Case Title: Walker v. City of Birmingham

Citation: 181 So. 2d 493

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1965-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 So. 2d 493 (1965)
Ex parte Wyatt Tee Walker et al.
In re Wyatt Tee WALKER et al.
v.
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.
6 Div. 999.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 9, 1965.
Rehearing Denied January 20, 1966.
*495 Arthur D. Shores and Orzell Billingsley, Jr., Birmingham, Norman C. Amaker, Leroy Clark, Jack Greenberg and Constance Baker Motley, New York City, for petitioners.
J. M. Breckenridge and Earl McBee, Birmingham, for respondent.
COLEMAN, Justice.
We review by certiorari convictions of petitioners for criminal contempt for violating a temporary injunction issued by the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, in equity.
On April 10, 1963, the City of Birmingham, a municipal corporation, presented its verified bill of complaint to one of the judges of the Tenth Judicial Circuit. The bill prayed for temporary and permanent injunctions. The judge to whom the bill was presented ordered the temporary injunction to issue upon the City's making bond for $2,500.00. The prescribed bond was filed and injunction issued out of the circuit court and was served on certain of petitioners.
The return of the sheriff shows that a copy of the injunction was personally served on petitioners as follows:
On Martin Luther King, A. D. King, F. L. Shuttlesworth, Wyatt Tee Walker, and Ralph Abernathy on April 11, 1963, at 1:00 a. m.;
On John Thomas Porter on April 12, 1963, at 4:13 p. m.; and
On N. H. Smith, Jr. on April 15, 1963, at 8:35 a. m.
We have not found a return of the sheriff showing service on the other petitioners who were adjudged to be in contempt. Notice to those not personally served is hereinafter discussed.
The injunction recites in part as follows:
On April 11, 12, and 13, 1963, certain meetings were held at which some or all of petitioners were present.
On April 11, 1963, "The Revs. King, Abernathy, and Shuttlesworth were seated *496 at the round table." Several copies of "a news bulletin put out by the Alabama Christians for Human Rights" were brought there by "Rev. Wyatt Tee Walker." After the bulletin was distributed to members of the press, "* * * Rev. Martin Luther King took one copy of it and read verbatim the entire text." The paper he read appears in the record as follows:
"COMPLAINANT'S EXHIBIT 2 "NEWS from
"ALABAMA CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 5051/2 No. 17th Street B'ham, Ala.
*497 "* * * Shuttlesworth read from a typed statement more or less re-affirming what was said in the statement that was read by Rev. King." Shuttlesworth made the statement:
J. Walter Johnson, Jr., reporter for Associated Press, testified:
Elvin Stanton, news director for WSGN Radio, testified that he was present at a meeting on April 11th, and that:
Petitioners did not obtain a permit to march or parade. A march or parade occurred on Friday, April 12, and another march occurred on the streets of Birmingham on Sunday, April 14, 1963.
Willie B. Painter, investigator with Alabama Department of Public Safety, testified that he observed the Friday march, that several of petitioners entered a church, that within several minutes a group came out of the church and began a parade or march in the direction of downtown Birmingham, that:
The witness, Painter, further testified that he was present at a church from 2:30 or 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, April 14, 1963; that he observed the petitioner, Walker, talking to a group "and forming a group of people two or three abreast"; that a group came out of the church and began walking rapidly along the sidewalk; that "this large crowd of people that had gathered outside the church began moving along with them"; that there were several hundred people within this group; that an object struck the windshield of one of the city motors and broke the windshield; that the witness saw a negro man throw a brick which "passed within a close range of one of the police officers there in the street on duty."
James Ware, newspaper photographer, testified that a rock, "About the size of a large grapefruit" hit him on the back of the head and caused a knot which was still sore; that a lot of people were "hollering, apparently at the policemen making the arrests"; that the witness saw only two rocks but heard several more falling around him; that he was concentrating on taking pictures of what was happening; that he identified A. D. King and Wyatt Tee Walker in the picture.
