Case Title: Colonial Plbg. & Htg. Supply Co. v. Contemporary Const. Co.

Citation: 464 A.2d 741

Docket Number: 

State: rhode-island

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
464 A.2d 741 (1983) COLONIAL PLUMBING & HEATING SUPPLY CO. v. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. and Robert W. Leonard, Jr. No. 81-94-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. August 23, 1983. Felix A. Appolonia, West Warwick, for plaintiff. Thomas H. Quinn, Jr., Providence, for defendants. SHEA, Justice. The defendant appeals an award of an attorney's fee in a Superior Court action on a promissory note. We sustain the appeal and vacate the award of the attorney's fee. *742 On October 19, 1976, defendant, Contemporary Construction Co., Inc., signed a promissory note in favor of plaintiff in the face amount of $9,981.73. The note bore interest at the rate of 10.5 percent per annum. It provided also, in part: The note also contained the personal guaranty of defendant, Robert W. Leonard, Jr. (Leonard).[1] The matter was tried before a Superior Court justice sitting without a jury. The note was introduced into evidence, as was a copy of plaintiff's ledger sheet reflecting payments on the note. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial justice determined that this note was a demand note given in satisfaction for an account payable with interest at the rate of 10.5 percent. The trial justice also found that Leonard, who had personally guaranteed the note, was absolutely liable on it. After rendering a decision that the principal sum due on the note was $8,921.94 and computing interest due at that time in the amount of $3,123.68 plus costs, the trial justice then awarded an attorney's fee in the amount of $3,071.08. The trial justice stated: The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in awarding an attorney's fee on a record devoid of any evidence to support the fee request. Apparently conceding that the record is silent in this matter, plaintiff nevertheless argues that the award should stand. He asserts that the trial justice's expertise both as a lawyer and as a judge enables him to take judicial notice of the difficulty plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel encountered in obtaining the judgment below. He therefore suggests that the trial justice properly acted upon his personal knowledge of charges generally made by other attorneys in this kind of case. The plaintiff also contends that since the fee award comports with the Rhode Island Bar Association minimum-fee schedule (revised 1969), it should be allowed. We disagree. The plaintiff's argument based on a minimum-fee schedule is inappropriate in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975). In that case the court invalidated the minimum-fee schedule published by the Fairfax County, Virginia, Bar Association on the ground that it violated the Sherman Act. We therefore could not uphold an attorney's fee based on this impermissible guideline. We also reject the argument that the trial justice, because of his expertise as a lawyer and a judge, could take judicial notice of regularly accepted methods of computing legal fees in commercial collection matters. Basically, a court may take judicial notice of two categories of facts. One category consists of facts generally known with certainty by all reasonably intelligent people in the community, and the other consists of facts capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources of indisputable accuracy. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 329-30 (2d ed. Cleary 1972.) Because a trial justice's knowledge of an accepted method of fee computation arises from his *743 expertise both as a lawyer and as a judge, these particular facts would by definition be eliminated from either category of which a court should take judicial notice. This court has had occasion to consider what constitutes a proper fee for an attorney's services. In Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 220, 229 A.2d 620 (1967), this court stated that an attorney's fee should be "consistent with the services rendered, that is to say, which is fair and reasonable." The court held that Subsequently, the court adopted Supreme Court Rule 47, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Disciplinary Rule 2-106 Fees for Legal Services which provides: Applying these guidelines to this case, the trial justice below considered only one of the criteria when fixing the award, that being the fee customarily charged in the locality. We believe this was error. He should have considered each of the factors discussed in the Palumbo decision and later embodied in the disciplinary rule. It remains for us, however, to determine whether a trial justice should determine a reasonable fee without the aid of expert testimony or whether specific evidence is required to decide the issue. Recently, in Piantedosi v. Florida, 186 Conn. 275, 440 A.2d 977 (1982), the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted what appears to be the minority view on this issue. It stated: Despite this broad standard, Connecticut nevertheless requires that the trial court be advised in detail of the time consumed in and efforts devoted to the preparation of the case, and the activities of counsel during the course of the actual trial. Piantedosi v. Florida, 186 Conn. at 279, 440 A.2d at 979-80; Hoenig v. Lubetkin, 137 Conn. 516, *744 524-25, 79 A.2d 278, 282 (1951). The record in this case would not support an award under Piantedosi. We believe the better rule is the so-called majority rule that has been adopted by the State of Vermont. That court held that when a trial court is The Vermont court reasoned that the factual issue of what is a reasonable fee requires particular facts upon which the trial court can base a decision. We conclude that affidavits or testimony establishing the criteria on which a fee award is to be based should be required. These will assist a trial justice in determining what a reasonable fee would be in a given case. It will also create a record for this court to review in those cases where an appeal is taken. Furthermore, our holding today in no way places an undue burden on parties attempting to prove this facet of damages. It is well settled that attorneys "are competent to testify as experts in determining what is a reasonable charge for legal services rendered." Cottrell Employees Credit Union v. Pavelski, 106 R.I. 29, 35, 255 A.2d 162, 165 (1969). Expert testimony of that kind in the form of an affidavit has been found to be adequate. Stewart v. Industrial National Bank, R.I. 458 A.2d 675 (1983). For these reasons, the defendant's appeal is sustained, the judgment below is affirmed in part, that portion of the judgment awarding a counsel fee in the amount of $3,071.08 is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for hearing on the issue of a reasonable counsel fee consistent with this opinion and for entry of judgment thereafter in Superior Court. [1] Prior to trial, plaintiff's motion to sever the case of Colonial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Robert W. Leonard, Jr., from the case of Colonial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Contemporary Construction Co., Inc. was granted, and the case proceeded to trial against Leonard alone.