Case Title: Kazal v. Kazal

Citation: 402 P.2d 1001, 98 Ariz. 173

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1965-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
98 Ariz. 173 (1965) 402 P.2d 1001 John KAZAL and Pauline Kazal, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Albert S. KAZAL and Vera Kazal, husband and wife, Appellees. No. 7349. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. June 9, 1965. Ben F. Williams, Jr., Douglas, for appellants. Lloyd C. Helm, Douglas, for appellees. LOCKWOOD, Chief Justice. Plaintiff, John Kazal, sued defendant, Albert Kazal, to recover a proportionate share of moneys advanced by plaintiff toward the construction of a building to be leased by plaintiff and defendant as joint venturers. From the judgment in favor of defendant, the order denying plaintiff's *174 motion to amend complaint, and the order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals. On November 10, 1960, the case was tried before the court without a jury. After the plaintiff had completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal. Such a motion is appropriate at this juncture of a case pursuant to Ariz.R.Civ.P. 41(b), 16 A.R.S. The court ordered that defendant's motion be taken under advisement and defendant thereupon rested. Thereafter, on February 2, 1961, the court ruled on defendant's motion, stating in its minute entry the following: In rendering judgment for defendant, the trial court did not make findings of facts or state its conclusions of law. Ariz.R.Civ.P. 41(b), as it read at the time of trial, provided in pertinent part as follows: Rule 41(b), Ariz.R.Civ.P., clearly provides that it is incumbent upon the trial court to make findings of fact when it grants defendant's motion for dismissal. The question thus is what should be done on review when the trial court does not discharge its duty in making these findings when it grants defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury case. The resolution of this question entails a consideration of the trial court's function when granting defendant's motion in a non-jury case under Rule 41(b). *175 Professor Moore explains this function as follows: The 1946 amendment to which Professor Moore refers was adopted in Arizona in 1955. The Arizona amendment was identical to the Federal amendment, except that the Arizona rule added the words "without prior request" in describing the court's duty to make findings upon granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. In Chadwick v. Larsen, 75 Ariz. 207, 254 P.2d 1020 (1953), this Court held that in a non-jury case the court, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss after plaintiff has presented his case, has power to consider *177 and weigh the evidence. This conclusion was supported by an analysis of the decisions of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. However, in Joseph v. Tibsherany, 88 Ariz. 205, 354 P.2d 254 (1960), we said that the Chadwick case, supra, was no longer applicable because it had been decided prior to the amendment of Rule 41(b) in 1955. However, we do not understand Joseph, supra, to stand for the proposition that in granting a motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury case a trial judge cannot consider and weigh the evidence. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the avowed purpose of the amendment to Rule 41(b) which we noted in Joseph, supra. The text of Rule 41(b) leaves no room for doubt on this point inasmuch as it expressly provides as follows: Since a trial judge in granting a motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury case does have the power, as the trier of the facts, to consider and weigh the evidence and must make findings of fact and conclusions of law when it grants the motion, it is now appropriate to consider what consequence should attach on review when the trial court does not discharge its duty to make such findings and conclusions. In Joseph, supra, we noted The Makowsky case upon which we relied in reaching the above conclusion has subsequently been clarified by the Third Circuit. O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 293 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.1961). In O'Brien, supra, the court pointed out that Makowsky was a case tried before a jury so that it was proper to consider a motion in such circumstances as a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a). The court in O'Brien noted the following: Since the doctrinal underpinning of our conclusion in the Joseph case has been seriously cut into by the Third Circuit's later explanation of Makowsky in O'Brien, it now seems appropriate for us to join the Third Circuit "to dissipate any confusion that may have grown out of the prior decisions of this court." The sounder view in the instant case is suggested by the approach of the Fourth Circuit in Kreielsheimer v. Cohen, 252 F.2d 330 (4th Cir.1958). In that case where the trial court had failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury case, the court remanded the case to the trial court noting as follows: This approach is consonant with the requirement of Rule 41(b) which allocates the function of fact finding to the trial court, not to this court. In the long run, this approach seems better designed to assure that the function of fact finding will be accomplished at the trial court level. Since the conclusion we have reached requires a reversal of the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal, the remaining question involves the proper disposition of this case on remand. Where the granting of defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal is reversed on appeal, Federal appellate courts remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in which the defendant may present any evidence he may have. Roebling v. Anderson, 103 U.S. *179 App.D.C. 237, 257 F.2d 615 (1958). In some situations it is not necessary to require plaintiff to represent his evidence. United States v. United States Gypsum Co. et al., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948); Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 158 A.L.R. 990 (2d Cir.1945). However, in the analogous situation under Federal Rule 52(a), which, unlike our own Rule 52(a), imposes a mandatory duty on trial judges to make findings of fact, Federal courts have remanded for a new trial where the trial judge does not comply with this requirement where to remand to a trial court for the sole purpose of permitting it to state adequately its findings of fact and conclusions of law "would serve no useful purpose." Kruger v. Purcell, 300 F.2d 830, 832 (3d Cir.1962). Because the trial judge who heard the evidence in the trial below is no longer a judge, a fact of which we can take judicial notice, cf. Peterson v. Sundt, 67 Ariz. 312, 195 P.2d 158 (1948), a remand for the sole purpose of permitting findings of fact in the present case would likewise "serve no useful purpose." Cf. Ariz.R.Civ.P. 63. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. A.R.S. §§ 12-2102, subsec. A.; 12-2103, subsec. A. (1956). STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and BERNSTEIN, UDALL and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.