Case Title: Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 70

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 70 
Docket: 
BCD-19-297 
Argued: 
March 3, 2020 
Decided: 
May 19, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.1 
 
 
FRIENDS OF LAMOINE et al. 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF LAMOINE et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Harold MacQuinn, Inc., (MacQuinn) appeals from a judgment of the 
Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.), see M.R. Civ. P. 80B, vacating a Town 
of Lamoine Board of Appeals decision that reversed the Town Planning Board’s 
denial of MacQuinn’s application for a permit pursuant to the Town’s Site Plan 
Review Ordinance, and affirming and reinstating the Planning Board’s decision.  
MacQuinn contends that (1) the Rule 80B complaint filed by Friends of Lamoine 
and Jeffrey Dow as Trustee for the Tweedie Trust (collectively, Friends) should 
have been dismissed as untimely, (2) the Board of Appeals should have 
conducted a de novo rather than appellate review, (3) the Planning Board’s 
                                         
1  Although Chief Justice Saufley participated in this appeal, she resigned before this opinion was 
certified. 
 
 
2 
findings in denying the permit were unsupported by substantial evidence, and 
(4) the Planning Board should have waived a criterion of the ordinance as 
duplicative or inapplicable.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  We draw the following facts from the administrative record before 
the Planning Board, the municipal body that issued the operative decision.  See 
M.R. Civ. P. 80B(f); Appletree Cottage, LLC v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 
2017 ME 177, ¶¶ 2, 11, 169 A.3d 396; Osprey Family Tr. v. Town of Owls Head, 
2016 ME 89, ¶ 2, 141 A.3d 1114.  
 
[¶3]  In February 2017, MacQuinn filed two separate applications with 
the Planning Board, pursuant to the Town’s Gravel Ordinance and Site Plan 
Review Ordinance, seeking permits to allow the expansion of its existing gravel 
extraction operation at Kittredge Pit from 65 acres to 108 acres.2  See Lamoine, 
Me., Gravel Ordinance (March 16, 2011); Lamoine, Me., Site Plan Review 
                                         
2  MacQuinn had previously filed identical Gravel Ordinance and Site Plan Review Ordinance 
permit applications with the Planning Board in 2012.  The Planning Board considered those 
applications for more than a year and a half before voting to deny them in 2014.  MacQuinn appealed 
the Planning Board denials to the Board of Appeals, and, around the same time, filed a complaint in 
the Superior Court alleging that two of the Planning Board members were biased.  In 2016, MacQuinn 
and the Town reached an agreement that the Superior Court lawsuit would be dismissed in exchange 
for MacQuinn’s ability to conduct a “do-over” of the applications before the Planning Board, without 
the allegedly biased members sitting and pursuant to the Ordinances in effect at the time of 
MacQuinn’s original applications.  In its April 4, 2019, judgment, the Business and Consumer Docket 
concluded that the Town did not err in applying the earlier versions of the Ordinances when it 
conducted its “do-over” review of the 2017 applications, and Friends does not raise the issue in this 
appeal. 
 
 
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Ordinance (March 16, 2011).  On November 14, 2017, the Planning Board voted 
to deny the Gravel Ordinance permit, issuing written findings on 
November 21, 2017.  On December 11, 2017, the Planning Board voted to deny 
the Site Plan Review Ordinance permit and issued written findings. 
 
[¶4]  MacQuinn appealed both denials to the Board of Appeals (BOA).  
Pursuant to the BOA’s interpretation of the respective appeals provisions in the 
Gravel Ordinance and Site Plan Review Ordinance, the BOA conducted a 
de novo review of the Gravel Ordinance permit application and an appellate 
review of the Planning Board’s Site Plan Review Ordinance denial.  The BOA 
reversed the Planning Board’s decision on both permit applications and 
remanded to the Planning Board with instructions to issue both permits.  
Following the BOA’s directive, the Planning Board voted to approve both 
permits on July 9, 2018. 
 
[¶5]  On August 8, 2018, Friends filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, and the case was transferred to the Business and 
Consumer Docket (BCD).  Friends challenged only the BOA’s decision to reverse 
the Planning Board’s denial of the Site Plan Review Ordinance permit and not 
the BOA’s decision concerning the Gravel Ordinance permit.  On April 4, 2019, 
the BCD issued an order vacating the BOA’s decision and affirming the Planning 
 
 
4 
Board’s December 2017 decision denying the Site Plan Review Ordinance 
permit.  In response to MacQuinn’s first of two motions to reconsider, the BCD 
amended its judgment in part in an order signed June 17, 2019, altering its basis 
for why the Planning Board’s findings regarding the Site Plan Review 
Ordinance’s section J.1 natural landscape criterion were supported by sufficient 
evidence; the BCD maintained its conclusion that the Planning Board’s decision 
was the operative one for review and should be affirmed.  Following that 
amended judgment, the BCD denied MacQuinn’s motion for reconsideration of 
the amended judgment, and MacQuinn appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Timeliness of Friends’ Rule 80B Complaint 
 
[¶6]  MacQuinn argues that Friends’ M.R. Civ. P. 80B complaint should 
have been dismissed as untimely.  In particular, MacQuinn invokes 30-A M.R.S. 
§ 2691 (2020), governing boards of appeal, to suggest that Friends’ complaint 
was foreclosed.  We disagree and hold that the applicable statute is 30-A M.R.S. 
§ 4482-A (2020), which covers land use decisions of bodies other than boards 
of appeal and pursuant to which Friends’ complaint was timely filed. 
 
[¶7]  We interpret statutes de novo, looking first to the plain language 
and delving beyond the plain meaning only if the language is ambiguous.  See 
 
 
5 
Wister v. Town of Mount Desert, 2009 ME 66, ¶ 17, 974 A.2d 903.  Rule 80B 
provides that “[t]he time within which review may be sought shall be as 
provided by statute” and establishes a default time period if one is not provided 
by statute.  M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b).  Here, the time for appeal is provided by statute.  
We have not yet construed 30-A M.R.S. §§ 2691(3)(H), 4482-A, or 4482-B 
(2020), each of which was enacted in 2017, and we take the opportunity to do 
so now.  See P.L. 2017, ch. 241, §§ 3, 5, 6 (effective Nov. 1, 2017). 
 
[¶8]  Title 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(G) establishes a 45-day period for 
appeals following a vote of a board of appeals.  Section 2691(3)(H) provides 
that  
a decision of the board is a final decision when the project for which 
the approval of the board is requested has received all required 
municipal administrative approvals by the board, the planning 
board or municipal reviewing authority, a site plan or design 
review board, a historic preservation review board and any other 
review board created by municipal charter or ordinance.  If the final 
municipal administrative review of the project is by a municipal 
administrative review board other than a board of appeals, the time 
for appeal is governed by section 4482-A.  Any denial of the request 
for approval by the board of appeals is considered a final decision 
even if other municipal administrative approvals are required for 
the project and remain pending.  A denial of the request for 
approval by the board of appeals must be appealed within 45 days 
of the date of the board’s vote to deny or within 15 days of final 
action by the board on a reconsideration that results in a denial of 
the request.   
 
 
 
6 
30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(H) (emphasis added).  Here, when the BOA determined 
that the Planning Board erred in its interpretation of the Site Plan Review 
Ordinance, it reversed and remanded the matter to the Planning Board to 
approve the permits as the last and final step in the permitting process.  
Pursuant to the plain language of section 2691(3)(H), the final decision was 
that of the Planning Board, not the Board of Appeals, and the time for appeal is 
therefore governed by 30-A M.R.S. § 4482-A.  See 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(H). 
 
[¶9]  Section 4482-A, entitled “Review of other municipal land use 
decisions,” permits a party to file an appeal in the Superior Court of “a final 
decision within 30 days of the date of the vote on the final decision.”  30-A M.R.S. 
§ 4482-A(1).  Section 4482-A(2) instructs that section 4482-B defines what is 
meant by a “final decision.”  30-A M.R.S. § 4482-A(2).  Section 4482-B mirrors 
the language found in section 2691(3)(H) and dictates that “a municipal land 
use decision is a final decision when an application for a project . . . has received 
all required municipal administrative approvals,” including those by the 
“planning board,” before a party can appeal.  30-A M.R.S. § 4482-B. 
 
[¶10]  Contrary to MacQuinn’s contention that Friends should have filed 
its Rule 80B complaint immediately following the BOA’s decision, Friends could 
not have appealed the granting of the Site Plan Review Ordinance permit until, 
 
 
7 
on remand from the BOA, the Planning Board voted to approve the permit.  See 
30-A M.R.S. § 4482-B (“An appeal may not be filed under this section prior to 
the review and final approval of a project by each applicable municipal 
administrative review board . . . .”).3  Because Friends filed its Rule 80B 
complaint on August 8, 2018, within 30 days after the Planning Board’s 
July 9, 2018, final vote, the complaint was timely.  See 30-A M.R.S. § 4482-A(1). 
B.  
The Operative Decision 
 
[¶11]  In order to determine which municipal decision is the operative 
decision for our review on the merits, we must first determine whether the 
BOA’s review pursuant to the Site Plan Review Ordinance is de novo or 
appellate.  See Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 ME 22, ¶¶ 5, 7, 
868 A.2d 161.  When the BOA conducts a de novo review, acting as “factfinder 
and decision maker,” the BOA’s decision is the operative decision.  Id. ¶ 7 
(quoting Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 4, 757 A.2d 773).  
However, when the BOA conducts an appellate review, the decision of the 
Planning Board, or other previous tribunal, is operative.  Id. 
                                         
3  If the BOA had instead upheld the Planning Board’s permit denial, rather than directing the 
Planning Board to grant MacQuinn’s request for approval, MacQuinn would be correct that the time 
period for appeal would have been within 45 days of the BOA decision.  Section 2691(3)(H) provides, 
“Any denial of the request for approval by the board of appeals is considered a final decision even if 
other municipal administrative approvals are required for the project and remain pending.  A denial 
of the request for approval by the board of appeals must be appealed within 45 days of the date of 
the board’s vote to deny . . . .” 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(H) (2020) (emphasis added). 
 
 
8 
 
[¶12]  In determining the nature of the BOA’s review, “we look to state 
statutes and to the municipality’s own ordinances.”  Yates v. Town of 
Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 2, ¶ 11, 763 A.2d 1168.  Pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. 
§ 2691(3)(C), the default review for a board of appeals is de novo, but a town’s 
ordinance may establish an appellate standard instead.  Under a de novo 
review, the BOA can receive evidence, see 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(C)-(D), but in 
an appellate review, the BOA “limit[s] its review on appeal to the record 
established by the [planning] board” and “may not accept new evidence,” 
30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(C). 
 
[¶13]  Turning to the Ordinance’s language, we examine section M of the 
Site Plan Review Ordinance, which governs appeals and provides:  
1.   
If the [Planning] [B]oard disapproves an application or 
 
grants approval with conditions that are objectionable to the 
 
applicant or to any abutting landowner or any aggrieved 
 
party, . . . or when it is claimed that the provisions of this 
 
section do not apply, or that the true intent and meaning of 
 
the ordinance has been  misconstrued 
or 
wrongfully 
 
interpreted, the applicant, an  abutting 
landowner, 
or 
 
aggrieved party . . . may appeal the decision of the [Planning] 
 
[B]oard, as  follows:  
 
 
a.  A written appeal must be filed within 30 days of the time 
 
the applicant receives a written notice of the [Planning] 
 
[B]oard’s 
decision. 
 
 
 
9 
 
b.  Appeals 
involving 
administrative 
procedures 
or 
 
interpretation of this ordinance may be heard and decided by 
 
the [BOA] as detailed below. 
 
 
c.  When errors of administrative procedure are found by the 
 
[BOA], the case shall be referred back to the [Planning] 
 
[B]oard for  rectification. 
 
 
d.  When errors of interpretation are found, the [BOA] may 
 
modify the interpretation or reverse the order of the 
 
[Planning] [B]oard but may not alter the conditions attached 
 
by the [Planning] [B]oard.  All changes in conditions, other 
 
than changes made by the granting of a variance, shall be 
 
made by the [Planning] [B]oard in accordance with the 
 
[BOA’s] interpretation. 
 
 
e.  Appeals involving conditions imposed by the [Planning] 
 
[B]oard, or a decision to deny or approve, shall be made to 
 
the Superior Court, when such appeals do not involve 
 
administrative procedures and interpretation which shall 
 
first be heard and decided by the [BOA], as detailed above. 
 
