Case Title: Joreski v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0066

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
JASON JAMES JORESKI v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 143Case Number: S-12-0066Decided: 11/14/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
JASON 
JAMES JORESKI,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane Lozano, State 
Public Defender and Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Joshua Eames, Student 
Intern.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and GOLDEN, J., Retired
 
HILL, Justice.
 
[¶1]      
Jason Joreski entered an Alford plea to three counts 
of first degree sexual abuse of a minor and one count of third degree sexual 
abuse of a minor.  The Alford plea 
allowed Joreski to enter a guilty plea 
without allocuting or otherwise admitting his participation in the 
crimes.  During Joreski’s sentencing hearing, the 
district court cited to a number of factors that influenced the court’s 
sentencing decision and then commented on Joreski’s flippancy and 
lack of remorse before announcing its 
decision.  Joreski challenges the sentence, 
contending that the district court violated his constitutional right against 
self incrimination by using his silence as evidence of a lack of 
remorse.  We affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Joreski 
presents a single issue on appeal:
 
Did the trial court 
err in considering [Joreski’s] lack of remorse at sentencing, when 
[Joreski] entered an Alford plea, and declined at sentencing to 
allocute?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
On May 22, 2011, the Mills, Wyoming police department was called to 
respond to a family dispute.  Joreski’s fifteen 
year old daughter, C.J., had run away from home to her grandparents’ 
home.  When the police reported to the grandparents’ address, 
the grandparents reported that Joreski had shown up, dragged his 
daughter from their residence, forced her into his minivan and left the 
residence.  A short time later, Joreski returned 
his daughter to the grandparents’ residence.
 
[¶4]      
On May 24, 2011, C.J.’s grandmother reported to a Mills 
police officer that C.J. had disclosed to her that she had been 
sexually abused by Joreski.  C.J. was 
thereafter interviewed, and her reported abuse was investigated.  
On June 8, 2011, Joreski was charged with twenty counts 
relating to the sexual abuse of his daughter beginning in 2007 and continuing 
into 2011.
 
[¶5]      
On July 28, 2011, Joreski pled not guilty to all 
counts.  On September 9, 2011, following plea negotiations 
with the State, Joreski changed his plea and entered an 
Alford guilty plea to Counts One, Two, and Four, each of which charged 
him with first degree sexual abuse of a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-314(a)(ii), and to Count Three, which charged him with third degree sexual 
abuse of a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(iv).  
In exchange for Joreski’s plea, the State dropped the 
remaining charges and agreed to cap its requested sentence at a maximum of 
twenty-five years, with Joreski permitted to argue for a shorter 
sentence.
 
[¶6]      
After the district court advised Joreski of his rights and 
the consequences of an Alford plea, the State set out the factual basis 
for the plea.  Neither Joreski nor his counsel 
objected to the sufficiency of the State’s factual basis, and the district court 
found the State’s factual basis to be “strong evidence of 
Mr. Joreski’s actual guilt to the crimes charged.”  
The district court then accepted Joreski’s guilty 
plea.
 
[¶7]      
On December 16, 2011, the district court held a sentencing 
hearing.  Consistent with its plea agreement, the State 
requested a sentence of twenty to twenty-five years for Counts One, Two, and 
Four, and a sentence of thirteen to fifteen years for Count Three, all to run 
concurrently.  Counsel for Joreski argued for a 
sentence of five to ten years for each count, again to run 
concurrently.  Following argument by counsel, the district 
court gave Joreski an opportunity to speak:
 
            
THE COURT:  … Mr. Joreski, you have an opportunity 
to speak before sentence is pronounced.  Is there anything 
you'd like to say?
            
THE DEFENDANT:  I don’t think so, Your Honor.  
Just to, just to, to express my, you know, apologies to anybody that this 
has, you know, affected directly.
            
And any time I see them asking, or anything like that, it’s not my 
attention.  It’s a very foreign land to me, if you 
will.
            
I’ve never been in anything like this.  Juvenile matter 
when I was 15, 16.
            
So, -- But, it was nothing like this.  So, 
yeah.
 
[¶8]      
After hearing argument from counsel and the comments from Joreski, 
the district court ruled as follows:
 
            
THE COURT:  Like I said, I’ve reviewed the Presentence 
Investigation Report and the letters that were filed on behalf of Mr. 
Joreski, and I have read the Victim Impact Statement that was provided in 
the PSI by the Victim in this case.  It is compelling, to say 
the very least.  
            
The nature of these offenses have been designated as some of the most 
serious crimes in Wyoming by the State Legislature.  
First-degree sexual abuse of a minor carries with it a maximum potential 
penalty of not more than 50 years.
            
That is a recognition by the State Legislature that, as I said, these are 
some of the most serious crimes committed against some of the most vulnerable 
victims in our community.
            
Mr. Joreski has pled to three separate Counts of first-degree 
sexual abuse of a minor, and a third-degree-sexual-abuse-of-a-minor 
charge.  What occurred between Mr. Joreski and the 
Victim in this case can only be characterized as chronic sexual 
abuse.  Chronic sexual abuse.
            
The relationship that you had, Mr. Joreski, with your victim is a 
very special relationship.  A father is supposed to protect 
his child.
            
A father is supposed to protect his daughter from harm.  
You’ve failed in that miserably, Mr. Joreski.
            
Instead of protecting your daughter, you victimized her over and over and 
over again for a period of years.  You’ve victimized her in 
almost every way possible, and you victimized her with unspeakable 
brutality.
            
What you did to your child will stay with her for the rest of her 
life.  It has impacted her to a degree that I don’t think you 
recognize, sir.
            
You have not shown remorse, and, quite frankly, your attitude throughout 
this entire process has been almost flippant.  It is with all 
of those considerations in mind that for your conviction, sir, on Count 1, I 
sentence you to 22 to 24 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary; for Count 2, 
22 to 24 years; and Count 4, 22 to 24 years in the State 
Penitentiary.
            
For Count 3 I sentence you to 12 to 15 years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  You should receive credit for one day that you 
previously served.
 
[¶9]      
On January 11, 2012, the district court issued an Order to Correct 
Sentence, pursuant to a stipulated motion for correction of the sentences for 
first degree sexual abuse.  The order adjusted the sentences 
from the originally ordered twenty-two to twenty-four years to corrected 
sentences of twenty-one years, seven months to twenty-four years.  
On that same date, the court entered the Judgment and Sentence from 
which Joreski appeals.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶10]   
We review a challenge to a district court’s sentencing decision using the 
following standard of review:
 
We 
review a district court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of 
discretion.  Roeschlein v. State, 2007 WY 156, ¶ 17, 
168 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2007). 
 A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing 
procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural 
conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. 
 Id. 
 An error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it 
affects an appellant’s substantial rights.  Id. 
 The party who is appealing bears the burden to establish that 
an error was prejudicial.  Id.
 
Noller v. 
State, 2010 
WY 30, ¶ 7, 226 P.3d 867, 869 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶11]   Joreski 
did not lodge an objection during the sentencing hearing and raised his 
contention of error for the first time on appeal.  We 
therefore use a plain error analysis in reviewing the claimed sentencing 
error.  See Jones v. State, 2012 WY 82, 
¶ 15, 278 P.3d 729, 733 (Wyo. 
2012); Rathbun v. State, 2011 WY 116, ¶ 28, 
257 P.3d 29, 38 (Wyo. 2011).  To show plain error, 
an appellant “must establish, by reference to the record, a violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way and 
that the violation adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice.” Jealous v. State, 2011 WY 171, ¶ 11, 
267 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Wyo. 2011) (citing Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 
153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 2006)).  
To establish material prejudice, an appellant “must show a reasonable possibility exists that he would have 
received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the errors.”  
Jealous, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d  at 1104 (citing 
Pendleton v. 
State, 2008 WY 
36, ¶ 11, 180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]   Joreski 
asserts that he pled guilty using an Alford plea to retain his right to 
remain silent and against self incrimination.1  He argues then 
that the district court violated his constitutional right against self 
incrimination by using his silence during the sentencing hearing to infer a lack 
of remorse and by imposing a longer sentence based on that perceived lack of 
remorse.  We find no plain error in the district court’s 
sentencing decision.
 
[¶13]   
This Court has recognized that a district court has broad discretion to 
consider a wide range of factors about the defendant and the crime when imposing 
sentence.  Noller, ¶ 13, 
226 P.3d  at 871 (citing Thomas 
v. State, 2009 
WY 92, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 509, 512 (Wyo. 2009)).
 
They 
are free, in the exercise of their sentencing discretion, to consider victim 
impact statements, PSIs and other factors relating to the defendant 
and his crimes in imposing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range. 
Garcia 
v. State, 2007 
WY 48, ¶ 10, 153 P.3d 941, 944 (Wyo. 2007), citing Smith v. 
State, 2005 WY 
113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d 411, 422 (Wyo. 2005). 
 Trial courts are permitted to consider a defendant’s 
character when exercising their discretion to impose sentence. Doherty, ¶ 35, 
131 P.3d  at 974. In 
evaluating character, the trial court may consider a broad range of reports and 
information.  Gorseth v. State, 2006 WY 109, ¶ 15, 
141 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 2006). 
 A defendant’s cooperation with authorities and remorse for 
his actions are appropriate factors to be considered when imposing sentence. 
Dodge v. 
State, 
951 P.2d 383, 386 (Wyo. 1997). 
 A sentencing recommendation contained in a PSI is one of the 
factors that a court may properly consider in determining the appropriate 
sentence to impose.  Duke v. 
State, 2009 WY 
74, ¶ 15, 209 P.3d 563, 569 (Wyo. 2009).
 
Noller, 
¶ 13, 226 P.3d  at 871; see also Johnson v. State, 
2012 WY 112, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Wyo. 2012) (“We have 
previously recognized that a defendant’s failure to accept responsibility for 
her criminal activity is an appropriate factor to consider at sentencing.”) 
(citing Frederick v. 
State, 2007 WY 
27, ¶ 27, 151 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2007); Doherty 
v. State, 2006 
WY 39, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006)).
 
[¶14]   
Our precedent is clear that a defendant’s lack of remorse is an 
appropriate factor for a court to consider at sentencing.  The 
question is whether the district court committed plain error in using lack of 
remorse as a factor in this case where Joreski entered an 
Alford plea and chose to remain silent on the factual basis for the 
charges to which he pled guilty.
 
[¶15]   
In support of his argument that the district court’s remorse finding 
infringed on his right to remain silent, Joreski cites to 
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1999).  In Mitchell, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a defendant does not waive his right to remain silent 
during a sentencing hearing by entering a guilty plea.  
Mitchell, 526 U.S.  at 316-317, 119 S. Ct.  at 1309.  
The Court then concluded that holding a defendant’s silence against him 
in determining the facts of the crime, for purposes of sentencing, “imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the 
constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.”  
Id. at 330, 119 S. Ct.  at 1316.  The Court also 
stated, however, “Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of 
remorse … is a separate question.  It is not before us, and we 
express no view on it.”  Id. at 330, 119 S. Ct.  at 
1316.  Thus, in Mitchell the Supreme Court did 
not reach the question Joreski presents in this appeal, that is, 
whether inferring a lack of remorse from a defendant’s silence during 
sentencing infringes on that defendant's right against self 
incrimination.
 
[¶16]   
Nor do we need to reach the question in this appeal.  
Under a plain error analysis, the appellant is required to establish that 
the record clearly reflects the alleged 
error.  Jones, ¶ 15, 278 P.3d  at 
733.  In this case, that means Joreski must 
establish that the district court found a lack of remorse based solely upon his 
silence.  Joreski cannot meet that burden because, 
although Joreski entered an Alford plea and remained silent 
as to the factual basis for his guilty plea, he did not maintain that silence 
during his sentencing.  In response to the district court’s 
inquiry during sentencing whether Joreski wished to make a 
statement, Joreski did not assert his right to remain 
silent.  He instead stated, “I don't think so, Your 
Honor.  Just to, just to, to express my, you know, apologies 
to anybody that this has, you know, affected directly.”  Given 
that his statement to the district court included an apology of 
sorts, Joreski cannot establish that the district court’s 
determination that Joreski was flippant and lacked remorse was drawn 
from his silence rather than from his statement.
 
[¶17]   
Even if the record did support a finding that the district court inferred 
a lack of remorse from Joreski’s silence, we would nonetheless 
reject Joreski’s claim of plain error.  In 
addition to requiring Joreski to establish that the record clearly reflects the alleged error, the plain 
error analysis requires that Joreski show that he was 
materially prejudiced by the court’s finding of a lack of remorse.  
See Jones, ¶ 15, 278 P.3d  at 733 (third prong of 
plain error analysis requires a showing that defendant was materially prejudiced 
by denial of substantial right).  Joreski cannot 
make that required showing.
 
[¶18]   
The district court identified a number of factors that it relied upon in 
reaching its sentencing decision.  Those factors included the 
Victim Impact Statement, which the court described as “compelling, to say the 
very least.”  The court also cited the “chronic sexual 
abuse” Joreski perpetrated upon his daughter; the lifelong scars 
resulting from the abuse; the “unspeakable brutality” of the sexual abuse; the 
victim’s vulnerability and the fact that the sexual abuse was perpetrated on his 
own daughter, who Joreski was supposed to protect; and the 
legislature’s decision to allow up to fifty years of imprisonment as reflecting 
the seriousness of Joreski’s crimes.  It is simply 
impossible for us to conclude, based upon this record, that it 
was Joreski’s lack of remorse, rather than the other substantial 
factors, that motivated the district court to reject Joreski’s 
sentencing recommendation and impose instead a sentence of twenty-two to 
twenty-four years imprisonment.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶19]   Joreski 
has not established that the district court inferred a lack of remorse based on 
his silence, and we therefore do not address the question whether such an 
inference would infringe on a defendant’s right against self 
incrimination.  Moreover, we find no plain error in the 
district court’s sentencing decision.  Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
  1An Alford plea is “a plea 
that allows an accused to voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to 
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit 
his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime.”  Kurtenbach v. State, 2008 
WY 109, ¶ 7, 192 P.3d 973, 976 (Wyo. 2008) (citing 
North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)).