Case Title: Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89269

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89269-Agenda 17-January 2001.
LARRY GEDDES et al., Appellants, v. MILL CREEK
 COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Larry and Choh-Ying Geddes, filed a complaint in
the circuit court of Kane County against defendants, Mill Creek
Country Club, Inc., and American Golf Corporation. The
complaint contained actions for intentional trespass and intentional
private nuisance based on errant golf balls hit onto their property
from defendants' adjacent golf course. Following a bench trial, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants. The appellate
court affirmed. No. 2-99-0370 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We allowed plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We now affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	Plaintiffs' complaint, as amended, alleged as follows.
Plaintiffs own approximately 16 acres of land in Kane County.
They reside on the property and use it for their gradually
developing agricultural and landscaping business.
	Mill Creek Country Club constructed and owns a golf course
known as Mill Creek Golf Club. The course is leased to American
Golf Corporation, which performs daily tasks such as collecting
greens fees and maintaining the course.
	Defendants caused and allowed golf balls to continually
invade plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs' business is seasonal and
coincides with the golf season."[D]ue to the constant stream of
uninvited, wayward golf balls," plaintiffs have not been able to use
significant portions of their property. Defendants' intentional acts
constituted both an intentional trespass and a private nuisance.
Plaintiffs sought an injunction against defendants, i.e., plaintiffs
asked the trial court to "enjoin the Defendants from causing and
allowing the continual trespass of golf balls to occur." Plaintiffs
also sought compensatory and punitive damages.
	In their answer, defendants denied all material allegations and
pled the affirmative defense of estoppel. Defendants alleged that
plaintiffs were estopped from bringing their claims by virtue of
plaintiffs' conduct, memorialized in a prior agreement.
	Prior to trial, the court: denied plaintiffs' motion for a
temporary restraining order; entered an agreed order dismissing
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction; denied defendants'
motion to dismiss (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1998));
and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (see 735
ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1998)). The cause proceeded to a bench
trial.
	The evidence at trial included the testimony of plaintiffs; Kent
Shodeen, president of Sho-Deen, Inc.; and David Patzelt, vice-president of Sho-Deen. The parties presented the following
pertinent evidence. In 1986, plaintiffs bought 16.5 acres in Kane
County. The property is rectangular in shape, with the north-south
dimension slightly larger than the east-west dimension.
	In the same area, Sho-Deen was developing approximately
1,450 acres as a planned unit development. A planned unit
development is a land use control device that often combines
subdivision regulations and zoning for the unified development of
a large geographic area. Rather than seeking piecemeal variances
or rezoning, a coordinated plan is drawn up and approved as a
special use for the entire proposed area. See 9 Real Property
Service: Illinois §49:1, at 8 (1989); accord 2 K. Young,
Anderson's American Law of Zoning §11:12 et seq. (1989). The
concept of this development, known as the Mill Creek
Development, was to combine open space with residential areas.
A golf course was to constitute part of that open space. The
development surrounds plaintiffs' property. A public road, Bartelt
Road, adjoins the east side of the property. The land adjoining
plaintiffs' western boundary was formerly a cornfield.
	In 1986 and 1987, Shodeen interviewed golf course architects.
He also began work with government agencies and adjoining
neighbors of the development, including plaintiffs, to obtain
approval and authority for planning the development. The
neighbors had the right to contest the development by objecting to
those government agencies.
	In 1991, the Mill Creek Country Club, Inc., was created as a
subsidiary to Sho-Deen, with Shodeen as the country club's sole
shareholder. Its purpose was to design and build a golf course.
	In April 1992, Shodeen invited plaintiffs and other neighbors
to review the concept plan for the development. For the next two
years, plaintiffs and Shodeen negotiated. However, they now
disagree as to the subject of their negotiations and the result
thereof.
	According to defendants, Shodeen negotiated with plaintiffs
so that the development would impact them as little as possible.
The original concept plan provided for the rear lawns of single-family residences to adjoin plaintiffs' western boundary. Facing
these residences would be a golf course fairway. The fairway
would have residences facing it on the east and the west. In other
words, the residences facing the fairway on the east would stand
between it and plaintiffs' western boundary.
	Plaintiffs told Shodeen that they did not want housing
adjoining their property. Shodeen then permitted plaintiffs to
choose between the housing, a bicycle path, or the fairway.
Plaintiffs chose the fairway to abut their property's western
boundary and made other requests that he granted. Accordingly,
Shodeen changed the development plan by removing the housing
on the east side of the fairway and relocating the fairway to adjoin
plaintiffs' western boundary.
	According to Shodeen, Larry Geddes not only negotiated an
agreement with Shodeen, but also publicly endorsed it. In June or
July 1993, Geddes spoke at a county development planning
committee meeting. Geddes said that "he had worked quite a bit
with Mr. Shodeen in order to get things where they are, and he
didn't want the board to mess around with it." By that time,
Shodeen and Geddes had agreed on placing the golf course
adjacent to the western boundary of plaintiffs' property.
	However, according to plaintiffs, they did not negotiate any
specific land use of defendants' property. Rather, plaintiffs only
wanted assurances from defendants that the use of their property
would not impact plaintiffs' property use. Plaintiffs never
requested that a golf course-especially a golf course fairway-be
located adjacent to their property.
	On June 3, 1994, plaintiffs and Sho-Deen signed an
agreement, which stated in pertinent part:
		"Sho-Deen, Inc., will provide and install at its expense an
eight foot (8') high chain link fence with two (2) fourteen
foot (14') entrance gates on Bartelt Road along the
complete common border of the Mill Creek Development
with the Geddes' property. The fence and gates will be
installed when the golf course fairway that borders the
Geddes' western property line is constructed ***."
(Emphasis added.)
The agreement further provides as follows. Sho-Deen would plant
a landscape border along the Mill Creek side of the fence. Sho-Deen would not plan a bicycle path along any border of plaintiffs'
property, or construct any houses within 100 feet of the south and
west boundaries thereof. Sho-Deen would provide for a 40-foot
"green area and landscape easement" along the south boundary of
plaintiffs' property. The agreement made several references to a
"golf course." The agreement concludes that plaintiffs agree not to
protest the development as long as Sho-Deen complies with the
agreement.
	Sho-Deen received county approval for the Mill Creek
development. None of the neighboring property owners or relevant
government agencies objected. The development has received an
award for design excellence from the National Association of
Builders.
	Mill Creek Country Club interviewed approximately 25
architects before hiring golf course architect Roy Case to design
the Mill Creek Golf Course. Case followed all recognized design
criteria. The golf hole at issue is described in the record as either
"Hole #5" or "Hole #14" (hereafter, fifth hole). The fairway for the
fifth hole runs south to north and lies adjacent to the western
boundary of plaintiffs' property. The hole is designed so that the
first shot is slightly to the west of, i.e., away from, plaintiffs'
property. The second shot is slightly east, towards the northwest
corner of the property.
	The fairway for the fifth hole is 300 feet wide, and is
separated from plaintiffs' property by a 25-foot "rough" area. An
asphalt golf cart path lies between the fairway and the rough. As
noted earlier, an eight-foot-high chain link fence and landscaping,
which includes trees over that height, surround plaintiffs' property.
	The width of both the fairway and the rough meet recognized
design standards. Similar 25-foot separations exist elsewhere in
the development.
	The following conditions favor golfers hitting errant shots
toward plaintiffs' property. The prevailing winds move from the
west to the east. Also, most golfers slice rather than hook, i.e., hit
the ball to the right of the target as opposed to the left. The
following conditions disfavor golfers hitting errant shots toward
plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs' property is out of bounds; golfers
are penalized if they hit balls onto plaintiffs' land. No part of the
fairway runs in the direction of plaintiffs' property. Also, the fence
and trees separate the fifth hole from plaintiffs' property.
	Mill Creek Golf Course began operating in 1996. The course
is open to the public. In 1997, approximately 21,000 rounds of
golf were played there; in 1998, approximately 23,500 rounds
were played. An average of approximately 30,000 rounds of golf
are played on courses in the greater Chicagoland area.
	When the course opened, plaintiffs began to find golf balls on
their property. During the 1997 and 1998 golf seasons, plaintiffs
collected 2,128 golf balls on their property. Some of these had
landed as far away as 300 feet from the property's western
boundary.
	Plaintiffs testified as to how the invading golf balls harmed
them. Plaintiffs previously grew alfalfa in the area where the golf
balls landed. Indeed, a golf ball once struck Larry's tractor while
he was mowing the alfalfa field. Plaintiffs planned to use the
affected area to grow plants for sale, cultivate "pick-your-own"
vegetables, and build greenhouses and similar structures. Plaintiffs
had drilled a well and had hired an architect to plan a retail nursery
building. Plaintiffs feared that the golf balls would injure
themselves, their family, and their customers, and would damage
their planned greenhouses.
	However, the following evidence was also adduced at trial.
Plaintiffs' residence and other existing buildings are not in the
affected area. No person on plaintiffs' property had ever been
struck by an invading golf ball. Persons on plaintiffs' property
would be in no more danger of being struck than those walking in
other areas in the development. No one had ever told plaintiffs that
the golf balls inhibited the property's suitability for being farmed.
Plaintiffs stopped growing the alfalfa crop not because of the golf
balls, but rather because they planned to use that land for
cultivating plants for their nursery business. No one had ever told
plaintiffs that the golf balls prevented them from placing
greenhouses in the area or cultivating plants for their nursery
business.
	Shodeen was asked whether, at the time of the agreement, he
knew that plaintiffs would have golf balls on their property. He
answered: "I would imagine they'd have some, sure." However, it
"[d]idn't occur" to him to "specifically tell them they were going
to have golf balls." Also, the agreement with Sho-Deen did not
specifically mention the possibility of golf balls entering plaintiffs'
property.
	Plaintiffs testified that they knew nothing about the game of
golf. If plaintiffs had anticipated the golf ball problem and its
impact on their property, they would have objected to the golf
course.
	Defendants presented testimony that the development
generally increased the value of plaintiffs' property. Sho-Deen
paid for most of the construction costs of a new school located
near plaintiffs' property. A neighborhood school further increases
property values. Particularly, the placement of the golf course
fairway adjacent to plaintiffs' property further enhanced the value
of plaintiffs' land.
	Plaintiffs complained to defendants that the invading golf
balls interfered with plaintiffs' business and residential quality of
life. Defendants, through their legal counsel, responded only that
the course met industry standards. However, Shodeen talked with 
plaintiffs about defendants' possibly planting additional trees
adjoining plaintiffs' property, but no agreement was reached. At
least once, Shodeen asked plaintiffs if they wanted to relocate at
his expense. According to Shodeen, it would not be possible to
relocate or otherwise change the fifth hole because of the various
approvals necessary from all of the applicable government
agencies.
	In closing argument, plaintiffs clarified that they were not
seeking monetary damages. They also acknowledged "that it's
virtually impossible to abate *** all of the golf balls from coming
into their property. Once in awhile you're going to have an errant
shot. It's going to go in there." However, plaintiffs complained
that "they've gotten absolutely nothing from the Defendants." In
their trial brief, plaintiffs suggested, inter alia, that the court
"could order that [the fifth hole] be closed until such time that
Defendants have implemented a plan to abate the trespass and
nuisance,"
	Following the trial, the court found, inter alia:
			"4) *** [T]here was no evidence produced as to what
specific acts the defendants themselves engaged in or the
manner in which those activities were conducted which
caused or enabled the golf balls to go into plaintiffs'
property.
			5) Moreover there was no evidence produced as to what
actions the defendants could have taken, but didn't, to
prevent or limit the golf balls from landing in plaintiffs'
property.
			6) Rather the evidence shows that the Fifth Hole by
design went north from the teebox to the green requiring
that golf balls be driven in a direction other than toward
the plaintiffs' property.
			7) In addition the easterly border of the defendants'
property immediately adjacent to the plaintiffs' property
was landscaped in such a fashion as to render it out of
bounds to golfers thereby removing any need or incentive
to intentionally drive a golf ball in the direction of the
plaintiffs' property.
			8) Use of one's property for a golf course is neither
unlawful nor a nuisance per se and there was no evidence
produced that the golf course here constituted an ultra
hazardous activity.
			9) Under the circumstances shown by the evidence
produced by the plaintiffs a claim to enjoin altogether the
use by defendants of their property as a golf hole is over
broad and facially inequitable.
			10) The plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of
proof."
The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants.
	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed,
holding that the trial court's judgment was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. No. 2-99-0370 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court concluded that
defendants' conduct did not constitute an intentional trespass and
an intentional private nuisance. Accordingly, the appellate court
reasoned that there was no basis for the trial court to issue an
injunction.
	Plaintiffs appeal. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed
in the context of the issues raised on appeal.
DISCUSSION
	Plaintiffs contend that the evidence at trial demonstrated that
defendants' conduct resulted in an intentional trespass and an
intentional private nuisance. Defendants contend that the evidence
demonstrated that plaintiffs should be estopped from bringing their
claims. We first consider defendants' contention.
Equitable Estoppel
	Defendants invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Defendants claim that plaintiffs, by their conduct, are estopped
from bringing their action. According to defendants, plaintiffs
chose the fairway over other options that Sho-Deen presented to
them and made other requests that Sho-Deen granted. Sho-Deen,
at great expense, redesigned the development plan to
accommodate plaintiffs. The agreement between plaintiffs and
Sho-Deen, which contains several references to a golf course and
a specific reference to the fairway, memorializes plaintiffs'
requests. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' conduct prevents them
from maintaining this action.
	Defendants pled this affirmative defense and presented
supporting evidence and argument in the trial court and argued it
in the appellate court. The trial court made no findings regarding
this issue and the appellate court did not address it. However, "the
appellee may urge any point in support of the judgment on appeal,
even though not directly ruled on by the trial court, so long as the
factual basis for such point was before the trial court." Shaw v.
Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969); accord American National
Bank & Trust Co. v. National Advertising Co., 149 Ill. 2d 14, 21
(1992); La Salle National Bank v. Village of Grayslake, 29 Ill. 2d 489, 492 (1963). Since the record contains the factual basis for the
defense of equitable estoppel, we will address the merits of this
contention.
	The general rule is that where a person by his or her
statements and conduct leads a party to do something that the party
would not have done but for such statements and conduct, that
person will not be allowed to deny his or her words or acts to the
damage of the other party. Dill v. Widman, 413 Ill. 448, 455
(1952); Bondy v. Samuels, 333 Ill. 535, 545 (1929). Equitable
estoppel may be defined as the effect of the person's conduct
whereby the person is barred from asserting rights that might
otherwise have existed against the other party who, in good faith,
relied upon such conduct and has been thereby led to change his
or her position for the worse. M.J. Oldenstedt Plumbing Co. v.
K mart Corp., 257 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764 (1994); Byron Community
Unit School District No. 226 v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 215 Ill. App.
3d 343, 348 (1991); 18 Ill. L. & Prac. Estoppel §22 (1956).
	To establish equitable estoppel, the party claiming estoppel
must demonstrate that: (1) the other person misrepresented or
concealed material facts; (2) the other person knew at the time he
or she made the representations that they were untrue; (3) the party
claiming estoppel did not know that the representations were
untrue when they were made and when they were acted upon; (4)
the other person intended or reasonably expected that the party
claiming estoppel would act upon the representations; (5) the party
claiming estoppel reasonably relied upon the representations in
good faith to his or her detriment; and (6) the party claiming
estoppel would be prejudiced by his or her reliance on the
representations if the other person is permitted to deny the truth
thereof. Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 162-63 (1988).
	Regarding the first two elements, the representation need not
be fraudulent in the strict legal sense or done with an intent to
mislead or deceive. Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap
Processing, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 133, 148 (1986). Although fraud is an
essential element, it is sufficient that a fraudulent or unjust effect
results from allowing another person to raise a claim inconsistent
with his or her former declarations. Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 86 (1976); Dill, 413 Ill.  at 456; M.J. Oldenstedt Plumbing
Co., 257 Ill. App. 3d at 764. The following corollary must be
remembered:
		"Estoppel may arise from silence as well as words. It may
arise where there is a duty to speak and the party on
whom the duty rests has an opportunity to speak, and,
knowing the circumstances, keeps silent. [Citations.] It is
the duty of a person having a right, and seeing another
about to commit an act infringing upon it, to assert his
right. He cannot by his silence induce or encourage the
commission of the act and then be heard to complain."
Bondy, 333 Ill.  at 546.
	The question of estoppel must depend on the facts of each
case. The party claiming estoppel has the burden of proving it by
clear and unequivocal evidence. Jennings v. Bituminous Casualty
Corp., 47 Ill. App. 2d 243, 249 (1964); see 18 Ill. L. & Prac.
Estoppel §36 (1956).
	Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that
defendants' estoppel defense is meritorious. Injustice would result
in allowing plaintiffs to bring these claims. Plaintiffs, by their
conduct, induced or encouraged defendants to design and build the
fifth hole. For plaintiffs to assert these claims now would be
inequitable and damage defendants.
	Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the consequences of their conduct
with Sho-Deen. Initially, plaintiffs claim in their reply brief that
they "never requested that the golf course be located next to their
property." (Emphasis added.) This is beside the point. The record
clearly and unequivocally shows that plaintiffs knowingly agreed
to the placement of the fairway. The original concept plan
provided for single-family residences to adjoin the western
boundary of the property. Sometime during the following two
years, Sho-Deen and plaintiffs agreed on the placement of the fifth
hole fairway next to plaintiffs' property. The record contains
unrebutted testimony that, prior to signing the formal agreement,
Larry Geddes informed a county development planning committee
meeting of his work with Shodeen and asked the board not to alter
any of the proposed plans as they related to him. Finally, plaintiffs
signed the 1994 agreement, which refers throughout to a golf
course, and once specifically to "the golf course fairway that
borders the Geddes' western property line."
	Acknowledging that they agreed to the placement of the fifth
hole adjacent to their property, plaintiffs contend that their
decision was not a knowing one. In their reply brief, plaintiffs
argue that "the agreement is silent as it relates to golf balls," and
"the concept of golf balls is never addressed in the 1994
agreement." Plaintiffs testified that when they signed the
agreement, and during the construction of the golf course, they
knew nothing about the game of golf. They had no idea of the
number of errant golf balls that would enter their property.
	This contention lacks merit. That golfers do not always hit
their golf balls straight is a matter of common knowledge; it is a
fact that needs no supporting evidence, a principle that needs no
citation of authority. Courts have long acknowledged this axiom:
" 'It is well known that not every shot played by a golfer goes to
the point where he intends it to go. If such were the case, every
player would be perfect and the whole pleasure of the sport would
be lost.' " Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225,
241 (1938), quoting Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471,
475-76, 157 A. 10, 11 (1931); accord Patton v. Westwood Country
Club Co., 18 Ohio App. 2d 137, 139, 247 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1969)
("It is generally known that the average golfer does not always hit
the ball straight"). Indeed, "it is a matter of common knowledge
that on practically all golf courses, including those constructed on
vast acreages where the fairways are wide and well separated by
rough and shrubs," a golfer can slice or hook a ball off of the
fairway. Campion, 295 Ill. App. at 235. For a thorough discussion
of the various golf errors that could result in golf balls intruding on
plaintiffs' property, see Patton, 18 Ohio App. 2d at 139-40, 247 N.E.2d  at 763. This condition is as natural as gravity or ordinary
rainfall.
	We repeat: it is a matter of common knowledge that golfers
do not always hit their shots straight. Defendants knew it. This
axiomatic proposition is evidenced by Shodeen's assumption that
plaintiffs would have some golf balls on their property. However,
plaintiffs also knew it. This is evidenced by the agreement
provision that plaintiffs' property be surrounded by an eight-foot-high fence with landscaping that includes trees over that height.
Even assuming that plaintiffs did not know of this fact of life, they
reasonably should have. Plaintiffs cannot avoid the reasonable
results of their conduct.
	Regarding the third element of equitable estoppel, defendants
did not know, either at the time of the agreement or during the
construction of the fifth hole, that plaintiffs would act in a manner
contrary to the agreement. Fourth, plaintiffs, of course, expected
that Sho-Deen would perform all of the provisions of the 1994
agreement. Plaintiffs' promise not to protest the construction of
the golf course, specifically the fifth hole, was conditional on Sho-Deen's compliance with the agreement.
	Fifth, defendants reasonably relied upon plaintiffs' conduct to
their detriment. All agreements between adults should be entered
into thoughtfully. This admonition takes on increased significance
in the context of a planned unit development:
			"Obtaining approval for a planned unit development
can involve considerable negotiation: with other
developers on a project, with the community, and with the
local zoning board. *** Often more amenities, such as
open space or recreational facilities, are provided under a
PUD [planned unit development] than could be required
by local law." (Emphasis added.) 9 Real Property Service:
Illinois §49:1, at 8 (1989).
The creation of the golf course, specifically the fifth hole, required
considerable negotiation with many public and private parties,
including plaintiffs. Sho-Deen obtained their approval and, based
thereon, built the fifth hole.
	Regarding the sixth element of equitable estoppel, defendants
would be prejudiced if plaintiffs were permitted to deny their
conduct. Initially, the original concept plan had residences
adjoining the fifth hole on the east, between the fairway and
plaintiffs' property. The record contains unrebutted evidence that
there would have been approximately 14 of these lots, and
Shodeen would have charged an additional $15,000 for each lot
because it would have adjoined the fairway. Thus, Sho-Deen lost
approximately $210,000 in lot "premiums" by placing these
residences elsewhere. Additionally, the record contains evidence
that Sho-Deen incurred other costs in relocating the fifth hole, e.g.,
$25,000 for re-engineering the area.
	Not only did Sho-Deen incur costs in relocating the fifth hole,
it now would be problematic to move it or close it. Residences
were planned for the west side of the fifth hole. The price of those
lots include the additional "premium" for adjoining the fairway. If
Sho-Deen now moved or closed the fifth hole, it could be liable
for violating the PUD agreement with other lot owners. See
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Weiss, 238 Ill. App. 3d 921, 925-26
(1992).
	"An injunction will be refused where the complainant has
actively encouraged defendant to undertake the work and then has
silently, without protest, permitted defendant to go ahead with the
work in disregard of the right of complainant." Bondy, 333 Ill.  at
551. In this case, plaintiffs are equitably estopped from bringing
their claims.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.