Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF WILMA FISHER, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF DAVID E. FISHER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE WESTERN SUGAR COMPANY: WILMA FISHER V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0220

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF WILMA FISHER, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF DAVID E. FISHER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE WESTERN SUGAR COMPANY: WILMA FISHER V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2008 WY 89189 P.3d 866Case Number: S-07-0220Decided: 07/30/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF WILMA FISHER, SURVIVING SPOUSE 
OF DAVID E. FISHER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE WESTERN SUGAR COMPANY: WILMA 
FISHER,Appellant(Petitioner/Claimant),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Objector/Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big HornCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Larry 
B. Jones of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, the Cody, Wyoming Division of 
Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh & Jardine, PC, Cody, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Wilma 
Fisher (Mrs. Fisher), sought worker's compensation death benefits as the 
surviving spouse of her husband, David Fisher.  He was seriously injured at work on 
October 1, 1993.  Those injuries 
left him a paraplegic.  On June 22, 
2005, a fire occurred in the Fishers' home.  Mr. Fisher was rescued from the house, 
although he was unconscious from the effects of smoke inhalation.  He was hospitalized for 19 days before 
he expired from pneumonia.  His 
attending physician testified that Fisher died because his paraplegia rendered 
him unable to cough with sufficient force so as to expel the mucus that 
developed in his bronchi as a result of the smoke inhalation.  Appellee, the Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division (Division), denied Mrs. Fisher's claim for death 
benefits on the basis that Mr. Fisher did not die as a result of the 
work-related injury.  Mrs. Fisher 
requested a hearing, and a hearing examiner agreed with the Division's denial of 
benefits.  Mrs. Fisher also appealed 
to the district court and it, too, affirmed the Division's denial of 
benefits.  We conclude that there is 
not substantial evidence to sustain the hearing examiner's findings and, 
therefore, we will reverse and 
remand to the district court with directions that it further remand to the 
hearing examiner with directions that the applicable death benefits be awarded 
to Mrs. Fisher.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mrs. Fisher 
raises these issues:

 
 
1.  The 
decision of the hearing examiner, in denying benefits under W.S. § 27-14-403(e) 
(LexisNexis 2007), to the surviving widow was arbitrary, capricious, not 
otherwise in accordance with the law and unsupported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
2.  The 
work-related injuries of the deceased, David Fisher, were a direct cause of his 
subsequent death from smoke inhalation and pneumonia, the competent and 
sufficient evidence presented by [Mrs. Fisher] established such cause, and the 
conclusion of the hearing examiner, in interpreting and applying W.S. § 
27-14-403(e) so as to deny [Mrs. Fisher] the benefits requested was arbitrary, 
capricious, [and] not otherwise in accordance with the 
law.

 
 
The 
Division contends that the hearing examiner's decision is in accordance with 
law.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties 
essentially agree that the facts in this case are not in dispute.  It is the application of the governing 
law to those facts that has produced the controversy at hand.  David Fisher suffered his debilitating 
injuries on October 1, 1993.  Mrs. 
Fisher described her husband's injuries in these words, as in turn they had been 
described to her:

 
 
            
They told me that it was about an 8 inch pipe by 10 or 15 feet long that 
hit him on the head and knocked him back against an iron railing.  It was a big, thick, heavy iron railing 
and it bent it.  It crushed his 
spinal cord and cut off his fingers and tore his aorta and gave him a very 
severe head injury.

 
 
[¶4]      After suffering 
those injuries, Mr. Fisher was confined to a wheelchair during his waking hours, 
and he and his wife moved to Pocatello, Idaho, to be near family members who could 
help him and his wife with his care.  
In the early afternoon of June 22, 2005, Mr. Fisher went into his bedroom 
where he had a wheelchair-accessible worktable where he built model planes, 
trains, etc.  He was 74 years old at 
that time.  When Mr. Fisher emerged 
from that room a short time later, Mrs. Fisher noted thick smoke in the 
room.  The exact cause of the fire 
was not determined, other than that it was accidental.  Mrs. Fisher continued her narration of 
those events like this:

 
 
I 
ran out and got my fire extinguisher, which was just right here close.  I grabbed it and went in and couldn't 
see.  I put a towel up to my 
face.  I couldn't work the fire 
extinguisher with one hand.  I could 
tell that it was getting out of hand.

I 
said, come on, Dave, I've got to get you out of here.  He said, I think I can put it out.  Well, you know, his mind was not that 
clear, and he wouldn't come with me and the chair was too heavy for me to force 
him to come out.  So I just ran out 
and went to the neighbor's to call the fire department.

.

            
They came real quickly.  They 
came in and found him and got him out.  
He was unconscious they said when they brought him out.  He was conscious when I saw him.  They gave him oxygen and he kind of came 
around.

 
 
[¶5]      Cross-examination 
of Mrs. Fisher revealed that Mr. Fisher had tried to get a glass of water from 
the bathroom so as to try to extinguish the fire and that his wheelchair was 
wedged in the hallway of his home when he was found by 
firefighters.

 
 
[¶6]      As noted above, 
Mr. Fisher died on July 11, 2005, 19 days after he first suffered the effects of 
smoke inhalation.  On August 23, 
2005, the Division denied Mrs. Fisher's death benefits claim for the stated 
reason that:  "The death certificate 
stated the cause of death to be pneumonia from smoke inhalation which is not 
related to the original injury to the spine.  Wyoming Statute § 27-14-601(a)."  That statute 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Upon 
receipt, the division shall review the initial injury reports to determine if 
the injury or death resulting from injury is compensable and within the 
jurisdiction of this act.  No 
subsequent claim for compensation under this act shall be approved if the 
division determines the injury or death is not compensable and under the 
jurisdiction of this act or if the employer states on his injury report that the 
injury is not compensable, until a determination is rendered by the 
division.  The division shall 
provide notice of its determination to the employee, employer and the 
claimant.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(a) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶7]      That response to 
Mrs. Fisher's claim was only partially accurate.  A document entitled Certificate of 
Death, issued by the State of Idaho on August 17, 2005, indicates that Mr. 
Fisher died of "Pneumonia & Respiratory Failure."  There is no indication that this 
document was received by the Division, although it appears in the record created 
by the agency.  The Division did 
receive a second death certificate from the State of Idaho.  It is date-stamped as received on both 
July 29, 2005, and August 11, 2005 (it was certified by the State of Idaho on July 19, 
2005).  That death certificate 
indicates that Mr. Fisher died from pneumonia of two days duration, secondary to 
smoke inhalation of two weeks duration, and included a notation to this effect, 
under "otherconditions contributing to death:" "Paraplegia & respiratory 
muscle weakness."

 
 
[¶8]      In a letter dated 
July 19, 2005, which is found in the record, but which is not date-stamped as to 
when it was received by the Division, Mr. Fisher's attending physician 
wrote:

 
 
Mr. 
Fisher recently expired after a long hospital stay related to complications from 
smoke inhalation.  He was in his 
train room at home when a fire began.  
When his wife found him, she tried to get him out of the room, but he 
would not cooperate and he was too heavy in the wheelchair for her to force him 
out.  Family informs me that when the firemen got there they found 
him unconscious in the hall and his wheelchair was wedged in the hallway.  He required mechanical ventilation for 
the prominent mucous production that resulted from the smoke inhalation and 
subsequently succumbed related to difficulty clearing the secretions.  A prominent player in the difficulty 
clearing those secretions was his chronic weakness related to the paraplegia 
that happened as a result of a work accident back in the 
1990's.

 
 
In 
summary, the paraplegia was certainly not the cause of the fire, but his 
inability to recover from the smoke inhalation injury was directly related to 
his paraplegia.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      We have not had 
occasion to address an issue quite like the one presented here before.  In a case that has some parallels with 
the instant case, we held that:  
"in order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the 
direct cause of the employee's death."  
Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 377 (Wyo. 1997).  In the Bruhn case, the employee died as the 
result of injuries suffered in an automobile accident that occurred when she was 
returning home from a doctor's appointment at which she received care for the 
injury that she suffered at work.  
Id. at 374.  We rejected her arguments and our 
reasoning was this:

 
 
As 
the division points out, it would be impossible to ever cut off compensability 
if we were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of the causation 
requirement.  Would we compensate an 
employee who wrecked her car and died because she fell asleep at the wheel while 
she was on her way to see her doctor?   Would we compensate an employee 
who was killed by a drunk driver while she was on her way home from her doctor's 
appointment?   A logical end 
would not exist to the causation test which the hearing examiner proposes.  Furthermore, it would lead to too many 
abuses, and the worker's compensation fund would, in effect, become a general 
health and accident insurance fund, a purpose for which it was not 
intended.  
(FN1)

 
 
            
A causal connection does not exist between the employee's initial injury 
and her car accident.  The fact that 
she was returning from a doctor's appointment for an injury which she sustained 
while she was working at the Pamida Discount Store does not translate to a 
finding that the injury caused her death.  
Certainly, the accident which caused the employee's death did not occur 
because of her work related back injury.  
The accident was not a hazard of her employment that she would not have 
been subjected to apart from her job nor did it result from a risk reasonably 
incident to the character of the business.  
Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that we are all equally 
exposed to--bad road conditions.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the hearing examiner's award of worker's 
compensation death benefits to the survivors of the employee was not in 
accordance with the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 
 
            
The hearing examiner's decision is reversed.

 
 
(FN1.) 
By way of dicta, we discussed the "quasi-course of employment" analysis in Bearden v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 868 P.2d 268 (Wyo.1994).  Under this theory, injuries are 
compensable if they arise out of the following "quasi-course" 
activities:

 
 
"activities 
undertaken by the employee following upon his injury which, although they take 
place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and would not be 
considered employment activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to 
the employment in the sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities 
that would not have been undertaken but for the compensable injury.  'Reasonable' at this point relates not 
to the method used, but to the category of activity 
itself."

 
 
868 P.2d  at 270 (quoting 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 
13.11(d) at 3-542 (1993)).  Given 
our interpretation of § 27-14-403(e), we expressly reject the "quasi-course of 
employment" theory of recovery.  We 
instead hold that, in order for a second injury to be compensable, the original 
compensable injury must itself be the direct cause of the subsequent 
injury.

 
 

Bruhn, 
951 P.2d  at 377.

 
 
[¶10]   The above citation to Professor 
Larson's treatise is now found in 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 10.05, 
10-12 (2007) where this pair of principles is articulated:

 
 
            
When the injury following the initial compensable injury arises out of 
quasi-course activity, such as a trip to the doctor's office, the chain of 
causation should not be deemed broken by mere negligence in the performance of 
that activity, but only by intentional conduct which may be regarded as 
expressly or impliedly prohibited by the employer.

            
When, however, the injury following the initial compensable injury does 
not arise out of a quasi-course activity, as when a claimant with an injured 
hand engages in a boxing match, the chain of causation may be deemed broken by 
either intentional or negligent claimant misconduct.

 
 
[¶11]   We conclude that the reasoning we 
employed in Bruhn is readily 
distinguishable from the circumstances of this case, and we decline to apply its 
very limited scope to this case where there is a direct link between Fisher's 
work-related injury and his death.

 
 
[¶12]   As suggested in Bruhn, there are some peripheral 
statutory construction issues involved here (and, of course, those are matters 
of law that we review de novo).  However, here we must apply the standard 
of review that we routinely apply to cases such as this which we have restated 
in great detail in Dale v. Wyoming 
Worker's Safety and Compensation Division, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8-27, ___ 
P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2008).  The 
issue raised by Fisher invokes only application of the substantial evidence 
prong of our standard of review.

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(LexisNexis 2007) defines "injury" as follows: "Injury' means any harmful 
change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or 
loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course 
of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business."  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶14]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(e) 
(LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
            
(e)  If an injured employee dies as a result of 
the work related injury whether or not an award under paragraphs (a)(i) 
through (iv) of this section has been made:

                        
(i)  All awards under paragraphs (a)(i) through (iv) of this 
section shall cease as of the date of death;

                        
(ii)  The burial expenses of the deceased employee shall be 
paid in an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) together with 
an additional amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) to cover other related 
expenses, unless other arrangements exist between the employer and employee 
under agreement;

                        
(iii)  The surviving spouse shall receive for fifty-four (54) 
months a monthly payment as provided by subsection (c) of this section.  If the surviving spouse dies before the 
award is entirely paid or if there is no surviving spouse, the unpaid balance of 
the award shall be paid to the surviving dependent children of the employee in 
the manner prescribed by paragraph (d)(ii) of this section.  If there are no dependent children, 
further payments under this paragraph shall cease as of the date of the spouse's 
death;

                        
(iv)  In addition to any amount paid under paragraph (e)(iii) 
of this section, surviving children shall receive an award as provided by 
subsection (b) of this section;

                        
(v)  If the employee died with no surviving spouse or dependent 
children but with one (1) surviving parent of the employee who received 
substantially all of his financial support from the employee at the time of 
injury, the surviving parent shall receive six hundred dollars ($600.00) the 
first month after the death and one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) for thirty 
(30) months thereafter or until the parent dies, whichever is less.  If two (2) remaining parents of the 
employee who received substantially all of their financial support from the 
employee at the time of the injury survive the employee and the employee had no 
surviving spouse or child, they shall receive six hundred dollars ($600.00) the 
first month after the death and two hundred dollars ($200.00) for thirty-two 
(32) months thereafter or until both parents die, whichever is less.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-509 
(LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
§ 
27-14-509. Autopsy may be required; procedure.

 
 
            
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for death for which an 
autopsy is necessary to accurately and scientifically ascertain and determine 
the cause of death, a hearing examiner may order an autopsy.  The hearing examiner may designate a 
licensed physician who is a specialist in autopsies to perform or attend the 
autopsy and to certify his findings.  
The autopsy findings are a public record and shall be filed with the 
division.  The hearing examiner may 
exercise the authority on his own motion or on an application made to him at any 
time by any party in interest upon the presentation of facts showing that a 
controversy may exist in regard to the cause of death or the existence of any 
compensable injury.  All proceedings 
for compensation shall be suspended upon refusal of a claimant or his 
representative to permit an autopsy when ordered and no compensation shall be 
payable during the continuance of the refusal.

 
 
[¶16]   The question directly proposed to 
us here is whether or not Mr. Fisher's death was the result of his 
paraplegia.  We conclude that 
"result" is used in its most general sense, and in this context, it simply means 
"something that results as a consequence, effect, issue, or conclusion 
 ."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, 1937 (1986); also see "result," 37A Words and Phrases, 423-24 
(2004).  The testimony at trial was 
uncontradicted that it was the paraplegia that resulted in Mr. Fisher's death 
and that but for the effects of his workplace injury, he most likely would have 
fully recovered from the effects and consequences of the smoke inhalation.  Bradford v. Workers' Compensation Com'r, 
408 S.E.2d 13, 20-21 (W.Va. 1991).

 
 
[¶17]   There is a good bit of case law 
that speaks to the circumstances of this case.  For instance, in the case Gerhardt v. Welch, 125 N.W.2d 721, 
722-25 (1964), the reviewing court noted that there was no evidence pointing to 
why the decedent did not escape the fire in his home, but the dictum suggested 
that if decedent had been unable to escape the fire because of a compensable 
back injury suffered three years earlier, his dependents would have been 
entitled to compensation.  See 1 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, supra, § 10.04, fn. 9.  In a case where a bedridden injured 
worker died from a fire that he was, perhaps, unable to escape due to his 
injuries, a majority of the reviewing court concluded that the fire was an 
intervening cause of the worker's death and was not compensable.  Skrobosinski v. Champion International 
Corporation, 1986 WL 9707 (Ohio App. 12 Dist.).  The distinction between that case and 
this is that the worker died in and from the fire.  In the instant case, Mr. Fisher did not 
die from the fire, but from his inability to expel mucous from his lungs as a 
result of the paraplegia caused by his industrial accident.  In the case Drake v. State Department of Social 
Welfare-Larned State Hospital, 499 P.2d 532, 534-39 (Kan. 1972), the worker 
at issue injured his back, but that injury did not lead to his death.  Rather, the pain from the back injury " 
made it extremely difficult for him to cough and to clear his lungs.  The condition was so aggravated that he 
was forced to enter the hospital for severe respiratory distress and back pain 
and was making a recovery when a complication set in and he died from the 
combined results."  Id. at 534.  The appellate court affirmed the 
district court's award of benefits (which had been denied by the hearing 
examiner).  In Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 366 P.2d 864, 865 (Colo. 1961), death benefits were awarded where the worker died of 
bacterial pneumonia secondary to on-the-job injuries he suffered "which caused 
him pain and that the pain of the injury kept him from coughing and clearing out 
his bronchi."

 
 
[¶18]   These sorts of cases present 
difficult questions and, as is almost always the case in this setting, turn on 
the facts available to reviewing courts from the record on appeal.  Here, the evidence of record is 
unequivocal that Mr. Fisher died because his paraplegia severely reduced his 
ability to cough and to clear his bronchi of mucus.  That evidence stands 
uncontradicted.  We apply those 
facts in light of the plain language of the governing statute, i.e., "[if] an 
injured employee dies as a result of the work[-]related injury.," and we 
conclude that the only sustainable answer that can be reached, based on the 
record on appeal, is that Mr. Fisher did die as a "result" of his work-related 
injury.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The order of the district court 
affirming the hearing officer's denial of benefits is reversed, and this matter 
is remanded to the district court with directions that it further remand it to 
the hearing officer with directions that the applicable death benefits be 
awarded to Mrs. Fisher.