Case Title: People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84452

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
People ex rel. Birkett v. Chicago, No. 84452 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84452-Agenda 25-May 1998.
Opinion filed December 17, 1998.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal, we are asked to recognize a "deliberative process privilege" 
to protect certain advice and discussions between government officials 
concerning formulation of governmental decisions and policy. For the reasons 
that follow, we hold that the adoption of a privilege as broad-based as that 
sought in this case is best left to the legislature.
BACKGROUND
Defendant, the City of Chicago (City), brought this appeal from a trial court 
order holding it in contempt for refusing to produce certain documents sought by 
plaintiffs, Du Page County, the Du Page County State's Attorney, and 
the municipalities of Bensenville, Elmhurst and Wood Dale, during the course of 
underlying litigation. In the underlying suit, plaintiffs requested declaratory 
and injunctive relief, alleging as follows. Plaintiffs are located in close 
proximity to O'Hare International Airport, which is owned and operated by the 
City, and have suffered ongoing severe noise, air pollution and safety concerns 
resulting from incoming and outgoing flights. Plaintiffs charged that the City 
had completed extensive construction to O'Hare, without obtaining a certificate 
of approval from the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) as required 
under the Illinois Aeronautics Act (Act) (620 ILCS 5/47 (West 1994)). In 
addition, the City had plans to proceed with even larger new expansion and 
alteration projects, all without procuring the required certificate from IDOT. 
According to plaintiffs, the City was deliberately embarking on a scheme of 
incremental construction ventures, with the purpose of greatly expanding airport 
capacity while circumventing IDOT approval as required under the Act. Thus, the 
complaint requested that the City's prior construction be declared in violation 
of the Act and that its current expansion be halted unless it procured the 
required certificate of approval.
On February 2, 1996, plaintiffs served the City with a request to produce, in 
relevant part, all documents concerning applications for certificates of 
approval under the Act; documents relating to construction projects for O'Hare 
since 1970; all documents concerning plans or discussions regarding alterations 
to increase O'Hare's capacity, or concerning past, present, or proposed "airport 
layout plans" for the airport. The City objected to the request asserting, 
inter alia, that the documents were irrelevant to the present 
litigation and were immune from discovery under the "deliberative process 
privilege." Plaintiffs moved to compel production of the documents, arguing that 
the City had failed to properly assert the privilege by submitting a privilege 
log or by identifying the documents supposedly covered by the privilege.
In its response to plaintiffs' motion to compel, the City agreed to produce 
"all requested documents relating to past and current construction projects at 
O'Hare," including documents relating to projects approved for the future. 
However, the City declined to produce documents relating to "discussions," 
"plans" or "forecasts" concerning future projects as yet unapproved, claiming 
that such documents were covered under the deliberative process privilege. The 
City also refused to release the privileged documents under a protective order, 
arguing that such an order would hinder the ability of City officials to engage 
in deliberations free of outside intrusions. The City's response to the motion 
to compel was supported by several exhibits, including the affidavit of Renee C. 
Benjamin, deputy commissioner for policy and procedure for Chicago's department 
of aviation (hereinafter department). In the affidavit, Benjamin attested to the 
confidentiality of the documents alleged to be privileged. The City subsequently 
filed a supplemental affidavit of Kitty Freidheim, deputy commissioner for 
planning for the department.
After a hearing on May 20, 1996, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion 
and compelled the immediate production of the requested documents. The court 
rejected a subsequent motion by the City for clarification and reconsideration 
of this ruling, and entered an order stating that the privilege was not valid in 
Illinois and that the City must produce all documents withheld under the claim 
of privilege. The court also gave the City leave to submit logs accompanying the 
allegedly privileged documents, and stated that the court would keep these 
documents under seal.
Shortly thereafter, the court entered a protective order encompassing all of 
the allegedly confidential documents and restricting plaintiffs' use and 
disclosure of these documents. Nonetheless, the City informed the court that it 
intended to withhold the documents from plaintiffs until the appellate court 
could rule on its privilege claim.
On November 4, 1996, after again having ordered that the documents be 
released to plaintiffs subject to the protective order, the court granted a 
motion by the City to be held in contempt in order to properly appeal the 
rejection of its claim of deliberative process privilege. The court also entered 
an "access order" granting plaintiffs' counsel in camera access to the 
documents filed under seal. The access order provided that enforcement would be 
stayed to allow the City time to appeal.
On appeal, the appellate court initially stayed the access order. It then, 
inter alia, affirmed the court's refusal to recognize the 
deliberative process privilege, finding that creation of the privilege was best 
left to the legislature. The court further rejected the argument that protection 
of deliberative documents was in the public interest. 292 Ill. App. 3d 745. We 
granted leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)), and now affirm the decision of 
the appellate court rejecting the deliberative process privilege.(1)
ANALYSIS
Defendant urges that we adopt a common law deliberative process privilege to 
exempt from discovery "confidential advice given to those involved in making 
[decisions and] policy for state and local government." Within this realm, 
defendant seeks protection of all confidential documents prepared in connection 
with yet unapproved plans to alter or expand the airport.
Widely recognized in the federal courts, the deliberative process privilege 
protects certain classes of intra-agency communications offered in the course of 
governmental decisionmaking. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. 
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958); see also United States 
v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993). Some courts have defined the 
privilege to encompass:
"intra-governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations 
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions 
and policies are formulated." Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, 
Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967).(2) 

Excluded from the privilege are any factual aspects of predecisional 
communications, and communications made subsequent to the agency's final 
decision. Farley, 11 F.3d  at 1389, citing National Labor Relations 
Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 152, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29, 48, 
95 S. Ct. 1504, 1517 (1975). In addition, the privilege is qualified in that a 
litigant may obtain access to privileged communications upon a showing of 
particularized need. See Sears, 421 U.S.  at 149 n.16, 44 L. Ed. 2d  at 
46 n.16, 95 S. Ct.  at 1516 n.16. The City urges that we create a privilege based 
upon this definition.
The primary rationale for the privilege is to ensure the frank exchange of 
advice and opinions in the course of governmental decisionmaking and 
policymaking. Zeiss, 40 F.R.D.  at 324; see also Kaiser, 157 F. Supp.  at 946. Courts adhering to the privilege believe that exposing certain 
types of predecisional communications to public scrutiny and possible reprisals 
would produce a "chilling effect" on the candor of government staff, 
jeopardizing the decisionmaking process. See Farley, 11 F.3d  at 1389, 
quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 
1062, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3106 (1974). Thus, the privilege serves the dual aim of 
fostering effective and efficient government decisionmaking, and in the process, 
advancing the public interest.
Nonetheless, privileges are strongly disfavored because they operate to 
"exclude relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of 
legal proceedings." People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1983); see 
also Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board v. Homer Community 
Consolidated School District No. 208, 132 Ill. 2d 29, 34 (1989), citing 
Nixon, 418 U.S.  at 709-10, 41 L. Ed. 2d  at 1065, 94 S. Ct.  at 3108. 
Further, it is believed that governmental privileges, if created and applied 
indiscriminately, will undermine public trust "in the integrity of the 
government and its commitment to serving the public interest." G. Wetlaufer, 
Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 
65 Ind. L.J. 845, 890 (1990); see also Nixon, 418 U.S.  at 709, 41 L. Ed. 2d  at 1064, 94 S. Ct.  at 3108. As such, courts will not create or apply any 
evidentiary privilege unless it " `promotes sufficiently important 
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.' " University of 
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 107 L. Ed. 2d 571, 582, 110 S. Ct. 577, 582 (1990), quoting Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186, 195, 100 S. Ct. 906, 912 (1980); 
see also Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 34; People ex rel. Noren v. 
Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288 (1957). For these reasons, this court has 
repeatedly concluded that the extension of an existing privilege or 
establishment of a new one is a matter best deferred to the legislature. 
Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 34; Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d  at 269 
(recognizing that great majority of privileges recognized in Illinois are 
statutory creations).
The City advances two bases of support for our adoption of the deliberative 
process privilege: namely (1) the recognition of the privilege in the federal 
courts; and more importantly (2) the existence of an exemption under Illinois' 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 
1994)) covering "predecisional" governmental communications. We address the 
contention regarding the FOIA first.
The purpose of the FOIA is to ensure the access of the general public to the 
records of public bodies, subject only to certain explicit exemptions. 5 ILCS 
140/3(a) (West 1994); Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 36-37. In particular, 
section 7(1)(f) provides an exemption for "[p]reliminary drafts, notes, 
recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or 
policies or actions are formulated." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 1994). The City 
asserts that this exemption manifests the legislature's intent to create a 
deliberative process privilege applicable to parties in litigation. We 
disagree.
The existence of an FOIA exemption for predecisional materials is evidence of 
a public policy favoring the confidentiality of such communications. However, it 
is not dispositive of whether the legislature sought to create an analogous 
evidentiary privilege. Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 37; In re Marriage of 
Daniels, 240 Ill. App. 3d 314, 326-37 (1992). The FOIA was intended to 
further the citizens' general desire or need to know about the affairs of 
government, thus enhancing public discourse and governmental accountability. 5 
ILCS 140/1 (West 1994); Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 
738 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing the federal FOIA). However, the 
concerns underlying this purpose often differ greatly from those of a party in 
litigation who needs governmental information in order to establish his case. 
See Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 394 n.24 (D. Del. 
1977). For example, while a citizen may procure nonexempt information out of 
little more than personal curiosity, a litigant must make a threshold showing of 
the relevancy of such information before obtaining it in discovery. Further, 
there are safeguards inherent in the discovery process, such as the use of 
protective orders, which serve to shield the government's interest in 
maintaining confidentiality. See Friedman, 738 F.2d  at 1344. 
Recognizing these principles, courts considering this question under the federal 
FOIA have held it unsound to equate FOIA exemptions to similar discovery 
privileges. Friedman, 738 F.2d  at 1344; Association for Women in 
Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (existence of FOIA 
exemption neither creates new privileges nor effects existing ones). The 
drafters of the Illinois FOIA also acknowledged a distinction, observing that 
the FOIA was "more in the *** interest of citizen involvement in public records" 
and that "litigation, depositions, request for documentation" were all "far 
beyond the range" of the bill. 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 27, 
1983, at 130-31 (statements of Senator Bruce); Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Board v. Homer Community Consolidated School District No. 208, 
160 Ill. App. 3d 730, 736 (1987), aff'd, 132 Ill. 2d 29 (1989) (in 
enacting the FOIA, legislature was balancing need of public to be informed 
against need for confidentiality, but was not balancing needs of litigants 
against such need).
We find these principles especially applicable under the circumstances at 
bar, where the government is a party to the litigation and, more importantly, 
has been charged with malfeasance. In such circumstances, it is unjust to afford 
the government the benefit of withholding relevant evidence while requiring its 
opponent to adhere to the established rules of open discovery. In this case, 
plaintiffs have raised a colorable claim that the City engaged in a purposeful 
and covert scheme to circumvent the requirements of a statute. As observed by 
amici, this case, like other state actions, such as an alleged breach 
of contract or certain tort claims, could well turn more upon a showing of the 
government's intent or motives in taking a particular action, 
rather upon than the fact of the final action itself. See, e.g., 
Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 179 (1989) 
(ultimate inquiry is whether employer intentionally discriminated against 
plaintiff). The adoption of a privilege shielding predecisional opinions and 
recommendations, cast in such broad terms as that espoused by the City here, 
would undoubtedly operate to hinder the fact-finding process in many of these 
cases. We do not believe that our General Assembly intended such a result in the 
creation of FOIA exemption 7(1)(f).
The City also argues that the policies underlying the federal courts' 
recognition of the privilege militate in favor of its adoption in this court. As 
with many federal courts adhering to the deliberative process privilege, the 
City's affidavits and brief repeatedly parrot the rationale for the executive 
privilege as initially stated in Nixon:
"Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their 
remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own 
interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." Nixon, 418 U.S.  at 705, 41 L. Ed. 2d  at 1062, 94 S. Ct.  at 3106.
See also Sears, 421 U.S.  at 150-51, 44 L. Ed. 2d  at 47, 95 S. Ct.  at 
1516; Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119, 132, 93 S. Ct. 827, 836 (1973). Freidheim's affidavit states 
that:
"[t]he safety of hundreds of thousands of air travelers at O'Hare each year 
depends upon the integrity of the Department's planning process, and the ability 
of its participants to raise questions and concerns about planning alternatives, 
simulations, or models without fear that the opinions they express during 
pre-decisional deliberations will later be disclosed and subject to public 
scrutiny."
One need only review the cases upon which the City repeatedly relies, 
however, to see stark distinctions from the case at bar. For example, to the 
extent Sears and Mink provide persuasive authority for the 
need for a governmental privilege, it is for a narrowly tailored one, protecting 
communications given directly to high-level government officials, containing 
advice bearing heavily on the final decision or policy. See Sears, 421 U.S. 132, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29, 95 S. Ct. 1504 ("advice and appeals memoranda" 
prepared for National Labor Relations Board by its general counsel advising 
whether or not to file unfair labor practice complaints); Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119, 93 S. Ct. 827 (documents by advisors to President 
containing recommendations over upcoming underground nuclear test). See also 
Kaiser, 157 F. Supp.  at 942 (executive privilege asserted, on grounds 
of "national interest," over document containing advice to the General Services 
Administrator concerning the sale of war asset). The Nixon case 
involved the President's claim of privilege over his confidential conversations 
with "close advisors." The Court recognized the "plain" and "valid need for 
protection of communications between high Government officials and those who 
advise and assist them in *** their manifold duties." Nixon, 418 U.S. 
at 705, 41 L. Ed. 2d  at 1062, 94 S. Ct.  at 3106. In addition, it is significant 
that the executive privilege applied in Nixon was rooted not only in 
national interests, but also in the separation of powers doctrine. See also 
Hamilton, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (analogous privilege found for 
governor); University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S.  at 195, 107 L. Ed. 2d  
at 585, 110 S. Ct.  at 585. The City does not claim any such basis for the 
privilege asserted in this case.
These cases provide no real support for the adoption of the deliberative 
process privilege proposed here. Although the privilege may be applied on a 
qualified basis, its scope is unreasonably broad. The City appears to claim a 
privilege over all "deliberative" communications regarding any proposed 
expansion or alteration to the airport or airport layout plan, no matter how 
trivial or routine. Further, the City does not restrict the privilege based upon 
the importance or relevance of the particular communication to the decision or 
decisions, or to the level of the official either compiling or relying upon the 
communication.
As such, although the City professes to a need to ensure the safety of O'Hare 
passengers and the integrity of the decisionmaking process, its claim of the 
future "chilling" of these communications amounts to nothing more than 
speculation. Cf., Farley, 11 F.3d  at 1389, citing Coastal 
States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). Assuming, arguendo, that certain types of state governmental 
decisions call for advice or opinions that would be controversial or unpopular, 
the City provides no real evidence that governmental officials would withhold 
giving advice they believe is necessary and correct, based merely upon the 
remote possibility that it could some day be produced in litigation. Indeed, the 
City does not claim that the decisionmaking process has been harmed thus far 
despite the absence of such a privilege in this state. Babets v. Secretary 
of the Executive Office of Human Services, 403 Mass. 230, 238, 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (1988). We conclude that in light of the range of competing policies 
underlying the deliberative process privilege, its adoption should be left to 
the General Assembly.
The City also contends that the confidentiality test established by Dean 
Wigmore (see 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) 
and most recently applied by this court in Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 35, 
supports the recognition of a privilege protecting the communications in this 
case. We disagree. Recognizing that the creation of a new privilege is 
presumptively a legislative task, Homer allows for a court's 
recognition of an evidentiary privilege, in "rare instances," where each of the 
following conditions are met: (1) the communications originated in a 
confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) this element of 
confidentiality is essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance 
of the relation between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which 
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and 
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure would be 
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation. Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 35; In re October 1985 Grand Jury 
No. 746, 124 Ill. 2d 466, 475 (1988). The burden of establishing the 
privilege rests with the party claiming exemption under it. Homer, 132 Ill. 2d  at 35. Furthermore, the mere assertion that the matter at issue is 
"confidential" and "privileged" will not suffice. Rather, the proponent of the 
privilege must set forth with particularity circumstances giving rise to the 
privilege in each particular case. Cox v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ill. 2d 416, 419-20 (1975); Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 
42 (1956); cf., Douglas v. Windham Superior Court, 157 Vt. 34, 
43-45, 597 A.2d 774, 780 (1991), citing King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988).
We dispose of this issue based upon the City's failure to establish the first 
element of the test. Under this prong, the City contends it had a "general 
expectation of confidentiality" derived once again from two sources: the 
long-standing recognition of a deliberative process privilege under federal law, 
and the existence of FOIA exemption 7(1)(f). The City's argument is misplaced, 
however, because neither of these sources conclusively establishes the existence 
of a deliberative process litigation privilege in this state. Of course, it is 
beyond question that the federal courts' recognition of a privilege does not 
justify the City's assumption of that same privilege in this court. Further, as 
stated above, FOIA exemption 7(1)(f) does not demonstrate a legislative intent 
to adopt the privilege, as there are great differences between the concerns of 
the FOIA and those underlying this privilege. Accordingly, the City has failed 
to demonstrate that the communications at issue originated in confidentiality 
under Homer. Thus, this argument fails.
In light of our decision on this issue, we do not reach the City's argument 
concerning the alleged error in the trial court's access order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court rejecting the 
deliberative process privilege in this case is affirmed.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting:
I hasten to add my vigorous dissent to the majority opinion which refuses to 
recognize a deliberative process privilege.
The Burnham Plan of 1909, sponsored by The Commercial Club of 
Chicago, is regarded as the model for regional planning which turns visions into 
reality. "Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men's blood and 
probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans; aim high in hope and 
work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once recorded will never die, 
but long after we are gone will be a living thing, asserting itself with 
ever-growing insistency. Remember that our sons and grandsons are going to do 
things that would stagger us. Let your watchword be order and your beacon 
beauty[,]" proclaimed Daniel H. Burnham about this historic event. 
Respectfully Quoted, A Dictionary of Quotations Requested from the 
Congressional Research Service 256 (S. Platt ed., 1989).
As we embark into the new millennium, The Commercial Club of Chicago released 
a sequel to the 1909 Burnham Plan for the Metropolitan Chicago area. "The Plan 
of 1999 focuses principally on an area of 3,749 square miles of real estate 
covering six counties and supporting about 7.7 million people and 4.1 million 
jobs. The six counties are Cook, Du Page, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will." 
Chicago Metropolis 2020, The Commercial Club of Chicago, at 1 n.1 
(October 30, 1998).
By refusing to recognize a deliberative process privilege, the majority has 
unwittingly driven a stake through the heart of executive creativity which 
emerges from the deliberative process. "And today, as in the past, we must ask 
ourselves what are the strengths on which we must build, what are the new 
opportunities that we must exploit, and what are the serious obstacles that we 
must overcome. Only as we answer these questions and turn those answers into 
actionable programs will we prove worthy of our heritage and approximate the 
economic and social goals to which we aspire." Chicago Metropolis 2020, 
The Commercial Club of Chicago, at 5 (October 30, 1998).
The executive branch, from the Governor of our state to the lowest rank of 
executive in government, should not be inhibited by the shackles with which the 
majority seeks to bind them.
The deliberative process privilege protects from discovery predecisional 
documents that reflect opinions, recommendations and deliberations generated in 
the course of the decisionmaking process of a governmental agency. See 
National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
421 U.S. 132, 150, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 1516 (1975); United 
States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993). The privilege has 
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals and other federal and state courts. See Sears, 421 U.S. 132, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29, 95 S. Ct. 1504; Farley, 11 F.3d 1385 (7th Cir. 1993); 
First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Ostoin v. Waterford Township Police Department, 189 Mich. App. 334, 471 N.W.2d 666 (1991); Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial 
District, 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986); Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 
544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980). This court should likewise recognize the deliberative 
process privilege.
The need to recognize a deliberative process privilege is readily apparent. 
The realities of governmental decisionmaking create a need for preserving the 
confidentiality of intragovernmental documents reflecting the mental processes 
of decisionmakers. Good government requires sound decisionmaking. Sound 
decisionmaking depends on research, planning, and the consideration of the full 
array of contrasting views on a particular subject. Those responsible for 
providing assessments or detailing the potential pitfalls of policy options 
necessarily depend on an expectation of confidentiality, if their advice is to 
be candid and uninhibited. In my view, it is of paramount importance that 
government officials be able to engage in open and candid discussions without a 
concern for appearances. Such an atmosphere is conducive to good quality 
governmental decisions and policies, which result from unvarnished advice. 
Policymakers should not have to fear that every warning or dissent received from 
staff members could one day become public, and staff members should be free to 
dissent from recommendations without fear that their dissent will become public. 
The consequence of not recognizing the deliberative process privilege could be 
severe. The ability to obtain routine disclosure of predecisional deliberative 
documents would enable opponents of government action to embarrass government 
decisionmakers with their own unpolished thoughts.
It is important to emphasize that the privilege is not absolute. Rather, it 
is a qualified privilege because it can be overcome if the party seeking 
discovery shows a sufficient need for the privileged documents. In showing a 
sufficient need, the party must establish that the documents are relevant, and 
that the party has a particularized need for the documents which outweighs the 
government's interest in maintaining confidentiality. See Farley, 11 F.3d  at 1389-90. The privilege attempts to accommodate the competing interests 
of a just resolution in legal disputes with the need to protect certain 
confidential government documents. In light of its qualified nature, the 
privilege will not interfere with the truthseeking function of legal proceedings 
since a government entity will not be able to hide relevant and necessary 
documents.
