Case Title: In re E.F.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S260839

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re E.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
E.F., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S260839 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B295755 and B297079 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
PJ53161 
 
 
April 19, 2021 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
In re E.F. 
S260839 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
When a minor is the subject of a juvenile wardship 
petition, the juvenile court may, “upon application in the 
manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” 
issue ex parte orders enjoining the minor from “contacting, 
threatening, stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the 
court finds to be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with 
whom association would be detrimental to the child.”  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (b); all undesignated statutory 
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)  The 
Courts of Appeal have divided on whether the juvenile court 
may issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) pursuant to this 
statute without advance notice to the minor. 
We hold that section 213.5, subdivision (b) incorporates 
the notice requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 527, subdivision (c).  By the terms of that provision, “[n]o 
temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice” 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (c)) to the minor unless the 
prosecutor (1) shows that “great or irreparable injury will 
result” before the matter can be heard with proper notice (id., 
subd. (c)(1)) and (2) previously informed the minor of the time 
and place that the application will be made, made a good faith 
attempt but was unable to so inform the minor, or provides 
specific reasons why the prosecutor should not be required to so 
inform the minor (id., subd. (c)(2)).  Where the prosecutor has 
not given advance notice and has not made an adequate showing 
to justify the lack of notice, the court must give sufficient time 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
for counsel and the minor to prepare and respond to the 
application before any order is issued. 
I. 
In December 2018, E.F. and L.S. were ninth graders 
enrolled in the same high school art class.  At school on 
December 7, E.F. offered L.S. a microwaved cup of noodles.  
When L.S. went to drink the broth, he smelled bleach and threw 
the cup out.  One week later, a school official contacted officers 
from the Los Angeles School Police Department and recounted 
a report of the incident from an anonymous student.  E.F. was 
arrested but not detained.  In late January 2019, the district 
attorney filed a delinquency petition under section 602 alleging 
that E.F. had committed the crime of poisoning, a felony.  (Pen. 
Code, § 347, subd. (a).)  E.F. had no prior history of arrest or 
involvement with the juvenile court.   
In February 2019, E.F. made her first appearance in 
juvenile court.  Appearing with counsel for arraignment, E.F. 
denied the allegations.  The prosecutor asked the court to issue 
a TRO enjoining E.F. from having any contact with L.S.  E.F. 
objected on the ground that the application did not meet the 
procedural requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 527.  Specifically, she asserted that the application was 
not filed with advance notice to her, nor was it accompanied by 
an affidavit or verified complaint to establish that great or 
irreparable injury will result to the applicant before the matter 
could be heard with notice.  The prosecutor acknowledged that 
no notice was provided before the hearing and explained that he 
did not know who was assigned to defend E.F. before the case 
was called.  He added that “any allegation that [the prosecutor] 
didn’t inform [counsel for E.F.] in time” was due in part to the 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
deputy public defender’s failure to check in with the prosecutor 
sooner.  The prosecutor did not have a copy of the application to 
share with E.F. or her counsel at the hearing, and the court 
called a recess to allow time to make copies.  Nor did the 
prosecutor provide an affidavit or verified complaint in support 
of the TRO request; he instead referred to the police report 
attached to the petition to recount the facts of the December 
2018 incident.  The juvenile court overruled E.F.’s objection, 
finding “substantial compliance,” and issued a TRO prohibiting 
E.F. from contacting L.S. and requiring her to stay at least 100 
yards from him.   
E.F. appealed the TRO.  While that appeal was pending, 
the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the 
prosecutor’s application for a three-year restraining order on the 
same basis and terms as the TRO.  E.F. filed a second notice of 
appeal, this time challenging the three-year restraining order.   
The two appeals were consolidated, with E.F. arguing, as 
relevant here, that the TRO was procedurally defective and thus 
invalid.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that section 
213.5, subdivision (b) provides for the issuance of an ex parte 
TRO and that section 213.5, subdivision (c) expressly provides 
for a TRO effective up to 21 or 25 days to be “ ‘granted without 
notice,’ ” notwithstanding the notice requirements of Code of 
Civil Procedure section 527.  (In re E.F. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 
216, 220.)  The Court of Appeal disagreed with In re L.W. (2020) 
44 Cal.App.5th 44, 49–51, which held that a TRO application 
under section 213.5, subdivision (b) must comply with the notice 
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 527. 
We granted review to resolve this conflict.  Although E.F.’s 
appeal of the TRO was rendered moot by the juvenile court’s 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
subsequent order granting a three-year restraining order, the 
limited duration of a TRO in this context calls for the exercise of 
our discretion to resolve an issue that is “ ‘ “capable of repetition, 
yet evading review.” ’ ”  (United Farm Workers v. Superior Court 
of Santa Cruz County (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 907.)   
II. 
The question presented is one of statutory interpretation 
and is thus subject to de novo review.  (Christensen v. 
Lightbourne (2019) 7 Cal.5th 761, 771.) 
Section 213.5, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part:  
“After a petition has been filed pursuant to Section 601 or 602 
to declare a child a ward of the juvenile court, and until the time 
that the petition is dismissed or wardship is terminated, upon 
application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure . . . , the juvenile court may issue ex parte 
orders . . . enjoining the child from contacting, threatening, 
stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the court finds to 
be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with whom 
association would be detrimental to the child.” 
Section 213.5 goes on to provide a process that applies 
when a TRO is issued without notice:  “If a temporary 
restraining order is granted without notice, the matter shall be 
made returnable on an order requiring cause to be shown why 
the order should not be granted, on the earliest day that the 
business of the court will permit, but not later than 21 days or, 
if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from the date the 
temporary restraining order is granted.  The court may, on the 
motion of the person seeking the restraining order, or on its own 
motion, shorten the time for the service of the order to show 
cause on the person to be restrained.”  (Id., subd. (c)(1).)  In the 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
alternative, or following the expiration of a TRO granted 
without notice, the juvenile court may, upon notice and hearing, 
issue a restraining order that may “remain in effect, in the 
discretion of the court, no more than three years, unless 
otherwise terminated by the court, extended by mutual consent 
of all parties to the restraining order, or extended by further 
order of the court on the motion of any party to the restraining 
order.”  (Id., subd. (d)(1).) 
By its terms, section 213.5, subdivision (b) says that a 
court may issue an ex parte order for injunctive relief “upon 
application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure.”  Code of Civil Procedure section 527 states 
in relevant part:  “No temporary restraining order shall be 
granted without notice to the opposing party, unless both of the 
following requirements are satisfied:  [¶] (1) It appears from 
facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that great 
or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before the 
matter can be heard on notice.  [¶] (2) The applicant or the 
applicant’s attorney certifies one of the following to the court 
under oath:  [¶] (A) That within a reasonable time prior to the 
application the applicant informed the opposing party or the 
opposing party’s attorney at what time and where the 
application would be made.  [¶] (B) That the applicant in good 
faith attempted but was unable to inform the opposing party 
and the opposing party’s attorney, specifying the efforts made to 
contact them.  [¶] (C) That for reasons specified the applicant 
should not be required to so inform the opposing party or the 
opposing party’s attorney.”  (Id., subd. (c).) 
The district attorney contends, as the Court of Appeal held 
below, that section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1)’s reference to a TRO 
“granted without notice” suggests that notice and a hearing are 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
required only for a restraining order extending beyond the 21 or 
25 days provided for in that subdivision.  According to the 
district attorney, it is the absence of notice and a formal hearing 
that differentiates the process for issuing a 21- or 25-day TRO 
from the process for issuing a restraining order of longer 
duration.  Echoing the Court of Appeal, the district attorney 
reads section 213.5 as distinguishing between a TRO “granted 
without notice” (§ 213.5, subd. (c)(1)) and a longer-term 
restraining order granted “upon notice and a hearing” (id., 
subd. (d)(1)). 
But this reading confuses the process for obtaining a TRO, 
which is set forth in subdivision (b) of section 213.5, with the 
process set forth in subdivision (c) that follows “[i]f a temporary 
restraining order is granted without notice” (id., subd. (c)(1)).  In 
specifying what happens if a TRO is granted without notice, 
subdivision (c) says nothing about what procedures must be 
followed before a TRO may be granted without notice.  That 
issue is addressed by subdivision (b), which says the court may 
issue an ex parte order “upon application in the manner 
provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 
The district attorney, like the court below, contends that 
requiring the applicant to comply with the notice requirements 
of Code of Civil Procedure section 527 would conflict with or 
render superfluous section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1)’s language 
that TROs may be “ ‘granted without notice.’ ”  (See In re E.F., 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)  But section 213.5, subdivision 
(c)(1)’s recognition that TROs may be “granted without notice” 
is not itself an authorization for courts to grant TROs without 
notice.  Section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1) sets forth the procedure 
to be followed in the event that a court grants a TRO without 
notice, whereas section 213.5, subdivision (b) makes clear that 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
an application for a TRO must proceed “in the manner provided 
by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” which authorizes 
a TRO without notice only under certain conditions (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 527, subd. (c)(1), (2)).  There is no conflict or surplusage. 
The district attorney further argues that even if notice is 
required, courtroom notice — in other words, notice first 
provided at the hearing itself — suffices to satisfy the relevant 
statutes.  Courts have rejected this position, explaining that 
“[w]hile the specific amount of time necessary to satisfy the 
‘notice’ requirement is not delineated in section 213.5, more 
than courtroom notice is required.”  (In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 
Cal.App.5th 236, 245; see In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44, 
51; cf. Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 
965 [requiring notice in advance of hearing for criminal 
protective order]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1203(a) [“A party 
seeking an ex parte order must notify all parties no later than 
10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, absent 
a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify a shorter 
time for notice.”].)  We agree with these courts that under the 
statutory scheme, courtroom notice is not enough to avoid the 
affidavit requirement specified by Code of Civil Procedure 
section 527, subdivision (c). 
The Court of Appeal suggested that “TROs do not need 
advance notice because they are typically issued under more 
emergency circumstances, while longer lasting restraining 
orders do need advance notice because they are typically issued 
under less pressing circumstances (usually because a TRO is 
already in place).”  (In re E.F., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)  
But Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (c) makes 
clear that advance notice or a showing of justification for lack of 
such notice is required for issuance of a TRO.  The limited 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
duration of a TRO under section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1) 
provides no reason to infer — contrary to section 213.5, 
subdivision 
(b)’s 
express 
incorporation 
of 
the 
notice 
requirements in Code of Civil Procedure section 527 — that the 
Legislature intended no advance notice be given to the juvenile, 
especially when a TRO in this context may have serious 
consequences for the juvenile who is restrained.  
A willful and knowing violation of a restraining order 
issued under section 213.5 is a misdemeanor and may subject a 
juvenile to a new delinquency proceeding.  (§ 213.5, subd. (h); 
see Pen. Code, § 273.65.)  Section 213.5 orders can be entered 
into the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications 
System (CLETS) database system.  (§ 213.5, subd. (g).)  And the 
issuance of an order enjoining a juvenile’s contact with a fellow 
student or other member of the school community, even for just 
a few weeks, creates additional difficulties for the juvenile.  
These potential consequences of a TRO counsel against an 
inference that the Legislature intended to eliminate the 
standard notice requirement that affords the juvenile an 
adequate opportunity to contest an application for a TRO. 
We see nothing in the legislative history that casts doubt 
on our straightforward reading of the statutes.  The Legislature 
enacted section 213.5 in 1989 to provide a means by which a 
juvenile court could enter TROs and protective orders in 
connection with a dependency petition, similar to the injunctive 
powers of the family law courts.  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1409, § 2, 
p. 6203; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading 
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 221 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Sept. 11, 1989, p. 3.)  The primary purpose of the legislation was 
to provide a tool by which a person committing abuse, rather 
than the child suffering the abuse, could be removed from the 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
home in situations of domestic violence.  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. 
of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 221 
(1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 11, 1989, p. 2.)  Section 
213.5 was amended in 1998 to extend the same authority in 
connection with delinquency petitions.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 390, § 1, 
p. 2909.)  According to the bill sponsor, “it is common in 
delinquency cases to encounter a family situation in which a 
member of the household either poses a threat to a child or is 
contributing to the anti-social behavior of the child.”  (Sen. Com. 
on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2017 (1997–1998 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 20, 1998, p. 3.)  The same amendment 
also authorized the juvenile court to enjoin the minor subject to 
the delinquency 
petition “from contacting, threatening, 
stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the court finds to 
be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with whom 
association would be detrimental to the child.”  (Stats. 1998, 
ch. 390, § 1, p. 2909.)  The Judicial Council, which sponsored the 
bill, explained that “expressly authorizing the juvenile court to 
issue restraining orders would increase efficiency and expedite 
the resolution of many cases” — for example, by enabling 
“victims of juvenile crime . . . to seek protection from the juvenile 
court, rather than having to pursue a civil harassment 
protection order in a separate forum.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2017 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced Feb. 20, 1998, p. 3.) 
Although efficiency was a guiding purpose of the 
legislation, the Legislature chose a specific means of achieving 
that end:  providing a single forum for resolving a delinquency 
petition along with any associated restraining or protective 
orders instead of requiring two separate proceedings.  Toward 
that end, the Legislature largely imported rather than amended 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
the procedures and standards for obtaining preliminary relief 
set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivisions (a) 
and (c).  Section 213.5 does authorize the juvenile court to take 
a number of steps to protect the safety of the minor and the 
public, including issuing orders regarding custody, parental 
rights, and the minor’s freedom of movement and access to 
school.  The Legislature recognized that such steps may be 
necessary, sometimes with little or no notice, to ensure the 
safety of the minor and the public.  But the Legislature did not 
do away with notice in all instances.  Instead, it authorized 
issuance of a TRO without notice when the applicant shows a 
need to avoid “great or irreparable injury” and otherwise 
complies with applicable procedures.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, 
subd. (c)(1).) 
Finally, the district attorney cites rule 5.630 of the 
California Rules of Court — which provides that an application 
for a restraining order in a delinquency case “may be submitted 
without notice, and the court may grant the petition and issue a 
temporary order” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(d)) — as 
confirmation that a TRO in a juvenile proceeding may be issued 
without notice.  The question, however, is not simply whether a 
TRO application may be submitted and granted without notice, 
but under what circumstances this may occur. 
California Rules of Court, rule 5.630(a) explains:  “After a 
petition has been filed under section 300, 601, or 602, and until 
the petition is dismissed or dependency or wardship is 
terminated, or the ward is no longer on probation, the court may 
issue restraining orders as provided in section 213.5.”  The 
phrase “as provided in section 213.5” necessarily incorporates 
the procedural requirements set forth in section 527.  Further, 
although California Rules of Court, rule 5.360(d)(1) provides 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
that “[i]n determining whether or not to issue the temporary 
restraining order without notice, the court must consider all 
documents submitted with the application and may review the 
contents of the juvenile court file regarding the child,” nothing 
in the rule specifies under what circumstances it is permissible 
for a court to issue a TRO without notice.  Code of Civil 
Procedure section 527 makes clear that the court must find that 
“great or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before 
the matter can be heard on notice” (id., subd. (c)(1)) and that the 
applicant has made efforts or has given reasons why no effort 
need be made, to inform the opposing party when and where the 
application would be made (id., subd. (c)(2)).  To the extent the 
district attorney claims there is tension or inconsistency 
between what California Rules of Court, rule 5.630 authorizes 
and what section 213.5 or Code of Civil Procedure section 527 
says, it is settled that “ ‘[r]ules promulgated by the Judicial 
Council may not conflict with governing statutes’ ” and that 
“ ‘[i]f a rule is inconsistent with a statute, the statute controls.’ ”  
(People v. Guerra (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 961, 966.) 
In sum, we hold that a TRO application under section 
213.5 must satisfy the procedural requirements of Code of Civil 
Procedure section 527.  This means that an applicant who seeks 
the issuance of a TRO without notice must show “great or 
irreparable injury” justifying the absence of notice (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 527, subd. (c)(1)), as well as a good faith effort to inform, 
or reasons why no effort need be made to inform, the opposing 
party when and where the application would be made (id., subd. 
(c)(2).  In light of our holding, we need not decide whether notice 
in this context is required as a matter of due process.  Where the 
prosecutor neither provides notice nor makes a showing of 
justification for lack of notice, the juvenile court must provide 
In re E.F. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
counsel and the minor with sufficient time to prepare and 
respond before any TRO may issue.  How much time is required 
will depend on the totality of the circumstances, including the 
complexity of the incident that gave rise to the juvenile petition, 
the number of witnesses relevant to the matter, and the scope 
and type of restrictions requested in the TRO application. 
In this matter, the district attorney concedes that no 
notice was provided before the hearing, and no attempt was 
made to show “great or irreparable injury” (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 527, subd. (c)(1)) or otherwise to comply with Code of Civil 
Procedure section 527, subdivision (c).  The juvenile court’s 
issuance of the TRO thus exceeded its authority under section 
213.5.  We express no view on the Court of Appeal’s 
determination that substantial evidence supports the juvenile 
court’s issuance of the restraining order in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment affirming the 
issuance of the temporary restraining order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re E.F. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 45 Cal.App.5th 216  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S260839  
Date Filed:  April 19, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Morton Rochman    
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, John Pomeroy, Phyllis Asayama and 
Grace Shin, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
  
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Courtney M. Selan 
Attorney at Law 
11664 National Blvd., Suite 258 
Los Angeles, CA 90064 
(310) 452-6870 
 
Grace Shin 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple St., Room 540 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
(213) 974-5911