Case Title: City of Oak Ridge v. Campbell

Citation: 511 S.W.2d 686

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1974-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
511 S.W.2d 686 (1974) CITY OF OAK RIDGE et al., Appellants, v. Isaac F. CAMPBELL, Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 1, 1974. *687 William N. Groover, Knoxville, for appellants. J.H. Hodges, Knoxville, for appellee; Hodges, Doughty & Carson, Knoxville, of counsel. CHATTIN, Justice. For convenience, the parties will be referred to as they were in the court below: that is, Isaac F. Campbell, as the plaintiff; and the City of Oak Ridge and the Kansas City Fire and Marine Insurance Company, as the defendants. This suit was filed seeking recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The plaintiff alleged he sustained a one hundred per cent permanent disability as the result of a myocardial infarction suffered while performing his duties as a policeman for the City of Oak Ridge. The trial judge found the proof sustained the plaintiff's allegations, and a judgment was entered accordingly. Defendants insist plaintiff's disability is not compensable because the injury producing the disability was not an ". . injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment..." T.C.A. Section 50-902(d). Plaintiff insists that this is a proper case for the application of the "accident result" rule announced in R.E. Butts Company v. Powell, 225 Tenn. 119, 463 S.W.2d 707 *688 (1971), and that there is material evidence to support the trial judge's finding. In addition, plaintiff insists that even if the evidence fails to support a causal connection between the myocardial infarction and his employment, he is entitled to a presumption that the disability occurred "... due to accidental injury suffered in the course of employment." T.C.A. Section 6-639. Consequently, plaintiff argues that, without competent medical evidence to the contrary, the presumption alone is sufficient to establish the requirements of T.C.A. Section 50-902(d) that "`Injury'... . mean[s] any injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment ..." We will consider the second argument of plaintiff first. T.C.A. Section 6-639 provides in pertinent part as follows: We are of the opinion that once the prerequisites of T.C.A. Section 6-639 are met the presumption standing alone is sufficient to establish the disability was the result of an "... injury by accident... ." See Brewer v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, Tenn., 490 S.W.2d 506 (1973). Having thus decided, we must determine if the prerequisites of T.C.A. Section 6-639 were met and determine if there is material evidence to support the conclusion that the presumption was not rebutted by competent medical evidence. T.C.A. Section 6-639 provides three prerequisites which must be met before the presumption arises; it must be established that: (1) the disabled employee was employed by a regular law enforcement department manned by full-time employees; (2) the employee suffered a disability resulting from hypertension or heart disease; and (3) prior to such claimed disability, the individual had a physical examination which did not reveal heart disease or hypertension. The record shows that the prerequisites were met in this case; therefore, plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the presumption. In order to determine if the presumption was rebutted by competent medical evidence, it is necessary to review briefly not only the medical testimony but also other salient facts. *689 The evidence shows that on the afternoon of April 1, 1972, plaintiff suffered chest pain but the pain subsided and he reported for work at the 11:00 P.M. shift. Plaintiff's duties on this particular night consisted of patrolling certain sections of the City making sure the doors of various business establishments were securely locked. This duty required him to alight from his car on numerous occasions during the course of the night. Between one and two o'clock A.M., while checking the locks at a business establishment, plaintiff again suffered a pain in his chest. Plaintiff managed to return to his automobile, but thereafter fainted. Upon regaining consciousness, he drove to the police headquarters and reported his condition. The following morning he entered the Oak Ridge hospital. After his arrival at the hospital, plaintiff was treated by Dr. C.W. Sensenbach. Dr. Sensenbach was of the opinion plaintiff was suffering from arteriosclerotic heart disease and on the dates in question he had an occlusion of one of the coronary arteries that led to an infarction of the myocardium. Dr. Sensenbach's opinion was that the attack began on the afternoon of April 1, 1972, then subsided and occurred again around two o'clock A.M., on April 2, at which time plaintiff fainted. Both the Attorney for plaintiff and the Attorney for defendants attempted to get Dr. Sensenbach to make a direct statement regarding whether there was a causal connection between the infarction suffered by plaintiff and the strain of his work. Dr. Sensenbach testified as follows: Based upon the statements of Dr. Sensenbach, his testimony being the only medical evidence introduced, we cannot say the presumption of T.C.A. Section 6-636 was rebutted. Since the presumption was not overcome by the medical testimony, we must overrule defendants' assignment of error that the evidence did not establish a causal connection between plaintiff's disability and his *690 employment; the presumption having supplied the causal connection. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to decide if the causal connection was otherwise established by material evidence. The judgment of the trial judge is affirmed. Defendants are taxed with the cost. DYER, C.J., McCANLESS and FONES, JJ., and LEECH, Special Justice, concur.