Case Title: People v. Nieves

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84564

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 84564-Agenda 9-January 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
								HECTOR NIEVES, Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Hector Nieves, was convicted of first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1992)). The same jury found that
defendant was eligible for the death penalty and that there were no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death penalty.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death.
Defendant's execution has been stayed pending direct review by
this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603,
609(a).
	On appeal, defendant argues that (1) he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney presented an
invalid "mercy killing" defense; (2) he was improperly found
eligible for the death penalty; (3) the trial court erred in allowing
the State to introduce hearsay evidence at defendant's sentencing
hearing; (4) the trial court improperly denied defendant's request
to make a statement in allocution; and (5) the Illinois death penalty
statute is unconstitutional. We will address each of these
arguments, and the facts relating to them, in turn.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
	Defendant first argues that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel when his trial attorney presented an invalid
"mercy killing" defense.
Background
	Defendant was indicted for the murder of Rafael Cuevas, a/k/a
Pookie-Pookie. On May 10, 1992, the Chicago police found
Cuevas' body in an abandoned store front building at 2452 West
North Avenue. Officer Ronald Ferrari of the Chicago police
department's mobile crime lab testified that he received an
assignment to go to that location. Upon arriving, Ferrari observed
Cuevas' body lying on a bloodstained mattress. Ferrari testified
that Cuevas had suffered severe trauma to the top of his head, a
gash on his forehead, and bruises on his head and face. On a table
near the body, Ferrari found a bottle cap, two burnt matches, hand
wipes, and alcohol swabs. According to Ferrari, these items are
commonly found where people are using crack cocaine. Ferrari did
not find any money on Cuevas' person.
	Dr. Thamrong Chira performed the post-mortem examination.
Chira found lacerations on the forehead, the right side of the head,
and the face. Cuevas also had a large depressed skull fracture.
Chira found that Cuevas' brain was bruised and had hemorrhaged.
According to Chira, Cuevas died of craniocerebral injuries; Cuevas
had received at least six blows to his head. Chira found alcohol in
Cuevas' blood, but all tests for other drugs were negative. Cuevas
tested positive for HIV.
	John Muldoon, a former Cook County assistant State's
Attorney, testified that, on May 20, 1994, he was working as a trial
supervisor in the felony review unit. On that day, he received an
assignment to go to New York to interview a suspect who had
surrendered to the police. Muldoon flew to New York with a court
reporter, Cordelia Bussie. When they arrived, they met with
another Chicago detective, Louis Rabbit, and two detectives from
Brooklyn. They went to a police precinct in Manhattan, and
Muldoon learned that he would be speaking to defendant.
	Muldoon read defendant his Miranda rights, and Muldoon and
Rabbit then interviewed defendant for approximately 20 minutes.
The detectives asked defendant if he would make a statement to
the court reporter, and he agreed. The court reporter transcribed
the statement, and defendant signed it.
	In the statement, defendant confesses to killing Cuevas.
Defendant states that, on May 9, 1992, he was in an abandoned
building at 2452 West North Avenue with Pookie-Pookie.
Defendant had known Pookie-Pookie for approximately three
months; defendant knew him "from the street." At the time,
defendant was living in the abandoned building.
	On the date in question, at approximately 8 p.m., defendant
was talking to Pookie-Pookie, and Pookie-Pookie said, "Man I tell
you this shit you know. I want to die." Defendant inquired as to
what manner of "shit" Pookie-Pookie referred, and Pookie-Pookie
responded, "Drugs and alcohol and things like that." The
conversation lasted about 10 minutes, after which Pookie-Pookie
said he wanted to go to sleep. Defendant waited until Pookie-Pookie went to sleep, and then went outside for about 10 minutes.
	Defendant returned with a 2 x 4 board so that he could kill
Pookie-Pookie. When the detectives asked why defendant intended
to kill Pookie-Pookie, defendant responded, "Because he said he
wanted to die." Defendant struck Pookie-Pookie several times in
the head with the 2 x 4. He did not remember exactly how many
times he hit him, but he believed it was more than 5 and fewer than
10. Defendant said that he threw the board away about 10 feet
from Pookie-Pookie, inside the abandoned building. Referring to
the board, defendant said, "The police never find it." Defendant
surrendered to the New York police two years later.
	The State also presented the testimony of Cuevas' sister,
Blanca Nater. Nater testified that Cuevas lived in a house with
three friends at North Avenue and Fairfield. Cuevas' share of the
rent was $55. Cuevas supported himself through public assistance
and food stamps. Nater saw Cuevas on May 7, 1992, when she
took him to pick up his public assistance check. The check was for
$155, of which defendant used $55 to pay his rent. Nater spoke to
Cuevas briefly on May 8. He did not seem depressed on either
occasion, and Nater testified that he was always happy.
	Nater testified that Cuevas was HIV positive and had a
drinking problem. He was receiving treatment for HIV at St. Mary
Hospital and St. Elizabeth Hospital. Nater said that Cuevas'
attitude was that he would have to deal with the HIV, and she
never heard him say that he wanted to die because of it. Cuevas
and Nater had made plans to go to their mother's house on May 10
to celebrate Mother's Day. On cross-examination, Nater indicated
that she was aware that Cuevas had been treated for depression,
but she still insisted that he was happy all the time.
	At the close of the prosecution's case, the defense attorney
stated that he planned to call two witnesses: Chicago Police
Detective Louis Rabbit and the keeper of records from St.
Elizabeth Hospital. As to the keeper of records, the defense
attorney stated that the person would testify about Cuevas' suicidal
ideations, which the defense attorney stated were relevant to his
defense that Cuevas wanted to die. The attorney further explained
that he would be seeking a second degree murder instruction. The
trial court informed the defense that the keeper of records would
not be allowed to testify because that testimony was irrelevant. The
court further explained that it would not be giving a second degree
murder instruction.
	The defense called Rabbit as its only witness. Rabbit testified
about defendant's statements immediately preceding his statement
to the court reporter. Defendant said that he wanted to tell what
had happened. He said that Pookie-Pookie was one of his "street
friends" and that he killed Pookie-Pookie because Pookie-Pookie
wanted to die. According to defendant, Pookie-Pookie frequently
complained that he wanted to die.
	At the instruction conference, the court denied the defense
request that the jury be instructed on second degree murder. In his
closing argument, the defense attorney argued that the jury should
find defendant not guilty because the killing was a mercy killing
and that defendant was merely helping his friend who wanted to
die.
Analysis
	On appeal, defendant contends that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel when his attorney presented an invalid "mercy
killing" defense. Defendant argues that "mercy killing" is not a
defense to first degree murder and that his attorney improperly
conceded his guilt to the jury. Although pursuing an invalid defense
may be proper strategy when the defendant consents to the
strategy, defendant argues that the record here does not show his
consent.
	A defendant raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
must meet the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show
that (1) counsel's performance was so seriously deficient as to fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance so prejudiced
the defendant as to deny him a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. To meet the
second prong of the test, a defendant must demonstrate "that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068.
	In certain situations when a defendant argues that he received
the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney conceded
guilt, prejudice will be presumed. See, e.g., People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 464-65 (1985). That standard, however, applies only
when defense counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's
case to meaningful adversarial testing. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984); People v.
Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 269-70 (1989); Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d  at
464-65. In Hattery, for instance, the defense attorney told the
jurors in his opening statement that they would find the defendant
guilty and eligible for the death penalty and that the only question
was whether the defendant should receive the death penalty. The
attorney did not present any evidence and did not advance a theory
of defense. This court held that, in that situation, prejudice would
be presumed, and the defendant did not have to meet the
Strickland standard. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d  at 461-64. In this case, by
contrast, defendant concedes, and we agree, that Strickland
supplies the proper standard. The defense attorney extensively
cross-examined State witnesses, called a witness in support of his
theory of defense, and forcefully argued that defendant should be
found "not guilty."
	The primary case relied upon by defendant is People v.
Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233 (1989). In Chandler, the defendant was
charged with murder, residential burglary, and aggravated arson.
The evidence showed that two persons broke into the victim's
house, stole several items, stabbed the victim, and then set the
house on fire. The defendant confessed to being involved in the
crime, but asserted that a codefendant killed the victim. The State
argued that defendant was guilty of murder, either as a principal or
as an accomplice. The defense presented no witnesses, although
the defense attorney promised the jury in his opening statement
that the defendant would testify. In both opening and closing
statements, the defendant's attorney conceded that defendant was
involved in the crime, but denied that defendant was guilty of
murder. Under the law of felony murder and accountability,
however, the concessions by the defendant's attorney amounted to
a concession of guilt. This court applied the Strickland test and
found that the defendant received the ineffective assistance of
counsel. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d  at 237-50.
	Since Chandler was issued, this court has revisited this issue
several times. In People v. Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d 466 (1992), the
defendant was charged with murder. The evidence against
defendant included his own detailed confession. The defendant's
attorney, through cross-examination of the State's witnesses,
attempted to establish the affirmative defense of compulsion,
although compulsion is not a defense to first degree murder. This
court found that defendant could not establish either prong of the
Strickland test. In rejecting defendant's claim, this court stated:
		"What the instant case presents is a situation where the
defendant literally had no defense. Evidence of his guilt
was overwhelming. His counsel conceived a compulsion
defense which, though not a legal defense, could or might
have persuaded a jury not to convict. Jury nullification is
always a possibility. It is not inconceivable that a
compulsion defense might have evoked empathy,
compassion or understanding and sympathy in the minds
of the jurors. It is a truism that if a man is drowning, he
will grasp at a straw that comes floating by. A weak or
insufficient defense does not indicate ineffectiveness of
counsel in a case where a defendant has no defense. In this
case it would appear that defense counsel used his
imagination and resourcefulness to come up with
something where he had nothing to go on." Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d  at 473-74.
	In People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232 (1993), the defendant was
charged with murder, robbery, and home invasion. The evidence
against the defendant included his admission to stabbing the victim
in the chest four times. In opening statement at the guilt phase of
the trial, the defendant's attorney told the jury that the defendant
committed the homicide but was guilty of voluntary manslaughter
rather than murder. At the end of the guilt phase of the trial, the
judge denied the defense request for a voluntary manslaughter
instruction and told the defendant's attorney not to argue that
theory to the jury. The defense attorney instead argued that the
defendant did not intend to kill the victim. Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 260.
	On appeal, the defendant argued that his counsel was
ineffective for relying on theories that were not supported by the
evidence. This court rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel argument. The Page court noted that there was little
evidence to support the voluntary manslaughter defense, but held
that, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's
participation in the killing, the defense attorney might reasonably
have believed voluntary manslaughter to be the only reasonable
course of defense. Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 262. Further, this court held
that, with respect to the defendant's attorney switching to the
argument that the defendant did not intend to kill the victim, the
defendant could not meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test
in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant. Page,
155 Ill. 2d  at 266-67.
	In People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133 (1996), the defendant
was charged with first degree murder, armed robbery, and arson.
The defendant gave a statement in which he admitted his
involvement in the robbery, but placed the blame for the murder
and the arson on another participant in the crime. In his closing
argument, the defendant's attorney stated that the defendant's
statement was the correct version of the crime and that "if he's
guilty of anything, he's guilty of robbery." Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d  at
147.
	On appeal, the defendant argued that his attorney was
ineffective because his concession to the defendant's participation
in the robbery inevitably conceded the defendant's guilt of felony
murder. This court rejected the defendant's argument, finding that
the defendant could not meet the Strickland test. Shatner first
explained the holding in Chandler, noting that the finding of
ineffectiveness of counsel did not rest exclusively on Chandler's
counsel's alleged failure to develop a theory of innocence. Instead,
Chandler also relied on the defense counsel's cursory cross-examination of some witnesses, the failure to cross-examine others,
and his calling no witnesses to testify even though he stated in his
opening argument that the defendant would testify. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d  at 147.
	By contrast, the defense attorney in Shatner aggressively
cross-examined nearly every witness and called several witnesses
on the defendant's behalf. This court stated that it was the
defendant's own statements that undermined any claim of
innocence that he may have had. Shatner explained that, although
the defense's strategy of hoping the jury would convict the
defendant of only robbery was a risky one, it was perhaps the only
strategy that could have been seriously pursued given the
defendant's incriminating statements and the overwhelming
evidence of his guilt. Further, this court stated that:
		"If a defendant enters a not-guilty plea in the face of
overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we are unwilling to
find that his counsel was ineffective simply because he
failed to contrive a leak-proof theory of innocence on
defendant's behalf. To do so would effectively require
defense attorneys to engage in fabrication or subterfuge."
Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d  at 148.
	Turning to the present case, and keeping the above authorities
in mind, we cannot find that defendant received the ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant cannot meet either prong of the
Strickland test. Defendant's attorney hoped to convince the court
to instruct the jury on second degree murder. The basis for the
attorney's argument was that the "sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed" (720
ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1) (West 1998)) required for a finding of second
degree murder did not necessarily have to be viewed in terms of
anger and violence. The attorney's position was that the "sudden
and intense passion" could be viewed in terms of sympathy and the
desire to help a friend. While this is a dubious proposition at best
(see People v. Fausz, 95 Ill. 2d 535, 539 (1983) (only recognized
categories of serious provocation are substantial physical injury or
assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with
the offender's spouse), the defendant had confessed to the crime,
and his attorney was trying to come up with something where his
client had no defense. See Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d  at 474. Further,
defendant's attorney thoroughly cross-examined the State's
witnesses, presented a witness in support of his defense, and
vigorously argued that the defendant should be found "not guilty."
	Moreover, we cannot find that a reasonable probability exists
that, had counsel not pursued the invalid mercy killing strategy,
defendant would have been acquitted. The evidence against
defendant was overwhelming. Defendant gave a detailed confession
to the crime, and the physical evidence corroborated his account of
the crime.
	The defendant next argues that this choice of defenses was not
proper because he had a legitimate reasonable doubt defense
because, although he told the police that he threw the murder
weapon away approximately 10 feet from the body, the police
never found it. We note that, when the police searched the
building, they did not know that a board was the murder weapon.
Defendant did not confess until two years after the crime.
Defendant has not persuaded us that the police's failure to find a
particular board in an abandoned building raises sufficient doubt of
his guilt that, had he made that argument instead of the mercy
killing one, a reasonable probability exists that he would have been
acquitted.
	Defendant further argues that his failure to consent on the
record to the invalid mercy killing defense requires reversal of his
conviction. Our response to this assertion is twofold. First, in
Hattery, we stated that a defense attorney "may not concede his
client's guilt in the hope of obtaining a more lenient sentence where
a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless the record adequately
shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to his
counsel's strategy." Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d  at 465. Defendant's
attorney in this case did not concede guilt in the hope of obtaining
a more lenient sentence. He argued that his client should be found
not guilty. Second, we explained in a subsequent case that Hattery
did not hold that it is per se ineffectiveness whenever the defense
attorney concedes his client's guilt in the face of overwhelming
evidence and the defendant's consent does not appear in the
record. Rather, a defendant must still meet the Strickland test
unless the case involves a complete failure to subject the State's
case to meaningful adversarial testing. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d  at 268-270. As we held above, defendant cannot meet that test.
	Finally, defendant argues that the mercy killing strategy
defense was invalid because defendant did not reargue that theory
as a mitigating factor against the death penalty. Defendant appears
to read Ganus as establishing a per se rule that, when an attorney
argues an invalid defense, the strategy must be to either argue for
jury nullification or to reargue the invalid theory as a mitigating
factor at sentencing. Ganus establishes no such rule. The holding
in Ganus was merely that, on the facts of that case, the defendant
did not establish that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel and that he could not meet either prong of the Strickland
test. Likewise, defendant cannot meet either prong of the
Strickland test. Further, although defendant is correct that his
attorney did not specifically reargue the mercy killing theory at the
aggravation/mitigation phase, he fully developed that theory at
trial, and the jury was instructed that it could consider the evidence
at trial in mitigation. The sentencing jury also received the
instruction that a mitigating factor that can be considered is that
"the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act." 720 ILCS
5/9-1(c)(3) (West 1998).
	In sum, we cannot find that the defendant received the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant has shown neither that
his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness nor that a reasonable probability exists that, had his
attorney pursued another line of defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
ELIGIBILITY FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
	Defendant next argues that he was improperly found eligible
for the death penalty based on the aggravating factor that he was
convicted of two or more murders (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West
1998)). The second conviction relied on by the State to establish
defendant's death eligibility was defendant's conviction for the first
degree murder of Louis Vargas. Defendant killed Vargas on
September 13, 1992, and was convicted of the crime in June 1997.
According to defendant, although he was convicted of the Vargas
murder first, the crime itself occurred after Cuevas' murder.
