Case Title: W.E. Bill Sauer's Drilling Co. v. Gendron

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-37

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
W.E. Bill Sauer's Drilling Co. v. Gendron1986 WY 146720 P.2d 909Case Number: 86-37Decided: 07/03/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
W.E. BILL SAUER'S 
DRILLING COMPANY, Appellant (Employer-Respondent),

v.

Patrick GENDRON, Appellee 
(Employee-Claimant).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Lee E. 
Karavitis, Casper, for appellant 
(employer-respondent).

David A. Drell, 
Casper, for appellee 
(employee-claimant).

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Suffering from carpal 
tunnel syndrome (a wrist nerve problem), an employee filed a Worker's 
Compensation claim which was approved by the trial court and is now appealed by 
the employer with a defense of belated employee notification. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     The employee, Patrick 
Gendron, a drilling rig deck hand, concluded his work shift at 8:00 a.m., July 
18, for weekend vacation time. At 4:00 o'clock the following morning, July 19, 
with severe pain and swelling in his right hand, he went to the emergency room 
at the local hospital, where a preliminary diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome 
was made, with a consequent medical reference for him to pursue treatment with 
an orthopedic specialist. It is appellant's contention that the employee did not 
call in about the initial medical examination and diagnosis until 11:00 a.m. on 
July 20, and consequently lost eligibility for Worker's Compensation benefits 
under a statutory 24-hour notice provision.

[¶3.]     Following the weekend 
time off, he worked on the rig for two days, July 22 and 23, and then, on seeing 
the orthopedic physician, discontinued work while medical treatment was 
pursued.

[¶4.]     His claim for 
disability for the period July 24 through August 13, the date of release to 
return to work, in the amount of $1,041.26, and medical expenses of $150.50, was 
resisted by the employer on the basis that the "[e]mployee is not working 
because rig moved to Shoshoni and he did not move with it," and that there was 
lack of proper notice of the injury. "He was on his day off for two days before 
calling our office to say he was hurt." The employee completed and filed the 
normal Worker's Compensation written form on the 24th, and at issue is only the 
question of noncompliance with the statutory 24-hour notice of 
injury.

[¶5.]     The deposition of the 
doctor was taken but not included in the appeal record. The testimony of the 
employee was taken by telephone conference at the hearing; no transcript is 
available since a court reporter was not used.

[¶6.]     The appeal contest 
comes with the employer's defense that the injury notice given by the employee 
to the employer was 31 hours after attendance at the emergency room in the 
hospital, as not then within the 24-hour limit, and that consequently the trial 
court was in error in granting the Worker's Compensation benefits on a 
jurisdictional basis.

[¶7.]     The record does not 
establish whether the defense was considered by the trial court, except that the 
order entered after the hearing stated in relevant part:

"* * * [T]hat said injury 
is compensable under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and that notice of 
said injury was properly given to the Employer-Respondent.

"* * * Employee-Claimant 
was injured in a compensable accident on July 18, 1985, while employed with the 
Employer-Respondent, W.E. Bill Sauer's Drilling Company. The Employee-Claimant, 
properly notified the Employer-Respondent as required by law and as a result, he 
shall be awarded medical benefits for said injury and temporary total disability 
benefits as computed by the Worker's Compensation Division for the period from 
July 24th, 1985 to August 14, 1985."

Status of the Appeal 
Record

[¶8.]     Employee's 20-day claim 
form was filed with the clerk of court on July 24, as was the application form. 
The clerk of court's notice form was mailed to the employer July 26 and received 
July 29, and then answered as a claim disapproval with an employer's filing form 
and a specific disapproval form.

[¶9.]     The record for 
consideration of the appeal consists of these documents and the court order, 
supplemented by a statement of evidence and proceedings, prepared by appellant 
and served but not approved by counsel for the employee and never submitted to 
the trial court for settlement and approval pursuant to Rule 4.03, 
W.R.A.P.

[¶10.]  The only facts here available, other than 
those contained in the original basic documents, are the nonsettled statement 
and factual discussion in the briefs.1 

Statutory 
Construction

[¶11.]  The statute called into question by 
appellant is § 27-12-502, W.S. 1977, which was first enacted by Ch. 128, S.L. of 
Wyoming 1937, Section 3.

"(a) If an employee is 
injured he shall make a report of the occurrence and general nature of the 
injury to the employer within twenty-four (24) hours after the injury became 
apparent, and to the clerk of court within twenty (20) days thereafter, and file 
the report in the office of the clerk of court of the county in which the 
accident occurred. * * * The reports shall contain such information as provided 
by rules and regulations adopted by the director." Section 27-12-502, W.S. 
1977.

[¶12.]  In a period of 49 years, the Worker's 
Compensation Division has apparently never adopted any rules pursuant to the 
statute denominating the substance of the 24-hour report. Furthermore, only two 
cases in this court have discussed the statute, in neither of which was the 
24-hour provision a factor of benefit denial.

[¶13.]  In Big Horn Coal Company v. Wartensleben, Wyo., 502 P.2d 187 (1972), the issue invoked a 
belated recognition of the onset of the injury. That case is not comparable, 
since no question of time after discovery was contended.

"The question of the time 
when the employee first knows that he has suffered an injury which results in, 
or is likely to cause, compensable disability is of course one for the trial 
judge. The evidence * * is such that we cannot and will not disturb the findings 
of the trial court in that regard." 502 P.2d  at 189.

[¶14.]  The other case, Big Horn Coal Company v. 
LaToush, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1250 (1972), involved a hernia, where the court noticed 
the 24-hour defense and then resolved the case on a totally different 
requirement, without substantive comment.

[¶15.]  The recent United States Supreme Court 
case of Brock, Secretary of Labor v. Pierce County, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 1834, 90 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1986), reasonably considers time limitations as 
jurisdictional events. One could appropriately adopt its philosophy although the 
subject is far removed from claim filing under Worker's 
Compensation.

Factual 
Analysis

[¶16.]  Subject to the question of what is 
actually the record, assuming contentions of fact from the brief and accepting 
to some degree the nonapproved statement, the factual status of this case for 
activities of the employee would appear to be:

1. Emergency room 
treatment, 4:00 a.m., July 19, carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosed, patient 
referred to orthopedic doctor.

2. Rested on the 19th, 
one of his vacation days.

3. Second day of 
vacation, or 31 hours after emergency-room examination, at about 11:00 a.m., 
July 20, he called the employer about the problem.

4. Went to work on July 
22, and worked July 23.

5. July 24 determined he 
could not work, filed the clerk of court report, and went to see the orthopedic 
doctor for treatment; doctor diagnosed employment relationship as causative 
factor of disability.

[¶17.]  This $1,191.76 case presents multiple 
subjects for possible consideration whether the 24-hour provision requires 
reversal of the benefit grant of the district court following a contested-case 
hearing.2

[¶18.]  We determine that without even 
anticipating the validity or invalidity of any of the possible questions a more 
adequate record should exist to justify any effort by this court to evaluate 
each of those separate issues (only one of which is actually briefed). See Salt 
River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, Wyo., 
663 P.2d 518 (1983). 

[¶19.]  After applying the principle of Worker's 
Compensation law (liberal construction of the statutes in favor of the worker, 
Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219, 222 (1977)), and the appellate 
principle (determination of the trial court to be sustained if supported by 
substantial evidence as examined in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, Olson v. Federal American Partners, Wyo., 567 P.2d 710 (1977)), this 
court will sustain the decision of the trial court on the demonstrated fact that 
the employee worked for two days and then, being unable to continue, promptly 
gave notice and filed the required reports at the same time he obtained medical 
attention from the orthopedic physician.

[¶20.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant did not 
reference his brief to the record as required by Rule 5.01(3), 
W.R.A.P.:

"A statement of the case. 
The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings; and its disposition in the court below. There shall follow a 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, with 
appropriate page references to the record; * * *"

Unfortunately, to further 
add problems, the brief of the appellee references the deposition, which is not 
in the record, and references a page of the record as R. 30, which was obviously 
in error.

2 Considering sufficiency 
of the appellate record and factual questions and concerns about statutory 
construction, this court could find 12 topics to be pursued by appellate 
inquiry, ranging from constitutional questions to method of counting 
time.