Case Title: IKE KING v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IKE KING v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 177780 P.2d 943Case Number: 88-297Decided: 09/20/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IKE KING, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Steven E. 
Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, and Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, of Public 
Defender Program, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Ike King was 
convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and battery as proscribed by Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (1977). On appeal, he presents numerous contentions of 
error in the proceedings below relating to the conduct of the prosecutor and the 
jury, the introduction of certain evidence, the assessment of various costs upon 
him as part of his sentence, the propriety of a jury instruction, and the 
failure to grant a new trial.

[¶2.]     We affirm but modify 
the judgment and sentence with respect to costs.

[¶3.]     The specific issues 
raised by appellant, as rephrased in the form of questions for clarity, are as 
follows:1

1. Was the trial court's 
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial error?

2. Was plain error 
committed when the trial court failed to grant a mistrial after prosecutorial 
misconduct took place which denied appellant a fair trial?

3. Was plain error 
committed during the closing argument when the prosecutor questioned why 
appellant had not called certain witnesses to testify?

4. Was it error to allow 
Patricia Koryn's preliminary hearing testimony to be used at trial when the 
State did not use reasonable means to subpoena her?

5. Did the trial court 
err in failing to regulate or stop note-taking by the jury?

6. Could the trial court 
legally and constitutionally require appellant to repay the costs of his 
representation by the public defender?

7. Is the statutory 
scheme allowing for the recoupment of the costs of prosecution unconstitutional, 
and was the assessment of certain costs reasonable?

8. Did the trial court 
err by failing to suppress evidence and by allowing the State to augment the 
record concerning the motion to suppress?

9. Did the trial court 
err in instructing the jury and in allowing testimony on intimidation of a 
witness?

[¶4.]     The evidence produced 
at trial, with conflicts properly resolved in favor of the State, Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988), revealed the 
following facts. At 10:30 p.m. on January 29, 1988, Officer Mark Abraham of the 
Riverton police department issued a traffic ticket to appellant for driving 
without an operable license plate light. In addition to the inoperable license 
plate light, Officer Abraham initially stopped appellant for exceeding the speed 
limit and changing lanes without signaling. At this time, appellant was driving 
a green 1968 GMC pickup. After being stopped, appellant got out of his pickup, 
walked back to Officer Abraham, and handed him his driver's license. As a safety 
precaution, Officer Abraham walked over to appellant's pickup and shined his 
flashlight through the window into the interior in order to determine whether 
other occupants were in the vehicle. He observed a club in the pickup which he 
described at trial as resembling an axe or pick handle wrapped in black tape. 
After ascertaining that no other occupants were in the vehicle, Officer Abraham 
issued the citation, and appellant left.

[¶5.]     Later that evening, 
sixteen-year-old Guy Muggelberg, accompanied by his girl friend, Sheila Baldes, 
was driving his car east down West Main Street in Riverton when a car suddenly 
pulled out directly in front of him, causing him to brake sharply and swerve to 
avoid a collision. Muggelberg pulled along side the other vehicle, which he 
described as a "[b]rownish gold, midsized Oldsmobile." Both drivers rolled down 
their windows, and a verbal exchange occurred in which Muggelberg called the 
other driver "Jeff" and suggested that he should drive more carefully. 
Muggelberg testified that he referred to the other driver as Jeff "[b]ecause I 
knew that he was a King, but I didn't - I wasn't sure if it was Ike or Jeff." 
Muggelberg and Baldes testified that the other driver responded by stating that 
his name was Ike, not Jeff, and that, if Muggelberg had a problem or something 
to say, he should pull over.

[¶6.]     Muggelberg pulled over 
to the side of the street, climbed out of his car, and started walking toward 
the Oldsmobile. As Muggelberg approached the Oldsmobile, the driver came out of 
the car and struck Muggelberg behind the right ear with a club, which Muggelberg 
described as being two to three feet long, tapered, and wrapped in black tape. 
Muggelberg stumbled back toward his car, and the assailant brandished the club 
in the air, threatening and shaking it at Baldes who had come out of 
Muggelberg's car to assist Muggelberg.

[¶7.]     Muggelberg and Baldes 
drove away, located Officer Abraham's police patrol car, and reported the 
incident to Officer Abraham at about 11:40 p.m. Muggelberg and Baldes informed 
Officer Abraham that the assailant was either Jeff King or Ike King. Muggelberg 
was acquainted with appellant's son and, therefore, was somewhat familiar with 
the King family. Muggelberg was subsequently transported by ambulance to 
RivertonMemorialHospital where he received eight stitches 
in his head. Officer Abraham ran a check on the license number of the 
Oldsmobile, as reported to him by Baldes, and discovered that the car was 
registered to appellant's sister, Patricia Koryn. The following day, Muggelberg 
saw appellant, recognized him as his assailant, and reported this information to 
Officer Abraham.

[¶8.]     A criminal complaint 
charging appellant with aggravated assault and battery was filed on February 1, 
1988. After a preliminary hearing, appellant was bound over to the district 
court, and an information containing the same charge was filed on March 2, 1988. 
After various pretrial proceedings, appellant's trial began on July 18, 
1988.

[¶9.]     Appellant's defense, as 
presented at trial, consisted in part of the alibi that he had been with Linda 
Kennah at her home at the time of the assault. Appellant also attempted to 
discredit the identification of himself as the assailant, asserting, at least 
obliquely, that his brother, Jeff, was the actual perpetrator of the assault. 
Kennah's testimony at trial supported appellant's alibi defense. She stated that 
appellant came to her house on January 29, 1988, around suppertime, that 
sometime before 10:00 p.m. he left to buy some snacks, and that he returned 
shortly after 10:30 p.m., staying until after midnight.

[¶10.]  The preliminary hearing testimony of 
appellant's sister, Patricia Koryn, was admitted at trial. Koryn initially 
testified at the preliminary hearing that she had not allowed appellant or 
anyone else to drive her Oldsmobile on the evening of January 29, 1988. Upon 
cross-examination by the State, however, she admitted that she had in fact given 
the car keys to appellant on the night in question. Appellant's testimony 
regarding the Oldsmobile was that Jeff King wanted to use the car that evening 
and that appellant borrowed the car for Jeff because Koryn would never allow 
Jeff to drive the car. Appellant testified that, after going to his sister's 
house and borrowing the Oldsmobile, he immediately gave possession of the car to 
Jeff, and he (appellant) returned to Kennah's home. Appellant called Jeff as a 
witness. After answering some preliminary questions as to his name, residence, 
et cetera, Jeff invoked the fifth amendment2 privilege against 
self-incrimination and refused to answer questions material to his brother's 
trial.

[¶11.]  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of aggravated assault and battery. 
Post-trial motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal after jury 
verdict were denied after a hearing. On September 21, 1988, appellant was 
sentenced to a term of not less than one and one-half years and not more than 
six years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Additionally, appellant was ordered 
to pay $50 to the crime victims compensation fund, to make restitution to the 
victim in the amount of $198.88, to repay the State $2,750 for the services of 
the public defender, and to repay FremontCounty $1,081.51 for the costs of 
prosecution. This appeal was perfected. Additional relevant facts will be 
discussed as they relate to the specific issues presented.

Motion for New 
Trial

[¶12.]  On August 1, 1988, counsel for appellant 
filed a W.R.Cr.P. 34 motion for a new trial premised upon several grounds, 
including newly discovered evidence. The motion was denied after a hearing, and 
the denial of that motion with respect to newly discovered evidence is urged as 
error upon appeal.

[¶13.]  The alleged newly discovered evidence 
consisted of a post-trial statement made by Jeff King to appellant's trial 
counsel that he (Jeff), and not appellant, had committed the assault. In an 
affidavit submitted with the motion, and in testimony at the motion hearing, 
appellant's trial counsel related that, after the verdict had been returned, he 
was standing outside the courthouse when Jeff drove up. Counsel testified that 
he walked over to Jeff's car and informed him of the verdict. According to the 
affidavit, the two discussed sentencing and appeal possibilities for appellant, 
and then this exchange occurred:

8. I then said to Jeff 
King, "Did you do it?". Jeff King's response was, "Yeah, Ike's not guilty.". I 
then said to Jeff King, "Why don't you just tell the truth?". Jeff King said, 
"Then [the prosecuting attorney] will just want to put me in prison.". I then 
said, "Yes, but you did do it.". Jeff King said, "Yes I did it. I know 
Muggelberg and I did it." I then said to Jeff King, "Why don't you just tell the 
truth?". He said, "I've done all I can do.". I then said to Jeff, "No, you 
haven't. You haven't told the truth.". He then asked when he could see 
[¶14.]      Ike and I said 
probably tomorrow and then Jeff King drove off.

