Case Title: State v. Roya

Citation: 167 Vt. 594, 708 A.2d 908

Docket Number: 97-078

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Roya  (97-078); 167 Vt. 594; 708 A.2d 908

[Filed 6-Jan-1998]

                          ENTRY ORDER

                 SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-078

                        OCTOBER TERM, 1997

State of Vermont                }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     District Court of Vermont,
                                }     Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit
Travis B. Roya                  }
                                }     DOCKET NO. 1129-11-96 WnCr

               In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The State brings this interlocutory appeal from a district court order
  that granted defendant's request to depose two minor witnesses about prior
  sexual abuse by other family members.  The State argues that 13 V.S.A. §
  3255(c) prohibits a defendant from questioning a complaining witness during
  a deposition about prior sexual conduct.  Further, the State contends that
  this prohibition does not violate defendant's rights to confrontation or
  due process. We hold that defendant has failed to show that applying §
  3255(c) in this case violates his constitutional rights, and therefore, we
  reverse.

       Defendant has been charged with two counts of sexual assault on a
  minor, 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3), and four counts of lewd and lascivious
  conduct with a child, 13 V.S.A. § 2602. Both sexual-assault charges and two
  of the lewd-and-lascivious-conduct charges allege defendant committed
  offenses against K.R.1, his niece, who is now fifteen years old.  The
  remaining two lewd-and-lascivious-conduct charges allege defendant
  committed offenses against K.R.2, K.R.1's sister, who is now twelve years
  old, and R.R., another niece, now fifteen years old.

       The mother of K.R.1 and K.R.2 found condoms and a marijuana pipe in
  K.R.1's bedroom, and she questioned K.R.1 about these items.  K.R.1
  disclosed that she was sexually involved with her boyfriend, and the
  boyfriend later confirmed this information.  K.R.1 subsequently disclosed
  to her mother the sexual acts with which defendant is charged.  After other
  members of the family learned of the accusations, K.R.2 and R.R. accused
  defendant of committing sexual acts against them as well.  Subsequently,
  K.R.1 revealed that she had been sexually abused by her brother also, who
  later pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault against her.  The same
  brother had admitted years previously that he had sexually abused K.R.2.

       Defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that the court allow him
  to depose K.R.1 about sexual conduct with the boyfriend and with the
  brother, and K.R.2 about sexual conduct with the brother.  The court
  granted the motion in part, holding that "counsel may inquire into [the]
  nature, content and timing of statement made by [the] complaining witnesses
  of prior sexual abuse by other family members."(FN1)  The State appeals.

 

       Vermont's Rape Shield Statute prohibits the admission at trial of
  evidence of prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness, with three
  exceptions.  See 13 V.S.A. § 3255(a)(3).  The statute also prohibits
  inquiring about prior sexual conduct during a deposition of the complaining
  witness.  13 V.S.A. § 3255(c).  Section 3255(c) provides that, in a
  prosecution for sexual assault or for lewd and lascivious conduct, "if the
  defendant takes the deposition of the complaining witness, questions
  concerning [prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness] shall not be
  permitted."  There are no statutory exceptions to the rape-shield
  deposition rule.

       Defendant maintains that applying § 3255(c) in this case violates his
  federal constitutional Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and
  Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.  He also contends that § 3255(c)
  violates his right to call for evidence in his favor under the Vermont
  Constitution.  See Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10.  We first consider our
  standard of review. Defendant argues that discovery matters are within the
  discretion of the trial court, and therefore, we may reverse the trial
  court order only if the State has shown an abuse of discretion.  Here,
  however, we are reviewing the trial court's decision that § 3255(c), as
  applied in this case, violates defendant's constitutional rights.  In
  reviewing a constitutional challenge to the application of a statute, we
  give no deference to the trial court.  See State v. Pulizzano,