Case Title: Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corp. v. Town of Jonesport

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021 ME 21

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2021 ME 21 
Docket: 
Ken-20-179 
Argued: 
February 9, 2021 
Decided: 
April 8, 2021 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
ROQUE ISLAND GARDNER HOMESTEAD CORPORATION 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF JONESPORT 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  In this consolidated appeal concerning property tax abatement 
requests made by the Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation (RIGHC), 
the Town of Jonesport appeals from two decisions of the Superior Court.  In the 
first, the court (Washington County, Stewart, J.) vacated a decision of the Town’s 
Board of Appeals (BOA) denying RIGHC’s requests for abatement concerning 
tax years 2015, 2016, and 2018, and remanded the matter to the BOA to make 
an independent determination of the property’s fair market value.  See 
M.R. Civ. P. 80B.  In the second, the court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) granted 
RIGHC’s petition for judicial review of an adverse decision of the State Board of 
Property Tax Review (State Board) concerning its request for a tax year 2017 
 
 
2 
abatement and ordered the Town to grant RIGHC’s request.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  
We affirm both decisions. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The facts are drawn from the supported factual findings of the State 
Board and the BOA, and from the corresponding administrative records.  See 
Grant v. Town of Belgrade, 2019 ME 160, ¶ 2, 221 A.3d 112.  RIGHC owns 
Roque Island off the Jonesport coast.  Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corp. v. 
Town of Jonesport, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 3, 167 A.3d 564.  The island is largely taxed 
as farmland, with the primary exception of a homestead compound consisting 
of several houses and other buildings.  See id.; 36 M.R.S. §§ 1102(4), 1105 
(2021). 
 
[¶3]  Over time, RIGHC applied for property tax abatements for tax years 
2014 through 2018, with the following results: 
• 2014: RIGHC asserted that the Town’s use of a 200% “economic 
obsolescence factor,” which increased the assessed value of buildings on 
the island as compared to comparable mainland buildings, was unjustly 
discriminatory.  Roque Island, 2017 ME 152, ¶¶ 5, 10, 167 A.3d 564.  We 
disagreed and affirmed the Town’s denial of RIGHC’s 2014 abatement 
request.  Id. ¶ 18.  The 2014 tax year is not at issue in the present appeal. 
 
• 2015 and 2016: RIGHC’s abatement requests were stayed pending a 
judicial decision on the 2014 request.  When those requests were heard 
in 2019, the BOA denied them on the grounds that (1) our decision in 
Roque Island resolved the unjust discrimination claim; and (2) it was not 
 
 
3 
required to consider RIGHC’s overvaluation claim for tax years 2015 and 
2016 because that claim was raised for the first time at the hearing and 
was not included in RIGHC's original abatement applications. 
 
RIGHC appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, 
asserting that the assessments on Roque Island were “grossly excessive 
and illegal.”  The court (Stewart, J.) found that RIGHC had met its burden 
to “present evidence of what the just value of its property was and that 
the assessed value was substantially overrated,” vacated the BOA’s 
decision, and remanded for the BOA “to make an independent 
determination of the fair market value of the Roque Island Property.” 
 
• 2018:  In the same proceeding in which it denied the 2015 and 2016 
abatement requests, the BOA denied RIGHC’s abatement request for tax 
year 2018 after considering its overvaluation argument concerning that 
year, finding that RIGHC had “failed to meet its burden to demonstrate 
substantial overvaluation resulting in injustice.”  The BOA noted that the 
appraisal on which RIGHC relied addressed only the “primary homestead 
area” constituting “less than 1% of the island.”  The BOA concluded that 
because the appraisal did not address “the fair market value of the 
excluded lands or the impact of the existence of the rest of the island on 
the value of [the homestead area],” it was not “indicative of . . . the value 
of the whole property.” 
 
On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the BOA’s decision and remanded 
for the Board to make an independent determination of Roque Island’s 
fair market value, concluding that RIGHC was not required to show the 
fair market value of its farmland because it was established by statute, 
see 36 M.R.S. § 1105, and that the appraisal and other evidence RIGHC 
presented was sufficient to meet its burden.   
 
