Case Title: Betts v. Crawford

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Betts v. Crawford1998 WY 130965 P.2d 680Case Number: 98-30Decided: 10/13/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Terry 
L. BETTS and Kay T. Betts, husband and wife, Appellants (Defendants),

v.

Bonnie CRAWFORD, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Fremont County, Nancy 
J. Guthrie, J.

 

Jeffrey J. Gonda, Jonathan 
A. Botten (argued), and James L. Salmon of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for 
Appellants (Defendants).

David B. Hooper, Riverton, 
for Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1] Homeowners Terry and Kay Betts filed this appeal 
seeking a new trial after a jury found that their negligence caused injuries to 
their housecleaner Bonnie Crawford and awarded her substantial damages. The 
Bettses contend a new trial is warranted because an expert's surprise medical 
testimony was presented to the jury, and the trial court's refusal of their 
proffered jury instruction on Crawford's duty of care prejudiced 
them.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The Bettses present 
these issues for our review:

 

Is 
a new trial required under the following circumstances: (1) at trial, an expert 
witness rendered a previously undisclosed, surprise opinion, and (2) the 
expert's trial opinion directly contradicted the expert's opinion as 
represented in the expert's designation, and (3) the expert's trial opinion 
directly contradicted the expert's opinion given during his deposition, 
and (4) the opposing counsel relied upon the expert's disclosed opinion 
in deciding not to retain a rebuttal expert, and (5) the trial court refused 
to strike the undisclosed surprise expert opinion?

 

Is a new trial required because the 
trial court refused to instruct the jury on an employee's duty to exercise care 
respecting the usual risks associated with her employment?

 

Crawford rephrases the issues 
as:

 

I. 
Were the opinions of Dr. Crane (a treating physician) a surprise to Defendants 
or was his testimony essentially unchanged from his deposition testimony as 
supplemented by his continuing treatment notes and the notes and deposition 
testimony of other physicians?

 

          
II. Were adequate instructions given to the jury concerning Defendants' 
theory of the case?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] Bonnie Crawford cleaned 
house for the Bettses for several hours each week. The Bettses have small 
children, and Crawford occasionally had to pick up items left on the stairs that 
led to the basement laundry room. On July 22, 1994, as Crawford was carrying 
bundled sheets to be laundered, she tripped over some items left on the stairs, 
fell down the stairs, and suffered serious injuries. On October 23, 1996, she 
filed suit against the Bettses, alleging their negligence caused her 
injuries.

 

[¶5] In her complaint, 
Crawford alleged that she suffered injuries to her "C-spine, chest, skull, right 
knee, left lower leg and lower back resulting in multiple contusions and 
abrasions and post concussion syndrome" and claimed the severe injuries resulted 
in numerous medical procedures and therapy, continuing pain and suffering, and 
permanent physical disability. Before trial, Crawford designated Peter Crane, 
M.D., as one of six medical doctor expert witnesses. Dr. Crane had treated 
Crawford in July and August of 1994 for her injuries and was deposed by the Bettses on April 9, 
1997. On October 1, 1997, Crawford filed her pretrial memorandum listing the 
medical records and resume of Dr. Crane as exhibits and summarizing his 
testimony as:

 

Dr. Crane is plaintiff's treating neurologist and a 
named expert witness for the plaintiff. He is expected to testify in accordance 
with his expert designation filed herein, his tests, evaluations and 
examinations of plaintiff and his deposition taken in this matter, which is 
incorporated herein by reference. Further, Dr. Crane is expected to testify in 
accordance with the medical records of Lander Valley Medical 
Center.

 

[¶6] The Bettses contend 
that Dr. Crane's deposition testimony was favorable to them, and they decided 
they did not need to designate an expert to rebut Dr. Crane's testimony. 
Crawford saw or consulted with Dr. Crane again on May 2, May 14, June 5, and 
June 13, 1997, and although Dr. Crane's notes are not part of the record, both 
parties agree that the Bettses were supplied with these notes on July 31, 1997, 
and September 16, 1997. The Bettses contend that neither these notes, later 
supplementations, nor Crawford's pretrial memorandum filed on September 30, 
1997, informed them that Dr. Crane had changed the medical opinions he gave in 
his deposition and would testify differently at trial.

