Case Title: Angle v. Alexander

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Terry ANGLE, et al. v. Jerry ALEXANDER, et
al.

96-608                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 2, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- theory not presented at trial -- theory not
     reached on appeal. -- The employees' inherent-risk theory was
     summarily disposed of because the abstract failed to reflect
     that theory was presented to or ruled on by the trial court. 
     
2.   Workers' compensation -- facts needed for tort action for
     damages brought by employee against employer -- intentional
     torts discussed. -- Before an employee is free to bring a tort
     action for damages against an employer, the facts must show
     that the employer had a "desire" to bring about the
     consequences of the acts or that the acts were premeditated
     with the specific intent to injure the employee; intentional
     torts involve consequences that the actor believes are
     substantially certain to follow his actions. 

3.   Workers' compensation -- conduct that goes beyond aggravated
     negligence that falls within Workers' Compensation Act --
     actual intention still lacking. -- Even if the alleged conduct
     goes beyond aggravated negligence and includes such elements
     as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist,
     knowingly ordering a claimant to perform an extremely
     dangerous job, willfully failing to furnish a safe place to
     work, or even willfully and unlawfully violating a safety
     statute, such conduct still falls short of the kind of actual
     intention to injury that robs the injury of accidental
     character.

4.   Workers' compensation -- appellees' conduct fell within
     exclusivity provision of Act -- appellant employees limited to
     rights granted under Workers' Compensation Act. -- Where 
     appellees' conduct, even if intentional, still fell within the
     exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act,
     appellant employees were limited to the rights and remedies
     granted them under the Workers' Compensation Act. 

5.   Torts -- outrage -- factors needed to establish. -- To
     establish an outrage claim, it must be shown (1) the actor
     intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have
     known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
     conduct; (2) the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," was
     "beyond all possible bounds of decency," and was "utterly
     intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) the actions of the
     defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs' distress; and (4)
     the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so
     severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.

6.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- factors on review. -- If a
     moving party supports its motion for summary judgment by
     making a prima facie showing of an absence of factual issues
     and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the
     adverse party fails to set forth specific facts showing a
     genuine issue of material fact, then the supreme court will
     not say that the trial judge erred in granting summary
     judgment.

7.   Torts -- outrage -- analyzing claim where no physical illness
     or harm in evidence. -- When analyzing an outrage claim where
     no physical illness or harm is evident the courts tend to look
     for more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that
     the mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious, but if the
     enormity of the outrage itself carries conviction that there
     has in fact been severe and serious mental distress that is
     neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not required; in
     the great majority of the cases allowing recovery, the mental
     distress has been inflicted intentionally, the defendant
     either desiring to cause it or knowing that it was
     substantially certain to follow from the conduct.  

8.   Torts -- outrage -- extreme emotional distress required to
     prevail on outrage claim not present. -- Although appellants,
     including some nonemployees, offered testimony that they have
     experienced emotional distress, thoughts of death, fear, anger
     and worry, none of the plaintiffs had seen a physician or
     mental health professional for treatment for these concerns;
     no evidence was present that showed that appellees' conduct
     caused the nonemployees the kind of extreme emotional distress
     required to prevail on an outrage claim; when considering
     appellees' conduct as related to whether they intended to
     cause the nonemployees severe mental distress or knew it was
     substantially certain to follow appellees' conduct, the
     supreme court could not say that either objective was met; the
     nonemployees never showed their exposure or extent of
     exposure, much less that appellees intended or should have
     known that the nonemployees would experience mental distress
     from appellees' decision to complete the renovation of the
     floor; because appellants/nonemployees failed to show
     appellees' conduct caused the type of severe emotional
     distress needed to establish an outrage claim, the trial
     court's ruling granting summary judgment in appellees favor
     was affirmed.

9.   Appeal & error -- damages issue not reached -- underlying
     claim unsupported. -- Appellants' third point, which touched
     on damages, was not discussed in view of the supreme court's
     holding that appellants failed to show that a material
     question of fact existed to support their tort-of-outrage
     claim or underlying claim of liability against appellees.

     Appeal from Benton Circuit Court; David Clinger, Judge;
affirmed.
     Steven Napper and Robert McHenry, for appellants.
     Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by:  John G. Lile, for appellees.
     Davis, Cox & Wright, PLC, by: Paul H. Taylor, for appellee
Copes Furnitureland, Inc.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Appellants represent (1) Concordia Care Center employees and
(2) their family members who claim they were exposed to asbestos
resulting from a 22,000 square-foot floor renovation project at the
Center's facility at Bella Vista.  The project commenced before
Thanksgiving in November of 1990, and lasted until on or about
December 18, 1990.  
     On June 24, 1991, the employees and nonemployee family members
subsequently brought suit against appellees, Concordia, its
administrator, Jerry Alexander, and the contractor, Cope's Fine
Carpets, alleging causes of action of outrage, negligence, and
fraud.  In brief, appellants alleged that the appellees
intentionally hid the truth concerning appellants' exposure to
asbestos which was caused from the removal of old carpet and
asbestos-backed vinyl required before installation of new carpet. 
Appellants asserted that, as a result of this exposure, they
suffered physical injury, an increased risk of serious illness, and
mental distress, anguish, fear and phobias of asbestos-related
disease.
     Although sometimes disputed, the facts leading to this
litigation generally are as follows.  In November 1990, Concordia
Care Center, after bids were let, hired Cope's Fine Carpets to do
a floor renovation at the Center's facility located in Bella Vista. 
Cope's employed a subcontractor, Mr. Dan Snowden, to remove the
existing carpet and to lay new carpet.  However, sometime after
Snowden commenced work, it was learned that vinyl was under the old
carpet, and the vinyl also had to be removed before placement of
any new carpet.  Shortly after removal of the vinyl began in
November, Concordia's administrator, Jerry Alexander, allegedly
voiced concern to the Center's maintenance man, Robert Greeley,
that asbestos might possibly be in the vinyl.  While Alexander
denied any knowledge of an asbestos problem early in the project,
he admitted that, on about December 14, 1990, he learned that such
a problem existed when an employee's spouse, Robert Hamilton, told
him of it.  Hamilton had taken a sample of the vinyl flooring, had
it tested, and received a lab report verifying asbestos content was
in the vinyl.  Upon learning of Hamilton's report, Alexander
informed Vernon Fredrickson of Cope's of the asbestos discovery,
and Fredrickson contacted the manufacturer of the new vinyl.  That
company sent Cope's a "tip sheet" on removing the old vinyl. 
Cope's forwarded that information to Concordia and Snowden. 
Apparently the project had been temporarily stopped, but after
receiving the information on asbestos removal, Snowden resumed work
on about December 15th or 16th, and continued until the project's
completion on or about December 18th.  
     At trial, appellees moved for summary judgment.  First, they
asserted Concordia's employees were covered under the Arkansas
Workers' Compensation Act, which barred any tort claims.  Second,
appellees claimed that both employees and the family-member
nonemployees failed to state a cause of action for the tort of
outrage or severe emotional distress, had no present compensable
injuries, and had not shown entitlement to medical monitoring
damages or damages resulting from the fear of increased risk of
contracting asbestos-related disease.  
     The trial court granted appellees' requests for summary
judgment, and appellants appeal that ruling, raising the following
three points for reversal: (1) Appellant-employees argue their tort
claims were not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act; (2) both
employees and nonemployee family members had established that a
material fact question existed showing appellees' conduct amounted
to outrage; and (3) such conduct resulted in all of the appellants'
injuries and justified their requests for medical monitoring
damages and damages resulting from the fear of an increased risk of
an asbestos-related disease.
     We first consider the employees' argument that the Workers'
Compensation Act does not bar their tort-of-outrage claim against
appellees Concordia and its administrator, Alexander.  In arguing
the Act's inapplicability, they contend (a) appellees intentionally
exposed them to asbestos fibers and appellees' conduct is outside
the Workers' Compensation Act; and (b) the exposure and injuries
the appellants/employees suffered were not inherent risks expected
to arise from their employment and intended to be covered under the
Act.  We disagree.  In doing so, we first note that we must
summarily dispose of the employees' inherent risk theory because
the abstract fails to reflect that that theory was presented to or
ruled on by the trial court.  See Scroggins v. City of Grubbs, 318
Ark. 648, 887 S.W.2d 283 (1994); see also Hercules, Inc. v.
Pledger, 319 Ark. 702,