Case Title: State v. Ruffin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP001046-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1046-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Theophilous Ruffin, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 242, 959 N.W.2d 77 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 26, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 5, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
M. Joseph Donald 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. 
There was an oral argument by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by 
Nicole M. Masnica and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin, & Brown LLP. There 
was an oral argument by Nicole M. Masnica. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 34 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1046-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF5306) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Theophilous Ruffin, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 26, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, the State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals 
that reversed the circuit court in part and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing.1  Specifically, the court of appeals 
                                                 
1 State v. Ruffin, No. 2019AP1046-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021) (affirming in part, reversing in 
part, and remanding the order of the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, M. Joseph Donald, Judge). 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
2 
 
determined that Theophilous Ruffin alleged sufficient facts so 
as to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a request for 
a self-defense instruction. 
¶2 
The State contends that the court of appeals failed to 
apply the correct legal framework and that Ruffin is not 
entitled 
to 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
because 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief.  
Ruffin, on the other hand, argues that the court of appeals 
applied the proper framework, and that he is entitled to a 
Machner2 hearing on his ineffective assistance claim. 
¶3 
We determine that the court of appeals applied an 
incorrect legal framework.  In reaching our determination we 
emphasize that even if the motion alleges sufficient facts, an 
evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the motion presents only 
conclusory allegations or if the record as a whole conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief. 
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
record 
here 
conclusively 
demonstrates that Ruffin is not entitled to relief on his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a request for 
a self-defense instruction.  As a result, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Ruffin's 
motion without an evidentiary hearing. 
                                                 
2 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶6 
Ruffin was charged with one count of second degree 
sexual assault3 and one count of mayhem,4 both as acts of 
domestic abuse.5  The charges stemmed from a physical altercation 
between Ruffin and his partner, A.B.6  At the time of the 
altercation, A.B. and Ruffin were in a relationship and lived 
together, along with several children that each partner had from 
previous relationships and their six-month-old son.  A.B. was 
pregnant with the couple's second child. 
¶7 
According to A.B.'s testimony at trial, she and Ruffin 
had a "couple of beers" earlier in the day, and A.B. also 
consumed a "couple lines of cocaine."  Ruffin went to bed around 
10:00 or 11:00 p.m., and A.B. stayed up later, going to bed 
around 3:00 a.m.  A.B. awoke to Ruffin kicking her and telling 
her that the baby was crying. 
¶8 
Ruffin and A.B. began to argue, and A.B. got up to 
prepare a bottle for the baby.  They continued to exchange 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(b) (2015-16). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 940.21. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a). 
6 To protect the dignity and privacy of the victim, we use 
initials that do not correspond to her real name. 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
4 
 
words, which eventually escalated to a physical altercation.  
A.B. testified that Ruffin pulled her by her hair, hit her, and 
punched the back of her head.  She recounted that she hit Ruffin 
with an open hand, and he responded by again hitting her. 
¶9 
A.B. testified next that she told Ruffin that she was 
going to leave, and Ruffin responded by telling her that he was 
not going to let her leave.  When A.B. tried to get past Ruffin, 
she testified that he picked her up by her hair and inner thigh 
and threw her on the bed.  She landed on her back with Ruffin 
kneeling over her. 
¶10 Ruffin put his left arm across her face, pinning her 
on the bed.  A.B. testified that with his right hand, Ruffin 
"just shoves right into my vagina, rips and pulls out."  Ruffin 
did this at least three times.  A.B. felt "all this pressure" 
and instantly felt wet.  She thought that Ruffin was trying to 
kill her unborn child. 
¶11 A.B. ran downstairs and discovered blood dripping down 
her legs.  She also noticed a piece of vaginal tissue "just 
hanging" from her body.  A.B. required surgery to repair and 
reattach two to two-and-a-half inches of separated vaginal 
tissue.   
¶12 The treating doctor testified that "[r]oughly half of 
the right labia minora ha[d] been torn off" and that she "had 
never seen anything quite like it."  Further, the doctor 
testified that A.B. told her that "she fell down the stairs, and 
it caught on her underwear and tore it off."  This explanation 
was suspect, in the doctor's estimation, because she "couldn't 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
5 
 
imagine any way underwear could tear [it] off" because the 
tissue that makes up the labia is "not easily torn."  Due to the 
nature of the tissue and the extent of the injury, the doctor 
thus did not believe A.B.'s initial explanation that she fell 
down the stairs and instead suspected intimate partner violence. 
¶13 Ruffin 
also 
testified 
at 
trial, 
and 
offered 
a 
different version of events.  According to Ruffin, when he 
nudged A.B. with his foot to wake her up, she was upset and 
angry, "cussing" at him.  He noticed that three of his beers and 
his cocaine were missing, and he "threatened to call the social 
workers" to report A.B.'s drug and alcohol use.  Ruffin then 
testified that A.B. "started to come towards me hitting me, 
punching me, try to push me down the stairs." 
¶14 According to Ruffin, as A.B. hit him, he tried to push 
her onto the bed.  As he pushed her, she tripped and grabbed 
Ruffin's collar, and both fell on the bed.  In an effort to 
avoid falling on A.B.'s pregnant belly, Ruffin testified that he 
held himself up with his hand.  In Ruffin's telling, A.B. then 
put her legs around Ruffin's waist. 
¶15 Ruffin indicated that he tried to free himself from 
A.B.'s grasp.  He used his left hand to try to push her legs off 
of him.  When asked on cross-examination how A.B.'s labia was 
injured, Ruffin acknowledged that he "was pushing in that area" 
but later stated that he "didn't never think [he] was pushing 
her labia. . . . All I was trying to do was just push her legs 
off of me so I can go."  He further testified that he wasn't 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
6 
 
trying to use force and was "gently" trying to remove A.B.'s 
legs from around him so he could leave. 
¶16 Ruffin acknowledged the size disparity between him and 
A.B.  He stated that he was a "big man," six feet, four inches 
tall, who weighed 300 pounds at the time of the altercation and 
that A.B. was "small" and five months pregnant. 
¶17 After the close of evidence, Ruffin's counsel asked 
the circuit court to give the jury instruction on self-defense 
and defense of others.7  Counsel explained that Ruffin testified 
that "he didn't know what she was going to do to him and that he 
was trying to get away and he was also trying to prevent himself 
from falling on the unborn child so the actions he undertook 
were designed to protect himself, the unborn child, quite 
frankly [A.B.]."  However, soon after making this request, 
Ruffin's counsel withdrew it.  He reasoned:  "After reading 
through it I don't think it can be worded the way I think it 
needs to be worded.  Therefore, I'm going to withdraw the 
request.  I'm not sure it really fits this situation."   
¶18 In its stead, Ruffin's counsel asked the circuit court 
to give the jury the instruction on an accident defense.8  
Ultimately, the circuit court read the accident instruction with 
respect to the mayhem charge, but not the sexual assault charge.  
The jury convicted Ruffin of second-degree sexual assault 
                                                 
7 For the elements of self-defense, see infra, ¶32. 
8 "Accident is a defense that negatives intent, and may 
negative lesser mental elements."  State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 
101, ¶41, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244. 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
7 
 
(sexual 
intercourse9 
without 
consent 
causing 
injury), 
and 
acquitted him of mayhem.   
¶19 After some additional proceedings not relevant to the 
issue before us,10 Ruffin filed a postconviction motion.  In his 
motion, he asserted three claims:  (1) that the circuit court's 
error in giving a wrong jury instruction on the sexual assault 
count was not harmless, (2) that the circuit court erred by not 
giving the jury the accident instruction for the sexual assault 
count, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective for withdrawing 
the request for a self-defense instruction. 
¶20 The circuit court denied Ruffin's motion without a 
hearing, rejecting each of Ruffin's claims.  With regard to the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for withdrawing the 
request for a self-defense instruction, the circuit court 
determined that withdrawing the request did not constitute 
ineffective assistance "based on the facts of this case."  It 
further stated that "even if a self-defense instruction had been 
given, there is not a reasonable probability the jury would have 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(5)(c) 
defines 
"sexual 
intercourse" as including an "intrusion, however slight, of any 
part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or 
anal opening . . . by the defendant." 
10 After conviction and prior to sentencing, it came to 
light that the circuit court had given the incorrect jury 
instruction 
on 
the 
sexual 
assault 
charge. 
 
Namely, 
the 
instruction given was for sexual assault with use of force (Wis 
JI——Criminal 1208) rather than the charged offense, sexual 
assault causing injury (Wis JI——Criminal 1209).  After briefing 
from the parties on how to address the error, the circuit court 
determined that giving the wrong jury instruction was harmless 
error, and the case proceeded to sentencing. 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
8 
 
bought it based on the amount of force that was used."  The 
circuit court further commented on the extent of A.B.'s 
injuries:  "Almost entirely ripping off the woman's labia——she 
testified it was just hanging there——that required 28 stitches 
to reattach it?  When she was laying on the bed face up?  There 
is not a reasonable probability he would have obtained an 
acquittal." 
¶21 Ruffin appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.  State v. Ruffin, No. 2019AP1046-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021).  It affirmed 
the circuit court's rejection of Ruffin's first two arguments, 
but 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
denial 
of 
Ruffin's 
postconviction motion on the basis that Ruffin's trial counsel 
was ineffective for withdrawing the request for a self-defense 
instruction and remanded to the circuit court for a Machner 
hearing. 
¶22 Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that 
"Ruffin has alleged sufficient facts in his postconviction 
motion that his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing 
his request for the self-defense instruction and is, therefore, 
entitled to a Machner hearing addressing his claim."  Id., ¶42.  
In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals noted that 
Ruffin had alleged in his postconviction motion that A.B. was 
attacking him and his decision to push what he thought were her 
legs was a reasonable action, "given that he did not want to put 
his weight on [A.B.] and possibly harm [A.B.] and their unborn 
child," and that it must accept all of Ruffin's allegations as 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
9 
 
true for purposes of deciding the necessity of an evidentiary 
hearing.  Id., ¶45. 
¶23 Judge White concurred in part and dissented in part, 
dissenting to the majority's conclusion that Ruffin is entitled 
to a Machner hearing on his ineffective assistance claim related 
to 
the 
self-defense 
instruction. 
 
Id., 
¶48 
(White, 
J., 
concurring in part; dissenting in part).  Specifically, Judge 
White determined that "the record conclusively demonstrates that 
Ruffin is not entitled to relief."  Id., ¶53.  The dissent 
reasoned:  "I do not believe any jury would conclude that 
Ruffin's testimony showed he believed his actions that caused 
[A.B.]'s injury were necessary for his self-defense."  Id., ¶50. 
¶24 Further, 
the 
dissent 
espoused 
the 
belief 
that 
"Ruffin's theory of defense is antithetical to Wisconsin law on 
self-defense. . . . Ruffin's testimony does not establish that 
his use of force against [A.B.] was intentional and necessary, 
even in the light most favorable to Ruffin's claims."  Id., ¶51.  
"It defies common sense that during a physical altercation 
between a pregnant woman and a man nearly a foot taller and more 
than one hundred pounds heavier than she, that there was a 
reasonable basis for Ruffin's use of force."  Id., ¶52.  
Accordingly, Judge White concluded that "[t]here is no view of 
the evidence under which the jury could have found Ruffin's use 
of force was reasonably made in self-defense, and there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a 
different verdict had it been instructed on self-defense."  Id., 
¶53. 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 Both Ruffin and the State petitioned for review of 
aspects of the court of appeals' decision.  This court granted 
the State's petition and denied Ruffin's.  Thus, the only issue 
before the court is that raised by the State regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to the withdrawal of the 
request for a self-defense instruction. 
II 
¶26 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by denying Ruffin's postconviction motion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  We are guided by a mixed standard of 
appellate review.  State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. 
¶27 First, we must determine whether the motion on its 
face alleges sufficient material facts that, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief.  Id.  This is a question that 
we review independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Id.  Whether the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is entitled to no 
relief is also a question of law we review independently.  State 
v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659.   
¶28 If the motion does not raise facts sufficient to 
entitle the defendant to relief, or if it presents only 
conclusory 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the 
circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.  
Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9.  In other words, if the record 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
11 
 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, then either option——holding a hearing or not——is within 
the circuit court's discretion.  We review discretionary 
decisions for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id.  An 
exercise of discretion is erroneous if it is based on an error 
of fact or law.  Horizon Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Marshalls Point 
Retreat LLC, 2018 WI 19, ¶29, 380 Wis. 2d 60, 908 N.W.2d 797.   
¶29 Ruffin's claim arises in the context of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  For an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim to be successful, a defendant must demonstrate both that 
(1) 
counsel's 
representation 
was 
deficient, 
and 
(2) 
the 
deficiency was prejudicial.  State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶32, 
383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.  Both prongs of the inquiry 
need not be addressed if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one.  Id. 
¶30 To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must 
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness considering all the circumstances.  
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 
N.W.2d 695 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984)).  In evaluating counsel's performance, we are highly 
deferential to counsel's strategic decisions.  Dalton, 383 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶35.  Indeed, counsel's performance need not be 
perfect, or even very good, to be constitutionally adequate.  
Id. 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
12 
 
III 
¶31 We begin by setting forth and reaffirming the legal 
test when determining if a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on a postconviction motion.  Subsequently, 
we apply that test to the facts of this case. 
A 
¶32 Ruffin contends that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for withdrawing his request for a self-defense instruction on 
the sexual assault count.  Self-defense is a defense to criminal 
liability set forth by statute as follows:   
A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing or terminating what the person reasonably 
believes to be an unlawful interference with his or 
her person by such other person.  The actor may 
intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as 
the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent 
or terminate the interference.  The actor may not 
intentionally use force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1).  In other words, the law of self-defense 
allows the defendant to threaten or intentionally use force 
against another if (1) the defendant believed that there was an 
actual or imminent unlawful interference with the defendant's 
person, (2) the defendant believed that the amount of force the 
defendant used or threatened to use was necessary to prevent or 
terminate the interference, and (3) the defendant's beliefs were 
reasonable.  State v. Stietz, 2017 WI 58, ¶11, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 
895 N.W.2d 796. 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
13 
 
¶33 "A jury must be instructed on self-defense when a 
reasonable jury could find that a prudent person in the position 
of the defendant under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the incident could believe that he was exercising the privilege 
of self-defense."  Id., ¶15.  To be entitled to the instruction, 
the defendant bears a burden of production, but it is a low bar.  
Id., ¶16; State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶111, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 
N.W.2d 413.  Indeed, the defendant "need produce only 'some 
evidence' in support of the privilege of self-defense," a 
standard that may be satisfied even if the evidence is weak, 
inconsistent, of doubtful credibility, or slight.  Stietz, 375 
Wis. 2d 572, ¶¶16-17.  When considering whether to permit a 
defense, the court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant.  State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 
213, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996). 
¶34 The court of appeals here determined that Ruffin is 
entitled to a Machner hearing because, assuming that all facts 
raised in his postconviction motion are true, he came forward 
with "some evidence," which is sufficient to support the 
instruction.  Ruffin, No. 2019AP1046-CR, at ¶¶44-47.  The State 
contends that the court of appeals did not conduct the complete 
analysis by failing to address the question of whether the 
record conclusively demonstrates that Ruffin is not entitled to 
relief.  
¶35 Before answering this question, we provide a quick 
reference regarding the legal standard under which we determine 
whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
14 
 
postconviction motion.  The test we apply in this case is well-
established.  That is, we must determine first whether the 
motion on its face alleges sufficient material facts that, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief.  Allen, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶9.  "A defendant is entitled to a Machner hearing 
only when his motion alleges sufficient facts, which if true, 
would entitle him to relief."  State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶50, 
381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citing Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 
¶14).  However, if the motion does not raise facts sufficient to 
entitle the defendant to relief, or if it presents only 
conclusory 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the 
circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.  
Id. 
¶36 This test was articulated in State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 310-11, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) (citing Nelson v. 
State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972)).  It has been 
repeated in numerous cases.  See, e.g., Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 
¶50; State v. McAlister, 2018 WI 34, ¶¶25-26, 380 Wis. 2d 684, 
911 N.W.2d 77; State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 
880 N.W.2d 659; State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶18, 336 
Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334; State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶26, 
284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62; Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9. 
¶37 Lest there be any doubt about the application of the 
test, we clarified Bentley's language in State v. Howell, 2007 
WI 75, ¶77 n.51, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48.  In Howell, we 
set forth:  
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
15 
 
The Bentley court interpreted Nelson as follows:  "If 
the motion on its face alleges facts which would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has 
no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing."  
In phrasing the Nelson test this way, Bentley might be 
interpreted to make an evidentiary hearing mandatory 
whenever the motion contains sufficient, nonconclusory 
facts, even if the record as a whole would demonstrate 
that the defendant's plea was constitutionally sound.  
Such an interpretation of Nelson and Bentley, however, 
is not correct.  The correct interpretation of 
Nelson/Bentley is that an evidentiary hearing is not 
mandatory if the record as a whole conclusively 
demonstrates that defendant is not entitled to relief, 
even if the motion alleges sufficient nonconclusory 
facts. 
Id. (second emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
¶38  We take this opportunity to once again reaffirm the 
test articulated in Bentley, clarified by Howell, and repeated 
in 
numerous 
cases. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
emphasize 
that 
an 
evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if a defendant's motion 
presents only conclusory allegations or if the record as a whole 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief.  Next, we move to apply this test here, with our focus 
on whether the record conclusively demonstrates that Ruffin is 
not entitled to relief. 
B 
¶39 In applying the test to the facts of this case, we 
agree with the State that the court of appeals erred.  Although 
Ruffin's motion on its face alleges facts that, if true, would 
entitle him to relief, the court of appeals majority did not 
conduct the "record conclusively demonstrates" inquiry, thus 
performing only half of the required analysis.   
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
16 
 
¶40 The court of appeals began its analysis by setting 
forth the proper legal standard for determining entitlement to 
an evidentiary hearing.  Ruffin, No. 2019AP1046-CR, at ¶16.  
With regard to another of Ruffin's claims, it correctly applied 
the standard, determining that "despite the jury having received 
the wrong instruction, the record conclusively shows that there 
is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 
different had trial counsel objected and the jury received the 
correct instruction on the sexual assault charge."  Id., ¶22.   
¶41 However, the court of appeals neglected the "record 
conclusively demonstrates" analysis with respect to the claim at 
issue here.  Conducting such an analysis, we conclude that the 
record conclusively demonstrates that Ruffin is not entitled to 
relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 
withdrawing a request for a self-defense instruction. 
¶42 As 
stated, 
the 
law 
of 
self-defense 
allows 
the 
defendant to threaten or intentionally use force against another 
if (1) the defendant believed that there was an actual or 
imminent unlawful interference with the defendant's person, (2) 
the defendant believed that the amount of force the defendant 
used or threatened to use was necessary to prevent or terminate 
the 
interference, 
and 
(3) 
the 
defendant's 
beliefs 
were 
reasonable.  Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶11.  We agree with the 
State that no reasonable jury would find that Ruffin acted in 
self-defense. 
¶43 In Ruffin's telling, he and A.B. engaged in a verbal 
argument, and she tried to push him down the stairs.  He 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
17 
 
testified that he responded by pushing her back into the room 
and onto the bed.  As he pushed her onto the bed she tripped and 
grabbed Ruffin's collar, dragging both of them onto the bed.  
Ruffin then testified that A.B. wrapped her legs around him and 
that "[a]s she did that all I know she's pulling me toward her.  
I have no idea what she was trying to do so I'm trying to get 
her legs from around my waist so everything happened so fast." 
¶44 Even assuming that there was an unlawful interference 
with Ruffin's person, there is no evidence from which a 
reasonable person could find that Ruffin applied an amount of 
force 
he 
reasonably 
believed 
was 
necessary 
to 
stop 
the 
interference.  As Judge White wrote in dissent at the court of 
appeals, "It defies common sense that during a physical 
altercation between a pregnant woman and a man nearly a foot 
taller and more than one hundred pounds heavier than she, that 
there was a reasonable basis for Ruffin's use of force."  
Ruffin, No. 2019AP1046-CR, at ¶52 (White, J., concurring in 
part; dissenting in part).  Indeed, the amount of force used 
here can only be described as heinous.  There is no view of the 
evidence under which such a use of force can be "reasonable" 
given the size disparity between Ruffin and the victim, the 
alleged actions of the victim, and the extent of the victim's 
injuries, even accepting Ruffin's testimony.    
¶45 Further, as Judge White observed, "Ruffin's testimony 
does not establish that his use of force against [A.B.] was 
intentional and necessary."  Id., ¶51.  Such testimony is 
necessary to establish self-defense because "[o]ne exercising 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
18 
 
the privilege of self-defense intends to use force or to 
threaten force against another for the purpose of self-defense."  
Thomas v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 483, 488, 192 N.W.2d 864 (1972) 
(emphasis added); see also Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶84.   
¶46 Ruffin testified only that he was "pushing in that 
area," not that he intentionally used the force he did because 
he thought it necessary to terminate A.B.'s interference with 
his person.  Further, Ruffin testified that he was not trying to 
use force and was just "gently" attempting to remove A.B.'s legs 
from around him so he could leave.  This is entirely 
inconsistent with an intentional use of force of the magnitude 
employed here.  With no testimony that his use of force was 
intentional and necessary, Ruffin's self-defense argument was 
bound to fail even if the circuit court had given the 
instruction he requested. 
¶47 Put in the context of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel analysis, the record conclusively demonstrates that 
Ruffin's counsel did not perform deficiently by withdrawing the 
request for a self-defense instruction.  As stated, there is no 
reasonable view of the evidence that would have entitled Ruffin 
to the instruction.  Counsel was correct in his assessment that 
self-defense does not "fit[] this situation" and made an 
objectively reasonable strategic decision to not request the 
self-defense instruction.  Failing to request a jury instruction 
to an invalid defense does not constitute deficient performance.  
State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 676, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999).  
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
19 
 
¶48 In sum, we conclude that the record conclusively 
demonstrates that Ruffin is not entitled to relief on his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a request for 
a self-defense instruction.  As a result, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Ruffin's 
motion without an evidentiary hearing. 
¶49 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
2019AP1046-CR   
 
 
 
1