Case Title: Gibson v. Riverside Hospital Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 941446

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
CRAIG GIBSON, AN INFANT, ETC., ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 941446 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL 
                                   June 9, 1995 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, INC., ETC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
 
Robert W. Curran, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in a medical malpractice 
action, we consider whether the trial court correctly ruled that 
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Our decision depends, in 
part, upon certain provisions in the Virginia Birth-Related 
Neurological Injury Compensation Act, Code §§ 38.2-5000 through -
5021, in effect at the time of the alleged malpractice.   
 
Plaintiffs, Craig Gibson, an infant, by his mother and next 
friend, Tami (Gibson) Voris, and Tami (Gibson) Voris,  
individually, filed their motion for judgment against Riverside 
Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Regional Medical Center, Dr. 
Louis E. Nelsen, III, Dr. William H. Woessner, the estate of Dr. 
Charles W. Nickerson, Sentara Hospital-Norfolk, d/b/a Sentara 
Norfolk General Hospital, Dr. Matthew Whitted, and Dr. Randall S. 
Kuhlmann.  The plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by the 
negligent acts and omissions of the defendants.   
 
Certain defendants filed a special plea in bar, in which 
they asserted that the Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction over 
the plaintiffs' claims in the Workers' Compensation Commission.  
The trial court, relying solely upon the allegations contained in 
the motion for judgment, granted the defendants' special plea.  
We awarded the plaintiffs an appeal.   
 
For purposes of this appeal, we assume that the facts in the 
plaintiffs' motion for judgment and all reasonable inferences 
deducible therefrom are true.  Tami (Gibson) Voris sought 
treatment at the Riverside Hospital after she was injured in an 
automobile accident on July 13, 1989.  Tami was pregnant, and she 
was concerned that her unborn child might have been injured in 
the accident.  She was admitted as a patient to Riverside 
Hospital on that date, and she was treated by several health care 
providers.  According to the plaintiffs, "[d]espite indications 
of fetal distress during monitoring on July 13, 1989, [Tami] was 
removed from the monitor; and the hospital gave her no definitive 
treatment."   
 
On July 14, 1989, certain health care providers noted that 
the unborn child was experiencing fetal distress.  Tami was 
subsequently transported to Sentara Hospital-Norfolk, where a 
physician performed an emergency caesarean section to deliver her 
infant, Craig.  Craig experienced certain injuries that the 
plaintiffs claim are related to the defendants' failure to 
diagnose timely the fetal distress.  
 
The plaintiffs allege in their motion for judgment: 
 
 
That as direct and proximate cause of the 
negligence of the defendants, jointly and severally, 
the Plaintiff, Craig Gibson has spastic diplegia 
cerebral palsy, delayed mile stones [sic] with 
resultant developmental delay, obstructive 
hydrocephalus and short stature with microcephaly.  He 
requires crutches to ambulate and has difficulty with 
shortening of the hamstrings due to his spastic 
diplegia and visual difficulties. 
 
 
 
That the minor Plaintiff, Craig Gibson, as a 
direct and proximate result of the joint and several 
negligence of the defendants, has suffered and will 
continue to suffer, physical and mental pain and 
anguish, impairment, disability, humiliation and 
embarrassment, loss of earning capacity, and he will 
incur medical, rehabilitation and pharmaceutical 
expenses in the future. 
 
 
The plaintiffs argue that Craig did not, and does not, 
suffer a birth-related neurological injury as defined by the 
Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Compensation Act and, 
therefore, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate their claims.  The defendants contend, however, that 
the trial court correctly ruled that Craig suffers from a birth-
related neurological injury and that the Workers' Compensation 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to consider the birth-
related claims.  We disagree with the defendants.   
 
The Act was enacted by the General Assembly in 1987.  As 
provided by the pertinent provisions of the Act, an infant who 
incurs a birth-related neurological injury, caused by the 
negligence of a participating health care provider, cannot 
maintain a common law tort action against the participating 
health care provider other than as provided by the Act.  Code 
§ 38.2-5002(B); see King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Compensation Program, 242 Va. 404, 406-07, 410 S.E.2d 656, 
658 (1991).  Rather, an infant who suffers a neurological injury 
as defined by the Act must file a claim with the Workers' 
Compensation Commission, which has exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide all claims made pursuant to the Act.  Code § 38.2-5003.   
 
Former Code § 38.2-5001, which was effective in 1989 at the 
time of Craig's birth, stated in relevant part: 
 
"Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the 
brain or spinal cord of an infant caused by the 
deprivation of oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in 
the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the 
immediate post-delivery period in a hospital which 
renders the infant permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, 
incontinent, and in need of assistance in all phases of 
daily living.  This definition shall apply to live 
births only. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Applying the clear and unambiguous language contained in 
this statute, we hold that the plaintiffs' causes of action do 
not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' 
Compensation Commission.  The plaintiffs, in their motion for 
judgment, simply do not allege that Craig is "aphasic,
*T 
incontinent, and in need of assistance in all phases of daily 
living," as required by the Act.  The allegations in the motion 
for judgment, quoted above, contain no facts which permit an 
inference to be drawn that Craig is "aphasic, incontinent, and in 
need of assistance in all phases of daily living."   
 
We also observe that the defendants, who have the burden of 
proving any facts related to their special plea, failed to 
present any evidence that the infant is "nonambulatory, aphasic, 
incontinent, and in need of assistance in all phases of daily 
living."  Furthermore, we reject the defendants' suggestion that 
the Workers' Compensation Commission, as opposed to the circuit 
court, is better situated to determine whether an infant has 
suffered a birth-related neurological injury.  Without question, 
it is the function of the court to determine the existence, or 
lack, of subject matter jurisdiction.  In this instance, in view 
of the factual allegations contained in the motion for judgment, 
we hold that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
     
*Aphasia is defined as "the loss or impairment of the power 
to use words as symbols of ideas that results from a brain 
lesion."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 98 (1993).