Case Title: Allen Hodgdon v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-1867

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1867
____________
ALLEN HODGDON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[July 5, 2001]
SHAW, J.
We have for review the decision in Hodgdon v. State, 764 So. 2d 872 (Fla.
4th DCA 2000), which certified conflict with the decision in Bailey v. State, 634 So.
2d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const.  This case presents us with the opportunity to clarify our holding in Tripp v.
State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993).  
TRIPP V. STATE
In Tripp the defendant pled guilty to charges of burglary and grand theft. 
1.  The general parameters of the sentencing guidelines are spelled out in
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701.  As to how the guidelines function, in
Tripp we observed:
The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is “to
establish a uniform set of standards to guide the
sentencing judge in the sentence decision-making
process” so as to eliminate unwarranted variation in
sentencing.  Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.301(b).  One guidelines
scoresheet must be utilized for all offenses pending
before the court for sentencing.  Fla.R.Crim.P.
3.701(d)(1).  A sentence must be imposed for each
separate offense, but the total sentence cannot exceed the
-2-
Tripp was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment on the burglary charge and four
years’ probation on the grand theft charge consecutive to the burglary sentence. 
Following his release from prison, Tripp violated probation and it was revoked. 
The trial court sentenced him to four-and-a-half years’ incarceration on the grand
theft charge, but gave Tripp credit for the four years he previously served on the
burglary charge.  
On appeal, the Second District reversed the award of credit for time served,
reasoning that Tripp was not entitled to credit for time served on the grand theft
charge on which he violated probation, as the original sentence imposed by the trial
judge was the product of two separate convictions.  So constructed, the total
sentence imposed on Tripp exceeded by three years the sentence permitted under
the guidelines.1 
permitted range of the applicable guidelines scoresheet
unless a written reason is given.  Fla.R. Crim.P.
3.701(d)(12).  Sentences imposed after revocation of
probation must be within the recommended guidelines
range and a one-cell bump.  Fla. R. Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14). 
622 So. 2d at 942.  
2.  In Tripp the Second District certified the following question:
If a trial court imposes a term of probation on one
offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on
another offense, can jail credit for the first offense be
denied on a sentence imposed after a revocation of
probation on the second offense?
622 So. 2d at 941.  
-3-
This Court reversed the Second District, holding that when “a trial court
imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of
incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be
awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second
offense.”  Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 942.2 
At the root of our decision was a desire to effectuate the intent underlying the
sentencing guidelines.  The Second District’s decision would have permitted trial
judges to circumvent the sentencing guidelines by structuring sentences so as to
allow them to impose sentences in excess of the guidelines upon a violation of
probation.  Specifically, the sentence imposed by the trial court upon Tripp’s
-4-
probation violation, without giving Tripp credit for the time he served on the
burglary charge against the grand theft charge, exceeded the highest permitted range
for his total sentence.  We explained:
Thus, it appears that the sentencing method
sanctioned by the district court of appeal is inconsistent
with the intent of the sentencing guidelines.  Under this
method, trial judges can easily circumvent the guidelines
by imposing the maximum incarcerative sentence for the
primary offense and probation on the other counts. 
Then, upon violation of probation, the judge can impose
a sentence which again meets the maximum incarcerative
period.  Without an award of credit for time served for
the primary offense, the incarcerative period will exceed
the range contemplated by the guidelines.  
Id. at 942.  In so holding, we rejected the State’s argument that Tripp was not
entitled to credit for time served against his second conviction because he was
convicted of two separate crimes and received two separate sentences:  “The State,
however, ignores the fact that both offenses were factors that were weighed in the
original sentencing through the use of a single scoresheet and must continue to be
treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been
violated.”  Id.  
Our holding in Tripp was interpreted by the First District in Bailey as
creating, “a ‘bright line’ rule intended to simplify the application of sentencing
guidelines and avoid confusion arising from the varying circumstances that can
-5-
occur in different cases.”  634 So. 2d at 172.  
Bailey was convicted in 1989 of one count of grand theft, one count of
carrying a concealed firearm, and one count of resisting arrest without violence. 
Bailey received a four-year sentence of imprisonment followed by one year of
probation on the grand theft count, a five-year probationary sentence on the
concealed firearm count to run consecutive to the sentence on the grand theft
count, and a one-year probationary sentence on the resisting arrest without violence
charge to run concurrently with the probationary sentence on the grand 
theft count.  In sum, Bailey was sentenced to four years in prison to be followed by
six years of probation.  
After serving the four-year term of imprisonment and being released, Bailey
violated probation.  The trial court revoked probation on all three counts and
sentenced Bailey as follows:  (1) five years in prison on the grand theft charge with
four years’ credit for time served; (2) two years in prison on the concealed firearm
charge, without credit for time served, to run consecutively to count one; and (3)
one year in prison on the resisting arrest without violence count, without credit for
time served, to run concurrently with the sentences in counts one and two.  In total,
Bailey faced a total of three years in prison on the violation of probation, which
brought his total sentence on the 1989 charges to seven years in prison--within the
3.  The First District certified the following question:
-6-
range permitted by the guidelines. 
Nevertheless, the First District applied Tripp to allow Bailey to receive credit
for the four years served on count one against the sentences imposed on all counts
on the violation of probation, although acknowledging that its application produced
a “bizarre result”:
We note, however, that the application of Tripp in
this case leads to a bizarre result.  The trial judge intended
to require Bailey to serve a total of 7 years’ imprisonment
on the three offenses, and the sentence imposed is within
the sentencing guidelines.  However, on resentencing the
circuit court can only impose a sentence of 5 years’
imprisonment on counts 1 and 2 as they are third degree
felonies (only one year can be imposed for the first
degree misdemeanor in count 3).  Four years’ credit
against each of these potential sentences, even if each is
to be served consecutively, will erase any imprisonment
on the misdemeanor count entirely, and leave only 1 year
to be served on each of the felony counts.  As a result,
the total imprisonment that Bailey can be ordered to serve
will be only 6 years.  While we apply the bright line
holding in Tripp in deciding this case, we question
whether the supreme court considered and intended this
potential result. 
Id. at 173.  Accordingly, the Bailey court certified a question to this Court
concerning its application of Tripp where the sentence imposed did not exceed that
permitted by the guidelines.3 We declined to exercise jurisdiction.  See Bailey v.
Does the holding in Tripp require that credit be given for
time served in prison on each consecutive sentence
imposed upon revocation of probation when the failure to
give such credit on each sentence does not result in a
sentence beyond that allowed by the sentencing
guidelines?
Bailey, 634 So. 2d at 173.  
-7-
State, 637 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1994).  
THE PRESENT CASE
In 1989, the petitioner, Allen Hodgdon, was charged with three counts of
DUI manslaughter (counts I-III), one count of leaving the scene of an accident
involving death (count IV), two counts of DUI with serious bodily injury (counts V
and VI), and three counts of vehicular homicide (counts VII-IX).  
Hodgdon pled no contest to counts I through VI as charged and pled no
contest to three counts of reckless driving as lesser included offenses of vehicular
homicide (counts VII-IX).  Hodgdon was sentenced to fifteen years in prison on
count I and five years in prison on count IV to run concurrently.  As to counts II
and III, he was sentenced to ten years’ probation to run concurrently to each other
and consecutively to his fifteen-year prison sentence.  Hodgdon was also sentenced
to consecutive five-year probationary terms on counts V and VI.  The sentences on
counts V and VI were to run consecutively to the ten-year probationary sentences
4.  Prior to the enactment of chapter 89-531, Laws of Florida, “credit for
time served” included jail time actually served and gain time granted pursuant to
section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1991).  See Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 943 n.2.  
-8-
imposed on counts II and III.  Finally, Hodgdon was sentenced to time served on
the reckless driving charges in counts VII-IX.  In sum, Hodgdon was sentenced to
fifteen years in prison (fifteen and five concurrent) followed by twenty years’
probation (ten followed by consecutive five-year terms). 
After serving approximately seven years of his prison sentence, Hodgon was
released and placed on probation.  In 1999 an affidavit of violation of probation
was filed by the State and Hodgdon admitted the violation.  At sentencing,
Hodgdon argued that he was entitled to credit for the time served in his 1989
sentence for each consecutive sentence entered by the trial court on the instant
violation of probation pursuant to Tripp and Bailey.  Stated differently, Hodgdon
claimed that he was entitled to credit for the fifteen years he “served”4 on count I
against each additional count he violated probation on (counts II, III, V, VI). 
Under Hodgdon’s rendition of Tripp, he would have faced no additional jail time
for the violation of probation.   
The trial court rejected Hodgdon’s arguments and sentenced him to a total of
forty years in prison: fifteen years on counts II and III, and five years each on
counts V and VI, all sentences to run consecutively.  The trial court credited the
-9-
fifteen years Hodgdon served on count I against the entire forty-year sentence, and
not against the individual sentence imposed on each count as argued by Hodgdon. 
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed but certified conflict with Bailey.  See
Hodgdon, 764 So. 2d at 873.  
ANALYSIS
At the outset, it must be noted that we are not confronted here with a
sentence that exceeds that permitted under the sentencing guidelines.  That factor
alone, however, does not preclude the application of Tripp.  
In Cook v. State, 645 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1994), we affirmatively answered the
question of “whether Tripp applies to situations in which a defendant is sentenced
to incarcerative terms and ‘resentenced’ to probationary periods using a single
scoresheet.”  Id. at 437.  The defendant in Cook was originally sentenced in 1989
to concurrent three-year terms of probation on one count of grand theft, one count
of forgery, and three counts of passing worthless checks.  In 1990 Cook violated
probation when he was convicted of four new counts--credit card fraud, grand
theft and two counts of forgery.  Cook was sentenced to concurrent four-and-a-
half-year prison terms for these new offenses.  The trial court revoked Cook’s
probation on the 1989 offenses and sentenced Cook to concurrent three-year
probationary periods for each of the 1989 offenses to run consecutively to the
5.  The Fifth and Third Districts have expressed concern over the application
of Tripp where the sentence under attack does not exceed that permitted under the
sentencing guidelines.  See Witherspoon v. State, 776 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 5th DCA
2001) (applying Tripp, albeit reluctantly, where the defendant’s sentence did not
exceed the maximum permitted by the guidelines); Priester v. State, 711 So. 2d 177
-10-
four-and-a-half-year prison term.  After being released from prison and beginning to
serve his probationary sentence on the 1989 offenses, Cook violated probation
again.  The trial court revoked his probation and sentenced Cook to concurrent
three-and-a-half-year prison terms for the 1989 offenses.  The trial court did not
allow Cook credit for the four and a half years he had served on the 1990 offenses. 
The three-and-a-half-year sentence did not exceed the range permitted under the
guidelines.  
We nevertheless applied Tripp, emphasizing the interrelatedness of sentences
computed on a single scoresheet: 
[In Tripp] we recognized that a single guidelines
scoresheet “must be utilized for all offenses pending
before [a] court for sentencing,” and that where a single
scoresheet is used for multiple offenses, those offenses
must continue to “be treated in relation to each other,
even after a portion of the sentence has been violated.” 
Accordingly, where a defendant is sentenced to prison to
be followed by probation for multiple offenses, and
ultimately violates that probation, that defendant’s
cumulative sentence may not exceed the guidelines range
of the original scoresheet.
Cook, 645 So. 2d at 437-38 (citation omitted).5  Of particular relevance to the
(Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (same).  Although we were concerned in Tripp with the
circumvention of the sentencing guidelines, we were equally concerned with
ensuring that offenses treated together at sentencing via a single scoresheet continue
to be treated as a single unit for purposes of sentencing upon a violation of
probation.  
-11-
instant case, we explained how the trial court could have achieved its desired result
of having Cook serve an additional three and a half years in prison on his probation
violation while giving Cook the credit he was entitled to under Tripp:
The sentencing judge clearly intended for Cook to spend
an additional three and a half years in prison for the 1989
offenses.  We note that the sentencing judge could have
structured Cook’s sentence such that Cook would have
spent three and a half years in prison for the 1989
offenses even after being credited for the four and a half
years he served for the 1990 offenses.  As we previoulsy
recognized, with a two-cell increase, Cook could have
been sentenced to a total of 17 years.  After crediting
Cook with time served for the 1990 offenses, Cook
would still have spent three and a half years in prison for
the 1989 offenses if he had been sentenced to eight years. 
The sentencing judge could have sentenced Cook to eight
years for the 1989 offenses--well within the permitted
range. 
Cook, 645 So. 2d at 438 n.5 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  That explanation
refutes Hodgdon’s contention that Tripp mandates the award of credit for time
served against each additional count of probation rather than the entire sentence
imposed on the violation of probation.  
If Cook had been allowed credit for the four and a half years he served in
-12-
prison on the 1990 offenses against each of the three 1989 offenses he violated
probation on, it is clear that the imposition of an eight-year sentence for the
violation on all three 1989 offenses would have been insufficient to achieve the trial
court’s desired result of having Cook spend an additional three and a half years in
prison.  
When stripped down to its facts, it is apparent that Tripp does not mandate
the award of credit for time served against each additional consecutive count of
probation as the First District found in Bailey and Hodgdon contends here.  Unlike
Hodgdon and the defendant in Bailey, the defendant in Tripp violated probation on
only one count.  Accordingly, the net effect of our decision was to allow Tripp
credit for the prison time he served as against the total sentence imposed on the
violation of probation.  Indeed, that is what the trial court did in the instant case in
allowing Hodgdon credit for his fifteen-year incarcerative term against the total
forty-year sentence imposed on the probation violation.   
Moreover, allowing a defendant to receive credit against the entire sentence
imposed on a probation violation permits a defendant’s sentences to be treated as
an interrelated unit as they were when they were originally imposed:  “[B]oth
offenses were factors that were weighed in the original sentencing through the use
of a single scoresheet and must continue to be treated in relation to each other, even
-13-
after a portion of the sentence has been violated.”  Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 942.  
CONCLUSION
In sum, we clarify our holding in Tripp to emphasize that a defendant who
violates probation on multiple counts imposed consecutive to a prison term is
entitled to credit for the time served on the prison term as to the entire sentence
imposed on the probation violation, not against each individual count on which
probation was violated.  This Court’s holding in Tripp was intended to prevent the
circumvention of the guidelines by treating sentences computed on one scoresheet
as an interrelated unit.  Tripp was never intended to provide a sentencing boon or
windfall to defendants upon violations of probation.
Accordingly, we approve Hodgdon and disapprove Bailey.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Direct Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D00-0030 
(St. Lucie County)
-14-
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender,
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney
General, Chief, West Palm Beach Bureau, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant
Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent