Case Title: State v. Reis. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

Citation: 115 Haw. 79

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #*#

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

200

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellant,
SUSAN REIS, aka SUZANNE REIS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 27171 (CR. NO. 04-1-0028)

 

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellant,

SUSAN REIS, ska SUZANNE REIS, Defendant-Appellee.
(CR. NO. 04-1-0675)

‘wo. 27172
No. 27171

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NOS. 04-1-0028 AND 04-1-0675)

 

auGusT 21, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.7
AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT SY LEVINSON, J.

‘The plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i (hereinafter,
“the prosecution”) appeals from the January 11, 2005 judgment of

  

conviction and probation of the circuit court of the first

circuit, the Honorable Steven S. Alm presiding, convicting the

defendant-appellee Susan Reis in Criminal (Cr.) Ne. 04-1-0028 of

promoting @ dangerous drug in the third deoree (Count I), in
(igs) § 722-1243 (Supp.

violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes

awful use of drug paraphernalia (Count 11), in

 

2002), un

anys
‘194 FOR PUBLICATION I WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER ++*

violation of HRS § 325-43.5(a} (1993), and prostitution, in
violation of HRS § 712-1200 (Supp. 1998) (Count 111), and
convicting her in Cr. No. 04-1-0675 of the sane drug offenses
based upon a separate incident, and sentencing her, inter alia,
to @ five-year period of probation, pursuant to ERS § 706-€22.5
(supp. 2008).

2 B&tective July 1, 2002, the legislature enacted the predecessor
statute to HRS § 1067622.5 (Supp. 2004) in Act 161, $3, later codified at BRS
§ 706-622.5 (Supp. 2002), which proviged in relevant part

Sentencing for first-tine drug offenders .
(2) Notwithstanding any penalty or sentencing provision
unger [HRS eh. 712, pt. IV igeheerning offenses related to drugs

     

 

 

land intoxicating cospounds)], 2 person convicted for the firet
Cine for any offense under (HRS Gh. 112, pt- IV) involving
possession } not aneluding to distribute cr menvfacture as

Sefined in inis's} 712-1240 [ (Supp. 1999)], of eny dangerous drug

Vino is non-violent, se determined by'the court after
Feviewing the:

(g] Criminal history of the defendant,

(5) Factual cireunstanc

Gefendant is being

(c) Other information deened relevent by the court:
shall be sentenced in accordance with (paragraph). (2)7, provided
that the person does net have @ conviction for any violent felony
for five years immediately prece[iding the date of the commission
of the offense for wnich the defendant is being sentences.

(2) person eligible under paragraph) (2) shall be
sentenced to!prchation to Undergo ahd cenplete & drug treatment
progran.

See 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 161, §6 3 and 12 at 572, $75. Effective July 1,
2004, the legislature amended RS § 706-622.5 to read:

for wich the

 

 

 

 

Sentencing for first-tine drug offenders |.
(2) Notwithstanding (HRS) 706-620(3). { (disallowing

probation for repeat offenders) ], a cexson convicted for the first
Kins for any offense under (HRS ch. 712, ph V1 invelving

onsession % tribute or ment
5 ie

eligible to be centencea to probation unser [paregroph) (2) if the

person neets the following criteria:

‘The court has determined that the person is nonviolent after
reviewing the person’ criminal history, the factuel
Circumstances of the offense for which the person is being
sentenced, ano any other relevant information|.

 

 

 

{2 A person eligible under (paragraph) (1) may be sentences
(cont snves

 
 

‘44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S JUKAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
on appeal, the prosecution asserts that the circuit
court imposed an illegal sentence in sentencing Reis to
probation, inasmuch as, in light of an undisputed prior
conviction, she was a repeat offender and, therefore, should have

been sentenced pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999).

 

11. scontinues)
te probation to undergo and complete a substance sbuse treatment
Erogran if the court determines thst the person can benefit from

 

  

Sobstance abuse treatment and, not
would be eublect to sentencing ss2 rapes neat
ErGtect the public.

see 2004 Haw, Seas. 1. Act 44, $§ 11 and 33 at 214, 227) HRS $ 106-622.5(1)
Sha 12) (Supp. 2008) (emphases eadea).” Section 29 of Act 44, absent from the
Codified version found at HAS § 706-622.5, reads ae follows:| “This Act doe
not affect rights ane duties thet matured, fenalties that were incurred, end
Proceedings thet were begun, before ite effective Gate.” See 2008 Haw. Sess.
Ei net aay § 28 at 227

 

+ uRS § 106-606.5 provides in relevant part:

(2) Notwithstanding [HRS §] 706-669 (Supp. 1996) (providing
for parole hearing anc procedure therefor)] anu any other iaw to
the Contrary, any person convicted of... (HRS §) 712-1243
and who has’ price conviction... for"... any of the class C
felony offenses eninersted above [including HRS § 708-836,
Felating to unauthorized control of (a) propelled vehicle,}. .
Shall be fentences to 2 mondstory ninisum period of inpriscnment
Without pessibility ef parole ouring euch peried as follows:

al one prior felony conviction:

 

 

 

(av)' there the instant conviction is for a class C
felony offense enumerates above ~~ one year, eight

‘zi Except os in (paragraph) (3) (concerning special terms
for young adults) I, a person shell not be sentences to's mandatory
inimon period of imprisonment under this section unless the
Unstane felony offense wae committed »

je)" Within five years after @ prior felony conviction
where the pricr felony conviction wae for a class C
felony offense enumerated ebove |]

 

 

 

Effective May 8, 2006, the legislature snended HRS § 706-606.5 in respects
Unmoterie! to the present netter- See 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 80, §§ 1 and 7
at 234-3
 

FOR PUBLICATION 10 WEST’ © HAWA'T REFCRTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER «#4
For the reasons discussed infra in section III, ve hold
that the circuit court erred in sentencing Reis as a first-time
drug offender rather than a repeat offender. We therefore vacate
the Janvary 11, 2008 sentence and remand for resentencing as @

repeat offender, pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5.

1. BACKGROUND

on January S, 2004, Reis was charged by complaint in
Cr. No. 04-21-0028 with Counts 1, II, and III in connection with
events that occurred on or about December 23, 2003.

on April 13, 2004, in Cr. No. 04-1-0675, Reis was
charged by complaint with new violations of HRS § 712-1243 (Supp.
2002) (Count I) and HRS § 329-0043.5(a) (1993) (Count 11) in
connection with events that occurred on or about April 1, 2004.

on June 22, 2004, in a consolidated proceeding, Reis
pled guilty to all counts. On July $, 2004, the prosecution
filed a motion for sentencing as @ repeat offender. The
prosecution's motion was based on Reis’s prior conviction in
2001, in Cr. No. 1-1-1533, of unauthorized control of a
propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836. Reis did not
contest the fact of the prior conviction.

On January 10, 2008, the circuit court conducted &
hearing. Reis stipulated to her eligibility for sentencing as @

repeat offender. The prosecution opposed probation, requesting
 

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the court to impose concurrent indeterminate five-year terms of
imprisonment in all three cases.”

After reviewing Reis’s efforts at rehabilitation since
her arrest, the circuit court ultimately reasoned that

che législature hae given the Court the discretion and
the opportunity when we think it's appropriate not to
Bevgiving repeat offender and not to be giving prison
tine» (ryalk is Very cheap, bor you have
Gone nat you said you were going to dow Since you
felts brought this op in the sumer, you've gone
through one place et [the] Queen's Medical Center]

then you've transferred te Csancnd Head [2 crug
Fehebilitation program)... [Yieu've done well sn
there. I'm going te give you 8 chance to continue on
this toad. So i'm going to deny the motion for repest
Elfenders 1 will place you on probation for five
Jeers. the Jail ie credit for time served. 1 con't
Think that's appropriate Fight pow.

 

 

 

 

 

on January 12, 2005, the circuit court entered its judgment of
conviction and sentence, sentencing Reis to a five-year term of
probation.

on January 26, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration of sentence, and the circuit court conducted
February 22, 200 hearing on the notion. The prosecution argued
that the circuit court erred in sentencing Reis to probation
under HRS § 706-622.5 (Supp. 2004), originally enacted as Act 44,
‘see gupra note 1, noting that Act 44 did not go into effect until
July 1, 2004, while Reis''s convictions were based upon incidents
that occurred on December 23, 2003 and April 1, 2004 and
complaints that were filed on January 5, 2004 and April 7, 2004,
respectively. The prosecution argued that, pursuent to our
precedent in State v, smith, 103 Hewai'i 228, €1 P.3d 408 (2003),

 

2 Rede acknowledged that her guilty pleas in Cr. No. 04-21-0026 and
_ to. Of-1"0675, see supes, sutonstically revoked the probetion she was
frving in Cr, Ne. O9-i-1883

      
 

‘s** FOR FUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REFORTER
and State v. Welker, 106 Hewai'i 1, 100 P.3d 595 (2004), Reis’s

repeat offender status under HRS § 706-606.5, see supra note 2 -~
based upon Cr. No. 01-1-1533

 

trumped the provisions of HRS
§ 706-622.5, see supra note 1, “‘with respect to all cases
involving rights and duties that mature(d), penalties that vere
incurred, land) proceedings that were begun, before the effective
date of Act 44*" and contended that, insofar as both prosecutions
in the present matter were begun before July 1, 2004, Reis shovld
have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment as a repeat
offender.

Reis argued that because she was sentenced after
Duly 1, 2004, the provisions of Act 44 applied to her cases
because the language of Act 44, section 29 refers to “proceedings
that were begun” before the effective date of the act, and Reis’s
sentencing hearing (in her view a “proceeding” within the meaning
of Act 44, section 29), wholly separate and apart from her ple
and conviction dates, was commenced after July 1, 2004. she
distinguished the prospective application of Act 44 to her case
from the retroactive application at issue in Walker, noting that

in Walker, the defendent . . . was sentenced... in

Decenter 2003. "So nis actual sentencing was prior to

the July 1, 2004 [effective date] of Act 44.

In the present case, .. . Reis was sentenced
=. after the July lst, 2008 [effective aate) of
ict 44°" “Rael we would argue th
ying proceedings begun befo

het applicable. in our pert ice:
Proceeding is the sentencing itself.

 

    

Ad. Reis then argued that

[ilt's clear from the language in... act 4
that [the legislature is) intensing to give the courts
nore or greater discretion in terme of sentencing te
Silow for probation even for those persone sho ave
eligible Gr repest offencer, and thet 1s enscely

 

é
 

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what occurred in this case. she war sentenced after
the effective date of the statute

So, for all those ressons, we believe
thet's exactly what Act 44 intended in this case, and
tie co not believe for thst reason that Welker is
Gispositive

 

 

The court conducted the following analysis

ALL right. I agree with (Reis). [in] Walker,
«ss the arrest, the plea, the conviction,
Jehténcing, all took place before Act 46" effective
Gate, Suly 2, 2008. Ane Act 44 does say the Act
[acer not affect rights and duties thet meture(d),
pensitier that were incurred, and proceedings that
Mere begun before the effective cate-[")

here, Reis was arrested, she pled, and
think the plea ‘was opproxinately a week before the Act
4¢ gate. [$] But the sentencing was well after that
And there ie no question the legislature in their word
MMtended a broader group of non-violent druc offenders
Mill be eligible for consideration for probation in
Sreer to undergo drug treatnent. And that the
Jegialature wants to present more discretion by the
Court in sentencing. “I'believe that Ms. Reis fits
Snte thar ersteri (on), end that Both she ano society
wild be better off with her getting duai-diagnosis
Core an the drug treatrent care that ere set up for
her rather than sentencing her as a repeat offender
tnd sentencing ner to priser.

Toehink (this case is) éifferent from
fauker'peckuse of the timing. - +. Penalties were
Uncurred after the effective date of Aet 44.” And
preceedinge thet were begun, the Court is of the
belief chat when... proceedings [are] being

sti eferring to the sentencing

 

   

 

 

 

s (739 State w. Avilla, 69 Haw. 509, 1750
adee],] there’s @ similar... clacte
ct the

 

P.2d
Geseribing that. [*]This Act does fot of
Hlghte and duties that mature (o,) penalti
Inesrred(,] and proceedings thet were begun before its
effective’ date. ("] And the prosecution in

Sigued thet proceedings that were begun shculd refer
forthe initiation of the prosecution. The Suprene.
Court cisagrees.” They seid that proceedings con also
Fefer to bail proceedings, and in Avilla, this was =
post-conviction bail preceeding. Sete accurred after
Ehe conviction, and thet, J think, certainly comporte
with our situation sn thie ca

 

 

 

 

 

< _ae bears noting thet Reis entered her guilty pless in both Cr.
4-1-0026 and 0471-0675 ang the circuit court sdjucged ner guilty on’ all
Js before the provisions of

Nes
counts in both aatters on June 22, 2004, nine
Ret 44 cook effect.

 

 
‘04 FOR FUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

In addition, the Suprene Court alse pointed out
in Avilla thet when there is doubt or dovbleness of
meaning, of indistinctness, or uncertainty of an
expression vsed in the atetute, thac on ambiguity
exists. And in such case, the Court should lock at
the intent of the legislature for guidance. And as T
said before, the intent is clear, and that’s to give
the Court more discretion in sentencing.

The circuit court then denied the prosecution's motion.
Pursuant to an extension, on March 11, 2005, the prosecution
timely filed notices of appeal in both Cr. No. 04-1-0028 and cr
No. 04-31-0675, which were docketed as Supreme Court Nos. 27171
and 27172, respectively. Our June 2, 2008 order consolidated the

two appeals under No. 27171.

IT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

AL Sentencing

“The authority of a trial court to select and

determine the severity of a penalty is normally undisturbed on
review in the absence of an apperent abuse of discretion or
unless applicable statutory or constitutional commands have not
been observed.’” State v, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3¢
792, 797 (2001) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 100,
997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000)).

B. Conclusions of Law (coLs:

“YA COL is not binding upon an
appellate court and is freely reviewble
for its correctness."" AIG await Ine.
So. 2, Estate of Carsang, 19 Haw. Got,
626, 851 Pr2a 321, 32 (1995) (qdoting
2 lide

TT naw. 65, 119, 039 Puta 10, 26
(1882})." ‘This court ereinarily reviews
COLs under ‘the right /wren

ze Estate of folty 75 Haw. 224,
Fie tsss, 1359 (1983). Thue, **{a) COL
that is supportea by the trisi court's

 

 

   
44 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

[sindings of fect) and that reflects
application of the correct rule of law
Will not be overturned.’” Estate of

74 Mase, at 626-29, 851 Przd at
See (Geoting anéac, Inc., 74 Haw. at 115,
839 Pa2d et 29). ‘Wowever, a COL that
presente mined questions of fact and lew
[ereviewed under che clearly errenesvs
tandard because the court's conclusions
are depencent pon the fects sna

of each individual casi

is} Po2d at 326 (quoting
174 Haw, at 119, 039 Pead at
Ger (intertal quotation marke emitted) -

 

 

 

 

 

    

State vs Burutani, 76 Hewas's 172, 1180), 673 P.28 51, 159)
T185e7-

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ponce, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453, 99 P.3d 96, 104

(2004) (some internal citations omitted) (bracketed material

altered).

Cc. Interpretation of Statutes

The interpretation of a statute is a question of lew

reviewable de nove. State v, Arcec, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d
843, 852 (1996).

Furthermore, our stetutery construction
Gatabiisned roles:

 

vides by

linen construing @ statote, our foremost
cbligation 1 to zecertain and give effect
fo the intention of the legislature, which
Is to be cbtained prinariiy from the
‘anguage contesned in the statute itself.
And we must. Tead #tatutory Language in the
Content of the entire statute and construe
Stina manner consistent with ite
purpose,

Tihen there is doubt, doubleness of
neaning, cr Indistinctiveness oF
Uncertainty of an ewpresescn used in 2
statute, en ambiguity exists. .

Yh construing am ambiguous statute,
wieyhe mesning of the anbiguovs words may
be sought by examining the content, with
Walch the anbigueus words, phrases, anc
Sentences nay Be compared, in order te
ascertain their true pearing.” HRS
S's15(1) 1(1993)}., Moreover, the courts
hay resort to extrinsic eigs 30

 

 

 

 

°
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #+4

Getermining legislative intent. one
avenue fs the se of Legislative history
a5 an interpretive tool,

 

Gesu! vs admin, Dir. of the Court], 64 Hawai'i (138,)
448, 931 F.2d 1980,] 290 [11987] (footnote omitted)

State v. Koch, 107 Hewai'i 218, 220, 112 P.3d 69, 74 (2005)
(quoting State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7-8, 72 P.3d 473, 479-80
(2003)}. Nevertheless, absent an absurd or unjust result, see
State v. Hauoen, 104 Hawai'i 71, 77, 85 P.3d 178, 184 (2004), we
are bound to give effect to the plain meaning of unambiguous
statutory language; we may only resort to the use of legislative
history when interpreting an ambiguous statute. State v
Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i 465, 472, 24 P.3d 661, 668 (2001).

IIT. piscussion
A, The Parties’ Arounente

1. Reis contends that the circuit court correctly
Aet_44, section 2005
Act 44, section v se.

Reis and the prosecution disagree regarding the meaning
of the following underscored phrases within Act 44’s savings
chavs
matured, penalties that vere incurred, and proceedings that were
begun, before its effective date,” see supra note 1, Reis

 

“This Act does not affect rights and duties that

maintains that the meaning of “incurred” and “proceedings” cannot

be divined with certainty from the plain language of the savings

10
444 FOR FUELICATION IN WEST'S JOMAL'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER #+*
clause? and that the cases cited by the prosecution, which
Anterpret the same language in other legislation, merely
illustrate how statutory interpretations have varied, thereby
bolstering her argument that the language of Act 44’s savings
clause is inherently ambiguous. (Citing Walker; State v
Feliciano, 103 Hawai'i 269, 274, 81 P.3d 1184, 1189 (2003);
Avilla, 62 Haw. at 512, 750 P.2d at 60; State v. Kel, 98 Hawai'i
137, 44 P.3d 286 (App. 2002); State v. Werner, 93 Hawai'i 290,
295, 1 P.3d 760, 765 (App. 2000); State v. Johnson, 92 Hawai's
36, 44, 986 P.2d 987, 995 (App. 1999).)

Reis argues that, inasmuch as the foregoing terms are
ambiguous, the circuit court correctly delved into the Act's
legislative history to support the circuit court’s COL that the
word “proceedings” can refer, in isclation, to 2 sentencing
hearing conducted after Act 44's effective date, thereby
authorizing the circuit court's application of Act 44,

section 11/s amendments to HRS § 706-622.5, see supra note 1, so

 

+ Reis quotes HRS § 701-101(2) (19931, which provides that
vanendnents made By Act 214, Session Laws of Hawsii 1986, to this Code do not
apply to offenses: committed before the effective date of Act $14, Session Laws
cP igwest 1986" a8 en example of an tnasbiquous savings clauses that clearly
Sncludes offenses committed prior to en effective date, she argues that the
[egisleture, in Act #4, section 29, “chose to use the anbiquous tems of
thet were begun’ and spensities thet were incurred” and argues
che'tno phrases are net ambiguove woul vielate rules of
Statutory interpretation. —lEnphasis eaced.)
The Gissent, too, aszerte thet to avoid ambiguity the legislature was
sonchow requires to use the phrase “offense committea” in the savings clause
fang, by failing to do so, created ambiguity. Dissenting opinion at 12-13 1.7,

 

     

 

 

 

he digevesed antzg, this court, in State v. van den Bera, 101 Hawas's 187,
To1, 68 F.3d 154, 138. [2008], Anplietezy concluded that the plain language of
the term “proceedings” in the etangsré savings clause betokened ~~ so clearly

ae not to werrent further coment -- the initiaticn of = criminal prosecution.
Contrary to the implication of Reis’s and the dissent's logic, the absence of
fone unesbiovcus tern dees not, ipso Zacig, render encther otherwise
Ghambiguous cere spontaneously ambaguous:

    

a
 

OR PUBLICATION 1% WEST'S WOWAS'T REPORTS AND PACITZC REPORTER +#4
as to authorize sentencing Reis to probation.* In conclusion,
she asserts that any ambiguity should be construed in her favor,
in keeping with the rule of lenity, citing State v. Shimabukuro,
100 Hawai'i 324, 327, 60 P.3¢ 274, 277 (2002), State v,
Vallesteros, &¢ Hawai'i 295, 302, 933 P.2d 632, 639 (1997), and
State v. Rosers, 68 Haw. 438, 443, 718 P.2d 275, 277-78 (1986).
In light of the dissent’s insistence on arguing that
the provisions of Act 44, section 11 should be applied
retroactively” (gee, e.c., dissenting opinion at 12, 33 6 n.32),
St As important to emphasize that Reis herself does not
characterize her argunent as implicating retroactive application.
Reis contends only that the terms “proceedings” and “incurred”
are ambiguous, which she argues justifies a review of the
legislative history underlying Act 44, The legislative history,
she argues, supports @ construction of the tern “proceedings” to
include @ sentencing hearing and of the term “incurred” to mean
imposition of sentence, both of which would allow a prospective
application of Act 44, section 11, see supra note 1, to her case

 

‘Reis cites to legislative committee reports to denonstrate that
the intent underlying Act 447s anendnents to HRS § 106-€22.5 was "te clear Up

ding repeat offenders ana the eriteria for eligibility for
Grug treatment, and permit more discretion by the court in sentencing” and
thereby to incvease the number of non-vielent drug effenders eligible for
probation under HRS § 706-622.5. (Quoting 200¢ Hew. Secs. L. Act €¢, § 9 at
Bige13.) ke that the circuit court's interpretation of the savings
clause Congorte with that intent,

    

 

 

    

 

he dissent argues that Act dé, section 29 does not prevent
retroactive application of the aneliorative anendnents to Reis's case, See,
Eig, Giseenting opinion at 12, 33. Ie 4¢ worth noting, therefore, that th
Slate wv. brantiey, "98 sawas't 4e3, 56 P.3a 1262 (2002), after anelyeing en
Hcenticat savings clause, compare 1999 liaw. Sees. L. Ket 12, € 2 ac 19 with
2004 How. Sess. L. Act 4, § 29 st 221, the dicsent aeserted thot the same
language represented “the' legislature's exprest itection that the enencnent
wes not to be eppised retresctively.” Id. at 483, S6 F.3d et 172 tnecber Su,
Slesenting)

 

      

az
‘19+ FOR FUELICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
by grounding the relevant events chronologically after Act 44"s
effective date. she docs not, by contrast, characterize the
application of Act 44’s amendments to her case at sentencing as
retroactive -- which would require viewing the sentencing

proceeding as part of the unitary criminal prosecution initiated

 

by the charging instruments dated January 5 and April 13, 2004
and, therefore, does not challenge this court's conclusion in
Halker, 106 Hawai'i at 10, 100 F.3d at 604, that Act 44 does not
apply retroactively.

Nevertheless, to the extent that Reis’s arguments could
be construed as implicitly arguing for retroactive application,"
and in the interests of thorough analysis,’ we address, infre,
the dissent’s arguments in favor of retroactive application of

Act 44, section 11 to Reis’s ca

 

2.
unambioususly refers to offenses that were
inits rte i's effective

The prosecution contends that the plein language of the
savings clause bars Reis from access to Act 44's amendments

because “a penalty is ‘incurred’ upon commission of the criminal

 

+ Black's Law Dictionsry 1343 (8th ed. 1999) defines @ “retroacti
law® as one thst icoks becmwara cr contemplates the past, affecting scts or
facts thet existed before the act cane into effect." Therefore, although Reis
Goes not employ the ters “retroactive” in her arguments, insofar es she does
Seek to appiy het 44°F anenanents to events that occurred prior to the Act's
etfective cate, we con conserve an implicit argunent for retroactive
applicstion.

 

 

 

 

+ the cigsent notes tuo pending cases, State v. Cruz, No. 27242, and
Sate v tactay, Ne. 27271, which implicste Act 44, section 78, Dissenting
EIST ETs.3°° the present opinion enconpasses the arguments nade by the
perties in those matters, including the retroactivity ergunent nade, at the
fest, eniy inplicitiy by Reis. We Leave a ciscussion of the merits of those
cose for ancther tine

 

 
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER
offense,” whereas the penalty itself “is imposed by the court at
sentencing,” and that Reis “incurred” the penalties at ‘issue in
December 2003 and Apri 2004, prior to Act 44's effective date.
(Bmphasis in original.) (Citing State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.24
88 (Iowa 1973); Bilbrey v, State, 135 P.2¢ 999 (Okla. Crim. App.
1943); State v. Matthews, 310 A.2d 17 (Vt. 1973).) Therefore,

the prosecution argues, Reis “incurred” the penalties before
July 1, 2004, and the plain language of the savings clause in Act
44, section 28, see supra note 1, prevents the sentencing court
in the present matter from applying Act 44’s amendments to Reis’s
convictions.

The prosecution further asserts that we have previously
interpreted “proceedings” as unambiguously referring to unitary
criminal proceedings initiated with a formal charge and have
rejected the argument that a sentencing hearing can qualify as 3
severable “proceeding” for purposes of escaping the effect of a
savings clause. (Citing, inter alia, Feliciano, 103 Hawai'i at
273, €1 P.3d at 1188; State v. Van den Bere, 10] Hawai'i 187,
191, 65 P.3d 134, 138 (2003)). The prosecution also challenges
the circuit court's reliance on Avilla, insisting that bail
Proceedings are distinct in nature and character from criminal
Proceedings, distinguishing the ambiguity discerned by this court
in villa in the term “proceeding” from the plain language of
Act 44, section 29. (Citing State v. Miller, 79 Hawai'i 194,
201, 900 P.24 770, 777 (1995) (for the proposition that during
appeal, the circuit court loses jurisdiction over the criminal

proceeding but retains jurisdiction over bail).)

PY]
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ # HAWAI'E REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER #**

 

3 0
‘con wo dis irua=re offense:
several nonthe apart, her conviction for the

at recll he <: rt fros
ing “he stot

Finally, the prosecution argues that the circuit court

erred by failing to note that because Reis was convicted of two

 

separate offenses of possession of cocaine
December 23, 2003 and the cther on April 1, 2004

one occurring on

 

she could not
be a first-time drug offender with respect to the second of the
two offenses and, hence, regardless of the interpretation of

Act 44’ savings clause, could not be eligible for sentencing as
a first-time drug offender. (Citing Koch, 107 Hawai'i at 224,
112 P.3d at 18 (holding that Koch did not qualify es @ first-time
drug offender for two chronologically separate drug offenses for
which he was convicted and sentenced on the same day at @
consolidated hearing); State v, Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 706 P.2¢
1283 (1985) (holding that two offenses committed at separate
times but for which sentence was imposed on the sane day
constituted separate convictions for purposes of HRS § 706-606.5
(Supp. 1984)).)

Reis attempts to distinguish her cases from the
proceedings in Kech by noting that, while in Koch the simultaneous
entry of judgment of conviction was based on two separate findings
of guilt entered on different days with respect to the two charges
== one following a July 2003 jury trial and the other following an
Octcber 2003 no-contest plea -- Reis entered a change of plea to
guilty on both charges on the same day at the same proceedings,

with the clear intention of doing so in order to be eligible for

as
 

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER ++
parole sentencing as a first-time drug offender, (Citing 107

wei'i at 223-24, 112 P.3d at 77-78.) She further argues that

 

application of Koch to her cases would result in substantial
prejudice to her, given her reliance on circuit court sentencing
practices before the Koch decision, and would violate her right to
due process because she committed the offenses in question and
pled guilty prior to the date of the Koch decision. (Citing,
Anter alia, State v. ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 220-21, 857 P.2d 593,
599 (1993) (setting forth a three-pronged test for analyzing the
fairness of retroactive applicability of a decision); Boule vs
Columbias 378 U.S. 347 (1964); United States v. Newman, 203 F.3d
700 (9th Cir. 2000).)

2 ircwi Erred ine
706 I lied 7 Y's Case:
1. *Pre¥ asd in Bi
‘criminal 4 ution Ta def

 

‘The initiation of criminal proceedings -- through “a

 

formal felony prosecution, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information or arraignment” -- “‘is the starting point of our
whole system of adversary criminal justice.” State v. Luton, 63

Hawai'i 443, 449-50, 927 P.2d 844, 850-51 (1996) (footnotes

omitted) (quoting State v. Maseniai, 63 Haw. 254, 360, 628 P.2d
1018, 1023 (1981) (following Kirby v. Illinois, 406 v.s. 662

(1972))). In Van den Berg, analyzing an identically worded
savings clause," this court construed the term “proceedings” to
* _.im Vanden Berg, we noted that the act in question contained «

sovings clause that "expressly stated thet the amenanents to the act were not
ieont inves)

 

as
 

[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ¢*#

 

mean the initiation of prosecution through a charging instrument
and concluded that the amendments in question were therefore not

available to the defendants:
In the present case, the record indicates that [the
defendants'] respective proceedings were “begun”
before [the effective date of the enendnente): (2)
Yan den Berg war indsctea on October 25, 199)
and (2) Keraglenes wos chsrged on July 6, 19892
Becsuse the proceedings involving [the defendants)

of Act 288, the 1993

 

 

Stotoce didaar eppiy to (trent
101 Hewai'i at 191, 65 P.36 at 138 (emphases in original).

