Case Title: State v. Schubert

Citation: 2022-Ohio-4604

Docket Number: 2021-0761

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Schubert, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4604.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4604 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SCHUBERT, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Schubert, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4604.] 
Criminal law—Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution—Good-faith 
exception to exclusionary rule—Probable cause—For the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule to allow the introduction of evidence 
obtained through a defective search warrant, the affidavit supporting the 
warrant must evince a minimum connection between the item or place 
searched and the alleged criminal activity—Good-faith exception to 
exclusionary rule did not apply to search of cell phones found at 
automobile-accident scene—Warrant to search cell phones lacked probable 
cause—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2021-0761—Submitted April 27, 2022—Decided December 22, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 2020 CA 00040, 
2021-Ohio-1478. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the execution of a constitutionally 
deficient search warrant authorizing the search of cell phones found at the scene of 
a car crash, when nothing in the affidavit supporting the warrant connected the 
phones to the crash other than the police officer’s averment that evidence of how 
the accident occurred “may” be found on the phones.  We determine that the good 
faith-exception does not apply under the facts of this case.  For the objective-good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to allow the introduction of evidence 
obtained through a defective search warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, the affidavit supporting the warrant must evince 
a minimum connection between the item or place searched and the alleged criminal 
activity.  This is not a difficult standard to meet; a minimum connection means only 
some modicum of evidence, however slight, that connects the criminal activity 
described in the affidavit to the item or place searched.  See United States v. White, 
874 F.3d 490, 497 (6th Cir.2017).  The warrant affidavit at issue in this case, even 
when generously construed, does not meet this standard.  Thus, the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to the search of the cell phones in 
this case. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Alan Schubert, drove his car left of center and hit another 
car, causing the death of the driver of the other car.  Police obtained a search warrant 
for Schubert’s blood, and a blood draw was performed by staff of the local hospital 
where Schubert was taken.  His blood tested positive for amphetamine, 
methamphetamine, and fentanyl.  Thereafter, police obtained another search 
warrant for the search of three cell phones that were discovered at the scene of the 
crash.  The probable-cause affidavit signed by the officer who applied for the 
second warrant stated that he was seeking the warrant to search the phones because 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
they “may” contain additional evidence regarding the active aggravated-vehicular-
homicide investigation relating to the crash.  Specifically, the affidavit stated: 
 
The digital device may contain personal identifiers for the owner, 
also date and time stamps for incoming and outgoing calls, text 
messages and/or Internet browsing information.  The affiant submits 
the digital device in question may contain evidence to phone 
conversations, texting, and/or video related to the crimes referenced.  
Also, the use of cloud storage has become so closely tied with many 
devices that the cloud storage functions as an extension of their 
digital devices; for this reason, a person may have data on the cloud 
storage that is not present on the digital device.  For these reasons, 
the affiant requests authorization to seize, listen to, read, review and 
copy, operate and maintain the above described property and 
convert it to human readable form as necessary. 
 
{¶ 3} While searching Schubert’s phone, police discovered what they 
believed to be pictures of nude juveniles.  Schubert was subsequently charged in 
the Licking County Common Pleas Court with five second-degree-felony counts of 
pandering obscenity involving a minor, one fourth-degree-felony count of 
pandering obscenity involving a minor, and one count each of second-degree-
felony and third-degree-felony aggravated vehicular homicide. 
{¶ 4} Schubert filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
search of the phones, arguing that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did 
not establish probable cause upon which the magistrate could issue the warrant.  
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the affidavit established 
probable cause for the search warrant to issue.  Schubert then pleaded no contest to 
all the charges and was found guilty of them.  The court merged the pandering-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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obscenity-involving-a-minor counts and sentenced Schubert to four years in prison 
for that conviction.  The court also merged the aggravated-vehicular-homicide 
counts and sentenced Schubert to eight years in prison for that conviction.  The 
court ordered the four-year and eight-year prison terms to be served consecutively, 
for an aggregate prison term of 12 years. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment denying Schubert’s motion to suppress.  2021-Ohio-1478, 170 
N.E.3d 1296, ¶ 37-43.  In doing so, however, the appellate court disagreed with the 
trial court’s decision that the affidavit supporting the warrant to search the cell 
phones established probable cause for the search.  Id. at ¶ 37.  The appellate court 
noted that at the time police requested the warrant to search the cell phones, they 
already had information about the cause of the crash—the amphetamine and 
methamphetamine in Schubert’s system.  Id.  The court further noted that if the 
affidavit’s assertion that there “may” be evidence of the cause of the crash on the 
phones were enough to establish probable cause to search the phones, then there 
would be probable cause to search any phone discovered at the scene of a crash 
based on mere speculation that the crash was caused by distracted driving.  Id. 
{¶ 6} The appellate court refused to sanction such a blanket rule that 
probable cause always exists in such instances, instead determining that police in 
this case needed to establish a connection between the cell phones and the crash, 
which they had not done.  Id.  Nevertheless, the appellate court upheld the cell-
phone search under the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule set forth in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), 
and adopted by this court in State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 254, 490 N.E.2d 
1236 (1986).  2021-Ohio-1478 at ¶ 38-41. 
{¶ 7} Schubert filed a discretionary appeal to this court, and we accepted 
review of his third proposition of law, which states: 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
An officer cannot reasonably presume a warrant to search a 
cell phone found at a crash scene is valid, when the affidavit 
supporting the warrant only states that the police “may” find 
evidence of how a crash occurred on the phone, without any actual 
evidence that the driver was using his phone when the crash 
occurred. 
 
See 164 Ohio St.3d 1419, 2021-Ohio-2923, 172 N.E.3d 1041. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  The Exclusionary Rule and Leon’s Good-Faith Exception 
{¶ 8} The exclusionary rule safeguards Fourth Amendment rights through 
its deterrent effect.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 
172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 
S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).  In Leon, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that given the heavy societal cost of excluding “inherently trustworthy 
tangible evidence” from a jury’s consideration, id. at 907, the exclusionary rule 
should be applied only when its application will result in appreciable deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations, id. at 909.  The Leon court recognized that when an 
officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable, “ ‘excluding the evidence will not 
further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way.’ ”  Id. at 920, 
quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-540, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 
(1976) (White, J., dissenting).  It thus adopted the objective-good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule for it to be applied to instances in which police acted in an 
objectively reasonable manner.  Id. at 918-919. 
{¶ 9} The court in Leon explained that a police officer’s having relied on a 
warrant issued by a judicial officer—even when the warrant was later determined 
to be invalid for want of probable cause—generally suffices to show that the police 
officer “ ‘acted in good faith in conducting the search.’ ”  468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, 102 S.Ct. 
2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), fn. 32.  Nevertheless, the court made clear that a 
police officer’s reliance on a warrant, even in good faith, must still be “objectively 
reasonable,” id., and that “in some circumstances the [police] officer will have no 
reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued,” id. at 922-
923.  The court then noted certain circumstances in which it would not be 
objectively reasonable for a police officer to rely on a warrant, one being when the 
affidavit supporting the warrant is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ”  Id. at 923, quoting 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring in part).  “An affidavit that is so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause that no reasonable officer would rely on the warrant has come to be 
known as a ‘bare bones’ affidavit.”  White, 874 F.3d at 496, citing United States v. 
Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1380 (6th Cir.1996).  An affidavit is “bare bones” when it 
fails to establish a minimally sufficient nexus between the item or place to be 
searched and the underlying illegal activity.  United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 
518, 526 (6th Cir.2006). 
{¶ 10} To avoid being labeled as “bare bones,” an affidavit must state more 
than “ ‘suspicions, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual 
circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge,’ ” United 
States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir.2019), quoting United States v. 
Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir.2004), fn. 4, and make “ ‘some 
connection,’ ” id. at 313, quoting White at 497, “ ‘between the illegal activity and 
the place to be searched,’ ” id., quoting United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 385 
(6th Cir.2016). 
{¶ 11} The minimally-sufficient-nexus understanding of the “so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause” language employed in Leon developed out of the rule of 
law first announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held that some 
deference must be accorded to a judicial officer’s probable-cause decision.  
Although the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to issue only “upon 
probable cause,” meaning only when the affidavit supporting the warrant 
establishes a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place,” Gates at 238, the court in Gates made clear that the “duty of 
a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for 
* * * conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed,” (ellipsis and brackets added in 
Gates) id. at 239, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 
4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. 83, 85, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).  Thus, even though the 
existence of probable cause is a legal question to be determined on the historical 
facts presented, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 
134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), a warrant should be upheld when the issuing judicial 
officer had a substantial basis for believing that probable cause existed, regardless 
of what the reviewing court’s independent determination regarding probable cause 
might be. 
{¶ 12} With this understanding, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit adopted the Fourth Circuit’s explanation for why a standard less strict 
than that of “substantial basis” applies to the good-faith exception: 
 
“If a lack of a substantial basis also prevented application of 
the Leon objective good faith exception, the exception would be 
devoid of substance.  In fact, Leon states that * * * a finding of 
objective good faith [is inappropriate] when an officer’s affidavit is 
‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in 
its existence entirely unreasonable.’  This is a less demanding 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
showing than the ‘substantial basis’ threshold required to prove the 
existence of probable cause in the first place.” 
 
(Ellipsis and brackets added in Carpenter.)  United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 
591, 595 (6th Cir.2004), quoting United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th 
Cir.2002).  Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that when an affidavit does not 
contain a substantial basis supporting the judicial officer’s finding of probable 
cause but nevertheless contains a “minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal 
activity and the place to be searched,” a police officer relying on the warrant acts 
in objective good faith.  Id. at 596.  Further defining the contours of what 
“minimally sufficient nexus” means, the Sixth Circuit has explained that “[i]f the 
reviewing 
court 
is 
‘able 
to 
identify 
in 
the 
averring 
officer’s 
affidavit some connection, regardless of how remote it may have been’—‘some 
modicum of evidence, however slight’—‘between the criminal activity at issue and 
the place to be searched,’ then the affidavit is not bare bones and official reliance 
on it is reasonable.”  (Emphasis added in Laughton.)  White, 874 F.3d at 497, 
quoting United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 749-750 (6th Cir.2005). 
{¶ 13} The minimally-sufficient-nexus standard thus recognizes the 
Supreme Court’s determination in Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 
677, that a judicial officer is the foremost person responsible for determining 
probable cause and that law-enforcement officers are not expected to have the same 
nuanced understanding of probable cause that judicial officers are expected to have.  
Nevertheless, the minimally-sufficient-nexus standard recognizes the important 
contours of Leon’s holding: that law-enforcement officers also play a role in 
upholding the Fourth Amendment; that it is not always reasonable for law 
enforcement to rely on a judicial officer’s finding of probable cause and that when 
it is unreasonable to do so, the exclusionary rule should apply to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment; and that when a warrant is based on an affidavit that is so lacking in 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the existence of probable 
cause entirely unreasonable, no well-trained law-enforcement officer should rely 
on it. 
B.  The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply 
{¶ 14} We conclude that under the facts of this case, the warrant affidavit 
at issue does not evince a minimal connection between the alleged criminal activity 
and the three cell phones discovered at the scene of the car crash.  Thus, the 
appellate court erred in applying Leon’s good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
{¶ 15} The warrant affidavit at issue includes the following factual 
assertions: 
 
On June 20, 2018, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Trooper 
Vogelmeier was dispatched to a fatal crash on SR 37 near Milepost 
23 in Licking County, Union Township, Ohio.  According to 
Vogelmeier’s report, evidence at the scene indicates the vehicle 
driven by Alan Schubert was traveling Southbound on SR 37 and 
crossed left of center striking Northbound vehicle driven by [the 
victim]. 
* * * 
[The victim] died as a result of the injuries sustained in the 
crash.  Mr. Schubert was transported to the hospital with serious 
injuries.  An official statement was not taken from Mr. Schubert and 
he told a sergeant on scene he did not remember how the crash 
occurred.  A blood sample from Mr. Schubert was obtained from 
Grant Hospital via a search warrant through Licking County.  Those 
results 
were 
returned 
positive 
for 
amphetamine 
and 
methamphetamine. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
There were no witnesses to the crash and the three phones 
were found outside of the vehicles at the scene. 
 
The affiant, Sergeant John Chaney of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, then offered 
the following: 
 
