Case Title: Pinacle v. State

Citation: 654 So. 2d 908

Docket Number: 82945

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1995-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
654 So. 2d 908 (1995)
Dewayne Jermaine PINACLE, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 82945.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 27, 1995.
*909 Jeffery P. Raffle, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Roberta G. Mandel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Pinacle v. State, 625 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), based on direct conflict with Linkous v. State, 618 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 626 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1993), and Hood v. State, 603 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The facts, as determined by the court below, are as follows:
Pinacle, 625 So. 2d  at 1273-74. Pinacle asks that this Court quash the district court's *910 decision and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to Karchesky v. State, 591 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1992).
The district court found that Pinacle failed to make a specific objection to the addition of points for victim injury. While we agree that the objection was not as specific as it might have been, we find that it was nonetheless sufficient to preserve the Karchesky issue for our review. Our finding is based on the following excerpt from the sentencing hearing transcript:
We find that the above colloquy was sufficient to put the trial judge on notice that the defendant objected to the imposition of victim-injury points for penetration; accordingly, we find that the Karchesky issue has been preserved for this Court's review.
Both parties agree that pursuant to Karchesky, "penetration, which does not cause ascertainable physical injury, does not result in victim injury as contemplated by the rule for which victim-injury points may be assessed."[1] 591 So. 2d  at 932. We have reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the trial court's sentencing order, both parties' briefs, the state's "Memorandum of Law in Support of Multiple Convictions and Sentence of the Defendant," the information and the indictments. None allege *911 or prove ascertainable physical injury. Nor does the State rebut Pinacle's contention that no physical injury occurred. In sum, there has been no factual finding that the victim suffered ascertainable physical injury and in the absence of such a finding, victim-injury points cannot be assessed.
Based on the above, we find that Pinacle's sentence violates Karchesky. In light of this finding, we quash the decision of the court below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
[1]  In 1992 the Florida Legislature added subsection (8) to section 921.001, Florida Statutes (1991). This addition, which became effective on April 8, 1992, superseded the holding in Karchesky and reads as follows:

(8) For purposes of the statewide sentencing guidelines, if the conviction is for an offense described in chapter 794, chapter 800, or s. 826.04 and such offense includes sexual penetration, the sexual penetration must receive the score indicated for penetration or slight injury, regardless of whether there is evidence of any physical injury.
Chapter 92-135, § 1, at 1089, Laws of Fla. Pinacle committed his crimes on April 29, 1990; consequently this 1992 amendment does not effect his sentencing.