Case Title: Pote v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pote v. State1987 WY 24733 P.2d 1018Case Number: 86-120Decided: 03/06/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charles 
Arthur POTE, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff)

 
 
Richard 
Wolf, Cheyenne, 
for Appellant.

 
 
And 
Charles Arthur Pote, Pro Se.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Terry L. Armitage, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. 

 
 
Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. Brown, C.J., delivered 
the opinion of the court; Urbigkit, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
district court's denial of appellant's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Appellant raises the following issues:

 
 
I

 
 
"Did the 
Court err in not disqualifying himself from hearing the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief?

 
 
II

 
 
"Did the 
Court err in not granting Appellant a hearing on the 
Petition.

 
 
III

 
 
"Were 
Appellant's constitutional rights to due process of law violated when the state 
failed to comply with discovery in the Appellant's trial.

 
 
IV

 
 
"Was 
Appellant denied due process of law when the Court imposed a criminal sentence 
which was disproportionate to the crime."

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant Charles 
Arthur Pote was convicted in 1983 by a ParkCounty jury of numerous crimes, and on 
September 30, 1983, appellant was sentenced as follows:

 
 
"Count 
I, aiding and abetting second-degree murder, in violation of § 6-4-104, 
W.S.1977. Count II, aiding and abetting attempted second-degree murder, in 
violation of § 6-4-104, W.S.1977. Count III, unlawful possession of deadly 
weapon with intent to threaten, in violation of 6-1-101, W.S.1977, a single 
sentence of life imprisonment at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with 
eligibility for parole after serving twenty-five years and a fine of 
$41,000.

 
 
"Count 
V, attempted first-degree murder of a police officer, in violation of § 6-4-101, W.S.1977, a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole, such sentence to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed 
on Counts I, II and III, and a fine of $1,000.

 
 
"Count 
VI, concealing stolen goods, in violation of § 6-7-304, W.S.1977. Count VIII, 
concealing stolen goods, in violation of § 6-7-304, W.S.1977, a single sentence 
of ten years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with eligibility for parole 
after having served seven years and six months, said sentence to be served 
consecutive to the sentences previously imposed, and a fine of 
$1,000.

 
 
"Count 
VII, criminal trespass, a sentence of three months in the ParkCounty 
jail in Cody, Wyoming, and a fine of $750. Appellant 
received 92 days credit against this sentence."

 
 
Subsequently, 
this court affirmed appellant's 1983 conviction and sentence. See Pote v. State, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 617 (1985).

 
 

[¶4.]     On September 17, 1985, 
appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On March 31, 1986, Mr. 
Pote's petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the district court and 
this appeal from the district court's order of denial 
followed.

 
 

[¶5.]     In appellant's 24-page 
petition for post-conviction relief he attempts to identify numerous 
circumstances that denied him a fair and impartial trial in 1983. Generally, 
these matters were urged by appellant in his original appeal or could have been 
and should have been brought to our attention in the first 
instance.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶6.]     The main thrust of this 
appeal is that it was error for the district judge to refuse to disqualify 
himself from hearing and determining appellant's petition for post-conviction 
relief.

 
 

[¶7.]     Although appellant 
sometimes speaks of peremptory disqualification, his remedy if any, is under 
Rule 23(e), Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Disqualification for cause." 
He exercised his peremptory disqualification against Judge Dixon before his 1983 
trial. The petition here for post-conviction relief is the same case (State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County, Wyo., 
696 P.2d 54 (1985); and appellant is not entitled to an additional 
peremptory disqualification.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant persists in 
the perverse notion that he can try to create bias and prejudice by his own 
conduct and then disqualify the trial judge. For example, before the original 
trial in 1983 appellant attempted to disqualify Judge Nicholas from conducting 
the trial. He had previously exercised a peremptory disqualification of Judge 
Dixon. In support of his motion to disqualify the trial judge appellant filed an 
affidavit. In the affidavit he vilified Judge Nicholas at great length, and in 
conclusion, stated that if Judge Nicholas was not prejudiced against him before 
the affidavit, he would be now after reading it. In the present case appellant 
appears to be trying to do the same thing.

 
 

[¶9.]     On October 7, 1985, 
appellant filed a motion to disqualify Judge Nicholas from hearing his petition 
for post-conviction relief. He based his motion on:

 
 
1) 
Material in the record and court file.

2) 
Material alleged in his petition for post-conviction 
relief.

3) 
Appellant's pending grievance against Judge Nicholas before the Wyoming Bar 
Association and the Judicial Ethics Committee [sic].

4) 
Anticipated federal litigation by appellant against Judge 
Nicholas.

 
 

[¶10.]  The circumstances referred to in 
appellant's petition, more than two dozen in number, occurred before his trial, 
during trial, before and at sentencing or while he was in the Park County jail, 
some of which had nothing to do with Judge Nicholas. These allegations are not 
supported by affidavits or depositions, are conclusionary, and some are 
irrelevant and argumentative. Furthermore, the great bulk of these allegations 
were considered by the court in connection with one of appellant's issues in his 
original appeal.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant asks this court to search the 
record for materials which he claims will demonstrate that Judge Nicholas was 
biased and prejudiced. The record consists of 221 pages and contains separate 
documents. Most of these entries are copies of letters and other communications 
authored by appellant, and apparently sent to various and sundry people. For 
example, there is a letter to the President of the United States 
with receipt requested, and also, a petition requesting that appellant be 
granted asylum in absentia and recognized as a political prisoner. The record on 
appeal mainly consists of numerous copies of letters to the Governor of the 
State of Wyoming, the Wyoming Supreme Court, Judge 
Nicholas, Judge Dixon, and others.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant's petition for post-conviction 
relief with respect to Judge Nicholas' bias and prejudice are merely bare 
allegations unsupported by affidavits, depositions or any other evidence that 
may be admissible at a hearing. The myriad of letters and other communications 
in the record do not support the allegation in the 
petition.

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant's petition is patently 
insufficient and does not comply with Rule 23(e), Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which provides:

 
 
"Disqualification 
for cause. -- Whenever the grounds for such motion [motion for disqualification] 
become known, the state or the defendant may move for a change of district judge 
on the ground that the presiding judge is biased or prejudiced against the 
state, the prosecuting attorney, the defendant or his attorney. The motion shall 
be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any person or persons stating 
sufficient facts to show the existence of such ground. Prior to a hearing on the 
motion any party may file counter-affidavits. The presiding judge shall rule on 
the motion, and if he grants the same shall immediately call in another district 
judge to try the action. A ruling on a motion for change of district judge shall 
not be an appealable order, but the ruling shall be entered on the docket and 
made a part of the record, and may be assigned as error in an appeal of the 
case."

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant has not demonstrated to us that 
Judge Nicholas was biased and prejudiced and should have been disqualified from 
hearing the motion for post-conviction ruling. He has merely brought to our 
attention a mass of vexatious materials created by him, directed to Judge 
Nicholas. Appellant apparently asks us to conclude that these materials, 
designed to rile the district judge, resulted in him being biased and 
prejudiced. This we cannot do. Appellant has not met his 
burden.

 
 

[¶15.]  The "bias" which is a ground for 
disqualification of a judge must be personal. Such conditions must exist which 
reflect prejudgment of the case by the judge or a leaning of his mind in favor 
of one party to the extent that his decision in the matter is based on grounds 
other than the evidence placed before him. Cline 
v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725 
(1979).

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant has the burden to demonstrate 
that the judge was biased and prejudiced. He has failed in that 
burden.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶17.]  In appellant's second issue on appeal he 
complains that it was error for the district judge to act on his petition for 
post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The statutes pertinent to 
this issue provide in part:

 
 
"Any 
person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which 
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under 
the constitution of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may 
institute proceedings under this act [§§ 7-14-101 to 
7-14-108]. * * * *" § 7-14-101, 
W.S.1977.

 
 
"* * * * 
The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting the allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. The 
petition shall identify any previous proceedings that the petitioner may have 
taken to secure relief from his conviction. Argument, citations, and discussion 
of authorities shall be omitted from the petition." § 
7-14-102, W.S.1977.

 
 
"The 
court may receive proof by affidavits, deposition, oral testimony, or other 
evidence. In its discretion the court may order the petitioner brought before 
the court for the hearing. * * * *" § 7-14-106, 
W.S.1977.

 
 

[¶18.]  The post-conviction procedure set forth 
in the statutes does not require a formal hearing nor does it require that the 
petitioner be brought before the court. Whether a formal hearing is held or a 
petitioner is brought personally before the court depends on the circumstances 
of each case. Bibbins v. State, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1300 
(1985).

 
 

[¶19.]  A petition is properly denied without an 
evidentiary hearing where it contains only bald allegations and conclusions with 
no supporting factual materials. Boggs v. 
State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711 (1971). Therefore, 
in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for 
post-conviction relief the petition must contain more than naked allegations and 
conclusions and documents. Petitioner must plead a substantial claim and 
demonstrate how the allegations can be proven. Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 696 P.2d 54 (1985).

 
 

[¶20.]  Appellant states in his petition that 
police officers instructed witnesses not to speak with the defense. He does not 
say who these witnesses are, what they could testify to or whether or not they 
testified at his trial. Mr. Pote contends that a material witness, his wife, 
Connie Pote, was harassed and run out of town because she would not lie to the 
jury. Appellant further contends that while in the Park County Jail his 
telephone conversations were recorded and mail censored. He also states that 
while in jail he was subjected to physical torture.

 
 

[¶21.]  The only material in support of 
appellant's petition is the affidavit of Connie Pote. In her affidavit Connie 
Pote said it was she rather than appellant who did some of the criminal acts for 
which appellant was charged and that Mr. Pote was totally innocent. She 
testified on behalf of appellant at his 1983 trial and testified to some of the 
matters now set out in her affidavit. At trial she was not inhibited from 
testifying to anything appellant asked her.

 
 

[¶22.]  It would be a curious procedure to allow 
appellant to produce part of his exculpatory evidence at trial, but save some 
for post-conviction relief in the event he was not successful at trial. 
Obviously appellant knew as much about Connie Pote's testimony before and at 
trial as he does now, and he does not contend otherwise. So far as we can tell, 
if an evidentiary hearing were held, appellant could do no more than testify 
orally to the same things contained in his petition.

 
 

[¶23.]  In summary, appellant's petition is 
comprised of naked allegations and conclusions unsupported by depositions or 
affidavits nor does he tell us how his allegations could be proven. Hence, the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not affording appellant an 
evidentiary hearing.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶24.]  In his third issue appellant states that 
he was denied due process of law when the prosecution failed to comply with the 
court's order to disclose all discovery material. This same issue was raised and 
discussed in Mr. Pote's first appeal, Pote v. 
State, supra, at 624. However, in 
the present appeal he focuses on the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 
his first appeal appellant made a due process argument, albeit cursory. He now 
cites additional cases in support of the same argument, relying primarily in 
this appeal on the case of Brady v. State of 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).1

 
 

[¶25.]  It is universally recognized that 
post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal and the petition will 
not lie where the matters alleged as error could or should have been raised in 
an appeal or in some other alternative manner. Munoz v. Maschner, Wyo., 
590 P.2d 1352 (1979).

 
 

[¶26.]  The post-conviction statute does not give 
an appellant the right to have his cases tried over, and may not be employed as 
a substitute for an appeal. Issues disposed of in a previous appeal from the 
judgment of conviction are res judicata as to subsequent post-conviction 
proceedings. The Wyoming post-conviction statute does not 
afford relief from alleged errors for which remedies were available before and 
during the original trial. Johnson v. 
State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 285 (1979), cert. denied sub nom, 
442 U.S. 932, 99 S. Ct. 2864, 61 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1979).

 
 

[¶27.]  Appellant has not met his burden to show 
that he has been denied constitutional safeguards, nor has he demonstrated that 
we should depart from or modify that which was said in his first 
appeal.

 
 
IV

 
 

[¶28.]  In appellant's fourth issue on appeal he 
contends that he was denied due process of law when the trial court imposed a 
criminal sentence which was disproportionate to the crime.

 
 

[¶29.]  Appellant was convicted of six felonies 
and one misdemeanor, and received four separate sentences. The court considered 
several of the offenses to have merged, resulting in single sentences for 
several convictions.

 
 

[¶30.]  The court imposed a single sentence of 
life imprisonment, with eligibility for parole after serving twenty-five years 
and a fine of $1,000, for aiding and abetting second-degree murder, aiding and 
abetting attempted second degree murder and unlawful possession of a deadly 
weapon with intent to threaten. Also, for attempted first-degree murder of a 
police officer, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole, and a fine of $1,000. Additionally, the court imposed a single sentence 
of ten years imprisonment, with eligibility for parole after seven years and six 
months, and a fine of $1,000, for two concealment crimes. In each instance, the 
sentence imposed was the maximum permitted by law for the offense involved and 
the sentences were to be served consecutively.

 
 

[¶31.]  In his original appeal appellant 
contended that his sentence was unlawful but he did not specifically raise the 
issue that his sentence was disproportionate to the crimes for which he was 
convicted.

 
 

[¶32.]  Appellant's position with respect to this 
issue is not unlike his position in the last issue, that is, the discovery 
issue. In this issue he attacks the propriety of his sentence, but his focus is 
different than was his focus in his first appeal. Again, we repeat, that the law 
does not allow an appellant to assert some issues in his direct appeal and save 
some to be raised as post-conviction issues if he fails in his direct appeal. We 
know of no authority to support such procedure.

 
 

[¶33.]  Appellant does not contend that he could 
not have raised the proportionality issue in his first appeal and obviously he 
could have and should have. We hold that failure to properly raise the 
proportionality issue on direct appeal is a bar to its being raised in a 
post-conviction relief proceeding. Hoggatt v. 
State, Wyo., 606 P.2d 718 (1980); and Munoz v. Maschner, 
supra.

 
 

[¶34.]  In the proportionality issue appellant 
relies principally on Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). In that case the court 
said:

 
 
"* * * * 
We agree, therefore that, 'outside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences 
[will be] exceedingly rare,' * * * *. This does not mean, however, that 
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital 
cases.

 
 
"In sum, 
we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate 
to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of 
course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that 
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess 
in sentencing convicted criminals. But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. * * * *" Id., 463 U.S.  at 289-290, 103 S. Ct.  at 3009-3010, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 
649.

 
 

[¶35.]  Solem v. Helm, 
supra, was 
far different than the case before us now. In that case the defendant was 
convicted in a South 
Dakota trial court of uttering a "no account" check in 
the sum of $100. For this horrible crime defendant was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. A sentence of this magnitude 
resulted because of South 
Dakota's recidivist statute. The defendant had been 
convicted six times before for crimes the United States Supreme Court 
characterized as nonviolent. The United States Supreme Court held that this 
sentence was disproportionate to the crime committed. The Court also extended 
the proportionality analysis to noncapital cases, and in effect, held that any 
sentence of imprisonment is subject to proportionality 
scrutiny.

 
 

[¶36.]  In the case before us, unlike Solem v. Helm, 
supra, the convictions resulting in two consecutive life sentences were 
crimes of violence, resulting in one death and others placed in danger of being 
killed.

 
 

[¶37.]  Giving substantial deference to the broad 
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and 
limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts 
are afforded, we cannot determine that the sentences imposed in this case were 
disproportionate to the crimes for which he was convicted.

 
 

[¶38.]  We have carefully considered the four 
issues raised on appeal. We cannot say that appellant was denied a fair trial or 
was not afforded due process in the first instance or with respect to his 
petition for post-conviction relief.

 
 

[¶39.]  Affirmed.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶40.]  I dissent.

 
 

[¶41.]  I would reverse to give an actual hearing 
before another judge. The decision in State ex 
rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County, Wyo., 696 P.2d 54 (1985) is founded on neither 
compelling precedent nor adjudicatorily fair logic. Present application of the 
Hopkinson rule to any later case is not acceptable to me.

 
 

[¶42.]  If the contentions of the defendant in 
the statutorily provided and constitutionally premised proceedings of § 7-14-101, et seq., W.S.1977 are legally 
unsustained or factually unsupported, society is not at risk in providing a fair 
and adequate hearing by an impartial jurist.

 
 

[¶43.]  I would reverse and re-assign to another 
judge in accord with the philosophy of the statute, Ch. 63, S.L. of Wyoming 
1961:

 
 
"AN ACT 
to provide a remedy for persons convicted and imprisoned in the penitentiary, 
who assert that rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the 
United States or the State of 
Wyoming, or 
both, have been denied or violated in proceedings in which they were 
convicted."

 
 
See Art. 
1, §§ 6, 8, and 14 of the Wyoming Constitution, 
and Amendments V, VIII, and XIV of the United States 
Constitution.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In Brady, the court 
said:

 
 
"We now hold that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 
(1963).