Case Title: Dean v. Board of Cty Supervisors

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100048

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
CHARLES W. DEAN, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 100048  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 21, 2011 
BOARD OF COUNTY SUPERVISORS  
OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Craig D. Johnston, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Prince William County ("trial court") abused its discretion in 
a condemnation action when it sustained the Board of County 
Supervisors of Prince William County's ("the County") motion in 
limine and prohibited the introduction of evidence regarding a 
particular purported comparable sale of property at trial. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
In 2008, the County filed a petition for condemnation in 
the trial court against Charles W. Dean and Anna L. Dean ("the 
Deans"), seeking to obtain the Deans' property "to permit the 
expansion of the PRTC [Potomac Rappahannock Transportation 
Commission] bus maintenance facility and construction of a 
commuter parking facility."  The Deans' property consisted of 
approximately 0.6 acres and had previously been used as a 
gasoline station and as a transmission repair shop.  The County 
filed a condemnation petition against the Deans because the 
County had made efforts to purchase the property but the 
parties had been unable to reach an agreement regarding 
compensation for the property. 
Prior to trial, the County filed a motion in limine, 
requesting the trial court to exclude evidence regarding a 
purported comparable sale of property from Sultan Aman to the 
County ("the Aman sale"), upon which the Deans relied to 
determine their desired level of compensation for their 
property.  The County contended that the Aman sale was not a 
"comparable sale" under Virginia law because the County, as the 
buyer, was influenced by a degree of compulsion or compromise 
in purchasing the Aman property due to its need to complete a 
planned road project.  The Deans argued that the evidence 
demonstrated that the Aman sale was voluntary, and the fact 
that the sale was made to a condemning authority does not make 
it per se compulsory or involuntary. 
At the hearing on the County's motion in limine, the 
County presented evidence that it lacked flexibility in 
purchasing the Aman property because the County planned to 
widen a public highway and the Aman property was directly in 
the path of the planned widening.  The County initially offered 
Aman $860,000 for his property, based on the fair market value 
in an independent appraisal, but Aman rejected this offer and 
made a counteroffer of $1.4 million five weeks later.  The 
County rejected this counteroffer but subsequently offered Aman 
 
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$1.175 million for the property two months later, which Aman 
accepted.  The County testified that if negotiations with Aman 
had failed, it would have filed a certificate of take for 
$860,000.  The County also indicated that it was willing to 
compromise because it desired "to avoid any risk or time and 
expense of going to court." 
The Deans proffered the testimony of Aman, stating that 
Aman would testify that, from his perspective, the sale lacked 
compulsion.  The Deans also stated that Aman would testify that 
he had been trying to sell his property for some time, and the 
County eventually paid him more than his original listing 
price.  Finally, a witness testified that the County did not 
need the Aman property at the exact moment of the sale because 
the County did not start work until several months later.  The 
trial court sustained the motion in limine and ordered that no 
evidence regarding the Aman sale would be admitted into 
evidence at trial. 
At trial, the County's expert appraiser testified that the 
Deans' property was worth $475,000 during the relevant time 
period, and that his valuation was based on eight similar land 
sales and six similar building sales.  The Deans' expert valued 
the property at $900,000.  His valuation was based on three 
comparable sales of gasoline stations that were approximately 
the same size as the Deans' property.  Because of the sustained 
 
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motion in limine, however, the Deans' expert was only permitted 
to testify concerning two of the comparable sales.  Ultimately, 
the jury fixed the value of the Deans' property at $488,750. 
The Deans filed exceptions to the jury's report, arguing 
that the trial court erroneously deprived the jury of the 
opportunity to consider the comparable sale of the Aman 
property.  The trial court overruled and denied all of the 
Deans' exceptions and confirmed the jury's report.  
The Deans timely filed their notice of appeal, and we 
granted an appeal on the following assignment of error: 
1. The trial court erred in barring the jury from 
considering in its determination of just compensation a 
comparable sale to the County. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A. 
Standard of Review 
"Generally, we review a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and, on 
appeal, will not disturb a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence absent a finding of abuse of that discretion."  Avent 
v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197, 688 S.E.2d 244, 256 (2010) 
(citing John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 590, 650 S.E.2d 
851, 855 (2007)).  Specifically, "[t]he question of the 
admissibility of prior sales of comparable property is one left 
largely to the discretion of the trial courts."  Edwards v. 
 
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State Highway Comm'r, 205 Va. 734, 737, 139 S.E.2d 845, 848 
(1965).   
B. 
The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion 
The Deans argue that the trial court erred in barring the 
jury from considering the Aman sale in its determination of 
just compensation for the Deans' property. We disagree. 
We have previously held: 
In eminent domain proceedings a landowner is 
entitled to just compensation for his land taken. 
Where property has a present market value at the 
time of the taking that value is the just 
compensation to which the owner is entitled.  
Market value has been defined as the price which 
one, under no compulsion, is willing to take for 
property which he has for sale, and which 
another, under no compulsion, being desirous and 
able to buy, is willing to pay.  
 
Evidence as to other sales in the same 
locality is admissible if they are close enough 
in time and on a free and open market so as to 
permit a fair comparison.  But . . . it is 
generally held that the amount paid by the 
condemnor for similar land is not admissible as 
an indication of fair market value unless the 
offering party produces evidence sufficient to 
establish that the sale was voluntary and free 
from compulsion and not by way of compromise. 
 
State Highway Comm'r v. Crockett, 203 Va. 796, 798, 127 S.E.2d 
354, 356 (1962) (citations omitted).  Additionally, we have 
stated that 
[u]sually transactions between an owner of land 
that is about to be taken and the condemner fail 
to meet the tests of "comparable sales." Neither 
the purchaser nor the seller is then acting as a 
free agent for the price paid is usually 
 
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influenced to a degree by compromise or 
compulsion because of the pending litigation.  
 
May v. Dewey, 201 Va. 621, 634, 112 S.E.2d 838, 848 (1960). 
In this case, the Deans desired to introduce evidence of 
the Aman sale as a comparable sale to establish the fair market 
value of their property.  However, because the Aman sale 
involved a transaction between "an owner of land that is about 
to be taken and the condemn[or]," the Deans had the burden of 
"produc[ing] evidence sufficient to establish that the [Aman] 
sale was voluntary and free from compulsion and not by way of 
compromise."  Crockett, 203 Va. at 798, 127 S.E.2d at 356.  See 
May, 201 Va. at 634, 112 S.E.2d at 848. 
 
The Deans proffered evidence that the Aman sale, from 
Aman's perspective as the seller, was voluntary, free from 
compulsion, and not by way of compromise, but they failed to 
demonstrate that the same was true from the perspective of the 
County, the purchaser.  To the contrary, the evidence in this 
case indicates that the County's purchase of the Aman property 
was under compulsion and by way of compromise.  A witness for 
the County testified that the County was compelled to acquire 
the Aman property for its planned road project.  Moreover, the 
County presented evidence that it engaged in a series of offers 
and counteroffers before agreeing on the purchase price, which 
was significantly higher than its original offer, and that it 
 
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was willing to compromise because it desired "to avoid any risk 
or time and expense of going to court."  Finally, the County 
also presented evidence that it would have filed a certificate 
of take for the Aman property for $860,000, which was the amount 
the County initially offered based on an independent appraiser's 
determination of the property's fair market value.   
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that 
the Deans failed to produce "evidence sufficient to establish 
that the [Aman] sale was voluntary and free from compulsion and 
not by way of compromise."  Crockett, 203 Va. at 798, 127 
S.E.2d at 356. 
III.  Conclusion 
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by sustaining the County's motion in limine and excluding 
evidence regarding the Aman sale.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent.  Dean proffered testimony that “[Aman] did not 
feel he was under any compulsion” and “thinks he got a 
fantastic deal.”  The trial court held that evidence 
inadmissible because the County would have elected to pursue 
condemnation if the negotiation failed.  That holding, though, 
is not compelled by this Court’s precedents. 
 
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In May v. Dewey, 201 Va. 621, 634, 112 S.E.2d 838, 848 
(1960), this Court reviewed the refusal of evidence of a sale 
of neighboring land “in settlement of a pending condemnation 
suit incident to the same project.”  The Court found the 
evidence inadmissible because “no . . . proof was offered” that 
the sale was voluntary.  Id.  Under May, it is clear that a 
party may offer sufficient proof of a voluntary sale with a 
condemnor.  See id. (“Usually transactions between an owner of 
land that is about to be taken and the condemner fail to meet 
the tests of ‘comparable sales.’ ”) (emphasis added). 
 
The Deans proffered such proof through Mr. Aman’s 
testimony.  The County’s argument to the contrary that it was 
under compulsion because it feared the “risk of time and 
expense of going to court” is unpersuasive.  The County faced 
absolutely no risk relating to the timing of its highway 
project because it had “quick-take” authority to acquire the 
Aman property.  See Code § 15.2-1904; § 25.1-313.  Its only 
risk relating to expense was that a condemnation jury might 
award a higher sum than a negotiated purchase.  But that 
argument is counter-intuitive at best and disingenuous at 
worst, since if the County paid less than it may have at trial 
then it benefited from the so-called “compulsion.” 
 
Perhaps compulsion, like beauty, is in the eye of the 
beholder.  I shed no tears for any government that complains of 
 
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compulsion while simultaneously wielding the big stick of 
condemnation. 
 
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