Case Title: Webb v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 71S05-1106-CR-329

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Phillip R. Skodinski 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
South Bend, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Karl M. Scharnberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 71S05-1106-CR-329 
 
BRICE WEBB, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court, No. 71D03-0910-MR-00023 
The Honorable Jerome Frese, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 71A05-1007-CR-517 
_________________________________ 
 
 
March 23, 2012 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Mar 23 2012, 9:30 am
 
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Charged with murder in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Brice Webb requested a jury 
instruction on the lesser offense of reckless homicide.  The trial court denied the request and 
Webb was convicted as charged.  We granted transfer to address the propriety of the trial court’s 
ruling. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
Webb and his girlfriend, Cherlyn Reyes, shared an apartment.  On October 8, 2009, 
Shane Hillebrand and Ashley Gurrister were visiting the apartment where the four ate dinner, 
watched movies, and drank alcohol.  Gurrister brought a handgun with her that she had recently 
purchased.  The friends posed for photos with the handgun and went outside to shoot the 
handgun in the air. 
 
 
During the course of the evening, Reyes and Gurrister left the apartment to visit friends.  
While they were gone, Webb passed out on the couch while Hillebrand continued watching 
movies.  When Reyes and Gurrister returned later that evening, Reyes began looking through 
Webb’s cell phone call history.  Reyes discovered Webb had been making calls to other women, 
became jealous and upset, and slapped Webb across the face.  A verbal and physical fight 
between Reyes and Webb ensued.  Hillebrand described the fight as “an all out rumble between 
the both of them.  It was more physical than I’ve ever saw [sic] in my life between a male and a 
female.”  Tr. at 354.  The fight lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour.  At one point, 
Webb punched Reyes and briefly knocked her unconscious.  Hillebrand and Gurrister repeatedly 
attempted to break up the fight.  After the fighting had settled down, Reyes went into the 
bathroom to call the women she suspected Webb had been calling, and another fight ensued.  
That fight ended when Gurrister and Hillebrand intervened. 
 
 
Shortly before midnight, Reyes again went into the bathroom to call her friend Jessica 
Hoover.  Hillebrand testified that while Reyes was on the phone, Webb came into the living 
room and asked for a cigarette lighter.  At that time, Hillebrand believed the “gun was still sitting 
on the table.”  Tr. at 356.  Webb lit his cigarette and left the room.  Hoover testified regarding 
her phone conversation with Reyes that she heard Webb come into the bathroom and he 
 
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“sounded a little irritated. . . .  I could hear him loudly in the phone, and they were arguing.”  Tr. 
at 179.  Then Reyes said “Brice, no,” and went quiet.  Tr. at 179.  The next thing Hoover heard 
was Webb screaming, “Cherlyn, baby, wake up, wake up.”  Tr. at 179. 
 
From the apartment’s living room, Hillebrand and Gurrister heard a gunshot and both ran 
toward the bathroom and met Webb in the hallway.  Hillebrand testified Webb said, “I just shot 
my baby’s momma,” Tr. at 357, while Gurrister testified that Webb “said he didn’t mean to, that 
it was an accident.”  Tr. at 483.  They found Reyes lying on the bathroom floor and “watched her 
take her last breath.”  Tr. at 483. 
 
 
During the commotion that followed, Hillebrand took the gun from Webb, and Gurrister 
drove Webb to Hillebrand’s house.  While there Webb woke up Sasha Alexander.  Alexander 
testified that “[Webb] just kept repeating he shot his baby momma.”  Tr. at 415-16.  Still at the 
apartment, Hillebrand called 911 and went outside to wait for police.     
 
 
Officers of the South Bend Police Department arrived at Hillebrand’s home, arrested 
Webb and transported him to the homicide unit where a videotaped interview was conducted.  
During the interview, Webb stated he did not shoot Reyes, that he had left the apartment to buy 
cigarettes at a nearby gas station, and when he returned he found that Reyes had been shot and 
was lying on the bathroom floor. 
 
 
The day after the shooting the State charged Webb with murder.  And on March 5, 2010, 
the State filed an information alleging Webb to be an habitual offender – to which Webb 
objected.  A jury trial began on May 17, 2010, at the close of which Webb requested a jury 
instruction on the lesser offense of reckless homicide.  The trial court denied the request and the 
jury found Webb guilty as charged.  The jury also found Webb to be an habitual offender.  The 
trial court sentenced Webb to sixty-five years for murder enhanced by thirty years for the 
habitual offender adjudication.  
 
 
Webb appealed raising the following restated issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the State to file the habitual offender charge beyond the statutory period allowed for 
 
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amending charges; (2) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Webb’s videotaped 
interview; and (3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser 
offense of reckless homicide.  The Court of Appeals rejected each of these claims and affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court in an unpublished memorandum decision.  See Webb v. State, 
71A05-1007-CR-517 (Ind. Ct. App. April 12, 2011).  Having previously granted transfer thereby 
vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we now reverse the 
judgment of the trial court with respect to Webb’s jury instruction claim.  We summarily affirm 
that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion concerning Webb’s remaining claims.  Additional 
facts are set forth below where necessary. 
 
Discussion  
 
 
In Wright v. State the Court developed a three-part test that trial courts should perform 
when called upon by a party to instruct on a lesser included offense to the crime charged.  658 
N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995).  First, the trial court must compare the statute defining the crime 
charged with the statute defining the alleged lesser included offense to determine if the alleged 
lesser included offense is inherently included in the crime charged.  Id. at 566.  Second, if a trial 
court determines that an alleged lesser included offense is not inherently included in the crime 
charged under step one, then it must determine if the alleged lesser included offense is factually 
included in the crime charged.  Id. at 567.  If the alleged lesser included offense is neither 
inherently nor factually included in the crime charged, the trial court should not give an 
instruction on the alleged lesser included offense.  Id.  Third, if a trial court has determined that 
an alleged lesser included offense is either inherently or factually included in the crime charged, 
“it must look at the evidence presented in the case by both parties” to determine if there is a 
serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the 
lesser offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was 
committed but not the greater.  Id.  “[I]t is reversible error for a trial court not to give an 
instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense” if there is 
such an evidentiary dispute.  Id.  
 
 
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Applying the foregoing framework, as to the first two prongs of the Wright test the only 
element distinguishing murder and reckless homicide is the defendant’s state of mind: reckless 
homicide occurs when the defendant “recklessly” kills another human being, and murder occurs 
when the killing is done “knowingly” or “intentionally.”  Compare Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5, with 
I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1).  Reckless conduct is action taken in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable 
disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from 
acceptable standards of conduct.  I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c).  By contrast, a person engages in conduct 
“knowingly” if the person is aware of a “high probability” that he or she is doing so.  I.C. § 35-
41-2-2(b).1  Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.  See 
Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144, 1150 (Ind. 2001).  The determinative issue here is whether 
the evidence produced a serious evidentiary dispute concerning Webb’s state of mind that would 
justify giving the requested instruction. 
 
 
The trial court refused Webb’s request to give a reckless homicide lesser included jury 
instruction because Webb “denied the act [of murder], period.  When he denies the act, he cannot 
then take advantage of the inherent lesser” included offense.  Tr. at 680.  The trial court was 
certainly correct that Webb himself declared not only was he not the shooter but also he was not 
even present when the shooting took place.  But that does not end the analysis.  Wright makes 
clear that in determining whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists the trial court “must look at 
the evidence presented in the case by both parties.”  Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567 (emphasis 
added).  The Court has been consistent in this regard.  See Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 680 
(Ind. 2004) (“[W]hen addressing the question of whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute, 
the court must evaluate the evidence presented by both parties.”); Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 
252, 255 (Ind. 1998) (“[T]he trial judge must consider whether the evidence provided by both 
parties creates a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements which distinguish the 
greater from the lesser offense.”); Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 473 (Ind. 1998) (“[T]he 
inquiry hinges on whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists as to which offense was committed 
by the defendant, given all the evidence presented by both parties.”); Champlain v. State, 681 
                                                 
1 We do not address whether Webb “intentionally” killed Reyes because the charging information alleged 
only that Webb “knowingly” did so.  Appellant’s App. at 5.  
 
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N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1997) (“[T]he question whether to give the instruction hinges on the 
evidence presented by both parties.”).  
 
 
To be sure, if we consider only the evidence presented by Webb, there would be no 
question that he would not be entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense.  But Wright 
and its progeny dictate that the evidence presented by the State must also be taken into account.  
This point is well illustrated in at least two cases.  For example, in Young the defendant 
interposed an alibi – the classic “I didn’t do it because I wasn’t there” defense – and for that 
reason the trial court refused to give the defendant’s tendered reckless homicide instruction.  699 
N.E.2d at 256.  Yet this Court unanimously held that because there was a serious evidentiary 
dispute, the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of 
reckless homicide.  Reversing the trial court and remanding for new trial, the Court declared that 
“[p]resenting an alibi defense does not automatically bar instructions on a lesser included 
offense.”  Id.  The Court noted that “[w]hether a defendant raises an affirmative defense bears 
only tangentially on the issue of whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the 
State’s case in chief.”  Id. at 256 n.5.   
 
Young relied on Champlain, where the trial court refused to give the defendant’s tendered 
reckless homicide instruction because the defendant had argued that another person had 
committed the murder.  In essence defendant’s theory of the case was “to pin the murder” on 
someone else.  Champlain, 681 N.E.2d at 700.  On review this Court determined that the trial 
court’s refusal was reversible error.  We held that the trial court’s statement that such a defense 
was inconsistent with defendant’s alternative defense, which conceded defendant’s involvement 
but attempted to show a lower level of mental culpability, was inadequate to explain that no 
serious evidentiary dispute existed regarding whether the defendant had committed murder or 
reckless homicide.  Specifically the Court declared: “Assuming without deciding that it is within 
the trial court’s discretion to refuse to instruct on affirmative defenses if they are inconsistent 
with the defense’s contentions, the issue in this case is whether an instruction is required when 
there is a serious evidentiary dispute as to an element of the State’s case in chief.”  Id.  Young 
also discusses with approval a pre-Wright case, Shelby v. State, 281 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. 1972), 
 
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where a defendant charged with robbery presented an alibi defense but was convicted of theft, a 
lesser included offense of robbery.  699 N.E.2d at 256. 
 
 
We observe that looking at the evidence presented in the case by both parties ensures that 
both the prosecution and the defense are entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if there 
is a serious evidentiary dispute justifying it.  Although this rule is admittedly deployed far more 
often on a defendant’s behalf, there are times when the State decides at the close of all the 
evidence that it wants the benefit of instructing the jury on a lesser included offense.  There are 
times when a defendant objects to a lesser included offense instruction.  Indeed, in Wright the 
defendant appealed the giving of instructions on the lesser offenses of murder.  It is precisely 
because we intended the door to swing both ways that Wright makes such a strong point of 
saying that a serious evidentiary dispute requires the court to “look at the evidence presented in 
the case by both parties.”  658 N.E.2d at 567. 
 
In this case, the State’s evidence concerning Webb’s state of mind is at best ambiguous. 
As defense counsel pointed out at trial, there were “discrepancies of evidence that came through 
at various times from two other people who [were present at the scene] who say [Webb] had the 
gun, even how he got it, even when it got loaded or by whom it was loaded or unloaded, we 
think [that] raises a question as to whether or not when the gun was fired whether or not the 
person who fired it knew that it was in fact loaded.”  Tr. at 679.  Defense counsel was referring 
to the testimony from Hillebrand and Gurrister.  Hillebrand testified that Gurrister brought a gun 
to the apartment and all four present, Hillebrand, Gurrister, Reyes, and Webb, played with the 
gun.  Tr. at 350.  Each fired the gun into the air.  Tr. at 351.  Gurrister and Webb both unloaded 
the gun at different points in the evening.  Tr. at 351-52.  Hillebrand, Gurrister, and Webb had 
pictures taken posing with the gun, and Webb pointed the gun at both Gurrister and Reyes in a 
“playing but not playing way.”  Tr. at 352.  Gurrister similarly testified that she brought a gun to 
the apartment and each of the four fired the gun.  Tr. at 476-77.  She testified that she posed with 
the gun and “took the clip out a lot of times.”  Tr. at 477.  The four also passed the gun around 
“talking and just looking at it.”  Tr. at 477.  Further, when Webb pointed the gun at Reyes, “the 
clip wasn’t in it . . . at that time.”  Tr. at 477.  Gurrister and Reyes left the apartment for 
approximately an hour and a half.  Gurrister testified she “took the clip with me because I didn’t 
 
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want [Hillebrand and Webb] shooting [the gun] off while I was gone.  But I didn’t want to ride 
with it because we had been drinking.  So I left the gun there and I took the clip with me.”  Tr. at 
478.  After returning to the apartment, the gun was in Gurrister’s purse, but she did not testify 
specifically if it had been reloaded.  See Tr. at 484-85.  Finally, Gurrister testified that after 
hearing the gunshot, she ran toward the bathroom and encountered Webb who said “he didn’t 
mean to [shoot Reyes], that it was an accident.”  Tr. at 483.  Hoover, who was on the phone with 
Reyes when she was shot, heard Webb say “Cherlyn, baby, wake up, wake up.”  Tr. at 179. 
 
 
The evidence in this case is certainly sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict of 
murder.  However, the evidence also produced a serious evidentiary dispute concerning whether 
Webb acted knowingly or recklessly.  And depending on how the jury might have weighed and 
credited all of this evidence, it very well could have returned with a conviction of reckless 
homicide.  The trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless 
homicide was reversible error.   
 
Conclusion 
 
We reverse Webb’s conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.  
 
Dickson and Sullivan, JJ., concur. 
David, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Shepard, C.J., joins. 
 
 
David, J., dissenting. 
 
A jury convicted Webb of murdering Reyes after a trial court denied Webb’s request for 
a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide.  I agree with the trial court, 
and therefore respectfully dissent.  As the trial court said, 
[h]e has denied the act, period.  When he denies the act, he cannot then take 
advantage of the inherent lesser and say, well, even if they think I’m a liar and 
think I did it, I’m entitled to the lesser because for this argument the judge should 
assume that I was lying also and give me that but then give me the benefit of the 
lesser. 
 
I agree with the majority that the issue here is the third prong of the Wright test, to “look 
at the evidence presented in the case by both parties” to determine if there is a serious 
evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser 
offense, and thus, if a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the 
greater.  Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind. 1995).  However, I find the cases cited in the 
majority opinion to be distinguishable from the facts before us today.   
 
In Champlain v. State, 681 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. 1997); Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. 
1998); and Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. 1998), the defendant in each case did not 
testify.  In Fisher v. State, which the majority opinion also cites today, the defendant testified that 
he did not intend to shoot the victim and was only “playing around” with the gun.  810 N.E.2d 
674, 680 (Ind. 2004).  Furthermore, Fisher testified after the gun discharged, he “started 
screaming, I’m sorry, I’m sorry” and called for an ambulance.  Id.  Similarly, had Webb testified 
to his mens rea at the time of the crime, he would have been entitled to the lesser included 
instruction.   
 
I find the present case analogous to Wilson, in which the defendant proffered an insanity 
defense.  697 N.E.2d at 474.  In concluding the trial court correctly refused Wilson’s reckless 
homicide instruction, this Court said, “[b]ecause a successful insanity defense would make 
Wilson nonculpable for any offenses he may have committed, the insanity defense cannot be the 
mechanism to demonstrate dispute entitling him to a lesser included instruction.”  Id. at 475.  
The logic is analogous to our majority holding today, that had the jury believed Webb’s 
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testimony, they could have found him not guilty, similar to if a jury had believed Wilson’s 
insanity defense, he would have been not culpable for any offense he committed.   
 
I believe to require the trial court to give the lesser included jury instruction when Webb 
claims under oath at trial that he was not present and therefore not the shooter would result in a 
farce upon the trial court.  It would be giving Webb the opportunity to testify that he was not 
there and could not have committed the crime, but that if the jury believed he was there, then he 
didn’t intend to kill her.   
The defendant chose to testify.  He did not have to and certainly if he had not, no adverse 
inference could have been drawn.  In fact, had he not testified, he most certainly would have 
been entitled to the lesser included instruction.  However, he chose to testify.  That was his 
choice.  His testimony was that he was not there.  He should not be allowed to make a mockery 
out of the state’s burden of proof and argue to a jury he was not there, but if he was, he didn’t 
have the necessary intent.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
Shepard, C.J., joins.