In addition to the realities of government decisionmaking, section 7(1)(f) of 
the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 1994)), which 
exempts predecisional governmental materials from disclosure to the public, 
supports recognition of the deliberative process privilege in the context of 
litigation. Although the exemption in section 7(1)(f) involves disclosure to the 
public in general and not in response to discovery in litigation, it 
nevertheless evinces a general public policy of protecting predecisional 
governmental deliberative materials from disclosure.
The context of this case further underscores the need for recognition of the 
deliberative process privilege. This case centers around a political fight 
between the plaintiffs, which are municipalities located in close proximity to 
O'Hare International Airport, and the City of Chicago, which owns and operates 
O'Hare, concerning the possible expansion of O'Hare. According to the Chicago 
Metropolis 2020 report, O'Hare is presently unable to accommodate the 
ever-growing demand on its facilities, and the loss of operations will have 
significant adverse economic repercussions for the region. Chicago 
Metropolis 2020, The Commercial Club of Chicago, at 40 (October 30, 1998). 
The report recommends expanding capacity at O'Hare to maintain the region's 
preeminence as a domestic air transportation hub and to build on its potential 
as an international gateway. Chicago Metropolis 2020, The Commercial 
Club of Chicago, at 89 (October 30, 1998). Likewise, a study commissioned by the 
Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce warns of a $10 billion annual loss to the 
region's economy, with $7 to $8 billion being borne by the O'Hare vicinity 
suburbs, if capacity is not dramatically increased at O'Hare to meet demand. 
Chicago Aviation Policy, Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce, at 2 
(November 12, 1998). The heart of the dispute in this case concerns the 
plaintiffs' opposition to any such expansion at O'Hare. The plaintiffs contend 
that the City has plans to proceed with future expansion of O'Hare without 
obtaining the required certificate of approval from the Illinois Department of 
Transportation. The plaintiffs seek to use the documents at issue in their 
attempt to halt any future expansion plans at O'Hare. This strategy is evident 
given the nature of the documents.
The types of documents sought by the plaintiffs should be protected from 
disclosure. The affidavits in the record reveal the planning process from which 
these documents were generated. According to affidavits submitted by various 
deputy commissioners of the City's department of aviation, the documents 
requested by the plaintiffs reflect preliminary and predecisional planning 
deliberations concerning development options and alternatives at O'Hare. 
Included in these deliberations are opinions expressed during meetings and 
recommendations by City personnel and hired consultants. The affidavits further 
state that the documents contain confidential advice given to municipal 
policymakers evaluating policy options. Such planning documents go to the heart 
of the City officials' ability to engage in open and honest discussions relating 
to future planning. I believe that these officials should be able to discuss all 
pertinent policy options without fear that their candid assessments of each 
option's strengths and weaknesses will be disclosed to the airport's opponents. 
The affidavits of the deputy commissioners establish the importance of 
protecting these airport planning deliberations from disclosure in order to 
maintain the candid evaluation of proposals within that process. I would 
therefore hold that any documents relating to opinions, discussions, forecasts, 
recommendations and other predecisional matters concerning O'Hare and arising in 
the course of government decisionmaking are protected by the deliberative 
process privilege.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgments of the appellate and 
circuit courts and recognize a deliberative process privilege. I would also 
remand to the circuit court and direct it to conduct an in camera 
review of the City's documents filed under seal to determine which documents are 
covered by this privilege and to determine whether the plaintiffs have shown a 
particularized need for any privileged documents.
Footnotes:
1. The Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and the 
Illinois chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union have filed briefs as 
amici curiae in opposition to the privilege.
2. It appears that the term "deliberative process 
privilege" has come to be recognized by some courts as interchangeable with the 
terms "executive privilege," or "governmental," "official information" or 
"intragovernmental opinion" privilege. See, e.g., Bobkoski v. Board 
of Education of Cary Consolidated School District 26, 141 F.R.D. 88, 91 
(N.D. Ill. 1992); see also Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 553 n.3, 
414 A.2d 914, 920 n.3, citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §§106, 107, at 
229-31 (2d ed. 1972). The accuracy of such fluid classification is questionable. 
For purposes of this opinion, we refer to the asserted privilege as the 
deliberative process privilege, and pass solely upon that privilege as defined 
in this case.