Case Title: STATE v. CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE v. CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT2001 WY 9032 P.3d 325Case Number: 00-120Decided: 10/02/2001
 
October Term, A.D. 2001

STATE 
OF WYOMING, et al.,                                

 Appellants(Defendants),

v.

CAMPBELL 
COUNTY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, 
et al.,

Appellees(Plaintiffs),

                                                                                    

LARAMIE 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 
ONE, et al.,

Appellees(Intervening 
Plaintiffs),

and

WYOMING 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Appellee(Intervening 
Plaintiff).

  

Representing 
Appellants:

Rowena 
Heckert, Deputy Attorney General; Raymond B. Hunkins, Special Assistant Attorney 
General, of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, WY; and Jack B. 
Speight and Dominique D.Y. Cone of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, LLC, Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Hunkins.

 Representing 
Appellee Laramie County School District No. One:

Paul 
J. Hickey and Richard D. Bush of Hickey, Mackey, Evans & Walker, Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Hickey.

 Representing 
Appellee Natrona County School District No. One:

Stuart 
R. Day and Kevin D. Huber of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Day.

 Representing 
Appellee Wyoming Education Association:

Patrick 
E. Hacker of Patrick E. Hacker, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Hacker.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J., 
Ret.

Lehman, 
C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court.  
Voigt, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      In 1995, 
this court heard school districts' claims challenging the constitutionality of 
school financing statutes.  This 
court determined the Wyoming Constitution required that all students receive an 
equal opportunity to a quality education.  
Finding a lack of equal oppor­tunity, we remanded the case.  Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 
907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) (Campbell I).  After the legislature acted, the 
challenger school districts and the Wyoming Educa­tion Association (WEA) 
continued the action, culminating in a second opinion by this court in which we 
again decided issues involving the constitutionality of operations and capital 
construction financing.  State v. 
Campbell County Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell 
II).  From this second opinion, 
the State petitioned for rehearing.  
The petition indicated an inter­pretation of our decision not 
intended by this court regarding the issue of capital construc­tion.  We heard oral argument by the State, 
Laramie County School District Number One, Natrona County School District Number 
One, and WEA.

[¶2]      At oral argument 
upon the Petition for Rehearing, all parties agreed that the present method for 
financing capital construction is not constitutional, and further agreed that 
capital construction financing cannot be based upon local wealth, but must be 
based upon the wealth of the state as a whole.  Although our opinion on the adequacy of 
capital construction fund­ing did not draw the same agreement by the 
parties, no one disputes that inadequate funding causes serious damage to school 
districts' ability to deliver a constitutional education to the children of this 
state.  Until a comprehensive plan 
exists to adequately fund capital construc­tion from the wealth of the state 
as a whole, the students of all school districts remain subject to injuries and 
damages.

[¶3]      The following 
issues were raised in the Petition for Rehearing to which the court now 
responds.

Taking 
Judicial Notice of Incomplete Documents

[¶4]      The legislature 
ordered the state superintendent to establish the needs of "school 
build­ings and facilities" on or before September 1 of each year.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-15-107(e) (Lexis 
1999).  On or before October 
1 of each year, the state superintendent reports those needs to the Joint 
Education Interim Committee, and, "[n]ot later than December 31 of each year," 
the state superintendent is to report on the "progress being made" on capital 
con­struction projects.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-15-107(e), (g), (j) (Lexis 1999).  In Campbell II, the court took 
ju­dicial notice of a document entitled "November 2000-Schools in Immediate 
Need of Capital Construction" and, in doing so, omitted a final column.  Although the State disputes both the 
propriety of our use of the state superintendent's November 2000 report and the 
accuracy of our interpretation, we assure the State that we did consider the 
last column of that report as noted in footnote 57 of our 
opinion.

[¶5]      As statutorily 
required, the MGT study was the method employed to assess "school buildings and 
facilities" in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-15-111 (Lexis 1999), a 
statute entitled "State capital construction assistance."  Our opinion requires completion of the 
capital construction projects identified in the MGT study and recognizes the 
total amount will fluctuate for various reasons.  The State contends substantial funds 
have been pro­vided for which it was not given credit by this court's 
opinion, including major maintenance fund­ing.  Those appropriations were not proposed 
until after our opinion was issued.  
Obvi­ously, any funds appropriated for capital construction projects 
will reduce the ultimate state-funding obligations.  Therefore, the State need not 
believe that it has been mandated to spend a fixed amount without regard to 
ongoing progress.  In addition, some 
of the funds the State points to are currently encumbered until such time as the 
legislature conducts its own separate review of the proposed projects.  Accordingly, this court will not 
consider the funds until they are available to be spent.

Consequences 
of Inadequacy

[¶6]      Before we again 
focus on methodology details, it cannot be forgotten why, since 1981, we have 
found that capital construction financing critically impacts the quality of 
edu­cation.  Without adequate 
funding for costly repairs, renovations, and building construction, school 
districts faced with non-routine major expenditure items must choose from the 
lesser of two evils:  either 
ignoring the problem or, if that is no longer an option, diverting 
opera­tional funding intended for teachers' and staff salaries and essential 
school programs.  If the schools' 
operational funding budgets have no surplus money to divert, a deficiency 
results and educational staff and programs are eliminated to reduce 
expenditures.  At the same time, it 
is rare that these extraordinary efforts are sufficient to properly maintain 
buildings. 

[¶7]      Our 1995 opinion 
found the challenger school districts had proved that the cumulative effect from 
years of diverting and cutting operational funding had forced untenable staff 
and program cuts while failing to prevent the deterioration and overcrowding of 
school buildings.  Consequently, 
school districts were unable to provide to all students in this state a 
sufficient number of teachers and buildings to maintain small class size, 
sufficient programs necessary to deliver a proper education, and assurance that 
all buildings met basic safety standards.  
Since 1995, the legislature has comprehensively addressed school 
districts' operational funding issues, but not capital construction 
deficiencies.  Unless the two parts 
of the whole are simultaneously remedied, the unconstitutionality of the system 
is not eliminated.

Relying Upon Scores of 90  
   

[¶8]      The 
constitutional goal is to ensure adequate capital construction funding from 
state wealth.  In 1999, the 
legislature enacted statutes creating a school capital construction system in 
response to our decision in Campbell I.  
1999 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 170, §§ 101, 102.  Entitled "Capital Construction 
Projects," the statutes were separate from those statutes governing school 
operations finance.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 21-15-106 through -112 (Lexis 1999).  
This set of capital construction statutes constituted the legislative 
plan to identify and separately fund capital construction needs.  

[¶9]      State officials 
identified  "inadequate and 
immediate need" buildings and facilities by means of a scoring system.  However, within the State's scoring 
system capital construction projects were not limited to those falling into the 
"inadequate and immediate need" category. The legislative plan limited 
eligibility for state funding to those school buildings and facilities that had 
been identified as "inadequate" and "in need of immediate capital 
construc­tion."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-15-107(e) (Lexis 1999).  We 
have agreed that the State's scoring methodology was constitutional and 
accordingly ruled that a legislative plan that limited as­sistance to the 
worst buildings unconstitutionally failed to provide for completing all capital 
construction projects identified by the scoring system.  

[¶10]   There is no serious dispute from 
any party that inadequate funding impedes school districts' ability to deliver a 
constitutional education to our children.  
Subsequent to our 1995 opinion, the legislature acknowledged this premise 
by enacting legislation ordering evalua­tion of all school buildings through 
the use of "qualified contractor assistance."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-15-107(b) (Lexis 
1999).  From this 
directive, the  legislature's 
capital construction project identification method was formulated under the MGT 
study.  The MGT study devel­oped 
a scoring system and then assigned score ranges to categories.  

[¶11]   In this matter on reconsideration, 
the State now alleges the court overstepped its authority by relying upon the 
MGT study, suggesting the study does not represent pro­posed legislative 
action, but merely guidelines for the legislature to consider.  However, the MGT study was the 
only piece of evidence regarding capital construction needs 
submitted by the State during the trial.  
Furthermore, there was no argument presented to this court prior to the 
most recent funding opinion that indicated the study would not be used for 
legislative decision making.  In 
fact, in addition to the legislation itself, the rules of the DOE rely upon the 
scoring system as a measure for its actions.  Therefore, this court also relied upon 
the study.  In this instance, the 
study created a mechanism for the State itself to determine if funding of 
capital construction meets constitutional standards, and we have no alternative 
but to rely on it and to respond to its results.

[¶12]   In developing the scoring system, 
the MGT study began by distinguishing "capital construction projects" 
from "routine maintenance," and then assigned a numerical score which had the 
effect of categorizing or, as the State says, prioritizing.  Because routine maintenance was funded 
through a school's operations budget, while capital construction projects were 
to be separately funded, it was essential to begin by identifying those needs 
not presently funded.  In addition 
to new capital construction, projects included non-routine items that the MGT 
identified as deferred maintenance repairs and replacement, and all were scored 
and categorized.  

[¶13]   The critical aspect, however, was 
the score.  The higher the 
score, the closer the build­ing was to changing its designation from 
a "capital construction project" to a condition requiring only "routine 
maintenance"the obvious goal.  By 
definition then, and without regard to whether new construction, a repair, a 
replacement, or a renovation is required, scores below 90 indicate that a 
non-routine, major expenditure is needed.  
Thus, it is a capital construction project to be addressed by the 
legislature's separate statutory scheme.  

[¶14]   As a point of clarification, the 
score of 90 categorizing the building as "new or as new," simply meant that the 
building condition was such that it required only routine main­tenance.  The State, the legislature, school 
districts, and citizens can rest assured that our opinion, in no way, required 
the construction of entirely new buildings for every building which scores below 
90.  

[¶15]   As to the score of 90, the court is 
cognizant of the fact that future studies could utilize different methodologies 
to measure capital construction needs.  The second point of clarifi­cation, 
therefore, is that the test of whether capital construction funding is needed 
must be whether the facilities are in a condition where only routine maintenance 
is required.  

[¶16]   Campbell II adopted the goal 
that, using the currently accepted MGT system, all buildings should ultimately 
be able to achieve a score of 90 for building condition, 80 for educational 
suitability and technological readiness, and 4 for building accessibility.  These numbers were obtained from the 
State's MGT report.  In 
addi­tion, the opinion concluded that buildings that did not meet the state 
standards for square footage would be deemed "in immediate need."  We remain commit­ted to that goal 
for all school buildings and to Campbell II's requirement for a 
legislative plan within six years to achieve that goal for the long term.  Campbell County Sch. Dist., 2001 
WY 19, ¶137, 19 P.3d 518, ¶137.  

[¶17]   We conclude a clarification of 
those goals is appropriate.  That 
plan should include a mechanism to fund non-routine maintenance to prevent 
buildings from deteriorating to a condition deemed inade­quate.  The State's own regulations define 
buildings in "immediate need" as those with scores below 49 in building 
condition, having a condition which creates a major or critical health hazard, 
or having a condition which prohibits activities essential to the educational 
program.  Department of Education 
School Capital Construction Grants, Building Mainte­nance and Repair 
Programs, ch. 24, §3(i) (2/23/00).  It cannot be responsibly argued that 
facilities in immediate need should not be remedied as quickly as possible.  Campbell II required this funding 
be provided (not projects completed) within two years, and we confirm that 
requirement.  The statutes and 
regulations do not specifically categorize buildings which fall below the 
minimum square footage standards adopted by the State.  Obviously, buildings which are 
overcrowded, where the cause of the overcrowding is not short term, prohibit the 
school's ability to deliver the educational services deemed appropriate by the 
legislature.  Consequently, the 
State must consider chronically overcrowded buildings as in immediate 
need.

[¶18]   The State's own regulations then 
define "inadequate" buildings as those falling below a score of 69 for 
condition, educational suitability, or technology readiness and which have a 
condition(s) that impedes the delivery of educational services.  Department of Education School Capital 
Construction Grants, Building Maintenance and Repair Programs, ch. 24, §3(j) 
(2/23/00).  Allowing schools to have 
inadequate facilities cannot meet the constitutional standard set forth in 
Campbell I of elimination of deficient facilities.  Campbell II required inadequate 
facilities be remedied within four years, and we continue to believe that is 
appro­priate.

[¶19]   During argument, the State 
indicated it was on schedule as outlined in our previous opinion, and we see no 
compelling reason to alter that schedule.  
We are aware significant funds have been appropriated and numerous 
projects are in various stages of plan­ning, development, and state 
approval.  Thus, the estimated 
project costs contained in the MGT report are outdated and are an inaccurate 
indication of the final costs.

[¶20]   Critical to this issue on rehearing 
is the recognition that the State is in control of the ultimate amount of 
spending as it exercises its responsibility of review and oversight of specific 
projects proposed by local school dis­tricts.  The constitution simply requires the 
State to provide capital construction funding of the facilities in the amount 
deemed necessary to provide facilities capable of delivering the level of 
educational services determined appropriate by the State of Wyoming.  If a local school district seeks funding 
in excess of that required to meet state stan­dards, the State is not 
obligated to provide such funding, and the local school district can seek it 
from other sources.  For example, if 
a school district proposes to build a new high school for $30 million dollars 
and the State determines it is able to build a school capable of delivering the 
educational services required by their standards for $20 million dollars, then 
the State is obligated to spend only $20 million dollars, and the school 
district must provide funding for that part of the proposal in excess of 
constitutional state standards.  

Which 
Buildings Apply

[¶21]   The State seeks clarification of 
which buildings need to be included in the capital con­struction funding 
scheme.  The legislative directive 
in § 21-15-111(a)(iii) defines "school buildings and facilities" as "the 
physical structures and the land upon which the structures are situated, which 
are primarily used in connection with or for the purpose of providing the 
educational programs offered by a school district in compliance with law, 
including both student-related and nonstudent-related buildings and 
facilities."  
(Emphasis added.)

[¶22]   The court finds the legislation to 
be sufficiently clear and would expect the legislature and the school districts 
to employ common sense in its application.  
Clearly, buildings used to educate students should take priority in terms 
of capital construction financing.  
However, the legislature wisely included an ongoing review of all 
buildings, and wisdom teaches us all that an ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure.

Construction 
Infrastructure

[¶23]   The State asked the court to 
consider its capital construction obligations in light of our state's inability 
to complete the projects because of a dearth of contractors and labor.  Just as with any other litigant before 
this court, we are unable to rely upon evidence not submitted in the course of 
trial.  Further, it would appear 
this issue is premature for the court to make subject of an 
opinion.

Summary 
of Issues Raised on Rehearing

[¶24]   
In summary, capital construction funding must continue within the time 
frame set forth in the Campbell County II opinion, with the goal to 
achieve facilities that need only routine maintenance.

Uniform Taxation

[¶25]   Our recent opinion noted that 
capital construction funding primarily relied upon non-uniform property 
taxation.  The court again advised 
the legislature of the option of statewide taxation as an alternative method of 
obtaining capital construction revenues, just as we have since 1971.  Despite voiced concerns that the court 
overstepped its bounds by ordering statewide taxation, clearly our opinion 
contained no such order.  In fact, 
we stated:

To date, the Wyoming legislature 
has limited school funding taxation to property taxes although nothing prohibits 
it from im­posing other taxation or revenue raising mechanisms.  That de­cision, however, is the 
prerogative of the legislature.

State v. Campbell County Sch. 
Dist., 2001 WY 
19, ¶123, 19 P.3d 518, ¶123.  We 
went on to say that: 

The 
Wyoming Constitution does not prohibit the state from im­posing a statewide 
mill levy taxation level for capital construction, nor does it limit the number 
of mills that can be levied for such a fund. It merely requires that it be 
uniform.  Nothing in the state 
constitution prevents the legislature from raising the entire amount needed of 
more than $565 million for capital construc­tion by enacting statutes 
imposing a new cate­gory of statewide mill levy for capital construction at 
whatever level is required to raise the desired amount of money, and, if 
it so desires, the leg­islature can act within any time frame 
includ­ing raising all funding in a single year.  

Id. at 
¶127 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

Bonding and Local Revenues

[¶26]   We agree with WEA that we must 
clarify that, from the date of our opinion, all bonds in place remain in 
effect.  However, school districts 
are no longer required to have reached bonded indebtedness of ninety percent 
(90%) or more of their constitutional debt limitation imposed under Wyoming 
Constitution, art. 16, § 5 in order to receive state assistance for those 
capital construction projects identified in the MGT study.  In Campbell II, we held that the 
legislature unconstitutionally relied upon local wealth by requiring local 
school districts to resort first to local resources for capital construction and 
to bond to ninety percent (90%) of their capacity before becoming eligible for 
state funding.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-15-111(e) (Lexis 1999).  

[¶27]   Our decisions have neither 
eliminated nor reduced "local control" as it exists today.  On the contrary, we have recognized a 
school district's right to rely upon some local funding to serve the purpose of 
improving the quality of education delivered to its students through innovation 
or modernization.  The Wyoming 
Constitution permits school districts to impose bonded 
indebtedness up to a set limit.  We 
have decided that the State cannot take this money from a local school district 
for any purpose.  

[¶28]   Historically, and perhaps with even 
more justification in the present setting, the court has been reluctant to 
remain involved in ongoing disputes.  
The purpose for that is our rec­ognition that we are not charged with 
developing policy or making funding decisions.  How­ever, all parties have requested 
that this court retain jurisdiction.  
While it is our expectation that our continued jurisdiction will not be 
necessary, we will accept petitions for resolution of constitutional or 
statutory interpretations should the parties reach an impasse.  It is our ex­pectation that all 
parties will act in good faith in all matters including requesting or agreeing 
to any requests for extensions under our previously an­nounced time 
frames.  Finally, the court will 
consider the appropriateness of appointing a special master in the future should 
the parties be unable to resolve ongoing disputes.

Separation 
of Powers

[¶29]   This court remains acutely aware of 
the criticism surrounding the two most recently issued opinions regarding school 
financing.  While all parties now 
acknowledge that the cur­rent method for financing capital construction is 
unconstitutional, the court's discussion of the funding issues surrounding 
capital construction was viewed as crossing the lines sepa­rating our 
branches of government in Wyoming.  

[¶30]   We continue to recognize that it is 
our duty to declare void all legislation that is uncon­stitutional.  In 1787, Alexander Hamilton stated that 
it is the duty of courts of justice to declare void all legislative acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution.  In The Federalist No. 78,1 Alexander Hamilton described 
this doctrine to be "of great importance in all the American constitutions," and 
spoke to "[s]ome perplexity" that had "arisen from an imagination that the 
doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative 
power."  Hamilton removed the 
perplexity in his cogent explanation of the doctrine:

            
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every 
act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under 
which it is exercised, is void.   
No leg­islative act, therefore, contrary to the constitution, can be 
valid.  To deny this, would be to 
affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above 
his master; that the repre­sentatives of the people are superior to the 
people themselves; that men, acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what 
their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

            
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional 
judges of their own powers, and that the con­struction they put upon them is 
conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be 
the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular 
provisions in the constitution.  It 
is not otherwise to be sup­posed, that the constitution could intend to 
enable the represen­tatives of the people to substitute their will to 
that of their con­stituents.  It 
is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an 
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.  The interpretation of the laws is the 
proper and peculiar province of the courts.  A constitution is, in fact, and must be, 
regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.  It must therefore belong to them to 
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act 
pro­ceeding from the legislative body.  
If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, 
that which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course, to be 
preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the 
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their 
agents.

            
Nor does the conclusion by any means suppose a superior­ity of the 
judicial to the legislative power.  
It only sup­poses that the power of the people is superior to both; 
and that where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in 
opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought 
to be governed by the latter, rather than the former.  They ought to regulate their decisions 
by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not 
fundamental.

These 
truths of which Hamilton spoke found expression in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), and most state courts, including 
Wyoming's, have fol­lowed this judicial path.  

[¶31]   Our school finance decisions are 
the natural result of our understanding and applica­tion of the immutable 
truths of which Hamilton spoke.  
They have been firmly and faithfully anchored in the plain language of 
the Wyoming Constitution, a fundamental law established by and expressing the 
will of the people.  Because it 
falls to us to preserve, protect, and defend the people's fundamental law, we 
cannot declare valid any legislation which contra­venes that fundamental 
law.  To deny this would be to 
affirm that the people's representa­tives in the legislature are superior to 
the people.  Where the will of the 
legislature declared in its school finance statutes stands in opposition to the 
will of the people declared in their Wyoming Constitution, we are, and must be, 
governed by the will of the people.  

[¶32]   While we recognize the legislative 
and executive branches of Wyoming's state govern­ment have broad powers and 
responsibilities in providing the fundamental right of an education to our 
children, the powers of each branch of government are bound by the man­dates 
and the constraints of the Wyoming Constitution.  "If the executive and legislative 
branches fail to fulfill their duties in a constitutional manner, the Court too 
must accept its continuing constitutional responsibility . . . for 
overview . . . of compliance with the consti­tutional imperative."  Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance 
Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L.Rev. 1088 
(1991).

[¶33]   For thirty years, this court has 
witnessed the legislature struggle with capital construc­tion 
issues.  Our decisions 
attempted to provide a framework within which the legislature could achieve a 
constitutional school financing scheme.  
However, consistent reiteration of constitutional requirements has proved 
to be ineffective.  The 
legislature's failure to create a timely remedy consistent with constitutional 
standards justifies the use of provisional reme­dies or other equitable 
powers intended to spur action.  
Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 
104 Harv. L.Rev. 1086.  When 
insufficient action in the legis­lative process occurs, judicial monitoring 
in the remediation phase can help check political process defects and ensure 
that meaningful relief effectuates the court's decision.  Id. at 1087.  When these defects lead to continued 
constitutional violations, judicial action is en­tirely consistent with 
separation of powers principles and the judicial role.

"An 
active judicial role in monitoring remedy formulation is well-rooted in the 
courts' equitable powers."[2] . . . How long a court waits and 
the degree of intervention exercised will depend upon the facts, such 
assessments fall squarely within the court's expertise.  But staying the judicial hand in the 
face of continued violation of constitutional rights makes the courts vulnerable 
to becoming complicit actors in the deprivation of those rights.  

Id.

[¶34]   Considerations of time and space 
restrain us from undertaking anything more than an abbreviated and measured 
response to the view of the dissent that the school finance issues are 
nonjusticiable political questions which this court should refrain from deciding 
and leave to the legislature.  It 
asserts that in neither Campbell I, our 1995 decision, nor in the instant 
case, which flows from the earlier case, has this court explained why the matter 
is not a nonjusticiable political question.  More specifically, the dissent focuses 
the debate on the political question doctrine and mechanically draws on and 
applies two of six attributes of federal political question doctrine identified 
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 
(1962), a federal legislative apportionment case in Article III federal 
courts.  The United States Supreme 
Court there held that the legislative apportionment matter before the federal 
court was not a nonjusticiable political question.  So applying this federal 
nonjusticiability doctrine, which is of questionable currency as shall be seen, 
the dissent con­cludes that this purely state matter is a nonjusticiable 
political question.  There are a 
number of sound reasons why the federal political question doctrine does not 
apply here and why this court has not adopted a stance toward that 
issue.

[¶35]   First and foremost, in the 
Campbell litigation the State has never raised or briefed the so-called 
political question issue.  One can 
scour the State's briefs and oral arguments in these cases, including the 
instant rehearing, and not find reference to either that discrete doctrine or 
Baker, 369 U.S. 186.  Under 
this court's long-standing precedent, this court will not frame the issues for 
the litigants and will not consider issues not raised by them and not supported 
by cogent argument and authoritative citation.

[¶36]   Moreover, Baker is clearly 
irrelevant and inapplicable for purposes of state constitutional analysis.  The case was decided in 1962, during a 
time in this nation's history when racial discrimination and malapportionment of 
representative districts at local, state, and federal levels were two of many 
causes of inequity in voting patterns across the nation.  These causes effectively diluted the 
voting power of new interest groups and, in many instances, numerical 
majorities.  Some held the view that 
legislative malapportionment was a political question and courts should not be 
involved in the "political thicket" surrounding apportionment problems.  In Baker, an action filed under 
the federal civil rights act, the plaintiffs claimed that a Tennessee 
apportionment statute debased their votes and denied them the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed them under the federal constitution.  The federal district court dismissed the 
action, holding that the subject matter of the action was not justiciable and 
the claim not legally cognizable.  
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr., on behalf of the Court, focused on the lower court's 
misunderstanding that because the plaintiffs sought to have a legislative 
apportion­ment declared unconstitutional, their action presented a 
nonjusticiable political question.  
The Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the 
apportionment challenge pre­sented no nonjusticiable political 
question.  In the course of Justice 
Brennan's discussion, he reviewed a number of federal political question cases 
"to expose the attributes of the doctrineattributes which, in various settings, 
diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness."  369 U.S.  at 210, 82 S. Ct.  at 706.  He emphasized that his review was 
"undertaken solely to demonstrate that neither singly nor collectively do these 
cases support a conclusion that this apportionment case is nonjusticiable, [and] 
we of course do not explore their implications in other contexts."  Id.  His review revealed that the 
relationship giving rise to the political question "is the relationship between 
the judiciary and the coordi­nate branches of the Federal Government, and 
not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States . . . ."  Id.  He also stressed that "[d]eciding 
whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the [Federal] Constitution 
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds 
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in 
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate 
inter­preter of the Constitution."  
Id. at 211, 82 S. Ct.  at 706.  
With respect to the attribute of  
"lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards," which his 
review had identified, id. at 217, 82 S. Ct.  at 710, he observed that 
"[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well-developed and 
familiar . . . ."  Id. at 
226, 82 S. Ct.  at 715.  

[¶37]   The federal doctrine of 
nonjusticiable political question, as discussed and applied in Baker and 
later federal decisions, has no relevancy and application in state 
constitutional analysis.  For 
example, Justice Brennan himself wrote in 1977:

And of 
course state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state law 
need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny 
litigants access to the courts.

. . 
. .

. . . [D]ecisions 
of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of 
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state 
law.  Accordingly, such decisions 
are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and 
the members of the bar seri­ously err if they so treat 
them.

William 
J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv. L.Rev. 489, 501-02 (1977).

[¶38]   Leading scholars debate whether the 
political question doctrine even exists, its wis­dom and validity, and its 
scope and rationale.  See, e.g., 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 TermForward: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 Harv. L.Rev. 40 (1961); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of 
the "Passive Virtues"A Comment on Principle and Expedi­ency in Judicial 
Review, 64 Colum. L.Rev. 1 (1964); Louis Henken, Is There a "Political 
Question" Doctrine?" 85 Yale L.J. 597 (1976) (Henken was a law clerk to 
Justice Frankfurter and a constitutional scholar of the highest stature); Martin 
H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L.Rev. 
1031 (1985); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone:  Do We Still Need the Political Question 
Doctrine? 100 Dick. L.Rev. 303 (1996); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 6-9 
(1959).

[¶39]   Another constitutional scholar of 
high stature observes several ways in which  "the political question doctrine is the 
most confusing of the justiciability doctrines."  Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction 142 (Little, Brown and Co., 2d ed. 1994).  He states:

First, 
the confusion stems from the fact that the political ques­tion doctrine is a 
misnomer; the federal courts deal with political issues all of the time. . . 
.

            
Second, the political question doctrine is particularly con­fusing 
because the [United States Supreme] Court has defined it very differently over 
the course of American history.

. . . 
.

            
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the political ques­tion 
doctrine is confusing because of the [United States Supreme] Court's failure to 
articulate useful criteria for deciding what subject matter presents a 
nonjusticiable political question.  
The classic, oft-quoted, statement of the political question 
doc­trine . . . provided in Baker v. Carr . . . seem[s] useless in 
identi­fying what constitutes a political question.

Id. 
at 
143-45.  Explaining this third 
point, Professor Chemerinsky writes:

For 
example, there is no place in the [Federal] Constitution where the text states 
that the legislative or executive should decide whether a particular action 
constitutes a constitutional violation.  
The [Federal] Constitution does not mention judicial review, much less 
limit it by creating "textually demonstrable commitments" to other branches of 
government.  Similarly, most 
important constitutional provisions are written in broad, open-textured language 
and certainly do not include "judicially discoverable and manageable standards." 
. . . .

            
In other words, it is impossible for a court or a commenta­tor to 
apply the Baker v. Carr criteria to identify what cases are political 
questions.  As such, it hardly is 
surprising that the doctrine is described as confusing and 
unsatisfactory.

Id. at 
145.  Professor Chemerinsky and 
other critics of the doctrine conclude that it "should play no role whatsoever 
in the exercise of the judicial review power."  Id. at 147 (quoting Martin 
Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L.Rev. 
1031, 1033 (1985); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the 
Constitution 99-105 (1987)).

[¶40]   Closer to home, Professor Robert B. 
Keiter, formerly at the University of Wyoming College of Law and a respected 
Wyoming state constitutional law scholar, has made a force­ful case against 
the separation-of-powers objection contained in the various nonjusticiability 
doctrines, such as standing and political question.  See, Robert B. Keiter, An 
Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 
527 (1986).  He has described in 
detail the significant institutional differences between the Article III federal 
courts and the state courts which justify a more expansive judicial review role 
for Wyoming's courts on public law issues than is appropriate for the federal 
courts.  His con­cern, which we 
share, is that as these doctrines develop they should be clearly related to the 
Wyoming Constitution rather than the federal charter.  Id. at 541.  In the state constitutional law context, 
Professor Keiter is not alone.  
See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive 
Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L.Rev. 1834 (2001) 
("[S]tate courts, because of their differing institutional and normative 
position, should not conform their rules of access to those that have developed 
under Article III.  Instead, state 
systems should take an independent and pragmatic approach to judicial authority 
in order to facilitate and support their integral and vibrant role in state 
governance."  Id. at 
1941).  It should probably not go 
unnoticed that Professor Michael Heise, whose law review article on Wyoming's 
school finance litigation is cited by the dissent, has spoken on the point when 
he concludes in that article:  "[M]y 
impression is that the weight of scholarly and judicial opin­ion on this 
issue decidedly favors the conclusion reached by the Wyoming [Supreme] Court in 
Campbell."  Michael Heise, 
Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses:  Educational Finance, Constitutional 
Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 Land & Water L.Rev. 
281, 304 n.141 (1998).

[¶41]   Although what we have said to this 
point should end the matter, let us briefly take one more step and discuss the 
conclusion in the dissent that judicially discoverable and manage­able 
standards do not exist in the education provisions of the Wyoming 
Constitution.   Rely­ing 
largely on a few dissenting opinions from school finance cases in Ohio, 
Washington, and South Carolina, and without the benefit of a state 
constitutional analysis, the dissent describes the words of the framers and 
ratifiers contained in these provisions as "amor­phous," concluding 
apparently that they have no meaning and express no principles.  One need only examine the litany of case 
law, state and federal, interpreting the broad language of such constitutional 
provisions as the due process and equal protection provisions and 
estab­lishing standards on which to invoke the rights enshrined in those 
fundamental laws to reject the disingenuousness of the "absence-of-standards" 
rationale.  If one were to take 
seriously this rationale, a huge portion of judicial constitutional review would 
be without basis.  The dissent would 
invoke the words of Judge Robert Bork to insinuate that this court has 
suc­cumbed to temptation in its headlong rush to judicial review excess, all 
the while ignoring that a constitution, whether state or federal, often 

states 
its principles in majestic generalities . . . .

. . 
. .

The role 
of a judge . . . is to find the meaning of a texta process which includes 
finding its degree of generality, which is part of its meaningand to apply that 
text to a particular situa­tion, which may be difficult if its meaning is 
unclear. . . . The problem is most difficult when dealing with the broadly 
stated provisions of the Bill of Rights. . . . In dealing with such 
provi­sions, a judge should state the principle at the level of generality 
that the text and historical evidence warrant.

. . 
. .

Original 
understanding [finds] the level of generality that interpretation of the words, 
structure, and history of the Consti­tution fairly supports.  This is a solution generally applicable to all constitutional provisions 
as to which historical evidence exists.

Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of 
America 147-50 (The Free Press 1990).

[¶42]   Judge Bork believes in, as we do, a 
"historically rooted" constitution.   Judge Bork states:

The provisions of the Constitution state profound but 
simple and general ideas.  The law laid down in those provisions 
gradually gains body, substance, doctrines, and distinctions as judges, equipped 
at first with only those ideas, are forced to confront new situations and 
changing circumstances.  It is essential, how­ever, that the new 
developments always be weighed in the light of the lessons history provides 
about the principles meant to be enforced.

Id. at 352.  For an illuminating and valuable history 
lesson on the Wyoming Constitution, see Robert B. 
Keiter and Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State 
Constitution 1-28 (Greenwood Press 1993).

[¶43]   The dissent ignores Judge Bork's 
counsel that

[a]ll that counts is how the words used in the Constitution 
would have been understood at the time.  The original understanding is thus manifested 
in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates at the 
conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the 
time, and the like.  
Almost no one would deny this; in fact almost everyone would find it 
obvi­ous to the point of thinking it fatuous to state the matter 
. . . .

. . . .

. . . [L]awyers and judges should seek in 
the Constitution what they seek in other legal texts:  the original 
meaning of the words.

Bork, supra, at 144-45.  As the 
constitutional decisions of this court reveal, from Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819 (1897), to the 
present, this court has heeded this counsel.  In Campbell I in 
particular did this court analyze the words of the education provisions of our 
state constitution using a sound methodology of constitutional analysis to 
achieve the under­standing of the text manifested in the words used and in 
secondary materials.  
The petitioners have challenged neither the analysis nor the resulting 
understanding.  
The proclamation that these words of the framers and ratifiersthe 
peoplehave no judicially discoverable mean­ing, commits the very heresy 
that Judge Bork condemns:

The heresy, which dislocates the constitutional system, is 
that the ratifiers' original understanding of what the Constitution means is no 
longer of controlling, or perhaps of any, impor­tance. . . . The 
result is a belief . . . that judges 
may . . . destroy old [principles], thus altering the 
principles actually to be found in the Constitution.

Bork, supra, at 6.  

[¶44]   Joining with his former federal court 
of appeals colleague in this condemnation, Justice Antonin Scalia has 
written:

Not that I agree with, or even take very seriously, the 
intricately elaborated scholarly criticisms to the effect that (believe it or 
not) words have no meaning.  They have meaning enough, as the scholarly 
critics themselves must surely believe when they choose to express their views 
in text rather than music.  But what is true 
is that it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of 
an ancient text.  
Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of 
material . . . .  Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation 
of the reliabil­ity of that material . . . . And further 
still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the timesomehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which 
an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philoso­phies, 
prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day.  It is, in short, a 
task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.

Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser 
Evil, 57 Cincinnati L.Rev. 849, 856-57 (1989).

[¶45]   Finally, to put a fine point on the 
subject, we are reminded of Judge Bork's counsel, after favorably offering Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-95, 74 S. Ct. 686, 690-92, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), as a worthy example 
of a court correctly applying an old prin­ciple according to a new 
understanding of a social situation.  He warned:

The important thing, the ultimate consideration, is the 
constitu­tional freedom that is given into our keeping.  A judge who refuses 
to see new threats to an established constitutional value, and hence provides a 
crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable 
meaning, fails in his judicial duty.  That duty, I repeat, is to ensure that the 
powers and freedoms the framers [and ratifiers] specified are made effective in 
today's circumstances.  The evolution of doctrine to accomplish that 
end contravenes no postulate of judicial restraint.

Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).  This court's 
constitutional analysis in this on-going litigation contravenes no postulate of 
judicial restraint.

Conclusion 

[¶46]   This court remains cognizant that just 
as all should recognize that our state's schools are the experts in providing an 
education to our children, all must recognize and rely upon the legislature's 
constitutionally granted authority and experience in designing and implementing 
our state's educational system.  We refuse to believe that legislators do not 
consider our children's right to education as fundamental and important.  Nor can we imagine 
that legislators will deliberately fail to uniformly assess through their chosen 
methodology the level of funds necessary to complete the capital construction 
goals identified through their plan and classified by this court as 
constitutionally required.

 
[¶47]   As the school districts and the 
legislature combine their efforts to implement the legislative plan for capital 
construction, these fundamental precepts apply.  First, the State is responsible for funding 
capital construction of facilities to the level deemed adequate by state 
standards.  
Second, the Legislature is in control of the ultimate amount of spending 
as it exercises its responsibility of review and oversight of specific projects 
proposed by local school districts.  Third, local school districts may supply 
revenue in excess of Legislative spending.  Lastly, local bonded indebtedness is no 
longer required.

[¶48]   The effort we all must maintain as 
citizens and officials is to remain focused on the very purpose those who 
created the constitution of this state sought:  the adequate and equal opportunity for 
education of our children.  When that purpose is given its proper place 
in our priority for our future as a state, open discussion of divergent points 
of view will inevitably lead to better resolution of issues in education.  Our history must 
not be based on a legacy of school finance cases laid on the doorstep of the 
supreme court, but rather on the considerate resolution of never-ending 
challenges we all face as responsible adults when providing for our 
children.

  
            

FOOTNOTES

1The Federalist No. 78, at 577-78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(John C. Hamilton ed. 1880).

2Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971) ("Once a right and a 
violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to 
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies").  
See also Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687-88, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2571-72, 57 L. Ed. 2d 522 
(1978).

VOIGT, Justice, dissenting.

[¶49]   I respectfully dissent.

[¶50]   The State's Petition for Rehearing 
raises five issues:

            
1.         The 
Court took judicial notice of partial or incomplete documents in arriving at the 
conclusion that Wyoming's legislative and executive branches have shirked their 
duties.  The 
Court should consider the complete documents which demonstrate significant 
progress and appropriations for capital construction.

            
2.         The 
Court's conclusion that scores of ". . . 90 or above for building condition, . . 
. assure each facility achieves a rating of good'" is erroneous.  The consequences of 
that finding are significant.

            
3.         The 
ambiguous language of the opinion invites interpretation that the Court intended 
all buildings owned by school districts, regardless of use, achieve minimum MGT 
scores.

            
4.         In 
connection with the directive by the Court for the Legislature to expend $563 
million (in 1998 dollars) on capital construction programs, the Court's premise 
that the State of Wyoming has the design and construction industry 
infrastructure to accommodate such a directive is questionable, and the 
consequences of the directive on the cost of constructing educational facilities 
and the potential adverse impact on the quality of work to be performed appear 
not to have been considered.

            
5.         The 
advisability of directing equal branches of Wyoming state government to adopt 
and implement specific policy prescriptions appears not to have been given the 
consideration it deserves.

I will direct my attention to the fifth issue because it 
should be dispositive of this case.

[¶51]   Wyoming is far from alone in its 
historic reliance upon local property taxes for education funding.  And Wyoming is far 
from alone in having had to come to grips with the resulting funding 
disparities.  
By 1995, no less than thirty-three of the fifty states had addressed 
school finance in their state courts.  Peter Enrich, Leaving 
Equality Behind:  
New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101, 185-94 
(1995).  Commentators have recognized three "waves" of 
school finance litigation in the past several decades.  Before 1973, 
plaintiffs emphasized the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution.  
During the second wave, lasting approximately from 1973 to 1989, the 
focus of such cases shifted to the education and equal protection clauses of the 
various state constitutions.  Finally, and continuing today, state court 
cases have centered on the education clauses of state constitutions.  Jennifer L. Fogle, 
Note, Abbeville County School District v. State:  The Right to a 
Minimally Adequate Education in South Carolina, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 781, 789-90 
(2000).

[¶52]   The shift from federal to state 
constitutional analysis had its genesis in a United States Supreme Court 
case:

            
Predictably, citizens suffering from inadequate and inequitable education 
finance sought redress in the courts.  While education finance questions have been 
litigated since at least 1912, the modern era of education finance begins in 
1971 with Serrano v. Priest, [5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971)].  The California Supreme Court relied on both 
the federal and state constitutions in holding that California's property 
wealth-based finance scheme violated the respective equal protection 
clauses.  The 
California Supreme Court's federal equal protection analysis regarding the 
Federal Constitution was negated, however, when the United States Supreme Court 
in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, [411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973)] held that there is no fundamental 
right to education under the Federal Constitution.

            
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rodriguez was 
of great import.  
First and foremost, the Rodriguez opinion 
expressly consigned the question of education finance to the states.  Second, the Rodriguez Court determined, five Justices to four, that 
education is not a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution for equal 
protection purposes.  
By finding that education is not a fundamental right under the Federal 
Constitution, yet simultaneously recognizing the critical importance of 
education and urging states to address the problems of education finance, the 
Court presented state courts that would subsequently hear education finance 
cases with a textbook opportunity to fulfill the ideals of the new judicial 
federalism.

Michael D. Blanchard, The New 
Judicial Federalism:  
Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in 
State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 231, 244-45 
(1998) (footnotes omitted).1

[¶53]   The importance of education to the 
citizens of Wyoming is reflected in the numerous references to public education 
in the Wyoming Constitution.  Three sections are particularly pertinent to 
the present case.  
Wyo. Const. art. 1, entitled "Declaration of Rights," contains Section 
23, entitled "Education," which reads as follows:

            
The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have 
practical recognition.  The legislature shall suitably encourage 
means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences and liberal arts.

In Wyo. Const. art. 7, which is devoted wholly to 
education, two sections bear directly on the issues at hand:

§ 1.  Legislature to provide for public 
schools.

            
The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a 
complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary 
schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and 
professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the 
state allow, and such other institutions as may be necessary.

§ 9.  Taxation for schools.

            
The legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or 
otherwise, as with the income arising from the general school fund will create 
and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public schools, adequate to the 
proper instruction of all youth of the state, between the ages of six and 
twenty-one years, free of charge; and in view of such provision so made, the 
legislature shall require that every child of sufficient physical and mental 
ability shall attend a public school during the period between six and eighteen 
years or a time equivalent to three years, unless educated by other means.

[¶54]   It is in the interpretation and 
application of these constitutional mandates that the separate branches of 
Wyoming's government now are at loggerheads.  It may or may not be comforting to know that 
neither the legislature nor the courts are "at fault" for this conflict.  It is the natural 
result of the litigation spawned by local property tax funding of a state's 
school system.  
This realization should, perhaps, help to tone down some of the public 
rhetoric directed toward the litigants and the courts.

[¶55]   The process whereby courts determine 
the constitutionality of statutes is called "judicial review."2  Judicial review is 
now an accepted part of American jurisprudence, but that was not always the 
case.

            
Early constitutions preferred to give the lion's share of power to the 
legislature.  
In the light of American political history, this was only natural.  The colonial 
governorand the judiciary, to a certain extentrepresented foreign 
domination.  
The assemblies, on the other hand, were the voice of local 
influentials.  
The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 gave "supreme legislative power" to 
a single house of representatives.  No upper house or governor's veto checked its 
power.  Over 
the course of the years, however, the states became somewhat disillusioned with 
legislative supremacy.  The governor was one beneficiary of this 
movement.  
Typically, he gained a longer term of office and the veto power (which 
the federal President had from the start).  Judicial power, too, increased at the 
legislature's expense.  Judicial power took the form called judicial 
reviewreview, through private litigation, of acts of other branches of 
government; with the right to declare these acts void, if, in the judges' 
opinion, they were unauthorized by the constitution.  Judicial review fed 
on constitutional detail; the more clauses a constitution contained, especially 
clauses that did something more than merely set out the basic frame of 
government, the more potential occasions for the exercise of the power of 
review.

Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of 
American Law 106-07 (Simon and Schuster 1973) (footnote omitted).

[¶56]   The boundaries of judicial review are 
not universally recognized or well defined, at either the state or the federal 
level.  The 
following comments, though made about the United States Constitution, are 
equally applicable to the Wyoming Constitution:

            
The Framers, it is fair to say, failed to think through the power of 
judicial review and its ramifications for constitutional politics.  * * *

* * *  The Constitution, of course, is not 
self-interpreting and crucial principlessuch as judicial review, separation of 
powers, and federalismare presupposed rather than spelled out.  Moreover, in 
creating separate institutions that share specific and delegated powers, the 
Constitution amounts to a prescription for political struggle and an invitation 
for an ongoing debate about enduring constitutional principles.

II David M. O'Brien, Constitutional 
Law and Politics 25 (W.W. Norton Co. 1991).  This struggle and debate began almost 
immediately after the constitutional convention as the fight over ratification 
was taken to the states.  The following quotes, the first from Robert 
Yates, an opponent of the new constitution, and the second from Alexander 
Hamilton, a supporter of the new constitution, should help to place in 
historical perspective Wyoming's current controversy over the proper role of the 
judiciary:

Robert Yates:

"There is no authority that can remove [supreme court 
justices], and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature.  In short, they are 
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under 
heaven.  Men 
placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of 
heaven itself . . ..

