Case Title: Tenas v Progressive Preferred Ins

Citation: 2008 MT 393

Docket Number: 13f70fa2-1c7f-4a81-aae9-75e72eaf09c3

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED
November 25 2008,

DA 07-0188
INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 393

FIL }

HOV 2S 2008

RONDA TENAS,

Plaintiff and Appellee,
fs:

  

PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court ofthe Twentieth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DV 06-134
Honorable Deborah Kim Christopher, Presiding Judge
‘COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:

‘Mark S. Williams and James D. Johnson, Williams Law Firm, Missoula,
Montana

For Appellee:
Edward K. Duckworth, Duckworth Law Office, Ronan, Montana

‘Submitted on Briefs: January 8, 2008

Decided: November 25, 2008

Filed:

Terk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Progressive Preferred Insurance Company (Progressive) appeals from an order ofthe
‘Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granting Ronda Tenas’s (Tenas) motion for

summary judgment, We affirm in part and reverse in part.

 

{2 Progressive raises the following issues on appe

 

$3 Whether the District Court properly denied Progressive's motion to dismiss.

44 Whether the District Court properly applied Montana law to a Nevada insurance

policy.

$5 Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Tenas.

{6 Whether the District Court properly awarded attorney fees to Tenas.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{7 Tenas and her mother, Barbara Bames (Bares), had traveled to Montana from their

‘home in Nevada to vist relatives in July 2003. While in Montana, Tenas was a passenger in

‘car driven by an uninsured motorist that crashed near Charlo, Montana, in Lake County on

July 5, 2003. Tenas suffered serious injuries.

{8 Barnes was the named insured under a Nevada Progressive policy that covered Tenas.

‘The partes had contracted forthe policy in Nevada. The policy contained a choice of law

provision requiring the appli

 

tion of Nevada law to resolve any disputes. The policy
covered two vehicles registered to Bames in Nevada. ‘The policy also provided uninsured

‘motorists (UM) coverage. The policy limited UM coverage to $25,000 per person. The
policy contained an anti-stacking provision that prohibited the insured from recovering more
than the single highest limit of UM coverage regardless of the number of vehicles upon
Which premiums have been paid

49 Tenas received treatment at St. Patrick's Hospital in Missoula, where she accrued
$34,000 in medical bills. Tenas struggled to pay her medical bills as Progressive hed denied
all UM benefits based upon the Montana Highway Patrol’s incorrect conclusion that Tenas
has been the driver of the car, and not the passenger. Tenas retained Montana counsel to
‘conduct an independent investigation of the accident to correct Progressive’s
misapprehension regarding her role inthe accident, and to help Tenas to obtain benefits from
Progressive. Progressive finally paid Tenas $25,000, the limit for a single UM payment
pursuant to the contract, Progressive sent the check to Tenas's counsel's Montana: law
offices. Tenas sought an additional $25,000 from Progressive. She asserted that Bares had
paid separate premiums for UM coverage for each of the two vehicles covered under the
policy. TTenas argued that Montana law required Progressive to pay her the highest limit of
UM coverage for each separate UM premium paid, notwithstanding the policy's anti-stacking
provision. Progressive refused.

{10 Progressive filed a declaratory judgment action in Nevada secking a determination
thatthe policy probibited stacking, Tenas filed suit in District Court in Lake County almost a
‘week later seeking a determination that Montana law required Progressive to stack payments.

‘Tenas alleges that she was not aware of the Nevada action. Progressive filed a motion to
dismiss the Lake County action. Progressive argued that the District Court should abstain
from jurisdiction in light ofthe principle of comity and Nevada's priority jurisdiction over
the matter, Tenas moved for summary judgment before the District Court had determined
Progressive’s motion to dismiss.

‘UL The District Court denied Progressive’s motion to dismiss. The court determined that
choice of law principles, not jurisdictional principles, were at issue. The District Court
‘ranted Tenas’s motion for summary judgment. The court noted thatthe policy, by its terms,
required it to apply Nevada law to the dispute. ‘The District Court acknowledged that our
decision in Youngblood v. American States Ins. Co.,262 Mont. 391, 395, 866 P.2d 203, 205
(1993), requires courts to enforce such clear, unambiguous contract terms, unless the terms
violate Montana public policy.

{12 The District Court determined that the policy's anti-stacking provisions, however,
violate Montana public policy pursuant to our decision in Hard v. Progressive Specialty Is.
Co.,2003 MT 85,4 47,315 Mont. 107, 9 47, 67 P.3d 892, 47. The court concluded that the
policy entitled Tenas to receive the additional $25,000 UM coverage because “an insurance
policy that contains provisions that defeat coverage for which the insurer has received
valuable consideration is against public policy.” Hardy, 4.47. The District Court also
awarded attomey fees and costs to Tenas pursuant to Montana law as an insured forced by
her insurer to assume the burden of a legal action to obtain coverage under an insurance

contract pursuant to Mountain West. v. Brewer, 2003 MT 98, § 36, 315 Mont. 231, 36, 69
P.3d 652, 4.36. Progressive appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

{13 A district court exercises discretion in deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for
declaratory judgment. Northfield Ins. v. Ass'n of Counties, 2000 MT 256, 4 8, 301 Mont.
472,48, 10 P.34 813, 8. We will not disturb a district court's decision that declaratory
relief is not necessary or proper absent abuse of discretion. Northfield Ins., 8.
$14 We review de novo a district coun’s decision to grant summary judgment using the
same criteria applied by the district court. Farmer's Co-op Ass'n v. Amsden, LLC, 2007 MT.
286, 424, 339 Mont. 445, 24, 171 P.3d 690,24. Summary judgment is appropriate when
“the pleadings, depositions, answers o interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and thatthe
‘moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). We draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, Farmer's Co-op
Assn, 24,
{1S A district court's grant or denial of attomey fees is a discretionary ruling that we
review for an abuse of discretion. Martin v. SAIF Corp., 2007 MT 234, 10,339 Mont. 167,
110, 167 P.34 916, 10.

DISCUSSION
{16 Whether the District Court properly denied Progressive's motion to dismiss.
417 Progressive argues that the District Court erred when it did not abstain from
jurisdiction based on the principle of comity and Nevada's priority jurisdiction over the

3
matter. Progressive contends that the District Court should have abstained from jurisdiction
in order to avoid “imping{ing] unnecessarily upon the harmonious interstate relations which
are part and parcel ofthe spirit of co-operative federalism.” Simmons v. State, 206 Mont.
264, 290, 670 P.2d 1372, 1385 (1983).

U8 Progressive contends that dismissal was particularly appropriate here in light of our
‘admonition in Simmons that courts should apply comity to discourage forum shopping. We
determined in Simmons that Montana jurisdiction was inappropriate because Oregon
‘maintained more significant connection tothe cause of action. Progressive points out that we
also determined Montana jurisdiction to be inappropriate in Simmons due to the plaintiff's
desire to take advantage of a higher damage award under Montana law through forum
shopping. Simmons, 206 Mont, at 285-86, 670 P.2d at 1383. Progressive argues that Tenas

likewise engaged in forum shopping when she pursued this action in’ Montana, where

 

stacking is allowed, rather than in Nevada.

's motion as comity

 

srgues thatthe District Court properly denied Progressive
represents a discretionary principle. Tenas points out that comity is “not a rule of law, but
one of practice, convenience, and expediency [that] .. . does not of its own force compel a
particular course of action.” Columbia Falls Alum. Co. v. Hindin/Owne/Englke, 224 Mont.
202, 206, 728 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
‘Simmons, 206 Mont. at 289, 670 P.2d at 1385. Tenas also distinguishes this case from

Simmons and Columbia Falls Alum. Co., citing differences in contract language and
questions of whether the defendant purposely availed itself of the benefits of doing business
in Montana

420 Tenas contends thatthe existence ofa provision in the Progressive policy that violates
“Montana public policy constitutes the most significant factual distinction, In Hardy, we held
that “an insurance policy that contains provisions that defeat coverage for which the insurer
has received valuable consideration is against public policy.” Hardy, 47. Tenas argues that
the anti-stacking provision contained in the Progressive policy represents such a provision,
{21 We declined to relinquish jurisdiction voluntarily under the principle of comity in
Oberson v, Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 MT 329, § 10, 330 Mont. 1, § 10, 126 P.34 459,
1110, when such relinquishment would have violated a firm Montana public policy. Oberson
concerned Michigan resident who had been injured severely while working in Montana for
his Michigan employer. The injured employee won a substantial judgment in federal district
court in Montana. Oberson, 44. ‘The Michigan court later affirmed that the employee had
‘been acting in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured. ‘The workers”
compensation insurer paid the employee's benefits. Oberson, $4. ‘The insurer filed a
subrogation claim against the worker's Montana personal injury award in a Michigan court
Oberson 6.

{22 The injured employee's representative filed a declaratory judgment action secking a
declaration that Montana law barred the insurer from recovering on a subrogation claim until

the worker was made whole. Oberson, 6. We determined that a firm public policy exists in
Montana that prohibits subrogation before the injured party has been made whole. We
concluded that the existence of this firm public policy justified our refusal to apply the
discretionary principle of comity to relinquish jurisdiction over the subrogation issue.
Oberson, $9 10, 16.

$23 The rule against anti-stacking provisions in insurance potices that defeat coverage for
which an insurer has received valuable consideration constitutes a similarly firm public
policy under Montana law. Hardy, $47. Montana’s firm public policy in enforcing the ule
against these types of anti-stacking provisions justified the District Court's decision to retain
jurisdiction over Tenas’s declaratory judgment action. The District Court properly
subordinated the discretionary principle of comity tothe important public policy implications.
Oberson, $$ 10, 16.

{24 Progressive also argues that the District Cour should have abstained from jurisdiction

in light of Progressive’s previously filed Nevada action. Progressive contends that the first

 

‘court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to dispose of the entire case

 

pursuant to the doctrine of priority jurisdiction. Progressive asserts that this Court adopted
the doctrine of priority jurisdiction in Agri West v. Koyama Farms, Inc.,281 Mont. 167,933
P.24 808 (1997),

{25 We find unavailing Progressive’s priority jurisdiction argument. The Court
considered in Agri West whether a district court must abstain from exercising its concurrent

jurisdiction when the same parties dispute the same issues in a pending tribal court action.
Agri West, 281 Mont. at 171, 933 P.2d at $10. The Court determined that “the District Court
crred by sustaining jurisdiction in this action when the Crow Tribal Court had previously
assumed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter...” Agri West, 281 Mont. at
174, 933 P.24 at 813.

{26 We focused our analysis and conclusion in Agri West narrowly. We took into
consideration the special sovereign status of Indian tribes and the body of federal law
surrounding tribal court jurisdiction. Agri West, 281 Mont. at 171-74, 933 P.2d at 810-812,
We did not adopt the doctrine of priority jurisdiction asa general rule in Agri West. Noother
Montana decision adopts the doctrine. The District Court didnot abuse its discretion when it
denied Progressive’s motion to dismiss,

{27 Whether the District Court properly applied Montana law to a Nevada insurance
policy.

{28 The District Court determined that Montana law applied notwithstanding the
existence of a choice of law provision in the policy requiring application of Nevada law to
resolve any disputes. The court relied on Youngblood. Youngblood reiterates the established
rule that we will enforce clear and unambiguous contract terms, including choice of law
provisions. Youngblood also provides, however, that we will not enforce a clear and
‘unambiguous contract term that violates public policy. Youngblood, 232 Mont. at 395, 866
P.2dat205. The District Court applied Montana law after determining thatthe anti-stacking

provision violated Montana public policy pursuant to Hardy.
{29 Progressive argues thatthe District Court misapplied Youngblood. Progressive points
‘out that Youngblood concemed contract terms that violate public policy. Youngblood, 232
Mont, at 394-95, 866 P.2d at 205. Progressive asserts that the choice of law provision does
‘not, by itself, violate public policy. Progressive instead contends that Mitchel v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 2003 MT 102, 315 Mont. 281, 68 P.3d 703, provides the appropriate analysis in a
conflict of laws scenario. Progressive argues that the circumstances do not support the
application of Montana law in this case pursuant to the test set out in Mitchell. Tenas agrees
that Mitchell provides the appropriate test, but counters that the circumstances here required
the District Court to apply Montana law.

{80 The Court reiterated in Mitchell the systematic approach to resolving choice of law
issues that we applied in Phillis v. General Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, § 23, 298 Mont.
438, 4 23, 995 P.2d 1002, §23. This analysis generally follows the Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws, and applies either a substantial relationships test or local laws in the
absence of an agreement by the parties. Mitchell, $] 17-18 (citing Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 188, 193 (1971)). The Mitchell Restatement analysis has no
application here, however, in light of the fact that Tenas’s policy's choice of law provision
‘constitutes an agreement by the parties

WI Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994) overruled on other
grounds by Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 US. 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996),

provides this Court’s most curren ule regarding which jurisdiction's law should apply where

10
‘a contract includes a choice of law provision, Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 372-75, 886 P.2d at
934-35. The Court in Casarotto determined that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of

Laws § 187(2) (1971), appropriately governs such circumstances. Casarotto explains that §

 

187(2) “is consistent with our decision in Youngblood, and expands upon the factors to be

considered” when determining whether a choice of law clause is effective. Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 268 Mont. at 374-75, 886 P.2d at 934.
$82. Section 187(2) provides:

(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govem their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even ifthe particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issues, unless either

(@) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or

(©) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination ofthe particular issue and which, under the
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 187(2).

483 _ Section 187(2)(a) plays no role with the choice of law provision contained in the

 

insurance contract between Progressive and Tenas as neither party has alleged that Nevada
lacks a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction or that there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, Tenas can prevail on her claim that Montana law

should apply notwithstanding the parties’ express contractual agreement that Nevada law

should govern, therefore, only under § 187(2)(b).
{34 Section 187(2)(6) requires al ofthe following tobe true: (1) the aplication ofthe law
‘of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental Montana policy; (2) Montana has @
‘materially greater interest than the chosen state; and (3) Montana law would apply pursuant
to § 188, which governs choice of law in the absence of an effective choice of law provision.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2X(b). Casarotto and § 187(2X(b) emt. g,
state that whether Montana law applies absent an effective choice of law by the parties
pursuant to § 188 constitutes a threshold issue, Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 375, 886 P.2d at
935. Section 188 does not provide a separate substantive basis, however, for resolving
choice of law issue. Section 188 instead requires us to analyze the question pursuant to the
principles stated in § 6. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 188.

85 Section 6 presents a two-part analysis. Section 6(1) provides that “[a] cour, subject to

 

 

constitutional restrictions, wil follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice oflaw.”
Section 6(2) provides seven principles relevant tothe choice of applicable law if there is no
such statutory directive, and § 188(2) provides factors to aid in that consideration.
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 188(2).
¥36 This Court has determined that before a court can apply the factored test at § 188(2)
and § 6(2), it must determine “'whether Montana law addressed the choice of law conceming
[the] policy pursuant to § 6(1)."" Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 MT 56,4 40, 341
‘Mont. 467, $40, 178 P.3d 102, 40 (quoting Mitchell, 18). Section 6(1) “requires a court

to first look to relevant state law when determining applicable aw.” Wamsley, $40 (quoting

2
Mitchell, § 21). Mitchell and Wamsley both determined that § 28-3-102, MCA, controls in
Montana when applying § 6(1) to an insurance contract Wamsley, § 40; Mitchell, § 19.

$37 _ Section 28-3-102, MCA, provides that “[a] contract i to be interpreted according to
the law and usage of the place where it isto be performed or, fit does not indicate a place of
performance, according to the law and usage of the place where itis made.” Wamsley and

‘Mitchell noted that “unless the terms of the insurance contract provide otherwise ... where

 

‘an insurance contract designates the place of performance to be any state where a claim
arises, performance occurs where the insured obtains judgment." Wamsley, $40 (quoting
Mitchell, 20.) Wamsley and Mitchell concluded that “it logically follows, thatthe place of|
performance is also the place where an insured is entitled to receive benefits, has incurred

accident related expenses, o is entitled to judgment.” Wamsley, 4 40 (quoting Michell,

 

120)
$88 The Court in Mitchell determined that Montana law should apply to an insurance
policy negotiated in California and owned by California residents pursuant to § 28-3-102,
MCA. Mitchell, $9 5-6, 19-20,23. The insurance policy provided coverage for every state
within the United States. Mitchell, 19. The Court determined that Montana constituted the
place of performance in light of several factors: Mitchell, the insured, worked and lived in
Montana at the time of the accident; the underinsured tortfeasors had insured his ear in
Montana; Mitchell incurred his medical expenses in Montana; Mitchell setled with the

‘underinsured tortfeasor’s insurance in Montana giving rise tothe underinsured motorist claim

B
in Montana; and the judgment was rendered and paid in Montana. Mitchell, $122.

{89 The Court in Wamsley determined pursuant to § 28-3-102, MCA, that Montana law

 

should apply to a North Dakota insurance policy owned by North Dakota residents who were
killed in a Montana car accident. Wamsley, $9 3, 41, 43. The insurance policy's UIM
coverage did not specify a place of performance, but it also did not limit the place of
performance. Wamsley, 443. The Court determined that Montana constituted the place of
‘performance in light of several factors: the accident occurred in Montana; the damages arose
in Montana; the insureds" estat filed the personal injury action in Montana; the tortfeasor
‘was a Montana resident; the estate obtained a judgment in Montana; and the insurer already
hhad paid the estate a portion of the UIM claim in Montana, Wamsley, § 44.

{40 Montana likewise constituted the place of performance under the contract between
Progressive and Tenas pursuant to § 28-3-102, MCA. Tenas’s Progressive policy did not
limit the place of performance, Tenes’s accident occurred in Montana. Tenas incurred her
‘medical expenses, giving rise to damages, in Montana, The uninsured tortfeasor resided in
Montana. Progressive paid the initial portion of Tenas’s claim in Montana. See Wamsley,
144; Mitchell, $22. Montana law would apply pursuant to § 188, which governs choice of
law in the absence of an effective choice of law. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§187(2\(b)..

41 We next must determine whether Montana has a materially greater interest than

‘Nevada, the chosen state. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(b). We determine

4
‘whether Montana has a materially greater interest than the chosen state by applying the
factored test at § 188(2): ““(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the
contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract,
and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business ofthe
parties."” Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp., 1998 MT 326, § 10, 292 Mont. 229, 10,
971 P.2d 1240, § 10 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(2)). We
evaluate these contacts according to the relative importance that they bear on the particular
issue. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(2)

$42 The Restatement's comments provide instruction regarding the weight that should be
accorded to each factor in determining whether Montana has @ materially greater interest in
an insurance policy pursuant to § 187(2)(b) and § 188(2). Modroo v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co, No. 07-0096, $f 60-62 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 emt.
«). Wereasoned in Modroo, based upon the comments tothe Restatement, hat several ofthe
factors listed at § 188(2) bear little significance to a state’s material interest in an insurance
contract, but gain importance based on their relationship tothe contract issue involved and all
the other contacts. Modroo, $9 59-61.

143 Application of the factors listed at § 188(2) reveals Nevada's materially greater
interest. First, Nevada constitutes the place of contracting as Tenas’s mother, the policy
holder, purchased the Progressive policy in Nevada. Place of negotiation does not factor

heavily in our analysis here because, to the extent that insurers negotiate with insureds, the

1s
 

resulting contracts are essentially “take-itor-leave-it" adhesion contracts. Modroo, § 61
Place of performance likewise weighs in Nevada's favor as Tenas and her mother, the policy
holder, were mere visitors t Montana, Modroo, $162. Montana's interest in an out of state
insurance contract weakens when applied toa non-resident visitor to the state. The location
of the subject matter factors little in our analysis of an insurance contract as the subject
‘matter of an insurance contract does not constitute a specific physical thing or localized risk.
Modroo, § 60.

{44 Finally, we address the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties, to determine whether Montana has 2 materially greater
interest than the chosen state in an insurance contract containing a choice of law provision.
Modroo, 4 59. Tenas, the insured, and her mother, the policy holder, both reside in Nevada.
‘The record indicates that Progressive is headquartered in Florida, but Tenas’s mother
purchased the Progressive policy through a Nevada insurance agent. According to these
factors, Nevada has a materially greater interest in the insurance contract between Tenas and
Progressive than Montana.

$45 We have determined, pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6, that
Montana statutory directive provides that Montana represented the place of performance

under Tenas’s insurance policy. 40. The § 188(2) a

 

lysis demonstrates, however, that
‘Nevada has @ materially greater interest than Montana in the insurance contract between

‘Tenas and Progressive. Tenas cannot defeat the policy's choice of Nevada law to govern

16
disputes under the three part analysis in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §

187(2)(b). We need not address the third and remaining part ofthe § 187(2)(b) analysis ~

 

“whether application of Nevada law would be contrary toa fundamental Montana policy — in
light ofthis conclusion. Modroo, 463.

$45 Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Tenas.

 

{47 The District Court improperly granted summary judgment to Tenas allowing her to
stack insurance coverages under Montana law as we have determined above that the District
Court improperly applied Montana law to this dispute. 445.

$48 Whether the District Court properly awarded attorney fees o Tenas.

$49 The District Court awarded attomey fees to Tenas based upon our rule in Mountain
West that “an insured is entitled to recover attomey fees ... when the insurer forces the
insured to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of the insurance

contract...” Mountain West, 36. The District Court improperly awarded attomey fees to

 

‘Tenas in light of our determination that the District Court erroneously granted summary
judgment to Tenas. § 47.

150 We affirm in part and reverse in part.

   

Tustice

‘We Concur:

Chief Tustice

a
 

Justices
Justice Jim Rice, concurring.

{51 Iconcur with the Court's reversal of the judgment under the second, third and
fourth issues. However, I also believe Progressive’s motion to dismiss should have been
‘granted as a matter of comity and that reversal for that reason is also warranted.

432 Progressive filed a declaratory judgment action in Nevada on May 30, 2006,
secking a determination of whether the policy at issue permits UM stacking. Tenas filed
hher complaint in Montana District Court for determination of the same issue on June 5,
2006, Not only did Progressive first file its action in a Nevada State Court, but there
exists a strong Nevada connection to this case in comparison to the de minimus Montana
connection. While comity is a “voluntary decision’ to defer to the policy of another
state, Simmons, 206 Mont. at 289, 670 P.2d at 1385, itis the conclusion that should have
been rendered herein.

433 I believe the District Court ignored the numerous factual ties to Nevada. Not only
are both Tenas and her mother, Bames (the named insured), Nevada residents, the
insurance policy was contracted for and entered into in Nevada. ‘The vehicles covered by
the policy are registered to Barnes in Nevada, were not involved in the accident spurring
this litigation, and remain located in Nevada, Additionally, the insurance contract

includes a choice of law provision requiring application of Nevada law. The only

 

connection to Montana is that Tenas was injured in Montana while riding as @ passenger
ina vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist. In fact, the only Montanans affected by the

Court's decision today are the local Montana lawyers.
$54 The strong Nevada bond with this case combined with priority jurisdiction
presents an appropriate situation whereby we should defer to Nevada’s judgment. Failure

jster state and

 

to do so in these situations will only strain the relationship with our
potentially jeopardize the rights of Montanans who may be placed in a similar situation in
Nevada. ‘The refusal to recognize comity in this case does little more than impinge on
‘Nevada policy and disrupts the harmonious interstate relations which we should seek to
preserve as necessary to the operation of cooperative federalism. See Simmons, 206

‘Mont. at 289, 670 P.2d at 1385.

Chief Justice Karla M. Gray and Jus
Jim Rice.

  

20
Justice Patricia O. Cotter concurs.
{55 I concur in the result reached in this case, as 1 believe the analysis in which the
Court engages comports with that applied in Modroo, I write separately to reassert my
concems—expressed in my dissent in Modroo—that the somewhat rote approach utilized
in these cases fails to take into account the important legal principles and interests that
‘Montana might have in applying its own law to a dispute before it, notwithstanding the
parties’ expectations. However, as Modroo is now the law of the land, and the Court

reaches the correct result thereunder, I concur.

 

Justice James C. Nelson joins in the Concurrence of Justice Patricia O. Cotter.

E—

fustice

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