Case Title: Jerry M. Blevins and Carol A Blevins v. Hillwood Office Center Owners' Association et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090512

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Released: 06/18/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
_________________________
1090512
_________________________
Jerry M. Blevins and Carol A. Blevins
v.
Hillwood Office Center Owners' Association et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-08-901041)
WOODALL, Justice.
Jerry 
M. 
Blevins 
("Jerry") 
and 
Carol 
A. 
Blevins
("Carol"), husband and wife, appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of the Hillwood Office Center Owners' Association, Inc.
("the HOCOA"), and Russ Chandler, Mark Mullins, Jerry
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2
Mitchell, Mike Underwood, Buddy Rousso, and Charles Henson,
members of the board of directors of the HOCOA.  We vacate the
judgment, dismiss the appeal, and dismiss the action.
I. Factual Background
On March 29, 2005, Carol purchased Unit 200-3, Building
200, Phase I ("the unit"), of Hillwood Office Center, a
condominium office complex ("the complex").  By quitclaim deed
dated May 15, 2005, Carol purported to transfer her interest
to Jerry.  However, the deed was witnessed solely by Jerry.
Moreover, the deed was never recorded in the office of the
Montgomery Probate Court, and no copy was presented to the
HOCOA.  In that connection, Article IX.D.2. of the HOCOA's
declaration of condominium ("the DOC") provides: 
"Change of membership in the [HOCOA] shall be
established by the recording in the Probate Court
records of Montgomery County, Alabama, of a deed or
other instrument establishing record title to a
unit, and upon delivery to [the HOCOA] of a
certified copy of such instrument, the owner
designated by such instrument thereby becomes a
member of [the HOCOA], and the membership of the
prior owner shall be thereby terminated."
(Emphasis added.)
By April 15, 2005, Jerry had begun operating a law
practice in the unit.  He planted shrubbery in front of the
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3
unit at a cost of approximately $300.  However, the shrubbery
wilted and died from lack of water. He then replanted the
shrubbery, at a cost of another $300.  When Jerry inquired as
to why the in-ground sprinkler system at the complex was never
activated, Charles Henson, the owner of another unit in the
complex, told him that the sprinkler system had not been
operational for several years.  
In that connection, Jerry also learned that the HOCOA had
not held annual meetings in several years and that it had no
board of directors.  According to Jerry's affidavit submitted
in opposition to the defendants' summary-judgment motion, he
then instigated a meeting of purported unit owners for the
purpose of selecting a board of directors.  At the meeting,
the owners elected a board of directors, of which Jerry was a
member and president.  He served in that capacity for the next
three years.  
During that time, the sprinkler system was repaired.  It
could be activated by anyone from an unlocked control panel
located at the rear of the complex.  While he was serving as
president of the board of directors, Jerry activated the
sprinkler system at his discretion.  However, he was the only
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one to do so, and he did so over the objections of Chandler,
Mitchell, Underwood, and Henson.  Their objections centered on
the costs incurred by the HOCOA for the water usage.
Jerry resigned from the board of directors and the
presidency in June 2008.  In July 2008, the HOCOA elected a
new board of directors, including Chandler, Mullins, Mitchell,
Underwood, Rousso, and Henson.  Mullins was elected president.
On August 10, 2008, Jerry activated the sprinkler system.
The next day, Jerry discovered that a lock had been installed
on the box containing the control panel for the sprinkler
system.  The discovery prompted a flurry of e-mails that same
day from Jerry to Chandler and other members of the HOCOA'S
board of directors.  
At 11:56 a.m., Jerry wrote to Chandler in an e-mail:
"Until such time as I am provided with a key to the lock on
the sprinkler controller box, I would appreciate you ensuring
that the lock is immediately removed.  Otherwise, I shall have
no recourse but to cut it off."  At 1:39 p.m., Chandler sent
Jerry the following e-mail:
"I forwarded your earlier request to the board.  If
you can show me in the by-laws where every
association member is entitled to a key to the
sprinkler 
system, 
I 
will 
forward 
the 
same
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information to the board.  We want to ensure that we
do everything correctly.  The only people with a key
will be the president and the lawn maintenance
contractor.  If you remove the lock, you will be
responsible for the damage thereto.  We as officers
and board members are responsible for the common
property areas, not condo owners."
At 2:05 p.m., Jerry sent Chandler the following e-mail:
"I suggest you provide me with a key to the
sprinkler box, or remove the lock by the end of the
day today, or the lock will be cut off tomorrow
morning.  I'll turn the sprinklers on as I see fit
in light of the fact that the board is allowing the
grass to die presently."
(Emphasis added.)
Jerry then sent an e-mail to the board of directors, at
2:44 that same afternoon, in which he stated:
"[Chandler] has advised me on several occasions
today that the lock on the sprinkler control box
will not be removed, nor will I be provided with a
key to the lock.  The grass around my office is
dying as are the bushes that I paid for and
installed.  This is to be expected in light of the
fact that it has not rained for over a week nor have
the sprinklers been run during this time.
"In light of the new course the 'board' has chosen
to take, I advised [Chandler] on this date that in
my opinion, the corporate entity known as Hillwood
Office Center Owners' Association, Inc., no longer
legally 
exists. 
The 
corporation 
has 
not
substantially complied with the laws pertaining to
corporate existence since inception; therefore, I
have 
decided 
not 
to 
recognize 
the 
'board's'
authority on any matters.  Accordingly, I hereby
demand that each of you take appropriate action to
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either remove the lock from the sprinkler control
box, or provide me with a key to the same, or I
shall have no recourse but to take appropriate
action to hold each and every one of you liable for
the intentional interference with my rights as owner
of my office unit.  You have until the close of
business on tomorrow to act on this demand.
"In addition, until such time as the deficiencies
with HOCOA's corporate existence are remedied, I
have 
no 
intention 
of 
adhering 
to 
any 
rule,
regulation, or directive from the 'board' of a
defunct corporation."
(Emphasis added.)
When Jerry subsequently found the control box still
locked, he broke off the lock and activated the sprinkler
system.  However, when he next attempted to activate the
system, he discovered another lock on the control box.  He
broke off the second lock.  This procedure was repeated over
the succeeding weeks until Jerry had broken four locks on the
control panel.  Finally, Chandler removed the entire control
panel and placed it under his exclusive control.  As a result,
Jerry had to water the shrubbery in front of the unit manually
with a garden hose.  He unsuccessfully sought access to the
HOCOA's corporate records in connection with his contention
that it had not sufficiently complied with laws respecting the
HOCOA's corporate existence.
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On September 29, 2008, Jerry sued the HOCOA, as well as
Chandler, Mullins, Mitchell, Underwood, Rousso, Henson, and
others (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Hillwood").
His complaint sought a declaratory judgment and contained
claims alleging (1) nuisance, (2) breach of fiduciary duty,
(3) conspiracy, (4) specific performance, and (5) conversion.
He sought a judgment declaring, among other things, that the
HOCOA did not "legally exist due to [its] failure to comply
with the formal requirements of corporate existence" and
ordering Hillwood to allow him "immediate access" to various
records of the HOCOA.  His nuisance count averred that
Hillwood "had a duty not to expose [Jerry] to anything that
works hurt, discomfort, annoyance, inconvenience, or damage,"
and that it breached that duty by "intentionally having the
sprinkler controller box locked, and then eventually removed
it from the common area location at [the complex] to prevent
[Jerry] from watering the grounds, resulting in harm to the
landscaping around [Jerry's] office unit."  According to the
complaint, Hillwood converted the sprinkler-control panel by
locking it and eventually removing it from the common area.
Finally, Jerry averred that Hillwood had breached a fiduciary
1090512
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duty owed to him by, among other things, "locking the
sprinkler controller box, and eventually having [it] removed
to prevent [Jerry] from watering the grounds," and "refusing
[his] repeated requests for access to the HOCOA's [records]."
On October 31, 2008, Hillwood filed a "motion to dismiss
and counterclaim," challenging, among other things, Jerry's
standing to sue.   More specifically, it asserted that Carol
was the record owner of the unit and, therefore, that Jerry
"lack[ed] standing to bring any claims regarding the duties
and obligations of the [HOCOA] and/or its board of directors."
(Emphasis added.)  Hillwood also asserted a counterclaim
alleging trespass, by which it sought compensatory and
punitive damages.  The trespass count alleged that Jerry
"lack[ed] any right to access the control box for the
sprinkler system" at the complex and that, "without legal
authority," 
he 
had 
"purposefully, 
intentionally, 
and
repeatedly caused damage to the control box."  Additionally,
Hillwood sought a judgment declaring that, among other things,
Jerry has no right to access, use, or control the sprinkler
system at the complex and had no right to break into the
control panel.  Hillwood also sought a judgment "enjoin[ing]
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9
[Jerry] from damaging, tampering with, or in any way
attempting to use the sprinkler system and/or its control
box."
In December 2008, Jerry amended his complaint to add
Carol as a plaintiff.  Subsequently, Hillwood moved for a
summary judgment on the Blevinses' claims against it.  The
trial court granted Hillwood's motion and certified the
judgment as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
The Blevinses appealed.  On appeal, Hillwood again raises the
issue of standing. 
II. Discussion -- Standing
"'When a party without standing purports to commence an
action, 
the 
trial 
court 
acquires 
no 
subject-matter
jurisdiction.'"  Riley v. Pate, 3 So. 3d 835, 838 (Ala. 2008)
(quoting State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d
1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999)).  "Standing is '"'[t]he requisite
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation.'"'"  Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 4 So. 3d 460, 462-63
(Ala. 2008) (emphasis added)(quoting Pharmacia Corp. v. Suggs,
932 So. 2d 95, 98 (Ala. 2005), quoting in turn In re Allison
G., 276 Conn. 146, 156, 883 A.2d 1226, 1231 (2005)).  "The
1090512
10
jurisdictional defect resulting from the plaintiff's lack of
standing cannot be cured by amending the complaint to add a
party having standing."  Cadle Co., 4 So. 3d at 463 (emphasis
added).  Thus, according to Hillwood, if Jerry lacked standing
to sue at the commencement of the action, the December 2008
amendment adding Carol as a plaintiff was a legal nullity.  We
agree.
"'"To be a [person with standing], the person must have
a real, tangible legal interest in the subject matter of the
lawsuit."'"  Ex parte Simpson, [Ms. 1080981, October 16, 2009]
___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2009) (quoting Ex parte Chemical
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 929 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Ala. 2005), quoting
in turn Doremus v. Business Council of Alabama Workers' Comp.
Self-Insurers Fund, 686 So. 2d 252, 253 (Ala. 1996)).  The
person asserting the claim must specifically allege an injury
in fact to a "legally protected  right."   Property at 2018
Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d at 1027 (emphasis omitted).
Hillwood contends that the quitclaim deed purporting to
transfer title to the unit from Carol to Jerry was
ineffective, because, it argues, it was neither witnessed in
accordance with Ala. Code 1975, § 35-4-20, and relevant
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caselaw nor recorded and filed as required by the DOC.  Thus,
according to Hillwood, the complaint was filed by a non-member
of the HOCOA who, consequently, lacked standing to challenge
the HOCOA's existence and practices.
The Blevinses do not dispute the factual basis for
Hillwood's argument.  Indeed, they concede that Jerry "saw no
need to record and file the deed with the HOCOA as dictated by
HOCOA's governing documents."  Blevinses' brief, at 12
(emphasis added).  The Blevinses' entire response to
Hillwood's jurisdictional challenge is found in their reply
brief, as follows:
"[I]t is indeed amusing that it was [Hillwood] who
first raised the issue of standing as it relates to
[Jerry], and argued that [Jerry] had no right to
complain about [Hillwood's] misconduct, or to even
bring 
this 
action, 
because 
[Jerry] 
had 
not
technically 
complied 
with 
HOCOA's 
governing
documents with respect to his ownership interest in
Suite 
200-3. 
 
Now 
that 
the 
Blevinses 
have
established [Hillwood's] 
non-compliance 
with 
HOCOA's
governing documents as it pertains to the election
of the 'Board,' [Hillwood] cartoonishly argue[s]
that despite this non-compliance the 'Board' was
lawful. [Hillwood] clearly want[s] to have [its]
proverbial cake and eat it too.
"In short, [Hillwood] cast the first stone about
standing and compliance with HOCOA's governing
documents and now that the stone has boomeranged and
landed square on their forehead, they want to
conveniently disregard the governing documents."
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Reply brief, at 11-12.  
This Court has often said that it is "'"duty bound to
notice 
ex 
mero 
motu 
the 
absence 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction."'"  Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643, 648 (Ala.
2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Baldwin County v. Bay Minette,
854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Stamps v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 945 n. 2 (Ala.
1994)).  However, just because the Court is duty bound to
notice the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, it does not
follow that it is so bound to construct theories and search
the record for facts to support the existence of jurisdiction
for plaintiffs who choose to stand mute in the face of a
serious jurisdictional challenge.  On the contrary, 
"when the parties have not provided sufficient legal
or 
factual 
justification 
for 
this 
Court's
jurisdiction, this Court is not obligated to embark
on its own expedition beyond the parties' arguments
in pursuit of a reason to exercise jurisdiction.
The burden of establishing the existence of subject-
matter jurisdiction falls on the party invoking that
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Ex parte HealthSouth
Corp., 974 So. 2d 288 (Ala. 2007) (setting forth the
plaintiff's burden of demonstrating standing to
bring 
an 
action, 
an 
issue 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction); ... Ex parte Ray-El, 911 So. 2d 1100,
1104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (placing the burden to
'"justify the jurisdiction of this court"' on the
person bringing a habeas petition as a 'next friend'
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164,
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110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990))); cf.
Bush v. Laggo Props., L.L.C., 784 So. 2d 1063, 1065
(Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ('Once a party challenges the
trial 
court's 
jurisdiction, 
pursuant 
to 
Rule
12(b)(1), 
[Ala. 
R. 
Civ. 
P.,] 
the 
burden 
of
establishing jurisdiction is on the plaintiff.'
(citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1980)))."
Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So. 3d 631, 635-36 (Ala. 2008) (some
emphasis added).
Essentially, the Blevinses do not dispute Hillwood's
contention that Jerry lacks standing to make the claims
asserted in this action.  Instead, the Blevinses merely
characterize the contention as "amusing" and suggest no legal
theory on which standing might be based.  It is not this
Court's function to "embark on its own expedition," Crutcher,
12 So. 3d at 635, in search of such a basis.  Consequently, we
hold that the Blevinses have not carried their burden of
establishing 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
This 
action, 
having
begun at the instance of someone without standing, cannot now
be maintained by someone with standing.  Cadle Co., 4 So. 3d
at 463.
III. Conclusion  
Because the trial court never acquired subject-matter
jurisdiction over this dispute, its summary judgment was void
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and is hereby vacated.  Also, because a void judgment will not
support an appeal, Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Phillips,
991 So. 2d 697, 701 (Ala. 2008), this appeal and the action
from which it arises, must be, and are, hereby dismissed for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT VACATED; APPEAL DISMISSED; AND CASE DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Smith, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., recuses himself.