Case Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

Citation: 

Docket Number: 73, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES DOMINICK FALLON III,
)
)
No. 73, 2004
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)
Court Below:  Superior Court
)
of the State of Delaware,
v.
)
in and for New Castle County
)
C.A. No. 96C-04-070
STEPHAN E. KANEY,
)
KOEHNE TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
)
)
Plaintiffs Below,
)
Appellees.
)
Submitted:  August 4, 2004
Decided: August 23, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice,  HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 23rd day of August, 2004, on consideration of the parties’ briefs, it appears
that:
(1)  James D. Fallon III appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
awarding Appellee Stephan E. Kaney approximately $13,000 for unreturned property.
Fallon claims the trial judge erred in accepting certain evidence of value in calculating
damages, asserting Kaney’s proffer was untimely and barred by the doctrine of
election of remedies.  Because these defenses were not raised at trial, they cannot be
considered on appeal unless review is required in the interests of justice.  We have
examined the record and conclude that Fallon has not shown that the trial court
committed plain error in failing to address these defenses sua sponte.  Accordingly,
the decision of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Kaney v. Fallon, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96C-04-070, (Jan. 28, 2004) (Letter Op.).
1
Stoltz Realty Co. v. Raphael, 458 A.2d 21, 23 (Del. 1983) (quoting 28 C.J.S. Election
2
of Remedies § 11 (1941)) (quotation marks omitted).
DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8.
3
2
(2)  Pursuant to a one-year written agreement signed in early 1996, Fallon
leased to Kaney and his company, KTI, the premises at 195 South Chapel Street
(“195") in Newark, Delaware.  Fallon owned and occupied 197 South Chapel Street
(“197"), which is adjacent to Kaney’s commercial space.  Following a fire in Fallon’s
portion of the building in November 1996, the City of Newark prohibited occupancy
for both 195 and 197.  Although the parties dispute the subsequent payment
arrangement, the trial judge found that by January 1997, Fallon had moved Kaney’s
equipment into 197, and changed the locks on 195.  
(3)  Later in 1997, Kaney obtained an order of replevin requiring Fallon to
return the distrained property.  Several years later, Kaney sought relief in the Superior
Court, claiming that Fallon had only partially complied with the replevin order.
Following a hearing, the Superior Court found that Kaney was wrongfully ousted
from the leased premises, and awarded him $13,036.95, the value of the unreturned
property.   Fallon appeals to this Court, contending Kaney’s requests at trial were
1
untimely and barred by the doctrine of election of remedies.   According to Fallon, the
trial judge erred in accepting evidence of value, as Kaney cannot pursue additional
relief several years after entry of the replevin order. 
(4)  The “prosecution of one remedial right to judgment . . . is a decisive act
which constitutes a conclusive election, barring the subsequent prosecution of
inconsistent remedial rights.”   Such claims, however, must be “fairly presented” to
2
the trial court.  Unless review is required in the interests of justice, a party is
3
Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del. 2004).
4
3
precluded from attacking a judgment on a theory that was not raised below.4
(5)  The record shows that Fallon did not assert an election of remedies defense
in the Superior Court.  Furthermore, other than stating that Kaney’s action was
“untimely,” Fallon has not shown plain error or that appellate review is required in the
interests of justice.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice