Case Title: State v. Dwight M. Sanders

Citation: 2008 WI 85

Docket Number: 2006AP002060-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2060-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Dwight M. Sanders, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 174 
Reported at: 304 Wis. 2d 159, 737 N.W.2d 44 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis J. Barry   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and ZIEGLER, JJ., join the 
concurrence. 
 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Patrick 
M. 
Donnelly, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2060-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF600) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dwight M. Sanders, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The State seeks review 
of a published court of appeals decision reversing an order and 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Dennis J. 
Barry, Judge.1  The circuit court denied defendant Dwight M. 
Sanders' 
motions 
to 
suppress 
both 
physical 
evidence 
and 
statements that law enforcement officers obtained following a 
warrantless entry into the defendant's home and two subsequent 
warrantless searches of the defendant's bedroom.  The defendant 
                                                 
1 State v. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, 304 Wis. 2d 159, 737 
N.W.2d 44.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
2 
 
was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as 
a second offense and as a habitual offender contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r., 961.48, and 939.62 (2005-06).2    
¶2 
In reversing the circuit court's order and judgment, 
the court of appeals concluded that the law enforcement 
officers' warrantless entry into the defendant's home violated 
the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States 
Constitution3 
applicable 
to 
the 
states 
under 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals but on different grounds.  
¶3 
The determinative issue on review is whether the 
circuit court erred in denying the defendant's motions to 
suppress the physical evidence that law enforcement officers 
obtained following a warrantless entry into the defendant's home 
to make a warrantless arrest and two subsequent warrantless 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted.  
3 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in full:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
3 
 
searches of his bedroom.4  This issue turns on the answer to the 
following question:  Are the law enforcement officers' two 
warrantless searches of the defendant's bedroom justified 
(respectively) under the "protective sweep" and "search incident 
to 
arrest" 
exceptions 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
warrant 
requirement?   
¶4 
The 
court 
concludes 
that 
although 
the 
first 
warrantless search of the defendant's bedroom may have been 
justified under the "protective sweep" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement, the second search of the bedroom 
was not justified under the "search incident to arrest" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  The 
court further concludes that the search of the canister found in 
the bedroom and seizure of its contents were not justified under 
either exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.   
                                                 
4 Accordingly, we need not address the issue the court of 
appeals decided, namely, whether the law enforcement officers' 
warrantless 
entry 
into 
the 
defendant's 
home 
to 
make 
a 
warrantless arrest was justified as an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement. 
The initial entry into the defendant's home to arrest the 
defendant, the searches of the defendant's bedroom, the search 
of a canister in the defendant's bedroom, and the seizure of the 
contents of the canister were all nonconsensual in the instant 
case.  The instant case does not address consensual searches or 
seizures.   
The State's brief concentrates on suppression of the 
physical evidence and makes little mention of the defendant's 
statements.  The assumption seems to be that if the physical 
evidence 
is 
suppressed 
so 
are 
the 
defendant's 
alleged 
statements.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order denying 
the defendant's motion to suppress and reversing the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction. 
I 
¶6 
We briefly summarize the facts relating to the 
officers' 
obtaining 
possession 
of 
the 
evidence 
that 
the 
defendant moved to suppress.   
¶7 
Two City of Racine police officers, Officers Garcia 
and Anderson, were dispatched to a residence on a complaint of 
cruelty to animals.  As the officers arrived, they heard a dog 
yelping and proceeded to the yard behind the residence.  There, 
the officers observed four people, one of whom was the 
defendant, along with three or four dogs.  Officer Garcia 
testified that he did not notice any signs of mistreatment or 
injury to the dogs. 
¶8 
Officer Anderson advised the defendant of the animal 
cruelty complaint and made multiple requests for the defendant 
to identify himself.  The defendant responded to each of these 
requests by saying that he had done nothing wrong.  According to 
Officer Anderson, the defendant objected to the officers' 
conduct, saying that "this [is] bullshit."   
¶9 
As the officers conversed with the defendant, they 
observed that the defendant was holding folded-up bills of 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
5 
 
currency5 as well as a yellow and black canister later revealed 
to be a beef jerky canister. 
¶10 Officer 
Garcia 
testified 
that 
the 
defendant's 
residence was not a known drug house, that Officer Garcia had 
had no prior dealings with the defendant, that Officer Garcia 
was unaware at the time whether the defendant had a history of 
drug trafficking, and that Officer Garcia observed neither a 
controlled substance nor a drug transaction in the defendant's 
back yard.  Officer Garcia also testified that the defendant's 
residence is located in a known drug trafficking area and that 
it 
was 
"not 
unusual" 
for 
persons 
to 
conceal 
controlled 
substances in canisters "similar to" the beef jerky canister 
that the officers observed in the defendant's hand. 
¶11 Officer Anderson attempted to detain the defendant 
with handcuffs.  At oral argument in this court, the State 
characterized this attempted detainer not as an attempted arrest 
upon probable cause but instead as an attempted seizure 
justified under the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  The defendant has not 
challenged the lawfulness of Officer Anderson's attempt to 
detain the defendant, and the State has not briefed the validity 
of Officer Anderson's conduct as a Terry stop.  For purposes of 
this appeal, we assume that the attempted detainer was justified 
under Terry.   
                                                 
5 The record does not indicate how much money the officers 
observed in the defendant's hand.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 When 
Officer 
Anderson 
attempted 
to 
detain 
the 
defendant, the defendant moved away from the officers and then 
ran into his home through the rear door.  At some point while 
the defendant was moving toward his home, Officer Anderson 
ordered the defendant to stop.  The defendant did not stop. 
¶13 The officers pursued the defendant, following him into 
his home.  The defendant ran into a bedroom and shut the door 
behind him.  Officer Garcia and Officer Anderson each testified 
that the purpose of following the defendant into his home was to 
take the defendant into custody.  Each officer also testified 
that he did not believe evidence of any crime would be 
discovered inside the defendant's home.   
¶14 After approximately one minute or less, the defendant 
voluntarily exited the bedroom.  Officer Garcia testified that 
he then ordered the defendant to the ground and that the 
defendant did not obey this order.  Chemical spray was applied 
to the defendant.6  The defendant fell to the ground and was 
handcuffed.7     
¶15 Officer Garcia testified that after the defendant was 
handcuffed, Officer Garcia performed a brief "protective sweep" 
of the bedroom in which the defendant had just been hiding.  The 
defendant was escorted out of the home after Officer Garcia 
                                                 
6 The record does not show which officer applied the 
chemical spray.  
7 The record does not show which officer handcuffed the 
defendant.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
7 
 
performed this brief search of the bedroom.  Officer Garcia then 
performed a second search of the bedroom.     
¶16 Officer Garcia testified that while performing this 
second search, he discovered underneath the defendant's bed the 
canister 
that 
the 
officers 
earlier 
had 
observed 
in 
the 
defendant's hand.  Officer Garcia opened the canister.  The 
canister contained a substance that Officer Garcia identified as 
cocaine. 
¶17 Officer 
Garcia 
testified 
that 
his 
purpose 
in 
performing the second search of the defendant's bedroom was "to 
search[] for the canister."  When asked why he did not obtain a 
warrant before performing this second search of the defendant's 
bedroom, Officer Garcia testified that he "didn't think of it."   
¶18 Officer 
Anderson's 
testimony 
regarding 
Officer 
Garcia's searches of the bedroom was inconsistent with Officer 
Garcia's testimony on one point.  Officer Anderson testified 
that Officer Garcia discovered the canister during his initial 
search of the defendant's bedroom, not during the second search.  
Officer Anderson offered no testimony regarding the nature or 
timing of either the first or second searches of the bedroom. 
¶19 The circuit court did not make a factual finding 
regarding whether Officer Garcia discovered the canister and 
contraband during his first or second search of the defendant's 
bedroom.  In his brief, the defendant states that the canister 
and contraband were discovered during the second search of the 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
8 
 
defendant's bedroom.8  The State asserts in its reply brief that 
it is unclear whether the canister was found during the first or 
second search of the defendant's bedroom.9  
¶20 Subsequent 
to 
his 
arrest, 
the 
defendant 
was 
transported to the Racine County Jail.  The defendant allegedly 
made inculpatory statements to police while at the jail. 
¶21 The State charged the defendant with one count of 
obstructing 
an 
officer 
and 
one 
count 
of 
second 
offense 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.  The defendant was 
charged as a habitual offender under each count.  
¶22 The defendant moved to suppress as evidence the 
contraband that Officer Garcia discovered while searching the 
defendant's bedroom, as well as the statements that the 
defendant allegedly made at the Racine County Jail.  The circuit 
court denied the defendant's suppression motion. 
¶23 The defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine 
with intent to deliver as a second offense and as a habitual 
offender.  The defendant filed a motion for postconviction 
relief, which the circuit court denied.   
¶24 The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit 
court, holding that the officers' warrantless entry into the 
defendant's residence was unlawful.  The court of appeals did 
                                                 
8 See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant at 5-6. 
9 See Reply Brief of [State] Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner 
at 8. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
9 
 
not address the question whether the searches of the defendant's 
bedroom were lawful. 
II 
¶25 Assuming without deciding that the warrantless entry 
into the defendant's home was justified under the Fourth 
Amendment, we consider whether the warrantless search of the 
defendant's bedroom and the warrantless search of the canister 
and seizure of the contents thereof are constitutional under the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
The 
question 
whether 
a 
search 
is 
constitutional is a question of constitutional fact.10  This 
court upholds the circuit court's findings of evidentiary or 
historical facts unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  
This 
court 
determines 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles to those evidentiary facts independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from those 
courts' analyses.11  
¶26 Neither the record nor the circuit court's findings 
resolves whether the canister was found during the first or 
second search of the defendant's bedroom.  Resolution of this 
factual question is unnecessary for purposes of this review.  We 
conclude that the search of the canister and seizure of its 
contents were unlawful regardless of whether the canister was 
found during the first or second search of the bedroom.    
                                                 
10 State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 
(1998). 
11 State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶15, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
10 
 
¶27 We approach the issue of the search of the bedroom and 
the search of the canister and seizure of its contents with the 
understanding that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
subject 
to 
a 
few 
carefully 
delineated exceptions.12  We must therefore determine whether the 
warrantless search of the defendant's bedroom and the search of 
the canister and seizure of the contents of the canister fall 
within any of the delineated exceptions.  The burden is on the 
State to show that the search of the bedroom and search of the 
canister and seizure of its contents fall within one of the 
exceptions 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement. 
"[T]he 
general 
requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to 
be dispensed with, and the burden is on those seeking an 
exemption from the requirement to show the need for it."13   
A.  The First Search 
¶28 For purposes of this part of the opinion, we assume 
that Officer Garcia discovered the canister and contraband 
during his first search of the defendant's bedroom and that the 
officers' presence in the home was lawful.   
¶29 The record offers little information regarding what 
happened during the first search.  Officer Garcia's testimony 
flatly 
contradicts 
the 
very 
premise 
that 
Officer 
Garcia 
discovered the canister and contraband during his first search 
                                                 
12 State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 227, 455 N.W.2d 618 
(1990) (citation omitted). 
13 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (citation 
and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
11 
 
of 
the 
bedroom. 
 
Officer 
Anderson 
offered 
no 
testimony 
describing Officer Garcia's searches.   
¶30 The State's brief seems to assume that if the first 
warrantless search of the bedroom falls within an exception to 
the warrant requirement, the search of the canister and seizure 
of its contents during the first search of the bedroom also fall 
within an exception to the warrant requirement.   
¶31 The State relies on the "protective sweep" exception 
to the search warrant requirement established in Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), to validate the search of the 
bedroom. 
¶32 The 
protective 
sweep 
doctrine 
applies 
once 
law 
enforcement officers are inside an area, including a home.  Once 
inside an area a law enforcement officer may perform a 
warrantless "protective sweep," that is, "a quick and limited 
search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to 
protect the safety of police officers or others."14  Under Buie, 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
is 
justified 
in 
performing 
a 
warrantless protective sweep when the officer possesses "a 
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area 
swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or 
others."15  Because the protective sweep exception authorizes 
                                                 
14 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 
15 Id. (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).  
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
12 
 
only a limited intrusion, Buie requires the officer to have only 
reasonable suspicion that the area poses a danger to the officer 
or others; the test is not probable cause.16  
¶33 The protective sweep extends "to a cursory inspection 
of those spaces where a person may be found"17 and may last "no 
longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of 
danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the 
arrest and depart the premises."18    
¶34 The State argues that Officer Garcia's initial search 
of the defendant's bedroom was justified under the Buie 
standard.  According to the State, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion of drug trafficking and therefore understandably 
feared others may be present who would jeopardize the officers' 
safety.19 
 
The 
State 
recounts 
that 
the 
defendant 
"was 
uncooperative, had fled, was carrying money and a container that 
looked like it could be used to conceal drugs and, in addition, 
                                                 
16 See id. at 336 (characterizing a protective sweep as a 
"limited intrusion," not as a "full-blown search"; requiring 
"reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a 
person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene"); id. at 
334 n.2 ("Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspicion 
before a frisk for weapons can be conducted.  That approach is 
applied to the protective sweep of a house.").  
17 Buie, 494 U.S. at 335. 
18 Id. at 335-36. 
19 Reply Brief of [State] Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 
8. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
13 
 
the area where [the defendant's] apartment is located is noted 
for drug trafficking."20   
¶35 Accepting for the moment the State's position that 
articulable facts exist to demonstrate that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion that other persons may be lurking in the 
defendant's bedroom who would pose a danger to the officers and 
that a protective search of the bedroom was therefore justified, 
we nevertheless must conclude that Officer Garcia's search of 
the canister and seizure of its contents clearly were not within 
the purpose of the protective sweep.  The search of the canister 
and seizure of its contents were not part of a search for 
persons who might pose a danger to law enforcement officers or 
to others.  No person could be hiding in the canister.  
Furthermore, the officers had no articulable suspicion that 
weapons were involved in the instant case.  The search of the 
canister and seizure of its contents therefore do not fall 
within the "protective sweep" exception to the search warrant 
requirement.  
¶36 Accordingly, we determine that if the canister was 
searched and the contents of the canister were seized during the 
first search of the defendant's bedroom, the search of the 
canister and the seizure of its contents do not fall within the 
protective sweep exception to the search warrant requirement.  
                                                 
20 Brief and Appendix of [State] Plaintiff-Respondent-
Petitioner at 33. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
14 
 
The physical evidence is therefore the fruit of a search that 
violated the Fourth Amendment and must be suppressed.  
¶37 The State offers no justification for the officers' 
search of the canister and seizure of its contents beyond the 
protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement.  Under 
our case law, warrantless seizure and inspection of evidence are 
justified when the officer is lawfully in a position to observe 
the evidence, the evidence is in plain view of the officer, the 
discovery is inadvertent, and the item seized in itself or in 
itself with facts known to the officer at the time of the 
seizure provides probable cause to believe there is a connection 
between the evidence and criminal activity.21  The State does 
not, however, cite to or rely on this line of cases and does not 
argue in this court that Officer Garcia had probable cause to 
believe that there was a connection between the canister and 
criminal activity.  The State argues in this court only that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense.22   
¶38 The present case is reminiscent of Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987), in which officers were lawfully in 
an apartment looking for a shooter.  Suspecting that stereo 
                                                 
21 See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶40, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 
609 N.W.2d 795 ("An officer may inspect an object seized in a 
Terry frisk when it is immediately apparent that the object is, 
or contains, contraband.").  
22 The State unsuccessfully argued before the court of 
appeals that the officers had probable cause to believe that 
Sanders was involved in a drug offense.  Sanders, 2007 WI App 
174, ¶1.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
15 
 
components in the squalid, ill-appointed apartment might be 
stolen goods, one of the officers moved some pieces of equipment 
slightly to reveal and record their serial numbers.  The officer 
called in the serial numbers and immediately established that 
the equipment was stolen property.  The law enforcement officers 
seized the equipment.  The United States Supreme Court held that 
the officer's initial movement of the equipment was a search 
separate and apart from the search of the apartment for the 
shooter that justified the officer's original entry into the 
apartment and that the search of the equipment was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment because only reasonable suspicion, 
not probable cause, existed to believe that the equipment was 
stolen.   
¶39 Hicks teaches that even in the face of a lawful entry 
and reasonable suspicion that an object is evidence of a crime, 
a slight movement of the object is an impermissible search 
whenever it is "unrelated to the objectives of the authorized 
intrusion."23   
¶40 In the instant case the officers were in the home to 
arrest the defendant for obstructing the officers.  The officer 
did not merely move the canister slightly and examine its 
exterior surface.  Rather, the officer removed the canister from 
under the bed and opened it. 
¶41 Because the officer's search of the canister and 
seizure of the contents were unrelated to the objectives of the 
                                                 
23 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
16 
 
authorized intrusion into the bedroom as a protective sweep in 
relation 
to 
arresting 
the 
defendant 
for 
obstructing 
the 
officers, the officer's search of the canister and seizure of 
its contents do not fall within the protective sweep exception 
to the warrant requirement.   
¶42 Accordingly, we conclude that if the canister was 
searched and its contents were seized during the first search of 
the defendant's bedroom, the physical evidence in the canister 
is the fruit of a search that violated the Fourth Amendment and 
must be suppressed. 
B.  The Second Search 
¶43 For purposes of this part of the opinion, we assume 
that Officer Garcia searched the canister and seized its 
contents during his second search of the defendant's bedroom and 
that the officers' presence in the home was lawful. 
¶44 The record offers little information regarding what 
happened during the second search of the bedroom.  Officer 
Garcia testified that he discovered the canister and contraband 
during his second search of the bedroom while he was looking 
under the bed.   
¶45 The defendant was arrested in the living room.  The 
parties do not dispute that the police had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant for obstructing an officer.  The State 
relies on the "search incident to an arrest" exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to justify the second 
search of the bedroom.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
17 
 
¶46 The State's brief seems to assume that if the second 
warrantless search of the bedroom falls within an exception to 
the warrant requirement, the search of the canister and seizure 
of its contents during the second search of the bedroom also 
fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. 
¶47 The circuit court concluded that the search of the 
bedroom was a valid search pursuant to an arrest.  
¶48 The scope of what is conventionally termed the "search 
incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement was set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969).  In Chimel, the  United States Supreme Court held that a 
lawful arrest creates a situation justifying a contemporaneous, 
warrantless "search of the arrestee's person and the area within 
his immediate control."24  It is a search of the area within the 
arrestee's immediate control that is at issue here.    
¶49 This exception to the warrant requirement serves two 
primary governmental interests.  "One is the need to detect and 
remove any weapons that the arrestee might try to use to resist 
arrest or escape.  Another is the need to prevent the 
destruction or concealment of evidence."25  
¶50 Significantly, while "the Chimel rule states that it 
is reasonable to search an area near the arrestee," the rule 
does not permit a warrantless search of "an area so broad as to 
                                                 
24 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
25 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 228 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
763). 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
18 
 
be unrelated to the protective purposes of the search."26  "Thus, 
Chimel defines the area of 'immediate control' within which the 
police may reasonably search incident to arrest as 'the area 
from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence.'"27   
¶51 The State contends that Officer Garcia's second search 
of the defendant's bedroom was justified as a search incident to 
arrest under the Chimel standard because the bedroom was "within 
[the 
defendant's] 
immediate 
presence 
or 
control 
when 
he 
barricaded himself in the bedroom and was out of the police 
officers' sight."28   
¶52 Although the bedroom might be considered within the 
defendant's immediate presence or control for Chimel purposes, 
we do not agree with the State that the second search of the 
bedroom was a search incident to arrest under the circumstances 
of the present case.  The second search occurred after the 
defendant had been removed from the home.29   The defendant could 
                                                 
26 Id. at 228-29. 
27 Id. at 229 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
28 Brief and Appendix of [State] Plaintiff-Respondent-
Petitioner at 36. 
29 In its brief, the State asserts that Officer Garcia's 
second search of the defendant's bedroom "occurred just after 
[the 
defendant] 
was 
handcuffed 
and 
removed 
from 
[his 
residence]." 
 
Brief 
and 
Appendix 
of 
[State] 
Plaintiff-
Respondent-Petitioner at 36.   
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
19 
 
not have gained possession of a weapon or destructible evidence 
from his bedroom when the defendant was not even inside the home 
when the bedroom and canister were searched and the contents of 
the canister seized.   
¶53 The State relies upon State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 
217, 227, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990), to support the second search of 
the bedroom under the Chimel standard even though the defendant 
in the instant case had been removed from the home.  Murdock  
does not authorize the search of the bedroom at issue in the 
present case as a search incident to arrest.   
¶54 In Murdock, law enforcement officers performed a 
warrantless search of an area immediately surrounding the 
defendant.  The search was contemporaneous with handcuffing the 
defendant.30  The search involved a pantry-type closet connected 
to the room in which the arrest was made.  The court upheld the 
search notwithstanding the defendant's restrained condition and 
apparent inability to access the areas immediately surrounding 
him.  The Murdock court was "unwilling to say that a defendant 
who is arrested in and remains in his or her dwelling as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nothing in the record suggests that the defendant was still   
in his residence at the time that Officer Garcia performed his 
second search of the defendant's bedroom.  The record instead 
shows that the State was correct to assert in its brief that the 
second search occurred after the defendant had been handcuffed 
and removed from his residence. 
30 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 223. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
20 
 
search is conducted could never regain access to areas in his or 
her immediate control at the time of arrest."31   
¶55 The Murdock court also determined that even when an 
arrestee is handcuffed, "we cannot require an officer to weigh 
the arrestee's probability of success in obtaining a weapon or 
destructible evidence hidden within his or her immediate 
control."32  According to the Murdock court,  Chimel authorizes a 
limited, contemporaneous search for weapons and evidence in the 
area 
surrounding 
the 
arrestee. 
 
"Its 
sanction 
of 
a 
contemporaneous, 
limited 
search 
protects 
the 
individual's 
privacy interests in areas outside his or her immediate control 
and also serves valid societal interests in protecting officer 
safety and preserving evidence."33   
¶56 The facts in the present case do not resemble those in 
Murdock.  In the instant case, unlike in Murdock, the defendant 
was not in his home when the bedroom was searched.  The 
defendant had already been removed from the home at the time of 
the search.  No possibility existed that the defendant could 
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence in the home.  The purposes 
of the search incident to arrest were achieved by removing the 
defendant from his home.  By removing the defendant from the 
home, the officers eliminated the need to detect and remove any 
                                                 
31 Id. at 234 (emphasis added). 
32 Id. at 235 (emphasis added). 
33 Id. at 236. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
21 
 
weapons that the arrestee might try to use to resist arrest or 
escape or to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.   
¶57 Neither Chimel nor Murdock governs the instant case, 
in which the defendant was removed from the home before the 
search supposedly incident to the arrest.   
¶58 At oral argument, the State suggested that the law 
enforcement officers were justified in conducting the second 
warrantless search of the defendant's bedroom because it was 
"highly likely" that persons other than the defendant would  
destroy evidence inside the defendant's bedroom had the officers 
waited to obtain a warrant before searching for the evidence.  
Nothing in the record supports speculation that other persons 
posed risks.  Nothing in the record suggests that the law 
enforcement officers could not have maintained the status quo 
and could not have obtained a search warrant promptly upon a 
showing of probable cause to believe illicit drugs were in the 
home.   
¶59 Accordingly, we determine that the second search of 
the bedroom does not fall within the search incident to arrest 
exception to the search warrant requirement.  If the canister 
was searched and the contents seized during the second search of 
the defendant's bedroom, the search and seizure were not within 
the State's claimed search incident to arrest exception to the 
search warrant requirement.  The physical evidence in the 
canister is therefore the fruit of a search that violated the 
Fourth Amendment and must be suppressed. 
No. 
2006AP2060-CR   
 
22 
 
 
* * * * 
¶60 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order denying 
the defendant's motion to suppress and reversing the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶61 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The court is 
unanimous 
that 
evidence 
of 
a 
yellow 
and 
black 
canister 
containing cocaine must be suppressed because the canister was 
obtained in a search without a warrant in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  I agree with the majority opinion's analysis 
that police searches for that canister and its contents inside 
the defendant's house were not valid. 
¶62 I write separately to address the real issue that 
brought this case before the court: namely, whether warrantless 
police entry into a home under the exigency of "hot pursuit" to 
arrest a person for a misdemeanor violates the Fourth Amendment, 
as stated in State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, 256 
Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421. 
¶63 The facts are undisputed that the defendant in this 
case committed a jailable criminal offense in the presence of 
police and that police entered the defendant's house in hot 
pursuit to effect the defendant's immediate arrest.  Entering a 
home without a warrant under these circumstances is not 
unreasonable.  Entry into a home in hot pursuit to arrest a 
person on probable cause for a jailable criminal offense is a 
longstanding, common sense exception to the warrant requirement.  
Accordingly, I concur.   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶64 The facts relevant to the warrantless entry of 
defendant Dwight Sanders' (Sanders) residence are stated below.  
They are based on the testimony of Officers Jorge Garcia 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
(Officer Garcia) and Hendriel Anderson (Officer Anderson) at an 
August 5, 2005, hearing on Sanders' motion to suppress. 
¶65 On May 6, 2005, Officers Garcia and Anderson were sent 
to 1222 Villa Street in the City of Racine in response to a 
complaint of cruelty to animals.  Officer Garcia testified that 
he was familiar with the neighborhood as a high-volume drug 
trafficking area, although the residence in question was not a 
known "drug house."  The officers entered the property through 
an open fence.  They heard a dog yelping and made contact with 
four males standing in the back yard.  The officers saw several 
pit bull dogs, but none of them showed signs of injury or 
mistreatment. 
¶66 Officer Garcia observed that one of the men, later 
identified as Sanders, was holding an unknown amount of folded 
United States currency and a yellow and black canister in his 
left hand.  Officer Garcia testified that it would not be 
unusual for persons selling drugs to conceal them in a canister 
similar to the one Sanders was holding. 
¶67 Officer Anderson advised Sanders of the animal abuse 
complaint and requested identification.  Sanders responded that 
he "did not do anything wrong" and that "this [is] bullshit."  
Sanders repeatedly refused to give his name, address, and date 
of birth.  Officer Anderson testified that he became "firm" with 
Sanders and attempted to handcuff him for officer safety.  
Sanders reacted by backing away, turning, and running toward the 
house.  Officer Anderson ordered Sanders to stop, but he did not 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
obey.  Sanders ran into the house.  Officer Garcia believed he 
had probable cause to arrest Sanders for obstructing an officer. 
¶68 The officers immediately chased Sanders into the house 
where Sanders had barricaded himself in a bedroom.  Sanders 
voluntarily emerged from the bedroom after about one minute and 
was arrested.  Officer Anderson testified that his purpose in 
chasing Sanders into the house was that he saw Sanders as a 
threat to himself and Officer Garcia.  The officers pursued 
Sanders into the house to take him into custody, not to search 
for evidence in his house.  After arresting Sanders, however, 
Officer Garcia searched Sanders' bedroom twice and located the 
canister that Sanders was holding while he was in the back yard.  
Officer Garcia opened the canister and found crack cocaine.1 
¶69 The circuit court denied Sanders' motion to suppress 
the evidence seized during the searches of Sanders' bedroom.  
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officers' 
warrantless entry into Sanders' residence violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  State v. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, ¶33, 304 
Wis. 2d 159, 737 N.W.2d 44.  It is this latter conclusion——one 
that the chief judge of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals asked us 
to review, id., ¶35 (Brown, J., concurring)——that requires this 
separate writing.   
II. ANALYSIS 
¶70 The issue of hot pursuit is before us because the 
court of appeals applied its 2002 decision in Mikkelson to the 
                                                 
1 These searches were not valid for the reasons explained in 
the majority opinion.  See majority op., ¶¶25-59. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
facts of this case.  Sanders, 304 Wis. 2d 159, ¶33.  Thus, the 
majority opinion neglects to confront the very issue why this 
court accepted the State's petition for review. 
¶71 In Mikkelson the court of appeals held that a 
warrantless entry into a home under the exigency of "hot 
pursuit" to arrest a probable misdemeanant violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  Mikkelson, 256 Wis. 2d 132, ¶17.  In the case at 
hand, the court of appeals applied this bright-line rule from 
Mikkelson to suppress the evidence and statements obtained by 
police after the warrantless entry into Sanders' residence.  
Sanders, 304 Wis. 2d 159, ¶33.  However, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740 (1984), does not mandate the decision in Mikkelson, and 
the Mikkelson court erred when it concluded that its decision 
was required by Welsh.  Nonetheless, the majority simply looks 
away.  The Mikkelson decision represents a major departure from 
prior law: e.g., the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, the decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the 
decisions of courts in other states.  It creates serious 
problems for law enforcement officers attempting to preserve 
order and effect expedient, lawful arrests for crimes that are 
grounded in probable cause. 
¶72 Historically, the distinct exigency of hot pursuit has 
been sufficient to justify the warrantless entry of a dwelling 
to arrest a person for a misdemeanor such as obstructing an 
officer.  Abandoning this principle creates a perverse incentive 
for misdemeanor defendants to flee from police officers into 
their homes to prevent their lawful seizure. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
¶73 To address these concerns, this concurrence will first 
discuss the Mikkelson decision——which involved some peculiar 
facts regarding consent——and show that it was an aberration that 
did not follow either federal or state precedents interpreting 
and applying Welsh.  The concurrence will then discuss existing 
law regarding "hot pursuit" as a stand-alone justification for a 
warrantless home entry and arrest.   
A. 
The Mikkelson Rule 
¶74 Mikkelson 
involved 
an 
encounter 
between 
Harold 
Mikkelson (Mikkelson) and Officer Bonita Jo Johnson (Officer 
Johnson), a police officer in Superior.  Mikkelson, 256 
Wis. 2d 132, ¶¶1-2.  While on vehicle patrol, Officer Johnson 
observed a male, later determined to be Mikkelson, making 
suspicious movements between a car and garage.  Id., ¶2.  
Officer Johnson pulled her squad car into an alley and shined 
her light on the scene.  Id.  She saw Mikkelson duck down inside 
a minivan.  Id.  She approached the van and asked Mikkelson for 
his name and an explanation for his actions.  Id., ¶3.  
Mikkelson responded that he lived there, in an adjacent house, 
and that he was doing nothing wrong.  Id.  When Officer Johnson 
asked what he was doing in the van, Mikkelson pushed her away 
and walked toward the house.  Id.  Officer Johnson ordered 
Mikkelson to stop, but he kept walking.  Id.  When Officer 
Johnson reached to grab Mikkelson's arm, he again pushed her 
away.  Id.  At that point Officer Johnson decided to arrest 
Mikkelson for obstructing an officer.  Id., ¶3 n.1.  Officer 
Johnson sprayed Mikkelson with chemical spray, but Mikkelson was 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
able to enter the house while Officer Johnson radioed for 
backup.  See id., ¶3. 
¶75 When help arrived, Officer Johnson knocked on the 
door, spoke with Mikkelson's father, and was told that Mikkelson 
would be forthcoming.  Id., ¶4.  However, Mikkelson never 
appeared.  Id.  According to Officer Johnson, she then received 
permission from Mikkelson's mother to enter the house.  Id., ¶5.  
After gaining entry, several officers went into the basement and 
arrested Mikkelson.  Id., ¶6.  During the arrest, Mikkelson 
allegedly punched an officer and was subsequently charged with a 
misdemeanor count of obstructing an officer and a felony count 
of battery to a police officer.  Id. 
¶76 Mikkelson moved to suppress all evidence obtained by 
the police inside the house.  Id., ¶7.  At the suppression 
hearing, three officers testified that they had been given 
consent to enter Mikkelson's house.  Id., ¶8.  This was disputed 
by Mikkelson's parents.  Id., ¶5.  The circuit court found that 
the officers had not received consent to enter the house, and 
therefore suppressed evidence of everything that happened in the 
house.  Id., ¶9.  The State appealed.  Id., ¶1.  It did not 
challenge the circuit court's ruling on consent.  Instead, it 
argued that the police had probable cause to pursue Mikkelson 
into his home without a search warrant to arrest him for 
obstructing an officer.  Id., ¶¶1, 11. 
¶77 The court of appeals ruled that the State had waived 
its argument that police were entitled to enter Mikkelson's 
house without a warrant because they were in hot pursuit.  Id., 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
¶¶13, 16.  Nonetheless, a plainly annoyed court addressed the 
hot pursuit argument and held that, under the facts presented, 
the argument was without merit.  Id., ¶17.  The court stated:   
Even if we were to consider the State's argument, 
we would reject it.  An arrest made in hot pursuit 
constitutes an exigent circumstance required for a 
warrantless entry.  State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 
229, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).  Relying on United States 
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976), the State argues 
that the police were entitled to enter the house and 
arrest Mikkelson because they were in hot pursuit.  
Santana holds that a suspect may not defeat an arrest 
that has been set in motion in a public place by 
escaping to a private place.  Id.  However, in Welsh 
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-51 (1984), the Supreme 
Court limited Santana to the hot pursuit of fleeing 
felons.  Also, the court in Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980), stated that Santana was limited to 
in-home arrests of felons when police have probable 
cause and exigent circumstances.  The police were 
pursuing Mikkelson for obstructing an officer, a 
misdemeanor. See Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  Therefore, 
Santana does not permit the warrantless entry into 
Mikkelson's house. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
¶78 The Mikkelson court's reading of Welsh went too far.  
The Welsh Court hailed the sanctity of the home and the 
importance of the warrant requirement for agents of the 
government who seek to enter a home for purposes of search or 
arrest.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748.  But the Court also recognized 
the exception for exigent circumstances, including hot pursuit.  
Id. at 750.  The Court did not draw a distinction between 
felonies and other jailable crimes.  Instead, it singled out "a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment 
is possible," id. at 754, as the sort of "minor offense" that 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
would "rarely" justify the exigent circumstances exception.  Id. 
at 753.  
¶79 In Welsh, the Court considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless night 
entry into a person's home to arrest him for a nonjailable 
traffic offense.  See id. at 742.  The defendant, Edward Welsh 
(Welsh), drove his car while intoxicated, swerved off the road 
into an open field, left the scene of the accident, and walked 
home.  Id. at 742-43.  An eyewitness told police of his 
observations of the accident and his conversations with the 
intoxicated driver.  Id. at 742.  The police proceeded to the 
driver's home,2 entered it without a warrant or consent, found 
Welsh in bed, and arrested him for driving a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of an intoxicant.  Id. at 743.  At that 
time, a first offense for driving while intoxicated in Wisconsin 
was a noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture of 
$200.  Id. at 746. 
¶80 The Court determined that a warrantless entry under 
these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 754.  
The Court considered both the exigency of destruction of 
evidence (due to Welsh's body metabolizing the alcohol) and the 
minor nature of the civil, nonjailable offense of first-time 
drunk driving, and concluded that the police entry and arrest 
were not reasonable.  Id.  The Court held that "an important 
                                                 
2 The Welsh majority pointedly disqualified the exigency of 
"hot pursuit" because there "was no immediate or continuous 
pursuit of the [defendant] from the scene of a crime."  Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency 
exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the 
arrest is being made."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.  In dealing with 
warrantless entry of a home, the Court stated that an exigency 
is not created merely because there is probable cause to believe 
that a serious crime has been committed, and "application of the 
exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry 
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to 
believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed."  
Id.   
¶81 The Court did not state that all misdemeanors are 
inherently "minor."  Instead, the Court cautioned that the 
critical factor in judging the impact of a particular offense is 
not the nature of the crime but "the penalty that may attach to 
any particular offense."  Id. at 754 n.14.3  The Court added that 
the penalty "seems to provide the clearest and most consistent 
                                                 
3 One commentator has observed that the Court's holding in 
Welsh can be read to distinguish between the "civil" or 
"criminal" nature of an offense:   
[T]he Welsh Court specifically disavowed any judicial 
judgment 
about 
the 
significance 
of 
the 
actual 
violation 
in 
question 
and 
deferred 
instead 
to 
Wisconsin's classification of the offense as "civil" 
in deciding the case.  If Wisconsin were unhappy with 
the Court's decision, it could, therefore, nullify it 
prospectively by simply changing (legislatively) the 
status of driving while intoxicated from a civil 
violation to a criminal offense.  
Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
"Reasonableness", 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1642, 1683 (1998) (footnotes 
omitted). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals 
suspected of committing that offense."  Id. 
¶82 The Court concluded that there were no exigent 
circumstances 
at 
play 
in 
Welsh 
sufficient 
to 
justify 
a 
warrantless home entry and arrest; therefore, it had "no 
occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an 
absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor 
offenses."  Id. at 749 n.11.   
¶83 The Mikkelson court's mistaken reading of Welsh is 
confirmed by the fact that the Supreme Court subsequently 
explained that Welsh drew a distinction between jailable and 
nonjailable 
offenses, 
not 
between 
felony 
and 
misdemeanor 
offenses.  Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335-36 (2001).  
The Court emphasized in McArthur that the important factor in 
determining 
whether 
an 
offense 
provides 
a 
justification 
supporting an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement is whether the offense is jailable.  Id. at 336.   
¶84 McArthur involved the question of whether police 
officers effected an unlawful "seizure" when they prevented the 
defendant, Charles McArthur (McArthur), from entering his home 
for two hours while police obtained a search warrant.  Id. at 
329-30.  After receiving the warrant, police searched McArthur's 
home and retrieved marijuana and drug paraphernalia.  Id. at 
329.  The Court ruled that, although McArthur was seized, the 
police action of preventing him from entering his residence did 
not offend the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 333, 337. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
¶85 The Court addressed the reasonableness of the seizure 
based on the gravity of the misdemeanor offenses of possession 
of drug paraphernalia and marijuana.  Id. at 330, 335-36.  
McArthur argued that, under Welsh, his misdemeanor offenses were 
"minor," and therefore would not justify the seizure.  Id. at 
335-36.  The Court rejected this distinction and noted that it 
had held in Welsh that "police could not enter a home without a 
warrant in order to prevent the loss of evidence (namely, the 
defendant's blood alcohol level) of the 'nonjailable traffic 
offense' of driving while intoxicated."  Id. at 335 (quoting and 
citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742, 754).  The Court further 
distinguished Welsh:   
We nonetheless find significant distinctions. The 
evidence at issue here was of crimes that were 
"jailable," not "nonjailable."  See Ill. Comp. Stat., 
ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998); ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(3) 
(possession of less than 2.5 grams of marijuana 
punishable by up to 30 days in jail); ch. 720, § 
600/3.5; ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(1) (possession of drug 
paraphernalia punishable by up to one year in jail).  
In 
Welsh, 
we 
noted 
that, 
"[g]iven 
that 
the 
classification of state crimes differs widely among 
the States, the penalty that may attach to any 
particular offense seems to provide the clearest and 
most consistent indication of the State's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that 
offense."  466 U.S., at 754, n.14.  The same reasoning 
applies here, where class C misdemeanors include such 
widely diverse offenses as drag racing, drinking 
alcohol in a railroad car or on a railroad platform, 
bribery by a candidate for public office, and assault.  
See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 65, § 5/4-8-2 (1998); 
ch. 610, § 90/1; ch. 625, § 5/11-504; ch. 720, § 5/12-
1. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. at 336. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
¶86 The highest courts of several states have interpreted 
Welsh——and 
McArthur——and 
concluded 
that 
the 
important 
distinction recognized by Welsh is the distinction between 
jailable and nonjailable offenses.  For example, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he unmistakable implication of 
the discussion in McArthur is that the distinction drawn by the 
Court in Welsh between minor offenses that do not justify a 
warrantless entry into a residence and those offenses that do is 
predicated upon whether the subject offense carries a potential 
jail term."  Rideout v. State, 122 P.3d 201, 210 (Wyo. 2005).4   
¶87 The 
Iowa 
Supreme Court has interpreted McArthur 
similarly and concluded that Welsh can be distinguished on the 
ground that the civil offense at issue was not jailable.  See 
State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 769-70, 773 (Iowa 2001).   
¶88 The Minnesota Supreme Court also interpreted Welsh and 
rejected a bright-line rule limiting the availability of the 
exigency of hot pursuit as a warrant exception to suspected 
felonies.  State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 267-68 (Minn. 1996).  
The court concluded that warrantless entry to make a "hot 
pursuit" arrest for suspected driving under the influence of 
alcohol (DUI) was lawful because the Minnesota Legislature has 
                                                 
4 Two recognized criminal law treatises note that the 
conclusion drawn by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Rideout v. 
State, 122 P.3d 201 (Wyo. 2005), is correct.  See 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 3.6(a), at 243 n.24 (3d ed. 
2007); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.1(f), at 38-39, 
39 n.211.2 (4th ed. Supp. 2007). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
determined that DUI is a "serious offense" and "a criminal 
offense for which imprisonment is possible."  Id. at 267.   
¶89 Many other state appellate courts have distinguished 
Welsh because the offense at issue there was civil and did not 
include possible incarceration.5  These courts have thereby 
rejected the Mikkelson rule that jailable misdemeanor offenses 
are not sufficient to support a warrantless home entry in hot 
pursuit of a fleeing suspect.  See Mikkelson, 256 Wis. 2d 132, 
¶17.  These judicial interpretations of Welsh and McArthur are 
consistent with the Supreme Court's signal that the critical 
factor is not the nature of the offense but "the penalty that 
may attach to any particular offense."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 
n.14.  They also reflect the fact that Welsh itself cited two 
hot pursuit cases involving misdemeanors.  Id. at 752-53 (citing 
State 
v. 
Penas, 
263 
N.W.2d 
835 
(Neb. 
1978); 
State 
v. 
Niedermeyer, 617 P.2d 911 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)). 
¶90 The jailable/nonjailable distinction noted by the 
authorities above correlates with this court's discussion of 
Welsh in State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621, a pre-McArthur case.  Although Hughes involved a 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., People v. Lavoyne M., 270 Cal. Rptr. 394, 395-
96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 283 
(Colo. 1999); Dyer v. State, 680 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996); Threatt v. State, 524 S.E.2d 276, 280 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999); City of Kirksville v. Guffey, 740 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987);  State v. Nikola, 821 A.2d 110, 117-18 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); People v. Odenweller, 527 N.Y.S.2d 
127, 129-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Beaver v. State, 106 S.W.3d 
243, 248-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 605 
S.E.2d 297, 306-07 (Va. Ct. App. 2004). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
warrantless entry premised upon the exigency of potential 
destruction 
of 
evidence 
(burning 
marijuana), 
the 
court's 
analysis of Welsh is apt.  Id., ¶¶30-31, 39.   
¶91 This court correctly anticipated McArthur when it 
noted that the Welsh Court "did not definitively say . . . that 
certain categories of offenses are per se insufficiently grave 
to 
justify 
a 
warrantless 
entry, 
only 
that 
the 
minor, 
noncriminal, nonjailable traffic violation in that case (first 
offense drunk driving) was so."  Id., ¶30 (second emphasis 
added).  This court evaluated the overall penalty structure for 
marijuana-related offenses while expressly noting that first-
time marijuana offenses were misdemeanors subject to punishment 
of up to six months of incarceration.  Id., ¶¶36-37.  The court 
determined that even a first-offense marijuana possession was 
treated "significantly more seriously than the noncriminal, 
nonjailable first offense drunk driving violation involved in 
Welsh."  Id., ¶39 (emphasis added).   
¶92 The Wisconsin Legislature has determined that all 
misdemeanors, 
regardless of class, are "serious" offenses 
because all misdemeanors are jailable offenses.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.51.  The legislature could have created a class of "minor" 
or "petty" misdemeanors for which incarceration is not an 
available punishment.6  It has not done so.  Thus, every 
                                                 
6 Several states have classes of misdemeanor offenses not 
subject to potential imprisonment.  Some examples:   
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
misdemeanor is serious in the sense that it entails a potential 
deprivation of liberty.  See, e.g., Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 267 
("The legislature . . . has clearly and consistently indicated 
that driving under the influence of alcohol is a serious 
offense. 
 
The 
statute 
under 
which 
[the 
defendant] 
was 
charged . . . is classified as a criminal offense for which 
imprisonment is possible." (First emphasis added.)).  Instead of 
requiring officers to distinguish felonies from misdemeanors in 
the midst of hot pursuit, this court should reduce confusion for 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Minnesota 
has 
a 
class 
of 
offenses 
designated 
"petty" 
misdemeanors.  "'Petty misdemeanor' means a petty offense 
which is prohibited by statute, which does not constitute a 
crime and for which a sentence of a fine of not more than $300 
may be imposed."  Minn. Stat. § 609.02, Subd. 4a (2007).   
• Nebraska's 
"Class 
IV" 
and 
"Class 
V" 
misdemeanors 
are 
nonjailable and subject only to maximum fines of $500 and 
$100, respectively.  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106(1) (2007).   
• New Hampshire classifies offenses as "felony," "misdemeanor," 
or "violation."  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:9, II (2008).  
Only a "felony" and "misdemeanor" are considered crimes.  Id.  
"A class B misdemeanor is any crime . . . for which the 
maximum penalty does not include any term of imprisonment."  
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:9, IV(b) (2008). 
• Ohio has a class of "minor misdemeanors" for which punishment 
cannot exceed a $150 fine, community service, or a financial 
sanction not constituting a fine.  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2901.02(A), (G) (West 2006). 
• Texas' "Class C" misdemeanors are subject to no imprisonment 
and a fine "not to exceed $500."  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.23 
(Vernon 2003). 
• Virginia's 
"Class 
3" 
and 
"Class 
4" 
misdemeanors 
are 
nonjailable and subject only to maximum fines of $500 and 
$250, respectively.  Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-11(c)-(d) (2004). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
law enforcement by maintaining the rule that all criminal 
offenses (felonies and misdemeanors) support the exigency of hot 
pursuit.7  Such a rule faithfully reflects the legislature's 
classification of both felonies and misdemeanors as "jailable" 
and therefore "serious."   
¶93 A 
felony-only 
rule 
for 
hot 
pursuit 
allows 
the 
perpetrator of a serious misdemeanor offense, for which jail 
time is a penalty, to avoid immediate arrest merely because of 
the label ("felony" or "misdemeanor") chosen by the legislature.  
See id.8  This fortuity is very difficult to defend. 
                                                 
7 Asking law enforcement officers to draw a line between 
criminal offenses and civil offenses is one thing; asking them 
to remember whether an offense is categorized as a felony or a 
misdemeanor, or to assess whether an offense will be charged as 
a felony or a misdemeanor based on incomplete evidence, is quite 
another.  The impracticality of the distinction is obvious. 
8 The Minnesota Supreme Court also questioned the idea that 
a bright line felony-only rule would aid law enforcement.  State 
v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. 1996).  The court stated:   
The determination of whether an offense is a felony or 
a serious misdemeanor is not one that we should force 
officers to make on the spot in the tense and often 
dangerous circumstances of hot pursuit.  See Payton 
[v. New York], 445 U.S. [573, 619 (1980)] (White, J., 
dissenting).  Adopting a bright-line rule based on the 
legislature's 
classification 
of 
conduct 
as 
a 
misdemeanor would also sweep away any possibility that 
warrantless home arrests would be justified for those 
misdemeanors in which the underlying conduct is 
serious, or when the underlying offense is minor, but 
subsequent activity by the perpetrator during his 
flight from the police elevates the situation to a 
serious one.   
Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 268. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
17 
 
