Case Title: W.A. MONCRIEF, JR., AND CHARLES TAUBMAN v. SOHIO PETROLEUM COMPANY; BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., Successor in interest to MONSANTO COMPANY; GRACE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, successor in interest to W.R. GRACE & CO.; NORTH CENTRAL OIL CORPORATION; YATES DRILLING COMPANY; MARTIN YATES, III; and INEXCO OIL COMPANY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
W.A. MONCRIEF, JR., AND CHARLES TAUBMAN v. SOHIO PETROLEUM COMPANY; BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., Successor in interest to MONSANTO COMPANY; GRACE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, successor in interest to W.R. GRACE & CO.; NORTH CENTRAL OIL CORPORATION; YATES DRILLING COMPANY; MARTIN YATES, III; and INEXCO OIL COMPANY1989 WY 132775 P.2d 1021Case Number: 88-87, 88-88Decided: 06/16/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
W.A. MONCRIEF, JR., AND 
CHARLES TAUBMAN, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

SOHIO PETROLEUM COMPANY; 
BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO MONSANTO COMPANY; GRACE 
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO W.R. GRACE & CO.; NORTH 
CENTRAL OIL CORPORATION; YATES DRILLING COMPANY; MARTIN YATES, III; AND INEXCO 
OIL COMPANY, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

SOHIO PETROLEUM COMPANY; 
BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO MONSANTO COMPANY; GRACE 
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO W.R. GRACE & CO.; NORTH 
CENTRAL OIL CORPORATION; YATES DRILLING COMPANY; MARTIN YATES, III; AND INEXCO 
OIL COMPANY, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

W.A. MONCRIEF, JR., AND 
CHARLES TAUBMAN, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Morris R. Massey 
of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellants in 

No. 88-87 and appellees 
in No. 88-88.

Neil J. Short, 
Casper, Larry R. Veselka and Billy Coe Dyer of Vinson & Elkins, Houston, 
Tex., Peter A. Bjork of Poulson, Odell & Peterson, Denver, Colo., Gretchen 
VanderWerf of Hawley & VanderWerf, Denver, Colo., and David D. Uchner, 
Cheyenne, for appellees in No. 88-87 and 
appellants in No. 88-88.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal and 
cross-appeal arises from an action brought by appellants W.A. Moncrief, Jr. and 
Charles Taubman seeking specific performance of an alleged contractual 
obligation on the part of appellees Sohio Petroleum Company; BHP Petroleum 
Company, Inc.; Grace Petroleum Corporation; North Central Oil Corporation; Yates 
Drilling Company; Martin Yates III; and Inexco Oil Company to offer and/or 
assign appellants an interest in a renewed oil and gas lease and an accounting 
for appellants' share of the gas production attributable to their alleged 
interest in the disputed lease. The district court granted summary judgment to 
appellees upon the ground that appellants' claim was barred by laches and the 
applicable statute of limitations.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The issues presented by 
Moncrief and Taubman may be summarized in this manner:

1. Did the district court 
properly conclude that appellants' claim was barred by 
laches?

2. Did the district court 
properly determine that appellants' claim was barred by Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105 
(1977)?

[¶4.]     Our resolution of the 
issues presented on direct appeal precludes the necessity of addressing the 
contingent cross-appeal brought by appellees, challenging the conclusion by the 
district court that Taubman (and, through Taubman, Moncrief) retained an 
interest in the renewed lease entitling him to notice of, and an opportunity to 
participate in, the acquisition of the renewed lease.

[¶5.]     The facts of this case, 
involving myriad agreements and transactions, are complicated and cover the 
better part of two decades. By a written agreement dated April 2, 1968 (the Wolf 
Agreement), Erving Wolf and several other persons and entities (Wolf assignors) 
assigned to Stonehenge Oil Company, Inc. (predecessor in interest to appellants) 
an undivided one-fourth interest in and to the shallow rights1 in the leases listed on Exhibits A 
and B (the A and B leases) to the Wolf Agreement. These leases covered 
approximately 64,000 acres of land in the Madden Deep Unit Area in Fremont and Natrona Counties, Wyoming. Pursuant to the Wolf Agreement, 
Stonehenge also acquired an option to earn 
"deep rights" in the A and B leases by participating in the drilling of an 
exploratory well to a depth sufficient to test the Cody formation or 19,000 
feet, whichever was the lesser depth.

[¶6.]     Under separate but 
identical agreements, the Wolf assignors assigned to appellees, or their 
predecessors in interest, various fractional interests, totaling 72.92%, in the 
shallow rights in the same A and B leases with the same option to earn interests 
in the deep rights.2 We will refer to these agreements 
collectively as the "Wolf Agreements" and the various assignees, including 
Stonehenge, as the "Wolf assignees." The Hugh 
S. Day lease (Day lease), the lease at issue, was listed on Exhibit B of each 
Wolf Agreement as one of the assigned leases. Although most of the A and B 
leases were within the Madden Deep Unit,3 the Day lease, covering 
approximately 520 acres, was located just outside the boundary of the Unit but 
within the Area of Mutual Interest (AMI). The Exhibit B listing of the Day lease 
indicated that the lease would expire on May 14, 1972. With respect to expiring 
leases, paragraph 1.1.1 of the Wolf Agreements provided that: "In the event any 
of said leases terminates and is subsequently re-acquired by either party 
hereto, it shall be considered as an `after-acquired lease' under Article III 
hereinbelow." Article III of the Wolf Agreements provided:

In the event that either 
party acquires an interest in oil and gas leases within the area delineated by 
the solid heavy line on the map attached [the AMI] * * *, it shall promptly 
offer an interest therein by notice in writing, describing the terms and 
conditions applicable to such acquisition, to the other party and any third 
parties owning interests in the Exhibit "A" and "B" leases in proportion to the 
ownership of each such party in said leases. * * * Each party electing to 
participate shall have the right to acquire an interest in the proportion that 
its interest assigned hereunder bears to the interest of all electing parties * 
* *.

[¶7.]     Subsequent to the 
initial agreements described above, the following series of events transpired, 
eventually leading to the litigation in this case. On November 4, 1969, 
Stonehenge assigned its undivided one-fourth 
interest in the shallow rights to the A and B leases to Volunteer Oil and Gas 
Company. Pursuant to the terms of the assignment, Stonehenge retained its deep 
rights option but granted Volunteer the option to earn one-half of Stonehenge's 
one-fourth participatory rights in the deep rights by paying all costs 
attributable to Stonehenge in drilling and 
completing two deep test wells. In February of 1970, Stonehenge was dissolved, and Taubman, as the sole 
surviving stockholder, succeeded to all of its assets. On December 22, 1970, 
Volunteer conveyed to an affiliate of Petro-Lewis Corporation all of its 
one-fourth interest in the shallow rights and its option to earn deep rights in 
the A and B leases.4

[¶8.]     Sohio, as the operator 
of the Madden Deep Unit, coordinated the exercise of the deep rights option by 
the Wolf assignees (also referred to by the parties as the Madden Group). In 
early 1972, Sohio reviewed the status of the A and B leases, notified the owners 
of shallow rights of certain leases which were to expire in the near future, 
including the Day lease, and held a meeting with the shallow rights owners 
regarding the expiring leases. Neither Stonehenge nor Taubman was notified of or 
included in these communications and discussions, although Petro-Lewis, as 
successor to Stonehenge's shallow rights, was 
included. Sohio recommended that leases lying outside the Madden Deep Unit, 
including the Day lease, be allowed to expire. The Day lease expired on May 14, 
1972.

[¶9.]     Contrary to its 
recommendation, Sohio reacquired or renewed the Day lease. By letter dated May 
26, 1972, Sohio advised all parties owning shallow rights in the A and B leases 
of the Day lease renewal and offered them an opportunity to participate in the 
lease in proportion to their respective interests in the A and B leases. 
Petro-Lewis, as successor to the shallow rights of Stonehenge, was notified and elected not to participate. 
Neither Stonehenge nor Taubman was notified of 
the acquisition. All other interest owners participated, and the proportionate 
interest of each participant in the renewed Day lease was revised to allocate 
among the participants the one-fourth interest of Petro-Lewis and the expenses 
attributable to it. Sohio recorded the renewed Day lease in FremontCounty on June 30, 1972. The partial 
assignments of that lease were similarly recorded on May 17, 1973. The recorded 
assignments did not show Taubman or Moncrief as owning any interest in the 
renewed Day lease.

[¶10.]  Sohio proposed a deep test well on 
November 1, 1972, and all interest owners were given until December 1, 1972, to 
make a participation election. On December 1, 1972, Taubman assigned to Moncrief 
his contractual option to earn deep rights, reserving for himself a two percent 
overriding royalty convertible to a working interest at the completion of the 
well. Correspondingly, Moncrief agreed to pay all of the costs of the well 
attributable to Taubman's interest. The deep test well was spudded on February 
14, 1973, and it reached total depth on August 8, 1974. The well was completed 
as a significant gas producer in October of 1974.

[¶11.]  In 1976, Moncrief formed the Long Butte 
Unit, an exploratory unit adjacent to the Madden Deep Unit. The Long Butte Unit 
encompassed approximately 480 acres of the Day lease. Moncrief was the operator 
of the Long Butte Unit, and in preparation of the Unit Agreement, which 
indicates lease ownership within the Unit, Moncrief's staff became aware that he 
had no interest in the renewed Day lease. In July of 1977, Moncrief wrote to 
Inexco Oil Company inquiring as to why he had not received an interest in the 
renewed Day lease. Inexco referred the inquiry to Sohio which responded by 
letter dated October 13, 1977, relating that the lease had been tendered to 
Petro-Lewis in 1972 and that Petro-Lewis had elected not to participate in the 
reacquisition of the lease. Thus, Moncrief became aware that he and Taubman had 
lost the deep rights to that tract. Thereafter, several producing wells were 
drilled in the Long Butte Unit significantly increasing the value of the renewed 
Day lease.

[¶12.]  In the summer and fall of 1982, Moncrief, 
as unit operator, prepared division orders and began making distributions of 
proceeds from the sales of gas from the Long Butte Unit. The division orders 
reflected that neither Moncrief nor Taubman had any interest in the renewed Day 
lease. By 1982, the Long Butte Unit was producing "full blast." In December of 
1982, Raymond G. Feldman, an Oklahoma attorney engaged by Taubman in 
connection with Taubman's interest in the Long Butte Unit, contacted Moncrief 
regarding Taubman's participation in the Madden and Long Butte Units, including 
the Day lease. Moncrief responded by letter dated December 13, 1982, stating 
with respect to the Day lease:

Regarding the Day Lease 
(Tract 37 of the Long Butte Unit), it appears that somehow Petro Lewis was 
offered this lease, evidently due to some sale or farm-out that Mr. Taubman had 
made, and at any rate Mr. Taubman evidently was not entitled to participate. I 
enclose correspondence regarding this Day lease, and if you think there is any 
way we could win it I would be happy to pursue the matter because it is a 
valuable tract.

[¶13.]  In January 1983, Feldman contacted Sohio 
asserting that Sohio had erred in not offering Taubman an opportunity to 
participate in the renewed Day lease in 1972 and requesting that Sohio assign an 
interest in the lease to Taubman or his successor in interest, Moncrief. Sohio 
responded by letter dated November 3, 1983, in which it denied the request to 
assign an interest, and stated that Sohio had notified the proper parties of the 
renewal in 1972, that Petro-Lewis had declined to participate, and, further, 
that any disagreement with Sohio's interpretation of its duties under the Wolf 
Agreements should have been raised in 1972 and not eleven years 
later.

[¶14.]  Moncrief and Taubman filed the instant 
lawsuit on July 18, 1984. Following extensive discovery, appellees filed a 
motion for summary judgment on December 1, 1987. After a hearing, the district 
court granted the motion. The district court determined that Sohio did have a 
duty pursuant to the Wolf Agreements to notify Taubman of the renewal of the Day 
lease and to offer him an opportunity to participate in the acquisition of the 
renewed lease. The district court reasoned that Taubman's right to earn deep 
rights was an interest retained by a third party entitling that party to such 
notice and opportunity. Thus, the district court found a breach of contract. The 
district court further held, however, that, despite the contractual breach, the 
claim of Moncrief and Taubman was barred by the statute of limitations and the 
doctrine of laches. Appellants then perfected this appeal.

[¶15.]  Although the district court determined 
this case on the dual grounds of limitations and laches, we perceive this to be 
a particularly appropriate case for application of the doctrine of laches, and 
our decision on that basis is dispositive of this appeal. We therefore need not 
consider the propriety of the statute of limitations, which presents various 
difficulties in this case, as a ground for decision. In its order granting 
summary judgment, the district court found:

That [appellants] were 
also guilty of laches; that the Moncrief letter to Sohio in 1977 established 
that [appellants] were aware of [appellees'] breach and yet did not file their 
lawsuit for some seven years.

Appellants 
contend that this finding was in error because the delay was not unreasonable 
and appellees were not prejudiced. We cannot agree.

[¶16.]  Laches is an equitable defense, and its 
applicability depends upon the circumstances of each case.5 Eblen v. Eblen, 68 Wyo. 353, 234 P.2d 434 (1951); Taylor v. Salt Creek Consol. Oil Co., 285 F. 532 (8th Cir. 
1922) (case arising in Wyoming - which was then within the Eighth 
Circuit). The existence of laches is a question addressed to the sound 
discretion of the district court. Gardner v. 
Panama Railroad Company, 342 U.S. 29, 72 S. Ct. 12, 96 L. Ed. 31 
(1951); Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Department of 
Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987); Moore 
v. State, 553 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1976); 30A C.J.S., Equity § 115 (1965). 
Our review, therefore, must focus upon whether or not the trial court abused its 
discretion by invoking the doctrine of laches. Park County Resource Council, 
Inc., 817 F.2d 609; Moore, 553 P.2d 8.

[¶17.]  Laches is comprised of two elements - 
inexcusable delay and injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendants or 
others. Big Piney Oil & Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission, 715 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1986); Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357 (Wyo. 
1981); Pfister v. Cow Gulch Oil Co., 189 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 342 U.S. 887, 72 S. Ct. 177, 96 L. Ed. 665 (1951). In the instant case, the record 
clearly supports the district court's finding that appellants had actual 
knowledge in 1977 that they had not been conveyed an interest in the renewed Day 
lease. Appellants, however, delayed filing this lawsuit until 1984, a delay of 
nearly seven years.6 Appellants offer no plausible 
excuse for the extended delay, and none is apparent in the record other than 
disinterest until the lease became valuable. Although apparently conceding 
inexcusable delay, appellants assert a lack of resulting prejudice to appellees. 
We disagree.

[¶18.]  Innumerable cases have established that 
the doctrine of laches is particularly applicable to oil and gas and mining 
claims due to the nature of such property interests. See, e.g., Torgeson v. 
Connelly, 348 P.2d 63 (Wyo. 1959); and Eblen, 234 P.2d 434. The 
rationale for strict application of laches in these cases was expressed by the 
United States Supreme Court in the oft-cited case of Twin-Lick Oil Company v. 
Marbury, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 587, 592-93, 23 L. Ed. 328 
(1875):

The fluctuating character 
and value of this class of property is remarkably illustrated in the history of 
the production of mineral oil from wells. Property worth thousands to-day is 
worth nothing tomorrow; and that which would to-day sell for a thousand dollars 
as its fair value, may, by the natural changes of a week or the energy and 
courage of desperate enterprise, in the same time be made to yield that much 
every day. The injustice, therefore, is obvious, of permitting one holding the 
right to assert an ownership in such property to voluntarily await the event, 
and then decide, when the danger which is over has been at the risk of another, 
to come in and share the profit.

Similarly, in 
Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 321, 25 S. Ct. 35, 49 L. Ed. 214 (1904), the Supreme Court stated:

There is no class of 
property more subject to sudden and violent fluctuations of value than mining 
lands. * * * Under such circumstances, persons having claims to such property 
are bound to the utmost diligence in enforcing them, and there is no class of 
cases in which the doctrine of laches has been more relentlessly 
enforced.

See also Amerada 
Petroleum Corporation v. Rio Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 907 (D.Wyo. 1964) (doctrine 
of laches must be relentlessly enforced in this case because of the fluctuating 
and speculative character of oil and gas leases - mining and oil properties 
require extremely prompt action); Pope v. Pennzoil Producing Company, 288 Ark. 
10, 701 S.W.2d 366 (1986) (oil and gas properties are unusual, requiring 
diligence on the part of parties claiming an interest - parties asserting title 
thereto must act more promptly than in ordinary cases); and 5 W. Summers, The 
Law of Oil and Gas § 997 (1966) (the rule in oil and gas cases is that a 
claimant for equitable remedies must bring his action promptly - rather than 
withholding it and speculating on the outcome before commencing 
suit).

[¶19.]  With respect to prejudice to appellees or 
others, a significant increase in the value of the property is a relevant 
consideration. In Merrill v. Rocky Mountain Cattle Co., 26 Wyo. 219, 181 P. 964 
(1919), this Court affirmed the denial of specific performance to convey certain 
lands upon which oil had been discovered. The decision was premised on both 
contract grounds and laches. Regarding laches, we quoted Patterson, 195 U.S.  at 317, 25 S. Ct.  at 36, to the 
effect that, in addition to the passage of time, a change in the value of the 
property was a material consideration in application of the doctrine of laches. 
We then noted:

Thus, with knowledge of 
the facts, the plaintiffs waited before asserting their right here claimed until 
the value of the land for oil purposes had been demonstrated by the defendant 
Phelps through his lease to said operating company, allowing their decision to 
insist upon what they now claim as their right to depend upon the success or 
failure of the drilling operations carried on at the expense of 
others.

Merrill, 181 P. 
at 975. In Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 
1120 (Wyo. 
1979), quoted in Hartnett, 629 P.2d  at 1364, we stated:

There is an inherent 
injustice in one purportedly holding a right to assert an ownership in property 
to voluntarily await the propitious event and then decide, when the danger which 
has been at the risk of another is over, to come in and claim a share of the 
profits.

Similarly, in 
Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 225 F. Supp. 907, the court held that the 
defendants' hostile claims against certain Wyoming property were barred, inter 
alia, by laches, where the defendants had known for years of the existence of 
the property but, thinking it worthless, delayed prosecuting their claims until 
approached by an oil company regarding mineral leasing. The court in that case 
observed:

The rule of laches must 
foreclose tardy claimants from asserting any rights in property when they sit 
quietly by and permit some one else "to bring into form and being a latent 
property right" which only in recent years appeared to have considerable or 
potential value. Hodgson v. Federal Oil and Development Co., et al., 285 F. 546 
(Wyo.) 
(1922).

Id. at 914. In J. Pomeroy, 
Specific Performance of Contracts § 407 at 864 (3d Ed. 1926), the author 
states:

Where a vendee delays in 
completing the contract in order that he may speculate upon the chances of its 
proving to be an advantageous bargain, or that through a rise in value or other 
change of circumstances his gain may be assured, and then when he is thus 
certain that it will be a fortunate speculation offers to perform and sues to 
compel a conveyance by the vendor, a court of equity will refuse to grant him 
the remedy * * *. And a rise in value of the land during the interval will 
always be a fact of much weight in tending to show that the vendee's delay was 
speculative * * *.

(Footnotes 
omitted.) Thus, a significant increase in value during the period of delay, 
where the claimant might have asserted the right before such change, is 
ordinarily fatal to the plaintiff's case. See 30A C.J.S., supra at § 118, and 
cases cited therein.

[¶20.]  In the case at bar, appellants had actual 
notice in 1977 that they had not been conveyed an interest in the renewed Day 
lease, and yet they waited until 1984 to bring this action. Moncrief, in his 
deposition, made several revealing statements regarding appellants' delay in 
pressing their claim. Moncrief stated: "[A]fter getting that letter from Sohio 
in 1977, I really didn't do much on this until about '82 or '83, somewhere in 
there. There really wasn't much happening." Thereafter, the following exchanges 
occurred:

Q The question is: Is it 
your testimony today that you had the same interest and motivation in seeking to 
be allowed to participate in the Day renewal lease in '76 and '77 as you did in 
1982?

A I might have been a 
little more interested in '82. Is that your question?

Q Yes, sir. I mean had 
any circumstances changed?

A I might have been a 
little more interested then.

Q Would that be due to 
the fact that there had been five, or six or seven wells drilling on the Long 
Butte Unit in the meantime?

A I would say that would 
be correct.

* * * * * 
*

Q * * * As of 1977 at 
least, you knew Sohio took the position that you and Mr. Taubman did not 
participate in the Day renewal lease; is that correct?

A That's when Sohio wrote 
me a letter dated '77?

Q Yes, 
sir.

A I was aware of that 
through that letter.

Q And after becoming 
aware of that, you did not take action to try to enforce or assert your claim 
until Mr. Taubman was pressing the claim in order to try to get a larger portion 
of the revenue stream attributed to him after you started handing out 
distributions from the Long Butte Unit in late 1982?

A I believe what you said 
is correct.

In December 
1982, Moncrief wrote to Feldman, Taubman's attorney, regarding Taubman's 
retained interest in the Long Butte and Madden Units. The letter, as noted 
earlier in this opinion, included a response to Feldman's prior inquiry 
regarding the Day lease. Moncrief wrote: "I enclose correspondence regarding 
this Day lease, and if you think there is any way we could win it I would be 
happy to pursue the matter because it is a valuable 
tract."

[¶21.]  The record clearly indicates that the 
value of the renewed Day lease increased dramatically between 1977 and 1984 as a 
result of extensive drilling in the Long Butte Unit. Additionally, the record 
establishes that appellees paid the expenses attributable to the Day lease for 
the area development. From the deposition testimony and correspondence 
highlighted above, it can readily be seen that for several years appellants 
lacked sufficient interest in the Day lease to pursue their claim, until it 
became apparent that the Day lease was quite valuable. In the meantime, 
production attributable to the lease had begun, with a corresponding 
distribution of revenues to the various fractional interest owners.7 While it is true, as appellants 
point out, that they (i.e., Moncrief) contributed considerable sums in 
developing the area as a whole, which development established the value of the 
Day lease, they nevertheless did not contribute costs attributable to the Day 
lease, and they simply were not interested in pursuing their asserted right to 
participate in that lease until its value became apparent. As in Merrill, 181 P. 964, appellants here delayed their decision on whether to assert a claim on this 
lease until its value was established by drilling operations. Appellants, in 
their complaint, indicate their willingness to reimburse appellees for the costs 
of development attributable to the Day lease. With respect to a similar offer by 
the plaintiff in the Eblen case, we observed:

Yet for some five or six 
years he did nothing to assert his claimed rights in this property. It is true 
that now he offers to pay "his share" of the cost of development of these lands. 
That hardly satisfies the equities of the situation. The risk in this matter is 
all over at this time.

Eblen, 234 P.2d  
at 442. As appellees point out in their brief, any claimant would be willing to 
pay his share of expenses once the risk is over and the economic benefit is 
obvious.

[¶22.]  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
hold that application of the doctrine of laches to bar appellants' claim was 
justified. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary 
judgment to appellees on the basis of laches.

[¶23.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The specific definition 
of shallow rights in the Wolf Agreement(s) can be generally described as rights 
from the surface to a depth of approximately 11,500 feet.

2 The remaining 2.08% of 
the shallow rights in the A and B leases, with the deep rights option, was 
assigned to Harold B. Ehrlich. This interest was subsequently acquired by W.A. 
Moncrief Jr.'s son, C.B. Moncrief. C.B. Moncrief was not made a party defendant 
by appellants.

3 The Madden Deep Unit was 
a federal exploratory unit encompassing approximately 70,000 
acres.

4 Petro-Lewis maintained 
its shallow rights interest in the A and B leases until 1977. Moncrief acquired 
some of these shallow rights from Petro-Lewis in that 
year.

5 The governing maxim 
regarding laches is: "`Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their 
rights.'" Crowell v. City of Cheyenne, 54 
Wyo. 459, 93 P.2d 934, 939 (1939), and W. de Funiak, Handbook of Modern Equity § 21 at 46 
(1950).

6 Appellees also contend 
that appellants had constructive notice that they had no interest in the renewed 
Day lease as of June 30, 1972, when the renewed Day lease was recorded, or 
alternatively as of May 17, 1973, when the assignments of the lease were 
recorded. The district court did not rely upon this alleged constructive notice 
to find laches in this case, and we will similarly limit our holding to the 
period beginning with actual notice.

7 Production attributable 
to the Day lease, as only one of numerous leases in the Long Butte Unit, 
represented only a fraction of the overall production from the Unit. Moncrief 
and Taubman participated in the revenue distributions from the balance of the 
Unit.

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶24.]  I concur in the result of the majority 
opinion. I would, however, ground that result upon the statute of limitations, 
and would have no occasion then to consider the application of the doctrine of 
laches to these facts.

[¶25.]  I recognize that, in tort cases, 
Wyoming has 
adopted the discovery rule for purposes of ascertaining when a cause of action 
accrues. Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo. 
1989); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986); Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1985); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985); Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 696 P.2d 1294 (Wyo. 1985); Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 
(Wyo. 1979), 
reh. denied 590 P.2d 1340, cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). The adoption of a discovery rule for purposes of determining when a 
tort action accrues does not necessarily mean that the discovery rule has been 
adopted for all purposes.

[¶26.]  The general rule throughout the 
United 
States is that a cause of action for breach of 
contract accrues at the time of the breach. Paul Holt Drilling, Inc. v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, 664 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1981); Carman v. Prudential 
Insurance Company of America, 
748 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1988); Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (1988); E.O.C. Ord, Inc. v. Kovakovich, 246 Cal. Rptr. 456, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1194 (1988); Farmers National Bank v. Wickham 
Pipeline Construction, 114 Idaho 565, 759 P.2d 71 (1988); Welty v. Western Bank 
of Las Cruces, 106 N.M. 126, 740 P.2d 120 (1987); Koulis v. Standard Oil Company 
of California, 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987); Upland Industries Corporation v. 
Pacific Gamble Robinson Company, 684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984). There are some 
limited exceptions to that general rule. One of those is the invocation of a 
discovery rule when the fact of the breach may occur in secret, and the 
information is not available to the other party to the contract. April 
Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805 (1983). See 
Yingling v. Phillips, 65 Md. App. 451, 501 A.2d 87 (1985). But see 
State v. Holland Plastics Company, 111 Wis.2d 497, 331 N.W.2d 320 (1983) 
(discovery rule not applicable in contract suit). The other exception is found 
in those instances in which there has occurred a fraudulent concealment of the 
breach of contract. L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 
566 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1978); Atlantic Richfield Company v. CRA, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Frank Cooke, Inc. 
v. Hurwitz, 10 Mass. App. 99, 406 N.E.2d 678 (1980). Cf. 
McCloskey v. Carlton Builders, 211 Cal. Rptr. 659, 165 Cal. App. 3d 689 (1985) (fraudulent concealment applied in tort case); Skuffeeda 
v. St. VincentHospital and MedicalCenter, 77 Or. App. 477, 714 P.2d 235 
(1986) (fraudulent concealment in medical malpractice suit). The facts of this 
case do not adapt to either of these exceptions.

[¶27.]  I would apply the statute of limitations 
found in § 1-3-105, W.S. 1977. There is no question that, if a breach of the 
Wolf Agreement occurred, it happened on May 11, 1973. The cause of action 
accrued more than ten years before the complaint was filed, and the district 
court correctly determined that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The 
action being barred by the statute of limitations, there is no necessity for 
invoking the doctrine of laches, and my view is that reliance upon the doctrine 
of laches when the statute of limitations governs the disposition of a case 
undermines the efficacy of the statute of limitations. We should refrain from 
doing that as a matter of judicial restraint. 

[¶28.]  I would affirm the judgment, but for the 
reason stated.