Case Title: Ortiz v. Examworks, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11584

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11584 
 
FLOR ORTIZ1  vs.  EXAMWORKS, INC.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2014. - March 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Insurance, Motor vehicle personal injury protection benefits. 
Motor Vehicle, Insurance. Doctor, License to practice 
medicine. Statute, Construction. Privacy. Consumer 
Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act. Practice, Civil, 
Complaint, Motion to dismiss. Words, "Physician." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 7, 2012. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas P. Billings, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Matthew T. LaMothe (Robert E. Mazow with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Mark J. Ventola for the defendant. 
 
Matthew Iverson & Justin A. Brown, for Premier Insurance 
Company of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
 
1 On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 
 
2 Doing business as Boston Medical Evaluation/Examination, 
Inc. 
2 
 
 
David O. Brink, Douglas R. Tillberg, & Melissa C. Buynell, 
for Government Employees Insurance Company, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The third paragraph of G. L. c. 90, § 34M 
(§ 34M), the "personal injury protection" (PIP) statute, 
provides in part that an injured person claiming PIP benefits 
"shall submit to physical examinations by physicians selected by 
the insurer as often as may be reasonably required" in order "to 
assist in determining the amounts due" (emphasis added).  The 
threshold question in this case is the meaning of the word 
"physicians" in this provision.  More particularly, the question 
is whether the word "physicians" refers solely to medical 
doctors licensed under G. L. c. 112, § 2, or whether the term 
also includes additional types of licensed health care 
practitioners.  We interpret the statute to intend the broader 
definition of the word because it is the one most consonant with 
the statutory purpose.  Adopting this interpretation, we affirm 
the order of a Superior Court judge dismissing the plaintiff's 
complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974), but for somewhat different reasons from those that the 
judge provided. 
3 
 
 
Facts.3  In June of 2011, the plaintiff, Flor Ortiz, was 
injured in an automobile accident in Massachusetts while riding 
in a car that Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive) 
insured.  Following the accident, Ortiz notified Progressive 
that he sought PIP benefits available under the insurance policy 
to pay for medical expenses that resulted from the accident.4  
Progressive then engaged the defendant, Examworks, Inc. 
(Examworks), to arrange an independent medical examination (IME) 
of Ortiz.  To this end, Examworks separately notified Ortiz and 
his lawyer in writing that Ortiz was scheduled to undergo a 
"Physical Therapy Medical Evaluation" on August 25, 2011, to be 
conducted by "Eugene R. Boeglin, Jr., DPT, OCS," whom the 
notification characterized as the "Examining Physician."5  Ortiz 
                     
 
3 The facts are drawn from the allegations of the complaint 
and exhibits attached to the complaint, which we accept as true.  
See Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 241 (2013), and cases 
cited. 
 
 
4 Although the complaint does not specify the type of 
medical expenses incurred, Examworks's response to Ortiz's G. L. 
c. 93A demand letter, attached to the complaint, indicates that 
Ortiz suffered injuries to his neck and back and underwent 
physical therapy as a result. 
 
5 In relevant part, the notice sent by Examworks, Inc. 
(Examworks), stated: 
 
"Examining Physician: 
Eugene R. Boeglin, Jr., DPT, 
OCS 
Exam Type: 
Physical Therapy Medical 
Evaluation" 
 
The notice did not define the initials following Boeglin's 
name, but there is no disagreement by the parties that the 
4 
 
did not attend the August 25 appointment; Examworks then sent 
Ortiz and his lawyer a second notice regarding the medical 
examination, which was rescheduled for September 13, 2011.  Like 
the first notice letter, the second notice letter indicated that 
the scheduled examination was a "Physical Therapy Medical 
Evaluation," to be conducted by "Examining Physician" Eugene R. 
Boeglin, Jr., DPT, OCS. 
 
Boeglin was a licensed physical therapist, but not a 
licensed medical doctor under the Commonwealth's physician 
licensing statute, G. L. c. 112, § 2.  Ortiz attended the 
September 13 examination conducted by Boeglin, who thereafter 
prepared a report of the IME that indicated that he took Ortiz's 
history, physically examined Ortiz, and reviewed Ortiz's medical 
records.  Boeglin's report included his opinion of the extent of 
Ortiz's injuries.6 
 
Procedural background.  On June 13, 2012, Ortiz sent a 
demand letter to Examworks alleging multiple violations of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 2.7  Examworks timely responded in a letter dated 
                                                                  
initials "DPT" signify "doctor of physical therapy," and the 
initials "OCS" signify "orthopedic clinical specialist." 
 
