Case Title: State v. Foster

Citation: 2006-Ohio-856

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. FOSTER, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. QUINONES, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ADAMS, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HORN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856.] 
Criminal law — Felonies — Sentencing — Sentencing statutes are 
unconstitutional to extent that judicial fact-finding is required before 
imposition of sentence greater than maximum authorized by jury verdict 
or by defendant’s admissions, before imposition of consecutive sentences, 
or before imposition of penalty enhancements for major drug offenders 
and repeat violent offenders — Offending statutes severed. 
 (Nos. 2004-1568 and 2004-1771 — Submitted July 26, 2005; 
No. 2005-0735 — Submitted August 10, 2005; and  
No. 2005-2156 — Submitted February 10, 2006 —  
Decided February 27, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, 
No. 03CA95, 2004-Ohio 4209. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 83720, 2004-Ohio-4485. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County,  
No. 2003-L-110, 2005-Ohio-1107. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ottawa County,  
No. OT-03-016, 2005-Ohio-5257. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Because R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) and 2929.19(B)(2) require judicial fact-
finding before imposition of a sentence greater than the maximum term 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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authorized by a jury verdict or admission of the defendant, they are 
unconstitutional.  (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 
124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, followed.) 
2. 
R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) and 2929.19(B)(2) are capable of being severed.  
After the severance, judicial fact-finding is not required before a prison 
term can be imposed within the basic ranges of R.C. 2929.14(A) based 
upon a jury verdict or admission of the defendant.  (United States v. 
Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, followed.) 
3. 
Because R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) require judicial finding of 
facts not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the 
defendant before the imposition of consecutive sentences, they are 
unconstitutional.  (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 
124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, followed.) 
4. 
R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) are capable of being severed.  After 
the severance, judicial fact-finding is not required before imposition of 
consecutive prison terms.  (United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 
125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, followed.) 
5. 
Because the specifications contained in R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) and 
(D)(3)(b) require judicial fact-finding before repeat-violent-offender and 
major-drug-offender penalty enhancements are imposed, they are 
unconstitutional.  (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 
124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, followed.) 
6. 
R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) and (D)(3)(b) are capable of being severed.  After 
the severance, judicial fact-finding is not required before imposition of 
additional penalties for repeat-violent-offender and major-drug-offender 
January Term, 2006 
3 
specifications.  (United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 
738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, followed.) 
7. 
Trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the 
statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their 
reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum 
sentences. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} The question presented in these four1 cases, consolidated sua 
sponte, is whether Ohio’s felony-sentencing structure violates the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in the manner set forth in Apprendi 
v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and 
Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403.  
Because we determine that portions of the applicable statutes are unconstitutional, 
we apply a severance remedy similar to that adopted in United States v. Booker 
(2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  This opinion will (1) 
summarize the Sixth Amendment principles of Apprendi and Blakely, (2) present 
the histories of the Foster, Quinones, Adams, and Horn appeals, (3) provide an 
overview of Ohio sentencing statutes, (4) measure the statutes against the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and (5) apply a remedy for the 
constitutional violation. 
I.  Sixth Amendment Principles 
{¶ 2} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an 
accused the right to trial by jury.  Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 88 
S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491.  Likewise, Section 5, Article I of the Ohio 
                                                          
 
1.  Case Nos. 2005-0735 and 2005-2156, State v. Adams and State v. Horn, were consolidated sua 
sponte in order to provide a comprehensive examination of Ohio’s sentencing scheme.   
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Constitution states that the “right of trial by jury shall be inviolate,” and Section 
10, Article I confirms the right to “speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”  
These sections preserve for the accused “all essential and distinguishing features 
of the trial by jury” known to the common law in Ohio.  Work v. State (1853), 2 
Ohio St. 296, syllabus. 
{¶ 3} It was not anticipated that jury rights may be implicated in 
sentencing until Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court of the United States examined 
New Jersey’s “hate crime” statute, which allowed an enhanced sentence if the 
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that racial bias was a motive for 
the offense.  After the judge made this finding in his case, Apprendi was 
sentenced to 12 years in prison, two years above the maximum for the second-
degree crime of which he had been convicted.  The Supreme Court ruled that 
Apprendi’s sentence, by exceeding the statutory maximum based only on judicial 
fact-finding, violated his Sixth Amendment rights because the jury, rather than 
judge, must find all facts essential to punishment.  Apprendi held that “[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. 
{¶ 4} Two years later, the Apprendi rule was applied to an Arizona 
capital statute that permitted the death penalty solely on a judicial finding of 
statutory aggravating circumstances.  Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 
S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556.  Because the aggravating factor found by the judge 
operated as “ ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ ” it 
required submission to a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 609, 
122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, fn. 19. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 5} Until now, we have not had occasion to rule on the effect of 
Apprendi, Ring, or Blakely on our noncapital sentencing law.  State ex rel. Jaffal 
v. Calabrese, 105 Ohio St.3d 440, 2005-Ohio-2591, 828 N.E.2d 107, ¶ 7 
(adequate remedy in extraordinary-writ case prevented consideration of 
constitutional claim); State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 
N.E.2d 48, at ¶ 69-70 (Ring not applicable to Ohio’s capital-sentencing scheme).  
In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, the 
Apprendi rule was broadened.  We now examine our statutes in light of Blakely. 
{¶ 6} Blakely pleaded guilty in a Washington state court to second-
degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm, a class-B 
felony carrying a ten-year maximum prison penalty.  Other sentencing provisions 
specified a “standard range” of 49 to 53 months for second-degree kidnapping 
with a firearm.  The sentencing judge imposed a prison term of 90 months, after 
making a finding of “deliberate cruelty,” one of the statutorily enumerated 
grounds that justified an exceptional sentence.  Thus, the sentence fell below the 
ten-year statutory maximum, but well above the 53-month maximum of the 
“standard range.” 
{¶ 7} The United States Supreme Court held that Blakely’s sentence 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because a jury did not find the 
facts that permitted an “exceptional” sentence.  Id., 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403.  Although the state argued that the court had not violated 
Apprendi because the statutory maximum was ten years, the court held that “the 
‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.  In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is 
not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but 
the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”  (Emphasis sic 
and citations omitted.)  Id. at 303-304, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403.  Thus, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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aside from the exception for prior criminal convictions2 and the defendant’s 
consent to judicial fact-finding, the Sixth Amendment prohibits a judge from 
imposing a sentence greater than that allowed by the jury verdict or by the 
defendant’s admissions at a plea hearing. 
{¶ 8} Commentators expected that as a consequence of Blakely, juries 
would be required to take a more active sentencing role in determinate guideline 
states.3   But the Supreme Court created a different remedy for a Blakely violation 
by converting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to an advisory, rather than 
mandatory plan. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
L.Ed.2d 621. 
{¶ 9} Having heard evidence that Booker had been found with 92.5 
grams of crack cocaine, a federal jury found him guilty of possession with intent 
to distribute “at least 50 grams” of crack cocaine.  The federal range for the 
offense was ten years to life.  Booker’s criminal history and the quantity of drugs 
found by the jury gave him a guideline “base” prison sentence of 210 to 262 
months.  Nevertheless, after a hearing, the trial judge concluded that Booker had 
possessed an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine and was guilty of obstructing 
justice and consequently imposed a sentence of 30 years. 
{¶ 10} The Supreme Court held that the guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment because they required the judge rather than jury to make findings of 
fact necessary for punishment.  Id., 543 U.S. at 233-234, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
                                                          
 
2.  See Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998), 523 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed. 
2d 350.  But, see, Shepard v. United States (2005), 544 U.S. 13, 24-25, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 
L.Ed.2d 205, concerning the meaning of “prior conviction” and whether a fact about a prior 
conviction falls within an Apprendi exception. 
 
3.  See Vera Institute of Justice, Aggravated Sentencing:  Blakely v. Washington — Practical 
Implications for State Sentencing Systems (Aug.2004); Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. 
Washington — Legal Considerations for State Sentencing Systems (Sept.2004); and Beyond 
Blakely: Implications of the Booker Decision for State Sentencing Systems (Feb.2005).  See, also, 
Douglas A. Berman’s legal blog, Sentencing Law and Policy, at http://sentencing.typepad.com, for 
updates on Blakely and current source material on sentencing. 
January Term, 2006 
7 
L.Ed.2d 621.  As a remedy for the Blakely violations, the court held that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines must be treated as advisory only, with the 
maximum sentence being the top of the range set by the statute under which the 
defendant was convicted.  See id. at 259, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court excised from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 those 
provisions that made the guidelines mandatory, rendering the guidelines 
“effectively advisory.”  Id. at 245, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  District 
courts, although no longer bound to apply them, must consider the guidelines and 
take them into account in sentencing.  Id. at 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621. 
{¶ 11} The court also replaced the de novo standard of appellate review 
required by Section 3742(e), Title 18, U.S.Code with a “reasonableness” standard 
under the now advisory guidelines, noting that reasonableness is a standard 
already familiar to appellate courts and provides the best chance for sentencing 
uniformity.  Id. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  Finally, the holding in 
Booker was applied “to all cases on direct review.”  Id. at 268, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
L.Ed.2d 621, citing Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 
93 L.Ed.2d 649. 
{¶ 12} Blakely already has caused several states to review their sentencing 
systems.4 Ohio’s plan has been called into question by the four cases now before 
us. 
II.  Histories of Cases on Review 
{¶ 13} Appellant Andrew Foster and appellee Jason Quinones waived 
their rights to jury trial, entering pleas.  Appellants Robert Adams and Jeannett 
                                                          
 
4.  See, e.g., State v. Brown (2004), 209 Ariz. 200, 99 P.3d 15; Lopez v. People (Colo.2005), 113 
P.3d 713; Smylie v. State (Ind.2005), 823 N.E.2d 679; State v. Natale (2005), 184 N.J. 458, 878 
A.2d 724; State v. Shattuck (Minn.2004), 689 N.W.2d 785; State v. Dilts (2004), 337 Or. 645, 103 
P.3d 95; People v. Black (2005), 35 Cal.4th 1238, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d 534; State v. 
Gomez (Tenn.2005), 163 S.W.3d 632; State v. Allen (2005), 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256; and 
State v. Provost, 2005 VT 134, ___ A.2d ___. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Horn were convicted by a jury.  We have accepted each case on a discretionary 
appeal. 
Andrew Foster 
{¶ 14} Andrew Foster was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury on 
April 10, 2003.  He was charged with 14 counts of breaking and entering5 and one 
count of possession of cocaine,6 all felonies of the fifth degree; four counts of 
safecracking,7 three counts of grand theft,8 one count of grand theft of a motor 
vehicle,9 and two counts of forgery,10 all felonies of the fourth degree; and one 
count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity,11 a felony of the second degree. 
{¶ 15} Foster eventually entered no-contest pleas on September 25, 2003, 
to all 26 charges.  According to a statement made by the prosecutor at the 
sentencing hearing, Foster broke into business establishments in Fairfield, 
Licking, and Franklin counties between July 28, 2002, and January 26, 2003.  At 
some locations, he tampered with safes.  He stole money from two businesses and 
forged stolen checks.  During the break-ins, Foster took lottery tickets, a company 
van, and other items of property from 14 victims altogether.  When he was 
arrested for the forgeries, he had drug-related materials containing cocaine residue 
in his possession. 
{¶ 16} Foster was found guilty after his no-contest pleas were accepted.  
He was sentenced to minimum prison terms of six months on counts one through 
                                                          
 
5.  R.C. 2911.13. 
 
6.  R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(a).  
 
7.  R.C. 2911.31(A). 
 
8.  R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). 
 
9.  R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). 
 
10. R.C. 2913.31(A)(3). 
 
11. R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). 
January Term, 2006 
9 
25 and two years on count 26.  Count 26 and 14 others are to be served 
consecutively, while 11 of the counts imposed are to be served concurrently, for a 
total prison term of nine years.  The sentence was upheld by the Licking County 
Court of Appeals.  State v. Foster, 5th Dist. No. 03CA95, 2004-Ohio-4209, 2004 
WL 1789514. 
{¶ 17} Foster appeals his sentence, arguing, “A trial court may not 
sentence a defendant to more than minimum, concurrent sentences unless the 
State proves the statutory criteria for increasing the sentence to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  We accepted this proposition to determine Blakely’s 
application to the statutes involved. 
Jason Quinones 
{¶ 18} Jason Quinones was indicted on March 20, 2003, and June 25, 
2003, on charges arising from his sexual intercourse with three girls, aged 14, 15, 
and 12.  He was over 18 at the time of the offenses.  Quinones was charged with 
forcible rape of a child under the age of 13, a first-degree felony,12 with a 
sexually-violent-predator specification;13 two counts of kidnapping, also felonies 
of the first degree,14 with sexually-violent-predator and sexual-motivation 
specifications;15 five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, fourth-
degree felonies;16 one count of intimidation, a third-degree felony;17 and 
obstruction of official business, a fifth-degree felony.18  As a result of a plea 
                                                          
 
12.  R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). 
 
13.  R.C. 2941.148. 
 
14.  R.C. 2905.01. 
 
15.  R.C. 2941.147 and 2929.148. 
 
16.  R.C. 2907.04. 
 
17.  R.C. 2921.04. 
 
18.  R.C. 2921.31. 
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agreement, Quinones entered guilty pleas to four felonies: two counts of unlawful 
sexual conduct with a minor in CR 435216; a first-degree felony of rape of a child 
under the age of 13 with force, but with the sexually-violent-predator 
specifications deleted in CR 437597; and a single count of unlawful sexual 
conduct with a minor in CR 438531.  A nolle prosequi was entered on the 
remaining counts. 
{¶ 19} Quinones was sentenced October 3, 2003.  The judge orally 
imposed a maximum ten-year prison term for the rape in CR 437597, an eight-
month prison term in CR 438531, and two 18-month concurrent prison terms in 
CR 435216.  Certain of the terms were to be served consecutively.  After a 
hearing, Quinones was also adjudicated a sexual predator.  A discrepancy 
between the judgment entries was resolved in Quinones’s favor on appeal, for a 
total prison term of 11 ½ years.19  Quinones’s sentence included three terms 
greater than the minimum,20  maximum terms21 for rape and the unlawful sexual 
conduct with a minor, and consecutive sentences22 with respect to the rape 
conviction and two of the concurrent fourth-degree felonies.  Quinones appealed 
the maximum and consecutive nature of his sentences as well as the sexual-
predator finding to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals. 23 
{¶ 20} The appellate court concluded that although the trial court had 
made the appropriate findings and adequately given its reasons for imposing the 
                                                          
 
19.  The appellate court noted that the judgment entries in CR 435216 and CR 437597 reflect 
consecutive sentences, but the judgment entry in CR 438531 states that the eight-month prison 
term is concurrent with the prison terms in the other two cases.  The appellate court resolved the 
perceived conflict by determining that the eight-month prison term in CR 438531 is to be served 
concurrently with the others. 
 
20.  R.C. 2929.14(B). 
 
21.  R.C. 2929.14(C).  
 
22.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4). 
 
23.  The sexual-predator determination was upheld on appeal and is not an issue before us. 
January Term, 2006 
11 
maximum sentence as required by R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d), 
Quinones’s sentence violated Blakely because a jury did not find that he had 
committed the worst form of the offense or posed the greatest likelihood of 
recidivism, nor did he admit to either.  State v. Quinones, Cuyahoga App. No. 
83720, 2004-Ohio-4485, 2004 WL 1903250, at ¶ 30.  The maximum sentences 
were vacated, and Quinones’s cases were remanded for resentencing in light of 
Blakely.  The assignment of error related to consecutive sentences was deemed to 
be moot.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 21} Pursuant to the appeal by the state of Ohio, we accepted the first 
proposition of law to determine whether Blakely applies to the imposition of 
maximum or consecutive sentences in Ohio.  State v. Quinones, 105 Ohio St.3d 
1401, 2005-Ohio-286, 821 N.E.2d 1023. 
Robert Adams 
{¶ 22} Robert Adams was indicted on April 18, 2003, on charges arising 
from an automobile accident resulting in the deaths of two individuals.  At the 
time of the offense, Adams was under the influence of drugs.  He was charged 
with two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide resulting from driving under 
the influence, felonies of the second degree;24 one count of driving while under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor;25 and two counts of 
aggravated vehicular homicide due to reckless operation, felonies of the third 
degree.26  Counts one and two also contained repeat-violent-offender 
specifications.27  Adams had been convicted of felonious assault on November 4, 
1987 in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. 
                                                          
