Case Title: State v. Stojetz

Citation: 1999-Ohio-464

Docket Number: 19971111

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. STOJETZ, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Stojetz (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when — There is no 
requirement for trial court to “life qualify” any prospective juror, absent a 
request by defense counsel, in a capital murder case. 
There is no requirement for a trial court to “life qualify” any prospective juror, 
absent a request by defense counsel, in a capital murder case. 
(No. 97-1111 — Submitted November 10, 1998 — Decided February 17, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Common Pleas Court of Madison County, No. 96CR-10-086. 
 
On April 25, 1996, appellant, John C. Stojetz, Jr., along with five other 
adult inmates, ran across the prison yard of Madison Correctional Institution and 
toward the Adams Alpha Unit (“Adams A”), which houses many of the state’s 
juvenile offenders who had been tried as adults and convicted of criminal offenses.  
Appellant and the other five inmates were each armed with knives commonly 
known as “shanks.”  Appellant and the others entered the Adams A unit, circled 
the control desk, and held corrections officer Michael C. Browning at knifepoint.  
Appellant then placed a shank to Browning’s throat and ordered him to give 
appellant the keys that opened the cell doors of the Adams A unit.  Browning 
threw the keys down and was allowed to flee the unit. 
 
Corrections officers immediately responded to Browning’s “man down” 
alarm and converged on Adams A.  Officers were able to observe appellant and 
the other five inmates carrying shanks.  The corrections officers, armed only with 
pepper mace, attempted to enter Adams A.  However, appellant and the other 
inmates, wielding shanks, prevented the officers from entering. 
 
Once inside Adams A, appellant and his accomplices proceeded to cell 
number 144, the cell of Damico Watkins, a seventeen-year-old juvenile inmate.  
 
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Using the keys taken from Browning, appellant unlocked Watkins’s cell and 
appellant and the other adult inmates entered the cell and began attacking Watkins.  
After eluding the initial attack and escaping from his cell, Watkins was pursued 
throughout the Adams A unit and repeatedly stabbed by appellant and the other 
shank-wielding inmates.  Watkins was able to escape his attackers several times 
only to be again cornered and subjected to repeated stabbings.  Eventually, 
Watkins was cornered by appellant on the second floor of the Adams A unit.  As 
Watkins pleaded for his life, appellant and inmate Bishop repeatedly stabbed 
Watkins and left him for dead. 
 
During the attack on Watkins, correction officers had surrounded the 
exterior of the Adams A unit.  Deputy Warden Mark Saunders arrived on the scene 
and began conversing with the inmates who had taken over Adams A.  During this 
conversation, inmate Lovejoy stated that “they [the inmates who had taken over 
Adams A] would not cell with black inmates.”  Also during the conversation, 
appellant stated, “we took care of things because you [prison officials] wouldn’t.”  
Subsequently, the inmates were ordered to surrender.  The prison yard was cleared 
and appellant and the five perpetrators passed their shanks through a window in 
the foyer of Adams A.  Once prison officials retrieved the weapons, appellant and 
the other adult inmates exited the Adams A unit and surrendered to prison 
authorities. 
 
After prison authorities regained control of the Adams A unit, the coroner 
arrived at the scene and declared Watkins dead. 
 
In October 1996, appellant was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury 
for the aggravated murder of Watkins.  The single-count indictment charged 
appellant with purposely causing the death of Watkins with prior calculation and 
design in violation of R.C. 2903.01([A]).  The count also charged appellant with a 
 
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(R.C. 2929.04[A][4]) death penalty specification of committing aggravated murder 
while a prisoner in a detention facility. 
 
Appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” to the charges in the indictment, and 
the case proceeded to a trial by jury.  Evidence submitted at trial indicated that 
appellant was known to be the head of the “Aryan Brotherhood” gang at the 
Madison Correctional Institution.  Other evidence at trial indicated that appellant 
and other members of the Aryan Brotherhood did not want to be housed in the 
same cells as black inmates.  Further testimony indicated that appellant and 
members of the Aryan Brotherhood wanted to be transferred from Madison 
Correctional to other penal institutions.  In fact, following the murder, prison 
authorities conducted a search of appellant’s cell as well as the cells of his 
accomplices.  During the search it was found that appellant and four of the other 
five inmates who had participated in the attack on Watkins had already packed 
their personal belongings. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, and after deliberation, the jury found appellant 
guilty of the charge and specification in the indictment.  Following a mitigation 
hearing, the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to death for the 
aggravated murder of Watkins.  The trial court accepted the jury’s 
recommendation and imposed the sentence of death. 
 
Appellant directly appeals his conviction and sentence of death from the 
trial court to this court pursuant to Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, as amended in 1994.  See, also, R.C. 2953.02. 
__________________ 
 
Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel H. 
Huston, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
4
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Joseph E. Wilhelm and Kelly 
Culshaw, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Appellant presents nineteen propositions of law for our 
consideration.  (See Appendix, infra.)  We have considered each of appellant’s 
propositions of law and have reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness and 
proportionality.  Upon review, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm 
appellant’s conviction and the sentence of death. 
I 
 
We have held on a number of prior occasions that this court is not required 
to address and discuss, in opinion form, each and every proposition of law raised 
by the parties in a death penalty appeal.  We adhere to that position today as our 
judgment on that issue has not changed.  We have, however, in this case, as in all 
other death penalty cases, carefully considered all of appellant’s propositions of 
law and allegations of error and have, in its entirety, thoroughly reviewed the 
record.  Many of the issues raised by appellant have been addressed and rejected 
by this court under analogous circumstances in a number of our prior cases.  
Therefore, these issues require little, if any, discussion.  Moreover, a number of 
appellant’s arguments have been waived.  Upon a careful review of the record and 
the governing law, we fail to detect any errors requiring reversal of appellant’s 
conviction and sentence.  We have found nothing in the record or in the arguments 
advanced by appellant that would, in any manner, undermine our confidence in the 
integrity and reliability of the trial court’s decision.  Accordingly, we see no 
reason to deviate from our prior procedures in death penalty appeals.  We address 
and discuss, in detail, only those issues that merit analysis. 
II 
 
5
Proposition of Law No. 1 
 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to “life qualify” 
prospective jurors after they had been death qualified in accordance with State v. 
Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  Appellant argues that, during voir dire, prospective jurors must be 
questioned by the trial court concerning any views on capital punishment that 
would prevent or substantially impair their ability to consider a life sentence, as 
opposed to the death penalty, should the case go to the penalty phase.  Thus, 
appellant proposes that, in order to ensure basic fairness to both parties, the trial 
court must, sua sponte, life-qualify prospective jurors.  For the following reasons 
we disagree. 
 
Initially we note that appellant’s trial counsel never objected to the jury 
selection process, nor did defense counsel object to the trial court’s lack of “life 
qualification” questions.  Thus, appellant has waived all but plain error.  See 
Crim.R. 52(B).  An alleged error “does not constitute a plain error * * * unless, but 
for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.”  State v. 
Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
 
R.C. 2945.27 provides that “[t]he judge of the trial court shall examine the 
prospective jurors under oath or upon affirmation as to their qualifications to serve 
as fair and impartial jurors, but he shall permit reasonable examination of such 
jurors by the prosecuting attorney and by the defendant or his counsel.”  In State v. 
Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920, we stated that the 
scope of voir dire is within the discretion of the trial court and it varies depending 
on the circumstances of each case. 
 
6
 
Appellant’s first proposition of law is based substantially on Morgan v. 
Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, wherein the 
United States Supreme Court held that, on voir dire, upon defendant’s request, the 
trial court must inquire into the prospective juror’s views on capital punishment.  
Id. at 729-734, 112 S.Ct. at 2230-2233, 119 L.Ed.2d at 503-506.  The Morgan 
court, in so holding, reiterated its views, as set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois 
(1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 
U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 
412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, and Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 
108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, that a capital defendant may challenge for cause 
any prospective juror who, regardless of evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and in disregard to jury instructions, will automatically vote for the 
death penalty in every case.  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 
2229, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502-503. 
 
Appellant concedes that Morgan requires only life qualification by the trial 
court upon the defendant’s request.  Appellant would like, however, this court to 
go a step further in cases involving capital offenses and mandate an additional 
requirement on the trial court of life qualifying prospective jurors.  This we 
decline to do. 
 
In State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 493, 663 N.E.2d 1277, 1288, 
we followed the proposition set forth in Morgan.  Thus, in Allard, we expressed 
our view that when the trial court permits defense counsel wide latitude to inquire 
into each prospective juror’s beliefs and opinions concerning the death penalty, 
and defense counsel exercises that right, there is no reversible error in the death 
qualification process used in jury selection.  Id. 
 
7
 
Appellant does not contend that the trial court rejected defense counsel 
requests to question prospective jurors regarding their views on capital 
punishment.  In fact, defense counsel was given ample opportunity by the trial 
judge to do so.  A review of the voir-dire examination in this case undermines 
appellant’s contentions that the trial court’s failure to life qualify prospective 
jurors is somehow an uneven or unfair use of the voir-dire process.  Of the jurors 
selected, appellant submits that two were not “life-qualified” by either the trial 
court or defense counsel.  After review of their voir dire, we find that neither juror 
fits within the category of the “automatic death penalty juror” condemned in 
Morgan.  In fact, both juror Suzanne Coffin and juror Richard Hirst expressed 
reservations about imposing the death penalty as a sentencing option.  For 
instance, Coffin stated that voting for the death penalty “would never be an easy 
thing to arrive at and I would hope I would never have to make that judgement.”  
Hirst stated that, because of his religion, he could not condone the death penalty.  
Hirst also indicated his belief that there should be just punishment for every crime 
but that he was not sure where he would stand on the imposition of capital 
punishment.  Given these expressed misgivings and uncertainty over their ability 
to impose a death sentence, it would appear logical to assume that jurors Coffin 
and Hirst would not be opposed to imposing a life sentence. 
 
Further, the United States Supreme Court in Morgan reiterated what the 
court had long recognized that “ ‘[a]s with any other trial situation where an 
adversary wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, then, it is the adversary 
seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential 
juror lacks impartiality.  It is then the trial judge’s duty to determine whether the 
challenge is proper.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 733, 
 
8
112 S.Ct. at 2232, 119 L.Ed.2d at 505, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423, 
105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851. 
 
Accordingly, we decline to impose any new requirements on trial courts 
during the jury selection process in capital cases, and, specifically, we hold that 
there is no requirement for a trial court to “life qualify” any prospective juror, 
absent a request by defense counsel, in a capital murder case.  As appellant has 
failed to meet his burden under the plain error standard, we reject appellant’s first 
proposition of law. 
III 
Proposition of Law No. 2 
 
Appellant’s arguments concerning the appropriateness of his death sentence 
are addressed in our discussion in Part XXI, infra. 
IV 
Proposition of Law No. 3 
 
Appellant, in his third proposition of law, argues that he was deprived of the 
effective assistance of trial counsel.  Many of the claimed errors raised by 
appellant have been or will be addressed in our discussions of other propositions 
of law.  See, Part II, supra, Parts VII, VIII, IX, X, XVI, XXI, infra.  Assuming 
arguendo that defense counsel was ineffective, this alone would not warrant 
reversal.  To warrant reversal, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698.  After reviewing the 
record in its entirety and considering all claims of alleged ineffectiveness, we find 
that appellant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the 
standards spelled out in Strickland. 
 
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V 
Proposition of Law No. 4 
 
In proposition of law four, appellant claims that the trial court erred in 
failing to specifically instruct the jury that it must find by unanimous verdict that 
appellant was either the principal offender or, if not the principal offender, that 
appellant was an aider and abettor.  We note that appellant failed to object to the 
instruction and thus has waived all but plain error.  Appellant asserts that, pursuant 
to State v. Johnson (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 96, 104, 545 N.E.2d 636, 644, if a single 
count of the indictment can be divided into two or more distinct conceptual 
groupings, the jury must be specifically instructed that it must unanimously 
conclude that the defendant committed acts falling within one particular grouping 
in order to reach a guilty verdict.  Our response to appellant’s argument is 
threefold. 
 
First, in Johnson we indicated that a specific instruction is necessary when 
there exists the possibility of a “patchwork” or less than unanimous verdict.  Id. at 
105, 545 N.E.2d at 645.  Johnson involved an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification, 
which requires a finding of either principal offender or prior calculation and 
design before death can be imposed.  In contrast, the specification at issue here, 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(4), requires only that the murder was perpetrated by appellant 
while he was a prisoner in a detention facility.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(4) makes no 
distinction between principal offender and aider and abettor. 
 
Second, appellant could be convicted of aggravated murder under R.C. 
2903.01(A) as a principal offender, or as an aider and abettor, pursuant to R.C. 
2923.03(A).  R.C. 2923.03(F) also provides that appellant could be punished as an 
aider and abettor as if he were the principal offender. 
 
10
 
Our third response centers on appellant’s additional contention that the 
failure of a specific instruction deprived him of his right to a reliable sentencing 
hearing.  Appellant contends that such failure prevented defense counsel from 
asserting, and the jury from considering, the mitigating factor in R.C. 
2929.04(B)(6), which permits the jury to consider a defendant’s aider and abettor 
status.  However, we find no error, since the evidence was substantial that 
appellant was a principal offender.  There was substantial testimony that the shank 
in appellant’s possession caused two of Watkins’s six fatal wounds.  We have 
previously stated that “principal offender” means the “actual” killer and not the 
“sole” offender.  As there can be more than one actual killer, there can thus be 
more than one principal offender.  State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 655, 
693 N.E.2d 246, 256.  Accordingly, we find that appellant has not met his burden 
under the plain error standard and we reject his fourth proposition of law. 
VI 
Proposition of Law No. 5 
 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying him access to the grand 
jury testimony in his case.  While not being entirely clear, appellant appears to be 
making several overlapping arguments regarding Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(a) and Crim.R. 
6(E).  Appellant asserts that because his five co-conspirators are “co-defendants” 
he is entitled to their grand jury testimony, if any, pursuant to Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(a)(iii).  Additionally, appellant claims that he had a particularized need, 
pursuant to State v. Greer (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 20 O.O.3d 157, 420 N.E.2d 
982, and presumably Crim.R. 6(E), for the grand jury testimony in order to 
determine whether any of his five “co-defendants” testified before the grand jury.  
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in 
camera inspection of the grand jury testimony to ensure compliance with Crim.R. 
 
11
16.  For the following reasons we find appellant’s fifth proposition of law not well 
taken. 
 
Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(a) provides that “[u]pon motion of the defendant, the 
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect * * *. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(iii) Recorded testimony of the defendant or co-defendant before a grand 
jury.” 
 
In State v. Wickline (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 118, 552 N.E.2d 913, 918, 
we defined “co-defendant” for purposes of Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(a)(iii) as “ ‘[m]ore 
than one defendant being sued in the same litigation; or, more than one person 
charged in the same complaint or indictment with the same crime.’ ”  (Emphasis 
added; quoting Black’s Law Dictionary [5 Ed.1979] at 233.)  Appellant was the 
only person charged in the indictment in the instant matter with causing the death 
of Watkins.  Therefore, appellant’s co-conspirators in the death of the victim were 
not co-defendants and thus mandatory disclosure of grand jury testimony under 
Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(a)(iii) is inapplicable. 
 
As to appellant’s argument regarding a particularized need, the applicable 
law is set forth in State v. Greer, supra.  In Greer, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus, this court held that “[d]isclosure of grand jury testimony, other than that 
of the defendant and co-defendant, is controlled by Crim.R. 6(E), not by Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(g), and release of any such testimony for use prior to or during trial is 
within the discretion of the trial court.”  (Emphasis added.)  The court further held 
that secrecy of grand jury proceedings is to be maintained unless “the ends of 
justice require it [disclosure] and there is a showing by the defense that a 
particularized need for disclosure exists which outweighs the need for secrecy.”  
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
12
 
We find that appellant failed to establish a particularized need for the grand 
jury testimony of his five co-conspirators.  Appellant’s claim of a particularized 
need is replete with speculation and innuendo.  See State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio 
St.3d 325, 337, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1034.  For instance, appellant asserts that the co-
conspirators were not called as state witnesses in order “to keep their exculpatory 
or impeachment testimony from [appellant] on cross-examination.”  As appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion for grand jury testimony, we reject appellant’s fifth proposition of law.  
See State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 250, 15 OBR 379, 389, 473 
N.E.2d 768, 780-781. 
VII 
Proposition of Law No. 6 
 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to remove prospective 
juror Andre Porter for cause based on Porter’s bias in favor of capital punishment.  
Appellant claims that this error was compounded, since appellant had to 
unnecessarily use a peremptory challenge to remove Porter and was thus unable to 
exercise one against juror Carla Stover, who, according to appellant, was 
“strident[ly]” in favor of the death penalty.  We reject appellant’s argument based 
on the following reasons. 
 
Although defense counsel questioned Porter regarding his views on capital 
punishment, counsel failed to challenge Porter for cause on that basis and instead 
limited the challenge of Porter to his statements as to the defendant’s right not to 
testify at trial.  Therefore, appellant has waived any error, save plain error. 
 
We do not find that the trial judge’s failure to, sua sponte, excuse Porter 
amounted to plain error.  The voir dire of Porter, taken as a whole, does not lead to 
the conclusion that Porter was the type of automatic death penalty juror who was 
 
13
criticized in Morgan v. Illinois, supra.  In fact, the record reflects that Porter 
would consider the evidence and follow the law as instructed by the trial judge.  
Further, Porter expressed a willingness to take into consideration other factors, 
such as defendant’s background and the nature and circumstances of the crime, 
before deciding to render a death verdict.  The determination of issues raised in 
voir dire is within the trial judge’s discretion.  State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 29, 39, 526 N.E.2d 274, 285.  Moreover, deference must be accorded to the 
trial judge who sees and hears the juror.  State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 
30, 553 N.E.2d 576, 586, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 
853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853. 
 
In addition, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the record does not reflect that 
juror Stover was “strident[ly]” in favor of the death penalty.  Defense counsel 
questioned Stover regarding her beliefs on the death penalty.  For instance, in 
responding to defense counsel’s inquiry whether she could sentence appellant to a 
term of thirty years without parole, Stover stated that her decision would be based 
on evidence presented during the trial.  Moreover, the trial judge questioned 
Stover regarding her beliefs on the death penalty and instructed Stover at length 
regarding the law on the guilt and penalty phases.  Stover clearly indicated that she 
would follow and apply the law to the facts as instructed.  In short, the trial judge 
took adequate steps to ensure that Stover was in fact an impartial juror. 
 
The trial judge’s decision not to remove prospective juror Porter for cause 
was not outcome-determinative and thus did not amount to plain error.  
Accordingly, appellant’s sixth proposition of law is not well taken. 
VIII 
Proposition of Law No. 7 
 
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Appellant contends in his seventh proposition of law that the prosecutor 
improperly “coached” a witness to identify a certain exhibit as the murder weapon.  
At trial, corrections officer Browning testified that after appellant and five other 
inmates entered the Adams A unit of Madison Correctional, appellant held a shank 
knife to his throat and forced him to surrender the keys to the jail cells.  Browning 
further testified that he was able to view the shank that appellant held to his throat.  
The prosecutor then directed Browning to walk over to a table in the courtroom 
where six shank knives were displayed as State’s Exhibits 2 through 7.  The 
prosecutor then asked Browning whether he recognized any of those knives as the 
knife appellant held in his hand as appellant entered the Adams A unit.  Browning 
replied:  “Yes.”  The prosecutor then asked:  “Could you point it out to us, please?  
State’s exhibit 3?”  Browning answered:  “Yes.”  The prosecutor further inquired:  
“Is there [sic] the knife he held to your throat?”  Browning again responded:  
“Yes.”  At that point the state concluded its direct examination of Browning. 
 
Appellant asserts that the above passages from the transcript indicate that 
prior to identifying the exhibit, Browning’s attention was improperly directed by 
the prosecutor to State’s Exhibit 3.  According to appellant, this incident had 
prejudicial implications that reached beyond Browning’s testimony because the 
trial court failed to order a separation of witnesses during appellant’s trial.  Stated 
another way, appellant asserts that the prosecutor essentially informed subsequent 
witnesses which shank to identify as the weapon in appellant’s possession. 
 
Appellant failed to object to the prosecutor’s line of questioning.  The issue 
is thus waived except for plain error. 
 
Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the transcript passages at issue are 
subject to more than one interpretation.  Appellant argues that the prosecutor 
suggested or coached Browning as to which shank to identify as belonging to 
 
15
appellant.  However, the transcript could also be reasonably interpreted to mean 
that the witness pointed to the shank marked State’s Exhibit 3 and the prosecutor 
merely verbalized the choice made by Browning to verify that it was indeed his 
choice.  Unfortunately, the record does not reflect that Browning was pointing to 
or indicating a particular shank.  In any event, several other witnesses gave a 
description of the knife in question and testified that this particular shank, State’s 
Exhibit 3, was in fact in the possession of appellant. 
 
Although appellant argues that Browning’s identification of appellant’s 
weapon somehow tainted identifications made by subsequent witnesses due to the 
lack of any separation of witnesses, appellant fails to demonstrate that the 
subsequent witnesses were in fact in the courtroom during Browning’s testimony.  
We find that appellant has failed to demonstrate that but for the alleged error, the 
outcome of his trial clearly would have been otherwise.  Accordingly, we find no 
plain error here. 
IX 
Proposition of Law No. 8 
 
Appellant claims that the trial court admitted improper testimony of inmate 
Andre Wright during the trial phase.  Appellant submits that Wright’s testimony 
contained improper speculation and, beyond that, Wright’s testimony concerning 
the mindset of the victim and the intent of the accused constituted improper 
testimony by a lay witness. 
 
Appellant again failed to object to the prosecutor’s line of questioning.  
Therefore, the issue is waived except for plain error. 
 
Appellant asserts that Wright improperly speculated about events that 
transpired in Watkins’s cell when Wright stated that “I guess they stuck him 
[Watkins] a couple times while inside the cell * * *.”  We disagree.  Wright 
 
16
testified that he immediately observed blood on Watkins as Watkins escaped from 
his cell.  State’s Exhibit 18 indicates a trail of blood that begins directly outside 
Watkins’s cell.  Wright subsequently witnessed appellant pursuing Watkins 
throughout the Adams A compound and repeatedly stabbing Watkins.  It was 
hardly speculation for Wright to conclude that appellant stabbed Watkins inside 
the cell.  In any event, as the state points out, since Watkins was stabbed forty 
times, Wright’s testimony, even if improper, was not outcome-determinative. 
 
Appellant further contends that Wright’s testimony regarding Watkins’s 
mindset was improper testimony by a lay witness.  Evid.R. 701 states that “[i]f the 
witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or 
inferences is limited to those * * * which are (1) rationally based on the perception 
of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the 
determination of a fact in issue.”  Wright’s statement did not constitute improper 
testimony by a lay witness.  Wright’s statement that Watkins was “scared” and 
“not able to think” was rationally based on Wright’s perception of events 
transpiring before him, specifically watching Watkins running for his life while 
being attacked, and was therefore helpful in explaining Wright’s perceptions. 
 
Wright also testified that appellant “came in with intention to kill.”  Defense 
counsel did not object to this statement.  Appellant now claims that this testimony 
was “improper.”  However, Wright’s statement concerning appellant’s intent at the 
time of the murder, even if improper, does not rise to the level of plain error.  
Wright’s statement clearly did not affect the outcome of the trial.  The evidence of 
appellant’s intent to kill was established by overwhelming evidence at trial. 
X 
Proposition of Law No. 9 
 
17
 
In proposition of law nine, appellant alleges that the trial court, in two 
instances, admitted the testimony of corrections officers that constituted improper 
hearsay.  In the first instance, corrections officer Terry Campbell testified that, 
after the murder, there was a lot of conversation taking place in the prison yard 
between appellant and the juvenile inmates in the Adams A unit.  The prosecutor 
asked Campbell whether appellant was talking to a black inmate.  Campbell 
replied:  “The black guy said * * * ‘[w]hat are you going to — * * *.’ ”  Defense 
counsel objected to “what the black guy said.”  The trial court overruled the 
objection.  Campbell then answered:  “He [the black inmate] asked, ‘What are you 
going to do now, Whitey?’ ”  We find that this was not hearsay, since the declarant 
in this instance was clearly not making an assertion.  See Evid.R. 801(A).  In the 
second instance complained of by appellant, corrections officer John Vanover was 
asked whether he heard appellant make any statements after he was apprehended 
outside the Adams A unit.  Vanover replied, “[appellant] was yelling to inmates 
that were still locked in their cells in Adams A and some of them had yelled out to 
him he was a murderer, et cetera.”  Defense counsel failed to object to Vanover’s 
statement, therefore any error was waived, save plain error.  We find no plain 
error. 
XI 
Proposition of Law No. 10 
 
Appellant 
argues 
that 
R.C. 
2929.03(D)(1) 
and 
2929.04 
are 
unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied.  Appellant contends that the 
interplay between R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) and 2929.04(B) incorporates the nature and 
circumstances of an offense into nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. 
 
We have addressed contentions such as those appellant raises here 
numerous times in the past and have upheld the statutory scheme.  As we have 
 
18
previously stated, R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) requires that in a capital jury trial, the court 
and the jury consider testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the nature 
and circumstances of the aggravating circumstance(s) the offender was found 
guilty of committing.  State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 353, 662 
N.E.2d 311, 320.  However, “the nature and the circumstances of the offense may 
only enter into the statutory weighing process on the side of mitigation.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 356, 662 N.E.2d at 322.  Viewing the trial court’s penalty 
phase instructions in their entirety, we find no error, plain or otherwise. 
 
Additionally, the state’s closing argument did not, as appellant suggests, 
improperly draw the jury’s attention to the nature and circumstances of the crime.  
During the penalty phase of a capital trial, counsel for the state may introduce and 
comment upon “evidence rebutting the existence of any statutorily defined or other 
mitigating factors first asserted by the defendant.”  State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 413, 421, 653 N.E.2d 253, 263.  Here, the state merely referred to various 
evidence in an effort to rebut mitigating factors raised by the appellant.  The 
prosecutor separated his discussion of the statutory aggravating circumstance from 
his discussion of the nature and circumstances of the crime, and thereby 
“exercise[d] an abundance of caution to avoid suggesting or implying that the 
nature and circumstances of the offense are ‘aggravating circumstances.’ ”  State 
v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at 358, 662 N.E.2d at 323. 
 
Finally, contrary to appellant’s contention, we find that the trial judge’s 
sentencing opinion did not offend the dictates of Ohio’s capital sentencing 
scheme.  Accordingly, we deny appellant’s tenth proposition of law. 
XII 
Proposition of Law No. 11 
 
19
 
In proposition of law eleven, the appellant raises claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Appellant alleges that the prosecutor committed several acts of 
misconduct during the trial and sentencing phases, which deprived appellant of a 
fair trial and a reliable sentence.  Appellant, having failed to object to any of the 
alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, has waived all but plain error.  
Appellant’s most compelling argument in this regard centers on his assertion that 
the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof at the penalty phase.  During the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor’s closing argument did contain statements 
mischaracterizing the proper standard for weighing the aggravating circumstance 
and mitigating factors.  However, as previously noted, appellant’s arguments have 
been waived.  In any event, the trial court cured any alleged error by correctly 
instructing the jury on the weighing process.  Specifically, the trial court instructed 
that “[t]he state has the burden of proving by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating circumstance that the defendant was found guilty of committing is 
sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation of the sentence of death[,]” and 
“[i]n the context of this case, does the aggravating circumstance outweigh the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt[,]” and again, “you [the jury] must 
unanimously agree that the prosecutor has proven to you beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors * * *.”  
Further, the verdict forms, which the court reviewed with the jury, also described 
the correct weighing process.  Any perceived error concerning the prosecutor’s 
misstatements was clearly harmless.  See State v. Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 
251, 530 N.E.2d 382, 400.  Therefore, having reviewed the record thoroughly, we 
conclude that none of appellant’s arguments, taken singularly or together, rises to 
the level of plain error. 
XIII 
 
20
Proposition of Law No. 12 
 
In proposition of law twelve, appellant questions the trial court’s guilt phase 
jury instructions.  Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court’s jury 
instructions created a mandatory rebuttable presumption of appellant’s purpose or 
intent to kill.  Appellant further claims that the instructions undermined the mens 
rea element of aggravated murder by interjecting the civil standard of 
foreseeability.  See State v. Burchfield (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 261, 263, 611 N.E.2d 
819, 820-821.  Last, appellant argues that the trial court’s guilt phase instructions 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. 
 
Appellant failed to raise these issues in the trial court and, therefore, each 
claim has been waived absent plain error.  The court has previously addressed 
similar arguments concerning the trial court’s use of the foreseeability standard in 
murder-case jury instructions, and we conclude here that the trial court’s 
instructions in this instance do not rise to the level of reversible error.  See State v. 
Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 100, 656 N.E.2d 643, 668.  As to appellant’s 
remaining contentions under this proposition, having considered the trial court’s 
instructions to the jury in their entirety, we find no error prejudicial to the 
appellant.  Accordingly, we reject appellant’s twelfth proposition of law. 
XIV 
Proposition of Law No. 13 
 
The matter raised by appellant in proposition of law thirteen has been 
addressed and rejected in a number of our prior cases.  See, e.g., State v. Woodard 
(1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 623 N.E.2d 75, 80-81, and State v. Raglin (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 253, 260, 699 N.E.2d 482, 489. 
XV 
Proposition of Law No. 14 
 
21
 
Appellant asserts that he was denied a fair trial when the court permitted the 
jury to replay the crime scene videotape during its trial-phase deliberations.  
Appellant further contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury not 
to unduly emphasize the videotape during its deliberations.  We disagree. 
 
Ohio courts follow the majority rule that permits the replay of a videotape 
exhibit during jury deliberations.  State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 79, 641 
N.E.2d 1082, 1103.  Appellant’s claims of prejudicial effect are not supported by 
the record.  The appellant was not pictured on the videotape.  Moreover, the trial 
court admitted the videotape into evidence only on the stipulation that the last 
scene (the victim lying in a pool of blood) be edited to reflect only what was 
shown to the jury in the courtroom.  Specifically, the trial court instructed that this 
scene be edited to a few seconds’ view of the victim.  No objection was made 
either to the trial court’s admittance of the videotape or to the jury’s request to 
replay the videotape during its deliberations.  Since the videotape was properly 
admitted into evidence, and the trial court took precautions to limit any potential 
prejudicial effect, we find no reversible error in the jury’s second viewing of the 
videotape.  See State v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 527 N.E.2d 844, 
851. 
XVI 
Proposition of Law No. 15 
 
Appellant claims that the trial court considered an improper expression of 
opinion by the victim’s grandmother as to whether appellant deserved the death 
penalty.  Appellant points to language in the judgment entry imposing the death 
sentence and argues that the trial court impermissibly relied on the victim-impact 
statement.  We disagree.  A review of the transcript and sentencing opinion reveals 
no indication whatsoever that the trial court relied on the victim-impact statement 
 
