Case Title: Coliseum Enterprises, Inc. v. Campbell

Citation: 173 Vt. 585, 795 A.2d 1212

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Coliseum Enterprises, Inc. v. Campbell (2000-576); 173 Vt. 585; 795 A.2d 1212

[Filed 25-Feb-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER
                      
                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-576

                             JANUARY TERM, 2002

  Coliseum Enterprises, Inc.         }	APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
       v.                            }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                     }
  Colin Campbell, et al.             }
                                     }	DOCKET NO. S636-99 CnC

                                        Trial Judge:  David A. Jenkins

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiffs Coliseum Enterprises and Shawn B. Cliche appeal from an
  order of the Chittenden Superior Court granting summary judgment to
  defendants who are individual members of the Burlington Local Control
  Commission.  Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming
  that the commissioners violated plaintiffs' due process rights when they
  rescinded their recommendation that the Vermont Liquor Control Board
  approve plaintiffs' application for a liquor license.  Plaintiffs also
  claimed that defendants tortiously interfered with plaintiffs' business
  under state law.  We agree with the trial court that defendants are
  entitled to qualified immunity from suit.  Accordingly, we affirm.

       On October 21, 1996 the commissioners considered plaintiffs'
  application for a first class liquor license.  After hearing testimony in
  favor of and opposed to the application the commissioners approved
  plaintiffs' application by a vote of 8-6.  According to state law, once an
  application has been approved by a local commission, the application is
  passed on to the state board for it to investigate the applicant and
  approve or disapprove of the application.  7 V.S.A. § 222.  Accordingly,
  plaintiffs' application was forwarded to the board.  Before the board acted
  on the application, however, the Burlington commissioners decided to
  reconsider its prior vote at a November 18 meeting.  Plaintiffs were
  present at this meeting and given an opportunity to be heard, as were
  others in attendance.  At the conclusion of this meeting, the commissioners
  voted by 12-1 to rescind the approval of the application.

        
       Plaintiffs brought suit in superior court arguing that the
  commissioners violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights by taking their
  property, the liquor license, without due process of law.  They sought
  money damages only under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides relief to those
  harmed by the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
  by the Constitution" by anyone acting "under color" of state law.  Id. 
  Plaintiffs also claimed that the commissioners had engaged in tortious
  interference with plaintiffs' business.  Both parties filed motions for
  summary judgment.  

  

  The court granted defendants' motion and denied plaintiffs' on the grounds
  that defendants did not improperly deprive plaintiffs of a property
  interest because there was no license granted to them, and plaintiffs have
  no property interest in only an approved license application.  The court
  further held that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because
  they were public officials acting in good faith.  Plaintiffs appeal.

       On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the original vote of the
  commissioners bestowed upon plaintiffs a property interest in a liquor
  license that could be revoked only with due process.  They base their
  argument on the fact that a high percentage of applicants whose licenses
  were approved by the local commissions were also approved by the state
  board.  From this statistic, plaintiffs conclude that there was a strong
  likelihood that the board would have approved their application, vesting
  plaintiffs with a property interest in the license, and thus due process
  protections should attach following the approval of the local
  commissioners.  The manner in which the commissioners rescinded the
  application, plaintiffs contend, did not comport with due process because
  the commissioners did not comply with the revocation proceedings laid out
  in 7 V.S.A. § 236.  Plaintiffs also argue that the commissioners are not
  protected by qualified immunity because § 236 states the "clearly
  established law" in Vermont for revoking a liquor license of which the
  commissioner should have known. 

       We need not address the question of whether plaintiffs had a property
  interest in the liquor license following the original vote of the
  commissioners because we find that the commissioners are immune from suit.  
  We have recognized that "[i]mmunity is a defense to § 1983 actions for
  damages against persons in their individual capacity."  Billado v. Appel,
  165 Vt. 482, 486,