Case Title: Johnson v. Cauley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002058

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
PEGGY H. JOHNSON, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 002058     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 8, 2001 
GENEVA H. CAULEY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY 
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly found that missing original testamentary documents 
were in the possession of the drafting attorney and were 
inaccessible to the testator, giving rise to a presumption 
that the documents were lost, not revoked. 
 
Josephine S. Howell executed a will in 1985 and three 
codicils in 1987, 1990, and 1992.  Upon her death in 1999, the 
original of the 1990 codicil was discovered in a safe in 
Howell's former home, but only copies of the will and the 
other two codicils were found.  Three of her daughters, Amelia 
H. Spivey, Lynda H. Bond, and Geneva H. Cauley, and their 
children (collectively "Spivey") brought suit to establish the 
missing original documents as lost and to probate a copy of 
the missing will and codicils along with the original 1990 
codicil.  A fourth daughter, Peggy H. Johnson, and her 
children (collectively "Johnson") filed a counterclaim, 
charging that the missing documents had been destroyed by 
Howell and were therefore revoked, not lost. 
 
After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court found that 
the evidence conclusively established that Howell executed 
each of her testamentary documents in the offices of her 
attorney, J. Louis Rawls, Jr., pursuant to a comprehensive 
estate plan.  Furthermore, the trial court held that the 
evidence clearly established that the missing documents "were 
last specifically known to be in the possession of Mr. Rawls 
at his law office."  Rawls predeceased Howell, and the current 
members of Rawls' law practice did not know what happened to 
the original documents. 
 
Based on the available evidence, the trial court 
considered the documents to be in the possession of the 
attorney and not in Howell's possession at her death, and 
found, as a matter of fact, that Howell had no "reasonable 
possibility" of access to the will and codicils while they 
were kept at the law offices.  Because Howell had neither 
possession of, nor access to, her documents, the trial court 
applied the presumption that the documents had been lost and 
concluded that the defendants had not met their burden to 
overcome that presumption with clear and convincing evidence 
that the documents had been revoked.  Accordingly, the trial 
court entered an order establishing the copies of the 1985 
will, the 1987 and 1992 codicils, and the original 1990 
 
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codicil as the final will and codicils of Howell.  We awarded 
Johnson an appeal. 
Johnson raises four assignments of error.  These 
assignments challenge the trial court's findings that the 
documents were in the possession of Howell's attorney and that 
Howell had no access to those documents.  Johnson also asserts 
that in determining whether Howell had access to the documents 
in question, the trial court used an erroneous test. 
I. 
 
We begin by reviewing familiar principles applicable in 
instances when original testamentary documents are missing.  
Under such circumstances, two different presumptions are 
available, depending on the last known location of the missing 
documents.  First, if an executed will was known to be in the 
testator's custody but cannot be found after death, there is a 
presumption that it was destroyed by the testator animo 
revocandi, that is with the intention to revoke.  Under these 
circumstances, the proponents of a copy of the will must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the will was simply lost 
and not revoked by the testator.  Second, if the evidence 
shows that after execution the will was not in the possession 
of the testator and not accessible to her, then a presumption 
of loss arises.  The presumption of loss must then be rebutted 
by clear and convincing evidence that the will was revoked by 
 
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the testator.  Harris v. Harris, 216 Va. 716, 719, 222 S.E.2d 
543, 545 (1976); Ballard v. Cox, 191 Va. 654, 659-60, 62 
S.E.2d 1, 3 (1950).  Which presumption is applied in a 
specific case depends on the threshold factual determination 
of whether the will was in the possession of the testator at 
death and, if not, whether the testator nevertheless had 
access to it prior to death. 
II. 
In this case, the trial court determined as a threshold 
factual matter that Howell had entrusted the custody of her 
original will and codicils to her attorney and that Howell did 
not have access to them thereafter.  Johnson contends that the 
trial court erred in both of these findings.  First, Johnson 
asserts that the conclusion that the testamentary documents 
were in the possession of Howell's attorney "flies in the 
face" of the evidence that the only remaining original 
document was found in Howell's former home, that no original 
documents were found in Rawls' law offices, that originals of 
prior wills and codicils were kept by Howell personally, that 
members of Rawls' firm testified that they had never lost an 
original testamentary document in their possession, and that, 
although the records of the firm showed the firm's possession 
of testamentary documents, the records did not show that these 
documents were in the firm's possession. 
 
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As a trier of fact, a chancellor evaluates the testimony 
and credibility of witnesses.  Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. 
v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 120, 501 S.E.2d 148, 156 (1998).  
Thus, a finding of fact, made by a chancellor who has heard 
the evidence ore tenus, carries the weight of a jury verdict, 
and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Buchwalter, 
228 Va. 684, 689, 325 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1985).  Here, in addition 
to the evidence cited by Johnson, there was testimony that 
Howell stated to others that her testamentary documents were 
at Rawls' offices and notations on copies of these documents 
indicated that the originals were at Rawls' offices.  In light 
of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court's finding 
that the documents were in Rawls' possession was plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support it. 
III. 
Johnson next argues that even if the testamentary 
documents were in the possession of Rawls' law firm, the trial 
court erred in finding that Howell did not have access to 
them.  We disagree with Johnson. 
First, Johnson argues that in considering Howell's 
"accessibility" to the testamentary documents, the trial court 
required a "reasonable possibility of access" rather than 
simply a "possibility of access" as set out in our prior 
 
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cases.  Harris, 216 Va. at 719, 222 S.E.2d at 545.  Johnson 
claims that, by requiring proof that Howell had a "reasonable 
possibility" of access, the trial court transformed the 
standard from one of possibility to one of probability. 
 
Johnson's argument is one of semantics.  The trial 
court's addition of the word "reasonable" was superfluous and 
did not impose a higher standard than that required by Harris.  
To the extent "reasonable" modifies "possibility," it 
restricts the circumstances of access to those that are 
"reasonable" rather than "unreasonable."  A "reasonable 
possibility" does not require probability. 
Finally, Johnson argues that testamentary documents left 
with an attorney as custodian "obviously are accessible to 
clients," and, therefore, unless the custodial attorney 
testifies that the testator did not claim the documents or 
that the attorney lost or destroyed them, a testator must be 
considered to have access to the documents.  Such a definition 
of access, however, reflects the legal right of the testator 
to retrieve her documents but does not address the practical 
acts necessary to access testamentary documents for purposes 
of revoking them or reasserting physical control over them. 
For example, in Ballard, the testatrix directed her 
attorney to mail the original will to her sister, Miss 
Ballard, who in turn put the will in her safe deposit box 
 
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where it remained until the testatrix's death.  Miss Ballard 
delivered the original will to the deceased testatrix's 
husband, who denied having received the will.  Miss Ballard 
sought to have a copy of the will admitted to probate.  191 
Va. at 658-59, 62 S.E.2d at 3. 
In admitting the copy to probate, the Court found that 
the evidence clearly showed that after executing the will, it 
was never again in the possession of the testatrix and the 
presumption of loss arose.  Id. at 659-60, 62 S.E.2d at 3.  
Clearly, the testatrix had "access" to her will in the sense 
that she had the legal right to recover possession of it from 
her sister.  Nevertheless, the facts indicated that the 
testatrix was in the hospital when she made her will and that 
she died approximately four months later.  The lack of access 
necessary for the imposition of the presumption of loss was 
based on the factual record developed.  It was not dependent 
on the testimony of any single witness or a generalized right 
of access to one's documents. 
Thus, for purposes of determining whether the presumption 
of loss applies, a testator's access to testamentary documents 
entrusted to a custodian is a matter to be resolved by the 
fact finder based on the evidence produced. 
This principle is consistent with cases from other 
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.  After 
 
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establishing that a will had been left in the hands of a 
custodian, those courts conducted a factual inquiry to 
determine whether the testator had access to the documents; 
the legal right to access the documents was not determinative.  
See, e.g., In re Estate of Mammana, 564 A.2d 978, 982 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989); Thompson v. Dobbs, 234 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1950); In re Pinney's Will, 72 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896 
(N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1947); see also John P. Ludington, Annotation, 
Sufficiency of Evidence That Will Was Not Accessible to 
Testator for Destruction, in Proceeding To Establish Lost 
Will, 86 A.L.R.3d 980, § 8 (1978). 
This principle is also consistent with our decision in 
Harris, in which we stated, "[i]f the possibility of access is 
shown that is controlling."  216 Va. at 719, 222 S.E.2d at 
545.  In Harris, the testator did not entrust his will to a 
custodian.  The daughter who sought to have a copy of the will 
probated testified that, unknown to her father, she took his 
will to the second floor of his home, put it in her bureau 
drawer, and subsequently discovered it was missing.  Sometime 
later the testator was transferred to a nursing home where he 
died.  Id. at 718, 222 S.E.2d at 544.  We concluded that the 
testator had access to the will because the will was in his 
home and he was physically active before he entered the 
nursing home "long after [his daughter] discovered that the 
 
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will was missing."  Id. at 720, 222 S.E.2d at 545.  The 
determination of accessibility in Harris, as in Ballard, was 
based on a consideration of the facts, not the legal 
entitlement of the testator to possession of his will. 
Having rejected Johnson's contention that access was 
established in this case because the testator had a legal 
right to repossess her documents or because there was no 
affirmative testimony by the custodial attorney that the 
documents were either retrieved by the testator or lost or 
destroyed by the attorney, we now turn to Johnson's argument 
that the record was insufficient to show lack of access.  
Johnson relies primarily on the fact that Howell enjoyed good 
health, was able to go to Rawls' law offices by herself, and 
was not generally known by sight to Rawls' staff as evidence 
that supports a finding of access.  In addition, Johnson cites 
testimony that the testator expressed concern about the 
fairness of her estate plan.  However, the evidence in this 
case also shows that Howell entrusted the documents to Rawls, 
knew her documents were with Rawls, intended that they remain 
there, and commented that she had "everything on paper with my 
lawyers." 
As we have already said, the trial court, as the finder 
of fact, was entitled to weigh the evidence and credibility of 
the witnesses.  We cannot set aside a finding of fact unless 
 
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it is clearly erroneous or without evidentiary support.  See 
Advanced Marine and Va. Elec., supra.  We agree with the trial 
court that, on this record, only pure speculation would 
support a finding that Howell exercised her ability to access 
the missing will and codicils and retrieved them from Rawls' 
law offices after leaving them there in 1992.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the record supports the trial court's 
determination that the missing testamentary documents were not 
in the possession of the testator and that she did not have 
access to them. 
Thus, the documents were properly presumed lost and the 
burden shifted to Johnson to prove that Howell revoked the 
missing will and codicils by clear and convincing evidence.  
Johnson has not assigned error to the trial court's conclusion 
that Johnson did not produce clear and convincing evidence of 
revocation to rebut the presumption of loss.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the trial court.*
Affirmed.
                     
* In light of this holding we need not address Spivey's 
assignment of cross-error. 
 
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