Case Title: SUE H APSEY V MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 129134

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 1, 2007 
SUE H. APSEY and ROBERT APSEY, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellees/Cross-
Appellants, 
v 
No. 129134 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, doing business as 
MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE CENTER 
and 
Defendant. 
RUSSELL H. TOBE, D.O., JAMES H. 
DEERING, D.O., JAMES H. DEERING, 
D.O., P.C., and SHIAWASSEE 
RADIOLOGY CONSULTANTS, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-
Appellees. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
KELLY, J. 
This case presents the question of what authentication is necessary for out­
of-state affidavits in Michigan. The parties ask us to determine whether MCL 
600.2102(4) of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) conflicts with the Uniform 
 
 
 
  
 
Recognition of Acknowledgements Act (URAA), MCL 565.261 et seq., and to 
discern the meaning of MCL 565.268 and its relation to MCL 600.2102(4).  We 
find no conflict between the URAA and MCL 600.2102(4).  The Legislature 
intended the URAA to serve as an alternative to MCL 600.2102(4) for 
authenticating out-of-state affidavits. 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that MCL 600.2102(4) controlled 
because it is more specific. Therefore, it erroneously found that the signature of a 
notary public on an affidavit taken out of state must “be certified by the clerk of 
any court of record in the county where such affidavit shall be taken, under the 
seal of said court.” MCL 600.2102(4). The Court of Appeals failed to give 
adequate weight and consideration to the language of MCL 565.268 that makes 
the URAA an additional method of attestation.  Apsey v Mem Hosp (On 
Reconsideration), 266 Mich App 666; 702 NW2d 870 (2005).  We reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Sue Apsey went to Memorial Healthcare Center for an exploratory 
laparotomy, which resulted in the removal of a large ovarian cyst.  Medical 
complications followed this procedure. 
Plaintiffs allege that various acts of 
medical malpractice caused her to become septic, necessitating several follow-up 
surgeries. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit was prepared in Pennsylvania, and the notary 
public who signed it came from that state. A normal notarial seal appears on the 
document, but no other certification accompanied the seal.  Plaintiffs later 
provided further certification, but not until after the statutory period of limitations 
had run on their medical malpractice cause of action. 
Defendants moved for summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claims.1  The trial 
court granted the motion.  It found that plaintiffs’ failure to provide further 
certification as required by MCL 600.2102(4) rendered the out-of-state 
notarization insufficient. As a result, it ruled that the affidavit was a nullity. 
Without the affidavit, plaintiffs’ complaint was not complete, and their cause of 
action failed for never having been properly commenced.   
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, arguing that the affidavit was 
sufficient under MCL 565.262, but the trial court denied reconsideration. 
Although it did not give its reasoning, the court stated that compliance with MCL 
565.262 would not have changed its decision. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion in April 2005.  It stated 
that, if it were basing its decision solely on the URAA, the affidavit in this case 
would be valid. But it found that MCL 600.2102(4) changed this.  It found 
1 Defendant Memorial Hospital is not an appellant in this Court. 
Subsequent references in this opinion to “defendants” are to defendants Russell H. 
Tobe, D.O.; James H. Deering, D.O.; James H. Deering, D.O., P.C.; and 
Shiawasee Radiology Consultants, P.C. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                              
significance in the fact that MCL 600.2192 appears in the RJA, which deals with 
material presented to the courts. It reasoned that, on the other hand, the URAA 
appears among the statutes governing the conveyance of real property.  It 
concluded that the URAA’s emphasis is not on documents submitted to the courts.   
The Court of Appeals also focused on the final sentence in MCL 565.268: 
“Nothing in this act diminishes or invalidates the recognition accorded to notarial 
acts by other laws of this state.” It reasoned that this sentence indicated that the 
URAA did not diminish the more formal and specific requirements of MCL 
600.2102(4). And it found that these more formal requirements controlled when 
the affidavit is to be officially received and considered by the judiciary.  Given 
this, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case in a 
published opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 19, 2005 
(Docket No. 251110). 
On June 2, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals granted reconsideration and vacated 
its opinion. On June 9, 2005, it issued its published opinion on reconsideration. 
In a split decision, a majority of the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its past decision, 
issuing essentially the same opinion.  But it decided to give the decision only 
prospective application. It found that it would be fundamentally unfair to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ case because of plaintiffs’ reliance on the URAA.  It determined that the 
2 Unpublished order in Docket No. 251110. 
4  
 
 
 
  
 
interests of justice would best be served by allowing plaintiffs’ claim to proceed. 
Apsey, 266 Mich App at 681-682. 
Judge Mark Cavanagh dissented. He argued that the URAA provided an 
alternative method of proving that the notary actually notarized the document.  He 
concluded that the URAA was a response to advances in technology and that the 
Legislature intended both it and MCL 600.2102 to provide legal methods of 
authenticating out-of-state affidavits. Id. at 685-686 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
Defendants sought leave to appeal in this Court, and plaintiffs sought leave 
to cross-appeal. This Court directed the clerk to schedule oral argument on 
whether to grant the applications or take other peremptory action pursuant to MCR 
7.302(G)(1). 474 Mich 1135 (2006). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court 
reviews de novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 
(2003). The fundamental rule and primary goal of statutory construction is to 
effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 472 Mich 566, 
571; 701 NW2d 102 (2005). To accomplish this task, we start by reviewing the 
text of the statute, and, if it is unambiguous, we will enforce the statute as written 
because the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed.  Id. 
Whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given meaning.  And no 
5  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
word should be treated as surplusage or made nugatory.  People v Warren, 462 
Mich 415, 429 n 24; 615 NW2d 691 (2000). 
III. THE URAA PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ATTESTATION AND  
AUTHENTICATION  
The URAA and MCL 600.2102(4) require different certifications for out­
of-state affidavits. MCL 600.2102 provides, in part: 
In cases where by law the affidavit of any person residing in 
another state of the United States, or in any foreign country, is 
required, or may be received in judicial proceedings in this state, to 
entitle the same to be read, it must be authenticated as follows: 
* * * 
(4) If such affidavit be taken in any other of the United States 
or in any territory thereof, it may be taken before a commissioner 
duly appointed and commissioned by the governor of this state to 
take affidavits therein, or before any notary public or justice of the 
peace authorized by the laws of such state to administer oaths 
therein. The signature of such notary public or justice of the peace, 
and the fact that at the time of the taking of such affidavit the person 
before whom the same was taken was such notary public or justice 
of the peace, shall be certified by the clerk of any court of record in 
the county where such affidavit shall be taken, under the seal of said 
court.  [Emphasis added.] 
MCL 565.262(a) defines “notarial acts” under the URAA.  It provides, in part: 
“Notarial acts” means acts that the laws of this state authorize 
notaries public of this state to perform, including the administering 
of oaths and affirmations, taking proof of execution and 
acknowledgments of instruments, and attesting documents.  Notarial 
acts may be performed outside this state for use in this state with the 
same effect as if performed by a notary public of this state by the 
following persons authorized pursuant to the laws and regulations of 
other governments in addition to any other person authorized by the 
laws of this state: 
(i) A notary public authorized to perform notarial acts in the 
place in which the act is performed.  [Emphasis added.] 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
It is undisputed that an affidavit is a “notarial act” that is controlled by the 
URAA.3 
On first review, these statutes appear to be in conflict.  The Court of 
Appeals majority was troubled by this and struggled to make the two fit together. 
But, in attempting to harmonize them, the Court of Appeals majority severely 
limited the reach and application of the URAA in ways unsupported by the text of 
the URAA and unintended by the Legislature.  While it was appropriate for the 
Court of Appeals to read the statutes in pari materia,4 the Court’s method of doing 
so was incorrect. The Legislature has provided guidance on how to read the 
statutes in the URAA. 
The Court of Appeals should have used it before 
attempting other means of harmonizing the statutes. 
3 In fact, defendants concede that the URAA applies to all notarial acts. 
This would include affidavits offered in a judicial proceeding.  Defendants’ 
concession undermines any argument that MCL 600.2102 was retained to carve 
out an exception to the URAA for affidavits used in judicial proceedings.   
4 “‘The object of the rule in pari materia is to carry into effect the purpose 
of the legislature as found in harmonious statutes on a subject.’”  Jennings v 
Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 137; 521 NW2d 230 (1994), quoting Wayne Co v 
Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930). 
Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same 
person or thing, or the same class of persons or things, or which 
have a common purpose.  It is the rule that in construction of a 
particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes 
relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, 
should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one 
law, although enacted at different times, and containing no reference 
one to the other. [Detroit v Michigan Bell Tel Co, 374 Mich 543, 
558; 132 NW2d 660 (1965).] 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In MCL 565.268, the Legislature indicated how the URAA was meant to 
interact with MCL 600.2102. MCL 565.268 provides: 
A notarial act performed prior to the effective date of this act 
is not affected by this act. This act provides an additional method of 
proving notarial acts. Nothing in this act diminishes or invalidates 
the recognition accorded to notarial acts by other laws of this state. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Although the Court of Appeals majority took note of MCL 565.268, it focused on 
the last sentence to the exclusion of the others.  It reasoned that, because the 
URAA does not diminish MCL 600.2102(4), this must mean that the Legislature 
intended MCL 600.2102(4) to trump the requirements of the URAA.  But this 
reasoning is not supported by the complete text of MCL 565.268.   
The final sentence must be read in light of what precedes it.  The second 
sentence of MCL 565.268 indicates that the URAA is an additional or alternative 
method of proving notarial acts. As an “additional” method, the URAA does not 
replace the prior method. Instead, it is intended to stand as a coequal with it. 
Because the two methods are alternative and coequal, the URAA does not 
diminish or invalidate “the recognition accorded to notarial acts by other laws of 
this state.” MCL 565.268.  Simply, MCL 600.2102(4) is not invalidated by the 
URAA. It remains an additional method of attestation of out-of-state affidavits. 
Because the two methods exist as alternatives, a party may use either to validate 
an affidavit. 
8  
 
 
 
                                              
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,5 a phrase must be read in context. 
A phrase must be construed in light of the phrases around it, not in a vacuum.  Its 
context gives it meaning.  Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 318; 
645 NW2d 34 (2002). Similarly, it is a well-settled rule of law that, when 
construing a statute, a court must read it as a whole.  G C Timmis & Co v 
Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 421; 662 NW2d 710 (2003); Arrowhead Dev 
Co v Livingston Co Rd Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982); Layton 
v Seward Corp, 320 Mich 418, 427; 31 NW2d 678 (1948).  Without proper 
adherence to this rule, the Court of Appeals could not effectuate the intent behind 
the URAA. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the interpretation we use in the belief that 
reading the URAA as an alternative method of authenticating out-of-state 
affidavits would render MCL 600.2102(4) nugatory.  Of course, a reviewing court 
should not interpret a statute in such a manner as to render it nugatory.  Warren, 
462 Mich at 429 n 24. A statute is rendered nugatory when an interpretation fails 
to give it meaning or effect.6  But our interpretation of MCL 565.268 does no such 
damage to MCL 600.2102(4). 
5 “It is known by its associates.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).   
6 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines “nugatory” as “of no force or 
effect; useless; invalid.” 
9  
 
 
 
                                              
Because the URAA does not repeal MCL 600.2102, the latter provision 
remains in effect as a viable means of authenticating out-of-state affidavits.  If a 
party chooses to use it, the affidavit can be admitted as evidence just as if the party 
had decided to follow the URAA. MCL 600.2102(4) has the same meaning and 
effect after the enactment of the URAA as it did before.  At both times, it was a 
viable means of authenticating an out-of-state affidavit. 
We question how the Legislature could have signaled more clearly its intent 
that the URAA should function as an alternative to MCL 600.2102 than by stating 
that the URAA “provides an additional method of proving notarial acts.”  MCL 
565.268. The Legislature need not repeal every law in a given area before it 
enacts new laws that it intends to operate in addition to their preexisting 
counterparts. The Legislature has the power to enact laws to function and interact 
as it sees fit. And when it does so, this Court is bound to honor its intent. 
In this case, the Legislature made its intent clear through MCL 565.268. 
By enacting the URAA, it wished to create an additional method of 
authentication.7  We must respect this decision. Despite its likely decreased use in 
7 The brief amicus curiae of the Negligence Section of the State Bar of 
Michigan makes the uncontested assertion that 24 states and the District of 
Columbia will not comply with the requirements of MCL 600.2102(4).  This list 
includes heavily populated states such as California, Florida, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and Texas. This fact may have provided additional motivation for the 
Legislature to create an additional method of authenticating affidavits. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
light of the URAA’s less rigorous requirements, MCL 600.2102(4) still has 
meaning. Hence, it is not rendered nugatory.8 
Also, MCL 600.2102(4) is not rendered nugatory because it provides for 
the Governor to appoint a commissioner to authenticate out-of-state affidavits. 
Under the statute’s language, Michigan’s Governor could appoint a person who is 
not a notary to authenticate affidavits in any state or territory of the United States. 
MCL 600.2102(4). Such affidavits likely would not be admissible under the 
URAA. But they could be used because of MCL 600.2102(4).  Given this, MCL 
600.2102 is not rendered nugatory under our interpretation of the URAA.  Instead, 
it has valid meaning and effect, even if it is rarely used. 
By contrast, a strict application of MCL 600.2102 as the only method of 
authenticating affidavits would render part of MCL 565.268 nugatory.  Only by 
ignoring the sentence “[t]his act provides an additional method of proving notarial 
8 Justice Markman accuses us of rewriting and rendering nugatory the 
phrase “must be authenticated” as used in MCL 600.2102.  This opinion does not 
render the phrase nugatory. As we have repeatedly noted, MCL 600.2102 still can 
be used as an alternative means of authentication.  If a party chooses to use this 
method, the affidavit still “must be authenticated” in the same manner.  As such, 
the phrase continues to have meaning.   
This Court is not rewriting the statute.  Instead, it is effectuating the intent 
behind the language written by the Legislature and considering MCL 600.2102 
together with the URAA. 
The language of the URAA indicates that the 
Legislature intended to change MCL 600.2102 to render it no longer the exclusive 
means of authenticating out-of-state affidavits.  To discern the true intent of the 
Legislature, the statutes must be read together, and no one section should be taken 
in isolation. This is where Justice Markman’s review fails.   
11  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
   
 
acts” could we arrive at defendants’ desired outcome.  As discussed earlier, there 
is no reason to do so when we can provide both statutes full meaning as 
alternatives to one another. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.9 
MCL 565.268 lays out how the Legislature intended to deal with MCL 
600.2102 and the URAA. The URAA is an additional method of authenticating 
9 Courts in other states have faced issues similar to the one we face today. 
They have consistently come to the conclusion that the uniform act creates an 
alternative means of authentication. Rumph v Lester Land Co, 205 Ark 1147; 172 
SW2d 916 (1943), provides an excellent example.  In that case, an Arkansas 
statute that predated the enactment of the uniform acknowledgement act required 
that 
“the certificate shall be authenticated by a certificate as to the 
official character of such officer, executed, if the acknowledgment is 
taken by a Clerk or Deputy Clerk of a court, by the presiding judge 
of the court or, if the acknowledgment is taken by a Notary Public, 
by a Clerk of a Court of Record of the County, Parish or District in 
which the acknowledgment is taken.”  [Id. at 1149, quoting § 9(2) 
of 1943 Ark Acts 169 (emphasis added).] 
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that, despite this language, the statute 
was merely a system of acknowledgement that was an alternative to the uniform 
acknowledgement act:   
In other words, Act 169 of 1943 is merely permissive. 
Acknowledgments may still be taken, certified and authenticated just 
as heretofore; on the other hand, acknowledgments may be taken, 
certified and authenticated under the Uniform Acknowledgment Act, 
which is Act 169 of 1943. Two ways are open: (1) the old way; or 
(2) the way under Act 169 of 1943. Either way reaches the same 
goal: i. e., the right to be recorded. [Rumph, 205 Ark at 1149.] 
(continued…) 
12  
 
 
  
 
 
                                              
out-of-state affidavits, and either method may be used as an alternative to the 
other.10  Because plaintiffs complied with the URAA, their affidavit was 
admissible. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of the unambiguous language of MCL 565.268, there is no conflict 
between the URAA and MCL 600.2102(4). The URAA was enacted as an 
additional means of dealing with all notarial acts.  This includes affidavits. 
Because of the unambiguous language of MCL 565.268, the URAA provides an 
alternative method of authenticating out-of-state affidavits.  The Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that plaintiffs’ affidavit was insufficient and inadmissible despite 
its compliance with the URAA.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
(…continued)  
See also First Nat’l Bank v Howard, 148 Tenn 188; 253 SW 961 (1923), and  
Valley Nat’l Bank of Arizona v Avco Dev Co, 14 Ariz App 56; 480 P2d 671  
(1971).  
10 We strongly disagree with Justice Markman that the “most obvious 
means of reconciling and harmonizing” these two provisions is to find that MCL 
600.2102 carves out an exception to the URAA. Post at 3. Again, this fails to 
give effect to MCL 565.268. The “most obvious” means of accomplishing this 
task is to follow the instructions of the Legislature and treat the provisions as 
alternative means of authentication. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.  We do not retain 
jurisdiction. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
SUE H. APSEY and ROBERT APSEY, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellees/Cross- 
Appellants,  
No. 129134 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, doing business as 
MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE CENTER 
Defendant. 
and 
RUSSELL H. TOBE, D.O., JAMES H. 
DEERING, D.O., JAMES H. DEERING, 
D.O., P.C., and SHIAWASSEE 
RADIOLOGY CONSULTANTS, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants/Cross- 
Appellees.  
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
Given that I authored it, I fully concur in the majority opinion.  I write this 
separate concurrence to address additional reasons why I believe the Court has 
reached the correct conclusion in this case.  The following further explains why 
the two means of authentication continue to coexist and demonstrates why the 
Legislature did not simply repeal MCL 600.2102(4).  It also offers an added 
explanation of how the Court of Appeals attempt to harmonize MCL 600.210(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
with the Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgements Act actually subverted the 
Legislature’s intent. 
Our interpretation of MCL 600.2102(4) and the Uniform Recognition of 
Acknowledgements Act (URAA), MCL 565.261 et seq., is supported by certain 
written matter that was supplied to the Legislature before it enacted the URAA. 
Of particular importance is the Michigan Law Revision Commission’s report and 
recommendations. The commission was created by the Legislative Council Act 
(LCA), MCL 4.1101 et seq. It is charged with recommending changes in the law 
to the Legislature. MCL 4.1403. The LCA also created the Legislative Service 
Bureau. MCL 4.1105. It is this bureau’s responsibility to compare pending bills 
with existing laws for the purpose of avoiding conflicts.  MCL 4.1108(a). The 
bureau may also recommend legislation to the Legislative Council or the 
commission. MCL 4.1109. Along with its recommendations to the Legislature, 
the Legislative Council may submit proposed bills to implement the 
recommendations. MCL 4.1104(4). 
The Michigan Law Revision Commission brought no conflicts to the 
Legislature’s attention in its report on the URAA.  Rather, the report specifically 
advised the Legislature that it need not repeal any laws in order to fully effectuate 
the URAA. It stated, “The act does not require the amendment or repeal of any 
existing legislation in Michigan but the old Uniform Act adopted in 1895 . . . .” 
Michigan Law Revision Commission, Third Annual Report, 1968.  The reason no 
2  
 
 
   
                                              
 
 
such action had to be taken was because of proposed language that later became 
MCL 565.268.1 
Given the specialized function of the Michigan Law Revision Commission, 
its report carries extra weight in assisting a court’s interpretation of statutes.  As 
the Legislature created the commission specifically to aid it in drafting legislation 
and identifying conflicts in the law, its report is a particularly useful tool in 
discerning legislative intent. 
In this case, the report explains why MCL 600.2102 was retained.  The 
Legislature did not repeal it because the commission advised that there was no 
need to do so. As the URAA was meant to provide an additional method of 
authentication, there was no need to repeal MCL 600.2102.  Instead, by enacting 
MCL 565.268, the URAA made clear that there would be an additional and 
alternative method of authenticating affidavits.  The commission’s report belies 
the argument that, by retaining MCL 600.2102, the Legislature intended it to 
trump the URAA. 
1 MCL 565.268 provides: 
A notarial act performed prior to the effective date of this act 
is not affected by this act. This act provides an additional method of 
proving notarial acts. Nothing in this act diminishes or invalidates 
the recognition accorded to notarial acts by other laws of this state. 
[Emphasis added.] 
3  
 
 
  
The report specifically indicated to the Legislature that the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared the URAA. 
Michigan Law Revision Commission, Third Annual Report, 1968.  The national 
commissioners prepared a prefatory note to the URAA to aid in its uniform 
enactment. This note is also a useful tool in discerning the legislative intent 
behind the URAA and in explaining why both it and MCL 600.2102 remain good 
law. This is because, like the Michigan Law Revision Commission’s report, it 
told the Legislature that it need not overturn existing statutes to fully effectuate the 
URAA. The prefatory note stated that there was no need to amend existing 
acknowledgement law because the URAA was “in addition to” other recognition 
statutes. This demonstrates why the Legislature took no action to repeal MCL 
600.2102. 
The advice provided by these materials explains why the Legislature left 
MCL 600.2102 on the books when it adopted the URAA.  And it informs our 
interpretation of the language of MCL 565.268.  This provision of the URAA was 
included to streamline the enactment process.  It did so by making the URAA a 
method of dealing with notarial acts that was additional to any existing before its 
enactment, including MCL 600.2102. 
The Court of Appeals attempted to harmonize MCL 600.2102 with the 
URAA. But its attempts conflicted with the Legislature’s intent that the URAA be 
interpreted as it has been in other states that have enacted it.  MCL 565.269 
4  
 
 
 
provides: “This act shall be so interpreted as to make uniform the laws of those 
states which enact it.” Use of the term “shall” in MCL 565.269 is a mandatory 
directive. Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 471 Mich 745, 752; 691 NW2d 424 
(2005). 
But far from making the URAA uniform, the Court of Appeals 
interpretation creates a gaping exception applicable only in Michigan.  Contrary to 
the requirements of MCL 565.269, the Court of Appeals actually isolated 
Michigan from every other state that has enacted the URAA.  The language of 
MCL 565.269 helps demonstrate that this could not have been the Legislature’s 
intended interaction between the URAA and MCL 600.2102. The Court of 
Appeals erred in failing to follow the directive of MCL 565.269. 
These materials provide substantial evidence that this Court properly 
interpreted the statutes in this case.   
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
SUE H. APSEY and ROBERT APSEY, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellees,  
Cross Appellants,  
No. 129134 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, doing business as 
MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE CENTER 
Defendant. 
and 
RUSSELL H. TOBE, D.O., JAMES H. 
DEERING, D.O., JAMES H. DEERING, 
D.O., P.C., and SHIAWASSEE 
RADIOLOGY CONSULTANTS, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants, Cross-
Appellees. 
YOUNG, J. (concurring in the result only). 
I concur in the result to reverse the Court of Appeals.  This is a case in 
which the majority and the dissent offer two compelling but competing 
constructions of the Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgements Act (URAA) and 
MCL 600.2102 of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), and, in my view, neither 
 
 
                                              
 
construction is unprincipled.1  Both sides invoke legitimate, well-established 
canons of statutory construction to justify their respective positions.  In short, this 
is a rare instance where our conventional rules of statutory interpretation do not 
yield an unequivocal answer regarding how to reconcile the provisions of the two 
statutes that appear to conflict. 
The majority honors the plain, unambiguous language in the more recently 
enacted URAA, noting that the statute explicitly states that it creates an 
“additional method” of authenticating notarial acts.2  The majority theorizes, 
1 It is not just the members of this Court who have struggled to reconcile 
the provisions of these two statutes.  The Court of Appeals has twice considered 
this issue. 
Initially, it held that the more specific requirements of the RJA 
controlled over the requirements of the URAA and affirmed summary disposition 
in favor of defendants. Apsey v Mem Hosp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Court of Appeals, issued April 19, 2005 (Docket No. 251110).  After granting 
reconsideration, one member of the original panel urged a different reading of the 
statutes, while a majority of the panel continued to hold that the RJA controlled 
over the URAA, but reversed the trial court and gave plaintiffs an opportunity to 
remedy the defect. Apsey v Mem Hosp (On Reconsideration), 266 Mich App 666; 
702 NW2d 870 (2005). Moreover, in their briefs filed with this Court, the parties 
themselves and the numerous amici curiae aligning with either side have 
thoroughly debated the competing approaches to construing the URAA and the 
RJA. Also, the Court of Appeals subsequently has questioned the correctness of 
its published decision in this case and, despite the fact that this case was pending 
before this Court, it took the unorthodox step of convening a special conflict panel 
to consider whether its decision in this case was correct.  See White v Barbara Ann 
Karmanos Cancer Institute, order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 23, 
2007 (Docket No. 270320). 
2 MCL 565.268. Importantly, the URAA definition of “notarial acts” is 
very broad and encompasses those also covered by the RJA.  MCL 565.262(a) 
(“‘Notarial acts’ means acts that the laws of this state authorize notaries public of 
this state to perform, including the administering of oaths and affirmations, taking 
(continued…) 
2  
 
 
                                              
correctly I believe, that the Legislature, using the appropriate statutory language to 
signal its intent, is capable of prescribing a restrictive method of authentication 
then later approving a more lenient method as an alternative to the prior enactment 
without expressly repealing that earlier statute.  I have no doubt of the 
Legislature’s ability to provide an alternative, more lenient statutory regime, 
without having to negate a more restrictive one.  The majority believes that the 
Legislature has clearly signaled such an intent in this case.  
The dissent responds, first, that MCL 600.2102 dictates that out-of-state 
affidavits that are to be received in judicial proceedings “must be authenticated” in 
accordance with its more stringent requirements, and, second, that the more 
specific provision, that of the RJA, must govern the more general provision, the 
URAA, when the two overlap. The dissent also believes that the “additional 
method” language is an insufficient signal that the Legislature intended for both 
statutes to coexist as alternatives.  Moreover, the dissent concludes that the 
majority’s construction renders “nugatory” the more restrictive RJA. 
The dissent labels the majority’s approach a “non-interpretation” and a 
“non-harmonization” of the URAA and the RJA, 
while criticizing my 
characterization of it as a reasonable application of basic principles of statutory 
(…continued)  
proof of execution and acknowledgements of instruments, and attesting  
documents.”).  
3  
 
 
 
                                              
 
construction.3  In the process, the dissent recoils at the suggestion that his 
approach and the majority’s approach are reasonable alternatives, as he believes 
that his interpretation is the only one that truly harmonizes the URAA and the 
RJA. 
To the contrary, the dissent fails to explain why his “harmonization” is pre­
eminent where the dissent gives little, if any, weight to the URAA’s explicit 
statement that it “provides an additional method of proving notarial acts.”4  Given 
that the URAA expressly encompasses all notarial acts, if the URAA’s methods 
are not “additional” to the RJA’s methods where the statutes overlap, then I cannot 
conceive that the phase “additional method” has any significance.  The dissent 
criticizes the majority for failing to give effect to the word “must,” but meanwhile 
falls prey to the same criticism with respect to the phrase “additional method.” 
The dissent’s approach cannot be the only true means of harmonization where it 
criticizes the majority for rendering statutory language nugatory and proceeds to 
do the same.  The dissent does not explain why the Legislature could not have 
created an all-encompassing alternative methodology for proving notarial acts and 
thus why his construction is the superior harmonization of the statutes. The 
Legislature apparently intended the URAA and the RJA to coexist as alternatives 
where they overlap, and the majority has attempted to respect the Legislature’s 
3 Post at 6.  
4 MCL 565.268.  
4  
 
 
  
will. Therefore, I believe that the best “harmonization” of the two statutes allows 
both to coexist, as the Legislature apparently intended. 
I also disagree with the dissent that the URAA renders nugatory the 
provisions of the RJA merely because, as a matter of practice, the public and the 
bar might preferentially choose to use the more liberal statute.  If the Legislature 
can create two differing methods to accomplish the same act, then the fact that one 
is preferred does not render the other “nugatory” in a legal sense. See The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New College Edition 
(1978) (defining “nugatory” as “[h]aving no power; invalid; inoperative: a 
nugatory statute”). Foreign affidavits to be used in judicial proceedings can still 
be certified under the RJA. The RJA will be neither invalid nor inoperative as a 
result of this decision. 
Although the majority and the dissent readily expose the flaws apparent in 
the other’s analysis of the URAA and the RJA, I cannot conclude that either 
construction is entirely unfaithful to the statutory language or departs from the 
exacting judicial philosophy that has marked this Court in recent years.  Since I 
believe that the Legislature has created in the URAA an alternative to the RJA for 
proving notarial acts, including those required in judicial proceedings, I decline to 
join the dissent. Like the dissent, I believe that the Legislature should dispel much 
of the confusion generated by the URAA and the RJA for the benefit of future 
litigants. I hope it will do so. However, until that time, I favor a resolution that is 
5  
 
 
 
least unsettling and disruptive to the rule of law in Michigan, and so I concur with 
the result to reverse the Court of Appeals. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
SUE H. APSEY and ROBERT APSEY, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellees/  
Cross Appellants,  
No. 129134 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, doing business as 
MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE CENTER 
Defendant. 
and 
RUSSELL H. TOBE, D.O., JAMES H. 
DEERING, D.O., JAMES H. DEERING, 
D.O., P.C., and SHIAWASSEE 
RADIOLOGY CONSULTANTS, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-
Appellees. 
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
I would deny leave to appeal and uphold the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals.  I would also call on the Legislature to 
promptly clarify its intentions concerning the need for the certification of foreign 
affidavits used in Michigan judicial proceedings.   
Although the range of support from amici curiae for plaintiff’s cross­
application is impressive-- encompassing the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association, 
the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, and the State Bar of Michigan-- their briefs 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
and the majority opinion are ultimately unpersuasive, in my judgment, because 
each fails to accord any meaning to MCL 600.2102, which states that foreign 
affidavits “must be authenticated” by the procedures set forth in that law.  It is not 
to 
read 
this 
law 
“technically,” 
“narrowly,” 
“crabbedly,” 
“literally,” 
“unreasonably,” or “conservatively” to conclude that “must be authenticated” 
means what it says. The majority opinion would simply transform what the 
Legislature has written into “may be authenticated.”1  Although I am sympathetic 
to this result, and would urge the Legislature to consider an amendment to that 
effect, it is not within this Court’s authority to modify the clear language of the 
law, even where there is a consensus within the bar for such a result.  
Unquestionably, considerable confusion is introduced by the Uniform 
Recognition of Acknowledgments Act (URAA), which states, in part: 
This act provides an additional method of proving notarial 
acts. Nothing in this act diminishes or invalidates the recognition 
accorded to notarial acts by other laws of this state.  [MCL 565.268.] 
1 The majority opinion asserts that its harmonization “does not render the 
phrase nugatory” because “[i]f a party chooses to use this method, the affidavit 
still ‘must be authenticated’ in the same manner.”  Ante at 11 n 8. But, of course, 
the majority opinion’s specified condition-- “if a party chooses to use this 
method”-- drains the remainder of its statement of any coherence, for this is the 
very question in controversy-- must a party choose to use this method?  The 
Legislature says “yes,” and the majority opinion says “no.”  The majority opinion 
does “equity” in the guise of statutory interpretation, distorting both legal concepts 
in the process. 
2  
 
 
                                              
However, the most obvious means of reconciling and harmonizing MCL 600.2102 
and MCL 565.2682 is to recognize that the former-- applicable only to the use of 
affidavits in judicial proceedings-- is the more specific of these provisions, and 
therefore the latter is best understood as applicable only to the use of affidavits 
outside the scope of judicial proceedings.  Such a harmonization, while imperfect 
as all harmonizations must be, respects the language of § 2102, while also 
respecting the language of the URAA, albeit outside the judicial sphere.  While a 
perfect harmonization of these provisions is not possible, a harmonization that 
gives reasonable meaning to both provisions should be preferred to a 
“harmonization” that gives no meaning at all to one provision.  In contrast, the 
majority’s “harmonization,” while fully respecting the language of the URAA, 
would accord no respect to the language of § 2102.  As the Court of Appeals 
correctly observed, the majority’s interpretation “basically makes the certification 
requirement in MCL 600.2102(4) worthless or nugatory.”  Apsey v Mem Hosp (On 
Reconsideration), 266 Mich App 666, 677 n 4; 702 NW2d 870 (2005). 
2 The majority states, “We question how the Legislature could have 
signaled more clearly its intent that the URAA should function as an alternative to 
MCL 600.2102 than by stating that the URAA ‘provides an additional method of 
proving notarial acts.’” Ante at 10. I agree with this. However, it is equally true 
that the Legislature could hardly “have signaled more clearly its intent” 
concerning § 2102 than by providing that certain notarial acts “must be” 
authenticated under the procedures of that provision.  The issue here is not the 
clarity of the URAA but how to reconcile it with the equally clear § 2102. 
3  
 
 
 
 
In response to Justice Young’s concurring opinion, I do not assert that the 
majority opinion renders § 2102 nugatory “merely because, as a matter of practice, 
the public and the Bar might preferentially choose to use the more liberal statute.” 
Ante at 5. Rather, I assert this because the majority opinion replaces “must” with 
“may,” and thereby renders § 2102 “trifling, of little or no consequence, 
inconsequential,” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (4th ed)-- that is, 
“nugatory.” In so doing, the majority opinion departs from what the concurring 
justice correctly describes as “the exacting judicial philosophy that has marked 
this Court in recent years.” Ante at 5. 
The concurring opinion also errs in characterizing the dispute between the 
majority and dissenting opinions as one in which the majority adheres to the 
dispositional rule that “later-in-time” statutes control while the dissent adheres to 
the rule that more specific statutes control.  As useful as such maxims may be 
where statutes stand in irreconciliable conflict and where it must be determined 
which is to trump the other, it is first the obligation of a court to seek to harmonize 
or reconcile statutes so that neither must be trumped out of existence.  “To make 
laws agree or harmonize with laws is the best mode of interpreting them.” 
Halkerston, Maxims 70; see also Nowell v Titan Ins Co, 466 Mich 478, 483; 648 
NW2d 157 (2002) (“In . . . a case of tension, . . . it is our duty to, if reasonably 
possible, construe them both so as to give meaning to each; that is, to harmonize 
them.”). 
4  
 
 
 
That is, the process of harmonization, which is simply another name for one 
aspect of the process of interpretation, precedes the application of dispositional 
maxims of the sort identified by the concurring opinion.  See Klapp v United Ins 
Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 473; 663 NW2d 477 (2003).  This opinion 
undertakes to harmonize; the majority opinion does not.  No “harmonization” can 
fairly be said to occur where one statute ends up utterly without practical meaning 
or effect. Koenig v South Haven, 460 Mich 667, 677; 597 NW2d 99 (1999) (“[A] 
court’s duty is to give meaning to all sections of a statute and to avoid, if at all 
possible, nullifying one by an overly broad interpretation of another.”).  “Words . . 
. ought to be interpreted in such a way as to have some operation.” 8 Coke Reports 
94a. “Words are to be received with effect, so that they may produce some 
effect.” Bacon, Maxims, reg 3. “Words should be understood effectively.” 
Rickets v Livingston, 2 Johns Cas 97, 101 (NY Sup Ct, 1800). If the majority 
opinion does not genuinely render § 2102 nugatory in the view of the concurring 
opinion, it is difficult to imagine when a statue would ever be rendered nugatory 
by judicial construction. A statute need not be physically ripped out of a legal 
code and set ablaze in a bonfire in order to be rendered nugatory; it is merely 
necessary that a statute be rendered of no consequence.  Here, the operative word 
of § 2102 is transformed from “must” to “may,” and there is simply no 
circumstance in which the statutory shell that remains could ever have any 
applicability or pertinence separate from the URAA.  The concurring opinion fails 
5  
 
 
 
 
to differentiate between an imperfect harmonization-- which is what all 
harmonizations must necessarily be-- and a non-harmonization.  The difference is 
the difference between an interpretation and a non-interpretation.   
The § 2102 “problem”-- and I would acknowledge it as such-- is easily and 
quickly remediable by the Legislature. By contrast, the “problem” caused to our 
jurisprudence by this Court reading the law in a manner that is unsupported by its 
language is considerably less easily and quickly remediable. 
Stephen J. Markman 
6