Case Title: Prattville Memorial Chapel and Memory Gardens, Inc. v. W.E. Parker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061756

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/05/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1061756
_________________________
Prattville Memorial Chapel and Memory Gardens, Inc.
v.
W.E. Parker
Appeal from Autauga Circuit Court
(CV-05-22)
LYONS, Justice.
Prattville Memorial Chapel and Memory Gardens, Inc.
("Memorial Chapel"), appeals from a judgment entered on a jury
verdict against it and in favor of W.E. Parker on Parker's
1061756
2
claims alleging breach of contract and fraud.  We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
Procedural History
Parker sued Prattville Memory Gardens, Inc. ("PMG"), in
the Autauga Circuit Court on January 27, 2005.  Parker
asserted claims of breach of contract and fraud arising from
his purchase in 1976 of interment rights to 16 plots in PMG's
cemetery.  PMG filed a timely answer to the complaint, and the
parties proceeded with discovery.  Although not named as a
party to Parker's action, Memorial Chapel, the current owner
of the cemetery, which it purchased in 1993 from an entity
that had purchased it from PMG, filed an answer to the
complaint and a motion for a summary judgment on January 12,
2006.  Subsequently, on February 1, 2006, Parker amended his
complaint to name Memorial Chapel as a defendant.  The trial
court denied Memorial Chapel's motion for a summary judgment
and its later renewed motion for a summary judgment. 
Parker's claims were tried to a jury in March 2007.
Pursuant to Rule 50(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., Memorial Chapel moved
for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") at the close of
Parker's evidence and again at the close of all evidence.  The
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3
trial court denied both motions, finding that Parker had
presented sufficient evidence to submit his claims to the
jury.  Also at the close of all evidence, Parker moved for a
JML on the issue whether Memorial Chapel was a continuation of
PMG.  Pursuant to that motion, and over Memorial Chapel's
objection, the trial court held as a matter of law that
Memorial Chapel was a continuation of PMG and that it had
assumed PMG's liabilities and responsibilities.
Upon the trial court's determination that Memorial Chapel
was a continuation of PMG and therefore that PMG and Memorial
Chapel were one and the same entity, the case was submitted to
the jury against only Memorial Chapel.  On this rationale, the
jury was never given the opportunity to return a verdict
against PMG.  The trial court's granting of Parker's motion
for a JML as to successor liability left Memorial Chapel as
the lone remaining defendant, and PMG was thereby dismissed
from the action. 
Attorneys for Parker and Memorial Chapel gave closing
arguments; however, neither party asked the official court
reporter to transcribe the arguments, and no transcription of
the arguments was made.  The trial court charged the jury;
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4
several of the charges were given over Memorial Chapel's
objection.  After deliberating, the jury returned a $30,000
compensatory-damages 
award 
against 
Memorial 
Chapel 
on 
Parker's
breach-of-contract 
claim, 
a 
$50,000 
compensatory-damages 
award
against Memorial Chapel on Parker's fraud claim, and a
$1,000,000 punitive-damages award against Memorial Chapel on
Parker's fraud claim.  The trial court entered a judgment on
the jury's verdict. 
Memorial Chapel moved to remit the compensatory-damages
awards and for a hearing pursuant to § 6-11-23(b), Ala. Code
1975, Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989),
and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986),
to determine whether the punitive-damages award was excessive.
Memorial Chapel also renewed its motion for a JML pursuant to
Rule 50(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and alternatively moved for a new
trial and to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment pursuant to
Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.  Additionally, Memorial Chapel moved
the trial court to authorize a transcription of the parties'
closing arguments.
The trial court held a hearing on Memorial Chapel's
postjudgment motions and received evidence on the motion for
1061756
5
a remittitur.  The trial court entered an order denying each
of Memorial Chapel's postjudgment motions.  Memorial Chapel
then filed a timely notice of appeal.
Facts
At trial, the parties stipulated that in April 1976 a
representative of PMG, Philip Gidiere, sold Parker interment
rights to 16 grave sites in the cemetery owned by PMG for a
total purchase price of $1,595.  The parties also stipulated
that Parker received a deed for the rights dated July 14,
1976.  The parties did not stipulate to any other facts.
Gidiere did not testify at trial, and the only evidence
submitted to the jury regarding the events surrounding
Parker's purchase of the interment rights in 1976 was Parker's
testimony, a drawing, a written contract, and the July 14,
1976, deed.  
Parker testified to the following facts: Parker was 71
years old at the time of trial.  He first knew Gidiere in 1965
when he rented a house from Gidiere.  Several times during the
following years, Gidiere asked Parker to purchase interment
rights in PMG's cemetery; however, Parker declined.  In the
spring of 1976, Gidiere offered Parker what Gidiere called an
1061756
6
"estate plot" in the cemetery.  Parker and Gidiere went to the
cemetery, where Gidiere showed Parker a specific plot, later
identified as lot no. 60, in an undeveloped part of the
cemetery. Without objection from Memorial Gardens, Parker
testified regarding Gidiere's description of what Parker would
receive if he purchased the estate plot.  Gidiere stated that
Parker's estate plot would be bordered by plants along the
edge of the cemetery and between adjoining estate plots.
Gidiere told Parker that the estate plot would have a 4-foot
walkway down the center with a total of 16 graves, 2 rows of
4 graves on each side of the walkway.   Gidiere also told
Parker that the estate plot would have sections for plants,
family markers, individual markers, and a bench.  Gidiere
advised Parker that his family could choose whether to have
plants on either side of the estate plot and along the
walkway.
Parker submitted a drawing into evidence, which he
testified Gidiere gave him shortly after their visit to the
cemetery ("the drawing").  The drawing is not dated; however,
it matches Parker's testimony regarding Gidiere's description
of the estate plot.  According to the drawing, the center
1061756
The cemetery is divided into seven sections referred to
1
as gardens; each garden has a different name.
7
walkway was to be 4 feet wide, and each interment space was to
be 3 feet 9 inches by 10 feet.  During cross-examination,
Memorial Chapel's attorney asked: "Well, Philip Gidiere told
you your plots were going to look like [the drawing], didn't
he?"  Parker answered: "Correct."  Parker testified that based
on the drawing and on  Gidiere's description, he decided to
purchase the estate plot, and he paid $1,595 for it.  
Parker testified that after he paid for the estate plot,
Gidiere delivered a written contract ("the contract") to him.
In response to questions asked by Memorial Chapel's attorney
during cross-examination, Parker testified that he owned the
estate plot before he received any written contract from PMG.
The contract, dated April 14, 1976, identified Parker as the
purchaser and PMG as the seller of interment rights to 16
spaces in lot no. 60 in a part of the cemetery referred to as
the Garden of Devotion.   The contract identified Prim Parker
1
as Parker's wife, but not as a purchaser.  It stated a
purchase price of $1,595.  The contract did not specify that
Parker was to receive an estate plot, nor did it describe the
walkway, plants, and other features shown in the drawing.  The
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8
contract provided that Parker would receive a deed for the
interment rights and that Parker would "comply at all times
with all Rules and Regulations heretofore or hereafter
promulgated and adopted for the operation, care, and control
of said Prattville Memory Gardens."  The contract also
contained the following paragraphs:
"9. 
 
Entire 
Agreement: 
 
This 
instrument
represents the entire agreement of the parties
hereto, and shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit 
of 
heirs, 
next 
of 
kin, 
personal
representatives, successors and assigns of the
parties.
"10.  PURCHASER CERTIFIES THAT NO ORAL OR
WRITTEN STATEMENTS, PROMISES, REPRESENTATIONS OR
GUARANTEES OTHER THAN THOSE CONTAINED HEREIN HAVE
BEEN MADE BY SELLER, ITS AGENTS, SERVANTS, OR
EMPLOYEES, WITH REFERENCE TO CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF
THE SAID PLOT OR PRATTVILLE MEMORY GARDENS, OR
OTHERWISE IN RELATION TO THIS AGREEMENT."
(Capitalization in original.) Gidiere signed the contract on
behalf of PMG.
Parker subsequently received a deed dated July 14, 1976,
that granted interment rights in the 16 spaces in lot no. 60
in PMG's Garden of Devotion to "Dr. W.E. Parker and/or Prim H.
Parker (wife)."  As was the case with the contract, the deed
did not specify that Parker was to receive an estate plot, nor
did it describe the walkway, plants, and other features shown
1061756
9
in the drawing.  Also as was the case with the contract, the
deed provided that it was "subject to the Rules and
Regulations now in effect, or which may hereafter be adopted
or enacted for the control, regulation, and government of said
cemetery."  The deed provided that those rules and regulations
were "on file for inspection in the office of [PMG]" and were
incorporated by reference.
Parker did not sign the contract or the deed.  He
testified that he did not sign anything with respect to his
purchase.  Without objection from Memorial Gardens, Parker's
attorney asked: "[W]hat paper describes your agreement with
that cemetery?" and Parker answered: "They didn't have one.
I had his [Gidiere's] word and his description, and the
drawing, to back it up.  That's what he told me."
After Parker received the deed, he and his wife, Prim,
divorced.  Parker testified that, after the divorce, Prim had
no interest in the estate plot and she would not be buried
there.  The parties did not submit any other evidence
regarding Prim's interest, or lack thereof, in the estate
plot.
1061756
10
As of the date of trial, Parker had not buried or
attempted to bury anyone in the cemetery.  The record shows
that the cemetery was operated by three companies between
Parker's April 1976 purchase and the March 2007 trial.  PMG
operated the cemetery until 1989, when it was sold to Douglas
Massey, Timothy Massey, Curtis Massey, Sr., Curtis Massey,
Jr., James Seal, and Jefferson Memorial Companies, Inc.
(collectively "Jefferson").  Jefferson continued to operate
the cemetery under the name "Prattville Memory Gardens."  It
also developed a funeral home on the property.  The evidence
showed that, when Jefferson purchased the cemetery, it was
assigned all PMG's "pre-need contracts," contracts for
interment spaces purchased before burial was needed.  The
purchase agreement pursuant to which Jefferson purchased the
cemetery from PMG provided that Jefferson assumed no
liabilities, debts, or obligations of PMG's other than those
stated in the agreement.
In 1993, Jefferson sold the cemetery and funeral home to
Memorial Chapel, a corporation owned by Tom and Carol
Huntington; Tom Huntington was an employee of Jefferson.
Memorial Chapel operated the cemetery and funeral home from
1061756
11
1993 through the trial in March 2007.  Upon Memorial Chapel's
purchase of the cemetery, the Huntingtons placed a photograph
of Gidiere in the funeral-home lobby with a plaque stating:
"Founder of Prattville Memory Gardens."  The asset-purchase
agreement between Memorial Chapel and Jefferson provided that
Memorial Chapel was to "assume the aggregate amount of all
contractual liabilities ... to provide funeral and interment
services, interment spaces and related merchandise, of
[Jefferson] and all preceding owners of the cemetery facility
...."  (Emphasis added.) A separate document specified
Jefferson's transfer to Memorial Chapel of the pre-need
contracts.  That document provided: "[Memorial Chapel] does
hereby assume and agree to perform the contractual obligations
of [Jefferson] pertaining to the Pre-Need Contracts ...."  The
parties do not dispute that Parker's was one of the pre-need
contracts Memorial Chapel assumed.  The asset-purchase
agreement between Jefferson and Memorial Chapel also provided
that, except for pre-need contracts: "[Memorial Chapel] shall
not assume by virtue of this agreement or the transactions
contemplated herein any obligation or liability of [Jefferson]
of any kind whatsoever ...."
1061756
12
Parker testified that between his purchase of the plot in
1976 and the trial in 2007, whenever he learned that the
cemetery had a new owner, he would call the cemetery office
"just to verify."  In 1992, in response to one such call,
Parker received a letter from Jefferson confirming that he had
16 "cemetery lots" in the Garden of Devotion.  Parker
testified: "Whenever they would confirm that I had the sixteen
spaces, automatically in my mind, I assumed I had the estate."
Parker also occasionally drove by the cemetery to see his
plot.  On cross-examination he confirmed that between 1976 and
2007 the plot was never developed with a walkway, plants, or
other features as shown in the drawing.  Parker explained that
he understood that he would have what was shown in the drawing
when he first buried someone in one of the interment spaces in
the plot.
In July 2004, Parker visited the cemetery and noticed
that someone had been buried near his plot.  Parker asked
Carol Huntington to confirm that his plot had not been
encroached.  During the course of their conversation, Parker
told Carol Huntington that he had an "estate" plot and Carol
Huntington denied knowledge of the existence of any "estate
1061756
13
plot" in the cemetery.  Parker later showed the drawing to
Carol Huntington and Marilyn Kilgore, a Memorial Chapel
employee.  Both women denied that the cemetery had any plots
laid out as shown in the drawing.  They told Parker that lot
no. 60, in which he had interment rights, consisted of 16
standard burial spaces. 
Tom Huntington, Carol Huntington, and Marilyn Kilgore
each testified that Memorial Chapel's file regarding Parker's
purchase did not include a copy of the drawing and that they
had never seen a similar drawing before.  They also testified
that after Parker showed them the drawing, they searched
Memorial Chapel's records for similar drawings and found no
plots like those shown on the drawing.  Carol Huntington
testified that she found nothing in Memorial Chapel's files
that referred to "estate plots" and that none currently
existed in the cemetery.  Tom and Carol Huntington both
testified that they had never heard the term "estate plot"
before Parker's July 2004 inquiries.
