Case Title: West Creek Associates v. County of Goochland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071411

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee,1 JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
WEST CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 071411  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       September 12, 2008 
COUNTY OF GOOCHLAND 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY 
Timothy K. Sanner, Judge 
 
 
This appeal involves numerous applications for relief 
from the allegedly erroneous assessment of real property 
taxes.  The primary issue concerns whether a taxpayer must 
prove manifest error in the “manner” in which a taxing 
authority arrived at the assessed value of real property or 
whether a taxpayer can prevail by proving a sufficient 
disparity between the assessed value of real property and 
its fair market value.  Because we conclude the circuit 
court erred by holding that, in order to show manifest 
error, a taxpayer must prove what information the taxing 
authority considered and how it arrived at the assessment 
in question, we will reverse that portion of the circuit 
court’s judgment sustaining a motion to strike the evidence 
with regard to certain parcels.  We will, however, affirm 
the portion of the circuit court’s judgment holding that 
                     
1 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 
30, 2008. 
the taxpayers failed to present credible evidence of fair 
market value with regard to certain other parcels. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In June 2000, 144 separate limited liability companies 
with various names (collectively, West Creek) purchased 
from Bank of America, N.A., as Trustee of the WC Land 
Trust, approximately 2,500 acres of real estate located in 
the West Creek Business Park (the Park) in Goochland County 
(the County).2  Each limited liability company was conveyed 
only a small portion of the acreage, but the total purchase 
price for the 144 separate parcels comprising the 2,500 
acres was approximately 34.1 million dollars.  For the 
purpose of preparing the deeds, a map of the 2,500 acres 
was drawn to create 144 separate parcels for recordation 
purposes.  The map, which the parties referred to as the 
“Timmons Sketch,” did not contain a metes and bounds 
description for any of the 144 parcels, but the Timmons 
Sketch was recorded in the land records of the County along 
with the 144 deeds.3 
                     
2 Ninety percent of each of the 144 limited liability 
companies is owned by another limited liability company, 
with the remaining ten percent owned by Beverly W. 
Armstrong. 
3 The purpose of creating 144 parcels out of the 2,500 
acres and deeding each parcel to a different limited 
liability company was to obtain long-term capital gains tax 
treatment should the parcels be subsequently sold. 
 
2
The Timmons Sketch contained the following notation: 
The parcels described on this sketch do not 
constitute a subdivision under the provisions of 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Code of Ordinances, 
Goochland County, Virginia (“Goochland County”), 
and a recording of this sketch and the reference 
to parcels depicted thereon in any deed of 
conveyance shall not be deemed to imply any 
approval by Goochland County for a division of 
property pursuant to the subdivision ordinance of 
Goochland County, nor shall the depiction of any 
parcel thereon as a road or right-of-way or the 
recording of this sketch constitute a dedication 
of such parcel to Goochland County, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, or political 
subdivision thereof. 
 
Prior to the 2000 sale, the County had assessed the 
2,500 acres as 20 separate parcels having a total assessed 
value of 54.8 million dollars.  In 2001, the County 
conducted its quadrennial reassessment of real property 
pursuant to Code § 58.1-3252.  In that reassessment, the 
County assessed the 2,500 acres as 144 separate parcels, 
reflecting the 144 recorded deeds conveying various 
acreages to the 144 limited liability companies.  The total 
2001 assessed value of the 144 parcels was 105.4 million 
dollars.  The County assessed a few of the parcels at a 
value of approximately $1,000 per acre, 40 parcels at a 
value of approximately $35,000 per acre, and the majority 
of the 144 parcels at a value of approximately $75,000 per 
acre. 
 
3
On December 28, 2004, each limited liability company 
filed an application for relief from an erroneous 
assessment of real property taxes for the years 2001, 2002, 
2003, and 2004.4  In each application for relief, the 
respective limited liability company asserted that, 
“[a]lthough there were no changes to the infrastructure and 
no improvements to the Park between 2000 and 2001, the 
County ignored the fact that the Park had not been 
subdivided and subsequently assessed the Park . . . as if 
it had been subdivided into 144 parcels.”  Such assessment 
was allegedly in error and resulted in an assessed value 
that “substantially exceeded the fair market value of the 
Property and was invalid.”  The limited liability companies 
further alleged that the County’s assessments were not 
uniform in their applications and that the County 
disregarded controlling evidence in making the assessments. 
After the circuit court granted West Creek’s motion to 
consolidate the 130 applications into a single action, the 
case proceeded to a bench trial.  During its case-in-chief, 
West Creek called numerous witnesses, including William H. 
                     
4 Although 144 applications for relief were filed, the 
circuit court dismissed 14 of the applications.  The record 
in this appeal does not disclose the basis for that 
dismissal.  The issues before this Court relate only to the 
remaining 130 applications. 
 
 
4
Goodwin, Jr., who was Armstrong’s business associate and 
participated in the decision to purchase the 2,500 acres 
and to deed the property to 144 limited liability 
companies; Steven I. Wampler, the reassessment contractor 
hired by the County to appraise all real property in the 
County for purposes of the quadrennial reassessment; 
members of the County’s board of assessors (BOA) and board 
of equalization (BOE);5 and its own real estate appraiser, 
Michael G. Miller. 
Goodwin testified that, for purposes of determining 
how much to offer Bank of America for the 2,500 acres, the 
Park was divided into three or four phases or quadrants 
that represented the presence of infrastructure, or lack 
thereof, and charts were prepared that contained estimates 
of the costs of developing the water, sewer, and roads in 
the quadrants that still needed such infrastructure.  Using 
three methods to estimate the value of the 2,500 acres, 
Goodwin concluded that the property was worth approximately 
33 to 34 million dollars.  To form his opinion as to the 
value of the 144 parcels assessed by the County, Goodwin 
                     
5 During the quadrennial reassessment, the function of 
the BOA was to assess the real property in the County at 
fair market value.  The role of the BOE was to resolve 
appeals by taxpayers challenging the assessed value of real 
property set by the BOA and to equalize assessments when 
needed. 
 
5
assigned a portion of the purchase price to each phase or 
quadrant, divided that number by the acres in the quadrant, 
and thereby arrived at the per acre value. 
Wampler testified that he used a mass appraisal method 
to assess real property in the County because that method 
provided a systematic approach to valuing parcels in large 
quantities by using characteristics of similar parcels.  
With regard to the West Creek parcels, Wampler received 144 
separate tax cards from the commissioner of revenue, with 
each card containing the acreage for that parcel.  Wampler 
assessed the West Creek parcels at $75,000 per acre, except 
for parcels labeled on the Timmons Sketch as “floodplain,” 
“waste,” “lakes,” or “roads,” which he valued at $1,000 per 
acre.  The total assessed value of the 144 parcels, 
according to Wampler, was $128,664,800. 
Wampler acknowledged that, although he was appraising 
each individual parcel, he spread the $75,000 per acre 
value “across every bit of dirt out there except waste and 
roads.”  Wampler, however, did not believe that every 
parcel was worth $75,000 an acre.  He agreed that the 
parcels in phase one of the Park’s development were worth 
more than $75,000 per acre and those parcels in phases two 
and three were worth less than $75,000 per acre.  Wampler 
admitted that he did not consider the cost of 
 
6
infrastructure in his appraisal because County officials 
told him that the infrastructure “was coming.”  At the time 
of his appraisal, he also knew that the water and sewer 
allocations then available would only support the 
development of an additional 110 acres of the Park. 
In making his appraisal, Wampler used comparable sales 
of parcels in the Park, which ranged from $63,000 to 
$120,000 per acre.  Wampler stated that he “threw out the 
highest and the lowest [sales] . . . and came up with 
[$]75,000.”  Most of the comparable sales were in the range 
of $100,000 per acre, but Wampler discounted the 144 
parcels to $75,000 per acre in part because they lacked 
improvements for water and sewer.  Wampler also testified 
that he valued the 144 parcels at $75,000 per acre before 
he learned about a contract to sell 27 of the 144 parcels 
for approximately $77,500 per acre to an entity known as 
“Capital One.” 
Wampler provided his appraisal and all the information 
he had collected to the BOA.  The BOA adopted only part of 
Wampler’s appraisal of the 144 parcels.  It reduced the 
assessed value of parcels in phase two of the Park to 
$35,000 per acre.  Wampler was not present at all of the 
BOA meetings and did not know what information the BOA 
possessed in addition to that which he had provided. 
 
7
Three individuals who served as members of the BOA 
during the quadrennial reassessment testified at trial.  
They indicated that the BOA reviewed Wampler’s appraisal, 
but none of the board members who testified could remember 
why the BOA reduced the assessed value of certain parcels 
from $75,000 to $35,000 per acre.  One member explained 
that the BOA members rode through the West Creek property, 
discussed the land, and performed their job with the 
information they had. 
Members of the BOE also testified at trial.  The BOE 
did not agree with the BOA’s assessment of the parcels 
designated as “roads.”  Thus, the BOE increased the 
assessed value of the road parcels from $1,000 per acre to 
either $35,000 or $75,000 per acre, thereby increasing the 
total assessment by $594,000.  The BOE also changed the 
description of those parcels from “road” to 
“commercial/industrial.”  Like the BOA, the BOE members who 
testified could not recall how the BOE arrived at its 
equalization numbers. 
Miller, who qualified as an expert in the field of 
real estate appraisal, valued the 144 parcels at 34.1 
million dollars, which was the purchase price paid for the 
2,500 acres.  Miller opined that the parcels should be 
appraised as a whole, rather than individually, for several 
 
8
reasons: (1) there were no metes and bounds descriptions 
for the parcels; (2) the Timmons Sketch was not an approved 
subdivision of the property; and (3) over two-thirds of the 
acreage was, according to Miller, “raw land, [with] no 
infrastructure to it.”  Miller considered the 34.1 million 
dollar sale price of the 2,500 acres as “a controlling 
factor” and used that sale as his comparable sale.  He then 
divided the total acreage into quadrants and assigned a per 
acre value to each quadrant based on the availability of 
infrastructure in the particular area of the Park. 
In making his appraisal, Miller stated the price per 
acre in relation to the average per acre sale price for the 
2,500 acres, which was $13,552.  For example, he valued the 
best quadrant at about 5.5 times the average per acre sale 
price, another quadrant with existing infrastructure at 3.5 
times the average sale price, the quadrant close to 
existing infrastructure at twice the average sale price, 
the quadrant that would be in the third phase of 
development at 1.3 times the average sale price, and the 
quadrant with limited access and no infrastructure at about 
half of the average sale price.  Thus, Miller appraised the 
most valuable quadrant at $75,000 an acre and the quadrant 
with no infrastructure at $7,500 per acre.  Finally, Miller 
 
9
valued the areas of wetlands or waste at a little over ten 
percent of the average per acre sale price, i.e., $1,614. 
Except for the wetlands and waste areas, Miller 
admitted that he agreed with and adopted the values that 
Goodwin had placed on the 2,500 acres for purposes of 
negotiating with Bank of America.  In Miller’s words, “I 
also agreed with . . . the way that [Goodwin] came up with 
[the values].  And I concluded that that was logical and 
reasonable, and that’s what I’ve come up with.”  In fact, 
he acknowledged that he simply did a mathematical 
calculation in order to arrive at a per acre value for the 
wetland and waste areas: 
Q  Okay.  And when you say you do the math, what 
you’re saying is when you got to the bottom line 
on the fourth page of this chart and you see the 
values listed, 2001 fair market value, that 
bottom line, that bottom number, the total is 
$33,096,832.79.  What you’re saying is you change 
the values of the waste parcels so that it would 
add up to $31.9 million? 
 
A  What I did – that wasn’t the only thing.  I 
looked at the waste and I divided it out, the 
million dollars difference, and then in my mind I 
reconciled it.  
 
Miller criticized Wampler’s assessment because, in 
Miller’s opinion, Wampler treated the parcels as if they 
all were “retail pad sites, where a site is ready to be 
built upon, it’s approved, you have roads to it, you have 
infrastructure, you have everything that you need in order 
 
10
to go and build a building on it.”  Miller also questioned 
the validity of the comparable sales Wampler used in his 
appraisal because those parcels already had access to 
water, sewer, and roads.  Unlike Wampler, Miller believed 
that the lines on the Timmons Sketch creating the 144 
parcels did not increase the value of the parcels because 
they would not be developed and/or sold in accordance with 
those lines. 
After Miller testified, West Creek rested its case, 
and the County moved to strike the evidence.  The County 
contended that West Creek had failed to establish a 
sufficient record from which the circuit court could 
conclude that the County had assessed the relevant parcels 
in violation of Code § 58.1-3984.6  In the County’s view, 
West Creek proved only how Wampler appraised the parcels 
but did not establish what the BOA did with the information 
provided by Wampler.  Similarly, the County argued that 
West Creek did not show what information the BOE considered 
in making the adjustments to the assessments set by the 
BOA. 
                     
6 In relevant part, Code § 58.1-3984(A) provides that, 
in a proceeding to correct an allegedly erroneous tax 
assessment, “the burden of proof shall be upon the taxpayer 
to show that the property in question is valued at more 
than its fair market value or that the assessment is not 
 
11
In ruling on the motion, the circuit court noted that 
there is a “presumption in favor of the validity of the 
assessment and that the taxpayer must show manifest error 
in the manner of making the estimate, or that evidence 
which should be controlling has been disregarded.”  
Continuing, the circuit court concluded that Wampler 
committed “manifest error” by applying a median value of 
$75,000 per acre to all 144 parcels even though that figure 
bore no relation to any particular parcel.  The question 
for the court, however, was whether that error could be 
“reasonably inferred to serve as the basis for the 
assessment ultimately arrived at by the board of assessors 
and the board of equalization.” 
As to the 90 parcels assessed at either $75,000 per 
acre or $1,000 per acre, the circuit court overruled the 
County’s motion to strike.  Drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court 
concluded that, since the assessed values matched Wampler’s 
appraised values, Wampler’s manifest error could be imputed 
to the County.  The court also concluded that West Creek 
had presented sufficient evidence at that point in the 
                                                             
uniform in its application, or that the assessment is 
otherwise invalid or illegal.” 
 
12
proceedings to establish that those assessments were in 
excess of the fair market values of the parcels. 
With regard to the 40 parcels assessed at $35,000 per 
acre, the circuit court granted the motion to strike.  In 
the court’s view, West Creek had presented no evidence 
regarding the “manner” in which the County arrived at the 
assessment of $35,000 per acre for those parcels nor any 
evidence from which it could infer the methodology used.  
The court further stated that “the difference in values on 
those parcels determined by the board of assessors and 
those set forth by the taxpayers is insufficient to permit 
the [c]ourt to reasonably infer there was manifest error in 
the . . . manner of making the estimate or that controlling 
evidence was disregarded.” 
 
The County then presented its evidence, calling as one 
of its witnesses, Joseph B. Call, III, who qualified as an 
expert in the field of real estate appraisal.  Call 
explained that, when the County hired him, his assignment 
was to appraise the 144 West Creek parcels “as separate and 
distinct parcels, not recognizing the value of other 
parcels in conjunction with each of the 144 subjects of 
[his] assignment.”  Call testified that he began his 
assignment by researching information in the office of the 
commissioner of revenue, inspecting portions of the 
 
13
property from existing roadways, interviewing members of 
the planning staff and the utilities department, and 
reviewing various maps including the Timmons Sketch of the 
144 parcels.  Call also inquired about the availability of 
utilities in the Park and learned about the exact location 
of existing utility lines, the current capacity of the 
water and sewer system, and the “chronology of the dealings 
between Goochland County and Henrico County regarding 
enhanced utility service as required by users of land 
within the project.”  Call concluded that, while the water 
and sewer capacity at that particular time would not serve 
the requirements of the Park if it were fully developed, 
“the [C]ounty had shown good faith and persistence in 
making efforts to ensure that there were sufficient 
utilities and capacities to serve existing [land users], as 
well as any requirements of land users as they might 
develop within the foreseeable future.”  He also collected 
market data and identified “land sales that exhibited 
similar function and economic characteristics as each of 
the subject properties.” 
Call decided that the appropriate valuation method was 
the “sale comparison approach where comparable sales were 
considered, evaluated, analyzed, [and] adjusted to . . . 
provide for a credible value estimate for each parcel.”  
 
14
Call determined that any other approach for arriving at the 
fair market value for the 144 parcels would not have been 
reliable.  Call explained the sales comparison approach 
that he conducted.  First, he “identif[ied] sales which 
[were] deemed as superior to the subject property and 
others which [were] inferior to set the upper and lower 
limits of value.”  This method permitted Call “to then 
consider each sale on its own merits and consider the 
differences between the sale and subject [property] and 
apply some adjustment.”  Call explained that “[v]alue 
factor considerations include those for time, location, 
physical features, zoning, availability of utilities, and 
size.” 
Call identified a number of sales involving parcels 
with acreage that approximated the sizes of the subject 
parcels and having “similar soil types, topographical 
features, locational features, and to some degree 
availability of utilities and accessibility.”  Even though 
all the comparable sales were not timely, Call stated that 
he could not “ascertain that the market had changed 
measurably during the period of study [s]o there was no 
time adjustment.”  Since all the comparable sales involved 
parcels in the Park, Call made neither a “locational 
 
15
adjustment” nor “an adjustment for physical features of any 
significance.” 
Call did, however, make value adjustments for parcels 
that did not have utilities or road access.  Generally, he 
valued such parcels at 40 to 50 percent less per acre than 
parcels with such infrastructure.  Call also made 
adjustments to certain parcels because of their limited 
marketability.  For “lake parcels” as well as parcels 
containing  “floodplain,” “swamp,” or “wetlands,” he 
assigned a value of $1,000 per acre.  Call placed no value 
on the “road parcels” because, in his opinion, “[w]hatever 
value they have is inherent in the adjacent lands that 
[they] serve.”  Call also made adjustments for certain 
parcels labeled on the Timmons Sketch as “waste parcels” 
because they, nevertheless, have “considerable usable 
land.”  He valued the usable land in those parcels between 
$15,000 and $37,500 per acre. 
Call concluded that these comparable sales occurring 
between 1991 and 2000 “yielded prices of $83,333 to 
$120,000 per usable acre[; the parcels] had usable areas 
ranging from 7.3 to 38.43 acres[; and t]he mean price 
during that 9-year period of study was $107,503 [p]er 
acre.”  In summary, Call appraised the 144 parcels at 
values ranging from a high of $90,000-$100,000 per acre to 
 
16
a low of $15,000-$17,500 per acre, excluding those parcels 
valued at $1,000 per acre or with no value.  According to 
Call’s appraisal, the total fair market value for the 144 
parcels ranged from approximately $103,200,000 to 
$113,700,000.7 
Call testified about his use of the Capital One sale 
as a comparable sale.  He admitted “[t]here were some 
inducements to the Capital One purchase.”  Specifically, 
according to Call, Capital One “would receive about $3 
million from the state governor’s opportunity fund, about 
$3 million in county rebates.”  Call believed that Capital 
One would expend over four million dollars for water and 
sewer line extensions but that the “cost would be rebated 
by the [C]ounty over the term.”  Call concluded that the 
Capital One sale “at approximately $77,000 an acre should 
be viewed as a pertinent and excellent indication of 
values” as to a certain group of the West Creek parcels.  
Call further testified that he arrived at a value between 
$70,000 and $75,000 per acre for this same group of parcels 
without utilizing the Capital One purchase as a comparable 
sale. 
                     
7 Armstrong testified that, if the cost of 
infrastructure were added to the 34.1 million dollar 
purchase price, that sum would approximate Call’s appraised 
fair market value of the parcels. 
 
17
When asked why he did not consider the June 2000 
purchase price for the 2,500 acres when valuing the 144 
separate parcels, Call responded: 
First off, the sale in excess of 2,000 acres 
has a totally different highest and best use as 
concluded for each of the 144 units.  Secondly, 
. . . the large sale would appear to appeal to a 
different type of purchaser than any anticipated 
purchasers of [individual lots.]  Thirdly, a 
comparison of in excess of a 2,000-acre parcel 
with a smaller of 7 to 25 acres is just 
ludicrous.  Comparisons in that instance are 
odious. 
 
 
The only comparability with regard to that 
over 2,000-acre sale of the West Creek project is 
the fact that it is approximate and timely.  But 
in no way is it physically similar.  No way does 
it offer the same economies.  I don’t think a 
size adjustment is possible.  Relying on that 
sale as an independent indicator of value for any 
of the 144 parcels would produce an appraisal 
report that would lack total credibility. 
 
 
The use of that sale and that sale alone as 
an indication of value would be grounds for 
possible dismissal from The Appraisal Institute 
and probably revocation of one’s appraisal 
license. 
 
On cross-examination, Call stated that, if someone 
wanted to purchase the entire acreage in a single 
transaction, the price would be discounted, maybe down to 
34.1 million dollars.  Call, however, reiterated that he 
had appraised 144 separate parcels, not “the project.”  He 
also admitted that he appraised each parcel believing that 
the acreage had been subdivided into 144 parcels and did 
 
18
not initially realize the Timmons Sketch was not an 
approved subdivision under the County’s ordinances.  He, 
nevertheless, insisted that fact would not affect his 
appraisal of the parcels. 
Call also admitted that, in making his appraisal, he 
assumed each parcel had some form of “legal access,” except 
for the few parcels that he had otherwise specifically 
identified.  Call testified that “[if he] were instructed 
by [his] client to assume that certain parcels have no 
legal access, then [he] would have to amend [his] opinion 
of market value for . . . the particular parcels.”  When 
questioned about the fact that, after the Capital One 
purchase, the remaining water and sewer allocation was 
sufficient only to develop an additional 145 acres, Call 
explained that he had “reached a comfort level” that led 
him to believe that water and sewer allocations would be 
increased as development occurred in the Park. 
At the close of the trial after considering all the 
evidence, the circuit court dismissed West Creek’s 
remaining 90 applications with prejudice.  In doing so, it 
made several rulings that are the subject of this appeal.  
The circuit court held that the law of the Commonwealth 
requires an individual assessment of each of the parcels in 
question even though the 2,500 acres were not “legally 
 
19
subdivided.”  In the court’s words, “[t]he difference in 
how the parties regard these parcels has shaped the 
presentation of the evidence, affected the determination of 
value, and created a conflict regarding the applicable 
law.”  The court then explained the parties’ disagreement 
about the applicable law.  According to the court, West 
Creek argued that evidence showing a great disparity 
between real property’s assessed value and its fair market 
value is sufficient to establish manifest error; whereas, 
the County asserted that in order to establish manifest 
error or disregard of controlling evidence, a taxpayer must 
show “what information the assessing authority had, how 
that evidence was considered and weighed, and ultimately 
what was the basis for [the] decision.” 
Relying on this Court’s decision in City of Norfolk v. 
Snyder, 161 Va. 288, 170 S.E. 721 (1933), the circuit court 
concluded that the County’s position was correct.  The 
court reasoned that manifest error cannot be established 
merely by evidence of differing opinions about fair market 
value but that, instead, a taxpayer must present evidence 
establishing what information the taxing authority 
considered and how it arrived at the assessment in 
question.  The court described the evidence as to how the 
BOA and the BOE arrived at the assessments in question as 
 
20
“nearly nonexistent” and therefore concluded that West 
Creek had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence either manifest error or disregard of controlling 
evidence. 
In contrast to its view when it overruled the motion 
to strike West Creek’s evidence, the court refused to 
impute Wampler’s manifest error in his appraisal to the 
County.  The court reached this contrary position because 
of evidence that the BOA met at times when Wampler was not 
present and had information other than that provided in his 
appraisal.  According to the court, the “best evidence” 
that the BOA considered other evidence and was influenced 
by factors unrelated to Wampler’s appraisal was its 
assessment of certain parcels at $35,000 per acre, which 
was a number not found in Wampler’s appraisal. 
In an alternative holding utilizing the legal standard 
urged by West Creek, the circuit court found West Creek’s 
evidence about the parcels’ fair market values unpersuasive 
because West Creek did “nothing more than spread the value 
of the development across the individual parcels.”  The 
court noted that West Creek was able “to negotiate a bulk 
sale of this property for cash at a price $5 million lower 
than that initially sought by Bank of America.”  The court 
concluded that the bulk sale of the 2,500 acres was not a 
 
21
comparable sale for the purpose of establishing the 
assessed value of each individual parcel, despite West 
Creek’s urging to the contrary.  West Creek’s evidence 
regarding the parcels’ fair market values, in the court’s 
words, “fl[ew] in the face of the evidence that land in the 
. . . Park was selling at prices ranging from $43,000 per 
acre to $120,000 per acre.”  The court found it “difficult 
to accept that any kind of independent appraisal was 
conducted by Mr. Miller when it matched the testimony of 
Mr. Goodwin, except for the waste parcels, to the penny.”  
In contrast, the circuit court was persuaded by Call’s 
appraisal and concluded that it supported the assessments 
in question.  The court described Call’s appraisal as a 
“detailed evaluation of each parcel with appropriate 
adjustments.” 
On appeal to this Court, West Creek assigns four 
errors to the circuit court’s judgment.  First, West Creek 
asserts that the circuit court “erred when it eliminated 
the ability of the Taxpayer to challenge the assessment by 
showing ‘manifest error’ through the disparity between the 
assessment and the fair market value of the property.”  
West Creek also claims that the circuit court erred by 
holding that it did not present sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the County committed manifest error in the 
 
22
methodology employed in assessing the parcels in question 
when the assessment was based on Wampler’s appraisal that 
the court had found to be erroneous.  Next, West Creek 
assigns error to the circuit court’s holding that the 
property in question should be assessed as 144 separate 
parcels without regard to the fair market value of the 
parcels aggregated as a whole.  Finally, West Creek asserts 
that the circuit court erred by holding that the County’s 
assessment may be based on sales of property with “fully 
developed utilities and infrastructure where no such 
infrastructure existed for the assessed property, and no 
such improvements were imminent.” 
ANALYSIS 
We begin our analysis by repeating the well-
established principles that guide our review of a circuit 
court’s judgment upholding a taxing authority’s assessment 
of the fair market value of real property.  A taxing 
authority’s assessment is presumed to be correct, and a 
taxpayer has the burden to rebut that presumption by 
establishing that the real property in question is assessed 
at more than fair market value or that the assessment is 
not uniform in its application.  Code § 58.1-3984(A); 
Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of Albemarle, 273 Va. 128, 
136, 639 S.E.2d 243, 247 (2007); Shoosmith Bros., Inc. v. 
 
23
County of Chesterfield, 268 Va. 241, 245, 601 S.E.2d 641, 
643 (2004); Arlington County Board v. Ginsberg, 228 Va. 
633, 640, 325 S.E.2d 348, 352 (1985).  “ ‘The effect of 
this presumption is that even if the assessor is unable to 
come forward with evidence to prove the correctness of the 
assessment this does not impeach it since the taxpayer has 
the burden of proving the assessment erroneous.’ ”  R. 
Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 207, 228 
S.E.2d 113, 117 (1976) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 695, 179 S.E.2d 623, 626 
(1971)).  We have held that a taxpayer must show by a clear 
preponderance of the evidence that the taxing authority 
committed manifest error or totally disregarded controlling 
evidence in making the assessment.  Keswick Club, 273 Va. 
at 137-38, 639 S.E.2d at 247; Board of Supervisors v. HCA 
Health Servs. of Va., 260 Va. 317, 329, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169 
(2000); Tidewater Psychiatric Inst. v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 256 Va. 136, 141, 501 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (1998). 
The initial issue we decide involves the legal dispute 
between the parties regarding the means by which a taxpayer 
can show manifest error by a taxing authority in assessing 
the fair market value of real property.  Relying on this 
Court’s decision in Board of Supervisors v. 
Telecommunications Indus., 246 Va. 472, 436 S.E.2d 442 
 
24
(1993), West Creek contends that a taxpayer can establish 
manifest error by proving a sufficient disparity between 
the assessed value of real property and its fair market 
value.  Thus, according to West Creek, the circuit court 
erred by holding, both in the motion to strike and at the 
end of the trial, that a taxpayer must prove manifest error 
in the “manner” in which the taxing authority arrived at 
the assessed value of the real property in question, i.e., 
what information the taxing authority considered and how it 
arrived at the assessment. 
The County, on the other hand, agrees with the circuit 
court’s ruling and argues that this Court’s precedent 
establishes that a taxpayer must prove manifest error in 
the taxing authority’s methodology and that a mere 
difference of opinion as to fair market value is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness 
afforded an assessment.  Continuing, the County argues that 
a taxpayer must present evidence showing “what methodology 
was used, how it was applied, what factual information was 
available to the assessing authority when making the 
assessments, how that information was considered and/or 
what weight it was given, and what information was 
disregarded.”  Then, according to the County, a taxpayer 
 
25
must identify the alleged error in the taxing authority’s 
methodology. 
In Snyder, we explained why a court cannot substitute 
its judgment for that of a taxing authority with regard to 
the assessed value of real property: 
The value of property is a matter of opinion 
and there must necessarily be left a wide room 
for the exercise of opinion, otherwise courts 
will be converted into assessing boards and in 
assuming to act as such, would assume the powers 
lodged elsewhere by the law-making branch of 
government. Judge Cooley says in Cooley on 
Taxation, section 1612: “Courts cannot substitute 
their judgment as to the valuation of property 
for the judgment of the duly constituted tax 
authorities.” 
 
Generally the question as to whether an 
applicant’s property in any particular case has 
been assessed at more than its fair market value, 
or out of proportion to other like property, 
presents a question of fact to be decided by the 
assessors or the local board of equalization and 
the result fairly arrived at by them should not 
be disturbed by the court unless the applicant 
has carried the burden of showing clearly that 
the assessment is excessive or out of proportion 
to that of other like property. 
 
 
In Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. Kanawha 
County Court, 41 W.Va. 658, 24 S.E. 1002, 1005 
[(1896)], the court said: “. . . if assessments 
are to be based upon the opinions of individuals 
. . . instead of being uniform and bearing 
equally upon property of the same character 
throughout the State, the assessments would be as 
shifting and variable as the opinions of men 
influenced oftentimes by local causes could 
possibly make them.” 
 
 
26
161 Va. at 292, 170 S.E. at 723.  We then stated: 
“Conclusions of a board of commissioners will not be 
disturbed unless it appears that there has been a manifest 
error in the manner of making the estimate, or that 
evidence which should be controlling has been disregarded.” 
Id. at 292-93, 170 S.E. at 723 (citing 4 Thomas M. Cooley, 
The Law of Taxation § 1618, at 3235 & n.58 (4th ed. 1924)) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Despite the emphasized language, the Court’s decision 
upholding the assessment at issue in Snyder did not turn on 
the taxpayer’s failure to demonstrate “a manifest error in 
the manner of making” the assessment.  Instead, the Court 
noted that the evidence showed a difference of opinion 
about the fair market value of the real property at issue.  
Id. at 293, 170 S.E. at 723.  The Court concluded that “so 
long as the assessment comes within the range of a 
reasonable difference of opinion, . . . when considered in 
the light of the presumption in its favor, it cannot be 
said that the assessment is erroneous.”  Id. at 293, 170 
S.E. at 723. 
 
As the County contends, however, this Court has 
affirmatively stated in some cases that, in order to rebut 
the presumption of correctness, a taxpayer must show a 
manifest error in the manner that the assessment was made 
 
27
or that controlling evidence has been disregarded.  See, 
e.g., Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., 256 Va. at 141, 501 
S.E.2d at 764 (deciding whether the trial court correctly 
determined that the taxpayer failed to rebut the 
presumption of correctness by “ ‘a showing of manifest 
error or total disregard of controlling evidence’ in the 
[taxing authority’s] method of determining the fair market 
value of the property” (quoting Telecomm. Indus., 246 Va. 
at 475, 436 S.E.2d at 444)); City of Richmond v. Gordon, 
224 Va. 103, 110, 294 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1982) (“The taxpayer 
must show ‘manifest error in the manner of making the 
estimate, or that evidence which should be controlling has 
been disregarded.’ ” (quoting Snyder, 161 Va. at 293, 170 
S.E. at 723)); Tuckahoe Woman’s Club v. City of Richmond, 
199 Va. 734, 739-40, 101 S.E.2d 571, 575 (1958) (holding 
that the assessment will not be disturbed “ ‘unless it 
appears that there has been a manifest error in the manner 
of making the estimate, or that evidence which should be 
controlling has been disregarded’ ” (quoting Snyder, 161 
Va. at 293, 170 S.E. at 723)); City of Norfolk v. Holland, 
163 Va. 342, 345-46, 175 S.E. 737, 739 (1934) (same). 
Yet, in other cases, the Court stated only that a 
taxpayer must show that the taxing authority committed 
manifest error or disregarded controlling evidence in 
 
28
making the assessment.  The Court’s holdings, nevertheless, 
turned on whether the taxing authority had employed an 
improper methodology in determining fair market value.  
See, e.g., Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 139-41, 639 S.E.2d at 
249-50 (assessment was not entitled to the presumption of 
validity because the taxing authority did not properly 
consider and reject certain methods of evaluation); 
Shoosmith Bros., 268 Va. at 247, 601 S.E.2d at 644 (finding 
that the taxing authority “did not commit manifest error in 
assessing [the taxpayer’s property by] using the income 
method of assessment”); HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 330-
31, 501 S.E.2d at 170 (evidence was insufficient to show 
that the taxing authority considered and properly rejected 
other methods of calculating the value of the taxpayer’s 
real property when it used only a depreciated reproduction 
cost approach as the sole method of determining fair market 
value); County of Mecklenburg v. Carter, 248 Va. 522, 526, 
449 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1994) (in deciding whether an 
assessment was uniform in its application, there was “no 
evidence that the methodology used was erroneous, or that 
it was not followed in appraising the [taxpayer’s] property 
and each property with which it was compared”); Clarke 
Assocs. v. County of Arlington, 235 Va. 624, 629, 369 
S.E.2d 414, 416 (1988) (finding assessment erroneous 
 
29
because “neither the assessor nor the trial court factored 
the contract rent into a determination of the fair market 
value” of the taxpayer’s properties); Smith v. Board of 
Supervisors, 234 Va. 250, 258-59, 361 S.E.2d 351, 355-56 
(1987) (finding assessment erroneous because the taxing 
authority did not consider actual rent and expense figures 
in determining the fair market value of the taxpayer’s 
property); Nassif v. Board of Supervisors, 231 Va. 472, 
483, 345 S.E.2d 520, 526-27 (1986) (holding that assessment 
was erroneous because the taxing authority’s methodology 
gave no effect to contract rent); Board of Supervisors v. 
Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 620, 627-28, 325 S.E.2d 
342, 345-46 (1985) (affirming the trial court’s decision to 
reduce the assessment because the taxing authority had 
disregarded the recent sale price of the property and other 
factors); Ginsberg, 228 Va. at 642-43, 325 S.E.2d at 353-54 
(affirming trial court’s judgment reducing tax assessment 
on the basis that the taxing authority “had ignored the 
sale price and the contract rents and had relied entirely 
on highly speculative economic rents”). 
 
Despite these cases that support the County’s position 
that West Creek had to demonstrate manifest error in the 
County’s methodology, we also have decisions that turned on 
nothing more than conflicting evidence of fair market value 
 
30
and whether the taxpayer had demonstrated that the real 
property at issue was assessed at more than fair market 
value.  See, e.g., City of Martinsville v. Commonwealth 
Boulevard Assocs., LLC, 268 Va. 697, 699-700, 604 S.E.2d 
69, 70-71 (2004) (after concluding that a taxpayer may 
challenge an annual levy of taxes without demonstrating 
that the previous general reassessment was erroneous, the 
Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, based on 
conflicting evidence of value, that the real property was 
assessed at more than its fair market value); Fray v. 
County of Culpeper, 212 Va. 148, 151, 183 S.E.2d 175, 178 
(1971) (because the evidence introduced by both the 
taxpayer and the taxing authority showed a fair market 
value less than the assessed value of the property in 
question, the trial court erred in concluding that the 
taxpayer had not shown that the assessed value of the 
property was in excess of fair market value); City of 
Harrisonburg v. Taubman, 212 Va. 28, 30, 181 S.E.2d 654, 
656 (1971) (upon conflicting evidence of fair market value, 
the trial court did not err in reducing the assessed value 
of the subject property); Washington County Nat’l Bank v. 
Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 222, 10 S.E.2d 515, 518 
(1940) (evidence of fair market value from several 
 
31
witnesses demonstrated that the value fixed by the trial 
court was excessive). 
 
This survey of the Court’s decisions leads to the 
conclusion that the circuit court erred by holding that, in 
order to show manifest error, a taxpayer must prove what 
information the taxing authority considered and how it 
arrived at the assessment in question, i.e., its 
methodology.  It is correct that, in the majority of our 
cases, the dispositive issue was whether the taxing 
authority had utilized an improper methodology in setting 
the assessed value of real property.  But, we have never 
explicitly held that manifest error cannot be established 
simply by evidence showing that real property is assessed 
at more than its fair market value.  In all cases, however, 
a taxing authority’s assessment is presumed to be correct, 
Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 136, 639 S.E.2d at 247, and the 
taxpayer has the burden of proof “to show that the property 
in question is valued at more than its fair market value or 
that the assessment is not uniform in its application, or 
that the assessment is otherwise invalid or illegal.”  Code 
§ 58.1-3984(A).  When a taxpayer attempts to prove manifest 
error solely by showing a significant disparity between 
fair market value and assessed value without showing that 
the taxing authority employed an improper methodology in 
 
32
arriving at the property’s assessed value, the taxpayer 
cannot prevail “so long as the assessment comes within the 
range of a reasonable difference of opinion, . . . when 
considered in light of the presumption in its favor.”  
Snyder, 161 Va. at 293, 170 S.E. at 723; accord Gordon, 224 
Va. at 112, 294 S.E.2d at 851.  Thus, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in granting the County’s motion to 
strike. 
 
This conclusion does not end our analysis because the 
circuit court had an alternative basis for dismissing the 
90 applications that remained after the court sustained the 
County’s motion to strike the evidence.  The court 
concluded that West Creek had not established those 
parcels’ fair market values because West Creek had done 
“nothing more than spread the value of the development 
across the individual parcels.”  West Creek challenges the 
circuit court’s alternative holding in two respects.  It 
claims that the court erred by valuing the property as 144 
separate parcels without giving due regard to the fair 
market value of the parcels aggregated as a whole and by 
accepting the County’s appraisal that was based on sales of 
parcels with fully developed utilities and infrastructure.  
We do not agree with West Creek’s position. 
 
33
 
First, West Creek acknowledges on brief that the 
circuit court was correct in finding that, pursuant to Code 
§ 58.1-3290, the County was required to assess the 144 
parcels individually.8  West Creek, nevertheless, contends 
that the circuit court erred by failing to consider the 
recent purchase price for the amassed parcels as evidence 
of fair market value.  According to West Creek, the 
creation of the 144 parcels on the Timmons Sketch was for 
income tax planning purposes and the total sale price 
represented the highest and best use of the property as a 
business park comprised of parcels containing 10 to 20 
acres. 
                     
8 In relevant part, Code § 58.1-3290 provides that, 
“[w]hen a tract or lot becomes the property of different 
owners in two or more parcels, subsequent to any general 
reassessment of real estate in the city or county in which 
such tract or lot is situated each of the two or more 
parcels shall be assessed and shown separately upon the 
land books, as required by law.”  Although the assessments 
at issue in this appeal were part of the County’s 
quadrennial reassessment, other statutes also require the 
parcels to be assessed individually.  See, e.g., Code 
§ 58.1-3281 (commissioner of revenue shall annually, on 
January 1, “ascertain all the real estate in his county or 
city, . . . and the person to whom the same is chargeable 
with taxes on that day”); Code § 58.1-3303 (requiring clerk 
of each circuit court to provide commissioner of revenue 
with deed recordation receipt showing, among other things, 
description of real property conveyed and names of grantor 
and grantee); Code § 58.1-3309 (requiring information 
appearing in receipts provided pursuant to Code § 58.1-3303 
to be transferred “on the land book and charged to the 
person to whom the transfer is made”). 
 
34
Contrary to West Creek’s argument, the circuit court 
did not ignore the 34.1 million dollar purchase price of 
the 2,500 acres.  In weighing the evidence, the court, 
however, concluded that West Creek negotiated a bulk sale 
of the property at a price significantly lower than Bank of 
America first sought and that the bulk sale price was not a 
comparable sale for the purpose of establishing the 
assessed value of the 144 parcels.  Although the purchase 
of the 2,500 acres was an arms-length transaction between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, the court’s factual 
determination that the sale was a “bulk sale” is not 
challenged on appeal by West Creek.  Since the 34.1 million 
dollar figure represented the “bulk sale” of the 2,500 
acres, the County is correct in its assertion that the mere 
difference between the purchase price and the assessed 
value was not sufficient to show manifest error or 
disregard of controlling evidence.  As we have previously 
stated, the recent sale price of real property is “merely 
one of the factors to be taken into consideration” when 
determining whether such property has been assessed at more 
than fair market value.  American Viscose Corp. v. City of 
Roanoke, 205 Va. 192, 196, 133 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1964).  The 
sale price is accorded substantial weight but, contrary to 
West Creek’s position, it is not “conclusive evidence of 
 
35
[the property’s] fair market value.”  Id.; accord Ginsberg, 
228 Va. at 640, 325 S.E.2d at 352; Donatelli & Klein, 228 
Va. at 628, 325 S.E.2d at 345. 
The circuit court’s factual finding also distinguishes 
the present case from the situation in Donatelli & Klein.  
There, the recent sale of the subject property “was not a 
sale in bulk, because the sale of each individual property 
was negotiated separately to its ultimate purchase price.”  
228 Va. at 625, 325 S.E.2d at 343.  Thus, we concluded that 
the trial court did not err by according “substantial 
weight” to the sale price and concluding that the fair 
market value of each property was the sale price paid by 
the taxpayer.  Id. at 628, 325 S.E.2d at 345-46. 
With regard to West Creek’s second challenge to the 
circuit court’s alternative holding, we agree that “fair 
market value ‘is the present actual value of the land with 
all its adaptations to general and special uses, and not 
its prospective, speculative or possible value, based on 
future expenditures and improvements.’ ”  Fruit Growers 
Express Co. v. City of Alexandria, 216 Va. 602, 609, 221 
S.E.2d 157, 162 (1976) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Appalachian Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 708, 187 
S.E.2d 148, 152 (1972)).  West Creek’s assertion, however, 
that the County’s assessment was based on sales of parcels 
 
36
with fully developed utilities and infrastructure is not 
entirely accurate.  Despite the manifest error in Wampler’s 
appraisal methodology,9 Call took into account the lack of 
infrastructure and reduced the per acre value of parcels 
that did not have utilities or road access by forty to 
fifty percent of the per acre value of comparable sales of 
parcels having such infrastructure.  His appraisal supports 
the assessments at issue. 
Furthermore, the circuit court, in weighing the 
evidence, found Call’s testimony “the most compelling.”  
“It was within the province of the court, as the fact-
finder, to determine the credibility of the witnesses.  The 
factual determinations of the [circuit] court, like those 
of a jury, are binding on this Court, and we will reverse 
such findings only if they are plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support them.”  Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 
408, 641 S.E.2d 494, 506 (2007) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Code 
§ 8.01-680; Ivy Constr. Co. v. Booth, 226 Va. 299, 301, 309 
S.E.2d 300, 301 (1983) (trial court’s findings based on 
conflicting evidence heard ore tenus will not be disturbed 
                     
9 The circuit court held that Wampler committed 
manifest error by applying a median value of $75,000 per 
acre to all 144 parcels.  That holding is not challenged on 
appeal. 
 
37
on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence 
to support them). 
Moreover, the crux of the circuit court’s alternative 
holding was not that it accepted the County’s appraisal 
but, instead, that West Creek failed to present credible 
evidence of the parcels’ fair market values.  In order to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of showing that real 
property is assessed at more than its fair market value, 
see Code § 58.1-3984(A), a taxpayer must necessarily 
establish the property’s fair market value.  This is so 
irrespective of whether a taxpayer is attempting to show 
manifest error or disregard of controlling evidence by 
proving a significant disparity between fair market value 
and assessed value, or by establishing a flawed methodology 
by the taxing authority in setting the assessed value. 
The circuit court enunciated several reasons why it 
rejected West Creek’s evidence regarding the fair market 
values of the parcels.  First, the court found that West 
Creek’s valuation method of “spread[ing] the value of the 
development across the individual parcels” was not 
persuasive.  The court explained that West Creek purchased 
2,500 acres for 34.1 million dollars and now wants to 
allocate that sale price to the individual parcels.  The 
court, however, rejected the use of the sale price of the 
 
38
2,500 acres as a comparable sale because West Creek was 
ignoring the “economy of scale” realized when it purchased 
the 2,500 acres at one time.  The court pointed out that 
even Goodwin testified that there is an inverse 
relationship between the size of a parcel and the purchase 
price, i.e., the larger the parcel, the cheaper the price.  
Finally, the court concluded that Miller had not conducted 
an independent appraisal because his testimony “matched the 
testimony of . . . Goodwin, except for the waste parcels, 
to the penny.” 
We cannot say that the circuit court’s findings are 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.  See, 
e.g., Booth, 226 Va. at 301, 309 S.E.2d at 301.  There is 
no question that Miller accepted the sale price of the 
2,500 acres as controlling and assigned portions of the 
price as the per acre value for parcels depending on the 
developmental phase in which the parcels were located.  In 
the words of one of the County’s witnesses, Miller’s 
methodology was “an arithmetic formula,” which is not an 
accepted appraisal method.  Thus, we conclude, as did the 
circuit court, that West Creek did not carry its burden of 
showing that the parcels are assessed at more than fair 
 
39
market value.  See Code § 58.1-3984(A).10  West Creek’s 
evidence did not rebut the presumption of correctness 
afforded the assessments.  Because of the presumption, the 
County did not have to come forward with evidence to prove 
the correctness of the assessment.  See R. Cross, Inc., 217 
Va. at 207, 228 S.E.2d at 117; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 211 
Va. at 695, 170 S.E.2d at 626. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The circuit court erred in granting the motion to 
strike West Creek’s evidence with regard to the parcels 
assessed at $35,000 per acre.  We will, therefore, reverse 
that portion of the circuit court’s judgment and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  See Gina 
Chin & Assocs., Inc. v. First Union Bank, 260 Va. 533, 540, 
537 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2000) (“following the trial court’s 
grant of [a] motion to strike [the] evidence [this Court 
is] unable to review [the] case in consideration of all the 
evidence that may have been produced on the issue in 
                     
10 This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the Court 
to address West Creek’s remaining assignment of error 
challenging the circuit court’s holding that the County did 
not commit manifest error in the methodology it used in 
setting the assessments with regard to the 90 parcels that 
remained in the case after the court sustained the motion 
to strike the evidence.  Assuming without deciding that the 
court erred in refusing to impute Wampler’s flawed 
methodology to the County at that point in the proceeding, 
 
40
 
41
question [and is] unable to reach the ultimate merits [of 
the case]”).  With regard to the 90 remaining parcels, we 
will affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
                                                             
West Creek, nevertheless, did not establish the fair market 
values of those 90 parcels.