Case Title: State v. Kramer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
#24660-rev-PER CURIAM 
2008 SD 73 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,  
 
 
 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
v. 
 
JAMES M. KRAMER, 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
LYMAN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
HONORABLE LORI S. WILBUR 
Judge 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
LAWRENCE E. LONG 
Attorney General  
 
CRAIG M. EICHSTADT 
Assistant Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
Pierre, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
 
and appellee. 
 
WALLY EKLUND of 
Johnson, Eklund Law Office 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for defendant 
Gregory, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
 
and appellant. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON MARCH 26, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED 7/23/08 
 
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PER CURIAM 
[¶1.]  
James Kramer was convicted of three separate hunting violations.  In 
this appeal he challenges the revocation of his hunting privileges contending the 
revocation was for a longer period than authorized by law.  We agree and reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
[¶2.]  
On March 14, 2005, following a court trial before the Honorable Max 
Gors, Kramer was convicted of hunting with a revoked license, hunting big game on 
highway and public rights of way, and hunting on private land without consent.  
The convictions were ordered to be served consecutively and Kramer was sentenced 
to 160 days in the county jail.  The circuit court also ordered Kramer’s hunting 
privileges revoked for a period of one year for each count to run consecutively, 
effectively revoking his hunting privileges for three years.  No appeal was filed from 
this judgment of conviction. 
[¶3.]  
On January 26, 2006, acting pursuant to a motion Kramer filed for a 
modification of his sentence, the circuit court (again Judge Gors) ordered that 
Kramer would receive credit for the time he had served and the remainder of the 
jail sentence would be suspended upon the condition that his hunting privileges 
would be revoked for life.   
[¶4.]  
On May 24, 2007, Kramer filed a motion pursuant to SDCL 23A-31-1 
(Rule 35) alleging that the January 26, 2006, order revoking his hunting privileges 
for life was an illegal sentence as it was in excess of the punishment authorized by 
the relevant statutory authority.  Additionally, Kramer argued that a revocation 
could not exceed one year or be consecutive.  This motion was filed with the 
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Honorable Judge Lori Wilbur as the result of Judge Gors’ retirement from the 
bench. 
[¶5.]  
The circuit court found that the original judgment of conviction which 
revoked Kramer’s hunting privileges for three years, based on the consecutive 
running of the one-year terms for each conviction, was permissible under SDCL 22-
6-6.1.  However, the court found that the lifetime revocation was unauthorized and 
constituted an illegal sentence.  As a result, the court reinstated the original three 
year revocation consisting of the three consecutive one-year terms under the 
original judgment of conviction and the jail time remained suspended.  An order to 
this effect was entered on September 28, 2007.  Kramer appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
ISSUE ONE 
[¶6.]  
Whether this Court has jurisdiction to act in this appeal. 
[¶7.]  
The State argues that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal because Kramer failed to timely appeal from the original judgment of 
conviction.  The State misapprehends the nature of a Rule 35 motion to correct an 
illegal sentence.  SDCL 23A-31-1 (Rule 35) provides: 
A court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and 
may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner 
within the time provided in this section for the reduction 
of sentence. A court may reduce a sentence: 
 
 
(1) 
Within two years after the sentence is   
 
 
imposed; 
 
 
(2) 
Within one hundred twenty days after  
 
 
 
receipt by the court of a remittitur issued  
 
 
upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal 
 
 
of the appeal; or 
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(3) 
Within one hundred twenty days after entry  
 
 
of any order or judgment of the Supreme  
 
 
Court denying review of, or having the effect  
 
 
of upholding, a judgment of conviction;  
 
whichever is later. A court may also reduce a sentence 
upon revocation of probation or suspension of sentence as 
provided by law. The remedies provided by this section 
are not a substitute for nor do they affect any remedies 
incident to post-conviction proceedings. 
 
(Emphasis added).  A defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence does not 
permit a challenge to the underlying conviction.  See State v. Oscarson, 898 A2d 
123, 126 (Vt 2006); State v. Kerrigan, 141 P3d 1054, 1056 (Idaho 2006).  Rather, “it 
is an attack on the sentence or the sentencing procedure.”  Oscarson, 898 A2d at 
126.  Kramer’s appeal in this matter relates only to the illegality of the sentence 
imposed and not to the underlying conviction.  Therefore, his failure to timely 
appeal his conviction is not jurisdictionally fatal. 
[¶8.]  
In State v. Tibbetts, 333 NW2d 440, 441 (SD 1983), this Court 
specifically held that the circuit court’s denial of a request to correct an illegal 
sentence under SDCL 23A-31-1 was properly before this Court on appeal and 
rejected the State’s contention that the appeal was procedurally improper.  
Moreover, this Court has consistently reviewed such requests.  See e.g., Application 
of Grosh, 415 NW2d 824 (SD 1987); State v. Thomas, 499 NW2d 621 (SD 1993); 
State v. Moon, 514 NW2d 705 (SD 1994); State v. Sieler, 1996 SD 114, 554 NW2d 
477.  See also State v. Steen, 665 NW2d 688, 689-90 (ND 2003)(holding a defendant 
has a right to appeal an order from a motion to correct an illegal sentence under 
Rule 35).  Consequently, Kramer’s sentencing challenge is properly before the Court 
and we proceed to the merits. 
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ISSUE TWO 
[¶9.]  
Whether the circuit court was authorized to revoke 
Kramer’s hunting privileges for three consecutive one-year terms.  
 
[¶10.]  
Kramer was sentenced for the hunting violations pursuant to SDCL 
41-6-74.1 and SDCL 41-9-8.  Those statutes provide in relevant part: 
41-6-74.1. Offenses causing one-year revocation of 
hunting, fishing, or trapping privileges. 
 
 
At the time of conviction for any one of the following 
offenses: 
 
 
(1) 
Violation of any game and fish law  
 
 
 
punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor; 
 
 
(2) 
Violation of § 41-8-37, 41-9-1.2, 41-8-17  
 
 
except for a landowner, occupant, or   
 
 
accompanying guests of the landowner or  
 
 
occupant on the owner's or occupant's land or 
 
 
a person employed by the Department of  
 
 
Game, Fish and Parks in the performance of  
 
 
the person's duty, or  41-12-12; 
 
 
(3) 
Violation of any other statute or rule   
 
 
pertaining to fishing, hunting, or possessing  
 
 
game or game fish without a license or  
 
 
during a closed season; or 
 
 
(4) 
Taking or possessing in excess of the   
 
 
lawful daily or possession limit: 
 
 
 
(a) 
One or two paddlefish; 
 
 
(b) 
Two or three turkeys;  
 
 
(c) 
Four to six, inclusive, of any one game  
 
 
 
fish as regulated other than  
 
 
 
 
paddlefish; 
 
 
(d) 
Four to six, inclusive, of any one small 
 
 
 
game animal as regulated; 
 
the person's applicable hunting, fishing, or trapping 
privileges in South Dakota are automatically revoked 
without further hearing for a period of one year following 
date of conviction.  
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(Emphasis added). 
 
41-9-8. Revocation of license on conviction - 
Retrieval of game excepted - Civil remedies of 
landowner unaffected. 
 
Any person who knowingly enters or remains on private 
property for the purpose of hunting, fishing or trapping, 
in violation of § 41-9-1 or 41-9-2, shall lose hunting, 
trapping, or fishing privileges for one year following the 
conviction. If the person is the holder of a license to hunt, 
trap, or fish, the court shall require the license holder to 
surrender and deliver the license to the court to be 
returned to the Department of Game, Fish and Parks. For 
the purpose of this section, the term, guilty, has the same 
meaning as the term, conviction, in § 32-12-53. 
 
  
(Emphasis added).  Kramer argues that under the plain terms of these statutes his 
hunting privileges could only be suspended for one year following the date of his 
convictions and there was no authority for the circuit court to order the revocations 
to be served consecutive.  We agree. 
[¶11.]  
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo.”  State 
v. Burdick, 2006 SD 23, ¶ 6, 712 NW2d 5, 7.  “When the language of a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, our only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as 
clearly expressed.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Both of the above sentencing provisions 
indicate that loss of hunting privileges for a violation shall occur for a period of one 
year following the applicable conviction.  There is no mention in the statutory 
framework concerning a circuit court’s authority to impose consecutive revocations 
of hunting privileges in the event of multiple convictions.  Instead, the circuit court 
seized upon SDCL 22-6-6.1 to support consecutive revocations.  That statute 
provides: 
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If a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses, 
regardless of when the offenses were committed or when 
the judgment or sentence is entered, the judgment or 
sentence may be that the imprisonment on any of the 
offenses or convictions may run concurrently or 
consecutively at the discretion of the court.   
 
SDCL 22-6-6.1 (emphasis added).  While this statute provides authority for the 
circuit court to order consecutive terms of imprisonment, which we note the court 
ordered here and is not disputed, it cannot be interpreted to support an order of 
consecutive revocations of hunting privileges.  See State v. Flittie, 318 NW2d 346, 
349 (SD 1982); State v. Arguello, 1996 SD 57, ¶ 7, 548 NW2d 463, 464 (recognizing 
the purpose of SDCL 22-6-6.1 is to limit a court’s power to impose consecutive 
sentences to situations described in the statute).  By its plain terms, SDCL 22-6-6.1 
only authorizes consecutive sentences for terms of “imprisonment” and a revocation 
of hunting privileges does not constitute “imprisonment” under its plain and 
ordinary meaning.  “This Court will not enlarge a statute beyond its face where the 
statutory terms are clear and unambiguous in meaning.”  Arguello, 1996 SD 57, ¶ 7, 
548 NW2d at 464. 
[¶12.]  
“Illegal sentences are essentially only those which exceed the relevant 
statutory maximum limits or violate double jeopardy or are ambiguous or internally 
inconsistent.”  Sieler, 1996 SD 114, ¶ 7, 554 NW2d at 480; see also State v. 
Schwebach, 2000 SD 50, 609 NW2d 130 (holding the circuit court exceeded the 
statutory authority in revoking defendant’s driving privileges for life when the 
maximum statutory period for revocation was two years).  The portion of Kramer’s 
sentence that revoked his hunting privileges for three years based on consecutive 
one-year terms was unauthorized under the statutory framework.  No matter what 
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purpose or public benefit the circuit court considered in revoking Kramer’s hunting 
privileges for three years, the court cannot exceed the sentence authorized by law.  
Revocation of hunting privileges in this matter should have been for one year from 
the date of convictions as provided by SDCL 41-6-74.1 and SDCL 41-9-8. 
[¶13.]  
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 35 motion 
to correct an illegal sentence and remand with instructions for the court to modify 
the sentence consistent with this opinion. 
 
[¶14.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER 
and MEIERHENRY, Justices, participating.