Case Title: Ex Parte Dobyne

Citation: 805 So. 2d 763

Docket Number: 1992261

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
805 So. 2d 763 (2001)
Ex parte Willie C. DOBYNE.
(Re Willie C. Dobyne v. State).
1992261.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 15, 2001.
*766 Patrick J. Keenan and Charlotta Norby, Atlanta, Georgia, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and J. Clayton Crenshaw, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Willie Dobyne petitioned for certiorari review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's ruling on his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. We granted his petition, for the purpose of addressing three of his arguments relating to the Court of Criminal Appeals' holdings in regard to Dobyne's claims of juror misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. See Dobyne v. State, 805 So. 2d 733 (Ala.Crim. App.2000). Before proceeding to the merits of those claims, however, we address the appropriate standard of review.
We recognize that Rule 39(a)(2), Ala. R.App. P., governs petitions for certiorari filed in death-penalty cases and that Dobyne has been sentenced to death and has had his sentence affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on appeal and by this Court on certiorari review. See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1353 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), and Ex parte Dobyne, 672 So. 2d 1354 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1169, 116 S. Ct. 1571, 134 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1996). The plain-error standard of review does not apply in this case. Rule 39(a)(2) reads:
(Emphasis added.)
Dobyne's petition for certiorari review in this case does not arise from a direct appeal of a judgment imposing the death penalty; this petition seeks review of a judgment entered on appeal from the denial of Dobyne's petition for postconviction relief. The correct reading of Rule 39(a)(2), Ala. R.App. P., permits plain-error review only with respect to the certiorari petition that arises from the direct appeal of the death-penalty sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Although this Court has not previously stated this construction of the plain-error rule, the Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently applied it:
Siebert v. State, 778 So. 2d 842, 847 (Ala. Crim.App.1999). Thus, we review Dobyne's allegations of conflict under the standards set out in Rule 39(c), Ala. R.App. P.
Dobyne's specific argument with respect to juror misconduct is that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Ex parte Pierce [Ms. 1981270, Sept. 1, 2000] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2000). In his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Dobyne argued that the trial court denied him an appropriate hearing on his postconviction claims that the jury foreperson had failed to disclose the full nature and extent of her relationship with him, and that her presence on the jury had deprived him of a fair trial.
The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Dobyne's argument in part by stating:
Dobyne v. State, 805 So. 2d  at 758. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court of Criminal Appeals then went on to address Dobyne's claim on the merits, the language quoted above is at some variance with our holding in Ex parte Pierce, supra. However, we note that the Court of Criminal Appeals referred to our original opinion in Pierce, released May 26, 2000, to further address Dobyne's claim on the meritsbut this Court, on September 1, 2000, on application for rehearing, withdrew its May 26, 2000, opinion and issued a new opinion.
In the September 1, 2000, Pierce opinion, this Court considered a similar claim of juror misconduct. We stated:
___ So.2d at ___. This Court then quoted the applicable rules, including Rules 32.1 and 32.2, Ala. R.Crim. P. After reviewing the language of the Rules, we further stated:
___ So.2d at ___.
We write to illustrate how the facts of Pierce are distinguishable from the facts presented here. In Pierce, the petitioner alleged that the sheriff, who was called as a key witness in his case, had substantial contacts with the jury during the trial. The trial court dismissed the claim as procedurally barred; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the issue was procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), i.e., that it could have been, but was not, raised at trial or on appeal, and, additionally, *769 that it did not meet the requirements of a "newly discovered material fact" as imposed by Rule 32.1(e). This Court held that a juror-misconduct claim need not meet the requirements of Rule 32.1(e) to be considered by the trial court and pointed out that a juror-misconduct claim implicates constitutional violations under Rule 32.1(a); this Court also noted that such a claim remains subject to the preclusive bars found in Rule 32.2. This Court thereafter remanded the case for the Court of Criminal Appeals to remand it to the trial court because the record was not clear as to whether the trial court had heard Pierce's juror-misconduct claim on its merits.
The facts presented by Dobyne's petition are clearly different. The trial court did address Dobyne's claim of juror misconduct on its merits. In its order denying that claim, the trial court stated:
C.R. at 2831-35. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, despite the statement by the Court of Criminal Appeals that a juror-misconduct claim can be addressed only if it meets the requirements of a newly discovered material fact, imposed by Rule 32.1(e), Ala. R.Crim. P., that court also addressed Dobyne's claim on its merits.
The action taken by the trial court on Dobyne's Rule 32 petition distinguishes this case from the action taken on the petition filed in Pierce. In this case, the trial court has already provided the relief that Dobyne would have received under Pierce. In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals directly addressed Dobyne's juror-misconduct claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals applied the factors set out in Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), before concluding that the juror-misconduct claim was to be denied. Thus, the situation presented in Pierce is not the situation presented in this case, and our holding in Pierce does not affect our determination that Dobyne's claim of juror misconduct was correctly addressed.
In addressing the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on Dobyne's juror-misconduct claim on the merits, we must note that that court employed the wrong standard when it stated:
Dobyne, 805 So. 2d  at 759.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that, based on the evidence presented at the Rule 32 hearing, Dobyne is not entitled to relief from his conviction or his sentence, the standard the Court of Criminal Appeals applied in reaching its conclusion that this Court, in Dawson, had changed the law relating to the standard of proof required to prove a juror-misconduct claim, is not correct. In Dawson, this Court applied the same standard that was advanced in Roan v. State, 225 Ala. 428, 143 So. 454 (1932), namely, that in determining whether a new trial or a reversal is warranted because of juror misconduct (in this present case a juror's alleged failure to respond truthfully to a question during voir dire) the test is whether the defendant might have been prejudiced, not whether he actually was prejudiced, by such misconduct. See Roan, 225 Ala. at 435, 143 So.  at 459. ("The test of vitiating influence is not that it did influence a member of the jury to act without the evidence, but that it might have unlawfully influenced... [the] verdict rendered." (Emphasis added.)); and Dawson, 710 So. 2d 472, 476 (Ala.1997) ("Because Dawson failed to show that the juror's viewing of the crime scene resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the jury's verdict, a new trial is not warranted." (Emphasis added.)). In fact, in Dawson this Court looked to Reed v. State, 547 So. 2d 596 (Ala.1989), in resolving the issue presented. Both Dawson and Reed applied the "might-have-been-prejudiced" standard, rather than the "actual-prejudice" standard.
The proper standard for determining whether juror misconduct warrants a new trial, as set out by this Court's precedent, is whether the misconduct might have prejudiced, not whether it actually did prejudice, the defendant. See Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d 122 (Ala.1993); Campbell v. Williams, 638 So. 2d 804 (Ala. 1994); Union Mortgage Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d 1335 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 906, 113 S. Ct. 301, 121 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1992). The "might-have-been-prejudiced" standard, of course, casts a "lighter" burden on the defendant than the actual-prejudice standard. See Tomlin v. State, supra, 695 So. 2d  at 170. For a more recent detailed discussion of the burden of proof required to make a showing under the "might-have-been-prejudiced" standard, see Ex parte Apicella, [Ms. 1992273, March 30, 2001] ___ So.2d ___ at ___ (Ala.2001) ("It is clear, then, that the question whether the jury's decision might have been affected is answered not by a bare showing of juror misconduct, but rather by an examination of the circumstances particular to the case." (Emphasis original.)).
It is true that the parties in a case are entitled to true and honest answers to their questions on voir dire, so that they may exercise their peremptory strikes wisely. See Fabianke v. Weaver, 527 So. 2d 1253 (Ala.1988). However, not every failure to respond properly to questions propounded during voir dire "automatically entitles [the defendant] to a new *772 trial or reversal of the cause on appeal." Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 166, 238 So. 2d 330, 335 (1970); see also Dawson v. State, supra, at 474; and Reed v. State, supra. As stated previously, the proper standard to apply in determining whether a party is entitled to a new trial in this circumstance is "whether the defendant might have been prejudiced by a venire-member's failure to make a proper response." Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d  at 124. Further, the determination of whether a party might have been prejudiced, i.e., whether there was probable prejudice, is a matter within the trial court's discretion.[1]Eaton v. Horton, 565 So. 2d 183 (Ala.1990); Land & Assocs., Inc. v. Simmons, 562 So. 2d 140 (Ala.1989) (Houston, J., concurring specially).
Union Mortgage Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d  at 1342-43 (quoting Freeman v. Hall, supra (other citations omitted)). The trial court, in its order denying Dobyne's Rule 32 petition, extensively addressed these factors in determining that juror M.A.M.'s failure to respond did not present a situation that might have been prejudicial to Dobyne. While Dobyne presented an affidavit of a juror, G.S., that stated that M.A.M. had improperly influenced the jury to consider her knowledge of mental retardation, rather than the evidence presented at trial, we have stated in other contexts that "[we] grant great deference to the trial judge, who is on the scene and who can best judge the credibility of the participants and determine what actually occurred." Ex parte Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143, 147 (Ala.2000).
The form of prejudice that would entitle a party to relief for a juror's nondisclosure or falsification in voir dire would be its effect, if any, to cause the party to forgo challenging the juror for cause or exercising a peremptory challenge to strike the juror. Ex parte Ledbetter, *773 404 So. 2d 731 (Ala.1981); Warrick v. State, 460 So. 2d 320 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984); and Leach v. State, 31 Ala.App. 390, 18 So. 2d 285 (1944). If the party establishes that the juror's disclosure of the truth would have caused the party either to (successfully) challenge the juror for cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike the juror, then the party has made a prima facie showing of prejudice. Id. Such prejudice can be established by the obvious tendency of the true facts to bias the juror, as in Ledbetter, supra, or by direct testimony of trial counsel that the true facts would have prompted a challenge against the juror, as in State v. Freeman, 605 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. Crim.App.1992).
Dobyne is not entitled to relief on this juror-misconduct claim because he neither proffered nor introduced evidence that a true answer by M.A.M. would have caused him to challenge M.A.M. for cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge against her. The closest to direct evidence to such effect proffered or introduced in the trial court in support of this Rule 32 claim was this testimony by one of Dobyne's trial lawyers:
(R. 1429-30.) An inference on an inference, forbidden by law, Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. McCardle, 277 Ala. 100, 167 So. 2d 274 (1964), would be necessary to conclude from the answer "Yes, sure, it's possible," that the defense would have challenged M.A.M. (even successfully) for cause or would have exercised a peremptory challenge against her had she revealed the information. The first inference needed by the defendant would be that the "effect on [his lawyer's] thinking about her as a desirable juror" would have been negative rather than positive, for trial counsel's other testimony reveals that they affirmatively thought M.A.M.'s training and experience made her a desirable juror. The second inference, to be impermissibly inferred from the first inference, would be that the negative effect on the lawyer's thinking would have been strong enough to overcome his, and cocounsel's, favorable impression of M.A.M. as a juror and to impel them to challenge her for cause or to exercise a peremptory strike to remove her from the venire. Thus, this testimony fails to establish the requisite prejudice.
In the Rule 32 proceedings, Dobyne also had introduced evidence that, over a span of years more than a decade before the trial, M.A.M., in her capacity as special education coordinator for the Bibb County school system, which included the schools Dobyne then attended, had participated in certain evaluations of his intelligence and behavior. If M.A.M. had recalled and disclosed this information during voir dire, we would note that, even so, the nature of the information, together with the information the defense already knew at that time, *774 does not, in and of itself, tend to establish that it would have caused the defense to challenge M.A.M. to remove her, or to peremptorily strike her, from the venire.
Dobyne argues that the trial court erroneously deprived him of an opportunity to call witnesses to impeach M.A.M.'s live Rule 32 testimony to the effect that she did not recognize or recall Dobyne during the voir dire. In the Rule 32 proceedings, the trial court allowed the state to present M.A.M.'s testimony live. At the same hearing, Dobyne introduced the affidavits of several witnesses whose testimony does tend to impeach M.A.M. by tending to prove that M.A.M. must have recognized and recalled Dobyne during the voir dire when she failed to respond to the question "Is there anyone who knows the defendant, Willie Dobyne." Such impeachment tends to establish that a truthful answer by M.A.M. at voir dire would have revealed M.A.M.'s previous professional acquaintance and work with Dobyne. Absent any proffer of evidence indicating that such a revelation at voir dire would have caused the defense to challenge M.A.M., or to strike her, as already discussed, however, the trial judge's hearing live testimony from the impeaching affiants would have served no purpose. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in rejecting the juror-misconduct claim.
Dobyne also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because: (1) his trial lawyers failed to present available evidence in support of his motion for a change of venue; and (2) his trial lawyers failed to investigate the circumstances surrounding his statement to police and failed to present evidence indicating that he was incapable of waiving his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
In addressing Dobyne's ineffective-assistance claim based on his trial lawyers' failure to present available evidence in support of his motion for a change of venue, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
805 So. 2d  at 744-46.
Dobyne's remaining allegation of ineffective assistance in regard to the statement he made to police was addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals as follows:
805 So. 2d  at 751-52.
As we have previously discussed, plain-error review does not apply to appeals from rulings on Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., postconviction petitions. In Ex parte Dobyne, 672 So. 2d 1354 (Ala. 1995), this Court conducted a plain-error review during Dobyne's direct appeal, stating, "We have also thoroughly reviewed the record before us for error concerning the various other issues that Dobyne has raised, as well as for plain error not raised." Id. at 1359. Moreover, Rule 32.2(a) specifically states:
The Court of Criminal Appeals fully discussed the extent to which it considered these issues on Dobyne's direct appeal. Because they were raised in his direct appeal, Rule 32.2(a)(4) now precludes their consideration as part of Dobyne's appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirming the trial court's order denying Dobyne's postconviction petition alleging juror misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and other things is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
*777 HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., concurs in result.
[1]  Two separate standards had previously existed for civil and criminal cases in regard to the standard to be applied, the Roan test of "might have been influenced" in criminal cases, and the Freeman test of "probable prejudice" in civil cases. In Ex parte O'Leary, 438 So. 2d 1372 (Ala.1983), a criminal case involving a possession-of-marijuana charge, this Court relied upon the discussion in Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1348 (Ala.1982), a civil case, discussing the "might-have-been-prejudiced" standard as employed in Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So. 2d 731 (Ala.1981), and the "probable-prejudice" standard advanced by Freeman. This Court then stated that "we follow the Freeman standard and opine that the false answers given [on voir dire] resulted in probable prejudice to O'Leary." O'Leary, 438 So. 2d  at 1375. These two standards are arguably different. However, since O'Leary, the standards have become intertwined. See, e.g., Apicella v. State, [Ms. CR-96-2285, February 25, 2000] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Travis v. State, 776 So. 2d 819, 847 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997); Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 169 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Knight v. State, 675 So. 2d 487, 494 (Ala.Crim.App.1995); State v. Freeman, 605 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Ala.Crim. App.1992); State v. Gilbert, 568 So. 2d 876, 878 (Ala.Crim.App.1990); Washington v. State, 539 So. 2d 1089, 1095 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988); Clark v. State, 551 So. 2d 1081, 1088 (Ala.Crim.App.1986); and Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 680 (Ala.Crim.App.1985).