Case Title: State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1115

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1115.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1115 
THE STATE EX REL. KNOWLTON v. NOBLE COUNTY BOARD OF  
ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1115.] 
Sheriffs — Qualifications for office — Postsecondary education requirement — 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9) — Writ of prohibition granted to prevent candidacy. 
(No. 2010-0375 — Submitted March 18, 2010 — Decided March 23, 2010.) 
IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1 }  This is an expedited election action for writs of mandamus and 
prohibition to prevent respondents, the Noble County Board of Elections and its 
members, from placing Stephen S. Hannum’s name on the ballot as a candidate 
for the office of Noble County sheriff in the May 4, 2010 Democratic Party 
primary election.  Because the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded R.C. 311.01(B) and relator lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
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course of law, we grant the writ of prohibition.  We dismiss the mandamus claim 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
Facts 
{¶2 }  On May 22, 2009, pursuant to R.C. 305.02, Stephen S. Hannum was 
appointed Noble County sheriff after former sheriff Landon Smith resigned.  The 
interim appointment became permanent in June.  Smith subsequently pleaded 
guilty to having an unlawful interest in a public contract, a felony of the fourth 
degree, and having a conflict of interest, a misdemeanor of the first degree. 
{¶3 }  On January 25, 2010, Hannum filed his declaration of candidacy 
and nominating petition for the May 4, 2010 Democratic Party primary election 
for the office of Noble County sheriff.  Four days later, on January 29, relator, 
Denny R. Knowlton Jr., a registered Democrat and Noble County resident, filed a 
protest pursuant to R.C. 3513.05 to prevent the board of elections and its members 
from placing Hannum’s name on the primary-election ballot because he did not 
meet the qualifications set forth in R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible candidate 
for sheriff.  Knowlton is the other candidate for the Democratic Party nomination 
for sheriff. 
{¶4 }  On February 22, the board held a hearing on Knowlton’s protest.  
At the hearing, Hannum conceded that he had not served as a peace officer at the 
rank of corporal or above for the requisite period of time, and former sheriff 
Smith testified that Hannum had never attained the rank of corporal or above 
during his employment with the sheriff’s office before being appointed sheriff in 
May 2009. 
{¶5 }  Hannum also submitted two uncertified copies of his academic 
record from Washington State Community College in Marietta, Ohio.  The 
transcripts are dated January 26, 2010, and February 22, 2010, and indicate that 
Hannum had earned a total of 92 credits, including three for a life-experience 
portfolio and the remaining 89 credits for life experience.  Life-experience credits 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
are awarded for life experience rather than for traditional classes, and Hannum 
received a grade of “L” for these courses.  Twenty-nine of these 89 life-
experience credits are for “OPOTA I,” “OPOTA II,” and “OPOTA III.”  
Knowlton claims that these credits are for Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy 
(“OPOTA”) and that other life-experience credits also appear related to Hannum’s 
employment as a peace officer. 
{¶6 }  At the hearing, Hannum specified that 72 credit hours at 
Washington State Community College were equivalent to two years of 
postsecondary education.  In his closing argument, Knowlton asked that the board 
verify the claimed educational credit and determine whether the credits met the 
applicable legal requirements. 
{¶7 }  At the conclusion of the hearing, the board voted unanimously to 
deny Knowlton’s protest against Hannum’s candidacy.  In a ledger entry of its 
decision, the board noted that the denial of the protest was based on the 
information provided by Hannum at the hearing and that Hannum had submitted 
transcripts to substantiate his educational qualifications. 
{¶8 }  A week later, on March 1, Knowlton filed this action for writs of 
mandamus and prohibition to prevent the board and its members from certifying 
Hannum’s candidacy for the Democratic Party nomination for the office of Noble 
County sheriff and placing his name on the May 4, 2010 primary-election ballot.  
The board and its members filed an answer, and the parties submitted briefs and 
evidence pursuant to the expedited schedule for election cases in S.Ct.Prac.R. 
10.9. 
{¶9 }  This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Laches 
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{¶10 }  “We have consistently required relators in election cases to act 
with the utmost diligence.”  Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-
Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 19.  “If relators in election cases do not exercise 
the utmost diligence, laches may bar an action for extraordinary relief.”  State ex 
rel. Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706, 
882 N.E.2d 435, ¶ 11.  “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or 
lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the 
other party.”  State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶11 }  The board of elections asserts that Knowlton’s claims are barred 
by laches because he could have objected to Hannum’s qualifications to be sheriff 
after Hannum was appointed.  The board’s argument lacks merit.  Knowlton is 
challenging Hannum’s right to be a candidate for sheriff at the May 4, 2010 
primary election.  He filed his protest only four days after Hannum filed his 
declaration of candidacy and petition for his nomination at the primary election.  
A protest pursuant to R.C. 3513.05 would have been premature before Hannum 
filed his declaration of candidacy and nominating petition.  Nor is Hannum’s 
delay of seven days from the date the board denied his protest to file this case 
unreasonable.  Cf. State ex rel. Landis v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 187, 189, 724 N.E.2d 775 (“we have held that a delay as brief as nine 
days can preclude our consideration of the merits of an expedited election case”  
[emphasis sic]).  And any minimal delay by Knowlton in filing this action did not 
prejudice the board and its members because even if Knowlton had filed this 
action the same day as the board’s decision, this case would still have been an 
expedited election case.  Craig, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706, 882 N.E.2d 
435, ¶ 15. 
{¶12 }  Therefore, laches does not bar Knowlton’s claims. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
Mandamus 
{¶13 }  Knowlton initially requests a writ of mandamus to compel the 
board and its members to sustain his protest against Hannum’s candidacy for 
sheriff. 
{¶14 }  “It is axiomatic that ‘if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Obojski 
v. Perciak, 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453, 866 N.E.2d 1070, ¶ 13, quoting 
State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 
704.  “We have applied this jurisdictional rule to expedited election cases by 
examining the complaint to determine whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather 
than compel, official action.”  State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 
437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20. 
{¶15 }  Although some of the allegations and requests contained in 
Knowlton’s complaint are couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, it is 
apparent that he actually seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the board’s denial 
of his protest was improper and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing Hannum 
from appearing on the primary-election ballot.  In fact, in his complaint, 
Knowlton claims that he is entitled to the writ “to prevent Respondents from 
placing Stephen S. Hannum’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the office of 
Noble County Sheriff at the May 4, 2010 primary election.”  The relief sought by 
Knowlton is thus comparable to that sought by relators in other election cases in 
which we held that we lacked jurisdiction over mandamus claims to remove 
candidates’ names from the ballot.  See, generally, State ex rel. Reese v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 
N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 14, and cases cited therein. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶16 }  Therefore, because Knowlton seeks relief in the nature of 
declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, we lack jurisdiction to consider 
his  mandamus claim and dismiss it.  Id. at ¶ 15; Evans, 111 Ohio St.3d 437, 
2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 19, 
Prohibition 
{¶17 }  Knowlton alternately requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
board of elections and its members from certifying Hannum’s candidacy for the 
Democratic Party nomination for the office of Noble County sheriff and placing 
his name on the May 4, 2010 primary-election ballot.  To be entitled to the writ, 
Knowlton must establish that (1) the board of elections and its members are about 
to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by 
law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate 
remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 28. 
{¶18 }  Knowlton has established the first and third requirements for the 
writ.  The board of elections exercised quasi-judicial authority by denying his 
protest after conducting a hearing required by statute that included sworn 
testimony.  Reese, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, at ¶ 
17.  He also lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, given the 
proximity of the May 4 primary election.  State ex rel. Columbia Res. Ltd. v. 
Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 111 Ohio St.3d 167, 2006-Ohio-5019, 855 N.E.2d 
815, ¶ 28. 
{¶19 }  For the remaining requirement of the exercise of unauthorized 
power, “we must determine whether the board acted fraudulently or corruptly, 
abused its discretion, or clearly disregarded applicable law.”  State ex rel. Brown 
v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 
8, ¶ 23.  Knowlton claims that the board abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) in denying his protest to Hannum’s candidacy.  
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
“An abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable 
attitude.”  State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 238. 
{¶20 }  R.C. 311.01(B) provides: 
{¶21 }  “[N]o person is eligible to be a candidate for sheriff * * * unless 
that person meets all of the following requirements: 
{¶22 }  “* * * 
{¶23 }  “(9) The person meets at least one of the following conditions: 
{¶24 }  “(a) Has at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace 
officer at the rank of corporal or above, or has been appointed pursuant to section 
5503.01 [referring to the State Highway Patrol] of the Revised Code and served at 
the rank of sergeant or above, in the five-year period ending immediately prior to 
the qualification date; 
{¶25 }  “(b) Has completed satisfactorily at least two years of post-
secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours in a college or 
university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or the 
comparable agency of another state in which the college or university is located or 
in a school that holds a certificate of registration issued by the state board of 
career colleges and schools under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code.” 
