Case Title: State v. Singer

Citation: 170 Vt. 346, 749 A.2d 614

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Singer (98-578); 170 Vt. 346; 749 A.2d 614

[Filed 04-Feb-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-578

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Eldon W. Singer	                                 January Term, 2000

Howard E. Van Benthuysen, J.

       Lauren Bowerman, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and John R.
  Treadwell, Deputy State's  Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Paul D. Jarvis and Robert S. Behrens of Jarvis and Kaplan, Burlington,
  for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.    The State appeals from the district court's dismissal
  of the civil license  suspension proceeding against defendant Eldon Singer. 
  The court dismissed the matter because a  final hearing could not be held
  within forty-two days of the date of the alleged offense, and the State 
  had not shown good cause for the delay.  See 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h).  We
  affirm.

       The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On October 17, 1998, defendant
  was charged with  driving while intoxicated (DWI), in violation of 23
  V.S.A. § 1201.  The police officer who charged  defendant did not
  administer a breath test; rather, defendant was taken to Fletcher Allen
  Health Care,  where a sample of his blood was obtained.  On December 9,
  1998, the officer delivered to defendant  a notice of intent to suspend his
  driver's license.  See id. § 1205(c).  On December 11, 1998,  defendant
  requested a hearing before the district court on the issue of license
  suspension.  See id.  § 1205(f).

 

       The court held a preliminary hearing on December 24, 1998, see id. §
  1205(g), at which time  defendant asked the court to dismiss the civil
  suspension proceeding because a final hearing could  not be held within
  forty-two days of the date of the alleged offense as required by statute. 
  See id.  § 1205(h).  The State argued that the language of §1205(h) was
  directory, not mandatory, and that  it had good cause for the delay in this
  case because defendant had been given a blood test.   According to the
  State, a blood test is per-se good cause.  The court disagreed, holding
  that the  language of the statute was mandatory, and that the fact that the
  state was relying on a blood test,  rather than a breath test, was not, in
  and of itself, good cause for the delay.  The State appealed  pursuant to
  23 V.S.A. § 1205(k).

       The State argues that the court erred in dismissing the civil
  suspension proceeding because  (1) the above-quoted language of 23 V.S.A. §
  1205(h) is directory, not mandatory, (2) a blood test  is per-se good
  cause, and (3) the court did not give the State an opportunity to develop
  its argument  that a blood test is per-se good cause.  We address these
  arguments in order.

       23 V.S.A. § 1205(h) states, in relevant part:

     If the defendant requests a hearing on the merits, the court shall 
     schedule a final hearing on the merits to be held within 21 days of the 
     date of the preliminary hearing.  In no event may a final hearing occur 
     more than 42 days after the date of the alleged offense without the 
     consent of the defendant or for good cause shown.  The final hearing 
     may only be continued by the consent of the defendant or for good 
     cause shown.

       According to the State, the statute does not specify a consequence for
  failure to comply with  the forty-two-day time limit, and therefore, the
  statute is directory, not mandatory.  We disagree. 
	
       As we have previously stated, "[t]he determination of whether
  statutory language is  mandatory or directory is one of legislative
  intent."  In re Mullestein, 148 Vt. 170, 174,