Case Title: Board of Supervisors v. McDonald's Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 001484

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz and 
Lemons, JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 001484      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 20, 2001 
MCDONALD’S CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the trial court’s review of 
the decision of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 
(“Board”) to deny Special Exception Application SE 96-H-032 
(“SE application”) filed by McDonald’s Corporation, Bishop 
Properties, L.L.C., and Bishop Properties II, L.L.C.  
Specifically, we address the trial court’s determination that 
the Board’s action was invalid because the denial of the SE 
application was discriminatory. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
McDonald’s is the lessee of approximately 1.20 acres of 
property (“McDonald’s” or “subject property”) located at the 
intersection of Colts Neck Road and Glade Drive in Reston, a 
planned community in Fairfax County.  Since December 31, 1995, 
McDonald’s has been operating a fast food restaurant at this 
location. 
 
On January 13, 1965, the Board approved a rezoning 
application, which rezoned approximately 141 acres in the 
Reston area of Fairfax County, to a Residential Planned 
Community zoning district.1  The RPC zoning classification was 
subsequently replaced by the Planned Residential Community 
(“PRC”) zoning district on August 14, 1978.  According to 
Fairfax County (“County”) Zoning Ordinance2 § 6-301, rezoning 
and development in a PRC “will be permitted only in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan and development plan” approved by 
the Board. 
 
On July 22, 1970, the Board approved a development plan 
for the “Southern Sector [of] Reston,” which was to include a 
village center, now known as Hunters Woods Village Center 
(“HWVC”).  Under the terms of Zoning Ordinance § 6-302(C), a 
village center: 
[S]hould be a central location for activity of 
retail, community and leisure uses on a scale 
serving a number of neighborhoods.  A village 
center should be easily accessible to both 
vehicles and pedestrians.  Within such a 
center, the primary emphasis should be on the 
pedestrian circulation system.  A village 
center should contain uses such as professional 
offices, a supermarket, a hardware store, 
specialty shops and other [listed] uses. 
 
HWVC currently includes Hunters Woods Village shopping center 
(“HWVSC”), an Exxon gas station, and McDonald’s. 
                     
1 Included in these 141 acres was the subject property, as 
well as land which now contains the Hunters Woods Village 
shopping center and the Hunters Square residential 
development.  The Hunters Woods Village shopping center 
consists of 15.28 acres, while the Hunters Square residential 
development contains 12.0 acres.   
 
2
 
The subject property is triangular in shape and is 
physically separated from HWVSC and the Exxon station by Colts 
Neck Road, an undivided four-lane road that runs along the 
east side of McDonald’s.  Glade Road is a four-lane divided 
road that runs along the southern border of the subject 
property.  McDonald’s remaining border abuts the edge of 
Hunters Square townhouse community (“Hunters Square”).  To the 
north of Hunters Square is the Hunters Crossing multi-family 
development (“Hunters Crossing”).3
 
On September 17, 1974, a Non-Residential Use Permit 
(“Non-RUP”) was granted for a fast food establishment, known 
as Jack In The Box, on the subject property.  Subsequent Non-
RUPs were granted on September 1, 1982, for a Popeye’s fast 
food restaurant, and on January 2, 1996, for McDonald’s. 
 
Under the terms of the Zoning Ordinance in effect since 
August 1978, a fast food restaurant with drive-through 
facilities is permissible in a PRC zoning district if the 
restaurant is specifically displayed as a drive-through fast 
                                                                
2 Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance will be referred to as 
“Zoning Ordinance.” 
3 On March 1, 1976, the Board permitted residential 
townhouse development immediately adjacent to the subject 
property.  This development is known as Hunters Square.  On 
November 1, 1982, the Board approved a development plan 
amendment permitting 92 single-family attached or multi-family 
units to be built to the west of Colts Neck Road and north of 
the subject property.  This development is known as Hunters 
Crossing.   
 
3
food restaurant on a development plan approved by the Board.  
Additionally, if the development plan merely references 
commercial use in a designated village center, the drive-
through facilities may be permitted upon obtaining a special 
exception or approval of an amended development plan. 
 
On June 19, 1996, McDonald’s filed a SE application with 
the Board, in which it proposed to add a drive-through 
facility to its restaurant on the subject property.4  The 
proposed drive-through would add 75 square feet to the 
existing restaurant for a total of 2,515 square feet.  An 
October 23, 1996 Staff Report prepared by County staff 
recommended approval of the SE application subject to proposed 
development conditions. Prior to a Planning Commission 
hearing on the application scheduled for November 6, 1996, 
McDonald’s requested permission to defer the application to 
allow it “time to address the civic concerns that were raised 
and to work with additional citizens to obtain their support.”  
                     
4 On the same date, McDonald’s filed a corresponding 
variance application, VC 96-H-091, requesting permission for 
22 parking spaces to remain 6.5 feet from the front property 
line adjacent to Ridgehampton Court.  Current regulations 
require that these parking spaces be more than 10 feet from 
the property line.  Zoning Ordinance § 11-102(8).  Although 
these spaces are pre-existing and the SE application did not 
propose changing them, the County requires that an existing 
condition be brought into conformance with current 
regulations, or a variance obtained, when a special exception 
is approved.  The Board of Zoning Appeals has deferred the 
 
4
The request was granted and the application was reactivated in 
May 1997.  Several modifications were made to the original SE 
application to address concerns that were raised in the 
October 23, 1996 Staff Report.5  On October 22, 1997, the 
County staff issued another Staff Report recommending approval 
of the modified SE application, subject to proposed 
development conditions.  On November 5, 1997, the Planning 
Commission voted unanimously to recommend to the Board that it 
deny the SE application. 
 
The Board held a hearing on the application on December 
8, 1997.  After testimony from several witnesses, the Board 
voted unanimously to deny McDonald’s SE application. 
 
On the same day, the Board voted to approve DPA A-936-3, 
an application by Hunters Woods Village Center, L.L.C., the 
owner of HWVC, to amend the development plan approved by the 
Board in 1965.  That application proposed demolition of the 
existing shopping center, excluding the gas station, and 
construction of a new, 123,000 square foot shopping center and 
48 single-family attached residential units.  Also, the 
                                                                
consideration of the variance application until resolution of 
the SE application.   
5 These modifications included, “a second building 
addition to replace the proposed speaker post voice ordering 
system; a modification of the limits of clearing to reflect 
the deletion of retaining walls along the drive-thru aisle 
and; a reformulation of the landscape plan to include more 
tree-save on the site.”   
 
5
application requested three drive-through facilities, 
including one for a free-standing Burger King restaurant. 
 
Other applications approved by the Board on December 8, 
1997 included three special exceptions requested by Tall Oaks 
Village Center, L.L.C., the owner of the Tall Oaks Village 
shopping center (“TOVSC”).6  One of these applications, SE 97-
H-049, requested approval of a drive-through fast food 
restaurant. 
 
On June 1, 1999, McDonald’s filed a Second Amended Bill 
of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief 
against the Board.7  McDonald’s sought a declaration that the 
Board’s denial of its SE application violated state law 
because such action was discriminatory and without a rational 
basis, a declaration that McDonald’s has a right to construct 
and operate a drive-through window on the subject property, 
and an injunction preventing the Board and the County from 
interfering with its use of the subject property.  
Specifically, McDonald’s alleged that the Board’s denial was 
discriminatory because the Board approved drive-through fast 
food restaurants for HWVSC and TOVSC.  McDonald’s contended 
                     
6 TOVSC is a Reston village shopping center located over 
two miles to the northeast of HWVC.   
7 McDonald’s originally filed a Bill of Complaint on 
January 7, 1998.  The Board filed a demurrer on February 13, 
1998.  After the trial court, on April 3, 1998, granted in 
 
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that “[t]here is no demonstrated real difference that 
distinguishes the [subject property] from the Hunters Woods 
and Tall Oaks approvals that justify preferring these sites to 
the [subject property].” 
 
A bench trial was held on September 27-30, 1999 and 
October 14, 1999.  Additionally, the trial court and counsel 
viewed the subject property on September 28, 1999.  On January 
27, 2000, the trial court issued an opinion letter, stating 
that the evidence clearly demonstrated that McDonald’s was 
“subjected to [] different and irrational treatment” by the 
Board.  The trial court stated that the Board’s denial of the 
application “loses all credibility when the same factors cited 
by the Board [in denying the application] are waived or 
ignored in connection with the approval of the Tall Oaks and 
HWSC applications.” 
 
The trial court issued a Final Decree, incorporating its 
letter opinion, on March 15, 2000.  In the Final Decree, the 
trial court declared invalid the Board’s denial of McDonald’s 
SE application and enjoined the Board from taking any action 
“that would disallow McDonald’s right to construct and operate 
a drive-through window on the subject property consistent with 
                                                                
part the Board’s demurrer, McDonald’s filed the Second Amended 
Bill of Complaint.  
 
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McDonald’s application,” subject to imposition of reasonable 
development conditions. 
 
On appeal, the Board contends that the trial court erred 
in ruling that the denial of McDonald’s SE application was 
“discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious.”  The Board 
maintains that the two shopping centers utilized by the trial 
court for comparison were not similarly situated to the 
McDonald’s site and that the Board’s decision was based upon 
“numerous rational bases.”  Further, the Board argues that the 
trial court erred in misapplication of the “fairly debatable 
standard.”  Finally, the Board alleges that the trial court 
erred in permitting McDonald’s to amend its SE application 
during the trial and in finding that the SE application 
satisfied zoning ordinance requirements. 
 
McDonald’s assigns no cross-error and urges affirmance of 
the trial court’s ruling. 
II. Standard of Review 
 
When a governing body of any locality reserves unto 
itself the right to issue special exceptions, the grant or 
denial of such exceptions is a legislative function.  Cole v. 
City Council of Waynesboro, 218 Va. 827, 837, 241 S.E.2d 765, 
771 (1978).  A legislative action “is presumed to be valid.” 
City Council of Virginia Beach v. Harrell, 236 Va. 99, 101, 
372 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1988).  On appeal, we review the decision 
 
8
of the trial court to reverse the Board’s denial of McDonald’s 
SE application with this principle in mind.  As we have 
previously stated: 
[W]e accord the court’s finding, as with the 
usual case, a presumption of correctness, but 
we also give full credit to the presumption of 
validity of the legislative action involved in 
the denial and then, assimilating the two 
presumptions, we examine the record to 
determine whether the evidence sustains the 
court’s finding.  In other words, the 
presumption of validity of legislative action 
does not disappear when a trial court finds 
that the action is unreasonable; the 
presumption accompanies the legislative action 
when the latter is brought to this court for 
review, and it is viable until this court holds 
with the trial court that the legislative 
action is unreasonable. 
 
Board of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34-35, 267 S.E.2d 
100, 103 (1980)(internal citation omitted). 
III. Analysis 
 
 
Despite multiple issues advanced by the Board on appeal, 
we need only focus upon the narrow issue identified by the 
trial court as the basis for its judgment.  The trial court 
stated: 
 
The question presented here is not whether 
the Board’s decision on the McDonald’s drive-
through standing alone is fairly debatable.  
Rather, the question is: When viewed with the 
Board’s contemporaneous decisions granting the 
applications of HWSC and Tall Oaks, is the 
Board’s denial of the McDonald’s application 
unlawfully discriminatory?  If so, has the 
Board demonstrated a rational basis for that 
discrimination? 
 
9
 
The trial court found that “[t]he Tall Oaks and Hunters Woods 
Village Centers are similarly situated” to the McDonald’s site 
and that the denial of McDonald’s SE application was 
“inconsistent and discriminatory.” 
 
The presumption of legislative validity that attaches to 
the Board’s decision is a presumption of reasonableness.  When 
presumptive reasonableness “is challenged by probative 
evidence of unreasonableness, the challenge must be met by 
evidence of reasonableness.”  Board of Supervisors v. Jackson, 
221 Va. 328, 333, 269 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1980).  If the evidence 
of reasonableness is sufficient to make the question fairly 
debatable, the zoning action must be upheld upon judicial 
review.  Id.  If the evidence of reasonableness is 
insufficient, the presumption of reasonableness is overcome 
and the zoning action cannot be sustained.  Board of 
Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659, 202 
S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974).  An issue is said to be fairly 
debatable “when the evidence offered in support of the 
opposing views would lead objective and reasonable persons to 
reach different conclusions.”  Board of Supervisors v. 
Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975). 
 
Applying these general principles in Board of Supervisors 
v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975), we recognized 
 
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that evidence bearing on the subject of reasonableness may 
include evidence of discriminatory treatment.  Holding that 
Allman had overcome the presumption of legislative validity, 
we noted that: 
His evidence established a course of action by 
the Board that was inconsistent and 
discriminatory.  A discriminatory action is an 
arbitrary and a capricious action, and bears no 
reasonable or substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare.  The reasonableness of the Board’s 
action is not fairly debatable, and it will not 
be sustained. 
 
Id. at 445, 211 S.E.2d at 55. 
 
Discrimination in zoning decisions is impermissible if it 
is unjustified.  Justification may be found “if there is a 
rational basis for the action alleged to be discriminatory.”  
County Board of Arlington v. Bratic, 237 Va. 221, 229-30, 377 
S.E.2d 368, 372 (1989).  See also County of Lancaster v. 
Cowardin, 239 Va. 522, 527, 391 S.E.2d 267, 269-70 (1990). 
Thus, for the purpose of considering whether an issue is 
fairly debatable, a “rational basis” is synonymous with 
“reasonableness.”  Clearly, impermissible discrimination in 
zoning actions is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.  
Consequently, a decision resulting in impermissible 
discrimination is not fairly debatable, and will not be 
sustained upon judicial review. 
 
11
 
To sustain a claim of impermissible discrimination, the 
party contesting the zoning action must show that “a land use 
permitted to one landowner is restricted to another similarly 
situated.”  Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 140, 
216 S.E.2d 199, 209 (1975).  Thereafter, the governing body 
must show that “there is a rational basis for the action 
alleged to be discriminatory.”  Bratic, 237 Va. at 229-30, 377 
S.E.2d at 372.  That the properties in question are adjacent 
to one another is insufficient alone to establish a zoning 
discrimination claim.  Helmick v. Town of Warrenton, 254 Va. 
225, 231, 492 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1997). 
 
Upon review of the extensive record in this case, we hold 
that the trial court erred in determining that HWVSC and TOVSC 
were similarly situated to the McDonald’s site.  The following 
are among the factors that distinguish the subject property 
from the comparison sites: 
 
1. 
The subject property is a free-standing parcel of 
only 1.2 acres, whereas HWVSC is a shopping center with 15.28 
acres and TOVSC is a shopping center with 7.46 acres. 
 
2. 
The subject property is a single use site, whereas 
the shopping centers are multiple use sites. 
 
3. 
In contrast to the subject property, fast food 
restaurants with drive-through facilities in the HWVSC site 
and TOVSC site are not directly accessed from public roads.  
 
12
Service roads within the shopping centers serve to mitigate 
traffic congestion, whereas no such relief is possible at the 
subject property. 
 
4. 
HWVSC has three separate locations of entrance and 
exit. TOVSC has two separate entrance and exit locations.  By 
contrast, due to the size, configuration, and location of the 
subject property close to the intersection of Colts Neck Road 
and Glade Drive, the subject property has an entrance/exit on 
Colts Neck Road, but only an exit on Glade Drive.  Because the 
shopping centers have more than one entrance, there are 
alternatives to potential traffic blockage or congestion at a 
particular entrance.  Such alternatives are not available at 
the subject property. 
 
5. 
The entrance to the subject property is only 265 
feet from the intersection of Colts Neck Road and Glade Drive.  
The northern entrance to HWVSC, which is closest to the drive-
through facility, is approximately 1200 feet from the 
intersection.  At the TOVSC location, the entrance/exit 
locations are 670 feet and “about 940 feet” from the nearest 
intersection at North Shore Drive and Wiehle Avenue. 
 
6. 
Estimated “vehicle trips” differ greatly between the 
sites.  The subject property with a drive-through window was 
estimated to serve 539 vehicles per day per thousand square 
feet of gross floor area, whereas the estimate of “vehicle 
 
13
trips” was 62 per day per thousand square feet of gross floor 
area at HWVSC. 
 
7. 
Visual screening requirements for the sites differ 
significantly.  The subject property is controlled by “Zoning 
Ordinance Screening Matrix Transition 3” which requires a 50-
foot wide vegetated buffer.  McDonald’s SE application 
proposed to modify the buffer to 6.5 feet, a proposed 
reduction of 87 percent, along its northwestern border with 
the Hunters Square residential community.  The application 
proposed to modify the buffer to 14.5 feet, a proposed 
reduction of 71 percent, along its southern border with the 
Machaans Cluster townhouse community across Glade Drive.  By 
contrast, the drive-through facility at HWVSC is subject to a 
different screening matrix altogether (“Transitional Screening 
2” requiring a 35-foot wide vegetated buffer) which had been 
subject to waiver of 32 percent.  The TOVSC drive-through 
facility had no screening requirement applicable to it. 
 
8. 
In contrast to the comparison sites, only the 
subject property required a variance to meet the Zoning 
Ordinance parking requirements.  The McDonald’s parking lot is 
just 6.5 feet from the Hunters Square residential property and 
98 feet from the nearest residence.  By contrast, the parking 
lot at the Burger King at HWVSC is 140 feet from the nearest 
residence in Hunters Crossing and is separated from the 
 
14
residential community by a four-lane highway.  The parking 
facilities at TOVSC are 239 feet from the nearest residences. 
 
Having determined that the trial court erred in finding 
HWVSC and TOVSC to be similarly situated to the McDonald’s 
site, it is unnecessary to consider the Board’s justification 
for treating the parcels differently.  Similarly, it is 
unnecessary to address any of the Board’s remaining 
assignments of error.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment for the 
Board. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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