Affiant avers, based on his knowledge, training and 
experience, the digital devices in question, may contain additional 
evidence into the criminal investigation.  The digital device may 
contain personal identifiers for the owner, also date and time stamps 
for incoming and outgoing calls, text messages and/or Internet 
browsing information.  The affiant submits the digital device in 
question may contain evidence to phone conversations, texting 
and/or video related to the crimes referenced.  Also, the use of cloud 
storage has become so closely tied with many devices that the cloud 
storage functions as an extension of their digital devices; for this 
reason, a person may have data on the cloud storage that is not 
present on the digital device.  For these reasons, the affiant requests 
authorization to seize, listen to, read, review and copy, operate and 
maintain the above described property and convert it to human 
readable form as necessary. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 16} Of course, much of this statement is obviously true.  Cell phones and 
other digital devices regularly contain personal identifiers and call, text, and 
internet-browsing information, and they have cloud storage that can function as an 
extension of the device.  Critically missing from this affidavit, however, is 
information providing any reason to believe that the material listed in it would 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
contain evidence relevant to the crash in this case.  Although the affiant bases his 
assertion that the cell phones “may” contain evidence of an aggravated vehicular 
homicide on his “knowledge, training and experience,” he does not venture to 
explain what that knowledge, training, or experience amounts to, let alone how it 
relates to the facts of this case.  Without that information, the affidavit’s language 
is wholly conclusory as to the existence of probable cause to search the cell phones.  
Furthermore, the affiant’s repeated use of the term “may” patently signals that 
whatever his beliefs might have been regarding potential evidence on the phones, 
they were based in complete speculation.  A well-trained police officer offering or 
encountering this language should know that such conclusory and speculative 
statements, without more, do not support a finding of probable cause.  See Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111-115, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (an affidavit 
that states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying 
factual circumstances pertaining to veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, is 
a bare-bones affidavit), abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527. 
{¶ 17} Moving beyond the affiant’s conclusory and speculative assertion 
that there “may” be evidence on the phones, there is not a single fact or statement 
in the remainder of the affidavit, nor are there any inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom, suggesting that the phones had anything to do with the crime of 
aggravated vehicular homicide.  To begin, the averments concerning the 
circumstances of the crash simply explain where and when it occurred and that 
Schubert’s car went left of center and hit the victim’s car.  None of these averments 
suggest that the cell phones might contain evidence of the crime of aggravated 
vehicular homicide. 
{¶ 18} The affiant’s additional averments that the victim died, that there 
were no witnesses to the crash, and that Schubert did not remember how the crash 
occurred fare no better in supplying the necessary, albeit minimal connection 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
between the cell phones and the alleged crime.  On the contrary, these statements 
highlight the utter lack of any facts or evidence suggesting that the phones were 
involved in causing the crash.  For example, had the victim survived or had there 
been witnesses to the crash, those individuals may have been able to say that they 
saw Schubert using his phone at the time of the crash.  If this hypothetical 
information were available and included in the affidavit, it would create at least a 
minimally sufficient connection between the phones and the alleged crime.  
Similarly, if Schubert had had better recall of the incident, he might have been able 
to offer some insight as to what happened just before the collision.  And if this 
insight were included in the affidavit, it may have suggested some connection 
between the phones and the alleged crime.  But because none of this information or 
insight was available, there was no minimally sufficient nexus between any 
evidence that might have been found on the phones and the crime. 
{¶ 19} It is axiomatic that a proper finding of probable cause requires the 
affidavit to show not only the affiant’s knowledge but also that the affiant has 
sufficient basis for the knowledge.  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527 (a judicial officer’s job is to determine “whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and 
‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place”).  It is thus inconceivable that an affiant’s lack of knowledge could somehow 
contribute to a finding of probable cause. 
{¶ 20} The statement in the affidavit noting that Schubert’s blood had tested 
positive for the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine after the crash also 
supplies no connection whatsoever between the crime and the cell phones.  Indeed, 
the rational inference that may be drawn from that fact is that impaired driving 
caused the crash.  That this is the only evidence or information in the affidavit that 
suggests what may have caused Schubert’s car to cross the center line, and that it 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
bears no connection to the cell phones, is significant and further informs our 
analysis.  The ultimate question in this case is whether the affidavit supporting the 
warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would 
have relied on the warrant.  An affidavit that includes facts and statements that 
affirmatively cut against a finding of probable cause—as opposed to simply being 
neutral on the issue—not only fails to support a finding of probable cause but 
affirmatively reduces any indicia of it and thus informs whether an officer’s 
reliance on the warrant was reasonable.  See People v. Smith, 2022 CO 38, 511 P.3d 
647, ¶ 25; United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 897 (10th Cir.2004). 
{¶ 21} On these facts, we hold that the information in the warrant affidavit 
did not establish a minimal connection between the alleged crime of aggravated 
vehicular homicide and the cell phones that were searched.  We therefore reverse 
the Fifth District’s judgment affirming the trial court’s denial of Schubert’s motion 
to suppress on the court of appeals’ ground that the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applied.  To hold otherwise would allow bare-bones affidavits 
like the one at issue here to be used time and time again in future investigations 
whenever one or more cell phones or similar electronic devices are discovered at a 
crime scene. 
{¶ 22} We recognize that it may seem to some that this decision indicates 
that we expect a police officer to know more than a judicial officer about what 
constitutes probable cause and that some may find it unfair to hold police 
accountable for a judicial officer’s mistake.  However, in any case in which a 
warrant is deemed facially invalid, the fact that the judicial officer issued the 
warrant in the first place means that the judicial officer believed that probable cause 
existed.  The United States Supreme Court recognized this fact in Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.  But the court nevertheless made clear that 
law enforcement still has a duty to act reasonably in executing a warrant and that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
there is no irrebuttable presumption of good-faith reliance regarding all warrants 
that excuses all facial deficiencies.  See id. at 923-924. 
{¶ 23} The Supreme Court’s decision in Leon tacitly recognizes that all 
parties involved with securing and executing a warrant are required to uphold 
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.  And each government official involved 
with obtaining and executing a search warrant plays a role in protecting those rights.  
While the judicial officer is the official initially tasked with determining whether 
probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, the government’s duty to adhere to 
the Fourth Amendment does not stop there. 
{¶ 24} Leon makes clear that police officers also play a role in protecting 
Fourth Amendment rights.  They are  required to (1) be truthful in search-warrant 
affidavits, (2) not rely on warrants that they know were rubber-stamped by a 
judicial officer who did not make an independent determination of probable cause, 
(3) know that a warrant is facially deficient when it fails to state with particularity 
the item or place to be searched and the things to be seized, and (4) not execute a 
warrant that is so lacking in indicia probable cause that no well-trained officer 
would reasonably rely on it.  See Leon at 923.  Courts reviewing a challenged search 
warrant also play a role in upholding the Fourth Amendment; they are required to 
suppress evidence when the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not 
apply because one or more of these four requirements has not been met and it was 
unreasonable for the police officer to rely on the warrant.  See Leon at 923.  While 
it might seem unfair that the law requires a police officer to question a judicial 
officer’s probable-cause determination before the officer may properly execute the 
warrant, that is in fact what the law requires.  Thus, when the issue before this court 
is viewed in its proper context, it is clear that finding the good-faith exception 
inapplicable in this case and excluding the evidence obtained in the illegal search 
does not punish law enforcement for the judicial officer’s failure but simply ensures 
that the Fourth Amendment is not eroded. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
C.  Probable Cause to Issue the Warrant Was Lacking 
{¶ 25} Our holding today is that the appellate court erred in applying the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this case, and we reverse the 
appellate court’s judgment on that basis.  However, we affirm the appellate court’s 
determination that the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause and that 
the warrant should not have been issued.1  See 2019-Ohio-1478, 170 N.E.3d 1296, 
at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 26} The warrant at issue in this case granted broad access to search all 
data on three cell phones for evidence of “intent to commit a violation of” R.C 
2903.06, aggravated vehicular homicide.  The judicial officer issued the warrant, 
thus granting the state’s request for unfettered access to search the phones.  
However, the warrant was not supported by probable cause, but rather mere 
 
1.  Although the state did not ask this court to accept a discretionary appeal of the appellate court’s 
judgment that the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to search the cell phones, we 
nevertheless feel it necessary to address that question to discourage future Fourth Amendment 
violations of this sort.  The state’s decision not to appeal the appellate court’s probable-cause 
determination in no way limits our ability to determine whether the warrant affidavit supported a 
finding of probable cause to search.  Indeed, in response to arguments raised in Leon that the 
Supreme Court’s adoption of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would cause Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to suffer, the court stated: 
 
If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is necessary 
to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing will 
prevent reviewing courts from deciding that question before turning to the good-
faith issue.  Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers 
acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue.  Even if the 
Fourth Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing courts could 
decide in particular cases that magistrates under their supervision need to be 
informed of their errors and so evaluate the officers’ good faith only after finding 
a violation.  In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression motions 
posing no important Fourth Amendment questions by turning immediately to a 
consideration of the officers’ good faith.  We have no reason to believe that our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing reviewing courts to 
exercise an informed discretion in making this choice. 
 
468 U.S. at 925, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.  The significant privacy interests at stake here, as 
well as law-enforcement and judicial officers’ apparent need for guidance in this area, compel our 
consideration of the probable-cause question. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
conjecture.  Not only does the supporting affidavit reflect this truth—as we have 
explained in detail above—but so does the trial court’s decision denying Schubert’s 
motion to suppress.  Specifically, the judgment entry denying the motion to 
suppress states: 
 
The affidavit for Exhibit 3 specifies it is to search cellular 
telephones, including SIM cards and/or SD cards for each phone, 
related documentation, passwords, encryption keys, access codes, 
voicemail, email, and geographical information.  It alleges these 
devices may contain personal identities for the owner, date and time 
stamps for incoming and outgoing calls, text messages and/or 
internet browsing information, evidence pursuant to phone 
conversations, texting or video relating to these crimes.  It also 
explains how Cloud storage could indicate use and time even with a 
lack of anything on the digital device. 
 * * * 
In the present case, it is unknown what may be on the phone 
to indicate distracted driving, only that three phones were found at 
the scene, which may have belonged to the defendant or the decedent 
or anyone else, and may have been evidence of distracted driving to 
explain the left-of-center fatal crash. 
The court finds the affidavit is sufficient to set forth 
reasonable grounds to search the cell phones found at the scene of 
the crash. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 27} It is clear from this entry that the trial court was operating under the 
mistaken belief that as a matter of policy, any time there is a car crash, police may 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
search any cell phones discovered at the scene to discern whether there is evidence 
of distracted driving.  This shows that the court was not evaluating the particular 
facts presented in the warrant affidavit to determine whether there was a fair 
probability that the phones would contain evidence of the crime—i.e., the probable-
cause analysis—but rather was ruling in accordance with its mistaken belief about 
the law concerning probable-cause determinations as to cell phones recovered at the 
scene of a crash. 
{¶ 28} On appeal, the Fifth District took note of this error.  It explained the 
simple truth that cell phones are likely to be found at the scene of any car crash and 
that without an affidavit’s presenting specific, case-related facts showing a fair 
probability that evidence of the crime will be found on the phones, it can only be 
speculated that the phones played any role in the crash.  2021-Ohio-1478, 170 
N.E.3d 1296, at ¶ 37.  The court of appeals explicitly “declin[ed] to adopt a rule 
[that] police may obtain a warrant to search every cell phone found in a car crash on 
the speculation evidence of texting or other improper cell phone use while driving 
‘may’ be found in the phone,” and it reversed the trial court’s determination that 
probable cause existed to search the cell phones.  Id.  We agree with the appellate 
court’s analysis on that issue and affirm its determination that there was not probable 
cause to issue the warrant to search the cell phones. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the warrant at issue in 
this case is defective under the Fourth Amendment for want of probable cause in 
the warrant’s supporting affidavit.  We further conclude that because the warrant 
affidavit failed to establish any connection between the cell phones recovered at the 
scene of the crash and the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide, the affidavit is 
“bare bones” and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.  
We therefore reverse the Fifth District’s judgment affirming the trial court’s denial 
of Schubert’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
constitutionally defective search warrant, and we remand the cause to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I dissent from the majority’s decision that the good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule does not apply to the initial cell-phone searches in this case 
because the affidavit supporting the warrant is bare-bones.  An affidavit is not “bare 
bones” merely because it “lacks the requisite facts and inferences to sustain the 
magistrate’s probable-cause finding; rather, it must be so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause that, despite a judicial officer having issued a warrant, no reasonable 
officer would rely on it.”  (Emphasis sic.)  United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 
497 (6th Cir.2017).  The affidavit at issue here does not state suspicions or 
conclusions but makes a connection between the fatal automobile accident and the 
cell phones found at the accident scene—it is not bare bones.  Therefore, I would 
affirm the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals. 
I.  FACTS 
{¶ 31} I agree with the facts and procedural history set forth in the majority 
opinion and rely on those here.  However, it is necessary to clarify which officers 
were involved in obtaining and executing the search warrants. 
{¶ 32} After receiving the results of appellant Alan Schubert’s blood test, 
Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant John Chaney applied for the search warrant to 
search the three cell phones found at the accident scene.  It was his affidavit in 
support of the warrant that the Franklin County municipal-court judge considered 
in finding probable cause to issue the warrant to search the three cell phones. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
{¶ 33} The search of the cell phones, however, was executed by Ohio State 
Highway Patrol Forensic Computer Specialist Keith Ferguson.  It was Ferguson 
who found nude pictures of juvenile females on Schubert’s phone.  Based on this 
information, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Evan Cox applied for and was 
granted an additional search warrant to search Schubert’s phone for child 
pornography. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of review 
{¶ 34} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question 
of law and fact.”  State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 
N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.  An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if 
they are supported by competent, credible evidence.  See State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio 
St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).  But the appellate court must decide the legal 
questions de novo.  Burnside at ¶ 8. 
B.  An affidavit that is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable 
officer would rely on it precludes application of the good-faith exception 
{¶ 35} The crux of the dispute is whether the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant regarding the cell phones was so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to preclude application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  An 
affidavit that is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause * * * render[s] official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ”  (Ellipsis and brackets added.)  
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), 
quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring in part).  This inquiry requires a court to determine whether 
the officer who executed the warrant “ ‘reasonably believed that the warrant was 
properly issued, not whether probable cause existed in fact.’ ”  (Emphasis added in 
Carpenter.)  United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 752 (6th Cir.2005), quoting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir.2004) (Gilman, J., 
concurring). 
{¶ 36} As stated above, an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
that no reasonable officer would rely on the warrant” is known as a “bare bones” 
affidavit.  White, 874 F.3d at 496.  However, an affidavit is not bare bones merely 
because it lacks the requisite facts and inferences to sustain the probable-cause 
finding.  Id. at 496-497. 
{¶ 37} To avoid being labeled as “bare bones,” an affidavit must state more 
than “ ‘suspicions, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual 
circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge,’ ” United 
States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir.2019), quoting United States v. 
Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir.2004), fn. 4, and make “ ‘some 
connection,’ ” id. at 313, quoting White at 497, “ ‘between the illegal activity and 
the place to be searched,’ ” id., quoting United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 385 
(6th Cir.2016). 
{¶ 38} In Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, the United 
States Supreme Court cited two classic examples of bare-bones affidavits, which 
were respectively considered in  Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46-47, 
54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 
1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.  In Nathanson, the affiant had said 
nothing more than that “ ‘he has cause to suspect and does believe that’ ” liquor 
illegally brought into the United States “ ‘is now deposited and contained within 
the premises’ ” belonging to the defendant in that case.  Id. at 44.  In Aguilar, a 
warrant was obtained based only on officers’ statements that they had “ ‘received 
reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, 
barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions 
of the law.’ ”  Id. at 109. 
{¶ 39} And in a recent case, Spencer v. Staton, 489 F.3d 658, 661-662 (5th 
Cir.2007), opinion withdrawn in part on rehearing, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an affidavit that set forth the suspect’s 
biographical and contact information, the charged offense, and a conclusory 
statement that the suspect had assisted her husband and her brother-in-law in 
evading authorities was “a textbook example of a facially invalid, ‘barebones’ 
affidavit.”  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly held that an affidavit 
stating that the defendant had been the last person to have contact with the victim, 
that the defendant had been convicted of and had served time in prison for murder 
and attempted murder, and that an unknown source had indicated that the defendant 
dealt marijuana was bare bones.  United States v. West, 520 F.3d 604, 607, 610 (6th 
Cir.2008).  The court in West concluded, “Taken on its face, the affidavit is bereft 
of any facts that suggest any connection between [the victim’s] disappearance and 
any evidence likely to be found at the residence or in the van.  Instead, the affidavit 
is based on unsubstantiated conclusions and unreliable hearsay, and accordingly, is 
constitutionally deficient.”  Id. at 610. 
{¶ 40} Guided by these examples, this court should hold that Sergeant 
Chaney’s affidavit is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
Ferguson’s official belief in the existence of probable cause when executing the 
search entirely unreasonable. 
C.  The affidavit at issue is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
preclude application of the good-faith exception 
{¶ 41} In this case, the municipal-court judge found probable cause to 
search the cell phones based on Sergeant Chaney’s affidavit.  The affidavit stated 
that Schubert had been driving a vehicle that went left of center and struck an 
oncoming vehicle.  There were no witnesses to the crash, Schubert had no memory 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
of how the crash had occurred, and the driver of the other vehicle involved in the 
crash died in the crash.  The affidavit reported that Schubert’s blood had tested 
positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.  And it explained that three cell 
phones whose owners had not been identified were found at the scene of the crash.  
Sergeant Chaney averred that “based on his knowledge, training and experience,” 
the phones might contain “personal identifiers for the owner, also date and time 
stamps for incoming and outgoing calls, text messages and/or Internet browsing 
information” and evidence of “phone conversations, texting and/or video related to 
the crimes referenced.” 
{¶ 42} The affidavit looks nothing like the prototypical bare-bones 
affidavits first identified by the Leon court and later by the federal courts of appeals.  
The statements in the affidavit are not so vague as to be wholly conclusory or 
merely conjecture.  Instead, they suggest some connection between the fatal 
automobile accident and the cell phones found at the accident scene; they suggest 
that information about how the crash occurred, such as whether distracted driving 
by one of the drivers was a factor in the fatal crash, may be found on the cell phones.  
That is all that is needed.  As such, the affidavit is not “bare bones.”  To find 
otherwise fails to put daylight between a bare-bones affidavit and one that merely 
lacks probable cause.  See United States v. Gilbert, 952 F.3d 759, 763 (6th 
Cir.2020). 
{¶ 43} The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, provides 
support for this conclusion.  In Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit considered the 
following affidavit language setting forth the reasons why the law-enforcement 
officer in that case believed that evidence of criminal conduct would be found in 
the residence to be searched: 
 
On June 23, 1999 at approx[imately] 12:30 pm, Helicopter 
Pilot Lt. Bob Crumley was conducting an aerial search of Hawkins 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
23 
Co when he was flying over the above described property he saw 
numerous Marijuana Plants growing.  Near the residence. 
Upon information I received from Lt. Crumley, there is a 
road connecting the above described residence to the Marijuana 
Plants.  Having personal knowledge that Lt. Crumley is certified in 
the identification of Marijuana I feel there is probable cause to 
search the said residence and property and seize any illegal 
contraband found. 
 
(Brackets added.)  Id. at 593. 
{¶ 44} The court concluded that there was no probable cause to search the 
residence, because the affidavit failed to provide the required nexus between the 
residence and the illegal activity.  Id. at 595.  However, it could not say that the 
affidavit was “completely devoid of any nexus between the residence and the 
marijuana that the police observed.”  Id. at 595-596.  Specifically, the court noted 
the affidavit’s inclusion of the facts that “marijuana was growing ‘near’ the 
residence and that ‘there is a road connecting’ the residence and the marijuana 
plants.”  Id. at 596. 
{¶ 45} Similarly, there is some nexus in this case between the fatal 
automobile accident and the cell phones found at the accident scene.  The affidavit 
states that Schubert was driving the vehicle that went left of center and struck an 
oncoming vehicle, that three cell phones were found at the scene of the crash, and 
that based on Sergeant Chaney’s knowledge, training, and experience, the phones 
might contain “date and time stamps for incoming and outgoing calls, text messages 
and/or Internet browsing information” and evidence of “phone conversations, 
texting and/or video related to the crimes referenced.”  Therefore, the affidavit was 
not “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable,’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 611, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part). 
{¶ 46} This conclusion is not altered by the fact that drugs were found in 
Schubert’s system.  While the presence of drugs in Schubert’s system may provide 
an explanation for his driving left of center, it does not eliminate all other possible 
causes of the fatal crash, such as distracted driving by either Schubert or the driver 
of the other vehicle.  Just because there was one factor known to be a possible cause 
of the accident does not mean there were no other factors that could have caused 
the accident. 
{¶ 47} Here, Ferguson acted with an objectively reasonable, good-faith 
belief in the validity of the warrant when executing the search of the cell phones.  
The search warrant regarding the cell phones had been issued by a judicial officer 
and was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would 
rely on it.  Ferguson acted within the scope of the warrant.  And when the search 
revealed nude pictures of juvenile females, Ferguson stopped the search and police 
applied for another warrant.  The good-faith exception applies here. 
{¶ 48} To echo the  Leon court, it was the issuing judge’s “responsibility to 
determine whether the officer’s allegations establish[ed] probable cause and, if so, 
to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment,” 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.  Here, the judge 
found probable cause and issued the warrant.  There are no facts in the record that 
should cause us to expect a reasonable officer executing the warrant to question the 
judge’s probable-cause determination. 
D.  The majority conflates an affidavit that is bare bones with an affidavit that 
lacks probable cause 
{¶ 49} “Too often courts raise the Leon bar, making it practically 
indistinguishable from the probable cause standard itself.”  Christian, 925 F.3d at 
318 (Thapar, J., concurring).  This is what the majority has done in concluding that 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
25 
the affidavit at issue is bare bones; it has  “confuse[d] a bare bones affidavit with 
one that merely lacks probable cause,” Gilbert, 952 F.3d at 763. 
{¶ 50} The majority ignores the verifiable facts in the affidavit, which 
establish “some connection” between the fatal automobile accident and the cell 
phones found at the accident scene.  Instead, the majority requires the establishment 
of probable cause for the affidavit to avoid being labeled as “bare bones.”  In doing 
so, the majority fails to heed the fact that “[t]here must be daylight between the 
‘bare bones’ and ‘substantial basis’ standards if Leon’s good-faith exception is to 
strike the desired balance between safeguarding Fourth Amendment rights and 
facilitating the criminal justice system’s truth-seeking function.”  Id. 
E.  The majority’s consideration of probable cause is inappropriate 
{¶ 51} As the majority recognizes, the state did not appeal the appellate 
court’s determination that the affidavit in support of the initial search warrant 
regarding the three cell phones lacked probable cause.  Nevertheless, it proceeds to 
consider that probable-cause issue and affirms the appellate court’s holding that the 
affidavit lacked probable cause and therefore the warrant should not have been 
issued.  It does so on the belief that such review is necessary to discourage future, 
similar Fourth Amendment violations. 
{¶ 52} “It has long been the policy of this court not to address issues not 
raised by the parties. * * * This court should be hesitant to decide such matters for 
the reason that justice is far better served when it has the benefit of briefing, 
arguing, and lower court consideration before making a final determination.”  
Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2.  An 
appellate court relies on the parties in a case to determine the issues before the court 
and to argue the applicable law: 
 
“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate 
courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
but [preside] essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and 
argued by the parties before them.”  Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 
171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983).  Proceeding to decide an issue not briefed 
by the parties creates “ ‘the risk “of an improvident or ill-advised 
opinion, given [the court’s] dependence * * * on the adversarial 
process for sharpening the issues for decision.” ’ ”  Carbino v. West, 
168 F.3d 32, 35 (D.C.Cir.1999), quoting Headrick v. Rockwell 
Internatl. Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1278 (10th Cir.1994), quoting 
Herbert v. Natl. Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 
(D.C.Cir.1992). 
 
(Brackets and ellipsis sic.)  State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 
933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 53} This court should follow these principles, exercise a modicum of 
judicial restraint, and refrain from deciding issues that no party has asked this court 
to review and that the parties have had no opportunity to weigh in on. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 54} The affidavit supporting the warrant set forth facts and 
circumstances that provided some connection between the fatal automobile 
accident and the cell phones found at the accident scene and was not bare bones.  It 
was not so utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in 
the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable, thereby preventing 
application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  Therefore, the 
specialist who executed the warrant to search the cell phones acted in good-faith 
reliance on the warrant.  Any error under the Fourth Amendment in this case rests 
with the judge who issued the challenged warrant, not with the law-enforcement 
employee who executed the warrant.  Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals.  Because the majority does otherwise, I dissent. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
27 
FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Jenny Wells, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Clay Mischka, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Campbell Law, L.L.C., and April F. Campbell, for appellant. 
_________________