Case Title: Christensen v. Bowen

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-2078

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2078 
____________ 
 
ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MARY JO BOWEN, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[April 10, 2014] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Bowen v. Taylor-Christensen, 98 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2012).  In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which it 
certified to be of great public importance: 
MAY A PERSON WHO INTENTIONALLY DIRECTS THAT 
TITLE BE ISSUED IN HIS NAME AS CO-OWNER, BY 
COMPLETING A SWORN APPLICATION FOR TITLE IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE PURCHASE OF A VEHICLE, AVOID 
LIABILITY UNDER THE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY 
DOCTRINE BY CLAIMING THAT HE NEVER INTENDED TO 
BE THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE AND FURTHER CLAIMING 
THAT HE RELINQUISHED CONTROL TO A CO-OWNER OF 
THE VEHICLE? 
 
 
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Id. at 145.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We rephrase 
the certified question as follows: 
MAY A PERSON WHOSE NAME IS ON THE CERTIFICATE OF 
TITLE OF A VEHICLE AS CO-OWNER AVOID VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE DANGEROUS 
INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE BY ASSERTING THAT HE 
NEVER INTENDED TO BE THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE 
AND FURTHER CLAIMING THAT HE RELINQUISHED 
CONTROL TO A CO-OWNER OF THE VEHICLE? 
 
We answer this question in the negative and hold that a person whose name is on 
the certificate of title as co-owner is a beneficial owner with the right to control the 
vehicle.   
BACKGROUND 
 
Robert Christensen paid the purchase price for a Chrysler PT Cruiser on 
April 29, 2003, and the certificate of title was placed in the name of both Mary 
Taylor-Christensen and Robert Christensen as co-owners.  They were married at 
the time, but were involved in dissolution of marriage proceedings.  Both 
Christensen and his then wife Taylor-Christensen signed the application for 
certificate of title, under penalty of perjury, to have the title issued to them jointly 
as “owner” and “co-owner.”  Christensen did not receive the certificate of title 
because it was mailed to the wife’s address, but the certificate of title was issued in 
the name of both Christensen and his wife, as “Mary G. Taylor-Christensen or 
Robert L. Christensen.”  Although Christensen did not have a key to the vehicle or 
 
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use the vehicle, and did not reside with Taylor-Christensen or have access to her 
garage where the vehicle was kept, the title to the vehicle was in his name as co-
owner.   
 
Approximately twenty-two months after the vehicle was purchased, Taylor-
Christensen negligently struck and killed Thomas Bowen while driving the vehicle. 
At the time of the accident, the title remained in the names of both Taylor-
Christensen and Christensen and the vehicle was being operated with his consent.  
After the accident, Mary Jo Bowen, as executor of her husband’s estate, filed an 
action for wrongful death against both Taylor-Christensen and Christensen.  
Bowen alleged that Christensen, as an owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable 
for Taylor-Christensen’s negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.  
Christensen, however, contended that he was not vicariously liable under the 
beneficial ownership exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.  He 
testified during trial that his intent was to purchase the vehicle as a gift for his wife 
and that he had no involvement with the vehicle after it was purchased.   
 
Bowen moved for a directed verdict on the issue of ownership, but the trial 
court denied the motion.  The jury was instructed that “[a]n owner of a vehicle is 
one who has legal title to the vehicle and who has a beneficial ownership with the 
right of control and authority over its use.”  The jury subsequently found that 
Christensen was not an owner of the vehicle.  Bowen appealed the denial of the 
 
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motion for directed verdict to the Fifth District, and the district court, on rehearing, 
reversed the trial court’s ruling.  The Fifth District held that Christensen was liable 
under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because he retained an identifiable 
property interest in the vehicle for himself by having his name placed on the title as 
co-owner, and that his subjective intent in signing the purchase and title documents 
was insufficient to defeat vicarious liability of a titleholder.  The district court then 
certified to this Court the previously quoted question, and this review followed.  
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
The rephrased certified question presents a pure question of law, which is 
reviewed de novo.  Rando v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 39 So. 3d 244, 247 (Fla. 2010).  
Further, the issue in this case concerns an order entered on a motion for directed 
verdict, which is also reviewed de novo.  Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm 
Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).  When reviewing a trial 
court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict, this Court views the evidence and 
all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Id. 
The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine  
and Beneficial Ownership Exception 
 
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine serves to ensure financial recourse to 
members of the public who are injured by the negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle by imposing strict vicarious liability on those with an identifiable property 
 
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ownership interest in the vehicle.  See Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 
572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990).  The underlying rationale of the doctrine is that 
if a vehicle owner, who has control over the use of the vehicle, exercises his or her 
control by granting custody of the vehicle to another, the owner commits himself 
or herself to the judgment of that driver and accepts the potential liability for his or 
her torts.  S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 634 (Fla. 1920) (quoting 
Barmore v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 38 So. 210, 215 (Miss. 1905)).   
 