 

[¶7] Trial was held on 
November 3, 1997. During direct examination, Dr. Crane testified for Crawford, 
describing the injuries she suffered at the time of the fall and describing her 
condition at the time of trial. When asked about the 1994 magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) scan of her brain, Dr. Crane testified:

 

A. 
The lumbar MRI scan, the scan of her back was felt to look normal. And the scan 
of her brain showed a few abnormalities in the brain that were thought to either 
represent a previous sheer injury, meaning a tearing of the nerve cells, or a 
demyelinating process. And that means one of a variety of disorders that can 
damage the insulating sheath around certain nerve cells.

 

          
Q. Did that have a particular - that finding, did that have a particular 
significance to you at that time?

 

A. 
Well, at that time, no. I really didn't think it was significant. At least I 
don't think it had anything to do with her headaches and I still don't. And she 
really - I'm not totally convinced that she has any symptoms related to them, 
but I think they could have been a manifestation of the fall and the head 
injuries she sustained during the fall.

 

Q. 
Okay. Have you recently found some additional scientific evidence that supports 
your opinion in that regard?

 

A. 
Yes. I - I used to think that these types of sheering injuries occurred with 
serious head injuries that would render a person unconscious for days or weeks, 
or at least hours. And in her case, it's not totally clear that she was 
unconscious. She may or may not have been unconscious.

 

But there is - there are some studies that show that 
you can get this type of injury even with a milder - or with this kind of - it's 
called diffuse axonal injury, again with a mild head injury, without necessarily 
losing consciousness. So I think it's possible it did occur 
-

 

[Bettses' Attorney]: Well, I'm going - that answer as 
phrased is speculation. It has to be stricken. If we are going to talk about 
possibilities -

 

          
THE COURT: I will instruct the jury to disregard that 
answer.

 

Q. 
Let me ask you, Doctor, if there's a way you can rephrase your answer to - tell 
me what you think today of those MRI results.

 

          
A. I think that they are compatible with her head 
injury.

 

[¶8] Dr. 
Crane continued on direct examination with considerable testimony about 
Crawford's present condition, disabilities, and pain and suffering. On 
cross-examination, he was questioned about the MRI brain scan and said 
this:

 

          
Q. Okay. So we are talking in the deposition right here about the MRI of 
the brain, correct?

 

          
A. Correct.

 

Q. 
And then your next answer talks about the abnormalities that you've just talked 
about here today that were seen on MRI, correct?

 

          
A. Right. . . .

 

Q. 
And the next questions says: And it is your opinion that these abnormalities 
would not have been caused by her fall down the stairs, 
correct?

 

          
A. Yes.

 

Q. 
And your answer was: Yes. I think it's quite unlikely. Just because of the fact 
that they didn't become brighter with the dye, which with a recent abnormality 
you would think it would. Correct?

 

          
A. Yes. That's right, yeah.

 

Q. 
And then the next question: Are these the type of abnormalities that could cause 
headache symptoms? And your answer to that one was, you don't think 
so.

 

          
A. Correct.

 

Q. 
Now she - Mrs. Crawford was discharged from the hospital the day after the MRI 
studies were completed, correct?

 

          
A. Yes.

 

          
Q. Is it true that generally, people with these types of muscle injuries 
get better and improve?

 

A. 
I think this is the third time I've been asked that question, and I said 20 to 
40 percent of the time they don't. And I didn't say that 60 to 80 they do, so . 
. .

 

          
Q. You expected that Mrs. Crawford would improve when you saw her in 
August of '94, didn't you?

 

          
A. Yes. I thought she would.

 

          
Q. Soft tissues and muscles, ligaments, they generally heal given time, 
don't they?

 

          
A. 60 to 80 percent of the time.

 

[¶9]The 
cross-examination continued to elicit testimony from Dr. Crane that in August of 
1994, it was his opinion that Crawford was improving and would continue to 
improve. On redirect examination, he testified:

 

          
Q. Do you have a comment to make?

 

          
A. Yeah. Just about the abnormalities about her cranial on the MRI scan 
which I find interesting.

 

          
Q. What do you find interesting about the abnormalities on her MRI 
scan?

 

A. 
I'd forgotten that she had received the gadolinium, which is the dye which tends 
to make certain brain abnormalities brighter depending on what kind of 
abnormality it is, and depending on the time that the scan is done from - how 
far from the date of injury the scan is done.

 

And in fact, just about an hour before coming here, I 
was doing a literature search on diffuse axonal injury, because I wasn't sure 
that you could see it with - without having a very severe head injury that would 
make you unconscious for days or hours - or hours or days or weeks. But it turns 
out that you can.

 

Now, I had forgotten about the gadolinium which was 
brought up in my deposition. And I guess we would have to talk to a radiologist 
if one wanted to really be certain about this. But I - my feeling at the time of 
the deposition was that being only a month from the time of injury, it probably 
would light up with the dye. And it didn't. So that would make me feel that that 
was there before the injury. However, one would have to double-check that with a 
radiologist if that was important.

 

          
Q. Apparently you have a question in your own mind about it now, having 
reviewed some recent literature.

 

          
A. Right.

 

[¶10] Crawford attempted to 
enter Dr. Crane's medical records into evidence, and the Bettses objected. The 
court withheld its ruling and did not enter them into evidence at that time. The 
next day, the Bettses moved to strike Dr. Crane's testimony, claiming they had 
never been notified that Dr. Crane had seen Crawford after 1994 and claiming 
prejudicial surprise testimony. In reply to the trial court's question as to 
whether Dr. Crane had implied a brain injury, Crawford argued that Dr. Crane had 
only suggested that his later research revealed the brain abnormalities were 
possibly related to the fall, but had then withdrawn his testimony when he 
stated that one would have to check with a radiologist. The trial court ruled 
that the testimony would not be stricken, and the jury would not be instructed 
to disregard it. The trial continued, and several more doctors testified for 
Crawford.

 

[¶11] During closing 
arguments, Crawford did not discuss a brain injury and referred to Dr. Crane's 
testimony only to argue that Crawford should be compensated for future medical 
damages because she is among the twenty to forty percent of people who will 
never fully recover from a lifetime of problems of disabling headaches and will 
have future expenses. The Bettses' closing argument referred to Dr. Crane's 
testimony to point out that Crawford had last seen him in August of 1994 when he 
believed that she had improved and would continue to improve, and had then not 
seen him again until 1997 after her lawsuit was filed. On rebuttal, Crawford 
contended that she had returned to see 
Dr. Crane at the urging of her attorneys to see if the doctor could help her 
feel better, and he could not. None of the three arguments contended that Dr. 
Crane believed that the MRI scan indicated a brain injury.

 

[¶12] Before the jury began 
deliberations, the Bettses offered a jury instruction concerning a servant's 
assumption of risk of all open and obvious risks of employment. The trial court 
refused that instruction. The jury returned a verdict finding the Bettses 
eighty-five percent negligent and Crawford fifteen percent negligent and 
awarding $178,000 in damages. The Bettses filed a timely notice of appeal and 
filed a motion to supplement the record with discovery documents, including Dr. 
Crane's deposition. Crawford objected and, although the order is not in the 
record, the Bettses inform us that the trial court orally denied their motion 
during a hearing on January 27, 1998. 
The Bettses filed the same motion with this Court, and that motion was 
denied.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶13] The Bettses contend 
that the change in Dr. Crane's testimony at trial from his testimony in his 
deposition is prejudicial surprise testimony that the trial court should have 
excluded, and its admission requires a new trial. Crawford contends that the 
Bettses had all of Dr. Crane's notes prior to trial, there was no motion in 
limine made to restrict his testimony, and there was no request for a 
continuance and, thus, the Bettses did not preserve the error for appeal. 
Crawford further contends that there was no prejudice because the trial 
testimony did not amount to a change in testimony and does not constitute 
surprise testimony.

 

[¶14] A trial court's 
decision to exclude evidence at trial because its pretrial orders regarding 
discovery and disclosure of information were violated is reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard. Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo. 
1996); Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 237-38 (Wyo. 1988). The trial 
court's decision is governed by WYO. R. CIV. P. 61, which 
states:

 

No 
error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a 
verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties.

 

[¶15] On appeal, our rule is 
that a trial court will not have abused its discretion in determining that an 
error has not affected the substantial rights of the parties unless it caused a 
miscarriage of justice, damaged the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the 
judicial process, or clearly possessed a capacity to bring about an unjust 
result. Robinson, 914 P.2d  at 155.

 

[¶16] We hold the trial 
court's decision not to exclude the testimony to be proper. The basis for the 
decision is not in the record; however, it appears that the trial court did not 
conclude that this particular testimony presented a new theory of recovery. On 
appeal, the Bettses suggest surprise because the testimony provided evidence of 
a brain injury that they were unable to rebut with their own expert witness; 
however, at trial they did not request a continuance. It is established that the 
appropriate response from a surprised party who wishes to counter testimony is a 
request for a continuance, and the failure to request one precludes a claim of 
prejudice.  White v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Western Wyoming Community College Dist., 648 P.2d 528, 537 (Wyo. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107, 103 S. Ct. 732, 74 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1983). 
Considering that the Bettses only requested exclusion of the evidence, it is 
also fair if the trial court concluded that the Bettses had not been prevented 
from effectively cross-examining Dr. Crane by using his previous deposition 
testimony. Our review of the record leads to this conclusion. We also conclude 
that the Bettses' case was not harmed by this testimony because, from the 
beginning, Crawford sought damages for headaches associated with a concussion; 
she used Dr. Crane's testimony to argue 
this to the jury without mention of a brain injury; upon the one objection the 
trial court did strike testimony for speculation; and Dr. Crane did ultimately 
state only a radiologist could make a determination of whether or not head 
injuries reflected by the MRI were caused by her fall at the Bettses' 
house.

 

[¶17] In their second 
contention, the Bettses complain that the trial court did not correctly instruct 
the jury on Crawford's duty of care.  
They contend that a proposed instruction refused by the trial court 
appropriately presented their theory of defense. It read:

 

A 
servant assumes all of the risks and dangers pertaining to his employment which 
are known to him, or discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care on his part, 
which includes assuming the risk of all open and obvious risks of employment, 
even though said risks are directly attributable to his master's 
negligence.

 

The proposed instruction 
cited to Owl Creek Coal Co. v. Goleb, 210 F. [209], 127 C.C.A. 27 (1914); 
Boatman v. Miles, 27 Wyo. 481, 199 P. 933, 26 A.L.R. 864 (1921); and Eiban v. 
Widsteen, 31 Wn.2d 655, 198 P.2d 667, 669 (1948). While this proposed 
instruction was rejected, the instructions given presented Bettses' theory of 
defense that Crawford's negligence caused the accident and injuries, some of 
which were preexisting and unrelated to the accident. Regarding the contested 
issue of breach of duty, the trial court instructed the jury that homeowners 
must use reasonable care to avoid injury to anyone on the premises with the 
permission of the homeowners, that an 
employer had a duty to furnish an employee with a safe place to work, that all 
persons have a duty to use ordinary care, and that comparative fault 
applied.

 

[¶18] Our standard of review 
for alleged error in jury instructions is:

 

Errors of substantive law contained in the language 
of an instruction require reversal if the error is prejudicial. In reviewing the 
content of a challenged jury instruction, the charge is considered as a whole. 
To measure the degree of prejudice, jury instructions are viewed in the light of 
the entire trial, including the allegations of the complaint, conflict in the 
evidence on critical issues and the arguments of counsel. The goal of our review 
is to determine if the charge presents a comprehensive, balanced and 
fundamentally accurate statement of the governing law to the jury. The charge is 
deemed adequate if it is not likely to confuse or mislead the jury. The fact 
that an instruction may have been more precisely drafted or drafted in a way 
more favorable to a party does not warrant reversal for a new 
trial.

 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶19] While the Bettses 
concede that the adoption of the comparative negligence statute meant that 
assumption of risk is no longer an absolute defense to negligence, they insist 
their proposed instruction was necessary to properly apportion fault. In order 
to show that the proposed instruction appropriately stated that an employee had 
a duty of care regarding the usual risks inherent in her employment, the Bettses 
look to Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981), which concluded that 
the comparative negligence statute barred assumption of risk as an absolute 
defense; to Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979), which said 
that assumption of risk is a basis for 
apportionment of fault; and to Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific, 859 P.2d 85, 89 
(Wyo. 1993), which found that an assumption of risk jury instruction given to a 
jury in a products liability action was harmless error.

 

[¶20] In reply, Crawford 
views the argument as inappropriate for an assumption of risk instruction as 
well as an improper attempt to predicate liability on a common law 
classification abolished in Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 296 (Wyo. 1993). 
She points out that the court gave a general duty of care instruction based on 
the pattern instruction and the comparative fault instruction, and contends 
that, considering the law from Clarke and Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Company, 
550 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1976), the jury was appropriately 
instructed.

 

 [¶21] In Wyoming, there is no distinction 
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk when raised as a defense 
to an established breach of duty. Brittain, 601 P.2d  at 534. The Bettses 
misapprehend that part of Brittain which states that it is a basis for 
apportionment of fault. This language in Brittain explains that after the 
enactment of the comparative negligence law, assumption of risk, because it is a 
type of contributory negligence, merged into the system of comparative 
negligence, thus, allowing the comparison of fault. Id.; W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 496 (5th ed. 1984). The Bettses 
also cannot rely on Barnette, which 
offered a comprehensive discussion of the viability of the assumption of risk 
defense in the master/servant context and recognized that, in addition to this 
defense, a form of assumption of risk existed which did not allow a cause of 
action against an employer. Barnette, 622 P.2d  at 1356-62. This Court ultimately 
concluded that, in Wyoming, assumption of risk did not prevent a duty from 
arising on the part of an employer, and that assumption of risk was no longer a 
defense because of the enactment of the comparative negligence statute. Id. 
Recently, our discussion in Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562 (Wyo. 1995), in the context of assumption of-risk language 
contained in the Recreation Safety Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 through 123 (Supp. 
1992), effectively confirmed Barnette's distinction and recognized that the type 
of assumption of risk that limits the duty owed by the recreation privilege is 
primary assumption of risk, which is to be distinguished from secondary 
assumption of risk, a type of contributory negligence, and an affirmative 
defense to an established breach of duty. Halpern, 890 P.2d  at 565. Anderson v. 
Louisiana-Pacific acknowledged that when knowledge of the danger was at issue, 
assumption of risk remained a defense in a strict liability action because the 
comparative fault statute did not apply to a non-negligence action. Anderson, 
859 P.2d  at 89. The concurring opinion, however, clarified that the generic 
assumption-of-risk language was no longer favored over the language appropriate 
to the "specific category of defense under scrutiny." Anderson, 859 P.2d  at 89 
(Macy, J., concurring); and see Halpern, 890 P.2d  at 565.

 

[¶22] Given this state of 
the law, the Bettses' proposed jury instruction as an affirmative defense would 
not have presented a comprehensive, balanced and fundamentally accurate 
statement of the governing law to the jury. We also agree that Crawford's status 
was that of an invitee on the premises, that Wyoming has abolished predicating 
liability on the common law classifications of invitee and licensee, and the 
jury was appropriately instructed that the Bettses owed her a duty to act with 
reasonable care. Clarke, 858 P.2d  at 296.

 

[¶23] We affirm the 
judgment.