Case Title: BIG MAN v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-265

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-265 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTNAA 1981 LOIS JEFFERSON BIG MAN, Personally and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Daniel Big Man, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. THE STATE OF MONTANA, and EUNICE IRENE CASE, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Big Horn. Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Holmstrom, Dunaway & West, Billings, Montana Jock B.West argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents : Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings, Montana Corinne Courtney argued, Billings, Montana Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana Cynthia Ford argued, Billings, Montana Filed: MAR 1 0 198% Submitted: January 15, 1981 Decided: MAR I 0 1 s M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an a p p e a l from a summary judgment e n t e r e d a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f i n f a v o r of both d e f e n d a n t s by t h e District Court o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District, i n and f o r t h e County of Big Horn. Daniel Big Man, a five-year-old p e d e s t r i a n , was s t r u c k by a car d r i v e n by Eunice Case. The a c c i d e n t occurred on o r n e a r t h e s o u t h end of a b r i d g e t h a t c r o s s e s t h e L i t t l e Big Horn R i v e r , 1 8 miles s o u t h of H a r d i n , Montana, on I n t e r s t a t e 90 (1-90). The s i t e of t h e a c c i d e n t a b u t s a "swimming h o l e " f r e q u e n t l y used by c h i l d r e n i n t h e area. The c h i l d r e n had a c c e s s to t h e swimming h o l e through an opening i n a f e n c e which r u n s from t h e i n t e r s t a t e boundary f e n c e to a c o n c r e t e abutment l o c a t e d a t t h e s o u t h end of t h e b r i d g e . Daniel d i e d as a r e s u l t of t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d i n t h e a c c i d e n t . P l a i n t i f f brought s u i t a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and maintenance of t h e highway f e n c e and a g a i n s t Eunice Case f o r n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of h e r v e h i c l e . Defendants contend t h a t Daniel d a r t e d from behind t h e b r i d g e abutment s o q u i c k l y t h a t Case could n o t avoid h i t t i n g him. A f t e r some d i s c o v e r y was pursued, d e f e n d a n t s m v e d f o r summary judgment. The c o u r t g r a n t e d judgment i n t h e i r f a v o r . P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Did t h e District Court err i n f i n d i n g no g e n u i n e i s s u e as to any material f a c t and t h e r e b y err i n g r a n t i n g t h e summary j udgment? 2. Did t h e s t a t e have a l e g a l d u t y t o erect and m a i n t a i n t h e f e n c e a l o n g t h e i n t e r s t a t e where t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d so as t o p r e v e n t access by p e d e s t r i a n s ? A p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment h a s t h e burden of showing t h e complete absence of any g e n u i n e i s s u e as to a l l f a c t s which are deemed material i n l i g h t of t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e him t o a judgment as a matter of l a w . Reaves v. Reinbold (1980 I Mont . , 615 P.2d 896, 37 St.Rep. 1500; Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613. A s to d e f e n d a n t Case, t h e p l a i n t i f f contends t h e r e are i s s u e s of f a c t y e t to be r e s o l v e d . Case concedes t h a t t h e sub- m i t t e d r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t t h e r e are g e n u i n e i s s u e s of f a c t b u t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e y are n o t material i n l i g h t of t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e h e r to a judgment a s a matter of law. The D i s t r i c t Court could p r o p e r l y g r a n t summary judgment t o Case o n l y on a f i n d i n g t h a t , on t h e submitted r e c o r d , s h e e x e r c i s e d p r o p e r due care i n proceeding down t h e highway and was u n a b l e t o avoid t h e c o l l i s i o n w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t . I n s u p p o r t of t h i s f i n d i n g , Case p r e s e n t e d h e r own a f f i d a - v i t and t h e a f f i d a v i t of h e r husband, C l a r e n c e Case, who was a p a s s e n g e r i n t h e car a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . These a f f i d a - v i t s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : 1. The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a t 2: 30 p.m. i n t h e southbound l a n e of a l i m i t e d access f o u r - l a n e i n t e r s t a t e highway. The speed l i m i t w a s 55 m i l e s p e r hour. 2. Eunice Case was d r i v i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 miles per h o u r . 