Case Title: Harris v. Woodlands Club

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 117 
Docket: 
Cum-11-435 
Argued: 
September 13, 2012  
Decided: 
October 11, 2012 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
J. COLE HARRIS et al. 
 
v. 
 
THE WOODLANDS CLUB et al. 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  J. Cole Harris and P. Daphne Harris appeal from a judgment of the 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) in favor of The Woodlands Club 
and The Woodlands Homeowners Association (collectively, the Woodlands).  In 
their complaint, the Harrises allege that the Woodlands tortiously discharged 
surface water onto their property causing flooding and an increase in wetland.  The 
Harrises challenge the court’s (1) entry of a judgment in favor of the Woodlands 
following a nonjury trial on the Harrises’ common law trespass claim, (2) grant of 
a summary judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the Harrises’ claim for 
negligence, (3) entry of a pretrial order excluding certain testimony, and (4) refusal 
to grant the Harrises an injunction.  The Woodlands cross-appeals from the court’s 
 
2 
judgment on the Harrises’ common law trespass claim, arguing that its legal 
characterization of their drainage system was flawed.  We affirm the judgment.1 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶2]  The following facts are taken from the court’s written findings 
following a nonjury trial and are viewed in the light most favorable to the 
judgment.2  See Van Dam v. Spickler, 2009 ME 36, ¶ 2, 968 A.2d 1040. 
[¶3]  The Woodlands Club is a corporation that operates a golf course in 
Falmouth.  The Woodlands Homeowners Association is a corporation that owns 
the common elements of a residential development that surrounds the golf course 
as well as the golf course itself, its cart paths, and its drainage facilities.  The Club 
leases the golf course from the Association pursuant to a long-term lease. 
[¶4]  Fairway Villas, Inc.3 was the original developer of the Woodlands.  As 
part of the development, Fairway Villas submitted a permit application to the 
Maine Department of Environmental Protection that included plans and designs for 
the golf course and the residential development.  The designs included plans for 
                                         
1  Because we affirm the judgment against the Harrises, we need not address the portion of the 
judgment related to the injunction. 
2  Although we review the facts from the parties’ summary judgment pleadings for purposes of the 
Harrises’ challenge to the summary judgment against them, see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 
2011 ME 101, ¶ 8, 28 A.3d 1158, the summary judgment facts are not, for purposes of review of the 
issues on appeal, materially different from those found by the court after the trial. 
3  Before changing its name, the entity called itself the Woodlands Corporation.  Fairway Villas, Inc. 
was named as a third-party defendant but was dismissed before trial. 
 
3 
the stormwater management system.  The Department issued a site-location permit 
in 1987. 
[¶5]  In 2004, the Harrises purchased a twelve-acre parcel that abuts the 
northern boundary of the Woodlands Club.  The land was the topographic low 
point to which water would drain from the Woodlands property and other 
properties before any development at the Woodlands.  The relevant watershed in 
this case, Watershed A, is located on the northwest portion of the Woodlands 
development.  Before the Woodlands was constructed, Watershed A drained, 
following the natural contour of the land, onto what is now the Harris parcel, 
mostly at a location known as Discharge Point A. 
[¶6]  The Woodlands stormwater management system was designed to 
slowly drain water into areas where it would naturally discharge, including the 
Harris property.  The stormwater management system featured topographic bowls 
or basins typically not entirely filled with water that were either artificially created 
or naturally occurring.  Some of the bowls also serve as water hazards for the golf 
course, which means they contain some water that fills only a fraction of the bowl 
area. 
[¶7]  As built, the Woodlands stormwater management system varied from 
the plan approved in the Department permit.  Particularly relevant to this case is a 
basin that included part of the third fairway, which is near the Harris property.  The 
 
4 
basin as designed was to be bordered by an elevated golf cart path.  As built, 
however, the path is a foot lower than that for which the design called.  Further, 
two culverts not shown on the plan were placed along the rim of the basin, and the 
spillway as built is longer than that for which the plans called.4 
[¶8]  The purpose of the stormwater system is to prevent erosion and sudden 
surges of water by controlling the rate at which stormwater flows onto neighboring 
properties.  Even as built, the stormwater system has achieved this goal because the 
rate at which stormwater flows across the northern boundary of the Woodlands 
meets Department requirements and does not exceed the rate at which stormwater 
flowed onto the Harris parcel prior to the development of the golf course. 
[¶9]  Although the rates of stormwater flow have not increased, the 
construction of the golf course and the residential development have increased the 
total volume of stormwater discharged onto the Harris parcel.  This occurs, the 
evidence indicates, because developed lands with cut grass surfaces and 
impervious surfaces such as golf cart paths and other common features of 
development tend to retain less stormwater than brush, grasslands, and woodlands 
in their natural state.  A hydrologist testified that the development increased the 
volume of stormwater discharged in a two-year storm event by thirty-one percent.  
                                         
4  After the Harrises brought the discrepancies between the approved plan and the golf course as built 
to the Department’s attention, the Department issued a notice of potential violation, but no further action 
had been taken by the time of trial. 
 
5 
The Woodlands accounts for twenty-four percent of the stormwater discharged at 
the southern boundary of the Harris parcel during a two-year storm event.  Larger 
storms result in larger volumes, but the percentage of stormwater for which the 
Woodlands is responsible in larger storms decreases.   
[¶10]  There was no evidence that the drainage system as built discharges 
more stormwater than it would have had the original design been followed.  The 
evidence supports the court’s conclusion that all of the increased stormwater 
discharged onto the Harris parcel from the Woodlands is runoff that would have 
been discharged onto the parcel even if the Woodlands did not have a stormwater 
management system to collect and channel stormwater. 
[¶11]  After storms, particularly when the ground is frozen, there is standing 
water on the Harris parcel.  The location of the standing water is largely within 
areas that constituted wetlands before the Woodlands was developed.  Stormwater 
from the north, the side opposite the Woodlands, also contributes to the wetness of 
the parcel.  In fact, during storms, more water drains onto the Harris property from 
the north than from the Woodlands to the south.  Because of the development of 
the Woodlands, the amount of wetlands on the southwest corner of the Harris 
parcel has increased marginally.  The Woodlands did not cause other increases in 
wetlands in other areas of the Harris parcel. 
 
6 
[¶12]  The Harrises knew or had ample reason to know, before they 
purchased the parcel in 2004, that the property included substantial portions of 
wetland and received stormwater runoff from the Woodlands and other properties.  
At that time, all of the drainage features at the Woodlands already existed.  In 
addition, the existence of a stream5 that crossed the Harris parcel and arrived at a 
culvert6 under Woodville Road was apparent on the face of the earth even before 
the Woodlands was constructed. 
[¶13]  In November 2008, the Harrises filed a three-count complaint against 
the Woodlands alleging statutory trespass, common law trespass, and negligence.  
The Woodlands moved for a summary judgment.  The court granted a partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the statutory trespass and 
negligence claims.  The court concluded that disputes of material facts precluded a 
summary judgment on the common law trespass claim.   
[¶14]  Before trial on the common law trespass claim, the court granted the 
Woodlands’s motion to exclude the testimony of the Harrises that, in their opinion, 
the value of their property had declined to about $500,000 from about $3,500,000 
                                         
5  The trial court’s use of the word “stream” is somewhat inexact.  There is no suggestion that the 
feature amounts to a watercourse, to which a different body of law would apply.  See Pettengill v. Turo, 
159 Me. 350, 355, 193 A.2d 367 (1963). 
6  The record indicates that the culvert under Woodville Road, which drains water from the Harris 
parcel, is undersized.  This means that water discharged onto the Harris parcel takes longer to drain 
through the culvert and more is drained into the Harris parcel in the process. 
 
7 
because of the alleged trespass.  Previously, the Harrises had represented their 
damages in their statement of material facts opposing summary judgment and in 
Cole Harris’s deposition testimony as about $255,000.  The court found that Cole 
Harris’s opinion was disclosed so late in the proceedings—five days before jury 
selection and eleven days before trial—as to constitute a discovery violation 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2)(B).  The court found that Daphne Harris’s 
opinion was also disclosed too late—after jury selection and five days before 
trial—and that her methodology was flawed.  Subsequently, the Harrises 
voluntarily withdrew their claim for damages and elected to seek injunctive relief 
only in a nonjury trial; however, they sought to preserve for our review the court’s 
exclusion of their testimony as to damages. 
[¶15]  The court conducted a nonjury trial on the common law trespass claim 
in May 2011 and entered a judgment, with extensive findings of fact, in favor of 
the Woodlands.  The court concluded that the Harrises failed to prove that the 
Woodlands committed common law trespass.  The court also explained why it 
would not have granted the Harrises’ proposed injunction, noting that their 
proposal to preclude any discharge of water from the Woodlands by the 
construction of a dam—“would be completely impractical and was described by 
the Harrises’ own hydrologist as an ‘absurd’ solution.” 
 
8 
[¶16]  The Harrises timely appealed the court’s summary judgment on their 
statutory trespass7 and negligence claims and the judgment after trial on their 
common law trespass claim.  The Woodlands timely cross-appealed.8  
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 
Common Law Trespass 
[¶17]  The Harrises argue that the Superior Court erred in finding that they 
had failed to prove that the discharge of stormwater from the Woodlands 
constitutes a common law trespass.  A party who had the burden of proof at trial 
can prevail on a claim that the trial court should have found facts in that party’s 
favor only if that party can demonstrate that such findings of fact are compelled by 
the evidence in the record.  Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79; 
Westleigh v. Conger, 2000 ME 134, ¶ 12, 755 A.2d 518.  When a trial court 
judgment is based on a conclusion of law, we review its conclusion de novo.  
Goudreau v. Pine Springs Rd. & Water, LLC, 2012 ME 70, ¶ 11, 44 A.3d 315.  
                                         
7  The Harrises abandoned their challenge to the summary judgment on the statutory trespass claim 
during briefing for this appeal. 
8  The Woodlands cross-appealed from a portion of the Superior Court’s reasoning supporting its 
conclusion that no common law trespass occurred.  When an appellee has prevailed in the forum from 
which a case is appealed, the appellee need not cross-appeal if it argues in favor of affirming the decision 
in every respect but simply contends that the same result should have been reached through different legal 
reasoning.  See State v. Me. Cent. R.R., 517 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 1986); Givertz v. Me. Med. Ctr., 459 A.2d 
548, 556 (Me. 1983). 
 
9 
[¶18]  We apply the modified common enemy doctrine to determine 
common law trespass liability for the discharge of surface water onto the land of an 
abutter.9  See William P. Elliott II, Diffused Surface Water In Wyoming: 
Ascertaining Property Owners’ Rights and Settling Disputes, 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 409, 
414-15 (2011) (describing the modified common enemy rule).  Our rule was most 
recently articulated in Johnson v. Whitten in which an abutter sued a landowner for 
blocking the flow of surface water causing the water to back up onto the abutter’s 
property.  384 A.2d 698, 700 (Me. 1978).  In Johnson, we held against the abutter 
because a landowner “may control the flow of mere surface water over his own 
premises . . . without obligation to any proprietor either above or below.”  Id. 
(quoting Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 355 (1877)).  
Johnson includes an exception indicating that a landowner may nevertheless be 
liable for creating an artificial collection of water and discharging it onto land 
“where it would not otherwise naturally have fallen.”  384 A.2d at 700.  Johnson 
held that the abutter could not recover because the landowner’s actions “caused the 
natural drainage of surface water to back up on plaintiffs’ land.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
                                         
9  In 2006, the Legislature enacted legislation providing that “[u]nreasonable use of land that results in 
altered flow of surface water that unreasonably injures another’s land or that unreasonably interferes with 
the reasonable use of another’s land is a nuisance.”  P.L. 2005, ch. 564, § 1 (codified at 17 M.R.S. § 2808 
(2011)).  The statute applies to causes of action that accrue on or after January 1, 2007.  P.L. 2005, 
ch. 564, §§ 2-3.  The parties did not argue that this section applies to this case. 
 
10 
[¶19]  The court in Johnson implicitly reasoned that an artificial collection 
exists when surface water accumulates at a location through unnatural means and 
for a purpose other than drainage.  Johnson, 384 A.2d at 700.  Johnson used the 
phrase “artificial collection” to distinguish two prior opinions: McRae v. Camden 
& Rockland Water Co., 138 Me. 110, 22 A.2d 133 (1941) and Goodwin v. The 
Texas Co., 133 Me. 260, 176 A. 873 (1935).  Johnson, 384 A.2d at 700.   
[¶20]  In McRae, we upheld a jury verdict finding that a pit dug below a 
valve house,10 which overflowed, apparently while water was being pumped, when 
a drain beneath it failed, was an artificial collection.  138 Me. at 111-13, 
22 A.2d 133.  In Goodwin, we upheld another jury verdict finding that seawater 
was artificially collected when it was pumped along with dredgings to create new 
land on the shore.  133 Me. at 261-62, 176 A. 873.  Illustrating a contrast to McRae 
and Goodwin, Johnson also cited Morrison, in which a railroad was held not liable 
when the design of its track caused surface water to accumulate and flood an 
abutter’s land.  67 Me. at 357; see also Murphy v. Kelley, 68 Me. 521, 522 (1878) 
(applying Morrison).  Morrison, however, did not articulate the artificial collection 
exception.  67 Me. at 357. 
                                         
10  A valve house is “[a] building to cover the valves and valve chamber of the mains from a 
reservoir.”  3 Russell Sturgis, A Dictionary of Architecture and Building 933 (1902). 
 
11 
[¶21]  Johnson cited one opinion inconsistent with this implicit rule.  
384 A.2d at 700.  In Smith v. Preston, a pedestrian sued a landowner for negligence 
after the landowner’s clogged gutter caused water to accumulate on a public way 
and freeze, upon which the pedestrian slipped and fell.  104 Me. 156, 158, 
71 A. 653 (1908).  Smith recited the artificial collection rule and analogized it to 
the discharge of water on to the public way at issue.  Id. at 161, 71 A. 653.  Smith, 
however, addressed the law of negligence, not common law trespass.  See id. at 
160, 71 A. 653. 
[¶22]  The stormwater management system at issue in this case does not 
create an artificial collection of water, as any accumulation is for purposes of 
drainage alone.  If anything, the court’s findings suggest that the bowls and basins 
in the stormwater management system, by retaining some water, may slow what 
otherwise might be a more rapid rate of stormwater discharge onto the Harris 
property.  Johnson held that no liability arose from blocking the “natural drainage 
of surface water” from an abutter’s land, causing flooding.  384 A.2d at 700.  The 
two opinions distinguished in Johnson concerned water pumped to the defendant’s 
land, for a purpose other than drainage, and then released onto a neighboring 
parcel.  See McRae, 138 Me. at 111-13, 22 A.2d 133; Goodwin, 133 Me. at 261-62, 
176 A. 873.  Our earlier opinion explicitly held that the accumulation of surface 
water did not give rise to liability.  See Morrison, 67 Me. at 357. 
 
12 
[¶23]  Against this background, the Superior Court did not err in concluding 
that the Woodlands was not liable for trespass.  The court found that the 
Woodlands’s stormwater management system caused surface water to flow onto 
the Harris parcel.  The system’s sole purpose was to slowly drain stormwater.  To 
the extent that the stormwater accumulated, it did so for drainage purposes alone.11  
Thus, no artificial collection existed. 
[¶24]  The Harrises’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  First, the 
Harrises’ reliance on Smith is misplaced because Smith was a personal injury 
action that did not address the law of trespass to property.  See 104 Me. at 158, 
71 A. 653.  Second, the Harrises’ argument that the trial court’s ruling fails to 
account for the increase in water volume from the Woodlands development ignores 
that the Johnson rule is always applied when water volume increases.12  Finally, 
the Harrises’ contention that Johnson only applies to water that accumulates 
upland is without merit.  Although Johnson directly concerned upland 
                                         
11  Notably, the trial court found that the water in the water hazards on the golf course filled only a 
fraction of the topographic bowls at issue, and thus, the presence of that water does not affect our 
analysis.  
12  The Harrises cite Pettengill to imply that common law nuisance liability may exist in this case.  
Pettengill, however, concerned liability resulting from the blockage of a watercourse to which a different 
body of law applies.  See 159 Me. at 355, 193 A.2d 367.  The Harrises also argue that they are entitled to 
relief because the Woodlands violated its Department site permit, but violation of a civil regulatory statute 
is not an element of common law trespass.  See Radley v. Fish, 2004 ME 87,  ¶ 7, 856 A.2d 1196 (noting 
that the violation of a government regulation does not, by itself, create a duty or an obligation toward a 
private party). 
 
13 
accumulation, its rule bars liability “to any proprietor either above or below.”  See 
384 A.2d at 700. 
[¶25]  We affirm the Superior Court’s entry of a judgment in favor of the 
Woodlands on the Harrises’ common law trespass claim. 
B. 
Negligence 
[¶26]  The Harrises argue that the Superior Court erred in granting a 
summary judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the Harrises’ claim for 
negligence.  The Superior Court’s judgment was based on its conclusion that, 
pursuant to Maine law, a landowner does not have a duty of care to an adjoining 
landowner regarding the discharge of surface water beyond the law of trespass.  
We review the Superior Court’s conclusion of law de novo.  See Davis v. Dionne, 
2011 ME 90, ¶ 8, 26 A.3d 801. 
[¶27]  A landowner does not owe a duty to a neighboring landowner 
regarding the drainage of surface water that could give rise to negligence liability.  
As the Superior Court recognized, it is impossible to harmonize Johnson’s general 
rule of no liability with a duty of care sounding in negligence.  See 384 A.2d at 
700-01.  The Harrises again cite Smith in support of their argument, but Smith is 
again not applicable.  In Smith, we held that the defendant’s duty “was to repair the 
gutter and maintain it in a reasonably suitable condition to keep the water it 
collected from the sidewalk.”  104 Me. at 160, 71 A. 653.  As between Smith and 
 
14 
Johnson, the Johnson rule controls the extent of potential liability in this area,13 
and we affirm the Superior Court’s summary judgment. 
C. 
Exclusion of Testimony 
[¶28]  The Harrises argue that the Superior Court abused its discretion in 
excluding their testimony that the Woodlands’s purported trespass reduced the 
value of their property to $500,000 from $3,500,000.  The court excluded their 
testimony as a sanction after the Harrises failed to update their valuation opinions 
until the eve of trial after having offered different opinions during discovery.14  
See M.R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2)(B).  We review the exclusion of testimony for failure to 
comply with Rule 26(e) for an abuse of discretion.  Beaudin v. Beaulieu, 472 A.2d 
426, 428 (Me. 1984). 
[¶29]  The trial court was well within its discretion in refusing to permit the 
Harrises to testify that their damages amounted to $3,000,000.  The damages 
claimed on the eve of trial—five days before jury selection by J. Cole Harris and 
after jury selection by Daphne Harris—were dramatically larger than the roughly 
$255,000 claimed earlier.  Given the lateness of the disclosure, the stark change in 
                                         
13  A landowner also may have a statutory nuisance remedy.  See 17 M.R.S. § 2808. 
14  The court expressed concerns about Daphne Harris’s methodology in formulating her opinion, but 
its reasoning focused on the discovery violation. 
 
15 
the opinion, and the centrality of the issue of damages to the case, the trial court 
committed no error in its application of M.R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2)(B). 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., Bruce A. McGlauflin, Esq., and Jisel E. Lopez, 
Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for appellants J. Cole 
Harris and P. Daphne Harris 
 
Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., and David A. Goldman, Esq., Norman, Hanson 
& DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for cross-appellant The Woodlands Homeowners 
Association 
 
Thomas R. McKeon, Esq., and Joseph L. Cahoon, Jr., Esq., Richardson, 
Whitman, Large & Badger, Portland, for cross-appellant The Woodlands 
Club 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., for appellants J. Cole Harris and P. Daphne 
Harris 
 
Thomas R. McKeon, Esq., for cross-appellants The Woodlands Club and 
The Woodlands Homeowners Association 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number RE-2008-260 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY