Case Title: KENNETH D HESSE V ASHLAND OIL INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118548

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
KENNETH D. HESSE, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
JASON L. HESSE, Deceased, KENNETH 
D. HESSE, CYNTHIA R. HESSE, and 
AMY R. HESSE, a Minor, by her next 
friend, Kenneth D. Hesse,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v  
No. 118548  
ASHLAND OIL, INC., formerly known as 
Ashland, Inc., a foreign corporation, 
doing business as Valvoline Instant Oil 
Change and as the Valvoline Company,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
CHIPPEWA VALLEY SCHOOLS, JAMES J. 
RIVARD, JAMES P. MURPHY, and RUTH 
ANN BOOMS, Jointly and Severally,  
Defendants.  
PER CURIAM  
In this case, plaintiffs, the parents of the decedent1,  
claimed that the decedent’s employer was liable in tort for  
the negligent infliction upon plaintiffs of emotional  
distress, caused when plaintiffs were present at their son’s  
workplace at the time of his death.  The circuit court denied  
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.  The Court of  
Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the denial of  
summary disposition on the claim of negligent infliction of  
emotional distress.2  We reverse in part the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Macomb Circuit  
Court for entry of summary disposition in favor of the  
defendant on the claim of negligent infliction of emotional  
distress.
 Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the  
exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability  
Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.131.  
I  
The sixteen-year-old decedent was hired by defendant  
Ashland Oil, Inc.,3 through the Chippewa Valley Schools’ work  
1 The decedent’s minor sister is also named as a  
plaintiff by virtue of her loss of consortium claim.  Because  
that claim is not implicated in this appeal, further  
references to “plaintiffs” in this case refer only to the 
parents of the decedent.  
2 
 The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that the 
trial court erred in denying summary disposition of the claims 
of intentional tort and breach of contract.  Those claims are  
not before us.  
3 While there are multiple defendants in this case, only 
defendant Ashland Oil is a party to this appeal.  Accordingly, 
further references to “defendant” in this case refer only to  
2  
study plan.  After securing a work permit, decedent began  
working for defendant at defendant’s “Instant Oil Change”  
service facility.  On June 2, 1995, a customer brought in a  
five-gallon bucket that was filled with a liquid believed by  
a coemployee of decedent to be waste oil. 
Following  
procedures outlined by the defendant, the bucket was emptied  
into a “catch basin.”  Toward the end of normal business  
hours, there was a problem with draining the catch basin.  The  
coemployee set about to check the level of the waste oil in  
the catch basin. 
He purportedly did this by using a  
disposable lighter, which caused an explosion.4
 In the  
ensuing 
fire, 
decedent was killed.  Decedent’s parents learned  
of the explosion and fire almost immediately and went to the  
service center.  While at the service center, plaintiffs were  
told of their son’s death.  
II  
Plaintiffs sued their son’s employer, his school, and  
employees of the school.5  Of the several causes of action  
brought by plaintiffs against defendant Ashland, only one  
Ashland Oil.  
4 The coemployee denied he had used the lighter to look 
inside the catch basin.  For purposes of resolution of the 
issue presented by defendant, it is unnecessary to resolve 
this factual dispute.  
5 
 Decedent’s parents filed several causes of action 
including 
breach 
of 
contract, 
gross 
negligence, 
and  
intentional 
tort. 
 
Additionally, 
decedent’s 
minor 
sister 
filed 
an action for loss of consortium.  Decedent’s father also sued  
defendant as personal representative of his son’s estate.  
3  
 
 
remained after the Court of Appeals issued its unpublished per  
curiam opinion on January 12, 2001 (Docket No. 209075).  This  
was a claim by plaintiffs of negligent infliction of emotional  
distress.6  Plaintiffs claimed damages from witnessing the  
death of their child.  Defendant asserts that the cause of  
action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the  
WDCA, MCL 418.131, which states:  
(1) The right to the recovery of benefits as 
provided in this act shall be the employee's 
exclusive remedy against the employer for a  
personal injury or occupational disease. The only 
exception 
to 
this 
exclusive 
remedy 
is 
an  
intentional tort. An intentional tort shall exist  
only when an employee is injured as a result of a 
deliberate act of the employer and the employer 
specifically intended an injury. An employer shall 
be deemed to have intended to injure if the 
employer had actual knowledge that an injury was 
certain to occur and willfully disregarded that 
knowledge.  The issue of whether an act was an  
intentional tort shall be a question of law for the 
court. This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce 
rights under law.  
(2) As used in this section and section 827, 
“employee” includes the person injured, his or her 
personal representatives, and any other person to  
whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury to, or  
death of, the employee, and “employer” includes the 
employer's insurer and a service agent to a self­
insured employer insofar as they furnish, or fail 
to furnish, safety inspections or safety advisory 
services 
incident 
to 
providing 
worker's  
compensation insurance or incident to a self­
6 Plaintiffs’ cause of action is sometimes referred to as  
“bystander recovery,” and its elements are set forth in 
Wargelin v Sisters of Mercy Health Corp, 149 Mich App 75; 385  
NW2d 732 (1986). 
This Court has never recognized the 
existence of such a cause of action, and we decline to discuss 
the validity of plaintiffs’ claim at this time because a 
discussion of the merits of the claim is unnecessary to our 
determination.  
4  
 
 
insured employer's liability servicing contract. 
[Emphasis added.]  
III  
The Court of Appeals held that the claim for negligent  
infliction of emotional distress brought by plaintiffs, even  
when it concerned a work-related accident, was a separate tort  
and thus not within the bar of the exclusive remedy provision.  
The plain language of the statute, however, states that the  
exclusive remedy for an employee, including “his or her  
personal representatives, and any other person to whom a claim  
accrues by reason of the injury to, or death of, the  
employee,” is found in the WDCA. MCL 418.131(2).  
This provision is dispositive of this case.  Here, the  
plaintiffs’ claim has accrued by reason of the death of an  
employee of the defendant.  The plaintiffs are within the  
category of individuals barred from suit, namely, as defined  
by § 131(2) of the WDCA, “any other person to whom a claim  
accrues by reason of the . . . death of . . . the employee .  
. . .” 
Thus, the claim is barred.  
In asserting that plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of  
emotional distress claim is not barred by MCL 418.131, the  
Court of Appeals and the dissent here rely substantially on  
Barnes v Double Seal Glass Co, Inc, 129 Mich App 66; 341 NW2d  
812 (1983), and Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Hardiman, 228 Mich App  
470; 579 NW2d 115 (1998).  However, those cases are materially  
5  
 
  
distinguishable 
from 
the 
present 
case 
and, 
consequently, 
offer  
little guidance in its resolution.  
Barnes also involved a tragic workplace death of a  
sixteen-year-old.  In that case, the Court of Appeals held  
that the trial court erred, on the basis of the exclusive  
remedy provision of the WDCA, in granting summary disposition  
in favor of the employer with regard to the claim of the  
employee’s parents for intentional infliction of emotional  
distress. Id. at 75-76. This result does not seem unusual in  
any way because MCL 418.131(1) provides for an intentional  
tort exception to the exclusive remedy rule of the worker’s  
compensation scheme and that is the exception the Barnes’ suit  
invoked.
 
Thus, 
since 
the 
instant 
case 
involves 
a  
nonintentional tort claim, i.e., negligent rather than  
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Barnes  
holding is inapposite.  
Similarly, the holding of Hardiman is inapposite to the  
resolution of the present case.  Most importantly, Hardiman  
did not involve a worker’s compensation question; rather, it  
dealt with the narrow question whether damages in a non­
worker’s compensation civil lawsuit, involving a “negligent  
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress” 
claim, 
constituted  
“derivative damages” so that insurance coverage could be  
limited.7  This issue of law is irrelevant to a discussion of  
7 
 Evidently, the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim in Hardiman was based on an incident in which  
6  
the nuances of the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA.  
While there is discussion in Hardiman of the distinctions  
between 
derivative 
and 
independent 
actions 
in 
civil  
litigation, the statute here, MCL 418.131, controls the  
lawsuit in the instant case. This statute never alludes to  
derivative or independent actions, but simply states that  
claims accruing “by reason of the injury to, or death of, the  
employee” are barred.  Thus, because these plaintiffs have  
claims that have accrued “by reason of” the death of the  
employee, they are without a remedy, and nothing Hardiman  
states affects this in the slightest.  
Moreover, although we regard the plain language of MCL  
418.131 as decisive, we believe that our decision is  
reinforced by an understanding of the history of the exclusive  
remedy provision of the WDCA.  Helpful in this regard are this  
Court’s companion decisions in Moran v Nafi Corp, 370 Mich  
536; 122 NW2d 800 (1963), and Balcer v Leonard Refineries,  
Inc, 370 Mich 531; 122 NW2d 805 (1963). 
In both Moran and  
Balcer, we addressed whether a claim for loss of consortium  
against an employer based on an injury suffered by a spouse as  
an employee was barred by the then much less well-defined  
a six-year-old witnessed her brother being struck by an 
automobile, which rendered the brother a paraplegic. Id. at  
472.  The Hardiman panel concluded that a claim for negligent 
infliction 
of 
emotional damages is not “derivative” because it 
“may be maintained as a separate, independent cause of action 
and is not dependent upon actual injury to, or recovery by, 
another person.” Id. at 475.  
7  
 
exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,  
which did not then, as it does now, expressly extend to  
persons other than an employee.8  
Notwithstanding the much less sweeping language in the  
old statute, Justice O’Hara writing for the Court had no  
trouble concluding in Moran that, not just an employee, but  
also a third party, was barred from maintaining a cause of  
action against an employer under the exclusive remedy  
provision. Justice O’Hara said:  
Under the above section and the title of the  
act, as previously discussed, we believe any 
broadening of the base of recovery against the 
employer as a result of an industrial injury to 
include an action at law by any other person must, 
if it is to be authorized, be authorized by 
legislative action.  We hold the legislative intent  
expressed in the act precludes the judicial 
construction contended for by plaintiff and adopted 
by the learned trial judge [which would have 
allowed the loss of consortium claim to go 
forward]. [Id. at 543.][9]  
8 The language of MCL 411.4, the predecessor of MCL 
418.131, as then in effect, stated simply:  
Where the conditions of liability under this  
act 
exist, 
the 
right 
to 
the 
recovery 
of  
compensation benefits, as herein provided, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer.  
9 
 Three justices joined the lead opinion of Justice 
O’Hara in Moran that contained this holding. 
At the time, 
there were eight justices on this Court.  In a concurring 
opinion, Chief Justice Carr, joined by two other justices, 
stated “[w]e are in accord with the holding of Mr. Justice 
O’Hara that the rights granted by the workmen’s compensation 
act to an employee who sustained an injury arising out of and 
in the course of his employment are exclusive.” Id. at 545.  
Thus, the above-quoted holding from the lead opinion in Moran  
regarding the exclusivity of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 
constituted a majority holding of this Court. Chief Justice  
8  
 
  
 
 
 
In Balcer, which was considered and released with Moran,  
Justice Smith concluded to similar effect that the exclusive  
remedy provision barred a claim by a third party against the  
employer on the basis of an injury to an employee. He offered  
historical background that is edifying:  
“The history of the development of statutes,  
such 
as 
this, 
creating 
a 
compensable 
right 
independent of the employer’s negligence and  
notwithstanding 
an 
employee’s 
contributory 
negligence, recalls that the keystone was the  
exclusiveness of the remedy.  This concept emerged 
from a balancing of the sacrifices and gains of 
both employees and employers, in which the former 
relinquished whatever rights they had at common law 
in exchange for a sure recovery under the  
compensation statutes, while the employers on their 
part, in accepting a definite and exclusive  
liability, assumed an added cost of operation which 
in 
time 
could 
be 
actuarially 
measured 
and  
accurately predicted; incident to this both parties 
realized a saving in the form of reduced hazards 
and costs of litigation.”  [Id. at 535 (Smith, J.), 
quoting Smither & Co, Inc v Coles, 100 US App DC 
68, 70; 242 F2d 220 (1957) (emphasis in Balcer).]  
Our holding in this case is also consistent with the  
overview of the different approaches to the exclusive remedy  
provision that Justice Smith discussed in Balcer at 533-534,  
Carr’s 
opinion 
included additional discussion of his view that 
this Court should not have adopted a cause of action for loss 
of consortium, id. at 544-545, which presumably was his reason 
for writing separately.  
Similarly, in Balcer, the lead opinion, which was joined 
by four of the eight participating justices, indicated that 
the plain language of MCL 411.4 as then in effect barred the 
wife’s loss of consortium claim.  Id. at 532-533 (Smith, J.). 
The other four justices concurred for the reasons set forth in 
Moran, supra. Id. at 535 (Carr, C.J.).  
9  
 
 
quoting 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 66.10, p 141, as  
follows:  
“There are 3 general types of ‘exclusive 
liability’ clause which, for present purposes, must 
be carefully identified with the cases that depend 
upon them; from the narrowest to the broadest, they 
are as follows:  the Massachusetts type, which only 
says that the employee, by coming within the act, 
waives his common-law rights; the California and 
Michigan type, which say that the employer’s 
liability shall be ‘exclusive,’ or that he shall 
have ‘no other liability whatsoever’; and the New 
York type, which carries this kind of statute 1 
step further by specifying that the excluded  
actions include those by ‘such employee, his  
personal 
representatives, 
husband, 
parents, 
dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise  
entitled to recover damages, at common law or 
otherwise on account of such injury or death.’” 
[Emphasis in Balcer.]  
Since this was written in 1963, MCL 418.131 has been enacted  
and has, of course, moved Michigan into the “New York type” of  
exclusive remedy provision under which it is even more clear  
that a third party ordinarily cannot recover damages from an  
employer on the basis of an employee’s death.  
Against this background, it is all the more appropriate  
that, as with our predecessors, we should continue to accord  
a plain reading to the current exclusive remedy provision,  
which unambiguously bars from suit “any other person to whom  
a claim accrues by reason of the injury to, or death of, the  
employee.”  
No one would disagree with the dissent that the death  
underlying this case occurred under tragic and horrific  
circumstances. However, our empathy for plaintiffs does not  
10  
justify this Court ignoring the plain language of MCL 418.131,  
which bars the imposition of liability on defendant in the  
present circumstances.  It could be argued, as undoubtedly it  
has been before the Legislature, that the law should allow a  
cause of action under circumstances like those in this case.  
Yet, as Justices Smith and O’Hara and the many others on this  
Court who have written or signed opinions to a similar effect  
have understood, this is a policy matter—which is to say, it  
is not this Court’s choice to make.  Rather, we, as judges,  
must apply the legislation as it is written.  As Justice  
Cavanagh stated for a unanimous Court in Huggett v Dep’t of  
Natural Resources, 464 Mich 711, 717; 629 NW2d 915 (2001):  
If the statutory language is clear and  
unambiguous, then we conclude that the Legislature 
intended the meaning it clearly and unambiguously 
expressed, and the statute is enforced as written. 
No further judicial construction is necessary or 
permitted.  
Justice Kelly not only joined that statement, but earlier  
stated in her unanimous opinion in Chandler v Dowell  
Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 406; 572 NW2d 210 (1998), with  
regard to the statute at issue there, that “[t]he Legislature  
can and may rewrite the statute, but we will not do so.”  The  
dissent, we assume, still adheres to this rule, but deflects  
the thrust of it by the claim that the language of the statute  
at issue is ambiguous and, thus, the judiciary is free to  
interpret its meaning.  The worth of this argument, we  
believe, 
is 
self-evident 
to 
those 
who 
read 
this  
11  
 
