Case Title: Merida v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 69S01-1301-CR-24

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Jennifer A. Joas  
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Madison, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brian Reitz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 69S01-1301-CR-24 
 
 
CALVIN MERIDA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Ripley Circuit Court 
No. 69C01-1012-FA-8 
The Honorable Carl H. Taul, Judge 
  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 69A01-1203-CR-110 
_________________________________ 
 
May 17, 2013] 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
An investigation showed Merida had been molesting a girl from the time she was five or 
six years old, starting perhaps as early as 2000.  In all, Merida was charged with ten counts of 
child molesting covering the period from 2000 through 2007.  After a jury was empanelled but 
May 17 2013, 12:14 pm
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before evidence was offered, Merida pled guilty to two counts of child molesting as Class A 
felonies.  See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (2008).  The remaining counts were dismissed.  The 
sentencing range for a Class A felony is from twenty years to fifty years; the advisory sentence is 
thirty years.  See I. C. § 35-50-2-4 (2008).   
 
 
The trial court imposed consecutive advisory sentences for an aggregate term of sixty 
years.  As mitigating circumstances, the Court noted the guilty plea but did not accord it a lot of 
weight since the State and the victim had had to prepare for trial.  The trial court also noted 
Merida’s lack of criminal history.  The trial court discussed several aggravating circumstances.  
Merida was in a position of having care, custody and control of the girl, and his conduct occurred  
over a seven-year period.  Also, as a result of the offense becoming known in the community, the 
girl no longer attends public school and does not go out with friends or talk with them on the 
phone as she once did.  She has suffered an emotional impact greater than in the usual case, the 
trial court noted.    
 
 
Citing Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), the Court of Appeals revised the sentences by 
ordering them to run concurrently, thus reducing the aggregate term from sixty years to thirty 
years.  See Merida v. State, 977 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), vacated.  We granted the 
State’s petition to transfer jurisdiction to this Court.  See Merida v. State, 980 N.E.2d 841 (Ind. 
Jan. 11, 2013) (table); App. R. 56(B); 58(A). 
 
 
The authority granted by Article 7, § 4 of the Indiana Constitution permitting appellate 
review and revision of criminal sentences is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which 
provides:  “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of 
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the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 
the offense and the character of the offender.”  Under this rule, and as interpreted by case law, 
appellate courts may revise sentences after due consideration of the trial court's decision, if the 
sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 
offender.  Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222-25 (Ind. 2008); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 
852, 856-57 (Ind. 2003).  The principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers.  
Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.     
 
 
Having reviewed the matter, our collective judgment is that the sentence imposed by the 
trial court is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), and does not warrant appellate 
revision.  Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. 
 
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.