Case Title: Gruwell v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0168

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAY ALLEN GRUWELL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 67Case Number: No. S-10-0168Decided: 04/18/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

JAY ALLEN 
GRUWELL,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

Tara Nethercott and 
Gay Woodhouse, Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Nethercott.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; Samuel T. Hucke, Student Intern, Prosecution 
Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Hucke.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Jay Allen Gruwell, challenges his conviction on one count of sexual abuse of a 
minor in the third degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(iv).1  He contends the district court erred in 
excluding the testimony of one proposed expert witness and limiting the 
testimony of another expert witness.  
He also argues that the district court erred in determining that the 
child victim was competent to testify at trial.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Appellant presents 
the following issues:

 
 

1.    
Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in excluding Appellant's expert witness, Dr. 
Fukutaki, thereby denying Mr. Gruwell his right to present a defense and his 
right to compulsory process?

 
 

2.    
Was it clearly 
erroneous, based on the record of the competency hearing, for the district court 
to determine that the five year old A.H. was competent to 
testify?

 
 

3.    
Did the district 
court abuse its discretion by limiting the scope of Dr. Denison's expert 
testimony to only general characteristics of sex offenders and the types of 
behaviors of the perpetrators who commit these types of alleged 
crimes?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
During the weekend of 
May 16, 2009, Appellant traveled to Gillette, Wyoming, to attend his nephew's 
graduation.  On Saturday morning, 
May 16, Appellant drove to his brother-in-law's house to meet with other family 
members.  Appellant went to the 
basement to check email on his laptop computer.  While Appellant was using his computer, 
A.H, age 5, asked if she could play a game on the computer.  Appellant agreed and they played games 
on the computer for a while.  At 
some point in time, according to the State, Appellant exposed his penis to A.H. 
and asked if she wanted to touch it.  
A.H. ran upstairs, found her mother, and told her that she and Appellant 
had been playing a game on his computer, and that Appellant had his "privacy" 
out and asked her to touch it.

 
 

[¶4]        
Two days later, 
A.H.'s parents contacted the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) to 
report the incident.  Later that 
week, DCI agents traveled to Appellant's office in Lusk, Wyoming, to interview 
him.  During the initial interview, 
Appellant stated that he remembered that his penis was in plain view, but that 
he did not remember taking it out of his pants.  He denied that he asked A.H. to touch it. 
 At the close of the interview, 
Appellant was told to contact the DCI agents if he remembered anything 
else.  The agents left Appellant's 
office and headed back to Gillette.  
A short time later, however, Appellant telephoned the agents and told 
them that he wanted to speak with them again.  The agents returned to Appellant's 
office for a second interview.  
During the second interview, Appellant admitted that he had asked A.H. to 
touch his penis. 

 
 

[¶5]        
Appellant was 
subsequently charged with sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree.  On September 9, 2009, he pled not guilty 
to the charged offense.  The 
following day, the court entered a Criminal Case Management Order setting a 
trial date of December 7, 2009.  The 
Order required the parties to file a list of all witnesses and exhibits no later 
than three working days before the pretrial conference, which was to be held on 
November 5.  The Order also stated 
that the defense could be afforded relief from the witness disclosure 
requirements if the defense filed a motion establishing good cause for relief at 
least five working days before the pretrial conference.  Appellant did not file a motion 
requesting relief from the disclosure requirements at any time prior to the 
pretrial conference.  

 
 

[¶6]        
Appellant filed his 
pretrial memorandum on November 4.  
He identified more than thirty potential witnesses, including Dr. Chuck 
Denison.  According to the witness 
designation, Dr. Denison was proposed to testify "that his psychosexual 
evaluation of Jay Gruwell shows him to be a stable person with no indicators of 
sexual deviance."  After the State 
raised concerns about this testimony at the pretrial conference, the district 
court requested briefing on the issue.  Appellant submitted a memorandum in 
support of admitting Dr. Denison's testimony.  In that memorandum, Appellant 
acknowledged that Dr. Denison's proposed testimony "may be considered character 
evidence as allowed under Rule 404(a)(1)," and stated that "[i]f deemed 
character evidence under 404(a), defense counsel anticipates that the State, if 
allowed, will then attempt to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence under 
404(b), specifically, the allegations of [B.P.]."  The substance of that allegation was 
that Appellant had exposed himself to B.P. when she was 10 or 12 years old.  Appellant also filed a motion in limine 
regarding those allegations, arguing that evidence of the prior incident of 
alleged misconduct by Appellant should be excluded.  The court ruled that the State was 
prohibited from using the allegations of B.P. in its case in chief, but stated 
that it "cannot at this time prohibit the use of such allegations in the State's 
rebuttal case because the allegations may be proper testimony at trial if the 
defense should open the door to such testimony."

 
 

[¶7]        
Appellant did not 
identify any other expert witnesses aside from Dr. Denison in his November 4 
pretrial memorandum, but included the following statement:

 
 
The Defense reserves 
the right to call additional witnesses in this matter specifically a witness who 
may testify about the effect that the repeated statements that the agent was not 
lying to the Defendant during the interrogation and that children like [A.H.] do 
not lie or have a very low probability that they are lying and other statements 
to that effect.

 
 
On November 30, 2009, 
Appellant filed a motion to amend his pretrial memorandum seeking to add an 
additional witness.  That motion did 
not identify any witness by name or provide an explanation for the late notice. 
The motion stated:

 
 
The Defense reserves 
the right to call witnesses in this matter who may testify about the children's 
veracity, the effect of outside influences, and the psychology of children in 
general.  This witness may testify 
about additional matters in connection with the defense of this 
matter.

 
 
On December 1, 2009, 
the district court issued an order denying the amendment of Appellant's pretrial 
memorandum.  The court stated that 
Appellant's request "was filed after the deadlines set in the Criminal Case 
Management Order in this case and is unnecessarily vague."  Further, the court found that "allowing 
the amendment at this time would be prejudicial to the opposing 
party."

 
 

[¶8]        
On December 2, 2009, 
three working days prior to trial, Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider 
Amended Pretrial Memorandum and identified Dr. Karen Fukutaki as a proposed 
expert witness.  Appellant sought to 
have Dr. Fukutaki testify as to the "voluntariness of the confession and the 
psychology relating to confessions."  
The district court again denied Appellant's motion, finding that it was 
"filed after the deadlines set in the Criminal Case Management Order" and that 
"allowing the amendment at this time would be prejudicial to the opposing 
party." 

 
 

[¶9]        
Prior to trial, 
Appellant challenged A.H.'s competency to testify and also requested a taint 
hearing to determine whether A.H.'s testimony would be tainted by an interview 
with a forensic examiner from the Child Advocacy Center.  The court conducted a hearing on 
Appellant's motion and determined there was insufficient evidence to support a 
taint hearing.  Appellant does not 
challenge this ruling.  The court 
also conducted a hearing to determine A.H.'s competency to testify at 
trial.  After questioning the child, 
the court ruled that A.H. was competent to testify.

 
 

[¶10]     
After a three-day 
jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the third 
degree and was sentenced to four to seven years in prison.  He appealed his conviction to this 
Court.  Additional facts will be set 
forth as necessary in our discussion of the issues.

 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Exclusion of Expert 
Witness

 
 

[¶11]     
Appellant 
contends the district court's decision to exclude the testimony of 
Dr. Fukutaki violated his right to present a defense under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  He argues that Dr. 
Fukutaki's proposed testimony regarding confessions was crucial to his 
defense.  Appellant asserts that his 
"entire defense was that he never exposed himself to the victim and this alleged 
confession was a false confession based on the methods of interrogation."  The State contends Appellant gave no 
indication that he wished to introduce testimony by Dr. Fukutaki regarding the 
"false confessions" issue until Dr. Fukutaki was identified in his Motion 
to Reconsider Amended Pretrial Memorandum, which was filed less than three full 
working days prior to trial.  The 
State argues that late notice of the expert testimony undermines the truth 
finding purpose of the trial process.  
It argues that late notice limits the ability to effectively 
cross-examine the proposed expert and counter the proposed 
testimony.

 
 

[¶12]     
We review a district 
court's decision to admit or reject expert testimony for an abuse of 
discretion. 
 Dean v. 
State, 2008 WY 124, ¶ 14, 
194 P.3d 299, 303 (Wyo. 2008).  
Under an abuse of discretion standard, "the ultimate issue is whether or 
not the court could reasonably conclude as it did."  Breazeale v. State, 2011 WY 10, ¶ 30, 
245 P.3d 834, 843 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 947 
(Wyo. 2000)).  "Decisions of the 
trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal."  Lawson, 994 P.2d  at 947.

 
 

[¶13]     
The Compulsory 
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is nearly identical to the language 
in Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution,2 guarantees every defendant "the 
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor."  U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 A violation of the Compulsory Process Clause 
occurs when a defendant is arbitrarily deprived of testimony that would have 
been relevant, material, and vital to his defense.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2003) (citing United 
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982)).  Although 
fundamental, "the right to present defense witnesses is not absolute.  A defendant must abide the rules of 
evidence and procedure."  United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 
659 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 
1151-52 (10th Cir. 1998)).

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15, 108 S. Ct. 646, 656, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's invocation 
of the right to present witnesses "cannot automatically and invariably outweigh 
countervailing public interests."  
The Court held that the factors to be weighed in the balance include, but 
are not limited to, "[t]he integrity of the adversary process, which depends 
both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable 
evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and 
the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process." 
Id.  The Court also noted that the right to 
compulsory process depends on the affirmative conduct of the defendant: 

 
 
            
There is a significant difference between the Compulsory Process Clause 
weapon and other rights that are protected by the Sixth Amendment -- its 
availability is dependent entirely on the defendant's initiative.  Most other Sixth Amendment rights arise 
automatically on the initiation of the adversary process and no action by the 
defendant is necessary to make them active in his or her case.  While those rights shield the defendant 
from potential prosecutorial abuses, the right to compel the presence and 
present the testimony of witnesses provides the defendant with a sword that may 
be employed to rebut the prosecution's case.  The decision whether to employ it in a 
particular case rests solely with the defendant.  The very nature of the right requires 
that its effective use be preceded by deliberate planning and affirmative 
conduct.             

Id., 484 U.S.  at 410, 
108 S. Ct.  at 653-54 (footnote omitted).  
We adopted the Taylor factors 
in Lawson.  In that case, we held that the exclusion 
of alibi testimony from a fact witness was an abuse of discretion where the 
district court failed to consider any factor other than the defendant's failure 
to comply with the filing date requirement of W.R.Cr.P. 12.1(a) and failed to 
consider the factors articulated in Taylor.  Lawson, 994 P.2d  at 
947.

 
 

[¶15]     
Appellant contends 
his right to present a defense was violated because the district court failed to 
consider the factors identified in Taylor for exclusion of witnesses.  He argues that this case is similar to 
Dysthe, 63 P.3d 875, a case in which 
we reversed the district court's decision to exclude the defendant's 
witnesses.  In that case, the 
district court required the parties to identify their witnesses by November 13, 
2000.  Id., ¶ 4, 63 P.3d  at 878.  The State filed a notice of additional 
witnesses on December 5, 2000, identifying a former drug court employee as a 
witness.  Id.  
On January 25, 2001, the defendant identified two other drug court 
employees as potential witnesses regarding favorable treatment of the State's 
primary witness in return for that witness's testimony.  Id.  The State's primary witness apparently 
believed that he was under pressure from Drug Court personnel to testify and 
that he would not be prosecuted if he testified.  The State objected to the defendant's 
witnesses, but identified another witness for potential use in rebuttal.  Id., ¶ 7, 63 P.3d  at 879.  In an oral ruling, the district court 
stated that "the late filing precludes [use of any of the four witnesses named 
after the November 13 deadline] in the case in chief.  If it turns out that, you know, one of 
you thinks that they are necessary for some sort of proper rebuttal, I'll 
consider it at that time."  Id.  (Emphasis omitted.)  However, when the defendant attempted to 
impeach the credibility of the State's primary witness with questions that would 
have made such rebuttal testimony appropriate, the district court sustained the 
State's objection.  Id., ¶ 8, 63 P.3d  at 880.  We held that the district court abused 
its discretion in excluding the defendant's witnesses because it failed to 
consider any of the Taylor factors in 
enforcing its pretrial deadline and because evidence relating to the possibility 
of favorable treatment of the State's witness in return for his testimony was 
relevant, material, and vital to the defense in order to impeach that witness's 
credibility.  Id., ¶ 9, 63 P.3d  at 
881.

 
 

[¶16]     
The present case, 
however, is distinguishable from Dysthe.  In addition to Appellant's failure to 
meet the deadline for disclosure of witnesses set out in the Case Management 
Order, the district court excluded Dr. Fukutaki's testimony because Appellant's 
witness designation was "unnecessarily vague" and because admitting the 
testimony "would be prejudicial to the opposing party."  Although there was considerable delay in 
the defendant's disclosure of his witnesses in Dysthe, no mention was made of the 
proximity of the defendant's disclosure to the date of trial.  In this case, Appellant identified Dr. 
Fukutaki less than three full working days before trial.  Further, in contrast to Dysthe, the proposed witness in this 
case was an expert witness, which raises additional concerns about the ability 
of the adversary process to test the reliability and credibility of the proposed 
testimony.  If Dr. Fukutaki's 
testimony was to be adequately "tested," so as to facilitate the presentation of 
reliable evidence, the State must have been provided an opportunity to 
investigate Dr. Fukutaki's qualifications, review the scientific basis for the 
proposed testimony, and locate an expert witness with the requisite background 
who was available to travel to Gillette, Wyoming, for the scheduled trial if the 
State wished to present rebuttal testimony.  Given such short notice by Appellant, 
however, the State could not have assembled an adequate response to Dr. 
Fukutaki's testimony prior to trial.  
The late notice was prejudicial to the State.

 
 

[¶17]     
Appellant's failure 
to timely identify Dr. Fukutaki as an expert witness impinged on each of the 
concerns identified by the Taylor 
factors.  As the Supreme Court noted 
in Taylor, adherence to procedure is 
essential to the fairness and reliability of the trial process: 

 
 
            
The principle that undergirds the defendant's right to present 
exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right. 
 The adversary process could not 
function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the 
orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair 
opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the 
opponent's case.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
            
The defendant's right to compulsory process is itself designed to 
vindicate the principle that the "ends of criminal justice would be defeated if 
judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the 
facts." United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. [683,] 709, 94 S.Ct. [3090,] 3108[, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974)]. Rules that 
provide for pretrial discovery of an opponent's witnesses serve the same high 
purpose.  Discovery, like 
cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on 
incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony.   

Taylor, 
484 U.S.  at 410-12, 108 S. Ct.  at 654 (footnote omitted).  It is also important to note that the 
district court, in its Case Management Order, stated that the defense could be 
afforded relief from the witness disclosure requirements if the defense filed a 
motion stating good cause for relief at least five working days before the 
pretrial conference.  Appellant, 
however, never filed such a motion showing good cause and never provided any 
explanation for his failure to timely identify Dr. Fukutaki.  Despite having knowledge of his 
confession from the inception of the case, Appellant gave notice of his intent 
to use Dr. Fukutaki as an expert witness fewer than three full working days 
before the trial.  Appellant's right 
to compulsory process, which depended entirely on his own initiative, was not 
violated by the district court's refusal to allow Dr. Fukutaki to testify.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Appellant's motion to amend his pretrial 
memorandum.

 
 

Competency 
Hearing

 
 

[¶18]     
Appellant next 
asserts that the district court erred in determining that A.H. was competent to 
testify at trial.  Pursuant to 
W.R.E. 601, any person is competent to be a witness unless he is otherwise 
disqualified from testifying.  "A 
person is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember 
and narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken 
before testifying."  Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 32, 121 P.3d 790, 800-01 
(Wyo. 2005) (quoting Watters v. State, 2004 WY 155, ¶ 14, 101 P.3d 908, 
914 (Wyo. 2004)).  The district 
court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is competent to 
testify.  Sisneros, ¶ 32, 121 P.3d  at 801.

 
 

[¶19]     
With 
regard to children, intelligence, not age, is the guiding criteria in 
determining the competency of the witness.  
Woyak v. State, 2010 WY 27, ¶ 
21, 226 P.3d 841, 851 (Wyo. 2010).  
A five-part test is used to determine the competency of a child 
witness.  The witness must 
demonstrate the following:

 
 
(1) 
an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to 
testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to 
understand simple questions about it.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
20, 226 P.3d at 850-51; Sisneros, ¶ 
33, 121 P.3d  at 801; Watters, ¶ 14, 
101 P.3d  at 914; Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 

[¶20]     
Appellant concedes 
that A.H. understood the obligation to speak the truth.  He argues, however, that the type and 
number of questions answered by A.H. were not sufficient to establish that A.H. 
possessed the attributes identified in the remaining factors of the five-part 
test.  Although Appellant 
acknowledges that "there are no specific guidelines or types of questions that 
the District Court must follow" in applying the test, he nonetheless argues that 
the district court is required to question the witness about her recollection or 
understanding of the particular events at issue.  We do not agree.

  

[¶21]     
The test does not 
require the witness at a competency hearing to answer questions about the 
specific events at issue in a case.  
Rather, by requiring that the witness have a "memory sufficient" to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence and the "capacity" to 
relate a memory of the occurrence, the test focuses on the mental abilities of 
the witness rather than the witness's recollection of specific events.  Appellant has not presented any 
authority which indicates that a child witness must be asked about specific 
events at a competency hearing, and we find good reason for not imposing such a 
requirement.  As the district court 
determined in this case, questions relating to the events at issue have the 
potential to cause unnecessary trauma to the child witness and are not warranted 
when the witness demonstrates the requisite capacity to receive, remember, and 
narrate her experience.

 
 

[¶22]     
We note that other 
jurisdictions have concluded that questions regarding specific events at issue 
in a sex abuse case are not required 
in determining whether a child witness is competent to testify at trial.  In State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 
1990), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a determination as to whether a 
child witness has the capacity to remember or relate facts does not require 
questions about the details of the possible 
testimony:

 
 
            
In determining competency of a child, the trial court must determine 
whether the child understands the nature and obligations of an oath and whether 
the child has "the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting 
which the child is examined." Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(l) (1988). The 
latter requirement does not mean that the court is to question the child on the 
details of possible testimony, but rather means that the court should determine 
in a general way whether the child remembers or can relate events truthfully. 
The jury will judge the child's credibility and decide the weight to assign the 
testimony.          

 Id. at 659-60.  In State v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 
1993), the same court identified an additional reason, aside from potential 
trauma to the child witness, that questions regarding the events at issue in a 
sex abuse case should not be asked:

 
 
We stress that cases 
in which a child appears to have been determined incompetent because the 
testimony at the competency hearing did not comport with the criminal 
allegations or earlier statements of the child will be reviewed very closely by 
this court.  The simple reason is 
that those cases create the appearance that the trial judge did not determine 
competency, but rather prejudged the facts and determined the child to be 
incompetent for not testifying to particular facts.  If questions about the subject matter are 
not asked, this problem will not arise.  Thus we recommend that questions not be 
asked about the subject matter of the case during competency hearings.   

Id. at 615.  Other courts have also determined that 
questions regarding the events at issue in a sex abuse case are not required in 
determining a child witness's competency.  See, e.g., People v. Trujillo, 923 P.2d 277, 281 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) 
("We hold that questioning a child-witness about the actual events of the 
charged offense is not required before a determination of his or her competency 
can be made."); Commonwealth v. 
Gamache, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 805, 626 N.E.2d 616 (1994) (court acted correctly 
in not requiring the child witness's competence to rest on a recall of the 
events and circumstances of the crime; only a general ability to observe and 
remember is required); State v. Cobb, 
81 Ohio App. 3d 179, 610 N.E.2d 1009 (1991) (court did not err in finding the 
child victim competent, despite the failure to ask the victim questions related 
to charged offense); see also 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 145 (2011); 81 Am. Jur. 2d 
Witnesses § 201 (2010); Kentucky 
v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 741, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2665, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1987) 
("[Q]uestions at a competency hearing usually are limited to matters that are 
unrelated to the basic issues of the trial.").  

 
 

[¶23]     
We agree with the 
authorities referenced above and conclude that it is not necessary to ask a 
child witness about the events at issue in a sexual abuse case in order to 
determine whether the child witness is competent to testify.  Such questions, however, are not 
precluded as a matter of law.3  Ultimately, in determining whether a 
child witness is competent to testify, the decision to ask the child questions 
regarding the specific events at issue in the case is within the broad 
discretion of the trial court.  See Sisneros, ¶ 32, 121 P.3d  at 
800-01.

 
 

[¶24]     
In this case, we are 
unable to find that the district court abused its discretion in determining that 
A.H. was competent to testify.  A.H. 
was asked questions about her knowledge, memory, and her awareness of the 
obligation to tell the truth.  See Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 586.  A.H. knew how old she was, where she 
went to school, the names of her teachers, the name of her brother, how old her 
brother was, the names of her pets, the names of her friends, the various ways 
in which she usually traveled to school in the morning, whether she had lived in 
another house, and the different objects that she and her brother had in their 
rooms.  

 
 

[¶25]     
Upon conclusion of 
the district court's examination of A.H., the court summarized its evaluation as 
follows:

 
 
Based upon the 
court's examination, I'm going to find that the witness is qualified to 
testify.  That she expressed an 
understanding of the obligation to speak the truth.  That she has although limited mental 
capacity on certain things, things that most of us might know such as where we 
live and that type of thing, at five years old she doesn't know the address. But 
she does have capacity to express in words the things that she can remember and 
she clearly has the capacity to understand simple questions when asked. So it 
would be the finding of the court that for purposes of the trial in this case 
the witness would be competent to testify.

 
 
As we have repeatedly 
stated, the trial court is in a far better position to judge the demeanor, 
truth, and veracity of the witness, and we give considerable deference to the 
court's findings concerning witness competency.  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 880 (Wyo. 1987).  "We do not presume to place ourselves in 
the shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a cold record.  The trial court sees the witness' facial 
expressions, hears inflections in her voice and watches her mannerisms during 
examination.  These observations are 
a vital part of the ultimate ruling on competency."  Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 32, 76 P.3d 805, 819 (Wyo. 
2003) (citing In Interest of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 271 (Wyo. 1988)).  It is also worth noting that at trial, 
A.H. was able to recall and relate the events leading up to and after the 
incident, as well as details of the incident itself, including the clothes 
Appellant was wearing, the position he occupied on the couch, where she was 
sitting, the game they were playing on the computer, and the location of her 
mother and other relatives when she ran upstairs to tell her mother what 
happened.  

 
 
Limitation of Expert 
Testimony

 
 

[¶26]     
In Appellant's final 
argument, he contends the district court erred in limiting the expert testimony 
of Dr. Denison.  We review for abuse 
of discretion.  Dean, ¶ 14, 194 P.3d  at 303.  

 
 

[¶27]     
As noted above, the 
State raised concerns regarding the potential testimony of Dr. Denison at 
the pretrial conference.  The State 
requested that they be furnished a copy of Dr. Denison's report and objected to 
Dr. Denison's proposed testimony, stating that "[Dr. Denison] obviously is going 
to be called to opine that these events didn't happen because the defendant is 
perhaps incapable in his mind of engaging in that behavior and I think it's 
irrelevant.  It's highly 
prejudicial."  Defense counsel 
advised the court that it would provide the State with a copy of the report "as 
soon as we have it."  Defense 
counsel also advised the court that "[w]e believe it's highly relevant with 
regard to the issue at hand and whether or not the defendant is . . . a sexual 
deviant.  I mean, obviously this is 
a sexually deviant act and it is very important to have someone who is an expert 
who can testify in that regard."  The court subsequently requested briefing 
from the parties regarding the admissibility of Dr. Denison's 
testimony.

 
 

[¶28]     
In his responsive 
briefing, Appellant advised the court that "[t]he defense has two proposed uses 
of Dr. Denison's testimony."  One 
purpose of the testimony was to "assist the jury in understanding the typical 
behaviors of sexual offenders."  The 
defense also advised the court that it sought to have Dr. Denison "relate such 
behaviors to Mr. Gruwell."  
Apparently, Appellant intended to elicit testimony from Dr. Denison to 
the effect that Mr. Gruwell did not suffer from a sexual disorder and that it 
was unlikely that someone without a sexual disorder would have committed the 
charged offense.  Appellant 
recognized that the testimony of Dr. Denison "may be considered character 
evidence" and that the State, in response, would attempt to introduce testimony 
regarding specific instances of Appellant's conduct.  Appellant was concerned that such 
evidence would include testimony from B.P., another individual who alleged that 
she was a victim of similar conduct by Appellant.  Appellant advised the court that, if Dr. 
Denison's testimony would open the door to the presentation of such evidence, 
Dr. Denison's testimony would be limited to the general characteristics of sex 
offenders.

 
 

[¶29]     
On December 1, 2009, 
the district court entered an Order Limiting Scope of Expert Testimony relating 
to Dr. Denison.  The Order provided: 

 
 

1.    
The court cannot 
order any testimony suppressed from the State's rebuttal case at this time 
because the defense may open the door to such testimony.

 
 

2.    
Under WRE 404 the 
defense may offer any character evidence they feel is appropriate, but the State 
is allowed to rebut any evidence proffered.

 
 

3.    
The defense expert 
may testify as to "general characteristics of sex offenders and the types of 
behaviors of the perpetrators who commit these types of alleged 
crimes."

 
 

4.    
Under WRE 702, the 
defense expert is allowed to give his opinion as long as such opinion does not 
go to the ultimate fact in this case.

 
 

5.    
The defense expert 
may not give opinion testimony as to the defendant's 
guilt.

 
 
Appellant contends 
the district court implicitly determined that Dr. Denison's proposed testimony 
relating behaviors of sex offenders to Appellant was character evidence.  Appellant contends that this 
determination was error and negatively impacted Appellant's ability to defend 
against the charge.  As we 
understand Appellant's position, the classification of the proposed testimony as 
character evidence potentially opened the door for the State to present rebuttal 
evidence under W.R.E. 405(a) that Appellant wanted to keep from the jury.  Stated in procedural terms, if Appellant 
introduced the proposed testimony, Appellant was concerned that the court would 
permit the State to introduce evidence regarding other incidents of Appellant's 
improper sexual conduct with minors.  
At trial, Dr. Denison presented testimony regarding the general 
characteristics of sex offenders but did not "relate" those characteristics to 
Appellant.4  Appellant contends that Dr. Denison 
would also have related those characteristics to Appellant but for the district 
court's erroneous determination that it was character 
evidence.

 
 

[¶30]     
We note initially 
that we are unable to discern from the record the specific testimony that 
Appellant sought to elicit from Dr. Denison.  Dr. Denison's report, if it existed, is 
not in the record.  It seems 
undisputed, however, that he would have testified, at a minimum, that Appellant 
does not possess the personality traits of a typical sex offender.  It is also undisputed that Appellant 
intended to offer the testimony for the purpose of establishing that Appellant 
could not have committed the charged offense.  Such testimony is unquestionably 
character evidence.  

 
 

[¶31]     
W.R.E. 404(a) states 
as follows: 

 
 

Character evidence 
generally.  Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 

 
 
(1) Character of 
Accused.  Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same.

 
 
"Character evidence" is generally defined as 
"[e]vidence regarding someone's general personality traits or 
propensities."  Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 
2004).  We have not had occasion to 
address the admissibility of the type of evidence at issue here, but other 
jurisdictions that have considered the admissibility of such evidence have found 
that testimony relating to the defendant's propensity towards sexual deviation 
is character evidence.  See 
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to 
Criminal Defendant's Propensity Toward Sexual Deviation, 42 A.L.R. 4th 937.  This is true even in the single case 
that Appellant cites where such testimony has been considered relevant and 
admissible.  See State v. Richard A. P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 793 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) 
("Although no Wisconsin case has expressly addressed the admissibility of the specific kind of character evidence 
at issue in this case, certain other case law offers guidance for our decision 
and support for our conclusion.") (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶32]     
In 
the instant case, Appellant contends the proposed testimony is not character 
evidence but is rather "framework" evidence such as exists in cases involving 
battered-woman-syndrome (BWS).  We 
discussed this issue, in the context of evidence introduced against the defendant, in Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 
1999).  In that case, we 
distinguished testimony relating to BWS from more general "profile" evidence 
relating to separation violence.  We 
held that testimony regarding separation violence that attempted to explain "the 
characteristics of batterers and the kind of conduct they tend to exhibit" was 
inadmissible because it was irrelevant, prejudicial, and violated the general 
prohibition against character evidence offered against the defendant in a 
criminal case.  Id. at 53, 56.  Although we do not address the 
admissibility of Dr. Denison's proposed or actual testimony in this case, we 
quote here for the discussion of the contrast between testimony relating to BWS 
and character evidence:

 
 
            
The prosecutor argued, and the district court agreed, that separation 
violence is a logical extension of BWS.  Ryan argued that under W.R.E. 404(a), 
such an extension is not admissible. W.R.E. 404(a) prohibits use of evidence of 
a person's character if used to prove that he acted in conformity therewith. 
 If offered pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b), evidence which implies bad character is admissible for a limited 
purpose, but not to show conduct conforming to character.  A large part of the testimony which 
portrayed Ryan as an angry and violent person who expressed that violence toward 
his wife was admitted for W.R.E. 404(b) reasons.  That testimony was not offered for the 
purpose of showing that he acted in conformity therewith, but rather to show 
motive, intent, or identity.  The 
expert testimony on separation violence, however, was not offered under W.R.E. 
404(b), and, therefore, we must determine if it violates W.R.E. 404(a).      

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
            
At the outset, we must determine whether separation violence evidence 
falls within the emerging field of "social framework and syndrome" evidence. 
 In general, BWS and other syndrome 
evidence is considered a proper subject for expert testimony, and does not 
implicate the proscription against character evidence.  See Mueller and Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence, § 351 (2d ed. 1994). 
 According to Mueller and 
Kirkpatrick: 

 
 
            
Usually framework and syndrome evidence is offered by prosecutors and 
relates to the victim, as in sexual assault and child abuse trials.  But sometimes it is offered by the 
defense and relates to defendants, as in the setting of homicide trials of women 
charged with killing husbands or intimate companions.  And typical patterns of usage do not 
always hold true, for defendants sometimes offer evidence that patterns of 
behavior or attitudes in the alleged victim did not fit the syndrome and 
prosecutors sometimes offer evidence of battered women syndrome in trials 
of men to explain the victim's behavior.

 
 

Id. at 633.  . . .  Expert testimony on BWS which relates to 
the victim is entirely proper.  Evidence concerning the defendant's 
involvement, however, demands close scrutiny under the character evidence rules. 
 This is so even if reference to the 
defendant may only be inferred from the testimony.        

            
Bratton did not say that because Ryan was possessed of a violent 
character he acted in conformity therewith on the night of the murder.  She was more subtle, but the effect was 
the same.  After showing that the 
subjects of the study tended to commit homicide when faced with the prospect of 
separation, she impliedly invited the jury to group Ryan among those subjects 
and by this method determine conduct.

            
Finding guilt by reference to common characteristics of a class of 
individuals to which one belongs raises the specter of profile evidence.  Profile or syndrome evidence is developed 
through expert testimony and tends to classify people by their shared physical, 
emotional, or mental characteristics.  State v. Percy, 146 Vt. 475, 507 A.2d 955, 960 (Vt. 1986) (citing 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 401[10], at 88-91 
(1985)).  In the context of drug 
courier profiles, a profile has been characterized as, 

 
 
an "informal 
compilation of characteristics often displayed by those trafficking in drugs," 
and as an "abstract of characteristics found to be typical of persons 
transporting illegal drugs.'"  Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
described the profile as essentially an investigative tool involving 
characteristics recognizable to trained officers.  "A profile' is, in effect the collective 
or distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics 
repeatedly seen in drug smugglers." 

 
 

United States v. 
Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1021 
(8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1091, 110 S. Ct. 1163, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1990).  Translated into the battering spouse 
context, a profile is a compilation of characteristics repeatedly seen in those 
who batter their spouses.           

. . .       

            
Many courts find profile evidence irrelevant. Commonwealth v. Day, 409 Mass. 719, 569 N.E.2d 397 (1991) aptly articulated the reasoning for such a conclusion: 

 
 
            
A criminal trial is by its very nature an individualized adjudication of 
a defendant's guilt or legal innocence. Testimony regarding a criminal profile 
is nothing more than an expert's opinion as to certain characteristics which are 
common to some or most of the individuals who commit particular crimes.  Evidence of a "child battering profile" 
does not meet the relevancy test, because the mere fact that a defendant fits 
the profile does not tend to prove that a particular defendant physically abused 
the victim. 

 
 
[569 N.E.2d] at 399. 
See also, Percy, 507 A.2d  at 960 (Evidence that 
other rapists often excused or explained their conduct the way the defendant did 
was not relevant.); State v. 
Clements, 244 Kan. 411, 770 P.2d 447, 454 (1989) (Evidence which only 
describes the characteristics of the typical offender has no relevance to 
whether the defendant committed the crime in question.); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 
157 (4th Cir. 1990) (Proof that a person fits the drug courier profile, 
unsupported by evidence of drug trafficking, proves nothing.); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (Wash.App. 1983) (The relevance of testimony that the majority of 
child abuse cases involved a male parent figure is not readily discernable.); State v. Brown, 370 S.2d 547, 552 (La. 
1979) (Unable to see how evidence of drug courier profile is relevant to any 
issue of innocence or guilt at the trial on the merits.); Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983) (Evidence of child abuser profile is totally irrelevant 
because it does not tend to prove that the defendant committed the acts of abuse 
attributed to him.); United States v. 
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983), rehearing denied, 721 F.2d 822 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (Drug courier profile evidence is nothing more than the opinion of 
those officers conducting an investigation, and it cannot be used as substantive 
evidence of guilt.); State v. Hansen, 
304 Ore. 169, 743 P.2d 157, 161 (1987) (That child abusers use certain 
techniques to get near their victims has no bearing on whether a person who does 
these things is a child abuser.); and People v. Bradley, 172 Ill. App. 3d 545, 
122 Ill. Dec. 523, 526 N.E.2d 916, 921 (1988) (Evidence showing characteristics 
of child abuse perpetrators was in no way probative or relevant to the question 
of whether the defendant committed the crime.).      

. . .       

            
Finally, profile evidence is often found to be an 
impermissible attack on the defendant's character.  See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27, 33 (Id. 1988); In the Interest 
of D.L., 401 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Iowa App. 1986); People v. Walkey, 177 Cal. App. 3d 268, 
223 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138 (1986); State v. 
Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62-64 (Minn. 1981); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983); Haakanson v. State, 
760 P.2d 1030, 1035-36 (Alaska 1988); and Bradley, 122 Ill. Dec. 523, 526 N.E.2d  
at 921.      

 
 
            
We hold that the evidence pertaining to separation violence was 
inadmissable.  Our ruling does not, 
however, proscribe BWS testimony in general, and we reaffirm our prior decisions 
which have allowed expert testimony to explain the behavior of a battered 
spouse.  See Trujillo v. State, 953 P.2d 1182, [1187] 
(Wyo. 1998).          

Id. 
at 53-56 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).  

 
 

[¶33]     
Appellant 
contends our precedent holding that testimony relating to BWS is not character 
evidence also applies to the testimony at issue in this case.  However, cases involving BWS are 
distinguishable from the present case.  
First, we distinguished evidence relating to BWS from more general 
profile evidence in Ryan and held 
that the latter was inadmissible character evidence.  Second, a specific statutory provision 
allows testimony regarding BWS to explain the behavior of a victim, creating an 
exception to the general prohibition against introduction of character evidence 
in a criminal case.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-203.5  There is no statutory exception for 
evidence regarding the typical behaviors of sex offenders.  Third, even in cases where BWS evidence 
is admissible, we have cautioned that "[e]vidence concerning a defendant's 
involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence rules."  Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 21, 96 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Ryan, 988 P.2d at 55).  "This is so even if reference to the defendant 
may only be inferred from the testimony."  
Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 55.  In this case, however, Appellant sought 
to introduce Dr. Denison's testimony in order to directly relate Appellant's 
character to the behaviors of sex offenders.  Such testimony goes even one step 
further than the "subtle" reference to the defendant induced by the profile 
evidence that was found to be character evidence in Ryan.  Dr. Denison's proposed testimony clearly 
constituted character evidence and we find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's determination that the proposed testimony was character 
evidence.

 
 

[¶34]     
Because 
it was not raised as an issue, we do not specifically address the relevance or 
admissibility of evidence offered by the defense that pertains to the typical 
behaviors of sex offenders.  

 
 

[¶35]     
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-316(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2009) provides as follows:

 
 

§ 
6-2-316.  Sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree.           
(a) Except under circumstance 
constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first or second degree as defined by 
W.S. 6-2-314 and 6-2-315, an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor 
in the third degree if:

            

. 
. . 

            
(iv) Being seventeen (17) years 
of age or older, the actor knowingly takes immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties with a victim who is less than seventeen (17) years of age and the 
victim is at least four (4) years younger than the actor.

 
 

2Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
10 states: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . 
. have compulsory process served for obtaining witnesses."

 
 

3Although 18 USC § 3509(c)(8) (2011) prohibits such 
questions, there is no similar Wyoming statute.  

 
 

4The State did not 
object to Dr. Denison's testimony regarding the general characteristics of sex 
offenders.  The State sought only to 
prohibit "the introduction of any testimony from Dr. Denison regarding his 
examination of the Defendant and his opinion that the Defendant lacks the 
ability to commit this offense."

 
 

5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-203 states:

 
 

(a) The "battered woman syndrome" is defined as 
a subset under the diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder established in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III -- Revised of the 
American Psychiatric Association. 
(b) If a 
person is charged with a crime involving the use of force against another, and 
the person raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may 
introduce expert testimony that the person suffered from the syndrome, to 
establish the necessary requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the person's 
use of force.

[¶36]