Case Title: JARUSSI v BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-120

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
LOUIS J. !,lo. 82-120 IN THE SUPREP4E COUST OF THE SYATE I)F YOTJ?P.hJP+ 3.913 P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, THE BOARD O F TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 8 , LAKE COUNTY, MONT., s a i d Board c o n s i s t i n 9 of LILLIAN STROTJG, e t al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lake, The Eonorable Douglas G. Harkin, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants: John F r e d e r i c k , County Attorney, Polson, Montana For Respondents: Jon E. Ellingson and Nancy 4.;. ploe, Missoula, Montana - - .- - - - - - - Submitted on B r i e f s : Plarch l r ) , 1993 Decided. May 1 9 , 1983 F i l e d : MAY191983 8 - - ----- c l e r k Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. A t e a c h e r recovered a judgment a g a i n s t t h e School Board f o r its v i o l a t i o n of Montana's Open Meeting Law, wrongful t e r m i n a t i o n of employment, and damages of $19,400, a t t o r n e y fees and c o s t s . The School Board a p p e a l s . P l a i n t i f f is Louie J. J a r u s s i , a nontenured h i g h s c h o o l p r i n c i p a l and t e a c h e r i n S t . I g n a t i u s , Montana. Defendant is t h e Board of T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 28, Lake County. J a r u s s i was f i r s t employed by t h e Board f o r t h e 1976- 77 s c h o o l y e a r . During t h e 1977-78 s c h o o l y e a r , he was employed a s a f u l l t i m e p r i n c i p a l and S p a n i s h t e a c h e r a t a s a l a r y of $18,486. The record i n d i c a t e s he was an excep- t i o n a l t e a c h e r and p r i n c i p a l . On February 1, 1978, J a r u s s i m e t w i t h t h e Board and r e q u e s t e d a s a l a r y of $21,000 f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h o o l y e a r . The Board c l o s e d t h e meeting a p p a r e n t l y t o d i s c u s s J a r u s s i ' s r e q u e s t . J a r u s s i claimed he o b j e c t e d t o t h e c l o s u r e , b u t no , . such a c t i o n was recorded i n t h e minutes of t h e meeting. The Board t h e r e a f t e r r e t u r n e d t o o p e n s e s s i o n and o f f e r e d J a r u s s i $19,200, t h e o f f e r t o be a c c e p t e d by March 8. J a r u s s i immediately c o n t a c t e d l e g a l c o u n s e l t o proceed a g a i n s t t h e Board f o r improperly c l o s i n g t h e meeting. The Board's p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r e x p r e s s e d t h e B o a r d ' s anger t o J a r u s s i over h i s complaint and i n d i c a t e d it would n o t h e l p h i s employment s i t u a t i o n . J a r u s s i claimed he v e r b a l l y a c c e p t e d t h e o f f e r of employment on March 8. The Board d i s p u t e d t h i s , and no a c c e p t a n c e is noted i n t h e minutes. The p r e l i m i n a r y budget, i n c l u d i n g a p r o v i s i o n f o r J a r u s s i ' s p o s i t i o n , was approved on March 15. The Board m e t a g a i n on March 29. P a r t of t h e meeting was a g a i n c l o s e d w i t h o u t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e demand of i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y c l e a r l y exceeded t h e merits of p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e . During t h e c l o s u r e of t h e meeting t h e Board unanimously decided t o withdraw its o f f e r of employment t o J a r u s s i . T h e r e a f t e r , t h e meeting was opened, and a formal m o t i o n was a p p r o v e d w i t h d r a w i n g t h e s a l a r y i n c r e a s e p r e v i o u s l y o f f e r e d J a r u s s i . The Board never o f f i c i a l l y nor s p e c i f i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e d J a r u s s i ' s p o s i t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Board's r e c o r d s . On A p r i l 7 , J a r u s s i demanded a s t a t e m e n t of termina- t i o n by t h e Board. The Board s e r v e d n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n on A p r i l 21. On A p r i l 28, J a r u s s i f i l e d s u i t a g a i n s t t h e Board i n t h r e e c o u n t s : (1) f o r v i o l a t i o n of Montana's Open Meeting Law a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g h i s r i g h t s and s e e k i n g t o have t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n s d e c l a r e d void; ( 2 ) f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y t e r m i n a t e him i n v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t e ; and, ( 3 ) r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t him f o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s r i g h t s under Montana I s Open Meeting Law by withdrawal of t h e o f f e r of employment. I n June J a r u s s i r e q u e s t e d r e l e a s e from h i s e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t o f employment t o seek o t h e r employment. H e a c c e p t e d a p o s i t i o n i n Alaska and r e p o r t e d t o work i n J u l y . Following a j u r y t r i a l , judgment was e n t e r e d awarding J a r u s s i $16,500 f o r h i s l o s s i n s e l l i n g h i s p r o p e r t y , and $2,900 moving expenses. The judgment a l s o i n c l u d e d a d e t e r - m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i t h o u t a j u r y t h a t t h e Board had v i o l a t e d Montana's Open Meeting Law and voided t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Board withdrawing its p r e v i o u s o f f e r of employment to Jarussi. The judgment included an award of attorney fees and costs. Following denial of its motion for a new trial, the Board appeals. Three issues are raised on appeal: 1. Was Jarussi required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in District Court? 2. Should a new trial have been granted because ex- cessive damages were awarded under the influence of passion or prejudice? 3. Did the School Board violate Montana's Open Meet- ing Law? The Board contends that Jarussi was required to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the Board's decision to the county superintendent of schools before seeking judicial relief in the courts, citing section 20-3- 210, MCA, giving the county superintendent sole jurisdiction to decide this controversy. We hold that Jarussi was not required to exhaust administrative remedies within the educational apparatus before filing suit in the District Court. The District Court is expressly granted jurisdiction to void any decision in violation of Montana's Open Meeting Law. The pertinent statute provides: "Voidability. Any decision made in vio- lation of 2-3-203 [statutory implementa- tion of Montana's Open Meeting Law] may be declared void by a district court having jurisdiction. A suit to void any such decision must be commenced within 30 days of the decision." (Bracketed de- scriptive phrase added. ) Section 2-3- 213, MCA. We have previously upheld the jurisdiction of the Dis- trict Court in actions to enforce Montana's Open Meeting Law. Board of Trustees, Huntley Project School Dist. 24 v . Board of County Commissioners, Yellowstone County (1980), Mon t . , 606 P.2d 1069, 38 St.Rep. 175. Further, statutory time constraints negate exhaustion of administra- tive remedies before the county superintendent of schools and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to constitutional issues. Davies Warehouse Co. v . Bowles (1944), 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635; 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, S 185 at 484-490. Here, Jarussi claims violation of his constitutional right to observe the deliberations of the School Board under the right to know provisions of the Montana Constitution, Article 11, Section 9. Constitutional questions are properly decided by a judicial body, not an administrative official, under the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Art. 111, Section 1, 1972 Mont. Const. Next, the Board contends that the jury awarded Jarussi excessive damages under the influence of passion and preju- dice. The Board argues that the jury exercised no critical judgment in its award of economic damages to Jarussi, disre- garded the disparity between his increased salary in Alaska compared to his salary in Montana, and had to "speculate wildly" concerning cost of living differences between Alaska and Montana, and that Jarussi's claim of economic losses lacked specificity. The Board points out that the jury award for loss on the sale of Jarussi's property was the midpoint in the range of Jarussi's testimony; awarded him actual costs including travel and lodging expenses for trial, all attorney fees and all court costs; that the minimal p e r i o d of d e l i b e r a t i o n and t h e unanimous v e r d i c t i n d i c a t e a p a s s i o n and p r e j u d i c e t o p u n i s h t h e Board; and t h a t t h e j u r y a p p a r e n t l y d i s r e g a r d e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t it c o u l d n o t award damages f o r p a i n and s u f f e r i n g , l o s s of c o n s o r t i u m , mental d i s t r e s s , l o s s of r e p u t a t i o n and c o u l d o n l y award t a n g i b l e p e c u n i a r y l o s s e s . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e j u r y awarded damages i n t h i s case f o r wrongful t e r m i n a t i o n of J a r u s s i ' s employ- ment, n o t f o r v i o l a t i o n of Montana's Open Meeting Law. The damage award must be r e a s o n a b l e . S e c t i o n 27-1-302, MCA. The damages must be s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . Johnson v. Murray ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont. , 656 P.2d 170, 39 St.Rep. 2257; Bjerum v. Wieber ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 149 Mont. 375, 427 P.2d 62. The law r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t t h e t r i e r of f a c t e x e r c i s e calm and r e a s o n a b l e judgment and t h e amount of t h e award rests of n e c e s s i t y i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i e r of f a c t . Johnson v. Murray, s u p r a . When t h e r e is s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f t h e f a c t of damage, d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d n o t e s c a p e l i a b i l i t y because t h e amount of damage c a n n o t be proven w i t h p r e c i - s i o n . Johnson v. Murray, s u p r a , c i t i n g Winsness v. M . J . Conoco D i s t r i b u t o r s (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) , 593 P.2d 1303. Here J a r u s s i t e s t i f i e d t h a t he l o s t between $16,000 and $17,000 when he had t o h a s t i l y s e l l most of h i s p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n view of h i s move t o Alaska. H e t e s t i f i e d h e h e l d a g a r a g e sale and t h a t " t h e move c l e a n e d m e o u t . " H e k e p t a r e c o r d of s a l e s of t h e v a r i o u s i t e m s and what h e o r i g i n a l l y p a i d f o r them, which w a s n o t i n t r o d u c e d i n t o evidence. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s a c t u a l moving c o s t s were $2,902.50. T h i s t e s t i m o n y was n o t d i s p u t e d o r q u e s t i o n e d on cross-examination. No e v i d e n c e w a s p r e s e n t e d by t h e Board r e f u t i n g J a r u s s i ' s claimed damages. W e hold t h e damages awarded were supported by substan- t i a l evidence and t h e jury exercised reasonable judgment i n determining the amount of t h e award. The jury awarded $16,500 f o r l o s s e s on t h e s a l e of J a r u s s i ' s p e r s o n a l property which was w i t h i n t h e range of h i s testimony. The jury a l s o awarded $2,900 moving c o s t s which was s l i g h t l y l e s s than h i s testimony. The jury awarded c o u r t c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 2-3-221, MCA. The j u r y a l s o awarded a c t u a l c o s t of t r a v e l and lodging expenses f o r t r i a l which was n o t included i n t h e judgment. The d i f f e r e n c e i n s a l a r y and c o s t of l i v i n g between Alaska and Montana is i r r e l e v a n t a s no items of damages encompassed t h i s d i f f e r e n c e . N o evidence was introduced by t h e Board supporting an o f f s e t on t h i s b a s i s . The v e r d i c t is c l e a r t h a t no damages were awarded f o r pain and s u f f e r - ing, l o s s of consortium, mental d i s t r e s s , l o s s of r e p u t a t i o n or noneconomic or i n t a n g i b l e damage. Where, a s h e r e , t h e amount of damages is c l e a r and uncontradicted, a s h o r t period of jury d e l i b e r a t i o n and a unanimous v e r d i c t w i l l n o t support a claim of excessive damages influenced by passion o r p r e j u d i c e . F i n a l l y , t h e Board c o n t e n d s it d i d n o t v i o l a t e Montana's Open Meeting Law. The Board argues t h a t c l o s u r e was proper under a s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n p e r m i t t i n g c l o s u r e " t o d i s c u s s a s t r a t e g y t o be followed w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o l l e c t i v e bargaining." The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n provides: "RIGHT TO KNOW. N o person s h a l l be de- prived of t h e r i g h t t o examine documents o r t o observe t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of a l l p u b l i c b o d i e s o r a g e n c i e s of s t a t e government and its s u b d i v i s i o n s , e x c e p t i n c a s e s i n which t h e demand of i n d i v i - d u a l p r i v a c y c l e a r l y e x c e e d s t h e m e r i t s of p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e . " A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 9 , 1972 Mont. Const. A s t a t u t o r y implementation of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate p r o v i d e s t h a t meetings of a s c h o o l board s h a l l be "open t o t h e p u b l i c . " S e c t i o n 2-3-203(1), MCA. S u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) o f t h a t s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c e p t i o n s : "However, a meeting may be c l o s e d t o d i s c u s s a s t r a t e g y t o be followed w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g o r liti- g a t i o n when an open meeting would have a d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on t h e b a r g a i n i n g o r l i t i g a t i n g p o s i t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c agency. " There is no c l a i m o r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e l i t i g a t i o n e x c e p t i o n i n t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s . The Board r e l i e s s o l e l y on t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g e x c e p t i o n . The r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e depends on t h e c o r r e c t meaning o f t h e term " c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . " The a p p r o p r i a t e g u i d e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e meaning o f words and p h r a s e s is s e c t i o n 1-2-106, MCA. The s t a t u t e r e a d s : " C o n s t r u c t i o n of words and p h r a s e s . Words and p h r a s e s u s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e s o f ~ o n t a n a a r e c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n t e x t and t h e approved usage of t h e language, b u t t e c h n i c a l words and p h r a s e s and such o t h e r s a s have a c q u i r e d a pecu- l i a r and a p p r o p r i a t e meaning i n law o r a r e d e f i n e d i n c h a p t e r 1, p a r t 2, a s amended, a r e t o be c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o such p e c u l i a r and a p p r o p r i a t e meaning o r d e f i n i t i o n . " The common meaning of t h e term " c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g " is i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t used i n t h e t e c h n i c a l , l e g a l s e n s e . The A m e r i c a n C o l l e g e D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a s " t h e p r o c e s s by which wages, h o u r s , r u l e s , and working c o n d i t i o n s a r e n e g o t i a t e d and a g r e e d upon by a union with an employer for all the employees collectively whom it represents." American College ~ictionary 236 (1966). Black's defines collective bargaining as: ". . . a procedure looking toward making of collective agreements between employer and accredited representative of emplo- yees concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and requires that parties deal with each other with open and fair minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles existing between them to the end that employment relations may be stabilized and obstruc- tion to free flow of commerce prevented. . . . Negotiation between an employer and organized employees as distinguished from individuals, for the purpose of determin- ing by joint agreement the conditions of employment." Black's Law Dictionary, 238-39 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979). The "appropriate" and "peculiar" meaning of the term in the law is expressed in the National Labor Relations Act. It is contemplated in the definition of "unfair labor practice" that collective bargaining is negotiation between the employer and a representative of the employees. 29 USCA Numerous federal cases have held that collective bar- gaining has the well understood meaning in the law of settling disputes by negotiation between the employer and the representative of the employees. See e.g., United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co. (4th Cir. 1955), 223 F.2d 872. " . . . Collective bargaining is an activity, presupposing that the employees shall have opportunity in absence of their employer to canvass their grievances, formulate their demands in common, and instruct an advocate who they believe will best press their suit." NLRB v . Stow Manufacturing Co. (2nd Cir. 1954), 217 F.2d 900, 904. There is no specific definition of collective bargain- i n g i n Montana law. T h e r e f o r e , w e a d o p t t h e d e f i n i t i o n brought f o r t h by t h e f o r e g o i n g a u t h o r i t y . W e af f irm t h e D i s t r i c t Court ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e c l o s i n g of t h e meeting t o d i s c u s s J a r u s s i ' s employment s t a t u s d o e s n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g e x c e p t i o n , t h u s voiding a c t i o n t a k e n by t h e Board r e g a r d i n g J a r u s s i . J a r u s s i was d e a l i n g w i t h t h e S c h o o l Board r e g a r d i n g h i s own f u t u r e employment. H i s a c t i o n s were n o t on behalf of anyone else and t h e Board's d e c i s i o n s would n o t a f f e c t anyone else. Hence, J a r u s s i had t h e r i g h t t o be p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e B o a r d ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g h i s f u t u r e w i t h t h e School District. If w e were t o adopt t h e Board's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , a n o t h e r avenue would be a v a i l a b l e t o c l o s e p u b l i c meetings. T h i s undermines t h e p o l i c y of t h e Open Meeting Law and is c o n t r a r y t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e mandate t h a t t h e open m e e t i n g p r o v i s i o n s s h o u l d be l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d . Affirmed. f o Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: