Case Title: State v. Anderson

Citation: 2014-Ohio-542

Docket Number: 2012-1834

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Anderson, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-542.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-542 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ANDERSON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Anderson, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-542.] 
Appellate procedure—Final orders—Denial of motion to dismiss for double 
jeopardy is a final, appealable order—R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). 
(No. 2012-1834—Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided February 19, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, 
No. 11 MA 43, 2012-Ohio-4390. 
_____________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In early June 2003, Amber Zurcher was found dead in her home by 
her mother.  Two months later, appellee, Christopher Anderson, was arrested and 
charged with Zurcher’s murder. 
{¶ 2} Anderson has now been subjected to five trials in seven years.  He 
has been incarcerated for more than a decade, but he has never been lawfully 
convicted. 
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{¶ 3} When the state attempted to prosecute Anderson for the sixth time, 
he moved to dismiss the indictment against him.  In so doing, he argued that the 
prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the 
United States Constitution. 
{¶ 4} Our task today is not to determine whether Anderson is guilty of 
the murder, or even whether he can be forced to stand trial for a sixth time.  
Rather, we answer a narrower question:  Was the trial court’s order denying 
Anderson’s motion to dismiss the indictment a final, appealable order that the 
appellate court had jurisdiction to review?  We conclude that it was. 
{¶ 5} Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s decision denying the 
state’s motion to dismiss Anderson’s appeal, and we remand the cause to the court 
of appeals to address Anderson’s appeal on its merits. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 6} Because the question before us is a question of law, it is not 
necessary to extensively detail the facts.  For our limited purposes here, we 
summarize the state’s evidence against Anderson and the procedural path that 
brought this appeal before us as they have been described by the appellate court’s 
prior decisions. 
The Murder 
{¶ 7} Facts surrounding the murder and the first two trials are set forth 
here as stated in the appellate court’s opinion in the appeal from the second trial.  
7th Dist. Mahoning App. No. 03 MA 252, 2006-Ohio-4618.  On June 2, 2002, 
Zurcher went to Chipper’s Bar in Youngstown.  There, she met several friends, 
including Sandy Shingleton and John Orosz. 
{¶ 8} After the bar closed, Zurcher and her friends went to Zurcher’s 
apartment in Austintown, where they continued to drink.  By 3:50 A.M., only 
Anderson, Orosz, and Shingleton remained in Zurcher’s apartment.  When they 
left, Zurcher was clothed.  Orosz locked Zurcher’s door from the inside, shut the 
January Term, 2014 
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door, and checked to make sure it was locked.  Anderson then drove Orosz and 
Shingleton to Orosz’s pizzeria, where he dropped them off and then departed. 
{¶ 9} A few hours later, Zurcher’s mother, Diane Whiteman, grew 
concerned because Zurcher had not come to retrieve her son from Whiteman as 
they had planned.  After Zurcher did not answer or respond to Whiteman’s 
repeated phone calls, Whiteman went to Zurcher’s apartment building and 
secured a key to Zurcher’s apartment from the building manager. 
{¶ 10} When Whiteman entered the apartment, she found Zurcher’s 
naked, dead body on the floor near the door.  There were no signs of forced entry 
into the apartment and no indication that Zurcher had been robbed. 
{¶ 11} A deputy coroner determined that Zurcher had died around 4:00 
A.M. due to asphyxiation by strangulation.  Ligature marks around Zurcher’s 
neck were consistent with the conclusion that Zurcher had been strangled by cord 
or wire, but neither was recovered from the scene. 
{¶ 12} Near the time of her death, Zurcher had also sustained a deep scalp 
contusion and multiple bruises to her body.  A contusion on her left breast 
appeared to be a “love bite,” or “hickey.”  The DNA sample taken from that site 
was consistent with Anderson’s DNA profile.  Zurcher’s fingernail scrapings 
contained a mixture of DNA profiles consistent with the DNA of Anderson, 
Zurcher’s son, and a third person.  Foreign DNA was not found in Zurcher’s oral, 
vaginal, or rectal cavities. 
{¶ 13} Zurcher was buried on June 6, 2002.  That day, Zurcher’s friends 
gathered again at Chipper’s Bar.  Anderson arrived, wearing a jacket with long 
sleeves.  When he removed it, witnesses noticed that he had scratches on his hand 
and arms that had not been present three days earlier. 
The Trials and Appeals 
{¶ 14} The first trial in this case began May 27, 2003.  On the day of trial, 
Anderson successfully moved in limine under Evid.R. 404 to preclude the state 
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from introducing evidence of prior bad acts through testimony from Donna 
Dripps.  The state intended to have Dripps testify that prior to Zurcher’s death, 
Anderson had choked Dripps and bitten one of her breasts. 
{¶ 15} Although Anderson’s motion was granted, another witness, 
Nichole Ripple, testified during trial that Zurcher had called Anderson “a freak” 
and that Anderson had “tried to strangle his ex-girlfriend.”  That portion of 
Ripple’s testimony was repeated on a local evening news broadcast.  On 
Anderson’s motion, the trial court granted a mistrial based on the undue prejudice 
caused by Ripple’s statement. 
{¶ 16} A second trial began November 18, 2003.  During the second trial, 
the state was permitted to introduce the same testimony by Dripps that previously 
had been excluded.  The jury found Anderson guilty of murder, and the trial court 
imposed a prison sentence of 15 years to life. 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals, however, found error in the admission of the 
bad-acts evidence.  It reversed Anderson’s conviction, finding it “difficult, if not 
impossible, to correlate the two opposing decisions by the trial court on this 
matter.”  2006-Ohio-4618, ¶ 45.  We declined to review that decision.  112 Ohio 
St.3d 1443, 2007-Ohio-152, 860 N.E.2d 767. 
{¶ 18} Subsequent history of the case is set forth in the opinions of the 
court of appeals concerning the order now on appeal before us.  7th Dist. 
Mahoning App. No. 11-MA-43, 2012-Ohio-4390. 
{¶ 19} A third trial began in December 2008.  The jury was unable to 
return a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. 
{¶ 20} The fourth trial began in April 2010.  During voir dire, defense 
counsel fell asleep.  The court declared a mistrial. 
{¶ 21} After a fifth trial in August 2010, the jury was again unable to 
reach a verdict.  The court declared another mistrial. 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
{¶ 22} When the trial court set a sixth trial date, Anderson moved to 
dismiss the indictment, asserting that making him stand trial a sixth time violated 
his right to protection from double jeopardy and his right to due process.  The trial 
court denied the motion, and Anderson appealed. 
{¶ 23} The state moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the denial of 
Anderson’s motion to dismiss was not a final, appealable order.  The court of 
appeals rejected its claim, “finding that in this particular situation where there 
have been multiple mistrials, the order appealed is a final, appealable order as 
defined by R.C. 2505.02.”  2012-Ohio-4390 at ¶ 1. 
{¶ 24} On the state’s motion, the court of appeals sat en banc to consider 
whether the order was final and appealable.  The court was equally divided on the 
issue; two judges agreed that the order was a final, appealable order, and two 
would have held that it was not.  Id.  Thus, the original appellate court 
determination—that the order was a final, appealable order—stood.  Id. at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 25} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal, which asserts that the 
denial of a motion to dismiss on due-process and double-jeopardy grounds is not a 
final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.  134 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2013-
Ohio-347, 982 N.E.2d 727.  We disagree. 
{¶ 26} We hold that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy 
grounds is a final, appealable order.  We affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals to the extent that it held that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-
jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order.  We need not, and do not, reach the 
issue of a whether a motion to dismiss on due-process grounds is also a final, 
appealable order. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 27} We are presented with two important considerations:  the 
prudential concerns that limit which orders an appellate court can review and the 
constitutional protections against double-jeopardy violations.  Although we have 
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not specifically addressed the issue in light of the General Assembly’s most recent 
amendments to the definition of “final order” in R.C. 2505.02, we do not write on 
a blank slate. Indeed, we have answered this important question repeatedly, but 
admittedly inconsistently, over the years. 
{¶ 28} The requirement of a final, appealable order is equally important in 
both civil and criminal cases.  “An appellate court can review only final orders, 
and without a final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction.”  Supportive 
Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 137 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-
Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2953.02 authorizes appellate courts to review the judgment or 
final order of a trial court in a criminal case.  State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 
444, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (2001).  To determine whether the order issued by the trial 
court in a criminal proceeding is a final, appealable order, appellate courts must 
apply the definitions of “final order” contained in R.C. 2505.02.  Id., citing State 
ex rel. Leis v. Kraft, 10 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 460 N.E.2d 1372 (1984). 
{¶ 30} Here, the specific question before us is whether the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order within 
the meaning of the statute. 
{¶ 31} In Owens v. Campbell, 27 Ohio St.2d 264, 272 N.E. 116 (1971), 
syllabus, we held that an accused could invoke the original jurisdiction of Ohio’s 
appellate courts through extraordinary writs to adjudicate his right against being 
placed in double jeopardy.  But less than a decade later, we overruled that 
holding. 
{¶ 32} In State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 400 N.E.2d 897 (1980), 
syllabus, we unanimously held that the accused has the right to immediately 
appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss that is predicated on double-jeopardy 
grounds.  In so doing, we made clear the importance of providing an immediate 
appeal in such a situation: 
January Term, 2014 
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It is clear that the Double Jeopardy Clause is a guarantee 
against being twice put to trial for the same offense.  Abney v. 
United States (1977), 431 U.S. 651, 661 [97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 
L.Ed.2d 651].  It is equally clear that an order affecting a right of 
constitutional dimensions is an “order affecting a substantial 
right,” within the contemplation of R.C. 2505.02.  It would seem 
reasonable to conclude that some form of review prior to judgment 
is necessary to preserve this right.  Id. at page 660. 
* * * 
We believe that a proceeding on a motion to dismiss for 
double jeopardy should be considered a special proceeding as well. 
A claim of double jeopardy raises an issue entirely collateral to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant.  While it is a complete 
defense, it is more than that, for it, in principle, bars a new trial as 
well as a new conviction.  Additionally, an erroneous decision on a 
double jeopardy claim cannot be effectively reviewed after 
judgment within the second trial; by that time, the defendant’s 
right has been violated. 
We hold, therefore, that the overruling of a motion to 
dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy is a final appealable 
order under R.C. 2953.02 and 2505.02. Owens v. Campbell ([1971] 
27 Ohio St.2d 264 [272 N.E.2d 116]) is hereby overruled. 
 
Id. at 258. 
{¶ 33} Ten years after Thomas, we again abruptly changed course in State 
v. Crago, 53 Ohio St.3d 243, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (1990). 
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{¶ 34} In Crago, we held that a defendant cannot appeal the denial of a 
motion to dismiss based on double-jeopardy until after the trial is concluded.  Our 
explanation in Crago was conclusory and based solely on the definition of “final 
order” in R.C. 2505.02. 
{¶ 35} Specifically, we noted that R.C. 2505.03(A) directs that every 
“final order” may be reviewed on appeal.  At the time, “final order” was defined 
as follows: 
 
An order that affects a substantial right in an action which 
in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order 
that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon 
a summary application in an action after judgment, or an order that 
vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial is a final 
order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with 
or without retrial. 
 
 Former R.C. 2505.02, 1986 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 412, 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3563, 
3597. 
{¶ 36} We summarily determined that “the denial of a motion to dismiss 
on the basis of double jeopardy is not a ‘final order’ with the meaning of R.C. 
2953.02 as the definition of ‘final order’ contained in R.C. 2505.02 is applicable 
to criminal proceedings.”  Id. at 244-245.  We then proceeded to overrule 
Thomas, without further explication.  Id. at 245. 
{¶ 37} Shortly after Crago, we decided Wenzel v. Enright, 68 Ohio St.3d 
63, 623 N.E.2d 69 (1993).  Applying Crago, a slim majority of this court held that 
neither an extraordinary writ nor an interlocutory appeal was available to an 
accused after the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds.  Id. at 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  We held that the accused may seek review only on 
January Term, 2014 
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direct appeal, at the conclusion of the proceedings.  Id. at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 38} Our decision in Crago has been questioned by members of this 
court and the appellate courts.  E.g., State v. Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-
Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, ¶ 42 (Lanzinger, J., concurring) and ¶ 55 (McGee 
Brown, J., concurring); State v. Anderson, 2012-Ohio-4390, ¶ 31 (DeGenaro, J., 
concurring); Mentor v. Babul, 11th Dist. Lake No. 98-L-244, 1999 WL 820583, 
*4 (July 16, 1999) (holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-
jeopardy grounds is not a final, appealable order, but noting “the very persuasive 
argument that can be made in support of the immediate exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction” because of “the unique nature” of the motion).  But in order to 
resolve this appeal, we need not delve into the merits, or lack thereof, of Crago. 
{¶ 39} As we have in other cases, we decide the appeal based on the new 
statutory language, which altered the language that was dispositive to our decision 
in Crago.  See, e.g., State v. Chambliss, 128 Ohio St.3d 507, 2011-Ohio-1785, 
947 N.E.2d 651 (departing from the court’s prior holding in State ex rel. Keenan 
v. Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119 (1994), which held, under a 
previous version of R.C. 2505.02, that an order denying a defendant’s counsel of 
choice was not a final, appealable order). 
The 1998 Amendments to R.C. 2505.02 
{¶ 40} In 1998, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2505.02.  1998 
Sub.H.B. No. 394, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3277, 3278.  The prior language of 
R.C. 2505.02 “was more restrictive concerning what constitutes a final, 
appealable order than the one currently in effect.”  State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 189, 2006-Ohio-4253, 852 N.E.2d 711, ¶ 7.  Put another way, the revised 
language now in place is more extensive than the language we construed in 
Crago. 
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{¶ 41} Most notably, through Sub.H.B. No. 394, the General Assembly 
expanded the definition of a “final order” to include two additional categories:  
(1) orders that grant or deny a “provisional remedy” and otherwise satisfy certain 
specified criteria and (2) orders that determine whether an action may be 
maintained as a class action.  The latter category is clearly inapplicable here, and 
our analysis will focus on whether an order that denies a motion to dismiss on 
double-jeopardy grounds is a provisional remedy.1   
{¶ 42} R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) provides: 
 
(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, 
affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is 
one of the following: 
 * * * 
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and 
to which both of the following apply: 
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to 
the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in 
favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a 
meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final 
judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the 
action. 
 
Thus, in order to qualify as a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), 
three requirements must be satisfied:  (1) the order must grant or deny a 
                                          
 
1 In so doing, we need not revisit Crago’s decision that the denial of a motion to dismiss 
predicated on double-jeopardy grounds did not fall within any of the three original categories of 
final orders described in R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) through (3).   
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
provisional remedy as that term is defined in the statute, (2) the order must in 
effect determine the action with respect to the provisional remedy, and (3) the 
appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful review of the decision if that 
party had to wait for final judgment as to all proceedings in the action.  Upshaw, 
110 Ohio St.3d 189, 2006-Ohio-4253, 852 N.E.2d 711, ¶ 15, citing Muncie, 91 
Ohio St.3d at 446, 746 N.E.2d 1092. 
{¶ 43} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds satisfies these requirements. 
A motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a provisional remedy 
{¶ 44} A “provisional remedy” for purposes of defining “final order” is “a 
proceeding ancillary to an action.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(3). 
{¶ 45} The statute sets forth as examples, introduced by the phrase 
“including, but not limited to,” certain types of proceedings that fall within the 
definition of an ancillary proceeding, including motions to suppress evidence.  
The statutory phrase “including, but not limited to,” means that the examples 
expressly given are “a nonexhaustive list of examples.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Muncie, 
91 Ohio St.3d at 448, 746 N.E.2d 1092, citing State v. Lozano, 90 Ohio St.3d 560, 
562, 740 N.E.2d 273 (2001); Boedeker v. Rogers, 140 Ohio App.3d 11, 18, 746 
N.E.2d 625 (2000) (noting that by its express terms, the list of provisional 
remedies in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) is “illustrative and not exhaustive”).  Thus, the 
failure to include a motion to dismiss in the list does not undermine the notion 
that a motion to dismiss is an ancillary proceeding. 
{¶ 46} Because the statute does not define the term “ancillary 
proceedings,” we must define it according to its plain, common, ordinary 
meaning.  R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 47} As 
we 
recognized 
in 
Muncie, 
“for 
purposes 
of 
R.C. 
2505.02(A)(3)’s definition, ‘[a]n ancillary proceeding is one that is attendant upon 
or aids another proceeding.’ ”  Muncie at 449, quoting Bishop v. Dresserr 
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Industries, 134 Ohio App.3d 321, 324, 730 N.E.2d 1079.  An ancillary proceeding 
is an “ancillary suit,”  Black’s Law Dictionary 101 (9th Ed.2009), i.e., “[a]n 
action, either at law or in equity, that grows out of and is auxiliary to another suit 
and is filed to aid the primary suit, to enforce a prior judgment, or to impeach a 
prior decree.”  Id. at 1572. 
{¶ 48} We have little trouble concluding that a motion to dismiss on 
double-jeopardy grounds is an ancillary proceeding. 
{¶ 49} A motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds “grows out of” 
the primary suit, i.e., the prosecution.  The act of prosecution triggers a 
defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy.  A motion to 
dismiss is certainly “attendant” upon the underlying prosecution because it is 
“consequent; concomitant; associated; [and] related” to the prosecution.  The 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 133 (1987). 
{¶ 50} As one commentator has recognized, a motion to dismiss on 
double-jeopardy grounds is  
 
separate from and entirely collateral to the substantive issues at 
trial.  The defendant’s right not to be tried has nothing to do with 
guilt or innocence.  The proceeding on the issue is independent of 
the main trial * * *.  Such a position is entirely consistent with the 
court’s willingness to broadly define what constitutes an ancillary 
hearing 
and 
thus 
a 
“provisional 
remedy” 
under 
R.C. 
2505.02(A)(3). 
 
John Paul Sellers III, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Does Ohio Revised 
Code Section 2505.02 Adequately Safeguard a Person’s Right Not to Be Tried?, 
28 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 285, 299 (2002).  We agree. 
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{¶ 51} A motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy is a 
provisional remedy satisfying the first prong of the analysis. 
A motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds can 
determine the action 
{¶ 52} We thus turn to the second prong:  whether the motion in effect 
determines the action.  Orders denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on 
double-jeopardy grounds “constitute a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, 
final rejection of a criminal defendant’s double jeopardy claim.”  Abney v. United 
States, 431 U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651.  And orders granting a 
motion to dismiss generally end the prosecution.  We thus have no trouble 
concluding that a decision on a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds 
determines the action because it permits or bars the subsequent prosecution.  
Absent an interlocutory appeal from 
the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, 
the moving party would not be afforded meaningful review of the decision 
{¶ 53} We turn now to the third and final prong of the test for final, 
appealable orders for purposes of R.C. 2505.02(A)(3):  whether the appealing 
party would not be afforded a meaningful review of the decision if that party had 
to wait for final judgment as to all proceedings in the action. 
{¶ 54} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution ensures that a state may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice 
for the same offense.  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 
L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).  The “basic theory” underlying the doctrine of double 
jeopardy “is that it is wrong for one to be subjected more than once to the danger 
of being punished for an offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Best, 42 Ohio 
St.2d 530, 532, 330 N.E.2d 421 (1975). 
{¶ 55} The denial of an interlocutory appeal to an accused arguing that a 
prosecution is barred by double jeopardy vitiates one of the very protections the 
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constitution provides:  the right not to be improperly forced to stand trial 
repeatedly for the same offense. 
{¶ 56} As the Supreme Court has explained: 
 
[The] protections [of the Double Jeopardy Clause] would be lost if 
the accused were forced to “run the gauntlet” a second time before 
an appeal could be taken; even if the accused is acquitted, or, if 
convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double 
jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit. Consequently, if 
a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and 
thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy 
challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before that 
subsequent exposure occurs. 
 
(Emphasis added in part, and footnote omitted.)  Abney, 431 U.S. at 662, 97 S.Ct. 
2034, 52 L.Ed.2d. 651. 
{¶ 57} In Wenzel, a slim majority of this court relied heavily on Crago to 
hold that Abney does not mandate that a state provide a mechanism for an 
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy 
grounds.  Wenzel, 68 Ohio St.3d at 67, 623 N.E.2d 69, fn. 1.  That analysis has 
been described as “superficially dismissive” and has been criticized for failing to 
address the constitutional analysis set forth in Abney.  Anderson, 2012-Ohio-4390, 
¶ 38 (DeGenaro, J., concurring).  That criticism is not unfair, particularly given 
that after Crago and Wenzel, a defendant’s only way to secure pretrial judicial 
review of the denial of the motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds was 
through federal habeas relief.  See, e.g., Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th 
Cir.1997); Lucas v. Hamilton Cty. Mun. Ct., S.D.Ohio No. 1:12-cv-138, 2012 WL 
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15 
 
1986680, *4 (June 4, 2012) (in finding that the prisoner-petitioner had exhausted 
his state-court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief, the court noted the 
state’s concession that there is no right to an interlocutory appeal from a motion to 
dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds and rejected the state’s argument that 
mandamus is available to secure pretrial review of a double-jeopardy claim).  Yet 
Abney makes clear that as a matter of federal constitutional law, retrial itself is 
one of the harms at issue in double-jeopardy cases. That harm cannot be remedied 
by a subsequent acquittal in the trial court or by the reversal of any conviction 
through appeal after trial. 
{¶ 58} “ ‘A post-conviction appeal may offer a remedy, but not an 
adequate one * * *.’  (Emphasis sic.)”  Chambliss, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-
Ohio-1765, 947 N.E.2d 651, at ¶ 26, quoting State ex rel. Keenan, 69 Ohio St.3d 
at 180, 631 N.E.2d 119 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  In the context of double jeopardy, 
we agree that a postconviction appeal is not an adequate remedy “because the 
protection against double jeopardy is not just protection against being punished 
twice for the same offense, it is also the protection against being tried twice for 
the same offense.”  Wenzel, 68 Ohio St.3d at 68, 623 N.E.2d 69 (Wright, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 59} We therefore conclude that an accused would not be afforded a 
meaningful review of an adverse decision on a motion to dismiss and discharge 
on double-jeopardy grounds if that party must wait for final judgment as to all 
proceedings in order to secure review of the double-jeopardy decision. 
The Denial of a Motion to Dismiss on Double-Jeopardy Grounds 
Is a Final, Appealable Order 
{¶ 60} Having determined that an order denying a motion to dismiss on 
double-jeopardy grounds denies a “provisional remedy” as that term is defined in 
the statute, that the order in effect determines the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy, and that the appealing party would not be afforded a 
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meaningful review of the decision if that party had to wait for final judgment as to 
all proceedings in the action, we hold that the order is a final, appealable order.  In 
so doing, we are not bound by Crago, which was decided on a different, narrower 
statutory definition, or by Wenzel, which relied on the decision in Crago. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 61} We hold that an order denying a motion to dismiss on double-
jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order.  Thus, the trial court’s denial of 
Anderson’s motion to dismiss was a final, appealable order.  We therefore affirm 
the order of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court to consider 
Anderson’s appeal on its merits. 
Order affirmed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
____________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ralph M. 
Rivera, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
John B. Juhasz, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the 
Ohio Public Defender. 
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