Case Title: Julie L. Weber v. Angelene White

Citation: 2004 WI 63

Docket Number: 2003AP000471

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 63 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0471 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Julie L. Weber and Joshua Weber,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
WEA Insurance Corporation, Carefirst of  
Maryland, Inc., d/b/a Carefirst Blue  
Cross Blue Shield, and Wisconsin  
Physicians Insurance Corporation,  
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Angelene White and Farmers Insurance Exchange,  
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 240 
Reported at:  267 Wis. 2d 862, 672 N.W.2d 151 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 8, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Cooper   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Thomas W. Kyle, Jonathan P. Groth and Pitman, Kyle & 
Sicula, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jonathan P. Groth. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by Michael 
R. Vescio and O’Hagan, Smith & Amundsen, LLC, Greenfield, and 
oral argument by Michael R. Vescio. 
 
 
2004 WI 63 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    03-0471 
(L.C. No. 
01-CV-2095) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julie L. Weber and Joshua Weber,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners,   
 
WEA Insurance Corporation,  
Carefirst of Maryland, Inc., d/b/a  
Carefirst Blue Cross Blue Shield, and  
Wisconsin Physicians Insurance Corporation, 
 
Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
Angelene White and Farmers Insurance Exchange,   
 
 
Defendants-Appellants.   
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
 ¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Julie and 
Joshua Weber (hereinafter "the Webers"), seek review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing a portion 
of the jury verdict awarding them $5,000 for future health care 
No. 
03-0471   
 
2 
 
expenses.1  The Webers assert that the court of appeals erred 
when it determined that the award for future health care 
expenses was based on fatally contradictory testimony and thus 
not supported by any credible evidence. 
¶2 
The respondents, Angelene White and Farmers Insurance 
Exchange (hereinafter "White"), contend that the court of 
appeals erred when it concluded that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying their motion for 
relief pending appeal.2  Specifically, White had sought to pay 
the clerk of courts a portion of the judgment at issue to avoid 
the accumulation of further statutory interest.   
¶3 
We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
White's motion to pay the clerk of courts.  However, we disagree 
with its conclusion that the verdict for future health care 
expenses was based on fatally contradictory testimony and thus 
not supported by any credible evidence.  Because we determine 
that a reasonable jury could have awarded future health care 
expenses, we reverse the court of appeals and remand for further 
proceedings.   
                                                 
1 Weber v. White, 2003 WI App 240, 267 Wis. 2d 862, 672 
N.W.2d 151 (reversing a judgment of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, Thomas R. Cooper, Judge).   
2 Weber v. White, No. 03-0471, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 23, 2003) (affirming a determination of the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Thomas R. Cooper, Judge).  
No. 
03-0471   
 
3 
 
 
I 
¶4 
This case arises out of an automobile accident.  Julie 
Weber suffered injuries after a car driven by Angelene White 
rear-ended her vehicle at the intersection of West Brown Deer 
Road and North 76th Street, in Milwaukee.  Following the 
accident, Julie Weber was diagnosed with a whiplash injury.  
When she failed to make a full recovery after physical therapy, 
she was referred to Dr. George J. Hanacik Jr., for chiropractic 
treatment.   
¶5 
The Webers commenced this action, alleging that White 
acted negligently when she hit Julie Weber's car and that, as a 
result, Julie Weber sustained permanent injuries.  Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01 (1999-2000),3 the Webers offered to settle 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 807.01 provides in relevant part: 
(3) After issue is joined but at least 20 days before 
trial, the plaintiff may serve upon the defendant a 
written offer of settlement for the sum, or property, 
or to the effect therein specified, with costs.  If 
the defendant accepts the offer and serves notice 
thereof in writing, before trial and within 10 days 
after receipt of the offer, the defendant may file the 
offer, with proof of service of the notice of 
acceptance, with the clerk of court.  If notice of 
acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given as 
evidence nor mentioned on the trial.  If the offer of 
settlement is not accepted and the plaintiff recovers 
a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall recover 
double the amount of the taxable costs. 
(4) If there is an offer of settlement by a party 
under this section which is not accepted and the party 
No. 
03-0471   
 
4 
 
their claim for $35,000.  White countered with an offer of 
judgment for $20,000, which the Webers rejected.  Prior to 
trial, the parties stipulated that White was "100% negligent in 
causing the accident."   
¶6 
Both the doctor who originally treated Mrs. Weber and 
Dr. Hanacik testified that she was permanently injured and that 
she would experience future pain and suffering.  Dr. Hanacik, 
however, was the Webers' sole witness concerning future health 
care expenses.  He stated that Julie Weber had suffered a 
permanent shoulder impingement as a result of the accident and 
that he treated her on an as-needed basis, depending upon her 
level of activity.  On direct examination he explained:  
One can not estimate exactly what is going to happen, 
but in seeing what we've seen so far, she has times 
that she is very, very good where I might not see her 
for a month, month-and-a-half, and then all of a 
sudden, there will be an event that may cause her a 
lot of pain. 
¶7 
Dr. Hanacik further observed that Julie Weber would 
probably need on an average of 20-25 chiropractic visits per 
year for future care: 
Future care for her I would probably say would 
probably be around 20 to 25 visits a year, probably, 
on an average.  I mean, if it's better, it's better.  
If it's worse, it's worse, but when I do it on an as-
                                                                                                                                                             
recovers a judgment which is greater than or equal to 
the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the 
party is entitled to interest at the annual rate of 
12% on the amount recovered from the date of the offer 
of settlement until the amount is paid.  Interest 
under this section is in lieu of interest computed 
under ss. 814.04(4) and 815.05(8). 
No. 
03-0471   
 
5 
 
needed basis, I mean, she comes in when she's got a 
problem.  
¶8 
Finally, Dr. Hanacik noted that a typical visit would 
cost $60.  He concluded his testimony by stating that all of his 
opinions 
were 
to 
a 
"reasonable 
degree 
of 
chiropractic 
certainty."   
¶9 
On cross-examination, Dr. Hanacik was asked if it was 
his opinion to a reasonable degree of chiropractic certainty 
that Julie Weber would need 20 to 25 visits a year for at least 
the next 35 years.  He answered that 20 to 25 visits a year was 
an example and that she could possibly need only three visits in 
one year.  He stated:  
That is an example of what we've seen this year.  That 
does not mean – I mean, next year I may see her only 
three times.  It depends on what is happening with 
her. 
¶10 Dr. Hanacik was asked, "[s]o you are not saying to a 
reasonable degree of chiropractic certainty she is going to be 
in 20 to 25 times a year for the next 35 years?"  He responded, 
"No, I'm not."  Dr. Hanacik further acknowledged that he could 
not see into the future and give a "ballpark figure" as to how 
many times Julie Weber would need treatment.  However, Dr. 
Hanacik did reiterate that he would provide care to her on an 
as-needed basis for the injury.    
¶11 The jury awarded Julie Weber $5,000 for future health 
care expenses.  It also awarded her $18,278.50 for past health 
care expenses, $5,000 for past pain, suffering and disability, 
and $8,000 for future pain, suffering and disability.  The total 
verdict was $36,278.50.   
No. 
03-0471   
 
6 
 
¶12 White moved to vacate the jury's award of future 
health care expenses.  Citing Ianni v. Grain Dealers Mutual 
Insurance Co., 42 Wis. 2d 354, 166 N.W.2d 148 (1969), White 
argued that the jury could not rely on Dr. Hanacik to determine 
future health care expenses because his testimony on cross-
examination completely contradicted his testimony on direct 
examination. 
¶13 The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that 
the totality of Dr. Hanacik's testimony provided sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's award.  It then entered judgment 
awarding the Webers double costs and interest pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01.   
¶14 While the matter was being appealed, White filed a 
motion asking the circuit court for permission to pay the clerk 
of courts a portion of the judgment to avoid the accumulation of 
further statutory interest.  The circuit court denied the 
requested relief. 
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision denying White's motion to pay the clerk of courts.  
Weber v. White, No. 03-0471, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 23, 2003).  However, it reversed the portion of the jury 
verdict awarding $5,000 for future health care expenses, as well 
as the portion of the judgment awarding double costs and 
interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  Weber v. White, 2003 WI App 
240, ¶16, 267 Wis. 2d 862, 672 N.W.2d 151.  Relying on Ianni, 42 
Wis. 2d 354, the court concluded that Dr. Hanacik's testimony 
No. 
03-0471   
 
7 
 
was fatally contradictory and that the jury's verdict was based 
on nothing but mere speculation.  Id., ¶15. 
II 
¶16 Our review of a jury's award is a limited one.  See, 
e.g., Morden Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶38, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 
611 N.W.2d 659.  We will sustain a verdict if there is any 
credible evidence to support it.  Id. (citing Meurer v. ITT Gen. 
Controls, 90 Wis. 2d 438, 450, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979); Giese v. 
Montgomery Ward, 111 Wis. 2d 392, 401, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983)).   
¶17 In the present case, the scope of our review is 
further circumscribed because the circuit court approved the 
jury's award.  See Kuklinski v. Rodriguez, 203 Wis. 2d 324, 331, 
552 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Ct. App. 1996).  Thus, we will not upset 
the verdict unless "there is such a complete failure of proof 
that the verdict must be based on speculation."  Coryell v. 
Conn, 88 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723 (1979).  
¶18 In reviewing the denial of a motion for relief pending 
appeal, we employ an erroneous exercise of discretion standard 
of review.  See Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Hawkins, 
Ash Baptie & Co., 224 Wis. 2d 312, 330-31, 592 N.W.2d 279 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  Accordingly, we will uphold the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion, so long as it examined the relevant 
facts, applied a 
proper 
standard 
of 
law, 
and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, arrived at a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.  Id. at 330.   
No. 
03-0471   
 
8 
 
 
III 
¶19 In this case, we consider the application of the Ianni 
"no case" rule.  Given the testimony of Dr. Hanacik, we must 
determine whether a reasonable jury could award future health 
care expenses. 
¶20 We begin our discussion by examining whether the 
jury's verdict on future health care expenses was supported by 
any credible evidence.  In order to sustain such an award, two 
criteria must be met:  (1) there must be expert testimony of 
permanent injuries, requiring future medical treatment and the 
incurring of future medical expenses; and (2) an expert must 
establish the cost of such medical expenses.  Bleyer v. Gross, 
19 Wis. 2d 305, 311, 120 N.W.2d 156 (1963).   
¶21 Both parties agree that Julie Weber's injury is 
permanent and that the cost per chiropractic visit is $60.  
However, the parties disagree as to whether a reasonable jury 
could determine her future health care expenses from Dr. 
Hanacik's testimony.  
¶22 White contends, and the court of appeals agreed, that 
Dr. Hanacik made fatally contradictory statements on cross-
examination 
concerning 
Julie 
Weber's 
future 
health 
care 
expenses. 
 
Specifically, 
they 
allege 
that 
Dr. 
Hanacik 
contradicted himself in two ways: (1) by retracting his 
statement that Julie Weber would need 20 to 25 visits per year; 
and (2) by refusing to give a "ballpark figure" on the amount of 
treatment she would need at specific times in the future.  
No. 
03-0471   
 
9 
 
Because Dr. Hanacik was the only expert to testify to future 
health care expenses, White asks this court to apply the "no 
case" rule from Ianni, 42 Wis. 2d at 360.  
¶23 In Ianni, a mother and daughter, who were passengers 
in an automobile that was involved in a head-on collision, 
brought a personal injury action against the insurer of the 
automobile in which they were riding.  Id. at 358.  Six days 
after the accident, Mrs. Ianni signed a statement that she did 
not see any part of the accident because she was asleep.  Id. at 
359.  Approximately nine months later, she signed another 
statement, indicating that the other vehicle had crossed the 
centerline and collided with her family's car.  Id.  Finally, at 
trial, Mrs. Ianni testified that her family's car was traveling 
at 70 m.p.h. down the center of the road.  Id.   
¶24 Due to the inconsistencies of her account, this court 
was asked to find the witness stand testimony of Mrs. Ianni 
incredible as a matter of law.  Id. at 360.  It observed that 
the general rule would seem to support preclusion of such 
testimony.  Quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, it explained: 
Where a party relies on the testimony of a single 
witness to prove a given issue, and the testimony of 
such witness is contradictory and conflicting with no 
explanation of the contradiction, and no other fact or 
circumstance in the case tends to show which version 
of the evidence is true, no case is made. 
Id. (quoting 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 1043 at 832).   
 
¶25 However, 
the 
court 
went 
on 
to 
distinguish 
contradictions in the course of the same in-court testimony from 
No. 
03-0471   
 
10 
 
contradictions between in-court and out-of-court statements.  It 
observed: 
Where the conflict and contradictions are within the 
body of the testimony given, the "no case" conclusion 
follows.  Where the conflict or contradiction arises 
by reason of an earlier statement given by the 
witness, it is for the jury to determine the question 
of the weight and credence to be given the witness-
stand testimony and prior extrajudicial statement. 
Id.  Thus, the Ianni court ultimately chose not to apply the 
very "no case" rule it articulated. 
 
¶26 Although the Ianni "no case" rule has existed for 35 
years in Wisconsin, no appellate court has ever applied it.  The 
court of appeals recognized this fact in Liles v. Employers Mut. 
Insurance, 126 Wis. 2d 492, 498, 377 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1985), 
noting, "we hesitate to [apply the "no case" rule] except in the 
most extreme cases."  Given the severe consequences of the rule, 
we too believe that it should be reserved for the most extreme 
cases. 
 
¶27 We refuse to apply the Ianni "no case" rule to the 
case at hand because it fails to meet the essence of the test:  
contradictory testimony.  We do not view Dr. Hanacik's testimony 
as fatally contradictory when viewed as a whole.  Rather, we 
conclude that it provided the jury with credible evidence to 
determine future health care expenses. 
 
¶28 Here the alleged contradictions are contrived.  When 
counsel for White asked Dr. Hanacik if it was his opinion to a 
reasonable degree of chiropractic certainty that Julie Weber 
No. 
03-0471   
 
11 
 
would need 20 to 25 visits a year for at least the next 35 
years, he answered:  
That is an example of what we’ve seen this year.  That 
does not mean – I mean, next year I may see her only 
three times.  It depends on what is happening with 
her. 
¶29 Later in his testimony, Dr. Hanacik acknowledged that 
he could not see into the future and give a "ballpark figure" as 
to how many times Julie Weber would need treatment.  This is 
consistent with Dr. Hanacik's repeated insistence that Julie 
Weber would require future treatment on an "as-needed basis," 
depending upon her level of activity.  
¶30 The law does not require mathematical certainty to 
determine future health care expenses.  As long as the decision 
is based on probability and not possibility, the court can make 
such an award.  Bleyer, 19 Wis. 2d at 312.   
¶31 In this case, two doctors testified that Julie Weber 
suffered a permanent shoulder impingement as a result of the 
accident.  Dr. Hanacik further explained that she would need 
future treatment, depending upon her level of activity.  Based 
upon his prior treatment and a review of her medical records, he 
estimated that her future care would "probably be around 20 to 
25 visits a year, probably, on an average."  Despite his 
statements on cross-examination, he never withdrew from this 
prediction.  Because there is credible evidence from which the 
No. 
03-0471   
 
12 
 
jury could determine future chiropractic expenses, we do not 
disturb its award.4   
IV 
¶32 We turn next to White's request for relief from 
further statutory interest.5  That interest accrues from the date 
of the offer of settlement until the judgment is paid.  
Wis. Stat. § 807.02(4); 
Management 
Computer 
Services, 
224 
Wis. 2d at 331; see also Ritt v. Dental Care Associates, 199 
Wis. 2d 48, 75, 543 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1995).   
¶33 In the present case, White filed a motion for relief 
pending appeal with the circuit court.  Specifically, she sought 
the court's permission to pay the clerk of courts a portion of 
the judgment to avoid the accumulation of further statutory 
interest.   
¶34 As the court of appeals recognized in Management 
Computer Services, the circuit court has broad discretion to 
stay execution of a judgment and to condition a stay upon terms 
it deems appropriate.   224 Wis. 2d at 330.  Likewise, the 
circuit court has broad discretion to grant a partial stay.  
                                                 
4 Since we do not disturb the jury award, the verdict 
exceeded the Webers' settlement offer of $35,000.  Therefore, 
under Wis. Stat. § 807.01, the Webers are entitled to double 
fees and costs as awarded by the circuit court.   
5 We note that White did not file a cross-petition for 
review of this issue.  However, once a case is before us, it is 
within our discretion to review any substantial issue that the 
case presents.  Univest Corp. v. General Split Corp., 148 Wis. 
2d 29, 32, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989).  Here, we choose to exercise 
that discretion, as the challenged action is capable of 
repetition yet may evade appellate review. 
No. 
03-0471   
 
13 
 
Scullion v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 2000 WI App 120, ¶31, 
237 Wis. 2d 498, 614 N.W.2d 565.  That authority is based on 
Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2).6   
¶35 There are four factors for the circuit court to 
consider when asked to grant a stay of a money judgment pending 
appeal.  Scullion, 237 Wis. 2d 498, ¶¶18-22.7  They are: (1) the 
issues appealed and the likelihood of success on those issues; 
(2) the need to ensure the collectibility of the judgment and 
accumulated interest if the appellant does not succeed on 
appeal; (3) the interest of the appellant; and (4) harm to the 
respondent that may result if the judgment is not paid until 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.07(2) provides in relevant part: 
(2) Authority of a court to grant relief pending 
appeal. 
   
(a) During the pendency of an appeal, a trial court or 
an appellate court may: 
1. 
Stay execution or enforcement of a judgment or 
order; 
2. 
Suspend, modify, restore or grant an injunction; 
or 
3. 
Make 
any 
order 
appropriate 
to 
preserve 
the 
existing state of affairs or the effectiveness of 
the judgment subsequently to be entered.  
7 These factors are taken from State v. Gudenschwager, 191 
Wis. 2d 431, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995), Wis. Stat. § 808.07 and its 
legislative history, and specific interests involved when a 
money judgment is appealed.  Scullion v. Wisconsin Power & Light 
Co., 2000 WI App 120, ¶11, 237 Wis. 2d 498, 614 N.W.2d 565.   
No. 
03-0471   
 
14 
 
completion of an unsuccessful appeal.8  Id.  These factors are 
not intended to be prerequisites, but rather interrelated 
considerations that must be balanced together.  Id., ¶13.   
¶36 In its oral decision, the circuit court set forth its 
reasoning.  It acknowledged the first factor from Scullion was a 
difficult one for White.  The court had rejected her motion 
after verdict to apply Ianni's "no case rule."  In doing so, it 
believed its decision was in accordance with the law and that 
White would not be successful on appeal.   
¶37 In consideration of the second factor, the need to 
ensure collectibility of the judgment and interest if White did 
not succeed on appeal, the court noted the assets of White's 
insurance company.  It concluded that collectibilty was not an 
issue for the Webers.   
¶38 The circuit court then examined the third factor:  the 
interest of White.  It reasoned that if White won on appeal, 
there would be no harm to either party.  Additionally, the court 
concluded that if the Webers won on appeal, the only harm to 
White would be the statutory interest.  The court considered 
White's use of the money in the meantime and determined that it 
mitigated any harm from the statutory interest.  
¶39 Finally, the circuit court weighed the fourth Scullion 
factor, the harm to the Webers.  It noted that if the money were 
paid directly to the clerk, the Webers would not have control of 
                                                 
8 The court discussed a fifth factor, the interest of the 
public, but concluded it is not likely to be relevant in an 
appeal of a money judgment.  Id., ¶23.   
No. 
03-0471   
 
15 
 
it and would not receive the statutory interest on the judgment.  
Because this factor weighed heavily in the Webers' favor, the 
court could not justify granting the requested relief to White.   
¶40 In the end, we are satisfied that the circuit court 
examined the relevant facts, applied the correct standard of 
law, demonstrated a rational process, and reached a decision 
that a reasonable judge could make.  Therefore, we affirm the 
court of appeals' order upholding the circuit court's exercise 
of discretion.   
V 
¶41 In sum, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying respondents' motion to pay the clerk of courts.  We 
disagree, however, with its conclusion that the verdict for 
future health care expenses was based on fatally contradictory 
testimony and thus not supported by any credible evidence.  
Because we determine that a reasonable jury could have awarded 
future health care expenses, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for determination of costs 
and statutory interest.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 
03-0471   
 
 
 
1