Case Title: LC v. TL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
LC v. TL1994 WY 29870 P.2d 374Case Number: 93-135, 93-136Decided: 03/15/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
LC,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

TL, 
L, and TJ, a Minor Child, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

L 
and TL,

 Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

LC, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County, John T. Langdon, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dennis 
M. Grant, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellees:

Franklin 
D. Bayless, Bayless & Slater, Cheyenne.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant ("LC") 
brought this action, No. 93-135, against TL, her ex-husband ("L"), and TJ, TL's 
child, to establish his paternity to the child. The district court concluded 
that LC lacked standing to bring the action and dismissed his complaint with 
prejudice. LC appeals that decision. In a cross-appeal, No. 93-136, L and TL 
appeal the district court's denial of attorney fees.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court in both appeals.

[¶3]      LC raises the 
following issues:

Did 
the district court err in dismissing the appellant's complaint for paternity 
with prejudice?

Is 
the case rendered moot because of the amendment of Wyoming Statute § 
14-2-104(c)?

Did 
the district court err in determining that the appellant had no standing to 
pursue paternity as a presumed father pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 
14-2-102(a)(iv)?

Did 
the district court err in denying the appellant a hearing to establish paternity 
and thereby denying the appellant due process and equal protection under the 
United States and Wyoming Constitutions?

[¶4]      In their 
cross-appeal, L and TL present the following issue:

Whether 
the district court erred in failing to award attorney fees to [L] and [TL], 
appellants, as against [LC], appellee, based upon W.S. 14-2-114 authorizing a 
court to order reasonable fees of counsel in paternity proceedings and/or 
pursuant to Rule 11, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing a court to 
award attorney fees because the pleadings are not well grounded in fact or law 
and are interposed for an improper purpose.

[¶5]      Ostensibly, this 
case comes to us as a dismissal for lack of standing. However, the record does 
not reveal whether the action was dismissed under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or 41. LC 
believes that the dismissal was under Rule 41. We do not agree. The dismissal 
could not have been pursuant to 41(a), since that applies only to voluntary 
dismissals. This clearly was not a voluntary dismissal.

[¶6]      Rule 41(b) 
applies where the plaintiff has failed to: prosecute his claim, comply with the 
rules of civil procedure, or show that he has a right to relief after he has 
presented his evidence in a trial before a judge without a jury, none of which 
is applicable in this case. This action, therefore, was not dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 41.

[¶7]      This case is 
properly characterized as a dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) because the 
district court dismissed based upon the parties' pleadings and memoranda with no 
fact finding or evidentiary hearing having been held. When a motion to dismiss 
is determined upon matters outside of the pleadings, it is automatically 
converted to a summary judgment motion. See Stalkup v. State Dep't of 
Environmental Quality, 838 P.2d 705, 708-09 (Wyo. 1992); Landmark, Inc. 
v. Stockmen's Bank & Trust Co., 680 P.2d 471, 474-75 (Wyo. 1984). Here 
the district court considered matters outside of the pleadings and its decision, 
therefore, was a ruling under W.R.C.P. 56. Accordingly, we will use our 
well-established standard for summary judgment in our examination of this case. 

FACTS

[¶8]      L and TL were 
married July 9, 1982. From April 1984 to February 1987, L, who was in the Air 
Force, was stationed in England. However, in September 1986, TL and their two 
sons returned to the United States. LC and TL began an intimate relationship in 
November of 1986, during TL and L's marriage. L had a vasectomy in September of 
1986. L returned to Wyoming and stayed with TL during December of 1986 and 
January 1987. On September 11, 1987, TL gave birth to TJ.

[¶9]      TL and L 
separated in April 1988 and remained separated until their divorce. After 
separating from L, TL moved into an apartment with LC, where she and her 
children, including TJ, lived. L and TL were divorced on January 9, 1989, and L 
was ordered to pay child support for TJ. During the time LC and TL lived 
together, LC held TJ out to the world as his own child by: letting TJ and TL 
live in his apartment rent free, supervising and caring for TJ, providing 
clothing and other items, and introducing TJ as his son to other 
persons.

[¶10]   On September 16, 1987, five days 
after the birth of TJ, LC filed a paternity action. The action was subsequently 
dismissed without prejudice. After his break-up with TL, LC filed this action on 
April 30, 1992. LC claimed he was a presumed father by virtue of his having held 
TJ out to the world as his own son and, therefore, he was entitled to blood and 
DNA tests to prove his claim. The district court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing; instead a hearing was held on a motion to dismiss by TL and L. The 
court granted the motion and ordered LC's complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 
In Case No. 93-135, LC has appealed that decision to this court.

[¶11]   L and TL moved for attorney fees 
under W.R.C.P. 11 and W.S. 14-2-114 (Cum.Supp. 1993) because, they claimed, LC's 
suit was baseless. The district court denied their motion. They appeal that 
decision in Case No. 93-136.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶12]   Our standard for the review of a 
summary judgment has been articulated by this court many times:

Summary 
judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baros v. 
Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 
1987).

"We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties."

Wagner 
v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. Laramie, 
784 P.2d 224, 226 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted).

Kilmer 
v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 
860 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Husman, Inc. v. Triton Coal Co., 
809 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Wyo. 1991), appeal after remand, 846 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 
1993)).

DISCUSSION

I. 
CASE NO. 93-135

[¶13]   As a preliminary matter, we note 
that several of the paternity statutes located at W.S. 14-2-101 to 14-2-120 were 
amended after this action had commenced. LC asserts that the amendment to W.S. 
14-2-104(c) (Cum.Supp. 1993) confers standing on him, even though the amendment 
did not take effect until after the district court had entered its order. Since 
we conclude that LC had standing under the act before it was amended, we need 
not decide this question.

[¶14]  The issue of standing is not complex. At 
common law a putative father could not bring a paternity action. CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 531 (Wyo. 1992); State by Dep't of Family Servs. v. Jennings, 
818 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Wyo. 1991). The statutory provisions contained in W.S. 
14-2-101 to 14-2-1201, the Wyoming Parentage Act, are the 
exclusive means for determining the paternity of a child and his natural father. 
CSP, at 531; AEI v. JDM, 758 P.2d 22, 23-4 (Wyo. 1988). In A v. 
X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982), we held that A had no standing to 
bring a paternity action because he was not a presumed father under any of the 
three possibilities set out in W.S. 14-2-102. Our prior cases, therefore, 
require a putative father, as a prerequisite to standing, to show that he has a 
presumption under one of the three possibilities contained in § 14-2-102. X, 
Y, and Z, at 1223.

[¶15]   Assuming that the facts alleged by 
LC are true, W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv) (1986) and our prior case law, clearly give LC 
standing to bring this action. W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv) provides:

(a) 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

* 
* * * * *

(iv) 
While the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his 
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.

We 
look at the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party who opposed 
summary judgment. LC has alleged sufficient facts in his pleadings and through 
the affidavits of other persons to support his contention that he received TJ 
into his home and held the child out as his own. Therefore, we must conclude 
that LC is entitled to the presumption provided in W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv). 
Furthermore, W.S. 14-2-104(b) (1986) provides that:

[a]ny 
interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining 
the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed 
under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv).

[¶16]   Since LC is a presumed father of 
TJ, he has standing to maintain this action. See A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d  at 1223.

[¶17]   Our finding that LC has standing 
does not end our inquiry. The district court based its dismissal on two 
alternative grounds contained in W.S. 14-2-102(b) (1986). The district provided 
in its order, the following:

4. 
It is not disputed that the Defendants, [L and TL] were married at the time [TJ] 
was conceived and born to [TL]. When the Defendants were divorced by this Court, 
on 9 January, 1989, under Docket 117, Number 53[,] [TJ] was determined by the 
divorce action to be a child of the marriage. Any presumption of the paternity 
of the child raised by [LC] is rebutted by W.S. § 14-2-102(b): "A presumption is 
rebutted by Court decree establishing paternity of the child by another 
man."

5. 
If the Court were to rely solely upon the presumption of paternity of the child 
in [L], as set out in § 14-2-102(a)(i), as against the presumption sought by 
[LC], the Court must also find that [L] is the father of [TJ], because the 
presumption which is "founded on the weightier considerations of policy and 
logic controls," § 14-2-102(b). * * *

6. 
Under either of the alternatives set out above, [LC] lacks standing to bring 
this action, and the matter should be dismissed with prejudice.

While 
the district court's stated reason for dismissal was lack of standing, it is 
clear from the order that the court relied upon W.S. 14-2-102(b) as a basis of 
its decision. Standing "focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial * * * determination." Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992). As we have already noted, appellant had standing 
to bring a paternity action and was entitled to a presumption. Section 102(b), 
however, provides for a rebuttal of that presumption and for the resolution of 
conflicting presumptions and thus goes to the merits of appellant's claim. 
Regardless of how the district court may have framed its decision, we agree that 
§ 14-2-102(b) is determinative of LC's claim.

[¶18]   In construing a statute, we look at 
the language of the statute to determine if it is ambiguous. If the statute is 
"vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations," it is ambiguous. 
Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993). When a statute is ambiguous, we will resort to our rules 
of statutory construction. Id., at 1044. If, however, the statute is 
unambiguous, we will not resort to the rules of statutory construction; instead 
we will apply the plain meaning of language contained in the statute. 
Id., at 1043.

[¶19]   Wyoming Statute 14-2-102(b) 
provided:

A 
presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by 
clear and convincing evidence. If two (2) or more presumptions arise which 
conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls. A presumption is rebutted 
by a court decree establishing paternity of the child by another 
man.

LC 
asserts that the district court misapplied the statute. He insists that the 
language of § 14-2-102(b) requires an evidentiary hearing, which would include 
blood and DNA tests. LC argues that the phrases "an appropriate action," "by 
clear and convincing evidence" and "on the facts" mandate this 
conclusion.

[¶20]   We find the statute to be plain and 
unambiguous, and we reject LC's interpretation. The word "action" has a 
well-defined meaning in law. "An action is a legal demand of one's rights in a 
court of justice." 1A C.J.S. Actions § 2 (1985); Elmo v. James, 
282 S.W. 835 (Tex.Civ.App. 1926). Thus § 14-2-102(b) is referring to an 
"appropriate legal demand of one's rights," not to a hearing. The legislature 
knows how to write a hearing requirement into a statute. See W.S. 14-2-312 
(Cum.Supp. 1993) (hearing required before parent-child relationship can be 
terminated). Section 102(b) plainly means that when an appropriate action has 
been brought, a presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing 
evidence.

[¶21]   Nor is the phrase "on the facts" a 
requirement for a hearing. "[O]n the facts" simply means based on the facts in 
the record at the time the ruling is made. For example, if the proceeding is a 
summary judgment motion, then the facts would be those derived from the 
pleadings and supporting or opposing memoranda. On the other hand, if a hearing 
was held, then the facts would include those adduced at the hearing. This 
portion of § 102(b) is a mechanism by which the court can resolve conflicting 
presumptions, and nothing in its language dictates that a blood or DNA test is a 
prerequisite to determining which presumption is "founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic."

[¶22]   The district court held that even 
if LC had a presumption under § 14-2-102(a)(iv), the presumption of paternity in 
L was "founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic." The 
district court determined that the State has an interest in protecting and 
preserving the family unit and that TJ has a right to legitimacy. LC asserts 
that the district court's reasoning is no longer valid because L and TL are 
divorced. Since they are divorced, LC argues, the State cannot possibly have any 
interest in preserving the family unit because it no longer exists.

[¶23]   The legislature in W.S. 14-2-102(b) 
has established a procedure for how and when a presumption can be rebutted. A 
presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. AEI v. 
JDM, 758 P.2d 22, 24 (Wyo. 1988). The presumption of L's paternity of TJ is 
found in W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i) (1986):

(a) 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

(i) 
He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the 
child is born during the marriage * * *.

The 
presumption of paternity in L has been established by clear and convincing 
evidence - it is undisputed that TJ was born during L and TL's 
marriage.

[¶24]   The legislature has also provided 
in § 102(b) the standard by which two conflicting presumptions are to be 
resolved. The presumption founded on the "weightier considerations of policy and 
logic controls." This court has long recognized the strong state policy in 
legitimacy, which is difficult to overcome.

[W]e 
note there is a strong policy against bastardy. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937, 
110 S. Ct. 22, 106 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1989). In support of that policy, the Wyoming 
Legislature has enacted stringent provisions that tend to insure children born 
during wedlock will not be considered illegitimate. That presumption of 
paternity is sufficiently strong in certain instances to override even the fact 
of biological parenthood.

Matter 
of Adoption of R.S.C., 
837 P.2d 1089, 1093 (Wyo. 1992). The presumption of legitimacy is one of the 
strongest in law. Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶25]   Recently we restated the rationale 
for this policy:

We 
cited Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937, 110 S. Ct. 22, 106 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1989), and 
we concluded that the presumption of legitimacy is actually a substantive rule 
of law based on an overriding social policy derived from the relationship of a 
presumed father and the child at the time of birth. We said, 
categorically:

Applying 
the reasoning in Michael H. to this case, if we grant the appellant the 
right to compel genetic testing, we effectively deny the children's protected 
interests in having their legitimacy presumed under the Act. The balance between 
the children's protected right not to be "bastardiz[ed]" outweighs the father's 
interest in ascertaining paternity more than two years after acknowledging the 
same.

JRW, 
814 P.2d  at 1262 (citations omitted).

Livingston 
v. Vanderiet, 
861 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo. 1993). See also Peters v. Campbell, 80 Wyo. 492, 
505, 345 P.2d 234, 238-39 (Wyo. 1959).