The witness Ware identified four pictures, which were introduced into evidence and are before us. Ware identified the pictures as being pictures which he took of the paraders on Sunday afternoon. The pictures show people walking in and entirely occupying a street from curb to curb on each side and on the sidewalks.
On Monday, April 15, 1963, the City of Birmingham filed petition alleging that respondents had violated the injunction and praying that rule nisi issue to respondents requiring them to show cause why they should not be adjudged and punished for contempt. Rule nisi did issue, hearing was had, and those respondents who have applied *499 for certiorari were adjudged guilty of contempt of the circuit court and committed to the sheriff for five days and fined Fifty dollars each. We review this judgment by certiorari.
On the same Monday, April 15, 1963, respondents filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction which had been issued on April 10, 1963.
During the hearing on the charge that petitioners had violated the injunction, the trial court stated the issues presented by the evidence as follows:
Petitioners do not appear to deny the charge that they, or a number of them, did parade or march without a permit contrary to the order temporarily enjoining them "* * * from engaging, sponsoring, inciting or encouraging mass street parades or mass processions or like demonstrations within a permit * * *."
Petitioners, on page 3 of brief, filed in this court July 19, 1963, admit that "After issuance of the injunctive order, petitioners and others continued their participation in these protest demonstrations and accordingly were held in contempt of the injunctive decree." On page 3 of brief petitioners say:
In the light of petitioners' statement in brief, it would be difficult to decide that petitioners did not violate the temporary injunction against engaging in mass street parades without a permit. Petitioners did engage in and incite others to engage in mass street parades and neither petitioners nor anyone else had obtained a permit to parade on the streets of Birmingham.
Petitioners argue that the injunctive order is void and, for that reason, the judgment of contempt is void.
*500 The circuit court, in equity, is a court of general equity jurisdiction and has power to issue injunctions. Section 144 of Constitution of 1901 recites:
§§ 1038 and 1039, Title 7, Code 1940, recite:
Petitioners do not argue that there was any failure to observe procedural requirements in the issuance of the injunction. We discuss later the question of lack of service on some petitioners.
Petitioners rest their case on the proposition that Section 1159 of the General City Code of Birmingham, which regulates street parades, is void because it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore, the temporary injunction is void as a prior restraint on the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and assembly.
It is to be remembered that petitioners are charged with violating a temporary injunction. We are not reviewing a denial of a motion to dissolve or discharge a temporary injunction. Petitioners did not file any motion to vacate the temporary injunction until after the Friday and Sunday parades. Instead, petitioners deliberately defied the order of the court and did engage in and incite others to engage in mass street parades without a permit.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said:
"`We regard this argument as unsound. It has been held, it is true, *501 that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 5 S. Ct. 724, 28 L. Ed. 1117; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 26 L. Ed. 861. But even if the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Johnson's petition, and if this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, this court, and this court alone, could decide that such was the law. It and it alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the case was properly before it. On that question, at least, it was its duty to permit argument, and to take the time required for such consideration as it might need. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 387, 4 S. Ct. 510, [514] 28 L. Ed. 462, 465. Until its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had authority, from the necessity of the case, to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition, just as the state court was bound to refrain from further proceedings until the same time. Rev.Stat. § 766, act of March 3, 1893, c. 226, 27 Stat. 751 * * *. The fact that the petitioner was entitled to argue his case shows what needs no proof, that the law contemplates the possibility of a decision either way, and therefore must provide for it.' 203 U.S. 573, 27 S. Ct. 166, 51 L. Ed. 319.
No useful purpose would be served by further discussion of this point. See concurring opinion of Harlan, J., in In Re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 693, 82 S. Ct. 1114, 8 L. Ed. 2d 198.
We hold that the circuit court had the duty and authority, in the first instance, to determine the validity of the ordinance, and, until the decision of the circuit court is reversed for error by orderly review, either by the circuit court or a higher court, the orders of the circuit court based on its decision are to be respected and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished. Howat v. State of Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S. Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550.
*503 Petitioners Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, A. D. King, Wyatt Tee Walker, and F. L. Shuttlesworth, are named in the injunction and were served with a copy on April 11, 1963. That they were active in inciting others to parade and actively participated in the parades or marches after they were served with a copy of the injunction is clearly shown by the testimony. Petitioners do not seem to argue in brief to the contrary. As to those five of the petitioners last named the judgment is due to be and is affirmed.
Petitioner Porter was served with a copy of the injunction on April 12, 1963, at 4:13 p. m. There is testimony that with respect to his participation in the parade on Sunday, April 14, 1963, "Rev. Porter stated that he was one of the leaders." There is other testimony that he engaged in the Sunday parade. The judgment against him is affirmed.
The general rule is that one who violates an injunction is guilty of contempt, although he is not a party to the injunction suit, if he has notice or knowledge of the injunction order, and is within the class of persons whose conduct is intended to be restrained, or acts in concert with such a person. See 15 A.L.R. 387, and authorities there cited.
The instant injunction enjoins the named respondents "and all other persons in active concert or participation with the respondents to this action." As to the petitioners who were not named as parties in the bill, or were not served with a copy of the injunction, we come now to consider the evidence going to show their knowledge of the terms of the injunction with respect to parades and the conduct of such petitioners in participating in the parades or marches.
Petitioners Hayes, Smith, and Fisher were not served with a copy of the injunction until after the Sunday march. Each of them participated in the Sunday parade and there is evidence that each of them had knowledge of the injunction prior to that parade. Fisher testified that he attended the Friday and Saturday meetings. He also testified:
The witness Jones, City Detective, referring to Hayes, testified that:
Jones also testified that petitioner Smith stated that he "had knowledge of the injunction" prior to his participation in the Sunday parade.
We think it would require of the trial court an unduly naive credulity to declare that the court erred in concluding that Hayes and Fisher had knowledge that marching on the streets was enjoined and that they knowingly and deliberately violated the injunction by marching or parading *504 on Sunday. As to Hayes and Fisher the judgment against them is affirmed.
As to petitioner Smith we reach a different result. Smith was not a party to the suit and was not served with a copy of the injunction prior to the Sunday March. He was bound, alike with other members of the public, to observe its restrictions when known, to the extent that he must not aid or abet its violation by others, and the power of the court to proceed against one so offending and punish for the contemptuous conduct is inherent and indisputable. Garrigan v. United States, 7 Cir., 163 F. 16, 89 C.C.A. 494, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 1295. But, in order to convict a person of contempt where he is not a party and has not been served with a copy of the order, it must be shown clearly that he had knowledge of the order for the injunction in such a way that it can be held that he understood it, and with that knowledge committed a wilful violation of the order. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 8 Cir., 124 F. 736.
There is evidence that Smith "had knowledge" of the injunction and he testified that he had heard about the injunction on the radio, "Maybe Saturday," before the Sunday March. It may well be that Smith was fully advised of the terms of the injunction, but we think a finding to that effect must rest on speculation rather than on a reasonable inference from the testimony. The injunction restrains acts other than parading. Knowledge of other enjoined acts would not be knowledge of the injunction against parading. We hold that it is not clearly shown that Smith had knowledge of the injunction in such a way that it can be held that he understood it and with that knowledge committed a wilful violation of the injunction. The judgment of contempt against Smith is quashed.
We have not found in the record where petitioners Young and Bevel were served with a copy of the injunction. We have not found evidence to show that either of them participated in the march on either Friday or Sunday. We are not persuaded that the evidence sustains the judgment of contempt against them, and as to Young and Bevel the judgment holding them in contempt is quashed.
Affirmed in part.
Quashed in part.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.