Case Title: Unser v. Unser

Citation: 526 P.2d 790, 86 N.M. 648

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1974-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
526 P.2d 790 (1974) 86 N.M. 648 Norma A. UNSER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert W. UNSER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 9762. Supreme Court of New Mexico. August 2, 1974. Rehearing Denied September 18, 1974. *791 Farlow & Lill, LeRoi Farlow, Albuquerque, for appellant. Marchiondo & Berry, Mary C. Walters, Albuquerque, for appellee. ZINN, District Judge. Appellant was the defendant in a divorce action brought by appellee as plaintiff. Six months after the decree was obtained, appellee applied for a modification of the terms of the decree as to child support and division of the community property and sought alimony. Relief was granted appellee under the theory of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of appellant, and a judgment was entered increasing child support from $200.00 to $400.00 a month, awarding her a money judgment in the sum of $60,628.00 in addition to the property and money originally awarded her, decreeing that appellant pay her alimony of $350.00 per month and awarding her $2,500.00 for attorneys' fees. Appellant seeks a reversal of this judgment and restoration of the original decree. The appellant as defendant did not contest the original divorce action. Appellee selected her attorney without objection by appellant. He did not have counsel. The details of the property settlement and the amount of child support were mutually discussed by the parties before and after the complaint was filed. Both parties gave details *792 of the proposed settlement to appellee's attorney. While no written stipulation or agreement was executed, they agreed to the terms of the proposed decree. Appellee's counsel informed her that the division of community property proposed would give her considerably less than an equal share. He advised her not to agree to the settlement. She acknowledged that she was aware of this inequality. Because of her attorney's apprehensions about this disparity, he prepared a written statement which she signed expressly acknowledging his advice and that the terms of the decree were as she wanted them. Her statement ended: Within a week after filing the complaint and two days following their agreeing upon the terms of the decree, the appellee with her counsel appeared in court and presented the cause as a settled matter and obtained the decree. Appellant did not appear in court. The theory of the grant of relief to appellee from the first judgment appears to have rested upon Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure [§ 21-1-1(60)(b), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 4 1970)], giving a trial court jurisdiction to relieve a party from a final judgment upon timely application for certain grounds or reasons. The grounds include those of "fraud * * * misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Setting aside husband and wife property settlements for fraud has been the subject of cases here and in other jurisdictions. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780 (1919); Trujillo v. Padilla, 79 N.M. 245, 442 P.2d 203 (1968). In Beals v. Ares, a husband, in contemplation of divorce made a property settlement with the wife through his attorney, in which she accepted $4,000.00 in settlement of her share of community assets worth over $100,000.00. The wife did not have independent legal advice, she was not told the extent or the value of the community property, nor was she told of her entitlement to a half interest in the community property. In Trujillo v. Padilla, the wife, who could not read English, executed documents in that language, a deed of the community property and an answer and waiver to a divorce proceeding, in the office of her husband's lawyer. She received nothing for her interest in the property. She was informed that the property was the separate property of the husband which was untrue. She had no independent counsel. The court in each case evaluated the relationship and found the dominance of the husband and the confidence of the wife to exist. Neither Beals v. Ares, nor Trujillo v. Padilla, held that the mere fact of marriage created a fiduciary relationship in which the husband presumptively occupies the role of dominance and the wife confidence. In each case the facts supported the existence of the dominion of the one and the confidence of the other. The elements necessary to establish a fraud wrought by one of the persons who occupies a fiduciary relationship is not quite the same as in other circumstances. If from the facts it appears that the parties have such a relationship to each other, and then as a result of confidence reposed by the one, dominion and influence resulting from such confidence can be exercised by the other, fraud and undue influence may be presumed to exist when an advantage is gained by the dominant party at the expense of the confiding party. Harrison v. Harrison, 21 N.M. 372, 155 P. 356 (1916). Cases from other jurisdictions give some perspective on the issues of fiduciary relationships arising in the marriage and how to view the parties' relative positions as to dominance or confidence. *793 In Collins v. Collins, 48 Cal. 2d 325, 309 P.2d 420 (1957), the parties agreed on the terms of a property settlement and divorce. The wife went to Nevada and obtained the divorce incorporating the settlement. Later she asked the California court to set aside the settlement on the ground of failure to disclose assets by the husband as a fiduciary. In answering the wife's contentions the court from that opinion said: Blair v. Blair, 140 Mont. 278, 370 P.2d 873 (1962) was an action brought by a divorced wife seeking to set aside a property settlement obtained in an Oregon divorce decree. After holding that the wife's attempt was a forbidden collateral attack on a judgment of a sister state entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Montana, that court said: Le Bert-Francis v. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d 662 (D.C.App. 1963) was another case in which the wife was attempting to get a property settlement set aside. Her main contention was that the burden of proof was on the husband to affirmately show that the separation agreement was made after full disclosure. In each situation, the relationship that exists between the parties when the questioned transaction occurs or is undertaken is critical. The presumption of fraud that may be utilized to aid the party seeking to set aside the transaction is available only to the one proving that they were in the confidential relationship and the other party was in the dominant position. Without the fiduciary relationship existing in fact at the time of the agreement then, to set aside the transaction requires that fraud and misrepresentation be proven by the challenging party in the ordinary sense. *795 It is questionable as to whether the relationship of dominance and confidence existed between the parties to this action when the divorce settlement was made. The appellee was advised by independent legal counsel in the property settlement and divorce. An examination of the findings of the trial court on the dominance of the husband and the confidence of the wife so as to support the conclusion it made of a trustee relationship is necessary to see whether the presumptions of fraud need be considered or whether actual fraud is required to support the action of the court. The facts found by the trial court as to the confidential relationship of the parties were silent except as to the fact that they were married. Conclusions of law bearing on the subject relate: The conclusion as to the trusteeship arising and imposing the fiduciary obligation upon the appellant husband and the statement as to control of plaintiff are not supported in the evidence or in the court's findings of fact. Making a presumption of fraud and the imposition upon the appellant of the burden of disproving fraud under the Beals v. Ares, supra, formula was erroneous. If the action of the trial court is to be supported on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation by the appellant, it must be based upon actual fraud. A look at the record on the issue of actual fraud discloses the following in the decision of the court: The promise to marry mentioned in the finding and the conclusion quoted above need testing against the testimony. Appellee stated on direct examination: The trial court's conclusion of an unequivocal promise of marriage, fraudulently made is not supported in the evidence nor by the court's own finding of fact. Fraud and misrepresentation under Rule 60(b) requires the same elements as fraud in the ordinary sense. An actionable fraud is a misrepresentation of a fact, known to be untrue by the maker, and made with an intent to deceive and to induce the other party to act upon it with the *796 other party relying upon it to his injury or detriment. Sauter v. St. Michael's College, 70 N.M. 380, 374 P.2d 134 (1962). Could the statement relating to remarriage be deemed a statement of fact? Sometimes statements made as to a present intent to act in the future when the stated intent is false and meets the other criteria of expected reliance and actual reliance to damage or injury have been a basis of actionable fraud. Werner v. City of Albuquerque, 55 N.M. 189, 229 P.2d 688 (1951); Pacific Royalty Company v. Williams, 227 F.2d 49 (10th Cir.1955), cert. denied 351 U.S. 951, 76 S. Ct. 847, 100 L. Ed. 1474. The court's finding and the testimony indicates the promise to marry was not a certain statement of present intent as to a future act but evidenced some reservation which was communicated clearly to the other party. That the promising party held a present intent not to perform the promised act when the promise was expressed is a matter for proof by the one complaining of fraud. Werner v. City of Albuquerque, supra. Neither the evidence nor a finding of fact establishes this. In summary, the action of the trial court in setting aside all terms of the original decree except the dissolution of marriage was an improper action under Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, supra. There was no showing of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct on the part of the appellant which supports the action of the trial court in setting aside the essentials of the original divorce decree. It was contended by appellee at trial, although not on appeal, that the court had jurisdiction to act upon the questions of alimony and child support under the terms of the decree first entered which reserved such jurisdiction, or under statutory provisions. The original decree contained a final paragraph reciting: The statute in force when the original decree was entered, § 22-7-6, N.M.S.A. 1953 reads in part: The general reservation of jurisdiction by the court is not effective to grant jurisdiction when it contravenes statutes fixing jurisdictional limits. This jurisdiction is conferred by statute and any reservation in the decree is ineffectual surplusage. See Mindlin v. Mindlin, 41 N.M. 155, 66 P.2d 260 (1937). We hold that a general reservation of jurisdiction is ineffective to uphold an award of alimony allowed after the entry of a final decree of divorce. The general rule is that where a divorce decree is silent on any award of alimony to the wife, that judgment is res judicata on the question of alimony and precludes a later alimony award. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1387. As this court recently held in Gruber v. Gruber (No. 9691 filed June 28, 1974), 86 N.M. 523 P.2d 1353 (1974): Thus, in the present case, absent a showing of relief under Rules 59 or 60, the awarding of alimony to appellee by the trial court, when no alimony was awarded at *797 the time of the divorce, cannot be allowed under § 22-7-6, supra. The increased child support awarded cannot be supported by the evidence or findings and conclusions entered in this case. While it remains within the jurisdiction of the trial court to make such a change in the event of a change of circumstance, such proof was not offered here. The requirement for a change in the amount of child support ordered is well established in New Mexico. § 22-7-6, supra, requires a showing of changed circumstances. As to the degree and kind of change in circumstances required, the change must be substantial, materially affecting the existing welfare of the child. The change in circumstances must have occurred since the prior adjudication where child support was originally awarded. See our review of the New Mexico cases in Allgood v. Orason, 85 N.M. 260, 511 P.2d 746 (1973); Merrill v. Merrill, 82 N.M. 458, 483 P.2d 932 (1971). See also Albright v. Albright, 45 N.M. 302, 115 P.2d 59 (1941). As to the award of attorneys' fees, while the matter is discretionary, this discretion is exercised in the usual case where the party has achieved some success through litigation in asserting a right and imposing liability. The specific authority of the court is contained in § 22-7-6, N.M.S.A. 1953, which has been construed to include attorneys' fees. That statute says: Dunne v. Dunne, 83 N.M. 377, 492 P.2d 994 (1972). An award of attorneys' fees in this case is inappropriate when the matter of attorneys' fees was covered by the original decree, and this effort to set aside that decree on ill-founded grounds has come to naught. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions that the decree of September 18, 1970, be reinstated and the judgment of February 21, 1973, modifying that earlier decree be set aside. It is so ordered. McMANUS, C.J., and MONTOYA, J., concur.