{¶26 }  “A candidate for sheriff can satisfy R.C. 311.01(B)(9) in one of the 
following ways:  (1) have at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace 
officer at the rank of corporal or above in the five-year period immediately before 
the qualification date, (2) be appointed to the Highway Patrol under R.C. 5503.01 
and serve at the rank of sergeant or above in the five-year period ending 
immediately before the qualification date, or (3) satisfactorily complete at least 
two years of qualifying postsecondary education or the equivalent.”  Wellington v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 44. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶27 }  Hannum was never appointed to the Highway Patrol, but at the 
hearing, he claimed to satisfy both of the other two alternatives specified in R.C. 
311.01(B)(9). 
{¶28 }  For the requirement of supervisory experience as a peace officer, 
“[u]nder the language used in the pertinent portion of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a), in 
order to be eligible to be a candidate for sheriff, the person must, within the five-
year period, have two years of supervisory experience and that supervisory 
experience must have been earned when the person served as a peace officer at 
the rank of corporal or above.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Wolfe v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 184, 724 N.E.2d 771; 
State ex rel. Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-
Ohio-706, 882 N.E.2d 435, ¶ 22. 
{¶29 }  Like the prospective sheriff’s candidates in Wolfe and Craig, 
Hannum did not serve as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above for the 
required two years during the pertinent period.  The former Noble County sheriff 
confirmed this fact, and the board of elections and its members conceded it in 
their answer.  Therefore, Hannum did not satisfy the supervisory-experience 
requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a). 
{¶30 }  For 
the 
postsecondary-education 
requirement 
of 
R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b), Knowlton claims that Hannum had not completed “at least two 
years of post-secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours 
in a college or university authorized to confer degrees” to be eligible to be a 
candidate for sheriff. 
{¶31 }  In State ex rel. Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 120 
Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, ¶ 30, we held that “under the 
plain language of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), as read in the context of the entire statute, 
peace officer training is not acceptable to constitute course credit under R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b), because it is already included in the eligibility requirements in 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
R.C. 311.01(B)(8).”  (Emphasis added.)  We reasoned that “R.C. 311.01(B)(8) 
already specifies that peace officer training is a distinct requirement, along with 
specified employment.  To be eligible to be a candidate for sheriff, one must 
obtain the certificate of peace officer training (or a certificate of training pursuant 
to R.C. 5503.05) and have employment either as a peace officer or with the 
highway patrol as specified under R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) or as a law-enforcement 
officer under R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b).  The postsecondary education needed under 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) is altogether distinct from the peace officer training 
specified in R.C. 311.01(B)(8).  The equivalent of ‘at least two years of post-
secondary education’ specified in R.C. 311.01(B)(9) is to be ‘semester or quarter 
hours in a college or university authorized to confer degrees.’ ”  Id.  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶32 }  Notwithstanding the board’s suggestions to the contrary, the 
evidence before the board at the protest hearing supports the conclusion that 
Hannum has double-counted credits earned for peace-officer training contrary to 
our decision in Wellington.  The OPOTA courses specified on the transcripts that 
Hannum submitted refer to courses he has taken at the Ohio Peace Officer 
Training Academy.  In fact, the board and its members do not claim that 
“OPOTA” refers to anything other than academy courses.  These courses are 
manifestly for “peace officer training,” which, according to Wellington, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, at ¶ 30, do not constitute course 
credit that can satisfy the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondary-education 
requirement. 
{¶33 }  Therefore, because 29 credits that Hannum earned were for peace-
officer training, they could not be counted toward the postsecondary-education 
requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b).  Furthermore, any other “life-experience” 
credits related to his job as a peace officer were also ineligible for credit under 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already accounts for Hannum’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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employment as a peace officer.  A contrary holding would render R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b) superfluous in these circumstances and would permit 
postsecondary-education credit even though it duplicates other distinct criteria in 
R.C. 311.01(B) for qualification as a candidate for sheriff.  Thus, Hannum earned 
at most only 63 credits, which, by his own testimony at the protest hearing, is 
insufficient to satisfy the postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b). 
{¶34 }  Consequently, the board and its members abused their discretion 
and clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by denying Knowlton’s protest and 
certifying Hannum’s candidacy for sheriff at the May 4 primary election because 
Hannum did not satisfy any of the three categories in that subsection.  Knowlton 
is thus entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Although we 
have a “duty to liberally construe the statutory limitations on the right to be an 
eligible candidate for sheriff in order to permit electors to choose from all 
qualified candidates, the court cannot liberally construe a statute with an 
unequivocal meaning.”  Wellington, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 48. 
Conclusion 
{¶35 }  Based on the foregoing, Knowlton has established his entitlement 
to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Therefore, we grant a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the board and its members from placing the name of 
Stephen S. Hannum on the ballot as a candidate for the Democratic Party 
nomination for Noble County sheriff at the May 4, 2010 primary election.  We 
also dismiss Knowlton’s mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
Judgment accordingly. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
MOYER, C.J., and CUPP, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶36 }  I concur in the dismissal of the mandamus claim but dissent from 
the judgment granting the writ of prohibition to prevent Hannum from appearing 
as candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for Noble County sheriff at the 
May 4, 2010 primary election. 
{¶37 }  The majority errs in relying on State ex rel. Wellington v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 
N.E.2d 641, to hold that the board of elections abused its discretion in concluding 
that Hannum satisfied the postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b).  I dissented in Wellington and continue to believe that the 
majority therein read “additional requirements into a statute already designed to 
thwart competition.”  Id. at ¶ 34 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Moreover, for the 
following reasons, Wellington is distinguishable, and Knowlton’s arguments lack 
merit. 
{¶38 }  Knowlton argues that the board and its members erred in 
determining that Hannum satisfied the postsecondary-education requirement.  
Knowlton’s claims, however, are largely based on supposition, not evidence, and 
they are insufficient to establish that the board of elections abused its discretion.  
First, no evidence was submitted before the board of elections that the transcript 
notations for “OPOTA I,” “OPOTA II,” and “OPOTA III” necessarily referred to 
peace officer training courses.  Knowlton relies on Wellington, 120 Ohio St.3d 
198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, in which this court held that the 
prospective sheriff’s candidate had not met the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) requirement.  
But that case is distinguishable because the prospective sheriff’s candidate in 
Wellington had conceded that some of the credit claimed by him was for “law-
enforcement-certification courses at the Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy.” 
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Id. at ¶ 7.  Here, there is no comparable concession that the courses are “law-
enforcement-certification courses” or are for peace-officer training at the 
academy.  Although Knowlton attempted to introduce evidence to support this 
argument, he did not, and “a claim that the board of elections abused its discretion 
* * * could not be based on evidence that was never presented to it.”  State ex rel. 
Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 
N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 40. 
{¶39 }  Second,  no evidence was submitted to the board of elections at the 
protest hearing that an additional 20 credits on Hannum’s transcript relating to 
courses referred to as “CRJU” courses should not be counted toward his 
satisfaction of the postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) 
because they were actually OPOTA courses.  The statute contains no prohibition 
against the use of life-experience credit. 
{¶40 }  Finally, credible evidence was submitted at the protest hearing to 
establish that Hannum earned sufficient credits before the February 18, 2010 
qualification date.  The January 26, 2010 Washington State Community College 
transcript that Hannum presented at the protest hearing includes a notation that 89 
credits from the winter quarter are “ERN,” which the board could have reasonably 
inferred meant earned.  Hannum also testified at the hearing that he “had 
documentation” that his “college credits had been assigned to [him] on January 
26.”  Insofar as the evidence could be considered conflicting on this point, “[w]e 
will not substitute our judgment for that of a board of elections if there is 
conflicting evidence on an issue.”  State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 185, 724 N.E.2d 771. 
{¶41 }  Noble County is small; it has a population of just over 14,000.  
http://www.epodunk.com/cgi-bin/genInfo.php?locIndex=17252.  It is probably 
safe to assume that every voting-age person in the county is aware of who is 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
running for sheriff.  I know it is safe to assume that collectively the voters of 
Noble County are competent to decide who should be their sheriff. 
{¶42 }  Finally, this court has many times stated that it avoids construing 
statutes that lead to illogical or absurd results.  State ex rel. Haines v. Rhodes 
(1958), 168 Ohio St. 165, 5 O.O.2d 467, 151 N.E.2d 716, paragraph two of the 
syllabus;  In re T.R., 120 Ohio St.3d 136, 2008-Ohio-5219, 896 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 
16.  Hannum is currently the sheriff of Noble County.  By the time the next 
elected sheriff takes office, Hannum will have been the sheriff for almost two 
years.  But today this court concludes that the Noble County Board of Elections 
abused its discretion when it certified Hannum’s candidacy for sheriff.  This court 
concludes that a man who has been sheriff since May 2009 is unqualified to be a 
candidate for sheriff.  How is that not an absurd result? 
{¶43 }  I conclude that Knowlton failed to establish that the board of 
elections abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in 
determining that Hannum had met the requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(9).  I 
would deny the writ of prohibition.  Because the majority erroneously extends 
Wellington’s beef to Knowlton’s and thereby precludes the Noble County 
electorate from the opportunity to reelect their current sheriff, I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
McTigue & McGinnis, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, Mark A. McGinnis, 
and J. Corey Colombo, for relator. 
 
Patrick C. Piccininni, Special Counsel to Clifford N. Sickler, Noble 
County Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
_____________________