Case Title: Commonwealth v. Manolo M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12967

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12967 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MANOLO M., a juvenile 
(and three consolidated cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.  Plymouth.     November 4, 2020. - January 26, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, 
Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Delinquent child, Juvenile 
Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Statute, 
Construction.  Riot.  Words, "First offense." 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on November 27, 2019. 
 
 
The cases were reported by Budd, J. 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Plymouth County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on October 4, 2019. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Mark Newman, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Commonwealth vs. Frederick F., a juvenile; Commonwealth 
vs. Angela A., a juvenile; and Commonwealth vs. Manolo M., a 
juvenile, & others. 
2 
 
Johanna S. Black, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Eva G. Jellison for Frederick F. 
Melissa Allen Celli for Angela A. 
Michelle Menken for Manolo M. 
Joshua M. Daniels, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Dennis M. Toomey, for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Four juveniles with no prior offenses were 
charged with varying combinations of minor misdemeanors and 
greater offenses, including a felony charge of inciting a riot, 
all arising from the same episode.2  The primary issue presented 
is which of the charges constitutes a first offense of a minor 
misdemeanor pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 52.  We conclude that 
all of the minor misdemeanors arising out of this single episode 
for each juvenile constitute a first offense for which the 
Legislature intended a second chance, and thus must be 
dismissed.  Because § 52 makes no exception for greater 
offenses, the Commonwealth may proceed directly to arraignment 
on the greater offenses; however, in this case there is not 
probable cause to support the felony charge of inciting a riot 
in violation of G. L. c. 264, § 11.  Although we decline the 
                                                          
 
 
2 For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to all 
misdemeanors "for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment 
in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months 
or both such fine and imprisonment" as minor misdemeanors, and 
all other misdemeanors as major misdemeanors.  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 52. 
3 
 
invitation to declare the entirety of § 11 unconstitutional on 
its face, as we do not decide constitutional questions 
unnecessarily, we do emphasize that the statute must be read 
consistently with the requirements of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969).3 
 
1.  Facts.4  Shortly after Brockton High School students 
were dismissed on October 3, 2019, Brockton police officers, 
including Officer Raymond Parrett and school police Officer 
Daniel Vaughn, were dispatched in response to the presence of a 
large crowd of teenagers who were walking in the street and 
refusing to disperse to let traffic pass.  Police officers 
unsuccessfully used their cruisers' public address microphones, 
lights, and sirens to encourage the teenagers to move.  While 
Parrett was driving on the same street, Frederick F. looked 
inside the police cruiser and yelled, "Fuck the police!"  
Parrett then got out of his cruiser to speak to the juvenile. 
 
Angela A. approached Parrett as he spoke to Frederick.  
Angela shoved a cell phone in Parrett's face, while numerous 
                                                          
 
 
3 We recognize the amicus briefs submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and Citizens for Juvenile Justice, and by the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
4 The juveniles have agreed to the following facts for the 
purposes of this appeal only.  The facts are drawn from the 
various police reports, but the juveniles contest the police 
reports' characterization of the incident.  There has been no 
fact finding or discovery in the lower court. 
4 
 
other teenagers surrounded Parrett and Vaughn, shouting at them.  
Parrett told Angela several times to take the camera out of his 
face, and then pushed her hand from his face.  Thomas5 then 
approached and shoved Parrett's shoulder, saying, "Yo what the 
fuck are you doing?" and "She's a female!"  Parrett pushed 
Thomas back.  Thomas then lunged at Parrett and swung his fist 
at Parrett's head.  Parrett attempted to place Thomas into 
custody, and as Thomas physically resisted attempts to handcuff 
him, the two fell to the ground.  Vaughn attempted to keep 
anyone else from approaching the arrest. 
 
Manolo M. attempted to run past Vaughn, and Vaughn pushed 
him back several times.  Manolo took up a fighting stance and 
yelled at Vaughan, "Mother fucker you wanna go!  Let's go!"  He 
then swung at Vaughn's head.  Vaughn blocked his fist and struck 
him with a forward kick in an attempt to stop his momentum, and 
the two fell to the ground as Manolo resisted Vaughn's attempts 
to handcuff him. 
 
Two other officers arrived and ordered the crowd of 
teenagers to stay back.  Many of the teenagers, including 
Angela, filmed the officers.  Another officer assisted Vaughn in 
handcuffing Manolo and placing him in a police cruiser. 
                                                          
 
 
5 A pseudonym.  Thomas has been dismissed from this appeal, 
but we include facts regarding his behavior where they are 
pertinent to the event as a whole. 
5 
 
 
While police attempted to disperse the crowd, Frederick 
began yelling, refusing to move and "enticing the crowd to 
stay."  Vaughn advised Frederick that he was under arrest and 
ordered him to place his arms behind his back, but Frederick 
tensed up and pulled his arm away.  Two officers attempted to 
handcuff Frederick, but he continued to pull away, move side to 
side, and throw his arms forward and away from the officers' 
grips.  After warning Frederick that if he did not comply the 
officer would use his stun gun, a third officer issued a three-
second drive stun to Frederick.  Frederick then placed his hands 
behind his back and was handcuffed. 
 
During the struggle with Frederick, Angela again approached 
and filmed the officers at close range, asking them why they 
were doing what they were doing and swearing at them.  After 
telling her several times to back away, Parrett attempted to 
arrest her.  She pulled away, and Parrett brought her to the 
ground.  She refused several times to put her hands behind her 
back, and after warning her, Parrett gave her a one-second burst 
of pepper spray and placed her in handcuffs. 
 
At the time of the event, Manolo, Frederick, and Angela 
were seventeen years of age, and none of them had ever been 
charged with a delinquency offense or criminal conduct. 
6 
 
 
2.  Procedural history.  Manolo, Frederick, and Angela6 were 
all charged with disorderly conduct (a minor misdemeanor), 
disturbing the peace (a minor misdemeanor), resisting arrest (a 
major misdemeanor), and inciting a riot (a felony).  In 
addition, Manolo and Frederick were charged with the common-law 
offense of interfering with a police officer (a minor 
misdemeanor).  Manolo also was charged with assault and battery 
on a police officer (a major misdemeanor).7 
 
Following motions to dismiss pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562 (2013), and over the Commonwealth's 
objection, a Juvenile Court judge dismissed the charges of 
inciting a riot in violation of G. L. c. 264, § 11, against all 
three juveniles.  The judge stated that the statute is "not an 
appropriate law to apply," that "it has lost its vitality," and 
that it was not applicable to this particular situation, 
involving juveniles, as a matter of law. 
                                                          
 
 
6 Prior to his dismissal, Thomas pleaded delinquent to a 
greater charge and was arraigned on minor misdemeanor charges. 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 272, § 53, provides for a maximum fine of 
$150 for a first offense of disorderly conduct or disturbing the 
peace.  General Laws c. 268, § 32B, provides for a maximum 
sentence of two and one-half years for resisting arrest.  
General Laws c. 264, § 11, provides for a maximum sentence of 
three years for inciting a riot.  General Laws c. 265, § 13D, 
provides for a maximum sentence of two and one-half years for 
assault and battery on a police officer.  Interfering with a 
police officer is a common-law offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Adams, 482 Mass. 514, 526 (2019).  The lower court judge treated 
this charge as a minor misdemeanor. 
7 
 
 
Manolo moved to dismiss the minor misdemeanor charges 
pursuant to Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789 (2019).  
The Commonwealth moved for arraignment on all of the charges, 
arguing that Wallace W. is inapplicable to a complaint charging 
multiple, simultaneous offenses.  The Juvenile Court judge 
rejected this argument, concluding that the juveniles could be 
arraigned on the major but not the minor misdemeanors.  The 
minor misdemeanors were continued for a Wallace W. hearing, at 
which the Commonwealth would be given the opportunity to prove 
that those charges were not subject to dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction as "first offense" misdemeanors.  The Commonwealth 
appealed from the dismissal of the felony charges to the Appeals 
Court and also petitioned this court for extraordinary relief 
from the judge's decision not to immediately arraign on the 
minor misdemeanor charges.  The single justice reserved and 
reported the cases to the full court, regarding the application 
of G. L. c. 119, § 52, to charges arising from the same 
incident; transferred sua sponte the Commonwealth's pending 
appeal from the dismissal of the felony charges to this court; 
and ordered that the matters be consolidated. 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Multicount complaints and Wallace W. 
hearings.  General Laws c. 119, § 52, excludes from the 
definition of "delinquent child," and therefore from the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, any child between the ages 
8 
 
of twelve and eighteen years old who commits "a first offense of 
a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment 
in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months 
or both such fine and imprisonment."  See G. L. c. 218, § 60 
(Juvenile Court shall have jurisdiction over cases of delinquent 
children).  In Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 800-801, we delineated 
the process for establishing a first offense:  so-called Wallace 
W. hearings, at which the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the juvenile has committed a prior 
offense.  We also described how an adjudication of delinquency 
at a Wallace W. proceeding would be reported and recorded.  We 
explained that where a juvenile had no prior delinquency 
adjudications, the first offense of a minor misdemeanor would be 
dismissed, even if the first offense was proved at a Wallace W. 
hearing.  The Commonwealth could then, however, proceed to 
arraignment on subsequent minor misdemeanor charges.  Id. at 
799-800. 
 
We anticipated, however, apparently correctly, analytical 
complexities in the application of Wallace W. to cases involving 
"a juvenile accused of committing two or more six months or less 
misdemeanors, or a six months or less misdemeanor and a greater 
offense or offenses."  Id. at 800.  The instant cases present 
these issues to the court for resolution in the context of a 
single episode of criminal misconduct.  We now affirm, for the 
9 
 
reasons explained in more detail infra, that the Legislature's 
clear intention was to provide juveniles with a second chance in 
regard to minor misdemeanor conduct.  The Legislature did not 
intend that this second chance would be defeated simply because 
multiple minor misdemeanors could be charged based on the same 
isolated incident.  An isolated instance of misconduct was to be 
distinguished from a pattern of behavior.  See id. at 795.  
Therefore, multiple minor misdemeanors arising from the 
juvenile’s first episode of minor misdemeanor misconduct must 
all be dismissed as a "first offense."  The Commonwealth may, 
however, proceed to arraign the juvenile on major misdemeanors 
or felonies accompanying the minor misdemeanors.  The second 
chance provided by § 52 expressly applies to minor misdemeanors, 
not major misdemeanors or felonies. 
 
"Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature . . . ."  AIDS Support 
Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 300 
(2017).  "We also consider the 'cause of [the statute's] 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of 
its framers may be effectuated.'"  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 793, 
quoting Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76-77 (2011).  In 
addition, we consider the legislative history where it is 
informative.  Wallace W., supra.  Finally, where a juvenile 
10 
 
justice statute "can 'plausibly be found to be ambiguous,' . . . 
the rule of lenity requires that the juvenile be given 'the 
benefit of the ambiguity.'"  Id. at 798, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 813 (2013). 
 
We begin with the statutory language and our interpretation 
of that language in Wallace W.  At issue is the meaning of "a 
first offense of a [minor] misdemeanor" in the statute.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 52.  In Wallace W. we found the language, to put it 
mildly, to be less than a model of clarity.  There, the 
Commonwealth argued that "the exclusion under § 52 is a one-time 
exclusion from jurisdiction over the first time a juvenile 
commits a six months or less misdemeanor."  Wallace W., 482 
Mass. at 793.  The juvenile argued that "the exclusion applies 
to the first time a juvenile commits each individual six months 
or less misdemeanor.  Under the juvenile's interpretation, a 
juvenile could conceivably commit every individual six months or 
less misdemeanor once without the Juvenile Court ever having 
jurisdiction."  Id.  We rejected the juvenile's interpretation, 
concluding that the statute was "intended to excuse a juvenile's 
first isolated instance of such misconduct," but "provid[es] the 
Juvenile Court with jurisdiction over repeat offenders."  Id. at 
790, 791.  In that case, however, we were not presented with 
multiple charges arising out of a juvenile's first episode of 
delinquent misconduct. 
11 
 
 
We are now asked to determine whether the exclusion of a 
"first offense of a [minor] misdemeanor" in the statute should 
excuse a first episode of minor misdemeanor misconduct or a 
single minor misdemeanor charge.  As demonstrated by this case 
and others, it is possible for a first episode of delinquent 
misconduct to result in multiple charges of minor misdemeanors 
against a juvenile, even if such a first episode is of very 
brief duration.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 
747, 748-749, 755-756 (2018) (within prosecutor's discretion to 
bring multiple, different charges based on single episode of 
misconduct).  Whether the Legislature intended to excuse just 
one of such offenses is not clear from the statutory language 
alone.  Section 52 refers to "a first offense of a [minor] 
misdemeanor" without further definition.  We therefore turn to 
the entire statutory scheme and legislative history for further 
guidance. 
 
The statutory scheme governing juvenile justice is designed 
to be rehabilitative rather than punitive, and to "act in the 
best interests of children by encouraging and helping them to 
become law-abiding and productive members of society, and not to 
label and treat them as criminals" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 466 (2012).  The 
Legislature has mandated that the statutory scheme "shall be 
liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of 
12 
 
the children brought before the court shall approximate as 
nearly as possible that which they should receive from their 
parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, 
not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement 
and guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53. 
The particular amendment at issue was enacted as part of a 
comprehensive act to reform the criminal justice system.  St. 
2018, c. 69.  This legislation was designed to protect juveniles 
from involvement with the juvenile justice system by increasing 
opportunities for juvenile diversion, raising the age at which 
children may be deemed delinquent, and eliminating jurisdiction 
over violations of local ordinances, certain episodes of 
misconduct at school, and first offenses of minor misdemeanors.  
St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 72, 75, 79, 159, 160.  The act was intended 
to "decriminaliz[e] childhood behaviors" in an effort to "cut 
the chains that hold people down when they're trying to get back 
up on their feet."  Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 333 
(2019), quoting State House News Service (Senate Sess.), Oct. 
26, 2017 (statement of Sen. William N. Brownsberger, co-chair, 
Joint Committee on Judiciary) (Brownsberger statement).  "[O]ne 
of the Legislature's aims was to reduce recidivism for juvenile 
offenders."  Lazlo L., supra at 333 n.13.  The Legislature noted 
that early involvement in the juvenile justice system -- not 
just an adjudication of delinquency -- made it more likely that 
13 
 
the child would remain in the system for the rest of his or her 
life.  Id. at 333, citing State House News Service (House 
Sess.), Nov. 13, 2017 (statement of Rep. Claire D. Cronin, co-
chair, Joint Committee on Judiciary) (Cronin statement).8 
The first offense provision itself was specifically 
designed to give juveniles who commit delinquent acts a "second 
chance" for minor misconduct.  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 795, 
quoting State House News Service (House Sess.), Apr. 4, 2018 
(statement of Rep. Kay Khan).  Studies have indicated that more 
than one-half of Massachusetts adolescents engage in potentially 
chargeable behavior when they are teenagers, but the Legislature 
recognized that criminalizing these behaviors causes more harm 
than good.  See Brownsberger statement, supra; Cronin statement, 
supra; Citizens for Juvenile Justice, Less Crime for Less Money 
2-3 (Nov. 2016), citing Department of Public Health data, and 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Health and 
Risk Behaviors of Massachusetts Youth (2013); National Research 
Council of the National Academies, Reforming Juvenile Justice:  
A Developmental Approach 59-60 (2013) (National Academies).  The 
majority of young people who are involved in initial stages of 
                                                          
 
 
8 The act reforming the criminal justice system also created 
a juvenile justice policy and data board, responsible for 
collecting data and making recommendations regarding, among 
other things, the reduction of racial and ethnic disparities.  
St. 2018, c. 69, § 89 (b) (2). 
14 
 
the delinquency process never return to court on subsequent 
offenses, especially where the misconduct is minor.  National 
Academies, supra at 24-25, 151. 
Charging juveniles for this behavior and moving them into 
the juvenile justice system increases the odds that they will 
reoffend -- the precise opposite of the Legislature's intent.  
See, e.g., Annie E. Casey Foundation, Expand the Use of 
Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System 2-3 (2020) (multiple 
studies in different locations found system involvement 
increases odds of recidivism); Cronin statement, supra; 
Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, & Guckenburg, Formal System 
Processing of Juveniles:  Effects on Delinquency, Campbell 
Systematic Reviews, at 6 (2010).  A juvenile delinquency record 
-- even just an arraignment -- can also be used to enhance 
future sentencing or affect charging or probation decisions.  
See Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 572-573 (discussing consequences 
of court activity record information [CARI] records); Dennis, 
Decriminalizing Childhood, 45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2017).  
In addition to the legal consequences of a delinquency record, 
court-involved youth are more likely to have present or future 
problems with physical or mental health, educational outcomes, 
employment opportunities, and housing access, among other 
things.  See, e.g., Annie E. Casey Foundation, supra at 8-9; 
Dennis, supra; Kirk & Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral 
15 
 
Educational Damage in the Transition to Adulthood, 88 Sociol. 
Educ. 36 (2013); Sweeten, Who Will Graduate?  Disruption of High 
School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 Justice Q. 
462 (Dec. 2006). 
Rather than subject a juvenile to the long-term 
consequences of court involvement for minor misconduct that is 
typical of youth, the Legislature mandated that all youth be 
given a second chance for this behavior.  Section 52 was also 
enacted with a keen awareness of the racial disparities in our 
criminal justice system, which led to some youth being given a 
second chance while others were denied it.  See, e.g., St. 2018, 
c. 69, § 89 (b) (2) (seeking recommendations for how to decrease 
racial and ethnic disparities).  The Legislature purposefully 
sought to combat those disparities through the passage of the 
act containing the amended § 52.  Recognizing the significant 
consequences of criminalizing childhood behavior and the 
unfairness of inconsistently granting grace to some youth but 
not others, the Legislature enacted a statutory mandate that all 
youth be given a second chance for minor misdemeanor misconduct. 
 
Reading § 52's "first offense" to refer to a single minor 
misdemeanor charge, as the Commonwealth would have us do, rather 
than the first episode of misconduct, would clearly contradict 
the Legislature's express intent to give juveniles this "second 
chance" and decrease their involvement with the juvenile justice 
16 
 
system.  "The rehabilitative purposes of the act [containing the 
amended § 52] recognize the difference between an isolated act 
of misbehavior, for which a second chance can and should be 
granted, and a pattern of such misbehavior, which cannot be 
ignored."  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 795.  It would also violate 
the statutory mandate to liberally construe statutes governing 
delinquency proceedings to provide "aid, encouragement, and 
guidance" to children, rather than treat them as criminals.  Id. 
at 799 n.3.  See G. L. c. 119, § 53.  This mandate also 
incorporates the rule of lenity, which requires us to give the 
benefit of any doubt to the juvenile where there is ambiguity in 
the application of a statute.  See, e.g., Wallace W., supra at 
798 (rule of lenity requires juvenile be given benefit of 
ambiguity).  Given the uncertainty of the meaning of "first 
offense," where the first episode of misconduct results in 
multiple minor misdemeanor charges, we conclude that the rule of 
lenity applies here.  In sum, our holding here is driven by our 
understanding of the clear legislative intent to give juveniles 
a meaningful second chance for minor misdemeanor conduct, and 
the salutary rules of construction for statutes related to 
delinquency, all of which are designed to aid, encourage, and 
guide juveniles to enable their future success.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 53. 
17 
 
 
Although our interpretation is specific to this statute, we 
have, in other contexts, recognized that a separate incident or 
episode is required to satisfy statutory requirements.  In 
Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 59 (2017), we concluded 
that G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a), the habitual criminal statute, 
"requires that the underlying convictions arise from separate 
incidents or episodes of criminal behavior" in order to satisfy 
the definition of habitual criminal as one "twice convicted."  
The statutory language at issue was as follows: 
"Whoever is convicted of a felony and has been previously 
twice convicted and sentenced to [S]tate prison or [S]tate 
correctional facility or a [F]ederal corrections facility 
for a term not less than [three] years . . . shall be 
considered a habitual criminal and shall be punished . . . 
for such felony for the maximum term provided by law." 
 
Garvey, supra at 61, quoting G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a). 
 
The statute itself, like the one before us, did not 
expressly require separate incidents.  It simply stated, 
"[w]hoever is twice convicted."  G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a).  
Recognizing that the statutory language was not clear as to "the 
issue whether the necessary two prior convictions must relate to 
different criminal incidents," we looked to the history of the 
statute, our past decisions, the statutory effects, and the rule 
of lenity, as we do in the instant case.  Garvey, 477 Mass. at 
62.  We emphasized that "the constant concept throughout [the 
legislative history] was the Legislature's focus on separate 
18 
 
prior incidents."  Id. at 63.  Here, we do not have past 
statutory language for guidance, but we do have clear 
legislative intent to limit juvenile involvement in the juvenile 
justice system, avoid criminal records and the consequences 
thereof, and provide juveniles with a second chance, all of 
which support the separate incident approach. 
 
As for the statutory effects, we stated in Garvey, 477 
Mass. at 66-67: 
"taking the Commonwealth's proposed interpretation of 
§ 25 (a) to its logical conclusion, the Commonwealth, in 
its discretion, could seek a habitual offender enhancement 
for any single incident in which a defendant committed 
three felonies, by parsing them into two separate 
prosecutions . . . .  Thus, the statute's application would 
depend not on habitual criminal conduct but on how the 
Commonwealth chooses to prosecute any one criminal episode.  
This cannot be what the Legislature intended." 
 
The same logic applies here.  As explained above, the 
Commonwealth's decision to charge juveniles with multiple minor 
misdemeanors cannot defeat the Legislature's intention of 
providing juveniles with a second chance for minor misdemeanor 
conduct and protection from criminal records for such first 
offenses.  See Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 790 ("Legislature 
intended to excuse a juvenile's first isolated instance of such 
misconduct"); Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 572-573 (discussing how 
creation of CARI record may adversely affect juveniles).  A 
19 
 
single brief episode can too easily generate multiple minor 
misdemeanor charges.9 
 
Finally, we concluded in Garvey that to the extent the 
statute was ambiguous, "the rule of lenity supports the 
interpretation advocated by the defendant and accepted by us."  
Garvey, 477 Mass. at 67, citing Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 
Mass. 455, 469 (2016).  The same is true here.  Indeed, as 
explained above, the rule of lenity is not only a canon of 
construction in the juvenile delinquency context, but also a 
statutory mandate.  See Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 
497, 506 (2017).  This statutory command of lenient construction 
supports the interpretation that "a first offense of a [minor] 
misdemeanor" in § 52 refers to a first episode of minor 
misdemeanor misconduct. 
 
Our interpretation of "first offense of a [minor] 
misdemeanor" has no effect on charges of major misdemeanors or 
felonies.  Where a juvenile is charged with greater offenses 
alongside minor misdemeanors and all charges arise from the same 
episode of misconduct, the Commonwealth may proceed with the 
                                                          
 
 
9 Of course, even without the adoption of the first episode 
interpretation, there is no support whatsoever for the 
Commonwealth's argument that all it needs to do is allege two 
offenses to avoid the statutory exclusion.  We rejected this 
probable cause approach in Wallace W.  Until a first offense has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, no such offense has been 
established.  See Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 801. 
20 
 
greater offenses without a Wallace W. hearing.  Neither § 52 nor 
our holding in Wallace W. excludes the first commission of 
greater offenses from the definition of delinquent child.10  
However, the inclusion of greater charges in a complaint that 
also charges one or more minor misdemeanors does not mean that 
the minor misdemeanors may move to arraignment.  To do so would 
be contrary to legislative intent to excuse instances of minor 
misdemeanor behavior where that behavior is the juvenile's first 
instance of misconduct.  First episodes of minor misdemeanor 
level conduct must be dismissed as a first offense, even if they 
are accompanied by more serious charges.11 
 
Because the juveniles before the court today do not have 
any prior adjudications of delinquency, the minor misdemeanor 
                                                          
 
 
10 Frederick and Angela dispute the notion that resisting 
arrest, a major misdemeanor, should not be dismissed on a first 
episode of misconduct, particularly where it is the only 
remaining charge after the dismissal of minor misdemeanors.  
Section 52 does not forbid the Commonwealth from proceeding with 
this charge; the Legislature has made no exception in § 52 for 
the major misdemeanor of resisting arrest, and "[w]here the 
Legislature did not include an exception in a statute, this 
court will not create one."  Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019).  
We do note, however, that the charge of resisting arrest, 
particularly when brought in a marginal case, may defeat the 
Legislature's over-all intent of providing the juvenile with a 
second chance. 
 
 
11 The Legislature has not clarified the ambiguity in § 52 
that led to the Wallace W. decision, but we repeat that the 
Legislature could enact further legislation to specify the 
definition of "first offense of a [minor] misdemeanor" and the 
mechanism by which such an offense is to be proved. 
21 
 
charges against them must be dismissed.  The dismissal of 
charges against Manolo, Frederick, and Angela of disorderly 
conduct and disturbing the peace, and the dismissal of charges 
against Frederick and Angela of interfering with a police 
officer, were therefore proper.  The major misdemeanor of 
resisting arrest charges against Manolo, Frederick, and Angela, 
as well as the major misdemeanor assault and battery on a police 
officer charge against Manolo, may proceed directly to 
arraignment without a Wallace W. hearing.12 
 
b.  Humberto H. motions.  Angela argues that a Juvenile 
Court judge is compelled to hold a hearing to establish probable 
cause pursuant to Humberto H. whenever the Commonwealth brings a 
charge that might be a child's first offense of a misdemeanor.  
See Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 575-576.  Only after a Humberto H. 
probable cause hearing, Angela argues, should a Juvenile Court 
judge proceed to conduct a Wallace W. analysis in some limited 
circumstances.  We disagree. 
                                                          
 
 
12 Prior to his dismissal, Thomas pleaded delinquent to a 
greater charge, and he indicated that he did not oppose his 
arraignment on minor misdemeanor charges.  The record does not 
include Thomas's age or any indication whether he had a 
delinquency record prior to the events.  However, our holding 
today makes clear that if he was between twelve and eighteen 
years of age at the time of the incident and had no prior 
record, the Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction over his minor 
misdemeanor charges.  Those proceedings must cease, and the case 
must be dismissed.  See Lazlo L., 482 Mass. at 335.  Any 
judgment on those charges is void for lack of jurisdiction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 Mass. 72, 76 (2016). 
22 
 
 
Humberto H. allows, but does not require, a juvenile to 
move to dismiss a complaint for lack of probable cause before 
arraignment.  Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 575-576 (Juvenile Court 
judge has discretion to hear and rule on motion to dismiss prior 
to arraignment due to lack of probable cause).  A judge is 
certainly not mandated to require a Humberto H. hearing in every 
case.  As we stated in Humberto H., "[p]robable cause is 
considerably less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, so 
evidence that is insufficient to support a guilty verdict might 
be more than sufficient to establish probable cause."  Id. at 
565.  Given this much lower burden of proof, many cases do not 
merit a Humberto H. challenge or hearing. 
 
c.  General Laws c. 264, § 11.  Manolo, Frederick, and 
Angela were all charged with inciting a riot13 in violation of 
G. L. c. 264, § 11, which states in part: 
"Whoever by speech or by exhibition, distribution or 
promulgation of any written or printed document, paper or 
pictorial representation advocates, advises, counsels or 
incites assault upon any public official, or the killing of 
any person, or the unlawful destruction of real or personal 
property, or the overthrow by force or violence or other 
unlawful means of the government of the commonwealth or of 
the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not more than three years, or in jail for 
not more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not 
                                                          
 
 
13 The words "inciting a riot" appear nowhere in the 
statute, nor does the statute deal with assembly.  The phrase 
"riot, incite" was used as a charge code for § 11 on the 
complaints against the juveniles, but it is unclear from where 
this language comes.  We focus our analysis on the language of 
the statute, not this extrastatutory idea of a riot. 
23 
 
more than [$1,000]; provided, that this section shall not 
be construed as reducing the penalty now imposed for the 
violation of any law." 
 
The statute also prohibits anyone convicted of a violation from 
working as a teacher or school administrator, regardless of 
whether any punishment was imposed.  G. L. c. 264, § 11.14 
 
In its brief to this court, the Commonwealth conceded that 
there was not probable cause to support the charge against 
Frederick and Angela.  It is pursuing the charge against Manolo, 
who yelled, "Mother fucker you wanna go!  Let's go!" at an 
officer and took up a fighting stance against him.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the Juvenile Court judge's dismissal 
of the charge against Manolo was improper both because there was 
sufficient probable cause and because the judge's determination 
that the statute lacked vitality and was inapplicable was 
incorrect.  Manolo counters that there is no probable cause to 
support the complaint, and that we should further find that 
G. L. c. 264, § 11, is overbroad and unconstitutional in 
violation of the First Amendment to the United States 
                                                          
 
 
14 The ban on teaching or working as a school administrator 
for anyone convicted in violation of § 11 is presumably a 
remnant of historical concern for spreading communist thought.  
See St. 1948, c. 160, § 1 (enacting this part of statute); 1948 
House Doc. No. 220 (bill proposed in same year banning 
communists from teaching in Massachusetts).  The validity of 
this ban was not raised by the parties and is outside the scope 
of our analysis. 
24 
 
Constitution and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.15 
 
i.  Probable cause.  We begin with the probable cause 
determination.  Our review of the dismissal of a complaint is de 
novo, as the question of probable cause is a question of law (as 
is the Juvenile Court judge's complete dismissal of the statute 
in this case).  Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 566.  "To establish 
probable cause, the complaint application must set forth 
reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable or prudent person in believing that the defendant has 
committed the offense" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 
565.  The complaint clearly does not meet this burden.  Manolo's 
only speech was yelling at Vaughan, "Mother fucker you wanna go!  
Let's go!"  These words, in combination with his fighting stance 
and attempts to hit Vaughn, may be sufficient to establish 
probable cause of an assault and attempted battery against the 
officer, but they were not speech that "advocates, advises, 
counsels or incites" anyone else to assault the officer.  G. L. 
c. 264, § 11.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13D (punishment for assault 
and battery on public employee engaged in performance of 
                                                          
 
 
15 In this context, "we apply the same analysis under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 16 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 481 Mass. 352, 365 n.13 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
910 (2020). 
25 
 
duties).16  The complaint does not allege, directly or 
indirectly, that Manolo intended anyone other than the person at 
whom his speech and actions were directed, Vaughn, to react.  
Nor does the complaint allege that Manolo took any action that 
could be understood as communicating a desire for others to join 
him, like gesturing for his peers to join him in the assault.  
Even presuming constitutionality of the relevant part of the 
statute, there would not be probable cause to support a 
complaint here.  Manolo's angry reaction does not attempt to 
"incite[] assault upon any public official" by anyone else; it 
merely accompanies his own violent actions.  G. L. c. 264, § 11. 
 
ii.  Constitutionality.  It is our general practice not to 
decide constitutional questions "unless they must necessarily be 
reached" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 
739, 743 (2009).  We follow this guidance here, but with one 
caveat.  The statute must be read consistently with the 
requirements of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Brandenburg, which addressed a statute containing similar 
language and sharing a similar historic purpose. 
 
Section 11 was passed during the "first red scare" in the 
late 1910s and early 1920s and was expressly aimed at combatting 
                                                          
 
 
16 The parties contest whether a police officer is a public 
official for purposes of this statute.  Because we find that 
there is no probable cause even assuming a police officer is a 
qualifying public official, we need not reach this argument. 
26 
 
anarchist political activity.  St. 1919, c. 191.17  It was 
amended and further used in the "second red scare" of the 1940s 
and 1950s as part of a legislative package increasing penalties 
related to "subversive organizations" such as the Communist 
Party.  See St. 1954, c. 584, §§ 3-5 (similarly amending 
statutes in G. L. c. 264 pertaining to membership in subversive 
organizations, destruction or concealment of records of 
subversive organizations, and funding of subversive 
organizations).  See also St. 1951, c. 805, § 3 (declaring 
Communist Party "unlawful" and "subversive organization").  The 
origins and purpose of the statute considered by the Supreme 
Court in Brandenburg also date back to syndicalism concerns that 
informed the passage of § 11.18 
                                                          
 
 
17 The preamble to § 11 states, in part, "There is now in 
this commonwealth a considerable number of persons, mainly non-
residents, who are striving to promote anarchy in the community 
and who are inciting others to acts of violence with a view to 
the overthrow of all government; and . . . Legislation is 
necessary to provide for the prompt repression of these 
attempts; therefore this act is hereby declared to be an 
emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public safety."  St. 1919, c. 191. 
 
 
18 Other States also passed syndicalism statutes in the 
early 1900s.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) 
("From 1917 to 1920, identical or quite similar [syndicalism] 
laws were adopted by [twenty] States and two territories").  The 
Supreme Court originally found these laws constitutional in 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927), but later 
reversed in Brandenburg, supra at 447-449.  Some Federal courts 
had already found such State laws unconstitutional as vague and 
overly broad.  See McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 
850-852 (E.D. Ky. 1967) (Kentucky sedition law both 
27 
 
 
The Ohio criminal syndicalism statute at issue in 
Brandenburg punished  
"persons who 'advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or 
propriety' of violence 'as a means of accomplishing 
industrial or political reform'; or who publish or 
circulate or display any book or paper containing such 
advocacy; or who 'justify' the commission of violent acts 
'with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety 
of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism'; or who 
'voluntarily assemble' with a group formed 'to teach or 
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.'" 
 
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.  In interpreting this statute, the 
Supreme Court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action. . . .  A statute which fails to draw this distinction 
impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments [to the United States Constitution].  
                                                          
 
unconstitutional and preempted as applied to communist 
sedition); Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564, 569 (N.D. Miss. 
1967) (Mississippi syndicalism statute facially invalid as 
overbroad).  One State court held that the laws were valid but 
required reading in constitutional limitations.  People v. 
Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 505-506 (1967).  Since Brandenburg, at 
least one State court has acknowledged the invalidity of these 
statutes, and many States have repealed them.  See In re Harris, 
20 Cal. App. 3d 632, 634 (1971); White, The Crime of Economic 
Radicalism:  Criminal Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial 
Workers of the World, 1917-1927, 85 Or. L. Rev. 649, 760-761 & 
n.628 (2006).  Montana amended its criminal syndicalism statute 
to a criminal incitement statute, the elements of which mimic 
the Brandenburg test.  See 1999 Mont. Laws c. 350. 
28 
 
It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution 
has immunized from governmental control."  Id. at 447-448.  The 
same limiting principle obviously applies here.  Its specific 
application, however, to the different parts of this multipart 
statute we decline to decide, absent an actual case or 
controversy requiring resolution of the constitutional question.  
Compare United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518, 535-548 (4th 
Cir. 2020) (in context of addressing "Unite the Right" rally in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, court assessed constitutionality of 
Federal Anti-Riot Act in light of Brandenburg, concluding that 
statute could validly proscribe riot-related activity described 
by verbs "organize," "incite," "participate in," and 
"instigate," but could not prohibit other protected activity). 
 
4.  Conclusion.  We hold that "a first offense of a [minor] 
misdemeanor" in G. L. c. 119, § 52, refers to a first episode of 
minor misdemeanor level misconduct.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
dismissal of the charges of disorderly conduct and disturbing 
the peace against Manolo, Frederick, and Angela, and the charges 
of interfering with a police officer against Manolo and 
Frederick.  The Commonwealth may proceed against Manolo, 
Frederick, and Angela with the arraignment of the charges of 
resisting arrest, and against Manolo with the arraignment of the 
29 
 
charge of assault and battery on a police officer.19  We also 
conclude that there is no probable cause to support the charge 
of incitement in violation of G. L. c. 264, § 11, and hold that 
G. L. c. 264, § 11, must be read consistently with the 
limitations in Brandenburg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                          
 
 
19 Our holding as applied to the facts of this case will 
result in no Wallace W. hearings for these juveniles.  For that 
reason, we do not address the question whether the full rules of 
evidence apply in Wallace W. hearings.  This question is before 
the court in a related case, Commonwealth v. Nick N., 486 Mass.     
(2021), and is addressed there.