Case Title: Charles Bell v. Idaho Dept. of Labor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 41592

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 41592 
 
CHARLES C. BELL, 
 
    Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
    Respondent-Respondent on Appeal, 
 
and 
 
SEARS, 
 
    Respondent. 
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Boise, December 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 138 
 
Filed: December 18, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
Charles C. Bell, pro se appellant. 
 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.  
_____________________ 
J. JONES, Justice 
Charles C. Bell appeals a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission holding that he 
willfully made false statements or willfully failed to report material facts for the purpose of 
obtaining unemployment benefits. Because the Commission’s decision is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, we affirm.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
  
Charles C. Bell was employed by Sears from September 25, 2012, to May 16, 2013. 
During that period, Bell regularly filed for unemployment benefits with the Idaho Department of 
Labor (“DOL”). He received benefits for each week beginning with the week ending on Sept. 29, 
2012, through the week ending on March 23, 2013. On March 26, 2013, the DOL discovered 
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discrepancies between the weekly gross wages reported by Bell in his unemployment filings and 
the gross wages reported to the DOL by Sears. The DOL requested additional information from 
Sears and Bell concerning his weekly gross wages and the hours he worked each week. The 
DOL relied upon the information provided by Bell to calculate his actual weekly gross wages 
because Sears provided only bi-weekly, rather than weekly, gross wage information. Based on 
the information provided by Bell, the DOL determined that Bell willfully misstated his gross 
wages for nineteen weeks in which he received benefits and that he was ineligible for benefits for 
nine weeks in which he claimed to have worked part-time hours despite working at least forty 
hours. Bell was disqualified from receiving benefits for fifty-two weeks, ordered to repay 
benefits he received for the relevant periods, and ordered to pay penalties for willfully 
misrepresenting his gross wages and the hours he worked in particular weeks.  
 
Bell filed a protest of the DOL’s initial determination and a hearing was held before a 
DOL appeals examiner. During that hearing Bell did not dispute that he worked at least forty 
hours during the weeks identified by the DOL or that he inaccurately represented his gross wages 
in the manner determined by the DOL. Instead, Bell argued that the misrepresentations were 
honest errors and that he should therefore not be subject to penalties. According to Bell, Sears 
represented to him that he was a part-time employee despite working full-time hours during 
certain weeks and Bell relied upon that representation when he stated that he worked part-time 
hours even during weeks in which he worked in excess of forty hours. Bell claimed he erred in 
reporting his weekly gross wages because Sears paid him bi-weekly with direct deposits into his 
bank account, which deposits did not provide information regarding his gross wages, much less 
his weekly gross wages. Bell stated that he estimated his gross wages for each week by 
multiplying his hourly rate by the number of hours he was scheduled to work that week, without 
later updating the DOL with more accurate wage information.  
The DOL appeals examiner affirmed the DOL’s initial determination. Bell then appealed 
to the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”). As in the hearing before the appeals 
examiner, Bell did not dispute that he misrepresented his gross wages or that he worked at least 
forty hours in certain weeks in which he claimed to have worked part-time hours, but argued 
only that the misrepresentations were not willful.  
The Commission issued a decision and order after conducting a de novo review of the 
record. It found that there was no dispute that Bell worked at least forty hours during certain 
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weeks in which he received benefits, though he claimed to have worked part-time hours during 
those weeks. It also found that Bell was aware of the requirement to update the DOL with 
accurate information regarding weekly gross wages if he initially estimated those wages when 
filing for benefits. Because Bell estimated his gross wages and knew of the requirement to 
update the DOL with accurate information, but made no attempt to do so, the Commission found 
that Bell willfully made false statements or failed to disclose material facts for the purpose of 
securing unemployment benefits.1 The Commission concluded that Bell was not entitled to a 
waiver of the obligation to repay benefits that he received but to which he was not entitled, and 
that Bell was subject to penalties as a result of his misrepresentations.  
Bell subsequently filed a request for a new hearing, repeating his argument that the 
misrepresentations were not willful. The Commission issued an order denying reconsideration 
and Bell timely filed a notice of appeal. The only issue on appeal is whether there is substantial 
and competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s finding that Bell willfully 
made false statements or willfully failed to report material facts for the purpose of obtaining 
unemployment benefits.  
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
“When this Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, we exercise free 
review over questions of law, but review questions of fact only to determine whether the 
Commission’s findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Uhl v. Ballard 
Med. Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). “Substantial and competent 
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Id. 
“[T]his Court does not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a 
different conclusion from the evidence presented.” Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 
351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). “The Industrial Commission’s conclusions regarding the 
credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly 
erroneous.” Id. “[T]his Court views all the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
                                                 
1 With respect to one of the weeks at issue, however, the Commission reversed the DOL appeals examiner. For the 
week ending October 13, 2012, the difference between the weekly gross wages Bell reported and the weekly gross 
wages he actually earned was $4.35. The Commission concluded that given “the nominal nature of the difference in 
reported wages,” it “is not inclined to find that Claimant willfully made a false statement during this week.” 
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party who prevailed before the Industrial Commission.” Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 802–03, 118 P.3d 133, 134–35 (2005).  
B. The Commission’s conclusion that Bell willfully made false statements or 
willfully failed to report material facts in order to secure unemployment benefits 
is supported by substantial and competent evidence.  
Idaho Code section 72-1366(12) provides that “[a] claimant shall not be entitled to 
benefits for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks if it is determined that he has willfully made a false 
statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits.” Such a claimant 
must “repay any sums received for any week for which the claimant received waiting week 
credit or benefits as a result of having willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to 
report a material fact,” id., and is liable for penalties “for each determination in which the 
claimant is found to have made a false statement, misrepresentation, or failed to report a material 
fact to the department . . . .” I.C. § 72-1369(2).  
Bell does not argue that his weekly gross wages or the number of hours he worked in 
particular weeks were immaterial. A fact is material if it “is relevant to the determination of a 
claimant’s right to benefits . . . .” Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 760, 589 P.2d 
89, 95 (1979). Idaho Code section 72-1312(1) conditions the availability of benefits for a 
particular week on the claimant working less than full-time during that week. Idaho Code 
sections 72-1312(4) and 72-1367(4) tie the benefits to which a claimant is entitled during a 
particular week, if any, to the gross wages the claimant earned during that week. As a result, 
Bell’s wages and the hours he worked during the weeks for which he claimed benefits are 
material facts. See McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 586, 272 P.3d 554, 558 (2012) 
(holding that the amount the claimant earned working part-time was “material because his 
earnings were relevant to the determination of . . . [the claimant’s] right to benefits and could 
have affected the amount of benefits . . . [the claimant] was entitled to receive”). 
Nor does Bell dispute the Commission’s conclusion that his unemployment filings 
included misrepresentations regarding his weekly gross wages and whether he worked part or 
full-time hours during certain weeks. As to both, Bell acknowledges that his unemployment 
filings contained misrepresentations but claims that “[a]ny/all acknowledged reporting errors 
were and remain strictly inadvertent and accidental” and that he was not “willfully trying to get 
compensation that was not rightfully [his] . . . .” The only issue on appeal, then, is whether Bell 
acted willfully when he made false statements or failed to disclose material facts regarding his 
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weekly gross wages and the hours he worked during particular weeks.  
[Willfully] implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the 
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the sense of 
having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong, and 
may be distinguished from an act maliciously or corruptly done, in that it does not 
necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more nearly synonymous with 
“intentionally,” “designedly,” “without lawful excuse,” and therefore not 
accidental. 
Meyer, 99 Idaho at 761, 589 P.2d at 96 (quoting Archbold v. Huntington, 34 Idaho 558, 565, 201 
P. 1041, 1043 (1921)). Enactment of “provisions penalizing claimants who willfully fail to report 
material facts in order to obtain benefits. . . . suggests that [the Legislature] intended to disqualify 
those claimants who purposely, intentionally, consciously, or knowingly fail to report a material 
fact, not those whose omission is accidental because of negligence, misunderstanding or other 
cause.” Id. See also Smith v. State, Dept. of Employment, 107 Idaho 625, 628, 691 P.2d 1240, 
1243 (1984).  
 
