Case Title: Marquess v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0172

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
GARY DALE MARQUESS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 95Case Number: No. S-10-0172Decided: 06/17/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

GARY 
DALE MARQUESS,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. Young, Faculty Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Frint.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Gary Marquess 
(the appellant) was tried and convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and 
battery, battery, kidnapping, and being a habitual criminal.  The appellant appeals from the Judgment 
and Sentence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it 
admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct and prior consistent statements by the 
victim.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The parties 
raise two issues in this appeal.  
Because of our disposition of the second issue we add a third issue to 
the statement of issues.

 
 

1.      
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the events 
that occurred on March 1, 2009?

 
 

2.      
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence a 911 
recording under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)?

 
 

3.      
Was 
the 911 recording admissible under W.R.E. 802(2) as an excited 
utterance?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The victim and 
the appellant met while they were in jail.  
The series of events leading to the appellant's arrest, trial, 
conviction, and current appeal occurred following his and the victim's release 
from jail.  On Friday, February 27, 
2009, the appellant, the appellant's brother, and the victim got together and 
drank alcohol and smoked methamphetamine.  
The three men spent the night at the victim's hotel room.  The next day, Saturday, February 28, 
2009, the three got together again, consumed alcohol, and again spent the night 
in the victim's hotel room.

 
 
[¶4]      The victim 
testified that on Sunday, March 1, 2009, the appellant asked him about whether 
he had access to any guns because the appellant needed one "to do some 
dirt."  The victim responded that 
his parents owned guns and that he could get a gun for the appellant.  Later that evening the three men went to 
a trailer home owned by the appellant's friend.  The victim testified that upon arriving 
at the trailer home the victim stayed in the front family room while the 
appellant and the appellant's brother made their way to a room located at the 
back of the residence.  A short time 
later, the victim was summoned to the rear of the trailer by an acquaintance of 
the victim who asked if the victim was the guy "that knows where to get 
guns."  Once the victim made his way 
to the rear of the trailer, he was ambushed and held at knife point by the 
appellant, the appellant's brother, and the acquaintance, who accused the victim 
of being a confidential informant, or "nark."  After some discussion between the armed 
men and the victim, a third party intervened, the situation de-escalated, and 
the men left the residence.  The men 
drove to the victim's hotel room where the appellant and the appellant's brother 
continued discussing the need to obtain guns.  The three men once again spent the night 
in the victim's motel room.

 
 
[¶5]      On Monday, March 
2, 2009, the victim spent most of the morning with the appellant and the 
appellant's brother in the victim's hotel room.  That afternoon, the appellant and the 
appellant's brother dropped the victim off at his parents' house.  The victim testified that when the 
appellant dropped him off, the victim knew that the appellant wanted him to 
steal guns from his parents' house.  
After the victim spent several hours at his parents' house, his mother 
drove the victim back to his motel room around 9:00 p.m.  The victim entered his hotel room to 
find the appellant and the appellant's brother waiting for him.  The appellant asked the victim whether 
he had any guns for him, to which the victim responded that he did not.  The victim testified that the appellant 
then became very upset, made the victim sit in a chair, and struck the victim in 
the face.  The victim also testified 
that the appellant was holding a knife during the altercation and made 
threatening remarks regarding the victim's parents.  At some point, the victim stood up from 
the chair and the appellant punched and kneed the victim and slashed him in the 
face with the knife.  The appellant 
then left the room to go to the parking lot to get plastic bags, duct tape, and 
rope from the appellant's brother's truck.  
The victim attempted to escape through a window, but was stopped by the 
appellant's brother.  Shortly after 
the appellant returned to the room, the victim escaped through the window.  The victim ran to the hotel office where 
he locked himself in the manager's office and called 911.

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant was 
arrested the next morning and charged with two counts of aggravated assault and 
battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i)(b) (LexisNexis 2009), 
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i)(b), § 6-1-303(a), and § 6-1-304, and kidnapping in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a)(iii), (b)(i), (d).  The State later filed an Amended 
Information including reference to the habitual offender statute found at Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(i)(b)(ii).1  The appellant was tried on January 25, 
2010.  The jury found the appellant 
guilty of aggravated assault and battery, simple battery, and kidnapping.  The jury returned a not guilty verdict 
regarding the conspiracy charge.  
Following a separate jury trial relating to the habitual offender status, 
the jury found the appellant guilty, and the district court decreed habitual 
offender status as it related to the aggravated assault and battery charge and 
the kidnapping charge.  Several 
months later the district court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment for 
the aggravated assault and battery conviction, 180 days for the battery 
conviction, and life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction.2  The district court ordered the 
convictions to run concurrently.  
The appellant timely appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the events 
that occurred on March 1, 2009?

