Case Title: Paul Davis Restoration of Se. Wis., Inc. v. Paul Davis Restoration of Ne. Wis.

Citation: 2013 WI 49

Docket Number: 2011AP001121

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1121   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. Wisconsin, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Paul Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Denmark State Bank, 
          Garnishee.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 343 Wis. 2d 678, 819 N.W.2d 562 
(Ct. App. – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 4, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2013    
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald R. Zuidmulder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, ZIEGLER, J.J., concur.    
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Adam A. Bardosy and Sean D. Lanphier, and Mallery & 
Zimmerman, S.C., Milwaukee, with oral argument by Adam A. 
Bardosy. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Natalie M. Sturicz, with whom on the brief was Robert E. Bellin, 
Jr. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP1121 
(L.C. No. 
2010TJ154) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. Wisconsin, Inc., 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Paul Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant 
 
and 
 
Denmark State Bank, 
 
 
Garnishee. 
FILED 
 
JUN 4, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case centers on a 
garnishment 
action 
in 
which 
the 
alleged 
judgment 
debtor 
challenged the ability of the judgment creditor to enforce a 
judgment by garnishment.  The case arises from territory-related 
disputes between two franchisees, Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. 
Wisconsin, Inc. (Southeast) and Paul Davis Restoration of 
Northeast Wisconsin (Northeast).  Pursuant to the franchise 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
2 
 
agreement, binding arbitration is prescribed to resolve such 
disputes, and the results of an arbitration process included an 
award for Southeast in the amount of $101,693 against Northeast, 
which is the name under which EA Green Bay, LLC, does business.  
The problem we now address arose when Southeast sought to 
enforce a judgment, via a garnishment action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 812.01 (2009-10)1, for the money damages it had been awarded by 
the arbitration panel. 
¶2 
Following the arbitration, there was no objection to 
confirming the award by entry of judgment against Northeast in 
circuit court.2  Nor has there been any dispute that Northeast 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  
2 There was a dispute in proceedings in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, before the Honorable William S. Pocan, concerning 
"the appropriate form of the judgment confirming the award." At 
a hearing related to that dispute, Southeast's counsel expressed 
concern that a judgment naming only Northeast, EA Green Bay, 
LLC's "d/b/a" name, might be unenforceable and sought to have 
the judgment entered against Northeast, Matthew Everett and EA 
Green Bay, LLC,  on the basis that the franchise agreement 
contemplated joint and several liability in such a circumstance.  
In asking the court to confirm the arbitration award against 
Northeast but not also against EA Green Bay, LLC, Northeast's 
counsel made the following statement: 
[T]his business about all this hypothetical difficulty 
that [Southeast] may or may not encounter in enforcing 
the judgment is not appropriate in this particular 
proceeding, number one. It's not supported by any 
evidence, number two.  . . . And thirdly, the idea 
that as a matter of law an entity operating as a quote 
[d/b/a], meaning it's operating under a trade name, 
the idea that a judgment can't be enforced against it 
is simply untrue as a matter of law.  
No. 2011AP1121  
 
3 
 
was the name under which EA Green Bay, LLC, did business.  
Nevertheless, 
EA 
Green 
Bay, 
LLC, 
opposed 
the 
subsequent 
garnishment action in circuit court on the grounds that the 
judgment, entered against only Northeast, the name under which 
it did business, was unenforceable.   
¶3 
The circuit court for Brown County, the Honorable 
Donald R. Zuidmulder presiding, relied on two Wisconsin cases3  
for the proposition that  Northeast, the name under which EA 
Green Bay, LLC, did business, had "no independent legal 
significance apart from the underlying business" and applied 
that principle in this context to mean that the names "refer to 
the same legal entity."  It therefore held that any valid 
judgment against Northeast is also enforceable against EA Green 
Bay, LLC.  The court of appeals reversed.  It cited to the same 
cases as the circuit court, stating that where a company does 
business under a name different from the legal entity's name, 
that name is "merely descriptive of" and "not . . . distinct 
from" the person or corporation operating the business and is "a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The circuit court, for reasons that cannot be determined on the 
record before us, did as Northeast requested and confirmed the 
award on August 18, 2010, as to Northeast in the amount of the 
arbitration award, $101,693, and entered judgment on September 
3, 2010. 
3 Jacob v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 2d 524, 537 
n.7, 
553 
N.W.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the 
designation "'d/b/a' means 'doing business as' and is merely 
descriptive of the person or corporation who does business under 
some other name; it does not create or constitute an entity 
distinct from the person operating the business"); and Binon v. 
Great N. Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 580 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 
1998) (citing the language from Jacob).  
No. 2011AP1121  
 
4 
 
legal nonentity"; it therefore reasoned that a judgment against 
such a name is unenforceable and cannot serve as a basis for a 
garnishment action.4 
¶4 
Wisconsin courts have not directly addressed the 
precise question presented: whether an otherwise valid judgment 
can be enforced against a legal entity when the judgment is 
entered against the name under which the legal entity does 
business.5  The cases relied on by the circuit court and court of 
appeals state that when a person or corporation does business 
under a name, that name "is merely descriptive of the person or 
corporation" and "it does not create or constitute an entity 
distinct from the person operating the business." Jacob v. West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 2d 524, 537 n.7, 553 N.W.2d 800 
(Ct. App. 1996).  In Capsavage v. Esser, 224 Wis. 2d 404, 415, 
591 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1999), which involved a dispute 
concerning the type of legal entity involved, the court 
clarified that the name under which the company, Sundance 
                                                 
4 Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. Wis., Inc. v. Paul Davis 
Restoration of Northeast Wis., No. 2011AP1121, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶7-9 (Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 2012).    
5 When deciding a duty-to-defend case that did not present 
this question directly, the court of appeals noted, "We are not 
required to decide in this case whether the default judgment 
against [an entity named in the complaint], a legal nonentity, 
is of any enforceable effect against the estate of [its deceased 
owner, who was not personally named as a defendant]."  Jacob, 
203 Wis. 2d at 537 n.7 (emphasis added).  In that case, a 
separate ruling from a probate court dismissing a related claim 
on the basis of the unenforceability of the judgment was not 
before the court.  Id. at 531. 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
5 
 
Marine, was doing business was not "a distinct entity" but 
rather was "simply another way to refer to Sundance Marine."6   
¶5 
It follows from this principle that if the name under 
which a person or corporation does business is "simply another 
way to refer to" a single legal entity and constitutes no entity 
distinct from the person or corporation who does business, then 
a judgment against the "doing business as" or "d/b/a" name is 
enforceable 
against 
the 
legal 
entity 
from 
which 
it 
is 
indistinct.  This result is consistent with the approach taken 
on this question by the majority of other jurisdictions that 
have addressed it.  Based on this principle in Wisconsin case 
law concerning a d/b/a designation or trade name, and consistent 
with the approaches of the majority of other jurisdictions, we 
hold that the judgment against EA Green Bay LLC's d/b/a 
                                                 
6 The Capsavage court made note of the fact that California-
based Sundance Marine had made a fictitious name filing or d/b/a 
filing "to do business as SDSR."  Capsavage v. Esser, 224 Wis. 
2d 404, 415, 591 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1999).  
[T]he purpose of a fictitious name statute is to 
protect the public against false identification of the 
character of a business by use of certain words in the 
name employed by the enterprise, or to ensure that 
those who do business with persons operating under a 
fictitious name will know the true identities of the 
individuals with whom they are dealing or to whom they 
are giving credit or becoming bound.  . . . By filing 
an assumed-name certificate as authorized by statute, 
a corporation puts the public on notice that it is 
doing business under an assumed name . . . .   
18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 237. 
 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
6 
 
designation, Paul Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin, is 
enforceable against EA Green Bay, LLC, and the account at 
Denmark State Bank; Northeast and EA Green Bay, LLC, are not two 
distinct legal entities; and EA Green Bay, LLC, was undisputedly 
doing business under the name Northeast.  We reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶6 
After the arbitration proceedings described above were 
complete and the judgment was entered in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Northeast refused to pay the arbitration award.  
Southeast commenced the action that is now before us, a separate 
and independent garnishment action in Brown County Circuit 
Court, to collect the judgment from a Denmark State Bank account 
titled in the name of "EA Green Bay LLC d/b/a Paul Davis 
Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI d/b/a Building Werks."  The 
record7 reflects that the checks on the account bear only the 
name "Paul Davis Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI."  In its 
answer to the garnishment complaint, garnishee defendant Denmark 
State Bank stated that "EA Green Bay LLC d/b/a Paul Davis 
                                                 
7  The record we have is the record from the garnishment 
action filed in Brown County Circuit Court.  The record in this 
case does not include the arbitration ruling or any documents 
from the arbitration proceedings.  It does not contain the 
record from the Milwaukee County Circuit Court case confirming 
the arbitration award either, though portions of the record in 
that case, such as briefs and partial transcripts, have been 
included in the garnishment case record as exhibits attached to 
filings.   
No. 2011AP1121  
 
7 
 
Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI d/b/a Building Werks is a 
Denmark State Bank customer.”  It also stated that  
[a]s of the date and time Denmark State Bank was 
served with the Garnishment Summons and Complaint, 
Denmark State Bank was indebted to EA Green Bay LLC 
d/b/a Paul Davis Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI 
d/b/a Building Werks in the full amount of the 
. . . garnishment, by virtue of a deposit account.  
In its ruling, the circuit court stated, "It cannot be disputed 
that EA [Green Bay, LLC] was the principal name on the account 
on [the date of the service of the garnishee summons] and that 
it was EA [Green Bay, LLC]'s Employer Identification Number."  
It also noted that "checks continued to be deposited for Paul 
Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin . . . ." 
¶7 
The Brown County Circuit Court denied Northeast's 
motion to dismiss and directed the bank to release the funds in 
the account to Southeast.  As noted above, the court based the 
ruling on the Jacob and Binon cases and on its determination 
that "[r]ather than separating the [Northeast] non-entity from 
the 'EA Green Bay, LLC' legal entity, the d/b/a designation 
simply means that the two names refer to the same legal entity." 
It considered EA Green Bay, LLC's arguments an "attempt[] to 
create a legal distinction where none exists."     
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed in an unpublished, per 
curiam opinion.  It read the Jacob and Binon cases as supporting 
the proposition that because a d/b/a designation "does not 
create or constitute an entity distinct from the person [or 
corporation] operating the business," a judgment against a d/b/a 
designee alone is unenforceable. Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
8 
 
Wis., Inc. v. Paul Davis Restoration of Northeast Wis., No. 
2011AP1121, unpublished slip op., ¶¶7-9 (Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 
2012).   It drew parallels to the facts discussed in Jacob, in 
which the court found that a plaintiff had improperly named a 
deceased 
person, 
rather 
than 
the 
estate's 
personal 
representative, as a party to the suit.  Id.  Southeast 
petitioned this court for review, which we granted. 
II. 
 STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 
¶9 
The question presented here arises in the context of a 
garnishment action, which is governed by Wis. Stat. § 812.01. 
The statute states:  
 
Any creditor may proceed against any person who is 
indebted to or has any property in his or her 
possession or under his or her control belonging to 
such 
creditor's 
debtor 
or 
which 
is 
subject 
to 
satisfaction of an obligation described under s. 
766.55(2), 
as 
prescribed 
in 
this 
subchapter. 
"Plaintiff" as used in this subchapter includes a 
judgment creditor and "defendant", a judgment debtor 
or the spouse or former spouse of a judgment debtor if 
the judgment is rendered in connection with an 
obligation described under s. 766.55(2). 
Wis. Stat. § 812.01(1).  Application of a statute to an 
undisputed set of facts is a question of law.  Nichols v. 
Nichols, 162 Wis. 2d 96, 103, 469 N.W.2d 619 (1991).   
¶10 We also note that it is well established that a 
garnishment action is an action independent of the judgment for 
which it seeks to recover payment and is instituted separately 
according to statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 812.01.  See Butler v. 
Polk, 592 F.2d 1293, 1295-1296 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that 
"garnishment 
actions 
against 
third-parties 
are 
generally 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
9 
 
construed as independent suits, at least in relation to the 
primary action"); Randolph v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of 
Wis., 260 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1958) ("The only issue is the 
liability of the garnishee on its insurance contract. . . . 
[T]he amount of such liability has been established by the 
judgment against [the insured] in the state court action."); 
Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 
1958) (garnishments are "original and independent actions [by] 
the holders of the judgments").  
¶11 Noting, in the context of a garnishment case, that 
"[t]he judgment carries the presumption of validity," this court 
cited the settled law on judgments: 
The 
general 
rule 
is 
stated 
in 
49 
C.J.S. 
Judgments . . .  as follows: "A judgment rendered by a 
court having jurisdiction of the parties and the 
subject matter, unless reversed or annulled in some 
proper proceeding, is not open to contradiction or 
impeachment, in respect of its validity, verity, or 
binding 
effect, 
by 
parties 
or 
privies, 
in 
any 
collateral 
action 
or 
proceeding, 
except . . . for 
fraud in its procurement." 
 
Zrimsek v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 98 N.W.2d 383 
(1959).  Where a judgment debtor asserts claims about a 
judgment's legitimacy, "it is in the context of that [first] 
suit and not [in the garnishment suit] that those claims should 
[be] asserted."  Schultz v. Sykes, 2001 WI App 260, ¶16, 248 
Wis. 2d 791, 638 N.W.2d 76.  Further, "[t]he fact that the 
judgment is contested materially affects the nature of mistakes 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
10 
 
that might be complained of and the considerations involved in 
determining whether relief is warranted.  . . . An application 
for relief after a contested proceeding [as distinct from a 
default 
judgment] 
therefore 
partakes 
of 
a 
petition 
for 
reconsideration, and all the reasons for finality of judgment 
are arrayed against such an application."  Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments § 71 cmt. a (1982).  We also note that "a valid and 
final award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules 
of 
res 
judicata, 
subject 
to 
the 
same 
exceptions 
and 
qualifications, as a judgment of a court."  Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments § 84(1).  "If the arbitration award were not 
treated as the equivalent of a judicial adjudication for 
purposes of claim preclusion, the obligation to arbitrate would 
be practically illusory." Id., § 84 cmt. b.  The following 
provisions 
appear 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
788, 
which 
governs 
arbitration.  After an award is made, any party has one year in 
which it "may apply to the court . . . for an order confirming 
the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order 
 . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 788.09.  "Upon the granting of an order 
confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment may be 
entered in conformity therewith in the court wherein the order 
was granted."  Wis. Stat. § 788.12.  
III.  DISCUSSION 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
11 
 
¶12 In this case, the application of the garnishment 
statute requires us to determine whether the holder of the 
Denmark State Bank account, "EA Green Bay, LLC d/b/a Paul Davis 
Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI d/b/a Building Werks," is the 
debtor against whom the judgment was entered.   
¶13 The 
question, 
as 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
identified it, is whether "the underlying judgment against Paul 
Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin can apply to [the legal 
entity, EA Green Bay, LLC]" so that the assets in the bank 
account belonging to EA Green Bay, LLC, are subject to 
garnishment in satisfaction of the judgment.  To answer that 
question, we need to examine principles related to a legal 
entity such as a corporation or a person doing business as or 
under a name different from the corporation’s or person’s name.  
In doing so, we examine Wisconsin case law and also consider how 
other jurisdictions have approached the issue. 
¶14 First, we consider what Wisconsin courts have said 
about the names under which a legal entity such as a corporation 
or person does business.8  The parties, as noted previously, rely 
                                                 
8 In this case we discuss use of a d/b/a designation or 
trade name interchangeably.  Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009) states that "d/b/a" is the abbreviation for "doing 
business as"; the definition continues:  
[Usually] precedes a person's or business's assumed 
name . It 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
12 
 
on the same cases yet reach opposite conclusions about how the 
stated principle applies in the context of an action under the 
garnishment statute.   
¶15 The three cases that mention the principle or rule of 
law that we consider here——that a d/b/a designation "is merely 
descriptive of the person or corporation who does business under 
some other name; it does not create or constitute an entity 
distinct from the person operating the business"——are Jacob, 
Binon and Capsavage.  In each of these cases, the brief 
discussion about the "doing business as" name appears to be 
secondary to the legal question being decided in the case, and 
none of these cases directly addresses an action under the 
garnishment statute.   
¶16 The first, Jacob, was a case concerning construction 
defects and a contractor's insurer's duty to defend, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
signals 
that 
the 
business 
may 
be 
licensed 
or 
incorporated under a different name. Cf. tradename. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "tradename" this way: 
A name, style, or symbol used to distinguish a 
company, partnership, or business (as opposed to a 
product or service); the name under which a business 
operates. A tradename is a means of identifying a 
business — or its products or services — to establish 
goodwill. It symbolizes the business's reputation. Cf. 
brand; d/b/a; trademark. 
Black's Law Dictionary 455 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
13 
 
court 
of 
appeals 
made 
the 
observation 
about 
the 
d/b/a 
designation in a footnote in which the court commented on a 
tactical decision by a subcontractor's attorney not to answer 
the complaint.  Jacob, 203 Wis. 2d at 537 n.7.  The case to 
which the Jacob footnote cited, Duval v. Midwest Auto City, 
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D. Neb. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 
721 (8th Cir. 1978), was an odometer-tampering case, and the 
plaintiffs had listed six defendants in the amended complaint, 
including two d/b/a designations.  Though there is no indication 
that it was a contested issue in the case, the court stated: 
Under the evidence there are four entities only – 
Midwest Auto City, Inc., David Studna, Ervin Delp, and 
Bernard Flaherty. The designation "d/b/a" means "doing 
business as" but is merely descriptive of the person 
or corporation who does business under some other 
name.  Doing business under another name does not 
create an entity distinct from the person operating 
the business.  The individual who does business as a 
sole proprietor under one or several names remains one 
person, personally liable for all his obligations.  So 
also with a corporation which uses more than one name. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶17 The second case, Binon, concerned whether a policy-
holder was a motor vehicle handler for purposes of a statute 
giving such entities permission to restrict coverage.  The 
policy was issued to "Arrow Motors, Inc., d/b/a Lease Associates 
Group."  Binon v. Great N. Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 580 
N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1998).  Plaintiffs had argued that the 
d/b/a designation of "Lease Associates Group" was not a motor 
vehicle handler, even if Arrow Motors was.  The court of appeals 
quoted the Jacob court as the basis for treating the d/b/a 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
14 
 
designation as an entity that was not distinct from Arrow 
Motors, Inc.  In determining whether the restricted coverage was 
permitted under the statute in that case, the court "look[ed] to 
all the activities and services of the insured . . . and not 
merely the activities of its leasing division . . . , which has 
no independent legal status or significance."  Id.   
 
¶18 A third Wisconsin case in which a company's "doing 
business as" name is discussed is Capsavage.  The Capsavages 
were seeking to hold a shareholder of a corporation personally 
liable for a breach of contract by the corporation after they 
paid $291,987 for a yacht that was never delivered.  Capsavage, 
224 Wis. 2d at 407-409.  The contract was with Sundance Marine 
d/b/a San Diego Sea Ray (SDSR).  Id. at 407.  The Capsavages 
sought to argue that SDSR was actually a joint venture or a 
partnership and that the shareholder was personally liable for 
the contract as a participant in the partnership.  Id. at 414-
415.  The court of appeals rejected the argument, noting that "a 
fictitious name filing was made for Sundance Marine to do 
business as SDSR."  Id. at 415.  The court added, "When a 
corporation does business under another name, it does not create 
a distinct entity.  Rather, SDSR [the d/b/a designation] is 
simply another way to refer to Sundance Marine."  Id. 
¶19 Northeast and Southeast both rely on the principle 
cited in the above cases that the name under which a person or 
corporation does business is not a "distinct entity."  Northeast 
argues that that means that such a name is not an entity against 
which a judgment can be enforced.  It analogizes the situation 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
15 
 
to cases in which a party has failed to identify and serve the 
proper party,9 citing Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2011 WI App 
5, 331 Wis. 2d 51, 794 N.W.2d 475, aff'd, 2012 WI 31, 339 Wis. 
2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756 (holding that a court had no personal 
jurisdiction over defendant when there was a fundamental defect 
in a summons and complaint that named, rather than the intended 
defendant, the similarly named parent corporation of the 
intended defendant).  Southeast argues that the "not a distinct 
entity" language means that a judgment against the name under 
which a company does business is simply a judgment against the 
legal entity from which the "doing business as" name is legally 
indistinct.10 
¶20 The principle or rule of law stated in these cases——
that the name under which a person or corporation does business 
                                                 
9 We note, as did the circuit court, that there is no 
"evidence calling into question whether any other business 
operated as Paul Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin and 
had [the same address], as is indicated on the Milwaukee County 
judgment."  Nor is there any allegation or evidence of lack of 
notice or improper service in this case.   
10 The parties also make arguments concerning judicial 
estoppel and a collateral attack against a judgment.  Because we 
resolve this case on the grounds that the judgment can be 
validly enforced against the account held by Denmark State Bank, 
we do not address the parties' other arguments.  Northeast 
additionally argues that the money in the Denmark State Bank 
account in question cannot be reached under the garnishment 
statute because it "does not belong to [Northeast]" but belongs 
to EA Green Bay, LLC, instead.  This argument merely restates 
the 
question 
we 
address 
concerning 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
relationship between a legal entity and the name under which it 
does business; therefore, there is no need to address that 
argument separately. 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
16 
 
is 
indistinct 
from 
the 
underlying 
legal 
entity——is 
more 
logically consistent with the circuit court's approach.  The 
circuit court held that "the two names refer to the same legal 
entity." The court of appeals' approach implicitly treated the 
name as a distinct but legally meaningless entity.   
¶21 A case concerning a judgment against a name under 
which a legal entity is doing business is very different from 
the category of cases involving a plaintiff's failure to 
identify and serve the proper party. Such cases turn on a 
different question (i.e., which of several distinct legal 
entities is the proper defendant) and, more importantly, involve 
different considerations, such as notice.  See Mared Indus., 
Inc. v. Mansfield, 2005 WI 5, ¶¶34, 38, 277 Wis. 2d 350, 690 
N.W.2d 835 (discussing the "policy of ensuring that a defendant 
receives notice of an action" and acknowledging that "the 
consequences for failing to strictly comply with the statutory 
rules of service are harsh"); Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 
2012 WI 31, ¶24, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756 ("Indeed, 
notice that apprises a party of the pendency of an action 
against it and affords the opportunity to present objections is 
regarded as '[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process.'").  As the court specifically noted in Cintas Corp. 
No. 2,  
Unlike the single corporation in Hoesley, which the 
plaintiff correctly sued but simply misnamed as "La 
Crosse VFW Chapter, Thomas Rooney Post," see 46 Wis.2d 
at 502, 175 N.W.2d 214, Cintas and Cintas No. 2 are 
two, distinct legal entities, and Johnson mistakenly 
sued the first instead of the second.   
No. 2011AP1121  
 
17 
 
Cintas Corp. No. 2, 339 Wis. 2d 493, ¶41 (emphasis added).  The 
court further stated that the plaintiff did not dispute "that 
his summons and complaint named the wrong party . . . and that 
the party he intended to sue . . . is an independent legal 
entity." Id., ¶42 (emphasis added).  Although it is relied upon 
by Northeast, Cintas Corp. No. 2 does not support its argument 
in this garnishment action. 
¶22 The 
majority of courts from other jurisdictions 
confronted with similar cases in which a judgment debtor 
challenges the enforceability of a judgment against an entity 
using a name under which an entity does business have reached 
the same conclusion we reach in this case.   See Acad. of IRM v. 
LVI Envtl. Serv., Inc., 687 A.2d 669, 677 (Md. 1997) (holding 
that "notice that an order for default had been entered against 
Trade Name was notice to Debtor that an order for default had 
been entered against it, since Trade Name was simply another 
name by which Debtor was known"); Aman Collection Serv., Inc. v. 
Burgess, 612 S.W.2d 405, 408-409 (Mo. App. 1981) (holding that a 
judgment solely against a d/b/a designation may be enforced 
against the entity operating under the trade name on the grounds 
that "the trial court committed no error in finding that Dako 
Products Co. was merely a trade name under which Robert V. 
Burgess operated and that they were one and the same");  
Toulousaine de Distribution et de Services v. Tri-State Seed and 
Grain, 520 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that 
"[t]he law from other jurisdictions also indicates that doing 
business under another name or several names does not create an 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
18 
 
entity separate and distinct from the person operating the 
business, and the person remains personally liable for all his 
or her obligations," and holding that where evidence is that a 
sole proprietor is doing business under a trade name and a 
judgment is obtained against the trade name, the judgment 
creditor may execute the registered judgment); Beneficial Fin. 
Co. of Colo. v. Bach, 665 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) 
(in a garnishment action, affirming a trial court's finding that 
where an entity on a lease was a trade name for a corporation, 
the corporation was liable under the lease, and noting that "a 
valid judgment against Compass Real Estate, Limited, must also 
be premised upon the fact that Realty World Senti, the named 
defendant and judgment debtor, is the trade name of that 
corporation"); Becker v. Truitt, 154 S.E. 262, 263 (Ga. 1930) 
(holding that "[a] judgment rendered against a person in his 
assumed or trade name is not void"); Long v. Carolina Baking 
Co., 3 S.E.2d 46, 50 (S.C. 1939) (where a corporation was doing 
business under a trade name, a "verdict and judgment against 
[the trade name] is binding upon the existent corporate entity 
and its assets" and judgment against a trade name "would not 
invalidate the judgment, where . . . the corporate defendant has 
suffered no prejudice"); Bishop v. Wilson Quality Homes, 986 
P.2d 512, 514 (Okla. 1999) (where plaintiff sought to amend a 
Workers' Compensation judgment against a d/b/a designation to 
add the legal entity to which it was attached, court held that 
plaintiff 
"may 
collect 
his 
judgment 
against 
[the 
d/b/a 
designation] as he would from any business whose judgment was 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
19 
 
pronounced as a result of trial in district court" and "does not 
need a nunc pro tunc order inserting [the legal entity's name] 
into the original award"); and Hughes v. Cox, 601 So. 2d 465, 
471 (Ala. 1992) ("[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment 
entered against a trade name is a judgment against the 
individual doing business under that trade name, at least so 
long 
as 
the 
individual 
was 
personally 
served 
with 
the 
complaint."). 
¶23 The Louisiana courts have, based on an interpretation 
of a Louisiana statute, held that a "doing business as" name is 
not a separate legal entity against which a judgment can be 
entered11 but mitigated the consequences for a plaintiff by 
employing an "equitable remedy the Louisiana Supreme Court 
crafted" in such cases: while they have held that a judgment 
entered against a legal nonentity cannot stand, the courts have 
granted plaintiffs a remand for a new trial and instructions to 
the trial court that the plaintiff be allowed leave to amend the 
petition to name the proper party defendant.  Assensoh v. 
Diamond Nails, 897 So. 2d 806, 812 (La. App. 2005); Walker v. 
Self-Serv. Storage and Mini Warehouses, Inc., 519 So. 2d 771 
(La. 1988). 
                                                 
11 "Underlying this line of jurisprudence is the principle 
codified in La. C.C.P. art. 736 that a trade name is not a 
separate legal entity capable of being sued."  Assensoh v. 
Diamond Nails, 897 So. 2d 806, 810 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
20 
 
¶24 In light of the principle that the name under which a 
legal entity does business "does not create or constitute an 
entity distinct from the person operating the business," "is 
merely descriptive of the person or corporation who does 
business under some other name," and "is simply another way to 
refer" to the legal entity, we find no basis for holding that a 
judgment against such a name, indistinct from the legal entity 
to which it is attached, cannot be enforced against that entity.  
Nothing in Wisconsin law precludes our conclusion, and the case 
law from the majority of other jurisdictions provides ample 
support for it.       
¶25 As noted above, the question presented in this 
garnishment action is whether, under Wis. Stat. § 812.01, the 
money in the Denmark State Bank is "property . . . belonging to 
[the] creditor’s debtor."  Northeast, the name under which EA 
Green Bay, LLC, does business, is not an entity distinct from EA 
Green Bay, LLC.  The account at Denmark State Bank is in the 
name of "EA Green Bay LLC d/b/a Paul Davis Restoration & 
Remodeling of NE WI d/b/a Building Werks." The account is 
"property  . . . belonging to such creditor's debtor or which is 
subject to satisfaction of an obligation  . . . ." in an action 
under Wis. Stat. § 812.01, and therefore can be used to satisfy 
the judgment granted which confirmed the arbitration award.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶26 Wisconsin courts have not directly addressed the 
precise question presented: whether an otherwise valid judgment 
can be enforced against a legal entity when the judgment is 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
21 
 
entered against the name under which the legal entity does 
business.  The cases relied on by the circuit court and court of 
appeals state that when a person or corporation does business 
under a name, that name "is merely descriptive of the person or 
corporation" and "it does not create or constitute an entity 
distinct from the person operating the business." Jacob, 203 
Wis. 2d at 537 n.7.  In Capsavage, which involved a dispute 
concerning the type of legal entity involved, the court 
clarified that the name under which the company, Sundance 
Marine, was doing business was not "a distinct entity" but 
rather was "simply another way to refer to Sundance Marine."   
¶27 It follows from this principle that if the name under 
which a person or corporation does business is "simply another 
way to refer to" a single legal entity and constitutes no entity 
distinct from the person or corporation who does business, then 
a judgment against the "doing business as" name is enforceable 
against the legal entity from which it is indistinct.  This 
result is consistent with the approach taken on this question by 
the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed it.  
Based on this principle in Wisconsin case law concerning a d/b/a 
designation or trade name, and consistent with the approaches of 
the majority of other jurisdictions, we hold that the judgment 
against EA Green Bay, LLC's d/b/a designation, Paul Davis 
Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin, is enforceable against EA 
Green Bay, LLC, and the account at Denmark State Bank; Northeast 
and Green Bay, LLC, are not two distinct legal entities; and EA 
Green Bay, LLC, was undisputedly doing business under the name 
No. 2011AP1121  
 
22 
 
Northeast.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
By the Court.— Reversed and cause remanded. 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
  
 
 
¶28 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(concurring).   The 
majority opinion concludes that the judgment in favor of Paul 
Davis Restoration of Southeast Wisconsin, Inc. (Southeast), 
entered as the confirmation of an arbitration award against Paul 
Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin (Northeast) (which is a 
"doing business as" (d/b/a) designation employed by EA Green 
Bay, LLC), is enforceable in a garnishment action against an 
account at Denmark State Bank that is held in the name of EA 
Green Bay, Northeast and other d/b/a's of EA Green Bay.1  I 
agree. 
¶29 Prior 
to 
entering 
the 
judgment 
confirming 
the 
arbitration award, Southeast's counsel requested that the court 
name EA Green Bay as a defendant in the judgment because 
Northeast was a d/b/a designation for EA Green Bay and not a 
separate legal entity.  In response, counsel for Northeast 
represented to the court that a judgment solely in the name of 
Northeast was fully enforceable, even though "Paul Davis 
Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin" was not a legal entity.  
Northeast now asserts that the judgment is not enforceable 
because, although Northeast's name was on the bank account to be 
garnished, Northeast is not a legal entity and therefore has no 
legal ownership in the bank account. 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶5.   
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶30 Because 
of 
Northeast's 
prior 
inconsistent 
representations to the circuit court, which the circuit court 
apparently accepted, I conclude that Northeast is judicially 
estopped from challenging the garnishment on the ground that the 
judgment is not enforceable because Northeast is not a legal 
entity.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur with the majority 
opinion's reversal of the decision of the court of appeals, 
albeit on a different rationale.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶31 Both Southeast and EA Green Bay are franchisees of 
Paul Davis Restoration, Inc.  EA Green Bay operated its 
franchise under the name of Northeast.  Northeast is not a 
corporate entity, but rather it is a trade name, or "d/b/a," of 
EA Green Bay.  
¶32 Southeast and Northeast entered into arbitration for 
claims that each franchisee was doing business in the exclusive 
territory of the other and therefore each owed certain payments 
to 
the other.  
The arbitration panel agreed that both 
franchisees had been selling in the other's exclusive territory, 
but that Northeast had done so much more frequently.  The panel 
issued a net award that required Northeast to pay Southeast 
$101,693.10.   
¶33 Southeast's 
counsel 
moved 
the 
circuit 
court 
of 
Milwaukee County to confirm the award.  During that process 
counsel for Southeast sought to have EA Green Bay and others 
added as defendants.  Southeast's counsel said, 
[If the court] confirms the award in such a manner 
that it is only against . . . Paul Davis Restoration 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
3 
 
of Northeast Wisconsin, I'm not even sure how to go 
about collecting against a company operating as a 
trade name.  How do you separate the company's trade 
name from the underlying entity? And not just any 
underlying entity, but the underlying entity that's 
required 
to 
be 
there 
under 
the 
franchise 
agreement. . . .  The only way to give [e]ffect to the 
award in this case is to make it against . . . the 
underlying entities.  To do otherwise would tie the 
hands of the party who received the award in this case 
from enforcing any judgment.  Because I'm not sure 
how——I'm sure that you can't own property under a 
DBA. . . .  Without that, we'll have a judgment that I 
believe would be worthless. 
¶34 In response, Northeast's counsel urged the circuit 
court to reject Southeast’s argument and refuse to add EA Green 
Bay to the judgment: 
First of all, the fact that someone operates under——an 
entity operates under a trade name does not mean that 
it is not also a business entity of its own.  That 
doesn't follow as a matter of law.  Secondly, 
regardless of that, a business operating under a trade 
name certainly can own all sorts of assets.  And—— And 
thirdly, the idea that as a matter of law an entity 
operating as a quote DBA, meaning it's operating under 
a trade name, the idea that a judgment can't be 
enforced against it is simply untrue as matter of law.   
After considering the arguments of counsel, the circuit court 
issued a judgment against Northeast and not against EA Green 
Bay, consistent with Northeast's contention.   
¶35 When the garnishment action from which this review 
springs was filed in Brown County Circuit Court, it named only 
Northeast as the debtor and Denmark State Bank as the garnishee.  
The bank responded that it had an account in the name of EA 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
4 
 
Green Bay LLC d/b/a Paul Davis Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI2 
d/b/a Building Werks.  The Bank said that on the date that it 
received 
the 
garnishment, 
the 
account 
had 
a 
balance 
of 
$102,772.87, which the Bank would hold until further order of 
the court.   
¶36 Northeast objected to release of the funds and a 
hearing on its objection was held before the circuit court of 
Brown County.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit 
court found that 
[Northeast] has had ample opportunity to make some 
kind of showing that EA [Green Bay] is not in fact the 
same entity as is named in the Milwaukee County 
judgment as a defense to garnishment, and yet the 
record is devoid of any evidence that the owner of the 
account and the judgment debtor are two different 
business entities.  
Thereafter, the circuit court concluded that the bank account 
was properly subject to Southeast's garnishment action.   
¶37 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because 
Northeast is a d/b/a and not a legal entity, the judgment 
against Northeast is unenforceable against the bank account.  
Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. Wis., Inc. v. Paul Davis 
Restoration of Ne. Wis., No. 2011AP1121, unpublished slip op., 
¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 2012). 
¶38 Before us, Northeast again contends that a judgment 
against a trade name is unenforceable.  Northeast agrees that 
                                                 
2 No one has argued that the slight difference in the names 
of Paul Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin and Paul Davis 
Restoration & Remodeling of NE WI is significant or that both do 
not refer to the same d/b/a for EA Green Bay, so I do not 
consider it further. 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
5 
 
Southeast attempted to convince the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court to add EA Green Bay as a debtor and that the circuit court 
did not do so.  At oral argument, Chief Justice Abrahamson asked 
counsel for Northeast whether a predecessor attorney had 
represented to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court that EA Green 
Bay was bound by the judgment even without being named.  Counsel 
admitted that that had happened, but asserted that it was an 
erroneous statement to the court, which she characterized as a 
mistake insufficient to support judicial estoppel.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶39 Whether judicial estoppel applies presents a question 
of law for our independent review.  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 
337, 346-47, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).   
B.  Principles of Judicial Estoppel 
¶40 Statements of law upon which a circuit court relies 
may give rise to the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel.  
Under that doctrine, a party is precluded from asserting a 
position in litigation after having previously asserted an 
inconsistent position at a different stage in the litigation, or 
in another proceeding.  See State v. Ryan, 2012 WI 16, ¶¶32–34, 
338 Wis. 2d 695, 809 N.W.2d 37 (discussing elements and 
application of judicial estoppel in two separate, but factually 
interrelated proceedings).   
¶41 Judicial estoppel is intended to protect the integrity 
of the judicial process against parties playing "fast and loose 
with the courts by asserting inconsistent positions."  Petty, 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
6 
 
201 Wis. 2d at 347 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The doctrine, therefore, does not operate on the 
relationship between the parties, but instead operates on the 
relationship between each party and the judicial system.  See 
id. at 346 (noting that "judicial estoppel is not directed to 
the relationship between the parties").  
¶42 As with other equitable doctrines, the application of 
judicial estoppel is typically within the discretion of the 
circuit court.  State v. Fleming, 181 Wis.2d 546, 558, 510 
N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1993).  However, because the elements of 
judicial estoppel are questions of law, a circuit court's 
failure to address the doctrine will not preclude an appellate 
court from doing so.  See Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 346–47 
(recognizing propriety of appellate court addressing judicial 
estoppel where doctrine had not been applied by circuit court). 
¶43 For a party to be judicially estopped from maintaining 
a particular position in litigation, three elements must be met.  
Id. at 348.  First, the party's position must be "clearly 
inconsistent" with an earlier position.  Id.  Second, the facts 
relevant to the party's position must have been the same at both 
points in litigation.  Id.  Third, the party to be judicially 
estopped "must have convinced the first court to adopt its 
position."  Id.  Additionally, because judicial estoppel "looks 
toward 
cold 
manipulation 
and 
not 
unthinking 
or 
confused 
blunder," the doctrine will not be applied to inadvertent 
representations.  Id. at 347.   
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
7 
 
C.  Application 
¶44 Northeast's representations to the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court meet the three criteria necessary for judicial 
estoppel.  Therefore, I conclude that Northeast is estopped from 
contending that the judgment upon which the garnishment is based 
may not be enforced because Northeast is not a legal entity.  
First, the facts relevant to whether Northeast was a legal 
entity did not change between the hearing before the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court and the commencement of this garnishment 
action.  During the relevant time period, Northeast remained a 
d/b/a or trade name of EA Green Bay.   
¶45 Second, Northeast represented to the Milwaukee County 
circuit court that EA Green Bay's use of the d/b/a designation 
would not prevent enforcement of the judgment.  Counsel for 
Northeast said, "the idea that a judgment can't be enforced 
against it is simply untrue as a matter of law."  Northeast's 
contention was made to the court when Southeast moved to add EA 
Green Bay as a party to the judgment and argued that EA Green 
Bay must be added in order to prevent the judgment from being 
unenforceable.  Southeast said that without a legal entity as a 
party to the judgment, "we'll have a judgment that I believe 
would be worthless."  After consideration of the arguments of 
counsel, the circuit court denied Southeast's request to add EA 
Green Bay as a party to the judgment.   
¶46 Third, as repeated more fully in the quote in 
paragraph 7 above, Northeast's legal position was carefully 
stated and urged the circuit court not to name EA Green Bay as a 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
8 
 
party 
to 
the 
judgment. 
 
Northeast's 
contention 
was 
not 
inadvertently made but was placed before the court in direct 
response to Southeast's position that without the addition of EA 
Green Bay, Southeast would have a judgment that was "worthless."  
Before us, Northeast attempts to make the judgment worthless in 
this garnishment action. 
¶47 Accordingly, Northeast's position before us meets all 
the elements for judicial estoppel.  Therefore, I conclude that 
Northeast is estopped from asserting that its bank account 
cannot be garnished based on Northeast not having the legal 
status that would permit it to have ownership rights in the 
account.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶48 Because 
of 
Northeast's 
prior 
inconsistent 
representations to the circuit court, which the circuit court 
apparently accepted, I conclude that Northeast is judicially 
estopped from challenging the garnishment on the ground that the 
judgment is not enforceable because Northeast is not a legal 
entity.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur with the majority 
opinion's reversal of the decision of the court of appeals, 
albeit on a different rationale. 
¶49 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  11AP1121.pdr 
 
 
 
1