Case Title: State v. Hollis

Citation: 161 Vt. 87, 633 A.2d 1362

Docket Number: 92-462

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_HOLLIS.92-462; 161 Vt. 87; 633 A.2d 1362

[Filed 15-Oct-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-462


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Thomas Hollis                                May Term, 1993



 Robert Grussing III, J.

 Karen R. Carroll, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro, for
    plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
    Montpelier, for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.   The State appeals from an order suppressing contraband
 discarded by defendant at police barracks following a custodial arrest for
 possession of marijuana discovered during an unlawful search of his vehicle.
 The question we address is whether suppression of the discarded contraband
 was error considering that police had the authority to arrest, but did not
 arrest, defendant for driving with a suspended license (DLS).  We affirm.
      Acting on a tip, the Windsor Police Department informed the state
 police on March 8, 1991 that specified individuals, including defendant,
 would be transporting cocaine into Vermont that day.  A computer printout
 described the vehicle that the suspects would be driving and indicated that

 

 defendant's license had been suspended.  Based on this information, two
 state police officers stopped the vehicle shortly after it entered Vermont.
 Defendant, the driver, displayed a Louisiana driver's license.  One officer
 placed defendant in the police cruiser and ran a license check, which con-
 firmed that his license had been suspended in Vermont for failure to appear
 in New Hampshire on a motor vehicle charge.  Further investigation revealed
 that the other three occupants of the vehicle had suspended licenses, and
 that all of the occupants, including defendant, resided in Windsor.
      Stating that he smelled marijuana, the other officer searched the
 vehicle.  Marijuana was discovered.  A tape made at the scene of the arrest
 indicates that the first officer informed defendant as follows: "[Y]our
 vehicle is going to be towed, the search is going to continue at the State
 Police Barracks, West Brattleboro.  I'm going to issue you a citation for
 DLS. . . .  I'm placing you under arrest for possession of marijuana."  At
 the barracks, defendant was placed in a conference room by himself.  At one
 point, an officer entered the room and discovered a bag containing cocaine
 and marijuana on the floor.  A short time later, defendant was cited and
 released.
      Defendant was charged with felony possession of cocaine, misdemeanor
 possession of marijuana, and DLS.  At the hearing on defendant's motion to
 suppress, the State conceded that the marijuana found in the vehicle had to
 be suppressed because the search of the vehicle was unlawful.  The State
 argued, however, that the drugs discovered at the police barracks should not
 be suppressed because defendant had been lawfully arrested for DLS.  The
 State pointed out that an officer may arrest a person for a misdemeanor if
 the person's ties to the community are not sufficient to assure that the

 

 person will respond to a citation, or if the person has previously failed to
 appear in response to a citation or other court order.  The State argued
 that defendant was properly arrested for DLS because he was coming from out
 of state, he presented a license from a different state, and he had failed
 to appear at a court proceeding in yet another state.
      Defendant conceded that the stop was legal, but argued the evidence
 discovered at the police barracks was the "tainted fruit" of an illegal
 arrest that directly resulted from an unlawful search.  The district court
 ruled that the evidence must be suppressed because (1) despite the officer's
 testimony that he arrested defendant for possession of marijuana and DLS,
 the actual ground for the arrest, as stated by the officer at the time the
 arrest was made, was possession of marijuana; and (2) assuming defendant had
 also been arrested for DLS, a custodial arrest would have been improper
 because the officer's doubts concerning defendant's ties to the community
 were minimal.
      On appeal, the State argues that the facts known to the officer at the
 time of the arrest permitted the police to take defendant to the state
 police barracks and then release him on a citation after confirming his ties
 to the community.  Defendant responds that, given the court's finding that
 defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana, not DLS, whether he
 could have been arrested for DLS is irrelevant.  Therefore, according to
 defendant, the arrest was unlawful and the evidence discovered at the
 police barracks must be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the illegal
 arrest.  We agree that the contraband discarded at the police station must
 be suppressed.

 

      At the outset, we note that we cannot affirm the trial court's decision
 on the ground that an arrest for DLS, even if intended, would not have been
 lawful.  Although the court concluded that a custodial arrest would have
 been improper because the officer's doubts concerning defendant's ties to
 the community were minimal, it did not address the State's argument that a
 custodial arrest for DLS would have been proper under V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(2)(E)
 because the officer was aware that defendant had previously failed to appear
 in response to a citation before another court.  We conclude that a
 custodial arrest for DLS would have been appropriate here under Rule
 3(c)(2)(E), which permits arrest or continued custody for a misdemeanor when
 the "person has previously failed to appear in response to a citation,
 summons, warrant or other order of court issued in connection with the same
 or another offense."
      While it is true that allowing police to make a custodial arrest for a
 misdemeanor because of the defendant's prior failure to appear is most
 likely based on the same rationale as the one allowing an arrest where the
 defendant's ties to the community are in doubt, the latter does not subsume
 the former.  Compare V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(2)(D) with V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(2)(E).  In
 effect, a prior failure to appear, regardless of other factors, creates
 enough doubt about whether the defendant would respond to a citation to
 allow a custodial arrest.  Further, the fact that defendant ultimately was
 released on citation would not somehow invalidate an arrest for DLS.  The
 police could have made a custodial arrest for DLS based on defendant's
 previous failure to appear, and then released him when they were satisfied
 that he would appear.  See V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(1) (citation must be issued once
 reasons for custodial arrest no longer exist).

 

      Our determination that the officer could have arrested defendant for
 DLS does not end our inquiry, however.  We must address whether the
 arresting officer's actual motives or stated grounds for the arrest may be
 considered in determining whether the arrest broke the causal link between
 the unlawful search and the discovery of the contraband at the police
 station.  Although we have recently followed the majority of the federal
 circuits, which limit Fourth Amendment analysis to examining "the objective
 legality of the arrest,"  State v. Towne, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 615 A.2d 484,
 496-97 (1992), we have not addressed this issue in the precise context
 presented here.
      In Towne, the defendant argued that his warrantless arrest on a federal
 firearms charge was a mere pretext for interrogating him regarding a murder
 he was suspected of committing, and therefore was unlawful.  We held that
 regardless of the officer's underlying motive for the arrest, the arrest was
 valid because (1) the officer had probable cause to believe defendant was
 carrying a firearm in violation of federal law, and (2) the warrantless
 arrest was authorized by state law.  Id. at ___, 615 A.2d  at 497.  We
 followed this two-part objective test because we recognized that it was more
 consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent than the test
 followed by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, which seeks to determine
 whether an arrest or stop would have been made absent the allegedly improper
 motive.  Id. at ___ n.3, 615 A.2d  at 497 n.3 (citing Scott v. United States,