22
in rendering the sentence of death.  Absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, 
this court will presume that the trial judge considered only the relevant, material, 
and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment.  State v. Dennis (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 421, 433, 683 N.E.2d 1096, 1107.  The mere reference to the victim-
impact statement in the trial court’s judgment entry, without more, does not 
amount to reversible error.  We reject appellant’s proposition of law. 
XVII 
Proposition of Law No. 16 
 
In proposition of law sixteen, appellant asserts that the trial court, in its 
sentencing opinion, inappropriately considered public policy matters, treated the 
aggravating circumstance as a mandatory death sentence, failed to weigh relevant 
mitigating evidence, and used the wrong standard in considering mitigating 
evidence.  We have stated in several of our previous cases that any alleged errors 
in the trial court’s sentencing opinion may be cured by this court’s independent 
review of appellant’s death sentence.  See, generally, State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio 
St.3d 160, 170-173, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304-307.  See, also, State v. Fox (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 183, 191-192, 631 N.E.2d 124, 131, and State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 
Ohio St.3d 670, 684-685, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1373.  We continue to adhere to our 
position on this issue. 
XVIII 
Proposition of Law No. 17 
 
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in its “reasonable doubt” 
instructions at both the trial and sentencing phases.  With respect to the trial phase 
instruction, the court has repeatedly upheld the definition of “reasonable doubt” 
set forth in R.C. 2901.05.  See State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 
473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph eight of the syllabus, and State v. Frazier (1995), 73 
 
23
Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 652 N.E.2d 1000, 1008.  Regarding the penalty-phase jury 
instruction, appellant concedes that claims similar to those he raises here have 
been previously considered and denied by this court.  Accordingly, proposition of 
law seventeen is rejected.  State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 
568, syllabus. 
XIX 
Proposition of Law No. 18 
 
The matter raised in appellant’s proposition of law eighteen is rejected on 
authority of State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 
984, paragraph three of the syllabus.  To appellant’s credit, he acknowledges this 
court’s holding in Rogers and concedes that this proposition has been advanced 
solely for the purpose of preserving the issue for review on federal habeas corpus. 
XX 
Proposition of Law No. 19 
 
We have repeatedly held that Ohio’s death penalty laws are constitutional.  
See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State 
v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768; State v. Buell (1986), 
22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio 
St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585; State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 584 N.E.2d 
1192; State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82.  Appellant’s 
argument that Ohio’s death penalty statutes are in violation of treaties to which the 
United States is a signatory, and thus offends the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, were specifically rejected in State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 
103-104, 656 N.E.2d at 671.  Further, appellant’s arguments challenging the direct 
appeal provisions of the Ohio Constitution were rejected in State v. Smith (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, syllabus. 
 
24
XXI 
 
Having considered appellant’s propositions of law, we must now 
independently review the sentence of death for appropriateness (also raised in 
appellant’s Proposition of Law No. 2) and proportionality. 
 
We find that the aggravating circumstance appellant was found guilty of 
committing, R.C. 2929.04(A)(4), was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
In mitigation, appellant’s stepfather, John Untermoser, his sister, Denise 
Crosston, his stepsister, Lorrie Holdreith, and his brother-in-law, Timothy 
Holdreith, testified concerning appellant’s history, character, and background. 
 
Appellant’s stepfather, John Untermoser, testified that appellant was raised 
by his grandmother and his mother.  Untermoser stated that there was constant 
conflict between appellant’s mother and grandmother on how to raise him.  The 
stepfather indicated that he never developed a close relationship with the appellant 
and that he and appellant seldom communicated after appellant became 
incarcerated.  Despite the lack of communication, Untermoser also testified that he 
always cared for appellant and never knew him to be a violent person. 
 
Appellant’s brother-in-law, Timothy Holdreith, testified that he knew 
appellant for approximately thirteen years, since appellant was in his early thirties.  
Timothy visited appellant in prison once a month for about eight years and stated 
that appellant lived with him and his wife (appellant’s stepsister Lorrie) for six 
months when appellant was on parole.  Timothy testified that he never saw 
appellant lose his temper or act violently against anybody and that appellant 
“always seemed to be caring in showing love and support for his family.” 
 
Lorrie Holdreith testified that appellant was very protective and caring and 
that he was a “good brother.”  Lorrie indicated that appellant never had a formal 
 
25
education, and she recalled that most of appellant’s adult life was spent in prison.  
Lorrie additionally stated that she never saw appellant commit a violent act. 
 
Denise Crosston, appellant’s sister, testified that when appellant was a 
young boy he witnessed his grandfather’s suicide.  Crosston described appellant as 
a thief who, while growing up, would bring home stolen items to try to make his 
mother happy.  Crosston testified that appellant was “always institutionalized,” 
that she knew appellant best while they were growing up, and that she built a 
relationship with appellant by visiting him in prison and making sure he had 
money in his prison account.  She further testified that appellant had both of his 
ankles broken as a result of a prison fight.  Crosston also recalled that appellant 
had his throat cut while in prison.  She expressed her view that appellant is not a 
murderer but “is a product of the environment that he is in.” 
 
Eberhard Eimer, Ph.D., a professor of psychology at Wittenberg University 
and a clinical psychologist, also testified on appellant’s behalf.  Dr. Eimer met 
with appellant on two occasions at the London Correctional Institution for 
approximately ten and one-half hours.  Dr. Eimer also interviewed Lorrie 
Holdreith and appellant’s girlfriend of ten years, Diane Ash, and additionally 
performed psychological testing. 
 
Dr. Eimer administered or attempted to administer a total of four tests.  Dr. 
Eimer concluded from the testing that appellant adjusts poorly to “life 
circumstances” and that appellant tends to have an exaggerated conception of his 
capability, is highly suspicious, and is alienated from himself and from society.  In 
Dr. Eimer’s opinion appellant is capable of being aggressive, is easily provoked, is 
constantly worried and scared for his life, and is intensely fearful and on guard.  
Dr. Eimer also expressed his belief that appellant sees the world as a threatening 
place and suffers from long-term depression. 
 
26
 
Through interviews with appellant, Lorrie Holdreith, and Diane Ash, Dr. 
Eimer elicited further information regarding appellant’s history and background.  
Dr. Eimer testified that appellant’s mother worked as a barmaid and appellant’s 
father was a laborer, a musician, and an alcoholic, whom appellant saw a total of 
three times.  Appellant was raised primarily by his grandparents until age five, at 
which point the grandfather committed suicide. 
 
Dr. Eimer testified that appellant’s mother thought the most effective way of 
raising appellant was to strike him when he did something wrong.  Dr. Eimer 
further stated that appellant would thus turn to the grandmother, who protected 
appellant from his own behavior and from his mother.  Dr. Eimer found that both 
the mother’s and grandmother’s methods of child rearing were highly unhealthy. 
 
Dr. Eimer further noted that appellant has spent much of his adult life in 
prison.  According to Dr. Eimer, appellant became a “citizen of the institution,” 
and abided by rules such as “if one is threatened, one also has a choice to die or to 
kill.”  In contrast, Dr. Eimer considered appellant’s earning his G.E.D. and 
receiving an associate degree from Ashland University to be quite an achievement 
in light of appellant’s limited intellectual potential. 
 
Based on the psychological testing of appellant as well as the clinical 
interviews with appellant, his stepsister, and girlfriend, Dr. Eimer concluded that 
appellant is “not socialized in terms of moral norms.”  According to Dr. Eimer, 
appellant lacked adequate parenting in his formative years and appellant’s adult 
role models were abusive and amoral.  Dr. Eimer further noted that appellant is 
“even more dysfunctional in our society,” given that appellant was 
“institutionalized” at an early age and spent much of his adult life in jail. 
 
In addition, Dr. Eimer diagnosed appellant as suffering from Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and determined that appellant has a paranoid schizoid 
 
27
personality with antisocial tendencies.  According to Dr. Eimer, appellant’s 
difficulty in adjusting to societal roles is comparable to that experienced by some 
survivors of military combat.  In Dr. Eimer’s view, appellant’s PTSD and 
personality disorder qualify as a mental disease.  Nevertheless, Dr. Eimer 
ultimately concluded that appellant holds himself accountable for his actions.  Dr. 
Eimer opined that although appellant “is largely unfamiliar with our [society’s] 
moral norms * * * that doesn’t mean that he doesn’t know them. * * * [Appellant] 
knows what he is doing but he has not internalized our societal norms.” 
 
Appellant gave a rather lengthy unsworn statement in which he chronicled 
his life history both in and out of prison.  Appellant recounted the time his 
grandfather committed suicide, how appellant began stealing at an early age, and 
when he visited his dying mother in the hospital accompanied by prison guards. 
 
Appellant also gave his version of the events leading up to the murder of 
Watkins.  According to his statement, appellant had promised to protect Doug 
Haggerty, a juvenile inmate at Madison Correctional.  Apparently, Haggerty’s 
father and appellant were once cellmates at Lucasville Correctional Institution.  
Appellant stated that he was informed that Watkins, and other juvenile inmates, 
had attacked Haggerty.  Appellant also stated that he was informed that Watkins 
had threatened appellant and other members of the Aryan Brotherhood.  Appellant 
alleged that his only intention was to answer Watkins’s threat with a fight, but that 
“things got out of control.” 
 
Appellant concluded his unsworn statement by extending sympathy to 
Watkins’s family and by expressing sorrow for his (appellant’s) part in Watkins’s 
murder.  Finally, appellant asked the court and God to forgive him and have mercy 
on his life. 
 
28
 
Upon a review of the evidence in mitigation, we find that the nature and 
circumstances of the offense do not reveal any mitigating value.  The murder of 
Watkins took place in a detention facility amidst an atmosphere full of racial 
animosity.  Appellant and five fellow inmates seized control of the juvenile unit at 
knifepoint and then tracked down and repeatedly stabbed their intended victim.  
Finally, as Watkins pleaded for his life, appellant and another inmate cornered 
Watkins and stabbed him to death. 
 
The record does reflect, however, that appellant had a troubled childhood.  
At the age of five years, appellant witnessed his grandfather’s suicide.  Testimony 
established that appellant’s formative years were marked by a lack of proper 
supervision and parental guidance, that appellant was subjected to conflicting 
methods of discipline from his mother and grandmother, and that appellant lacked 
a formal education.  We believe that appellant’s childhood and other history are 
entitled to some weight in mitigation. 
 
We now consider the statutory mitigating factors listed in R.C. 2929.04(B).  
The R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) and (5) mitigating factors are not applicable on the record 
before us.  R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) is also inapplicable because evidence produced at 
trial overwhelmingly established that appellant was a principal offender in the 
death of Watkins. 
 
In his second proposition of law, appellant asserts that, in view of the fact 
that he suffers from PTSD, Watkins’s attack on Haggerty induced or facilitated 
Watkins’s death.  Moreover, appellant contends that Watkins’s threat to kill 
appellant, coupled with appellant’s PTSD, caused him to be under duress and 
triggered or provoked Watkins’s own murder.  We disagree. 
 
The fact that appellant apparently suffers from PTSD compels very little 
weight, if any, in mitigation under R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) or (2).  Although Dr. Eimer 
 
29
diagnosed appellant as suffering from PTSD, Dr. Eimer also added that appellant 
“knows what he is doing” and that appellant holds himself accountable for his 
actions. 
 
The fight that involved Watkins and Haggerty could perhaps be construed 
under other circumstances as having motivated appellant and his accomplices to 
seek revenge against Watkins.  However, in light of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, this court finds that this incident was merely an excuse used by appellant 
to achieve other ends.  Testimony at trial established that appellant wanted to get 
transferred out of Madison Correctional and had his belongings already packed 
when prison officials went to his cell after the murder.  Further, shortly after 
killing Watkins, appellant told corrections officer Vanover something to the effect 
that “this will definitely get me my ride out (of Madison Correctional).”  We 
therefore conclude that the R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) mitigating factor is not implicated 
here. 
 
In addition, the R.C. 2929.04(B)(2) mitigating factor is entitled to little or 
no weight.  There was no direct provocation by Watkins against appellant.  
Appellant failed to establish that he was under a threat of imminent harm from 
Watkins.  After the assault on Haggerty and alleged threat by Watkins, appellant 
had sufficient time to consider his course of action.  Watkins’s purported threat to 
appellant, as well as the assault on Haggerty, is a weak attempt by appellant to 
justify his use of deadly force.  Moreover, as previously stated, the evidence at 
trial established that appellant committed the murder to compel a transfer out of 
Madison Correctional.  It was further established at trial that the murder of 
Watkins was also intended to send a message to the black juvenile inmates at 
Madison Correctional that the Aryan Brotherhood would not be intimidated. 
 
30
 
We also conclude that Dr. Eimer’s diagnosis of appellant’s mental condition 
is not entitled to weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Dr. Eimer agreed that 
appellant’s mental condition was, in fact, a “mental disease.”  However, Dr. Eimer 
never asserted, and we do not find, that appellant’s mental condition caused him to 
lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law.  See State v. Lawrence (1989), 44 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 32, 541 N.E.2d 451, 460.  Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s 
paranoid schizoid personality with antisocial tendencies and his PTSD are entitled 
to only modest mitigating weight as R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) mitigating factors. 
 
In regard to other R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) factors, appellant apparently cares for 
his family and they for him.  Nonetheless, their relationship reveals nothing of any 
mitigating value.  Finally, appellant’s expressions of sorrow and remorse in his 
unsworn statement are entitled to some, but very little, weight in mitigation.  See 
State v. Rojas (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 143, 592 N.E.2d 1376, 1387, and State v. 
Raglin, 83 Ohio St.3d at 273, 699 N.E.2d at 498. 
 
Weighing appellant’s evidence presented in mitigation against the single 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(4) aggravating circumstance, we conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors.  
Therefore, the penalty of death is statutorily appropriate. 
 
As a final matter we find that the death penalty imposed in this case is 
neither excessive nor disproportionate to similar cases where the offender 
committed murder while a prisoner in a detention facility.  See, e.g., State v. 
Zuern, 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585, and State v. Carter (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction 
and death sentence. 
 
31
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law No. I:  During jury selection in a capital case, the trial 
court must ask each prospective sentencing juror whether the juror’s views on the 
death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the juror’s ability to consider a 
life sentence if the defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder and the 
aggravating circumstance.  Life qualification of each prospective juror is required 
whenever the trial court death qualifies the jurors by asking them if their views of 
the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their ability to consider the 
death penalty in the case before them. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. II:  John Stojetz’s death sentence is inappropriate.  
Damico Watkins[‘s] death resulted from his own threats against Stojetz and 
Stojetz’s post-traumatic stress disorder. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. III:  When trial counsel fail to conduct an adequate 
voir dire, fail to object to inadmissible evidence, fail to request a separation of 
witnesses, fail to conduct an adequate investigation of the case, fail to object to 
victim impact evidence, present a confusing explanation of the mitigation 
weighing process, fail to adequately present evidence of a capital defendant’s 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and fail to adequately prepare defendant’s 
mitigation expert, a capital defendant is deprived of the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IV:  A capital defendant is denied his rights to a 
jury verdict, to a fair trial, to due process, to the effective assistance of counsel, 
 
32
and to a reliable and non[-]arbitrary death sentence when the jury returns a general 
verdict of guilty for aggravated murder without a unanimous finding that the 
defendant was either the principal offender or an aider and abettor.  U.S. Const. 
Amend. VI, VIII, XIV; Ohio Const. Art. I, §§ 5, 9, 10, 16. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. V:  The defendant who is death-eligible as either a 
principal offender or aider and abettor must have access to the grand jury’s 
testimony [sic] when there are five co-defendants and the defendant shows a 
particularized need for their testimony.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Ohio Const. 
Art. I, § 16. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VI:  A defendant’s right to a fair and impartial 
sentencing jury is denied when the trial court overrules a challenge for cause 
against a prospective juror who is biased in favor of capital punishment. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VII:  When improper identification evidence is 
presented during a defendant’s capital trial the defendant’s due process rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendments [sic] to the United States Constitution 
and § 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution are violated. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VIII:  Appellant’s right to due process is violated 
when the trial court admits improper testimony in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 16, Article I, of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No.  IX:  Appellant’s due process and confrontation 
rights are violated when the trial court admits hearsay testimony in violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and §§ 10 and 
16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. X:  Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.03(D)(1) 
(Anderson 1996) and Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.04 are unconstitutionally vague 
 
33
in violation of appellant Stojetz’s right against cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and §§ 9 and 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XI:  When prosecutors misrepresent witness 
testimony, argue victim impact evidence unrelated to the offense, deny a defendant 
individualized sentencing, mislead on the definition of mitigation, and shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant, a capital defendant is denied his substantive and 
procedural due process rights to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, 
Sections 1, 9, 16 and 20 of the Ohio Constitution.  He is also denied his right to 
reliable sentencing as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 9 and 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XII:  A jury instruction that shifts the burden of 
proof on the mens rea element of aggravated murder to the accused is 
unconstitutional.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Ohio Const., Art. I, § 16.  A jury 
instruction that makes the accused’s guilt or innocence the ultimate issue of fact is 
also unconstitutional.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Ohio Const., Art. I, §16. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIII:  A capital defendant’s right to a reliable and 
non[-]arbitrary death sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is 
violated when the sentencing jury’s responsibility for its verdict is attenuated by 
the trial court’s instructions. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIV:  When a videotape is replayed for the jury, its 
significance is overemphasized and a capital defendant’s due process rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 
16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution are violated. 
 
34
 
“Proposition of Law No. XV:  It is constitutional error for the trial court to 
consider victim impact evidence in capital sentencing in the form of an opinion by 
a victim’s family member about the defendant’s fate.  U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, 
XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVI:  When the trial court considers public policy 
matters, treats an institutional killing as requiring a mandatory death sentence, 
fails to weigh relevant mitigating evidence, and uses inappropriate standards in 
weighing proper mitigating evidence, a capital defendant is deprived of the right 
to individualized sentencing and of his liberty interest in the statutory sentencing 
scheme thus violating rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and §§ 9 and 16, Article I, of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVII:  The accused’s right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United Constitution is violated when the state is 
permitted to convict upon a standard of proof below proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVIII:  The defendant in a capital case has a due 
process liberty interest in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2945.25(C) (Anderson 1996).  
The defendant’s liberty interest in [R.C. 2945.25(C)] is infringed when the trial 
court fails to follow the Revised Code during voir dire on the issue of capital 
punishment. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIX:  Ohio’s death penalty laws are 
unconstitutional.  The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution establish the requirements for a valid death penalty scheme.  Ohio 
Rev.Code Ann. Sections 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.021, 2929.022, 2929.023, 
 
35
2929.03, 2929.04 and 2929.05 (Anderson 1996).  Ohio’s death penalty statute 
does not meet the prescribed constitutional requirements and is unconstitutional on 
its face and as applied to appellant Stojetz.”