6 Boeglin's report is not in the record before us, and no 
information has been provided concerning the substance of 
Boeglin's opinion about the nature or extent of Ortiz's 
injuries. 
 
 
7 The demand letter asserted that Examworks's first notice 
of examination violated G. L. c. 93A, § 2, in that it deceived 
Ortiz by indicating that Boeglin was a "physician."  The letter 
further claimed that this "deception," coupled with the medical 
5 
 
July 10, 2012.  Soon thereafter, Ortiz filed this action in the 
Superior Court on behalf of himself and similarly situated 
persons.  The putative class consists of those injured in an 
automobile accident who sought PIP benefits, received a notice 
from Examworks of a scheduled IME to be conducted by a 
"physician" who was not actually a licensed medical doctor, and 
then attended an IME conducted by that person.  The complaint 
alleges violations of G. L. c. 112, § 8A, G. L. c. 93A; §§ 2 and 
9; and G. L. c. 214, § 1B.  It seeks declaratory relief, 
equitable relief, and damages. 
 
Examworks moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), for failure to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted.  After a hearing, a judge in the 
Superior Court allowed Examworks's motion.  The judge agreed 
with Ortiz that the term "physicians," as used in the third 
sentence of § 34M, third par., is limited to licensed medical 
doctors.  The judge allowed the motion to dismiss, however, on 
the ground that Ortiz did not sufficiently allege a claim of 
invasion of privacy, and also failed to allege an injury 
resulting from Examworks's alleged unfair or deceptive practice 
as needed to sustain his claim under G. L. c. 93A.  We 
transferred Ortiz's appeal to this court on our own motion. 
                                                                  
examination of Ortiz, interfered with Ortiz's privacy in 
violation of G. L. c. 214, § 1B, and also constituted a 
violation of c. 93A, § 2. 
6 
 
 
Statutory framework.  Section 34M is a "critical part" of 
the Commonwealth's no-fault automobile insurance law, enacted to 
"reduce the amount of motor vehicle tort litigation, control the 
costs of automobile insurance, and ensure prompt payment of 
claimants' medical and out-of-pocket expenses."  Fascione v. CNA 
Ins. Cos., 435 Mass. 88, 94 (2001).  See Flanagan v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 195, 198 (1981).  Section 34M, first 
par., requires that all motor vehicle liability policies in 
Massachusetts provide PIP benefits.  The term "personal injury 
protection" is defined as "provisions of a motor vehicle 
liability policy . . . which provide for payment to the named 
insured," or to any passenger of the insured's car, "of all 
reasonable expenses incurred within two years from the date of 
accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, and dental 
services . . . as a result of bodily injury" caused by the 
accident, limited to $8,000 "on account of injury to . . . any 
one person."  G. L. c. 90, § 34A.8 
 
When an injured person files a claim for PIP benefits, 
§ 34M, third par., directs that the person "submit to physical 
examinations by physicians selected by the insurer as often as 
may be reasonably required and shall do all things necessary to 
enable the insurer to obtain medical reports and other needed 
                     
 
8 PIP benefits are to be paid "regardless of fault in the 
causation of the accident."  Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 6 
(1971).  See G. L. c. 90, § 34A. 
7 
 
information to assist in determining the amounts due" (emphasis 
added).  The physical examinations referred to are IMEs.  See 
Boone v. Commerce Ins. Co., 451 Mass. 192, 195 n.3 (2008).  PIP 
benefits are due "upon receipt of reasonable proof of the fact 
and amount of expenses and loss incurred."  § 34M, fourth par.  
If benefits are due and payable and not paid within thirty days, 
any "unpaid party" is entitled to bring an action for payment in 
the District Court, the action is to be heard on an expedited 
basis, and if the unpaid party prevails, the party is entitled 
to recover costs and attorney's fees.  Id. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Meaning of "physicians."  The judge, as 
indicated, ruled that the term "physicians" in § 34M, third 
par., refers only to medical doctors licensed under G. L. 
c. 112, § 2,9 an interpretation that Ortiz also advances.  We 
consider this question of statutory interpretation de novo.  
Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 
(2006). 
 
The term "physicians" is not defined in § 34M.  
Accordingly, we give the term its "usual and accepted" meaning, 
so long as it is "consistent with the statutory purpose."  
Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477-478 (2008).  We determine 
a word's "usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably 
known to the statute's enactors," such as dictionary 
                     
 
9 Physical therapists are licensed under G. L. c. 112, 
§ 23B. 
8 
 
definitions.  Id. at 478, quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, 
Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  The term "physicians" appeared 
in § 34M as originally enacted in 1970.  See St. 1970, c. 670, 
§ 4.  The term "physician" was defined at that time as a "person 
licensed to practice medicine; medical doctor", and as "[a]ny 
person who heals or exerts a healing influence."  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 989 (1969).  This 
meaning has remained largely the same in the years since the 
enactment of § 34M.10  The term, therefore, includes medical 
doctors and, more generally, those who engage in the healing 
arts.  We consider which of these common meanings of the term 
"physician" most appropriately suits the intent and purpose of 
§ 34M.  See Dominguez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 112, 
115 (1999), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 
Mass. 511, 513 (1975). 
 
A primary objective of the no-fault automobile insurance 
statutory scheme was, and is, to "provide an inexpensive and 
uncomplicated procedure for obtaining compensation for injuries 
                     
 
10 See The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII 807 (1978) 
(defining "physician" as "[o]ne who practises the healing art, 
including medicine and surgery"); Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1707 (1993) ("physician" is "a person 
skilled in the art of healing"; "one duly authorized to treat 
disease"; "a doctor of medicine"); The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1325 (4th ed. 2006) (defining 
"physician" as "person licensed to practice medicine; a medical 
doctor," as one "who practices general medicine as distinct from 
surgery," and as "person who heals or exerts a healing 
influence"). 
9 
 
sustained in automobile accidents."  Dominguez, 429 Mass. at 
115.  In addition, as the provisions of § 34M, fourth par., make 
obvious, speed in securing the payment of PIP benefits 
associated with treating such injuries is of great importance:  
the benefits are due as expenses are incurred, and if not paid 
within thirty days after they become due and payable, the 
claimant who remains unpaid is entitled to bring suit to recover 
them; the litigation is to be put on a fast track.  At the same 
time, PIP benefits are payable for necessary medical and dental 
services related to a motor vehicle accident generally -- the 
statute does not limit the benefits to certain types of medical 
assistance, services, or procedures11 -- and in this regard, an 
insurer is specifically entitled under § 34M, third par., to 
require that a claimant undergo IMEs in order for the insurer to 
determine what benefits are properly due.  See Boone, 451 Mass. 
at 195 (IMEs "assist insurers in determining the amounts due"); 
Brito v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 37 (1997) 
(insurer that "has reason to doubt its liability" may require 
injured claimant to undergo IME).  If every IME were required to 
be performed by a licensed medical doctor, it is obvious that 
achievement of the no-fault statutory goals of inexpensive, 
uncomplicated, as well as timely payment of benefits to cover 
medical expenses would suffer. 
                     
 
11 See G. L. c. 90, § 34A (defining "Personal injury 
protection"). 
10 
 
 
Moreover, in at least one respect -- where PIP benefits to 
pay for necessary dental services are involved -- requiring IMEs 
to be performed solely by licensed medical doctors would render 
the statute unworkable.  Licensed medical doctors do not have 
the professional authority or competence to evaluate dental 
services, and would not be able to do so.  See Boone, 451 Mass. 
at 198.  See also Hartunian v. Pilgrim Ins. Co., 86 Mass. App. 
Ct. 670, 672 & n.3 (2014).  In our view, an interpretation of 
"physicians" in § 34M, third par., to mean solely licensed 
medical doctors would create an unreasonable result that the 
Legislature did not intend.  See Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. 
of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982) ("We assume the Legislature 
intended to act reasonably").12,13 
                     
 
12 Although practice does not dictate the answer to 
questions of statutory interpretation, it appears that insurers 
often if not routinely have required injured claimants to 
undergo an IME with a practitioner who is not a licensed 
physician.  See Barron Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. 
Norfolk & Dedham Group, 469 Mass. 800, 801-802 (2014) (insurer 
required claimant to undergo IME conducted by licensed 
chiropractor); Hartunian v. Pilgrim Ins. Co., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
670, 673 n.5 (2014) (citing with approval IME conducted in 
Barron).  See also Miller v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 1998 Mass. 
App. Div. 245 (1998) (IME conducted by chiropractor); Olympic 
Physical Therapy v. ELCO Admin. Servs., 2010 Mass. App. Div. 171 
(2010) (IME conducted by physical therapist). 
 
 
13 The parties in this case focus on the meaning of 
"physicians" in the third paragraph of G. L. c. 90, § 34M 
(§ 34M), but we note that the word "physician" also is used in 
the statute's fourth paragraph.  The first sentence of § 34M, 
fourth par., provides:  "Personal injury protection benefits 
. . . shall be due and payable as loss accrues, upon receipt of 
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses and loss 
11 
 
 
Ortiz argues that the language of § 34M and this court's 
decision in Boone support his argument.  He points to the fact 
that in § 34M, fourth par., the Legislature provided 
specifically that before an insurer could refuse to pay a bill 
for which PIP benefits were sought based only on a medical 
review of the bill or the medical services "underlying the 
bill," the insurer was obligated to have the record review 
conducted by a licensed practitioner holding the same type of 
professional license as the practitioner whose bill was in 
dispute; this obligation is referred to in Boone as "the same 
profession requirement."14  Boone, 451 Mass. at 195-196 & n.4.  
                                                                  
incurred provided that upon notification of disability from a 
licensed physician, the insurer shall commence medical payments 
within ten days or give written notice of its intent not to make 
such payments . . . ."  We conclude the statutory purpose of 
making available efficient, timely, and relatively inexpensive 
medical, dental, and related services is best served if 
"physician" in the fourth paragraph of § 34M is, like 
"physicians" in the third paragraph, interpreted to include not 
only medical doctors licensed under G. L. c. 112, § 2, but other 
licensed health care practitioners as well, including physical 
therapists.  See Knight v. Trust Ins. Co., 1998 Mass. App. Div. 
184 (1998) (adopting broad definition of "physician" in § 34M, 
fourth par., to include range of licensed health care providers, 
and rejecting insurer's claim that term refers only to medical 
doctors licensed under G. L. c. 112, § 2:  under narrow reading 
of "physician," "a dentist, oral surgeon or other c. 112 
practitioner who provided necessary medical treatment to an 
insured injured in an automobile accident would never be 
entitled to PIP payments unless the practitioner, or the 
insured, took the additional step and incurred the extra expense 
of obtaining and filing a disability certificate from a 
physician licensed under c. 112, § 2[,] prior to submitting any 
PIP bill or claim to the insurer"). 
 
 
14 Section 34M, fourth par., provides in relevant part: 
12 
 
The thrust of Ortiz's argument is that, by embracing the same 
profession requirement in the record review of bills or services 
and rejecting it in the context of IMEs, the Legislature 
intended to restrict those who may conduct IMEs to medical 
doctors, regardless of the specialty of the practitioner 
treating the injured claimant, and that Boone supports this 
reading of the statute. 
 
We disagree with both components of the argument.  We begin 
with Boone.  In that case, a chiropractor treated the plaintiff, 
who had been injured in an automobile accident, for 
approximately nine months, and the chiropractor's bills were 
paid on behalf of the plaintiff by the defendant insurer as PIP 
benefits.  Id. at 193.  Thereafter, at the insurer's behest, an 
orthopedic surgeon performed an IME on the plaintiff and 
determined that the plaintiff did not require continued medical 
treatment.  Id. at 193-194.  The insurer terminated further PIP 
benefits relating to chiropractic services as a result.  Id. at 
194.  The question raised in the case concerned the meaning and 
                                                                  
 
"With respect to [PIP] benefits, . . . no insurer shall 
refuse to pay a bill for medical services submitted by a 
practitioner registered or licensed under [G. L. c. 112], 
if such refusal is based solely on a medical review of the 
bill or of the medical services underlying the bill, which 
review was requested or conducted by the insurer, unless 
the insurer has submitted, for medical review, such bill or 
claim to at least one practitioner registered or licensed 
under the same section of [G. L. c. 112] as the 
practitioner who submitted the bill for medical services." 
13 
 
