Case Title: State v. Crawley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 65/16

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Anthony Allen Crawley, No. 65, September Term, 2016.  Opinion by 
Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL LAW — PLEA AGREEMENT — CORRECTING AN ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE — Respondent, Anthony Allen Crawley, entered into a plea agreement for 
first degree murder and, in accordance with the agreement, was sentenced to life, suspend 
all but 35 years.  Because the sentence did not include a period of probation, Crawley’s 
sentence would be converted to a 35-year term-of-years sentence—an illegal sentence that 
violates the statutorily-prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for first degree 
murder.  See Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477, 513 (2012).  A period of probation was an 
implied term of the plea agreement, and, therefore, the circuit court properly added a period 
of probation to correct the illegality and effectuate the originally-intended split sentence. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
 
Case No. CT 97-0647B 
Argued:  March 3, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 65 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY ALLEN CRAWLEY 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
               JJ. 
 
 
 
                 Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 2, 2017
 
 
 
All forms of first degree murder carry a statutorily-mandated life sentence.  See Md. 
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-201(b) (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.).1  Although a life 
sentence must be imposed, the sentencing court retains the discretion to suspend any 
portion of it so long as the suspended portion carries with it a period of probation.  Md. 
Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222 (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.);2 Cathcart v. State, 
397 Md. 320, 327 (2007).  The absence of a period of probation has the effect of removing 
the portion of the life sentence that has been suspended, leaving standing only the term-of-
years portion of the sentence.  See Cathcart, 397 Md. at 330.  A term-of-years sentence for 
first degree murder is an illegal sentence that must be corrected by adding a period of 
probation.  Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477, 513 (2012). 
                                                          
 
1  Crim. Law § 2-201(b) provides: “A person who commits a murder in the first degree is 
guilty of a felony and on conviction shall be sentenced to . . . imprisonment for life.”  
Section 2-201 was derived, without substantive change, from Md. Code Ann., Article 27, 
§ 412(b) (1996 Repl. Vol.), which was in place at the time Crawley entered into his plea 
agreement. 
 
2  Crim. Proc. § 6-222 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
(a)  Limits on probation after judgment. — A circuit court or the District 
Court may: 
(1)  impose a sentence for a specified time and provide that a lesser 
time be served in confinement; 
(2)  suspend the remainder of the sentence; and 
(3)(i)  order probation for a time longer than the sentence but, subject 
to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, not longer than: 
1.  5 years if the probation is ordered by a circuit court[.] 
 
Section 6-222 was derived, without substantive change, from Md. Code Ann., Article 27, 
§ 641A (1996 Repl. Vol.), which was in place at the time Crawley entered into his plea 
agreement.  We also note that this section has recently been amended, with the amendment 
to take effect in October 2017.  The changes do not affect the substance of the statute as it 
pertains to this case. 
2 
 
 
The case before us presents the question of whether a sentence for first degree felony 
murder containing such an illegality must be corrected as described in Greco when the 
illegal sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement.   For the reasons that follow, 
we hold that the rule established by Greco applies regardless of whether the sentence was 
the product of a plea agreement or upon a conviction following trial. 
I 
The crime, the plea agreement, and the sentencing 
 
This case has its genesis in the 1997 armed robbery and murder of a District of 
Columbia policeman, Officer Oliver Smith, who was off duty at the time.  The subsequent 
investigation quickly led the police to conclude that Respondent, Anthony Allen Crawley, 
and two co-actors, Antwaun Brown and Donovan Strickland, were involved in the 
commission of the crime.  Crawley was charged with first degree felony murder and armed 
robbery.  In exchange for his agreement to testify truthfully against Brown and Strickland, 
Crawley agreed to plead guilty to both charges.   
 
The plea hearing was held in September 1997.  At the outset of that hearing, counsel 
for Crawley made the following request:  “We are asking the Court to bind itself to an 
agreement reached between the State and the Defense that the sentence in this case would 
be life, which the Court would be required to impose, but that all but thirty-five years would 
be suspended on the felony murder charge.”  The plea agreement, which was read at the 
hearing, provided in pertinent part: 
The State, the Court, and the Defendant agree that the Defendant shall be 
sentenced after the conclusion of the trials of codefendants Antwaun Brown 
and Donovan Strickland, to life suspend all but 35 years for the aforesaid 
3 
 
felony murder charge.  The underlying charge of robbery with a deadly 
weapon will merge, by operation of law, with the felony murder charge at 
sentencing. 
 
The plea agreement did not mention probation, and the court did not utter the term 
“probation” during the hearing, except in the course of a somewhat lengthy colloquy with 
Crawley concerning the impact that his guilty plea in the present case could have on his 
then-current status in the criminal justice system.  Even then, the court’s reference to 
probation was in asking Crawley whether he was “on any kind of parole or probation at 
this point in time.”  Neither the State nor defense counsel referred to probation in 
connection with the sentence presented by the plea, and neither brought up the necessity to 
have a period of probation attached to the suspended portion of the life sentence.  
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declared its satisfaction that the plea was 
“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made,” and that defense counsel had discussed 
the plea in detail with Crawley and, with Crawley’s consent, his family.  The court then 
formally accepted the plea agreement. 
 
Sentencing took place a little more than a year later, on October 16, 1998.  At the 
hearing, the court reiterated the agreement in imposing the sentence: 
The sentence of this Court is, as to Count One, first degree felony murder, 
that you be sentenced to life in prison.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, all 
but 35 years is suspended, and that sentence is to commence as of February 
27th, 1997. 
 
As to Count Two, robbery with a deadly weapon, the sentence is that the 
Court rules that no sentence can be imposed because under felony murder 
robbery with a deadly weapon merges with Count Number One.  
 
4 
 
No mention of probation was made by anyone at any time during the hearing.  The 
commitment record indicates a sentence of “life, all but 35 years suspended,” with the box 
for the probation period left blank.   
 
In 2011, Crawley initiated the present challenge to the legality of his sentence.  
Before addressing that claim, we pause to review the then-evolving jurisprudential 
landscape in Maryland that bears directly on the claim he makes.  
II 
Cathcart v. State, Greco v. State, and their effect on this case 
 
Cathcart v. State 
 
On February 9, 2007, this Court decided Cathcart, 397 Md. at 320.  The defendant 
Cathcart was convicted by a jury of first degree assault and common law false 
imprisonment.  Id. at 322.  He was sentenced to ten years in prison on the assault conviction 
and to life imprisonment with all but ten years suspended on the false imprisonment 
conviction.  Id.  Cathcart appealed and challenged the life sentence for false imprisonment 
as disproportionately excessive, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and the Constitution of Maryland.  Cathcart v. State, 169 Md. App. 
379, 388 (2006).  The Court of Special Appeals, noting in part that “no period of probation 
was imposed,” concluded that, “[i]f . . . appellant serves the entire unsuspended ten years, 
he will have no future risk of being retaken, as there is no probation to be violated.”  Id. at 
389.  Focusing on what was effectively a ten-year sentence, the Court of Special Appeals 
readily concluded that the sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the 
crime.  Id. at 391. 
5 
 
 
Cathcart sought and we granted a writ of certiorari to review his challenge to what 
he maintained was an illegal sentence.  Before us, Cathcart advanced an argument different 
from his argument in the Court of Special Appeals.  We summarized the new argument 
this way: 
Acknowledging that, in the absence of a period of probation attached to the 
suspended part of the sentence, there will be no occasion for the suspended 
part of the sentence ever to be executed and that, as a result, he will never 
have to serve more than ten years on that sentence, [Cathcart] complains that 
the effect of the sentence [for common law false imprisonment] as articulated 
[by the Court of Special Appeals to be ten years] and when considered 
together with the ten-year sentence for assault, is to preclude any parole 
consideration for the entire duration of the twenty years. 
   
Cathcart, 397 Md. at 324.  To that argument, we responded:   
We do not agree that the sentences imposed on Cathcart were in any way 
illegal.  The sentence imposed on the assault conviction was well within the 
permissible statutory range, and, as we shall explain, the sentence imposed 
for false imprisonment, despite its wording, was not a life sentence and has 
no attribute or collateral consequence of a life sentence.  What the court has 
effectively done is to impose two ten-year sentences, one consecutive to the 
other, and there is nothing unlawful in its doing so.  
 
Id. at 325.  
 
Our conclusion was grounded in three sentencing principles: 
“[1] in the absence of statutory authority a court does not possess any power, 
after sentence has been pronounced, to suspend the execution of its judgment 
so as to relieve an accused, either in whole or in part, from suffering the 
sentence imposed”[; 2] that, pursuant to Art. III, § 60 of the Maryland 
Constitution, the General Assembly has the power, by “suitable general 
enactment,” to provide for the suspension of sentences in criminal cases[;] 
and [3] that any suspension of execution of a sentence by a court, in whole 
or in part, must be in conformance with an authorizing statute.   
 
Cathcart, 397 Md. at 327 (citing State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 512-13, 518-
19 (1974)). 
6 
 
 
For purposes of resolving the sentencing issue presented in Cathcart, we noted:  
What is relevant from Shearin is the principle that, because the Maryland 
Constitution has vested in the General Assembly the power to enact 
legislation providing for the suspension of sentences, if the Legislature, 
pursuant to that authority, enacts such legislation setting conditions or 
limitations on the suspension of sentences, courts are not authorized to ignore 
or act inconsistently with those conditions or limitations.   
 
Cathcart, 397 Md. at 328.  We recognized nonetheless that, in Cathcart’s case, because 
there was not a mandatory minimum sentence for the false imprisonment conviction, the 
court’s failure to impose a period of probation did not render the sentence illegal, “but 
simply precludes it from having the status of a split sentence.”  Id. at 330.  Important to the 
case at bar, we addressed the relevance of Crim. Proc. § 6-222 to the analysis.  We 
explained that, “[u]nder what is now CP § 6-222,” courts have the authority to “impose 
what is commonly referred to as a split sentence.”  Cathcart, 397 Md. at 326.  “If a court 
chooses to use that approach, however, it must comply with the requirements of CP § 6-
222, one of which is that there must be a period of probation attached to the suspended part 
of the sentence.”  Cathcart, 397 Md. at 327.  We held that, “[b]ecause the effect of the 
omission is to limit the period of incarceration to the unsuspended part of the sentence, that 
becomes, in law, the effective sentence.”  Id. at 330. 
Greco v. State 
 
Five years after Cathcart, we decided Greco.  Greco was tried and convicted by a 
jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and first degree rape.  Greco, 427 
Md. at 485.  The circuit court sentenced Greco to concurrent terms of life imprisonment 
for the premeditated murder and rape, with all but 50 years suspended; the court did not 
7 
 
impose a period of probation.  Id. at 486.  No separate sentence was imposed for the felony 
murder conviction.  Id. 
 
We determined that “[Greco’s] previously imposed sentence for first degree 
premeditated murder of life, suspend all but fifty years, was converted by operation of law 
into a term-of-years sentence of fifty years imprisonment.”  Id. at 513.  Such conversion, 
as we had said in Cathcart, “does not necessarily make the sentence illegal but simply 
precludes it from having the status of a split sentence” under Crim. Proc. § 6-222.  Greco, 
427 Md. at 505 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  But, unlike the convictions at issue 
in Cathcart, Greco’s conviction for premeditated murder carried a statutorily-prescribed 
penalty of life imprisonment, rendering the resultant 50-year sentence illegal.  See id. at 
505-07, 513. 
 
We further explained in Greco that correcting a split sentence by tacking on a 
probationary period was not an abuse of the authority granted by Maryland Rule 4-345(a).  
We noted that the courts have revisory power, pursuant to Rule 4-345(a), to correct illegal 
sentences and, if necessary, can accomplish the correction by increasing the sentence.  
Greco, 427 Md. at 508.  We held: 
In sum, Petitioner’s previously imposed sentence for first degree 
premeditated murder of life, suspend all but fifty years, was converted by 
operation of law into a term-of-years sentence of fifty years imprisonment.  
That converted sentence was not authorized by statute; therefore, it was 
illegal.  On remand, the Circuit Court is limited by the maximum legal 
sentence that could have been imposed, with the illegality removed.  That is, 
the Circuit Court must impose a sentence of life imprisonment, all but fifty 
years suspended, to be followed by some period of probation. 
 
Id. at 513. 
8 
 
III 
Subsequent proceedings in the present case 
Crawley’s Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence  
 
In May 2011, after Cathcart but before Greco was issued, Crawley, representing 
himself, filed a “Memorandum of Law” requesting the circuit court to “Revise Judgment 
of an Illegal Sentence.”   Crawley asserted that the trial court’s failure to impose a period 
of probation precluded the sentence from having the status of a split sentence.  Crawley 
argued that, under Cathcart, the omission of a period of probation rendered his sentence a 
fixed term-of-years sentence of 35 years.  The circuit court treated Crawley’s pleading as 
a motion to correct an illegal sentence.   
 
By the time the motion came on for a hearing, Greco had been decided.  The circuit 
court ruled that, pursuant to Greco, Crawley’s sentence was an illegal sentence and a new 
sentence was necessary to correct the illegality.  A resentencing hearing was held on April 
26, 2013.  The circuit court explained that, although his “personal druthers would be stick 
with the binding plea agreement, [because] that’s what the parties agreed to,” he could not 
because the sentence was illegal.  Over defense objection, the court vacated the then-extant 
sentence and resentenced Crawley to life imprisonment, all but 35 years suspended, with 
9 
 
four years of supervised probation.3  Crawley, satisfied with the 35-year portion of the 
sentence, but displeased with the addition of the period of probation, appealed that decision 
to the Court of Special Appeals. 
The decision of the Court of Special Appeals and Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
  
A majority of the three-judge panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the 
judgment of the circuit court in an unreported opinion.  Crawley v. State, No. 467, Sept. 
Term, 2013, slip op. at 20-21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 8, 2016).  The panel majority 
agreed with Crawley that the sentence, as modified by the circuit court, was itself illegal 
because it added four years of probation not included as a term of the plea agreement.  Id. 
                                                          
 
3  The court stated: 
 
Life, suspend all but 35 years.  Give him credit from February 27, 1997, 
which Madam Clerk has put it in the computer, translates to 16 years, 62 
days.  Give him credit for that. 
 
The Court will place him on a period of probation.  I can go up to five years.  
But in recognition that you have done extremely well, while balancing the 
interest of society at the same time, the Court will place you on a period of 
four years probation, with the special conditions as follows. 
 
As to Count 1, this is all to Count 1 . . . . 
 
Special conditions.  I am required by law for you to provide a DNA sample, 
which I will order that that be done. 
 
Special conditions are: during that period, you are to submit and pay for 
random urinalysis as directed by your supervising agent, and submit to any 
alcohol, drug evaluation testing, treatment and education, as directed by the 
supervising agent. 
 
The circuit court also ordered Crawley not to have any contact with eight named 
individuals, and waived court costs, Public Defender fees, and probation fees. 
 
10 
 
 
The panel majority recognized that Crawley’s sentence, as converted by operation 
of law to a term-of-years sentence, violated the statutorily-mandated life sentence and that 
Greco mandates the illegality be corrected to impose the life sentence, “with the illegality 
removed.”  Crawley, slip op. at 18-20; see Greco, 427 Md. at 513.  The panel majority 
further recognized the distinction between Greco and Crawley’s case, as the latter and not 
the former involved a plea agreement to which the court had bound itself.   Crawley, slip 
op. at 21.  The panel majority reasoned that the remedy for the sentencing illegality in 
Crawley’s case—suspending a part of the sentence without imposing a period of 
probation—should apply only where the record “demonstrate[s] both an understanding [of] 
and an agreement to the imposition of a probationary period.”  Id. at 19-20 (quoting Rankin 
v. State, 174 Md. App. 404, 414 (2007)).  The panel majority concluded that, because the 
evidence does not establish that Crawley contemplated probation when he entered into the 
plea agreement, that element of the sentence that was imposed at resentencing following 
the motion to correct the original must be removed.  Id. at 20-21. 
 
The panel majority vacated the sentence imposed by the circuit court and remanded 
the case for a hearing, at which Crawley would have the opportunity to negotiate a 
probationary period with the State.  Id. at 21.  The panel majority further directed that, if 
that negotiation is successful, then Crawley “must be resentenced to life imprisonment, 
with all but thirty-five years suspended and to be followed by the agreed-to probationary 
term. . . . [I]f the appellant does not agree with the State to a probationary term, then he 
shall have the right to withdraw his guilty plea in favor of a new trial.”   Id. at 22. 
11 
 
 
The third member of the panel, now-Chief Judge Patrick Woodward, dissented from 
the judgment.  He agreed with the majority that, “we must determine what are the terms of 
his plea agreement,” but he “diverge[d] from the views of appellant and the majority as to 
exactly what are those terms.”  Crawley, slip. op. at 1 (Woodward, J., dissenting).  Chief 
Judge Woodward relied in this case on Rankin.  There, the Court of Special Appeals 
concluded that “we consider terms implied by the plea agreement as well as those expressly 
provided.”  Rankin, 174 Md. App. at 409 (citation omitted).  The Rankin court held that, 
because a period of probation must be attached to a suspended sentence, . . .  
the right to impose a period of probation is included in any plea agreement 
that provides for a suspended sentence. If we were to hold otherwise, the 
imposition of a suspended sentence would be meaningless.   
 
Id. at 411-12 (footnotes omitted).  Chief Judge Woodward reasoned in his dissent in this 
case: 
[T]he instant case leads me to the conclusion that a period of probation is an 
implied term of appellant’s plea agreement to a split sentence of life 
imprisonment suspend all but thirty-five years.  Such conclusion is reinforced 
by the fact that, without a period of probation as an implied term, the plea 
agreement would be for an illegal sentence, and “[a] defendant cannot 
consent to an illegal sentence.” 
 
Crawley, slip op. at 1 (Woodward, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190, 
196 (2000)).  Chief Judge Woodward, finding no error or abuse of discretion on the part of 
the circuit court, would have affirmed the sentence as corrected by that court.  Id. at 4. 
12 
 
 
We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals.  State v. Crawley, 450 Md. 421 (2016).4 
IV 
Discussion 
The parties’ arguments 
 
The State seeks reversal of the holding of the panel majority of the Court of Special 
Appeals.  The State maintains that the circuit court, in resentencing Crawley pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 4-345(a), properly corrected Crawley’s illegal sentence by adding the 
period of probation to effectuate the split sentence imposed at the original sentencing.  
Relying on the undisputed proposition that Crawley’s original sentence was illegal 
pursuant to Greco, the State argues that, because the statutory minimum sentence for felony 
murder is life imprisonment, absent a provision for a period for probation, “there would be 
no ability for the court ever to direct execution of the suspended part of the sentence.”  
(Citation omitted).  The State disagrees with Crawley’s emphasis on the fact that his 
sentence was imposed as a result of a guilty plea.  The State maintains that an illegal 
sentence remains illegal even if it was the product of a plea agreement.  The State further 
                                                          
 
4  The Question Presented for review was: 
Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly vacate Crawley’s corrected 
sentence, where the trial court, pursuant to Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477 
(2012), corrected the illegality in Crawley’s sentence by the addition of a 
period of probation in order to effectuate the split sentence imposed in the 
case?   
 
Oliver Smith, Sr., the father of the deceased murder victim, also filed a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, which this Court denied. 
13 
 
argues that “Crawley’s negotiated arrangement for a split sentence of life imprisonment 
implicitly and necessarily contemplated a period of probation.” 
 
Crawley argues, in response, that the test for determining the legality of a sentence 
imposed pursuant to a plea deal is based upon what a “reasonable lay person would 
understand the agreement to be.”  He asserts that “[i]t would be unreasonable to conclude 
. . . that a lay person in [Crawley’s] position would somehow know that his sentence 
included probation, especially in light of the fact that this Court has held that, in other 
circumstances, probation is not part of the sentence, if a sentencing court fails to mention 
‘probation.’”  (citing Cathcart, 397 Md. at 329).  Crawley maintains that any ambiguity as 
to the nature of the plea agreement must be resolved in his favor to avoid a violation of 
Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(3).5  He agrees with the majority of the Court of Special Appeals 
panel that Greco is distinguishable from the instant case because the defendant in Greco 
received his original sentence following a guilty verdict, rather than a guilty plea.  Finally, 
Crawley requests that, even if this Court reverses the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals, this case be remanded with instructions for the parties to attempt to negotiate a 
new sentence. 
What is—and is not—controlling authority 
 
                                                          
 
5  Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(3) provides that: “If the plea agreement is approved, the judge 
shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action 
encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more 
favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement.”   
 
14 
 
 
Our decision in this case is guided by settled law.  A substantively illegal sentence 
is subject to correction at any time.  Md. Rule 4-345(a).  Whether a sentence is an illegal 
sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) is a question of law that is subject to de novo 
review.  Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 663 (2015). 
 
Courts do not possess the authority to impose a sentence that does not comport with 
a legislatively-mandated sentence, and any such sentence must be corrected to remedy the 
illegality.  See Cathcart, 397 Md. at 325, 329.  The mandated sentence for the crime of first 
degree murder is “imprisonment for life.”  Crim. Law § 2-201(b).  The sentencing court, 
however, is not precluded from imposing a split sentence, even when the crime is first 
degree murder.  But, a court, when imposing a split sentence, must impose a period of 
probation.  Cathcart, 397 Md. at 329 (discussing Crim. Proc. § 6-222).  Moreover, a 
defendant cannot consent to an illegal sentence.  Holmes, 362 Md. at 196. 
 
Crawley acknowledges that the statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment, 
though legitimately split by suspending all but 35 years of imprisonment, suffered from the 
fatal flaw of not including a period of probation.  And, he agrees that the sentence originally 
imposed on his plea of guilty to first degree murder, given the inherent illegality of it, could 
not stand and therefore was subject to later correction pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a). 
 
Neither does Crawley take issue with the remedy established in Greco, which is to 
“impose a sentence of life imprisonment, all but [the term-of-years portion of the original 
split sentence] suspended, to be followed by some period of probation.”  Greco, 427 Md. 
at 513.  He insists, though, that the Greco remedy does not apply here because the 
sentencing illegality arose out of a plea agreement. 
15 
 
 
Crawley directs us to Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (2010).  We held in that case 
that “any question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing term of a 
binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the record established at the 
Rule 4-243 plea proceeding.”  Id. at 582.  What Crawley does not mention is that Cuffley, 
as well as its progeny, Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 (2010), and Matthews v. State, 424 
Md. 503 (2012), dealt with resolving ambiguous sentencing terms of a plea agreement.  See 
Cuffley, 416 Md. at 583 (stating that where “examination of the record leaves ambiguous 
the sentence agreed upon by the parties, then the ambiguity must be resolved in the 
defendant’s favor”); Baines, 416 Md. at 615 (same); Matthews, 424 Md. at 523 (holding 
that the sentencing term of the plea agreement was “ambiguous” and that the “ambiguity 
must be resolved in favor of Petitioner”).  We do not have here an issue concerning an 
arguably ambiguous sentencing term of a plea agreement.  What we have, instead, is a 
sentencing term of a plea agreement that, though agreed upon by the parties and imposed 
by the court, was unequivocally illegal. Cuffley and its progeny therefore have no 
application here. 
Our decision 
 
The principle that a substantively illegal sentence must be corrected applies 
regardless of whether the sentence has been negotiated and imposed as part of a binding 
plea agreement.  Here, the negotiated split sentence to which Crawley agreed and the court 
imposed was the statutorily-mandated life imprisonment, with all but 35 years suspended.  
Because the suspended portion could not remain due to the lack of a probationary period, 
the sentence was converted by operation of law to an illegal term-of-years sentence, which 
16 
 
could not stand.  Crawley’s sentence—unlawful as originally imposed—was properly 
remedied through the imposition of a period of probation. 
 
Greco instructs that a corrected sentence is “limited by the maximum legal sentence 
that could have been imposed, with the illegality removed.”  427 Md. at 513.  The circuit 
court followed the dictates of Greco by vacating the original unlawful sentence, reimposing 
the mandatory life sentence with all but 35 years suspended, and adding a period of 
probation to the suspended portion of that sentence.  In doing so, the circuit court 
effectively removed the illegality created by the absence of a period of probation attached 
to the suspended portion of the life sentence.  There is no dispute that the four-year 
probation period satisfied constitutional standards and statutory limits.  Meyer, 445 Md. at 
670 (“When imposing probation conditions, [a] judge is vested with very broad discretion 
. . . [in order] to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing—punishment, deterrence and 
rehabilitation[,] and is limited only by constitutional standards and statutory limits.”)  
(citations and internal quotations omitted).  The imposition of that period of probation, 
moreover, did not constitute an abuse of the circuit court’s “very broad discretion.”  Id. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.  
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
RESPONDENT.