Case Title: Julia Huff Walker v. City of Huntsville et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090431

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/30/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090431
_________________________
Julia Huff Walker
v.
City of Huntsville et al.
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-04-1801)
LYONS, Justice.
Julia Huff Walker appeals from a summary judgment entered
by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of the City of
Huntsville ("the City"); former Huntsville Chief of Police,
Compton Owens ("Chief Owens); Huntsville police officer Rhonda
1090431
2
Rosser; and Huntsville police officer Jennifer Watkins.  We
affirm.
Procedural History
Officer Watkins arrested Walker on July 28, 2002, for
driving under the influence and for unlawfully stopping her
vehicle in an intersection.  Walker was detained in the City's
jail for approximately 24 hours, and the City subsequently
prosecuted her on both charges.  Walker, however, was not
under the influence of an intoxicating substance at the time
of her arrest; she was suffering from a brain aneurysm.  On
January 23, 2003, in compliance with § 11-47-192, Ala. Code
1975, Walker notified the City of her potential claims.   The
charges against Walker were dismissed on January 28, 2003.  On
July 28, 2004, Walker sued the City, Chief Owens, and Officers
Rosser and Watkins (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"the defendants") in the Madison Circuit Court.  Walker stated
claims related to her arrest and detention under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Walker also
stated state-law claims of negligence, malicious prosecution,
1090431
3
false imprisonment, false arrest, the tort of outrage, assault
and battery, and invasion of privacy.
The action was removed to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama ("the federal
court").  While the action was pending before the federal
court, Walker amended her complaint, and the defendants moved
for a summary judgment.  On June 11, 2008, the federal court
granted the defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to
Walker's § 1983 claims.  The federal court then declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Walker's state-law
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and remanded the action to the
Madison Circuit Court.  Walker appealed from the summary
judgment and on February 6, 2009, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
On remand, the defendants moved for a summary judgment as
to Walker's state-law claims.  They argued that Walker's
claims were barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel;
that the individual defendants were entitled to have the
charges against the dismissed on the basis of State-agent
immunity; that the City was entitled to municipal immunity;
and that Walker had not presented substantial evidence to
1090431
4
support her claims.  Walker responded, arguing, in part, that
the defendants were guilty of spoliation of evidence.  
Five days before the hearing on the defendants' motions,
the City filed a second summary-judgment motion raising
additional arguments regarding Walker's assertions that the
City was liable for the actions of certain nonparty jail
personnel.  At the hearing, Walker objected to the City's
second summary-judgment motion on the basis that it was
untimely.  The trial court twice asked Walker's counsel
whether Walker wanted more time to respond to the City's
second motion.  On both occasions, Walker's counsel restated
objections to the City's motion and then moved on to
substantive arguments.  Walker's counsel did not ask for more
time to respond to the City's motion.
On September 11, 2009, the trial court entered an order
granting the defendants' motions for a summary judgment as to
all of Walker's claims.  The trial court did not state the
reasons for its decision.  In a footnote to its order, the
trial court stated: "As discussed during oral arguments,
[Walker] had adequate time to address the issues in the
[City's] second motion for summary judgment and had amply
1090431
5
addressed those same issues in her opposition brief filed
[previously]."  Walker moved to alter, amend, or vacate the
trial court's judgment.  The trial court denied that motion;
Walker appealed.
Factual Background
In July 2002, Walker, who was then 48 years old, lived in
Marshall County with one of her two adult sons and his wife.
During the weekend of July 26, 2002, Walker visited a friend
in Huntsville.  Walker testified at her deposition that she
remembers getting sick to her stomach at her friend's house on
the evening of Saturday, July 27, 2002.  Walker has no memory
of anything that occurred from that time until early September
2002, approximately six weeks later.  Accordingly, the facts
underlying Walker's claims are largely undisputed and are
evidenced primarily by the City's records and by the testimony
of the officers involved in Walker's arrest and detention.
I.
Walker's Arrest
On Sunday, July 28, 2002, at approximately 4:00 p.m., the
Huntsville Police Department ("the Department") received a
telephone call from an individual who complained that a female
driver had "just mowed down several mailboxes" in a
1090431
6
residential area.  Officers Watkins and Rosser were dispatched
to the scene.  Watkins arrived first and found Walker's car
stopped in an intersection.  Approaching the vehicle, Watkins
saw Walker slumped over the steering wheel; the engine was
running.  Watkins opened the passenger door and put the
transmission in park.  She then opened the driver's door,
lifted Walker's head and asked if she was okay.  According to
Watkins, Walker's response was unintelligible.  Watkins then
asked Walker to get out of the vehicle.  At that time, Walker
became what Watkins described during her deposition as
"combative."  Watkins explained that Walker was in a dazed
state, that she started swinging her arms, and that she
refused to get out of her vehicle.  
Watkins testified that Walker's eyes were bloodshot, that
her hair was in disarray, that her speech was slurred, and
that she appeared very confused.  In Watkins's arrest report,
she described Walker as "half asleep and half awake."  Watkins
did not smell alcohol on Walker's breath or person, and she
did not ask Walker if she had been drinking or taking drugs.
Watkins testified that Walker demonstrated "all the same
1090431
"A person shall not drive or be in actual physical
1
control of any vehicle while: ... (5) Under the influence of
any substance which impairs the mental or physical faculties
of such person to a degree which renders him or her incapable
of safely driving." § 32-5A-191(a), Ala. Code 1975.
"Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other
2
traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of a
police officer or official traffic-control device, no person
shall: (1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle: a. On the roadway
side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of
a street; ... c. Within an intersection ...."  § 32-5A-137(a),
Ala. Code 1975.
7
characteristics of previous [driving-under-the-influence]
arrests" Watkins had made. 
Watkins removed Walker from the vehicle and placed her on
the ground using what Watkins described as a "slight leg
sweep."  Watkins stated that she placed Walker on the ground
to control her because Walker was combative and flailing her
arms.  Watkins handcuffed Walker and placed her under arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance ("DUI") in violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(5), Ala. Code
1975,  and for stopping, standing, or parking in a roadway or
1
intersection in violation of § 32-5A-137(a), Ala. Code 1975.2
The dispatcher's log shows that just over two minutes passed
between Watkins's arrival on the scene and Walker's arrest.
1090431
8
After the arrest, Watkins searched Walker's purse and
found Walker's identification and several pills that Watkins
could not identify.  Watkins confiscated the pills and later
turned them over to the Department's evidence division.
Watkins did not test Walker's breath-alcohol content or
perform any other sobriety tests on Walker.  She testified,
however, that such tests would not be administered if the
individual was uncooperative.
Chief Owens, the chief of police at the time of Walker's
arrest, was responsible for developing and implementing the
Department's policies, primarily in the form of written
directives.  Chief Owens was also ultimately responsible for
hiring and training the Department's employees.  He testified
that Huntsville police officers received 40 hours of initial
training regarding DUI enforcement and arrests, including
training regarding behaviors to look for and standard field-
sobriety tests.  Chief Owens testified that, in making DUI
arrests, Huntsville police officers usually base the decision
to arrest on the actions of the individual and on the
officer's observations of the individual's appearance and
demeanor.  Specifically, Chief Owens stated that Huntsville
1090431
9
police officers considered whether the individual had slurred
speech patterns, bloodshot eyes, an odor of alcohol on the
breath, and/or was incoherent.  Chief Owens also stated that
the officers had to determine whether it was safe enough to
perform a field-sobriety test. The only written directive made
a part of the record on appeal relating to DUI arrests is a
directive regarding drug evidence, which relates primarily to
the collection and handling of bodily fluids.  It does not
require that such evidence be collected, and none was ever
collected from Walker.
Before Watkins transferred Walker from the scene to the
City's jail, Officer Rosser arrived.  Rosser testified at her
deposition that she arrived at the scene as Watkins was
helping Walker up off the ground.  Watkins testified that
Rosser arrived as she was placing Walker, who was resisting,
in the police vehicle.  Nonetheless, it is undisputed that
Rosser spoke briefly with Watkins and then proceeded to
impound Walker's vehicle and to speak with the witnesses
present at the scene.  Rosser stated that, as she and Watkins
were talking, Walker said that she needed to get dressed and
asked what Rosser and Watkins were doing in her living room.
1090431
10
Rosser described Walker as looking "wild" and stated that
Walker did not understand what was going on.  In her incident
report, Rosser stated: "The female appeared to be under the
influence of narcotics.  The female kept ranting about needing
to get dressed.  She had no idea where she was or who we
were."
Ronald Sheaffer, a resident of the neighborhood where
Walker was arrested, stated in an affidavit that he saw Walker
drive slowly through his neighbor's yard, back up and move
forward several times, drive on the wrong side of the street,
hit a mailbox without stopping, continue off the street onto
a sidewalk, and finally stop in the intersection where she was
arrested.  Sheaffer witnessed Walker's arrest.  He stated that
when Watkins "assisted" Walker out of her vehicle, he noticed
that Walker had bruises on both of her arms and on her eyes.
Rosser and Watkins testified that they did not recall noticing
that Walker was bruised.  Sheaffer stated: "It was obvious to
me from my observation of Ms. Walker's appearance and demeanor
after she exited her car, coupled with my observation of her
driving, that Ms. Walker was drunk."
1090431
11
Another witness, Kathy Sue Werndli, whose mailbox Walker
had driven into, also saw Walker's arrest.  She stated in an
affidavit that she saw Walker become physically aggressive
with Watkins and that Watkins "perform[ed] a gentle maneuver
which resulted in Ms. Walker going to the ground."  Werndli
stated: "it was obvious to me by [Walker's] behavior and
appearance that she was either drunk or under the influence of
drugs."  Werndli also stated that she did not observe Watkins
or Rosser mistreat Walker in any way. Werndli's account
differed slightly from Watkins's and Sheaffer's in that she
stated that she saw Walker get out of her vehicle on her own.
Both Watkins and Rosser testified that they believed that
Watkins was under the influence of alcohol or drugs because
she displayed symptoms characteristic of persons under the
influence.  Watkins testified that she did not believe that
Walker needed medical attention and that she would have called
paramedics to the scene if she had known Walker needed medical
treatment.  Both Watkins and Rosser testified that they had
received training in first aid and CPR.  Watkins testified
that she did not receive any training on how to distinguish
1090431
12
between intoxication and a medical condition presenting
similar symptoms.
Watkins transported Walker to the City's jail shortly
after her arrest while Rosser impounded Walker's vehicle and
completed an incident report.  The Department's written
directive regarding arrest procedures does not state under
what circumstances a prisoner should be transported to the
hospital instead of to the jail.  The Department's written
directive regarding the transportation of prisoners states:
"Any prisoner who is injured prior to or during an arrest will
not be transported to the City detention facility until he/she
has been transported to and offered treatment at an approved
medical facility."  That directive defines an injury as "any
broken bone, cut in the skin requiring stitches, or any other
injury or condition a supervisor or detention facility officer
determines must be treated."  It does not state any specific
procedures regarding prisoners who are under the influence of
alcohol or drugs or regarding prisoners who are ill, except
those with contagious disease.  Chief Owens testified that the
arresting officer typically would make the decision whether to
transfer a prisoner to the hospital instead of to jail.  Chief
1090431
13
Owens did not recall any written guideline detailing when an
officer should transport a prisoner to the hospital instead of
to jail.  
II.
Walker's Detention
Although Chief Owens was not directly involved in the
administration of the jail in July 2002, ultimately--through
several layers of bureaucracy--he was responsible for the
hiring of its officers, for its operations, and for the
development and enforcement of its policies. Chief Owens
testified that, in July 2002, the City had a jail nurse who
was on duty Monday through Friday during "regular business
hours" and who was on call at nights and during the weekends.
The jail nurse on duty at the time of Walker's detention has
not been positively identified.  During discovery, three
nurses were identified as potentially being the nurse on duty.
However, one never worked as a jail nurse, another was never
deposed, and the third did not recall Walker and could not
confirm whether she was on duty during Walker's detention.  It
is unclear whether the jail nurse was employed by the City or
by a local hospital that had a contract with the City to
provide nursing services for the jail.  Walker requested that
1090431
14
the City and the hospital produce the contract if it existed;
however, neither entity could locate a contract. 
At the time of their depositions, none of the detention
officers on duty during Walker's detention remembered her.  As
a result, and because of Walker's amnesia and the lack of
information regarding the jail nurse, all the facts known
about Walker's detention come from the jail records.  Notably,
on February 1, 2003, just a few days after Walker notified the
City of her claims, administration of the jail was transferred
from 
the 
City 
to 
Madison 
County 
pursuant 
to 
an
intergovernmental agreement.  Chief Owens testified that the
transfer occurred because of cost-management issues and that,
after the transfer, the jail was administered by the county
and housed both city and county prisoners.  A detention
officer who was employed at the jail during the transfer
testified at her deposition that "there was so much chaos, I
don't know where the paperwork or half of the things went."
The jail records presented by the parties to the trial court
show the following facts regarding Walker's detention and the
jail policies in place at that time.
1090431
15
The 
City 
had 
several 
written 
operations 
policies
regarding inmates who were intoxicated or in need of medical
care.  Policy No. B-106  required booking officers to complete
a form, which the jail personnel generally referred to as the
"medical questionnaire," "as soon as the inmate [was]
cooperative enough to answer questions."  The policy stated:
"If during the completion of the form it is
determined to deny admission of the inmate until
medical 
clearance 
is 
obtained, 
the 
Detention
Supervisor or Detention Officer in Charge (DOIC)
will complete as much of the ...form as possible and
complete a Denial of Admission Form. ...
"....
"The following types of new inmates will be
denied admission to the facility until evaluated by
the jail nurse. If the jail nurse is unavailable,
the arresting officer will transport the inmate to
the City of Huntsville approved medical provider for
proper treatment and clearance.
"- Inmates who are unconscious;
"- Inmates who are having or who have recently
had convulsions; 
"- 
Inmates 
with 
any 
significant 
external
bleeding;
"- Inmates with any obvious fractures;
"- Inmates with signs of head injuries;
"- Inmates with neck or spinal injuries;
"- Inmates with any type of serious injury;
"- Inmates who cannot walk under their own
power;
"- Inmates who display symptoms of internal
bleeding;
"- Inmates with abdominal bleeding;
1090431
16
"- Pregnant women in labor;
"- Pregnant women with any other serious
problem(s);
"- 
Extremely 
intoxicated 
or 
incapacitated
behavior; 
"- Breathing difficulties;
"- Seizures;
"- Apparent hallucinations; and/or 
"- Other serious indications.
"The jail nurse will maintain all inmate medical
screening records."
Separately, Policy No. B-108 stated the jail policies and
procedures related to intoxicated inmates.  That policy
stated:
"Inmates who appear to be under the influence of
alcohol or other drugs will be housed in Close
Observation Cells until the Detention Supervisor or
Detention Officer in Charge (DOIC) determines that
frequent observation is no longer necessary.
"Inmates who demonstrate potentially serious
medical conditions to include but not limited to the
following will be denied admission until evaluated
by the jail nurse or City of Huntsville approved
medical services provider:
"- Unconsciousness;
"- 
Extremely 
intoxicated 
or 
incapacitated
behavior;
"- Breathing difficulties;
"- Convulsions; Seizures;
"- Apparent hallucinations; and/or -- Other
serious indications.
"Staff will observe inmates housed in Close
Observation Cells at least every fifteen (15)
minutes, and staff will document each observation.
1090431
17
"Inmates will be transferred to the appropriate
housing unit when a Detention Supervisor determines
that the inmate is no longer a threat to themselves,
other inmates, staff or the security of the
facility."
Policy No. B-108 does not define the term "[e]xtremely
intoxicated or incapacitated behavior," and the detention
officers did not receive any specific training on how to
identify it.  Chief Owens testified that, in his opinion,
Policy No. B-108 was not discretionary, except that the
determination whether an inmate was extremely intoxicated or
incapacitated required "a judgment call ... requires a human
being to exercise their subjective judgment."
Chief Owens testified that detention officers at the jail
were trained and certified annually in basic life support and
CPR.  Policy No. F-109 required jail personnel to provide
medical care to any inmate with an "emergency medical need"
and stated procedures for providing that care once it was
determined that an inmate required it.  The policy, however,
did not state any guidelines for determining when an inmate
had an "emergency medical need."  The deposed detention
officers stated that they did not receive any specific
1090431
18
training on how to recognize serious medical conditions such
as a stroke or head injuries when there was no broken skin.
The jail records show that Walker was booked upon her
arrival at the jail and that a booking report was created at
approximately 6:00 p.m.  Walker was not admitted into the
"housing" area of the jail where multiple inmates were held in
a single, large cell.  Instead, Walker was assigned a cell in
the booking area.  Several detention officers stated in their
depositions that intoxicated inmates were kept in individual
holding cells in the booking area where they could be observed
until they were sober enough to be held safely in the housing
area.  A handwritten log entry in a book used by the detention
officers to pass information from one shift to the next
stated: "1805 [6:05 p.m.]--Julia Walker intoxicated at time of
booking unable to get prints and do medical." 
A medical questionnaire was created for Walker on July
29, 2002, at 1:16 a.m.  Several parts of the questionnaire are
left blank, including the name of the booking officer, the
name of the reviewing nurse, and the line for Walker's
signature.  There is some testimony to the effect that Walker
would have signed an original copy of the questionnaire;
1090431
19
however, other testimony indicates that the record was kept by
computer only and that a hard copy of the questionnaire with
Walker's signature might never have been created.   That part
of the questionnaire answered by the detention officer states
that Walker was conscious, that she did not have any "obvious
pain or bleeding or other symptoms suggesting need for
emergency service," and that she did not have any "visible
signs of trauma or illness requiring immediate emergency or
doctor's care."  Interestingly, the questionnaire also states
that Walker did not appear to be under the influence of
alcohol or drugs.  That part of the questionnaire answered by
Walker states that she had not recently fainted or had a head
injury and that she did not have any other medical problems
the detention officers should know about.
An entry in the surveillance log states: "8:00 Nurse
checked Pentecost, Walker, Wynne and Vinny.  Pentecost and
Vinny good to go to housing.  Wynne and Walker will need to be
housed in booking till later date."  As stated above, the
identity of the nurse who checked Walker remains unknown.  The
nurse who could not recall whether she was on duty during
Walker's detention stated that she completed written forms
1090431
20
when she saw an inmate and that those forms were kept in a
filing cabinet in an exam room at the jail.  She also
testified: "Not every contact with a patient or inmate
requires written documentation."  She explained that, if the
inmate was not having physical troubles or she did not observe
anything remarkable or abnormal, then there was nothing to say
and no need to document the contact.
The surveillance log next stated that at 8:05 a.m. Walker
and two other inmates were sent to video arraignment.  A
computerized entry in Walker's inmate log shows that she was
moved from her cell to the municipal court at 8:55 a.m.
Although it is unclear precisely when, Walker signed an
affidavit-of-indigency form requesting appointed counsel in
which she identified her employer, stated her weekly income,
her monthly expenses, her marital status, and the fact that
she had two adult children.  The municipal court denied her
request for indigency status.  Municipal court records show
that, at her arraignment, Walker pleaded not guilty, and her
case was set for trial on September 10, 2002.  Walker's inmate
log shows that she was returned from municipal court to her
cell at approximately 1:03 p.m.  The surveillance log,
1090431
21
however, does not specifically state when Walker returned, but
states: "11:30 Court over--several inmates brought down."
All other entries in the surveillance logs created during
Walker's detention say "all ok," "all quiet and secure," or
state information regarding other inmates.   No other log
entries mention Walker by name.  Entries in the surveillance
logs were made every 30 minutes, not every 15 as required by
the jail-operations policy.
Rosser testified that she saw Walker at the jail the day
after Walker's arrest, although she did not recall what time.
Rosser stated that she saw Walker walking around the booking
area outside her cell and that Walker was talking to herself,
looking in other rooms and cells, and "bouncing off the
walls."  Rosser saw Walker for less than five minutes, did not
talk to her, and was not close enough to tell if she still
appeared to be under the influence of narcotics.
Walker did not make any telephone calls while she was at
the jail.  Several detention officers testified that
telephones were located in the jail's housing area to which
Walker was never admitted.  However, there is no evidence
indicating that Walker requested and was denied access to a
1090431
22
telephone.  Walker was released to the custody of her sons on
the afternoon of July 29, 2002.  Her inmate log shows that she
left the jail at 4:15 p.m.
III.  Walker's Medical Treatment
Walker's sons testified at their depositions that they
grew worried for Walker’s safety when she did not return home
on the day of her arrest.  They started looking for her the
next morning and found her that afternoon when Walker's
daughter-in-law telephoned the Department.  Walker’s sons
drove to the jail, where they paid Walker's bail.  She was
released into their custody approximately 24 hours after her
arrest.  They testified that the detention officers told them
only that Walker had been arrested for driving under the
influence and that she was incoherent. 
Walker’s sons testified that when they saw her, she
appeared to be "in very bad shape."  She had several bruises
and scratches on her arms and legs; she also seemed
disoriented and complained of a headache.  Walker's sons
stated that she told them she could not remember what had
happened to her but denied drinking or using drugs.  They
further stated that they tried to convince her to see a doctor
1090431
23
but that she refused.  They stated that they assumed that she
was intoxicated because the detention officer they spoke with
said she had been arrested for driving under the influence.
Walker's sons made sure that Walker was with a family
member during the next 24 hours.  When her symptoms did not
improve, they insisted that she see a doctor.  On Tuesday,
July 30, 2002, Walker was admitted to the emergency-room at
Gadsden Regional Medical Center.  The admitting nurse noted
Walker's condition as "non-urgent."  The nurse also noted
bruises on Walker's arms and legs.  The emergency-room
physician's notes state that Walker's chief complaint on
admission was neck pain and that she also complained of
amnesia.  Walker's doctors performed a CT scan of her head and
neck, which revealed a subarachnoid hemorrhage--a brain
aneurysm.  Later that night, Walker was transferred to the
University of Alabama at Birmingham hospital for treatment by
a specialist.  
During the next several months, Walker underwent at least
three brain surgeries.  She ultimately recovered, but has no
memory of the events that occurred on July 28 and 29, 2002.
Lab tests of Walker's blood taken upon her admission to
1090431
24
Gadsden Regional Medical Center showed negative results for
the presence of illegal drugs.
IV.
Walker's Prosecution
Walker's trial on the DUI and standing-in-the-roadway
charges was set for September 10, 2002.  On September 9, 2002,
Walker's counsel requested a continuance, stating that she had
just been retained, that she had a conflict on the trial date,
and that Walker had been "diagnosed with a cerebral brain
hemorrhage and [had been] hospitalized at University [of
Alabama] Hospital in Birmingham in August" and was still under
a doctor's care.  The municipal court granted that continuance
and the hearing was reset for November 19, 2002.  On that
date, the City requested a continuance pending an analysis of
the pills Watkins had recovered from Walker's purse.  The
municipal court granted the City's request.  On November 22,
2002, the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences reported
that 
the 
pills 
recovered 
from 
Walker's 
purse 
were
noncontrolled caffeine pills.  At the next hearing date,
January 28, 2003, the municipal court dismissed the case.
Walker's son, who was present at that hearing, testified that
1090431
25
the prosecutor for the City wanted to proceed with the claims
against Walker unless she released the City from liability.
V.
Expert Witnesses
Walker and the defendants presented evidence from several
expert witnesses.  For purposes of this opinion, it is not
necessary to discuss that evidence in detail.  In summary,
Walker's experts testified that the defendants breached the
applicable standards for arrests, nursing, detention, and
training; 
the 
defendants' 
experts 
testified 
that 
the
defendants did not breach any applicable standard of care.
Standard of Review
"'The standard of review applicable to a summary
judgment is the same as the standard for granting
the motion....' McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor
Flea Market, Inc., 601 So. 2d 957, 958 (Ala. 1992).
"'A summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3),
Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. In determining whether the
movant has carried that burden, the court
is to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party. To defeat a properly supported
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving
1090431
26
party must present "substantial evidence"
creating a genuine issue of material fact--
"evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547
So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough-Clean, Inc.,
639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994). Questions of law
are reviewed de novo. Alabama Republican Party v.
McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004)."
Alabama Elec. Coop. v. Bailey's Constr. Co., 950 So. 2d 280,
283 (Ala. 2006).
Analysis
As stated above, the trial court did not state its
reasons for entering a summary judgment for the defendants.
On appeal, Walker argues that the trial court erred in
entering the summary judgment because, she says, her state-law
claims are not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
State-agent immunity, or municipal immunity, and because the
defendants were guilty of spoliation.  The defendants counter
each of these arguments and also argue that Walker's claims
are not supported by substantial evidence.
I.  Collateral Estoppel
1090431
27
The parties dispute whether Walker's state-law claims are
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on the
federal court's summary judgment for the defendants on
Walker's § 1983 claims.  This Court has stated:
"For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
apply, the following elements must be established:
"'"(1) that an issue in a prior
action was identical to the issue
litigated in the present action;
(2) that the issue was actually
litigated in the prior action;
(3) that resolution of the issue
was 
necessary 
to 
the 
prior
judgment; and (4) that the same
parties are involved in the two
actions."
"'Smith v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 653 So.
2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1995). "'Where these
elements are present, the parties are
barred from relitigating issues actually
litigated in a prior [action].'" Smith, 653
So. 2d at 934 (quoting Lott v. Toomey, 477
So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985)).'
"Biles v. Sullivan, 793 So. 2d 708, 712 (Ala. 2000).
'Only issues actually decided in a former action are
subject to collateral estoppel.' Leverette ex rel.
Gilmore v. Leverette, 479 So. 2d 1229, 1237 (Ala.
1985) (emphasis added). The burden is on the party
asserting collateral estoppel to prove that the
issue it is seeking to bar was determined in the
prior adjudication. See Adams v. Sanders, 811 So. 2d
542, 545 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ('Because we have no
transcript of the trial in the district court, the
burden is on Sanders to show that the district court
determined that he was not negligent.'). See also
1090431
28
United States v. Cala, 521 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir.
1975) ('The burden ... is on [the one asserting
collateral estoppel] to establish that the issue he
seeks to foreclose from litigation in the present
prosecution was necessarily decided in his favor by
the prior verdict.')."
Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851 So. 2d
507, 520 (Ala. 2002).
The 
defendants--the 
parties 
asserting 
collateral
estoppel--argue that the federal court determined that Watkins
had probable cause to arrest Walker and that the defendants'
conduct was reasonable.  Accordingly, the defendants argue,
collateral estoppel applies to bar relitigation of those
issues and effectively decides certain elements of each of
Walker's state-law claims in favor of the defendants.  As a
result, the defendants maintain, the trial court correctly
entered a summary judgment in their favor.  
Walker argues that collateral estoppel does not apply to
any of her state-law claims because the federal court declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.  She
cites this Court's decision in Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc.
v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 2007), and the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982).  In Lloyd
Noland, the trial court entered a summary judgment for
1090431
29
HealthSouth based, in part, on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.  In prior litigation, a federal court had
interpreted a certain contract provision that HealthSouth
contended was at issue in the plaintiff's state-law action.
This Court determined that, because the plaintiff's state-law
claims were based on a different contract and a different set
of transactions than those at issue in the federal court, the
issue decided by the federal court was "not identical to any
of the issues to be addressed in the present litigation."  979
So. 2d at 796.  This Court then stated:
"Furthermore, collateral estoppel is not applicable
where the plaintiff was unable to seek a certain
remedy or form of relief in the first action because
of 
the 
limitations 
on 
the 
subject-matter
jurisdiction of the courts. See Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 26 (1982). Collateral estoppel does
not apply where it is 'asserted in an action over
which the court rendering the prior judgment would
not 
have 
had 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.'
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3) cmt. d
(1982). '[A]fter a court has incidentally determined
an issue that it lacks jurisdiction to determine
directly, the determination should not be binding
when a second action is brought in a court having
such 
jurisdiction.' 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of
Judgments § 28(3) cmt. d."
In Lloyd Noland, this Court determined, based on federal
diversity rules, that the federal court could not have
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
1090431
30
state-law claims.  As a result, the plaintiff was actually
unable to seek a remedy in that court as to those claims, and
this Court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
did not apply.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982), relied
on by Walker and by this Court in Lloyd Noland, states that,
even where other elements of collateral estoppel are met,
relitigation is not appropriate where: "A new determination of
the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or
extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or
by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between
them ...."  The comment explains: 
"Not infrequently, issue preclusion will be asserted
in an action over which the court rendering the
prior judgment would not have had subject matter
jurisdiction. In many such cases, there is no reason
why preclusion should not apply; the procedures
followed in the two courts are comparable in quality
and extensiveness, and the first court was fully
competent to render a determination of the issue on
which preclusion is sought. In other cases, however,
there may be compelling reasons why preclusion
should not apply. For example, the procedures
available in the first court may have been tailored
to the prompt, inexpensive determination of small
claims and thus may be wholly inappropriate to the
determination of the same issues when presented in
the context of a much larger claim. The scope of
review in the first action may have been very
narrow. 
Or 
the 
legislative 
allocation 
of
1090431
31
jurisdiction among the courts of the state may have
been designed to insure that when an action is
brought to determine a particular issue directly, it
may only be maintained in a court having special
competence to deal with it. In such instances, after
a court has incidently determined an issue that it
lacks 
jurisdiction to determine directly, the
determination should not be binding when a second
action 
is 
brought 
in 
a 
court 
having 
such
jurisdiction. The question in each case should be
resolved in the light of the nature of litigation in
the courts involved and the legislative purposes in
allocating jurisdiction among the courts of the
state."
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. d (1982) (emphasis
added).
 
In this case, the federal court expressly determined that
it had supplemental jurisdiction over Walker's state-law
claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  It stated:
"[Walker's] amended complaint also contains a
number of tort claims that sound in state law.  This
does 
not 
present 
any 
jurisdictional 
problems
because, in cases where a federal district court's
jurisdiction is based solely upon the presence of a
federal question, the court also possesses the
discretion to entertain state claims that are so
related to the federal causes of action that they
form a part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a).  The district court may, however,
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when
... the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction .... 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)."
1090431
32
(Emphasis added.)  Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the federal
court, 
within 
its 
discretion, 
declined 
to 
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Walker's claims and remanded
the action to the Madison Circuit Court.  
This case is, therefore, procedurally distinguishable
from Lloyd Noland--in which the federal court actually lacked
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims.  Likewise, this case
is different from those situations identified in the
Restatement in which there are "compelling reasons why
preclusion should not apply," such as when "the procedures
available in the first court may have been tailored to the
prompt, inexpensive determination of small claims"; where "the
scope of review in the first action [was] very narrow"; or
where the first court determined issues collateral to the
primary issues over 
which the legislature granted it
jurisdiction.  Walker has not argued that any such situations
are present in this case.  Accordingly, the federal court's
decision to exercise discretion under § 1367(c) and to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims it could have
decided does not preclude application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to Walker's state-law claims.
1090431
33
Where the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied,
this Court has applied the doctrine to bar relitigation of
issues decided by a federal court, even though the federal
court, in its discretion, declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over claims it could have decided.  In Roden v.
Wright, 646 So. 2d 605 (Ala. 1994), the plaintiff sued the
Marshall County Commission and its chairman, alleging that the
chairman had wrongfully interfered with his business contract.
The plaintiff stated claims under § 1983, alleging violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and his right to contract.  The plaintiff also stated several
state-law claims arising from the chairman's actions.  The
federal court denied the chairman's motion for a summary
judgment based on federal principles of qualified immunity,
and the chairman appealed the decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  The Eleventh
Circuit reversed the federal district court's decision.  On
remand, the federal district court entered a judgment in favor
of the defendants on the § 1983 claims and dismissed the
state-law claims without prejudice.
1090431
34
The plaintiff in Roden then filed a complaint in the
Marshall Circuit Court, alleging his state-law claims against
the same defendants.  Ultimately, the trial court granted the
chairman's motion for a summary judgment, and the plaintiff
appealed.  This Court, on the chairman's argument, applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, analyzing the federal court's
decision and reasoning: "[A] comparison of the legal and
factual questions involved in this action with those involved
in Roden's § 1983 action reveals a factual issue that is
common to both actions, that is, whether [the chairman's
action] was a discretionary act taken within the scope of his
authority."  646 So. 2d at 610.  Specifically, this Court
stated: "Determining whether [the chairman] is entitled to
good-faith immunity from liability under [the plaintiff's]
state-law claims requires resolution of the same issue
involved in step one of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis."  646
So. 2d at 610.  Finding that the other elements of collateral
estoppel were satisfied, this Court ultimately concluded that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the
question whether the chairman's actions were discretionary.
1090431
We note that dicta in Matthews v. Alabama A&M, 787 So.
3
2d 691, 696 (Ala. 2000), indicates that there can never be
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion in a subsequent state-
court proceeding when the federal court in a prior action
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims.  None of the parties has cited Matthews, and we
decline to follow its dicta because it fails to consider
Roden, Lightfoot, and the sound reasoning set forth in
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 28, quoted above.    
35
Similarly, in Lightfoot v. Floyd, 667 So. 2d 56 (Ala.
1995), the plaintiff sued several defendants in the Madison
Circuit Court, alleging state-law claims and claims under
§ 1983.  The action was removed to the federal court, which
entered a summary judgment for the defendants on the § 1983
claims and remanded the state-law claims to the Madison
Circuit Court.  On remand, the defendants moved for a summary
judgment on the state-law claims, asserting, in part, that
certain questions at issue in the state-law claims should be
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  The circuit
court granted the defendants' motions, and the plaintiff
appealed.  In a detailed analysis, this Court held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to certain
issues that had not actually been decided by the federal court
but that it barred relitigation of other issues that were
decided by the federal court.  
3
1090431
36
Walker states, without citing authority or elaborating,
that her state-law claims arise out of the same facts as do
her § 1983 claims but that "the rule of law is not the same."
Walker also states, again without citing authority or
explaining further, that "collateral estoppel should not apply
across the board and bar Walker's claims that were not decided
with the application of state law by the federal district
court that subsequently declined to exercise  supplemental
jurisdiction and declined to rule on those issues."  However,
the critical question, as shown in Roden and Lightfoot, is
whether the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied--
specifically whether an identical issue has been presented,
litigated, and decided by the federal court.  Wright and
Miller explain:
"Identification 
of 
differences 
in 
legal
standards and ensuing differences in the issues of
law application is apt to be particularly easy when
different legal systems are involved. Federal courts
have often found that questions presented by federal
law are different from questions decided under
foreign law or state law. Determination of a
state-law issue may be particularly unsuited for
preclusion when federal law applies independent
constraints to the role of state law. And of course
the laws of different states may give different
meanings to the same legal terms, just as happens
with federal and state law. At the same time,
careful 
examination 
of 
the 
controlling 
legal
1090431
37
principles may show that the standards are the same,
or that the fact findings have the same effect under
either standard, so that the same issue is presented
by both systems of law. So long as the same issue is
presented, preclusion is appropriate unless some
special reason for relitigation arises from the
nature of the relationship between federal courts
and state or foreign courts."
19 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4417 (2d ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted;
emphasis added)(citing Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd., 20 Cal.
3d 881, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Ca. Rptr. 692 (1978)("[T]he federal
and state determinations of gross income [for purposes of
federal and state income taxes] were sufficiently identical to
warrant an estoppel.")).  Therefore, so long as the elements
of collateral estoppel are satisfied, the doctrine may apply.
See Lee L. Saad Constr., 851 So. 2d at 520.
Walker alleged six state-law claims based on arrest,
detention, and prosecution.  The federal court entered a
summary judgment for the defendants on Walker's § 1983 claims
based on an alleged unlawful arrest and excessive use of force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment; an alleged unlawful
denial of medical care in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and an alleged wrongful failure to train Department
personnel to prevent the above violations.  It is undisputed
1090431
38
that the parties to the federal action and the state action
are the same.  The defendants argue that the federal court
determined 1) that probable cause existed for Walker's arrest,
2) that the defendants' conduct was reasonable, and 3) that
Watkins's use of force was reasonable and not excessive, and
that these determinations prevent relitigation of issues that
bar each of Walker's claims.
A.  Probable Cause
In the federal court, the defendants raised the defense
of qualified immunity.  The federal court analyzed that
defense using the two-step test stated in Andujar v.
Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 2007):
"[C]ourts apply a two-step test to determine whether
qualified immunity is appropriate. First ...: Taken
in the light most favorable to the party asserting
the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right?' Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed.
2d 272 (2001). When a court answers this question
affirmatively, the court moves to the second step,
which is to consider whether the constitutional
right was 'clearly established' on the date of the
violation. Id."
Regarding Walker's claim that her arrest violated Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the federal court determined that her arrest--her
1090431
39
seizure--was supported by probable cause and was therefore
reasonable.  Specifically, the federal court stated: "A
warrantless arrest on a public street is reasonable and,
therefore, lawful if it is supported by probable cause."  The
federal court defined probable cause, stating: 
"[P]robable cause to effect an arrest exists if, at
the moment the arrest was made, 'the facts and
circumstances [within the officers'] knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing' that the person arrested either had
committed, or was in the process of committing an
offense.  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228
(1991)(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964))."
The federal court then examined the evidence presented by
Walker and by the defendants and concluded:
"Here, 
plaintiff's 
outward 
symptoms 
and 
the
surrounding circumstances--e.g., the minor, one car
accident, the pills located in plaintiff's purse,
the absence of any obvious indication of serous
injuries--would clearly suggest to a reasonable
police officer that the plaintiff was either
intoxicated or under the influence of some other
substance.  Indeed, both police officers at the
scene and both third-party witnesses were united in
this belief.  Therefore, ... the court is satisfied
that Officer Watkins possessed actual probable cause
to arrest plaintiff on suspicion of DUI."
As a result, the federal court concluded that Walker's arrest
was not an unreasonable seizure.  The defendants, therefore,
1090431
40
were entitled to qualified immunity on Walker's  § 1983 claim
based on Fourth Amendment violations related to her arrest. 
The question of probable cause, therefore, was actually
litigated in the federal court and was necessary to its
judgment regarding Walker's § 1983 claims.  We must determine
whether the question of probable cause under the federal
court's analysis is identical to the issue to be determined in
Walker's state-law claims. 
Three of Walker's claims require proof of probable cause:
malicious-prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest.
Walker's malicious prosecution claim relates to her arrest and
to the City's prosecution of the charges against her.  As an
element of this claim, Walker must show that "the defendant[s]
acted without probable cause and with malice."  Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 174 (Ala. 2000).  In
Wal-Mart Stores, this Court stated: 
"In malicious prosecution cases, 'probable cause' is
defined as 'such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that the person arrested is
guilty.' Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan, 601 So. 2d 442,
445 (Ala. 1992) (citation omitted). Thus, the
determination of probable cause does not hinge upon
whether [the plaintiff] was in fact guilty ..., but
whether [the defendant's] subjective belief under
1090431
41
the circumstances led her to believe that [the
plaintiff] was guilty."
789 So. 2d at 174.  In substance, this question is identical
to that decided by the federal court regarding the existence
of probable cause for Walker's arrest.  Accordingly, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of that
issue, and Walker's malicious-prosecution claim is barred to
the extent it relates to her arrest.  However, because the
federal court decided the question of probable cause only as
it related to Walker's arrest, collateral estoppel does not
preclude litigation of that claim as it relates to the City's
prosecution of the charges against her.
Walker's false-imprisonment claim relates to her arrest
and detention.  Section 6-5-170, Ala. Code 1975, defines false
imprisonment as "the unlawful detention of the person of
another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his
personal liberty."  In Upshaw v. McArdle, 650 So. 2d 875 (Ala.
1994), this Court upheld a summary judgment for a defendant on
a claim of false imprisonment related to an arrest because
probable cause existed for the arrest and, therefore, the
detention was not unlawful.  For purposes of the false-
imprisonment claim, this Court stated: "'"Probable cause
1090431
42
exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge and of which he has reasonable trustworthy
information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed."'"  650 So. 2d at 878 (quoting Bush v. State, 523
So. 2d 538, 543 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), quoting in turn Knight
v. State, 346 So. 2d 478, 481 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)).  This
question is also identical to that decided by the federal
court.  Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of the issue, and Walker's false-imprisonment
claim stemming from the arrest is barred. 
Finally, Walker's claim of false arrest requires proof
"that the defendant caused [her] to be arrested without
probable cause."  Higgins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 512 So. 2d
766 (Ala. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Drill Parts &
Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1993).  For
purposes of false arrest, this Court has stated of probable
cause:
"Thus, for a detention to be valid, the officer must
reasonably, 
and 
in 
good 
faith, 
suspect 
the
individual detained of being involved in some form
of criminality. Fennell v. State, 51 Ala. App. 23,
282 So. 2d 373, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 778, 282 So.
2d 379 (1973). Reasonable ground for belief of
1090431
43
guilt, or probable cause, 'exists where the facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed.' Fennell, 51 Ala. App. at 29, 282
So. 2d at 378."
Higgins, 512 So. 2d at 768.  The question of probable cause
for purposes of Walker's claim of false arrest is, therefore,
identical to that decided by the federal court.  As a result,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the
issue, and Walker's false-arrest claim is barred.
The defendants argue that the federal court's finding of
probable cause also bars Walker's invasion-of-privacy claim.
However, that claim relates to the City's prosecution of
Walker after it received notice of her medical condition.  The
federal court's finding of probable cause related only to
Walker's arrest.  Accordingly, the issues are not identical,
and the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar Walker's
invasion-of-privacy claim.
B.  Reasonableness
The defendants next argue that the federal court
determined that their conduct was reasonable and, therefore,
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Walker's claims
1090431
44
of negligence and the tort of outrage because those claims
require a finding of unreasonable and outrageous behavior,
respectively.  However, a close examination of the federal
court's decision shows that it actually determined that
Walker's arrest--her being taken into custody--was supported
by probable cause and, therefore, that it was not an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Walker's
negligence claim is based on her arrest, her 24-hour detention
without medical care, and the City's and Chief Owens's alleged
negligent failure to supervise and train Department employees.
As to Walker's arrest and detention, she alleges that Watkins,
Rosser, the detention officers, and, vicariously, the City,
were negligent in not recognizing her medical symptoms and in
not providing her with medical treatment.  Accordingly, Walker
must show that these defendants breached a duty to provide her
medical treatment and that that breach proximately caused her
injury or damage.  See Ex parte Wild Wild West Social Club,
Inc., 806 So. 2d 1235, 1239-40 (Ala. 2001).  The federal
court's inquiry regarding reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment 
is 
a 
different 
issue 
from 
the 
defendants'
reasonableness in failing to provide Walker with medical care.
1090431
45
Similarly, Walker's state-law claim of negligent training and
supervision relates to the provision of medical care both at
the time of her arrest and her subsequent detention.  The
federal court determined that Walker's § 1983 claim against
Chief Owens and the City based on a failure to train and
supervise with respect to the arrest was precluded because
probable cause existed for the arrest--a different issue.
Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar
Walker's negligence claim.
Walker bases her tort-of-outrage claim on her detention
and subsequent prosecution.  Walker's claim, therefore,
presents different issues than those decided by the federal
court regarding the reasonableness of Walker's arrest under
the Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not bar Walker's tort-of-outrage claim.
C.  Use of Force
The defendants argue that Walker is collaterally estopped
from pursuing her assault and battery claim based on the
federal court's determination that Watkins's use of force was
not excessive and, therefore, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.  The federal court based its determination on
1090431
46
federal precedent that allows the use of reasonable or de
minimus force during an arrest, citing Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094
(11th Cir. 2003); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2000); and Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460
(11th Cir. 1997).  Walker's complaint very generally states an
assault and battery claim against all defendants.  The only
evidence relating to that claim relates to Watkins's use of
force during Walker's arrest.  
"The plaintiff in an action alleging assault and battery
must prove '(1) that the defendant touched the plaintiff; (2)
that the defendant intended to touch the plaintiff; and (3)
that the touching was conducted in a harmful or offensive
manner.'"  Harper v. Winston County, 892 So. 2d 346, 353 (Ala.
2004)(quoting Ex parte Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So. 2d 1190,
1193 (Ala. 1998)).  However, this Court has stated: "In making
the arrest, a police officer may use reasonable force and may
be held liable only if more force is used than is necessary to
effectuate the arrest."  Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670
So. 2d 848, 852 (Ala. 1995), citing § 13A-3-27(a), Ala. Code
1975 ("A peace officer is justified in using that degree of
1090431
47
physical force which he reasonably believes to be necessary,
upon a person in order: (1) To make an arrest for a
misdemeanor, violation or violation of a criminal ordinance
... unless the peace officer knows that the arrest is
unauthorized.").
The issue decided by the federal court is, therefore,
identical to the issue raised by Walker's assault and battery
claim.  The issue was actually determined by the federal court
and was necessary to its judgment on Walker's § 1983 claim
alleging an excessive use of force.  Therefore, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of this issue and, as
a result, Walker's assault and battery claim.
The trial court, therefore, correctly entered a summary
judgment on Walker's claims of malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment to the extent they relate to Walker's arrest and
on Walker's claims of false arrest and assault and battery.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude
litigation of any issues related to Walker's claims of 1)
malicious 
prosecution; 
2) 
negligence 
regarding 
Walker's 
arrest
and detention without medical care and the City's and Chief
Owens's failure to train and supervise; 3) the tort of outrage
1090431
We here deal with spoliation as the basis for an
4
inference of guilt or negligence and not the separate doctrine
of spoliation as the basis for a cause of action.  See, e.g.,
Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000).
48
regarding Walker's detention and prosecution; and 4) invasion
of privacy regarding Walker's prosecution. 
II.  Spoliation
Walker contends that the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment on her claims because, she says, the
defendants were guilty of spoliation and she was therefore
entitled to adverse inferences of fact against them.   This
4
Court has stated:
"Spoliation is an attempt by a party to suppress
or destroy material evidence favorable to the
party's adversary. May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 603
(Ala. 1982). Proof of spoliation will support an
inference of guilt or negligence. May, 424 So. 2d at
603. One can prove spoliation by showing that a
party 
purposefully 
or 
wrongfully 
destroyed 
a
document that the party knew supported the interest
of the party's opponent. Id."
Wal-Mart Stores, 789 So. 2d at 176 (concluding that Wal-Mart
was not entitled to a new trial based on spoliation because
"nothing in the record show[ed] that [the plaintiff] knew that
the [allegedly spoliated evidence] would be a key piece of
evidence in her case, and Wal-Mart provided no evidence to
show that [the plaintiff] intentionally destroyed [it] in
1090431
49
order to inhibit Wal-Mart's case.").  See also Williams v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 496 So. 2d 743, 746 (Ala. 1986)
("Plaintiffs also contend that the defendants purposely and
wrongfully destroyed the tire. We are of the opinion that
plaintiffs have failed to offer one shred of evidence that the
tire was destroyed wrongfully. ... [P]laintiffs have failed to
offer any proof that anyone from [United Parcel Service,
Inc.,] destroyed the tire to keep it from being used as
evidence. Such naked allegations, without more, will not
render the trial court's summary judgments improper.").
Walker, citing Vesta Fire Insurance Corp. v. Milam & Co.
Construction, Inc., 901 So. 2d 84 (Ala. 2004), argues that,
"as to the culpability issue, it is a reasonable-person test
as to what the spoliator knew or 'should have known' before
disposing of the evidence."  In Vesta, this Court applied the
standards stated above and, as part of a detailed analysis,
stated: 
"The defendants do not argue that Vesta and
Wausau acted with malicious intent in deciding what
evidence to preserve, and the record, when viewed
most favorably to Vesta and Wausau ... reflects at
most 
honest 
error 
in 
judgment 
and/or 
simple
negligence. There is no showing that they allowed
evidence that they knew, or should have known, would
be favorable to the opposing parties in foreseeable
1090431
50
litigation to be discarded. Classic spoliation
involves 
the 
idea 
that 
the 
offending 
party
'purposefully and wrongfully' destroyed evidence 'he
knew 
was 
supportive 
of 
the 
interest 
of 
his
opponent.'"
901 So. 2d at 96 (quoting May, 424 So. 2d at 603).  Nothing in
this language suggests the availability of an inference
contrary to the alleged spoliator on the issue of liability
when the loss or destruction of the evidence is shown to be
merely an act of negligence inconsistent with the standards of
conduct expected of a reasonable person acting under similar
circumstances.
In her principal brief on appeal, Walker argues generally
that the defendants destroyed "jail records," "jail logs," and
"numerous records."  However, she specifically identifies
only: 1) records showing the identity of the jail nurse on
duty during Walker's detention; 2) the City's contract with a
local hospital to obtain nursing services; 3) a medical
questionnaire signed by Walker; and 4) a written record of the
jail nurse's examination of Walker.  The defendants argue
primarily that Walker has not shown that this evidence ever
existed.  Similarly, the federal court, in addressing Walker's
allegations of spoliation as it related to her § 1983 claims,
1090431
51
noted significant questions as to whether the evidence ever
existed and whether it was material to Walker's claims.
During the discovery process, three individuals who may
have served as the jail nurse at the time of Walker's
detention were found; however, none was positively identified
as the nurse at the time.  It is undisputed that Walker
requested a copy of the contract that allegedly existed
between the City and a local hospital regarding the jail
nurse, but that neither the City nor the hospital could locate
any such contract.  One witness testified that Walker would
have signed a copy of her medical questionnaire; however,
another witness testified that the jail created and maintained
only electronic copies of the record Walker sought.  The
witness who had once served as a jail nurse testified that
inmate medical records were kept in filing cabinets in an exam
room at the jail.  However, she also testified that she did
not always make written records of her contact with the
inmates.
It is undisputed that the City has a duty to maintain its
records.  See §§ 36-12-2 and 41-13-23, Ala. Code 1975.  It is
also undisputed that on February 1, 2003, the administration
1090431
52
of the jail was transferred from the City to Madison County.
One witness described the transfer as "chaotic."  Huntsville
Police Lieutenant Sherry Jackson testified that she personally
searched the Department's records, the jail records that were
stored separately after the transfer, and the Department's
electronic records for information relating to Walker.  Lt.
Jackson testified that she did not find anything the
defendants had not already produced to Walker's counsel.  
There is no evidence in the record showing that the
defendants destroyed evidence purposefully or wrongfully or
that the defendants knew that the evidence allegedly destroyed
supported Walker's interests.  See Wal-Mart Stores and
Williams, supra.  Accordingly, Walker has not shown spoliation
on the part of the defendants that would render the trial
court's entry of a summary judgment improper.
III.  Immunity
The defendants argue that they are immune from liability
on Walker's state-law claims under §§ 6-5-338 and 11-47-190,
Ala. Code 1975.  Section 6-5-338(a) states, in part:  "Every
peace officer, ... shall have immunity from tort liability
arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any
1090431
53
discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her
law enforcement duties."  Section 11-47-190 applies to
municipalities; it states, in part: "No city or town shall be
liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any
person or corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or
suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness
of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality
engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his
or her duty ...."
This Court has stated: "The restatement of State-agent
immunity as set out in [Ex parte] Cranman, 792 So. 2d [392,]
405 [(Ala. 2000)], now governs the determination of whether a
peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a)."  Ex
parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005).  This
Court in Cranman stated the test for State-agent immunity as
follows:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
1090431
54
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) making administrative adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) 
hiring, 
firing, 
transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
1090431
55
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  In Hollis v. City of Brighton,
950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006), this Court modified category
(4) of the Cranman test to state: "exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but
not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers
under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity
pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975."
"Additionally, this Court has stated:
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a
"burden-shifting" process when a party
raises the defense of State-agent immunity.
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052
(Ala. 2003). In order to claim State-agent
immunity, a State agent bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims
arise from a function that would entitle
the State agent to immunity. Giambrone, 874
So. 2d at 1052; Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d
705, 709 (Ala. 2002). If the State agent
makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
State agent acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his
or her authority. Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at
1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte
Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998). "A
State agent acts beyond authority and is
therefore not immune when he or she
'fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to
1090431
56
detailed rules or regulations, such as
those stated on a checklist.'" Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).'
"Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452
(Ala. 2006)."
Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299, 305 (Ala. 2008).
A.  Officer Watkins and  Officer Rosser
The only claim against Watkins and Rosser that survives
our analysis of the availability of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is Walker's claim of negligence relating to their
failure to recognize her symptoms at the time of her arrest
and their failure to obtain medical treatment for her.  It is
undisputed that Watkins and Rosser are State agents.  Watkins
and Rosser argue that their actions fall within the fourth (as
modified by Hollis) and fifth categories identified by
Cranman: "exercising judgment in the enforcement of the
criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest
persons, or serving as peace officers under circumstances
entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a)"
and "exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by
statute, 
rule, 
or 
regulation 
in 
releasing 
prisoners,
1090431
In her principal brief on appeal, Walker argues that
5
Watkins violated the Department's written directive No. 101-13
regarding the use of force.  However, that directive has not
been made a part of the record on appeal. Additionally, it is
not material to the facts upon which Walker bases her
negligence claim, i.e., Watkins's failure to provide her with
57
counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating
students."  See Cranman and Hollis, supra.
Chief Owens testified that, in making DUI arrests, the
Department's police officers like Watkins and Rosser based the
decision to arrest on their observations and experience.  A
written directive of the Department stated: "Any prisoner who
is injured prior to or during an arrest will not be
transported to the City detention facility until he/she has
been transported to and offered treatment at an approved
medical facility."  The directive defined the term "injury" as
a broken bone, a cut requiring stitches, or "any other injury
or condition a supervisor or detention facility officer
determines must be treated."  Chief Owens testified that the
decision to transport an individual to the hospital instead of
to jail lies with the arresting officer.  He also testified
that there was no directive or guideline, other than that
stated above, detailing when an officer should transport an
individual to the hospital instead of the jail.5
1090431
medical care.
58
Based on this evidence, it is apparent that, in
determining whether Walker needed medical attention, Watkins
and Rosser were not discharging duties pursuant to detailed
rules, regulations, or checklists.  See Yancey, supra.  They
were, instead, exercising judgment with respect to Walker's
arrest and performing a discretionary function in the line and
scope of their law-enforcement duties within the meaning of
§ 6-5-338.  Watkins and Rosser, therefore, have shown that
they are entitled to State-agent immunity under the fourth
area identified in Cranman.
The burden then, shifts to Walker to present evidence
indicating 
that 
Watkins 
and 
Rosser 
acted 
willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond their
authority.  No evidence in the record shows that they did so.
Accordingly, Walker has not met her burden, and Watkins and
Rosser are immune from liability on Walker's negligence claim
relating to their failure to recognize her symptoms at the
time of her arrest and their failure to obtain medical
treatment for her.
B.  The City's Liability for the Conduct of Officer
Watkins and  Officer Rosser
1090431
59
This Court has stated: "under principles of vicarious
liability, where a municipal employee enjoys immunity, the
municipality likewise is immune as to claims based on the
employee's conduct."  City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785
So. 2d 1128, 1131 (Ala. 2000).  Therefore, because Watkins and
Rosser are immune, the City is also immune from liability on
Walker's claims against it based on their acts.  The trial
court, therefore, correctly entered a summary judgment in
favor of Watkins, Rosser, and the City as to Walker's claims
related to the failure of its employees, Watkins and Rosser to
recognize her symptoms at the time of her arrest and their
failure to obtain medical treatment for her.
C.  Chief Owens 
The only claim remaining against Chief Owens is a claim
alleging that he negligently failed to train and supervise
Department employees including Watkins, Rosser, and the jail
personnel.  It is undisputed that Chief Owens is a State agent
for purposes of the Cranman analysis.   Walker's claims relate
directly to Chief Owens's "formulating plans, policies, or
designs;" 
and 
"exercising 
his 
... 
judgment 
in 
the
administration of a department or agency of government,
1090431
60
including, 
but 
not 
limited 
to, 
... 
hiring, 
firing,
transferring, 
assigning, 
or 
supervising 
personnel"; 
therefore,
Chief Owens's actions fall squarely within the first two
categories identified in Cranman.  Chief Owens has, therefore,
shown that he is entitled to immunity.  The burden then shifts
to Walker to show that Chief Owens acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his
authority.  No evidence in the record supports such a finding.
Accordingly, Chief Owens is immune from liability on Walker's
claim against him for negligence in failing to train or
supervise Department employees. The trial court, therefore,
correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of Chief Owens
on Walker's claim of negligent failure to train and/or
supervise. 
D.  The City's Liability for the Conduct of Chief Owens
As a result of our determination that Chief Owens is
immune from liability on Walker's claim against him alleging
negligence in failing to train or supervise Department
employees, the City likewise is immune from liability on
Walker's claims based on Chief Owens's conduct.  See City of
Bayou La Batre.  The trial court, therefore, correctly entered
1090431
61
a summary judgment in favor of the City on Walker's claim
alleging Chief Owens's negligent failure to train and/or
supervise.
E.
The City's Liability for Acts of Detention Personnel
Walker asserts additional claims against the City based
on the acts of the detention officers and the jail nurse on
duty during Walker's detention.  Regarding the detention
officers and the jail nurse, Walker argues that the trial
court erred in considering the City's second motion for a
summary judgment addressing the claims related to them
because, she argues, the motion was untimely.  The parties
dispute whether that second motion related to a new issue
raised in Walker's reply to the City's first motion for a
summary judgment or to issues Walker had previously argued.
In any event, the transcript of the summary-judgment hearing
shows that, although Walker objected, her counsel responded to
the substance of the City's arguments.  Additionally, the
trial court twice asked Walker's counsel whether she wanted
more time to respond in writing to the City's second motion,
but Walker's counsel did not respond affirmatively.  In its
order, the trial court concluded that Walker "had adequate
1090431
62
time to address the issues in the [City's] second motion for
summary judgment and had amply addressed those same issues in
her opposition brief filed [previously]."
This Court has stated:
"It is ... well settled 'that a party may not induce
an error by the trial court and then attempt to win
a reversal based on that error. "A party may not
predicate an argument for reversal on 'invited
error,' that is, 'error into which he has led or
lulled the trial court.'"'  Mobile Infirmary Med.
Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 808 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Atkins v. Lee, 603 So. 2d 937, 945 (Ala.
1992), quoting in turn Dixie Highway Express, Inc.
v. Southern Ry., 286 Ala. 646, 651, 244 So. 2d 591,
595 (1971))."
White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042,
1057 (Ala. 2008). If the trial court erred in considering the
City's second summary-judgment motion, Walker invited that
error by failing to ask the trial court for more time to
respond when she had the opportunity to do so.  We will not
reverse the trial court's judgment on this ground.
We note that Walker did not name either the detention
officers or the jail nurse as defendants in this action.
However, this Court has stated:
"The vicarious liability of a putative master
under the rule of respondeat superior depends upon
the liability of the putative servant. See Larry
Terry Contractors, Inc. v. Bogle, 404 So. 2d 613,
1090431
63
614 
(Ala. 
1981) 
...; 
 
Franklin 
v. 
City 
of
Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1995) (holding that
a city could not be held vicariously liable for the
act of a magistrate who was immune from liability).
Thus, if a putative servant is not liable, either
because he is innocent or because he is immune, no
liability exists to be visited upon the putative
master under the rule of respondeat superior. Id."
Hollis, 885 So. 2d at 141-42.  See also City of Bayou La
Batre, supra.  Therefore, because the liability of a master,
in this case the City, is contingent on the liability of its
servants, i.e., the detention officers and the jail nurse, we
will consider whether those agents would be entitled to State-
agent immunity under Cranman if they had been named as
defendants. 
1.  The Detention Officers
Walker alleges against the City claims of negligence, and
the tort of outrage based on the acts of the detention
officers, specifically based on the detention officers'
failure to provide Walker with medical care.  Walker argues
that the detention officers are not peace officers within the
meaning of § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, because, she argues,
they were not police officers and did not have the powers
1090431
Section 6-5-338(a) states in full:
6
"Every peace officer, except constables, who is
employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution
or statutes of this state, whether appointed or
employed as such peace officer by the state or a
county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or
institution, 
corporate 
or 
otherwise, 
created
pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state
and authorized by the Constitution or laws to
appoint or employ police officers or other peace
officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by
the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,
include the enforcement of, or the investigation and
reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of
this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take
into custody persons who violate, or who are
lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other
lawful process, with violations of, the criminal
laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as such shall have
immunity from tort liability arising out of his or
her conduct in performance of any discretionary
function within the line and scope of his or her law
enforcement duties."
(Emphasis added.)
64
listed in § 6-5-338(a).   To support this argument, Walker
6
relies on Ex parte Shelley, [Ms. 1080588, Sept. 18, 2009], ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2009), and Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.
2d 201 (Ala. 2003).
In Shelley, this Court determined that a sheriff's jailer
was not entitled to State immunity as an alter ego of a
constitutional officer under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution
1090431
65
of 1901.  This Court did not address whether a municipal
detention officer may be entitled to State-agent immunity
under Cranman.  Therefore, this Court's decision in Shelley
has no bearing on the question Walker presents in this case.
In Howard, this Court determined that a city police
officer who was working as a "jailer/dispatcher" was
performing law-enforcement duties.  In a footnote, this Court
expressly declined to answer the question "whether the
immunity afforded by § 6-5-338(a) applies to a city-jail guard
who is not a regular municipal police officer."  887 So. 2d at
204 n.1.  We now hold that a municipal jailer who lacks the
authority of a police officer cannot claim immunity under
concepts applicable to the immunity of a State agent under
§ 6-5-338(a), which requires that the individual be "empowered
by the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and
to take into custody persons who violate, or who are lawfully
charged by warrant, indictment, or other lawful process, with
violations of, the criminal laws of this state."  The
detention officers in this proceeding, unlike the jailer in
Howard, did not, according to the evidence before us, have
such authority.  We conclude that the detention officers at
1090431
66
the City's jail are not entitled to immunity as peace officers
under § 6-5-338(a) or as State agents under Cranman.
2.  The Jail Nurse
Walker asserts a claim of negligence against the City
based on the actions of the jail nurse.  The defendants argue
that the jail nurse is entitled to State-agent immunity under
Cranman.  Walker argues that the jail nurse was not entitled
to State-agent immunity, citing Wilson v. Manning, 880 So. 2d
1101 (Ala. 2003).  Although there was some question regarding
whether the jail nurse was employed by the City or by a local
hospital, none of the evidence in the record shows that the
jail nurse was an employee of the State.  The record on appeal
contains little evidence regarding the duties of the jail
nurse.  Of that evidence, nothing shows that the jail nurse
was employed or appointed as a peace officer or that he or she
exercised the duties of a peace officer identified in § 6-5-
338(a), such as the enforcement of or the investigation of
criminal laws.  See note 6, supra.  The jail nurse, therefore,
was not a State employee, nor was he or she an officer of the
State under 6-5-338.  Accordingly, the jail nurse is not
1090431
67
entitled to immunity as a peace officer under § 6-5-338(a) or
as a State agent under Cranman.
F.  Additional Claims Against the City
Walker asserts three final claims against the City:
malicious prosecution, the tort of outrage, and invasion of
privacy, all based on the City's continued prosecution of
Walker after she provided proof of her medical condition.  All
three claims alleging intentional torts are barred under § 11-
47-190, which limits the liability of a municipality to
injuries "suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or
unskillfulness of some agent."
In Neighbors v. City of Birmingham, 384 So. 2d 113 (Ala.
1980), this Court held that a city could not be held liable
for malicious prosecution.  The Court reasoned: "Section
11-47-190 remains the pertinent legislative enactment. It
limits the liability of municipalities to injuries suffered
through 'neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness.'  To
construe that language to include an action for malicious
prosecution would be to expand the words beyond their normal
meaning. This we decline to do."  384 So. 2d at 114.  This
Court expressly affirmed that holding in Franklin v. City of
1090431
68
Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848, 852 (Ala. 1995)("This court
therefore affirms the holding of Neighbors ... that a
municipality is immune from a malicious prosecution claim
....").  Accordingly, under § 11-47-190, the City cannot be
held liable on Walker's claim of malicious prosecution, and
the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment for the
City on that claim.
Regarding the tort of outrage, this Court has stated:
"In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant's conduct '(1) was intentional or
reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3)
caused 
emotional 
distress 
so 
severe 
that 
no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.'
Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.
2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990)"
 
Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000).  The tort of
outrage is, therefore, an intentional tort.  Because the City,
under § 11-47-190, may be liable only for acts of neglect,
carelessness or unskillfulness, the trial court correctly
entered a summary judgment for the City on Walker's tort-of-
outrage claim.
Finally, it is undisputed that Walker's claim of invasion
of privacy is based on the City's allegedly putting her in a
false light by proceeding with its prosecution of her.
1090431
69
"This Court has stated the following regarding
a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a
false light:
"'"'One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is
subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if
"'"'(a) the false light in which
the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and
"'"'(b) the actor had knowledge
of or acted in reckless disregard
as 
to 
the 
falsity 
of 
the
publicized matter and the false
light in which the other would be
placed.'"'
"Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 12 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound
Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178, 180 (Ala. 1993), quoting
in turn Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E
(1977))."
S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So. 2d 72, 9 (Ala. 2006)
(emphasis added).  Because this claim requires proof that the
City's agent acted knowingly or recklessly, it also falls
outside those acts of neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness
for which the City may be liable under § 11-47-190.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered a summary
judgment in the City's favor on this claim as well.
1090431
70
Based on the foregoing, the City is not immune from
liability on Walker's claim against it based on the alleged
negligence of the jail nurse.  However, Walker's remaining
claims against the City, Chief Owens, and Officers Watkins and
Rosser are barred under the doctrines of State-agent and
municipal immunity, and the trial court correctly entered a
summary judgment on those claims.
IV.  Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Claims Not Barred by
Immunity
The trial court entered a summary judgment on all claims,
including Walker's claim against the City based on the alleged
negligence of the detention officers and the jail nurse.
Because, as previously noted, the City is not entitled to
assert the defense of immunity as to claims stemming from the
conduct of the detention officers and the jail nurse,
resolution of the appeal as to this claim involves substantive
principles of tort law.  
In her principal brief on appeal, Walker fails to cite
authority regarding the substantive principles of tort law
applicable 
to 
her 
claim--either general 
principles 
of
negligence applicable to the detention officers or more
1090431
In her reply brief, Walker cites two cases regarding the
7
general proposition that the existence of proximate causation
is generally a question for a jury: Swanstrom v. Teledyne
Continental Motors, Inc., [Ms. 1080269, Nov. 20, 2009] ___ So.
3d ___ (Ala. 2009), and Norris v. City of Montgomery, 821 So.
2d 149 (Ala. 2001).  However, we do not consider the argument
presented for the first time in the reply brief.  See Lloyd
Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 906 So. 2d 157, 173 (Ala. 2005) ("It
is a well-established principle of appellate review that we
will not consider an issue not raised in an appellant's
initial brief, but raised only in the reply brief.").
71
specific principles of medical negligence as might be
applicable to the jail nurse.  Walker cites cases for the
proposition that mental-anguish damages are available to her.
See Slack v. Stream, 988 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 2008), and Horton
Homes, Inc. v. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44 (Ala. 2001).  However,
she cites no authority to support the antecedent proposition
that the detention officers and the jail nurse are liable to
her for such damages.7
This Court has stated:
"Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that
arguments in an appellant's brief contain 'citations
to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts
of the record relied on.'  Further, 'it is well
settled 
that 
a 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of
authority in support of the arguments presented
provides this Court with a basis for disregarding
those arguments.' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 822 (Ala. 2005) (citing Ex
parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001)).
This is so, because '"it is not the function of this
1090431
72
Court to do a party's legal research or to make and
address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by
sufficient authority or argument."' Butler v. Town
of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes
v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala.
1994))."
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9
(Ala. 2007) (emphasis added).  Walker has not supported her
arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of her
negligence claim with citation to authority as required by
Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P.  Accordingly, Walker has not shown
that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment as
to her claim against the City for the alleged negligence of
the detention officers and the jail nurse.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly entered
a summary judgment for the defendants as to all of Walker's
state-law claims.  We, therefore, affirm the trial court's
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
and Shaw, JJ., concur.  
Murdock, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs
in the result.
1090431
73
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).  
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion in all
respects.  I concur in all respects with the rationale stated
in the main opinion except as to the issue discussed in
Part III.A. of the analysis section of the opinion.  See
Ex parte Monroe County Bd. of Educ., [Ms. 1090387, May 14,
2010] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2010) (Murdock, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Watson, 37 So. 3d
752, 765 (Ala. 2009) (Murdock, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).