Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel

Citation: 2007-Ohio-258

Docket Number: 20061639

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel, 112 Ohio St.3d 443, 2007-Ohio-258.] 
 
 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. ROTHERMEL. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel,  
112 Ohio St.3d 443, 2007-Ohio-258.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice — 
Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Practicing law 
in violation of jurisdictional regulations — Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2006-1639 — Submitted November 15, 2006 — Decided February 7, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-090. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Christian Dean Rothermel of Hamilton, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0043140, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1977. 
{¶ 2} On December 31, 1984, we suspended respondent from practice 
for one year for professional misconduct involving conversion of client trust 
funds, failure to disburse funds held on a client's behalf, and failure to maintain 
the identity of client funds in a trust account.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Rothermel (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 121, 15 OBR 272, 472 N.E.2d 1072.  
Respondent was eventually reinstated.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Rothermel 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1215, 716 N.E.2d 712.  On December 15, 2004, we 
suspended respondent’s license to practice again, this time for an indefinite 
period, for his failure to maintain the identity of client funds, his failure to keep 
complete records of client property in his possession, and his acts of fraud, deceit, 
dishonesty, or misrepresentation.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel, 104 
Ohio St.3d 413, 2004-Ohio-6559, 819 N.E.2d 1099. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} On October 10, 2005, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, charged 
respondent with additional counts of professional misconduct.  Respondent was 
served the complaint but did not answer, and relator moved for default pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F).  A master commissioner appointed by the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline granted the motion, making 
findings of misconduct and a recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} The complaint charged respondent with three counts of 
misconduct, the third of which was recommended for dismissal because it was not 
supported by the sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence required by 
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b).  On review, we adopt the recommendation to dismiss.  
Accord Toledo Bar Assn. v. Dewey, 98 Ohio St.3d 418, 2003-Ohio-1495, 786 
N.E.2d 453, ¶ 2. 
Count I 
{¶ 5} Bradley Abrams retained respondent to sue a business associate 
sometime after June 10, 2000, the day on which Abrams was involved in an 
accident and suffered a traumatic brain injury.  The injury left Abrams with 
permanent brain damage resulting in memory loss and periods of extreme 
agitation.  Abrams paid respondent $5,000 in September 2001. 
{¶ 6} On February 24, 2004, while still representing Abrams, respondent 
convinced his client to lend him $15,000, ostensibly to finance the expansion of 
his law practice.  The note for the loan required payment of the entire debt on 
August 24, 2004.  Respondent offered no collateral to secure the loan, and he did 
not repay the loan as promised.  According to the March 8, 2006 affidavit of 
Abrams’s mother, respondent has made only three payments, totaling $2,400, on 
the debt. 
{¶ 7} Abrams’s case against his business associate was tried, apparently 
by respondent, before a magistrate on December 6, 2004.  Respondent’s license to 
January Term, 2007 
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practice law was indefinitely suspended on December 15, 2004, and the 
magistrate ruled against Abrams on January 25, 2005.  Despite the continuing 
status of their professional relationship, including the possibility of an appeal, 
respondent failed to notify Abrams of his suspension as ordered by this court. 
Count II 
{¶ 8} Despite his indefinite suspension on December 15, 2004, 
respondent also ignored this court’s order by continuing to represent clients 
before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.  On 
January 5, 2005, according to the federal court’s operations and personnel 
manager, respondent filed plans for Chapter 13 relief in that court on behalf of 
two clients.  On January 11, 2005, for yet a third Chapter 13 client, respondent 
filed a motion to reinstate a case that had been dismissed. 
{¶ 9} By improperly borrowing money from Abrams and never fully 
repaying the loan, as alleged in Count I of the complaint, respondent violated DR 
1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation) and 5-104(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering a business 
transaction with a client if the lawyer and client have differing interests unless the 
client has given informed consent).  We also agree with the board that respondent 
violated Gov.Bar R. V(6)(A)(1) by failing to notify Abrams of his indefinite 
suspension in accordance with our order.  The board, relying on the master 
commissioner’s report, further found respondent in violation of two related 
prohibitions — DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice) and 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely 
reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice); however, we do not find these 
violations, because they were not charged in relator’s complaint.  Accord 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 19, 2004-Ohio-1587, 806 N.E.2d 
503, ¶ 24, fn. 2. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} As to Count II, we agree with the board that respondent’s 
continued representation in bankruptcy court violated DR 3-101(B) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from practicing in violation of jurisdictional regulations) and Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(A)(1).  We do not, however, adopt the board’s findings that respondent 
violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E), again because these violations 
were not charged against respondent.  Deaton, supra. 
Sanction 
{¶ 11} When imposing a sanction for attorney misconduct, “we consider 
the duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney's mental 
state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.”  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006-
Ohio-5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 44.  We have already identified the professional 
duties respondent violated, and his mental state is not in dispute.  Moreover, the 
injury to his clients and the judicial system is obvious – respondent acted in his 
own interest, and to Abrams’s detriment, in taking his client’s money, and also 
disregarded a court order that had been issued for the public’s protection. 
{¶ 12} Thus, all that is left is to weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
features of respondent’s case.  See Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 13} As the board found, the record contains no mitigation evidence that 
weighs in favor of leniency.  In aggravation, we agree that respondent has a 
significant history of prior misconduct, has committed multiple offenses, has 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and has failed to participate in the 
disciplinary process.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), and (e).  Weighing 
these factors in combination with his misconduct, relator, the master 
commissioner, and the board all recommended that respondent be permanently 
disbarred. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 14} We have repeatedly disbarred attorneys for practicing law while 
under suspension.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Henderson, 108 Ohio St.3d 447, 
2006-Ohio-1336, 844 N.E.2d 348; Disciplinary Counsel v. Jefferson (1998), 83 
Ohio St. 3d 317, 699 N.E.2d 930; Disciplinary Counsel v. Caywood (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 596, 660 N.E.2d 1148.  Absent any mitigating circumstances, the 
penalty for ignoring orders of the court and continuing to practice law while under 
suspension is disbarment.  Disbarment is warranted, and we accept the 
recommendation to disbar. 
{¶ 15} Respondent is therefore permanently disbarred from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
CUPP, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Christopher R. Heekin and James K. Rice, for relator. 
______________________