Case Title: Douglas Warney v. State of New York

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 35  
Douglas Warney,
            Appellant,
        v.
State of New York,
            Respondent.
Peter J. Neufeld, for appellant.
Alison J. Nathan, for respondent.
American Psychological Association; Innocence Network,
amici curiae.
CIPARICK, J.:
Claimant Douglas Warney spent over nine years
incarcerated for a murder he did not commit.  The primary
evidence against him was a confession that contained non-public
details about the crime.  Warney now seeks damages under Court of
Claims Act § 8-b, the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act.  We
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conclude that Warney's confession as well as other statements and
actions the State attributes to him do not, on the facts as
alleged here, warrant dismissal of his claim on the ground that
he caused or brought about his conviction. 
The facts as stated in the claim and record below are
as follows.  On January 3, 1996, Rochester Police Department
(RPD) officers found William Beason dead in his home, stabbed 19
times in the neck and chest.  The following day, Warney called
the RPD to provide information about the murder, and was
interviewed in his home by an officer.  According to the
officer's trial testimony, Warney told her that he had been
shoveling snow outside "William's" house when he saw his cousin
go inside, and that the cousin later admitted to Warney that he
had killed Beason.  
Warney alleges that he has an IQ of 68, was in special
education until he dropped out of school in eighth grade, and was
suffering at the time of the Beason investigation from
AIDS-related dementia.  Additionally, the RPD was aware of his
mental condition when they began questioning him about the Beason
murder, as officers had transported Warney to a psychiatric
facility two weeks earlier for pulling fire alarms and reporting
false incidents to the police.
On January 6, 1996, two RPD officers brought Warney to
the police station for questioning.  The claim alleges that they
used "escalating coercive tactics to force . . . Warney to make
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statements or admissions concerning the murder," and one of them
verbally abused and threatened him.  It further alleges that the
officers denied Warney's request for an attorney.
Warney gave a series of increasingly inculpatory
statements, initially blaming his cousin, but eventually
confessing to murdering Beason on his own.  He signed a detailed
written confession stating that, acting alone, he had stabbed
Beason repeatedly.  The confession contained numerous details
that allegedly corroborate crime scene evidence that the RPD had
intentionally held back from the public.1  The claim alleges that
the officers fed these details to Warney, creating "a false sense
of the confession's reliability," and coerced him into adopting
the detailed confession as his own. 
At central booking, an officer not involved in the
investigation asked Warney how he was doing.  According to the
officer's testimony, he responded, "not good.  I've got a body,"
slang for having killed someone.  In contrast, Warney testified
1  These corroborating details include: (1) that Beason was
cooking chicken and mashed potatoes at the time of his murder;
(2) that Beason was wearing a red-striped nightshirt; (3) that
Beason was stabbed "about 15 or more" times with a 12-inch
serrated knife; (4) that Beason's throat was slit; (5) that
Beason's body was left on his bed, face up and eyes open; (6)
that the perpetrator was wounded; (7) that the perpetrator
cleaned his wound with "a paper towel," which he discarded in the
toilet; (8) that the perpetrator put intensive care lotion on his
wound; and (9) that the back door and basement door were locked. 
Additionally, evidence was introduced at trial that Warney orally
"confessed" that, prior to the murder, he and Beason had been
watching a pornographic tape featuring two men.  
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that he said, "I'm being charged with a body."  
On February 13, 1996, a grand jury indicted Warney on
two counts of second degree murder.  Before trial, Supreme Court
denied Warney's motion to suppress his statements to police,
finding that he "initiated most contacts with the police and then
freely volunteered information to them," that he never requested
an attorney, and that "no threats or promises were ever made to
[him] and no fraud or tricks were used to solicit statements." 
At trial, Warney's signed confession was the primary evidence
against him, although he testified that it was coerced and
manufactured by the police.  The prosecutor emphasized that the
confession contained details that, in his words during closing,
"only the killer would have known about." 
Warney was convicted of both second degree murder
counts on February 12, 1997.  Supreme Court sentenced him on
February 27, 1997 to imprisonment for 25 years to life on each
count, to run concurrently.  The Appellate Division affirmed
(People v Warney, 299 AD2d 956 [4th Dept 2002]) and leave to this
Court was denied (93 NY2d 633 [2003]).
Warney consistently maintained his innocence and sought
to conduct DNA testing on biological crime scene evidence. 
Although his application to access this evidence was denied, the
People submitted the material for testing, which resulted in a
DNA profile that did not match Warney.  In March 2006, nine years
after Warney's conviction, the Combined DNA Indexing System
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(CODIS) database yielded a match, a man named Eldred Johnson. 
The RPD discovered that fingerprints from the crime scene matched
Johnson's and, on May 11, 2006, Johnson confessed that, acting
alone, he had murdered Beason.2  As a result, on May 16, 2006,
Supreme Court vacated Warney's conviction and set aside his
sentence pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (g) on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence. 
Warney now seeks damages under Court of Claims Act §
8-b for the years he spent wrongly incarcerated.  His claim
alleges that he "did not cause or contribute to his own wrongful
arrest, conviction, or incarceration," but rather his conviction
"was the direct result of the intentional and malicious actions
of members of the [RPD] who fabricated and coerced a false
confession from . . . a man whom they knew had a history of
serious mental health problems."  The State moved to dismiss the
claim for failing to state facts in sufficient detail to
demonstrate that Warney is likely to succeed at trial in proving
that he did not bring about his own conviction.  
Court of Claims granted the State's motion and
dismissed the claim.  It was "not convinced" that only the
perpetrator and police could have known many of the details
contained in the confession, and noted that Warney "does not
indicate how he was coerced by police to give a false
2  Johnson pleaded guilty to second degree murder in March
2007.  
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confession."  Moreover, the court held that Warney, "by his own
actions, which included calling the police to tell them he had
information about the murder, trying to frame an innocent man for
the crime, and . . . volunteering that he had 'a body' . . . did
cause or bring about his own conviction."  Warney appealed. 
The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that a
criminal defendant who gave an uncoerced false confession that
was presented to the jury at trial could not subsequently bring
an action under section 8-b, and that Warney failed to adequately
allege that his confession was coerced (see Warney v State of New
York, 70 AD3d 1475, 1476 [4th Dept 2010]).  The Appellate
Division also found that Warney brought about his own conviction
by making other incriminating statements, and by approaching the
police falsely claiming to have information about the murder (see
id.).  We granted Warney leave to appeal and now reverse.
Court of Claims Act (CCA) § 8-b, the Unjust Conviction
and Imprisonment Act, provides a mechanism for "innocent persons
who can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they
were unjustly convicted and imprisoned . . . to recover damages
against the state" (CCA § 8-b [1]; see also Ivey v State of New
York, 80 NY2d 474, 479 [1992]).  It offers claimants who meet its
strict pleading and evidentiary burdens "an available avenue of
redress over and above the existing tort remedies" (CCA § 8-b
[1]).  
To present a claim under the statute, a claimant must
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"establish by documentary evidence" that (a) the claimant was
convicted of a crime, sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and
served at least part of the sentence; (b) the claimant was
pardoned on the ground of innocence or, alternatively, the
conviction was reversed or vacated and the accusatory instrument
was dismissed; and (c) the claim is not time-barred (CCA § 8-b
[3]).  Here, the State does not dispute that Warney met this
initial burden.   
The statute further requires that the claim "state
facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that
claimant is likely to succeed" in meeting his or her burden at
trial of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, as
relevant here, (a) "he did not commit any of the acts charged in
the accusatory instrument" and (b) that "he did not by his own
conduct cause or bring about his conviction" (CCA § 8-b [4]). 
"If the court finds after reading the claim that claimant is not
likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim" (CCA § 8-
b [4]). 
The parties here debate whether, in addition to being
sufficiently detailed, the allegations in the pleading must have
evidentiary support.  We now clarify that no such support is
necessary, except where expressly indicated by the statute. 
Although a claimant must submit documentary evidence supporting
certain facts pursuant to CCA § 8-b (3), the pleading standard
articulated in CCA § 8-b (4) lacks any analogous requirement. 
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Because the State, in waiving its sovereign immunity from suit,
has consented to have its liability "determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme
court," except where superseded by the Court of Claims Act or
Uniform Rules of the Court of Claims (CCA § 8; see also 22 NYCRR
206.1 [c] [matters not covered by the CCA or Uniform Rules of the
Court of Claims are governed by the CPLR]), we presume that the
familiar standard governing motions to dismiss in Supreme Court
is appropriate here (see CPLR 3211).   Therefore, Court of
Claims, like other trial courts, should "accept the facts as
alleged in the [claim] as true" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87
[1994]).  
Of course, section 8-b still imposes a higher pleading
standard than the CPLR.  Court of Claims must consider whether
the allegations are sufficiently detailed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success at trial (see CCA § 8-b [4]).  "[T]he
allegations in the claim must be of such character that, if
believed, they would clearly and convincingly establish the
elements of the claim, so as to set forth a cause of action"
(Solomon v State of New York, 146 AD2d 439, 442 [1st Dept 1989]). 
In evaluating the likelihood of success at trial, Court of Claims
should avoid making credibility and factual determinations (see
Klemm v State of New York, 170 AD2d 438, 439 [2d Dept 1991] ["In
the absence of serious flaws in a . . . statement of facts, the
weighing of the evidence is more appropriately a function to be
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exercised at the actual trial"], quoting Dozier v State of New
York, 134 AD2d 759, 761 [3d Dept 1987]; Solomon, 146 AD2d at 445
[Court of Claims erred in "assess(ing) the credibility of the
evidence (and) weighing . . . the evidence (which) is more
appropriately a function to be exercised at the actual trial"]). 
In short, a claimant who meets the evidentiary burdens described
in CCA § 8-b (3) and makes detailed allegations with respect to
the elements described in section 8-b (4) is entitled to an
opportunity to prove the allegations at trial (CCA § 8-b [5]). 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the claim at issue
here.   
Court of Claims' dismissal was based in large part on
factual determinations that were inappropriate at this stage of
the litigation.  First, although Warney alleges in detail that
his confession was coerced, the court concluded that "the
evidence presented" did not "indicate" that it was.  The court
was "not convinced" that, as Warney alleges, "only the police and
the true perpetrator could have known many of the factual
details" in the confession.  These findings were premature; the
proper inquiry was whether Warney's allegations, if true,
demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial, not whether they
were supported by convincing evidence.  As the State concedes, a
coerced false confession does not bar recovery under section 8-b
because it is not the claimant's "own conduct" within the meaning
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of the statute.3  Assuming the truth of Warney's allegations, as
we must, the police used "coercive tactics" and threats to induce
his confession.  The allegations describe how no member of the
public other than the perpetrator could have known all the
details contained in the confession -- whether negligently or
through intentional manipulation, police misconduct led to the
inclusion of these details in Warney's statement.  Thus, Warney
has adequately pleaded that he was coerced into adopting the
false confession.4  
Second, Court of Claims determined that Warney's
statement to an RPD officer, "I've got a body," which was
introduced against him at trial, was conduct contributing to his
conviction.  Warney has never admitted to making that statement,
however, and his claim alleges that, as he maintained at trial,
he actually said "I'm being charged with a body."  Accepting
3 Warney argues that the word "conduct" in the statute
should be read as "misconduct," as this reading is in line with
clear Legislative intent (see 1984 Report of NY Law Rev Commn,
1984 McKinney's Session Laws of NY at 2932 [claimant should "have
to establish that he did not cause or bring about his prosecution
by reason of his own misconduct"]).  Because he alleges that no
conduct of his brought about his conviction, however, we find it
unnecessary to consider whether such conduct must rise to the
level of misconduct.
4 The State contends that since Supreme Court ruled at a
suppression hearing prior to the criminal trial that the
confession was voluntarily given, it cannot be found in this
action to have been coerced.  We reject that contention and
conclude that although the statement was admissible at the
criminal trial, the judge there lacked many of the facts now
stated in Warney's claim.  Most importantly, the question of
coercion must now be viewed in light of Warney's innocence.
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Warney's allegations as true, we presume that he never made this
inculpatory statement.  Determining what Warney said is purely a
credibility determination, pitting his account against the
officer's.  The officer's testimony is no more or less
convincing, at this pleading stage, than Warney's account of the
conversation.  
The State further argues that Warney's initial
interactions with the RPD ought to bar him from recovery.  We
disagree.  A claimant's statutory obligation to prove that "he
did not . . . cause or bring about his own conviction" (CCA § 8-b
[4]) could conceivably be read as barring recovery when any
action by the claimant caused or brought about the underlying
conviction, no matter how indirectly.  This reading, however,
would bar recovery by every innocent claimant who inadvertently
and unforeseeably played some small role in the chain of events
leading to his or her conviction.  Instead, as we have previously
suggested, a claimant's conduct bars recovery under the statute
only if it was the "proximate cause of conviction" (Ivey, 80 NY2d
at 482). Warney's early conversations with the RPD, as the events
are described in his claim, did not cause or bring about his
conviction within the meaning of the statute.  While Warney
acknowledges that he initiated contact with the RPD, triggering
the questioning that ultimately led to his false confession and
conviction, he alleges that he was "severely mentally impaired,"
and that the RPD knew of his mental illness.  Moreover, it was
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the RPD's alleged mishandling of the ensuing investigation that
ultimately resulted in Warney's conviction. 
In sum, the courts below inappropriately made
credibility and factual findings, dismissing Warney's claim
without giving him the opportunity to prove his detailed
allegations that he did not cause or bring about his conviction.
Because these allegations, taken as true, demonstrate a
likelihood of success at trial, Warney is entitled to proceed
with his claim, secure discovery, and obtain a disposition on the
merits. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the defendant's motion to dismiss
the claim denied.   
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Douglas Warney v State of New York
No. 35
SMITH, J. (concurring):
I agree with the result the majority reaches, and have
no major quarrel with the general principles it states.  I write
separately to emphasize that the application of those principles
in this case is easy, because this claimant appears, on the
present record, to have an exceptionally strong case.  Our
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decision today should not be read as implying that any claimant
can, by skillful pleading, get a significantly weaker case past a
motion to dismiss.
I
It may not be obvious from the majority opinion how 
compelling a case Warney's statement of claim presents.  His
confession, now known to be false, included a number of facts --
many of them recited in the majority's footnote 1 -- known only
to the police and to the real murderer.  It seems highly likely
that the inclusion of these facts is the reason Warney was
convicted.  How, the prosecutor at Warney's trial asked
rhetorically, could Warney have known these facts if he were
innocent?  
"How would he have known about a tissue
wrapped in the form of a bandage if he hadn't
had been in Mr. Beason's bathroom?  Only the
killer would have known about that and about
the knife and about the towel with the blood
on it and about the video tapes."
***
"[H]e knew how Mr. Beason was dressed, and he
described a nightshirt . . .  The defendant
says he's cooking dinner, and he's particular
about it, cooking chicken . . .  Now, who
could possibly know these things if you
hadn't been inside the house, inside the
kitchen?"
***
"The defendant described the knife as being
twelve inches, with ridges.  I think
[forensic testimony] said it was thirteen
inches with the serrated blade."
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Now that his innocence has been established, Warney
echoes the prosecutor's question: How indeed could he have known
all these facts?  It is hard to imagine an answer other than that
he learned them from the police.  In short, the details set forth
in Warney's 41-page statement of his claim, with 58 pages of
annexed exhibits, point strongly to the conclusion that the
police took advantage of Warney's mental frailties to manipulate
him into giving a confession that contained seemingly powerful
evidence corroborating its truthfulness -- when in fact, the
police knew, the corroboration was worthless.
The majority correctly holds that this sort of police
conduct, if proved at trial, would be sufficient to show that
Warney "did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his
conviction" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4] [b]).  In general, a
claimant who gives an uncoerced confession to a crime he did not
commit should be found to have caused his own conviction (see
Report of the Law Revision Commission to the Governor on Redress
for Innocent Persons Unjustly Convicted and Subsequently
Imprisoned [hereafter Commission Report], 1984 Session Laws 2900,
2932 [listing "falsely giving an uncoerced confession of guilt"
as among the acts of misconduct that justify rejecting a claim]). 
But a confession cannot fairly be called "uncoerced" that results
from the sort of calculated manipulation that appears to be
present here -- even if the police did not actually beat or
torture the confesser, or threaten to do so.  Thus, while
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Warney's claim does include the general allegation that the
police threatened him "both physically and otherwise," I view
this allegation as unnecessary -- and, if it stood alone,
obviously insufficient -- to prevent dismissal of Warney's claim. 
The majority opinion, as I interpret it, does not disagree.
Of course it would be wrong to assume that the State
cannot refute Warney's assertions.  Claims that appear strong at
the pleading stage do not always win.  But I have no hesitation
in concluding that Warney's claim states facts "in sufficient
detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to
succeed at trial" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]).  The contrary
decisions of the courts below seem to me not just "premature," as
the majority says (majority op at 9), but simply wrong.
II
I have emphasized the strength of Warney's claim
because I am concerned that some of the majority's
generalizations, made in the context of this very strong claim,
will be misunderstood as requiring courts to uphold much weaker
ones.  I agree that, as a general matter, a claimant need not
actually present his evidence as part of his claim; detailed
allegations are enough.  And I also agree that CPLR 3211 applies
in actions under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, except to the extent
that section 8-b imposes a more stringent pleading standard;
thus, where there is a bona fide factual dispute, the claimant's
allegations should  be taken as true.  That does not mean,
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however, that allegations implausible or unconvincing on their
face are sufficient to prevent dismissal of a claim for unjust
conviction and imprisonment.  So to hold would be to read out of
the statute provisions that the Legislature wrote in, in an
attempt to balance two important, and competing, goals: to
compensate people who have been unjustly convicted, but also to
protect the State against the administrative burden, and the cost
of nuisance settlements, that could result from having to
litigate a large number of false claims.
In pursuit of the latter goal, the Legislature
strengthened the tests normally applied to gauge the sufficiency
of pleadings, requiring not only that a claim be stated in
"detail" -- itself a significant departure from the normal rule -
- but "in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that
claimant is likely to succeed at trial" (Court of Claims Act § 8-
b [4]).  Lest anyone miss the point, the Legislature added this
sentence: "If the court finds after reading the claim that
claimant is not likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the
claim, either on its own motion or on the motion of the state"
(id.).  The Report of the Law Revision Commission accompanying
the proposed legislation that became Court of Claims Act § 8-b
makes quite clear that this provision should have real teeth. 
The legislation is based, the Commission said, on:
"a careful balancing between the goal of
compensating one who has been unjustly
convicted and imprisoned, and society's dual
interest of ensuring that only the innocent
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recover and of preventing the filing of
frivolous claims.  With respect to the
latter, the Commission is most sensitive to
the needs of the criminal justice system in
that is does not want to overburden the
staffs of the Attorney General and the
District Attorneys with the defense of
frivolous claims."
(Commission Report at 2926.) 
The Commission added: "Consequently . . . most cases
will not survive a motion to dismiss.  The few exceptions will be
the ones appropriate for a full hearing on the claim of
innocence" (id. at 2930).  No one should conclude from today's
decision that we have opened a loophole that will defeat this
legislative goal.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and defendant's motion to dismiss the
claim denied. Opinion by Judge Ciparick. Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Pigott and Jones concur. Judge Smith concurs in result in
an opinion in which Judges Graffeo and Read concur.
Decided March 31, 2011
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