Case Title: Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing Examiner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing Examiner1992 WY 144841 P.2d 90Case Number: 91-277Decided: 11/09/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert E. 
WILSON, Appellant (Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE of 
Wyoming ex 
rel. OFFICE OF HEARING EXAMINER, Appellee (Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

 
 
Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lillian 
Nicholas Sharpe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The appellant, Robert 
E. Wilson, asks us to review the district court's order in which it affirmed the 
hearing examiner's decision to deny the appellant's request for probationary 
privileges to drive commercial motor vehicles while his private driver's license 
was suspended.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The appellant presents 
the following issues:

 
 
     I. Whether the 
provisions of W.S. 1977, as amended, Section 31-17-105, prohibit the issuance of 
limited driving privileges to holders of commercial driver[']s 
licenses.

 
 
     II. Whether the 
provisions of W.S. 1977, as amended, Section 31-17-105, pertain to on-duty 
violations, only.

 
 
     III. Whether the 
provisions of W.S. 1977, as amended, Section 31-7-105, clarifies and/or modifies 
and/or controls Section 31-17-105.

 
 
     IV. Whether W.S. 1977, 
as amended, Section 31-17-105, is unconstitutional when applied as it was in 
this case.

 
 
The 
appellee, State of Wyoming ex rel. Office of Hearing Examiner, 
phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
     I. When a commercial 
vehicle operator receives a 90-day driver's license suspension for driving under 
the influence in a private vehicle, can the operator obtain limited driving 
privileges to operate a commercial vehicle during the suspension 
period?

 
 
     II. Do W.S. 
31-17-105(b) and 31-7-105(d) violate the equal protection guarantees of the 
United States Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 

[¶4.]     The appellant was a 
commercial truck driver. On March 11, 1991, he was driving his personal 
noncommercial motor vehicle on the South Greeley Highway when he was arrested 
for driving while under the influence in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233 
(1989). He pleaded guilty, and his driver's license was suspended. See 
Wyo. Stat. § 
31-6-102 (1989). After receiving notice of the ninety-day suspension, the 
appellant requested a hearing.

 
 

[¶5.]     A hearing was held on 
April 29, 1991, before the Independent Hearing Examiner of the State of 
Wyoming. The 
hearing examiner upheld the suspension but found that it would create an undue 
hardship on the appellant, so he modified the suspension by issuing a 
probationary driver's license. The probationary driver's license was valid only 
for medical emergencies, doctor appointments, errands during a specified time 
each week, and driving to and from work. The hearing examiner specifically noted 
that the probationary driver's license was not valid for commercial motor 
vehicle operation. Therefore, although the appellant could drive his personal 
car to and from work under the probationary driver's license, he could not 
perform his work because he could not operate commercial motor vehicles during 
the suspension of his driver's license.

 
 

[¶6.]     The appellant 
petitioned the district court for a review of the hearing examiner's decision. 
The district court granted the petition for review and entered a stay of the 
suspension until all appellate review had been completed. The district court 
upheld the hearing examiner's ruling. The appellant lodged his appeal with this 
Court.

 
 
Limited 
Driving Privileges Under a Commercial Driver's License1

[¶7.]     The appellant argues 
that, because his arrest for DWUI took place while he was in his private vehicle 
and not while he was operating a commercial motor vehicle, the hearing examiner 
should have granted him limited privileges to operate a commercial motor vehicle 
during the suspension of his private driver's license. At the hearing, the 
hearing examiner commented:

 
 
     We have a slight 
problem, Mr. Wilson, in that under Wyoming law, my office can issue what is 
called a probationary driver's license and under normal circumstances, we can 
issue you a license to drive to and from and at work. However, since the 
Commercial Driver's License Act went into effect in January of '90, there's a 
provision in there that says you cannot operate any commercial motor vehicle 
while your license is suspended. What that means is we can go ahead and give you 
the probationary license, but it's not going to be valid for commercial 
operation. . . . [T]he only thing I can tell you is we can go ahead and enter 
the order, grant you the privileges, and we can get you to and from work. But 
it's not going to be any good to drive over the road.

 
 
The hearing 
examiner concluded that the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
31-17-101 to -120 (1989 & Supp. 1992), limited the discretion otherwise 
provided to the hearing examiner under Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105 (Supp. 1990)2 of the Driver's License Act, Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 31-7-101 to -140 (1989 & Supp. 1992), and, therefore, he could not 
issue a probationary driver's license which would allow the appellant to operate 
commercial motor vehicles. When the district court reviewed the matter, it 
resolved the conflict between § 31-7-105 and the Uniform Commercial Driver 
License Act in favor of the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act because of its 
purpose. The district court found:

 
 
Commercial 
motor vehicles do pose a higher degree of risk to the public and in an effort to 
deal with this higher risk, the legislature apparently found that the 
prohibition against driving a commercial motor vehicle while one's license was 
under suspension was needed. The court agrees with the State that higher 
standards for commercial motor vehicle operation serve a legitimate state 
interest in the regulation of such vehicles in order to promote public 
safety.

 
 

[¶8.]     In general, we review 
agency actions and the district court's review of those actions under the 
standard set forth in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (1990), provides in relevant part:

 
 

[¶9.]     The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
 . . . .

 
 
     (ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
     (A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]

 
 
The 
standard of review used when this Court reviews an agency's conclusion of law is 
straightforward. "If the conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is 
affirmed; if it is not, it is to be corrected." Employment Security Commission 
of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990) 
(citing Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming v. Casper Legion 
Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1989), and Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas 
Association v. State Board of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 
1987)).

 
 

[¶10.]  In order to determine whether the hearing 
examiner, and in turn the district court, reached the correct conclusion of law, 
we must construe § 31-17-105 of the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act 
against § 31-7-105 of the Driver's License Act.

 
 

[¶11.]  The Driver's License Act allows for an 
appeal once a driver has his or her private driver's license suspended. Section 
31-7-105(d). After hearing the evidence, the hearing examiner was statutorily 
provided with several options. The relevant provision of the Driver's License 
Act in effect at the time of the appellant's suspension 
provided:

 
 
Upon 
hearing, the hearing examiner shall either rescind or uphold the denial or order 
of suspension, revocation or cancellation or disqualification from driving a 
commercial motor vehicle or, good cause appearing therefor, may continue or 
modify a suspension of the license. The discretion to continue or modify any 
order of suspension so as to allow driving privileges is limited as 
follows:

 
 
     (i) It shall be 
extended only in cases where failure to do so would cause an undue 
hardship;

 
 
     (ii) It shall be 
extended only once to any person in a five (5) year 
period;

 
 
     (iii) It may be 
extended to a person convicted under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence only if:

 
 
     (A) Within the five 
(5) year period preceding the date of the most recent offense, the person has 
not been convicted under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving while 
under the influence; and

 
 
    (B) The person agrees to 
pursue and completes an alcohol education or treatment program as the division 
prescribed.

 
 
     (iv) It shall not be 
granted in cases of:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
     (F) A disqualification 
from driving a commercial motor vehicle under W.S. 31-17-111 and 
31-17-113.

 
 
Section 
31-7-105(d). The hearing examiner encountered a conflict between this provision 
and the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act.

 
 

[¶12.]  Wyoming adopted the Uniform Commercial Driver 
License Act in 1989. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 176, § 1. Section 
31-17-105 of the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act 
provides:

 
 
     (a) Except as provided 
by W.S. 31-17-106 or when driving under a commercial driver instruction permit, 
no person may drive a commercial motor vehicle unless the person has been issued 
and is in immediate possession of a commercial driver license and applicable 
endorsements valid for the vehicle they are driving.

 
 
     (b) No person may 
drive a commercial motor vehicle while:

 
 
             (i) His driving privilege is suspended, 
revoked or canceled;

 
 
             (ii) Subject to a disqualification; 
or

 
 
(iii) 
Subject to an out-of-service order.

 
 

[¶13.]  The appellant contends that he should 
have been granted probationary privileges to drive commercial motor vehicles 
since the suspension concerned only his private driver's license. We disagree. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act and the corresponding federal 
legislation, the appellant was required to notify his employer of the suspension 
even though it occurred while he was operating his personal vehicle. Section 
31-17-103(a) & (b). See also 49 U.S.C. app. § 2702(b) (1988). Once this 
notification occurred, the employer could not allow the appellant to operate a 
commercial motor vehicle during the time of the suspension.3 Section 31-17-104; 49 U.S.C. app. § 
2703 (1988). Section 31-17-104 provides: 

 
 
(a) Each 
employer must require the applicant to provide the information required in W.S. 
31-17-103.

 
 
     (b) No employer may 
knowingly allow, permit or authorize a driver to drive a commercial motor 
vehicle during any period in which the driver has:

 
 
(i) Not 
been licensed to drive a commercial vehicle;

 
 
(ii) A 
driver license suspended, revoked or cancelled by a state;

 
 
(iii) Lost 
the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle in a 
state;

 
 
(iv) Been 
disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle; or

 
 
(v) More 
than one (1) driver license.

 
 

[¶14.]  Section 31-17-104 makes it clear that the 
Legislature did not intend for commercial drivers to operate commercial motor 
vehicles while their private driver's licenses are suspended. That section fits 
into the overall scheme of the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act by closely 
regulating commercial motor vehicles because of the unique danger they pose to 
the public.

 
 

[¶15.]  The public safety purpose of the Uniform 
Commercial Driver License Act is made clear in the session laws, which 
state:

 
 
     (a) The purpose of 
this act is to implement the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, 49 
U.S.C. § 2701 through 2716 and to reduce 
or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities and injuries 
by:

 
 
(i) 
Permitting commercial drivers to hold only one (1) 
license;

 
 
(ii) 
Disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain serious traffic 
violations or other specified offenses;

 
 
(iii) 
Strengthening license and test standards.

 
 
     (b) This act is a 
remedial law and shall be liberally construed to promote the public health, 
safety and welfare. To the extent that 
this act conflicts with general driver licensing provisions contained in W.S. 
31-7-101 through 31-7-202, this act prevails. The general driver licensing 
provisions contained in W.S. 31-7-101 through 31-7-202 apply to persons licensed 
under this act to the extent there are no conflicting provisions in this 
act.

 
 
1989 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 176, § 4 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶16.]  Statutes in pari materia are to be 
construed together. Halliburton Company v. McAdams, Roux and Associates, Inc., 
773 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Wyoming Department of 
Revenue and Taxation-Excise Tax Division v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Kemmerer, 
718 P.2d 31 (Wyo. 1986)). A reading of the purpose 
statement of the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act in conjunction with §§ 
31-7-105 and 31-17-105 leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Legislature 
intended that the hearing examiner's discretion to modify suspensions be limited 
and removed in the case of commercial motor vehicle drivers. The purpose 
statement requires that the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act be construed 
to prevail over the general Driver's License Act. Therefore, we conclude that 
the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act limits the hearing examiner's 
discretion to issue probationary driver's licenses during suspensions in that 
probationary driving privileges cannot extend to the operation of commercial 
motor vehicles.

 
 

[¶17.]  We must examine whether this legislative 
intent violates the equal protection guarantees of our state and federal 
constitutions.

 
 
Equal 
Protection

 
 

[¶18.]  The appellant argues that the hearing 
examiner construed the statutory schemes in a fashion which violated the equal 
protection guarantees of both the Wyoming and the United States Constitutions. 
In essence, his argument is that, if a person whose job involved driving a 
noncommercial motor vehicle had a driver's license suspension, the hearing 
examiner could statutorily allow limited driving privileges so that the person 
could remain employed during the suspension. He argues that, because he cannot 
be given limited driving privileges to drive a commercial motor vehicle, he is 
deprived of the same protection against employment loss which others who hold 
only private driver's licenses receive.

 
 

[¶19.]  Although in the past we have held that 
Wyoming's equal protection guarantee is 
identical to the federal protection, we recently reexamined the equal protection 
provision of the Wyoming Constitution and found that the Wyoming guarantee is 
broader than the federal protection. Johnson v. State, 838 P.2d 158, 165 
(Wyo. 1992). 
In Johnson, the court considered a new test4 for analyzing state constitution 
equal protection claims. The test requires that four questions be 
analyzed:

 
 
First, what 
class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been subjected to a 
"tradition of disfavor" by our laws? . . . Second, what is the public purpose 
that is being served by the law? Third, what is the characteristic of the 
disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment? And lastly, how are 
the characteristics used to distinguish people for such disparate treatment 
relevant to the purpose that the challenged laws purportedly intend to 
serve?

 
 

Id., at 
166.

 
 

[¶20.]  We first analyze whether the legislation 
harms the "class" of commercial driver's license holders and whether that class 
has been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor." The appellant argues that he 
was unduly hampered in his employment. If he had held only a private driver's 
license, the hearing examiner could have granted him a probationary driver's 
license so that he could have continued his employment. Since he held a 
commercial driver's license and was not granted a probationary driver's license 
because of § 31-17-105, the appellant argues that he was deprived of the same 
opportunity to pursue employment during the suspension that a private driver 
would receive merely because his employment happens to involve driving 
commercial motor vehicles. Therefore, the harm faced by the appellant was the 
adverse economic impact of not being able to pursue his employment during the 
suspension period.

 
 

[¶21.]  While the legislation subjected the 
appellant to harm, the class or group the legislation regulates is not a group 
which has been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor" by our laws. Commercial 
drivers are heavily regulated at both the state and federal levels not because 
of assumptions about the characteristics of members in the group but, rather, 
because of the dangerous nature of the work they perform. Courts faced with 
equal protection challenges to various driver's license schemes have reached 
similar conclusions. See, e.g., Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 
Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Huff, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 261, 310 A.2d 435, 436 (1973) 
(holding that a point system for only commercial drivers did not violate equal 
protection rights because of the unique danger). The legislative concern with 
safety will remain and be legitimate regardless of the makeup or characteristics 
of individuals in the regulated group. The need to regulate the operation of 
commercial motor vehicles is not the product of stereotypical thinking about a 
disadvantaged group of people but instead is a concern with regulating a 
dangerous industry. This line of reasoning flows into the second prong of the 
equal protection analysis, which is: "[W]hat is the public purpose that is being 
served by the law?" Johnson, at 166.

 
 

[¶22.]  The purpose is to protect the public from 
potentially dangerous commercial motor vehicles. This particularized purpose is 
very persuasive and carries a great deal of weight when compared with potential 
harm to individuals who have been convicted of a dangerous offense relating to 
motor vehicles. This public purpose also helps us to identify the characteristic 
of the disadvantaged class which justifies the disparate treatment - commercial 
driver's license holders drive large and dangerous commercial motor vehicles. 

 
 

[¶23.]  In the final analysis, the 
characteristics which are used to distinguish commercial drivers for disparate 
treatment are highly relevant to the purpose which the challenged provision (§ 
31-17-105 of the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act) intends to serve. As 
specifically noted in the purpose statement of the Uniform Commercial Driver 
License Act, the Legislature intended to promote the safe operation of 
commercial motor vehicles on public highways. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 176, 
§ 4. Not permitting those who have received a DWUI conviction while operating 
their private vehicles to receive probationary commercial driver's licenses is 
relevant to the purpose of preventing impaired persons from operating commercial 
motor vehicles. The characteristic of being a commercial driver's license holder 
is relevant to the purpose of preventing unsafe operation of commercial motor 
vehicles. By not allowing those who have suspended private driver's licenses to 
drive commercial motor vehicles during the suspension, the Legislature made the 
logically relevant determination that those who may have a problem operating 
private vehicles within the law may also have a similar problem operating 
commercial motor vehicles within the safe limits of the 
law.

 
 

[¶24.]  The Legislature made a policy choice by 
deciding that it was better to ensure public safety during the suspension period 
and not allow commercial employment during that period rather than allow 
commercial operation during the suspension and force risk upon the public. 
Because of the great risk involved, the Legislature's judgment that individual 
commercial drivers should bear the loss rather than the entire public when such 
dangerous vehicles are involved passes constitutional muster. The statute 
survives this Court's equal protection analysis and is constitutional under both 
the Wyoming 
and United States Constitutions.

 
 

[¶25.]  The hearing examiner did not err in 
deciding that he could not issue a probationary driver's license for commercial 
operation to the appellant because of § 31-17-105. The appellant's equal 
protection argument fails because the characteristics regulated by the statutory 
scheme were relevant to the purpose behind the Uniform Commercial Driver License 
Act.

 
 

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Since this appeal 
concerns two different types of licenses, we will refer to them respectively as 
a private driver's license and a commercial driver's license for purposes of 
this opinion.

 
 

2 Amended by 1991 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 241, § 3 effective April 1, 
1991, and by 1992 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 30, §§ 2 & 3 effective 
July 1, 1992, and ch. 69, § 1 effective September 1, 1992.

 
 

3 The federal act is 
similar. Section 2703 provides:

 
 
     Effective July 1, 
1987, no employer shall knowingly allow, permit, or authorize an employee to 
operate a commercial motor vehicle in the United States 
during any period -

 
 
     (1) in which such 
employee has a driver's license suspended, revoked, or cancelled by a State, has 
lost the right to operate a commercial motor vehicle in a State, or has been 
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle. . . 
.

 
 

4 The new test in 
Johnson does not affect the result reached in Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 
(Wyo. 1992). 
In fact, if Mills had been decided using the Johnson analysis, the result would 
have been the same. Thus, Johnson simply changes the way we analyze equal 
protection issues. See, e.g., Mills, 837 P.2d  at 52-53.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶27.]  I dissent. The issue presented is whether 
the legislature intended to deny rights to a commercial driver which are 
available for other motorists.1 Wyoming law provides a limited special 
hardship privilege for an employed motorist after a driver's license suspension. 
By a statutory interpretation, this decision denies appellant access to that 
opportunity following a non-job related conviction for a driving under the 
influence offense.

 
 

[¶28.]  Conforming with the majority analysis, 
Robert E. Wilson, a licensed commercial truck driver, was convicted of driving 
under the influence during use of his private car in non-work activities. 
Wyo. Stat. § 
31-5-233 (1989). Commercial driving and his existent qualification under federal 
and state statutes to operate commercial vehicles were not involved in the 
incident.

 
 

[¶29.]  Wilson applied for a probationary work 
privilege for his non-commercial license so that disqualification would not be 
applied allowing him to continue under the hardship proviso in commercial 
trucking. He received the hardship exception from suspension, but accompanied 
with a decision that his right to commercially drive would not be benefitted by 
the remission of suspension. The result then achieved is that even though the 
driver can secure the probationary work privilege since his license to drive is 
subject to a suspension activity, he is disqualified by federal and state 
statutes from commercial vehicle operation.

 
 

[¶30.]  I do not find any system of statutory 
construction, including plain meaning, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. 
of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, C.J., specially concurring, 
that justifies the extensive judicial construction resulting in this 
interpretation. I am supported in this view by an equal protection concern and 
special legislation question. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27; Johnson v. Hearing 
Examiner, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 

[¶31.]  As an example to illustrate this 
discriminatory effect, four people attend a birthday function at a liquor 
establishment for a common friend. Those include a route salesman, a state 
employee who travels extensively, a beet hauler for a local farmer, and a 
commercial long-haul truck driver. If each, following the party, were to be 
arrested and convicted of driving under the influence, decisively different 
penalties would apply where the hardship proviso would be available to three but 
not to the fourth participant. Those three benefitted are subject to the ninety 
day suspension of Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233 and § 31-7-128 (Supp. 1992) since they 
drive regularly in work activities. If none of the three have a prior violation, 
they are afforded the opportunity to ask for the special work privilege of Wyo. 
Stat. § 31-7-105 (Supp. 1992) and can consequently maintain 
employment.

 
 

[¶32.]  Joe truck driver, however, has a worse 
problem. Even though he has the right to apply for the special hardship 
privilege of Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105, his non-involved commercial vehicle 
operation authority is revoked and his access to continued employment is 
foreclosed during the suspension period with hardship 
remission.

 
 

[¶33.]  I neither directly nor indirectly find 
persuasive evidence of legislative intent to create this higher exposure for 
this one class of worker when compared to all of the rest of the citizenry 
involved in the use of motor vehicles in work activities. Many spend an 
equivalent percentage of their work career in a vehicle as does a commercial 
truck driver. Fairness and equality would provide the same rehabilatory 
punishment upon the non-commercial drivers. None should be excused, but each 
should be subject to an identical penalty. The one class, commercial drivers, 
designated only because it requires both a state driver's license for any 
vehicle operation and a commercial driving authority for their own particular 
occupation, is not by any observable legislative intent singled out for a 
resulting severity of penalty.

 
 

[¶34.]  If we were to seek a fair and realistic 
plain meaning, another answer is available. I conclude that the granting of 
driving to work privilege of Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105 applies equally to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 31-17-104 (1989) since the privilege to drive is not suspended from work 
pursuits under the controlling statute. As to employment driving, the driver's 
license is not suspended, revoked or canceled.

 
 

[¶35.]  It should be clear from a plain meaning 
legislative interpretation or otherwise the legislature could have provided that 
the limited driving privilege of Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105(f) should never be 
applied to the commercial driver. In specific terms, the suspension for 
commercial driving denying the hardship remission privilege only results from an 
offense during commercial driving. See Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105(f)(iv)(F), § 31-17-111 
(1989) and § 31-17-113 (1989). The majority, by its interpretation, takes the 
exclusion from availability of a hardship driving privilege (on the job conduct 
of Wyo. Stat. § 31-17-111, § 31-17-113), as provided in Wyo. Stat. § 
31-7-105(f)(iv)(F), as a disqualification and extends the text by interpretation 
to the non-designated, non-included statutory provision found in Wyo. Stat. § 
31-17-105 (1989). The issue is whether the legislature intended absolute 
liability without opportunity for probationary exception to extend beyond the 
commercial driving activities to the non-commercial, social driving activities 
if the license holder happens to require the commercial license qualification. I 
do not find that purpose clearly stated in the totality of the legislation 
involved here. Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d 214. The specificity of the statute 
does not provide room for this court's constructive expansion.2 

 
 

[¶36.]  The source of the present Wyoming Uniform 
Commercial Driver License Act was congressional enactment of 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 
2701 through § 2716 (1990). See also 49 C.F.R. § 386 and 392.5 (1991). Neither 
litigant nor the majority opinion cite a single federal or other jurisdictional 
case which addresses the relationship of the commercial driver's license statute 
to a non-commercial driving suspension penalty. See Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-101 
through § 31-7-202 (1989 & Supp. 1992), involving the Wyoming general driver's 
license statute, and specifically the hardship driving provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
§ 31-7-105(f).

 
 

[¶37.]  Careful examination of federal statutes 
and the CFR supplementation, in conjunction with the identically written 
Wyoming 
statutes to track federal law, reveal three events which deny the commercial 
driver a right to occupational pursuit. The first is the one at issue here. This 
is a commercial driver whose driver's license is suspended, revoked or canceled 
under general state law where he may obtain a hardship work remission under Wyo. 
Stat. § 31-7-105. The second is a loss under state statute of the right to drive 
a commercial vehicle, Wyo. Stat. § 31-17-111, and the third is the general 
federal disqualification statute, 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 
2707.

 
 

[¶38.]  Clearly, the first is driver's license 
suspension or revocation and the last two are prohibitions against operating a 
commercial vehicle. 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 2703; Wyo. Stat. § 31-17-103(b) (1989). It is just 
as clear that the prohibition against driving under the first event should 
extend no further than its limiting provisions exist for any driving, whether commercial, at 
work, or social.

 
 

[¶39.]  The validity of this conclusion is 
demonstrated by the specific provisions of Wyoming statutes which include authority 
generally for the limited driving privilege (the hardship clause). Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105(f). 
The introductory provision in the section applies its provisions not only to 
that general statute, Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-101 through § 31-7-202, but also to the 
disqualification concept provided by Wyo. Stat. § 31-17-111 and § 31-17-113. 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105(d), which includes the requirement for a hearing "to 
receive limited driving privileges," includes reference to the Commercial 
Driver's License Act and then adds a further provision that as to 
disqualification under the federal-state law, no hardship privilege is granted. 
See Wyo. Stat. 
§ 31-17-103(b); 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 2702(b); and 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 2703(1). 
The driver's license suspension preclusion applies to the act of driving while, 
conversely, the federal-state law commercial driver's statute applies to the 
right to operate a commercial vehicle or consequent 
disqualification.

 
 

[¶40.]  This examination of the relevant statutes 
leads to an analysis that: (1) driver's license suspensions or revocations are 
ameliorated by the hardship provision of Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-105(f); and (2) 
disqualification results only from commercial driving activities, 49 U.S.C.S. 
Appx. § 2707; 49 C.F.R. § 383, subpart D, and 383.51; Wyo. Stat. § 31-17-111 and 
§ 31-17-113.

 
 

[¶41.]  The majority opinion legislates the 
result not contemplated by the federal or state language by finding that the 
hardship proviso in suspension is not only ineffective as to disqualification 
under the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act, but is also ineffective where 
loss of driving privilege for the commercial driver results from the general 
suspension of his driver's license for any reason.3 

 
 

[¶42.]  I would accept as reliable the concept 
which fits within the structure of the statutes as initially recognized within 
the Attorney General's communication. Furthermore, no precedent or 
administrative directives have since been provided by the litigants or found in 
opinion writing to tell this court of any single additional jurisdiction, 
including federal authorities and state licensing agencies, that has adopted the 
federal-state law statutory interpretation created by this majority 
decision.

 
 

[¶43.]  I dissent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyoming's Uniform 
Commercial Driver License Act also includes an exemption from any coverage for 
individuals involved in farm and ranch operations, operating fire fighting 
equipment or military personnel. Wyo. Stat. § 31-17-106 
(1989).

 
 

2 Federal law provides 
for a twenty-four hour out-of-service penalty in cases where a commercial 
driver, during work, is found to have consumed any alcoholic beverage during or 
within the previous four hours before driving started. 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 
2707(d) (1990); 49 C.F.R. § 392.5 (1991).

 
 

3 The only 
authoritative discussion provided within this record is found in correspondence 
where the Attorney General's office addresses an offered and later withdrawn 
settlement arrangement for the case accepting extension of the hardship proviso 
to commercial drivers. Unfortunately for appellant, the trial court ruled before 
the stipulated dismissal became final and the Attorney General's office then 
withdrew its stipulated agreement. The letter, addressed to the trial judge 
hearing the administrative review, stated in part:

 
 
     This letter is to 
clarify the position of the Attorney General concerning the above cases. Prior 
to receiving your orders affirming the ruling of the hearing examiner, the State 
had agreed to have the above two cases, and two Park County cases involving the 
same issue, remanded to the hearing examiner to grant limited driving privileges 
to operate a commercial vehicle.

 
 
     At the time the State 
agreed to stipulate, there were no judicial determinations on the issue, and the 
Department of Transportation considered the issue still open for administrative 
resolution. The State agreed to stipulate based on informal information from the 
Federal Department of Transportation and from other states. The U.S. Department 
of Transportation issued informal opinions that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations do not prohibit states from granting limited driving privileges to 
operate a commercial vehicle if a driver receives a DWUI in a personal vehicle. 
Consequently, certain states grant limited driving privileges to operate a 
commercial vehicle so long as the underlying DWUI did not occur in a commercial 
vehicle. To provide uniform enforcement and consistent administration, it was 
decided that Wyoming would take a similar 
position.

 
 
     Before the 
stipulations in the four pending appeals were fully implemented, we received 
your decision on the merits of the above two cases. The Office of the Attorney 
General has considered your decisions and is in full agreement with your ruling. 
It is the opinion of this office that the decisions are binding on the 
Department of Transportation. To achieve uniform enforcement of the judicial 
determinations, the State will request to withdraw its stipulations in the two 
appeals pending in ParkCounty.