Case Title: Liddy v. Lamone

Citation: 398 Md. 233

Docket Number: 71/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nikos Stanford Liddy v. Linda H. Lamone, et al., No. 71, September Term 2006. 
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
ELECTIONS - CIVIL PROCEDURE - AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES - LACHES
An action challenging the constitutional qualifications of a candidate for the office of the
Attorney General filed more than three months after a similar action, almost 2 months
after this Court’s Order in that case and just 18 days prior to the general election, is barred
by the equitable doctrine of laches. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 71
September Term, 2006
NIKOS STANFORD LIDDY
v.
LINDA H. LAMONE, ET AL.
Bell, C. J.
Raker
         *Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed:    March 29, 2007
*Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
1Abrams filed his action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on July 13,
2006.   In it, he sought an order declaring that Perez did not have the qualifications
required for the office of the Attorney General and injunctions requiring Perez to
withdraw his certificate of candidacy and prohibiting Linda H. Lamone, in her official
capacity as the State Administrator of Elections, and the State Board of Elections from
placing Perez’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the office of the Attorney General.   
2This Court filed a Per Curiam Order on August 25, 2006, holding that Perez was
not qualified to run for the office of the Attorney General and that his name was to be
removed from the primary election ballot.  The appellees sought modification of the
portion of the Order that required Perez’s name to be removed from the ballot because
they claimed, with only 18 days remaining before the primary election, that it was
impossible for them to reprogram voting machines or reorder paper ballots for absentee
and provisional voters in order to prepare an entirely new ballot. This Court granted the
appellees’ motion and issued a modified Per Curiam Order on August 29, 2006.  That
Order directed the local boards of elections to post notices conspicuously in each polling
This is the second of two cases involving the eligibility requirements of a candidate
for the office of the Attorney General of Maryland.  In Abrams v. Lamone, __ Md. __, __
A.2d __ (2007), this Court considered a petition by Stephen A. Abrams (“Abrams”)1
challenging the eligibility of Thomas E. Perez (“Perez”) to hold the office of the Attorney
General.  In Abrams, a case of first impression for this Court, this Court was required  to
interpret Article V, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution, which provides:
“No person shall be eligible to the office of Attorney-General, who is not  a
citizen of  this State,  and  a qualified voter therein, and has not resided and
practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.”  (Emphasis added).
Concluding that Perez had not met the eligibility requirements, i.e., he had not been a
member of the Maryland Bar for the requisite period, we reversed the judgment of the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __, which had ruled that Perez met
the necessary qualifications to run in the 2006 Gubernatorial Primary Election.2  
location to inform voters that Perez was not a candidate for the office of the Attorney
General and that any votes cast for him would not be counted.
3The appellees, Lamone and the State Board, claimed, in addition, that the
appellant’s action is barred by § 12-202 of the Election Law Article, specifically § 12-
202(b)(2), see infra note 7, at 4, the applicable statute of limitations.  They argued that the
action needed to have  been brought within three days of the certification of the primary
election results by the State Board.   Because that occurred on September 26, 2006, the
appellant, they submit,  should have brought his action by September 29, 2006 .  We,
however, need not  address this issue, as we are disposing of the appellant’s claim on the
equitable theory of laches.
2
The instant  challenge was brought by Nikos Stanford Liddy (“Liddy”), the appellant,
against Douglas F. Gansler (“Gansler”), one of the appellees, the victor  in the  September
12, 2006  primary election, thus the  Democratic Party’s nominee for the office of the
Attorney General.  In addition to Gansler, the appellant also named Linda H. Lamone
(“Lamone”), the State Administrator of Elections, and the State Board of Elections (“the
State Board”), collectively, the appellees, as defendants.    It was filed on October 20, 2006,
more than three months after the Abrams suit, almost two months after this Court’s Order in
that case, and just 18 days prior to the November 7, 2006 general election.  In the complaint,
he asserted that Gansler, like Perez, was ineligible to run for the office of the Attorney
General, arguing that Gansler has not “practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.” 
There is, however, a threshold issue which must be addressed, whether the appellant
waited too long to bring this action and, thus, is barred, by the equitable doctrine of laches,
from bringing it now.3  We shall hold that this action is barred by laches.
A.
4Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 5-301(a) of the Election Law Article
provides:
“In general
“(a) An individual may become a candidate for a public or party office only
if:
“(1) the individual files a certificate of candidacy in
accordance with this subtitle; and
“(2) the individual does not file a certificate of withdrawal
under Subtitle 5 of this title.”  (Emphasis added).
5See Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 5-302(a) of the Election Law
Article, which provides:
“On form
“(a) A certificate of candidacy shall be filed under oath on the prescribed
form.”
6Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 5-601(a) of the Election Law Article
provides:
“The name of a candidate shall remain on the ballot and be submitted to the
voters at a primary election if:
“(1) the candidate has filed a certificate of candidacy in
accordance with the requirements of § 5-301 of this title and
3
As stated earlier, in order for one to run for the office of the Attorney General, one
must be qualified to do so.   Article V, § 4 of the Maryland Constitution prescribes those
qualifications.  In addition, under the current Election Law Article, see Maryland Code
(2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.), §§ 1-101, et seq., a candidate wishing to hold the office of the
Attorney General must register his or her candidacy by filing,  with the State Board, pursuant
to § 5-301(a),4 a certificate of candidacy, under oath.5  On June 28, 2006,  Gansler filed his
certificate of candidacy, in which he  certified that he is “a registered voter and a citizen of
Maryland and meet[s] all other requirements for the...office [of the Attorney General].”  The
State Board accepted Gansler’s certificate and, pursuant to  § 5-601(1)6 of the Election Law
has satisfied any other requirements of this article relating to
the office which the individual is a candidate, provided the
candidate
“(i) has not withdrawn the candidacy in
accordance with Subtitle 5 of this title; 
“(ii) has not died or become disqualified, and
that fact is known to the applicable board by the
deadline prescribed in § 5-504(b) of this title;
“(iii) does not seek nomination by petition
pursuant to the provisions of § 5-703 of this
title; or
“(iv) is not a write-in candidate.”
7See Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 12-202 of the Election Law
Article, which provides:
“§ 12-202.  Judicial challenges
“(a) In general.  If no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by this
article, a registered voter may seek judicial relief from any act or omission
relating to an election, whether or not the election has been held, on the
grounds that the act or omission:
“(1) is inconsistent with this article or other law applicable to
4
Article, placed his name on the ballot for the 2006 Gubernatorial Primary Election. 
The Election Law Article also provides that any registered voter may seek judicial
relief if he or she alleges that an “act or omission relating to an election, whether or not the
election has been held, is inconsistent with th[e Election Law A]rticle or other law applicable
to the elections process and may change or has changed the outcome of the election,”
provided that  the action is filed  “within the earlier of 10 days after the act or omission or
the date the act or omission became known to the petitioner or 7 days after the election
results are certified, unless the election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary
election, in which case 3 days after the election results are certified.” 7  As stated earlier,
the elections process; and
“(2) may change or has changed the outcome of the election.
“Place and time of filing
“(b) A registered voter may seek judicial relief under this section in the
appropriate circuit court within the earlier of:
“(1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or
omission became known to the petitioner; or
“(2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the
election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary
election, in which case 3 days after the election results are
certified.” (Emphasis added).
8A number of stipulations were placed on the record, in support of the appellees’
position: that Gansler filed his certification for candidacy on June 28, 2006; the 2006
Gubernatorial Primary Election was held on September 12, 2006, and the primary election
results were certified on September 26, 2006; plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on October
20, 2006; on October 25, 2006, 138,043 applications for absentee ballots had been
received by the State Board, of which 7,074 were from service members overseas; the
deadline for the filing of such applications was October 31, 2006; 14,277 absentee ballots
had already been cast and received by the State Board; 19,000 electronic voting machines
5
Liddy  brought a challenge to Gansler’s qualifications.  He did so on October 20, 2006, when
he sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Gansler, Lamone, and the State Board
because, he claimed,  Gansler’s legal experience did  not satisfy Article V, § 4's requirement
that a candidate for that office  “practice[] Law in this State for at least ten years.”   
Gansler filed a Motion to Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, for Summary Judgment,
contending that he met all eligibility requirements for the office. Moving to dismiss and
expedite scheduling, the other appellees contended that Liddy’s action was barred by
limitations and by laches.  In support, they alleged that their sole interest in the action was
to ensure an orderly administration of the election process, the deadlines of which would be
jeopardized if the action were not adjudicated expeditiously.8  
had been deployed throughout the State, and 13 of the 24 election jurisdictions had
completed the required testing of these units; and an upward of 1.1 million paper ballots,
of more than 200 different styles, had been ordered and were in the process of being
delivered to the more than 3 million registered Maryland voters.
9Pertaining to the merits of the case, Liddy testified that he first became aware of
Gansler’s lack of qualifications for Attorney General during the week of October 16,
2006 when he was conducting some research on the Internet.  There he claims to have
found information on Gansler’s limited practice of law in Maryland.  He, in fact, testified
that, apart from Gansler’s service for the past eight years as State’s Attorney for
Montgomery County, the sites he consulted referred only to Gansler’s practice in
Washington, D.C. and not in Maryland.  Based on this information, Liddy inferred that
Gansler did not meet the constitutional ten-year practice of law requirement and decided
to bring suit challenging Gansler’s continued candidacy for the office of the Attorney
General.  
Gansler, on the other hand, testified to having continuously practiced law in the
State since his admission to the Maryland Bar in 1989.  He cited his judicial clerkship
from 1989-90 and numerous pro bono matters he handled in the State  while practicing in
the District of Columbia, before becoming the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County.
