Case Title: Commonwealth v. Lopez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11551

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11551 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GREGORIO LOPEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 11, 2016. - July 8, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior violent conduct, State of mind, Self-
defense.  Self-Defense.  Defense of Others.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, State of mind, Argument by 
prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 15, 2009. 
 
 
The case was tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
 
David Keighley for the defendant. 
 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (David 
Fredette, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant, Gregorio "Mikey" Lopez,1 appeals 
from his conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of 
                     
 
1 The defendant's nickname was "Mikey." 
 
2 
 
 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.2  The 
defendant shot and killed his girl friend's former boy friend in 
the early morning hours of March 11, 2009.  On appeal, the 
defendant argues that a new trial is required because (1) the 
trial judge abused his discretion when he refused to permit 
evidence of the victim's prior violence against the defendant's 
girl friend to be admitted and, by doing so, denied him his 
constitutional right to present a defense; (2) the prosecutor's 
comments in his closing argument severely prejudiced the 
defense; and (3) this court should require the defendant's state 
of mind to be considered in determining whether a murder is 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty and, by applying such 
a requirement to this case, the defendant's conviction of murder 
in the first degree based on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty should be overturned.  We affirm the conviction and 
decline to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  At the time of the shooting, the defendant was staying 
with his girl friend, Desirae Ortiz, in one bedroom of a five-
bedroom apartment on Mozart Street in the Jamaica Plain section 
of Boston.  Four additional people lived in the apartment, each 
renting a separate bedroom.  The tenants shared a kitchen and a 
                     
 
2 The defendant was acquitted of carrying a firearm without 
a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
3 
 
 
bathroom.  Insofar as relevant here, Ortiz lived, and the 
defendant stayed, in one bedroom, Jenicelee Vega lived in 
another bedroom, Moises Rivera lived in a third bedroom, and 
Gricelle Alvarado and her infant son lived in a fourth bedroom.  
Vega and Alvarado are cousins.  The other individuals living in 
the apartment did not know each other prior to occupying the 
apartment.  The defendant, Ortiz, Vega, Rivera, and Alvarado 
were all home the morning of the murder. 
 
The defendant and Ortiz met during the winter of 2008-2009 
and the defendant began to stay frequently with Ortiz on Mozart 
Street beginning shortly after February, 2009.  Before dating 
the defendant, Ortiz had had a relationship with the victim.  
They had met when they were fourteen years old and had begun 
dating shortly thereafter.  They were no longer dating at the 
time of the murder.  However, Ortiz would speak with the victim 
in the months prior to the murder using the telephone at the 
house of their mutual friend.  The defendant had knowledge of 
Ortiz's prior relationship with the victim but did not know that 
she was speaking recently to the victim on the telephone. 
 
On March 10, 2009, photographs from a Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority surveillance video camera showed the 
victim at the Massachusetts Avenue station at 12:34 A.M. and 
again at the Jackson Square station in Jamaica Plain at 12:47 
A.M.  The Mozart Street apartment is a short walk from the 
4 
 
 
Jackson Square station.  At approximately 1 A.M. on March 11, 
2009, Alvarado heard "loud banging" at the front door.  She was 
in bed at the time.  At first she tried to ignore the banging, 
but as it continued, she answered the door.  She looked through 
the peephole of the front door and recognized the victim as 
Ortiz's boy friend.3  It had been a while but she had seen the 
victim at the apartment before.  Despite knowing who it was, she 
asked, "Who's this?"  The victim asked whether Ortiz was home.  
Alvarado opened the door and told the victim that she did not 
know whether Ortiz was at the apartment or if she were sleeping.  
The victim told Alvarado that Ortiz was expecting him.  Alvarado 
responded, "Well if she's expecting you, then you know what room 
is hers."  She did not show the victim to Ortiz's room but she 
saw him walk through the kitchen in the direction of Ortiz's 
bedroom.  She then returned to her bedroom. 
 
The defendant and Ortiz were asleep.  Ortiz was awakened by 
a knock on her bedroom door and the sound of the bedroom door 
opening.  At first, she did not know who it was.  She got up and 
walked toward the door, and realized that it was the victim.  
Ortiz was not expecting him that night.  The victim forced 
himself into Ortiz's bedroom and Ortiz turned on the light.  As 
Ortiz turned on the light, the victim saw the defendant in the 
                     
 
3 Gricelle Alvarado testified that she recognized the victim 
as Ortiz's boy friend; Ortiz, however, testified that she and 
the victim were no longer together. 
5 
 
 
bed, naked.  The victim, shocked by the presence of the 
defendant, threatened him.  The victim said "he was going to 
blow his head off."  The victim said that Ortiz was his "wife."  
The defendant did not respond.  Ortiz did not see the victim 
with a weapon nor did she see him hit the defendant.  At this 
point, Ortiz wanted the victim to leave so she told the 
defendant that she was going to speak to the victim outside.  
Ortiz left her cellular telephone in the bedroom.  She and the 
victim proceeded to the landing outside the front door of the 
apartment, shutting the door behind them.  The defendant 
remained in the bedroom.  The victim and Ortiz were on the 
landing for approximately forty-five minutes.  Ortiz and the 
victim did not shout, yell, or argue. 
 
Meanwhile, at 1:35 A.M., Vega awoke when her cellular 
telephone rang.  The caller identification indicated that the 
call was from Ortiz's cellular telephone.  When Vega answered 
her cellular telephone, the defendant was speaking.  The 
defendant said that there was an emergency and asked Vega to 
come to Ortiz's bedroom.  Vega went to Ortiz's bedroom where the 
defendant appeared "really upset."  The defendant told Vega that 
Ortiz was outside with her former boy friend and that the former 
boy friend showed him a gun.  He asked Vega to take him up the 
street to get a gun.  Vega refused and told him that she did not 
want to become involved.  Vega left Ortiz's bedroom and did not 
6 
 
 
see the defendant leave the apartment.  Because she sensed 
something was going to happen, Vega went to Alvarado's bedroom 
and told her to get her son and leave the apartment. 
 
At approximately 1:51 A.M., while she was in Alvarado's 
bedroom, Vega received another telephone call from the 
defendant, who was still using Ortiz's cellular telephone.  He 
told her that he was around the corner.  At one point while the 
defendant was not there, Alvarado became "curious" so she went 
to look through the peephole of the front door.  She saw Ortiz 
and the victim on the landing.4  She then returned to her 
bedroom.  At approximately 2:05 A.M., Vega received a third 
telephone call from the defendant.  He told Vega to tell the 
"guy" not to go anywhere and that he was on his way.  After the 
telephone calls, Vega went back to her room while Alvarado 
continued to get ready to leave the apartment.  A short time 
later, Vega saw the defendant enter the house through the back 
door.  She saw a "long, brown" gun in his hand that looked like 
a shotgun.  Alvarado saw the defendant walking down the hallway 
with a gun that looked like a rifle.  When she saw the 
defendant, Alvarado yelled at him to "stop, hold on" and to 
allow her and her son to leave.  At this time, the defendant was 
                     
 
4 Vega also was curious when the defendant left the 
apartment.  She looked through the peephole and saw Ortiz and 
the victim having a conversation.  She did not see any physical 
confrontations or hear any arguing. 
7 
 
 
standing about two feet away from the front door.  The defendant 
responded, "Go ahead, go get your little man." 
 
Alvarado returned to her bedroom, picked up her son, and 
started to walk toward Vega's bedroom, walking past the 
defendant.  Alvarado knocked on Vega's bedroom door and as Vega 
opened the door, she saw the defendant with his hand on the 
doorknob, looking through the peephole of the front door.  While 
the defendant was looking through the peephole, Vega did not 
hear fighting or shouting coming from the landing.  As Alvarado 
was entering the room and before Vega closed the door, Alvarado 
heard the front door open and she looked back to see the 
defendant raise the gun and shoot the victim.  She did not see 
anything in the victim's hands at the time he was shot.  Ortiz, 
still on the landing, saw the defendant open the door and 
without saying a word, shoot the victim.  Ortiz yelled, "No, 
Mikey, no," and, "[W]hy did you do this to me?"  The victim fell 
to the floor.  Rivera was walking to his bedroom door to go to 
the bathroom when he heard a "very loud" gunshot.  He did not 
hear arguing or shouting prior to hearing the gunshot.5  He 
checked his body and clothes for any signs of injury.  Once he 
knew he was not injured, he opened the door and saw the hands 
                     
 
5 On cross-examination, Rivera stated that he heard arguing 
immediately before the gunshot. 
8 
 
 
and shoes of the victim on the landing, the defendant at the 
front door, and Ortiz in the hallway. 
 
Rivera then saw the defendant pull the victim to the floor 
and begin to kick and curse at him.  The defendant walked toward 
Ortiz's bedroom and then returned to the landing.  The defendant 
began to grunt at the victim.  Rivera then saw the defendant 
leave the landing, return, and kick the victim again.  Ortiz 
also testified that the defendant returned to the landing three 
times, each time kicking and cursing the victim.  The defendant 
then left the apartment through the back door.  While leaving, 
he told Ortiz that he was trying to protect her. 
 
Ortiz returned to the landing and attempted to perform 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the victim.  The victim tried 
to speak to Ortiz, but his speech was "very slurred" and he 
struggled to breathe.  Alvarado, while still in Vega's room, 
telephoned 911, as did Rivera.  When the police arrived, about 
five to ten minutes after the shooting, the victim was on the 
floor of the landing with a large gunshot wound to his lower 
right chest area.  The victim also had small abrasions on his 
forehead and chin.  The victim was pronounced dead at the scene 
between 2:15 A.M. and 2:30 A.M.  The cause of death was 
determined to be a shotgun wound to the torso, with injuries to 
9 
 
 
the liver, gallbladder, bowel, pancreas, aorta, and inferior 
vena cava.6 
 
Prior to the commencement of trial, the trial judge allowed 
a motion in limine, filed by the Commonwealth, to exclude 
evidence of the victim's prior violence toward Ortiz.7  The 
defendant argued that evidence of the prior violent relationship 
between the victim and Ortiz would be relevant to the 
defendant's state of mind to support his theory of self-defense 
and defense of another and as it relates to murder in the first 
and second degrees and manslaughter.  The judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion but stated that he would reconsider if the 
evidence raised an issue of reasonable provocation, defense of 
another, or self-defense. 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of 
all the evidence, the defendant moved for a required finding of 
not guilty.  The judge denied both motions.  At the charge 
conference, the defendant argued that a jury instruction on 
extreme atrocity or cruelty should not be given because the 
judge refused to permit evidence of the prior violent 
relationship between the victim and Ortiz, thereby denying the 
                     
 
6 The vena cava is the large vein that drains blood from the 
lower extremities back to the heart. 
 
 
7 The Commonwealth also filed a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that the victim was incarcerated until March 10, 2009.  
The trial judge allowed this motion. 
10 
 
 
defendant the opportunity to present evidence of his state of 
mind and have the jury determine whether the killing was 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The judge denied 
the defendant's request.  The defense theory was that the four 
other residents of the apartment conspired to convict the 
defendant. 
 
2.  Right to a defense.  The defendant argues that the 
judge's refusal to admit evidence of the victim's prior violent 
relationship with Ortiz was an abuse of discretion because the 
evidence was admissible under Massachusetts common law, and that 
the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense was 
violated.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge properly 
excluded the evidence because the defendant failed to make a 
sufficient proffer as to the prior acts of violence, and the 
evidence was insufficient to support a claim of self-defense, 
defense of another, or manslaughter based on reasonable 
provocation.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
 
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantee a 
criminal defendant's right to present a defense."  Commonwealth 
v. Dagenais, 437 Mass. 832, 839 (2002).  However, this right is 
not absolute.  "In the face of 'legitimate demands of the 
adversarial system,' this right may be tempered according to the 
discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 
11 
 
 
Mass. 547, 552 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 
Mass. 337, 343 (1977).  The judge refused to admit evidence of 
the victim's prior violent relationship with Ortiz because he 
concluded that the evidence was irrelevant in the absence of 
evidence of sufficient provocation, self-defense,8 or defense of 
another.  The judge indicated he would consider admitting the 
evidence if evidence of provocation, self-defense, or defense of 
another were presented. 
 
Evidence of prior violent acts committed by the victim 
"known to the defendant at the time of the homicide" may be 
introduced in evidence when a claim of self-defense is raised 
"to support his assertion that he acted justifiably in 
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm."  Commonwealth v. 
Fontes, 396 Mass. 733, 735-736 (1986).  However, "[t]he 
incidents must not be remote (a discretionary matter for the 
trial judge) and other competent evidence must raise the 
question whether the defendant may have acted justifiably in his 
own defense."  Id. at 736. 
 
Here, the defendant did not establish when in time the 
prior acts of violence took place in relation to the murder, nor 
did he provide any details as to specific incidents.  The 
                     
 
8 The defendant does not claim that he was denied the 
opportunity to present evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor.  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 654 
(2005). 
12 
 
 
defendant's proffer was merely that there was a "long term 
relationship" between the victim and Ortiz and that "he beat her 
pretty regularly."  Defense counsel stated merely that he may 
inquire about one or two incidents but hoped that he did not 
have to "go into specific incidents."  He did not offer any 
details of the victim's prior acts of violence.  This proffer 
was not sufficient.  See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 51 Mass. App. 
Ct. 479, 481-482 (2001). 
 
Moreover, even if the proffer were sufficient, there was 
insufficient evidence that the defendant acted justifiably in 
his own defense.  In order for self-defense to be a viable issue 
at trial, there must be sufficient evidence to create a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant "(1) had reasonable ground 
to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily harm, from which he could save 
himself only by using deadly force, (2) had availed himself of 
all proper means to avoid physical combat before resorting to 
the use of deadly force, and (3) used no more force than was 
reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the case."  
Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 (1980).  In this 
case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, the evidence does not show that the defendant acted 
justifiably in his own defense.  Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 
393, 395 (1998). 
13 
 
 
 
A defendant must avail himself of all proper means to avoid 
a physical confrontation before he resorted to fatally shooting 
the victim.  Harrington, supra at 450.  "This rule does not 
impose an absolute duty to retreat regardless of personal safety 
considerations . . . .  [An individual] must, however, use every 
reasonable avenue of escape available to him" (citations 
omitted).  Pike, supra at 398.  See Commonwealth v. Toon, 55 
Mass. App. Ct. 642, 653-654 (2002).  In this case, the defendant 
did not use "every reasonable avenue escape available."  Pike, 
supra at 398.  After the initial verbal confrontation, the 
victim and Ortiz went to the landing outside the apartment's 
front door for approximately forty-five minutes, during which 
the defendant could have telephoned the police or taken further 
precautions such as leaving the apartment and not returning.  
Instead, the defendant made several telephone calls, left the 
apartment to retrieve a gun, returned to the apartment, allowed 
Alvarado to get her son, looked out the peephole of the front 
door, opened the front door, and then, without any warning, shot 
the victim approximately forty-five minutes after the initial 
confrontation.  Commonwealth v. Hart, 428 Mass. 614, 616 (1999) 
("Indeed, the defendant had the opportunity to retreat and did 
so, but only to return a few minutes later armed with a loaded 
handgun").  There was no evidence that the defendant here 
attempted to avoid physical combat or that it was unreasonable 
14 
 
 
for him to retreat.  Therefore, there was insufficient evidence 
to support a theory of self-defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 227 (2008).  See also Pike, 428 Mass. at 
399. 
 
Nor was there evidence to support a theory of defense of 
another.  An individual may be justified in using deadly force 
against a person in defense of another when "(a) a reasonable 
person in the actor's position would believe his intervention to 
be necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in 
the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them 
to be, the third person would be justified in using such force 
to protect himself."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 
(1976).  Although there was evidence of a threat made inside 
Ortiz's bedroom, the threat was directed at the defendant, not 
Ortiz.  There was no evidence that the victim threatened Ortiz, 
either in the apartment or on the landing.  Alvarado was the 
only witness who testified that she heard some arguing and 
yelling between a male and female; however, it is unclear 
whether the defendant was in the apartment at that time.  
Despite the fact that the defendant told Ortiz that he was 
trying to protect her, a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would not believe that Ortiz needed intervention to 
protect her from the victim, nor would it have been reasonable 
for Ortiz to have used deadly force to protect herself.  The 
15 
 
 
evidence was insufficient evidence to support a theory of 
defense of another. 
 
Last, there was insufficient evidence of adequate 
provocation to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction.  "A 
voluntary manslaughter instruction based on provocation is 
appropriate 'if there is evidence of provocation deemed adequate 
in law to cause the accused to lose his self-control in the heat 
of passion, and if the killing followed the provocation before 
sufficient time had elapsed for the accused's temper to cool.'" 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 220, cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 1079 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 Mass. 
236, 237 (1996).  Although there was evidence that the victim 
threatened the defendant inside Ortiz's bedroom, the victim did 
not lay his hands on the defendant, nor did he have a weapon at 
the time he was shot.  The only conceivable threat to the 
defendant was when the victim said that he would "blow his head 
off."  Words alone generally do not amount to sufficient 
provocation.9  Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 316 
(1999).  Even if these words caused the defendant to "lose his 
self-control in the heat of passion," the defendant had adequate 
time to compose himself and cool his temper in the forty-five 
                     
 
9 There is an exception to this general rule when a victim 
"convey[s] inflammatory information to the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 317 (1999).  This is not 
applicable in this case. 
16 
 
 
minutes between the confrontation and the shooting.  Colon, 
supra at 220.  During that time, the defendant left the 
apartment and returned with a loaded firearm.  "Our cases 
suggest that even where sufficient provocation exists, if a 
defendant leaves the scene of the provocation (as here) and then 
returns to attack the victim, the defendant is considered to 
have had adequate opportunity for his anger to subside."  
Commonwealth v. Keohane, 444 Mass. 563, 568 (2005).  Even if 
adequate provocation existed, the defendant had a sufficiently 
reasonable amount of time to cool off.  A voluntary manslaughter 
instruction was not warranted. 
 
Because there was insufficient evidence to support a theory 
of self-defense, defense of another, or sufficient provocation, 
evidence of a prior violent relationship between the victim and 
Ortiz was not relevant.  The judge did not abuse his discretion 
in excluding such evidence, and the defendant's constitutional 
right to present a defense was not violated. 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that certain comments made by the prosecutor during his closing 
argument unfairly prejudiced him where the prosecutor invited 
the jury to draw inferences from the absence of evidence 
regarding the victim's prior violence toward Ortiz that the 
Commonwealth successfully requested to exclude.  Additionally, 
17 
 
 
the defendant argues that the prosecutor took advantage of the 
absence of the evidence.  We disagree. 
 
The defendant takes issue with the comments made by the 
prosecutor in his closing argument to the effect that the 
defendant shot the victim because he was jealous, angry, 
humiliated, and embarrassed.10  Because defense counsel requested 
a mistrial at the conclusion of closing arguments, we review for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Hrabak, 440 Mass. 650, 653-
654 (2004). 
 
In the closing arguments, a prosecutor may argue the 
evidence, draw conclusions, and assist the jury in evaluating 
and analyzing the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 
Mass. 422, 437 (2008); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 
750 (1999).  However, "[a] prosecutor is barred from referring 
in closing argument to matter that has been excluded from 
evidence . . . and a prosecutor should also refrain from 
inviting an inference from the jury about the same excluded 
subject matter" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 
412 Mass. 505, 508 (1992).  Additionally, a prosecutor may not 
                     
 
10 For example, the prosecutor in his closing statement 
stated:  "This man right here Gregorio Lopez was jealous.  He 
was angry.  He had just been in that bedroom.  His girlfriend, 
new girlfriend of three months, the girl is changing his life.  
The girl is helping him move away from his mother's house.  He 
was living there.  Her old boyfriend came back at 1:30 in the 
morning, forced his way into that bedroom, humiliated him and 
made him angry.  He was jealous.  And he didn't call 911." 
18 
 
 
exploit the absence of evidence that was excluded at his or her 
request.  Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 732 (2005).  In 
this case, the defendant concedes that the prosecutor never made 
a direct reference to the excluded evidence (prior violent 
relationship).  Rather, he contends that the prosecutor took 
unfair advantage of the absence of excluded evidence when 
arguing motive, which the defendant could not contradict without 
the excluded evidence.  We disagree. 
 
The prosecutor was responding to defense counsel's closing 
argument where he said that the four other occupants of the 
apartment conspired to convict the defendant.  The prosecutor 
was merely drawing reasonable inferences and conclusions from 
the evidence.  Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 421 
(1978).  The prosecutor focused on the fact that the victim, who 
the defendant knew had been Ortiz's former boy friend, 
unexpectedly barged into the bedroom that the defendant shared 
with Ortiz.  The victim had referred to Ortiz as his "wife."  
Ortiz and the victim then left and were alone together for 
approximately forty-five minutes until the defendant opened the 
door and, without warning, shot the victim.  Vega testified that 
the defendant appeared "really upset" when she saw him alone in 
Ortiz's bedroom.  It is reasonable to infer from the evidence 
that the defendant was angry, jealous, embarrassed, and 
humiliated after the victim barged into his bedroom, where he 
19 
 
 
was naked and vulnerable.  Based on this record, it was not 
improper for the prosecutor to make these statements in his 
closing argument. 
 
Even if the prosecutor's statements were improper, they do 
not warrant reversal.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 
336, 353 (1998).  Ortiz was standing on the landing with the 
victim when the defendant opened the door and shot the victim.  
Vega, prior to the defendant's shooting the victim, received 
three telephone calls from the defendant.  In the first call the 
defendant asked Vega to drive him up the street to get a gun.  
In the second and third calls, after the defendant left the 
apartment, the defendant told Vega that he was around the corner 
and he asked her to tell the victim not to go anywhere.  She 
then saw the defendant return and look out the peephole of the 
front door, all the while with a "large, brown" gun in his hand.  
Alvarado saw the defendant raise the gun and shoot the victim as 
she was running into Vega's room.  The prosecutor's statements 
were inconsequential in the face of the overwhelming evidence of 
deliberate premeditation.  Moreover, the judge instructed the 
jury that closing arguments were not evidence, that they must 
base their decision on the evidence as they recalled it, and 
that they alone were the judges of the facts.  Additionally, the 
judge instructed the jury that motive was not an element of the 
murder but that evidence of motive may be helpful in their 
20 
 
 
analysis of the case.  The defendant suffered no prejudice by 
the comments made by the prosecutor in his closing statement. 
 
4.  Defendant's state of mind.  The defendant urges us to 
adopt the concurring opinion of then Justice Gants in 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 777 (2014) (Gants, J., 
concurring), and conclude that a defendant's state of mind, or 
intent, must be considered as an element of the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and not just in circumstances where 
the evidence suggested that the defendant had a mental 
impairment or was intoxicated by drugs or alcohol.  Where the 
defendant also was convicted of murder on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, we need not address this issue.  See Commonwealth 
v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220 (2007). 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record, we discern no basis to grant the defendant a new 
trial or reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.