A narrow exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been 
recognized in cases where the titleholder lacks the beneficial ownership of a 
vehicle.  See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 64 (Fla. 2000) (“In Metzel v. 
Robinson, 102 So. 2d 385, 385-86 (Fla. 1958), the Court made it clear that, absent 
a conditional sales agreement, the circumstances where an entity or individual who 
possessed legal title would not be vicariously liable under the dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine were extremely limited.”).  Under this “beneficial 
ownership” or “bare legal title” exception, a titleholder may avoid vicarious 
liability if the titleholder demonstrates that he or she does not have the authority to 
exert any dominion or control over the vehicle and therefore is not a beneficial 
owner of the vehicle.  Id. at 63-65.  In such circumstances, this Court has held that 
the titleholder holds only “naked legal title” in the vehicle.  See Palmer v. R. S. 
Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1955).   
 
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The beneficial ownership exception was first recognized in Palmer nearly 
sixty years ago.  In Palmer, a car dealership held title to a vehicle that was involved 
in an accident.  Id. at 636.  At the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle had 
already submitted the down payment, signed a conditional sales contract for the 
vehicle, and taken possession of the vehicle, but “bare” legal paper title remained 
with the dealership.  Id.  This Court held that the dealership possessed only naked 
legal title in the vehicle as security for payment of the full purchase price, and no 
longer had any authority over the use of the vehicle (i.e., beneficial ownership of 
the vehicle).  Id.  The Court further explained that the rationale for imposing 
vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine did not apply 
because the dealership could no longer exercise control over the use of the vehicle.  
As a result, the dealership was not an owner of the vehicle and was not liable under 
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.  Id.  Thus, under Palmer, a person or entity 
who holds bare paper title in a vehicle solely under a conditional sales agreement is 
exempted from vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.   
Subsequently, this Court extended the beneficial ownership exception 
recognized in Palmer to prohibit vicarious liability in the situation where an actual 
common law sale of a vehicle had occurred but formal title had not yet been 
transferred.  See McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 1957).  In 
McAfee, the titleholder left the vehicle with the operator of a filling station to sell.  
 
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Id. at 739.  A prospective buyer test drove the vehicle, gave the filling station 
operator less than the full purchase price, and departed in the vehicle.  Id.  The 
buyer collided with another vehicle before speaking with the titleholder regarding 
the sale.  Id.  This Court held that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the common 
law prerequisites for a sale and applied Palmer to conclude that the titleholder had 
transferred beneficial ownership of the vehicle to the buyer.  Id. at 740.   
However, shortly after deciding McAfee, this Court declined to further 
extend the exception.  See Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386.  In Metzel, the titleholder had 
title issued in her name for a vehicle that was purchased by her nephew because the 
seller objected to an eighteen-year-old signing the financing paperwork.  Id. at 385.  
The nephew lived with the aunt and the aunt insured the vehicle.  Id.  Between the 
time that title was issued and the time of the accident, the aunt took no action to 
remove her name from the title, but she also had no further involvement with the 
vehicle.  Id.  This Court held that the aunt was still in a position to exert some 
dominion and control over the vehicle, and therefore she held an ownership interest 
as a matter of law.  Id. at 386.  Thus, the relevant inquiry after Metzel for 
beneficial ownership is whether a titleholder is in a position to exercise any 
dominion and control over a vehicle, and the use or non-use of the vehicle by the 
titleholder is insufficient to establish a lack of beneficial ownership.   
 
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More recently, in Aurbach, this Court addressed whether a person’s ability 
to exert dominion and control over a vehicle alone was sufficient to impose 
vicarious liability, even absent title ownership.  753 So. 2d at 65.  In Aurbach, a 
married couple purchased and maintained a vehicle with joint funds, but with the 
intention that one of their daughters be the primary driver.  Id. at 61.  The vehicle 
was titled in the wife’s name.  Id.  The daughter negligently operated the vehicle 
and caused an accident.  A person injured in the accident sought to hold the father 
liable on the basis that he was in a position to exert dominion and control over the 
vehicle.  Id.  The jury specifically found that the father exercised control over the 
vehicle.  This Court recognized that in the past it had consistently required a person 
to have an identifiable property interest in the vehicle involved in the accident for 
vicarious liability to be imposed.  Id. at 62.  Accordingly, this Court held that the 
ability of the father to exert some dominion and control over the vehicle did not 
constitute a basis for vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality 
doctrine.  Id. at 65.   
This precedent demonstrates that vicarious liability arises from an 
identifiable property interest in a vehicle possessed by the person held to be 
vicariously liable which creates the right to exert some dominion and control over 
the vehicle.  See, e.g., id. at 62-63.  The precedent further establishes that the 
beneficial ownership exception is narrow and applies only where the titleholder 
 
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holds title under a conditional sales agreement or has sold the vehicle and 
transferred possession.  In such cases, the underlying rationale of the dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine—that the titleholder has committed himself or herself to 
the driver’s judgment—does not apply.  However, in the absence of evidence that 
the titleholder holds only naked legal title under a conditional sales contract or a 
faulty incomplete transfer, precedent demonstrates that the certificate titleholder is 
a beneficial owner as a matter of law and is liable for the permissive use of the 
vehicle by another person.   
Certified Question 
The rephrased certified question relates to the scope of the beneficial 
ownership exception that was first recognized in Palmer.  Specifically, the question 
presented is whether the beneficial ownership exception applies to an individual 
who applied for title to be issued in his or her name, but who neither used nor had 
physical access to the vehicle.  We hold that under these circumstances, a joint 
titleholder who has not divested himself or herself of the ownership interest is an 
owner as a matter of law.   
A joint titleholder holds a joint tenancy interest in the vehicle and, 
accordingly, has the right to possess and use the vehicle.  See § 319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (2013) (“When a motor vehicle . . . is registered in the names of two or 
more persons as coowners in the alternative by the use of the word ‘or,’ such 
 
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vehicle shall be held in joint tenancy.”).  Each joint titleholder has statutorily 
conferred legal rights in the vehicle.  Id.  Each titleholder enjoys a right of 
survivorship in the vehicle.  Id.  Additionally, where the names of joint titleholders 
are separated by the word “or” on the title documentation, as in the instant case, 
either may unilaterally encumber or sell the vehicle.  Id.  Each of these rights 
places a joint titleholder in a position to exercise authority or control over the 
vehicle.   
The legal rights of a titleholder exist regardless of whether they are actually 
exercised.  The failure of a titleholder to use the vehicle, or otherwise exercise his 
or her legal rights, does not eliminate these rights.  Consequently, the exclusive use 
of the vehicle by one titleholder does not destroy the beneficial ownership of 
another titleholder.  Beneficial ownership continues to exist with regard to the non-
using titleholder because he or she remains in a legal position to exert dominion or 
control over the vehicle.   
Further, we hold that an assertion by a joint titleholder that he or she never 
subjectively intended to be a titleholder is irrelevant to beneficial ownership of a 
vehicle.  See Johnson v. Deangelo, 448 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) 
(holding that the subjective intent of a titleholder in placing her name on a title 
certificate was legally immaterial and insufficient as a matter of law to rebut title 
ownership and stating that the titleholder “intentionally caused her name to be 
 
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placed on the title certificate, it did not happen by accident or without her 
knowledge and consent, nor did she hold her formal ownership interest in the 
vehicle as a mere security device or because she had made a good faith but 
ineffectual attempt or effort to transfer her title interest.”).  Upon purchasing a 
vehicle, an owner (or owners) must apply to the Florida Department of Highway 
Safety and Motor Vehicles to have title issued in his or her name.  § 319.23(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2013).  The application must be attested to by the applicant(s) under penalty 
of perjury.  Fla. Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Application for 
Certificate of Title with/without Registration 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.flhsmv.gov/dmv/forms/BTR/82040.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2013).  If 
more than one person applies for title, the co-owners must apply on the same form.  
Id.  Thus, each applicant knowingly enters into joint title ownership.  When two 
individuals submit an application for joint ownership, each co-owner commits 
himself or herself to the judgment of the other and is subject to vicarious liability 
for the other’s negligent use of the vehicle.  Should a titleholder never intend to use 
a vehicle and wish to avoid vicarious liability, then the titleholder must divest 
himself or herself of any interest in the vehicle.  See Horne v. Vic Potamkin 
Chevrolet, Inc., 533 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1988) (“It is clear . . . that under existing 
law there is no liability on the part of the seller of a motor vehicle where beneficial 
ownership or legal title, together with possession, have been transferred to a 
 
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purchaser and injuries occur because of the negligence of the purchaser in 
operating the vehicle.  In short, transfer of ownership cuts off liability on the part 
of the former owner.”).   
Therefore, we conclude that beneficial ownership is unrelated to physical 
access to a vehicle, past use of a vehicle, or intent to use or not use a vehicle.  
Rather, beneficial ownership arises from legal rights that allow an individual to 
exert some dominion and control over the use of the vehicle.  Thus, because a 
titleholder has legal rights in the vehicle and is in a position to exert some 
dominion and control over the vehicle, he or she is a beneficial owner.  The 
injection of theories of subjective intent would destabilize the law with regard to 
motor vehicles in Florida.   
This construction of beneficial ownership is consistent with Palmer as it was 
construed in Metzel and McAfee.  In these cases, the analysis centered on the 
objective steps taken by a titleholder to transfer his or her interest in the vehicle, 
and whether that transfer prevented the titleholder from being able to control the 
use of the vehicle.  Palmer, 81 So. 2d at 637; Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386; McAfee, 
98 So. 2d at 740.  In these cases, any subjective intent of the titleholder with regard 
to placement of his or her name on the title is not relevant to the beneficial 
ownership analysis. 
 
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Furthermore, the irrelevance of subjective intent is consistent with Florida’s 
statutory scheme, in that vehicle ownership is determined through legal title.  Title 
XXIII of the Florida Statutes, which governs motor vehicles, defines “owner” in 
several chapters, and, in all but one chapter, the owner is defined as the titleholder, 
subject to exceptions for conditional vendees, lessors, and mortgagees.1
                                          
 
1.  For example, Chapter 324, “Financial Responsibility,” provides:  
 
Owner.—A person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle; 
or, in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement 
for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of 
purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the 
agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in 
the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of 
a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee 
or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the 
purpose of this chapter.  
 
§ 324.021(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013).  Similarly, Chapter 316, “State Uniform Traffic 
Control,” provides: 
  
OWNER.—A person who holds the legal title of a vehicle, or, in the 
event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale 
or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the 
conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of 
possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a 
mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional 
vendee, or lessee, or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner, for the 
purposes of this chapter.  
 
§ 316.003(26), Fla. Stat. (2013).  Additionally, Chapter 322, “Driver’s 
Licenses,” provides: 
 
  Thus, the 
“Owner” means the person who holds the legal title to a vehicle. 
However, if a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the 
 
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Legislature has developed a system whereby the rights and responsibilities of 
owners of motor vehicles are both assigned and dependent upon the existence of 
legal title.  In reaching this conclusion, we note that title is a clear and simple 
method of determining ownership.  If title ownership were subject to attack based 
on the subjective intent of a titleholder, then all types of cases that involve motor 
vehicles would become subject to litigation on ownership issued.  The better and 
more efficient and consistent rule is that title determines ownership, and ownership 
can only be disproven by objective evidence of a conditional sale or incomplete 
faulty transfer.   
To the extent Christensen asserts that the district courts have interpreted the 
beneficial ownership exception to be applicable where exclusive use and 
possession reside in a person other than the titleholder, we find these cases to be 
fully distinguishable.  See Wummer v. Lowary, 441 So. 2d 1151, 1151-52 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1983) (applying beneficial ownership exception where employer refinanced 
                                                                                                                                        
conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon 
performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an 
immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or 
lessee, or if a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, such 
conditional vendee, lessee, or mortgagor is the owner for the purpose 
of this chapter.  
 
§ 322.01(31), Fla. Stat. (2013).  These statutory definitions in 2005, when the 
accident in this case occurred, contained identical language.  §§ 316.003(26), 
322.01(30), 324.021(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). 
 
 
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the vehicle for employee and held title as refinancer); see also Carrasquero v. 
Ethan’s Auto Express, Inc., 949 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (applying 
beneficial ownership exception where titleholder “agreed to take title in its name 
only as a tax-delaying convenience to [the beneficial owner].”) (footnote omitted); 
Plattenburg v. Dykes, 798 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (applying 
beneficial ownership exception where defendant had presented sufficient evidence 
that he gifted his entire interest in the vehicle, and the donee simply had not yet 
completed the paperwork to transfer the title at the time of the accident).  Unlike 
the instant case, these cases involved either a financial transaction to benefit the 
beneficial owner of the vehicle or an incomplete transfer of the vehicle.  Exclusive 
possession in those cases simply demonstrated that the titleholder had no legal 
rights with regard to the subject vehicles.   
Instead, the instant case is more closely aligned with Hertz Corp. v. Dixon, 
193 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), and Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty 
Insurance Co. v. Ritz, 284 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), in which the 
titleholders were held liable despite having no involvement with the vehicles in 
question.  In Hertz and Ritz, although all indicia of ownership resided in the 
negligent driver, the titleholder had enabled the driver to acquire the vehicle by 
having title placed in his name, and the driver possessed and drove the vehicle with 
the titleholder’s knowledge and consent.  Hertz, 193 So. 2d at 177 (“Here, not only 
 
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was [the non-driving joint titleholder] one of the record title holders, but in fact had 
put in motion and made possible the operation of the automobile by [the driver], 
who, as a minor, could not have bought the automobile.  Not only did [the driver] 
operate the car as a co-owner, but with the knowledge, consent and direct 
participation by [the non-driving joint titleholder] in the acquisition of title.”);  
Ritz, 284 So. 2d at 477.  The beneficial ownership exception was not applied and 
the titleholders, because title was placed in their names and they consented to the 
use of the vehicle by another, were determined to be vicariously liable.   
 
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
negative and hold that a person whose name is on the certificate of title of a vehicle 
as co-owner cannot avoid vicarious liability under the “beneficial ownership” or 
“naked legal title” exception to vicarious liability under the dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine.   
This Case 
It is undisputed that Christensen was named on the title as a co-owner of the 
vehicle.  The title objectively reflects that Christensen gave only a co-ownership 
interest to Taylor-Christensen while retaining a co-ownership interest for himself.  
Therefore, to divest himself of his co-ownership interest, and relieve himself from 
the possibility of vicarious liability, Christensen should have transferred his 
interest at some point after the purchase of the vehicle.  Christensen presented no 
 
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relevant evidence that, in the twenty-two months between the time that he had title 
placed in his name as co-owner and the accident, he transferred his co-ownership 
interest in the vehicle.    
The only evidence presented by Christensen to establish he no longer owned 
the vehicle was that: (1) he did not use the vehicle; (2) he was not in a position to 
use the vehicle because he did not live with Taylor-Christensen, he could not 
access the garage where she kept the vehicle, and he did not possess keys to the 
vehicle; and (3) he subjectively intended to gift the vehicle to Taylor-Christensen 
when he purchased it.  We conclude that this evidence was insufficient as a matter 
of law to rebut the legal principle that Christensen was a beneficial owner.  
Christensen’s non-use of the vehicle does not demonstrate that he transferred 
his interest in the vehicle to Taylor-Christensen, or that he was not the beneficial 
owner.  As previously discussed, this Court established in Metzel that the simple 
failure to exercise control does not demonstrate that a titleholder is not in a 
position to exert some dominion and control over the vehicle.  Metzel, 102 So. 2d 
at 386.  Rather, the existence of the legal right to exercise control and the actual 
exercise of control are separate concepts, and the legal right to exercise control is 
the relevant inquiry for beneficial ownership.  
Christensen, as a joint titleholder, had a legal right to encumber, sell, or take 
possession of the vehicle.  Had he wished, Christensen could have done any of the 
 
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above, and the mere fact that he did not act on these legal rights does not alter or 
diminish their existence.  Further, had Taylor-Christensen died, Christensen would 
have inherited the vehicle because of his joint ownership interest.  See § 
319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013).  Therefore, he indisputably was in a position 
to exercise dominion and control over the vehicle and was a beneficial owner of 
the vehicle.  
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
negative.  We hold that Christensen was an owner of the vehicle as a matter of law 
and approve the decision of the Fifth District reversing the trial court’s ruling on 
the motion for directed verdict. 
It is so ordered.   
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D09-3888 
 
(Brevard County) 
  
Raoul G. Cantero, III, David P. Draigh and Jesse Luke Green of White & Case 
LLP, Miami, Florida; Warren B. Kwavnick of Cooney Trybus Kwavnick Peets, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida; George Alexander Vaka of Vaka Law Group, P.L., 
 
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Tampa, Florida; and Dennis Richard O’Connor of O’Connor & O’Connor, LLC, 
Winter Park, Florida,   
 
for Petitioner  
 
Stephen John Pajcic, III and Thomas Fitzpatrick Slater of Pajcic & Pajcic, P.A., 
Jacksonville, Florida; William A. Bald of Dale, Bald, Showalter, Mercier & Green, 
P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and S. Sammy Cacciatore, Jr. of Nance, Cacciatore, 
Hamilton, Berger, Nance & Cacciatore, Melbourne, Florida,    
 
for Respondent