Case Title: Brown v. Gress

Citation: 378 Md. 667

Docket Number: 38/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., et al. v. Gress, et al.
No. 38, September Term, 2003
HEADNOTES: FINAL JUDGMENT; DISCRETION; APPEAL 
An appellate court  may not direct entry of final judgment where the trial court,
with discretion under Maryland Rule §2-602 (b) (1) to do so, has declined, after
considering the option, to enter final judgment.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No.  38
September Term, 2003
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO
CORP., et al.
                                     
v.
GRESS, et al. 
                                       
Bell, C. J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed:   December 15, 2003
*Eldridge, J. now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion. 
Maryland Rule 8-602 (e) provides: 
“(e) Entry of Judgment Not Directed Under Rule 2-602. (1) If the appellate
court determines that the order from which the appeal is taken was not a final
judgment when the notice of appeal was filed but that the lower court had
discretion to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602 (b), the
appellate court may, as it finds appropriate, (A) dismiss the appeal, (B) remand
the case for the lower court to decide whether to direct the entry of a final
judgment, (C) enter a final judgment on its own initiative or (D) if a final
judgment was entered by the lower court after the notice of appeal was filed,
treat the notice of appeal as if filed on the same day as, but after, the entry of
the judgment.
“(2) If, upon remand, the lower court decides not to direct entry
of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b), the lower court
shall promptly notify the appellate court of its decision and the
appellate court shall dismiss the appeal.  If, upon remand, the
lower court determines that there is no just reason for delay and
directs the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b),
the case shall be returned to the appellate court after entry of the
judgment.  The appellate court shall treat the notice of appeal as
if filed on the date of entry of the judgment.
“(3) If the appellate court enters a final judgment on its own
initiative, it shall treat the notice of appeal as if filed on the date
of the entry of the judgment and proceed with the appeal.”
As relevant to the case sub judice, pursuant to Rule 8-602 (e) (1) (C), where the trial court
could have directed entry of final judgment in a case prematurely appealed, an appellate court
has discretion to “ enter a final judgment on its own initiative[.]”  
It is well settled that
 “an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates
fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether raised by original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim), or that adjudicates less than
an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties to the action:
“(1) is not a final judgment;
1Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Replacement Volume), § 12-301 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
“Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a
final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.  The
right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the
exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a
particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.  In a criminal
case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of
sentence has been suspended.  In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a
remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment.”
2
“(2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any
of the parties;  and
“(3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a
judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of
the parties.”
Maryland Rule 2-602 (a).    See  Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546, 801 A.2d 1013, 1016
(2002); Taha v. Southern Mgmt. Co., 367 Md. 564, 567-68, 790 A.2d 11, 13 (2002);  O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 367 Md. 547, 553-54, 790 A.2d 1, 4-5 (2002); Board of Liquor License Comm’rs
for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 129, 685 A.2d 772, 776 (1996),
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 40-41, 566 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1989).   Such an order is
not appealable.  See Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Replacement Volume), § 12-301 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article;1 Estep v. Georgetown Leather, 320 Md. 277, 282,
577 A.2d 78, 80 (1990).   
An order that is not otherwise final may be certified as such, under some
circumstances.   Maryland Rule 2-602 (b) addresses those circumstances.   It provides:
3
“(b) When allowed.  If the court expressly determines in a written order that
there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final
judgment:
“(1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties;
or
“(2) pursuant to Rule 2-501 (e) (3), for some but less than all of
the amount requested in a claim seeking money relief only.”
Rule 2-602 (b) (1) is relevant to the case sub judice.
At the center of  this case is the relationship between Maryland Rule 8-602 (e) (1) (C)
and Maryland Rule 2-602 (b) and, in turn, that relationship’s impact on the appellate court’s
discretion to itself enter a final judgment in a case in which an appeal has been taken
prematurely.    More particularly, we are required to consider whether, in deciding to direct
entry of final judgment, the appellate court may disregard the trial court’s appropriately
exercised discretionary decision not to certify the order at issue as a final judgment.  
Although the respondents, Patricia A. Gress, Mary E. Mayes, Joseph and Iva Dingus, and
George Van Daniker, so requested, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City refused to certify as
a final judgment its order dismissing their complaints against the petitioners Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as successor in interest to The American
Tobacco Company, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Phillip Morris Incorporated, R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company, The Tobacco Institute, Inc., and Liggett Group Inc. (the “cigarette
defendants”), thus leaving only asbestos claims against  AC and S, Inc., Owens Illinois, Inc.,
Flintkoke Company, Pfizer Corporation, Universal Refractories, E.L. Stebbings & Co., Inc.,
2The respondents initially sued the asbestos defendants for occupational exposure
to asbestos products.  Gress v. ACandS, Inc., 150 Md. App. 369, 374-75, 820 A.2d 616,
619 (2003).   They subsequently filed amended complaints “adding claims against the
Cigarette Defendants, and seeking damages for injuries and death allegedly caused by
exposure to both asbestos and inhaled cigarette smoke,” which, because they acted in
“synergy,” multiplied the risk of developing lung cancer.  Id. at 375, 820 A.2d at 619.  
Following a hearing on the cigarette defendants’ motion to dismiss or sever, the trial court
entered orders, dated March 22, 2002, granting that motion and ordering “that the
complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”  Id.   Thereafter, because the order
dismissed the complaint, which included both claims against the cigarette defendants and
the asbestos defendants, the respondents noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals
and, on the same day, the cigarette defendants brought to the court’s attention that its
order dismissed all claims against all defendants.   By orders dated May 28, 2002 and
April 17, 2002, the court entered amended orders in all cases but Dingus’, dismissing only
the claims against the cigarette defendants, without prejudice.   Id.  The respondents did
not note appeals from those orders.   
4
Quigley Company, Inc., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Corhart Refractories
Company, A.W. Chesterton, and Anchor Packing, as defendants (the “asbestos defendants”).2
Notwithstanding that court’s refusal to certify the orders relating to the cigarette
defendants as final judgments, the Court of Special Appeals entered such judgments on its
own initiative pursuant to Rule 8-602 (e) (1) (C),   Gress v. ACandS, Inc., 150 Md. App. 369,
383, 820 A.2d 616, 624 (2003), holding 
“under Md. Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C), an appellate court is authorized to enter a
final judgment even if the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to do so, provided that (1) the appellate court is persuaded that entry of a final
judgment is appropriate under the circumstances, and (2) the circuit court had
discretion to enter a final judgment but did not do so.”
Rationalizing its decision, the intermediate appellate court relied on Wilde v.
3Although the issue involved in this case was not presented in Shofer v. the Stuart
Hack Company, 324 Md. 92, 98,  595 A.2d 1078, (1991),  cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096,
112 S. Ct. 1174, 117 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1992) , it is interesting to note that the Shofer Court,
explaining its decision to enter final judgment on its own initiative, stated:
“The docket of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reflects that no judgment
has ever been entered disposing of the third-party claim by respondents against
Grabush. Nor was the circuit court asked to certify its dismissal of Shofer's
second amended complaint as a final judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule
2-602. Thus, this case could be dismissed as a premature appeal. See Estep v.
Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277, 577 A.2d 78 (1990). Nevertheless,
we exercise our discretion under Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C) and hereby
enter as a final judgment the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
dismissing all of Shofer's claims.”
5
Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 548 A.2d 837 (1988). 3   In that case, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County directed the entry of a final judgment when it dismissed the case against
Wilde, one of the four defendants allegedly involved  in an assault against a motel guest. 
Id. at 82, 548 A.2d at 838.   On appeal, respondent Wilde argued that the trial court should
not have entered final judgment and, thus, the appeal was improper. The Court of Special
Appeals denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal and addressed, and ultimately
reversed,  the Circuit Court on the merits of the dismissal. After granting certiorari, this Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, both on the grounds that the
certification of final judgment was proper and that the Court of Special Appeals had ruled
correctly regarding the merits of the Circuit Court dismissal.  In doing so, this Court noted
that all of the claims “arose out of the same transaction or occurrence,” id.  at 87, 548 A.2d
at 840, that the issues of liability involved “a substantial degree of common proof,” and
compensatory damages, “a complete commonality of proof,” id.,  and that, because  the
6
venue ruling split one action into two actions, “[i]f erroneous, the ruling unnecessarily
multiplied the time, effort, and expense for the plaintiffs in asserting all of their claims and
needlessly created collateral estoppel complexities.” Id. at 88, 548 A.2d at 841.   
In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that “the reasons for
certification that were discussed by the Wilde Court are equally applicable to the case at bar.”
150 Md. App. at 382, 820 A.2d at 623-24.      It explained:
“Because appellants seek to hold both the Cigarette Defendants and the
Asbestos Defendants liable under the "synergy theory," the claims against both
groups will involve a substantial amount of "common proof." Moreover, it is
more likely so than not so that a jury considering only appellants' claims
against the Asbestos Defendants would be presented with evidence that
appellants' injuries were caused and/or aggravated by their use of tobacco.”
Id. at 382, 820 A.2d at 624 (footnote omitted).    
The intermediate appellate court also pointed out that the trial court’s time “is a
valuable public commodity that should not be wasted.”  Id.   Therefore, it concluded, noting
the Circuit Court’s discretion to certify the subject orders as final judgments, “[i]f the orders
of dismissal were erroneously entered, there would be a needless waste of the court's time
in addition to the extra time, effort, and expenses imposed upon the parties.”   Id. at 382-83,
820 A.2d at 624.  That is also consistent with the purpose of the Rule, the court asserted, that
purpose being,  as reflected in a letter from the Committee’s Reporter,  to “provide the
appellate court with an ‘option [that] will eliminate the necessity for a remand when the
appellate court determines that entry of a judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b) would be
appropriate.’” Id. at 383, 820 A.2d at 624.
4Having entered final judgments, the Court of Special Appeals proceeded to
address the merits and reverse the judgment of the trial court in that regard.   We do not
reach the merits and, therefore, express no opinion as to the intermediate appellate court’s
resolution of them.
7
The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that the trial court had refused to certify
the judgments as final judgments and that the exercise of discretion in doing so was not
abused.  The Court, however, concluded that neither constituted a barrier to its option  to
enter final judgment on its own initiative.    The intermediate appellate court explained:
“Because the appellate court applies the law in effect on the date that it files
its opinion, rather than the law in effect when the circuit court made the ruling
at issue, there are cases in which a post-ruling change in - or a clarification of -
the applicable law makes the entry of a final judgment under Md. Rule
8-602(e) (1) (C) appropriate even if the circuit court's refusal to enter a final
judgment did not constitute an abuse of that court's discretion.  The cases at
bar are such cases.  It is appropriate for this Court to enter final judgments in
order to decide the issue of whether appellants are entitled to join in one action
their claims against the Asbestos Defendants and the Cigarette Defendants.”
Id. at 383-84, 820 A.2d at 624-25.4
The cigarette defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, seeking review of this
important issue.   We granted their Petition.   In re Brown & Williamson, 376 Md. 76, 827
A.2d 112 (2003).   We shall reverse.
The question whether the Court of Special Appeals has the authority to enter final
judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602 (e) (1) (C) when the trial court, that could have
entered final judgment   pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602 (b), has expressly refused to do so,
requires  the interpretation of Rule 8-602.   It is well settled that 
8
“To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same canons and principles of
construction used to interpret statutes. Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 563, 611
A.2d 581, 583 (1992); State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 533, 555 A.2d 494, 496
(1989); O'Donnell v. McGann, 310 Md. 342, 350, 529 A.2d 372, 376 (1987);
In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477, 481, 505 A.2d 504, 507 (1986); Pappas v.
Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). In our effort to discern
the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. When the words
are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further. Mustafa v.
State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991); G. Heileman Brewing Co.
v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 755, 521 A.2d 1225, 1230 (1987); In re
Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 685, 516 A.2d 976, 982
(1986); Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 303 Md. 280,
284, 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985). Only when the language of the rule is
ambiguous is it necessary that we look elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.
State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
280 Md. 35, 41, 371 A.2d 645, 648 (1977). We are also to give effect to the
entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a  meaning
not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Bd. of Educ. of Garrett
County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982); Smelser v.
Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 389, 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982); Pappas v.
Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). Finally, we seek to give
the rule a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible
with common sense. D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d
1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196
(1985); Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 315, 498
A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985).”
New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 275, 627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993).  See Nina &
Nareg, Inc. v. Mohaved, 369 Md. 187, 193-94, 798 A.2d 557, 561 (2002); Cooper v. Sacco,
357 Md. 622, 629-30, 745 A.2d 1074, 1077 (2000); State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717, 720
A.2d 311, 315-16 (1998); State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79-80, 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997); In
re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994).   See also Md. Transit Auth. v.
King, 369 Md. 274, 289, 299 A.2d 1246, 1255 (2002) (noting that interpretation of agency
rules is subject to same canons and rules as applicable to the construction of statutes).   
9
Taken as a whole, Rule 8-602 (e) is capable of but one reasonable construction. 
Subsection (e) (1) requires the appellate court to make two threshold determinations before
choosing from among the four options it is given as to how to proceed: first, whether the
order appealed was premature - not final - when the appeal was noted and second, whether
the trial court could have directed the entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602 (b).  If
those two threshold questions are answered affirmatively, Rule  8-602 (e)  gives it discretion
to (1) dismiss the appeal, subsection (e) (1) (A), (2), remand the case to allow the trial court
to decide whether to direct entry of final judgment, subsection (e) (1) (B), (3), enter final
judgment, subsection (e) (1) (C), or (4) where the trial court has entered final judgment after
the appeal was noted, deem the appeal timely filed and, thus, consider the appeal, subsection
(e) (1) (D).    The determination with regard to the trial court’s discretion to enter final
judgment  is stated in the past tense and, thus, its focus is on the trial court’s power to have
directed, as opposed to its actual exercise of discretion with respect to, entry of final
judgment. Were the contemplation or intention  otherwise, the Rule’s reference to the
threshold determinations  undoubtedly would have been phrased much as the Court of
Special Appeals characterized them when stating its holding: “provided that (1) the appellate
court is persuaded that entry of a final judgment is appropriate under the circumstances, and
(2) the [C]ircuit [C]ourt had discretion to enter a final judgment but did not do so.”  
Viewed from this perspective, the first three options contemplate the situation in
which the trial court has not entered final judgment and, indeed, in which the trial court has
10
not considered the issue.    This is quite obvious in the case of the second option, remand -
there is no reason to remand for further consideration if the matter has already been
considered or if a final judgment has been entered.   Considered in context, the other two
options must be read the same way.   Confirmation of that construction is supplied by the
fourth option, which expressly contemplates the situation in which the trial court  has entered
final judgment on its own initiative, albeit after the appeal was filed.   
If still further confirmation is necessary, subsection (e) (2) supplies it.   That
subsection further addresses the situation in which the case is remanded for the trial court to
determine whether to direct the entry of final judgment.    It instructs that when “the lower
court decides not to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602 (b), the lower
court shall promptly notify the appellate court of its decision and the appellate court shall
dismiss the appeal.”    If dismissal is required where the case has been remanded for a
determination of whether a final judgment should be directed to be entered, it  follows that
the same requirement must apply when, as in this case,  the trial court has been invited to
consider the same issue after a premature appeal has been noted, and the trial court has not
only considered the desirability of certification, but rejected it.    A different construction
renders the Rule internally inconsistent and, in truth, illogical.  
The history of Rule 8-602 (e)’s promulgation is consistent with our interpretation of
that Rule.  Rule 8-602 was adopted by the Court of Appeals, as a part of the Ninety-Seventh
Report, by Rules Order dated November 19, 1987, effective July 1, 1988.   Subsection (e)
5Maryland Rule 8-602 (d) provides:
“(d)  Judgment entered after notice filed.- A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement or signing by the trial court of a ruling, decision, order, or
judgment but before entry of the ruling, decision, order, or judgment on the
docket shall be treated as filed on the same day as, but after, the entry on the
docket.”     
6Although a part of the Ninety-Seventh Report, delivered to the Court on
November 5, 1987, this Rule was transmitted to the Court early, as an attachment to the
Reporter’s letter of November 3, 1987.
7The “Rule 2-602 problem” was referred to in Planning Board of Howard County
v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 644, n. 2, 530 A.2d 1239, 1240, n. 2 (1987) and Jenkins v.
Jenkins,112 Md. App. 390, 415, 685 A.2d 817, 829 (1996).   These references reflect the
two aspects of the problem that have been recognized.   In Mortimer, after noting the
purpose of the Rule 2-602 (b), “to avoid the costs, delays, frustrations, and unnecessary
11
and subsection (d),5 were “intended to deal with the vexing problem of premature appeals.”
Reporter’s Note to Rule 8-602 (e), Ninety-Seventh Report at 134.6  In that Note, the Reporter
explained:
“The Committee perceives three major categories of premature appeals: (1)
when the appeal is noted from some action of the court, but a judgment as
such, or further action qualifying under case law as a judgment, is never
entered; (2) when an appeal is noted and a judgment is ultimately entered, but
after the notice of appeal; and (3) when the lack of a judgment is due to the
fact that there remains unresolved claims against one or more parties. 
“Sections (d) and (e) deal only with the latter two categories.   If there
is no judgment at all, there is little that the appellate court can do but dismiss
the appeal.    Where the judgment has, in fact, been entered, the Committee
believes that it is more appropriate, in terms of the efficient administration of
justice, simply to regard the appeal as having been taken from that judgment
than to dismiss the appeal.   That is provided for in section (d), the language
of which is patterned after F[ederal] R[ules of] A[ppellate] P[rocedure] 4 (a)
(2).
“Section (e) deals with the Rule 2-602 problem.[7] Essentially, it permits
demands on judicial resources occasioned by piecemeal appeals... [and] provide litigants
with certainty as to the finality of judgments for appeal purposes,” 310 Md. at 646-47,
530 A.2d at 1241, 1241 (citations omitted), this Court explained that, to accomplish these
goals,  Rule 2-602  “view[s] an action involving multiple claims or multiple parties as a
single judicial unit ordinarily requiring complete disposition before a final appealable
judgment may be entered.” Id. at 647, 530 A.2d at 1242.  We then pointed out:
“... Md. Rule 2-602 ... envision[s] exceptions to this design and invest[s] in the
trial judge discretionary authority to manage complex cases by acting as a
“dispatcher” of final orders. ... [and], therefore, reflects ‘a return to the general
pre-rules equation of finality with complete disposition of the action, subject
to a limited discretion in the trial court to bend the general principle to avoid
injustice.’     
“Absent the exercise of this discretionary authority, final decisions that
completely dispose of one of several claims or the rights and liabilities of one
of several parties are treated, essentially, as interlocutory orders. As this Court
noted in Lang v. Catterton, 267 Md. 268, 272, 297 A.2d 735, 738 (1972),
discussing the operation of former Rule 605a, ‘[t]he right of appeal is not
denied, but the time for taking the appeal is regulated in the interest of judicial
administration and to prevent piecemeal appeals.’”
Id. at 647-48, 530 A.2d at 1241 (some citations omitted, quoting 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart,
J. Wicker, Federal Practice, § 54.27 [2.-2] at p. 54-115 (2d ed. 1987)).   This is the aspect
of the Rule 2-602 problem to which the Jenkins case referred, when, speaking for the
intermediate appellate court, Judge Harrell wrote of the “Md. Rule 2-602 problem, i.e. the
multiple parties, multiple claims problem.” 112 Md. App. at 415, 685 A.2d at 829.
The Mortimer reference to the problem concerned the second aspect, the situation
in which a certification under Rule 2-602 is not permissible because it is not “‘completely
dispositive of an entire claim or party.’” 310 Md. at 648-49, 530 A.2d at 1242, quoting 
Snowden v. Baltimore Gas & Electric, 300 Md. 555, 563, 479 A.2d 1329, 1333 (1984). 
12
the appellate court, instead of simply dismissing the appeal as it does now, to
return the case to the [C]ircuit [C]ourt in compliance with Rule 2-602.    If the
[C]ircuit [C]ourt makes the required determination, the appeal can proceed;
otherwise it will be dismissed.   The Rule also permits the appellate court to
enter a final judgment on its own initiative and to proceed with the appeal
without returning the case to the [C]ircuit [C]ourt.”
The respondent  submits that  this history, along with the letter dated November 3,
1987 from the Rules Committee Reporter, referenced by the intermediate appellate court,
13
which emphasized the option of the appellate court to enter final judgment on its own
initiative, confirms the accuracy of the Court of Special Appeal’s decision in this case.   We
do not agree.  As we have explained, the option of entering final judgment cannot be viewed
in isolation.   When it is considered along with the other available options, as the Reporter’s
Note does, we believe that it is obvious and clear that the option to enter final judgment sua
sponte does not extend to those cases in which the trial court was asked to certify an order
as final and refused to do so.
The respondents, like the Court of Special Appeals, direct our attention to Wilde as
support for the proposition that an appellate court may enter a final judgment even after the
trial court has consciously declined to do so.    Also, like the intermediate appellate court,
respondents’ focus is on the merits of the case for or against certifying the dismissal of the
claims against the cigarette defendants as final.   Thus, they argue:
“... [I]f the appeal were not allowed to proceed, the possibility existed that the
Plaintiffs would obtain complete recovery from the Asbestos Defendants such
that no second trial would ever proceed against the Appellants.   The
possibility also existed, however, that the Plaintiffs might not be able to effect
a recovery against Asbestos Defendants at trial, thus subjecting the case, as
expressly contemplated by the Court of Appeals in Wilde, to ‘collateral
estoppel complexities’ resulting from court-mandated parallel lawsuits seeking
recovery for the same injury.   Thus, the orders issued below by the [C]ircuit
[C]ourt, if left not final and unappealable, put the Plaintiffs at substantial risk
of being denied the ability of further prosecuting their claims against the
[petitioners].’”
In Wilde, supra, the petitioner argued that the Circuit Court should not have certified
its dismissal for improper venue as a final judgment, thus allowing  for immediate appeal in
14
that multiple parties and claims action.  Wilde, 314 Md. at 87, 548 A.2d at 840.   Thus, the
Court was considering an argument “address[ing]  the role of the [C]ircuit [C]ourt judge as
‘dispatcher’ in applying Rule 2-602.”   Id. Consequently, that case falls within the rule “that
the dispatcher’s ‘exercise of discretion is reviewable and should not be routinely exercised.
A separate appeal under Rule 2-602 should be allowed only . . . in the very infrequent harsh
case.’”’ Id., quoting Planning Bd. v. Mortimer, 310 Md.  639, 648, 530 A.2d 1237, 1242
(1987) (quoting Diener Enterprises v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556, 295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972)).
There was, in this case, no separate appeal under Rule 2-602 challenging, or at least
seeking review of,  the trial court’s exercise of discretion.    Indeed, the only issue presented
to the Court of Special Appeals by the respondents was:
“Did the trial court err in granting the Cigarette Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss or Sever and dismissing the Plaintiffs’ amended complaints without
prejudice?”
That issue was later refined by the  trial court to relate only to the complaints against the
cigarette defendants and, as refined, continued to be resolved adverse to the respondents,
who, as we have said, did not cross petition for certiorari on the basis that, even as refined,
the trial court abused its discretion.  Moreover, Wilde simply does not address the issue that
this case does present, whether an appellate court’s discretion to enter a final judgment
survives a trial court’s exercise of its discretion not to direct entry of one. 
We hold that where a trial court has been invited to direct entry of a final judgment
in a case in which that trial court has discretion to do so and that trial court expressly declines
8The petitioners would have us go further and hold that a ruling refusing to direct
the entry of a final judgment is not appealable.   We have not gone so far and decline to
do so in this case.    As noted, we have stated, albeit arguably in the context of the
directing of the entry of final judgment,  that the exercise of the trial court’s discretion as
the “‘dispatcher’ of final orders,” Mortimer, 310 Md. at 647, 530 A.2d at 1241, is
reviewable. Id. at 648, 530 A.2d at 1242.
15
to do so, and the merits of that  ruling is not appealed,8 Rule 8-602 (e) (1) (C) does not
authorize an appellate court nevertheless to enter final judgment on its own initiative.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
DISMISS THE RESPONDENTS’ APPEALS.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENTS.