Case Title: Montgomery Co. v. Wade

Citation: 345 Md. 1

Docket Number: 7/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 7  
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
v.
PAMELA J. WADE
___________________________________
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
    Murphy, Robert C. 
(retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  March 14, 1997       
         
      The applicable Maryland Code provisions at the time of the injury at issue
1
here were located in Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, §§ 67(b) and 15, respectively.  They
were recodified by Chs. 8 and 21 of the Acts of 1991 without substantive change.
Throughout this opinion, we shall cite to the recodified provisions.
The principal issue presented in this case is whether an
injury sustained by an off-duty police officer while operating a
patrol vehicle for personal purposes as permitted by departmental
regulations is compensable under the Maryland Workers' Compensation
Act.  Specifically, Petitioner, Montgomery County, seeks to
classify the injury suffered by Respondent, police officer Pamela
Wade, as falling without the contemplation of Maryland Code (1991
Repl. Vol.), §§ 9-101(b) and 9-501 of the Labor and Employment
Article (LE),  and thus, not compensable as an accidental injury
1
within the meaning of those statutes.  For the reasons recited
below, we hold that Wade's injuries fall within the relevant
statutory framework and shall affirm the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals.
I.
On September 4, 1988, Officer Wade, while not on scheduled
duty or in uniform and while operating her personal patrol vehicle,
was hit from behind by another vehicle.  At the time of the
accident, Officer Wade was on her way to her mother's home; her
grandmother was a passenger in the car.  Officer Wade sustained
upper body 
injuries 
that 
ultimately 
necessitated 
surgery.
Thereafter, on October 18, 1990, she filed a claim with the
Workers' Compensation Commission (hereinafter "the Commission").
-2-
The Commission found, in an order dated August 27, 1991, that
Officer Wade had "sustained an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of employment," and, as a result, was entitled to
temporary total disability benefits for those injuries.  Judicial
review of that order, which was sought by Montgomery County, came
before a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on
November 2, 1994.  Following the court's denial of the parties'
motions for judgment at the close of all the evidence and its
refusal of a number of the County's requested jury instructions,
the jury confirmed the Commission's award.  The County appealed the
judgment on that verdict to the Court of Special Appeals.  After
the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment in an
unreported opinion, we granted the County's petition for
certiorari.
II.
Montgomery County police officers are permitted, under certain
circumstances and subject to a variety of restrictions, to maintain
a personal patrol vehicle, or PPV.  According to the County, "[a]
PPV is a bargained for benefit of employment available to
Montgomery County police officers in the bargaining unit with its
use subject to certain guidelines and restrictions."  According to
the directive of the Montgomery County Police Department, published
on July 1, 1985, the PPV program (hereinafter "the program") was
established "to provide the highest level of police service to the
-3-
      The testimony of Lieutenant Stephen Hargrove, the Commander of the Planning
2
and Policy Management Section of the Montgomery County Police Department, listed
seven recognized objectives of the program:
"(1) To increase police protection in Montgomery
County by a greater visibility of police, resulting from
an increased number of police patrol vehicles on the
streets of [the] County;
(2) To promote police-community relations through
personal contact and services performed by police officers
in transit, as well as within their resident neighborhood;
(3) To deter crime by limiting the opportunity of
the criminal to commit the act by the presence of more
marked police vehicles;
(4) To provide quicker response time to certain
types of calls, and thereby increase the opportunity for
apprehending the criminal;
(5) To provide quicker response of off-duty
personnel when they are called back to duty because of an
emergency;
(6) To provide increased incentive and morale to
those officers in the program; and
(7) To provide improved care of the police vehicle,
and therefore reduce maintenance and cost per individual
responsibility."
      Notably, the officer must carry and/or equip the vehicle with these items
3
when he or she is on-duty.
community by providing greater police visibility on the streets and
in the neighborhoods of Montgomery County, and by enhancing the
responsiveness of both on-duty and off-duty officers to calls for
service."   To this end, the program places very stringent
2
procedural and operational regulations upon those who are assigned
a vehicle.  In operation thereof, the off-duty officers must carry
a handgun, handcuffs, and department credentials, and equip the PPV
with items such as flares, a fire extinguisher, a nightstick, a
tactical duty helmet, and a traffic vest and gloves.   They must
3
monitor the police radio, and may make traffic stops "only when
-4-
inaction would reflect unfavorably upon the department."  They must
"respond to incidents or calls for service which come to their
attention through any of the following means:  (1) on view; (2)
citizens[;] (3) radio monitored activity of a serious nature
occurring within reasonable proximity to their location."  After
responding to a scene while operating the PPV off-duty, the
officers must complete an "activity card."  A Monthly Activity
Summary Report, Unit/Shift Activity Report, and District PPV
Summary must also be submitted to departmental officials.  Further,
the regulations provide that off-duty officers who respond to and
work on an incident receive overtime compensation only for that
period of time in excess of two hours.  Other regulations include
prohibitions against taking the vehicle out of the County without
authorization and against utilizing it as a form of travel to a
place of secondary employment.  The PPV may also not be used in
furtherance of political activity, and bumper stickers are
prohibited without approval.  The participating officers must
further abide by a number of strict regulations relative to the
maintenance of the vehicle, upon which the County imposes mileage
and gasoline constraints.
It is undisputed that a benefit inures to the County by virtue
of this program.  The County concedes as much.  Indeed, according
to Lt. Hargrove, even while officers are operating their PPVs for
purposes other then responding to a call for police assistance,
they are still providing a police service, to the extent that the
-5-
      See also Md. Code (1991 Repl. Vol.), § 9-501(a) of the Labor and Employment
4
Article, which provides, in relevant part, that "each employer of a covered employee
shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to:  (1) the covered
employee for an accidental personal injury sustained by the covered employee."
PPV is a visual deterrent to criminal activity.  The question
remains, however, whether by virtue of the benefits the County
receives from the program injuries sustained by participating
officers are compensable as arising out of and in the course of the
employment within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act.  It
is to resolution of this query that we address our decision.
III.
A.
Under the Workers' Compensation Act (hereinafter "the Act"),
a compensable 
"[a]ccidental 
personal 
injury" 
includes "an
accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of
employment."  LE § 9-101(b)(1).   Just what "arises out of" and "in
4
the course of" one's employment has been the subject of
considerable dispute, particularly in respect to police officers
and other employees who, while not scheduled for duty twenty-four
hours a day, in essence must hold themselves ready for duty at a
moment's notice by virtue of the nature of their employment.  As a
threshold matter, ascertaining the nature and extent of an
employee's duties is integral to a determination of the
compensability vel non of an injury; that is to say, what arises
out of and in the course of employment is highly dependant upon the
-6-
precise nature of the employee's duties.  Each case requires
individual evaluation.
The County disputes that an officer operating a PPV while off
duty for personal purposes may sustain any injury that arises out
of and in the course of his or her employment.  Because Officer
Wade was not responding to a call for service or otherwise
performing a police function during the time she was using her PPV
on September 4, 1988, the County posits, the requisite causal
connection between the conditions under which the work is required
to be performed and the resulting injury is absent.  In other
words, "a person who has the benefit of an employer provided
vehicle (whatever the employer's motivation) and chooses to use
that vehicle for personal reasons, is not operating the vehicle in
the course of employment."  If, however, the County contends, this
Court were to determine that there was a sufficient nexus between
the employment relationship and its interest in providing PPVs to
its police officers such that their use arose out of and in the
course of the employment, the reasoning applicable to both the dual
purpose doctrine and special errand exception to the "going and
coming" rule, while not applicable, would render Officer Wade's
injury noncompensable.  We do not agree with either proposition.
B.
The mere occurrence of an accident is an insufficient basis
upon which to predicate a workers' compensation claim.  Richard P.
-7-
      As pointed out in 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 6.10
5
(1996):  "Few groups of statutory words in the history of law have had to bear the
weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon this slender
foundation."
Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers' Compensation
Handbook § 5.2 (2d ed. 1993).  The policy of the Act is to
compensate only those injuries that are occupationally-related, and
not those perils common to all mankind or to which the public is
generally exposed.  See Blake Constr. Co. v. Wells, 245 Md. 282,
289-90, 225 A.2d 857, 862 (1967), and cases cited therein; Maryland
Paper Prods. Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 584, 139 A.2d 219, 222
(1958).  When a claimant seeks compensation for an accidental
personal injury under LE §§ 9-101(b)(1) and 9-501, he or she must
demonstrate that it both arose out of and in the course of the
employment.  These two conditions precedent are not synonymous;
both must be proven in order to bring the claim within the
operation of the Act.   Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 590,
5
212 A.2d 324, 326 (1965).
1.
An injury is said to "arise out of" one's employment when it
results from some obligation, condition, or incident of the
employment.  Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 455, 385 A.2d 1179, 1183
(1978) (quoting Department of Correction v. Harris, 232 Md. 180,
184, 192 A.2d 479, 481 (1963)); Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 465,
90 A.2d 180, 182 (1952); Consolidated Eng'g Co. v. Feikin, 188 Md.
-8-
420, 424, 52 A.2d 913, 916 (1947).  It is construed to refer to
causal origin.  1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§ 6.10 (1996).  That is to say, it "requires a determination
whether the injury had its origin in (and is therefore attributable
to) the claimant's work environment."  Gilbert & Humphreys, supra
§ 5.3 (citing Harris); see also Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass,
Inc., 186 Md. 561, 565, 48 A.2d 166, 167-68 (1946) (It refers to
the cause or origin of the injury.).  In establishing the nexus
between the injury and the employment, the claimant must
demonstrate that the injury is attributable to some service or act
in the employment or is reasonably incident thereto.  Wells, 245
Md. at 290, 225 A.2d at 862; see also Feikin, 188 Md. at 425, 52
A.2d at 916 (It must be apparent to the rational mind that there
was a causal connection between the conditions under which the work
was required to be performed and the ensuing injury and that it is
contemplated as such by a reasonable person familiar with the
situation.); Harris, 232 Md. at 183-84, 192 A.2d at 481 (The
causative danger must be incidental to the nature of the work and
not independent of the employment relationship.).  Where there is
no causal connection between the work and the event giving rise to
the injury, then unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment
constituting a risk peculiar to the work may establish the
requisite causal nexus, either as an unusual cause or acceleration
of the injuring event or as a cause of unusual consequences of the
-9-
event, in which case the injury is said to have arisen out of the
employment.  Perdue v. Brittingham, 186 Md. 393, 402-03, 47 A.2d
491, 495-96 (1946).
Officer Wade's use of her PPV on September 4, 1988, was
clearly incidental to her role as a patrol officer.  The Montgomery
County police department established a program whereby its officers
were permitted to use their patrol cruisers as personal vehicles
when not on regularly scheduled duty.  It attached numerous and
detailed regulations to this privilege and encouraged off-duty use
of the PPVs in order to, inter alia, alleviate budget and staffing
concerns and increase police presence throughout the County.
Officer Wade would not have been operating a PPV but for her
employment and consequent participation in the program.  Thus,
because her injuries stem from her use of the PPV within the
department's guidelines, the requisite causal link exists, and,
under these circumstances, those injuries are properly considered
to have arisen from her employment.
2.
Given that Officer Wade's injuries arose out of her
employment, the compensability vel non of her claim, therefore,
depends upon whether she was acting in the course of her employment
at the time of the accident.  The "course of employment" test
directs our attention to the time, place, and circumstances of the
accident in relation to the employment.  Knoche, 282 Md. at 454-55,
-10-
385 A.2d at 1183, Watson, 200 Md. at 465, 90 A.2d at 182; Rice, 186
Md. at 565, 48 A.2d at 168; 1 Larson, supra § 6.10.  An analysis of
the occupational correlation of these factors "demands that the
injury be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries
of the employment, and in the course of an activity whose purpose
is related to the employment."  1 Larson, supra § 14.00.  Questions
pertinent to this inquiry are:  1) when the employment began and
ended, 2) whether the continuity of the period was broken, and 3)
how far the employee placed himself or herself outside the
employment during that period.  Harris, 232 Md. at 184, 192 A.2d at
481; see also Watson, 200 Md. at 466-67, 90 A.2d at 183.  Stated
otherwise, an injury is in the course of employment when it occurs
during the period of employment at a place where the employee
reasonably may be in performance of his or her duties and while
fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incident thereto.
Id.; see Pariser Bakery, 239 Md. at 590, 212 A.2d at 326 ("In the
course of" refers to an injury occurring while the employee is
performing a duty that he or she is employed to perform at a place
where he or she reasonably may be in performance thereof.); Miller
v. Coles, 232 Md. 522, 527, 194 A.2d 614, 616 (1963) (same)
(quoting Watson, 200 Md. at 466, 90 A.2d at 183).  If the injury
occurred at a point where the employee was within the range of
dangers associated with the employment, it is held compensable
under the Act.  When the employer provides the mode of
-11-
      We note that "[t]he course of employment is . . . confined [neither] to the
6
actual manipulation of the tools of the work, nor to the exact hours of work."  1
Larson, supra § 15.11.  When discussing a worker's "employment," we look to the
actual labor performed as well as the whole period of time or sphere of activities
in which the employee is engaged.  Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 466, 90 A.2d 180,
183 (1952); see also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 248 Md. 704, 708,
238 A.2d 88, 92 (1968).
transportation, the predicate for an award of compensation under
the Act is even more clear — courts have held that injuries
incurred under these circumstances are ordinarily compensable
because the employer has broadened the scope of employment by its
provision of the transportation.  Gilbert & Humphreys, supra § 6.6-
1 (citing Watson, 200 Md. at 469, 90 A.2d at 184).  Throughout this
analysis, however, it must be borne in mind that "whether a given
injury is in the course of the employment is determined by the
facts and circumstances of each particular case."  Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 248 Md. 704, 707-08, 238 A.2d 88,
90 (1968).
As we have stated, we must necessarily determine the scope of
Officer Wade's responsibilities to ascertain whether she was acting
pursuant to the employment relationship she maintained with the
department at the time of the accident.   If she was not performing
6
those duties or engaged in something incident thereto, she may not
recover.  
As a patrol officer, Officer Wade carried out her duties
through the use of a marked police cruiser.  As she explained to
the circuit court, "Most people work in a building; we [patrol
-12-
officers] work from our cruiser.  That's our office."  Incident to
that use, the department, by virtue of its unique program,
permitted eligible officers to retain possession of the vehicle in
furtherance of the objectives it set forth.  See note 1, supra.
The department, however, conditioned the use of the PPVs upon
adherence to a stringent set of guidelines, which required, inter
alia, that participating officers equip the vehicles with specified
items, monitor the police radio, and "respond to incidents or calls
for service."  The guidelines, in essence, outline additional
responsibilities by which the participating officers are to abide
upon penalty of, at minimum, expulsion from the program.  Any time
Officer Wade placed the vehicle in operation while she was not on
scheduled duty, she was bound to act within those guidelines.
Taking this view, she may, therefore, properly be considered to
have been operating the PPV under the auspices of the department at
the time of the accident and, thus, within the course of her
employment.
a.
Despite the County's importuning, we find further support for
the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that Officer Wade's
injuries resulted in the course of her employment in the dual
purpose doctrine.  The doctrine brings within its scope trips that
serve both business and personal missions.  As explained by Judge
Cardozo in In re Dependents of Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93-94,
-13-
167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929) (citation omitted):
"If the work of the employee creates the
necessity for travel, he is in the course of
his employment, though he is serving at the
same time some purpose of his own.  If,
however, the work has had no part in creating
the necessity for travel, if the journey would
have gone forward though the business errand
had been dropped, and would have been canceled
upon failure of the private purpose, though
the business errand was undone, the travel is
then personal, and personal the risk."
See also Atlantic Refining Co. v. Forrester, 180 Md. 517, 527, 25
A.2d 667, 671 (1942); 1 Larson, supra § 18.12 (citing Watson,
supra).
It is undisputed that, in the case sub judice, Officer Wade
was not on scheduled duty on September 4, 1988, and she was using
the PPV in furtherance of a personal errand — namely, transporting
her grandmother to and from her mother's house.  That is not to
say, however, that her use of the vehicle was purely personal so as
to place her without the Act.  As the Court of Special Appeals
pointed out, under the unique circumstances of this case, where the
police department assigned the PPVs, required officer response to
certain, specified situations, and encouraged off-duty use of the
vehicles — albeit within departmental guidelines — each time
Officer Wade and any other participating officer placed the vehicle
in operation, a business purpose was being furthered.  As gleaned
from Lt. Hargrove's testimony, at minimum, the benefit of visual
deterrence inured to the County.  In fact, Officer Wade testified
-14-
that she had responded to incidents and calls for service on
numerous occasions while off duty.  Thus, while arguably the
catalyst for Officer Wade's use of the patrol car might have been
personal in nature, once she deployed the vehicle on the streets of
Montgomery County, any such personal purpose was overridden by the
needs of the department, in essence, transforming her errand into
one imbued with business aspects.  Therefore, because both a
business and personal purpose were being served on the day in
question, Officer Wade's use of her PPV was within the course of
her employment.
Quoting from Atlantic Refining Co. v. Forrester, 180 Md. at
526, 25 A.2d at 671, the County states:  "`The mission for the
employer must be the major factor or, at least[,] a concurrent
cause of the journey, and[,] if it is merely incidental to what the
employee was doing in his own benefit, the injury does not arise
out of or in the course of the employment.'" (Emphasis omitted).
Because Officer Wade was pursuing no business objective in her
travel on the day in question, the County reasons, her trip was
personal and, therefore, not compensable under the Act.  The
County, however, ignores that a business purpose — at minimum, a
visual deterrent to criminals — is furthered each and every time an
officer chooses to employ his or her PPV on the streets of
Montgomery County.  Certainly, as the County points out, Officer
Wade could have used her personal automobile that day to transport
-15-
      The special errand principle is an exception to what is known as the "going
7
and coming" rule.  That rule excludes injuries sustained while traveling to or from
a place of employment, as falling outside the "course of employment."  Authorities
reason that the hazards of such travel are ones to which the public at large is
exposed while undertaking personal errands and, thus, should not be compensable
under the Workers' Compensation Act.  Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr.,
Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook § 6.6 (2d ed. 1993); see also Director of
Finance v. Alford, 270 Md. 355, 359, 311 A.2d 412, 414 (1973) ("Well established,
in respect of the application of Workmen's Compensation acts, is the general rule
that if an employee is injured while going to work or returning therefrom his injury
cannot be said to have arisen out of or in the course of his employment.").
her grandmother.  The fact that she did not, or that she had the
choice in the first instance, is inapposite and should provide no
reason to deny her workers' compensation benefits.  She was using
the PPV under the department's rules and encouragement, with
knowledge that she could be called to service at any moment.  This
preparedness for duty is sufficient to negate the County's
assertion that, to the extent that Officer Wade was pursuing a
business purpose on September 4, 1988, it was incidental to her
personal mission.  Based upon the facts presented, it was her
personal use of the vehicle that was incidental to the overriding
and primary business purpose of deploying on the County's streets
an additional marked police cruiser, which would not have otherwise
been there but for the program.
b.
The facts of the case at bar present a situation more akin to
that addressed by the special errand, or special mission,
principle.   It provides that, in undertaking a journey not
7
normally covered under the Act, it "may be brought within the
course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of
-16-
making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or
urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself
sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the
service itself."  1 Larson, supra § 16.11; see also Alitalia Linee
Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 329 Md. 40, 44, 617 A.2d 572, 574
(1993) ("Injuries incurred while the employee travels to or from
work in performing a special mission or errand for the employer are
. . . compensable.").  This exception was early recognized in this
State in Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 167 A. 51
(1933).  There, an employee, scheduled to work at his employer's
store between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., was also subject to call at
any time after 6:00 p.m. to handle any unusual conditions that
might have arisen there.  On the evening in question, the employee
responded to a call from police and went to the store to discover
the lights on and the back door ajar.  He secured the location and,
on his way home, was struck by an automobile.  The award of
workers' compensation was affirmed by the trial court.  In
affirming the trial court's judgment, we stated, in language
particularly instructive and singularly applicable to the case sub
judice:
"[I]t 
could 
hardly 
be 
said 
that 
[]his
employment, 
for 
which 
he 
was 
to 
be
remunerated, would cover only the period for
which he was actually at work in or about the
store.  The work that he was called upon to do
under these circumstances differs greatly from
the regular employment of one employed at
regular hours at a given place, and who at the
-17-
      Indeed, the benefit received by the Montgomery County Police Department by
8
PPV operation is arguably greater than that received by the store owner in
Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 167 A. 51 (1933) — that is, an off-duty
officer operating a PPV and responding to a call is not remunerated before two hours
have elapsed.  In effect, any stop executed by a participating officer is a part of
that officer's regular employment before the expiration of those two hours.
expiration of the period of his work is free
to serve himself as he pleases.
There 
was, 
we 
think, 
an 
implied
agreement, from the nature and character of
the 
employment 
of 
the 
claimant 
in 
the
performance of additional duties, that his
employment was not to be restricted to the
time in which he was at work at the store on
such occasions.  It was in the nature of an
errand or mission on behalf of his employer,
and when so treated his employment commenced
at the time when he left his home to go to the
store, and ended when he returned to his
home."
Id. at 199, 167 A. at 53-54; see also Alford, 270 Md. at 360-62,
311 A.2d at 415-16; Maryland Paper Prods., 215 Md. at 585, 139 A.2d
at 223.  
The same may be said of Officer Wade.  Although not required
to utilize her PPV while off duty, such use was encouraged by the
department, which benefitted from, among other things, the
increased police presence in the County.   Upon entry into the
8
vehicle, Officer Wade was required to abide by the program's
numerous regulations.  She was required to stop in particular
circumstances or in response to calls for service.  The duties and
responsibilities concomitant to use of a PPV are in addition to
those expected of a nonparticipating officer.  As in Perry, this
fact in no way lessens the work-related nature of a participating
-18-
officer's use of a PPV.  As we have stated, to the extent that
Officer Wade used her PPV while not on regularly scheduled duty,
she was, in effect, working.  We, therefore, disagree with the
County that the actual activity in which she was engaged at the
time of the accident is dispositive of her claims.  We explain.
The County reasons that, based upon our prior decision in
Police Comm'r v. King, 219 Md. 127, 148 A.2d 562 (1959), because
Officer Wade was not performing a police duty at any time up to or
at the time of the accident on September 4, 1988, her injuries do
not fall within the operation of the Act.  As we have indicated, an
officer utilizing a PPV off duty is performing a police function.
The County seems to intimate that, if the "work" being performed is
not required, injuries sustained in performance thereof are not
compensable, for failing to satisfy the requisite nexus.
Certainly, a participating officer is not required to use the PPV
while off duty, but the County developed the program precisely for
such use in furtherance of its objectives, supra note 1.  By its
assertions and assessment of the compensability of Officer Wade's
claim, the County appears affirmatively to disregard the
department's motivation in providing the vehicles to the officers
in the first instance.  This belies traditional analysis of what is
considered to be within the course of employment.  Thus, while the
County may be correct in stating that its off-duty officers are not
required to operate their PPVs while off duty, if and when they do,
-19-
they are performing a police function and should be compensated
under the Act for any injuries sustained pursuant thereto.
C.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Court of Special
Appeals properly rejected the County's assignment of error
regarding the compensability vel non of Officer Wade's claim.  We
similarly reject the County's invitation to follow those decisions
by foreign jurisdictions that have held, under comparable
circumstances, that the injuries are not compensable under workers'
compensation statutes because they did not arise out of and in the
course of employment.  See, e.g., Kunze v. City of Columbus Police
Department, 74 Ohio App. 3d 742, 600 N.E.2d 697 (1991); Palm Beach
County Sheriff's Office v. Ginn, 570 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. App. 1990);
Westberry v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 492 A.2d 888 (Me. 1985);
Wolland v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ill. 2d 58, 434 N.E.2d 1132
(1982); In re De Jesus v. New York State Police, 95 A.D.2d 454, 467
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1983); Rogers v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 Colo. App.
313, 574 P.2d 116 (1978); Walker v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 28
Or. App. 127, 558 P.2d 1270 (1977); Kansas City, Missouri Police
Dep't v. Bradshaw, 606 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. App. 1980); Chambo v. City
of Detroit, 83 Mich. App. 623, 269 N.W.2d 243 (1978).  Because the
PPV program and the regulations to which it holds its participating
officers are specific to Montgomery County, the case law cited by
the County is inapposite.
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IV.
The County also assigns error to the circuit court's refusal
of one of its proposed jury instructions.  Regarding what
constitutes a claim arising out of and in the course of employment,
the court instructed the jury as follows:
"An accidental injury is defined as one
which results from some unusual strain or
exertion of the employee, or some unusual
condition of the employment.  An injury arises
out of the employment if the injury results
from some obligation, condition, or incident
of the employment.  An injury arises in the
course of employment if it happens during a
period of employment, at a place where the
employee may reasonably be and while he or she
is performing his or her work, or some other
activity reasonably related to his or her
work."
The County contends that the "unique factual scenario and legal
premise" of the case rendered the above instruction inadequate.  It
proffered the following instruction, which, it claims, more
adequately addressed "the area which is the primary concern of this
appeal" — namely, whether Officer Wade's injuries incurred during
the use of her PPV for a personal errand while not on scheduled
duty both arose out of and in the course of her employment as a
patrol officer:
"In order for Claimant Wade to be compensated
for her injury by Montgomery County, she must
show that her injury both arose out of and in
the course of her employment.  The terms `out
of' and `in the course of' are not synonymous.
An injury arises out of the claimant's
employment 
when 
it 
results 
from 
some
obligation, condition or incident of [her]
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employment.  Whether it does must be decided
from the facts and circumstances of each
individual case.  There must be a causal
connection between the conditions under which
the work is required to be performed and the
ensuing injury.  Thus, if the injury can be
seen to have followed as a natural incident of
the work and to have been contemplated by a
reasonable person familiar with the whole
situation 
as a 
result 
of 
the 
exposure
occasioned by the nature of the employment,
then 
it 
arises 
out 
of 
the 
employment.
However, it does not include an injury which
cannot be traced to the employment as a
contributing, proximate cause and which comes
from a hazard to which the [worker] would have
been exposed away from the employment.
An injury arises in the course of employment
when 
it 
happens 
during 
the 
period 
of
employment at a place where the employee
reasonably may be in performance of [her]
duties `and while [she] is fulfilling those
duties or engaged in something incident
thereto.'"
Parties are "entitled to have the jury fairly instructed upon
their theory of the case."  Aleshire v. State ex rel. Dearstone,
225 Md. 355, 370, 170 A.2d 758, 765 (1961).  To this end, the trial
court may instruct the jury on the law either by granting requested
instructions and/or by giving instructions of its own on particular
issues, but it need not grant any requested instruction if the
matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.  Sergeant
Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 193, 401 A.2d 651, 655 (1979); see
also Md. Rule 2-520(c), 4-325(c).  "A proposed instruction that is
a `"correct exposition of the law,"' that is `"applicable in light
of the evidence before the jury,"' and is not `"fairly covered by
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the instructions actually given,"' must be given."  CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 343 Md. 216, 240, 680 A.2d 1082, 1094
(1996) (citations omitted).  "Jury instructions are sufficient if
they fully and fairly cover the law."  Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256,
280, 681 A.2d 30, 41 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct.
____, __ L. Ed. 2d ____ (1997); see also Molesworth v. Brandon, 341
Md. 621, 640-41, 672 A.2d 608, 618 (1996) ("The court is not
required . . . to read a requested instruction `if the matter is
fairly covered by instructions actually given.'" (quoting Md. Rule
2-520(c); Kennelly v. Burgess, 337 Md. 562, 577, 654 A.2d 1335,
1342 (1995)).
The County avers that the trial court's refusal of its
instruction deprived the jury of the opportunity "to determine
whether Wade's off-duty operation of her PPV on a personal errand
could have been found to have arisen out of her employment as a
patrol officer."  Based upon the unique circumstances presented,
the County continues, the instruction it proffered was warranted
and the trial court's refusal to read the instruction "gave
insufficient guidance to the jury to the detriment of the County."
Be that as it may, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals
properly concluded that the court's instruction "not only 
adequately, but more clearly, conveyed the law in this area."
Indeed, the trial court used the precise language recommended by
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction No. 30:6 (Md. State Bar
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Association, 2d ed.) in describing the concepts of arising out of
and in the course of employment.  It is hard to see how instructing
the jury in the manner suggested by the County would have added any
benefit to the jury's deliberations.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.