Case Title: Hertzler v. Hertzler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hertzler v. Hertzler1995 WY 206908 P.2d 946Case Number: 94-262Decided: 12/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Pamela M. HERTZLER, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Dean B. 
HERTZLER,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court of Goshen County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Susan Laser-Bair 
of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Susan J. Becker, Cleveland, Ohio, 
for appellant.

James A. 
Eddington of Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, for 
appellee.

Daniel G. Blythe 
of Rogers, Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne; Carolyn F. Corwin and Donald R. McMinn 
of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; and James L. McHugh, Jr., General 
Counsel, and Dort S. Bigg, Director, Legal Affairs, American Psychological 
Association, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Psychological 
Association and Wyoming Psychological Association.

Marvin J. 
Johnson of Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne; Beatrice Dohrn, Legal Director, 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York City; and David J. Cynamon, 
Elizabeth A. O'Brien, and Teresa L. Diaz of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & 
Trowbridge, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, The National Center for Lesbian Rights, The American Civil 
Liberties Union, The Wyoming Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
United Gays and Lesbians of Wyoming.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY, and TAYLOR, JJ., and GUTHRIE, District 
Judge.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The parties in 
this appeal ask us to resolve a child custody dispute arising from completely 
divergent lifestyles of the mother and father. The district court granted the 
father's petition to modify the visitation schedule and limited the mother's 
visitation.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, Pamela 
M. Hertzler (Pamela), posits the following issues:

A.        Whether the 
trial court erred in determining that plaintiff exposed her children to 
inappropriate sexual behavior, thereby creating a substantial change in 
circumstances which vested the court with jurisdiction to entertain Defendant 
Dean Hertzler's petition to modify the custody and visitation Stipulation and 
Order of February 26, 1992.

B.        Whether the 
trial court erred in determining that the best interests of the children are 
served here, and in every case, by limiting visitation between the children and 
their gay or lesbian parent to a de minimis level.

[¶4]      Appellee, Dean B. 
Hertzler (Dean), states the issue as:

1. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by granting the Appellee's petition and request for 
supervised visitation of Appellant with the parties' minor 
children?

[¶5]      The American 
Psychological Association and Wyoming Psychological Association filed an amicus 
curiae brief identifying the issue as:

Whether the trial court 
erred in holding that a mother's involvement in an open lesbian relationship 
provided an independent basis for restricting visitation with her 
children.

[¶6]      The Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the Wyoming Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the United Gays and Lesbians of Wyoming filed an amicus curiae brief in 
support of appellant and identified the following issues:

A.        Whether the 
trial court erred in severely restricting Pamela Hertzler's visitation with her 
children based solely on the fact that she is a lesbian and without any evidence 
that her sexual orientation would harm her children.

B.        Whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the Hertzler children were 
"eroticized" based on its disapproval of Pamela's lesbianism and its 
determination to credit the testimony of an expert who admitted that his 
conclusions were influenced by the mother's sexual orientation; and whether the 
trial court further abused its discretion in assuming that when a lesbian parent 
is open and honest with her children about her sexual orientation, and displays 
affection, just as a non-gay parent commonly does, she "exposes" them to 
behavior that is sexual and inappropriate.

II. 
FACTS

[¶7]      Married in 1976, 
but unable to conceive children of their own, Dean and Pamela Hertzler adopted a 
baby boy and, a few years later, a baby girl. Less than two weeks after the 
second adoption became final, Pamela took both children and left Dean, filing 
for divorce. Incorporated in their divorce decree was Dean's stipulation to 
Pamela's primary custody of the children, expressly conditioned upon her 
disavowal of lesbianism and subject to his liberal visitation 
rights.

[¶8]      In late 1991, 
less than a year after the divorce and against their daughter's wishes, Pamela's 
parents informed Dean that their daughter was, indeed, a lesbian. Following that 
revelation, Pamela quickly acquiesced in transferring primary custody of the 
children to Dean, subject to her liberal visitation rights. By that time, Pamela 
had entered into an open and ongoing lesbian relationship with Peggy Keating, 
relocating to Lakewood, Ohio.

[¶9]      Dean availed 
himself of a match-making service to seek the affections, via letters and 
telephone calls, of Christine Thompson - herself a divorcee. In November of 
1992, within two months of Dean's first letter, Christine came to visit Wyoming. 
An attraction quickly developed and was later consummated in 
marriage.

[¶10]   Insisting that she is a firm 
believer in Biblical principles, Christine manifested a strong desire to 
inculcate the children with those values. She convinced Dean that such a program 
should be pursued with a vengeance, eventually to include close questioning of 
the children about the details of Pamela's lifestyle, conducted amidst 
unrelenting exhortations against the perceived sins of 
Pamela.

[¶11]   With equally ill-conceived ardor, 
Pamela insisted upon fully informing the children as to her lifestyle. When 
visiting Ohio, the children "snuggled" with Pamela and her companion in bed; 
marched with the couple in a gay/lesbian rights parade; and participated in a 
"commitment" ceremony uniting Pamela and her new companion. Upon returning to 
Dean from such a visitation with Pamela, the children brought home an 
astonishing grasp of anatomical terminology, their articulation of which served 
only to deepen and reinforce Dean and Christine's leaden fears concerning 
activities which were taking place in Pamela's new home. Finally, driven by 
those dark fears, Dean obtained stringent modification of Pamela's visitation 
privileges, from which Pamela timely prosecutes this 
appeal.

[¶12]   The record is full of Dean and 
Christine's judgmental recriminations against Pamela's new life. On the other 
hand, the record is equally replete with Pamela's intensive and unrelenting 
efforts to immerse the children in her alternative lifestyle, seemingly to the 
point of indoctrination. As a consequence, we are asked to referee a contest 
between these protagonists of antithetical lifestyles. The manifold perils of 
such an exercise include the danger that we might superimpose our discretionary 
sensibilities upon those of the district court.

[¶13]   With equal and opposing force, each 
party vilifies the other's views and habits, inviting a decision rooted in the 
lifestyles of the parents rather than in the best interests of the children. In 
fact, we are unimpressed with the prejudice and condemnation heaped upon 
Pamela's lifestyle by Dean and Christine and remain equally dubious of Pamela's 
compulsion to relentlessly expose the children to every aspect of her 
relationship. Taking note that restrictions on Pamela's visitation have been 
eased during the pendency of this appeal, we eschew relative value judgments on 
the parents' respective lifestyles in favor of a decision based upon the best 
interests of the children, made with due regard for the sound discretion of the 
district court.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶14]   The court entering a divorce decree 
retains jurisdiction to enforce or modify orders affecting child custody, 
visitation and maintenance as the interests of the children and the 
circumstances of the parents may require. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (1994); 
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 
443 (Wyo. 1995). Jurisdiction to modify such orders is properly occasioned only 
upon a showing of substantial change in the circumstances affecting the welfare 
of the children. Mulkey-Yelverton v. Blevins, 884 P.2d 41, 43-44 (Wyo. 1994). The 
burden of demonstrating such a change is on the party seeking modification. 
Thompson v. Thompson, 824 P.2d 557, 559 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 312 (Wyo. 
1989)).

[¶15]   Custody and visitation decisions 
necessarily summon broad discretionary authority in the district court. Love v. 
Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 
1993) (quoting Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990)). Adversarial enmity frequently forces the mantle 
of Solomon upon such courts. Sadly, even Solomonic wisdom becomes folly between 
parties seemingly prepared to subordinate the best interests of their children. 
The atmosphere in such cases is generally so charged, the decision so daunting, 
and accurate assessment of the character of the contestants so pivotal that we 
defer to the superior evidentiary perspective of the district court in custody 
and visitation decisions absent a clear abuse of discretion. Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶16]   Employment of judicial discretion 
is a definitively subjective exercise. Appellate review, however, probes the 
logic and soundness of discretionary decisions in light of more objectively 
measurable evidentiary underpinnings. Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1988) 
(quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). The propriety of discretionary decisions is a 
function of ascertainable factual circumstances processed in a manner which is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious. Mintle, 764 P.2d  at 257. Reasonable 
conclusions based upon evidence of record will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Thompson, 824 P.2d  at 559. Furthermore, judgments supportable upon application 
of sound legal analysis to any grounds of record are equally inviolate, 
notwithstanding the district court's choice of a flawed approach predicated upon 
disparate factual underpinnings. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754, 757-58 (Wyo. 1987). 
Reversal is required only when the district court's judgment exceeds the bounds 
of reason or constitutes an error of law in light of the entire record. Combs v. 
Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 
(Wyo. 1993).

B. EXPERT 
TESTIMONY

[¶17]   Dean and Pamela both called expert 
witnesses to bolster their cases. The district court rejected testimony of 
Pamela's experts, finding it neither particularly useful nor credible. Our 
deference to that decision cannot be extended to the district court's 
inappropriate reliance upon the testimony of Dean's expert, Mr. Rhodes. Mr. 
Rhodes' categorical bias against homosexuality, compounded by truncated 
professional experience, necessarily relegate his views to the dubious stature 
reserved by the district court for the opinions of Pamela's 
experts.

[¶18]   Entirely discounting the "expert" 
testimony, we nonetheless discern a substantial basis in the record upon which 
to sustain the district court. Searching the record for abuse of discretion, we 
cannot say, under the circumstances revealed, that the district court's decision 
was either arbitrary or capricious. Mintle, 764 P.2d  at 
257.

C. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES

[¶19]   Dean's threshold obligation was to 
show a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to restrictively modify 
Pamela's existing visitation privileges. Thompson, 824 P.2d  at 559. Although 
accomplished by indirection, in a fashion which implicated Dean and Christine in 
wrongdoing as much as Pamela and her new companion, we nevertheless find that 
the children's circumstances had changed substantially, to their detriment, so 
that their best interests required some kind of court 
action.

[¶20]   Before assessing the record's 
manifestations of changed circumstances, we must address a fundamental flaw in 
the analysis articulated by the district court in its decision 
letter:

The state has an interest 
in perpetuating the values associated with conventional marriage, as the family 
is the basic cornerstone of our society. Homosexuality is inherently 
inconsistent with families, and with the relationships and values which 
perpetuate families.

The position of 
the family as the cornerstone of our society is a proper subject of judicial 
notice. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-20 at 1414 (2d 
ed. 1988). We are not, however, inclined towards exclusion in defining the 
family unit, particularly where the care and nurturing of children is at issue. 
See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1977) (quoted with approval in DS v. Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 922 (Wyo. 
1980)).

[¶21]   Whether or not Mr. Rhodes merits 
recognition as an expert witness, his acknowledged homophobic bias vitiates any 
value his testimony might have as a factual basis for the district court's 
critique of homosexuality. Nor can reliance be placed on the harsh and 
judgmental "fundamentalism" of Dean and Christine. Absent evidentiary 
underpinnings or persuasive precedent, we conclude that the district court 
indulged an essentially personal viewpoint in derogation of Pamela's 
lifestyle.

[¶22]   There cannot be found, in the 
district court's improvident expression of personal views on homosexuality, 
indices of malice or prejudice sufficient to cast doubt upon that court's 
capacity to remain "`open to the conviction which evidence might produce.'" 
Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 
353 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1979)). 
Notwithstanding the unrelenting insistence of the parties and amici, parental 
lifestyles remain of secondary import to the paramount interests of the 
children. Error in expression of personal beliefs cannot gainsay a district 
court decision which clearly promotes the children's best 
interests.

[¶23]   The district court also held that 
the children had been "eroticized" during their visits with Pamela, finding that 
this "eroticization" manifested itself in subsequent inappropriate sexual acting 
out behavior. The decision to restrict Pamela's visitation was largely 
predicated on the detrimental effects attributed to that 
"eroticization."

[¶24]   We respectfully refuse to elevate 
"eroticization" from its dubious rank as a solipsistic contrivance of the 
erstwhile expert, Mr. Rhodes. Absent that spurious denomination, however, it 
remains clear that both parties deliberately seized the opportunity of their 
divorce to ostentatiously embrace conspicuously divergent lifestyles, to the 
great detriment of their innocent children. The children's subsequent sexually 
charged and inappropriate behavior is a consequence of both parents' thoughtless 
insistence upon making their offspring the focal point of an acrimonious 
lifestyle debate. Already suffering the ill-effects of the divorce, the children 
were proselytized by Pamela on one side and Dean on the other as if their souls 
were a grand prize in a strange and destructive parental 
contest.

[¶25]   Precedent abounds, of course, 
concerning failed marriage partners whose love for their children is exceeded 
only by a mutual appreciation for the exquisite pain to be inflicted by 
manipulating custody and visitation rights as weapons of retribution. Dean and 
Pamela are hardly unique in this regard. More unusual is a lifestyle clash so 
intense and detrimental to the children that it rises to the threshold of a 
substantial change in circumstances. Whether or not they have been "eroticized," 
these children have certainly suffered abuse from both 
parents.

[¶26]   Initially, Pamela's custody of her 
children was predicated upon her disavowal of homosexuality. When it became 
clear that this was not the case, she voluntarily relinquished custody of the 
children to Dean in exchange for liberal visitation privileges. Pamela's 
capitulation did not quell the righteous fires burning within Dean and 
Christine, who felt compelled to instruct the children that Pamela had abandoned 
them for the affections of another woman, embracing a lifestyle which was a sin 
and abomination.

[¶27]   Pamela, of course, understood that 
Dean's aversion to lesbianism antedated his union with Christine. Pamela, on her 
part, insisted upon familiarizing the children with every aspect of her newfound 
existence, "snuggling" with the children and her companion, enlisting the 
participation of the children in a gay/lesbian rights parade and her 
"commitment" ceremony. Their son was particularly confused by seemingly 
irreconcilable conflicts between Dean's remarriage and Pamela's 
commitment.

[¶28]   In their efforts to wound each 
other, Dean and Pamela continually placed the children at sword's point. No one, 
least of all the parents, should have been surprised when the anguish and 
confusion of those innocents began to find expression in untoward acting out 
behavior. Such inappropriate behavior was a warning sign of a substantial change 
in circumstances, sufficient to invoke the authority of the district court to 
modify custody and visitation provisions. We therefore review the district 
court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Mulkey-Yelverton, 884 P.2d  at 
43.

[¶29]   The substantial change in 
circumstances we have identified was clearly the product of zealous machinations 
by both contestants. In this ignoble context, it is particularly foolhardy to 
believe that modification of custody and visitation is appropriate to punish or 
reward either equally culpable contestant. The only proper objective is a 
modification which will serve the best interests of the children by stabilizing 
an environment made chaotic by thoughtlessly self-absorbed 
parents.

[¶30]   True to form, however, the parties 
encourage us to resolve these issues on far different bases. Pamela's claim is 
that the district court erred in taking exception to her sexual preference. We 
hold that error to have been cured by a decision which serves the best interests 
of the children. This case is no more about Pamela's sexuality than it is about 
Dean and Christine's pretentious "family values." The clash of those so-called 
value systems recommends neither, but did inure to the detriment of the children 
in a manner substantial enough to authorize the district court's modification 
and require our deference to that modification absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.

[¶31]   Careful reading of the contentious 
and unattractive record reveals no abuse of discretion. It was reasonable for 
the district court to conclude that limiting Pamela's visitation with the 
children would limit the damage done by mutual parental insistence upon use of 
the children as weapons in an acrimonious contest between lifestyles. Although 
we cannot condone the district court's indulgence of a personal viewpoint, we 
likewise cannot reverse a discretionary decision which is reasonable and 
benefits from substantial support in the record. Thompson, 824 P.2d  at 559; 
Ferguson, 739 P.2d  at 757. A substantial change in circumstances, manifested by 
troubled behavior in the children, was engendered by the efforts of both parties 
to reduce the children to mere proselytes of conflicting lifestyles. 
Misconstruction of the district court's decision as parental punishment or 
reward ignores the beneficial stabilizing effect of that decision as being in 
the best interests of the children.

[¶32]   Since its initial decision, the 
district court has wisely eased restrictions on Pamela's visitation rights. Even 
Dean and Christine admit that the bonds of love immutably link mother and 
children. We applaud the district court's recognition of that reality and 
commend the parties and the district court to a course that continues to ease 
practical vindication of those bonds.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶33]   Dean and Christine have justified 
their demonization of Pamela on religious grounds, while Pamela, with fervent 
zeal, seeks to justify her new sexual preference. Contrary to the fears of the 
parties and amici, however, it is not the dogmatic belief systems of the parents 
which are in jeopardy here.

[¶34]   The district court's judgment is 
not affirmed because of Dean and Christine's insistence upon their 
"values" so much as it is in spite of that behavior. The damage 
their contest with Pamela has done to these children may already be irreparable. 
If Dean, Christine, and Pamela cannot fully subordinate promotion of their 
respective lifestyles to the natural innocence and love of their children for 
both parents, they will quickly extinguish whatever remaining chances these 
children have for happy and productive lives. With that somber caveat, the 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.

GOLDEN, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion, with whom GUTHRIE, District Judge, 
joins.

GOLDEN, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom GUTHRIE, District Judge, 
joins.

[¶35]   I respectfully 
dissent.

[¶36]   In 1991, when the mother and father 
divorced, the court awarded primary custody of the couple's minor children to 
the mother and granted the father liberal visitation. Later, when the mother, a 
homosexual, told the father that she wished to establish a household with her 
companion, Peggy Keating, the parties agreed to transfer primary custody of the 
children to the father and to allow the mother liberal unsupervised visitation. 
In February, 1992, the district court entered an order to this effect which 
incorporated the parties' agreement.

[¶37]   In July, 1993, the mother and Ms. 
Keating had a commitment ceremony in which the mother's children participated. 
In August, 1993, the father and Ms. Christine Thompson married. 

[¶38]   In late January, 1994, the father 
filed a petition in the district court seeking to modify the parties' divorce 
decree by increasing the mother's child support obligation. On March 11, 1994, 
the father filed an amended petition seeking to suspend the mother's visitation 
or to impose supervised visitation based on allegations that the mother's 
alternative lifestyle is contrary to the children's emotional and physical 
well-being, the mother and her companion engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct 
during the children's visitation, and the behavior of the mother and her 
companion during the children's visitation is psychologically and physically 
damaging to the children.

[¶39]   The district court entered a 
temporary restraining order which severely restricted the mother's visitation 
and contact with her children.

[¶40]   The mother denied the father's 
allegations asserted in his amended petition. The trial on the amended petition 
was held in early July, 1994. The trial court's decision letter was issued on 
July 21, 1994, and was incorporated by reference in the court's order of 
September 8, 1994, which modified the divorce decree by severely restricting the 
mother's visitation. As part of the decision, the court barred the mother's 
companion from any contact with the children. The mother has appealed the 
district court's decision.

[¶41]   In its decision letter, the 
district court recognized that the father had the burden to prove a substantial 
change of circumstances and modification of mother's visitation is in the 
children's best interests. In its decision letter, the district court expressly 
identified two, independent grounds for its decision to restrict the mother's 
visitation. With respect to the first ground, change in circumstances, the 
district court found that since February, 1992, when the court transferred 
custody to the father and granted liberal unsupervised visitation to the mother, 
these changes had occurred: (1) the mother had involved the children "in 
homosexual activities such as a gay rights parade and a `commitment' ceremony 
between the [mother] and Peggy Keating" and (2) the "eroticization" of the 
children during the mother's visitation. About the "eroticization" finding, the 
district court characterized it as the most evident change and relied on the 
opinion of the father's expert witness, Mr. Rhodes. Although it is not 
altogether clear from his testimony, Mr. Rhodes' usage of the term 
"eroticization" appears synonymous with the term "sexual abuse." Independently 
of its reliance on Mr. Rhodes' opinion, however, the district court found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the children "have been exposed to sexual 
behavior inappropriate to their ages while visiting with [their mother]." The 
court based this finding largely on the testimony of the father and Christine 
who related what they had seen or heard after the children returned from 
visitation with their mother.

[¶42]   With respect to the second ground 
for its decision, the district court discussed the impact of the mother's 
lifestyle on her visitation with the children. After stating that the mother's 
open homosexuality

has [created] and is 
likely to create confusion and difficulty for the children, and . . . is likely 
to negatively affect the development of the children's moral values, and because 
the State has an interest in supporting conventional marriages and families, . . 
.

the court 
announced "the Court would find it appropriate to reduce the [mother's] 
visitation with the children even if the issues of sexual abuse or eroticization 
were resolved."

[¶43]   In its review of the district 
court's decision, the majority concludes that the district court erred in basing 
its decision to restrict the mother's visitation on the mother's lifestyle. I 
agree with that majority conclusion; I would go further, however, and hold that 
the district court's expression of personal views on this subject casts 
sufficient doubt upon that court's capacity to remain "open to the conviction 
which the evidence might produce" that the district court's decision must be 
reversed and this matter remanded for a new trial presided over by a judge who 
does not hold such views.

[¶44]   Moving from that underpinning of 
the district court's decision, the majority then makes rather short shrift of 
the only other basis supporting the district court's decision: the father proved 
that during the mother's visitation with her children she eroticized or sexually 
abused them. The majority concludes, and I agree, that the testimony of Mr. 
Rhodes, the father's expert witness, and the testimony of the father and 
Christine on this allegation is without value. Implicit in the majority's 
analysis is a determination that the district court erred in considering these 
witnesses' testimony at all. I agree. Mr. Rhodes was not qualified and, 
moreover, his categorical bias rendered his testimony worthless. Similarly, the 
categorical bias of the father and Christine rendered their testimony worthless. 
Without the testimony of these witnesses, the father's case 
fails.

[¶45]   But the majority does not stop 
there. Instead, it identifies a substantial change in circumstances neither 
advanced by the father nor found by the district court: "a lifestyle clash so 
intense and detrimental to the children that it rises to the threshold of a 
substantial change in circumstances." According to the majority, the children's 
inappropriate behavior "was a warning sign of a substantial change in 
circumstances." The majority identifies "the zealous machinations" of both the 
father and the mother as the cause of this substantial change in circumstances. 
It seems to me that the majority has far exceeded its review function and has 
engaged, improperly, in fact-finding. Were I the fact-finder, and I am not, I 
read the record differently from my colleagues. As I understand the evidence, 
the cause of the children's inappropriate behavior is found in the father's and 
Christine's "zealous machinations," not the mother's.

[¶46]   The record quite clearly reveals 
that the father and Christine worked long and hard at alienating these children 
from their mother. They should have been held in contempt for what they have 
done; instead, they are, despite the spin placed on it by the majority, rewarded 
for their outrageous behavior.

[¶47]   I find it a strange and 
unacceptable rule of law that the majority invokes to "limit the damage done by 
mutual parental insistence upon use of the children as weapons in an acrimonious 
contest between lifestyles." In nearly every custody/visitation case this court 
hears the father and mother have engaged in an acrimonious contest. But the 
court abandons its responsibility for reasoned and informed decision-making when 
it arbitrarily without reason chooses one side over the other simply to put a 
stop to the battle. In the majority's rush to end the battle, in the name of 
serving the children's best interests, it has forgotten one of the most 
important interests these children have: to know their mother and develop a 
loving and caring relationship with her. The testimony of Dr. Rachel Moriarity, 
a licensed psychologist chosen and then rejected by the father, was quite 
telling in this regard:

Q.        How would 
the children be affected if the visitation continued to be 
supervised?

A.        Well, I 
think the underlying message if visits continue to be supervised, as well as 
phone calls be monitored, is that this mother is not safe or okay; and I think 
this has deleterious effect on the children and will over the long run have an 
even more deleterious effect.

Q.        How would 
it affect the children if the visitations remain very limited, to six weekends a 
year?

A.        I think the 
relationship will grow more strained.

Q.        Will that 
harm the children?

A.        Yes, I 
believe it will.

Q.        
Why?

A.        I feel like 
they will have more abandonment issues to deal with, more mistrust issues to 
deal with. If, indeed, this mother is safe and okay to be with, as I have 
concluded from my criterium in reviewing all of this information, and they 
continue to be supervised and things being monitored, that continues to give 
them the message that this is not okay, or not a safe person, and that's 
contrary to reality. That's contrary, making statements to a child, and that has 
harmful psychological effects for children.

Q.        You 
recommended that the phone calls no longer be monitored. You feel that the 
monitoring of phone calls puts the children in a bind, a psychological bind. Is 
that why you recommended that the monitoring of phone calls be ended completely? 

A.        Yes. As 
well as these children need private time with their mother to maintain a 
relationship.

Q.        And you 
also recommended that Miss Peggy Keating be involved in the children's 
visitation with their mother. Why did you recommend that?

A.        I believe 
that Miss Keating is a co-parent for these children, and I saw evidence and 
heard evidence from other reports that the children are positively bonded to 
her, that she has good parenting capability also, and has a very strong 
relationship with the children.

Q.        When you 
say co-parenting role, could you explain to us what you mean by 
that?

A.        In the 
household with the mother, her partner, Miss Keating, is another parent for 
these children.

Q.        Do the 
children in your observations and in your opinion, do the children seem very 
confused by the relationship between Miss Keating and their 
mother?

A.        No, they 
did not. As I reported, Miriam on one occasion said, "Pam and Peggy are married. 
They are ladies, and they are married." Joshua on an occasion said - was talking 
about his mother and Peggy, and said they were kind of married. He was talking 
about Ohio and his friend there and the things they would do there, and he said 
they were kind of married.

Q.        How would 
the children be affected if they are prevented from seeing Miss 
Keating?

A.        Well, I 
think whenever we have relationships that are positive in a child's life that 
even, oftentimes that may be because of a person moving away or death or 
something like that, then we have to deal with the psychological effects of 
that. Certainly, we want to prevent those as much as possible because that's 
grief for a child. I think if these children are not allowed to see this person 
that they are positively bonded to and seem to have a very strong relationship 
with, they will have grief, and I think there is anger and sadness and more 
mistrust; and the more relationships that a child loses, the more mistrust they 
will develop over time in relationships. That's of 
concern.

Q.        You have 
also recommended therapy, that therapy continue for the family. Could you 
explain your recommendation that the therapy be continued for the family in 
order to monitor alienation?

A.        I think it 
would be very important for the father and the stepmother to be able to at the 
very least encourage a relationship for these children with their mother, and 
they may do that by doing very simple and short kind of things like it is good 
for you to have a relationship with your mom, or we want you to have a 
relationship with your mom, or this is good for you to have a relationship with 
your mom. That would be a step. There was no kind of initial steps like that 
taken in the therapy so far.

I think that it is 
imperative if the situation is to change that the father and the stepmother are 
able to encourage this kind of relationship with the children's other parent, so 
that would be their goal in the therapy, and the goals for the children would be 
to positively affect changes in visitation.

Q.        What goals 
would you have for the mother and her partner in therapy?

A.        For them to 
continue to understand the process the children are in and their feelings and to 
be able to help the children with those.

Q.        Is it your 
observation or conclusion that this alienation will continue without 
therapy?

A.        Yes, it 
is.

Q.        Why do you 
say that?

A.        Because 
research shows in these kind of cases that at best therapy may make some impact. 
At the worst there will be no change, and that's why research recommends 
changing of physical custody of the children in these kind of 
situations.

Q.        I was just 
going to ask you your final recommendation was that if these didn't change that 
there would be a change in custody. That's a rather drastic measure. Did you 
consider that it may do more harm than good to have a change in custody for the 
children? 

A.        Well, 
the research shows that it is more deleterious for the children to lose a parent 
and go on in a process of alienation than it is for them to have a relationship 
with a parent that maybe can provide a more healthy 
attachment.

[¶48]   Enough 
said.