Case Title: Bellalta v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12516

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12516 
 
MARIA BELLALTA & another1  vs.  ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF 
BROOKLINE & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 1, 2018. - February 8, 2019. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Zoning, Nonconforming use or structure, Special permit, 
Variance, Interior area of residence, Multiple dwelling, 
By-law.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
November 18, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Keith C. Long, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey P. Allen (Donald J. Gentile also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Jennifer Dopazo Gilbert for Jason Jewhurst & another. 
 
Jonathan Simpson, Associate Town Counsel, for zoning board 
of appeals of Brookline. 
 
                     
 
1 Damon Burnard. 
 
 
2 Jason Jewhurst and Nurit Zuker. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  We once again construe the "difficult and 
infelicitous" language of the first two sentences of G. L. 
c. 40A, § 6, insofar as they concern single- or two-family 
residential structures.  See Fitzsimonds v. Board of Appeals of 
Chatham, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 55-56 (1985).  These statutory 
provisions set forth both the exemption afforded to all legally 
preexisting nonconforming structures and uses from the 
application of zoning ordinances and bylaws, as well as how 
those protections can be forfeited or retained when such 
nonconforming structures or uses are extended or altered.  The 
statute also accords special protection to single- and two-
family residential structures in the event that the 
nonconformity is altered or extended; it is the extent of that 
protection in the circumstances here that we clarify. 
The defendant homeowners sought to modify the roof of their 
two-family house and to add a dormer; doing so would increase 
the preexisting nonconforming floor area ratio.  The zoning 
board of appeals of Brookline (board) allowed the defendant's 
request for a special permit, after determining that increasing 
the preexisting nonconforming nature of the structure would not 
be substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood than the 
preexisting nonconforming use.  The plaintiff abutters, however, 
challenged the board's action, contending that the statute does 
3 
 
 
not exempt the defendants from compliance with municipal bylaws, 
and that to do so here would require the defendants to obtain a 
variance in addition to the special permit.  The plaintiffs 
appealed; a Land Court judge upheld the board's action. 
We conclude that the statute requires an owner of a single- 
or two-family residential building with a preexisting 
nonconformity, who proposes a modification that is found to 
increase the nature of the nonconforming structure, to obtain a 
finding under G. L. c. 40A, § 6, that "such change, extension or 
alteration shall not be substantially more detrimental that the 
existing nonconforming use to the neighborhood."  The statute 
does not require the homeowner also to obtain a variance in such 
circumstances.  We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Land 
Court. 
 
1.  Background.  The material facts are not in dispute.  
The defendants, Jason Jewhurst and Nurit Zuker, own the second-
floor condominium unit of a two-family house on Searle Avenue in 
Brookline.  The plaintiffs, Maria Bellalta and Damon Burnard, 
own a house on Cypress Street that abuts the defendants' house.  
The two abutting lots are located in a T-5 residential zoning 
district that encompasses single-family, two-family, and 
attached single-family houses.  While many of the lots on Searle 
Avenue are undersized according to the Brookline zoning bylaw, 
the defendants' lot is the smallest; its 2,773 square feet are 
4 
 
 
slightly more than one-half the minimum requirement of 5,000 
square feet for a lot containing a two-family house in the T-5 
zone. 
As to the structure itself, the sole legal nonconformity of 
the defendants' house, which was in existence when they 
purchased the property, is the floor area ratio (FAR).3  The Town 
of Brookline (town) bylaw requires a maximum FAR of 1.0 for a 
two-family house in a T-5 zoning district, and the defendants' 
house has a FAR of 1.14.  The proposed renovation project would 
convert the roof of the house from a hip roof to a gable roof 
and would add a dormer to the street-facing façade, thereby 
creating 677 square feet of additional living space on the third 
floor of the building.4  This project would increase the already 
                     
 
3 A building's floor area ratio (FAR) compares the gross 
floor area of the building to the area of the lot upon which it 
is built.  See generally Institute for Local Government, Land 
Use and Planning:  Glossary of Land Use and Planning Terms, at 
24 (2010).  A provision of the town of Brookline's (town's) 
bylaw entitled "Floor Area Ratio" provides that, "[f]or any 
building . . . the ratio of gross floor area to lot area shall 
not exceed the maximum specified in the Table of Dimensional 
Requirements."  See Town of Brookline Planning and Community 
Development Dep't, Zoning By-Law, Art. V Dimensional 
Requirements, at § 5.20 (May 24, 2018).  The table of 
dimensional requirements specifies that the maximum FAR for a 
two-family house in a T-5 residential zoning district is 1.0.  
Id. 
 
