Case Title: Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. One

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-48

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. One1988 WY 128763 P.2d 843Case Number: 88-48Decided: 10/24/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
TETON 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES,LARAMIECOUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Don W. Riske and 
Stephen M. Kissinger of Law Office of Don W. Riske, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Ward A. White 
and Larry B. Kehl of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Teton 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc., in an event receiving local publicity, was rejected 
as a subcontractor on a construction project let by appellee Board of Trustees, 
Laramie County School District Number One. Thereafter, appellant brought an 
action in district court, alleging, inter alia, a cause of action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights - specifically, the right to 
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of appellee, 
and this appeal was taken.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant describes the 
issue in this fashion:

WHETHER APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO PARTICIPATE IN CONTRACTS LET BY APPELLEE IS A PROPERTY OR LIBERTY INTEREST PROTECTED 
BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES.

[¶4.]     Appellee, 
alternatively, characterizes the appeal as presenting three issues, which it 
phrases as follows:

I. THE ISSUE OF AN 
ALLEGED DEPRIVATION OF A LIBERTY INTEREST WITHOUT DUE PROCESS SHOULD NOT 
BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT AS IT HAS BEEN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME BY APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL.

II. WHETHER THE APPELLEE 
IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENTAS A MATTER OF LAWON THE APPELLANT'S ALLEGED DEPRIVATION OF A 
LIBERTY INTEREST 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

III. WHETHER THE APPELLEE 
IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENTAS A MATTER OF LAWON THE 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGED DEPRIVATION OF A PROPERTY INTEREST WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW.

[¶5.]     The events leading 
directly to the litigation in the instant case occurred in 1986. An 
understanding of the issues presented, however, requires that we set out in some 
detail the history of appellant's business relations with appellee. Appellant 
was a Wyoming 
corporation wholly owned by Edwin Smith, which worked almost exclusively on 
public works projects as a plumbing subcontractor. In 1982, appellant was the 
plumbing subcontractor for the construction of the new JohnsonJunior High School being built for Laramie County School District Number One 
(School District)1 in Cheyenne. In the course of the construction and 
afterwards, the School 
District became aware of 
problems regarding appellant's workmanship and materials.

[¶6.]     Thereafter, in 1983, 
appellee solicited bids for the construction of the new GilchristElementary School. After a successful bid 
and award of the contract, the general contractor notified representatives of 
the School 
District that the designated 
plumbing subcontractor had withdrawn and requested that appellant be substituted 
in its place. As a result of the previous problems with appellant, appellee 
refused the substitution of appellant as subcontractor on this project. This 
action was taken at a board meeting held August 22, 1983. Appellee's 
difficulties with appellant on the GilchristElementary School project, however, did not end at that point. 
The plumbing subcontract was let to Yukon Corporation, which in turn 
subcontracted part of the work to Edwin Smith. When appellee attempted to reject 
Mr. Smith from the project, Mr. Smith claimed that appellee had no authority to 
take such action. The issue was submitted to arbitration, and, following a 
hearing, the arbitrator found in favor of appellee. The arbitrator's award 
included the following findings:

The School District was justified in requesting the removal of 
Ed Smith from the job. The District had previously rejected Teton Plumbing & 
Heating as a subcontractor, as it was entitled to do under the general 
conditions of the contract. The subcontract was then let to Yukon Corporation, 
who in turn gave part of the contract to Ed Smith purportedly as a 
sub-subcontractor. There is no question that Ed Smith and Teton Plumbing were 
one and the same, and it was admitted by Smith that the arrangement was made to 
get around the School District's rejection of 
his firm as a subcontractor.

