Case Title: Grievance Committee, Wyoming State Bar v. Riner

Citation: 

Docket Number: D-88-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Grievance Committee, Wyoming State Bar v. Riner1988 WY 147765 P.2d 925Case Number: D-88-6Decided: 12/07/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE, 
WYOMING STATE BAR, PETITIONER,

v.

WILLIAM A. RINER, 
RESPONDENT. No. D-88-6

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

Frederic C. 
Reed, Cheyenne, for respondent.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

ORDER OF 
SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW

[¶1.]     The Grievance Committee 
of the Wyoming State Bar has presented to this Court its Report, Findings and 
Recommendation which incorporates its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommended Action, a copy of which is attached to this Order as Appendix A and 
hereby incorporated herein by reference, charging the above-named 
respondent-attorney (respondent), regularly admitted to the practice of law in 
the State of Wyoming, with professional misconduct in his office as an attorney 
at law. The respondent has filed his Exceptions to Report of Grievance Committee 
in accordance with the former version of Rule VI(g)(2) of the Disciplinary Code 
for the Wyoming State Bar, together with relevant portions of the Transcript of 
Hearing before the Grievance Committee. Both parties have filed briefs in 
accordance with the Order Setting Time for Filing Briefs and Setting the Matter 
for Argument entered in this case on August 26, 1988. The Court, having 
considered the file and record of the Court, the proceedings before the 
Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Bar, the responsive pleading of the 
respondent, and the briefs and arguments of the parties, finds and 
rules:

[¶2.]     The primary contention 
of the respondent to be addressed in this matter is whether an attorney who 
undertakes a probate matter pursuant to the Wyoming Probate Code is the attorney 
for the estate or the attorney for the personal representative. The thrust of 
this contention is that, as a matter of law, the relationship of attorney and 
client did not exist between the complainant in this matter and the respondent. 
Other issues are raised with respect to whether a violation of a disciplinary 
rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a finding of intent 
before the imposition of discipline; whether borrowing money without regard to 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship amounts to conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, and conduct adversely reflecting 
on the fitness to practice law; whether the failure to repay money borrowed from 
the complaining party constitutes engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; whether inability to repay amounts to a 
violation of the disciplinary rules by not promptly paying or delivering over 
the funds of a client when requested to do so; whether the inclusion of a charge 
in the Report of the Grievance Committee which was not contained in the 
complaint violates the right of the respondent to due process; and the extent of 
the disciplinary action that should be imposed. The Court is satisfied that an 
attorney-client relationship existed between the respondent and the complainant 
to the Grievance Committee. Consequently, the Court concludes that there was a 
violation of the disciplinary rules and appropriate discipline hereby is 
imposed.

[¶3.]     This matter comes 
before the Court according to Rule VI(i), Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming 
State Bar, which provides:

"(i) Whenever the 
committee shall recommend to the Supreme Court that an attorney be disciplined 
and shall file its report, findings and recommendations with the clerk of the 
Supreme Court (with a copy mailed to the respondent-attorney and his or her 
counsel), the said respondent-attorney shall within twenty (20) days after the 
mailing of such copy file with the clerk of the Supreme Court six (6) copies 
of:

"(1) A statement that 
respondent does not wish to file exceptions to the report, findings and 
recommendations; or

"(2) Respondent's 
exceptions to said report stating the explicit reasons for the exceptions 
together with a brief prepared in accordance with Rule 5.01 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.

"If the 
respondent-attorney files a statement that respondent does not wish to file 
exceptions to the report or, if the respondent-attorney fails to respond, the 
court shall proceed with such discipline as it may determine to be proper. If 
the respondent-attorney files exceptions as required herein, properly supported 
with a brief and a transcript of relevant portions thereof, the court 
immediately shall calendar the matter for such briefs or arguments as it may 
deem appropriate and shall thereafter enter its judgment. During its review, the 
Supreme Court shall not receive or consider any evidence that was not presented 
to the committee."

The Grievance 
Committee of the Wyoming State Bar submitted its Report to the Court on August 
1, 1988. The Exceptions of the respondent were filed on August 19, 1988 and, 
following compliance with the briefing schedule which was ordered by the Court, 
argument was held on October 4, 1988.

[¶4.]     The specific issues 
raised by the respondent in his brief are: 

"1. Under the Wyoming 
Probate Code, is an attorney who undertakes to probate a decedent's Will the 
attorney for the estate or the attorney for the Personal 
Representative?

"2. As a matter of law 
did an attorney-client relationship exist between Respondent and 
Complainant?

"3. Does violation of a 
Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility for attorneys 
require a finding of intent before discipline can be 
imposed?

"4. Did the actions of 
Respondent in borrowing money from the Complainant, whether or not an 
attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law, constitute Respondent's 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and 
conduct which adversely reflects on Respondent's fitness to practice law in 
violation of DR1-102(A)(4) and (6)?

"5. Did the actions of 
the Respondent in failing to repay the money borrowed from the Complainant Avis 
Wagner constitute engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation in violation of DR1-102(A)(4)?

"6. Did Respondent's 
inability to repay the monies borrowed constitute a violation of DR9-102(B)(4) 
by not promptly paying or delivering over the funds of a client when requested 
to do so?

"7. Does the inclusion of 
a separate charge of misconduct in the Report of the Grievance Committee to the 
Supreme Court, which was not contained in the Complaint for Formal Disciplinary 
Proceedings violate Respondent's Constitutional Right of Due 
process?

"8. In the event the 
Court finds the Respondent to have violated one or more of the provisions of the 
Disciplinary Code what disciplinary action, if any, would be in the best 
interest of the Respondent, the Complainant, the Bar Association and the 
Public?"

[¶5.]     Constitutionally, 
statutorily, by the Court's own rules, and as an inherent responsibility, this 
Court is charged with supervising those attorneys who practice law in the courts 
of this state. In each instance in which a recommendation is made by the 
Grievance Committee, the Court must examine the evidence, make findings, 
determine whether there has been a violation of appropriate standards of 
conduct, and impose the discipline which is perceived to be appropriate. 
Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶6.]     The respondent contends 
that he was attorney for the estate of Harvey P. Armstrong, and that the 
attorney-client relationship existed only with respect to the estate. The logic 
of this position is that there was no attorney-client relationship with the 
complainant, Mrs. Avis A. Wagner, who served as personal representative for the 
estate. We do not agree with, and we do not accept, this position. The facts 
manifested by the records in this matter demonstrate that Mrs. Wagner consulted 
with the respondent and employed him to furnish legal advice to her and to 
assist her in closing the Armstrong estate. Formality is not required to 
establish an attorney-client relationship. Ordinarily, the relationship rests on 
contract, but the contract need not be express. It may be implied from the 
conduct of the parties, for example, the giving of advice and assistance or the 
awareness of the attorney of reliance on the relationship. Whether the 
relationship of attorney-client exists depends on the facts and circumstances of 
each case. Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988); Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 
446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980); ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct, § 31:101 (1984). Mrs. Wagner had the authority, as 
personal representative, to employ an attorney to assist her in performing her 
statutory duties. 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 147 (1942). Without 
relying on any prior arrangements between the respondent, Mr. Armstrong, and 
Mrs. Wagner, we conclude that Mrs. Wagner and the respondent entered into an 
attorney-client relationship when she engaged the respondent to assist her in 
performing her duties as personal representative of the Armstrong estate. See 
Matter of Holloway, 514 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. 1987); 
Louisiana State Bar Association v. Bosworth, 481 So. 2d 567 (La. 1986); People v. Kramer, 188 Colo. 184, 534 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1975).

[¶7.]     At the time of the 
events addressed in the Report of Grievance Committee, the respondent's conduct 
was governed by Canon 5, DR5-104(A)1 of Rule 20 of the Amended Rules 
Providing for the Organization and Government of the Bar Association of the 
Attorneys at Law of the State of Wyoming. The rule 
provides:

"DR5-104 Limiting 
Business Relations with a Client.

"(A) A lawyer shall not 
enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests 
therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional 
judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has 
consented after full disclosure."

There are four 
significant phrases incorporated in this rule which we 
parse:

A lawyer shall 
not

(1) enter into a business 
transaction with a client

(2) if they have 
differing interests therein and

(3) if the client expects 
the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of 
the client,

(4) unless the client has 
consented after full disclosure.

The first three 
phrases articulate the elements of the prohibited conduct, while the last phrase 
permits such an arrangement if, after full disclosure, the client consents. As 
we have ruled, the relationship of attorney and client was present in this case. 
The respondent does not question, but we expressly find, that the loans were 
transactions constituting a business relationship and that the interests of the 
parties inherently are adverse in a loan transaction. Louisiana State Bar, 481 So. 2d  at 571. Similarly, the respondent does not take issue with, but again we 
expressly find, the expectation of Mrs. Wagner that the respondent would 
exercise his professional judgment for her protection with regard to these 
loans. Further, it is clear that her consent was obtained without the requisite 
full disclosure having been made by the respondent.

