Case Title: State v. DeRosa

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_DEROSA.92-306; 161 Vt. 78 ; 633 A.2d 277

[Filed 08-Oct-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-306


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Bennington Circuit
 Robin J. DeRosa
                                              March Term, 1993


 Theodore S. Mandeville, Jr., J.


 Jonathan Cohen, Bennington County Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington, for
    plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
    Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   Defendant Robin DeRosa appeals the trial court's denial
 of her motion to correct a sentence imposed by the Bennington District Court
 in April 1991.  Defendant, a needy person, claims that the imposition of a
 sentence of imprisonment, suspended, and probation, after she was denied
 assistance of counsel, violated her rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
 Amendments to the United States Constitution, Chapter I, Article 10 of the
 Vermont Constitution, and the Vermont Public Defender Act, 13 V.S.A. {{
 5201-5277.  We reverse and remand.
      Defendant was arraigned on an information charging her with driving
 under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), first offense.  23 V.S.A.

 

 { 1201(a)(2).  At the time, this offense was punishable by a fine of up to
 $750, imprisonment up to one year, or both.(FN1) 23 V.S.A. { 1210(b) (1991).
 At the arraignment, the trial court found defendant to be a needy person,
 but denied her counsel on the ground that the court would not sentence her
 to a period of imprisonment or a fine of over $1,000.  Subsequently,
 defendant waived counsel on the record (FN2) and entered a plea of nolo
 contendere.  The court accepted her plea and sentenced her to pay a $508
 fine and to serve a term of imprisonment of zero to three months, suspended,
 and probation until further order of the court.
      In October 1991, defendant allegedly violated the terms of her
 probation and was brought before the court.  She waived counsel and was
 found in violation of the conditions of her probation, but her term of
 probation was continued.  In January 1992, defendant was arraigned on a
 subsequent violation of her probation; she requested and was assigned public
 counsel.  Defendant's counsel filed a motion to strike defendant's original
 sentence on the ground that the court had lacked the authority to impose a
 suspended prison sentence and probation after denying defendant counsel.
 The trial court denied the motion, and defendant now appeals.
      We first consider defendant's argument that her sentence violated the
 Vermont Public Defender Act (PDA), 13 V.S.A. {{ 5201-5277.  Section 5231(1)
 of the PDA provides, in relevant part, that "[a] needy person . . . who is
        
 

 charged with having committed . . . a serious crime, is entitled . . . [t]o
 be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own
 counsel."  A "serious crime" includes a misdemeanor, "the maximum penalty
 for which is a fine of more than $1,000.00 or any period of imprisonment."
 13 V.S.A. { 5201(4)(B).  The statute provides an exception, however, if "the
 judge, at the arraignment but before the entry of a plea, determines and
 states on the record that he will not sentence the defendant to a fine of
 more than $1,000.00 or a period of imprisonment if the defendant is
 convicted of the misdemeanor."  Id. (emphasis added).
      In the case at bar, the trial judge denied defendant counsel pursuant
 to the exception in 13 V.S.A. { 5201(4)(B).  Upon defendant's uncounseled
 guilty plea, the trial court sentenced her to a period of imprisonment from
 zero to three months, suspended, and placed her on probation "until further
 order of the Court."  The issue we must decide is whether the trial court's
 imposition of a suspended sentence of imprisonment and probation violated
 the trial court's representation pursuant to 13 V.S.A. { 5201(4)(B) that it
 would "not sentence the defendant to . . . a period of imprisonment" if she
 were convicted.
      The overriding objective of statutory construction is to ascertain the
 intent of the Legislature.  State v. Wilcox, __ Vt. __, __,