Case Title: Sperry v. McKune

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112455

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,455 
 
JEFFREY SPERRY, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID MCKUNE (Warden), et al., 
(Raymond Roberts, Kansas Department of Corrections), 
Appellees. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A petition may be dismissed under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A district court considering a motion to 
dismiss filed under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) must decide the motion from the 
well-pleaded facts of plaintiff's petition. 
 
2. 
Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-210(c), a written instrument attached as an exhibit to 
a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes. Hence, documents attached to a 
petition can be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 
60-212(b)(6). 
 
3. 
If, on a motion under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) or (c), matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by a court, the motion must be treated as one 
 
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for summary judgment under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-256. As defined in K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 60-207(a), a "pleading" consists of a petition and an answer. 
 
4. 
When a motion to dismiss converts to a motion for summary judgment, all parties 
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the 
motion. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-256 and Supreme Court Rule 141 (2015 Kan. Ct. Annot. 
242) govern the form and manner of presenting these outside matters. 
 
5.  
Before an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Secretary of Corrections files a civil 
suit against the state, any political subdivision of the state, or any public official, K.S.A. 
75-52,138 requires an inmate to (1) exhaust administrative remedies established by rules 
and regulations promulgated by the secretary of corrections and (2) file with the inmate's 
petition proof that the administrative remedies have been exhausted. 
 
6. 
Both federal and state law require an inmate in the custody of the secretary of 
corrections to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit. But only a state 
claim is impacted by K.S.A. 75-52,138's requirement that an inmate file proof of having 
exhausted administrative remedies; the requirement does not apply to a federal claim. 
 
7. 
A district court considering a motion to dismiss filed under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 
60-212(b)(6) errs when it considers matters outside the pleadings without requiring 
litigants to comply with Supreme Court Rule 141 (2015 Kan. Ct. Annot. 242). The error 
can be harmless if, for example, (1) the district court had excluded from its consideration 
 
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any matters outside those in the petition; (2) the additional material did not otherwise 
infect the district court's consideration; or (3) the subsequent filings allowed for the 
proper presentation of the minimal number of uncontroverted facts required to establish a 
defendant's entitlement to relief. Reversible error occurs, however, if an appellate court 
cannot determine what facts are or are not controverted or on what evidence the litigants 
rely. 
 
8. 
While a court will liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants, pro se 
litigants must still follow procedural rules.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed June 5, 2015. 
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; DAN K. WILEY, judge. Opinion filed November 23, 2016. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding is reversed on the 
issues subject to review. Judgment of the district court is reversed on the issues subject to review and 
remanded with directions.  
 
Jeffrey J. Sperry, appellant, was on the brief pro se. 
 
Fred W. Phelps, Jr., legal counsel, Kansas Department of Corrections, was on the brief for 
appellees. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  K.S.A. 75-52,138 requires prison inmates to (1) exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing a civil lawsuit against the Kansas Secretary of 
Corrections, a prison warden, or certain other officials and (2) file proof of that 
exhaustion when initiating the suit. This appeal raises procedural issues regarding these 
requirements and the standards for deciding motions to dismiss and for summary 
 
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judgment. Because we determine the district court and Court of Appeals failed to apply 
the correct standard, we reverse and remand. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In September 2011, Jeffrey Sperry, an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility 
(LCF), filed a lawsuit in district court seeking civil damages from the LCF Warden, the 
Secretary of Corrections for the State of Kansas, and the Kansas Department of 
Corrections (KDOC) (collectively, the KDOC defendants). Sperry, acting on his own 
behalf, alleged he had been exposed to asbestos and lead paint while incarcerated at LCF. 
After Sperry filed his lawsuit, this case's procedural path involved a series of motions to 
dismiss that eventually led to this appeal. Those motions focus on the allegations in 
Sperry's verified petition, which he captioned a "Complaint." 
 
In that document, Sperry alleged that in January 2010 he first learned he had been 
exposed to contaminants. He sought medical treatment in March 2010, but a "facility 
doctor examined [Sperry] and told him that there was nothing he could do for him." 
Sperry also sought "mental health counseling," but the "psychologist simply told [Sperry] 
that worrying would not help his condition so he should not worry about the fact that he 
will become seriously ill and die prematurely due to the exposure." To remedy these 
alleged wrongs, Sperry sought an injunction ordering the KDOC defendants to treat 
Sperry's current and future medical needs through medical personnel and facilities of 
Sperry's choosing; an injunction ordering the KDOC defendants to remove all dangerous 
environmental contaminants from LCF; a declaratory judgment that the KDOC 
defendants "knowingly and/or recklessly caused [Sperry] to be exposed to friable 
asbestos and lead paint"; and monetary damages in excess of $75,000. 
  
 
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As a means of obtaining this relief, Sperry alleged causes of action based on both 
federal and state law. He first alleged his federal cause of action, asserting he was entitled 
to redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) because the KDOC defendants violated his 
right under the United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 
He then alleged several torts governed by Kansas law:  negligence, battery, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and outrageous conduct. 
 
Sperry also addressed his efforts to obtain administrative relief prior to filing his 
lawsuit. According to him: 
 
 He filed his first internal grievance with LCF in March 2010, but "[t]he 
facility refused to process the grievance." He did not attach any documents 
related to this first grievance, but he did attach a contemporaneous claim he 
filed with the Joint Committee on Special Claims Against the State, 
pursuant to K.S.A. 46-907 et seq., which was denied in September 2010. 
 
 He filed a second grievance with LCF in October 2010, but LCF lost the 
form. Sperry did not attach a copy of this second grievance, either, but he 
included a document from a KDOC official acknowledging this filing and 
stating, "I can only suspect that it was lost in the mail or misplaced." 
 
 He filed a replacement grievance in November 2010, which was "denied all 
the way through to the Secretary of [C]orrections on December 17, 2010." 
Sperry attached this third grievance and related documents to his 
"Complaint." 
 
 
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These attached documents show that Sperry filed the November grievance on 
KDOC forms relating to one of two KDOC administrative procedures that potentially 
applied to his claims. KDOC defines both procedures in its regulations. K.A.R. 44-15-
101 et seq. defines one procedure (article 15 procedure) for grievances relating to, for 
example, prison conditions. K.A.R. 44-16-102 et seq. defines the other (article 16 
procedure), which applies when an inmate claims property damage or personal injury. 
KDOC has adopted separate forms for each procedure. 
 
From the documents attached to Sperry's petition, we know that Sperry used an 
article 15 form when filing his November 2010 grievance and that the grievance was 
reviewed and denied at three administrative levels—by his unit supervisor, the Warden, 
and the Secretary of Corrections. Ultimately, the Secretary, incorporating the previous 
responses, denied Sperry's claim because Sperry had not been exposed to harmful 
contaminants and had not filed an article 16 claim even though he claimed personal 
injury and sought monetary damages. 
 
In response to Sperry's petition in district court, the KDOC defendants filed 
multiple motions to dismiss the lawsuit. The first motion raised various issues not 
presented in this appeal:  whether the KDOC defendants lacked the capacity to be sued, 
whether they enjoyed immunity, and whether Sperry failed to adequately allege various 
claims. Then, in a "Supplement to Motion to Dismiss," the KDOC defendants raised the 
issue now before us:  whether Sperry exhausted his administrative remedies before filing 
suit. The KDOC defendants' arguments focused on Sperry's failure to file an article 16 
claim. To support this argument, the KDOC defendants attached an affidavit of the 
Grievance/Property Claims Officer at LCF, who stated he reviewed all available LCF 
records and was unable to find any personal injury claim filed by Sperry. 
 
 
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Sperry responded to both the motion and its supplement, raising several legal 
arguments regarding the KDOC defendants' capacity to be sued and the reasons they 
were not immune, the sufficiency of his allegations, and the inapplicability of article 16. 
He pursued some of those arguments before the Court of Appeals but did not advance 
them in his petition for review filed with this court. But Sperry also replied to the motions 
by raising an issue preserved for our review:  He argued the KDOC defendants waived 
any requirement that he exhaust an article 16 procedure by taking certain actions during 
the grievance process. When Sperry first raised his waiver argument, he asserted the 
KDOC employees provided him with the wrong claim form. He also pointed to KDOC's 
Internal Management Policy and Procedure (IMPP) 01-118, which stated that "[s]taff 
assistance and all necessary forms shall be provided to inmates interested in filing a 
claim." In other words, Sperry acknowledged he never pursued an article 16 claim, but he 
argued this failure was excused because KDOC wrongfully provided him article 15 
forms. 
 
In ruling on this first motion to dismiss and its supplement, the district court 
granted some aspects of the KDOC defendants' various arguments about capacity; this 
resulted in dismissal of KDOC itself as a party. In addition, the district court dismissed 
Sperry's personal injury claim and request for damages against the Warden and Secretary 
in their official capacities because Sperry had failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
when he did not file a timely article 16 claim. The court noted that Sperry "does not deny 
that he did not submit a personal injury claim within 10 calendar days of the claim[ed] 
personal injury." Then, addressing Sperry's waiver argument, the district court simply 
concluded:  "The [d]efendants didn't relinquish a known right by allegedly failing to 
provide forms to the Plaintiff." The court observed that the argument seemed to be more 
one of estoppel than waiver. Without asking the litigants for arguments or to present a 
statement of facts relating to the elements of estoppel, the district court determined 
 
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Sperry could not establish estoppel because he had not detrimentally relied on the KDOC 
defendants. This determination appears to have been based on arguments Sperry 
presented in an effort to establish that the article 16 procedure did not apply to his claim. 
 
After the district court's ruling, Sperry's claims against the Warden and Secretary 
in their individual capacities—as opposed to official capacities—remained. 
 
Sometime after the district court's ruling, Sperry filed an "Amended Complaint" 
without any attached documents. In many respects the "Amended Complaint" mirrored 
the original "Complaint." For example, Sperry again alleged that the KDOC defendants 
had "refused to process" his March 2010 grievance, lost his October 2010 grievance, and 
denied his November 2010 replacement grievance "all the way through[] to the Secretary 
of Corrections." But the amended pleading also differed from the original in several 
ways. Of note, Sperry did not specifically allege violations of state law; his jurisdictional 
statement was limited to "civil rights claims," and he listed only a single cause of action:  
"Eighth Amendment—Cruel and Unusual Punishment." Nevertheless, for reasons not 
made clear in the record before us, the parties and the district court continued to discuss 
the state law tort claims found in Sperry's original "Complaint." We can only assume the 
reasons are explained in a hearing not transcribed for appeal since the State does not 
assert error on this point. So we, too, will consider those claims. 
 
Almost 2 years later, the district court dismissed all remaining claims when ruling 
on multiple motions to dismiss filed by the Warden and Secretary. In those motions the 
Warden and Secretary had argued, among other things, that all of Sperry's claims arose 
from actions subject to the prison's administrative grievance process. They renewed their 
argument that Sperry had never filed an article 16 personal injury claim and needed to do 
so. Finally, they argued Sperry failed to comply with K.S.A. 75-52,138 because he had 
 
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not and could not provide proof that he had timely exhausted administrative remedies 
prior to filing the lawsuit. 
 
In response, Sperry asserted he had filed some type of claim within 10 days to put 
the facility on notice—his March 2010 grievance—and it was LCF's fault he was 
provided the wrong form. He supported his argument with a statement of facts, which 
consisted of a series of numbered paragraphs. These facts were not verified, supported by 
an affidavit, or supported by references to the discovery record. 
 
Sperry also addressed, in his response to the State's motion to dismiss, the timing 
of his claims' accrual and of his grievance filing. In one statement of fact, Sperry 
indicated he learned of his exposure to contaminants on February 22, 2010; this statement 
conflicted with Sperry's previous sworn statement in his verified "Complaint" that he had 
learned of his exposure to contaminants in January 2010. In another statement of fact, 
Sperry stated prison officials placed him in segregation for an alleged disciplinary 
violation on February 23, 2010, and "separated [him] from his rule book." He also 
alleged:  "Unit Team Manger Jewell was in charge of segregation at the time and refused 
to supply plaintiff with the appropriate forms. In fact, he made certain that he did not 
return the grievance form until the ten calendar days for filing the injury claim form had 
passed." 
 
Regarding the form used to file the grievance, Sperry alleged he used the form 
provided by prison officials. He also argued his grievance "clearly contained matters that 
were valid under the grievance procedure (i.e.[,] remediation of asbestos and lead paint[] 
and medical treatment)." Sperry asserted the Warden "falsely" denied the grievance—
and, for the first time, he attached some documentation about this alleged March 2010 
grievance:  a March 26, 2010, letter from the Warden stating that his grievance was 
 
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received, an investigation was completed, and LCF declined to take action. According to 
Sperry, he appealed the Warden's denial to the Secretary but "the appeal was never 
returned to him." Finally, Sperry alleged he "tried to file an out of time Property/Injury 
Claim form, but Unit Team Manager Muckenthaler refused to process it as it was beyond 
the 10 calendar day time limitation set forth in K.A.R. 44-16-104a." Sperry thus 
reiterated and expanded upon his argument that LCF had wrongfully provided him with 
article 15 procedure forms and thus could not now claim his lawsuit must fail because of 
a failure to pursue an article 16 procedure. 
 
The district court rejected Sperry's waiver arguments. In reaching this result, the 
district court reasoned that Sperry had not alleged ultra vires acts on the part of the 
defendants—"all of the acts allegedly attributed to the Defendants would have clearly 
been within their dut[ies]." Thus, Sperry had to exhaust administrative remedies before 
filing a lawsuit against the Warden and Secretary in their individual capacities, which 
meant that Sperry was required to timely file an article 16 personal injury claim but had 
failed to do so. The district court rejected Sperry's argument that the KDOC defendants 
had waived reliance on K.A.R. 44-16-104a and K.S.A. 75-52,138's exhaustion 
requirement. In doing so the district court incorporated its earlier ruling that the KDOC 
defendants had not knowingly waived a known right. 
 
Sperry appealed both dismissal orders to the Court of Appeals. A panel of that 
court affirmed the district court's order in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings. Sperry v. McKune, No. 112,455, 2015 WL 3632752 (Kan. App. 
2015) (unpublished opinion). Specifically, the panel affirmed the dismissal of Sperry's 
state law claims and reversed the dismissal of his § 1983 claim. 2015 WL 3632752. 
 
 
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The Court of Appeals began its analysis by acknowledging that both Kansas and 
federal law require exhaustion of administrative remedies before an inmate can file suit in 
trial court. Nevertheless, because of different statutory schemes for state and federal 
claims, the issue under federal law was whether Sperry exhausted his remedies; the issues 
under Kansas law, under K.S.A. 75-52,138 specifically, were whether Sperry exhausted 
his remedies and provided proof he did so. 2015 WL 3632752, at *3-4. K.S.A. 75-52,138 
thus imposed a filing requirement in addition to an actual exhaustion requirement. 
 
After recognizing the exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals discussed the 
question of which administrative procedures Sperry was supposed to follow in order to 
exhaust his remedies, concluding the article 16 procedures applied because Sperry 
claimed personal injury. 2015 WL 3632752, at *4-5. The Court of Appeals noted it was 
uncontested Sperry did not comply with the article 16 personal injury procedures. And 
even though Sperry claimed he filed some sort of claim on March 1, 2010, he did not—at 
least at the time he filed his petition—provide any proof of this initial grievance or the 
KDOC defendants' responses. The court ruled Sperry both failed to follow the proper 
procedure for exhaustion of a personal injury claim and failed to file proof of exhaustion. 
2015 WL 3632752, at *6; see K.S.A. 75-52,138. 
 
The Court of Appeals then acknowledged an argument could be made that Sperry 
exhausted his administrative remedies under the article 15 grievance procedures, since his 
documentation showed he filed a grievance regarding conditions within the facility. 
Regardless, he still failed to file proof of timely exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
and this failure was determinative of his state law claims because of K.S.A. 75-52,138's 
filing requirements. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, whether Sperry was required 
to file a personal injury claim or instead was required to file a grievance, his state law 
claims failed for failure to attach proof. 2015 WL 3632752, at *6. 
 
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The Court of Appeals then turned to Sperry's federal § 1983 claim, which, unlike 
his state law claims, was not subject to Kansas law requiring an inmate to file proof of 
exhaustion when filing his lawsuit. The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that 
exhaustion requirements for Sperry's § 1983 claim were mandatory, but not 
jurisdictional—meaning defendants like the Warden and the Secretary could waive their 
ability to use administrative exhaustion as an affirmative defense to an inmate's suit. 
2015 WL 3632752, at *6-7. The Court of Appeals focused on Sperry's initial grievance in 
March 2010 instead of the November 2010 procedure considered by the district court, 
even though Sperry did not file any evidence of a March 2010 grievance until well after 
his petition was filed. The Court of Appeals found that the Warden addressed the merits 
of Sperry's March 2010 claim rather than rejecting it for a failure to comply with the 
article 16 claims procedure. This led the Court of Appeals to conclude:  "KDOC waived 
its right to assert exhaustion of administrative remedies as an affirmative defense when it 
addressed the merits of Sperry's initial grievance . . . ." 2015 WL 3632752, at *8. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals held the district court erred in dismissing Sperry's 
§ 1983 claim. 2015 WL 3632752, at *8. 
 
The Warden and the Secretary of Corrections then filed a petition seeking review 
of the panel's ruling regarding Sperry's § 1983 claim; they argued the waiver issue could 
not be considered because of procedural defects. Sperry cross-petitioned for review of the 
panel's decision regarding his state causes of action; he argued, in part, the waiver 
considerations the Court of Appeals had applied to his federal claim should also apply to 
his state claims. We initially denied the Warden and Secretary's petition, but we granted 
review of Sperry's cross-petition and the case was docketed. However, after reviewing the 
record and considering Sperry's cross-petition, we withdrew our denial of the Warden and 
Secretary's petition for review and granted review. Two circumstances prompted our 
 
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change in direction. First, on June 6, 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued Ross 
v. Blake, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2016), which deals with the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies when an inmate brings a § 1983 claim. As we will 
discuss in detail, this decision raises potential questions about some of the Court of 
Appeals' and district court's reasoning. Second, our review of the full record suggested 
there were procedural obstacles that precluded a final determination of the waiver issue.  
 
Our change of course, while unusual, is within our power and is warranted in this 
case. Under our rules, a party may not file a motion for reconsideration after a petition for 
review has been denied. Supreme Court Rule 8.03(g) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 78). 
Nevertheless, this court has recognized its power to recall, correct, amplify, or modify its 
own mandate. E.g., West v. Insurance Co., 105 Kan. 414, 415-16, 185 P. 12 (1919). And 
here, a mandate had not even issued because of the pendency of Sperry's cross-petition 
for review. Further, this court has repeatedly observed the need for the discretionary 
power to reconsider a prior ruling, stating:  "If an erroneous decision has been made, it 
ought to be corrected speedily, especially when it can be done before the litigation in 
which the error has been committed has terminated finally." Railway Co. v. Merrill, 65 
Kan. 436, 451, 70 P. 358 (1902); see Hudson v. Riley, 114 Kan. 332, 335, 219 P. 499 
(1923) ("If there was error in the ruling it is competent for the court to correct it, and 
especially where it can be done before the litigation in which it occurred has been finally 
terminated."); Henry v. Railway Co., 83 Kan. 104, 108-09, 109 P. 1005 (1910) (errors 
should be corrected before final judgment). 
 
Given these considerations we granted review, allowed both parties to file 
additional briefing, and placed the case on another docket for simultaneous consideration 
of all issues. Both the petition and cross-petition are now ready for decision. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The Warden and Secretary present a seemingly straightforward argument in their 
petition for review:  The district court and Court of Appeals erred in considering material 
outside the pleadings when ruling on motions to dismiss. This would mean that the Court 
of Appeals should not have considered the Warden's response to Sperry's March 2010 
grievance (which, as we have repeatedly underscored above, Sperry filed after his initial 
pleading). And, because that document served as the basis for the Court of Appeals 
ruling, the Court of Appeals should not have reversed the district court order dismissing 
Sperry's federal claim. 
 
In Sperry's cross-petition he argues the district court and Court of Appeals erred in 
ruling his failure to attach proof that he exhausted his administrative remedies required 
dismissing his state law claims. He argues the exhaustion requirements of K.S.A. 75-
52,138 are not jurisdictional and he should have had a chance to correct any filing errors. 
Then, as with his federal claim, he should be allowed to present evidence of waiver. He 
suggests the Court of Appeals inconsistently applied equitable doctrines to his federal and 
state claims and that equity should excuse both his failure to timely exhaust 
administrative remedies and his initial failure to prove he did so. 
 
The arguments arising from the petition and cross-petition are intertwined, so we 
discuss them together. In our analysis, we will examine:  (1) the motion to dismiss 
standard and the standard for when material outside the pleadings is considered (i.e., the 
summary judgment standard); (2) K.S.A. 75-52,138 and the federal requirements 
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies; (3) the specifics of what Sperry needed 
to do to exhaust those requirements—that is, the requirements of KDOC regulations 
 
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regarding article 15 and 16 claims; (4) equitable considerations; and (5) whether the 
district court and Court of Appeals applied the correct standards in this case.  
  
1. Motion to Dismiss Standard and Standard When Material Outside the Pleadings is 
Considered (i.e., the Summary Judgment Standard) 
 
As the Warden and Secretary point out, each of the motions considered by the 
district court and Court of Appeals was labeled as a motion to dismiss. But only the third 
motion cited a statute for authority. It referred to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(b)(6), which 
allows dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." And as 
the Warden and Secretary also point out, a district court, when considering such a 
motion, must decide it "from the well-pleaded facts of plaintiff's petition." Hemphill v. 
Shore, 295 Kan. 1110, 1117, 289 P.3d 1173 (2012).  
 
When considering the well-pleaded facts of the petition, K.S.A. 75-52,138 adds a 
wrinkle to the usual considerations because it requires an inmate to file proof of 
exhaustion with a petition initiating suit against any of the KDOC defendants; in an 
attempt to do so, Sperry attached some documents to his first filing. We know, through 
operation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-210(c), that documents attached to a petition can be 
considered when ruling on a 60-212(b)(6) motion. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-210(c) ("A 
copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 
purposes."). This means the district court, in reviewing the KDOC defendants' motion to 
dismiss, should have considered Sperry's petition as well as his attached exhibits 
regarding his claim with the Joint Committee on Special Claims Against the State and his 
November 2010 replacement grievance. 
 
The KDOC defendants did not solely base their first motion seeking dismissal for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies on the facts pleaded by Sperry, however. 
 
16 
 
 
 
Instead, they filed the affidavit of the Grievance/Property Claims Officer at LCF, who 
stated he reviewed all available LCF records and was unable to find any personal injury 
claim filed by Sperry. By filing this affidavit, the KDOC defendants introduced matters 
outside the pleadings. This changed the appropriate standard for the motion. 
 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) explains this shift. It provides:  "If, on a motion 
under subsection (b)(6) or (c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under 
K.S.A. 60-256." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(d). By definition, a "pleading" consists of a 
petition and an answer and not a filing such as the KDOC defendants' supplement to its 
motion to dismiss. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-207(a). Thus, in this case, the 
Grievance/Property Claims Officer's affidavit should have served as the catalyst for 
converting the KDOC defendants' motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. 
 
When a motion to dismiss converts to a motion for summary judgment, "[a]ll 
parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent 
to the motion." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(d). K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-256 and Supreme 
Court Rule 141 (2015 Kan. Ct. Annot. 242) govern the form and manner of presenting 
these outside matters. Rule 141 requires statements of fact to be set out in separately 
numbered paragraphs, with documentation and record citations to support the factual 
statements. Supreme Court Rule 141(a). The opposing party may then controvert the 
facts, again with documentation and record citations. Supreme Court Rule 141(b). Under 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-256(c)(2), summary judgment "should be rendered if the 
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits or 
declarations show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
Neither the parties, the district court, nor the Court of Appeals cited the summary 
judgment standard. Yet, both the district court and the Court of Appeals considered the 
fact established by the affidavit presented by the KDOC defendants. Because a matter 
outside the pleading was not excluded, the summary judgment standard should have been 
applied and the questions addressed by the district court should have been whether there 
were any genuine issues of material fact and whether the KDOC defendants were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. And, as we will explain in more detail, the district court's 
and Court of Appeals' error in considering the facts in a manner contrary to K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 60-212, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-256, and Supreme Court Rule 141 dictates the 
outcome of this appeal. To frame that procedural discussion, we need to discuss the law 
to determine what facts were material to the exhaustion issue. 
 
2. K.S.A. 75-52,138 and Federal Law Require Inmates to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. 
 
The Kansas Legislature defined an inmate's burden regarding exhaustion in K.S.A. 
75-52,138. It states, in part: 
 
 
"Any inmate in the custody of the secretary of corrections . . . , prior to filing any 
civil action naming the state of Kansas, any political subdivision of the state of Kansas, 
any public official, the secretary of corrections, [or] the warden . . . as the defendant 
pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, shall have exhausted such inmate's administrative 
remedies, established by rules and regulations promulgated by the secretary of 
corrections . . . , concerning such civil action." 
 
This portion of K.S.A. 75-52,138 corresponds to the federal Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA), which similarly requires all inmates to exhaust their administrative 
remedies prior to filing a civil suit in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) ("No action 
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§] 1983 . . . , or any other 
 
18 
 
 
 
Federal law, by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted."). 
 
K.S.A. 75-52,138 contains an additional provision, absent from federal law, 
imposing a requirement of proof of exhaustion. Specifically, it states:  "Upon filing a 
petition in a civil action, such inmate shall file with such petition proof that the 
administrative remedies have been exhausted." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 75-52,138. In 
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has held that, while "failure to exhaust is an 
affirmative defense under the PLRA, . . . inmates are not required to specifically plead or 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." (Emphasis added.) Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 
199, 216, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007). 
 
When a state court considers an inmate claim under a federal law such as 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution preempts any 
state laws or rules that inhibit prosecution of such a claim in a manner different from 
what would be required in federal court. See Prager v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 271 
Kan. 1, 14-15, 20 P.3d 39 (2001) (citing United States Supreme Court decisions holding 
that a state cannot rely on a rule of procedure or an exhaustion rule that would 
"'frequently and predictably'" produce different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation 
based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court). Hence, when 
an inmate states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Kansas state court can enforce Kansas' 
requirement that an inmate exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit because the 
same requirement is present in federal law, but it cannot impose a pleading requirement 
not found in federal law. 
 
This means that, under both federal and state law, Sperry must have exhausted his 
administrative remedies—those remedies made available by the prison system in which 
 
19 
 
 
 
he is housed. But only his state claim is impacted by K.S.A. 75-52,138's pleading 
requirement. As a result, while Sperry had to file proof that he had exhausted 
administrative remedies when filing his petition in order to bring state law claims, he did 
not need to do so to bring his federal claim. 
 
K.S.A. 75-52,138 also explains how exhaustion is to be determined; it requires an 
inmate to exhaust administrative remedies "established by rules and regulations 
promulgated by the secretary of corrections . . . concerning such civil action." In this 
case, both the district court and the Court of Appeals determined that the gravamen of 
Sperry's claim fell under article 16 of the KDOC's regulations, but the Court of Appeals 
recognized Sperry also had a potential article 15 claim. Sperry, 2015 WL 3632752, at *6. 
Which procedures govern Sperry's claim will impact how he needed to show exhaustion. 
To explain, we look to the details of the two articles in the KDOC's regulations. 
 
3. KDOC Regulations Regarding Article 15 and Article 16 Claims 
 
The article 15 grievance procedure applies to complaints by inmates "regarding 
policies and conditions within the jurisdiction of the facility or the department of 
corrections," "actions by employees and inmates, and incidents occurring within the 
facility," and some other circumstances. K.A.R. 44-15-101a(d)(1). An article 15 
grievance must be filed within 15 days of discovery of the event giving rise to the 
grievance, but "[n]o grievance, regardless of time of discovery, shall be filed later than 
one year after the event." K.A.R. 44-15-101b. 
 
The other procedure—the article 16 claim procedure—applies if an inmate claims 
a "loss of or damage to the inmate's own property" or if the inmate makes a claim for 
personal injury. K.A.R. 44-16-102(a) (property damage); K.A.R. 44-16-104a (personal 
 
20 
 
 
 
injury). A personal injury claim must be presented to prison officials "within 10 calendar 
days of the claimed personal injury." K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a). 
 
Grievances about prison conditions may, in some circumstances, overlap with 
claims of personal injury. In such a case, the regulations explain that simply filing an 
article 15 grievance will not suffice. K.A.R. 44-15-101a(d)(2) provides that the article 15 
grievance procedure "shall not be used in any way as a substitute for, or as part of, . . . the 
property loss or personal injury claims procedure" under article 16. And K.A.R. 44-16-
104a(c) states that the article 16 requirement for filing a personal injury claim within 10 
days "shall apply whether or not the inmate pursues a grievance pursuant to article 15 and 
whether or not the inmate files a claim with the legislative joint committee on special 
claims against the state." 
 
Both the district court and the Court of Appeals concluded these regulations 
required Sperry to file an article 16 form in order to seek relief for personal injury. The 
Court of Appeals also distinguished between Sperry's article 15 and article 16 claims. It 
acknowledged that "[a]n argument could be made that Sperry did properly exhaust his 
administrative remedies by filing" an article 15 claim relating to conditions in the prison. 
Sperry v. McKune, No. 112,455, 2015 WL 3632752, at *6 (Kan. App. 2015) 
(unpublished opinion). Indeed, in Sperry's "Complaint," he complained about prison 
conditions and sought an injunction requiring the removal of contaminants from the 
prison. But the Court of Appeals cited the requirement that article 15 claims be filed 
within 15 days from the date of the discovery of the event giving rise to the grievance and 
concluded the claim must be dismissed because "he did not attach documentation of his 
initial grievance." 2015 WL 3632752, at *6. By implication, the Court of Appeals 
concluded the November 2010 grievance—the only grievance filed with the court when 
Sperry originally filed this lawsuit—was untimely. 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
Sperry's failure to prove he had filed a timely grievance defeated his state law 
claims, according to the Court of Appeals. But, because the proof-on-filing requirement 
did not apply to his federal claim, the Court of Appeals examined his federal cause of 
action separately. And with regard to that, it held the KDOC defendants waived the 
exhaustion requirement when the Warden did not deny Sperry's March 2010 claim on the 
grounds it was an article 15, not article 16, form. Sperry, 2015 WL 3632752, at *6-8. 
 
In his cross-petition for review, Sperry argues the Court of Appeals conclusion 
regarding his failure to prove exhaustion is inconsistent with its conclusion that equitable 
principles—specifically waiver—excuses his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
He argues the equitable considerations should be considered as a basis for explaining 
why an inmate cannot file the necessary proof of exhaustion. Logically, it would seem 
that if an inmate could not exhaust administrative remedies because of circumstances 
giving rise to equitable considerations, the inmate would not be able to meet the proof 
requirement of K.S.A. 75-52,138. Yet, the Court of Appeals did not explain the 
difference in its treatment of K.S.A. 75-52,138's two requirements. 
 
Sperry's argument depends on whether equitable considerations can be considered 
at all when K.S.A. 75-52,138 applies (and perhaps on other legal questions). We turn 
next to the legal basis for the district court's and Court of Appeals' consideration of 
equity. 
 
4. Equitable Considerations 
 
As we have discussed, both the district court and the Court of Appeals, citing 
Chelf v. State, 46 Kan. App. 2d 522, 263 P.3d 852 (2011), accepted the legal possibility 
 
22 
 
 
 
that principles of equity could excuse an inmate's failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. The Chelf court held "the exhaustion requirement set forth in K.S.A. 75-52,138 
is a mandatory, but nonjurisdictional, prerequisite to filing suit that must be strictly 
enforced by the court. Because it is not jurisdictional, failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies as required by this particular statute may be subject to certain equitable 
defenses." Chelf, 46 Kan. App. 2d at 533. 
 
Before us, neither party takes issue with the holding in Chelf, even though this 
court has never expressly adopted Chelf. Perhaps this is because the Chelf court explained 
its analysis in detail, applying guidance from the United States Supreme Court regarding 
how to distinguish statutes that impose conditions upon a court's jurisdiction and those 
that merely impose procedural conditions that do not affect jurisdiction. This same 
reasoning has been adopted by other Court of Appeals panels, leading to the conclusion 
that the requirements of K.S.A. 75-52,138 are nonjurisdictional. E.g., Pittman v. Bliss, 
No. 113,577, 2015 WL 9302708, at *4 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (citing 
Chelf); Sperry, 2015 WL 3632752, at *7 (same); Burdine v. State, No. 108,152, 2013 WL 
1943075, at *3 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (same); Redford v. State, No. 
106,787, 2013 WL 781102, at *6 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (same). 
 
Nevertheless, a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting 
the PLRA suggests courts should not create judicial exceptions to the exhaustion 
requirement of statutes such as K.S.A. 75-52,138. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. ___, 136 
S. Ct. 1850, 1856-57, 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2016) (holding the PLRA imposes a mandatory 
exhaustion requirement "[a]nd that mandatory language means a court may not excuse a 
failure to exhaust . . . . No doubt, judge-made exhaustion doctrines, even if flatly stated at 
first, remain amenable to judge-made exceptions. . . . But a statutory exhaustion provision 
stands on a different footing. There, Congress sets the rules—and courts have a role in 
 
23 
 
 
 
creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to. For that reason, mandatory 
exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing 
judicial discretion."). 
 
Even before Ross, federal courts expressed reluctance to apply exceptions to the 
PLRA's exhaustion requirement, which is comparable—although not identical—to 
K.S.A. 75-52,138. See Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 
n.1 (D.D.C. 2009) (collecting cases and concluding "[t]he law is unsettled . . . on the 
question of the extent to which waiver, equitable estoppel or tolling can apply to defeat 
the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion under the PLRA"); Hoover v. West, 93 Fed. 
Appx. 177, 182 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion) ("[T]he Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits have so far declined to decide whether equitable estoppel applies" to the PLRA 
exhaustion requirement.). 
 
In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Ross and the Chelf 
court's reliance on United States Supreme Court decisions in its analysis, we decline to 
decide today whether we will adopt Chelf's holdings. We defer this determination for two 
reasons. First, that issue has not been presented to us in either petition for review and the 
parties have not cited to nor discussed Ross or its implications on Sperry's federal claim 
or on the Chelf analysis. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(a)(4)(C) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
79) ("The court will not consider issues not presented or fairly included in the petition 
[for review]."). And, second, we need not resolve the questions because procedural issues 
require us to remand this case. On remand, the parties will be able to fully argue whether 
Ross impacts these proceedings if their arguments necessitate such a discussion. 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
Now that we have explained the legal background, we return to the manner in 
which the exhaustion issue was presented to and considered by the district court and the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
5. Application of the Appropriate Standard 
 
As our discussion of the law indicates, Sperry had to exhaust his remedies to seek 
judicial relief for either his federal or his state law causes of action and had to file proof 
of exhaustion to advance his state law claims. Facts critical to an exhaustion 
determination under Chelf include:  (1) When did the incident giving rise to a grievance 
or claim occur? (2) Was a grievance or claim filed? (3) When was the grievance or claim 
filed? (4) Was the correct process or grievance filed and appealed to all administrative 
levels? and (5) Were there any equitable considerations? See 46 Kan. App. 2d at 534-35. 
 
In Sperry's petition, he not only made allegations of fact, he arguably provided 
proof of any allegations he had made because he verified his petition—meaning he swore 
an oath that the contents of the petition were "true and correct." This court has long held 
that a "petition verified, positively, and not on information and belief, is, in effect, an 
affidavit." Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124, 128, 1866 WL 457 (1866). And we have 
allowed the use of a verified petition as evidence as long as it was not "verified on 
information and belief." State, ex rel., v. Molitor, 175 Kan. 317, 325, 263 P.2d 207 
(1953). 
 
The verified facts in the petition address:  (1) when the claim arose (Sperry stated 
he learned of his exposure to contaminants in January 2010 and was denied medical 
treatment in March 2010); (2) whether a grievance was filed (Sperry filed several 
grievances); (3) when a grievance or claim was filed (Sperry filed an internal grievance 
 
25 
 
 
 
and a claim with the Joint Committee on Special Claims Against the State in March 
2010); (4) what procedure was used and appealed through the various administrative 
steps (the March grievance was not exhausted but a November one, filed on an article 15 
form, was exhausted); and (5) a potential equitable consideration arose (because the 
KDOC defendants "refused to process the grievance"). The KDOC defendants' did not 
particularly focus on these facts, either by arguing (1) the statements established the 
claim was untimely or (2) the statements were too vague or legally insufficient to meet 
the requirements of K.S.A. 75-52,138 or to raise an issue under Chelf. 
 
Instead, the KDOC defendants' exhaustion arguments focused on the regulations 
requiring Sperry to bring an article 16 claim before filing suit. To establish that he had 
not done so, they filed the affidavit of the LCF Grievance/Property Claims Officer. The 
district court and Court of Appeals found that Sperry had not filed an article 16 claim, 
and both courts noted that Sperry had not disputed that fact. Although the affidavit was 
only attached to the supplement to the first motion to dismiss, the district court made the 
same finding in its second motion. Hence, under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(d), the 
KDOC defendants' motions should have been treated as motions for summary judgment. 
 
Ironically, it is the Warden and Secretary who argue the Court of Appeals erred 
when it considered facts outside the pleadings in determining the KDOC defendants 
waived the exhaustion requirement. Because they submitted the affidavit that converted 
the process from one under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212 to one under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 
60-256, we reject the KDOC defendants' contention that this case should be resolved as a 
motion to dismiss. A party cannot invite a court to consider material outside a pleading 
and then complain of error when the court does so. See Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson Co. 
v. Prairie Center Dev., 304 Kan. 603, 618, 375 P.3d 304 (2016). 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
We note further that the KDOC defendants' appellate brief before the Court of 
Appeals did not directly respond to Sperry's argument that equitable considerations 
excused his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Sperry, 2015 WL 3632752, at 
*7 ("Sperry argues that KDOC's violation of its own rules constitutes waiver of the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. Defendants do not address this 
argument on appeal."). As a result, the KDOC defendants abandoned this issue. State v. 
Seacat, 303 Kan. 622, 628, 366 P.3d 208 (2016) ("[T]he failure to brief and argue an 
issue constitutes abandonment of the issue."). 
 
Nevertheless, the KDOC defendants may still be correct in arguing that the district 
court and Court of Appeals erred by considering matters they should not have in ruling 
on the KDOC defendants' motion. But rather than being based on an inappropriate 
application of the motion to dismiss standard, as they argue, the error arises from an 
improper application of the rules regarding summary judgment and the summary 
judgment standard. Both courts considered facts argued by the litigants even though the 
factual statements did not cite to "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits" and without a determination "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Born v. Born, 304 Kan. 542, 554, 374 P.3d 624 (2016); see 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-256; Supreme Court Rule 141. And while we will liberally 
construe the pleadings of pro se litigants like Sperry, pro se litigants must still follow 
procedural rules. Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 605, 88 P.3d 214 (2004). 
 
The failure of the litigants to comply with Rule 141 and of the district court or 
Court of Appeals to enforce its provisions creates a situation where the record before us 
lacks the clarity necessary for ruling on a motion for summary judgment. This court 
 
27 
 
 
 
considered the ramifications of such a situation in Rhoten v. Dickson, 290 Kan. 92, 223 
P.3d 786 (2010). 
 
In that case, this court held that a district court erred when it did not require 
litigants to comply with Rule 141 after materials outside the pleadings were argued in 
relation to a motion to dismiss. The court explained that not requiring compliance "risks 
confusion among the litigants and the court and runs a substantial prejudicial risk to the 
fair presentation of the facts and law." 290 Kan. at 103. But the court also noted the error 
could be harmless and cited cases supporting harmlessness when, for example, (1) the 
district court had excluded from its consideration any matters outside those in the 
petition; (2) the additional material did not otherwise infect the district court's 
consideration; or (3) the subsequent filings "allowed for the proper presentation of the 
minimal number of uncontroverted facts required to establish defendants' entitlement" to 
relief. 290 Kan. at 104-05. The Rhoten court contrasted these situations with one that 
arose in McCullough v. Bethany Med. Center, 235 Kan. 732, 683 P.2d 1258 (1984). 
 
In McCullough, this court found reversible error when a district court failed to 
enforce Supreme Court Rule 141. Noting Rule 141 "is not just fluff," the court 
determined there was "no way to determine then or now what facts are or are not 
controverted or on what evidence the parties rely." 235 Kan. at 736. 
 
This case presents a situation like that in McCullough. An examination of the 
conflicting rulings of the district court and the Court of Appeals on the issue of waiver 
illustrates why. 
 
The district court made the factual finding that the KDOC defendants did not 
waive reliance on the exhaustion doctrine because they "didn't relinquish a known right 
 
28 
 
 
 
by allegedly failing to provide forms" to Sperry. Ordinarily, the issue of waiver presents a 
question of fact that can only be decided on summary judgment when the material facts 
are uncontroverted. See Foundation Property Investments v. CTP, 286 Kan. 597, 610, 
186 P.3d 766 (2008). In this case, we are unable to tell what facts the district court relied 
on in finding that KDOC did not relinquish a known right and we are similarly unable to 
tell whether those facts were disputed. 
 
Our inability to determine the facts on which the district court's ruling was based 
creates problems because the Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion, holding 
instead: 
 
"[T]he trial court's decision to dismiss Sperry's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies was improper because KDOC waived its right to assert 
exhaustion of administrative remedies as an affirmative defense when it addressed the 
merits of Sperry's initial grievance that was later deemed to be improper." Sperry, 2015 
WL 3632752, at *8. 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by relying on a March 26, 2010, 
document in which the LCF Warden denied Sperry's claim—a document Sperry attached 
only with his response to the KDOC defendants' third motion to dismiss. It appears the 
Court of Appeals raised the effect of the March 2010 denial of Sperry's grievance on its 
own, without benefit of argument from the parties. Yet, this document was not attached 
to Sperry's "Complaint" or "Amended Complaint" and was not before the district court 
when it made its initial ruling on waiver. And because Sperry's allegations regarding this 
letter did not conform to Rule 141, it is not clear that the KDOC had an opportunity to 
controvert any facts regarding the effect of the letter. Moreover, because the grievance 
process was not final until the Warden's letter had been reviewed by the Secretary, a 
 
29 
 
 
 
question of law arises as to whether the Warden's letter was sufficient to waive the 
exhaustion doctrine on behalf of all—or any—of the KDOC defendants. 
 
We could provide several other examples of essential facts we cannot determine, 
but this one area of controverted facts establishes the point. Given our inability to know 
whether the facts cited by the district court or the Court of Appeals are supported and, if 
supported, are uncontroverted and thus ripe for summary judgment, we conclude the 
district court and the Court of Appeals erred in failing to require compliance with Rule 
141. Consequently, we remand for consideration of the various filings under the 
appropriate standards. Given this resolution, we need not discuss Sperry's other 
arguments. 
 
We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the KDOC defendants 
waived their right to rely on Sperry's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Likewise, we reverse the district court's decision granting the KDOC defendants' motion 
to dismiss because it was based, at least in part, on facts not properly before the court. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Both the district court and Court of Appeals erred in not enforcing the 
requirements of Supreme Court Rule 141, and that error cannot be considered harmless 
because there is "no way to determine then or now what facts are or are not controverted 
or on what evidence the parties rely." McCullough, 235 Kan. at 736. We, therefore, 
reverse the district court's decision that Sperry's claims must be dismissed for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. We also reverse the Court of Appeals. We remand to 
the district court for reconsideration of the parties' arguments and, if appropriate, 
enforcement of Supreme Court Rule 141. 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming in part, reversing in part, and 
remanding is reversed on the issues subject to review. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed on the issues subject to review and remanded with directions.