 
 
 
straightforward statute and the statute’s consistent and  
unvarying judicial construction over the whole of the era of  
worker’s compensation.  
In 
sum, 
plaintiffs’ 
claim 
against 
defendant 
for 
negligent  
infliction of emotional distress is barred by the exclusive  
remedy provision of the WDCA contained in MCL 418.131.  
IV  
We reverse, in part, the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
and remand to the Macomb Circuit Court for summary disposition  
in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
12  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
KENNETH D. HESSE, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
JASON L. HESSE, deceased, KENNETH 
D. HESSE, CYNTHIA R. HESSE, and 
AMY R. HESSE, a minor, by her next 
friend, Kenneth D. Hesse,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 118548  
ASHLAND OIL, INC., formerly known 
as Ashland, Inc., a foreign 
corporation, doing business as 
Valvoline Instant Oil Change and 
as the Valvoline Company,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
CHIPPEWA VALLEY SCHOOLS, JAMES J. 
RIVARD, JAMES P. MURPHY, and RUTH 
ANN BOOMS, jointly and severally,  
Defendants.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
In its efforts to read the law scrupulously, the majority  
has misconstrued the exclusive remedy provision of the  
 
Worker's Disability Compensation Act,1 giving it meaning never  
intended by its framers.  Plaintiffs allege an injury to  
themselves, not to their son.  Because their claim falls  
outside the scope of the act, this Court should affirm the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
Plaintiffs 
witnessed 
a 
terrible 
accident 
that 
they 
assert  
was caused by defendant's negligence.  They arrived at the  
service 
center 
simultaneously with fire fighters and found the  
building where their son Jason worked aflame from the  
explosion that had occurred there minutes before.  The fire  
was burning too strongly for plaintiffs or anyone else to  
rescue Jason from inside.  Mrs. Hesse, in her anguish, made a  
rescue effort and had to be restrained. 
She became so  
distraught 
that 
she 
required immediate medical attention.  She  
and her husband remained at the scene for hours and eventually  
witnessed the removal of a body, presumably that of their son.  
Jason 
Hesse 
was 
burned beyond recognition, his body identified  
only by dental records.  
As the Court of Appeals recognized, there was ample  
evidence that the experience traumatized both Mr. and Mrs.  
Hesse to the point of causing them physical harm:  
Ashland next argues that plaintiffs produced 
no evidence that Kenneth and Cynthia Hesse suffered  
1  MCL 418.131.  
2  
actual physical harm as a result of the accident, 
other than the expected shock and distress stemming 
from the death of their son. We disagree. Evidence 
showed that Cynthia Hesse became so hysterical when 
she arrived at the scene of the fire that she  
required immediate medical treatment and sedation. 
Further, in her deposition, Cynthia Hesse testified 
that she experienced additional medical problems as 
a result of her trauma. Mrs. Hesse testified that  
her preexisting bladder condition was exacerbated 
by her nervous condition after Jason's death.  
Moreover, she suffered at least one nightmare 
related to Jason's death, during which she reacted 
so violently that she pulled muscles in her neck 
and shoulder, which required medical attention. 
Clearly, plaintiffs established a triable issue 
with regard to whether Cynthia Hesse incurred 
actual physical injury due to the shock she  
experienced because of her son's death.  
Further, plaintiffs succeeded in establishing 
a triable issue with regard to whether Kenneth 
Hesse suffered an actual physical injury. According 
to the evidence, Kenneth Hesse experienced shock 
and trauma related to Jason's death. Mr. Hesse  
reported 
experiencing 
"depression, 
anxiety[,] 
sleeping problems" and an inability to concentrate. 
He also stated that Jason's death had caused him to  
abuse alcohol. In August 1996, a doctor prescribed 
Mr. Hesse Prozac because he was having "[a] lot of 
trouble with energy," which was related to Mr.  
Hesse's state of grief following Jason's death. 
This evidence establishes a triable issue with  
regard to whether Mr. Hesse suffered actual  
physical injury as a result of the accident.  [Slip 
op, pp 9-10 (citations omitted).]  
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals concluded that plaintiffs' claim for  
their own injuries caused by witnessing the fire stated a  
separate tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
It was not derived from the injuries to their son.  The panel  
cited Michigan law recognizing such a nonderivative claim.  
Slip op at 9, citing Auto Club Ins Ass'n v Hardiman, 228 Mich  
3  
 
 
 
App 470, 474-477; 579 NW2d 115 (1998), and Barnes v Double  
Seal Glass Co, 129 Mich App 66, 75-76; 341 NW2d 812 (1983).  
II. The Cause of Action  
A 
claim 
for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is  
generally 
recognized 
when a parent witnesses the violent death  
of a child. See generally Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed),  
§ 54, pp 359-367; see also Consolidated Rail Corp v Gotshall,  
512 US 532, 545-549; 114 S Ct 2396; 129 L Ed 2d 427 (1994).2  
The common-law cause of action for negligent infliction of  
emotional distress has been recognized and applied in  
Michigan, although this Court has never ruled on the issue.  
Hardiman, supra at 475; Wargelin v Sisters of Mercy Health  
Corp, 149 Mich App 75, 81; 385 NW2d 732 (1986).  
As stated by the Court of Appeals, the elements of  
negligent infliction of emotional distress are: (1) serious  
injury threatened or inflicted on a person, not the plaintiff,  
of a nature to cause severe mental disturbance to the  
plaintiff, (2) shock by the plaintiff from witnessing the  
2 The United States Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail  
noted that "[n]early all of the States" have recognized some 
form of negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at  
544-545.  It went on to identify Michigan as one of nearly 
half the states that "now allow bystanders outside of the zone 
of danger to obtain recovery in certain circumstances for 
emotional distress brought on by witnessing the injury or 
death of a third party (who typically must be a close relative 
of the bystander) that is caused by the defendant's  
negligence." Id. at 549, n 10, citing Nugent v Bauermeister, 
195 Mich App 158; 489 NW2d 148 (1992).  
4  
 
  
event that results in the plaintiff's actual physical harm,  
(3) close relationship between the plaintiff and the injured  
person (parent, child, husband, or wife), and (4) presence of  
the plaintiff at the location of the accident at the time the  
accident occurred or, if not presence, at least shock "fairly  
contemporaneous" with the accident. Wargelin, supra at 81.3  
Michigan generally does not regard a claim of negligent  
infliction of emotional distress made by a close family member  
to be derivative of the family member's injury. The Court of  
Appeals considered the difference between derivative and  
nonderivative actions in Hardiman, supra. 
There, it  
distinguished the claim of negligent infliction of emotional  
distress from claims such as loss of consortium, society, and  
companionship, which are derivative claims.4  Unlike them, "a  
claim of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional  
distress may be maintained as a separate, independent cause of  
3 Michigan precedent does not adhere to the "zone of 
danger" rule that precludes liability when the witness was not 
in any danger himself.  See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 313, pp 
113-115; See also 2 Stein, Personal Injury Damages (3d ed), 
§ 10:31, p 10-69, n 23.  
4 The majority makes much of this Court's lead opinion in 
Moran v Nafi Corp, 370 Mich 536; 122 NW2d 800 (1963). There, 
the Court addressed only the claim of loss of consortium, 
describing it as "growing out of the accidental injury to the 
employee," or derivative. 
Id. at 538. 
See Black's Law  
Dictionary (6th ed), defining "derivative" as: "Coming from 
another; taken from something preceding; secondary." Where, 
unlike a claim for loss of consortium, plaintiffs' claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is not derivative 
of the employee's injury, Moran does not support the  
majority's construction of MCL 418.131.  
5  
action and is not dependent upon actual injury to, or recovery  
by, another person." Hardiman, supra at 475, citing Barnes,  
supra at 75-76; Campos v General Motors Corp, 71 Mich App 23,  
25; 246 NW2d 352 (1976).  
I believe that the claim plaintiffs made in this case is  
not derivative of their son's accident, as the term  
"derivative" is used in Michigan law.  For that reason, it  
survives the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA.  
Moreover, I believe that my position finds support in the  
language and purpose of the WDCA.  
III. The Exclusivity of the WDCA  
Although no case is on point, Barnes is closely  
analogous.
 In Barnes, the Michigan Court of Appeals  
determined that a claim for the intentional infliction of  
emotional distress is not covered by the exclusive remedy  
provision of the WDCA.  There, the plaintiffs' son was killed  
in a work-related accident.  Although intentional tort claims  
are generally not precluded by the WDCA, the Court of Appeals  
analysis of the emotional distress claim is instructive.  The  
Court concluded that "Plaintiffs' claim for intentional  
infliction of emotional distress is made on their own behalf,  
for their own injuries, for a tort directed at them rather  
than at their son.  The claim is not for wrongful death and is  
not covered by . . . the exclusive remedy provision of the  
WDCA . . . ."  See Id. at 76. The instant claim for negligent  
6  
 
infliction of emotional distress belongs to plaintiffs in the  
same way.  
The language of the exclusive remedy provision is not  
unambiguous, as the majority unequivocally asserts.  MCL  
418.131 restricts recovery to the disabled employee and "any  
other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury  
to, or death of, the employee . . . ." MCL 418.131(2). The  
purpose of the WDCA is to provide a system of "compensation to  
employees for injuries suffered in the course of employment,  
regardless of who is at fault."  Clark v United Automotive  
Technology, Inc, 459 Mich 681, 686-687; 594 NW2d 447 (1999)  
(emphasis added).  By way of contrast, plaintiffs allege  
injuries to themselves. They were not employed by defendant  
and therefore did not sustain their injuries in the course of  
employment.  
I believe that a fair reading of MCL 418.131 begins with  
the understanding that recovery under the WDCA is available to  
an injured employee and to individuals standing in his place.  
Claims outside the WDCA brought, for example, by the personal  
representative 
of 
a 
deceased employee's estate truly accrue by  
reason of the employee's death and are precluded by MCL  
418.131.  On the other hand, plaintiffs' claim is based on the  
effect on them of having witnessed the employee's death. It  
is not meant to recover for the death itself.  They do not  
stand in their son's shoes while making this claim.  Hence, it  
7  
 
falls outside the scope of the WDCA, and MCL 418.131 does not  
pertain to it. See Barnes, supra at 71.  
Notably, if plaintiffs are prevented from maintaining  
this action, they will also be unable to avail themselves of  
the remedies of the WDCA.  They will have nowhere else to turn  
to recover for their physical manifestations of witnessing  
their son's horrific death.  
As this Court stated in Clark, supra at 687: "In return  
for [the employer incurring] almost automatic liability,  
employees are limited in the amount of compensation they may  
collect from their employer, and, except in limited  
circumstances, may not bring a tort action against the  
employer."  
Under 
the majority's construction of the exclusive  
remedy 
provision, 
plaintiffs' 
recovery 
is 
precluded, 
but 
there  
is no corresponding "almost automatic liability" for their  
injuries to justify the preclusion.  That result could not  
have been intended by the Legislature.  
IV. Conclusion  
The majority has extended the reach of the exclusive  
remedy provision of the WDCA to bar plaintiffs' claim of  
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The per curiam  
opinion effects this leap without citing any authority on  
point and without considering that MCL 418.131 is subject to  
differing interpretations.  The majority relies simply on its  
reading of MCL 418.131, obdurately asserting that it is plain  
8  
 
and unambiguous.  
By contrast, the Court of Appeals interpretation of the  
statute is based on the sound reasoning in Barnes, Hardiman,  
and Wargelin. 
This Court should apply existing law and  
consider the purpose underlying the WDCA.  It should conclude  
that the exclusive remedy provision must be construed as not  
including the claims of third parties ineligible for  
compensation under the WCDA, and it should affirm the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals.  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I would either grant or deny leave to appeal, but would  
not dispose of this case by an opinion per curiam.  
9