The Commission’s findings regarding Bell’s misrepresentation of his weekly gross wages 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Between 2005 and 2012, Bell 
made initial filings for unemployment benefits on nine separate occasions. According to the 
DOL, Bell would have received a copy of its pamphlet, “Unemployment Insurance Claimant 
Benefit Rights, Responsibilities and Filing Instructions,” on each occasion. That pamphlet makes 
clear that benefit amounts are determined by weekly gross wages and that “[i]f wages have been 
reported incorrectly, you MUST contact your local office immediately.” The pamphlet states that 
“[i]f you cannot determine the exact amount you earned, you must estimate weekly earnings as 
close as possible. If you do estimate earnings, you must contact your local office when you 
receive the correct earnings information.” The pamphlet says that “[m]aking false statements or 
failing to report material facts, including weekly earnings” constitutes fraud. Bell argues that he 
did not receive the DOL’s pamphlet each time he initiated a new unemployment claim, but 
acknowledges that he “most likely” received it in the past. Bell filed electronically for 
unemployment benefits during the period at issue here. That process required Bell to certify that 
he had read the DOL’s pamphlet and that the information he provided, including information 
regarding his weekly gross wages, was accurate. Finally, Bell knew how to contact the DOL with 
updated information. Bell previously called the DOL to correct information in his weekly 
unemployment filings on several occasions. On each such occasion, the correction secured Bell 
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additional benefits.  
Bell knew that he was required to correct inaccurate information with the DOL and how 
to do so. He blames the information provided by Sears for his failure to satisfy this obligation. 
Bell claims that he received only bi-weekly payments directly deposited by Sears into his 
checking account and those direct deposits provided only his bi-weekly net wages, not his 
weekly gross wages. So, he claims “he had no way of reasonably, rationally, or logically 
knowing he received benefits to which he was not entitled.” Bell knew, however, that he merely 
estimated his weekly gross wages each week and that, as mere estimates, the amounts he 
provided the DOL were likely inaccurate. Bell claims that he estimated his weekly gross wages 
in his unemployment filings by determining the number of hours he was scheduled in a given 
week and multiplying that number by his hourly wage. Such a method is bound to result in 
inaccuracy where, as is surely common, an employee occasionally clocks in early, stays late, or 
picks up additional hours here and there. Bell does not explain why he did not personally keep 
track of the hours he actually worked during the course of a week. While doing so might still 
have resulted in some inaccuracy, it would have been significantly more accurate than the means 
by which Bell chose to estimate his weekly gross wages. Assuming that the figures provided by 
the DOL are accurate, Bell’s estimates were often more than just slightly off. For the weeks 
ending November 10th and November 17th, for instance, Bell’s actual weekly gross wages were 
nearly twice what he reported in his unemployment filings for those weeks. Bell presumably 
should have realized at that point, if he somehow failed to realize earlier, that his estimates were 
substantially inaccurate. 
Bell does not explain his failure to investigate his actual weekly gross wages prior to the 
DOL’s request for additional information. Bell accessed additional payroll information through 
Sears’ “My Personal Information” website and recovered his bi-weekly gross wages in response 
to the DOL’s request, but apparently made no attempt to seek out this information prior to the 
DOL’s request. As Bell notes, even this information did not include his weekly gross wages. But, 
had Bell accessed the information earlier, he could have compared the bi-weekly gross wages 
reported by Sears with the gross wages he reported to the DOL over the corresponding two-week 
periods and noted the discrepancies with the DOL. Bell likewise does not explain why he did not 
contact Sears directly to request weekly gross wage information or contact the DOL for advice 
concerning how to proceed in the absence of that information. 
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On the hours-worked issue, Bell argues that when he reported he worked part-time hours 
during weeks in which he worked in excess of forty hours, he relied upon Sears’ representation 
that he was a part-time employee because, though he might occasionally work forty hours in a 
week, he was not guaranteed forty hours each week. When Bell filled out an unemployment 
claim each week, he answered the question: “Did you work full time hours for the entire week?” 
Even if Sears categorized Bell as a part-time employee, that fact has no obvious relevance to the 
question whether Bell worked “full-time hours” in particular weeks. As Bell was allegedly 
understanding “part-time employee,” part-time employees might work full-time hours in 
particular weeks. The DOL asked Bell whether he worked full-time hours in particular weeks, 
not how Sears categorized him as an employee. Bell acknowledges that he never sought 
clarification from the DOL concerning what it meant by “full-time hours.” “[A] finding that a 
benefit claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not know what information 
a question solicited but nevertheless deliberately chose to respond without pursuing clarification 
would ordinarily support a conclusion of willful falsehood or concealment.” Meyer, 99 Idaho at 
762, 589 P.2d at 97.  At the very least, Bell should have been uncertain whether he could work in 
excess of forty hours in a week without working “full-time hours” in that week.  
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s 
findings that Bell willfully made false statements regarding the hours-worked issue and that he 
failed to report material facts regarding his actual weekly gross wages for the purpose of 
securing unemployment benefits. Bell argues that he did not intend to defraud the DOL. Though 
that may be so, willful conduct “does not require any intent to violate law . . . .” Id. at 761, 589 
P.2d at 96. The evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Bell knew of his obligation to 
correctly report his actual hours worked, on the one hand. And, on the other, he knew he was 
required to update the DOL if he initially reported inaccurate information, he knew the 
information he initially reported was inaccurate, and he made no attempt to provide the DOL 
with accurate information or notify the DOL that the information he provided was inaccurate.  
C. The Court will not consider issues raised for the first time in Bell’s reply brief. 
While Bell’s opening brief focuses exclusively on the claim that he did not willfully 
make false statements or fail to disclose material facts, Bell’s reply brief states eight “issues on 
appeal.” Six of those asserted issues relate to the propriety of the Commission’s decision while 
two of the issues were not raised below. First, this Court “will not consider issues that are raised 
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for the first time on appeal.” Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 941, 265 P.3d 1144, 
1153 (2011). Second, we “will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant’s 
reply brief.” Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004). 
“A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those 
are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in the 
respondent’s brief.” Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Though he is a 
pro se appellant, Bell is “held to the same standards and rules as . . . [an appellant] represented 
by an attorney.” Twin Falls Cnty. v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003). 
Because Bell did not raise these issues below or in his opening brief, they are not properly before 
the Court. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the Commission’s decision and award costs to the Department of Labor.  
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, HORTON, and Justice Pro Tem 
WALTERS CONCUR.