Case Title: Larry D. Mitchell v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S05-0603-CR-105

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Kurt A. Young 
Steve Carter 
Nashville, Indiana 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
George P. Sherman 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S05-0603-CR-105 
 
LARRY D. MITCHELL, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G01-0110-CF-198307  
The Honorable Tanya Walton-Pratt, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-0312-CR-00625  
_________________________________ 
 
March 23, 2006 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
Larry Mitchell challenges his sentence for the robbery and felony murder of three people.  
Mitchell argues that the aggravators used to enhance his sentence were not properly found under 
the standards set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  Mitchell did not need to 
make a specific Blakely challenge at trial to preserve the issue, and he is entitled to review of 
that question.  We conclude the trial court’s sentence should be affirmed. 
 
 
1
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
On October 5, 2001, Larry Mitchell, Brian K. Baxter, and Terrance L. Thomas broke into 
the residence of Latanya Ashmore in order to rob Edward Green.  During the course of the 
robbery, Latanya’s brother Anthony Ashmore saw three men in the apartment.  During the 
robbery, Anthony Ashmore heard Green say: “You’ve already shot me,” and “I already gave you 
everything,” and then saw Green struggle with Thomas before Thomas fatally shot him in the 
head.  (Tr. 149, 152-54.)  Ashmore then saw Thomas shoot and kill Edward Gilbert, Green’s 
cousin.   Thomas then began shooting at Ashmore and Antonio McGregor.  McGregor was 
killed, and Ashmore suffered wounds to his face and shoulder.  Although Ashmore never 
identified Mitchell, he did identify Baxter and Thomas.    
 
 
Early the next morning police apprehended Baxter and Thomas after pursuing them for 
an unrelated vehicle theft.  Police found in their possession a white bag containing what later 
turned out to be the handguns used in the robbery.  During questioning, both Thomas and Baxter 
identified Mitchell as the third participant in the robbery and indicated that he too had shot 
Green, although not fatally.  On October 10, 2001, the State charged Baxter, Thomas, and 
Mitchell for their involvement in the robbery and murders.  The information specified nine 
counts against Mitchell, including both murder and felony murder counts for the killing of 
Green, Gilbert, and McGregor; the attempted murder of Ashmore; conspiracy to commit 
robbery; robbery; possession of a handgun as a serious violent felon; and carrying a handgun 
without a license.   The State later sought enhancement of the carrying without a license charge, 
based on a prior felony, and asked that Mitchell be sentenced as a habitual offender.   
 
Following a trial in October 2003, a jury found Mitchell guilty on three counts of felony 
murder, the count of attempted murder, the count of robbery, and the count of carrying a 
handgun without a license.  It acquitted him on conspiracy to commit robbery.  Mitchell 
stipulated to the enhancement on the charge for carrying the handgun without a license, and the 
State dismissed the charge for the possession of a handgun as a serious violent felon and the 
habitual offender enhancement. 
 
2
 
In imposing sentence, the trial judge found no mitigating circumstances.  The court found 
the existence of three aggravators: 1) Mitchell’s criminal history; 2) that he was on probation at 
the time of the offense; and 3) the nature and circumstances of the crime.  (Tr. at 462-63.)  It 
sentenced Mitchell to sixty-five years on each of the three felony murder counts, fifty years on 
the attempted murder, twenty years on the robbery, and eight years on the carrying a handgun 
without a license.  The court ordered consecutive sentences for one of the murders, the robbery, 
and the handgun charge, for a total executed sentence of ninety-three years.  The other sentences 
were concurrent.   
 
On appeal, Mitchell challenged both his conviction and his sentence.  He claimed error 
on certain instructions, on admission of certain testimony, and on sufficiency grounds.  He 
challenged his sentence by arguing that the aggravating circumstances used to enhance his 
sentence were neither admitted to nor found by a jury as required by Blakely v. Washington.1   
The Court of Appeals rejected each of these arguments, holding among other things that 
Mitchell’s Blakely claim was forfeited because he had not raised an objection to the sentencing 
at the time of trial. Mitchell v. State, 821 N.E.2d 390, 398-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) vacated. 
 
We hold that Mitchell is entitled to raise the Blakely claim despite not having raised an 
objection at trial, and review its merits.2
 
 
Mitchell Can Raise Blakely Claim 
 
 
We recently noted that both this “Court and the Court of Appeals [review] many claims 
of sentencing error . . . without insisting that the claim first be presented to the trial judge.” 
Kincaid v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 2005).  In that case, we addressed whether an 
appellant could challenge his sentence on Blakely grounds without having first raised a specific 
Sixth Amendment objection at the sentencing hearing.  In holding that he could, we stated that 
                                             
 
1 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
2 We otherwise affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
 
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the defendant need only “raise a particular sentencing claim in his or her initial brief on direct 
appeal in order to receive review on the merits.”3  Id.  Because Kincaid had challenged his 
sentence on Blakely grounds in his initial appellant brief, we determined that he had adequately 
preserved the issue for review.  Id.
 
 
Like Kincaid, Mitchell challenged his sentence on Blakely grounds in the initial brief on 
direct appeal and thus, adequately preserved this issue for appellate review.4  (Br. of Appellant at 
26-32.) 
 
 
Sentence Properly Enhanced 
 
 
Mitchell argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the aggravating 
factors used by the trial court to impose terms above the presumptive sentences were neither 
found by a jury, nor admitted by the defendant.  In support of its decision to impose an enhanced 
sentence, the trial court used three aggravators: 1) Mitchell’s criminal history; 2) that he was on 
probation at the time of the offense; and 3) the nature and circumstances of the crime.  (Tr. at 
462-63.) 
 
Starting with the third of these, we recently held that except when they are supported by 
facts otherwise properly found, and meant as concise descriptions of the moral or penal weight of 
those facts in assessing criminal culpability, aggravators such as “the nature and circumstances 
of the crime” run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.  Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 17-18 (Ind. 
2005); Trusley v. State, 829 N.E.2d 923, 926-27 (Ind. 2005).  The trial court’s description of this 
aggravator focused on Mitchell’s role as “a major participant” in the crime, observing that 
without his participation “none of this would have happened,” and, most notably, that he and the 
others had “planned and conspired to commit a robbery.”  (Tr. at 462-63.)  These could well 
                                             
 
3 We also noted that when addressing Blakely issues, this Court has relaxed the ordinary rules of preservation.  
Specifically, we noted that our holding in Smylie v. State permits the review of Blakely claims for appeals filed 
prior to our decision in that case provided that some sentencing issue was raised in the initial brief, and that a 
specific Blakely claim was added later.  Kincaid, 837 N.E.2d at 1010.  We also noted that for appeals filed after 
Smylie, a defendant must make a specific Blakely claim in their initial appeal or that issue cannot be reviewed.  Id.  
4 We commend Mitchell’s appellate counsel for addressing this issue in a coherent, thorough, and thoughtful 
manner. 
 
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serves as aggravators had they been admitted by the defendant, or found by a jury, but they were 
not.  In fact, the conspiracy charge was specifically not found.  The nature and circumstances 
aggravator is impermissible. 
 
 
The remaining aggravators are permissible.  A defendant’s criminal history, or “fact of 
prior convictions,” was specifically exempted from the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement 
by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  That exemption was reaffirmed in 
Blakely.  542 U.S. at 301.  The only question regarding the permissibility of this aggravator here 
is whether the trial court properly considered Mitchell’s juvenile record in finding this 
aggravator. 
 
 
We recently addressed this issue in Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 2005).  In that 
case, we held that because juvenile adjudications afford individuals sufficient procedural 
safeguards, they may be considered as a “prior conviction” for the purposes of sentencing under 
Blakely. Id. at 322-23.  Consequently, the trial court properly considered Mitchell’s juvenile 
record as part of his criminal history. 
 
In Ryle we also addressed whether the fact that a defendant was on probation at the time 
of the offense needed to be proven before a jury before it could be considered in aggravation.  Id. 
at 323-24.  We held that because the “requirements governing probation officers and their 
presentation of information to the sentencing court ensure their work product’s reliability,” and 
because the documents they rely on in creating pre-sentencing reports are “judicial records” 
sufficient to pass constitutional muster, the fact that a defendant is on probation at the time of the 
offense is so closely related to the fact of prior conviction that it need not be submitted to a jury.   
Id. at 324.  The pre-sentence investigation report clearly indicates that Mitchell was on probation 
at the time of the offense, so the trial court could properly consider this aggravator. 
 
 
The only question that remains is whether the permissible aggravators are sufficient to 
justify the imposition of the enhanced sentences.  Mitchell’s criminal history, as his attorney at 
sentencing accurately noted, is “bad.”  (Tr. at 461.)  He has true findings in juvenile proceedings 
for resisting law enforcement, criminal trespass, theft, and three counts of robbery arising out of 
 
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a single incident.  (Appellant’s App. at 222-23.)  His adult record is hardly less extensive.  He 
has been found guilty of criminal trespass, two counts of auto theft, and carjacking.  (Id. at 223-
24.)  This history, particularly his repeated resort to violence, when combined with his violation 
of probation, is sufficient to warrant the enhanced sentences. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Mitchell’s sentence is appropriate.  We affirm the trial court. 
 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
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