Case Title: Findlay v. State

Citation: 235 Kan. 462, 681 P.2d 20

Docket Number: 55,879

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1984-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
235 Kan. 462 (1984)
681 P.2d 20
IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY L. FINDLAY, A Minor Child, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 55,879

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 27, 1984.
Fred J. Logan, Jr., of Prairie Village, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Bruce W. Beye, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Dennis W. Moore, district attorney, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
Jeffrey L. Findlay appeals his juvenile offender adjudication under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code (K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1601 et seq.).
For his first issue, appellant contends the district court erred in refusing to grant him a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right.
In support of his contentions herein appellant relies heavily on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971). In McKeiver the United States Supreme Court held juveniles had no federal constitutional right, pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to trial by jury. The court, in so doing, stated:
Further:
Concluding:
Appellant's argument on this issue rests on the tenuous proposition that district court proceedings involving acts by juveniles that would constitute felonies if committed by adults are essentially criminal trials under Kansas law. This concept is in diametric conflict with the intent of the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code as specifically expressed in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1601 which provides:
We conclude there is no federal or state constitutional right to a trial by jury in proceedings under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders *464 Code (see Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 5). This result is consistent with earlier decisions of this court decided before the 1982 adoption of the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code. See Hall v. Brown, 129 Kan. 859, 861-62, 284 Pac. 396 (1930); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 121-22, 145 Pac. 871 (1915).
For his second issue appellant contends the district court's denial of his request for a jury trial constituted an abuse of discretion.
At the heart of this issue is K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1656 which provides:
Appellant interprets this statute as investing in him the right to request a jury trial. He reasons the granting or denial of the request is, therefore, a matter of judicial discretion. The argument is then made the district court was required to state its reason for denying the request in order for appellate review to be had on whether or not the court abused its discretion. Finally, appellant requests this court to set standards to be applied in determining when a jury trial should be allowed. This entire rationale is specious.
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1656 does not grant to the respondent in the juvenile offender proceeding a right to request or demand a jury trial. Rather, the statute grants to the district court the option of having a jury serve as the finder of fact rather than the court. In exercising or declining to exercise the option, the district court is not required to make findings of fact or state its reasons therefor.
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1656 relative to optional jury trials is in sharp contrast to K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1636 relative to authorization to prosecute a juvenile as an adult. The latter statute provides in part:
....
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1681 permits an appeal by the respondent from an order authorizing prosecution as an adult only after conviction unless the order attaches to future acts. K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1682 permits the State to appeal from an order denying authorization to prosecute the respondent as an adult.
*466 We conclude allowance of or failure to allow trial by jury in a juvenile offender proceeding pursuant to K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1656: (1) is entirely at the district court's option; (2) involves no rights of either the State or the respondent; and (3) is not subject to appellate review.
The final issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding the appellant had uttered a terroristic threat contrary to K.S.A. 21-3419.
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 38-1654 imposes upon juvenile offender proceedings the same burden of proof as in criminal cases  proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Pham, 234 Kan. 649, 675 P.2d 848 (1984), the applicable test on appellate review was stated as follows:
K.S.A. 21-3419 provides:
In the instant action the State had to establish:
1. The respondent threatened to commit violence;
See PIK Crim.2d 56.23.
In applying the heretofore stated appropriate standard of review, we conclude the evidence amply supports the district court's adjudication. Respondent believed a Mr. Clarence Capper owed him money. On April 15, 1983, respondent telephoned *467 Mr. Capper in Johnson County and demanded payment of the debt. The victim testified in part as follows:
"Q. What did Mr. Findlay say to you?
For clarification, the individual referred to as the "biker" also talked to the victim in the same telephone call and threatened to kill the victim. This occurred after the respondent had talked to the victim. Respondent admitted a conversation occurred but denied uttering a threat.
The judgment is affirmed.