Case Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Carter

Citation: 2007-Ohio-4262

Docket Number: 20070757

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Carter, 115 Ohio St.3d 18, 2007-Ohio-4262.] 
 
 
 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. CARTER. 
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Carter, 115 Ohio St.3d 18, 2007-Ohio-4262.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules — 
Guilty plea to felonious conduct — Two-year suspension with one year 
stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2007-0757 — Submitted June 6, 2007 — Decided August 29, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-060. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Cornell Phillip Carter of Fairlawn, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0062986, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1994.  For the reasons 
that follow, we conclude that respondent’s license to practice law in Ohio should 
be suspended for two years, with the final year of the suspension stayed. 
{¶ 2} On June 9, 2006, relator, Akron Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with professional misconduct.  Respondent filed an answer 
to the complaint, and a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline held a hearing on the complaint in March 2007.  The panel then 
prepared written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended 
sanction, all of which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} Respondent was employed from May 2003 until June 2005 by 
State and Federal Communications, Inc.  During part of this employment, 
respondent was entitled to use one of the company’s American Express charge 
cards. This privilege was taken away by the company’s president in August 2004 
because respondent had charged excessive personal expenses to the card, 
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including stays at a Comfort Inn in Akron.  Respondent was then permitted to use 
the card for official business only after requesting the card from the company’s 
controller and on the condition that he return it immediately after use. 
{¶ 4} On December 31, 2004, respondent checked into the Comfort Inn 
using the company’s American Express card number to guarantee payment for the 
room charges without the approval of his employer. 
{¶ 5} Respondent continued to stay at the Comfort Inn for several 
months without paying for the room, and in March 2005, the owner of the hotel 
charged the American Express card for respondent’s unpaid balance.  Respondent 
was upset and told the hotel’s owner that he intended to pay his hotel bill in cash 
within one week.  After that discussion, the hotel owner canceled the charge on 
the American Express card. 
{¶ 6} When respondent failed to pay the room charges within one week, 
the hotel’s owner again charged the unpaid balance of $5,900.23 to the American 
Express card that belonged to respondent’s employer.  After that second charge 
was made by Comfort Inn, respondent repeatedly promised his employer that he 
would promptly deliver a check to the employer for the full amount that had been 
charged to the company’s charge card.  Respondent failed, however, to present 
the promised check. 
{¶ 7} Respondent gave a letter to his employer in late April 2005, 
resigning from the company effective June 1, 2005.  When he left the company, 
respondent still had not paid his employer for his personal hotel bill that had been 
charged to the American Express card. 
{¶ 8} In August 2005, a detective from the Copley police department 
contacted respondent about the unpaid debt.  Respondent gave the detective a 
check the next month purporting to cover the amount owed for the hotel charges, 
but the account on which the check was drawn did not contain sufficient funds.  
Finally, respondent did repay the amount that he owed State and Federal 
January Term, 2007 
3 
Communications, Inc., for his personal hotel bill. He pleaded guilty to felony 
charges of theft and misuse of a credit card.  Respondent entered a diversion 
program that could lead to the dismissal of the criminal charges if he successfully 
completes the program. 
{¶ 9} We agree with the board that respondent’s actions violated the 
following Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-
102(A)(6) (barring conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law). 
Sanction 
{¶ 10} Relator recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law.  The panel and the board instead recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the second 
year stayed on conditions.  Respondent has filed no objections to the board’s 
findings or its recommendation. 
{¶ 11} In imposing a sanction for attorney misconduct, we consider the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  The 
aggravating factors in this case include respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive, 
his pattern of misconduct, his multiple offenses, and his refusal to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his conduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), and 
(g). 
{¶ 12} Mitigating factors identified by the board include the absence of 
any prior disciplinary record, respondent’s eventual payment of restitution to his 
former employer, his cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, 
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and the imposition of criminal penalties on respondent for his misconduct.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (f). 
{¶ 13} After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, 
we agree with the board that respondent should be suspended from the practice of 
law for two years, with the final year of that suspension stayed on conditions.  As 
respondent himself acknowledged at the disciplinary hearing, he exercised “bad 
judgment,” made “bad financial decisions,” and broke several promises that he 
had made to his former employer and to the owner of the Comfort Inn.  He 
nonetheless characterized his actions as “not criminal, * * * not deceitful, * * * 
[and] not dishonest.”  Respondent also testified at the disciplinary hearing that his 
conduct was not “unethical, * * * illegal, * * * [or] immoral,” and he told the 
panel that he had pleaded guilty to the criminal charges despite his belief that he 
was not guilty. 
{¶ 14} Like the panel and the board, we are troubled by respondent’s 
failure to accept full responsibility for his unprofessional, and ultimately criminal, 
actions.  Even if he honestly intended to pay his debt promptly, he took advantage 
of the hotel owner’s patience.  He gave misleading statements to his former 
employer about his willingness and ability to pay his financial obligations.  His 
actions during 2005 and his attitude at the 2007 disciplinary hearing do not reflect 
the kind of sound judgment, integrity, and candor that we expect from Ohio 
lawyers. 
{¶ 15} “An attorney who has been convicted of felony theft offenses has 
violated the basic professional duty to act with honesty and integrity.”  Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Blankemeyer, 109 Ohio St.3d 156, 2006-Ohio-2038, 846 N.E.2d 523, 
¶ 12.  “One of the fundamental tenets of the professional responsibility of a 
lawyer is that [the lawyer] should maintain a degree of personal and professional 
integrity that meets the highest standard.  The integrity of the profession can be 
maintained only if the conduct of the individual attorney is above reproach.  [The 
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lawyer] should refrain from any illegal conduct.  Anything short of this lessens 
public confidence in the legal profession – because obedience to the law 
exemplifies respect for the law.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Stein (1972), 29 Ohio 
St.2d 77, 81, 58 O.O.2d 151, 278 N.E.2d 670. 
{¶ 16} A violation of Disciplinary Rules barring conduct involving fraud, 
deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation ordinarily calls for the actual suspension 
of an attorney’s license.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 
2005-Ohio-1143, 824 N.E.2d 78, ¶ 44; Akron Bar Assn. v. Williams, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 317, 2004-Ohio-6588, 819 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 17} The board’s recommended sanction is similar to those that we have 
imposed in other cases.  See, e.g., Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Garfield, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-1935, 846 N.E.2d 45, ¶ 10 (imposing an 18-month 
suspension on an attorney with no history of disciplinary problems who had 
entered a plea of guilty to the crime of bank fraud); Akron Bar Assn. v. Meyer 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 324, 325, 720 N.E.2d 900 (attorney’s convictions for grand 
theft and trafficking in food stamps constituted illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude as well as dishonest or fraudulent conduct that adversely reflected on the 
attorney’s fitness to practice law, warranting a two-year suspension, with the 
second year stayed); Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. West (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 565, 
567-568, 653 N.E.2d 376 (a two-year suspension, with the second year stayed, 
was the appropriate sanction after an attorney pleaded guilty to the felony offense 
of carrying a concealed weapon). 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for two years, with the final year stayed on conditions.  During the 
first year of his suspension, respondent shall successfully complete the diversion 
program that he entered in January 2006.  If he fails to do so, or if he commits any 
further misconduct during the two-year suspension period, the stay will be lifted, 
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and respondent will be suspended for the full two-year period of suspension.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in regard to the 
sanction imposed on respondent.  In reviewing respondent’s actions, I see a 
troubling pattern of dishonesty.  He abused the trust of his employer and a hotel 
owner on multiple occasions to further his own selfish needs.  He delayed 
opportunities to repay the injured parties for several months, to the point that the 
police were called to resolve the matter.  Even at that late stage, he further 
prolonged the proceedings by giving a police detective a check that was not 
supported by sufficient funds.  Despite the fact that he pleaded guilty to two 
fourth-degree felony charges, theft and misuse of a credit card, he has refused to 
acknowledge that his conduct was wrongful. 
{¶ 20} These serious ethical violations warrant a stricter sanction than the 
partially stayed suspension ordered by the majority.  I would therefore impose a 
two-year suspension from the practice of law, with no time stayed. 
 
O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
James M. Campbell and Joseph C. McLeland, for relator. 
 
Cornell P. Carter, pro se. 
______________________