Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Alan D. Eisenberg

Citation: 2013 WI 37

Docket Number: 2009AP000284-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP284-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alan D. Eisenberg, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EISENBERG 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 2, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Alan D. Eisenberg, pro se, and oral argument by Alan D. 
Eisenberg. 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief 
filed by Paul W. Schwarzenbart and oral argument by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart.  
 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 37
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP284-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan D. Eisenberg, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 2, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   This 
is 
the 
sixth 
disciplinary 
proceeding involving Attorney Alan D. Eisenberg.  In this matter 
Attorney Eisenberg has appealed from the report of the referee, 
Attorney John R. Decker, in which the referee recommended that 
the period of ineligibility for Attorney Eisenberg to petition 
for reinstatement from the prior revocation of his license to 
practice law be extended for a period of two years, and that 
Attorney Eisenberg be ordered to pay the full costs of this 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
2 
 
disciplinary 
proceeding, 
which 
were 
$27,689.29 
as 
of 
November 19, 2012. 
¶2 
After fully reviewing this matter, we reject Attorney 
Eisenberg's arguments on appeal.  We accept the referee's 
findings of fact and agree that those facts provide clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Eisenberg 
committed five violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys.  We further agree with the referee that those 
violations require the imposition of an additional two-year 
suspension, which shall run consecutive to the existing five-
year period in which Attorney Eisenberg is prohibited from 
petitioning for the reinstatement of his license to practice law 
in Wisconsin due to the prior revocation of his license.  We 
also determine that Attorney Eisenberg should be required to pay 
the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney Eisenberg was admitted to the practice of law 
in this state in 1966.  He has been the subject of professional 
discipline on five prior occasions.  In 1970 this court 
suspended Attorney Eisenberg's license for a period of one year 
due 
to 
his 
unprofessional 
conduct. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529 
(1970) (Eisenberg I).  In 1988 we imposed a two-year suspension 
for a lengthy list of ethical violations, including multiple 
false statements.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988) (Eisenberg 
II).  In 1996 Attorney Eisenberg received a public reprimand for 
failing to close out a client trust account and thereby to wrap 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
3 
 
up his law practice during the suspension imposed in Eisenberg 
II.  Public Reprimand of Alan D. Eisenberg, No. 1996-3 
(Eisenberg 
III). 
 
In 
2004 
we 
again 
suspended 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's license for a period of one year for misconduct that 
included, among other things, directing his staff to fabricate 
billing records, which he then incorporated into an affidavit 
that he personally signed, disrupting an administrative hearing 
with "rude, abusive, controlling, [and] disrespectful" behavior, 
and entering into a prohibited transaction with a client.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶¶19 and 
24-25, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747 (Eisenberg IV).  Finally, 
in 2010 we revoked Attorney Eisenberg's license for misconduct 
in filing and maintaining a frivolous lawsuit that served merely 
to harass or maliciously injure the opposing party.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2010 WI 11, 322 
Wis. 2d 518, 778 N.W.2d 645 (Eisenberg V).  Under this court's 
rules, Attorney Eisenberg will not be eligible to petition for 
the reinstatement of his license until April 1, 2015.  See 
SCR 22.29(2) ("A petition for reinstatement of a license that is 
revoked may be filed at any time commencing five years after the 
effective date of revocation."). 
¶4 
The OLR filed its complaint in this matter in February 
2009.  The proceedings before the referee did not move forward 
for a period of time given the pendency of the disciplinary 
proceeding that resulted in the Eisenberg V decision.  Attorney 
Eisenberg subsequently filed two motions to dismiss this matter, 
but both were denied by the referee.  He also filed a motion in 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
4 
 
this court requesting that Referee Decker be disqualified and 
that a new referee be appointed to decide the disqualification 
issue.  This court denied his request for the appointment of a 
different referee to decide the disqualification motion and 
referred the recusal/disqualification motion to Referee Decker 
for a decision.  The referee subsequently denied that motion.  
After the passage of a considerable amount of time between 
sessions of an evidentiary hearing, the referee issued his 
report and recommendation.  Attorney Eisenberg appealed, and 
oral argument on his appeal was conducted in November 2012. 
¶5 
The OLR's complaint in this proceeding relates to two 
separate representations.  The referee ultimately found the 
following facts regarding the underlying matters.   
¶6 
In the first matter, Attorney Eisenberg represented a 
man, T.H., regarding the euthanization of a pet dog.  Prior to 
undertaking 
this 
representation, 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
had 
previously represented a plaintiff dog owner in a civil action 
against a neighbor, an off-duty police officer who had shot the 
plaintiff's dog.  Attorney Eisenberg had argued on behalf of the 
plaintiff in that case that the plaintiff dog owner had a legal 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  This 
court ultimately ruled in that case that the plaintiff could not 
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
because 
such 
a 
claim 
requires 
that 
the 
person 
seeking 
compensation must have witnessed the death of a close relative, 
and under the law of this state a pet dog is considered the 
personal property of the owner and not a close relative.  
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
5 
 
Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57, 243 Wis. 2d 486, 627 
N.W.2d 795.  From his work on the Rabideau case, Attorney 
Eisenberg was aware of the legal categorization of pet dogs as 
personal property. 
¶7 
T.H. had formerly been married to S.H., and they had 
owned a Labrador retriever during their marriage.  After T.H. 
moved out of the family residence and while the divorce 
proceeding was pending, the dog resided with S.H. and the 
couple's son, but not with T.H.  S.H. and T.H. entered into a 
marital 
settlement 
agreement 
(MSA), 
which 
was 
ultimately 
incorporated into the judgment of divorce.  In the MSA, T.H. 
expressly agreed that S.H. would be awarded, inter alia, all 
"personal belongings and other personal property currently in 
her possession at the time of the final hearing," and that T.H. 
was divested of any right or legal interest in any of the 
property awarded to S.H.  This MSA was never modified.  The dog 
was therefore awarded to S.H. in the divorce judgment. 
¶8 
S.H. had the dog euthanized at a veterinary hospital 
in August 2000.  T.H. learned of this fact a short time later.  
He then retained Attorney Eisenberg regarding a potential claim. 
¶9 
Despite his knowledge of the legal characterization of 
pet animals as personal property and of the terms of the MSA and 
the divorce judgment, which awarded all personal property in her 
possession to S.H., Attorney Eisenberg filed a large-claim civil 
action on T.H.'s behalf on the theory that T.H. was the lawful 
owner of the dog.  Although the referee found that the initial 
belief in Attorney Eisenberg's office was that S.H. had been 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
6 
 
responsible, with or without her mother's assistance, for the 
euthanization of the dog, Attorney Eisenberg did not name S.H. 
as a defendant.  Apparently for strategic reasons Attorney 
Eisenberg named B.S., who was S.H.'s mother and T.H.'s former 
mother-in-law, as the sole defendant.1   
¶10 Attorney 
Eisenberg 
subsequently 
claimed 
that 
the 
veterinary hospital had told him that it had been B.S. who (1) 
had brought the dog to the hospital, (2) had falsely claimed 
that she was the owner, and (3) had demanded that the dog be 
euthanized.  The referee found that this claim was "incredible 
and false."  Attorney Eisenberg also claimed that S.H. had 
admitted to him in a later telephone conversation that her 
mother had been the individual responsible for the euthanization 
of the dog.  The referee also found this to be a "fabrication" 
by Attorney Eisenberg.   
¶11 In April 2001 counsel for B.S. sought to take the 
deposition of T.H., but was unable to do so because T.H. refused 
to answer counsel's questions and Attorney Eisenberg refused to 
instruct T.H. to answer.  B.S.'s counsel attempted to resolve 
the discovery dispute in a telephone call with Attorney 
Eisenberg, but Attorney Eisenberg continued to refuse to 
instruct his client to answer.  Instead, Attorney Eisenberg 
                                                 
1 The referee described his view of the way in which the 
lawsuit was structured as follows:  "[Attorney] Eisenberg 
constructed a compelling narrative for the case:  vicious, 
vindictive 
ex-mother-in-law has the perfectly healthy dog 
belonging to her ex-son-in-law euthanized.  The only problem 
with the narrative was that it was untrue." 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
7 
 
questioned opposing counsel about the facts of the case and then 
hung up after calling opposing counsel a liar.   
¶12 B.S. was forced to bring a motion to compel discovery.  
Attorney Eisenberg did not appear for the hearing on the motion.  
Instead, 25 minutes after the scheduled start time for the 
hearing, Attorney Eisenberg called an associate attorney in his 
firm who had graduated from law school just one month earlier 
and instructed her to appear in his stead.  Consequently, the 
court and opposing counsel were forced to wait 35 minutes before 
the associate reached the courtroom.  The circuit court granted 
the motion to compel and ordered that Attorney Eisenberg pay the 
opposing side's costs and attorney fees, including the fees for 
the 35 minutes spent waiting for Attorney Eisenberg or his 
associate to appear.   
¶13 When the deposition of T.H. resumed, B.S.'s counsel 
presented T.H. with documentation from the veterinary hospital 
which showed that S.H., not his former mother-in-law, had signed 
the consent form for the dog to be euthanized.  T.H. indicated 
that he had never seen the form before and acknowledged that it 
made "everything irrelevant."  T.H. also acknowledged that the 
dog had bitten people in a few incidents over the years and that 
he had been convicted on a municipal charge of cruelty to 
animals for an incident involving the dog.   
¶14 The circuit court ultimately granted B.S.'s summary 
judgment motion and dismissed the case.  Finding that both T.H. 
and Attorney Eisenberg had no basis in law or fact to assert 
that T.H. had any ownership interest in the dog at the time it 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
8 
 
had been euthanized, the circuit court also ruled that the 
action had been frivolous and ordered Attorney Eisenberg and 
T.H. to pay B.S. the sum of $3,680.70, plus costs.  Ultimately, 
in September 2001 this sanction order was reduced to a judgment 
in the amount of $3,785.70 against Attorney Eisenberg and T.H., 
jointly and severally.   
¶15 Attorney Eisenberg did not make any payments toward 
the judgment for a number of years.  He initially filed a motion 
for reconsideration, which was denied.  He then filed an appeal, 
which was dismissed as untimely.  Almost five years after the 
judgment had been entered, Attorney Eisenberg filed a motion to 
vacate and dismiss the judgment because he wanted "to do certain 
things financially" and "to move on with certain things in his 
life."   That motion was denied, and the denial was upheld on 
appeal.  Finally, in January 2008, more than six years after the 
entry of the sanction order and judgment, Attorney Eisenberg 
tendered a check to B.S. in satisfaction of the judgment.   
¶16 On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded 
that by alleging that T.H. was the "owner" of the dog when T.H. 
had agreed to relinquish any claim to ownership in the MSA and 
the divorce judgment, Attorney Eisenberg knowingly advanced a 
factual position where the basis for doing so was frivolous, in 
violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(2).2  Second, the referee determined 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:3.1(a)(2) states that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a factual position unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
9 
 
that Attorney Eisenberg had violated SCR 20:3.4(a) and (d)3 by 
encouraging his client to make objections to legally proper 
questions in his deposition, by disrupting the deposition with 
deceitful and inflammatory representations about the examining 
attorney, and by opposing a motion to compel discovery in bad 
faith.  Finally, the referee concluded that Attorney Eisenberg's 
failure to comply with the court's sanction order and judgment 
for a period of several years constituted a violation of 
SCR 20:3.4(c).4   
¶17 The second matter at issue in this disciplinary 
proceeding involves Attorney Eisenberg's financial arrangement 
with a nonlawyer in the representation of a claimant in a 
worker's compensation proceeding.  Under the applicable statutes 
and the rules of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD), 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:3.4(a) and (d) state as follows: 
 
A lawyer shall not: 
 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to 
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a 
document 
or 
other 
material 
having 
potential 
evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or 
assist another person to do any such act; 
 
. . .  
 
(d) in 
pretrial 
procedure, 
make 
a 
frivolous 
discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent 
effort to comply with a legally proper discovery 
request by an opposing party; . . . . 
4 SCR 20:3.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
10 
 
nonlawyers are permitted to represent worker's compensation 
claimants in negotiating settlements with insurers and to appear 
before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on behalf of a claimant 
if they meet certain requirements, including obtaining a license 
from the DWD.  Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(c).  A nonlawyer who does 
not have the necessary license or meet the requirements must 
work with a licensed attorney, who represents the claimant.  If 
multiple attorneys have represented a claimant in succession and 
they are unable to agree on how the fees are to be allocated, it 
is the ALJ who allocates fees among the various attorneys.  When 
an attorney is involved, the DWD directs fees to be paid only to 
attorneys.  Thus, nonattorney individuals who are not authorized 
to appear before an ALJ and who work on a worker's compensation 
matter must have an affiliation with an attorney of record and 
receive compensation from the attorney.   
¶18 J.M.Z. was an unlicensed medical doctor who provided 
case management and evaluation services for a number of law 
firms and lawyers.  Because he was not authorized to appear 
before an ALJ in worker's compensation matters, he worked with 
claimants 
in 
such 
matters 
in 
conjunction 
with 
licensed 
attorneys.  He apparently referred a worker's compensation 
claimant, G.M., to a law firm where he worked.  The lawyer with 
whom J.M.Z. worked on such cases subsequently left the firm and 
started his own firm.  J.M.Z. also subsequently left that firm 
and developed a referral relationship with the lawyer in his new 
practice.  One of the cases that J.M.Z. referred from the prior 
firm to the lawyer's new firm was G.M.'s case.  A dispute, 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
11 
 
however, developed between J.M.Z. and the lawyer over J.M.Z.'s 
belief that the lawyer was not paying him the amounts J.M.Z. 
believed he was owed on referred cases, including G.M.'s 
worker's compensation case.  
¶19 Ultimately, J.M.Z. ceased working with the attorney 
and developed an association with Attorney Eisenberg.  Although 
J.M.Z. was not a lawyer, Attorney Eisenberg testified in this 
disciplinary proceeding that J.M.Z. had "pulled" G.M.'s case out 
of the other lawyer's firm and had brought the case along with 
him to Attorney Eisenberg's firm.  Attorney Eisenberg was then 
substituted as counsel of record.  He testified, however, that 
"there was almost nothing left that needed to be done" on the 
case and that "[a]ll my office did was busy work."    
¶20 When G.M.'s claim was settled, the prior attorney 
filed an attorney's lien against the settlement proceeds.  
According to Attorney Eisenberg, J.M.Z. told Attorney Eisenberg 
that he wanted to get the money he thought was owed to him.  A 
letter, dated September 4, 2007, which Attorney Eisenberg 
described as a "letter of protection," was sent under Attorney 
Eisenberg's handwritten signature to advise the ALJ of Attorney 
Eisenberg's and J.M.Z.'s claim against the settlement monies 
under a statutory lien for attorney fees.  The September 4, 2007 
letter was received by the ALJ the following day.  The 
September 4, 2007 letter described the history of G.M.'s case 
and its travels through the various law firms.  It stated that 
J.M.Z. had actually done the lion's share of the work on G.M.'s 
case, much of which had occurred prior to J.M.Z.'s affiliation 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
12 
 
with Attorney Eisenberg.  Although Attorney Eisenberg has 
acknowledged that his firm was required to do very little work 
on the case, the final paragraph of the letter argued that his 
firm should receive the overwhelming majority of the legal fees.  
That paragraph also describes an agreement between Attorney 
Eisenberg and J.M.Z. regarding G.M.'s case: 
For the above reasons, it seems most equitable that 
the Law Offices of Alan D. Eisenberg receive all but 
$1,000.00 in legal fees and $250.00 in costs, or a net 
amount of $23,288.29.  Please note that the present 
agreement between Attorney Alan D. Eisenberg and 
[J.M.Z.] involves a 50/50 split between them once a 
matter has been adjudicated and settled.  This is 
identical to the former agreement between [J.M.Z.] and 
[the prior attorney].  
¶21 Apparently still upset with the prior attorney, J.M.Z. 
sent a copy of Attorney Eisenberg's September 4, 2007 letter to 
the OLR apparently as part of his complaint about the prior 
attorney.  After speaking with J.M.Z. about his arrangements 
with the various attorneys, an OLR investigator sent a letter to 
Attorney Eisenberg regarding the investigator's contact with 
J.M.Z. and Attorney Eisenberg's relationship with J.M.Z.  In a 
subsequent 
telephone 
conversation 
involving 
the 
OLR 
investigator, Attorney Eisenberg and J.M.Z., Attorney Eisenberg 
denied, contrary to the statement in his September 4, 2007 
letter, that there was a fee-splitting agreement between himself 
and J.M.Z.  
¶22 Two days after this telephone conversation, Attorney 
Eisenberg sent a second version of the "letter of protection" 
(the September 26, 2007 letter) to the ALJ.  The referee found 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
13 
 
that this September 26, 2007 letter was identical to the first 
letter, with the sole exception that the final two sentences 
referring to the 50/50 fee split between J.M.Z. and Attorney 
Eisenberg and between J.M.Z. and the prior attorney had been 
deleted.  This letter was also received by the ALJ. 
¶23 In 
subsequent 
communications 
with 
the 
OLR's 
investigator, Attorney Eisenberg claimed that he had never 
entered into any fee-splitting agreement with J.M.Z., that he 
had not dictated the September 4, 2007 letter, that no rough 
draft of that letter had ever been given to him for review, and 
indeed that the September 4, 2007 letter had been voided and 
never sent to the ALJ.   
¶24 The referee explicitly and specifically found that 
Attorney Eisenberg's denial of having entered into a fee-
splitting 
agreement 
with 
J.M.Z. 
and 
his 
claim 
that 
the 
September 4, 2007 letter had not been sent to the ALJ were 
false.  The referee further found that, although there indeed 
had been a fee-splitting agreement, which had been communicated 
to the ALJ, there was no evidence that fees had actually been 
split between Attorney Eisenberg and J.M.Z. pursuant to their 
agreement after its existence had been disclosed to the OLR.  
¶25 Based on these facts regarding the representation of 
G.M. and the resulting OLR investigation, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Eisenberg had committed two violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  First, by agreeing 
to serve as a conduit to share fees that he did not earn with a 
nonlawyer, and by agreeing to split fees on a 50/50 basis with a 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
14 
 
nonlawyer, Attorney Eisenberg violated SCR 20:5.4(a),5 which is 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(a).6  Second, by falsely stating to the 
OLR that he had never entered into a fee-splitting agreement 
with J.M.Z. and that his September 4, 2007 letter had never been 
sent to the ALJ, Attorney Eisenberg violated SCR 22.03(6),7 which 
is enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).8  
                                                 
5 SCR 20:5.4(a) states: 
 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal 
fees with a nonlawyer, except that: 
 
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's 
firm, partner, or associate may provide for the 
payment of money, over a reasonable period of time 
after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to 
one or more specified persons; 
 
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a 
deceased, 
disabled, 
or 
disappeared 
lawyer 
may, 
pursuant to the provisions of SCR 20:1.17, pay to the 
estate or other representative of that lawyer the 
agreed-upon purchase price;  
 
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer 
employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even 
though the plan is based in whole or in part on a 
profit-sharing arrangement; and 
 
(4) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees 
with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained 
or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter. 
6 SCR 20:8.4(a) says it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to 
"violate 
or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do 
so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . ." 
7 SCR 22.03(6) provides: 
 
In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
15 
 
¶26 In his report the referee also commented on Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
conduct 
and 
demeanor 
during 
the 
disciplinary 
proceedings before the referee.  The referee noted that Attorney 
Eisenberg gave multiple varying accounts of a number of events, 
which often tended to minimize his own involvement and to cast 
blame on others.  The referee commented that Attorney Eisenberg 
had on numerous occasions leveled inaccurate criticisms against 
the OLR's director and the attorney representing the OLR, even 
making a false accusation that the OLR's counsel had made a 
false statement to the referee.  The referee found that the 
statement made by OLR's counsel was supported by deposition 
testimony and documentary evidence.  In addition, the referee 
stated that Attorney Eisenberg had "attempted to engineer a 
false picture of the proceedings" by making numerous false 
claims on the record, including that OLR's counsel and the 
referee had mocked and laughed at him during the evidentiary 
hearing.  The referee further found that Attorney Eisenberg had 
leveled untrue and unfair attacks on B.S. in an unsuccessful 
attempt to discredit her.  Moreover, as in other cases, the 
referee noted that Attorney Eisenberg had repeatedly complained 
                                                                                                                                                             
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
8 SCR 20:8.4(h) says it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by SCR 
21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or SCR 
22.04(1); . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
16 
 
that he was being singled out for harsh treatment by the OLR, 
going so far as to claim that the OLR was engaged in a "jihad" 
against him.  The referee summarized Attorney Eisenberg's 
attitude and conduct throughout this disciplinary proceeding as 
follows:  "In sum, [Attorney] Eisenberg refused to acknowledge 
any fault or wrongdoing whatsoever, and remained accusatory, 
hostile, and defiant throughout."   
¶27 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
the referee rejected Attorney Eisenberg's argument that the 
claims against him were de minimis and should not result in any 
discipline.  The referee concluded that Attorney Eisenberg's 
violations were not based on mere technicalities, but to the 
contrary, were serious and substantive ethical violations.  The 
referee also concluded that the OLR's request for a six-month 
extension of the period of ineligibility to seek reinstatement 
was not sufficiently supported by authority and was insufficient 
under the facts of this case. 
¶28 The 
referee 
conducted 
his 
own 
review 
of 
prior 
disciplinary cases and concluded, based on those precedents, 
that a two-year extension of Attorney Eisenberg's ineligibility 
to seek reinstatement was a proper level of discipline in this 
case.  As support for this recommendation, the referee discussed 
a substantial number of prior decisions, including, inter alia, 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Horvath, 219 Wis. 2d 334, 
579 N.W.2d 240 (1998), in which an attorney who had been 
disciplined on three prior occasions and whose license remained 
suspended 
received 
an 
additional 
two-year 
suspension 
for 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
17 
 
repeatedly 
engaging 
in 
deceitful 
conduct 
and 
failing 
to 
cooperate 
in 
a 
disciplinary 
investigation, 
and 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ratzel, 218 Wis. 2d 423, 578 
N.W.2d 194 (1998), in which an attorney who had been disciplined 
on three prior occasions was suspended for two years for making 
fraudulent claims in litigation and making misrepresentations to 
the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) during 
its investigation. 
¶29 Finally, 
the 
referee 
recommended 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg be ordered to pay the full costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding. 
¶30 Attorney Eisenberg has appealed from the referee's 
report and recommendation.  Our consideration of his appeal and 
our review of the referee's findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and sanction recommendation are conducted according to 
long-established standards.  Specifically, we affirm a referee's 
findings of fact unless we determine them to be clearly 
erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We establish 
the appropriate level of discipline in light of the particular 
facts of each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, 
but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶31 Attorney Eisenberg's appellate brief in this court 
frames the issue on appeal broadly as whether the referee's 
recommendation of an additional two years of ineligibility to 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
18 
 
petition for reinstatement should be approved and adopted by 
this court.  He does not present any narrower subissues nor does 
he organize his various contentions about this case into 
discrete arguments.  For the sake of organization, we will 
separate his various assertions, to the extent possible, into 
matters of process and matters of substance. 
¶32 On the procedural side of the ledger, Attorney 
Eisenberg levels several criticisms against the referee.  First, 
he points to a number of quotations from the referee's report, 
in which the referee stated, inter alia, that many of Attorney 
Eisenberg's statements in this proceeding were willfully false, 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
had 
engaged 
in 
"calculated 
and 
repetitive efforts to confuse and confound," and that the 
referee in his decades as a practicing attorney and referee had 
never encountered "a more evasive, inconsistent, deceitful, and 
untruthful witness." 
¶33 Attorney Eisenberg also complains about an incident 
where the referee missed a hearing, which then had to be 
rescheduled.  Attorney Eisenberg asserts that this incident 
required him to sit in pain unnecessarily while waiting with a 
witness he had brought to the hearing.  This incident was also 
part 
of 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
prior 
interlocutory 
disqualification motion in this court. 
¶34 Although Attorney Eisenberg points to these facts in 
his brief and oral argument, he never develops any legal 
argument 
from 
the 
facts. 
 
His 
previous 
motion 
sought 
disqualification of the referee because of the referee's alleged 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
19 
 
bias against Attorney Eisenberg, but he does not develop any 
such argument in his appeal.  He cites no legal authority of any 
sort regarding the standard for disqualifying a judge or referee 
due to bias.  He never explains how the facts that he cites 
prove that the referee was biased against him under the 
applicable standard.  We therefore will not address this matter 
further because we will not develop Attorney Eisenberg's legal 
argument for him.9 
¶35 Attorney Eisenberg also criticizes the OLR and its 
retained counsel in this proceeding.  First, he implies that the 
OLR has pursued this and other disciplinary cases against him 
because of some vendetta.  He contends that he has become the 
"OLR's piñata."  With respect to OLR's counsel, he contends that 
during the evidentiary hearing opposing counsel laughed at and 
mocked him. 
¶36 Attorney Eisenberg also asserts that the OLR has 
informed him that it is withholding nine more counts of 
misconduct, which it intends to pursue in the event that he 
would petition for the reinstatement of his license.  Citing 
                                                 
9 We note, however, that the referee's comments about 
Attorney Eisenberg's conduct and testimony in this proceeding 
are proper subjects of a referee's report.  While Attorney 
Eisenberg may not like the manner in which the referee described 
his credibility determinations, Attorney Eisenberg has not 
presented a single instance in which the referee's comments are 
inaccurate or are based on something other than the evidence and 
testimony in this proceeding.  Similarly, while the incident 
with missing a hearing is regrettable, Attorney Eisenberg fails 
to show how the referee's missing a hearing was directed 
specifically at him or showed a bias against him. 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
20 
 
only an unpublished court of appeals opinion in a criminal case 
that addressed the withholding of requested evidence, Attorney 
Eisenberg contends that the OLR's failure to pursue those nine 
additional charges in this proceeding violates his due process 
rights. 
¶37 We find no merit to any of Attorney Eisenberg's 
complaints regarding the OLR and its counsel as they pertain to 
this disciplinary proceeding.  We see no evidence that the OLR 
is pursuing disciplinary cases against Attorney Eisenberg simply 
because of who he is.  Each of the prior disciplinary cases 
against 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
brought 
by 
the 
OLR 
or 
its 
predecessor, BAPR, resulted in findings of misconduct and the 
imposition of professional discipline by this court.  Pursuing a 
meritorious case in this instance against Attorney Eisenberg is 
not an invalid exercise of prosecutorial discretion.   
¶38 We 
further 
note 
that 
in 
response 
to 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's claim that OLR's counsel had laughed at him and 
mocked him, the referee indicated that he had not observed any 
such conduct and that Attorney Eisenberg's claim was false.  The 
referee cited this claim as one example of Attorney Eisenberg's 
attempt to "engineer a false picture of the proceedings." 
¶39 With respect to the alleged additional counts that the 
OLR is purportedly withholding until Attorney Eisenberg files a 
petition for reinstatement, we note that Attorney Eisenberg has 
not provided factual support for his claim.  Even if his 
contention is accurate, any due process claim regarding the 
timeliness of prosecuting those claims would relate only to 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
21 
 
those claims, if they were ever pursued.  Attorney Eisenberg 
never explains how any delay in prosecuting those other nine 
claims, which are not before this court, affects his due process 
rights with respect to the five counts of misconduct that the 
OLR has pursued and that are before the court in this 
proceeding.  There simply can be no due process violation in 
this case due to the timeliness of other charges of professional 
misconduct that have not been alleged in this case.10 
¶40 Attorney Eisenberg's arguments regarding the substance 
of the referee's report are similarly without merit.  He pursues 
essentially two substantive arguments in his brief.  First, he 
merely repeats his version of the facts.  For example, he again 
claims that he was unaware of the language in the September 4, 
2007 "letter of protection," that he signed the letter in haste, 
and that he withdrew the letter three weeks later.  He therefore 
implies that he never actually had a fee-splitting agreement 
with J.M.Z., as the letter states.  His factual claims, however, 
including his assertions regarding the fee-splitting letter of 
protection, were expressly rejected by the referee.  Attorney 
                                                 
10 Indeed, it is interesting to note that Attorney Eisenberg 
also criticizes the OLR for continuing this disciplinary 
proceeding after his license was revoked in Eisenberg V.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2010 WI 11, 322 
Wis. 2d 518, 778 N.W.2d 645.  He implies that there was no valid 
reason for continuing this disciplinary proceeding and that the 
only reasons for the OLR to move forward with this case were to 
harass him and to increase the amount of costs he will have to 
pay.  Given these concerns, it is an irreconcilable conflict 
also to claim that the OLR is violating his rights by choosing 
not to prosecute additional misconduct charges against him in 
this proceeding. 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
22 
 
Eisenberg is obligated to demonstrate how the referee's factual 
findings were clearly erroneous.  He has not even attempted to 
do so.  Simply repeating his version of the facts in the face of 
the referee's clear and unambiguous adverse findings of fact has 
no appellate worth.   
¶41 After conducting our review, we find no basis to 
conclude that the referee's findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous, with one minor exception that has no bearing on 
whether Attorney Eisenberg engaged in professional misconduct.  
The referee expressly found that the September 4, 2007 and 
September 26, 2007 letters signed by Attorney Eisenberg were 
identical, except for the deletion of the final two sentences, 
which set forth the fee-splitting agreements between J.M.Z. and 
Attorney Eisenberg and between J.M.Z. and the previous attorney.  
While much of the earlier parts of the two letters are the same, 
there are some other differences, although those differences are 
not relevant to the fee-splitting charge at issue in this 
disciplinary case.  Thus, with the exception of the finding that 
the two letters were identical but for the deletion of the last 
two sentences, we accept and adopt the referee's findings of 
fact. 
¶42 The other substantive argument that can be gleaned 
from Attorney Eisenberg's brief and oral argument is that any 
violations in these two representations were de minimis, and 
therefore should not be treated as violations.  First, whether 
the violations were insubstantial would bear on the level of 
discipline that should be imposed, not on whether the findings 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
23 
 
of fact demonstrate that Attorney Eisenberg committed the rule 
violations.  Second, we disagree that the violations charged in 
this proceeding are de minimis.  Alleging and pursuing a 
frivolous claim and then engaging in bad faith tactics designed 
to frustrate the opponent's discovery and defense of that claim 
are serious ethical violations.  Moreover, while Attorney 
Eisenberg did ultimately satisfy the cost judgment imposed on 
him for the frivolous claim against B.S. in an amount that was 
substantially greater than the original judgment, his refusal to 
pay that cost judgment for years signified a cavalier disregard 
for the circuit court's orders.  Finally, agreeing to split fees 
with a nonlawyer and then lying to investigators about that 
agreement is clearly more than a technical violation.   
¶43 We note that while Attorney Eisenberg attempts to 
downplay 
the 
seriousness 
of 
his 
misconduct, 
he 
has 
not 
explicitly argued that the facts as found by the referee do not 
satisfy the elements of the charges against him.  Our review of 
the matter leads us to agree with the referee that the facts of 
this case clearly and convincingly support a conclusion of 
misconduct on each of the five counts at issue. 
¶44 We turn now to the question of the proper level of 
discipline.  Of great importance to this issue is the fact that 
this is the sixth time that Attorney Eisenberg has been the 
subject of professional discipline due to misconduct.  Moreover, 
there is a recurring pattern of behavior and disregard for the 
rules that govern the privilege of practicing law in this state.  
This is not the first time that Attorney Eisenberg has been 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
24 
 
found to have commenced sham or frivolous litigation.  It is 
also not the first time that he has provided false statements to 
the regulatory authorities investigating his conduct.  Indeed, 
even during the course of this disciplinary proceeding, the 
referee found that Attorney Eisenberg had repeatedly changed his 
story on several issues in an apparent attempt to avoid 
discipline for his misconduct.  The referee found that his 
claims were nothing more than fabrications.  Further, as we 
noted above, the misconduct we have found in this case is 
serious and represents a flagrant misuse of the law and the 
position of attorney for self-serving ends.  Finally, Attorney 
Eisenberg has not demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility 
or remorse for his misconduct.  To the contrary, as the referee 
pointed out, he has attempted to place blame on everyone else, 
including the OLR's counsel and the referee, and to minimize the 
seriousness of his misconduct.  We therefore agree with the 
referee that our prior precedents and the particular facts of 
this case warrant imposing a two-year suspension, which shall 
run consecutive to the period of ineligibility required by the 
prior revocation of Attorney Eisenberg's license to practice law 
in this state.11 
                                                 
11 We have on prior occasions extended the ineligibility of 
a previously revoked or suspended attorney to petition for 
reinstatement upon a finding that an additional period of 
suspension is warranted by the attorney's further misconduct.  
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weber, 219 
Wis. 2d 342, 345, 579 N.W.2d 229 (1998) (imposing additional 
six-month period of ineligibility on attorney whose license had 
been 
previously 
revoked); 
see 
also 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Edgar, 2003 WI 49, ¶13, 261 Wis. 2d 413, 661 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
25 
 
¶45 Finally, we address the issue of the costs of this 
proceeding.  Attorney Eisenberg submitted two letters in 
response to the OLR's initial statement of costs, in which he 
made unsupported claims regarding the OLR's attorney fees and 
the referee's fees.  He asked for mediation or arbitration 
regarding the OLR's fees or for an evaluation of the OLR's and 
the referee's fee invoices by a third party.  A portion of 
Attorney Eisenberg's brief in this court and a significant part 
of his oral argument was also directed to arguing that he should 
not have to pay any costs.  However, when the OLR filed its 
supplemental statement of costs after oral argument, Attorney 
Eisenberg did not lodge any objection.  
¶46 In addition to claiming that the referee's and the 
OLR's fees were inflated, Attorney Eisenberg also contends that 
there was no need for much of the OLR's and the referee's work 
because the OLR claimed that his defenses to the charges in this 
proceeding were frivolous.  He claims that he offered to 
voluntarily refrain from ever seeking the reinstatement of his 
license, which would have eliminated the need for any further 
fees, but the OLR refused his offer.  He further states that he 
has no financial resources to pay any cost award.   
¶47 The general policy of this court, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, is to impose the full costs of a disciplinary 
proceeding on the attorney whose misconduct necessitated the 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.W.2d 817 (imposing one-year suspension to run consecutive to 
the end of a prior two-year suspension). 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
26 
 
proceeding.  SCR 22.24(1m).  An attorney who objects to a 
statement 
of 
costs 
filed 
by 
the 
OLR 
must 
state, 
with 
specificity, the bases for the objection and must also provide 
an amount that he/she believes to be reasonable under the 
circumstances.  SCR 22.24(2).  Attorney Eisenberg has not 
complied with either requirement.  He makes only broad, 
unsupported assertions and never indicates what he believes to 
be a reasonable amount of costs.  Moreover, to the extent that 
Attorney Eisenberg contends that some expenses incurred by the 
OLR's counsel or the referee were unnecessary because the OLR 
claimed his defenses were without merit, we note that Attorney 
Eisenberg continued to litigate this matter aggressively, cross-
examining the OLR's witnesses, calling his own witnesses and 
appealing the referee's report and recommendation to this court.  
One cannot litigate aggressively and then criticize the opposing 
party for doing the same.  We therefore find no extraordinary 
circumstances that would warrant deviating from our general 
policy.  To the extent that Attorney Eisenberg contends that he 
is financially unable to pay the costs of this proceeding, he 
has provided no proof of his financial situation.  He may 
provide financial information to the OLR and negotiate a payment 
plan with that agency. 
¶48 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Alan D. Eisenberg to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 
years, effective April 1, 2015. 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
27 
 
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Alan D. Eisenberg shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not 
already done so, Alan D. Eisenberg shall comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended or 
revoked. 
¶51 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED that 
compliance 
with 
all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(3). 
 
 
No. 
2009AP284-D   
 
 
 
1