Case Title: William Shepherd and Richard Saylor v. Hunterdon Developmental Center et als.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-14-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Hunterdon Developmental Center (HDC) is a State-owned and -operated facility that provides long-term care to physically and mentally handicapped clients, primarily male adults. HDC consists of several cottages that house the clients. During the relevant period, Shepherd and Saylor (collectively, plaintiffs) each worked as a Cottage Training Technician (CTT) in Cottage #22, which housed thirty-two severely retarded male clients. Plaintiffs worked the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift and were responsible for conducting bed checks every half hour to ensure that clients were sleeping well and were not wet or soiled. Mario Sclama and Ida Gal supervised plaintiffs. In 1989, plaintiffs co-workers, Annie Sampson and Donald Greenfield, both African-American, claimed that Sclama and Gal, among others, discriminated against them because of race and created a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs supported their co-workers and both signed a letter of protest describing several alleged incidents that were consistent with Sampson and Greenfield s claims. The Sampson-Greenfield discrimination suit was tried from October through December 1994. Plaintiffs letter of protest was used as evidence in the trial, which resulted in favorable verdicts for both co-workers. Plaintiffs claim that, at about the time of the Sampson-Greenfield trial, Sclama and Gal began a continued pattern of ill treatment and hypercritical supervision. On November 30, 1994, Gal allegedly approached Shepherd and yelled at him for what she claimed she and Sclama had to go through during the trial. Gal told Shepherd that she and Sclama were going to watch everything plaintiffs did and that what goes around, comes around. On December 6, 1994, Gal reportedly repeated the what goes around, comes around comment loud enough for Saylor to hear. Plaintiffs also claim that in December 1994, Sclama gave holiday gifts to the entire staff, except for them. They also were not invited to the Christmas party for shift employees. At about the same time, Shepherd took a sick-leave-day. He thereafter was placed on extended medical verification status for an alleged pattern of absences, which required him to obtain a doctor s note to verify any future illness. Shepherd filed a grievance and, following a hearing, that status was lifted. Plaintiffs further allege that on December 30, 1994 and January 12, 1995, Sclama was unfriendly and hostile toward them, but not to other coworkers, during the shift. Plaintiffs also claim that Sclama and Gal began to supervise them more aggressively and hypercritically. Plaintiffs were constantly reminded to come back on time from their breaks, while others received no such warnings. A co-worker, Irene Capitulik, wrote a letter to HDC s affirmative action officer describing the hostility that the supervisors had shown toward plaintiffs and that, since the start of the Sampson-Greenfield trial, the supervisors had tried to provoke arguments in an effort to get plaintiffs transferred from the cottage. On February 1, 1995, plaintiffs wrote separate letters to HDC s superintendent, William Wall, detailing the incidents with Sclama and Gal and seeking assistance. In response, Wall called a shift meeting on February 9, 1995. He later scheduled a counseling session in March that plaintiffs were not able to attend because of scheduling conflicts. Plaintiffs allege other hostile incidents occurring on February 3, 1995 and February 10, 1995. On February 27, 1995, after experiencing severe hostility from Sclama, Shepherd went home sick. Shortly thereafter, he requested a transfer. On March 2, 1995, Shepherd, on his and Saylor s behalf, filed a discrimination complaint with the Department of Human Services (DHS). On the complaint form, he listed the dates on which the discriminatory activities allegedly occurred, November 30, 1994, through and including February 27, 1995. On March 3, 1995, Sclama charged Saylor with using inappropriate language in front of clients. Saylor denied the allegation and no disciplinary action was taken. On March 18, 1995, Shepherd transferred from Cottage #22. At about the same time, Saylor applied for retirement, effective August 1, 1995. On April 5, 1995, HDC brought disciplinary charges against Saylor for alleged racial epithets made against Sclama. After a hearing, the charges were dismissed for lack of corroboration. Lastly, on April 19, 1995, Saylor was sent a letter regarding a pattern of sick leave usage. After Saylor s retirement and Shepherd s transfer, plaintiffs each received a response to their complaint to DHS, finding no support for the claims alleged. Plaintiffs appealed to the New Jersey Department of Personnel, which found the matter moot because of Shepherd s transfer and Saylor s retirement. On February 27, 1997, plaintiffs filed a complaint against HDC, Sclama, Gal (collectively, defendants) and others, claiming hostile work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge, negligent supervision, and conspiracy in violation of the LAD. Plaintiffs claim that defendants subjected them to ongoing acts of intimidation, harassment, and retaliation because they had given their support to their co-workers in the Sampson-Greenfield trial. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing plaintiffs complaint as untimely because it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court rejected the argument that the alleged discriminatory acts constituted a continuing violation that enabled plaintiffs to include claims outside the two-year limitations period. On appeal, a divided panel of the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for trial, determining that plaintiffs had sufficiently established defendants continuing violation and that some of the acts giving rise to the violation occurred during the relevant limitations period. The panel also upheld Saylor s constructive discharge claim. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division. HELD: Under the continuing-violation doctrine, Shepherd and Saylor s hostile-work-environment claims accrued within the two years of filing their complaint. Those claims present material issues of fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted. In addition, no reasonable jury could find that the facts presented support Saylor s constructive discharge claim; therefore, that claim was properly dismissed. 1. The continuing-violation doctrine provides an exception to the LAD s two-year limitations period. Under that doctrine, the cumulative effect of a series of discriminatory or harassing events may represent a single cause of action and the limitations period does not begin to run until the wrongful conduct ends. The U.S. Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan noted that hostile-environment claims are different from discrete acts of discrimination. While discrete acts of discrimination occur on a specific day or with a specific event, hostile-environment claims involve repeated conduct that occurs over several days or years and where a single act may not be actionable on its own. In does not matter that some of the acts of a hostile-work-environment claim fall outside of the statutory time period. As long as one act contributing to the series of acts constituting the claim occurred within the limitations period, the court may consider all alleged acts to determining liability. (Pp. 19-24) 2. The Court will apply Morgan s analytical framework when evaluating a state cause of action under the LAD. Except for two discrete acts, there is no dispute that the conduct alleged in the complaint was continual and occurred during the period set forth by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that their supervisors subjected them to heightened scrutiny beginning November 30, 1994, and that conduct, along with the what goes around comes around comments continued over the ensuing months, with no one incident constituting a stand-alone claim. Those allegations clearly fall within the hostile-environment framework set forth in Morgan and, as such, plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the last act in the pattern or series of acts the comprise the continuing violation claim. Shepherd s claim accrued on February 27, 1995 when Sclama s alleged hostility caused Shepherd to go home sick. For Saylor, the last act occurred on April 19, 1995 when he was sent a letter of caution regarding a pattern of sick leave usage. Because both acts occurred within two years of the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs hostile-work-environment claims are timely. (Pp. 24-26) 3. A victim s knowledge of a claim is insufficient to start the limitations period so long as the defendant continues the series of non-discrete acts on which the whole claim is based. The victim s knowledge becomes relevant only within the framework of an employer s laches defense (or some other equitable defense), which may bar a plaintiff from maintaining a suit if he unreasonably delays in filing his action and, as a result, harms the defendant. Here, plaintiffs filed suit without unreasonable delay. (Pp. 26-29) 4. Viewed cumulatively, plaintiffs have alleged facts minimally necessary to form a hostile-work-environment claim sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. (Pp. 29-33) 5. An unwelcome job transfer clearly constitutes a discrete act; therefore, Shepherd s retaliation claim, filed within two years of his transfer date, is timely. Saylor s claim of constructive discharge is also a discrete act. However, Saylor has not alleged facts sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion on that claim. On the record presented, a reasonable jury could not find defendants conduct to have been so intolerable that it would have forced Saylor s retirement. (Pp. 33-38) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICES STEIN and LONG join, agrees with the Court s conclusion that plaintiffs hostile-work-environment claims are not barred by the statute of limitations under the LAD, and that those claims present material issues of fact for a jury to determine. However, Justice Zazzali dissents from the majority s conclusion that Saylor did not allege sufficient facts to sustain a claim of constructive discharge. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE VERNIERO S opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI, joined by JUSTICES STEIN and LONG, filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. HUNTERDON DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER, MARIO SCLAMA, Cottage Training Supervisor and IDA GAL, Cottage Training Supervisor, Defendants-Appellants, and WILLIAM WALL, Superintendent, LEON CRONCE, Assistant Superintendent, ARTHUR SEARFASS, Assistant Supervisor of Professional Residential Services, VINCENT MURANTE, Cottage Training Supervisor and DONALD STAMBAUGH, Cottage Training Supervisor, Defendants. Argued January 28, 2002 Decided August 7, 2002 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 336 N.J. Super. 395 (2001). Cynthia M. Jacob argued the cause for appellants Mario Sclama and Ida Gal (Collier, Jacob & Mills, attorneys; Ms. Jacob and David J. Treibman, on the briefs). Allison E. Accurso, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant Hunterdon Developmental Center (David N. Samson, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). James L. Pfeiffer argued the cause for respondent (Pfeiffer & Winegar, attorneys; Brian A. Roemersma, on the briefs). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. This case arises under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 49 (LAD). The primary issue is whether plaintiffs claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. To resolve that question, the Court is called on to consider an equitable exception to the statute of limitations known as the continuing violation doctrine. Under that doctrine, a plaintiff may pursue a claim for discriminatory conduct if he or she can demonstrate that each asserted act by a defendant is part of a pattern and at least one of those acts occurred within the statutory limitations period. West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1995). The claims here include allegations that defendants had subjected plaintiffs to a hostile work environment by targeting them for strict enforcement of workplace rules. That conduct purportedly was in response to plaintiffs support of an unrelated lawsuit against defendants. Finding that plaintiffs allegations did not implicate a continuing violation, the trial court dismissed all claims as untimely. The court identified one act that had occurred within the limitations period, but it concluded that that act was insufficient to sustain a cause of action under the LAD. A divided panel of the Appellate Division reversed. The panel determined that plaintiffs sufficiently established defendants continuing violation and that some of the acts giving rise to the violation occurred during the relevant limitations period. The panel also upheld plaintiff Richard Saylor s constructive discharge claim. We now affirm in part and reverse in part. We hold that under the continuing violation doctrine plaintiffs hostile work environment claims accrued within two years of their Law Division action. We further agree that those claims present material issues of fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted in defendants favor. However, we disagree with the Appellate Division in respect of Saylor s constructive discharge claim. Although plaintiff filed that individual claim on a timely basis, we hold that no reasonable jury could find in his favor on the facts alleged. As to that claim only, summary judgment remains the proper disposition. On Nov. 31, 1994 [sic] at approximately 1:45 a.m., C.T.S. Ida Gal said to me on the way to my lunch break that Mr. Saylor and myself should have written better statements in their favor concerning the lawsuit and that we were to blame for their court problems, and for being sued. She said, remember, what goes around, comes around, [that s] all I can say, now take your lunch break. She made this goes around, comes around statement several times during the next few weeks, in my presence and Mr. [Saylor s], and also in the presence of C.T.T. Irene Capitulik c-22. On another night of Dec. 6, 1994 at approximately 11:00 p.m. at the change of shift, after spending several days in court in Flemington, C.T.S. Ida Gal and C.T.S. Mario Sclama were talking in the office and C.T.T. Richard Saylor said that C.T.S. Gal said real loud so Mr. Saylor could hear it, what goes around, comes around, right Mario! I have written many of these incidents down, times and dates, as I was told . . . to protect myself and Mr. Saylor. I kept notes from Nov. 1994 thru Jan. 1995. Mr. Wall, C.T.S. Mario Sclama has been the worst of all, he has treated Mr. Saylor and myself with obvious animosity and scorn. When he speaks to Mr. Saylor or me, which is seldom, he always has a nasty look on his face. He treats our coworkers C.T.T. Fred Lancaster and C.T.T. Irene Capitulik real nice. They have both been in cottage 22 about one year. Irene said to me that she doesn t like [what s] going on and that C.T.S. Sclama should not be treating me and Mr. Saylor so badly. C.T.S. Sclama talks to Lancaster and Capitulik a lot and tells them to take extra coffee breaks. He and Ida Gal, sometimes help them fold their clients clothes at night, and help them with their other work and they treat me and Mr. Saylor like outcasts. C.T.S. Sclama is cold and unfriendly to me and Mr. Saylor every night, and in Mario s presence C.T.S. Ida Gal is the same way. When Mario is off and Ida is in charge alone she isn t as bad. When she is around Mario, she backs him up one hundred percent. Mario makes most of the decisions and she always goes along with what he says. This is the worst I ve ever been treated in my whole life. I had to call out sick several times in the past year because of the stress and tension in cottage 22. My blood pressure has been running on the high side and my Doctor told me I have hypertension attributed to stress. I have been having frequent headaches at work and at home. About the [Sampson-Greenfield] lawsuit in Flemington and the statements that we had to write, Mr. Saylor and I told the truth about everything. It should never have gone that far. It could and should have been settled in cottage 22, but it wasn t. Mr. Sclama has been arrogant and nasty and H.C.T.S. Bruno seems to always back him up. Most of the direct care [technicians] in cottage 22 do not like C.T.S. Mario Sclama, and that s [putting] it mildly, but they are afraid to complain for the threat of being removed from the cottage as a troublemaker. . . . . Please help us. Sometimes we feel like there is no hope left in this situation and I can t believe this is really happening to Mr. Saylor and myself. Also I ve been told that retaliation from the court case is against the law. Please help us, don t let this go any further than it has already. Saylor s letter to Wall states, in part: I have been working at H.D.C. for almost eleven years. I have always liked working here and I like the clients in cottage #22. My co-worker Mr. Bill Shepherd (CTT) and I have been under a lot of stress lately because of the case in court in Flemington N.J. It started back in 1989 when Ms. Sampson and Mr. Greenfield worked in cottage #22. Mr. Mario Sclama (CTS) came to C-22 from C-12. He came here acting like [an] army storm trooper. Walking around like a dictator trying to [cause] trouble and it seemed he was good at [it.] The harassment seemed to have died [down] for a while after Mr. Greenfield and Ms. Sampson were transferred out of [Cottage # 22.] But it started all over again in . . . 1994 and got worse after the court [case] was over in Flemington N.J. For example on Dec. 6, 1994 at [around] 11:00 p.m. at the start[] of my shift [in] c-#22, while the court case was still going on[,] I heard Ida Gal (CTS) say to Mario Sclama (CTS) in a loud voice [for] my benefit[,] What goes around comes around[.] Right Mario. I told my co-worker Mr. Shepherd (CTT) about it [and] he wrote it down. Also (CTS) Mario [Sclama] picks at me for being a few minutes late on my break and he doesn t say anything to (CTT) Fred Lancaster or (CTT) Irene Capitulik when they are late returning from their breaks. (I am submitting a statement to you that I wrote to Mr. Bruno (HCTS) concerning the [memos] from Mr. Sclama.) It seems he is just trying to harass[] me. Mr. Sclama (CTS) always seems to talk [in] a nasty tone of voice to Mr. Shepherd (CTT) and myself. But he goes out of his way to be real nice to the other two direct care [technicians] (Lancaster and Capitulik) at all [times.] Mrs. Ida Gal (CTS) acts with animosity [toward] Mr. Shepherd (CTT) and myself but when Mario (CTS) is not around she seems to treat us better. It seems Mr. Sclama . . . intimidates Mrs. Gal (CTS). I know she will never admit[] to it. It seems Mr. Sclama (CTS) does anything he wants and gets away with it. . . . . I hope writing this statement [to] you will not mean Mr. Shepherd (CTT) [and] myself may be moved to another cottage. . . . The problem is not Mr. Shepherd or myself. Mr. Shepherd and [I] worked in cottage #22 a long time before Mr. Sclama or Mrs. Gal came to C-#22 and we [had] no problem [] then. In response to those letters, the superintendent called a shift meeting on February 9, 1995. He later scheduled a counseling session for the shift on March 15, 1995. Plaintiffs did not attend the counseling session, however, claiming that they became aware of the meeting only the day before, on March 14, 1995, and that it conflicted with their schedules. Specifically, Shepherd stated that he could not attend because he had a conflicting appointment to drop off his car at a garage and had a bad head cold. Saylor s asserted reason for not attending was that he would be out of town. The atmosphere in the cottage remained unchanged. Plaintiffs allege that on February 3, 1995, Sclama insisted that Shepherd give a particular client a shower in the middle of the night after the client had urinated in bed. As a result of the shower, the client became violent, screamed and yelled, and caused much disturbance in the dorm room and to the staff. Shepherd claims that he was always told not to shower this client in the middle of the night, because [the client would then become] violent, self abusive and destructive in his dorm room and [would be] a threat to staff and peers. Shepherd asserts that Sclama had given those exact instructions to the staff at a previous shift meeting. Shepherd alleges that Sclama purposely created that disruptive situation to upset him. Plaintiffs further allege that on February 10, 1995, Sclama and Gal, along with a housekeeper, William Cordes, were laughing and talking about a newspaper article regarding the Sampson-Greenfield discrimination case. Plaintiffs claim that the supervisors were speaking loud enough for them to hear. Cordes allegedly remarked that Sampson and Greenfield would not get a penny of money. They all laughed and Sclama said, and some of them might have to go to jail before this is over. Plaintiffs assert that those comments were meant to harass them. Additionally, Cordes allegedly informed plaintiffs that some supervisors told him it wasn t too late for [plaintiffs] to write statements saying that [they] were wrong about what happened in cottage 22. Cordes also told plaintiffs that he had heard from certain supervisors that the superintendent was mad as hell, and that people who had written statements adverse to their supervisors would be transferred. Plaintiffs allege that Sclama and Gal were behind Cordes comments in view of their close relationship with the housekeeper. On February 27, 1995, after allegedly experiencing hostility from Sclama, Shepherd went home sick because his nerves were bad and he felt sick [to his] stomach. Shepherd testified that Sclama was unfriendly and nasty looking all night to me [and] did not talk to me at all[.] Around late February or early March, Shepherd requested to be transferred to another cottage. In reacting to that request, Gal allegedly remarked, we were going to get rid of you[] anyway. On March 2, 1995, Shepherd filed a discrimination complaint with the New Jersey Department of Human Services (DHS). On the complaint form, he listed the dates on which the discriminatory activities allegedly occurred, November 30, 1994, through and including February 27, 1995. (Although only Shepherd signed the form, it also refers to Saylor and appears to have been filed on behalf of both employees.) On March 3, 1995, Sclama charged Saylor with using inappropriate language in front of clients. Saylor denied the allegation, and no disciplinary action was taken. On March 18, 1995, Shepherd transferred out of Cottage # 22 as he had requested. About that same time, in mid-March, Saylor applied for retirement effective August 1, 1995. On April 5, 1995, HDC brought disciplinary charges against Saylor for allegedly referring to Sclama as a god-damn guinea and fucking W.O.P. After a hearing, the charges were dismissed based on the hearing officer s conclusion that the supervisors had failed to corroborate the testimony of the one witness who allegedly had overheard Saylor s remarks. (Saylor had received a three-day suspension in 1990 on similar charges after admitting that he had stated to a former supervisor that the supervisor was the type of person who would have sexual intercourse with his own mother. ) On April 19, 1995, an assistant supervisor sent Saylor a letter of caution regarding an alleged patterning of sick leave usage by Saylor. The letter stated, [i]n an effort to be fair to residents and co-workers and to correct a problem which affects our ability to provide adequate care and training to our residents, it is strongly recommended that you make every effort to report for duty as scheduled. The letter further stated, [y]our record of attendance will continue to be observed and, should no improvement be noted, you will be required to submit acceptable medical verification for each absence due to illness. After Shepherd had transferred to a different cottage and Saylor had retired, they each received a letter in response to their previous complaint to DHS. The letter to Shepherd informed him that DHS found no probable cause to support his charge that HDC had taken action against him for his participation in matters leading to the Sampson-Greenfield trial. The letter to Saylor similarly found that Saylor s charge was unsubstantiated. Plaintiffs appealed to the New Jersey Department of Personnel, which, in turn, concluded that the matter was moot because Shepherd had transferred out of Cottage # 22 and Saylor had retired. [Id. at ___ n.1, 122 S. Ct. at 2068 n.1, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___ n.1.] Title VII s statute of limitations requires that an aggrieved party file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2068, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___ (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1)). The employee in Morgan filed charges against the employer in early 1995, over four years from the date of the first alleged discriminatory act. Ibid. In analyzing the limitations question, the Court differentiated between discrete discriminatory acts and hostile work environment claims. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2070, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___. The Court explained that some discrete acts, such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2073, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___. Each [such] incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice. Ibid. (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1)). The Court further indicated that a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act occur[s] on the day that it happen[s]. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2070, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___. Thus, an employee under Title VII must file a charge within 180 or 300 days of the date of the [discrete] act or lose the ability to recover for it. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2071, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___. In a critical passage, the Court explained the distinction between a hostile work environment claim and a claim based on a discrete act: Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct. The unlawful employment practice therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. Such claims are based on the cumulative affect of individual acts. . . . . In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim exists, we look to all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee s work performance. . . . A hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice. . . . It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability. That act need not, however, be the last act. As long as the employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employment practice has occurred, even if it is still occurring. Subsequent events, however, may still be part of the one hostile work environment claim and a charge may be filed at a later date and still encompass the whole. [Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2073-74, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___ (internal citations and footnotes omitted).] The employer in Morgan had argued for a more limited application of the continuing violation doctrine. More specifically, the employer had contended that recovery for out-of-time acts should be available only in hostile environment cases where the plaintiff reasonably did not know such conduct was discriminatory or where the discriminatory nature of such conduct is recognized as discriminatory only in light of later events. Id. at ___ n.11, 122 S. Ct. at 2074 n.11, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___ n.11. In explicitly rejecting that argument, the Court indicated that other avenues of relief are available to employers. Ibid. As examples, the Court cited equitable defenses such as waiver, estoppel, or laches that would apply when a plaintiff unreasonably delays in filing a charge. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2076-77, ___ L. Ed.2d at ___. [Shepherd, supra, 336 N.J. Super. at 420 (citing Woods-Pirozzi, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 276; T.L. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 616, 663 (App. Div.) (Skillman, J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19 (1992), aff d as modified on other grounds sub nom. Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. 587).] There are subtle but discernible differences between the standard for a hostile work environment and the standard for constructive discharge. The hostile work environment claim requires severe or pervasive conduct that objectively alters the conditions of employment and is hostile or abusive. Loss of a tangible job benefit is not necessary for a hostile work environment claim because the harassment itself affects the terms of conditions of employment. Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 507. In contrast, constructive discharge requires not merely severe or pervasive conduct, but conduct that is so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign rather than continue to endure it. Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. Super. 412, 428 (App. Div. 2001). More precisely, the standard envisions a sense of outrageous, coercive and unconscionable requirements. Ibid. Simply put, a constructive discharge claim requires more egregious conduct than that sufficient for a hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 331-32 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that to establish constructive discharge under Title VII plaintiff is required to demonstrate a discriminary work environment even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2001) (observing that to establish constructive discharge claim under Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work environment claim ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying those tenets, we are not convinced on the record presented that a reasonable jury could find defendants conduct to have been so unbearable that it would have forced Saylor s retirement. Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 545. That conclusion is consistent with our earlier finding in respect of plaintiffs hostile work environment claim. Put differently, because Saylor has alleged conduct only minimally necessary to form a hostile work environment claim, supra at ___ (slip op. at 33), he cannot survive summary judgment under the elevated constructive discharge standard unless he asserts additional facts. Moreover, Saylor did not, in our view, do all that was reasonably necessary to remain employed, an additional consideration in this setting. In fact, Saylor absented himself from a critical counseling session called by the superintendent to discuss the very issues raised by his internal complaint. Lastly, defendants indicate, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that Saylor contemplated retiring more than a year before the Sampson-Greenfield trial. That fact suggests that Saylor intended to retire for reasons other than the complained-of violations. When viewed in a light most favorable to him, Saylor s constructive discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-14/ 15 September Term 2001 WILLIAM SHEPHERD and RICHARD SAYLOR, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. HUNTERDON DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER, MARIO SCLAMA, Cottage Training Supervisor and IDA GAL, Cottage Training Supervisor, Defendants-Appellants, and WILLIAM WALL, Superintendent, LEON CRONCE, Assistant Superintendent, ARTHUR SEARFASS, Assistant Supervisor of Professional Residential Services, VINCENT MURANTE, Cottage Training Supervisor and DONALD STAMBAUGH, Cottage Training Supervisor, Defendants. ZAZZALI, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the comprehensive opinion of the Court that plaintiffs hostile work environment claims are not barred by the statute of limitations under the LAD, and that those claims present material issues of fact for a jury to determine. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 3). However, I cannot join in the majority s conclusion that Saylor did not allege sufficient facts to sustain a claim of constructive discharge. The majority reasons that because Saylor has alleged conduct only minimally necessary to form a hostile work environment claim, . . . he cannot survive summary judgment under the elevated constructive discharge standard unless he asserts additional facts. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 37). In my view, the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Saylor, reveals a triable issue regarding both hostile work environment and constructive discharge. I therefore respectfully dissent. Therefore, like the Appellate Division, I would allow Saylor s constructive discharge claim to be decided by a jury. Justices Stein and Long join in this opinion. NO. A-14/15 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court WILLIAM SHEPHERD and RICHARD SAYLOR, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. HUNTERDON DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER, MARIO SCLAMA, Cottage Training Supervisor and IDA GAL, Cottage Training Supervisor, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED August 7, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali DISSENTING OPINION BY