[¶15.]  The decision of whether to grant or deny 
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is one within the sound 
discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse absent a showing of an 
abuse of that discretion. Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), appeal after remand 766 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1988); Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1983). This Court 
has defined judicial discretion as "a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously." Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), quoted in Best v. State, 769 P.2d 385, 387 
(Wyo. 1989). 
We have said that an abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts in a manner 
which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Keser v. State, 737 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 1987); Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831 (Wyo. 1980). In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion in denying a motion 
for a new trial, we will look to the facts and circumstances of each individual 
case. Siegert v. State, 634 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1981). As we have noted in previous 
cases, the question is not whether the district court would have been justified 
in granting a new trial but, rather, whether it was error to not grant a new 
trial. Id.; Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 
(Wyo. 
1967).

[¶16.]  In Opie we adopted the criteria applied 
by the federal courts for granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence. We established in Opie, 422 P.2d  at 85, that

it is incumbent on a 
party who asks for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to 
satisfy the court: (1) That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the 
trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not 
come sooner; (3) that it is so material that it would probably produce a 
different verdict, if the new trial were granted; and (4) that it is not 
cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in relation to which there was evidence at 
the trial.

We have 
consistently applied the "Opie test" in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Best, 769 
P.2d at 387-88; Gist, 737 P.2d at 339-40; and Grable, 664 P.2d  at 533. All the 
factors must be present in order for this Court to find that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence. If any one of the factors is not satisfied, then there has 
been no error of law committed by the district court under the circumstances, 
and no abuse of discretion can be found. Gist, 737 P.2d 336; Grable, 664 P.2d 531.

[¶17.]  In the instant case, the district court 
did not give its reasons for denying appellant's motion for a new trial.3 We, therefore, must examine the 
facts in relation to each factor to determine if the district court erred in 
denying appellant's motion.

[¶18.]  This case is similar to Gist, 737 P.2d 336, with respect to the question of whether the evidence came to appellant's 
knowledge since the trial. In that case, Steve Gist had been convicted of 
delivery of, or possession with intent to deliver, marijuana. Although Gist did 
not put on any evidence at trial, it was his theory of the case, as developed 
through cross-examination and argument, that the undercover narcotics officer 
involved in the transaction was mistaken as to the identity of the person who 
actually delivered the marijuana; i.e., that the delivery had actually been made 
by Steve's brother, Roger. Roger Gist had also been charged with respect to this 
transaction but had been a fugitive until two days before Steve's trial. One day 
before Steve's trial, Roger appeared for an arraignment and pleaded not guilty 
to several charges, including a count involving the transaction for which Steve 
was about to be tried. Due to a perceived conflict of interest, Steve's counsel 
did not interview Roger prior to Steve's trial, nor did he attempt to produce 
Roger as a witness at Steve's trial.

[¶19.]  After Steve's trial, Roger negotiated a 
plea bargain which resulted in the dismissal of the charges against him arising 
out of the transaction for which Steve had been convicted. Roger then confessed 
that he, not Steve, made the delivery in question. Thereafter, Steve moved for a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The district court denied 
the motion for a new trial on the ground that Steve or his attorney knew of the 
role of Roger in the transaction and, therefore, under the circumstances, the 
testimony could not be newly discovered. Although this Court reversed Steve's 
conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, as emanating from 
the failure of counsel to investigate the nature and availability of Roger's 
testimony, we affirmed, in a divided decision, the trial court's denial of a new 
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. With respect to the asserted 
newly discovered evidence, this Court concluded that at least the potential for 
such testimony was known before trial, and, therefore, the testimony was not 
newly discovered.

[¶20.]  The situation in the instant case, 
although similar, is distinguishable from Gist. Here, as in Gist, appellant's 
theory of the case was that his brother committed the crime, and at least the 
potential for Jeff's testimony was known to appellant and his counsel prior to 
trial. In this case, however, counsel acted upon this potential testimony and 
discovered that it would not materialize; i.e., that the desired evidence was 
unavailable and would not be forthcoming despite efforts to produce it. Counsel 
for appellant unsuccessfully attempted to contact Jeff before trial and did 
cause a subpoena to issue which produced Jeff as a witness at trial. Prior to 
the commencement of the trial, counsel for appellant inquired of Jeff what his 
testimony would be, and Jeff indicated that he would not answer any questions. 
Nevertheless, appellant's counsel did call Jeff to the stand, only to have Jeff 
exercise his privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to answer any 
relevant questions. 

[¶21.]  In Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238, 242 
(Wyo. 1977), 
we said:

Critical to the concept 
of newly discovered evidence is that the defendant had no knowledge of the new 
and material facts either prior to or during his trial. If the accused knew of 
the evidence prior to trial, it was his duty to produce that testimony at the 
trial or at least show that after due diligence the witness could not be found. 
Evidence is not newly discovered when it was known to the defendant or could 
have been known in the exercise of due diligence, and such evidence is not 
sufficient to grant a new trial.

In Salaz, we 
affirmed the denial of a motion for a new trial sought on the basis of a witness 
located after the defendant's trial where the defendant, knowing of the facts to 
which the witness would testify, did not exercise diligence in attempting to 
locate and produce the witness. In the instant case, appellant and his counsel 
did know of the existence of the witness, but they initially had no knowledge of 
the facts to which Jeff would testify. Cf. Salaz, 561 P.2d 238. They 
subsequently discovered, however, that Jeff would not testify to anything 
material to this case. Consequently, in pursuing their duty to produce the 
evidence, appellant and his counsel discovered that, in fact, the desired 
evidence did not exist prior to or during trial. Thus, since the fact and 
evidence of Jeff's confession came to appellant's knowledge after the trial, we 
conclude that appellant satisfied the first Opie factor, and the denial of his 
motion for a new trial cannot be sustained on that basis.

[¶22.]  We are similarly satisfied that it was 
not owing to a want of due diligence that the evidence did not come to 
appellant's knowledge sooner. Counsel for appellant attempted to locate Jeff 
before trial and, failing in that regard, succeeded in producing him at trial by 
issuance of a subpoena. Although counsel discovered shortly before trial that 
Jeff would invoke his fifth amendment privilege, he nevertheless called Jeff as 
a witness in an attempt to elicit testimony regarding Jeff's participation in 
and/or knowledge of the offense. No lack of due diligence existed.

[¶23.]  Although we determine that appellant has 
satisfied the first two Opie factors, we are of the opinion that this evidence 
is not so material that it would produce a different result and also that it is, 
to some extent, merely cumulative. As to these factors, we first observe that 
there is no indication that Jeff would testify if a new trial were granted; in 
fact, the record strongly suggests the contrary; i.e., that Jeff would not 
testify. Somewhat analogous circumstances were presented in the case of 
United 
States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982). 
In that case, a third party wrote a letter to the defendant's counsel confessing 
to the crime for which the defendant had been convicted. The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied a motion for a new trial on the basis of a lack of due 
diligence. The court additionally noted, however, that, although it did not need 
to consider it, the question of whether the letter would probably produce an 
acquittal was much more difficult. The court described the "aura of suspicion" 
and problems of trustworthiness surrounding the letter and observed that there 
was no assurance that the author would come forth and subject himself to a 
thorough examination and cross-examination. Id. at 228-29. See also Hopkinson v. State, 
679 P.2d 1008 (Wyo.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1984) (unsigned affidavit of witness of no value - no 
assurance that she would testify). These problems are obviously also present in 
the instant case.

[¶24.]  Further, if we discount the possibility 
that Jeff would testify and focus exclusively on the statement he made to 
appellant's counsel, we must recognize there are serious questions as to the 
admissibility of that statement. See Grable, 664 P.2d  at 535-36 (whether such 
evidence could even be admitted is problematical). The affidavit of appellant's 
counsel recounting Jeff's confession is clearly hearsay as would be counsel's in 
court testimony on this topic. Appellant argues, however, that the evidence is 
admissible as a statement against penal interest pursuant to W.R.E. 804(b)(3). 
That rule provides in relevant part:

(b) Hearsay exceptions. - The following are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness:[4]

* * * * * *

(3) Statement Against 
Interest. - A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to 
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject 
him to civil or criminal liability, * * * that a reasonable man in his position 
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement[.]

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶25.]  Under the rule, the statement of Jeff 
King is arguably admissible if corroborating circumstances are present.5 In 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence § 489 at 1153 (1980), the authors note that courts have been 
"highly skeptical" of third-party confessions offered in support of motions for 
new trials. Thus, as the authors in the above-cited treatise point out, the rule 
allows the prosecutor to exclude such statements unless their trustworthiness is 
clearly indicated by corroborating circumstances. Id. at 1149. See also E. 
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 278 at 824 (3d ed. 1984) (corroborating 
circumstances requirement reflects traditional distrust of statements against 
penal interest). In excluding statements against penal interest, courts have 
emphasized, among other things, the fact that particular statements were made 
under suspicious circumstances. 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra at 1161. 
The motive of the declarant to falsify for the benefit of the accused should 
also be considered. Id. at 1160. See also 3 C. Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 557 at 334 (1982) (courts properly 
suspicious and will deny motion for new trial on the basis of third-party 
confession if not satisfied with the truth of the confession).

[¶26.]  In the instant case, while there are some 
corroborating circumstances with respect to Jeff King's confession, in 
particular Muggelberg's initial confusion as to the identity of his assailant, 
an "aura of suspicion" and questions of trustworthiness surround the confession. 
The district court could reasonably have suspected a contrivance in Jeff's 
invocation of the fifth amendment at trial followed immediately and conveniently 
by a furtive confession after appellant's conviction. In any event, the 
admissibility of this evidence is at least questionable, and the decision to 
exclude or admit this evidence, as with other evidentiary rulings, would fall 
within the exercise of the district court's discretion.

[¶27.]  If the evidence was not admitted, it 
obviously would not change the verdict. See United States v. 
Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (inadmissable new evidence could not 
possibly produce a different result). If the affidavit and testimony of counsel 
were admitted, however, we are not convinced that it would probably produce a 
different verdict. Appellant's theory that Jeff committed the crime was 
developed for the jury at trial. In addition, counsel for appellant successfully 
argued against the State's proposed instruction to the effect that the jury was 
not to consider Jeff's exercise of the fifth amendment as an indication of his 
guilt. Thus, the jury was allowed to draw whatever inference it might from 
Jeff's refusal to testify, including an inference of his guilt. We do not 
believe that testimony regarding Jeff's convenient confession would be likely to 
materially alter the jury's perception of this case and result in a different 
verdict. In this regard, the evidence was also cumulative. Since this evidence 
fails to satisfy all the factors of the "Opie test," the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial on the basis 
of newly discovered evidence.

[¶28.]  In an argument similar to that presented 
to this Court in Gist, 737 P.2d 336, appellant additionally urges this Court to 
adopt a less stringent standard than the "Opie test" for motions for new trials 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence which are made within ten days of the 
final decision. This "interest of justice" standard proposed by appellant has 
been applied by various federal courts to motions filed within the required time 
frame pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 33, the federal counterpart to W.R.Cr.P. 34. Gist, 
737 P.2d  at 340; C. Wright, supra at 316 and cases cited therein. As in Gist, 
however, we are of the opinion that application of a less stringent standard 
would not change the result in this case. The admissibility of the evidence 
supporting the motion was questionable, and, even if admitted, the evidence 
would be unlikely to change the verdict. Thus, we do not need to determine 
whether we would apply the "interest of justice" test in an appropriate 
case.

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct/Cross-Examination

[¶29.]  Appellant's second issue concerns the 
conduct of the prosecuting attorney with respect to an exchange which occurred 
during cross-examination of appellant at trial. After impeaching several 
statements appellant had made on direct examination concerning events occurring 
on the night of the crime, the prosecutor asked appellant: "Mr. King, you're the 
only person who has any real interest in the outcome of this case, aren't you?" 
The court sustained an objection to this question as calling for speculation, 
but not before appellant answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor then 
propounded this question:

Given the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, Mr. King, you're not going to be too surprised when 
you are convicted, are you not?

Appellant's 
counsel immediately objected, and the prosecutor withdrew the 
question.

[¶30.]  Appellant's contention regarding this 
question is twofold. First, appellant asserts that the question constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct intentionally designed to deny him a fair trial in that 
the prosecutor was in effect testifying as to his opinion regarding appellant's 
guilt. Second, although no motion for a mistrial was made, appellant contends 
that the district court committed plain error by not immediately declaring a 
mistrial upon its own motion. Although we agree that the question was improper, 
we do not perceive that it constituted misconduct so grave as to deprive 
appellant of a fair trial or to require the district court to sua sponte order a 
mistrial.

[¶31.]  We review a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct by examining the entire record to determine whether the conduct of 
the prosecutor resulted in substantial prejudice amounting to the denial of a 
fair trial. Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 (Wyo. 
1987); Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1986). Our review of the record includes 
an evaluation of the state of the evidence and the probability of prejudicial 
impact on the defendant under the circumstances of the particular case. Burke, 
746 P.2d 852; Stogner v. State, 674 P.2d 1298 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶32.]  The question, which implied that 
appellant was guilty in the eyes of the prosecutor, was improper. Appellant 
calls our attention to various standards for prosecutors enunciated in I ABA, 
Standards for Criminal Justice ch. 3 at 3-69 (2d ed. 1979 & 1986 Supp.).6 We agree with appellant that some 
of these standards are pertinent to our consideration of the prosecutor's 
conduct in this case. Standard 3-5.6(b) describes as unprofessional conduct by a 
prosecutor the asking of questions known to be legally objectionable and the 
making of impermissible comments in the presence of the judge or jury. Standard 
3-5.8(b) states that it is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express 
a personal belief or opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. See also Browder 
v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982) (prosecutor prohibited from 
injecting personal beliefs relating to matters in issue). The prosecutor, by 
making this thinly veiled statement of his belief in appellant's guilt, 
overstepped the bounds of proper prosecutorial conduct. As this Court has noted: 
"While [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not free to strike foul 
ones." Lindsey, 725 P.2d  at 656, and Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 166 
(Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). See also 
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S. Ct. 783, 791, 13 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1965).

[¶33.]  In reviewing the entire record, however, 
we are not convinced the conduct of the prosecutor in asking this one improper 
question substantially prejudiced appellant. The evidence of appellant's guilt 
was considerable. In particular, the testimony of the victim, Muggelberg, his 
girl friend, Baldes, and appellant's sister, Koryn, established a strong case 
for the State. In addition, the credibility of appellant and his theory of the 
case had been severely damaged by earlier cross-examination which revealed 
numerous inconsistencies in appellant's versions of the events on the night of 
the crime. We also note that the jury returned a verdict against appellant after 
deliberating only two and one-half hours. This was not a particularly close 
case. Cf. Browder, 639 P.2d  at 895 (reversal of defendant's conviction on basis 
of plain error where the case was close and the improper comments of the 
prosecutor were numerous and extreme). As we have observed on other occasions, 
the Constitution guarantees only a fair trial, not a perfect one. Lindsey, 725 P.2d  at 657; Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1330 n. 2 (Wyo. 1977). We conclude 
that the prosecutor's conduct in cross-examination, while improper, did not deny 
appellant a fair trial. It follows, accordingly, that the district court did not 
commit plain error by failing to declare a mistrial upon its own 
initiative.

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct/Closing Argument

[¶34.]  In closing argument, the prosecutor 
commented on appellant's failure to call two witnesses who might have been able 
to corroborate appellant's version of the events in question. Appellant contends 
that such comments were misconduct which denied him due process and a fair 
trial. We do not agree.

[¶35.]  As the State correctly points out, the 
comments of the prosecutor must be put into perspective. Appellant defended this 
case on the theory that his brother, Jeff, who assertedly resembles appellant in 
appearance, committed the assault for which appellant had been charged. 
Appellant testified that he had not been driving his sister's Oldsmobile on 
January 29, 1988, and that he gave the car keys to Jeff. Appellant further 
testified that his son and Koryn's son observed him give the car keys to Jeff 
and that the boys asked why he had done so. Appellant did not call either of the 
boys at trial.

[¶36.]  It was within this context of the trial 
that the prosecutor, near the end of his closing argument, said to the 
jury:

If the defendant had been 
telling you the truth, why wasn't Chad King called? He could have 
backed up a portion of the testimony. Why wasn't Chester, the daughter of Patricia - excuse me, 
the son of Patricia Koryn called? He could have backed up some of the 
testimony.

[¶37.]  Although no objection was taken to these 
comments at trial, appellant argues that they constitute plain error, warranting 
reversal. Our standard for evaluating a claim of plain error was recently 
reiterated in Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350, 357 (Wyo. 1989):

When an issue was not 
raised at trial, the appellant must establish that the alleged error was plain 
error. Failure to object at trial constitutes a waiver of the alleged error 
unless the error rises to the level of plain error. Appellant bears the burden 
of establishing plain error, and the rule is applied sparingly and only in 
special circumstances. This Court applies a three-part test to determine if 
plain error has occurred. First, the record must clearly show the incidents 
alleged as plain error. Second, the appellant must demonstrate the violation of 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Finally, it must be shown that the 
appellant was materially prejudiced - that a substantial right of the appellant 
was adversely affected.

(Citations 
omitted.)

[¶38.]  A contention similar to appellant's was 
raised in Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1978), and we believe our holding in that 
case is dispositive of this issue. In Seyle, the defendant was convicted of 
manslaughter of his two-year-old stepson. The child's mother was not called to 
testify at trial by either the State or the defendant. In his closing argument, 
the prosecutor commented, without objection, on the mother's failure to testify. 
We noted in Seyle that the marital privilege would not have prevented the wife's 
testimony in a child abuse/child homicide case. Id. at 1086. Thus, it was not a case in which 
the prosecutor improperly commented on the exercise of a privilege not to 
testify. We also noted that the wife, having the same status as any other 
witness, was equally available to the defense and the prosecution. Id.

[¶39.]  In rejecting a claim of plain error in 
Seyle, we first observed that, generally, where a witness is equally available 
to both parties, the failure to call the witness is not the proper subject of 
comment. Id. 
We acknowledged an exception to that principle, however, which arises where the 
failure to call such a witness leads more naturally to an inference against the 
defendant. Id. 
We held that, "where the wife of a defendant in a criminal case, like that now 
before us, might be a material witness, and she is not placed on the stand by 
the defendant, it is permissible for the State in argument to infer that the 
absent testimony would have been both material and damaging." Id. This principle has 
been approved in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Ennis, 99 N.M. 117, 
654 P.2d 570 (Ct.App.), cert. denied 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982) 
(prosecutor may comment on the failure to call a witness as long as the comment 
cannot be construed as a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify); 
Assadollah v. State, 632 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Cr. 1981) (rule in Oklahoma is that, 
where a person who might be a material witness on behalf of the defendant is not 
called by the accused nor his absence accounted for, failure to produce him as a 
witness is a legitimate matter for comment in the State's argument); and State 
v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974) (when defense theory is premised 
on facts within the personal knowledge of a person available as a witness and no 
attempt to secure the testimony of such person is made, the failure to produce 
the testimony may give rise to an inference that it would be adverse to the 
party who could have produced it - and comment by the prosecutor on such an 
inference is permissible).

[¶40.]  The comments by the prosecutor in the 
instant case fall squarely within the principle established by the Seyle case, 
and we hold that such comments did not constitute error. Thus, appellant did not 
establish the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and his 
contention of plain error must fall.

Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony

[¶41.]  Appellant called his sister, Patricia 
Koryn, as a witness at his preliminary hearing. On direct examination, she 
testified that she owned a gold colored 1986 Oldsmobile which she drove to work 
on January 29, 1988. Koryn testified that, on the evening of January 29, 1988, 
she did not give anyone permission to drive the Oldsmobile, that to her 
knowledge no one (other than she) drove the car that evening, and that to her 
knowledge neither Ike King nor Jeff King possessed a set of keys to her car at 
that time. On cross-examination, Koryn initially held to her testimony that she 
had not loaned her car to appellant on the night in question. The prosecutor 
persevered, however, eventually obtaining this admission:

[Q.] Would you answer my 
question.

[A.] What, what was the 
question? 

[Q.] You gave your keys 
to your brother [Ike] that night, I, your car keys.

[A.] Yes sir, I did. I'm 
sorry.

[¶42.]  At appellant's trial, it was determined 
that Koryn was unavailable as a witness, and the district court, over the 
strenuous objection of appellant's trial counsel, permitted Koryn's preliminary 
hearing testimony to be read to the jury and into the record. Appellant argues, 
as he did below, that the admission of this testimony violated established rules 
of evidence and his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. We 
disagree.

[¶43.]  In reviewing the admissibility of this 
testimony, we must analyze the hearsay rule concerning former testimony within 
the framework of the confrontation clauses of the United States 
Constitution7 and the Wyoming Constitution.8 See Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 
1985). Former testimony, as an exception to the hearsay rule, is addressed by 
W.R.E. 804(b)(1), which reads:

(b) Hearsay exceptions. - 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former Testimony. - 
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different 
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the 
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or 
redirect examination[.]

The rule 
establishes three requirements for admissibility of former testimony: (1) 
unavailability of the witness; (2) the testimony must have been given by the 
witness while he was testifying at a hearing or deposition (i.e., under oath); 
and (3) the party against whom the testimony is offered must have had the 
opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony. Rodriguez, 711 P.2d  
at 413; Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 671 (Wyo. 1982); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
supra at § 487. Appellant does not contest the second requirement but, rather, 
focuses his argument on the questions of unavailability and opportunity and 
motive to develop.

[¶44.]  Various definitions of unavailability of 
a witness are provided by W.R.E. 804(a). The definition with which we are here 
concerned is found in W.R.E. 804(a)(5), which states that a witness is 
unavailable if he "[i]s absent from the hearing and the proponent of his 
statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other 
reasonable means." The unavailability requirement reflects a preference for live 
testimony and face-to-face confrontation. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65, 
100 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-38, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980) (confrontation clause conforms to 
framers' preference for face-to-face accusation); and 4 D. Louisell & C. 
Mueller, supra at § 486 (requirement expresses rule of preference for live 
testimony). The prosecution bears the burden of proving unavailability of a 
witness despite good faith efforts to obtain his presence at trial. Grable, 649 P.2d  at 672; Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 65, 100 S. Ct.  at 2538. The 
determination of unavailability, however, is a matter vested in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and that determination will not be overturned 
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Grable, 649 P.2d  at 672; Martinez, 611 P.2d  at 
837.

[¶45.]  In the instant case, prior to admission 
of the preliminary hearing testimony, the district court heard testimony in 
chambers regarding the efforts by the State to locate Koryn, who had left 
Riverton, Wyoming, and apparently had moved out of the 
state. Kevin Lee, a Riverton police investigator, and Vernon Hennesay, Jr., a 
deputy sheriff with the FremontCounty sheriff's office, testified as to 
their attempts, working separately, to locate and serve a subpoena on Koryn. The 
officers recounted obtaining various vague leads as to Koryn's location from a 
number of sources, including her last employer, the post office, and her mother. 
The information they initially received indicated that Koryn might be in 
Utah, but later information indicated that 
Koryn and her husband were in Nevada working at a mine. Deputy Sheriff 
Hennesay described his contacts with law enforcement authorities in Elko, Nevada, and with several mining concerns in 
the Elko area, all of which were fruitless. Officer Hennesay also testified that 
his office ran license plate and driver's license checks in both Wyoming and Nevada. Of particular significance, we think, 
is Officer Lee's testimony regarding his contacts with Koryn's mother. According 
to the officer, the mother indicated that she did not know where her daughter 
was and that, the last she had heard, Koryn was in Utah.

[¶46.]  After hearing the above testimony and the 
arguments of counsel, the district court determined that the State's efforts to 
procure the attendance of Koryn had been reasonable and that the State had met 
its burden of proving unavailability. We do not perceive that the district court 
abused its discretion in making this determination. Appellant emphasizes in his 
argument, however, that the State did not attempt to locate or subpoena Koryn 
until July 12, 1988, six days before trial. In response to this same argument, 
the district court noted that, as late as July 6, 1988, the court had been 
informed that appellant was going to enter a change of plea to guilty and that, 
in fact, all the parties had appeared in court on that date for a change of 
plea. We agree with the district court that, under those circumstances, the 
State should be excused from trying to locate the witness at least prior to July 
6, 1988. Although a good faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness must 
be demonstrated, futile acts are not required. Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 74, 100 
S.Ct. at 2543;9 Grable, 649 P.2d  at 672. The length 
to which the prosecution must go to obtain the presence of the witness is a 
question of reasonableness. Id. Here, the efforts by the prosecution to 
locate and produce Koryn for trial were reasonable, and we cannot say that the 
district court abused its discretion in concluding that Koryn was 
unavailable.

[¶47.]  Having determined the unavailability 
requirement was satisfied, we turn our attention to the question of appellant's 
opportunity and motive to develop the testimony at the preliminary hearing. We 
first observe that appellant unquestionably had the opportunity to develop the 
testimony at the preliminary hearing. Appellant's trial counsel called Koryn at 
the preliminary hearing and questioned her at length regarding her knowledge of 
the events of January 29, 1988. The prosecutor then cross-examined Koryn, 
eliciting the damaging admission that she had indeed loaned her car to appellant 
on that night. Following the State's cross-examination, counsel for appellant 
did not pursue the opportunity for further examination of the 
witness.

[¶48.]  With respect to motive to develop, we 
noted in Rodriguez, 711 P.2d 410, that a minority of jurisdictions have adopted 
a per se rule against admission of preliminary hearing testimony. The rationale 
offered for this per se rule is that defense counsel's motive to cross-examine 
at a preliminary hearing is assertedly never similar to his motive at trial 
because of the limited scope of a preliminary hearing in establishing probable 
cause. Id. at 413 (citing People v. Smith, 198 
Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979)). As have the majority, we rejected that position. Rodriguez, 
711 P.2d  at 414. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 487 at 1092-93; E. 
Cleary, supra, § 255 at 762. We similarly refused to join those jurisdictions 
which have adopted a per se rule of admissibility of preliminary hearing 
testimony if the declarant is unavailable. Rodriguez, 711 P.2d  at 414 (citing 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), and 
State v. Martinez, 102 N.M. 94, 691 P.2d 887 (Ct.App. 
1984)). We decided in Rodriguez that this Court would apply a case-by-case 
analysis to the similar motive requirement in relation to preliminary hearing 
testimony. Rodriguez, 711 P.2d  at 414.

[¶49.]  Most of the cases analyzing the motive of 
the defendant to develop the former testimony of a witness have focused on the 
motive to cross-examine. See, e.g., our analysis in Grable, 649 P.2d 663, and 
Martinez, 611 P.2d 831. W.R.E. 804(b)(1), however, refers to the motive to develop "by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination." In 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 487 
at 1086, the authors note, with respect to the motive to develop on direct and 
redirect as referred to by the rule, that:

The idea is that a party 
who calls a witness and elicits his testimony ordinarily has no need of the tool 
of cross-examination, and has enough opportunity fairly to develop the knowledge 
of the witness on the important points without use of other questioning 
techniques.

[¶50.]  In Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, the preliminary hearing testimony at issue involved a witness called 
at the preliminary hearing by the defendant. Counsel for the defendant 
questioned the witness at length, unsuccessfully attempting to elicit an 
admission favorable to his client. The witness' testimony, however, supported 
the prosecution. Defense counsel did not ask to have the witness declared 
hostile and did not request permission to cross-examine. The prosecutor did not 
question the witness. Id. at 58, 100 S. Ct.  at 2535. The Supreme 
Court held that the admission of this former testimony at trial did not violate 
the confrontation clause. Id. at 73, 100 S. Ct.  at 2542. The Court noted 
that, in evaluating former testimony under the confrontation clause:

"The focus of the Court's 
concern has been to insure that there `are indicia of reliability which have 
been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before 
the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,' and to `afford the 
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement.'"

Id. at 65-66, 100 S. Ct.  at 
2538-39. (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213, 
92 S. Ct. 2308, 2313, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1972) (citations omitted)). Although the 
Court left open the question of whether the mere opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness satisfied the confrontation clause, Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 70, 100 S. Ct.  at 2541, the Court found sufficient "indicia of reliability" in the direct 
examination of the witness in Roberts. Particularly, the Court observed that 
defense counsel explored the underlying events in detail with the witness, that 
counsel tested the sincerity and veracity of the witness, and that in many 
respects counsel's examination partook the form of cross-examination. Id. at 70-71, 100 S. Ct. 
at 2541-42.

[¶51.]  The analysis in Roberts is applicable to 
the instant case. Here, Koryn was called by appellant at the preliminary 
hearing. On direct examination, appellant's trial counsel explored in depth the 
underlying events of January 29, 1988. Although counsel occasionally asked 
leading questions, the favorable nature of the testimony precluded the need for 
such questioning. On cross-examination by the prosecutor, however, Koryn broke 
down and admitted that she had in fact allowed appellant to use her car on the 
night in question, essentially admitting that she had lied on direct. 
Appellant's trial counsel, undoubtedly shocked by this turn of events, declined 
the opportunity to further examine the witness. Realistically, the damage had 
been done, and there was little counsel could hope to accomplish by further 
examination. Under the circumstances, the requirement for a similar opportunity 
to develop the testimony was satisfied and, considering the entire tenor of the 
testimony, the trier of fact was afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the prior statement. We conclude that the district court did not 
err in admitting into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of Patricia 
Koryn.

Note-Taking

[¶52.]  For his fifth issue, appellant contends 
that his right to a fair trial was compromised by the failure of the district 
court to control note-taking by the jury. The basis of this contention is found 
in two comments made by the district court to counsel in chambers to the effect 
that "we have a note-writing jury here" and "I'm going to have to do something 
about it." It appears from the record, however, that on each occasion the 
district court was referring to notes individual jurors had sent to the bench 
and not, as appellant suggests, to the jury taking notes during testimony. No 
mention or objection by appellant's trial counsel to note-taking by the jury is 
evident in the record. Even if note-taking had occurred, the failure to object 
at trial precludes our considering it for the first time on appeal absent plain 
error, which we do not perceive. See United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 687 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 885, 89 S. Ct. 197, 21 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1968) 
(where issue of alleged note-taking was not presented to trial court, it cannot 
be raised for first time on appeal). Given the absence of record support for the 
incidents appellant alleges as error, we do not need to further consider the 
issue.

Costs of 
Defense

[¶53.]  As part of his judgment and sentence, 
appellant was ordered to "repay the State of Wyoming for the services of the Public 
Defender in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2,750.00)." 
Appellant challenges the propriety of this order, contending that the Wyoming statutes 
authorizing recoupment of defense costs, Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-6-106 and 7-6-108 
(1977), unconstitutionally "chill" the exercise of the right to counsel. We do 
not need to reach appellant's constitutional claim, however, because we conclude 
that the district court erred in ordering this reimbursement without first 
determining appellant's ability to pay as required by § 7-6-106 and Keller v. 
State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989) (construing Wyo. Stat. § 7-1-112 (1977), which 
was amended and renumbered § 7-6-106 in 1987).

[¶54.]  Section 7-6-106(c) provides in pertinent 
part:

To the extent that a 
person receives the services set out in W.S. 7-6-104, and is able to provide some funds toward the costs 
associated with such services, the presiding court may order the person to 
reimburse the state for the cost of the services provided. In making such an 
order, the court shall consider the 
financial resources of the person and the expenses and services provided * * 
*.

(Emphasis 
added.)10 The above language is similar to 
that which was found in § 7-1-112(c) prior to its amendment in 1987:

To the extent that a 
person covered by W.S. 7-9.20 [§ 7-1-110] is able to provide for an attorney, 
the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs, 
the court may order him to provide for their payment.

[¶55.]  In Keller, 771 P.2d 379, we held that, 
pursuant to § 7-1-112(c) (now § 7-6-106(c)), the district court could not order 
reimbursement without first determining the defendant's ability to pay. We now 
hold that the substantially similar language in § 7-6-106(c) mandates the same 
determination. The State contends that the district court did consider 
appellant's financial resources at sentencing. The inquiry to which the State 
refers, however, was made subsequent to the decision to order reimbursement for 
the services of the public defender and was made for the purpose of determining 
whether the court should certify appellant's indigency for purposes of providing 
counsel on appeal. After ascertaining that appellant had approximately $500 in 
ready cash, a pickup worth about $1,000, and a car worth $250 upon which he 
still owed $150, the district court certified his indigency. Since the district 
court failed to consider appellant's ability to pay in ordering reimbursement of 
defense expenses, we reverse that aspect of the judgment and 
sentence.

Costs of 
Prosecution

[¶56.]  As part of his judgment and sentence, 
appellant was additionally ordered to repay FremontCounty $1,081.51 for certain costs of the 
prosecution. The figure represents various witness expenses, including travel 
expenses, per diem, and witness fees. Appellant presents a twofold challenge to 
the assessment of these costs. First, he challenges the constitutionality of the 
statutory scheme providing for recoupment of prosecution costs. Second, 
appellant argues that certain costs assessed were unreasonable. We cannot agree 
with either contention.

[¶57.]  We have established that a court cannot 
tax costs in a criminal case without express statutory authority. Loomer v. 
State, 768 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1989); Burke, 746 P.2d 852. Institutional 
costs involving court, jury, and bailiff expenses cannot be assessed, as the 
right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions must be held inviolate. Kaess v. 
State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1987); Johnson v. 
State, 532 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1975); Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368, 65 A.L.R.2d 839 
(1957). In Loomer and Burke, we disallowed assessments of the costs of 
prosecution because, under the applicable statutes, assessment of such costs was 
not authorized in felony cases. In 1987, however, the legislature amended Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-11-516 (1977) and renumbered it Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-505 (1977) to 
provide: "Payment of the costs of prosecution may be added to and made a part of 
the sentence in any felony or misdemeanor case." Thus, the legislature has 
expressly provided for the assessment of costs such as those taxed against 
appellant in the instant case.

[¶58.]  In arguing the unconstitutionality of § 
7-11-505, appellant refers us to cases involving the assessment of defense 
costs, which assessments, as previously noted, invoke considerations of the 
right to counsel and equal protection. By analogy, appellant asserts that 
statutes providing for the recoupment of prosecution costs operate to "chill" 
the right to plead not guilty. Appellant provides scant authority for this 
argument, however, and we note that statutes such as § 7-11-505, imposing 
liability for prosecution costs, have consistently been held constitutional as 
long as they are not construed to authorize assessment of institutional costs. 
See, e.g., United 
States v. Palmer, 809 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 
1987); People v. Estate of Scott, 66 Ill. 2d 522, 6 Ill.Dec. 876, 363 N.E.2d 823 
(1977); State v. Harris, 309 Minn. 395, 244 N.W.2d 733 (1976); Annotation, Items of costs of prosecution for which defendant 
may be held, 65 A.L.R.2d 854 at § 21 (1959) (annotating Arnold, 306 P.2d 368); and 
20 C.J.S., Costs § 436 (1940). This Court has long acknowledged the 
constitutionality of assessing costs of prosecution in criminal cases where 
authorized by statute. Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 135 P. 749 (1913);11 cf. Arnold, 306 P.2d 368 (disallowing costs 
associated with jurors and bailiffs). We reject, therefore, appellant's 
challenge to the constitutionality of § 7-11-505.

[¶59.]  Aside from the constitutional argument, 
appellant challenges as unreasonable the inclusion as part of the costs of 
prosecution the expenses of prosecution witness Jack Vining. Officer Vining, an 
investigator with the Riverton police department, investigated this case. At the 
time of appellant's trial, however, Officer Vining had moved to California. Of the 
$1,081.51 in prosecution costs assessed against appellant, $847.75 represented 
airline tickets, motel accommodations, meals, mileage, and witness fees for this 
witness.

[¶60.]  Officer Vining testified at appellant's 
trial that he had taken statements from appellant and Muggelberg and that he had 
taken photographs of Muggelberg's injuries. Appellant argues that this testimony 
was unnecessary to the State's case and that he should not be burdened with the 
expense of obtaining needless testimony. The photographs were received into 
evidence, however, and appellant's statement to Officer Vining was used 
extensively by the State when cross-examining appellant. Nevertheless, the 
district court did express some reservations about ordering reimbursement for 
the transportation expenses of Officer Vining as claimed by the State in its 
affidavit of costs. The district court said, regarding these expenses: "[I]f 
there is some question about that, I'll be glad to reconsider it upon the proper 
presentation by the defense." Appellant did not respond to this offer and made 
no objection in the district court to these expenses. Having failed to contest 
these expenses in the district court even when invited to do so, appellant will 
not now be heard to complain that they are unreasonable. Under the 
circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by 
including expenses associated with Officer Vining's testimony in the costs of 
prosecution assessed against appellant.

Failure to 
Suppress

[¶61.]  Prior to his trial, appellant filed a 
motion to suppress, seeking suppression of all evidence and testimony by Officer 
Abraham concerning his observation of a club in appellant's truck during the 
course of the traffic stop of appellant on the evening of January 29, 1988. 
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion, and Officer Abraham's 
testimony regarding the club was received at trial. On appeal, appellant 
asserts, as he did in the proceedings below, that such testimony was the product 
of an unconstitutional search and seizure and was, therefore, 
inadmissible.

[¶62.]  The guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is found in both art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, as applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment. As we observed in Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 1986):

In all contended 
impermissible-search questions, the court must first consider the threshold 
question of whether a search, in the constitutional sense, occurred at all, 
before reaching the issue as to whether or not the search was 
unreasonable.

In the case at 
bar, the activities of Officer Abraham constituted neither a search nor a 
seizure. The question of reasonableness, therefore, does not arise, and, in the 
absence of a search or seizure, there can be no constitutional violation 
requiring suppression of the evidence.

[¶63.]  The protection afforded by the fourth 
amendment has been defined as the protection of persons from unreasonable 
government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy. 
United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 
2481, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Pellatz, 711 P.2d  at 1141. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that people have a lesser expectation of privacy in 
automobiles. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S. Ct. 960, 
965, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986); Chadwick, 433 U.S.  at 12, 97 S. Ct.  at 2484. In Class, 475 U.S.  at 112-13, 106 S. Ct.  at 965, the 
Court said:

"One has a lesser 
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation 
and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal 
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels 
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 94 S. Ct. 2464 [2469], 

69 Ohio Ops.2d 69 (1974) 
(plurality opinion).

[¶64.]  The Supreme Court decision in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983), is both instructive and dispositive with 
respect to the issue before us. In that case, a police officer made a routine 
stop of the defendant's car at night at a driver's license checkpoint. Standing 
next to the driver's window, the officer asked the defendant for his license and 
shined his flashlight into the car. The officer observed the defendant pulling 
an opaque green party balloon, which was knotted near the tip, from his pants 
pocket. The balloon fell from the defendant's hand onto the car seat as he 
reached to open the glove compartment. From his experience, the officer knew 
that narcotics were often packaged in such balloons. While the defendant was 
rummaging through his glove compartment looking for his license, the officer 
shifted his position to obtain a better view and observed small plastic vials, 
loose white powder, and a bag of party balloons in the glove compartment. The 
officer instructed the defendant to get out of the car, and the officer picked 
up the green balloon which appeared to contain a powdery substance. The 
defendant was placed under arrest, and the car was searched, resulting in the 
seizure of other items. The state trial court refused to suppress the seized 
evidence, and the defendant was convicted for possession of heroin. The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, in reversing the conviction, held that the evidence 
should have been suppressed and rejected the State's argument that the "plain 
view" doctrine justified the seizure.

[¶65.]  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, holding that the "plain view" 
doctrine as enunciated in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), was applicable and that the evidence was lawfully seized. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535. In reaching 
this decision, the Court noted the three requirements established by Coolidge 
for the warrantless seizure of private possessions by a police officer: (1) the 
initial intrusion must be lawful or the officer must otherwise properly be in a 
position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the incriminating 
evidence must be discovered inadvertently; and (3) it must be immediately 
apparent that the items observed may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or 
otherwise subject to seizure. Brown, 460 U.S.  at 737, 103 S. Ct.  at 1540-41. The Court's comments regarding the first requirement are 
particularly germane to the instant case. The Court stated that "`plain view' 
provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's access to an object 
has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 738, 103 S. Ct.  at 
1541. Significantly, the Court noted:

It is important to 
distinguish "plain view," as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of an object, from an officer's mere observation of an item 
left in plain view. Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment 
search, the former generally does implicate the Amendment's limitations upon 
seizures of personal property.

Id. at 738 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 
at 1541 n. 4 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

[¶66.]  In determining that the officer in Brown 
was properly in a position to view the particular area, the Court 
said:

It is likewise beyond 
dispute that [the officer's] action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the 
interior of [the defendant's] car trenched upon no right secured to the latter 
by the Fourth Amendment. The Court said in United 
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 71 L. Ed. 1202, 47 S. Ct. 746 [748] (1927): "[The] use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of 
a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." 
Numerous other courts have agreed that the use of artificial means to illuminate 
a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth 
Amendment protection.

Likewise, the fact that 
[the officer] "changed [his] position" and "bent down at an angle so [he] could 
see what was inside" [the defendant's] car is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment 
analysis. The general public could peer into the interior of [the defendant's] 
automobile from any number of angles; there is no reason [the officer] should be 
precluded from observing as an officer what would be entirely visible to him as 
a private citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that 
portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the 
vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the conduct that enabled [the 
officer] to observe the interior of [the defendant's] car and of his open glove 
compartment was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.

Id. at 739-40, 103 S. Ct.  at 
1541-42 (emphasis added; footnote and citations omitted). To similar effect, see 
Pellatz, 711 P.2d 1138 (examination of exterior of backhoe located in public 
parking lot to find vehicle identification number not a search in constitutional 
sense); Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973) (in speeding stop, officer 
shined his flashlight into interior of car and saw bag of marijuana, which he 
seized - not an illegal search and seizure - not a search to observe that which 
is in the plain view of an officer who is rightfully in a position to have that 
view); and 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.5(c) (2d ed. 1987) (if officer by 
use of his natural senses is able to discover what is inside a vehicle while 
standing in a place where he has a right to be - this discovery does not 
constitute a fourth amendment search).

[¶67.]  Applying the reasoning from Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, to the instant case, it is apparent that the conduct of Officer Abraham did 
not constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In the 
course of a routine traffic stop, Officer Abraham shined his flashlight into the 
interior of appellant's vehicle to ascertain whether or not others were present. 
Officer Abraham testified that he does this as a matter of standard procedure 
for personal safety, and we do not question that he was legitimately in a 
position to make the view into the interior of the pickup. The club which 
Officer Abraham observed was in plain view. There is no reason he could not 
testify as to what he observed. The district court did not err in denying 
appellant's motion to suppress this testimony.

[¶68.]  Appellant also argues, as a collateral 
issue, that the district court erred in allowing the State to augment the record 
in connection with the motion to suppress. At a hearing upon the State's motion 
to augment, the district court allowed the State to present the testimony of a 
dispatcher for the Riverton police department. This testimony was offered to 
rebut appellant's testimony at the suppression hearing and to corroborate the 
testimony given by Officer Abraham at that hearing regarding facts surrounding 
the traffic stop. At the time of the hearing on the motion to augment, the 
district court had taken the motion to suppress under advisement. The district 
court allowed further testimony because of the conflicting nature of the 
testimony received at the suppression hearing and because, as the State argued, 
the testimony of appellant at the suppression hearing did not comport with that 
which was reasonably to be expected on the basis of the pretrial conference, 
thereby taking the State somewhat by surprise. Under the circumstances, we 
perceive no error in allowing the State to augment the record.

Instruction No. 
8

[¶69.]  As his final issue, appellant contends 
that the district court improperly gave a jury instruction offered by the State 
regarding intimidation of a witness. We disagree.

[¶70.]  The trial court has a duty to instruct 
the jury on the general principles applicable to the case. Phillips v. State, 
760 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 
1988). In Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 1987), we said:

The general rule in 
reviewing questions involving instructions is that the trial judge is afforded 
latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible 
error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and 
in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the 
issues.

Quoted in Miller 
v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶71.]  Linda Kennah testified as an alibi 
witness for appellant. On cross-examination she testified, without objection, 
that appellant had threatened her in the past, that she sometimes was afraid of 
appellant, and that appellant was going to retaliate against the people involved 
if he was convicted. Over the objection of appellant, the district court gave 
the following instruction to the jury:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
8

If you find that the 
defendant attempted to persuade a witness to testify falsely or attempted to 
intimidate a witness, then you may consider that fact in determining the 
question of his guilt or innocence.

At the 
instructions conference, the district court noted that it had not intended to 
give the instruction before hearing Kennah's testimony. The court observed that, 
from Kennah's demeanor, it appeared she was afraid and intimidated, and, 
therefore, the instruction was appropriate.

[¶72.]  This Court approved an instruction 
similar to Instruction No. 8 in State v. Hines, 79 Wyo. 65, 331 P.2d 605 
(1958), cert. denied 366 U.S. 972, 81 S. Ct. 1938, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1261 (1961), and the 
instruction is taken virtually verbatim from WPJIC § 2.201, "Efforts by 
Defendant to Alter Evidence." Appellant argues, nevertheless, that Hines was 
decided before the Wyoming Rules of Evidence became effective and that the 
testimony regarding intimidation should not have been admitted in the absence of 
a consideration of W.R.E. 404(b) regarding the admissibility of evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Appellant did not object to the testimony 
regarding intimidation, however, and he does not contend the admission of this 
testimony rises to the level of plain error. See Lauthern, 769 P.2d 350. In any 
event, in approving a substantially similar instruction in Hines, we stated that 
the instruction stated a well-settled rule of law. We believe that is still the 
case. See, e.g., United 
States v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied 440 U.S. 980, 99 S. Ct. 1787, 60 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1979); People v. 
Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 1936, 104 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1989); State v. Clark, 209 Mont. 
473, 682 P.2d 1339 (1984); State v. Van Alcorn, 136 Ariz. 215, 665 P.2d 97 
(Ct.App. 1983); Bradley v. State, 561 P.2d 548 (Okla. Cr. 1977); 1 L. Sand, J. 
Siffert, W. Loughlin & S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions ¶ 6.05, 
Instruction 6-16 (1989). Instruction No. 8 was supported by the evidence, and it 
is an adequate statement of the law in Wyoming. We find no error in the giving of 
this instruction.

[¶73.]  To summarize, other than as to that part 
of appellant's judgment and sentence requiring repayment of defense costs, we 
affirm the decision of the district court in all respects. Where part of a 
divisible sentence is improper, we may modify it by vacating that part and 
affirming the balance. Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1988). We hold, 
therefore, that the provision of appellant's judgment and sentence ordering him 
to repay $2,750 to the State of Wyoming for the services of the public 
defender is void and that the judgment and sentence is otherwise 
affirmed.

[¶74.]  Affirmed as modified.

THOMAS, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion in which CARDINE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, J., 
join.

