Case Title: People v. Jurisec

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89731

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89731-Agenda 8-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								THOMAS JURISEC, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 22, 2002.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Thomas Jurisec, is an insanity acquittee who had
been granted a conditional release from the custody of the
Department of Human Services (the Department), as provided in
section 5-2-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730
ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 1998)). On November 4, 1998, the circuit
court of Will County found that defendant was not fulfilling a
condition of his release and returned defendant to the custody of
the Department. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court in
an unpublished order. No. 3-98-1032 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's petition for
leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For reasons that follow, we
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	In April 1983, a complaint was filed in the circuit court of
Will County charging defendant with aggravated indecent liberties
with a child, a Class X felony. After a bench trial in 1985,
defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. See 725
ILCS 5/115-3 (West 2000). Following his acquittal, defendant
was evaluated by the Department and, after a hearing pursuant to
section 5-2-4(a) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par.
1005-2-4(a), now 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2000)), was found
to be subject to involuntary admission and in need of in-patient
mental health services (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par.
1005-2-4(b), now 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000)). The court
issued an order, dated April 26, 1985, committing defendant to the
custody of the Department for a period not to exceed 30 years.
	In February 1990, defendant was granted a conditional release
from the Department. See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D), (d) (West
1998). One of the conditions of the release was that defendant
receive treatment with the drug Depo Provera, a female hormone
that decreases sexual impulses and behavior in males. Upon his
release, defendant began receiving weekly injections of Depo
Provera. This continued until July 1991, when the shots were
stopped at defendant's request due to his concern about the drug's
side effects.(1) Three years later, in August 1994, the Department
received information that defendant had reoffended by sexually
abusing his niece while baby-sitting. Dr. Kelly, defendant's
treating physician, filed a report with the court indicating that, due
to a recurrence of defendant's pedophilic disorder, defendant was
in need of long-term mental health services on an in-patient basis.
The Will County State's Attorney's office filed a petition
requesting the revocation of defendant's conditional release and
his involuntary readmission to the Department. A hearing was held
on September 19, 1994, at which time the petition was granted by
agreement of the parties and defendant was returned to the custody
of the Department.
	In February 1996, the Department notified the court that
defendant, once again, was no longer subject to involuntary
admission or in need of in-patient treatment. See 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(d) (West 1998). The court held a hearing on May 7, 1996,
and, after evidence was presented, granted defendant a second
conditional release. At the hearing, the court admonished
defendant that "part of my conditional release order is that you
continue to take your Depo Provera. *** Not quit because you
don't want to take it anymore, not quit because you're worried
about the health risk. That is part of the condition of my order
allowing you to be released."
	The court also stated:
		"If there is any change in the type of medication, I want to
be notified. If the medication becomes life threatening the
Court is going to be notified, because you will not stop
taking your Depo Provera before the Court is notified."
	The written order granting defendant's second conditional
release listed the terms of the release as follows:
		"[The defendant] is to be conditionally released from the
custody of [the Department] upon condition that
Defendant abides by treatment program through Isaac Ray
Center, resides in Gateway Sober Living Environment and
takes Depo Provera. Court shall be notified every 60 days
that the Defendant is taking Depo Provera. ***
Conditional release subject to revocation upon Defendant
refusing/ceasing/or stops taking the Depo Provera."
	The court also sent a letter to defendant's treating physician,
Dr. Kelly, advising him that defendant's conditional release would
be revoked if defendant refused to take Depo Provera.
	Defendant was released on July 22, 1996. Three months later,
on October 18, 1996, defendant was arrested and held in custody
at the Cook County jail on charges related to the 1994 sex offense
which precipitated the revocation of defendant's conditional
release in September 1994.
	The record reveals that the Department sent reports to the
circuit court of Will County, advising the court that defendant had
been incarcerated and was not receiving Depo Provera. However,
no action was taken until September 24, 1998, almost two years
after defendant's arrest, when the Will County State's Attorney
filed a petition to revoke defendant's conditional release and return
him to the custody of the Department. The grounds for revoking
defendant's conditional release were listed in the petition as
follows:
			"7. That on October 18, 1996, the defendant was
arrested in Cook County. He has remained in Cook
County Jail since that date.
			8. The defendant has not received his Depo Provera
medication since September of 1996."
	On November 4, 1998, the Will County circuit court held a
hearing on the petition. At this hearing, it was stipulated by the
parties that Dr. Jonathan Kelly, if called, would testify that
defendant had been ordered to receive Depo Provera as a condition
of his release, that defendant had been taking the medication and
complying with his therapy sessions and AA meetings until his
incarceration in Cook County, and that defendant had not received
a Depo Provera shot since October 9, 1996. After this stipulation
was entered, the State rested.
	Defendant testified in opposition to the petition. He stated that
he was residing at the Cook County correctional facility, where he
had been held since October 1996 on "pending charges" regarding
the 1994 criminal sexual assault.(2) Upon his arrival at the
correctional facility, defendant informed the psychiatric supervisor
that he was required to receive shots of Depo Provera. The
psychiatric supervisor, however, refused to administer Depo
Provera, citing as a reason the fact that Depo Provera is an
experimental drug not approved by the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA).
	Defendant contacted his attorney, who then filed petitions in
the circuit court of Cook County to obtain court orders to have
Depo Provera administered to defendant at the correctional
facility. The Cook County circuit court issued orders on December
6, 1996, February 19, 1997, and April 27, 1997, directing facility
authorities to administer the medication to defendant. Copies of
these orders were filed as exhibits at defendant's hearing.
Defendant testified that, despite these court orders, the
psychiatrists at the correctional facility continued to refuse to
administer Depo Provera to him. According to defendant, the
psychiatrists ignored the court orders due to concerns about the
liability that might stem from administering a non-FDA approved
drug. For this reason, defendant was given Anafril as a substitute
for Depo Provera. Anafril, defendant testified, is an antidepressant
medication which also helps control impulse disorders.
	After hearing all of the evidence, the Will County circuit court
judge ruled that defendant's failure to take Depo Provera was a
violation of his conditional release and ordered that defendant's
release be revoked. The hearing was continued until November 12,
1998, when the court, without receiving any additional evidence,
entered a finding that defendant was subject to involuntary
admission and in need of mental health services on an in-patient
basis. The court ordered that a hold be placed on defendant's Cook
County charges so that he could be remanded to the custody of the
Department. The court directed the Department to prepare a
treatment plan for defendant within 30 days of the date of
defendant's return to the Department's custody.
	On December 17, 1998, defendant was still in the custody of
the Cook County jail when the Will County circuit court held a
hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant argued
that his conditional release should not have been revoked because
he had not voluntarily violated the terms of his conditional release.
The court rejected the argument, stating that its decision to revoke
defendant's conditional release was based on a concern for the
public's safety because "what the experts told me is if he's not on
medication, he's a danger."
	Defendant appealed. Again, he claimed that he did not fail to
fulfill the conditions of his release because he did not voluntarily
cease taking Depo Provera. On April 6, 2000, the appellate court
issued an unpublished order in which it found that the circuit court
did not err in finding that defendant's failure to take Depo Provera,
though involuntary, was a violation of the terms of his release.
Looking to probation revocation cases for guidance, the appellate
court ruled that a conditional release could be revoked even
though the defendant was not culpable for the violation. The
appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order returning
defendant to the custody of the Department. We granted
defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	On appeal to this court, defendant contends that the circuit
court erred when it revoked his conditional release because he did
not fail to fulfill its terms. In making this claim, defendant initially
argues that his release was based on the condition that he not
voluntarily stop taking Depo Provera. In the alternative, he argues
that nonculpable behavior cannot form the basis for a violation of
a conditional release. In either case, he contends that, because
cessation of the medication was beyond his control, the circuit
court erred when it found that he failed to fulfill the terms of the
release and revoked it. Defendant also presents a general claim
that the court, by revoking his release, violated his due process
rights.
	After reviewing the record, we find that the circuit court did
not err in finding that defendant failed to fulfill the conditions of
his release. Nevertheless, we reverse the circuit court's order
revoking defendant's release because we find that the circuit court
did not adhere to the mandates of section 5-2-4 of the Code (730
ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 1998)).
	When an individual has been acquitted of a crime by reason
of insanity, the acquittee's subsequent treatment is governed by
section 5-2-4 of the Code. This statutory provision authorizes the
involuntary commitment of an insanity acquittee to the
Department " 'to treat the individual's mental illness, and at the
same time protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness.' " People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 197
(1995), quoting People v. Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 216, 228
(1986). Our legislature, recognizing that " 'commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires
due process protection' " (Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80,
118 L. Ed. 2d 437, 448, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992), quoting
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 703,
103 S. Ct. 3043, 3048 (1983)), and that grounds for confinement
must be established according to constitutionally adequate
procedures (Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437, 447-48,  112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992), citing Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435, 450-51, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 1853 (1972)), instituted the procedures set forth in section
5-2-4 to ensure that an insanity acquittee's liberty interests are
protected.
	Section 5-2-4 of the Code promulgates standards for
involuntarily committing insanity acquittees, for computing the
length of commitment, and for granting a conditional release or
discharge. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 1998). According to the
provisions of section 5-2-4, an insanity acquittee may be
committed to the custody of the department only if it is shown, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the acquittee is "subject to
involuntary commitment" and "in need of mental health services
on an inpatient basis." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)
(West 1998). "Subject to involuntary commitment" and "in need
of mental health services on an inpatient basis" are terms of art
defined in the statute. See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)
(West 1998).
	Once an insanity acquittee has been committed to the custody
of the Department, he may be detained only as long as he
continues to be "subject to involuntary admission" and "in need of
[inpatient] mental health services." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West
1998). If, subsequent to initial admission, the court determines by
clear and convincing evidence that the insanity acquittee no longer
meets this criteria, but is still in need of mental health services, the
court shall grant the insanity acquittee a conditional release. 730
ILCS 5/5-2-4(g), (h) (West 1998). " 'Conditional Release' " is
defined by the Code as "the release from either the custody of the
Department of Human Services or the custody of the Court of a
person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity under
such conditions as the Court may impose which reasonably assure
the defendant's satisfactory progress in treatment or habilitation
and the safety of the defendant and others." 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 1998). A conditional release "shall be for
a period of five years, unless the defendant, the person or facility
rendering the treatment, therapy, program or outpatient care, or the
State's Attorney petitions the Court for an extension of the
conditional release period for an additional three years. Upon
receipt of such a petition, the Court shall hold a hearing consistent
with the provisions of this paragraph (a) and paragraph (f) of this
Section, shall determine whether the defendant should continue to
be subject to the terms of conditional release, and shall enter an
order either extending the defendant's period of conditional
release for a single additional three year period or discharging the
defendant. In no event shall the defendant's period of conditional
release exceed eight years." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West
1998).
	Although the statute does not speak in terms of "revocation"
of a conditional release, the statute, in paragraph (i), provides:
			"(i) If within the period of the defendant's conditional
release, the Court determines, after hearing evidence, that
the defendant has not fulfilled the conditions of release,
the Court shall order a hearing to be held consistent with
the provisions of paragraph (f) and (g) of this Section. At
such hearing, if the Court finds that the defendant is
subject to involuntary admission or in need of mental
health services on an inpatient basis, it shall enter an order
remanding him or her to the Department of Human
Services or other facility. If the defendant is remanded to
the Department of Human Services, he or she shall be
placed in a secure setting unless the Court determines that
there are compelling reasons that such placement is not
necessary. If the Court finds that the defendant continues
to be in need of mental health services but not on an
inpatient basis, it may modify the conditions of the
original release in order to reasonably assure the
defendant's satisfactory progress in treatment and his or
her safety and the safety of others. In no event shall such
conditional release be longer than eight years. Nothing in
this Section shall limit a Court's contempt powers or any
other powers of a Court." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West
1998).
	As noted, this provision makes reference to paragraph (f) and
paragraph (g). Paragraph (f) provides that "the defendant, the
facility director, the State's Attorney, and the defendant's
attorney" shall be given notice of the time and place of the hearing
and that "an impartial examination of the defendant by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist *** who is not in the employ
of the Department" may be ordered upon the request of defense
counsel or the State or "if the Court feels it is appropriate." 730
ILCS 5/5-2-4(f) (West 1998). Paragraph (g) requires that the
court's findings "be established by clear and convincing
evidence," places on the State the burden of proof and the burden
of going forward with the evidence if the hearing is being held "to
review the determination of the facility director that the defendant
should be transferred to a non-secure setting, discharged or
conditionally released," and requires that "[t]he evidence shall be
presented in open Court with the right of confrontation and
cross-examination." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(g) (West 1998).
	Paragraph (i) of section 5-2-4 of the Code has not previously
been interpreted by this court. When interpreting any statute, the
primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's
intent. People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 201 (1992). The most
reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute.
People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195 (1993). When legislative
intent can be ascertained from the language of the statute, it will
be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction.
People v. Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d 155 (2000). Statutory construction
is a question of law. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995); People v. Savory, 309 Ill. App. 3d 408, 413
(1999).
	According to the plain language of section 5-2-4(i), an
insanity acquittee's conditional release is subject to review and
revocation if, in the first instance, the circuit court determines,
after hearing evidence, that the defendant "has not fulfilled the
conditions of release." Once this threshold determination has been
made, the court must take further steps to determine whether the
conditional release should be terminated and the defendant
recommitted.
	In his appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred
when it found that he failed to fulfill the conditions of his release.
He further contends that, even if the circuit court was correct when
it found that he failed to fulfill the conditions of his release, his
conditional release should not have been revoked. We shall
consider these arguments separately.

Failure to Fulfill the Conditions of Release
	In the case at bar, the circuit court found that defendant failed
to fulfill a condition of his release because defendant was not
taking the medication Depo Provera. Initially, defendant takes the
position that this finding was error because "the actual condition
of [his] release was that he not voluntarily stop taking Depo
Provera." Defendant contends he could have violated this
condition of his release only if he unilaterally refused, ceased, or
stopped taking Depo Provera. In this case, however, the evidence
presented at the hearing showed that he did not voluntarily cease
taking Depo Provera. Thus, defendant contends, the trial court
erred when it found that he violated this condition. We disagree.
	Defendant's interpretation of the court's conditional release
is too narrow. After examining the record and the written order
granting the conditional release, we are convinced that defendant's
voluntary compliance with the medication order was never a
condition of his release. The court's written release order plainly
states, "[The defendant] is to be conditionally released from the
custody of [the Department] upon condition that Defendant ***
takes Depo Provera." Although the court admonished defendant
that he could not refuse to take Depo Provera, we do not interpret
the court's comments as evidence that the court intended to make
defendant's voluntary compliance a condition of the release.
Rather, the record before us indicates that the admonishments
were made because the circuit court was aware that defendant had
previously been granted a conditional release and, due to health
concerns, had chosen to stop taking Depo Provera. Thereafter,
defendant had a recurrence of pedophilic behavior. Thus, contrary
to defendant's assertion, we find that the court, by advising
defendant that he could not refuse to take Depo Provera, was
placing defendant on notice that his continued use of Depo
Provera was a condition of his release which he could not
unilaterally choose to ignore.
	In an alternative argument, defendant contends that, even if
his continued use of Depo Provera was a condition of his release,
his lack of culpability for the failure to take Depo Provera should
have precluded a finding that he failed to fulfill the conditions of
his release. He argues that the appellate court erred when it applied
the rationale employed in probation revocation cases to determine
that nonculpable conduct can form the basis for a finding that an
insanity acquittee failed to fulfill the conditions of a release.
	We, however, agree with the appellate court below that a
court may find that an insanity acquittee has failed to fulfill the
conditions of a release even if the insanity acquittee bears no
personal responsibility for the violation. In reaching this
determination, we, like the appellate court, find it appropriate to
look to probation revocation cases for guidance.
	It has been determined that "[p]ersonal culpability is not
required for a court to revoke a sentence of probation" (People v.
Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 314-15 (1985) (insanity defense not
cognizable at a probation revocation proceeding); People v.
Cooper, 146 Ill. App. 3d 596 (1986) (intoxication defense
unavailable at probation revocation proceedings)), because a
sentence of probation has as its core purposes the rehabilitation of
the offender and the protection of the public and, "[w]hen the
varied purposes of probation are fully considered, it becomes
readily apparent that nonculpable conduct on the part of the
probationer may frustrate the goals of a probationary sentence"
(People v. Davis, 123 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353 (1984) (unavailability
of a drug- and alcohol-treatment program that would accept
defendant was a violation of the probation order which justified
revocation)).
	Similarly, when an insanity acquittee is granted a conditional
release, the court imposes terms which it deems necessary to
"reasonably assure the defendant's satisfactory progress in
treatment or habilitation and the safety of the defendant and
others." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 1998). The goals of a
conditional release, like the goals of probation, may be frustrated
when the conditions are not being fulfilled, even if the insanity
acquittee bears no personal culpability for the failure.
	In the present case, the trial court granted defendant a release
from the custody of the Department and made his continued use of
Depo Provera a condition of his release. The record shows that this
condition was included because medical testimony linked
defendant's treatment with Depo Provera to his continued progress
and the safety of the public. Thus, discontinuing use of the
medication could have a deleterious effect on the goals of
defendant's release. We conclude, therefore, that the unequivocal
evidence that defendant was not taking Depo Provera, despite the
lack of willful or volitional misconduct on defendant's part, was
proof that the conditions of defendant's release were not being
fulfilled. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's finding that
defendant's use of Depo Provera was a condition of his release
which was not being fulfilled at the time of the court hearing on
the State's petition. By affirming the circuit court's finding that
defendant was not fulfilling the conditions of his release, however,
our inquiry does not come to a close. We must further consider
whether the circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's release
was made in accord with statutory procedures.

Revocation of the Conditional Release
	Paragraph (i) of section 5-2-4 states in pertinent part:
			"(i) If within the period of the defendant's conditional
release, the Court determines, after hearing evidence, that
the defendant has not fulfilled the conditions of release,
the Court shall order a hearing to be held consistent with
the provisions of paragraph (f) and (g) of this Section. At
such hearing, if the Court finds that the defendant is
subject to involuntary admission or in need of mental
health services on an inpatient basis, it shall enter an order
remanding him or her to the Department of Human
Services or other facility." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West
1998).
	The plain language of section 5-2-4(i) instructs that a finding
that an insanity acquittee has not fulfilled the conditions of release
is simply the first step in the inquiry to determine whether a
conditional release should be terminated. Pursuant to the language
of the statute, revocation of a conditional release does not follow
automatically upon a finding that there has been a failure to fulfill
a condition of the release. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West 1998). That
is to say, failure to fulfill a condition of release is not, by itself,
sufficient grounds for a finding that defendant is subject to
involuntary recommitment. People v. Hager, 253 Ill. App. 3d 37,
42 (1993). Rather, once a threshold finding that a condition has
not been fulfilled is made, a hearing must be held, "consistent with
the provisions of paragraphs (f) and (g)" of section 5-2-4, at
which time the court must determine whether the insanity
acquittee is "subject to involuntary admission" or "in need of
mental health services on an inpatient basis." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i)
(West 1998). This standard, then, is the touchstone for any
commitment of an insanity acquittee, whether initial or otherwise.
	When deciding whether an insanity acquittee is "subject to
involuntary admission" and "in need of mental health services on
an inpatient basis," courts have long held that the determination
must be based upon explicit medical opinion regarding the
defendant's future conduct and cannot be based upon a mere
finding of mental illness. People v. Robin, 312 Ill. App. 3d 710
(2000); People v. Grant, 295 Ill. App. 3d 750 (1998); People v.
Washington, 167 Ill. App. 3d 73 (1988); People v. Smith, 126 Ill.
App. 3d 5, 9 (1984). See also In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544
(1977) (civil commitment must be based on clear and convincing
evidence, including medical testimony). Indeed, it has been
recognized that decisions which place a restraint on an insanity
acquittee's liberty may violate substantive due process unless they
are grounded on professional judgment, "guided and informed by
'normal professional standards.' " Lucas v. Peters, 318 Ill. App. 3d
1, 14 (2000), citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982). It has been held that an order of
involuntary commitment meets statutory requirements only when
the evidence, based on a current evaluation of defendant's conduct
and state of mind, clearly establishes the need for inpatient care.
Hager, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 41; see also Washington, 167 Ill. App.
3d at 79, quoting People v. Bradley, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1084
(1974) (order of involuntary commitment requires " 'fresh
evaluation' " of individual's conduct and state of mind).
	Under section 5-2-4(i) of the Code, then, once it is shown
that the insanity acquittee has failed to fulfill the terms of a
conditional release, the court must conduct a hearing to reconsider
the grant of conditional release and determine whether, in light of
expert testimony on defendant's current mental status, there is
clear and convincing evidence that defendant's involuntary
readmission to the Department is required or whether the
conditional release should be continued, with or without
modification of the conditions of the original release. 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(i) (West 1998). These procedures are not precatory. As
this court noted in Radazewski v. Cawley, 159 Ill. 2d 372, 378
(1994):
			"It is well settled that detention of an individual at a
mental health care facility implicates a substantial liberty
interest. (See Foucha v. Louisiana (1992), 504 U.S. 71,
118 L. Ed. 2d 437, 112 S. Ct. 1780; Jones v. United States
(1983), 463 U.S. 354,  77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 103 S. Ct. 3043;
In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126; In re Splett (1991),
143 Ill. 2d 225; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407; In
re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544.) Statutes involving
involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed
narrowly unless such a construction would require 'the
performance of an empty formality.' (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d  at 232; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial
Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507.) *** A hearing to
vindicate the liberty interest of insanity acquittees is not
an empty formality."
	Examining the record in the case at bar, it is clear that the
circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's conditional release
was not made in conformity with the statutory procedures
mandated by section 5-2-4 of the Code. There was only one
hearing at which the State presented any evidence. The evidence
that was entered established that defendant was not taking Depo
Provera as required by the court's conditional release order. Based
on that evidence alone, the circuit court revoked defendant's
conditional release and held that defendant was "subject to
involuntary admission" and "in need of inpatient care." Thus, the
court presumed, without any evidence, that without Depo Provera
defendant was subject to being involuntarily committed to the
custody of the Department. This was error.
	The court's decision to revoke the release and recommit
defendant was not grounded on clear and convincing evidence that
defendant was "subject to involuntary admission" and "in need of
mental health services on an inpatient basis." There was no clear
and convincing evidence that, under the circumstances at the time
of the hearing, defendant was mentally ill and, because of his
mental illness, reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm
upon himself or another in the near future, or unable to provide for
his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm
(730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(A) (West 1998)) or, though not subject
to involuntary admission, reasonably expected to inflict serious
physical harm upon himself or another and, as a result, would
benefit from inpatient care or is in need of inpatient care (730
ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(B) (West 1998)). These are determinations
that cannot be made without the benefit of a current medical
evaluation of defendant's mental status. Because the circuit court
had before it no evidence regarding defendant's mental condition
at the time of the hearing, the decision does not meet the clear and
convincing standard and cannot be sustained.
	We recognize that the court was aware that in 1996, when
defendant's conditional release was granted, defendant's
continuation on Depo Provera was instrumental to his treatment
and release. However, the court's reliance on that evidence to
support defendant's involuntary recommitment is misplaced. The
hearing in this matter took place in 1998, two years after defendant
was granted the release conditioned on his use of Depo Provera.
There was no evidence presented to the court that, at the time of
this hearing, defendant's mental condition could not be
successfully treated on an outpatient basis without Depo Provera.
Nor was there any way that the court could assess whether
defendant's treatment with a substitute medication was adequate
to protect him and others from possible dangers stemming from
defendant's mental condition. In short, without medical testimony
regarding defendant's mental status at the time of the hearing, the
circuit court could not accurately determine defendant's present
need for recommitment and inpatient care or his eligibility for
continued conditional release. For this reason, the court's findings
that, without Depo Provera, defendant presented a danger to the
public and was "subject to involuntary admission" and "in need of
in patient care" were unsupported by clear and convincing
evidence.
	 There is an additional reason why the circuit court's decision
to revoke defendant's conditional release was not made in
conformity with the statutory procedures mandated by section
5-2-4(i) of the Code. According to this provision, after a court
finds that an insanity acquittee has not fulfilled the conditions of
a release, the court may revoke the release and recommit the
defendant to the custody of the Department if defendant meets the
criteria for involuntary admission, or it may continue the
conditional release and, if necessary, "modify the conditions of the
original release in order to reasonably assure the defendant's
satisfactory progress in treatment and his *** safety and the safety
of others." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West 1998).
	This procedure is similar to the scheme used in deciding
whether to grant a probation revocation petition. Paragraph (e) of
section 5-6-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections states:
			"If the court finds that the offender has violated a
condition at any time prior to the expiration or
termination of the period, it may continue him on the
existing sentence, with or without modifying or enlarging
the conditions, or may impose any other sentence that was
available under Section 5-5-3 at the time of initial
sentencing." 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(e) (West 1998).
	Due to this similarity, we, once again, consult probation
revocation cases for guidance in interpreting section 5-2-4(i) and
determining whether the circuit court's decision to revoke
defendant's conditional release was proper.
	In People v. Davis, 123 Ill. App. 3d 349 (1984), the circuit
court had revoked a defendant's sentence of probation, which was
conditioned on his securing inpatient treatment for drug- and
alcohol-dependency problems, when evidence presented at the
revocation hearing established that there were no treatment
facilities in the state willing to accept the defendant for inpatient
treatment. On review, it was found that the court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking defendant's probation because "defendant
had not achieved and could not achieve the principal objective of
his probation." (Emphasis added.) Davis, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 354.
	Similarly, in People v. Welch, 78 Ill. App. 3d 184 (1979), the
defendant's probation was conditioned on his "treatment at the
Illinois Psychiatric Institute" and it was unequivocally established
at the revocation hearing that defendant was not receiving
treatment. Nevertheless, the reviewing court reversed the order
revoking defendant's release because the evidence did not
establish that the goal of the probation order could not be
achieved. This is because defendant testified that he had been
turned away by the receptionist at the Psychiatric Institute and,
after informing his probation officer of the situation, received no
assistance in making treatment arrangements he required. On
review, the court said, "[W]ithout attempting to fix blame, it
appears to us that the sole objective at this time should be to
attempt to remedy the situation and to obtain the needed treatment
for defendant." Welch, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 187.
	Applying the rationale of Davis and Welch to the present case,
we find that the circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's
conditional release did not meet the clear and convincing standard
because the evidence relied on by the circuit court failed to
establish that terms of defendant's conditional release could not be
achieved.
	Defendant testified that he was willing to take Depo Provera,
but that he had been prevented from doing so by prison authorities.
Defendant further testified that he had gone as far as obtaining
court orders which demanded that prison authorities administer
Depo Provera to him. These court orders were ignored, apparently
because of liability concerns stemming from the fact that Depo
Provera was not FDA approved.
	The circuit court made no factual determination regarding the
legitimacy of the prison authorities' liability concerns, nor did it
attempt to remedy the situation. In sum, the court never
determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the condition
of defendant's release, i.e., treatment with Depo Provera, could not
be achieved.
	We conclude, then, that the statutory clear and convincing
standard was not met in the case at bar for two reasons. First, the
court failed to determine, based on expert medical testimony, that
defendant's use of Depo Provera, to the exclusion of other
medications, was necessary to reasonably assure his satisfactory
progress in treatment on an outpatient basis and his safety and the
safety of others. For that reason, the circuit court's determination
that defendant was subject to involuntary admission and in need
of inpatient care was not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Second, in light of defendant's testimony that he was
being prevented from fulfilling the condition of his release, the
circuit court had an obligation to determine whether the condition
could be achieved, that is, it had to determine whether Depo
Provera could be made available to defendant. Because the court
did not address this matter, its decision to revoke defendant's
conditional release did not satisfy the clear and convincing
standard.
	" 'The primary objective of section 5-2-4 is to insure that
insanity acquittees are not indeterminately institutionalized' "
(Turner v. Campagna, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094 (1996), quoting
People v. Winston, 191 Ill. App. 3d 948, 959 (1989)), and that the
intrusion on liberty interests is kept at a minimum. We conclude
that, in the present case, the circuit court failed to comply with the
procedures and standards required by section 5-2-4 of the Code.
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's failure to
fulfill the conditions of his release-his failure to take Depo
Provera-did not provide the circuit court with clear and
convincing evidence that defendant was subject to involuntary
admission and in need of inpatient care. Nor was there clear and
convincing evidence that defendant could not be maintained on an
outpatient basis. Because the statutory procedures mandated by
section 5-2-4 were not followed, the circuit court erred when it
revoked defendant's conditional release.
	Defendant makes the additional argument that his due process
rights were violated because the circuit court revoked his
conditional release without taking into consideration the State's
culpability for his failure to fulfill the conditions of his release. We
acknowledge that there is a substantive component to the notion
of due process which bars arbitrary, wrongful governmental
action. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437,
448, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992). However, because we find that
the circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's conditional
release was not based on clear and convincing evidence and,
therefore, did not meet the standard of proof required by statute,
we need not consider whether the court's decision to revoke also
violated due process.



CONCLUSION
	We agree with the circuit court's finding that defendant failed
to fulfill the conditions of his release because he was no longer
taking Depo Provera. However, for the reasons stated, we reverse
the order revoking defendant's conditional release and remand to
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. The judgment of the appellate court, affirming the circuit
court's order, is reversed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order reversed;
cause remanded.
 



 



1.      1The record indicates that Depo Provera can cause liver problems,
increased sugar levels, and diabetes.

2.      2At the time the revocation hearing was held, two years had elapsed
since defendant's arrest and defendant had not yet been tried on the
Cook County charges. The record provides no explanation for the delay.