Case Title: JAMES JONES V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 120991

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 2, 2003  
JAMES JONES,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120991  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether plaintiff parolee was properly discharged from prison  
where defendant, the Department of Corrections, failed to  
conduct a timely fact-finding hearing under MCL 791.240a on  
plaintiff’s parole violation charges.1  Because we conclude  
1MCL 791.240a(1) provides in part that “[w]ithin 45 days 
after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for 
return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a 
(continued...)  
that nothing in the plain language of MCL 791.240a permits the  
release of a parole violator under the circumstances of this  
case and that the appropriate remedy for the department’s  
failure to timely conduct a fact-finding hearing is a writ of  
mandamus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals,  
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for habeas corpus relief and  
reinstate the order of the parole board revoking plaintiff’s  
parole.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
In October 1998, plaintiff was paroled from sentences  
imposed for controlled substances convictions.  Plaintiff  
tested positively for cocaine on several occasions after his  
release on parole, and his original twenty-four-month parole  
term was extended because of various parole violations prior  
to those at issue in this case.2  In February 2001, plaintiff  
again tested positively for cocaine, and he subsequently  
failed to report to his parole officer.  These two parole  
violation charges were first detailed in a warrant issued  
February 13, 2001.  A third parole violation charge was added  
1(...continued) 
parole violation . . ., the prisoner is entitled to a fact­
finding hearing on the charges . . . .”  
2Plaintiff’s 
prior 
parole 
violations 
included 
an 
incident 
in which he punched and threatened a woman; cocaine use; and 
failure to report to his parole officer.  
2  
   
 
 
on March 12, 2001, charging plaintiff with fleeing and eluding  
police.3  
Plaintiff 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing under  
MCL 791.239a.  On April 19, 2001, plaintiff appeared before a  
Department of Corrections administrative law examiner (ALE)  
and received notice of the charges against him and the time,  
place, and purpose of the fact-finding hearing as required by  
MCL 791.240a(2).  Plaintiff admitted that he had used cocaine  
and had failed to report to his parole officer.  However,  
plaintiff denied the third parole violation charge, the  
commission of the criminal offense of fleeing and eluding  
police.  Plaintiff asked to present evidence in mitigation of  
the parole violations pursuant to MCL 791.240a(2)(d).  He did  
not object to the date of the fact-finding hearing, which was  
scheduled for May 16, 2001.  
At the fact-finding hearing, the ALE noted that the  
plaintiff had pleaded guilty of the first two counts alleging  
violation of the conditions of parole.  The third count,  
alleging commission of a criminal offense, was dismissed  
pursuant to MCL 791.240a(1) for failure to hold a hearing  
within forty-five days of the date of plaintiff’s arrest,  
March 11, 2001.  Nevertheless, the ALE accepted evidence in  
3Plaintiff was subsequently convicted in the Washtenaw 
Circuit Court of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding in  
violation of MCL 750.479a(2).  
3  
 
mitigation of that offense.4  The ALE determined that  
plaintiff was in violation of the conditions of his parole as  
charged in the first two counts of the warrant, ruling that  
plaintiff’s 
guilty 
plea provided a sufficient factual basis to  
establish the charged violations by a preponderance of the  
evidence.  The ALE recommended a revocation of plaintiff’s  
parole and continuation of plaintiff’s incarceration for  
eighteen months before again considering plaintiff for  
parole.5  The parole board adopted the ALE’s recommendation.  
Plaintiff filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus  
in the circuit court, contending that he was entitled to  
discharge 
from 
prison because the fact-finding hearing was not  
held until the sixty-sixth day of his availability for return  
to a state correctional facility.  The circuit court denied  
the requested relief.  Plaintiff then filed a complaint for  
habeas corpus relief in the Court of Appeals,6 which entered  
4Apparently, 
plaintiff’s 
only 
mitigation 
evidence  
pertained to the dismissed third count of the parole violation 
warrant.  
5The ALE noted: “Parolee is a drug offender who has 
previously violated his parole on charges of assault, using 
cocaine, failing to enter treatment, and absconding.  For  
these violations, he has been diverted to [the Technical Rules 
Violation Center] three times. . . . Parolee has plainly 
established that he remains an unwarranted danger to the 
community, will likely re-offend, and is not amenable to 
parole supervision.”  
6The Court of Appeals treated plaintiff’s complaint as an 
(continued...)  
4  
 
  
an order of habeas corpus discharging plaintiff from prison  
and returning him to the jurisdiction of the parole board.  
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 30, 2001  
(Docket No. 236835).  
The Attorney General, on behalf of the Department of  
Corrections, filed an application for leave to appeal the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals.  This Court issued a stay of  
the Court of Appeals decision and granted defendant’s  
application for leave to appeal. 467 Mich 884 (2002).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
At issue in this case is whether a parolee accused of a  
parole violation is entitled to discharge from prison where a  
fact-finding hearing on the charge is not held within forty­
five days as required by MCL 791.240a(1).  This Court reviews  
de novo the interpretation and application of a statute as a  
question of law.  Cruz v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 466  
Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002); People v Thousand, 465  
Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001). If the language of the  
statute is clear, “no further analysis is necessary or allowed  
to expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover.”  
Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196, 201; 644 NW2d 730  
6(...continued) 
original action, noting that plaintiff had not appealed from 
the circuit court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.  
5  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
(2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. MCL 791.240a(1)  
A prisoner enjoys no constitutional or inherent right to  
be conditionally released from a validly imposed sentence.  
See 
Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional  
Complex, 442 US 1, 7; 99 S Ct 2100; 60 L Ed 2d 668 (1979);  
People v Malmquist, 155 Mich App 521; 400 NW2d 317 (1986).7  
Furthermore, parole revocation is not a stage of a criminal  
prosecution. See Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 782; 93 S Ct  
1756; 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471,  
480; 92 S Ct 2593; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972). However, pursuant  
to Morrissey, limited due process requirements, including  
notice and the opportunity to be heard, apply to the loss of  
liberty occasioned by parole revocation.  
The granting, rescission, and revocation of parole in  
Michigan is overseen by the Bureau of Pardons and Paroles  
pursuant to MCL 791.231 et seq. This statutory scheme makes  
7A preliminary hearing is required to determine if there 
is probable cause to believe that parole conditions have been 
violated.  However, a paroled prisoner may be arrested and 
detained without a warrant.  MCL 791.239, 791.239a. 
This  
reflects the conditional nature of the release and the  
continuing authority of the Department of Corrections to 
maintain the prisoner in custody.  
6  
clear that, with limited exception,8 matters of parole lie  
solely within the broad discretion of the parole board, and  
that the freedom enjoyed by a paroled prisoner is a limited  
freedom.9  The release of a prisoner on parole “shall be  
granted solely upon the initiative of the parole board,” MCL  
791.235(1), and a paroled prisoner remains in the legal  
custody and under the control of the Department of  
Corrections, MCL 791.238(1).  A parole is “a permit to the  
prisoner to leave the prison,” not a release.  MCL 791.238(6).  
Furthermore, a parolee may be arrested without a warrant where  
there exists reasonable cause to believe that he has violated  
parole. MCL 791.239.  
The procedural requirements of MCL 791.240a serve to  
protect the due process interests, as outlined by Morrissey,  
of a parolee whose liberty is at stake by virtue of a charge  
of parole violation. However, contrary to the holding of the  
Court of Appeals in this case, MCL 791.240a neither deprives  
8See MCL 791.234(1); MCL 791.234a.  
9See Morrissey, supra at 480:  
[T]he revocation of parole is not part of a 
criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of 
rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does 
not apply to parole revocations. . . . Revocation 
deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty 
to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the 
conditional 
liberty 
properly 
dependent 
on  
observance 
of 
special 
parole 
restrictions.  
[Citation omitted.]  
7  
 
 
the parole board of jurisdiction to revoke parole nor requires  
the discharge of a parolee where the required hearing has been  
delayed beyond the forty-five-day period prescribed.  
MCL 791.240a(1) provides:  
Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has 
been returned or is available for return to a state  
correctional facility under accusation of a parole 
violation other than conviction for a felony or 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment under the 
laws of this state, the United States, or any other 
state or territory of the United States, the 
prisoner is entitled to a fact-finding hearing on 
the charges before 1 member of the parole board or 
an attorney hearings officer designated by the 
chairperson of the parole board. The fact-finding 
hearing shall be conducted only after the accused 
parolee has had a reasonable amount of time to 
prepare a defense. The fact-finding hearing may be 
held at a state correctional facility or at or near 
the location of the alleged violation.  
The Court of Appeals “reluctantly” held that it was  
required, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Stewart v Dep’t  
of Corrections, 382 Mich 474; 170 NW2d 16 (1969), to order  
plaintiff’s release from prison because the fact-finding  
hearing was not held within forty-five days of his  
availability for return to the Department of Corrections as  
required by MCL 791.240a(1).  The panel further opined that  
habeas corpus relief was appropriate on the basis of this  
Court’s order granting such relief to an alleged parole  
violator in In re Lane, 377 Mich 695 (1966), after a Court of  
Appeals panel had determined that a writ of mandamus was the  
appropriate remedy for the failure to hold a timely parole  
8  
 
 
 
 
violation hearing.10  However, the panel urged this Court to  
reconsider Stewart and Lane:  
In light of these Supreme Court cases, we have 
little option but to grant plaintiff’s requested 
relief.  However, we urge defendant to seek review 
in the Supreme Court and for the Supreme Court to 
reverse us. We agree with our prior opinion in Lane  
[2 Mich App 140; 138 NW2d 541 (1965)] that mandamus 
is a more appropriate remedy than habeas corpus.  We  
see little rational reason to require that plaintiff 
be returned to parole status.  It would seem to us  
that if defendant violates the forty-five-day rule, 
it could properly be remedied by mandamus.  It might 
perhaps even be appropriate to require that a  
parolee be released from detention on the forty­
sixth day.  However, we find nothing in the statute 
or in common sense to justify entitling plaintiff to 
a return to parole status, particularly in light of 
parole violations to which he has admitted. [Slip op 
at 2.]  
In Stewart, the plaintiff was charged with several  
alleged parole violations. The plaintiff admitted his guilt  
on some of the charges.  Although the plaintiff demanded a  
formal hearing under former MCL 791.240, the predecessor of  
the current MCL 791.240a,11 in light of the plaintiff’s  
10At issue in Stewart and Lane was former MCL 791.240, the 
predecessor of MCL 791.240a.  Former MCL 791.240 was repealed  
by 1968 PA 192.  
11MCL 791.240, which was substantially similar to the 
current MCL 791.240a, provided:  
Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a 
violation of his parole, other than the commission 
of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor 
under the laws of this state, he shall be entitled 
to a fair and impartial hearing of such charges 
within 30 days before 2 members of the parole board 
(continued...)  
9  
 
