Case Title: Bevan v. Garrett

Citation: 284 Or. 293, 586 P.2d 1119

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1978-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
586 P.2d 1119 (1978)
284 Or. 293
Joseph BEVAN, Appellant,
v.
Helen GARRETT, Respondent.
TC 76-2882-L-3; SC 25628.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted November 3, 1978.
Decided November 22, 1978.
*1120 Robert L. Cowling, Medford, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs was Dennis H. Black, of Ford & Cowling, Medford.
James C. Rhodes, Deputy Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., and Al J. Laue, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before DENECKE, C.J., and HOLMAN, TONGUE, HOWELL and LINDE, JJ.
Argued and Submitted at Eugene, November 3, 1978.
TONGUE, Justice.
This is an action for damages arising from a false statement allegedly made by defendant about plaintiff, who was then a candidate for the office of Treasurer of Jackson County. The complaint alleged two causes of action: one as an action under ORS 260.532 relating to false statements about candidates for public office and the second as an action for common law defamation. Plaintiff appeals from the granting of defendant's motion for a summary judgment. We affirm.
Defendant was the Administrator of the Oregon State Board of Accountancy. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that:
Defendant's answer denied these allegations and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that any statement made by defendant about plaintiff on or about October 5, 1976, was made by defendant in the performance of her official duties as a state officer. This allegation was denied by plaintiff's reply.
Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment based upon affidavits. According to defendant's affidavit:
The letter to plaintiff dated July 23, 1976, stated, among other things, that:
The answering letter from plaintiff's attorney, dated August 3, 1976, stated, among other things, that:
The responding letter from defendant to plaintiff's attorney, dated September 23, 1976, stated, among other things, that:
Before receiving an answer to that letter, however, the following occurred, according to defendant's affidavit:
No affidavits filed by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment denied these facts, as alleged in the affidavit of defendant attached to her motion for a summary judgment.[1]
Upon this record, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of defendant, based on a finding that
In support of his contention that the trial court erred at the entry of summary judgment plaintiff says in his brief, among other things, that:
Since the adoption of the statute providing for motion for summary judgment (ORS 18.105), this court has on several occasions attempted to make it clear to lawyers the effect of the express terms of that statute. Under ORS 18.105, when a defendant makes a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits stating facts under which (if true) plaintiff would not be entitled to a judgment, the plaintiff cannot successfully oppose such a motion by contending that the facts as stated in such affidavits are contrary to the allegations of his complaint, with the result that an issue of fact is presented so as to make it improper to grant the motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Melton v. Allen, 282 Or. 731, 735, 580 P.2d 1019 (1978); Gleason v. International Multifoods Corp., 282 Or. 253, 257-58, 577 P.2d 931 (1978); Pelege v. Chrysler, 278 Or. 223, 227, 563 P.2d 701 (1977).
As pointed out in Gleason, upon which plaintiff seeks to rely (282 Or. at 257-58, 577 P.2d at 933), ORS 18.105(4) expressly provides that:
In Gleason, the court held (at 258, 577 P.2d at 933) that:
In this case plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was supported by affidavits, by filing counter affidavits which denied the truth of the facts as stated in defendant's affidavits, and as set forth above. It follows that the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motions for summary judgment based upon his finding that "there was no genuine issue as to any material fact" unless even under the facts alleged in defendant's affidavit, the entry of summary judgment would not be "appropriate." See ORS 18.105(4). Cf. Gleason v. Multifoods Corp., supra, at 258, 577 P.2d 931.
Plaintiff makes no such direct contention. Plaintiff states in his brief, however, that:
*1123 It may or may not be true, as contended by plaintiff, that defendant's attorneys did not, at the time of argument in support of her motion for summary judgment, expressly contend that her affidavit established that no defamation occurred. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, however, was upon the express ground, among others, that there was "no genuine issue as to certain material facts." In addition, when it appears from the record that a trial judge has entered a judgment which reaches a correct result, we affirm such a judgment even though at the time of trial neither party states as a contention the reason why the entry of such a judgment was proper. See State Farm Fire. v. Sevier, 272 Or. 278, 298, 537 P.2d 88 (1975).
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant "did utter and did cause to be published in the Medford Mail Tribune" a statement to the effect that plaintiff's lawyer had promised that plaintiff's future campaign advertisements "would not describe Bevan as an accountant."
We believe it to be obvious that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover a judgment either under ORS 260.532 or at common law if, as stated in defendant's affidavit, her statement to the reporter was "that plaintiff was not a licensed accountant and that plaintiff's attorney had written to the Board to the effect that plaintiff's future advertisements would not describe plaintiff as a licensed accountant" (as stated in his letter of August 3, 1976, also attached to defendant's motion), and that she "did not tell the reporter that plaintiff's attorney had written to the Board that plaintiff's future advertisements would not describe him as an accountant." This is so because under such facts plaintiff did not "utter" the alleged false statement and also did not "cause to be published" the erroneous story by the Medford Mail Tribune that plaintiff's attorney had promised that plaintiff's future campaign advertisements "would not describe Bevan as an accountant."
On this record we cannot say that the entry of a summary judgment was not "appropriate" within the meaning of ORS 18.105(4). It follows that the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.[2]
Affirmed.
[1]  Affidavits were filed by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's affidavits, however, did not deny those portions of the affidavit of the defendant, as set forth above, including her statement as to what she told the newspaper reporter.
[2]  Because of the basis on which we decide this case we need not consider defendant's further contention that in making the statements complained of she was acting as the administrator of the Oregon State Board of Accountancy and was performing a discretionary function so as to be protected by a absolute privilege and that ORS 260.532 extends only to written, not oral, statements about candidates for public office. Nor do we face a question whether liability can constitutionally be imposed for such statements about a candidate.