10On the issue of the applicable statute of limitations, the Circuit Court stated that
“§12-202(b)(2) does not yet apply because the general election has not yet taken place,
and consequently, the election results have not yet been certified.”  The court continued,
stating that “[b]ecause the general election has not yet been held, the ‘earlier of’ the two
deadlines set forth in §12-202(b) is §12-202(b)(1), ten days of it being known to the
Plaintiff that an allegedly ineligible candidate will be running in the general election.” See
Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 12-202 of the Election Law Article, supra
note 7, at 4.  The court ultimately held that Liddy’s claim was not barred by any
6
Following a hearing at which it heard extensive testimony pertaining to the merits of
Gansler’s constitutional eligibility for the office of the Attorney General,  the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County denied the dispositive motions filed by the appellees and Gansler.9
Although the Circuit Court addressed, in addition to laches, the issues of the applicable
statute of limitations and the merits of the case, we will confine our discussion  to the
equitable doctrine of laches.10 
applicable statute of limitations because it had “no reason to disbelieve his testimony that
he recently came to the conclusion on October 16, 2006, while accessing the internet, that
Mr. Gansler had only practiced law in this State for eight years.”  
Addressing the merits of the case, the Circuit Court found, as a factual matter, that
“Mr. Gansler does possess the requisite ten (10) years of practice in Maryland making
him eligible to run for the Office of the Attorney General.” 
7
On the issue of laches, the appellees argued that the appellant’s claim was “an
eleventh hour lawsuit that threaten[ed] to disrupt the entire elections machinery, to sew doubt
in the minds of voters, to create voter confusion and uncertainty, and generally to defeat
voters’ choices.”  The appellees maintained “voters ought to be able to make their choice
intelligently and based on the ballots that have been created and in accordance with the
election law.”  The appellees’ paramount concern was the prejudice this action would have
on the electorate and its choice of Attorney General candidates.  In addition, they outlined
the various procedures which had already taken place, and which were in the process of
taking place, and insisted that the appellant’s claim was simply brought too close to the
general election to allow any changes or alterations to be made.  The process was well
underway, and to grant the appellant the  relief he requested, i.e. the removal of Gansler’s
name from the general election ballot, at such a late stage “would  lead to an unmanageable
disruption of the general election and disenfranchise thousands of voters.”  Conversely, the
appellant argued that the constitutional issue, the interpretation of Article V, § 4,  outweighed
any merit found in the laches defense.  
In rejecting the appellees’ arguments, the Circuit Court, citing Ross v. State Board of
11Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 12-203(a) of the Election Law Article
provides:
“(a) In general.  A proceeding under this subtitle shall be conducted in accordance
with the Maryland Rules, except that:
“(1) the proceeding shall be heard and decided without a jury and as
expeditiously as the circumstances require;
“(2) on the request of a party or sua sponte, the chief administrative judge
of the circuit court may assign the case to a three-judge panel of circuit
court judges; and
8
Elections, 387 Md. 649, 671, 876 A.2d 692, 705 (2005), held that application of laches was
inappropriate in a situation such as the case sub judice.   It determined that Liddy was “not
responsible for any inexcusable delay in the processing of his complaint [and found] it
inappropriate to allow the general election to go forward without examining whether a
candidate who may become this State’s next Attorney General is constitutionally eligible to
hold that office.”  The court further noted, on the issue of prejudice,  that “Mr. Gansler
cannot be prejudiced because if, in fact, he does not meet the eligibility requirements, he
ought not to be on the ballot.  The S[tate] B[oard of] E[lections] is not prejudiced because
it is undisputed that at this late date, there is nothing that can be done to alter the makeup of
the ballot for this election.”  On the other hand, the court noted that “Plaintiff [Liddy] and
similarly situated voters would be prejudiced if an ineligible candidate were to remain on the
ballot because of a delay in finding out about the lack of eligibility.”
Although the appellant prevailed on the  dispositive motions, the Circuit Court
ultimately ruled in favor of Gansler and his continued candidacy for the office  of the
Attorney General.  The appellant, pursuant to § 12-203(a)11 of the Election Law Article, in
“(3) an appeal shall be taken directly to the Court of Appeals within 5 days
of the date of the decision of the circuit court.” (Emphasis added).
12Maryland Rule 2-323 provides, in pertinent part: 
“ANSWER
*  *  *
“(g) Affirmative Defenses. Whether proceeding under section (c) or section (d) of
this Rule, a party shall set forth by separate defenses: (1) accord and satisfaction,
(2) merger of a claim by arbitration into an award, (3) assumption of risk, (4)
collateral estoppel as a defense to a claim, (5) contributory negligence, (6) duress,
(7) estoppel, (8) fraud, (9) illegality, (10) laches, (11) payment, (12) release, (13)
res judicata, (14) statute of frauds, (15) statute of limitations, (16) ultra vires, (17)
usury, (18) waiver, (19) privilege, and (20) total or partial charitable immunity.
“In addition, a party may include by separate defense any other matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense on legal or equitable grounds. When a party
has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a
defense, the court shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation,
if justice so requires.”
9
response, noted an appeal to this Court and to the Court of Special Appeals.   In addition, he
filed, in this Court, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted.  Liddy v.
Lamone, 395 Md. 420, 910 A.2d 1061 (2006).   The appellees and Gansler subsequently filed
a Joint Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari.  Oral argument was heard on November 2, 2006,
and, on that same day, the Court issued its Order vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court
and remanding the case  to that court with directions to dismiss it on the ground of laches.
We now set forth the reasons for that Order.
B.
Laches is one of the affirmative defenses recognized and expressly  listed in Md. Rule
2-323.12  Generally, it must be pled,  but it can be invoked by a court on its own initiative. 
13Other states also recognize that a court, in its discretion, may invoke the doctrine
of laches as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Bass River Sav. Bank, 336 N.E.2d 921,
925 n.2 (Mass. App. 1975) (“Although not pleaded, a judge may sua sponte find and rule
on the basis of laches where justice so requires”) (emphasis added); Becker v. Becker,
202 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Wis. 1972) (noting that the defense of laches must be pleaded in
the answer as a matter of affirmative defense “unless laches appears obvious from the
face of complaint”); Rutt v. Frank, 186 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Neb. 1971) (asserting that facts
constituting laches should normally be pleaded, but a court of equity may deny relief on
the ground of laches when admissible evidence together with plaintiff’s pleading shows
laches); Wallace v. Timmons, 101 S.E.2d 844, 847 (S.C. 1958) (stating that in a proper
case, the defense of laches can be considered by a court on its own motion, even though
not pleaded, since “[i]t is not necessary to set up laches in a formal manner”); Baslego v.
Kruleskie, 56 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa. Super 1948) (noting that where fact of laches appears in
the evidence, a court may deny relief on the ground of laches in its discretion and on its
own motion, though laches was not pleaded in defense).  Cf. Hansen v. Kiernan, 499 P.2d
787, 792 (Mont. 1972) (recognizing that a court would not consider a claim of laches
which was not pleaded); Danovitz v. Portnov, 161 A.2d 146, 148 (Pa. 1960) (noting that
the defense of laches which “was not raised in the pleadings nor at any time in court
below” could not be considered by the appellate court); Lincoln County v. Fischer 339
P.2d 1084, 1097 (Or. 1959) (“[L]aches is not available as a defense unless pleaded”);
Otero v. Sandoval, 292 P.2d 319, 321 (N.M. 1956) (asserting that where laches was not
10
See, e.g., Ipes v. Board of Fire Comm’rs of Baltimore, 224 Md. 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339
(1961) (recognizing that laches is a proper ground for refusing to issue a writ of mandamus);
Baltimore County v. Glendale Corp., 219 Md. 465, 468, 150 A.2d 433, 435 (1959) (noting
that, although it is essential to raise the defense of laches in the pleadings, “equity may
decline relief for a stale claim after the facts are fully developed”); Warburton v. Davis, 123
Md. 225, 231, 91 A. 163, 165 (1914) (recognizing that a court,  in a proper case and on its
own motion,  may refuse to grant relief to a complainant who on the final hearing appears
to have been guilty of laches, although the defense was not interposed by the defendant),
citing Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288, 319 (1867).13   This Court has held that laches “is a
pleaded as an affirmative defense, it was not available);  Kramer v. Johnson, 238 S.W.2d
416, 421 (Mo. 1951) (holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded, denial of
equitable relief on grounds of laches was error). 
11
defense in equity against stale claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public policy by
discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society.” Ross, supra, 387 Md. at 668, 876 A.2d
at 703, quoting Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126, 130, 186 A.2d 195,
197 (1962); Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 645, 770 A.2d 152, 158 (2001);  Berman v.
Leckner, 193 Md. 177, 187, 66 A.2d 392, 396 (1949); Kaufman v. Plitt, 191 Md. 24, 28, 59
A.2d 634, 635 (1948).  In its application, “[t]here is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes,
or what does not constitute, laches; hence its existence must be determined by the facts and
circumstances of each case.” Ross, 387 Md. at 669, 876 A.2d at 704, quoting Parker, 230
Md. at 130, 186 A.2d at 197, citing Brashears v. Collision, 207 Md. 339, 352, 115 A.2d 289,
295 (1955); Bowie v. Ford, 269 Md. 111, 122, 304 A.2d 803, 810 (1973); Day v. Day, 237
Md. 229, 236, 205 A.2d 798, 803 (1965).  
It is, however, well settled that laches “applies when there is an unreasonable delay
in the assertion of one’s rights and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.”
Frederick Road Ltd. Partnership v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 117, 756 A.2d 963, 985
(2000), citing Inlet Assoc. v. Assateague House Condominium Ass’n, 313 Md. 413, 438-39,
545 A.2d 1296, 1309 (1988); See Ross, 387 Md. at 669, 876 A.2d at 704 (“[L]aches must
include an unjustifiable delay and some amount of prejudice to the defendant”); Schaeffer
12
v. Anne Arundel County, 338 Md. 75, 83, 656 A.2d 751, 755 (1995) (“[L]aches is an
inexcusable delay, without necessary reference to duration in asserting an equitable claim”)
(emphasis in original); Simpers v. Clark, 239 Md. 395, 403, 211 A.2d 753, 757 (1965)
(“[F]or the doctrine [of laches] to be applicable, there must be a showing that the delay [in
the assertion of a right] worked a disadvantage to another”); Hungerford v. Hungerford, 223
Md. 316, 320-21, 164 A.2d 518, 521 (1960) (“Only two requisites are necessary in order to
invoke the doctrine of laches.  There must have been some lapse of time during which
plaintiff failed to assert his rights, and the lapse must have caused some prejudice to the
defendant”).  Prejudice is “generally held to be any thing that places [the defendant] in a less
favorable position.” Ross, 387 Md. at 670, 876 A.2d at 704, quoting Buxton, 363 Md. at 646,
770 A.2d at 159; Parker, 230 Md. at 130, 186 A.2d at 197; Roberto v. Catino, 140 Md. 38,
43,116 A. 873, 875 (1922).
 Moreover, this Court has recognized that in the context of election matters,“any claim
against a state electoral procedure must be expressed expeditiously,” Ross, 387 Md. at 671,
876 A.2d at 705, quoting Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that
“[a]s time passes, the state's interest in proceeding with the election increases in importance
as resources are committed and irrevocable decisions are made”), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1206,
111 S. Ct. 2799, 115 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1991); Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1980),
without unreasonable delay, so as to not cause prejudice to the defendant.  Fulani, 917 F.2d
at 1031.  See, e.g., MacGovern v. Connolly, 637 F.Supp. 111, 115 (D.Mass. 1986) (stating
13
that “in awarding or withholding relief, a court should...endeavor to avoid a disruption of the
election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make
unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the
court's decree”), quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 506, 541 (1964); Farnum v. Barns, 548 F.Supp. 769, 774 (D.R.I. 1982) (noting that
“equitable principles may require a court not to interfere with the conduct of rapidly
upcoming elections where the election machinery is already in gear”) (emphasis added);
Barthelmes v. Morris, 342 F.Supp. 153, 160 (D.Md. 1972) (stating that although “the election
process is one fraught with uncertainty[, i]t does not follow [] that a court should add a
further element of wholly unanticipated uncertainty into the process at the eleventh hour”);
cf.  Ross, 387 Md. at 671 n.9, 876 A.2d at 705 n.9 (outlining instances where the application
of laches in the election context may not apply). 
We note that, in reviewing the Circuit Court’s decision, the issue of laches, in this
case, is a mixed question of fact and law.  Whether the elements of laches have been
established is one of fact, see, e.g., Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services 977 F.2d 511, 516 (10th
Cir. 1992) (noting that whether a party's delay is unreasonable is a question for the trier of
fact); Harman v. Masoneilan International, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 503 (Del. 1982) (stating that
a finding of unreasonable delay is a factual question);  Everett v. Bosch, 50 Cal. Rptr. 813,
820 (Cal.Ct.App. 1966) (noting that whether there has been delay amounting to laches is a
fact question); Leathers v. Stewart, 79 A.16, 18 (Me. 1911) (“The circumstances in a given
14
case which are claimed to constitute laches is, of course, a question of fact”), while the
question of whether in view of the established facts, laches should be invoked, is a question
of law. See, e.g., Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 77 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he conclusion that a delay is ‘inexcusable’ comprehends both the application of a legal
standard and an exercise of the trial court's sound discretion in assessing the equitable
circumstances of a particular case”), quoting Churma v. United States Steel Corp., 514 F.2d
589, 593 (3d Cir. 1975); Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 606, 689 (Tenn.
App. 1970) (“The question whether in view of the established facts, relief is to be denied-that
is, whether, it would be inequitable or unjust to the defendant to enforce the complainants’
right-is a question of law”); Leathers, 79 A. at 18 (“[T]he conclusion whether upon the facts
it would be inequitable to enforce the right, and whether the claimant is barred by laches,
involves a question of law”).
Maryland Rule 8-131, providing:
“c) Action tried without a jury. When an action has been tried without a jury,
the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will
not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly
erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses,” (emphasis added),
governs the standard of review for questions of fact, i.e. whether the elements of laches have
been established.   In addition, this Court has held that questions of law, i.e. whether the facts
taken together are sufficient to sustain the defense of laches, are subject to review under the
de novo standard.  See In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 411, 906 A.2d 898, 903 (2006); Ehrlich
15
v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 708, 908 A.2d 1220, 1230 (2006); Renbaum v. Custom Holding, Inc.,
386 Md. 28, 43, 871 A.2d 554, 563 (2005); Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 67, 871 A.2d 575,
577 (2005); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 48, 803 A.2d 482, 487 (2002).
With respect to the standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law, in Bowers
v. Eastern Aluminum Corp., on the other hand, we held that this Court must affirm the trial
court’s decision on mixed questions of fact and law when “we cannot say [that its findings]
were clearly erroneous[,]...[a]nd we find no error in [its] application of the law to the facts.”
240 Md. 625, 214 A.2d 924 (1965).   Thus, we have stated that mixed questions of fact and
law are entitled to deferential review on judicial review.  See, e.g., Charles County Dept. of
Social Services v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 296, 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004) (noting that when an
agency decision under judicial review involves a mixed question of fact and law, the
reviewing court applies the same standard of review it would apply to the review of an
agency factual finding);  NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 313
Md. 118, 133-34, 544 A.2d 764, 771 (1988) (stating that a reviewing court must defer to a
tax court’s expertise on determinations involving mixed questions of fact and law);
Pemberton v. Montgomery County, 275 Md. 363, 368, 340 A.2d 240, 243 (1975) (asserting
that, on questions of mixed fact and law, it is not the function of the appellate court to
substitute its assessment of the facts, as they relate to the issues of a particular case, for those
of the administrative agency).   
