Case Title: Turner v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2833

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Turner v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2833.] 
  
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2833 
TURNER, APPELLANT, v. DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Turner v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-2833.] 
Mandamus—Adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law—Judgment 
dismissing petition for writ affirmed. 
(No. 2014-1349—Submitted April 14, 2015—Decided July 16, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 13AP-911, 
2014-Ohio-2789. 
_____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the 
appellant’s, Donald Turner’s, petition for a writ of mandamus.  Turner sought a 
writ that would order the appellees, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction (“ODRC”), the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”), and the Bureau of 
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Sentence Computation (“BOSC”), to remove his 1970 conviction for aggravated 
assault from their records and no longer base any decisions or rulings on that 
conviction.  Turner argues that the 1970 sentence was invalid because the 
sentencing entry did not explicitly set forth the maximum and minimum length of 
his sentence, but instead imposed a prison term of an “indeterminate period.”  He 
also argues that ODRC, not a court, imposed a sentence of one to five years. 
{¶ 2} Because Turner had or has adequate remedies in the ordinary course 
of the law to challenge the sentence and ODRC’s interpretation of the sentence, 
we affirm. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} Turner was charged with aggravated assault in violation of former 
R.C. 2901.241, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 55, 128 Ohio Laws 560, which stated: 
 
No person shall assault another with a dangerous weapon or 
instrument or by other means or force likely to produce death or great 
bodily harm. 
Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years. 
 
Turner entered a guilty plea, which was accepted.  The judge sentenced him to an 
indeterminate period. 
{¶ 4} Turner was placed in the custody of ODRC, which treated his 
sentence as the one-to-five-year term authorized by former R.C. 2901.241.  The 
APA and BOSC then made decisions regarding Turner’s parole eligibility and 
release based on the one-to-five-year term. 
{¶ 5} Turner filed this action in mandamus in the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals, requesting a writ ordering that the appellees remove the invalid sentence 
from their records and no longer make decisions based on it.  The appellees filed a 
January Term, 2015 
 
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motion to dismiss Turner’s complaint, arguing that Turner was not entitled to a 
writ of mandamus because he could have challenged the validity of his sentence 
in a direct appeal.  They also argued that Turner’s sentencing records or parole 
eligibility should be challenged in a declaratory-judgment action.  Turner filed a 
memorandum in response, arguing that the appellees had misconstrued his claim.  
He argued that he was challenging the one-to-five-year term imposed by the 
appellees, not the indeterminate sentence imposed by the court. 
{¶ 6} A magistrate issued a decision recommending that the court grant 
the motion to dismiss because direct appeal gave Turner an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of the law.  Turner filed objections reiterating his earlier 
arguments.  The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted 
the motion to dismiss. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Turner must establish a clear 
legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondents 
to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 
N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  Turner must prove that he is entitled to the writ by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 8} Turner cannot show that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus, 
primarily because he has or had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the 
law.  If, as argued by the appellees, his petition asserts the invalidity of his 
original sentence, he could have argued that claim in a direct appeal or in 
postconviction claims for relief. 
{¶ 9} But even if, as Turner claims, his argument is that ODRC, not a 
court, imposed the sentence, he still cannot establish that he is entitled to a writ of 
mandamus.  First, a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the correction of 
prison records, absent evidence of a present injury to the petitioner that would 
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prevent a declaratory judgment from providing a complete remedy.  State ex rel. 
Earl v. Shafer, 85 Ohio St.3d 370, 708 N.E.2d 714 (1999), citing State ex rel. 
Konoff v. Shafer, 80 Ohio St.3d 294, 295, 685 N.E.2d 1248 (1997).  Here, Turner 
has not provided any evidence that the use of his 1970 sentence has harmed him 
in any way at all, let alone any evidence that a declaratory judgment would not 
provide complete relief.  He has served the sentence and has provided no evidence 
that the appellees are using that sentence in a way that is detrimental to him. 
{¶ 10} Second, as pointed out by the appellees, Turner’s sentencing entry 
is not invalid.  He was sentenced under former R.C. 2901.241, which was 
repealed in 1974.  The only sentence under that statute was an indefinite sentence 
of one to five years. Therefore, when Turner was sentenced to an “indeterminate 
period” of imprisonment, the one-to-five-year sentence set forth in the former 
statute was intended.  ODRC’s interpretation of the sentencing entry was 
reasonable. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 11} Because Turner had or has adequate remedies in the ordinary 
course of the law to challenge the sentence and ODRC’s interpretation of the 
sentence, we affirm. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_____________________ 
 
Donald Turner, pro se. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Peter L. Jamison, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
_____________________