 
24.  R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a). 
 
25.  R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (G)(1)(a). 
 
26.  R.C. 2903.06(A)(2) and (B)(3). 
 
27.  R.C. 2941.149(A). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 23} Adams was tried by a jury and convicted on all counts.  He was 
sentenced to a maximum eight-year prison term on each aggravated-vehicular-
homicide charge of the second degree and five years for each repeat-violent-
offender specification.  These sentences were ordered to be served consecutively.  
Adams also received a concurrent six-month sentence for the count of driving 
under the influence.  The remaining aggravated-vehicular-homicide counts were 
merged into the other counts for a total prison term of 26 years.  Adams appealed 
his conviction, the maximum and consecutive nature of his sentences, and the 
repeat-violent-offender specifications to the Lake County Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 24} The appellate court concluded that although consecutive sentences 
may not be imposed unless a court makes findings not determined by a jury, 
Blakely and Apprendi do not apply to consecutive sentences.  State v. Adams, 
Lake App. No. 2003-L-110, 2005-Ohio-1107, 2005 WL 583797, at ¶ 69.  In 
considering the propriety of the repeat-violent-offender finding, the Eleventh 
District determined that because Adams’s status as a repeat violent offender was 
based on a prior conviction and because Apprendi exempted prior convictions, 
there was no Sixth Amendment violation.  Id. at ¶ 73.  The appellate court also 
addressed Adams’s maximum sentences of eight years for aggravated vehicular 
homicide.  It explained that because Adams was a repeat violent offender, R.C. 
2929.14(D)(2) required imposition of the maximum sentence.  Id. at ¶ 74.  
Finally, the Eleventh District determined that the additional five-year sentence on 
each repeat-violent-offender specification did not violate Apprendi or Blakely 
because the required findings are not factual, but rather the result of judicial 
discretion.  Id. at ¶ 78. 
{¶ 25} We accepted Adams’s first proposition of law to determine 
whether Blakely applies to maximum, consecutive, and repeat-violent-offender 
sentences. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
January Term, 2006 
13 
Jeannett Horn 
{¶ 26} Jeannett S. Horn was indicted on August 6, 2002, on one count of 
drug possession, a first-degree felony,28 and one count of conspiracy to possess 
drugs, a second-degree felony.29  The case was tried to a jury, and Horn was 
convicted of the drug-possession charge.30  The court found that Horn was a 
major drug offender due to the amount of drugs involved – more than 100 grams 
of crack cocaine.  She was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. 
{¶ 27} On appeal, among other issues, Horn challenged her enhanced 
sentence under Blakely due to the trial court’s finding that she was a major drug 
offender.  State v. Horn, Ottawa App. No. OT-03-016, 2005-Ohio-5257, 2005 WL 
2416033, at ¶ 21.  The sentence was upheld by the Ottawa County Court of 
Appeals.  We accepted jurisdiction to determine Blakely’s application to major-
drug-offender sentences. 
Scope of Consideration 
{¶ 28} The criminal defendants in these cases assert that Ohio’s felony-
sentencing structure violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and, according to Quinones, Section 5, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, because it requires impermissible judicial fact-finding before a 
prison term greater than the “presumptive” sentence is imposed.  Foster 
challenges statutes that require judicial fact-finding for a prison sentence 
exceeding a minimum term31 and for imposition of consecutive sentences.32  
                                                          
 
28.  R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(f). 
 
29.  R.C. 2923.01(A)(2) and (J)(2). 
 
30.  The state moved to dismiss the conspiracy charge, and the trial court granted the motion. 
 
31.  R.C. 2929.14(B). 
 
32.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Quinones challenges maximum33 and consecutive sentences.  Adams challenges 
maximum, consecutive, and repeat-violent-offender sentences.  Horn challenges 
her major-drug-offender sentence.  All argue that their sentences are 
unconstitutional because a judge rather than jury found the existence of enhancing 
factors to lengthen their prison terms beyond the statutory presumptive terms.  On 
the other hand, the state, appellee in the Foster, Adams, and Horn cases and 
appellant in the Quinones case, maintains, first, that Ohio’s system does not 
unconstitutionally permit judges to exceed a statutory range and, second, that 
sentencing “facts” and sentencing “factors” differ. 
{¶ 29} Because resolution of these discretionary appeals will affect 
hundreds of pending cases, a comprehensive approach to Ohio felony-sentencing 
statutes is required.  We acknowledge the amici briefs,34 which have assisted in 
sharpening these important issues. 
Waiver 
{¶ 30} The state raises the issue of waiver as a preliminary matter in the 
Foster case and argues that we should apply a “plain error” test because Foster 
did not specifically object to the constitutionality of his sentence pursuant to 
Apprendi or its progeny at trial and did not raise the issue in the court of appeals.  
The state suggests that pursuant to State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 
759 N.E.2d 1240, the error could not have been plain, i.e., “obvious,” because 
Blakely was decided after Foster was sentenced.  Furthermore, the state proposes 
that a plea of guilty or no contest waives all jury rights, including those 
established by Apprendi.  Foster responds that the state itself did not raise the 
issue of waiver at the trial or appellate level. 
                                                          
 
33.  R.C. 2929.14(C). 
 
34. The American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc., filed an amicus brief in the 
Foster case; the Ohio Attorney General, the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and 
the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association filed in both the Foster and Quinones cases. 
January Term, 2006 
15 
{¶ 31} Waiver indicates an “ ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right.’ ”  United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 
1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461.  Foster could not have relinquished his sentencing 
objections as a known right when no one could have predicted that Blakely would 
extend the Apprendi doctrine to redefine “statutory maximum.”  Smylie v. State 
(Ind.2005), 823 N.E.2d 679, 687.  In addition, we note that Blakely’s guilty plea 
did not create an inference that he waived a jury’s finding of the additional fact of 
“deliberate cruelty.”  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 
403 (“When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence 
enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or 
consents to judicial factfinding” [emphasis added]).  We have no such stipulations 
or consent to judicial fact-finding in any of the cases before us. 
{¶ 32} Furthermore, Blakely’s Sixth Amendment holding has been applied 
retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal in states that have found it 
applicable to their statutes.  See, e.g., Lopez v. People (Colo.2005), 113 P.3d 713, 
716; Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d at 688 (Indiana); State v. Natale (2005), 184 N.J. 
458, 494, 878 A.2d 724; State v. Houston (Minn.2005), 702 N.W.2d 268, 273. 
{¶ 33} The state’s propositions on waiver are rejected.35 
III. Ohio’s Felony-Sentencing Statutes Pre-Blakely 
{¶ 34} Before passage of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
7136, effective July 1, 1996 (“S.B. 2”), Ohio had a predominantly indeterminate 
felony-sentencing structure in which a sentence was expressed in the form of a 
minimum and maximum prison term with the release decision in the hands of a 
parole board.  See Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, The Impact of Ohio’s 
                                                          
 
35.  Although we declined to accept a proposition on waiver in Quinones’s appeal, Quinones 
obtains the same benefit of the new rule, as he was sentenced on October 3, 2003, and Blakely was 
announced on June 24, 2004. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
Senate Bill 2 on Sentencing Disparities (Apr. 19, 2002) 4-5.  With the enactment 
of S.B. 2, the General Assembly adopted a comprehensive sentencing structure 
that recognized the importance of “truth in sentencing.”  The general purpose of 
S.B. 2 was to introduce certainty and proportionality to felony sentencing.  
Accordingly, S.B. 2 established broad sentencing reforms. 
{¶ 35} As a result, Ohio’s felony-sentencing plan is a hybrid.  Aspects of 
indeterminate sentencing continue for certain offenses.  See, e.g., R.C. 2971.03 
(authorizing indefinite sentences for certain sexually violent offenses).  But the 
plan is determinate for most offenses, for the court selects a specific prison term 
from different statutory ranges as determined by the level of the felony charged.  
The parole board no longer makes early-release decisions, and a sentence is 
subject to modification only by the judge.  The statutes themselves are extremely 
complex, as a brief survey will show. 
Statutory “Considerations” in Every Case:  R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 
{¶ 36} Two statutory sections apply as a general judicial guide for every 
sentencing.  The first, R.C. 2929.11, states that the court “shall be guided by” the 
overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are “to protect the public from 
future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.”36  In 
achieving those purposes, the court shall also consider the need for incapacitation, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and restitution.37  A felony sentence “shall be 
reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony 
sentencing” and be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of 
the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with 
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”38  A 
                                                          
 
36.  R.C. 2929.11(A). 
 
37.  Id. 
 
38.  R.C. 2929.11(B). 
January Term, 2006 
17 
sentence may not be based upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or religion 
of the offender.39 
{¶ 37} The second general statute, R.C. 2929.12, grants the sentencing 
judge discretion “to determine the most effective way to comply with the 
purposes and principles of sentencing.”40  R.C. 2929.12(A) directs that in 
exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other “relevant” 
factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the 
recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.  These statutory 
sections provide a nonexclusive list for the court to consider. 
{¶ 38} Seriousness factors, i.e., factors indicating that a defendant’s 
conduct is “more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense,” include 
the following considerations:  whether the physical or mental injury was 
worsened “because of the physical or mental condition or age of the victim”; 
whether the offense caused serious physical, psychological, or economic harm to 
the victim; whether the defendant held a public office or position of trust in the 
community, and the offense related to that office or position; whether the 
defendant’s position obliged him to prevent the offense or bring offenders to 
justice; whether the defendant used his position to facilitate the offense or is likely 
to influence the future conduct of others; whether the defendant’s relationship 
with the victim facilitated the offense; whether the defendant committed the 
offense for hire or as a part of an organized criminal activity; whether the 
defendant was motivated by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, 
sexual orientation, or religion; and whether, for specified offenses, the offense 
was committed by a household member “in the vicinity of one or more children,” 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
39.  R.C. 2929.11(C). 
 
40.  R.C. 2929.12(A). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
and the defendant or his victim is a parent or custodian of at least one of those 
children.41 
{¶ 39} Factors indicating that “the offender’s conduct is less serious than 
conduct normally constituting the offense” include whether the victim induced or 
facilitated the offense, whether there was strong provocation, whether the 
offender either did not cause or did not expect to cause physical harm to anyone 
or anything, and whether there are substantial mitigating grounds that do not 
reach the level of a defense.42 
{¶ 40} With respect to recidivism factors, the court is required to consider 
whether the defendant is more or less likely to commit future crimes.  Factors that 
indicate a likelihood of reoffending are whether the defendant was already under 
the control of the court, whether there are previous adjudicated delinquencies or 
criminal convictions, whether the defendant has not responded favorably to 
previous sanctions or attempts at rehabilitation, whether the defendant refuses to 
acknowledge a drug- or alcohol-abuse problem or refuses treatment, and whether 
the defendant shows no “genuine remorse.”43 
{¶ 41} Along with “any other relevant factors,” factors that indicate that 
the defendant is not likely to commit future crimes are an absence of delinquency 
adjudications or criminal convictions, a law-abiding life for a significant number 
of years before the current offense, an unlikelihood that the circumstances under 
which the offense was committed will recur, and genuine remorse.44 
                                                          
 
41.  R.C. 2929.12 (B)(1) through (9). 
 
42.  R.C. 2929.12 (C)(1) through (4). 
 
43.  R.C. 2929.12(D). 
 
44.  R.C. 2929.12(E). 
January Term, 2006 
19 
{¶ 42} It is important to note that there is no mandate for judicial fact-
finding in the general guidance statutes.  The court is merely to “consider” the 
statutory factors. 
Presumptions, Guidance, and Ranges:  R.C. 2929.13 and 2929.14 
{¶ 43} R.C. 2929.13, which follows the general-guidance statutes, 
provides directives that relate to specific felony degrees.  R.C. 2929.13(D) sets 
forth a presumption in favor of prison for higher level felonies and felony drug 
offenses, and R.C. 2929.13(B) creates a preference for (but not a presumption in 
favor of) community control (formerly probation) for lower level felonies.  R.C. 
2929.13(B) allows, but does not mandate, findings before imprisonment for 
felonies of the fourth or fifth degree, unless the offense involves mandatory terms.  
Certain findings require a prison sentence;45 a lack of specified findings, in 
combination with other considerations, requires community control.46 
{¶ 44} R.C. 2929.14 establishes the ranges of prison terms for the five 
degrees of felony offenses.47  This statute also restricts a court’s discretion by 
imposing fact-finding obligations upon judges before they impose more than the 
minimum48 or maximum49 prison terms.  The statute also includes mandatory 
prison terms,50 special terms for repeat violent offenders51 and major drug 
                                                          
 
45.  R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(a). 
 
46.  R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b). 
 
47.  R.C. 2929.14(A). 
 
48.  R.C. 2929.14(B). 
 
49.  R.C. 2929.14(C). 
 
50. R.C. 2929.14(D). 
 
51. R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(a) and (b). 
 
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20 
offenders,52 specifications, consecutive terms,53 and postrelease control,54 as well 
as provisions related to specific offenses55 and shock incarceration.56 
Nonprison Sanctions:  R.C. 2929.15 through 2929.18 
{¶ 45} R.C. 2929.15 through 2929.18 authorize a range of sanctions other 
than imprisonment, allowing a sentencing judge to choose a combination of 
punishments that will best serve the overriding purposes of felony sentencing.57  
If a court is authorized to grant community control58 in a particular case, it may 
consider residential sanctions,59 nonresidential sanctions,60 and financial 
sanctions,61 including mandatory fines for certain offenses.62  
The Sentencing Hearing:  R.C. 2929.19 
{¶ 46} A sentencing hearing is required before a felony sentence is 
imposed.63  At the hearing, the defendant, prosecuting attorney, and the victim or 
the victim’s representative may present relevant information.64  Before imposing 
                                                          
 
52.  R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) and (b). 
 
53.  R.C. 2929.14(E). 
 
54.  R.C. 2929.14(F). 
 
55.  R.C. 2929.14 (G), (I), and (J). 
 
56.  R.C. 2929.14(K).  
 
57.  R.C.  2929.12(A). 
 
58.  R.C. 2929.15. 
 
59.  R.C. 2929.16. 
 
60.  R.C. 2929.17. 
 
61.  R.C. 2929.18. 
 
62.  R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). 
 
63.  R.C. 2929.19.(A)(1). 
 
64.  Id. 
January Term, 2006 
21 
sentence, the judge shall consider the record, any presentence investigation report, 
and any victim-impact statement.65  In imposing a prison term for a felony 
sentence, the judge shall impose a “stated” prison term66 and provide various 
notifications as required.67  See State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-
6085, 817 N.E.2d 864 (R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (d) require notification of 
postrelease control at hearing and in journal entry); State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837 (R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B) 
require certain community-control notifications to be given to offender at 
sentencing hearing). 
{¶ 47} By no means is this everything that must be considered at the 
sentencing hearing, for there are statutes relevant only to sexually oriented 
offenses, alcohol-related offenses, drug offenses, and certain violent offenses,68 
which may lead to different procedural requirements. 
Appellate Review:  R.C. 2953.08(G) 
{¶ 48} The General Assembly also enacted appellate review of sentences 
as part of S.B. 2.  R.C. 2953.08(G)(1), as amended effective October 10, 2000,69 
allows an appellate court to remand a case to the sentencing court to make certain 
findings, specifically, those findings required for imposing prison terms for lower 
level felonies,70 for granting community control for high level felonies,71 for 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
65.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(1). 
 
66.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(a). 
 
67.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(b) through (f), (4), and (5). 
 
68.  See, e.g., R.C. 2929.13(E) through (H), as well as R.C. 2929.14(D) (mandatory prison terms). 
 
69.  148 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3418-3419. 
 
70.  R.C. 2929.13(B). 
 
71.  R.C. 2929.13(D). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
imposing consecutive sentences,72 or for granting judicial release.73  The appellate 
court must review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or 
modification.74  Employing a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of review,75 
the appellate court may “increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence” or may 
vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing if the record does not 
support the judge’s findings or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law under 
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) and (b). 
{¶ 49} In summary, as a result of S.B. 2, Ohio has a comprehensive and 
complicated felony-sentencing plan, both determinate and indeterminate in nature 
and containing aspects of presumptive sentencing.  Although Ohio is not a true 
“mandatory guidelines” or matrix state where sentencing is confined within 
designated presumptive prison-term ranges unless aggravators are found, Ohio, 
like a number of other states, must now engage in the difficult process of 
disassembling its comprehensive sentencing-reform legislation under the Blakely 
mandate.  As a result, there are portions of the state’s sentencing statutes that are 
eviscerated by Blakely. 
IV.  Blakely as Applied to Ohio Statutes 
{¶ 50} In addition to the Quinones case before us, the Eighth Appellate 
District has applied Blakely to repeat-violent-offender76 and major-drug-
offender77 sentencing enhancements.  Only two other districts have applied 
                                                          
 
72.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4). 
 
73.  R.C. 2929.20(H). 
 
74.  R.C. 2953.08(F). 
 
75.  R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 
 
76.  See State v. Sims, 8th Dist. No. 84090, 2005-Ohio-1978, ¶ 47; State v. Malcolm, 8th Dist. No. 
85351, 2005-Ohio-4133, 2005 WL 1923593, ¶ 10. 
 
77.  See State v. Short, 8th Dist. No. 83804, 2005-Ohio-4578, ¶ 39; State v. Moore, 8th Dist. No. 
85825, 2006-Ohio-305, 2006 WL 202756,¶ 13. 
January Term, 2006 
23 
Blakely to some aspect of Ohio’s sentencing law.78  Most Ohio appellate courts 
have determined that Blakely is inapplicable.  They have distinguished Ohio’s 
plan from Washington’s grid system,79 or emphasized a sentencing court’s 
inability to exceed a statutory range through fact-finding,80 or characterized 
required findings as traditional sentencing factors,81 or read the “prior conviction” 
exception to Apprendi broadly to uphold challenged sentences.82  These are also 
the arguments of the state against Foster, Quinones, and Adams.  Nevertheless 
and unfortunately, Blakely is misunderstood if it is seen as inapplicable to Ohio. 
{¶ 51} The state first attempts to distinguish Ohio’s sentencing plan from 
Washington’s.  It contends that Blakely does not apply because in Ohio, the top of 
the range is the relevant “statutory maximum,” of which the defendant is aware 
before the entry of verdict or plea.  But by focusing on the statutory ceiling and 
arguing that a court may select a term anywhere within the range, the state ignores 
the General Assembly’s use of the word “shall” at crucial points in the legislative 
scheme.  Unlimited judicial discretion to sentence within a range is not currently 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
78.  The First District applied Blakely to maximum sentences in State v. Bruce, 159 Ohio App.3d 
562, 2005-Ohio-373, 824 N.E.2d 609, and to sentences exceeding the minimum on a first prison 
term in State v. Montgomery, 159 Ohio App.3d 752, 2005-Ohio-1018, 825 N.E.2d 250.  The 
Eleventh District applied Blakely to repeat-violent-offender sentencing enhancements in State v. 
Payne, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L-118, 2005-Ohio-7043, 2005 WL 3610429. 
 
79.  See, e.g., State v. Lett, 161 Ohio App.3d 274, 2005-Ohio-2665, 829 N.E.2d 1281; State v. 
Ward, 4th Dist. No. 04CA25, 2005-Ohio-1580, 2005 WL 737578, ¶ 14; State v. Curlis, 6th Dist. 
No. WD-04-032, 2005-Ohio-1217, 2005 WL 635025, ¶ 18; State v. Burns, 9th Dist. No. 22198, 
2005-Ohio-1459, ¶ 4-5; State v. Berry, 159 Ohio App.3d 476, 2004-Ohio-6027, 824 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 
48. 
 
80.  State v. Trubee, 3d Dist. No. 9-03-65, 2005-Ohio-552, 2005 WL 335833, ¶ 23; State v. 
Iddings, 5th Dist. No. 2004CAA06043, 2004-Ohio-7312, 2004 WL 3563921, ¶ 12; State v. Goins, 
7th Dist. No. 02 CA 68, 2005-Ohio-1439, 2005 WL 704865, ¶ 111; State v. Rupert, 11th Dist. No. 
2003-L-54, 2005-Ohio-1098, 2005 WL 583796, ¶ 48. 
 
81.  State v. Abdul-Mumin, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-485, 2005-Ohio-522, 2005 WL 315062, ¶ 32. 
 
82.  State v. Sour, 2d Dist. No. 19913, 2004-Ohio-4048, 2004 WL 1728579, ¶ 8. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
authorized by statute.  If required judicial facts are not found, certain sentences 
may not be imposed.  These limitations create presumed statutory maximums that 
implicate Sixth Amendment protection.  As Foster argues, his “statutory 
maximum” sentence was limited to two years because the jury did not make the 
findings of fact required to sentence him to consecutive sentences or to sentence 
him to more than the minimum.  Similarly, Quinones argues that a jury’s verdict, 
standing alone, authorizes only community-control sanctions for fourth- and fifth-
degree felonies, the minimum term of imprisonment for felonies of the first, 
second and third degrees, and concurrent terms.  As a result, Quinones argues that 
he should have received only community control for the unlawful-sexual-conduct-
with-a-minor counts and a three-year prison term on the rape count.  In a similar 
vein, Adams argues that a jury’s verdict alone does not authorize maximum or 
consecutive sentences or an additional sentence on a repeat-violent-offender 
specification because specific findings must first be made by the court before 
those prison terms are imposed. 
{¶ 52} Second, the state argues that Ohio’s required findings are merely 
“sentencing enhancements” or “traditional sentencing factors” rather than factual 
“elements” of a crime, and, therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury is not 
implicated.  Adams, however, argues that the Eleventh District was “merely 
playing with words” when it chose to label the findings under R.C. 2929.14 as 
nonfactual findings.  The Supreme Court of the United States has repeated its 
holding that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized 
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State 
labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, citing 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-483, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435.  As Justice 
Scalia noted in his Ring concurrence, “I believe that the fundamental meaning of 
the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to 
January Term, 2006 
25 
imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives — whether the 
statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane — 
must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 610, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
{¶ 53} Neither state argument prevails.  Certain aspects of Ohio’s felony-
sentencing plan are unconstitutional when measured against the Sixth 
Amendment principles established in Blakely.  The reason for this is that, like 
many state legislatures that attempted sentencing reform, the Ohio General 
Assembly, through its enactment of S.B. 2 in 1996, authorized narrower 
sentencing ranges and restricted the discretion of trial judges by mandating that 
underlying “findings” be made before increasing what seems to be a presumptive 
sentence.  In other words, the sentence is not determined “solely on the basis of 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,” as Blakely 
requires.  (Emphasis omitted.)  Id., 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 
403. 
{¶ 54} The parties have raised five separate sentencing areas as 
questionable when they are measured against Blakely: (1) imposing more than the 
minimum prison term for those who have never served a prison term, (2) 
imposing the maximum term, (3) imposing consecutive terms, (4) imposing a 
prison term rather than community control for fourth- and fifth-degree felons, and 
(5) imposing repeat-violent-offender or major-drug-offender enhancements.  We 
agree with respect to four of the five that Ohio judges are not merely advised to 
consider certain sentencing factors, but are statutorily required to make specific 
findings before imposing a sentence beyond that presumed solely by a jury verdict 
or admission of a defendant. 
{¶ 55} In conducting a Blakely analysis, we must determine whether a 
presumptive sentence is created and whether judicial fact-finding is required to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
exceed that sentence.  Stated another way, is the sentence allowed simply as a 
result of a conviction or plea or must the judge find additional facts first? 
More than the Minimum Prison Term 
{¶ 56} Foster challenges R.C. 2929.14(B), which states: 
{¶ 57} “[I]f the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony 
elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender, the court shall 
impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) 
of this section [setting forth the basic ranges], unless one or more of the following 
applies: 
{¶ 58} “(1) The offender was serving a prison term at the time of the 
offense, or the offender previously had served a prison term. 
{¶ 59} “(2) The court finds on the record that the shortest prison term will 
demean the seriousness of the offender’s conduct or will not adequately protect 
the public from future crime by the offender or others.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 60} Thus, Ohio has a presumptive minimum prison term that must be 
overcome by at least one of two judicial findings.  For someone who has never 
been to prison before (not necessarily a first-time offender), the court must find 
that the shortest term will “demean the seriousness” of the crime or will 
inadequately protect the public; otherwise, the court must find that the offender 
has already been to prison to impose more than a minimum term.  R.C. 
2929.14(B)(2). 
{¶ 61} Under R.C. 2929.14(B), therefore, a court is not authorized to 
exceed the shortest prison term unless it makes the additional findings.  State v. 
Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (findings required, 
reasons not); State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E.2d 
473 (findings required for first offender).  Since a jury verdict alone does not 
determine the sentence, R.C. 2929.14(B) violates Blakely principles. 
The Maximum Prison Term 
January Term, 2006 
27 
{¶ 62} Quinones and Adams challenge R.C. 2929.14(C), which states that 
“the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose the 
longest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this 
section only upon offenders who committed the worst forms of the offense, upon 
offenders who pose the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes, upon 
certain major drug offenders under division (D)(3) of this section, and upon 
certain repeat violent offenders in accordance with division (D)(2) of this 
section.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 63} Although this statute does not use the word “findings,” our 
holdings in State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d at 329, 715 N.E.2d 131, and State v. 
Evans, 102 Ohio St.3d 240, 2004-Ohio-2659, 809 N.E.2d 11, recognize that R.C. 
2929.14(C) is mandatory and prohibits maximum sentences unless the required 
findings of fact are made beforehand.  The First Appellate District applied an 
Apprendi and Blakely analysis to determine that judicial fact-finding to reach a 
maximum prison sentence was improper.  It then applied the pertinent sentencing 
statutes without the unconstitutional findings and reduced the sentence to what it 
could have been without the judicial finding of “worst form of the offense,” that 
is, one year less than the ten-year maximum for a first-degree felony.  State v. 
Bruce, 159 Ohio App.3d 562, 2005-Ohio-373, 824 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 64} Bruce was correct in its analysis, if not in its solution.  We have 
consistently held that R.C. 2929.14(C) requires that specific findings be made 
before a maximum sentence is authorized.  Evans, 102 Ohio St.3d 240, 2004-
Ohio-2659, 809 N.E.2d 11, at ¶ 15; Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d at 325, 715 N.E.2d 
131.  As it stands, R.C. 2929.14(C) creates a presumption to be overcome only by 
judicial fact-finding. It does not comply with Blakely. 
Consecutive Prison Terms 
{¶ 65} Foster, Quinones, and Adams challenge their consecutive terms.  
R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) requires the court to find that “the consecutive service is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and 
that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”  In 
addition, at least one of three more findings of fact must be found: that the 
offender was already under control of the court due to an earlier conviction,83 that 
at least two of the offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct and the 
harm was so great or unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the 
seriousness of the conduct,84 or that “[t]he offender’s history of criminal conduct 
demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public.”85 
{¶ 66} While other state courts have held that their statutes on consecutive 
sentences do not violate Blakely,86 Ohio appears to be unique in having a rule that 
sentences of imprisonment shall be served concurrently.  See R.C. 2929.41(A); 
State v. Barnhouse, 102 Ohio St.3d 221, 2004-Ohio-2492, 808 N.E.2d 874, at ¶ 
11.  R.C. 2929.41(A) states, “Except as provided in division (B) of this section, 
division (E) of section 2929.14, or division (D) or (E) of section 2971.03 of the 
Revised Code, a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be 
served concurrently with any other prison term.” (Emphasis added.)  Thus, except 
for certain enumerated statutes imposing nondiscretionary consecutive terms,87 
judicial fact-finding must occur before consecutive sentences may be imposed 
under R.C. 2929.14(E)(4).  We have held previously that R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 
2929.19(B)(2)(c) require trial courts that impose consecutive sentences to make 
the statutorily enumerated findings and to give reasons at the sentencing hearing 
                                                          
 
83.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(a). 
 
84.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(b). 
 
85.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(c). 
 
86.  See, e.g., Smylie v. State (Ind.2005), 823 N.E.2d 679, 686-687; State v. Abdullah (2005), 184 
N.J. 497, 512-514, 878 A.2d 746; State v. Cubias (2005), 155 Wash.2d 549, 120 P.3d 929. 
 
87.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(1) through (3). 
January Term, 2006 
29 
to support those findings for review on appeal.  State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 
463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E.2d 473. 
{¶ 67} Thus, with limited exceptions, the Ohio Revised Code provides 
that consecutive sentences in Ohio may not be imposed except after additional 
fact-finding by the judge.  In State v. Lett, 161 Ohio App.3d 274, 2005-Ohio-
2665, 829 N.E.2d 1281, at ¶42, an en banc decision, the Eighth Appellate District 
held that Blakely is inapplicable to consecutive sentencing because “the facts 
found by the court do not increase the maximum penalty for an individual 
offense.”  This is true; nevertheless, because the total punishment increases 
through consecutive sentences only after judicial findings beyond those 
determined by a jury or stipulated to by a defendant, R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) violates 
principles announced in Blakely. 
Prison Rather than Community Control for Lower Level Felonies 
{¶ 68} Community control is the default sentence for felonies of the 
fourth and fifth degree, except for those identified as mandatory prison offenses.  
R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b) states that “if the court does not make a finding described 
in division (B)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of this section88 and if the 
                                                          
 
88.  
{¶a} Those sections provide: 
 
{¶ b}“[I]n sentencing an offender for a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, the sentencing 
court shall determine whether any of the following apply: 
 
{¶ c}“(a) In committing the offense, the offender caused physical harm to a person.
 
{¶ d} “(b) In committing the offense, the offender attempted to cause or made an actual 
threat of physical harm to a person with a deadly weapon. 
 
{¶ e} “(c) In committing the offense, the offender attempted to cause or made an actual 
threat of physical harm to a person, and the offender previously was convicted of an offense that 
caused physical harm to a person. 
 
{¶ f} “(d) The offender held a public office or position of trust and the offense related to 
that office or position; the offender’s position obliged the offender to prevent the offense or to 
bring those committing it to justice; or the offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated 
the offense or was likely to influence the future conduct of others. 
 
{¶ g} “(e) The offender committed the offense for hire or as part of an organized criminal 
activity. 
 
{¶ h} “(f) The offense is a sex offense that is a fourth or fifth degree felony violation [of 
certain enumerated statutes].   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
court, after considering the factors set forth in section 2929.12 of the Revised 
Code, finds that a community control sanction or combination of community 
control sanctions is consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set 
forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose a community 
control sanction or combination of community control sanctions upon the 
offender.”89  On the other hand, if the court makes one of the findings in R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i) and also finds that “a prison term is consistent with 
the purposes and principles of sentencing” and that “the offender is not amenable 
to an available community control sanction,” the court shall impose a prison 
term.90  
{¶ 69} At first blush, this portion of the statute appears to violate Blakely, 
but on closer inspection, it does not.  If the appropriate findings are made, the 
court has no discretion and must impose a prison term; however, the statute does 
not prevent a court from imposing a prison term without these findings.  There is 
no presumption in favor of community control, in other words.  If no findings are 
made under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i), the court must find that a 
community-control sanction meets the principles of sentencing under R.C. 
2929.11 before it must impose community control.  Thus, a judge who does not 
make one of the (B)(1) findings and does not find that community control is a 
sufficient sanction could still impose a prison term.91   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
{¶ i} “(g) The offender at the time of the offense was serving, or the offender previously 
had served, a prison term. 
 
{¶ j} “(h) The offender committed the offense while under a community control sanction, 
while on probation, or while released from custody on a bond or personal recognizance. 
 
{¶ k} “(i) The offender committed the offense while in possession of a firearm.” 
 
89.  R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b). 
 
90.  R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(a). 
 
91.  As noted by Griffin and Katz, “If the particular [R.C. 2929.13(B)] combinations are not 
found, the judge is simply guided by the general principles of sentencing, as occurs with third 
January Term, 2006 
31 
{¶ 70} R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(a) would permit a judge to impose prison 
rather than community control without R.C. 2929.13(B) findings.  This subtle 
distinction was found to be constitutional in McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986), 
477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67.  There, with respect to a statute 
involving use of a firearm during an offense, the court was required to impose a 
mandatory minimum prison term if findings were made—yet the court could still 
have imposed a greater term without the findings.  R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b) and 
2929.13(B)(2)(a) do not violate Blakely by requiring the sentencing court to make 
additional findings of fact before increasing a penalty at the fourth- or fifth-
degree-felony level. 
Repeat-Violent-Offender and Major-Drug-Offender Penalty Enhancements 
{¶ 71} Adams challenges his sentence enhancement as a repeat violent 
offender and Horn contests her penalty enhancement as a major drug offender, as 
being violative of Blakely.  Unlike all other penalty-enhancing specifications, the 
court, not the jury, makes the necessary factual findings for convicting the 
offender of being a repeat violent offender or a major drug offender.  See R.C. 
2941.149(B) and 2941.1410(B).  With respect to the repeat violent offender, R.C. 
2929.14(D)(2)(a) states: 
{¶ 72} “If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also 
is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification * * * that the offender is a repeat 
violent offender, the court shall impose a prison term from the range of terms 
authorized for the offense under division (A) of this section that may be the 
longest term in the range * * *.  If the court finds that the repeat violent offender, 
in committing the offense, caused any physical harm that carried a substantial risk 
of death to a person or that involved substantial permanent incapacity or 
substantial permanent disfigurement of a person, the court shall impose the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
degree nondrug felonies.”  1 Griffin & Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law (2005) 761, Section 
7:11. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
longest prison term from the range of terms authorized for the offense under 
division (A) of this section.” 
{¶ 73} Similar to imposing prison rather than community control for 
lower level felonies, the findings in R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(a) do not violate Blakely.  
The foregoing language shows that a judge is not compelled to make findings 
before selecting the longest prison term under R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(a).  A judge 
still had the ability to impose the longest prison term without making these 
findings. 
{¶ 74} Subsection (D)(2)(b), however, is another matter.  It states: 
{¶ 75} “[T]he court may impose on the offender an additional definite 
prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if the 
court finds that both of the following apply * * *: 
{¶ 76} “(i) The terms so imposed are inadequate to punish the offender 
and protect the public from future crime, because the applicable factors under 
section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism 
outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating a lesser likelihood of 
recidivism. 
{¶ 77} “(ii) The terms so imposed are demeaning to the seriousness of the 
offense, because one or more of the factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised 
Code indicating that the offender’s conduct is more serious than conduct normally 
constituting the offense are present, and they outweigh the applicable factors 
under that section indicating that the offender’s conduct is less serious than 
conduct normally constituting the offense.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 78} This section requires the court to make findings before imposing 
an additional penalty on repeat violent offenders and thus violates Blakely. 
{¶ 79} For the major drug offender, R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) requires that a 
ten-year term be imposed, and that term cannot be reduced.  The determination 
that a defendant is a major drug offender is dependent upon the amount of the 
January Term, 2006 
33 
controlled substance.  Subsection (b), however, provides: “The court * * * may 
impose an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, 
nine, or ten years, if the court, with respect to the term imposed under division 
(D)(3)(a) of this section and, if applicable, divisions (D)(1) and (2) of this section, 
makes both of the findings set forth in divisions (D)(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of this 
section.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 80} As with R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b), R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(b) cannot 
withstand a Blakely challenge, because judicial fact-finding is required and a court 
may not add the additional penalties based solely on the jury’s verdict. 
{¶ 81} For example, in Horn’s case, the jury determined that she 
possessed in excess of 100 grams of crack cocaine.  Thus, the court’s finding that 
she was a major drug offender is based on the jury’s verdict.  R.C. 
2929.14(D)(3)(a) mandates that she receive the longest term; therefore, her 10-
year sentence does not offend Blakely.  However, any additional penalty under 
R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(b) would have required judicial fact-finding and would have 
violated Blakely.  Because Horn did not receive any additional penalty, her 
sentence is Blakely compliant. 
Blakely’s Impact 
{¶ 82} Ohio’s sentencing statutes offend the constitutional principles 
announced in Blakely in four areas.  As was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Booker, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of 
guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 
621. 
{¶ 83} Because R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) and 2929.19(B)(2) require 
judicial fact-finding before imposition of a sentence greater than the maximum 
term authorized by a jury verdict or admission of the defendant, they are 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
unconstitutional.  Because R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) require judicial 
finding of facts not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the 
defendant before imposition of consecutive sentences, they are unconstitutional.  
Because R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) and (D)(3)(b) require judicial finding of facts not 
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant, before 
repeat-violent-offender and major-drug-offender penalty enhancements are 
imposed, they are unconstitutional.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435; Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. 
V.  Remedy 
{¶ 84} Ohio’s felony-sentencing structure may be severely wounded, but 
it is not fatally unsound.  Our holdings are limited to areas where the statutes are 
Blakely-deficient.  As a result, we must decide on a remedy.  The question 
becomes, which remedy to apply?  
{¶ 85} Since Blakely was decided, other states have examined their 
sentencing statutes and crafted remedies in response to the Apprendi-Blakely 
error.92  These states have come to varying conclusions regarding the impact of 
Blakely, with no two supreme courts resolving the constitutional issues 
identically.  The selected remedies fall into three broad categories:  requiring 
sentencing juries, reducing sentencing to minimum terms until the state legislature 
acts, and severing the offending statutory sections. 
{¶ 86} In considering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the United 
States Supreme Court observed that the remedial question for a Blakely violation 
is to be resolved by looking to legislative intent.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 246, 125 
S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621.  We note that the overriding goals of Ohio’s 
                                                          
 
92.  But, see, People v. Black (2005), 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1257-1261, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d 
534 (No Sixth Amendment impediment in California’s sentencing scheme when a judge increases 
a sentence above the presumptive term); Lopez v. People (Colo.2005), 113 P.3d 713, 726 
(Colorado’s aggravated-sentencing statute found constitutional because “aggravated sentences can 
be based on Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt facts”).  
 
January Term, 2006 
35 
sentencing scheme are to protect the public and punish the offender.93  S.B. 2 
delegated the role of determining the applicability of sentencing factors to judges 
rather than to juries to meet these overriding goals.  With this context in mind, we 
examine the possible remedies. 
{¶ 87} One way to comply with Blakely is to provide for jury involvement 
in sentencing, as is done in capital cases.94  We have already held that a common 
pleas judge lacks jurisdiction to conduct a jury-sentencing hearing pursuant to the 
current statutes.  State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 104 Ohio St.3d 279, 2004-Ohio-
6384, 819 N.E.2d 644.  In Griffin, we granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
judge from conducting a sentencing hearing before a jury in a noncapital case.  
Certainly the General Assembly may enact legislation to authorize juries to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt all facts essential to punishment in felony cases, but it 
has not yet done so.  We cannot say that, if faced with the Apprendi and Blakely 
decisions before passing S.B. 2, the General Assembly would have enacted such 
legislation.  The General Assembly undoubtedly never anticipated that the 
judicial-finding requirements contained within S.B. 2 would be held 
unconstitutional.  We therefore reject this potential solution. 
{¶ 88} A second way to comport with Blakely would be to accept the 
criminal defendants’ request that we interpret all the affected statutes as imposing 
only the minimum sentence for those entering prison for the first time and as 
preventing maximum sentences, consecutive sentences, and enhanced penalties 
such as repeat-violent-offender and major-drug-offender prison sentences, 
because all require judicial fact-finding.95  The criminal defendants and their 
                                                          
 
93.  R.C. 2929.11. 
 
94.  See Smylie v. Indiana, 823 N.E.2d at 685 (Blakely and the Sixth Amendment require that 
Indiana’s sentencing statute be “modified to require jury findings on facts in aggravation”).     
 
95.  See State v. Brown (2004), 209 Ariz. 200, 203, 99 P.3d 15 (The “ ‘maximum sentence’ for 
Apprendi analysis in this case is the five-year presumptive sentence”); State v. Shattuck 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
amici urge us to hold that for purposes of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, the 
“statutory maximum” in Ohio is the presumptive term – i.e., the minimum, 
concurrent term – rather than the longest possible term.  For example, on 
resentencing, this would mean a prison term of two years instead of nine years for 
Foster and three years rather than 11 ½ years for Quinones. 
{¶ 89} The General Assembly provided a sentencing scheme of “guided 
discretion” for judges, intending that the required findings guide trial courts to 
select sentences within a range rather than to mandate specific sentences within 
that range.  When mandatory sentences are intended, they are expressed.96  We, 
therefore, reject the criminal defendants’ proposed remedy of presumptive 
minimum sentences, for we do not believe that the General Assembly would have 
limited so greatly the sentencing court’s ability to impose an appropriate penalty. 
{¶ 90} A third possibility for Blakely compliance is the severance remedy.  
Booker provided a blueprint for this remedy by converting the guidelines from 
mandatory to advisory through severance of the offending portions.97  Where 
sentencing is left to the unguided discretion of the judge, there is no judicial 
impingement upon the traditional role of the jury.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308-309, 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(Minn.2004), 689 N.W.2d 785 (the presumptive sentence is the maximum penalty authorized 
solely by the jury’s verdict for purposes of Apprendi); State v. Provost, 2005 VT 134, ___ 
A.2d___, ¶ 21 (“until the Legislature designs a constitutionally permissible means by which the 
factors can be weighed, there can be no basis for adjusting defendant’s sentence above the 
presumptive term”) State v. Allen (2005), 359 N.C. 425, 437, 615 S.E.2d 256 (“the ‘statutory 
maximum’ to which Apprendi applies is not the maximum sentence authorized by statute; rather, 
for Apprendi purposes, ‘statutory maximum’ means the maximum sentence authorized by the jury 
verdict or the defendant’s admissions”).    
 
96.  For example, R.C. 2929.14 (D)(1)(a), (c), (d), and (f). 
 
97.  The severed portions were “the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence 
within the applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure), 
see 18 USC § 3553(b)(1) (Supp.2004), and the provision that sets forth standards of review on 
appeal, including de novo review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range, see § 
3742(e) (main ed. and Supp.2004).”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 259, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621. 
 
January Term, 2006 
37 
124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403.  States that have applied a Booker remedy 
include New Jersey and Indiana.98 
{¶ 91} As Justice Stevens clarified in Booker, “If the Guidelines as 
currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, 
rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing 
sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.  We have never 
doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a 
sentence within a statutory range.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348 
[147 L.Ed.2d 435]; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079 [93 
L.Ed.2d 1337] (1949).  Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues 
presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had 
omitted from the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984] the provisions that make the 
Guidelines binding on district judges; it is that circumstance that makes the 
Court’s answer to the second question presented possible.  For when a trial judge 
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the 
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems 
relevant.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 234, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621. 
{¶ 92} As we believe the severance remedy to be the most appropriate, we 
next turn to Ohio law regarding severance. 
Applying the Booker Remedy 
{¶ 93} We presume that compliance with the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions is intended and that an entire statute is intended to be effective.  
R.C. 1.47(A) and (B).  Furthermore, R.C. 1.50 states, “If any provisions of a 
section of the Revised Code or the application thereof to any person or 
                                                          
 
98.  In State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 878 A.2d 724, the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated 
presumptive terms from the state’s sentencing statute, allowing trial courts to use full discretion in 
imposing sentences within the range.  Similarly, in Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 685-686, the 
Indiana Supreme Court severed portions of Indiana’s sentencing statute that mandated a fixed term 
and permitted judicial discretion in finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances to deviate 
from the fixed term. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or 
applications of the section or related sections which can be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions are severable.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 94} When this court holds that a statute is unconstitutional, severance 
may be appropriate.  R.C. 1.50; see, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 17, 711 N.E.2d 203 (severing the portion of a bill that violated the one-
subject rule); but, see, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 500, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (severance rejected as 
tantamount to judicial legislation); State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward (1994), 71 
Ohio St.3d 513, 523-524, 644 N.E.2d 369 (severing the portion of a statute that 
violated Section 11, Article III of the Ohio Constitution, which authorizes the 
General Assembly to regulate application process with respect to pardons but not 
commutations or reprieves); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 225, 230, 631 N.E.2d 582 (severing the portion of a bill that violated 
the one-subject rule); State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 
62 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 580 N.E.2d 767 (same).  Severance is suitable, however, 
only where it satisfies our well-established standard.  State ex rel. Ohio Academy 
of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 500, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (where bill 
violated one-subject rule, severance was not appropriate because “any attempt on 
our part to carve out a primary subject by identifying and assembling what we 
believe to be key or core provisions of the bill would constitute a legislative 
exercise wholly beyond the province of this court”). 
{¶ 95} The severance test was first pronounced in Geiger v. Geiger 
(1927), 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28, quoting State v. Bickford (1913), 28 
N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407, paragraph 19 of the syllabus.  Three questions are to be 
answered before severance is appropriate. “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the 
unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may 
January Term, 2006 
39 
stand by itself?  (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general 
scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention 
of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out?  (3) Is the insertion of words 
or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the 
unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?’ ”   
{¶ 96} After examining Ohio’s felony-sentencing statutes, we determine 
that severance of the Blakely-offending portions meets the Geiger test.  All 
references to mandatory judicial fact-finding properly may be eliminated in the 
four areas of concern.  Without the mandatory judicial fact-finding, there is 
nothing to suggest a “presumptive term.”  To explain Ohio’s “statutory 
maximum” for purposes of Apprendi and its progeny, the maximum prison term 
authorized by the jury verdict or the facts admitted by a defendant upon 
acceptance of a plea is the top of the sentencing range for the crime of which the 
defendant is convicted.  For example, if the offender is convicted of a first-degree 
felony, the “statutory maximum” is ten years under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1). 
{¶ 97} The following sections, because they either create presumptive 
minimum or concurrent terms or require judicial fact-finding to overcome the 
presumption, have no meaning now that judicial findings are unconstitutional:  
R.C. 2929.14(B), 2929.19(B)(2), and 2929.41.  These sections are severed and 
excised in their entirety, as is R.C. 2929.14(C), which requires judicial fact-
finding for maximum prison terms, and 2929.14(E)(4), which requires judicial 
findings for consecutive terms.  R.C. 2953.08(G), which refers to review of 
statutory findings for consecutive sentences in the appellate record, no longer 
applies.  We also excise R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) and (D)(3)(b), which require 
findings for repeat violent offenders and major drug offenders. 
{¶ 98} This approach conforms to the Geiger standard.  Excising the 
unconstitutional provisions does not detract from the overriding objectives of the 
General Assembly, including the goals of protecting the public and punishing the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
offender.  See R.C. 2929.11(A).  The excised portions remove only the 
presumptive and judicial findings that relate to “upward departures,” that is, the 
findings necessary to increase the potential prison penalty.  We add no language, 
and the vast majority of S.B. 2, which is capable of being read and of standing 
alone, is left in place. 
{¶ 99} We therefore hold that R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) and 2929.19(B)(2) 
are capable of being severed.  After the severance, judicial fact-finding is not 
required before a prison term may be imposed within the basic ranges of R.C. 
2929.14(A) based upon a jury verdict or admission of the defendant.  We further 
hold that R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) are capable of being severed.  After 
the severance, judicial fact-finding is not required before imposition of 
consecutive prison terms.  Finally, we hold that R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) and (3)(b) 
are capable of being severed.  After the severance, judicial fact-finding is not 
required before imposition of additional penalties for repeat-violent-offender and 
major-drug-offender specifications.  The appellate statute R.C. 2953.08(G), 
insofar as it refers to the severed sections, no longer applies. 
{¶ 100} Accordingly, we have concluded that trial courts have full 
discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer 
required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, 
consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.  By vesting sentencing judges 
with full discretion, it may be argued, this remedy vitiates S.B. 2’s goals, 
particularly with respect to reducing sentencing disparities and promoting 
uniformity.  Indeed, the dissenters in Blakely fretted that as a result of the 
Apprendi expansion, “[o]ver 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost* * *.”  
542 U.S. at 326, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  It 
may well be that in the future, the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission may 
recommend Blakely-compliant statutory modifications to the General Assembly 
that will counteract these, among other, concerns.  Nevertheless, we are 
January Term, 2006 
41 
constrained by the principles of separation of powers and cannot rewrite the 
statutes. 
{¶ 101} Significantly, the severance remedy preserves “truth in 
sentencing,” a fundamental element of S.B. 2.  Because offenders will continue to 
be sentenced to a specific prison term, all parties and the victim of the crime will 
know at the time of sentencing exactly what sanction that the court is imposing on 
the defendant.  Moreover, S.B. 2 established an entirely new framework for 
felony sentencing in Ohio, and the breadth of its reforms is wide.  For example, 
the legislation recategorized numerous felonies, added various sentence-
enhancing specifications, permitted courts to use residential and nonresidential 
sanctions in lieu of a prison term, required a definite term of imprisonment, and 
created the option of a life sentence without the possibility of parole.  The 
overwhelming majority of those reforms survive today’s constitutional decision. 
{¶ 102} Severance also is the remedy that will best preserve the 
paramount goals of community safety and appropriate punishment and the major 
elements of our sentencing code.  Removing presumptive terms and preserving 
the remainder of the sentencing provisions of the code will most effectively 
preserve the General Assembly’s goal of truth in sentencing. However tempting it 
may be for this court to reconfigure the sentencing code to cause the least impact 
on our criminal-justice system, we must adhere to our traditional judicial role.  
Our remedy does not rewrite the statutes but leaves courts with full discretion to 
impose a prison term within the basic ranges of R.C. 2929.14(A) based upon a 
jury verdict or admission of the defendant without the mandated judicial findings 
that Blakely prohibits. 
Sentencing Rehearings 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
{¶ 103} The sentences of Foster, Quinones, and Adams were based on 
unconstitutional statutes.99  When a sentence is deemed void, the ordinary course 
is to vacate that sentence and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing 
hearing.  See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 
N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23 (where a sentence is void because it does not contain a 
statutorily mandated term, the proper remedy is to resentence the offender).  In 
fact, in the case of Quinones, the court of appeals, whose judgment we today 
affirm, vacated the sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. 
{¶ 104} These cases and those pending on direct review must be 
remanded to trial courts for new sentencing hearings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.  We do not order resentencing lightly.  Although new sentencing 
hearings will impose significant time and resource demands on the trial courts 
within the counties, causing disruption while cases are pending on appeal, we 
must follow the dictates of the United States Supreme Court.  Ohio’s felony-
sentencing code must protect Sixth Amendment principles as they have been 
articulated. 
{¶ 105} Under R.C. 2929.19 as it stands without (B)(2), the defendants 
are entitled to a new sentencing hearing although the parties may stipulate to the 
sentencing court’s acting on the record before it.  Courts shall consider those 
portions of the sentencing code that are unaffected by today’s decision and 
impose any sentence within the appropriate felony range.  If an offender is 
sentenced to multiple prison terms, the court is not barred from requiring those 
terms to be served consecutively.  While the defendants may argue for reductions 
in their sentences, nothing prevents the state from seeking greater penalties.  
                                                          
 
99.  Horn’s sentence as a major drug offender was based only on R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a).  It did not 
include an additional penalty under R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(b), which has now been severed.  
Therefore, her sentence is affirmed and does not require any further proceeding. 
January Term, 2006 
43 
United States v. DiFrancesco (1980), 449 U.S. 117, 134-136, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 
L.Ed.2d 328. 
{¶ 106} As the Supreme Court mandated in Booker, we must apply this 
holding to all cases on direct review. Booker, 543 U.S. at 268, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
L.Ed.2d 621, quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 
L.Ed.2d 649. (“ ‘A new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 
applied retroactively to all cases * * * pending on direct review or not yet final’”). 
DISPOSITIONS 
{¶ 107} In case No. 2004-1568 (Andrew Foster), the judgment of the 
Licking County Court of Appeals is reversed.  In case No. 2004-1771 (Jason 
Quinones), the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals is affirmed.  
In case No. 2005-0735 (Robert Adams), the judgment of the Lake County Court 
of Appeals is reversed.  In case No. 2005-2156 (Jeannett Horn), the judgment of 
the Ottawa County Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The Foster, Quinones, and 
Adams cases are remanded to the trial courts for resentencing in light of our 
remedial severance and interpretation of Ohio’s felony-sentencing statutes. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
RESNICK, J., concurs in paragraph seven of the syllabus and in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Robert L. Becker, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kenneth W. 
Oswalt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case No. 2004-1568. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Theresa G. Haire, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 2004-1568. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and Diane 
Richards Brey and Franklin E. Crawford, Deputy Solicitors, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General in case No. 2004-1568. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor 
and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association in case No. 2004-1568. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender; and Jason Macke, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Cuyahoga County Public 
Defender in case No. 2004-1568. 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc., in case No. 2004-1568. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa 
Reitz Williamson and Jon W. Oebker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant in case No. 2004-1771. 
 
Michael T. Fisher, for appellee in case No. 2004-1771. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender; and Jason Macke, urging affirmance for amici curiae 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender and Ohio Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers in case No. 2004-1771. 
 
John E. Wells Sr., urging affirmance on his own behalf in case No. 2004-
1771. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and Diane 
Richards Brey and Franklin E. Crawford, Deputy Solicitors, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General in case No. 2004-1771. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor 
and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association in case No. 2004-1771. 
 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alana A. 
Rezaee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case No. 2005-0735. 
January Term, 2006 
45 
 
R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. Clapp, 
Supervising Attorney-Appellate Division, for appellant in case No. 2005-0735. 
 
Lorrain R. Croy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case No. 
2005-2156. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Charles B. Clovis, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 2005-2156. 
______________________