Case Title: MULLINNIX LLC V. HKB ROYALTY TRUST, c/o H. BROWN; JAW ROYALTY TRUST, WILTSE; OSWALD; RODERICK; BAALMAN; HIGH PLAINS ASSOCIATES, INC.; PARNELL; PENNACO ENERGY, INC.; BARRETT RESOURCES CORPORATION; LANCE OIL AND GAS COMPANY, INC.; SCHIENKER; FULTON; TONGUE RIVER ROYALTIES; M&M OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES, LLC; U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NA; SCHUMAN; MORTON; SMITH; HIGGINS; BENNETT, BANK ONE, f/k/a THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, NA; McDONALD; JOHNSON; FRAZEY; TOWER COLOMBIA CORPORATION; CROUCH; QUANTUM ENERGY; COULTER; FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF COMMERCE; ROTHWELL; and NORTH FINN, LLC ; HICKMAN; BOYCE; and LANE BOYCE V. BERNICE GROVES; JAMES E. DRAKE; and EDRA JUNE DRAKE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-80

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MULLINNIX LLC V. HKB ROYALTY TRUST, c/o H. BROWN; JAW ROYALTY TRUST, WILTSE; OSWALD; RODERICK; BAALMAN; HIGH PLAINS ASSOCIATES, INC.; PARNELL; PENNACO ENERGY, INC.; BARRETT RESOURCES CORPORATION; LANCE OIL AND GAS COMPANY, INC.; SCHIENKER; FULTON; TONGUE RIVER ROYALTIES; M&M OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES, LLC; U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NA; SCHUMAN; MORTON; SMITH; HIGGINS; BENNETT, BANK ONE, f/k/a THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, NA; McDONALD; JOHNSON; FRAZEY; TOWER COLOMBIA CORPORATION; CROUCH; QUANTUM ENERGY; COULTER; FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF COMMERCE; ROTHWELL; and NORTH FINN, LLC ; HICKMAN; BOYCE; and LANE BOYCE V. BERNICE GROVES; JAMES E. DRAKE; and EDRA JUNE DRAKE2006 WY 14126 P.3d 909Case Number: 05-80, 05-8Decided: 01/24/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
MULLINNIX 
LLC,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
HKB ROYALTY 
TRUST, c/o H. KIRK BROWN, III, TRUSTEE; JAW ROYALTY TRUST, JILL A. WILTSE, 
TRUSTEE; LOUIS A. OSWALD, III, TRUSTEE OF THE OSWALD FAMILY TRUST DATED APRIL 
27, 1998; JONATHAN S. RODERICK; LYNNE M. BAALMAN AND MARK E. BAALMAN, WIFE AND 
HUSBAND; HIGH PLAINS  ASSOCIATES, 
INC.; JIMMIE E. PARNELL AND NANCY PARNELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE; FIRST INTERSTATE 
BANK OF COMMERCE AND MILDRED B. PARNELL AS CO-TRUSTEES OF THE PARNELL PRIMARY 
TRUST; PENNACO ENERGY, INC.; BARRETT RESOURCES CORPORATION; LANCE OIL AND GAS 
COMPANY, INC.; KENNETH A. SCHIENKER; WILLIAM M. FULTON, III; TONGUE RIVER 
ROYALTIES; M&M OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES, LLC; JIMMIE E. PARNELL, INDIVIDUALLY; 
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NA; MARY JO SCHUMAN; BRIAN LUTE MORTON; WILLIAM 
DAKE MORTON, a/k/a WILLIAM DUKE MORTON; MILDRED SMITH;  WILLIAM W. HIGGINS AND BARBARA LEE 
HIGGINS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; MICHAEL BENNETT, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR MARY FRANCES 
BENNETT; BANK ONE, f/k/a THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, NA; DON McDONALD, 
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; VERNON A. JOHNSON AND TERESA F. JOHNSON, HUSBAND WIFE; 
RICHARD E. FRAZEY; MILDRED B. PARNELL, TRUSTEE OF THE PARNELL TRUST; FIRST 
INTERSTATE BANK, AS TRUSTEE OF THE PARNELL TRUST; TOWER COLOMBIA CORPORATION; 
MARSHALL C. CROUCH III; JANE R. CROUCH; QUANTUM ENERGY; MIKE J. COULTER AND 
SHIRLEY P. COULTER, HUSBAND AND WIFE; MILDRED B. PARNELL AND FIRST INTERSTATE 
BANK OF COMMERCE, CO-TRUSTEES WITH REGINALD R. PARNELL, DECEASED, OF THE 
REGINALD R. PARNELL TRUST DATED APRIL 5, 1976; MILDRED B. PARNELL AND FIRST 
INTERSTATE BANK OF COMMERCE, CO-TRUSTEES WITH REGINALD R. PARNELL, DECEASED, OF 
THE MILDRED B. PARNELL TRUST DATED APRIL 5, 1976; MABEL K. ROTHWELL, WIDOW OF 
JAMES L. ROTHWELL, a/k/a JIM ROTHWELL, DECEASED; MABEL K. ROTHWELL, AS SUCCESSOR 
IN INTEREST, HEIR AND BENEFICIARY OF JIM ROTHWELL,  a/k/a JAMES L. ROTHWELL, INDIVIDUALLY; 
and NORTH FINN, LLC,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
JOHN W. HICKMAN; 
FRED BOYCE, JR., PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF FRED J. BOYCE; and 
LANE BOYCE,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
BERNICE GROVES; 
JAMES E. DRAKE; and EDRA JUNE DRAKE,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Case No. 
05-80

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Parnell  Appellees:

            
James L. Edwards of Stevens, Edwards, Hallock & Carpenter, P.C., 
Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Pennaco Energy, Inc.

            
S. Thomas Throne of Throne & Hurst, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 

Case No. 
05-81

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Kendal R. Hoopes and Jay A. Gilbertz of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The dispositive 
issue in this case was whether deeds reserving "oil rights" which were executed 
in the 1940s in CampbellCounty, effectively reserved gas rights 
without a specific reference to "gas."  
In these consolidated appeals, Mullinnix, LLC and John W. Hickman, Fred 
J. Boyce and Lane Boyce (hereinafter referred to as Hickmans) contest the 
district court's order quieting title in gas rights in the appellees.  The district court examined extrinsic 
evidence of the trade usage of the term "oil rights" at the time and place of 
the execution of the deeds and concluded the term, as used in real estate 
documents, did not include the gas rights.  
In the Mullinnix case, the district court also concluded that a document 
entitled "Declaration of Interest" executed in 1968, long after the deed was 
executed, by the grantees in the deed in question did not operate as a waiver or 
to estop them from asserting their full interest in the gas estate.  We agree with the district court's 
conclusions and, therefore, affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Case numbers 
05-80 and 05-81 were consolidated for a bench trial and, also, on appeal.  Appellants Mullinnix and Hickman filed a 
single brief.  They articulate the 
issues on appeal as follows:

            

1.         
Was the Court's decision that reservations of "oil rights" exclude gas 
contrary to the evidence introduced at trial[?]  Did the Court intentionally ignore 
relevant evidence and rely on inadmissible evidence in reaching its 
conclusion?  (Mullinnix and Hickman cases)

 
 
2.         
In analyzing evidence to decide that a reservation of "oil rights" 
excluded gas, did the Court fail to follow the precedent and process set forth 
by the Court in Hickman v. Groves, 
[2003 WY 76,] 71 P.3d 250 [(Wyo. 2003)]?  (Mullinnix and Hickman cases)

 
 
3.         
Did the Court err by allowing an expert opinion from attorney Edward 
Halsey interpreting deeds when that was the job of the Court, and Mr. Halsey 
refused to apply the decision of Hickman 
v. Groves to his analysis?  (Mullinnix and Hickman cases)

 
 
4.         
Did the Court erroneously exclude evidence of conduct of parties to the 
deeds and their successors in interest demonstrating that they considered a 
reservation of "oil rights" to include "gas" as well?  (Mullinnix and Hickman cases)

 
 
5.         
Did the Court ignore the evidence and decide contrary to the evidence 
when it held that Johny Mullinnix did not have sufficient detrimental reliance 
to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and thereby preclude the Parnells 
and their successors in interest from disavowing the Declaration of 
Interest?  (Mullinnix case)

 
 
6.         
Since actual consideration was recited and paid for the Declaration of 
Interest, was detrimental reliance necessary in order to give effect to the 
Declaration of Interest?  (Mullinnix case)

 
 
7.         
Did the Court improperly curtail the evidence so that Mullinnix was 
unable to prove detrimental reliance upon the representations of the Parnells 
and their attorney, Tom Morgan, that the Declaration of Interest would be signed 
before allowing his draft to be paid and filing the mineral deed he had taken 
from the Rothwells?  (Mullinnix case)

 
 
8.         
In light of the foregoing evidence, which should have been admitted, and 
the evidence which was admitted, was it error for the judge to conclude that 
Mullinnix did not rely on a Declaration of Interest before allowing the 10-day 
draft issued for the mineral interest in the property to be paid and filing the 
Rothwell mineral deed?  (Mullinnix case)

 
 
9.         
Did the Court err as a matter of law when it determined that the 
Declaration of Interest was not a waiver or an estoppel of record?  (Mullinnix case)

 
 
10.       Did the 
Court err by failing to apply the doctrine of laches to prevent the Parnells and 
their successors in interest from disavowing the Declaration of Interest?  Should the doctrine be applied as a 
matter of law to this case?  (Mullinnix case)

 
 
11.       Should the 
Parnells and their successors in interest be estopped as a matter of law by the 
fact of signing and providing the Declaration of Interest for filing of record 
in the records of the CountyClerk? (Mullinnix case)

 
 
12.       Is the 
Court's decision that the Declaration of Interest was not a waiver erroneous as 
a matter of law contrary to the evidence? (Mullinnix case)

 
 
13.       Did the 
Court err by interpreting a reservation of "oil and commercial gravel rights" to 
be a reservation of "oil", but not "oil rights"?  (Hickman case)

 
 
14.       Should the 
reservation of "oil rights" include coalbed methane gas?  (Mullinnix and Hickman cases)

 
 
[¶3]      Appellees Pennaco 
Energy, Inc., Groves, and Parnells filed separate briefs on 
appeal.  Pennaco identified the 
issues on appeal as: 

 
 
1.         
Did the reservation of "oil" rights in the 1947 deed also include a 
reservation of "gas"?

 
 
2.         
Does a document without words of conveyance (the Declaration of Interest) 
recorded 20 years after the date of the deed change ownership transferred by the 
deed?

 
 
3.         
Should "circumstances surrounding" an unambiguous document be considered 
when determining the intent of the parties to a deed?

 
 
Parnells 
restate the issues as:

 
 
[1.] 
      Did 
Appellant meet his burden of proof that "oil rights" includes 
"gas"?

 
 
[2.] 
      Was the 
decision of the District Court that "oil rights" means "oil" and does not 
include "gas" substantiated by the evidence presented?

 
 

Groves phrases 
the appellate issues as follows:

 
 

1.                  
Whether 
the District Court's determination that the reservation of "oil and commercial 
gravel rights" did not include gas or coalbed methane gas, is supported by the 
evidence.

 
 

2.                  
Whether 
the District Court followed the process outlined in Hickman v. Groves, 2003 WY 76, 71 P.3d 256 (Wyo. 2003), in interpreting the warranty deed.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
            
Case No. 05-81

 
 
[¶4]      On October 14, 
1944, Jerry Hickman and Effie Hickman executed a warranty deed conveying real 
property located in Campbell County to Ed Willard, but reserving "to the 
grantors one-half of all oil and commercial gravel rights" in the property.  Hickmans are the successors in interest 
to Jerry and Effie Hickman; and Bernice Groves, James Drake, and Edra June Drake 
(hereinafter referred to as Groves) are the successors in interest to Mr. 
Willard.

 
 
[¶5]      On July 20, 2001, 
Groves filed an 
action seeking to quiet title to all coal bed methane gas (CBM)1 underlying the subject real 
property.  Hickman filed a 
counterclaim seeking a declaration that they owned one-half of all of the gas, 
including CBM, underlying the property pursuant to the reservation of "oil 
rights" contained within the warranty deed.  Hickmans contended the term "oil rights" 
had a particular meaning when the deeds were executed in 1944 in CampbellCounty, which included gas and they filed 
affidavits supporting that contention.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Groves, ruling that the warranty deed was 
unambiguous and, as a matter of law, the reservation of "oil rights" did not 
include a reservation of gas rights.  
Hickman v. Groves, 2003 WY 76, ¶¶ 
3-4, 71 P.3d 256, 256-57 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶6]      Hickmans appealed 
the summary judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded for a trial, finding 
a question of fact was raised concerning whether "oil rights" had a particular 
trade usage at the time the deed was executed.  We ruled, although the term "oil rights" 
is unambiguous on its face, facts had been alleged showing that the trade usage 
of the term "oil rights" included gas and, therefore, suggested the true intent 
of the grantors was to reserve gas, as well as oil.  Id., ¶ 10, 71 P.3d  at 259.  We reasoned:  "In interpreting unambiguous contracts 
involving mineral interests, we have consistently looked to surrounding 
circumstances, facts showing the relations of the parties, the subject matter of 
the contract, and the apparent purpose of making the contract."  Id., ¶ 6, 71 P.3d  at 258.  Consistent with our decisions in Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., 2002 WY 
132, 53 P.3d 540 (Wyo. 2002), and McGee 
v. Caballo Coal Co., 2003 WY 68, 69 P.3d 908 (Wyo. 2003), the court must 
focus on the general intent of the parties, concentrating on the purpose of the 
grant or reservation "in terms of the respective manner of enjoyment of surface 
and mineral estates and the exploitation of the mineral resources 
involved."  Hickman, ¶ 7, 71 P.3d  at 258.  We, therefore, remanded the case to the 
district court for a trial to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the issue 
of fact regarding the trade usage of the term "oil rights" at the time and place 
of execution of the deeds.  
Id., ¶ 16, 71 P.3d  at 
262.

 
 
Case No. 
05-80

 
 
[¶7]      On May 8, 1947, 
James and Vida Rothwell executed a warranty deed conveying certain property in 
CampbellCounty to R.D. and Mary 
Parnell.  The Rothwells reserved 
"one half of all the oil rights" in most of the property and "one fourth of the 
oil rights" in the remainder of the property.  In 1968, Johny Mullinnix, acting on 
behalf of Mullinnix 67 Associates, contacted the Rothwells regarding their 
mineral interests.  Mullinnix, LLC 
is the successor in interest to Mullinnix 67 Associates.  On August 6, 1968, the Rothwells signed 
a mineral deed conveying their mineral interests to Mullinnix.  In consideration for the mineral deed, 
Mullinnix executed a $24,000 draft, payable to the Rothwells through the Lusk 
State Bank.  The draft was a ten-day 
sight draft and was specifically subject to Mullinnix's approval of the title to 
the property.  The Rothwells 
deposited the draft on August 7, 1968, and on August 13, 1968, Mr. Mullinnix 
sent a check and a letter to the Lusk State Bank, instructing it to pay the 
draft on its due date unless he informed it otherwise.  Mr. Mullinnix did not provide other 
instructions to the bank prior to its due date, and the draft was paid  according to its terms.  The mineral deed was recorded on August 
15, 1968. 

 
 
 [¶8]     Mr. Mullinnix conducted 
a title search after the mineral deed was executed and before the draft was paid 
and discovered the Rothwells had reserved an interest in "oil rights."  He was concerned the reservation created 
some uncertainty as to the status of the gas rights.  Consequently, he contacted the Parnells 
in an effort to clarify the matter.  
R.D. Parnell had passed away, leaving Mary Parnell and her son and 
daughter-in-law, Reginald and Mildred Parnell, as the holders of the Parnell 
mineral interests.2  Mr. Mullinnix prepared a document 
entitled "Declaration of Interest" for the Parnells' signatures, which stated 
the Parnells owned an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas and associated 
hydrocarbons and other minerals in certain property and an undivided one-fourth 
interest in the oil, gas and associated hydrocarbons and other minerals in other 
property.  The Parnells directed 
their attorney to review the Declaration of Interest document.  Their attorney struck the "other 
minerals" language from the declaration, leaving the reference to "oil, gas, and 
associated hydrocarbons."  The 
Parnells signed the Declaration of Interest on August 20, 1968, and it was 
recorded in the Campbell County Clerk's Office on August 27, 1968.    

 
 
[¶9]      On March 14, 
2001, Mullinnix LLC filed an action in the district court for a declaratory 
judgment and to quiet title to the mineral interests it acquired through its 
transaction with the Rothwells.  In 
particular, Mullinnix sought a declaration as to its title in the gas 
estate.  The parties recognized the 
issues presented in the Mullinnix case were very similar to the issues in the 
Hickman case.  Thus, the district 
court stayed proceedings in the Mullinnix case, pending this Court's decision on 
the Hickman appeal. 

  

Consolidated 
cases

 
 

[¶10]   After we reversed the summary 
judgment in Hickman, the district 
court consolidated the Mullinnix and Hickman cases.  The district court held a bench trial on 
the consolidated cases in October 2004.  
It subsequently issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment.  In accordance with this 
Court's opinion in Hickman, the 
district court considered evidence relevant to whether the term "oil rights" had 
a particular trade usage, which included gas, at the time the deeds were 
executed.   The district court 
concluded: "Local usage in CampbellCounty during the 1940s was such that both 
oil and gas were specifically referred to when used to reserve interests in 
mineral deeds."  As to 
both deeds, the district court ruled the grantors reserved the oil rights, in 
the relevant percentages, but conveyed the gas rights, including the rights to 
CBM.  

 
 
[¶11]   In the Mullinnix case, the district 
court originally granted a summary judgment to Mullinnix, finding the 
Declaration of Interest had "achieved its stated intent of clarifying the 
interests held, and that as a result the Plaintiff had thereafter relied upon 
it, and entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs."  After the Hickman case was reversed by 
this Court, the district court withdrew its summary judgment on the Declaration 
of Interest.  After the trial, the 
district court ruled Mullinnix's claims of estoppel and waiver pursuant to the 
Declaration of Interest were not supported by the evidence.  Hickman and Mullinnix filed timely 
notices of appeal from the district court's findings of facts, conclusions of 
law and judgment.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   The district court heard these 
cases without a jury.  We, 
therefore, apply our standard for reviewing decisions made by a district court 
following a bench trial:

 
 
"The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."

 
 

Harber 
v. Jensen, 2004 
WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) quoting, Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. 
Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003).  See also Powder River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 
2005 WY 1, ¶ 8, 103 P.3d 876, 879-80 
(Wyo. 2005).  Further, with regard 
to the trial court's findings of fact,

 
 
"we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law."

 
 

Harber, ¶ 7, 
97 P.3d  at 60.  The district court's conclusions of 
law are, however, subject to our de 
novo standard of review.  Powder River Ranch,  ¶ 8, 103 P.3d at 879-80; Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. 
Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, 
680-81 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Interpretation of Terms of the 
Deeds

 
 
[¶13]   In Hickman, we concluded a genuine issue of 
material fact existed regarding whether the term "oil rights" as used in the 
Hickman/Willard deed had a particular trade usage at the time and place of the 
deed's execution.  Hickman, ¶ 10, 71 P.3d  at 259.  Quoting 11 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 
32:7 (4th ed. 1999), we stated: ". . . circumstances known to the parties at the 
time they entered into the contract, such as what that industry considered to be 
the norm, or reasonable or prudent, should be considered in construing a 
contract, while the parties' statements of what they intended the contract to 
mean are not admissible."  Hickman, ¶ 13, 71 P.3d  at 260.  Thus, we directed the district court to 
consider the circumstances surrounding execution of the deed to determine 
whether "oil rights" was a term of widely known custom and usage in CampbellCounty in the 1940s which included the 
"gas rights" without specifically mentioning the word "gas."  Hickman, ¶¶ 10-11, 16, 71 P.3d  at 
259-60, 262.

 
 
[¶14]   After the trial, the district court 
ruled Mullinnix and Hickmans did not satisfy their burden of proving use of the 
term "oil rights"3 in deeds in CampbellCounty in the 1940s had a particular trade 
usage which included the "gas rights."  
As properly recognized by the district court, the party asserting a 
particular trade usage of a term has the burden of proving the existence of the 
trade usage.  Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Central 
Engineering & Equipment Company, 611 P.2d 863, 869 (Wyo. 1980).  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222 (1981) gives guidance in defining 
a "usage of trade" as:  "a usage 
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to 
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a particular 
agreement."  

 
 
[¶15]   The grantors in both deeds, the 
Hickmans and the Rothwells, were involved in the ranching business when they 
conveyed the property.  Mullinnix 
and Hickmans attempted to prove that ranchers, who may not have been highly 
educated or sophisticated, often referred to their entire bundle of minerals 
rights as "oil rights" without distinguishing between oil and gas.  Consequently, they maintained the use of 
the term "oil rights" in the deeds was meant to include the gas, as well as the 
oil.  The appellees agreed that, in 
the 1940s, people may have used the term "oil rights" in casual conversation to 
mean a broader variety of mineral rights.   Nevertheless, they claimed, in 
formal documents such as deeds, landowners (including ranchers) were more 
specific and described with particularity the interests being conveyed and/or 
reserved.  Thus, according to the 
appellees, the term "oil rights" was used in the deeds to mean simply thatoil 
and not gas.  

 
 
[¶16]   In deciding whether Mullinnix and 
Hickmans had satisfied their burden of proof, the district court considered the 
understanding of persons who had occasion to negotiate land transactions at the 
time the deeds were executed. In that regard, the district court 
found:

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 

5.      
During 
the 1940s, the production of oil was the primary consideration for all concerned 
in northeastern Wyoming.  
At the time, natural gas was not considered a commercial product in 
northeastern Wyoming primarily due to the lack of pipelines 
and associated production and storage infrastructure. Gas then produced in 
northeastern Wyoming was solely the by-product of the 
production of oil and was customarily "flared," that is, simply burned off as a 
by-product of the oil production process.

  

6.      
While 
the general term "oil rights" was undoubtedly used during the 1940s in Campbell 
County during informal discussions to refer to the bundle of rights associated 
with surface and sub-surface holdings, warranty deeds recorded during the period 
habitually referred with more exacting specificity to those substances being 
reserved by the grantor in a conveyance.  
Common language employed to reserve interests included language such as 
"reserving unto the grantor one-half of the oil and gas rights"; or "reserving 
unto the grantor, all oil, gas, and other minerals."  Where the grantor sought to reserve only 
an interest in the oil, language such as "the first parties reserve an undivided 
one-half interest in all oil that may be found in or under the surface of said 
land"; "reserving unto the grantors one-half of all the oil rights"; or 
"grantors reserving, however, an undivided one-half interest in all oil and 
minerals (not gas) in, and under or appertaining to said premises," was 
employed.  

 
 

7.      
The 
better weight of credible evidence presented at trial includes that, where the 
1940s grantor intended to reserve an interest in oil and gas, language in a deed reservation referring to both "oil" and "gas" was customary and 
was the language expected by those examining deeds for title 
purposes.

 
 

8.      
Similarly, 
the weight of credible testimony at trial established that the reasonably 
prudent party to a conveyance would not have relied on the common parlance to 
provide that a reservation of "oil rights" in a deed included gas or other 
minerals.  Instead, the credible 
testimony presented indicated that a 1940s era reservation of "oil rights" in a deed probably would not have 
included a reservation of gas or other minerals.   

 
 
(emphasis 
in original).    

 
 
[¶17]   The testimony and documentary 
evidence presented at the trial supports the district court's findings.4  Several landmen and attorneys who worked 
in the minerals industry during that time testified at the trial about their 
experiences in CampbellCounty in the 1940s and 1950s.  Obviously, persons who dealt in the 
minerals trade during that era were elderly at the time of the trial in 
2004.  Still, the witnesses 
testified people knew the difference between oil and gas at that time.  They also testified the term "oil 
rights" was sometimes used as a colloquialism or short-hand in casual 
conversation to mean the broader bundle of mineral rights.      

 
 
[¶18]   Nevertheless, the witnesses 
consistently testified that, when used in legal documents such as deeds, parties 
did not routinely use the term "oil rights" to mean "oil and gas" or the entire 
bundle of mineral rights.  Instead, 
the interests at stake in a conveyance or reservation were described with 
particularity.  Numerous documents 
of conveyance offered into evidence showed the use of specific descriptions of 
different mineral interests.  For 
example, the trial evidence included several deeds of that era which included 
specific references to "oil and gas" or specifically exempting "gas."  Furthermore, the attorneys and the 
landmen testified that, if they encountered a deed which included the term "oil 
rights" during that time, they would have taken some type of action to correct 
or "cure" what they perceived as a problem with the title.    

 
 
[¶19]   Mullinnix and Hickmans attempted to 
prove the grantors in each deed, i.e. Jerry and Effie Hickman and James and Vida 
Rothwell, were simple ranchers with limited education, suggesting that they 
would have used the colloquial or slang term "oil rights" to mean all of the 
minerals or, at least, the "oil and gas" in their deeds.  Thus, they offered testimony about the 
experiences and education of the grantors.  
The relevance of that evidence to the ultimate inquiry, i.e. whether "oil 
rights" had a particular trade usage which included gas rights, was not, 
however, shown at trial.  Simply 
because the grantors were ranchers of limited education and/or experience and 
may have used the term "oil rights" to mean oil and gas in casual conversation, 
does not mean that they would use the term "oil rights" in a legal document to 
mean "oil and gas" or the entire bundle of mineral rights.   In fact, the evidence presented at 
the trial expressly refuted that leap in logic.  An oil and gas lease executed by the 
Rothwells prior to the deed at issue in this case contained separate specific 
references to their oil and gas interests, indicating the Rothwells understood 
well the distinction between their interests in the different hydrocarbons.  In addition, an 83-year-old CampbellCounty rancher, Charles Christensen, 
testified landowners in the 1940s may have referred to their mineral rights as 
oil rights in casual conversation, but they had a very good understanding of the 
scope and nature of the property they owned and were very specific when 
describing the property they bought or sold in formal documents.  He also provided an analogy which is 
instructive to our analysis in this case.  
He testified that ranchers often referred to their cattle herds 
generically as "cows" in conversation, but when they were buying or selling the 
livestock, they would particularly describe them as "steer calves, heifer 
calves, cows," etc. in the bills of sale.   

 
 
[¶20]   Substantial evidence supported the 
district court's conclusion that the term "oil rights" in the deeds did not 
include "gas."  Mullinnix and 
Hickmans did not meet their burden of proving the term "oil rights" was used 
with such regularity in deeds in the 1940s in CampbellCounty to mean both oil and gas that a 
person intending to include oil and gas in a conveyance would have used the 
language "oil rights."

 
 
[¶21]   On appeal, appellee Pennaco 
specifically requests we revisit decisions in which we stated that, even when 
the language of a deed is unambiguous, the court should consider the 
"surrounding circumstances" in determining the meaning of its terms.  See e.g., Caballo Coal Company v. Fidelity Exploration 
& Production Company, 2004 WY 6, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 311, 315 (Wyo. 2004); Newman, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d  at 544, McGee, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d  at 912.  Pennaco argues this interpretive 
procedure introduces too much uncertainty into real property title.  It insists deeds should be interpreted 
differently than typical contracts because persons other than the parties to the 
deeds rely upon them.  In order to 
remedy this situation, Pennaco urges us to announce that, henceforth, so long as 
the language is not ambiguous on its face, the court should establish the "plain 
meaning" of the language as a matter of law.  It argues such a procedure would foster 
certainty in real estate law and allow persons examining the title to rely upon 
their understanding of the plain meaning of the recorded documents in 
determining where title reposes.  
The district court's decision letter after the bench trial in this case 
indicates it shares Pennaco's view.              

 
 
[¶22]   In responding to this issue, we 
start with a reminder that the ultimate goal of our interpretation of any 
contract, including a deed, is to discern the intention of the parties to the 
document.  See, e.g., Caballo Coal Company, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d at 
314-15; Newman, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d  at 544; 
McGee, ¶ 10, 69 P.3d  at 912.  In doing so, we look first to the plain 
meaning of the words of the deed.  
Id.  This has long been the law in Wyoming.  See,  e.g., Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 29, 59 P. 434, 436 (1899); Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103, 107 
(Wyo. 1963); Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15, 18 
(Wyo. 
1973).

 
 
[¶23]   Pennaco and the district court 
insist allowing extrinsic evidence of the "surrounding circumstances" of a deed 
in order to determine the meaning of its terms is a new development in 
Wyoming 
law.  However, a careful examination 
of our case law reveals it has long been the law that we look to the meaning of 
terms at the time of execution of an unambiguous deed.  In 1899, we stated in Balch, 9 Wyo. at 29, 59 P. at 436:  "The rule in such cases [involving deed 
interpretation] is that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained by 
considering all the provisions of the deed, as well as the situation of the parties, 
and then to give effect to such intention if practicable." (emphasis 
added).  Understanding the 
importance of the use of "surrounding circumstances" evidence is not difficult 
when you take into account the definition of "plain meaning" as used in contract 
interpretation cases.  The "plain 
meaning [of a contract's language] is that meaning which [the] language would 
convey to reasonable persons at the time 
and place of its use.'" Newman, ¶ 
12, 53 P.3d  at 544, quoting Moncrief v. 
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company, 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo. 1993) (emphasis 
added).   If we were to adopt 
Pennaco's position, real property documents would be interpreted in accordance 
with the meaning of terms as the court understands them at the time and place of interpretation 
of the document rather than at the time 
and place of the execution of 
the document. 

 
 
[¶24]   The case of Boley v. Greenough, 2001 WY 47, 22 P.3d 854 (Wyo. 2001), illustrates the importance of examining a conveyance of mineral 
interests at the time and place of 
execution.  Thirty years after 
the Greenough parents had conveyed royalty interests to their children, a 
dispute arose because one provision of the assignments used the term "overriding 
royalty" when the grantors were not leaseholders or overriding royalty owners at 
the time of the assignments.  Some 
of the confusion in Boley resulted 
from the evolution of the term "overriding royalty" in oil and gas law.  In resolving the dispute, we emphasized 
the importance of interpreting the language of a conveyance at the time and 
place of its execution in order to effectuate the intentions of the parties to 
the conveyance.   Boley, ¶¶ 14-22, 22 P.3d  at 858-60.   

 
 
[¶25]   The district court's decision 
letter seems to suggest, by considering extrinsic evidence of the "surrounding 
circumstances" of a deed's execution, we endorse a violation of the parol 
evidence rule.  Those statements 
indicate a misunderstanding of the parol evidence rule, which is a rule of 
substantive law rather than a rule of evidence.  See, e.g., Bowen v. Korell, 587 P.2d 653, 656 
(Wyo. 
1978).  It originated in the 
doctrine of merger, which states:  
"[A]ll provisions in a contract are merged into the deed when executed 
and delivered except those covenants which are deemed to be collateral to the 
sale.  Thus, the deed regulates the 
rights and liabilities of the parties."  
Bakken v. Price, 613 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo. 1980), quoting 8A Thompson on Real Property, § 4458, p. 
331.  See also Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 2004 
WY 29, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 843, 848 (Wyo. 2004).    

 
 
"The 
parol evidence rule has been stated in many ways but the basic notion is that a 
writing intended by the parties to be a final embodiment of their agreement may 
not be contradicted by certain kinds of evidence.  A writing that is final is at least a 
partial integration.  If the writing 
is final and also complete, it is a total integration and may not only not be 
contradicted by the type of evidence in question but may not even be 
supplemented by consistent (non-contradictory) additional terms.  If it is final and incomplete it may be 
supplemented by consistent additional terms."     

 
 

Longtree, 
Ltd. v. Resource Control International, Inc., 755 P.2d 195, 204 (Wyo. 
1988), quoting, J. Calamari and J. Perillo, Law of Contracts, § 3-2 at 135-36 (3d ed. 1987).  Consequently, the function of the parol 
evidence rule is to prevent parties from supplementing or contradicting the 
terms of the contract.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 231; E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, §§ 7.2 through 7.7 (3d ed. 
1999).  Once the terms of the 
agreement are identified, the parol evidence rule ceases to operate.  The rule does not prohibit use of 
extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed to 
interpret the meaning of its terms.  
Id.  
By allowing evidence of the circumstances surrounding execution of 
the deed, courts are more apt to arrive at the parties' true intention at the 
time of the execution of the deed.  

 
 
[¶26]   The proper role of the parol 
evidence rule was recognized by the Wyoming legislature when it adopted the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34.1-1-101 through 34.1-10-104 
(LexisNexis 2005).  The Uniform 
Commercial Code specifically allows evidence of "usage of trade" to be 
considered in interpreting a contract.  
See § 34.1-1-205; Century Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & 
Company, 770 P.2d 692, 696-97 (Wyo. 1989).  "Custom and usage of a particular place 
or trade can be proved to give to the words of a written contract a meaning 
different from that which would be given to the words by their more general 
usage" without violating the parol evidence rule.  6 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 579 (2002).  In Hickman, this Court quoted, at length, 
Williston's esteemed treatise on contracts, which discusses the proper 
application of evidence of custom and usage in determining the meaning of 
contract terms.  In light of 
Pennaco's argument and the district court's decision letter, we think parts of 
that discussion bear repeating.

 
 
"Historically, 
it has been recognized that familiar words may have different meanings in 
different places and that every contract will therefore have a relation to the 
custom of the country where it is made. . . .

 
 
[I]n 
subsequent years, numerous cases were decided where words with a clear normal 
meaning were shown by usage to bear a meaning which was not suggested by the 
ordinary language used.  This is not 
only true of technical terms, but of language which, at least on its face, has 
no peculiar or technical meaning or significance.

 
 
Therefore, 
evidence of usage may be admissible to give meaning to apparently unambiguous 
terms of a contract where other parol evidence would be inadmissible.  Thus, circumstances known to the parties 
at the time they entered into contract, such as what that industry considered to 
be the norm, or reasonable or prudent, should be considered in construing a 
contract, while the parties' statements of what they intended the contract to 
mean are not admissible.

 
 
It is 
currently the widely-accepted rule that custom and usage may be proved to show 
the intention of parties to a written contract or other instrument in the use of 
phrases of a peculiar technical meaning which, when unexplained, are susceptible 
of two or more plain and reasonable constructions.  Parol evidence may be admitted to 
establish a technical meaning where certain provincialisms and technicalities of 
science and commerce have acquired a known, fixed and definite meaning different 
from their ordinary meaning by legal custom or usage.  Thus, in the interpretation of technical 
terms used in a contract, it is proper to consider the meaning given to those 
terms in the course of prior dealings between the parties, as well as by 
business or trade custom or usage. . . .

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
[T]he 
correct rule with reference to the admissibility of evidence as to trade usage 
under the circumstances presented here is that while words in a contract are 
ordinarily to be construed according to their plain, ordinary, popular or legal 
meaning, as the case may be, if in reference to the subject matter of the 
contract, particular expressions have by trade usage acquired a different 
meaning, and both parties are engaged in that trade, the parties to the contract 
are considered to have used them according to their different and peculiar sense 
as shown by such trade usage.  Parol 
evidence is admissible to establish the trade usage, and that is true even 
though the words are in their ordinary or legal meaning entirely unambiguous, 
since, by reason of the usage, the words are used by the parties in a different sense."

 
 

Hickman, 
¶¶ 
12-13, 71 P.3d  at 260-61, quoting 12 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 
34:5 (4th ed. 1999).  See also Caballo Coal Company, ¶¶ 11-12, 84 P.3d  
at 316-17.  Thus, we continue to 
recognize the importance of allowing the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret 
a contract, including custom and usage in a particular place or trade at the 
time of execution of the contract, in order to arrive at the plain meaning of 
the agreement, with the goal of more closely effectuating the parties' true 
intent.     

 
 
[¶27]   If we were to accept Pennaco's 
invitation to adopt a definition of the term "oil rights" to be applied in every 
legal document coming before Wyoming courts, there might be greater 
predictability in resolving disputes over the meaning of that certain term.5  It would not, however, serve to 
effectuate the intent of the parties to documents and would undermine this 
Court's deed interpretation jurisprudence which has developed over more than one 
hundred years.  Upon review of our 
numerous cases involving interpretation of real property interests, we certainly 
cannot say that such jurisprudence has caused excessive litigation or confusion 
as predicted by Pennaco.          

 
 
[¶28]   In Newman, we surveyed the ways other 
jurisdictions addressed the problems associated with determining coalbed methane 
ownership.  Newman, ¶¶ 20-27, 53 P.3d  at 
546-49.  We discussed the advantages 
and disadvantages of various interpretation models and, ultimately, rejected any 
rigid rule of law established by the courts without regard to the parties' 
intent.  Instead we returned to our 
longstanding procedure designed to give "effect to the general intent of the 
parties to the conveyance with regard to the exploitation of mineral 
resources."  Newman, ¶ 27, 53 P.3d  at 549.  We were not convinced there is any 
better way to resolve disputes over property ownership than by trying to 
ascertain the intentions of the parties to the conveyance by looking to "the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the execution" of deeds.  We continue to believe that is the best 
approach and, therefore, decline Pennaco's invitation to revise the law of deed 
interpretation in Wyoming. 

 
 
            
Declaration of 
Interest

 
 
[¶29]   
In an attempt to cure the problem with the "oil rights" language in 
the Rothwell/Parnell deed, Mullinnix arranged for the Parnells to sign a 
"Declaration of Interest."  The 
declaration stated, in relevant part:

 
 
            
COMES NOW Mary E. Parnell, a widow, and Reginald Parnell and Mildred 
Parnell, husband and wife, all of Campbell County, Wyoming for and in 
consideration of the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration and for the further consideration of clarifying the Records of 
Campbell County, Wyoming do hereby state and declare that they own the following 
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and associated hydrocarbons, [other 
minerals deleted] in and under those lands and interests more particularly 
described as follows:  An undivided 
one-half interest in [legal description omitted] [and an] undivided one-fourth 
interest in [legal description omitted].

 
 
 
 
The 
declaration was signed by the Parnells on August 20, 1968, and recorded in the 
Campbell County Clerk's Office on August 27, 1968.     

 
 
[¶30]   The district court ruled on the 
effectiveness of the Declaration of Interest as follows: 

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 

6.                  
The 
Declaration of Interest dated August 20, 1968[,] did not convey property, and 
did not alter the then-existing ownership of the mineral estate in the lands 
described therein.

 
 

7.                  
Neither 
the Plaintiff nor his predecessor relied upon the Declaration of Interest in 
obtaining the August 1968 mineral deed.

 
 

8.                  
Plaintiff's 
claims of estoppel and waiver are not supported by the evidence offered at trial 
and considered by this Court.

 
 
[¶31]   On appeal, Mullinnix argues that 
the district court erred by refusing to recognize the Declaration of Interest as 
defining the Rothwells' and Parnells' ownership in the subject property.  We agree with the district court's 
conclusion that, pursuant to its plain language, the Declaration of Interest did 
not affect the parties' interests in the mineral estate.  It was signed only by the Parnells, who 
were the grantees in the original deed, so it could not modify the interests 
transferred and/or reserved in the original deed.  Furthermore, the Declaration of Interest 
did not contain words of conveyance indicating the Parnells were relinquishing 
or conveying any interest they held to the Rothwells or Mullinnix.  Although no particular words are 
required to convey real property, the language of the document must indicate a 
specific intention to convey the property.  
See DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 860 (Wyo. 
1986).  There were no such words of 
conveyance included in the Declaration of Interest.  Consequently, the declaration failed to 
modify legal title to the property.  

 
 
[¶32]   Mullinnix also argues, under the 
doctrines of equitable estoppel, laches, and/or waiver, the Declaration of 
Interest, prohibits the Parnells from claiming they owned the entire gas 
estate.  The doctrines of estoppel, 
laches, and waiver are related doctrines originating in the principles of 
equity.  

 
 
"Equitable 
estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is 
absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as 
against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has 
been led thereby to change his position for the worse.  Equitable estoppel arises only when a 
party, by acts, conduct, or acquiescence causes another to change his 
position.  The elements of equitable 
estoppel are a lack of knowledge, reliance in good faith, and action or inaction 
that results in an injury."  

 
 

Parkhurst 
v. Boykin, 2004 WY 
90, ¶ 21, 94 P.3d 450, 460 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted).  Laches is a form of equitable estoppel 
which operates when a party has unreasonably delayed in asserting a legal 
right.  Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 13, 88 P.3d 1050, 1058 (Wyo. 2004).  
"Laches does not depend on the passage of time alone; the plaintiff must 
be chargeable with lack of diligence in failing to proceed more promptly.  Laches will apply when the delay has 
worked injustice, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendant." Id. (citations omitted).  Similarly, "[t]he traditional elements 
of waiver are:  (1) an existing 
right; (2) knowledge of that right; and (3) an intent to relinquish it.'"  Scherer v. Schuler Custom Homes Const., 
Inc., 2004 WY 109, ¶ 16, 98 P.3d 159, 162 (Wyo. 2004), quoting Jackson State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1992). 

 
 
[¶33]   Mullinnix asserts it acted to its 
detriment by allowing payment of the $24,000 draft to the Rothwells for the 
mineral deed based upon the Parnells' promise to sign the declaration of 
interest.  There are two problems 
with Mullinnix's argument:  the 
language of the declaration does not support Mullinnix's claim that the Parnells 
relinquished or waived their interest in the gas by signing it and the record 
indicates Mullinnix did not rely upon the Parnells' execution of the declaration 
when it purchased the Rothwells' mineral interest.   The plain language of the Declaration of 
Interest simply states the Parnells owned one-half or one-fourth, respectively, 
of the oil and gas in the subject property.   The declaration does not, however, 
include any language of exclusivity to indicate that the Parnells only owned the stated interests in 
the gas.  In addition, the Parnells 
did not stipulate to the Rothwells' or Mullinnix's ownership of an interest in 
the gaswhich is the interest at issue in this case.  As recognized by the parties at the 
trial, the problem could have been cured with a cross-conveyance between both 
parties to the original deed.  
Unfortunately for Mullinnix, the Declaration of Interest did not go far 
enough to effectuate the result it apparently desireda recognition by the 
Parnells that the Rothwells or Mullinnix owned a portion of the gas 
interests.  Consequently, there was 
no basis in equity to prevent the Parnells from asserting they owned the 
disputed gas estate.  

 
 
[¶34]   Furthermore, the time of filing the 
relevant documents indicates Mullinnix did not rely upon the declaration in 
paying the draft.  The Rothwells 
signed the mineral deed to Mullinnix on August 6, 1968, and deposited the 
$24,000 draft on August 7, 1968.  
The draft was paid according to its terms in ten days, and the mineral 
deed was recorded on August 15, 1968.  
The Parnells did not sign the Declaration of Interest until August 20, 
1968, and it was not recorded until a week later, on August 27, 1968.  Therefore, the documentary evidence 
indicates Mullinnix did not rely upon the Declaration of Interest when it 
purchased the Rothwells' mineral interests.  Mr. Mullinnix testified, however, that, 
prior to the due date of the draft, the Parnells orally represented they would 
sign the Declaration of Interest.  
Mr. Mullinnix claimed he relied upon the Parnells' representation when he 
allowed the draft to be paid and recorded the mineral deed.  His claim is refuted by his own business 
memorandum dated August 12, 1968, in which he discussed the title problem and 
his thoughts about how to cure it.  
He stated:  "The oil is the 
greatest potential value for the properties involved, and we feel no particular 
concern for our position as to oil.  
Therefore, we are apt to pay the outstanding draft, irrespective of what 
curative work can be accomplished prior to due-date of the draft."  On this record, we conclude the district 
court properly ruled the Declaration of Interest did not preclude the Parnells 
from challenging Mullinnix's claim to the gas estate.  

 
 
[¶35]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In our 
earlier decisions, we thoroughly discussed the properties of coal bed methane 
and concluded it is chemically no different than other types of natural 
gas.  See, e.g., Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., 2002 WY 
132, ¶¶ 9-10, 53 P.3d 540, 543 (Wyo. 
2002) (discussing the chemistry of coal and coalbed methane).  

 
 

2The other 
appellees in Case No. 05-80, apparently, claim various interests deriving from 
the Parnells.

  

3The 
Hickman/Willard deed reserved "oil and commercial gravel rights." Hickmans argue 
that the district court ruled the adjective "oil" did not modify the noun 
"rights."  Hickmans maintain, 
therefore, that the district court improperly concluded that the language in the 
Hickman deed reserved only "oil" and not "oil rights."  While there was some testimony from one 
of witnesses at the trial, who was an attorney, that the deed reserved "oil" 
rather than "oil rights," the district court's decision letter clearly indicated 
that it did not rely on a grammatical parsing of the language in reaching its 
decision.  It interpreted both deeds 
as reserving "oil rights."  The 
Hickmans' allegation of error in that regard is, therefore, unfounded.  

 

4Mullinnix and Hickmans argue in various 
places in their brief certain testimony and documentary evidence was improperly 
admitted or excluded by the district court at trial.  Their arguments are little more than 
perfunctory, with little in the way of cogent authority or citation to pertinent 
authority.  Moreover, they do not 
explain how these alleged evidentiary errors impacted the district court's 
decision or prejudiced their case.  
We, therefore, decline to consider their contentions.   See Johnson v. Reiger, 2004 WY 83, ¶ 9, n. 
1, 93 P.3d 992, 996 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

5For a 
discussion of different approaches to defining ownership rights in real property 
see David E. Pierce, Evaluating the 
Jurisprudential Bases for Ascertaining or Defining Coalbed Methane Ownership, 
4 Wyo. L. Rev. 607 (2004).