Case Title: Lund v. District Court

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 28

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
ome

127 Nev., Advance Opinion 28
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BENJAMIN A. LUND, AN No, 57800
INDIVIDUAL,
Petitioner,
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE,
VALORIE VEGA, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,

and
BRIAN M. WALSH, AN INDIVIDUAL;
BRAD A. MARK, AN INDIVIDUAL;
HAYLI ROCHELL, AN INDIVIDUAL;
NIKKI CHAVES, AN INDIVIDUAL;
AND MELANIE GROSS, AN
INDIVIDUAL,
Real Parties in Interest.

   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  

FILED

JUN 02 2011

Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order dismissing certain of petitioner's counterclaims in a tort
action.

Petition granted in part and denied in part.
Glen J. Lerner & Associates and Corey M. Eschweiler and Joseph F.

Schmitt, Las Vegas,
for Petitioner.

Parker Scheer Lagomarsino and Andre M. Lagomarsino, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest Brian M. Walsh.

Perry & Westbrook and Alan W. Westbrook, Las Vegas,

for Real Parties in Interest Brad A. Mark, Hayli Rochell, Nikki Chaves,
and Melanie Gross,

BEFORE CHERRY, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.

1-10l03

 

 
OPINION
By the Court, GIBBONS, J.:

In this petition, we address the narrow issue of whether a
defendant may, under NRCP 13(h), bring a counterclaim that adds new
parties to an action. Under that rule, if there is at least one original
party included in the counterclaim, a defendant may add new parties to
the action through a counterclaim as long as the nonparty meets the
joinder requirements under NRCP 19 or 20. We take this opportunity to
address this discrete issue and, while the dispute presented in this
original proceeding does not warrant this court's expedited or emergency
review, we nonetheless grant in part the petition for a writ of mandamus
and direct the district court to vacate ite order dismissing the
counterclaims and to reconsider the decision in light of this opinion.
Because petitioner has failed to fully develop his petition for
extraordinary relief by necessarily addressing NRCP 19 or NRCP 20,
however, we reject petitioner's request that we order the dismissed
counterclaims reinstated.

BACKGROUND

In September 2010, real party in interest Brian M. Walsh filed
a complaint against, among others, petitioner Benjamin A. Lund. In his
complaint, Walsh alleged that he was injured by Lund in a fight that
broke out at a charity golf event in Las Vegas. Lund answered Walsh's
complaint, disputing much of Walsh’s version of the events, and added
counterclaims of his own against Walsh and real parties in interest Brad
Mark, Hayli Rochell, Nikki Chaves, and Melanie Gross as additional
counterclaim defendants. Lund alleged counterclaims against Walsh and

Mark related to injuries he allegedly suffered in the fight and against
Walsh, Mark, Rochell, Chaves, and Gross related to defamation for

 

 
allegedly being untruthful about what Lund had said on the golf course
and making Lund wrongly appear as an instigator of the fight.

Mark, Rochell, and Gross subsequently moved the district
court to dismiss the counterclaims filed against them, arguing that under
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, new parties cannot be added to a
lawsuit through counterclaims. Lund opposed the motion, arguing that
NRCP 13(h) expressly permitted him to add new parties to his
counterclaim. After a reply was filed and a hearing was held, the district
court entered an order summarily dismissing the counterclaims against
Mark, Rochell, and Gross. Lund then filed in this court an emergency
petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to NRAP 21(a)(6). Mark,
Rochell, Chaves, and Gross were permitted to file an answer.

DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis by addressing the district court's

refusal to permit the addition of new counterclaim defendants pursuant
to NRCP 13(h). After concluding that the district court failed to apply the
proper NRCP 13(h) analysis, we consider whether this failure warrants
our intervention by way of extraordinary writ relief.

Adding new parties to an action through a counterclaim
NRCP 13 governs the filing of permissive and compulsory

counterclaims and cross-claims.’ Under NRCP 13(h), “[plersons other

1While Chaves is participating as a party to the writ proceeding
before this court, she did not file a joinder to the district court motion to
dismiss.

2Walsh has informed this court that he does not intend to participate
in this proceeding, and thus, he has not filed an answer.

8A counterclaim refers to a claim by a defendant against an opposing
party, while a cross-claim is a claim against a co-party. Depner
continued on next page

 

 

 
nn

 

than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a
counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19
and 20." Courts typically construe Rule 13(h) liberally “in an effort to
avoid multiplicity of litigation, minimize the circuity of actions, and foster
judicial economy.” 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane Federal Practice and Procedure § 1434 (2010) (footnotes omitted);
accord NRCP 1 (providing that Nevada's rules of civil procedure “shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action”). Federal courts that have interpreted
NRCP 13(hy’s federal counterpart have concluded that @ counterclaim or
cross-claim brought under the rule must include at least one existing
party, and thus, may not be brought solely against an unnamed party.
See, e.g,, AllTech Communications, LLC v, Brothers, 601 F. Supp. 2d
1255, 1260 (N.D. Okla. 2008) (applying FRCP 13(h)); Microsoft. Corp. v.
Ion Technologies Corp, 484 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (D. Minn. 2007) (same);
Raytheon Aircraft Cred. Corp. v. Pal Air Intern., 923 F. Supp. 1408, 1414
(D. Kan. 1996) (same); see also Johansen v. US., 392 F. Supp. 24 56, 59-
60 (D. Mass. 2005) (permitting an FRCP 13(h) counterclaim against a
nonparty because the same counterclaim was already asserted against a
party); Foster v. Dingwall. 126 Nev. _. _, 228 P.3d 453, 456 (2010)
(explaining that federal caselaw involving the Federal Rules of Civil

  

 

Procedure provides persuasive authority for this court in reviewing the

continued
Architects v. Nev, Nat'l Bank, 104 Nev. 560, 563, 763 P.2d 1141, 1143
(1988).

‘Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(h), amended on April 30, 2007,
to be effective December 1, 2007, reads: “Rules 19 and 20 govern the
addition of a person as a party to a counterclaim or crossclaim.”

 
 

Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure). In addition, NRCP 13(h) expressly
permits the joinder of additional nonparties so long as the nonparty can
be joined in “accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20.”

NRCP 19 and 20 set forth the procedure for mandatory and
permissive joinder of parties, respectively. See Dutchess Bus. Servs. v.
State, Bd. of Pharm., 124 Nev. 701, 710, 191 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2008).
NRCP 19 requires joinder of all parties necessary for an action’s just
adjudication, NRCP 19(a)(1)-(2). NRCP 20(a) authorizes permissive
Joinder of a defendant against whom a right to relief is asserted “in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or of fact common
to all these persons will arise in the action.”

In the present matter, Walsh, the original plaintiff, was
named as a counterdefendant in each of Lund’s counterclaims. Thus, as
long as Mark, Rochell, Chaves, and Gross can be joined under either
NRCP 19 or 20 as additional counterclaim defendants, they may face
Lund’s counterclaims brought under NRCP 13(h). —AllTech
Communications, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Microsoft. Corp., 484 F. Supp.
2d at 965; Raytheon Aircraft, 923 F. Supp. at 1414. While the next
analytical step should be to address Lund’s counterclaims within the
context of NRCP 19 and 20, because the parties failed to provide any
briefing on this point, we decline to reach this issue. See Edwards v.
Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288
1.38 (2006) (noting that this court need not consider an issue not cogently
argued or supported by salient authority).

Our review of the documents before this court reveals that the

district court was under the impression that Lund should have filed a

third-party complaint, under NRCP 14, instead of filing counterclaims

pursuant to NRCP 13(h). ‘This conclusion was incorrect. Moseley v, Dist.
5

 
Ct., 124 Nev, 654, 662-68, 188 P.3d 1136, 1142-46 (2008) (explaining that
this court reviews the district court’s interpretation of the Nevada Rules
of Civil Procedure de novo, even when that interpretation is challenged
through a petition for extraordinary relief). The third-party practice rule,
NRCP 14, is reserved for claims based on an indemnity theory.’ NRCP
14; Reid v. Royal Insurance Co., 80 Nev. 137, 140, 390 P.2d 45, 46-47
(1964). In other words, under NRCP 14, “[a] defendant is permitted to
defend the case and at the same time assert his [or her] right of
indemnity against the party ultimately responsible for the damage.”
Reid, 80 Nev. at 140-41, 390 P.2d at 47.

A review of Lund’s counterclaims makes clear that he is
secking recovery for his independent injuries, which he claims were
wrongfully caused by Walsh as a counterdefendant and Mark, Rochell,
Chaves, and Gross as additional counterclaim defendants. He is not
seeking indemnity for Walsh's claims against him. ‘Thus, NRCP 13,
rather than NRCP 14, is applicable to this case and the appropriate
means for relief was the assertion of counterclaims, not a third-party
complaint, Consequently, the district court erred when it concluded that
it lacked the authority to allow Lund to add parties as additional
counterclaim defendants under NRCP 13(h).

Propriety of writ relief

A writ of mandamus is generally not available to control the
exercise of judicial discretion, Round Hill Gen. Imp, Dist. v. Newman, 97
Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 586 (1981) (explaining that writ relief

SNRCP 14 states, in most relevant part, that the rule is available to
a defending party, acting as a third-party plaintiff, against “a person not

a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.”

 
 

may be available to correct manifest abuses of discretion). But
mandamus may lie to compel a court to exercise discretion that it
unquestionably has, when it fails to do so, See Willmes v. Reno Mun. Ct

118 Nev. 831, 835, 59 P.3d 1197, 1200 (2002) (concluding that mandamus

 

 

relief was warranted to correct a municipal court’s complete failure to
exercise discretion that it clearly possessed), Indeed, when, as here, legal
error leads the district court to decline to exercise discretion that it
indisputably has regarding prospective additional parties, mandamus
may lie, in the diserotion of this court, to avert further avoidable error
See Ex Parte Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 289 (1918) (concluding that
extraordinary relief was warranted to correct a legal error that, under the
circumstances, the aggrieved party should not have had to wait until the
final judgment was entered to correct); In re Connaway Rec'r of Moscow
Nat. Bank, 178 U.S. 421, 425 (1900) (concluding that mandamus relief
was proper in the prospective additional party context to address whether
the lower court acquired jurisdiction over a deceased codefendant); Babb
vy. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 479 P.2d 379, 385 (Cal. 1971)
(granting writ relief in reviewing whether a cross-complaint could be filed
and stating that “[aJlthough it is well established that mandamus cannot
be issued to control a court's discretion, in unusual circumstances the
writ will lie where, under the facts, that discretion can be exercised in
only one way"); In Re Kuntz, 124 $.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex. 2003) (noting that
writ relief may lie when trial court fails to analyze or apply law correctly
in entering an order that conflicts with the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure).

Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that the
istrict court manifestly abused its discretion in concluding that it lacked
the authority to allow Lund to add parties as additional counterclaim
defendants under NRCP 13(h). Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 603-04, 637 P.2d

7

 
one

at 536 (explaining that writ relief may be available to correct manifest
abuses of discretion); Willmes, 118 Nev. 831, 59 P.3d 1197 (noting that
the failure to exercise available discretion can constitute a manifest abuse
of discretion). The application to join these parties could and should have
been considered by the district court under NRCP 15(h); the failure to
entertain the application potentially affects the future course of this
proceeding. Ex parte Simons, 247 U.S. at 239; Conaway, 178 U.S. at
425; Babb, 479 P.2d 379. The confusion as to the scope and application of
NRCP 13(h) is of statewide significance, State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct.
Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 614, 56 P.3d 420, 428 (2002) (explaining that
writ relief may be warranted when an important issue of law needs
clarification), and thus, we entertain and grant the writ petition to the
limited extent of directing the district court to vacate its order dismissing
the counterclaims and to reconsider its order in light of this opinion.

Our conclusion does not mean that we necessarily direct the
district court to reinstate the counterclaims. The decision whether to
permit the amendment to add the additional counterclaim defendants
under NRCP 19 and 20 is entrusted to the discretion of the district court.
Cummings v, Charter Hospital, 111 Nev. 639, 645, 896 P.24 1197, 1140
(1995) (stating that the district court possesses “broad discretion” to
permit or deny the joinder of parties). As noted above, the parties have
failed to provide briefing on the NRCP 19 or 20 analysis presented by this
case, and we have no reason to believe on this record that the district
court will not properly exercise its discretion under these rules. See
Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 603-04, 637 P.2d at 536 (explaining that writ relief
is available to control a manifest abuse of discretion). Accordingly, with
rogard to the overall disposition, as Lund has failed to demonstrate a
manifest abuse of discretion concerning the necessary NRCP 19 and 20
analysis, we deny writ relief to the extent that Lund asks this court to

8
ras aera

 
reinstate the counterclaims. Pan v, Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d
‘840, 844 (2004) (explaining that, in a petition for a writ of mandamus, the
petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is
warranted),
CONCLUSION

Under NRCP 13(h), new parties may be added to an action
through a counterclaim if there is at least one original party included in
the counterclaim and the nonparties meet the joinder requirements under
NRCP 19 or 20, The district court manifestly abused its discretion by
failing to apply the proper NRCP 13(h) analysis, and we therefore grant
the writ petition in part and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to vacate its dismissal order and
reconsider the NRCP 13(h) analysis. As Lud has failed to provide

"This petition was presented to this court as an “emergency,”
warranting this court's expedited treatment under NRAP 21(a)(6).
Because Lund could have simply filed a separate complaint and
thereafter move to consolidate the two cases, see EDCR 2.50 (addressing
motions to consolidate two or more cases), there was no immediate harm
warranting emergency treatment. Such abuses of NRAP 21(a)(6)'s
emergency consideration procedures unnecessarily waste this court's
limited resources and may, in the future, warrant the imposition of
sanctions. We decline, however, real parties in interest's request to
impose NRCP 11 sanctions against Lund.

Finally, as the underlying incident allegedly occurred on June 11,
2010, there are no pressing concerns presented by NRS 11.190(4)'s two-
year statute of limitations for Lund’s counterclaims related to the alleged
fight or defamation should the district court rule against Lund in its
NRCP 19 or 20 analysis and require Lund to file a new, separate action.

 

 
sufficient analysis on the next necessary analytical step regarding NRCP
19 o 20, however, we deny the petition to the extent that Lund seeks
reinstatement of his counterclaims, without prejudice to Lund’s ability to
seek relief on this point from the district court.

 

We concur:

Cherry