Case Title: Heiss v. Conti Guardianship of minor children

Citation: 

Docket Number: 36386-2009

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36386-2009 
 
In the Matter of:  JANE DOE and JOHN 
DOE, Children Under the Age of 18. 
 
FRED HEISS, ANNABELLE HEISS, and 
MAIA HEISS, 
 
Petitioners-Respondents-Cross 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
VIOLETTA CONTI, 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross 
Respondent. 
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Boise, December 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  155 
 
Filed: December 30, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Boundary County.  The Hon. Justin W. Julian, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The order of the magistrate court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
Liesche & Reagan, Coeur d‟Alene, and Tolin & Victoria, LLP, Seattle, for 
appellant.  Anna M. Tolin argued. 
 
Finney Finney & Finney, Sandpoint, for respondents.  Rex A. Finney argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a petition to remove a testamentary guardian 
of two orphaned minor children.  We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the 
magistrate court. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Jane Doe, age 11, and John Doe, age 6, (Children) resided with their parents Karl Heiss 
(Karl) and Marisa Bauducco-Heiss (Marisa) in Bonner County, Idaho.  On October 1, 2008, the 
family left Idaho intending to travel to Argentina to spend six months with Marisa‟s mother, 
 
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Violetta Conti (Conti), who resides in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego, at the southern tip of 
Argentina.  They first traveled by car to Seattle, Washington, to visit close friends, and then 
intended to drive to Malibu, California, to visit Karl‟s parents, Fred and Annabelle Heiss 
(Heisses).  From there they intended to drive to Los Angeles from where they would fly to 
Argentina, expecting to arrive on October 14, 2008. 
 
In 2002, Karl and Marisa (Parents) had both executed holographic wills naming Conti as 
Children‟s guardian in the event of Parents‟ deaths.  They had entrusted their close friends in 
Seattle with the wills.  On the morning of October 3, 2008, the family had left their friends‟ 
house in Seattle and were driving south on I-5 when they were involved in a tragic accident.  
Parents were killed instantly, Jane Doe suffered life-threatening injuries that will result in 
permanent impairment, and John Doe suffered injuries from which he has recovered. 
 
On October 22, 2008, one of their Seattle friends, who was nominated in Parents‟ wills as 
personal representative, filed an application for informal probate, an application for informal 
appointment of personal representative, and an application for testamentary appointment of Conti 
as guardian of Children.  On the same date, Conti filed her acceptance of appointment as 
guardian. 
 
On October 23, 2008, Conti also filed a petition to be appointed guardian of Children.  
On the same day, the magistrate court entered an order appointing her as temporary guardian, 
and Conti filed letters of temporary guardianship. 
 
On October 24, 2008, Heisses filed a petition to be appointed Children‟s temporary and 
permanent guardians.  They also requested appointment of an attorney or guardian ad litem for 
John Doe. 
 
Jane Doe was hospitalized in Seattle, Washington.  Heisses obtained a temporary 
residence there to be near her.  Conti and Heisses then entered into a stipulation providing that 
during the pendency of the proceedings Heisses could have custody of John Doe, with Conti 
having reasonable visitation; John Doe would remain in either Idaho or Washington; and Conti  
and Heisses together would make decisions regarding Jane Doe‟s care.  On October 28, 2008, the 
court entered an order consistent with that stipulation, and that order was later amended pursuant 
to stipulation of the parties.  The court also entered an order appointing counsel for Children. 
 
On January 8, 2009, after a court hearing, the court informed the parties of its initial 
opinion regarding several issues in the guardianship proceedings.  During that discussion, the 
 
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court stated that in its opinion, the party challenging the testamentary appointment of a guardian 
must show that the guardian is unfit to be a guardian. 
 
On January 29, 2009, Heisses and their daughter Maia Heiss filed a petition to have Conti 
declared unfit to be guardian of Children.  The court held a three-day trial on the petition, and 
then entered its memorandum opinion on March 27, 2009.  The court ruled that “the 
testamentary guardianship appointment must be upheld unless the guardian is found to be 
unqualified or unfit to discharge his or her inherent duties and responsibilities, and that the party 
challenging the fitness of the presumptive guardian bears the burden of proof.”  The court 
addressed the twenty-six different allegations of unfitness alleged by Heisses and found them 
unproven.  The court concluded that they had failed to prove that Conti was unfit or unqualified 
to serve as Children‟s guardian.  The court noted that “it is nonetheless comforting for the court 
to know that the children will enjoy a good life in Ushuaia.”  The court found that Conti was “a 
fit and proper person to discharge the duties of testamentary guardian.”  The court also wrote that 
“much of Heiss‟ case asserting Conti‟s unfitness did have the appearance of „grasping at 
straws.‟” 
 
Parents‟ wills stated that they desired Heisses to have the children for one month each 
year.  The court construed those provisions as being testamentary appointments of Heisses as 
coguardians for one month each year.  The court also held that due to Jane Doe‟s medical 
condition, Conti would not have full powers of guardianship over her until she was medically 
cleared to travel to Argentina.  Until then, the court held that Conti and Heisses “shall continue 
to exercise their current de facto temporary powers of equal co-guardianship over [Jane Doe].”1  
On April 9, 2009, the court entered its order appointing Conti and Heisses as coguardians. 
 
On April 1, 2009, Heisses filed a notice of appeal to the district court.  On April 13, 2009, 
Conti filed a motion for permissive appeal to this Court, which was granted on April 23, 2009.  
She then filed a notice of appeal to this Court on May 5, 2009, and Heisses filed a notice of 
cross-appeal. 
 
                                                 
1 Conti has not challenged this provision on appeal, so we express no opinion on it. 
 
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II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.  Did the court err in interpreting Parents‟ wills as including a testamentary appointment of 
Heisses as coguardians? 
2.  Did the court apply the wrong standard in denying Heisses‟ petition to remove Conti as 
guardian? 
3.  Did the court err in holding that Heisses were not entitled to the rights set forth in Idaho Code 
§ 32-717(3)? 
4.  Is Conti entitled to an award of attorney fees for defending the cross-appeal? 
5.  Did the court err in ordering the parties to pay the cost of Children‟s court-appointed counsel? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the Court Err in Interpreting Parents’ Wills as Including a Testamentary 
Appointment of Heisses as Coguardians? 
 
Conti appeals the court‟s action in appointing Heisses as coguardians.  Parents‟ wills 
were both handwritten, but Mother‟s will was written in Spanish and then translated into English 
for these proceedings.  It is undisputed that Parents‟ wills are valid.  It is also undisputed that 
both wills nominated Conti as guardian of Children.  The issue is whether the wills also 
nominated Heisses as coguardians for one month each year. 
 
The relevant portions of Parents‟ wills are as follows: 
Karl‟s will:  
 
In such case that we (Marisa Bauducco and Karl Heiss) should die, the 
surviving children ([Jane] and [John]) should be left in the care of (in this order) 
Violeta E. Conti (mother of Marisa Bauducco) [Marisa‟s sister], or [Marisa‟s 
brother].  If such possibility exists it would be our wish that they be able to raise 
them in our (Idaho) house.   One month out of the year should be reserved for 
Anna and Fred Heiss (parents of Karl Heiss) to raise the children where they see 
fit to do so.  . . . . 
 
Marisa‟s will: 
 
In case that we (Karl Heiss and Marisa Bauducco) would die; the 
surviving children ([Jane] and [John]) will stay under the guardianship of Violeta 
E. Conti (Mother of Marisa) [Marisa‟s sister] or [Marisa‟s brother].  If at all 
possible we would prefer that the children and the guardians live and grow up in 
our house in Idaho.   One month of the year should be reserved for Anna and 
Fred Heiss (Karl Heiss‟s parents), the place of the visit shall be decided by them.  
. . . . 
 
 
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The court determined that Parents intended to execute identical wills with respect to the 
testamentary guardianship provisions, and the parties agree.  “„[I]n construing the provisions of a 
will to ascertain the meaning of a testator, the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the 
testator‟s intent; and . . . [t]his intent is to be ascertained from a full view of everything within 
the four corners of the instrument.‟”  Wilkins v. Wilkins, 137 Idaho 315, 319, 48 P.3d 644, 648 
(2002). 
 
In construing the wills, the court began with the observation that Parents wanted Children 
to maintain contact with Heisses.  Father‟s will stated, “One month out of the year should be 
reserved for Anna and Fred Heiss (parents of Karl Heiss) to raise the children where they see fit 
to do so,” and Mother‟s will stated, “One month of the year should be reserved for Anna and 
Fred Heiss (Karl Heiss‟s parents), the place of the visit shall be decided by them.”  The court 
then reasoned, however, that the “legally proper” way to insure that the Heisses would have that 
visitation would have been to make them coguardians.  The court wrote as follows: 
 
The legally proper method for accomplishing that goal, in this court‟s 
view, would have been to explicitly designate Heiss as limited co-guardians of the 
children, with Conti assuming the duties and powers of primary guardian during 
the remaining eleven months of the year.  This approach is, in the court‟s opinion, 
preferable to interpreting said provisions as conferring “grandparents‟ visitation 
rights” which could be legally inadequate to allow Heiss to authorize medical 
treatment for the children in the U.S. in Conti‟s absence during their month of 
custody, or make international travel arrangements for the children, along with a 
host of other potential impediments. 
 
 
The court then concluded that “[h]ad these legal nuances been properly explained to Karl 
and Marisa, the court believes that they would have specified Heiss as limited coguardians in 
their wills.”  The court found additional support for its conclusion from the provision in Father‟s 
will stating, “One month out of the year should be reserved for Anna and Fred Heiss (parents of 
Karl Heiss) to raise the children where they see fit to do so.”  (Emphasis added.)  The court 
concluded that Father likely would not equate “raise” with “visit.”  The court did not address the 
comparable provision in Mother‟s will stating, “One month of the year should be reserved for 
Anna and Fred Heiss (Karl Heiss‟s parents), the place of the visit shall be decided by them.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The court erred in its interpretation of the wills.  First, the court must interpret the wills as 
written, not in a manner that would have, in the court‟s opinion, better accomplished one of 
 
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Parents‟ objectives.  Although appointing Heisses as limited coguardians for one month a year 
would better insure that they had that time with Children, there are also problems that can arise 
with coguardianships when there are disagreements between the coguardians.  The issue is what 
Parents intended from the wording of their wills, not what, in the court‟s view, would have been 
a better manner of accomplishing the goal of enabling Heisses to maintain contact with Children. 
 
The court‟s decision was also based upon its belief that designating Heisses as 
coguardians was preferable to “interpreting [the wills] as conferring „grandparents‟ visitation 
rights” which could be legally inadequate to allow Heiss to authorize medical treatment for the 
children in the U.S. in Conti‟s absence during their month of custody, or make international 
travel arrangements for the children, along with a host of other potential impediments.”  That 
concern does not empower the court to redraft the wills.  In addition, that concern ignores the 
fact that when Children are visiting Heisses in the United States, Conti can delegate to Heisses 
the power to consent to medical care for Children, make international travel arrangements, and 
do whatever else is necessary.  Idaho Code § 15-5-104 provides: 
[A] guardian of a minor . . . by a properly executed power of attorney, may 
delegate to another person, for a period not exceeding six (6) months . . . any of 
the . . . guardian‟s powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor or 
ward including, but not limited to, powers for medical care and educational care 
of the minor or ward, except the parent‟s or guardian‟s power to consent to 
marriage or adoption of a minor or ward. 
 
 
There is no contention that a limited power of attorney given by Conti to authorize Heisses to 
consent to medical care, arrange for international travel, or do other necessary acts would not be 
valid in California. 
 
Second, the court interpreted the wills based upon its speculation as to how Parents 
would have drafted their wills had “these legal nuances been properly explained to [them].”  The 
court‟s speculation as to what Parents would have done had they consulted with an attorney is 
not a proper factor in interpreting their wills. 
 
Finally, the court found that Karl‟s use of the word “raise” was controlling without 
recognizing that Marisa used the word “visit.”  When the corresponding provisions in both wills 
are read together and in context, it is clear that Parents were simply indicating their preference 
that Heisses be able to choose where they exercise visitation with Children.  Immediately 
preceding these provisions, both Parents expressed the desire that Children and their guardians 
 
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live at Parents‟ house in Idaho, if possible.  Parents obviously knew that Conti lived in Argentina 
and that it was unlikely she would move to Idaho upon being appointed Children‟s guardian, 
assuming she could even obtain legal residency.  Karl then wrote, “One month out of the year 
should be reserved for Anna and Fred Heiss (parents of Karl Heiss) to raise the children where 
they see fit to do so.”  (Emphasis added.)  Mother wrote, “One month of the year should be 
reserved for Anna and Fred Heiss (Karl Heiss‟s parents), the place of the visit shall be decided by 
them.”  (Emphasis added.)  These provisions were addressing where Heisses could exercise 
visitation.  They should be able to exercise their month-long visitation where they desired, such 
as their home in Malibu, rather than in Argentina.2  These provisions cannot reasonably be 
construed as appointing Heisses as coguardians. 
 
It is clear that Parents did not appoint Heisses as coguardians.  We therefore reverse the 
order appointing them as coguardians. 
 
 
B.  Did the Court Apply the Wrong Standard in Denying Heisses’ Petition to Remove Conti 
as Guardian? 
 
Heisses cross-appeal the court‟s denial of their petition to have Conti removed as 
Children‟s guardian.  They contend that the court applied the incorrect standard when denying 
their petition. 
 
Under Idaho law, a person can become the guardian of a minor child in one of two ways.  
“A person becomes a guardian of a minor by acceptance of a testamentary appointment or upon 
appointment by the court.”  I.C. § 15-5-201.  If a person becomes a guardian by acceptance of a 
testamentary appointment, there is no need for appointment by the court.  These are alternative 
ways of becoming the guardian of a minor. 
 
Testamentary appointment of a guardian for an unmarried minor child is governed by 
Idaho Code § 15-5-202.3  Under that statute, “A testamentary appointment becomes effective 
                                                 
2 This should not be interpreted as implying that Conti, as guardian, is required to follow Parents‟ wishes regarding 
visitation by the Heisses. 
3 Idaho Code § 15-5-202 provides: 
 
A parent of a minor may appoint a guardian of an unmarried minor by will, subject to the 
right of the minor under section 15-5-203, Idaho Code. The termination of parental rights of a 
parent as to the minor shall also terminate the right of that parent to appoint a guardian for the 
minor.  A testamentary appointment becomes effective upon the filing of the guardian‟s 
acceptance in the court in which the will is probated, if, at the decedent‟s death, no parent of the 
minor was alive who had a right to appoint a guardian for the minor. This state recognizes a 
 
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upon the filing of the guardian‟s acceptance in the court in which the will is probated, if, at the 
decedent‟s death, no parent of the minor was alive who had a right to appoint a guardian for the 
minor.”  Assuming the testamentary appointment is valid, the guardianship becomes effective 
upon the filing of the guardian‟s acceptance.  It does not require court approval or any finding 
that such appointment is in the best interest of the child(ren).  At that point, the court need only 
issue letters of guardianship to the testamentary guardian. 
 
In their wills, Parents appointed Conti as guardian of Children.  It is undisputed that the 
wills were valid.  On October 22, 2008, Conti filed her acceptance of appointment in the court 
where Parents‟ wills were being probated.  At that point, Conti became the guardian of Children, 
and she was entitled to exercise the powers of a guardian until her guardianship was terminated. 
 
Heisses contend that even if there is a testamentary guardian, another person seeking to 
become guardian should be able to file a petition for appointment, and the court should then 
determine which of the two would make the better guardian.  In support of that contention, they 
point to the sentence in Idaho Code § 15-5-204, which states, “In all cases, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child as the primary factor in the determination whether to 
appoint, and whom to appoint, as a guardian for such child.”  They argue that “all cases” 
includes the testamentary appointment of a guardian.  Their argument fails because section 15-5-
204 governs the court appointment of a guardian, not the testamentary appointment.  Likewise, 
sections 15-5-206 and 15-5-207 apply to court appointment, not testamentary appointment. 
 
Section 15-5-204 begins, “The court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all 
parental rights of custody have been terminated by prior court order or upon a finding that the 
child has been neglected, abused, abandoned, or whose parents are unable to provide a stable 
home environment.”  The statute provides for court appointment of a guardian in two 
circumstances. 
 
First, the court may appoint a guardian if “all parental rights of custody have been 
terminated by prior court order.”  Id.  If the person who was appointed testamentary guardian has 
accepted that appointment, that person would have “parental rights of custody.”  I.C. § 15-5-209.  
The court would not be able to appoint a guardian unless the guardianship created by that 
                                                                                                                                                             
testamentary appointment effected by the guardian‟s acceptance under a will probated in another 
state which is the testator‟s domicile.  Written notice of acceptance of the appointment must be 
given by the guardian to the minor and to the person having his care or to his nearest relation 
immediately upon acceptance of appointment. 
 
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testamentary appointment was first terminated by court order.  The last sentence of section 15-5-
204 confirms that.  It states that a guardian appointed by will “has priority over any guardian 
who may be appointed by the court but the court may proceed with an appointment nonetheless 
upon a finding that the testamentary guardian has failed to accept the testamentary appointment 
within thirty (30) days after notice of the guardianship proceeding.”  It provides that where there 
has been a testamentary appointment of a guardian, “the court may proceed with an 
appointment” if the testamentary guardian has failed to accept the appointment timely.  If the 
testamentary guardian has accepted the appointment timely, then the court may not proceed with 
the proceedings for court appointment of a guardian. 
 
Second, the court may appoint a guardian “upon a finding that the child has been 
neglected, abused, abandoned, or whose parents are unable to provide a stable home 
environment.”  I.C. § 15-5-204.  Because neither circumstance existed in this case, section 15-5-
204 would not permit the court to appoint Heissess as guardians unless Conti‟s guardianship had 
been terminated. 
 
Heisses also “encourage[] the Idaho Supreme Court to adopt the view point adopted in 
Illinois.”  They cite to In re Marriage of Russell, 523 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) 
(citations omitted), in which the court stated:  “In Illinois, the best interests and welfare of the 
minor is the determining question in a guardianship proceeding.  Consequently, the feelings and 
desires of the adult parties must yield to the court‟s obligation to protect the best interests of the 
minor child.”  The appointment of guardians for unmarried minor children in Idaho is governed 
by statute.  It is not the province of this Court to adopt a different statutory scheme, such as that 
in Illinois.  Enacting and modifying statutes is the province of the legislature. 
 
Heisses also contend that their proposed procedure would be fairer than the existing 
statutes.  They argue: 
 
It is fair and consistent with the rights of the infants to make a standard 
that all other things being equal (the child‟s best interests will be served equally 
by either competing guardian) a named testamentary guardian should have 
priority over another for appointment.  It is not fair to the children to say that you 
are not entitled to have the best possible upbringing and life. 
 
It is not fair to treat orphans of a parent with a will naming a testamentary 
guardian, different than orphans whose parents did not have a will.  One orphan is 
left to another by will, while the other orphan is entitled to have his or her best 
interest promoted. 
 
 
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Heisses‟ views of the unfairness of the statutory scheme are unavailing.  It is the 
legislature that has the power to change the statutes, not this Court.  The legislature obviously 
believed that parents should be able to direct who will have guardianship of their unmarried 
minor children in the event of the parents‟ deaths.  Heisses are understandably dissatisfied with 
their son‟s choice of guardian for their grandchildren, but he was empowered to make that choice 
under Idaho law. 
 
Although Heisses‟ motion sought a determination that Conti was unfit to be Children‟s 
guardian, it was in legal effect a motion to remove her as guardian.  Idaho Code § 15-5-212(a) 
provides that a guardian may be removed “on the ground that removal would be in the best 
interest of the ward.”  The court held that this statute required a finding that the guardian was 
unfit or unqualified to remain as guardian.  Heisses contend that the statute should be interpreted 
to permit removal if someone else would be a slightly better guardian. 
 
Heissess assert that the words “best interest” in section 15-5-212(a) should be construed 
in the same manner as the words “best interests” in Idaho Code § 32-717(1), which provides for 
awarding custody in divorce actions.  Under that statute, a court is often required to determine 
which of two loving, caring, and fit parents should have primary physical custody of a child 
based upon the best interests of the child after considering the factors listed in the statute and any 
other relevant factors.  See King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 445, 50 P.3d 453, 460 (2002).  Because 
parents have equal rights to custody, the divorce court must compare the parents when 
determining that issue.  According to Heisses, the same standard should apply in removing a 
guardian, assuming that the person seeking removal also requests appointment as a successor 
guardian. 
 
Heisses‟ argument is not consistent with the guardianship statutes for four reasons.  First, 
Idaho Code § 32-717(1) applies to divorce actions in which there are two parents who have equal 
rights to the custody of their minor child(ren).  The divorce court must often make the difficult 
choice of determining which of the parents will be primary custodian of the child(ren).  When 
considering the removal of the guardian of an unmarried minor child, the guardian and the 
person seeking to become the successor guardian are not on equal footing in relation to the 
child(ren).  The guardian has “the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not been 
deprived of custody of his minor and unemancipated child.”  The person seeking removal of the 
guardian and appointment as a successor guardian does not have any of those rights and 
 
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responsibilities.  Thus, the issue is not whether the person seeking to become the successor 
guardian may be a better guardian.  It is whether there is a reason to remove the current 
guardian.4 
 
Second, Idaho Code § 15-5-204 begins, “The court may appoint a guardian for an 
unmarried minor if all parental rights of custody have been terminated by prior court order.”  
The termination of the existing guardian must first occur before the court can consider 
appointment of a successor guardian.  Because the termination must occur first, the 
determination of whether removal of the guardian would be in the best interest of the child(ren) 
must focus upon the fitness of the existing guardian and whether it would be in the best interest 
of the child(ren) to remove the guardian regardless of who may be then appointed as successor 
guardian.  This is supported by the comment to section 15-5-204, which Heisses quote in their 
brief, but apparently fail to appreciate its significance.  In their brief, Heisses state as follows: 
 
The official comment (underlining added) to Idaho Code § 15-5-204, 
(which the Magistrate ruled is not applicable to the testamentary appointment of a 
guardian (R. Vol. I, P. 254), provides: 
 
The words “all parental rights of custody” are to read with 
Sections 5-201 and 5-209 which give testamentary and court 
appointed guardians of minors certain parental rights respecting the 
minor.  Hence, no authority to appoint a guardian for a minor 
exists if a testamentary guardian has accepted an effective 
appointment by will.  The purpose of this restriction is to support 
and encourage testamentary appointments which may occur 
without judicial act.  If a testamentary guardian proves to be 
unsatisfactory, removal proceedings as provided in Section 5-211 
may be used if the objection device of Section 5-203 is 
unavailable. 
. . . . 
 
Clearly the standard to remove the guardian named in a will should be the 
“best interests of the ward”, rather than the fitness standard employed by the 
Magistrate.  (Emphasis theirs.) 
 
 
The portion of the comment underlined by Heisses states, “If a testamentary guardian 
proves to be unsatisfactory, removal proceedings . . . may be used . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
                                                 
4 If two or more persons are seeking court appointment as guardian under Idaho Code § 15-5-204, then the court 
could consider factors such as those listed in Idaho Code § 32-717(1) to determine which person‟s appointment 
would be in the best interest of the child(ren).                                                                                                                                                
 
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comment does not support Heisses‟ argument; it supports the magistrate court‟s interpretation of 
section 15-5-212.5 
 
Third, Heisses‟ proposed interpretation of “best interest” in section 15-5-212(a) would 
substantially diminish parents‟ rights to appoint their children‟s guardians by will.  The Official 
Comment to Idaho Code § 15-5-204, which governs court appointment of a guardian, states, 
“[N]o authority to appoint a guardian for a minor exists if a testamentary guardian has accepted 
an effective appointment by will.  The purpose of this restriction is to support and encourage 
testamentary appointments which may occur without judicial act.”  If a court could remove the 
parents‟ choice of guardian because the court felt that someone else would be a slightly better 
guardian, it would substantially diminish the rights of parents to choose the guardian they believe 
would be in the best interest of their children. 
 
Finally, because of the power given to parents to make a testamentary appointment of a 
guardian for their unmarried minor children, Heisses‟ proposed interpretation conflicts with 
Idaho Code § 15-5-204.  A person can become a guardian of an unmarried minor child by 
acceptance of testamentary appointment or by court appointment.  I.C. § 15-5-201.  A person 
who contends that he or she would be a better guardian than the testamentary guardian could 
only become guardian by court appointment.  As explained above, the court cannot appoint such 
person as guardian if either the testamentary guardian has already accepted appointment or does 
so within thirty days after notice of the proceedings seeking court appointment.  I.C. § 15-5-204.  
If the legislature intended that anyone could challenge a testamentary appointment simply by 
contending he or she would be a better guardian, there would have been no reason to limit 
proceedings for court appointment of a guardian as it has done in section 15-5-204. 
 
The magistrate court held that in order to prove that removal of Conti as guardian would 
be in the best interest of the children, Heisses must prove that Conti was unfit or unqualified to 
be guardian of the children.  Heissess failed to do so.  The court did not err in refusing to adopt 
the interpretation of “best interest” proposed by Heisses.  The court found that “Conti is in fact a 
fit and proper person to discharge the duties of testamentary guardian.”  As such, her removal 
would not be in the best interest of Children. 
                                                 
5 As Heisses correctly state in their brief, “The Official Comment, due to re-numbering, must refer to 
Idaho Code § 15-5-212 when Idaho Code 15-5-211 is referenced.” 
 
 
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C.  Did the Court Err in Holding that Heisses Were Not Entitled to the Rights Set Forth in 
Idaho Code § 32-717(3)? 
 
Idaho Code § 32-717(3) provides, “In any case where the child is actually residing with a 
grandparent in a stable relationship, the court may recognize the grandparent as having the same 
standing as a parent for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interests of the 
child.”  Heisses contended in the magistrate court that this statute entitled them to be treated as 
parents of John Doe.  The court rejected that argument.  Heisses contend that the statute applies 
because “from the time John Doe was released from the hospital after the accident on October 3, 
2008, until the time that the Magistrate ended that relationship by appointing Conti as the 
primary guardian, he had been actually residing with his grandparents.” 
 
Section 32-717(3) has no application to these proceedings.  The statute begins, “In an 
action for divorce the court may . . . give such direction for the custody, care and education of 
the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the 
children.”  I.C. § 32-717(1).  It only applies to actions for divorce, which this obviously is not. 
 
D.  Is Conti Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees for Defending the Cross-Appeal? 
 
Conti seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 for 
defending against Heisses‟ cross-appeal.  “Attorney fees can be awarded to the prevailing party 
on appeal under that statute only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation.”  Allbright v. Allbright, 147 Idaho 752, 756, 215 P.3d 472, 
476 (2009).  Heisses‟ cross-appeal simply asked this Court to disregard the current statutes 
regarding appointment and removal of guardians and adopt a scheme Heisses believed would be 
more favorable to them.  The magistrate court wrote that “much of Heiss‟ case asserting Conti‟s 
unfitness did have the appearance of „grasping at straws.‟”  This appeal has even less merit.  
Although it refused to award Conti attorney fees under section 12-121, the magistrate court 
admonished Heisses, “In the event that Heiss pursues additional litigation beyond this point, a 
different conclusion may well be reached by this or another court.”  We award Conti attorney 
fees on appeal for defending against Heisses‟ cross-appeal. 
 
E.  Did the Court Err in Ordering the Parties to Pay the Cost of Children’s Court-
Appointed Counsel? 
 
14 
 
The magistrate court appointed an attorney to represent Children in these proceedings.  In 
its memorandum decision entered on March 27, 2009, the court wrote, “The reasonable fees and 
costs of the court appointed attorney for the children shall be evenly shared by Conti and Heiss, 
with each party promptly paying their half upon request.”  On August 18, 2009, the court entered 
an order awarding the attorney $9,550.45 in fees.  The court held that the fees were to be paid 
from the estates of Children, but if those estates did not have the funds to pay the fees within 
ninety days, then Conti and Heisses were each to pay one-half of the cost, but could recover such 
sums from Children‟s estates.  Heisses argue: 
 
 
The Court on its own initiative ordered that the reasonable fees and costs 
of the court appointed attorney for the children shall be evenly shared by Conti 
and Heiss, with each party promptly paying their half upon request. 
 
No authority is cited for the award and the magistrate should be reversed. 
 
The attorney for the children should be paid from the Karl and Marisa‟s 
Estates. 
 
 
The above is Heisses‟ entire argument on this issue in their opening brief.  The August 
18, 2009, order entered by the magistrate court differed from the order it initially indicated it 
would enter.  Although Heisses‟ reply brief was filed the day before the court entered the August 
18, 2009, order, they did not seek to supplement the record with a copy of that order, nor did 
they seek to file a supplemental brief addressing the actual provisions of the order.  This Court 
learned of the order during Conti‟s closing argument on appeal.  We have previously said, “We 
will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law, authority, 
or argument.”  KEB Enters., L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 754, 101 P.3d 690, 698 (2004).  We 
therefore decline to address this issue. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We reverse the order of the magistrate court appointing Heisses as coguardians, and we 
affirm the order of the magistrate court denying Heisses‟ motion to remove Conti as guardian.  
We award Conti costs on appeal, including attorney fees for defending against Heisses‟ cross-
appeal.  We remand this case for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.