Case Title: State v. Vincent T. Grady

Citation: 2007 WI 81

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2424-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Vincent T. Grady, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 188 
Reported at:  296 Wis. 2d 295, 722 N.W.2d 760 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jean Di Motto   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Donna L. Hintze, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
2007 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2424-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF6628) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Vincent T. Grady, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision, State v. Grady, 2006 WI App 188, 296 
Wis. 2d 295, 722 N.W.2d 760.  The court of appeals affirmed an 
order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jean W. DiMotto, 
Judge, which denied a postconviction motion for resentencing by 
Vincent T. Grady (Grady). 
¶2 
This 
appeal 
presents 
two 
issues. 
 
First, 
does 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10)(2003-04)1 preclude appellate review of a 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(10) provides the following: 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
2 
 
circuit court's consideration of a sentencing guideline pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a)?2  We hold that § 973.017(10) does 
not prevent review of a circuit court's consideration of an 
applicable sentencing guideline.  Second, how does a circuit 
court satisfy its § 973.017(2)(a) obligation to consider an 
applicable sentencing guideline?  We hold that a circuit court 
satisfies its § 973.017(2)(a) obligation when the record of the 
sentencing 
hearing 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
court 
actually 
considered the sentencing guidelines and so stated on the 
record. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(10) USE OF GUIDELINES; NO RIGHT TO OR BASIS FOR 
APPEAL.  The requirement under sub. (2)(a) that a 
court consider sentencing guidelines adopted by the 
sentencing commission or the criminal penalties study 
committee 
does 
not 
require 
a 
court 
to 
make 
a 
sentencing decision that is within any range or 
consistent with a recommendation specified in the 
guidelines, and there is no right to appeal a court's 
sentencing decision based on the court's decision to 
depart in any way from any guideline. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version, unless otherwise stated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) provides the following:  
(2) GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.  When a court makes a 
sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a 
criminal offense committed on or after February 1, 
2003, the court shall consider all of the following: 
(a) If the offense is a felony, the sentencing 
guidelines adopted by the sentencing commission under 
s. 973.30 or, if the sentencing commission has not 
adopted a guideline for the offense, any applicable 
temporary sentencing guideline adopted by the criminal 
penalties study committee created under 1997 Wisconsin 
Act 283. 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
In this case, the record of the postconviction motion 
hearing reveals that the sentencing judge considered the 
applicable guideline during the sentencing hearing.  Hereafter, 
supplementing the record with evidence beyond the sentencing 
hearing will be insufficient.  For sentencing hearings occurring 
after 
September 
1, 
2007, 
a 
circuit 
court 
satisfies 
its 
§ 973.017(2)(a) obligation when the record of the sentencing 
hearing demonstrates that the court actually considered the 
sentencing guidelines and so stated on the record.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
On November 22, 2004, a sentencing hearing occurred 
for Grady.  Grady had pleaded guilty to two counts of party to a 
crime pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.05 for armed robbery with use 
of force under Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2).  Grady committed the 
offenses 
on 
November 
12, 
2003, 
making 
§ 973.017(2)(a) 
applicable.  A sentencing guideline also existed for armed 
robbery at the time.   
¶5 
Grady pleaded guilty to the charges as part of a plea 
agreement.  The State in turn dismissed the one count of 
conspiracy 
to 
commit 
armed 
robbery 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.31. 
 
As 
part 
of 
the 
plea 
agreement 
negotiations, Grady refused a deal that would have required him 
to testify at one of his accomplice's trials.  The accomplice he 
refused to testify against was his uncle.     
¶6 
At the sentencing hearing, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court Judge Jean W. DiMotto gave a detailed explanation of her 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
4 
 
reasoning for imposing Grady's sentence.  She emphasized that 
Grady’s character and prior criminal record did not warrant 
placing him on probation.  Grady had already been placed under 
supervision on two occasions and both times subsequently 
committed armed robbery.  The judge also concluded that Grady 
had consistently minimized the danger of his activities and 
criminality. 
¶7 
Judge DiMotto noted the degree of force used during 
the latest armed robberies.  Grady's accomplices brandished a 
semi-automatic handgun, barricaded employees of the targeted 
restaurant in a cooler, and struck the manager in the head.  The 
judge assessed the harm caused to the victims and the role Grady 
played in the offenses. 
¶8 
Judge DiMotto also discussed factors that warranted 
Grady receiving a longer sentence.  Grady refused to testify 
against an accomplice, unlike another accomplice who agreed to 
testify.  Grady also had worked at one of the targeted 
restaurants.  Even though he knew the employees that would be 
terrorized by the crime, he played a pivotal role in it.  
Additionally, 
he 
participated 
despite 
knowing 
that 
his 
accomplices had already murdered an employee during an attempted 
robbery of another restaurant only six days earlier.         
¶9 
Judge 
DiMotto 
explained 
that 
the 
goals 
of 
rehabilitation, punishment, protection, and deterrence were 
better served through confinement.  Based on the seriousness of 
the charges and what Grady did, the judge imposed a ten-year 
sentence for the first count of armed robbery, party to a crime, 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
5 
 
with 
seven 
years 
confinement 
and 
three 
years 
extended 
supervision.  The judge also imposed a 20-year consecutive 
sentence for the second count of armed robbery, party to a 
crime, 
with 
13 
years 
confinement 
and 
7 
years 
extended 
supervision. 
¶10 During the sentencing hearing, Judge DiMotto did not 
refer to the applicable sentencing guideline.  The record also 
does not include a completed sentencing guideline worksheet.  No 
one at the sentencing hearing, including the parties, mentioned 
the sentencing guideline for armed robbery.  
¶11 Grady later filed a postconviction motion seeking 
resentencing on the grounds that the trial court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by failing to consider the sentencing 
guideline for armed robbery.  During the hearing on the motion, 
Judge DiMotto stated on the record that she had considered the 
sentencing guideline during the initial sentencing hearing.  She 
recognized that she had failed to mention it at the time, but 
she compared the oversight to a scrivener's error.  In a written 
order, Judge DiMotto stated that "the court considered the 
sentencing guidelines without explicitly identifying that fact 
and it is clearly apparent from the record that the court did 
so."  Accordingly, the judge denied Grady's motion.   
¶12 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment 
and 
order. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10) 
precluded 
appellate 
review 
of 
a 
sentencing court’s failure to consider sentencing guidelines.  
Grady, 296 Wis. 2d 295, ¶ 1.  Citing State v. Halbert, 147 Wis. 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
6 
 
2d 123, 131, 432 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of 
appeals ruled that Grady could not appeal his sentence even if 
the 
sentencing 
court 
failed 
to 
consider 
the 
applicable 
sentencing guideline.3  Grady, 296 Wis. 2d 295, ¶5.   
¶13 Grady petitioned for review by this court, which we 
granted. 
                                                 
3 Judge Dykman wrote a concurring opinion, in which he 
stated the following:  
The issue of our jurisdiction to review a trial 
court’s failure to consider guidelines has been 
decided, 
albeit, 
in 
my 
view, 
incorrectly. 
 
I 
respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that 
[State v. Halbert, 147 Wis. 2d 123, 432 N.W.2d 633 
(Ct. App. 1988)] mandates that we have no jurisdiction 
to 
review 
a 
trial 
court’s 
failure 
to 
consider 
sentencing guidelines.  I concur with the majority’s 
decision because I conclude that [State v. Elam, 195 
Wis. 2d 683, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995)] holds that we do 
not.  I write to explain my view of why the majority’s 
view of Halbert is incorrect and why we do not have 
jurisdiction to review this issue.  I do so pursuant 
to the court’s suggestion in Cook. 
State v. Grady, 2006 WI App 188, ¶20, 296 Wis. 2d 295, 722 
N.W.2d 760.  In Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997), the court suggested that when the court of 
appeals concludes that a prior decision is erroneous, "the court 
of appeals may decide the appeal, adhering to a prior case but 
stating its belief that the prior case was wrongly decided." 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
7 
 
II 
¶14 The issues presented in this case both involve 
statutory interpretation.4   To determine whether an appellate 
court 
may 
review 
a 
circuit 
court's 
consideration 
of 
an 
applicable sentencing guideline we must interpret § 973.017(10).  
To determine how a sentencing court satisfies its obligation to 
consider any applicable sentencing guideline, we must interpret 
§ 973.017(2)(a).  Statutory interpretation presents a question 
of law that we review de novo.  State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, 
¶7, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769.   
¶15 Our goal in interpreting statutory provisions is to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature, which we assume is 
expressed in the text of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  To this end, absent ambiguity in a statute, we do 
not resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation and instead apply 
the plain meaning of the words of a statute in light of its 
textually manifest scope, context, and purpose. Id., ¶¶45-46.  A 
statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable understanding.  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is ambiguous, 
                                                 
