Case Title: Ambrose v. Singleton

Citation: 356 P.2d 253

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1960-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
356 P.2d 253 (1960) Paul D. AMBROSE, Executor of the Estate of S. Essie Philips, Deceased, Plaintiff In Error, v. Helen A. SINGLETON and John P. Edwards, Defendants in Error. No. 18404. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. October 24, 1960. *254 W. David McClain, Edwin A. Williams, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duane O. Littell, Kenneth D. Sutterlin, Denver, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. The parties in this cause will be referred to as they appeared in the district court, namely, plaintiff in error as the executor, defendants in error as petitioners or by name, and the deceased S. Essie Philips as the testatrix or the deceased. The testatrix died in Denver June 27, 1954. Her will dated February 6, 1953, was admitted to probate on August 9, 1954, and Paul D. Ambrose was appointed executor of the estate. The deceased was an elderly woman in excellent health up to the time of her sudden death. She was far above average in business experience and had prospered with her investments and dealings in real estate. She drew her own will without the aid of professional advice, and the uncertainties arising from the language contained in certain paragraphs thereof caused the executor to petition the probate court for a construction of portions of the will. The particular paragraphs of the will with which we are concerned in this cause are numbered 5 and 6. They read as follows: In the probate court the executor sought and obtained a construction of other paragraphs contained in decedent's will. No objection was raised with reference thereto and we give no further consideration to those constructions except as they may be pertinent to the questions raised by the paragraphs above quoted. With reference *255 to paragraphs 5 and 6 the county court held that they gave to Singleton and Edwards life estates in their respective properties with contingent remainders over, subject to a defeasance if during their lifetime they and the executor shall determine that the properties be sold, then they should be sold and the proceeds resulting from such sales should become the sole and exclusive property of Singleton and Edwards respectively. It was further held that the word "trustee" referred to "executor" and that there was no residuary clause in said will except as to personalty. The parties accepted these constructions without objection. It is admitted that following the foregoing construction by the probate court it was "the combined judgment" of the executor and each of the beneficiaries named in said paragraphs 5 and 6, that the real estate described therein should be sold "and the proceeds delivered" to the devisees as provided for by the will. The real estate was sold accordingly. With reference to the property devised to Helen A. Singleton, the deceased had executed a lease thereon and had accepted a substantial sum in the form of prepaid rentals, much of which would be applicable to rentals for a period of time following her death. With reference to the premises devised to John P. Edwards, the deceased had placed a lien thereon on June 25, 1952, to secure payment of her promissory note for the sum of $8,500. This real estate was also leased by the deceased and the tenant had also paid a substantial sum in advance rentals. It is clear from the inventory of assets on file in the estate that the numerous specific gifts to brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, stepchildren and friends were made with the intent to dispose of substantially the entire estate. The only provision in the will which would be termed a residuary clause was as follows: On September 16, 1955, petitioners filed their "Petition for Construction and Interpretation of Will" in which they sought reimbursement from assets of the estate to the extent of the advance rentals and the mortgage indebtedness which had been deducted from the purchase price of the real estate devised to them by the terms of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the will. Their contention is that by the language used the testatrix intended to transfer title free of liens and encumbrances and that it was the burden of the estate to "exonerate" to the extent of the indebtedness against the property and the amount of prepaid rentals. The probate court agreed with the contention of petitioners and upon appeal to the district court the same result obtained and judgment entered accordingly. The executor seeks review by writ of error. As grounds for reversal of the judgment it is contended by the executor, inter alia, that: On behalf of petitioners, it is argued, inter alia, that: "The doctrine of exoneration requires that an encumbrance upon real property, which is the subject of a specific devise, be paid out of the personalty of the estateunless the testator clearly and plainly shows in his *256 will that the devisee shall take cum onere." The issue of law here involves the claimed right of devisees of real estate to have the same exonerated from a lien, or a charge thereon, at the expense of the personal estate of the deceased. An exhaustive analysis of numerous cases dealing with the doctrine of exoneration will be found in 5 A.L.R. 488-507. General statements of the rule and variations thereof as applied in other jurisdictions will be found in 57 Am. Jur. 993, and 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1316, p. 221. There is a marked difference of opinion in the decisions of appellate courts in other jurisdictions involving the doctrine of exoneration. We have read many of these opinions and have considered them for the purpose of determining whether the most recent pronouncement of this court upon the question should be modified. The case to which reference is made is entitled Robinson v. Tubbs, 140 Colo. 471, 344 P.2d 1080, which was decided after briefs were filed in the instant case but prior to oral argument. No reference was made to that opinion by counsel and we conclude that they were not informed concerning it. We think our opinion in that case is decisive of this controversy and has established a precedent by which we should be governed in the determination of claims for "exoneration" of real estate to the extent of encumbrances thereon when said real estate is the subject of a specific devise by will. In the Robinson case the devise was made in the following language: The legal description of the property is then set forth. The devisee demanded reimbursement from the estate for the amount of taxes levied by the City and County of Denver for the year 1955, payable in 1956. The decedent died October 27, 1955. In essence the provisions of the will in the Robinson case are identical to those in the case at bar. In holding that the daughter of the deceased was not entitled to the "reimbursement" claimed by her, or in other words, in denying the claim for "exoneration" we there said: We think this language is tantamount to a rejection of the common-law doctrine of "exoneration" as applied by courts of last resort in other jurisdictions. In substance, the Colorado rule as above stated is, that if from the will itself it affirmatively appears that the testator intended the real estate devised should go to the devisee free of any existing liens or charges, then the residuary estate, or such *257 other asset as is indicated by the will in express terms, should be drawn upon to clear the property. In the absence of such showing of intent no "exoneration" or reimbursement can be obtained by the devisee. It cannot be successfully contended that the will in the instant case affirmatively shows any intention on the part of the testatrix to devise the property to her brother and sister free and clear of the encumbrances and charges placed upon it by her. A careful analysis of the will in its entirety indicates an opposite intent. We believe the rule announced in Robinson v. Tubbs, supra, is sound and in keeping with the generally accepted views of the bench and bar in this state. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in a manner consistent with the views herein expressed. FRANTZ and DOYLE, JJ., concur.