Case Title: Stockard v. State

Citation: 391 So. 2d 1060

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1980-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
391 So. 2d 1060 (1980)
Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General.
(In re Herbert STOCKARD
v.
STATE of Alabama).
79-266.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 8, 1980.
Rehearing Denied September 26, 1980.
*1061 Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Edward R. Jackson of Tweedy, Jackson & Beech, Jasper, for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
In its petition for writ of certiorari, the State asks this Court to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 391 So. 2d 1049, in reversing the first degree murder conviction of the defendant, Herbert Stockard. In support of its petition, the State makes two basic contentions:
(1) The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that statements made by the victim in an extrajudicial conversation held outside the presence of the defendant were inadmissible because: the statements were made in a conversation which was a part of the res gestae, and, the portion of the conversation was first introduced by the defendant; therefore, the State could introduce the whole of it.
(2) The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury:
We have considered the arguments presented by the State, and by the defendant, and we conclude that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be reversed and remanded for the reasons which we will set out in this opinion.
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals sets out substantially all of the evidence surrounding the extrajudicial statements of the victim which that court held was inadmissible. We do not set it out again; for a better understanding of the issues, we do point out that the extrajudicial conversation was first mentioned while the victim's daughter was being examined by the State. The victim's daughter, by an unresponsive answer, first introduced the statement her mother had made:
At that time, as the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly points out, the unresponsive answer was excluded by the court and the jury was instructed not to consider it.
Defendant's counsel, on cross-examination, went back into the matter and asked the witness specifically about the conversation she had with her mother:
As we read the court's opinion, we think the court held that the defendant did not first inject the conversation into evidence. We cannot agree with this finding. That court is correct in stating that it was "first injected by the irresponsive answer of the witness." The distinguished judges of that court apparently thought it irrelevant that the defendant's counsel, after getting the trial court to exclude the unresponsive answer, asked the witness about the very same conversation, after being warned by counsel for the State that he was opening the door for the introduction of the other portions of the conversation. Based solely upon the testimony excerpted by the Court of Criminal Appeals and included in its opinion, we determine that defendant's counsel, not the State, injected the extrajudicial conversation into evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals apparently aware that there could be a colorable question as to which party injected the conversation into evidence, stated that even if the defendant first injected the conversation into evidence, the result was the same because:
*1064 We conclude that this holding by the Court of Criminal Appeals is in conflict with this Court's opinion in Logan v. State, 291 Ala. 497, 282 So. 2d 898 (1973), wherein it was stated:
It appears to us that the Court of Criminal Appeals, in applying the rule that one party can show the entire conversation when the opposing party has introduced a portion of it, made a distinction between admissible and inadmissible hearsay. We do not think that Logan authorizes such a distinction. The rule of admissibility has been explained in McElroy's Alabama Evidence as follows:
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 316.01 (1977). Thus, relevancy to the subject matter brought out is the standard by which a party might call for the remainder of a conversation partially proved by his opponent.
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with this Court's opinion in Logan v. State; we reverse and remand.
Even though we agree with the State's argument on the admissibility of the conversation, we reject the State's argument that the victim's conversation was also admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Criminal Appeals was correct in holding that the res gestae exception was inapplicable.
With regard to the second issue raised by the State, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that a distinction must be made between the testimony of a witness impeached by contradiction and the testimony of a witness shown to be unworthy of belief. In charging a jury concerning the appropriate treatment of these distinct types of testimony, it is incumbent upon the trial court to give significantly different instructions. When a witness has willfully sworn falsely and is, therefore, shown to be unworthy of belief, the jury is entitled to disregard his entire testimony and may be so charged. Jordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1 So. 577 (1886). By way of comparison, however, when a witness is merely impeached by contradiction, the jury may disregard only such portions of his testimony as are controverted and otherwise uncorroborated by other credible and unimpeached witnesses. Recognizing these distinctions in treatment, we raise the question as to which type of charge, if either, was appropriate in the present case.
It is clear from the record that there was never any witness shown to have willfully sworn falsely; however, the defendant was contradicted by his mother, who testified to the effect that the defendant came by her house before taking his wife to the hospital. The defendant had testified earlier that when he realized his wife was injured, he drove her straight to the hospital. In view of this contradiction, the state duly requested that the jury be charged concerning the proper treatment of the testimony of an impeached witness. The charge which was given was a proper evidentiary charge, and its usage in this case did not constitute prejudicial error.
The Court of Criminal Appeals expressed its deep concern over the giving of the charge in the present case because it believed the jury may have relied upon it as a *1065 license for disregarding everything the defendant said. Since the defendant was the only witness called in his behalf, the court believed this would be tantamount to destroying his only defense. We disagree. When a defendant decides to testify, his testimony is subject to the same scrutiny and rules of evidence as the testimony of any other witness. In the present case, the defendant was impeached, and the jury was thus entitled to treat his testimony as it would the testimony of any other impeached witness.
The fallacy of the holding by the Court of Criminal Appeals becomes clear when one studies the longstanding rule set out in the case of Jordan v. State, supra. In that case, the jury was instructed concerning the possible willful and corrupt false swearing of three witnesses, with the defendant being specifically named in the charge. Notwithstanding the fact that the jury was instructed that it might disregard the defendant's entire testimony, the charge was upheld as a correct statement of the law and fully proper. At 81 Ala. 31-32, 1 So. 585, the Court held:
We recognize that the charge in Jordan was one dealing with false swearing; however, the principle of that case is applicable here. The oral charge involved in the present case is much less specific than that used in Jordan in that it addressed the impeachment of "any witness."
The giving of the instruction was not prejudicial in light of the underlying facts. If the defendant felt the charge was confusing or left the impression that the jury was required to disregard his entire testimony, he should have filed a proper request for an explanatory charge. Having failed to do so, he cannot now claim that the charge was improper.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
BLOODWORTH, J., not sitting.