Case Title: SHADID v. HAMMOND

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112327

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHADID v. HAMMOND  SHADID v. HAMMOND 2013 OK 103 Case Number: 112327 Decided: 12/09/2013 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. EDWARD A. SHADID, II, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE LISA HAMMOND, Special Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Respondent, and DINA HAMMAM, Real Party In Interest. ORDER ¶1 Original jurisdiction is assumed. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4. The Oklahoma Publishing Company is directed to file a motion requesting access to the referenced court file pursuant to the Open Records Act, 51 O.S. 2011 § 24 A. 1 et seq. The Honorable Lisa Hammond, or any other assigned judge, is directed to conduct a hearing to determine all pending matters before the court in FD-2004-6310. ¶2 DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THIS 9th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2013. /S/CHIEF JUSTICE REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, TAYLOR (by separate writing), COMBS, GURICH, JJ., CONCUR; COLBERT, C.J., and EDMONDSON (by separate writing), J., CONCUR IN PART and DISSENT IN PART. TAYLOR, J., with whom KAUGER, J., joins, concurring: ¶1 I fully concur with the Order of this Court. It provides for a timely hearing with notice to all parties on an important public issue. In the spirit of giving guidance to the District Courts, I write separately to emphasize the clear intent of the Oklahoma Open Records Act. Court records are public records. There are specific statutory exceptions to this general rule (juvenile, adoption, mental health, etc.). Otherwise, documents filed with the Court Clerk's office are public records and available for public access. ¶2 There are no provisions in the Oklahoma Open Records Act that allow parties to simply agree to seal a public record and submit a summary agreed order to the court. Sealing a public record should be a very rare event that occurs in only the most compelling of circumstances. ¶3 If after very careful and independent consideration a District Court decides to seal a public record, it "shall" make a specific finding that sealing the public record is "necessary in the interests of justice to remove the material from the public record". 51 O.S. 24 A. 29. That is a very high standard for good reason and is required in every case. ¶4 All of this current litigation and expense demonstrates the very reason why courts should rarely take the drastic measure of sealing public records. After the records are sealed, those seeking to protect the public interest are required to go to great time and expense to view what were once public records. This issue should be resolved by a hearing forthwith. That was this trial judge's original plan. Local Rule 10.1 C. ¶5 My future guidance to the District Courts is to not block public access to court records unless it is absolutely "necessary in the interests of justice". Public records should remain public except in the most compelling of circumstances. EDMONDSON, J., Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part, joined by COLBERT, C.J. ¶1 This controversy is about the proper procedure to be used when a news organization invokes the Oklahoma Open Records Act, 51 O.S.2011 §§ 24A.1-24 A. 29, to gain access to a record that has been sealed and made confidential in a court proceeding where the news organization was not a party. ¶2 The petitioner, Edward A. Shadid, II, was a party to a divorce proceeding in the District Court for Oklahoma Court. On June 11, 2007, the assigned judge in the divorce proceeding granted a joint application to seal documents in the court clerk's file and the documents were removed from public access. In September 2013, a staff writer for the Oklahoma Publishing Company (OPUBCO) attempted to obtain the documents from the Court Clerk, and upon being informed that they were sealed the staff writer mailed a letter to the assigned judge in the divorce proceeding and requested that the documents be unsealed and thus available for public inspection. ¶3 The assigned judge issued an order stating that pursuant to the request in the letter the matter was set for a hearing. Petitioner objected to a hearing on the letter's request, filed a motion to strike the hearing, and then sought extraordinary relief in this Court. ¶4 The controversy before the Court presents issues of first impression involving the application of the Oklahoma Open Records Act and a local rule of a District Court, and whether decisions involving opening and sealing court records should be reviewed by an original action as in the present case or by an appeal. The controversy is publici juris, is likely to be repeated, and judicial economy is served by answering the issues now. The Court should thus assume original jurisdiction pursuant to Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 4 and issue an opinion for official publication. ¶5 Petitioner requests a supervisory writ of extraordinary relief. Generally, such writs are not available if a remedy by appeal exists and that remedy is adequate.1 Analyzing this issue requires addressing the nature of a court's order sealing records in a court file in the custody of a District Court Clerk. The order in Petitioner's case that sealed the records was rendered in the context of a statutorily provided procedure for divorce. Although divorce is a statutory proceeding, a District Court is empowered to provide ancillary or provisional remedies for the protection of parties in a matrimonial proceeding.2 ¶6 This Court has discussed provisional and ancillary remedies for the protection of parties' rights, and has indicated that a particular provisional remedy may be sought in a manner that is ancillary or auxiliary to the proceeding on the merits.3 The nomenclature of provisional and ancillary comes from the former practice of a remedy granted in an ancillary suit in equity, such as bills for discovery or to perpetuate testimony.4 Later a party was not required to seek a remedy from a chancery court, and the ancillary remedies in equity were available in the principal case as provisional and temporary remedies because the court was simultaneously exercising jurisdiction in equity and law.5 Records of a court are in that court's custody and control,6 and a court pursuant to its general equity powers may issue an order which impounds and seals papers or records.7 Some jurisdictions have stated that in a general sense the formal equitable remedies have been superseded by either rules or statutes.8 ¶7 In Oklahoma, a District Court's equity jurisdiction to seal a record has not been supplanted by statute. Rather, the exercise of that equity jurisdiction is governed or controlled by applicable statutes, 51 O.S.2011 § 24 A. 25 and 51 O.S. § 24 A. 29, as amended by Laws 2012, c. 278.9 On June 11, 2007, the version of §24 A. 29 then in effect had been in force for less than two years and stated in part that: A. Unless confidentiality is specifically required by law, any order directing the withholding or removal of pleadings or other material from a public record shall contain: 1. A statement that the court has determined it is necessary in the interests of justice to remove the material from the public record and in those instances where such withholding is required by law, the order shall so indicate; 51 O.S.Supp.2005 § 24 A. 29, (A) (1) eff. November 1, 2005. The plain language of the statute recognizes that confidentiality may occur "in those instances" which are "required by law" or in those instances when "it is necessary in the interests of justice." The latter circumstance is an obvious reference to the court's application of equity principles.10 Section 24 A. 25 of the Open Records Act states that: Any order of the court for removal of materials from the public record shall require compliance with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 7 of subsection C of Section 3226 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes. 51 O.S.2011 § 24 A. 25. Section 3226 is part of the Oklahoma Discovery Code, 12 O.S.2001 § 3224-3237,11 in effect on June 11, 2007, and paragraphs 2 through 7 of "subsection C" of § 3226 provide a procedure for obtaining a protective order and for keeping material confidential.12 A reference in § 3226 (C)(2)(a) to the circumstances to remove material from the public record "in the interests of justice" corresponds to the language of 51 O.S.Supp.2005 § 24 A. 29, (A) (1) and is a reference to a District Court's equity jurisdiction. ¶8 In the 2009 case of Collier v. Reese this Court correctly held that an order was the functional equivalent of an injunction when it sealed records, prohibited dissemination of information, and enjoined filings.13 In Collier we also correctly held that the functional equivalent of an injunction in that case should be treated as an injunction for the purpose of its classification as an appealable interlocutory order. It was not the mere coercive nature of the order or its historical pedigree in equity that made the order the functional equivalent of an injunction to be treated as an interlocutory appealable order. ¶9 Our judicial procedure includes coercive interlocutory discovery orders which have an historical pedigree of ancillary and provisional orders, but they are nevertheless construed as interlocutory orders that are not appealable separate from an appeal from the judgment or final order.14 Although there are various types of injunctions and they may issue for either temporary of permanent relief, they are ultimately based upon an adjudication of a legally cognizable right that would support a cause of action for equitable relief.15 The Open Records Act does not create privacy rights; but its exceptions to disclosure indicate that under some circumstances privacy rights of individuals should be protected,16 and the Act provides such protection for a privacy right in the context of a divorce proceeding when the personal privacy right supersedes the public's right to acquire the information because "the interests of justice" in the particular circumstance presented gives precedence to the individual's right. 51 O.S.2011 § 24 A. 29 (A) (1). It is this judicial adjudication of the personal privacy right and the public's right to the information in the context of the coercive order which makes the order sealing a record the functional equivalent to an injunction and an appealable interlocutory order. ¶10 The remedy of an appeal from an order sealing or unsealing a record may be an adequate remedy17 as when a court either grants or refuses to grant an injunction.18 However, the fact that the order should be treated as an appealable interlocutory order does not necessarily mean that the remedy by an appeal will be adequate in every circumstance, such as when the time usually necessary for an appeal would result in mooting the public's claim of its right to access a judicial record.19 Because we have not previously explained this procedure I would not make the availability of the appellate remedy a bar to this proceeding. ¶11 In addition to the adequacy of an appellate relief, this Court does not usually grant prohibition in advance of the trial court's adjudication of a petitioner's challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction. However, we have stated that a party need not be compelled to use the remedy of an appeal when a proper showing has been made that a court is proceeding without jurisdiction,20 or when a showing has been made that presenting the claim in the trial court would be futile, or that the question relates to a public interest where the remedy by appeal is inadequate.21 ¶12 The letter sent to the judge stated that it was or had been the practice of a District Judge for Oklahoma County, to open a sealed record upon a letter-request from OPUBCO. The District Court hearing in this matter was not scheduled by OPUBCO as the party moving for judicial relief in a filed case, but by the judge on the letter itself which did not request a hearing. Petitioner showed a possibility of futility in pressing his claim before the District Court due to the assertions of OPUBCO that the Special Judge should follow the previous practice of a District Court Judge. Prohibition may issue prior to the Special Judge hearing Petitioner's motion to strike. ¶13 The Open Records Act provides a remedy when a record is not provided. B. Any person denied access to records of a public body or public official: 1. May bring a civil suit for declarative or injunctive relief, or both, but such civil suit shall be limited to records requested and denied prior to filing of the civil suit; and 2. If successful, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees 51 O.S.2011 § 24A.17(B). OPUBCO asserts that the record is a record subject to the Open Records Act, but did not use the remedy provided by that Act. The Legislature did not state that this section is an exclusive remedy. The right of the People for access to public documents exists independent of the Open Records Act, and since the Open Records Act did not create a right, the remedy provided by § 24 A. 17 should not be deemed the exclusive remedy for OPUBCO.22 However, the remedy for challenging a judicial order that affects the rights of parties appearing in a judicial proceeding is not an informal off-the-record plea to the judge by a non-party individual who is not licensed to practice law but purporting to represent another, but by a pleading filed by the party or entity seeking to intervene in that judicial proceeding. OPUBCO is seeking to alter the rights of parties in a legal proceeding, and its claim, as any judicial claim, must be made by a pleading filed in the action giving notice of its claim for relief.23 The Due Process Clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions require this procedure.24 ¶14 Because an order sealing a record is the functional equivalent of an injunction adjudicating rights of the parties to the principal proceeding as well as the public's right to the information in a public record, limited intervention should be allowed in the principal case by one seeking to intervene to unseal a record. While it is theoretically possible for one to obtain equitable relief from a final judgment by an independent suit in the same District Court,25 the order sealing the record is continuing in its effect and the principal case has not been closed. Generally, intervention is allowed in a proceeding where an injunction is sought.26 I thus agree that an intervention is a possible proper method for OPUBCO to seek judicial relief. ¶15 Here, OPUBCO is claiming aggrieved status by the continuing nature of an injunction. If OPUBCO declines to select the remedy provided by Open Records Act, then it should file a petition (a pleading) alleging and giving notice of its claim or cause of action to modify or vacate the injunction and that it is seeking to intervene in the divorce proceeding for the limited purpose of adjudicating the public's right of access to a public record. OPUBCO must give proper notice to the parties in the proceeding as required by the Oklahoma Pleading Code. The Court's requirement for filing a "motion" is incorrect. OPUBCO, seeking the party status by intervention must file a pleading setting forth its cause of action. Claims (or to use the older designation, causes of action) are not judicially presented by motion, but by pleadings. ¶ 16 I agree that prohibition should issue, and that OPUBCO should be directed to give proper notice of its claim if it desires judicial relief in unsealing a judicial record. I agree with the Court that the underlying issue whether the record should be unsealed is an adjudication which should be made first by the trial court. However, I would make the Court's disposition here by a published opinion to give guidance to the District Courts on how to handle requests for unsealing court records. FOOT