URBIGKIT, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The State argues that 
this appeal should be dismissed because appellant did not include a separately 
designated statement of the issues in his brief as required by W.R.A.P. 5.01(2). 
We have stated that failure to list the issues is a serious error for which this 
Court may refuse to consider the contentions of the party violating the rule. 
Cline v. Safeco Insurance Companies, 614 P.2d 1335 (Wyo. 1980). In the 
instant case, however, the table of contents in appellant's brief clearly 
identifies the issues in the case, although they are there designated as 
arguments, and we are not placed in the position of having to frame the issues 
for a party. We agree with counsel for appellant that, under the circumstances, 
we should not penalize appellant for this oversight by counsel, and we will not 
dismiss the appeal. We again caution members of the bar, however, to carefully 
comply with the requirements of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

2 U.S. Const. amend. V 
provides in relevant part:

[N]or shall [a 
person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * 
*.

3 In Best, 769 P.2d  at 
389, we noted that W.R. Cr.P. 34 does not require the district court to 
specifically state its reasons for denying the motion. As we further observed in 
that case, however, appellate review is facilitated by a statement of the 
grounds for denial.

4 The unavailability 
requirement is satisfied where the witness has invoked his fifth amendment 
privilege not to testify. W.R.E. 804(a)(1). E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 
253 at 754 (3d ed. 1984).

5 The corroborating 
circumstances requirement refers to the hearsay statement itself and not to the 
testimony of the witness testifying to the statement at trial, because his 
credibility can be tested in the usual manner. E. Cleary, supra, § 278 at 824 n. 
10, and cases cited therein.

6 The Standards for 
Criminal Justice (ABA) have been previously cited with approval by this Court. 
See Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 
1982); and Roby v. State, 587 P.2d 641, 644 (Wyo. 1978).

7 U.S. Const. amend. VI 
provides in part:

In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him * * *.

8 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, 
in nearly identical language, provides:

In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him * * *.

9 The facts regarding 
unavailability in Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, are similar 
to those in the instant case. The defendant in Roberts called a witness at the 
preliminary hearing whose testimony supported the prosecution. Before trial, 
five subpoenas were issued for the witness at her parents' home, although she 
was never at that residence when these were executed. The defendant's trial was 
held fourteen months after the preliminary hearing. At trial, the prosecution 
sought admission, over defense objection, of the preliminary hearing testimony. 
A voir dire hearing on admissibility was held. The missing witness' mother 
testified that her daughter had left the parents' home in Ohio soon after the 
preliminary hearing. The mother stated that seven or eight months before trial 
the daughter called her parents to say she was traveling outside of Ohio and 
that the daughter would not reveal the place from where she was calling. The 
mother testified she knew of no way to contact her daughter. Upon these facts, 
the Supreme Court upheld the determination by the Ohio Supreme Court that the 
witness' unavailability in the constitutional sense had been established. 
Id. at 75, 100 S. Ct.  at 2543.

10 Section 7-6-108 empowers 
the attorney general to sue on behalf of the State to recover payment for 
defense services.

11 In Jenkins, upon a 
conviction of first-degree murder, the defendant was sentenced "to suffer the 
penalty of death," fined $1,000, and assessed the costs of prosecution. This 
Court upheld the imposition of the statutorily authorized fine and assessment of 
prosecution costs. Jenkins, 135 P.  at 751.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom CARDINE, Chief 
Justice, and GOLDEN, Justice, 
join.

[¶75.]  I agree with the conclusion of the 
majority that King's judgment and sentence should be affirmed as modified. I 
cannot agree, however, as the majority determines, "that appellant has satisfied 
the first two Opie factors, * * *." At 949. The correct conclusion should be 
that, under these circumstances, the possible confession of Jeff King is not 
newly discovered evidence.

[¶76.]  The test articulated in Opie v. State, 
422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967), is taken from federal precedent. 
United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. dismissed 323 U.S. 806, 65 S. Ct. 265, 89 L. Ed. 643 (1944). Consequently, the invocation of federal 
precedent with respect to similar facts is appropriate. A number of federal 
courts, considering motions for new trial under Rule 33, F.R.Cr.P., have 
concluded that the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination does not 
have the effect suggested in the majority opinion in an analysis of what is 
"newly discovered" evidence. Those courts have held that, in circumstances which 
demonstrate that the evidence did exist at the time of trial, it should not be 
deemed to be "newly discovered" simply because the witness' exercise of 
testimonial privilege made it unavailable at trial. United States v. Offutt, 736 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 
1984); United States v. 
Vergara, 714 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731 
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 970, 102 S. Ct. 516, 70 L. Ed. 2d 387 
(1981). See also United States v. LaDuca, 447 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1978), cert. 
denied 440 U.S. 972, 99 S. Ct. 1537, 59 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1979), (holding that the 
exculpating testimony of a witness who had exercised his Fifth Amendment 
privilege at the defendant's trial was not newly discovered, but merely newly 
available; holding further that the defendant, in order to demonstrate diligence 
in producing the evidence, should have requested that the reluctant witness 
receive immunity; and affirmed on other grounds but criticized for the theory 
relative to "immunization" in United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147-48 (3d 
Cir. 1978)).

[¶77.]  Those federal cases are consistent with 
Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238 (Wyo. 1977), in which we explained that, if, prior 
to or during the trial, the defendant had knowledge of the existence of a 
particular witness and the factual matters to which he could testify, the 
testimony could not subsequently be said to be "newly discovered" simply because 
the defendant could not produce it at his first trial. A clear distinction was 
made between "newly discovered" and "newly produced" evidence. Salaz, 561 P.2d 242-43. The same result was reached in Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), appeal after 
remand 766 P.2d 1149 (1988). There the court held that a confession to the crime 
was not newly discovered because Gist had known of the potential testimony prior 
to the conclusion of his trial but had failed to produce it.

[¶78.]  In these cases, the defendant knew the 
identity of a witness whose truthful testimony on the material facts of the case 
would corroborate the defendant's theory and serve to establish innocence. That 
identity was known from the outset of the trial. In both cases, the evidence was 
deemed to have been discovered prior to the end of the trial so far as a new 
trial motion based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence was concerned. 
The fact that the respective witnesses were known to the defendants at the time 
of the trials on the charged offenses, together with the common claim that the 
witnesses would exculpate the defendants, manifests the fact that no further 
investigation was required to "discover" such evidence. These defendants, as is 
true of King, simply failed to "produce" the evidence.

[¶79.]  Our rule is that this court will limit 
itself, in reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial based upon grounds of 
newly discovered evidence, to the determination of whether the denial 
constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion; that is, could the trial 
court reasonably have concluded as it did. Gist, 737 P.2d  at 340; Grable v. 
State, 664 P.2d 531, 532-33 (Wyo. 1983). The trial court should not grant 
such a motion based on the ground of newly discovered evidence unless the 
defendant has established that all four factors of the Opie test have been 
satisfied. Gist; Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986); Opie, 422 P.2d 84. In this 
instance, the conclusion of the trial court, based upon the precedent cited 
above that the post-trial confession was not newly discovered evidence, indeed 
was reasonable. I would affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial by 
holding that this was not newly discovered evidence, but that it simply was 
evidence, known to the defendant at the time of the trial, that the defendant 
could not produce.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶80.]  I completely concur with the majority's 
opinion but write further only to discuss terminology. Assessment in this 
jurisdiction of criminal costs in criminal as well as civil cases has a strong 
precedent. Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 
1987); State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 
1985); Hahn v. State, 78 Wyo. 258, 322 P.2d 896 (1958). Prosecutorial 
costs as a punitive assessment against the convicted individual invokes a more 
recently developing penalty thesis which can address investigation and trial 
preparation as well as facility and jury maintenance incurrences. Completely 
different concepts and constitutional questions arise. Cf. Johnson v. State, 532 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 
1975). Assessed court costs are essentially reimbursement obligations as 
similarly applied to both criminal and civil cases. See W.R.C.P. 1; W.R.C.P. 
54(d); and W.R.Cr.P. 20(a). Prosecutorial costs frequently involving 
institutional expenditures whether itemized in amount or arbitrarily established 
to be a stated sum constitute a punitive assessment as a conviction punishment. 
Present here was a trial court's application of the conventional court costs 
reimbursement obligation and not the punitive prosecutorial cost. Consequently, 
this case is completely consistent with this court's recent review in Kaess, 748 P.2d 698. See likewise Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 (Wyo. 1987) and compare retroactivity review in Loomer v. 
State, 768 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1989).