Case Title: Ex parte Marshall, as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190644

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:  September 25, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1190644
____________________
Ex parte Steven Marshall, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Michael Belcher et al.
v.
Steven Marshall, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-20-900154)
PER CURIAM.
1190644
Attorney General Steven Marshall and circuit judges
Michael Bradley Almond, Ruth Ann Hall, Brandy Hambright,
Jacqueline Hatcher, and Bert Rice (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the petitioners" and the circuit judges are
hereinafter referred to collectively as "the petitioner
circuit judges") -- all in their official capacities --
petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court") to grant their
motion to dismiss a complaint for a declaratory judgment filed
by Michael Belcher, Peter Capote, Derrick Dearman, Lionel
Francis, Brett Yeiter, and Benjamin Young, all prisoners on
death row (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
respondents").  For the reasons set forth herein, we grant the
petition and issue the writ.
I.  Facts
The respondents were all convicted of capital offenses
and were sentenced to death after August 1, 2017, the
effective date of the Fair Justice Act ("FJA"), Act No.
2017-417, Ala. Acts 2017 (codified at Ala. Code 1975,
§ 13A-5-53.1).  The FJA governs petitions for postconviction
2
1190644
relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., in death-penalty
cases. Specifically, the FJA provides:
"(a) Rule 32.2(c) of the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure shall not apply to cases in which
a criminal defendant is convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death, and files a petition for
post-conviction relief under the grounds specified
in Rule 32.1(a), (e), or (f) of the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
"(b) 
Post-conviction 
remedies 
sought 
pursuant 
to
Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure
in death penalty cases shall be pursued concurrently
and simultaneously with the direct appeal of a case
in which the death penalty was imposed. In all cases
where the defendant is deemed indigent or as the
trial judge deems appropriate, the trial court,
within 30 days of the entry of the order pronouncing
the defendant's death sentence, shall appoint the
defendant a separate counsel for the purposes of
post-conviction relief under this section. Appointed
counsel shall be compensated pursuant to Chapter 12
of Title 15; provided, however, that notwithstanding
any provision of that chapter to the contrary, the
total fee awarded shall not exceed seventy-five
hundred dollars ($7,500), which may be waived by the
Director of the Office of Indigent Defense Services
for good cause shown.
"(c) A circuit court shall not entertain a
petition for post-conviction relief from a case in
which the death penalty was imposed on the grounds
specified in Rule 32.1(a) of the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure unless the petition, including
any amendments to the petition, is filed within 365
days of the filing of the appellant defendant's
first brief on direct appeal of a case in which the
death penalty was imposed pursuant to the Alabama
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3
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"(d) A circuit court, before the filing date
applicable to the defendant under subsection (c),
for good cause shown and after notice and an
opportunity to be heard from the Attorney General,
or other attorney representing the State of Alabama,
may grant one 90-day extension that begins on the
filing date applicable to the defendant under
subsection (c).
"(e) Within 90 days of the filing of the state's
answer 
to 
a 
properly 
filed 
petition 
for
post-conviction relief, the circuit court shall
issue an order setting forth those claims in the
petition that should be summarily dismissed and
those claims, if any, that should be set for an
evidentiary hearing. If the properly filed petition
for post-conviction relief is still pending at the
time of the issuance of the certificate of judgment
on direct appeal, the court in which the petition is
pending shall issue a final order on the petition or
appeal within 180 days.
"(f) If post-conviction counsel files an
untimely petition or fails to file a petition before
the filing date applicable under this section, the
circuit court shall direct post-conviction counsel
to show good cause demonstrating extraordinary
circumstances as to why the petition was not
properly filed. After post-conviction counsel's
response, the circuit court may do any of the
following:
"(1) Find that good cause has been
shown and permit counsel to continue
representing the defendant and set a new
filing deadline for the petition, which may
not be more than 30 days from the date the
court 
permits 
counsel 
to 
continue
representation.
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"(2) Find that good cause has not been
shown and dismiss any untimely filed
petition.
"(3) Appoint new and different counsel
to represent the defendant and establish a
new filing deadline for the petition, which
may not be more than 270 days after the
date the circuit 
court appoints 
new
counsel. 
In 
the 
instance 
that 
this
subdivision is applicable and new counsel
is appointed, the circuit court in which
the petition is pending shall issue a final
order on the petition or appeal within 180
days of the filing of the petition.
"(g) The time for filing a petition for
post-conviction relief under Rule 32.1(f) in a case
in which the death penalty was imposed shall be six
months from the date the petitioner discovers the
dismissal or denial, irrespective of the deadlines
specified in this section. This provision shall not
extend the deadline of a previously filed petition
under Rule 32.1 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
"(h) Any petition for post-conviction relief
filed pursuant to this section after the filing date
that is applicable to the defendant under this
section is untimely. Rule 32.7(b) of the Alabama
Rules of Criminal Procedure shall not apply to any
amendments to a petition for post-conviction relief
filed pursuant to this section after the filing date
that is applicable to the defendant under this
section. 
Any 
amendments 
to 
a 
petition 
for
post-conviction relief filed pursuant to this
section filed after the filing date that is
applicable to the defendant under this section shall
be treated as a successive petition under Rule
32.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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"(i) The circuit court shall not entertain a
petition in a case in which the death penalty has
been imposed based on the grounds specified in Rule
32.1(e) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure
unless the petition for post-conviction relief is
filed within the time period specified in subsection
(c) or (d), or within six months after the discovery
of the newly discovered material facts, whichever is
later.
"(j) This section shall apply to any defendant
who is sentenced to death after August 1, 2017."
§ 13A-5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975.
Belcher was sentenced to death by petitioner Judge Almond
in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, on April 3, 2019.  Belcher
filed his appellant's brief in his direct appeal on
February 14, 2020.  Under the FJA, Belcher must file his
Rule 32 petition within 365 days of his first brief on appeal,
i.e., February 13, 2021, unless he is granted a 90-day
extension.  See § 13A-5-53.1(c) and (d).  No other Rule 32
deadlines under the FJA will begin to run for Belcher unless
and until the Court of Criminal Appeals affirms Belcher's
conviction and death sentence, overrules his application for
rehearing, any certiorari review is fully exhausted, and a
certificate of judgment is issued.  See § 13A-5-53.1(e).
Capote was sentenced to death in Colbert County, Alabama,
on May 24, 2018, and petitioner Judge Hatcher is currently
6
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presiding over his case.  Capote filed his appellant's brief
in his direct appeal on April 5, 2019.  Thus, under the FJA,
Capote's Rule 32 petition was originally due on April 4, 2020. 
Capote filed a motion for a 90-day extension to file his
Rule 32 petition under the FJA, and Judge Hatcher granted his
request while the underlying action was pending against her.
Consequently, Capote's Rule 32 petition was due on or before
July 3, 2020.  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued an
opinion affirming Capote's conviction and death sentence on
January 10, 2020.  See Capote v. State, [Ms. CR-17-0963,
Jan. 10, 2020] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).  The
Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Capote's application for
rehearing on May 22, 2020.  Thus, the 180-day deadline for a
final order concerning Capote's Rule 32 petition will be
November 18, 2020.  See § 13A-5-53.1(e).  
Dearman was sentenced to death in Mobile County, Alabama,
on October 12, 2018, and petitioner Judge Hambright is
currently presiding over his case.  Dearman filed his
appellant's brief in his direct appeal on August 27, 2019. 
Thus, under the FJA, Dearman must have filed his Rule 32
petition by August 26, 2020, unless he was granted a 90-day
7
1190644
extension.  No other Rule 32 deadlines under the FJA will
begin to run for Dearman unless and until the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirms Dearman's conviction and death
sentence, overrules his application for rehearing, any
certiorari review is fully exhausted, and a certificate of
judgment is issued.
Francis was sentenced to death by petitioner Judge Hall
in Madison County, Alabama, on July 25, 2019.  Francis filed
his appellant's brief in his direct appeal on April 29, 2020. 
Thus, under the FJA, Francis must file his Rule 32 petition by
April 29, 2021, unless he is granted a 90-day extension.  No
other Rule 32 deadlines under the FJA will begin to run for
Francis unless and until the Court of Criminal Appeals affirms
Francis's conviction and death sentence, overrules his
application for rehearing, any certiorari review is fully
exhausted, and a certificate of judgment is issued.
Yeiter was sentenced to death by petitioner Judge Rice in
Escambia County, Alabama, on March 20, 2019.  Yeiter filed his
appellant's brief in his direct appeal on March 24, 2020. 
Thus, under the FJA, Yeiter has until March 24, 2021, to file
his Rule 32 petition unless he receives a 90-day extension. 
8
1190644
No other Rule 32 deadlines under the FJA will begin to run for
Yeiter unless and until the Court of Criminal Appeals affirms
Yeiter's conviction and death sentence, overrules his
application for rehearing, any certiorari review is fully
exhausted, and a certificate of judgment is issued.
Young was sentenced to death in Colbert County, Alabama,
on March 13, 2018, and petitioner Judge Hatcher is currently
presiding over his case.  Young filed his appellant's brief in
his direct appeal on April 10, 2019.  Thus, under the FJA,
Young had until April 9, 2020, to file his Rule 32 petition,
unless he received a 90-day extension.  Young filed a motion
for a 90-day extension to file his Rule 32 petition under the
FJA, and Judge Hatcher granted his request while the
underlying action was pending against her.  Young's Rule 32
petition was due on or before July 8, 2020.  Young's death-
penalty conviction and sentence are pending on direct appeal.
No other Rule 32 deadlines under the FJA will begin to run for
Young unless and until the Court of Criminal Appeals affirms
Young's 
conviction 
and 
death 
sentence, 
overrules 
his
application for rehearing, any certiorari review is fully
exhausted, and a certificate of judgment is issued.
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On January 29, 2020, the respondents filed in the trial
court a complaint for a declaratory judgment under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 6–6–220 through –232, Ala. Code
1975, and for injunctive relief1 against the petitioners in
their official capacities as the officials the respondents
believe are responsible for enforcing the provisions of the
FJA against the respondents.  In their complaint the
respondents alleged that the FJA is unconstitutional because
it:
"(1) denies [respondents] of the opportunity to
fairly present their constitutional claims thereby
depriving them of 'access to courts' in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Alabama law; (2) denies
[respondents] their rights to due process of law in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Alabama law;
(3) denies [respondents] their rights to ensure that
their convictions and sentences are not imposed in
an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Alabama law; (4) denies
[respondents] their rights to effective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Alabama law;
and 
(5) 
violates 
established 
constitutional
1The respondents filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction on the same date they filed their complaint seeking
a declaratory judgment.  The trial court had not ruled on that
motion before this petition for a writ of mandamus was filed
and this Court ordered answers and briefs and entered a stay
of all proceedings in the trial court.
10
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principles of separation of powers by mandating
Alabama courts to act on filed petitions within a
fixed timeline ...."
More specifically, the respondents alleged:
"69. 
The 
FJA 
specifically 
mandates 
that
Rule 32.7(b), [Ala. R. Crim. P.,] which had
previously allowed for amendment to petitions prior
to judgment to modify or add claims based on
information obtained during the Rule 32 process,
does not apply under the FJA and that any amendments
filed after the filing date will be treated as
successive 
petitions. 
Ala. 
Code 
[1975,]
§ 13A-5-53.1(h).
"70. However, existing Alabama precedent prohibits
discovery from being obtained in Rule 32 proceedings
prior to the filing of a petition.
"....
"73. As a consequence, under this precedent
[respondents] are not able to seek discovery until
after filing their petitions for relief, but, due to
the FJA's prohibition on amendment, Alabama Code
[1975, §] 13A-5-53.1(c), (h), [respondents] are
unable to use any discovery that they obtain, as
they would be unable to amend their petitions to
incorporate that discovery.
"74. In effect, the FJA eliminates the ability to
seek discovery in post-conviction proceedings if an
individual has been sentenced to death."
The complaint went on to allege that, because of the FJA's
alleged prohibition on seeking discovery in postconviction
proceedings for death-penalty petitioners, the respondents
will be unable to assert in their Rule 32 petitions any Brady
11
1190644
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), claims for the alleged
withholding of potentially exculpatory evidence or to raise
any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that require
access to the prosecution's file to establish or to allege
many juror claims that require rigorous investigation. 
Additionally, the complaint alleged that the FJA's deadline on
a circuit court for issuing a final order in a Rule 32
proceeding "violate[s] state constitutional separation of
powers principles" and prevents proper deliberation of a
Rule 32 petitioner's claims.
On February 21, 2020, the petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
asserting 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
lacked 
subject-matter
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
complaint. 
 
Specifically, 
the
petitioners contended that the trial court could not enjoin
the enforcement of criminal laws through this civil action and
that the respondents failed to present a justiciable
controversy 
because 
their 
claims 
were 
not 
ripe 
for
adjudication.  The petitioner circuit judges additionally
moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R.
12
1190644
Civ. P., on the ground that they are absolutely judicially
immune from suit.
On April 15, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion to dismiss, and it requested proposed orders from each
side concerning the motion.  On April 27, 2020, the trial
court entered an order denying the petitioners' motion to
dismiss that addressed each of the petitioners' arguments.  On
May 15, 2020, the petitioners filed this petition for a writ
of mandamus.  This Court ordered answers and briefs.
II.  Standard of Review
"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).  The
question of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a
petition for a writ of mandamus.  See Ex parte Flint Constr.
Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2000).  The denial of a claim
of judicial immunity is also reviewable by mandamus.  See
Ex parte City of Greensboro, 948 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 2006).
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III.  Analysis
A.  Interference with Criminal Law Through Civil Action
The petitioners first contend that the trial court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the respondents' claims because,
they say, the requested relief -- a judgment declaring that
the FJA is unconstitutional and an injunction precluding its
enforcement against the respondents -- "would interfere with
future criminal proceedings, i.e., the Rule 32 petitions." 
The petitioners rely upon the principle this Court enunciated
in Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d 587,
589 (Ala. 2010):
"The general rule is that a court may not
interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws
through a civil action; instead, the party aggrieved
by such enforcement shall make his case in the
prosecution of the criminal action:
"'It is a plain proposition of law that
equity will not exert its powers merely to
enjoin 
criminal 
or 
quasi 
criminal
prosecutions, "though the consequences to
the 
complainant 
of 
allowing 
the
prosecutions to proceed may be ever so
grievous and irreparable."  Brown v.
Birmingham, 140 Ala. [590,] 600, 37 South.
[173,] 174 [(1904)].  "His remedy at law is
plain, adequate, and complete by way of
establishing and having his innocence
adjudged in the criminal court."  Id.'
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"Board of Comm'rs of Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308,
318, 61 So. 920, 923 (1913).  See also 22A Am. Jur.
2d Declaratory Judgments § 57 (2003) ('A declaratory
judgment will generally not be granted where its
only effect would be to decide matters which
properly should be decided in a criminal action.')."
The petitioners argue that this principle is reinforced by
Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., which states that a Rule 32
petition "displaces all post-trial remedies except post-trial
motions under Rule 24 and appeal.  Any other post-conviction
petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be
treated as a proceeding under this rule."  The petitioners
interpret this language to prohibit the use of a declaratory-
judgment action if the action in any way concerns a Rule 32
petition.
However, 
there 
are 
multiple 
problems 
with 
the
petitioners' argument.  To begin with, Rule 32.4 expressly
notes that it "displaces ... [a]ny other post-conviction
petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence." 
(Emphasis added.)  As the respondents rightly observe, they
"do not challenge their convictions or death sentences, but
rather seek a straightforward declaratory judgment that the
procedures established by the FJA are unconstitutional and an
injunction to prevent the Attorney General and the Circuit
15
1190644
Court judges in their official capacities from enforcing the
FJA's provisions."  Respondents' brief, p. 2.  Indeed, the
petitioners conceded this fact in their motion to dismiss,
stating that "[i]t is true that [the respondents] ... do not
ask this Court to overturn their convictions or change their
sentences."  In other words, this declaratory-judgment action
is not a "post-trial remed[y]" but, rather, a constitutional
challenge to the procedures the respondents must follow when
seeking a postconviction remedy.  Thus, by the plain language
of Rule 32.4, the respondents' declaratory-judgment action is
not precluded.
Second, Tyson itself recognized an exception to the
principle that "a court may not interfere with the enforcement
16
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of criminal laws through a civil action."2  Tyson, 43 So. 3d
2A Rule 32 proceeding is not, strictly speaking, a
criminal proceeding. 
"Rule 32 postconviction proceedings in Alabama are
considered civil in nature ....  As Justice Stuart
explained in her dissent in Ex parte Hutcherson, 847
So. 
2d 
386, 
389 
(Ala. 
2002) 
(Stuart, 
J.,
dissenting):
"'[W]hile 
a 
Rule 
32 
proceeding 
for
postconviction relief is considered to be
civil in nature, such a proceeding is
distinct from a typical civil case. Rule
32, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides a defendant
a method by which to seek postconviction
relief; 
therefore, 
the rights to be
accorded a defendant during a Rule 32
proceeding and the procedures pursuant to
which such a proceeding is conducted are
based upon the rule and caselaw.'
"847 So. 2d at 389–90 (citation omitted)."
Ex parte Jenkins, 972 So. 2d 159, 162–63 (Ala. 2005). 
However, the fact that a Rule 32 proceeding is civil in nature
does not by itself prevent the application of the principle
enunciated in Tyson.  As the petitioners note, in both
Ex parte Rich, 80 So. 3d 219 (Ala. 2011), and State v.
Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014), this Court
concluded that the plaintiffs in those cases could not use a
civil 
action 
to 
interfere 
with 
civil-forfeiture 
type
proceedings sought by the State because, "[l]ike a criminal
prosecution, a civil forfeiture action is a mechanism
available to the executive branch for the enforcement of
criminal laws making the possession of certain property
illegal."  Greenetrack, 154 So. 3d at 956 n.5.  Thus, the
principle enunciated in Tyson is concerned with protecting
executive enforcement of criminal laws, regardless of whether
that enforcement is carried out in a civil or criminal
proceeding.
17
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at 589.  Specifically, the Court noted:
"This Court has recognized an exception to the
general rule whereby the equitable powers of the
court can be invoked to avoid irreparable injury
when the plaintiff contends that the statute at
issue is void.  ...  The exercise of equitable
jurisdiction in such cases is consistent with this
Court's recognition of the propriety of actions
against State officials in their official capacity
to enjoin enforcement of a void law because such
conduct -- enforcing a void law -- exceeds the
discretion of the executive in administering the
laws of this State. ...
"The complaint in this action does not present
a situation in which the plaintiff acknowledges that
his conduct is prohibited by a statute and then
challenges the enforceability of the statute."
Id. at 589-90.  As the respondents observe, their declaratory-
judgment action falls squarely within the stated exception
because they contend that the FJA is void under the United
States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution.  Moreover,
unlike the plaintiffs in Tyson, the respondents here posit
that what they wish to do -- engage in discovery and then
amend their Rule 32 petitions to include the fruits of that
discovery in support of their Rule 32 allegations -- is
prohibited by the FJA.  Further, the respondents correctly
observe that the Declaratory Judgment Act specifically
recognizes 
that 
it 
may 
be 
used 
to 
challenge 
the
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constitutionality of state laws.  See Ala. Code 1975,
§§ 6-6-223 and 6-6-227 (stating that "[a]ny person ... whose
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
statute ... may have determined any question of construction
or validity arising under the ... statute" and that, "if the
statute ... is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney
General of the state shall also be served with a copy of the
proceeding and be entitled to be heard").
The petitioners argue that the exception noted in Tyson
is not available to the respondents based on Citizenship Trust
v. Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d 99 (Ala. 2011), and Arthur v. State,
238 So. 3d 1276 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).  But Keddie-Hill and
Arthur are inapposite because in each of those cases the
plaintiffs 
actually 
sought 
to address 
their 
criminal
punishments through civil actions. 
"In Keddie–Hill, this Court addressed claims by Mary
Kathleen Keddie–Hill, Cheryl Tillman, and Justin
Hammond, alleging, among other things, that the
provision in Act No. 2009–768, Ala. Acts 2009,
allowing a portion of the DNA-database fee to be
distributed 
to 
the 
Citizenship 
Trust 
was
unconstitutional.  Keddie–Hill and Tillman had
pleaded guilty to traffic violations and paid the
fines and court costs assessed against them in their
respective cases, including the DNA-database fee.
However, they paid the DNA-database fee under
protest, arguing that the provision for distribution
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of 
the 
fee 
to 
the 
Citizenship 
Trust 
was
unconstitutional but that they could not afford a
lawyer to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional
portion of the fee.  Hammond had also received a
traffic citation, but, at the time he filed his
claims in Keddie–Hill, he had not yet pleaded guilty
or been ordered to pay any fines or court costs.
Instead, he argued that '"[s]hould I plea[d] or be
found guilty I anticipate being ordered to pay fines
and court costs assessed against me,"' including the
allegedly 
unconstitutional 
portion 
of 
the
DNA-database fee.  Keddie–Hill, 68 So. 3d at 103."
Poiroux v. Rich, 150 So. 3d 1027, 1033 (Ala. 2014).  The
Keddie-Hill Court 
expressly 
noted 
that 
Keddie–Hill and 
Tillman 
"seek an injunction remedying the payment of the
allegedly unconstitutional fine by ordering the
defendants to refund the fees or, alternatively, an
order making distribution of those fees pursuant to
the cy pres doctrine.  Thus, the present proceeding
is a collateral proceeding to secure relief from
criminal sentences on constitutional grounds."
168 So. 3d at 104.  As for Hammond, his criminal proceeding
had not yet occurred, but he sought an injunction against the
penalty he would be subjected to in his pending criminal
proceeding.  See id. at 106.  
In Arthur, a death-row inmate sought a judgment declaring
that Alabama's statutes relating to the execution of convicts
violated the Alabama Constitution and an injunction barring
the State from executing him pursuant to a method of execution
determined by the executive branch.  In an appeal-transfer
20
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order, this Court determined that Arthur's action "'in
substance seeks relief from a sentence on constitutional
grounds'" and that, therefore, "Arthur's declaratory-judgment
action is in substance a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition
for postconviction relief."  Arthur, 238 So. 3d at 1278.  In
other words, Arthur plainly sought relief from his death
sentence through his declaratory-judgment action.  
In contrast to the situations presented in both Keddie-
Hill and Arthur, the respondents in this case do not seek to
attack their murder convictions or their death sentences in
this declaratory-judgment action; they seek a judgment
declaring that the FJA is unconstitutional and an injunction
to prohibit the enforcement of the FJA, relief that will not
affect the respondents' convictions or sentences in any way. 
Because the respondents do not seek "relief from [a] criminal
sentence[] on constitutional grounds," or "collaterally
attack[] the judgments in criminal cases," their declaratory-
judgment action falls within the exception noted in Tyson
concerning an action that contends that the subject statute is
void.  Keddie–Hill, 68 So. 3d at 104, 105.  Accordingly, the
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principle enunciated in Tyson does not deprive the trial court
of subject-matter jurisdiction over the respondents' claims.
B.  The Ripeness of the Respondents' Claims
The petitioners argue that the respondents' claims 
"present 
only 
a 
nonjusticiable 
anticipated
controversy and invite an advisory opinion --
something the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to
provide.  They allege that in their future Rule 32
proceedings, they might not be able to meet the
FJA's standard for amending their Rule 32 petitions,
that the FJA's filing deadlines might interfere with
their ability to prepare a Rule 32 petition, and
that the FJA's deadlines for the Petitioner Circuit
Judges to enter a final order on their petitions
might prevent meaningful consideration of their
petitions.  But these claims are inherently
fact-specific 
and 
must 
be 
raised 
in 
the
circumstances of their six individual Rule 32
proceedings rather than collectively in a collateral
civil suit.  The circuit court erred in finding
Respondents' claims were ripe and that they alleged
an imminent and tangible injury caused by the FJA as
required for standing."
Petition, pp. 18-19.
The respondents counter that "[t]here is nothing
'abstract' or 'anticipated' ... about the imminent threat of
injury or the inevitability of litigation" because they are
subject to the provisions of the FJA right now if any of them
seeks to file a Rule 32 petition.  Respondents' brief, p. 14.
The 
respondents allege 
that 
their 
"post-conviction counsel 
are
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already being forced to make impossible choices about which
claims to investigate and raise, and which to forfeit
forever," because of the procedural deadlines in the FJA.  Id. 
In support of the contention that their complaint presents a
justiciable controversy, the respondents point to the fact
that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act "is to settle
and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respects to rights, status, and other legal relations and is
to be liberally construed and administered."  § 6-6-221, Ala.
Code 1975.  They argue that their constitutional rights are in
present jeopardy because the FJA has the force of law.
"In a legal context,
"'"[r]ipeness 
is 
defined 
as 
'[t]he
circumstance existing when a case has
reached, but has not passed, the point when
the facts have developed sufficiently to
permit an intelligent and useful decision
to be made.'"  Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of
Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 352 n.5
(Ala. 
2008) 
(quoting 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary
1353 (8th ed. 2004)).'
"Martin v. Battistella, 9 So. 3d 1235, 1240–41 (Ala.
2008).  Courts generally restrain themselves from
addressing cases that have not reached the point of
ripeness. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that the basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is
'to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves
in abstract disagreements ....'  Abbott Labs. v.
23
1190644
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18
L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).  See also National Park
Hospitality Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 538
U.S. 803, 807, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017
(2003).  Alabama cases often address ripeness in the
context of whether a case is justiciable, or
appropriate for judicial review.  That is, the case
must concern a dispute that is '"'a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a [judgment].'"'  Ex parte Bridges, 925 So.
2d 189, 193 (Ala. 2005) (holding that declaratory
relief is not available for an 'anticipated
controversy' (quoting Baldwin County v. Bay Minette,
854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn
Copeland v. Jefferson County, 284 Ala. 558, 561, 226
So. 2d 385, 387 (1969)))."
Ex parte Riley, 11 So. 3d 801, 806–07 (Ala. 2008).
"'[A]pplying 
the 
ripeness 
doctrine 
in 
the
declaratory judgment context presents a unique
challenge.'  Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe,
212 F.3d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 2000).  This is because
declaratory 
relief 
is 
more 
likely 
to 
be
discretionary, and declaratory actions contemplate
an 'ex ante determination of rights' that 'exists in
some tension with traditional notions of ripeness.'
Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian
Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1994))."
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. A & D Interests,
Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 741, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  See also
Ex parte Town of Summerdale, 252 So. 3d 111, 121 (Ala. 2016)
("A declaratory-judgment action is a unique form of action in
that it is often filed before an actual breach of a right has
occurred, and so an 'actual injury' has not yet been sustained
24
1190644
by the plaintiff. A declaratory judgment often seeks to avoid
harm before it happens.").  
Nonetheless, ripeness is still required for a court to
entertain a request for a declaratory judgment.
"Although 
the 
Declaratory 
Judgment 
Act, 
codified
at Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6–6–220 through –232 ('the
Act'), provides for actions to declare the legal
rights, status, and relations of parties, the Act
does not '"'empower courts to decide moot questions,
abstract propositions, or to give advisory opinions,
however convenient it might be to have these
questions decided for the government of future
cases.'"'  Bruner v. Geneva County Forestry Dep't,
865 So. 2d 1167, 1175 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Stamps v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 944
(Ala. 1994), quoting in turn Town of Warrior v.
Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662
(1963) (emphasis added in Stamps)).
"'This 
Court 
has 
emphasized 
that
declaratory-judgment actions must "settle
a 'bona fide justiciable controversy.'"
Baldwin County v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d
42, 45 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Gulf South
Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557
(Ala. 1979)).  The controversy must be
"'definite and concrete,'" must be "'real
and substantial,'" and must seek relief by
asserting a claim opposed to the interest
of another party "'upon a state of facts
which must have accrued.'"  Baldwin County,
854 So. 2d at 45 (quoting Copeland v.
Jefferson County, 284 Ala. 558, 561, 226
So. 2d 385, 387 (1969)).  "'Declaratory
judgment proceedings will not lie for an
"anticipated controversy."'"  Creola Land
Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C.,
828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
25
1190644
City of Dothan v. Eighty–Four West, Inc.,
738 So. 2d 903, 908 (Ala. Civ. App.
1999)).'
"Bedsole[ v. Goodloe,] 912 So. 2d [508,] 518 [(Ala.
2005)]."
Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So. 3d 89, 93 (Ala. 2011).
In light of the foregoing principles, the difficulty with
the respondents' claims is a lack of a factual context
necessary to make a proper determination concerning the
constitutionality of the FJA.  We do not doubt the likelihood
of future litigation between the respondents and the Attorney
General's office: inmates on death row nearly always file at
least one Rule 32 petition.  But the respondents' claims make
largely hypothetical assumptions about the effect the FJA will
have upon their respective Rule 32 petitions and how the FJA
will be applied in their respective cases.  The respondents
simply state, without specific explication concerning each of
their cases, that the procedural requirements of the FJA will
force them to file Rule 32 petitions without sufficient time
to research and formulate arguments, that it will prevent them
from engaging in discovery that supports the claims in their
petitions or sheds light on new claims, that the petitioner
circuit judges will be forced to disallow amendments to their
26
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Rule 32 petitions based upon such discovery, and that the
petitioner circuit judges will not have sufficient time to
thoroughly examine the claims in the respondents' Rule 32
petitions before the FJA requires them to issue final orders
on the respondents' Rule 32 petitions.  Indeed, although the
subject 
declaratory-judgment action 
is 
brought 
by 
six 
specific
death-row inmates, their claims are couched in general terms
because the respondents assume that the FJA will be applied
the same way and have the same effects for every death-penalty
Rule 32 petitioner.  As the respondents assert in their brief:
"Given the FJA's dramatically reduced statute of limitations,
any Plaintiff who takes the time required to file a petition
that incorporates discovery will default their constitutional
claims, and never be able to raise them due to procedural
bars, no matter the strength of these claims."  Respondents'
brief, pp. 13-14 (emphasis added).  But there is no way a
court can actually know that such results will occur under the
FJA for each of the respondents -- or, for that matter, for
any other death-row inmate who has yet to file a Rule 32
petition governed by the FJA -- until the Rule 32 petitions
are filed and the claims are examined.  
27
1190644
This declaratory-judgment action forces the trial court
to make assumptions or predictions absent the factual context
that would exist in an actual Rule 32 proceeding.3 
"'Predominantly legal questions are generally amenable to a
conclusive determination in a preenforcement context';
however, judgements that would be 'based upon a hypothetical
set of facts' stray towards the realm of advisory opinions and
thus favor a finding of unripeness."  AXIS Ins. Co. v. PNC
Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 321, 327 (W.D. Pa.
2015) (quoting Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union
3The 
respondents argue 
that 
all 
of 
their 
allegations "must
be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage." 
Respondents' brief, p. 13.  But this confuses the respondents'
factual allegations with their legal allegations; the court is
required to accept only the former as true in evaluating a
motion to dismiss.  Specifically, we must accept as true that
the respondents are all subject to the FJA and that they will
file Rule 32 petitions before the petitioner circuit judges
because those are factual allegations.  However, the effects
that the respondents allege the FJA will have on the substance
of their Rule 32 claims and upon the rulings of the petitioner
circuit judges are legal allegations that carry no such
presumption.  See, e.g., Ex parte Gilland, 274 So. 3d 976, 985
n.3 (Ala. 2018) ("Although we are required to accept McCain's
factual allegations as true at this stage of the proceedings,
we are not required to accept her conclusory allegations that
Gilland acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad
faith. Rather, to survive Gilland's motion to dismiss, McCain
was required to plead facts that would support those
conclusory allegations.").
28
1190644
No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2009)).  As we noted in
the rendition of the facts, the FJA's initial deadline for
filing a Rule 32 petition has not passed for respondents
Belcher, Francis, and Yeiter, and it has passed for
respondents Capote, Dearman, and Young, though we have no
information as to whether the latter three respondents have,
in fact, filed Rule 32 petitions.  Regardless, before a Rule
32 proceeding has been initiated, there is an "absence of an
extant factual scenario from which to frame a controversy." 
Baldwin Cnty. v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 46 (Ala. 2003).
Determination of the effects of the FJA on the respondents'
constitutional rights outside the Rule 32 context "would
require 
the 
trial 
court 
to 
speculate 
on 
presently
undeterminable circumstances," including how the FJA would
affect the claims filed by each respondent in his Rule 32
petition and how the petitioner circuit judges would apply the
FJA in each Rule 32 proceeding.  Bruner v. Geneva Cnty.
Forestry Dep't, 865 So. 2d 1167, 1176 (Ala. 2003).  As to the
latter point, "[w]e presume that trial court judges know and
follow the law."  Ex parte Atchley, 936 So. 2d 513, 516 (Ala.
2006).  And yet, the subject declaratory-judgment action
29
1190644
presumes that the petitioner circuit judges in the yet-to-
occur Rule 32 proceedings will apply the law in such a way as
to violate the respondents' constitutional rights.  This
discrepancy further highlights why the asserted claims are
speculative, absent the context of a Rule 32 proceeding.  For
all that appears, the deadlines mandated by the FJA might be
navigated in such a way that there are no detrimental effects
upon the respondents' constitutional rights -- or at least
upon those of some of the respondents.  Until such time as the
respondents file their respective Rule 32 petitions, "any
attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment as to a hypothetical
future controversy is beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the circuit courts."  Ex parte Johnson, 993 So. 2d 875, 884
(Ala. 2008).
In short, "whether there is an actual case or controversy
to support a declaratory judgment may be affected by a
preference for resolution in a different and better-developed
proceeding."  13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3529 n.17 (3d ed. 2008).  In this instance,
the respondents' claims are inherently fact-specific and
necessitate resolution within the context of a Rule 32
30
1190644
proceeding.  In the present context, their claims amount to an
anticipated controversy, which the Declaratory Judgment Act
does not address.  See Surles, 68 So. 3d at 93.  Accordingly,
the trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the
respondents' complaint, and the trial court erred in denying
the petitioners' motion to dismiss.4
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the general
principle that a court may not interfere with the enforcement
of criminal laws through a civil action does not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction in this case. However, we also
conclude that the respondents' claims are not ripe for
adjudication 
in 
this 
declaratory-judgment 
action 
because 
their
claims are inherently fact-specific and must be raised within
the context of their six individual Rule 32 proceedings. 
Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the respondents' complaint.  Accordingly, we grant the
4Because we have concluded that the respondents' claims
are not ripe for adjudication in the context of a declaratory-
judgment action, we pretermit discussion as to whether the
petitioner circuit judges are judicially immune from the
respondents' claims.
31
1190644
petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to
enter an order granting the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Sellers and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur
specially.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
32
1190644
MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring specially).
I fully concur with the main opinion.  I write separately
to address the fact that the respondents named as defendants
in this action the circuit judges who will preside in the
respondents' Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., proceedings when the
respondents file their Rule 32 petitions.5
The Attorney General has argued on behalf of the
petitioner circuit judges that judicial immunity bars the
respondents from asserting their claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the petitioner circuit judges.  In
support of this argument, the Attorney General cites Ex parte
City of Greensboro, 948 So. 2d 540, 542 (Ala. 2006), in which
this Court stated: "Judges acting in an official judicial
capacity are entitled to absolute judicial immunity under
Alabama law ...."
The respondents counter that Greensboro involved a
situation in which the plaintiff sought damages against a
municipal-court clerk and magistrate, whereas they seek
equitable relief: a judgment declaring the Fair Justice Act
("FJA") unconstitutional and an injunction preventing its
5This issue was pretermitted by the conclusion in the main
opinion that this case is not ripe for adjudication.
33
1190644
enforcement against them.  The respondents cite for support
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), a case in which the
United States Supreme Court examined the common-law roots of
judicial immunity and concluded that "judicial immunity is 
not
a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial
officer acting in her judicial capacity."6  Id. at 541-42. 
Cf. Yeager v. Hurt, 433 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Ala. 1983) (noting
that the "doctrine of judicial immunity ... absolutely bars
actions for damages against judges").  The Attorney General
retorts that "'Congress responded to Pulliam in 1996 by
amending § 1983 to abrogate its holding.'  Justice Network,
Inc. v. Craighead Cnty., 931 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir. 2019)." 
Petition, p. 28.
In my view, neither the petitioners nor the respondents
have approached this issue correctly.  It is true that
Congress, in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996,
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such that "injunctive relief against
a judicial officer for an act or omission in his judicial
capacity shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
6Federal law concerning judicial immunity is implicated
here because most of the respondents' allegations assert that
the FJA violates their federal constitutional rights.
34
1190644
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."  Bauer v.
Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2003).  See also Pub.L. No.
104–317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Kuhn v. Thompson, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1322–23 (M.D.
Ala. 2004) (noting that, "[w]here a plaintiff does not allege
and the record does not suggest that the judicial defendant
violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was
unavailable, judicial immunity requires dismissal of claims
against judicial officers for actions taken in their judicial
capacity even when the claims seek prospective injunctive
relief"); 
Ray 
v. 
Judicial 
Corr. 
Servs., 
Inc.,
No. 2:12-CV-02819-RDP, Oct. 9, 2014 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (not
selected for publication in F.Supp.) (stating that "[i]t
cannot be seriously disputed that, after the [Federal Courts
Improvement Act], judicial immunity typically bars claims for
prospective injunctive relief against judicial officials
acting in their judicial capacity.  Only when a declaratory
decree is violated or declaratory relief is unavailable would
plaintiffs have an end-run around judicial immunity").  Thus,
even under the authority relied upon by the respondents, their
claim for injunctive relief against the petitioner circuit
35
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judges is barred by judicial immunity.  This leaves, at most,
the respondents' claim for declaratory relief as potentially
viable against the petitioner circuit judges.
However, although the doctrine of judicial immunity may
not bar a suit for declaratory relief against the petitioner
circuit judges, the respondents' action fails for another
reason that implicates jurisdiction:  There is a lack of a
justiciable controversy between the respondents and the
petitioner circuit judges.
"The seminal case on the subject is In re Justices
of The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17
(1st Cir. 1982).
"In 
that 
case, 
five 
attorney-plaintiffs sued 
the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court and the Puerto Rico Bar
association, attacking the constitutionality of
statutes requiring members of the bar to support the
bar association through dues payments.  See id. at
19.  Prior to the suit, the bar association had
filed disciplinary complaints against some, but not
all, of the attorney plaintiffs for non-payment of
their dues.  The Commonwealth's Supreme Court had
determined that the bar requirements were valid. 
See id.  When the attorney-plaintiffs filed suit
against the justices, the justices immediately
sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals
ordering 
the 
district 
court 
to 
dismiss 
the
complaint.  See id. at 21.
"In support of their request for mandamus, the
justices argued that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the matter under Article III
because no 'case or controversy' existed between the
36
1190644
justices and the attorneys.  In this connection, the
justices argued that 'they and the plaintiffs
possess[ed] no ... "adverse legal interest[s]," for
the Justices' only function concerning the statutes
being 
challenged 
[was] 
to 
act 
as 
neutral
adjudicators 
rather 
than 
as 
administrators,
enforcers, or advocates.'  Id. (emphasis added)."
Brandon E. v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Rather than deciding the case based on Article III of the
United States Constitution, "the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit simply held that the justices were not proper
parties under § 1983."  Brandon E., 201 F.3d at 198.
"We ... agree that, at least ordinarily, no
'case or controversy' exists between a judge who
adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant
who attacks the constitutionality of the statute.
Judges sit as arbiters without a personal or
institutional 
stake 
on 
either 
side 
of 
the
constitutional controversy.  ...  Almost invariably,
they have played no role in the statute's enactment,
they have not initiated its enforcement, and they do
not even have an institutional interest in following
their prior decisions (if any) concerning its
constitutionality if an authoritative contrary legal
determination has subsequently been made (for
example, by the United States Supreme Court).  In
part for these reasons, one seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of a statute on constitutional grounds
ordinarily sues the enforcement official authorized
to bring suit under the statute; that individual's
institutional obligations require him to defend the
statute.  One typically does not sue the court or
judges who are supposed to adjudicate the merits of
the suit that the enforcement official may bring."
37
1190644
In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17,
21-22 (1st Cir. 1982).  In short, "[t]he requirement of a
justiciable controversy is not satisfied where a judge acts in
his adjudicatory capacity."  Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d at 359.
Under this understanding, the petitioner circuit judges
in their role of presiding over the respondents' Rule 32
proceedings 
are 
not 
inherently 
antagonistic 
to 
the
respondents' constitutional claims concerning the FJA.  The
only way the required adverseness7 could exist is if the
petitioner 
circuit 
judges 
were 
viewed 
strictly 
as
administrators or enforcers of Rule 32, but that would be a
misunderstanding of a circuit judge's role in a Rule 32
proceeding.  An illustrative case is Mendez v. Heller, 530
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976).  In Mendez, the appellant Louisa
Roman married Thomas Roman in Puerto Rico on March 31, 1973.
Roman left her husband in California in June 1974, and she
moved to New York the following month.  Roman wanted a
7Under Alabama law, "'[t]here must be a bona fide
justiciable controversy in order to grant declaratory relief.
If no justiciable controversy exists when the suit is
commenced, then the court lacks jurisdiction.'"  Gulf Beach
Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So. 2d 1177, 1182
(Ala. 2006) (quoting Durham v. Community Bank of Marshall
Cnty., 584 So. 2d 834, 835 (Ala. 1991)).
38
1190644
divorce, but she did not satisfy the applicable two-year
residency requirement under New York law to obtain a divorce.
See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 230(5) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Roman
sought relief in federal court, contending that § 230(5)
violated her federal constitutional rights to due process and
travel.  Roman named New York state judge Louis B. Heller as
one of the defendants in her action under the theory that
Justice Heller would be responsible for granting or rejecting
her complaint for divorce under New York law.  See Mendez, 530
F.2d at 458.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed with the federal district court's
conclusion that Justice Heller lacked 
"a legal interest sufficiently adverse to Roman to
create 
a 
justiciable 
controversy. 
[Mendez 
v.
Heller,] 380 F. Supp. [985,] 989-93 [(E.D.N.Y.
1974)].  This conclusion rested in substance upon
its finding that, if a divorce action were
commenced, defendant Heller, a Justice of the New
York Supreme Court, would be called upon to
determine the constitutional validity of § 230(5)
and, in so doing, would be acting in a judicial
capacity.  In this adjudicatory role, Justice Heller
could not take any position on the merits of Roman's
claim prior to his ruling thereon; hence, 'his
posture would be that of an entirely disinterested
judicial officer and not in any sense the posture of
an adversary to the contentions made on either side
of the case.'  Id. at 990.
39
1190644
"Roman does not seriously contend that Justice
Heller could be considered her adversary in making
this ruling. Rather, she seeks to avoid the affect
of the decision below by claiming that Justice
Heller is sued, not in his judicial capacity, but
rather as the administrative superior of the
defendant Clerk.  Appellant reasons as follows:  The
Clerk, who initially screens divorce complaints for
compliance 
with 
§ 
230(5), 
would 
reject 
her
complaint.  Unlike a ruling on the statute's
constitutionality, the Clerk's action would be a
purely administrative act, similar to the rejection
of divorce complaints for failure to tender filing
fees in Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968,
971—72 (D. Conn. 1968) (three-judge court), aff'd on
other grnds., 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d
113 (1971).  As presiding Justice, defendant Heller
controls and is responsible for the administrative
acts of the Clerk.  Because Justice Heller is sued
only in this administrative capacity, he is a proper
party defendant.  Boddie, supra.
"This argument is untenable and factually
unwarranted.  Unlike the situation in Boddie, 286 F.
Supp. at 970, Roman cannot base her federal suit on
the rejection of her divorce complaint for failure
to meet statutory requirements, for she has made no
attempt to secure a divorce.  Compare Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975);
Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I.1973)
(three-judge court), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 904,
95 S.Ct. 819, 42 L.Ed.2d 831 (1975); Wymelenberg v.
Syman, 
328 
F. 
Supp. 
1353 
(E.D. 
Wis. 
1971)
(three-judge court).  Appellant's position rests on
the hypothetical assumption that, if she sued for
divorce, her complaint would be rejected pro forma,
without consideration of the constitutional issues
she presents here.  We are unwilling, nor are we
constitutionally able, to speculate that this would
be 
the 
response 
of 
the 
State 
courts. 
See
Longshoremen's Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74
S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954).
40
1190644
"Moreover, we do not believe that Justice
Heller's 
official 
responsibilities 
can 
be
compartmentalized 
in 
the 
manner 
suggested 
by
appellant.  Clearly, if Roman had filed a divorce
complaint which questioned the validity of § 230(5),
Justice Heller's consideration thereof would not
have been restricted to determining whether she had
been a New York resident for two years.  Appellant's
bifurcated conception of Justice Heller's duties
simply does not comport with adjudicatory reality.
Neither 
does 
her 
emphasis 
on 
the 
allegedly
administrative role performed by Justice Heller
comport with the gravamen of her complaint.  Roman
does not allege that she meets the requirements of
§ 230(5) but has not been permitted to file for a
divorce; rather, she claims that a two-year
durational 
residency 
requirement 
is 
an
unconstitutional means by which to determine divorce
jurisdiction.  In contrast to the traditionally
administrative task of fee collection, Boddie,
supra, a court's investigation of its jurisdiction
is eminently a judicial function.  Thus, as between
appellant and Justice Heller, this case does not
present 
the 
'honest 
and 
actual 
antagonistic
assertion of rights,' Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co.
v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 12 S.Ct. 400, 402, 36
L.Ed. 176 (1892), 'indispensable to adjudication of
constitutional questions ....'  United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305, 63 S.Ct. 1075, 1076, 87
L.Ed. 1413 (1943) (per curiam)."
Mendez, 530 F.2d at 
459-60 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
Just as in Mendez the plaintiff inappropriately assumed
that Justice Heller would not consider a constitutional
challenge to New York's residency requirement for seeking a
divorce, in this case the respondents assume that the
petitioner circuit judges either would not be able or willing
41
1190644
to 
entertain 
the 
respondents' 
challenges 
to 
the
constitutionality of FJA, even though no such assumption is
warranted. 
 
Likewise, 
just 
as 
Justice 
Heller's
responsibilities with respect to divorce complaints could not
be compartmentalized as solely administrative, the petitioner
circuit judges' roles in Rule 32 proceedings cannot be cabined
as simply "enforcers" of Rule 32's procedural requirements;
their primary task is to be "neutral adjudicators" between the
Rule 32 petitioners and the State as represented by the
Attorney General.  The petitioner circuit judges are not
presumed to take positions on the merits of the respondents'
Rule 32 claims before the petitions have been filed. 
Consequently, there is no adverseness between the respondents
and the petitioner circuit judges that would present a
justiciable controversy.  Without a justiciable controversy,
the declaratory-judgment action against the circuit judges
must be dismissed.
I must also note that additional problems are created by
the respondents naming the petitioner circuit judges as
defendants.  As the Attorney General has observed in the
petition, one of those problems already has 
manifested itself:
42
1190644
"Petitioner Judge Hatcher has already been required
to make a ruling in Respondents Young and Capote's
Rule 32 proceedings while simultaneously being
subject to suit in this proceeding.  If Respondents'
civil suit proceeds on the merits, the Petitioner
Judges will find themselves in the untenable
position of impartially presiding over Respondents'
Rule 32 proceedings while simultaneously responding
to 
the 
merits 
of 
Respondents' 
constitutional
challenges to the FJA in this proceeding."
Petition, p. 30.  In short, this action against the petitioner
circuit judges renders it difficult for those circuit judges
to neutrally apply the FJA's procedures in Rule 32 proceedings
filed by the respondents.  Thus, allowing such an action would
create the specter of circuit judges needing to recuse
themselves from participating in Rule 32 proceedings because
Rule 32 petitioners have named them as party defendants in
declaratory-judgment actions asserting constitutional claims. 
This action creates an unnecessary conflict for 
the 
petitioner
circuit 
judges, 
given 
that 
these 
same 
constitutional arguments
can be raised in the respondents' Rule 32 proceedings.
A final problem that arises from permitting the
petitioner circuit judges to be party defendants in this
action is that it purports to give the Montgomery Circuit
Court some supervisory power over the petitioner circuit
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judges' 
subsequent 
Rule 
32 
proceedings 
involving 
the
respondents. The circuit courts of this state are courts of
general jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction for each circuit
court is limited by the geographic territory of the circuit.
"All the Circuit Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
of the subject-matter.  But the constitution does
not grant jurisdiction of the case, or of the
person.  The cases, arising under the constitutional
grant, are distributed by the General Assembly among
the different Circuit Courts according to locality,
and jurisdiction of the person is acquired by proper
service of legal process, or by consent; and such
jurisdiction, when acquired, is exclusive.  The
distinction 
between 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
subject-matter, 
and 
the 
exercise 
of 
the
jurisdiction, 
must 
be 
observed. 
 
While 
the
jurisdiction of the subject-matter is co-extensive
with the State, the territorial limits in which it
may be exercised is left for legislative creation
and regulation."
Dunbar v. Frazer, 78 Ala. 529, 530 (1885).  See also Art. IV,
§ 142, Ala. Const. 1901 (providing that "[t]he state shall be
divided into judicial circuits," that "[f]or each circuit,
there shall be one circuit court," and that "[t]he circuit
court shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except
as may otherwise be provided by law").  Within their
territorial 
jurisdictions, 
the 
circuit 
courts 
have 
supervisory
authority over inferior tribunals, but the limitations on
their jurisdiction necessarily mean 
that the circuit courts do
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not have supervisory jurisdiction over one another.  See,
e.g., Brogden v. Employees' Ret. Sys., 336 So. 2d 1376, 1379
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (observing that "there are two aspects
of jurisdiction in a circuit court: that general subject
matter jurisdiction granted by the constitution and the
supervisory jurisdiction over inferior judicial bodies or
officers located and acting within its territorial boundaries
granted by statute" (emphasis added)); Ex parte Alabama
Textile Prods. Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 613, 7 So. 2d 303, 306
(1942) (explaining that "[i]t is said in Dunbar v. Frazer, 78
Ala. 529 [(1885)], that if the legislature confers appellate
and supervisory power on the circuit court, it is reasonable
to infer that the intention is that the exercise of such
authority shall be confined within the limits which restrict
the exercise of its original jurisdiction").  In short, the
Montgomery Circuit Court has no constitutional or statutory
authority to exercise jurisdiction over other circuit courts
of this state, including the Colbert, Escambia, Madison,
Mobile, and Tuscaloosa Circuit Courts -- the circuit courts in
which the respondents have possibly filed or will file their
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Rule 32 petitions.8  If this action against the petitioner
circuit judges was permitted to proceed, the Montgomery
Circuit Court could enter rulings on the respondents'
constitutional claims that potentially may conflict with the
rulings of the circuit courts that have exclusive jurisdiction
over the respondents' Rule 32 proceedings, but the Montgomery
Circuit Court's rulings would have no binding effect on the
petitioner circuit judges because of the limits on a circuit
court's jurisdiction.  Thus, it appears that the Montgomery
Circuit Court cannot provide effective relief to the
respondents.  This is yet another reason that the subject
action is due to be dismissed.  See, e.g., Harper v. Brown,
Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So. 2d 220, 224 (Ala. 2003)
(noting that "'[w]e have recognized that a justiciable
controversy is one that is "definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of the parties in adverse legal interest,
and it must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a [judgment]"'"  (quoting MacKenzie v.
First Alabama Bank, 598 So. 2d 1367, 1370 (Ala. 1992), quoting
8Rule 32.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that a Rule 32
petition "shall be filed in and decided by the court in which
the petitioner was convicted."
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in turn Copeland v. Jefferson Cnty., 284 Ala. 558, 561, 226
So. 2d 385, 387 (1969)) (emphasis added)).
In sum, I believe that the strategy of naming the
petitioner circuit judges as defendants in this action is
ill-conceived 
and 
ultimately 
impermissible 
because 
of 
multiple
jurisdictional defects.  Thus, even if the action as a whole
was ripe for adjudication (which it is not), the petitioner
circuit judges would have to be dismissed from the suit.
Bolin, Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
47