Case Title: Herbel v. S.K. Wood Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-214

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Herbel v. S.K. Wood Co.1995 WY 103897 P.2d 478Case Number: 94-214Decided: 06/29/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Fred 
C. HERBEL,

Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

S.K. WOOD COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation; Matlack 
Company; Carl D. Unsworth; Constance G. Johnson; and Karen A. Cavalier, 

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

J. Nicholas Murdock and 
Bradley D. Bonner of Reeves, Murdock & Gifford, and James E. Delaney, 
Casper, for 
appellant.

G.G. Greenlee and Todd H. 
Hambrick of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellees S.K. Wood Co., Matlack Co. 
and Unsworth.

Bret F. King of King & 
King, Jackson, for appellee 
Johnson.

David B. Hooper of Hooper 
Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellee Cavalier.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Fred 
Herbel appeals from the district court's order which granted a summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees S.K. Wood Company, Matlack Company, Carl Unsworth, 
Constance Johnson, and Karen Cavalier.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues on appeal:

A.        Whether the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment and in failing to permit 
Appellant to amend his complaint to allege affirmatively that he suffered from a 
legal disability.

1. Whether the district court erred in failing to 
grant Appellant's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.

2. Whether this Court should follow the general trend 
in most jurisdictions and the guidance of the courts interpreting the law of 
origin for Wyoming's disability tolling statute in defining the term "legal 
disability."

3. Whether the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment because the issues of whether a person is subject to a legal 
disability, and when a disability is removed, are questions of fact properly to 
be decided by a jury.

4. Whether the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment because Appellant's averments are sufficient to create an issue 
of fact as to whether and for what period he suffered from a legal disability 
which tolled the statute of limitations.

Facts

[¶4]      The facts as 
gleaned from the record and from the parties' briefs are not in dispute. A 
multi-vehicular accident occurred on January 26, 1989, which involved Appellant 
and Appellees. Appellant filed a complaint on January 15, 1993, which was 
predicated upon this accident. Service was made on each of the appellees more 
than sixty days after the complaint had been filed.

[¶5]      Each of the 
appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of 
limitations barred Appellant's claims.1 The district court issued a 
decision letter on October 12, 1993, directing that the motions to dismiss be 
converted to motions for a summary judgment, granting such motions, and 
requesting that the attorney for several of the appellees prepare the necessary 
order.

[¶6]      Three days after 
the district court issued its decision letter, Appellant filed a motion for 
leave to amend his complaint to add the claim that, as a result of the accident, 
he suffered from a legal disability which lasted from the time the cause of 
action accrued until April 30, 1991. On October 22, 1993, Appellant filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the decision letter and an objection to the form 
of the proposed order.

[¶7]      Appellees 
objected to Appellant's motion for leave to amend his complaint, arguing that 
the motion was untimely and prejudicial, and moved for a summary judgment. The 
district court granted a summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and this appeal 
followed.

Discussion
[¶8]      Although 
Appellant presents several issues for our consideration, our decision on the 
question of whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow Appellant to amend his complaint is dispositive of the remaining 
issues.

[¶9]      Appellant 
contends that the denial of his motion for leave to amend his complaint 
constituted an abuse of discretion and that his motion should have been granted 
under the free-and-liberal-amendment philosophy of W.R.C.P. 15. We disagree. 
W.R.C.P. 15(a) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Amendments. - A party may amend the party's 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served, or if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted 
and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so 
amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires.

"[L]eave to amend a 
complaint under W.R.C.P. 15 should be freely granted when the amendment will 
serve a good purpose and when it will not unduly prejudice the defendant. A 
district court's denial of a motion to amend will be reversed, however, only 
when it constitutes an abuse of discretion." Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 
(Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted). Judicial discretion is

a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986). "Although it is always easy for those on the secure 
heights of hindsight to suggest another course might have been taken, that is 
not to say the district court abused its discretion." Narans v. Paulsen, 803 P.2d 358, 363 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶10]   In Slavens v. Board of County 
Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683 (Wyo. 1993), we considered the 
issue of whether a district court abused its discretion when it denied the 
appellants' motion to amend their complaint which they filed four days after the 
district court had issued its decision letter. 854 P.2d  at 685-87. Relying on 
our decision in Narans, we held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion:

In Narans, we upheld a district judge's decision not 
to allow an amendment of pleadings on the eve of trial, Narans, 803 P.2d  at 363, 
and there is less reason to allow amendment after a decision in the case had 
been made. . . .

. . . The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying appellants' motion to amend their complaint when the motion was made 
after the decision letter had been issued.

854 P.2d  at 
687-88.

Conclusion

[¶11]   In accordance with our decisions in 
Narans and Slavens, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by refusing to allow Appellant to amend his complaint three days after the 
issuance of the decision letter which granted a summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees. In light of this holding, we do not need to address the remaining 
issues which were presented by Appellant.

[¶12]   Affirmed.

Footnote

1 In Wyoming, actions for personal injury 
must be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues. WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (Supp. 1994). W.R.C.P. 3(b) provides in 
part:

(b) When 
commenced. - For purposes of statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed 
commenced on the date of filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service 
is made on the defendant or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or 
otherwise united in interest with the defendant, within 60 days after the filing 
of the complaint. If such service is not made within 60 days the action shall be 
deemed commenced on the date when service is made.