¶94 The continuing validity of Mikkelson fosters such 
injustice.  Mikkelson is plainly inconsistent with McArthur.  
The 
United States 
Supreme Court has never held that a 
misdemeanor 
offense 
cannot 
provide 
justification 
for 
a 
warrantless home entry and arrest in hot pursuit.  Mikkelson 
establishes such a per se rule and should be overruled. 
B. 
Hot Pursuit 
¶95 This 
court's 
decisions 
in 
State 
v. 
Smith, 
131 
Wis. 2d 220, 229, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986), and State v. Richter, 
2000 WI 58, ¶29, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, identified hot 
pursuit of a suspect as one of four recognized exigent 
circumstances authorizing a warrantless home entry and arrest. 
¶96 Before 
setting 
forth 
the 
exigent 
circumstances 
standards laid out in Smith and Richter, it is helpful to put 
these cases in historical context with other Wisconsin and 
United States Supreme Court decisions recognizing the limited 
right of police to enter a home without a warrant to arrest a 
suspect when police have probable cause.   
¶97 Agnello 
v. 
United 
States, 
269 
U.S. 
20 
(1925), 
illustrates an example of a crime committed in the home and 
viewed by police outside.  Agnello involved the question whether 
the search and seizure of evidence in defendant Frank Agnello's 
house violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 30.  Two informants 
were employed by government revenue agents to go to the home of 
defendant Stephen Alba at 138 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York, 
to arrange a narcotics purchase from Alba and defendant Antonio 
Centorino.  Id. at 28.  At a preliminary visit to Alba's house, 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
18 
 
the informants had received samples of cocaine and scheduled a 
purchase for the next week.  Id.  When the pair returned to 
Alba's house at the agreed time, they were accompanied by six 
revenue agents and a city policeman who remained discreetly 
outside.  Id. 
¶98 During the operation, Alba left his house and returned 
with Centorino.  Id.  Neither man produced any narcotics for the 
informants.  Id.  After the informants refused to go to 
Centorino's house at 172 Columbia Street, Centorino went there 
alone to fetch drugs.  Id.  He was followed by some of the 
agents.  Id.  Centorino then went to 167 Columbia Street, a 
building that was part grocery store——owned by defendant Thomas 
Pace and defendant Thomas Agnello——and part house——owned by 
defendant Frank Agnello and Pace.  Id. 
¶99 In a short time, Centorino, Pace, and the Agnellos 
came out of 167 Columbia Street and went back to Alba's house.  
Id.  Looking through the windows, the agents on watch saw Frank 
Agnello produce a number of small packages for delivery to one 
of the informants and saw an informant hand money over to Alba.  
Id. at 28-29.  Upon viewing this transaction, agents rushed into 
Alba's house, arrested all the defendants, and found and seized 
packages containing cocaine on the table where the transaction 
took place.  Id. at 29.  Agents then went to 167 Columbia 
Street, entered, and searched the premises without a warrant.  
Id.  They found and seized a can of cocaine in Frank Agnello's 
bedroom, and this evidence was subsequently used at trial as 
evidence against the defendants.  Id. at 29-30.   
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
19 
 
¶100 The Court concluded that the warrantless search and 
seizure of evidence from Frank Agnello's house violated the 
Fourth Amendment because these actions were not incident to the 
earlier arrests.  Id. at 31 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920); People v. Conway, 195 
N.W. 679 (Mich. 1923); Gamble v. Keyes, 153 N.W. 888 (S.D. 
1915)).  The search of Agnello's house was attenuated in both 
time and place from the earlier arrests, as Frank Agnello's 
house was several blocks from Alba's house.  Agnello, 269 U.S. 
at 30-31.  Significantly, the Court noted no constitutional 
problem with the warrantless police entry of Alba's house and 
the arrest of the defendants in that house after agents 
witnessed the drug transaction through the windows.  Id. at 30.  
The Court stated:   
The 
right 
without 
a 
search 
warrant 
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested 
while committing crime and to search the place where 
the arrest is made in order to find and seize things 
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means 
by which it was committed, as well as weapons and 
other things to effect an escape from custody, is not 
to be doubted.  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 158 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
392 (1914).  The legality of the arrests or of the 
searches and seizures made at the home of Alba is not 
questioned.  Such searches and seizures naturally and 
usually appertain to and attend such arrests. 
Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).   
¶101 Although Agnello focused primarily on the legality of 
the search of the Agnello home and the subsequent seizure of 
evidence 
found 
inside, 
the 
Court's 
endorsement 
of 
the 
warrantless arrest of several suspects in the Alba home after 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
20 
 
viewing a drug transaction through the windows illustrates the 
principle that a warrantless arrest can be effectuated in a home 
when a crime is witnessed by officers outside and an arrest is 
subsequently, and immediately, pursued inside. 
¶102 The Court first used the term "hot pursuit" to 
describe exigent circumstances that might justify a warrantless 
home entry and arrest in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 
(1948).  Johnson involved the warrantless entry and search of a 
hotel room by an officer after the smell of burning opium 
emanating from within was discovered and reported by a police 
informant.  Id. at 12.  Police arrived outside the defendant's 
room, knocked on her door, and the defendant opened it.  Id.  
The smell of burning opium was immediately apparent to the 
officers when they reached the door, and the defendant was 
arrested and her room searched.  Id.  The search revealed opium 
and a smoking apparatus, the latter being warm, apparently from 
recent use.  Id.  The defendant sought to have the evidence 
suppressed.  Id. 
¶103 The 
Court 
noted 
that 
"[t]here 
are 
exceptional 
circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law 
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended 
that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with."  
Id. at 14-15.  However, the Court held in favor of the 
defendant, concluding that no such exigency was present.  Id. at 
15.  The Court distinguished Johnson's situation by listing 
circumstances not present that would have otherwise justified a 
warrantless entry: "No suspect was fleeing or likely to take 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
21 
 
flight.  The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable 
vehicle.  No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal 
or destruction, except perhaps the fumes which we suppose in 
time would disappear."  Id. 
¶104 The Government argued that the warrantless entry and 
arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the arrest 
was made in "hot pursuit."  Id. at 16 n.7.  The Court said that 
there was "no element of 'hot pursuit' in the arrest of one who 
was not in flight, was completely surrounded by agents before 
she knew of their presence, who claims without denial that she 
was in bed at the time, and who made no attempt to escape."  Id. 
¶105 Nineteen years after Johnson, the Court expanded upon 
this discussion in a seminal decision concerning the exigent 
circumstances doctrine.9  In Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), police officers had probable cause 
to believe that an armed robber had entered a particular house.  
Id. at 297.  Within minutes of receiving a dispatch, an 
unspecified number of officers arrived outside the house.  Id.  
One of the officers knocked and announced their presence, a 
woman answered the door, and police told her they believed that 
                                                 
9 In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court 
observed that "Warden was based upon the 'exigencies of the 
situation,' and did not use the term 'hot pursuit.'"  Id. at 43 
n.3 (citation omitted).  Although the Warden majority did not 
use the term "hot pursuit," the concurring opinion of Justice 
Abe Fortas and the dissenting opinion of Justice William Douglas 
both used the term.  Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 310, 321 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  For excerpts from these opinions, see the Appendix 
attached hereto. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
22 
 
a robber had entered the house.  Id.  Police asked to search the 
house, and the woman did not object.  Id.  Officers entered and 
spread out looking for the suspect.  Id. at 298.  Defendant 
Hayden was discovered in a bedroom, feigning sleep, and was 
arrested.  Id.  At the same time, officers in other parts of the 
house came upon and seized items that were related to the 
robbery.  Id.   
¶106 The Court held that neither the warrantless entry of 
the house, nor the subsequent warrantless search for the 
suspected robber, offended any constitutional principle.  Id.  
Under the circumstances presented, "'the exigencies of the 
situation made that course imperative.'"  Id.  (quoting McDonald 
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).  Police "acted 
reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a 
man of the description they had been given and for weapons which 
he had used in the robbery or might use against them."  Warden, 
387 U.S. at 298.  The Court held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment 
does not require police officers to delay in the course of an 
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or 
the lives of others."  Id. at 298-99.  The Court concluded that 
"[s]peed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the 
house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was 
the only man present and that the police had control of all 
weapons which could be used against them or to effect an 
escape."  Id. at 299. 
¶107 Nine years after Warden, the Court addressed the "hot 
pursuit" exigency doctrine in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
23 
 
38 (1976).  In Santana, a controlled drug purchase was arranged 
in which an associate of defendant Santana was dropped off by an 
undercover police officer at Santana's residence to obtain 
heroin.  Id. at 39-40.  The associate, who did not realize she 
was involved in a police operation, went inside with marked 
currency to get drugs, returned to the officer's car, gave 
heroin to the officer, and was arrested.  Id. at 40.  The 
associate then told the officer that Santana had retained the 
marked currency.  Id.   
¶108 Police officers proceeded to Santana's house and saw 
her standing in the front door holding a brown paper bag.  Id.  
The officers pulled their van within 15 feet of Santana, shouted 
"police," and displayed their identification.  Id.  Santana 
retreated into the vestibule of her home, police followed, and 
Santana was arrested.  Id.  Police seized both the bag Santana 
was holding, which contained heroin, and some of the marked 
currency Santana possessed.  Id. at 40-41.  Santana was charged 
with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, a felony, 
and she moved to suppress the heroin and money found after her 
arrest on the ground that police acted without a warrant.  Id. 
at 41. 
¶109 The Court held that the arrest did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment and concluded that Santana's act of retreating 
into her home could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest based 
on probable cause.  Id. at 42.  The Court noted that Santana was 
in a "public" place for Fourth Amendment purposes when she was 
spotted by police while standing at her doorstep and that she 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
24 
 
subsequently retreated into a "private" place.  Id. (citation 
omitted).  The Court cited Warden and concluded that Santana's 
case involved a true "hot pursuit" sufficient to justify a 
warrantless entry.  Id. at 42-43.  The Court noted that "'hot 
pursuit' means some sort of a chase, but it need not be an 
extended hue and cry in and about [the] public streets."  Id. at 
43 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The fact that the 
pursuit ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any 
the less a "hot pursuit" sufficient to justify the warrantless 
entry into Santana's house.  Id. at 43.  The Court concluded 
that "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in 
motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a 
private place."  Id. at 43. 
¶110 Wisconsin has consistently recognized the exigent 
circumstances 
principles established by the United States 
Supreme Court, particularly those related to "hot pursuit."  For 
example, in West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 246 N.W.2d 675 
(1976), this court was presented with facts substantially 
similar to those in Warden and concluded that the warrantless 
police entry of a home to apprehend suspected robbers, who had 
entered the home only minutes before, was not unreasonable.  Id. 
at 400.  The court relied heavily upon Warden to conclude that 
"the exigencies of the situation made the course which was taken 
imperative."  Id. at 399 (citing Warden, 387 U.S. at 298, 299). 
¶111 In State v. Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d 387, 396, 396 n.7, 251 
N.W.2d 421 (1977), this court again cited Warden as authority 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
25 
 
for the proposition that "hot pursuit" presents a circumstance 
"which may justify an exception to the warrant requirement." 
¶112 In Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d 278 
(1978), this court considered the case of Karyn Laasch (Laasch), 
who was arrested and jailed for selling cocaine to a police 
informer, released two days later, and then arrested in her 
apartment, without a warrant, 13 days after the first arrest.  
Id. at 588-89.  Laasch argued that the second arrest constituted 
an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. at 
591.  This court agreed and concluded that, despite probable 
cause, "the arrest was tainted by the warrantless entry of the 
defendant's home."  Id. at 592.  The court noted that the state 
identified no exigent circumstances necessitating a warrantless 
entry, and said the record was bereft of such circumstances:   
The arrest was not made in "hot pursuit"; there was no 
threat to the safety of other persons; there was no 
risk that evidence would be destroyed, since the 
delivered substance had been seized at the time of the 
previous arrest; and any suggestion that the police 
feared the defendant would flee is dispelled by the 
fact that she had been released for approximately two 
weeks. 
Id.  The court recognized that warrantless in-house arrests had 
previously been upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and United 
States Supreme Court on the grounds of consent or exigent 
circumstances.  Id. at 593-94 (citing Johnson v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 344, 
351, 
352, 
249 
N.W.2d 593 
(1976); 
West, 
74 
Wis. 2d 390; Rinehart v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 760, 218 N.W.2d 323 
(1974)).  The court also approvingly cited Santana and Warden as 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
26 
 
examples of cases where a warrantless home entry and arrest was 
upheld because of the existence of exigent circumstances.  Id. 
at 595-96. 
¶113 In Smith, the court built upon Laasch and the federal 
rule of exigent circumstances and set forth a list of factors 
and an objective test to evaluate the justifications for a 
warrantless home entry by police.  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 229 
(citing Laasch, 84 Wis. 2d at 595-96; Steagald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981)).  The Smith court identified four 
categories of circumstances that, when measured against the time 
needed to obtain a warrant, would constitute the exigent 
circumstances required for a warrantless entry: "(1) An arrest 
made in 'hot pursuit,' (2) a threat to safety of a suspect or 
others, (3) a risk that evidence would be destroyed, and (4) a 
likelihood that the suspect would flee."  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 
229 (citing Laasch, 84 Wis. 2d at 592).  The court concluded 
that whether the circumstances of a warrantless entry were 
justified should be measured by an objective test, namely: 
"[w]hether a police officer under the circumstances known to the 
officer at the time reasonably believes that delay in procuring 
a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk destruction of 
evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's 
escape."  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 230.   
¶114 The Smith court's reliance on the Supreme Court's 
Steagald decision is telling.  In Steagald, the Court stated 
that "a warrantless entry of a home would be justified if the 
police were in 'hot pursuit' of a fugitive."  Steagald, 451 U.S. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
27 
 
at 221 (citing Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43; Warden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967)).10  A "fugitive" has been defined as "[o]ne who flees; 
used in criminal law with the implication of a flight, evasion, 
or escape from arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 604 (5th ed. 1979).  The word "fugitive" is broad 
enough to cover both felons and misdemeanants. 
¶115 Fourteen years after Smith, in Richter this court 
reviewed a case involving a warrantless home entry by a police 
officer based on his knowledge of an alleged recent break-in 
across the street.  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶1.  The 
circumstances of the case were summarized by the court as 
follows:   
[A] Marinette County sheriff's deputy responded to an 
early-morning dispatch of a burglary in progress at a 
trailer park.  The victim flagged down the deputy as 
he arrived on the scene and told him that someone had 
broken into her mobile home, and that she had seen the 
intruder flee her trailer and enter the defendant's 
trailer across the street.  The deputy observed signs 
of forced entry at the defendant's trailer——a window 
screen was knocked out and lying on the ground.  The 
deputy shined his flashlight in the open window and 
attracted the attention of two people who were 
sleeping on the floor.  They opened the door and 
identified the defendant, who was sleeping on the 
couch, as the owner of the trailer.  The deputy 
entered the trailer, woke the defendant, told him what 
had happened and asked his permission to search the 
trailer for the burglary suspect.  Permission was 
                                                 
10 Recently, in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), 
the Court reiterated that "hot pursuit" can constitute a 
sufficient exigency for law enforcement to make a warrantless 
entry.  The Court stated: "We have held, for example, that law 
enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private 
property . . . to engage in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect."  
Id. at 403 (citing Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43).   
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
28 
 
granted.  During the search, the deputy observed 
marijuana in plain view, which the defendant admitted 
was his. 
Id.  The defendant was charged with marijuana possession and 
sought to suppress the physical evidence and statements obtained 
by police, alleging an illegal entry.  Id., ¶2.  This court 
concluded 
that 
the 
entry 
was 
"justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances——specifically, the deputy's 'hot pursuit' of the 
burglary suspect and his need to protect the safety of those 
inside the trailer."  Id. (emphasis added).  
¶116 The court evaluated the circumstances and concluded 
that 
the 
officer's 
entry 
was 
"justified 
by 
the 
exigent 
circumstance of hot pursuit."  Id., ¶36.  The court noted that a 
warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id., ¶28 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980)).  However, the court held that "the Fourth 
Amendment is not an absolute bar to warrantless, nonconsensual 
entries into private residences."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 
¶28.  The court stated that there "are four well-recognized 
categories of exigent circumstances that have been held to 
authorize a law enforcement officer's warrantless entry into a 
home."  Id., ¶29 (emphasis added).  These include: "1) hot 
pursuit of a suspect, 2) a threat to the safety of a suspect or 
others, 3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and 4) a 
likelihood that the suspect will flee."  Id., ¶29 (citing Smith, 
131 Wis. 2d at 229).  The court then stated the objective test 
to determine whether there are exigent circumstances supporting 
a warrantless entry: "[w]hether a police officer under the 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
29 
 
circumstances known to the officer at the time [of entry] 
reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would 
gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly 
enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape."  Id., ¶30 
(quoting Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 230).   
¶117 An officer in "hot pursuit" does not need to make a 
split-second determination about the availability of "hot 
pursuit" as an exigency justifying a warrantless entry.  The 
officer has to make a determination whether there is probable 
cause to make an arrest for a jailable crime.  Presuming 
probable cause, pursuit of the suspect is justified.  As long as 
the officer has probable cause to arrest for a jailable criminal 
offense, the only remaining important question is whether a 
chase or pursuit satisfies the hot pursuit definition in Welsh——
"immediate or continuous pursuit of the [defendant] from the 
scene of a crime."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.  Whether the officer 
reasonably believes he was in "hot pursuit" is not necessary.  
Thus, it is hardly surprising that this exigency is not part of 
the objective test set forth in Smith and Richter. 
¶118 There is no implication in our case law that "hot 
pursuit" 
cannot 
stand 
alone 
as 
an 
exigent 
circumstance 
justifying a warrantless home entry and arrest.  On the 
contrary, our cases explicitly recognize that hot pursuit is a 
sufficient justification for a warrantless entry and arrest.  
Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 229; Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29. 
¶119 Wisconsin is not alone in this view.  Several 
jurisdictions have recognized that hot pursuit is a sufficient 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
30 
 
exigency to support a warrantless entry and arrest.  The Supreme 
Court of Ohio held in City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 
330 (Ohio 2002), that police may pursue a suspect into his home 
in hot pursuit regardless of whether the offense for which the 
suspect is being arrested is a felony or a misdemeanor, even 
though no other exigency is involved.  Id. at 332.   
¶120 In Flinchum, officers saw the defendant's car waiting 
at a red traffic light.  Id. at 331.  When the light turned 
green, the defendant spun his tires.  Id.  Officers followed the 
defendant and observed him stop his car, then accelerate 
rapidly, causing his car to fishtail.  Id.  The officers 
attempted to approach the defendant's car twice, but each time 
the defendant fled from the police.  Id.   
¶121 The officers eventually caught up with the defendant 
and saw him standing outside his parked car.  Id.  When the 
defendant saw the officers' cruiser, he ran toward the rear 
entrance of his home.  Id.  One of the officers pursued the 
defendant, yelling "stop" and "police" several times, to no 
avail.  Id.  As the pursuit continued, an officer heard a rear 
screen door slam at the defendant's house.  Id.  The officer 
then 
observed 
the 
defendant 
standing 
in 
his 
kitchen 
approximately five feet inside his house.  Id.  Without the 
defendant's consent, the officer entered the house and arrested 
the defendant, who was subsequently charged with reckless 
operation, driving under the influence of alcohol, and resisting 
arrest, all misdemeanors.  Id. at 331. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
31 
 
¶122 The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the warrantless 
entry and arrest of the defendant was justified by the exigency 
of hot pursuit alone.  Id. at 332.  The court declared that "a 
suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in 
a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a private 
place." Id. (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 43).  The court noted 
that Santana involved a felony offense, but saw "no reason to 
differentiate [defendant's] offense and give him a free pass 
merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime."  
Flinchum, 765 N.W.2d at 332.  Consequently, the court held that 
"when officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit 
of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the 
police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the 
offense 
for 
which 
the 
suspect 
is 
being 
arrested 
is 
a 
misdemeanor."  Id. 
¶123 In State v. Paul the Minnesota Supreme Court declined 
to adopt a bright-line rule that would prohibit officers from 
entering a suspected misdemeanant's home when officers are in 
hot pursuit.  Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 268.  Paul involved a 
defendant charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving under 
the influence of alcohol.  Id. at 262.  Joseph Gunderson 
(Gunderson), a uniformed and on-duty police officer, bumped into 
defendant Peter Dean Paul (Paul) at an auto parts store, spoke 
with Paul, and noted a strong smell of alcohol on Paul's breath, 
his slurred speech, flushed face, watery eyes, and difficulty in 
standing.  Id.  Gunderson then observed Paul leave the store, 
climb into a pickup truck, drive away, and roll through a stop 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
32 
 
sign.  Id.  Gunderson followed Paul in his squad car, observed 
Paul "fishtail" as he entered the highway, and attempted to pull 
Paul over by activating his squad car's red lights.  Id.   
¶124 Paul did not stop but continued on in spite of 
Gunderson's flashing lights.  Id.  Paul pulled into his 
driveway, exited the truck, ignored Gunderson's commands to stop 
and get back in the truck, and "hastily" entered and locked his 
garage with Gunderson giving chase.  Id. at 262-63.  Gunderson 
made a warrantless entry into Paul's home and arrested him for 
DUI.  Id. at 263.  Paul moved to have all evidence obtained 
pursuant to the arrest suppressed because the entry allegedly 
violated Paul's Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. 
¶125 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Gunderson's 
warrantless entry into Paul's home was not unlawful.  Id. at 
268.  The court first concluded that Gunderson had probable 
cause to arrest Paul for DUI.  Id. at 264.  The court then 
addressed whether Gunderson was in "hot pursuit" of Paul when he 
made the home entry and arrest.  Id.  The court discussed 
Santana and noted that "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which 
has been set in motion in a public place by the expedient of 
retreating to a private place."  Id. (citing Santana, 427 U.S. 
at 43).  The court held that the doctrine of hot pursuit 
"applies whether police officers engage in a high-speed chase of 
the suspect . . . or merely approach a suspect who immediately 
retreats into a house."  Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).  Paul 
fell somewhere in the middle of this continuum.  Id. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
33 
 
¶126 The Paul court next analyzed Welsh and concluded that 
it was distinguishable.  Id. at 266.  Paul involved both "hot 
pursuit" of a suspect and the exigency of potential destruction 
of blood-alcohol evidence.  Id.  The court also found it 
important that the Minnesota Legislature had "clearly and 
consistently indicated that driving under the influence of 
alcohol is a serious offense" due to it being classified "as a 
criminal offense for which imprisonment is possible."  Id. at 
267.   
¶127 The court rejected Paul's invitation to establish a 
bright-line rule prohibiting the warrantless entry of a home in 
hot pursuit when the underlying offense is less than a felony.  
Id. at 267-68.  "A bright-line felony rule would allow the 
perpetrator of certain serious misdemeanor offenses to avoid 
punishment merely because of how the legislature had [labeled] 
an infraction."  Id. at 267.  The court also noted that a 
bright-line rule prohibiting hot pursuit in these circumstances 
would signal to the misdemeanant that a "hot pursuit or an 
arrest set in motion can be thwarted by beating the police to 
one's door."  Id. at 268.  The court's summation of the hot 
pursuit issue bears repeating:   
The Fourth Amendment simply cannot be stretched nor 
can public safety be ensured by a bright-line felony 
rule which would encourage drunk drivers to elude the 
police by racing through the streets to the sanctuary 
of their homes in order to "freeze" a hot pursuit or 
to otherwise evade a lawful arrest.   
Id. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
34 
 
¶128 Two decisions from the Iowa Supreme Court essentially 
echo the conclusions reached in Paul regarding hot pursuit as an 
exigency sufficient to support a warrantless home entry and 
arrest for a misdemeanor.   
¶129 In State v. Legg the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a 
warrantless "hot pursuit" home entry by police who possessed 
probable cause to believe a suspect had committed the "serious 
misdemeanors" of interference with official acts and first 
offense operating while intoxicated.  Legg, 633 N.W.2d at 766, 
772.  The court reviewed Santana, Welsh, and McArthur and 
concluded that, on balance, the competing privacy and law 
enforcement concerns weighed in favor of allowing the minimal 
intrusion at issue.  Id. at 769-73.  The court noted that 
"[s]ociety has an interest in not rewarding the evasion of 
lawful police authority by allowing suspects who make it to 
their homes steps ahead of law enforcement officers to claim 
sanctuary."  Id. at 772 (citation omitted).  Like Santana, the 
circumstances 
of 
Legg 
involved 
"(1) 
the 
'realistic 
expectation . . . that any delay would result in destruction of 
evidence'; and (2) the undesirable consequences of allowing a 
person to thwart an otherwise proper arrest 'by the expedient of 
escaping to a private place.'"  Id. at 773 (quoting and citing 
Santana, 427 U.S. at 43).   
¶130 Following Legg, the Iowa Supreme Court reiterated its 
position that hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant can provide 
a justification for a warrantless entry and arrest in State v. 
Pink, 648 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
35 
 
¶131 Recently, 
the 
Illinois 
Appellate 
Court, 
Fourth 
District refused to adopt a rule that hot pursuit, standing 
alone, was insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  People v. Wear, 867 N.E.2d 1027, 1045-46 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007).  The officer in Wear had probable cause to 
believe that the defendant committed several traffic violations 
and was guilty of eluding or attempting to flee an officer, a 
misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in jail.  Id. at 1041, 
1044.  The Illinois court discussed Welsh and distinguished the 
case on the grounds that the penalties for the offenses in 
question were jailable and that the officer in Wear was in "hot 
pursuit."  Id. at 1044.  The court held that the officer "was in 
hot pursuit of defendant and, for that reason alone, had the 
right to enter the house and arrest him."  Id. (emphasis added). 
The court stated that "[i]t appears that the majority of 
jurisdictions that have considered this question would so hold."  
Id. (citing D. Gilsinger, Annotation, When Is Warrantless Entry 
of House or Other Building Justified Under "Hot Pursuit" 
Doctrine, 17 A.L.R.6th 327, §§ 12, 14 (2006)).  The Illinois 
court also noted that the hot pursuit exigency, as a stand-alone 
warrant exception, has deep roots in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century common law.  Id. at 1045 (citing Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598 (1980)).11 
                                                 
11 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 595 n.41 (1980), 
included a quotation from 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 92 
(1736) that shines some light on the historical roots of "hot 
pursuit":  "if the supposed offender fly and take house, and the 
door will not be opened upon demand of the constable and 
notification of his business, the constable may break the door, 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
36 
 
¶132 Courts from several other jurisdictions are in accord 
with these cases from Ohio, Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois.12 
¶133 These jurisdictions represent a common sense approach 
to the "hot pursuit" doctrine that avoids creating an incentive 
for misdemeanant suspects to flee to the home to escape lawful 
arrest.  The home should not be viewed as a "sanctuary" or "safe 
zone" for a suspected misdemeanant in these circumstances.  Such 
a view equates law enforcement to sport.  Judge Joel C. Neal of 
the Indiana Court of Appeals may have put it best when he 
stated:   
Law enforcement is not a child's game of prisoner[']s 
base, or a contest, with apprehension and conviction 
depending upon whether the officer or defendant is the 
fleetest of foot.  A police officer in continuous 
pursuit of a perpetrator of a crime committed in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
tho he have no warrant." 
12 See, e.g., People v. Lloyd, 265 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-25 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989)(holding that "hot pursuit" was a "proper 
exception" to the warrant requirement when an officer made an 
arrest in the suspect's home for obstruction and traffic 
violations committed in the officer's presence); State v. 
Nichols, 484 S.E.2d 507, 508-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)(holding that 
an officer who was in "hot pursuit" of a defendant whom the 
officer observed committing the misdemeanor of illegal backing 
was justified in following the defendant into his residence to 
make a warrantless arrest); State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 553 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984)(holding that "where there is immediate or 
continuous pursuit from the scene of a misdemeanor crime to the 
door of the defendant's home a warrantless home arrest is 
permitted"); State v. Brown, 733 So.2d 1282, 1287-88 (La. Ct. 
App. 1999)(holding that officers were justified in effectuating 
a warrantless home entry and arrest for the offense of driving 
without a license); LaHaye v. State, 1 S.W.3d 149, 152-53 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1999)(holding that the misdemeanor crime of evading 
arrest was a serious enough crime that officers in hot pursuit 
could enter a residence without a warrant to arrest an 
offender). 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
37 
 
officer's presence, be it a felony or a misdemeanor, 
must be allowed to follow the suspect into a private 
place, or the suspect's home if he chooses to flee 
there, and effect the arrest without a warrant.  
State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). See 
also Gasset v. State, 490 So.2d 97, 98-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986) ("The enforcement of our criminal laws . . . is not a game 
where law enforcement officers are 'it' and one is 'safe' if one 
reaches 'home' before being tagged.") (citing Blake, 468 N.E.2d 
at 553). 
¶134 In sum, hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant, 
premised upon probable cause, is an exigency sufficient to 
justify a warrantless home entry and arrest.  This view is amply 
supported by existing Wisconsin case law, the United States 
Supreme 
Court, 
and 
persuasive 
authority 
from 
other 
jurisdictions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶135 The majority opinion's conclusion that the circuit 
court erred when it denied Sanders' motion to suppress is 
correct.  The searches of Sanders' bedroom and seizure of the 
evidence found there violated the Fourth Amendment.  
¶136 I write separately to address the issue that brought 
this 
case 
before 
us, 
namely 
the 
continuing 
validity 
of 
Mikkelson.  The facts are undisputed that the defendant in this 
case committed a jailable criminal offense in the presence of 
police and that police entered the defendant's house in hot 
pursuit to effect the defendant's immediate arrest.  Entering a 
home without a warrant under these circumstances is not 
unreasonable.  Entry into a home in hot pursuit to arrest a 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
38 
 
person on probable cause for a jailable criminal offense is a 
longstanding, common sense exception to the warrant requirement.  
Accordingly, I concur. 
¶137 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this concurrence.   
No.  2006AP2060-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
Appendix 
 
1. 
Excerpt from Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310-11 (1967) (Fortas, 
J., concurring): 
 
Our Constitution envisions that searches will ordinarily follow 
procurement by police of a valid search warrant.  Such warrants are to issue only 
on probable cause, and must describe with particularity the persons or things to be 
seized.  There are exceptions to this rule.  Searches may be made incident to a 
lawful arrest, and——as today's decision indicates——in the course of "hot 
pursuit."  . . . The use in evidence of weapons seized in a "hot pursuit" search or 
search incident to arrest satisfies this criterion because of the need to protect the 
arresting officers from weapons to which the suspect might resort.  The search for 
and seizure of fruits are, of course, justifiable on independent grounds.   
 
2. 
Excerpt from Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting): 
 
The right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment relates in part of 
course to the precincts of the home or the office.  But it does not make them 
sanctuaries where the law can never reach.  There are such places in the world.  A 
mosque in Fez, Morocco, that I have visited, is by custom a sanctuary where any 
refugee may hide, safe from police intrusion.  We have no such sanctuaries here.  
A policeman in "hot pursuit" or an officer with a search warrant can enter any 
house, any room, any building, any office.  The privacy of those places is of 
course protected against invasion except in limited situations. 
 
3. 
Excerpt from United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43-44 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring): 
 
It is not disputed here that the officers had probable cause to arrest 
Santana and to believe that she was in the house.  In these circumstances, a 
warrant was not required to enter the house to make the arrest, at least where entry 
by force was not required.  This has been the longstanding statutory or judicial 
rule in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, see ALI, A Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure 306-314, 696-697 (1975), and has been deemed 
consistent with state constitutions, as well as the Fourth Amendment.  It is also 
the Institute's recommended rule.  Id., § 120.6.  I agree with the Court that the 
arrest here did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶138 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  The majority 
does not determine whether the warrantless entry into Sanders' 
home to make a warrantless arrest was justified as an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  Because this case 
is resolved on other grounds, we need not (and should not) 
decide 
whether 
the 
warrant 
requirement 
exception 
for  
warrantless entry into a home by police engaged in hot pursuit 
should continue to be limited to warrantless felony arrests or 
if it should be extended to warrantless serious misdemeanor 
arrests.  While I join the majority opinion, I write separately 
to 
address 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence's 
misreading 
of 
pertinent 
and 
controlling 
case 
law 
addressing 
the 
constitutionality of warrantless home entries.  
¶139 This case involves one of the most fundamental 
liberties guaranteed by our federal and state constitutions:  
the right to privacy in the sanctity of one's home.  The United 
States Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment, 
and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. 
At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion."  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court also affirmed the 
fundamental importance of jealously guarding the right to 
privacy against unwarranted invasions in McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948), explaining: 
We are not dealing with formalities.  The 
presence of a search warrant serves a high function.  
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has 
interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
police.  This was done not to shield criminals nor to 
make the home a safe haven for illegal activities.  It 
was done so that an objective mind might weigh the 
need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the 
law.  The right of privacy was deemed too precious to 
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the 
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.  Power 
is a heady thing; and history shows that the police 
acting on their own cannot be trusted.  And so the 
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the 
desires of the police before they violate the privacy 
of the home.  
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56.  
¶140 In a later case, the Supreme Court elaborated: 
 
It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed."  And a principle 
protection against unnecessary intrusions into private 
dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek 
to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. 
. . . . 
"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a 
home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the 
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance." 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 & n.10 (1984)(quoting 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)). 
¶141 Whether viewed in terms of the protections accorded by 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or by 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, warrantless 
entries into the homes of Wisconsin residents are presumptively 
unreasonable and unconstitutional, with a heavy burden on the 
government to justify such intrusions of personal liberty and 
the right to privacy and security in one's home and effects.  
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 581-86 (1980); State v. 
Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶16-21, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 
(citations omitted).  In order to justify the lawfulness of such 
an entry, the State must establish both (1) probable cause to 
arrest or search, and (2) exigent circumstances sufficient to 
establish an exception to the warrant requirement.  Hughes, 233 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶24; Smith v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 226-28, 388 
N.W.2d 601 (1986).  "Warrantless entry is permissible only where 
there is urgent need to do so, coupled with insufficient time to 
secure a warrant."  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 228.   
¶142 In 
Smith, 
this 
court 
described 
the 
exigent 
circumstances test as follows:  "[w]hether a police officer 
under the circumstances known to the officer at the time 
reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would 
gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly 
enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape."  Id. at 230.  
As reinforced in later decisions such as Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 
280, ¶24, the Smith decision recognized 
four factors which, when measured against the time 
needed to obtain a warrant, would constitute the 
exigent 
circumstances 
required 
for 
a 
warrantless 
entry:  (1) An arrest made in "hot pursuit," (2) a 
threat to safety of a suspect or others, (3) a risk 
that evidence would be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood 
that the suspect would flee.  See Laasch [v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 587, 592, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978)].  We 
recommended in Welsh, consistent with Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979), that a review of exigent 
circumstances be directed by a flexible test of 
reasonableness 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.  [State v. ]Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d [319,] 
328, 329[, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982)]. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 229.  The debate presented by Justice 
Prosser's concurrence comes down to the question of whether the 
first factor alone, hot pursuit, can constitute such sufficient 
exigent 
circumstances 
under 
Welsh's 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
test 
to 
justify 
warrantless 
entry 
for 
any 
misdemeanor offense.   
¶143 In its Welsh decision addressing the constitutional 
limitations on warrantless home entries, the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
emphasized 
its 
hesitation 
to 
find 
exigent 
circumstances "when warrantless arrests in the home are at 
issue," and particularly when the underlying offense giving rise 
to probable cause to arrest "is relatively minor."  Welsh, 466 
U.S. at 749-50 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 
42-43 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).  The Welsh court further 
noted that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in 
number and carefully delineated."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 
(citation omitted).  The Court listed the emergency conditions 
it had previously recognized, and indicated that it had applied 
only the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon emergency condition to 
warrantless arrests in the home.  Id. at 750, 753.  
¶144 Welsh explained the difference between how courts 
should treat serious and minor offenses in the context of 
warrantless entry cases in the following terms:  "When the 
government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 
that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests 
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and 
detached magistrate."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750.  The Court 
pointed out that "[e]ven the dissenters in Payton, although 
believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony 
limitation on such arrests. . . . ('The felony requirement 
guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that 
invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious 
crimes')."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 n. 12 (quoting Payton, 445 
U.S. at 616-17 (White, J., dissenting)).  The Court ultimately 
held 
that 
the 
"application 
of 
the 
exigent-circumstances 
exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be 
sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense . . . has been committed."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 
(emphasis added).  
¶145 Justice Prosser's concurrence recognizes that Welsh 
distinguishes between different types of offenses.  The context 
in which that distinction was made in Welsh was limited, 
however, to noting that the Court "[did not have] to consider 
whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an absolute ban on 
warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses."  Id. at 
749 n. 11 (emphasis added).  The Court also noted that the 
decision allowing warrantless home arrests upon a showing of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, Payton, was also 
"expressly limited to felony arrests."  Id. (emphasis added).  
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
¶146 The Court quoted Justice Jackson's concurrence in 
McDonald in discussing why a finding of exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted, 
if allowed at all, when a minor offense has been committed: 
It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, 
even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately 
invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police 
officer engaged in following up offenses that involve 
no violence or threats of it.  While I should be human 
enough to apply the letter of the law with some 
indulgence to officers acting to deal with threats or 
crimes of violence which endanger life or security, it 
is notable that few of the searches found by this 
Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of 
crime. . . .  While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the "numbers" lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think its suppression 
is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
When 
an 
officer 
undertakes 
to 
act 
as 
his 
own 
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it 
by pointing to some real immediate and serious 
consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant. 
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459-60 (Jackson, J. concurring)(emphasis 
added).  See also Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751 (quoting the above 
passage from Justice Jackson's McDonald concurrence).  Thus, 
while the Court discussed the possibility that an argument could 
be made to extend the Payton limitation of felony home arrests 
upon a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
situations involving minor offenses where threats or crimes of 
violence were involved, the rule established in Payton remained 
in effect for the time being.  Moreover, the Court never 
contemplated home arrests for any type of minor offense that did 
not involve threats or crimes of violence.  
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
¶147 Justice Prosser's concurrence strives to go in a 
direction never adopted, nor even contemplated, by the Supreme 
Court.  Justice Prosser's concurrence would establish a rule 
that police in hot pursuit can enter the sanctity of one's home 
without 
a 
warrant 
for 
any 
jailable 
misdemeanor 
offense, 
notwithstanding 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
Payton 
rule 
allowing 
warrantless entry into the home in some cases was expressly 
limited to felony arrests.  See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n. 11.  
¶148  Welsh, while not a hot pursuit case itself, discussed 
hot pursuit along with the other exigent circumstances that may 
be factors in a warrantless entry analysis.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 
749-53.  Similarly, although Payton is not a hot pursuit case, 
its focus dealt with restrictions on warrantless entries into 
the home.   
¶149 Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence 
suggests 
that 
the 
distinction to be drawn in warrantless entry cases is between 
jailable and nonjailable offenses, completely ignoring the 
Payton limitation.  Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶83-85.  
Justice Prosser's concurrence then boldly states that because 
all misdemeanors are potentially jailable in Wisconsin, then all 
crimes in Wisconsin are "serious" offenses, see id., ¶¶92-94, 
leading to the necessary conclusion that warrantless entry 
during hot pursuit 
is justified for any type of crime 
whatsoever.   
¶150 Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence 
errs 
by 
completely 
misconstruing the case of Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 
(2001).  McArthur did not involve a warrantless home entry by 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
police based on probable cause and exigent circumstances for a 
jailable misdemeanor offense.  To the contrary, the police in 
McArthur prevented a defendant from entering his home outside of 
their presence, precisely so the police could secure a warrant 
prior to entering the home.  Id. at 328-29.  The Court's holding 
was limited to justifying the restriction upon the defendant's 
entry into his home that the police imposed.  Id. at 336.  Of 
particular import is the distinction recognized by the Court 
that: 
Temporarily 
keeping 
a 
person 
from 
entering 
his 
home . . . is considerably less intrusive than police 
entry into the home in order to make a warrantless 
arrest or conduct a search.  Cf. Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S., at 585 (the Fourth Amendment's central 
concern is the warrantless entry and search of the 
home). 
Id.  
¶151 In addition to misinterpreting Welsh and McArthur by 
concluding 
that 
warrantless 
entry 
is 
constitutionally 
permissible for any misdemeanor as long as hot pursuit exists, 
the analysis in Justice Prosser's concurrence collapsing the 
distinctions between different types of crimes ignores language 
to the contrary in other controlling precedents as well.  The 
majority of cases that have addressed the issue of exigent 
circumstances justifying warrantless home entries distinguish 
between different types of crimes.   
¶152 Some cases have maintained the distinction between 
felonies and misdemeanors.  See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 
n.11 ("Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests 
upon a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
also 
expressly 
limited 
to 
felony 
arrests."); 
 
State 
v. 
Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, ¶17, 256 Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421 
(interpreting Welsh as "limit[ing] Santana to the hot pursuit of 
fleeing felons"); see also State v. Sorenson, 590 P.2d 136, 139 
(Mont. 1979)("The [hot pursuit] doctrine is unavailable to peace 
officers until a felony has been committed and the suspect is 
fleeing."); City of Seattle v. Altschuler, 766 P.2d 518, 520 
(Wash. App. 1989)("Santana's facts limit its application to the 
'hot pursuit' of a fleeing felon.").  But cf. City of Middletown 
v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002)(holding "that when 
officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a 
suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the 
police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the 
offense 
for 
which 
the 
suspect 
is 
being 
arrested 
is 
a 
misdemeanor"). 
¶153 Other cases adopt what may be viewed as a "hot pursuit 
plus" approach that upholds hot pursuits for offenses of varying 
degrees 
of 
seriousness 
where 
there 
are 
other 
exigent 
circumstances present, for example threats of violence or 
destroyed 
evidence, 
or 
other 
emergencies 
or 
dangerous 
situations.  See Warden, 387 U.S. at 297-99 (upholding hot 
pursuit on the grounds that an armed robbery suspect who had 
entered a house might "gravely endanger" the lives of officers 
or other individuals, with speed being of the essence to ensure 
"that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had 
control of all weapons which could be used against them or to 
effect an escape"); Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶26-27, 33-35, 39 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
(The "immediate and compelling" exigent circumstances in that 
case included probable cause to believe that apartment occupants 
would intentionally destroy evidence of drug-related offense.); 
Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ark. 1992)(interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment as requiring an "exigent circumstance 
requiring immediate aid or action" beyond a mere hot pursuit 
where the suspected crime is a minor offense); State v. Bolte, 
560 A.2d 644, 652-53 (N.J. 1989)(concluding that hot pursuit 
alone was an insufficient justification for a warrantless arrest 
in the suspect's home, and describing a series of other cases in 
which hot pursuit alone was not sufficient without additional 
exigencies such as the alleged commission of a felony, the 
potential destruction of evidence,  or concern for the safety of 
others); State v. Wren, 768 P.2d 1351, 1352, 1356 & n.5 (Idaho 
App. 1989)(holding in part "that if an arrest is not initiated 
in a public place, but is made after a warrantless entry into 
the home, it may not be justified solely upon a theory of 'hot' 
or 'fresh' pursuit.  Other exigent circumstances must exist."  
The court, in rejecting a misdemeanor-felony distinction, also 
rejected hot pursuit as sufficient by itself to justify 
warrantless entry, explaining that "any simplistic equation of a 
hot pursuit with an exigent circumstance is conceptually unsound 
and is at variance with pronouncements of the United States 
Supreme Court.").  See also Payton, 445 U.S. at 583 ("[W]e have 
no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous 
situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
11 
 
that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the 
purpose of either arrest or search."). 
¶154 Santana, relied upon by Justice Prosser's concurrence 
and described by that concurrence as a case that does not limit 
"hot pursuit" warrantless entries to felonies, involved a felony 
arrest upon probable cause of criminal heroin sales activity, 
with the Supreme Court holding that in such a context, a 
defendant 
cannot 
defeat 
an 
otherwise 
proper 
arrest 
that 
commenced in a public place by retreating into a private place.  
Santana, 427 U.S. at 39-40, 42-43.  See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 
(citing Santana as involving "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon").  
The Court described the chase in that case as "a true 'hot 
pursuit'" because there was a realistic expectation that if the 
police did not follow Santana into her house, "any delay would 
result in a destruction of evidence."  Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-
43.  As such, it was the likelihood of the destruction of drug 
evidence, rather than any actual chase,1 that caused the Court to 
conclude that warrantless entry was justified in that felony 
case. 
¶155 However, Santana has not been applied to warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests inside a home by the Supreme Court; 
notwithstanding Santana,2 the Court in Welsh did emphasize that 
                                                 
1 Indeed, there was no literal chase involved in Santana; as 
Justice Marshall's dissent points out, Santana was already 
standing in her doorway when the police approached her home to 
arrest her.  United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45-47 
(1976)(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
2 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), was decided 
subsequent to Santana.  
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
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Payton was limited to felonies.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n. 11.  
Absent further action by the Supreme Court, this court lacks the 
constitutional authority to create a new rule of law that would 
abandon the precedent of Payton.  
¶156 In denying all criminal suspects in Wisconsin the 
right to a warrant before being hotly pursued right into their 
own home, Justice Prosser's concurrence would accord fewer 
protections to individuals to be secure in their homes and 
persons than those recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court.  Such denial of fundamental Fourth Amendment rights would 
be in clear contravention of the basic constitutional principle 
that the federal Constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling 
for individual rights, and states may not provide fewer 
constitutional protections than those guaranteed by the federal 
constitution, although we are always free to grant more rights 
under our state's constitution.  See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 
State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶30 & n. 9, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 729. 
¶157 Finally, Justice Prosser's concurrence confuses and 
conflates "minor" with "petty" misdemeanors, in its analysis 
that our legislature "has determined that all misdemeanors, 
regardless of class, are 'serious' offenses" simply "because all 
misdemeanors 
are 
jailable 
offenses." 
 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence, ¶92.  Justice Prosser's concurrence ignores the 
fact 
that 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
already 
distinguished "serious" offenses from "petty offenses," not in 
terms of whether any jail time at all may be a penalty, but in 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
13 
 
terms 
of 
how 
much 
maximum 
jail 
time 
may 
be 
imposed.  
Specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that: 
[i]n deciding whether an offense is "petty," we have 
sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness 
with which society regards the offense, and we have 
found the most relevant such criteria in the severity 
of the maximum authorized penalty.  Applying these 
guidelines, we have held that a possible six-month 
penalty is short enough to permit classification of 
the offense as "petty," but that a two-year maximum is 
sufficiently "serious" to require an opportunity for 
jury trial. . . .  
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970)(citations 
omitted).  Other cases in which the Court has explained that 
offenses are presumptively "petty," as opposed to "serious" 
offenses, if the maximum potential sentence is six months or 
less, include United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3-4 
(1993), and Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 
542-43 (1989).   
¶158 In closing, although the proposal of Justice Prosser's 
concurrence——denying the Fourth Amendment right to be protected 
from literally unwarranted intrusions into the sanctity of one's 
home in any misdemeanor involving hot pursuit——is contrary to 
established legal standards, I again emphasize that we need not 
decide whether a warrantless entry into a home by police 
officers in the context of hot pursuit should continue to be 
limited to warrantless felony arrests or if the hot pursuit 
exception to the warrant requirement should be extended to 
serious misdemeanor arrests.  The majority correctly decided 
this case on narrower grounds.    
¶159 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2006AP2060-CR.lbb 
 
1