3. The d e c e d e n t was f i r s t s e e n by C l a r e n c e Case, a p a s s e n g e r i n d e f e n d a n t ' s car, as they approached t h e s o u t h end of t h e b r i d g e . 4. The d e c e d e n t d a r t e d from behind a three-foot-high b r i d g e abutment on t h e r i g h t h a n d s i d e of t h e roadway d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e highway. 5. The d e c e d e n t appeared a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e f e e t from t h e b r i d g e abutment. 6. The d e c e d e n t t r i e d to s t o p , b u t r a n i n t o t h e r i g h t f r o n t f e n d e r of t h e v e h i c l e . 7. The d e c e d e n t appeared and r a n i n t o t h e s i d e of t h e car w i t h o u t warning and w i t h o u t time f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t to t a k e any a c t i o n to avoid t h e c o l l i s i o n . 8. The d e c e d e n t was t h e o n l y c h i l d who r a n o u t from behind t h e b r i d g e abutment a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . I n response t o C a s e ' s a l l e g a t i o n s , p l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t e d a f f i d a v i t s which e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e r e were o t h e r c h i l d r e n on t h e b r i d g e o r s t a n d i n g on t h e i n t e r s t a t e roadbed n e a r t h e highway. The a f f i d a v i t s a l s o i n d i - c a t e d t h a t t h e p o i n t of impact appeared t o be 21.1 f e e t from t h e end of t h e b r i d g e abutment. I s s u e s of f a c t i n d i s p u t e i n c l u d e whether t h e r e were o t h e r c h i l d r e n on t h e b r i d g e or roadway a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t ; whether t h e p o i n t of impact was 3 f e e t o r 2 1 f e e t from t h e end of t h e b r i d g e abutment and whether Case's v e h i c l e was t r a v e l i n g a t a r e a s o n a b l e rate of speed. These f a c t s being i n d i s p u t e , t h e i s s u e becomes whether t h e y are m a t e r i a l to a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h i s matter and, t h u s , p r e c l u d e any summary judgment. S e c t i o n 61-8-504, MCA, p r o v i d e s : " . . . e v e r y d r i v e r s h a l l e x e r c i s e due care to a v o i d c o l l i d i n g w i t h any p e d e s t r i a n upon any roadway and s h a l l g i v e warning by sounding t h e h o r n when n e c e s s a r y and s h a l l e x e r c i s e p r o p e r p r e c a u t i o n upon o b s e r v i n g any c h i l d . . . upon a roadway. " I f c h i l d r e n were p r e s e n t on t h e b r i d g e or s t a n d i n g on t h e roadbed and r e a d i l y v i s i b l e t o Case, s h e was under a d u t y to e x e r c i s e p r e c a u t i o n to avoid any c o l l i s i o n and t o sound h e r h o r n when such a c t i o n became n e c e s s a r y . Case f a i l e d to make use of h e r horn as s h e approached t h e b r i d g e b u t still c o n t e n d s s h e e x e r c i s e d due care i n d r i v i n g h e r car. Case t h e n concludes t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t c h i l d r e n may have been on t h e b r i d g e o r roadbed a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n t e r s t a t e is of no c o n c e r n f o r t h e c o l l i s i o n w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t stil remained u n a v o i d a b l e . I n s u p p o r t of t h i s p o s i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t cites Autio v. Miller ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont. 150, 11 P.2d 1039, f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n : "While t h e d r i v e r of an automobile is r e q u i r e d t o be v i g i l a n t , he is n o t bound to a n t i c i p a t e t h a t a c h i l d w i l l suddenly d a r t from t h e s i d e of t h e street o r s u d d e n l y run across t h e street, i n f r o n t of h i s car." 1 1 P.2d a t 1042. S e e also Annot., 65 A.L.R. 192 ( 1 9 3 0 ) ; Annot., 1 1 3 A.L.R. 528 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ; 60A C.J.S. Motor V e h i c l e s , 5 3 9 6 ( 2 ) a t 777. I t should be noted, however, t h a t t h e c o u r t i n A u t i o also s t a t e d t h a t i f t h e d r i v e r of an automobile "is n o t v i g i l a n t , i f h e does n o t keep a l o o k o u t , t h e j u r y may s a y he was n e g l i g e n t . " I n p r o v i d i n g a l o o k o u t , t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e " d r i v e r must l o o k ' n o t o n l y s t r a i g h t ahead, b u t l a t e r a l l y ahead " I and t h a t a " p e r s o n is presumed to see t h a t which he could s e e by looking." I n viewing t h e p r e s e n t e d a f f i d a v i t s and t h e i n f e r e n c e s a r i s i n g therefrom, i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion f o r summary judgment, t h i s Court must acknowledge t h a t c h i l d r e n were p r e s e n t on t h e b r i d g e o r roadway and r e a d i l y viewable by t h e d e f e n d a n t . C h i l d r e n being p r e s e n t , Case was under a d u t y to e x e r c i s e a l l p r o p e r p r e c a u t i o n to avoid a n y c o l l i s i o n . A d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e is always dependent upon a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . McCusker v. R o b e r t s ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 152 Mont. 513, 452 P.2d 408; Jackson v. W i l l i a m Dingwall Co. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 5 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236. The submitted r e c o r d f a i l s to f u l l y d e s c r i b e t h e l o c a t i o n and a c t i o n s of t h e c h i l d r e n b u t a f f o r d i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f a l l r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s which may be drawn from t h e o f f e r e d p r o o f , it could be found upon f u r t h e r examination a t t r i a l t h a t a f a i l u r e to sound t h e car h o r n and/or reduce t h e car's speed to less t h a n 40 m i l e s p e r hour was i n v i o l a t i o n of a d u t y of r e a s o n a b l e care and p r e c a u t i o n . T h i s b e i n g t h e case, t h e t r i a l c o u r t improperly g r a n t e d Case a summary j udgmen t . A s to t h e d i s p u t e d f a c t of whether t h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d 3 o r 21 f e e t from t h e b r i d g e abutment, t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y b e a r s on t h e i s s u e of whether Case had time to avoid t h e d e c e d e n t as he r a n o n t o t h e highway. P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t s t h a t , i f t h e d e c e d e n t was 21.1 f e e t down t h e road from t h e b r i d g e , Case i n t h e exer- cise of due c a r e would have been a b l e t o see him p r i o r to impact and t h e r e b y avoid t h e a c c i d e n t . There a p p e a r s t o be no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e d e c e d e n t d a r t e d s u d d e n l y o u t i n t o t h e roadway from u n d e r n e a t h t h e b r i d g e and from behind a b r i d g e abutment. The d i s p u t e is whether t h e d e f e n d a n t was 3.0 f e e t or 21.1 f e e t from t h e b r i d g e when he appeared i n t h e view of d e f e n d a n t . The d i s c r e p a n c y i n t h i s i n s t a n c e is 1 8 . 1 f e e t , b u t t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s it is of l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h a t when t r a - v e l i n g a t a speed of 40 miles p e r hour, t h i s d i s t a n c e is covered i n less t h a n a second. What d e f e n d a n t f a i l s to acknowledge, however, is t h a t under t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 40 miles p e r hour may have been e x c e s s i v e and had she been d r i v i n g a t a more reaso- n a b l e speed t h e d i s t a n c e could have allowed a d e q u a t e t i m e t o a v o i d t h e c o l l i s i o n . I n viewing t h e e v i d e n c e and in£ e r e n c e s a r i s i n g t h e r e f r o m i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p l a i n t i f f , w e are not able to c o n c l u d e , as a matter of l a w , t h a t d e f e n d a n t p r o p e r l y e x e r c i s e d h e r duty. Consequently, t h e summary judgment was i m p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d . T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a g r e e s w i t h t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g t h a t o r d i n a r i l y i s s u e s of n e g l i g e n c e a r e n o t s u s c e p t i b l e of summary a d j u d i c a t i o n . Hogen v. Great N o r t h e r n Railway Co. ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3 Mont. 309, 456 P.2d 51. I t is f e l t t h a t t h e Court s h o u l d be e x t r e m e l y c a u t i o u s i n reviewing g r a n t s of summary judgment i n t h i s area f o r t h e i s s u e s involved i n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n e g l i - g e n c e are b e t t e r r e s o l v e d a t t r i a l . McAlpine v. Dahl ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 585 P.2d 1307, 3 5 St.Rep. 1561; see also Lyndes v. S c o f i e l d ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 589 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 185; S l a g s v o l d v. Johnson ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 490, 544 P.2d 442; Dean v. F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank of G r e a t F a l l s ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 152 Mont. 474, 452 P.2d 402. I n r e g a r d to t h e second i s s u e on a p p e a l t h e p l a i n t i f f con- t e n d s t h a t an i s s u e of f a c t y e t to be r e s o l v e d is whether t h e - 6 - S t a t e of Montana as a d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d to p r o p e r l y upkeep t h e f e n c e e x t e n d i n g from t h e i n t e r s t a t e boundary f e n c e t o t h e b r i g e abutment. The S t a t e s u b m i t s t h a t t h e f a c t t h e f e n c e may have been i n d i s r e p a i r is of no concern i n t h i s matter f o r t h e S t a t e is under no l e g a l d u t y to erect o r m a i n t a i n t h e f e n c e . To s u p p o r t h e r argument t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s a d u t y of maintenance, p l a i n t i f f cites s e c t i o n 60-5-105, MCA. T h i s s e c t i o n r e a d s : "Each highway a u t h o r i t y may so d e s i g n any c o n t r o l l e d access f a c i l i t y and so r e g u l a t e , restrict, o r p r o h i b i t access as t o b e s t s e r v e t h e t r a f f i c f o r which t h e f a c i l i t y is intended. I n doing so, it may d i v i d e and s e p a r a t e any c o n t r o l l e d access f a c i l i t y i n t o s e p a r a t e road- ways by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of r a i s e d c u r b i n g s , c e n t r a l d i v i d i n g s e c t i o n s , or o t h e r p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n s or by d e s i g n a t i n g a s e p a r a t e roadway by s i g n s , m a r k e r s , s t r i p e s and o t h e r d e v i c e s . " Upon r e a d i n g t h i s s e c t i o n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h S t a t e v. District C o u r t of t h e F o u r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 63, 572 P.2d 201, p l a i n t i f f concludes t h a t once t h e S t a t e h a s chosen a method of r e g u l a t i n g , r e s t r i c t i n g and p r o h i b i t i n g access t o a highway (i.e., by means of a f e n c e ) it is l i a b l e f o r any n e g l i - g e n t maintenance of such d e v i c e . W e f a i l t o f i n d any requirement c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 60-5-105, MCA, t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s a l e g a l d u t y t o erect a f e n c e t o p r e v e n t access by p e d e s t r i a n s to a c o n t r o l l e d access highway. The s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y states t h a t t h e highway a u t h o r i t y may ( n o t s h a l l ) restrict or p r o h i b i t access. Furthermore, w e f a i l to see t h a t t h e S t a t e of Montana can b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e n e g l i g e n t maintenance of a f e n c e it had no d u t y to erect based upon t h e d e c i s i o n rendered i n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court, s u p r a . I n t h a t c a s e , t w o i s s u e s were p r e s e n t e d f o r review: "(1) May t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n a d e f e n s e of s o v e r e i g n immunity a g a i n s t claims a r i s i n g from d e a t h ? " ( 2 ) May t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n a d e f e n s e of f i n a n c i a l f e a s i b i l i t y o r d i s c r e t i o n ' i n a high- way i n j u r y o r d e a t h case?" 572 P.2d a t 202. N e i t h e r of t h e s e i s s u e s are i n c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e case a t hand. T h i s Court i n S t a t e , i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e second i s s u e on review, d i d i n d i c a t e t h a t "whenever and wherever it [ t h e S t a t e ] c h o o s e s to b u i l d highways it assumes t h e d u t y of m a i n t a i n i n g them s a f e l y and is answerable i f it f a i l s t o do so." T h i s s t a t e m e n t , however, w a s d i r e c t e d a t a d u t y owed to a m o t o r i s t , n o t a p e d e s t r i a n , and was made s o l e l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e cannot avoid a c l a i m of n e g l i g e n c e on a d e f e n s e of f i n a n c i a l f e a s i b i l i t y or d i s c r e t i o n - - m a t t e r s n o t i n i s s u e i n t h i s p r o c e e d i n g . See S t a t e , 572 P.2d a t 203. S t a t e should n o t be deemed c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s proceeding. (The same a n a l y s i s is t r u e f o r Modrell v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 405, 3 5 St.Rep. 1811, c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f . ) P l a i n t i f f also a r g u e s t h a t s i n c e t h e S t a t e of Montana knew, or should have known, t h a t c h i l d r e n i n t h e a r e a s w a m i n t h e r i v e r d i r e c t l y below t h e b r i d g e where t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , t h e S t a t e was under a d u t y t o erect and m a i n t a i n a f e n c e to p r e v e n t t h o s e c h i l d r e n from g a i n i n g access to t h e highway. I n making t h i s argument p l a i n t i f f f i r s t relies upon a p o l i c y d e c l a r a t i o n concerning t h e l e g i s l a t u r e 's purpose i n c o n t r o l l i n g access on c e r t a i n d e s i g n a t e d highways. See sect i o n 60-5-101, MCA. The p o l i c y of t h e S t a t e i n t h i s regard is to f a c i l i t a t e t h e flow of t r a f f i c and t h e promotion of p u b l i c s a f e t y . T h i s Court acknowledges t h e p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t b u t d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f . The i n i t i a l purpose of t h e s t a t u t e is to f a c i l i t a t e t h e f l o w of t r a f f i c on highways which have been d e s i g n a t e d f o r use s o l e l y by through t r a f f i c . ( S e e s e c t i o n 60-5-102 ( 2 ) , MCA, f o r t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l l e d - access highway. ) I t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e flow of t r a f f i c i n t h i s r e g a r d refers s o l e l y to motor v e h i c l e and n o t p e d e s t r i a n t r a f f i c as s u b m i t t e d by p l a i n t i f f . The a d d i t i o n a l purpose of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n is t o promote p u b l i c s a f e t y and a r g u a b l y t h i s i n c l u d e s t h e promotion of p e d e s t r i a l s a f e t y . W e are, however, u n w i l l i n g to f i n d t h a t t h i s - 8 - promotion also i n c l u d e s a s t a t u t o r y d u t y , on t h e p a r t of t h e S t a t e , to p r o t e c t p e d e s t r i a n s by p r e v e n t i n g access to a c o n t r o l l e d - a c c e s s highway by e r e c t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g a f e n c e . I t should n o t be s a i d t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , i n d e c l a r i n g a p o l i c y f o r c o n t r o l l i n g access to d e s i g n a t e d highways, intended t h a t t h e S t a t e be r e q u i r e d to a s s u r e p e d e s t r i a n s a f e t y by e n c l o s i n g o u r highways w i t h a p h y s i c a l o b s t r u c t i o n so as to p r e v e n t a p e d e s t r i a n ' s i n t e n t i o n a l e n t r a n c e upon t h e roadway. Such a c o n c l u s i o n is u n t e n a b l e . I n f i n a l s u p p o r t of t h e c o n t e n t i o n f o r imposing l i a b i l i t y on t h e S t a t e f o r f a i l i n g to m a i n t a i n a f e n c e i n an area known to b e f r e q u e n t e d by c h i l d r e n , p l a i n t i f f asserts t h e d o c t r i n e of a t t r a c t i v e n u i s a n c e . See G a g n i e r V. Curran C o n s t r u c t i o n C o . ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 468, 443 P.2d 894; Molohon v. United S t a t e s ( D . Mont. 1 9 6 2 ) , 206 F.Supp. 388; Johnson v. United S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 5 9 ) , 270 F.2d 488, cert. d e n i e d , 362 U.S. 924, 80 S.Ct. 677, 4 L.Ed.2d 742; Driscoll v. C l a r k ( 1 9 0 5 ) , 32 Mont. 172, 80 P. 1. T h i s Court h a s n o t d e c i d e d , however, whether a highway, as a n a r t i f i c i a l c o n d i t i o n , is such t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e is deemed a p p l i c a b l e when a c h i l d is k i l l e d o r i n j u r e d t h e r e o n . N o r have w e been a b l e t o f i n d a case d e a l i n g w i t h such an a p p l i c a t i o n i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . The e l e m e n t s needed t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of l i a b i l i t y u n d e r a t h e o r y of a t t r a c t i v e n u i s a n c e i n c l u d e : (1) a n a r t i f i c i a l c o n d i t i o n maintained by t h e p o s s e s s o r of land i n a p l a c e which t h e p o s s e s s o r knows or should know t h a t c h i l d r e n are l i k e l y to t r e s p a s s ; ( 2 ) t h e c o n d i t i o n i n v o l v e s an unreasonable r i s k of d e a t h or s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm; ( 3 ) c h i l d r e n because of t h e i r y o u t h w i l l be unable t o d i s c o v e r t h e c o n d i t i o n or r e a l i z e t h e danger; ( 4 ) t h e u t i l i t y of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n is s l i g h t compared t o t h e r i s k it p r e s e n t s to young c h i l d r e n ; ( 5 ) t h e p o s s e s s o r f a i l s t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e care to e l i m i n a t e t h e danger or o t h e r w i s e p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d r e n . See Restatement of T o r t s 2d, S 339; Gagnier, s u p r a . - 9 - An i n t e r s t a t e highway most c e r t a i n l y c o n s t i t u t e s an arti- f i c i a l c o n d i t i o n , b u t w e a r e unable to f i n d anything i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t a five-year-old c h i l d would not be a b l e to d i s c o v e r it nor be a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e dangers involved when walking t h e r e o n . I n a s o c i e t y where c a r s , streets and highways a r e commonplace, a c h i l d from t h e minute he is a b l e t o walk is c o n s t a n t l y reminded t h a t one should be e x t r e m e l y c a r e f u l of roadways. Consequently, by t h e t i m e a c h i l d is f i v e y e a r s of a g e , it may be he h a s grown t o a p p r e c i a t e and f e a r t h e r i s k s a highway p r e s e n t s t o a p e d e s t r i a n . P l a i n t i f f f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h a l e g a l d u t y on t h e S t a t e t o erect or m a i n t a i n t h e f e n c e a t i s s u e . W e a f f i r m t h e summary judgment g r a n t e d i n f a v o r of t h e S t a t e of Montana. S i n c e material i s s u e s of f a c t have y e t t o be r e s o l v e d concerning t h e p r o p r i e t y of d e f e n d a n t Case's d r i v i n g behavior and t h e d i s t a n c e from t h e b r i d g e abutment of t h e impact, t h e summary judgment i n d e f e n d a n t C a s e ' s f a v o r is f u r t h e r proceedings. J u s t i c e d W e concur: ~ u s t i c e rank I. Haswell. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring: I agree with the decision of this Court affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendant State of Montana, but reversing the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, Eunice Irene Case. Nonetheless, I must express my disapproval of the way the trial court handled and granted both motions for summary judgment. There is absolutely no way from the record that we can tell why the trial court ruled in the way it did. We should be able to tell from the trial court order or accompanying memorandum precisely why the trial court considered there to be no genuine issue of fact. It has always seemed to be that if parties are to be thrown out of court they are entitled to know why. The Canons of Judicial Ethics require that trial judges, in disposing of controverted cases, set out the reasons for their decisions. The first paragraph of Canon 19 (144 Mont. at xxvi-xxvii) states in unequivocal language: "In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for his action in an opinion showing that he has not disregad-ed or overlooked serious arguments of counsel. He thus shows his full understanding of the case, avoids the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual integrity and may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the law." The order of the trial judge granting summary judgment to both defendants fails to measure up to this mandate. The order states in pertinent part: "WHEREAS, the Court having received written memorandums on behalf of the Plaintiff and the respective Defendants, and the Court having duly considered the same, "NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant State of Montana is hereby GRANTED, "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Emice Irene Case is hereby GRANTED. " That is it--abs~lutely no analysis of why there is no genuine issue of material fact. Nor is there an accompanying memorandum setting out an analysis. In Ballantyne v . Anaconda Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 406, 574 P.2d 582, this Court quoted f r o i n The State Trial Judge's Book published by the West Publishing Company. 175 Mont. at 409, 574 P.2d at 584. This language sets out in no uncertain terms why trial judges should explain the reasons for their decisions. One paragraph of -- The State Trial Judge's Book, quoted in Ballantyne, is particularly apt here: "'The function of an opinion is to state the reason which led the court to decide the case the way it did. Moreover, since in the process of preparing an opinion the judae must discipline his thinking, he is more apt to reach a just decision in a complex case if he reduces his reasoning to writing. Referring to the fruitful effect of the process, Chief Jfistice Hughes once commented, "The importance of written opinions as a protection against judicial carelessness is very great."'" 175 Mont. at 409, 574 P.2d at 584. If the trial court would have mulled the case over and entered a written decision explaining why it granted summary judgment, it might, in the process of reaching that decision, have recognized the basic error in granting summary judgment. Obviously, the existence or nonexistence of children on the bridge would markedly change the duty of the defendant- driver to slow down as she was approaching the bridge. That basic fact is in dispute. A jury issue is manifestly involved here. On trial, had the jury believed there were children on the bridge, it might well conclude that the defendant-driver did not exercise reasonable care in approaching the bridge and that this lack of care caused the death of the child. On the other hand, if the jury concluded there were no children on the bridge, it could conclude that the driver exercised reasonable care in approaching the bridge. A careful analysis of the case would suggest a strong likelihood that the trial court would realize the error in granting summary judgment to the defendant-driver. The dis- puted facts were clearly pointed out to the trial court in the plaintiff's memorandum opposing the grant of summary judgment. That brief, after pointing out that the affidavits of defendant's witnesses that there were no children on the bridge, were flatly contradicted by affidavits of plaintiff's witnesses that there were children on the bridge, stated: "If the facts are as stated in the Affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, the question of fact which must be resolved is whether or not the defendant Eunice Irene Case exercised due care in proceeding down the highway knowing children were on or near the highway and whether or not she was negligent in not seeing the decedent although he was 20 feet down the road from the bridge abutment:' (Plaintiff's Memorandum to the Trial Court at page 2.) The trial court therefore, cannot claim that the existence of such genuine issues of material fact were not pointed out to the court by plaintiff's counsel. If the trial court found that the existence or nonexistence of children on the highway was not a material fact, the duty would then be imposed on the trial court to explain why the presence or absence of children on the bridge would not alter the right of the defendant-driver to summary judgment on the liability issue. I would urge the trial courts to heed the mandate of Canon 19. But even were the Canon not there, the reasons, as pointed out in Ballantyne, supra, are just as compelling for a requirement that the trial courts spread upon the record the reasons for their I concur with the foregoing concurring Justice