overarching.”
 Whether the referendum process or the  
legislative judgment should prevail in a particular case does  
not depend upon which right or which value is perceived to be  
more “overarching” by a judge, but rather upon which result is  
required by the terms of the constitution itself. There is,  
in fact, an “overarching right” to a referendum, but only in  
accordance with the standards of the constitution; otherwise,  
there is an “overarching right” to have public policy  
determined by a majority of the people’s democratically  
elected representatives.  
(4) It is hard to imagine a single statement more  
fundamentally at odds with the genuinely “overarching right”  
of the people to responsible constitutional government than  
that of the Court of Appeals. I repeat it, for it evidences  
a profound misunderstanding about the proper role of the  
judiciary that demands response:  
[E]ven if we were to conclude that the  
statutory expenditures constituted appropriations 
for state institutions as contemplated by [the 
constitution], we would nevertheless hold that the 
overarching right of the people to their ‘direct 
legislative voice’ . . . requires that 2000 PA 381 
be subject to referendum.  
What this apparently means is that, “[e]ven if we were to  
4  
  
conclude” that the constitution stated one thing, the Court of  
Appeals panel would still abide by its own views in holding  
that the constitution meant a different thing.  Thus, it could  
be that “[e]ven if we were to conclude” that the constitution  
prohibited 
prior 
restraints 
on 
the 
press, 
we 
would  
“nevertheless 
hold” 
that the “overarching right” of persons to  
a fair trial requires that newspapers not write irresponsibly  
about high-profile criminal cases.  Or it could be that,  
“[e]ven if we were to conclude” that the constitution  
prohibited denying criminal defendants a right to a jury  
trial, we would “nevertheless hold” that the “overarching  
right” of judicial efficiency requires that exceptions  
sometimes be made to this requirement.  In other words, no  
matter what the actual language of the constitution, the Court  
of Appeals panel will, in effect, create a “higher”  
constitutional law whose requirements will supersede those of  
the constitution ratified by “we, the people.”  This is not  
law; it is a prescription for judicial domination.  
II. JUSTICE CAVANAGH’S DISSENT  
Concerning the dissent of Justice Cavanagh in this  
matter, I offer the following thoughts:  
(1) In addition to the various standards fashioned by the  
Court of Appeals in replacing those set forth by the Michigan  
Constitution, the dissent adds the standard of “great public  
significance.”
 
Apparently, 
the 
greater 
the 
“public  
significance” of a law, the more essential it is that a  
referendum 
be 
allowed 
to 
proceed, 
notwithstanding 
the 
language  
of the constitution. For what it is worth, I am in complete  
5  
agreement that 2000 PA 381 is a matter of “great public  
significance” 
and 
can easily appreciate why its opponents wish  
to make it the subject of a referendum. Nevertheless, it can  
be assumed that any measure that becomes the focus of a  
serious referendum effort will be a matter of “great public  
significance” and, in any event, the constitution does not  
make distinctions between those legislative enactments that  
some justices may view as of “great public significance” and  
those that are viewed as of lesser significance.  
(2) Equally irrelevant to this Court’s constitutional  
analysis are the dissent’s various references to the “lame­
duck” character of the Legislature3; the fact that “firearms  
advocates and persons interested in hunting” are “pitted”  
against a “coalition of law enforcement, religious, and  
educational interest”; and the fact that some individual  
members of the Legislature view their colleagues as having  
improper motives in attaching an appropriations provision to  
2000 PA 381.  
(3) The dissent chastises the majority for having  
“neglected to recite” certain facts in its opinion.  With all  
due respect, the majority has done no such thing.  It has  
merely neglected to “recite” facts that are wholly irrelevant  
to its legal analysis, as is typically the case in our  
3 The dissent describes the majority as “granting the 
lame-duck legislative majority the prize it apparently sought 
. . . .”  However, as the dissent well appreciates, judges are 
not in the business of “granting prizes” to either side of a 
controversy; rather, they are in the business of interpreting 
the language of the law and letting the chips fall where they 
may.  
6  
opinions. The majority, for example, views it as irrelevant  
for purposes of its legal analysis that the law under  
consideration is of “great public significance,” or, in  
particular, that the law relates to a highly divisive  
political 
controversy.  
Rather, 
the 
constitution 
means 
exactly  
the same thing whether the law at issue pertains to firearms,  
to farming irrigation, or to any other conceivable subject  
matter. Therefore, reciting the details or the political or  
legislative history of the statute before us, beyond  
identifying the appropriations that it makes, would add  
nothing 
to 
the 
constitutional 
analysis.  
Furthermore, 
contrary  
to what would have been the case if the dissent’s position had  
prevailed, “future litigants,” concerning whom the dissent  
expresses such concern, will henceforth be apprised of the  
unvarying meaning of the constitution, and will not be  
required to count noses about how many justices view the law  
at issue in their future case as being of “great public  
significance,” or whether the appropriations made in their  
future case involve a “core function” or are essential to the  
“continued existence” of some state agency.  
(4) The dissent describes the majority’s constitutional  
analysis as one that “focuses narrowly on the superficially  
straightforward question,” as being “legalistic,” as being  
“pinched,” and as being “overly literal.” Such descriptions  
are typical of those uttered when a judge is frustrated in his  
ability to reach a particular result by the actual language of  
the law.  Contrary to the dissent, the majority does not  
interpret the constitution “literally” or “legalistically.”  
7  
 
 
There is simply no reasonable alternative interpretation to  
the 
words 
“acts 
making 
appropriations 
for 
state 
institutions.”  
Again, it may well be that the dissent’s formulation of the  
right of referendum is preferable to that of the constitution.  
However, such a determination is not for this Court to make–  
no matter how “publically significant” a law.  As Chief  
Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury v Madison, nearly two  
centuries ago, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to  
say what the law “is,” not what it believes that it “ought” to  
be.4  
(5) The dissent’s reference to Justice Cooley’s rules of  
constitutional interpretation is apt, but misses the point.  
Constitutional 
interpretation 
varies 
from 
statutory  
interpretation principally because constitutional language  
tends to be more concise, and to relate to broader expressions  
of principle, than does statutory language. The language of  
constitutions, 
therefore, also tends to be more susceptible to  
multiple interpretations than does the more precise and more  
thorough language of statutes.  Justice Cooley’s rules make  
clear how, in a constitutional context, broad language and  
general words are to be given reasonable meaning.  When,  
however, constitutional language is straightforward, such as  
the eligibility requirements for a member of Congress,5 or the  
4 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L Ed 60 
(1803).  
5 Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486; 89 S Ct 1944; 23 L Ed  
2d 491 (1969).  
8  
 
procedural requirements of the legislative process,6 we accord  
such language its plain and ordinary meaning. “[R]easonable  
minds, the great mass of the people themselves” tend to accord  
words such plain and ordinary meanings.  Contrary to the  
dissent, Justice Cooley did not assert, in effect, that  
“apple” can mean “orange,” if a group of citizens could be  
found who understood it in this sense.  Rather, what he  
asserted 
was 
that 
ambiguous terms, those fairly susceptible to  
multiple understandings, should be assessed by his rules.  The  
“common understanding” of most words is that they possess  
their plain and ordinary meanings.7  
(6) It should be noted that the dissent does not  
ultimately rest its interpretation upon any specific language  
or phrase contained in the constitution, since it cannot do  
so. Instead, it relies upon such amorphous concepts as “the  
6 Clinton v New York City, 524 US 417; 118 S Ct 2091; 141  
L Ed 2d 393 (1998).  
7 The dissent’s “generous” reading of the constitution is 
only “generous” if one starts with the point of view that a 
referendum should proceed on the law in controversy. If, on 
the other hand, one wishes to have the law take normal effect, 
without awaiting the next general election, then perhaps the 
dissent’s reading might be characterized by some as somewhat 
less “generous.” Although, in my judgment, the constitution 
should be interpreted “faithfully,” rather than “generously” 
or “non-generously,” it is difficult for me to understand how 
any interpretation can be drawn from the language of the 
referendum clause, no matter how “generous,” that leads to the 
conclusion reached by the dissent.  It is unclear whether the  
dissent believes that the majority has misconstrued “acts” or 
“making” or “appropriations” or “for” or “state” or  
“institutions,” or how such words have been misconstrued.  In  
other words, exactly which interpretation of which word by the 
majority is most “dark” or most “abstruse,” in the dissent’s 
judgment?  
9  
overall approach” to legislation taken by the constitution’s  
framers and the people who ratified it.  But, rather than  
taking the framers and ratifiers of the constitution at face  
value and assuming that they intended what they plainly wrote,  
the dissent manages creatively to conclude that the framers  
and ratifiers meant something other than what they wrote.  On  
what basis does it reach such a conclusion?  Does the dissent  
identify convincing statements in support of that proposition  
by the framers?  Does the dissent point to evidence that “we,  
the People” were misled into believing that “acts” or  
“appropriations” 
really 
did 
not 
mean 
“acts” 
or  
“appropriations?”
 Does the dissent offer new historical  
information that the ratifiers understood that Detroit Auto  
Club, and other earlier decisions of this Court, were being  
reversed by the Constitution of 1963?  No, there is no  
argument of this kind.8  All that we are left with is that the  
dissent believes that the drafters of the constitution, and  
“We, the People” who ratified it, should have adopted the  
8 In lieu, the dissent asserts that the “great mass of 
the people” would, if asked, “surely suppose” that the 
language of the referendum clause did not mean what the 
majority understands.  I do not know whether the dissent is  
right or wrong in this proposition, for it sets forth no 
evidence in this regard and I am aware of no such evidence. 
However, at the very least, the dissent is obligated to 
demonstrate in regard to its assertion: (a) why it should be 
assumed that the “great mass of the people” did not understand 
that their words would be taken seriously and accorded their 
common understanding; and (b) why a substantial majority of 
the 
people’s 
representatives 
in 
the 
Legislature, 
the  
overwhelming number of whom had just been reelected and who 
had been fully apprised by opponents of 2000 PA 381 of the 
latter’s 
views 
on 
the 
impropriety 
of 
attaching 
an  
appropriations 
provision to this measure, cannot be assumed to 
have been representing the actual sentiments of the “great 
mass of the people.”  
10  
 
  
 
 
referendum provision that it prefers.9  
III. JUSTICE WEAVER’S DISSENT  
Concerning the dissent of Justice Weaver in this matter,  
I offer the following thoughts:  
(1) The dissent asserts that Detroit Auto Club stands for  
the proposition that only appropriations that “enable the  
state to exercise its various functions free from financial  
embarrassment,” or without which state agencies would “cease  
to function,” are excepted from the referendum process.  
However, Detroit Auto Club, does not say this at all; rather,  
it merely stands for the proposition that the Michigan Highway  
Department is a “state institution.”  It does not even purport  
to address the issue of what constitutes “acts making  
appropriations.”  Of course, even if the decision had said  
what the dissent asserts, no decision of this Court can  
permanently transform the plain language of the constitution.  
(2) The dissent asserts that “the majority fails to  
recognize the importance of the referendum, and this Court’s  
responsibility to protect the people’s power of the  
referendum, derived from the constitution . . . .” However,  
a 
better 
characterization 
of 
this 
Court’s 
“responsibility,” 
in  
my judgment, is that we have a responsibility to protect the  
people’s power of referendum as set forth by the constitution,  
9 The dissent is harsh in its characterization of the  
Legislature’s “legerdemain” in attaching an appropriations 
provision to 2000 PA 381.  Possibly, this is a deserved 
characterization.  But, any such skills in this regard by the 
Legislature can hardly compare to the “legerdemain” (or, 
indeed, the alchemy) on the part of the dissent in  
transforming an otherwise clear and straightforward statement 
of law into something of altogether different meaning.  
11  
and we have a responsibility to protect the people’s power of  
representative 
self-government 
as 
set 
forth 
by 
the  
constitution.  Indeed, the principal “responsibility” of this  
Court is to read the language of the constitution faithfully.  
If the people wish to modify their constitution, they may do  
so under the terms of article 12, and the majority will  
attempt to interpret the modified constitution faithfully.  
But the majority will not act as a continuing constitutional  
convention and dilute the people’s right to have their supreme  
law mean what it says.  
IV. JUSTICE KELLY’S DISSENT  
Concerning the dissent of Justice Kelly in this matter,  
I offer the following thoughts:  
(1) The dissent contends that the majority “ignores” the  
meaning of the word “for” as used in the constitutional  
provision 
“acts 
making 
appropriations 
for 
state 
institutions.”  
I respectfully disagree.  The relevant meaning of “for” in the  
instant context is “intended to belong to.”10  Clearly, in this  
case, the appropriation was “intended to belong to” the  
Department of State Police.  Demonstrating that no word is too  
straightforward not to be transmuted beyond recognition, the  
dissent manages to conclude that what the framers and the  
people meant by using the word “for” was that only  
“appropriations aimed at satisfying the purpose or reason for  
which a state institution exists” are excepted from the  
referendum process.  The premise of this interpretation  
10 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) at  
519.  
12  
 
appears to be that there is a meaningful distinction between  
an agency qua agency, and the functions that are performed by  
such agency, i.e., that there is some disembodied assemblage  
of functions that are carried out by an agency that define its  
“essence” or “core” as distinct from the total array of  
functions that it is charged by the law with carrying out.  
This is plainly without any basis.  If the Legislature  
determined tomorrow that the Department of State Police  
should, in addition to its current responsibilities, be  
assigned 
new 
 
responsibilities now belonging to the Department  
of 
Corrections, 
monies 
appropriated 
for 
such 
new  
responsibilities would be every bit as much “for” the  
Department of State Police as monies appropriated “for” its  
current responsibilities. I am aware of no textual or other  
basis for understanding “for” to mean anything at all  
different in these circumstances.  
(2) The dissent accurately asserts that “[w]e start by  
examining the provision’s plain meaning as understood by its  
ratifiers at the time of its adoption.”  I agree with that  
statement and I believe that this is exactly what the majority  
has done.  The dissent has failed to produce a scintilla of  
evidence to demonstrate that the people of this state in 1963  
understood the language “acts making appropriations for state  
institutions” to mean anything other than what it plainly  
says.  
(3) Because the dissent is unable to produce evidence to  
contradict 
the 
idea 
that 
the 
people 
intended 
their  
constitution to mean what its words convey, in the end, it  
13  
  
 
  
also relies upon such amorphous concepts as “the fundamental  
purpose of the general power of referendum” to justify its  
interpretation of the law.  However, there is no “general  
power” of referendum in Michigan, but only a specific power of  
referendum as defined by the constitution.  And whatever  
“fundamental purpose” can be discerned to the referendum  
power, such a purpose must be subordinate to the “fundamental  
purpose” of a constitution itself, which is that it  
establishes the ground rules for a system of self-government,  
and its words, where plain, must be taken seriously.  
V. FINAL QUERY FOR THE DISSENTERS  
Finally, I would address the following question to each  
of my dissenting colleagues: Had those who proposed and  
ratified our constitution truly intended to limit the  
referendum power as the majority interprets it, how should  
they, how could they, have fashioned it any more clearly than  
they did in article 2, § 9? That is, what words should they  
have used that they did not? 11  
VI. CONCLUSION  
I respectfully believe that the Court of Appeals and my  
dissenting colleagues, by transforming the plain meaning of  
the words of the constitution, would engage the judiciary in  
an exercise far beyond its competence and authority.  While I  
can certainly understand the frustrations of those who  
11 In this regard, I can recall the member of Congress 
who, in frustration over a judicial interpretation of a 
statute that, in his opinion, ignored its plain language, 
reintroduced the identical statute, but appended at its 
conclusion, “and we mean it this time!”  
14  
 
disapprove of the substance of 2000 PA 381, such frustrations  
should not be viewed as a justification for giving a meaning  
to the constitution that is so irreconcilable with its  
language.12  
12 In light of the confusion generated, let me make clear, 
for what it is worth, that I, as a part of the citizenry of 
Michigan, would also prefer a broader referendum clause in our 
constitution, 
one 
less 
susceptible 
to 
avoidance 
by 
appropriations of the type contained in 2000 PA 381.  However, 
until such a referendum clause is adopted by the prescribed 
constitutional process, see Const 1963, art 12, I will 
continue to interpret, as best as I can, the referendum clause 
that has actually been ratified by the people. Furthermore, 
let me make clear that I am not oblivious to the debate over  
the motives of the Legislature in attaching the instant 
appropriations to 2000 PA 381. However, for the reasons set 
forth 
in 
Chief 
Justice Corrigan’s concurring opinion, I simply 
do not believe that such motives are relevant to our  
constitutional analysis.  
15  
________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBECK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
This case presents issues involving the Legislature’s  
constitutional authority and the authority of the people of  
Michigan—expressly reserved in our 1963 constitution—to vote  
on matters of great public significance.  The statute in this  
case affects just such an issue of great public significance,  
involving the delicate balance between the free exercise of  
Second Amendment rights and the fundamental obligation of  
government 
to 
protect 
its 
citizens’ 
physical 
safety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Understandably, this case has energized opposing groups of  
citizens to a degree rarely seen in public debate.1  
Similarly, this case has energized this Court, prompting  
each justice to offer an opinion.  I join in and agree with  
the reasoning offered in the dissenting opinions by Justice  
KELLY and Justice WEAVER. However, I offer this opinion to  
address my specific concerns with the majority’s decision.  
The facts, which the actual majority opinion has  
neglected to recite to either explain its opinion or to serve  
future litigants as precedent, and which appear only in the  
seriatim concurrences, are not in dispute.  For many years,  
Michigan has restricted citizens’ rights to carry concealed  
weapons.  To obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon from  
a county concealed weapons board, a person has needed to  
demonstrate “proper reasons” to carry a concealed weapon.  See  
1 The many concerned citizens on both sides defy easy 
description.  
To 
oversimplify, the background dispute over the 
place of weapons in our society pits firearm advocates and 
persons interested in hunting against a coalition of law 
enforcement, religious, and educational interests.  
In his concurrence, Justice YOUNG characterizes my 
observations as a “generous” statement of my own “extensive 
personal 
views” 
of 
the “political issue” underlying this case. 
Slip op at 2 (YOUNG, J., concurring).  While he is certainly 
correct that this “political issue” is not before the Court, 
his conclusion that I have somehow aired my views of the 
matter is baffling.  This dissent merely states that the 
underlying matter, which led to the referendum drive, is 
significant and that thoughtful people may disagree about it. 
If that is a “generous” statement of my “extensive personal 
views,” then apparently Justice YOUNG is equally copious about 
the matter, see id., and one can only wonder what Justice YOUNG  
would conclude about Justice MARKMAN’s generosity. See slip op 
at 6-7 (MARKMAN, J., concurring) (“For what it is worth, I am 
in complete agreement that 2000 PA 381 is a matter of ‘great 
public significance’ and can easily appreciate why its 
opponents wish to make it the subject of a referendum”).  
2  
 
 
MCL 28.426, repealed by 2000 PA 381.  Under the former system,  
the popular perception was that the permits were difficult to  
obtain.  
Proposed 
legislation 
to 
change 
this 
system 
was 
introduced  
in the 90th Legislature, but it had few prospects for approval.  
However, 
a 
legislative 
majority 
discovered 
new 
prospects 
after  
the 
November 
2000 
election, when the Legislature reconvened to  
conduct its biennial “lame duck” session.2  In 2000 PA 381,  
the Legislature adopted what is popularly known as “shall  
issue” legislation, providing that county boards must issue  
concealed 
weapons 
permits 
to 
applicants 
when 
certain  
unremarkable conditions are met. See MCL 28.425b(7).  
Despite the timing of its passage, this profound change  
in Michigan law did not go unnoticed.  Opposition quickly  
formed, but to no immediate avail.  However, opponents of the  
new law realized the great public interest in this measure,  
and the likelihood that Michigan citizens on both sides of the  
issue would want to make their views known.  Therefore,  
opponents began publicly to discuss invoking the referendum  
process that the people of Michigan reserved for themselves in  
Const 1963, art 2, § 9.  
In that constitutional provision, the people kept the  
right to vote on laws enacted by the Legislature. The people  
of Michigan have long reserved this right, first providing for  
it in Michigan’s 1908 Constitution.  See Const 1908, art 5,  
2 Because of its timing, the lame duck session is 
understood 
to 
be 
a 
period of diminished public accountability. 
See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, Public choice revisited, 96 Mich  
L R 1715, 1729 (1998).  
3  
 
 
§ 1.  Recent examples of the people exercising this right  
occurred with the controversial legislation discussed in Doe  
v Dep’t of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 658; 487 NW2d 166  
(1992), and with the measures discussed in Bingo Coalition for  
Charity—Not Politics v Bd of State Canvassers, 215 Mich App  
405; 546 NW2d 637 (1996).  
The referendum power is not unlimited, however.  The  
framers of the Constitution—and the people of Michigan when  
they ratified the constitution—wisely limited the referendum  
power so that it would not “extend to acts making  
appropriations for state institutions . . .,”  Const 1963, art  
2, § 9. For obvious reasons, the state’s fulfillment of its  
financial obligations cannot be subject to the delay and  
uncertainty inherent in the referendum process.  Indeed, as  
this Court has stated, the limitation is designed to “enable  
the State to exercise its various functions free from  
financial embarrassment.”  Detroit Auto Club v Secretary of  
State, 230 Mich 623, 625; 203 NW 529 (1925).  
The concealed weapons legislation that is the subject of  
this suit acquired, late in the enactment process, some  
language that provided for a $1 million grant to the Michigan  
State Police.  See MCL 28.425w. Intervening defendant People  
Who Care About Kids seeks to establish that the monetary  
provision of 2000 PA 381 will have no effect on the state’s  
ability to function normally, and is not necessary to save the  
state from financial embarrassment. 
Rather, intervening  
defendant suggests that the monetary provision of the act was  
added specifically to evade the people’s right to review the  
4  
wisdom of the concealed weapons provisions in that act.3  That  
is, intervening defendant states that although 2000 PA 381  
will fundamentally change Michigan law governing concealed  
weapons permits, a legislative majority acted with the  
specific intent to deny Michigan citizens their right to  
decide whether most people should be legally allowed to carry  
concealed firearms.  
In 
answering 
this 
argument, 
the 
majority 
focuses 
narrowly  
on the superficially straightforward question whether 2000 PA  
381 fits within the phrase “acts making appropriations for  
state institutions.” Slip op at 2. As the reader has seen,  
the majority has no problem answering that question  
affirmatively, 
granting 
the 
lame-duck 
legislative 
majority 
the  
prize it apparently sought: freedom to change the concealed  
weapons law without public review through the referendum  
process.  
Despite the legalistic temptation to focus on the  
3 
Various 
Michigan 
legislators 
would 
agree 
with  
intervening defendant. For example, protesting the new law, 
Senator Byrum stated that “we know that the only reason there 
was an appropriation . . . was to block the referendum, block 
the people’s right to disagree with the action of their 
Legislature,” 2000 Journal of the Senate 2125, and Senator 
Gast said that the appropriation “was put in to make it 
bulletproof and ballot-proof, and I think it’s kind of 
deceptive.”  
White, 
Lawyers, guns and money: weapons petitions 
go to court, Grand Rapids Press, June 10, 2001, at A18. 
Similarly, Representative Wojno stated that “the reason that 
the 
proponents 
of 
this 
legislation 
added 
this  
appropriation . . . is inappropriate and insidious.  They 
apparently believe that in doing so they can circumvent  
Article II, Section 9 of the Michigan Constitution, and 
silence the voices of the majority of the people of this 
State,” while Representative Jellema added that the eleventh­
hour addition of the appropriation “further diminishes the 
right of voters to express their views on this very important 
issue.” 2000 Journal of the House 2682, 2683.  
5  
 
