Case Title: Collins v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 505, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CURTIS COLLINS, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 505, 2003 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. No. 0206019341 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
     Submitted:  March 16, 2004 
 
 
 
 
        Decided:  May 25, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 25th day of May, 2004, having considered the briefs of the 
parties and the respective arguments set forth therein, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant Curtis Collins was charged with two 
counts of Robbery in the First Degree, one count each of Assault in the 
Second Degree and Terroristic Threatening, and related weapons charges.   
(2) 
On July 7, 2002—the day before trial—the State offered to 
dismiss the balance of charges if Collins entered a guilty plea to one count of 
Robbery in the First Degree, a related weapons charge, and Assault in the 
 
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Second Degree.  The State also offered to recommend a sentence of five 
years imprisonment.   
 
(3) 
Collins’ attorney communicated the offer to his client.  Defense 
counsel then reported to the trial judge that Collins refused to accept the plea 
agreement offered by the State.  Defense counsel suggested that the trial 
judge bring his client into the courtroom and read Collins “the riot act.”  
Because of Collins’ actions at the previous trial,1 the trial judge declined this 
request.  Instead, the trial judge stated, “Well, we’ll deal with him tomorrow.  
If you want me to talk to him tomorrow, I will.” 
 
(4) 
On July 8, 2003, before Collins’ trial began, defense counsel 
indicated that Collins would like to accept the plea offered the day before by 
the State.  The State told defense counsel that the plea offer had been 
withdrawn and was no longer on the table.  Defense counsel then requested 
the trial judge to require the State to allow Collins to accept the earlier 
agreement.  The trial judge denied the request.  
 
(5) 
Collins’ trial commenced that same day.  During the course of 
the trial, Juror #10 informed the trial judge that she believed she recognized 
a witness who was testifying.    That witness was Wayne Corbin, the victim.  
Outside the presence of the other juror members, the trial judge questioned 
                                          
 
1 At the first trial, Collins had exchanged words with the victim’s son, who was a 
spectator.  This exchange led to the trial judge declaring a mistrial. 
 
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the juror to determine if she did, in fact, know Corbin.  The judge also 
questioned Corbin, and then questioned the juror again, all outside the 
presence of the jury.   
(6) 
Through this inquiry, the trial judge was able to determine that 
the juror knew that Corbin’s son had been involved with the criminal justice 
system.  It was also determined that the juror had encountered Corbin 
through her employment when he made deliveries there.  The juror had no 
social interactions with Collins outside of passing greetings at work.   
 
(7) 
Following these revelations, Collins moved to excuse Juror #10 
for cause.  Collins argued that, had he known of this juror’s contacts with the 
victim during voir dire, he would have challenged her for cause.   The trial 
judge denied Collins’ motion at that time. 
(8) 
Later, after the trial judge had instructed the jury on the law 
following closing arguments, the trial judge granted Collins’ motion to 
excuse Juror #10 because an alternate was still available.  In the presence of 
the jury, the trial judge excused Juror #10 and explained to the jury his 
reasons for doing so by stating that Juror #10 had had “some contact” with 
Corbin.  Juror #10 was replaced with the alternate.   
(9) 
The jury, now with the alternate, found Collins guilty on all 
counts.   
 
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(10) On August 26, 2003, Collins filed a motion for a new trial 
based on the trial judge’s statement to the jury explaining his reasons for 
excusing Juror #10.  The trial judge denied that motion on September 25, 
2003. Sentencing occurred on September 28, 2003.  Collins filed a timely 
appeal with this Court. 
(11) On appeal, Collins contends that the trial judge committed two 
errors.  First, he argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing 
the State to withdraw a plea offer that had been tendered to the defendant the 
day before his trial was scheduled to commence.  Collins second claim of 
error is that, as a matter of law, the trial judge’s decision to deny a new trial 
based on an allegation of juror impartiality was erroneous.   
 
(12) The Superior Court’s refusal to enforce an alleged plea 
agreement is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.2  While Collins 
concedes that he did not actually enter into a plea agreement, he argues that 
the record clearly indicates that the plea offer had not been withdrawn.   
 
(13) The record reflects that after the State indicated the plea offer 
had been withdrawn, the trial judge noted:  “I also recall [the prosecutor] 
indicating yesterday in court, when I inquired whether or not the plea was 
going to be available until tomorrow, he indicated it wasn’t.”  The record 
                                          
 
2 Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 819 (Del. 1977). 
 
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also reflects that, after being informed that the defendant was rejecting the 
proffered agreement, the prosecutor told defense counsel, “I’ll see you at 
trial.”   
(14) In Shields v. State, we held that “the State may withdraw from a 
plea agreement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the 
guilty plea by the defendant or any other action by him constituting 
detrimental reliance.”3  The record indicates that the trial judge properly 
exercised his discretion in permitting the case to proceed to trial and denying 
Collins’ request for specific performance of the withdrawn plea offer.4 
 
(15) The second issue on appeal is the denial of a motion for a new 
trial based on juror impartiality.  That issue is reviewed de novo because it 
involves mixed questions of law and fact.5   Collins does not contend that 
Juror #10 was improperly excused.6  Rather, he argues that the trial judge’s 
mention of “some contact” between Juror #10 and the victim constituted an 
“extraneous influence” which prejudiced the remaining jurors.  This Court 
has defined “extraneous influence” as actions such as exposure to news 
reports, consideration by the jury of facts outside the record of the case, 
                                          
 
3 Id. at 820. 
4 Id. 
5 Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 486 (Del. 2003). 
6 See Id. at 484. 
 
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communications between jurors and third parties, and pressure or bias on the 
part of the court.7  
 
(16) In other cases with similar facts, this Court has concluded there 
was no juror bias necessitating the reversal of a criminal conviction.  For 
example, in Evans v. State,8 a juror discovered after commencement of trial, 
but prior to deliberations, that she was related to the victim.9  This Court 
concluded that the trial judge’s instruction that the jury not discuss the case 
amongst themselves, coupled with the dismissal of the juror did not result in 
jury bias and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.10  More recently, in 
Caldwell v. State,11 we stated, “since deliberations had not begun at the time 
that the juror’s friendship with [a prosecutor who was not trying the case] 
was discovered, the trial court could properly grant a motion to excuse the 
juror while denying the motion for mistrial.”12 
 
(17) The record reflects that the trial judge’s neutral reference to 
“some contact” between Juror #10 and the victim did not prejudice the jury 
or deprive Collins of a fair trial.  The trial judge’s statement to the jury made 
no mention of the defendant, and did not indicate whether the contact 
                                          
 
7 See Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 895 (Del. 1987). 
8 Evans v. State, 1999 WL 1090558 (Del. Oct. 7, 1999). 
9 Id. at *3.  The juror had not seen the victim in seven years.  Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001). 
12 Id. at 1059 n.80. 
 
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between the juror and the victim was positive or negative.  In fact, in 
excusing the juror, the trial judge noted that he still believed that this juror 
could be fair and impartial.  There is no merit in Collins’ contention that the 
trial judge’s reference to “some contact” between the excused juror and the 
victim constitutes reversible error.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the 
Superior Court be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice