Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sarah Clemment

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001933-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1933-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sarah Clemment, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Sarah Clemment, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CLEMMENT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2018 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1933-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sarah Clemment, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Sarah Clemment, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of Referee John 
Nicholas Schweitzer recommending that Attorney Sarah Clemment be 
declared in default, concluding that Attorney Clemment engaged 
in professional misconduct, and recommending that she be 
publicly reprimanded.  Attorney Clemment failed to present a 
defense despite being given the opportunity to do so, and she 
did not oppose the Office of Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) motion 
for default.  Accordingly, we declare her to be in default.  We 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
2 
 
also conclude that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction 
for her misconduct.  We further agree with the referee that 
Attorney Clemment should be required to make restitution in the 
amount of $5,000, and the full costs of the proceeding, which 
are $802.19 as of April 12, 2018, should be assessed against 
her.  
¶2 
Attorney Clemment was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 2000 and practices in Madison.  In 2011 she 
received a consensual public reprimand for failing to provide 
competent representation to a client, failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, 
failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status 
of the matter, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  Public Reprimand of Sarah 
Clemment, 
No. 
2011-6 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002365.html).  
¶3 
On October 3, 2017, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Clemment alleging six counts of misconduct arising out 
of her representation of D.H.  In November 2015, D.H. had been 
charged with first-degree murder in Dane County.  In January of 
2016, D.H. hired Attorney Clemment to represent him.  Attorney 
Clemment had never handled a homicide case and had never tried a 
case to a jury.  D.H.'s sister, B.H., paid Attorney Clemment 
$5,000 to represent D.H.  Attorney Clemment deposited the $5,000 
into her business account and prepared a written flat fee 
agreement outlining the scope of the representation. 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The circuit court held a preliminary hearing on 
January 28, 2016, found probable cause, and bound D.H. over for 
trial.  There was DNA and GPS evidence implicating D.H. 
¶5 
Prior to arraignment, Attorney Clemment visited D.H. 
four times while he was incarcerated at the Dane County jail.  
D.H. was arraigned on March 8, 2016.  Attorney Clemment moved 
for a speedy trial even though discovery was ongoing.  Attorney 
Clemment subsequently filed requests for discovery, a motion to 
sequester the jury, and a number of motions in limine seeking to 
exclude 
certain 
evidence, 
including 
evidence 
of 
prior 
convictions, DNA evidence, and GPS evidence. 
¶6 
The 
circuit 
court 
held 
a 
hearing 
on 
Attorney 
Clemment's motions on May 3, 2016.  Attorney Clemment failed to 
submit any case law or evidence to support her motion to 
sequester the jury and for that reason the circuit court denied 
the motion.  Attorney Clemment withdrew her motion in limine to 
exclude evidence of prior convictions after an exchange with the 
circuit court showed she had misunderstood the appropriate legal 
standard for the motion. 
¶7 
As to the speedy trial motion, the circuit court noted 
that Attorney Clemment had not hired an investigator, had not 
retained any DNA, GPS, or pathology experts, had not filed a 
witness list that identified any witnesses other than those 
identified by the state, and had not received additional 
discovery forthcoming from the state.  In addition, D.H. was 
then serving time for other crimes and thus would not be 
prejudiced by having a speedy trial request denied.  The circuit 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
4 
 
court continued D.H.'s case and strongly urged Attorney Clemment 
to associate more experienced trial counsel to assist her in the 
case.  
¶8 
By this point, Attorney Clemment had visited D.H. four 
more 
times, 
including 
two 
visits 
to 
the 
Dodge 
County 
Correctional Institution in Waupun.  In September of 2016, D.H. 
was transferred to the Green Bay Correctional Institution.  
After April 5, 2016, Attorney Clemment made no additional 
personal visits to D.H. but rather communicated with him by 
telephone and letter.  Attorney Clemment never associated any 
experienced counsel on the case. 
¶9 
On August 29, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing 
on Attorney Clemment's motion to suppress DNA evidence.  The 
motion alleged that a search warrant to obtain D.H.'s DNA was 
not signed by a judge and was thus invalid.  Testimony and 
evidence introduced during the hearing showed that a judge had 
signed the search warrant and it was legally valid.  Moreover, 
even if D.H.'s motion had been granted, the state would have 
simply gotten another search warrant to obtain the DNA samples, 
which would defeat the purpose of the motion.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court denied the motion. 
¶10 During the August 29, 2016 motion hearing, the circuit 
court noted that Attorney Clemment had not filed a witness list 
but had simply reserved the right to call witnesses identified 
by the state.  The circuit court reminded Attorney Clemment that 
she had no right to call the state's witnesses without 
specifically referencing each witness on her own list.  The 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
5 
 
circuit court scheduled a hearing on the pending state's 
motions, and it admonished both parties to be prepared to talk 
about the evidentiary issues.  At that time Attorney Clemment 
had not filed any non-evidentiary motions. 
¶11 Another motion hearing took place on September 28, 
2016, less than two weeks before the scheduled trial date.  At 
this hearing the state noted that Attorney Clemment had not 
reviewed any of the physical evidence in the case despite 
numerous offers by the state to schedule a review of the 
evidence.  Attorney Clemment said she had been ill. 
¶12 During the September 28, 2016 hearing, the circuit 
court considered the state's motion in limine regarding a 
variety of standard pre-trial evidentiary issues, such as 
exclusion of witnesses, exclusion of evidence not shown, 
character evidence, other acts evidence, impeachment by prior 
conviction, and alibi evidence.  Attorney Clemment raised no 
objection to any of the state's individual requests. 
¶13 At one point, after Attorney Clemment did not object 
to the exclusion of "golden rule" comments, the circuit court 
asked her if she knew what the "golden rule" was.  Attorney 
Clemment did not know.  The circuit court asked Attorney 
Clemment if she knew what exclusion of witnesses meant, and she 
could not adequately answer the question correctly.  Attorney 
Clemment was also unable to answer questions from the circuit 
court about what "impeachment by prior conviction" meant, and 
she was unable to recite the specific statutory procedures for 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
6 
 
addressing when a witness could be impeached based on a prior 
conviction.  
¶14 The circuit court asked Attorney Clemment why she did 
not object to the exclusion of alibi evidence when it appeared 
that she had planned to introduce evidence at trial showing that 
D.H. was not at the scene of the crime.  Attorney Clemment could 
not adequately answer the circuit court's questions about the 
meaning of "effect of arrest and conviction" or "known or 
unknown third party acts evidence."  Attorney Clemment was also 
unable to explain the difference between testimonial and non-
testimonial evidence in the context of the confrontation clause 
or recall the key United States Supreme Court case discussing 
these issues. 
¶15 At this point the circuit court determined that 
Attorney Clemment was not competent to represent D.H., that she 
had not acted diligently in representing him, that she had not 
communicated appropriately with him, and that overall she was 
not providing effective legal representation to her client.  The 
circuit court noted that Attorney Clemment had not provided all 
of the police reports to D.H., she had not reviewed all of the 
physical evidence in the case, she had not hired an investigator 
to interview any witnesses, she had not hired any experts, and 
she had not received all of the discovery in the case.  The 
circuit court said, "I find you grossly incompetent and I am 
removing you from this case." 
¶16 Following her removal from the case, D.H.'s sister 
contacted Attorney Clemment and requested a full refund of the 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
7 
 
$5,000 fee so she could hire a new attorney for her brother. 
Attorney Clemment agreed to provide a full refund but said due 
to economic hardship she was unable to repay the money 
immediately. 
¶17 Attorney 
Clemment 
did 
not 
provide 
D.H. 
post-
termination notices as required by supreme court rules, nor did 
she refund the $5,000 fee or make arrangements to do so. 
¶18 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct: 
COUNT ONE 
By failing to provide competent representation to 
D.H., and, in addition, by failing to associate more 
experienced counsel on the case, Attorney Clemment 
violated SCR 20:1.1.1 
COUNT TWO 
By 
failing 
to 
consult 
sufficiently 
with 
D.H. 
concerning the means by which the objectives of the 
representation were to be pursued, Attorney Clemment 
violated SCR 20:1.2(a)2 and SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).3 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation."  
2 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides:  
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall 
abide 
by 
a 
client's 
decisions 
concerning 
the 
objectives of representation and, as required by SCR 
20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means 
by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer may take 
such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly 
authorized to carry out the representation.  A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a 
matter.  In a criminal case or any proceeding that 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
8 
 
COUNT THREE 
By failing to act diligently on D.H.'s behalf, 
Attorney Clemment violated SCR 20:1.3.4 
COUNT FOUR 
By failing to withdraw from the representation when 
continued representation of D.H. would result in a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Attorney Clemment violated SCR 20:1.16(a)(1).5 
COUNT FIVE 
By failing to provide to D.H. post-termination notices 
and an agreed upon refund following termination of the 
representation, 
Attorney 
Clemment 
violated 
SCR 20:1.5(g)(2).6 
                                                                                                                                                             
could result in deprivation of liberty, the lawyer 
shall 
abide 
by 
the 
client's 
decision, 
after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify. 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides:  "A lawyer shall reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished."  
4 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client."  
5 SCR 20:1.16(a)(1) provides:  "Except as stated in 
paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation 
has 
commenced, 
shall 
withdraw 
from 
the 
representation of a client if the representation will result in 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."  
6 SCR 20:1.5(g)(2) provides:  
Upon 
termination 
of 
the 
representation, 
the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following:  
a.  A final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
9 
 
COUNT SIX 
After agreeing to a full refund, by failing to refund 
the full $5,000 in advanced fees received from B.H. 
following 
the 
termination 
of 
her 
representation, 
Attorney Clemment violated SCR 20:1.16(d).7 
¶19 Attorney Clemment did not file an answer to the OLR's 
complaint.  The referee was appointed on January 24, 2018.  At a 
continued scheduling conference held on March 9, 2018, the OLR 
made an oral motion for default.  Attorney Clemment did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment.  
b. A refund of any unearned advanced fees and 
costs.  
c. Notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
binding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting.  
d. Notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration.  
7 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expenses that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law.  
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
10 
 
oppose the motion, and the referee granted it and recommended 
that Attorney Clemment be declared in default. 
¶20 The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
March 23, 2018.  The referee found that the OLR had met its 
burden of proof with respect to all of the counts of misconduct 
alleged in the OLR's complaint.  The referee concluded that a 
public reprimand, which was the level of discipline sought by 
the OLR, was an appropriate sanction for Attorney Clemment's 
misconduct.  
¶21 The referee said that the purpose of professional 
discipline in Wisconsin, as stated in the preamble to SCR 21, is 
to protect the public from misconduct by persons practicing law 
in Wisconsin.  The referee noted that in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Kelsay, 155 Wis. 2d 480, 481, 455 N.W.2d 871 
(1990), this court said that the purposes of professional 
discipline 
are: 
(1) 
to 
protect 
the 
public 
from 
further 
misconduct by the offending attorney; (2) to deter other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct; and (3) to foster 
the attorney's rehabilitation.  The referee also noted that 
Attorney Clemment has already been the subject of one public 
reprimand.  The referee said while the previous public reprimand 
makes a second public reprimand "somewhat lenient," the referee 
expressed hope that Attorney Clemment will learn from this 
proceeding and be more committed in the future to her 
obligations, both to the Rules of Professional Conduct and to 
her clients.  
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
11 
 
¶22 The OLR requested that Attorney Clemment be ordered to 
pay restitution to B.H. in the amount of $5,000.  The referee 
noted that Attorney Clemment did spend some time on D.H.'s case 
and she might have been able to justify retaining part of those 
funds if her agreement had been on an hourly basis.  The referee 
noted, however, that B.H. paid Attorney Clemment $5,000 as a 
flat fee, and the definition of a flat fee states that it may 
not be billed against an hourly rate.  For that reason, the 
referee deemed it appropriate, given that Attorney Clemment did 
not complete the service contracted for, that she be required to 
return the entire amount to B.H.  Finally, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Clemment be assessed the full costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding.  
¶23 Attorney Clemment has not filed an appeal from the 
referee's report.  Although Attorney Clemment was given an 
opportunity to file an answer and present a defense to the OLR's 
complaint, she failed to do so.  Accordingly, we declare her to 
be in default.  
¶24 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. 
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  This court may impose 
whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 43, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  
¶25 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
12 
 
also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 
Clemment violated the supreme court rules set forth above. 
¶26 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
upon careful review of this matter, we agree with the referee's 
recommendation that Attorney Clemment be publicly reprimanded. 
As the referee noted, generally, discipline is progressive in 
nature.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, 296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.  For 
that reason we share the referee's concern as to whether a 
second public reprimand is sufficient discipline for Attorney 
Clemment's most recent transgressions, particularly since both 
cases involved failing to provide competent representation.  
However, at times this court has imposed a public reprimand 
despite prior reprimands.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Dade, 2017 WI 51, 375 Wis. 2d 140, 895 
N.W.2d 37.  We note that Attorney Clemment's first consensual 
reprimand was imposed seven years ago, and she has no other 
disciplinary history.  On balance, we conclude that a second 
public reprimand is an appropriate sanction. 
¶27 We also agree with the referee that Attorney Clemment 
should be required to make restitution to B.H. in the amount of 
$5,000 and that she should be assessed the full costs of this 
proceeding. 
¶28 IT 
IS 
ORDERED 
that 
Sarah 
Clemment 
is 
publicly 
reprimanded. 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
13 
 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Sarah Clemment shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $802.19. 
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Sarah Clemment shall pay restitution to B.H. in 
the amount of $5,000. 
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. 
 
 
No. 
2017AP1933-D   
 
 
 
1