Case Title: P. v. Feyrer

Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 426

Docket Number: S154242

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 3/25/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S154242 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/6 B192752 
JESSE FEYRER, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. KA056346 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Jesse Feyrer was charged with assault by means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury, an offense punishable either as a felony or a 
misdemeanor — commonly known as a “wobbler.”  It also was alleged defendant 
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim of the assault, his father.  
The parties negotiated a plea agreement pursuant to which defendant would plead 
no contest to felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury 
and admit the enhancement allegation of personal infliction of great bodily injury 
in the commission of a felony.  In return, defendant would serve six months in 
county jail as a condition of five years‟ formal probation.  The plea agreement did 
not specify whether probation would be granted by suspending imposition of 
defendant‟s sentence, or instead by suspending the execution of that sentence.  The 
trial court approved the plea agreement, accepted defendant‟s plea of no contest to 
the charged felony and his admission of the enhancement allegation, and granted 
probation — by suspending the imposition of any sentence. 
Three years after defendant was placed on probation, the trial court, at the 
request of the probation department, ordered early termination of probation and 
2 
subsequently granted defendant‟s application to set aside his plea and dismiss the 
charges.  The trial court declined, however, to grant defendant‟s request to declare 
his offense to be a misdemeanor, because under the express terms of the plea 
agreement, defendant had pleaded no contest to, and admitted an enhancement for, 
a felony.  The Court of Appeal reversed the latter ruling.  Without considering the 
effect of the original plea agreement, the appellate court construed the statute that 
governs the treatment of a wobbler offense as permitting the trial court upon 
termination of probation to declare the offense to be a misdemeanor (and in effect, 
to annul the felony enhancement), because probation had been granted by 
suspending imposition of any sentence. 
The plea agreement specified that defendant would not contest his 
commission of the charged felony and of conduct constituting an enhancement to 
that felony, and that the prosecutor would consent to defendant‟s being placed on 
probation.  We granted review to consider the effect, if any, of the plea agreement 
upon the applicability in this case of the statutory provision authorizing a trial 
court, when probation originally was granted by suspending imposition of 
sentence, to subsequently declare a wobbler offense to be a misdemeanor. 
As we shall explain, the plea agreement did not render inoperative the 
statute conferring upon the court discretionary authority to declare a wobbler 
offense to be a misdemeanor, where the court initially granted probation by 
suspending the imposition of a sentence.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
rendered by the Court of Appeal. 
I 
In order to ascertain the terms of the plea agreement and the underlying 
intent of the parties, we relate in some detail the circumstances under which 
defendant entered his plea.  On March 15, 2002, a complaint was filed alleging 
that on March 13, 2002, defendant committed felony assault by means of force 
likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and that in 
committing this felony, he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim 
3 
(Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).  The latter allegation qualified the offense as a 
violent and serious felony under the Three Strikes law.  (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, 
subd. (c)(8), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)1 
On the day the complaint was filed, the parties negotiated a plea agreement 
pursuant to which defendant would plead no contest to felony assault by means of 
force likely to produce great bodily injury and admit the allegation that he 
personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of a felony, thereby 
rendering him subject to a potential maximum sentence of seven years in state 
prison.  In return, defendant would serve six months in county jail as a condition 
of five years‟ formal probation.  The plea agreement did not specify the manner in 
which probation would be granted:  by suspending imposition of a sentence or by 
imposing sentence and suspending its execution. 
On that same date, at the arraignment hearing, defendant waived formal 
reading of the complaint and recital of his constitutional rights, and stipulated the 
complaint would be deemed an information.  Noting the abbreviated nature of the 
proceedings, the trial court stated:  “All right.  I‟m willing to go along with the 
disposition at this time.  It‟s an early stage in the proceedings.  That‟s why you‟re 
probably getting the break that you‟re getting on this, Mr. Feyrer.  [¶]  So I want 
you to listen to the District Attorney.  He‟s going to go through your rights with 
you one more time and make sure you understand the deal in your case.” 
The prosecutor proceeded to explain that defendant was charged with a 
violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), “a felony,” with an enhancement 
allegation under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), for “great bodily injury,” and 
could be sentenced to a maximum term of seven years in state prison if he “went 
to trial and lost.”  Under the plea agreement, however, defendant would be granted 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
4 
five years‟ formal probation, a condition of which was that he serve 180 days in 
county jail.  The prosecutor advised defendant of the possible consequences of 
pleading guilty, obtained a waiver of defendant‟s constitutional rights, and 
received his acknowledgement that any violation of probation might result in a 
state prison term.  The prosecutor also advised defendant, and received his 
acknowledgement that “this — plea in this count as well as an admission to the 
special allegation[,] should you be convicted of a felony in the future[,] will be 
used to enhance any sentence that you receive in the future,” that it “will be a 
strike under California law,” and that “you will have this one strike for any future 
sentencing purposes.”  Defendant acknowledged his signature and initials on a 
form that recorded his no contest plea to felony assault and his admission of the 
enhancement, and that specified a maximum prison sentence of four years for the 
aggravated assault and three years for the enhancement.  The trial court suspended 
imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on five years‟ probation on 
conditions that included his serving 180 days in county jail. 
Defendant performed well during the term of his probation.  On July 21, 
2005, at the request of the probation department, the trial court ordered early 
termination of defendant‟s period of probation.  (§ 1203.3, subd. (a).)2  The trial 
court denied without prejudice defendant‟s contemporaneous requests to set aside 
his no contest plea and dismiss the charges, and to declare the charged offense to 
be a misdemeanor. 
                                              
2 
Section 1203.3, subdivision (a) provides:  “The court shall have authority at 
any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of 
suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.  The court may at any time 
when the ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the good conduct and 
reform of the person so held on probation shall warrant it, terminate the period of 
probation and discharge the person so held.”  Subdivision (b)(1)(B) provides:  “As 
used in this section, modification of sentence shall include reducing a felony to a 
misdemeanor.” 
5 
The following year, defendant renewed his application for an order setting 
aside his plea of no contest and dismissing the charges (§ 1203.4, subd. (a)),3 and 
declaring the offense to be a misdemeanor (§ 17, subd. (b)(3)).4  On May 17, 
2006, the trial court ordered the no contest plea set aside and vacated, a plea of not 
guilty entered, and the complaint dismissed.  The court denied, as in excess of its 
                                              
3 
Section 1203.4, subdivision (a) provides that a defendant who has been 
discharged on early termination of probation “shall” be permitted by the trial court 
to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or no contest and enter a plea of not guilty.  
The court “shall thereupon dismiss” the information and, “except as noted,” the 
defendant “shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting 
from the offense of which he or she has been convicted . . . .  However, in any 
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for any other offense, the prior conviction 
may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if probation had not 
been granted or the accusation or information dismissed. . . .”  The dismissal “does 
not permit a person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any 
firearm or prevent his or her conviction under Section 12021 [felon in possession 
of a firearm].” 
4 
Section 17, subdivision (a) classifies crimes according to their punishment, 
defining a felony as a crime “punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state 
prison,” and a misdemeanor as every other crime except those offenses classified as 
an infraction.  Subdivision (b) provides, as relevant here, that when a crime is 
punishable in the court‟s discretion “by imprisonment in the state prison or by . . . 
imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the 
following circumstances:  [¶]  (1)  After a judgment imposing punishment other 
than imprisonment in the state prison.  [¶]. . . .  [¶]  (3)  When the court grants 
probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting 
probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the 
court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor.  [¶]  (4)  When the prosecuting 
attorney files in a court having jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses a complaint 
specifying that the offense is a misdemeanor . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Subdivision (b) 
“outlines the procedural mechanisms by which a trial court may classify an offense 
as a misdemeanor [citation], whereas the sentencing discretion itself derives from 
the various charging statutes that provide alternative felony or misdemeanor 
punishment.  (See, e.g., §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), . . .)”  (People v. Superior Court 
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 974, fn. 4 (Alvarez).) 
6 
authority, the request to declare the offense a misdemeanor, because defendant had 
inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. 
Defendant appealed from the order to the extent it denied his request to 
declare the offense to be a misdemeanor.5  The Court of Appeal reversed the order 
and remanded the case, concluding that the trial court was authorized not only to 
terminate probation, vacate the no contest plea, and dismiss the charges, but also 
in its discretion to declare the offense to be a misdemeanor.  The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that because the trial court originally granted probation by suspending 
the imposition of sentence rather than imposing and suspending the execution of a 
sentence, “no judgment [was] then pending against the probationer, who [was] 
subject only to the terms and conditions of the probation.”  Accordingly, when in 
subsequent proceedings the trial court ordered early termination of defendant‟s 
probation, the court retained its discretion to declare the offense to be a 
misdemeanor notwithstanding defendant‟s admission that he had inflicted great 
                                              
5 
Section 1237 provides that a defendant may appeal:  “(a) From a final 
judgment of conviction . . . .  A sentence [or] an order granting probation . . . shall 
be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of this section. . . .  [¶]  (b) 
From any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”  
An order pursuant to section 1203.3 that modifies an order suspending the 
imposition or execution of a sentence (that is, an order granting probation) is 
appealable as an order following a final judgment that affects the substantial rights 
of the defendant.  (See People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 91; In re Bine 
(1957) 47 Cal.2d 814, 817; People v. Ramirez (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1421.)  
Section 1203.3 expressly defines modification of a sentence as including the 
reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor.  (Id., subd. (b)(1)(B).)  Upon termination 
of probation, an order that denies a request pursuant to section 1203.4 for release 
from disabilities and penalties is appealable.  (People v. Romero (1991) 235 
Cal.App.3d 1423, 1425-1426; see People v. Hawley (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 247, 
248, fn. 2; People v. Chandler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 782, 787.)  An order 
granting relief pursuant to section 1203.4 but denying relief pursuant to section 17, 
subdivision (b)(3) would not be treated differently.  (See Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 
at pp. 976-977.)  The Attorney General has not challenged the appealability of the 
order denying the request to declare the offense a misdemeanor. 
7 
bodily injury upon the victim.  The Court of Appeal also held that when a trial 
court declares a wobbler to be a misdemeanor, any enhancement that is applicable 
solely to felonies “is simply not imposed and ceases to have any significance.  
(People v. Kunkel (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 46, 55.)” 
The Attorney General petitioned for rehearing on the ground that the Court 
of Appeal had analyzed the issue strictly in terms of the statutory authority 
conferred upon the trial court to terminate the period of probation and discharge 
the person held, to vacate the no contest plea and dismiss the action, and to declare 
the offense a misdemeanor, without taking into account the negotiated plea 
agreement or considering the substance of defendant‟s no contest plea.  The Court 
of Appeal denied the request for rehearing.6 
The Attorney General petitioned for review on the ground that defendant‟s 
plea of no contest to assault as a felony and admission of the felony enhancement 
allegation pursuant to a plea agreement precluded any subsequent reduction of the 
offense to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3).  We granted 
                                              
6 
Although the Court of Appeal, in its opinion as modified upon denial of 
rehearing, noted that the parties had entered into a plea agreement, the court in 
essence viewed the original plea disposition — in which defendant pleaded no 
contest to a felony assault and admitted the sentence enhancement allegation, and 
the trial court granted probation by suspending imposition of any sentence — as 
having been offered and procured by the trial court.  A trial court may provide the 
defendant an “indicated sentence” if he or she pleads guilty or no contest to all 
charges and admits all allegations.  (People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 419.)  
When “the defendant pleads „guilty to all charges . . . so all that remains is the 
pronouncement of judgment and sentencing‟ [citation], „there is no requirement 
that the People consent to a guilty plea.  [Citation.]‟ ”  (Id. at pp. 418-419.)  In 
contrast in the present case, it is clear from the record, quoted above, that it was the 
prosecution rather than the trial court that negotiated the plea agreement with the 
defense, conferring upon defendant formal felony probation in lieu of a prison 
term; this is a situation in which the trial court gave its approval to the parties‟ 
agreement rather than unilaterally negotiating a permissible agreement with 
defendant. 
8 
review and held this case pending our decision in People v. Segura (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 921 (Segura).  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2).)  After that decision 
became final, we directed the parties to file briefs in order to consider the 
application of the holding in Segura to the present case. 
II 
A 
The Attorney General contends that because defendant entered into a plea 
agreement not to contest the charge of felony assault and to admit the allegation of 
personal infliction of great bodily injury, in exchange for a term of probation in 
lieu of service of a term in state prison, neither defendant‟s subsequent good 
conduct, nor the trial court‟s resulting modification of the consequences of 
defendant‟s offense — by terminating probation early, vacating the no contest plea 
and entering a plea of not guilty, and dismissing the action — authorized the court 
to declare the offense to be a misdemeanor over the People‟s objection.  The 
Attorney General notes that in Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th 921, we held the trial 
court‟s general statutory authority to modify probation conditions pursuant to 
section 1203.3 did not authorize it unilaterally to alter a material term of the 
parties‟ plea agreement — one requiring the defendant to serve a year in county 
jail as a condition of his probation — by reducing the jail term in order to avert the 
defendant‟s deportation.  (Segura, supra, at pp. 925, 935-936.)  The Attorney 
General urges that the rule should not be different when a party requests the trial 
court to modify a material provision of the plea agreement pursuant to section 17, 
subdivision (b)(3) rather than section 1203.3, subdivision (a), and that accordingly 
the trial court properly denied defendant‟s request. 
In response, defendant asserts that his agreement not to contest the charge 
of felony assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and the allegation 
of infliction of great bodily injury, in exchange for a grant of probation, did 
nothing to alter the statutory classification of the substantive offense as a 
wobbler — unless and until he were to be sentenced as a felon by the trial court.  
9 
According to defendant, because the court originally granted probation by 
suspending the imposition of any sentence, the court was authorized by section 17, 
subdivision (b)(3) in its discretion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor in view 
of defendant‟s subsequent conduct during the period of probation.  In defendant‟s 
view, had the prosecutor intended to define the permanent character and use of the 
offense in any future proceedings, the prosecutor would have been required to 
specify as a material term of the negotiated plea that probation would be granted 
by imposing a felony sentence and suspending the execution of that sentence. 
The parties do not dispute that in view of defendant‟s good conduct on 
probation, the trial court properly exercised its authority to terminate defendant‟s 
probation early, to vacate defendant‟s no contest plea and enter a plea of not 
guilty, and to dismiss the charges — subject to the statutory exception that in a 
subsequent prosecution the conviction would not be considered to have been set 
aside and could be pleaded and proved.  It is disputed whether, in view of the plea 
agreement, the court also properly could exercise its discretionary authority to 
reduce the felony to a misdemeanor. 
In Segura, a case in which the trial court imposed a sentence and suspended 
its execution, we considered whether the requirement that the defendant serve a 
specified period in the county jail — an express condition of granting probation — 
constituted a material term of the plea agreement, and therefore was not subject to 
later modification by the trial court as a matter of its general statutory authority to 
modify probation in light of subsequent events.  In the present case, it is evident 
that defendant‟s plea of no contest to an enhanced felony was a material term of 
the plea agreement.  The question we consider here is the efficacy of that term of 
the agreement in fixing the status of the offense for all purposes, even though 
probation — also a material term of the plea agreement — is designed to afford 
(and, as granted here, otherwise would provide) the trial court with discretionary 
authority to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor based upon the probationer‟s 
good conduct. 
10 
As we explained in Segura, “[p]lea negotiations and agreements are an 
accepted and „integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to 
the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.‟  [Citations.]  Plea 
agreements benefit that system by promoting speed, economy, and the finality of 
judgments.  [Citations.]”  (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 929.)  A plea agreement 
“is a tripartite agreement which requires the consent of the defendant, the People 
and the court.”  (People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 358, 371; see People 
v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 418.)  “Acceptance of the agreement binds the 
court and the parties to the agreement.”  (Segura, supra, at p. 930.) 
In determining whether the Attorney General is correct in asserting that 
defendant‟s request properly was declined because reduction of the offense to a 
misdemeanor would in effect modify a material term of the plea agreement, we 
commence with the applicable rules of construction.  “Because a „negotiated plea 
agreement is a form of contract,‟ it is interpreted according to general contract 
principles.”  (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 930, quoting People v. Shelton (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 759, 767 (Shelton).)  “ „The fundamental goal of contractual 
interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.  (Civ. Code, 
§ 1636.)  . . . .  [Citation.]‟   „The mutual intention to which the courts give effect 
is determined by objective manifestations of the parties‟ intent, including the 
words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective 
matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or 
entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and 
the subsequent conduct of the parties.  [Citations.]‟ ”  (Shelton, supra, at p. 767.) 
In the present case it is reasonably clear the parties to the plea agreement 
intended to facilitate the early disposition of the case without trial, perhaps in view 
of the familial relationship between defendant and the victim, who was 
defendant‟s father.  To that end, defendant pleaded no contest to a felony assault 
and admitted a fact related to its commission that would result in a prison term if a 
sentence were to be imposed, in exchange for defendant‟s being placed on five 
11 
years‟ formal probation subject to a comparatively short term of incarceration of 
six months in county jail, in contemplation of the possibility of rehabilitation.  It 
also is clear the parties intended to ensure that if defendant committed any future 
offense, his conviction for the current offense could be treated as a “strike” under 
the Three Strikes law. 
There is no clear indication, however, that the parties also intended to 
provide that the felony could not be reduced to a misdemeanor under any 
circumstances, regardless of defendant‟s conduct during the period of probation.  
The terms of the plea agreement do not state that this is the case.  Nor do the terms 
of that agreement abrogate the provisions of section 17, subdivision (b)(3), or 
other statutes applicable during (or upon the conclusion of) a successful term of 
probation. 
Although the Attorney General asks that we imply such a term based upon 
defendant‟s express plea of no contest to a felony and his admission of the alleged 
felony enhancement, we are mindful of the rule that every term of a plea 
agreement should be stated on the record.  (See People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 
595, 609-610; People v. James (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1169.)  Application 
of this rule to the present case is essential to ensure not only that defendant was 
not made subject to a term of which he was not made fully aware prior to giving 
his consent to the proposed plea, a term foreclosing any possible reduction of his 
offense, but also that the trial court was made aware of a term purporting to limit 
its sentencing authority — a restriction that if known might have caused it to 
refuse to accept the proposed plea agreement.  Accordingly, we should not, and do 
not, imply such a term purporting to restrict the sentencing authority of the court. 
The parties‟ plea agreement did expressly provide that defendant would be 
placed on formal probation — without a stipulation or qualification that this would 
be done only by imposing and then suspending a felony sentence.  We also note 
that when the trial court proceeded to suspend the imposition of sentence instead 
12 
of imposing and then suspending execution of sentence, there was no objection by 
the prosecutor. 
In view of the parties‟ express agreement that defendant would be placed 
on formal probation, and their mutual silence concerning the form in which it 
would be granted, we briefly consider the underlying purpose and effect of a grant 
of probation when the underlying conviction is of a wobbler offense and the trial 
court proceeds without first imposing a sentence.  “An integral and important part 
of the penological plan of California is the discretionary retention in the trial court 
of jurisdiction over the defendant and the cause of action against him [or her] . . . 
by virtue of the probation procedures.”  (People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 
383, italics omitted (Banks).)  A verdict or plea of guilty is not a final conviction, 
in part because it may be nullified, “except for expressly defined purposes, when 
jurisdiction and control over the defendant and the cause of action have been 
retained in the court under the probation law (with or without pronouncement of 
sentence) and the probation procedures have been fully executed.”  (Ibid.) 
When a defendant is convicted (whether by a guilty plea or a no contest 
plea, or at a trial) of a wobbler offense, and is granted probation without the 
imposition of a sentence, his or her offense is “deemed a felony” unless 
subsequently “reduced to a misdemeanor by the sentencing court” pursuant to 
section 17, subdivision (b).  (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685, italics 
added; see In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 879; Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at 
pp. 381-382; People v. Holzer (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 456, 460; Meyer v. Superior 
Court (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 133, 137 (Meyer); 1 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law 
(3d ed. 2000) Introduction to Crimes, § 73, p. 119.) 
A trial court that grants probation upon a defendant‟s conviction of a 
wobbler offense is assumed to have acted “with discriminating appreciation of the 
effect of the form of [the court‟s] order upon defendant‟s activities and status,” 
having in mind the rule that the charge remains a felony until a contrary 
pronouncement of judgment occurs.  (Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 387.)  If 
13 
ultimately a misdemeanor sentence is imposed, the offense is a misdemeanor from 
that point on, but not retroactively:  “Thus, when [the court] suspends 
pronouncement of sentence for an alternatively punishable offense, it is to be 
assumed that while [the court] did not wish to deprive the defendant of his [or her] 
civil rights and thereby unnecessarily hamper defendant‟s efforts to rehabilitate 
himself [or herself] (by stigmatizing him [or her] even temporarily as one against 
whom a judgment of conviction of felony and sentence to prison had been entered) 
the [court] also did not wish to classify the defendant as a mere mis[de]meanant 
whose offense would not be available, for example, to increase defendant‟s 
punishment if defendant should thereafter prove himself [or herself] a recidivist.”  
(Id. at pp. 387-388.)  When probation is granted without imposition of a sentence, 
a defendant remains under the jurisdiction of the court “not only in relation to his 
[or her] probationary status but also in relation to the character of the offense of 
which he [or she] has been convicted.”  (Meyer, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p. 136.) 
A grant of probation is intended to afford the defendant an opportunity to 
demonstrate over the prescribed probationary term that his or her conduct has 
reformed to the degree that punishment for the offense may be mitigated or 
waived.  Thus, under favorable circumstances, when punishment has not been 
imposed, the offense (with certain exceptions) may be reclassified or nullified.  
(See Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 386-388; Meyer, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at 
pp. 139-140.)  When a trial court grants probation without imposing a sentence, 
sections 17 and 1203.4, read together, express the legislative purpose “that an 
alternatively punishable offense remains a felony . . .  until the statutory 
rehabilitation procedure has been had, at which time the defendant is restored” to 
his or her former legal status in society, subject to use of the felony for limited 
purposes in any subsequent criminal proceeding.  (Banks, supra, at p. 391.) 
As we have discussed, the probation statutes confer upon the trial court 
jurisdiction and authority over a defendant during the term of probation.  These 
statutes are intended to afford the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate his or 
14 
her rehabilitation in order to obtain early termination of probation, reclassification 
of the offense, or dismissal of the action, and — in certain cases — all such forms 
of leniency.  In view of the operation and purpose of probation, the parties here 
could not have reasonably understood a plea agreement that designated the offense 
as a felony, but that also provided for a grant of probation without any restriction 
on the form of the probation ordered, as fixing the status of the offense as a felony 
for all purposes and for all time.  Had the prosecution sought to ensure that, 
regardless of defendant‟s subsequent conduct on probation, the offense would 
remain a felony, it should have expressed an understanding (subject to acceptance 
by the court) that probation would be granted by imposing and suspending the 
execution of a felony sentence or that the felony would not be subject in the future 
to reduction pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3). 
The Attorney General suggests that, as a matter of policy, the prosecutor 
should not be obligated to influence the manner in which probation is granted 
merely to foreclose the possibility that the trial court subsequently will act on its 
authority during probation to reclassify the offense as a misdemeanor, when the 
offense has been designated a felony under the parties‟ plea agreement.  The 
Attorney General suggests that imposing such an obligation would reduce the 
flexibility of the trial court and the prosecutor in plea negotiations, because 
imposition and suspension of execution of a sentence would be the sole form of 
probation ensuring that the offense viewed by the prosecutor as a felony 
subsequently is treated as a felony by the court. 
In offering probation in exchange for a defendant‟s plea of guilty or no 
contest, however, the prosecutor is providing the defendant with an opportunity 
and an incentive to alter the consequences of his or her conviction in exchange for 
securing the conviction itself.  The fundamental feature of probation is that good 
conduct on the part of the probationer may invite mitigation of punishment and (in 
the case of a wobbler) reclassification of the offense.  If there is to be any 
15 
curtailment of those routinely available options, such a restriction should be made 
an express term of the plea agreement. 
In Segura, we recognized that the term of the plea agreement conditioning 
the defendant‟s placement on probation upon his service of 365 days in the county 
jail was an express negotiated term “integral to the granting of probation in the 
first place . . . .”  (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 936.)  By contrast, in the present 
case, the terms of the plea agreement conditioning defendant‟s placement on 
probation on his plea of no contest to a felony and admission of a felony 
enhancement allegation did not incorporate or reflect a negotiated condition 
purporting to restrict or deprive the court of its jurisdiction and authority to 
subsequently determine the ultimate character of the offense in light of 
defendant‟s success at rehabilitation — an incentive that constitutes one of the 
principal objectives of probation.  (See People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 
380-381.) 
B 
In the alternative, the Attorney General contends that because defendant 
pleaded no contest to a “wobbler” assault and admitted personally inflicting great 
bodily injury in the commission of a felony, in effect he pleaded no contest to a 
“straight felony.”  According to the Attorney General, section 17, subdivision 
(b)(3) thus would not, and did not, authorize the trial court to declare the offense 
to be a misdemeanor, and the court properly denied defendant‟s request.7 
                                              
7 
Defendant contends that we should not reach this issue raised by the 
Attorney General, because it is not fairly included in the issue upon which we 
granted review.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(1); People v. Alice (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 668, 677-678; In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388, fn. 
6; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 580.)  Defendant points out that the 
Attorney General sought review of the question whether a trial court has the 
authority, over the People‟s objection, “to unilaterally rewrite and reduce an 
agreed-upon material term of a plea bargain after it has accepted the agreement.”  
Defendant urges that the issue upon which review was granted does not encompass 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
16 
As we have noted, section 17, subdivision (b) applies solely to a crime 
“punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or 
by fine or imprisonment in the county jail.”  That statute does not confer upon the 
trial court the authority to reduce a straight felony to a misdemeanor.  (People 
v. Mauch (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 669, 674-675 (Mauch); People v. Douglas 
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 810, 813; People v. Superior Court (Feinstein) (1994) 29 
Cal.App.4th 323, 329-330 (Feinstein).)  “ „Fixing the penalty for crimes is the 
province of the Legislature, which is in the best position to evaluate the gravity of 
different crimes and to make judgments among different penological approaches.‟  
[Citation.]  Phrased differently:  „The definition of crime and the determination of 
punishment are foremost among those matters that fall within the legislative 
domain.‟  [Citations.]”  (Mauch, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.)  When the 
Legislature has classified an offense as a felony without providing for an alternate 
punishment, a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction “in purporting to reduce the 
offense to a misdemeanor.”  (Ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
the potential impact that admission of a felony sentence enhancement allegation 
might have upon the character of the offense as a wobbler, and thus does not 
invoke the applicability of the statute conferring authority upon the trial court to 
reduce a wobbler offense to a misdemeanor. 
 
