Case Title: CAVANAUGH MESLER v CRIST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-194 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 JAMES P. CAVANAUGH AND JAMES I. MESLER, Petitioners, -vs- ROGER W. CRIST, Warden, Montana State Prison, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Petitioners: James P. Cavanaugh, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana James I . Mesler, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: July 29, 1980 Decided : AUG 14 1980 BUG 14 1986 Filed: M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l application f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus i n which p e t i t i o n e r s James Cavanaugh and James Mesler j o i n t l y challenge t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 46-18- 202 (2) , MCA. That s e c t i o n permits d i s t r i c t judges t o sen- tence persons convicted of f e l o n i e s t o imprisonment with no p o s s i b i l i t y of parole o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e prisoner furlough program. James Cavanaugh received concurrent sentences of one hundred years and twenty years f o r aggravated kidnapping and aggravated a s s a u l t . James Mesler was sentenced t o ten years . f o r robbery. The d i s t r i c t judges imposed t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s of section 46-18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, on both p e t i t i o n e r s . Both pleaded g u i l t y t o t h e offenses charged. The application f o r habeas corpus r e l i e f a l l e g e s t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, i s unconstitutional on equal protection, due process and vagueness grounds and a s an unlawful delegation of l e g i s l a t i v e authority. Among t h e numerous contentions r a i s e d by p e t i t i o n e r s i s t h a t t h e i r convictions and sentences a r e invalid. However, t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l a t t a c k on t h e s t a t u t e i s n o t an a t t a c k on t h e underlying convictions. The d i s t r i c t judge's decision whether t o impose t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n s of s e c t i o n 46-18- 2 0 2 ( 2 ) occurs subsequent t o and does n o t a f f e c t t h e under- lying conviction. Therefore, the i s s u e presented i s one of a sentencing s t a t u t e . I f it were t o be found unconstitu- t i o n a l , t h e only appropriate remedy would be t o remand f o r resentencing and n o t overturn t h e convictions. This Court w i l l address only t h e i s s u e of whether t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on p e t i t i o n e r s ' parole and prisoner furlough e l i g i b i l i t y imposed pursuant t o s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I n 1977, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, which set o u t t h e sentencing options a v a i l a b l e t o a d i s t r i c t judge by adding subdivision ( 3 ) (b) . See Chapter 580, Laws of 1977. That provision, now s e c t i o n 46- 18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, states: "Whenever t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t imposes a sentence of imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a t e r m exceeding 1 year, t h e c o u r t may a l s o impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t t h e defendant be i n e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e prisoner furlough program while serving h i s t e r m . I f such a r e s t r i c t i o n i s t o be imposed, t h e c o u r t s h a l l s t a t e t h e reasons f o r it i n w r i t i n g . I f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s neces- s a r y f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y , it s h a l l impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n ---- a s p a r t of t h e sentence and t h e judgment s h a l l contain a statement of t h e reasons f o r t h e r e s t r i c t i o n . " (Emphasis added. ) The c l e a r e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) is t o permit a d i s t r i c t judge t o c l o s e one avenue f o r escaping t h e f u l l f o r c e of a sentence. This complete r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and furlough program e l i g i b i l i t y i s d i s t i n c t from t h e par- t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t follows a determination by t h e D i s - t r i c t Court t h a t a defendant i s i n e l i g i b l e f o r designation a s a nondangerous offender. See s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA. I n t h e l a t t e r case, a defendant must serve a t l e a s t one-half of h i s f u l l term, less good t i m e , t o be e l i g i b l e f o r parole. A defendant who i s designated a nondangerous offender becomes e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e a f t e r serving one-quarter of h i s f u l l t e r m , l e s s good t i m e . Section 46-23-201, MCA. Unless he i s sentenced under s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, a defendant may apply t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e furlough program a f t e r serving a t l e a s t one-half of t h e time required t o be considered f o r parole. Section 46-23-411, MCA. P e t i t i o n e r s contend t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) f a i l s t o include procedural elements which they a l l e g e a r e required t o m e e t due process standards. The elements presented a r e : (1) n o t i c e t h a t a complete r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r - lough program e l i g i b i l i t y may be imposed a s a p a r t of t h e sentence; (2) a jury t r i a l s p e c i f i c a l l y addressing t h i s matter; and (3) proof beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s required. P e t i t i o n e r s r e l y on d e c i s i o n s involving sentence en- hancement s t a t u t e s and cite Specht v. P a t t e r s o n (1967), 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326, a s c o n t r o l l i n g . I n Specht t h e defendant was convicted of "indecent l i b e r t i e s " under a Colorado s t a t u t e which c a r r i e d a ten-year maximum sentence. The defendant, however, was sentenced under t h e s t a t e ' s Sex Offender Act which permitted an indeterminate t e r m of from one day t o l i f e . H i s sentencing followed a s e p a r a t e commitment proceeding conducted pursuant t o t h e a c t , t o determine whether t h e defendant c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t of bodily harm t o members of t h e public, o r i s an h a b i t u a l offender and mentally ill. The defendant was n o t given n o t i c e o r an opportunity t o be heard a s t o t h a t d e t e r - mination and argued t h a t t h e due process c l a u s e was, there- f o r e , violated. The Supreme Court agreed. The Court found i n Specht t h a t t h e Colorado a c t re- quired t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o determine a f a c t t h a t w a s n o t an i n g r e d i e n t of t h e charged offense and compared t h e a c t ' s proceedings t o "those under r e c i d i v i s t s t a t u t e s where an h a b i t u a l criminal i s s u e i s a ' d i s t i n c t i s s u e ' . . . on which a defendant 'must r e c e i v e reasonable n o t i c e and an oppor- t u n i t y t o be heard.'" Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. a t 610. The Court r u l e d where such commitment proceedings a r e involved, due process r e q u i r e s t h e defendant t o be p r e s e n t with counsel, t o have an opportunity t o be heard, t o confront witnesses a g a i n s t him, and t o p r e s e n t witnesses of h i s own. Due process standards a r e required where a sentence is t o be enhanced on t h e b a s i s of a p s y c h i a t r i c evaluation and p a s t behavior and pursuant t o a s e p a r a t e a c t ( a s i n Specht). It i s n o t required f o r s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA. This s t a t u t e i s n o t a sentence enhancement s t a t u t e . The s t a t u t e does n o t permit d i s t r i c t judges t o add any t i m e beyond t h e s t a t u t o r y maximum f o r t h e underlying offense. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) i s fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from t h e kinds of s t a t u t e s examined i n t h e cases p e t i t i o n e r s c i t e . I n Specht, f o r instance, while t h e underlying offense c a r r i e d a ten-year maximum sentence, t h e Sex Offender Act permitted a sentence of from one day t o life. The Montana s t a t u t e does n o t permit enhancement. I t i n s u r e s t h a t t h e length of t h e penalty enacted by t h e l e g i s - l a t u r e and imposed by t h e c o u r t i s c a r r i e d out. The restric- t i o n on p a r o l e and furlough e l i g i b i l i t y permitted by s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) has no existence beyond t h e t e r m of t h e sen- tence imposed f o r t h e underlying offense. The Specht-type s t a t u t e e n t a i l s a proceeding which i s s e p a r a t e from t h e ordinary sentencing proceeding. A s t h e Supreme Court empha- s i z e d i n Specht, t h e Colorado Sex Offender Act "makes one conviction t h e b a s i s f o r commencing another proceeding under another A c t . . ." 386 U.S. a t 608. Section 46-18-202(2), on t h e o t h e r hand, has no such e f f e c t . The r e s t r i c t i o n of parole and furlough Program e l i g i b i l i t y i s "a p a r t of t h e sentence" by t h e express terms of t h e s t a t u t e and does n o t involve any proceeding except t h e ordinary sentencing proceeding. It r e p r e s e n t s one option, among o t h e r s , t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has made a v a i l - a b l e t o d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e course of ordinary sentencing. The f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and furlough e l i g i b i l i t y permitted by s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) has no existence a p a r t from t h e sentence imposed f o r the underlying offense. P e t i t i o n e r s f u r t h e r contend t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) i s s i m i l a r t o t h e Specht-type s t a t u t e i n t h a t t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and furlough program e l i g i b i l i t y must be necessary f o r " t h e p r o t e c t i o n of society." They argue t h i s i s a f a c t determination t h a t r e q u i r e s a jury. D i s t r i c t Courts a r e required t o determine whether t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and furlough e l i g i b i l i t y i s necessary f o r " t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y " when a person i s sentenced a f t e r conviction. This matter i s n o t an element of determining whether t h e underlying offense was committed. A f t e r conviction, such considerations as t o " p r o t e c t s o c i e t y from t h e a c t i o n s of t h e g u i l t y " i s a matter of t h e ordinary course of sentencing proceedings. The source of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e sanctioning t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a x a t i o n of t r i a l standards is W i l l i a m s v. New York (1949), 337 U.S. 2 4 1 , 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337. I n W i l l i a m s t h e defendant w a s convicted of murder and then sentenced t o death, r a t h e r than l i f e imprisonment, l a r g e l y on t h e b a s i s of background information contained i n a pre- sentence r e p o r t prepared by probation a u t h o r i t i e s . H e chal- lenged t h e sentence because he had been given no opportunity t o confront and cross-examine t h e witnesses who supplied t h e information i n t h e r e p o r t . The Supreme Court upheld t h e sentence and approved t h e t r i a l judge's use of such unchal- lenged evidence. It r e l i e d on a nonadversarial theory of penology i n which punishment i s individualized t o f i t t h e offender and not merely the crime. The sentencing judge should be concerned with obtaining as much information about the defendant as possible, the Court asserted, and most information that courts relied upon in the "intelligent imposition of sentences" would become unavailable if it could be obtained only in open court and subject to cross- examination. Williams, 337 U . S . at 250. The Supreme Court allowed very broad judicial discre- tion, based on the principle that courts should not be encumbered by the procedural formality required at trial. This remains the rule. The Specht court classified Williams as "a case where at the end of the trial and in the same proceeding the fixing of the penalty for first degree murder was involved." Specht, 386 U.S. at 606-607. Here is a case where the admissions of guilt and the fixing of the penal- ties for the crimes admitted were conducted in the same proceeding. The judge in Williams, in sentencing the defen- dant to death rather than life imprisonment, relied on the information in the presentence report. Since the Court in Specht specifically announced it would adhere to Williams, which permitted the judge to make such a finding on the basis of hearsay, then Williams is controlling in these facts. While the trial judge in Williams examined past events, he was doing so only to predict the defendant's future behavior rather than impose a separate punishment for past actions. The same is true here. Federal courts have consistently declined to extend full procedural due process protections to defendants whose sentences were enhanced by federal statute. In United States v. Bowdach (5th Cir. 1977), 561 F.2d 1160, the court rejected the argument that such proceedings must include an opportunity t o have a jury determine t h e r e q u i s i t e f a c t s . See a l s o United S t a t e s v. Stewart ( 6 t h C i r . 1976), 531 F.2d 326, c e r t . denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d 376; United S t a t e s v. Holt (D. Tex. 1975), 397 F.Supp. 1397, affirmed i n p a r t and vacated i n p a r t , ( 5 t h C i r . 1975), 537 F.2d 845, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051, 97 S.Ct. 764, 50 L.Ed.2d 767; United S t a t e s v. Neary (7thC;ix. 1977) , 552 F.2d 1184, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864, 98 S.Ct. 197, 54 L.Ed.2d 139. I n H o l l i s v. Smith (2nd C i r . 1978), 571 F.2d 685, 693, t h e c o u r t said: "There i s no a u t h o r i t y . . . which holds t h a t t h e procedure i n proceedings r e l a t i n g s o l e l y t o punishment, even when an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t has t o be e s t a b l i s h e d , must conform p r e c i s e l y t o those i n proceedings r e l a t i n g t o g u i l t , and w e see no b a s i s i n p r i n c i p l e f o r s o holding. . ." While t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l on sentencing o r compelled attendance of persons supplying hearsay informa- t i o n , W i l l i a m s v. New York, supra, c e r t a i n p r o t e c t i o n s are necessary i n ordinary sentencing. A defendant has t h e r i g h t t o counsel a t sentencing, Mempa v. Rhay (1967), 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336, and t o have h i s sentence based on a c c u r a t e information, Townsend v. Burke (1948) , 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690. And, a s t h i s Court held i n S t a t e v. Stewart (1977), 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138, 1139, a defendant has t h e r i g h t t o be f r e e from a d i s t r i c t judge's abuse of sentencing d i s c r e t i o n . I n addi- t i o n , a d i s t r i c t judge must now s t a t e reasons for t h e sen- tence he imposed i n t h e record i n every case. S t a t e v. Stumpf (1980) , Mont. - , 609 P.2d 298, 37 St.Rep. 673. Cavanaugh's sentence and judgment shows t h a t he appeared f o r sentencing, with counsel, approximately one month a f t e r e n t e r i n g p l e a s of g u i l t y t o t h e charged offenses. Cavanaugh was given t h e opportunity t o p r e s e n t evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n of sentence a t t h e sentencing hearing, b u t i n f a c t , pre- sented no evidence. Cavanaugh was given t h e opportunity t o address t h e c o u r t before sentence was imposed. H e declined t o do so. Material appearing i n t h e presentence r e p o r t , including h i s p a s t felony record, w a s summarized by t h e c o u r t , Cavanaugh was asked i f t h e r e w a s any l e g a l cause why sentencing should n o t be imposed. H e o f f e r e d nothing. Mesler's record i n d i c a t e s likewise. Mesler, with t h e concurrence of counsel, waived a presentence r e p o r t . H e t e s t i f i e d a t t h e sentencing proceeding. Both p e t i t i o n e r s were accorded a l l t h e procedural p r o t e c t i o n s required by t h e court. P e t i t i o n e r s contend t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, denies equal p r o t e c t i o n because it provides d i f f e r e n t punish- ments, o r d i f f e r e n t degrees of punishment, f o r d i f f e r e n t persons f o r t h e same a c t . This Court recognizes t h a t v i r - t u a l l y every sentencing provision has t h i s e f f e c t . A s t h e Supreme Court noted i n Williams, t h e "prevalent modern philosophy of penology [ i s ] t h a t t h e punishment should f i t t h e offender and n o t merely t h e crime." Furthermore, " [ t l h e b e l i e f no longer p r e v a i l s t h a t every offense i n l i k e l e g a l category c a l l s f o r an i d e n t i c a l punishment without regard t o p a s t l i f e and h a b i t s of a p a r t i c u l a r offender." 337 U.S. a t 247. Parole and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e furlough program, both of which r e l a t e t o punishment, a r e privileges--matters of grace, not r i g h t s . Lopez v. C r i s t (1978), Mont. , 578 P.2d 312, 314, 35 St.Rep. 622; P e t i t i o n of Hart (19651, 145 Mont. 203, 206, 399 P.2d 984. The d i s t r i c t judges d i d n o t deprive p e t i t i o n e r s of a r i g h t when they decided t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s should be imprisoned with no p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e furlough program. The d i s - t r i c t judges withheld grace. Section 46-28-202(2), MCA, which allows a d i s t r i c t judge t o r e s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n a l re- l e a s e , does n o t s i n g l e o u t a c l a s s without r a t i o n a l i t y . Individualized sentencing goals must be m e t . Any kind of c o n d i t i o n a l r e l e a s e n e c e s s a r i l y involves t h e r i s k t h a t parolees " w i l l n o t be a b l e t o l i v e i n s o c i e t y without com- m i t t i n g a d d i t i o n a l a n t i - s o c i a l a c t s . " Morrissey v. B r e w e r (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. P e t i t i o n e r s a l s o claim t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) must f a l l because it i s too vague i n defining t h e supposed "of- fense" c i t i n g Lanzetta v. New J e r s e y (1939), 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888. P e t i t i o n e r s a r e misled. Sec- t i o n 46-18-202(2) does n o t d e f i n e an offense. It i s invoked n o t so much on t h e b a s i s of p a s t a c t s a s on t h e b a s i s of a p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e behavior. I t focuses on the offender, n o t on a p a r t i c u l a r offense. I t does n o t c r e a t e a new offense; nor does it f o r b i d o r r e q u i r e t h e doing of an a c t . Its s o l e purpose i s t o permit a d i s t r i c t judge, i n t h e course of ordinary sentencing, t o determine t h a t a defendant should serve h i s f u l l sentence f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y . F i n a l l y , p e t i t i o n e r s contend t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) unlawfully d e l e g a t e s l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o t h e j u d i c i a l and executive branches of government. The r e a l t h r u s t of t h i s argument appears t o be t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) v e s t s t o o much d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s t r i c t judges and prosecuting attorneys. P e t i t i o n e r s a l l u d e t o p r o s e c u t o r i a l v i n d i c t i v e - ness i n t h e use of t h i s s t a t u t e a s a device t o punish de- fendants who choose t o go t o t r i a l r a t h e r than plead g u i l t y . The f a c t t h a t both p e t i t i o n e r s here d i d plead g u i l t y and were subsequently sentenced without p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e furlough program i s convincing evidence t o t h e contrary. ~ i s t r i c t judges, n o t county prosecutors, determine t h e punishment t h a t i s imposed following conviction. P e t i t i o n e r s ' a l l e g a t i o n t h a t prosecuting a t t o r n e y s somehow induce d i s t r i c t judges i n t o r e s t r i c t i n g p a r o l e and furlough program e l i g i - b i l i t y ignores t h e p l a i n language of t h e s t a t u t e ( " . . . t h e c o u r t may a l s o impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n . . . " ) . While a recommendation might be made i n a given c a s e t h a t t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n permitted by s e c t i o n 46-18-202 (2) should be imposed, t h e determination whether t o do s o i s manifestly t h e d i s t r i c t judge's alone. This Court f i n d s t h e contention t h a t excessive j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n e x i s t s i n permitting d i s t r i c t judges t o choose t o f u l l y r e s t r i c t p a r o l e and furlough p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s without merit. A d i s t r i c t judge i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l positioned t o p r e d i c t whether t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s necessary f o r t h e protec- t i o n of s o c i e t y i n l i g h t of t h e o f f e n d e r ' s personal and criminal h i s t o r y , apparent willingness t o conform h i s be- havior t o s o c i e t y ' s r u l e s , and o t h e r f a c t s t h a t a r e commonly weighed i n sentencing. For t h e reasons set f o r t h p e t i t i o n e r s ' a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus i s denied. We concur: ustices ii Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a special concurring opinion later.