Case Title: Commonwealth v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11570

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11570 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ENFRID BROWN, JR. 
(and a companion case1).2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 9, 2014. - February 11, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Capital case,  
Verdict.  Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court on May 
16, 1973. 
 
Following review by this court, 367 Mass. 24 (1975) and 378 
Mass. 165 (1979), motions for a new trial, filed on September 
23, 2009, and July 26, 2012, were considered by Frank M. 
Gaziano, J. 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Commonwealth vs. William J. Johnson, Jr. 
 
 
2 According to the defendants' brief, Enfrid Brown's correct 
first name is Efrid and William Johnson's current name is 
Abdullah K. Sabree.  We follow the custom of the court and refer 
to the defendants by the names used in their indictments.  See 
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 425 Mass. 685, 685 n.1 (1997). 
2 
 
 
Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
William J. Johnson. 
 
Matthew Sears, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Robert L. Sheketoff, for Enfrid Brown, Jr., was present but 
did not argue. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendants, Enfrid Brown, Jr., and William 
J. Johnson, were indicted on charges of murder and armed entry 
with the intent to commit a felony in connection with the 1973 
death of the victim, Hakim A. Jamal.3  The defendants were 
convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree at their first 
trial.4  We reversed the first convictions on grounds not 
pertinent to this appeal and remanded for a new trial.  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 367 Mass. 24, 32 (1975) (Brown I).  They 
were retried and again convicted.  We affirmed the second 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 Mass. 165, 166 (1979) 
(Brown II). 
 
After various proceedings, which we detail below, the 
defendants filed a third5 motion for a new trial in July, 2012, 
arguing that the jury's initial report of not guilty verdicts in 
                     
 
3 The victim also was known as Allen Donaldson. 
 
 
4 The defendants were also convicted by a jury of armed 
entry with the intent to commit a felony at their first trial; 
they were not retried on the armed entry indictments. 
 
 
5 This motion is referred to as the "supplemental" motion by 
the defendants, but the single justice adopted the reference 
used by the Commonwealth, and we too shall refer to this as the 
"third" motion. 
3 
 
the first trial was in fact an acquittal of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and the retrial 
on that same theory in the second trial violated their double 
jeopardy rights.  In a thoughtful memorandum of decision, a 
Superior Court judge denied the motion.  The defendants 
petitioned a single justice of this court, pursuant to the 
"gatekeeper" provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for leave to 
appeal.  The single justice allowed the appeal to proceed on the 
question whether the jury's initial verdict has the double 
jeopardy consequence, under Federal constitutional law and the 
statutory and common law of Massachusetts, of barring retrial on 
a theory of premeditated murder.  For the reasons explained 
below, we conclude that the defendants suffered no violation of 
their double jeopardy rights and affirm the denial of the motion 
for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  We set forth the facts the jury could have 
found, as detailed in Brown II: 
 
"On May 1, 1973, Hakim Jamal occupied a third-floor 
apartment with Hane Jamal, who described herself as Hakim's 
wife in a "spiritual" but not a legal sense, and with Crab 
Jamal, Kidogo Jamal, Linda Jacobs, and Linda's son Anthony 
Jacobs.  On the morning of May 1, . . . Kidogo had an 
argument with one Louella Burns (also known as Sister 
Cissy). 
 
 
"Burns informed members of an organization called 'De 
Mau Mau' of her argument with Kidogo.  Included among the 
members of the organization were the . . . defendants [and 
4 
 
John Clinkscales],[6] as well as [Phillips] Key and [Isaac] 
Mitchell.  These five individuals procured various firearms 
including handguns, carbines, and a rifle and drove to the 
Jamal apartment about 11 P.M.[7]  Leaving their car locked 
but with the engine running, all five ascended the stairs 
carrying the firearms.  Key knocked on the door of the 
Jamal apartment and Kidogo answered.  A German shepherd dog 
left the apartment while the door was open.  Kidogo 
attempted to close the front door, ran into the living 
room, and blocked the living room door closed with his 
body.  Hakim, Hane, and Crab were also present in the 
living room.  At the same moment, Anthony was in a bedroom 
at the other end of an interior hallway.  Linda was in the 
kitchen, which was located between the bedroom and the 
living room. 
 
 
"Key, Mitchell, [Clinkscales,] and the . . . 
defendants entered the apartment.  Johnson turned down the 
hall toward the bedroom.  He kicked open the bedroom door 
and pointed a rifle at Anthony.  Linda and Anthony, both of 
whom knew Johnson well, asked him not to hurt Anthony, and 
Johnson backed away.  Key forced open the living room door, 
pinning Kidogo between the open door and a wall.  Hakim 
attempted to raise a shotgun lying next to the chair in 
which he was sitting.  Key quickly lay down on the floor.  
Mitchell fired several shots at Hakim, killing him.  At 
some point during these events, Brown and Clinkscales were 
in the foyer area of the apartment where they were 
observed, respectively, by Linda and Anthony." (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
 
Brown II, 378 Mass. at 166-168. 
 
To provide context for the defendant's double jeopardy 
claim, we describe additional aspects of the defendants' trials 
and the relevant procedural history. 
                     
 
6 John Clinkscales was tried in 1973 and 1975 together with 
the defendants appealing here and was convicted of the same 
charges as the defendants, but he has since died and is not a 
party to this appeal. 
 
7 The theory presented by the Commonwealth was that the 
defendants and other participants went to the apartment to pick 
up Kidogo Jamal and implement "black justice." 
 
5 
 
 
a.  First trial.  After a ten-day trial,8 the jury reported 
that they had reached verdicts and the judge summoned them to 
the court room to announce the verdicts.  In response to the 
clerk's inquiry, the jury foreman initially announced not guilty 
verdicts as to each of the murder indictments and guilty 
verdicts as to the armed entry indictments.  Within minutes, 
however, the jury reentered the court room and amended the 
previously announced not guilty verdicts to find the defendants 
guilty of murder in the first degree.  The jury confirmed its 
initial guilty verdicts as to the indictments for armed entry of 
a dwelling with intent to murder.   The circumstances of the 
change in the jury's verdicts from not guilty to guilty of 
murder in the first degree, although mired in confusion and 
ambiguity, form the factual core of the defendants' double 
jeopardy claim.  This court in Brown I described the events 
surrounding the verdicts as follows: 
"On the afternoon of the second day of their deliberations, 
the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on the . . . 
murder indictments and guilty on the . . . indictments for 
armed entry.  The verdicts were affirmed by the jury and 
recorded, and the jury were discharged and allowed to 
retire.  Four minutes later the jury returned to the court 
room and were permitted to correct the verdicts.  The 
foreman said, 'The way the [c]lerk read the charges to us, 
or the indictments, was not the same as the form that we 
                     
 
8 This murder trial commenced on July 20, 1973, 
approximately two months after the return of the indictment on 
May 16, 1973, and nearly three months after the murder on May 1, 
1973. 
 
6 
 
were using in the case. . . .  We had written down 'not 
guilty' of the intent of entering to murder.[9]  But we did 
find him guilty of murder in the first degree on the charge 
of a felonious murder.'  Corrected verdicts of guilty of 
murder in the first degree and guilty of armed entry were 
then returned, affirmed and recorded, and the jury were 
again permitted to retire." 
 
Brown I, 367 Mass. at 27. 
 
We recount additional details of the reporting of the 
jury's verdicts as gleaned from the record available to us.10  
After instructing the jury on the law, the judge suggested a 
procedure for recording the verdicts in the jury room.  He 
provided copies of the indictments and directed the jury foreman 
to indicate the verdicts on those copies "so that [the foreman 
                     
 
9 The trial judge had asked the jury to write their verdicts 
on copies of the indictments, and the clerk requested the copies 
from the foreman of the jury after the verdicts were read, but 
the foreman indicated to the clerk that he did not want to turn 
them in.  After reading the corrected verdicts, the foreman 
handed the clerk the marked copies.  The copies of the murder 
indictments stated "Guilty" and there were erasure marks where 
the foreman had erased "Not"; the copies of the armed entry 
indictments stated "Guilty, First Degree." 
 
 
10 The transcript from the first trial is missing even-
numbered pages in the portion of the trial that includes the 
trial judge's instructions to the jury, the jury verdicts, and 
the foreman's statements made in connection with the corrected 
verdicts.  In place of the missing pages, both parties cite to 
our decision after review of the defendants' direct appeal 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, Commonwealth v. Brown, 367 
Mass. 24 (1975) (Brown I), which contains factual information 
that is missing from the transcript.  To the extent the 
defendants' claim rests on the missing portions of the 
transcripts, that claim is waived by the defendants' failure to 
follow the procedure under Mass. R. A. P. 8 (c), as amended, 378 
Mass. 932 (1979), for reconstructing the record.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 932, 933 (1986). 
7 
 
would] not have any confusion in reporting."  In his explanation 
of this process, the judge began first with the armed entry 
indictments and ended with the murder indictments, adding 
information about how the foreman was to report the verdicts in 
the event of guilty findings on that offense.  However, in 
calling for the verdicts, the clerk did not follow the order of 
the judge's instructions for reporting of the verdicts.  
Instead, the clerk inquired first regarding the verdict on the 
murder indictments.  The foreman replied, "Not guilty."  As the 
jury left the court room and before they were released, the 
foreman alerted the court officer, stating, "There is something 
wrong in the verdict."  The court officer advised the foreman to 
say no more and reported this exchange to the chief court 
officer.  The chief court officer immediately reported the 
matter to the judge who was still in the court room in the 
presence of counsel and the defendants.  The defendants had not 
yet been discharged on the indictments. 
 
The judge summoned the jury back to the court room for 
further inquiries into the matter of the verdicts.  When the 
jury returned to the court room, the foreman announced guilty 
verdicts on each of the indictments.  Apparently by way of 
explanation, the foreman stated, "We signed these affidavits in 
the fashion that we voted.  The way the [c]lerk read the charges 
to us, or the indictments, was not the same as the form that we 
8 
 
were using in this case."  The foreman continued, "We had 
written down 'not guilty' of the intent of entering to murder.  
But we did find him guilty of murder in the first degree on the 
charge of a felonious murder."  Brown I, 367 Mass. at 27. 
 
Additional details of the trial judge's charge to the jury 
also provide context for the foreman's explanation regarding the 
changed verdicts.  In reaching their verdicts on the murder 
indictments, the jury were required to parse the instructions on 
two different felonies:  the kidnapping of Kidogo as the 
predicate felony for felony-murder; and the separate felony of 
armed entry with the intent to murder Hakim.  As to the latter, 
the jury were instructed that if there was a reasonable doubt 
"that [the defendants] went [to the apartment] to murder Hakim, 
these defendants must be found not guilty" on this second 
indictment.11  Brown I, supra at 29.  The foreman's statement, 
"We had written down 'not guilty' of the intent of entering to 
murder," was an apparent reference to this instruction on the 
armed entry charge. 
 
After the jury were permitted to correct the verdicts, the 
defendants moved for a mistrial, arguing that the jury had no 
power to change its verdicts after being discharged.  The 
defendants claimed that the jury were free to mingle and talk 
                     
 
11 The court observed that this instruction may well have 
been "too favorable" to the defendants.  Brown I, supra at 29. 
9 
 
with alternate jurors and that the changed verdicts indicate 
prejudicial confusion.  The trial judge conducted an evidentiary 
hearing and denied the defendants' motions, concluding that the 
jury had the power to correct the verdicts because they were 
"still within the control of the [c]ourt and in the custody of 
the court officers" and had not mingled or discussed the case 
with others prior to correcting their verdict.  Adding his own 
gloss to what had occurred, the trial judge stated, "It is clear 
beyond all doubt that it was the decision of the jury that the 
defendants were guilty of murder in the first degree, such 
murder having been committed during the commission of a felony 
punishable by life imprisonment."  The judge made no comment 
concerning deliberately premeditated murder. 
 
The defendants appealed their convictions, raising a number 
of issues, including the trial judge's denial of the motions for 
a mistrial.  We reversed the convictions and remanded for a new 
trial based on the trial judge's use of an impermissibly 
coercive version of the charge modeled in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 
8 Cush. 1, 2 (1851).  Brown I, 367 Mass. at 32.  We reviewed the 
circumstances of the corrected verdicts and noted that the 
"present record shows no impropriety in the correction of the 
verdicts on the murder indictments."  Id. at 29.  We questioned, 
however, whether the armed entry convictions could stand in 
light of the foreman's explanation, "We had written down 'not 
10 
 
guilty' of the intent of entering to murder.  But we did find 
him guilty of murder in the first degree on the charge of 
felonious murder."  Because we reversed based on the Tuey 
charge, we did not review the point further and noted that "[i]t 
is sufficient for present purposes that the erroneous 'not 
guilty' verdicts on the murder indictments do not preclude a new 
trial."  Id. 
 
b.  Second trial.  The defendants were retried only on the 
murder indictments, and both were convicted of murder in the 
first degree by a jury on July 31, 1975.  The trial judge had 
instructed the jury to consider both "deliberately premeditated" 
murder and "felony murder" as theories supporting the 
indictments.  The jury returned general verdicts of guilty of 
murder in the first degree without specifying the theory of 
culpability, as was the practice at the time.12  See Commonwealth 
                     
 
12 At the time of the defendants' trials, the jury were 
allowed to return a guilty verdict on a murder indictment even 
if fewer than twelve jurors agreed on a particular theory of 
murder.  Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 111 (1995), citing 
Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 567-568 (1957).  In 1995, 
this court recognized that the right to a unanimous jury should 
extend to the theory of culpability where the offense charged 
contains more than one theory.  Berry, supra at 112 & n.17.  
Accordingly, juries in murder trials now must unanimously agree 
on the theory underlying a guilty verdict and mark such 
determinations on a special verdict slip.  See Commonwealth v. 
Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 77-78 (2007); Berry, supra at 112.  This 
rule, however, applied only prospectively, and at the time of 
the defendants' trials, there was no expectation that the jury 
should unanimously agree on theories underlying a verdict.  
Berry, supra at 111-112. 
11 
 
v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 567-568 (1957), S.C., 361 Mass. 287 
(1972) and 363 Mass. 171 (1973). 
 
c.  Posttrial motions.  After the second trial, the 
defendants filed a first motion for a new trial on the grounds 
of newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice, 
based on information obtained during the trial of Phillips Key 
and Isaac Mitchell for the same murder.  We affirmed the 
convictions following the second trial and the denial of the 
first motion for a new trial.  Brown II, 378 Mass. at 166. 
 
In September, 2009, the defendants filed a second motion 
for a new trial, asserting, among other claims, that their 
second trial violated their double jeopardy rights because a 
jury had acquitted them of murder in the first degree in their 
first trial.13  The judge denied this motion, and the defendants 
petitioned a single justice of this court, pursuant to the 
gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for leave to appeal 
the denial.  The Commonwealth assented to the defendants' 
request to stay the gatekeeper proceedings pending the 
defendants' filing of their third motion for new trial.  In the 
                     
 
13 The defendants' second motion for a new trial made 
essentially the same argument asserted in their petition for 
habeas corpus relief.  The judge dismissed the petition, 
concluding that "the erroneous verdict of not guilty in the 
first trial was not a final determination of the proceedings 
against the petitioners and . . . , therefore, their second 
trial did not violate their right not to be twice placed in 
jeopardy."  Brown v. Gunter, 428 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Mass.), 
aff'd, 562 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1977). 
12 
 
third new trial motion, the defendants revised their double 
jeopardy argument and for the first time argued that the jury 
had actually acquitted them of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of deliberate premeditation in their first trial and, 
therefore, double jeopardy protections precluded retrial on that 
same theory.  The same judge who had denied the second motion 
for a new trial (motion judge) also rejected this claim, ruling 
that the defendants were not acquitted of murder in the first 
degree murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation and, 
therefore, the Commonwealth was not barred from retrying the 
defendants on that theory. 
 
The defendants then petitioned the single justice for leave 
to appeal from this ruling.  The single justice allowed the 
defendants' petition to appeal the double jeopardy claim made in 
their third motion for a new trial.14 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  In reviewing the 
denial or grant of a new trial motion, we examine the motion 
                     
 
14 The single justice determined that the defendants' claim 
was "new" in that they had not previously focused their double 
jeopardy argument on the deliberate premeditation theory, 
reasoning that "this variant of the defendants' double jeopardy 
argument was not raised at trial or on direct review, was not 
argued or addressed on appeal, and reasonably could not have 
been addressed because the applicable law was not sufficiently 
developed at the time of the direct appeal."  Accordingly, 
review is limited to whether the defendants were acquitted at 
the first trial of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation.  We do not address the Commonwealth's 
waiver argument because we affirm the denial of the defendants' 
third motion for a new trial on other grounds. 
13 
 
judge's conclusion only to determine whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion or significant error of law.  Commonwealth 
v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 (2014).  If the motion judge did 
not preside at the trial, as is the case here, "we . . . 'regard 
ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to assess 
the trial record.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Weichell, 446 
Mass. 785, 799 (2006). 
 
b.  Analysis.  "[T]he [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause 
precludes the [g]overnment from relitigating any issue that was 
necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial."  
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009), citing Ashe 
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).  "[T]he prohibition against 
double jeopardy, which flows from the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, as well as the statutory and common 
law of Massachusetts, provides that 'a person cannot twice be 
put in jeopardy for the same offence.'"  Marshall v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Burke, 342 Mass. 144, 145 (1961).  See G. L. c. 263, § 7.15  The 
double jeopardy principle "protects against three specific evils 
-- 'a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and 
                     
 
15 General Laws c. 263, § 7, provides in relevant part:  "A 
person shall not be held to answer on a second indictment or 
complaint for a crime of which he has been acquitted upon the 
facts and merits . . . ." 
14 
 
multiple punishments for the same offense.'"  Marshall, supra, 
quoting Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 278, 283 (1993).  The 
defendants' double jeopardy claim derives from the prohibition 
of a second trial after an acquittal. 
 
The defendants' double jeopardy claim depends not on what 
the jury explicitly stated in the report of the verdict but on 
the defendants' interpretation of what the jury must have 
intended.  They argue that despite the confusion surrounding the 
announcement of the verdicts in the first trial, the trial judge 
correctly interpreted the jury foreman's statement that the jury 
reached guilty verdicts "on the charge of a felonious murder" 
when he inferred that the jury intended to acquit the defendants 
of deliberately premeditated murder.  Consequently, they claim 
that the motion judge erred in concluding that the jury did not 
specifically reject the theory of deliberate premeditation and 
that the jury's pronouncement, therefore, was not an acquittal 
barring a retrial.  We disagree.  No acquittal occurred where 
the jury's pronouncement of its verdicts did not unequivocally 
reject the defendant's guilt on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation. 
 
An "acquittal requires a verdict on 'the facts and 
merits.'"  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 437 Mass. 276, 282 (2002), 
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 962 (2003), quoting G. L. c. 263, § 7.  
This disposition properly may be claimed only when the fact 
15 
 
finder reaches "a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of 
the factual elements of the offense charged."  Commonwealth v. 
Babb, 389 Mass. 275, 281 (1983), quoting United States v. Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).  Thus, where a 
verdict does not specifically resolve all the elements of the 
offense charged, it is defective and cannot operate as either an 
acquittal or a conviction.  Commonwealth v. Call, 21 Pick. 509, 
514-515 (1839). 
 
The defendants do not claim that the jury unequivocally 
found that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof 
on the theory of deliberate premeditation.  Rather, the 
defendants urge us to conclude that the jury intended to acquit 
them of murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation.  This 
alleged intent is to be deduced from an interpretation of 
postverdict statements of the trial judge and jury foreman 
immediately before correcting the verdicts.  We are invited to 
interpret the meaning of the foreman's statements and defer to 
statements made by the trial judge.  We decline to do so. 
 
The foreman's statements were not sufficiently clear and 
unequivocal to show that the jury actually reached a resolution 
of the "factual elements" of deliberate premeditation.  Babb, 
389 Mass. at 281.  The foreman's statement, "We had written down 
'not guilty' of the intent of entering to murder.  But we did 
find him guilty of murder in the first degree on the charge of a 
16 
 
felonious murder."  Brown I, 367 Mass. at 27, is silent as to 
the jury's verdict on the theory of deliberate premeditation.  
Because an acquittal may not be based on such silence, we accord 
no legal significance to the jury not expressly declaring their 
intent on deliberately premeditated murder.  See Commonwealth v. 
Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 80 (2007) (absence of indication of any 
decision on third theory of culpability not acquittal on that 
theory even though jury indicated culpability on first two 
theories).  Thus, we may not definitively conclude that the jury 
intended to acquit the defendants of deliberately premeditated 
murder. 
 
Because of the ambiguity in the foreman's statements, we do 
not and cannot know what the jury intended even if it were 
possible, in the absence of a clear expression, to effectuate 
that intent.  See Carlino, 449 Mass. at 78 n.18 ("The jury might 
have intended an acquittal . . . ; they might have been unable 
to reach a unanimous verdict; or they might not have deliberated 
on that theory at all").  "[T]he interests of justice are not 
served by entry of an acquittal by accident or supposition."  
Id. at 80. 
 
The trial judge's instructions to the jury also support the 
inference that the jury did not intend to acquit the defendants 
of murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation.  As 
instructed by the judge, the only charge that required an 
17 
 
"intent of entering to murder" was armed entry with the intent 
to commit a felony.  The jury could find the defendants guilty 
of murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation even if the 
defendants did not have the intent to murder upon entry but 
developed that intent while inside the apartment.  Accordingly, 
the foreman's explanation that the jury intended to vote not 
guilty of "the intent of entering to murder" is consistent with 
this court's interpretation in Brown I that the jury may have 
intended to acquit the defendants of the armed entry charges 
only.16  Brown I, 367 Mass. at 29 ("there is a serious question 
whether any of the verdicts on the armed entry indictments can 
stand"). 
 
Although the defendants suggest that we adopt the trial 
judge's explanation of the jury's intention, this suggestion 
also is unavailing.  Based on the record, the trial judge could 
not reasonably have concluded that the jury unequivocally and 
unanimously intended to return a guilty verdict only on the 
theory of felony-murder without impermissible speculation into 
                     
 
16 The foreman's markings on the verdict slips further 
support this theory.  After being instructed that the possible 
verdicts for armed entry were not guilty or guilty and the 
possible verdicts for murder were not guilty, guilty of first 
degree murder, or guilty of second degree murder, the foreman 
had marked, "Guilty, First Degree," on the armed entry 
indictments and marked, "Not Guilty" -- later erasing the "Not" 
-- on the murder indictments. 
 
18 
 
jury deliberations.17  See Yeager, 557 U.S. at 122; Carlino, 449 
Mass. at 80.  The foreman did not testify at the posttrial 
hearing on the motions for mistrial, nor did any other jurors.18  
In these circumstances, where the trial judge's explanation 
contradicts the foreman's statements, we accord it no deference.  
We do not and cannot know what the jury intended.  "The jury 
might have intended an acquittal . . . ; they might have been 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict; or they might not have 
deliberated on that theory at all."  See Carlino, supra at 78 
n.18. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Because the first trial produced no 
"verdict on 'the facts and merits'" of the charge of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the 
motion judge did not err in concluding that there was no 
acquittal and therefore no error in prosecuting the defendants 
on that same theory in the second trial.  Gonzalez, 437 Mass. at 
282, quoting G. L. c. 263, § 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a 
                     
 
17 The defendants also ask us to adopt the prosecutor's 
statement at the posttrial hearing regarding the jury's intent, 
which is similarly only speculation and not binding on our 
analysis. 
 
 
18 The issue before the trial judge was whether the jury had 
the power to correct their verdict in light of the assertion 
that they were free to mingle with alternate jurors and other 
persons before making such correction.  The issue of what the 
jury intended when they changed their verdict was not in 
dispute. 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.