Case Title: TEAMSTERS LOCAL 45 v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-11-09T00:00:00Z

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No. 81-129 I N T H E S U P R E I M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 TEAMSTERS, L O C A L #45, A f f i l i a t e d with I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman & Helpers of America, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, STATE O F MONTANA, ex rel., BOARD O F PERSONNEL APPEALS and STUART T H O M A S McCARVEL , Respondents and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: James Gardner, Jr., Helena, Montana P a t r i c k F. F l a h e r t y , Boulder, Montana For Respondent: Hklley & Loring, Great P a l l s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 8 1 Decided: SiR!f !i . . 1981 Filed; Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Appellant began this action in August 1977 by filing with the Board of Personnel Appeals (BPA) an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that respondent union had breached its duty of fair representation. Appellant was hired by the Great Falls Public Library as a bookmobile driver on February 10, 1976. He performed some clerical work in addition to his actual driving of the bookmobile. As a bookmobile driver, appellant was repre- sented by the respondent union for collective bargaining purposes. Upon receipt of his first paycheck, appellant dis- covered that he was paid for twenty hours per week as a driver and twenty hours per week as a clerk. A clerk's pay was $1.60 per hour less than a driver's pay. Concerned about his wages, appellant requested the union to file a grievance on his behalf. He made similar requests periodically from March 1976 to March 1977. The union continually refused to file a grievance stating that such a grievance would simply not be successful because the union and the city had a long-standing oral agreement that the drivers of the bookmobiles would be paid half-time as drivers and half-time as clerks. On August 8, 1977, the BPA received appellant's charges that the union had breached its duty of fair representation. The hearing examiner for the BPA concluded that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by failing to accept and process appellant' s grievance. The hearing examiner's decision was upheld by the BPA on appeal, but in October 1979 the union petitioned for a rehearing before the BPA in light of the case, Bonnie Ford v. University of Montana (1979), Mont. 598 P.2d 604, 36 St.Rep. 1485. On rehearing the BPA found that the Ford case did not affect its prior ruling and reaffirmed appellant's claims against the union. The union then appealed to the District Court of the First Judicial District, County of Lewis and Clark. On November 7, 1980, the District Court, basing its conclusion on Ford, held that the BPA lacked jurisdiction to hear claims arising from alleged breaches of fair representation. Appellant and the BPA now appeal the holding of the District Court. The single issue before this Court is whether, in light of the Ford decision, the BPA lacks jurisdiction to decide claims that a union has breached its duty of fair representation. In Ford the plaintiff filed a grievance with her union concerning seniority status. A special meeting was held and the union members, interpreting their own collective bargaining agreement, decided that the plaintiff did not have the seniority she claimed. The majority of the union rejected her grievance. The plaintiff in - Ford then filed a complaint in state District Court. The union moved for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff must bring her claim initially before the BPA and exhaust her administrative remedies. The District Court denied the motion, and this was one issue of error on appeal to this Court. We ultimately decided in Ford that the District Court d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear F o r d ' s complaint. W e do n o t i n t e n d i n any way by t h i s p r e s e n t d e c i s i o n t o a l t e r t h e r u l e of Ford which r e c o g n i z e s o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e s t a t e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t o d e c i d e q u e s t i o n s of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s Court still r e c o g n i z e s t h e a c t u a l h o l d i n g i n Ford. There is c e r t a i n d i c t a i n Ford, however, t h a t w e can no l o n g e r r e c o g n i z e . I n reasoning t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e Ford c a s e i n i t i a l l y , t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t a breach of t h e d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n cannot be c o n s i d e r e d an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 39-31-402, MCA. S e c t i o n 39-31-402, MCA, which d e f i n e s a u n i o n ' s p o s s i b l e u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e s , was found n o t t o a p p l y t o an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t a union h a s f a i l e d t o f a i r l y r e p r e s e n t a member. I n Ford w e looked o n l y t o t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e s t a t u t e s from t h e Montana P u b l i c Employees' C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A c t , d i s r e g a r d i n g f e d e r a l p r e c e d e n t , which d o e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t a breach of t h e d u t y o f f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e , a s a v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) o f t h e N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s A c t (NLRA), 29 USC 5 1 5 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) . F e d e r a l p r e c e d e n t was c a l l e d " q u e s t i o n a b l e a u t h o r i t y " by t h i s Court i n Ford because of t h e way w e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e language of t h e l e a d i n g c a s e , Vaca v. S i p e s ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 1 7 1 , 87 S . C t . 903, 1 7 L.Ed.2d 842. Upon a c l o s e r examination of Vaca, we a r e persuaded t h a t it was n o t i n t e r p r e t e d a c c u r a t e l y by t h i s Court i n Ford. I n Ford, we i n c o r r e c t l y assumed t h a t t h e r e a s o n f e d e r a l c o u r t s assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n over f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c a s e s was because of t h e p r e s e n c e of s e c t i o n 301 of t h e Labor Management R e l a t i o n s A c t (LMRA), 29 U S C 5185. I n dicta, we reasoned that, "If this Court were to hold that a breach of duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 39-31-402, MCA, the District Court would be denied jurisdiction because Montana does not have a statute that parallels S 301." 598 P.2d at 609. We now are persuaded that Vaca did not stand for the proposition that section 301 alone grants original jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases of fair representation. Section 301 is silent on unfair labor practices; it goes solely to enforcement of contracts where there has been a breach of a contract obligation. Vaca held that federal courts had jurisdiction in fair representation cases because the policy reasons underlying application of the preemption doctrine were overridden by other considerations. The Court mentioned as an aside that in many cases where a breach of fair representation is an unfair labor practice, the union may also be sued for breach of contract under section 301. Our reasoning in Ford for not looking to federal precedent was, therefore, based upon what we now believe was an inaccurate reading of Vaca. As in all other cases except Ford where we have interpreted the Public Employees' Collec- tive Bargaining Act (the Act), we now look to NLRB and federal interpretation of the NLRA for guidance in inter- preting this Act. For cases where we have found it appropriate for the BPA and this Court to consider NLRB precedents in interpreting and administering the Act, see State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals v. District Court (1979) I Mont. , 598 P.2d 1117, 36 St.Rep. 1531; S t a t e ex r e l . Dept. of Highways v. P u b l i c Employees C r a f t Council ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785; Local 2390 of Amer. Fed. e t c . v . C i t y of B i l l i n g s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171 Mont. 20, Moreover, w h i l e o t h e r d i c t a i n Ford suggested t h a t we l o o k t o t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g of s e c t i o n 39-31-402, MCA, concerning p o s s i b l e u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e s by a union, we now acknowledge t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n must be read i n l i g h t of t h e s e v e r a l s e c t i o n s of t h e A c t d e f i n i n g t h e d u t y of a union a s a n e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , g u i d e d by NRLB i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of l i k e s t a t u t e s . S e c t i o n 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) of t h e NLRA, 29 USC § 1 5 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) , p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( b ) I t s h a l l be an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e f o r a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n or its a g e n t s -- (1) t o r e s t r a i n o r c o e r c e ( A ) e m p l o y e e s i n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e r i g h t s guaranteed i n s e c t i o n 7 . . ." S e c t i o n 7 of t h e NLRA, 29 USC S157, p r o v i d e s : "Employees s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n , t o form, j o i n o r a s s i s t l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y through r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r own choosing and t o engage i n o t h e r c o n c e r t e d a c t i v i t i e s f o r t h e purpose of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g or o t h e r mutual a i d o r p r o t e c t i o n , and s h a l l a l s o have t h e r i g h t t o r e f r a i n from any and a l l of such a c t i v i t i e s e x c e p t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h r i g h t may b e a f f e c t e d by a n agreement r e q u i r i n g membership i n a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a s a c o n d i t i o n of employment a s a u t h o r i z e d i n s e c t i o n 8 ( a ) ( 3 ) . " The above-quoted s e c t i o n s a r e v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h e s t a t u t e s i n Montana's P u b l i c Employees' C o l l e c t i v e Bargain- i n g Act: " I t is an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e of a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n o r i t s a g e n t s t o : "(1) r e s t r a i n or c o e r c e employees i n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e r i g h t guaranteed i n 39-31-201 . . ." S e c t i o n 39-31-402, MCA. "Public employees shall have and shall be protected in the exercise of the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection free from interference, restraint, or coercion." Section 39-31-201, MCA. Likewise, section 9 of the WLRA, 29 USC 5159, the section the NLRB found gives rise to the duty of fair representation, is very similar to our own section 39-31- 205, MCA, when augmented with subsection 39-31-208(5), MCA. Section 9(a), of the NLRA , 29 USC 5159, provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri- ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain- ing in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ- ment: . . ." Sections 39-31-205 and 39-31-208(5), MCA: "39-31-205. Labor organizations designated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter are responsible for representing the interest of all employees in the exclusive bargaining unit without discrimination for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment." "39-31-208 (5). A labor organization which receives the majority of the votes cast in an election shall be certified by the board as the exclusive representative." The first time that the NLRB found that a breach of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice was in Miranda Fuel Co. (1962), 140 NLRB 181, 51 LRRM 1584. In Miranda, the NLRB reasoned that the privilege to act as an exclusive bargaining representative granted in section 9 of t h e NLRA n e c e s s a r i l y gave r i s e t o a corresponding s e c t i o n 7 r i g h t i n union c o n s t i t u e n t s t o f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by t h e e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The NLRB concluded t h a t a union which a c t e d on t h e b a s i s of " i r r e l e v a n t , i n v i d i o u s o r u n f a i r " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n 8 ( b ) (1) ( A ) of t h e NLRA which makes it an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e t o " r e s t r a i n or c o e r c e . . . employees i n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e r i g h t s guaranteed i n s e c t i o n 7." The NLRB c o n t i n u e s t o hold t h a t breach of t h e d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e , and more s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h a t t h e p r o c e s s i n g of a g r i e v a n c e i n an a r b i t r a r y manner is a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) . See, UAW, Local 600 (Dearborn Stamping P l a n t of Ford Motor Co.) ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 225 NLRB 1299, 93 L R R M 1233; and Laborers Local 324 (Centex Homes of C a l i f o r n i a ) ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 234 NLRB 367, 97 L R R M 1265. The F e d e r a l C o u r t s of Appeals have enforced t h e h o l d i n g t h a t a breach of t h e d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e many times. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 315 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 545 F.2d 1173, 93 L R R M 2747; NLRB v. American P o s t a l Workers Union ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 618 F.2d 1249, 103 L R R M 3045; Newport News S h i p b u i l d i n g & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 631 F.2d 263, 104 LRRM 2633. I n its f i r s t h e a r i n g of t h i s c a s e , t h e BPA recognized t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e NLRA and t h e Montana A c t . Applying a r a t i o n a l e s i m i l a r t o t h a t used by t h e NLRB and t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , t h e BPA found t h a t t h e a c t i o n by t h e union h e r e was an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 39-31-402, MCA. On r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s c a s e i n l i g h t of Ford, t h e BPA decided t h a t i t s assumption of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e d i d n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e a c t u a l law s e t down i n Ford, a l t h o u g h it d i d c o n f l i c t w i t h d i c t a i n Ford which s t a t e d t h a t a breach of t h e d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was n o t an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e . W e a g r e e with t h e BPA i n t h i s m a t t e r . W e still r e c o g n i z e t h e h o l d i n g i n Ford t h a t a D i s t r i c t Court has o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear c l a i m s t h a t a union h a s breached its d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . W e no longer r e c o g n i z e , however, t h e d i c t a i n Ford which s t a t e s t h a t a breach of t h e d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is n o t an u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 39-31-402, MCA. F u r t h e r , w e no longer r e c o g n i z e o t h e r d i c t a i n Ford which s t a t e s t h a t f i n d i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e BPA on t h e s e m a t t e r s would n e c e s s a r i l y d e p r i v e t h e D i s t r i c t Court of j u r i s d i c t i o n . W e s e e no reason why j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court should d e p r i v e a g r i e v a n t of h i s or her a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies under t h e A c t . Vaca i t s e l f s t o o d f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n of c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n i n both t h e NLRB and t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t t h e BPA h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear c l a i m s t h a t a union h a s breached its d u t y of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . W e remand t h i s c a s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court I J u s t i c e v We concur: