Case Title: Commonwealth v. Lutskov

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12411

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12411 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MAKSIM LUTSKOV. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     March 5, 2018. - September 14, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Armed Home Invasion.  Youthful Offender Act.  Constitutional 
Law, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Sentence.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 27, 2000. 
 
 
After transfer to the Hampden County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department, the cases were tried before Patricia 
M. Dunbar, J., and a motion for postconviction relief, filed on 
November 28, 2016, was heard by Carol A. Shaw, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Barbara Kaban, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
Meredith Shih, for Boston Bar Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant, Maksim Lustkov, was sixteen years 
old in October, 1999, when he committed an armed home invasion 
during which he shot one occupant three times in front of the 
occupant's teenage daughter.  A Juvenile Court jury adjudicated 
the defendant a youthful offender on indictments charging armed 
home invasion and various related offenses, and he was sentenced 
to a mandatory minimum State prison term of from twenty years to 
twenty years and one day.1 
 
In 2016, after our decision in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013), S.C., 471 
Mass. 12 (2015), the defendant filed a motion for relief from 
unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), arguing that all mandatory 
minimum sentences violate art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights when applied to juveniles.  He also argued 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his adjudication 
as a youthful offender, and that the judge incorrectly 
instructed the jury on the issue.  A Juvenile Court judge denied 
the motion, and we granted the defendant's application for 
direct appellate review. 
                     
 
1 The defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender on 
indictments charging armed home invasion; assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon (two counts); armed assault with 
intent to rob; assault by means of a dangerous weapon; and 
assault and battery. 
3 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant primarily argues that in light of 
this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677 
(2017) (Perez I), his mandatory twenty-year minimum sentence is 
presumptively disproportionate because it imposes a longer 
period of incarceration prior to eligibility for parole than 
that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder without a 
finding of extraordinary circumstances based on consideration of 
the factors articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-
478 (2012) (Miller).  He further argues that our reasoning 
in Perez I applies with equal force to invalidate all mandatory 
minimum sentences when applied to juveniles. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain the defendant's adjudication as a 
youthful offender and, although we agree that the judge failed 
to instruct the jury that they were required to find the 
defendant's qualifying age in order to adjudicate him a youthful 
offender, this error does not require reversal.  As to the 
constitutionality of the defendant's sentence, we agree that the 
defendant's sentence violates the proportionality requirement 
inherent in art. 26.  Our decision in Perez I, 477 Mass. at 686, 
requires sentencing judges to follow an individualized process 
that allows for the consideration of mitigating circumstances 
related to the juvenile's age and youthful characteristics 
before imposing a sentence with a longer period of incarceration 
4 
 
prior to eligibility for parole than that applicable to a 
juvenile convicted of murder.  The defendant was sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term exceeding that applicable to a juvenile 
convicted of murder without a Miller hearing in violation of the 
requirements announced in Perez I, and refined in Commonwealth 
v. Perez, 480 Mass.     (2018) (Perez II), also decided today.  
Accordingly, we remand the case to the Juvenile Court for 
resentencing.2 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts relevant to 
the present appeal in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion.  
At approximately 8:30 P.M. on October 31, 1999, Fulia Aiken 
heard a knock at the door of the house where she lived with her 
father, Amhet Aiken.3  Fulia opened the door and the defendant, 
who was armed with a firearm and accompanied by two accomplices, 
forced his way inside.  All three individuals were wearing 
masks.  Ahmet, in response to his daughter's screams, came 
downstairs and a struggle ensued.  During the struggle, Ahmet 
knocked off the defendant's mask and the defendant shot Ahmet 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, Citizens for Juvenile 
Justice, and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers; and by the Boston Bar Association. 
 
 
3 Because Fulia Aiken and her father, Amhet Aiken, share a 
last name, we refer to them by their first names. 
5 
 
three times.  The defendant and his accomplices fled, leaving 
behind the mask that Ahmet had knocked off the defendant's face. 
 
2.  Trial.  During its direct case at trial, the 
Commonwealth offered evidence of the defendant's age through two 
witnesses.  A Springfield police detective testified that a 
fingerprint lifted from the mask left at the Aikens' house was 
identical to the defendant's left thumbprint, and a fingerprint 
card bearing the defendant's name and date of birth ("02/06/83") 
was admitted in evidence.  Fulia also testified that the 
intruders appeared to be "kids . . . [a]bout sixteen, seventeen, 
eighteen [at] the most."  At the close of the Commonwealth's 
case, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty 
on all charges, which the judge denied.  After the Commonwealth 
rested, the defendant offered medical records and testimony from 
his physician establishing that he was sixteen years old on the 
date of the offenses.  The defendant was adjudicated a youthful 
offender pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 54, on all charges. 
 
3.  Sentencing.  At the sentencing hearing, the 
Commonwealth recommended a sentence of from thirty to forty 
years in State prison on the home invasion charge, and a 
combination of concurrent and from-and-after sentences on the 
remaining counts.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58, as amended 
through St. 1996, c. 200, § 5, the defendant requested a 
sentence of commitment to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) 
6 
 
until age twenty-one, and thereafter a commitment to State 
prison for a term of from five to seven years. 
 
The judge did not follow the defendant's sentence 
recommendation.  She explained that armed home invasion carried 
a mandatory minimum sentence and, although a split sentence with 
commitment to DYS was an available option, such a disposition 
was not appropriate considering the defendant's age at the time 
of sentencing (almost nineteen years old), public safety 
concerns, and the violent nature of the offenses.  The judge 
sentenced the defendant to from twenty years to twenty years and 
one day in State prison on the armed home invasion charge. 
 
4.  Posttrial proceedings.  In August, 2013, after serving 
one-half of his committed sentence, the defendant filed, pro se, 
a motion for relief from unlawful restraint and for a new trial 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) and (b), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001), claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The defendant primarily argued that he was entitled to 
resentencing in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Miller.  The trial judge denied the motion, and the 
defendant did not appeal. 
 
In November, 2016, the defendant, represented by counsel, 
filed his second motion for relief from unlawful restraint 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a).  He argued that art. 26 
prohibited the automatic application of any mandatory minimum 
7 
 
sentence for a juvenile defendant.  He also argued that the 
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence that he was between 
fourteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the crimes, 
and that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that they 
were required to find the defendant's age within this range in 
order to adjudicate him a youthful offender.  A different judge 
of the Juvenile Court (the trial judge having retired) denied 
the motion, concluding that the defendant's failure to raise 
either argument at trial, on direct appeal, or in his first rule 
30 motion constituted waiver.  After finding the defendant's 
arguments waived, the judge nonetheless went on to consider 
whether any of the claimed errors would give rise to a 
miscarriage of justice.  The judge agreed that the jury heard 
insufficient evidence of the defendant's age at the time of the 
offenses and that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct 
the jury that in order to adjudicate the defendant as a youthful 
offender, they must find that the Commonwealth had proved that 
he was between fourteen and seventeen years of age at the time 
of the offenses.  Nevertheless, the motion judge found no risk 
of a miscarriage of justice because, although she found that the 
Commonwealth failed to submit sufficient evidence of the 
defendant's age during its case-in-chief, the defendant 
introduced evidence establishing that he was between fourteen 
and seventeen years of age at the time of the crimes.  The judge 
8 
 
further concluded that the sentencing judge's imposition of a 
twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence was not automatic:  the 
record demonstrated that she had considered the evidence 
presented at trial and the probation department's presentence 
report before imposing the mandatory minimum sentence. 
 
Discussion.  We review the denial of a motion for relief 
from unlawful restraint brought under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) 
for an abuse of discretion or error of law.  See Perez I, 477 
Mass. at 681-682; Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 
(2014). 
 
1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his 
adjudication as a youthful offender, and therefore that his 
motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been 
allowed.  Specifically, the defendant challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence that he was between the ages of fourteen and 
seventeen at the time of the offenses.  We consider this claim 
to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational jury could have 
found each of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
 
In order for a juvenile to be adjudicated a youthful 
offender, the Commonwealth must present sufficient evidence that 
(1) the juvenile was between fourteen and seventeen years of age 
9 
 
at the time of the offense; (2) the offense, if committed by an 
adult, is punishable by imprisonment in State prison; and (3) 
either the juvenile has previously been committed to DYS, the 
alleged offense involves certain enumerated firearms violations, 
or the alleged offense involves the infliction or threat of 
serious bodily harm.  G. L. c. 119, § 54, as amended through St. 
1996, c. 200, § 2.4 
 
Here, the evidence introduced at trial concerning the 
defendant's age was sufficient to support his adjudication as a 
youthful offender.  During its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth 
offered a fingerprint card bearing the defendant's name and date 
of birth ("02/06/83"), and Fulia testified that the intruders 
were "kids . . . [a]bout sixteen, seventeen, eighteen [at] the 
most."  Accordingly, there was no error in the denial of the 
defendant's motion for a required finding.5 
                     
 
4 The version of the youthful offender statute in effect at 
the time of the defendant's offenses defined a "youthful 
offender" as "a person who is subject to an adult or juvenile 
sentence for having committed, while between the ages of 
fourteen and seventeen, an offense against a law of the 
commonwealth."  G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St. 1996, 
c. 200, § 1.  In 2013, the Legislature amended the definition of 
a "youthful offender" to a person "between the ages of fourteen 
and [eighteen] ."  G. L. c. 119, § 54, as amended through St. 
2013, 84, § 8. 
 
 
5 We agree with the motion judge's conclusion that Fulia's 
testimony regarding the defendant's physical appearance, by 
itself, would have been insufficient to support the defendant's 
adjudication as a youthful offender.  See Commonwealth v. 
Pittman, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 27 (1987) (physical appearance 
10 
 
 
2.  Jury instructions.  The defendant next contends that 
the trial judge's jury instructions were erroneous because the 
judge did not instruct the jury that if the defendant were to be 
adjudicated a youthful offender, they must find that he was 
between fourteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the 
offenses. 
 
The judge instructed the jury only that the Commonwealth 
was proceeding against the defendant "as a youthful offender."  
The instruction should have informed the jury that the 
Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
requirements set forth in G. L. c. 119, § 54, including the 
defendant's qualifying age at the time of the offenses.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 54; Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 
866 (2001).  The defendant did not object to the jury 
instruction as given, and did not request any additional 
instruction.  Thus, we review to determine whether this error 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
                                                                  
may be considered as factor in discerning age, but judging age 
on physical appearance alone is not sufficient).  However, 
Fulia's testimony, considered together with the fingerprint 
chart bearing the defendant's age, was sufficient to satisfy the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof on this element.  We note that 
the motion judge did not have the benefit of the fingerprint 
chart bearing the defendant's age (exhibit no. 15) in ruling on 
the defendant's motion.  After the defendant's trial, that 
exhibit was transferred to the Superior Court for the trial of 
codefendant Artem Vaskanyan.  When the fingerprint chart was 
admitted at Vaskanyan's trial, the exhibit sticker identifying 
the chart as Juvenile Court exhibit no. 15 was covered with a 
Superior Court exhibit sticker. 
11 
 
See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 6-7 (2001) 
(where defendant fails to object to jury instruction that omits 
element of crime, appellate court considers whether omission 
created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice). 
 
We conclude that the judge's omission in her instruction to 
the jury does not warrant reversal.  At the close of the case, 
the evidence showing that the defendant was between fourteen and 
seventeen years of age at the time of the offenses was so 
overwhelming that the defendant's age was not a contested issue 
at trial.  See Quincy Q., 434 Mass. at 866.  Indeed, the 
defendant himself presented documentary evidence that, at the 
time of the offenses, he was sixteen years old.  Because there 
is no likelihood that the omitted instruction materially 
influenced the jury's verdicts, there was no substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 398 
Mass. 1, 5 (1986) ("no harm accrues to a defendant if an error 
does not relate to an issue actively contested at trial"). 
 
3.  Constitutionality of the sentence.  The defendant was 
sentenced prior to the issuance of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, and our decisions 
in Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 667, and Perez I, 477 Mass. at 687. 
 
In Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, the Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
12 
 
sentencing juveniles to mandatory sentences of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  The Court explained that the 
sentencing judge must "have the ability to consider the 
mitigating qualities of youth" rather than imposing a mandatory 
sentence of life without parole (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Id. at 476.  Three years later, in Diatchenko, 466 
Mass. at 671, we held that art. 26, unlike its Federal 
counterpart, prohibits not only mandatory life sentences, but 
also discretionary juvenile sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole.  After Diatchenko, supra, a juvenile 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole would be 
eligible for parole after fifteen years.  See Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 688-689 (2013), S.C., 474 Mass. 576 
(2016). 
 
In Perez I, 477 Mass. at 682-687, we considered whether 
art. 26 prohibits an aggregate term-of-years sentence for a 
juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses with a longer period 
of incarceration prior to eligibility for parole than that 
applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder.  Applying the 
tripartite test established in Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 
Mass. 495, 497-499 (1981), we held that 
"a juvenile defendant's aggregate sentence for 
nonmurder offenses with parole eligibility exceeding 
that applicable to a juvenile defendant convicted of 
murder is presumptively disproportionate.  That 
presumption is conclusive, absent a hearing to 
13 
 
consider whether extraordinary circumstances warrant a 
sentence treating the juvenile defendant more harshly 
for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of 
murder." 
 
Perez I, supra at 686.  In determining whether extraordinary 
circumstances justify a longer period of incarceration prior to 
eligibility for parole, the judge must consider "(1) the 
particular attributes of the juvenile, including immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; 
(2) the family and home environment that surrounds [the 
juvenile] from which he cannot usually extricate himself; and 
(3) the circumstances of the . . . offense, including the extent 
of [the juvenile's] participation in the conduct and the way 
familial and peer pressures may have affected him" (quotations 
omitted).  Id., quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477.  Not every 
factor will necessarily be relevant in every case.  A sentencing 
court exercising its discretion may afford whatever weight it 
reasonably determines appropriate to each Miller factor in light 
of the circumstances of the case.  See Perez I, supra. 
 
In Perez II, also decided today, we emphasized that under 
the individualized sentencing process outlined in Perez I, 477 
Mass. at 686: 
"the criminal conduct alone is not sufficient to 
justify a greater parole eligibility period than is 
available for murder.  The juvenile's personal and 
family history must also be considered independently; 
this consideration of the individual's personal and 
family history is also not the ordinary mitigation 
14 
 
analysis associated with sentencing. . . .  [B]oth the 
crime and the juvenile's circumstances must be 
extraordinary to justify a longer parole eligibility 
period." 
 
Perez II, 480 Mass. at    .  Although the Commonwealth need not 
show that "the defendant exhibited 'irretrievable depravity' or 
'irreparable corruption,'" id. at    , the Commonwealth must 
prove "that the juvenile's personal characteristics make it 
necessary to delay parole eligibility for a time exceeding that 
available to juveniles convicted of murder."  Id. at    .  In 
other words, "the Commonwealth must prove that there is no 
reasonable possibility of the juvenile's being rehabilitated 
within the time after which a juvenile convicted of murder 
becomes eligible for parole."  Id. 
 
The defendant in this case was sentenced to the mandatory 
twenty-year minimum sentence under the armed home invasion 
statute, G. L. c. 265, § 18C, without a Miller hearing.  Because 
this is five years longer than the sentence applicable to a 
juvenile convicted of murder in 2001, the presumption announced 
in Perez I applies.  See Perez I , 477 Mass. at 685 ("[t]here is 
a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses 
against the individual. . . .  In the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, . . . this line must not be crossed to treat a 
juvenile convicted of a nonmurder offense, or multiple nonmurder 
15 
 
offenses, more harshly than a juvenile convicted of murder" 
[quotations and citation omitted]).6 
 
Where the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by statute 
exceeds the parole eligibility for murder, by definition, the 
sentencing judge is not afforded an opportunity to consider 
the Miller factors as they relate to imposing a sentence below 
the mandatory minimum.  See Perez I, 477 Mass. at 686 (requiring 
individualized consideration of characteristics attendant to 
youth before imposing integrated sentence with resulting parole 
eligibility date in excess of that applicable for murder).  
Because the defendant's sentence was imposed without "a finding 
that the circumstances warrant treating the [defendant] more 
harshly for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of 
murder," it is presumptively disproportionate under art. 
26.  Id. at 679.7  We therefore vacate the denial of the 
                     
 
6 Under the juvenile disproportionality test announced in 
Perez I, 477 Mass. at 683-685, we examine first the "nature of 
the offense and the offender," with regard to the degree of 
danger present to society (citation omitted).  Id. at 684.  
Second, a comparison is made of the challenged sentence with 
those imposed for juveniles convicted of more serious crimes.  
Id.  Third, the challenged sentence is compared with those 
imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.  Id.  The 
unique characteristics of a juvenile defendant "weigh more 
heavily in the proportionality calculus" under art. 26.  Id. at 
683, citing Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015). 
 
 
7 The Commonwealth contends that the defendant's sentence is 
not presumptively disproportionate under Perez I, 477 Mass. at 
684, because, given the good conduct credits available at the 
16 
 
defendant's rule 30 motion.  At resentencing, the judge may 
impose a committed sentence with parole eligibility in excess of 
fifteen years only after finding extraordinary circumstances 
under the factors identified in Perez I, and clarified in Perez 
II.8  In addition, because the defendant was sentenced in 2001, 
relevant evidence of the defendant's "particular attributes" of 
youth include evidence of postconviction rehabilitation, 
including any good behavior in prison since he was sentenced as 
a juvenile.  This is consistent with "societal goals of 
punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and 
                                                                  
time of the defendant's offenses, he would be eligible for 
parole after serving fourteen and one-half years.  See 
G. L. c. 127, § 129D; G. L. c. 127, § 133; 120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 200.02(2) (1997).  See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 
772, 774 & n.6 (2000).  We disagree.  Although the defendant's 
minimum twenty-year sentence under G. L. c. 265, § 18C, may be 
reduced for "good conduct credits," Perez I, supra, focuses on 
the parole eligibility date at the time of sentencing, not 
future computation of "good time."  Moreover, good conduct 
programs are controlled by the Department of Correction, not the 
sentencing judge. 
 
 
8 A Juvenile Court judge has three dispositional choices 
after a defendant is adjudicated a youthful offender:  (1) a 
sentence provided by law (i.e., an adult punishment for the 
offense); (2) a combination sentence consisting of a commitment 
to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until the juvenile 
reaches the age of twenty-one followed by a suspended adult 
sentence; or (3) commitment to DYS until the age of twenty-one.  
G. L. c. 119, § 58, third par.  See Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 
476 Mass. 497, 503 (2017).  We need not reach the issue, not 
argued or briefed by the parties, whether the so-called Truth in 
Sentencing Act, St. 1993, c. 432, § 11, which, inter alia, 
amended G. L. c. 127, § 133, to prohibit imposition of a 
suspended State prison sentence, bars the sentencing judge from 
imposing a combination sentence pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58, 
third par. 
17 
 
rehabilitation" (quotations and citation omitted), Commonwealth 
v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 147 (2015), as well as the heightened 
capacity of juveniles for rehabilitation, Miller, 567 U.S. at 
477-478.  See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490-491 
(2011) (court may impose lesser sentence based on postconviction 
rehabilitation efforts).  If the sentencing judge imposes a 
committed sentence, she may not impose a sentence below the 
minimum twenty-year sentence required by statute for armed home 
invasion.  Nonetheless, the defendant would be eligible for 
parole after fifteen years absent a finding of extraordinary 
circumstances. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
the defendant's rule 30 motion is vacated, and the matter is 
remanded to the Juvenile Court for resentencing consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.