Case Title: Dept. of Corrections v. Human Rights Commission

Citation: 2006 VT 134

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dept. of Corrections v. Human Rights Commission (2004-503)

2006 VT 134

[Filed 29-Dec-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 134

                                No. 2004-503


  Department of Corrections                      Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Washington Superior Court


  Human Rights Commission                        October Term, 2005


  Alan W. Cook, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Marie J. Salem and
    Kate Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, Waterbury, for
    Petitioner-Appellant.

  Robert Appel, Executive Director, Montpelier, for Respondent-Appellee.

  John Boldosser IV and Barbara Prine, Vermont Legal Aid, Burlington, for
    Intervenor-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   The issue in this appeal is whether the Vermont
  Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 4500-4507, applies
  to state correctional facilities, thereby giving the Human Rights
  Commission jurisdiction to investigate complaints filed by state prisoners
  alleging violations of the Act.  Based upon its determination that the Act
  covers state prisons, the superior court denied the Department of
  Corrections' motion to quash a subpoena served by the Commission in
  conjunction with a prisoner's discrimination claim.  The Department
  contends that the court erred insofar as prisons do not offer services or
  benefits to the "general public" and thus are not "places of public
  accommodation" subject to the Commission's investigatory powers.  We
  conclude that the Legislature intended to make all governmental entities,
  including state prisons, subject to the Act.  Accordingly, we affirm the
  superior court's decision.

       ¶  2.  On appeal, the Department relies primarily on a single phrase
  in one statutory definition to support its argument that state prisons are
  not covered by the public accommodations statute.  Nothing in the language
  or history of the statute, however, indicates that the Legislature intended
  the law to cover some governmental entities, but not others, depending on
  whether, or how directly, they offer services or benefits to the general
  public.  The phrase "general public" within the statutory definition of a
  "place of public accommodation" is a holdover from the original 1957
  statute, which, like similar laws in other jurisdictions, was aimed at
  assuring that private establishments catering to members of the general
  public did not discriminate on the basis of race or other specified
  criteria.  Hence, a "place of public accommodation" was defined as an
  establishment that provided benefits or services to the general public. 
  The critical inquiry, then, in determining which private entities were
  covered by the law was whether a particular establishment served the
  general public.  That question makes little sense, however, when applied to
  public or governmental entities, which are created for the very purpose of
  serving the general public.
   
       ¶  3.  The most reasonable interpretation of the statute,
  particularly considering that it must be liberally construed to effectuate
  its remedial purpose, is that the Legislature intended to make all
  governmental entities, in addition to all private entities offering
  services or benefits to the general public, subject to the Act's
  anti-discrimination provisions.  There is support for this interpretation
  not only in the statutory language, but also in the history of the
  statutory amendments and the legislative policy underlying the Act.  In
  particular, the legislative history of the 1992 amendment unequivocally
  confirms that the Act was intended to apply to all governmental entities
  and to provide a local enforcement mechanism for claims actionable  under
  the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300, which
  applies to all public entities, including state prisons.

       ¶  4.  The Human Rights Commission has jurisdiction to investigate and
  enforce complaints of unlawful discrimination in public accommodations.  9
  V.S.A. § 4552(b).  Pertinent to this case, it is generally unlawful for any
  place of public accommodation to discriminate against an individual with a
  disability.  Id. § 4502(c).  The Commission may accept complaints that
  state a prima facie case of discrimination, and must dismiss those that do
  not.  Id. § 4554(a)-(b).  In conducting an investigation, the Commission
  can issue subpoenas with respect to complaints filed under § 4554 where
  there is reasonable cause to believe that the materials or testimony
  requested are material to the complaint.  Id. § 4553(a)(5).

       ¶  5.   In November 2003, the Commission served a subpoena on the
  Department in connection with a discrimination charge filed on behalf of a
  state prisoner.  The prisoner complained that the Department's correctional
  facility discriminated against him on the basis of his disability.  The
  Department moved the Commission to quash the subpoena under § 4553(a)(5),
  asserting that the complaint failed to state a prima facie case of
  discrimination because a correctional facility was not a "place of public
  accommodation" under the Act.  The Commission denied the Department's
  request in December 2003.
   
       ¶  6.  The Department then moved to quash the subpoena in superior
  court.  In September 2004, following a hearing, the court denied the
  Department's motion and granted the Commission's motion to enforce the
  subpoena.  Relying on Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,