Tom and Carol Huntington testified that Parker had
interment rights in 16 standard burial spaces but that he had
no right to or space for a walkway or the other features shown
1061756
14
on the drawing.  Tom Huntington testified that Parker would
not receive those amenities.  According to Tom Huntington,
granting Parker the amenities shown on the drawing would
require the equivalent of four additional burial spaces and
there was no room among the plots adjoining lot no. 60 to
grant Parker what he requested.  At the time of trial,
interment rights to a single grave site in the cemetery sold
for $1,032.  
Tom Huntington, Carol Huntington, and Marilyn Kilgore
also testified that the rules and regulations of the cemetery
did not allow, and never had allowed, plants between interment
spaces as shown in the drawing.  Rule 56 of the rules and
regulations Gidiere had drafted stated: "All work and all
planting of any kind on all lots and graves is strictly
prohibited."  The same rule is included in the rules and
regulations the Huntingtons used to operate the cemetery.  Tom
Huntington testified that plants were not allowed between
interment spaces because the plants would have to be removed
to make space for funerals at nearby spaces.
The individual burial spaces shown on Memorial Chapel's
maps, including those in lot no. 60, are 4 feet by 11 feet,
1061756
15
somewhat larger than those spaces shown on the drawing.  James
Seale, one of the owners of the cemetery during the time
Jefferson owned it, testified that when Jefferson purchased
the cemetery, it received maps of the burial spaces and that
he did not recall Jefferson receiving any drawings.  Seale
further testified that the only maps Jefferson had were those
it had received from PMG.  Tom Huntington testified that none
of the maps Memorial Chapel had obtained from Jefferson showed
burial spaces laid out like those in the drawing, with
walkways and plants among the burial spaces.  Tom Huntington
denied that Memorial Chapel had altered any of the maps it
received from Jefferson. 
Parker presented testimony from George Creel, who the
documentary evidence showed was president of PMG in 1989.
According to Creel, PMG had sold "family estates," like the
one shown in the drawing, and he had personally purchased one.
Creel testified that, when he was president of PMG, the
cemetery maps showed these family estates, and the maps were
given to Jefferson upon Jefferson's purchase of the cemetery
in 1989.  He also testified that PMG's records regarding
1061756
16
Parker's plot, which were given to Jefferson, included a copy
of the drawing. 
Creel also testified that, sometime after Jefferson
purchased the cemetery, he saw Tom Huntington, who was then
employed by Jefferson, removing plants from between the family
estates.  Tom Huntington denied doing so and testified that
there never were plants between burial spaces.  Creel
testified that, if Parker had presented a body for burial
while Creel was president of PMG, he would have allowed Parker
to bury the body in accordance with the drawing.  Memorial
Chapel called Creel's credibility into question during cross-
examination, 
soliciting testimony that Creel had been
convicted of theft by deception on an unrelated matter.
Parker testified that he would not have considered
purchasing 16 standard gave sites without the walkway between
the sites and the other amenities.  Parker testified that he
was worried about his own burial, and, because he had health
problems, he worried that the issue of his burial would not be
resolved before he died.  Parker stated that after his first
conversation with Carol Huntington in July 2004, he felt
stunned, shocked, and a little angry.  Parker testified that,
1061756
17
after he showed her the drawing in August 2004, he had a bad
feeling.  He described feeling angry and thought that he had
been treated wrongfully, unfairly, and unjustly.  He stated
that he thought about the situation nearly every day and that
he did not want the same thing to happen to others.  On cross-
examination, Parker admitted that he had suffered from
depression after his divorce and that he had been on
prescription medicine for depression at some time in the past.
Analysis
Memorial Chapel raises more than 20 issues on appeal.
Our resolution of several of these issues pretermits
discussion of the rest.  
I.
Continuation and Assumption of Liabilities as to the
Fraud Claim Against Memorial Chapel
Memorial Chapel argues that the trial court erred in
denying its motion for a JML as to Parker's fraud claim,
specifically as to whether it may be held liable for tort
claims against PMG arising from activities that predated
Memorial Chapel's acquisition of the cemetery.  Memorial
Chapel also argues that the trial court erred in  granting
Parker's motion for a JML and holding that Memorial Chapel is
1061756
18
liable for tort claims predicated on the pre-acquisition
conduct of PMG. We apply the following standard of review:
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML,
this Court uses the same standard the trial court
used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny
the motion for a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v.
Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997). Regarding
questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether
the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to
allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a
factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d
1350 (Ala. 1992). The nonmovant must have presented
substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion
for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989). A reviewing court must
determine whether the party who bears the burden of
proof has produced substantial evidence creating a
factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury.
Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on
a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw. Id. Regarding a
question of law, however, this Court indulges no
presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.
2d 1126 (Ala. 1992)."
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).
This Court has stated:
"As a general rule, where one company sells or
otherwise transfers all its assets to another
company, the transferee is not liable for the debts
and liabilities of the transferor unless (1) there
is an express agreement to assume the obligations of
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19
the transferor, (2) the transaction amounts to a de
facto merger or consolidation of the two companies,
(3) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to
escape liability, or (4) the transferee corporation
is a mere continuation of the transferor. 15
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 7122 (Perm. ed.
1973); 19 Am. Jur. 2d § 1546."
Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala.
1979).  See also Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. City of
Fairfield Healthcare Auth., 837 So. 2d 253, 265 (Ala. 2002);
Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Coker, 482 So. 2d 286, 292 (Ala.
1985).
During trial, Parker attempted to show that Memorial
Chapel had expressly assumed all the liabilities of its
predecessors and thus was liable in tort pursuant to the first
exception stated above.  However, the asset-purchase agreement
between Memorial Chapel and its predecessor, Jefferson,
contained an express assumption of contractual liabilities and
a disclaimer of all other liabilities, which would exclude the
tort liability upon which the jury verdict in favor of Parker
on his fraud claim was based.  Accordingly, the first
exception to the general rule regarding transferees does not
apply to Parker's fraud claim. Parker never argued that the
second or third exception applies.  Therefore, we must
1061756
Cf. Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785 (stating the exception as
2
part of a general rule and declining to hold that the
exception did not apply in product-liability actions).
20
determine whether the trial court erred when it entered a JML
in Parker's favor based on the fourth exception--that Memorial
Chapel was a mere continuation of its predecessors.
Memorial Chapel contends that the continuation exception
applies only to liabilities arising out of product-liability
claims.  However, this Court has applied the exception in
other contexts, and Memorial Chapel has not presented any
reason for us to limit the application of the exception to
product-liability actions.  See, e.g., Parrett Trucking, Inc.
v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., 989 So. 2d 513, 519-20 (Ala. 2008)
(considering the exception in a breach-of-contract action);
Asher v. KCS Int'l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 601 (Ala. 1995)
(considering the exception in a breach-of-warranty action);
Coker, 482 So. 2d at 293 (considering the exception as to
guarantee issued by bank's predecessor).   Accordingly, the
2
exception may apply to cases outside the product-liability
context, and we will consider whether Parker presented
sufficient evidence showing that it applies here.
1061756
21
In Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 So. 2d 827, 830 (Ala.
1988), this Court explained that there must be substantial
evidence of four factors to support a finding that a successor
corporation is a mere continuation of its predecessor:
"'1) 
There 
was 
basic 
continuity 
of 
the
enterprise of the seller corporation, including,
apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets,
general business operations and even the [seller's]
name.
"'2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary
business operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon
after distribution of consideration received from
the buying corporation.
"'3) The purchasing corporation assumed those
liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily
necessary for the continuation of the normal
business operations of the seller corporation.
"'4) The purchasing corporation held itself out
to the world as the effective continuation of the
seller corporation.'"
(Quoting Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 430,
244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (1976).)  Parker contends that he is
not required to establish each of these four factors, if the
totality of the transaction demonstrates that Memorial Chapel
was a continuation of its predecessors.  Parker bases this
contention on this Court's statements in Andrews, supra, on
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22
Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983), and on
cases from other jurisdictions.
This Court's 1976 decision in Andrews stated the general
rule that a transferee is not liable for the debts and
liabilities of the transferor and identified four exceptions
to that rule.  In determining whether to apply the rule and
its exceptions in a product-liability context, this Court
considered a case from the Michigan Supreme Court, Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., supra.  This Court noted the Michigan
court's holding that "there may be a cause of action where the
totality of the transaction demonstrates a basic continuity of
the enterprise."  Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785.  This Court then
found the following reasoning from Turner v. Bituminous
Casualty Co. persuasive: "'Justice would be offended if a
corporation which holds itself out as a particular company for
the purpose of sales, would not be estopped from denying that
it is that company for the purpose of determining products
liability.'"  369 So. 2d at 785 (quoting Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882).  Although this
Court in Andrews found the estoppel theory persuasive, it
declined to base a ruling on that theory because the plaintiff
1061756
23
had not asserted it in the complaint.  Id.  This Court in
Andrews did not expressly adopt a totality-of-the-transaction
approach 
instead 
of 
the 
four-factors 
requirement 
for
determining whether a successor corporation is a mere
continuation of its predecessor.  Indeed, Andrews did not
expressly examine the four factors at all, and we cannot say
that the statements in Andrews precluded this Court's
subsequent application of the factors.
This Court's 1983 decision in Rivers v. Stihl, Inc.,
supra, quoted Andrews as having held that "a transferee may be
held liable for its predecessor's liabilities 'where the
totality of the transaction demonstrates a basic continuity of
the enterprise.'"  434 So. 2d at 771 (quoting the discussion
of Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. in Andrews, 369 So. 2d at
785).  The Rivers opinion stated that this Court had adopted
in Andrews a "'basic continuity of the enterprise' test."  434
So. 2d at 771.  This Court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment for the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could have
found a continuity of the enterprise. 434 So. 2d at 772.  This
Court never stated the four factors of the continuation
1061756
Although Parker does not cite them, this Court's
3
decisions in Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782
(Ala. 1984), and Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Coker, 482 So. 2d
286 (Ala. 1985), also discuss the continuation exception in
more general terms.  In Springsteen, this Court applied only
three of the four factors as "guidelines," 461 So. 2d at 787,
and in Coker this Court simply noted some of the "traditional
indicia" of the continuation exception, 482 So. 2d at 293.
24
exception, but based its finding on several "factors" from
Andrews and Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., including an
express assumption of liabilities.3
Parker also relies on cases from the Michigan Court of
Appeals and the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan to show that a plaintiff need not submit
evidence of each factor in order to show a continuity of the
enterprise under the totality-of-the-transaction approach.
Ammend v. BioPort, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Mich.
2004); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343,
314 N.W.2d 614 (1981).  However, this Court expressly applied
the four factors in 1988 in Turner v. Wean United, Inc.,
supra.  Turner cited Andrews and Rivers, but went further than
those cases did and expressly applied all four factors,
ultimately concluding that the successor corporation did not
fall within the continuation exception.  Since our decision in
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25
Turner, this Court has rejected arguments that the four
factors of the continuation exception are not mandatory.
In Brown v. Economy Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala.
1992), this Court stated that the "factors are to be
considered in the conjunctive, not in the alternative."
Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
for the defendant because the plaintiff had failed to present
substantial evidence of the second and third factors.
Likewise, in Asher v. KCS International, Inc., 659 So. 2d at
601, the plaintiff argued that "when the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates a basic continuity of enterprise it
should not be necessary that each of the four factors be
proved."  Based on Brown, we disagreed, stating that "each of
the four factors must be met before a successor corporation
may be held liable based on the 'mere continuation' of the
enterprise exception."  659 So. 2d at 601.  Most recently, in
Parrett Trucking, Inc. v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., this Court
stated: "[U]nder the continuity-of-enterprise test adopted by
this Court, there is no 'weighing' of the factors; rather, as
we stated in Asher, there must be 'substantial evidence of
each of the four factors.'"  989 So. 2d at 521-22.  In Parrett
1061756
26
Trucking, we reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that
the successor corporation could not be held liable as a
continuation of the predecessor corporation because the
plaintiff had not presented evidence that the predecessor
corporation had been dissolved. 989 So. 2d at 522.
Parker argues that Brown and Asher are inconsistent with
Andrews and Rivers and that we should follow a totality-of-
the-transaction approach to determine whether Memorial Chapel
was a mere continuation of PMG instead of requiring proof of
all four factors.  However, our decisions in Brown and Asher
and more recently in Parrett Trucking clearly state, over
objections identical to Parker's, that the four factors are
mandatory.  In a single sentence in a footnote to his brief on
appeal, Parker states that Brown and Asher should be
overruled.  However, Parker does not cite any basis upon which
we may overrule those cases.  Parker acknowledges this Court's
decision in Parrett Trucking in a subsequent footnote but
states that that case is distinguishable because it did not
apply the totality-of-the-transaction approach.  Parker has
not made a sufficient showing that we should overrule these
cases and depart from an approach this Court has followed for
1061756
27
the last 20 years.  In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d
1236, 1245 (Ala. 2003), we stated: 
"Justice Houston, writing specially in Southern
States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor, 541 So. 2d 1081 (Ala.
1989), embraced a useful standard for weighing the
need for change against the advantages of settled
principles of law under the doctrine of stare
decisis.  He posed the question as follows: whether
the ratio decidendi of earlier precedent would
'"hypothetically be consented to today by the
conscience and the feeling of justice of the
majority of all those whose obedience is required by
[that] rule of law?"' Southern States Ford, Inc.,
541 So. 2d at 1093 (quoting Laun, Stare Decisis, 25
Va. L. Rev. 12, 22 (1938))."
Applying this question to our consideration of whether to
depart from the rule established by Brown and Asher, we cannot
say that the "conscience and feeling of justice of the
overwhelming majority whose obedience is required" would be
shocked by requiring adherence to the view that each of the
four factors must be present before a successor corporation
may be held liable under the continuation-of-the-enterprise
exception.  883 So. 2d at 1245-46.  Therefore, on the basis of
stare decisis, we decline to overrule Brown and Asher.
Accordingly, 
we 
consider 
whether 
Parker 
presented
substantial evidence of each element of the continuation
exception and whether he was entitled to a JML on that issue.
1061756
28
As to the first element of the continuation exception, we must
consider whether there was a basic continuity of PMG's
enterprise, including a retention of key personnel, assets,
general business operations, and PMG's name.  Turner, 531 So.
2d at 830.  It is undisputed that first Jefferson and then
Memorial Chapel retained the same basic assets and maintained
the same general business operations as PMG.  Furthermore,
upon its purchase of the cemetery, Jefferson continued
operating under the name "Prattville Memory Gardens."  This
evidence tends to show a continuity of the enterprise.
However, upon Memorial Chapel's purchase of the cemetery
and funeral home from Jefferson, it operated under the name
"Prattville Memorial Chapel and Memory Gardens."  Furthermore,
the evidence presented at trial showed that the primary
shareholders, owners, and operators of PMG, Jefferson, and
Memorial Chapel changed with each sale of the cemetery.  This
evidence tends to demonstrate a lack of continuity of the
enterprise between Memorial Chapel and its predecessors. 
Regarding 
the 
second 
factor 
of 
the 
continuation
exception, Parker must have presented evidence indicating that
PMG and/or Jefferson "'ceased ordinary business operations,
1061756
29
liquidated, 
and 
dissolved 
soon 
after 
distribution 
of
consideration received'" upon the sale of the business.
Turner, 531 So. 2d at 830.  This Court recently held that
"[t]here must be evidence of dissolution" and that testimony
that the predecessor company may have been dissolved is
insufficient to satisfy this element.  Parrett Trucking, 989
So. 2d at 521-22.  Although the evidence clearly shows that
PMG no longer operated the cemetery after it was purchased by
Jefferson and that Jefferson no longer operated the cemetery
after it was purchased by Memorial Chapel, no evidence shows
whether Jefferson and PMG dissolved soon after those sales.
Regarding PMG, Parker cites his attorney's statement to
the trial court that PMG no longer existed at the time of
trial.  However, statements of counsel are not evidence.  See,
e.g., Carver v. Foster, 928 So.2d 1017, 1025 (Ala. 2005).
Furthermore, even if the statement were evidence, the
statement does not show that PMG dissolved "soon after"
Jefferson's purchase of the cemetery.  
Regarding the
dissolution of Jefferson, Parker cites an August 30, 1993,
document captioned "Assignment and Assumption of Pre-Need
Contracts" between Jefferson and Memorial Chapel, which was
1061756
30
signed by Massey-Seal Corporation "f/k/a Jefferson Memorial
Companies, Inc."  According to Parker, this "formerly known
as" designation following the signature shows that Jefferson
no longer existed as of the date of the assignment of the pre-
need contracts to Memorial Chapel.  However, the "formerly
known as" designation alone does not show that Jefferson had
actually been dissolved; it merely shows that the Massey-Seal
Corporation was once known by that name.  Parker offers no
other evidence showing that Jefferson or PMG were dissolved
soon after the distribution of the proceeds of their sales of
the cemetery.
Regarding 
the 
third 
element 
of 
the 
continuation
exception, it is undisputed that Memorial Chapel and Jefferson
"'assumed 
those 
liabilities and obligations of [their
predecessors] necessary for the continuation of the normal
business operations'" of the cemetery.  Turner, 531 So. 2d at
830.  Regarding the fourth element of the continuation
exception, whether first Jefferson and then Memorial Chapel
held themselves out as the effective continuation of PMG, 531
So. 2d at 830, Parker cites the fact that Memorial Chapel
continues to include the phrase "Memory Gardens" in its name
1061756
31
and the fact that the Huntingtons placed a photograph of
Gidiere in the lobby of the funeral home with a plaque that
says "Founder of Prattville Memory Gardens."  By this
evidence, Parker argues that Memorial Chapel has sought to
profit from PMG's accumulated goodwill and therefore should be
liable for PMG's liabilities.  Memorial Chapel contends that
because it operated under a different name, Parker cannot
satisfy the fourth factor of the continuation exception.
Parker had the burden of raising substantial evidence of
each of the four factors of the continuation exception.
Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3.  As to the second factor--the
dissolution--there is a lack of substantial evidence in view
of the speculation necessary to treat "f/k/a Jefferson
Memorial Companies, Inc." as evidence of timely dissolution of
Jefferson.  This Court has stated that "[t]here must be
evidence of dissolution."  Parrett Trucking, 989 So. 2d at
521.  Because Parker failed to offer substantial evidence of
timely dissolution of the predecessor corporations, Memorial
Chapel was entitled to a JML on this issue and, consequently,
on Parker's fraud claim.  The trial court thus erred in
granting Parker's motion for a JML and denying Memorial
1061756
32
Chapel's motion for a JML on this issue.  Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court's judgment against Memorial Chapel on
Parker's fraud claim.
II.  Breach-of-Contract Claim Against Memorial Chapel
A. Overview 
Memorial Chapel does not dispute that it assumed PMG's
contractual liabilities when it purchased the cemetery from
Jefferson.  We therefore address Memorial Chapel's arguments
regarding 
Parker's 
breach-of-contract 
claim 
against 
it 
dealing
with issues other than the assumption of liability.  
B.
Failure to Join an Indispensable Party
Memorial Chapel argues that the trial court's judgment
against it on Parker's breach-of-contract claim is due to be
reversed because, it argues, Parker failed to join an
indispensable party.  Citing only the 1976 deed that conveyed
interment rights to "Dr. W.E. Parker and/or Prim H. Parker,"
Memorial Chapel argues that Parker's former wife, Prim, has a
property interest in Parker's interment rights and, therefore,
is an indispensable party to the breach-of-contract action.
Parker contends that Memorial Chapel waived this argument by
failing to raise it in the trial court; however, the failure
1061756
33
to join an indispensable party may be raised for the first
time on appeal.  See Town of Dauphin Island v. Point Props.,
Inc., 620 So. 2d 602, 604-05 (Ala. 1993).
Although Memorial Chapel may raise this issue for the
first time on appeal, we nonetheless decline to consider it
because Memorial Chapel has failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.  This Court
has stated: 
"Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that
arguments in an appellant's brief contain 'citations
to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts
of the record relied on.' Further, 'it is well
settled 
that 
a 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of
authority in support of the arguments presented
provides this Court with a basis for disregarding
those arguments.' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 822 (Ala. 2005)(citing Ex
parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001)).
This is so, because '"it is not the function of this
Court to do a party's legal research or to make and
address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by
sufficient authority or argument."' Butler v. Town
of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Dykes
v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala.
1994))."
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9
(Ala. 2007).  In Jimmy Day Plumbing, the appellant's argument
consisted of three sentences and one citation to a general
1061756
Memorial Chapel incorrectly states that Taliaferro was
4
decided by this Court; it was decided by the Court of Civil
Appeals.
34
proposition of law with no discussion of how the law related
to the facts presented in that case.  Similarly, Memorial
Chapel's argument on this issue consists of a single paragraph
and  one citation to Taliaferro v. Goff Group, 947 So. 2d 1073
(Ala. Civ. App. 2006),  for the general proposition that a
4
trial court's judgment may be reversed for failure to join an
indispensable party.  Memorial Chapel does not discuss the
rules regarding joinder, particularly Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.
Nor does it discuss the two-step process courts follow in
determining whether a party is necessary and indispensable.
E.g., Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama
Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1021-22 (Ala.
2003).  Nor does it offer any analysis regarding how the facts
of this case apply to the joinder rules.  Accordingly, as to
its joinder argument, Memorial Chapel has not complied with
the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., and we
will not consider the argument.
C.
Parol Evidence
1061756
Rule 50(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., as amended effective October
5
1, 1995, renamed the "motion for a directed verdict" as a
"motion for judgment as a matter of law."
35
Memorial Chapel argues that the trial court erred in
admitting parol evidence regarding the contract between Parker
and PMG.  Memorial Chapel bases its argument on the Statute of
Frauds, on Alabama law regarding the interpretation of deeds,
and on the parol-evidence rule.  Parker argues that the trial
court did not err in admitting parol evidence because Memorial
Chapel did not object when the evidence was offered at trial.
Therefore, Parker argues, Memorial Chapel waived any argument
that the evidence was inadmissible.
In Alfa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northington, 561 So. 2d
1041 (Ala. 1990), a policyholder sued his insurance company
alleging breach of contract and fraud.  The policyholder,
Northington, contended that his agreement with the insurance
company, Alfa, included coverage for the loss of personal
property due to theft; Alfa denied coverage based on a written
policy, and Northington sued.  561 So. 2d at 1042.  During
trial, Alfa moved for a directed verdict,  arguing that any
5
oral 
negotiations 
between 
Northington 
and 
Alfa's
representative were merged into a written policy.  561 So. 2d
1061756
36
at 1043.  Therefore, according to Alfa, no evidence supported
Northington's contention that his policy covered loss of
personal property due to theft.  The trial court denied the
motion, and Alfa appealed.
On appeal, this Court noted that during the trial of the
case, 
"Northington 
sought 
to 
introduce 
the 
testimony
concerning the oral negotiations for the purpose of proving
the terms of his contract with Alfa and ... the testimony was
admitted into evidence without any objection."  561 So. 2d at
1043-44.  This Court recognized that once contracts have been
reduced to a writing and the parties have acknowledged that
the writing represents the complete agreement between them,
parol evidence of the negotiations will not be admitted to
alter or contradict the writing.  However, in Alabama, parties
"may try their case on evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible upon proper objection and ... where evidence
violative of the parol evidence rule is admitted without
objection, it may be considered and allowed such force and
effect as its weight entitles it in construing the agreement
of the parties."  561 So. 2d at 1044.  Because Alfa did not
object to the admission of the parol evidence Northington
1061756
37
offered to prove the terms of his policy, this Court held that
the trial court did not err in denying Alfa's motion for a
directed verdict.  Accord, ALFA Life Ins. Corp v. Jackson, 906
So. 2d 143, 156 (Ala. 2005).
Similarly, the trial transcript in this case shows that
Parker 
submitted 
parol 
evidence 
regarding 
his 
oral
negotiations with Gidiere for the purpose of proving the terms
of the contract.  Specifically, Parker testified regarding
Gidiere's oral representations in order to show that he had
contracted to receive an estate plot, which included a
walkway, plants, and special markers.  Memorial Chapel did not
object to the admission of this evidence.  In fact, Memorial
Chapel's attorney solicited testimony from Parker regarding
Gidiere's oral representations.  Because Memorial Chapel
failed to object during trial to the admission of parol
evidence regarding the terms of Parker's agreement with PMG,
it now has no basis on which to argue that the evidence should
have been excluded.  Like Alfa in Northington, Memorial Chapel
has waived its arguments regarding parol evidence.
D.
Statements During Closing Argument
1061756
38
Memorial Chapel argues on appeal that it is entitled to
a new trial because Parker's attorney made what it claims were
prejudicial statements during closing arguments.  However,
neither party requested that the closing arguments be
transcribed, either before or during the trial.  After the
jury returned its verdict, Memorial Chapel filed a motion
requesting that the closing arguments be transcribed from the
court reporter's backup audio recording of the proceedings.
The trial court denied the motion, stating: "The rules do not
require an official court reporter to [transcribe] arguments
of counsel.  If closing was taken by this Court's former
official court reporter ... and he is compensated for the
same, they may be transcribed.  Otherwise, this Court will not
order that they be transcribed."  Memorial Chapel then
arranged for the closing arguments to be transcribed and
subsequently moved for the transcription to be made part of
the record.  Parker opposed that motion.
In its ruling on Memorial Chapel's postjudgment motions,
the trial court stated the following regarding Memorial
Chapel's motion to supplement the record with a transcription
of the closing arguments: 
1061756
39
"Neither [Parker] nor [Memorial Chapel] requested
that the official court reporter transcribe closing
arguments 
during 
the 
trial 
of 
this 
case.
Thereafter, 
after 
being 
requested 
by 
defense
counsel, this Court's former official court reporter
attempted to transcribe the closing arguments by
reviewing his backup tape.  That transcription
included 
a 
great 
number 
of 
'unintelligible'
entries."  
In fact, in the 42-page transcript of the closing arguments,
the court reporter made 32 notes that the argument was
unintelligible.  Instead of certifying that the transcript of
the closing arguments was a full, true, and correct transcript
of the proceedings, the court reporter's certificate states
only that he has "transcribed from tape recordings the
aforesaid transcript and [that] the foregoing pages contain as
correct a transcript of the proceedings to the best of [his]
understanding and to the best of [his] ability."  The trial
court concluded:
"The official court reporter would have written and
transcribed closing arguments if he had been
requested to do so.  However, counsel did not
request the same and the Court will not include as
a part of this record something that cannot be
certified 
as 
accurate 
by 
the 
official 
court
reporter. Therefore, [Memorial Chapel's] motion is
DENIED."
Accordingly, the trial court did not consider whether the
statements were prejudicial, and the transcript has not been
1061756
40
made a part of the court reporter's record on appeal.  Based
on Memorial Chapel's failure to request a transcript, on the
number of "unintelligible" portions of the transcript, and on
the 
court 
reporter's 
inability 
to 
fully 
certify 
the
transcript, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in denying Memorial Chapel's motion to supplement
the record.  See, e.g., Ex parte Edwards, 450 So. 2d 464, 465-
66 (Ala. 1984)(reviewing trial court's decision whether to
supplement appellate record under Rule 10(f), Ala. R. App. P.,
under abuse-of-discretion standard).
Parker contends that "[b]ecause there is no record of the
allegedly improper statement, this issue presents nothing for
this Court to review."  Johnston v. Frost, 547 So. 2d 528, 529
(Ala. 1989).  We agree.  Memorial Chapel contends that it need
only show "'with reasonable certainty what was said in the
court below.'"  Mathews v. Tuscaloosa County, 421 So. 2d 98,
100 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Flowers v. State, 269 Ala. 395, 397,
113 So. 2d 344, 345 (1959)).  Memorial Chapel urges this Court
to consider the transcript attached to its motion to
supplement the record. According to Memorial Chapel, because
those portions of the transcript it now challenges are not the
1061756
41
portions 
that 
contain 
notes 
that 
the 
argument 
is
unintelligible, it has shown with reasonable certainty what
was said in the court below, and its argument should be
considered.
In Mathews, upon which Memorial Chapel relies, the
plaintiff made a timely objection during the defendant's
opening statement; however, the objection was not recorded
because of an inadvertent error by the court reporter.  421
So. 2d at 99.  The plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule 10(f),
Ala. R. App. P., to supplement the record; the plaintiff
supported its motion with affidavits from the court reporter
and counsel for both parties.  Id.   The trial court denied
the motion but included the supporting affidavits in the
record on appeal.  Additionally, the record on appeal included
a transcript of the 
parties' arguments regarding the
objection.  That transcript contained references to the
objectionable statement sufficient to show its substance and
the basis for the trial court's ruling.  421 So. 2d at 100.
The record of the trial proceedings, therefore, contained
sufficient undisputed information for this Court to discern
1061756
42
that the statement violated consistent precedent and that the
trial court's ruling on the objection was erroneous.  Id.
Here, the court reporter's record on appeal does not
contain any information regarding or reference to the closing
arguments.  Therefore, unlike Mathews, there is nothing in the
record from which this Court can determine the substance of
the statements Memorial Chapel challenges on appeal.   We
agree with Parker that, "[b]ecause there is no record of the
allegedly improper statement, this issue presents nothing for
this Court to review."  Johnston, 547 So. 2d at 529. 
Additionally, unlike the plaintiff in Mathews, Memorial
Chapel has not complied with the requirements of Rule 10, Ala.
R. App. P., and the trial court has not approved any
supplement to the record on appeal that shows the substance of
the closing arguments.  This Court has stated:  "Rule 10(d),
[Ala. R. App. P.], is the appropriate rule with which [a
party] must comply in order to supplement the record when no
report of the proceedings was made. This rule carefully fixes
the procedure and time limits that must be followed in order
to effect such supplementation." Todd v. United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, 441 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1983).
1061756
Rule 10(d), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
6
"If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is
unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement
of the evidence or proceedings from the best
available 
means, 
including 
the 
appellant's
recollection. If the appellant prepares such a
statement, the appellant shall serve it on the
appellee within 28 days (4 weeks) after filing the
notice of appeal; the appellee, within 14 days (2
weeks) after service, may serve on the appellant
objections or proposed amendments to the statement.
... If the appellee serves on the appellant any
objections or proposed amendments, then, within 7
days (1 week) after service, the appellant shall
file the statement and any objections or proposed
amendments with the trial court for settlement and
approval. Within 21 days (3 weeks) after the filing,
the trial court shall rule, settling any questions
regarding the objections and proposed amendments,
and issuing an approved statement of the evidence or
proceedings. The statement, either as approved by
the court or as issued by the court after its
ruling, shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court, who shall include it in the record on
appeal."
43
Specifically, Rule 10(d) requires that the trial court approve
a statement of the proceedings that were omitted from the
record.   The record on appeal does not show that Memorial
6
Chapel attempted to comply with Rule 10(d).  However, even if
we were to construe Memorial Chapel's proffer of the
incomplete transcript as compliant with the rule, it is
apparent that Parker objected to the transcript and that the
1061756
44
trial court did not approve it.  For the reasons stated above,
we cannot conclude that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in declining to approve the transcript of the
closing arguments prepared after the conclusion of the trial
proceedings.
Furthermore, this Court has stated:
"'This Court has generally held that
improper arguments by an attorney are not
sufficient grounds for a new trial without
a timely objection and a ruling by the
trial court or a refusal by the trial court
to make a ruling. Lawrence v. Alabama Power
Co., 385 So. 2d 986, 987 (Ala. 1980).  The
exception to this rule is "where the
comment is so prejudicial that its effect
is ineradicable." Banner Welders, Inc. v.
Knighton, 425 So. 2d 441, 450 (Ala. 1982).'
"Isbell v. Smith, 558 So. 2d 877, 881 (Ala. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821, 111 S. Ct. 68, 112 L.
Ed.2d 42 (1990)."
Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moreland, 589 So. 2d 169, 171 (Ala.
1991).  Even if we were to consider the transcript, it is
apparent that Memorial Chapel did not raise a timely objection
to the statements it now challenges on appeal, nor did it
obtain a ruling on any objection from the trial court that
this Court can review.  Additionally, without a complete
transcript, Memorial Chapel has not shown, and we cannot
1061756
45
determine, whether the statements at issue were so prejudicial
as to have an ineradicable effect.  Therefore, we will not
consider 
Memorial 
Chapel's 
argument 
regarding 
Parker's 
closing
argument.
E.
Damages for Mental Anguish
1.  Remittitur
As to Parker's breach-of-contract claim, the jury awarded
Parker $30,000 in compensatory damages.  Memorial Chapel
argues that the trial court impermissibly instructed the jury
that it could award damages for mental anguish and that Parker
proved only $4,128 in actual damages.  Accordingly, Memorial
Chapel argues that the trial court should have ordered a
remittitur as to the compensatory-damages award for breach of
contact.  To support its argument, Memorial Chapel cites only
National Security Fire & Casualty  Co. v. Vintson, 414 So. 2d
49, 52 (Ala. 1982), for the proposition that the "general rule
in this state is that mental anguish is not a recoverable
element of damages arising from breach of contract."
The evidence submitted to the jury showed that, at the
time of trial, individual burial spaces in the cemetery were
selling for $1,032.  The evidence further showed that in order
1061756
46
for Parker to have the walkway, plants, special markers, and
other amenities he says he had been promised, he would have to
have the equivalent of 20 burial spaces.  Parker already owned
16 burial spaces; however, the Huntingtons testified that
Parker would not be given the extra features and that there
was physically no space in the Garden of Devotion for Parker
to have the 4 additional spaces necessary to do so.
Purchasing 20 burial spaces in another part of the cemetery at
$1,032 per space would cost Parker $20,640.  Memorial Chapel
contends that, because interment spaces cost $1,032, Parker
suffered actual damages of only $4,128--i.e., the cost of four
additional spaces.  Without showing how he calculated the
amount, Parker contends that he received 388 fewer square feet
from Memorial Chapel than Gidiere had promised him and that
the decreased value as a result of that loss of space is
$9,437.
The record shows that the trial court instructed the jury
as follows:
"[T]here's 
two 
types 
of 
compensatory 
damages
claimed, if you find that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover.  One are the economic, pure add them up,
count them, money damages, okay? And with regard to
that, the law says that the purpose of such damages
is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he
1061756
47
would have been with regard to a contract, if it
hadn't been broken.  ... Now, it says where a
contractual duty or obligation is so related to
matters of mental concern or apprehensiveness, or
with the feelings of the party to whom a duty is
owed, that breach of duty will necessitate or
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering,
and if such matters that are reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties when a contract is
made, then in that event, then the party is entitled
to recover and he would be entitled to recover such
sum as would reasonably compensate him for mental
anguish and physical suffering."
This Court has stated:
"An 
award 
of 
damages 
for 
mental 
anguish
generally is not allowed in breach-of-contract
actions in Alabama. Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt &
Furman Ins. Agency, 207 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2000),
citing Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Inc., 373
So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Ala. 1979).
"'The ground on which the right to recover
such damages [for mental anguish] is
denied, is that they are too remote, were
not 
within 
the 
contemplation 
of 
the
parties, and that the breach of the
contract is not such as will naturally
cause mental anguish. "Yet where the
contractual duty or obligation is so
coupled with matters of mental concern or
solicitude, or with the feelings of the
party to whom the duty is owed, that a
breach of that duty will necessarily or
reasonably result in mental anguish or
suffering, it is just that damages therefor
be taken into consideration and awarded."'
"F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala.
655, 656, 141 So. 630, 631 (1932) (citations
omitted)."
1061756
48
Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So. 2d 63, 68-69 (Ala.
2001).  It is pursuant to this exception that the trial court
instructed the jury.  To determine whether the trial court
erred in instructing the jury as to the availability of
mental-anguish 
damages 
for 
breach 
of 
a 
contract 
and
subsequently in failing to order a remittitur of the damages
the jury awarded, we must determine whether this exception
applies to Parker's breach-of-contract claim. 
Memorial Chapel cites authority regarding the general
prohibition of mental-anguish damages for breach of contract;
however, it does not point us to any authority regarding the
application of the mental-concern or solicitude exception, the
legal issue upon which its argument turns.  Rule 28(a)(10),
Ala. R. App. P., provides that an appellant's argument must
set out "the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with
respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
with citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and
parts of the record relied on."  We have stated that "it is
not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research
or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient
1061756
We note that we do not decide whether this contract falls
7
within the mental-concern or solicitude exception identified
in Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So. 2d at 68-69.
There is simply insufficient argument and authority allowing
us to reverse the trial court's judgment or, indeed, to make
any determination as to this issue.
49
authority or argument."  Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.
2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994).  Rather, it is the appellant's duty
to present "relevant legal authorities that support [its]
position."  White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, [Ms.
1070050, April 18, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008).
Although Memorial Chapel has cited one case stating the
general prohibition of mental-anguish damages, it has not
cited any authority regarding the mental-concern or solicitude
exception.  Accordingly, as to mental-anguish damages,
Memorial Chapel has not complied with the requirements of Rule
28(a)(10), and we will not address the issue.7
2.  Stipulation
Based on our refusal to order a remittitur as to the
damages awarded for mental anguish, we must address Memorial
Chapel's argument that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury that Parker stipulated that he never sought
treatment for mental anguish.  During trial, Memorial Chapel
attempted to elicit testimony regarding Parker's history of
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50
mental anguish and his failure to seek treatment for the
mental anguish he alleges he suffered as a result of Memorial
Chapel's actions.  Parker objected to the testimony, and the
parties argued the objection outside the hearing of the jury.
During their argument, Parker stipulated that he had not
sought psychological treatment for mental anguish resulting
from Memorial Chapel's actions.  The trial court otherwise
sustained the objection.
Thereafter, 
Memorial 
Chapel 
did 
not 
attempt 
to
communicate Parker's stipulation to the jury.  Furthermore, at
no time before the claims were submitted to the jury did
Memorial Chapel request the trial court to instruct the jury
as to the stipulation, although it now argues that the trial
court erred to reversal in failing to do so.  Parker contends
that, if the trial court erred in this respect, we should not
reverse the trial court's judgment because Memorial Chapel
invited the error.  See Lawrence v. Alabama Power Co., 385 So.
2d 986, 987 (Ala. 1980).  Memorial Chapel responds, stating
simply that it "obviously ... intended for the information to
be presented to the jury ...."
This Court has stated: 
1061756
51
"It is ... well settled 'that a party may not
induce an error by the trial court and then attempt
to win a reversal based on that error. "A party may
not predicate an argument for reversal on 'invited
error,' that is, 'error into which he has led or
lulled the trial court.'"' Mobile Infirmary Med.
Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 808 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Atkins v. Lee, 603 So. 2d 937, 945 (Ala.
1992), quoting in turn Dixie Highway Express, Inc.
v. Southern Ry., 286 Ala. 646, 651, 244 So. 2d 591,
595 (1971))."
White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, ___ So. 2d at ___.
If the trial court in fact erred in failing to instruct the
jury on this issue, Memorial Chapel invited that error by
failing to make any attempt to present Parker's stipulation to
the jury.  It further invited error by failing to request the
trial court to instruct the jury on the stipulation.  If
Memorial Chapel had desired such an instruction, it should
have requested one; we will not reverse the judgment of the
trial court for failing to do what Memorial Chapel did not
request.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's judgment against Memorial
Chapel as to Parker's fraud claim, and we affirm the trial
court's judgment against Memorial Chapel on Parker's breach-
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52
of-contract claim; we remand this case for the entry of a
judgment consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1070816
53
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur in the main opinion except as to Parts I and
II.D., as to which I concur in the result.  I write separately
to address briefly the continuity-of-the-enterprise issue
discussed in Part I.
The main opinion declines to revisit Brown v. Economy
Baler Co., 559 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1992), and Asher v. KCS
International, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1995)(per Hornsby,
C.J., with only three Justices concurring and one Justice
concurring in the result), insofar as they stand for the
proposition that all four of the elements of the continuity-
of-the-enterprise test must be met in order to hold that a
successor 
corporation 
is 
a 
mere 
continuation 
of 
its
predecessor.  The main opinion also declines to address
Parker's related and more specific argument that Brown and
Asher should be overruled to the extent, among other things,
that they require the fourth of the four continuity-of-the-
enterprise elements to be satisfied, even if all the other
three elements are met.  Because Parker does not supply us
with a sufficient rationale for revisiting these cases, see,
1070816
54
e.g., Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala.
1994), I concur in the result as to the main opinion's refusal
to do so.
As to the "subissue" of dissolution, upon which the main
opinion ultimately relies to resolve the continuity-of-the-
enterprise issue in this case, please see my special writing
in Parrett Trucking, Inc. v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., 989 So.
2d 513, 523 (Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result in part).