Case Title: State v. Raymond Lord, Jr.

Citation: 2006 WI 122

Docket Number: 2005AP001485-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 122 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1485-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Raymond Lord, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 289 Wis. 2d 551, 710 N.W.2d 726 
(Ct. App. 2006 – Unpublished 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 9, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian & Michael B. Brennan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a brief by 
George M. Tauscheck, Milwaukee. 
 
 
2006 WI 122
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports. 
 
No.  2005AP1485-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CM4635) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Raymond Lord, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 9, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
State's motion for summary reversal of Court of Appeals 
decision.  Motion granted and cause remanded to the court of 
appeals.  
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The State of Wisconsin, the successful 
party at the circuit court and court of appeals, moves this 
court to summarily reverse the decision of the court of appeals.1  
On the basis of the State's motion and accompanying memoranda 
                                                 
1 The 
motion 
of 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
(which 
was 
represented in this court by the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice) was joined by the Milwaukee County District Attorney's 
Office (which represented the State in the circuit court and 
court of appeals).  
No. 
2005AP1485-CR   
 
2 
 
filed in this court (to which the defendant did not file a 
response) and on the basis of the defendant's brief filed in 
this court (to which the State did not file a response brief), 
we grant the State's motion and summarily reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.  We remand to the court of appeals for 
reconsideration in light of our decision and the request of the 
parties that further proceedings be conducted in the circuit 
court.    
¶2 
The court granted the defendant's petition for review 
to address whether law enforcement officers may stop an 
automobile on the sole ground that the automobile has a 
temporary license plate.  In other words, the question before us 
is whether a temporary plate on an automobile, without more, 
creates reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), to justify 
law enforcement's stop of that vehicle. 
¶3 
The court of appeals in an unpublished decision 
answered this question in the affirmative, adopting a position 
that the State asserted in both the circuit court and court of 
appeals.2   
¶4 
The State's motion for summary reversal concedes, as 
the defendant has argued all along and in its brief before this 
court,3 that the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with 
                                                 
2 State v. Lord, No. 2005AP1485-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2006). 
3 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 
12-14.  
No. 
2005AP1485-CR   
 
3 
 
the holding and rationale of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979): Law enforcement officers cannot stop an automobile to 
determine whether it is properly registered unless the officers 
have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that 
either the automobile is being driven contrary to the laws 
governing its operation or that any occupant is subject to 
seizure in connection with the violation of an applicable law. 
¶5 
The 
State's concession that the legal principle 
adopted by the court of appeals is an incorrect statement of law 
effectively eliminates the issue upon which the petition for 
review was granted.   
¶6 
We need not, however, accept a party's concession of 
law.4  This court, not the parties, decides questions of law.   
¶7 
In the present case, we readily accept the State's 
concession without further briefing or argument because the 
State's concession on the issue of law is well-settled law 
requiring no extensive research or explanation.  Prouse is clear 
that "except in those situations in which there is at least 
articulable 
and 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
a 
motorist 
is 
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that 
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to 
seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and 
detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and 
the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the 
                                                 
4 Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 
(1997). 
No. 
2005AP1485-CR   
 
4 
 
Fourth Amendment."5  Contrary to Prouse, the court of appeals 
decision enables law enforcement officers to stop any vehicle to 
verify the registration solely because the vehicle is displaying  
                                                 
5 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
For courts reaching the same conclusion as the State, see, 
e.g., United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720, 724 (4th Cir. 2000) 
("The Fourth Amendment does not allow a policeman to stop a car 
just because it has temporary tags."); State v. Childs, 495 
N.W.2d 475, 482 (Neb. 1993) ("We cannot accept that every 
motorist who operates a vehicle displaying In Transit decals 
waives the protection against an unconstitutional stop and 
invalid search and seizure as a consequence of the stop."); 
State v. Butler, 539 S.E.2d 414, 416 (S.C. 2000) ("[T]he mere 
presence of a temporary tag on the back of a car, without more, 
is insufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion that the 
driver is violating registration or insurance laws or that the 
driver is otherwise involved in criminal activity."); People v. 
Nabong, 9 Cal. Reptr. 3d 854, 855 (Cal. App. Div. Super. Ct. 
2004) (stop invalid because no particularized belief that car 
not validly registered when car had a temporary registration 
sticker, even though in the officer's experience over half of 
the stickers are invalid); Bius v. State, 563 S.E.2d 527, 529 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("We find that stopping a car with a drive-
out tag solely to ascertain whether the driver was complying 
with our vehicle registration laws is also not authorized."). 
No. 
2005AP1485-CR   
 
5 
 
temporary license plates as set forth in the statutes6 and 
administrative rules7 of the state.8   
¶8 
Accordingly, we summarily reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals.  The result of the reversal is that a law 
enforcement officer cannot infer wrongful conduct based solely 
on the display of a temporary license plate.  We remand to the 
court of appeals for reconsideration in light of our decision 
and the request of the parties that further proceedings be 
conducted in the circuit court. 
By the Court.—Motion granted and cause remanded to the 
court of appeals.   
 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 341.15 (2003-04). 
7 Wis. Admin. Code § Trans. 132.04 (1998). 
8 The State's concession adheres to Richards v. Wisconsin, 
520 U.S. 385 (1997), which overturned State v. Richards, 201 
Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996).  The United States Supreme 
Court admonished this court against a per se blanket rule 
inferring that exigent circumstances are always present in the 
execution of search warrants involving felonious drug delivery, 
even when the testimony was that the officers' experience shows 
that many drug sellers have weapons. 
No.  2005AP1485-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶9 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The State moved 
this court to summarily reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.  The majority asserts that it is granting the State's 
motion.  Nonetheless, the court's per curiam opinion entails a 
substantive discussion of law that extends the principles in 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), to temporary license 
plates. 
¶10 The court makes this substantive decision without oral 
argument and without the articulation of an opposing view.  The 
decision may be correct, but it puts law enforcement officers in 
a more difficult position when they deal with vehicles with 
temporary plates than vehicles with permanent plates because 
officers are seldom able to run computerized checks on temporary 
license plates.  This distinction is important because temporary 
plates frequently turn out to be invalid. 
¶11 Upon receipt of the State's motion, I voted to grant 
it, assuming that this court would be sending the case back for 
an evidentiary hearing without an opinion.  My concurrence here 
represents a vote for that action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1485-CR.dtp 
 
1