Case Title: State v. Wyatt Daniel Henning

Citation: 2004 WI 89

Docket Number: 2002AP001287-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 89 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1287-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wyatt Daniel Henning,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 54 
Reported at: 261 Wis. 2d. 664, 660 N.W.2d 698 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 17, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen A. Simanek   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier and Eileen W. Pray, assistant 
attorneys general, with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2004 WI 89 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1287-CR   
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 68) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wyatt Daniel Henning,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case presents intricate 
issues of double jeopardy.  The State seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing Wyatt 
Henning's (Henning) convictions of three counts of bail jumping.  
The 
State 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
reversal 
of 
Henning's 
convictions.  It disputes the court's determination that Henning 
may not be retried on bail jumping charges because a jury found 
him not guilty of two charges of possession of controlled 
                                                 
1 State v. Henning, 2003 WI App 54, 261 Wis. 2d 664, 660 
N.W.2d 698. 
No. 02-1287  
 
2 
 
substances with intent to deliver.  Those charges had served as 
the basis for the three bail jumping counts.  The State views 
the court's "remedy" of barring a new trial on bail jumping 
charges——this time alleging the crime of simple possession of a 
controlled substance as the basis for "bail jumping"——as a 
misapplication of double jeopardy principles.  We agree.  
Accordingly, we withdraw any language to that effect, especially 
¶29, from the court of appeals opinion and remand the matter to 
the circuit court.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
Wyatt Henning, then 19, was arrested by two officers 
of the Burlington Police Department on January 25, 2001.  He was 
taken into custody on an outstanding Racine County arrest 
warrant.  At the time of his arrest, Henning was already 
released on bond in two separate misdemeanor cases from Racine 
County and in a felony case from Walworth County. 
¶3 
Henning was arrested as his brother's car pulled away 
from a restaurant in Burlington.  Police stopped the vehicle, 
arrested Henning, and searched him and the vehicle incident to 
his arrest.  The search of the vehicle uncovered a number of 
potentially incriminating items including three separate plastic 
bags containing marijuana and ten individually-wrapped sugar 
cubes laced with LSD.  The narcotics were located in a plastic 
wireless phone accessory package in the back seat behind a 
folded up armrest next to where Henning had been seated. 
Fingerprint analysis revealed Henning's thumb print and palm 
print on the plastic accessory package and his thumb print on 
No. 02-1287  
 
3 
 
the plastic bag which held the three smaller plastic bags of 
marijuana.  The police also found a postal scale in Henning's 
possession.   
¶4 
One of the other occupants of the vehicle, Jeff 
Willis, later testified that he saw a "bag of weed" in the back 
seat and saw Henning place the drugs in a package and put the 
package behind the armrest.  Willis said that he believed the 
drugs belonged to Henning.   
¶5 
The State prosecuted Henning for (1) possession of THC 
with intent to deliver;2 and (2) possession of LSD with intent to 
deliver.3  It also charged Henning with (3) misdemeanor bail 
jumping, based on Henning's release on a bond arising out of a 
criminal trespass charge in Racine County;4 (4) misdemeanor bail 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1 (2001-02).  All references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(f)3.  
4 Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(a).  Wisconsin Stat. § 946.49 
provides:  
946.49 Bail jumping (1) Whoever, having been released 
from custody under ch. 969, intentionally fails to 
comply with the terms of his or her bond is: 
(a) If the offense with which the person is 
charged is a misdemeanor, guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
(b) If the offense with which the person is 
charged is a felony, guilty of a Class H felony. 
(2) A witness for whom bail has been required under s. 
969.01(3) is guilty of a Class I felony for failure to 
appear as provided. 
No. 02-1287  
 
4 
 
jumping, based on Henning's release on a second bond arising 
from a separate bail jumping charge for failing to comply with 
the first Racine County bond;5 and (5) felony bail jumping based 
on Henning's release on a third bond from Walworth County for 
burglary.6  The State did not charge Henning with simple 
possession of a controlled substance, and it did not rely on 
simple possession of a controlled substance as the basis for the 
bail jumping charges.   
¶6 
Under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
defendants 
charged 
with 
misdemeanors 
(Wis. Stat. § 969.02) 
or 
felonies 
(Wis. Stat. § 969.03) violate the bail jumping statute if they 
commit 
any 
crime 
while 
released 
on 
bond.7  
Wis. Stat. §§ 969.02(4), 969.03(2).  Because Henning was subject 
to three separate bonds, the State charged Henning with three 
counts of bail jumping because it believed he intentionally 
violated the conditions of his release by committing another 
crime.   
¶7 
At trial Henning and the State stipulated that, if 
Henning were found guilty of either count of possession with 
intent to deliver, Henning would have no defense to the three 
bail jumping charges.  The stipulation benefited both parties.  
It relieved the State of the burden of proving the additional 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b).   
7 Both Wis. Stat. § 969.02(4) and § 969.03(2) provide: "As a 
condition of release in all cases, a person released under this 
section shall not commit any crime."   
No. 02-1287  
 
5 
 
bail jumping elements and it helped the defendant keep the jury 
from hearing information about the burglary, criminal trespass, 
and other bail jumping charge that formed the basis for the 
three bonds.   
¶8 
Neither the parties nor the court foresaw how the 
parties' stipulation would be handled by the jury.  The court 
gave no instruction to the jury regarding the crime of 
possession, which is a lesser-included offense of possession 
with intent to deliver, because no verdict was requested by 
either party for that crime.  Consequently the jury received no 
general 
instruction 
from 
the 
court 
about 
lesser-included 
offenses.  With the stipulation in place, Henning and the State 
assumed that the bail jumping verdicts would depend entirely on 
the jury's resolution of the possession with intent to deliver 
charges.   
¶9 
During its deliberations, the jury sent the court a 
note saying it needed "more information on [the bail jumping 
counts], what was violated, what were the conditions."  After 
consulting with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court 
responded: "The condition of the bond was that he not commit a 
new crime while out on bond such as possession with intent to 
deliver LSD or THC."   
¶10 That response did not satisfy the jury.  The court 
received a second note, this time asking, "If we find the 
defendant not guilty of [possession of LSD and THC with intent 
to deliver], but we believe he is guilty of another crime, can 
we still find him guilty [of bail jumping], crime being 
No. 02-1287  
 
6 
 
possession as opposed to possession with intent?"  (Emphasis 
added.)  The court heard arguments from the prosecution and 
defense as to the appropriate response and then answered the 
question with a "yes."  
¶11 The record indicates that the jury reached its verdict 
approximately seven minutes later.  The jury acquitted Henning 
on the two possession with intent to deliver charges and found 
him guilty of all three bail jumping charges.   
¶12 Henning appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Henning, 261 Wis. 2d 664, ¶4.  The court noted that Henning's 
defense to the bail jumping charges relied on his defense to the 
charges of possession with intent to deliver.  Id., ¶18.   The 
evidence presented focused on the possession with intent to 
deliver 
charges, 
and 
not 
the 
lesser-included 
offense 
of 
possession.  Id., ¶19.  Further, the jury was not properly 
instructed on lesser-included offenses, and therefore had no 
guidance as to the proper manner to deliberate regarding simple 
possession, nor was the jury provided a separate verdict 
relating to possession.  Id., ¶20.  The court of appeals 
summarized the issue as whether the court could uphold "an 
undocumented lesser-included jury finding based upon incomplete 
lesser-included jury instructions."  The court of appeals 
refused to do so.  Id., ¶28.   
¶13 Since the State does not challenge the court of 
appeals' primary analysis, we focus in this review on the remedy 
awarded to Henning by the court of appeals.  Because of the 
No. 02-1287  
 
7 
 
procedural irregularities at trial, the court first reversed 
Henning's convictions, then went on to state: 
That brings us to the question of the remedy. The 
State argues that if we reverse Henning's bail jumping 
convictions, we should remand for a new trial. 
However, 
two 
offenses 
are 
considered 
the 
"same 
offense" for double jeopardy purposes unless each 
offense requires proof of a fact that the other does 
not. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 355 
(1990) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299, 304 (1932)). The core protection of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause attaches to an acquittal and prohibits 
retrial for the "same offense" after an acquittal. 
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 355. Pursuant to the "elements 
only" test of Blockburger, possession of a controlled 
substance is clearly a lesser-included offense of the 
greater 
offense 
of 
possession 
of 
a 
controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. Since Henning has 
been acquitted of the greater offense, he cannot be 
retried for bail jumping based on a lesser-included 
offense. We reverse outright. 
Id., ¶29.  Thus, rather than remanding, the court of appeals 
barred the State from retrying Henning.  The State petitioned 
this court for review, asking that we reverse this last 
paragraph of the court of appeals decision. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 Whether a defendant may be retried without violating 
his or her right to be free from double jeopardy is a question 
of law that this court reviews de novo.  State v. Anderson, 219 
Wis. 2d 739, 746, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998) (citing State v. 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 492, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992)).  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Applicable Double Jeopardy Principles 
No. 02-1287  
 
8 
 
 
¶15 Henning's position rests upon the supposition that, 
when bail jumping is predicated upon the commission of a new 
offense, as it was here, bail jumping and the new offense are 
the "same" for double jeopardy purposes.  Henning extrapolates 
this premise to preclude retrial on bail jumping charges if that 
retrial is predicated upon a lesser-included offense of a charge 
of which Henning has already been acquitted.  In order to 
evaluate his theory, we set forth several double jeopardy 
principles.   
1. 
The "Same Offense" 
¶16 Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, as well as a similar provision in the Wisconsin 
Constitution,8 no person shall be "placed twice in jeopardy of 
punishment for the same offense."  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 
77, ¶20, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801 (citing Sauceda, 168 
Wis. 2d at 492).  It is well established that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause applies in three situations.  "It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense."  North Carolina v. Pearce, 
                                                 
8 Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1).  Because of the similarities 
between the state and federal constitutions on this point, we 
generally view the two provisions as having identical scope and 
purpose.  State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶18, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 
666 N.W.2d 1 (citing Day v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 588, 591, 251 
N.W.2d 811 (1977); State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 401 n.5, 
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998)). 
No. 02-1287  
 
9 
 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also State v. Kurzawa, 180 
Wis. 2d 502, 515, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994). 
¶17 In all three situations, the protection of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause involves the definition of "same offense."  
State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶¶19-20, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 
N.W.2d 1.  How courts define "the same offense" often carries 
profound 
consequences for 
criminal 
defendants 
seeking the 
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Whether one offense 
is the same as another is not limited to whether the two 
offenses arise under the identical statutory provision.  Rather, 
the touchstone of "sameness" is the "elements-only" test, which 
the United States Supreme Court articulated in Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).  Under the Blockburger 
test, one offense is not the "same offense" as another when 
"each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does 
not."  Id. (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 
(1911)).   
¶18 In the context of a second prosecution, this court has 
adopted the Blockburger test to demarcate the boundary between 
lawful successive prosecutions from constitutional violations.  
State 
v. 
Kurzawa, 
180 
Wis. 2d at 
524. 
 
Unlike 
multiple 
punishments, 
where 
the 
Blockburger 
test 
can 
be 
seen 
as 
establishing a rebuttable presumption that may give way to 
legislative intent, Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶25, successive 
prosecutions, with the attendant danger of government abuse, 
caution 
against 
looking 
past 
the 
Blockburger 
test's 
proscriptions because of legislative intent.  See id.  Indeed, 
No. 02-1287  
 
10 
 
the Supreme Court, first in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 
(1990), and then in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), 
the case that overruled Grady, has been willing to move beyond a 
strict "elements only" interpretation of Blockburger in cases 
involving a second prosecution.  See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 
¶25 ("The court appears less tolerant of prosecuting the same 
offense in a second prosecution."). 
2. 
Continuing Jeopardy 
¶19 The Double Jeopardy Clause does not necessarily act as 
a bar to a second trial for the same charge after conviction.  
For instance, there is generally no bar to a second trial when a 
conviction is overturned on appeal.  Ball v. United States, 163 
U.S. 662 (1896).  As the Supreme Court explained in a more 
recent case: 
[I]f the first trial has ended in a conviction, the 
double jeopardy guarantee "imposes no limitations 
whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has 
succeeded 
in 
getting 
his 
first 
conviction 
set 
aside" . . . . "[T]o require a criminal defendant to 
stand trial again after he has successfully invoked a 
statutory 
right 
of 
appeal 
to 
upset 
his 
first 
conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of 
the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was 
intended to protect." 
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (first 
and third emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
¶20 The notion that a convicted defendant is not placed in 
jeopardy a second time when he is retried after his conviction 
is reversed, has been justified on grounds of waiver and on the 
legal fiction that the second trial is a continuation of the 
No. 02-1287  
 
11 
 
first.  See State v. Schmear, 28 Wis. 2d 126, 135-36, 135 
N.W.2d 842 (1965).9   
¶21 In 1964 Justice Harlan offered perhaps the most 
intellectually 
honest 
justification 
for 
the 
"continuing 
jeopardy" principle: 
While different theories have been advanced to 
support the permissibility of retrial, of greater 
importance than the conceptual abstractions employed 
to explain the Ball principle are the implications of 
that 
principle 
for 
the 
sound 
administration 
of 
justice. Corresponding to the right of an accused to 
be given a fair trial is the societal interest in 
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has 
obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed 
for society to pay were every accused granted immunity 
from punishment because of any defect sufficient to 
constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading 
to conviction. From the standpoint of a defendant, it 
is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be as 
zealous as they now are in protecting against the 
effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial 
stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would 
put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of 
further 
prosecution. 
In 
reality, 
therefore, 
the 
practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well 
as society's interest. The underlying purpose of 
permitting retrial is as much furthered by application 
of the rule to this case as it has been in cases 
previously decided. 
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); see also 
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 
(1984) ("[I]mplicit in the Ball rule permitting retrial after 
                                                 
9 Under the "continuing jeopardy" principle, "there is but 
one legal trial and . . . there is continuing jeopardy until the 
defendant has had a trial free from reversible error for the 
offense charged."  State v. Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 461-62, 210 
N.W.2d 685 (1973); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 25.4(a) (2d ed. 1999).   
No. 02-1287  
 
12 
 
reversal 
of 
a 
conviction 
is 
the 
concept 
of 
'continuing 
jeopardy.'  That principle 'has application where criminal 
proceedings 
against 
an 
accused 
have 
not 
run 
their 
full 
course.'"); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329, (1970) ("The 
concept of continuing jeopardy implicit in the Ball case would 
allow petitioner's retrial for voluntary manslaughter after his 
first conviction for that offense had been reversed."). 
 
¶22 There are exceptions to the principle of continuing 
jeopardy.  For example, double jeopardy principles prevent a 
defendant from being retried when a court overturns his 
conviction due to insufficient evidence.  Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).  Where the evidence is found 
insufficient to convict the defendant at trial, the defendant 
cannot again be prosecuted.  "[I]t should make no difference 
that 
the 
reviewing 
court, 
rather 
than 
the 
trial 
court, 
determined the evidence to be insufficient."  Id.   
3. 
Collateral Estoppel 
¶23 The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the principles 
of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion.  Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970).  Accordingly, "an issue of 
ultimate fact that is determined by a valid and full judgment 
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in a 
subsequent lawsuit."   State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 343, 
579 N.W.2d 35 (1998) (citing Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443).   
¶24 Although collateral estoppel is "embodied" in the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, in criminal cases it actually operates 
beyond double jeopardy's bar against a second prosecution for 
No. 02-1287  
 
13 
 
the same offense after acquittal or conviction.  As the Seventh 
Circuit put it, "collateral estoppel is applicable in criminal 
cases only when double jeopardy is not."  United States v. 
Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).  This paradox is 
understood when one recognizes that a criminal defendant will 
never need the protections of collateral estoppel when the state 
is barred entirely from prosecuting the defendant.  Id.   
B. 
Retrial or Successive Prosecution? 
¶25 The State contends that its plan to retry Henning on 
three counts of bail jumping is not barred by double jeopardy 
because double jeopardy imposes "no limitation" whatever upon 
the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his 
first conviction reversed.  See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 131 
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720).  The State asserts that the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erred 
in 
preemptively 
foreclosing 
the 
possibility that Henning could be retried on the overturned bail 
jumping convictions.   
¶26 Henning counters that double jeopardy does apply and 
does bar a retrial of the bail jumping charge.  He insists that 
this case falls outside of the "continuing jeopardy" rule.  
Henning asserts that he cannot be successively prosecuted for 
bail jumping in this situation in which bail jumping is 
predicated on the commission of a new crime because the bail 
jumping offense and the new crime are the "same" offense for 
double jeopardy purposes.  Because there was an acquittal on the 
new crime (possession of controlled substances with intent to 
deliver), any prosecution based on that crime or on a lesser-
No. 02-1287  
 
14 
 
included offense is a successive prosecution that violates 
double jeopardy. 
¶27 As we examine this situation, several principles are 
clear: Henning was acquitted of (1) possessing THC with intent 
to deliver; and (2) possessing LSD with intent to deliver.  
Consequently, he may not be charged with these same offenses in 
a second prosecution after acquittal.  Moreover, he may not be 
charged with simple possession of THC or simple possession of 
LSD because these charges would violate Blockburger in that the 
lesser-included offense in each instance is the "same offense" 
as the offense of which Henning was acquitted.  The lesser-
included offense does not require proof of a fact which the 
greater offense does not.  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
¶28 If there were a retrial of bail jumping charges, 
Henning could not be tried for these charges on a theory that he 
had violated the conditions of his bond by possessing THC or LSD 
with intent to deliver because those two charges have already 
been decided against the State.  If nothing else, the defendant 
could assert collateral estoppel. 
¶29 The issue to be decided is whether the defendant could 
be retried for bail jumping on a different theory, that is, bail 
jumping predicated on the commission of the crime of simple 
possession of THC or LSD. 
¶30 Henning devotes the bulk of his argument trying to 
establish that, for the purposes of successive prosecution, the 
elements of the substantive offense (possession with intent to 
deliver) are "incorporated" within the elements of bail jumping, 
No. 02-1287  
 
15 
 
and that therefore the two are the "same offense" as a matter of 
law.  For this he relies on Dixon. 
¶31 In Dixon, the defendant was arrested for second-degree 
murder and was released on bond.  Id. at 691.  His release form 
specified that he was not to commit "any criminal offense."  Id.  
He was subsequently arrested and indicted for possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver.  Id.  Under local procedure in 
the District of Columbia, the court issued an order requiring 
the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt.  After the show-cause hearing, the court concluded 
that the government had established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was in possession of drugs and that those 
drugs were possessed with intent to deliver.  Id.  The court 
found the defendant guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced 
him to 180 days in jail.  Id. at 691-92.  He later moved to 
dismiss the cocaine indictment on double jeopardy grounds.  Id. 
at 692.   
¶32 The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal 
of the indictment.  Writing for himself and Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Scalia wrote: "Because Dixon's drug offense did not 
include any element not contained in his previous contempt 
offense, his subsequent prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause."  Id. at 700 (emphasis added).  The Court provided the 
following explanation: 
 
In this situation, in which the contempt sanction 
is imposed for violating the order through commission 
of the incorporated drug offense, the later attempt to 
prosecute Dixon for the drug offense resembles the 
No. 02-1287  
 
16 
 
situation 
that 
produced 
our 
judgment 
of 
double 
jeopardy in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) 
(per curiam).  There we held that a subsequent 
prosecution for robbery with a firearm was barred by 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant had 
already been tried for felony murder based on the same 
underlying felony.  We have described our terse per 
curiam in Harris as standing for the proposition that, 
for double jeopardy purposes, "the crime generally 
described as felony murder" is not "a separate offense 
distinct from its various elements."  Illinois v. 
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1980).  So too here, the 
"crime" of violating a condition of release cannot be 
abstracted 
from 
the 
"element" 
of 
the 
violated 
condition.  The Dixon court order incorporated the 
entire governing criminal code in the same manner as 
the Harris felony-murder statute incorporated the 
several enumerated felonies.  Here, as in Harris, the 
underlying substantive criminal offense is "a species 
of lesser-included offense."  Vitale, supra, at 420.   
Id. at 698 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
¶33 Three other justices——White, Stevens, and Souter——
concurred in the judgment of dismissal on different grounds.  
Justice Scalia's "incorporation" theory was able to command only 
two votes.  Consequently, the holding in Grady——that "the Double 
Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish 
an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, 
the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense 
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted"——was 
overruled.  Grady, 495 U.S. at 510. 
¶34 In the aftermath of Dixon, one can imagine a situation 
in which a defendant is prosecuted for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver, for an offense 
committed while the defendant is on pretrial release.  If the 
defendant is tried on this single drug charge and acquitted and 
No. 02-1287  
 
17 
 
then the state turns around and brings a subsequent charge for 
bail jumping based on the crime of simple possession of the same 
controlled substance, this court would be faced with a situation 
comparable to Dixon, Harris, or Kurzawa——that is, a "second" or 
"subsequent" or "successive" 
prosecution of 
the 
defendant 
initiated at a different time. 
¶35 In that situation, according to Kurzawa, this court 
would engage in a Blockburger analysis.  "We believe that 
Blockburger, and the case law developed around it, adequately 
protect the interests embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
Under Blockburger, [1] the state cannot successively prosecute a 
defendant for two offenses unless each offense necessarily 
requires proof of an element the other does not."  Kurzawa, 180 
Wis. 2d at 524.  "[2] Neither can the state prosecute an offense 
whose elements are 'incorporated' into the elements of an 
offense already prosecuted.  Finally, [3] the state cannot 
relitigate factual issues that have already been adjudicated to 
the defendant's benefit in an earlier prosecution."  Id. 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
¶36 This language, which shows some willingness to embrace 
the "incorporation" theory, must be put in the context of two 
separately initiated prosecutions, one of which would come to 
trial subsequent to the first prosecution after there had been 
an acquittal or a conviction on the other prosecution. 
¶37 The Henning case is different.  This case involved 
five simultaneous charges in a single prosecution——five charges 
that went to trial at the same time.  This case does not involve 
No. 02-1287  
 
18 
 
a "second" or "subsequent" or "successive" prosecution.  Five 
charges filed at the same time do not implicate double jeopardy 
unless, 
after 
conviction, 
they 
violate 
double 
jeopardy's 
prohibition against "multiple punishments for the same offense."  
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.  Here, if Henning had been convicted of 
all five offenses, he would not have had a double jeopardy 
claim, even if we assume that the three bail jumping charges 
"incorporated" all the elements of, say, possession with intent 
to deliver THC.  Henning would not have had a double jeopardy 
claim for multiple punishments because in this line of analysis 
the Blockburger test is "now seen as simply a rule of 
construction creating a rebuttable prescription of sameness."  
Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶24 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Double 
Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L. Rev. 1807, 1819 (1997) 
(citing cases)). 
¶38 As we said in Davison, 
 
Looking then solely to cumulative punishments 
imposed in a single prosecution for the same offense, 
"the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent 
the 
sentencing 
court 
from 
prescribing 
greater 
punishment than the legislature intended."  Missouri 
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).  "Even if the 
crimes are the same under Blockburger, if it is 
evident that a state legislature intended to authorize 
cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry is at an 
end."  Johnson, 467 U.S. [493], at 499 n.8 [(1984)]; 
see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 
(1985). 
. . . .  
We read the Supreme Court as saying that when a 
defendant is convicted under more than one statute for 
a single act or transaction and the charges constitute 
No. 02-1287  
 
19 
 
"the same offense" because they are identical in law 
and 
fact, 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
prohibits 
cumulative punishments from these convictions unless 
the relevant legislative body intended to authorize 
cumulative punishments. 
Davison, 263 Wis. 2d  145, ¶¶28, 30. 
¶39 In Wisconsin, bail jumping and the crime underlying a 
bail jumping charge are distinct and separate offenses for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  State ex rel. Jacobus 
v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 53, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997) (citing 
State v. Harris, 190 Wis. 2d 718, 724, 528 N.W.2d 7 (Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Nelson, 146 Wis. 2d 442, 449, 432 N.W.2d 115 
(Ct. App. 1988)), review denied 147 Wis. 2d 890, 436 N.W.2d 30 
(1988)). 
 
These 
cases 
conclusively 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
legislature's purpose in enacting bail jumping laws was to 
authorize multiple punishments to promote multiple interests.  
"[B]ail jumping laws are intended not only to deter bail 
jumping, but also to enhance the effective administration of 
justice in the courts. . . . [C]ourts impose bond conditions 
with the intent to protect members of the community . . . and 
prevent a defendant from violating the law."  Jacobus, 208 
Wis. 2d at 52. 
¶40 These principles can coexist in harmony with the 
theory that a retrial of bail jumping charges would constitute 
"continuing jeopardy."  They are shattered if we determine that 
a retrial of bail jumping charges would constitute separate, 
successive prosecutions with respect to the drug charges of 
which Henning was acquitted. 
No. 02-1287  
 
20 
 
¶41 Thus, the critical question is this: When a jury, in a 
multicount trial, both convicts and acquits, and an appellate 
court then overturns the conviction or convictions, do the 
acquitted charges pose any direct bar to retrial of the reversed 
convictions? 
 
After 
reviewing 
the 
analyses 
of 
relevant 
authorities, 
we 
conclude 
that 
an 
acquittal 
in 
these 
circumstances is not equivalent to a first prosecution in a 
successive prosecution scenario: an acquittal poses no direct 
bar to retrial on the reversed charges.  Thus, even if we were 
to accept Henning's supposition that bail jumping and the 
underlying offense for the bail jumping are the "same" for 
double jeopardy purposes, there is still no direct double 
jeopardy bar to retrying him on convictions overturned on appeal 
because the retrial involves continuing jeopardy.   
¶42 In the ensuing analysis, we rely on principles that 
have been drawn from two interrelated lines of cases addressing 
double jeopardy: (1) retrial following a conviction overturned 
on appeal; and (2) retrial following a mistrial.   
¶43 Like a retrial after reversal of a conviction, 
"[m]ultiple trials on a single charge are not prohibited if the 
first trial resulted in a mistrial that was justified under the 
manifest necessity doctrine or was requested or consented to by 
the defense (absent judicial or prosecutorial overreaching that 
is aimed at forcing the mistrial)."  5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 25.1(g)(4) (2d ed. 1999).  Both situations 
are exceptions to the general rule that a second trial is a 
"successive prosecution": 
No. 02-1287  
 
21 
 
[I]n a case of a retrial after a successful appeal 
from a conviction, the concept of continuing jeopardy 
on the offense for which the defendant was convicted 
applies, 
thereby making 
retrial 
on that 
offense 
permissible. In a slightly different context, the 
defendant's right to have the need for a retrial 
measured by the strict "manifest necessity" standard 
of United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 
(1824), does not exist if the mistrial was granted at 
the defendant's request.  Both the trial after the 
appeal and the trial after the mistrial are, in a 
sense, a second prosecution for the same offense, but, 
in both situations, the policy behind the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not require prohibition of the 
second trial.   
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted).   
 
¶44 Double jeopardy principles are often difficult to 
apply,10 and this difficulty is magnified when, on appeal, the 
issues involve multi-count indictments that produce different 
results on different charges.  Courts that have addressed such 
situations handle these complex situations as if each different 
charge proceeds along a parallel track.  The termination of 
jeopardy on one track does not directly impact charges on the 
different parallel tracks.  In other words, when jeopardy on one 
count of a multi-count complaint terminates, this does not mean 
that other counts brought simultaneously become subject to 
successive prosecution analysis. 
                                                 
10 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981), 
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist coined an oft-quoted comment 
regarding 
the 
difficulties 
of double 
jeopardy 
litigation: 
"decisional law in the area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which 
could 
not 
fail 
to 
challenge 
the 
most 
intrepid 
judicial 
navigator."   
No. 02-1287  
 
22 
 
¶45 This analysis was well stated in Mauk v. State, 605 
A.2d 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992),11 where the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals issued a scholarly opinion about the retrial of 
particular charges in a multi-count indictment when jeopardy has 
terminated on some but not all charges.  The defendant stood 
trial on a multi-count indictment that included possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver and simple possession of 
marijuana.  Id. at 158.  The jury could not reach a verdict on 
the possession with intent to deliver charge, and the court 
declared a mistrial on that count.  At the same time, the jury 
convicted the defendant of the simple possession charge.  Id. 
¶46 The defendant moved to preclude retrial of the 
possession with intent to deliver charge on double jeopardy 
grounds.  The motion was denied, and the defendant appealed.  On 
appeal, the court considered the defendant's syllogism: (1) the 
defendant had been placed in jeopardy once because he had been 
                                                 
11 In Hunt v. State, 622 A.2d 155, 157 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1993), the same Maryland court recognized that, to some 
degree, Mauk v. State, 605 A.2d 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), 
had been functionally overruled by Griffiths v. State, 611 A.2d 
1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).  Griffiths recognized that Mauk, 
in crafting its analysis, overlooked aspects of Maryland common 
law.  "As [the Maryland common law] rule is more favorable to 
defendants and is therefore not precluded by the Constitutional 
principles formulated by the [United States] Supreme Court, it 
is the one that effectively binds us and the trial courts of 
this State."  611 A.2d at 1029. In any event, Griffiths involved 
multiple punishments, which are not directly at issue in this 
case.  Mauk's in-depth analysis regarding the double jeopardy 
principles of our federal constitution, which is generally 
interpreted in the same manner as the double jeopardy provision 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, see supra note 8, continues to 
offer compelling and relevant analysis.   
No. 02-1287  
 
23 
 
tried, convicted, and sentenced (and had even served his 
sentence) on the simple possession charge; (2) simple possession 
and possession with intent to deliver are the "same" for double 
jeopardy purposes; (3) therefore, retrying the defendant on a 
charge of possession with intent to deliver would place him 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense.  Id. at 159.   
¶47 The court concluded that there was no double jeopardy 
bar to the retrial.  "The appellant's problem is that he points 
to an impact that would be legally and logically compelling in a 
context involving sequential jeopardy but he misapplies it to a 
very different context involving continuing jeopardy.  His 
syllogism is a valid one and would be persuasive in an 
appropriate setting."  Id. at 160.  Thus, even though the new 
trial on the mistried possession with intent to deliver charge 
would be for the "same offense," the Blockburger test is 
"inapplicable to continuing jeopardy problems, not through any 
fault of its own but for the larger reason that the double 
jeopardy protection itself is inapplicable."  Id.   
¶48 Even though jeopardy on the simple possession count 
terminated when the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court 
noted that jeopardy on the possession with intent to deliver 
charge continued on through the mistrial and through the 
appellate process.  The court explained: 
In the context of a multi-count indictment or a 
multi-indictment trial involving related offenses, 
multiple jeopardies for different manifestations of 
the "same offense" routinely begin simultaneously and 
run along parallel tracks.  Clearly, no double 
jeopardy problem is involved.  In a multi-count 
No. 02-1287  
 
24 
 
indictment 
for 
armed 
robbery, 
for 
instance, 
simultaneous jeopardies will be suffered for 1) armed 
robbery, 2) simple robbery, 3) theft, and 4) assault 
and battery.  In a literal sense, this involves not 
simply double jeopardy or even triple jeopardy but 
quadruple jeopardy for the "same offense," except that 
that is not the way we count.  The reason there is no 
impediment 
to 
these 
apparently 
multiple 
parallel 
jeopardies is that "double jeopardy" essentially means 
"former 
jeopardy" 
and 
is 
primarily 
concerned, 
therefore, with regulating subsequent and sequential 
jeopardies. 
 
In 
the 
fundamentally 
different 
environment of simultaneous jeopardy, its only concern 
is with the avoidance of multiple punishment and that 
is a concern that is not addressed until the time for 
sentencing.   
While these routinely simultaneous jeopardies are 
legitimately proceeding along their parallel tracks, 
the termination of jeopardy on one or more of the 
tracks——through the declaration of a mistrial, the 
entry of a nol pros, the granting of a directed 
verdict of acquittal, the rendering of a verdict of 
acquittal, the rendering of a verdict of conviction, 
etc.——has no carry-over effect on the other jeopardies 
still proceeding along their own tracks.   
. . . . 
However long its life may be, the continuing 
original 
jeopardy 
for 
possession 
with 
intent to 
distribute will not be at all affected, under double 
jeopardy principles at least, by the fates of its 
doctrinal 
litter-mates, 
whose 
jeopardies 
began 
simultaneously with its own. 
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).  Thus, where multiple offenses are 
consolidated in one trial, termination of jeopardy on one count 
does not directly impact the proceedings on other counts, even 
if the offenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes.   
¶49 Mauk 
arrived at 
this conclusion by 
exhaustively 
analyzing United States Supreme Court precedent.  The Supreme 
Court seems partial to the concept that termination of jeopardy 
No. 02-1287  
 
25 
 
on one count of a multi-count indictment does not terminate 
jeopardy for all counts, although the precise issue in this case 
has never been directly presented to the Court.  For example, in 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), the defendant was charged 
with 
murder, 
robbery, 
and 
the 
respective 
lesser-included 
offenses of manslaughter and theft.  Id. at 494.  The defendant 
pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of manslaughter and theft, 
and the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the greater-included offenses on double jeopardy grounds.  Id.  
Ohio appellate courts affirmed the trial court's decision.  Id. 
at 496.   The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant 
could be tried on the greater-included offenses despite the 
guilty pleas to the lesser-included offenses.   
¶50 In the Johnson opinion, the Court responded to the 
defendant's position that, if the state prosecuted the defendant 
for murder and robbery following conviction and sentencing for 
manslaughter and theft pursuant to the plea, the prosecution 
would violate double jeopardy's bar against retrial following 
conviction.  The Court roundly rejected this argument: 
The answer to this contention seems obvious to us.  
Respondent 
was indicted 
on four 
related 
charges 
growing out of a murder and robbery.  The grand jury 
returned a single indictment, and all four charges 
were 
embraced 
within 
a 
single 
prosecution.  
Respondent's argument is apparently based on the 
assumption that trial proceedings, like amoebae, are 
capable of a being infinitely subdivided, so that a 
determination of guilt and punishment on one count of 
a multicount indictment immediately raises a double 
jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any remaining 
counts that are greater or lesser included offenses of 
No. 02-1287  
 
26 
 
the charge just concluded.  We have never held that, 
and decline to hold it now. 
Id. at 500-01 (emphasis added).    
¶51 The Johnson case admittedly addresses the termination 
of jeopardy following a conviction rather than following an 
acquittal, but it sets out an important principle.  It has been 
read to stand for the proposition that "the termination of 
jeopardy 
on 
the 
[lesser-included 
offense] 
counts 
had 
no 
crossover effect on other, already-charged counts."  Mitchell 
Keiter, The Mauled Verdict: The Knoller Case Shows Why Res 
Judicata 
Should 
Protect 
Partial 
Convictions 
As 
Well 
As 
Acquittals, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 493, 497 (2002).   
¶52 Later the same month, the Court issued another double 
jeopardy decision suggesting the same thing.  In Richardson v. 
United States, the government brought three charges against the 
defendant: two counts of distributing a controlled substance, 
and 
one 
count 
of 
conspiracy 
to 
distribute 
a 
controlled 
substance.  468 U.S. 317, 318 (1984).  The jury acquitted the 
defendant on one of the two distributing a controlled substance 
charges, but failed to reach consensus on the other two charges.  
Id. at 318-19.  The trial court declared a mistrial on those two 
counts.  Id. 
¶53 The Court analyzed the defendant's claim that a 
retrial was prohibited by double jeopardy.  The Court noted that 
it has "constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following 
a 'hung jury' does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."  Id. 
No. 02-1287  
 
27 
 
at 324 (citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 
(1892)): 
[T]he protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its 
terms applies only if there has been some event, such 
as 
an 
acquittal, 
which 
terminates 
the 
original 
jeopardy.  Since jeopardy attached here when the jury 
was sworn, petitioner's argument necessarily assumes 
that the judicial declaration of a mistrial was an 
event which terminated jeopardy in his case and which 
allowed him to assert a valid claim of double 
jeopardy. 
. . . .  
[W]e hold . . . that the failure of the jury to reach 
a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy. 
Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325. 
¶54 In its discussion, the Court notably omitted any 
discussion of whether the other charge of which the defendant 
had been acquitted created a preclusive effect on retrial of the 
mistried counts.  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied on Richardson to reject the argument that an acquittal on 
some counts of a multi-count prosecution should control whether 
a retrial of other mistried counts for the same conduct is 
barred by double jeopardy.  Bailin, 977 F.2d at 274.  In Bailin, 
the 
government 
brought 
195 
charges 
related 
to 
alleged 
improprieties the 12 defendants committed while traders at the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  Id. at 272.  The jury acquitted 
the defendants on the majority of the counts, but could not 
reach a verdict on the remaining charges, and the federal 
district court declared a mistrial.  Id. at 273.  "[A] 'trial 
court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not 
No. 02-1287  
 
28 
 
an event that terminates the original jeopardy,' even if there 
has been an acquittal on another count."  Id. at 274 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324).  Double jeopardy 
"applies only if there has been some event, such as an 
acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy."  Id. 
(quoting Richardson, 468 U.S at 324).  The court concluded that, 
"even when the defendant secured a partial acquittal in the 
first trial," the government could still retry the defendant 
following the mistrial.  Id. 
¶55 The court in Bailin held that double jeopardy did not 
apply and directed the focus of its analysis to estoppel.  Id. 
at 275.  Estoppel in a retrial context is more appropriately 
considered direct than collateral because the retrial is a 
continuation of the first trial, not a collateral event.  Id. at 
276.  Bailin held that direct estoppel prevented the government 
from relitigating issues in the retrial that had been previously 
decided in the defendant's favor.  Id.  According to Bailin, 
Direct estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a 
fact which was already determined against it in "a 
decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on 
the merits but does not preclude all further action on 
the remainder of the claim; issues common to both 
parts of the claim are precluded, even though new 
issues remain to be decided." 
Id. (quoting Jeffers, 432 U.S. 137, 152). 
 
¶56 Under the principles recognized in Mauk, Johnson, 
Richardson, 
and 
Bailin, 
even 
if 
we 
accepted 
defendant's 
contention that bail jumping and the underlying offense are the 
same for double jeopardy purposes, there is still no bar to 
No. 02-1287  
 
29 
 
retrying a reversed conviction for bail jumping because this is 
simply 
a 
case 
of 
continuing 
jeopardy, 
not 
successive 
prosecution.  Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
erred when it held that the State could not retry Henning for 
bail jumping.   
¶57 However, it is important to note the protections 
defendants enjoy through issue preclusion.  As the Seventh 
Circuit made clear, collateral estoppel applies where double 
jeopardy does not foreclose a second trial entirely, see Bailin, 
977 F.2d at 275, and therefore "when an issue of ultimate fact 
has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that 
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any 
future lawsuit."  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.  According to Bailin, 
direct 
estoppel, 
like 
collateral 
estoppel, 
"bar[s] 
the 
government from relitigating issues that were necessarily and 
finally decided in the defendant's favor by reason of the jury's 
partial acquittal on other counts." Bailin, 977 F.2d at 276.   
¶58 While this court is sensitive to the dangers the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
is 
designed 
to 
prevent——"repeated 
attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing him to 
continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing 
the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced 
sentence," Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498-99 (citing United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, (1975); Green v. United States, 355 
U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957))——these concerns must be balanced 
against the underpinnings of "continuing jeopardy."  Where there 
are multiple charges proceeding simultaneously, Ashe's estoppel 
No. 02-1287  
 
30 
 
principles provide a substantial bulwark that mitigates any 
harsh effects that the continuing jeopardy principle might work 
against a defendant.   
¶59 Because the State already tried Henning unsuccessfully 
for possession with intent to deliver, the State cannot retry 
him on that issue.  Therefore, the State cannot base a retrial 
for bail jumping on possession with intent to deliver.  However, 
whether Henning is guilty of committing the crime of simple 
possession is not an issue that has been litigated in his favor.  
The State would not violate double jeopardy if it retried 
Henning for the bail jumping predicated upon simple possession. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶60 In a multi-count trial, if the defendant is convicted 
of one or more counts and acquitted of one or more counts, and 
the 
defendant 
successfully 
appeals 
the 
conviction 
or 
convictions, the acquittals pose no direct bar to retrying the 
defendant.  Rather, acquittal may indirectly impact the state's 
ability to retry the defendant under Ashe's collateral estoppel 
principles.  In this case, the court of appeals erroneously 
conducted its double jeopardy analysis as one of successive 
prosecution.  We reverse the court of appeals decision with 
respect to double jeopardy and remand the matter to the circuit 
court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 02-1287  
 
31 
 
 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶61 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I strongly 
disagree with the majority that double jeopardy does not prevent 
a retrial of Henning on the bail jumping charges.  The 
majority's analysis rests on its conclusion that Henning's case 
is controlled by principles of continuing jeopardy.  In fact, 
the majority went so far as to say that the principle of 
continuing jeopardy is so dispositive to the outcome, that "even 
if we accepted defendant's contention that bail jumping and the 
underlying offense are the same for double jeopardy purposes, 
there 
is 
still 
no 
bar 
to 
retrying 
a 
reversed 
conviction . . . because this is simply a case of continuing 
jeopardy . . . ."  Majority op., ¶56.   
¶62 During the initial trial, the bail jumping charges 
rested solely on whether Henning possessed the controlled 
substances at issue with intent to deliver.  The stipulation 
makes this clear, as the prosecution and defense agreed that a 
guilty verdict on either count of possession with intent to 
deliver would result in Henning having no defense to the three 
bail jumping charges.  Throughout the trial, both attorneys 
acted in accord with the stipulation, as the evidence presented 
to the jury focused exclusively on the charges concerning 
possession with intent to deliver, not on simple possession 
charges.  During the jury instructions conference, neither 
attorney requested any lesser-included offense instructions on 
simple possession of the controlled substances at issue.  
¶63 The nature of the case was changed, however, when the 
jury asked the judge, during deliberations, if it could find 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
Henning guilty of bail jumping based on simple possession, 
rather than possession with intent to deliver.  I agree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that that question "functionally 
transformed the case into a lesser-included offense case."  
State v. Henning, 2003 WI App 54, ¶20, 261 Wis. 2d 664, 660 
N.W.2d 698.  As a result of the circuit court's affirmative 
answer, Henning's fate, which had once rested solely on the 
possession with intent to deliver charges, was decided instead 
on charges of simple possession.  See id., ¶3.  The jury 
deliberated and found Henning not guilty of the two charges of 
possession with intent to deliver, but guilty of bail jumping, 
apparently based on simple possession, without the proper 
instructions on lesser-included offenses and simple possession 
charges, and without applicable verdict forms.   
 
¶64 The majority recognizes an exception to the continuing 
jeopardy doctrine, but then brushes past it without analyzing 
its relevance to this case.  The exception makes clear that 
"double jeopardy principles prevent a defendant from being 
retried 
when 
a 
court 
overturns 
his 
conviction 
due 
to 
insufficient evidence."  Majority op., ¶22 (citing Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).  Such exception means 
that the prohibition against double jeopardy "forbids a second 
trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another 
opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the 
first proceeding."  Burks, 437 U.S. at 11 (footnote omitted).  
If the State is allowed another trial here, the prosecution is 
essentially being allowed another chance to present testimony 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
and request instructions and verdict forms on bail jumping 
charges premised on simple possession, rather than possession 
with intent to deliver THC and LSD.  As the court of appeals 
pointed out, it is not necessary to "quarrel with the State's 
right to make [a] strategic choice.  But having made it, the 
State has to live with it."  Henning, 261 Wis. 2d 664, ¶21.  
 
¶65 Since this is a case that was not tried on simple 
possession, it is a case nearly identical to one overturned for 
insufficient evidence.  Here, the State failed to try this case 
on charges of possession of THC and LSD, but rather tried and 
failed in its attempt to convince the jury of Henning's guilt of 
possession with intent to deliver those substances.  Under such 
circumstances, the State failed in its proof that Henning was 
guilty of bail jumping as well.12  If the jury had found Henning 
guilty of possession with intent to deliver, he would have had 
no defense to the bail jumping charges due to the stipulation he 
entered into with the state.  However, the jury found Henning 
not guilty with respect to the charges of possession with intent 
to deliver THC and LSD.  The government failed to meet its 
burden on those charges and, in turn, failed to meet its burden 
for charges of bail jumping.  The gamble the State made by 
                                                 
12 It is highly debatable that a jury, even if the bail 
jumping 
charges 
had 
originally 
been 
premised 
on 
simple 
possession, could have found Henning guilty of those charges and 
of the charges of simple possession, beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The drugs were found during a search of a car belonging to 
Henning's brother.  The "bag of weed" was found in the armrest 
between where Henning and the other backseat passenger were 
sitting.  It was this other passenger who told the police he 
believed the drugs belonged to Henning.   
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
entering into a stipulation, which rested the bail jumping 
charges on obtaining a guilty verdict for a possession with 
intent to deliver charge, proved unsuccessful.      
¶66 In State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998), we used similar reasoning when reversing a conviction 
for bail jumping:   
Because the bail jumping conviction was premised 
solely upon the Defendant's obstructing conviction, 
which we now reverse, the bail jumping conviction must 
also be reversed.  Absent a finding that the Defendant 
committed a crime, the State has not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt an element of the bail jumping 
charge——that the Defendant intentionally failed to 
comply with the term of his bond prohibiting criminal 
activity.   . . .  Because we are reversing the 
Defendant's conviction for obstructing, we conclude as 
a matter of law that the evidence, viewed most 
favorably 
to 
the 
State, 
does 
not 
support 
the 
Defendant's conviction for bail jumping. 
Id. at 245 (citations omitted).   
¶67 A similar finding is required here, because the jury 
found that the State had not proved an element of the bail 
jumping charge——commission of the crime of possession with 
intent to deliver——beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the 
jury was not instructed on lesser-included offenses or simple 
possession, forcing it to deliberate without the proper benefit 
of instructions and verdict forms before finding Henning guilty 
of bail jumping.  I agree with the court of appeals that  
"[b]ecause 
such 
verdicts 
were 
not 
provided, 
we 
have 
no 
documentation of the jury's supposed determination that Henning 
possessed controlled substances."  Henning, 261 Wis. 2d 664, 
¶23.  Without such verdict forms, there is no evidence that the 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
jury even reached the conclusion that Henning was guilty of 
simple possession.    
 
¶68 Despite the position of the court of appeals to the 
contrary, this is plainly a case of insufficient evidence.  See 
id., ¶26.  The stipulation clearly provided that Henning's bail 
jumping charges directly hinged on the jury's determination of 
his charges relating to possession with the intent to deliver 
THC and LSD.  Because the jury subsequently found him not guilty 
of those charges, the State's case in regard to the charges of 
bail jumping evaporated.  The analysis by the majority based on 
continuing jeopardy is clearly wrong.   
¶69 Without the argument based on the continuing jeopardy 
doctrine, any new proceeding against Henning on charges of bail 
jumping would violate the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  As stated in the United 
States Constitution, "nor shall any person be subject for the 
same 
offence 
to 
be 
twice 
put 
in 
jeopardy 
of 
life 
or 
limb . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  Similarly, the Wisconsin 
Constitution states, "no person for the same offense may be put 
twice in jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 1. However, the majority, in violation of these 
protections, would place Henning in jeopardy a second time, for 
what amounts to the same offenses of which he has already been 
acquitted. 
¶70 Relying on Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 
343 (1911), the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), clarified the test for 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
determining whether an offense is considered the same as another 
for purposes of double jeopardy.  Blockburger stated that "the 
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses 
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not."  Id.  See also majority op., ¶17. 
¶71 The majority makes several important points about the 
relationship of double jeopardy——in light of the Blockburger 
test——to this case: 
As we examine this situation, several principles 
are clear:  Henning was acquitted of (1) possessing 
THC with intent to deliver; and (2) possessing LSD 
with intent to deliver.  Consequently, he may not be 
charged 
with 
these 
same 
offenses 
in 
a 
second 
prosecution after acquittal.  Moreover, he may not be 
charged with simple possession of THC or simple 
possession of LSD because these charges would violate 
Blockburger in that the lesser-included offense in 
each instance is the "same offense" as the offense of 
which Henning was acquitted.  The lesser-included 
offense does not require proof of a fact which the 
greater offense does not.   
Majority op., ¶27 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).   
¶72 Thus, both the majority and case law are quite clear 
that Henning cannot be directly charged with simple possession 
of either controlled substance at issue.  Yet, despite its 
belief that it would be violative of double jeopardy to charge 
Henning with simple possession of THC or LSD, the majority would 
allow Henning to be retried on charges of bail jumping when 
Henning has already been acquitted of the crimes upon which the 
bail jumping charges are based.  As the United States Supreme 
Court noted on the subject of double jeopardy:  
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in 
at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
is that the State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).   
¶73 Here, the majority allows Henning to be subject to 
just such a repeated attempt at conviction, even though Henning 
is to be retried for bail jumping charges when he was acquitted 
of the crimes upon which the bail jumping charges were premised. 
¶74 In State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 524, 509 N.W.2d 
712 
(1994), 
this 
court 
discussed 
three 
features 
of 
the 
Blockburger analysis of double jeopardy claims: 
Under 
Blockburger, 
the 
state 
cannot 
successively 
prosecute a defendant for two offenses unless each 
offense necessarily requires proof of an element the 
other does not.  Neither can the state prosecute an 
offense whose elements are "incorporated" into the 
elements of an offense already prosecuted.  Finally, 
the state cannot relitigate factual issues that have 
already been adjudicated to the defendant's benefit in 
an earlier prosecution.  These protections ensure that 
defendants will not be forced to unfairly "run the 
gauntlet" a second time for the same offense. 
Id. (citations omitted).  See also, majority op., ¶35.   
¶75 The first of these three features is a basic element 
of double jeopardy as found in Blockburger: a person acquitted 
of one offense cannot subsequently be prosecuted for a lesser-
included offense of the original offense.  As previously noted, 
this means that Henning, who has already been acquitted of the 
offenses of possession of THC and LSD with intent to deliver, 
cannot now be charged with simple possession of THC or LSD, 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
because the simple 
possession charges 
are 
lesser-included 
offenses of possession with intent to deliver. 
¶76 The second of these features is the incorporation test 
initially enunciated in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 
(1993) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).  While only two United 
States Supreme Court Justices adopted this approach, this court 
chose to make the incorporation test a feature of Wisconsin's 
double jeopardy analysis in Kurzawa.  Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 
524.  Under the incorporation test, the State is precluded from 
prosecuting a defendant for an offense that incorporates the 
elements of an offense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted.  Id.  Here, the bail jumping charges against Henning 
incorporate the two charges of simple possession which the State 
wishes to use as the basis for the bail jumping charges.  Using 
the incorporation test, Henning should not be charged with bail 
jumping, which incorporates a charge——simple possession——which 
is a lesser-included offense of charges of which he has already 
been acquitted.  The incorporation test, which applies in this 
case, prevents a defendant like Henning from being indirectly 
charged with an offense for which the prosecution has already 
failed to secure a conviction. 
¶77 However, even without using the incorporation test, I 
still reach the conclusion that Henning cannot be retried on 
charges of bail jumping based upon simple possession.  Kurzawa 
also clearly states that issues already decided in favor of the 
defendant cannot be relitigated by the State.  Id.  In State v. 
Hauk, 2002 WI App 226, ¶19, 257 Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, the 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
court of appeals stated that a bail jumping conviction does not 
require proof of conviction for the underlying offense that led 
to a charge of bail jumping.  Rather, bail jumping requires 
"evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant intentionally 
violated his or her bond by committing a crime . . . ."  Id.  
See also Henning, 261 Wis. 2d 664, ¶25.  While Hauk allows a 
defendant to be convicted of bail jumping without being 
convicted of the underlying crime, this case is distinguishable 
in that Henning has already been acquitted of the offenses that 
underlie 
the 
bail 
jumping 
charges. 
 
The 
factual 
issues 
underlying the bail jumping charges have already been litigated 
in favor of Henning.  To predicate Henning's punishment for bail 
jumping on a crime for which he has already received an 
acquittal, as the majority does, is fundamentally unfair.  
Moreover, it directly contradicts Wisconsin case law, the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and the United States Constitution. 
¶78 The majority attempts to distinguish Henning's claims 
from those made in Kurzawa, by stating that "[t]his case does 
not 
involve 
a 
'second' 
or 
'subsequent' 
or 
'successive' 
prosecution."  Majority op., ¶37.  However, as an exception to 
the continuing jeopardy rule, this case involves just such a 
successive prosecution; therefore, the factors established by 
this court in Kurzawa apply and prevent Henning from being 
subjected to a second "running of the gauntlet."   
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  02-1287-CR.npc 
 
 
 
1