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony 
relating to the incident on the night of Sunday, March 1, 2009, when the 
appellant, the appellant's brother, and an acquaintance allegedly held the 
victim at knife point.  
Specifically, the appellant argues that this testimony was uncharged 
misconduct evidence, governed by W.R.E. 404(b)3, the State failed to provide 
adequate notice of its intent to use such evidence, and the district court 
failed to order a Gleason hearing 
relating to the evidence.  The State 
counters that this evidence was not governed by W.R.E. 404(b) because it was 
direct evidence of one of the crimes charged, namely conspiracy.  In the alternative, the State argues 
that the evidence would have been admitted under W.R.E. 404(b) as "course of 
conduct" evidence.

 
 
[¶8]      Although the 
appellant made no contemporaneous objection to the admission of the evidence, he 
submitted a pre-trial demand for notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  Generally, when there is 
an objection to the admission of evidence, we review the admission of that 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.  
Nelson v. State, 2010 WY 159, ¶ 29, 245 P.3d 282, 289 (Wyo. 2010).  We have recognized that a pre-trial 
demand for notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence will act as a timely 
objection to the admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence at trial.  Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).  However, as will be discussed below, we 
do not in this case consider the disputed evidence to be uncharged misconduct 
evidence, but instead direct evidence of one of the crimes charged.  Consequently, the pre-trial demand for 
notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence did not substitute for a 
contemporaneous objection at trial to admission of the 
evidence.

 
 
[¶9]      Because the 
appellant failed to object at trial to admission of the disputed evidence, we 
will review his claim for plain error.  
Sweet v. State, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 22, 234 P.3d 1193, 1202 (Wyo. 
2010).  "Plain error exists when: 
1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming 
error was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.'"  Id. (quoting Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 19, 228 P.3d 874, 882 (Wyo. 
2010)).  "The appellant bears the 
burden of proving plain error."  Christensen v. State, 2010 WY 95, ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1229, 1230 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 
[¶10]   The first prong of plain error is 
met because the record clearly reflects testimony by the victim regarding the 
incident when the victim was held at knife point by the appellant and the other 
two men.  As for the second 
prongwhether there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
lawthe following has been said regarding the admission of evidence of a 
conspiracy vis-¡-vis a W.R.E. 404(b) 
claim:

 
 
In 
a conspiracy case, "[a]cts committed in furtherance of the charged conspiracy 
are themselves part of the act charged."  
United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 175 (5th Cir. 
1998).  Evidence of such acts is 
therefore intrinsic and simply does not implicate the requirements of 
404(b).  See id.; United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1475 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (quoting 22 charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, 
Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239, at 450 (1978)) ("In cases 
where the incident offered is a part of the conspiracy alleged in the 
indictment, the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) . . . as direct 
evidence of the fact in issue, not as circumstantial evidence requiring an 
inference as to the character of the accused."); United States v. 
Sasser, 971 F.2d 470, 479 
(10th Cir. 1992) (affirming that direct evidence of the charged conspiracy was 
not 404(b) evidence and therefore did not require a limiting instruction on 
evidence of "other acts").

 
 

United 
States v. Green, 
175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Conduct during the life of a conspiracy that is 
evidence of the conspiracy is not Rule 404(b) evidence.").

 
 

[¶11]   In the present case, the Sunday 
night incident was one of many pieces of direct evidence of the conspiracy with 
which the appellant was charged  conspiracy to commit the Monday night 
aggravated assault and battery.  The 
conspirators (the appellant and his brother) were present at both incidents and 
the threats of serious violence, distrust in the victim, and interest in the 
victim stealing the guns were common themes in both the Sunday night incident 
and the Monday night assault.  The 
Sunday night incident was undertaken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy 
and was evidence of an overt act showing an agreement between the conspirators 
to carry out some illegal act (assault and battery) if the victim did not do as 
he was instructed.  As such, we find 
that evidence of the Sunday night incident was not uncharged misconduct 
evidence, but instead was admissible as "an 
inseparable part of the whole deed."  
Hopkinson v. State, 
632 P.2d 79, 127 (Wyo. 1981).  
Accordingly, 
we find that the admission of this evidence did not result in a transgression of 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law, meaning plain error did not occur. 

 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence a 911 
recording under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)?

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant next argues that the 
district court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a 911 
recording as a prior consistent statement under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  We review alleged errors relating to the 
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.  Hutchinson v. Taft, 2010 WY 5, ¶ 27, 222 P.3d 1250, 1257 (Wyo. 
2010).  "We will not disturb such 
rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the district court 
could reasonably conclude as it did."  
Id.