And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to 
any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to 
them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.  The opinions of the supreme court, whatever 
they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in 
the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their 
adjudications.  
From this court there is no appeal."

Alexander Hamilton:

"Whoever attentively considers the different departments of 
power must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from each 
other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least 
in a capacity to annoy or injure them.  The executive not only dispenses the honors, 
but holds the sword of the community.  The legislature not only commands the purse, 
but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to 
be regulated.  
The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or 
the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, 
and can take no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither Force 
nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."

David M. O'Brien, supra, at 
26.

[¶57]   It is the interplay between judge and 
legislatorthis constitutional separation of powersthat underlies the issues 
before this Court today.  The general theme is clear:  one branch of 
government should not exercise the powers of government belonging to another 
branch.  That 
statement is clearly made in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1:

            
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three 
distinct departments:  
The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

(Emphasis added.)  The problem lies in the highlighted 
language:  how 
do we determine what constitutional powers "properly belong" to one branch or 
another?  In 
deciding where the line should be drawn between legislating, on the one hand, 
and judicial review, on the other, we should be mindful that differences of 
opinion have endured on this question for hundreds of years.  Some cadre of 
judges in Wyoming did not create the concept of judicial review.

[¶58]   As mentioned above, Wyoming is 
certainly not the first state to have faced this conflict in education finance 
litigation.  It 
is not necessary to review every case across the nation where the separation of 
powers doctrine has been analyzed in the context of school finance reform.3  Suffice it to say that the focus of the 
debate is often on the "political question doctrine."  The central thesis 
of the political question doctrine is that some issues are not "justiciable;" 
that is, they are not capable of being determined by resort to legal principles 
in a court of law.

[¶59]   The United States Supreme Court has 
identified several circumstances that indicate the existence of a 
non-justiciable political question:

            
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to 
the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, 
although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a 
function of the separation of powers.  Prominent on the surface of any case held to 
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962).4  This Court has previously utilized these 
criteria to declare a lack of jurisdiction in the courts to determine a 
political question.  
State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 762-64 (Wyo. 
1972).  We have also recognized the fine line that 
must be drawn to ensure the separation of powers when exercising judicial 
review:

            
The disposition of the judicial branch of government has always been to 
scrupulously refrain from encroaching in the slightest way into the legislative 
field of policy making where factual or economic factors require latitude of 
discretion.  We 
will not and we do not substitute our opinions in such matters for the 
considered judgment of our lawmakers.  Yet, we ourselves have a function to perform, 
a constitutional right, and the paramount duty to insist that the legislature 
[not improperly delegate its power].

Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of 
Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 419 (Wyo. 1962).

[¶60]   The process of determining whether an 
issue is a non-justiciable political question begins with an interpretation of 
the constitutional text to determine whether and to what extent the issue is 
"textually committed" to another branch of government.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993).  In the case of the Wyoming Constitution, both 
Sections 1 and 9 of Article 7 clearly delegate the establishment, maintenance 
and funding of Wyoming's schools to the legislature.  See Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses:  Educational 
Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 
XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 281, 304 (1998).5  "These and other constitutional expressions 
should leave no doubt that the legislature has complete control of the state's 
school system in every respect[.]"  Washakie County 
School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 320 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).

[¶61]   The second circumstance found by the 
United States Supreme Court to involve a political question is the situation 
where there is "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving" the issue.  
Baker, 369 U.S.  at 217.  That is precisely 
the situation now before this Court.  Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 1 requires the 
legislature to provide "a complete and uniform system of public instruction," 
with free elementary schools of "every needed kind and grade," and a university with such 
technical and professional departments "as the public good may require and the means of the state 
allow . . .."  
(Emphasis added.)    Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 9 requires 
the legislature, by "taxation or 
otherwise," to create and maintain "a thorough and efficient" system of public schools, 
"adequate to the proper 
instruction of all youth . . .."  (Emphasis added.)  And finally, Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 23 provides that Wyoming's citizens' right "to opportunities 
for education should have practical recognition."  (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶62]   These constitutional provisions do not 
provide judicially discoverable and manageable standards.  It is not for this 
Court to create 
constitutional standards; we are only to discover ones that already exist.  City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-59 (R.I. 
1995); Abbeville County School Dist. v. 
State, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541-42 (1999) (Moore, J., dissenting); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 119-130 (1978) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).  In enacting school 
finance statutes, "the legislature must be free to remedy parts of a problem, or 
to recognize degrees of a problem and to formulate solutions in the areas it 
determines to be more in need or more readily corrected than others."  Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1026 (Colo. 
1982) (Erickson, J., specially concurring).  If this Court 
"enacts" standards of its own, the legislature is deprived of the legislative 
discretion necessary to make the policy decisions assigned to it by the 
constitution.6  Furthermore, the attempt to "manage" school 
finance in the courts by the enforcement of amorphous phrases such as "thorough 
and efficient" only leads to unending litigation:

            
We point out one additional caveat:  the absence of justiciable standards could 
engage the court in a morass comparable to the decades-long struggle of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey that has attempted to define what constitutes the 
"thorough and efficient" education specified in that state's constitution.  * * *  [T]he New Jersey 
Supreme Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education 
for more than twenty-one years, consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, 
and court attention.  
The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a 
chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the 
duties of a Legislature.

City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d  at 59.

[¶63]   Most certainly, the allocation of 
resources toward competing needs is a legislative, not a judicial, 
function.  Yet, 
in 1995, this Court issued the following mandate:

Because education is one of the state's most important 
functions, lack of financial resources will not be an acceptable reason for 
failure to provide the best 
educational system.  
All other financial considerations must yield until education is 
funded.

Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (emphasis added).  We have now 
repeated that mandate in the instant case.  State v. Campbell 
County School Dist., 2001 WY 
19, ¶ 138, 19 P.3d 518, 566 (Wyo. 
2001).  There are several things wrong with this 
mandate.  
First, it is, pure and simple, judicial legislation.  Second, "the best 
educational system" is not a standard that can be found anywhere in the 
constitution.  
Third, the spending dictates deprive the legislature of its right to 
identify and define "need," and of its right to balance competing societal 
interests.  And 
finally, under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 23, the right to education in Wyoming is to 
be given "practical recognition," which phrase does not suggest the 
extraordinary level of funding conceived by this Court.7  While we may, when 
appropriate, review legislation for constitutionality, we may not order the 
legislature to set a standard at a particular level nor may we order the 
legislature to determine a standard using a particular methodology.  Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1349 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶64]   "When a court concludes that an issue 
presents a nonjusticiable political question, it declines to address the merits 
of that issue."  
United States Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 
503 U.S. 442, 457-58, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 1425, 118 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1992).

In invoking the political question doctrine, a court 
acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional provision may not be 
judicially enforceable.  Such a decision is of course very different 
from determining that specific [legislative] action does not violate the 
Constitution.  
That determination is a decision on the merits that reflects the exercise of judicial 
review, rather than the abstention from judicial review that would be 
appropriate in the case of a true political question.

Id. (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted).  Stated otherwise, a 
court that invokes the political question doctrine does not tell the 
legislature, "this statute is constitutional;" rather, the statement made is "we 
decline to exercise the power of judicial review of this statute because the 
issue is non-justiciable."  The result is the same in that the statute is 
not declared unconstitutional.  See State ex rel. 
Schieck, 493 P.2d at 764 (court's refusal, based on political question 
doctrine, to review qualifications of person to serve in legislature does not 
mean the court has ruled on the qualification issue itself).

[¶65]   The principle of stare decisis requires that I discuss at least briefly 
the history of education finance reform in Wyoming.8  There are four 
cases that deserve mention.9  In 1971, this Court relied on Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) and the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution to invalidate a proposed school district 
reorganization.  
Sweetwater County Planning Committee for 
Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Wyo. 
1971).  While recognizing the separation of powers 
doctrine, the court went on to suggest a detailed "possible method by which 
equal and uniform taxes can be accomplished for school purposes," even going so 
far as to retain jurisdiction over the case until the next legislative 
session.  Id. at 1237.  Two years later, in Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814, 816 (Wyo. 
1973), this Court once again cited Serrano and the right to equal protection in rejecting 
Goshen County's school district reorganization plan because it would have 
resulted in grossly unequal property valuations between districts.  Ironically, the 
power of judicial review was not mentioned by the majority, but by Justice 
McIntyre in dissent, where he opined that, in accepting the state committee's 
reorganization plan, the court had made "a nullity of judicial review."  Id. at 820 (McIntyre, J., dissenting).

[¶66]   Wyoming's next school finance case 
noted that, since San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), reliance on the equal protection 
clause of the federal constitution was no longer appropriate, so the court's 
equal protection analysis was done under the state constitution.10  Washakie County 
School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d  at 319.  Though Washakie 
County School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d  at 317, rejected non-justiciability 
and the political question doctrine, it did so not through application of the Baker factors, which are relevant, but through the 
declaratory judgment analysis of a Wyoming state case, Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 
1974).11  The Brimmer 
factors, focusing as they do on the "genuineness" of the controversy, and not on 
the constitutional separation of powers, are not well-suited for analysis of an 
issue under the political question doctrine.

[¶67]   Fifteen years after Washakie County School Dist. No. One, this Court once 
again rejected separation of powers concerns in finding the state's school 
finance scheme unconstitutional.  Campbell County 
School Dist., 907 P.2d  at 1264-65.  This time, referring neither to Baker nor to Brimmer, this 
Court relied instead on a straightforward assertion of the right to judicial 
review:

"The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to 
apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and sections of 
the [Wyoming] Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it.  It is solely the function of the 
judiciary to so do.  
This duty must be exercised even when such action serves as a check on 
the activities of another branch of government or when the court's view of the 
constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the 
public."

Campbell County School Dist., 907 P.2d at 1264-65 (emphasis in original) (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989)).

[¶68]   In authoring this dissent, I am not 
taking a position one way or the other on the constitutionality of the state's 
school funding system.  Nor should anyone conclude from this dissent 
that I am against any particular level of school funding.  The decision is not 
mine to make.

            
Although we may personally favor it, it is not this court's place to 
order the General Assembly to give education "high priority" in its budget 
allocations, any more than it is our place to set policy or prioritize the 
allocation of funds to other state programs.  Members of the legislative branch represent 
the collective will of the citizens of Ohio, and the manner in which public 
schools are funded in this state is a fundamental policy decision that is within 
the power of its citizens to change.  Under our system of government, decisions 
such as imposing new taxes, allocating public revenues to competing uses, and 
formulating educational standards are not within the judiciary's authority.  As noted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, "the 
ultimate solutions [to perceived problems associated with school funding 
systems] must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those 
who elect them."  
Id., 411 U.S.  at 59, 93 S. Ct.  at 1310, 36 L. Ed. 2d  at 58.

DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, 786 (1997) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).

[¶69]   After concluding that the state's 
school finance system was unconstitutional in that it did not provide for a 
thorough and efficient system of schools, the majority in DeRolph made the following comment:

In reaching this conclusion, we dismiss as unfounded any 
suggestion that the problems presented by this case should be left for the 
General Assembly to resolve.  This case involves questions of public or great general 
interest over which this court has jurisdiction.

Id. at 737 (emphasis added).  The fallacy with this reasoning is that an 
issue's justiciability is not determined by its level of "public or great 
general interest."  
It might even be said that, the higher the level of public interest, the 
more likely the issue may involve political and policy decisions.  It is in this arena 
that judges must be most careful:

In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, 
when a judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of 
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a statute or in 
any provision of the Constitution.  He must then choose between his version of 
justice and abiding by the American form of government.  Yet the desire to 
do justice, whose nature seems to him obvious, is compelling, while the concept 
of constitutional process is abstract, rather arid, and the abstinence it 
counsels unsatisfying.  To give in to temptation, this one time, 
solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in the American 
foundation.  A 
judge has begun to rule where a legislator should.

Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of 
America:  The 
Political Seduction of the Law 1 (The Free Press 1990).  The duty to follow the constitution by 
recognizing the separate realm of the legislature must outweigh the principle of 
"following precedent."  The fact that this Court has previously ruled 
where it should not does not justify doing so again.

[¶70]   The issues presented to this Court in 
the State's Petition for Rehearing are non-justiciable political questions that 
should be left to the legislature.  The issues being political, rather than 
judicial, the remedies should also be political, rather than judicial.  If the people do 
not believe that the legislature is providing a thorough and efficient public 
school system, their displeasure should be registered in the voting booth, not 
in the office of the clerk of court.

  

FOOTNOTES FOR THE DISSENT

1Blanchard identifies this "new judicial federalism" as 
follows:

Proponents of the new judicial federalism envision vigorous 
state constitutional protection of individual rights implicating an increase in 
the scope of judicial power among state courts.  The new judicial federalism requires that the 
sphere of state     courts' influence expand to 
compensate for the perceived restraint exercised by the federal judiciary, 
causing state courts to enhance their review of legislative measures under a 
revitalized state constitution.  The new judicial federalism has thus stirred 
the coals of an old problemthe legitimate extent of judicial reviewin the 
(renewed) context of state constitutional jurisprudence.

Michael D. Blanchard, supra, 60 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 232.

 

2"The Courts become involved in executive or legislative 
functions only by virtue of judicial review."  State ex rel. Motor 
Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 742 (Wyo. 1983).

3See Peter Enrich, supra, 48 
Vand. L. Rev. 101.

4School finance litigation has focused on the first two 
factors, and the discussion herein will also be so limited.

5Interestingly enough, though Heise accurately notes that 
the education clauses of the Wyoming Constitution are "directed expressly to the 
legislature," he states that it "would be premature" to conclude that this 
"language amounts to a textual commitment to the legislative branch for 
political question doctrine purposes . . .."  Michael Heise, supra, XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. at 304.  His hesitancy 
appears to rest on the fact that courts have the power of judicial review.  This circular 
reasoning simply avoids the Baker concepts.  We know the power 
of judicial review exists; the question is whether it should be 
exercised.

6For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the potential 
ramifications of judicial legislating in the area of school finance, see Michael Heise, supra, 
XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 281.

7There may be one more concern with this mandate.  Social scientists 
continue to debate whether there is a connection between educational spending 
and educational equity.  See Michael 
Heise, supra, XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. at 
291-93.

8The term "stare decisis" is a 
Latin phrase meaning "to stand by things decided."  It refers to the 
"doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow 
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1414 (7th ed. 1999).

9Two others do not bear directly on the issues at hand.  See Campbell County School Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275 (Wyo. 2000) and Lincoln County School Dist. No. 
One v. State, 985 P.2d 964 (Wyo. 1999).

10See the definition of the "new judicial federalism" in 
Michael D. Blanchard, supra, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 
232.

11Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2001) provides as 
follows:

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract 
or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other 
legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations.