Case Title: Wakulla County v. Davis

Citation: 395 So. 2d 540

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1981-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
395 So. 2d 540 (1981)
WAKULLA COUNTY, Appellant,
v.
Clifford L. DAVIS, and Philip J. Padovano, Appellees.
No. 58421.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 5, 1981.
Ronald L. Baker, County Atty. and Joseph S. Geller, Crawfordville, for appellant.
Clifford Davis and Philip J. Padovano, in pro. per.
Michael Egan of Roberts & Egan, for State Ass'n of County Com'rs of Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, amicus curiae.
Steven L. Seliger of Gen. Counsel, Quincy, for Florida Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice, Inc., amicus curiae.
Howard B. Eisenberg, Richard J. Wilson, Malcolm Young and Jack J. Schmerling, Washington, D.C., Nat. Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, amicus curiae.
*541 H. Clyde Hobby of McClain & Hobby, for Pasco County Bar Ass'n, Dade City, amicus curiae.
ADKINS, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order entered by the Circuit Court of Wakulla County specifically passing upon the constitutionality of section 925.036, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Appellees Clifford Davis and Philip Padovano were appointed Special Assistant Public Defenders to represent Johnny Copeland and Frank Smith, respectively. Both defendants were charged with first-degree murder, robbery with a firearm, kidnapping and involuntary sexual battery. Following the convictions of Copeland and Smith, each appellee filed a motion for costs and attorneys fees; Davis requesting $5,891.84, and Padovano requesting $7,372.00. Fees were computed by applying court-adopted hourly compensation rates to the time spent on the cases. Appellant Wakulla County opposed the award of fees computed in this manner to the extent that the fees exceeded the $2,500 cap allegedly imposed by section 925.036, Florida Statutes, for capital cases represented at the trial level. Appellee Padovano asserted that the maximum fees payable to appointed counsel under section 925.036 can be "stacked" in cases involving multiple counts; yielding an $8,500 maximum in his case (three life felonies at $2,000 each plus one capital case at $2,500). Appellee Davis adopted this "stacking" theory and alternatively asserted that section 925.036 is unconstitutional as applied in his situation and on its face. In its order of compensation the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Wakulla County awarded the appellees the requested compensation and construed section 925.036 to allow "stacking" of the statutory fee maximums. Additionally, the court found the statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the appellees.
In interpreting section 925.036, Florida Statutes, to allow stacking, the trial court stated:
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm those parts of the trial court's decision holding that the fee limits of section 925.036, Florida Statutes, may be stacked and awarding the appellees the requested compensation.
Section 925.036, Florida Statutes, provides as follows:
The statute itself does not indicate whether stacking is to be allowed. It simply provides that compensation for representation in various types of cases is not to exceed the limits established "per case per defendant." The wording of the statute *542 leaves it open to either of two interpretations; that "per case" allows the attorney compensation for each charged offense on which he represented the defendant, or, that "per case" limits the attorney to the maximum fee allowed for the most serious charge on which he defended his client, regardless of the number of offenses joined for trial. Because of this ambiguity, we must apply the rules of statutory construction to determine whether fees may be stacked. "In statutory construction legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided, and this intent must be given effect even though it may appear to contradict the strict letter of the statute and well-settled canons of construction." State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 207, 116 So. 255, 261 (1928). In determining our pole star, legislative intent, we are not to analyze the statute in question by itself, as if in a vacuum; we must also account for other variables. Thus, it is an accepted maxim of statutory construction that a law should be construed together and in harmony with any other statute relating to the same purpose, even though the statutes were not enacted at the same time. Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971). We have in this case, another section within the same statute which must be harmonized with section 925.036, Florida Statutes.
Section 925.035, Florida Statutes (1977), provides:
(Emphasis supplied.) The potential for conflict between the two sections is evident. One sets limits on the fees which may be awarded, while the other requires reasonable compensation. In establishing limits on the fees which can be paid court-appointed attorneys per case per defendant, the legislature clearly intended to limit the burden which such representation places on public treasuries and to provide guidelines for courts to follow. Conceivably, in the absence of any kind of limitation on fees, a small county with limited resources could be placed in serious financial difficulties. Section 925.036, Florida Statutes, was intended to decrease the likelihood of such an occurrence.
Section 925.035, Florida Statutes, on the other hand, seeks to insure that counsel is made available to those charged with a capital offense who otherwise could not afford to hire an attorney and that the attorney appointed is reasonably compensated for his services. The conflict between sections 925.035 and 925.036 arises when "reasonable compensation" exceeds the limits imposed by section 925.036.
If chapter 925, Florida Statutes, is construed to prohibit stacking of fees and the appellees here are limited to a fee not to exceed $2,500, neither will receive the "reasonable compensation" required by section 925.035, Florida Statutes, for their services as court-appointed counsel. Thus, such an interpretation conflicts with the provisions of section 925.035. Alternatively, section 925.036 may be interpreted to allow stacking. If it is so construed, the appellees can be awarded the amount established by the trial court as reasonable compensation for their services, and yet still be within the limits of section 925.036. There would be no conflict with the provisions of any section of the statute.
Clearly, given the choice, the proper interpretation of this statute is the one permitting stacking. "[C]ourts, in construing a statute, must, if possible, avoid such construction as will place a particular statute in conflict with other apparently effective statutes covering the same general field." Howarth v. City of DeLand, 117 Fla. 692, 701, 158 So. 294, 298 (1934). "[W]here two statutes operate on the same subject without positive inconsistency or repugnancy, courts must construe them so as to preserve the force of both without destroying their evident intent, if possible." Mann v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 300 So. 2d 666, *543 668 (Fla. 1974). By construing chapter 925 to allow stacking, a potential conflict between two sections thereof will be avoided and any inconsistency will be resolved. Any other construction would exacerbate the problem, and be improper.
An interpretation allowing stacking is also compelled by the rule of statutory construction which provides that when the meaning of a statute is at all doubtful, the law favors a rational, sensible construction. Realty Bond & Share Co. v. Englar, 104 Fla. 329, 143 So. 152 (1932). Courts are to avoid an interpretation of a statute which would produce unreasonable consequences. Id.
If stacking is not permitted, the result could be quite unfair and unreasonable to the court-appointed attorney. He might be forced to defend a client on multiple nonlife felonies, and life felonies joined with a capital case, spend a large amount of time thereon, and still be limited to $2,500 in compensation for his services, as in this case. It is illogical to construe the law so that regardless of the number of charges on which a client is defended, his attorney is limited to a $2,500 fee. It is also illogical to construe the law in such a manner as to completely nullify the $2,000 maximum for life felonies simply because that offense is joined in the same prosecution with a separately punishable capital felony. Such is the case here. It would be much more reasonable and just to allow the attorney to stack the maximums for each offense for which his client was tried. Under that interpretation, the attorney would be more realistically and fairly compensated for the time spent on the case, and less likely forced to accept what might often turn out to be unfair compensation for his representation. At the same time, such an interpretation would still provide counties protection from exorbitant, limitless legal fees. Guidelines and maximums would not be abolished; they would simply be more realistic and equitable.
Given the differing interpretations of chapter 925, the proper one is that which allows stacking. It is the only construction which preserves and promotes the legislative goal of protecting county treasuries and providing guidelines for courts without impairing the section of the statute requiring reasonable compensation for court-appointed attorneys. It leads to more reasonable, sensible results. It is proper under the rules of statutory construction. For those reasons, we affirm that part of the circuit court's decision holding that the fee limits of section 925.036, Florida Statutes, may be stacked and awarding the appellees the requested compensation.
The court in Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183, 188-89, (Fla.3d DCA 1980), interpreted section 925.036, Florida Statutes (1979), as follows:
We approve this reasoning.
Having resolved the matter on that basis, we need not, and do not, rule on the constitutionality of the statute. Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973). Likewise, the circuit court's ruling on the constitutionality of the statute was unnecessary. Accordingly, those portions of its order of compensation finding section 925.036, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional as applied and on its face are reversed.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, J., concurs in result only.