 
 
[¶13]   W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
provides:

 
 
(d)    Statements which are not hearsay.  A 
statement is not hearsay if:

(1)    Prior Statement by Witness.  
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive . . . 
.

 
 
Regarding 
W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), we have held that

 
 
[f]our 
requirements must be satisfied before a prior consistent statement will be 
properly admissible: (1) The declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) the prior 
statement is consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior 
statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant 
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. 

 

Tombroek 
v. State, 
2009 WY 126, ¶ 8, 217 P.3d 806, 810 (Wyo. 2009) 
(quoting Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo. 
2007)).  The appellant concedes that 
the State met its burden with regard to the first three requirements.  Therefore, the only issue before this 
Court is whether the fourth requirementthe prior statement is offered to rebut 
an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motivewas met.  
We have previously said that "[t]he charge of fabrication or improper 
motive need not come only as a specific allegation during cross-examination" and 
may be derived from the "thrust" of the defenses and testimony presented.  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 80, 89 (Wyo. 2002).  Further, we have said that "it is not 
necessarily error that the prior consistent statement was received in evidence 
before the allegation of fabrication or improper motive."  Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d  at 
89.

 
 
[¶14]   The proferred prior consistent 
statement in this case was a recorded 911 call made by the victim almost 
immediately after he jumped out of the window of the hotel room where he was 
beaten and held hostage.  At trial 
and on appeal, the State asserted that the 911 call statements were admissible 
because there had been an implication by the appellant that the victim was 
fabricating his story, or that he could not remember the events accurately 
because he was using drugs and alcohol at the time.  The appellant counters that he never 
alleged recent fabrication, but merely cross-examined the victim and tested his 
recollection of the events.

 
 
[¶15]   Upon reviewing the record before 
us, especially the trial transcripts, we find the appellant's characterization 
more accurately reflects the parties' respective positions below.  While the appellant did attack the 
victim's credibility generally, and also submitted evidence of his prior 
criminal convictions involving lying, the appellant did not, either explicitly 
or implicitly, allege that the victim's testimony was the result of a recent 
fabrication or improper motive or influence.4  "The focus of W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B) is the use of a prior consistent statement as rehabilitation 
of a witness whose credibility has been impeached in 
the particular manner described in the rule." Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 15, 43 P.3d  at 89 
(emphasis added).  A general attack 
on a witness's credibility, without a claim of motive, influence or recent 
fabrication, does not warrant admission of 801(d)(1)(B) 
evidence.

 
 
Ordinarily, 
attacks suggesting untruthful disposition (bad character for truth or veracity), 
or some lack or defect in sensory or mental capacity, do not suggest fabrication, improper 
influence, or motive.  Hence such 
attacks do not usually invite repair by consistent statement, and do not bring 
Fed. R. Evid. 801[(d)(1)](B) into play. 

 

4 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8.39, at 329-30 
(3d ed. 
2007).  (Emphasis in original.)  Likewise, "[i]t has generally been held 
in state prosecutions that mere contradiction of a witness through the testimony 
of other witnesses or through attacks on the witness' reputation for truth or 
veracity are insufficient grounds for the admissibility of the witness' prior 
consistent statement."  Debra T. 
Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of impeached witness' prior consistent 
statementmodern state criminal cases 58 A.L.R.4th 1014. 1025 
(1987).

 
 
[¶16]   In this case, the appellant did not 
explicitly or implicitly claim that the victim's in-court testimony was a recent 
fabrication or the result of some improper motive or influence.5  Without such a claim, the prior 
consistent statement in the 911call did not fall within the purview of 
801(d)(1)(B), and was therefore inadmissible hearsay. 

 

Was 
the 911 recording admissible under W.R.E. 802(2) as an excited 
utterance?

 
 
[¶17]   Although we find that the 911 call 
should not have been admitted as a prior consistent statement, we may affirm a 
district court's decision on any legal ground appearing in the 
record.  Short v. State, 2009 WY 52, ¶ 9, 205 P.3d 195, 198 (Wyo. 2009); 
Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1979).  Upon reviewing the record before us, we 
conclude that the 911 call was admissible under the "excited utterance" 
exception to the hearsay rule.  This 
exception, found in W.R.E. 803(2), provides that statements are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if they relate "to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition."

 
 
The 
exception is founded upon the proposition that a statement made during the 
stress of excitement resulting from a startling event is probably trustworthy, 
since there is not leisure to reflect, contrive or fabricate.  The rule assumes the presence of a 
startling event which temporarily stills the senses and alleviates any motive to 
fabricate.

 
 

Boykin 
v. State, 
2005 WY 15, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 481, 483 (Wyo. 2005) 
(quoting Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 961 (Wyo. 2000)) 
(citations omitted in original).

 
 

This 
Court has identified five factors to be considered in determining the 
admissibility of evidence under the excited utterance exception: 
(1) the nature of the startling event; (2) the declarant's physical 
manifestation of excitement; (3) the declarant's age; (4) the lapse of time 
between the event and the hearsay statement; and (5) whether the statement was 
made in response to an inquiry.  
Boykin, 
¶ 8, 
105 P.3d  at 483. The ultimate inquiry is whether the "declarant's condition at 
the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive 
rather than the product of reflection and deliberation."  Id. (quoting James 
v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo. 1994)).

 
 

Sanchez 
v. State, 
2011 WY 77, ¶ 22, ___ P.3d ___, 
___ (Wyo. 2011).

 
 
[¶18]   In the present case, each of the 
factors weighs in favor of admissibility.  
After being severely beaten, the witness jumped out of a hotel room 
window, ran to the hotel office, and yelled to the front desk employee to call 
911.  The witness described his 
actions as follows:

 
 
Q.    Did you suffer any injuries 
to the best of your knowledge from the jump itself?

 
 
A.    No.  No.  I mean my adrenalin was going.  I mean, I landed and ran -- I ran 
straight for the office.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    And what did you do once you 
got in the office?

 
 
A.    I told the clerk he needed to 
call 911, somebody was trying to kill me and locked myself in the manager's 
office.

 
 
The 
front desk employee, whose testimony was admitted without objection, gave a 
similar account of the events of that night:

 
 
Q.    All right.  And do you recall being asked to contact 
the 911number [sic] that night?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    All right.  And how did that come 
about?

 
 
A.    At that time there was this 
person who rushed into the front desk.  
He had no -- he had no shirt, and he was only wearing his pants, and he 
rushed in.  And he is yelling, 
help.  And he rushed into my boss's 
office.

 
 
Q.    And what did he do in 
there?

 
 
A. 
   So I rushed in, and told him 
to get out of that office, or I am going to call the 
police.

 
 
Q.    Did he 
reply?

 
 
A.    Yes, sir.  He said, yes, call the police, someone 
[sic] trying to kill me and my mom.

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
Q.    Now, you have described his 
appearance.  You said he was 
bloody?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    Where on his body was he 
bloody?

 
 
A.    His nose.  I saw some blood on his nose and in his 
mouth.  There was some blood coming 
out of his mouth, and all over, like maybe he wiped it from.  So and also see, I also wiped some blood 
from my boss's office from the metal -- was that -- cabinets, so it is all over 
his body.

 
 
[¶19]   The first and second elements, 
relating to the shocking or startling nature of the event and the declarant's 
physical manifestation of excitement, favor admission.  In applying these two elements, we look 
to a factually similar case.  In 
Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 
126 (Wyo. 1985), the defendant engaged in a physical 
altercation with his girlfriend.  Id. at 129.  A friend attempted to intervene and the 
defendant began assaulting the friend.  
Id.  The girlfriend ran to a neighbor's 
house and called the police.  Id.  At trial, the neighbor repeated 
statements made by the girlfriend regarding the incident.  Id. at 129-30.  The defendant objected, arguing that the 
statements were hearsay.  Id.  
On appeal, we found that the statements satisfied the "excited 
utterance" exception to the hearsay rule inasmuch as the girlfriend had just 
witnessed, and been involved in, a violent scene, and that the statements were 
made after she "ran screaming across the street bursting' into her neighbor's 
residence . . . ."  Id. at 130.  
In the present case, after the victim had been severely beaten and 
had jumped out a hotel room window, he rushed into the hotel lobby yelling "help," locked himself 
in the office, and told the clerk people were trying to kill him.  In light of our holding in Kelly, it is clear that these facts 
favor admission under the first two factors listed 
above.

 
 

[¶20]   The third factor, the victim's age, is neutral in these 
circumstances.  The fourth factor, 
the lapse between the event and the hearsay statement, favors admission.  Although the record does not reflect the 
exact time between the startling event (being beaten and subsequent escape from 
the hotel room) and the statement, it is not disputed that the appellant went 
directly to the office, told the clerk that people were trying to kill him, and 
asked the clerk to call 911.  We 
find this to be a short enough time period that the victim's statements were 
spontaneous, excited or impulsive and not the product of reflection and 
deliberation.  See Sanchez, 2011 WY 77, ¶ 23, ___ P.3d at ___ 
(still under stress of excitement approximately one hour after being severely 
beaten); Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 927 (Wyo. 1999) (under stress of excitement 45 minutes after startling 
event); United States v. Iron Shell, 
633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir.1980) (under the stress of excitement 45 to 75 minutes 
after startling event).

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, to address the fifth factor, we must determine 
whether the victim's statements were in response to an inquiry.  Although the 911 operator asked the 
victim questions, it was the victim who initiated the statements.  The fact that some of his statements 
were "responses" to the 911 operator's inquiries is not sufficient, under these 
circumstances, to take the statement outside the excited utterance 
exception.  See Boykin, 2005 WY 15, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d  at 484 
(excited utterance admissible even though made in response to question, "Are you 
all right?").

 
 
[¶22]   We conclude that the victim's 
statements here fall within the requirements of the "excited utterance" 
exception of W.R.E. 803(2).  
Therefore, we find that they were properly admitted into 
evidence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   The evidence of the Sunday night 
incident when the appellant and two others threatened the victim at knifepoint 
was not uncharged misconduct evidence inasmuch as it was direct evidence of the 
conspiracy crime charged.  The 
victim's 911 call statements were improperly admitted as prior consistent 
statements under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) because they were not offered to rebut a 
recent charge of fabrication, improper motive or influence.  However, the 911 call statements were 
properly admissible as an excited utterance under W.R.E. 
803(2).

 
 
[¶23]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1A person found to be a habitual offender under the statute is one that is 
convicted of a violent felony and has at least two or more prior felony 
convictions.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-10-201(a)(i)(ii).  A habitual 
offender determination is punishable by life imprisonment if the person has 
three or more previous felony convictions.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(b)(ii).

 
 

2The life sentences for aggravated assault and battery and kidnapping were 
pursuant to the habitual offender statute.  
See supra 
n.1.

 
 

3W.R.E. 404(b) provides:

 
 
            
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence 
it intends to introduce at trial.

 
 

4During argument regarding 
the admissibility of the 911 statements, defense counsel 
stated:

 
 
And we certainly never 
offered a recent fabrication or a motive to lie, we have never offered that, or 
an influence.  Certainly we talked 
about drugs but someone coming to [the witness] and their story changing.  I mean, we have never offered anything 
about that.  We are not contending 
that the story changed, Your Honor. 

 
 

5In Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 22, 43 P.3d 80, 91 
(Wyo. 2002), we undertook a brief discussion concerning a party's contention 
that a prior consistent statement may be admissible even when not offered to 
rebut one of the claims specified in 801(d)(1)(B).  Although we concluded that the prior 
consistent statement was inadmissible in that case, we indicated that this Court 
had adopted a "rather broad interpretation of the use of prior consistent 
statements."  Id.  In a footnote, we then stated: 

 
 
Not all jurisdictions 
follow Wyoming's approach to this issue. Some courts contend that admitting 
prior consistent statements whenever a witness is subject to general impeachment 
has the effect of negating the requirement for an allegation of recent 
fabrication or improper motive.  See Keller v. State, 586 So. 2d 1258, 1259-60 (Fla. App. 1991); State v. Mensing, 297 
Mont. 172, 991 P.2d 950, 953 (1999); and Annotation, supra, 58 
A.L.R.4th 1014 at 1029-35.  Absent an allegation of recent fabrication or 
improper motive, admitting prior consistent statements merely bolsters the 
witness's in-court testimony.  Fields v. Com., 12 S.W.3d 275, 
280 (Ky. 2000).  Such statements are 
self-serving and cumulative.  
Harris v. State, 339 Ark. 35, 2 S.W.3d 768, 770 (1999).  Trial by re-enactment could 
result.  Pickren v. State, 269 Ga. 453, 500 S.E.2d 566, 570 
(1998).

 
 
Id. at ¶ 22 n.7, at 91 n.7.  Wyoming does interpret 801(d)(1)(B) more 
broadly than its federal counterpart in that it allows the admission of prior 
consistent statement even if made after the identified motive, influence or 
charge of fabrication.  Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 145 (Wyo. 
2000).  Additionally, we allow 
admission of prior consistent statements at trial prior to, but in anticipation 
of, an opposing party's impeachment of the witness by alleging improper motive, 
influence or fabrication.  Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 1998).  However, we have never held that an 
801(d)(1)(B) prior consistent statement is admissible where no charge of recent 
fabrication, improper motive or influence is made at all.  Any suggestion in Lancaster to the contrary is dicta and inconsistent with the plain 
language of the rule and our precedent.