Case Title: Ruhlin v. Samaan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101209

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ. 
 
JEFFREY A. RUHLIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 101209             JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
   November 4, 2011 
MARIAM G. SAMAAN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Timothy J. Hauler, Judge1 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in permitting the use of a transcript of a recorded 
statement to refresh a witness’s recollection, and whether the 
circuit court erred in ruling that a witness’s testimony 
concerning the plaintiff’s prior consistent statements was not 
admissible into evidence. 
Background 
 
Jeffrey A. Ruhlin (Ruhlin) filed a complaint against 
Mariam G. Samaan (Samaan) in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield 
County, seeking damages for injuries he suffered in an 
automobile accident with Samaan.  Samaan admitted that her 
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and the 
parties proceeded to a jury trial on the issue of damages.  The 
jury found in favor of Ruhlin and awarded him $5,000 in 
damages.  Ruhlin appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred 
in ruling on two evidentiary issues during the trial.  
 
On October 9, 2007, Ruhlin was involved in an automobile 
 
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accident with Samaan.  In addition to his other injuries, 
Ruhlin contends that he sustained a left shoulder injury as a 
result of the automobile accident.  A primary issue in 
assessing damages at trial was whether or to what extent Ruhlin 
suffered a shoulder injury as a result of the automobile 
accident. 
Several years before the automobile accident, Ruhlin 
sustained an injury to his left shoulder and underwent surgery.  
The medical records regarding Ruhlin’s treatment on the day of 
the accident do not reference an injury to or any complaints 
about his shoulder being injured in the accident.  Also, on the 
day of the accident, after Ruhlin received medical treatment, 
he spoke with a representative of Samaan’s insurance company by 
telephone.  During this telephone conversation, which was 
recorded, Ruhlin reported injuries to his ribs and head, but 
did not mention any shoulder injuries. 
Ruhlin presented evidence that his shoulder began to 
bother him shortly after the accident and that on October 25, 
2007 and on November 2, 2007, he received medical treatment 
from Dr. Erika Young because of the shoulder injury.  The 
medical records for both visits note that Ruhlin complained of 
shoulder pain.  Ruhlin also received medical treatment from Dr. 
                                                                 
1 Judge William R. Shelton presided at the trial of this 
case.  However, Judge Hauler entered the final order. 
 
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Marion M. Herring, an orthopedic surgeon specializing in 
shoulders, on December 27, 2007 and January 17, 2008.  Dr. 
Herring testified that when he saw Ruhlin in December 2007, 
Ruhlin reported that his shoulder had felt normal until after 
the automobile accident, but that during the January 2008 
office visit, Ruhlin stated that he had experienced mild 
shoulder pain and an incomplete return to shoulder function 
before the accident. 
 
During cross-examination, Samaan’s counsel questioned 
Ruhlin about the inconsistencies in his claim that he injured 
his shoulder in the automobile accident and his statement to 
Dr. Herring in January 2008 that he experienced pain and lack 
of range of motion in his shoulder before the accident.  Ruhlin 
claimed that he told Dr. Herring that the pain and functional 
limitations started after the accident. 
Samaan’s counsel also asked Ruhlin about the telephone 
conversation Ruhlin had with Samaan’s insurance company on the 
day of the accident.  The following cross-examination took 
place, in relevant part: 
Q:  And that phone call was all about what happened, 
who was at fault and did you get hurt.  Right? 
 
A:  More — more of they asked the question of what 
happened and how it happened. 
 
Q:  And whether you were hurt, too.  Right? 
 
A:  I don’t recall. 
 
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Q:  Let me see if I can refresh your recollection on 
that. 
 
Samaan’s counsel proposed handing a document to Ruhlin to 
refresh Ruhlin’s recollection.  Ruhlin’s counsel objected 
because the document was a transcript of the recorded telephone 
conversation (the transcript).  Ruhlin’s counsel argued that 
the use of the transcript violated Code § 8.01-404.  Samaan’s 
counsel argued that the transcript was merely being used to 
refresh Ruhlin’s recollection of the conversation, and that use 
of the transcript for that purpose did not violate Code § 8.01-
404.  The circuit court permitted Ruhlin to review the 
transcript to refresh his recollection.  The identity of the 
document reviewed by Ruhlin was not disclosed to the jury. 
Samaan’s counsel continued his cross-examination of Ruhlin 
stating, “Having seen the document, does that refresh your 
recollection as to whether or not, on the phone call, you were 
asked about your injuries?”  Ruhlin’s counsel again objected, 
but the circuit court overruled his objection.  Samaan’s 
counsel resumed questioning Ruhlin about the telephone 
conversation, without reference to the document Ruhlin had 
reviewed, including the following: 
Q:  And during that phone call, all you said was my 
ribs hurt, but not so bad.  And I hit my head.  And 
that’s it.   
 
. . . . 
 
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Q:  You didn’t mention your shoulder at all, did you? 
 
A:  No, because I had no idea it was broke again. 
 
Q:  Because by that time, you didn’t get any pain in 
your shoulder, did you? 
 
A:  I had pain in my shoulder from the time of the 
accident on. 
 
Q:  So why didn’t you tell the person on the phone? 
 
A:  Because it wasn’t significant over my chest pain. 
 
Q:  Are you saying that your chest pain was such that 
you didn’t perceive the shoulder? 
 
A:  I didn’t understand the shoulder was aching, yeah. 
 
 
Counsel for Ruhlin later called Ruhlin’s wife Johanna R. 
Ruhlin (Johanna) to testify.  He sought to elicit testimony 
from her concerning statements that Ruhlin made about the pain 
and discomfort he experienced after the accident.  Samaan 
objected, arguing that such statements constituted hearsay.  
Ruhlin argued that his prior consistent statements were 
admissible, under a hearsay exception, to rebut the defense’s 
allegation of recent fabrication.  The circuit court sustained 
Samaan’s objection.  Ruhlin appeals. 
Analysis 
 
Ruhlin argues that the circuit court erred in allowing 
Samaan to cross-examine Ruhlin with the transcript of his 
telephone conversation with the insurance company.  Ruhlin 
contends that the circuit court allowed Samaan to violate Code 
 
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§ 8.01-404, not only by permitting Samaan to cross-examine 
Ruhlin regarding the contents of the transcript, but also by 
allowing Samaan to use the transcript to contradict and impeach 
Ruhlin’s testimony concerning the onset of his shoulder pain. 
 
Samaan responds that Code § 8.01-404 did not prevent her 
from cross-examining Ruhlin regarding the telephone 
conversation that was recorded; she argues that Code § 8.01-404 
only prevents the direct impeachment of a witness using the 
transcript of a prior recorded statement.  Further, Samaan 
contends that she did not impeach Ruhlin with the transcript, 
but rather used it to refresh his recollection concerning the 
telephone conversation he had with the insurance company. 
 
“This Court reviews evidentiary rulings under an abuse of 
discretion standard.”  Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 
496, 689 S.E.2d 748, 751 (2010).  “However, a trial court has 
no discretion to admit clearly inadmissible evidence because 
admissibility of evidence depends not upon the discretion of 
the court but upon sound legal principles.  The converse is 
likewise true because admissibility of evidence is always 
governed by legal principles.”  Gray v. Rhoads, 268 Va. 81, 86, 
597 S.E.2d 93, 96 (2004) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  “[A] trial court’s interpretation of a statute 
is a question of law subject to de novo review.”  Id.  
 
Code § 8.01-404 prohibits the use of certain types of 
 
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prior inconsistent writings to contradict a witness in a 
personal injury action.  It provides as follows:  
 
A witness may be cross-examined as to previous 
statements made by him in writing or reduced into 
writing, relative to the subject matter of the civil 
action, without such writing being shown to him 
. . . . This section is subject to the qualification, 
that in an action to recover for a personal injury or 
death by wrongful act or neglect, no ex parte 
affidavit or statement in writing other than a 
deposition, after due notice, of a witness and no 
extrajudicial recording made at any time other than 
simultaneously with the wrongful act or negligence at 
issue of the voice of such witness, or reproduction 
or transcript thereof, as to the facts or 
circumstances attending the wrongful act or neglect 
complained of, shall be used to contradict him as a 
witness in the case. 
 
Code § 8.01-404.  This Court has stated that the purpose of the 
qualification noted in Code § 8.01-404  
was to correct an unfair practice which had developed, 
by which claim adjusters would hasten to the scene of 
an accident and obtain written statements . . . [that] 
were neither full nor correct and were signed by 
persons who had not fully recovered from shock and 
hence were not in full possession of their faculties.  
Later, such persons, when testifying as witnesses, 
would be confronted with their signed statements and  
. . . these statements would be introduced in evidence 
as impeachment of their testimony given on the witness 
stand. 
 
Harris v. Harrington, 180 Va. 210, 220, 22 S.E.2d 13, 17 
(1942). 
Accordingly, Code § 8.01-404 prevents the impeachment of a 
witness by use of an affidavit, statement or transcript made 
after an accident but before trial.  See id.  Code § 8.01-404 
 
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does not, however, “prohibit the proof of prior inconsistent 
statements by oral testimony,” even when such statements were 
reduced to writing and signed by the witness.  Id.  Otherwise, 
“an interested litigant, at any time between the occurrence of 
the accident and the trial, could reduce to writing a prior 
hostile statement of any witness and thus prevent this form of 
impeachment of such witness.”  Id. 
 
In the instant case, Ruhlin contends that the circuit 
court erred in allowing Samaan to cross-examine him about the 
content of his conversation with the insurance company.  We 
disagree.  Samaan could properly cross-examine Ruhlin 
concerning the content of the telephone conversation because, 
as we recognized in Harris, Code § 8.01-404 only prohibits the 
use of a written statement itself to directly impeach a 
witness.  Id.  The fact that the conversation with the 
insurance company was reduced to writing did not prevent Samaan 
from attempting to prove the inconsistencies in Ruhlin’s claims 
by questioning him about the oral statements he made. 
 
Ruhlin further argues that Samaan used the transcript 
itself to impeach and contradict his testimony.  The evidence 
in the record indicates that, on cross-examination, when Ruhlin 
stated that he did not recall whether the insurance company 
asked him about his injuries, Samaan used the transcript of the 
conversation to refresh Ruhlin’s recollection. 
 
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In Gray, we stated that “[t]he plain terms of Code § 8.01-
404 limit the application of the prohibition . . . to those 
situations where a prior written statement is used to 
‘contradict’ a witness.”  268 Va. at 89, 597 S.E.2d at 98.  
Accordingly, we held that Code § 8.01-404 did not preclude the 
introduction of a witness’s prior written statement as a party 
admission in a plaintiff’s case-in-chief because, at that point 
in the trial, the statements were not being used to 
“contradict” the witness.  Id. at 89-90, 597 S.E.2d at 98-99. 
The act of refreshing a witness’s recollection does not 
involve contradicting that witness’s testimony.  Rather, “when 
a witness has a memory lapse on the stand and ‘forgets some 
portion (or even all) of the facts of the matter about which 
[he or she is] called to testify,’ a party may attempt to 
‘refresh’ the witness’s memory by having the witness examine 
materials relating to the matter for which they are 
testifying.”  McGann v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 448, 451-52, 
424 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1992) (quoting Charles E. Friend, The Law 
of Evidence in Virginia § 18 (3d ed. 1988)).  After examining 
such materials, a witness may then “speak to the facts from his 
own recollection.”  Harrison v. Middleton, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 
527, 544 (1854) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
In the instant case, Samaan’s use of the transcript of 
Ruhlin’s telephone conversation was limited to refreshing 
 
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Ruhlin’s recollection concerning the content of the 
conversation.  Samaan did not introduce the transcript into 
evidence, quote it in open court, or even identify it to the 
jury.  After Ruhlin reviewed the transcript, Samaan questioned 
Ruhlin about the telephone conversation without regard or 
reference to the document itself, and Ruhlin testified from his 
independent memory of his conversation with the insurance 
company.  In addition, Ruhlin’s responses to the questions 
about this conversation did not “contradict” his prior 
testimony.  To the contrary, Ruhlin agreed that he did not 
mention his shoulder injury to the insurance company.  
Therefore, we hold that Samaan’s use of the transcript of the 
prior recorded statement to refresh Ruhlin’s recollection did 
not implicate the prohibitions in Code § 8.01-404 and the 
circuit court did not err by permitting such use. 
 
Ruhlin also contends that the circuit court erred in 
excluding Johanna’s testimony concerning prior consistent 
statements that Ruhlin made about his shoulder pain.  Ruhlin 
argues that his prior consistent statements were admissible 
under a hearsay exception to rebut Samaan’s allegation that 
Ruhlin fabricated his testimony at trial regarding when his 
shoulder pain started.  
 
Samaan responds that the recent fabrication exception 
applies only if the prior consistent statements were made 
 
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before the individual had a motive to falsify.  She contends 
that the record in this case lacks evidence that Ruhlin’s prior 
consistent statements comported with the requirements of this 
exception because he made the statements after the accident and 
after he made a claim with Samaan’s insurance company. 
 
Prior consistent statements of a witness – if offered for 
the truth of the facts recited – are inadmissible hearsay.  
Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 404, 417 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1992). 
“To allow such a statement to corroborate and buttress a 
witness’s testimony would be an unsafe practice, one which not 
only would be subject to all the objections that exist against 
the admission of hearsay in general but also would tend to 
foster fraud and the fabrication of testimony.”  Id.  As this 
Court has stated, “ ‘the repetition of a story does not render 
it any more trustworthy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Scott v. Moon, 143 
Va. 425, 434, 130 S.E. 241, 243 (1925)). 
 
When offered for the more limited purpose of 
rehabilitating the credibility of a witness who has been 
impeached, a prior statement that is consistent with the trial 
testimony may sometimes be used, but the “doubtful value” of 
prior statements generally (see Charles E. Friend, The Law of 
Evidence in Virginia § 4-14 (6th ed. 2003)) has led to 
restriction of such proof to situations where (1) the witness 
has been subjected to specific forms of attack, and the offered 
 
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prior consistent statement was made before any litigation 
motive of the declarant to make self-serving statements would 
have arisen, or (2) where a witness has been impeached by a 
prior inconsistent statement.  See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 
282 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2011) (this day decided). 
 
No issue is raised in this case regarding any form of 
attack upon the witness other than a charge of “recent 
fabrication” of the trial testimony.  The forms of attack 
during impeachment of a witness that this Court has held will 
permit later rehabilitation of credibility by consistent 
statements the witness made before trial include those attacks 
which suggest that the trial testimony of the witness is a 
“recent fabrication” or that claim in words or substance that 
the witness had an interest or motive to testify falsely at the 
present trial.  
Where a witness has been assailed on the ground that 
his story is a recent fabrication, or that he has 
some motive for testifying falsely, proof that he 
gave a similar account of the transaction when the 
motive did not exist, before the effect of such an 
account could be foreseen or motives of interest 
would have induced a different statement, is 
admissible. 
 
Id. at 404-05, 417 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting Honaker Lumber Co. v. 
Kiser, 134 Va. 50, 60, 113 S.E. 718, 721 (1922)); see also 
Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 4-14 (“If it is 
alleged that the testimony is a recent fabrication, . . . 
 
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evidence that the witness told the same story at an earlier 
time is admissible to refute the allegation of recent 
fabrication.”) (emphasis in original). 
 
However, in this case, there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that Samaan presented any argument that Ruhlin’s trial 
testimony was a “recent fabrication.”  The record establishes 
that Samaan attempted to show at trial the inconsistencies in 
the statements Ruhlin made after the accident about when he 
first began to experience shoulder pain.  Samaan did not allege 
that Ruhlin had crafted a new story at trial, but rather that 
Ruhlin had been inconsistent with his story all along.  As we 
have previously stated, “to allow the admission of a prior 
consistent statement after impeachment of just ‘any sort’ would 
create an unreasonably ‘loose rule.’ ”  Faison, 243 Va. at 405, 
417 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting Gallion v. Winfree, 129 Va. 122, 
127, 105 S.E. 539, 540 (1921)); see also McLean v. 
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 200, 214, 527 S.E.2d 443, 450 (2000) 
(“The introduction of a prior consistent statement of a witness 
is not [permitted] merely because the testimony of a second 
witness calls the veracity of the first witness into doubt.”). 
 
Although Samaan may have called the veracity of Ruhlin 
into question by pointing out inconsistencies in his statements 
regarding shoulder pain, Samaan did not allege the shoulder 
injury claim was a “recent fabrication.”  Therefore, we hold 
 
14 
that the record supports the circuit court’s exclusion of the 
proffered testimony.2 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgment. 
Affirmed. 
                     
2 Given the holding of the Court concerning “recent 
fabrication,” the Court need not examine the issue of whether 
the proffered testimony was inadmissible for rehabilitation 
purposes because the proffered statements were made at a time 
when Ruhlin had a motive to falsify.