Case Title: McLaughlin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 396, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
§ 
EDWARD J. McLAUGHLAN, 
§ 
No. 396, 2012 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant-Below, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for  
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
v. 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1104021773  
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  December 12, 2012 
 
 
Decided:     December 19, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of December 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Edward McLaughlan, the defendant-below (“McLaughlan”), appeals 
from his conviction of four counts of Rape Second Degree after a Superior Court 
jury trial.  On appeal, McLaughlan argues that, by dismissing three of the eight 
identically-worded Rape Second Degree counts in his indictment, the Superior 
Court violated his right under the Delaware Constitution to be indicted by a grand 
 
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jury.1  He also claims that the dismissal improperly allowed the petit jury to decide 
which evidence related to which of the remaining five counts of the indictment.  
Lastly, he argues that, by allowing the State to decide which counts to dismiss, the 
Superior Court made an impermissible substantive change to the indictment.  We 
find no merit to McLaughlan’s claims and affirm. 
2.  In May 2011, a grand jury indicted McLaughlan on five counts of Rape 
Second Degree, after which a trial resulted in a hung jury.  The grand jury then 
reindicted McLaughlan on eight, identically-worded counts of Rape Second 
Degree.  Five counts corresponded to five separate alleged incidents that occurred 
at 1214 Melontree Court, and three counts corresponded to three separate alleged 
incidents that occurred at McLaughlan’s trailer.  The new indictment did not link 
any specific incident to any specific count. 
3. 
McLaughlan moved to dismiss the new indictment, claiming a lack of 
specificity and an appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  The Superior Court 
dismissed three of the counts and permitted the State to identify which alleged 
incidents corresponded to which of the remaining five counts.  The five counts of 
Rape Second Degree were then tried before a jury. 
4. 
Before trial, McLaughlan’s counsel acknowledged that the five 
remaining counts corresponded to the five alleged incidents that occurred at 1214 
                                                 
1 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 
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Melontree Court.  During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor also 
specifically tied each alleged incident to a specific count.  The jury found 
McLaughlan guilty of four of the five counts of Rape Second Degree.  This appeal 
followed. 
5. 
 The issue presented is whether the dismissal of three of the eight 
counts of Rape Second Degree infringed on McLaughlan’s constitutional right to 
be indicted by a grand jury under Mott v. State.2  We review a claim of an 
infringement of constitutional rights de novo.3  On appeal, McLaughlan first claims 
that, by dismissing three counts in the new indictment, the Superior Court 
impermissibly allowed the petit jury to invade the role of the grand jury by 
deciding which evidence related to which count.  McLaughlan also argues that, by 
permitting the State to decide which counts would be dismissed, the Superior Court 
made improper substantive changes to the new indictment. 
6. 
McLaughlan’s first argument lacks merit.  Before trial, McLaughlan’s 
counsel knew that the trial would proceed on the five counts associated with the 
five alleged incidents at 1214 Melontree Court.  During the State’s closing 
statement, the prosecutor also specifically tied each alleged incident to a specific 
count.  The jury, in finding McLaughlan guilty on only four of the five counts, also 
                                                 
2 9 A.3d 464, 465 (Del. 2010). 
3 Pierce v. State, 911 A.2d 793, 796 (Del. 2006). 
 
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demonstrated its ability to confine its consideration of specific facts to each of the 
respective alleged incidents to which they related. 
7. 
Nor is there merit to McLaughlan’s second claim.  The Superior Court 
dismissed three counts to eliminate any possible appearance of vindictive 
prosecution.  By doing that, the court did not substantively change the new 
indictment.4  It was irrelevant which specific counts in the new indictment were 
dismissed, so long as the total number of Rape Second Degree counts was reduced 
to the number of counts in the original indictment.  McLaughlan was therefore 
properly indicted by a grand jury for all counts for which he was prosecuted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                                 
4 Cf. Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18, 26 (Del. 1998) (“The Delaware Bill of Rights permits grand 
jury indictments to be amended as to form, but not as to substance.”) (internal citation omitted).