Case Title: McWilliams v. Wilhelm By and Through Wilhelm

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
McWilliams v. Wilhelm By and Through Wilhelm1995 WY 55893 P.2d 1147Case Number: 94-131Decided: 04/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Keith 
McWILLIAMS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Mandy WILHELM By and Through her next of friend 
Phyllis WILHELM; Phyllis Wilhelm; and Wyoming Council of Girl Scouts, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, 
J.

H.W. Rasmussen of Badley 
& Rasmussen, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

John G. Fenn of Yonkee & 
Toner, Sheridan, for 
appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue before 
us in this case concerns the propriety of a jury instruction on the mitigation 
of damages in a tort action. We conclude there was sufficient evidence in the 
record to support giving the instruction and affirm.

[¶2]      Appellant Keith 
McWilliams presents one issue, phrased as a statement, for our 
review:

The trial court erred in presenting Jury Instruction 
No. 13 "Mitigation of Damages" because there was no evidence of how or the 
amount Plaintiff-Appellant should have mitigated his 
damages.

Mandy Wilhelm, Phyllis Wilhelm and the Wyoming 
Council of Girl Scouts (hereinafter collectively appellees) offer three 
issues:

1.         Does 
this court have jurisdiction to review a jury verdict without a 
judgment?

2.         Did 
the trial court correctly instruct the jury with Jury Instruction No. 13 
"Mitigation of Damages?"

3.         Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of $1,000.00 to Appellant 
for pain and suffering and lost earnings?

[¶3]      Appellant was 
injured when a truck he was loading backed up, pinning him against a loading 
dock. At trial, appellees admitted responsibility for the accident and liability 
for medical expenses. However, appellees contested the amount of damages 
appellant sought for lost income and pain and suffering. The trial court gave 
the jury an instruction on mitigation of damages, to which appellant timely 
objected. The jury returned a verdict awarding $1,000.00. Appellant now appeals, 
challenging the adequacy of that award.

DISCUSSION

[¶4]      Before we advance 
to the merits of this appeal, we must address a Motion to Dismiss filed by 
appellees. Appellees contend this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal 
because appellant did not appeal from a final order. The jury verdict was 
rendered April 8, 1994. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal April 27, 1994, 
appealing the verdict. Judgment was entered August 24, 1994, and was made a part 
of the record on appeal by stipulation of the parties.

[¶5]      Appellees 
correctly point out that a jury verdict is not an appealable order. W.R.A.P. 
1.05. However, W.R.A.P. 2.04 provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed 
prematurely shall be treated as though filed on the same day as entry of the 
appealable order, provided it complies with Rule 2.07(a)." W.R.A.P. 2.07(a), in 
turn, provides:

(a) The notice of appeal shall:

(1) 
Specify the party or parties taking the appeal;

(2) 
Identify the judgment or appealable order, or designated portion appealed; 
and

(3) 
Name the court to which the appeal is taken.

(Emphasis added.) We 
conclude that the notice of appeal was premature but that, in accordance with 
W.R.A.P. 2.04, we will treat it as if it had been timely made. Appellant's 
notice of appeal designated the jury's verdict as the basis of the appeal, which 
verdict was incorporated into the judgment. The notice of appeal, therefore, 
complies with W.R.A.P. 2.07(a) since it designated the portion of the judgment 
appealed. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this matter and proceed to the 
merits of appellant's appeal.

[¶6]      When a party 
alleges error in a jury instruction, our review is confined to a search for 
prejudicial error. Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 895 (Wyo. 1989). Prejudicial 
error is never presumed. Id. The trial court gave the following instruction to 
the jury:

A 
person has the duty to take reasonable steps under the circumstances to reduce 
his or her injuries and damages. Any damages resulting from a failure to take 
such reasonable steps cannot be recovered.

Appellant claims the trial 
court erred in giving the instruction because there was no evidence to support 
it. Specifically, appellant alleges that appellees "failed to present any 
evidence to support their claim that the damages would have been diminished had 
the appellant exercised reasonable diligence and ordinary care." The crux of 
appellant's complaint is his claim that appellees had to introduce evidence of 
the extent to which appellant failed to mitigate his damages, not just a broad 
claim of a failure to mitigate. The result, in the absence of any evidence, is 
that the jury was misled and confused by the instruction and consequently the 
jury returned an award that was insufficient and inconsistent with the evidence 
of his injuries.

[¶7]      One who is 
injured by the wrongful act of another must exercise reasonable care and 
diligence to avoid loss or to minimize the resulting damages. Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Wyo. 1977), reh'g denied 566 P.2d 219; Shidler v. Clayton Oil Co., 502 P.2d 987, 989 (Wyo. 1972); Asbell Bros., 
Inc. v. Nash-Davis Machinery Co., 382 P.2d 57, 59 (Wyo. 1963). The failure to 
take reasonable action to prevent an increase or extension of damages prevents 
any recovery for damages resulting from that failure. Thayer v. Smith, 380 P.2d 852, 854 (Wyo. 1963). We find that the instruction given is a correct statement 
of the law and turn to the question of whether there is sufficient evidence in 
the record to support the trial court's decision to give the 
instruction.

[¶8]      There was 
testimony that appellant did not follow his doctor's orders. Appellant's doctor 
testified that appellant's actions could have aggravated his injuries. There was 
also testimony that appellant did not mitigate his economic damages by hiring 
extra help for his business. In addition, there was evidence that appellant's 
economic loss could have been attributable to problems with a supplier. Further, 
there was some testimony that appellant, in fact, attempted to enhance his 
injuries in an apparent attempt to increase any potential damage 
award.

[¶9]      We conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to give the 
instruction to the jury. Appellees were not required to offer evidence detailing 
the exact extent to which appellant failed to mitigate his damages. Douglass 
Reservoirs Water Users Ass'n v. Cross, 569 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1977) ("if 
there is evidence from which a reasonable estimate of money damages may be 
made[,] that is sufficient[.]"). They need only introduce enough evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably conclude that appellant failed to mitigate to 
enable them to arrive at a damage award. Wyoming Wool Marketing Ass'n v. 
Woodruff, 372 P.2d 174, 181 (Wyo. 1962) ("It is sufficient if there is evidence 
which furnishes a basis from which a reasonable estimate of the money damage may 
be made."). The jury was able to conclude that appellant was entitled to an 
award of $1,000.00, and there is no basis for disturbing 
it.

CONCLUSION

[¶10]   The evidence was sufficient to 
justify the given instruction. Disappointment over the adequacy of a jury's 
damage award is not reason enough for a new trial. The judgment is affirmed in 
all respects.