Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 255 Ind. 47, 262 N.E.2d 515

Docket Number: 469S69

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1970-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
255 Ind. 47 (1970)
262 N.E.2d 515
BROWN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 469S69.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 8, 1970.
Rehearing denied December 17, 1970.
*48 William C. Erbecker, James Manahan, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
Appellant was charged by indictment with a violation of the Offenses Against Property Act, said indictment reading in pertinent part as follows:
On July 19, 1967, appellant waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime as charged. Trial by jury commenced on December 9, 1968. The jury returned its verdict on December 10, 1968, finding appellant "* * * guilty of the crime of Theft of Property of the Value of Less Than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), as covered by the Indictment * * *." The court thereupon ordered a pre-sentence investigation to be made and a report filed. On January 2, 1969, the court sentenced appellant to the Indiana State Farm for a period of 60 days and fined him $500.00 and costs.
Prior to the date set for sentencing, i.e. on December 23, 1968, appellant filed his motion for new trial; said motion comprises five separate pages of the record in this cause and is here omitted in the interest of brevity. Appellant's motion for new trial was overruled on January 3, 1969. Appellant's sole Assignment of Error on appeal is that:
From the evidence adduced at the trial of this cause, viewed most favorably to the State, it appears that Charles Derbyshire was the manager of a Wake-Up Service Station located at Lyndhurst Drive and Morris Street in the City of Indianapolis on February 15, 1967. He arrived at the service station *50 at approximately 7:00 a.m. on said date and found that the storeroom had been broken into and that certain articles were missing, to-wit: forty-five (45) cartons of cigarettes, thirty (30) gallons of transmission fluid, forty-two (42) gallons of oil, an adding machine, a bank bag, a pair of shoes, and cash in the amount of $107.00. The State's principal witness, one Ronald Schoolcraft, a known burglar operating in Indianapolis, testified at the trial of this cause that he, along with one Johnny Spencer, committed the burglary in question.
Appellant owned and operated a general store at 1821 S. Lyndhurst in the City of Indianapolis. Said business necessitated the purchase and subsequent sale of distressed, "secondhand" merchandise. He also leased and operated a service station next to his general store, and, in the course of pursuing this business enterprise, he purchased numerous items such as automotive lubricants and accessories.
On February 15, 1967, Schoolcraft arrived at appellant's service station offering to sell transmission fluid, motor oil, and cigarettes. He told appellant at that time that such items had recently been stolen. Appellant paid Schoolcraft approximately $26.00 for the motor oil and transmission fluid and $1.50 for each of thirteen (13) cartons of cigarettes.
Appellant argues that such evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the reason that there is no evidence by which a trier of fact could infer that he knew that the goods in question were stolen at the time he obtained control over them. Appellant testified in his own defense that Schoolcraft told him that the oil, transmission fluid, and cigarettes had come from a Gulf Service Station which Schoolcraft and a man named "Bill" operated as a partnership, that the partners were "splitting up," and that Schoolcraft was liquidating certain tangible assets of the operation.
It is well-settled in Indiana that a conviction will be sustained if there is any evidence of probative value of the facts *51 essential to support the judgment. Bush v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 84, 237 N.E.2d 584; Butler v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 484, 229 N.E.2d 471. Further, this Court on appeal will not weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of the witnesses, Croney v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 319, 247 N.E.2d 501; Leaver v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 523, 237 N.E.2d 368; and, when the sufficiency of the evidence is raised as an issue on appeal, it will consider only that evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Buckner v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 379, 248 N.E.2d 348; Sampson v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 625, 237 N.E.2d 254.
The following testimony of Ronald Schoolcraft is significant:
(Tr., pp. 87, 88)
*52 Such direct, positive testimony by the State's principal witness was sufficient to justify the jury in determining that appellant knew, at the time he obtained control over the items in question, that they were, in fact, stolen property.
Appellant further contends that the trial court committed reversible error in concluding that it could not weigh the evidence in reaching a determination as to whether or not the defendant-appellant should have been entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty at the close of all the evidence. Said contention is predicated upon Specification #9 of appellant's motion for new trial, which reals as follows:
Appellant's argument is without merit. It is a well-settled rule in Indiana that where a determination of an issue involves the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses, it is an invasion of the province of the jury for the court to direct a verdict. Davis v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 596, 233 N.E.2d 642; State v. Patsel (1960), 240 Ind. 240, 163 N.E.2d 602; State v. Torphy (1940), *53 217 Ind. 383, 28 N.E.2d 70; State v. Kubiak (1936), 210 Ind. 479, 4 N.E.2d 193.
In Green v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 86, 229 N.E.2d 726, this Court stated:
The substance of appellant's final argument can best be stated in this opinion by reproducing verbatim Specifications #6 and 7 of his motion for new trial.
A review of the record of this cause substantiates appellant's contention that the prosecution was permitted to inject into said record irrelevant, scandalous, and highly prejudicial testimony concerning other alleged crimes and activities of the appellant. For purposes of illustration, we cite the following testimony of the State's principal witness, Ronald Schoolcraft:
The State has made no showing that the testimony or evidence above referred to was offered for a purpose which would permit its admissibility as an exception to the general rule enunciated in Watts v. State, supra, and those cases cited therein, and we, therefore, look with extreme displeasure upon the actions of the trial court in permitting said testimony to be admitted. However, the responsibility for keeping incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial testimony out of the record does not rest solely with the trial court. Appellant's counsel has an absolute duty to effectively preserve for appeal any and all errors committed during the course of the trial. In Hensley v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 633, 244 N.E.2d 225, this Court stated:
The record discloses that appellant's counsel made no objection whatsoever to the admission of the alleged prejudicial evidence set forth in his Specification of error #7. He argues that to so object would have been futile and would only have further prejudiced his client's case in the eyes of the jury. However true such an argument may be, it will not serve to dilute the long-standing rule of this Court that objections not raised in the court below are considered waived. Liford v. State (1965), 247 Ind. 149, 210 N.E.2d 366; Rogers v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 709, 88 N.E.2d 755; Shircliff v. State (1884), 96 Ind. 369.
Appellant's sole objection to the testimony in question, noted in his Specification #6, raises no question for our determination for the following reason. The ground upon which said objection was based was that the answer given by the witness, Ronald Schoolcraft, was unresponsive to the question asked by the Deputy Prosecutor. Appellant's argument on appeal is that said answer was incompetent because it related to other alleged criminal and improper activities attributable to him. Clearly he has changed the ground; and this Court has often held that, on appeal, a party may not urge for the first time other or different objections from those presented to the trial court. Leaver v. State, supra; Short v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 459, 237 N.E.2d 258; Johnson v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 295, 198 N.E.2d 373.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn, DeBruler and Givan, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 262 N.E.2d 515.