Case Title: People v. Blue

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87245

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87245-Agenda 2-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								MURRAY BLUE, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 27, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the Cook County circuit court, the
defendant, Murray Blue, was convicted of first degree murder for
killing Louis Moret. The jury found the defendant eligible for the
death penalty. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998). The jury
then found no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude the
death penalty, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to death.
That sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).
	We reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for a new
trial.

BACKGROUND
	Around 10 a.m. on February 26, 1995, a Chicago police
officer patrolling a west side neighborhood passed an Amoco gas
station where a group of people had gathered. When the officer
pulled into the station's parking lot, she saw Louis Moret lying
dead on his back in a pool of blood near the rear of the cashier's
booth. An autopsy revealed that Moret had been shot 14 times.
Injuries to his lungs, heart, liver, spleen, kidneys, and intestines
caused his death. On March 8, 1995, the defendant was arrested on
an unrelated charge.(1) He was later indicted for the first degree
murder of Moret.
	At trial, Terrance Hall, an attendant at the Amoco station,
testified that a two-tone gray van pulled up to the full-service
pumps around 10 a.m. on the day of the shooting. While Hall
filled the van with gas, a green car pulled up to the self-service
pumps. A passenger, Moret, exited the car, approached the van,
and spoke to the van's driver. Hall could not hear this
conversation. According to Hall, Moret then walked away from
the van and stood in line at the cashier's booth with two persons
from the car. The defendant then exited the van, walked toward the
cashier's booth, and began arguing with Moret. Hall finished
pumping gas for the van and returned to the booth. Inside the
booth, Hall saw the defendant become angrier as the argument
continued; Moret did nothing. Hall could not quite hear the entire
argument from inside the booth. He did not hear any mention of
drugs or gangs, but he did hear the defendant say "f- this bitch."
During the argument, Hall did not see anything in Moret's hands
nor did he see Moret reach into his jacket or make any unusual
movements with his hands. Hall testified that he saw the defendant
shoot Moret once. Moret then turned to run, but the defendant
pursued him and shot him again. Moret fell to the ground, and the
defendant kept shooting. As Hall called 911, the defendant
returned to the van, which then sped away from the gas station.
	Irma Pane, a cashier at a gas station across the street from the
shooting, testified that she saw a green car pull into the Amoco
station around 10 a.m. Moret exited the car, stopped for a moment
to count money, and stood in line at the cashier's booth. A gray
van then pulled into the station, and the defendant exited the van
to speak with Moret. Pane could hear this conversation because
the station's loudspeaker was on. Pane heard the defendant call
Moret a "motherf--." The defendant then pulled a gun from his
side and shot Moret. Moret spun toward the car to escape, and
Pane turned to call the police. When she looked back at the
Amoco station, Moret was lying face down on the ground. The
defendant then kicked Moret and returned to van. The van drove
away from the station. Pane never saw any weapons in Moret's
hands and never saw him reach for a weapon.
	Tyrus Taylor, one of Moret's friends and the driver of the
green car, testified that he pulled into the Amoco station around
9:45 a.m. on the day of the shooting with Moret, D'Shon Myrick,
and Gabriel Blakemore. The four men all exited the car. Taylor
prepaid for gas at the cashier's booth and returned to the car;
Moret, Myrick, and Blakemore continued to stand in line. The
defendant's gray van was already at the station. Tall Ralph and
Chow Mein, two of the defendant's friends were also standing in
line at the cashier's booth to buy cigars and soft drinks. The
defendant exited the van and approached Moret. According to
Taylor, he heard Moret and the defendant arguing about a recent
confrontation between two high school students: "Little James,"
a friend of Moret and Taylor, had slapped Tutu, a female friend of
the defendant. Taylor heard the defendant say, "[F]- that nigger."
He heard Moret respond, "[F]- that bitch and f- you, too." The
defendant then pulled a gun and shot Moret. Moret began to run,
but the defendant pursued him and continued to shoot. Taylor
dropped to the ground, taking cover behind his car. When the
shooting stopped, he saw the defendant get into the van, which
sped away. Taylor stood and walked around the car to see Moret,
but he did not touch him. Money from Moret's hand was flying
around the station. Taylor then gave his car keys to Blakemore, so
Blakemore could leave the station to tell Moret's family about the
shooting. Taylor had not seen Moret with a gun that day, and he
did not see Moret reach for anything inside his coat while at the
station. Taylor conceded that the gas pump was between him and
Moret during the argument, but he insisted that the pump did not
obstruct his view of the shooting.
	D'Shon Myrick testified that Taylor pulled into an Amoco
station around 10 a.m. on the day of the shooting. Taylor, Myrick,
Blakemore, and Moret all exited the car and walked to the
cashier's booth. Myrick noticed a gray van was already parked at
the full-service pumps. Blakemore paid for gas, and Taylor began
pumping. At the cashier's booth, the defendant and one of his
friends stood in front of Myrick and Moret. The defendant told his
friends to buy cigars and got out of line to speak with Moret.
According to Myrick, Moret asked the defendant why he was
being phony about something regarding Tutu. Myrick could see
the reflection of Moret and the defendant arguing behind him in
the window of the cashier's booth. Myrick saw the defendant wave
his gun in the air and begin shooting Moret. Moret ran away from
the defendant, but the defendant followed and continued to shoot.
Myrick eased behind the cashier's booth for safety and heard more
shots. Once the shooting stopped, Myrick did not see the
defendant or the van. He saw Moret lying on the ground with
gunshot wounds; money was lying around Moret. Myrick said that
before the shooting started, Moret was counting money in his
hands. Myrick did not see a weapon in Moret's hands, and he did
not see Moret reach into his jacket before the shooting. Myrick
flagged down a police car and ran from the station to tell Moret's
family about the shooting. Myrick encountered his friend Erwin
Henry and related the events to him.
	Erwin Henry testified that he heard gunshots down the street
from the Amoco station. He saw Myrick crying hysterically and
running down the street. According to Henry, Myrick said,
"Murray shot Louis, Murray just killed Louis." Henry drove
Myrick home.
	Gabriel Blakemore testified that Taylor pulled up to the self-service pumps at the Amoco station on the day of the shooting.
Blakemore saw a gray van which belonged to the defendant pull
up to the full-service pumps. Blakemore, Taylor, and Myrick
exited the car and went to the cashier's booth; Moret briefly went
to the van and came back to the booth. The defendant exited the
van, walked to the cashier's booth, where two of his friends from
the van were waiting, and instructed them to buy cigars and soft
drinks. The defendant then faced Moret and began arguing about
Little James and Tutu; the defendant looked upset. Blakemore did
not see any weapons in Moret's hands while they stood at the
cashier's booth, and he did not see Moret reach into his jacket.
Moret had money in his hands. During the argument, the defendant
pulled a gun and started shooting Moret. Blakemore and Moret ran
toward their car, but the defendant shot Moret in the legs.
Blakemore hid behind the car with Taylor, and when the shooting
stopped, he saw Moret lying on the ground. Neither Blakemore nor
Taylor touched Moret's body. The defendant and the van were
gone, and Blakemore took Taylor's car keys and drove the car to
Moret's house.
	Chicago Police Sergeant Michael Gerhardstein testified that
he arrived at the scene of the shooting around 10:25 a.m. and saw
Moret lying on the raised sidewalk on the side of the cashier's
booth. Two other police officers were present, including Sergeant
Ronald Holiday of the Maywood police department; Holiday had
collected some shell casings, $600 in cash, and a piece of jewelry.
Sergeant Gerhardstein spoke with several witnesses about the gray
van. He learned that the van was registered to the defendant and
obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant. Sergeant
Gerhardstein also spoke with Blakemore after the shooting.
Blakemore said that he and Myrick tried to move Moret's body.
Sergeant Gerhardstein wrote in his investigatory notes that
Blakemore, Taylor, and Myrick tried to pick up Moret before
realizing that he was dead; some of Moret's money fell out of his
hands and scattered around the gas station.
	The defendant testified that some friends picked him up in his
van on the morning of the shooting and proceeded to the Amoco
station. Two passengers, Tall Ralph and Chow Mein, exited the
van to buy cigarettes, while the driver, Poo, asked the attendant for
$30 worth of gas. Moret approached the van and asked Poo,
"Where is that p-- a- Murray Blue at? He shot up our tip [i.e.,
drug-selling territory]." According to the defendant, Moret was
"actually really [a] drug dealer actually just somebody that's a
rival member or you can say somebody who sold drugs right down
the street." The defendant stated that he and Moret were rival drug
dealers a block apart on West End Avenue. Moret and his friends
called themselves the Dog Pound, a subsidiary of the Vice Lords
street gang.
	The defendant testified that Moret then joined his friends
Myrick and Blakemore in line at the cashier's booth. The
defendant assumed Moret began talking about the shooting of his
drug-selling territory with Tall Ralph and Chow Mein. The
defendant exited the van and asked his two friends, "Is it all right?
What's up? Is you okay?" Moret and Blakemore, referring to the
defendant, said, "There go the p-- mother f-- right there." The
defendant responded by pulling out his gun and insisting he was
not involved in the shooting of Moret's drug-selling territory. The
defendant told Tall Ralph and Chow Mein to return to the van.
According to the defendant, Moret, again referring to the
defendant, said, "He ain't going to do nothing, you know. We will
do this guy, you know what I am saying, if you want us to." Moret
motioned with his left hand that Blakemore should move out of
the way and with his right hand he was "actually reaching toward
his pocket going like he going in his [jacket] pocket." The
defendant stated that he saw Moret's right hand go into his jacket
and that he believed Moret was reaching for a gun. The defendant
then began to fire, and Moret ran. The defendant pursued Moret
and continued to fire, thinking that he had missed Moret. After all
the shots were fired, the defendant "just kind of shuffled back to
the van" and drove to his girlfriend's house in Bellwood.
	On cross-examination, the defendant stated that he did not
return to his own house after the shooting because he knew the
police would look for him there. The defendant conceded that
Moret posed no threat to him after he walked away from the van,
though the defendant considered Moret's question to be an insult.
The defendant, however, thought Moret posed a threat to Tall
Ralph and Chow Mein because Moret was talking to them. When
the defendant asked if Tall Ralph and Chow Mein were fine,
Moret did not have a gun in his hand. The defendant did not see a
gun when Moret purportedly reached into his jacket. The
defendant acknowledged that he never saw Moret with a gun. The
defendant testified that he feared for his life for at least the first
five shots he fired at Moret. The defendant's fear dissipated once
Moret was lying on the ground.
	The defendant recalled Hall as a witness. Hall testified that
Moret's friends approached his body and turned him over to see if
he was dead. Moret had fallen to the ground and rested on his side;
Moret's friends pushed him onto his back. Hall did not see anyone
remove a weapon from Moret's body.
	Sergeant Holiday testified as a defense witness. On the day of
the shooting, he was dropping off his daughter for work at the gas
station where Pane worked. He noticed a commotion at the Amoco
station. Holiday crossed the street and saw Moret lying face down,
arms out, with money in his hands and coming from his pocket.
Holiday began picking up shell casings and the money because
people were "touching everything" around the crime scene.
Holiday did not see anyone reach toward the body to remove
anything.
	The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and
eligible for the death penalty. After the aggravation/mitigation
hearing, the jury found no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude
the death penalty, and the court sentenced the defendant to death.
This appeal followed.


ANALYSIS
	The defendant raises numerous issues in this appeal. We focus
on his third issue: whether the trial court unconstitutionally
restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of key witnesses
for the State.
	Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to bar any
reference to gang affiliation. The State's motion asserted that
"there is no evidence to show that this shooting was related to
gang membership or any type of gang activity" and "there is no
evidence to support a gang motive." According to the State, the
defendant had alternative methods for discrediting the testimony
of prosecution witnesses.
	At the hearing on the State's motion, the State reiterated its
contention that gang-affiliation evidence was irrelevant and
potentially confusing to the jury. The defense responded that
Moret and his friends were rival drug dealers and rival gang
members to the defendant. The defense argued that members of
Moret's gang, the Dog Pound subsidiary of the Vice Lords street
gang, had shot at the defendant's friends and house in the days
before the shooting here. Defense counsel concluded:
			"Because of that, your Honor, I think here the issue is
what was Mr. Blue's reasonable apprehension at the time?
The fact that these people were members of a group who
had fired at him, at his home, at his friends on several
occasions in the past is certainly relevant to what he is
thinking at the time of this occurrence."
	The trial court provisionally granted the State's motion
"unless there is something that comes forth to show that there is
some legitimate reason to let in the evidence of gang or gangs or
gang activity." The court stated, "I do not see that this has any
relevance based on what has been put forth here without any
specificity as to who may have been shooting at Mr. Blue or giving
him a reason to want to shoot and kill this other person."
	At the close of jury selection, the defense asked the court to
reconsider its ruling on the State's motion in limine. The defense
asserted that its case would show the shooting involved a dispute
between rival gang members over drug territory, not over an
argument between high school acquaintances. Gang-affiliation
evidence was relevant, the defense again argued, to show that the
defendant felt threatened by Moret. Defense counsel continued,
"[I]t also goes to the motive to testify. This person [the defendant]
is a rival of theirs. Because he is out of the way they stand to make
an awful lot of money, judge." The State disagreed: "The fact that
maybe these two groups had differing opinions or did business
differently does not justify the taking of a life. All [defense
counsel is] trying to do is dirty up the witness with no relevance to
it. That is not what the Court should allow."
	The court observed that the defense could impeach the
credibility of the State's witnesses with their drug convictions.
According to the defendant, the court then purportedly reversed its
original ruling, allowing the defense to present gang-affiliation
evidence during the defendant's testimony: "You're alleging self-defense. Then I will allow the testimony through the defendant.
Based on that I rule it can properly be brought forth and he is
allowed to present his defense." Immediately before trial, the State
asked the court to reconsider its new ruling. The court clarified
that the new ruling did not alter the original ruling: "[M]y intent
was not to allow the cross-examination of the State's witnesses as
to gang activity and gang membership. If Mr. Blue wanted to
testify to that, that's another situation. That's another story and as
I indicated I would allow that."
	The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the
witnesses against him ***." U.S. Const., amend. VI; accord Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §8 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him
or her"). Confrontation forces the prosecution's witnesses to
submit to cross-examination (California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
158, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 497, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935 (1970)), "beyond
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth" (5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1974)). Accordingly, a criminal defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation includes the right to cross-examine. Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934, 937, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1076 (1965).
			"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony
are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial
judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing
interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to
delve into the witness' story to test the witness'
perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the
witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to
introduce evidence of prior criminal conviction of that
witness. *** A more particular attack on the witness'
credibility is effected by means of cross-examination
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly
to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality
of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is
'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting
the weight of his testimony.' [Citation.]" Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 316, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353-54, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974).
	The scope of a defendant's cross-examination is limited to the
subject of direct examination and "[a]ny permissible matter which
affects the witness's credibility." People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81,
130 (1998); see 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §22, at 97
(5th ed. 1999). We have noted repeatedly that the court enjoys
discretion to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination
to assuage concerns about harassment, prejudice, jury confusion,
witness safety, or repetitive and irrelevant questioning (see, e.g.,
People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1992)), but this
discretionary authority arises only after the court has permitted
sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the confrontation clause
(People v. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (1999)). Accord
People v. Rufus, 104 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473 (1982), citing United
States v. Vasilios, 598 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1979); see Heard v.
United States, 255 F. 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1919) ("It is only after the
right [of full cross-examination] has been substantially and fairly
exercised that the allowance of cross-examination becomes
discretionary"); see also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 75 L. Ed. 624, 629, 51 S. Ct. 218, 220 (1931) ("The extent of
cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. It may exercise a
reasonable judgment in determining when the subject is
exhausted"). That is, the court should afford a defendant the
widest latitude to establish the witness' bias or hostile motivation.
People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1994); People v. Barr, 51 Ill. 2d 50, 52 (1972). A defendant states a confrontation clause
violation "by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness." Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986).
	Although a denial of the right of effective cross-examination
has been labeled a "constitutional error of the first magnitude"
(Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 316-17, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1246 (1966)), the Supreme Court has instructed:
		"The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the
damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully
realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether
such an error is harmless in a particular case depends
upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing
courts. These factors include the importance of the
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of
the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution's case." Van Arsdall,
475 U.S.  at 684, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 686-87, 106 S. Ct.  at
1438.
Accord People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 338 (1998); People v.
Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 43-44 (1989); see also People v. Wilkerson,
87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (1981) (confrontation clause case enumerating
three approaches for measuring harmless error).
	The defendant contends that the trial court erred in barring
cross-examination of Taylor, Myrick, and Blakemore on their gang
affiliation because such cross-examination would have revealed
these witnesses' bias against the defendant. These witnesses,
argues the defendant, sought to ensure his conviction in order to
eliminate a gang rival and avenge Moret's death. See People v.
Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475-76 (1985) (impeachment to show
bias must create an inference that the witness has something to
gain from the testimony).
	We have recognized that, particularly in metropolitan areas,
jurors may have negative feelings about street gangs; but
"evidence of gang affiliation need not be excluded if it is
otherwise relevant and admissible." People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990). In some circumstances, evidence of gang affiliation
is sufficiently probative of bias to warrant its admission on cross-examination. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450, 457, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984) ("A witness' and a party's
common membership in an organization *** is certainly probative
of bias"); People v. Roman, 248 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1086 (1993)
("A clear motive to lie could be shown when considering that two
of the identifying witnesses were part of a rival gang").
	In People v. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d 332 (1984), the defendant
was charged with first degree murder. The State made a motion in
limine to bar cross-examination of one of its two occurrence
witnesses on the subject of gang affiliation. The defendant argued
that such evidence was necessary to his defense. The defendant
theorized that the key witness fabricated his testimony in order to
retaliate against the defendant for recently quitting the gang or to
shift prosecutorial attention from the witness, who was present at
the murder scene, to the defendant. The trial court granted the
State's motion, barring all gang-affiliation evidence.
	We held that the trial court improperly limited the defendant's
cross-examination as to the witness' bias or motive to testify
falsely. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 337. We rejected the State's
contention that gang-affiliation evidence was collateral to the
identity of the shooter because the defendant asserted that he was
being framed by the State's witness. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 338.
We also rejected the State's contention that the court's ruling did
not limit the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness
about his motive to testify:
		"Gang affiliation and the concerted activity of the gang in
threatening the defendant and harassing his family formed
the very basis of the defense theory, however, and neither
in their briefs nor at oral argument did the State suggest
just how defense counsel could have framed questions
designed to elicit the necessary information without
reference to gang membership and activities.
			Questions regarding [the witness'] gang activities and
threats against the defendant were clearly relevant to the
reliability of [the witness'] testimony, and should have
been allowed." Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 338.
	We concluded that the trial court's error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 338. The error
may have contributed to the defendant's conviction; the State's
other evidence did not overwhelmingly support the conviction;
and the gang-affiliation evidence was not cumulative or
duplicative because the court barred all gang evidence. Gonzalez,
104 Ill. 2d  at 339.
	The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar result
in Clark v. O'Leary, 852 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1988). In Clark, the
defendant was convicted in the Cook County circuit court of first
degree murder and attempted murder. He filed a habeas corpus
petition in federal court alleging that his confrontation clause
rights were violated when the state trial court granted the
prosecution's motion in limine to exclude references to gang
affiliation as irrelevant. The defendant asserted that the State's two
key occurrence witnesses, who were also shooting victims, were
members of a rival gang with whom the defendant had an
altercation on the day of the murder. At trial, the defendant relied
on an alibi, and the only testimony placing the defendant at the
crime scene came from these two gang rivals. Bias and prejudice
purportedly emanated from "inter-gang animosity." Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1001.
	The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the confrontation
clause allows restrictions on cross-examination if the questions are
irrelevant or collateral. Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1004. The court noted,
however, that under Davis
		"defense counsel must be permitted to present its bias
evidence within the context of the defense theory.
[Citation.] Because the defense theory was based on alibi,
the potential motive of the State's witnesses to fabricate
their alleged observation of [the defendant] at the scene of
the crime had to be examined. The relevance of any gang
affiliation of identification witnesses would be apparent,
for besides any allegiance to other members, the potential
threat of physical reprisals for testifying otherwise
certainly could have motivated these witnesses to concoct
a story to 'get' rival gang members [the defendant] and
his co-defendants. Yet no such questions regarding threats
were permitted.
			The trial court here wrested the role of fact finder from
the jury by preliminarily screening the credibility of the
witnesses, stating 'Well, gang membership, even though
it probably should be a felony, isn't. And so-and it is
nothing that-that affects one's credibility.' [Citation.]
This assertion of the court was a constitutional error,
permitting the State to present its case without having its
only observation witnesses properly confronted." Clark,
852 F.2d  at 1006.
	The court then turned to the harmless-error factors identified
by the Supreme Court in Van Arsdall. Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1007.
The witnesses' identification testimony was vital to the State's
case; the testimony was not cumulative; the State offered no
evidence to corroborate the witnesses' testimony; defense
counsel's cross-examination was limited to routine matters of
perception, recall, and prompting by the State; and the State's case
was weak without testimony from these witnesses. Clark, 852 F.2d 
at 1007-08. The court concluded that this error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1008.
	Like the witnesses in Gonzalez and Clark, Taylor, Myrick,
and Blakemore provided crucial links proving the State's case, and
their gang affiliation was relevant to their credibility. The trial
court's in limine ruling, which cut off all cross-examination on
gang rivalry, unreasonably limited the defense from exploring
these witnesses' bias. This error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
	Taylor, Myrick, and Blakemore were three of the State's five
occurrence witnesses, and their testimony was not cumulative of
testimony from the State's other occurrence witnesses, Hall and
Pane. When the shooting began, Hall was standing inside the
cashier's booth, and Pane was working across the street, but
Taylor, Myrick, and Blakemore were standing outside when the
shooting began. Taylor saw the argument and the shooting from
behind his car, and Myrick saw the argument and shooting only as
a reflection in the window of the cashier's booth. Blakemore was
the only witness with a clear view of Moret and the defendant.
Additionally, their testimony, though corroborated by Hall and
Pane on some points, was contradicted on others-whether the
defendant's van was already parked at the station when Taylor's
car arrived, whether Moret had money in his hands before the
shooting, and whether Taylor, Myrick, and Blakemore touched
Moret's body after the shooting.
	At trial, although the defense was allowed to cross-examine
these witnesses on their prior convictions, which the State
discussed on direct, the remaining cross-examination was routine.
Defense counsel was unable to leave an impression of bias with
the jury. These witnesses testified that they were friends with
Moret, but the only evidence of gang rivalry came from the
defendant. Finally, the State's evidence supporting first degree
murder was strong, but not overwhelming.
	The State contends that gang-affiliation evidence was
inadmissible under People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 200 (1984),
in which we held that "when the theory of self-defense is raised,
the victim's aggressive and violent character is relevant to show
who was the aggressor." Lynch, however, is inapposite. The State
concedes, and we agree, that the defendant's evidence generally
showed the rivalry between the Dog Pound and the defendant's
gang. The defense sought to use this evidence to expose the
witnesses' potential bias against the defendant, not to show
Moret's character.
	The State also contends that we must balance the probative
value of gang-affiliation evidence against its prejudice. In its
motion, the State relied upon People v. Harris, 262 Ill. App. 3d 35
(1994). In Harris, the defendant was charged with attempted
murder. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the victim
if he was a street gang member. The State objected, contending
that irrelevant gang-affiliation evidence would confuse the jury.
The defense responded that gang affiliation was relevant because
the victim wanted to protect his cousin, a fellow gang member,
who allegedly had a shotgun on the night of the shooting. In the
absence of evidence linking the shooting to gang activity, the court
sustained the State's objection.
	On appeal, the court acknowledged that "gang activity may be
relevant to show bias against the defendant because the partiality
of a witness is always relevant." Harris, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 47.
The court held, however, that the trial court properly excluded
such evidence after weighing its marginal relevance to the
shooting against its potential to prejudice the State and confuse the
issues, "where defendant had other alternatives which he used to
discredit [the witness'] testimony." Harris, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 47.
Accord People v. Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d 55, 65 (1997)
(upholding the trial court's restriction of cross-examination
because the relationship between gang membership and the
shooting incident was "speculative at best").
	Unlike the defendant in Harris, the defendant here had few
alternatives to show witness bias. Additionally, the State's concern
with the accuracy of the gang-affiliation evidence was addressed
in the defendant's offers of proof. During trial, the defense made
an offer of proof that Taylor would have testified he is a member
of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang and that Henry would have
testified Moret was also a member of the Traveling Vice Lords.
The defense later made an offer of proof regarding the cross-examination of Blakemore. Defense counsel stated that he would
have asked Blakemore about
		"his membership in the Four Corner Hustlers, specifically
membership in the Dog Pound subsidiary of the Four
Corner Hustlers, their association with Louis Moret as a
member of the Dog Pound, Travelling Vice Lords, the
activities of the Dog Pound in *** the neighborhood
surrounding specifically drug dealing and weapons, the
occurrence of the shooting incident within the Dog Pound,
and Disciples in that area at the time leading up to
February 26, 1995."
	This presentation was sufficient to show the witnesses were
rival gang members with a potential bias against the defendant.
See Alford, 282 U.S.  at 692, 75 L. Ed.  at 628, 51 S. Ct.  at 219 ("It
is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the
cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what
facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop").
	The defendant asserts that gang-affiliation evidence had
relevance beyond bias to show his perception of danger
immediately before the shooting. According to the defendant, gang
rivalry was the background against which he viewed his exchange
with Moret. The State concedes that this evidence was admissible,
but answers that allowing cross-examination on gang affiliation
would have introduced a self-defense theory into its case in chief.
The State asserts that the court's in limine ruling affected only the
defense's cross-examination during the State's case; the defendant
could have called Taylor, Myrick, and Blakemore as witnesses
during the defense case in chief.
	We note that recalling a witness "is both inconvenient and
inefficient" (T. Mauet & W. Wolfson, Trial Evidence §12.2, at
367 (2d ed. 2001)) and, in the context of a criminal trial,
potentially fatal to the defense if the State's witnesses become
unavailable.
		"Unless the question is vital and he is fairly confident of
a favorable answer, the cross-examiner might be
unwilling to run the risk of calling the adversary's witness
at a later stage as his own and will abandon the inquiry.
Getting concessions from the opponent's witness hot on
the heels of the direct while his story is fresh is worth
trying for. It is a much less attractive option to call an
unfriendly witness later when his first testimony is stale."
1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §23, at 98 (5th ed.
1999).
	Additionally, although cross-examination which ranges
beyond the subject of direct examination to place the defense
theory of the case before the jury is generally improper (see M.
Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence
§611.11, at 514 (7th ed. 1999)), the defendant may inquire into
whatever tends to explain, qualify, modify, discredit, or destroy the
direct examination testimony, even if the inquiry may incidentally
constitute new matter which aids the defendant's case. People v.
Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 295 (1990); People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 478, 486 (1977); People v. Aughinbaugh, 36 Ill. 2d 320, 325-26
(1967); People v. Morris, 30 Ill. 2d 406, 409 (1964); see generally
1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §21 (5th ed. 1999). Cross-examination on gang affiliation would have discredited the
testimony from Taylor, Myrick, and Blakemore. The fact that this
cross-examination may have incidentally furthered the defendant's
self-defense theory does not make it improper. Cf. People v.
Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 430 (1989) ("Evidence which is admissible
for one purpose cannot be excluded for the reason that it would not
be admissible for another purpose").
	Trial courts should hesitate before granting the State's motion
in limine "if the result will be, for all practical purposes, an
evisceration of the defendant's theory of the case." People v.
Prevo, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1050 (1999). Although we do not
reverse the defendant's conviction for this reason, we observe that
a more flexible approach to the scope of cross-examination
sometimes may be preferable. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) ("Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.
The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination" (emphasis added)).
	The remaining issues raised by the defendant are unlikely to
recur on remand, and we decline to address them.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the defendant's
conviction and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
	The proceedings below were fatally flawed for an additional
reason not raised by my colleagues: they did not comport with the
new rules enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in
which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set
forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, No. 87286
(September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures
contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an
accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to
all capital cases now coming before us on direct review. Because
Blue was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the
new rules, his conviction and sentence could not be allowed to
stand even if the errors identified by my colleagues were not
present. For that reason, in addition to the reasons given by the
majority, I therefore agree that Blue's conviction and sentence
should be set aside and that he should be granted a new trial.
	On retrial, the State must proceed in accordance with our new
rules. Whether those rules will be sufficient, by themselves, to
place this state's capital punishment system within the tolerances
permitted by the state and federal constitution is a question we
cannot yet answer. What is certain, however, is that no proceeding
conducted without the benefit of the rules can be deemed reliable.
As I discussed in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the present Illinois death
penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2) because it will inevitably lead to the execution of innocent
persons. It is therefore void and unenforceable. Accordingly, if the
State does not adhere to the new rules, and if Blue is convicted
again, the State should not be permitted to seek the death penalty. 
	I concur with the majority's opinion and judgment.
Nevertheless, in addition to the reasons set forth by the majority,
I agree with Chief Justice Harrison that defendant's convictions
and sentence should also be set aside because the trial proceedings
were not conducted in accordance with the new supreme court
rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents in People
v. Hickey, No. 87286 (September 27, 2001), slip op. at 39-43
(Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084,
86926 (September 27, 2001), slip op. at 32-34 (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's
adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not
sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights.
Consequently, the rules, promulgated to help remedy the flaws of
the old system, must be applied retroactively to all capital cases
currently pending on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson,195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For this
reason, as well as those reasons articulated by the majority,
defendant's retrial must proceed in compliance with the new rules.
	The majority reverses defendant's conviction and remands for
a new trial on the ground that the trial court's in limine ruling
constituted prejudicial error. Because I believe that any error was,
at most, harmless error, I dissent from the majority opinion.
	In contrast to the majority, I believe this case is
distinguishable from People v. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d 332 (1984),
and Clark v. O'Leary, 852 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1988). In Gonzalez,
the defendant claimed that one of the State's witnesses fabricated
his testimony identifying defendant as the shooter in order to "get"
defendant for withdrawing from the witness' gang. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 335. The trial court ruled that there would be no reference
to gang affiliation in the case. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 335. This
court agreed with the appellate court that the trial court's
restriction of gang evidence was reversible error, noting that there
was little if any physical evidence linking the defendant to the
shooting, and the remaining evidence consisted almost entirely of
testimony from a witness whose testimony at trial differed from
the report he had given to the police, and who had been
sequestered in the State's custody prior to trial with the gang
member witness. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d  at 339.
	Likewise, in Clark, the defendant, a gang member, claimed
that the State's witnesses, rival gang members, had lied in
identifying defendant as the shooter in order to retaliate for an
earlier altercation with defendant's gang. Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1001.
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude all
reference to gang affiliation. Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1001. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trial court had committed
reversible error, noting that the State had relied entirely on the
rival gang witnesses to place the defendant at the scene of the
crime. Clark, 852 F.2d  at 1007.
	Here, in contrast, even excluding the testimony of Taylor,
Myrick and Blakemore, the three rival gang members, the
evidence supporting defendant's conviction was overwhelming.
Terrance Hall, the attendant at the Amoco station, testified that
while he was filling the defendant's van with gas, a car containing
the victim came into the gas station. Hall said that the victim got
out of the car, approached the van, spoke to the van's driver, then
walked over toward the cashier's booth. The defendant then
walked toward the cashier's booth and began arguing with the
victim. As defendant and the victim were arguing, Hall returned
to the cashier's booth. Hall heard the men arguing about a woman,
but heard nothing about gangs or drugs. The victim did nothing
while he was arguing with defendant, although defendant became
angrier as the argument continued. Hall did not see anything in the
victim's hands, and did not see the victim reach into his jacket or
make any unusual movements with his hands. Hall said that
defendant then shot the victim once, and pursued the victim as he
turned to run and shot him again. The defendant continued to
shoot the victim after the victim fell to the ground. The autopsy of
the victim revealed 14 gunshot wounds.
	The other witness that was not affiliated with any gang, Irma
Pane, testified that she saw the victim get out of a car, stop for a
moment to count money, then get in line at the cashier's booth.
She saw defendant's van pull into the gas station and observed
defendant get out of the van and go over to speak with the victim.
Pane heard defendant call the victim a mother---, and saw
defendant pull out a gun and shoot the victim. Pane never saw a
weapon in the victim's hands and never saw him reach for a
weapon.
	This court has recognized three approaches to determine
whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1)
whether the error contributed to the defendant's conviction; (2)
whether the other evidence in the case overwhelmingly supported
the defendant's conviction; and (3) whether the excluded evidence
would have been duplicative or cumulative. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d 
at 338-39, citing People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (1981).
In this case, each approach establishes that any error in this case
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, because the
testimony of Pane and Hall alone supported defendant's
conviction, it is unlikely that any error in restricting the cross-examination of the State's other three witnesses contributed to
defendant's conviction. See People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541
(1999) (even testimony of single witness, if positive and witness
is credible, sufficient to convict). Second, even excluding the
testimony of those three witnesses, the evidence in the case was
overwhelming. Both Hall and Pane testified that they never saw
the victim with a weapon, nor did he ever appear to reach for a
weapon, in contrast to defendant's testimony that he shot the
victim because he thought the victim was reaching for a gun. The
testimony of Pane and Hall also negates any claim that the victim
was threatening or aggressive, or that defendant and the victim
were arguing over drugs. Further, although defendant claimed he
acted in self-defense, the fact that he shot the victim 14 times, and
continued to shoot even as the victim turned and ran, tends to belie
defendant's claim.
	Third, and in contrast to Gonzalez and Clark, the trial court in
this case did not bar all evidence of gang affiliation, but in fact
allowed defendant to testify that he and the victim were rival gang
members and that the victim's drug operation was located one
block from defendant's drug operation. Defendant also testified
that Myrick and Blakemore were members of the gang that sold
drugs with the victim. Defendant claimed that just prior to the
shooting, the victim had accused defendant of shooting at the
block where the victim sold drugs, which caused defendant to be
apprehensive at the time of the shooting. Consequently, the
excluded evidence of gang affiliation would have been duplicative
of the evidence presented at defendant's trial.
	Because any error in restricting the cross-examination of the
State's witnesses concerning gang affiliation was, at most,
harmless error, I dissent from the majority's finding that
defendant's conviction should be reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
 



1.      1See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000).