Case Title: MCFARLANE v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-58

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MCFARLANE v. STATE2001 WY 1017 P.3d 31Case Number: 00-58Decided: 02/02/2001

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                          
February 2, 2001

JAMES 
CHARLES McFARLANE,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Weston County

The 
Honorable Terrence O'Brien, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Hughes, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

            
HILL, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, James 
Charles McFarlane (McFarlane), seeks review of his conviction for larceny, 
contending that the conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain it.  McFarlane 
contends that he was not appropriately charged, i.e., that the evidence may support a 
conviction for possession of stolen property, but not for the larceny 
itself.  We disagree with his view 
of the evidence and affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2]      The sole issue in 
this appeal is simply stated by both parties:  Is the evidence sufficient to sustain 
McFarlane's conviction for larceny?

FACTS

[¶3]      In September of 
1998, Karla and Tony Doll took a 1997 Artic Cat Powder Special snowmobile to 
Dampier's Snowmobiles, Inc., in Newcastle, Wyoming, to be sold on consignment 
for a minimum price of $4,200.00.  
Mrs. Doll last saw the snowmobile at Dampier's on November 21, 1998.  Mr. Doll died on January 8, 1999.  On January 15, 1999, the day of Mr. 
Doll's funeral, Mrs. Doll's brother placed a call to Dampier's to inquire about 
the snowmobile.  Mrs. Doll received 
a return call, reporting that the snowmobile had been stolen.  The theft was reported to the Weston 
County Law Enforcement Center.  
Shortly after the snowmobile was reported as stolen, it was located at 
McFarlane's home.  The reason the 
snowmobile was discovered so quickly is that a Newcastle police officer had been 
in McFarlane's house on January 8, 1999, on an unrelated but official matter, 
and that officer recalled seeing parts of a disassembled snowmobile, fitting the 
description of the Doll's snowmobile, in McFarlane's basement.  The snowmobile had been cannibalized for 
parts, but law enforcement officers were able to identify it from its vehicle 
identification number (VIN).  The 
motor, as well as many other parts of the machine, were gone.  McFarlane told the police officers that 
he and a couple of friends had found the snowmobile in the city dump in October 
or November, and that the parts he possessed and turned over to the police were 
the parts he found at the dump.  
McFarlane's story was not corroborated by the testimony of the friends 
who were supposedly with him when he found the snowmobile, nor was his story 
corroborated by testimony of employees of the city dump, who testified that they 
had never seen the snowmobile nor McFarlane at the dump.  The motor from the Doll's snowmobile was 
found in another snowmobile that McFarlane had sold to a third individual, Jason 
Bell, who happened to be the person who came to post bail for McFarlane.  McFarlane initially claimed that the 
motor in that snowmobile was the same motor which was in it when he bought it 
from a dealer in Gillette.  The 
State's evidence disproved that scenario and, during his testimony, McFarlane 
told a story about buying a damaged motor from an unknown seller during 
Thanksgiving Day weekend in 1998, and that it was possible that he accidentally 
put that motor into the snowmobile which he sold to Jason 
Bell.

DISCUSSION

[¶4]      McFarlane 
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for larceny 
but appears to concede that it could sustain a conviction for possession of 
stolen property.  Of course, 
McFarlane was neither charged with, nor convicted of, the latter crime.  When reviewing an appeal based on 
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, and any applicable inferences 
based on the evidence, in a light most favorable to the State.  Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo. 
1999); and see Pool v. State, 2001 WL 80190 (Wyo.), 2001 WY 8, ___P.3d ___ 
(Wyo. 2001).  In conducting 
such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, 
we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or 
even could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.

[¶5]      In Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-402(a) (LEXIS 1999) the crime of larceny is described as 
follows:

            
(a)  A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

If the 
value of the property which is the subject of the larceny is $500.00 or more, 
the maximum penalty is ten years imprisonment and/or a $10,000.00 fine.  § 6-3-402(c)(i).

[¶6]      In Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-403 (LEXIS 1999) the crime of wrongful taking or disposing of 
property is described as follows:

     (a)  A person who buys, receives, conceals or 
disposes of property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe 
was obtained in violation of law is guilty of:

          
(i)  A felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) or more;

[¶7]      With respect to 
the crime of larceny, the jury was given this instruction:

The 
defendant is charged with the crime of larceny, the elements of which 
are:

1.  The events occurred at some time between 
November 21, 1998 and January 15, 1999, in Weston County, Wyoming; 
and

2.  The Defendant, James Charles McFarlane, 
did steal, take and carry, lead or drive away property of another; 
and

3.  He did so with the intent to deprive the 
owner or lawful possessor; and

4.  The value of the property was $500.00 or 
more;

If you 
find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these elements 
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty.

If, on 
the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that 
each element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant guilty.

[¶8]      The only element 
in dispute is element number 2.  
McFarlane claims he did not steal the snowmobile; rather, he merely 
bought, received, concealed, and/or disposed of it.  Of course, implicitly he also contends 
he did not know, believe, nor have reasonable cause to believe, that he had 
obtained the snowmobile in violation of the law.

[¶9]      In constructing 
his argument, McFarlane relies heavily on our decision in Mendicoa v. State, 771 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Wyo. 
1989), as well as State v. Ellestad, 
88 S.D. 595, 225 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1975).  
In Mendicoa, we first noted 
that we were dealing with a specific type of larceny, i.e., livestock 
rustling.  Our decision rested in 
significant part upon the fact that the disappearance of the cattle could be 
traced to a reasonably ascertainable time, but that there was no evidence 
linking Mendicoa to the disappearance.  
In Mendicoa, the State argued 
that, although mere possession of recently stolen property is insufficient to 
support a conviction of larceny, possession in conjunction with other 
incriminating circumstances, such as misstatement and concealment, will support 
such a conviction.  We expressed our 
view that we had no quarrel with that construct as a general principle.  771 P.2d  at 1244.   Our decision to reverse Mendicoa's 
convictions then rested on our determination that such an inference could not be 
drawn in Mendicoa's case.  The 
application of the inference depends upon the recency of the alleged theft.  Id.  Therefore, we held that possession of 
stolen cattle which, at a minimum, was over a month after their disappearance, 
to as much as one and one-half years after, was not "recent" enough to fit 
within the rule.  771 P.2d  at 
1245.  Moreover, over Mendicoa's 
objection, the jury was instructed regarding the permissible inference of theft 
from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property.  Our conclusion was that the predicate 
fact of recency, upon which the inference depends, was not established by the 
evidence.  771 P.2d  at 
1245-46.

[¶10]   In reaching our decision we relied 
on a case from the South Dakota Supreme Court, which also dealt with cattle 
rustling, for the proposition that the "test of recency is whether the interval 
between the date of the alleged theft and the date of possession is so short as 
to render it morally or reasonably certain that there could have been no 
intermediate change of possession."  
Ellestad, 225 N.W.2d  at 
882.  The Ellestad case relied on a premise that 
in determining whether the possession of stolen goods can be characterized as 
recent, the circumstances and character of the goods, their salability, and 
whether they are readily and easily transferable, are among the factors to be 
considered, along with the length of time involved.  Id.

[¶11]   We note that the jury in this case 
was not given an instruction telling them that the theft could be inferred from 
the possession of recently stolen property, as was done in both Mendicoa and Ellestad.  
In addition, we hold that the recency construct was met in this 
case.  The snowmobile disappeared 
sometime after November 21, 1998, and McFarlane admitted to having possession of 
it on or about Thanksgiving weekend of 1998.  Thus, the jury could infer from all of 
the evidence that McFarlane gained possession by a taking within a matter of 
days after the snowmobile was last seen (Thanksgiving fell on November 26, 
1998).  Even if we were compelled to 
go out to the maximum date of January 15, 1999, we would continue to view the 
recency construct as having been met.  
When the circumstances and character of the goods, their salability, and 
whether they are readily and easily transferable are considered, we find the 
circumstances of this case distinguishable from cases involving the theft of 
livestock.  For one thing, livestock 
can, and often do, drift away on their own.  Livestock may have markings and 
distinguishing features that are identifiable to their owners (but not to most 
other persons), and they have brands which may be identifiable to brand 
inspectors.  A snowmobile cannot 
move by itself, and it has a vehicle identification number and a motor number 
that make it distinguishable from any other in the world.  In addition, both Mendicoa and Ellestad 
were regularly and significantly involved in buying and selling livestock.  McFarlane's involvement in buying and 
selling snowmobiles can, at best, be characterized as incidental.  The events of this theft took place in a 
fairly compact area within Weston County, and any doubt that the jury might have 
harbored, or that we might harbor, is not a reasonable one.  See generally, Annotation, What 
Constitutes Recently' Stolen Property Within Rule Inferring Guilt from 
Unexplained Possession of Such Property, 89 A.L.R.3d 1202 (1979 & Supp. 
2000); and see Rogers v. State, 185 
Ga. App. 211, 363 S.E.2d 846, 848-49 (Ga. 1987) (two months not too remote); People v. Panus, 76 Ill. 2d 263, 391 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ill. 1979) (four months not too remote); Rushing v. State, 461 So. 2d 710, 712-13 
(Miss. 1984) (one month not too remote); Marbles v. State, 874 S.W.2d 225, 227-28 
(Tex. App.  Houston [1st Dist.] 1994) (two 
and a half months not too remote); and Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 352, 353 (Va. 1980) (four weeks not too remote).

[¶12]   The Judgment and Sentence of the 
district court is affirmed.