Case Title: Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii

Citation: 117 Haw. 174

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

--+ 000

 

 

OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, ROWENA AKANA, HAUNANT APOLIONA,
DANTE CARPENTER, DONALD CATALUNA, LINDA DELA CRUZ,
COLETTE MACHADO, ‘BOYD P. MOSSMAN, OSWALD STENDER, and
JOHN WATHE'E, IV, in their official capacities as menbers of the
Board of Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs,

PIA THOMAS ALULI, JONATHAN KAMAKAWTWO'OLE OSORIO, CHARLES
KNATAI, and KEOKI'MAKA KAMAKA KI'ILT, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF
AWAT'T (HCDCH), ROBERT J. HALL, in his capacity as Acting
Executive Director of HCDCH, CHARLES STED, Chair,
STEPHANIE AVEIRO, FRANCIS L. JUNG, CHARLES KING, LILLIAN B
KOLLER, BETTY LOU LARSON, THEODORE E. LIU, TRAVIS THOMPSON,
TAIAOPO, ‘TUINALEIALTIPANO, ‘Members of the Board of Directors of
HCDCH,' State of Hawai'i, ‘and LINDA LINGLE, in her capacity as
Governor, State cf Hawai'i, Defendants-Appellees.

   

No. 25570

APPEAL PROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. No. 94-4207),

GANUARY 31, 2008

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND ACOBA, 9:
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE CHAN, IN PLACE OF DUFFY, J.,
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

ppellante -- (1) the Office of

 

Two sets of plaintiff

Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) and its Board of Trustees (hereinafter,

collectively, the OHA plaintiffs] and (2) Pia Thomas Aluli,

Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, Charles Ka'ai‘ai, and Keoki Maka

Kamaka Ki'ili (hereinafter, collectively, the individual

 

9974
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

plaintiffs and, together with the OHA plaintiffs, collectively,
the plaintiffs] appeal from the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit's January 31, 2003 final judgment,’ entered pursuant to
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule $4(b) (2007).*
Following a jury-waived trial, the trial court found in favor of
defendants-appellees State of Hawaii (State), the Housing and
Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i, and the executive
director and menbers of the board of directors of the HCDCH,’ as
well as Linda Lingle, in her capacity as Governor of the state
Thereinafter, collectively, the defendants] and against the
plaintiffs.

Briefly stated, the instant action arises from the
defendants’ efforts in the mid-1990s to transfer certain parcels
of ceded lands to private entrepreneurs for the purpose of
residential development. On August 11, 1995, the plaintiffs
filed suit, seeking an injunction against the defendants from

selling or otherwise transferring to third parties two specific

 

\ the Honorable Sabrina 8. MeKenna pré

 

iaing.

2 Rc Rule 4(b) provies

 

in rele

 

sat part thats

nen wore than one claim for relief is presented in an
fetion, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
thire-party claim, or when multiple parties are involves,
the court may direct the entry of final judgnent as to one
or more but fewer than all of the clains or parties only,
Spon an express determination that there le ho Just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgrent

 

 

 

> donald K.w. tau is the executive dixector of HCDCH, and the board of

Girectore includes chairperson, Wesley R. Segawa, and members Hadine K.
Nakamora, Kurt H. Mitchell, Dos Fujimeto, Allan Gos Banos, Jr., Susan
Chandler, Craig Hirai, Ronald 8. Lim, and Bradiey J. Mossman.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

parcels of ceded lands located on the islands of Maui and
Hawai'i,® as well as any ceded lande from the public lands trust
Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the State
was not authorized to alienate ceded lands from the public lands
trust or, if the trial court ruled the State was so authorized, a
declaration that (2) such alienation would not limit the claims
of native Hawaiians to the ceded lands

on Decenber 5, 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of
the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims were

barred by the doctrines o!

 

(2) sovereign immunity; (2) waiver

 

and estoppel; and (3) justiciability -- specifically, political
question, ripeness, and the mandate against advisory opinions.
Nevertheless, the trial court also concluded that the State had
the express authority to alienate ceded lands from the public

lande trust. An HRCP Rule 54(b) judgment was, the:

 

fer,

entered on January 31, 2003, and the plaintiffs appealed.
on appeal, both sets of plaintiffs challenge the

aforenentioned determinations made by the trial court.

Additionally, the OHA plaintiffs

 

jert that the trial court

erred in making several evidentiary rulings,

 

‘the plaintiffs filed suit before the parcel on the island of Hawai'i
(the aig Teland) waa transferred. It appears that, at sone point, che Big
[sland parcel {hereinafter, also referred to as the La'sopua parcel]
transferred to the Department of Hevailan Nowelands (DHKL}, which transfer ie
hot specifically challenged by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, other than a few
Feferescer to the ta'i'opua parcel in this opinion, the disposition of the Big
Eeland parcel ie not specifically addre

 

       

  
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

For the reasons discussed infra, we vacate the January
31, 2003 judgment and remand this case to the circuit court with
ingtructions to issue an order granting the plaintiffs’ request
for an injunction against the defendants from selling or
otherwise transferring to third parties (1) the parcel of ceded
land on Maui and (2) any ceded lands from the public lands trust
until the claims of the native Hawaiians to the ceded lands has
been resolved.
1. BACKGROUND

A. Historical Backsround

‘The issues presented in this case have their genesis in
the historical events that led to the overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawai'i, the surrender of 1.8 million acres of crown, government,
and public lande to the United states, the admission of Hawai'i
ag a state of the Union, and the creation of OHA and the public
lands trust. See Office of Hawaiian Affaira v. state, 110
Hawai'l 338, 340-42, 133 P.34 767, 769-71 (2006) (hereinafter,
QUA 12]; Office of Hawaiian Affairs v, State, 96 Hawai'i 388,

389-92, 31 P.3d 901, 902-05 (2001) (hereinafter, OHA tl; Pele

Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. $78, 585-87, 637 P.2d 1247, 1254-55
(1992); and Tre, of the office of Hawaiian Affaire v. Yamasaki,
69 Haw. 184, 159-65, 737 P.2d 446, 449-53 (1967), cert, denied,

404 U.S. 898 (1987); see algo Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 501
(2000).

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

the Uniced states Ina public land trust for tive
Durboses(-] See Acwission Act of Narch 18, 1959, Pub
No. 86-3, § 5, 73 Stat. 4, reprinted in, [avait Revi
Statutes’ (Hes), vol. 1 at'§'5 of the Adwiseions Act)

 

QUAI, 96 Hawai'i at 390, 31 P.34 at 903 (emphasis added). The
aforementioned five purposes are specifically delineated in
section 5(f) of the Admission Act, which provides in relevant
part:

‘The lands granted to the State of Havaii by subsection (b)
‘ction and public lands retained by the United

der subsections (c) and (a) and later conveyed to

the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds

fron the sale or other disposition ef

incone therefrom, shall be beld by sai

trust

  

   

St-lands for niblicuse. such tands, proceeds, and income
Shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the
foregoing purposes in such manner ae the constitution and
laws of sald State may provide, and their use for any other
object shall constitute a breach of trust for which uit may
be Brought by the United states

(Bmphasis added.) The management and administration of the ceded

lands subject to the section 5(f) trust, i.e., the public lands

< the Havaiian Homes Comission Act vas enacted by the United state
Congress (Congress) to set aside over 200,000 acres of ceded lands for

lusive honesteading by native Hawaiiang. Kez. Rep. $0. 629, seth Cong., 2
ia. 4 (1920). As a condition of statehood, the Unived state:
State fo adopt the act as a provision of the state constitution,
Const. art. XI, §.2 (1959) (renumbered art. XII, § 2 (1978)); ase also Anua
i Dep't of Hatalian Hone Lande, 64 Haw. 327, 336-38, 640 P.24 1361, 1167-68
(ide2) (detailing the purpose of the Hawaiian Homes Commision Act and the
creation of the Commission) -

 

     

Although the Hawailan Hones Comission Act defines the term “native
Hawaiian” as “any descendant of not leas than one-half part of the blood of
the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Ialands previous to 1776," HRS, vol, 1 at
4201(7) of the Hawaiian Hones Commission Act, for the purposes of this
opinion, we use the tera to mean “any individual who is a descendant of the
aboriginal people who, pricr te 1772, occupied and exercised sovereignty in
the area that now constitutes the state of Hawai'i.” Pub. L. Wo. 203-150, 107
Stac. 2510 (1993),

 

 

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

trust, is vested in the Department of Land and Natural Resources
(puNR), pursuant to HRS § 171-3 (Supp. 2006). See also Pele

Defense Fund, 73 Haw. at 586-87, 837 P.2d at 1254. ***

In 1978, the people of Havai'i clarified the state's trust
Obtigation to native Havaisane during a Constitutional
Convention, ae set forth in various provisions of the
Hawaii Conetitution, including article x12, sections 4
through €,- . wherein OWA wae created and charged with
fanaging proccede derived from the ceded lands and
Geeignated for the benefit of native Hawai lane,

Reditionally, article ti, section 7 of the Hawai'd

Const itution requires the state £0 enact legislation
Fegarding ite trust obligations. Thus, in 1979, legislation
wee enacted that set forth the purposes of OHA and described

  

 

 

 

the powere and duties of the trustees... «1979
Bese i. het 196, §-2 at 398-99, § 8 at 406 (codified at HRS
chapter 10) {.]- in 1980, the legialacure anended HRS chapter

fe by adding Hes § 10°13.5, which proviged that “twenty Ber
cent of all {unde derived from the public land trust shall
bbe expended by OHA for the purposes of thie chapter-" = =
3580 Haw. Seas. L. Act 273, $1 at 525(.")

QHA II, 110 Hawai'i at 340-41, 133 P.3d at 769-70 (citations,

original brackets, and ellipsis omitted) (emphasis in original).

 

Although not pertinent to the instant appeal, we concluded, in
Yamasaki, that the construction of the ter= “funda,” ao used in HRS § 10-13.5,
*provide[d) no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
the Gisputes|, ive.) whether OHA wae entitled to (1) a portion of damages
received by the State for illegal mining of sand from public land and (2) a
pro rata share of incone and proceeds fron sales, leases, or other
Bispositions of certain public lands,) and [that the disputes] cannot be
Geclaed withost initial policy determinations of a kind clearly for
fonjudicial discretion.” 69 Haw, at 273, 737 P.24 at 457 (citation, internal
Quotation marks, and original Brackete omitted). Consequently, the
[egisiacure enacted Act #04, amending HRS § 10-i3.5 by essentially
gubetituting sincones" for "funds" and defining the term “revenue.” 1950 Haw.
Sess. Le Act 304, $83, 7 ac 948, 951; HR SE 20-15.5 (2993), 10-2 (1983),
Rowever, in QHA-T, we invalidated and effectively repezied Act 304 as
conflicting with federal law, 96 Hawai'i at 399, 31 P.3d at 912.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+ Me observe that the trial court found that, *[i]n recent years, there
have been discussione and sovenent toward the creation of a sovereign Hawaiian
Government, and thie rovenent has received both state and federal
Fecognitios." Sone echolare dispute that this movenent has been of recent
Snception, stating instead that, "{elver since the illegal overthrow and
annexation, the native people of Hawali -- identified as ‘Kanaka Mali,’
Shative Havaiiang’ or ‘Hawaiians’ -- have struggled to regain their culture,
recover thelr lands and restore their sovereign nation." Jon M. Van Dyke ©
Melody K. WacKentie, An Intvodction to the Richte of Native Havailan People,
io-JUL Maw. B-d. 63, 63 (2006) (foothore omitted).

 

(continued...)
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Moreover, in 1993, the year that marked the one-
hundredth anniversary of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i,
both houses of Congress passed the Joint Resolution to
Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii (hereinafter, the Apology
Resolution], which was signed into law by then-President Bill

Clinton on November 23, 1993 as Public Law No. 103-150, 107 stat.

 

14. continued)

‘he trial court further found that ‘various Hawaiian groups support ()
aitterent forms of sovereionty.- However, ae observed by one scholar,
“fulieinacely,, (native Hawaiians seek return of [the ceded Lands} from both

“How such lands would be cared for and
fmanaged, who would have Jurisdiction over then, and what rights [nJative
Ravailane could exercise upon them are crucial aspects of [slative Hawaiian

felf-governance and sovereignty.” ative Hawaiian Eights Handbook, 40 (Welody
Kapiiialoba MacKenzie, ed:, 1981)

 

 

 

 

Additionally, we note that the trial court found that the federal
legislation comoniy referred to as the "akska Bill”

was passed cut of the Senate Comittee on Indian Affairs on
September 21, 2001... .. The Comittee Report on the
Akaka Bill expiaine that iee purpose "is to authorize a
Process for the reorganization of = [nJative Havaiian
Government and to provide for the recognition of the
{plative Hawaiian goveranent by the United States for the
purpose of carrying on a governnent-to-government
Felationship.

The Akaka Bil1, if enacted(,] . . . provides that the
federal government 16 authorized to Aegotiate with the Seate
and the Feorganized [native Havalian goverment for a
transfer of land and resources to « (njative Hawalian
government. The [n]ative Hawaiian governuest created by
{ene Akaka 8i11) would thus have a land base and resource
and a status einilar to that over other native peoples in
the United States, The Comittee Report to [ehe Akaka B111]

‘That "it de the Committee's intent that the
Feferences to ‘land, resources, and assets dedicated to
injative Hawaiian use" include, but not be limited to Lande
set asise under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and ceded
Tends"

‘The legislation is still pending before the United
Congress,

 

 

 

 

 

 

sea

 

(footnotes omitted.) We take judicial notice that the current version of the
Akaka Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on October 24, 2007.

 

 
 

asi0

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

(1993). The Apology Resolution provides, in its entirety,

as followa:

Yoint Resolution to acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the
Sanuary 17, 1693 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawail, and to
offer an apology to (slative Havaiians on behalf of the
United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii

Whereas, prior to the arrival of the firat Suropeans in
2076, the {n)ative Hawaiian people lived in a highly
organized self-sufficient, subsistent social eyaten based on
communal land tenure with'a sophisticated language, culture,
and religion;

    

 

Wiereas{,] @ unified monarchicel government of the Hawai lan
Islands uss establishes in 1610 under Kamehameha , the
first King of Hawaii;

Wnereas, from 1626 until 1893, the United states recognized
the independence of the Kingdon of Hawaii, extended full and
complete diplonstic recognition to the Hawaiian Governnent.
land! entered into treaties and conventions with the Hawaiian
Ponarchs to govern comerce and navigetion in 1626, 1962,
Tees, 1975, ana 2667;

 

 

Whereas.) the Congregational Church (now known as the
United church of Christ), through ite Anerican Board of
Connissioners for Foreigh Missions, sponsored and sent nore
than 100 missionaries to the Kingdom of Hawail between 1620
nd 1850;

 

Whereas, on January 14, 1693, John L. Stevens (hereatter
Yeferred to in this Resolution ae rhe “United States
Minister"), the United states Minister asaignea to the
jovereign and independent Kingdom of Hawaii conspired with =
‘nall group of non-Hawaiian resident of the Kingdos of
Nawaii; including citizens of the United States, to
overthtow the indigenous and lawful Government of Hawaii;

 

 

Whereas, in pursuance of the conspiracy to overthrow the
Goverment of Hawall, the United States Minister and the
naval representatives of the United States caused armed
aval forces of the United staten co invade the sovereign
Mawaiian sation on January 16, 1893, and to position
themselves near the Hawaiian Government buildings snd the
Tolani Palace to intimidate Queen Liliuokalani and her

   

  

rand financiers
sea the Haxalian monarchy and proclaimed the
establishment of a Provisional Government

 

Wnereas(,) the United states Minister thereupon extended
Giplonstic recognition to the Provisional Goveranent that
Was formed by the conspirators without the consent of the
Inlative Hawa‘ian people or the lavful Government of Hawaii

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

land in violation of treaties between the two nations and of
international Iaw;

lihereas, soon thereafter, when informed of the risk of
Bloodshed with resistance, Queen Liliuokalant issued the
following statenent yielding her authority to the United
Statew Government rather than to the Provisional Governnent:

 

I{,] Lilivokalani, by the Grace of God and under
the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdon, Queen,
Go hereby solemiy protest against any and ail
Seco done against myself and the Constitutional
Goverment of the Hawaiian Kingdon by certain
persons claiming to have established =
Provisional Government of and for ehis Kingdom.

 

mat I yield to the superior force of the United
States Of America whose Minister
Plenipotentiary, His Sxcellency John L. stevens,
has caused United States troops to be landed at
Nonolwiu and declared that he would support the
Provisional Government

he Tae th:

Biotest and impelled by sald force vield mr
sathoril hn time. of

‘fheUaited States shall, spon facts being
sent che

Tepresentatives aod reinstate me in the

Bithericy whieh I clain as the Constitutional

Sovereign of the Hawaiian Telands.

 

 

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A.D.
3099,

whereas, without the active support and intervention by the
United States diplosatic and miltary representatives, the
[nsurrection ageiner the Government of Queen Liliuokalant
would have failed for lack of popular support and
Snougficient ares;

 

Whereas (,) on February 1, 1893, the United states Minister
Taised the Anerican flag and proclaimed Hawaii to be a
protectorate of the United states;

 

Whereas, the report of a Preaidentially established
Ynvestigation conducted by former Congresanan Janes Blount
into the evente surrounding the insurrection and overthrow
of January 17, 1693, concluded chat the United states
Giplomatic and military representatives had abused their
Guehority and were responsible for the change in government;

 

 

here a renult of this investigation, the united
States inieter to Hawaii wae recalled from Ris diplomatic
port and the military commander of the United States arned
Rorces stationed in Hawail was disciplined and forced to
fesign his comission;

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Whereas, in a message to Congress on December 18, 1893,
President Grover Cleveland reported fully and accurately on

 

7 comitted with the participation of 2
Aipionatic representative of the United States and without
futhority of Congress”, and acknowledged that by such acts
the governsent of @ peaceful and friendly people was
overthrown;

Whereas.) President Cleveland further concluded that a

= ognd called for
the restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy?

