Case Title: Timmons v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 316 P.2d 935, 83 Ariz. 74

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1957-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
83 Ariz. 74 (1957) 316 P.2d 935 Leo M. TIMMONS, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent. No. 6350. Supreme Court of Arizona. October 29, 1957. *75 H.S. McCluskey, Phoenix, for petitioner. John R. Franks, Robert K. Park, and James D. Lester, Phoenix, of counsel, Donald J. Morgan, Phoenix, for respondent Industrial Commission of Arizona. UDALL, Chief Justice. Review by certiorari of an award of the Industrial Commission. The issues presented are the claimed inadequacy of compensation allowed; the matter of attorneys' fees and procedural questions. Statement of Facts Petitioner, Leo M. Timmons, on March 5, 1953, admittedly sustained multiple injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as a truck driver with Fannin's Gas & Equipment. *76 Company. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, the insurance carrier, promptly assumed jurisdiction by holding the claim to be compensable and it was treated as an "odd lot" or unscheduled injury. Petitioner subsequent to the date of injury was allowed compensation for temporary disability in the aggregate sum of $7,754.84, in addition to which he was furnished hospitalization and other accident benefits. The principal injuries suffered by the 43-year-old petitioner were a compression fracture of the 8th and 12th thoracic vertebrae, possibly a slight injury to the 1st and 2nd lumbar vertebrae, coupled with a bruise and sprain of the left hip. The injured man was promptly hospitalized and his upper body put in a cast. In due time the fractured vertebrae healed, the cast was removed and he has since worn a brace. No useful purpose would be served in attempting a seriatim review of the voluminous record presented in this case. It would only create confusion and leave the reader in a haze for it is needlessly verbose. Respondent correctly states that the proceedings had before the Commission constituted a legal marathon. Medical History It manifestly appears that during the more than three-year interval between the date of injury and the final award the petitioner was furnished the very best of medical care. In all a dozen or more of the "top flight" doctors of Phoenix each a specialist in his particular field performed some service in connection with the various treatments administered. At different times, four separate medical boards were appointed by the Commission to examine petitioner and evaluate his record. In each instance the doctors were unanimous in their findings and recommendations and Dr. Hartman, his regular physician, agreed with their conclusions. As early as December 18, 1953, the first consultation board found that the patient "was making satisfactory progress", and with respect to the back they recommended the patient "should carry on exercises at home under the occasional supervision of his attending physician." It was further their view that "The patient should, shortly after the first of the year, be able to return to light work." The second consultation board, on April 2, 1954, made these comments: Based upon this report the Commission, on April 23, 1954, found petitioner's condition to have become stationary and it made an award for temporary disability pending determination of loss of earning capacity. The petitioner was ordered to make a sincere, honest and conscientious effort to obtain light work and report his earnings therefrom. A petition for rehearing was filed, the basis of which was that counsel insisted on his right to cross-examine the doctors who signed said report. This was granted and later a third medical consultation board was convened. These doctors, under date of September 17, 1954, stated that in view of changes noted in the lumbar region they felt a more intensive study of the case should be made by Dr. George McKhann before final evaluation was made. This doctor, who specializes in internal medicine, rehospitalized petitioner and with the aid of laboratory tests and x-ray films made a most thorough study of the man as a whole in an endeavor to find the cause of the subjective complaint that he still suffered constant pain and was unable to do even the lightest work. He suspicioned a low-grade infection but was unable to verify this or find any other objective reason for such complaints. Thereafter, on January 14, 1955, a fourth medical board convened. These four doctors: Eisenbeiss, Haines, Steelman and James R. Moore, after again carefully reviewing the whole record, made these comments: The Commission accepted this report and ultimately found petitioner's condition to be stationary as of that date. Petitioner's Position Throughout these proceedings it has been petitioner's contention as shown by the various petitions for rehearing that at all times since the injury he has been and now is a totally disabled person and is therefore unemployable; has never recovered from his injuries and is unable to work even if it were available; he is without education or technical training and hence employment would necessarily be limited to manual labor. He avows that, nevertheless, in accordance with the directions of the Commission and the doctors, he repeatedly endeavored to obtain some remunerative employment but was unable to *78 do so. It appears from the record that the reported earnings since date of injury amounted to only $90.35. In keeping with this premise petitioner stoutly maintains that, as a result of the injury, he has suffered a 100% loss of earning capacity. It is very apparent from the record that he is unwilling to accept any award that gives him less than such a rating. The Final Award The Commission, based upon the record then before it, on June 8, 1956 made certain findings and entered its final award in favor of petitioner for unscheduled permanent partial disability, which award was affirmed on rehearing. Inter alia the Commission found: It is further recited therein that in determining the ultimate question, viz.: petitioner's loss of earning capacity, the Commission took into consideration all of the factors enumerated in A.R.S. § 23-1044 (D), including the fact that the employee had a 15% general physical functional disability. The award followed the findings and gave compensation to petitioner in the sum of $65 per month. By assignments of error and propositions of law petitioner challenges finding No. 7 supra, that his condition is stationary; also all of finding No. 8, supra, which fixed the sum of $200 as the amount he is now able to earn; his contention being that both *79 findings are without support in the evidence and in fact are contrary to the evidence for the reason that the record conclusively establishes he is totally disabled and therefore unemployable. Applicant having repeatedly alleged that his physical condition never became stationary; that he was totally disabled and had therefore suffered a 100% loss of earning capacity, it was incumbent upon him to prove these things. The Commission, as trier of fact, was at liberty to choose whom to believe. We hold it was not compelled to accept the testimony of petitioner that his condition was not stationary and that he was totally disabled to the extent he could not even perform light work. To have done so it must necessarily have rejected evidence given by, and the unanimous opinion of, the members of the medical profession (a) his physical status had become stationary, (b) he had only a 15% physical functional disability, and (c) he was able to perform light work even though some pain would ensue for a period of time. See Harmon v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 40, 258 P.2d 427. It is apparent from the record the belief probably honestly entertained by petitioner that he is wholly disabled and can do no work, stems in part from a negative and uncooperative attitude. He sought employment as a crippled person and while we do not dispute the moral obligation of informing a prospective employer of one's physical disabilities, nonetheless a positive attitude is necessary to compete successfully in the labor market. This defeatist attitude is reflected in his relationship with the doctors, one of whom testified: This same doctor stated the man had "a chip on his shoulder" and was "antagonistic", all of which led him to advise petitioner he probably needed "psychiatric treatment". When petitioner was questioned concerning his ability to work he stated: The result of all of the above, the injuries and resultant attitude shown by petitioner, is unemployment. This unemployability is urged as a basis for total disability. What we said in Kelsey v. Industrial *80 Commission, 79 Ariz. 191, 286 P.2d 195, 197, is apropos here: In Davidson v. Industrial Commission, 72 Ariz. 314, 235 P.2d 1007, at page 1009, we stated: This brings us to the crucial question as to whether there is any evidence in the record to sustain the Commission in its finding that petitioner was able to earn $200 per month doing light work. There must be some evidence showing the kind of light work the man is capable of performing and some evidence showing what he can earn at the work he is able to do. It will be recalled that in the final award several categories were enumerated, viz.: No witnesses were called to show that petitioner could do any of these jobs; nor is there any competent evidence as to what a man in such a category could earn. Apparently the Commission seeks to justify the $200 figure by asserting that its statutory duties, e.g., fixing minimum wages in certain cases for women and minors; fixing the prevailing rate of per diem wages on public works; supervising and licensing employment agencies; together with the knowledge obtained from monthly reports from the Employment Security Commission, which are required by law to be filed with it; entitled it in the instant case to take "judicial notice" of wages earned by those in these fields. In an attempt to further bolster its position the Commission has filed with us what it labels an "Economic Brief" containing statistical facts along such lines *81 compiled from its records. Inasmuch as this voluminous document was not produced at the hearings, nor counsel given any opportunity to rebut it or cross-examine any of those compiling such data, we are of the opinion that it cannot be used for any purpose and should be stricken from the record. Furthermore we hold the Commission cannot sustain its position in this matter by invoking the doctrine of "judicial knowledge". A comparable problem as to a lack of evidence was presented in the case of Davis v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 173, 309 P.2d 793, 795. Therein, Justice Windes, speaking for a unanimous court, laid down the following legal principle we believe should govern in the instant case, viz.: However, there is this difference in the two cases: the doctors in the Davis case, supra, were of the opinion the injured man would not be able to carry on even moderately light work and that further treatment, including a possible operation, was indicated, whereas in the instant case medical evidence as to petitioner's ability to do light work supports the Commission's finding. Furthermore we believe the Commission was correct in concluding that where, as here, a man had only a 15% physical functional disability there was surely some gainful work he could do. There being no competent evidence to sustain the Commission's finding as to petitioner's future earning ability, the award as to this feature must be set aside. A further assignment of error is the failure of the Commission to follow the 25% contingent fee contract in their award of attorneys' fees. Counsel and petitioner both testified before the Commission that the terms of said contract were satisfactory to them. Petitioner assigns as error a failure to adhere to such evidence in their award. In McCluskey v. Industrial Commission, 80 Ariz. 255, 296 P.2d 443, 447, we had present counsel advancing the same complaint based on a like contract (the only *82 distinction being, there the attorney relied upon the naked contract). We stated if counsel wished to seek the certainty of payment, i.e., through an award from the Commission, he has to forsake specific control of the amount of his fee. We held the Commission is guided, but not bound, by the terms of a prior agreement between attorney and claimant. We also stated in McCluskey, supra: A.R.S. § 23-1069 (formerly chapter 112, Laws 1953) provides for the Commission, upon application of the attorney or claimant, to fix a "reasonable attorney's fee" for such legal services as may be "reasonably necessary to the processing of the claim." We hold the Commission's action herein allowing a fee of $1250 is supported by the record. In sustaining the fee allowed for services rendered to the date of the final award we do not intend to close the door so as to prohibit counsel from later seeking additional compensation from the Commission for necessary services subsequently rendered. We find no merit to the complaint as to procedural irregularities. It appears to us from a careful examination of the entire record that from a procedural standpoint the Commission liberally construed the law and their regulations so as to give petitioner every opportunity to fairly present his claim. The numerous rehearings granted attest to this. Some of the threadbare objections, e.g., the failure of the individual commissioners to attend a hearing or personally observe the claimant; an attorney employed by the Commission being permitted to act as a referee; the Commission acting in a dual capacity, i.e., as trustee of the insurance fund and sitting as a quasijudicial body in determining claims for compensation; the Commission's right to appoint medical consulting boards, etc.; have all previously been passed upon adversely to petitioner's contention. The leading case on the general subject being Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors, 48 Ariz. 104, 59 P.2d 649. We adhere to the previous pronouncements of this court on such matters. The award as to attorneys' fees is affirmed; the finding as to petitioner's future earning ability and the award bottomed thereon are set aside. WINDES, PHELPS, STRUCKMEYER, and JOHNSON, JJ., concurring.