[¶26]   We hold that the presumption of 
paternity in L is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. 
Therefore, L's presumption controls, and the presumption of paternity in LC is 
rebutted. This state has made a policy choice in favor of legitimacy. That 
choice is based on social considerations of the family unit and the child, which 
go beyond the marriage itself. The result in this case effectuates that 
policy.

[¶27]   The district court also relied upon 
the divorce decree as an alternative ground for its decision. Section 
14-2-102(b) provides that "[a] presumption is rebutted by a court decree 
establishing paternity of the child by another man." The statute provides here 
an additional basis for the court's decision dismissing appellant's 
claim.

[¶28]   Finally, LC raises due process and 
equal protection claims. Essentially LC argues that because the marriage between 
TL and L is defunct, the State's interest in preserving legitimacy has 
evaporated. Therefore, equal protection and due process requires that his claim 
be heard.

[¶29]   In X, Y, and Z we rejected a 
gender-based equal protection challenge to the paternity statutes by a man who 
was not a presumed father. Id., 641 P.2d  at 1226. In fact, we held that 
those statutes would survive a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. LC has 
failed to present us with any cogent argument that would cause us to reconsider 
our decision. LC's equal protection challenge, therefore, is without merit and 
we reject it.

[¶30]   This court has accepted and applied 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 C.St. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1989). JRW, 814 P.2d  at 
1262; R.S.C., 837 P.2d  at 1093. LC asserts that Michael H. supports his 
position because a majority of that Court, the concurring justice and the four 
dissenters, found that putative fathers do have due process rights. The 
plurality, which is the opinion of that Court, held that putative fathers do not 
have any procedural or substantive due process rights. Michael H., 491 U.S.  at 121, 127, 109 S. Ct.  at 2341, 2344. It is irrelevant how one 
characterizes the holding in Michael H. because the State of Wyoming has 
provided putative fathers with due process rights by enacting the statutes found 
at §§ 14-2-101 to -120. Thus whatever due process rights a putative father has 
are found in those statutes. Since the presumption of paternity in LC was 
rebutted pursuant to those statutes, LC has received whatever due process he was 
entitled to under the statute.

II. 
CASE NO. 93-136

[¶31]   In this appeal, L and TL contest 
the district court's denial of their motion for attorney fees. L and TL assert 
that the district court should have granted attorney fees under either W.R.C.P. 
11 or W.S. 14-2-114 (Cum.Supp. 1993). L and TL's claim rests upon their 
contention that LC's action was frivolous and it was filed for an improper 
purpose - harassment.

[¶32]   Rule 11 provides in relevant 
part:

Every 
pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record[.] * * * The signature of an attorney 
or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. * * * If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include * * * a 
reasonable attorney's fee.

L 
and TL assert that a de novo appellate standard should be adopted by this court 
when reviewing district court decisions under Rule 11.

[¶33]   This court has, in the past, 
applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing district court sanctions 
under Rule 11. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Wyo. 1981). The 
federal courts also utilize an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing lower 
court rulings under the similar F.R.C.P. 11. See Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990). L and 
TL have failed to present us with an argument that would persuade us to deviate 
from our established standard. Therefore, we decline to do so, and we review for 
an abuse of discretion.

A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it[] act[s] in a manner which exceeds 
the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to 
mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.

Rodgers, 
at 1383 (quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980)). The 
district court did not give any reasons for its denial of the motion for 
attorney fees. However, we find that the district court could reasonably have 
concluded that L and TL were not entitled to attorney fees. LC presented enough 
evidence to show that he at least had an arguable claim and that it was not 
frivolous. Also, L and TL have made broad accusations that LC's action was 
interposed for an improper purpose. L and TL have not cited us to any evidence 
in the record supporting those claims; therefore we do not consider 
them.

[¶34]   L and TL also claim attorney fees 
under W.S. 14-2-114, which provides:

The 
court may order reasonable fees of counsel, experts and the child's guardian ad 
litem, and other costs of the action and pretrial proceedings including genetic 
tests, to be paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the 
court.

A 
denial or award of attorney fees pursuant to § 114 is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. The same analysis we used in reviewing the Rule 11 claim applies 
here because the standard is the same. Consequently, there was no abuse of 
discretion by the district court in denying L and TL attorney fees under § 
14-2-114.

CONCLUSION

[¶35]   This state has a strong policy in 
favor of legitimacy that goes beyond the marriage. In applying that policy, we 
conclude that the presumption in favor of L rebuts the presumption in LC because 
it is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. We also find 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied attorney 
fees to L and TL. The district court's decision is affirmed in all 
respects.

Footnotes

1 
LC raised retroactivity only in regards to W.S. 14-2-104(c) and its effect on 
his standing. Therefore any further reference to these statutes is to the 
version in force at the time LC filed his action on April 30, 1992.