Case Title: Shealer v. Straka

Citation: 

Docket Number: 38/17

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Amy Shealer v. George Straka, No. 38, September Term, 2017.  Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
ESTATES & TRUSTS — PROBATING A WILL —PETITION TO CAVEAT 
 
Pursuant to the plain language of Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Estates & Trusts 
(“ET”) § 5-207, an orphans’ court is required to hold a judicial probate proceeding when 
an interested party files a petition to caveat after administrative probate.  Similarly, an 
orphans’ court is required to hold a new judicial probate proceeding when an interested 
party files a petition to caveat after judicial probate.  In addition, the legislative history 
confirms that the Maryland General Assembly intended to create this single procedure, i.e., 
a judicial probate hearing, for a petition to caveat when it enacted ET § 5-207(b).  
Therefore, there is no requirement that the orphans’ court stay all of the proceedings upon 
the filing of a petition to caveat.  In this case, the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County did 
not err by refusing to stay the proceeding when George M. Straka filed a petition to caveat 
the Decedent’s Will.  
 
ESTATES & TRUSTS — PROBATING A WILL —TRANSMITTING ISSUES TO 
A COURT OF LAW 
 
The plain language and the legislative history of ET § 2-105 reveals that the legislature did 
not intend to change the longstanding procedure for transmitting factual issues to a court 
of law upon a request from an interested party in a plenary proceeding.  As such, an 
orphans’ court is required to frame and transmit issues to the circuit court when an 
interested party makes such a request before the orphans’ court has made an ultimate 
determination of those issues.  Although there were many procedural abnormalities in the 
case sub judice, which the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County could have corrected in 
any number of ways, this Court concludes that the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County 
erred in denying George M. Straka’s request to transmit issues to a court of law.  
Specifically, we conclude that this denial constituted error because the Orphans’ Court had 
not made a final determination on the issues at the time of the request and because the 
Orphans’ Court had sufficient information to determine that the judicial probate hearing 
would be a plenary proceeding and that the parties disagreed on key factual issues 
contained in the incomplete petition to caveat.  This Court also holds that the error was not 
harmless because it deprived George M. Straka as a caveator the right to have factual issues 
sent to a court of law for a trial by jury.    
 
 
 
Orphans’ Court for Worcester County  
Estate No. 16463 
Argued: January 4, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 38 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
  
AMY SHEALER 
 
 
 
v. 
 
GEORGE STRAKA 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
 
Filed: April 26, 2018 
 
 
The Bench, the Bar, and the general public should no longer tolerate 
the condition which 170 years of patchwork amendments have created 
out of the relatively simple Act of 1798.  The Commission’s basic job, 
therefore, has been to attempt to create reasonable order in the law of 
decedents’ estates. . . .  Most of the changes of substance are motivated 
by one salient thought – the handling of estates should be accomplished 
with efficiency, expedition, and as little red tape and expense as 
possible. 
 
Honorable William L. Henderson,1 “Letter of 
Transmittal” of the Second Report of Governor’s 
Commission 
to 
Review 
and 
Revise 
the 
Testamentary Law of Maryland, December 5, 
1968 
 
In this appeal, we must determine the proper procedure before an orphans’ court in 
two scenarios: (1) when an interested party files a petition to caveat a will; and (2) when 
an interested party requests that the orphans’ court transmit an issue to the circuit court for 
a trial by jury.  In deciding the appropriate procedures, this Court will analyze whether the 
Maryland General Assembly intended to eliminate the need for an automatic stay after a 
party files a petition to caveat when it enacted Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Estates 
& Trusts (“ET”) § 5-207.  Specific to this appeal, we must determine if the Orphans’ Court 
for Worcester County erred by proceeding with a judicial probate hearing after an 
interested party filed a petition to caveat and whether it erred by denying a request to 
                                                 
1 The Honorable William L. Henderson served as Chairman of the Governor’s Commission 
to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland, which was appointed by 
Governor J. Millard Tawes pursuant to Joint Resolution No. 23 passed by the Maryland 
General Assembly in the 1965 legislative session.  Before serving as Chairman, the 
Honorable William L. Henderson served as a judge on the Supreme Bench of Baltimore 
City from 1943 to 1944, an associate judge on the Court of Appeals from 1944 to 1964, 
and then served as the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals in 1964.   
 
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transfer issues to a court of law.  Moreover, this Court must decide whether any error by 
the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County was harmless.   
For the following reasons, we conclude that when it enacted ET § 5-207(b), the 
General Assembly intended to mandate a judicial probate hearing as the single, simple 
procedure after a party files a petition to caveat.  As such, an automatic stay is not required 
when a petition to caveat a will is filed.  We also hold that when an interested party in a 
caveat case makes a request to transfer undecided factual issues to a circuit court, the 
orphans’ court is required to transmit the issues to a court of law pursuant to ET § 2-105(b).  
In this case, the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County did not err in refusing to stay the 
judicial probate proceeding simply because a petition to caveat was filed; however, the 
orphans’ court did err when it refused a party’s request to transmit unresolved factual issues 
to a court of law.  We conclude that this error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the matter back to the Orphans’ 
Court for Worcester County.    
BACKGROUND 
On March 28, 2016, Andrea Ayers Straka (“the Decedent”) died at the age of thirty-
seven from pneumonia caused by Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.  Two days 
later, on March 30, 2016, the Decedent’s father, George M. Straka (“Mr. Straka”), filed a 
petition for administrative probate of a regular estate with the Worcester County Register 
of Wills.  In his petition, Mr. Straka affirmed that he made a diligent effort to search for a 
will prepared by the Decedent.  Mr. Straka’s petition also included a statement that no will 
existed to the best of his knowledge.  In an attachment to the petition, Mr. Straka indicated 
 
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that the Decedent’s estate included approximately $300,000 in real property.  After 
considering the petition, the Register of Wills of Worcester County issued an 
administrative probate order, appointing Mr. Straka as personal representative of the 
Decedent’s estate.   
The same afternoon that Mr. Straka filed a petition for administrative probate, a 
party2 filed the Last Will and Testament of the Decedent (“the Decedent’s Will”) with the 
Worcester County Register of Wills.  The Decedent’s Will indicated that the document was 
prepared on July 15, 2015 in Berlin, Maryland.  In addition, the Decedent’s Will stated that 
the Decedent had never been married and had no biological children.  In the Will, the 
Decedent appointed William Jay Mumma, Jr. (“Mr. Mumma”), the Decedent’s best friend, 
and Amy Shealer (“Ms. Shealer”) as personal representatives and executors of the 
Decedent’s Will.3  The Decedent’s Will bequeathed her real property, in addition to all of 
                                                 
2 In a petition for administrative probate, Ms. Amy Shealer, a personal representative and 
executor of the Decedent’s Will, alleged that she found the Decedent’s Will “among the 
Decedent’s important papers and [she] delivered [the Will] to the Register of Wills for 
Worcester County.”  The Court of Special Appeals raised the presumption that the law firm 
Adelberg, Rudow, Dorf & Hendler, LLC filed the Decedent’s Will with the Register of 
Wills because the record indicates that the Register of Wills contacted the firm to inquire 
whether they possessed the Decedent’s Will on the same date that the Decedent’s Will was 
filed.  The record indicates that the firm sent a response to the Register of Wills, stating 
that the “firm is in compliance with the requirements imposed by” ET § 4-202, which 
requires that a person in custody of a testator’s will shall deliver the will to the appropriate 
county’s register of wills.  However, compliance with ET § 4-202 might simply mean that 
the firm was not the custodian of the Decedent’s Will.  Therefore, we cannot confirm 
exactly who filed the Decedent’s Will.  
3 Although the Decedent’s Will named both Mr. Mumma and Ms. Shealer as co-personal 
representatives of the estate, the record indicates that Mr. Mumma’s attorney informed the 
orphans’ court that he declined to serve as a personal representative.   
 
4 
 
the personal property contained in the house, to Mr. Mumma, Ms. Shealer, and her 
godchildren: Ava and Abigail Simone.   
The Decedent’s Will also included a section of specific bequests, which directed 
that an investment account be sold, converted to cash value, and be distributed in the 
following manner: (1) $70,000 to Mr. Straka and $30,000 to Mr. Straka’s two daughters, 
the Decedent’s half-sisters; (2) $100,000 to her attorney; (3) $10,000 to her law firm to be 
donated to any charity of their choosing; (4) $10,000 to her friend, Robert Staph; (5) 
$10,000 to the charity The Delmarva Cat Connection to be donated in the Decedent’s name; 
(6) $25,000 to her friends and financial advisors, Lora and Greg Gann; and (7) a division 
of the remaining balance: fifty percent to Mr. Mumma; thirty percent to Ms. Shealer; and, 
twenty percent to be used for fees and taxes.  Any remainder of the Decedent’s estate is 
distributed equally between Mr. Mumma and Ms. Shealer.  The Decedent’s Will also bears 
the signature of two witnesses, Mark Anthony Burdette and Alan W. Forsythe.   
On April 5, 2016, Ms. Shealer filed a petition for administrative probate of a regular 
estate.  Ms. Shealer’s petition included an affirmation, stating that the Decedent’s Will was 
found among her important papers and delivered to the Register of Wills for Worcester 
County.  Ms. Shealer indicated that the only other proceedings regarding the Decedent’s 
estate was the regular estate petition for administration filed by Mr. Straka.  In her petition, 
Ms. Shealer requested that she be appointed personal representative of the Decedent’s 
estate.  In addition, Ms. Shealer included two specific requests under the petition’s section 
for additional relief: (1) that the Decedent’s Will be admitted to judicial probate; and (2) 
that the orphans’ court conclude that the Decedent’s Will was duly executed, the Decedent 
 
5 
 
was legally competent to make the Will, and the Decedent’s Will was properly attested to 
and executed by two witnesses.  Ms. Shealer listed Mr. Straka, the Decedent’s two half-
sisters, and Mr. Mumma as interested persons.     
In response to Ms. Shealer’s petition, the Register of Wills for Worcester County 
appointed Ms. Shealer as personal representative of the Decedent’s estate.  Moreover, the 
Orphans’ Court for Worcester County issued a notice of judicial probate, which indicated 
that Ms. Shealer had filed a petition for judicial probate of the Decedent’s Will.  The 
orphans’ court also issued a notice of hearing, which notified the interested parties that the 
judicial probate hearing would be held on April 19, 2016.  The court sent the two notices 
to Mr. Straka as an interested person.  In addition, the Register of Wills for Worcester 
County also sent Mr. Straka a letter informing him that the Letters of Administration 
appointing Mr. Straka as personal representative of the Decedent’s estate were revoked 
after the Decedent’s Will was filed.  The letter further informed Mr. Straka that he “will be 
the Special Administrator of the estate[,] which means you cannot act for the estate without 
the prior approval of the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt.”  The letter reminded Mr. Straka that the 
judicial probate hearing would be held on April 19, 2016, at which time he would be able 
to address the orphans’ court.  
After receiving the notice and letter, Mr. Straka obtained counsel in preparation for 
the judicial probate hearing.  Counsel for Mr. Straka filed his entry of appearance on April 
15, 2016, four days before the scheduled hearing.  Along with his entry of appearance, Mr. 
Straka’s attorney filed a motion for postponement, asserting that the judicial probate 
hearing was no longer necessary because Mr. Straka intended to file a petition to caveat as 
 
6 
 
well as a petition to transmit issues to the Circuit Court for Worcester County.  Moreover, 
the motion alleged that counsel for Mr. Straka had a scheduling conflict with the April 19, 
2016 hearing date.   
Mr. Straka’s attorney also filed a petition to caveat, which indicated that Mr. Straka 
believed the Decedent’s Will to be invalid.  Specifically, Mr. Straka alleged that the 
Decedent’s Will should not be admitted to probate for several reasons: the Decedent lacked 
capacity to make the Will; the Decedent’s Will was procured after undue influence; the 
Decedent’s Will was not signed by the Decedent or any other person in her presence; the 
Decedent’s Will was not properly executed or attested to in accordance with Maryland law; 
the Decedent’s Will was not known by the Decedent before or at the time of execution; 
and the Decedent’s Will was procured by fraud.  The petition to caveat requested multiple 
prayers of relief, including a determination that the Decedent’s Will is invalid with no legal 
effect and that the Decedent died intestate.  Mr. Straka also requested that he, or a neutral 
third party, be appointed as personal representative of the Decedent’s estate.  However, the 
petition to caveat failed to provide a complete list of interested persons.   
The April 19, 2016 judicial probate hearing was held before two orphans’ court 
judges.  Mr. Straka, Ms. Shealer, and Mr. Mumma all appeared at the hearing with counsel.  
The orphans’ court first permitted the parties to make an opening statement.  Counsel for 
Mr. Straka informed the court that he had previously filed a petition to caveat and had filed 
that day an amended petition to caveat with a complete list of interested parties.  Mr. 
Straka’s attorney argued the petition to caveat stayed the action until the issues in the 
petition are determined.  In addition, Mr. Straka’s counsel informed the court that they 
 
7 
 
were filing “petitions for issues” and that they were asking “that issues be framed to go to 
the circuit court for a jury trial.”  After hearing opening statements, the orphans’ court 
denied the motion for postponement and indicated that an order would be issued to that 
effect.  The orphans’ court did not rule on Mr. Straka’s petition to caveat, amended petition 
to caveat, or the request to transmit issues to a court of law, but instead proceeded with the 
judicial probate hearing and allowed Ms. Shealer’s counsel to call witnesses to testify.  
Before the witnesses began their testimony, counsel for Mr. Straka objected to any 
testimony, claiming that the only immediate duty of the orphans’ court was to appoint a 
special administrator of the estate because of the petition to caveat.  The orphans’ court 
overruled the objection.   
Ms. Shealer first called Alan W. Forsythe (“Mr. Forsythe”), who testified that he 
witnessed the Decedent sign the Decedent’s Will and signed the Decedent’s Will himself 
at the Decedent’s home on July 15, 2015.  Mr. Forsythe further testified that he witnessed 
Mark Anthony Burdette (“Mr. Burdette”) sign the Decedent’s Will on the same date.  On 
cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Straka asked Mr. Forsythe about his alleged previous 
convictions for theft, disorderly conduct, and passing a bad check.  Mr. Forsythe testified 
that he did not recall the Decedent reviewing her Will or explaining what the document 
was beyond stating it was her Will at the time he signed it.  Ms. Shealer then called her 
second witness, Mr. Burdette.  During his testimony, Mr. Burdette stated that he recognized 
the Decedent’s Will, that he witnessed the Decedent sign the Will, that he witnessed Mr. 
Forsythe sign the Decedent’s Will, and that he signed the Decedent’s Will at the same time.  
Mr. Burdette further testified that he did not believe that the Decedent was acting peculiar 
 
8 
 
or slurring her words on the day that each of them signed the Decedent’s Will.  On cross-
examination, Mr. Burdette indicated that the Decedent did not explain that the document 
he was signing was a Will.  Mr. Burdette also testified that he did not read the document 
and did not know who prepared the Decedent’s Will.   
After the testimony of the witnesses concluded, Mr. Straka’s attorney orally moved 
to “frame issue[s] to send to the [c]ircuit [c]ourt[.]”  Counsel for Mr. Straka also indicated 
that the relevant statute states “that anytime that a party asks for issues to be framed and 
transmitted to the [c]ircuit [c]ourt this [c]ourt must do so as long as it’s before you have 
issued a ruling.”  In sum, counsel requested that the orphans’ court “transmit a factual issue, 
which would be consolidated with the caveat issues[.]”  Counsel for Ms. Shealer indicated 
to the orphans’ court that his client would be entitled to file a response to the request to 
transmit issues to a court of law.  In addition, Ms. Shealer’s attorney stated that the purpose 
of the hearing, i.e. to obtain enough evidence to admit the Decedent’s Will and appoint a 
personal representative, had already been served through the testimony of the two 
witnesses.  After reconvening from a recess to deliberate,4 the orphans’ court denied Mr. 
Straka’s motion to transmit the issues.  The orphans’ court also denied Mr. Straka’s request 
for the court to consider the petition to caveat because the petition was incomplete.  
                                                 
4 Immediately after the orphans’ court reconvened, counsel for Ms. Shealer indicated that 
Mr. Straka made a symbol of a gun with his hand, pointed it at Mr. Burdette, and mouthed 
“you’re a dead man.”  The Court required Mr. Straka to leave the courtroom until the end 
of the hearing.   
 
9 
 
Ultimately, the orphans’ court admitted the Decedent’s Will to probate and named Ms. 
Shealer as personal representative.   
  That same day, the orphans’ court issued an order, confirming the oral rulings 
made at the hearing.  Specifically, the order accepted the Decedent’s Will into probate, 
removed Mr. Straka from his role as special administrator, and named Ms. Shealer personal 
representative of the estate.  In addition, the order recognized the petition to caveat filed 
by Mr. Straka on April 15, 2016, noting that the petition was incomplete.  The order did 
not address Mr. Straka’s motion to transmit issues to the circuit court or his amended 
petition to caveat filed on April 19, 2016.   
On April 26, 2016, Mr. Straka filed a motion to reconsider or to alter and amend the 
orphans’ court judgment, setting forth two main arguments.  Mr. Straka first contended that 
the orphans’ court erred when it ignored Maryland case law, which required a probate 
matter to be stayed when a party files a petition to caveat.  In support of his initial argument, 
Mr. Straka asserted that he filed an initial petition to caveat as well as an amended petition 
to caveat on the day of the hearing, either of which would require an automatic stay.  As to 
his second argument, Mr. Straka contended that the orphans’ court erred when it proceeded 
to rule on the judicial probate after Mr. Straka made an oral request at the hearing to 
transmit issues to the circuit court.  Mr. Straka argued that the orphans’ court was required 
to frame and transmit the issues to the circuit court pursuant to the Maryland rules and 
statutes.  On May 17, 2016, Ms. Shealer filed an opposition to the motion to reconsider, 
asserting that the petition to caveat was a nullity given its incompleteness.  Ms. Shealer 
 
10 
 
further argued that the orphans’ court properly refused to transfer the issues to the circuit 
court after Mr. Straka’s oral petition to transmit certain issues to a court of law.   
By memorandum and accompanying order dated June 21, 2016, the orphans’ court 
denied Mr. Straka’s motion to reconsider or to alter and amend judgment.  The orphans’ 
court specifically concluded that it did not err in refusing to consider the initial petition to 
caveat because the petition did not comply with the Maryland Rules.  Additionally, the 
orphans’ court determined that it properly denied the motion to transmit issues because the 
only petition to caveat filed at the time was defective.   
Mr. Straka filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the orphans’ court’s April 19, 2016 
order, which admitted the Decedent’s Will to probate, removed Mr. Straka as special 
administrator, and named Ms. Shealer as personal representative.  The Court of Special 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the orphans’ court in an unreported opinion issued on 
May 19, 2017.  Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals held that a petition to caveat 
stays all proceedings until the caveat is addressed.  Matter of Estate of Straka, No. 1023, 
2017 WL 2210122, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 19, 2017).  Ms. Shealer petitioned this 
Court for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on September 12, 2017.  Shealer v. 
Straka, 456 Md. 57 (2017).  Ms. Shealer presented several questions for our review, which 
we have rephrased: 
I. 
How should an orphans’ court proceed when an interested party files a 
petition to caveat?  
 
II. 
What is the proper procedure when an interested party requests an 
orphans’ court to transmit factual issues to a court of law? 
 
 
11 
 
III. 
Did the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County commit error by refusing 
to consider Mr. Straka’s petition to caveat and denying his request to 
transmit issues? 
 
IV. 
Was any error by the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County harmless? 5 
 
 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 
The first, second, and third questions in this appeal involve the interpretation and 
application of a Maryland statute, which is a question of law subject to de novo review.  
Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 189 (2017).  When this Court interprets a statute, this “Court 
defers to ‘the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly.’”  Reger v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Educ., 455 Md. 68, 95 (2017) (quoting Phillips, 451 Md. at 196).  
Therefore, we review the first question presented de novo without deference to the orphans’ 
court.   
 
As to the fourth question regarding harmless error, this Court should conduct an 
“independent review of the record[.]”  Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976).  After a 
“comprehensive review of the record[,]” the ultimate decision for a reviewing court is 
                                                 
5 In her petition for writ of certiorari, Ms. Shealer presented the following two questions 
presented:  
I. 
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that probate proceedings 
are to be stayed upon the filing of a caveat petition before judicial probate 
or after administrative probate, continuing the procedure under 
predecessor statutes recognized by Keene v. Corse, 80 Md. 20 (1984) and 
its progeny, despite the enactment of Estates & Trusts Article § 5-207(b) 
which omits any language concerning a stay of proceedings from its text?  
 
II. 
Was the harmless error standard satisfied by merely showing that the 
underlying decision from which an appeal is sought is final and binding 
upon the parties? 
 
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whether a complainant has shown that prejudice was probable rather than simply showing 
that prejudice was possible.  Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 670 (2011).  As such, 
this Court will conduct an independent, comprehensive review of the record from the 
orphans’ court to determine whether Mr. Straka demonstrated that prejudice was probable. 
DISCUSSION 
 
“A probate proceeding provides a vehicle for identifying and collecting the 
decedent’s property, paying the debts of the decedent and the estate in an orderly way, and 
distributing the remainder of the estate to those entitled to share in the estate either under 
the decedent’s will or according to intestate distribution.”  Green v. Nelson, 227 Md. App. 
698, 708, cert. denied, 448 Md. 725 (2016).  Probating a will means proving that certain 
documents constitute a decedent’s last will and testament.  Schlossberg v. Schlossberg, 275 
Md. 600, 625 (1975).  In Maryland, the “law confides in the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt power to 
determine whether or not a will should be admitted to probate.”  Ades v. Norins, 204 Md. 
267, 272 (1954).  In other words, once a party has offered a will for probate, the orphans’ 
court has the authority to find that the will is valid and enforceable, thereby admitting the 
will to probate.  Id.  The Maryland Estates and Trusts Article provides two ways for an 
interested person6 to probate a will: (1) administrative probate by the register of wills; and 
(2) judicial probate by the orphans’ court.  See ET § 5-101.  As the names suggest, the main 
                                                 
6 The Maryland Estates And Trusts Article defines “interested person” as “(1) A person 
named as executor in a will; (2) A person serving as personal representative after judicial 
or administrative probate; (3) A legatee in being, not fully paid, whether his interest is 
vested or contingent; (4) An heir even if the decedent dies testate . . .”  ET § 1-101.   
 
13 
 
difference between the two methods of probate is that the first consists of an administrative 
proceeding without a full hearing and the second is a full judicial proceeding before the 
orphans’ court.  When an interested party files a petition for judicial probate, the orphans’ 
court holds a hearing, during which the court can call witnesses, resolve issues of fact, and 
appoint a personal representative of the estate.  See ET § 5-401.   
 
Even after a petition for administrative or judicial probate, Maryland law provides 
an interested party with mechanisms to contest the will if that party believes that the will 
was not properly executed or that the will was procured by undue influence, fraud, or 
duress.  See Green, 227 Md. App. at 709.  Specifically, an interested party can file a petition 
to caveat contesting the validity of the will submitted to probate.  Id.  See also Md. Rule 6-
431.  Pursuant to ET § 5-207(a), a petition to caveat may be filed within six months of the 
initial appointment of a personal representative.7  Particularly significant to the instant case, 
ET § 5-207(b) explains that if a “petition to caveat is filed before the filing of a petition for 
probate, or after administrative probate, it has the effect of a request for judicial probate. 
If filed after judicial probate, the matter shall be reopened and a new proceeding held as if 
only administrative probate had previously been determined.”  (Emphasis added.)   
Along with the option to file a petition to caveat, interested parties can also request 
that the orphans’ court transmit certain factual issues to a court of law.  Ades, 204 Md. at 
272 (“To aid in the execution of that duty, the Legislature has empowered the court to 
                                                 
7 If a will is offered to probate after the appointment of a personal representative, an 
interested party may file a petition to caveat within three months of the subsequent probate 
proceeding.  ET § 5-207(a).   
 
14 
 
direct any issue of fact to be tried by plenary proceedings and with the help of a jury.”).  
Specifically, ET § 2-105 states, “At the request of an interested person made within the 
time determined by the court, the issue of fact may be determined by a court of law. When 
the request is made before the court has determined the issue of fact, the court shall transmit 
the issue to a court of law.”  See also Md. Rule 6-434.  This Court has previously 
recognized that “[a]lthough the transmission of issues to a law court for trial is most 
frequently used in caveat cases, it is a procedure available in all cases in controversy within 
the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court[.]”  Myers v. Hart, 248 Md. 443, 447 (1968).   
The parties in the case sub judice primarily disagree as to the proper procedure when 
an interested party attempts to employ these two mechanisms for contesting the validity of 
a will.  Specifically, this Court will analyze: (1) whether the General Assembly, when it 
enacted ET § 5-207, created a new procedure for orphans’ courts after an interested party 
files a petition to caveat a will; (2) whether the General Assembly intended to change the 
procedure after an interested party requests that the orphans’ court transmit caveat issues 
to a court of law; (3) whether these procedures implicate the case sub judice; and (4) 
whether any error on the part of the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County was harmless.  
As such, we will address these issues in turn. 
A.  
Proper Procedure in Orphans’ Court after a Party files a Petition to Caveat  
 
Ms. Shealer primarily contends that the plain and ordinary language of ET § 5-
207(b) is unambiguous in that a petition to caveat constitutes a request for judicial probate.  
Specifically, Ms. Shealer argues that the General Assembly would have included language 
requiring a stay in ET § 5-207 if the legislature intended for orphans’ courts to 
 
15 
 
automatically stay the proceedings after an interested person filed a petition to caveat.  Ms. 
Shealer maintains that the Court of Special Appeals erred in analyzing the legislative 
history of ET § 5-207(b) and argues that the statutory history confirms that a judicial 
probate hearing is the new, simple procedure, which is also outlined in the clear text of the 
statute. 
In response, Mr. Straka asserts that the Court of Special Appeals correctly 
determined that the plain language of the statute and the legislative history do not indicate 
an intention to abrogate the common law regarding petitions to caveat.  Mr. Straka argues 
that even after the legislature enacted ET § 5-207, orphans’ courts are required to stay all 
probate proceedings in the corresponding matter.  See Keene v. Corse, 80 Md. 20 (1894).  
Overall, Mr. Straka contends that the orphans’ court below deprived him of his right to 
pursue one of the two mechanisms of contesting the validity of a will by failing to stay the 
proceeding after he filed a petition to caveat.    
When conducting a statutory construction analysis, this Court’s principal goal is to 
determine the legislative intent underlying the relevant statutes.  See Downes v. Downes, 
388 Md. 561, 571 (2005).  “We begin our analysis by looking to the normal, plain meaning 
of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, 
sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.”  Brown 
v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551 (2017).  In some instances, a reviewing court will be able to 
discern the legislative intent from the clear and unambiguous statutory language; 
nevertheless, “[o]ccasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent 
merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language.”  Reger, 455 Md. at 96 
 
16 
 
(quoting Phillips, 451 Md. at 196).  The key extrinsic source for purposes of confirming 
the legislative intent is often the legislative history of the pertinent statutes.  See State v. 
Roshchin, 446 Md. 128, 140 (2016) (“But even when the language is unambiguous, it is 
useful to review legislative history of the statute to confirm that interpretation and to 
eliminate another version of legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language.”).   
 
Employing these principles, this Court will first consider the plain language of the 
statutes.  ET § 5-207 reads in pertinent part:  
(b) If the petition to caveat is filed before the filing of a petition for 
probate, or after administrative probate, it has the effect of a request for 
judicial probate.  If filed after judicial probate the matter shall be reopened 
and a new proceeding held as if only administrative probate had previously 
been determined.  In either case the provisions of Subtitle 4 of this title apply. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The first sentence of the above statutory text clearly indicates that a 
petition to caveat filed after a petition for administrative probate shall be treated as a request 
for judicial probate.  The language of the statute appears unambiguous, especially when 
considering the second sentence in tandem with the first.  When an interested person files 
a petition to caveat after an individual has filed a petition for administrative probate, then 
the orphans’ court will hold a judicial probate proceeding; however, when a petition to 
caveat is filed after a judicial probate proceeding has already occurred, then the petition to 
caveat requires the orphans’ court to conduct a new judicial probate proceeding.  Our 
reading of the plain language is confirmed by the last sentence that the legislature included 
in the text: “In either case the provisions of Subtitle 4 of this title apply.”  Subtitle 4, entitled 
Judicial Probate, discusses the nature of judicial probate and a judicial probate hearing.  
 
17 
 
Therefore, the clear language of ET § 5-207(b) dictates that a timely petition to caveat 
requires the orphans’ court to hold a judicial probate hearing pursuant to the Judicial 
Probate Subtitle.   
This Court concludes that the intent of the General Assembly is discernable from 
the plain and unambiguous language of the statute: an orphans’ court will conduct a judicial 
probate proceeding after a party files a petition to caveat.  Nothing in this mandated 
procedure requires the orphans’ court to stay the proceedings upon the filing of a petition 
to caveat a will.  Indeed, an automatic stay would be unnecessary given the statute’s 
unequivocal requirement that the orphans’ court hold a judicial probate hearing before 
admitting a will to probate.  Therefore, we conclude that the legislative intent to form a 
simple, mandatory procedure for a judicial probate proceeding upon the filing of a petition 
to caveat is evident from the language of the statute.  Although this Court concludes that 
the language of ET § 5-207(b) is clear and unambiguous, we will also consider the 
legislative history of the statute to confirm the legislative intent.  See Reger, 455 Md. at 96; 
Roshchin, 446 Md. at 140.   
 
In 1965, the General Assembly adopted Joint Resolution No. 23, which required the 
Governor to appoint a Commission to study and revise the Maryland testamentary laws.  
Pursuant to the Joint Resolution, Governor J. Millard Tawes appointed the Governor’s 
Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland (“the 
Commission”), naming William L. Henderson as Chairman of the Commission.  In 1966, 
the Commission submitted its First Report to the Governor, making recommendations to 
revise Maryland’s death tax structure.  On December 5, 1968, the Commission submitted 
 
18 
 
a Second Report, recommending a new testamentary article in the Maryland Code as well 
as substantive changes to the law.8  The legislation proposed by the Commission in the 
Second Report passed the General Assembly during the 1969 legislative session.  See 1969 
Md. Laws, ch. 3.  The Commission submitted a “Letter of Transmittal” with the Second 
Report in which the Commission explained that the Report was organized by the proposed 
sections of the statute, which are followed by Comments9 that “describe the relationship 
between the present Maryland law and the recommendations of the Commission.”  As such, 
the Commission’s Comments on the relevant statutes serve as a key insight into the 
legislature’s intent.  
In the Second Report, the Commission submitted a proposal for Md. Code (1969) 
Art. 93 § 5-207 regarding caveat proceedings.10  The Commission’s proposed legislation 
                                                 
8  See Second Report of Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary 
Law of Maryland, Article 93 Decedents’ Estates (1968)  [https://perma.cc/G6HW-3FGG].  
9 These Comments were republished when the statutes were recodified in the Estates and 
Trusts Article of the Maryland Code in 1974. 
10 The Commission’s proposed Art. 93 § 5-207 read in full: 
(a) Petition to Caveat.  Whether or not a Petition for Probate has been filed, any interested 
person may, until the expiration of four months following an administrative or a judicial 
probate (unless caveat proceedings had once been held and finally disposed of), file a 
Petition to Caveat the will.  
(b) Effect of Petition.  If the Petition to Caveat is filed before the filing of a Petition for 
Probate, or after administrative probate, it shall have the effect of a request for judicial 
probate.  If filed after judicial probate the matter shall be reopened and a new proceeding 
held as if only administrative probate had previously been determined.  In either case the 
provisions of Part 4 of this Subtitle shall apply. 
 
19 
 
included almost identical language to the present version of ET § 5-207(b).  The 
Commission’s Comment to § 5-207 stated: 
In place of all of the provisions of the prior law relating to a notice to 
caveat and the caveat procedures the Commission has substituted the single, 
simple procedure contained in Section 5-207 which it believes to be equally 
effective and protective of the caveator’s rights.  In the event of a caveat, 
judicial probate is mandatory.  See Section 5-402. 
 
Except for the reduction of the period of caveat from six months to 
four months (to be consistent with the period within which creditors’ claims 
must be filed) Section 5-207 is intended to follow the present law in §§379 
and 381 (Md).  With the new procedure here proposed, including the 
extensive protection granted to interested persons through the requirement of 
formal notice, the Commission suggests that the sometimes used technique 
of first filing a notice of intention to caveat [§375 (Md)] is no longer 
necessary or useful.  See also Karwacki, “The Right to Contest a Will in 
Maryland,” 16 Md. L. Rev. 61 (1956).  
 
The procedure for the hearing of a caveat case, including the 
transmission of issues to a court of law, is set forth in Sections 2-105 and 5-
404.  No change in the present law respecting such procedure is intended.  
 
The Commission also believes that it would serve no useful purpose 
to outline in the statute the available grounds for caveat.  It has assumed, and 
intends, that the existing law of Maryland will continue to apply; see Sykes, 
Contest of Wills in Maryland (1941), and Note, “The Presumption of Undue 
Influence arising from a Confidential Relation Between a Testator and 
Beneficiary in a Will Contest,” 17 Md. L. Rev. 153 (1957).  
 
(Emphasis added).  This Comment makes pellucid that the Commission intended to 
propose a new procedure for the orphans’ court after a party files a petition to caveat.  One 
sentence makes this revision explicit: “In the event of a caveat, judicial probate is 
mandatory.”  The Commission’s Comment acknowledged that they were proposing a “new 
 
20 
 
procedure” “[i]n place of all of the provisions of the prior law relating to a notice to caveat 
and the caveat procedures” by the revisions to § 5-207.  Therefore, this Comment confirms 
this Court’s analysis of legislative intent based on the plain language of ET § 5-207: a 
judicial probate hearing is the new procedure for orphans’ courts after a party files a 
petition to caveat.   
 
Furthermore, the Commission made clear that its recommendations would also 
eliminate the need for any interested party to file a notice of intention to caveat before filing 
a formal petition to caveat.  Before the Commission’s Second Report, interested parties 
were able to file a notice of intention to caveat before filing the petition to caveat as a 
means of invoking the previous procedure: a stay in the orphans’ court.  
In this State it is a common practice to file with the Register of Wills 
an informal notice of intention to caveat a will before it is admitted to 
probate in order to serve as a preliminary step to a formal petition. The 
purpose of such a preliminary notice is to prevent the probate of a will 
pending the filing of a formal caveat petition. Of course, under ordinary 
circumstances the preliminary notice must be seasonably followed by 
a caveat petition.  
 
Gessler v. Stevens, 205 Md. 498, 504–05 (1954).  This “notice of intention to caveat may 
operate as a temporary stay.”  Kent v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 225 Md. 590, 
594 (1961).  As this case law underscores, the purpose of filing a notice of intention to 
caveat was to prevent the orphans’ court from probating a will before the caveat issues are 
heard, thereby invoking a stay of proceedings.  However, the Commission’s recommended 
procedure for an orphans’ court upon the filing of a petition to caveat, i.e. to hold a judicial 
probate hearing before admitting a will to probate, removes the need for a party to invoke 
 
21 
 
a stay.  In doing so, the Commission has implicitly removed the need for a party to first 
file a notice of intention to caveat.  In adopting the Commission’s recommendations, the 
General Assembly intended to remove any system in which a stay would be necessary, 
including filing a notice of intention to caveat.  Instead, the Commission and the General 
Assembly intended to create a new system whereby the filing of a petition to caveat would 
automatically require the orphans’ court to schedule and hold a judicial probate hearing 
before admitting a will to probate.   
Instead of relying on the plain language of the statute and the emphasized portion 
of the Commission’s Comment, the Court of Special Appeals found the following line from 
the Comment persuasive: “Section 5-207 is intended to follow the present law in §§ 379 
and 381 (Md).”  As such, the Court of Special Appeals focused on the language of these 
prior statutes as well as the case law interpreting these sections.  Md. Code, Art. 93 § 379 
(1957) stated:  
If any person whatever shall enter a caveat against such will or codicil, either 
before or after it shall be exhibited to the register of wills or orphans’ court, 
the said caveat shall be decided by the court.  If any person shall enter a 
caveat against any will or codicil of which probate shall have been taken by 
the register as aforesaid, no letter testamentary shall be granted until a 
determination shall be had in the orphans’ court. 
 
(Emphasis added).  And Md. Code, Art. 93 § 381 (1957) provided: 
If the probate of any will or codicil be taken as aforesaid without contest, any 
person, before letters testamentary or of administration with a copy of the 
will shall be actually granted, may file a petition to the court praying that the 
case may be again examined and heard; and thereupon the orphans’ court 
shall delay the granting of letters until a decision shall be had on the petition, 
and in case the letters shall have been granted, and any person shall file such 
 
22 
 
petition, and the court on hearing both sides—that is to say, the petitioner 
and the grantee of such letters—shall decide against the probate, the letters 
aforesaid shall be revoked, and the power of the party under the letters shall 
cease; and the said will shall not be proved in any other county, unless the 
decision be reversed on appeal. 
 
(Emphasis added).  In so doing, the Court of Special Appeals held “that the stay 
requirement applies” once a party files a petition to caveat.   
 
It is crucial for this Court to clarify what it means to say that a petition to caveat 
operates as a “stay.”  As the Fourth Circuit recognized, the sixth edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary “defined ‘stay’ as: A stopping; the act of arresting a judicial proceeding by the 
order of a court.  Also that which holds, restrains, or supports.  A stay is a suspension of 
the case or some designated proceedings within it.  It is a kind of injunction with which a 
court freezes its proceedings at a particular point.”  Teshome-Gebreegziabher v. Mukasey, 
545 F.3d 285, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2008).  Therefore, the term “stay” in a legal context is often 
used to suggest that the entire proceeding or case is stopped and suspended.   
 
In the context of a petition to caveat, the plain language of ET § 5-207(b) and the 
Commission’s comment clearly indicates that the effects of a petition to caveat are twofold: 
(1) the petition constitutes a request for a judicial probate hearing; and (2) the orphans’ 
court cannot admit the will to probate until after the judicial probate hearing.  Indeed, 
creating a new procedure for a judicial probate hearing would be rendered useless if the 
orphans’ court could simultaneously schedule a judicial probate proceeding and admit the 
will to probate.  Therefore, a petition to caveat does not stay the proceedings, i.e., the filing 
of a petition to caveat does not stop all the proceedings related to the will.  After a party 
 
23 
 
files a petition to caveat, the opposing party is permitted to file a response to the petition 
within twenty days after service.  See Md. Rule 6-122(b)(2).  In addition, the orphans’ court 
may order a limited search for assets titled in the name of the decedent as well as order a 
financial institution to enter the safe deposit box of a decedent in the presence of the 
Register of Wills to locate the will.  See Md. Rule 6-122(c) & (d).   An orphans’ court may 
also appoint a special administrator upon the filing of a petition to caveat by an interested 
person.  See Md. Rule 6-454(a).  As such, the filing of a petition to caveat does not effect 
a “stay” on the entire proceeding; instead, a petition to caveat simply prevents the orphans’ 
court from admitting the will to probate until after the judicial probate proceedings are 
concluded.  To the extent that the Court of Special Appeals held that a petition to caveat 
prevents the parties and the orphans’ court from pursuing any of the permissible actions 
related to the same judicial probate proceeding, including those described above, this Court 
disagrees.   
 
This interpretation is confirmed by the former statutes on which the Court of Special 
Appeals relied: Md. Code, Art. 93 §§ 379 and 381.  The Court of Special Appeals was 
correct in noting that the Commission stated that “Section 5-207 is intended to follow the 
present law in §§379 and 381 (Md).”  The language of § 379 indicates that a caveat must 
be determined by the orphans’ court even when the will has previously been submitted for 
administrative probate with the register of wills.  Specifically, this section of the former 
statute makes clear that when “any person shall enter a caveat against any will or codicil 
of which probate shall have been taken by the register as aforesaid, no letter testamentary 
shall be granted until a determination shall be had in the orphans’ court.”   Md. Code, Art. 
 
24 
 
93 § 379 (emphasis added).  There is no mention of a “stay” in the language; however, the 
plain language of the statute instructs an orphans’ court to wait to issue letters testamentary 
until the court makes a determination on the petition to caveat. As the Commission’s 
comment reveals, the requirements of § 379 remain in effect even after the legislature 
changed the procedure for a petition to caveat to a judicial probate hearing.  See 
Commission’s Comment to § 5-207 (“Section 5-207 is intended to follow the present law 
in §§379 and 381(Md).”).   
 
Similarly, § 381 requires that an orphans’ court delay granting letters of 
administration or letters testamentary until the court determines the issues presented in a 
petition to caveat even when the court has previously held a probate hearing with no 
opposition.  See Md. Code, Art. 93 § 381 (“If the probate of any will or codicil be taken as 
aforesaid without contest, any person, before letters testamentary or of administration with 
a copy of the will shall be actually granted, may file a petition to the court praying that the 
case may be again examined and heard; and thereupon the orphans’ court shall delay the 
granting of letters until a decision shall be had on the petition[.]”) (emphasis added).  This 
statute also does not halt any and all proceedings related to the contested will after a petition 
to caveat is filed.  Instead, the statute instructs the orphans’ court that when a party files a 
petition to caveat after uncontested administrative probate, the orphans’ court must 
determine the issues contained in the petition before granting letters testamentary.  This is 
still the case under the mandates of ET § 5-207(b):  the orphans’ court must reopen and 
hold a new judicial probate proceeding when a party files a petition to caveat after 
administrative probate or judicial probate.  Therefore, the new procedure for judicial 
 
25 
 
probate still follows the mandates of Md. Code, Art. 93 §§ 379 and 381, which do not 
require a total stay of proceedings.   
 
The Court of Special Appeals also supported its conclusion by noting that this Court 
has previously held that a “stay” is required upon the filing of a petition to caveat.  See, 
e.g., Keene v. Corse, 80 Md. 20, 22–23 (1894) (“The filing of a caveat at any stage before 
an order has been signed admitting the will to probate arrests all further proceedings until 
the caveat has been disposed of.”); Gilbert v. Gaybrick, 195 Md. 297, 305 (1950) (“The 
filing of the notice of caveat operated as a stay of proceedings in the Orphans’ Court.”); 
Gessler, 205 Md. at 504 (“We have definitely held that when a caveat is filed to a will 
before it is admitted to probate, the Orphans’ Court cannot validly probate the will until 
the caveat is disposed of.”); Kent, 225 Md. at 594 (“If filed before probate, 
the caveat operates as a stay until the issues are determined . . . .”).  However, these cases 
were all decided before the Governor appointed a Commission to review the testamentary 
laws of Maryland, before the Commission proposed new procedures, and before the 
General Assembly enacted legislation to implement the Commission’s proposals. 11  See 
                                                 
11 Mr. Straka contends that Merling v. Merling is a case issued after the General Assembly 
enacted legislation adopting the Commission’s proposals, which indicates that a stay is still 
the proper procedure after a party files a petition to caveat.  336 Md. 365, 375 (1994).   
Merling required this Court to determine whether an exception to the rule against hearsay 
applied in a caveat case.  Id. at 366–77.  As an aside to the central issue of whether a person 
was a party to the caveat case for purposes of the hearsay exception, this Court stated “the 
caveat acts as a stay pending determination of the issues[.]”  Id. at 375.  However, the 
procedure after a petition to caveat was not at issue in Merling; therefore, this statement 
constitutes obiter dictum and will not be given precedential effect.  See State v. Baby, 404 
Md. 220, 246 (2008).   
 
26 
 
1969 Md. Laws, ch. 3.  Furthermore, the Commission indicated in its Comment that it was 
proposing a new procedure of judicial probate “[i]n place of all of the provisions of the 
prior law relating to a notice to caveat and the caveat procedures[.]”  As such, the 
Commission acknowledged that it would be changing the former procedures by proposing 
a “single, simple procedure.”  By enacting legislation that adopted the Commission’s 
proposal for mandatory judicial probate upon the filing of a petition to caveat, the General 
Assembly clearly intended to change the former procedure that “arrest[ed] all further 
proceedings until the caveat ha[d] been disposed of.”  Keene, 80 Md. at 22–23.  In its place, 
the General Assembly enacted legislation to require a judicial probate hearing on the 
petition to caveat issues before the will is admitted to probate.  Any jurisprudence 
interpreting the law before the General Assembly explicitly adopted a new procedure is, 
therefore, irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of the legislative intent behind enacting ET § 
5-207.  
 
Overall, the plain language of ET § 5-207(b) indicates that a timely petition to caveat 
requires an orphans’ court to hold a judicial probate hearing.  The legislative intent to create 
this new procedure is confirmed by the legislative history.  Specifically, the Commission’s 
Comment to the proposed § 5-207 indicated that this “single, simple procedure” would be 
“[i]n place of all of the provisions of the prior law relating to a notice to caveat and the 
caveat procedures[.]”  As such, this Court’s jurisprudence regarding the process before the 
legislature adopted a new procedure for a petition to caveat is not relevant to this Court’s 
analysis of the legislative intent in enacting ET § 5-207(b).  Given this legislative history, 
this Court concludes that the General Assembly intended to implement a new procedure of 
 
27 
 
mandatory judicial probate when a party files a timely petition to caveat.  Therefore, the 
orphans’ court is not required to stay the probate proceedings upon the filing of a petition 
to caveat.  Instead, the orphans’ court must follow the plain instructions of ET § 5-207: (1) 
when a party files a petition to caveat in response to a petition for administrative probate, 
the court should allow the original petitioner to file a response to the caveat and then 
schedule a judicial probate hearing for a later date; or (2) when a party files a petition to 
caveat after the court has already held a judicial probate proceeding, the orphans’ court 
must hold a new judicial probate hearing before admitting the will to probate.  See ET § 5-
207(b).  Accordingly, we disagree with the Court of Special Appeals that a stay of all 
proceedings is required upon the filing of a petition to caveat; rather, a petition to caveat 
requires an orphans’ court to hold a judicial probate hearing before admitting the will to 
probate.  
B.  
Proper Procedure in Orphans’ Court after a Party Requests the Orphans’ Court 
to Transmit Issues to Circuit Court  
 
Mr. Straka also asserts that, as a caveator, he was entitled to have the issues 
transmitted to a court of law pursuant to ET § 2-105.  In that vein, Mr. Straka points this 
Court to case law indicating that transmission of issues to a court of law is mandatory in 
caveat cases.  As such, Mr. Straka contends that the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County 
also deprived him of his right to pursue another mechanism of contesting the validity of a 
will by denying his request to transmit the issues in his petition to caveat to a court of law.  
In response, Ms. Shealer maintains that the required judicial probate procedure does not 
 
28 
 
affect or hinder the caveator’s right to transmit issues, but that Mr. Straka was not entitled 
to that right in this case. 
In its Comment to § 5-207, the Commission recognized that in caveat cases a 
petitioner may wish to transmit the issues raised in the petition to caveat to a court of law: 
“The procedure for the hearing of a caveat case, including the transmission of issues to a 
court of law, is set forth in Sections 2-105 and 5-404.  No change in the present law 
respecting such procedure is intended.”  Furthermore, this Court has emphasized that in a 
petition to caveat case, the orphans’ court’s duty to transmit issues to a court of law for 
trial by bench or jury is vital.  Maynadier v. Armstrong, 98 Md. 175, 179–81 (1903); see 
also Russell v. Gaither, 181 Md. App. 25, 34–35 (2008) (“The Court of Appeals, however, 
addressed this possibility in Maynadier v. Armstrong, supra, where it said the orphans’ 
court was authorized to decline to transmit issues in certain cases, but not 
in caveat proceedings, where the need for a right to transmit could be the greatest.”).   
Although the Court of Special Appeals did not specifically address this issue below, this 
Court will determine the proper procedure in the orphans’ court when a caveator also 
requests that certain issues be transmitted to a court of law pursuant to ET § 2-105.  
Just as we analyzed ET § 5-207, this Court will first look to the plain language of 
ET § 2-105(b) in deciphering legislative intent and then consider legislative history as well 
as other external resources to confirm that statutory interpretation.  See Brown, 454 Md. at 
551; Reger, 455 Md. at 96 (quoting Phillips, 451 Md. at 196).  The plain language of the 
statute regarding transmittal of issues to a court of law provides in relevant part:  
 
29 
 
At the request of an interested person made within the time determined by 
the [orphans’] court, the issue of fact may be determined by a court of law.  
When the request is made before the [orphans’] court has determined the 
issue of fact, the court shall transmit the issue to a court of law.   
 
ET § 2-105(b).12  The plain language appears to set forth a fairly straight-forward process 
after a party makes a request to transmit factual issues to a court of law.  When a party 
makes a request to transmit certain issues of fact before the orphans’ court has determined 
those issues, then the orphans’ court is required to transfer those issues to the circuit court.  
Although this language appears to be unambiguous, this Court will once again look to the 
legislative history to confirm this statutory interpretation.  
 
The Commission’s Second Report also proposed language for Md. Code (1969) Art. 
93 § 2-105.  Although the proposed language is slightly different than the current version 
of ET § 2-105, the proposal included language nearly identical to ET § 2-105(b):  
In any controversy in the [c]ourt, issues of fact may be determined by the 
[c]ourt or, at the request of any interested person made within such time as 
may be determined by the [c]ourt, by a court of law.  Where such request is 
made before the [c]ourt has determined the issue of fact, the [c]ourt shall 
transmit the issues to a court of law.   
 
The Commission also included a Comment analyzing the proposed § 2-105.  Specifically, 
the Commission indicated that § 2-105 “is intended to continue the present practice now 
set forth in [Md. Code, Art. 93] §§272, 278, 280, and 281 (Md).  See Sykes, §§221-229.  
                                                 
12 ET § 2-101 states, “In the estates of decedents law, the word ‘court’ means the orphans’ 
court in a county, or the court exercising the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court in a county.”  
We will use brackets in the quoted portion of ET § 2-105 in order to make clear that the 
court in question is the orphans’ court.   
 
30 
 
No substantive changes are intended.”  Because the Commission explained that it intended 
no substantive changes to the laws regarding transmittal of issues to a court of law, this 
Court will first consider the language of the pertinent sections of Art. 93 as it appeared in 
1957 as well as the cited sections of Philip L. Sykes, Maryland Practice: Probate Law and 
Practice (Washington Law Book Co., 1956) (“Sykes”).13     
Md. Code (1957), Art. 93 §§ 278 and 280 are the two main predecessor statutes of 
the proposed ET § 2-105.  Section 278 provided in relevant part that “[t]he orphans’ court 
may, in all cases of controversy thereon, upon the application of either party, direct plenary 
proceedings . . . .”  In addition, Art. 93 § 280 stated:  
On such plenary proceeding, all the depositions shall be taken in writing and 
recorded, and, if either party require it, the court shall direct an issue or 
issues to be made up and sent to any court of law convenient for trying the 
same, and the issues shall be tried in the said court of law as soon as 
convenient, without any continuance longer than may be necessary to 
procure the attendance of witnesses . . . [.] 
 
(Emphasis added).  The language of these statutes confirms our interpretation that an 
orphans’ court is required to frame and send issues to the circuit court upon a party’s 
request before an ultimate determination in the orphans’ court.  The former statutes further 
confirm that the General Assembly did not intend to make any changes to the procedures 
governing transmittal of issues to a court of law by enacting ET § 2-105.  
                                                 
13 On the first page of the Second Report to the Governor, the Commission indicated that 
all references to “Sykes” would refer to the specified sections of Philip L. Sykes, Maryland 
Practice: Probate Law and Practice (Washington Law Book Co., 1956).  This Court will 
continue to refer to the source as “Sykes” to avoid confusion.   
 
31 
 
 
In addition to informing the Governor and the legislature that the proposal did not 
intend to change the law of the former statutes regarding transmission of issues to a court 
of law, the Comment to § 2-105 also included a citation to Sykes.  The first section of 
Sykes cited in the Comment, § 221, reads in pertinent part:  
Issues of fact in controversies in the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt within its jurisdiction 
may be determined by the [c]ourt itself, or, at the request of either party, by 
a jury in a court of law..  In order to submit factual questions to a jury, 
“issues” must first be formulated.  An issue may be defined as a single, 
definite, and material question framed from the allegations of a petition and 
the answer thereto.  Issues, therefore, presuppose plenary proceedings, and 
the pleadings must contain allegations which disclose the affirmation and 
denial of material and relevant facts. . . .  In proper cases, provided the 
request is made in time, the duty of the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt to make up and 
transmit issues to a court of law is imperative.  Except in caveat cases, after 
the parties have elected to try, and are actually trying the identical facts 
embraced in the proposed issues, the [c]ourt is not required to stop the 
hearing and send them.  Nor can the [c]ourt be asked to transmit issues after 
it has passed an order on the merits of the controversy.   
 
(Emphasis added).  This thorough discussion of transferring issues of fact to a court of law 
expounds on the same principles enunciated by ET § 2-105: An orphans’ court that has 
tried and determined issues does not have a duty to send the issues to a circuit court; 
however, it is imperative for the orphans’ court to consider a petition to caveat and 
response, frame issues of fact, and transmit those issues to a court of law when the party to 
a plenary proceeding requests a transfer of issues before the issues are adjudicated in the 
orphans’ court.  See also Flaks v. Flaks, 173 Md. 358, 365 (1938) (“The duty of the 
orphans’ court to make up and transmit issues to a court of law, when required, is 
imperative, and it is also bound to accept the conclusions of the jury as final, and to make 
 
32 
 
them effective by proper orders or decrees.”).  Therefore, it is clear that in enacting ET § 
2-105(b), the General Assembly intended to continue the longstanding procedure for 
transmitting issues from orphans’ court to circuit court.   
C.  
Summary of Holdings and Application to the Case Sub Judice  
 
Ultimately, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to change the 
procedure to a judicial probate hearing before the orphans’ courts after a petition to caveat 
pursuant to ET § 5-207; however, the legislature did not intend to change the procedure for 
transmitting issues to a court of law under ET § 2-105.   
Pursuant to the simplified process for admitting a will to probate recommended by 
the Commission and enacted by the General Assembly, there are several possible timelines 
in which a party can contest the validity of the will.  For example, an interested party could 
first file a petition for administrative or judicial probate to admit a will to probate.  Another 
interested party may thereafter file a petition to caveat to contest the validity of that will.  
The original petitioner, along with the other interested parties, would then be provided 
twenty days to file a response to the petition to caveat.  See Md. Rule 6-122(b)(2).  Pursuant 
to this Court’s statutory interpretation of ET § 5-207(b), the orphans’ court would consider 
the petition to caveat and any response, then schedule a judicial probate hearing before 
admitting the will to probate.  In the meantime, the Court can appoint a special 
administrator as this new procedure does not require the orphans’ court to stay the 
proceedings.  If the caveator subsequently requests certain issues be transmitted to a court 
of law, the orphans’ court is bound to consider the petition to caveat and response, frame 
 
33 
 
the issues of fact, and send the issues to the circuit court if it has not already determined 
those issues as directed by ET § 2-105.   
Alternatively, an interested party may proceed with an uncontested administrative 
or judicial probate.  Within six months of the orphans’ court appointing a personal 
representative in that proceeding, another interested party can file a petition to caveat, 
which reopens the case for a new determination by the orphans’ court. 14  The reopening of 
the case requires the orphans’ court to schedule a judicial probate hearing to make a final 
determination of the issues raised in the petition to caveat. Before the judicial probate 
hearing takes place, the caveator may request that the orphans’ court transmit the issues to 
a court of law for a trial.   
As both parties recognize, there were procedural abnormalities in the case sub 
judice.  Here, the instant controversy arose when two interested parties each filed a petition 
for administrative probate.  First, Mr. Straka filed a petition for administrative probate, 
indicating that no will had been found.  Thereafter, Ms. Shealer filed a petition for 
administrative probate, asking that the Decedent’s Will be admitted to probate.  Ms. 
Shealer’s petition specifically requested that the orphans’ court hold a judicial probate 
hearing and that the orphans’ court make specific findings, including that the Will was duly 
                                                 
14 “Regardless of whether a petition for probate has been filed, a verified petition to caveat 
a will may be filed at any time prior to the expiration of six months following the first 
appointment of a personal representative under a will, even if there be a subsequent judicial 
probate or appointment of a personal representative.”  ET § 5-207 (emphasis added); see 
also Md. Rule 6-431.   
 
 
34 
 
executed.  In response to Ms. Shealer’s petition, the orphans’ court scheduled a judicial 
probate hearing for April 19, 2016.  As such, when Mr. Straka filed a petition to caveat, 
albeit an incomplete petition to caveat, on April 15, 2016, a judicial probate hearing was 
already scheduled.  Typically, a party requests issues to be transmitted to a court of law 
after a petition to caveat and an answer is filed with the orphans’ court; however, Mr. Straka 
made an oral request to transfer issues to the circuit court during the judicial probate 
hearing before the orphans’ court issued its ruling.   
The plain language and legislative history of ET § 5-207(b) indicate that the 
orphans’ court is no longer required to stay the proceedings upon the filing of a petition to 
caveat.  However, in this case, the judicial probate hearing was already scheduled when 
Mr. Straka filed a petition to caveat.  As such, the previously scheduled judicial probate 
hearing did not permit Mr. Straka time to file an amended petition to caveat and Ms. Shealer 
time to file a response to the petition.  As the legislative history of ET § 2-105 indicates, 
an orphans’ court derives issues of fact to be transmitted to the circuit court by looking to 
a petition to caveat and response.  See Sykes § 221 (“An issue may be defined as a single, 
definite, and material question framed from the allegations of a petition and the answer 
thereto.”) (Emphasis added); see also Fid. Tr. Co. v. Barrett, 186 Md. 483, 488 (1946) (“It 
is true that the orphans’ court may frame issues upon proper pleadings as to the invalidity 
of any portion of a will . . . .”).   
Mr. Straka made his oral request to transmit issues to a court of law during the 
judicial probate hearing.  At the time of the oral request, the Orphans’ Court for Worcester 
County had the opportunity to consider Ms. Shealer’s petition for judicial probate, 
 
35 
 
requesting the orphans’ court to determine that the Decedent’s Will was duly executed, that 
she was legally competent to make the Decedent’s Will, and that the Decedent’s Will was 
properly attested to and executed.  The Orphans’ Court for Worcester County also had 
before it Mr. Straka’s incomplete petition to caveat, which stated that Mr. Straka believed 
the Decedent’s Will to be invalid because the Will was not properly executed and attested 
to in accordance with Maryland law, the Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to make 
the Will, and the Decedent’s Will was procured by undue influence or fraud.   
There were many ways in which the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County could 
have responded to the procedural abnormalities and still complied with the required 
procedures under ET §§ 5-207 and 2-105.  This Court concludes that the Orphans’ Court 
for Worcester County had enough information from Ms. Shealer’s petition for 
administrative probate and Mr. Straka’s incomplete petition to caveat in order to determine 
that the judicial probate hearing constituted a plenary proceeding and to frame issues of 
fact on which the parties disagreed.  Based on the procedural abnormalities of this case, 
this Court concludes that the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County erred when it refused 
Mr. Straka’s oral request to frame and transmit issues to the circuit court.  Mr. Straka’s 
petition to caveat and request to transmit issues did not proceed in a typical fashion; 
however, the request to transmit the issues to circuit court was made before the Orphans’ 
Court for Worcester County made any final determination as to those issues.  Therefore, 
the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County failed to comply with the longstanding and 
unchanged procedure set forth under ET § 2-105(b) for transmission of issues to a court of 
law.   
 
36 
 
D.  
Harmless Error 
 
The final issue in this appeal is whether the orphans’ court’s error was harmless.  
The Court of Special Appeals determined that Mr. Straka satisfied his burden of showing 
prejudice because an orphans’ court’s determinations following a judicial probate 
proceeding are final and binding on all persons.  See ET § 5-406 (“[A]ny determination 
made by the court in a proceeding for judicial probate is final and binding on all persons.”).  
Ms. Shealer asserts that any error by the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County was 
harmless.  Furthermore, Ms. Shealer contends that the Court of Special Appeals improperly 
determined that Mr. Straka showed prejudice under the harmless error standard.  Mr. Straka 
maintains that he was prejudiced15 when the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County failed 
to stay the proceedings upon his petition to caveat.  In addition, Mr. Straka argues that he 
was mainly prejudiced because he was prevented from transmitting the issues outlined in 
his petition to caveat to the circuit court for trial by jury.   
 
We have repeatedly held that “this Court will not reverse a lower court judgment if 
the error is harmless.”  Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 33 (2007); see also Greenbriar v. 
Brooks, 387 Md. 683, 740 (2005); Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004).  The party 
                                                 
15 Mr. Straka also contends that he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice because the 
orphans’ court’s alleged failure in the proceedings below constituted an egregious civil 
error.  However, this Court has previously noted that parties are only entitled to a 
presumption of prejudice in “limited circumstances,” none of which apply here.  See 
Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 660 (2011) (“Other than these limited 
circumstances, the burden to show error in civil cases is on the appealing party to show 
that an error caused prejudice.”).    
 
 
37 
 
complaining that an error has occurred has the burden of showing prejudicial error.  Flores, 
398 Md. at 33.  “Prejudice will be found if a showing is made that the error was likely to 
have affected the verdict below.  ‘It is not the possibility, but the probability, of prejudice 
which is the object of the appellate inquiry.’”  Crane, 382 Md. at 91 (quoting State Deposit 
Ins. Fund Corp. v. Billman, 321 Md. 3, 17 (1990)). Ultimately, this Court determines 
prejudice “based on the facts of each individual case.”  Barksdale, 419 Md. at 662.   
 
As discussed above, this Court determined that the Orphans’ Court for Worcester 
County did not err when it held a judicial probate hearing, the new procedure enacted by 
the General Assembly, instead of staying the proceedings after Mr. Straka filed his 
incomplete petition to caveat.  See ET § 5-207(b).  However, we also concluded that the 
orphans’ court erred when it denied Mr. Straka’s request to transmit issues of fact to the 
circuit court when the orphans’ court had not yet determined those issues.  See ET § 2-
105(b).  Therefore, the question becomes whether the orphans’ court’s error in refusing to 
frame and transmit factual issues was harmless.   
This Court has long described the orphans’ court’s responsibility to frame and direct 
issues of fact to a court of law for a jury trial as an “imperative duty.”  Schmidt v. Johnston, 
154 Md. 125, 126 (1928); see also Flaks, 173 Md. at 365 (“The duty of the orphans’ court 
to make up and transmit issues to a court of law, when required, is imperative, and it is also 
bound to accept the conclusions of the jury as final, and to make them effective by proper 
orders or decrees.”); Price v. Taylor, 21 Md. 356, 363 (1864) (“The duty of the [o]rphans’ 
[c]ourt to make up and transmit issues to a [c]ourt of law, when required, is imperative[.]”).  
This line of jurisprudence explained: 
 
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The law confides in the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt power to determine whether or not 
a will should be admitted to probate.  To aid in the execution of that duty, the 
Legislature has empowered the court to direct any issue of fact to be tried by 
plenary proceedings and with the help of a jury.  Upon the request of either 
party, the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt is required to frame issues and send them to a 
court of law for trial.   
 
Ades, 204 Md. at 272 (emphasis added).  As such, Maryland courts have emphasized that 
the orphans’ court’s duty to transmit issues of fact to the circuit court is a significant 
obligation.   
In addition to the general principles regarding transmitting issues to a court of law, 
this Court has also stressed that having a jury decide certain issues of fact becomes most 
significant in caveat cases.  As early as 1821, this Court recognized:  
The regular mode of proceeding in opposition to the admission of a will to 
probat[e], is by caveat; and it may often happen, (and probably most 
frequently does,) that the necessity for a plenary proceeding and a trial by 
jury, is only discovered after a part at least of the testimony is taken; and at 
any stage of the proceedings, before final adjudication, either party may 
require it, and the court is not at liberty to refuse it. 
 
Barroll v. Reading, 5 H. & J. 175, 176 (1821).  Therefore, Maryland has consistently 
emphasized the importance of sending issues to a court of law in caveat cases even in 
instances when the orphans’ court has heard part of the testimony on the petition to caveat.  
See also Maynadier v. Armstrong, 98 Md. 175, 180 (1903) (“[W]e are of the opinion that 
the statute does not require the orphans’ court to stop the investigations being made before 
it, as these were, and send to a court of law issues for the determination of such questions 
as those proposed in this petition, when that investigation is being made under a plenary 
proceeding . . . .  There may be cases under caveats to wills, and possibly some other 
 
39 
 
plenary proceedings, in which it may be proper; but, when that court is actually engaged 
in the hearing of the question whether administrators are entitled to be allowed for such 
items as these, it might lead to dangerous practices if either party has the right to stop all 
proceedings in that court, and require issues to be sent to a court of law.”); Russell v. 
Gaither, 181 Md. App. 25, 34–35 (2008) (“The Court of Appeals, however, addressed this 
possibility in Maynadier v. Armstrong, supra, where it said the orphans’ court was 
authorized to decline to transmit issues in certain cases, but not in caveat proceedings, 
where the need for a right to transmit could be the greatest.”).   
 
In this case, Mr. Straka contends that he was primarily prejudiced because he was 
unable to transmit the issues asserted in his petition to caveat to a court of law to be tried 
by a jury.  After reviewing the record, this Court notes that Mr. Straka did not present any 
witnesses at the judicial probate hearing, did not present any substantive evidence, and did 
not have a chance to fully argue all of the issues alleged in the petition to caveat.  Given 
the importance of transmitting issues to a court of law, especially in caveat cases, this Court 
is persuaded that the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County’s refusal to transmit issues was 
not harmless.  See Barroll, 5 H. & J. at 176; Russell, 181 Md. App. at 34–35.  In denying 
Mr. Straka the opportunity to present witnesses, evidence, and arguments to a jury, we 
conclude that the orphans’ court’s refusal probably would have affected whether that court 
ultimately admitted the Decedent’s Will to probate.  See Crane, 382 Md. at 91.   
Moreover, the procedural abnormalities in this individual case also convince this 
Court that the error was not harmless.  See Barksdale, 419 Md. at 662.  Specifically, the 
timing of the petition to caveat disrupted one of two normal procedures intended by the 
 
40 
 
General Assembly: (1) the filing of a petition to caveat after a petition for administrative 
probate, which would require a future judicial probate hearing; or (2) the filing of a petition 
to caveat after a judicial probate proceeding, which would require the orphans’ court to 
hold a new judicial probate hearing before admitting the will to probate.  See ET § 5-207(b).  
Here, Mr. Straka filed a petition to caveat when there was already a judicial probate hearing 
scheduled.  As such, the orphans’ court properly proceeded with judicial probate in light 
of the petition to caveat.  However, the timing of that judicial probate hearing did not allow 
Mr. Straka the opportunity to file an amended petition to caveat or Ms. Shealer time to 
respond to the petition to caveat before the orphans’ court admitted the Will to probate.  
Therefore, this Court is persuaded that the specific facts of this case require a finding that 
the error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that 
error in this case was not harmless.   
CONCLUSION 
 
This Court concludes that the General Assembly intended to create a new, simple 
procedure before an orphans’ court upon the filing of a petition to caveat: a judicial probate 
proceeding.  See ET § 5-207(b).  The plain language and the legislative history of this 
statute persuades this Court that the legislature did not intend for the orphans’ court to have 
to stay all proceedings when an interested party files a petition to caveat a will.  This Court 
further concludes that the General Assembly did not intend to change the longstanding 
procedure required when an interested party requests to transmit issues to a court of law in 
caveat cases.  Pursuant to ET § 2-105(b), an orphans’ court is required to transmit issues 
of fact to the circuit court if it has not already determined those issues.   
 
41 
 
As such, the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County did not err by proceeding with a 
judicial probate hearing, and refusing to stay the matter, after a party filed a petition to 
caveat.  Although there were procedural abnormalities, ultimately this Court concludes that 
the Orphans’ Court for Worcester County committed error when it refused to transmit 
issues of fact because Mr. Straka requested the transfer before the orphans’ court had 
finally decided those issues.  This Court is further persuaded that this error was not 
harmless because it denied Mr. Straka, a caveator, the significant right to have certain 
issues of fact tried by a jury.   
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS A F F I R M E D  
I N  P A R T  A N D  REVERSED IN 
PART.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT 
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO 
VACATE 
THE 
ORDER 
DATED 
APRIL 19, 2016 ADMITTING WILL 
TO PROBATE AND APPOINTING 
MS. 
SHEALER 
PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE AND REMAND 
TO THE ORPHANS’ COURT FOR 
WORCESTER 
COUNTY 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  
COSTS TO BE PAID ONE-HALF BY 
PETITIONER AND ONE-HALF BY 
RESPONDENT.