Whereas(,] the Provisional Government protested President
Cleveland's call for the restoration of the monarchy and
continued to hold state power and pursue annexation to the
United states;

Whereas{,] the Provisional Government successfully lobbied
the Comittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (hereafter,
referred to in this Resolution as the "Conmittee") to
conduct a new investigation into the events surrounding the
overthrow of the monareny;

 

Whereas(,) the Comittee and’ its chairman, Senator John
Morgan, conducted hearings in Washington, D.c., from
Decenber 27, 1093, through February 26, 180, in which
mnenbers of the Provisional Government justified and condoned
The actions of the United States Minister and recommended
annexation of Hawaii?

 

Wnereas, although the Provisional Goveranent was able to
Obecure the role of the United states in the illegal
Overthrow of the Navaiian monarchy, it vas unable to rally
the support from two-thirds of ene Senate needed to ratizy a
treaty of annexation;

Whereas, on July 4, 1894, the Provisional Government
Geclared itself to'be the Republic of Havails

 

Whereas, on January 24, 1895, while Imprisoned in Iolani
Palace, Queen Lilivokalans was forced by representatives of
the Republic of Hawaii to officially abdicate her throne

   

Whereas, in the 1896 United states Presidential election,
William McKinley replaced Grover Cleveland;

 

Wnereas, on July 7, 1698, as a consequence of the
Spanish-Averican War, President McKinley signed the Newlands
Soint Resolution that provided for the annexation of Mawail;

 

Weereae, through the Newlands Resolution, the self-declared
Republic of avail ceded sovereignty over the Hawaiian
Islands to the United States;

-10-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

OO

wnereas, ie 1 also 290
ii

[nlative Havaiian people of Havail or their soversian

government: ("1

 

hereas{.1 the Congress, through the Newlands Resolution,
Taritied the cession, annexed Havaii as part of the Usited
States, and vested title to the lande in Hawaii in the
United’ states;

 

Whereas.) the Newlande Resolution also specitied that
Westies existing between fawaii and foreign nations were to
Immediately cease and be replaced by United states treaties
with sch ations;

Whereas.) the Newlands Resolution effected the transaction
Between the Republic of Hawaii and the United states

 

her
ft ela te tank oa

 

Whereas, on April 20, 1900, President McKinley signed the
Organic Act that provided a governnent for the territory of
Revell and defined the political structure and powers of the
herly established Territorial Government and its
Felationship with the United Staten:

 

whereas, on August 21, 1959, Hawaii became the soth state of
the United states;

 

Whereas (,] the health and well-being of the {native
Hawaiien people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings
and attachment to the Land;

ihereast,) the long-range economic and social changes. in
Hawsli over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
have been devastating to the population and to the health
ane well-being of the Hawaiian peopley ***

> As this court stated in OWA I:

tn addition to ite sovereignty, the Republic "ceded and
transferred to the United States the absolute fee and
Ownership of all public, Government, or Crom lands
belonging to the Goverment of the Hawaiian Islands together
wich every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining.”
Yasuaakl, 69 Hav. at 159, 737 Po2d at 449, Following
Zanexation and until 1989, Hawaii's seat of power was vested
inva Territorial Government. gee Organic Act § 3, Act of
April 30, 2990, c. 339, 31 Stat. 141, reprinted in (HRS,

Mel vat $8) 43, 44 [Of the Organic’ Act} (establiching’ the
Sovernment of the Territory of Hawas'l)

 

 

 

96 Mawas'{ at 269-90, 92 P.3d at 902-03.

oa
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Whereas(,) the [nlative Hawaiian people are determined to
preserve, develop end transmit to future aenerations their
ancestral territory. and their cultural identity in
Accordance with their ow spiritual and traditional beliefs,

SUAKOME, practices, language, and social institutions:

Whereas, in order to promote racial harmony and cultura?
Understanding, the Legislature of the State of Hawaii has
determined that the year 1993 should serve Hawai as a_year
of special reflection on the rights and dignities of the
Injative Hawaiians in the Hawaiian and the Auerican

sockets

 

 

  

Whereas (,] the Eighteenth General Synod of the United Church
of Christ in recognition of the denomination's historical
Complicity in the illegal overthrow of the Fingdom of Hawaii
in 1883 directed the oftice of the President of the Uniced
Church of Christ to offer a public apology to the [alative
Hawalian people and to initiate the procese of
reconciliation between the United Church Of Chriet and the
(alative Hawaiians; and

 

 

Whereas, it is proper_and timely for the Congress on the
cccasicn ot the Tependiog one hundredth afniversaty of the
event, £0 acknow) orie sian)

Eo the inlariy ea che

KeconciLiation efforts of the State of Hawaii and the United
Ghurch of christ with Inlative Havaliane, “Now. therefore,

best

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United state of American in Congr venbied,

SECTION 1, ACKNONLEDaRGHET AND APOLOGY.
‘The Congres

 

 

(2) _on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the éllegal
overthrow of the Kingdon of Hawai on January 1, 1893,
ledges 1 itiean at which

ive
(2), recognizes and comends the efforts of reconcitiation
initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United church of
Christ with (nlative Havasianey

 

(2), ,apolosizes te Inlative dawalians on bebalt of the

people of the sited States for the overthrow of the Kingdon
of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of

 

Agente and citizens of the United states, and the
Seprivation of che richte of [nlative Havaiiane to seif-

 

(4) expresses ite commitment to acknowledge the
ranifications of the overthrow of the Kinggom of Hawaii, in
eo provs 8

 

one

-12-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

(5) urges the President of the United states to also
Acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Mawai! and to support reconciliation ef forte
Between the United Seates and the (alative Hawaiian people

sec{Tiow] 2. Dermurrrons.

 

As used in thie Joint Resolution, the term *(alative
Ravallant meane any individval wo is 2 descendent of
the aboriginal people who, pricr to 1778, occupied and
cnerelsed sovereignty in the avea that now constitutes
the state of Hawaii

Sec(riow) 3. Drsctamwen.

x a ase
‘asttlamant of any claima againat the United States,

Approved Novenber 23, 1993
Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (emphases
added) (internal quotation marks omitted) .

Factual Backsround

 

In 1987, the legislature, in an effort to renedy the
problem of the "critical shortage of safe and sanitary housing
unite which are affordable to lower incone residents of the
State(,]* established the Housing Finance and Development
Corporation (HFDC)"® via ite enactment of HRS chapter 2018, 1987

 

L. Act 337, § 15 at 1045; HRS §§ 2018-2 and -3 (2993).

HDC was authorized to, inter alia, develop

 

© tm 1997, the legislature consolidated MPDC with the Hawal't Wousing
Authority and the fental housing trust fund into che Housing and Community
Development Corporation of Hawaii (HCDCH) 1997 Haw. Sess. Ly Act 350, $2 at
Yoio-2h7 HRS chapter 20:6 (2001)- However, the legislature, in 2006, divided
HeoeH into two separate agencies ~~ the Hawai'i Housing Finance and
Development Corporation ané the Mavai'l Public Housing Authority. See 2006
Haw. Sean. L. Act 280, $2 at 709; 2007 Haw. Sess, L. Act 249, § 2 at 777-806
(codified sn ues chaptere 201K and 3560). Wevertheless, inasmuch ae the
{netant action commenced prior to the afSrenentioned legislative changes, we
continue to utilize “HFDC,” as do the parties, throughout this opinion.

 

 

 

-13-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

fee simple or leasehold property, construct dwelling unite
thereon, including condoniniuns, ‘planned units, and cluster
developments, and sell, lease, or rent or cause to be leased
for rented, at the lowest possible price to qualifies
Tesidente, nonprofit organizations, of government agenci
with an eligible developer or in its om benalf, either:
(a) Fully completed dwelling units with the
appropriate interest in the land on which the
Gvelting unit is located; or
(2) Unite which are substantially complete and habitable
with the appropriate interest in the land on which the
Gvelling unit ls located; oF
(3) The land with siee inprovenente (other than the dwelling
unit) “either partially or fully developed.

 

 

 

 

 

HRS § 201E-201(a) (1993). Consequently, that same year, 1987,
the HFDC began to examine areas in the State that had a ‘critical
shortage of housing" and selected two potential sites --

(2) Weiali'i in West Maui and (2) La‘i‘opua in North Kona," both
of which were comprised of ceded lands -- for the development
of housing projects.

After conducting feasability studies of the potential
sites, the HFDC filed a petition with the Land Use Commission
(LUC) in December 1989, seeking to reclassify the Leials‘i parcel
from agricultural to urban use, At a public hearing on April 10,
1990, OKA, through its Land and Natural Resources Officer, gave
oral testimony reconmending conditional approval of the petition.

on May 18, 2990, the LUC granted the petition, recl.

 

fying the

property for urban use. Thereafte:

 

HEDC began a residential

 

housing development project for the parcel. As the “Master

 

% As stated gupra note 5, other than a few references to the La'iopua
parcel in this opinion, the transfer of said parcel is not specifically
Challenged by the plaintiffs. woreover, the parties’ briefs and argunente
focus primarily on the Leiali'i parcel and the ceded lands in general

 

The ueiali'i parcel was part of the former crown lands subject to
subsection 5(b) of the Admission Act

o14-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Developer" for the Leiali'i project, HFDC was responsible for
providing the major infrastructure, i.e., roadways, lighting
poles, and sewer hook-ups, needed for the residential
development. HFDC contracted with a private developer to build
the houses.

In 1992, the legislature enacted Act 318 (codified as
HRS § 10-13.6 (1993)) that set forth a forma to compensate OHA
for the “villages of Leiali'i, Maui and villages of La‘i‘opua,
Hawai'i" that were to be conveyed from DNR to HFDC. HRS
§ 10-12.6(e) (Supp. 2007); see algo 1992 Haw. Sess. L. Act 318,
§ 10 at 1016-17. According to Act 318’s formula, OHA was to be
compensated twenty per cent of the fair market value of the
subject lands. HRS § 10-23.6(a). As a result, OHA and DLNR each
retained an appraiser to determine the fair market value of the
Leiali'i parcel.

In November 1993, Congr

 

adopted the Apology
Resolution, quoted fully supra and discussed more fully infra,
wherein it expressly recognized, inter alia, that: (1) the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i waa illegal; (2) the taking
of crown, government, and public lands of the Kingdom was without
consent or compensation; and (3) “the indigenous Hawaiian people
never dizectly relinguished their claims . . . over their
national lands to the United States.* Apology Resolution, Pub.
L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1520. Congress also formally and

publicly apologized to native Hawaiians on behalf of the United

-15-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

States for the overthrow and the deprivation of native Hawaiians’
rights to self-determination. Jd, Thereafter and as a result of
the adoption of the Apology Resolution, OHA denanded, based on
the advice of attorney William Meheula, that a disclaimer be
included as a part of any acceptance of funds from the sale so as
to preserve any native Hawaiian clains to ownership of the ceded
lands, of which the Leiali‘i parcel was a part.

In October 1994, HFDC declined to honor OHA’s requested
disclaimer because "to do so would place a cloud on [the] title,
rendering title insurance unavailable to buyers in the Leali‘i
Isic] project." Thereafter, on Novenber 4, 1994, *DINR
transferred about 500 acres of ceded lands” at Leiali‘i to HDC
for the consideration of $1.00, HFDC tranenitted to OHA a check
in the amount of §5,573,604.40 as OHA’s entitlement in accordance
with Act 318. Based on advice from then-OKA counsel Earl Anzai
Chat the Apology Resolution created a cloud on the title of the
ceded lands, OHA refused to accept the check. The plaintiffs
thereafter filed suit in Novenber 1994.

Subsequent to the filing of the plaintiffe’ lawsuit,
the HFDC made a policy decision to stop work on the project. By
that time, all of the roadways, utilities, lighting poles, and
sewer hookups had been completed, including sone landscaping
Work. As of December 1994, HFDC estimated it had already

invested $32 million into the Leiali‘i project.

-16-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

B wi
1. The Complaint and Pretrial Motions

on August 11, 1995, the plaintiffe filed an amended
complaint (First Anended Complaint), seeking injunctive and,
alternatively, declaratory relief." The plaintiffs requested:
(2) an injunction against all sales of ceded lands (Count 1);
(2) an injunction to specifically bar the sale of the Leiali'i
parcel (Count II); and, alternatively, (3) a declaratory judgment
that “(a) any conveyance to a third-party violates the Hawai'i
State Constitution and the Admission Act, and/or (b) any sale of

ceded landa does not directly or indirectly re!

 

ave or Limit
claims of [nJative Hawaiians to those lands" (Count 12I)." The
plaintiffa alleged that they would suffer irreparable harm if the

defendant were allowed to transfer ceded lands to third-parties

 

inasmuch a:

 

salienation of the land to a third-party would erode
the ceded lands trust and the entitlenente of the native Hawaiian
people.” In other words, the plaintiffs alleged that an
injunction was proper because, in light of the Apolosy

sesolution, any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third-

» initially, the plaintiffs filed separate complaints. On Novenber
1994, the OMA plaiatifes filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the First
Cirelit.. On Novenber 9, 1994, the individual plaintiffs filed 2 complaint in
the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. Upon che filing of the First Anended
Complaint in Auguet 1995, the individual plaintiffe and allegations pertaining
to their clains were added to those of the OHA plaintiffs in the First Circuit
Court action.

   

an their First Anended Complaint, the plaintiffs asserted two other
alternative claime that addressed valuation tesues concerning the Lesalii
parcel (Counts IV and v). However, these counts were bifurcated from the
Case for later determination and are not at issue in this appeal. Counts IV
and V are currently stayed pending this appeal.

 

 

-17-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

parties would anount to a breach of trust inasmuch as such
transfers would be ‘without regard for the claims of Hawaiians to
those lands* to whom the State, as trustee, owes a fiduciary
duty.
2, The Trial and the Trial Court’s written Decision

A jury-waived trial commenced on Novenber 19, 2001. At
trial, the plaintiffs adduced evidence regarding the events that
surrounded the transfer of the Leiali‘i parcel, the importance of

the land to the native Hawaiians, analogies to Native American

 

property rights, and the developing body of international law
that favors the rights of indigenous people to traditional lands,
‘The defendants primarily adduced evidence that the State was
authorized to alienate ceded lands from the public lands trust.
Additionally, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs were
collaterally estopped “from even arguing that the State does not
have the power to sell [the ceded lands)” based on the

unpublished decision in Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian

Affaire v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, No. 19774 (Haw.
Mar. 12, 1998) (mem.) hereinafter, Ewa Marina),"* wherein thie

court held that the State, as ceded lands trustee, did not breach
its duties by granting a dredge permit for submerged lands to a

private party, discussed more fully infra,

“As correctly cited by the trial court, Hawai'i Rules of Appellate

Procedure (MRAP) Rule 38(c) (2007) prohibite citation to an unpublished
esorandum opinion, "except when the opinion or unpublished dispositional
Order establishes che law of the pending case, ree judicata or collateral
eevoppel [.1*

 

-18-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

on December 5, 2002, the trial court issued a 105-page
written decision, entitled "Opinion of the Court” [hereinafter,
the written decision]. As discussed more fully infra, the trial
court ruled that, although Ewa Marina did not collaterally estop
the plaintiffs from bringing their claims, such claims were
barred by the doctrines of: (1) sovereign immunity; (2) waiver
and estoppel; and (3) justiciability -- specifically, political
question, ripeness, and the mandate against advisory opinions.
Notwithstanding the above rulings, the trial court also concluded
that the state had the express authority to alienate ceded lands
from the public lands trust.

on December 13, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
RCP Rule 54(b) certification or, in the alternative, for leave
to file an interlocutory appeal, which was granted. The trial
court, on January 31, 2003, filed ite HRCP Rule 54(b) judgment in
favor of the defendants. Both sets of plaintiffs separately
filed timely notices of appeal on February 3, 2003.

TT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Findings of Fact

The (erial court's findings of fact) axe reviewed on
appeal under the “clearly erroneous" standard. A (finding
of fact] is clearly erroneous when (2) the record lacke
Substantial evigence to

 

 

jpport the finding, or (2) despite
Substantial evidence in support of the finding, the
Appellate court ia nonetheless left with a definite and firm
Conviction that a mistake has been made. Substantial
evidence is credible evidence which ia of euffictent quality
nd probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution
to support a conclusion.

 

 

<19-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Estate of Klink ex rel. Klink v, State, 113 Hawai'i 332, 351, 152
P.3d 504, 523 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks,
original brackets, and ellipses omitted) (format altered) .

B. Conclusions of Law

This court reviews the (trial court's conclusions of
ew) de nove. A [conclusion of law) is not binding upon an
appellate court and is freely reviewable for ite
Correctness. Moreover, a [conclusion of lew) that Se
Supported by the [eriai coure’s finding of facte) and that
Peflects an application of the correct rule of law will not,
be overturned

 

Hui Kako'o Aina Ho'opulapula v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 112
Hawai'i 28, 38, 143 P.3d 1230, 1240 (2006) (citations, internal

quotation marki

 

and original brackets omitted).
111. PIScUSSION

Ae previously stated, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin the
defendants from selling or otherwise transferring the Leiali'i
parcel to third parties and selling or otherwise transferring to
third parties any of the ceded lands in general until a
determination of the native Hawaiians’ claims to the ceded lands
is made. Alternatively, the plaintiffs seek a declaration that
the State is not authorized to alienate ceded lands from the
public lands trust or, if the trial court ruled that the State is
s0 authorized, a declaration that such alienation would not limit
the clains of native Havaiians to the ceded lands. at the heart
of the plaintiffs’ claims, before the trial court and on appeal,
is the Apology Resolution. The plaintiffs essentially believe
that the title to the ceded lands is clouded as a result of the

Apology Resolution’s recognition that the native Hawaiian people

-20-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

never relinquished their claims over their ancestral territory
and that, therefore, the defendants have a “fiduciary obligation
to protect the corpus of the (public (Lands {t]rust until an
appropriate settlement is reached between native Hawaiians and
the state."

specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court

erred in concluding that

 

(2) the doctzine of sovereign immunity
barred consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims; (2) the defenses
of waiver and estoppel barzed the plaintiffs’ requests for
injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the sale of the
Leiali‘i parcel; (3) the State's transfer of the Leiali"i parcel

did not breach

 

and any future transfer of ceded lands would
not breach -- the State’s fiduciary duties as trustee of the
public lands trust of which the ceded lands are a part; and

(4) the doctrine of political question barred the plaintiffs’
requests for injunctive and declaratory relief. Additionally,
the OHA plaintiffe assert that the trial court erred in:

(2) determining that their claim for injunctive relief with
regard to the future sale of ceded lands in general was barred by

the ripene:

 

doctrine; and (2) making several evidentiary
rulings.

Preliminarily, we believe it appropriate to first
examine the language of the Apology Resolution inasmuch as the
plaintiffs’ current claim for injunctive relief is, as more fully

described infra, based largely upon the Apology Resolution, which

-21-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

the defendants believe is inapplicable. Me also believe it

appropriate to examine related state legislation enacted around
the same time that Congress adopted the Apology Resolution. In
our view, thie preliminary examination is critical to an
understanding of the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief.
AL The Resolu Late islati

The plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and,
alternatively, for declaratory relief, are based on their belief
that the *recognition in{, inter alia, the Apology Resolution] of
the illegality of the transfer of lands and the ongoing
reconciliation and negotiation process dramatically reinforces
the State’s fiduciary obligation to protect the corpus of the
[p]ublic (lands [t]rust until an appropriate settlement is
reached.* Specifically, the OHA plaintiffs argue that the
“congressional recognition of illegality, and its accompanying

call for a ‘reconciliation’ through a proc

 

now underway, has
changed the legal landscape and restructured the rights and

obligations of the sta

 

"The OHA plaintiffs further ai

 

that

the failure of the Apology Resolution to complete the
process of settling [nlative Havaiian elaine does not
undercut its significance in recognizing the bagea for ithe
plaintifes| caine... . As the lerial cloure explained
the Apolosy Resolution ‘contires the factual foundarion for
‘the claims that previously had been asserted.©

 

(Bmphagis added.) Additionally, the OHA plaintiffa maintain that
the “Apology Resolution by itself does not require the state to

turn over the lands to the [nJative Hawaiian people, but it puts

-22-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

the State on notice that it must carefully preserve these lands
so that @ subsequent transfer can take place when the political
branches reach an appropriate resolution of this dispute.

The defendants admit that the Apology Resolution
vposits that the overthrow was illegal and that the [cleded
(Ilands were transferred without compensation." However, relying
on the disclaimer language contained therein, the defendants
assert that ‘nothing in the Apology Resolution serves as a
settlement of claims." Additionally, the defendants maintain
that the Apology Resolution’s “historical statements provide no
guideline as to what renedy, if any, is appropriate.”

‘The trial court, in analyzing the effect of the Apolosy

Resolution on the plaintiffs’ claims, stated:

 

jolution apologizes for the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawas't on January 17,2693, with the
jarcicipation of agente and citizens of the United states,
Bhd for’ the deprivation of the inherent rights of native
Hawaiians to self-detersination and sovereignty. It also

 

 

   

Supports, recognizes, and commends reconciliation efforte of
the'Stace cf Mwai with native Hawaiians. Congress

is binding upon this cosrt. that the overthrow of the

Kipade nied ernst

‘Tecould not have been accomplished without the assistance
SOUS acente. and that the subsequent “cession of these
i ed st 96 wae "Vil e

Gongiesa also expressed its conmitment to acknowledge
the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdon of Hawai'i
[norder te provide a proper foundation for reconciliation
between the United states and the [alative Hawaiian
(pleople, and urged the President of the United states to
dies acknowledge the ranifications and £0 support
Feconeiiiation efforte

 

-23-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Although, by ite terms, the 1993 Apology Resolution

the Onited Staten." or "result in any chanaes in entat ina
dau," (8. Rep. No. 105-123 (1953) at 35,] of ieeelt create a
Gaim ciont, or cause of action, Tmice’v. cavetans, 961 F
Supp. 1523, i546 2.24 1b. Haw. 1996), rev'd-on other
‘grounds, 520 0.8. 495 (2000) ,) 4 confixme the factual
elaine chat pt sh asserted

 

 

(Emphases added.) (Footnotes omitted.)
As previously stated, the Apology Resolution was

adopted by both the House and the Senate, signed by then-

President Clinton on November 23, 1993, and designated as Public

Law No. 103-150. Generally, when a joint resolution

 

such as

the one at issue in this case

 

has emerged from legislative
deliberations and proceedings, it is treated as law. Ann Arbor
R. Go, v. United States, 281 U.S. 658, 666 (1930). Consequently,
the rules applicable to statutory interpretation are also
applicable to the Apology Resolution. Norman J. Singer, Statutes.
and Statutory Construction § 29:8 (6th ed. 2002
Statutes § 306 (2007).

 

It is well-settled that,

(when construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to
certain and give effect £5 the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
language contained in the statute itself. Ang
in the conte ve statute:

‘sonstius it ina nanner consistent with ite purmose.
Soon vw. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 245, 47 P.3d

348, 360 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

 

 

Additionally, “the legislature is presumed not to intend an
abeurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if
possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality."
Keliipuleole v. Wileon, 65 Hawai'i 217, 222, 941 7.24 300, 305

-24-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

(997) (internal brackets and citations omitted). In other
words, “a rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a
statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or
impracticable{.]* Id. at 221-22, 941 P.2d at 304-05 (internal
brackets and citation omitted). Moreover,

Lilt is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
Courts are bound, if rational and practicable, to give
Effect coall pate of @ statute, and that no clause,
Sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void,
Se"ineignéticant if a construction can be legitimately found
Ghich will give force to and preserve all the words of the

 

 

      

 

Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 215-16, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984)
(citations omitted)

As previously quoted, the Apology Resolution stat

 

relevant part:

 

Whereas{,] the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly

ope of ehele ‘esas to ated,

feterendum,

hereas(,] the health end well-being of the (nlative

 

25d tr eats. =
Ancestral territery._and their cultural identity in
22iSriance with their ovn spiritual and eraditional beliets:

TT

-2s-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

‘Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (emphases
added). Based on 2 plain reading of the above passages, we
believe Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawaiian
people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands, which
were taken without consent or compensation and which the native
Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit
to future generations. Equally clear is Congress’s “express [ed]

+ commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper
foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the
[nlative Hawaiian people.” Id. We agree with the OHA plaintiffs
that the "Apology Resolution by itself does not require the state
to turn over the [ceded] lands to the [nlative Hawaiian
people[.]* In our view, the Apology Resolution acknowledges only
that unrelinguished claims exist and plainly contemplates future
reconciliation with the United States and the State with regard
to those claims.

‘The defendants place great reliance on the Apology

Resolution’s disclaimer that *[nJothing in [the resolution] is

intended to serve as a settlement of any claime against the

 

United States." Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-350, 107
Stat. 1510, In 0 doing, they essentially maintain that the
plaintiffs are precluded from using the language contained

therein to establish or support a claim for the return of the

ceded lands. when reading the disclaimer language -- as we

-26-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

must -- “in the context of the entire [Apology Resolution] and
constru[ing] it in a manner consistent with its purpose,” Coon,
98 Hawai'i at 245, 47 P.3d at 360, the disclaimer provision
dictates only that the Apology Resolution itself does not
constitute a settlement of any of the unrelinguished clains to
the ceded lands; in other words, it does not bestow upon native
Hawaiians any ownership interest in the ceded lands. As we have
stated, the Apology Resolution recognizes, inter alia, that
native Hawaiians (1) never "directly relinquished their claims to

. thesr national lande to the United States" and (2) ‘are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territory." If we were to determine,
as the defendants appear to urge, that the disclainer bars the
plaintiffs from relying upon the Apology Resolution -- a public
law -- in pursuing what the resolution clearly recognizes --

their unrelinguished claima to the ceded lands, -- we would be

 

 

violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction,
namely, that this court ie bound “to give effect to all parts of
a statute* so that “no clause, sentence, or word shall be
construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant." Camara, 67
Haw. at 215, 685 P.2d at 797. Subscribing to the defendant:
reading of the disclainer would render superfluous the Apology
Resolution's acknowledgnent of the plaintiffs’ unrelinguished
claims to the ceded lands. In fact, given the Apology

Resolution’s clear contemplation of future reconciliation, i.e.,

-27-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

settlement, it is not surprising that Congrese would include the
aforementioned disclaimer after having clearly acknowledged the
illegality of the overthrow, the existence of the native
Hawaiians’ unrelinguished claims to the ceded lands, their deep
feelings and attachment to those lands, and their determination
to pursue their claims. Clearly, the Apology Resolution is not
per sea settlement of claims, but serves as the foundation (or
starting point) for reconciliation, including the future
settlement of the plaintiffs’ unrelinguished clains.
Such interpretation is supported by the october 23,

2000 report, issued by the United States Departments of interior

and Justice (the Departments), entitled “From Mauka to Makai

 

The River of Justice Must Flow Freely." As indicated by the

trial court, the principal recommendation of the report states:

Te is evident from the documentation, statements, and
views received during the reconciliation process undertaken
by (the Departeente] pursuant to [the Apology Resolution]
that’ (alative Havailan people continue to maintain =
Giseinct’ conmunity and Certain governmental atractures and
They desire to increase their control over their own affaire

 

 

 

 

fand institutions. As [al matter of justice and equity, this
gelf-detersijation over thelr ovn atfaira within the
‘fwanework of [ilederal law, as do Native American tribes

For generations, the United Staten has recognized the righte

and promoted the welfare of [nJative Hawaliana as an
Indigenous people within our nation through legislation,

 

In March 1999, Senator Daniel K. Akaka requested Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt ‘and Attorney General Janet Reno designate officie
from their respective Deparenents whose task vould be "to Comence the
Eeconciliation process."” John Berry, Assistant Secretary, and Mark Van
Norman, Director of the Office of tribal Justice for the Department of Justice
Were s0 designated and commenced public consultations in Hawai'i in Decesber

i999.” over forty houre of public etatenente were heard, and the public
consultation process ended in two Gays of formal hesrings on O'ehu. The
Departments’ report “contains recomendations {(ineludiag « “proposed
action’}] with respect to the continuation of the reconciliation prec
should be read as merely the next step, as the United States and [nlsvive
Mevalians sove forward in further dialogve.©

 

 

   

  

 

-28-
#8 FOR PUBLICATION ***

Sees

 

administrative action, and policy statenents, To sateauard
ws tee avert
= mr cule hee
te clarify inbative Hawaiians’ political status
dha to create @ framework for recognizing a government -to-
Government relationship with @ representative [nlative
Havaiian governing Body.

(Format altered.) (Emphases added.)
‘The above interpretation is also supported by related
state legislation enacted at around or subsequent to the adoption

of the Apology Resolution

 

specifically, Acts 354, 359, 329,
and 340, Act 354, entitled "A Bill for an Act Relating to
Hawaiian Sovereignty,” stated in pertinent part that:

on January 16, 1893, John L. Stevens, American
inister in Hawaii and friend of those supporting the
Tnnexation of Mawa‘t to the United states, ordered the
Gnited states marines to invade Honolulu under the pretext
of protecting Awerican citizens and their property. Stevens
Chefeafter recognized a new provisional government even
before Queen Lilivokalani surrendered. The actions by the
annexationiace were condensed by President cleveland”
Special envoy and the President himself. when President
Cleveland refused to submit a treaty of annexation to the
Sesate, the new provisional government established the
Republic of Hawai'i which lasted until annexation in 18
Sixty-one years later, Hawai'i Decane a state.

‘neil the provieional government vas recognized by
John L. Stevens, the Kingdom of Hawai'i wae recognized as an
Yndependent nation by the United States, France, and Great
Britein. Many native Ravalians and other view the
Overthrow of 1293 and subsequent actions by the United
States, such as gupporting establishment of the provisional
Goverment and Later the Republic of Nawai'i, the
Gesignation of the crom and government lands as public
{Shds, annexation, and the ceding of the public lands to the
Federal government without the consent of native Hawaiians.

  

 

 

 

 

as lilegel. Because the actions taken by the United states
here viewed a8 illegal -ané done without the consent of
Bative Haeallaie, samy native Wawaiians feel there ina
val elsia fo tions ve Haas

PERESSa end if not, nonetary reparations wade, and that
Ehey should have the right to sovereignty, or the Tight to
belé-determination and self-governeent as do other native
Reerican peoples.

 

che ea uere and lessee
pea ea ation
Signity of native Hawaiians.

-29-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 354, § 1 at 999-1000 (emphases added). In

 

Act 359, also entitled "A Bill for an Act Relating to Hawaiian
Sovereignty," the legislature made findings similar to those
expressed in the Apology Resolution. 1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 359,
S§ 1-2 at 1009-11. ‘The stated purpose of Act 359 was to
“facilitate the efforts of native Hawaiians to be governed by an
indigenous sovereign nation of their own choosing.” 1993 Haw.
Sess. L. Act 359, § 2 at 1010. The legislature established the
Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory Comission “to advise the
legislature in carrying out the purposes of [the] Act." Id, § 4
at 1011. In enacting Acts 354 and 359, the legislature
recognized that ‘the indigenous people of Hawai'i were
denied . . . their lands,” 1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 359, § 1(9) at
1010, and contemplated further action by the legislature to “to
tak[e] steps to promote the restoration of the rights and dignity
of native Hawaiians." 1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 354, § 1 at 1000.
In 1997, the legislature enacted Act 329. 1997 Haw.
Sess. L. Act 329, § 1 at 956-58. Act 329, which attempted to
clarify "the proper management and disposition of the Lande
subject to the public land{s] trust and the proceeds and income
therefrom, and to effectuate article XII, section 6 of the
Hawai'i Constitution," stated that:

‘The legisiagure finde that the evente of history
relating to Hawai'i and [njative Hawaiians, including those
set forth in (the Apology Resolution) continie to. contribute
today toa deep sense of injustice among many [a]ative
Hawaiisne and others.

vesoncll iat beat i

-30-
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION **

is possible only if it fairly acknowledses the past while

‘The Tegiviature further finds that over the last few
decades, the Hawat fduents co

 

hav nth Le perenne
EecancLiiation, forenost anong these achieVenents have been
the creation of che (0) ffice of Hawaiian (Alffaire and the
Sliccation by legislative action co the [0] fice of Hawaiian
ialffaire of substantial funda cut of a portion of the
public land[s) trust established by section 3(f) of the
Raniesion Act. The overriding purpose of this Act is to
Continue this nonentum, through furcher executive and
Tegielative action in conjunction with the people of
Mawal't, re) n

resolution.

 

1997 Haw. Sees. L, Act 329, § 1 at 956 (emphases added) .

Adéitionally, we observe that, in 1993, the legislature
found that “the island of Kaho'olawe{"] is of significant
cultural and historic importance to the native people of
Hawai'i,” 1992 Haw. Sess. L. Act 340, § 1 at 803, and dictated
that:

 

be return [of Kaho'olave] to the state, the
Fesources and waters of Kahoolawe shall be beid in trust as
Dare of the public lands trust; provided chat the state
Sheil transfer management end control of the island and its
waters to the sovereign native Havaiian entity upon its
Tecognition By the United states and the state of Hawai'i.

 

Id, at § 2 at 806 (codified as HRS chapter 6K)
It is well-settled that native Hawaiian beneficiaries
of the ceded lands trust have a “right to bring suit under the

Hawai't Constitution to prospectively enjoin the State from

 

 

 

‘The island of Kaho'olave was used by the United states “as a military
target range since 1941." 2993 Maw. Seve, L. Act 340, § 1 at 803.
in 1990, the bombing and shelling of the isiand vas halted

 

by Congtese ane the president of che United states, A
federal commission, known a5 the Kabo'olave teland
Conveyance Comission, was created by Congress to determine
the terme of conveyance of the island to the state of
Hawai

 

oan
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

violating the texms of the ceded lands trust." Pele Defense
Eund, 73 Haw. at 601, 837 P.2d at 1262. Moreover, we have
previously indicated in an analogous case dealing with the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act that the State, as trustee, “must
adhere to high fiduciary duties normally owed by a trustee to its
beneficiaries." Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 338, 640 P.2d at 1168. In
describing the scope of the State's relevant fiduciary duties,
this court, in ahuna, analogized such duties to the fiduciary
duties of the United states to native Americans by quoting, with
approval, the words of the United states Suprene Court and
stated:

Under a hunane and self imposed policy which has found

 

 

expression in many acts of Congress and Mnerous decieions
Of this Court, [the Government, has chazged iteslf with

Tes coaguct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent
it in dealings with the Tndians, should therefore be iudaed
by the most exacting fiduciary atandards.

1d. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1169 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United

 

States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)) (brackets and emphases in
original) (format altered). In ahuna, we held that “(eJhe use of
the term ‘most exacting fiduciary standards’ imports the notion
that (this] court will strictly scrutinize the actions of the
government." Id, at 339, 640 P.2d at 1269. Moreover, we
observed that “the nature of the trust obligations of the [state]
toward beneficiaries . . . may be determined by examining well-
settled principles enunciated by the federal courts regarding
lands set aside by Congress in trust for the benefit of other

native Anericans(.]* Id. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1168. In

-32-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
particular, we cited three specific trust duties applicable to
the State as trustee: (1) “the obligation . . . to administer
the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary"; (2) the
obligation that the trustee “deal impartially when there is more
than one beneficiary; and (3) the “obligation to use reasonable
skill and care to make trust property productive[.J" Id. at
340, 604 P.2d at 1169-70 (citations omitted)

Ae native Hawaiians, the individual plaintiffs are
clearly beneficiaries of the ceded lands trust. Additionally,
OHA, waich is charged ‘with managing proceeds derived from the
ceded lands and designated for the benefit of native Hawaiians,”
ONAIL, 120 Hawai'i at 341, 133 P.3d at 770 (citation omitted),
can be said to be representing the interests of the native
Hawaiian beneficiaries to the ceded lands trust. The State, as
trustee, is under an obligation to “administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiary" and to “deal impartially when
there is nore than one beneficiary." Ahuma, 64 Haw. at 340, 640
P.2d at 1269-70 (citations omitted). As previously discussed,
the Apology Resolution and the aforenentioned related state
legislation clearly contenplate that native Hawaiians (1) “never
directly relinguished their claims to. . . their national lands
to the United States," and (2) ‘are determined to preserve,

develop and tranamit to future generations their ancestral

 

an eo doing, ve stated that the “reasonable prudent person standard
applies to protecting and caring for the (erust] property(.J* Ahuna, 64 Haw.
at a4G, 640" F.2d at 2269.

<3
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

SSS
territory. Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 stat.

1510. Ae such, we believe and, therefore, hold that the Apology
Resolution and related state legislation, discussed supra, give
rise to the State’s fiduciary duty to preserve the corpus of the
public lands trust, specifically, the ceded lands, until such
time as the unrelinguished claims of the native Hawaiians have
been resolved. Such duty is consistent with the State's
“obligation to use reasonable skill and care” in managing the
public lands trust and the Ahuna court's declaration that the
State’s conduct “should . . . be judged by the most exacting
fiduciary standards." Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1169
(citations and emphasis omitted) .

Keeping the aforementioned discussion and holding in
mind, we now turn to examine the issues raised by the parties in
this appeal -- the first of which is the defendants’ contention
that the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief is barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

B. Collateral Estoppel
Relying on Ewa Marina, the defendants

 

ext, as they

Gid before the trial court, that the plaintiffs are collaterally

 

topped from relitigating whether the state has the power to
alienate ceded lands from the public lands trust. The OHA
Plaintiffs maintain that the trial court addressed the issue and

“correctly rejected the argument presented by the [defendants] .*

-34-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

In Ewa Maring, the plaintiffs -- OHA, Save Ewa Beach
ohana, and two individual plaintiffs -- challenged the Board of
and and Natural Resources’ (BLNR) issuance of a conservation
district use area (CDUA) permit to Haseko, Inc. (Haseko). Ewa
Marina, slip op. at 2. “Haseko submitted a CDUA permit
application to the BLNR[,] seeking a permit to dredge a channel
through state-owned submerged lands. The purpose of this permit
was to allow Haseko to construct a 1400-slip marina as part of
the proposed ‘Ewa Marina development project." Id. BLNR
conditionally granted Haseko’s application for the CDUA permit on
December 29, 1994. Id, at 8. The plaintiffs timely appealed the
decision and order of the BLNR to the circuit court, which
affirmed the decision of the BLNR. Id, at 8-9. The plaintiffs
then appealed to this court, arguing, inter alia, that “the
issuance of the permit violated the fiduciary obligations of the

State of Hawai'i under section 5(£) of the . . . Adm

 

ion Act
and the public trust doctrine’ and that “issuance of the permit
constitute(d] an improper disposition of public lands.” Ids
ar 8

‘This court upheld the decisions of the circuit court

 

and BINR, reasoning that ‘section 5(f) does not limit the use of
the ceded lands thengelves to the five purposes[] 80 long as the
proceeds fron the disposition of these lands are held in trust.”
Id, at 21, Additionally, based on article XIZ, section 6 of the

Hawai'i Constitution, this court concluded that the state

-35-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

has the power to dispose of ceded lands. The actual use to
Which these lands is put by this disposition does not have
to comport with one of the five enumerated purposes in the

 

Agnission Act ac long as fair compensation for the
@isposition of these lands ie used for trust purposes, The
actual seve in this case, therefore, is whether the
Ammuance of the COVA permit in a proper disnosision-of ceded
tends

Id, at 21-22 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This court
held that the “grant of the permit for the dredging of a marina
entrance channel has an undisputably public purpose" and that,
therefore, *BLNR‘s conditional grant of the permit to Haseko did
not violate the public trust doctrine and was a proper
disposition of public lands." Id, at 26-27.

“Collateral estoppel is an aspect of ee judicata which
precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was
previously determined in 2 prior suit on a different claim
between the same parties or their privies.” Pele Defense Fund,
73 Haw. at 599, 837 P.2d at 1261 (citations omitted) (format
altered). Thus, the elements of collateral estoppel are:

(2) the issue decided in the prior adjudication {s identical
to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there ie
a final Judgnent on the merits; (3) the isaue decided in the
Prior adjudication vas essential to the final Judgment; and
a) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
wae a party or in privity with a party to the prior
Adjudication.

Keahole Def, Coal., Inc. v. Bd, of Land & Natural ges., 110
Hawai'i 429, 429, 134 P.3d 585, 595 (2006) (citations omitted)
nee algo Citizens for the Prot. of the W

Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawai'i, 91 Hawai'i 94, 102, 979

P.2d 1120, 1128 (1999). These elements “are tempered only by the

 

(format altered

 

prerequisite that a plaintiff have a full and fair opportunity to

-36-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

litigate the relevant issues." Pele Defer 73 Haw. at
600, 837 P.2d at 1261 (citations omitted) .

In this case, the trial court ultimately determined
that Ewa Marina did not collaterally estop the plaintiffs’ clains
in this case because the “issue of whether the State has the
power to gell ceded lands . . . was not ‘essential’ to the final
judgment in Bva Marina, which merely decided whether the BLNR
could issue @ permit to dredge submerged ceded lands." (Emphases
in original.) Curiously, the trial court also found that “the
issue of whether the State could sell or dispose of ceded lands
for public purposes was actually litigated.” However, the trial
court, after taking judicial notice of the files in the awa
Maxina case, seemingly concluded to the contrary, i.e., that the

plaintiffs in the instant case -- against whom collateral

 

coppel is asserted -- did not have a **full and fair
opportunity’ in Ewa Marina to litigate” the State’s authority to
alienate ceded lands from the public lands trust.

Neverthe

 

the trial court app

 

‘3 to have correctly
determined that two of the elements of collateral estoppel were
met in this case, to wit: (1) there was a final judgment on the

merits in the Ewa Marina c

 

; and (2) the individual plaintiffs
are privies of OHA for the purposes of collateral estoppel.
However, it is apparent that the other two elements of collateral
estoppel are not met here. First, the issue decided in Ewa

Marina -- ‘whether the issuance of the CDUA permit [was] a proper

o37-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

disposition of ceded lands,” Bwa Marina, slip op. at 22 (footnote
omitted), -- is not identical to the issue raised by the

plaintiffs in this case, i.e., whether the State, as trustee,
should be enjoined from alienating ceded lands from the public
lands trust until such tines as the claims of the native Hawaiian
People to the ceded lands are resolved. Second, the issue
whether such an injunction should be issued wae not essential to
the final judgment in Ewa Marina inasmuch as this court in Ewa
Marina needed to determine only whether the state violated its
fiduciary duties by issuing the CDUA permit. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court correctly determined that Ewa Marina
did not collaterally estop the plaintiffs’ claims in this case.
We now turn to the plaintiffs’ contention on appeal as they
relate to (1) the Leiali'i parcel and (2) the ceded lands in
general. We then examine the political question doctrine and the
plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief,

©. The Leiali‘i Parcel

Sovereign Immunity

 

‘The trial court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims
with regard to the Leiali‘{ parcel were barred by sovereign
inmunity because title to the Leiali'i parcel had already been
transferred to the HFDC. The trial court reasoned that, in order
to return the Leiali'i parcel to the public lands trust, it would
be required “to ‘turn back the clock and examine actions already

taken by the State.’* Thus, the trial court concluded:

-38-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

oo

‘The Leali'{ [aie] (parcel is] no longer in the {plublic
Tijande [elrust, Although the [pllaintitfe argue that the
(perce! was) merely transferred to another State entity and
that sovereign immunity therefore does not apply, the facts
Show that the state of Havai'i received payment for the
Efansfer of this parcel) to the HFDC. (HRS §] 172-2
Specifically exenpte from the definition of public land
ihsse lance to which the HDC holds title in its corporate
Enpacity. To return the (parcel) at Leals'i (sic) to the
iphubliz lands (e]ruse, the DIR would have to expend
seneye from che State treamury. Moreover, the HFDC has
Tirerdy epent millions of dollars improving those
properties

Aecordingly, thie court cannot compel HPDC to return
‘the [parcel] at Leaii' [sie] to the (plublic (lands
Telruet without directly affecting the state treasury,
Pursuant to Pele Defense Fund v.aty, (73 Haw, $78, 637
piod 1247 (1992);1 [ehe pliaineifte’ request for injunctive
Pollet «with respect to Leall'i (sic) is, therefore,
Barred by sovereign immunity.

 

 

 

 

on appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court
erred in concluding that their claim with regard to the Leiali‘t
parcel was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
specifically, the plaintiffs take issue with the trial court’s
reliance on Pele Defense Fund. The plaintiffs assert that their
claim regarding the Leiali‘i parcel was not barred by sovereign
immunity because the claim is for prospective injunctive relief.
Additionally, the OHA plaintiffs contend that: (1) the requested
injunction would not directly affect the State treasury inasmuch
e the transfer “from DLNR to HFDC was a paper transaction
shifting title from one State agency to another for which DLNR
received a mere $1[.00]"; and (2) the “dispute over the Leiali‘i

[parcel] involves governmental agencie:

 

rather than private
parties." Consequently, the OHA plaintiffs argue that the case
at bar is distinguishable from Pele Defense Fund.

‘The defendants, on the other hand, believe -- as did
the trial court -- that “the State has already transferred the

-39-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Leiali‘i [parcel] to HFDC" and, therefore, to return the parcel
to the public lands trust, "DLNR would have to expend moneys from
the State treasury." The defendants, therefore, maintain that
the trial court correctly determined that Pele Defense Fund

mandates the conclusion that the plaintiffe’ claim is barred by

 

sovereign immunity. Moreover, the defendants argue that the

exception to sovereign immunity recognized in Pele Defense

 

Eund -- “for ‘the limited purpose of enjoining state official

breach of trust by disposal of trust assets in violation of the

 

Hawai'i constitutional and statutory provisions governing the
public land trust'* -- ie inapplicable in this case “because the
Admission Act and state constitutional and etatutory provisions
explicitly authorize the State to sell ceded lands.”

The doctrine of sovereign immunity dictates that

the State cannot be sued without its consent or waiver of
its inmunity in matters “iovolving the enforcenent of
contracte, treasury Liability for tort, and the adjudication
of interest in property which tas become unsullied by tort

into the boson of government." Hovever, govereign iaminity
maynot be invoked ay a defense by state officisla aha
ackion Lf attacked aa beina unconstitutionai, wer vill
sqvereian inunity par suits to enioin state officials trom
siglating state statutes

Bele Defense Fund, 73 Haw. at 607, 637 P.2d at 1265 (emphasis

added) (internal brackets, ellipsis, and citations omitted)

 

(format altered). Additionally, this court has adopted the rule

from EX parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which makes an

important distinction between prospective and retrospective

relief. Id. at 609, 637 P.2d at 1266.

-40-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

ed by
EXemuxy, However, relief that is tantamount to an avara of
Ganages for a past’ violation of law, even though styled as
something else, is barred by sovereign immunity.

stantial ane!ia

 

Id. at 609-10, 837 P.2d at 1266 (emphasis added) (citations,
ellipsis, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). The
burden is on the State to prove “with specific facts that the
effect on the State treasury will be directly, substantially, and
quantifiably impacted." QHA II, 110 Hawai'i at 357, 133 P.3d at
786 (footnote omitted) .

Pele Defense Pund involved a claim brought by a non-
profit corporation comprised of native Hawaiian beneficiaries of
the section 5(f) Admission Act trust, challenging the exchange of
ceded land in Puna on the island of Hawai'i for privately owned
lands. 73 Haw, at 584-05, 837 P.2d at 1253. The plaintiff
prayed for, inter alia, injunctive relief to restore the Puna
parcel to the public lands trust, arguing that the transfer
constituted a breach of the trust created under section S(f) and
article XII, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Id. This
court held that, although the plaintiff's claim was couched as a
claim for prospective injunctive relief, its “request that the
trust status of the exchanged lands be restored by means of a
constructive trust [was] essentially equivalent to a
nullification of the exchange and the return of the exchanged
lands to the trust res." Id, at 611, 837 P.2d at 1267 (internal

quotation marks omitted). This court, therefore, concluded that

-a1-
*** FORPUBLICATION ***

the "effect on the state treasury would be direct and
unavoidable, rather than ancillary, because imposing a
constructive trust on lands [then privately owned] would

require . . . the State to compensate [the purchaser] for its
property." Id. at 611, 837 P.2d at 1267 (citations omitted) .
Consequently, we held that the plaintiff's “requested relief
[was], in effect, a request for compensation for the past actions
of the [State] and was, accordingly, barred by sovereign
immunity. Id.

Subsequent cases decided by this court have reaffirmed
the continued viability of the analysis articulated in Bele
Defense Fund. See, £.g., OHA II, 110 Hawai'i at 356-57, 133 P.3d
at 785-86 (holding that, under Pele Defense Fund, plaintiffs’
claims alleging a breach of the State's fiduciary duties were
barred by sovereign immunity because the plaintiffs requested
relief -- a share of revenues that the State had collected from
the ceded lands trust -- was essentially a request for past
monetary damages, and, therefore, the relief requested was
“retrospective"); Bush v, Watson, 61 Hawai'i 474, 481-82, 918
P.2d 1130, 1137-38 (1996) (holding that claims by native Hawaiian

homestead lessees, challenging the validity of third

 

arty

agreements (TPAs) between other le!

 

and non-Hawaiian farmers
ae violating the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, were not barred
by sovereign immunity because they sought declaratory and

injunctive relief that would void exiating TPAs and enjoin the

-42-
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

OO

Hawaiian Homes Commission from approving future TPAs); Aged
Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 78 Hawai'i 192, 208 n.26, 851
P.2d 279, 295 n.26 (1995) (noting that, with respect to clains
against state officials, claimants cannot recover money damages
or the equivalent for past violations of law; nevertheless,
relief that is prospective in nature may be allowed regardless of

the state's sovereign immunity) .

Most recently, this court affirmed the Pele Defense
Fund analysis in Kaholchanchano v. State, 114 Hawai'i 302, 162

P.3d 696 (2007). Kaho'chanohano involved a class action lawsuit
brought by members of the Employees’ Retirement System of the
State of Hawai'i (ERS), the State of Hawai'i Organization of
Police Officers, and the trustees of BRS (hereinafter, the
plaintiffs] against the State alleging a breach of trust. Id. at
310, 162 P,3d at 704, The plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief based on a challenge to a statute that
authorized the diversion of $346.9 million from the ERS fund,
which the plaintiffs alleged violated the state's constitutional
and contractual obligations to ERS menbers. Id, at 315, 162 P.3d
at 709, This court determined that, inasmuch as the State had
not expressly waived sovereign inmunity and the plaintiffs did

not claim money danage:

 

sthe relevant inquiry [was] whether the
relief sought for a past violation of law [was] ‘tantamount to an
award of damages’ or would merely have an ‘ancillary’ effect on

the state treasury." Id, at 337, 162 P.3d at 731 (citation and

<43-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

and other internal quotation marks omitted). ultimately, this
court concluded that, by granting the plaintiffs’ requested
relief, the effect on the state treasury, if any, would be only
vancillary" inasmuch as the state would be prohibited from any
future “skinming" from the ERS fund. Jd, Accordingly, this
court held that the plaintiffs’ clains were not barred by
sovereign immunity. Id, at 337-38, 162 P.3d at 731-32.

In this case, the plaintiffe seek to enjoin the actions
of state executive officials from transferring the Leialii
parcel because they believe such transfer would further diminish
the corpus of the public lands trust -- in violation of the
State’s constitutional and statutory fiduciary duties -- before

their unrelinguished claims to the ceded lands could be resolved.

 

‘As in Kaho'chanchano, the State, here, has not expressly waived

sovereign inmunity, and the plaintiffs do not claim money
Gamages. Although the plaintiffs characterize their claim with
respect to the teaili'i parcel as being one for prospective
injunctive relief, ise., enjoining the transfer of the Leiali‘i
parcel, the parcel was, in fact, transferred from DLNR to HFDC on
the eame day the plaintiffs filed suit. Accordingly, in this
case, as in Kaho'ohanchano, “the relevant inguiry is whether

We note that this court'# conclusion in xaho! As consiseent

with Bush. wherein we “decline (@) ‘to adopt the federal courts’ narrow view
Chat a claim for relief based on past iiiegal action ie necesearsiy,
Sretrospective[,|'" holding instead that ene crucial inguisy under our
sovereign immunity principies is whether the relief sought for s past
violation of law ie" ‘tantamount to an avard of damages’ oF would merely have
an ‘ancillary’ effect on the state treasury. Bush, 81 Hawail at 462 n.3, 318
Diag ae 1338.5. (eitations omitted)

 

-46-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

the relief sought for a past violation of law(, i.e., the
transfer of property,] is ‘tantamount to an award of damages’ oF
would merely have an ‘ancillary’ effect on the state treasury.”
Kaho'chanohano, 114 Hawai'i at 337, 162 P.3d at 731 (some internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

unlike Pele Defense Fund, in which ceded lands were
exchanged for privately owned lands, the Leiali‘i parcel was
transferred from one state agency to another, i.e., from DLNR to
HPDC. Moreover, the consideration of $1.00 was also paid from
one state agency to another. In other words, the return of the
property and purchase price between both state agencies
effectively changes nothing. Both the parcel and the $1.00 would
remain within the control of the State, To the contrary, because
the lands at iseue in Bele Defense Fund had been transferred to a
private third-party, thie court concluded that the State would
have to compensate the private third-party for the return of the
property in the public lands trust. 73 Haw. at 611, 837 P.2d at
1267, In that regard, Pele Defense Fund is distinguishable from
the instant case because the Leiali‘i parcel would remain within
the control of the State. Returning the parcel to the public
lands trust would require only that the HFDC transfer title back
to DIN and that DLNR pay only $1.00 for such transfer, As such,
the effect on the State treasury, if any, would be only

ancillary.

-45-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

However, in concluding that sovereign inmunity barred
the plaintiffs’ claims with regard to the Leiali‘i parcel, the
trial court additionally relied upon the fact that, prior to the
transfer of the Leiali'i parcel, HFDC had spent $31 million
developing infrastructure on the property. In so doing, the
trial court did not provide any explanation as to how the
expenditure of $31 million prior to the plaintiffe’ filing of the
present lawsuit resulted in a “direct” ae opposed to ‘ancillary
effect on the state treasury. We further observe that the
parties do not any present argument on this issue.

Although we recognize that $31 million dollars is a

significant sum of money, that fact alone is insufficient to

 

support a conclusion that such past expenditure constitutes a
“direct” future effect on the state treasury. Indeed, as
previously stated, sovereign immunity does not bar a claim for
Prospective injunctive relief “even though accompanied by a
substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury." pele
Defense Fund, 73 Haw.

(internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted). In

 

at 609, 837 P.2d at 1266 (emphasis added)

the casé at bar, the plaintiffs are not asking that the $21
million be returned to then or even to the state treasury.
Moreover, the benefit of the $31 million expenditure by HPDC on
infrastructure remains with the State. Thus the plaintiffs’
requested relief -- i.e., an injunction -- is not “tantamount to

an award of damages for a past violation of law.” Id. at 609-10,

-46-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

837 P.2d at 1266 (internal quotation marks, citation, and
ellipsis omitted). As such, the effect of the expenditure of $31
million on the state treasury is “ancillary* -- albeit a
substantial one. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs’ claim
for injunctive relief with regard to the Leiali‘i parcel is not
barred by sovereign immunity, Accordingly, we also hold that the
trial court erred in determining otherwise:
2. Waiver and Estoppel

‘he plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
determining that the defenses of waiver and estoppel barred the
plaintiffe’ request for injunctive relief with respect to the
Leiali‘i parcel. Because waiver and estoppel are distinct
doctrines, we analyze them separately below.

a. waiver

‘The trial court concluded that the

[pllaineitts, by thelr actions and inactions during the
Lig years beeween 1987 and 1994. = waived any right
they nay have had to contest the sale of [the teialit
parcel] to HFDC a5 illegal

 

no [individual (p)aineifes argue that hey and
their counsel relied on Congress's 1993 apology Resolution
an the Legis) ‘het 329 of 1993 a8 central bases to
Seek an injunction in the fall of 1994 on the
[Sodas pending resolution of the Hawaiians’ claim to
Uatetantp of the ceded lands. Mr. Meheula’ discussions
QIEE the” ofa Board aid cause OHA Co insist in the fal] of
SG5s that a disclaimer be placed in the HFDC agreenente

Reva practical matter, hovever, neither OHA nor the
(individual, Ipllaistltts objected to the sale of the
{deisis parce:) uatil the £211 of 1994. Te any event,
ISH uh piiaineiite aid not consider challenging the
Skilers power to sell ceded lands until after the Apology
Resolution wae adopted in 1993, OHA's continuing to
Resoeiste for sarket value after the Apology Resolution wa
Befoea is eiso tconduct from which an intention to waive may
Peasonably be inferred.” (The pllaintiffe’ failure to
Effect tothe development plan, which included market hore
Sekore the Luc and Legislature in testimony relating to Act

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

-41-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

318 is “wholly inconsistent with any diseatiafaction’ with
the development pian, alo suggesting waiver of any right to
challenge thes. "(Goo va Hee Fat, 34 Hav. 123, 129° (198),

Goo. v. Gao, 36 Haw. 530
sony

Moreover, HFDC and the state were prejudiced by their
reliance on Ipilaintitta’ acquiescence in the development
plan to sell che Leiali'i parcel]. he testified to by the
Project managers for both uealii [sie] and La'Vopua, there
(tere no objections from OHA ae to the State's power to sell
Public trust lands for those projects until Novenber 1994.
By that tine, however, $31 million had already Deen invested
in beali'i Tele]

 

 

   

 

(Footnotes omitted.)
The plaintiffs argue that they did not waive their
claim with regard to the Leiali'i parcel. The OHA plaintiffs’

maintain that,

[elfter the passage of the Apology Resolution, and as the
FULL import Of the congr
[glovernment’ and [pubis

  

 

‘of Haval'l oF their sovereign
government” and that “the indigenous Hawaiian people never
Sivectly relinguished their claine to eheir inherent

sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the

United Staten{l" becane evident, the OA Trustees took
sppropriate action to assure that che claim to the “national

 

 
 

As indicated by the trial court, the individual plaintiffs posit
that, “la}ithough OHA did not earlier object to the transfer of
ceded lands for the ultimate sale to honeowners in the Leiali‘i
project, the 1993 legislation [(ise., the Apology Resolution, as
well as, Acts 359 and 329, discussed gupra)] and Mr. Meheula’s
discussions with the OHA Board in [September 1994] were new
events that justified their objection in [September 1994].”
Relying on the ruling and rationale of the trial court,
the defendants maintain that the plaintiffe waived their clains

regarding the Leiali'i parcel because the “[p]laintiffs’ failure

-48-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Oe

to object to the development plan at the LUC and before the
hegislature in testimony relating to Act 318 [(setting forth a
rormila to compensate OHA for the ‘villages of Leiali'i, Maui and
villages of La'i'opua, Hawai'i')] is ‘wholly inconsistent with any
Gissatisfaction’ with the development plan. . . andl,
therefore,] clearly waived any right to challenge the plan." The
defendants further maintain that, *[elven if plaintiffs did not
think to challenge the State’s power to sell [cleded lands until

after the Apology Resolution, OHA’s continuing to negotiate for

 

smarket value’ after the Apology Resolution was passed is clearly
‘conduct from which an intention to waive may reasonably be
inferred.’*

‘This court has defined waiver as "an intentional

relinguishment of a known right, a voluntary relinquishment of

 

 

rights, and the relinguishment or refueal to use a right." Coon
City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 261, 47 P.34 348,
376 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
‘To constitute a yaiver, there must have existed a right
Tiained co have been waived and the waiving party gust have
had kum adoe—apua) ok cone te ey tater namie the

Sttrich whether a valid waiver existe is genersily ©
eseion of fact, “when the facts are undisputed it may
become a question of law." Hawaiian Hones Comm'n v. Bush,
SSuaw. 201, 266, (3955) (citations omitted); eg alea
Steuart v Spalding, 23 Haw. 502, 527 (1916) ("The question
SENSHar Ts usually a mixed one of law and fact but where

ite undisputed and are susceptible of but one
Tnference it becones one of law for the court."
(eltations omiteed-))

 

 

Id. at 261-62, 47 P.3d at 376-77 (some citations and original

ellipsis omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore,

-49-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

must nal. Such intention may be
Indicated by language or conduct, nay be either express or
implied but does not necessarily’ imply that one hat been
misled to his prejudice or into an altered position. waiver
Gepends upon the intention of the party who ie charged with
the waiver. Te say be proven by an expre:

Geclaration Of the party charged with the waiver, Tt may
also be proved by the existence of acts or language so
inconsistent with the purpose of the person charged ¢o stand
upon his rights as to leave no opportunity fora reasonable
inference co the contrary.

 

 

v. Lalakes, 35 Haw. 213, 218-19 (2939) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In this case, the record indicates that the first tine
that OHA had knowledge that DLNR intended to alienate the
Leiali'i parcel from the public lands trust for the purposes of
residential development was in December 1969 when HFDC filed a
petition with the LUC to reclassify the Leials‘i parcel from
agriculture to urban use. It is undisputed that OHA did not
object to the transfer of the Leiali'i parcel and participated in
negotiations with HFDC regarding the parcel’s fair market value,
pursuant to Act 318, As previously stated, it was not until the
adoption of the Apology Resolution that OHA requested the
@isclainer that its acceptance of funds would not affect any
further claim the native Hawaiian people may have to the Leiai's
parcel. hen HFDC declined to honor their request, the
plaintiffs filed suit.

In support of their position that they did not waive
their claim with regard to the Leiali'i parcel, the plaintitts
essentially maintain that the Apology Resolution gave rise to

their breach of trust claim. Pointing to language in the Apology

-50-
#** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
Resolution that "the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly
relinguished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a
people or over their national lands to the United states,”
‘Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-250, 107 Stat. 1510, the
plaintiffs submit that title to the ceded lands is now clouded.
Having held that the Apology Resolution and related
state legislation give rise to a fiduciary duty by the State, as
trustee, to preserve the corpus of the public lands trust,
specifically, the ceded lands, until such time as the
unrelinguished clains of the native Hawaiians have been resolved,
dt necessarily follows that it was not until at least Novenber
23, 1993, when the Apology Resolution was signed into law by
President Clinton, that the plaintiffs “had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of . . . a right [clained to have
been waived) at the time of the purported waiver." Coon, 98
Hawai'i at 261, 47 P.3d at 376 (citation omitted). Consequently,

we cannot say that the plaintiffs’ purported waiver was

 

“intentional,” expressly or impliedly. Hewahewa, 35 Haw. at 218.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s conclusion that OHA’
actions between 1987 and 1994 constituted a waiver of the

plaintiffs’ claims w

 

clearly erroneous and that, therefore, the
trial court erred in determining that the plaintiffs waived their

claim for injunctive relief with regard to the Leiali‘i parcel

 

2 the trial court also based its holding on the fact that the

Getendante expended over $21 million dollars on improvenents to the Leieli't

parcel prior ro the tranefer from DLNR to HFDC. However, the question on
(cont ined. .

 

 

-51-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

b. estoppel

‘The trial court ruled that, *[fJor the same reasons
that (the p]laintiffs waived any challenge to the legality of the
sales of Leali‘i [sic] lands, [the p]laintiffe are estopped from
making that challenge." Specifically, the trial court found
that,

applying equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel principles
to the cage at hand, during the years of negotiationa. and
Planning fer Leal [eiel before [the pllaintitts flea
this lawsuit, [che pllaintisfe did not suggest that they
would file a'lawouit challenging the right ro sell the
Geiais's parcel] to Hoc ana in urn to third parties for
thelr hones. During the

 

    
   

‘The state epent substantial

ing. [the parcel] before
Noveber 1984 when (the pJiaintiffs first filed euit

By their action (or inaction with respect £0 the
(individual [pl laineifes) and conduct {the
plaintiffs caused the HFDC to believe chat no one would
Challenge its acquisition of the [Lelali't parcel) as 1osg
fas OHA and Dine received fair monetary compensation for che
Tends. “Ite pliaineites’ acquiescence in the cevelopment of
Yeali'i [sic] ‘and HPOC'® expenditure of funds: for
infrastructure, and OlA's active participation in
negotiations for an appraised value for the ceded lands
Tnduced the State to continue moving forward with the
housing developeent. The State obtained neces!
changes, eatered into agreements with develope!
agreements vies county officials and pent over 431 million
for infrastructure at Lealli (sic) alone. the state
significantly altered ita position because of the statements
And conduct Of OHA, ae vell ag the inaction of the
[individual [pliaintitfs. Te p)iaineifts are, therefore,
algo estopped from challenging the State's sale of public
trust lands at Leali't (ele).

 

 

 

 

 

*(. seontinued)
waiver is “strictly whether che party charged with waiver intended to waive @
Keown claim, lswaewa, 35 Kaw, at 218-19, pat whether the party seeking to
prove waiver wag prejudiced, as was determined by the trial coure, Ae such,
the trial court's! finding that, because OHA aid not object to the transfer of
the Leialit parcel until 1994," #FDC and the State were prejudiced by ehelr
Fellance on the plaintiffs acquiescence in the project does not apply te an
analysis of waiver

-52-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

Te de true, as argued by the OHA [p]lainestfe, that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked against
W"Sovermmental agency euch as OKA in the absence of overt
Gelrinenral reliance and "manifest injustice.” The Law
‘eccgnizes that governmental bodies must be able to change
ERSTE"EIGG. Un‘ eSee circumstances. Thus, a mere change of
SREs' by the government does not iaveke estoppel unless the
Seber party fad detrimentally relied upon the agency’
ceeteP petition to such an extent chat it would constitute
SEanieeee injustice" to fail to invoke and apply the
Jocttiae, tn this case, however, based on the facts above,
Ske requisite showings of extensive detrimental reliance by
Gnd manifest injustice £0 the (dlefendants have been
antiafied to invoke equitable estoppel against the OHA
RINRifte:° Thust the doctrine of estoppel prohibits both
rete of [piiaintifts from seeking injunctive relief with
ect to the sale of (the ueiall'i parcel)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(internal footnotes omitted.) (Format altered.)

‘The OWA plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
concluding that the doctrine of estoppel barred the plaintiffe
clains because it is ‘manifestly unjust to [nJative Hawaiians to
allow alienation of [cleded [1]ands -- their national lands --
prior to a final resolution of the [nJative Hawaiian land claim.”
Additionally, the OHA plaintiffs argue that the application of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the government is not
favored, and, furthermore, “there can be no suggestion here that
OHA wilfully misled the HFDC in its earlier position on the
Leiali'i [parcel] or acted in bad faith.” The individual
plaintiffs appear to contend that estoppel is not applicable in
this case because it is an equitable defense, which cannot be
raised against the plaintiffs because “the 1993 Legislation
obligated the state to seek instructions from the [court before

selling ceded lands without prompting by [the p]laintitts.”

-53-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

‘The defendants insist that the trial court correctly
determined that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the
transfer of the Leiali‘i parcel because the “unchallenged
findings of facts show that HFDC spent more than $31 million at
Leiali'i over a seven-year period in reliance on OHA’s failure to
object to the project." Accordingly, the defendants assert that
“(e]hese facts squarely raise the defense of equitable

estoppel [.]”

“The theory of equitable estoppel requires proof that
one person wilfully caused another person to erroneously believe
a certain state of things, and that person reasonably relied on
this erroneous belief to his or her detriment.” potter v.
Hawai'i Newspaper Agency, 89 Hawai'i 411, 419, 974 P.2d 51, 59
(2999) (citation omitted). °A species of equitable estoppel, the
Principle of quasi estoppel, precludes a party from asserting to
another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position
Previously taken." Id, at 420, 974 P.2d at 60 (internal brackets
and citation omitted) .

As the OHA plaintiffs correctly point out, *[t)he
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel againet the
government is not favored." Turner v, Chandler, 87 Hawai'i 330,
333, 995 P.2d 1062, 1065 (App. 1998) (citations omitted) .
However, this court has also stated that the doctrine “is fully
applicable against the governnent if it ie necessary to invoke it

to prevent manifest injustice.” state pavashi v.

-54-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 126, $66 P.2d 725, 737 (2977) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

As previously discussed, it was not until the Apology
Resolution was signed into law on November 23, 1993 that the
plaintiffs’ claim regarding the State's explicit fiduciary duty
to preserve the corpus of the public lands trust arose. As such,
it was not until that time that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit could
have been grounded upon such a basis. Consequently, the

plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have ‘wilfully caused [the

 

defendants] to erroneously believe a certain state of things,
Potter, 69 Hawai'i at 419, 974 P.2d at 59, upon which the
defendants relied to their detriment.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs were estopped fron
challenging the transfer of the Leiali‘i parcel based on their
pre-1993 actions and hold that the plaintiffs’ claims are not

barred by the principles of equitable and quasi estoppel. We now

 

turn to the plaintiffs’ arguments as they relate to the ceded

lands in general

 

‘The Ceded Lands in General
2. Sovereign Immunity
With regard to ceded lands in general, the trial court

concluded that:

-55-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Case lay has held that sovereign immunity does not bar
4 suit for injunctive relief to prohibit state officials
from acting in an illegal manners ((Citing in a footnote to
Bele Defense Fund, Gupra.)] The State of Hawai'i has nos
consented, ‘however, to be sued in a lawsuit contesting the
validity ot its title to the ceded lands. "it is the daw in
this jurisdiction that a proceeding againat property in
wien the State of Hawai'l hag an interest ie a suit against
the State and cannot be maintained without the consent of
the state, so that the State ‘and ite interest in land are
inmune fron suit." [(Citiag ina footnote to A
Ld. Kaneahira, 51 Mav. 87, 80, 451 P.26 809, 811
(G963) J) "If it ie made to appear at any stage of the case
that the state clains title, the court’s jurisdiction over
the merite of such claim thereby is ousted under the
Goctrine of sovereign immunity.” {(Citing ins footnote to
40 Haw. 92, 94, 295 rad 620, €22 (1964) ©))
claim for injunctive aad declaratory reliet would
have the effect of depriving the state of control over
Public lands under (HRS) ‘chapters 171 and 2018 ie the
“tunctionat equivalent of a quiet title action,” and ie

 

 

 

 

 

 

barred by sovereign imaunity, [(citing Ina footnore to
ashe o $21 U.S. 261 (1989) -))
Looking Beyond the pleadings to examine the effect” of the

 

suit and “its impact on these special sovereignty interes
{of the state)," sovereign immunity bare (pi laincifte’
clains to the extent they seck relief based on an allege
[sic] cloud on the State's titie to ceded lands. Where the
"requested injunctive relief would bar the State's principal,
officers from exercising their governmental powers ad
authority over the disputed lands and watera,* and “would
Giminish, even extinguish, che state's control over 2 vast
Feach of land and vaters long deened by the State to be an
integral part of its territory,” sovereign immunity applies.
(iciting ina footnote to Cousr d'Alene)

(Internal footnotes omitted.)

 

 

 

‘The plaintiffs take issue with the trial court’s
reliance on Couer d'Alene. Specifically, the plaintiffs
challenge the trial court's determination that their claims with
regard to the sale of ceded lands in general “were the functional
equivalent of a quiet title action’® and, therefore, barred by
sovereign immunity inasmuch as “*[iJt ie the law in this

jurisdiction that @ proceeding against property in which the

 

An action to quiet titie is defined as an action brought *by any
person against another person who claina, oF who may claim adversely to the
Plaintétf, an estate or interest in real property, for the purpose of
Getermining the adverse claim." Wks} 669 1a) (1995)

 

-56-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

State of Hawai'i has an interest in is a suit against the state
and cannot be maintained without the consent of the state(.]'*
on appeal, the OHA plaintiffs contend that they are not seeking
ownership of property from this court, but “only an order
prohibiting the transfer of [cleded (lands pending the
resolution of [nJative Hawaiian claims." (Emphasis in original.)
As such, the OHA plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s reliance
on Cousr d'Alene, discussed infra, was error. The OHA plaintiffs
submit that the trial court should have, instead, been guided by
Mille Lace Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.34 904
(eth cir. 1997), aff'd, 526 U.S, 172 (1999), discussed infra.

‘The individual plaintiffs similarly maintain that they "do not
seek an ownership determination or even a declaration that they
are entitled to the beneficial use and/or occupancy of the ceded
lands."

The defendants, however, contend that the trial court
correctly relied on Couer d'Alene because, as in this case, *'the
requested injunctive relief would bar the state's principal
officers from exercising their governmental powers and authority
over the disputed lands and waters,’ and ‘would diminish, even
extinguish the State's control over a vast reach of lands. . .
long dened by the State to be an integral part of its

territory.’* (Citing Couer d'Alene, 523 U.S, at 262).

o57-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

In Couer d’Alene, the sole issue before the Court was

whether the federally recognized Couer d'Alene Tribe’s (the
Tribe) suit against the State of Idaho, seeking “the beneficial
interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in the
beds and banks of all navigable watercourses and waters (the
‘subnerged lands’) within the original boundaries of the Coeur
@’Alene Reservation,” was barred by sovereign immunity. 521 U.S.
at 264-65. The Tribe styled its suit as a claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief, “alleging an ongoing violation of its
property rights in contravention of federal law and [seeking]
Prospective injunctive relief." Id. at 266, 281. The Court
recognized that “[aJn allegation of an ongoing violation of
federal law where the requested relief is prospective is
ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young (exception) . [*]
However, this case is unusual in that the Tribe's suit is the
functional equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates
special sovereignty interests.” Id, at 261. The Court, in its

principal decision, determined that the Tribe’s suit was the

as previously indicated, this court, in Pele Defenge Fund, adopted
the rule expresses in x Parte Young, which differentiated between prospective
and retrospective relief, 73 Haw. at 609, 637 P.24 at 1266.” Accordingly. it
Ss the law in this state that, “[ilf the relief aought against « state
official is prospective in nature, then the relief may be allowed regardless
fof the state's sovereign immunity: This ie true even though acconpasied by a
Substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.” id. (internal quotation
marke and citations omitted); gee discussion suDra

 

-58-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
a

functional equivalent of a quiet title action “in that
substantially all benefits of ownership and control [in the
submerged lands] would shift from [Idaho] to the Tribe." Id. at

282. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the submerged lands ‘have

 

historically been considered ‘sovereign lands[,’ and] State

ownership of then has been considered an essential attribute of
sovereignty.” Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The Court concluded:

re is apparent, then, that[,) if the Tribe were co prevail)
TaiddPerecelgn Interest in Ste lands and waters would be
Affeccea ina degree fully as intrusive as almost any
Scnceivaple retroactive levy upon funds in ite Treasury.
Sader these particular and special circunstances, we find
the ound exception inapplicable. The dignity and statue of
[e HEME, Sca°eilow idaho to rely on ite Bleventh Asendment
[munity aed te insist upon responding to these claims in
ite own courts, which are open to hear and determine the

 

 

Id, at 287-88.

In a concurring opinion, Justice 0’Connor seemingly
attempted to clarify the Court's decision by distinguishing Coeur
@Alene from Ex parte Young. She noted that

tthe Tribe does ot merely seek to possess land chat would
Stheruise remain subject to state regulation, or to bring
 S"Tegutatory schese into coupliance with federal

 

Yee. Rather, the Tribe seeks to eliminate altogether the
Binte's regulatory power over the submerged lands at
Senue _- to establieh not oaly that the state has no right

iSTposaces the property, but also that the property i# not
Sichin Idaho's sovereign jurisdiction at all

Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

As previously stated, the OHA plaintiffs suggest that
the trial court erred in applying the Couer d/Alene analysis and
should look instead to the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Mille

Lacs. In Mille Lace, the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians

-59-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

(the Band), amongst others, brought an action for injunctive and

declaratory relief, seeking to enforce ite alleged treaty rights
to hunt, fish, and gather on state and private lands free of
state regulation. 124 F.3d at 914, The Eighth Circuit held that
the Band’s claims were not barred by sovereign immunity,
reasoning, inter alia, that the Bands’ claims “{sought]
prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their
official capacities for continuing violations of the Bands’
federal treaty rights. As such, they fall squarely within the Ex
parte Young exception to the [sovereign immunity doctrine] .* Id.
‘The court further noted that its holding was supported by the
Coeur d'Alene Court's concurring opinion, which observed that
“{a] Young suit is available where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is
prospective rather than retrospective." Id, (quoting Couer
diAlene, 521 U.S. at 294 (0’Connor, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) .

In the present cai

 

the plaintiffs, unlike the Couer
aiAlene plaintiffs, do not seek a determination from this court
that would shift “the benefits of ownership and control [of the
ceded lands} from the state to [thenselves].”" Cover d’Alene, 521
U.S, at 282. Rather, they seek only to enjoin the defendants
from alienating ceded lands.

Based on Mille Lacs and Justice 0’Connor’s concurrence

in Couer d’Alene, a claim seeking injunctive relief with regard

-60-
**% FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

to property rights may be maintained, if it falls within the
Young exception, i.e., allowing only prospective injunctive
relief. Here, as the plaintiffs have repeatedly made clear, they
are not asking this court to return the ceded lands to the
possession of the plaintiffs; they seek only an injunction

barring the future alienation

 

by way of sale or transfer -- of
ceded lands until their unrelinguished claims to those lands are
resolved via the reconciliation process contemplated by the
Apology Resolution and related state legislation. As such, the
plaintiffs’ requested relief is clearly prospective in nature
and, therefore, not barred by sovereign immunity under the Young
exception.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that the
plaintiffs’ claims with regard to the sale or transfer of the
ceded lands in general are not barred by sovereign inmunity.
Accordingly, we also hold that the trial court incorrectly
determined that sovereign immunity barred the plaintifte’

claims.»

® zn addition to the arguments stated above, the individual

plaintitte, in theit opening brief, argue that the state waived sovereign
Enunicy usder the *Netive Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act" contained in
Has chapter 673° (Supp. 2006). However, in a previous motion filed with the
Mecuie court, the individual plaineités argued that "{eJhapter 673, Native
fawalian Trusts Judicial Relief Act, does not permit [native Hawaiians to sue
The gtace for return of ceded lande.* inasmuch ae the individual plaintifte
SGuit inva prior pleading thst HRS chapter 673 does not apply in thi
Situation and there ie no other mention of thie argunent in the proceedings
Before the erial court, the plaintiffs have waived this argunent.

 

 

         

 

 

~61-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

SSS
2. Ripenes:

The trial court, in ruling that the plaintiffe’ clains
with regard to the ceded lands in general were also barred by the
ripeness doctrine, stated:

With respect to ripeness,” Pele Defense fund makes clear
Phat beneficiaries Of the ceded lands trust have standing to
bring suit to enjoin disposition of ceded lands that would
constitute breaches of trust. io evidence wan presented.
however, of any proposed sales of codes lands other than at
Lealt't ‘{eicl. In fact the evidence suggests that the state
has been ‘following a self {-]inposed moratorium on the sal
Of additional ceded lands. ("| Proposed sales could

 

 

 

tn explaining the

 

t-imposed moratorium,” the trial court stated

‘The Adsinietrator for the Lande Division of the DLNR ((i.e.,
Michael Wilson)) wrote [a senorandual to {the} then Chait of
DLW, stating that ‘a moratorium’ on the sale of ceded lange
was in effect {] and that “the current moratorium ie Saeed of
fhe concern that the sale of ceded lands dininiches the
corpus of the public lands and thereby diminished the
potential return to OHA [[hereinafter, the Hilson
Menorandunl."

 

At trial, Gilbert Colona-Agaran, chair of the SLNR, testified regarding
the Wilson Memorandum a follows:

 

 

 

© By oma Plaineieee: 80, vere you
working for Michael Wilson at the time, deputy
Girector?

A: Tuy’ Coloma-agaran] : In april ‘95, yes.
Are you familiar with that menorasdin?

Ri Tivelseen ie.

@: And are you familiar with a moratorium that
(then-|pirector Wilson refers to?

A: Yee!

(continued...)

-62-
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION **
a

constitute breaches of trust, but... not abi sales of
Seded lande would violate the ceded lands trust

 

(Footnotes omitted.)

‘the OHA plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
determining that their claims were not ripe because “the court
need not resolve the breach of trust issue in order to grant
injunctive relief." Additionally, the OHA plaintiffs assert thet

the (trial) court's ruling places [the plaintiffs] on the
horns ofa dilemma, [The plaintiffs] it seems, filed both
fos early and too iate. [They] waited too long on the
Eelalii barcet and not long enough on the moratorium. | (the
Pleineiéfe) must wait until che state takes preliminary
Bigg to enjoin the sale of (cleded (1Jands, but because the
Sete took preliminary steps in the Leielivt transfer,
SGunctive seliet is Barres because it would ‘turn back the
egck and exanine actions already taken by the State.’

‘The defendants

 

 

 

jert that the trial court correctly
determined that the plaintiffs’ claine were barred by the
doctrine of ripeness because the plaintiffs “preemptive [2y]
challenge” the “sale of any and all [cleded [1lands." The
defendants reason that “any particular sale of [cleded [1] ands
could present @ conflict of interest or a breach of fiduciary
auty (for example, if the State proposed to sell for less than

fair market value to a state official for hie or her private

 

(continued)
eet Rnd could you -- could you tell us what that was
‘bout.
ks Teguess shortly after we got there Michael decided

Ende given the controversy over the sale of ceded
Tends chat we would try not co sell but that if ve
Aanted to nove Forward sone transaction, we would.
Sor if there were basically sales were (sic) already
SSbraves by the oard before we got there we couldn't.
TP properties was (eic] necessary because of some

s you now, we take it case by case.

 

 

 

-63-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

eee

benefit) [,]* but that “this (clourt should decline to speculate
as to such future events." Additionally, the defendants argue
that "the trial court rightly declined to enter relief based on
the assumption that the coordinate and co-equal executive and
legislative branches will engage in bad faith and wrongful
conduct in the future. This [court should also decline to do
We have stated that ‘ripeness is peculiarly a question
of timing, and a ruling that an issue is not ripe ordinarily
indicates the court has concluded a later decision may be more
apt or that the matter is not yet appropriate for adjudication.

Sounty of Kaua'i ex rel, Nakazawa v. Baptiste, 115 Hawai'i 15, 36,

165 P.3d 916, 937 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation

 

omitted). Moreover, “prudential rules of judicial
self-governance founded in concern about the proper -- and
Properly limited -- role of courts in a democratic society, fand]

considerations flowing from our coequal and coexistent system of
government, dictate that we accord those charged with drafting
and administering our laws a reasonable opportunity to craft and

enforce them in a manner that produc

 

a lawful resule.* gave
Sunget_Beach Coa: City & County of Honolulu, 102 Hawai'i 465,
483, 78 P31, 19 (2003) (internal quotation marks, original
brackets, and citation omitted). The federal courts have applied
the following test, which we believe is instructive, in

determining whether a particular case is ripe:

-66-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

 

because ripeness is peculfarly a question of timing, the
Court must look at the facts as they exist today in’
Gvaluating whether the controversy before us is sufficiently
Concrete to warrant our intervention. The ripeness inguiry
EGtvtko pronger the fitness of the issues for judicial
Secision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
SE oasideracion. The fitness element requires that the
SSoue be prisarily legal, need no further factual
Gevelopment, and involve a final agency action. To meet the
Sirasnip requirement, a party must show that withholding
judicial review would result in direct and imediate
AudéSnip and would entail more than possible financial loss

 

 

 

Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp. 1529, 1538 (D. Haw. 1996)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd on other
grounds, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).

With respect to the first prong of the federal test,

 

the plaintiffs mst show that the issue regarding their
entitlement to injunctive relief is fit for judicial decision
because the issue is “primarily legal, need{s] no further factual
development and involve(s] a final agency action." Id, (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as the plaintiffs
argue, the issue is fit for judicial resolution inasmuch as they
are not seeking a determination whether the native Hawaiian
people are entitled to ownership of the ceded lands; what they
are seeking is a determination whether an injunction is
appropriate to allow for a resolution of their claims to the
ceded lands without further diminishment of the trust res. There
is no doubt that the issuance of an injunction involves a legal
question. See, €.g., ERCP Rule 65 (2007) (governing the issuance
of injunctive relief); Wahba, LIC v. USRP (Don), LLC, 106 Hawai'i
466, 106 P.34 1209 (2005) (describing injunctions ané temporary

restraining orders), Moreover, the record demonstrates that

-65-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
eS

there is no need for further factual development inasmuch as the
facts necessary to decide ripeness are currently before this
court. With regard to the Leiali'i parcel, a final agency action
(i.e, the transfer of the parcel from DLNR to HFDC) has been
taken, and, although “final agency action” with regard to the
ceded lands in general has yet to be taken, the very nature of
the plaintiffs’ requested relief -- that an injunction issue to
protect the corpus of the public land trust until the
reconciliation efforts contemplated by the Apology Resolution and
related state legislation has been completed -- dictates that a
judicial decision regarding the issuance of such an injunction is

appropriate. We, therefore, believe that the fitness element hi

 

been met.
With respect to the second prong of the federal test,
isc., the hardship requirement, the plaintiffe must show *that

withholding judicial review would reault in direct and inmediat

 

hardship and would entail more than possible financial 10

 

Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1538 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Here, inasmuch ae the Leiali‘{ parcel was transferred
to the HFDC for purposes of developing a residential housing
project, and, although the defendants have voluntarily
@iscontinued development, there exists a real threat that, should
the HFDC proceed with the housing development project, the parcel
could be transferred by the HFDC to third parties. Moreover, as

indicated by the trial court, "the State has been following a
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

self {-Jimposed moratorium on the sales of additional cede

 

lands." Thus, by the same token, should the State decide to lift
its own moratorium, there is a potential for the sale or transfer
of additional ceded lands. Once the ceded lands are alienated
from the public lands trust, they will be lost forever and will
not be potentially available to satisfy the unrelinguished claims
of native Hawaiians to the lands, as recognized and contemplated
by the Apology Resolution and the related state legislation,
discussed supra. Were this court to withhold consideration of
the plaintiffe’ request for injunctive relief, the State would be
free to alienate the ceded lands from the public lands trust.
And, in so doing, the resulting hardship to the plaintiffs would

be obvious

 

the alienated lands would be lost forever -- and,

as discul

 

4 more fully infra, the loss of the land itself
entails a mich greater injury "than possible financial loss."
Were we to determine that the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive

relief wi

 

not ripe, they may be left without a remedy while the
corpus of the public lands trust continues to diminish, a result
surely not contemplated by the Apology Resolution and our own
state legislative pronouncements in Acts 354 and 359.

Moreover, were this court to grant the plaintiffs’

requested injunctive relief, it would not be over:

 

epping
sprudential rules of judicial self-governance," Save Sunset Beach
coal., 102 Hawai'i at 483, 78 P.3d at 19 (original brackets

omitted), because, as previously indicated, such a decision would

-67-
*** FORPUBLICATION ***

OS

not involve a determination whether the native Hawaiian people
are entitled to ownership of the ceded lands; we need only
address whether an injunction is appropriate to allow resolution
of these claims without further diminishment of the trust res.
As such, any injunctive relief granted by this court would allow
Congress and/or the state legislature a “reasonable opportunity
to craft and enforce,” id., relevant laws consistent with the
congressional and legislative calle for reconciliation and
settlement of native Hawaiian clains.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that the
Plaintiffs’ claims -- to the extent they seek injunctive
relief -- are ripe for adjudication and, accordingly, hold that
the trial court erred in determining otherwise. Because the
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims do not necessitate a distinction
between the Leiali'i parcel and the ceded lands in general, the
Following discussion encompasses both the Leiali‘i parcel and the
ceded lands in general.

Rolitical Question

“The political question doctrine, often considered the
most amorphous aspect of justiciability, holds generally that
certain matters are political in nature and thus inappropriate
for judicial review." Nishitani v. Baker, 62 Hawai‘ 281, 250,
921 P.24 1162, 1291 (App. 1996) (citation omitted). In deciding
whether the political question doctrine should be invoked, this

court, in the offs. Hawaiian Affairs ak

-68-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

ee

69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446 (1987), adopted the test recited by the
United States Supreme Court in Baker v, Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(2962):

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found(: (2)] a textually denocstrable
Ronatiestionel commitment of the iesue toa coordinate
political department; {(2)] a lack of judicially
Rfecoverable and manageable standards for resolving ity
{(S)) the iepocsibiiity of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
Sfecreeions [lal] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
{neependent regolution without expressing lack of respect
due foordinate branches of goverment; ((5)] an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence co 2 political decision already
tude; or [{6)] the potentiality of enbarrasement from
Guiciferious pronouncements By various departments on one
question

 

 

   

Yamasaki, 69 Haw. at 170, 737 P.2d at 455 (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 217) (format altered). The presence of any one of these

ix factors renders a ca

 

nonjusticiable. Id, Moreover, the
political question doctrine is "essentially a function of the
separation of powers." Id. (citation omitted).

‘The trial court concluded that all the plaintiffs’
clains were barred by the doctrine of political question.
specifically, the trial court ruled that this court has held that
“the issue of whether the Territory of Hawai'i received good
title to the ceded lands ie a non-justiciable political
question,” and, as such, it was precluded from “consider [ing] the
nerits of [p]laintiffe’ claim that the sale of ceded lands is
prohibited due to a cloud on the States’s title due to the

illegality of the overthrow."

= xs previously indicated, the trial court, nevertheless, weat on to
determine that the State had the legal authority to sell ceded lands.

 

-69-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

In challenging the trial court's ruling, the OHA

plaintiffs assert that their claims do not present a non-
justiciable political question because, in their view, they are
“not seeking a judicial resolution of the underlying claim for a
return of lands,” but, instead, are asking only that this court
“protect the trust assets while the diepute is being resolved by
the political branches." In other words, the plaintiffs
specifically assert that they are not “ask{ing] thie [cJourt to
resolve any claim [to the ceded lands}, but only to protect the
trust assets that are in dispute by issuing an injunction barring
the sale or transfer of the [ceded] lands. [The plaintiffe] are
seeking only to have this [clourt protect the [eJeded [1]ands
from dissipation until the political branches can reach a just
solution to this dispute.” In fact, the OHA plaintiffs admit

that “the ultimate resolution of the [nlative Hawaiian clains

 

must be through the political processes, and it is actively

engaged in these proce:

 

But this struggle for justice will
te e. au

longer exist when a solution is found." Additionally, the

individual plaintiffs point out that their claims are not barred

by the political question doctrine because the standards that

apply to trusts provide this court with “judicially discoverable

and manageable standards for resolving this issue.”

-10-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
‘The defendants maintain that the trial court correctly
determined that the plaintiffs’ clains presented non-justiciable
political questions inasmich as, *(flor nearly 100 years{,] the
Hawai'i Suprese Court has foreclosed judicial inquiry into the
State’s title to the [ceded [1]ands because the issue presents a
political question, inappropriate for decision by the judicial
branch.’ Moreover, the defendants argue that there are four

specific re

 

lone why the plaintiffs’ claims present a non-
justiciable political question: (1) “the case involves
examination of questions for which there is a ‘textually
denonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a

coordinate political department’*; (2) “there is a ‘lack of

 

judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving’

this case"; (3) “the ca

 

ip impossible to decide ‘without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial

discretion’

 

and (4) “[thie clourt cannot undertake an
‘independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government .‘*

The primary question before this court on appeal is
whether, in Light of the Apology Resolution, this court should
sue an injunction to require the State, as trustee, to preserve
the corpus of the ceded lands in the public lands trust unti2
such time as the clains of the native Hawaiian people to the
ceded lands are resolved. ‘The important distinction here is that

this court is pot being asked to decide whether native Hawaiians

one
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
SSS

are entitled to the ceded lands. As even the plaintiffs

recognize, the “ultimate resolution of the [nlative Hawaiian

 

claima must be through the political process." We believe, as
discussed supra, that the Apology Resolution -- which is at the
heart of the plaintiffs’ claim -- and the related state

legislation, give rise to the State’s fiduciary duty to preserve

the corpus of the public lands trust, specifically, the ceded

 

lands, until such time as the unrelinguished claims of the native
Hawaiians have been resolved. Accordingly, we hold that the
Apology Resolution and the related state legislation provide the
standards needed for determining whether the issuance on an
Andunction is proper. In other words

court -- whether an injunction should issue

the question before this

 

 

presente a type of
Givpute that ie traditionally resolved in the judiciary and,
therefore, does not present a non-justiciable political question.

Moreover, we believe that the defendants’ argunente
with regard to four of the six Baker factors, previously
enunerated, are without merit. First, this case does not involve
van examination of questions for which there is a ‘textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department’ inasmich as the plaintiffs only
Fequest an injunction pending the resolution of the plaintiffs’
underlying claims in the legislative process, and this court need
ot encroach on any issues that have been constitutionally

committed to a coordinate political department in order to

o12-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
determine if injunctive relief is appropriate. Second, there
are, ao discussed infra, judicially manageable standards for
issuing an injunction. Third, this court need not make "tan
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion’* in order to determine whether the plaintiffs’
requested injunction is appropriate inasmuch as this court need
only look to the Apology Resolution and, additionally, the
related state legislation, as discussed supra. Lastly, were this
court to grant the plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief, this
court would not be “undertak [ing] an ‘independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government’* because, as previously indicated, the question
whether an injunction is warranted in this case is the kind of
question traditionally reserved for the courts.

Therefore, we agree with the plaintiffs that "the
[trial clourt’s analysis and citations miss(ed] the mark because
[ene plaintiffs are] not seeking a judicial resolution of the
underlying claim for a return of lands, but [are] rather asking
the judiciary to protect the trust assets while the dispute is
being resolved by the political branches. This modest goal is
well within the domain of the judiciary(.1* Accordingly, we hold

the trial court incorrectly determined that the claims pr

 

ented
by the plaintiffs in thie cage -- to the extent they seek
injunctive relief -- were barred by the political question

doctrine.

“73
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
ee

Fr Pu fe" Reque: niunction

As previously stated, the trial court -- although not
required -- concluded that the defendants had the explicit
authority under the Admissions Act and the Hawai"i state
Constitution to alienate the ceded lands. Having so concluded,
the trial court summarily denied the plaintiffa’ claim for
Anjunctive relief, reasoning only that,

for injunctive relief to issue on (the pllaintifte’ claim
seeking @ permanent injunction based on the allegation chat
sales of ceded lands constitute a breach of trust, (ene
Pllaintitts mst first prevail on the merits of the
underlying cause of action. The [trial] court only reaches
the issue of “balance of irreparable harm” and "public
interest in support” if the plaintiffs prevail on the
merits.

 

 

‘The plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in
denying their request for injunctive relief because it was not
necessary to first ‘resolve whether the State received ‘good
title’ to grant injunctive relief in this case." As previously
Giscussed, the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is
grounded in their view that the “recognition in [the Apology
Resolution and Acts 354 and 359] of the illegality of the
transfer of [the ceded] lands and the ongoing reconciliation and
negotiation process dramatically reinforces the State's fiduciary
obligation to protect the corpus of the [plublic (1]and [t}rust
until an appropriate settlement is reached.” Additionally, the
plaintiffs maintain that injunctive relief is critical to their
ability to “protect the status quo before these [cleded lands are
lost and the [native Hawaiian people suffer irreparable harm."
The OHA plaintiffs cite to a number of international situations

1
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

oe

chat they claim *illustrate(] that a moratorium on governmental
action is appropriate to protect the rights of the natives while
efforts to reach a proper settlement are underway." The
individual plaintiffs suggest that this court should look to
general trust law for guidance in determining whether to issue an
injunction and that trust law mandates that an injunction be
issued inasmuch as any sale or transfer of the illegally obtained
ceded lands by the State would constitute a breach of its
fiduciary duties to preserve the assets of the public lands trust
until a settlement is reached

The defendants maintain that the trial court correctly
denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because the
plaintiffs have not shown they can prevail on the merits.
specifically, the defendants argue that “the State has the
undoubted and explicit power to sell [cleded [1]ands pursuant to
the terms of the Admission Act and pursuant to [s]tate law. (7)
[The pliaintifts have completely failed to show any basis for
deviating from the terns of the trust or for finding that

applicable [2] tate laws are unconstitutional or void." The

 

= Rithough ve recognize that international law and situations cited by
the plaintiffs provide support for their requested injunction, we do not
Belitve it is necessary to engage ina discussion of these issues inasmuch at
Sur holding is grounded in Hawai and federal law.

2 the defendants assert that there are five “reasons or bases" for the
state's ‘unchallenged power to sell” the ceded lands: (1) ‘enabling acts
generally and historically have affordea the power to sell to new states";

Sy" the Adaiseion Act specifically grants the power to sell"; (3) ‘the Hawad't
Constitution contirns the power to sell"; (4) "state statutes embody the power
fovseliv; and (5) “the Hawai’ Supreme Court has previously held that the
State has power to sell."

 

 

 

 

 

-15-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

SS
defendants also argue that “the plaintiffs in our case

specifically disclaim title to the (ceded [1Jands. There simply
are no ‘merits’ on which plaintiffs did or could prevail." The
defendants further assert that “the unprecedented nature of the
plaintiffs’ request is highlighted by their use of the term
‘moratorium.’ It is not even clear whether this term is supposed
to mean something different from ‘injunction,’ and if s0, what.”
‘The test for granting or denying temporary injunctive
relief is three-fold: (1) whether the plaintiff is likely to
Prevail on the merits; (2) whether the balance of irreparable
Gamage favors the issuance of a temporary injunction; and
(3) whether the public interest supports granting an injunction.
Life of the Land v. Arivoshi, 59 Haw. 156, 158, 577 P.2d 1116,
11 (1978); see also Morgan v, Planning Dept’, County of Kauai,
104 Hawai'i 173, 86 P.3d 982 (2004). However, as observed by the
Intermediate Court of Appeals in Penny. Transportation Lease
Hawaii, Ltd., 2 Haw. App. 272, 630 P.2d 646 (1981), “[t]he more

the balance of irreparable danage favors 41

 

uance of the

injunction, the less the party

 

king the injunction hae to show

the likelihood of his success on the merits." id. at 276, 630

 

P.2d at 650 (citations omitted). As pointed out by the parties
and the trial court, *Inlo reported Hawai'i case discusses the
requizemente for entry of a permanent injunction.* However, we
agree with the trial court that ‘it is generally held that ‘ [t]he

standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as

-76-
 

** FOR PUBLICATION ***

oo
for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff

must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than

 

actual success.’* Accordingly, we believe that the appropriate
test in this jurisdiction for determining whether a permanent
injunction is proper is: (1) whether the plaintiff has prevailed
on the merits; (2) whether the balance of irreparable danage
favors the issuance of a permanent injunction; and (3) whether
the public interest supports granting such an injunction.

‘Thus, where a permanent injunction is sought from an
appellate court, the first elenent of the test is necessarily

concerned with whether the plaintiffs have prevailed on the

 

merits of the appé See indian Motorcycle Ass’n, 66 F.3d at
1249. Having held that the Apology Resolution and related state
Legislation give rise to the State’s fiduciary duty to preserve
the corpus of the public lands trust, specifically, the ceded

lands, until such time

 

the unrelinguished clains of the native

 

» see, e.g., Indian Motorevele Ass'n IZ Ltd. p’ship v, Massachusetts

Mowning Bins asensy, €6 F.3d 1266, 1249 (let Cir. 1995):

Four principal factore govern the appropriateness of
Permanene injunctive relief: (1) whether the plaintitt has
Brevaiied on the merits; (2) whether the plaintif£ will
Bitter irreparable injury absent injunctive relief;

(3) whether the harm to the plaintiff outweighs any harm
threatened by the injunction; and (4) whether the public
[dterest will be adversely affected by the injunction.

 

 

 

 

(internal quotations marke and citation omitted.)

-17-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
$$

Hawaiians have been resolved, we believe the plaintiffs, as a
matter of law, have succeeded on the merits of their claim
inasmich as any future transfer of ceded lands by the state would
be a breach of the State’s fiduciary duty to preserve the trust
res.

Specifically, the language of the Apology Resolution
itself supports the issuance of an injunction. As previously
discussed, we believe, based on a plain reading of the Apology
Resolution, that Congress has clearly recognized that the native
Hawaiian people have unrelinguished clains over the ceded lands,
which were taken without consent or compensation and which the
native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop, and

transmit to future generations. Equally cl

 

r is Congres

 

vexpress{ed) . . . commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of
the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a
proper foundation for reconciliation between the United states
and the [nJative Hawaiian people.” Apology Resolution, Pub. L.
No, 103-150, 107 stat. 1520 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the

Apology Resolution dictates that the ceded lands should be

 

Preserved pending a reconciliation between the United states and
the native Hawaiian people. Without an injunction, the ceded
lands are at risk of being alienated and, as previously stated,
once the ceded lands are sold or transferred from the public

lands trust, they will not be available to satisfy the

unrelinguised claims of native Hawaiians and will, as discussed

-78
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
more fully infra, undoubtedly have a negative impact on the
contemplated reconciliation efforts.

the plaintiffs’ argument that an injunction is

 

lary to preserve the status quo pending the resolution of
the native Hawaiians’ clains to the ceded lands is further
supported by the Justice and Interior Departments’ report,
entitled *Prom Mauka to Makai: The River of Justice Must Flow
Freely." As previously stated, the report states: “As [al
matter of justice and equity, this report recommends that
[nJative Hawaiian people should have self-determination over
their own affaire within the franework of [flederal law, as do
Native Auerican tribes.’ (Format altered.) (Emphases added.)
Moreover, the Departments asserted that, “[t]o safeguard and
enhance {nJative Hawaiian self-determination over their lands,
cultural resources, and internal affairs, the Departments believe
congress should enact further legislation to clarify [nJative
Hawaiians’ political status and to create a framework for
recognizing a governnent-to-government relationship with a
representative [native Hawaiian governing body.”

More importantly, the state legislature itself hi

 

announced that future reconciliation between the State and native
Hawaiians will occur. The Hawai'i legislature, in Acts 359 and
329, discuesed supra, recognized that “the indigenous people of
Hawai'i were denied . . . their lands,” 1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act

359, § 1(9) at 1020 (creating a Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory

-19-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

ee

Commission), and contemplated further action by the legislature
to reach a “lasting reconciliation so desired by all people of
Mawai'i.* 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act 329, § 1 at 956. Although Act

359, which created the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory Commission,

 

not specifically address the issue of native Hawaiians’ title
to ceded lands, the stated purpose of the Act was to “facilitate
the efforts of native Hawaiians to be governed by an indigenous
sovereign nation of their own choosing." 1993 Haw. Seas. L. act
359, § 2 at 1010, As previously stated, Act 354 recognized that
“ImJany native Hawaiians believe that the lands taken without
their consent should be returned and if not, monetary reparatione
made, and that they should have the right to sovereignty, or the
Hight to self-determination and self-governnent as do other

native American peoples." 1993 Haw. Se:

 

L. Act 354, § 1 at
1000. Moreover, the legislature "acknowledged that the actions
by the United States were illegal and immoral, and pledge[d) ite
continued support to the native Hawaiian community by taking
steps to promote the restoration of the rights and dignity of
native Hawaiians." Id. Additionally, in act 329, the

moving “toward a comprehensive,
iust.and lasting resolution" regarding native Hawaiian claims to

the ceded lands. 1997 Haw. Sess. Law. Act 329, § 1 at 956

legislature indicated that it w.

 

(emph

 

is added) .

-80-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

‘The governor, herself, has indicated her commitment -
and, by association, that of the executive branch -- to settling
the native Hawaiians’ clains to the ceded lands. On January 21,
2003, in her “State of the State Address," Governor Lingle
stated, “Here at hone in Hawai‘i[,] I will continue to work with

you [ise., the menbers of the legislature] and with the Hawaiian

 

community to resolve the ceded lands issue once and for all
Linda Lingle, Governor, State of Hawai'i, State of the State
Address: An Outline of the Governor’s Agenda (Jan. 21, 2003).
Riso, as previously noted, testimony was adduced at
trial that the state has been following a self-inposed moratorium
since 1994 on the sales of ceded lands until a resolution of the

present lawsuit. Such a

 

1f-imposed moratorium leads to an
inference that questions regarding the title to the ceded lands
exist and, additionally, that the State is apparently able to

comply with ite duties

 

public lands trustee without having to

alienate the ceded Lands

 

In sum, all of the aforementioned pronouncements

indicate that the issue of native Hawaiian title to the cede

 

 

lands will be addressed through the political process. In this

case, Congress, the Hawai" state legislature, the parties, and

 

the trial court all recognize (1) the cultural importance of the
land to native Hawaiians, (2) that the ceded lands were illegally
taken from the native Hawaiian monarchy, (3) that future

reconciliation between the etate and the native Hawaiian people

e1-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
eee

is contemplated, and, (4) once any ceded lands are alienated from
the public lands trust, they will be gone forever. For present
purposes, this court need not speculate as to what a future
settlement might entail -- i.e., whether such settlement would
involve monetary payment, transfer of lands, ceded or otherwise,
@ combination of money and land, or the creation of a sovereign
Hawaiian nation; it is enough that Congress, the legislature, and
the governor have all expressed their desire to reach such a
settlement. In other words, the aforementioned pronouncements as
they relate and impact the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive
relief clearly support the plaintiffs’ position that the state
has a fiduciary duty as trustee to protect the ceded lands
ending a resolution of native Hawaiian claims. As such, we
believe that the plaintiffs have met the first prong of the
three-part test for issuance of a permanent injunction, i.e.,
Prevailing on the merits of their claim.

‘The second prong of the test for an injunction is
whether “the balance of irreparable damage favor[s] the issuance
of a temporary injunction. Life of the Land, 59 Haw. at 158,
577 P.ad at 1118. Obviously, without an injunction, any ceded
lands alienated from the public lands trust will be lost and will
not be available for the future reconciliation efforts
contemplated by the Apology Resolution, Acts 354, 358, and 329,
and Governor Lingle. Although an argument could be made that

monetary reparations would be the logical remedy for such loss,

-02-
#** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
we are keenly aware -- as was Congress -- that “the health and
well-being of the [nJative Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied
to their deep feelings and attachment to the land[.1* Apology
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (emphasis added) .
Indeed, as more eloquently stated by the trial court:

‘The [native Hawaiian [pleople continue to be 2 unigue and

Ziseinee people with their ovn language, social system,

Gneestral’ and national lands, customs, practices

{hetitutions, ‘The health and well-being of the (native

Mjawallan people ie intrinsically tied eo their deep
‘ond attachsent to the land.” ((Citing in =

to the Apology Resolution.j) 3 .

   

 

 

pudticiene hele at r -
wie f sti
Hawaiian cosmology, and {a ixreplaceable. The satural
Uiitencs < land, air, vater, ocean ~~ are interconnected
find interdependent.
ssatyy Se ee ee om

vaina if part of their
epriiud they care for it aa they do for other members of
their families 1

 

Euvizonnent ip alive ea sd,
‘ven moraines.
(Footnotes omitted.) (Emphases added.)

Moreover, testimony adduced at trial further supports
and underscores the importance of the land to native Hawaiians
and to their continued “cultural identity . . . spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social
institutions," Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107
stat. 1510, ae well as the historical and cultural reasons
therefor. For example, David H. Getches, a professor at the
univereity of Colorado School of Law, was called to testify as
the plaintiffs’ expert. Getches testified that he was a menber
of the editorial board for the 1982 edition of the Felix Coven’s
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, considered “one of the leading

-03-
*** FOR PUBLICATIO!

ee

treatises on Indian law,* and authored the chapter on native

 

Hawaiians, He was qualified as an expert in the field of
“natural resources law," without objection. with regard to the
ceded lands, Getches testified:

Q. (By plaintiffs’ counsel] You have said that
Preventing ceded lands from being transferred would keep the
glains situation from becoming more complicated, preserve
Flexibility, and be consistent with the incent of cone

and the state legislature. Based on your knowledge of the
history of native Hawaiian claime[,] weat ss 20 special
about these lands?

A. (By Getches) 1 think that what ie special about

7 mx. This Te haghly umveual to be able fo
trace thie mich land otiil in public Gwership back to tre
time of dispossession, the very root of these Claire

Secondly, this ie land waich my understanding ie ha
been traditionally used in sone places by native people for
traditional purpose:

‘thir, fa ” mn s 1
on ie one rr
So there is certainly sonething special above tines tesa
when if cones to their use and disposition in the future,

Purther, T think that it ie notable that the objection
Eo the use of these lands is coming now by the only lessliy,
constituted voice for the present aay successors to the
people who were dispossessed, Thi Je as
Hhis cage. "And I think those reasons all support she
Conclusion that there ia something special about ‘the
snae’

 

 

 

 

© “can'a political entity have governance without
having any territory?

* u ave relanty with
land. ‘There afe sone exceptional examples. Terseiiees
before there was an Terael had a notion of governance, It
is very difficult for'a government to operate without
territorial boundaries.

O Is governance important? re land important to
native people for cultural survival as well?

‘a Yea. Ae I indicated, there are traditional uses of
land, and in'particular the land you were asking me aboce,
that'make it especially important. Land generally for
hnative people -- I am now speaking based on my kaowicdge of
Indian tribes throughout the United States and the on

   

 

 

have worked with =~ dai jeneraLiy ext) i as
2) ieterninati ‘Spteasion,

2 of a: 2 a)
people have said Tt 0 me. at weil, Eo
ne al roots, going back to the ancestors that cam

be felt and who vere known and the ancestors who were
unknown and exist only in the epiritual world, raat
connects present day communities with one another, within

84.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

oo

(Bmphases

those cultural roots. So the Jand is sysbolic for that,
SRStE SS HEIs tor burial places or Just the feeling that
this Je the place of inportance

 

Finally, a ual fulfilinent
someening we 68 not ae Oe love cert ene tna-apiritual way. I love certain

HMREEARES CT Go and sone that rown. But it is really,
pitegiaisferent. having the Land, water, nature connection
That native people have. I don’t Like seneralizations about
sath veGroupe. "And what {4-conmon among thes. hie is the
« ety 2

 

 

with tend eh or

added.)

olive Kanahele was called as a witness by the

plaintiffs. She holde a bachelor of arts degree in Hawaiian

Studies and is a "kumi hula” or dance teacher. In addition to

teaching dance, ise., the hula, Kanahele described learning about

ancient Hawaiian chants and testified specifically regarding

chants that tell the story of Pele and Hiiaka, deities of the

Life cycle. According to Kanahele,

pele cones and she erupts and her lava goes all over the
Jelge Gna also extende land. And Hilaka comes along and her
function as the eg3 chile {eto allow things to grow
saree and. and'co he’s the healer of the family and she
PEaio ene ands and things begin to grow. And as the things
Begin co grow, then it becomes suitable for. . - humans

vei? te live'on.

linen asked about “the land," Kanahele testified:

‘the land itself... {9 the deity, Pele, The land it
TEE fade from fire and it comes fron out of the earth.
oa Know, Toean give you a little geneaology (sic) of the
yee fominy. “tne pele family comes from -~ the mythological
Reneaclogy: (eicl of the Pele fanily is that the nother is
EERE TORL. {eStne other Earth, she is the earch and all of
tiiue Ghilires are born fron different parts of her.

 

 

 

 

Pele i born from the natural channel of @
fenale, the conse from the wonb. And eo... Ber
feeaSssbiticy 12 co go back into the wonb of the nother and

Eon bring cut ail of these things that ve call land, that
we UU Peagha ane lava and eventuaily will becose Land.

‘One af the -- one of the ost amazing Literary work
that ve have ie the kumlipo. .. . The kemulipo spane
Seterations of people... And the first era of the

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

eee

sumulipo, the very first Line of the kumlipe talks about
the making of the earth
© 1 find why does it have to be earth, you ask me?

it has to be earch because as man we need -—- we need
land to live on. That le =~ that is our foundation” kat
ze a ae their

foundation. and ie their identity.

(Bmphases added.) Based on the foregoing, we believe the second

 

Prong of the test for an injunction, i.e., irreparable danage,
has been met. Life of the Land, 59 Haw. at 158, 577 P.2d at
aus.

‘The last prong of the test for an injunction is whether
“the public interest supports granting an injunction." Id.
Here, we need look no further than the legislative pronouncement
contained in Act 329, declaring that a “lasting reconciliation

(is] desired by all people of Hawai'i,” 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act.

 

329 § 1 at 956, to conclude that the public interest supports
granting an injunction.

We firmly believe that, given the “crucial inportance
lof the ‘aina or land to] the (native Hawaiian people and their
culture, their religion, their economic set-sufficiency, and

their

 

je of personal and community well-being,* any further
diminishnent of the ceded lands (the ‘aina) from the public lands

trust will negatively impact the contemplated

 

conciliation/settlenent efforts between native Hawaiians and

the state,

-86-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
Ie is well-settled that 2 “[e]ettlement is an agreenent
to terminate, by means of mutual concessions, a claim that is
disputed in good faith . . . and is designed to prevent or put at
end to Litigation.” a ve ker, 102
Hawai'i 237, 251, 65 P.3d 1028, 1043 (2003) (internal quotation
marks, original brackets, citation, and footnote omitted). The
continued diminishment of the public lands trust means that any
land sold or transferred to third parties will be lost and, thus,
unavailable for settlement purposes. As such, native Hawaiians
would be placed in an unfair and disadvantaged position inasmuch
as they may, ultimately, be forced to accept less-than-desirable
settlement terms and make concessions that they would not have
otherwise made had certain ceded lands, for example, been kept in
the public lands trust. Moreover, the State, acting as both the
trustee of the land (with the power to alienate it) and a major
participant in the negotiation process, would be in a more
advantageous position and have greater bargaining power. In our

view, enjoining the defendants from selling or otherwii

 

transferring to third parties any ceded lands from the public
land trust until the claims of the native Hawaiians to those

lands ave resolved and, thus, preserving the status quo and the
trust res, would help in leveling the playing field during the

pendency of settlement negotiations and reconciliation process

-87-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
SS

contemplated by the Apology Resolution and related state
legislation discussed supra. Cf. Hosp, Klean of Tex., Inc, v.
United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 618 (2005) (finding lost opportunity
to compete for contract on level playing field sufficient to
constitute irreparable harm for purpose of issuing temporary
restraining order); Regal-Beloit Corp. v, Drecoll, 955 F. supp.
849, 867 (N.D. I11. 1996) (injunction iesued to level the playing
field of the parties).

Finally, as indicated by the plaintiffs, their request
for an injunction is further supported by the United states
Supreme Court’s decision in Lane v, Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249
U.S. 110 (1919). In Lane, the plaintif£, ‘an Indian town,”
brought a claim seeking to enjoin certain governmental officials
from “offering, listing, or disposing of certain lands in

southern Arizona as public lands of the United stati

 

" 249 uL8.
at 111, The plaintiffs alleged two grounds for their suit:
(2) “that under the laws of Spain and Mexico it had, when that

region w

 

acquired by the United States, and under the
Provisions of the treaty it now hae, a complete and perfect title
to the lands in question"; and (2) “that in disregard of ite
title the defendants are threatening and proceeding to offer,
List and dispose of these lands as public lands of the United
States.” Id. The court “of first instance" granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. On appeal, the Court of
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
a
Appeals of the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff's
claims entitled it to relief and granted its requested permanent
injunction. Id, The defendants challenged the Court of Appeals
decision. Although, ultimately determining that the Court of
Appeals should not have granted the permanent injunction because
that proceeding did not afford the defendants the opportunity te
answer the merits, the Court observed:

‘the defendants assert with mich earnestness that the Indians
Techie pucbio are wards of the United States -- recognized
So such by the legislative and executive departnent
that, in consequence the di spo
Adthu"ehels owe contol, bue subject to such regulations
“Sggrees my prescribe for their benefit and protection.
Seeiming. without eo deciding, that ehis La ali true, we
Shinn ie nae ne reel bearing on the point we are
Sonsidering, ‘certainly(,] it would not justify che
Seleadante in treating the lands of these Indians -- to
Gnich, according to the Dill, they have a complete and
Dereece title, as public lands of the United States and
Bftponing of the ame under the public land laws. That
wid not be an exer:

zt the indians are not bere
sataplieh any over oF SanAGL sn dioonat or
Sasiniatrative officers in disregard of their full
SDN DOr their capacity to maintain such a suit we
Gneereain no doubt. The existing wardship Ss not an
Sbetacie, as ie shown by repeated decisions of this court(.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

bane, 249 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The
Court held that

the decrees of both courts below should be reversed and the
Care remanded £0 the court of firet instance, with direction
eegyekEule’ ene motion to ditmiss, to afford the defendants

So Sppertunity to answer the bill, (and) to arant an order
Seacreining then from in any wise offerin

i 2 ‘he final

 

‘Secreel! 7
Id. at 114 (emphasis added) .

-89-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

«Sao

As the defendants in this case point out, the facts in
the instant case differ from those in Lang inasmuch the
plaintiffs do not assert that they have “complete and perfect
fitter and do not “seek judicial resolution of any controversy,”
#8 well as the fact that “Lane considered only the executive
branch’s power to deal with Indian land.” Nevertheless, Lane is
instructive to the extent that it demonstrates the Court's
rationale for ordering that injunctive relief be granted pending
final resolution of claims. The fact that Lane involved a
Judicial resolution for a controversy versus a legislative
resolution as in the instant case is, in our view, a distinction
without a difference

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the
plaintiffs have established that injunctive relief is proper
Pending final resolution of native Hawaiian claime through the
political process, Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
erred in denying the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief,
G. The Plaintiffs’ Remaining contentions

Tn light of the above discussion, we need not address
fhe OHA plaintiffa’ remaining contentions regarding declaratory
relief or certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court.

IV. concuuszon

Based on the foregoing, we hold that: (1) the Apology

Resolution and related state legislation, give rise to the

State's fiduciary duty to preserve the corpus of the public lands

-90-
#** FOR PUBLICATION ***

ee

trust, specifically, the ceded lands, until such time as the
unrelinguished claims of the native Hawaiians have been resolved;

(2) the trial court correctly determined that this court's

unpublished decision in Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian
Affaire v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, No. 19774 (Haw.

Mar. 12, 1998) (mem.), did not collaterally estop the plaintiffs’
claims in this case inasmuch as the elements of collateral
estoppel, see Keahole Def. Coal., Inc, v. Bd, of Land & Natural
Ress, 110 Hawai'i 419, 429, 134 P.3d 585, 595 (2006), are not

pre

 

wnt; (3) the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief with
regard to the Leiali‘i parcel is not barred by sovereign inmunity
based on our conclusion that the $31 million expenditure on
infrastructure for the Lesali‘i parcel had only an ancillary
effect -- albeit a substantial one -- on the state treasury, gee
Kaho'chanchano v. State, 114 Hawai'i 302, 337, 162 P.3d 696, 732
(2007); (4) inasmuch as the Apology Resolution and related state
legislation give rise to a fiduciary duty by the State, as
trustee, to preserve the corpus of the public lands truat until
such time as the unrelinguished claims of the native Hawaiians
have been resolved, the trial court's conclusion that OHA's
actions between 1987 and 1994 constituted a waiver of the
plaintiffs’ claims was clearly erroneous and, therefore, the
plaintifts did not waive their claim for injunctive relief with
regard to the Leiali'i parcel; (5) the plaintiffs were not

estopped from challenging the transfer of the Leiali'i parcel

-91-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
oo

based on their pre-1993 actions because it was not until the
Apology Resolution was signed into law on Novenber 23, 1993 that
the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the State’s explicit fiduciary
Guty to preserve the corpus of the public lands trust arose;

(6) inasmich as the plaintiffs’ requested relief is clearly
Prospective in nature, the plaintiffs’ claims with regard to the
sale or transfer of the ceded lands in general are not barred by
sovereign inmunity; (7) the question whether an injunction is
appropriate to allow resolution of the plaintiffs’ unrelinguished
claims without further diminishnent of the trust res is ripe for
adjudication; (@) the question whether an injunction should issue
Presents a type of dispute that ie traditionally resolved by the

courts and, therefore, does not present a non-justiciable

 

political question; (9) the appropriate test in this jurisdiction
for determining whether a permanent injunction is proper ie:

(a) whether the plaintiff has prevailed on the merits,

(®) whether the balance of irreparable damage favors the issuance
©f @ permanent injunction; and (c) whether the public interest

Supports granting such an injunction; and (10) the plaintiffs

 

have

 

‘ablished that injunctive relief is proper pending final
resolution of native Hawaiian claims through the political

proces

 

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s January 31,
2003 judgment and remand this case to the circuit court with

instructions to issue an order granting the plaintiffs’ request

-92-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

for an injunction against the defendants from selling or
otherwise transferring to third parties (1) the Leials‘i parcel
and (2) any other ceded lands from the public lands trust until

the claims of the native Hawaiians to the ceded lands have been

resolved.
on the briefs: Gpor—
sherry P. Broder, Bi fotoansmr

Jon M. Van Dyke, and
Melody MacKenzi¢,

for plaintiffe-appeliants
Office of Hawaiian Affairs Ooo
William Meheula (of Winer

Meheula & Devens) and etal Rbe

Hayden Aluli, for individual

plaintiffs-appellants
Aluli, et al

Petes Gr nueere pose

William J. wynhoff

and Sonia Faust,

Deputy Attorneys General,
for defendants-appellees

-93-