Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Bruhn

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Bruhn1997 WY 161951 P.2d 373Case Number: 97-98Decided: 12/24/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING 
WORKERS'

SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

Hobart BRUHN, surviving spouse of Susan K. 
Bruhn,

individually and on behalf of Corey Lynn Wittenhagen, 
minor child, Appellee (Respondent).

 

 

Appeal from Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division.

 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellant. 

C. John Cotton of Cotton Law 
Offices, Gillette, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant State 
of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the 
division) sought judicial review of the hearing examiner's decision to award 
worker's compensation death benefits to the survivors of Susan Bruhn (the 
employee). The district court certified the case to this Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

 

[¶2]      We reverse the 
hearing examiner's decision.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The division 
seeks our review of the following issue:

 

A. Was the Hearing 
Examiner's award of death benefits arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, and contrary to law, where the fatal injury was not an "injury" and 
was not proximately caused by an "injury["?]

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On March 18, 
1996, the employee, who had been in Rapid City, South Dakota, for a doctor's 
appointment, was returning to her home in Gillette when, at about 5:10 p.m., her 
vehicle skidded on ice and traveled into the ditch. The employee was ejected, 
and her vehicle rolled over her. She died as a result of the injuries which she 
sustained in the accident.

 

[¶5]      The hearing 
examiner relied upon the following facts, which were stipulated to by the 
parties, in rendering his findings of fact and conclusions of 
law:

 

1. The parties have stipulated to the following 
facts:

 

(1) 
[The employee], now deceased, sustained a compensable injury on or about January 
25, 1991, while employed by Pamida Discount Store.

 

(2) 
On March 18, 1996, [the employee] had an appointment to be seen and evaluated by 
Steven K. Hata, M.D., in Rapid City, South Dakota, in connection with treatment 
and care required for the January 1991, injury. . . .

 

(3) 
[The employee] died as a result of an automobile accident which occurred during 
the early evening hours of March 18, 1996. The March 18, 1996, automobile 
accident occurred following [the employee's] appointment with Dr. Hata in Rapid 
City[,] South Dakota, and during [the employee's] return trip to Gillette, 
Wyoming, from her appointment with Dr. Hata.

 

(4) Hobart Dean Bruhn[] is the Surviving Spouse of 
[the employee].

 

(5) 
Cory Lynn Wittenhagen[] is a Surviving minor child of [the employee]. Ms. 
Wittenhagen's date of birth was May 9, 1978, and she was 17 years of age at the 
time of the injury. Ms. Wittenhagen turned 18 years old on May 9, 
1996.

 

(6) 
Prior to her death, [the employee] had been awarded a Permanent Partial 
Impairment Award of 34% or $23,101.98. At the time of death, $9,965.56 remained 
to be paid out of this award.

 

(7) 
The Division has paid Hobart Bruhn an amount equal to the $9965.56 which 
remained to be paid to [the employee] at the time of her death. This was 
accepted by Mr. Bruhn as a "partial payment" on survivor's benefits payable 
pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-403(e).

 

(8) 
In the event of an award in favor of Mr. Bruhn for benefits pursuant to W.S. § 
27-14-403(e), the amount due and payable to Mr. Bruhn will be reduced by the 
amount previously paid as set forth in the preceding 
paragraph.

 

(End of Stipulation.)

 

2. The Office further finds that [the employee] was 
not employed at Pamida at the time of her death, and that the Pamida store in 
Gillette went out of business months prior to the date of her 
death.

 

3. The Office further finds that [the employee] was 
referred to Dr. Hata (a neurologist in Rapid City) by Dr. Sontag (a chiropractor 
in Gillette), that there are no neurologists practicing in Gillette, that the 
appointment with Dr. Hata was at 4:00 p.m., that [the employee] drove over 
earlier in the day for an MRI session, that the neurologist's appointment was 
late in the day so that Dr. Hata would have a chance to review the MRI report 
prior to seeing [the employee], that [the employee] proceeded home directly 
after the appointment, that the vehicle rolled at about 5:10 p.m. while she was 
driving home to Gillette, that there is no evidence of speeding or reckless 
driving, and that there was no evidence of diverting on a frolic or personal 
errand not related to the physician's appointment.

 

. 
. . .

 

5. The Office further finds that apparently [the 
employee] was driving without wearing her seat belt, but there is no evidence in 
the record to state whether that fact was causally related to her fatal 
injuries. In other words, it would be speculative to conclude that the failure 
to wear her seat belt caused her death, or to conclude that she would not have 
been injured had she been wearing her seat belt.

 

. 
. . .

 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

 

. 
. . .

 

2. The Division contends that benefits are awardable 
only for injuries that occur within the course and scope of employment and that 
this fatal injury did not occur under such circumstances. This argument was made 
and noted for the record, but the Office finds that the claim is made under W.S. 
27-14-403(e) for benefits "if an injured employee dies as a result of the work 
related injury. . . . [."]  Under 
that statute it is not necessary to determine whether the fatal injury, even if 
it is a second injury, occurred in the course and scope of employment, but 
rather, it is necessary to determine whether the injured employee (already 
injured by a work related injury) died as a result of the work related 
injury.

 

. 
. . .

 

6. The parties generally agreed that the phrase "as a 
result of" is invested with a burden upon the claimant to show that the work 
related injury was causally related to the death. Mr. Lesley contended that it 
was necessary to show that the work injury was the proximate cause of the death, 
without any intervening or superseding causes. Mr. Cotton urges a broad view of 
causation.

 

. 
. . .

 

12. This case involves a chain of causation that is 
stronger than a mere "but for" line of analysis. [The employee] needed to see 
Dr. Hata for treatment of her compensable work-related injury, she needed to 
travel and she was paid for the travel. There is no evidence of a diversion or 
frolic or side trip, nor of negligence in driving her vehicle. The linkage 
between the compensable injury and the travel is direct and unbroken.

 

. 
. . . 

 

15. This is a close question. Both counsel have 
provided thorough and incisive analysis. This case presents a legal dispute, not 
so much a factual dispute. On balance, the Office concludes that the language 
"as a result of" is broader than the concept of "proximate cause[."] The 
Legislature chose this language for a reason, and that reason must be because 
death benefits were not intended to be restricted only to the families of those whose deaths 
were immediately, solely, primarily or proximately caused by industrial 
accidents. If the Legislature had intended to be so restrictive, the language it 
used would have stated that intent.

 

(Footnote and citations 
omitted.) The hearing examiner awarded death benefits to the surviving spouse 
and minor child pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-403(d) (Supp. 1996) (amended 
1996) and (e) (1997). The division petitioned the district court, asking it to 
reverse the hearing examiner's decision. The district court certified the case 
to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) 
limits judicial review of administrative decisions to a determination of the 
matters which are specified in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). Section 
16-3-114(c) provides in pertinent part:

 

(c). . . . The reviewing court 
shall:

 

. 
. .

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law[.]

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      The division 
contends that the hearing examiner's order was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, and contrary to law, arguing that it misapplied the plain meaning 
of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 

[¶8]      In order to 
resolve this issue, we must interpret the language of the relevant 
statutes.

 

We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with 
the Legislature's intent. We begin by making an "`inquiry respecting the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 
Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). 
We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.

 

State Department of Revenue 
and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). "When the Court 
determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must 
give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort to the 
rules of statutory construction." Lancto v. City of Rawlins, 892 P.2d 800, 
802-03 (Wyo. 1995). If, on the other hand, the Court determines that a statute 
is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation to help it 
determine the legislature's intent. Newton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶9]      WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1997) defines a compensable injury:

 

(xi) "Injury" means any harmful change in the human 
organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of 
employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

 

(Emphasis added.) The 
statutory language of § 27-14-102(a)(xi) is clear and unambiguous. An injury is 
received "in the course of employment" when it occurs while the employee is 
performing the duties for which she was hired. Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 
Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208, 210 (1963). An injury "aris[es] out of" the employment 
when a causal connection exists between the injury and the conditions under 
which the work is required to be performed. Id. Under these guidelines, "`if the 
injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to 
have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation 
as a result of the exposure occasioned 
by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out of" the employment.'" Id. 
(quoting Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736, 738-39 (1951)). 
An injury is not compensable if it cannot fairly be traced to the employment as 
a contributing cause and if it comes from a hazard that the employee would have 
been equally exposed to outside of the employment. 380 P.2d  at 
210-11.

 

[¶10]   The hearing examiner opined that 
this case hinged upon how § 27-14-403(e) is interpreted. That provision sets out 
the benefits which are available for a deceased employee's survivors "[i]f an 
injured employee dies as a result of the work related injury." (Emphasis added.) 
The hearing examiner determined that, if the legislature had intended for the 
work related injury to be the sole or primary cause of an employee's death, it 
would have included those words in the statute. He concluded that, since the 
statute does not contain words to that 
effect, the legislature must have intended for death to be compensable as long 
as the death can be linked to the injury.

 

[¶11]   We disagree with the hearing 
examiner's interpretation of the statute. We read the statute to say that, in 
order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the direct cause 
of the employee's death. If the legislature had intended for a broader causation 
test to be applied, it would have defined what that test is instead of leaving 
it up to us to decipher.

 

[T]he purpose of the workmen's compensation laws is 
to spread the risk of injury inherent in a job, over the whole industry so that 
the cost of medical attention and loss of wages will be passed on by inclusion 
in the price of the product or service being sold by the employer, instead of 
having to be borne by the unfortunate individual who suffers the 
injury.

 

Whitington v. Industrial 
Commission, 105 Ariz. 567, 468 P.2d 926, 928 (1970).

 

[¶12]   As the division points out, it 
would be impossible to ever cut off compensability if we were to adopt the 
hearing examiner's interpretation of the causation requirement. Would we 
compensate an employee who wrecked her car and died because she fell asleep at 
the wheel while she was on her way to see her doctor? Would we compensate an 
employee who was killed by a drunk driver while she was on her way home from her 
doctor's appointment? A logical end would not exist to the causation test which 
the hearing examiner proposes. Furthermore, it would lead to too many abuses, 
and the worker's compensation fund would, in effect, become a general health and accident insurance fund, 
a purpose for which it was not intended.1

 

[¶13]   A causal connection does not exist 
between the employee's initial injury and her car accident. The fact that she 
was returning from a doctor's appointment for an injury which she sustained 
while she was working at the Pamida Discount Store does not translate to a 
finding that the injury caused her death. Certainly, the accident which caused 
the employee's death did not occur because of her work related back injury. The 
accident was not a hazard of her employment that she would not have been 
subjected to apart from her job nor did 
it result from a risk reasonably incident to the character of the business. 
Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that we are all equally exposed to - 
bad road conditions. Accordingly, we conclude that the hearing examiner's award 
of worker's compensation death benefits to the survivors of the employee was not 
in accordance with the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 

[¶14]   The hearing examiner's decision is 
reversed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1 By way 
of dicta, we discussed the "quasi-course of employment" analysis in Bearden v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 868 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1994). Under this theory, injuries are compensable 
if they arise out of the following "quasi-course" 
activities:

 

"activities 
undertaken by the employee following upon his injury which, although they take 
place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and would not be 
considered employment activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to 
the employment in the sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities 
that would not have been undertaken but for the compensable injury.  `Reasonable' at this point relates not 
to the method used, but to the category of activity 
itself."

 

868 P.2d  
at 270 (quoting 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.11(d) at 
3-542 (1993)). Given our interpretation of § 27-14-403(e), we expressly reject 
the "quasi-course of employment" theory of recovery. We instead hold that, in 
order for a second injury to be compensable, the original compensable injury 
must itself be the direct cause of the subsequent injury.