Case Title: Hill v. Blaine County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50088

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2024-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 50088-2022 
 
JEFFREY JAE HILL, an individual, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
BLAINE COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State of Idaho, 
 
     Respondent, 
 
and  
 
GREENHORN OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
 
     Intervenor-Respondent. 
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Boise, February 2024 Term 
 
Opinion filed:  June 5, 2024 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Blaine County. Ned C. Williamson, District Judge.   
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Alturas Law Group, PLLC, Hailey, for Appellant. Samuel L. Linnet argued. 
 
Matthew Fredback, Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney, Hailey, for Respondent. 
Timothy K. Graves argued. 
 
Lawson Laski Clark, PLLC, Ketchum, for Intervenor-Respondent. Heather E. 
O’Leary, argued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZAHN, Justice. 
This case arises from the denial of an approach and encroachment permit application. 
Appellant Jeffrey “Jae” Hill sought the permit to repair and maintain Imperial Gulch Road 
(“IGR”), which allows access to his property. Respondent Blaine County, through the Blaine 
County Board of County Commissioners (“the Board”), denied the permit application after 
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concluding that it did not have the authority to issue the permit because it had previously declined 
to validate IGR.  
Hill filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The district court affirmed 
the Board’s denial in part and vacated its decision in part. The district court concluded that the 
Board did not validate IGR and therefore the Board lacked authority to issue the requested permit. 
However, the district court remanded the matter back to the Board to determine if the Board had 
authority to issue the permit under a public easement theory. Hill appeals and argues that the 
district court erred by determining that the Board had not validated IGR. We affirm the district 
court’s decision.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Jeffrey “Jae” Hill owns the Imperial Lode mining claim, located on IGR. IGR is an 
unimproved dirt road located in Blaine County, which connects Hill’s property with Greenhorn 
Gulch Road. IGR traverses over private property identified as Lots 16 and 17 of the Greenhorn 
Subdivision and a portion of the Deer Creek Ranch. Both the Greenhorn Subdivision plat and the 
Deer Creek Ranch deed granted public access easements for the portion of IGR that traverses their 
private properties.  
 
Prior to applying for the approach and encroachment permit that is the subject of this 
appeal, Hill filed a petition with Blaine County, pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A, to 
validate IGR. After receiving Hill’s petition, the Board initiated formal validation proceedings, in 
which the Board ordered a survey and staff reports on the status of IGR and held hearings at which 
Hill and other affected members of the public testified. The Deer Creek Ranch Company and the 
Greenhorn Homeowners Association (collectively referred to as “Greenhorn”) opposed validating 
IGR and argued that validation and any resulting improvements to IGR would increase usage of 
IGR and increase the burden on property owners of the Deer Creek Ranch and the Greenhorn 
Subdivision.  
 
At the conclusion of the validation proceedings, the Board issued a written decision 
(“Validation Decision”) that began with the statement, “[b]ased upon the evidence and testimony 
presented, the Board finds that although there is evidence establishing that IGR is a public road, 
validation of IGR is not in the public interest.” The Validation Decision then turned to the analysis 
underlying its opening conclusion.  
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On the public road analysis, the Validation Decision addressed Hill’s contention that IGR 
was a public road by virtue of R.S. 2477 and state law. “R.S. 2477 was a standing offer by the 
federal government to grant rights-of-way on public land to the states and . . . can be an 
independent vehicle for creating a public road if there is some positive act or acts on the part of 
the proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to 
the particular highway in question.” Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 814, 264 P.3d 916, 
921 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]n R.S. 2477 right-of-way is either 
created through a positive act of acceptance by the local government or compliance with the road 
creation statutes in existence at the time.” Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 159, 191 P.3d 
233, 237 (2008).  
The Validation Decision discussed the history of IGR, noting that it dated back to 
approximately 1880, when the first Imperial Lode and Viana Lode mining claims were located in 
Blaine County. The Board determined that under Idaho law, any road regularly used by the public 
for any period of time before February 1, 1881, and used by the public for a period of five years 
between February 1, 1881, and 1893 was a public road. The Board found that it was likely that 
IGR existed prior to February 1, 1881, to provide access to the mining claims and found that IGR 
was used to access mining claims for at least a five-year period between 1883 and 1890. Based on 
this evidence, the Board determined that “it is more likely than not that IGR was a public road by 
operation of Idaho law and R.S. 2477.”  
 
The Validation Decision then addressed the public interest analysis. The Board found “that 
Idaho Code [s]ection 40-204A(4) [which states that federal land rights-of-way do not require 
maintenance for the passage of vehicles] provides support for leaving IGR in its primitive, 
unmaintained state” and that the express public easements across the Deer Creek Ranch and the 
Greenhorn Subdivision provide adequate access to IGR for recreational purposes. The Board 
reasoned that validating IGR and allowing subsequent improvements would be at odds with the 
private landowners near IGR and would permanently alter IGR from its current status as a 
recreational usage road. The Board also identified concerns that improving IGR would promote 
the residential or commercial development of remote mining claims across the county, which 
would result in increased public access to remote, hazardous, and sensitive terrain. The Board did 
not want to further burden its “already-stretched” law enforcement and emergency services 
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resources. Finally, the Board expressed concern that expanding development in remote areas was 
contrary to the Blaine County Comprehensive Plan and the Blaine County Code.  
 
The Validation Decision concluded with a section titled “Order,” which essentially 
repeated the statement at its beginning:  
The Board finds and declares that the evidence establishes that IGR is a 
County road, public highway and federal land right-of-way. The Board also finds 
that validation of IGR is not in the public interest. 
Hill did not appeal the Validation Decision. 
Hill interpreted the Validation Decision as validating IGR due to its finding that IGR was 
more likely than not a public road, and several months after the issuance of the Validation 
Decision, Hill submitted an approach and encroachment permit application to Blaine County. Hill 
sought the permit to conduct regular maintenance and minor repairs of IGR where it traversed the 
Greenhorn Subdivision and the Deer Creek Ranch.  
 
The Board, without holding a public hearing, denied the permit application, finding it was 
“constrained by the Validation Decision.” In contrast to Hill, the Board interpreted the Validation 
Decision as not validating IGR as a public road. The Board concluded that its determination that 
it was not in the public interest to validate IGR constituted a decision not to validate the road. As 
a result, it lacked the authority to grant Hill an application to improve the road. In denying the 
permit application, the Board noted its preference to keep IGR an “unmaintained, primitive public 
access.”  
 
Hill appealed the denial of the permit application. Pursuant to Blaine County Code, Hill’s 
appeal was heard by the Board. The Board held a public hearing on the matter, where Hill argued 
that the Validation Decision unambiguously declared IGR to be a public road and therefore the 
Board had no reason to deny his permit application. Hill contended that he did not appeal the 
Validation Decision and instead applied for a permit because he interpreted the decision as 
declaring IGR to be a public road. Greenhorn’s counsel appeared at the hearing to oppose the 
appeal, arguing that the Board’s Validation Decision declared that IGR was not a public road, the 
Board has complete discretion in denying the permit application, and that improving the road 
would burden nearby landowners. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied Hill’s appeal 
and reaffirmed its conclusion that it lacked authority to grant Hill a permit: “Since IGR has not 
been declared to be a public road, Blaine County lacks any authority to impose its road standards 
or grant Hill a permit to maintain or improve IGR.”  
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Hill filed a petition for judicial review in Blaine County District Court pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 67-5270. Greenhorn filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. Before the 
district court, Hill argued that the Validation Decision determined that IGR is a public road, 
independent of its finding that validation was not in the public interest. Hill contended that the 
Board therefore abused its discretion in denying his application because it had authority to issue 
the permit. Hill further argued that, based on the finding in the Validation Decision that IGR was 
more likely than not a public road, the Board would have to vacate or abandon the road before it 
could declare that IGR was not a public road. The County responded that the Validation Decision 
clearly did not validate IGR as a public road, and that it was not required to institute an 
abandonment proceeding if it declined to validate the road.  
 
After reviewing the parties’ briefing and hearing oral argument on the petition, the district 
court issued a memorandum decision affirming the Board’s decision in part, reversing it in part, 
and remanding the matter for further proceedings. The district court concluded that the Board did 
not err in concluding that its decision did not validate IGR and as a result, IGR was not a public 
road. Accordingly, the district court affirmed the Board’s denial of the permit application on the 
basis that the Board lacked authority to issue a permit for IGR because it was a public road. 
However, the district court determined that the Validation Decision only evaluated whether IGR 
was a public road created under R.S. 2477, not whether IGR was a public road by virtue of the 
public easements recognized by the Greenhorn Subdivision and Deer Creek Ranch Company. The 
district court remanded the case back to the Board to determine if the Board had authority to issue 
the permit due to the public easements granted over those portions of IGR. Hill timely appealed 
the district court’s decision.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Hill’s appeal should be dismissed due to a failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.   
2. Whether the district court erred when it affirmed the Board’s decision that Hill’s 
encroachment permit application must be denied because IGR was not a public road.  
3. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The parties do not agree on the proper standard of review in this appeal. In his brief, Hill 
contends that this is a matter of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo. The County and 
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Greenhorn argue that our standard of review is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 
specifically Idaho Code section 67-5279(3).  
“The []APA and its judicial review provisions do not apply to the actions of local governing 
bodies, unless expressly authorized by statute.” Ravenscroft v. Boise County, 154 Idaho 613, 614, 
301 P.3d 271, 272 (2013). Idaho Code section 31-1506 provides for judicial review of board 
decisions:  
Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any final act, order or 
proceeding of the board as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, shall be 
initiated by any person aggrieved thereby within the same time and in the same 
manner as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code [APA], for judicial review 
of actions. 
I.C. § 31-1506(1).  
 
In Ravenscroft, this Court interpreted Idaho Code section 31-1506 so that “a decision by a 
county board of commissioners is subject to judicial review in the same manner as provided in 
Idaho’s Administrative Procedure Act.” 154 Idaho at 615, 301 P.3d at 273 (quoting Allen v. Blaine 
County, 131 Idaho 138, 140, 953 P.2d 578, 580 (1998)). Thus, the Board’s decision denying Hill’s 
permit application is subject to review in the manner provided in the APA. Accordingly, Idaho 
Code section 67-5279(3) provides the correct standard of review. See I.C. § 67-5279(3); see also 
Blaine County Code § 6-1-1-4 (limiting appeals of permits to the record of proceedings before the 
decision-maker).  
 
Under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3), a reviewing court “shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions” are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C. § 67-5279(3). “Even if one of these conditions is met, [the reviewing court] will still affirm 
the agency action ‘unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.’” A & B 
Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 506, 284 P.3d 225, 231 (2012) 
(quoting I.C. § 67-5279(4)). “If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or 
in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” I.C. § 67–5279(3). 
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However, Hill is correct that when we analyze whether he has established a basis for 
reversal under section 67-5279(3), this Court freely reviews questions of law. 3G AG LLC v. Idaho 
Dep’t of Water Res., 170 Idaho 251, 257, 509 P.3d 1180, 1186 (2022). “Interpretation of a statute 
is a question of law.” Chester v. Wild Idaho Adventures RV Park, LLC, 171 Idaho 212, 222, 519 
P.3d 1152, 1162 (2022) (quoting Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468, 
470, 283 P.3d 785, 787 (2012)). 
“When reviewing an appeal from a district court’s decision acting in its appellate capacity 
under the [APA], this Court reviews the decision of the district court to determine whether it 
correctly decided the issues presented to it.” Grace at Fairview Lakes, LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of 
Health & Welfare, 172 Idaho 743, ___, 536 P.3d 382, 386 (2023) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). However, “we review the agency record independently of the district court’s 
decision.” 3G AG LLC, 170 Idaho at 257, 509 P.3d at 1186. This Court will “not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” I.C. § 67-
5279(1). “This Court instead defers to the agency’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.” A & B Irrigation Dist., 153 Idaho at 505–06, 284 P.3d at 230–31 (quoting Urrutia v. 
Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000)). “In other words, the agency’s factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before 
the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the 
record.” Id.  “However, we exercise de novo review over questions of law.” 3G AG LLC, 170 Idaho 
at 257, 509 P.3d at 1186.  
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
Hill asks us to reverse the district court’s decision and conclude that IGR is a public road, 
subject to Blaine County’s road standards, unless and until it is formally abandoned. Hill contends 
that the district court erred in interpreting the Validation Decision as not validating IGR. Hill also 
contends that the district court’s decision allows the County to impermissibly abandon IGR 
without undertaking formal vacation and abandonment proceedings. Lastly, Hill contends that his 
substantial rights have been prejudiced by the denial of his permit application.  
The County responds that Hill has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and this 
appeal should be dismissed. If we disagree and reach the merits of Hill’s appeal, the County 
contends that the Validation Decision did not validate IGR as a public road and therefore the Board 
had no authority to issue an approach and encroachment permit.  
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A. Hill properly exhausted his administrative remedies and his appeal is properly before 
this Court.   
 
The County argues that Hill has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because the 
district court remanded the case for further proceedings, but Hill appealed before the Board could 
hold any further proceedings. The County contends that Hill was required to exhaust the 
proceedings on remand before he could appeal to this Court. Hill contends that his appeal is 
permitted under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(2) and (f).  
Hill’s appeal is properly before this Court. Idaho Appellate Rule 11(f) allows a party to 
appeal from a “final decision . . . of the district court on judicial review of an agency decision.” 
The district court’s decision affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter to the 
Board for further proceedings. The decision fully disposed of the issues raised in Hill’s petition. 
Nothing in the district court’s order indicated it was remanding the matter for a limited purpose or 
that it was reserving ruling on an issue pending the outcome of proceedings on remand. This Court 
allows a party to seek judicial review even when the district court remands the case for further 
proceedings. See Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont Cnty., 157 Idaho 937, 939–
40, 342 P.3d 649, 650–51 (2015). The district court’s decision was final and Idaho Appellate Rule 
11(f) permitted Hill to appeal the decision to this Court. Because Hill’s appeal is permitted 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(f), we do not consider the argument whether his appeal is also 
permitted pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(2). 
The County conflates the doctrine of exhaustion with a party’s right to appeal. The 
exhaustion doctrine requires that “a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting 
to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts.” Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 
721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004). In other words, exhaustion typically applies before litigation 
is commenced in the courts. Here, Hill properly exhausted his remedies because prior to filing his 
petition for judicial review, he appealed the denial of his permit to the Board. Once the Board 
rendered its decision on his appeal, there were no further administrative remedies for Hill to 
exhaust. Hill then properly filed his petition for judicial review in district court. Having properly 
invoked the jurisdiction of the district court and having received a final decision on his petition, 
the Idaho Appellate Rules permit Hill to appeal the district court’s memorandum decision and 
order.  
 
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B. The Board lacked authority to grant Hill’s permit application because the Validation 
Decision did not validate IGR.  
This lawsuit results from the parties’ differing interpretations of the Validation Decision. 
Hill interprets the Validation Decision as a paradoxical decision declaring IGR to be a public road 
while simultaneously finding that validation was not in the public interest. Hill argues that the 
Board’s determination that validating IGR was not in the public interest cannot override its 
determination that IGR was more likely than not a public road.  
The County argues that Idaho law requires two findings to validate a public road: (1) that 
the road in question is a public road and (2) that validation is in the public interest. The County 
and Greenhorn assert that the Validation Decision clearly determined that it was not in the public 
interest to validate IGR and therefore the Validation Decision did not validate IGR. As a result, 
IGR is not a public road. The County asserts that Hill’s arguments here are a collateral attack on 
the Validation Decision and are barred by res judicata because Hill failed to appeal that decision. 
The parties agree that the Validation Decision is final because Hill did not seek judicial 
review of that decision. However, res judicata does not apply in this matter because Hill is not 
attacking the Validation Decision. Instead, he is attacking the Board’s decision denying his permit. 
He argues that the Board erroneously interpreted the Validation Decision as preventing it from 
issuing the permit. Res judicata does not bar Hill’s argument that the Board’s reading of the 
Validation Decision is incorrect. See Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game 
Dep’t, 153 Idaho 630, 634, 289 P.3d 32, 36 (2012); Lepper v. E. Idaho  Health Servs., Inc., 160 
Idaho 104, 111, 369 P.3d 882, 889 (2016); Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 881, 292 P.3d 264, 
272 (2012). 
To prevail on appeal, Hill must establish both that the Board erred in one of the manners 
specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3)(a) through (e), and that the Board’s decision 
prejudiced his substantial rights, as required by section 67-5279(4). While Hill generally contends 
that the Board’s decision denying his permit application violated all five prongs of section 67-
5279(3), a close reading of his opening brief suggests he is really challenging the Board’s decision 
as arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion in violation of section 67-5279(3)(d). “An agency 
action may be vacated when the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are 
arbitrary or capricious.” Skehan v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Crim. Identification, Idaho Cent. 
Sex Offender Registry, 173 Idaho 247, ___, 541 P.3d 679, 687 (2024). “An action is capricious if 
it was done without a rational basis and is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and 
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circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). An agency’s “actions are considered an abuse of discretion when the actions 
are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” Lane Ranch P’ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 
91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007).  
 
Determining whether the Board’s decision was erroneous requires us to ascertain the effect 
of the Validation Decision. Notably, the Validation Decision did not expressly state whether it was 
validating IGR or not. Instead, it only found that IGR was a public road and that it was not in the 
public interest to validate it. The parties disagree on whether the Board’s finding that IGR was a 
public road meant it validated the road, or whether the Board’s finding that it was not in the public 
interest to validate IGR meant it did not validate the road. Determining the effect of the Validation 
Decision requires an examination of Idaho law concerning the process and legal effect of 
validation.  
1. Validation is a determination that the County will assume jurisdiction over a highway or 
right-of-way. 
Idaho law does not define the term “validation,” but this Court has repeatedly referred to it 
as the confirmation of the legal status of a road as a public right-of-way or public highway. See 
I.C. § 40-203A (titled “Validation of County or Highway District System Highway or Public 
Right-of-Way”); Floyd v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bonneville Cnty., 137 Idaho 718, 723, 52 P.3d 863, 
868 (2002) (“Idaho Code [section] 40-203A confers upon the [the board of county commissioners] 
the authority to confirm the status of public highways through validation proceedings . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 
(2000) (“Section 40-203A may only be used to validate an existing highway or public right-of-
way about which there is some kind of doubt.” (emphasis added)).  
Hill interprets validation as declaring that the public has the right to use a particular road. 
For this reason, he argues that the Board’s finding that IGR was a public road validated the road 
and gave the Board authority to issue his permit. According to Hill, once the Board determined 
that IGR was a public road, any determination concerning the public interest was effectively 
meaningless. Hill argues that the public interest finding could only overcome the finding that IGR 
was a public road if the Board instituted proceedings to abandon IGR under Idaho Code section 
40-203.  
We conclude that Hill misunderstands what it means to validate a highway or public right-
of-way under Idaho law. Contrary to Hill’s interpretation, a close review of Idaho’s statutes reveals 
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that validation is a determination that a county or highway district will include a road within the 
county’s or highway district’s highway district system.  
Idaho Code section 40-203A, entitled “Validation of County or Highway District System 
Highway or Public Right-of-Way,” permits certain people to petition a board of county 
commissioners or highway district commissioners, whichever has jurisdiction of the county 
highway system, to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or public right-of-way. I.C. 
§ 40-203A(1). While Hill, the Board, and the Validation Decision discuss whether IGR was 
validated as a public “road,” section 40-203A and the definitions in that chapter provide a process 
for validating “highways” (which are defined to include roads) and “public rights-of-way.” The 
Idaho Code, in turn, defines each of those terms.  
Idaho law defines a highway to include “roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or 
established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public.” I.C. § 40-109(5). A public 
highway is defined as “all highways open to public use within the state, whether maintained by 
the state or any county, highway district, city, or other political subdivision.” I.C. § 40-117(7) 
(emphasis added). In contrast, a public right-of-way is defined as “a right-of-way open to the public 
and under the jurisdiction of a public highway agency, where the public highway agency has no 
obligation to construct or maintain” the public right-of-way. I.C. § 40-117(9) (emphasis added).    
But Idaho law recognizes that not all rights-of-way are under the control of the state or its 
political subdivisions. The Idaho Code also recognizes “federal land rights-of-way,” which are 
defined as “rights-of-way on federal land within the context of revised statute 2477 . . . and other 
federal access grants and shall be considered to be any road, trail, access or way upon which 
construction has been carried out to the standard in which public-rights-of-way were built within 
historic context.” I.C. § 40-107(5).  
As previously discussed, “R.S. 2477 was a standing offer by the federal government to 
grant rights-of-way on public land to the states and . . . can be an independent vehicle for creating 
a public road if there is some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities clearly 
manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to the particular highway in question.” 
Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 814, 264 P.3d 916, 921 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). “[A]n R.S. 2477 right-of-way is either created through a positive act of 
acceptance by the local government or compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at 
the time.” Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 159, 191 P.3d 233, 237 (2008). This Court 
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recognized that federal land rights-of-way could have been established some years ago, before the 
public lands exited the public domain. Id. If established before leaving the public domain, the 
federal right-of-way continued to remain effective even though the land later exited the public 
domain and became private property. Id. In this case, the Board found that IGR was an R.S. 2477 
right-of-way and that, pursuant to state law, IGR became a public road in the late 1800s due to 
public use. At some later point, the portion of IGR at issue in this appeal left the public domain 
and became private property owned by the Greenhorn Homeowner’s Association and Deer Creek 
Ranch Company. 
Our caselaw and the foregoing statutory definitions establish that validation is more than a 
determination that the public has a right to use the highway or right-of-way at issue, but instead 
involves a determination that the county or highway district is agreeing to assume some level of 
jurisdiction over the highway or right-of-way. Idaho law defines a public right-of-way or public 
highway as one within the jurisdiction of the state or one of its political subdivisions. I.C. § 40-
117(7), (9). Idaho law also provides that when a board of county commissioners validates a 
highway or public right-of-way, it shall record the order validating the highway or public right-of-
way and any related survey in the county records and shall amend the official highway system 
map. I.C. § 40-203A(5). The process of surveying and amending the official highway system map 
after validation supports the conclusion that validation results in a county or other subdivision 
declaring that the highway or right-of-way falls under its jurisdiction. All of this indicates that the 
effect of validating IGR under section 40-203A was not just a declaration that the public has a 
right to use it, but rather a determination that the County agreed to assume jurisdiction over it. 
Therefore, we reject Hill’s argument that the effect of validating a road for purposes of Idaho law 
is simply a determination that the public has the right to use the road. 
2. The plain language of section 40-203A required the Board to find both that IGR was a 
public road and that it was in the public interest for the Board to validate it.  
Having determined that the validation of IGR would result in a determination that the 
County agreed to assume jurisdiction over it and include it in the county highway system, we turn 
to the language of section 40-203A to determine whether it required the Board to determine that 
validation was in the public interest before it could validate IGR. “Statutory interpretation begins 
with the literal language of the statute. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we need not 
engage in statutory construction and are free to apply the statute’s plain meaning.” Nordgaarden 
v. Kiebert, 171 Idaho 883, 890, 527 P.3d 486, 493 (2023) (alteration omitted) (quoting Callies v. 
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O’Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009)). “However, if the statutory language is 
ambiguous, this Court must ‘look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the 
reasonableness of proposed interpretations.’” Id. (quoting City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, 
Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 582, 416 P.3d 951, 954 (2018)). “Statutory language is ambiguous where 
reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting 
H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho at 582, 416 P.3d at 954). 
Section 40-203A provides the process for validating a highway or right-of-way as public:  
If proceedings for validation of a highway or public right-of-way are initiated, the 
commissioners shall follow the procedure set forth in section 40-203, Idaho Code, 
and shall: 
(a) If the commissioners determine it is necessary, cause the highway or 
public right-of-way to be surveyed; 
(b) Cause a report to be prepared, including consideration of any survey and 
any other information required by the commissioners; 
(c) Establish a hearing date on the proceedings for validation; 
(d) Cause notice of the proceedings to be provided in the same manner as 
for abandonment and vacation proceedings; and 
(e) At the hearing, the commissioners shall consider all information relating 
to the proceedings and shall accept testimony from persons having an 
interest in the proposed validation. 
I.C. § 40-203A(2). The statute also requires a consideration of whether validation is in the public 
interest and the issuance of an order:  
Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine whether 
validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest and shall 
enter an order validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or declaring 
it not to be public. 
I.C. § 40-203A(3).  
 
We agree with the County that the plain language of section 40-203A(3) required the Board 
to find both that IGR was a public road and that validating IGR was in the public interest before it 
could validate IGR. The plain language of section 40-203A(3) directed the Board to make a finding 
concerning whether validation was in the public interest before it entered its order either granting 
or denying validation. Prior decisions of this Court have recognized that the public interest element 
is a separate element of a validation decision.  
 
In Sopatyk, this Court considered an appeal from a district court’s order dismissing a 
petition for judicial review and affirming a county board of commissioner’s decision validating a 
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road. 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916. On appeal to this Court, we considered challenges to two of 
the board’s findings: (1) that the road had become public; and (2) that it was in public interest to 
validate the road. Id. at 813–17, 264 P.3d 916, 920–24. The Court fully considered both questions 
even after affirming the board’s finding that the road had become public. At no point did we 
suggest that the finding that the road was public was dispositive of the validation petition. 
 
In Palmer v. East Side Highway District, we considered an appeal from a district court’s 
order dismissing a petition for judicial review and affirming a highway district’s refusal to validate 
a road. 167 Idaho 813, 477 P.3d 248 (2020). We concluded both that (1) the highway district 
properly initiated validation proceedings because there was a dispute about whether the road at 
issue had ever been constructed or had subsequently been abandoned; and (2) the highway 
district’s finding that it was not in the public interest to validate the road was an appropriate 
exercise of discretion and supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 819–21, 477 
P.3d at 254–56. Again, we did not suggest that the determination that the road had not been built 
or had been abandoned was dispositive of the validation petition. 
 
Our determination that the Board could not validate IGR without first finding that 
validation was in the public interest is further supported by the effect of validating IGR, which 
would bring it under the County’s jurisdiction. Just because a public right of use for IGR was 
created pursuant to R.S. 2477 and state law, that does not mean that the County was required to 
accept jurisdiction over IGR. It is entirely consistent with the effect of validation to require that 
the Board make a finding that it is in the public interest to assume jurisdiction over a highway or 
public right-of-way. If this was not required, counties and highway districts would be responsible 
for all roads created since the enactment of R.S. 2477 regardless of the road’s condition or the 
amount of public use it received. Imposing an obligation like this could have significant financial 
and administrative consequences for counties and highway districts. 
Under Hill’s theory, any time the public had the right to use a highway or a public right-
of-way, that roadway would automatically fall under the jurisdiction of the applicable county or 
highway district—there would be no need for validation proceedings under section 40-203A to 
take place at all. Hill’s interpretation would render the public interest finding required by section 
40-203A(3) meaningless. However, “[t]his Court must construe a statute to give effect to all the 
words and provisions . . . so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.” Chester v. Wild 
Idaho Adventures RV Park, LLC, 171 Idaho 212, 223, 519 P.3d 1152, 1163 (2022) (internal 
15 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 
265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011)). 
 
We acknowledge Hill’s frustration with the “Order” section of the Validation Decision, 
which states that “[t]he Board finds and declares that the evidence establishes that IGR is a County 
road, public highway and federal land right-of-way.” Regrettably, and when read in isolation, the 
sentence suggests that IGR had been validated as a public highway and was now under the 
jurisdiction of the County. However, when the sentence is read in the context of the rest of the 
Validation Decision, the Board concluded that IGR was an R.S. 2477 road and a federal right-of-
way, but it does not indicate that the County had previously accepted jurisdiction over IGR as a 
public right-of-way or public highway. Given the language of section 40-203A requiring that the 
Board first make a finding that validation was in the public interest before validating IGR, the 
Board’s use of the terms “county road” and “public highway” was erroneous. The fact that the 
public had developed a right to use IGR did not automatically impose responsibility for IGR on 
the County.  
 
No one disputes that the historical origins of IGR were as an R.S. 2477 road, and the 
Validation Decision concluded as much. While Hill bases his argument on the Board’s finding in 
the Validation Decision that “it is more likely than not that IGR was a public road by operation of 
Idaho law and R.S. 2477,” that finding simply satisfied the first part of the section 40-203A inquiry. 
The Board concluded that it was more likely than not that IGR was a “public road” because the 
historical evidence suggested that, between 1880 and 1887, the public had used the road, which 
was sufficient under Idaho territorial law to make IGR a “public road.” This, however, did not 
mean that the County had previously assumed jurisdiction over IGR. Hill’s argument on appeal 
appears to conflate these two concepts—whether IGR was a public road for purposes of section 
40-203A, with the effect of validation under that statute.  
 
Lastly, Hill repeatedly accuses the Board of attempting to abandon IGR through validation 
proceedings. Idaho Code section 40-203 provides that in the case of a non-R.S. 2477 road, the 
Board can only abandon a public highway or public right-of-way if it is in the public interest to do 
so:  
(1) A board of county or highway district commissioners, whichever shall have 
jurisdiction of the highway system, shall use the following procedure to abandon 
and vacate any highway or public right-of-way in the county or highway district 
16 
system including those which furnish public access to state and federal public lands 
and waters: 
. . . .  
(6) All other highways or public rights-of-way may be abandoned and vacated only 
upon a formal determination by the commissioners pursuant to this section that 
retaining the highway or public right-of-way for use by the public is not in the 
public interest, and such other highways or public rights-of-way may be validated 
or judicially determined at any time notwithstanding any other provision of law.  
I.C. § 40-203(1), (6) (emphasis added).  However, section 40-203 is not applicable to IGR because 
it is an R.S. 2477 road. I.C. §§ 40-203(1), 40-204A(2). Pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-204A(2), 
a roadway created through R.S. 2477 and never accepted into a county or highway district system, 
such as IGR, can only be abandoned through eminent domain proceedings. 
 
Moreover, Hill’s argument is misplaced given the effect of validation proceedings. Section 
40-203A permitted the Board to consider whether it was in the public interest to validate IGR 
before the Board decided whether the County should take jurisdiction over it. The Board concluded 
in its Validation Decision that it was not in the public interest to do so, and Hill did not challenge 
that finding or otherwise assert that the County had previously accepted IGR into the county 
highway system. The time to appeal the Validation Decision has passed. See I.C. § 40-208. 
 
While our decision today affirms the district court’s decision concerning the Board’s 
interpretation of the Validation Decision, our holding is premised on the facts of this specific case. 
Idaho Code section 40-203A does not allow the Board to utilize validation proceedings to abandon 
a roadway that is not an R.S. 2477 road but is a public highway or a public right-of-way. To do so 
would impermissibly allow the Board to abandon a public highway or right-of-way without 
undertaking the correct vacation and abandonment proceedings required under Idaho Code section 
40-203.  
 
In sum, we hold that the district court did not err when it affirmed the Board’s decision that 
it lacked authority to grant Hill’s permit because it had not validated IGR. Hill has therefore failed 
to establish that the Board’s decision denying his permit was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion. Because we find no violation of Idaho Code section 67-5279(3), we do not address 
Hill’s argument that his substantial rights were prejudiced. Further our decision today does not 
disturb the district court’s order vacating the Board’s decision in part and remanding the matter to 
the Board for further proceedings. 
 
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C. No party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
 
Hill, the County, and Greenhorn each seek attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 
12-117. Idaho Code section 12-117 allows for the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party 
“in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision” if this 
Court “finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” I.C. § 
12-117 (emphasis added). Greenhorn, who intervened on the side of the County, is not “adverse” 
to the County and therefore cannot be awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
117. See Neighbors For Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 177, 207 P.3d 
149, 153 (2009); Sylte v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 165 Idaho 238, 247, 443 P.3d 252, 261 (2019). 
Hill is not the prevailing party on appeal and therefore is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
Lastly, we decline to award attorney fees to the County because the interpretation of Idaho Code 
section 40-203A in this context is an issue of first impression for this Court. Accordingly, no party 
is awarded attorney fees on appeal.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed.  As the prevailing 
party on appeal, Blaine County and Greenhorn are awarded their costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40.  
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and MEYER CONCUR.