 
4 A hip roof is a structural design in which each side of 
the roof slopes downward from a central ridge toward the walls 
of the building.  With a gable roof, only two sides slope 
downward from a central ridge.  See C. M. Harris, American 
Architecture:  An Illustrated Encyclopedia, at 142, 174 (1998).  
5 
 
 
nonconforming FAR from 1.14 to 1.38. 
 
The defendants initially submitted their request for a 
building permit to the building commissioner; that application 
was denied.5  The defendants then submitted a request for a 
special permit to the board, and the board conducted a public 
hearing on the request.  The abutting plaintiffs opposed the 
request for a special permit, both in writing prior to the 
hearing and orally at the hearing.  Fifteen other neighbors 
submitted statements in support of the project; they viewed the 
proposed roofline as being consistent with the over-all design 
and character of the neighborhood. 
 
Members of the town's building department and its planning 
board spoke at the hearing, and presented reports on their 
review of the project, as did the defendants' architect, who had 
conducted shadow studies of the effect of the proposed roof on 
the abutters' property.  Statements and reports from town 
officials indicated that the majority of the houses on the 
street have partial or full third stories, and are taller than 
the defendants' existing building.  Those officials also noted 
                     
A dormer is a structure, often containing a window, that 
projects vertically beyond the plane of the roof.  See id. at 
174. 
 
 
5 The record before us does not reflect the grounds for the 
denial.  We note, however, that section 9.05.1 of the zoning 
bylaw requires specific findings by the board of appeals in 
order to increase a nonconformity in a nonconforming structure. 
6 
 
 
that the proposed project would make the defendant's house 
appear more consistent, both in height and in design, with the 
others on the street.  The board unanimously determined, inter 
alia, that, pursuant to the requirements of section 9.05 of the 
bylaw, "[t]he specific site is an appropriate location for such 
a use, structure, or condition," and "[t]he use as developed 
will not adversely affect the neighborhood."  Accordingly, the 
board found that the defendants had satisfied the requirements 
for issuance of a special permit.6  The defendants did not 
request a variance.7 
                     
 
6 Although the board's decision does not contain an explicit 
finding that the project would not be substantially more 
detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing structure, the 
Land Court judge appropriately noted that the finding is implied 
by the board's decision to grant the requested relief for a 
special permit, as well as its reference to the requirements of 
G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  While the board made a finding under the 
language of the zoning bylaw that "the use as developed will not 
adversely affect the neighborhood," the board allowed issuance 
of the special permit after having heard numerous professional 
and lay opinions using the language that the project would not 
result in a "substantial detriment."  Further, a finding of "no 
adverse effect" arguably is a much more stringent standard than 
a finding of "no substantial detriment."  The parties properly 
do not dispute that the board found that the project would not 
result in a substantial detriment to the neighborhood. 
 
 
7 A variance is a grant of relief from certain provisions in 
a municipality's zoning ordinance; such a deviation from the 
bylaw may be allowed only upon a finding that "owing to 
circumstances relating to the soil conditions, shape, or 
topography of such land or structures . . . , a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance or by-law would 
involve substantial hardship, financial or otherwise, to the 
petitioner" and that "desirable relief may be granted without 
substantial detriment to the public good and without nullifying 
7 
 
 
The plaintiffs commenced an action in the Land Court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, to challenge the board's 
decision.  The parties agreed that the material facts were not 
in dispute, and filed cross motions for summary judgment.  A 
Land Court judge denied the plaintiffs' motion and allowed the 
joint motion of the defendants and the board.  The plaintiffs 
appealed to the Appeals Court, and we allowed their petition for 
direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review de novo the allowance of a 
motion for summary judgment, viewing the facts "in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom judgment entered."  
81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 461 
Mass. 692, 699 (2012), citing Albahari v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 
of Brewster, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 245, 248 n.4 (2010).  A decision 
on a motion for summary judgment will be upheld if the judge 
"ruled on undisputed material facts and the ruling was correct 
as a matter of law" (citation omitted).  M.P.M. Bldrs., LLC v. 
Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 89 (2004). 
a.  Statutory framework.  In order to understand the 
parties' claims, some background on the statutory framework is 
necessary. 
                     
or substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of such 
ordinance or by-law."  G. L. c. 40A, § 10. 
8 
 
 
A preexisting nonconformity is a use or structure that 
lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning restriction 
that otherwise would prohibit the use or structure.  See 
generally G. L. c. 40A, § 6; Shrewsbury Edgemere Assocs. Ltd. 
Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shrewsbury, 409 Mass. 317, 
319 (1991).  Preexisting nonconformities become protected when 
zoning laws change, as a result of the long-standing recognition 
that "rights already acquired by existing use or construction of 
buildings in general ought not to be interfered with."  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 606 (1920). 
Preexisting non-conforming lots and structures throughout 
the Commonwealth are protected under G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  General 
Laws c. 40A, § 6, provides, in relevant part: 
"[1] Except as hereinafter provided, a zoning ordinance or 
by-law shall not apply to structures or uses lawfully in 
existence or lawfully begun, . . . but shall apply to any 
change or substantial extension of such use, . . . to any 
reconstruction, extension or structural change of such 
structure and . . . to provide for its use for a 
substantially different purpose or for the same purpose in 
a substantially different manner or to a substantially 
greater extent [2] except where alteration, reconstruction, 
extension or structural change to a single or two-family 
residential structure does not increase the nonconforming 
nature of said structure.  Pre-existing nonconforming 
structures or uses may be extended or altered, provided, 
that no such extension or alteration shall be permitted 
unless there is a finding by the permit granting authority 
or by the special permit granting authority designated by 
ordinance or by-law that such change, extension or 
alteration shall not be substantially more detrimental than 
9 
 
 
the existing nonconforming [structure or8] use to the 
neighborhood" (emphasis added). 
 
 
The language of G. L. c. 40A, § 6, has been recognized as 
particularly abstruse.  See Willard v. Board of Appeals of 
Orleans, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 20 (1987) ("The first paragraph 
of G. L. c. 40A, § 6 . . . contains an obscurity of the type 
which has come to be recognized as one of the hallmarks of the 
chapter").  See, e.g., Fitzsimonds, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 55-56.  
What has become known as the "first 'except' clause" of that 
statute affords explicit protection to the continuance of 
previously compliant structures and uses that are no longer 
compliant with subsequently enacted zoning bylaws.  See G. L. 
c. 40A, § 6.  See Willard, supra.  Ordinarily, however, an 
extension or structural change to a preexisting nonconforming 
structure or use must comply with the applicable municipal 
bylaw.  See Rockwood v. Snow Inn Corp., 409 Mass. 361, 364 
(1991).  The addition in 1975 of what has become known as the 
"second 'except' clause, "without accompanying explanation," see 
Willard, supra at 18, citing 1974 House Doc. No.5864, further 
                     
 
8 In Willard v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, 25 Mass. App. 
Ct. 15, 21 (1987), the Appeals Court construed the statutory 
exception for extensions or alterations to nonconforming uses in 
G. L. c. 40A, § 6, as including nonconforming structures, in 
addition to nonconforming uses.  Subsequent jurisprudence has 
continued to construe the statutory language as applicable both 
to nonconforming uses and structures.  See, e.g., Bransford v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown, 444 Mass. 852, 857 (2005) 
(Greaney, J., concurring). 
10 
 
 
complicated the statute's already difficult language.  See, 
e.g., Fitzsimonds, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 56.  That clause extends 
additional protections to single- and two-family nonconforming 
structures, and allows as of right the "alteration, 
reconstruction, extension or structural change" of such a 
structure, so long as the "extended or altered" structure "does 
not increase" its "nonconforming nature."  G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  
Where a proposed extension, structural change, reconstruction, 
or alteration would increase the "nonconforming nature" of the 
structure, a homeowner must obtain a finding from the relevant 
permit granting authority that the proposed modification would 
not be "substantially more detrimental" to the neighborhood than 
is the existing nonconformity.  Id. 
The plaintiffs contend that, in addition to the requirement 
of G. L. c. 40A, § 6, that the board find the defendants' 
proposed project would not be "substantially more detrimental" 
to the neighborhood, the defendants also are required to obtain 
approval from the board for a variance from the town's bylaw.  
Because the defendants obtained only a special permit, the 
plaintiffs argue that the proposed project does not meet the 
requirements of G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  In the plaintiffs' view, the 
language of the statute, its legislative history, and our 
existing jurisprudence do not exempt single- and two-family 
nonconforming structures from the requirement of obtaining a 
11 
 
 
variance under the town's bylaws in order to make any change 
that would intensify the preexisting nonconformity; the 
plaintiffs contend also that the requirement of a variance is in 
addition to obtaining a finding of no substantial detriment 
under G. L. c. 40A, § 6. 
b.  Statutory construction.  "As with all matters of 
statutory interpretation," Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 
627, 633 (2013), a court construing a zoning act must "ascertain 
and effectuate legislative intent," as expressed in the 
statutory language.  See S. Singer, 3C Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 77:7, at 659 (8th ed. 2018) (Singer).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Escobar, 479 Mass. 225, 230 (2018).  Where, as 
here, "the meaning of [the] statute is not clear from its plain 
language, well-established principles of statutory construction 
guide our interpretation" (citation omitted).  Id. at 228. 
Specific provisions of a statute are to be "understood in the 
context of the statutory framework as a whole, which includes 
the preexisting common law, earlier versions of the same act, 
related enactments and case law, and the Constitution."  Singer, 
supra at § 77:7, at 692-694.  A reviewing court's interpretation 
"must be reasonable and supported by the . . . history of the 
statute."  See Mogelinski, supra at 633, quoting Wright v. 
Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996).  
Ultimately, we must "avoid any construction of statutory 
12 
 
 
language which leads to an absurd result," or that otherwise 
would frustrate the Legislature's intent.  See Singer, supra at 
§ 77:7, at 689.  See also Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 
465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013). 
The crux of the issue in this appeal turns on the language 
of the "second 'except' clause," and the extent of the 
protections it affords to owners of single- and two-family 
preexisting nonconforming structures who seek to intensify those 
nonconformities.  As noted, the second "except" clause had "no 
identifiable ancestor" in earlier versions of the zoning act, 
before its appearance "without accompanying explanation . . . in 
1974 House Doc. No 5864" (citation omitted).  Willard, 25 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 18.  The "chief document" in the legislative history 
of the zoning act is a comprehensive report that was prepared by 
the Department of Community Affairs, which included its proposed 
recommendations and amendments to the act.  See Bransford v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown, 444 Mass. 852, 867 & n.3 
(2005) (Cordy, J., dissenting), citing Report of the Department 
of Community Affairs Relative to Proposed Changes and Additions 
to the Zoning Enabling Act, 1972 House Doc. No. 5009 at 35 (DCA 
report).  As concerned the treatment of legally preexisting 
nonconformities, the DCA report recognized, on the one hand, a 
goal of effectuating the "eventual elimination of 
nonconformities in most cases."  See DCA Report, supra at 39.  
13 
 
 
The report also recognized, however, that, "[o]n the other hand, 
there is increasing awareness that the assumption it is 
desirable to eliminate non-conforming uses may not always be 
valid."  See id. at 43, 45, 49, 62, 63, 65, 84 (noting 
constitutional and public policy reasons against eliminating 
property rights already acquired). 
In an effort to reconcile these goals, the DCA report 
proposed, inter alia, a course of action that would have 
provided extremely limited protections for any modification of a 
nonconforming structure, such as recognizing only a right to 
"perform normal maintenance and repair" on such structures.  See 
id. at 44.  The Legislature rejected this proposal, without 
stated reasoning, when it instead inserted the language of the 
second except clause, thereby creating explicit protections for 
one- and two-family residential structures, and allowing 
increases in the nonconforming nature of such structures, upon a 
finding of no substantial detriment to the neighborhood.  See 
G. L. c. 40A, § 6.9 
                     
 
9 In support of their proposed reading of the statute, the 
plaintiffs argue the inequity of requiring, in identical 
circumstances, a conforming structure such as theirs to obtain a 
variance when a nonconforming structure need not do so.  The 
inequity is not so apparent when one considers that conforming 
houses on conforming lots would not require even a special 
permit to undertake many modifications where, absent the 
statutory protections afforded one- and two-family nonconforming 
houses, comparable modifications would require a special permit 
or variance.  More fundamentally, however, and as discussed 
14 
 
 
To ensure that the protections the Legislature intended to 
afford single- and two-family residential structures are 
appropriately enforced by permitting authorities, reviewing 
courts have employed a long-standing interpretive framework 
construing the second except clause.  This framework was first 
discussed in 1985 in Fitzsimonds, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 56, by 
Judge Benjamin Kaplan, writing for the court; elaborated upon in 
Willard,   25 Mass. App. Ct. at 18-22; and subsequently adopted by 
this court in Bjorklund v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwell, 450 
Mass. 357, 358, 362-363 (2008) (adopting reasoning of 
concurrence in Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown, 
444 Mass. 852, 857-858 [2005] [Greaney, J., concurring]).  See 
Deadrick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 
539, 552 (2014) ("a long line of cases, notably including 
Bransford and Bjorklund, have held that an alteration that 
intensifies an existing nonconformity in a residential structure 
may be authorized under the second sentence of G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 6, upon a finding of no substantial detriment" [alteration 
omitted]). 
                     
supra, the Legislature chose to protect certain limited existing 
housing stock, as it was free to do.  Not all housing stock is 
treated the same by the Legislature, and owners of nonconforming 
three-family houses, for example, might also find cause to 
complain in such legislative line-drawing.  Perceived inequities 
resulting from legislative choices do not affect our 
construction of the statute. 
15 
 
 
Under this framework, the second except clause first 
requires the permit granting authority10 to make "an initial 
determination whether a proposed alteration of or addition to a 
nonconforming structure would 'increase the nonconforming nature 
of said structure'" (citation omitted).  Willard, 25 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 21.  This initial determination requires the permitting 
authority to "identify the particular respect or respects in 
which the existing structure does not conform to the 
requirements of the present by-law and then determine whether 
the proposed alteration or addition would intensify the existing 
nonconformities or result in additional ones."  Id. at 21-22.  
"If the answer to that question is in the negative, the 
applicant will be entitled" to a permit to proceed with the 
proposed alteration.11  See id. at 22.  "Only if the answer to 
                     
 
10 The permit granting authority is statutorily defined as 
"the board of appeals or zoning administrator."  See G. L. 
c. 40A, § 1A.  The concurrence in Bransford pointed out that the 
initial determination "more appropriately should be conducted by 
the building inspector or zoning administrator" in the first 
instance.  Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown, 444 
Mass. at 858, nn.8, 9 (Greaney, J., concurring), citing M. 
Bobrowski, Massachusetts Land Use and Planning Law, § 6.06 (2d 
ed. 2002). 
 
 
11 Earlier cases loosely used the term "special permit" to 
describe the process by which nonconforming one- and two-family 
homeowners can proceed with modifications or alterations to 
their nonconforming homes.  See, e.g., Bransford, 444 Mass. at 
864 n.2 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  Our reference to the 
"permitting procedure" and the "permit granting authority" 
encompasses any designated process by which municipalities allow 
16 
 
 
that question is in the affirmative will there be any occasion 
for consideration of the additional question," id. at 22, that 
is, whether the proposed modification would be "substantially 
more detrimental to the neighborhood," see id. at 21.  The 
"Willard test should be read as prescribing an entitlement to a 
building permit, not a special permit or finding, where no 
intensification of the nonconformity would result" (citation 
omitted).  Bransford, 444 Mass. at 865 n.2 (Cordy, J., 
dissenting).  See, e.g., Deadrick, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 550 ("It 
is important to observe at this juncture that the second 
'except' clause is directed to differentiating between those 
changes to nonconforming residential structures that may be made 
as of right, and those that require a finding of no substantial 
detriment under the second sentence of [G. L. c. 40A,] § 6").  
Only if a modification, extension, or reconstruction of a 
single- or two-family house would "increase the nonconforming 
nature of said structure" must it "be submitted . . . for a 
determination by the board of the question whether it is 
'substantially more detrimental than the existing nonconforming 
use'" pursuant to the sentence that follows the second except 
clause G. L. c. 40A, § 6" (citations omitted). Bransford, supra 
at 857-858 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
                     
their residents to proceed with home building renovations in the 
ordinary course. 
17 
 
 
c.  Relief requested by the defendants.  With respect to 
the defendants' plans to add 677 square feet of living space by 
adding a dormer to the third floor of their house and modifying 
the design of the roof, the framework first required a 
determination whether, and in what respect, the defendants' 
proposed extension would increase the nonconforming nature of 
the two-family structure.  See Willard, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 21-
22.   The board determined that the proposed project would 
increase the extent of the already nonconforming FAR,12 a 
determination that the parties did not dispute, and then 
proceeded to consider whether the defendants' house after 
modification would be substantially more detrimental to the 
neighborhood.  Concluding that it would not, the board issued 
the requested zoning relief. 
The board, however, did not consider whether the increase 
in the nonconforming FAR from 1.14 to 1.38 would increase the 
"nonconforming nature," G. L. c. 40A, § 6, of the defendants' 
property, and such a determination is hardly self-evident.  At 
the hearing, a member of the town's building department 
described the requested relief as "minimal," and several members 
                     
 
12 As mentioned, although the defendants in this case first 
sought approval for the project from the town's building 
commissioner pursuant to the procedures outlined in Bransford, 
supra at 857-858, the request was denied.  As a result, the 
defendants submitted their application to the town's zoning 
board of appeals. 
18 
 
 
of the planning board described it as "modest."  We previously 
observed that certain small-scale extensions, such as the 
addition of a dormer, a porch, a sunroom, or a two-car garage, 
among others, would not, as a matter of law, constitute an 
intensification of the nonconforming nature of a structure.  
Bjorklund, 450 Mass. at 362-363.  "Concerns over the making of 
small-scale alterations, extensions, or structural changes to a 
preexisting house are illusory. . . . Because of their small-
scale nature, the improvements mentioned could not reasonably be 
found to increase the nonconforming nature of a structure."  Id. 
As the parties have stipulated to the material facts, 
however, we assume, without deciding, that the proposed project, 
taken as a whole, would have constituted an increase to the 
nonconforming nature of the structure.  Accordingly, we turn to 
the plaintiffs' contention that, because no provision of the 
town's zoning bylaw would have allowed the requested increase in 
the FAR, G. L. c. 40A, § 6, also requires that the defendants 
obtain a variance from the town's zoning bylaw. 
d.  Town's bylaw.  In Gale v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Gloucester, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 337 (2011), the Appeals Court 
confronted a similar issue.  There, the zoning board of appeals 
had granted relief allowing the proposed reconstruction of a 
residence that would have increased the nonconforming nature of 
the structure.  Id. at 333.  The board in that case determined 
19 
 
 
that the reconstructed house, which would extend beyond the 
footprint of the original house, and would increase the 
preexisting nonconformities in the setback requirements of the 
city of Gloucester's zoning bylaw, would not result in a 
substantial detriment to the neighborhood, and allowed the 
homeowner's request for a special permit.  Id. at 332-333.  
After concluding that "literal enforcement" of the zoning bylaw 
would create a personal and financial hardship for the property 
owners due to the size, shape, steep grade, and outcroppings on 
the property, the Gloucester board also granted the homeowners a 
variance.  Id. at 333.  The abutting homeowners challenged the 
board's decision in the Land Court; they argued that the 
issuance of the variance was in error because the request did 
not meet the requirements for issuance of a variance.  Id.  A 
Land Court judge held that the determination that the 
reconstruction would not have resulted in a substantial 
detriment to the neighborhood was all that was required under 
G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  See Gale, supra at 333-334; id. at 337 
(variance is not required "as an additional step when proceeding 
to the no substantial detriment finding under the second 
sentence" exception for one- and two-family houses).  See also 
Deadrick, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 553 (affirming that variance is 
20 
 
 
not required for owners of one- and two-family properties to 
increase legally preexisting nonconformity).13 
We note also that, since its enactment in 1975, see 
St. 1975, c. 808, § 3, the Legislature has amended G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 6, numerous times.  See St. 1977, c. 829, § 3D; St. 1979, 
c. 106; St. 1982, c. 185; St. 1985, c. 494; St. 1986, c. 557, 
§ 54; St. 1994, c. 60, § 67; St. 1996, c. 345, § 1; St. 2000, 
c. 29; St. 2000, c. 232; and St. 2016, c. 219, § 29. Presumably, 
the Legislature therefore has adopted the framework first 
described in Fitzsimonds, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 56, and most 
recently discussed in detail in Gale, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 336-337.  
Where a statute or provision that has been given a particular 
construction by the courts is reenacted "without substantial 
change, it is generally fair to assume the legislature is 
familiar with that interpretation and adopted it."  See Singer, 
supra at § 77:7, at 711.  Indeed, when the Legislature "enacts 
or amends a statute, courts presume it has knowledge of . . . 
relevant judicial and administrative decisions, and it passed or 
preserved cognate laws to serve a useful and consistent 
purpose."  Id.  Where, as here, the Legislature has had 
                     
 
13 As the parties agree that in this case the question 
involves an increase in a preexisting nonconformity, we need not 
address the issue presented in Deadrick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 
of Chatham, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 553 (2014), concerning the 
creation of a new nonconformity. 
21 
 
 
considerable occasion to amend G. L. c. 40A, § 6, and repeatedly 
has amended the statute without changing the language at issue, 
we presume that it has adopted the construction of the statute 
upon which Massachusetts courts -- and this class of homeowners 
-- have relied.  We leave that framework undisturbed. 
 
Accordingly, in keeping with the Legislature's intent as it 
pertains to the special protections afforded one- and two-family 
residential structures, a variance from the local bylaw is not 
required by G. L. c. 40A, § 6; obtaining a finding of "no 
substantial detriment to the neighborhood" is all that is 
required.  See Rockwood, 409 Mass. at 364 (single- and two-
family residences are given "special protection" with regard to 
their existing nonconformities); Gale, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 337 
(outlining "special treatment" explicitly afforded to single- 
and two-family residential buildings); Dial Away Co. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Auburn, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 170-171 (1996) 
(if not for "special status" of nonconforming single and two-
family residences, "the by-law would probably apply"). 
 
Indeed, given the difficulties and expense associated with 
obtaining a variance, as well as in obtaining a finding of no 
substantial detriment, construing the statute to mandate both 
well could render illusory the protections the Legislature 
22 
 
 
intended to provide these homeowners.14  See Bransford, 444 Mass. 
at 870 n.7 (Cordy, J., dissenting) ("without question [the 
process of obtaining a special permit or variance] renders many 
home improvements more costly and subject to the discretionary 
determinations of local zoning boards").  Requiring single- and 
two-family homeowners to obtain both under these circumstances 
would render it nearly impossible for the homeowners to 
renovate, modernize, or make any substantial improvements to an 
older home, particularly if those improvements would increase 
the nonconforming nature of the structure.  This could, as a 
practical matter, make it economically infeasible to modify a 
nonconforming home in any but the most minimal ways, could 
curtail the ability to sell such a house, and, accordingly, 
could result in a reduction in the amount of available 
affordable housing, as well as potentially reducing the town's 
population and the municipal tax base.  Indeed, as noted in 
                     
 
14 The burdens that an applicant must meet, both to obtain a 
variance and to retain it on appeal, see Kirkwood v. Board of 
Appeals of Rockport, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 427 (1984), are 
significant.  See, e.g., Wolfson v. Sun Oil Co., 357 Mass. 87, 
89-91 (1970) (where board's findings inadequate, judge on appeal 
can annul issuance of variance without considering its merits); 
Gamache v. Acushnet, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 220 (1982) 
(requirements for findings to support variance are "rigorous").  
Although the requirements and expenses of obtaining a special 
permit or a finding of no substantial detriment certainly are 
not small hurdles, they are not of the same magnitude.  See 
Mendes v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 
531 (1990) (grant of variance is "grudging and restricted," 
while grant of special permit is "anticipated and flexible"). 
23 
 
 
Bransford, 444 Mass. at 869-870 (Cordy, J., dissenting), 
"application of the [plaintiffs'] reasoning is not without 
practical consequence to the multitude of citizens who own homes 
in cities or towns that, at some recent point, have attempted to 
limit growth by increasing minimum lot sizes, often 
dramatically.  The need to secure findings or special permits 
through lengthy, costly, and discretionary local zoning 
processes for any improvement that might increase the living 
space or footprint of a house might put such improvements out of 
reach for many homeowners.  Requiring homeowners to run such an 
administrative gauntlet impedes and burdens the upgrade of a 
large part of our housing stock." 
 
Given this, we do not think that the Legislature intended 
to require single- and two-family homeowners to undertake the 
laborious process of seeking both a special permit and a 
variance.  To construe G. L. c. 40A, § 6, in this way would 
place an additional burden on this limited class of homeowners, 
contrary to the clear statutory intent to provide them with 
special protections under the second except clause.  See 
Flemings v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 
375–376, (2000), citing Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 
400 Mass. 444, 453 (1987) ("If a sensible construction is 
available, we shall not construe a statute to make a nullity of 
pertinent provisions or to produce absurd results"). 
24 
 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the decisions in both 
Gale and Deadrick were erroneous, and do not comport with this 
court's language in Rockwood, 409 Mass. at 364.  In Rockwood, 
supra, the court stated in dictum that "even as to single or 
two-family residences, structures to which the statute appears 
to give special protection, the zoning ordinance or bylaw 
applies to a reconstruction, extension, or change that would 
intensify the existing nonconformities or result in additional 
ones" (quotations omitted).  Id., quoting Willard, 25 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 22.  Rockwood, however, involved the application of G. L. 
c. 40A, § 6, to a commercial inn, and accordingly did not 
involve the special protections from compliance with a local 
ordinance afforded to one- and two-family houses.  Further, 
consistent with our holding in Bransford, 444 Mass. at 858-859, 
to the extent that the obiter dictum expressed in Rockwood might 
suggest otherwise for one- and two-family houses, it is 
incorrect. 
 
The plaintiffs emphasize that no provision of the town's 
bylaw would permit the increase in the FAR sought here, and the 
defendants do not contest this assertion.15  Our prior 
                     
 
15 Section 8.02 of the bylaw permits an "alteration or 
extension" of a nonconforming use, but provides that "any 
increase in volume, area, or extent of the nonconforming use 
shall not exceed an aggregate of 25 percent during the life of 
the nonconformity."  Section 5.22 of the bylaw, "Exceptions to 
Maximum Floor Area Ratio (FAR) Regulations for Residential 
25 
 
 
jurisprudence, before Gale, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 331, involved 
situations in which the local bylaws at issue were coextensive 
with the language of G. L. c. 40A, § 6, thus serving as a mere 
procedural implementation of the statute's requirements.  See, 
e.g., Bjorklund, 450 Mass. at 357-358; Bransford, 444 Mass. at 
855; Rockwood, 409 Mass. at 364; Willard, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 
19-20.  By contrast, the town's bylaw does not contain a 
parallel provision implementing the language and requirements of 
G. L. c. 40A, § 6.  Rather, section 8.02(2) of the bylaw 
provides that any nonconforming structure or use "may be 
altered, repaired, or enlarged, except that any nonconforming 
condition may not be increased unless specifically provided for 
in a section of this By-law."  To the extent that no provision 
of the bylaw would permit the increase in FAR that the 
defendants seek, a zoning variance would be required, in 
addition to the requisite finding of no substantial detriment 
under G. L. c. 40A, § 6, in order to permit a modification that 
                     
Units," permits exceptions for additional floor area for 
buildings where the certificate of occupancy was issued at least 
ten years previously, and provides that "[e]xterior 
modifications to accommodate an exterior addition or interior 
conversion shall include, without limitation the addition of a 
dormer, penthouse, cupola, windows, doors or the like."  The 
defendants' proposed addition would result in an increase in the 
extent of the existing nonconforming FAR of 1.14 to an ultimate 
FAR that would be thirty-eight per cent higher than the 
permitted FAR of 1.0, and thirteen per cent higher than the 
maximum exception of twenty-five per cent. 
26 
 
 
would increase the "nonconforming nature" of the two-family 
structure. 
General Laws c. 40A, § 6, however, creates a statutory 
requirement that "sets the floor" throughout the Commonwealth 
for the appropriate protections from local zoning bylaws to be 
afforded properties and structures protected under that statue.  
See Rourke v. Rothman, 448 Mass. 190, 191 n.5 (2007).  As such, 
the statute prescribes "the minimum of tolerance that must be 
accorded to nonconforming uses." (citation omitted).  See id.  A 
municipality's bylaws may not afford fewer protections to 
preexisting nonconforming structures or uses than does the 
governing statute.  See, e.g., Schiffenhaus v. Kline, 79 Mass. 
App. Ct. 600, 605 (2011), quoting Planning Bd. of Reading v. 
Board of Appeals of Reading, 333 Mass. 657, 660 (1956) ("It is 
axiomatic that '[a] by-law cannot conflict with the statute'").  
The board determined as much, construing its own bylaw as 
prescribing only a finding of no substantial detriment in order 
to issue the requested zoning relief.  See Plainville Asphalt 
Corp. v. Plainville, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 710, 713 (2013) (applying 
"corollary principle that statutes or bylaws dealing with the 
same subject should be interpreted harmoniously to effectuate a 
consistent body of law").  Because the governing statute and its 
interpretive framework do not require a variance here, a 
municipality's bylaw may not do so. 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.