Case Title: O.G. v. Superior Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: S259011

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
O.G., a Minor, etc., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S259011 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B295555 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2018017144 
 
 
February 25, 2021 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger and Kline* concurred. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S259011 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
Proposition 57, passed in the November 2016 general 
election (Proposition 57), requires prosecutors to commence all 
cases involving a minor in juvenile court.  “Proposition 57 is an 
‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law’ ” that “the legislative 
body intended ‘to extend as broadly as possible.’ ”  (People v. 
Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal. 5th 299, 309 (Lara).)  
Proposition 57 expressly allowed for amendments that “are 
consistent with and further the intent of this act . . . .”  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 
5, p. 145 (2016 Voter Guide).)  As originally enacted, Proposition 
57 allowed prosecutors to move to transfer some minors as 
young as 14 from juvenile court to adult criminal court.  Senate 
Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391), enacted 
in 2018, amended Proposition 57 to prohibit minors under the 
age of 16 from being transferred to adult criminal court.  (See 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 
2018, ch. 1012, § 1.) 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill 1391 
is inconsistent with Proposition 57 and thus invalid (O.G. v. 
Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 626, 629), a holding at 
odds with every other Court of Appeal opinion to have addressed 
the issue.  We agree with the majority view that Senate Bill 1391 
was a permissible amendment to Proposition 57 and we reverse 
the judgment in this case.  Because Proposition 57 expressly 
permits legislative amendments, we must presume the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
Legislature acted within its authority and uphold Senate Bill 
1391 “if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said that the 
statute” is consistent with and furthers the intent of 
Proposition 57.  (Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 1243, 1256 (Amwest).)  While barring the transfer of 14 
and 15 year olds to adult court is a change from Proposition 57’s 
statutory provisions, that change is what makes Senate Bill 
1391 an amendment to Proposition 57.  The amendment is fully 
consistent with and furthers Proposition 57’s fundamental 
purposes of promoting rehabilitation of youthful offenders and 
reducing the prison population.  We therefore uphold Senate Bill 
1391 as a permissible amendment to Proposition 57. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
“ ‘Historically, a child could be tried in criminal court only 
after a judicial determination, before jeopardy attached, that he 
or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.’ ”  
(Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at p. 305.)  In 1961, the Legislature set 
16 years old as the minimum age that a minor could be 
transferred to criminal court.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, former 
§§ 510, 603, 707, as amended by Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, pp. 3462, 
3472, 3485.)  The age limit preventing prosecution of those 
younger than 16 in criminal court remained in place for close to 
34 years.   
In 1995, California began to move away from the historical 
rule when the Legislature permitted some 14 and 15 year olds 
to be transferred to criminal court.  (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 707, former subds. (d), (e), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 453, 
§ 9.5.)  This trend continued over the next five years and 
culminated with Proposition 21 in 2000.  For specified murders 
and sex crimes, Proposition 21 required prosecutors to charge 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
minors 14 years old or older directly in criminal court.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 602, former subd. (b), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.1.)  
For other specified serious offenses, Proposition 21 provided 
prosecutors with discretion to charge minors 14 or older directly 
in criminal court instead of juvenile court.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 707, former subd. (d), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.2.) 
In the years after the passage of Proposition 21, there was 
“a sea change in penology regarding the relative culpability and 
rehabilitation possibilities for juvenile offenders, as reflected in 
several judicial opinions.”  (People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 
1099, 1106.)  These changes were based upon developments in 
scientific research on adolescent brain development confirming 
that children are different from adults in ways that are critical 
to identifying age-appropriate sentences.  (See, e.g., Roper v. 
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–571; Graham v. Florida 
(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–75 (Graham); Miller v. Alabama (2012) 
567 U.S. 460, 469–470; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
1353, 1375–1376; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 
267.)  In the same period, the California Legislature enacted 
numerous reforms reflecting a rethinking of punishment for 
minors.  (See, e.g., Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1; Stats. 2013, ch. 312, 
§ 4; Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Stats. 2015, ch. 234, § 1.)  
Consistent with these changes, in November 2016, the 
public implemented a series of criminal justice reforms through 
the passage of Proposition 57.  For juvenile defendants, 
Proposition 57 “largely returned California to the historical 
rule.”  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at p. 305.)  “ ‘Among other 
provisions, 
Proposition 
57 
amended 
the 
Welfare 
and 
Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing by prosecutors.  
Certain categories of minors . . . can still be tried in criminal 
court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, 
degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and 
whether the minor can be rehabilitated.’ ”  (Ibid.)  For minors 16 
or older, prosecutors can seek transfer to criminal court for any 
felony offense.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)  For 14 
and 15 year olds, prosecutors could seek transfer to criminal 
court only for specified serious or violent offenses.  (Id., § 707, 
former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Prop. 57, § 4.2.)  “All 
remnants of Proposition 21 were deleted by passage of 
Proposition 57.”  (People v. Superior Court (K.L.) (2019) 36 
Cal.App.5th 529, 534, fn. 3 (K.L.).)   
Senate Bill 1391 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) continued 
California’s return to the historical rule.  Effective January 1, 
2019, Senate Bill 1391 amended Proposition 57 by eliminating 
the transfer of juveniles accused of committing crimes when 
they are 14 or 15 years old, unless they are first apprehended 
after the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.  (See Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 
1012, § 1.)  In this way, Senate Bill 1391 marked a return to the 
rule in place beginning in 1961 and for close to 34 years 
thereafter — 16 again became the minimum age for transferring 
a minor to criminal court.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, former 
§§ 510, 603, 707, as amended by Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, pp. 3462, 
3472, 3485.)   
Two days after the passage of Senate Bill 1391, the 
Ventura County District Attorney’s Office (the District 
Attorney’s Office) filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that 
when minor O.G. was 15 years old, he committed two counts of 
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and one count of second 
degree robbery (id., § 211), with gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) 
and firearm (id., § 12022.53, subds. (b), (d), & (e)(1)) 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
enhancements. 
 
The 
District 
Attorney’s 
Office 
contemporaneously filed a motion to transfer O.G. to criminal 
court.  The District Attorney’s Office argued that Senate Bill 
1391 is an unconstitutional amendment to Proposition 57 and 
the juvenile court therefore retained its authority to conduct a 
hearing to determine O.G.’s suitability for transfer to criminal 
court. 
The juvenile court found that Senate Bill 1391 is 
unconstitutional because it prohibits what Proposition 57 
“expressly permit[s]: adult court handling of 14 and 15 year old 
minors accused of murder.”  O.G. filed a petition for writ of 
mandate challenging the juvenile court’s ruling.  The Court of 
Appeal denied writ relief and held that Senate Bill 1391 is 
unconstitutional because the language of Proposition 57 permits 
adult prosecution for 14 and 15 year olds, but Senate Bill 1391 
precludes such prosecution.  (O.G. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 
Cal.App.5th 626, 628–629.)  The Court of Appeal disagreed with 
what was at the time five and is now seven other Court of Appeal 
panels to have addressed the issue.  (See People v. Superior 
Court (Alexander C.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 994 (Alexander C.); 
K.L., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 529; People v. Superior Court 
(T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, 
S257980 (T.D.); People v. Superior Court (I.R.) (2019) 38 
Cal.App.5th 383, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257773; People 
v. Superior Court (S.L.) (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 114, review 
granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258432; B.M. v. Superior Court (2019) 
40 Cal.App.5th 742, review granted Jan. 2, 2020, S259030 
(B.M.); Narith S. v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1131, 
review granted Feb. 19, 2020, S260090.)  We granted review. 
 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
II. DISCUSSION 
The parties disagree over whether Senate Bill 1391 is a 
constitutional amendment to Proposition 57.  The District 
Attorney’s Office, which is the real party in interest, argues that 
Senate Bill 1391 is an invalid amendment.  O.G.’s position, with 
which the Attorney General agrees, is that Senate Bill 1391 is a 
valid amendment.  We agree with O.G. and the Attorney 
General.  
A.  Legal Standard 
“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative 
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when 
approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits 
amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).)  In this case, in an uncodified 
amendment clause, Proposition 57 provides that its provisions 
concerning the treatment of juveniles “may be amended so long 
as such amendments are consistent with and further the intent 
of this act by a statute that is passed by a majority vote of the 
members of each house of the Legislature and signed by the 
Governor.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 
145.)  The parties agree that Senate Bill 1391 amended 
Proposition 57 by, in almost all circumstances, eliminating a 
juvenile court’s power to transfer cases to criminal court for 
more serious crimes committed by 14 and 15 year olds.  (See 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 
2018, ch. 1012, § 1.)  The question in this case is whether the 
amendments in Senate Bill 1391 are “consistent with and 
further the intent” of Proposition 57.  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, 
§ 5, at p. 145.) 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
In making this determination, we “apply the general rule 
that ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality supports the 
Legislature’s acts.’ ”  (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1253.)  
However, an initiative “must be given the effect the voters 
intended it to have.”  (Id. at pp. 1255–1256.)   “[S]tarting with 
the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority, 
we shall uphold the validity of [a legislative amendment] if, by 
any reasonable construction [of the initiative], it can be said that 
the statute” complies with the initiative’s conditions for enacting 
legislative amendments.  (Id. at p. 1256.)  Often, as is the case 
here and in Amwest, the initiative’s conditions for making 
amendments involve the requirement that any amendment 
“furthers the purposes of [the] Proposition . . . .” or words of 
similar effect.  (Ibid.; see id. at p. 1251.)  In discerning the 
purposes of a proposition, “we are guided by, but are not limited 
to, the general statement of purpose found in the initiative.”  (Id. 
at p. 1257.)  “ ‘[E]vidence of its purpose may be drawn from many 
sources, including the historical context of the amendment, and 
the ballot arguments favoring the measure.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1256.)  
“ ‘[L]egislative findings, while not binding on the courts, are 
given great weight and will be upheld unless they are found to 
be unreasonable and arbitrary.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1252.)  “ ‘ “[W]here 
limitations upon [legislative power] are imposed they are to be 
strictly construed, and are not to be given effect as against the 
general power of the legislature, unless such limitations clearly 
inhibit the act in question.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1255, quoting Martin v. 
Riley (1942) 20 Cal.2d 28, 40.) 
Guided by, but not limited to, the initiative’s statement of 
purpose, we therefore are bound to afford a highly deferential 
standard: We must presume the Legislature acted within its 
authority if by “any reasonable construction” (Amwest, supra, 11 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
Cal.4th at p. 1256) of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391’s 
amendments are “consistent with and further the intent” of the 
proposition.  (Prop. 57, § 5.)  This means that we must uphold 
the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391 even if the District 
Attorney’s 
Office 
is 
able 
to 
proffer 
other, 
plausible 
interpretations of the purpose and intent of Proposition 57.  As 
long as there is “any reasonable construction” of Proposition 57 
such that Senate Bill 1391’s amendments are “consistent with 
and further the intent” of Proposition 57, we must uphold 
Senate Bill 1391.  In this case, Senate Bill 1391 is fully 
consistent with and furthers Proposition 57’s purposes. 
B.  Express Purpose and Intent of Proposition 57 
Proposition 57’s statement of “Purpose and Intent” 
provides that: “[i]n enacting this act, it is the purpose and intent 
of the people of the State of California to: [¶] 1.  Protect and 
enhance public safety.  [¶] 2.  Save money by reducing wasteful 
spending on prisons.  [¶] 3.  Prevent federal courts from 
indiscriminately releasing prisoners.  [¶] 4.  Stop the revolving 
door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for 
juveniles.  [¶] 5.  Require a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide 
whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.”  (2016 Voter 
Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)  The proposition 
further provides that “[t]his act shall be broadly construed to 
accomplish its purposes” (id., § 5, p. 145) and that “[t]his act 
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes” (id., § 9, 
p. 146).  We examine each of these enumerated purposes in turn. 
First, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 
Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the 
proposition’s public safety purpose.  (See 2016 Voter Guide, 
supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)  Adjudicating juveniles in 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
juvenile court where the focus is on rehabilitation, rather than 
in criminal court, may reasonably be considered as furthering 
public safety by discouraging recidivism.   The voters who 
enacted Proposition 57 considered that “evidence shows that 
minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are less 
likely to commit new crimes.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, 
argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  In passing Senate Bill 
1391, the Legislature also considered that “[e]xtensive research 
has established that youth tried as adults are more likely to 
commit new crimes in the future than their peers treated in the 
juvenile system . . . .”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 
2018, p. 4 (hereafter Senate Committee Analysis).)  The 
Assembly Committee on Public Safety reiterated that “[y]outh 
who commit crimes fare much better in the juvenile system than 
in the adult system because they benefit from the rehabilitative 
services, and are also less likely to commit crimes in the future 
than youth in the adult system.”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis. of Sen. Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
May 25, 2018, p. 4 (hereafter Assembly Committee Analysis).)  
The practice of trying 14 and 15 year olds as adults “was started 
in the 90’s, a time in California history where the state was 
getting ‘tough on crime,’ but not smart on crime.  Back then, 
society believed that young people were fully developed at 
around age 14.  Now, research has debunked that myth and 
cognitive science has proven that children and youth who 
commit crimes are very capable of change.”  (Id. at p. 3.)  
Furthermore, as “stated by the Supreme Court, ‘it does not 
follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality 
approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few 
incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
capacity for change.’ ”  (Id. at p. 5, quoting Graham, supra, 560 
U.S. at p. 77.)  The Senate Committee on Public Safety noted 
that “[m]ost youth will eventually be released from prison and 
in the interest of protecting public safety, we need to ensure they 
get the treatment and tools they need to succeed when they 
return to society.”  (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, p. 4.)   
The District Attorney’s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 
does not protect public safety because Proposition 57 adopted a 
flexible approach that permits 14 and 15 year olds to be tried as 
adults when public safety warrants, but Senate Bill 1391 
ordinarily requires juvenile treatment for 14 and 15 year olds 
even if they have committed very serious crimes and pose a 
danger.  The District Attorney’s Office argues that it believes 
that Proposition 57’s “evidence-based approach” is more 
protective of public safety than Senate Bill 1391’s approach that 
places even greater emphasis on rehabilitation.  But that is not 
how our deferential standard works.  (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th 
at p. 1256.)  Both Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 sought to 
protect public safety by reducing juvenile recidivism and 
therefore, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 
Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the 
proposition’s public safety purpose.  As the Court of Appeal 
explained in B.M., “Senate Bill 1391 can easily be construed to 
promote public safety and reduce crime, since it increases the 
number of youth offenders who will remain in the juvenile 
justice system and avoid prison where the chance of recidivism 
is higher.”  (B.M., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) 
It is also worth emphasizing that Senate Bill 1391 focused 
only on 14 and 15 year olds, leaving Proposition 57’s procedures 
for handling 16 and 17 year olds completely intact.  Nothing in 
Proposition 57 appears to forbid the Legislature from making a 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
judgment that public safety can be better protected by keeping 
the subset of particularly young, 14- and 15-year-old offenders 
in the juvenile system where they are more likely to receive 
appropriate education and emotional and psychological 
treatment, and less likely to reoffend after their release.   
The District Attorney’s Office cites cases where 14 and 15 
year olds committed particularly serious crimes and argues 
these individuals pose such a danger to the public that releasing 
them at age 25 under the juvenile system would not protect the 
public.  Again, the fact the District Attorney’s Office does not 
agree with Senate Bill 1391’s approach to public safety does not 
mean that there is no reasonable interpretation that, like 
Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 
protecting public safety.  Moreover, in the case of the 
particularly heinous crimes cited by the District Attorney’s 
Office, other avenues are available to retaining jurisdiction over 
juvenile offenders that pose a danger to the public.  In signing 
the law the Governor “considered the fact that young people 
adjudicated in juvenile court can be held beyond their original 
sentence” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800.  
(Governor’s message to Sen. on Senate Bill 1391 (Sept. 30, 2018) 
Sen. J. (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) p. 6230.)  That section permits 
the prosecutor to petition for an extension of juvenile court 
jurisdiction, even past the age of 25, if discharging a juvenile 
offender “would be physically dangerous to the public because of 
the person’s mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or 
abnormality that causes the person to have serious difficulty 
controlling his or her dangerous behavior . . . .”  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 1800, subd. (a).) 
Second, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 
Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
proposition’s aim to save “money by reducing wasteful spending 
on prisons.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 
141.)  Senate Bill 1391 sought to save money by ensuring that, 
under the bill, fewer minors will be transferred to adult criminal 
court where they could be incarcerated for a longer period in 
adult prison and be more likely to recidivate.  (See Sen. Rules 
Com., Unfinished Business Analysis of Senate Bill 1391 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20, 2018, p. 6 [“Potential long-
term savings of an unknown amount by preventing youths from 
receiving extremely long sentences if adjudicated as an adult.  
[¶] 3)  Potential savings of an unknown amount to the extent 
that keeping youth in juvenile court and facilities designed to 
rehabilitate juveniles reduces recidivism”].)  Proposition 57 
ballot materials expressed the same goal, informing voters that 
trying fewer minors as adults “would reduce state prison and 
parole costs as those youths would no longer spend any time in 
prison or be supervised by state parole agents following their 
release.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 
Legis. Analyst, p. 57.)  The District Attorney’s Office does not 
dispute that Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 
this cost-saving purpose. 
Third, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 
Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the goal of 
preventing “federal courts from indiscriminately releasing 
prisoners.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 
141.)  Proposition 57’s ballot materials explained that 
“[o]vercrowded and unconstitutional conditions led the U.S. 
Supreme Court to order the state to reduce its prison population.  
Now, without a common sense, long-term solution, we will 
continue to waste billions and risk a court-ordered release of 
dangerous prisoners.  This is an unacceptable outcome that puts 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
Californians in danger — and this is why we need Prop. 57.”  
(2016 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  
The federal court order required California to “reduce the prison 
population to 137.5% of the adult institutions’ total design 
capacity.” (Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2009) 922 
F.Supp.2d 882, 962; see also Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 
501–503.)  The federal court later refused to vacate its order 
because, inter alia, the state failed to produce a “ ‘durable 
remedy’ ” to the problem of prison overcrowding.  (Coleman v. 
Brown (E.D.Cal.2013) 922 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1043 (Coleman II).)  
The federal court warned that the state had “thus far engaged 
in openly contumacious conduct by repeatedly ignoring both this 
Court’s Order and at least three explicit admonitions to take all 
steps necessary to comply with that Order.”  (Id. at p. 1049.)  The 
federal court further advised “Governor Brown has a duty to 
exercise in good faith his full authority, including seeking any 
changes to or waivers of state law that may be necessary to 
ensure compliance with the Supreme Court’s judgment.”  (Id. at 
p. 1054.)  Proposition 57 therefore facilitated California’s 
compliance with this federal court order by ensuring that fewer 
juveniles would be incarcerated in state prison.  These changes 
to juvenile transfer proceedings were part of the proposition’s 
broader strategy to reduce the prison population.  In addition to 
these changes, Proposition 57 also enabled inmates to be 
released earlier on parole by: (a) making any person convicted 
of a nonviolent felony offense eligible for parole consideration 
after completing the full term for his or her primary offense and 
(b) giving the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
authority to award credits to inmates for good behavior.  (2016 
Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, §§ 3–4, p. 141.)  Each of 
these changes provided a “ ‘durable remedy’ ” that would 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
decrease the prison population (Coleman II, at p. 1043) and 
thereby diminish the likelihood that federal courts would 
“indiscriminately release[e] prisoners” (2016 Voter Guide, 
supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141).  Senate Bill 1391 similarly 
mitigates against federal courts “indiscriminately releasing 
prisoners” in order to reduce prison population because the bill 
ensures that now and in the future fewer minors are ultimately 
sent to adult prison.  The District Attorney’s Office does not 
dispute that Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 
this purpose. 
Fourth, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 
Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purpose of 
stopping “the revolving door of crime by emphasizing 
rehabilitation, especially for juveniles.”  (2016 Voter Guide, 
supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)  The District Attorney’s 
Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 is inconsistent with this 
purpose because Proposition 57 already stopped “the revolving 
door” by implementing “a more balanced approach, which 
specifically includes the transfer of certain 14-or 15-year-olds to 
adult court.”  However, by its terms, Proposition 57 sought to 
broadly emphasize rehabilitation for all juveniles, including 14 
and 15 year olds.  In approving Proposition 57, voters considered 
“[e]vidence show[ing] that the more inmates are rehabilitated, 
the less likely they are to re-offend.  Further evidence shows 
that minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are 
less likely to commit new crimes.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, 
argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  Proposition 57 “focuses 
our system on evidence-based rehabilitation for juveniles and 
adults because it is better for public safety than our current 
system.”  (Ibid.)  Similarly, in enacting Senate Bill 1391, the 
Legislature considered that “[t]he juvenile system is very 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
different from the adult system.  The juvenile system provides 
age-appropriate treatment, services, counseling, and education, 
and a youth’s participation in these programs is mandatory.  
The adult system has no age-appropriate services, participation 
in rehabilitation programs is voluntary, and in many prisons, 
programs are oversubscribed with long waiting lists.”  (Sen. 
Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)   “When youth are given age-
appropriate services and education that are available in the 
juvenile justice system, they are less likely to recidivate.”  
(Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)  “Keeping 14 and 15 year 
olds in the juvenile justice system will help to ensure that youth 
receive treatment, counseling, and education they need to 
develop into healthy, law abiding adults.”  (Ibid.)  Senate Bill 
1391, like Proposition 57, seeks to prevent recidivism by 
emphasizing juvenile rehabilitation in lieu of state prison.  
Under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 
1391 is consistent with and furthers this fourth purpose. 
Finally, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, 
Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purpose of 
requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles 
should be tried in adult court.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text 
of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)  Proposition 57 accomplished this 
purpose by repealing a prosecutor’s power to directly file charges 
against juveniles in criminal court.  Senate Bill 1391 does not 
attempt to reinstate direct filing.  Rather, Senate Bill 1391 
“repeal[ed] the power of the prosecutor to make a motion to 
transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court if 
the minor was alleged to have committed certain serious 
offenses when he or she was 14 or 15 years old.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1391, supra, as introduced 
Feb. 16, 2018, p. 2, boldface and italics omitted.)  Proposition 57 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
took away prosecutorial power to bypass juvenile court 
jurisdiction by eliminating the direct filing authority.  Senate 
Bill 1391 then narrowed that power further.  In this way, both 
Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 had the same goal: to limit 
prosecutorial authority to prosecute juveniles as adults.   
Moreover, both before and after Senate Bill 1391, a judge, 
and not the prosecutor, still decides whether to transfer 
juveniles to criminal court, whenever the prosecutor has the 
authority to initiate the transfer process.  After Senate Bill 
1391, the prosecutor continues to make a motion to transfer 
charged minors age 16 and over and the juvenile court continues 
to determine whether the minor should be transferred.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1) [in certain cases involving minors 
“16 years of age or older . . . the district attorney . . . may make 
a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of 
criminal jurisdiction”].)  Thus, when there is a transfer decision 
to be made, a judge, and not a prosecutor, still makes that 
decision.  Senate Bill 1391 has not eliminated that procedural 
scheme.  
The District Attorney’s Office argues the Senate Bill 1391 
is inconsistent with requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to 
decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court” (2016 
Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141) because under 
Senate Bill 1391 a judge can no longer decide whether 14 and 15 
year olds can be transferred to criminal court.  The District 
Attorney’s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 is therefore at 
odds with the specific statutory provisions of Proposition 57 that 
allow a prosecutor to make a motion to transfer 14 or 15 year 
olds to criminal court in specified cases.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 707, former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Prop. 57, § 4.2 [stating 
that a prosecutor may make a motion in any case where a 14 or 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
15 year old was alleged to have committed a qualifying offense].)  
The District Attorney’s Office also emphasizes language in 
Proposition 57’s ballot materials that states that juvenile court 
judges will decide whether minors should be prosecuted and 
sentenced as adults and that permit the transfer of juveniles age 
14 and older.1  However, the focus of requiring “a judge, not a 
prosecutor” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 
141) to make transfer decisions was neither to confer new 
powers on judges nor to ensure that 14 and 15 year olds would 
continue to be subject to adult criminal prosecution.  Instead, 
the focus of the provision was on restraining prosecutorial 
discretion and upon ensuring that fewer youths would be tried 
in adult court.  Indeed, immediately after referencing the 
requirement that judges will make the juvenile transfer 
decision, the Legislative Analyst focused on the new protections 
for minors and not on the authority granted to juvenile court 
judges.  (See 2016 Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 
Legis. Analyst, p. 56 [“As a result, the only way a youth could be 
tried in adult court is if the juvenile court judge in the hearing 
decides to transfer the youth to adult court.  Youths accused of 
committing certain severe crimes would no longer automatically 
be tried in adult court and no youth could be tried in adult court 
based only on the decision of a prosecutor. . . . [T]here would be 
fewer youths tried in adult court”].)  Senate Bill 1391 “certainly 
narrows the class of minors who are subject to review by a 
juvenile court for potential transfer to criminal court . . . but it 
 
1  
For instance, the “Official Title and Summary” included: 
“Provides juvenile court judges shall make determination, upon 
prosecutor motion, whether juveniles age 14 and older should be 
prosecuted and sentenced as adults for specified offenses.”  
(2016 Voter Guide, supra, Official Title and Summary, p. 54.) 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
in no way detracts from Proposition 57’s stated intent that, 
where a transfer decision must be made, a judge rather than a 
prosecutor makes the decision.”  (Alexander C., supra, 34 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)  Under a reasonable construction of 
Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers 
this purpose because, like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 
further narrowed prosecutorial power to try 14 and 15 year olds 
in criminal court and, when there is a transfer decision to be 
made, a judge, and not the prosecutor, still makes that decision 
under Senate Bill 1391. 
Of course, eliminating the ability to transfer 14 and 15 
year olds to adult court is a change from Proposition 57’s 
statutory provisions and the prior practice, but that change is 
what makes Senate Bill 1391 an amendment to Proposition 57.  
Proposition 57 provides that its provisions concerning the 
treatment of juveniles “may be amended so long as such 
amendments are consistent with and further the intent of this 
act by a statute that is passed by a majority vote of the members 
of each house of the Legislature and signed by the Governor.”  
(2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145.) 
The District Attorney’s Office argues that Proposition 57’s 
amendment clause is a two-part test requiring that any 
amendment be both “consistent with [this act]” and “further[] 
the intent of this act.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 
57, § 5, p. 145.)  The District Attorney’s Office argues that 
because Senate Bill 1391 is not expressly consistent with 
Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is invalid.  However, O.G. 
argues that we should interpret Proposition 57’s amendment 
clause as authorizing amendments that are “consistent with 
[the intent of the act] and [that] further the intent of this act.”  
In other words, O.G. argues that the amendment must be 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
consistent with and further the intent of the act, but does not 
need to be consistent with the express language of the act.  O.G. 
has the better argument.  Limiting authorized amendments to 
those consistent with the express language of the act, “would 
appear to preclude any amendment that deletes or repeals any 
portion of the Act, no matter how consistent such action might 
be with the purpose of the Act itself.”  (T.D., supra, 38 
Cal.App.5th at p. 372.)  “[I]f any amendment to the provisions of 
an initiative is considered inconsistent with an initiative’s 
intent or purpose, then an initiative such as Proposition 57 could 
never be amended.”  (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 
1003.)  The District Attorney’s Office’s interpretation here would 
render the amendment clause a nullity.  (See Williams v. 
Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 357 [“An interpretation 
that renders statutory language a nullity is obviously to be 
avoided”].)    
The District Attorney’s Office nonetheless suggests this 
would not make the amendment clause a nullity because 
amendments “consistent with” Proposition 57 could still include 
“minor” amendments to “clarify ambiguous terms, to correct 
drafting errors in the original language” or adjust procedures.  
There is no reason to believe that Proposition 57’s amendment 
clause contemplated only the correction of typographical and 
drafting errors.  To the contrary, in enacting an initiative, voters 
are presumed to be aware of existing laws.  (Professional 
Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1016, 1048.)  Because existing case law had interpreted 
similar amendment clauses by the time of the passage of 
Proposition 57, we presume that in authorizing “amendments” 
that “are consistent with and further the intent of this act” (2016 
Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145), the voters 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
intended that authorization to carry the broad meaning defined 
by case law.  (See In re J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1483, 
1482 [even though one “plausible reading” of an initiative was 
inconsistent with subsequent legislation, “an alternat[e] and 
equally plausible reading” of the initiative “would satisfy the 
proposition’s requirement that any amendment be consistent 
with and further its intent”]; Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2009) 
178 Cal.App.4th 426, 441 [“[I]f the mental health services 
funding requirements [of Proposition 63] prove too onerous, the 
electorate or the Legislature may vote to diminish them in the 
future” without exceeding legislative authority to amend the 
initiative consistent with and in furtherance of its intent].)  In 
this specific context, it is at least a “reasonable construction” of 
Proposition 57 (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256) to 
conclude that “consistent with and further” (2016 Voter Guide, 
supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145) is simply a means of 
conveying emphasis — even though this involves surplusage.  
Finally, the District Attorney’s Office’s interpretation — 
which seeks to read the amendment clause in exceedingly 
narrow terms — also runs counter to the express language of 
Proposition 57, which provides that it “shall be broadly 
construed to accomplish its purposes” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, 
text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145) and that it “shall be liberally 
construed to effectuate its purposes” (id., § 9, p. 146).  Both 
provisions call for broadly or liberally construing Proposition 
57’s provisions to serve its “purposes.”  If voters want to 
specifically limit amendments to clarify terms or change 
procedures, there are amendment clauses that do that.  (See, 
e.g., Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) text of 
Prop. 63, § 18, p. 108 [“The Legislature may by majority vote add 
provisions to clarify procedures and terms including the 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
procedures for the collection of the tax surcharge imposed by 
Section 12 of this act”].)  The drafters of Proposition 57 could 
have explicitly limited amendments to minor clarifications or to 
procedural changes not affecting transfer eligibility.  The 
drafters could have also stated more overtly a purpose to ensure 
that judges retain the discretion to transfer some 14 and 15 year 
olds to criminal court.  Noticeably, they did neither.  
Arguing that any doubts should be resolved in favor of 
precluding changes to the initiative, the District Attorney’s 
Office relies upon People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008 and 
Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 
Cal.App.4th 1473.  Kelly, however, involved legislative 
amendments to Proposition 215 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)).  As 
stated earlier, the “Legislature may amend or repeal an 
initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only 
when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute 
permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.”  
(Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).)  Unlike Proposition 57, 
Proposition 215 did not contain a provision allowing for 
legislative amendment of the initiative.  (See Kelly, at p. 1013, 
fn. 2.)  The issue in Kelly was therefore whether the subsequent 
legislation amended Proposition 215 because, if so, the 
legislation would necessarily be impermissible under California 
Constitution, article II, section 10, subdivision (c).  (Kelly, at p. 
1024.)  The initiative at issue in Quackenbush did have an 
amendment clause, but the court separately analyzed two 
different issues: (1) whether legislative changes to the Insurance 
Code actually amended the provisions of Proposition 103 (Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988)) and, if so, (2) whether these amendments 
furthered the purposes of Proposition 103 as its amendment 
clause required.  (Quackenbush, at pp. 1483–1494.)  Although 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
the District Attorney’s Office cites Quackenbush for a standard 
that would resolve any doubt against validity of the amendment, 
the cited passage (id. at pp. 1485–1486) concerns the same 
question at issue in Kelly, i.e., whether subsequent legislation 
constitutes an amendment to the initiative.  When the 
Quackenbush court addresses the separate question of 
furtherance of the initiative’s purposes (Quackenbush, at pp. 
1490–1494), it cites Amwest’s statement of the standard 
(Quackenbush, at p. 1490) and does not purport to resolve 
doubts against the amendment.  (See Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th 
at p. 1256 [“[S]tarting with the presumption that the 
Legislature acted within its authority, we shall uphold the 
validity of [a legislative amendment] if, by any reasonable 
construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the 
purposes of [the] Proposition . . . . ”].) 
C.  The Fundamental Purpose and Intent of 
Proposition 57 
In considering a challenge to a legislative statute that 
amends an initiative, we consider not only the initiative’s 
statements of purpose or intent, but also the initiative “ ‘as a 
whole. ’ ”  (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1257 [“we are guided 
by, but are not limited to, the general statement of purpose 
found in the initiative”]; see id. at p. 1259 [construing the “major 
purposes” of Prop. 103].)  In this case, just as the District 
Attorney’s Office’s argument fails when reviewing each of 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
Proposition 57’s enumerated purposes, their argument also fails 
when reviewing the initiative’s purpose as a whole.2 
The major and fundamental purpose of Proposition 57’s 
juvenile justice provisions — as evidenced by its express 
language and enumerated purposes, the ballot materials, and 
its historical backdrop and the changes it made to existing law 
— was an ameliorative change to the criminal law that 
emphasized rehabilitation over punishment.  The impact of this 
ameliorative change was decarceration that, in turn, would 
prevent “federal courts from indiscriminately releasing 
prisoners.”  (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 
141.)  Our court has already stated that “Proposition 57 is an 
‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law’ that we infer the 
legislative body intended ‘to extend as broadly as possible’ ”  and 
that “ ‘we find an “inevitable inference” that the electorate “must 
have intended” that the potential “ameliorating benefits” of 
rehabilitation (rather than punishment) . . . .’ ”  (Lara, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 309.)  “The [a]ct’s overriding purpose was to 
 
2  
The District Attorney’s Office argues that we may not 
ignore any of Proposition 57’s enumerated purposes by 
designating one or more of them as “primary” or “fundamental.”   
Designating a major purpose, however, is consistent with our 
own statements about Proposition 57 in Lara.  (See Lara, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 309; see also Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 
1257, 1259 [reviewing the available information about Prop. 103 
“ ‘as a whole’ ” and its historical backdrop before construing its 
“two major purposes”].)  We can properly assess the major 
purpose or purposes of an initiative.  In any event, under a 
reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is 
consistent with and furthers each of Proposition 57’s 
enumerated purposes.  Thus, whether we look to the statute’s 
“major” purpose or instead analyze each of its enumerated 
purposes, O.G. still prevails. 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
channel more juvenile offenders into the juvenile justice system 
and to have a juvenile court judge make the transfer decision if 
one was to be made, not to set in stone the age parameters for 
such a determination.”  (T.D., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.)  
Proposition 57’s changes to juvenile filing were also consistent 
with its other provisions that advanced the time at which adult 
prisoners become eligible for parole and allowed prisoners to be 
released earlier on parole by earning credits for good behavior.   
(2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 3, p. 141.)  All of 
these measures serve the broader purpose of decarceration. 
Senate Bill 1391 is likewise an ameliorative change to the 
criminal justice system that emphasizes rehabilitation over 
punishment and serves the broader purpose of decarceration.  
Like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 focuses on rehabilitation 
by increasing the number of juveniles adjudicated in juvenile 
court and decreasing the number of juveniles tried in criminal 
court.  Like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 continued 
California’s return to the state’s historical rule on juvenile 
justice and undid a policy enacted at “a time in California 
history where the state was getting ‘tough on crime,’ but not 
smart on crime.”  (Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 3.)  Senate 
Bill 1391, accordingly, moves the law in the same direction as 
Proposition 57 — toward the historical rule placing minors 
under 16 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.  
(Cf. Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256 [striking down an 
amendment when the Legislature attempted to exempt surety 
companies from an initiative that had imposed rate rollback and 
rate approval provisions on them along with other types of 
insurance].)   
The District Attorney’s Office argues that Proposition 57 
was intended to be ameliorative, but only to a point.  The District 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
Attorney’s Office contends that the aim of Proposition 57 was 
also somewhat punitive in nature to ensure that certain 14 and 
15 year olds could be tried as adults, and therefore Senate Bill 
1391, which is even more ameliorative, is at odds with 
Proposition 57.  But Proposition 57 did not seek to punish 
juveniles.  Instead, Proposition 57 was clearly aimed at 
providing the “ ‘ “ameliorating benefits” of rehabilitation (rather 
than punishment) . . . .’ ”  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 309.)   
Viewed in its historical context, the juvenile transfer 
provisions of Proposition 57 functioned as a repeal of Proposition 
21, the 2000 initiative that had required prosecutors to charge 
eligible juveniles directly in criminal court if they were accused 
of specified murders and sex crimes.3  (See K.L., supra, 36 
Cal.App.5th at p. 534, fn. 3 [“All remnants of Proposition 21 
were deleted by passage of Proposition 57”]; J.N. v. Superior 
Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 710 [“The voters apparently 
rethought their votes on Proposition 21 and passed Proposition 
57 at the November 8, 2016, General Election”].)  The purpose 
of Proposition 57 was to have the electors undo what different 
electors had done sixteen years prior, not to insulate earlier 
legislation from future legislative change.   
Nothing in the text or history of Proposition 57 suggests 
that by changing the relevant procedural mechanism from 
direct filing to transfer hearings, voters intended to ratify the 
Legislature’s decision from over 20 years before to lower the 
minimum transfer age from 16 to 14, or to preclude the 
 
3  
Proposition 57 also effectively repealed a 1999 legislative 
act that required direct filing of criminal charges against 
juveniles 16 and older in adult court for select offenses.  (Stats. 
1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, p. 7560.)  
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
Legislature from revisiting that choice.  Similarly, there is 
nothing to suggest that Proposition 57 sought to endorse the 
punitive goals of the 1994 decision to expand eligibility criteria 
to include certain 14 and 15 year olds.  (See Assem. 3d reading 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 560 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Jan 27, 1994, p. 2 [the intended purpose of the 1994 
amendment was “to deal with juveniles committing serious 
violent crimes who currently hide behind the protections of 
Juvenile Court law”].)  Indeed, the passage of Proposition 57 was 
a repudiation of the punitive goals behind the 1994 amendment 
and Proposition 21 — not an endorsement of them.  The 
Legislature’s decision in Senate Bill 1391 to further the 
ameliorative purpose of Proposition 57 by repealing the 
Legislature’s punitive 1994 statutory framework is fully 
consistent with Proposition 57 itself. 
D.  Conclusion  
In sum, O.G. merely needs to show that by some 
“reasonable construction” of Proposition 57 (Amwest, supra, 11 
Cal.4th at p. 1256), Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and 
furthers the purposes of the proposition.  It does not matter if 
the District Attorney’s Office has a different view as to whether 
Senate Bill 1391 advances public safety or Proposition 57’s 
procedural scheme.  The District Attorney’s Office seeks to turn 
the applicable standard on its head and argues that any doubts 
whether such a reasonable construction exists should be 
resolved in favor of precluding changes to the initiative.  That is 
not the standard.  We start with the presumption that the 
Legislature acted within its authority.  (See Amwest, at p. 1256 
[“[S]tarting with the presumption that the Legislature acted 
within its authority, we shall uphold the validity of [a legislative 
amendment] if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said 
O.G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
that 
the 
statute 
furthers 
the 
purposes 
of 
[the] 
Proposition . . . ”].)  In this case, under a reasonable construction 
of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and 
furthers each of the proposition’s enumerated purposes.  That is 
all that is necessary in order for us to hold that Senate Bill 1391 
was lawfully enacted.  We therefore hold that Senate Bill 1391 
is a constitutional amendment to Proposition 57. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
KLINE, J.* 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  O.G. v. Superior Court   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted   XXX 40 Cal.App.5th 626  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S259011 
Date Filed:  February 25, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Ventura    
Judge:  Kevin J. McGee    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jennifer Hansen and Willard P. Wiksell, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
 
Susan L. Burrell, L. Richard Braucher, Cyn Yamashiro and Marketa Sims for Pacific Juvenile Defender 
Center and Independent Juvenile Defender Program Los Angeles County Bar as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner. 
 
Michael C. McMahon for California Public Defenders Association and Todd W. Howeth, Public Defender 
(Ventura), as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, William D. Temko and Sara A. McDermott for Human Rights Watch, Anti-
Recidivism Coalition and W. Haywood Burns Institute as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. 
Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitor General, Anthony R. Hakl, 
Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Rebecca P. Jones; Bryan A. Stevenson and Alicia A. D’Addario for The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Jeff Rubin, District Attorney (Santa Clara), for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Respondent and Real Party in Interest. 
 
Gregory D. Totten, District Attorney, Michael D. Schwartz, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Tate 
McCallister and Michelle Contois, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Amicus Populi as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
 
 
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jennifer Hansen 
California Appellate Project 
520 S. Grand Ave., 4th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 243-0300 
 
Nelson R. Richards 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-7867 
 
Michelle J. Contois 
Deputy District Attorney 
800 South Victoria Ave. 
Ventura, CA 93009 
(805) 654-3078