Where, however, an administrative agency decision is not being reviewed and, thus,
14It is important to note that we do not express an opinion as to the merits of the
case sub judice.  Unlike the application of law to facts, findings of fact are entitled to
substantial deference.  See Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001)
(“We extend great deference to the fact finding of the [trial] court and accept the facts as
found by that court unless clearly erroneous”).  See also Friendly Finance Corp. v. Orbit
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Truck, Inc., 378 Md. 337, 342, 835 A.2d 1197, 1200 (2003)
(noting that factual findings of a trial court will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous);
North River Ins. Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 34, 88, 680 A.2d
480, 507 (1996) (Bell, J., dissenting) (stating that findings of fact made by the trial court
are entitled to great deference as that court is in the best position to make such findings);
Maryland Rule 8-131 (c), supra at 14. We, thus, do not review the Circuit Court’s
ultimate finding that Gansler is eligible, i.e. he meets the constitutional requirements
prescribed in Article V, § 4,  to serve as the Attorney General of Maryland.
15In that case, the court articulated the policy concerns that underlie standard of
review jurisprudence, stating:
“Structurally, appellate courts have several advantages over trial courts in
16
the expertise of the decision-maker is not implicated, critical or germane, we have held that
the de novo standard of review is appropriate, see Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753
A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (“Issues of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de
novo”), at least with respect to application of law to facts.  See also Whiting v. State, 389
Md. 334, 345, 885 A.2d 785, 791 (2005) (“Although we extend great  deference to the
hearing judge’s findings of fact, we review independently the application of the law to those
facts”); Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310-11, 765 A.2d 97, 116 (2001) (“The trial court’s
determination of whether a confession was made voluntarily is a mixed question of law and
fact.  As such, we undertake a de novo review of the trial judge’s ultimate determination on
the issue of voluntariness”) (internal citations omitted).14 
The latter formulation is precisely this case.   A trial court is in no better position to
apply, and has no more expertise in applying, the law to facts, even those it has found, than
an appellate court. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied 469 U.S. 824, 105 S. Ct. 101, 83 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1984).15  Accordingly, where the
deciding questions of law.  First, appellate judges are freer to concentrate
on the legal questions because they are not encumbered, as are trial judges,
by the vital, but time-consuming, process of hearing evidence.  Second, the
judgment of at least three members of an appellate panel is brought to bear
on every case.  It stands to reason that the collaborative, deliberative
process of appellate courts reduces the risk of judicial error on questions of
law.  Thus, de novo review of questions of law, like clearly erroneous
review of questions of fact, serves to minimize judicial error by assigning to
the court best positioned to decide the issue the primary responsibility for
doing so.”  
In addition, on the appropriate standard of review for a lower court’s application of law to
facts, the court specifically enunciated:
“[T]he concerns of judicial administration will generally favor the appellate
court, justifying de novo review.  This is so because usually the application
of law to fact will require the consideration of legal concepts and involve
the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles.”
16The cases from other jurisdictions  that,  focusing  on the heavily factual nature of
laches,  apply the clearly erroneous standard of review are not necessarily to the contrary.
See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790-91, 
L. Ed. 2d 66, 79-81 (1982) (recognizing that mixed questions of fact and law that are
essentially factual in nature should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard as
opposed to the generally administered de novo standard); Jarrows Formulas Inc. v.
Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district court’s application
of the laches factors  is  entitled to deference, not to be reviewed de novo”); Lozier v.
Auto Owners Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[M]ixed questions in which
the applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual test...are reviewed for clear
error”), citing McConney, 728 F.2d at 1203-04 (adopting a functional analysis for mixed
questions of fact and law that focuses on the nature of the inquiry);  Bermuda Exp. N.V.
v. M/V Litsa (Ex. Laurie U), 872 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir. 1989) (on length of delay and
prejudice issues); Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Berwick Industries, Inc.,
532 F.2d 330, 334 (3d Cir.1976) (on prejudice issue); Tagaropulos, S.A.v. S.S. Santa
Paula ex S.S. Hans Isbrandtsen, 502 F.2d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 1974);  Carter-Wallace,
Inc. v.  Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 1970).  See also Piper Aircraft
Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc.,741 F.2d 925, 935-41 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring)
17
issue is whether a party is precluded by laches from challenging an action of another party,
we shall review the trial court’s ultimate determination of the issue de novo, just as we do
in similar circumstances.16    Thus, we hold that the Circuit Court  erred  in not invoking the
(providing an historical overview of equity and  concluding that the proper standard of
review in laches decisions is the clearly erroneous standard). Cf. Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the trial court’s
laches determination for abuse of discretion); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that an appellate court reviews
a lower court’s laches  determination for abuse of discretion); Bermuda, 872 F.2d at 557
(asserting that the lower court’s balancing of the equities is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, while its application of legal precepts in determining that any  delay was
excusable is reviewed under a plenary standard).
18
doctrine of laches as a bar to the appellant’s untimely claim when it placed the determination
of a candidate’s eligibility ahead of the urgency of the election itself and the possible
disenfranchisement of Maryland voters.
C.
As stated earlier, “any claim against a state electoral procedure must be expressed
expeditiously.” Ross, 387 Md. at 671, 876 A.2d at 705. The reason for this is plain.  As the
Supreme Court of the United States stated recently in  Purcell v. Gonzalez, __ U.S. __, 127
S. Ct. 5, 166 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2006), reversing a lower court’s injunction, in an election case,
enjoining operation of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election, “[a]
State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election
process.”  __ U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 7, 166 L. Ed. 2d at 4, quoting Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1024,103 L. Ed. 2d
271, 287 (1989).  The Court articulated further that “[c]onfidence in the  integrity of our
electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” __ U.S.
at __, 127 S. Ct. at 7, 166 L. Ed. 2d at 4.  The Purcell Court, moreover, addressed the issue
of the applicability of laches on an election challenge, stating: 
“[the lower court] was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant
upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to
19
election cases and its own institutional procedures.  Court orders affecting
elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion
and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.  As an election draws
closer, that risk will increase.” Id. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court, ultimately, held that, “[g]iven the imminence of the election and the
inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, [its] action [] shall of necessity allow the
election to proceed without an injunction.”__ U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 8, 166 L. Ed. 2d at 5.
Thus, it made clear that injunctive relief may be inappropriate in an elections case if the
election is too close for the State, realistically, to be able to implement the necessary changes
before the election. It is such pragmatic imperatives related to the implementation of the
elections process, coupled with the statutory scheme governing the process itself, that result
in the need for expedited resolutions of disputes. See also Reynolds, supra, 377 U.S. at 585,
84 S. Ct. at 1394, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 541 (stating that “a court is entitled to and should consider
the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election
laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394
U.S. 542, 547, 89 S. Ct. 1234, 1237, 22 L. Ed. 2d 535, 539-40 (1969) (finding no error when
court allowed an election that was only three months away to proceed “despite its
constitutional infirmities”); Kilgarin v. Hall, 386 U.S. 120, 121, 87 S. Ct. 820, 821, 17 L. Ed.
2d 771, 774 (1967) (affirming ruling to allow an election, “constitutionally infirm in certain
respects,” to proceed).
In the case sub judice, this Court is faced with the same quandary as the Purcell Court
and must contemplate the “considerations specific to election cases,” i.e.  the potential harm
to the appellees and, more important, to the electorate, which, we believe, the Circuit Court
failed to do.  The Circuit Court, citing Ross v. State Board of Elections, and relying more
20
specifically on Melendez v. O’Connor, 654 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2002), dismissed the
appellees’ laches argument, concluding that “it would be inappropriate to allow the general
election to go forward without examining whether a candidate who may become this State’s
next Attorney General is constitutionally eligible to hold that office.” We do not agree. To
be sure, this Court has stated, see Ross, 387 Md. at 671 n.9, 876 A.2d at 705 n.9,  that there
may be instances where laches would be inapplicable, and even further, that, perhaps, a
dispute concerning the eligibility requirements of a candidate to run for office should not be
given a laches analysis, id., the facts presented by the case sub judice, however,  do not
constitute such an instance. 
In Melendez, the court held that a petition brought by citizens to have a candidate for
state representative removed from the ballot on the grounds that he did not meet the
residency requirements was not barred by laches.  654 N.W.2d at 117.  The court reasoned
that “regardless of whether there has been an unreasonable delay by petitioners in filing their
petition, there would be no prejudice to [the candidate] or others in granting the
relief...[t]here is nothing in the record indicating that [the candidate] was prejudiced by the
timing of the filing of the petition.” Id.  Melendez is distinguishable from the case sub judice
for two distinct reasons.  
First, the citizens’ petition in Melendez was filed on October 2, 2002, over a month
before the November 5, 2002 general election was to take place.  Here, the appellant brought
his challenge on October 20, 2006, only 18 days before the November 7, 2006 general
election, claiming that it was proper under the statutory provisions governing the election.
The case was heard October 25, 2006 in the Circuit Court and then on November 2, 2006 in
this Court, leaving only 5 days remaining before the general election.  The time constraints
17The Melendez court issued an order granting the petition on October 15, 2002,
giving the Election Division Director three weeks to make any necessary changes.  
21
thus placed on this Court, as well as the Circuit Court, were substantially different than those
of the Melendez Court.  Moreover, notwithstanding that the appellant’s filing may have been
within the governing statutory provisions outlined in the Election Law Article, his failure
diligently to pursue his challenge left this Court, as well as the court below, a very brief time
in which to consider and decide this matter.  See Lubin v. Thomas 144 P.3d 510, 512 (Ariz.
2006) (noting that “merely complying with the time limits [of a state statute] for filing notice
of appeal may be insufficient if the appellant does not also promptly prosecute the appeal”).
Second, it is clear that the court in Melendez was more concerned with the prejudice
to the candidate than it was with prejudice to the electorate itself.  This, perhaps, can be
attributed to the additional time afforded to the court in making its decision, again, over a
month, and the additional time available to the State’s Election Division Director of the
Secretary of State to make the requisite changes to  the ballot, as well as any other election
processes that had already taken place.17  This Court, however, was not afforded that luxury.
This Court could not, without causing a substantial encumbrance to the State’s entire
elections process, address the merits of this case.  Moreover, and more important, the harm
caused by the appellant’s tardy filing did not only extend to the candidate himself, but to the
State Board and the millions of voters of this State.  
On the issue of prejudice, the Circuit Court held:
“Mr. Gansler cannot be prejudiced because if, in fact, he does not meet the
eligibility requirements, he ought not to be on the ballot.  The SBE is not
prejudiced because it is undisputed that at this late date, there is nothing that
can be done to alter the makeup of the ballot for this election.  In fact, if this
Court were to determine that Mr. Gansler is not eligible to run for the office of
the Attorney General, other remedies are available to preserve the integrity of
18 See supra note 8, at 5-6.
22
the election process and to give the voters the choice of qualified candidates
that they deserve.”
Again, we do not agree.  To begin, Gansler relied on the State Board’s initial certification of
his candidacy and, later, its certification of the results of the primary election, which
confirmed him as the Democratic Party’s nominee for the office of the Attorney General in
the general election.  For Gansler, the appellant’s dilatory challenge was, indeed, prejudicial,
as it could have been brought long before not just the general election but the primary
election as well.  The appellant’s challenge, in fact, could have been brought at any time after
Gansler’s June 28, 2006 filing of his certification of candidacy.
Next, the State Board also relied upon the accuracy of the ballots for both the primary
and general elections.  At the time the instant case was filed, the State Board had completed
extensive, and was proceeding with other, elections preparations.  The State Board, more
specifically, had printed ballots, received back tens of thousands of absentee ballots, and
completed most of its programming and testing of electronic voting machines.18  Contrary
to the Circuit Court’s ruling, we believe that, with just five days until the election, the State
Board’s inability to “alter the makeup of the ballot” was, in fact, cause for prejudice.  With
insufficient time to reprogram, install, and test voting machines, and to redesign, reorder,
reprint, and distribute absentee and provisional ballots, the State Board was, indeed,
prejudiced, particularly since, once again, the appellant’s action could have been brought
long before the eve of the general election. This Court, moreover, does not agree with the
Circuit Court that the State Board, in fact, did have “other remedies” available to it, and
would posit, further, that eleventh-hour, ballot-access challenges such as the one in the case
19This Court has long recognized the importance of the elective franchise.  See
Maryland Green Party v. State Board of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 150, 832 A.2d 214, 228
(2003) (stating that Article 7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights “has been held to be
even more protective of rights of political participation than the provisions of the federal
Constitution); Munsell v. Hennegan, 182 Md. 15, 22, 31 A.2d 640, 644 (1943) (holding
that electors should have the fullest opportunity to vote for candidates of any political
party, and any restrictions that are destructive of freedom of choice by voters will not be
upheld); Kemp v. Owens, 76 Md. 235, 241, 24 A. 606, 608 (1892) (noting that “[t]he
elective franchise is the highest right of the citizen, and the spirit of our institutions
requires that every opportunity should be afforded for its fair and free exercise).  See also
Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 7, which states “[t]hat the right of the People to
participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty and the foundation of all free
Government; for this purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent; and every citizen
having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought to have the right to
suffrage.” 
23
sub judice threaten the exercise of the most fundamental right granted to Maryland citizens
as members of a free society. 19 
Last, and paramount to this case, the appellant’s delay prejudiced the electorate as a
whole.  The relief sought by the appellant, i.e. the removal of Gansler’s name from the ballot,
or, in the alternative, signs being posted to indicate Gansler’s ineligibility to voters, would
have caused a great deal of uncertainty in the entire election process.  The confusion that
would have resulted from  such last-minute changes would have, indubitably, interfered with
the rights of Maryland voters, particularly those who had already cast absentee ballots,
causing them to be disenfranchised and the value of their votes diluted as they would not be
able to vote again. The Lubin Court commented on the importance of absentee voting in the
context of election challenges, and, in fact, articulated a more stringent guideline for those
24
bringing such claims.  The court stated that “[t]ime is of particular importance because all
disputes must be resolved before the printing of absentee ballots.” 144 P.3d at 512.  The
court went on to say that “[u]nreasonable delay can therefore prejudice the administration of
justice by compelling the court to ‘steamroll through...delicate legal issues in order to meet’
the ballot printing deadlines.” Id., quoting Mathieu v. Mahoney, 851 P.2d 81, 84 (Ariz.
1993); State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 688 P.2d 1303, 1308 (Or. 1984). 
While we recognize and respect the seriousness of the appellant’s claim, we hold that
the Circuit Court erred in failing to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to bar the
appellant’s claim, as his actions, coupled with the less favorable position in which Gansler,
the State Board, and the electorate as a whole were placed, were too disruptive of the election
apparatus to be consistent with the objective of an orderly election.  Allowing challenges to
be brought at such a late date would call into question the value and the quality of our entire
elections process and would only serve as a catalyst for future challenges.  Such delayed
challenges go to the core of our democratic system and cannot be tolerated. 
It is for the forgoing reasons that we vacated the judgment of the Circuit Court.