Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: Haywood Hartley v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061718

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hartley's first name appears as both "Hayward" and
1
"Haywood" in the materials before us.  
REL:3/14/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061718
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Haywood Hartley
v.
State of Alabama)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CC-07-320;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1466)
PER CURIAM.
The State of Alabama petitions for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to vacate its order requiring
Hayward  Hartley, an incarcerated defendant, to be transported
1
to the office of a private psychologist for a psychological
1061718
2
evaluation.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Hartley was arrested and subsequently indicted on charges
of attempted murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree
burglary, and first-degree theft of property.   Hartley's bond
was set at $1.5 million; he was unable to post bond, and he is
currently incarcerated at the Baldwin County Corrections
Center.   
Hartley's family arranged for him to be evaluated by a
clinical psychologist, Dr. C. Van Rosen, whose office is
located in Daphne.  Hartley's counsel thus filed what was
styled as an "ex parte" motion with the trial court to have
Hartley transported from the Baldwin County Corrections Center
to Dr. Van Rosen's office in Daphne for the evaluation.  The
motion included a letter from Dr. Van Rosen dated May 10,
2007, that stated that the facilities at the Baldwin County
Corrections Center were not suited for the evaluation he had
to perform on Hartley.
The trial court granted Hartley's motion and issued an
order directing "Baldwin County Corrections Staff to transport
Hayward Hartley to the office of Dr. C. Van Rosen at 9:00 a.m.
on the 18th day of May, 2007, ... for the purpose of a mental
1061718
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and/or psychological evaluation and upon completion of said
evaluation to return him to the Baldwin County Corrections
Center on the same date."  The trial court also indicated by
handwriting on the typewritten order that "the corrections
officer may leave [Hartley] in the custody of Dr. [Van] Rosen
during the exam and return to pick [Hartley] back up."
On May 16, 2007, the transportation division of the
Baldwin County Corrections Center and the Baldwin County
Sheriff's Department contacted the district attorney's office
(hereinafter "the State") about the transportation order.
According to the State's petition, the sheriff's department
was concerned that the transportation of Hartley to and from
Dr. Van Rosen's office would jeopardize "the safety of the
citizens of Baldwin County."  The State, which had been
unaware of the ex parte motion or the order allowing Hartley
to be transported to Daphne, filed a motion on May 17
requesting the trial court to reconsider its order.  The
motion stated, in part: 
"3. The State believes that [Hartley] is an extreme
danger to the community. He even threatened to kill
the victim at the time he was arrested for Attempted
Murder, Robbery 1, Burglary 1 and Theft of Property
1. [Hartley] is under a $1.5 Million bond in this
matter.
1061718
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"4. [Hartley] has already proven to be a flight risk
in that he fled to Mobile County and was arrested
there on these charges.
"5. Because of the great security risk that
[Hartley] poses to the community, multiple Deputies
will be needed for his transport to Daphne.  The
State avers that this is an extreme burden to the
taxpayers. 
Also, 
because 
of 
the 
danger 
that
[Hartley] poses, the Deputies will need to stay with
[Hartley], thereby undermining his confidentiality
with Doctor Van Rosen.
"6. The State adamantly opposes this transport and
requests a hearing."
The trial court denied the State's motion without a hearing.
The State subsequently filed a motion to stay the
transportation order, and the trial court conducted a hearing
on the motion.  At the hearing, the State appeared with two
witnesses, Brock Palmer, an investigator with the Orange Beach
Police Department, and Chief Deputy Charlie Jones with the
Baldwin County Sheriff's Department.  According to the State,
the witnesses were to testify as to the seriousness of the
charges against Hartley and the alleged threat he posed to the
community.  The trial court, however, did not allow the
witnesses to testify, and it denied the State's motion to stay
and upheld its previous order.  The facts before us do not
indicate why the trial court did not allow the State's
1061718
5
witnesses to testify.
The State then filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals a
petition for a writ of mandamus, presumably seeking the same
relief it now seeks from this Court.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals denied the petition, by an order.  Hartley v. State
(No. CR-06-1466, August 23, 2007), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2007) (table).  The State then filed the petition for the
writ of mandamus now before this Court.
The standard governing the availability of a writ of
mandamus as a means for reviewing a trial court's exercise of
its discretion has been stated as follows: "'"In cases
involving the exercise of discretion by an inferior court,
[the writ of] mandamus may issue to compel the exercise of
that discretion. It may not, however, issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion, except in a case of
abuse."'"  Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34, 40
(Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Monsanto Co., 794 So. 2d 350,
351-52 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn Ex parte Auto-Owners Ins.
Co., 548 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Ala. 1989)).  Our inquiry thus
focuses on whether, in issuing the transportation order, the
trial court exceeded its discretion.  
1061718
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The State maintains that Hartley is a dangerous inmate
and that he poses a danger to the community when he is not
confined in a secure facility.  The State also contends that
it should have been able to present the testimony of its two
witnesses, Chief Deputy Jones and Investigator Palmer.  The
State argues that the portion of the trial court's order
stating that "the corrections officer may leave [Hartley] in
the custody of Dr. [Van] Rosen during the exam and return to
pick [Hartley] back up" demonstrates the trial court's
"obvious lack of understanding as to the danger [Hartley]
poses." 
Because its witnesses were not allowed to testify, the
State has submitted to this Court with its petition an
affidavit of Chief Deputy Jones and the investigative summary
prepared by Investigator Palmer.  These materials describe
Hartley's 
allegedly 
dangerous 
nature, 
the 
security 
precautions
employed regarding Hartley, the nature of the crimes he is
alleged to have committed, and the alleged threats he made
against the victim.  
"Generally, most hearings should be held in the open
because of the concern that one be given notice and an
1061718
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opportunity to be heard."  Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 120
(Ala. 1996).  In this case, the facts before us indicate that
the order for transportation was not sealed.  The State
learned of the order for transportation and challenged it; the
trial court scheduled a hearing on the State's challenge but
did not allow the State's witnesses to testify.  The State's
evidentiary submissions to this Court regarding the offense
and Hartley's arrest would appear to support the State's
arguments that Hartley is violent, that he is an escape risk,
and that he poses a threat to the community.  Given that the
sheriff's department had concerns that potential security
risks were not adequately addressed by the trial court in
issuing the order, we conclude that the trial court exceeded
the scope of its discretion in refusing the State the
opportunity to present its witnesses.  Therefore, the trial
court is directed to hold a hearing on whether Hartley may be
safely transported and at that hearing to allow the State to
present its evidence.
  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., concurs specially.  
Smith and Bolin, JJ., concur in the result.  
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself. 
1061718
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STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I fully concur with the main opinion.  I write specially
to emphasize that this Court's decision in Ex parte Moody, 684
So. 2d 114 (Ala. 1996), with regard to the right of a
defendant to an ex parte hearing to determine whether the
defendant is entitled to expert assistance at public expense
is limited to an indigent defendant.  The specific issue
addressed in Moody was "whether an indigent defendant
requesting an expert witness [at public expense] is entitled
to an ex parte hearing on that request."  684 So. 2d at 119
(emphasis on "indigent" added).  We concluded in Moody that
"an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to an ex parte
hearing on whether expert assistance is necessary, based on
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution."  984 So. 2d at 120 (emphasis on
"indigent" added).  An ex parte hearing is necessary in such
a case because an indigent defendant may be required to reveal
incriminating evidence and/or defense strategy in order to
show "a reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his
defense and [must show that] a denial of an expert to assist
at trial would result in a fundamentally unfair trial."   684
1061718
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So. 2d at 119 (quoting Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1192
(Ala. 1995), citing in turn  Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th
Cir. 1987)).  Thus, our holding in Moody that a defendant has
a right to an ex parte hearing when requesting expert
assistance applies only to indigent defendants and to the
issue whether it is necessary to provide an expert at public
expense for the indigent defendant to have an adequate
defense.
The concern that incriminating evidence or defense
strategy may be revealed at the hearing is not relevant when
the hearing concerns security or transportation arrangements
and the public's safety is at issue.
The materials before us indicate that Hartley is not an
indigent defendant and that he was not seeking an expert
witness at public expense; therefore, this Court's holding in
Moody is not applicable to his case.