Case Title: MARK AND LAURA VOSS V. BEVERLY B. GOODMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0060

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK AND LAURA VOSS V. BEVERLY B. GOODMAN2009 WY 40203 P.3d 415Case Number: S-08-0060Decided: 03/18/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
MARK 
AND LAURA VOSS,Appellants(Defendants),v.BEVERLY B. 
GOODMAN,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Mark 
and Laura Voss, Pro se, of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse and Deborah L. Roden of Gay Woodhouse Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ, and YOUNG, 
DJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, Mark 
and Laura Voss, request relief from a district court decision in a declaratory 
judgment action finding that the Albany County Board of County Commissioners 
(Board) did not have authority to grant Appellants temporary access across 
Appellee's, Beverly Goodman's, land during a private road condemnation case. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court have 
jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgment as to whether the Board had authority 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 1999) to grant temporary access to 
Appellants during a private road condemnation action in which Appellants sought 
permanent access across Appellee's land?  

 
 
2.    Did the district court err 
when it determined that the Board did not have authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101 (LexisNexis 1999) to grant temporary access to Appellants during a 
private road condemnation action in which Appellants sought permanent access 
across Appellee's land?  

 
 
3.    Did the district court abuse 
its discretion when it denied Appellants leave to amend their Answer?  

 
 
FACTS1

 
 
[¶3]      Appellants filed 
a petition to establish a private road across Appellee's land in 1999.  In 2007, Appellants filed a Motion for 
Grant of Temporary Access Pending the Final Establishment of a Private Road for 
[Appellants'] Property.  The Board 
granted that request.  Appellee 
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief requesting that 
the district court interpret the statute and find that the Board had acted 
without authority in granting Appellants temporary access during the private 
road action.  Appellee filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment.  
Appellants filed a motion for leave to amend their Answer and a cross 
motion for summary judgment.  The 
district court issued a decision letter dated October 29, 2007, in which it 
denied Appellants' request for leave to amend the Answer, granted Appellee 
summary judgment on the issues of declaratory and injunctive relief,2 and denied summary judgment on the 
issue of damages.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶4]      We review the 
threshold question of jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act de novo.  Heilig v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 
2003 WY 27, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 734, 737 (Wyo. 2003).  The district court properly determined 
that it had jurisdiction to entertain this declaratory judgment action.  The Declaratory Judgments Act sets forth 
the scope of declaratory judgment actions as follows:

 
 
Courts 
of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status and 
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.  No proceeding is open to objection on 
the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.  The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
effect of a final judgment.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-37-102 (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶5]      We have 
interpreted the Act with respect to declaratory judgment related to 
administrative proceedings.  

 
 
[T]here 
is a restriction on the availability of a declaratory judgment action with 
reference to its applicability to administrative matters.  Where the action would result in a 
prejudging of issues that should be decided in the first instance by an 
administrative body, it should not lie.  
This is because, if it be otherwise, all decisions by the several 
agencies could be bypassed and the district court would be administering the 
activities of the executive branch of government.  This restriction on the scope of 
declaratory judgments is akin to the requirement that administrative remedies 
must be exhausted before judicial relief is available.

 
 
Accordingly, 
where the relief desired is in the nature of a substitution of judicial decision 
for that of the agency on issues pertaining to the administration of the subject 
matter for which the agency was created, the action should not be 
entertained.

 
 

Ten 
Broek v. County of Washakie, 
2003 WY 164, ¶ 8, 82 P.3d 269, 273-74 (Wyo. 2003) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
However, 

 
 
[t]he 
purpose of declaratory judgment actions is to render disputes concerning the 
legal rights and duties of parties justiciable without proof of a wrong 
committed by one party against another, and thus facilitate the termination of 
controversies.  Wyoming's 
declaratory judgment statute states that it is remedial and should be liberally 
construed and administered.  We do 
not interpret it in a narrow or technical sense, and there remains the 
prerequisite that the party seeking declaratory relief present the court with an 
actual controversy.  Trial judges 
may not dispense with the traditional rules prohibiting them from rendering 
advisory opinions or adjudicating hypothetical issues.  An action for declaratory judgment 
cannot be a substitute for an appeal from administrative decisions but is 
available even though there is a statutory method of appeal if it concerns the 
validity and construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the 
constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative 
action is, or is to be based.  

 
 

Hirschfield 
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Teton, 
944 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wyo. 1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  

 
 
[¶6]      The single issue 
before the district court in this case was whether the Board had the authority 
to grant Appellants temporary access during the private road condemnation 
case.  Although evidence of 
irrelevant facts was presented, it is apparent from the decision letter that the 
district court limited its decision to the appropriate legal issue before 
it.  This narrow issue of law falls 
into the category of an "interpretation of a statute upon which the 
administrative action is, or is to be based."

 
 
[¶7]      Our 
interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act makes clear that "there remains 
the prerequisite that the party seeking declaratory relief present the court 
with an actual controversy.  Trial 
judges may not dispense with the traditional rules prohibiting them from 
rendering advisory opinions or adjudicating hypothetical issues."  Hirschfield, 944 P.2d  at 1142 (citation 
omitted).  We have 
established

 
 
four 
elements as being necessary to establish a justiciable controversy under the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act:

 
 
1.    The parties must have 
existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or 
interests.

 
 
2.    The controversy must be one 
upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished 
from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, administrative, 
philosophical or academic conclusion.

 
 
3.    It must be a controversy the 
judicial determination of which will have the force and effect of a final 
judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal 
relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these 
qualities to be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the 
legal equivalent of all of them.

 
 
4.    The proceedings must be 
genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with 
sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major 
issues.

 
 

Id. 
at 1142-43.

 
 
[¶8]      The parties are 
disputing the right to exclusive use of their land and the right to adequate 
access for their land, respectively.  
The first order granting Appellant temporary access had expired but, at 
the time the action was entertained, another request for temporary access was 
pending.  With respect to the first 
requirement, there can be no doubt that real and genuine rights and interests 
are at stake in this case.  
Concerning the second requirement, the judgment of a court may certainly 
operate to determine the rights between parties in a land dispute.  The judgment of the district court will 
also serve effectively to resolve this dispute, fulfilling the third requirement 
for a justiciable controversy, because the district court serves as an appellate 
court for issues of law concerning the acts of the county commission in 
administrative actions and its decisions are binding on that commission.  Ten Broek, 2003 WY 164, ¶ 8, 82 P.3d  at 
273.  Finally, this case, which has 
already been litigated for more than ten years before multiple tribunals, 
including this Court, has certainly been litigated with sufficient "militancy" 
to ensure that "thorough research and analysis of the major issues" has been 
conducted.  See Voss v. Albany County Comm'rs, 2003 
WY 94, 74 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2003).  
This case presented a justiciable question and the district court had 
jurisdiction to decide that question.

 
 
Summary 
Judgment - Interpretation of the Statute

 
 
[¶9]      We review a grant 
of summary judgment entered in response to a petition for declaratory judgment 
de novo.  Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. 
Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wyo. 2001).  "We accord no deference to the district 
court on issues of law and may affirm the summary judgment on any legal grounds 
appearing in the record."  Id.  "The summary judgment can be sustained 
only when no genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  
Id.  There is no question of material fact in 
this case.  The declaratory action 
was brought to determine whether the Board had the authority to grant temporary 
access over Appellee's land during the pending private road condemnation 
action.  The parties admit that the 
Appellants requested temporary access and that the Board subsequently granted 
that temporary access across Appellee's land.

 
 
[¶10]   All that remains is to examine the 
district court's interpretation of the statute.  The Board gave the following 
justification for its decision to grant Appellants temporary access during the 
private road condemnation action:

 
 
Respondents 
correctly point out that the private road statute in effect at the time of the 
filing of the Petition does not expressly provide for the creation of temporary 
access during pendency of the proceedings.[3]  The statute does not address temporary 
access by allowing or disallowing it.  
However, the statute ultimately empowers the Board to declare existence 
of a permanent private road.  The 
Board will assume and exercise its implied power to address the Petitioner's 
requested relief for temporary access as it has a multitude of issues that have 
arisen during the nine year history of this road application. . . 
.

 
 
[¶11]   While the Board was correct that it 
is possible for an agency to have implied powers in conjunction with express 
statutory grants of power, this is not a situation where such an implied power 
exists.

 
 
[W]e 
have long held that administrative agencies have certain implied powers 
necessary to fulfillment of their statutory purposes.  Of course, those implied powers are only 
those derived by necessary implication from express statutory authority granted 
to the agency.  A more comprehensive 
statement of the concept of implied powers in this setting is 
this:

Generally, 
administrative agencies have the implied or incidental powers that are 
reasonably necessary in order to carry out the powers expressly granted.  The reason for implied powers is that, 
as a practical matter, the legislature cannot foresee all the problems 
incidental to carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the agency.  However, the inherent or implied power 
of an administrative agency is not boundless.  

 
 

BP 
Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2006 WY 27, ¶ 28, 130 P.3d 438, 466-67 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶12]   "Wyoming's private road statutes 
provide the mechanism by which a landowner may petition the exercise of the 
State's eminent domain power to condemn a private road across another's property 
in order to establish access between his own property and a public road."  Hulse v. First Amer. Title Co., 2001 WY 
95, ¶ 31, 33 P.3d 122, 132 (Wyo. 2001).  
"Neither the county commissioners nor the district court [is] at liberty 
to graft onto the statute that which [it] thinks ought to be included or to 
delete that which [it] find[s] inconvenient.  Neither they nor we have authority to 
add to or delete from a statute."  
Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 64-65 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting McGuire v. 
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1287 (Wyo. 1980)).  

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 
(LexisNexis 1999) makes no provision for temporary access.  The purpose of a private road 
condemnation action is to determine whether a landowner meets the statutory 
requirements that allow a board of county commissioners to exercise its very 
limited powers of eminent domain.  A 
grant of temporary access, while convenient for the petitioning landowner during 
the proceeding, is not a necessary step in the process.  The ability of the commission to perform 
its duty is in no way frustrated by the lack of power to grant temporary 
access.  Therefore, the power to 
grant temporary access is not reasonably necessary in order to carry out the 
powers expressly granted.

 
 
Amendment

 
 
[¶14]                           
            
The law in Wyoming is well settled that the decision to allow amendment 
to pleadings is vested within the sound discretion of the district court.  That decision will be reversed only for 
an abuse of discretion shown by clear evidence.

 
 

Ekberg 
v. Sharp, 
2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003).  Leave to amend pleadings "shall be 
freely given when justice so requires."  
W.R.C.P 15(a).  We have 
identified the "proper test as to what the trial court should consider when an 
amendment is proffered" to be the following:

 
 
"* 
* *  If the underlying facts or 
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he 
ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.  In the absence of any apparent or 
declared reasonsuch as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of 
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.the leave sought should, as the rules 
require, be freely given.'  * * 
*"

 
 

Beaudoin 
v. Taylor, 
492 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1972) (quoting 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 
(1962).  

 
 

Armstrong 
v. Hrabal, 
2004 WY 39, ¶ 11, 87 P.3d 1226, 1230-31 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶15]   Appellants sought leave to amend 
their Answer to add a claim for injunctive relief granting them temporary access 
to their property during the pending private road proceeding on the theory that 
the district court could grant such access through equity.  We held in Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1988), 
overruled on other grounds by Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 1991), that a district court may not exercise the right of eminent 
domain.  Id. at 162-63.  In Bush we concluded that "[t]he court 
usurped the function of the executive department of government, the county 
commissioners, in contravention of the separation of powers mandated by Art. 2, 
§ 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming" when it granted what was, in 
effect, a private road under the statute.  
Id. at 165.  Appellants' proposed amendment asked the 
district court to exercise powers of eminent domain not even granted to the 
executive branch at the time of the request.  Such a request is futile under clearly 
established Wyoming law and it was no abuse of discretion for the district court 
to deny Appellants' request to add a futile claim to the Answer.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to entertain this action for declaratory judgment and 
correctly determined that the Board had no authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101 (LexisNexis 1999) to grant Appellants temporary access over Appellee's 
land during a pending private road proceeding.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it refused to allow Appellants to amend their Answer to add a 
futile claim.  The judgment of the 
district court is affirmed.  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1A 
recitation of the facts underlying this case can be found at Voss v. Albany County Commissioners, 
2003 WY 94, ¶¶ 3-8, 74 P.3d. 714, 716-18 (Wyo. 2003).  Those facts are not relevant to the 
legal issues in this appeal.

 
 

2We 
do not reach the issue of injunctive relief because we find that the declaratory 
judgment provided sufficient remedy for Appellee.  The district court's interpretation of 
the statute is binding on the Board.

 
 

3This 
private road condemnation action was brought under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 
through § 24-9-104 (LexisNexis 1999) (amended 2000), which did not make 
provision for a grant of temporary access.  
The current version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 through § 24-9-104 
(LexisNexis 2007) gives a Board of County Commissioners the power to grant 
temporary access during a private road condemnation action under certain 
conditions.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(d) 
(LexisNexis 2007).