Case Title: Wakefield v. Tygate Motel Corp.

Citation: 161 Vt. 395, 640 A.2d 981

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
WAKEFIELD_V_TYGATE_MOTEL_CORP.93-108; 161 Vt. 395; 640 A.2d 981

[Filed 28-Feb-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-108


 Elaine and Roy Wakefield                     Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 Tygate Motel Corporation d/b/a               January Term, 1994
 Econo Lodge


 Matthew I. Katz, J.

 Geoffrey W. Crawford, Jerome F. O'Neill and Douglas L. Cade of O'Neill
   and Crawford, Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants

 James W. Spink and Jeffrey J. Nolan of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington,
   for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      MORSE, J.   This case presents the question of how specific jury
 instructions must be at the request of a party.  In this "slip and fall"
 personal injury action, plaintiffs Elaine and Roy Wakefield asked the court
 to relate the law of negligence to the factual setting -- ice on defendant's
 sidewalk -- in the jury instructions.  The court did so in part, but not in
 as much detail as plaintiffs wanted.  The jury rendered a verdict for
 defendant Tygate Motel Corporation.  Plaintiffs appeal the jury instruction
 and also three evidentiary rulings, which they claim as a group constituted
 reversible error.  We affirm.
                                     I.

  

      On March 19, 1989, Elaine Wakefield, a guest leaving defendant's motel
 in South Burlington, was injured when she slipped on ice and fell on
 defendant's sidewalk a short distance from the entrance.
      Plaintiffs requested the trial court to instruct the jury that
 defendant had
           a duty to exercise reasonable care . . . in keeping
           [entrances] reasonably safe from the danger incident to
           accumulations of ice and snow.  Such accumulations are
           bound to develop in the ordinary experience of the
           Vermont winter climate and are thus entirely foresee-
           able.

             If you find that Tygate Motel Corporation knew or
           ought to have known of the existence of a dangerously
           icy condition on the walkways of the Econo Lodge on the
           date in question and failed to take reasonable steps to
           alleviate that condition, you must find that Tygate
           Motel Corporation breached the duty of care it owed Mrs.
           Wakefield.

 (Emphasis added.)  The court, however, instructed the jury in relevant part:

           Defendant owed plaintiff the duty to use reasonable care
           to keep its premises in a safe and suitable condition.

           . . . .

              Winter weather is a reality of life in this area.  On
           the one hand slippery conditions cannot be wholly pre-
           vented, but on the other they are foreseeable.

      The relevant differences between what plaintiffs requested and the
 court's instructions are apparent.  Plaintiffs claim error occurred because
 the court did not mention "accumulations of ice and snow" and did not
 describe the spot where plaintiff fell as the "dangerously icy condition on
 the walkways."(FN1)

  
 
      Plaintiffs' request was taken virtually verbatim from Smith v.
 Monmaney, 127 Vt. 585, 588,