Defendant contends that it was improper to find him eligible for the
death penalty based solely upon a subsequent crime, even though
the latter was tried first. We disagree.
	Defendant's rationale for this argument is that, to allow a
defendant to be eligible for the death penalty based upon a
subsequent homicide would result in an arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty. According to defendant, a
particular defendant's eligibility for the death penalty would depend
solely on the fortuitous circumstance of which of the two cases
was tried first and would be unrelated to the nature of the offense
or the individual character of the defendant.
	This court has repeatedly held that the sequence of convictions
and not the sequence of offenses determines whether the multiple-
murder eligibility factor has been established in a particular case.
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 109 (1998); People ex
rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d 470, 483 (1988); People v.
Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72, 105 (1986); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 533-34 (1984). In Johnson, Strayhorn, and Guest, we
rejected the precise argument that defendant raises here. Defendant
has not offered any compelling reasons for us to revisit the
holdings of these cases, and we thus decline to do so.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AT THE SENTENCING HEARING
	Defendant next argues that he was denied his constitutional
right to a fair death penalty sentencing hearing when the prosecutor
was allowed to introduce hearsay evidence in the form of
defendant's Department of Corrections master file. Jim Utley, who
worked in the records office of the Department of Corrections,
testified as to the contents of this file. Defendant, however, failed
to object when this evidence was introduced. Consequently, this
issue is waived. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).
	Defendant asks us to relax the waiver rule and review the issue
as plain error. Under Supreme Court Rule 615(a), we will review
plain errors affecting substantial rights, even if those errors were
not objected to during trial or raised in the post-trial motion. See
134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). We will invoke the plain error rule in two
limited circumstances: (1) where the evidence is closely balanced;
or (2) when the errors are of such magnitude that defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial and remedying the error is
necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People
v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996).
	Defendant's plain error argument consists of a single sentence
asking us to employ the plain error rule because the right to a fair
death penalty sentencing hearing is a fundamental right. The
balance of his argument consists of explaining why the admission
of the evidence was error, not plain error. He neither argues that
the evidence was closely balanced nor explains why the error is so
severe that it must be remedied to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process. Accordingly, we find the argument waived. See
177 Ill. 2d Rs. 341(e)(7), 612(i).
	Defendant also raises this issue as an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, arguing that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of the report. This argument
consists of that single statement and a citation to Strickland.
Defendant explains neither how his attorney's actions fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness nor how a reasonable
probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Accordingly, we find the
argument waived. See 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 341(e)(7), 612(i); People v.
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 499-500 (1996).
ALLOCUTION
	Defendant next contends that his due process rights were
denied when the trial court denied his request to make a statement
in allocution. Defendant concedes, however, that this court has
consistently held that defendants have neither a statutory nor a
constitutional right to make a statement in allocution in capital
sentencing hearings. See People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 259
(1998) (and cases cited therein). Defendant asks us to revisit the
holdings of those cases, but offers no persuasive reason why we
should do so. Accordingly, we decline defendant's request to
reconsider our previous holdings on this issue and hold that the
trial court did not err in denying defendant's request.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ILLINOIS DEATH
PENALTY STATUTE
	Finally, defendant raises several constitutional challenges to
the Illinois death penalty statute. Defendant argues the statute is
unconstitutional because (1) innocent people will inevitably be
executed; (2) the statute places a burden of proof on the defendant
that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence and
allows the sentencer to weigh a vague aggravating factor; and (3)
the statute fails to minimize sufficiently the risk of arbitrarily or
capriciously imposed death sentences. This court has considered
and rejected each of these claims. See, e.g., People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 211-20 (1998); People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 260-61
(1998); People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 300 (1999). Defendant
has not provided us with any persuasive reasons to revisit these
holdings.
CONCLUSION
	The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting
Tuesday, November 28, 2000, as the date on which the sentence
of death entered in the circuit court is to be imposed. Defendant
shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS
5/119-5 (West 1998)). The clerk of this court shall send a certified
copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the
warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the
institution where defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Nieves' murder conviction should not be
disturbed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be
allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Nieves' sentence of death
should therefore be vacated and he should be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1992). Because Nieves
has previously been convicted of first degree murder, the term of
his imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(i) (West 1992).