Case Title: Thomas v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC96034

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
THADDEUS THOMAS, a Minor, by and 
) 
through his Next Friend, Marlin 
 
) 
Thomas, and MARLIN THOMAS and MA 
) 
SHERYLL JOY THOMAS, Individually,  
) 
) 
Appellants, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96034 
) 
MERCY HOSPITALS EAST COMMUNITIES, 
) 
d/b/a MERCY HOSPITAL-WASHINGTON, 
 
) 
and MERCY CLINIC EAST COMMUNITIES, 
) 
) 
Respondents. 
) 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Missouri 
Honorable Gael D. Wood, Judge 
Plaintiffs appeal the judgment entered by the trial court in favor of defendant 
hospitals following a jury trial.  Plaintiffs allege the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to strike for cause prospective juror 24 because she expressed a disqualifying bias 
in favor of defendants under section 494.470.1.1  This Court does not agree.  Prospective 
juror 24 did not say she had knowledge concerning the “matter or any material fact in 
controversy” from which to form an opinion requiring her disqualification under 
subsection 1.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, without additional 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo, Supp. 2013, unless otherwise indicated. 
Opinion issued August 1, 2017
 
2 
questioning, she was rehabilitated when the entire voir dire was considered, including her 
later statement that she could follow the trial court’s instructions.  See section 494.470.2.  
The trial court was in the best position to determine whether the prospective juror was 
disqualified.  This Court affirms. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 13, 2013, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging medical negligence in 
connection with the Caesarean-section delivery of Thaddeus Thomas, claiming defendants 
caused him to sustain brain damage.  During voir dire, plaintiffs’ counsel informed the 
venire panel, “[T]his case involves Mercy Clinics, Mercy Clinic Physicians, as the 
defendant and Mercy Clinic Hospital.  Just knowing that they are defendants in this case, 
is there anyone that feels they might start off the case a little bit more in favor of one party 
or the other?”  Prospective juror 24 raised her hand, and the following exchange took place: 
JUROR: Is Big St. John’s and this hospital affiliated? 
 
PL COUNSEL: Probably – well, you called it St. John’s, and I used to call 
them St. John’s because I grew up in Missouri. But I think – I would –  
 
JUROR: It’s Mercy. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Yeah, that’s it, right. 
 
JUROR: But it used to be called St. John’s so. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Right. And you will – the child was eventually transferred 
to Mercy, Big Mercy as you called it, at some point. 
 
JUROR: That’s what they call it. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Okay. So the same question, because you know people there, 
know – have some knowledge of that and a relationship with that 
organization indirectly, would you tend to give them more credibility or that 
 
3 
defendant maybe, in this case the local one, start off –  
 
JUROR: I don’t think so. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Okay. I think I hear where you’re going with this, but as a 
lawyer, I have to try to make sure things are clear. You say you don’t think 
so, but later on you did decide you were – they started off a step in advance, 
that would be –  
 
JUROR: Well, I’ve heard my sister have lots of opinions of St. John’s so, 
you know. 
 
PL COUNSEL: So ultimately, can you sit through this whole case without 
starting off a little bit in favor of Mercy or St. John’s, as you call them, or 
would you start off with them having a touch in favor of them? 
 
JUROR: I don’t – maybe – yeah, probably. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Maybe you would be slightly in favor of them? 
 
JUROR: Yep, probably. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Okay. And, you know, that’s – that’s all I’m trying to get is 
the best answer you can give, and you seem confident in that answer; is that 
correct? 
 
JUROR: Uh-huh. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you. 
 
After that exchange, defendants’ counsel asked to approach the bench and the 
parties and judge discussed prospective juror 24’s answers.  Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed 
doubt that prospective juror 24 could set aside her bias, while defendants’ counsel stressed 
“the ultimate question” was whether the prospective juror would set aside prejudice and 
follow the trial court’s instructions.  Before deciding whether the prospective juror was 
qualified, the trial court stated it would give counsel the opportunity to rehabilitate her.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel then continued to question prospective juror 24: 
 
4 
PL COUNSEL: ... So just to be clear, I’ve asked you about if you’d tend to 
start out maybe just a little bit, even just a touch, in favor of one side or the 
other. I haven’t asked you the other question, which is: If the judge gives you 
an instruction, will you read that instruction and follow that instruction to the 
best of your ability? 
 
JUROR: Yes. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Okay. It doesn’t change where you are in your past 
experiences as far as knowledge and understanding of your relationship to 
the defendant; is that also fair? 
 
JUROR: Yes. 
 
PL COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you.  
 
Defendants’ counsel later questioned the prospective juror as follows: 
 
DEF COUNSEL: Thank you. You rolled your eyes once when [Plaintiffs’ 
counsel] was asking you questions. You probably thought I wasn’t looking, 
and I wasn’t sure if that was a good thing or a bad thing, so I’ve got to ask. 
You probably don’t remember it, but let me – let me look at my notes for a 
second. So I think you indicated that your sister – sister works as a registered 
nurse at Big St. John’s. 
 
JUROR: Yeah. 
 
DEF COUNSEL: You did not think that had an impact. You heard lots of 
things from your sister. 
 
JUROR: She’s worked there 25 years. 
 
DEF COUNSEL: She’s worked there 25 years. Same place? 
 
JUROR: Burn ICU – ICU unit. 
 
DEF COUNSEL: Oh, the burn unit. 
 
JUROR: Yes. 
 
DEF COUNSEL: That’s a great unit. You said you may be unfair, but then 
you told us you would follow the instructions. So here’s the question: Your 
sister’s a nurse, there are claims against nurses here. Can you put that aside 
 
5 
and assure the Court that you will do your level best currently to decide this 
case based on what you hear in this courtroom, not what your sister has told 
you, not anything about Mercy, just on the evidence from that box and the 
judge’s instructions? 
 
JUROR: Yes. I’ve heard good and bad. I’ve heard both. 
 
DEF COUNSEL: We both have, and there’s nothing wrong with that. Okay. 
She doesn’t work in obstetrics, does she? 
 
JUROR: No, burn unit. 
 
DEF COUNSEL: Okay. 
 
Plaintiffs moved to strike for cause prospective juror 24, arguing, “She went back 
and forth” and that defendants’ counsel only “said, Will you do your best, and she said yes.  
But again, she said earlier she may be unfair.”  The trial court disagreed with plaintiffs and 
overruled the motion to strike.  Prospective juror 24 was seated as a juror and took part in 
the verdict. The case proceeded to trial on March 16, 2015, and the jury returned a verdict 
for defendants on March 26, 2015.  Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, challenging the trial 
court’s overruling of their motion to strike prospective juror 24.  The trial court denied 
plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, and plaintiffs appealed.  After opinion by the court of 
appeals, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“[T]he determination of the juror’s qualifications is a matter for the trial court in the 
exercise of sound judicial discretion, and an appellate court will reject the trial court’s 
determination only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.”  Joy v. Morrison, 254 
S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2008) (emphasis omitted).  “Generally, the trial court has wide 
discretion in determining the qualifications of prospective jurors, and its decision will not 
 
6 
be disturbed absent deprivation of a fair trial.”  Catlett v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 793 S.W.2d 
351, 353 (Mo. banc 1990).  “The trial court is in the best position to evaluate a 
venireperson’s qualifications to serve as a juror and has broad discretion in making the 
evaluation.”  Joy, 254 S.W.3d at 888 (quotation omitted). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR 24 WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE SHE WAS 
SUCCESSFULLY REHABILITATED  
 
 
Litigants have a constitutional right to trial by a fair and impartial jury of twelve 
qualified jurors.  Mo. Const. art. I, § 22(a); Catlett, 793 S.W.2d at 353.  “The competent 
juror must be in a position to enter the jury box disinterested and with an open mind, free 
from bias or prejudice.” Catlett, 793 S.W.2d at 353 (quotation omitted).  The trial court is 
in the best position to evaluate a potential juror and is afforded broad discretion in 
determining whether the potential juror is ultimately qualified to serve.  See, e.g., Joy, 254 
S.W.3d at 888; State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 264 (Mo. banc 2001); State v. Johnson, 
22 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo. banc 2000); State v. Walton, 796 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. banc 
1990); McClain v. Petkovich, 848 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Mo. App. 1993).   
Section 494.470, provides in relevant part: 
1. 
… [N]o person who has formed or expressed an opinion concerning 
the matter or any material fact in controversy in any case that may 
influence the judgment of such person … shall be sworn as a juror in 
the same cause. 
2. 
Persons whose opinions or beliefs preclude them from following the 
law as declared by the court in its instructions are ineligible to serve 
as jurors on that case. 
 
As State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Mo. banc 1993), explained, section 
494.470 describes two types of bias.  Section 494.470.1 identifies “[o]ne type of bias 
 
7 
involv[ing] venirepersons … who have formed an opinion on the material facts of the 
case.”  Id.  “The other type of bias focuses on opinions about ‘larger issues.’”  Id.  This 
Court reaffirmed and applied the distinction Debler drew:   
between the disqualifying bias of those who have formed an opinion on the 
material facts of the case, see § 494.470.1, and other types of bias that are 
merely “opinions about ‘larger issues”’ – opinions that all prospective jurors 
will have to some extent.   
 
Ray v. Gream, 860 S.W.2d 325, 333 n.1. (Mo. banc 1993), quoting Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 
645.  Ray concluded, “Under § 494.470.2, that type of bias is disqualifying ‘only if [the 
prospective jurors’] views would preclude following the instructions given by the court.’” 
Id., quoting Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 645.  
Joy provides a good example of this Court applying these principles in a medical 
malpractice case.  The prospective juror admitted he was “substantially” troubled by “the 
issue of lawsuits against doctors” and indicated he “probably would be biased for the 
doctors.”  Joy, 254 S.W.3d at 892, 890.  But the prospective juror also was asked if he could 
be “fair and unbiased if [he] were selected on this jury” and responded that he “could be 
fair.”  Id. at 890.  He also stated neither side had “a real advantage,” and he would be “fair 
and reasonable” in evaluating the evidence and the opinions of the other jurors.  Id.  Finally, 
all prospective jurors were asked whether they believed “they could not follow the trial 
court’s instructions” or if they could “keep an open mind until [they had] heard all of the 
evidence,” and the prospective juror did not respond.  Id.  The plaintiff argued the 
prospective juror should have been disqualified under subsection 1.  Id. at 889.  This Court 
disagreed, holding the prospective juror had formed no opinion about the “material facts 
 
8 
of the case” that would constitute a disqualifying bias under subsection 1 because the 
prospective juror did not have “any knowledge concerning the matter or any material fact 
in controversy” but rather “only had basic information, such as the fact that the litigation 
involved a medical malpractice action.”  Id. at 889. 
Similarly, in Ray, this Court was asked whether certain prospective jurors had been 
successfully rehabilitated after initially indicating a bias in favor of family members 
contesting a will and against non-family members who were proponents of the will because 
the prospective jurors generally believed property should go to family members.  860 
S.W.2d at 326-27.  The prospective jurors also indicated they could “follow the law that 
the [c]ourt gives [them] and the evidence that comes from this witness stand.”  Id. at 330-
31.  This Court stated, “Opinions formed, but not of a fixed character, and which readily 
yield to evidence, do not disqualify the juror.”  Id. at 332-33 (quotation omitted).  
Accordingly, it held “the jurors in question did not exhibit the degree of bias which would 
automatically disqualify them from serving and that the trial court appropriately considered 
the testimony of those jurors that they could set aside their stated bias and serve 
impartially.”  Id. at 334.  
Here, like the prospective jurors in Joy and Ray, prospective juror 24 had no 
“knowledge concerning the matter or any material fact in controversy” from which to form 
an opinion requiring her disqualification under subsection 1.  She only said her sister 
worked as a nurse in a separate hospital affiliated with defendants through a larger group 
and in the burn unit rather than in obstetrics, she had heard good and bad about the other 
hospital, and while she might start out “slightly” in favor of the hospital or nurses as a 
 
9 
result, she could put that slight tilt aside and follow the trial court’s instructions.  The 
knowledge she said she had was not specific to the case or parties but was the sort of 
generalized knowledge or opinions Joy held did not constitute knowledge concerning the 
matter or material facts of a case and was not disqualifying if the prospective juror was 
able to set it aside and follow the trial court’s instructions.     
Even if the prospective juror’s bias was only a general one, plaintiffs argue she did 
not unequivocally say she could set it aside and follow the trial court’s instructions.  The 
trial court and parties recognized in their discussions during voir dire that the prospective 
juror’s initial responses did indicate a generalized slight bias.  When asked, “So ultimately, 
can you sit through this whole case without starting off a little bit in favor of Mercy or St. 
John’s, as you call them, or would you start off with them having a touch in favor of them,” 
she responded, “I don’t – maybe – yeah, probably.”  When asked, “Maybe you would be 
slightly in favor of them,” she responded, “Yep probably.”   
Had questioning ceased at that point, plaintiffs are correct that the prospective 
juror’s answers would have been equivocal.  If counsel had not asked further and 
established an unequivocal response that prospective juror 24 could set aside any bias and 
judge the case fairly and impartially, the trial court would have been obligated to do so 
before seating the juror, for “where a venireperson’s answers are equivocal as to his or her 
qualifications to be a juror, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to question the juror further 
to either confirm the lack of qualifications to serve, or to rehabilitate the venireperson.”  
Rodgers v. Jackson Cnty. Orthopedics, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Mo. App. 1995).  In 
such a situation, “failure by a trial judge to question independently a potential juror to 
 
10 
explore possible prejudice may undercut any basis for a trial judge’s exercise of discretion 
and constitute reversible error.”  Joy, 254 S.W.3d at 891.   
But here, counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants asked additional questions of 
prospective juror 24.  Her initial reservations, therefore, must be considered in the context 
of the entire voir dire in deciding whether she showed an ability to be impartial,  id.,  
because “[m]ere equivocation is not enough to disqualify a juror,”  id. at 890.  Rather:  
If the challenged venireperson subsequently reassures the court that he can 
be impartial, the bare possibility of prejudice will not deprive the judge of 
discretion to seat the venireperson.  [McClain, 848 S.W.2d at 35.]  Initial 
reservations expressed by venirepersons do not determine their 
qualifications; consideration of the entire voir dire examination of the 
venireperson is determinative. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Mo. banc 
1991). 
 
Id. at 890-91.  
 
These principles apply directly here.  Prospective juror 24 specifically stated she 
would not give defendants more credibility than plaintiffs.  She also explained her slight 
bias arose not out of personal experience but rather on general opinions her sister expressed 
based on her experience as a nurse in the burn unit of a related, but different, Mercy 
hospital. When asked, “Can you put that aside and assure the Court that you will do your 
level best currently to decide this case based on what you hear in this courtroom, not what 
your sister has told you, not anything about Mercy, just on the evidence from the box and 
the judge’s instructions?” prospective juror 24 answered, “Yes. I’ve heard good and bad. 
I’ve heard both.”   
 
Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the fact that defense counsel asked whether 
prospective juror 24 would “do [her] level best” to set aside any bias she might bring into 
 
11 
the courtroom, not whether she absolutely could set aside that bias.  The cases on which 
plaintiffs rely, however, all involved situations in which the prospective juror’s answer 
contained equivocation.  See, e.g., State v. Lovell, 506 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. banc 1974).  
Here, prospective juror 24 expressly stated yes, without qualification, she could follow the 
trial court’s instructions.  Plaintiffs’ counsel chose not to explore this issue further by 
asking a question that did not include the words “do your level best.”  The record did show, 
however, that she did not respond affirmatively when all prospective jurors were asked 
whether they had “such a good experience with either the hospital here or somewhere else” 
that would cause them to start off in favor of the hospital or whether anybody had a problem 
“finding against a corporation if they believe the corporation was negligent.”     
In these circumstances, it was up to the trial court to evaluate the prospective juror’s 
answers and determine whether she could be impartial and follow the trial court’s 
instructions.  It was not improper for the trial court to rely on the juror’s assessment of her 
own ability to be impartial: 
[T]he self-assessment of prospective jurors that they can set aside their bias 
is, in most cases, sufficient evidence, in and of itself, to support the trial 
court’s determination that the juror is not disqualified. …  Indeed, reliance 
on such evidence is the common and long-accepted practice of our trial 
courts. 
 
Ray, 860 S.W.2d at 334.2 
                                              
2 Accord, Joy, 254 S.W.3d at 888 (“[I]t is proper for the trial court to consider the juror’s 
testimony concerning his or her ability to act impartially.  The trial court is not prohibited 
from basing its determination on the opinions or conclusions of the jurors, but the trial 
court must make an independent determination of the juror’s qualifications.  That task is 
accomplished when the trial court reviews and evaluates the juror’s conclusions and weighs 
them against the earlier admissions of prejudice.”) (citations omitted). 
 
12 
The trial court independently considered the entire voir dire examination, 
determined prospective juror 24’s unequivocal testimony indicated she had been 
successfully rehabilitated, and found she was qualified to serve on the jury.  This Court 
cannot agree with plaintiffs that the trial court abused its broad discretion by allowing 
prospective juror 24 to serve on the jury. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Fischer, C.J., Draper, Wilson, Russell and  
Breckenridge, JJ., concur. Powell, J., not  
participating.