Case Title: State v. Phinney

Citation: 236 Neb. 76, 459 N.W.2d 200

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 1990-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
459 N.W.2d 200 (1990) 236 Neb. 76 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Sean PHINNEY, Appellant. No. 89-759. Supreme Court of Nebraska. August 10, 1990. *201 Thomas L. Spinar, Crete, for appellant. Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen., and Mark D. Starr, Lincoln, for appellee. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. HASTINGS, Chief Justice. In State v. Phinney, 235 Neb. 486, 455 N.W.2d 795 (1990), because this court found that the record furnished on appeal failed to provide an adequate basis for a meaningful review by the court under Neb. Rev.Stat. § 43-276 (Reissue 1988), we remanded the cause with directions to the district court to review the record made on the motion to transfer and to set forth its findings as required by law. We further directed the district court to certify those *202 findings back to this court for further consideration of defendant's appeal. Suffice it to say that defendant was originally charged with the January 20, 1989, first degree murder of his mother and with the use of a weapon in the commission of a felony. Following the overruling of the defendant's motion to remove his case to the juvenile court, an agreement was reached whereby an amended information was filed charging defendant only with second degree murder, of which he was found guilty following a plea of no contest. The district court has now certified to this court a journal entry dated June 20, 1990, in which further findings and conclusions in support of a denial of removal of the case to juvenile court were made. We review that certified record in light of defendant's original appeal. In deciding whether to grant the requested waiver and to transfer the proceedings to juvenile court, the court having jurisdiction over a pending criminal prosecution must carefully consider the juvenile's request in light of the criteria or factors set forth in § 43-276. State v. Nevels, 235 Neb. 39, 453 N.W.2d 579 (1990); State v. Thieszen, 232 Neb. 952, 442 N.W.2d 887 (1989). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1816 (Reissue 1989) provides that the district court shall transfer the case unless a sound basis exists for retaining it. Section 43-276 requires consideration of the following criteria: In analyzing the findings of the district court, we set them forth, nearly verbatim, categorized with respect to the nine specifications required by § 43-276. (1) Type of treatment juvenile most likely to be amenable to: *203 (2) Evidence offense included violence or was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner: "The violence that he was accused of was premeditated, considered, and exercised in the most decisive and final manner." (3) Motivation: "His motivation was affected by one of the worst of situations and his act [to him], in some sense, constituted just desserts [sic] for the victum [sic]." (4) Age of juvenile: "The age of fifteen is an accountable age. This boy appeared to be something less than an eighth grader in accademic [sic] ability." (5) Previous history of juvenile: Although this was not mentioned by the court in its findings, the parties stipulated that defendant has no prior criminal record as an adult or juvenile. (6) Sophistication and maturity of juvenile: "This boy was not mature mentally, not sophisticated and was emotional but there was no evidence that he was not accountable." (7) Whether there are facilities particularly available to the juvenile court for treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile: (8) Whether the best interests of juvenile and the security of the public may require that juvenile continue in custody or under supervision for period extending beyond minority: (9) Any other relevant matters: In State v. Alexander, 215 Neb. 478, 486-87, 339 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (1983), this court stated: The statutory criteria or factors of [§ 43-276] disclose a balancing test by which public protection and societal security are weighed against practical and not problematical rehabilitation of the juvenile. [Citations omitted.] "Rehabilitation has traditionally played a key role in the treatment of young offenders.... Nevertheless, the concept of deterrence and the need to balance individual justice with the needs of societya balancing process that is basic and fundamental to *204 the general scheme of the criminal law also have a place in the juvenile justice system." State in the Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R., [89 N.J. 326, 336, 446 A.2d 93, 98 (1982) ]. As a result of such balancing, some youths will be held accountable through proceedings in the adult criminal justice system for effective deterrence of future antisocial misconduct. The standard of review applicable to an appeal from a denial of a motion to transfer to juvenile court is abuse of discretion. State v. Nevels, 235 Neb. 39, 453 N.W.2d 579 (1990). The juvenile court's jurisdiction over a juvenile lasts only until the juvenile attains the age of majority, age 19, or the court otherwise discharges the juvenile from its jurisdiction. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 43-247, 43-245(6), and 43-289 (Reissue 1988). Dr. Riedler diagnosed defendant as suffering from dysthymia and major depression with a paranoid psychotic component. He felt that defendant's condition was not permanent, that it could be treated, and that defendant needed "quite a bit more treatment." According to Riedler, when defendant is 17 or 18 he will require some therapy. Although Riedler felt that if defendant were successfully treated at the Youth Development Center-Kearney he could be released back into society without posing a danger to society, Riedler admitted on cross-examination that it is possible that defendant will still have problems after he is 19 years old. It was Riedler's opinion that defendant should be placed in the Youth Development Center-Kearney until he is 19 years old. However, as the trier of fact, the district court was not required to take the opinions of an expert as binding upon it. See State v. Nevels, supra. The district court apparently was not convinced that defendant could be rehabilitated within the time the juvenile court would retain jurisdiction over him and was concerned about defendant's premeditated act of violence which resulted in the death of his mother. The district court's implicit conclusion that a sound basis exists for retaining jurisdiction over defendant's case as a criminal prosecution is supported by appropriate evidence. Thus, it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer defendant's case to the juvenile court. The appropriateness of defendant's sentence need not be addressed because defendant did not assign it as error. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.