Case Title: Bolden v. City of Kodiak

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1968-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bolden v. City of Kodiak  439 P.2d 796 (1968) Ben R. BOLDEN, Appellant, v. CITY OF KODIAK, Appellee. No. 844. Supreme Court of Alaska. April 19, 1968. Hugh B. White, Anchorage, for appellant. David B. Ruskin, Kodiak, for appellee. Before NESBETT, C.J., and DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ. RABINOWITZ, Justice. This litigation arises out of the seismic wave which struck the city of Kodiak on Good Friday, March 27, 1964. The gist of appellant's complaint against appellee city of Kodiak was that the city wrongfully destroyed two buildings which were owned by appellant.[1] More specifically, it was plead that the *797 City of Kodiak and Kodiak Island Borough, either singly or collectively, demolished and destroyed or cause to be demolished and destroyed, the two buildings located upon the * * * real property, and all their contents; that the destruction was without the consent of the [appellant] and without any legal right whatsoever.[2] After trial by jury, a unanimous verdict in appellee's favor was returned.[3] The superior court then entered judgment dismissing appellant's cause of action on its merits. It is necessary to refer in some detail to the evidence which was produced at the trial before discussing the questions presented by this appeal. Appellant testified to the following: That he was the owner of two houses which were located in the downtown area of the city of Kodiak. As a result of the March 27, 1964, seismic wave, both of these structures were knocked off their respective foundations. In the period following the destruction caused by the seismic wave, he gave permission to Councilman Brechan to move one of the houses in order to re-establish power by running a cable into the downtown area. On April 6, 1964, appellant asked the city council for permission to move the two buildings and according to appellant's version, he received consent to do so from the city clerk, Mr. Preston. Appellant then hired a professional house-mover who proceeded to prepare one of the structures for moving. At this point appellant was refused a wide-load permit from the city of Kodiak's chief of police. The city manager of the city of Kodiak then requested appellant to write to the city council.[4] In his letter to the council, appellant asked permission to move the two buildings to appellee city of Kodiak's "old Rotary Park Playground."[5] The council refused this request and according to appellant, specifically denied him the right to move the buildings anywhere. Appellant's houses were thereafter destroyed by controlled fire on April 27, 1964. In regard to this act, appellant testified that no one told him they were going to destroy and burn his buildings. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he had been given notice that his buildings were to be destroyed. This notice was received on April 24, 1964, in the form of a letter written by Harry E. Carter, District Sanitarian, Department of Health and Welfare, State of Alaska. After enumerating the reasons why appellant's buildings *798 constituted public nuisances and health hazards, the letter stated that the Federal Bureau of Docks & Yards would be notified of "this condemnation order" and requested to "begin demolition of these houses on * * * April 27th, 1964."[6] Appellant called two additional witnesses and then rested his case in chief.[7] Appellee's *799 first witness was Harry E. Carter, a district sanitarian of the State of Alaska. This witness testified that after the widespread destruction wrought throughout the city of Kodiak by the seismic waves, he inspected the subject buildings and informed appellant he "had been requested to make a preliminary survey of these buildings to ascertain whether or not they should or should not be condemned." Carter further testified to several subsequent meetings with appellant, during the first of which he informed appellant that his buildings were "substandard and subject to condemnation as being unfit for human habitation as they existed." In response, appellant mentioned that he would like to relocate the buildings. (Carter testified that he agreed with appellant's suggestion.) Thereafter, Carter attempted to ascertain from appellant what success, if any, appellant had achieved concerning the moving of the structures. The witness further testified that at his last meeting with appellant "prior to the issuance of this condemnation order [appellant] Mr. Bolden himself said to go ahead." Elaborating upon the foregoing, the witness stated that: [I]n effect he said to go ahead with the condemnation; that he was leaving Kodiak. He was disgusted with the the people in * * * Kodiak and the lack of cooperation and * * * foresight and so forth, and he was just disgusted and he was going to leave.[8] Appellee called two additional witnesses.[9] Both parties then rested, and after argument and instructions the cause was submitted to the jury for determination. As we indicated earlier, the jury found against appellant and this appeal followed. In his opening brief, appellant asserts a single specification of error, namely, that the superior court erred in entering judgment upon the verdict since it was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.[10] In response thereto appellee city of Kodiak has advanced the argument that on review a jury verdict cannot be set aside on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence in the absence of a motion for a directed verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial.[11] Appellee relies *800 upon federal precedents holding that appellate courts will not review the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a motion for directed verdict.[12] In regard to this rule, Professor Moore states: From the beginning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts have been consistent in holding that the appellate court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of an unwaived motion for a directed verdict. Essentially, the reasons behind this position are two. The first is the general rule that an appellate court will not review issues on appeal that were not properly raised in the trial court. The second is that the function of the appellate court is to review actions of the trial court; it does not and cannot sit to review the actions of the jury itself. The latter proposition rests on a constitutional base that precludes the reconsideration of verdicts by an appellate tribunal.[13] Review of the record shows that appellant did not make any motions for directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., or for a new trial. It is established that motions for directed verdicts or for judgments n.o.v. raise questions as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. On the other hand, a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.[14] In regard to the necessity of a motion for a new trial, we said in Heacock v. Town[15] that Here the appellant made no motion for a new trial. We might dispose of the matter * * * by saying that since the discretionary authority of the court below to grant a new trial was never invoked by the appellant, there is nothing for us to review. We have, however, reviewed the record to ascertain whether the damages awarded appellant were so grossly inadequate as to amount to a miscarriage of justice.[16] *801 Following a technique similar to that employed in Heacock v. Town,[17] we have reviewed the record to ascertain whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict despite appellant's failure to make a motion for directed verdict or for judgment n.o.v. at the trial court level. We have further reviewed the record to ascertain whether a new trial should be granted on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Again, despite appellant's failure to move for a new trial on this ground, we have undertaken to review these questions in order to ascertain whether or not there has been a miscarriage of justice. After instructing the jury that appellant had the burden of proving appellee city of Kodiak "caused to be destroyed, the [appellant's] two houses," the trial court charged the jury that if they found for appellant on this issue they must then determine if the City of Kodiak acted reasonably during a period of emergency to protect the public health or safety as it claims, or that the [appellant] consented to the demolition or destruction of his houses.[18] Of particular significance to our disposition of the merits of this appeal is the full instruction which the trial court gave concerning the consent to demolition or destruction issue. In this part of its charge, the court said: The [appellee], City of Kodiak, has offered the testimony of Harry Carter, that the [appellant], Ben Bolden, gave his consent to the demolition and destruction of his two houses. The [appellant], Ben Bolden, has testified that at no time did he give his consent to Harry Carter or anyone else for the demolition or destruction of his property. If you believe the testimony of Harry Carter and disbelieve the testimony of Ben Bolden relating to a consent, you will find on this issue for the [appellee], City of Kodiak. But on the other hand, if you disbelieve the testimony of Harry Carter, and believe the testimony of Ben Bolden, that consent was not given, you will find for the [appellant] on this issue.[19] Appellee argues that the jury could have found appellant consented to the demolition of his buildings. Appellee further contends that since there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's finding that appellant consented to the destruction of his houses, the verdict and judgment below should be affirmed. Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to appellee, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient on the issue of appellant's consent to justify *802 the jury's verdict.[20] In our view there was room for diversity of opinion among reasonable men, in the exercise of reasonable judgment concerning the question of whether appellant consented to the demolition of his properties.[21] Resolution of the conflicts in testimony between appellant and Harry Carter was for the jury.[22] Not only are we of the opinion that there was adequate evidence of consent, but we are of the further view that the jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence. The judgment entered below is affirmed.[23]