[¶8.]     Accordingly, we sustain 
the Findings of Fact numbered 1, 3-6, and 10-36 of the Grievance Committee of 
the Wyoming State Bar attached hereto as Appendix A. We conclude that there was 
clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion that the respondent 
violated Canon 5, DR5-104(A). We adopt Conclusions of Law numbered 1-7 in the 
Report of the Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Bar, and that portion of 
Finding 8 addressing a violation of Canon 5, DR5-104(A).

[¶9.]     The Grievance Committee 
of the Wyoming State Bar, in addition to the conclusion that the respondent had 
violated Canon 5, DR5-104(A), concluded that the respondent had violated Canon 
1, DR1-102(A)(4) and (6)2 (Conclusion of Law 9), Canon 1, 
DR1-102(A)(4) (Conclusion of Law 10), Canon 7, DR7-106(C)(7) (Conclusion of Law 
11), and Canon 9, DR9-102(B)(4) (Conclusion of Law 12). The respondent has urged 
that Conclusions of Law 9, 10, and 12 are duplicative of the conclusion that he 
violated DR5-104(A) and, thus, the number of charges has been multiplied. We 
agree with this position asserted by the respondent and, for that reason, 
decline to adopt Conclusions of Law 9, 10, and 12. The respondent also has 
argued that the violations of the disciplinary rules relied upon in those 
Conclusions of Law require a finding of specific intent or wilfulness on the 
part of the attorney. We do not address that contention because we are declining 
to adopt those conclusions of law.

[¶10.]  The respondent also contends that he was 
not given notice of the violation found in Conclusion 11 (accepting payment of 
attorney fees for closing of the estate without the approval of the court), and 
he had no opportunity to be heard with respect to it. In Whitchurch, 565 P.2d  at 
473-474, we held that the Grievance Committee may not consider charges without 
furnishing notice to the respondent and the opportunity to be heard after 
notice. In this instance, the respondent was not furnished with the proper 
notice relating to this allegation. Rather, the alleged violation seems to have 
developed during the conduct of the hearing, and it then was added to the report 
because of that occurrence. For this reason, we decline to adopt Conclusion of 
Law 11.

[¶11.]  To summarize, we are satisfied that the 
evidence is clear and convincing to demonstrate that the respondent violated 
Canon 5, DR5-104(A), but we decline to find any other violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility on the part of the respondent. Based upon its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Grievance Committee of the Wyoming 
State Bar recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law 
for two years with the proviso that he could petition for reinstatement after 
one year of the suspension. In view of our declination to accept some of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Grievance Committee, we 
deem it appropriate to modify the recommendation for discipline. This we do, and 
it therefore is:

[¶12.]  ORDERED that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the Grievance Committee, to the extent 
set forth in the foregoing discussion be, and they hereby are, approved; and it 
further is

[¶13.]  ORDERED that William A. Riner be, and he 
hereby is, suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of two 
years for violation of Canon 5, DR5-104(A), adopted by Rule 20, with respect to 
this complaint; and it further is

[¶14.]  ORDERED that the respondent, William A. 
Riner, may apply for reinstatement to the practice of law in this state after 
six months from the date of this order upon a showing made that restitution to 
Mrs. Avis A. Wagner has been accomplished, which shall include any interest due 
and owing.3

APPENDIX 
A

State of Wyoming

County of Laramie

Before the Grievance 
Committee

Wyoming State 
Bar

State of Wyoming

In the Matter 
of

William A. 
Riner,

Respondent.

Docket No. 
(83-86)

REPORT, FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATION

[¶15.]  The Attorney General's Office filed a 
COMPLAINT FOR FORMAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS in the Matter of WILLIAM A. RINER, 
Docket No. 83-86, before the Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Bar on 
January 8, 1988. On January 27, 1988 the Respondent filed a MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO ANSWER. By ORDER dated January 28, 1988, the Committee granted 
Respondent's motion in part, allowing him until February 8, 1988 to answer the 
complaint. On February 8, 1988, Respondent, through his counsel, Frederic C. 
Reed, filed an ANSWER TO FORMER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. A hearing was held 
before the Committee on April 14, 1988. Members of the Committee present at the 
hearing were David F. Palmerlee, Chairman; Kathleen A. Hunt; and Joseph E. 
Vlastos. Committee member Dean W. Borthwick recused himself from participating 
in this matter. The Respondent was represented by counsel, Frederic C. Reed. The 
Attorney General's office was represented by Gerald P. 
Luckhaupt.

[¶16.]  At the start of the hearing, Respondent 
made a motion to amend his answer, indicating that he did not want to admit the 
existence of the attorney/client relationship. The Attorney General's office had 
no real objection. The motion was allowed.

[¶17.]  The following exhibits were offered and 
accepted into evidence at the formal hearing without objection by 
counsel:

[¶18.]  Attorney General's Exhibit A - 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF EXECUTOR AND PETITION FOR FINAL DISCHARGE in the Matter 
of the Estate of HARVEY P. ARMSTRONG, also known as HARVEY PAUL ARMSTRONG, in 
the District Court, First Judicial District, DOC. 30 NO. 312, and also a RECEIPT 
in the same action which details what the executor of the estate 
received.

[¶19.]  Attorney General's Exhibit B - JUDGMENT 
BY DEFAULT in the Matter of WAGNER v. RINER, in the District Court, First 
Judicial District, DOCKET 108 NO. 226, which has the following attachments: a 
promissory note dated July 20, 1984 signed by William A. Riner wherein he 
promises to pay to the order of Avis A. Wagner the sum of $5,000.00 with 
interest at 15%, which note merged in the judgment by order of the district 
judge; and a second promissory note dated July 5, 1984 signed by William A. 
Riner wherein Riner agrees to pay Avis A. Wagner the sum of $5,000.00 with 
interest at 15% which note also merged in the judgment. All three pages of the 
exhibit are certified copies from the district court file.

[¶20.]  Attorney General's Exhibit C - A receipt 
signed by William A. Riner dated June 4, 1984 which states he received from Avis 
A. Wagner $1,500.00 for attorney fees regarding the Armstrong 
Estate.

[¶21.]  Respondent's Exhibit 1 - Personal resume 
of William A. Riner.

FINDINGS OF 
FACT

1. Respondent is a member 
of the Wyoming State Bar, who maintains an office in Cheyenne, Wyoming.

2. In January of 1984, 
Respondent was retained by Avis A. Wagner and her brother-in-law, Harvey P. 
Armstrong, to draw up a power of attorney. A power of attorney was necessary to 
assist Mrs. Wagner in the management of Mr. Armstrong's affairs. Mr. Armstrong 
was elderly and bedridden at this time.

3. Mr. Armstrong died 
testate in February, 1984. Mrs. Wagner was the executrix under the will and also 
the sole legatee.

4. After Mr. Armstrong 
died, Mrs. Wagner called the Respondent with regard to him helping her in 
closing the estate. Thereafter Respondent represented Mrs. Wagner in closing the 
estate.

5. After payment of costs 
and fees, Mrs. Wagner was to receive approximately $33,000.00 from the estate. 
Her inheritance was to be the major source of her support during the later years 
of her life.

6. Mrs. Wagner was 
approximately 70 years old at this time.

7. On June 4, 1984, 
during the pendency of the estate proceedings, Mrs. Wagner personally paid 
Respondent $1,500.00 in cash as attorney fees for representing her in the 
probate proceedings. Respondent accepted the cash from Mrs. Wagner as payment of 
attorney fees and issued her a receipt for same.

8. This payment of 
attorney fees regarding the estate was accepted by Respondent without the 
approval of the court, in violation of W.S. 2-7-805(a).

9. Respondent knew the 
court had not approved the payment of any attorney fees regarding this estate 
when Respondent accepted the payment from Mrs. Wagner.

10. During this period of 
time, while the estate was still pending and had not yet been closed, Mrs. 
Wagner mentioned to Respondent her desire to find a safe investment for her 
inheritance.

11. After Mrs. Wagner had 
mentioned to Respondent her desire to find a safe investment for her 
inheritance, and before the estate had been closed, on June 26, 1984, Respondent 
asked Mrs. Wagner to loan him $5,000.00.

12. On July 5, 1984, 
respondent again asked Mrs. Wagner whether she would loan him $5,000.00. Mrs. 
Wagner agreed. Respondent wrote himself a check in the amount of $5,000.00 from 
the estate checking account, which check Mrs. Wagner 
signed.

13. The loan to which 
Mrs. Wagner agreed at the behest of the Respondent was an unsecured loan to 
Respondent of $5,000.00 at 15% interest payable in full in 45 days. Respondent 
prepared a promissory note to this effect.

14. On neither June 26 
nor July 5, 1984, nor at any other time did Respondent advise Mrs. Wagner to 
seek independent legal advice, nor did he advise Mrs. Wagner of the risks and 
disadvantages of loaning money without receiving proper collateral therefor, nor 
did he advise Mrs. Wagner of his financial condition.

15. Approximately two 
weeks after the first loan, Respondent asked Mrs. Wagner for another unsecured 
loan of $5,000.00.

16. Mrs. Wagner agreed to 
loan Respondent another $5,000.00. Respondent prepared a handwritten promissory 
note which allowed for interest at 15% and repayment in full in 30 days. The 
funds came from the estate.

17. Not at the time of 
the second loan, nor at any time preceding or subsequent to the loan, did 
Respondent advise Mrs. Wagner to seek independent legal advice, nor did he 
advise Mrs. Wagner of the risks and disadvantages of loans without obtaining 
proper collateral therefor nor did he advise Mrs. Wagner of his financial 
condition.

18. Both loans made by 
Mrs. Wagner to Respondent were not in the best interests of Mrs. 
Wagner.

19. At the time both 
loans were made by Mrs. Wagner to Respondent, Respondent could not received a 
loan for that amount of money from any financial institution due to his poor 
financial condition.

20. Respondent knew he 
could not receive a loan from a financial institution because of his poor 
financial condition.

21. Respondent did not 
inform Mrs. Wagner of his poor financial condition or of the fact that he could 
not receive a loan from a financial institution because of his poor financial 
condition.

22. Respondent took 
advantage of the faith, trust and confidence Mrs. Wagner had in him, her 
attorney, to borrow funds without collateral equalling almost one-third of her 
inheritance when Respondent knew he could not obtain such a loan of money from a 
bank.

23. During this period of 
time when Respondent requested both loans, Respondent told Mrs. Wagner that he 
was involved in some kind of gold deal.

24. Respondent created an 
impression in the mind of Mrs. Wagner that her loans were being utilized in some 
fashion in furtherance of these gold deals or at the least that the gold deals 
would provide Respondent with the money to repay the 
loans.

25. During this period, 
Respondent was the attorney for some persons, partnership or corporation which 
were attempting to sell gold overseas.

26. Respondent used the 
proceeds of the two loans to pay his own current financial obligations and 
operating costs of his law practice.

27. Thereafter Respondent 
again contacted Mrs. Wagner about loaning him an additional $5,000.00, which 
request Mrs. Wagner refused.

28. Mrs. Wagner is not, 
and never has been in, the business of loaning money nor has she experience in 
such affairs.

29. At all times herein, 
Mrs. Wagner considered the Respondent her attorney and expected Respondent to 
exercise his professional judgment on her behalf.

30. Mrs. Wagner was the 
client of Respondent during the periods of time in which she loaned Respondent 
money.

31. Mrs. Wagner and 
Respondent had differing interests in the debtor/creditor relationship which 
developed between them.

32. Both of the notes 
evidencing the sums borrowed from Mrs. Wagner were payable in full by Respondent 
on August 20, 1984. Respondent neither paid off the notes nor contacted Mrs. 
Wagner concerning the notes or any ability to repay them.

33. Between October 22, 
1984 and April 26, 1985, Respondent made two payments of interest to Mrs. Wagner 
in the amounts of $1,176.40. However, the notes in full were not 
paid.

34. Mrs. Wagner was 
forced to retain counsel, sue on the promissory notes and obtain a judgment of 
$11,919.12 plus interest, plus costs and fees, against Respondent. Aside from a 
garnishment from Respondent's bank account of $664.51 obtained by Mrs. Wagner's 
attorney on February 1, 1988, this judgment has not been 
satisfied.

35. The Committee finds 
the following aggravating circumstances present in this matter: dishonest 
motive; selfish motive; vulnerability of victim; substantial experience in the 
practice of law; and indifference to making restitution.

36. The Committee finds 
the following mitigating circumstances present in this case: absence of a prior 
disciplinary record; and full and free disclosure to this 
Committee.

CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW

1. The Committee has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rules I, IV and VI of the Disciplinary Code for the 
Wyoming State Bar.

2. At the time of 
Respondent's action described in the foregoing Findings of Fact, Respondent was 
subject to and his conduct was governed by Rule 20 of the Rules Providing for 
the Organization and Government of the Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law 
of the State of Wyoming.

3. Mrs. Wagner was the 
client of the Respondent when Respondent borrowed money from Mrs. 
Wagner.

4. In a debtor/creditor 
relationship, including the one between Mrs. Wagner and Respondent, the parties 
have differing interests.

5. Mrs. Wagner did and 
properly could expect Respondent to exercise his professional judgment on her 
behalf.

6. Mrs. Wagner was 
relying on Respondent for professional judgment to the same extent that Mrs. 
Wagner would have relied upon Respondent for professional judgment had Mrs. 
Wagner consulted Respondent concerning such a loan to a third 
party.

7. Mrs. Wagner's consent 
to the loans was without full disclosure by the 
Respondent.

8. Respondent, by 
soliciting and obtaining these loans from his client, Mrs. Wagner, entered into 
a business relationship with a client in which Respondent and Mrs. Wagner had 
differing interests; by failing to advise Mrs. Wagner to seek independent legal 
advice, by failing to advise Mrs. Wagner of the risks and disadvantages of 
loaning money without receiving proper collateral therefor, by failing to advise 
Mrs. Wagner of his financial condition, and by failing to obtain her consent 
after full disclosure and when Mrs. Wagner expected him to exercise his 
professional judgment on her behalf, violated DR5-104(A) and 
DR1-102(A)(1).

(A) A lawyer shall not 
enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests 
therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional 
judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has 
consented after full disclosure.

DR1-102(A)(1) provides as 
follows:

(A) A lawyer shall not: . 
. .

(1) Violate a 
Disciplinary Rule; . . . .

9. Respondent, by seeking 
loans from Mrs. Wagner while he was unable to obtain the same loan from a 
financial institution and by not disclosing that fact to Mrs. Wagner, and by 
soliciting these loans from Mrs. Wagner after she had disclosed to him her 
desire to find a safe investment for her inheritance and by using these loans to 
cover his personal and business expenses, violated DR1-101(A)(4) and 
(6).

DR1-101(4) and (6) 
provide as follows:

(A) A lawyer shall not: . 
. .

(4) Engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; . . 
.

(6) Engage in any other 
conduct which adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law; . . . 
.

10. Respondent, by not 
repaying Mrs. Wagner when the loans became due and when Respondent had promised 
to repay the loans as evidenced by the promissory notes, violated 
DR1-102(A)(4).

DR1-102(A)(4) provides as 
follows:

(A) A lawyer shall not: . 
. .

(4) Engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; . . 
.

11. Respondent, by 
accepting payment in cash from Mrs. Wagner for the payment of attorney's fees 
regarding the closing of the estate of Mr. Armstrong, without prior order or 
approval of the court, violated DR7-106(C)(7).

DR7-106(C)(7) provides as 
follows:

(C) In appearing in his 
professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall 
not:

(7) Intentionally or 
habitually violate any established rule of procedure or evidence; . . . 
.

12. Respondent, by 
failing to pay those monies which Mrs. Wagner was entitled to receive, after 
demand by Mrs. Wagner, violated DR9-102(B)(4).

DR9-102(B)(4) provides as 
follows:

(B) A lawyer shall: . . 
.

(4) Promptly pay or 
deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other 
properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to 
receive.

RECOMMENDED 
ACTION

[¶22.]  The Grievance Committee recommends that 
the Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. 
However, the Committee recommends that the order note that the Respondent can 
petition for reinstatement after one year of the 
suspension.

Dated this 1st day of 
August, 1988.

(s) David F. Palmerlee 

David F. Palmerlee, 
Chairman 

Grievance Committee 
Wyoming State Bar

ATTEST:

(s) Mary 
Elizabeth Senkewicz 

Mary Elizabeth 
Senkewicz Executive Secretary, Wyoming State Bar 

Grievance 
Committee 

500 Randall 
Avenue 

P.O. 
Box 
109

 

Cheyenne, WY82003-0109 

(307) 
632-9061

FOOTNOTES

1 The Disciplinary Code 
for the Wyoming State Bar was revised in 1986, and this provision now appears in 
similar language in Rule 1.8, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at 
Law.

2 Parenthetically, we note 
that the Committee's Report inadvertently numbered this violation as 
DR1-101(A)(4) and (6), although the language quoted is from DR1-102(A)(4) and 
(6).

3 Annotation, Power of 
Court to Order Restitution to Wronged Client in Disciplinary Proceeding Against 
Attorney, 75 A.L.R.3d 307 (1977).