Van den Gera raised the question whether the 1980 or
1993 version of HRS § 134-6(a), involving use of a firearm in the
connission of 8 felony, applied to the defendants’ cases. Id. at
190-91, 65 P.3d at 137-38 (majority opinion). In State v
Brantley, 99 Hawai'i 463, 469, $6 P.34 1252, 1258 (2002), this
court had concluded, based on a reading of the 1992 version of
the statute and its legislative history, that the legislature
intended to create a separate offense in HRS § 134-6(a) (Supp.
1993) and, therefore, that second degree murder was not @ lesser
included offense, overruling State v. Jumile, 87 Hawai'i 1, 950
P.3¢ 1201 (1998), which was similarly based on an analysis of HRS
to ‘aftect Fights sha duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, and

’ ivective gate.” “1d. at 151, 65 7.36
Tn Yan-den-Bera) (quoting 1993 Haw. Sexe. L, Act 238, § 2 at

   

Seas tempha
a9).

 

the digsent eeserte thet this court, “{in) Yen den Serg[,] did net
conclude thet ‘proceedings’ seans ‘criminal prosecutions.’ Dissenting
opinion at 21 ni20. A carefel reading of the language immediately supra
Feveals just such an inplicit conclueion, which this court determined did not
Narrant further explication or analysis in light of the normally unambiguous
Beening of the term 25 explcyed in the standard savings clause Nething in
Vanden Bexa's treatment of the term “proceedings,” certainly, renders it
Snepplicable oe illoetrative of how this court hee treated the term in the
poet

 

  

 

Vv
+14 TOR PUBLICATION 11 WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
§ 134-6(a) (1993), Yan den Berg, 101 Hawai'i at 191, 65 P.3d at
138. By contrast, in Yan den Berg, this court concluded that the
Plain language of HRS § 134-6(a) (Supp, 1990) revealed no
legislative intent to create a separate offense; accordingly, 2
Gefendant could not be convicted of both a violation of HRS

§ 134-6(2) (Supp. 1990) and murder in the second degree. Id. at
192, €5 P.3d at 139. We then concluded that “proceedings”

 

Plainly meant the initiation of a criminal prosecution against
both defendants," and, noting that their “proceedings” had been
initiated before the effective date of the 1993 amendnents, held
that the 1990 version of HRS § 134-6(a) applied to their cases
and reversed their convictions of and sentences for the HRS
§ 134-€(a) offense. Id, at 191-92, 65 P.3d at 196-39.

The dissent argues that this covrt’s interpretation in
Ven den Berg of “proceedings” to clearly betoken the initiation
of @ criminal prosecution against the defendant is inepposite to
the present case becouse an aneliorative sentencing statute was
not at issue. Dissenting opinion at 20-23 6 n.24, The dissent

contends that it is the ameliorative nature of an amendment that

 

 

4 We noted in Yan den Bexe thet Gary Karagianes, one of the
Gefendents, yas charged and tried prior to the effective date of the 1992
enendnents, but sentenced after, and concluded that his “proceecings” hed
begun prior to the effective date, preventing application of the 1983 version
of HRS § 134-(a) to his case. 102 Hawai'i at 191, 65 Podd at 136, our
ise as it applied to Karagianes in Ven den Bera is

of particular Inport, norecver, because it represents this court’ only,
opinion of which we are amare, asice from Brilla, 69 How. S08, 750 Prod 78,
Giscussed iutzg, in which e einilar eavinge classe applied to legisistion
governing 2ucrinine prosecution initisted prigr to ah anenceent’s effective

'e but in which s sentencing hearing was conducted after the effective det
mirroring the procedural stance of the present matter fee Walkers 106
Hewei'i at 4-5, 100 F.3e at 586-99 (sefendant charges, pled ve contest, and
sentenced gricr to Act 44's effective date)? Feliciang, 103 Hawald at 27¢, 62
F.3d at 11E9 (gefencant incictes on Septenber €, 1894, sentenced on March 25,
1895, "and amencnents became effective Joly 20, 1958) +

 

 

  

 

 

      

  

 

ae
{7+-yoR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 4+
determines whether retroactive application is available to @
defendant but fails to articulate how an unambiguous term can be
rendered ambiguous merely because the statutory provision urged
as applicable by the defendant is ameliorative.” See dissenting
opinion at 20-23, 33-37 (citing Koch, 107 Hawai'i st 221-22, 112
P.3d at 75-76; Avilla, 69 Hew. at 509, 750 P.2¢ at 787 State ws
Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 212-15, 638 P.24 319, 321-24 (1982)).

 

In short, nothing in the Van den Berg analysis conflicts with our
conclusion in that case that “proceedings” unambiguously commence
with the initiation of a unitary criminal prosecution and the
various proceedings subsumed within it.

a
act_can create al where normal

none exists,
Tt is not the amelictative nature of statutory
provision that has prompted us in the past to construe the term
“proceedings” as meaning sonething other then the initiation of a
criminal prosecution but, rather, the unique subject matter of

the act in question. Avilla is illustrative.

 

2 he cincurned inte in section 121.8.3.b, Act 44" savings claus
apptice to all eines tt, Eetbuslng she neny amendments vo the avere’# arvp
ithe Chat sdatense panssimente: sno create iu crimes and iiseilicies.. Secause
thcee provisions sce not aueliorutive, the Gissent's position begs the
Gucctils wheter the Gefaule, plain language interpretstion of “proceedings”
In'van den Bers applies to. then er wretter ambiguity continues to exsat,
dtopite the lack of any anelioretive provisson st Seave in those prev
SuFfaneiyeie resvite in avclesner construct, co wit, (1) that the term
proceedings” Sn the = S triminal peovecvtsone, ge
wasn nese, sei 'mivell ot sty 02 2.5 nd [ey thse the tone
Eutciig-apeiies to'aii sections of het tt

Tloreevers Sp. fight ef the feregeing anslysse concerning th
anedicrative provisions at iseve in lan-gen Sela, the diesen’ s
Ge'ignete this sietinctaon, siseenting opinions: Si'nczb; se eutloves he ge
Nic'TGncse'the sistinction! se simply 'co'net conclude that $= fe dlapseitive

 

 

 

 

  

at

     

      

19
14% FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS ASD PACIPIC REFORTER +4

In Avilla, this court held that the ameliorative
amendments to HRS § 804-4 (1985) provided for in Act 138 of
1967" ~~ allowing bail to convicted felons while on appeal

were available to a defendant who was indicted prior to June 5,

 

1987, the effective date of the amendments, but whose motion to
continue bail pending appeal was heard and denied thereafter. 69
Haw. at $11, 513, 750 P.2d at 78, 81. Me so held, not because

 

the amendments were ameliorative,’® but because the subject
matter of Act 139 -~ which pertained solely to bail, its

injected ambiguity into

 

availability, and related conditions
the term “proceedings.” Id, at 512-13, 750 P.Zd at 60, We noted
that, while proceedings normally would mean “prosecutions,” in
the context of statute concerned solely with bail,
“proceedings” could also be interpreted as bail proceedings. \*
Id. at 512, 750 F.2d at 60. It was that ambiguity, and that

ambiguity alone, that led us to the relevant conmittee reports in

 

 

Me Ste 1987 ew, Seas. L. Act 239) $6 2-9 at 212-16. net 139,
section 10 contained 2 savings clause identical to the language in Act 44,
section 29.

 

Bait ths regard, the dissent oversinplifies the analysis in avila

When ic asserts that [t]hie court held thet, in ligne of the
Reture of the legislation, the term "proceesinge’ included 6
occurring atter the effective cate” of the act in question, ai
1. "igvuse first
anbiguous before the aneliorative

   
    
  
 

“ 1¢ dissent mischeracterizes the discvesion in Avilla as
recognizing “multiple” meanings of "proceedings." Dissenting opinion at 16
There vere, in fact, only tac, the presumptive reaning cf “prosecution” ane
the alternate “pei ’proceedinge” creates by the unique subject matter of the
act, 65 Haw. et $12, 750 F.2d at 60 (Proceedings, 8s employes in the
section of Act 139 in question, can mean prosecutions; bur within the context
of the statutes regulating the release of defendants on

bail proceessnge.

    

 

   

20
++ POR PUBLICATION 18 WEST'S HANAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

order to determine that the legislature’s concerns in enacting
the measure could be addressed by allowing Avilla to benefit from
the amendments, Id. at $13, 750 P.2d at 80-81.

In Avilla, this court presupposed that the term
“proceedings” in the savings clause normally meant
“prosecutions.” Jd. at 512, 780 P.24 at 80. Insofar as Act 139
dealt exclusively with bail, the distinct nature of bail
proceedings!” wae sufficient to inject ambiguity into the term,
Avilla, 69 Haw. at 512, 780 P.2d at 60. Act 44, however, is
comprehensive legislation enacted to address the epidemic of
crystal methamphetamine use in the state, and includes sections
increasing penalties for exposing children to the methamphetamine
industry, inflicting injuries during its production, for ssles of
related drug paraphernalis, and for undertaking methanphetanine
production near a park or @ schocl. See 2004 Haw. Sess. L.

Act 44, $§ 3, 4, and @ at 206-10, 212. It amends penalties for
promoting the drug. Id. $$ $-7 at 210-11. It adopts a nore

 

» 952, proceedings are indeed separate and distinct in nature. See
wilder, 78 Wawel" ot 201, 900 F.20 at 777 (rhinen a convicted defencent is

fad on bail pending eppeal, the circuit court is temporarily without

intence that i the subject of the
defencant’s appeal; however, the circuit court nay enforce or modify the
Cenditione related to the defendant ‘on Beil penging eppesi.")s
Daxson v tanngn, 53 Maw. 76, €2-63, 468 Pozd 329, 399 (1972) (Beal
Fequirenente survive quathing of indietaent without prejudice during pendency
ef prosecution's sppeai)? Bates v, Gagia, $2 He. 575, 575-76, 462 P26 183,
Jéstse (1991) 1A boil hearing, ses nonsury proceeding, is limited in its
porpose and 1s not necestarily governed by “strict adherence to exclusionary
Foles of evidence" but, rather, “hearssy nay support 2 finding if in the eng
Nie ie the king of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to
rely in serious sffsire."") lgveting Net) Song fd. Beminct
foe Fa26 862) €73 (26 Cir, 1938) Nand, 3.1); Bates vs Hawkins, 52
Haws Ge3y- 460-70, 476 F.26 640, 843-44 (1970] ("(P)he bail nearing 32 not 8
fF guilt or innocence but ratner 9 determination cf the

ject the right tos Feasonable bail. Unless the accu!
Insists otherwise, it may well be coneucted scnewnat
abicavite.")

 

    

 

  

 

 

 

   

    

   

 

       
 

‘01 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER
treatment-oriented approach with respect to first-time offenders.
Ada §§ 9-12 at 212-15. It addresses tort Liebility for drug
dealers, insurance coverage for substance abuse, and civil
commitment and treatment centers for substance abusers. Ids

$§ 13, 18-22 at 216-19, 221-24. It supports citizen empowerment
in combating the drug. Id, $§ 24-26 at 225. In contrast to

Act 139 of the 1987 legislature at issue in Avilla, which dealt
solely with bail, see 1987 Haw. Sees. L. Act 139, passim at
312-16, no ambiguity is introduced by Act 44/s subject matter
that would lead us to question, as we did in Avilla, the standard
interpretation of “proceedings” as the initiation of a criminal
Prosecution. Cf. 69 Haw. at $12, 750 P.2d at 60.

Avilla, therefore, does not stand, as Reis contends,
for the proposition that this court construes the language of the
standard savings clause “in 2 manner that best effectuates the
underlying legislative intent and purpose of that particular
statute.” We resort to legislative history only when there is an
ambiguity in the plain language of the statute. Valdivia, 95
Hawai'i at 472, 24 P.3d at 668. Rather, Avilla stands for the
unremarkable proposition that, if a statutory amendment on a
single subject addresses proceedings other than criminal
Prosecutions -- and the numerous hearings subsumed within
criminal prosecutions, including hearings on evidentiary matters,
motions for reconsideration, and sentencing -- so as to give rise

to an ambiguity, the defendant may benefit from the amendment if

 

* We the:
axguendo, the term “preceesinge” in the savings 1
sreigueus " Dissenting opinion et 2

fore also decline the dissent’ invitation te “assuniel,
eis viewed as

 

 

22
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'S REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

doing so would comport with the intent of the legislature as

reflected in the amendnent’s underlying legislative history.
b .

within the body of the amending sta

the contents ef the act do not apply.
retroactively,

It is important to note that in both Koch and Yon

Gelder, upon which the dissent relies, see dissenting opinion at
33-37, neither of the statutes at issue contained speci:

savings clauses, crucial fact that informed the discussion of
the underlying legislative history and the ultimate conclusion in
both cases that the ameliorative amendments could apply to the
defendants. See Koch, 107 Hawai'i at 221-22, 112 P.3d at 75-76,
(citing 2002 Haw. Sess, L. Act 161 at 568-75)? Yon Geldern, 64
Haw. at 215, 638 P.2d at 323 (citing 1980 Haw. Sess. L. Act 264

 

at 544-46). In both cases, only the general savings clause,

1 the digesnetion between the intent expressed by the general
savings cleuse, codifies at HRS § 1-, gee infra note 20, anc a specific
Savings cleuse enacted ae part of particular legislation, euch ae Act 44,
section 29, is erveisi te the analysis. The dissent seeks to conflate the
Ene, dissenting cpinion st 27-35, in an attempt to reduce the express,
inclusion of a sevings clause in'Act 4¢ = which by ies plain language bers

of Act ¢ == to @ nullity that hes no more import than
nd we Were confronted only with the general savings
S323. “Ta ge 4ses3. (queting He .
Seates, “€83 A.28 61, 66 (0.C. 1996)] [asserting “thot state courte ‘fevor()
Fetroactive pplication of anelicrative sentencing legislation despite a
General sevings statute’™ and that "the generic savings language in Section 29
Uepetlective of the ‘general sovings’ provisions in ARS §§ 1-3 and I-11")
(brackets in diecent). in the present meter, we are confronted with @
specific eavings clause, Les, @ savings clause epecificelly and purposefully
includes in z particular plete of legislation ae en exprescicn of Legislative
intent regarding that legitiseien, and the inport of tne distinction becones
cles! alter eneiysing the fereign case lew upon which the diseent relies, see

iniza.

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

23
 

FOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#
codified at HRS § 1-3 (1993),* presented an obstacle to
retroactive application of the anelicrative amendnents, and this
court concluded that HRS § 1-3 “‘is only a rule of statutory
construction and where legislative intent may be ascertained, it
is no longer determinative.’" Koch, 107 Hawai'i at 222, 112 P.3¢
at 76 (quoting Yon Geldern, 64 Haw. at 213, 638 P.2d at 322).
‘The foreign case lew upon which the dissent relies for
the purpose of bolstering ite argument that ameliorative
amendments must be applied retroactively, regardless of savings
clauses, dissenting opinion st 49-83 (citing People v, Schultz,
460 W.W.2d $05 (Mich. 1990); State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468
(W.D. 1986); People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956),
merely comports with our conclusion, appearing in Von Geldern and
Koch, that the existence of 2 genera) savinos clause does not
Prevent ameliorative amendments from being applied retroactively
Af euch application would conform to specific legislative intent
Givined from the statute itself or from legislative history
surrounding the specific statute in question.” See Koch, 107
Hawai'i at 222, 112 P.3d at 76; Yon Gelder, 64 Haw. at 213-14,
638 P.2d at 222; Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 511-12; Cummings, 366

N.W.2d at 478 (concluding “that, unless otherwise indicated by
the Leaislature, an ameliorating amendment te @ criminal statute

 

= ons §
unless otherwise expr

Moreover, the dissent's rellence on Eecple vs Malker, 623 N.E.26 2
wey, contributes little to the ciscussicn, © Halker relies heavily on
Glines anc serely restates the anelicrative doctrine already recognized in
Hoch and Von" Geldern that, absent o specific savings cleuse, omelioretive
Snendnents can be applied retroactively. Sse id. at £6

 

any retrospective operation,

 

   

 

 

 

24
‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION 18 WEEE! KAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
As reflective of the Legislature’s determination that the lesser
punishment is the appropriate penalty for the offense”) (emphasis
added); Oliver, 134 .N.£.2d at 201). None of the cases that the
dissent cites implicate a specific savings clause enacted as part
of the anelicrative amendments, as is found in Act 44, section
28, see supra note 1. Indeed, Schultz, Cumminas, and Oliver all
relied upon legislative silence regarding solely prospective
application within the four corners of the legislation at issue
in order to conclude retroactive application was implicitly
endorsed by the ameliorative nature of the amendments. See
Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 509; Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 470
(observing that the legislature did not “expressly state” whether
the new law or the old law would apply to offenses committed
before the amendments); Oliver, 134 .N.E.2d at 201-02." By
contrast, 2 specific savings clause, expressly contained within
the body of the amending legislation, is clear evidence of

Legislative intent thet the act “not affect rights and duties

 

that matured, penalties that were incurred, and proceedings that

 

% the cases cites by the dissent contain other infirmities. In
Oliver, the court applied emeiscrative anenanents toa defendant who had
ordered his tuo-yeat-old brother se 8 fourteen-year ele ane was indicted
three years pricr te the anendente, ruling that the defendant coulé not be
tried 2s an Sdvlt and, ence, could net be subject to the death penalty. In
applying the new lew, the court ressoned thet, sithough the legislature had
clearly provided that “[t]he repeal of any statute shall net affect
ny... offence committed. . prior te the tine such repes:

 

 

 

 

    

 

ofiect," 134 .£,26 at 200-04, the amelicrative amendment nevertneles
Lo the defendant, resscning thet the dissent characterized as "rewrit (ing)
statute eno supplyling) that which legielatures in their wisdom. . . refuse

 

es ids et 204, (Froesse2, ., Gissentine]- Moreover, the appellate
Courts of Michigan nave noted ch scversi occasions “that (Eeople wv. JSchultzl,
Geo News2e 508 ich. 1990) (plurality cpinien),) dig not garner «majority
ang ole not represent binding precedent” even 3° Michigan, Zeople v. Doxey,
G27 Now.2e 360, 363, IMich, Ce. App. 2004). gee also Peonle vy winnitield,
Dood wt 1978790 et € (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Zeotle v. Tnenad, 618 N-W-Zo 631,
@37 nt ich. Ct, App. 2008)

to en

 

 

28
‘104 FOR PUBLICATION 26 WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACITIC REPORTER +
were begun, before its effective date,” i.e., that it not epply
retroactively, eliminating any justification for further
analysis. The dissent attempts to avoid the distinction when it
asserts that, in the instant case, “[aJs was the case in Yon
Gelder, Avillz, and Koch, here there is simply no express
indication thet the legislature desired to prohibit retrospective
effect to the remedial provisions,” dissenting opinion at 40
(emphasis omitted), but, in doing so, ignores the very real and
clear legislative intent represented by the inclusion of a
specific savings clause barring retroactive application within
the very body of Act 44.

2 <“ineure”
ion of an of;

This court has not previously had occasion to define
the plain meaning of the term “incurred,” as employed in the
standard savings clause, Nevertheless, courts in other
jurisdictions have analyzed the phrase “penalties incurred” in
the context of @ savings clause and have concluded that
defendant incurs the penalty at the tine of the commission of the
offense.” See McGranzhan, 206 N.W.2d at 91 (“The penalty is
imposed by the court after the fact of guilt is legally
Getermined. It is incurred when the act for which the law

Prescribed the penalty is conmitted.’) (quoting In re Schneck,
86 P. 43, 44-45 (Ken, 1908)); State v. Alley, 263 A.2d 66, 69

This Ss not to suggest that we pr
proven innocent bot, rather, that “[ujnder 9 saving classe cr stavutel,) the
‘tory rights end penalties are cetermined by the statute in effect at the
tine of the occurrence of the facts ang may De enforces after reseal if the
unéerlying facts are proves” later at trial. Matiiens, 10 A.28 e039,

 

rime the defendant guizty untéi

       

     

26
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

   

(Me. 1970) ("*Punishment, penalty or forfeiture is ‘incurred’
+ + + at the time the offence for which punishment is imposed is
conmitted.'”) (ellipses in original) (quoting Patrick v. Comm'rs
of Corr, 227 N.£.2¢ 348, 351 (Mass. 1967)); State v, Johnson,
402 A.2d 876, B80 (Md. 1979) (holding that 2 penalty is incurred
+ Commonwealth v.
Benoit, 191 N.£.2d 749, 781-52 (Mass. 1963) (concluding that

Massachusetts jurisprudence had settled since 1869 that a penalty

“at the time of the commission of the offense”

 

is incurred at the time of the offense, “emphasiz(ing) incurrence

resulting from the offender's wrongful act as distinguished

 

from any proceeding by public authority to impose the
consequences of the wrongdoing” and that “*[pJunishment incurred’

is not ‘sentence imposed,’ ‘conviction found’ or ‘judgment

 

entered’ ” and denying application of ameliorative amendments in
effect after the date of the commission of the offense but before
the issuance of the indictment) (quoting the applicable savings
clause); Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at $10 ("[I]t is clear that the two
defendants before this Court have incurred criminal liability for
which they may be punished . . . .”); Bilbrey, 135 P.2d at 1000
“*hold[ing] . . . that th[e] defendant was subject to any

 

 

penalty inposed by Jaw for this crime on the date of its
commission, and any subsequent statute repealing such penalty can
only operate prospectively, and is applicable only to offenses
committed after the statute took effect’) (emphasis added)
(quoting Benn v. State, 164 P. 992, 993 (Okla. Crim. Ap. 1927);
State v, Moore, 233 P.2d 283, 256-57 (Or. 1951) (concluding that

an ameliorative amendment was unavailable to the defendant,
‘*4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +#*
insofar as he incurred the original penalty before the effective
Gate of the new statute, reasoning that “to have ‘incurred

penalties’ implies a time past cr present as to the act and

 

future time as to the assessnent of the penalty”); State ve
Eetrucelli, 592 A.2d 365, 366 (Vt, 1991) ("AS @ result of the

saving clause, a criminal irrevocably incurs liability at the

time of the offense: not even the repeal of the statute imposing

that Iability affects that liability."); State v. Senna, 321
A.2d 5, 6 (Vt. 1974) ("*Criminal Liability ds incurred when the

criminal act is conmitted.'”) (quoting Matthews, 310 A.2d at 20);
Matthews, 310 A.2d at 21 ("Defendant's penalty was ‘incurred’

when he committed the act."). But see State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d
334, 336 (Utah 1971) (concluding thet “no penalty is incurred

until the defendant is convicted, judgment entered and sentence
imposed,” thereby allowing aneliorative amendments to be applied
to a defendant who was tried and convicted, but not sentenced,
prior to the effective date of the act).

The dissent mates Zapp the centerpiece of its argument that @
defendant incurs the penalty of ah offense at the time the sentence 12,
imposed. Dissenting opinion st 27-30, In 20b, the defendant was dadicted
before the effective date of the anelicrative sentencing stetute But erica,
Eenvicted, and sentenced thereafter. 490 F.id st 335. Interestingly, the
Zapp court inplicitly concludes in analyzing very simile: savings clavee
Ehat “proceedings” do not encompass centencing proceedings when If conelsded
that *[t)he only wey [the] statute [in question] can apply to the preblen here
+ would be through its provision that. "(e)he repeal of a statute doe not
affect. . any penalty incurrea,'” 450 £.2d at 396 (queting the
applicable savings clause). In light of the fact that the cefendorts iike
Reis, was sentenced after the effective date of the anenanent, 420 F.2d e¢
535) "the Zaup court implicitly rejected the proposition thet @ sentencing
Proceeding wes severable proceeding that coule quality the defendant fer
Sentencing Under the new lax, be it termed retroactive or prospective
application, We aze ata lows, therefore, as te how thet reasoning supports
the dissent’s position that 2 ¢entencing preceesing can be s separate
Eroceesing for the purposes of the savings claure which dats quality the
Sefendant for sentencing under the neu leu, ae the Gissent araues. gee

 

 

 

   

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

28
‘468 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HOMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++*

In our view, the reasoning of the foregoing authority
is conpelling.# Accordingly, we hold that a defendant incurs,
at the monent he or she conmits the offense, Iiability for the
criminal penalty in effect at the time of the conmissicn of the
offense.

3. “proces:
enspré stent not

avoids potentie) constitutional infirmity.

To interpret “proceedings” to mean any discrete hearing
pertaining te sentencing, motions for reconsideration, or
appellate review would, in practice, mean that the savings clause
would not operate to exclude @ defendant's case unless all stages
of @ prosecution and all appeals were entirely concluded prior to
the effective date of an amendment. Such a construction would
vitiate the very reason for enacting a savings clause, to wit,

(2) to delineate clearly which defendants fal1 under the new

 

H(, , continued)
dissenting opinion at 28-28 0.29.

Gh any case, the Tapp court appears to conflate the meaning of
“incur” ane “impose” and cites no authority supporting the conclusien that 9
pensity is, S Sincurred” at the tine of sentencing, gee
G50 Pode at SS7-58 (entied, Ju, dicsenting!. Moreover, ae discussed intra in
Section I1J.B.3.e, application of the Zeop role ultimately results in greater
Ineguities among defendant

 

 

 

% The dissent attenpte to distinguish the preceding foreign case lax
by characterizing it a5 either (1) concerning preventing abatement of criminal
prosecutions, {21 not involving aneliorstive statutes, or (3) drawn from
gislative statencnts of retroactivity.
sos, Insofar ae Act 44, section 29 by ite
plein longuage epplies to every section of Act (4, see supra note 1, the
Enterpretetion cf “incurree™ sleo implicates preventing abatement of criminal
prosecutions and most be enalyzed in ther light. oth the language of Act 44,
Etetion 2 ang SKS $ 1-3, see supra note 21, establish e presumption egeinst
Tetrosctivity and, regardless of the snelicrstive nature of amendnents, none
Sf the distinctions thet the dissent urges, in the end, explein why the plain
Seening of the term “incurred” should be equates with Cinposed,” particularly
Tehighe ef the policy considerations discussed intva in section 11.2.3.

    

 

     

Dissenting opinion,»

       

 

   

28
‘84 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § WAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER +4
statute, in order to avoid producing inconsistent and unjust
outcomes among defendants arising from the vagaries of the
scheduling process, and (2) to avoid rendering portions of an
act -- Act 44 in the present matter -- potentially
unconstitutional es ex post facto measures. To construe
penalties as having been “incurred” only at the moment of the
imposition of sentence would similarly generate risks of
inconsistency and constitutional infirmity.
a se com

As the District of Columbia’s highest court hes
reasoned, in considering the application of aneliorative
sentencing amendments to defendant who committed the charged

offense prior to the amendment but was sentenced thereafter,

 

Iiele cannot say thet 2 legislature could net
rationally conciuce that the best approach would be @
purely prospective one, 0 that al! defendants who
Connitted crines before the statute become effective
would be treated equally. “Otherwise, sentencings
Could get caught up in manipulations with snfelt
Fesults overall. some convicted felons, for exemple,
night be eble to arrange sentencing deleys to cake
advantage of the new sentencing scheme, whereas others
Could net achieve the sane result before Te:
Sympathetic susges.

 

 

insivigaale shoul sn oreance i
‘Seaniccad a eresenyee see seime Os offen ak
‘aiatutes themselves,

Holiday v, United States, 683 A.2d 61, 72 (D.C. 1996) (emphasis

added). Adopting Reis's contention that “proceedings” is
ambiguous and could be construed to include sentencing hearings
a5 separate and distinct “proceedings” would invite just such an

arbitrary application.

30
17+ POR PUBLICATION IN ESZ'S HAWAL'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER #44
The result in Tapp, discussed supra in section 111.8.2
4 n, 24, S2lustrates the danger, In Tapp, the court reviewed
precedent regarding when @ penalty is “incurred,” citing, inter
alia, State v. Miller, 464 P.2d 644 (Utah 1970), and Belt wy
Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971). In those related cases, the
defendants, Miller and Belt, were each indicted for writing
fraudulent checks prior to the effective date of the same
ameliorative sentencing amendnent reducing the penalty, but one
of them, Belt, was convicted and sentenced after the effective
date while the other, Miller, was convicted and sentenced before.
wwiller vas subject to a felony with incarceration in State
Prison for upwards of 14 years, for doing the same thing, at the
same time, under the sane statute, with the same penalty, for the
same guilt, while Belt was subject to only six months,” despite
the fact that it was Belt who viclated parole and fled the state.
Papp, 490 P.2d at 33

that the majority's conclusion “sanctions such discrimination

 

8 (Henriod, J., dissenting) (asserting

under the illogical, unreasonable platitude and guise that ‘time
of sentence,’ -- not guilt . . . -- is of the essence”).
Moreover, the concerns expressed in Holiday have since been borne
out in Utah, where the Zapp rule has been extended to allow the
application of anelicrative sentencing amendnents to defendants
“even where the defendant's presentence misconduct resulted in
the defendant's sentencing being delayed beyond the effective
date of the anendnents.” State v. Patience, 944 F.2d 361, 385
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing, inter alia, State v. Yates, 918
P.2d 136, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the “[Utah)

a
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WAWAL'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORSER #4

   

supreme court has determined (that the) defendant's actions that
delay sentencing are irrelevant” to receiving the benefits of the
amended sanctions)) .7

Nevertheless, the dissent insists that, by not applying
the ameliorative provisions of Act 44, section 11 to Reis’s case,
it is we who are being “arbitrary and unjust” and that our
decision runs counter to the general trend in other states.
Dissenting opinion at 49-82, $7-S8 (quoting In re Estrada, 408
P.2d 948, 981 (Cal. 1965)) (citing Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at $12;
Cummings, 366 N.W.2d at 472; Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 203) State vy.
Macarelli, 275 A.2é 944, 947 (RI. 1977); Holiday, 6€3 A.2d at
66-68). Again, as discussed supra in section III.B.1.b, the

 

cases upon which the dissent relies implicate only general.
savings clauses, which, as this court itself has concluded in Yon
Geldern, 64 Haw. at 213, 638 P.2d at 322, and Koch, 107 Hawas'i
et 222, 112 P.3d at 76 (quoting Yon Geldern), represent a rule of
statutory construction that may yield, and often does, to more
express, specific intent regarding retroactive application of
ameliorative amendrents. See Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at $10
(concluding that the “historical and philosophical underpinnings”
of the state's genera] savings clause did not support barring
retroactive application of aneliorative amendments); Cummings,

“| Further to the foregoing, in In ce Delong, 99 Cel. App. 4th $2
discussed in the dissenting opinion et 2e-ze and intsa in note 2
nt twice moved successfully co have eentencing aelayesy the second

extension rescheduling her eentencing hearing te July 12, 200i, efter the
Duly 1, 200i esfective date of the aneliorative anendnents. 1d, at 260-65.
She filed = motion for sentencing under the new lew on duly 2 2002. 1d. at
B68, “By the reasoning in Delong, similarly situated defendante who accepted
their originel pre-July 1, 2001 sentencing dates dic not Denefit from the new
Io

 

   

 

 

 

 

32
‘4+ FOR PUBLICAFION IN WEST'S IDMAE'E REFORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER +**
386 N.W.2d at 472 (concluding that the applicable general savings
clause “ie but © canon of statutory construction to aid in
interpreting statutes to ascertain legislative intent” and that
“[a]t 4s not an end in itself”); Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 203
(concluding that the general savings clause has “been read by

 

this court to provide merely a principle of construction, which
governs in the absence of contrary intent”) (quotation signals
omitted); Estrada, 608 F.2¢ at 952 (characterizing the general
savings clause as “simply embod{ying] the general rule of
construction . . . that when there is nothing to indicate a
contrary intent in a statute it will be presumed that the
Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not
retroactively[s] . . . [a] rule of construction, however, [that)
is not a streightjacket”); Macarelli, 375 A.2d at 947 (relying on
the unique wording of the general savings clause directing the
courts to lock to the record for legislative intent with regard
to specific statutes to overcome the presumption against
retroactive application).

However, a default presumption against retroactive
application remains alive and well both in our jurieprudence and
in the foreign jurisdictions that the dissent cites. See sau,
Taniguchi v. Assoc, of Apt, Owners of King Manox, 114 Hawai'i 37,
46, 185 P.3d 1138, 1149 (2007) ("[I]t is well settled that ‘all

statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective

 

operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them 2 retrospective effect is expressly declared or is

necessarily implied from the language used.’") (quoting Robinson

33
 

OR FUELICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++
Ya Bailey, 26 Haw. 462, 464 (1925)); Kramer v, Ellett, 108
Hawai'i 426, 432, 121 P.3d 406, 412 (2005) (quoting Gap v. Puna
Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 333, 104 P.3d 912, 920
(2004) ("*iswai" statutory and case law discourage retroactive
application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing
that such operation was intended.’”); Yon Geldern, 64 Haw. at
215-16, 638 F.2d at 323 (clarifying that “we are not suggesting,

 

as other courts have, see, e.c., . . . Estrada + Oliver,
that whenever sn amendatory statute is enacted... , it must be

Presuned that the legislature intended for it to apply in every
case where it could constitutionally apply” and reemphasizing
that “(w]here the intention of the legislature with respect to
retroactivity is incepable of ascertainment, the provisions of
HRS § 1-3 will determine the statute's interpretation");
Evangelatos v. Super, Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 642 (Cal. 1988)
(rejecting the characterization thet Estrada eroded the strong
presumption against retroactivity and asserting that “absen(t]

+ an express retroactivity provision, @ statute will not be
applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic
sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a
retroactive application.”).

Therefore, insofar as the presumption remains against
retroactive application, the inclusion of a specific savings
clause within an amendment -- the polar opposite of an express
retroactivity provision -- must operate as clear evidence of the

legislature's intention that the act in question should apply

 

prospectively only. Indeed, where a specific savings clause has

34
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEBE'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER
been included in amendatory legislation, the general trend anong
the states nationally is, in fact, not to apply the anendnents
retroactively, even when they are ameliorative.

In People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685 (Cal. 2003),
the California Supreme Court refused to apply aneliorative
amendments requiring probation and treatment for certain drug
offenders where the amendnents took effect before the defendant's
conviction was final, relying on the language of a savings clause
included as part of the emending statute.” 1 Cal. Retr. 3d at
886-87. It concluded that the rule of Estrada allowing
retroactive application for aneliorative amendments did not apply
when the amendnents in question contained @ specific savings

clause, adding thet “[wle cannot embrace an interpretation that

 

makes [the specific savings clause] mere surplusage.” Id. at
ge7, 889. Similarly, in State v. Parker, @71 So. 2d 317 (La.
the savings clause read “[elxcept as otherwise provided, the

 

provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and sts’ provisions
Shall be applied prospectively.” 1 cal. Rptt. 3d et’ 686.

*  Eloud stance for the proposition that the presence of s snecitic
savings clause enboaies clear legisistive intent that anelicrative snenanents
be unaveilenie £0 defendants who were sireacy in the sycten pricr to the
effective date of the act in question but whose convictions were still not yet
Hing) efter that ate. Id. et e6)-89, Therefore, insofar as the proceecings
against Reis and Floyd began prior to the effective date of the relevant.
aneliorative smendnents, the Feasoning of the Californie Supreme Court is
Clearly not “inapposite” to our present analysis concerning the effect of the
specific savings Clause contained in Act 4é, section 29, despite the dissent’s
attempts te reduce it to “mere surplusage,” ig, at £68." See dissenting
Spinien at 24,3733,

Joan sttenpe fo distinguish Floyd, the dissent cites e Celifornie
appellate eciescn from two years earlier, in re belong, 93 Cal. App. sth $62
{2001}, discussing the same Celifcrnia state Proposition. Dseeenting opinion
at 24-26. The conclusicn in Delong, however, thet. the snencuente

ailable to the defendant hinged oh the term “convicted,” which the court
Concluded was ambiguous, leading the court to interpret the term so that it
Bete cenperted with the underlying purpese of the amendment. 05 Cal- App, éth
st s€7-e8, The Delong ceurt alee relied upen the fect thet the enelicrative
Teent inved

     

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

.

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION 30 WEST'S HAWAI'Z REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER +++
2004), the lower appellate court attempted to apply to the
Gefendant’s case aneliorative amendments to the state’s habitual
despite @ specific savings clause that
Provided that “the provisions of this Act shall only have

offender statute

 

Prospective effect” -~ by relying on the fact that the hearing in
which the lower court “found” that the defendant was an habitual
offender occurred efter the amenduent’s effective date. 871 so.
24 at 324. The Loui

aneliorative sentencing amendments (a) in light of the existence

ena Supreme Court (1) refused to apply the

 

of @ specific savings clause and (b) becaus
jon of the court schedule for the benefit of individual
Gefendants end (2) noted that, “had the legislature intended the

 

it sought to prevent

manipu:

 

more lenient sentencing provisions to be inmediately effective,
it could have signified that intent in the Act.” Id. at 322-23
(citing State v. sugasti, €20 So. 24 518, 520-21 (La. 2002);

State v. Dreaux, 17 So. 24 $59, S60 (Le. 1944)). The Washington
Supreme Court reached the same conclusicn in State v. Ross, 95

F.3d 1225 (Wash. 2004), wherein st rejected the defendant’ s
argument that state precedent required that ameliorative

amendments apply retroactively. Id, at 1232, 1234. The court
instead concluded that, by including a specific savings clause

 

(. . continued}
onendnents were, by the express provisions cf the proposition, else available
fo both individbels alreacy sentenced to probation end those on parcle, and
the court could discern no rationale for denying the Benefit of the new la to
hore recent defencents. "Jé at 569,” By contrast, in the present matter, we
Fecognize no corresponding ambiguity in the term’ “proceeding” arising from
Act 4472 subject matter and de fot confront in Act 44 8 similarly broad
extension of its snelicrative proviesons to those other than newiy-indicted
Gefendante, The legislature, by including the specific savings clause i

Act dé," section 2, expressed an intent thet the snelicretive amendments, be
unavailable to defendants indicted before duly 3, 2004

36

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'S REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
that provided that the amendments in question “apply to crimes
committed on or after July 1, 2002," the state legislature had
expressed the opposite intent, j.e., that the aneliorative
amendments applied only prospectively. Id, at 1234. Indeed, @
number of other jurisdictions have refused to apply aneliorative
amendnents retroactively, even when only general savings clauses
were implicated. See, e.g., State v. Vineverd, 392 P.2d 30
(aria. 1964); State v. Ismascel, 840 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2004) (citing Holiday, 683 A.2d at 78-79, for its concern
that to conclude otherwise would bestow a “windfall” on
defendants whose sentencing proceedings had been delayed and
concluding that “[j]ust es the State will not surprise a
defendant with greater punishment in an ex post facto fashion,
neither should a defendsnt feign surprise about the penalties
that accompanied his [or her] conduct at the time”); Castle v.
State, 330 So. 26 10 (Fla. 1976); Tellis v. State, 445 P.2d 938
(Nev, 1968); Bollard v. State, 521 P.2d 400 (Okla. Crim. App.
1974); State v. Kane, § P.3d 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). Our
decision today is not, therefore, out of step with the
jurisprudence of other states, nor is our analysis of specific
versus general savings clauses, despite the dissent’s
disparagement of the distinction, dissenting opinion at 50 n.S1
(discussing the “so-called specific savings clause in Section

29").
 

‘4 TOR FUBLICATION IW WEST'S HAWAI'I REPCRTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

bo B in
atl whi

We must also interpret the language of the savings
Clouse to preserve, if possible, the constitutionality of the
statute. Kamal, @8 Hawai'i at 294, 966 P.2d at 606.
Interpreting the savings clause such that any hearing conducted
after the effective date could be considered a separate
Proceeding or that the defendant has not incurred the penalties
set forth in Act 44 until the date sentence is imposed could
expose some provisions of Act 44 te constitutional challenges.
This court has stated thet

[s)he 2x post {acta classe of the United states
ConatsEvtion[,) 0-8. Const. arte 1, 6 10, ef Il.)
pronibite states from enacting retforpective penal
Fegisiation

tn 437 U8. 37 (1590),
the United states Supreme Court was presented with’ the
question “shetner the application ef'e fexes statute,
hich was passed after respondent's crine and tanieh
Slloved the reforneticn of an improper jury veraice in
Fespondent’« case, vieiatele) the Ee Boa
Sabse ia 20138." In summerszing the
nesning of the ex Bist Zatic clause, the Court stated:

    

    

cit is settled, by decisions of this Court
so well knows that their citation may be
Gispenses with, that any statute (1!)
whieh punishes ae a crime an act
Previously committed, which was. innocent
when done[, (2)] which maxes nore
Burcensone’ the punisiment for a crine,
after ite comission, o [(3]] which
Geprives one charged with [a] crine of any
Gefense available sccording te lew at the
Eine when the act war connstted, te
Prohibited as gx post [acte-”

Hg, St 42 (quoting seazell v. ohic, 269 0.5. 167,
168-70 (1925)). “the Eeageil formulation is faithfur
fo our Dest knowledge of the original understanding of

the Bx Fest Facto Clause: lesisiatares say aot

incresse the punismen nee
64
(ier) tne new

 

 

 
 

496 POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1

ve neesure may be applied to 0 crime already
Ecnewnnsted . ; Such legislation would be [an] ex
post facto awi.i").

 

State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'i at 375, 878 P.2d at 714 (emphasis in
original) (foctnote and sone citations omitted) (sone brackets
added and some in original) (some underlining omitted in
original).

By ite plein language, the savings clause set forth in
section 29 applies to the entirety of Act 44. See supra
note 1. Act 44, section 3 provides for enhanced penalties for
exposing children to the process of manufacturing or distributing
methamphetamine, as well as new penalties for injuries to others
arising out of the manvfacture or distribution of the drug.
See 2004 Haw. Sese. 1. Act 44, § 3 at 206-08. If “proceedings”
and “incurrec” aze interpreted te allow pplication of Act 44 to
a defendant charged before July 1, 2004 but sentenced thereafter,
the provisions of Act 44, section 3, as an example, if properly
pled and proven, could be susceptible to challenge as
unconstitutional ex post facto measures because, at sentencing,

they would (1) “punish[] as a crime an act previously committed,

 

1 the dissent recegnizes the ex post facke danger of many of
Act 44"s provisions, e danger acaressed 6) the inclusion of the savings
ise, diesenting opinion at 44-45, but it appears to argue (1) that the
Sevings clause deee not spply uniformly to Act 4 and (2) thet the
Interpretation of the terme of the clause cen shift depending on the punitive
Ure cf the anendnent. Specifically, tne dissent esserts

      

 

t]he Act, es noted previously, substant:
related te drug possession, trafficking, and manufacturing. |The

‘Inge Clause here wae ef a generel nature obviously inciuded to
Prevent the 4x Dost {acto spplicetion of those penalty provisions.

 

 

 

Ads at 45 (footnote omitted) «
38
‘#9 FOR PUBLICATION 8 WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER *#*
which was innocent when done{, or (2)] . . . make[] more
burdensome the punishnent for a crime, after ite commission,”

Collins, 497 U.S. at 42.

4. The lecisleture unambiguously int bs

defendants shose Seininel pemeet ee ‘commenced
pricr to July 1, 2004,

The language of Act 44, section 29 does not present us

 

with a situation “[w)here the intention of the legislature .
is incapable of ascertainment,” Yon Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215, 638
P.2d at 323. Rather, we must presune that the legislature knows
the law when enacting statutes, Agustin v. Dan Ostrow Constr
Go, 64 Haw. 60, 83, 636 P.2¢ 1348, 1351 (1961) ("the legislature
is presumed to know the law when enacting statutes,” including
this court's interpretations of statutory language), and, hence,
we must presume that the legislature, in enacting Act 44, was
aware (1) of this court’s interpretation, in Yan den Berg, 101
Hawai'i at 191, 65 F.3d at 136, of the term “proceedings” as
being synonymous with the 4

 

tistion of a prosecution through the
analytical

 

issuance of criminal charces and (2) of the cruci
role the absence of @ savings clause played in Koch and Yon

Geldern; yet the legislature nevertheless chose to include a
savings clause that plainly states that its provisions do not

apply to proceedings begun prier to July 1, 2004.”

= hile there is no dispute thet the legislature, in enacting
Act 44, intended to give the lower courts nore discretion in applying
probation end eccess te drug trestnent in lieu cf inprisonnent, that intention
is not motvally exclusive with the act's savings clause, which, ae
Gencnstrated above, plainly affords that increased ciseretien prospectively to
ew viclatione eceurring after uly 3, 200¢

 

   

40
 

FOR PUBLICATION 2X WEST! AKAS'2 REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #44
‘The preceding analysis, in sum, leads to the conclusion
(1) that “proceedings,” absent ambiguity arising from subject
matter peculiar to the legislation, means criminal prosecutions
of which sentencing hearings are an inseparable conponent™ and
(2) that the legisleture did not intend to allow the sentencing
provisions of Act 44, section 11 to apply “prospectively” to a
sentencing hearing conducted after July 1, 2004, which resulted
from 8 criminal prosecution initiated prior to that date.
Therefore, we hold that the term “proceedings,” as employed in
Act 44, section 29, unambiguously means the initiation of a
criminal prosecution against a defendant through a charging
instrument and subsumes within its scope hearings and other
procedural events that arise as a direct result of the initial

charging instrument.

 

 

% The conclusion that sentencing is an inseparsble stage in the
progression cfs onitery criminal prosecution ie one shared by the Unites
States suprene Court. See Bradley states, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (2973)
(noting thet, "IiJn che legal sense, a prosecution terminates only when
Sentence is imposed” end conclusing that s defendant who committed drug
Stfences pricr to the effective date of an eneliorative sent
Soeld set’ eveil hinsel! of ite terme Geepite his conviction and
Sceurring after the effect date of the snencnent)
Harrere, 41? U.S. 683, €57, E56 (1974) (reiterating the
Court tela that sentencing is part of the concept of ‘prosecution’” and
Sfeasoned that, gince es . Gecieson to meke oh offender eligible for early
parole is sce’ at the tine of entering e jucgment of conviction, the decision
Kor pert of the sentence and therefore algo part of the ‘prosecution'”);
Heligay. 663 Ac2d st 72 (*(2)he [United States Suprene] Court confirmed in
Enudla: thet sentencing is part of the prosecution; the sentence is not part
bie subsequent, severable proceeding. ”)~

The cisvent seserts thet the preceding suthority is “inapposite” because
the savings clause at issue in Bradley and Warrere interpreted the term
Sprosecstiens” and fot “proceeding geenting opinion et s-10.p.
hector ee we have Gencrstreted thet thie court, in Yan cen Berg, interpretes
‘proceedings” to unambiguously betoken the initiation of eriminel
prosecutions, see supra st 16-19, it follows thet United States Supreme
Precedent interpreting “presecutione” to include sentencing proceedings
Eneeversble preceedings part end parcel of any prosecution is far from
Unepporite but, Father, quite persuasive,

 

 

 

 

     

     

 

    

 

 

          

 

    

 

a
‘1* FOR PUBLICATION 20 WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REFORTER +++
Hence, because Reis was charged on January $ and
Rpril 13, 2004, prior to Act 44’s effective date of July 1, 2008,
the circuit court erred in applying Act 44’s anelioretive
amendments to her sentence by feiling to observe the statutory
command of Act 44, section 28, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i at 22, 25 F.2d
at 797. Furthermore, in keeping with this court’s holdings in
Smith, 103 Hawas's at 234, 61 P.3d at 414, and Walker, 106 Hawaii
at 10, 100 P.3d at 604, and insofar as Reis conceded that she
qualified as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.8 in Light of
@ prior conviction of unautherized control of a propelled
vehicle, the circuit court could net sentence Reis to probation
Pursuant to HRS § 706-€22.5 (Supp. 2002), the first-time drug
offender statute in effect at the tine of the comission of her
offenses. Rather, the circuit court was required to apply HRS
$ 706-606.5 to sentence her to a mandatory minimum sentence of

one year and eight months. § —
FOR PUELICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

Iv. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we vacate the Janvary 11,
2008 judgrent and sentence of the circuit court, sentencing Reis
to probation, and remand for resentencing as 4 repeat offender,

pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999).*

on the briefe: Gogo

Loren J. Thonas,

‘Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, tH ate

for plaintiff-appellant
State of Hawai’

 

Pras Creat eve,
stephen 7. Niwa,

Deputy Public Defender,

for defendant-appellee Yne Duchy

Susan Reis

% tn ight of our dispceition, we need not reach the prosecuticn’ ©
argunert, sez gugre section I1IUA.3, ascerting that the seperete nature of
fela'a tue Grug-relétes offentes prevented the circuit court from sentencing
RECS Ercesticn es « firet-time Orog offencer, purevent to HRE § 706-622.
Sopp. 2006).

 

 

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