Case Title: Boyd J. Harrison v. Brenda A. Morrow and Samuel R. Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060300

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 07/06/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1060300
_________________________
Boyd J. Harrison
v.
Brenda A. Morrow and Samuel R. Anderson
Appeal from Winston Circuit Court
(CV-03-212)
WOODALL, Justice.
Boyd J. Harrison appeals from a judgment for Brenda A.
Morrow and Samuel R. Anderson on Harrison's complaint seeking
to declare the shares of Morrow and Anderson in the estate of
Alton Anderson, deceased, forfeited.  We affirm.  
1060300
In keeping with the practice of the testator and the
1
parties, we will use the terms "bequests" and "beneficiaries"
throughout this opinion, rather than the statutory terms
"devises" and "devisees."  See Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-1(5) and
(6).
"An in terrorem clause is '[a] provision designed to
2
threaten one into action or inaction; esp., a testamentary
provision that threatens to dispossess any beneficiary who
challenges the terms of the will.'"  Kershaw v. Kershaw, 848
So. 2d 942, 944 n.1 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 825 (7th ed. 1999)).
2
I. Factual Background
Alton Anderson died testate on March 24, 2000.  For all
purposes relevant to this appeal, his will named Morrow,
Anderson, and Harrison as beneficiaries,  and nominated Ben J.
1
Schillaci as the executor.  
The will also contained the following paragraph:
"E. Beneficiary Disputes. If any bequest requires
that the bequest be distributed between or among two
or more beneficiaries, the specific items of
property comprising the respective shares shall be
determined by such beneficiaries if they can agree,
and if not, by my Executor.  Any further dispute
between 
or 
among 
the 
beneficiaries 
regarding
distribution 
percentages 
or 
procedures 
shall
permanently 
disqualify 
that 
person 
from 
any
distribution.  If a bequest is contested this share
shall be distributed proportionately to the other
distributee(s) listed as beneficiaries."
(Hereinafter referred to as "the in terrorem provision.")2
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3
On July 7, 2001, Morrow and Anderson filed an application
to contest the will.  Based on expert handwriting analysis,
they alleged that the testator's signature was a forgery.  On
September 27, 2001, the probate court entered a judgment
denying the contest, admitting the will to probate, and
issuing letters testamentary to Schillaci.  Morrow and
Anderson appealed to the Winston Circuit Court, which affirmed
the judgment of the probate court.  On June 13, 2003, this
Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court without an
opinion.  Morrison v. Estate of Anderson (No. 1020154), 883
So. 2d 272 (Ala. 2003)(table).
Subsequently, on November 19, 2003, Schillaci filed in
the probate court a "petition for construction of will and
instruction as to proper distribution of estate."  The
petition sought a construction of the in terrorem provision in
the context of Morrow and Anderson's contest of the will.
Specifically, it  sought a determination as to "whether said
contest of the will ... caused [the] bequests to Brenda Morrow
and Samuel R. Anderson to be forfeited and distributed to
[Harrison]."  On the motion of Morrow and Anderson, the
administration of the estate was removed to the circuit court.
1060300
4
On February 23, 2004, Harrison filed a motion and
complaint in intervention, alleging that the will contest
operated as a forfeiture of Morrow's and Anderson's shares of
the estate pursuant to the in terrorem provision.  On March 2,
2004, Harrison's motion to intervene was granted.  Harrison
moved for a summary judgment.  On October 3, 2006, the circuit
court denied Harrison's summary-judgment motion and entered a
judgment in favor of Morrow and Anderson, holding that the
will contest did not violate the in terrorem provision, and,
consequently, that no forfeiture had occurred. Harrison
appealed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Harrison contends that the in terrorem
provision is unambiguous and plainly mandates a forfeiture.
In other words, he insists that the proscriptions in the in
terrorem provision encompass the will contest commenced by
Morrow and Anderson.  Morrow and Anderson agree that the in
terrorem provision is unambiguous, but contend that the
proscriptions clearly do not include the will contest they
prosecuted.  If they do include the will contest, they
contend, this Court should follow the lead of a number of
1060300
The parties agree that only two Alabama cases have
3
heretofore involved  in terrorem clauses: Kershaw v. Kershaw,
848 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2002), and Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501
(1881).  Neither case directly involved an issue regarding the
enforceability of in terrorem clauses per se.  Kershaw, 848
So. 2d at 950.
5
other jurisdictions and hold that in terrorem clauses are per
se unenforceable.  We need not determine whether in terrorem
clauses are unenforceable in Alabama when their enforceability
is specifically challenged, because we conclude that the will
contest did not fall within the proscriptions of the in
terrorem provision in this case.3
The resolution of this case turns on the construction of
a document.  "'[W]e apply a de novo review to a trial court's
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous and to a
trial court's determination of the legal effect of an
unambiguous contract term.'"  Young v. Pimperl, 882 So. 2d
828, 830 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Winkleblack v. Murphy, 811 So.
2d 521, 525-26 (Ala. 2001)).  We agree with the parties that
there is no ambiguity in the provision at issue in this case.
"An 'instrument is unambiguous if only one reasonable meaning
clearly emerges.'"  Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. First
Amfed Corp., 607 So. 2d 184, 186 (Ala. 1992)(quoting Vainrib
v. Downey, 565 So. 2d 647, 648 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)).  "When
1060300
6
the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the rules of
construction cannot be employed to rewrite that will and put
it at variance with the meaning of the language used by the
testator."  Windham v. Henderson, 658 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala.
1995).  "[W]ords employed in a will are to be taken in their
primary or ordinary sense and use, unless a different meaning
is indicated by the context and circumstances of the case
...."  Wiley v. Murphree, 228 Ala. 64, 68, 151 So. 869, 872
(Ala. 1933).
In Kershaw, although we pretermitted, as we do here,
discussion of the question of the enforceability of in
terrorem 
clauses, 
we nevertheless noted: "'Consistent with the
often expressed view that the law abhors a forfeiture, no-
contest provisions are looked upon with some disfavor and have
been strictly construed. ... A breach of a forfeiture clause
will be declared only when the acts of a party come strictly
within its expressed terms.'" 848 So. 2d at 955 (quoting
Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, What Constitutes Contest or
Attempt to Defeat Will Within Provision Thereof Forfeiting
Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 3 A.L.R. 5th 590 § 2[a]
(1992) (emphasis added)). 
1060300
7
The in terrorem provision consists of three sentences.
Some form of the word "distribute" appears four times in the
provision, at least once in each sentence.  In Kershaw, this
Court examined the implications of the use of the term
"distribute" in the context of estate administration.
Kershaw involved an in terrorem clause in the will of
Miriam M. Kershaw; that clause stated, in pertinent part: 
"'If either of my sons in any manner, directly
or indirectly, contests or attacks the validity of
this Will or the validity of any trust ... or any
disposition made under this Will or under any Trust
... by filing suit against my executor or the
trustee of any trust created by me or otherwise,
then any share or interest given to such son ...
shall be disposed of in the same manner as if such
son and all of his descendants had predeceased me.'"
848 So. 2d at 951 (emphasis added).  The issue was whether
Knox Kershaw, one of Miriam Kershaw's sons and one of two
beneficiaries under her will, had violated that clause by
commencing of an action to determine, among other things,  the
"proper use of proceeds from life insurance policies on Mrs.
Kershaw's life."  848 So. 2d at 947.  Under Knox's theory, the
proceeds should have been used to buy and convert to cash
outstanding stock in the family business, which stock
otherwise passed under the will to one of three inter vivos
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8
trusts, resulting in a diminution of the share of the estate
passing to Knox under the will.  Id.  
The trial court held that Knox had violated the in
terrorem clause, resulting in a forfeiture of his share of the
estate.  It concluded that "Knox's litigation constituted ...
'an effort to change distributions,'" because "different
amounts would be distributed to the two beneficiaries if
[Knox] prevailed on ... his claims with respect to the use of
the proceeds of the life insurance policies."   848 So. 2d at
949 (emphasis added).  This Court reversed the trial court's
judgment, explaining that the source of the trial court's
error lay in its "conflation of the terms distribution and
disposition."  848 So. 2d at 953 (emphasis added).  
We pointed out that under well-established and widely
understood principles, the "distribution of estate assets is
a function of the executor or administrator -- not the
testator," while a "testamentary disposition" is "the function
of the testator."  848 So. 2d at 952 (emphasis added).  On
that basis, we concluded that Knox had not "'directly or
indirectly, contest[ed] or attack[ed] ... any disposition made
under [the] Will.'" 848 So. 2d at 953 (emphasis added).  This
1060300
9
was so, because his "challenges [left] intact the formulas in
the ... will; they affect[ed] only the amount of the payout,"
that is, the distribution, "when those formulas were applied
to the assets."  848 So. 2d at 953. In other words, a
challenge to the manner of distribution did not implicate the
proscription on challenges to disposition.  Thus, Knox's
challenge to the manner of distribution of certain assets did
not amount to a challenge to the validity of the will itself.
This case is the converse of Kershaw in that, here, the
in terrorem provision purports to proscribe disputes regarding
distribution, rather than disposition, and the will contest
filed by Morrow and Anderson challenged the disposition,
rather than the distribution, of the assets.  The first
sentence refers to the distribution of specific bequests: "If
any bequest requires that the bequest be distributed between
or among two or more beneficiaries, the specific items of
property comprising the respective shares shall be determined
by such beneficiaries if they can agree, and if not, by my
Executor."  (Emphasis added.)  
Sentence two carries the subject of sentence one a step
further: 
"Any 
further 
dispute 
between 
or 
among 
the
1060300
10
beneficiaries 
regarding 
distribution 
percentages 
or 
procedures
shall 
permanently 
disqualify 
that 
person 
from 
any
distribution."  (Emphasis added.)  Sentence two does not
broaden the scope of sentence one.  This is so, because it
refers only to "further dispute[s]," that is, disputes of the
same class as are the subject of sentence one.  Also, sentence
two contains an additional clarifying clause, which is the
phrase "regarding distribution percentages or procedures."
(Emphasis added.)  This clause further illustrates that the in
terrorem provision refers to the distributive acts of the
executor, rather than to the dispositional acts of the
testator.
Finally, sentence three is essentially a restatement of
sentence two, with the addition of specific instructions as to
the procedure to be followed with regard to that portion of
the bequest forfeited by the beneficiary contesting the
bequest: "If a bequest is contested this share shall be
distributed 
proportionately 
to 
the 
other 
distributee(s) 
listed
as beneficiaries."  In other words, that bequest is to be
apportioned between or among the remaining beneficiaries of
that bequest. 
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11
Regarding sentence three, Harrison argues:
"The acts of [Morrow and Anderson] come strictly
within the expressed terms of the in terrorem clause
contained in the will ... in the second and third
sentences in that the contest has the legal effect
of disputing the entire will and violates the third
sentence in that once again, the contest for any
reason has the legal effect of contesting all
bequests contained in the will, for if the contest
is successful and the will is set aside, there will
be no bequest as the Testator ... intended and the
estate ... will pass under intestate succession."
Harrison's brief, at 41 (emphasis added) (citations to the
record omitted).  
Harrison's reasoning is faulty in a number of respects.
First, his construction of sentences two and three ignores the
narrowly drawn language limiting the scope of the provisions
to specific bequests requiring distribution "between or among
two or more beneficiaries."  Second, it fails to acknowledge
the fundamental distinction between a challenge to the
distribution of a specific bequest and a contest of the will
as a whole.  That a contest can arise over the distribution of
a specific bequest without implicating the entire will is
amply illustrated by Kershaw.  A provision, such as the one
involved in Kershaw, purporting to prohibit a will contest
does not necessarily prohibit a challenge to a specific
1060300
12
bequest.  Conversely, there is no reason why a testator could
not, or would not, narrowly draft a provision that prohibits
a beneficiary from contesting 
only 
the distribution of certain
specific bequests, without disinheriting that beneficiary
altogether if he or she challenges the overall validity of the
will.  Third, if sentence three prohibits an attack on the
will as a whole, as Harrison contends, then sentence three
entirely subsumes sentences one and two and renders them
nugatory.  In effectuating the intent of the testator,
however, this Court must "giv[e] effect to each provision
where it is possible to do so."  Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669
(Ala. 1995).  Fourth, Harrison's argument for the broadest
possible sweep of the provisions conflicts with the rule
articulated in Kershaw, namely, that in terrorem clauses, to
the extent they may be enforced in Alabama, are to be
construed narrowly to avoid a forfeiture.  848 So. 2d at 955.
III. Conclusion
Well-established rules of testamentary interpretation
compel the conclusion that the in terrorem provision in Alton
Anderson's will prohibits only challenges to procedures for
the distribution of specific bequests and percentages thereof,
1060300
13
not to a contest of the will itself.  The contest application
filed by Morrow and Anderson, however, challenged the
disposition of the estate, rather than the distribution of
specific bequests.  Consequently, the will contest commenced
by Morrow and Anderson was not within the purview of the in
terrorem provision in this case.  Because the trial court did
not err in entering its judgment in favor of Morrow and
Anderson, that judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Lyons, Stuart, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur in
the result.