 
admission of guilt the parole board denied the request for a  
hearing.  This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals granting the plaintiff’s writ of superintending  
control against the Department of Corrections, holding that  
[t]he failure of the parole board to conduct the 
hearing provided for by the statute within 30 days 
constituted, in effect, a waiver of any claim based 
upon these violations since the alleged violations 
were not “a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of 
this state.”[12]
 We further conclude that, under 
these circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to 
be discharged from prison but he will remain under 
the jurisdiction of the parole board as per their 
order of December 9, 1966. [Stewart, supra at 479.]  
The Stewart Court erred, in our judgment, by engrafting  
onto the terms of former MCL 791.240 a remedy that had no  
basis in the plain language of the statute.  As we have  
11(...continued) 
under such rules and regulations as the parole 
board may adopt.  Upon such hearing such paroled 
prisoner shall be allowed to be heard by counsel of 
his own choice, at his own expense, and may defend 
himself, and he shall have the right to produce 
witnesses and proofs in his favor and to meet the 
witnesses who are produced against him. . . .  
12The parole board argued in Stewart that because the  
plaintiff had been convicted of a crime in Missouri, he was 
not entitled to a parole violation hearing because the conduct 
underlying the Missouri conviction was a “felony or  
misdemeanor under the laws of this state” within the meaning 
of former MCL 791.240.  One of the primary differences between 
former MCL 791.240 and current MCL 791.240a is that the  
current statute does not require a fact-finding hearing for 
parole 
violations 
based 
on 
convictions 
punishable by 
imprisonment not only in this state, but in “the United States  
. . . or any other state or territory of the United 
States. . . .”  
10  
  
recently noted on several occasions, “‘our judicial role  
precludes imposing different policy choices than those  
selected by the Legislature, [and] our obligation is, by  
examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative  
intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words  
expressed in the statute.’”  People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich  
687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764 (2001), quoting People v McIntire,  
461 Mich 147, 152; 599 NW2d 102 (1999). In determining that  
the parole board had waived its authority and that the  
plaintiff 
was 
entitled to discharge, the Stewart Court created  
a remedy for a violation of former MCL 791.240 that was not  
grounded anywhere in the statutory scheme and thus exceeded  
its judicial authority.13  
We decline to impose the relinquishment of the parole  
board’s statutory authority14 to revoke parole as a remedy for  
a violation of the forty-five-day limitation period provided  
in MCL 791.240a(1).  To infer such a legislative intent where  
none is indicated either in the text of MCL 791.240a or  
elsewhere in the statutory scheme “would be an exercise of  
13The Legislature well knows how to provide remedies for 
statutory time limitation violations and has explicitly done 
so in other settings.  See, e.g., MCL 780.133 (providing that 
where the “180-day rule” of MCL 780.131 is violated, the 
courts of this state lose jurisdiction and must dismiss the 
action with prejudice).  
14MCL 791.240a(6).  
11  
 
will rather than judgment.” People v Stevens (After Remand),  
460 Mich 626, 645; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) (emphasis in original).  
We overrule Stewart to the extent that it conflicts with  
today’s holding.15  
B. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent, invoking the so-called “reenactment rule,”  
asserts 
that 
because 
the post-Stewart revisions to MCL 791.240  
and MCL 791.240a do not “clearly show an intention to undo  
this Court’s holding in Stewart,” we must assume that the  
Legislature intended to adopt the extra-statutory remedy  
imposed by the Stewart Court. 
We decline to impose on the  
Legislature any such duty to “clearly show” its intention to  
repudiate any judicial construction with which it disagrees.  
As we have recently explained in People v Hawkins, 468  
Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003), the reenactment rule cannot be  
used as a tool to circumvent the plain and unambiguous  
language of a statute.  Nothing in the language of MCL  
15The 
Attorney 
General cites Hawkins v Mich Parole Bd, 390 
Mich 569; 213 NW2d 193 (1973), in which this Court adopted and 
affirmed an opinion of the Court of Appeals ordering a parole 
revocation hearing de novo on the ground that the allegedly 
indigent plaintiff was not accorded a proper hearing because 
he was not provided with court-appointed counsel.  The  
Attorney 
General 
essentially 
argues 
that 
Stewart 
was 
overruled  
sub silentio by this Court’s decision in Hawkins. However,  
Hawkins is inapposite because the parties in that case 
stipulated that such a hearing would be held. See Hawkins v  
Michigan Parole Bd, 45 Mich App 529, 531; 206 NW2d 764 (1973).  
Thus, unlike in Stewart and the present case, the consequences 
of holding an improper parole revocation hearing were not at 
issue in Hawkins.  
12  
  
 
 
 
 
791.240a indicates the Legislature’s intent to adopt the  
Stewart Court’s holding that the parole board waives its right  
to pursue parole violation charges by failing to conduct a  
hearing within the statutory period. While the dissent opines  
that the Legislature’s failure to affirmatively limit the  
holding in Stewart is indicative of its approval of that  
holding, an equally plausible conclusion to be drawn from the  
Legislature’s silence is that it intended to reject the  
Stewart Court’s analysis. See Hawkins, supra at ___ n 12.  
“[O]ur 
most 
fundamental 
principle 
of 
statutory  
construction [is] that there is no room for judicial  
interpretation 
when 
the 
Legislature’s 
intent 
can 
be  
ascertained 
from 
the 
statute’s 
plain 
and 
unambiguous  
language.” Hawkins, supra at ___. Because there is no clear  
indication in the language of MCL 791.240a(1) that the  
Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate the Stewart  
Court’s imposition of an extra-statutory remedy for a  
violation of that statute, we decline to apply the reenactment  
rule in this case.  
C. APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF MCL 791.240a(1)  
Where an official has a clear legal duty to act and fails  
to do so, the appropriate remedy is an order of mandamus. See  
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 442-443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999);  
Lickfeldt v Dep't of Corrections, 247 Mich App 299, 302; 636  
13  
 
 
 
NW2d 272 (2001).16  Where, as here, the Legislature has  
established a clear, ministerial duty, but has failed to  
prescribe any consequence for a violation of that duty, a  
plaintiff may seek a writ of mandamus to compel compliance  
with the statutory duty.  Accordingly, we agree with the  
suggestion of the Court of Appeals in this case—and in Lane,  
2 Mich App 144—that the proper remedy for the failure to hold  
a timely hearing as required by MCL 791.240a(1) is a complaint  
for an order of mandamus rather than for a writ of habeas  
corpus.17  
IV. CONCLUSION  
Because nothing in the text of MCL 791.240a or the  
remainder of the statutory scheme governing paroles indicates  
a legislative intent that a violation of the forty-five-day  
time limit established by MCL 791.240a(1) requires the  
discharge of a prisoner, we reverse the decision of the Court  
of Appeals and reinstate the order of the parole board  
16See Phillips v Warden, State Prison of Southern  
Michigan, 153 Mich App 557, 566; 396 NW2d 482 (1986) (“Habeas 
corpus is an alternative remedy and may be refused in the 
exercise of discretion where full relief may be obtained in 
other more appropriate proceedings.”).  
17As noted by the Court of Appeals in this case, this 
Court, without comment, granted habeas corpus relief to the 
petitioner in Lane. To the extent that any implication arises 
from this Court’s terse order in Lane that habeas corpus 
relief is appropriate for a violation of MCL 791.240a(1), we 
overrule that decision.  
14  
revoking plaintiff’s parole.  The appropriate remedy for a  
violation of the forty-five-day requirement is a writ of  
mandamus.
 To the extent that this Court’s decisions in  
Stewart and Lane conflict with today’s holding, they are  
overruled.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
15  
__________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JAMES JONES,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 120991  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I join in all but part IIIB of the majority opinion.  As  
I noted in my concurring opinion in People v Hawkins, 468 Mich  
___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003), I believe that the reenactment rule  
may be relied on in cases where it is appropriate.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JAMES JONES,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120991  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully disagree with the majority.  Plaintiff is  
a prisoner whose parole was revoked by the parole board.  The  
issue presented is whether the parole-violation charges  
against plaintiff must be dismissed because the fact-finding  
hearing on the charges was not held within forty-five days, as  
required by MCL 791.240a.1
 In response to plaintiff’s  
complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals  
1 MCL 791.240a requires that the hearing be held within 
forty-five days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or 
is available for return to a state correctional facility. 
Plaintiff was available on March 11, 2001.  The hearing was 
held May 16, 2001.  
 
 
ruled that pursuant to existing case law, plaintiff’s  
requested relief must be granted and plaintiff must be  
discharged from prison and returned to the jurisdiction of the  
parole board.  For the reasons articulated below, I would  
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
I  
Whether the parole-violation charges against plaintiff  
must be dismissed because the fact-finding hearing on the  
charges was not held within forty-five days, as required by  
MCL 791.240a, is a matter of statutory interpretation.  A  
matter of statutory interpretation is a question of law, which  
this Court reviews de novo.  People v Morey, 461 Mich 325,  
329; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).  
MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part:  
(1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner 
has been returned or is available for return to a  
state correctional facility under accusation of a 
parole violation other than conviction for a felony 
or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment under the 
laws of this state, the United States, or any other 
state or territory of the United States, the 
prisoner is entitled to a fact-finding hearing on 
the charges before 1 member of the parole board or 
an attorney hearings officer designated by the 
chairperson of the parole board. The fact-finding 
hearing shall be conducted only after the accused 
parolee has had a reasonable amount of time to 
prepare a defense.  The fact-finding hearing may be 
held at a state correctional facility or at or near 
the location of the alleged violation.[2]  
2 The statute further provides:  
(continued...)  
2  
2(...continued) 
(2) An accused parolee shall be given written 
notice of the charges against him or her and the 
time, place, and purpose of the fact-finding 
hearing. At the fact-finding hearing, the accused 
parolee may be represented by an appointed or 
retained attorney and is entitled to the following 
rights:  
(a) Full disclosure of the evidence against 
him or her.  
(b) To testify and present relevant witnesses 
and documentary evidence.  
(c) To confront and cross-examine adverse  
witnesses unless the person conducting the fact­
finding hearing finds on the record that a witness 
is subject to risk of harm if his or her identity 
is revealed.  
(d) To present other relevant evidence in 
mitigation of the charges.  
(3) A fact-finding hearing may be postponed 
for cause beyond the 45-day time limit on the 
written request of the parolee, the parolee’s 
attorney, or, if a postponement of the preliminary 
hearing has been granted beyond the 10-day time 
limit, by the parole board.  
(4) If the evidence presented is insufficient 
to support the allegation that a parole violation 
occurred, the parolee shall be reinstated to parole 
status.  
(5) If the parole board member or hearings 
officer 
conducting 
the 
fact-finding 
hearing 
determines from a preponderance of the evidence 
that a parole violation has occurred, the member or 
hearings officer shall present the relevant facts 
to the parole board and make a recommendation as to 
the disposition of the charges.  
(6) 
 If a preponderance of the evidence  
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
In Stewart v Dep’t of Corrections, 382 Mich 474, 477; 170  
NW2d 16 (1969), this Court considered the predecessor of MCL  
791.240a, which stated:  
“Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a 
violation of his parole, other than the commission 
of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor 
under the laws of this state, he shall be entitled 
to a fair and impartial hearing of such charges 
within 30 days before 2 members of the parole board 
under such rules and regulations as the parole 
board may adopt.  Upon such hearing such paroled 
prisoner shall be allowed to be heard by counsel of  
2(...continued) 
supports the allegation that a parole violation 
occurred, the parole board may revoke parole, and 
the parolee shall be provided with a written 
statement of the findings of fact and the reasons 
for the determination within 60 days after the 
paroled prisoner has been returned or is available 
for return to a state correctional facility.  
(7) A parolee who is ordered to make  
restitution under the crime victim’s rights act, 
Act No. 87 of the Public Acts of 1985, being 
sections 780.751 to 780.834 of the Michigan 
Complied Laws, or the code of criminal procedure, 
Act No. 175 of the Public Acts of 1927, being 
sections 760.1 to 776.21 of the Michigan Compiled 
Laws, or to pay an assessment ordered under section 
5 of Act No. 196 of the Public Acts of 1989, being 
section 780.905 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, as a 
condition of parole may have his or her parole 
revoked by the parole board if the parolee fails to 
comply with the order and if the parolee has not 
made a good faith effort to comply with the order. 
In determining whether to revoke parole, the parole 
board shall consider the parolee’s employment 
status, earning ability, and financial resources, 
the willfulness of the parolee’s failure to comply 
with the order, and any other special circumstances 
that may have a bearing on the parolee’s ability to 
comply with the order.  
4  
 
 
his own choice, at his own expense, and may defend 
himself, and he shall have the right to produce 
witnesses and proofs in his favor and to meet the 
witnesses who are produced against him.” [MCL 
791.240.]  
Stewart’s parole agent submitted a parole-violation report  
charging that the plaintiff had unlawfully absconded from the  
jurisdiction, and a parole-violation warrant was issued.  
Subsequently, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor  
charge in St. Louis, Missouri.  He was released to the custody  
of the Michigan Parole Board, which denied his request for a  
formal hearing.  The parole board’s reasoning for denying the  
hearing was that the evidence Stewart proposed to offer would  
be “‘incompetent, immaterial, and unduly repetitious,’” given  
that he had already admitted his guilt on some of the charges.  
Stewart, supra at 477.  
This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals analysis  
rejecting defendant’s interpretation of the statute:  
“In our [the Court of Appeals] opinion the 
parole board misreads the statute.  An alleged 
parole violator (other than one accused of the 
commission of, and conviction for, a felony or 
misdemeanor ‘under the laws of this State’) is 
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing within 30 
days, at such hearing to be heard by counsel and to 
produce witnesses and proofs in his favor and to 
meet the witnesses produced against him, without 
regard to whether he admits his guilt.  The statute  
provides that all such alleged parole violators, 
not merely those that deny guilt, are entitled to 
such a hearing. 
The petitioner asserts he  
requested such a hearing which assertion was  
neither denied in the affidavit filed in response 
to the original petition or in the attorney  
5  
 
  
 
 
general’s briefs filed in response to petitioner’s 
complaint and our order.  Those responses merely 
state that the petitioner’s rights were explained 
to him, that he freely admitted his guilt, and 
therefore it was not necessary to conduct a  
hearing.” [Id. at 478.]    
The Court further stated:  
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ rejection 
of 
defendant’s 
construction 
of 
the 
statute  
applicable to this appeal.  
We affirm the [decision of the] Court of 
Appeals. 
The failure of the parole board to  
conduct the hearing provided for by the statute  
within 30 days constituted, in effect, a waiver of  
any claim based upon these violations since the  
alleged 
violations 
were 
not 
“a 
felony 
or  
misdemeanor under the laws of this state.”
 We  
further conclude that, under these circumstances, 
the plaintiff is entitled to be discharged from 
prison but he will remain under the jurisdiction of 
the parole board as per their order of December 9, 
1966. [Id. at 479 (emphasis added).]  
The version of the statute at issue in Stewart, MCL  
791.240, was repealed by 1968 PA 192.3  However, at the same  
time that it was repealed, the substance of that provision was  
reenacted in MCL 791.240a.  The 1968 version of this provision  
stated:  
Within 30 days after a paroled prisoner has 
been returned to a state penal institution under 
accusation of a violation of his parole, other than 
the 
conviction 
for 
a 
felony 
or 
misdemeanor  
punishable by imprisonment in any jail, a state or  
3 Although Stewart was decided in 1969, after the repeal 
of MCL 791.240, the issue before the Court at that time was 
the proper interpretation of MCL 791.240 because the alleged 
parole violations at issue in Stewart occurred in 1967, before 
the repeal and subsequent reenactment of the statute.  
6  
 
federal prison under the laws of this state, the 
United States or any other state or territory of 
the United States, he shall be entitled to a 
hearing on such charges before 2 members of the 
parole board.  Hearings shall be conducted in 
accordance with rules and regulations adopted by 
the director, and the accused prisoner shall be 
given an opportunity to appear personally or with 
counsel and answer to the charges placed against 
him. [1968 PA 192.4]  
Subsequent amendments of MCL 791.240a have taken effect in  
1982, 1985, and 1994.  The 1982 amendments are especially  
relevant because they altered the time requirement for the  
formal hearing, increasing it from thirty days after a paroled  
prisoner has been returned or is available to forty-five days  
after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available.  
The 1982 version of MCL 791.240a(1) stated in pertinent part:  
Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has 
been returned or is available for return to a state  
penal institution under accusation of a violation 
of parole, other than the conviction for a felony 
or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment under the 
laws of this state, the United States, or any other 
state or territory of the United States, the 
prisoner is entitled to a fact-finding hearing on 
the charges before 1 member of the parole board or 
an attorney hearings officer designated by the 
chairperson of the parole board. The fact-finding 
hearing shall be conducted only after the accused 
parolee has had a reasonable amount of time to 
prepare a defense.  The fact-finding hearing may be 
held at a state penal institution or at or near the 
location of the alleged violation. [1982 PA 314.]  
4 One of the primary differences between the 1968 version 
of MCL 791.240a and its predecessor, MCL 791.240, is that the 
1968 version of MCL 791.240a also included an exception for 
misdemeanor 
and 
felony 
convictions 
in 
jurisdictions 
other 
than 
the state of Michigan.  
7  
 
No revisions were made to the statute, as it was  
reenacted in 1982, to limit this Court’s conclusion in Stewart  
that the failure to conduct the formal hearing within the  
requisite time constitutes a waiver of any claim based on the  
alleged parole violations, nor have any such revisions been  
made in amendments after the 1982 version of MCL 791.240a.  
While this Court has disavowed the doctrine of legislative  
acquiescence in previous cases,5 this case represents  
something more than legislative acquiescence, or discerning  
legislative intent from the Legislature’s failure to take any  
action.  In the present case, the Legislature has acted  
several times to reenact and revise the statute, even  
increasing the time limit for the fact-finding hearing from  
thirty days to forty-five days.  However, none of the  
subsequent revisions to the statute since Stewart was decided  
can be construed as limiting this Court’s conclusion in  
Stewart that the failure to conduct the formal hearing within  
the requisite time constitutes a waiver of any claim based on  
the alleged parole violations.  The Legislature is presumed to  
know “that when a statute, clause or provision thereof, has  
been construed by the court of last resort of this State and  
the same is substantially re-enacted the legislature adopts  
such construction, unless the contrary is clearly shown by the  
5 See Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 258­
262; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
8  
language of the act.”  Jeruzal v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 350  
Mich 527, 534; 87 NW2d 122 (1957).6  The language used by the  
Legislature in subsequent revisions of the provision at issue  
does not clearly show an intention to undo this Court’s  
holding in Stewart.  
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals and order that the stay imposed on February 22, 2002,  
be lifted and that plaintiff be discharged from prison and  
returned to the jurisdiction of the parole board.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
6See also Smith v Detroit, 388 Mich 637, 650-651; 202 
NW2d 300 (1972) (“‘Even more persuasive is the rule that where 
the basic provisions of a statute have been construed by the 
courts and these provisions are subsequently reenacted by the 
legislature, it may be assumed that the legislature acted with 
knowledge of the Court’s decisions and that the legislature 
intended the reenacted statute to carry the Court’s  
interpretation with it.’” Quoting Breckon v Franklin Fuel Co, 
383 Mich 251, 295; 174 NW2d 836 [1970] [Adams, J., 
dissenting]); Sheppard v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 348 Mich 577, 
631-632; 83 NW2d 614 (1957) (Chief Justice Dethmers, 
concurring, wrote “Where a statutory provision is re-enacted 
without change in language, it must be presumed that the 
action was taken in the light of prior judicial construction 
placed upon it and with the intent to adopt such construction. 
When the Supreme Court has placed an interpretation on a 
statute over a considerable period of years it may indulge in 
the judicial assumption that the legislature has been content 
with that interpretation because of its failure to exercise 
its independent prerogative to restate the provision.” 
[Citations omitted.]).  
9