The Attorney General responds that defendant pleaded no contest to a 
wobbler as a felony and admitted the truth of a factual allegation applicable to a 
felony, based upon the parties‟ mutual understanding that the conviction was and 
would remain a straight felony as a matter of law.  The Attorney General suggests 
that his argument is merely an alternative argument made in support of the general 
contention that under the terms of the plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest 
to an enhanced felony that could not subsequently be reduced to a misdemeanor 
pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3).  The nature of the assault that comprises 
the subject of the plea agreement, including any factual allegations, appears to be 
fairly encompassed within the issue whether the terms of the plea agreement 
restricted the court‟s statutory authority.  Accordingly, we address the Attorney 
General‟s claim on the merits. 
17 
Although assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury is 
punishable either as a felony or a misdemeanor, defendant also admitted the 
factual allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury, for which the 
Legislature has prescribed a felony sentence enhancement.8  In Feinstein, supra, 
                                              
8 
That term of the plea agreement far more likely and logically reflects the 
prosecutor‟s intent to perfect the strike status of defendant‟s current conviction, 
should he reoffend in the future, than to render section 17, subdivision (b) 
inapplicable to the current conviction, should defendant be placed on probation by 
the trial court‟s suspending the imposition of a sentence. 
 
In and of itself, the wobbler offense of assault by any means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), when a felony sentence is 
imposed, does not constitute a “serious felony” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) for 
purposes of the Three Strikes law, which requires that a serious felony or a violent 
felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8)) be the basis for a prior felony conviction to be 
counted as a strike and on that basis to be used to increase the sentence for a 
current felony conviction.  (§§ 667, subds. (b), (d)(1), (e), 1170.12, subds. (b)(1), 
(c); People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 261-262; People v. Glee (2000) 
82 Cal.App.4th 99, 102; see People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065.)  
When “the additional element of personal infliction” of great bodily injury is found 
present, however (Delgado, supra, at p. 1065), then for purposes of the Three 
Strikes law, the offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 
injury constitutes a serious felony, and a prior conviction of that offense constitutes 
a “prior felony conviction.”  (Rodriguez, supra, at pp. 261-262.) 
 
In requiring that a “serious felony” or a “violent felony” be the basis for a 
“prior felony conviction” qualifying as a strike, the Three Strikes statutes also 
specify that “[t]he determination of whether a prior conviction is a prior felony 
conviction for purposes of [the statute‟s relevant provisions] shall be made upon 
the date of that prior conviction and is not affected by the sentence imposed unless 
the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a 
misdemeanor.”  (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), italics added.)  Nor is 
that determination affected by dispositions such as the suspension of imposition of 
a sentence or suspension of execution of a sentence. 
 
In the present case, the prosecutor, by obtaining defendant‟s plea of no 
contest to the offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 
injury, and his admission of the allegation of inflicting great bodily injury, ensured 
that defendant‟s current conviction would thus qualify as a “prior felony 
conviction” within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, in the event defendant 
were to commit and suffer conviction of any felony in the future, regardless of the 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
18 
29 Cal.4th at pages 329-330, the court concluded that although false imprisonment 
(§ 237) is alternatively punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor and thus 
constitutes a wobbler offense, when an additional finding is made that the offense 
was “committed by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit” the statute in question 
prescribes a sentence to state prison, and thus with that finding the offense is a 
straight felony that may not be reduced to a misdemeanor in the court‟s discretion 
under section 17, subdivision (b)(3).  Analogizing to Feinstein, the Attorney 
General asserts that because defendant pleaded no contest to an aggravated assault 
and admitted the personal infliction of great bodily injury, the offense was 
converted to a straight felony.9 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
eventual disposition of the conviction in the present case.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 485-486, 489 [the jury‟s true finding of the 
allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the course of 
an assault was obtained for the purpose of making “the assault conviction a „serious 
felony‟ for purposes of punishment in a future conviction”]; In re Jose H. (2000) 
77 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1096 [in sustaining current charges of battery with serious 
bodily injury, the juvenile court could not (and did not) impose a separate sentence 
based upon an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, but properly denied a 
defense motion to strike the enhancement, which was alleged to “ „qualify and 
perfect the offense for treatment as a “strike” in the future‟ ”].) 
9 
Ordinarily, section 1192.7 prohibits plea negotiation in any case in which 
the indictment or information charges a serious felony (such as assault by any 
means likely to produce great bodily injury with personal infliction of great bodily 
injury (id., subd. (c)(8)), unless the evidence is insufficient to prove the 
prosecution‟s case, the “testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained, or a 
reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence” (id., 
subd. (a)(2)).  Similarly, section 1203, subdivision (e)(3) ordinarily precludes 
granting probation to any person who willfully inflicted great bodily injury in 
committing the crime of which he or she has been convicted, “[e]xcept in unusual 
cases where the interests of justice would best be served if the person is granted 
probation . . . .” (See also id., subd. (f).) 
 
Nonetheless, defendant‟s conviction of assault by means likely to produce 
great bodily injury, enhanced by his personal infliction of great bodily injury, was 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
19 
The analogy is inapt.  In Feinstein, supra, 29 Cal.4th 323, the court 
reviewed the crime of false imprisonment (§ 237, subd. (a)), which is punishable 
either by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment in county jail for not 
more than one year or both.  The additional factual finding made in Feinstein was 
that the offense was “committed by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit,” for which 
the same statute, defining a substantive offense, specifies a sentence to state 
prison.  In the present case, by contrast, section 245, subdivision (a), insofar as it 
defines the substantive offense here at issue (assault by any means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury) does not specify that the additional factual finding 
of actual personal infliction of great bodily injury, if made, will cause the offense 
to be punished by a sentence to state prison.10 
As we explained above, a trial court may not reduce to a misdemeanor an 
offense that has been determined by the Legislature to be a straight felony.  
(Mauch, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.)  Nor may the trial court effectively 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
the product of a plea agreement that included a grant of probation.  It may be 
inferred from defendant‟s familial relationship with the victim (the defendant‟s 
father) that the prosecutor, viewing this as an unusual case, negotiated the plea 
because of a perceived deficiency in the available evidence or difficulty in 
obtaining the victim‟s testimony, and offered to accept a grant of probation for 
reasons related to the family relationship. 
10 
By comparison, the Legislature specified in section 245, subdivision (c) that 
“[a]ny person who commits an assault . . . by any means likely to produce great 
bodily injury upon the person of a peace officer or firefighter” with actual or 
imputed knowledge the victim is a peace officer or firefighter engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for three, four, or five years.”  It is clear that, had the Legislature intended 
the offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, when 
accompanied by actual infliction of great bodily injury, to be a felony in all cases, 
the Legislature would have designated such conduct as a substantive offense 
punishable solely as a felony, as it did in the form of the type of assault described 
in subdivision (c). 
20 
“felonize” a crime designated by the Legislature as a wobbler, by declining to 
apply section 17, subdivision (b)(3) solely because an additional factual finding 
related to sentencing is present.  (See People v. Kunkle (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 46, 
54-55.)11  But as we have seen, section 17, subdivision (b)(3) authorizes a trial 
court to reduce a wobbler offense from a felony to a misdemeanor and thus enable 
a defendant to avoid many — but not all — of the consequences of his or her 
conviction, notwithstanding vacation of the plea and dismissal of the charges 
pursuant to section 1203.4.  It is evident that the court‟s reduction of such an 
offense will not alter the status of the offense as a prior felony conviction for 
purposes of the Three Strikes law (ante, fn. 9) in the event the defendant were to 
commit a felony offense in the future.  In the present case, this consequence was 
noted specifically by the prosecutor in entering into the plea agreement and clearly 
was within the contemplation of the parties. 
Because the statute setting forth defendant‟s substantive offense does not 
prescribe a state prison sentence whenever the additional factual allegation (here 
in the form of a separate punishment enhancement) has been established, 
defendant‟s admission of that allegation did not automatically convert his offense 
to a straight felony.  Accordingly, defendant‟s offense remained within the class of 
                                              
11 
The circumstance that a defendant has admitted an enhancement allegation 
that would apply solely to a felony sentence has not been understood to 
automatically eliminate the trial court‟s authority to reduce the underlying wobbler 
conviction to a misdemeanor.  (See Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 974-980 
[approving the court‟s reduction of a wobbler conviction (after jury verdict), 
despite the defendant‟s admission of an allegation he had suffered four prior felony 
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law]; People v. Trausch (1995) 
36 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1243-1247 [same, in the context of a guilty plea to a wobbler 
offense].)  Thus, in the present case, upon reduction of defendant‟s offense to a 
misdemeanor, the admitted enhancement allegation had significance only for future 
purposes of the Three Strikes law and not for the present offense. 
21 
offenses that are subject to reduction upon the occurrence of various events 
specified in section 17. 
III 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J.  
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Feyrer 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 151 Cal.App.4th 506 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S154242 
Date Filed: March 25, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Wade Olson, Temporary Judge* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels, James William Bilderback II, Lance E. 
Winters, Kristofer Jorstad and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard Jay Moller 
So‟Hum Law Center of Richard Jay Moller 
P.O. Box 1669 
Redway, CA  95560-1669 
(707) 923-9199 
 
J. Michael Lehmann 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2371