Case Title: In re Addilyn R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 236

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 236 
Docket: 
Pen-17-301 
Submitted 
On Briefs: November 29, 2017 
Decided: 
December 19, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE ADDILYN R.  
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother of Addilyn R. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Bangor, Campbell, J.) terminating her parental rights to Addilyn 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).  On 
appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support both the 
court’s finding of parental unfitness and its finding that termination is in the 
child’s best interest.  Because competent record evidence supports the court’s 
findings, we affirm the judgment.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  To support its findings of unfitness and that termination was in the 
child’s best interest, the court made the following specific findings of fact, 
which are supported by the record:   
Mother was referred to the Family Treatment Drug Court 
(FTDC) in September of 2016. . . . Mother, however, did not 
cooperate . . . and was never screened for the program. . . .  
 
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Mother has not cooperated with [the Department] 
regarding drug screens, which the court finds to be very troubling 
given mother’s history of substance abuse.  [The Department case 
manager] testified that since she started on the case in July of 
2016, she requested that mother submit to drug screens 23 times.  
Mother missed 11 times.  Of the . . . requests for drug screens in 
2017, mother has missed eight.  
 
Mother has an ongoing pattern of drug use.  Mother admits 
to using marijuana regularly.  In October of 2016, mother tested 
positive for cocaine metabolites.  In February or March of 2017, 
father reported to [the Department case manager] that mother 
was drinking alcohol on a recent trip to Portland.  Mother tested 
positive for benzodiazepines on March 3, 2017, and on March 20, 
2017.  Since March 20, 2017, [the Department case manager] 
requested mother to submit to five drug screens.  Mother tested 
positive for marijuana on the two times that she submitted to 
tests.  Mother failed to appear for the other three tests.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
In this case, mother clearly has a chronic substance abuse 
problem. . . .  
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
. . . There is no doubt that both mother and father love [the 
child] very much.  However, [the child] has been in the custody of 
[the Department] since June 2, 2016. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[The child] has been placed with [the foster parents] since 
June 2, 2016.  [They] are experienced foster parents and have 
provided excellent care for the child.  [The foster mother] has 
been very attentive to [the child’s] medical needs resulting from 
her asthma.  [She] has transported [the child] to her medical 
 
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appointments.  [The foster parents] have provided a safe and 
stable home.  [The child] is doing well in the [foster parents’] 
care. . . .   
 
 
The court has had the benefit of an experienced GAL.  The 
child needs to have permanency, and [the foster parents] are able 
to provide it for her.  [The GAL] believes that it is in the best 
interest of the child for the parental rights of both mother and 
father to be terminated, and the court agrees with her assessment.   
 
 
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in 
the best interest of [the child] to have the parental rights of her 
mother and father terminated. . . .  
 
II.  DISCUSSION  
[¶3]  The court found the rebuttable presumption contained in 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1-A)(C) (2016) to apply to this case.  The rebuttable presumption 
provides,  
The court may presume that the parent is unwilling or unable to 
protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are 
unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to 
meet the child’s needs if: 
 
. . . . 
 
C. The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of 
the department, the parent has a chronic substance abuse 
problem, and the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child 
will not be able to return to the custody of the parent within 
a reasonable period of time, considering the child’s age and 
the need for a permanent home. The fact that a parent has 
been unable to provide safe care of a child for a period of 
9 months due to substance abuse constitutes a chronic 
substance abuse problem.  
 
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22 M.R.S. § 4055(1-A)(C).  Here, the court’s supported findings show that the 
child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the Department, that the 
mother has a chronic substance abuse problem, and that the mother’s 
prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to the mother’s 
custody within a reasonable period of time.   
[¶4]  We have recently held that the statutory “presumption” of parental 
unfitness in child protection cases is analogous to a permissive inference in 
criminal cases, where the fact-finder is entitled to reach a certain conclusion 
based on a specified factual predicate, but the burden of proof does not shift to 
the opposing party—here, a parent.  See In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, 
¶¶ 31-32, 169 A.3d 914.  In this case, the court invoked the evidentiary 
analysis allowed by section 4055(1-A)(C), but the judgment demonstrates 
that the court treated that statute as the pathway to an inference, and placed 
the burden of proof entirely on the Department and did not require or expect 
the mother to meet any evidentiary burden.  The court therefore properly 
applied section 4055(1-A)(C) as the basis to infer that the mother is unwilling 
or unable to protect the child from jeopardy in a time which is reasonably 
calculated to meet the child’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), 
(1-A).  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its finding of unfitness as to 
 
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the mother.  See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court 
finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative 
bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
[¶5]  Tellingly, the mother was offered the opportunity and resources 
available through the Family Treatment Drug Court.1  Her refusal to 
participate in that program demonstrates her unwillingness to take the steps 
necessary to protect her child from jeopardy within a time that meets the 
child’s needs.  Contrary to the mother’s argument, there is also sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that termination of the 
mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  See In re Kayla M., 
2001 ME 166, ¶ 13, 785 A.2d 330. 
The entry is:  
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
1  The Family Treatment Drug Court is described in part on the Judicial Branch’s website: “The 
Family Treatment Drug Court is a specialty docket located in the Maine District Courts that works 
with those families whose children have been at risk of abuse or neglect due to parental abuse of 
drugs or alcohol.”  Me. Judicial Branch website/Courts/Drug Treatment Courts/Family Treatment 
Drug Court (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).   
 
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Erik T. Crocker, Esq., Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, for appellant 
Mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2016-30 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY