Case Title: Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA At Your Serv., Inc.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-2942

Docket Number: 20060169

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA At Your Serv., Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 
2007-Ohio-2942.] 
 
 
NATIONAL CITY COMMERCIAL CAPITAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE, v. 
AAAA AT YOUR SERVICE, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA At Your Serv., Inc., 
 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-2942.] 
Civil procedure — R.C. 2505.02 — Final, appealable order — Dismissal for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, which prevented refiling in trial court, is a final, 
appealable order. 
(No. 2006-0169 — Submitted November 14, 2006 — Decided July 5, 2007.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Butler County, 
No. CA2005-08-219. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals certified this case as a 
conflict pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and 
App.R. 25.  It found its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals in Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Strellec, 161 Ohio App.3d 
346, 2005-Ohio-2607, 830 N.E.2d 403.  The certified question is “[w]hether a 
dismissal other than on the merits which prevents re-filing in the trial court is a 
final, appealable order.”  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that such a 
dismissal is a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 2} Appellants are various small businesses, nonprofit organizations, 
and associated individuals located in states other than Ohio.  These entities 
contracted with NorVergence, Inc., a New Jersey telecommunications company, 
for landline, cellular telephone, and high-speed Internet services.  The contracts 
included five-year equipment rentals for the hardware necessary to access the 
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various services.  NorVergence assigned appellants’ contracts to appellee, 
National City Commercial Capital Corporation (“National City”).  After the 
contracts were assigned, NorVergence failed to provide the services it had agreed 
to provide. 
{¶ 3} NorVergence was forced into bankruptcy by its creditors.  Many of 
NorVergence’s customers refused to pay the contract price because they did not 
receive services.  The present case arose when National City filed lawsuits against 
appellants seeking payments owed under the contracts which had been assigned to 
it. 
{¶ 4} Claiming that the forum-selection clause contained in the contracts 
provided the Butler County Court of Common Pleas with jurisdiction, National 
City filed suit in that court.  Appellants filed motions to dismiss, claiming that 
Ohio did not have personal jurisdiction over them.  The trial court granted these 
motions to dismiss, and National City appealed.  Appellants moved to dismiss the 
appeal, arguing that the trial court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was 
not a final, appealable order.  The court of appeals denied the motion to dismiss 
and determined that the trial court’s dismissal was a final, appealable order.  The 
court of appeals certified its decision as in conflict with Preferred Capital, 161 
Ohio App.3d 346, 2005-Ohio-2607, 830 N.E.2d 403. 
{¶ 5} R.C. 2505.02 defines a final order for purposes of appeal.  Under 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), “[a]n order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is * * * [a]n order that 
affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and 
prevents a judgment.” 
{¶ 6} A “substantial right” is “a right that the United States Constitution, 
the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a 
person to enforce or protect.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(1).  For purposes of this case, we 
January Term, 2007 
3 
will assume that the trial court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction 
deprived National City of a substantial right — the right to seek enforcement of its 
contract with appellants. 
{¶ 7} To be final, however, “an order must also determine an action and 
prevent a judgment.”  Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio 
St.3d 86, 88, 541 N.E.2d 64, citing Gen. Elec. Supply Co. v. Warden Elec., Inc. 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 378, 528 N.E.2d 195, syllabus; R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).  “For 
an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it 
must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch 
thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the court.”  Hamilton Cty. Bd. 
of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of 
Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 545 N.E.2d 1260.  See State ex rel. Downs 
v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 8} The trial court ruled that “[n]o evidence has been presented here 
from which the court may conclude that this defendant is subject to jurisdiction in 
the Ohio courts pursuant to R.C. 2307.382 and/or Civil Rule 4.3.”  By rule, a 
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction “operate[s] as a failure otherwise than 
on the merits.”  Civ.R. 41(B)(4)(a).  Ordinarily, a dismissal “otherwise than on the 
merits” does not prevent a party from refiling and, therefore, ordinarily, such a 
dismissal is not a final, appealable order.  In this case, however, National City 
cannot refile.  In essence, a final judgment has been rendered against National 
City because the cause has been disposed of and there is nothing left for the 
determination of the trial court.  See Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 46 
Ohio St.3d at 153, 545 N.E.2d 1260. 
{¶ 9} National City has a contract that it is seeking to enforce, but upon a 
determination that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
National City is prevented from enforcing that right.  If the trial court’s decision is 
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not final and appealable, National City is prevented even from challenging the 
trial court’s decision to dismiss its case.  The injustice of this result is manifest 
and is proven by a simple example.  Suppose a person who had never been in a 
state other than Ohio or a country other than the United States sued another person 
who had never been in a state other than Ohio or a country other than the United 
States, and suppose further that the trial judge dismissed the case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  According to the rule of law proposed by the appellants, the 
losing party would have no right to appeal – not in Ohio, not in another state, not 
in another country.  Such a rule of law cannot stand. 
{¶ 10} Parties that believe an Ohio court has wrongly asserted jurisdiction 
over them have a right of appeal.  Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
232, 235, 638 N.E.2d 541, citing State ex rel. Bradford v. Trumbull Cty. Court 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 502, 597 N.E.2d 116, and State ex rel. Pearson v. Moore 
(1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 37, 548 N.E.2d 945 (“Absent a patent and unambiguous 
lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an 
action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction.  A party challenging the 
court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via appeal from the court's 
holding that it has jurisdiction”).  See State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 589, 594, 752 N.E.2d 281; Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 
311-312, 695 N.E.2d 751.  It is not logical to allow a party that believes a court 
wrongly asserted jurisdiction to appeal but to prevent a party that believes a court 
wrongly did not assert jurisdiction from appealing. 
{¶ 11} Although it is not common for us to review cases that have been 
dismissed other than on the merits, we have done so when — as in this case — 
justice so requires.  See Svoboda v. Brunswick (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 348, 351, 6 
OBR 403, 453 N.E.2d 648 (“The primary objective and function of our courts is 
to adjudicate cases on the merits * * * , not to adjudicates cases with finality upon 
January Term, 2007 
5 
a strained construction of procedural law yielding unjust results”).  In Preferred 
Capital, Inc. v. Power Eng. Group, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257, 860 
N.E.2d 741, ¶ 5, we reviewed a case in which the trial court had sustained 
“motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”  In Kennecorp Mtge. 
Brokers v. Country Club Convalescent Hosp., Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 173, 610 
N.E.2d 987, we reviewed a dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.  In 
Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 519 
N.E.2d 370, we reviewed a dismissal based upon the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. 
{¶ 12} In Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 303, 56 
O.O.2d 179, 272 N.E.2d 127, this court stated in paragraph one of the syllabus: 
“A judgment of a trial court sustaining motions to quash service of summons and 
dismissing defendants as parties to the action is a final appealable order.”  We 
concluded that even though the motion to quash service was not a decision on the 
merits, it nevertheless was determinative of the action because, in sustaining the 
motion to quash, the trial judge also dismissed the defendants and thereby 
“disposed of the cases.”  Id. at 306.  Our conclusion was based on the rationale 
that a “court making an order which is not final is thereby retaining jurisdiction 
for further proceedings.”  Id.  The trial court in Lantsberry did not retain 
jurisdiction, and the dismissal otherwise than on the merits was considered a final, 
appealable order.  In this case, we reach the same result.  Even though the trial 
court’s dismissal of the action against the appellants, for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, is otherwise than on the merits, the trial court did not retain 
jurisdiction, and the dismissal is a final, appealable order. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
MOYER, C.J., CALABRESE, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
 
ANTHONY O. CALABRESE JR., J., of the Eighth Appellate District, was 
assigned to sit for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 13} Respectfully, I dissent.  I believe that the trial court order 
dismissing this action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2), without prejudice and not on 
the merits, is not a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 14} The law with respect to final, appealable orders emanates from 
Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, which states that “[c]ourts of 
appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and 
affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record 
inferior to the court of appeals within the district.” (Emphasis added.)  The 
legislature, in turn, enacted R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), which provides that an order is 
final and appealable when it “affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 
determines the action and prevents a judgment.”   (Emphasis added.)  Moreover, 
as this court explained in Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. 
Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 545 
N.E.2d 1260, “[f]or an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for 
the party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some 
separate and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the 
court.”  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2007 
7 
{¶ 15} In the matter before us, the trial court, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2), 
dismissed the breach-of-contract actions that National City Commercial Capital 
Corporation filed against 129 businesses located outside the state of Ohio, stating 
that it lacked personal jurisdiction over those parties.  Consistent with Civ.R. 
41(B)(4)(a), which provides that a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction 
“operate[s] as a failure otherwise than on the merits,” it is my view that the trial 
court never reached the merits of National City’s breach-of-contract claims 
against those entities. 
{¶ 16} Contrary to the holding of the majority, the trial court order does 
not prevent National City from obtaining a judgment on its causes of action for 
breach of contract against those business entities because it is not prevented from 
refiling the same claims against the same defendants in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, in Ohio or elsewhere. 
{¶ 17} As a result of the dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 
court has neither disposed of the whole merits of these actions nor determined the 
action or prevented a judgment.  See, e.g., Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Strellec, 161 
Ohio App.3d 346, 2005-Ohio-2607, 830 N.E.2d 403, ¶ 19, wherein the appellate 
court stated that “the determination that the order ‘prevents a judgment’ simply 
because it may prevent a judgment on the merits in Ohio reflects an undeserved 
lack of confidence in our sister courts in other states and reaches beyond the terms 
of R.C. 2505.02.  If the legislature had meant to say ‘prevents a judgment in 
Ohio,’ it certainly could have done so.”  (Emphasis sic.)  See, also, Smart Pages v. 
Ohio Mtge., Cuyahoga App. No. 83004, 2003-Ohio-7074.  Moreover, the order 
does not bar National City from refiling on its causes of action in an Ohio court, 
as long as it can demonstrate an appropriate basis for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the entities it intends to pursue. 
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{¶ 18} I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the consequence 
of authorizing a party to seek appellate review from a trial court order exercising 
personal jurisdiction but not from a trial court order declining personal 
jurisdiction is unjust and illogical.  Such a result is neither unjust nor illogical 
because, as in this case, the order does not prevent the claimant from refiling its 
action in a court that has personal jurisdiction over a defendant and that has the 
ability to reach the merits of the claims presented. 
{¶ 19} Because the order dismissing these actions for lack of personal 
jurisdiction and without prejudice is a failure other than on the merits, it did not 
determine the action and prevent a judgment on the causes of action against the 
business entities.  See R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).  Accordingly, the order is not final and 
appealable, and I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Coley & Associates Co., L.P.A., William P. Coley II, and Susan K. Cliffel, 
for appellee. 
 
Strauss & Troy, L.L.P., Matthew R. Chasar, and John M. Levy, for 
appellants Carolina Seals, Inc., Arnott Motley II, Garden Title Corporation, and 
Abbie Salt. 
 
Lutz, Cornetet, Meyer & Rush and Jennifer R. Harlow, for appellants Bee 
Electrical, Inc., Century 21 Royal, Gemini Scientific, Inc., Masterson Appraisal 
Service, Inc., North American Screw Products, Rainbow Mealworms, Inc., Red 
Ribbon Bakeshop, Inc., Reynolds Tile and Floorings, Inc., Steico U.S.A. Corp., 
and Woodland Competitive Basketball League. 
 
Mark S. Shearer, for appellants AAAA At Your Service, Inc., Allen Akbar 
Ali, All About Limousines, Bauer Industries, Boyd, Franz & Stephens, L.L.P., 
Caris & Company, Delta Electric Company, Inc., Dixie Packing, Doran Realty, 
East Bay, Flexone, General Power Limited, Inc., Gomez Construction Company, 
January Term, 2007 
9 
Henry J. Austin Health Center, Inc., J.M. Construction, Kenneth Campbell 
Designs, Inc., Kenway Consultants, Kurkowski, M.L. McDonald Sales Co., Inc., 
Machines Metals Co., Inc., Master Craft, McCutcheon Apple, MCN Group, MEA 
Group, Med Care, Mr. Roofing, Norvida, Plants Alive, Reelcology, S & S 
Overseas, Inc., Strawberry Stitch Company, T & T Investments and Trading 
Corp., Tecrep, and USA Transportation. 
 
Millikin & Fitton Law Firm, Steven A. Tooman, and Michael A. Fulton, 
for appellants Ace Air Conditioning and Appliance Co., Inc., Architects and 
Planners, Inc., Betty Geane, Inc., Brettmun Corp., Champion Enterprises, Inc., 
Chandler Foods, Inc., Depaper Associates, Inc., Durst Broker, Inc., Jewell 
Electrics, Inc., Lasalle Appraisal Group, Inc., Max Impressions, Inc., Neurolink, 
Ltd., Poltex Tile, Inc., Gary S. Robertson, Rose Garden Flowers & Gifts, and 
Specialized Cargo Haulers, Inc. 
 
Fiehrer & Lane Co., L.P.A., and Stephen C. Lane, for appellants Alamia, 
Inc., Jerome Anderson, Basic Janitorial Supply, Inc., Beskin & Pesciotta, 
Biomedical, Bulldog Fence, Inc., Caddy Company, Daniel G. Campbell, Colonial 
Wood Training Center, Weston Cotton, Electrical Energy Systems, Inc., ESA 
Technical, Evans and Lewis, Four Lakes Golf Club, Ltd., Ice Cap, Inc., Industrial 
Wholesalers, International Travel Center, Kale’s Moda International, Inc., Kenjes 
Corporation, L.T.T. International, LaPierre Cabinetry, Lasercam, L.L.C., LGP 
Promotions, Lu and Weber, Management Recruiters Garland, McCormick Paint 
Works, N-Line Traffic Maintenance, Newton T & M Corporation, Orange County 
Retina Group, Phones, Phones, Phones, Inc., R.E. Goodspeed & Sons Dist., Reil 
Insurance, Rhythm Net, Rice’s Concrete Pumping, Rick’s Motorsports, Spatial 
Data Sciences, Sportsmen of Stanislaus, Stuart Appraisal Co., Inc., Unlimited 
Environmental, and Veterinary House Calls Service PA. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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William Ruben Acosta, David A. Domzal, and Jose-Carlos Villanueva, for 
appellant Automotive Support Group, L.L.C. 
 
Mark Hardig, for appellant Auto Man Transmission. 
 
Cohen, Todd, Kite & Stanford, L.L.C., and Donald John Rafferty, for 
appellants Blue Mountain Woodworking, Inc., and Evergreen Properties, Inc. 
 
Victoria Daiker, for appellants Enduracolor Hardwood Flooring, Inc., and 
Twain Billiards, Inc. 
 
David Davidson, for appellants Etowah Decorating Center, Inc., and 
Holleman Construction Co. 
 
Thomas R. McGuire, for appellants Jerry Bullard and Southwest Pool 
Management. 
 
The Law Offices of Steven R. Hicks, Inc., and Steven R. Hicks, for 
appellant Hilliards Air Conditioning and Heating, Inc. 
 
J. Timothy Riker, for appellants Horizon Staffing, Inc., and Meadowlark 
Field Services, Inc. 
 
Daniel Wenstrup, for appellant Lair Swanson, Inc. 
Trenz, McKay & Knabe Co., L.P.A., and Alan Trenz, for appellant Lost 
Valley Ranch Corp. 
Jesse Lipcius and Jason Treherne, for appellant Master Tool Company, 
Inc. 
Ronald J. Kozar, for appellants North American Land Trust and Pine 
Point, L.L.C. 
Patricia Downing, for appellant Palm Beach Tours and Transp. 
Beckman Weil Shepardson, L.L.C., and Richard Hopple, for appellant 
Pasadena Community Church, Inc. 
Bagley & Langan, P.L.L.C., and Patrick Bagley, for appellant Powell & 
Assoc., Engineers. 
January Term, 2007 
11 
Davidson, Adams & Creach Co., L.P.A., and Larry H. Creach, for 
appellant Rees Contract Service, Inc. 
Michael D. Hon, for appellants Say Trade, Watson & Cochran, Inc., and 
Wizard Technologies, Inc. 
 
Angela Jackson, for appellant Shaffran Companies, Ltd. 
 
Barron, Peck, Bennie & Schlemmer, L.P.A., and Michael Barron, for 
appellant South Tampa Homes, Inc. 
 
Norbert Doellman Jr., for appellant SQV Technologies. 
 
Brannon & Associates and Dwight D. Brannon, for appellant Machined 
Metals Co., Inc. 
 
William D. Bell, for appellant Vision Health Management. 
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