Case Title: Martin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-526

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Charles MARTIN v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-526                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 21, 1997


Statutes -- scope of auxiliary officer's authority not exceeded --
     officer need not be "on duty" before he can be authorized to
     perform law enforcement functions. -- The trial court did not
     err in denying appellant's motion to suppress, nor was the
     officer required to be "on duty" in order to perform law
     enforcement functions; Ark. Code Ann.  12-9-303 (a) and
     (b)(Repl. 1995) contains no language that requires the
     auxiliary officer to be "on duty" before he or she can be
     authorized and activated to perform law enforcement functions;
     here, auxiliary officers for the county sheriff's office were
     not assigned regular work hours, and auxiliary officers could
     be called out at any time in unusual situations; the
     supervising officer specifically assigned the auxiliary
     officer the duty of following appellant's pickup after he saw
     the pickup leave the scene of the accident; the auxiliary
     officer's actions were in compliance with  12-9-303(a) and
     (b). 


     Appeal from White Circuit Court; William P. Mills, Judge;
affirmed.
     Robert Meurer, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     The court of appeals certified this appeal to us because it
involves the interpretation and construction of Ark. Code Ann. 
12-9-303(a) and (b) (Repl. 1995), as that statute establishes the
scope of an auxiliary law enforcement officer's authority. 
     Factually, this case arises from auxiliary officer Danny
Hill's observation of appellant Charles Martin driving his pickup
truck too fast around a curve and causing the truck to slide into
a telephone pole, breaking the pole in half.  Hill was not on duty
at the time, but he radioed the sheriff's office and told the
office dispatcher about the accident, and advised the dispatcher
that he would check to see if anyone was hurt.  Hill then saw the
vehicle backup and drive off.  He radioed the sheriff's office,
again, contacting Deputy Sheriff Roy Smith, who instructed Hill to
follow the truck and not let it get away.  Hill followed Martin's
vehicle until it pulled into a driveway.  When Hill pulled in
behind Martin's pickup, Martin departed his truck and started to
"take off," but Hill held him until Deputy Smith arrived on the
scene.
     Martin was arrested and charged with (1) refusing to submit to
a breathalyzer test, (2) DWI second offense, and (3) leaving the
scene of an accident.  Martin was convicted in municipal court, and
he appealed to circuit court where he moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing his arrest by Hill was unlawful because Hill was
not acting under legal authority.  The circuit court denied
Martin's motion, and afterwards, he was convicted of all three
charges.  On appeal, his sole point for reversal is that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in finding Hill
was validly performing an "assigned duty" at the time of Martin's
arrest.
     Martin relies upon  12-9-303 which in relevant part provides
as follows:
          (a)  An auxiliary law enforcement officer shall have
     the authority of a police officer as set forth by
     statutes of this state when the auxiliary law enforcement
     officer is performing an assigned duty and is under
     direct supervision of a full-time certified law
     enforcement officer.
          (b)  When not performing an assigned duty and when
     not working under the direct supervision of a full-time
     certified law enforcement officer, an auxiliary law
     enforcement officer shall have no authority other than
     that of a private citizen.
     Martin does not contend Hill was not acting under the direct
supervision of a full-time law enforcement officer.  Instead,
relying largely on provision (b) above, Martin argues Hill was not
on duty or patrol when he observed Martin's accident; nor was he on
an assigned duty as an auxiliary police officer.  Martin further
points to Hill's testimony where Hill conceded that he (and his
wife) was en route to a restaurant, was not in uniform or in a
police car, and had not previously been assigned to do anything as
a police officer.  Martin argues that, because Hill was not
performing an assigned duty when he observed Martin's actions, Hill
had no more authority than a private citizen who cannot make a
misdemeanor arrest, such as the one made of Martin.  See Brewer v.
State, 286 Ark. 1,