Case Title: WILLIAM F. WEST RANCH, LLC, L.J. TURNER, KAREN TURNER, WENDY TURNER, JENNIFER TURNER, and MICHAEL TURNER V. PATRICK TYRRELL, WYOMING STATE ENGINEER and THE WYOMING BOARD OF CONTROL; PENNACO ENERGY INC. and DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P. V. WILLIAM F. WEST RANCH, LLC, L.J. TURNER, KAREN TURNER, WENDY TURNER, JENNIFER TURNER, and MICHAEL TURNER and PATRICK TYRRELL, WYOMING STATE ENGINEER and THE WYOMING BOARD OF CONTROL

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0161

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM F. WEST RANCH, LLC, L.J. TURNER, KAREN TURNER, WENDY TURNER, JENNIFER TURNER, and MICHAEL TURNER V. PATRICK TYRRELL, WYOMING STATE ENGINEER and THE WYOMING BOARD OF CONTROL; PENNACO ENERGY INC. and DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P. V. WILLIAM F. WEST RANCH, LLC, L.J. TURNER, KAREN TURNER, WENDY TURNER, JENNIFER TURNER, and MICHAEL TURNER and PATRICK TYRRELL, WYOMING STATE ENGINEER and THE WYOMING BOARD OF CONTROL2009 WY 62206 P.3d 722Case Number: S-08-0161, S-08-0162Decided: 05/07/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WILLIAM 
F. WEST RANCH, LLC, L.J. TURNER, KAREN TURNER, WENDY TURNER, JENNIFER TURNER, 
and MICHAEL TURNER,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.PATRICK 
TYRRELL, WYOMING STATE ENGINEER and THE WYOMING BOARD OF 
CONTROL,Appellees(Defendants).

 PENNACO 
ENERGY INC. and DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, 
L.P.,Appellants(Intervenors/Defendants),v.WILLIAM F. 
WEST RANCH, LLC, L.J. TURNER, KAREN TURNER, WENDY TURNER, JENNIFER TURNER, and 
MICHAEL TURNER,Appellees(Plaintiffs)andPATRICK 
TYRRELL, WYOMING STATE ENGINEER and THE WYOMING BOARD OF 
CONTROL,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants Case No. S-08-0161 and Appellees Case No. 
S-08-0162:

Kate 
M. Fox and J. Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Sarah 
Klahn of White & Jankowski, Denver, Colorado.  Argument by Ms. 
Fox.

 
 
Representing 
Appellants Case No. S-08-0162:

Brent 
R. Kunz of Hathaway & Kunz, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; John C. Martin of 
Patton Boggs LLP, Washington, D.C.; Scott P. Klosterman and Margo Harlan-Sabec 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Martin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees Case Nos. S-08-0161 and S-08-0162:

 
 
Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Jay Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; Peter 
K. Michael, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Yoder.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      William F. West 
Ranch, LLC (West) and the Turners (Turner) appeal the district court's 
determination that it did not have jurisdiction over their declaratory judgment 
action challenging the Wyoming State Engineer's and Wyoming Board of Control's 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the State") administration of 
underground water produced and stored as part of the process of extracting coal 
bed methane (CBM).  The district 
court concluded that the plaintiffs had not presented a justiciable controversy 
because the issues were currently being considered by the legislative and 
executive branches of state government.      

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, although on different 
grounds.  In order for a controversy 
to be justiciable, the plaintiffs must allege a sufficient tangible interest and 
that the judicial decision they request will have a practical effect on that 
interest.  A justiciable controversy 
does not exist under the Declaratory Judgments Act if the plaintiffs are asking 
for a declaration to remedy someone else's problem or a potential future problem 
that is not certain to occur.  West 
and Turner have failed to allege a connection between a specific constitutional 
or statutory obligation with which the State has failed to comply and a 
particular harm they, as individuals, have suffered or will certainly suffer in 
the future.  As such, they have not 
shown that a judicial declaration requiring the State to undertake a particular 
function will have a practical effect on them.  In addition, a declaratory judgment is 
not available when the questions should initially be decided by an 
administrative agency.  West and 
Turner have not utilized available administrative processes to resolve  many of their concerns.  

 
 
[¶3]      CBM producers 
Pennaco Energy, Inc. (Pennaco) and Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. (Devon) 
contest the district court's ruling that only conditionally allowed them to 
intervene in the declaratory judgment action.  Given our affirmance of the district 
court's dismissal of this case, Pennaco's and Devon's appellate arguments 
regarding their right to intervene are moot and need not be considered.      

            

ISSUE

 
 
[¶4]      The parties state 
various issues on appeal.  However, 
the following issue is dispositive:

 
 
Have 
the plaintiffs sufficiently articulated any justiciable claim under Wyoming's 
Declaratory Judgments Act?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶5]      The Powder 
River Basin in northeastern Wyoming has, in recent years, been a rich source of 
CBM production.  In order to extract 
CBM, the producer must remove underground water from the coal seam, resulting in 
the production of large quantities of water.  Producers must obtain a groundwater well 
permit from the State Engineer before they may drill a well to dewater the 
coal.  In addition, if they are 
going to store the produced water in a reservoir, producers must obtain a 
reservoir permit from the State Engineer.      

 

[¶6]      West and Turner 
own property affected by CBM water production.  On June 14, 2007, they filed a complaint 
and petition for declaratory judgment in the district court, which they later 
amended.  The plaintiffs broadly 
claimed the State is not regulating CBM water production in compliance with 
Wyoming's constitution or statutes and that their property has been damaged by 
CBM water.1  The State filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint arguing West and Turner "intend this to be a public interest lawsuit" 
and they had not alleged individual harms that would be remedied by their 
requested relief.  The State also 
maintained that a judicial decision in accordance with the plaintiffs' 
declaratory judgment complaint would invade the provinces of the legislative and 
executive branches of government and thereby violate the separation of powers 
doctrine. 

 
 
[¶7]      Pennaco and Devon 
filed motions to intervene in the action, claiming a judicial decision in the 
plaintiffs' favor would impair their rights because they own CBM leases in 
Wyoming and hold many water well and reservoir permits issued by the State.  The district court conditionally granted 
their motions to intervene, allowing intervention in the event it denied the 
State's motion to dismiss.

 
 
[¶8]      Concluding there 
was no justiciable controversy because the legislative and executive branches 
were currently working on the regulation of CBM water, the district court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss.  
West and Turner appealed from the dismissal order in Case No. S-08-161, 
and Pennaco and Devon appealed from the court's conditional intervention order 
in Case No. S-08-162.     
          
           

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 

 
 
[¶9]      We review the 
threshold question of jurisdiction de 
novo.  Heilig v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 
2003 WY 27, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 734, 737 (Wyo. 2003).  When determining jurisdiction in a 
declaratory judgment action, "we examine the policies underlying both the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and the doctrine of justiciability to 
determine if this is a proper case for judicial action." Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Wyo. 1992).   In reviewing dismissal of a complaint for 
want of jurisdiction, "we focus on the allegations contained in the complaint 
and liberally construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."  Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 
7, 79 P.3d 500, 504-05 (Wyo. 2003).  
Consistent with the concept of "notice pleading" incorporated in W.R.C.P. 
8, if the allegations contained in the complaint "admit of any possibility that 
they may be the proper subject of relief,'" we will not deprive the plaintiff 
of the opportunity to litigate its claims on the merits.  Martinez v. Associates Financial Servs. Co., 
891 P.2d 785, 788 (Wyo. 1995).  
However, liberal construction of the pleadings does not "excuse omission 
of that which is material and necessary in order to entitle [one to] 
relief.'"  Id. at 790, quoting Sump v. City of Sheridan, 358 P.2d 637, 
642 (Wyo. 1961).   

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
1.         
Jurisdiction  

 
 

            
            
a.         
Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act

 
 
[¶10]   
Our starting place for determining jurisdiction is the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Section 1-37-102 
establishes the scope of the act: "Courts of record within their respective 
jurisdictions may declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed."  Section 1-37-114 emphasizes the remedial 
purposes of the act:

 
 
The 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is remedial.  Its purpose is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal relations, and is 
to be liberally construed and administered.

 
 
[¶11]   The Declaratory Judgments Act does 
not, however, extend the jurisdiction of the courts.  Reiman, 838 P.2d  at 1185-86.  Section 1-37-103 defines the rights 
which may be subject to declaration under the act and the parties who may seek a 
declaration of their rights:

 
 
Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations.

 
 

See 
also, 
Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo. 1997).  Thus, under 
the relevant statutes, in order for a court to have jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment action, the "right" to be declared must fall within the 
scope of the act and the plaintiff must be an "interested" person.  Cox, ¶ 8, 79 P.3d  at 505.  

 
 
The 
"requirement of an interest' captures the basic doctrine that there must be a 
justiciable controversy before relief will be granted."  Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 
951 (Wyo.1997).  Generically, a 
justiciable controversy is defined as a controversy fit for judicial 
resolution.  Reiman Corp. v. City or Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo.1992).  Many 
doctrines are encompassed within the concept of justiciability including 
standing, ripeness, and mootness.  
Id.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
9, 79 P.3d  at 505.        

 
 
[¶12]   In Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 
(Wyo. 1974), we adopted a four-part 
test for determining whether a party presents a justiciable controversy to 
maintain a declaratory judgment action in Wyoming.2     

 
 

1.            
The 
parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or 
interests.

 
 

2.            
The 
controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively 
operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.

 
 

3.            
It 
must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force 
and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, 
status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in 
interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding public 
moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. 

 
 
4. 
        
The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere 
disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough 
research and analysis of the major issues.   

 
 

Cox, 
¶ 
10, 79 P.3d  at 505, quoting Reiman, 
838 P.2d  at 1186.

 
 
[¶13]   Our case law provides guidance on 
applying these factors and establishes the parameters of what constitutes a 
justiciable claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act.  In White v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 1979), we held "the Declaratory Judgments Act gives the courts no 
power to determine future rights or anticipated disputes or controversies."  Instead, the plaintiffs must present an 
existing and genuine controversy to the court in order for it to have 
jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.  Id.  When the Board of Land Commissioners had 
previously issued a decision giving state land lessees (the Whites) the right to 
meet the highest bid and acquire state land slated for public auction by the 
Board and that agency decision was not appealed, this Court held the Board could 
not seek a judicial decision on the validity of its action.  We concluded the Board's complaint 
seeking a declaratory judgment was simply "a request for legal advice and 
opinion" as to the effect of the agency's action because there was no guarantee 
that the Whites would exercise their right to meet the highest bid after the 
auction.  Id. at 80.

 
 
[¶14]   In contrast, Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 
645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1982), established that a justiciable controversy did 
exist where the oil and gas producers challenged rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Environmental Quality Council for the disposal of water from 
oil production activities as being in excess of its statutory powers.  Id. at 1166-69.  Although the plaintiffs apparently had 
not applied for a permit to dispose of water from their oil production 
activities when they initiated their declaratory judgment action, the rules 
required "immediate and present action" by the plaintiffs.  We concluded the plaintiffs had standing 
because a judicial ruling on the issues presented would effectively terminate a 
controversy.  Id.  
  

 
 
[¶15]   The distinction between Rocky Mountain and White is instructive.  
The Rocky Mountain 
plaintiffs affirmatively alleged that they were required to seek permits 
under the challenged regulations and, consequently, would certainly be affected 
by the agency action in the very near future.  However, there was no such certainty 
that an actual controversy would develop in White.  See also, Brimmer, 521 P.2d 574 (ruling that the 
court had jurisdiction to render a declaration as to the ability of incumbent 
state senators to run for the office of governor, even though they had not yet 
filed as candidates, because they alleged their intent to do so). 

 
 
[¶16]   
Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1975) did not explicitly apply the 
justiciable controversy factors; however, that case provides a useful discussion 
of the requirements for alleging an affected interest for a declaratory judgment 
in the context of water law.   
Budd challenged the constitutionality of the Surplus Water Law and the 
State Engineer's interpretation and application of the law.  This Court concluded that Budd could not 
maintain his challenge because he did not assert that he owned any rights 
affected by the statute.  

 
 
[A] 
party who asserts the violation of a constitutional provision by a legislative 
enactment must show an adverse effect upon his rights.  No one is entitled to present a claim 
that a particular statute is unconstitutional as to other persons or classes of 
persons, but he must demonstrate injury to his own rights.

 
 

Id. 
at 371-72 (citations omitted).  
  

 
 
[¶17]   
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1977), provides another example of the failure of a plaintiff to 
allege an impact on its interests sufficient to sustain a declaratory judgment 
action.  In that case, the parties 
each issued liability insurance for activities on rodeo grounds.  Id. at 707.  Mountain West sought a declaration as to 
the rights and liabilities of the parties for an accident on the grounds.  It did not, however, place its insurance 
policy in the record.  This Court 
held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment under the 
Declaratory Judgments Act because, in the absence of the policy being made part 
of the record, Mountain West's rights were theoretical.  Id. at 711-12.  "[A] controversy must be demonstrated in 
which the parties have a real as distinguished from a theoretical concern."  Id. at 709.  

 
 
[¶18]   Similarly, this Court ruled long 
ago in Anderson v. Wyo. Dev. Co., 154 P.2d 318, 341-42 (Wyo. 1944), that in order for a declaratory judgment to lie, 
it must be based upon an actual and existing disagreement.

 
 
"This 
court, even under the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 
should not undertake to decide or declare the rights or status of parties upon a 
state of facts which is future, contingent, and 
uncertain."

 
 

Id. 
at 
341 (quoting Tanner v. Boynton Lumber 
Co., 129 A. 617, 619 (N.J. Eq. 85, 1925)).  

 
 
[¶19]   In addition, declaratory judgment 
is not available in administrative cases when the question should initially be 
decided by the agency.  An agency 
created by the legislature to perform a specific function is considered to have 
special expertise.  Rissler & McMurry Co. v. State, 917 P.2d 1157, 1160-61 (Wyo. 1996).  Honoring the administrative process is 
especially important in cases requiring fact finding or application of 
discretion by the agency.  See, Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 2007 WY 21, ¶ 18, 150 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Wyo. 2007).  This Court 
discussed the rationale behind this concept in Rocky Mountain, 645 P.2d  at 1168 
(citations omitted):

 
 
Where 
the action would result in a prejudging of issues that should be decided in the 
first instance by an administrative body, it should not lie.  This is because, if it be otherwise, all 
decisions by the several agencies could be bypassed, and the district court 
would be administering the activities of the executive branch of the 
government.  

 
 
[¶20]   Applying this underlying principle, 
we ruled in Bonnie M. Quinn Revocable 
Trust v. SRW, Inc., 2004 WY 65, ¶¶ 6-11, 91 P.3d 146, 148-49 (Wyo. 2004), 
that the plaintiffs had the obligation to seek zoning relief through the board 
of county commissioners before they could maintain an action seeking a 
declaration that the zoning laws required the defendants to apply for and obtain 
a conditional use permit prior to drilling for minerals on the Quinn 
property.  

 
 
            
            
b.         
West's and Turner's Declaratory Judgment 
Complaint

 
 
[¶21]   To determine whether West and 
Turner have alleged a justiciable controversy, we start with the four causes of 
action set out in their amended complaint.  
Their allegations are extensive and somewhat vague, and we summarize them 
as follows:

 
 
1.  The State has violated the Wyoming 
Constitution by failing to consider the "public interest" and "all the various 
interests involved" when administering CBM water.3  In addition, the plaintiffs allege 
generally that the State has violated their right to due process.  We assume they are referring to their 
assertion in the "Facts Common to All Claims" section of the complaint that the 
State does not provide "neighboring landowners such as Plaintiffs" with notice 
and an opportunity to be heard before issuing permits.4  

 
 
2. 
 The State has violated Wyoming 
statutes in administering CBM water by failing to protect the public interest in 
issuing CBM permits5 and to determine the amount of 
water which may be withdrawn from groundwater wells and placed in reservoirs in 
accordance with the concepts of beneficial use and prevention of waste.6  West and Turner also claim that the 
State has abdicated its statutory duty to adjudicate and inspect wells and 
reservoirs.7

 
 
            
3.  The State's actions 
violate the plaintiffs' due process rights. Although they do not explain this 
due process allegation, we assume they are referring to their assertion that 
"neighboring landowners" do not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard 
when the State considers applications for CBM water permits.  As such, it is a restatement of part of 
their first cause of action.  

 
 
4. 
 The State has violated the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115 (LexisNexis 2007), governing agency rulemaking.  Specifically, the plaintiffs claim the 
State has failed to promulgate rules pertaining particularly to CBM well and 
reservoir permitting and is, instead, unlawfully regulating by "policy" and 
"guidance" as evidenced by the exhibits to the complaint.8

 
 
c.         
Application of Declaratory Judgment Law to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint

 
 
[¶22]   As explained in more detail below, 
we conclude West's and Turner's claims and requests for relief are simply too 
amorphous to be justiciable.  The 
first two Brimmer elements for a 
justiciable controversy require the plaintiffs to allege that they have a 
tangible interest which has been harmed and that a judicial decision in their 
favor will effectively remedy the harm.  
In the context of this case, West and Turner needed to allege:  the State has a constitutional or 
statutory duty to undertake some function in administering CBM water; it failed 
or will fail to do so on CBM facilities affecting their property; that 
particular failure by the State has damaged or will damage their property in an actual, as opposed to 
theoretical, way; and a declaration that the State has the responsibility to 
undertake that specific function will effectively remedy their harm. 

 
 
[¶23]   While West and Turner do allege the 
State has generally failed to comply with certain statutory and constitutional 
duties in administering CBM water and that they have a genuine interest in that 
they own property that has been harmed by CBM water, they do not allege facts 
that connect the asserted general deficiencies in the State's administration of 
CBM water to direct harm they have suffered or will suffer in the future.  Nor, do they allege facts that would 
indicate a declaratory judgment in accordance with their particular requests for 
relief will have an actual effect on their properties.   

 
 
[¶24]   It is very important to focus on 
what West and Turner allege and what they do not allege in terms of a tangible 
interest and the utility of a judicial ruling.  Many of their allegations are very 
broad.  For example, they 
state:  

 
 
Plaintiffs 
bring this action to have the Court resolve constitutional questions regarding 
management of Wyoming's most valuable and finite resource:  water.  This is a matter of great public 
importance, impacting the social and economic realities of the present-day 
organization of Wyoming's society;  

 
 
and

The 
future of Wyoming's water supply, its lands, and the fabric of its society are 
threatened by the waste of Wyoming's ground water, and by the actual and 
potential damage and injury to soil, crops, vegetation, existing water wells, 
and ground water and surface water rights that is the result of Defendants' 
failure to administer water pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution and 
laws.

 
 
[¶25]   With regard to their specific 
interests, the plaintiffs state in the "Parties" section of their amended 
complaint:9

 
 

8.    
 Plaintiff [West] . . . owns and operates 
West Ranch.  For over fifty years 
Bill and Marge West have produced crops and raised cattle on the 13,000 acre 
property.  The normal irrigation of 
the Wests' ranch is prevented by the saline and sodic CBM water that has mixed 
with the water supply from Spotted Horse Creek.  Flooding from CBM water has also killed 
vegetation and damaged the soil of the ranch's valuable bottom lands.  CBM water stored in reservoirs has 
flooded bottom lands on the ranch and otherwise leaked out, damaging the soil 
and killing vegetation.

 
 

9.    
Plaintiffs 
[Turner] own the Turner Ranch on Bates Creek in the Cheyenne River 
Drainage.  The three permitted wells 
they use for domestic and stock watering purposes are either dried up or 
threaten to dry up as a result of CBM ground water pumping in the area.  

 
 
[¶26]   The plaintiffs' allegation that 
they own property affected by CBM water indicates they have a tangible interest 
and satisfies the first Brimmer 
element.  To meet the second 
element of the Brimmer test and demonstrate that the 
controversy is one upon which a judgment of the court may effectively operate, 
they must allege that the State's failures have affected their property.  In other words, the "court's decision 
must have some practical effect upon the litigants."  Reiman, 838 P.2d  at 1187.  See also, Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 
446, 463, 296 P. 206, 210 (Wyo. 1931); Heilig, ¶ 10, 64 P.3d  at 738.  Thus, West and Turner must allege facts 
to link the State's failures to follow its constitutional and statutory duties 
and the remedy they seek to impacts on their property.  

 
 
[¶27]   When we examine the relief 
requested by West and Turner, we find no allegation as to how that relief will 
redress or prevent the damage they claim their property has incurred or will 
certainly incur in the future.  They 
ask that the court enter a judgment declaring that the State's practice of 
permitting CBM groundwater wells and reservoirs unconstitutional and in 
violation of the applicable statutes and rules.  They also ask for specific declarations, 
which we summarize as:  

 
 
1.  The current permitting of CBM ground 
water and reservoirs violates Wyoming's statutes because it fails to quantify 
the amount of water put to beneficial use for CBM production.  

 
 
2.  The [State Engineer's] practice of 
permitting CBM ground water without notice and an opportunity for a hearing 
violates the constitutional right to due process of law under the United States 
and Wyoming constitutions.

 
 
3.  The State cannot issue permits for CBM 
groundwater wells and reservoirs without adopting rules pursuant to WAPA 
specifically addressing CBM water and defining the "public interest."    

 
 
4.  Placement of CBM water in reservoirs and 
pits for the purpose of achieving disposal of that water through evaporation, 
infiltration and/or flushing is not a beneficial use of 
water.

 
 
5.  The State must evaluate and weigh the 
public and various interests as part of its duty to supervise Wyoming's 
water.

 
 
6. 
The State must inspect and adjudicate all CBM groundwater wells and reservoirs 
used to store CBM water. 

 
 
[¶28]   The plaintiffs attack the State's 
process for issuing CBM water permits throughout Wyoming and within the Powder 
River Basin.10  For example, West and Turner allege that 
the State has failed to fulfill its duty to consider the public interest in 
making CBM water permitting decisions.  
They suggest that, if the State had properly considered the public 
interest, it would have denied the permits or at least incorporated a condition 
that the applicants have a disposal plan to reduce the impacts on downstream 
landowners.  The plaintiffs do not, 
however, allege that the State issued a particular permit affecting their 
property without considering the public interest, ask that any permit affecting 
their property be revoked or denied for failure to consider the public interest, 
or assert with any certainty that permits will be issued in the future that will 
actually injure their interests.  
They also do not explain how the relief they request, i.e., that the 
State be required to consider the public interest before approving applications 
for well and reservoir permits, will address any past or future harm to 
them.  Instead, they simply assert 
that future unspecified CBM water production will cause long term damage to the 
state.  

 
 
[¶29]   Even if we were to declare that the 
State is required to consider the public interest, a result that seems to be 
required by the applicable statutory and constitutional provisions, we cannot be 
assured that such a declaration would have a practical effect on the 
plaintiffs.  This situation is 
similar to White, Mountain West and 
Anderson where this Court ruled that 
the courts do not have the power to determine anticipated or theoretical 
disputes and is distinguishable from Rocky Mountain where there was a 
specific allegation that the plaintiffs were required to immediately apply for 
permits under the disputed regulatory scheme. 

 
 
[¶30]   As we explained in Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 729 
(Wyo. 1975), the difference between an abstract question that is nonjusticiable 
and a controversy contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is one 
of degree.  "Basically, the problem 
in each case is whether the facts alleged under all the circumstances show that 
there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal 
interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the declaratory 
judgment."  Id., citing Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S. Ct. 956, 959-960, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969).  
Persons seeking a declaratory judgment, therefore, have the duty to 
allege sufficient specific facts showing that a judgment in their favor will 
have an immediate and real effect on them.  
This is true even under the concept of notice pleading.  To find that West and Turner have a 
justiciable controversy in this case, we would have to make a number of 
assumptions about facts that are material and necessary to their claims.  For instance, we would have to assume 
that, because their properties have been damaged by CBM water, an order 
requiring the State to consider the public interest in its permitting decisions 
would mitigate that damage or prevent it in the future.  West and Turner have not made those 
allegations, and it is not the court's function or duty to make such 
assumptions.  In the absence of 
allegations of material and necessary facts, the State is entitled to an order 
of dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Martinez, 891 P.2d  at 790.  

 
 
[¶31]   It should also be noted that 
determining whether an agency has properly considered the public interest 
requires review of the facts of a particular action.  See, e.g., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 
1985) and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of 
Indians v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697 (Nev. 1996) (considering whether the 
involved state agencies had properly considered the public interest when 
granting specific water appropriation permits).  By failing to challenge a particular 
permit, the plaintiffs have not provided a context in which a court could 
determine whether the public interest had been considered.  

 
 
[¶32]   The declarations requested by West 
and Turner address the harm they claim the permitting process is causing the 
citizenry of the state and the public interest.  However, they are not entitled to a 
declaratory judgment that the State's actions violated the rights of other 
persons, Budd, 543 P.2d  at 372.11  It is not the function of the judicial 
branch to pass judgment on the general performance of other branches of 
government.  Instead, it is our 
function to resolve specific controversies between adverse parties and determine 
whether those parties, in the context of that controversy, have complied with 
the law.  By failing to challenge a 
specific permitting action, West and Turner have not satisfied the second Brimmer requirement.  

 
 
[¶33]   The same problem exists with regard 
to their due process claim. West and Turner do not allege that they were 
deprived of notice and an opportunity to be heard on any particular permit that 
affects their property.  Instead, 
they are apparently seeking a declaration that the State's procedures violate 
the due process rights of "neighboring landowners" in general.  This assertion presents an abstract 
legal question rather than the requisite "substantial controversy between 
parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the declaratory judgment."  
Cranston, 530 P.2d  at 
729.     

 
 
[¶34]   West's and Turner's complaints 
regarding the lack of adjudication and inspection of CBM wells and reservoirs 
suffer from similar deficiencies.  
Adjudication of water rights serves the purposes of establishing the 
relative priorities of water users and quantifying those rights, in accordance 
with the constitutional and statutory concept of beneficial use.  See, e.g., In re Big Horn River System, 2004 WY 21, 
85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2004); Nichols v. 
Hufford, 21 Wyo. 477, 133 P. 1084 
(Wyo. 1913).  Inspection serves the 
obvious purpose of determining whether permitted reservoirs and wells meet the 
legal requirements.  

 
 
[¶35]   The plaintiffs claim the statutes 
require the State to adjudicate CBM wells and reservoirs and the State has 
failed to do so for a "majority" of the CBM wells and reservoirs.  By alleging that a majority of the CBM 
wells and reservoirs have not been adjudicated, they are implying that some of 
them have been.  In order to present 
a justiciable controversy, the plaintiffs are required to assert that the wells 
and reservoirs affecting their lands (i.e., their tangible interests) have not 
been adjudicated and that failure by the State has harmed their properties.  They do not make that specific 
allegation.  In addition, the 
plaintiffs do not allege that a judicial order requiring the State to undertake 
its adjudication function on a state-wide basis will remedy the damages they 
have suffered or will certainly suffer in the future.  

 
 
[¶36]   Turner does allege domestic and 
stock wells on their property have dried up or threaten to dry up because of CBM 
water pumping in the area.  They do 
not, however, allege that their wells or the relevant CBM wells have not been 
adjudicated; they have requested an adjudication and the State has refused; 
particular CBM wells are interfering with their wells; any particular user is 
taking more water than necessary for beneficial use; or an order requiring the 
State to undertake state-wide adjudication of CBM wells will remedy their 
alleged harm.  Thus, the plaintiffs 
have not alleged sufficient facts to show that they are entitled to the relief 
they requestan order directing the State to undertake adjudication of all CBM 
wells and reservoirsunder the Declaratory Judgment Act.   

 
 
[¶37]   West and Turner also assert that 
the statutes require the State to inspect completed works and assert that water 
stored in CBM reservoirs has flooded their bottom lands and is otherwise leaking 
out and damaging their property.  
They do not, however, identify the CBM reservoirs that are damaging their 
properties or how a judicial declaration that the State is generally required to 
inspect reservoirs would effectively redress their particular grievances.  Thus, the plaintiffs have not 
successfully alleged their interest would be protected by an order of the 
court.12  In Budd, the plaintiff did not allege how 
the Surplus Water Law affected his water rights and, therefore, he did not 
present a justiciable claim.  
Similarly, the plaintiffs here do not connect the State's alleged 
failures to follow its statutory duties for adjudication and inspection to their 
particular circumstances.  By 
requesting some type of general ruling that the State is improperly 
administering CBM water without challenging a specific action or requesting 
individualized relief, the plaintiffs' complaint is a perfect example of a 
nonjusticiable controversy and a failure to meet the minimal requirements for 
notice pleading under W.R.C.P. 8.   

 
 
[¶38]   Moreover, as we explained in Rocky Mountain and Bonnie M. Quinn, when the matter at 
issue is one that has been delegated to an administrative agency, such as 
whether to grant a permit, the challenger must utilize available administrative 
processes rather than bring a declaratory judgment action.  By refusing to consider a declaratory 
action in matters requiring agency expertise, we avoid usurping the agency's 
fact finding and discretionary functions.  
Such a situation is distinguishable from when a party challenges the 
agency's statutory authority to act, like the producers' challenge to the EQC's 
authority to adopt rules in Rocky 
Mountain, which is an appropriate declaratory judgment action. 

 

[¶39]   There are administrative remedies 
available to West and Turner for many of their complaints, and they apparently 
have not availed themselves of those procedures.  First, Turner could file a well 
interference action pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-911 (LexisNexis 2007)13 to remedy the alleged interference 
with their wells by CBM wells.  A 
well interference action would provide a specific factual scenario for the 
agencies and, on judicial review, the courts to consider.    

 
 
[¶40]   To the extent the plaintiffs are 
asserting that CBM producers are using more water than necessary for production 
of methane gas, i.e., exceeding the amount necessary for beneficial use and/or 
wasting water, they have other remedies available to them to protect their water 
rights in the affected streams and/or wells.  In Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control, 
714 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1986), we stated that, under the proper circumstances, 
the Board of Control has jurisdiction to consider a petition from a surface 
water user to adjudicate another user's right.  Id. at 761.  Presumably, the State has similar powers 
with 

respect 
to groundwater wells.  Thus, if the 
appropriate circumstances were presented, the plaintiffs could petition the 
Board of Control for a determination of the quantity of water another water 
right holder is entitled to use.   

 
 
[¶41]   The plaintiffs could also petition 
the district court, pursuant to § 16-3-114, for review of a particular 
administrative action, such as the granting of a well permit or an adjudication 
order, so long as they could show that they were "aggrieved or adversely 
affected" by the agency action or inaction.  Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs 
could challenge the processes used by the State in making its decision and/or 
the legal and factual basis for the decision.  There is no showing in this case that 
the plaintiffs have challenged the permits affecting their properties through 
the available administrative channels. 

 
 
[¶42]   Likewise, West's and Turner's 
request for an order directing the State to adopt new or revised rules and 
regulations is not appropriate for declaratory judgment.  Wyoming statutes specifically give the 
State authority to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of water, 
see, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
41-4-211, 41-3-909 and 41-3-308 (LexisNexis 2007).  The State has adopted rules pertaining 
to groundwater and reservoirs, although they are not specific to CBM water.  See, Rules of State Engineer's Office, 
Chap. 1 (Introduction to Wyoming Water Administration); Chap. 4 § 2 
(Adjudication of Proofs, Groundwater Proofs) (2005); Rules of State Engineer's 
Office, Surface Water, Chap. 5 (Reservoirs) (1980); Rules of State Engineer's 
Office, Ground Water Rules (1974). 

 
 
[¶43]   Any interested person may petition 
an agency for promulgation, amendment or repeal of a rule under § 16-3-106.  We recognized the importance of the 
petition process in Goedert v. State ex 
rel., Wyo. Worker's Safety and Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Wyo. 1999). 
 West and Turner should have 
requested rule making before seeking a declaratory judgment ordering the State 
to undertake that function.14  This is especially true because, under 
the procedure set forth in § 16-3-106, a petitioner "may accompany his petition 
with relevant data, views and arguments" to help the agency determine if the 
petitioned action is appropriate.  
We conclude, therefore, that West's and Turner's fourth cause of action 
does not present a justiciable controversy.

 
 
[¶44]   The plaintiffs stress that this 
case presents a matter of great public importance and, consequently, the 
elements of a justiciable controversy should be ignored or relaxed.  As conceded by the State, the 
administration of water is unquestionably a matter of great importance in 
Wyoming's arid environment.  Over a 
century ago, this Court stated: "It is doubtful if any questions of graver 
importance than those affecting water rights are presented for judicial 
consideration."  Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 
61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900). 

 
 
[¶45]   
Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶ 9, 38 P.3d 1073, 1077 
(Wyo. 2002) involved a petition for review of agency action under § 16-3-114(a); 
nevertheless, we examined the public interest element of our justiciable 
controversy jurisprudence.  See also, Riedel v. Anderson, 2003 WY 70, ¶ 22, 70 P.3d 223, 230 (Wyo. 2003).   

 
 
We 
have recognized a more expansive or relaxed definition of standing when a matter 
of great public interest or importance is at stake.  Washakie County School District Number 
One, 606 P.2d 310, 317 [(Wyo. 1980)]. . . . Historically, we have applied 
the great public interest and importance doctrine to find standing where we 
ordinarily would not in the following instances:  Washakie County School District Number 
One, 606 P.2d 310 (constitutionality of school financing);  Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, 770 P.2d 223 [(Wyo. 1989)] (tax exempt status of hospital);  State ex rel. Wyoming Association of 
Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 
1990) (constitutionality of the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act);  Board of County Commissioners of the County 
of Laramie v. Laramie County School District Number One, 884 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 
1994) (entitlement of school district to interest on school district funds held 
by county treasurer);  and Management Council of the Wyoming 
Legislature, 953 P.2d 839 [(Wyo. 1998)] (constitutional scope of governor's 
veto power).

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
[W]e 
have historically applied the doctrine when a constitutional question is 
presentedas in Washakie School District 
Number One;  Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers 
and Land Surveyors;  and Management 
Council--or where the issue concerns the apportionment of state revenues 
among governmental entitiesas in Memorial Hospital and Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Laramie. . . . The doctrine of great public 
interest or importance should be applied cautiously:

 
 
The 
question of great public importance rests with this court, Kellner v. District Court In and For City 
and County of Denver, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, 888 [(Colo. 1953)].  This exception must be applied with 
caution and its exercise must be a matter where strict standards are applied to 
avoid the temptation to apply the judge's own beliefs and philosophies to a 
determination of what questions are of great public importance.  

 
 

Brimmer 
v. Thomson, 
521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974).  

 
 

Jolley, 
¶ 
9, 38 P.3d  at 1077-78 (some citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶46]   Although we have said that the 
requirements for a justiciable controversy may be relaxed or avoided in matters 
of great public interest or importance, we have also stated that "wanting any of 
[the Brimmer] requisites, a great 
public interest alone is insufficient to warrant the action of the court under 
any situation which we might at present foresee."  Cranston, 530 P.2d  at 729.  A close reading of the cases applying 
the public interest exception indicates that we have not detoured from Cranston.  The plaintiffs in cases involving a 
matter of great public importance have also alleged a tangible interest that 
would receive some practical benefit from a judicial decision.  For example, in Brimmer, incumbent state senators stated 
that they planned to file as gubernatorial candidates in the upcoming 
election.  Consequently, a decision 
about the legality of running for the governor's office while still holding the 
office of state senator would have a practical effect on them. In Washakie County, the plaintiffs included 
parents, children, and school board members whose interests were directly 
affected by inequality in public school funding, and, in Memorial Hospital, the public hospital's 
finances would be directly affected by a decision on whether it owed sales tax 
on construction purchases. In Director of 
State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 
(Wyo. 2003), school children, their parents and the Wyoming Education 
Association were found to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
exchanges of school trust lands without competitive bid, a matter of great 
public importance; however, a corporation that was only a prospective bidder did 
not. While this Court has recognized a more lenient definition of justiciablity 
in matters of great public importance, the facts alleged in these cases 
demonstrate that public importance alone is not sufficient to establish 
justiciability.  

 
 
[¶47]   The Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act envisions a true justiciable controversy before the court may decide a 
matter, even if the case presents a matter of great public importance.  The act does not extend the jurisdiction 
of the court and § 1-37-103 specifically requires that an "interested" person 
present an appropriate "right" for declaration before the court can assume 
jurisdiction.  If we were to rule 
that any matter of great public importance could be litigated under the 
Declaratory Judgments Act, we would be impermissibly extending our jurisdiction 
beyond that allowed under the act and the concept of justiciability firmly 
established in our jurisprudence.   

 
 
[¶48]   By ruling that the Court does not 
have jurisdiction over this case, we do not want to leave the impression that we 
approve of the State's administration of CBM water.  West and Turner raise serious 
allegations of damages to their property from CBM water and failures on the part 
of the State to properly regulate CBM water statewide.  The plaintiffs' failure to connect any 
particular state action to their harm prevents them from establishing 
justiciablity here.  Nevertheless, 
in the event we are presented with a true justiciable controversy in another 
case, we will not hesitate to determine whether the State's processes meet the 
constitutional and statutory directives.  

 
 
2. 
        
Right to Intervene

 
 
[¶49]   In Case No. S-08-0162, Pennaco and 
Devon challenge the district court's conditional order allowing intervention 
only in the event it did not grant the State's motion to dismiss.  They claim that, as long as they satisfy 
the requirements for intervention as a matter of right, they should be entitled 
to participate in all proceedings.  
In general, we have no quarrel with their position.  However, we need not delve into their 
question because we are affirming the district court's dismissal of the 
complaint and there will be no further proceedings in which the intervenors may 
participate. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶50]   The plaintiffs' claims are simply 
too general to be justiciable.  They 
do not connect the alleged deficiencies in the State's administration of water 
to a direct harm they have suffered.  
Nor do they make a sufficient showing that a ruling by the court will 
have an actual effect on them.  

 
 
[¶51]   Moreover, administrative remedies 
are available to the plaintiffs to address many of their complaints.  Where administrative procedures are 
provided, plaintiffs must utilize those procedures before bringing a declaratory 
judgment action.             

            

[¶52]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1West 
and Turner attached three documents to 
their complaint, including: 1) the Interim Report from the Wyoming Coal 
Bed Natural Gas Water Management Task Force (2006), which 
concluded:

 

a. 
The State Engineer has determined that water production for CBM extraction is a 
beneficial use.

b. 
The current regulatory structure is inadequate to protect downstream landowners; 
and

c. 
The State Engineer lacks specific authority to regulate quantity of water 
discharge; 

 
 
2)  The State Engineer's "Guidance: 
CBM/Ground Water Permits" dated March 2004 which instructs applicants: a 
groundwater appropriation application must be submitted and approved before 
drilling of a well may commence; the application must include the amount of 
ground water to be withdrawn in gallons per minute and acre feet per year; and 
if the applicant plans to store CBM water in a reservoir, a reservoir permit 
must be obtained; and 3) the State Engineer's Revised Interim Policy memo for 
administering CBM by-product water dated April 26, 2004, which discusses  impoundment of CBM water in reservoirs, 
both on and off channel, and specifies that CBM water placed in reservoirs is 
put to beneficial use by: a) inactive  evaporation or infiltration; or b) 
activedischarging for specific uses.

 
 

2The State relies heavily on federal law in arguing that the plaintiffs do 
not present a justiciable controversy.  
Wyoming jurisprudence as to the requirements for presenting a justiciable 
declaratory judgment action is well developed.  Consequently, we will rely on state 
precedent rather than federal law in resolving this case.  Nevertheless, our law is, in many 
respects, consistent with federal law.  
For example, in Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court reviewed the U.S. Constitution Art. 3, § 1 "case or controversy" 
requirement.  The Supreme Court 
ruled that the plaintiffs, who were parents of black children, had alleged an 
injury when they claimed the IRS's allowance of tax exempt status to racially 
segregated private schools diminished their children's ability to receive an 
education in a racially integrated school.  
However, the plaintiffs did not have standing to maintain the action 
because they could not trace the governmental conduct to the alleged 
injury.  Id. at 757.  The federal "traceability" analysis is 
similar to our requirement that a decision of the court must be one that can 
effectively operate on the parties.  
In other words, if the plaintiff's injury is not traceable to the 
governmental action, then a court decision on the legality of the action will 
not effectively terminate the controversy.  
See also, Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 
v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1977) (noting the similarities 
between Wyoming and federal law as to the "actual controversy" 
requirement).

 
 

3The plaintiffs refer to the following constitutional provisions in 
support of their first cause action:

 
 

·         
Wyo. Const. Art. 8, § 1:  
"The water . . . within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared 
to be the property of the state."  

 
 

·         
Wyo. Const. Art. 8, § 3:  "Priority of appropriation for beneficial 
use shall give the better right.  No 
appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public 
interests."  

 
 

·         
Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 31:  "Water being essential to industrial 
prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, 
its control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally 
guard all the various interests involved."

 
 

4The 
plaintiffs also assert, without explanation, that the State's actions amount to 
an unconstitutional exercise of absolute and arbitrary power.  They do not provide any cogent argument 
on this assertion in their appellate brief; thus, we will not consider it.  Pittard v. Great Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 
64, ¶ 44, 156 P.3d 964, 976 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 

5The 
plaintiffs point to the following statutes in support of their 
claims:

 
 

 

 
 
"[I]t 
shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve all applications made in 
proper form, which contemplate the application of the water to a beneficial use 
and where the proposed use does not tend to impair the value of existing rights, 
or be otherwise detrimental to the public welfare.  But where there is no unappropriated 
water in the proposed source of supply, or where the proposed use conflicts with 
existing rights, or threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest, it 
shall be the duty of the state engineer to reject such application and refuse to 
issue the permit asked for." 

 
 

·         
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-933 (LexisNexis 2007):  "The state engineer may issue any 
permits subject to such conditions as he may find to be in the public 
interest."

 
 

6The 
plaintiffs refer to the following provisions in support of their claims: 

 
 

·         
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-101 (LexisNexis 2007):  
Beneficial use is limit of a water right.

 
 

·         
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-909(a) (LexisNexis 2007):  It is the policy of the state to 
conserve underground water resources and the state engineer and board of control 
are charged with requiring well owners to prevent waste of underground water 
either above or below surface. 

 
 

·         
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-502 (LexisNexis 2007):  The State Engineer has the duty to 
examine applications to make sure they contain necessary information including 
the "amount of the proposed beneficial use."

 
 

7The 
plaintiffs cite to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-935 (LexisNexis 2007) in support of 
their claim:

 
 
(b) 
Adjudication of all ground water rights except stock watering and domestic uses 
of ground water referenced in W.S. 41-3-907 shall proceed upon completion of the 
work according to the terms of the permit and the recording on forms furnished 
by the state engineer of such information as is deemed necessary concerning the 
works, and the filing of a map signed by a Wyoming licensed professional 
engineer or land surveyor, showing the location of the well and the point or 
points of use.  The state engineer 
or his authorized representative shall inspect the works, the lands irrigated or 
other uses being made of the water upon receipt of the map.  
The adjudication of stock watering and domestic uses of ground water 
referenced in  W.S. 41-3-907 may be 
initiated by the state engineer or the appropriator of record and will not 
require the filing of a map signed by a Wyoming licensed professional engineer 
or land surveyor, showing the location of the well and the points and areas of 
use or require the inspection by the state engineer or his authorized 
representative of the works, the lands irrigated or other uses being made of the 
water unless, in the discretion of the state engineer, such procedures are 
deemed necessary and appropriate.  
At this time the board may consider for adjudication the ground water 
rights upon proof of beneficial use being submitted by the 
appropriator.

(c) 
Adjudication shall proceed in the same manner prescribed for the adjudication of 
surface water appropriations once the state engineer or his authorized 
representative has reported his findings to the board.  A ground water appropriation attaches to 
the land for irrigation, or for such other purposes or object for which it was 
acquired.

 
 

8West 
and Turner claim the State violates:  

 
 

·         
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-4-211(b) (LexisNexis 2007):  The board of control is authorized to 
"adopt reasonable rules and regulations to carry out the duties imposed by law" 
to it.  

 
 

·         
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-909 (LexisNexis 2007):  
The state engineer is authorized, on the advice and consent of the board 
of control, to prescribe rules that are necessary or desirable to effectively 
administer the policy of conserving underground water. 

 
 

·         
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-308 (LexisNexis 2007):  The state engineer is authorized and 
directed to promulgate regulations for construction, etc. of dams, diversion 
systems and reservoirs to carry out the purposes of the 
act.

 
 

9The 
plaintiffs also provide the following statements in their amended complaint 
pertaining to the specific impacts of the State's actions on their 
properties.  In the introductory 
paragraphs of their amended complaint, they allege:

 
 

6.    
Plaintiffs 
seek to prevent further injury and damage to their adjudicated water rights, the 
lands they use for forage and crops, and their trees and riparian vegetation 
that provide aesthetic value and stock and wildlife 
shelter.

 
 

7.    
Plaintiffs 
have been foreclosed of the opportunity to prevent continuing damage to their 
water rights, lands, and crops by the State's Engineer's summary and conclusory 
determinations to grant permits for CBM ground water diversions and storage, 
which violate both the Plaintiffs' due process rights and the State Engineer's 
and Board of Control's constitutional obligations.  

 
 
In 
the "Facts Common to all Claims" section of the amended complaint, the 
Plaintiffs allege:

 
 

23. 
The 
[State Engineer] accepts applications and issues permits for storage of CBM 
water in on and off-channel reservoirs without providing neighboring landowners 
such as Plaintiffs with notice or an opportunity for a hearing to object to the 
permit issuance.

 
 

10The Colorado Supreme Court recently issued a decision pertaining to the 
Colorado State Engineer's responsibility to regulate CBM water. Vance v. Wolf,  Docket No. 07SA293 (Colo. April 20, 
2009).  The Colorado State Engineer 
did not regulate CBM water wells because it did not consider diversion for CBM 
production to be a beneficial use but rather regarded it as a nuisance.  By failing to issue permits or otherwise 
regulate CBM water wells, the State Engineer was allowing out-of-priority 
diversions of water for CBM production.  
Some Colorado ranchers brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a 
declaration that diversion of groundwater for CBM production was a beneficial 
use and, consequently, should be regulated by the Colorado State Engineer.  There was no discussion in Vance about the ranchers' standing to 
bring the action, but the opinion does state that they alleged that their vested 
senior water rights were being harmed by the State's failures.  The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that 
diversion of ground water for CBM production is a beneficial use and the State 
Engineer was, therefore, required to regulate it.  Vance is obviously different from the 
case presented here as the State does regulate CBM water in Wyoming, although 
West and Turner do not agree with its methods.

 
 

11It 
appears that the plaintiffs may be attempting to act as "private attorneys 
general" by requesting, on behalf of the citizenry of the state, a ruling that 
the relevant agencies are not following the law.  However, such an action may be 
maintained only if there is a statute specifically giving a party the right to 
act as a private attorney general to enforce the state's laws.  For example, the Environmental Quality 
Act contains such a provision at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-904.  See also, Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore 
Livestock Co. 669 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1983) (interpreting an earlier version of 
the EQA's private attorney general statute).  The plaintiffs do not direct us to any 
statute giving them the authority to act as private attorneys general to secure 
a judgment, on behalf of the general citizenry, that the State is violating the 
law.

 
 

12We 
note that West and Turner could bring a civil action against the individual CBM 
producers whose water practices are damaging their property.  This Court has seen numerous cases 
presenting similar issues.  In Reed v. Cloninger, 2006 WY 37, 131 P.3d 359 (Wyo. 2006), we stated that a water user who fails to exercise reasonable 
care in directing irrigation or waste water is negligent, and the ditch owner 
will be responsible for the damages neighbors suffer as a result of his 
negligence.  Id., ¶ 13, 131 P.3d  at 365. In Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Co., 
802 P.2d 840 (Wyo. 1990), the landowners brought a negligence and trespass 
action against an oil and gas producer on the basis that the company's failure 
to properly plug an abandoned oil and gas well resulted in salty seepage water 
damaging their land.  In Hoy v. Miller, 2006 WY 147, 146 P.3d 488 
(Wyo. 2006), a landowner brought an action seeking recovery for damages to his 
land caused by a leaking reservoir.  See also, Howell v. Big Horn Basin 
Colonization Co., 14 Wyo. 14, 81 P. 785 (Wyo. 1905).           

 
 

13 Section 41-3-911 states in relevant part:

 
 
(a) 
Whenever a well withdrawing water for beneficial purposes shall interfere 
unreasonably with an adequate well developed solely for domestic or stock uses 
as defined in W.S. 41-3-907, whether in a control area or not, the state 
engineer may, on complaint of the operator of the stock or domestic well, order 
the interfering appropriator to cease or reduce withdrawals of underground water 
. . . 

(b) 
Any appropriator of either surface or underground water may file a written 
complaint alleging interference with his water right by a junior right.  Complaints are to be filed with the 
state engineer and are to be accompanied by a fee of one hundred dollars 
($100.00) to help defray costs of investigation.  This section is not applicable to 
interference between two (2) surface water rights.  Upon receiving the complaint and fee, 
the state engineer shall undertake an investigation to determine if the alleged 
interference does exist.  Following 
the investigation, the state engineer shall issue a report to all interested 
parties stating his findings.  The 
report may suggest various means of stopping, rectifying or ameliorating the 
interference or damage caused thereby.

(c) 
Any interested appropriator who is dissatisfied with the results of the 
foregoing procedure may proceed under the applicable provisions of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115].  If a hearing is to be held, it shall be 
held before the appropriate water division superintendent.  The superintendent shall report to the 
board of control at its next meeting.  
The board shall issue its order to include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.

 
 

14We do not suggest, at this juncture, that the plaintiffs would be 
entitled to a ruling directing the agencies to adopt rules even if they had 
exhausted their administrative remedies.  
A determination of whether an agency is required to adopt regulations 
depends on the agency's statutory authority and responsibility to adopt 
regulations.  See, e.g., Jergeson v. Board of Trustees of School 
Dist. No. 7, Sheridan County, 476 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Wyo. 1970) (stating that 
agencies directed by the legislature to adopt rules should do so);  Rissler and McMurry v. Environmental Quality 
Council, 856 P.2d 450 (Wyo. 1993) (ordering EQC to adopt rules because 
statute directed agency to do so);  Kearney Lake, Land and Reservoir Co. v. 
Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., 487 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1971) (ordering Board of 
Control to adopt rules).