4 The State contends that Grady waived the issues presented.  
Grady did not waive the issues presented because he filed a 
postconviction motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h).  
Filing a postconviction motion is a timely means of raising an 
alleged error by the circuit court during sentencing.  See e.g., 
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197. 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
8 
 
we may examine extrinsic sources in order to guide our 
interpretation.  Id., ¶50. 
A. Review of a Court's Consideration of a Sentencing Guideline   
¶16 We 
first 
address 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10) 
precludes appellate review of a circuit court's consideration of 
an 
applicable 
sentencing 
guideline 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a). 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(10) 
provides the following:  
(10) USE OF GUIDELINES; NO RIGHT OR BASIS FOR 
APPEAL.  The requirement under sub. (2)(a) that a 
court consider sentencing guidelines adopted by the 
sentencing commission or the criminal penalties study 
committee 
does 
not 
require 
a 
court 
to 
make 
a 
sentencing decision that is within any range or 
consistent with a recommendation specified in the 
guidelines, and there is no right to appeal a court's 
sentencing decision based on the court's decision to 
depart in any way from any guideline. 
The plain language of the statute begins by clarifying that 
§ 973.017(2)(a) does not require that a circuit court impose a 
sentence that falls within the range provided by an applicable 
sentencing guideline.   
¶17 After clarifying that § 973.017(2)(a) does not require 
a circuit court to impose a certain sentence, § 973.017(10) 
provides that "there is no right to appeal a court's sentencing 
decision based on the court's decision to depart in any way from 
any guideline."  Accordingly, a circuit court's departure from 
an applicable sentencing guideline does not provide a defendant 
with grounds for appeal. 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
9 
 
¶18 Nothing in the language of § 973.017(10) suggests that 
a circuit court's failure to consider an applicable sentencing 
guideline pursuant to § 973.017(2)(a) is not a valid grounds for 
appeal.  Therefore, we conclude that like the other provisions 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 973 that establish obligations for circuit 
courts during sentencing, an appellate court may review whether 
or 
not 
a 
circuit 
court 
satisfied 
its 
§ 973.017(2)(a) 
obligation.5     
¶19 The court of appeals did not interpret § 973.017(10) 
as we have.  A distinct interpretation of the statute's language 
did not cause the difference.  Rather, the difference arises 
because the court of appeals concluded that previous holdings of 
appellate courts had provided an interpretation of similar 
statutory 
language 
and 
the 
legislature 
had 
enacted 
§ 973.017(2)(a) with knowledge of that interpretation.  Grady, 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, ¶¶77-78, 294 
Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649 (court reviewed whether a circuit 
court 
properly 
imposed 
attorney 
fees 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.06(1)(e) and 973.09(1g)); State v. Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d 372, 374, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (court reviewed whether 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(1981-82) required a sentencing credit); 
State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, ¶¶35-36, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 
N.W.2d 24 (court reviewed whether Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(1999-
2000) permitted a penalty enhancer to be applied to the term of 
extended supervision); State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶9, 234 
Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147 (court reviewed whether the circuit 
court satisfied its Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r)(1997-98) obligation 
related to imposing restitution); State v. Pope, 107 Wis. 2d 
726, 731, 321 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1982) (court reviewed whether 
the circuit court satisfied its Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1m)(1979-80) 
obligation to consider the financial resources and future 
ability of the probationer to pay when establishing the amount 
of restitution and method of payment). 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
10 
 
296 Wis. 2d 295, ¶5.  Therefore, the court of appeals concluded 
the prior interpretation bound it to hold that § 973.017(10) 
precludes appellate review of the circuit court's consideration 
of an applicable sentencing guideline.  Id., ¶8.   
¶20 A prior interpretation of a statute is applied when 
courts subsequently consider the same statute.  Progressive 
Northern 
Ins. 
Co. 
v. 
Romanshek, 
2005 
WI 
67, 
¶41, 
281 
Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417.  The court may overturn a prior 
interpretation of a statute when it has been shown "not only 
that [the previous decision] was mistaken but also that it was 
objectively wrong, so that the court has a compelling reason to 
overrule it."  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  Our adherence to a previous 
interpretation applies to both decisions of this court and the 
court of appeals.  State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶42, 253 
Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1. 
¶21 Four cases, both decided by this court and the court 
of appeals, addressed issues related to language similar to 
§ 973.017(10).  State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 538 N.W.2d 249 
(1995); State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993); 
State v. Smet, 186 Wis. 2d 24, 519 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Halbert, 147 Wis. 2d 123.6  For a variety of reasons, we conclude 
                                                 
6 At the time all four cases were decided, the statutes 
included Wis. Stat. § 973.012.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.012 (1993-
94) provided the following:  
Use of guidelines by judges.  A sentencing court, 
when imposing a sentence, shall take the guidelines 
established under s. 973.011 into consideration. If 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
11 
 
that none of the previous cases addressing issues related to the 
language of § 973.017(10) binds this court as it considers 
whether the statute precludes appellate review of a circuit 
court's failure to consider pertinent sentencing guidelines.   
¶22 In Halbert, the court of appeals was not presented 
with the issue of whether the language of § 973.017(10) 
precluded an appellate court from reviewing the circuit court's 
failure to consider pertinent sentencing guidelines.  The 
defendant contended that the circuit court erred when it failed 
to consider the sentencing guideline.  The Halbert court noted 
that "[n]o matter how denominated, however, the crux of his 
complaint is that the ninety month sentence did not fall within 
the guidelines."  Halbert, 147 Wis. 2d at 129.  The facts of the 
case supported the court's assessment: "the [sentencing] court 
signed the form, which indicates the guideline was considered."  
                                                                                                                                                             
the court does not impose a sentence in accordance 
with the recommendations in the guidelines, the court 
shall state on the record its reasons for deviating 
from the guidelines. There shall be no right to appeal 
on the basis of the trial court's decision to render a 
sentence that does not fall within the sentencing 
guidelines. 
1995 Wisconsin Act 27, § 7252, repealed § 973.012.  
With 
2001 
Wis. 
Act 
109, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017.  Included in § 973.017 were sections 
(2)(a) 
and 
(10). 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(10) 
included 
language similar to the repealed § 973.012, stating "there is no 
right to appeal a court's sentencing decision based on the 
court's decision to depart in any way from any guideline."  
Wisconsin Stat. §§ 973.017(10) and 973.017(2)(a) have not been 
amended since they were enacted.  
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
12 
 
Id. at 130 n.3.  The Halbert court did not hold that a circuit 
court's failure to consider the applicable sentencing guideline 
was not a reviewable issue on appeal.  That issue was not before 
the court.   
¶23 With Halbert's contention on appeal characterized as a 
claim that the circuit court erred in departing from the 
sentencing guidelines, the Halbert court held that the express 
language of Wis. Stat. § 973.012 (1993-94) precluded its review 
of the issue.  Id. at 130.   Wisconsin Stat. § 973.012 
explicitly stated that "[t]here shall be no right to appeal on 
the basis of the trial court's decision to render a sentence 
that does not fall within the sentencing guidelines." 
¶24 Subsequent cases have characterized Halbert in a way 
that suggest it did reach a holding on the issue of whether a 
circuit court's consideration of a sentencing guideline was 
reviewable.  First, this court stated that "[i]n State v. 
Halbert, the District I court of appeals interpreted the last 
sentence of sec. 973.012, Stats., as precluding review of a 
circuit court's alleged failure to consider the guidelines 
and/or to place its reasons for deviating from the record."  
Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1120 (citations omitted).  Then, the court 
of appeals followed suit and stated that "Halbert held that the 
last sentence of § 973.012 precluded review of a circuit court's 
alleged failure to consider the guidelines and/or to place its 
reasons for deviating from the guidelines on the record."  Smet, 
186 Wis. 2d at 31 n.2 (citing Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1120).  
Finally, this court stated that "[i]n State v. Halbert, the 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
13 
 
court of appeals held that a sentencing court's failure to 
consider the sentencing guidelines is not subject to appellate 
review."  Elam, 195 Wis. 2d at 685 (citations omitted).   
¶25 The 
prior 
characterizations 
of 
Halbert 
do 
not 
represent holdings of any appellate court.  In Speer, the issue 
of whether § 973.012 precluded appellate review of the circuit 
court's consideration of a sentencing guideline arose.  However, 
a majority of the court did not agree on a holding related to 
the issue.  The lead opinion stated the following in Part II: 
[T]he legislature did not intend by the language of 
the last sentence of [§ 973.012] to preclude appellate 
review of a sentence imposed without consideration of 
the sentencing guidelines.  The last sentence of the 
statute is unambiguous and means what it says; a 
defendant has no right to appeal a sentence solely 
because the sentence exceeds the guidelines.  Section 
973.012, Stats., does not deprive an appellate court 
of jurisdiction to consider whether the sentencing 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing 
to follow the statutory mandate to consider the 
sentence guidelines and state on the record its 
reasons for deviating from the guidelines.  An 
appellate court must review the entire record to 
ascertain whether the circuit court has complied with 
these statutory mandates, regardless of any statements 
to the contrary found in Halbert. To the extent 
Halbert indicates otherwise, it is overruled.     
Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1122-23 (citations omitted).  Because only 
three of six justices joined Part II of the lead opinion, a 
majority of this court did not adopt the lead opinion's 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
14 
 
assessment of Halbert.7  On other grounds, the court did 
unanimously affirm the judgment of the circuit court.    
¶26 In Smet, the defendant relied on the lead Speer 
opinion to contend that he could seek review of whether failure 
to follow a sentencing guideline constituted an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  The State argued that Speer was not 
controlling authority on the issue of compliance with § 973.012.  
The Smet court concluded that it "need not be concerned whether 
Speer is binding precedent."  Smet, 186 Wis. 2d at 30 n.2.  The 
court of appeals did not reach a holding on whether a circuit 
court's consideration of a sentencing guideline is reviewable.     
¶27 In Elam, the court again considered whether § 973.012 
prohibited appellate review of a circuit court's failure to 
consider a sentencing guideline.  Like in Speer, the court was 
evenly divided on the issue.8 
¶28 Up to this point, there has not been a holding that 
§ 973.017(10) or § 973.012 precluded appellate review of a 
                                                 
7 Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan, Justices Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and William A. Bablitch believed Halbert should be 
overruled, as articulated in Part II of the lead opinion.  
Justices Roland B. Day, Donald W. Steinmetz and Louis J. Ceci 
did not join Part II of the lead opinion.  Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
did not participate.   
8 Chief Justice Roland B. Day, Justices Donald W. Steinmetz 
and 
Janine 
P. 
Geske 
concluded 
that 
a 
circuit 
court's 
consideration of an applicable sentencing guideline was not 
reviewable. 
 
Justices 
Shirley 
S. 
Abrahamson, 
William 
A. 
Bablitch, and Ann Walsh Bradley would have concluded that a 
circuit court's failure to consider an applicable sentencing 
guideline was reviewable.  Justice Jon P. Wilcox did not 
participate. 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
15 
 
circuit court's consideration of an applicable sentencing 
guideline. 
 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
court 
is 
unanimous.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(10) does not preclude appellate review 
to determine whether a circuit court considered a sentencing 
guideline. 
B. Consideration of an Applicable Sentencing Guideline 
¶29 We now address how a circuit court satisfies its 
§ 973.017(2)(a) obligation to consider applicable sentencing 
guidelines. 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) 
provides 
that 
"the 
court shall consider . . . [i]f the offense is a felony, the 
sentencing guideline."  Although the statute does not define 
"shall consider," the context of the statute provides guidance 
on 
how 
a 
sentencing 
court 
satisfies 
its 
§ 973.017(2)(a) 
obligation.  We conclude that a sentencing court satisfies its 
§ 973.017(2)(a) obligation when the record of the sentencing 
hearing demonstrates that the court actually considered the 
sentencing guidelines and so stated on the record. 
¶31 In sentencing, circuit courts exercise discretion.  
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197.  A circuit court's § 973.017(2)(a) obligation is one 
of many that affects its exercise of discretion at sentencing.  
Id., ¶43.  One of the crucial aspects of exercising discretion 
is deciding the weight to be given to particular factors.  We 
have long recognized that "[i]t has been made abundantly clear 
that the 'weight which is to be attributed to each factor is a 
determination which appears to be particularly within the wide 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
16 
 
discretion of the sentencing judge.'"  Anderson v. State, 76 
Wis. 2d 361, 364, 251 N.W.2d 768 (1977) (quoting Ocanas v. 
State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975)).  In Gallion, 
we recently affirmed that "[t]he circuit court possesses wide 
discretion in determining what factors are relevant to its 
sentencing decision."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶68.  Circuit 
courts must consider numerous factors, but the depth of that 
consideration is part of the exercise of discretion.  The same 
is true related to a court satisfying its § 973.017(2)(a) 
obligation.   
¶32 A circuit court's exercise of discretion does not go 
unchecked.  On appeal, appellate courts review whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised it discretion when imposing 
a sentence.  Id., ¶17.  Appellate courts "remand for sentencing 
or modify the sentence only when an abuse of discretion clearly 
appears." 
 
McCleary 
v. 
State, 
49 
Wis. 2d 263, 
278, 
182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971).  The sentence imposed by the circuit court is 
"'generally afforded a strong presumption of reasonability 
because the circuit court is best suited to consider the 
relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant.'"  
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶18 (quoting State v. Borrell, 167 
Wis. 2d 749, 781, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992)).   
¶33 The 
consideration 
of 
an 
applicable 
sentencing 
guideline must be found in the record.  Appellate review of a 
circuit court's exercise of discretion depends on appellate 
courts being able to access a circuit court's acts of discretion 
from the record.  McCleary established, and Gallion affirmed, 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
17 
 
"that the exercise of sentencing discretion must be set forth on 
the 
record." 
 
Gallion, 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, 
¶4. 
 
McCleary 
specifically noted that "[i]f the facts are fairly inferable 
from the record, and the reasons indicate the consideration of 
legally relevant factors, the sentence should ordinarily be 
affirmed."  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281.  Appellate courts 
depend on the record to determine whether a sentencing court 
satisfied an obligation during sentencing.  The same is true 
when appellate courts assess whether a circuit court satisfied 
its § 973.017(2)(a) obligation. 
¶34 For a sentencing court to satisfy its § 973.017(2)(a) 
obligation there are not magic words that must appear in the 
record.  The legislature has made clear that the § 973.017(2)(a) 
obligation "does not require a court to make a sentencing 
decision that is within any range or consistent with a 
recommendation 
specified 
in 
the 
guidelines."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10).  By requiring circuit courts to 
consider any applicable guideline, the legislature has indicated 
that courts must at least take any applicable guideline into 
account. 
¶35 The consideration of an applicable guideline must 
occur for each sentence imposed for a sentencing court to 
satisfy 
its 
§ 973.017(2)(a) 
obligation. 
 
"Individualized 
sentencing, 
after 
all, 
has 
long 
been 
a 
cornerstone 
to 
Wisconsin's criminal justice jurisprudence."  Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶48.   
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
18 
 
¶36 In this case, the record of the postconviction motion 
hearing reveals that the sentencing judge considered the 
applicable guideline during the sentencing hearing.  During the 
hearing 
on 
Grady's 
postconviction 
motion, 
Judge 
DiMotto 
explicitly stated that she had considered the sentencing 
guideline for armed robbery when she sentenced Grady.  In the 
order denying Grady's postconviction motion, the court also 
stated that it "considered the sentencing guidelines without 
explicitly identifying that fact and it is clearly apparent from 
the record that the court did so."  Hereafter, supplementing the 
record with evidence beyond the sentencing hearing will be 
insufficient.  Nevertheless, in this case, we are satisfied that 
Judge DiMotto considered the applicable sentencing guideline 
during Grady's sentencing hearing.   
¶37 Grady 
argues 
that 
§ 973.017(2)(a) 
requires 
a 
sentencing court to (1) complete any applicable sentencing 
worksheet, (2) consider the sentencing range recommended by the 
sentencing guideline, and (3) explain both how the sentencing 
guideline fits the objectives of sentencing and how the 
sentencing guideline influences the sentence imposed.  We 
disagree with Grady because the three components of his 
interpretation each run afoul of the statute and its context.   
¶38 First, Grady suggests that a judge must complete any 
applicable sentencing guideline worksheet.  This is not required 
by the statute.  Although sentencing guidelines "serve as a 
touchstone for explaining the reasons for the particular 
sentence imposed," they do not diminish the exercise of 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
19 
 
discretion that is fundamental to sentencing.  Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶48.  A sentencing court's consideration of an 
applicable sentencing guideline is one of many factors it must 
consider before imposing a sentence.  Id., ¶43.     
¶39 Second, Grady contends that § 973.017(2)(a) requires 
sentencing courts to consider the sentencing range recommended 
by 
the 
sentencing 
guideline. 
 
This 
construction 
of 
§ 973.017(2)(a) is too narrow to be consistent with the 
statutory language.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) requires 
that a sentencing court consider "the sentencing guidelines 
adopted by the sentencing commission under s. 973.30 or, if the 
sentencing commission has not adopted a guideline for the 
offense, any applicable temporary sentencing guideline adopted 
by the criminal penalties study committee created under 1997 
Wisconsin Act 283."   
¶40 Sentencing guidelines include more than simply a 
sentencing range.  At the time the sentencing court imposed 
Grady's sentence, the temporary guideline for armed robbery 
created by the Criminal Penalties Study Committee was in effect.  
The 
worksheet 
included 
five 
sections: 
offense 
severity 
assessment, risk assessment evaluation, armed robbery chart, 
adjustments to sentence indicated in chart, and imposition of 
sentence.  The armed robbery chart provided sentencing ranges.  
The legislature has stated that the § 973.017(2)(a) obligation 
"does not require a court to make a sentencing decision that is 
within any range or consistent with a recommendation specified 
in the guidelines."  Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10).    
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
20 
 
¶41 Third, Grady argues that § 973.017(2)(a) requires that 
the sentencing court explain both how the sentencing guideline 
fits the objectives of sentencing and how the sentencing 
guideline influences the sentence.  This construction of 
§ 973.017(2)(a) confuses the distinction between having the 
obligation to state the reasons for a sentencing decision and to 
consider a sentencing factor.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(10m) 
provides that a sentencing court "shall state the reasons for 
its sentencing decision."  It does not require that the 
sentencing court enumerate all of the factors that might have 
been considered in reaching the decision.  It "remains within 
the discretion of the circuit court to discuss only those 
factors it believes are relevant."  State v. Stenzel, 2004 WI 
App 181, ¶16, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20.   
¶42 Grady does not argue that the court failed to satisfy 
its § 973.017(10m) obligation to state the reasons for its 
sentencing decision.  His sole complaint relates to the 
sentencing court's failure to consider the applicable sentencing 
guideline.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) does not include 
language that suggests that considering a sentencing guideline 
means the sentencing court must explain both how the sentencing 
guideline fits the objectives of sentencing and how the 
sentencing guideline influences the sentence imposed.  From the 
language of § 973.017(2)(a), a sentencing court must consider an 
applicable guideline, not explain it.     
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
21 
 
¶43 Grady's contention that § 973.017(2)(a) requires an 
explanation on the record is similar to that put forward by the 
defendant in State v. Echols:  
The defendant asks this court to adopt a new rule of 
law requiring a sentencing court to specifically 
address on the record each of the factors . . . .  We 
refuse to adopt such a rule.  The trial court is in 
the best position to determine the relevant factors in 
each particular case.   
State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 683, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993).  
For 
the 
same 
reason, 
we 
reject 
Grady's 
suggestion 
that 
§ 973.017(2)(a) requires the sentencing court to explain its use 
of any applicable guideline. 
¶44 Based on the enacted language and context, we hold 
that a circuit court satisfies its § 973.017(2)(a) obligation 
when the record of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the 
court actually considered the sentencing guidelines and so 
stated on the record. 
¶45 Although the concept of sentencing guidelines has 
existed for over 25 years, there has been uncertainty about 
their use.  Because our holding will require different practices 
by circuit courts sentencing defendants, this decision will 
become effective for any sentencing occurring after September 1, 
2007.        
III 
¶46 In sum, § 973.017(10) does not prevent review of a 
circuit court's consideration of an applicable sentencing 
guideline 
pursuant 
to 
§ 973.017(2)(a). 
 
A 
circuit 
court 
satisfies its § 973.017(2)(a) obligation when the record of the 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
22 
 
sentencing 
hearing 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
court 
actually 
considered the sentencing guidelines and so stated on the 
record. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2005AP2424-CR   
 
 
 
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