[¶7.]     After the arbitration 
decision, appellant, through counsel, wrote to appellee inquiring as to whether 
appellant would be permanently barred from obtaining further work with the 
School District and whether its bids would be 
automatically rejected. Dean Conine, the School District's assistant superintendent for business services, responded 
by a letter dated April 25, 1984, in which he stated in 
part:

In answer to the concerns 
expressed by Mr. Smith, it is the position of the District that Mr. Smith would 
be welcome to view and/or obtain copies of plans and that he would also be 
welcome to bid on any project. As you are well aware, the Board can reject any 
or all bids and were his bid the low bid and it was rejected, I would think the 
Board would give him an explanation.

Discussions here lead me 
to believe that rather than an automatic rejection, the District would require 
perhaps additional safeguards for a time to insure completion of a project to 
the District's satisfaction. Once a reestablishment of credibility has taken 
place, these safeguards could be relaxed.

[¶8.]     Subsequently, in June 
of 1984, appellee awarded a contract for the Storey Gym remodeling to a general 
contractor who had listed appellant as the plumbing subcontractor. Appellant 
performed the plumbing work on this project. Robert Platt, the district engineer 
for the School District, testified in his 
deposition that appellant was subject to a heightened level of supervision on 
this project and that, even with the closer scrutiny of appellant's work, 
problems with appellant's workmanship were again 
encountered.

[¶9.]     In the summer of 1986, 
appellant worked as a subcontractor on an outside sewer system project at 
Johnson Junior High School with the knowledge, and apparently also the approval, 
of the School District. Mr. Platt stated in his 
deposition that he did not become aware of appellant's participation in this 
project until after it had commenced but that he was not concerned with 
appellant's involvement in this instance. He stated that he believed appellant 
could satisfactorily perform outside utility work, as opposed to interior 
plumbing which requires more sophistication and expertise. The record does not 
indicate any problems resulting from appellant's participation in this project. 

[¶10.]  Out of this background and in this 
atmosphere of business relations between the parties arose the events creating 
the controversy and litigation in this case. In July and August 1986, appellee 
solicited bids for the construction of the JohnsonJunior High School addition. The bids were opened on August 22, 
1986, and Westates Construction Company was the low bidder. Westates listed 
appellant as the plumbing subcontractor.

[¶11.]  Westates' bid was considered by appellee 
at a board meeting held August 25, 1986. The minutes of the meeting with respect 
to this bid indicate that a motion was made and seconded to accept the bid of 
Westates. A discussion followed in which Trustee Alfred A. Atkins stated that 
the plumbing subcontractor listed for the project (appellant) would not be 
acceptable because of problems appellee had experienced in the past with that 
subcontractor. Trustee Atkins then made a motion, which was seconded, to allow 
the architect and district engineer to negotiate for a different subcontractor. 
After further discussion, the original motion, as amended to allow substitution 
of another plumbing subcontractor, passed unanimously. The following day the 
Wyoming State Tribune carried an article reporting on the meeting with the 
headline, "School District 1 Bars Teton Plumbing." The article quoted Trustee 
Atkins as having said that appellant was responsible for some damage to school 
buildings which was irreparable and that some of the damage included 
"`atrocious' installation of the heating system and `the furnace was located in 
the wrong spot' and eventually had to be moved."

[¶12.]  By letter dated October 10, 1986, 
appellant requested a reversal of the action taken at the August 25 board 
meeting and further requested a contested case hearing before the board. The 
superintendent of schools responded on October 23, 1986, with a letter which 
indirectly rejected appellant's requests and which stated that it was the 
present position of the School District that appellant was an acceptable 
contractor for outside utility work and that future bids for such work would be 
given the same consideration as bids from other contractors, but that appellant 
was not acceptable for interior plumbing work. Edwin Smith stated in an 
affidavit that, subsequent to this board action and the attendant publicity, 
appellant's business fortunes had rapidly declined, culminating in the 
liquidation of its assets and the discontinuation of 
business.

[¶13.]  This action was commenced on November 4, 
1986, when appellant filed its "APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT 
FOR DAMAGES" in the district court. In this complaint, appellant alleged, inter 
alia, a denial of procedural due process under the United 
States 
and Wyoming Constitutions and requested that the court direct appellee to 
provide a contested case hearing. Appellant also alleged causes of action, 
apparently founded on tort theories, relating to lost profits, damage to 
business reputation, and intentional, reckless, and malicious disregard for 
appellant's constitutional rights. Appellee answered with a general denial and 
asserted as an affirmative defense the failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. With leave of the district court, appellant filed an 
amended complaint on May 8, 1987, adding as an additional cause of action a 
claim pursuant to § 1983 for violation of its civil rights, specifically its 
right to procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Appellee answered and filed a combined motion to 
dismiss and motion for summary judgment.

[¶14.]  A hearing was held on appellee's motions, 
and on September 4, 1987, the district court issued a decision letter granting 
summary judgment in favor of appellee on both the § 1983 claim and the request 
for a contested case hearing and dismissing all of appellant's other claims. 
Subsequently, it came to the district court's attention that it had authorized 
the submission of supplemental affidavits. Upon receipt and review of these 
affidavits, the court issued a second decision letter on September 17, 1987, 
essentially reaffirming the prior decision. A judgment and order of dismissal 
was entered on October 16, 1987. Appellant thereafter filed a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment, seeking a reversal of the summary judgment entered on the § 
1983 claim. After a hearing on appellant's motion, the court issued a decision 
letter denying the motion, and an order to that effect was entered on January 
13, 1988. This appeal was then perfected.

[¶15.]  Appellant limits its appeal to a 
challenge of the summary judgment granted appellee on the § 1983 claim. Summary 
judgment is properly granted upon the dual findings that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Whipple v. Northern WyomingCommunity College Foundation of Sheridan, 
753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 1988); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 
1987). The facts in this case are not in dispute, and we only need to determine 
whether appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On a question of 
law, we accord no deference to and are not bound by the district court's 
decision. Id.; Employment Security Commission 
of Wyoming v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶16.]  Section 1983 creates a cause of action 
for the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution or laws. That section provides:

Every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this 
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute 
of the District of 
Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982).2 For purposes of the statute, a 
school district may be a "person" acting under color of state law. Stoddard v. 
School District No. 1, Lincoln County, Wyoming, 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979); Courtney v. School 
District No. 1, Lincoln 
County, Wyoming, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D.Wyo. 1974). Similarly, a corporation (such as appellant) is 
considered to be a "person" possessing due process rights and being entitled to 
maintain a § 1983 action. San Bernardino 
Physicians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1987); Fulton 
Market Cold Storage Company v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 758 (7th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1121, 99 S. Ct. 1033, 59 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1979).

[¶17.]  The elements required to establish a 
claim for relief pursuant to § 1983 are: "(1) that the conduct complained of was 
engaged in under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected the 
plaintiffs to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States." Schultz v. Palmberg, 317 F. Supp. 659, 661 (D.Wyo. 1970). See also Sowell's Meats and Services, Inc. v. McSwain, 
788 F.2d 226, 86 A.L.R.Fed. 897 (4th Cir. 1986), and Courtney, 371 F. Supp. 401. 
On appeal, appellant asserts a deprivation of protected property and liberty 
interests without due process in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.3 With respect to the liberty claim, 
however, appellee argues that the asserted deprivation of a liberty interest was 
never raised in the proceedings below and therefore should not be considered by 
this Court upon appeal. We agree.

[¶18.]  Appellant first raised its § 1983 claim 
in its amended complaint. The amended complaint asserted a violation of 
appellant's civil rights "including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's right to 
procedural due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The amended complaint 
did not specify what protected interest appellant was allegedly deprived of 
without due process. Appellant, however, fleshed out the nature of its claim in 
its memorandum in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. In this 
memorandum, appellant argued that it had been deprived of a right to bid upon 
and participate in contracts let by appellee and that the asserted right 
amounted to a legitimate claim of entitlement; i.e., a property interest. 
Appellant, in this memorandum, never asserted the violation of a liberty 
interest, such as an injury to reputation or an infringement upon the freedom to 
contract. Appellant continued to adhere to this "property interest" posture 
throughout the proceedings below, up to and including its motion for amendment 
of judgment wherein appellant asserted that the district court had erred in not 
finding a property interest in its status as a prospective bidder. 
Correspondingly, appellee limited its arguments in motions and memoranda to the 
issue of a property interest.4

[¶19.]  We see no reason to deviate from our 
general rule that new issues cannot be raised on appeal. Ricci v. New Hampshire 
Insurance Company, 721 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986); 
Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1984). In a similar situation we 
stated:

Related to appellees' 
argument is the fundamental rule, applicable to appeals from summary judgments, 
that parties may not advance new theories or issues in order to secure a 
reversal of the lower court's determination. Theories or issues which are not 
apparent or reasonably discernible from the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits 
will not be considered.

Minnehoma 
Financial Company v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). Although we have noted an 
exception to this rule where the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
with respect to the new issue (Ricci, 721 P.2d 1081), we have further said: 
"Absent this exception it is well established that `[a] new theory cannot be 
asserted on appeal.'" Id. at 1088 (quoting 
Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 978 (Wyo. 1974), appeal after remand 540 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1975)). Accordingly, 
we do not consider the propriety of the grant of summary judgment in relation to 
appellant's newly asserted theory of a deprivation of a liberty 
interest.

[¶20.]  The only issue left for determination, 
therefore, is whether, as a matter of law, summary judgment was proper in 
relation to appellant's claimed deprivation of a property interest without due 
process. Neither party disputes the district court's determinations that 
appellant was not afforded a hearing before being excised from Westates' bid and 
that a post-deprivation remedy satisfying the requirements of due process was 
not available. Thus, the issue is reduced to whether appellant possessed a 
property interest subject to due process protections. We are in agreement with 
the district court that appellant lacked such a protected 
interest.

[¶21.]  The nature of property interests 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). The Court said that property interests protected by 
due process considerations are not limited to ownership of real property, 
chattels, or money but extend to the security of interests a person has obtained 
in specific benefits. Id.

To have a property 
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or 
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, 
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.

Id. at 577, 92 S. Ct.  at 2709 
(emphasis added). To a similar effect, and particularly relevant to the instant 
case, is the language in American Conveyor Corporation v. Municipality of 
Guanica, 614 F. Supp. 922, 930 (D.P.R. 1985), wherein the court, citing Roth, 
said: "In order to have a property interest in a government benefit, whether it 
be a job or a public works contract, the party making the claim must show that 
it has a legitimate claim of entitlement." (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court, 
in Roth, also described the source of property interests:

Property interests, of 
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure 
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.

408 U.S.  at 577, 92 S. Ct.  at 2709. See 
also Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435 (10th 
Cir. 1988).

[¶22.]  Appellant asserts that it had a protected 
property interest in being allowed to participate in contracts let by appellee, 
or, as the district court aptly summarized the claim, appellant asserts a 
property interest in its "status" as a bidder. In accordance with Roth and its 
progeny, we must evaluate appellant's alleged property interest by looking to 
Wyoming law 
and relevant school district rules and policies. W.S. 21-3-110 describes the 
duties of the boards of trustees in Wyoming school districts. Paragraph (a)(viii) 
establishes certain bidding procedures for building projects and provides in 
pertinent part:

The district shall 
reserve the right to reject any and all 
bids and to waive irregularities and informalities in the 
bidding.

(Emphasis 
added.) The School District's standardized "Instructions to Bidders," as issued 
in connection with the Johnson Junior High School addition project, states that 
appellee does not obligate itself to "the lowest or any other bid," and the 
"Project Manual" states that it reserves the right to "reject any or all bids 
without further obligation." Additionally, the "Bid Form for General 
Contractors" specifies that the general contractor shall not employ any 
subcontractors that the School District finds 
objectionable. In agreement with the district court, we fail to see how the 
statute or appellee's regulations provided appellant with anything approaching 
an entitlement to be accepted as a bidder or subcontractor or even to have its 
bids entertained by appellee, particularly in light of the fact that appellant 
had been previously removed from the Gilchrist Elementary School project for 
substandard work.

[¶23.]  We find support for our position in the 
case of Kasom v. City of Sterling Heights, 600 F. Supp. 1555 (E.D.Mich. 1985), aff'd 785 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1986). In that case, the city council rejected all bids on a 
landscaping project and ordered rebidding. The lowest bidder brought suit 
against the city pursuant to § 1983. The city's charter contained a provision 
authorizing the city to reject any and all bids. The court in Kasom noted that 
the central issue in disappointed bidder cases is "whether a plaintiff has shown 
that the benefit he seeks to enjoy is one to which he is entitled or merely one 
he desires to enjoy." Id. at 1559. In dismissing the plaintiff's 
claims, the court distinguished the situation from one in which a state statute 
requires public works contracts to be awarded to the lowest bidder, noting a 
limited property interest in such a situation. The court observed that, where 
the discretion of the state official responsible for conferring the benefit is 
limited by state law, an entitlement may exist respecting a benefit that is 
sought but not yet obtained. The court held, however, that no such limitation on 
discretion exists where the official may reject any and all bids and 
consequently there was no entitlement giving rise to a protected property 
interest on behalf of the disappointed bidder before the court in that case. To 
a similar effect is the language found in Waltentas v. Lipper, 636 F. Supp. 331, 
336 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), wherein the court stated: "Only when procedures impose a 
`significant substantive restriction' on the defendant's decision making does an 
expectation of a specific decision become a property interest." See also 10 E. 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 29.77 at 413-14 (3rd ed. 1981), where, in 
relation to municipal corporations, the author states that, when a municipal 
officer is authorized to reject any and all bids, the lowest bidder does not 
obtain a property interest and that "the courts will not interfere with the 
discretion unless exercised with a fraudulent intent."

[¶24.]  Appellant also characterizes the action 
of appellee as a debarment (i.e., the "[e]xclusion from government contracting 
and subcontracting," Black's Law Dictionary 361 (5th ed. 1979)), and claims that 
such debarment affected a protected property interest. We initially observe that 
the evidence in the record indicates that appellee's action at the August 25, 
1986, board meeting only effected the rejection of appellant as a subcontractor 
on the JohnsonJunior High School addition 
project. The subsequent letter to appellant's counsel from the superintendent of 
schools, however, did state that appellant was not acceptable for interior 
plumbing work, although it additionally stated that appellee did consider 
appellant an acceptable contractor for outside utility work and would give 
consideration to its bids for such projects. To the extent that this 
representation by the superintendent may have signified something akin to a 
partial debarment, and we do not hold that it did, we do not see that it 
infringed upon a protected property interest.

[¶25.]  The cases involving debarment of 
contractors from bidding on government contracts generally have held that such a 
debarment affects only a liberty interest, as opposed to a property interest, 
and then only in certain circumstances. The debarment issue often arises in 
connection with government procurement contracts. In Smith & Wesson, 
Division of Bangor Punta Corporation v. United States, 782 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st 
Cir. 1986), the court quoted Transco Security, Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 820, 102 S. Ct. 101, 70 L. Ed. 2d 90 
(1981), as follows:

"While the deprivation of 
the right to bid on government contracts is not a property interest * * *, the 
bidder's liberty interest is affected when that denial is based on charges of 
fraud and dishonesty."[5]

See also Old 
Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); and Coyne-Delany Co., Inc. v. Capital Development Board of State of 
Illinois, 616 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1980). In Berlanti v. Bodman, 780 F.2d 296 (3d 
Cir. 1985), however, the Third Circuit held that a debarred contractor in New 
Jersey had a property interest in being allowed to bid for and be awarded public 
works contracts. In reaching that decision, the court relied first upon a 
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, which it interpreted as implying that 
debarment effects the deprivation of a property right, and secondly upon the New 
Jersey debarment statute which allowed debarment only for cause. Neither of the 
two factors relied upon by the court in Berlanti is present in the instant case. 
This Court has never held that debarment affects a property interest, and 
Wyoming does 
not have a debarment statute. Under Wyoming law, therefore, a protected property 
interest does not exist in relation to a right to bid on public 
projects.

[¶26.]  Appellant further argues that it had a 
property interest on the basis of an implied promise or contract arising from 
the letter sent in 1984 by Dean Conine, the assistant superintendent. That 
letter, as referenced earlier in this opinion, stated that appellant was welcome 
to continue to bid on projects, but it also reiterated appellee's authority to 
reject any and all bids. The letter further stated: "Discussions here lead me to 
believe that rather than an automatic rejection, the District would require 
perhaps additional safeguards for a time to insure completion of a project to 
the District's satisfaction." In making its implied promise argument, appellant 
relies on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972), wherein the Supreme Court stated:

[¶27.]  A person's interest in a benefit is a 
"property" interest for due process purposes if there are such rules for 
mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the 
benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.

In Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976), the Supreme Court, in 
referring to Perry, said that, while a property interest in employment could be 
created by implied contract, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be 
determined by reference to state law. We agree with appellee that the letter 
from Mr. Conine is equivocal at best and does not represent an implied contract 
or a mutually explicit understanding enforceable under Wyoming law. It must be 
recalled that, at the time of receipt of this letter, appellant had previously 
been rejected and removed as a subcontractor on the GilchristElementary School project. In our view, 
the letter at most may have fostered an expectancy in appellant that its bids or 
status as a bidding subcontractor would be considered, but it certainly did not 
provide a legitimate claim of entitlement to any such 
consideration.

[¶28.]  For the foregoing reasons, we hold, as a 
matter of law, that the actions of appellee did not deprive appellant of a 
constitutionally protected property interest. The entry of summary judgment 
against appellant on its § 1983 claim was proper.

[¶29.]  AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Board of Trustees, 
as the defendant/appellee in this case, is the governing body of the School District. W.S. 21-3-105. The School 
District is a body corporate. W.S. 21-3-101. W.S. 
21-3-111(a)(i) provides that the board of trustees in each school district may 
be sued in the name by which the district is designated. Thus, for purposes of 
suit, a school district and the board of trustees are virtually one and the 
same. This opinion, therefore, will on occasion refer interchangeably to the 
School District rather than appellee Board of 
Trustees where such designation accords with common understanding and usage and 
enhances clarity.

2 State courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over § 1983 actions. Board of 
Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1, WestonCounty 
v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978); Merriman 
Construction Co. v. County of Geauga, 572 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D.Ohio 1983); 
Tomsick v. Jones, 464 F. Supp. 371 (D.Colo. 1979).

3 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, in pertinent part, proclaims: "nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1.

4 The only reference to a 
liberty interest in the proceedings below was made by the district court in its 
first decision letter, wherein the court observed:

The Court has not 
overlooked the fact that Plaintiff's reputational interest is at issue in these 
proceedings. Yet, as set forth above, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no redress 
according to Paul v. Davis, [424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976)].

Without 
addressing the correctness of the district court's statement, we note only that 
it is unclear why the reference to a liberty interest was made when appellant 
had never presented the issue to the district court.

5 In this case, appellant 
was not rejected as a subcontractor on the basis of fraud or dishonesty. The 
rejection, rather, was premised on inferior workmanship. In this vein, see 
Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no due process liberty 
interest implicated when a public employee was dismissed for reasons of 
unsatisfactory job performance and insubordination - as opposed to termination 
on ground of dishonesty, which has been held to affect liberty interests).