Case Title: Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4556

Docket Number: 20041425

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins, 106 Ohio St.3d 200, 2005-Ohio-
4556.] 
 
 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, APPELLEE, 
v. WILKINS; COLUMBUS STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins,  
106 Ohio St.3d 200, 2005-Ohio-4556.] 
Trusts — Application for exemption from real-property taxation. 
(No. 2004-1425 — Submitted June 15, 2005 — Decided September 14, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2002-V-1301. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Karl Greene and Gary Grube each owned an undivided one-half 
interest in a parcel of real estate known as the Bridgeview Golf Course in the city 
of Columbus.  By separate instruments, Greene and Grube each conveyed their 
interests in the property to separate irrevocable charitable-remainder annuity 
trusts (“CRAT”).  A CRAT is an irrevocable trust that provides the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries with a fixed yearly payment from the principal of the trust.  Both 
Greene and Grube appointed Columbus State Community College District 
(“Columbus State”) as the trustee of their CRATs. 
{¶ 2} The terms of the Greene and Grube CRATs provide that the 
trustee, Columbus State, is to pay an annuity of $130,000 to each beneficiary 
(Greene and Grube) for his life, and to the wife of each beneficiary for her life, if 
she survives her husband.  Upon the death of the last living beneficiary of each 
CRAT, the trustee is to distribute the remaining principal and income of the 
CRAT to the remainderman, Columbus State. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} As the trustee of each CRAT, Columbus State leases the golf 
course property to a corporation owned by Columbus State for a fixed monthly 
payment. 
{¶ 4} Columbus State filed an application with the Tax Commissioner to 
exempt the golf course property from real-property taxation.  Over an objection 
filed by the Board of Education of the Columbus City School District (“BOE”), 
the Tax Commissioner granted Columbus State an exemption for the property.  
The BOE filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  The 
BTA reversed the Tax Commissioner and denied the application, finding that 
under R.C. 3354.15, Columbus State was not the owner of the property, had not 
“acquired” the property, and did not use the property for purposes of the 
exemption in that statute. 
{¶ 5} The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 6} Columbus State claims that the golf course property is exempt 
under R.C. 3354.15, which provides: 
{¶ 7} “A community college district shall not be required to pay any 
taxes or assessments upon any real or personal property acquired, owned, or used 
by it pursuant to provisions of sections 3354.01 to 3354.18 inclusive, of the 
Revised Code, or upon the income therefrom, and the bonds issued pursuant to 
provisions of such sections and the transfer of the income therefrom, including 
any profits made on the sale thereof, shall at all times be free from taxation within 
the state.” 
{¶ 8} R.C. 3354.15 is not self-executing and does not specify the 
procedure by which a community college is to apply for real-property tax 
exemption.  However, R.C. 5713.08 provides that no additions shall be made to 
an auditor’s exempt list “without the consent of the tax commissioner as is 
provided for in section 5715.27 of the Revised Code.”  In Gahanna-Jefferson 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 233, 754 
January Term, 2005 
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N.E.2d 789, we observed that “R.C. 5715.27 is a general statute relating to the 
granting and revoking of exemptions from real property taxes.”  Thus, unless 
there is a statute specifying an alternative method of applying for and obtaining an 
exemption from real-property taxation, an application for tax exemption must 
comply with R.C. 5715.27. 
{¶ 9} A threshold question when considering an application for 
exemption filed under R.C. 5715.27 is whether the applicant has standing.  In a 
case involving another application for real-property tax exemption, Performing 
Arts School of Metro. Toledo, Inc v. Wilkins, 104 Ohio St.3d 284, 2004-Ohio-
6389, 819 N.E.2d 649, the application for real-property exemption was filed by 
the lessee.  In Performing Arts, the court stated, “In administrative appeals such as 
this, ‘parties must meet strict standing requirements in order to satisfy the 
threshold requirement for the administrative tribunal to obtain jurisdiction.’  State 
ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002, fn. 
4.”  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 10} The requirements for filing an application for real-property tax 
exemption are found in R.C. 5715.27(A), which provides that “the owner of any 
property may file an application with the tax commissioner, on forms prescribed 
by the commissioner, requesting that such property be exempted from taxation * * 
*.”  (Emphasis added.)  In Performing Arts, we found that the word “owner” as 
used in R.C. 5715.27 “refers only to a legal title holder of the real property for 
which a tax exemption is sought.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 11} Although the applicant for tax exemption in Performing Arts was a 
lessee of the property for which exemption was sought, the rationale for our 
decision in that case applies to the facts before us.  In Goralsky v. Taylor (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 197, 198, 571 N.E.2d 720, we stated, “In a trust, the trustee (and 
not the beneficiary) holds legal title to the trust corpus.”  Deeds for the property in 
question granted title to “Columbus State Community College District, Trustee.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(Emphasis added.)  Adoption of the taxpayer’s argument here would require us to 
disregard well-established trust law. 
{¶ 12} The holder of the legal title and the owner of the property for the 
purpose of filing an application for exemption under R.C. 5715.27 is “Columbus 
State Community College District, Trustee.”  The applicant filing the application 
for exemption in this case, “Columbus State Community College District,” was 
not the owner of the property and therefore lacked standing to petition the Tax 
Commissioner for exemption under R.C. 5715.27.  As a result, neither the Tax 
Commissioner nor the BTA had jurisdiction to consider the application. 
{¶ 13} We therefore hold that the BTA should not have decided the merits 
of the application for exemption filed by Columbus State Community College 
District, and we vacate its decision and that of the Tax Commissioner. 
Decision vacated. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Carlile, Patchen & Murphy, L.L.P., Michael H. Igoe, Robert B. Barnett Jr., 
and R. Brian Newcomb, special counsel for Jim Petro, Attorney General, for 
appellant. 
 
Rich, Crites & Dittmer and Jeffrey A. Rich, for appellee. 
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