Site Plan Review Ordinance § M (emphasis added). 
 
[¶14]  MacQuinn argues that rather than creating an appellate standard, 
the Ordinance merely narrows the types of appeals that the BOA can hear.  We 
do not dispute MacQuinn’s observation that the Ordinance limits the BOA’s 
jurisdiction,4 but we disagree with its contention that the BOA’s limited 
jurisdiction dictates de novo review for appeals over which it has jurisdiction. 
                                         
4  The ordinance limits the BOA’s jurisdiction to matters involving “administrative procedures or 
interpretation.”  Lamoine, Me., Site Plan Review Ordinance § M(1)(b) (March 16, 2011).  Matters that 
involve “conditions imposed by the [Planning] [B]oard, or a decision to deny or approve,” and not 
 
 
10 
 
[¶15]  MacQuinn also argues that the language in the Ordinance is not 
specific enough to abrogate the statutory default of de novo review.  See 
Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 11, 757 A.2d 773.  A town need not use particular 
language, such as the word “appellate,” in establishing appellate review.  We 
have on numerous occasions construed an ordinance that did not use the word 
“appellate” to nonetheless require the appeals board to undertake appellate, 
rather than de novo, review.  See, e.g., Mills v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 15, 
955 A.2d 258.  What is important is the function that the ordinance’s language 
prescribes.  “If the ordinance prescribes an appellate function, the [BOA] will 
review the record of the proceedings before the previous tribunal, review the 
evidence presented to that body, review the tribunal’s written or recorded 
findings, hear oral or written argument of the parties, and determine whether 
the lower tribunal erred in reaching its decision.”  Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 8, 
757 A.2d 773. 
 
[¶16]  In a number of cases involving similar ordinances, we held that the 
following or nearly identical language “explicitly authorize[d] a board of 
appeals to undertake appellate review”: the “[BOA] may modify or reverse 
action of the planning board or code enforcement officer . . . only upon a finding 
                                         
questions of administrative procedure or ordinance interpretation, must be appealed directly to the 
Superior Court.  Id. § M(1)(e). 
 
 
11 
that the decision is clearly contrary to specific provisions of this chapter.”5  
Mills, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 15, 955 A.2d 258 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Gensheimer, 2005 ME 22, ¶ 11, 868 A.2d 161, and Yates, 2001 ME 2, ¶¶ 12-13, 
763 A.2d 1168). 
 
[¶17]  In another decision, we recently held that an ordinance “limit[ed] 
the BOA to reviewing a decision of the Planning Board in an appellate capacity 
only” where it enabled appeals where the “Planning Board disapproves an 
application or grants approval with conditions that are objectionable . . . , or 
where it is claimed that the provisions of this chapter do not apply, or that the 
true intent and meaning of this chapter have been misconstrued or wrongfully 
interpreted.”  MSR Recycling, LLC v. Weeks & Hutchins, LLC, 2019 ME 125, 
¶¶ 10-11, 214 A.3d 1 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).  The 
emphasized language is akin to the Site Plan Review Ordinance’s language 
limiting appeals to legal questions of interpretation and procedure.  See Site 
Plan Review Ordinance § M. 
                                         
5  Further, unlike the ordinances in Stewart and Yates, which contained language suggestive of 
both types of review, the Site Plan Review Ordinance contains no language suggestive of de novo 
review.  See Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 11 & n.6, 757 A.2d 773 (observing that the 
ordinance included the mandate that BOA decisions include a statement of “findings” and that the 
appellant would have the “burden of proof”); Yates v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 2, ¶¶ 12-13, 
763 A.2d 1168 (comparing the ordinance with the one in Stewart and concluding that, although the 
ordinances contained similar provisions indicating de novo review, the ordinance in Yates provided 
the board of appeals with authority to conduct appellate review). 
 
 
12 
 
[¶18]  Contrary to MacQuinn’s contention, because the Ordinance limits 
the BOA’s jurisdiction to questions of legal interpretation and procedure and 
prevents the BOA from altering conditions set by the Planning Board, it cabins 
the BOA’s review to the factual record created by the Planning Board.  Such a 
limitation of the review to the record that was before the prior tribunal is 
inconsistent with a de novo review, in which original fact-finding is a defining 
feature.  See Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 7 & n.2, 757 A.2d 773.  We conclude that 
the Ordinance requires the BOA to conduct appellate review of the site plan 
permit decision, and thus that the BOA applied the proper standard here.  
Accordingly, the operative decision for our review is the Planning Board’s 
December 11, 2017, decision denying the Site Plan Review Ordinance permit.6  
See id. ¶ 4 (“If . . . the [BOA] acted only in an appellate capacity, we review 
                                         
6  At oral argument, MacQuinn suggested that of the two Planning Board decisions, the operative 
decision for review should instead be the Planning Board’s July 2018 decision, which followed the 
BOA’s reversal of the Planning Board’s December 2017 decision.  We disagree.  The July 2018 
Planning Board decision was made on remand pursuant to the mandate from the BOA.  Had the 
Planning Board disregarded the BOA’s instructions on remand, it would have acted improperly given 
the BOA’s appellate authority.  See Fitanides v. City of Saco, 2015 ME 32, ¶ 10, 113 A.3d 1088.  
Underlying our doctrine identifying the operative decision for review is the aim that the operative 
decision represent the decision of the fact-finding tribunal.  See Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶¶ 4-5, 7 & 
n.2, 757 A.2d 773 (explaining that the BOA decision will be the operative decision for review where 
the BOA acted as a tribunal of original jurisdiction by conducting de novo review, but otherwise the 
previous tribunal’s decision will be operative).  In this case, the operative decision for our review is 
the Planning Board’s initial decision, pursuant to which it conducted its original fact-finding.  See 
Fitanides, 2015 ME 32, ¶ 9, 113 A.3d 1088 (concluding that where the Planning Board had conducted 
two votes, the operative decision was its initial decision, in which it granted conditional approval and 
issued the permits, rather than its later decision to keep the permits unchanged). 
 
 
13 
directly the decision of the Planning Board, or other previous tribunal, not the 
[decision of the BOA].”). 
C. 
Review of the Planning Board’s Decision 
 
[¶19]  When the BCD acts as an appellate court, “we review directly the 
operative decision of the municipality” for “abuse of discretion, errors of law, 
or findings not supported by the substantial evidence in the record.”  
Gensheimer, 2005 ME 22, ¶¶ 7, 16, 868 A.2d 161 (quotation marks omitted).  
In conducting our review, we are limited to reviewing the record that was 
before the Planning Board, the operative decision maker.  See Appletree Cottage, 
LLC, 2017 ME 177, ¶ 11, 169 A.3d 396. 
 
[¶20]  Because MacQuinn is the party seeking to vacate the Planning 
Board’s decision on the application for site plan review, it bears the burden of 
persuasion on appeal.  See Anderson v. Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 2009 ME 134, 
¶ 3, 985 A.2d 501.  We accord substantial deference to a municipal agency’s 
factual findings.  Fissmer v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 195, ¶ 13, 
170 A.3d 797.  Where, as here, “an appellant had the burden of proof before the 
agency, and challenges an agency finding that it failed to meet that burden of 
proof, we will not overturn the agency fact-finding unless the appellant 
demonstrates that the administrative record compels the contrary findings that 
 
 
14 
the appellant asserts should have been entered.”  Anderson, 2009 ME 134, ¶ 3, 
985 A.2d 501; see Grant v. Town of Belgrade, 2019 ME 160, ¶ 9, 221 A.3d 112. 
 
[¶21]  The Planning Board denied MacQuinn’s Site Plan Review 
Ordinance permit application on the basis that it failed to meet criteria set forth 
in three subsections of the Ordinance: J.1 (Preserve and Enhance the 
Landscape), J.10 (Groundwater Protection), and J.17 (Stormwater Drainage).  
See Site Plan Review Ordinance §§ J.1, J.10, J.17.  In regard to section J.10, the 
Planning Board found that MacQuinn failed to demonstrate the “lack of adverse 
impact upon groundwater, and in particular upon the aquifer and the Cold 
Spring Water Company public water supply.”  Ample record evidence supports 
this finding.  The Planning Board received competent evidence from a number 
of experts regarding the Cold Spring groundwater supply.  These experts 
disagreed as to the geology surrounding the spring and the threat that 
MacQuinn’s proposal would pose to the spring.  We have stated, “A board’s 
finding is not unsupported by substantial evidence merely because two 
inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence.”7  Veilleux v. City of 
                                         
7  Indeed, it is clear that substantial evidence in the record supports either conclusion regarding 
groundwater impact.  The BOA, in conducting its de novo review of the Gravel Ordinance permit and 
finding that groundwater was not threatened, observed that “Willem Bru[t]saert, a civil and 
environmental engineer, gave a contrary conclusion, however the Board is persuaded by the 
testimony from Mr. Deyling and Mr. Gerber.”  See Lamoine, Me., Gravel Ordinance § 7.D.3 
(March 16, 2011).  The BCD concluded that that finding—by a different agency (the BOA) on a 
different permit (the Gravel Ordinance)—“supersed[ed]” the Planning Board’s December 2017 
 
 
15 
Augusta, 684 A.2d 413, 415 (Me. 1996).  Regarding the Planning Board’s ability 
to determine credibility and to weigh evidence, we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the Planning Board.  See Anderson, 2009 ME 134, ¶ 27, 
985 A.2d 501. 
 
[¶22]  Because we conclude that the Planning Board’s finding regarding 
section J.10 was supported by substantial evidence, we cannot say that 
MacQuinn carried its burden of showing that the record compels a contrary 
finding in its favor.  See Anderson, 2009 ME 134, ¶ 3, 985 A.2d 501.  It is 
therefore unnecessary to address the remaining bases for the Planning Board’s 
denial.  See  Tompkins v. City of Presque Isle, 571 A.2d 235, 236 (Me. 1990) 
(relying on the record that was before the operative board and concluding that, 
in order for the Court to reverse the findings of the board, “the record must 
establish that the evidence before the board would have compelled the Board 
to make a positive finding that the application of the plaintiffs complied with all 
of the seventeen criteria set forth in the Ordinance”).  In light of our holding, 
                                         
finding that MacQuinn failed to demonstrate a lack of adverse impact on groundwater.  We discern 
no reason why the BOA’s groundwater finding on the Gravel Ordinance should supplant our direct 
analysis of the Planning Board’s Site Plan Review Ordinance decision.  As such, we review the 
Planning Board’s decision directly, and observe that in order to vacate that decision, MacQuinn has 
the burden to demonstrate that the record compels contrary findings regarding each of the sections 
upon which the Planning Board based its denial, sections J.1, J.10, and J.17.  See Anderson, 
2009 ME 134, ¶ 3, 985 A.2d 501. 
 
 
16 
MacQuinn’s contention that the Planning Board should have waived criteria in 
section J.1 of the Site Plan Review Ordinance does not require discussion. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  Remanded to the Business 
and Consumer Docket with instructions to 
remand the matter to the Board of Appeals to 
reinstate the Planning Board’s denial of the 
permit application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edmond J. Bearor, Esq.(orally), Jonathan P. Hunter, Esq., and Katie R. Foster, Esq., 
Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellant Harold MacQuinn, Inc. 
 
Maxwell G. Coolidge, Esq. (orally), Ellsworth, for appellees Friends of Lamoine 
and The Tweedy Trust 
 
The Town of Lamoine did not file a brief 
 
 
Business and Consumer Court Docket docket number CV-2018-05 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY