Case Title: Scarpinato v. Nehring

Citation: 

Docket Number: 314, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DERRIK SCARPINATO, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 314, 2004 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JANIFFER NEHRING,  
 
)  File No. CN99-10451 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  November 3, 2004 
Decided:  December 9, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
O R D E R 
This 9th day of December 2004, on consideration of the parties’ briefs, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Derrik Scarpinato appeals an order of the Family Court that lifted a 
temporary stay of alimony and set off alimony arrearages that Scarpinato owed to 
his former wife, Janiffer Nehring, against back child support that Nehring owed to 
Scarpinato.  Scarpinato argues that the order was procedurally improper because 
there was no petition pending before the Family Court at the time the order was 
entered.  He argues that the order violated his due process rights.  Because 
Scarpinato has not cited any authority demonstrating a procedural impropriety, the 
 
2
trial judge acted within his discretion by lifting the temporary stay and by refusing 
to vacate the order.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
2. 
After nearly three years of marriage, the parties were divorced on 
September 28, 2000.  On December 18, 2001, the trial judge ordered Scarpinato to 
pay alimony to Nehring.  An interim consent order was entered on March 4, 2002, 
in which Nehring agreed to pay Scarpinato $65 a month in child support for their 
son, Joseph.  Scarpinato had sole custody of Joseph.   
 
3. 
In December 2002, the trial judge temporarily stayed the alimony 
order after discovering an error in the 2001 alimony calculations.  Alimony had 
been based on Nehring’s report that she paid $300 each month in child support.  
Instead, she had paid only $360 over a twelve-month period.  The trial judge thus 
stayed the alimony order pending verification of Nehring’s entitlement to alimony. 
 
4. 
In April 2004, the trial judge entered a child-support order, requiring 
Nehring to pay $393 a month, together with monthly payments toward the child 
support the Court determined to be in arrears.  Nehring filed a motion to lift the 
temporary stay of alimony in May 2004.  After Scarpinato failed to file a response, 
the trial judge granted Nehring’s request.  The trial judge then ordered a set-off of 
the alimony arrearages Scarpinato owed to Nehring against the back child support 
that Nehring owed to Scarpinato.  Scarpinato then unsuccessfully moved to vacate 
that order.  Scarpinato appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate. 
 
3
5. 
We review questions of law de novo to determine whether the trial 
judge committed legal error.1  A motion to vacate a judgment or order is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.2   In determining whether there is an abuse 
of discretion, the Court considers whether the defaulting party has shown that, if 
the order were vacated, the outcome would be different from the default judgment.3 
6. 
Scarpinato argues that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to issue 
the order because no petition was then pending before the Court, and that by 
refusing to vacate the order, the trial judge abused his discretion.  Although 
Scarpinato contends that the trial judge violated the requirements of procedural due 
process, he cites no relevant authority to support that argument. 
7. 
Scarpinato contends that Family Court Civil Rules 3, 5, and 7 support 
his argument.  Rule 3 provides that an action is commenced by filing a petition, 
Rule 5 sets forth the requirements for serving and filing the petition and all 
subsequent pleadings, and Rule 7 contains the standards for pleadings and motions.  
None of these Rules requires that, once a petition in a case is initially filed, the 
petition be pending before an order can be issued.  Rather, Rule 7(b) provides that 
“an application to the Court for an order shall be by motion.”  Nothing cited by 
                                          
 
1  
Yost v. Johnson, 591 A.2d 178, 181 (Del. 1991). 
 
2  
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d 385, 389 (Del. 1991). 
 
3  
Id. 
 
4
Scarpinato indicates that the order lifting the temporary stay of alimony was 
procedurally improper. 
8. 
Even if the order were improperly entered, Scarpinato has not shown 
that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to vacate the order.  Scarpinato 
does not argue that the result would be different if the current order was vacated 
and the Family Court reconsidered whether to reinstate its alimony order.  The 
initial alimony order was based on Nehring’s assertion that she paid $300 a month 
in child support.  After temporarily staying that initial order, the trial judge entered 
a child-support order that required Nehring to pay $393 each month.  Based on that 
order, the Family Court reinstated its initial alimony order.  Scarpinato has not 
shown that the alimony calculations were improper, or that the result would be 
different if the order were vacated. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
Chief Justice