 
 
 
seemingly literal language of a single phrase in a single  
sentence, the pertinent sentence here is but one sentence in  
our state Constitution. Constitutional analysis must not be  
overly literal; it is an undertaking that must be approached  
in an entirely different light.  Long ago, Michigan’s great  
constitutional scholar Justice COOLEY set forth for his many  
successors on this Court the primary rule of constitutional  
interpretation, the rule of “common understanding,” described  
in his treatise Constitutional Limitations, p 81, to which  
this Court has turned so frequently.  This Court gave a fully  
developed explanation of the rule in Traverse City Sch Dist v  
Attorney Gen, 384 Mich 390, 405-406; 185 NW2d 9 (1971):  
This case requires the construction of a 
constitution, 
where 
the 
technical 
rules 
of  
statutory construction do not apply.  McCulloch v  
Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 407; 4 L Ed 579 
(1819).  
The primary rule is the rule of “common 
understanding” described by Justice Cooley:  
“A constitution is made for the people and by 
the people.  The interpretation that should be 
given it is that which reasonable minds, the great 
mass of the people themselves, would give it.  ‘For  
as the Constitution does not derive its force from  
the convention which framed it, but from the people 
who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is  
that of the people, and it is not to be supposed 
that they have looked for any dark or abtruse 
meaning in the words employed, but rather that they 
have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the 
common understanding, and ratified the instrument  
in the belief that that was the sense designed to 
be conveyed.’ (Cooley’s Const Lim 81.)  (Emphasis  
added.)”  
* * *  
A second rule is that to clarify meaning, the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
adoption 
of 
a  
constitutional provision and the purpose sought to 
be accomplished may be considered.  On this point  
6  
 
 
this Court has said the following:  
“In 
construing constitutional provisions where 
the meaning may be questioned, the court should 
have regard to the circumstances leading to their 
adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished. 
Kearney v Board of State Auditors, [189 Mich 666, 
673; 155 NW 510 (1915)].”  
A third rule is that wherever possible an 
interpretation that does not create constitutional 
invalidity is preferred to one that does.  Chief  
Justice Marshall pursued this thought fully in 
Marbury v Madison, [5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 175; 2 L 
Ed 60 (1803)], which we quote in part:  
“If any other construction would render the 
clause inoperative, that is an additional reason 
for rejecting such other construction . . . .”  
These are the principles we must apply when interpreting our  
state constitution.  
The first and second principles stated in Traverse City  
Sch Dist greatly help in answering the question presented in  
this case.  Under those rules, we are to set aside the  
“technical rules of statutory construction” and the quest for  
“dark or abtruse meaning” in favor of the interpretation that  
“reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves,”  
would give the state constitution.  Without question, that  
exercise must be carried out in light of the whole document.  
Further, it must involve a generous reading of the people’s  
will, 
freed 
of 
a 
lawyer’s 
instinct 
toward 
pinched  
constructions of narrow phrases.  
When considered as a whole, the constitution provides  
various explanations of, and restrictions on, the legislative  
process. A broad examination of the provisions of article 4  
evidences that the framers and the people placed an extremely  
high value on the integrity and accountability of this  
7  
 
 
process.  There, the Constitution prohibits the Legislature  
from playing deceptive games in the course of enacting  
legislation,4 and further seeks to assure that legislation is  
given meaningful consideration before it is adopted.5  Article  
4 also notes the special nature of appropriations bills.6  
4 Const 1963, art 4, §§  24 and 25, provides this  
protection, stating:  
No law shall embrace more than one object, 
which shall be expressed in its title.  No bill  
shall be altered or amended on its passage through 
either house so as to change its original purpose 
as determined by its total content and not alone by 
its title.  
No law shall be revised, altered or amended by 
reference to its title only.  The section or  
sections of the act altered or amended shall be re­
enacted and published at length.  
5 Const 1963, art 4, § 26, provides this assurance, 
stating:  
No bill shall be passed or become a law at any 
regular session of the legislature until it has 
been printed or reproduced and in the possession of 
each house for at least five days.  Every bill 
shall be read three times in each house before the  
final passage thereof. No bill shall become a law  
without the concurrence of a majority of the 
members elected to and serving in each house.  On  
the final passage of bills, the votes and names of 
members voting thereon shall be entered in the  
journal.  
6 This is Const 1963, art 4, § 31, which provides:  
The general appropriation bills for the  
succeeding fiscal period covering items set forth 
in the budget shall be passed or rejected in either 
house of the legislature before that house passes 
any appropriation bill for items not in the budget 
except bills supplementing appropriations for the 
current 
fiscal 
year’s 
operation. 
Any 
bill  
requiring an appropriation to carry out its purpose 
shall be considered an appropriation bill. One of  
the general appropriation bills as passed by the 
legislature shall contain an itemized statement of 
(continued...)  
8  
 
 
Finally, the reserved role of the people is noted in article  
4,7 as well as in other provisions of the Constitution.  See  
Const 1963, art 2, § 9; art 12, § 2.  
In light of these provisions and the overall approach to  
legislation 
taken 
by 
the constitution’s framers and the people  
who ratified it, I am convinced that the Court of Appeals  
correctly decided this case.  I am confident that the  
constitutional right of referendum, in this narrow context,  
should not be taken away by so transparent an artifice.  
Justice COOLEY’s “great mass of the people” would, if asked,  
surely suppose that “acts making appropriations for state  
institutions,” which deny the people’s reserved power of  
referendum, are general appropriations bills containing  
substantial grants to state agencies.  Those grants would have  
to ensure the viability of the agencies or, as the Court of  
Appeals put it, support the agencies’ “core functions.” 246  
Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).  The people of Michigan, I  
am certain, never intended to authorize the 2000 lame duck  
Legislature’s legerdemain.  
6(...continued) 
estimated revenue by major source in each operating 
fund for the ensuing fiscal period, the total of 
which shall not be less than the total of all  
appropriations made from each fund in the general 
appropriation bills as passed.  
7 Article 4, concerning the legislative branch, notes the 
people’s power:  
Any bill passed by the legislature and  
approved 
by 
the 
governor, 
except 
a 
bill  
appropriating money, may provide that it will not 
become law unless approved by a majority of the 
electors voting thereon. [Const 1963, art 4, § 34.]  
9  
 
 
 
 
Additionally, 
the 
third 
principle 
stated 
in 
Traverse 
City  
Sch Dist provides further support for this conclusion. That  
principle is that when possible, we must prefer an  
interpretation 
that 
does 
not 
create 
a 
constitutional  
invalidity over an interpretation that does.8  The referendum  
power, of course, is the people’s reserved check on the  
Legislature.  In Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385,  
n 10; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), this Court, ironically, referred to  
the referendum power as a “gun-behind-the-door to be taken up  
8 The Court cited Marbury v Madison in support of this 
principle.
 See Traverse City Sch Dist, supra at 406.  
Although Marbury is sometimes cited for the proposition that 
the construction of a statute that creates a constitutional  
invalidity is disfavored, see, e.g., Council of Orgs & Others  
for Ed About Parochiaid v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 570; 566 
NW2d 208 (1997), in the passage this Court cited, Chief 
Justice 
Marshall 
actually 
was 
addressing 
invalidating 
constitutional provisions.  Council of Orgs, as well as  
Traverse City Sch Dist, supra at 406, and House Speaker v 
Governor, 443 Mich 560, 585; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), quoted this 
passage from Marbury:  
If any other construction would render the 
clause inoperative, that is an additional reason 
for rejecting such other construction, and for 
adhering to the obvious meaning. [Id. at 175.]  
The “clause” referenced, though, was a clause of the United 
States Constitution, as illustrated by the United States 
Supreme Court’s language preceding the quoted passage:  
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect; and 
therefore such construction is admissible, unless 
the words require it. [Id. at 174.]  
Marbury then discussed how US Const, art 3, § 2, ¶ 2 provided 
for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and how no construction 
of any clause in that section that rendered any other clause 
inoperative would be favored. See Marbury, supra at 175-180.  
Traverse City Sch Dist also dealt with giving meaning to the 
language of the constitution, not saving a statute from 
constitutional invalidity. See Traverse City Sch Dist, supra  
at 412-413. Likewise, in this case we must give meaning to, 
and not invalidate, the people’s reserved referendum power.  
10  
on those occasions when the legislature itself does not  
respond to popular demands.”  However, with its decision in  
this case, the majority removes the people’s check, taking the  
gun from behind the door and handing it to the Legislature.  
By holding that the money inserted into 2000 PA 381  
circumvents the people’s reserved referendum power, the  
majority holds that the referendum power exists at the  
Legislature’s pleasure.  Whenever the Legislature wants to  
avoid the people’s check on its power, it need only insert  
some money into a bill, apparently even a de minimis amount,  
to get around that power. 
The people’s check on the  
Legislature will thus become invalid because the people will  
only 
have 
the 
“gun-behind-the-door” 
when 
the 
Legislature 
gives  
it to them.  Such an interpretation is certainly at odds with  
this Court’s commitment to liberally construe constitutional  
provisions reserving for the people a direct legislative  
voice, see Kuhn, supra at 385, but further leaves the people’s  
reserved referendum power, in a word, useless.  
In its short opinion, the majority cites “an unbroken  
line of decisions of this Court interpreting [the referendum  
power].”
 Slip op at 2. 
The line is unbroken because it  
reflects this Court’s dual commitments to the people’s right  
to vote on matters of great public significance and to the  
taxpayers’ right to a state government that maintains  
responsible 
and 
functional 
taxation 
and 
appropriation  
policies. At times, the latter commitment has required that  
we give effect to the constitutional insulation against  
referring appropriations measures and related financial  
11  
 
 
 
 
enactments.  Never, though, has the “unbroken line” veered in  
the direction approved in this case.  
Also, I find it as inevitable as night following day that  
the concurrences would characterize the lengthy, thoughtful  
majority opinion as “admirably concise,” slip op at 1 (YOUNG,  
J., 
concurring), and as setting “forth its analysis simply and  
straightforwardly” and doing so because “the constitutional  
issue before us is simple and straightforward.”  Slip op at 1­
2 (MARKMAN, J., concurring).  Yet, as self-evident as the  
majority believes its result to be, the orchestrated,  
explanatory concurrences appeared following this dissent.  In  
my view, these serial apologias do nothing to alter the  
majority’s disembowelment of the public’s constitutionally  
guaranteed right to referendum.  
So, 
despite 
the 
constitutional 
structure 
and 
the 
people’s  
desire for a check on the Legislature, the majority concludes  
that the Legislature can decide when the people will have that  
check.  I reiterate that reasonable minds may differ about the  
underlying substance of this case.  Some say public safety and  
ordinary social intercourse will be disturbed by a radical  
switch in state concealed weapons policy, while others say  
that public safety will be enhanced when responsible citizens  
can carry weapons.  I say, and do not believe reasonable minds  
can dispute, that the constitution says that the people must  
be allowed to vote.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
12  
 
 
                                          
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBECK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v
 No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that  
2000 Public Act 381 is exempt from the power of referendum of  
the Michigan Constitution.  
Art 2, § 9 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution  states that  
“[t]he power of referendum does not extend to acts making  
appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies  
in state funds . . . .”  This language was taken almost  
 
 
 
verbatim1 from the 1908 Michigan Constitution, art 5, § 1  
(amendment of 1913), which read:  
The legislative power of the state of Michigan 
is vested in a senate and house of representatives; 
but the people reserve to themselves the power to 
propose legislative measures, resolutions and laws; 
to enact or reject the same at the polls 
independently of the Legislature; and to approve or 
reject at the polls any act passed by the  
Legislature, except acts making appropriations for 
state institutions and to meet deficiencies in  
state funds.” [Emphasis added.]  
The 
sole 
interpretation of the “acts making appropriations for  
state institutions” language of art 5, § 1 of the 1908  
Constitution is found in the 1925 Michigan Supreme Court case,  
Detroit Automobile Club v Secretary of State, 230 Mich 623;  
203 NW 529 (1925).  
In Detroit Automobile Club, plaintiffs sought a writ of  
mandamus to compel the defendant to refrain from immediately  
enforcing 1925 PA 2 in order to allow a referendum on the law.  
The act at issue in Detroit Automobile Club appropriated money  
for the use of the Highway Department in constructing and  
maintaining the highways of the state. To determine whether  
the Legislature had the power to give the act immediate  
effect, and thus preclude a referendum, Detroit Automobile  
Club addressed the meaning of art 5, § 212 and art 5, § 1.  
1 In 1974 this Court held that “The referendary provision 
and exceptions of the 1908 Constitution were retained in the 
1963 Constitution as art 2, § 9 without change in the 
pertinent language.” 
Bds of Co Rd Comm’s v Bd of State  
Canvassers, 391 Mich 666, 674-675; 218 NW2d 144 (1974) 
(emphasis added).  
2Art 5, § 21 provided in pertinent part:  
No act shall take effect or be in force until  
(continued...)  
2  
 
 
  
 
  
Detroit Automobile Club first addressed whether the  
Highway Department was a state institution within the meaning  
of art 5, § 1.  Ultimately, the Court held that the Highway  
Department was a state institution within the meaning of the  
constitution. 
Detroit Automobile Club, supra at 626. 
In  
order to reach this holding, the Court ruled:  
The question is not solely whether the highway 
department 
may 
be 
correctly 
termed 
a 
state  
institution, but rather whether, in view of the 
functions which it exercises, it comes within the 
meaning of that term as used in the Constitution. 
It is not difficult to determine what the framers  
of the Constitution had in mind. It is clear that, 
by permitting immediate effect to be given to 
appropriation acts for state institutions, it was 
their purpose to enable the state to exercise its 
various 
functions 
free 
from 
financial  
embarrassment. The highway department exercises 
state functions. It was created by the Legislature 
for that purpose. It must have money to carry on 
its activities. Without the money appropriated by 
this act for its immediate use, it would cease to 
function. The constitutional purpose was to prevent 
such a contingency. 
[Id., 625-626 (emphasis  
added).]  
The Court viewed the purpose of the Legislature’s power to  
give an act of appropriation immediate effect as one necessary  
to permit the “state to exercise its various functions free  
from financial embarrassment” and to allow for state  
institutions to carry on state functions.  Id.  To that Court,  
this 
purpose 
of 
the 
framers 
was 
“not 
difficult 
to  
determine . . . .” Id. Detroit Automobile Club recognized the  
2(...continued) 
the expiration of ninety days from the end of the 
session at which the same is passed, except that 
the legislature may give immediate effect to acts 
making 
appropriations 
and 
acts 
immediately 
necessary for the preservation of the public peace, 
health or safety by a 2/3 vote of the members of 
each elected house.  
3  
 
 
 
necessity of immediacy under these circumstances and it is  
under these circumstances that Detroit Automobile Club  
determined that an act was not subject to the people’s  
referendum power.  
This Court reaffirmed its articulation of the purpose of  
the constitutional provision in Moreton v Secretary of State,  
240 Mich 584, 592; 216 NW 450 (1927), where it declined to  
interpret the provision in a way which would “defeat the  
constitutional purpose, which is to save the State from  
financial embarrassment in exercising any of its State  
functions.”  Further, this Court has cited Detroit Automobile  
Club’s interpretation of this language without question or  
criticism in Co Rd Ass’n of Michigan v Bd of State Canvassers,  
407 Mich 101, 112-113; 282 NW2d 774 (1979), and Michigan Good  
Roads Fed v Bd of State Canvassers, 333 Mich 352, 356-357; 53  
NW2d 481 (1952).3  
When the framers of the 1963 Constitution included the  
language 
on 
“acts 
making 
appropriations 
for 
state  
institutions,” and the people approved it, it was with the  
knowledge of how this Court had previously interpreted this  
same language in Detroit Automobile Club. It is a well­
established rule of constitutional construction that “[t]he  
framers of a Constitution are presumed to have a knowledge of  
3 The 1939 decision in Todd v Hull, 288 Mich 521; 285 NW 
46 (1939), did briefly discuss art 5, § 1 of the 1908 
Constitution (the predecessor to Const 1963, art 2, § 9), 
although Todd’s primary focus was on whether 1939 PA 3 was 
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public 
peace, health, or safety within the contemplation of art 5, 
§ 21, of the 1908 Constitution. 
Moreover, this case was a 
four to four split decision, and has no precedential effect.  
4  
 
 
existing 
laws,...and 
to 
act 
in 
reference 
to 
that  
knowledge . . . .”  People v May, 3 Mich 598, 610 (1855). See  
also, Detroit v Chapin, 108 Mich 136, 142; 66 NW 587 (1895);  
Richardson v Secretary of State, 381 Mich 304, 311-313; 160 NW  
2d 883 (1968); Bds of Co Rd Comm’s v Bd of State Canvassers,  
391 Mich 666, 675; 218 NW2d 144 (1974).4  Indeed, in reviewing  
“[t]he construction placed by this Court on this exception to  
the right of referendum in the 1925 Detroit Automobile Club,  
1927 Moreton, and 1952 Good Roads cases,” this Court noted:  
The delegates to the 1961 Constitutional  
Convention are presumed to have known and to have 
understood the meaning ascribed in these earlier 
decisions to the language of the 1908 Constitution. 
This language was retained by them in the 1963 
Constitution without modification in response to 
the earlier decisions. 
Under well-established  
principles, it is not open to us to place a new 
construction on this language. [Bds of Co Rd  
Comm’s, supra at 676.]  
Because the reasoning in Detroit Automobile Club was the sole  
and 
uncontradicted 
interpretation 
of 
“acts 
making  
appropriations for state institutions,” I believe that its  
reasoning is the best evidence of the framers understanding of  
this language and perhaps the explanation why there is so  
little discussion of its meaning in the record of the  
convention.  
Applying Detroit Auto Club to the facts of this case, the  
money appropriated in 2001 PA 381 is not necessary for the  
4Notably, in Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 
1973 PA 1 and 2, 390 Mich 166, 176-177; 211 NW2d 28 (1973), we 
stated 
that 
a 
judicially created exception to a constitutional 
limitation of state indebtedness survived the ratification of  
the 1963 Constitution because, “whatever the logic,” the 
people were “presumably aware of the exception and did not 
eliminate it.”  
5  
         
State Police to “exercise its various functions free from  
financial embarrassment,” but rather is necessary only to  
implement the act itself. Detroit Automobile Club, supra at  
625-626.  The State Police would not cease to function without  
the appropriation.  The effect of referendum on 2001 PA 381 on  
the functioning of the State Police stands in contrast to the  
concerns of the Court in the “gas tax cases.”  Moreton, supra;  
Good Roads, supra; and Co Rd Ass’n of Michigan, supra. In the  
“gas tax cases,” the Court concluded that the building of good  
roads is an important state function.  Further, the Court  
concluded the appropriations at issue in the “gas tax cases”  
were made to “enable it to function in that regard, and, being  
made for that purpose, . . . are not subject to referendum.”  
Moreton, supra at 592.5  
Further, I believe that the majority fails to recognize  
the 
importance 
of 
the 
referendum, 
and 
this 
Court’s  
responsibility to protect the people’s power of the  
referendum, as derived from the constitution and as outlined  
in Michigan Farm Bureau v Hare, 379 Mich 387, 393; 151 NW2d  
797 (1967):  
There is nevertheless an overriding rule of 
constitutional construction which requires that the 
commonly understood referral process, forming as it 
does a specific power the people themselves have 
expressly reserved, be saved if possible as against 
conceivable if not likely evasion or parry by the 
legislature.  The rule is, in substance, that no 
court should construe a clause or section of a  
constitution as to impede or defeat its generally  
5 Thus, I agree with Justice Kelly that the gas tax cases 
do not support the majority conclusion, but, rather, are 
consistent with my position and that of my dissenting  
colleagues. See slip op at 6-7.  
6  
 
  
  
 
understood ends when another construction thereof, 
equally concordant with the words and sense of that 
clause or section, will guard and enforce these 
ends.  
Given the prior, uncontradicted, and equally concordant  
construction in Detroit Automobile Club, I believe we are  
precluded in this case from applying the constitutional  
provision in a way that would take the power of the referendum  
away from the people and give it to the Legislature.6  
Under the majority’s opinion, if the Legislature were to  
drop the six zeros on the appropriation in 2000 PA 381,  
leaving an appropriation of $1 to the State Police, the act  
would nevertheless remain referendum-proof.  I cannot believe  
that this outcome is the interpretation that “reasonable  
minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give  
it.” Traverse City Sch Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390,  
405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), quoting Cooley’s Const Lim 81.  I  
agree with Justice Cavanagh that by determining that the  
inclusion of a monetary provision in 2000 PA 381 circumvents  
the 
people’s 
reserved 
referendum 
power, 
the 
majority  
effectively holds “that the referendum power exists at the  
Legislature’s pleasure.” Slip op at 11.  
Finally, it is essential to recognize that the issue  
before us is one of constitutional interpretation. My opinion  
6 Such considerations are relevant even though  this  
Court has recently rejected the “absurd result” mode of 
statutory construction.  People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 155­
160; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).  McIntire concerned a matter of  
statutory construction. 
We have long recognized that  
“[c]onstruction 
of 
a 
constitution is a special situation where 
technical rules of statutory construction do not apply.” 
Highway Comm v Vanderloot, 392 Mich 159, 179; 220 NW2d 416 
(1974).  
7  
on the issue of constitutional law in this case does not  
address and should not be read to reflect one way or the other  
a position on the merits of the concealed weapons act passed  
by the Legislature.  
I would affirm the result of the Court of Appeals.  
8  
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION  
CLUBS, MICHIGAN COALITION FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERS, ROSS 
DYKMAN, DAVID K. FELBEK, and 
CORRIE WILLIAMS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
No. 119274  
SECRETARY OF STATE and STATE  
BOARD OF CANVASSERS,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT KIDS,  
Intervening 
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I agree with my two dissenting colleagues that 2000 PA  
381 
(Act 
381) 
does 
not 
constitute 
an 
act 
"making  
appropriations for state institutions" within the meaning of  
Const 1963, art 2, § 9. Thus, I would affirm the decision of  
the Court of Appeals and hold the act subject to referendum.  
I write separately, however, to make several points.  
I. The Constitutional Meaning of 
"Acts Making Appropriations For State Institutions"  
In Const 1963, art 2, § 9, the people reserved the power  
of referendum. They limited it, saying it "does not extend to  
acts making appropriations for state institutions . . . ."  
The question in the present case is whether a referendum of  
Act 381 is possible, because the act makes "appropriations for  
state institutions."  
When construing provisions of our constitution, this  
Court uses the rule of "common understanding." See American  
Axle & Mfg, Inc v Hamtramck, 461 Mich 352, 362; 604 NW2d 330  
(2000); Federated Publications, Inc v Michigan State Univ Bd  
of Trustees, 460 Mich 75, 84; 594 NW2d 491 (1999). The rule  
requires "ascertain[ing] as best the Court may the general  
understanding and therefore the uppermost or dominant purpose  
of the people when they approved the provision or provisions  
. . . ." Michigan Farm Bureau v Secretary of State, 379 Mich  
387, 390-391; 151 NW2d 797 (1967); Traverse City Sch Dist v  
Attorney Gen, 384 Mich 390, 405-406; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).  
We start by examining the provision's plain meaning as  
understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption. See  
American Axle & Mfg, Inc, supra at 362. 
Article 2, § 9  
provides:  
The people reserve to themselves the power to 
propose laws and to enact and reject laws, called 
the initiative, and the power to approve or reject 
laws enacted by the legislature, called the  
referendum. The power of initiative extends only to 
laws which the legislature may enact under this 
constitution. The power of referendum does not 
extend to acts making appropriations for state 
institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds  
and must be invoked in the manner prescribed by law 
within 90 days following the final adjournment of 
the legislative session at which the law was  
enacted. To invoke the initiative or referendum, 
petitions 
signed 
by 
a 
number 
of 
registered 
electors, 
not 
less 
than 
eight 
percent 
for  
initiative and five percent for referendum of the 
total vote cast for all candidates for governor at 
the last preceding general election at which a 
governor was elected shall be required. 
 In deciding this case, the majority makes much of the  
2  
fact that Act 381 allocates $1,000,000 "to the department of  
state police . . . ." Slip op at 2. It concludes that the  
$1,000,000 is an "appropriation" and that the Department of  
State Police is a "state institution." See slip op at 2. Thus,  
it reasons, the power of referendum does not extend to Act  
381. I disagree.  
The majority's error, in my view, arises in part because  
it fails to examine carefully the meaning of the phrase "acts  
making appropriations for state institutions." In particular,  
it ignores the use of the word "for"  in that phrase. In  
essence, it interprets art 2, § 9 to exempt from referendum  
any act that makes an appropriation "to" a state institution.  
This interpretation not only lacks support from the plain  
language of the article, it fails to appreciate the critical  
difference between the meanings of "to"1 and "for."  
I would interpret art 2, § 9 to give effect to the words  
contained in it. The provision indicates that an act making an  
appropriation is exempt from referendum only if the  
appropriation 
is 
made 
"for" 
state 
institutions. 
The 
dictionary  
definition of "for," in pertinent part, is "suiting the  
purposes or needs of," "with the object or purpose of."2  
"Purpose" is defined as "the reason for which something  
1"To" is defined, inter alia, as "used for expressing 
destination or appointed end." Random House Webster's College 
Dictionary, p 1401 (1995).  
2Id. at 519.  My use of the word "for" is not as Justice 
Markman 
asserts, 
"transmuted 
beyond 
recognition." 
 
The 
meaning  
is straight out of the dictionary.  
3  
 
exists."3 Thus, a reasonable interpretation of art 2, § 9 is  
that legislation that contains an appropriation aimed at  
satisfying the purpose or reason for which a state institution  
exists is referendum-proof. Unless the appropriation is  
intended to support the core function of a state institution,  
it does not prevent the people from voting on the legislation  
in referendum.  
I would adopt this as the most reasonable interpretation  
of art 2, § 9.4 Applying it to this case, I would conclude  
that Act 381 does not make an appropriation for a state  
institution." Of the $1,000,000 that it allocates to the  
Department of State Police not a penny serves the central  
function for which the department exists. Instead, the  
appropriation implements the specific substantive provisions  
of the act.5 None of items funded relates to a core function  
of the state police department.6 Thus, giving the words of art  
3Id. at 1096.  
4In his concurring opinion, Justice Markman makes a 
"final query for the dissenters":  How could those who  
ratified the constitution have fashioned the words of art 2, 
§ 9 more clearly?  My response is that no wording change is 
needed.  Art 2, § 9 means what it says.  However, it would 
have to be reworded to accurately convey the meaning that 
Justice Markman and the majority give it.  It would have to be  
changed to read:  The power of referendum "does not extend to 
acts making appropriations to state institutions . . . ."  
5Act 381 directs that the $1,000,000 be used, inter alia, 
to distribute trigger locks, provide permit application kits, 
take photographs of applicants, conduct a public safety 
campaign regarding Act 381's requirements, and conduct  
fingerprint 
analysis 
and 
comparison 
reports 
required 
under 
the 
Act.  
6Although Justice Young opines that the judiciary is ill­
equipped 
to 
resolve 
what a state institution's "core function" 
(continued...)  
4  
 
 
2, § 9 and of Act 381 their plain meaning, the Act does not  
make appropriations "for state institutions" within the  
meaning of the constitution.7  
My 
interpretation 
is 
consistent 
with 
this 
Court's 
mandate  
that the right of referendum should be liberally construed.  
See, e.g., Kuhn v Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385; 183  
NW2d 
796 
(1971). 
Furthermore, it prevents the Legislature from  
easily circumventing the people's constitutional referendum  
power. With that end in mind, I agree with the views expressed  
by the Arizona Supreme Court in Warner v Secretary of State:8  
To hold that an act may not be referred 
because incidentally it provides the funds to 
accomplish the ends it seeks would have the effect 
of practically nullifying the referendum provision 
of the Constitution, because many of the measures 
passed carry appropriations of this character, and 
it would be an easy matter to include such a 
provision in others and bring about the same 
result.  
II. The Majority's Unprecedented Interpretation of Art 2, § 
9: A Departure From Decisions In The "Gas Tax" Cases9  
6(...continued) 
is, see slip op at 32, I have every confidence in the 
judiciary's capabilities in this regard.  
7Justice Markman creates a hypothetical example whereby 
the Legislature enacts a law that assigns to the Department of 
State Police responsibilities belonging to the Department of 
Corrections, and then allocates money to that end. See Justice 
Markman's slip op at 16. I find his hypothetical example 
inapplicable. 
Act 
381 does not transfer functions belonging to 
any other agency.  
839 Ariz 203, 215-216; 4 P2d 1000 (1931).  
9Detroit Automobile Club v Secretary of State, 230 Mich 
623; 203 NW 529 (1925); Moreton v Secretary of State, 240 Mich  
584, 592; 216 NW 450 (1927); Good Rds Fed v Bd of State  
Canvassers, 333 Mich 352, 360; 53 NW2d 481 (1952); Co Rd  
Comm'rs v Bd of State Canvassers, 391 Mich 666; 218 NW2d 144 
(1974); Co Rd Ass'n of Michigan v Bd of State Canvassers, 407 
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
 
 
The majority asserts that its conclusion, that Act 381  
makes appropriations for state institutions, is consistent  
with "an unbroken line of decisions from this Court" in the  
gas tax cases. See slip op at 2. Upon close inspection, one  
finds the assertion untrue.  Rather, as will be seen, it is my  
interpretation, 
and 
that of my two dissenting colleagues, that  
is consistent with the gas tax cases.  
To be sure, the gas tax cases are "unbroken" in the sense  
that all constitute proclamations from this Court that the  
challenged gas tax  was nonreferable, meaning that it could  
not be subject to a referendum vote. Notwithstanding, they do  
not support the majority's conclusion.  
In the earliest gas tax case, this Court stated that the  
appropriation exception in our constitution was intended to  
allow the state to exercise its various core functions free  
from financial embarrassment. See Detroit Automobile Club v  
Secretary of State, 230 Mich 623, 625; 203 NW 529 (1925). We  
explained:  
It is clear that, by permitting immediate 
effect to be given to appropriation acts for state 
institutions, it was their purpose to enable the 
state to exercise its various functions free from  
financial embarrassment. The highway department 
exercises state functions. It was created by the 
Legislature for that purpose. It must have money to 
carry 
on 
its 
activities. 
Without 
the 
money 
appropriated by this act for its immediate use, it 
would cease to function. The constitutional purpose 
was to prevent such a contingency. [Id. at 625-626  
(emphasis added).][10]  
9(...continued) 
Mich 101, 116-118; 282 NW2d 774 (1979).  
10In Detroit Automobile Club, the issue was whether 1925 
(continued...)  
6  
 
 
 
 
This interpretation was reiterated in the second gas tax  
case. See Moreton v Secretary of State, 240 Mich 584, 592; 216  
NW 450 (1927).  Moreton stated that an act that contained  
appropriations to enable state agencies "to function" was  
nonreferable. Detroit Automobile Club and Moreton contain the  
most 
thorough 
discussion of this Court's interpretation of the  
appropriation exception to the referendum power.11 These cases  
demonstrate that the appropriation exception within art 2, §  
9, was prompted by a fear of financial embarrassment.  That  
could occur if, by referendum petition, an appropriation for  
a state institution were suspended pending a vote on a  
legislative 
act. 
See 
Moreton, supra at 592; Detroit Automobile  
Club, supra at 625.  
The majority's interpretation of art 2, § 9, impliedly  
10(...continued) 
PA 1 was subject to referendum under Const 1908, Art 5, § 1, 
amendment of 1913 (the predecessor to Const 1963, art 2, § 9), 
i.e., whether it made an appropriation "for [a] state  
institution[]." In his concurring opinion in this case, 
Justice Markman accurately notes that the portion of Detroit  
Automobile Club quoted above is taken from this Court's  
discussion regarding the meaning of the term "state  
institution." Nevertheless, it is clear that that discussion 
contained, also, an interpretation of the entire referendum 
exception provision. For this reason, I find the Court's 
discussion in Detroit Automobile Club useful here.  
11In two of the three later gas tax cases, this Court 
merely quoted or cited, then followed, our interpretation in 
Detroit Automobile Club of the appropriation exception to the 
power of referendum. See Michigan Good Rds Federation, supra 
at 356-357; Co Rd Assoc, supra at 112-113. In the other gas 
tax case, this Court merely cited our holding in Detroit  
Automobile Club. See Co Rd Comm'rs, supra at 672.  
In Todd v Hull, 288 Mich 521, 523-524; 285 NW 46 (1939), 
we discussed the predecessor to art 2, § 9 (Const 1908, art 5, 
§ 1). However, Todd was a four to four decision and, 
therefore, has no precedential effect.  
7  
 
 
 
rejects this Court's "core function" interpretation of the  
phrase in our constitution exempting from referendum "acts  
making 
appropriations 
for 
state 
institutions."12 
Therefore, 
its  
decision is not consistent with our prior decisions, at all.  
In fact, it seriously departs from them.  
Given that Detroit Automobile Club represents the only  
substantive interpretation by this Court of "acts making  
appropriations for state institutions," I agree with Justice  
Weaver that we should follow it. Doing so further supports the  
conclusion I have articulated: art 2, § 9 was intended to  
exempt from referendum only those acts containing grants that  
ensure the viability of state agency recipients, or as the  
Court of Appeals said, that support the agencies' "core  
functions." 246 Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).  
This interpretation renders the referendum exception  
consistent with the fundamental purpose of the general power  
of referendum. If the appropriation provision in an act is  
essential to a core purpose of a state institution, the act  
may not be referred.  The risk is too great that the delay  
caused by a referendum vote would embarrass government and be  
detrimental to the public. On the other hand, where the  
appropriation provision is for a lesser function, not  
essential to the purpose of the department, the embarrassment  
problem does not arise. In the latter case, the people's right  
to decide policy issues for themselves, which is the core  
12Two of the concurring opinions do so, as well. See 
Justice Markman's slip op at 2-3; Justice Young's slip op at 
12-29.  
8  
 
purpose for which the people reserved the referendum power,  
should survive.  
III. Court Consideration of the Legislature's Motives  
In one of the three concurring opinions joining the  
majority, my colleague "emphasize[s]" that the Legislature's  
subjective 
motivation 
for 
making 
a 
$1,000,000 
appropriation 
in  
Act 381 "is irrelevant." Chief Justice Corrigan's slip op at  
2. In my view, this is an unfortunate exaggeration.  
I acknowledge that, as a general rule, courts do not  
inquire into the motives of the Legislature in passing  
legislation. See Young v Ann Arbor, 267 Mich 241, 243; 255 NW  
579 (1934). However, "[c]ourts are not supposed to be blinded  
bats." Todd v Hull, 288 Mich 521, 543; 285 NW 46 (1939)  
(opinion of Bushnell, J.), quoting State ex rel Pollock v  
Becker, 289 Mo 660, ___; 233 SW 641, 646 (1921).13 Hence, I  
would not be so quick to eliminate categorically the  
possibility that this Court may consider, where pertinent,  
relevant, and ascertainable, the Legislature's motives in  
enacting a statute.  
IV. Referendum v Initiative  
I 
find 
objectionable, also, the palliation offered by two  
of my colleagues in the majority that the intervening  
defendant 
retains 
the direct remedy of the initiative process.  
Chief Justice Corrigan's slip op at 1; Justice Young's slip op  
at 31. Although I agree that the initiative process is  
13The instant case brings to mind the ancient quotation 
that "[t]he voice is Jacob's voice but the hands are the hands 
of Esau." Todd, supra at 543, (opinion of Bushnell, J.).  
9  
 
available here, I find their observation misplaced.  
First, any alternative remedy that exists is irrelevant  
to the issue before us: whether Act 381 constitutes an act  
"making appropriations for state institutions" within the  
meaning of art 2, § 9.  Moreover, there are real and  
heightened practical difficulties associated with pursuing an  
initiative 
process, 
as compared with referendum. Not only does  
the initiative process require far more petition signatures  
than the referendum process, it also involves much more  
complicated procedures. Const 1963, art 2, § 9.  
Also, this case presents the exact situation for which  
the referendum power was created. The power exists to permit  
citizens to suspend or annul laws passed by the Legislature  
until the people can vote on the merits of the law. See  
Alabama Freight v Hunt, 29 Ariz 419, 424; 242 P2d 658 (1926);  
see also Const 1963, art 2, § 9. Thus, if Act 381 is  
referable, it would not become effective until the people  
voted it should be the law of this state. Const 1963, art 2,  
§ 9.  
The power of initiative, on the other hand, is intended  
to protect against a Legislature that fails to act.14 It does  
not suspend the effective date of a law passed by the  
Legislature. Const 1963, art 2, § 9. Therefore, even if a  
successful 
initiative drive were pursued, the people would not  
14See Comment, Interpretation of initiatives by reference 
to similar statutes:  Canons of construction do not adequately  
measure voter intent, 34 Santa Clara L R 945, 973 (1994), 
"legislative 
inaction is the reason the initiative process was 
established."  
10  
vote on the law until at least November 2002. By then, Act 381  
would have been operative for over sixteen months and  
potentially 
thousands 
of 
additional 
concealed 
weapons 
would 
be  
carried 
by 
thousands 
more 
Michiganians. 
Thus, 
from 
intervening  
defendant's perspective, the availability of the initiative  
process is an unsatisfactory remedy.15  
V. Conclusion  
For these reasons, and for the reasons given by my two  
dissenting colleagues, I believe that Act 381 does not  
constitute 
"acts 
making 
appropriations 
for 
state 
institutions"  
within the meaning of art 2, § 9. Accordingly, I would affirm  
the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
15I note, also, that the issue in the instant case is one 
of constitutional interpretation.  Accordingly, my opinion 
here addresses an issue of constitutional law.  It does not  
address and ought not be construed to address the merits of 
Act 381.  
11