• 2017:  Distinct from the 2015, 2016, and 2018 tax years at issue in the 
Rule 80B appeal, RIGHC’s abatement request for 2017 was based on its 
challenge to the Town assessors’ “correction” of RIGHC’s farmland 
classification application, which resulted in an increase of “farm and 
housing structures” acreage from 5.7 acres to 10 acres, with a 
corresponding decrease in the category of “land unsuitable for farmland,” 
 
 
4 
primarily in the subcategory of “wasteland,” which is included in the 
statutory definition of “farmland.”  36 M.R.S. § 1102(4). 
 
The assessors denied the abatement request based on the Town’s blanket 
policy of assigning a one-acre “site lot” to each substantial building, 
regardless of the actual use of the parcel.  Because Roque Island had ten 
such buildings, its application was adjusted to reflect ten acres assessed 
as “other land” containing “farm and housing structures.” 
 
RIGHC appealed to the State Board, which denied the appeal, concluding 
that the Town’s methodology in assigning ten, one-acre “site lots” to 
Roque Island was “consistent with a reasonable interpretation of 
[36 M.R.S.] section 1105” and satisfied the constitutional requirement 
that property taxes “be apportioned and assessed equally according to 
[the property’s] just value.”  Me. Const.  art. IX, § 8. 
 
RIGHC sought review in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  
The court (Stokes, J.) agreed with RIGHC and directed the Town to grant 
the 2017 abatement request, concluding that “the Town’s good faith 
effort to equalize the tax treatment of structures brought it into conflict 
with the Farmland Tax Law [36 M.R.S. §§ 1105, 1108(1) (2021)] because 
of its one-acre site lot methodology.” 
 
 
[¶4]  We consolidated the Town’s appeals from the two Superior Court 
decisions concerning RIGHC’s abatement requests for tax years 2015 through 
2018. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Final Judgment Rule 
 
[¶5]  Although the Town’s appeal of the Superior Court’s Rule 80C 
decision regarding tax year 2017 is taken from a final judgment, its appeal from 
the court’s Rule 80B decision—remanding to the BOA for further findings 
 
 
5 
regarding tax years 2015, 2016, and 2018—is not.  Accordingly, the Town has 
the burden of demonstrating that an exception to the final judgment rule 
applies.  See Salerno v. Spectrum Med. Grp., P.A., 2019 ME 139, ¶ 7, 215 A.3d 804.  
The Town asserts that the judicial economy exception is applicable. 
 
[¶6]  We conclude that this is an appropriate case in which to apply the 
exception, which “may be invoked in those rare cases in which appellate review 
of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the 
entire litigation and the interests of justice require that an immediate review 
be undertaken.”  Cutting v. Down E. Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., 2021 ME 1, 
¶ 16, 244 A.3d 226 (alterations and quotation marks omitted).  We recently 
explained that  
[g]enerally, we invoke the judicial economy exception when there 
are particularly unique circumstances in the history of a case such 
as . . . multiple pending proceedings involving the same party . . . . 
Thus, we will reach the merits of the case when a decision could 
end the litigation and there is some additional reason to accept the 
appeal. 
 
Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis, citations, and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶7]  Here, the two appeals—one of which we would hear in any event as 
taken from a final judgment—involve the same parties disputing property taxes 
assessed for the same parcel of land.  If we consider the Rule 80B appeal and 
decide in the Town’s favor, then that decision ends that portion of the litigation.  
 
 
6 
If we decide in RIGHC’s favor, then the BOA will be required to make an 
independent determination of Roque Island’s fair market value, which is the 
same determination it will have to make if we dismiss the Rule 80B appeal as 
interlocutory.  Furthermore, the BOA’s fair market value determination would 
not assist us in a potential subsequent appeal from a final judgment raising the 
issue presented to us here because we would still be required to initially decide 
whether the Town’s assessment was “manifestly wrong” given the record.  See 
Roque Island, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 12, 167 A.3d 564 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶8]  Accordingly, we will apply the judicial economy exception to the 
Town’s interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s Rule 80B decision and turn 
to a discussion of the 2015, 2016, and 2018 tax years, which are the subject of 
that decision. 
B. 
Preservation of RIGHC’s Overvaluation Claim for 2015 and 2016 
 
[¶9]  The Town first contends that RIGHC did not preserve its claim that 
its property was overvalued for tax years 2015 and 2016.  RIGHC’s 2015 and 
2016 abatement requests explicitly set out an unjust discrimination claim 
based on the Town’s use of a 200% “economic obsolescence” factor; we rejected 
the same claim concerning the 2014 tax year.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 10, 18.  When the BOA 
took up the 2015 and 2016 requests following a stay, it denied them on the 
 
 
7 
grounds that (1) the Roque Island decision resolved the unjust discrimination 
claim; and (2) RIGHC’s overvaluation claim, presented for the first time at the 
hearing, was not properly before the Board and would not be considered 
because “[a] close examination of the 2015 and 2016 applications show that 
they do not set forth a claim for substantial overvaluation resulting in injustice.” 
 
[¶10]  “[W]e review the Board’s decision directly for abuse of discretion, 
errors of law, and sufficient evidence,” id. ¶ 11 (quotation marks omitted), and 
conclude that the BOA’s decision declining to consider RIGHC’s overvaluation 
claim for 2015 and 2016 was erroneous.  Although the abatement applications 
for those years did state an unjust discrimination claim, it was not the only 
claim advanced.  The applications also asserted that “there is no hint that the 
200% assessed value increase was tied to anything to do with valuation,” 
resulting in “an artificially increased value over and above market value” and 
ultimately a “property tax bill . . . [that] has been inflated”—in other words, a 
claim that RIGHC’s property was overvalued. 
 
[¶11]  Further, the BOA decision does not say that the stay was 
conditioned on later consideration of a single issue, and, in any event, we have 
said that “in the context of a tax abatement appeal” the BOA “reviews the 
decision of a prior decision maker, but does so on an independent review of 
 
 
8 
evidence, including evidence newly presented at the appellate hearing.”  Stewart 
v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 9, 757 A.2d 773 (emphasis added).  The 
BOA therefore erred in refusing to consider RIGHC’s overvaluation claim for 
2015 and 2016 and the evidence proffered to support it.  Accordingly, we will 
examine that claim for all three tax years that were the subject of the Rule 80B 
appeal—2015, 2016, and 2018.1 
C. 
Merits of RIGHC’s Overvaluation Claim for 2015, 2016, and 2018 
 
[¶12]  RIGHC’s burden is a heavy one because “[a] town’s tax assessment 
is presumed to be valid.”  Roque Island, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 12, 167 A.3d 564 
(quotation marks omitted).  “To overcome this presumption, [RIGHC] bears the 
burden of proving that the assessment is ‘manifestly wrong’ by demonstrating 
that . . . the property was substantially overvalued and an injustice resulted 
from the overvaluation.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “To meet the initial 
burden of showing that the assessment was manifestly wrong, [RIGHC] must 
demonstrate that . . . the judgment of the assessor was irrational or . . . 
unreasonable in light of the circumstances . . . .”  Yusem v. Town of Raymond, 
2001 ME 61, ¶ 9, 769 A.2d 865.  “Impeachment of the assessor’s methodology 
                                         
1  At the hearing, the BOA considered RIGHC’s evidence supporting its 2018 overvaluation claim.  
RIGHC advised the Board that the same evidence supported its overvaluation claim for the 2015 and 
2016 tax years. 
 
 
9 
alone is insufficient to meet that burden.”  Id. ¶ 13; Town of Bristol Taxpayers’ 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Selectmen/Assessors for Bristol, 2008 ME 159, ¶ 3 n.1, 
957 A.2d 977 (citing Yusem). 
 
[¶13]  Once again, “we review the Board’s decision directly for abuse of 
discretion, errors of law, and sufficient evidence,” and “[b]ecause the Board 
concluded that [RIGHC] failed to meet its burden to prove that an abatement 
was merited, we will vacate the Board’s decision only if the record compels a 
contrary conclusion to the exclusion of any other inference.”  Roque Island, 
2017 ME 152, ¶ 11, 167 A.3d 564 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶14]  As an initial matter, we reject the Town’s assertion that our 
decision in Roque Island “forestalls [RIGHC’s] challenge to the Town’s 200% 
economic obsolescence multiplier for buildings.”  In Roque Island, RIGHC 
“challenge[d] the assessment solely on the basis of unjust discrimination” 
allegedly resulting from the application of the multiplier, a challenge that we 
rejected.  Id. ¶¶ 12, 18 (emphasis added).  Here, RIGHC made it clear at the BOA 
hearing that it was not advancing the unsuccessful unjust discrimination claim, 
but rather a claim that the 200% multiplier resulted in its property being 
 
 
10 
substantially overvalued.2  Roque Island did not decide that issue, and does not 
preclude our consideration of it now. 
 
[¶15]  Turning to the merits of the arguments on appeal, we agree with 
the Superior Court that the Board erred.  The record before the BOA at the 
hearing compels the conclusion that RIGHC met its burden to demonstrate that 
the Town’s assessment was “manifestly wrong” and that the Roque Island 
property was “substantially overvalued.”  Id. ¶ 12 (quotation marks omitted).  
That record consisted of only two substantial pieces of evidence, both strongly 
favoring RIGHC: (1) an appraisal conducted by a qualified appraiser opining 
that the fair market value of the Roque Island homestead was much less than 
its assessed value, and (2) a packet of three letters—two from contractors with 
experience doing construction projects on Roque Island and one from the 
long-time assessor for the City of Portland with responsibility for assessing 
inhabited islands in Casco Bay—stating that the 200% “obsolescence factor” 
used by the Town to increase the assessed value of the homestead buildings 
was significantly higher than real-world conditions warranted.  See id. ¶ 5 
(quotation marks omitted).  Because RIGHC met its initial burden, the BOA was 
                                         
2  Because of the additional cost of building on an island, the Town assesses buildings on 
Roque Island at a higher value than it would for comparable buildings on the mainland.  See 
Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corp. v. Town of Jonesport, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 5, 167 A.3d 564. 
 
 
11 
required to “engage in an independent determination of fair market value 
based on a consideration of all relevant evidence of just value.”  Yusem, 
2001 ME 61, ¶ 8, 769 A.2d 865 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).  We 
discuss the record in greater detail to explain why the assessment was 
manifestly wrong. 
 
[¶16]  RIGHC’s experienced, certified appraiser opined that the market 
value of the ten-acre homestead compound3 with its associated buildings was 
$2,300,000 for the three tax years at issue.  The Town assessed the homestead 
at more than $4,150,000 for each of those years.  The Town’s valuation of the 
land at $1,125,000 as opposed to the appraisal’s $1,000,000 valuation 
accounted for a relatively small part of the difference; the remainder lay in the 
valuation of the buildings.  Concerning that valuation, the Town agreed at the 
hearing that its “statement of value for the buildings is actually pretty similar 
to [RIGHC’s] statement of building value before the 200% economic 
obsolescence factor is included.” 
 
[¶17]  In response to RIGHC’s assertion that the 200% factor—which 
doubles the assessed value of a building to which it is applied—is an arbitrary 
                                         
3  As discussed infra at ¶¶ 25-31, RIGHC challenges the Town’s assignment of ten acres to the 
homestead area.  For the purpose of the Rule 80B appeal, RIGHC has assumed that the homestead 
area comprises ten acres. 
 
 
 
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number unrelated to the building’s actual value, a former assessor for the Town 
told the BOA that the factor originated with an outside entity’s tax revaluation 
of the Town and “was nothing that any of us assessors did.”  She explained that 
the revaluation “reduced land values, per se, on the islands and upped [the 
value of] the buildings.  I [do] not have an answer for . . . why [the outside entity] 
did that.”  A current assessor was no more definitive in explaining why the 
values of RIGHC’s buildings were automatically doubled; she said that  
the 200% [factor] got brought in to try to equalize the value of the 
island properties because . . . it takes more to build on the islands 
. . . but . . . especially a place like . . . Roque [Island] . . . that’s so 
unique, we don’t have anything like that here on the mainland and 
to make sure that those values are, you know, probably higher . . . 
I think that’s why maybe they put it up to 200% . . . to get . . . the 
value of those properties where they needed to be. 
 
 
[¶18]  The problem with the Town’s application of the 200% multiplier 
automatically doubling the value of buildings on Roque Island is that on this 
record there was no evidence before the BOA to establish that the multiplier 
resulted in an accurate valuation of the buildings and not a purely arbitrary 
increase in their value.  The Maine Constitution requires as a general rule that 
“[a]ll taxes upon real . . . estate . . . shall be apportioned and assessed equally 
according to the just value thereof.”  Me. Const. art. IX, § 8 (emphasis added). 
 
 
13 
 
[¶19]  The only evidence before the BOA relating the 200% multiplier to 
fair market value consisted of the three letters submitted by RIGHC, which all 
stated that the multiplier resulted in building values that were too high.  None 
of the letters were mentioned in the BOA’s decision.  In the first, a general 
contractor who was “very familiar with local construction costs” and who had 
done work on Roque Island explained that because there are good facilities on 
the island, “Roque [Island] should expect to see construction costs higher than 
those on the mainland, but . . . not significantly higher . . . . I do not see any 
conditions at Roque Island under which a doubling of building costs would be 
warranted.” 
 
[¶20]  In the second letter, a builder of thirty-four years’ experience who 
was “quite familiar with local construction costs,” and who served as a 
municipal assessor for six years in a Washington County town near the coast, 
stated that “[i]n all my years of work [on Roque Island], I have not been involved 
in any construction activities on Roque which have caused a 100% increase in 
my normal labor costs, or anything close to it.”  He estimated that working on 
Roque Island added 25-35% to the labor costs of a project. 
 
[¶21]  Finally, RIGHC admitted a letter written by the City of Portland’s 
former assessor, who served in that position for twenty-nine years and who 
 
 
14 
“[had] been assessing Maine real estate for more than 45 years.”  He stated that 
in assessing inhabited islands in Casco Bay in 2018, the City “used the same 
costs and factors for island property as obtained for property located on the 
mainland without any upward adjustment based on island location.”  He added, 
“I am unaware of any practice among municipal assessors to increase cost 
estimates for island property by any significant factor to represent assumed 
increased costs for island construction.” 
 
[¶22]  Given this record before the BOA, a conclusion that RIGHC met its 
initial burden to show that its “property was substantially overvalued and an 
injustice resulted from the overvaluation” is unavoidable.  Roque Island, 
2017 ME 152, ¶ 12, 167 A.3d 564 (quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, on 
remand the BOA may not simply rely on the 200% multiplier and “must engage 
in an independent determination of fair market value based on a consideration 
of all relevant evidence of just value.”  Yusem, 2001 ME 61, ¶ 8, 769 A.2d 865 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶23]  The BOA’s denial of RIGHC’s appeal on the ground that the 
appraisal addressed only the ten-acre compound and did not opine on the value 
of the island as a whole does not alter our conclusion that RIGHC met its burden 
to demonstrate overvaluation.  The BOA acknowledged that “most of the 
 
 
15 
assessed value of the property is contained in the 10-acre subparcel because of 
the tax programs in which much of the land on the island is enrolled,” an 
understated finding borne out by the record.  In 2018, for example, the Town 
valued the entire island at $4,626,900, and only $370,580 was attributable to 
land and buildings not associated with the compound. 
 
[¶24]  Although we afford the Town’s assessment appropriate deference, 
see Roque Island, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 12, 167 A.3d 564, the BOA could not simply 
assume without evidence that the existence of other land and buildings on the 
island justified the large disparity between the assessed and appraised values 
of the ten-acre compound that represented the great majority of the island’s 
total value.  If evidence considered by the Board on remand leads it to conclude 
that the value of the island as a whole is greater than that of its component parts 
standing alone, then it may use that evidence-based determination in concert 
with all of the other evidence to value RIGHC’s property appropriately. 
D. 
Rule 80C Appeal Concerning the 2017 Tax Year 
 
[¶25]  RIGHC, as the owner of farmland on Roque Island, was entitled to 
apply to have that land taxed “based on [its] current use value” rather than its 
“just value.”4  36 M.R.S. §§ 1103, 1105 (2021); Me. Const. art. IX, § 8.  The 
                                         
4  The Maine Constitution provides as a general rule that “[a]ll taxes upon real . . . estate . . . shall 
be apportioned and assessed equally according to the just value thereof.”  Me. Const. art. IX, § 8.  The 
 
 
16 
“current use value” of farmland “may not reflect development or market value 
purposes other than agricultural or horticultural use” or “value attributable to 
road frontage or shore frontage,” 36 M.R.S. § 1105, and “may not include any 
increment of value reflecting development pressure,” id. § 1108(1). 
 
[¶26]  In applying for most of its Roque Island property to be taxed at the 
special farmland current use rate, RIGHC reported in 2017 that Roque Island 
had 13.7 acres of “other land” to be taxed at the usual just value rate: 5.7 acres 
occupied by “farm and housing structures,” and 8 acres of roads.  The Town, in 
accordance with its town-wide policy of allocating a one-acre “site lot” for any 
substantial structure on a parcel of land,5 increased the acreage attributable to 
structures on Roque Island from 5.7 acres to 10 acres and approved the 
application as amended. 
 
[¶27]  After its abatement request was denied, RIGHC appealed the 
classification of the disputed 4.3 acres to the State Board, contending that it was 
                                         
Constitution allows an exception for farmland at the discretion of the Legislature: “The Legislature 
shall have power to provide for the assessment of the following types of real estate whenever situated 
in accordance with a valuation based upon the current use thereof and in accordance with such 
conditions as the Legislature may enact: . . . [f]arms and agricultural lands, timberlands and 
woodlands . . . .”  Me. Const. art. IX, § 8(2)(A).  The Legislature exercised that discretion in enacting 
36 M.R.S. § 1105 (2021): “The municipal assessor . . . shall establish the 100% valuation per acre 
based on the current use value of farmland used for agricultural or horticultural purposes.” 
 
5  The Town explained to the State Board that “the one-acre site lot is an allocation rather than a 
delineation and therefore . . . [it] is not assigned [to] any specific area of a parcel.” 
 
 
17 
entitled to have that land classified as farmland.  The State Board disagreed and 
ruled in favor of the Town, concluding that its methodology of first allocating 
one-acre lots to buildings on the island—as the Town did for property on the 
mainland—before assessing remaining farmland “is consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of [36 M.R.S.] section 1105 and satisfies Maine 
constitutional requirements of just value and equality.” 
 
[¶28]  On RIGHC’s appeal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, the Superior Court 
(Stokes, J.) concluded that the State Board had erred and directed the Town to 
grant RIGHC’s abatement request for 2017.  In resolving the question of which 
category of land is identified and assessed first—farmland, as asserted by 
RIGHC, or “site lots,” as determined by the Town’s policy—the court 
differentiated between farm structures, taxed at just value, and the land itself.  
It concluded that allocating an arbitrary one acre of land for each structure 
“without regard to [the land’s] actual use” violated 36 M.R.S. §§ 1105 and 
1108(1), which bar consideration of “development or market value purposes 
other than [the land’s] agricultural or horticultural use” and consideration of 
“any increment of value reflecting development pressure” when valuing 
farmland.  For that reason, the court found that the Town’s methodology as 
 
 
18 
applied in this case was “manifestly wrong.”  Roque Island, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 12, 
167 A.3d 564 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶29]  After reviewing the State Board’s decision directly, we conclude 
that the court’s decision was correct.  As in the Rule 80B appeal discussed 
above, we begin our analysis with the presumption that the Town’s assessment 
was valid.  Id.  From that starting point, 
we review the decision of the [State] Board directly for an abuse of 
discretion, error of law, or findings unsupported by substantial 
evidence in the record. . . .  
 
 
Issues of law . . . are reviewed de novo. . . . [RIGHC] bears the 
burden of persuasion to demonstrate error. 
 
Town of Eddington v. Emera Maine, 2017 ME 225, ¶¶ 14-15, 174 A.3d 321; see 
Francis Small Heritage Tr., Inc. v. Town of Limington, 2014 ME 102, ¶ 11, 
98 A.3d 1012.  “We review the meaning of a statue de novo.”  Doe v. Bd. of 
Osteopathic Licensure, 2020 ME 134, ¶ 10, 242 A.3d 182. 
 
[¶30]  The State Board’s decision overlooks the explicitly stated 
legislative purpose of the farm tax law: 
It is declared that it is in the public interest to encourage the 
preservation of farmland and open space land in order to maintain 
a readily available source of food and farm products close to the 
metropolitan areas of the State to conserve the State’s natural 
resources and to provide for the welfare and happiness of the 
inhabitants of the State, that it is in the public interest to prevent 
the forced conversion of farmland and open space land to more 
 
 
19 
intensive uses as the result of economic pressures caused by the 
assessment thereof for purposes of property taxation at values 
incompatible with their preservation as such farmland and open 
space land, and that the necessity in the public interest of the 
enactment of this subchapter is a matter of legislative 
determination. 
 
36 M.R.S. § 1101 (2021). 
 
[¶31]  It was inconsistent with that strong statement of purpose, 
declaring that taxation of farmland at its current use value is a “necessity in the 
public interest,” id., for the State Board to sustain the Town’s policy of 
arbitrarily taxing one acre of land at its developed value for each substantial 
building on Roque Island, regardless of how much of the island is actually 
farmland.  By statute, “[i]f the assessor determines that the land is farmland . . . 
the assessor shall classify it as farmland and apply the appropriate 
100% valuations per acre for farmland and that land is subject to taxation 
under [the farm tax law].”  36 M.R.S. § 1109(1) (2021) (emphasis added).  
Further, contrary to the rationale of its decision, the State Board’s result was 
not compelled by article IX, section 8 of the Maine Constitution.  See supra n.4; 
36 M.R.S. §§ 1101, 1105, 1108(1) (indicating the Legislature’s intent to give 
farmland special tax treatment notwithstanding factors that would otherwise 
result in taxing the land at a higher valuation). 
 
 
20 
 
[¶32]  For these reasons, the State Board erred as a matter of law, and the 
Superior Court correctly found that RIGHC met its burden to show that the 
Town’s assessment methodology, and thus the assessment itself, was 
“manifestly wrong.”6  Roque Island, 2017 ME 152, ¶ 12, 167 A.3d 564 (quotation 
marks omitted); see Town of Eddington, 2017 ME 225, ¶ 14, 174 A.3d 321. 
The entry is: 
 
Order vacating the Jonesport Board of Appeals’ 
decision concerning the 2015, 2016, and 2018 
abatement requests and remanding for the 
Board to make an independent determination of 
fair market value affirmed.  Judgment granting 
the petition for judicial review and directing the 
Town of Jonesport to grant the 2017 abatement 
request affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
6  In unilaterally amending RIGHC’s farmland classification application by increasing the “other 
land: farm & housing structures” category from 5.7 acres to 10 acres, the Town correspondingly 
decreased the “land unsuitable for farming” category by 4.3 acres, designating 21.2 acres of the 
remaining 24.2 acres in that category as “wasteland.”  The remaining three acres constituted land 
designated as open space on another RIGHC-owned island.  By statute, “‘Farmland’ means any tract 
or tracts of land, including . . . wasteland, of at least 5 contiguous acres on which farming or 
agricultural activities have [been performed to a sufficient degree].”  36 M.R.S. § 1102(4) (2021) 
(emphasis added).  In its brief, the Town, based on the State’s instructions accompanying RIGHC’s 
farmland classification application, “presumes that land unsuitable for farmland is wasteland under 
[section] 1102.”  Accordingly, the Town’s amendment of RIGHC’s application, in addition to 
increasing the amount of land taxed at the “just value” rate for developed property, decreased the 
amount of land taxed on its farmland value. 
 
 
21 
John K. Hamer, Esq. (orally), Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellant Town of 
Jonesport 
 
Peter L. Murray, Esq. (orally), and Sage M. Friedman, Esq., Murray, Plumb & 
Murray, Portland, for appellee Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation 
 
 
Washington County Superior Court docket number AP-2019-02 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2019-28 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY