Case Title: Atkins v. State

Citation: 497 So. 2d 1200

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1986-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
497 So. 2d 1200 (1986)
Phillip A. ATKINS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 65974.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 30, 1986.
Rehearing Denied December 22, 1986.
Jack T. Edmund and Marshall G. Slaughter, Bartow, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and William E. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
BOYD, Justice.
In the late afternoon of September 23, 1981, Phillip Atkins, then age twenty-six, invited Antonio Castillo, who was six years old, to go for a car ride in the Lakeland area of Polk County. Later that evening young Antonio was found unconscious but alive, lying in a dirt road, wheezing and choking as he struggled to live. Antonio had been severely beaten about the head with a blunt instrument. He died in the emergency room of Lakeland General Hospital. His step-father was called to the hospital to verify the identity of the murdered boy, who by that time had been missing from his home neighborhood for several hours and had been reported as missing to the police.
Phillip Atkins was convicted of the murder of Antonio, based upon a confession and other evidence. The jury recommended a sentence of death and such a sentence was imposed by the court. On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions of murder and kidnapping, but vacated the death sentence and remanded for reconsideration of the sentence to be imposed for the capital offense. Atkins v. State, 452 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1984). On remand, the trial court heard arguments of counsel, reconsidered the sentencing question, and again sentenced Phillip Atkins to death. Atkins now seeks appellate review of that sentence. He is entitled to such an appeal and this Court has jurisdiction thereof. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1981).
Appellant argues that the trial court did not perform a proper and valid resentencing as mandated by this Court. Appellant *1201 says that the sentencing judge merely deleted the findings previously ruled improper by this Court, re-adopted his other previous findings and re-imposed the death sentence without engaging in any meaningful weighing of the various circumstances. Thus, appellant concludes, the new death sentence does not represent the exercise of reasoned judgment as required by law.
Appellant relies on Lucas v. State, 417 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1982), where this Court vacated a death sentence reimposed after remand because the record showed the trial judge had not engaged in any real, meaningful reconsideration of the matter of sentencing when the issue came before him a second time. Appellant says that because the sentencing judge issued most of the same findings he originally made when imposing the first death sentence, this case is like and should be controlled by Lucas. We disagree. The mere fact that many of the same findings of fact are made does not conclusively indicate that there was no meaningful reconsideration and no exercise of reasoned judgment in the resentencing.
Our previous decision vacating the death sentence and remanding for resentencing was based upon the fact that the court had considered an aggravating circumstance which this Court found to be improper. We found no fault with the evidence or argument presented to the jury at the sentencing phase. Accordingly, on remand no additional evidence was presented. The court heard arguments of counsel on both sides of the issue. The record shows that after the hearing, the judge called a court recess to reflect upon what he had heard.
Subsequently the court issued findings of fact regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required by section 921.141. The findings read in pertinent part as follows:
(Bracketed references added). Upon our review of the findings and the record, we conclude that the trial court exercised reasoned judgment and engaged in real and meaningful reconsideration of sentence with a weighing of circumstances as required by law.
Appellant argues that the evidence of emotional disturbance should tip the scales in favor of a life sentence. It is clear that the trial judge did consider appellant's mental and emotional problems as factors to be weighed but concluded that they did not outweigh the proven aggravating circumstances calling for a sentence of death. It is not this Court's function to engage in a general de novo re-weighing of the circumstances. Rather, we are to examine the record to ensure that the findings relied upon are supported by evidence. We find that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact.
Having found the trial judge's factual conclusions supported by evidence, and having found that the trial judge weighed and considered the circumstances in the manner required by law, we can find no reason to disturb the court's judgment. We therefore affirm the sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
McDONALD, Chief Justice, concurring.
Because of the mental status of the defendant, had I been the trial judge it is unlikely that I would have imposed the *1204 death penalty. However, as a justice reviewing the actions of the trial judge, I cannot say it was error for the trial judge to do so. Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of the death sentence.