Case Title: Quadros & Associates v. City of Hampton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 032213

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
QUADROS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
 
v.  Record No. 032213   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          June 10, 2004 
CITY OF HAMPTON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Louis R. Lerner, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal involving a contract dispute, we consider 
whether the circuit court erred in granting the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
Because this case was decided by summary judgment, we will 
state the facts, and the inferences fairly drawn from those 
facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
Quadros & Associates, P.C. (Quadros).  However, we are not 
permitted to draw inferences that are forced, strained, or 
contrary to reason.  Hansen v. Stanley Martin Cos., 266 Va. 345, 
351, 585 S.E.2d 567, 571 (2003); Thurmond v. Prince William 
Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 265 Va. 59, 61, 574 S.E.2d 246, 248 
(2003); Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 261 Va. 133, 136, 540 
S.E.2d 129, 130-31 (2001). 
 
In August 1997, Quadros, a law firm formerly known as 
Quadros & Swanson, P.C., entered into a three-year contract with 
the City of Hampton (the City) to collect delinquent taxes, 
fees, and other obligations owed to the City.  The contract 
required the City to pay Quadros a percentage of the amounts 
 
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Quadros recovered, and to reimburse Quadros "for all third party 
out-of-pocket expenses." 
 
Quadros’ duties were specified in "Section Three" of the 
contract, entitled "Duties of Attorney," which provided in 
relevant part: 
The Attorney shall: 
 
(1)  Send one “Demand Letter” to the delinquent debtor 
after the Treasurer has provided the Attorney with the 
name and address of delinquent taxpayers, the amount 
of delinquent taxes, fees and other obligations owed, 
the period for which taxes are owe[d] and a brief 
description of the reason for which taxes, fees and 
other obligations are owed. 
 
(2)  The Attorney shall then institute proceedings to 
collect taxes, fees and other obligations . . . 
against the delinquent debtor. 
 
The contract further provided that either party could terminate 
the contract by giving a 30-day notice to the other party. 
 
Prior to March 1999, the Treasurer’s Office for the City 
routinely provided Quadros with a computer disk that contained 
detailed records relating to the delinquent tax accounts, 
including information on abatements and credits.  An abatement 
is an adjustment of tax liability made by the Commissioner of 
the Revenue, which results in a reduction in the total amount 
owed on a particular account.  A credit is a reduction in tax 
liability based on a payment made by a taxpayer.  Such abatement 
and credit information was necessary for Quadros to make an 
 
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accurate determination of the total amount of taxes due on a 
particular account. 
 
In March 1999, after new computer software was installed in 
the City Treasurer’s Office, the City no longer provided Quadros 
with abatement and credit information for the delinquent tax 
accounts.  Quadros informed the City that collection actions on 
the delinquent accounts could not be initiated without the 
necessary data on abatements and credits, and requested the City 
to provide this information. 
The City refused Quadros’ request.  However, the City 
continued to refer new accounts to Quadros for collection 
through the beginning of the year 2000. 
In July 2000, frustrated by its inability to take action on 
the delinquent accounts, Quadros stopped all work on the 
collection of accounts for tax years prior to 1999.  Quadros 
turned over to the City all materials and files in its 
possession relating to those accounts. 
 
Quadros filed a motion for judgment against the City 
alleging that the City breached the parties’ contract by the 
City’s “failure and refusal” to provide Quadros with the 
necessary abatement and credit information for the delinquent 
accounts.  Quadros asserted that the City’s failure to provide 
the required data prevented Quadros from fulfilling its 
obligations under the parties’ contract, resulting in 
 
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“substantial losses of revenues and profits.”  Quadros sought 
damages “in the amount of at least $160,000.00” to recover “net 
profits” that Quadros alleged it would have earned on delinquent 
accounts through the end of August 2000. 
 
In response, the City filed a motion for summary judgment 
based on various grounds, including that the City had no 
obligation under the contract to refer any accounts to Quadros 
for collection.  The City asserted that under the plain and 
unambiguous language of the contract, Quadros was not required 
to begin collection action on an account until after the City 
had provided all the information outlined in “Section Three” of 
the parties’ contract. 
 
At a hearing on the City’s motion, counsel for Quadros 
conceded that the contract did not require the City to refer a 
particular number of delinquent accounts to Quadros for 
collection.  However, he asserted that “[t]here was an 
expectation on the part of Quadros . . . that the City would 
cooperate in the process,” and that the City failed to provide 
such cooperation.  Counsel for Quadros also stated that he did 
not think that the City had failed to pay Quadros for any 
amounts Quadros had already collected. 
 
The circuit court granted the City’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Quadros appeals. 
 
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Quadros argues that the circuit court erred in granting the 
City’s motion for summary judgment because there were material 
facts in dispute concerning whether the City had withheld from 
Quadros abatement and credit information on the delinquent 
accounts.  Quadros contends that the contract obligated the City 
to provide Quadros with this information for tax accounts that 
had been referred for collection because such information was 
necessary to determine the amount of delinquent taxes owed.∗ 
In response, the City argues that the circuit court 
properly granted the motion for summary judgment because there 
were no material facts genuinely in dispute, and the plain 
language of the contract did not require the City to furnish 
Quadros with any particular number of accounts for collection.  
The City further contends that it had no duty under the contract 
to provide Quadros with abatement and credit information, or 
with any other data, pursuant to a fixed time schedule.  
Finally, the City observes that while the contract obligated the 
City to pay Quadros a percentage of the taxes Quadros actually 
collected, Quadros does not contend that the City failed to make 
any such required payments.  We agree with the City’s arguments. 
                     
 
∗ We do not consider Quadros’ additional arguments that the 
City had a duty to perform its contractual obligations in “good 
faith,” and that the City breached the parties’ contract by its 
alleged failure to perform those obligations in “good faith.”  
Those arguments were the subject of separate assignments of 
 
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We construe the parties’ contract under established rules.  
A contract must be construed as written, and courts are not at 
liberty to add terms not included by the parties.  Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Newport News Circuit Court Asbestos Cases 
Plaintiffs, 264 Va. 89, 98, 563 S.E.2d 739, 744 (2002); TM 
Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C., 263 Va. 116, 119, 
557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (2002). 
We consider the contract as a whole and do not place 
emphasis on isolated terms.  American Spirit Ins. Co. v. Owens, 
261 Va. 270, 275, 541 S.E.2d 553, 555 (2001); Lansdowne Dev. Co. 
v. Xerox Realty Corp., 257 Va. 392, 401, 514 S.E.2d 157, 161 
(1999).  When contract terms are clear and unambiguous, a court 
must accord those terms their plain meaning.  Standard Banner 
Coal Corp. v. Rapoca Energy Co., LP, 265 Va. 320, 325, 576 
S.E.2d 435, 437 (2003); Amchem Prods., Inc., 264 Va. at 98, 563 
S.E.2d at 744; Owens, 261 Va. at 275, 541 S.E.2d at 555.  As we 
have stated, " '[t]he guiding light . . . is the intention of 
the parties as expressed by them in the words they have used, 
and courts are bound to say that the parties intended what the 
written instrument plainly declares.' "  Golding v. Floyd, 261 
Va. 190, 192, 539 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001) (quoting W.F. Magann 
                                                                  
error, which we refused at the time we considered Quadros’ 
petition for appeal. 
 
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Corp. v. Virginia-Carolina Elec. Works, Inc., 203 Va. 259, 264, 
123 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1962)). 
We conclude that the terms of the parties’ contract are 
plain and unambiguous.  Under those terms, Quadros was required 
to start collection procedures on accounts referred by the City 
after receiving from the City the information necessary to 
initiate action on those accounts.  Quadros was entitled to 
payment of a percentage of the amounts Quadros actually 
recovered from delinquent taxpayers, plus reimbursement of 
certain expenses. 
Notably, the parties’ contract did not require the City to 
refer to Quadros a fixed number or percentage of the City’s 
delinquent tax accounts for collection, nor did the contract 
require the City to provide data relating to the accounts 
referred according to any particular time schedule.  Therefore, 
under the plain terms of the contract, the City’s provision of 
incomplete information to Quadros for some of the delinquent 
accounts did not constitute a breach of contract. 
In addition, because the contract did not require the City 
to provide the supporting data at any particular time, the 
factual dispute regarding whether the City withheld certain data 
from Quadros for some accounts on which collection proceedings 
had not begun, was not material to a resolution of the City’s 
duties under the contract.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit 
 
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court did not err in deciding this action on the City’s summary 
judgment motion.  See Rule 3:18; Hansen, 266 Va. at 351, 585 
S.E.2d at 571; Thurmond, 265 Va. at 64, 574 S.E.2d at 250. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed.