Case Title: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12795

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12795 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  XAVIER E. RODRIGUEZ. 
 
 
May 15, 2020. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Appeal by 
Commonwealth, Interlocutory appeal.  Supreme Judicial 
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment of the county 
court denying, without a hearing, its petition for relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, from an order of the Boston Municipal Court.  
We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  The defendant, Xavier E. Rodriguez, stands 
charged with possession of a class A substance (fentanyl) with 
intent to distribute and possession of a class B substance 
(suboxone) with intent to distribute.  He was charged with these 
offenses after a confidential informant, working under the 
direction of the Boston police department, carried out three 
controlled purchases of a substance believed to be heroin.  
Using the information gleaned in these controlled purchases, the 
police applied for and obtained a warrant to search the 
defendant's apartment, averring that there was probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was keeping heroin there.  In the 
execution of the warrant, the police found and seized substances 
alleged to be fentanyl and suboxone, along with other items; no 
heroin was found.  The charges against the defendant concern the 
substances seized in the apartment, not any substance sold to 
the confidential informant in the controlled purchases. 
 
 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C), as appearing 
in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 378 Mass. 
885 (1979), the defendant filed a "motion for rewards and 
promises" seeking certain information concerning the Boston 
2 
 
police department's dealings with the confidential informant 
(without disclosing the identity of the informant).  The 
defendant requested generally that the Commonwealth be ordered 
to produce "[a]ny and all information available to the 
Commonwealth, or that by the exercise of due diligence can be 
ascertained by the Commonwealth, of promises, inducements, or 
rewards of any kind or nature made directly or indirectly to any 
Commonwealth witness or to the [d]efendant."  More particularly, 
he asked that the Commonwealth be ordered to provide "a copy of 
all documents executed by a member of the Boston Police 
Department with regard to the recruiting or active participation 
of the [c]onfidential [i]nformant in this case on or at any time 
prior subsequent to the evening of [the date of the search] 
. . . and any and all other documents included in any 
Confidential Informant file with regard to the [c]onfidential 
[i]nformant in this case that does not identify that person, 
whether in the possession of an officer, a detective, a 
detective supervisor, or Chief of Bureau Investigative Services" 
(emphasis added).  The defendant also requested that the police 
department be ordered "to answer in writing, through the 
officers involved in this case, whether or not the 
[c]onfidential [i]nformant was paid any money by them prior to, 
during, or within the hours following the events which are the 
subject matter of this complaint; and what occurred to the drugs 
allegedly purchased during this investigation (including any and 
all reports regarding same)."  In support of his motion, the 
defendant argued that the search warrant affidavit did not 
provide sufficient information to test the credibility and 
veracity of the confidential informant.  He also stated, as 
noted, that he was not seeking to have the Commonwealth reveal 
the informant's identity. 
 
 
The judge allowed the motion in part1 over the 
Commonwealth's opposition, finding that the requested 
information was relevant and necessary to prepare a defense.  In 
doing so, the judge noted that the dates of the controlled 
purchases were not specified in the affidavit, that there was a 
discrepancy between the informant's description of the defendant 
                     
 
1 The judge denied a further request that the Commonwealth 
provide the complete history of the informant's involvement with 
law enforcement, including, inter alia, a list of cases the 
informant had worked on, the results of those cases (including 
any cases in which the informer's tip turned out to be false or 
inaccurate), the names of all police agencies with which the 
informer had worked, and the dates of execution and return of 
any warrants based on information provided by the informant. 
3 
 
and his appearance at the time of his arrest, and that the 
controlled purchases had involved heroin whereas the search 
yielded only fentanyl and suboxone.  The Commonwealth's G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition followed.  In denying relief, the single 
justice ruled that the case did not present an exceptional 
circumstance requiring the exercise of this court's 
extraordinary power.  See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 
22, 25 (2019), and cases cited.  He also noted that, if the 
Commonwealth believed that responsive documents would identify 
the informant, it could take steps in the trial court to prevent 
that, such as requesting from the trial court a protective order 
or redaction of certain information. 
 
 
Discussion.  The first step for a single justice, when 
acting on a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, is to decide, in his or 
her discretion, "whether to employ the court's power of general 
superintendence to become involved in the matter," or, in other 
words, "whether to review 'the substantive merits of the . . . 
petition.'"  Fontanez, supra at 24 (citation omitted).  "The 
single justice is not required to become involved if the 
petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the single 
justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject 
of the petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary 
as to require general superintendence intervention."  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. D.M., 480 Mass. 1004, 1004 n.2 (2018) 
(discussing use of G. L. c. 211, § 3, petitions by Commonwealth 
in cases concerning confidential informants; "disclosure of 
information relating to confidential informants and witnesses 
does not in and of itself constitute exceptional 
circumstances").  The single justice in this case followed this 
approach and decided in his discretion not to review the 
Commonwealth's petition on its substantive merits. 
 
 
Where, as here, the single justice exercises discretion not 
to reach the merits of a petition, the appeal to the full court 
"is strictly limited to a review of that ruling," Commonwealth 
v. Samuels, 456 Mass. 1025, 1027 n.1 (2010), and the full court 
asks only whether the single justice abused his or her 
discretion in making that decision.  It is not for the full 
court to substitute its judgment for that of the single justice.  
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) ("An 
appellate court's review of a . . . judge's decision for abuse 
of discretion must give great deference to the judge's exercise 
of discretion; it is plainly not an abuse of discretion simply 
because a reviewing court would have reached a different 
result").  "An abuse of discretion occurs only where the judge 
makes '"a clear error of judgment in weighing" the factors 
4 
 
relevant to the decision . . . , such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 242 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 
(2018), quoting L.L., supra. 
 
 
The Commonwealth has not shown that the single justice 
abused his discretion by denying relief on the ground that its 
petition did not present an exceptional circumstance requiring 
the exercise of our extraordinary superintendence power.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the motion judge's decision was clearly 
erroneous, that it presents a novel question of law, and that a 
systemic issue has arisen, as shown by the issuance of similar 
orders in other cases.2  Although "[e]xceptional circumstances 
might exist" in light of such considerations (emphasis added), 
Fontanez, supra at 25, the single justice was not obligated to 
find on this record that they did exist; not every new or 
recurring issue or allegedly erroneous ruling necessarily 
constitutes an exceptional circumstance requiring general 
superintendence review.  Regardless of its merits, on which we 
express no view, the motion judge's order in this case was a 
discretionary discovery ruling, and one that the judge at least 
attempted to tailor to avoid disclosure of the confidential 
informant's identity.  Certainly, there has been no showing that 
the judge's order seriously impairs the Commonwealth's ability 
to prosecute the alleged crimes, unlike in Fontanez, supra at 
26, or that the judge considered the defendant's showing under 
the wrong standard, given the posture of the case, unlike in 
D.M., supra at 1006. 
 
 
To be sure, the Commonwealth has a strong and legitimate 
interest in protecting the informant's identity.  See D.M., 
supra at 1005, and cases cited (discussing Commonwealth's long-
                     
 
2 Regarding the claimed systemic issue, the Commonwealth has 
provided us with docket sheets, papers filed, and orders issued 
in several cases unrelated to this one and has discussed those 
cases in some detail in its brief.  These materials were not 
before the single justice.  Rather, the Commonwealth simply 
stated in a footnote in its petition that motions like the 
defendant's and orders like the judge's are frequent in the 
Boston Municipal Court.  No less than on other litigants, it is 
incumbent on the Commonwealth not merely to make allegations but 
to substantiate them in the record before the single justice.  
See, e.g., Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), and cases cited.  We cannot fault 
the single justice for not finding an exceptional circumstance 
based on information he did not have before him. 
5 
 
established privilege not to disclose identity of confidential 
informant).  However, as the single justice pointed out, the 
Commonwealth has several remedial measures available to it in 
the trial court before resorting to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  If the 
Commonwealth feels that any document would reveal the 
informant's identity, it can seek a protective order, move for 
reconsideration, request permission to make redactions, or, as 
the defendant suggested at oral argument, submit documents for 
in camera review.  Where the Commonwealth has these alternative 
means of protecting the confidential informant's identity, it 
has not been placed in any untenable position requiring 
extraordinary relief. 
 
 
In sum, the single justice was well within his considerable 
discretion to deny the Commonwealth's petition without reaching 
its merits.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Joseph R. Smith for the defendant. 
                     
 
3 As noted in the text, we express no view as to the merits 
of the judge's order, much less as to similar orders in other 
cases.  We simply hold that the single justice was not compelled 
to find exceptional circumstances in this case.