scope of the same profession requirement in § 34M, fourth par.  
Id. at 193, 195-196.  Based on the language of the statute as 
well as pertinent legislative history, the court concluded that 
the same profession requirement, which the fourth paragraph made 
applicable when an insurer seeks to terminate the payment of PIP 
benefits based "solely" on a medical record review, should not 
be read into the IME provisions of the third paragraph of § 34M.  
See id. at 196-199.15  But in reaching this result, the court's 
focus was not on the fact that the practitioner who performed 
the IME was a medical doctor.  In other words, although it was 
relevant that, as an orthopedic surgeon, the doctor performing 
the IME was presumably qualified to assess the need for 
continued chiropractic treatment, see id. at 198, the doctor's 
status as a person licensed to practice medicine was not the 
issue.  Rather, the only question was whether an insurer 
permissibly could refuse to pay a bill based on an IME performed 
by a health care practitioner who was not licensed in the "same 
profession" as the practitioner whose bill was in dispute.  See 
id. at 193, 196 & n.4.  No question about the meaning of 
                     
 
15 Accordingly, the defendant insurer was entitled to refuse 
to pay PIP benefits based on an IME conducted by a practitioner 
licensed in a different specialty than the treating 
practitioner.  See Boone v. Commerce Ins. Co., 451 Mass. 192, 
193 (2008). 
14 
 
"physicians" appearing in § 34M, third par., was raised, and the 
court did not discuss the word.16 
 
We turn to Ortiz's related point that if the Legislature 
had intended IMEs to be conducted by licensed nonphysicians, it 
could have required injured claimants to submit to IMEs 
conducted by a "licensed" or "registered" "practitioner" in the 
third paragraph of § 34M, just as it used the term 
"practitioner" in delineating the same profession requirement in 
the fourth paragraph of § 34M.  Because such a reading would 
interfere substantially with the purposes of the no-fault 
automobile insurance program and the provision of PIP benefits 
in particular, we decline to interpret those language 
differences as meaning the Legislature intended "physicians" in 
the third paragraph to restrict the performance of all IMEs to 
licensed medical doctors.  "In so large a legislative enterprise 
[as the no-fault automobile insurance scheme], there are likely 
to be casual overstatements and understatements, half-answers, 
and gaps in the statutory provisions," and it is the role of the 
courts to "interweave the statute with decisions answering the 
difficulties and composing, as far as feasible and reasonable, 
                     
 
16 Ortiz suggests there is language in Boone indicating that 
only a medical doctor may conduct an IME.  See Boone, 451 Mass. 
at 196, 197 n.6.  We do not read these references as indicating 
that the court was opining in any way on the question whether 
the term "physicians" in § 34M, third par., refers only to 
licensed medical doctors.  This question simply was not raised 
by the case. 
15 
 
an harmonious structure faithful to the basic designs and 
purposes of the Legislature."  Mailhot v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
375 Mass. 342, 345 (1978).17 
 
In sum, we conclude that the word "physicians" as it 
appears in § 34M, third par., encompasses not only medical 
doctors licensed under G. L. c. 112, § 2, but also other 
appropriate licensed or registered health care practitioners, 
including physical therapists licensed under G. L. c. 112, 
§ 23B. 
 
2.  Disposition of motion to dismiss.  We review de novo 
the judge's dismissal of Ortiz's complaint under Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (b) (6).  Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 
674, 676 (2011).  The question is whether the complaint's 
factual allegations are "'enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level' . . . .  What is required at the 
                     
 
17 Ortiz also contends, in accordance with the judge's 
reasoning, that as other statutes demonstrate, if the 
Legislature had intended the term "physicians" to include 
certain nonphysician practitioners, it would have said so 
explicitly.  He points to a statute in which the Legislature 
specifically has indicated that the term "physician" includes 
other practitioners.  See G. L. c. 233, § 79G (defining 
"physician" to include "chiropodists, chiropractors, 
optometrists, osteopaths, physical therapists, podiatrists, 
[and] psychologists").  Certainly, we "may turn to similar 
statutes to construe the meaning of words" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jean-Pierre, 65 Mass. App. 
Ct. 162, 164 (2005).  Regardless of the manner in which the word 
"physicians" is defined elsewhere in the General Laws, however, 
the task at hand is to construe the word in light of the intent 
and purpose of the Legislature in enacting § 34M, see Baccanti 
v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 794 (2001); the definition or scope of 
the term in other statutes is not dispositive. 
16 
 
pleading stage are factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting 
(not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief."  
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), 
quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 
(2007). 
 
a.  Claim under G. L. c. 214, § 1B.  The complaint alleges 
that Examworks's IME notice letters, and the subsequent 
examination of Ortiz, interfered with Ortiz's privacy interests 
in violation of G. L. c. 214, § 1B.  With regard to injury, the 
complaint alleges that Ortiz was obliged to sacrifice his 
personal time to attend the IME, that Boeglin touched Ortiz 
during the IME without legal authorization to do so, and that 
Ortiz divulged information to Boeglin regarding his car 
accident, his injuries and his personal health information 
during the IME. 
 
"To sustain a claim for invasion of privacy [under G. L. 
c. 214, § 1B], the invasion must be both unreasonable and 
substantial or serious."  Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 
Mass. 525, 536 (2006).  See Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514, 517-518 (1991).  
The complaint fails to allege an actionable interference with 
Ortiz's privacy because § 34M, as we have interpreted it, 
authorized Examworks, on behalf of Progressive, to require Ortiz 
to undergo an IME conducted by a physical therapist to "assist 
17 
 
in determining the amounts due."  § 34M, third par.  See 
Schlesinger, supra at 519, 521 (action not "serious" or 
"substantial" interference with privacy if, among other things, 
it "had a legitimate business purpose"); Bratt v. International 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 520 (1984) ("legitimate 
countervailing business interests . . . may render the 
disclosure of personal information reasonable and not actionable 
under" § 1B).  Because the examination was authorized under 
§ 34M, the invasions of privacy associated with its taking place 
were "justified."  See Schlesinger, supra at 518. 
 
b.  Claim under G. L. c. 93A.  The complaint alleges that 
the IME notice letters that Examworks sent to Ortiz representing 
that Boeglin was an "[e]xamining [p]hysician" violated G. L. 
c. 93A, §§ 2 and 9, because they "intentionally deceived" Ortiz 
and led him to attend an IME conducted by Boeglin who was not, 
in fact, a licensed medical doctor, even though § 34M required 
that he be such a person to conduct an IME.  It further alleges 
that Examworks violated G. L. c. 112, § 8A, resulting in an 
additional violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2.18  The complaint 
incorporates into the c. 93A claim the injuries alleged in the 
                     
 
18 General Laws c. 112, § 8A, prohibits a person "who is not 
registered by the board of registration in medicine as a 
physician under" G. L. c. 112, § 2, from using "the title 
'physician' . . . in any . . . communication with the public 
. . . to indicate or imply in any way that such person offers to 
engage or engages in the practice of medicine or in the 
provision of health care services to patients within the 
[C]ommonwealth." 
18 
 
interference with privacy claim -- that Ortiz took personal time 
to submit to the IME, divulged personal information during the 
examination, and was touched by Boeglin, who did not have the 
statutory authority to do so. 
 
Assuming for argument that a claim based on an alleged 
violation of § 34M properly may be raised against a company, 
like Examworks, that is not itself an insurance company, we 
agree with the judge that the complaint does not sufficiently 
allege actionable unfair or deceptive conduct on the part of 
Examworks.  Examworks's IME notice letters on which this claim 
depends state that Ortiz had been scheduled to undergo a 
"[p]hysical [t]herapy [m]edical [e]valuation," and that the 
"[e]xamining [p]hysician" was "Eugene R. Boeglin, Jr., DPT, OCS" 
(emphasis added).  Ortiz does not claim that Boeglin was not a 
licensed doctor of physical therapy or that he was not an 
orthopedic clinical specialist.  See note 5, supra.  The notice 
letters, therefore, accurately described Boeglin's 
qualifications.19  Cf. Gossels v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 453 Mass. 
366, 373 (2009) (bank did not violate c. 93A by accurately 
telling presenter of check that presenter was not required to 
indorse check).  That he was described as the "[e]xamining 
[p]hysician" does not render the notice letters unfair or 
                     
 
19 The letters were sent to both Ortiz and his counsel.  
Even if Ortiz did not know what "DPT, OCS" stood for, presumably 
his counsel either knew or was in a position to determine. 
19 
 
deceptive, as opposed to somewhat confusing.  In any event, if, 
as appears to be the case, Ortiz's claim is that the notice 
letter was actionably deceptive because it led him to believe 
that Boeglin was a licensed medical doctor as (he claims) § 34M 
required, the claim must fail because § 34M does not require the 
IME to be performed by a medical doctor licensed under G. L. 
c. 112, § 2. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Examworks's motion to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim was properly allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.