Case Title: Commonwealth v. Grier

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11386

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11386 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PATRICK GRIER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 11, 2022. - August 9, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Jury and Jurors.  Criminal Offender Record 
Information.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, 
Challenge to jurors, Instructions to jury, Argument by 
prosecutor, Capital case.  Evidence, Opinion. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 25, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Judith Fabricant, J. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Based on his fatal shooting of De'Andre 
Barboza, the defendant, Patrick Grier, was convicted by a 
Superior Court jury of murder in the first degree and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  On appeal from these convictions, the 
defendant argues reversible error in (1) the trial judge's 
2 
 
failure to require the Commonwealth to provide a race-neutral 
explanation for its use of peremptory challenges; (2) the 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike potential 
jurors based on their youth; (3) the judge's instructions to the 
venire that an impartial juror must put aside his or her 
personal experiences, thoughts, and opinions; (4) the judge's 
decision to excuse a juror for cause after it was revealed, 
based on a criminal record check, that the juror had not 
disclosed prior arrests and charges; (5) the prosecutor's 
closing argument, which the defendant claims vouched for a 
witness's credibility, appealed to the jurors' emotions, shifted 
the burden of proof, and improperly undermined his Bowden 
defense, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 
(1980); and (6) the judge's allowance of opinion testimony by a 
detective.  Because we conclude that the defendant's arguments 
are without merit, we affirm his convictions. 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury reasonably 
could have found them.  On the evening of November 30, 2008, the 
defendant and his close friend, Tratasia Day, were at Ada's 
Market, a store in the Dorchester section of Boston.  While at 
the store, they encountered the victim, who was in the store 
with Jaquan Lewis.  The defendant proceeded to have a 
conversation with the victim outside the store.  After this 
encounter, the defendant appeared quiet and upset. 
3 
 
The next morning, December 1, 2008, Day -- who was sixteen 
years old at the time -- went to the house where her friend 
Anays Mercedes lived, with the intention of walking to school 
with her.  Upon learning that Mercedes would not be going to 
school that day, Day decided to skip school, arranging instead 
to meet up with the defendant.  The pair met at Elmhurst Street 
in Dorchester, proceeding from there to Washington Street.  That 
morning, the defendant was wearing a black jacket with gray 
design elements, including Champion brand logos on the left 
sleeve and left and right chest areas.  He was also wearing a 
black baseball cap with a pinwheel design. 
As the pair were passing the Caribbean Market on Washington 
Street, Day noticed Lewis and the victim inside.  Lewis and the 
victim both then came out of the market.  After Lewis called out 
to Day, she turned back to talk to him.  Meanwhile, the 
defendant continued walking down Washington Street toward the 
corner with Lyndhurst Street, turning onto Lyndhurst Street when 
he reached the corner.  The victim also headed toward that 
corner. 
When the victim reached the corner of Washington and 
Lyndhurst Streets, the defendant shot him while advancing up 
Lyndhurst Street toward Washington Street, causing him to fall 
to the ground.  With the victim on the ground, the defendant 
continued to open fire at him, firing at least two more shots.  
4 
 
One shot struck the victim in the head, while two shots wounded 
his legs.  The victim was subsequently transported to Boston 
Medical Center in an ambulance.  He died two days later on 
December 3, 2008, as the result of fatal brain injuries caused 
by the gunshot wound to his head. 
Immediately following the shooting, the defendant fled the 
scene, running across Washington Street.  Upon hearing the 
shots, Day and Lewis also started running, dashing across 
Washington Street and down Aspinwall Road.  When Day passed the 
Citizens Bank on Aspinwall Road, the defendant caught up with 
her and threw the gun he used to shoot the victim at her, 
telling her to take it.  She caught the gun, a .22 caliber 
revolver with a shortened barrel, and tucked it in her waistband 
before continuing to run down Aspinwall Road.  When the 
defendant was running past 18 Aspinwall Road, he threw his 
baseball cap into the yard, where it was later recovered by the 
police.  The defendant and Day continued running down Aspinwall 
Road, where they were pursued by two police officers in a 
cruiser onto Talbot Avenue and then Colonial Avenue.  Getting 
out of their cruiser on Colonial Avenue, the officers chased 
after the defendant and Day on foot, with one officer stopping 
Day and the other stopping the defendant.  When approaching the 
defendant, the apprehending officer noticed a strong smell of 
gunpowder coming from him.  The other officer, who stopped Day, 
5 
 
performed a patfrisk of her and felt a weapon in her waistband.  
A third officer who subsequently arrived at Colonial Avenue 
recovered the .22 caliber gun from Day's waistband and brought 
it to police headquarters to be analyzed. 
The defendant and Day were then separately transported to 
the police station.  At the station, some items of clothing worn 
by Day and the defendant were collected, including a pair of 
gloves from Day and a jacket from the defendant.  A criminalist 
took surface samples, known as "stubs," from the hands of both 
the defendant and Day for gunshot primer residue testing.1  The 
stubs taken from both the defendant and Day's hands tested 
negative for gunshot residue, as did Day's jacket and gloves.  
When the defendant's jacket was subsequently tested, however, 
the cuffs were found to be positive for gunshot residue. 
Discussion.  1.  Peremptory challenges of potential jurors.  
a.  Racial discrimination.  The use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude potential jurors solely because of their race is 
prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 Adhesive-coated stubs are an alternative method of 
collecting gunshot residue to using alcohol-moistened swabs.  
See Reid, Chana, Bond, Almond & Black, Stubs Versus Swabs?  A 
Comparison of Gunshot Residue Collection Techniques, 55 J. 
Forensic Sci. 753, 753 (May 2010). 
6 
 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race").  Article 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights similarly proscribes the "use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely by 
virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with, particular, 
defined groupings in the community."  Commonwealth v. Soares, 
377 Mass. 461, 486 (1979).  Groups defined by race are among the 
particular or "discrete" groups, membership of which is an 
impermissible basis for peremptorily striking a potential juror 
under art. 12.  Id. at 488-489. 
Under both Federal and Massachusetts law, a three-step 
framework guides the constitutional review of peremptory 
strikes.  First, the party opposing a peremptory strike must 
rebut the presumption that the strike is constitutionally proper 
by making out a prima facie case that the purpose for the strike 
is discriminatory.  Second, if the judge finds that a prima 
facie case of discrimination has been established, the burden 
shifts to the party seeking to exercise the peremptory strike to 
provide a group-neutral explanation for the challenged strike.  
Third, the judge must then determine whether that explanation is 
genuine and adequate, or whether instead the opponent of the 
strike has proved a discriminatory purpose behind the strike.  
See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2019); 
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); Commonwealth v. 
7 
 
Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 493 (2020); Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 
Mass. 539, 545 (2017). 
The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in ruling 
that the defense had not made out a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination when the prosecutor exercised peremptory 
challenges to strike three Black women on the third day of jury 
selection, and consequently in failing to require the prosecutor 
to provide race-neutral explanations for the challenged strikes.  
We review the trial judge's ruling for an abuse of discretion:  
we do not ask "whether the judge was permitted to find that the 
presumption [of constitutional propriety] had been rebutted," 
but rather "whether [s]he was required to have so found" 
(emphases added).  Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 10 (2013). 
To make out the prima facie case required for the first 
Batson-Soares step, a party opposing a peremptory strike must 
"show[] that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an 
inference of discriminatory purpose."  Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168, 
quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.  See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 
511, quoting Johnson, supra ("the presumption [that a peremptory 
challenge is constitutionally proper] is rebutted when 'the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose'").  We have emphasized that the burden 
of making the requisite prima facie showing is "not . . . a 
terribly weighty one."  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 
8 
 
307, 321 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 
460, 463 n.4 (2003).  See also Sanchez, supra at 510 (describing 
first-step burden as "minimal").  We have also made clear that 
the prima facie case can be made upon a showing of a 
discriminatory purpose behind even a "single" peremptory 
challenge.  See Issa, 466 Mass. at 8, 9. 
In assessing whether a party has met its burden under the 
first Batson-Soares step of showing a purpose to discriminate 
against a protected group in the use of peremptory strikes, a 
trial judge should consider "the totality of the relevant 
facts."  Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 511, quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 
168.  Nevertheless, we have specifically highlighted a number of 
factors to guide this inquiry: 
"(1) 'the number and percentage of group members who have 
been excluded'; (2) 'the possibility of an objective group-
neutral explanation for the strike or strikes'; (3) 'any 
similarities between excluded jurors and those, not members 
of the allegedly targeted group, who have been struck'; (4) 
'differences among the various members of the allegedly 
targeted group who were struck'; (5) 'whether those 
excluded are members of the same protected group as the 
defendant or the victim'; and (6) 'the composition of the 
jurors already seated.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 311-312 (2020), 
quoting Jones, 477 Mass. at 322. 
Among these factors, "the number and percentage of group 
members who have been excluded" is "ordinarily . . . the 
beginning of the inquiry."  Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 512 & n.13.  
9 
 
In the instant case, defense counsel pointed out at trial that 
of the three Black women whom the judge had found indifferent on 
the third day of jury selection, the Commonwealth had 
peremptorily challenged all three.2  The relevant factor, 
however, is whether a disproportionate number of Black potential 
jurors were excluded over the entire course of the three days of 
jury selection, rather than on any particular day taken in 
isolation.  The record here does not disclose sufficient 
information to allow us to discern how many Black potential 
jurors were peremptorily challenged overall, or whether the 
over-all percentage of Black jurors who were challenged was 
higher compared to the corresponding percentage of jurors from 
other racial groups. 
Given the incomplete information in the available record, 
we therefore turn to the judge's own analysis.  When presented 
with the defendant's Batson-Soares challenge on the third day of 
jury selection, the judge responded: 
"I do find a pattern, the pattern is age.  It has nothing 
to do with race.  And the pattern with respect to age is 
clear and obvious and has been consistent throughout, and 
indeed, is consistent in every criminal case that I try in 
which prosecutors virtually always challenge young people.  
I've noticed in this case one exception to that, and the 
 
2 Defense counsel in fact objected at trial that the 
prosecutor had challenged all three Black women found 
indifferent "for cause."  It is clear from the context, however, 
that defense counsel misspoke and meant to refer to peremptory 
challenges. 
10 
 
one exception was a young black man who prosecutor did not 
challenge. 
 
"As to race, with that one exception, I do not find a 
pattern as to race.  And I note that we have a very 
diversified jury.  Our jury has included many, many people 
of color.  So, I do not find a pattern, so I am not going 
to require any information about the other challenges." 
 
The judge's finding of an age-related pattern was well-
supported given the facts in the record.  Of the sixteen 
potential jurors struck by the Commonwealth, eight were 
students, and thus inferably young.  This pattern appears to 
have extended to the three Black jurors whose exclusion the 
defendant challenges.  At least one of the three jurors was a 
student.  A second appeared to be young as well; the judge asked 
this potential juror whether she was "going to school," 
suggesting that the juror appeared to be school- or college-
aged.  Indeed, defense counsel's disagreement with the judge at 
trial regarding the presence of a pattern with respect to age 
was also only directed at the third Black juror, who was thirty-
one years old. 
While the Commonwealth's decision to peremptorily challenge 
the thirty-one year old Black juror did not conform to the 
pattern of striking young jurors, the record discloses a 
possible legitimate explanation for the Commonwealth's decision 
to challenge that potential juror.  Specifically, she revealed 
in her voir dire with the judge that her younger brother had 
11 
 
been arrested and charged two years prior with drug possession, 
which the Commonwealth could have legitimately feared would 
predispose her to be hostile to law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.  Finally, we note that the other jurors not 
struck on the third day were middle-aged.  Taking the above 
considerations together, we conclude that the judge could 
reasonably have discerned a race-neutral explanation for the 
Commonwealth's challenges to the three Black jurors who were 
excluded on the third day of jury selection. 
As for the judge's additional observation that the seated 
jury was "very diversified" and included "many, many people of 
color," we emphasize that the Batson-Soares framework does not 
protect against the use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
"members of all minority ethnic or racial groups lumped 
together"; rather, it guards against discriminatory "challenges 
to 'particular, defined groupings in the community.'"  
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 772 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 600 n.5 (2018).  Here, in 
regard to Black jurors, the record is unclear:  it does not 
indicate the number of Black jurors who were seated, nor does it 
12 
 
reveal the percentage of the seated jury that was comprised of 
Black jurors.3 
A final relevant factor is whether the jurors whose 
exclusion was challenged were members of the same protected 
group as the defendant or the victim.  In the instant case, the 
defendant and the victim were both Black, and the defendant's 
claim is that the prosecutor discriminated against Black jurors 
in his use of peremptory challenges.  Where, as here, the 
defendant shares the group membership of the jurors whose 
exclusion is challenged as discriminatory, and the victim was 
also a member of that protected group, we have stated that this 
factor "does little to tip the balance in either direction."  
See Jones, 477 Mass. at 322 n.27. 
In sum, given the limited record regarding the exclusion 
and selection of Black jurors, the apparent pattern of striking 
 
3 Even if the record disclosed more information about the 
number and percentage of Black jurors specifically who were 
seated, too much weight should not be placed on this factor.  As 
we have emphasized, "[w]hile the composition of seated jurors 
provides a prism through which to determine discriminatory 
intent, 'that is only one factor among many, and must be 
assessed in context.'"  Commonwealth v. Carter, 488 Mass. 191, 
197 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 Mass. 603, 607 
(2018).  "Placing 'undue weight on this factor not only would 
run counter to the mandate to consider all relevant 
circumstances . . . but also would send the unmistakable message 
that a prosecutor can get away with discriminating against some 
African-Americans . . . so long as a prosecutor does not 
discriminate against all such individuals.'"  Carter, supra at 
198, quoting Ortega, supra. 
13 
 
young jurors but not Black jurors, the objective basis for 
striking the one Black juror clearly outside the pattern of 
striking young jurors, and the fact that both the defendant and 
victim were of the same race, we have no basis for discerning an 
abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that the 
defense had not established a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination in jury selection. 
b.  Discrimination against young people.  Noting that he 
was twenty years old at the time of the victim's shooting, and 
twenty-one at the time of trial, the defendant argues that his 
right to a jury comprising a cross-section of the community 
under art. 12, and his equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, were violated when the Commonwealth used 
peremptory challenges to exclude most young people from the 
jury. 
This argument is unavailing, as "[p]eremptory challenges 
[are not] prohibited based on age, under either the United 
States or Massachusetts Constitution."  Lopes, 478 Mass. at 597.  
Our cases have rejected the argument that young people 
constitute a protected group under art. 12.  See Oberle, 476 
Mass. at 545 ("age is not a discrete grouping defined in the 
[Massachusetts] Constitution").  We have likewise concluded that 
young adults are not a cognizable group for purposes of a Batson 
equal protection challenge.  See Lopes, supra ("every United 
14 
 
States Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has 
rejected the argument that young adults are a protected group 
[under Batson] for peremptory challenges").  As recently as in 
Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 775-776 (2021), cert. 
denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022), we have declined to revisit these 
holdings, and we continue to decline to do so here.4 
2.  The judge's instructions to the venire.  On each day of 
jury selection, the trial judge instructed the venire -- without 
objection from defense counsel -- on what is required for a 
juror to be fair and impartial, each time using very similar 
words.  The following remarks, given by the judge on the first 
day of jury selection, are illustrative: 
"Being fair and impartial doesn't necessarily mean that 
you've never had any thoughts or opinions or experiences 
that might be in some way relevant.  That probably wouldn't 
describe many people.  Being fair and impartial requires 
 
4 The court in Soares, 377 Mass. at 488-489, drew the list 
of groups, membership of which may not be the basis of a 
peremptory challenge, from the list of protected groups under 
art. 1 of the Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 106 of 
the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution (Equal Rights 
Amendment):  sex, race, color, creed, and national origin.  This 
is not, to be sure, a closed list.  In Carter, 488 Mass. at 201, 
we expanded the list of protected groups to include groups 
defined by sexual orientation, recognizing that "gay individuals 
historically have faced pernicious discrimination, including by 
the State, solely because of their sexual orientation."  
Allowing peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation would 
"continue this deplorable tradition of treating gays and 
lesbians as undeserving of participation in our nation's most 
cherished rites and rituals."  Id. at 203, quoting SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 485 (9th Cir. 
2014).  These considerations do not apply to young people taken 
as a group. 
15 
 
that you can and you will decide the facts of this case 
based solely on the evidence presented in the trial of this 
case.  So if you've had some kind of relevant experience or 
thoughts or views or read something or heard something that 
might be in some way relevant, that you will put that out 
of your mind, put that aside, and decide the facts of this 
case based solely on the evidence presented in the trial of 
this case." 
 
In her final charge to the jury, however, the judge did not 
repeat this admonition.  To the contrary, she instructed the 
jurors to consider the evidence while "drawing on [their] own 
common sense and experience of life." 
The defendant now argues that the judge's instruction to 
the venire that jurors must put aside their experiences and 
opinions contravened our guidance in Commonwealth v. Williams, 
481 Mass. 443, 452 (2019), that "a judge should not require a 
prospective juror to disregard his or her life experiences and 
resulting beliefs in order to serve."  The defendant further 
urges that, because the instructions tainted the entire 
empanelment process, this was structural error requiring 
reversal.  We disagree. 
"Structural error is [g]enerally . . . error that 
necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or 
an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence" 
(quotations omitted).  Williams, 481 Mass. at 454, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 (2010).  Because the 
right to be tried by an impartial jury is "basic to a fair 
16 
 
trial," errors that undermine the right to an impartial jury are 
structural errors.  Williams, supra at 455, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Wood, 389 Mass. 552, 564 (1983).  We have previously 
determined, however, that the erroneous dismissal of a potential 
juror that the defendant had hoped would be seated did not 
implicate the defendant's right to an impartial jury and 
therefore did not rise to the level of structural error, 
"because where a potential juror is erroneously excused, the 
presumption is that that individual was replaced by another fair 
and impartial juror."  Williams, supra.  Here, the purported 
error did not even directly involve the dismissal of any 
potential jurors; rather, the challenged instructions simply 
generally explained to the potential jurors what juror 
impartiality requires.  Any error, therefore, was not 
structural.  Rather, as there was no objection at trial, we 
review any error for a "substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice."  See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 
247 (2022). 
We begin by emphasizing two crucial points.  First, when 
the trial judge gave the instructions at issue here, she did not 
have the benefit of our decision in Williams, 481 Mass. 443.  
Second, the issue here and the issue in Williams, though 
related, are distinct.  In the case before us, the defendant 
challenges the trial judge's general instructions to the venire 
17 
 
about what juror impartiality requires.  By contrast, in 
Williams, the question was whether the judge properly dismissed 
a potential juror for cause after the juror expressed 
uncertainty in her voir dire with the judge about her ability to 
put aside her beliefs arising from her life experiences and 
decide the case based on the evidence and the judge's 
instructions.  See Williams, supra at 446.  As we explained 
there, when a juror raises such concerns, a judge is confronted 
with the difficult task of discerning whether a juror will 
decide the case based on the evidence and the judge's legal 
instructions rather than the juror's own preconceptions.  Id. at 
453.  We are not presented with that difficult issue in the 
instant case, but rather with the judge's introductory remarks 
to the venire regarding impartiality.  There was therefore no 
error here under Williams. 
Nevertheless, although the propriety of a judge's 
preliminary instructions to the venire was not an issue directly 
raised in Williams, we recognize that some refinement of the 
instructions the judge gave here to the venire may be 
appropriate in light of the guidance provided by Williams. 
Much, if not all, of the judge's instructions at issue here 
was in alignment with the principles we articulated in Williams.  
She acknowledged that jurors almost inevitably have relevant 
experiences, opinions, or views, noting that an absence of any 
18 
 
relevant experiences and beliefs "probably wouldn't describe 
many people."  This was in line with our recognition in 
Williams, 481 Mass. at 453, that it is "arguably impossible" for 
a juror to "put aside her life experiences and her resulting 
world view."  The judge also properly emphasized that jurors 
must decide the case based only on the evidence presented.  Cf. 
Williams, supra at 448 (removal of potential juror "appropriate" 
where he or she unable to set aside preconceived opinion 
concerning case and "properly weigh the evidence"); Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 821 (2017) (during jury selection, 
judge must examine potential jurors to guard against risk that 
jurors will be "influenced by factors extraneous to the evidence 
presented to them" [citation omitted]).  In accordance with our 
guidance in Williams, supra at 452, that "bringing one's life 
experiences to jury service is appropriate," the judge also 
explained in her final charge to the jury that jurors could 
properly draw on their common sense and experience. 
Moreover, in explaining to the venire that, as jurors, they 
would have to put aside any relevant "experience or thoughts or 
views" they might have, the judge may simply have been 
indicating that impartial jurors must set aside their 
preconceived opinions and biases regarding the case, deciding 
the facts on the evidence presented rather than on extraneous 
factors.  If so, then the judge's instructions were fully 
19 
 
consonant with our teaching in Williams, 481 Mass. at 448, 
quoting Soares, 377 Mass. at 482, that where a juror has "formed 
an opinion regarding the case," the juror must "set aside that 
opinion or bias and properly weigh the evidence and follow the 
instructions on the law." 
To the extent, however, that the judge was suggesting that 
impartial jurors must set aside their background opinions born 
of their life experiences and worldviews, then the judge's 
instructions were somewhat in tension with the principles that 
lay behind our decision in Williams.  As we explained there, an 
impartial juror need not set aside "opinions formed based on his 
or her life experiences or belief system."  See Williams, 481 
Mass. at 448.  Rather, juror impartiality requires only that a 
juror be able, "given his or her experiences and resulting 
beliefs," to "fairly evaluate the evidence presented and 
properly apply the law."  Id. at 452, citing Commonwealth v. 
Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 221-222 (2012).  In future general 
instructions, judges should be careful to make clear this 
distinction between background opinions and preconceived notions 
regarding the case to be tried.  Jurors should not be asked to 
ignore or erase their relevant life experiences, as that is 
close to impossible, but rather to decide the case based on the 
evidence and the judge's instructions, rather than on any 
"preconceived notions about the case."  Williams, supra at 448. 
20 
 
Nevertheless, even if the judge's instructions were not 
fully consonant with our teaching in Williams, no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the challenged 
instructions.  The statements at issue were not repeated in the 
final charge, where the judge instructed the jury in terms that 
were closely aligned with our guidance in Williams.  In 
addition, the record indicates that of the eighteen potential 
jurors who were excused because they believed they could not be 
impartial, all but one expressed opinions or disclosed personal 
experiences that would not have favored, and in many cases would 
have been strongly adverse to, the defendant.5  While one 
 
5 One excused juror indicated that he was a longtime friend 
of the victim's family.  A second claimed a religious objection 
to participating in deciding a case to which he had not been an 
eyewitness.  A third disclosed very negative views toward gun 
and gang violence after his friend was shot.  A fourth revealed 
that she had cousins who were murdered due to gang activity.  A 
fifth claimed she would have difficulty being fair and impartial 
because she lived close to the area where the shooting took 
place.  A sixth knew the victim personally.  A seventh was the 
aunt of a fifteen year old who had been recently killed.  An 
eighth disclosed negative feelings about anyone who even carried 
a gun.  A ninth confessed that he found it difficult to set 
aside the strong racial bias he acquired from his parents.  A 
tenth disclosed criminal behavior by her father that affected 
her emotionally.  An eleventh indicated a belief that all gang 
members should be "put away."  A twelfth was friends with a gang 
unit police officer.  A thirteenth had a nephew who was killed 
in gang-related violence.  A fourteenth revealed that his uncle 
worked for the Boston police department.  A fifteenth mentioned 
that he had personal familiarity with street violence in 
Dorchester.  A sixteenth lived in the area of the shooting and 
admitted that she felt very strongly about crimes committed in 
the area.  A seventeenth revealed his belief that the defendant 
 
21 
 
potential juror who was excused did indicate that she had 
concerns about "inconsistencies within the judicial system," she 
also revealed that she had a friend who was "murdered by a 
police officer," and that this would "influence [her] as a juror 
in [the] case."  The judge could reasonably have concluded from 
this that this particular juror would not have been able to 
fairly evaluate the evidence and apply the law.  For these 
reasons, we discern no prejudicial error in the judge's 
instructions; still less did the challenged instructions create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
3.  Removal of a juror for cause in connection with the 
failure to disclose prior criminal charges.  A juror who had 
been seated on the second day of empanelment was discovered, 
following a criminal record check, to have failed to disclose 
several prior arrests and charges when filling out the juror 
questionnaire.  Specifically, he did not disclose that he had 
been charged with driving without insurance twenty-three years 
prior, and that he had been arrested and charged with operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence and with narcotics-
related offenses fifteen years prior.  After an additional voir 
dire with the juror on the third day of jury selection, the 
judge excused him for cause, pointing to "concerns about 
 
was guilty, based on his previous encounters with gang members 
and the defendant's "appearance." 
22 
 
comprehension and about candor."  Defense counsel objected to 
the juror's removal, noting that he was the only Black male on 
the jury.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge abused 
her discretion in excusing the juror based on decades-old 
charges, and that the Commonwealth's practice of checking the 
criminal records of potential jurors is unconstitutional. 
a.  For-cause removal of the seated juror.  We review the 
judge's decision to excuse the seated juror for an abuse of 
discretion.  A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where 
"the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the 
factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 
214 (2017), S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 (2019). 
Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the record indicates 
that the judge did not excuse the juror because of his previous 
arrests and criminal charges.  Rather, the judge excused him due 
to concerns about his candor and level of comprehension.  
Despite being prompted to do so on the juror questionnaire and 
by the judge during her earlier instructions to the venire, the 
juror did not disclose multiple prior arrests and charges.  As 
the judge reasonably inferred, these failures of disclosure 
could be explained either by a lack of candor or by a lack of 
comprehension, both of which would be legitimate reasons to 
23 
 
doubt the juror's suitability to serve.6  The judge's concerns 
about the juror's level of comprehension also stemmed from her 
colloquy with him during the additional voir dire, during which 
the juror often gave answers to her questions that were 
nonresponsive.  Indeed, defense counsel conceded that the juror 
"had some difficulty understanding [the judge's] questions."  
Because the judge reasonably determined that the juror lacked 
either candor or the ability to adequately comprehend the trial 
proceedings, she acted within her discretion in excusing him. 
b.  Constitutionality of checking jurors' criminal records.  
The defendant contends that, because people of color are 
stopped, arrested, and prosecuted at a higher rate, the 
Commonwealth's practice of checking the criminal records of 
potential jurors during the empanelment process is unlawful 
because it has a racially disparate impact. 
We have interpreted the criminal offender record 
information (CORI) statute, G. L. c. 6, § 172, to authorize the 
Commonwealth to access CORI to check the criminal records of 
jurors in a criminal case to determine their impartiality and 
 
6 We have previously held that where jurors failed to 
disclose their criminal histories, as revealed by a criminal 
record check, the judge can reasonably infer "that the jurors 
had concealed their criminal histories purposefully, and thus 
could not be expected to be impartial or to follow the court's 
instructions."  Commonwealth v. Cousin, 449 Mass. 809, 821-822 
(2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1007 (2008). 
24 
 
their qualifications to serve.  See Commonwealth v. Cousin, 449 
Mass. 809, 816-818 (2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1007 (2008).  
The defendant's argument, however, is not that prosecutors lack 
statutory authority to inquire into the criminal records of 
jurors, but that this practice is unconstitutional because it 
has a racially disparate impact. 
Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a neutral law or official act or practice that "has a 
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority" is 
unconstitutional "only if that impact can be traced to a 
discriminatory purpose."  Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239 (1976). 
"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the 
Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review 
of a Federal equal protection claim.'"  Commonwealth v. Roman, 
489 Mass. 81, 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 
Mass. 503, 505 n.5 (2015).  Thus, we affirm that under art. 1 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the racially disparate 
impact of an official act or practice would likewise, absent 
discriminatory intent, be constitutional.  See Cote-Whitacre v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 446 Mass. 350, 391 (2006) (Marshall, 
C.J., concurring) ("A statute neutral on its face may violate 
the equal protection requirements of the Federal and the 
25 
 
Massachusetts Constitutions if it results in an intended 
disparate impact" [emphasis added]). 
Because the defendant points to no evidence of 
discriminatory purpose in the Commonwealth's practice of 
checking the criminal records of potential jurors, nor does the 
record reveal any such evidence, his constitutional challenge 
fails. 
4.  The prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
claims that the judge made multiple errors in relation to the 
prosecutor's closing argument.  Specifically, he contends that 
the judge erroneously allowed the prosecutor to vouch for the 
credibility of Day's testimony, to unduly inflame the jurors' 
emotions, to shift the burden of proof onto the defense, and to 
undercut his Bowden defense.  We consider the prosecutor's 
remarks at issue in each claim of error "in the context of the 
whole . . . closing, as well as the entire case."  Commonwealth 
v. Alemany, 488 Mass. 499, 511 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673 (2015), S.C., 483 Mass. 571 (2019).  
Because the defense did not object at trial to any part of the 
Commonwealth's closing argument, we review his claims "for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Alemany, 
supra, citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
26 
 
a.  Vouching for Day's testimony.  The defendant argues 
that the prosecutor's closing argument contained improper 
vouching for Day.  The defendant does so in a cursory fashion, 
claiming first that the Commonwealth "suggested that . . . the 
grand jury declined to indict Day on murder, and only indicted 
her as an accessory after the fact"; second, that the 
Commonwealth "unfairly bolstered [Day's] testimony by suggesting 
[the defendant] implicated her in a murder, and then the 
Commonwealth provided her with a deal because she was wrongly 
implicated"; and third, that the Commonwealth "chose to put [the 
defendant] on trial, suggesting they had special knowledge of 
his guilt."  The defendant's argument is incorrect as a matter 
of law and relies on mischaracterizations of the prosecutor's 
closing argument.  None of the prosecutor's statements at issue 
constituted improper vouching. 
Vouching consists in the prosecutor "explicitly or 
implicitly . . . indicat[ing] that he or she has knowledge 
independent of the evidence before the jury verifying a 
witness's credibility" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. 
Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 265 (1989), citing Commonwealth v. 
Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978), S.C., 381 Mass. 340 (1980).  
There was no such suggestion of knowledge independent of the 
evidence in the instant case.  While the prosecutor briefly 
mentioned that Day "came within a whisper of being indicted for 
27 
 
murder," he did so in the context of explaining the charges 
filed against her.  Indeed, the prosecutor followed that remark 
with these statements:  "She was charged, she was arrested, 
arraigned in Dorchester District Court, her charges were 
upgraded to murder, and when it came out of the grand jury she 
was charged with accessory after the fact and unlawful 
possession of a firearm."  This was not vouching for her 
credibility but simply an accurate description of the grand jury 
process in Day's case, albeit with a hyperbolic rhetorical 
flourish characterizing Day as coming within a "whisper" of 
being indicted for murder. 
The prosecutor's remark that the defendant implicated Day 
in the victim's murder was likewise made in the context of 
explaining how Day came to cooperate with the Commonwealth.  
Because Day testified that the defendant had thrown her the 
murder weapon, urging her to "take [it]," this remark was based 
on the evidence before the jury.  Being firmly grounded in the 
evidence, the remark accordingly did not constitute vouching. 
Finally, the prosecutor did not vouch for Day's testimony 
by stating that she was "not on trial."  Given that defense 
counsel, in his closing argument, sought to discredit Day and 
suggest that she may have been the shooter, the prosecutor's 
statement reminding the jury that she was not on trial fairly 
"focus[ed] the jury on the question at hand."  See Commonwealth 
28 
 
v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 462-463 (1998), S.C., 468 Mass. 1009 
(2014).  In those circumstances, the Commonwealth could state 
that the defendant and not Day was on trial without improperly 
vouching for her credibility. 
In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor's remarks at issue 
did not vouch for Day's credibility by stating or implying that 
"the government has special knowledge by which it can verify 
[Day's] testimony."  Commonwealth v. Webb, 468 Mass. 26, 32 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 44 
n.21 (2011). 
b.  Undue appeal to the jury's emotions.  The defendant 
argues that elements of the prosecutor's closing argument unduly 
inflamed the jury's emotions.  Specifically, he contends that 
the prosecutor unfairly appealed to the jurors' sympathy for the 
victim by emphasizing the victim's youth, referring to him, for 
example, as an "unarmed, defenseless" sixteen year old,.7  This, 
the defendant claims, went against the prosecutor's "obligation" 
to argue the Commonwealth's case "in a way that . . . inspires 
confidence that the verdict was reached based on the evidence 
rather than sympathy for the victim and [his] family."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 494 (1997), S.C., 427 
Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998). 
 
7 The prosecutor also referred to the victim's youth in his 
opening statement. 
29 
 
To begin with, we emphasize the victim was in fact an 
unarmed, defenseless sixteen year old.  The prosecutor's remarks 
thus contained no misstatement of fact.  The three references to 
the victim's youth and single reference to his being defenseless 
in the prosecutor's closing argument also fall short of what we 
determined to be an undue appeal to the jury's sympathy for the 
victim in Santiago.  There, the prosecutor in his opening 
statement "referred five times to the fact that the victim was 
seventeen years old and pregnant," while in his closing 
argument, "he referred to those same facts seven more times, and 
noted four times that the victim was to have a birthday one day 
after the shooting and that, coincidentally, her twentieth 
birthday corresponded with the day of the closing arguments in 
the trial."  Santiago, 425 Mass. at 494.  In addition, the 
prosecutor directly and repeatedly invited the jury to consider 
the victim's youth and pregnancy in their deliberations.  Id. at 
494-495. 
The defendant further claims that the prosecutor sought to 
outrage the jury by vividly evoking legally immaterial aspects 
of the crime that would nevertheless provoke a moral and 
emotional response from the jurors.  For example, the prosecutor 
referred to the victim's killing as an "execution in broad 
daylight on a busy city street corner."  Addressing the jury, 
the prosecutor drew attention to how the shooting took place "in 
30 
 
your city," at a place and time when "people [were] running 
their errands."  The prosecutor also reminded the jury of how, 
when they went on a view of the site where the shooting took 
place, they "stood in the very spot" where the victim was 
fatally shot. 
"[A] prosecutor may argue zealously in support of 
inferences favorable to the Commonwealth's case that reasonably 
may be drawn from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 
Mass. 1, 22 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 
745, 748–749 (1999).  Accordingly, where a prosecutor's language 
is "based in fact" and tracks the "odious . . . nature of the 
crime[] committed," emotive language in a prosecutor's closing 
argument is permissible as merely "enthusiastic rhetoric, strong 
advocacy, and excusable hyperbole" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 131-132 (2021).  Although 
hyperbolic, the closing here did not cross the line.  Indeed, we 
have previously found no error in allowing statements by the 
prosecutor that remind the jury of what they experienced while 
on a view, and in the use of emotive rhetoric such as "stalking 
and hunting" in describing the nature of the crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 669-670 (2017). 
Here, the prosecutor's references to the deliberate, close-
range shooting of the victim in the head as an "execution" 
reflected the facts of the case.  We therefore conclude that the 
31 
 
challenged remarks by the prosecutor did not improperly seek to 
inflame the jury's emotions. 
c.  Shifting the burden of proof to the defense.  Seeking 
to discredit the defense's suggestion that Lewis may have been 
the shooter, the prosecutor urged in his closing argument that 
"[t]here isn't a shred of evidence that [Lewis] shot a gun that 
day, or that he had a gun that day," calling the defense's 
theory of a third-party culprit an invitation "to speculate."8  
This statement, the defendant now argues, impermissibly shifted 
the burden of proof to him by suggesting that he had some 
obligation to present evidence to undermine the Commonwealth's 
case. 
A prosecutor impermissibly shifts the burden of proof when 
he or she calls the jury's attention to the defendant's failure 
to produce evidence, because in so doing, the prosecutor 
"signal[s] to the jury that the defendant has an affirmative 
duty to bring forth evidence of his innocence, thereby lessening 
the Commonwealth's burden [of proof]."  Commonwealth v. Tu 
Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787 (2011).  Accordingly, we have 
cautioned that "[p]rosecutors should scrupulously avoid any 
statement that suggests that the defendant has any burden to 
 
8 Jaquan Lewis, to recall, was with the victim the day 
before the shooting at Ada's Market and on the day of the 
shooting at the Caribbean Market. 
32 
 
produce evidence."  Commonwealth v. Collazo, 481 Mass. 498, 503 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. McMahon, 443 Mass. 409, 419 
(2005).  We have also stressed, however, that a prosecutor may 
properly "emphasize the strong points of the Commonwealth's case 
and the weaknesses of the defendant's case," even if he or she 
may thereby "prompt some collateral or passing reflection" on 
the fact that the defendant has not produced certain evidence.  
Collazo, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 12 
(2014).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 686 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 623 (2015) 
("A prosecutor is 'entitled to respond to the defense argument 
and also to comment on the . . . weakness of the defense, as 
long as argument is directed at the defendant's defense and not 
at the defendant's failure to testify'" [quotation omitted]). 
When the prosecutor's comments at issue are considered in 
their full context, Alemany, 488 Mass. at 511, it becomes clear 
that the prosecutor was permissibly arguing that, in light of 
the evidence that the Commonwealth presented, the Commonwealth's 
case against the defendant stood in stark contrast with the 
defense's alternative theory that Lewis was the shooter.  
Immediately before the prosecutor remarked that there was not "a 
shred of evidence" that Lewis fired a shot or even had a gun at 
the scene, he listed numerous pieces of the evidence that 
implicated the defendant rather than Lewis.  Prior to 
33 
 
characterizing the theory inculpating Lewis as "speculat[ive]," 
the prosecutor put forward affirmative reasons supported by the 
evidence to doubt that Lewis shot the victim.  Thus, the remarks 
at issue -- when considered in context -- were a "comment on the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case and the weakness of the 
defendant's case," Commonwealth v. Garvin, 456 Mass. 778, 799 
(2010), which were accordingly permissible. 
d.  Undermining the defendant's Bowden defense.  Under 
Bowden, 379 Mass. at 485–486, a defendant is permitted to elicit 
evidence of an inadequate police investigation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 299, 315 (2018); Commonwealth 
v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 597 (2012).  From this evidence, 
the defendant may pursue a so-called Bowden defense, arguing 
that the jury should "find a reasonable doubt" because "the 
investigation was careless, incomplete, or so focused on the 
defendant that it ignored leads that may have suggested other 
culprits."  Alvarez, supra at 316, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009).  The defendant 
contends that the prosecutor improperly undercut his Bowden 
defense by two statements he made during his closing argument.  
First, he told the jury that they "need[ed] to focus on the 
evidence that was presented" rather than "speculat[ing] on 
what's not before [them] as opposed to what [was]."  Second, he 
34 
 
told them that it was their "job" to decide the facts "not based 
on speculation, but on the evidence that's been introduced." 
Given that, as we noted supra, defense counsel did not 
object at trial to any part of the prosecutor's closing 
argument, we review the claim here that the Commonwealth 
improperly undermined the defendant's Bowden defense for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
We conclude that the prosecutor's statements were 
permissible, as they generally contrasted the evidence presented 
in the Commonwealth's case with the defendant's tactic of 
encouraging speculation about alternative suspects.  We have 
previously held that, where a judge generally instructed a jury 
to find the facts "solely from the evidence admitted . . . and 
not from suspicion or conjecture," and did not do so in direct 
response to a Bowden argument made by the defendant, the judge's 
jury instruction did not improperly undercut or negate the 
defendant's Bowden defense.  See Alvarez, 480 Mass. at 317-318.  
Likewise, here the prosecutor's general comparison of the 
Commonwealth's case with the defendant's, without any particular 
focus on the defendant's Bowden argument, did not improperly 
35 
 
undercut the defendant's case.9  The judge therefore did not err 
in allowing the prosecutor's remarks. 
The judge's own instruction to the jury that they were "not 
to engage in any guesswork about any unanswered questions that 
may remain in your mind" was likewise not in error, given that 
the instruction was not given in direct response to a Bowden 
argument raised by the defendant.  Nevertheless, as we noted in 
Alvarez, 480 Mass. at 318, it would have been "prudent" to omit 
such language from jury instructions to avoid any risk that the 
jury would interpret it as somehow negating the defendant's 
Bowden argument. 
5.  The detective's testimony relating to the surveillance 
video evidence.  At trial, Sergeant Detective Michael Devane, 
one of the detectives who investigated the victim's killing, 
testified in relation to still photographs taken from 
surveillance video footage captured by cameras installed at a 
bank and a post office located in the vicinity of the crime 
scene.  The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in 
allowing this testimony where, first, the testimony amounted to 
 
9 Indeed, it is less likely that the prosecutor's closing 
argument undercut the defendant's Bowden argument, given that in 
the final jury charge, the judge instructed the jury that it was 
her responsibility to instruct them on the law and that they 
were to follow the law as she gave it to them.  The jury can 
thus be assumed to have understood that the prosecutor's remarks 
during his closing argument were not statements of the law. 
36 
 
impermissible opinion testimony by a lay witness, and second, 
the testimony impermissibly expressed the detective's opinion as 
to the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt. 
a.  Lay opinion testimony.  The defendant points to four 
specific instances where, he contends, Devane's testimony 
constituted inadmissible opinion evidence.  First, Devane 
testified that the two people depicted in a still image from the 
bank surveillance video showed two individuals crossing 
Washington Street toward the side where the Caribbean Market is 
located.  Second, Devane testified that, in a still image 
capturing a moment at or closely surrounding the time of the 
shooting taken from the post office camera recording the view 
onto Lyndhurst Street, there was apparently an image of an 
individual facing toward Washington Street with his right arm 
pointed out in front of him.  Third, regarding this same image, 
Devane also testified that the frame of a doorway was 
obstructing the view of the individual's right hand.  Fourth, in 
relation to an enlarged version of the image that zoomed in on 
the individual with his arm raised, Devane testified over 
objection that when he had previously reviewed the image, he 
"was focused primarily on the left chest area, . . . where the C 
is." 
Because the fourth instance of purportedly improper opinion 
evidence was objected to at trial, we review that portion of the 
37 
 
detective's testimony for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. 
Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429 (2019).  "An error is not prejudicial 
only if the Commonwealth can show with fair assurance . . . that 
the judgment was not substantially swayed by it" (quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 647 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rosado, 428 Mass. 76, 79 (1998).  The 
other portions of Devane's testimony at issue, which were not 
objected to at trial, we review for a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Morales, 483 Mass. 
676, 677 (2019). 
"A lay opinion . . . is admissible only where it is '(a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful 
to . . . the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not based 
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.'"  
Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 (2013), quoting Mass. 
G. Evid. § 701 (2013).  Where the jury are capable of viewing 
video or photographic evidence and drawing their own conclusions 
regarding what is depicted, a lay witness's testimony about the 
content of the video or photographs is admissible only if it 
would assist the jury in reaching more reliable conclusions.  
See Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 366 (1995).  Cf. 
Pina, 481 Mass. at 429-430, quoting Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 
Mass. 425, 441 (2014) (lay witness's opinion concerning 
identification of person depicted in surveillance photograph 
38 
 
admissible only if witness was "more likely to correctly 
identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury"). 
We conclude that, under this test, Devane's testimony 
regarding the still image from the bank surveillance video was 
admissible.  While the jurors could see for themselves that the 
still image depicted a scene with two individuals crossing a 
street, Devane was providing context that would allow the jurors 
to better situate the scene and the individuals depicted in it.  
But even if Devane's testimony here was erroneously admitted, 
his testimony was not in any way prejudicial to the defendant.  
Defense counsel conceded in his closing argument that there was 
"no dispute" that Day and the defendant were walking along 
Washington Street toward the corner with Lyndhurst Street 
moments before the shooting.  Thus, even if the jury were 
influenced by Devane's testimony into believing that the 
defendant was near the scene of the shooting close to the time 
it occurred, given that defense counsel had conceded that fact, 
the testimony was of no import, and thus was not prejudicial.  A 
fortiori, it did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
The admissibility of Devane's testimony regarding the still 
images, whether original or enlarged, extracted from the post 
office surveillance video is a closer question.  On the one 
hand, the jury were able to view for themselves the same still 
39 
 
images that Devane viewed and could review them during 
deliberations.  See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 
475 (2019) (noting that jury were able to view same surveillance 
footage that officers watched as reason against admitting 
opinion testimony by officers about footage).  The detective 
also did not "possess[] any special familiarity with the 
defendant that the jury lacked."  Vacher, 469 Mass. at 442. 
On the other hand, at no point in his testimony did Devane 
directly offer an opinion that the still image depicted the 
defendant or his jacket.  Devane was allowed only to note in 
passing that a "C" was visible on the left chest area of the 
individual appearing in the image.  Indeed, Devane did not even 
propose that the individual depicted was wearing the same 
clothes as the defendant, nor did he expressly connect the 
apparently visible "C" with the Champion brand logo on the 
jacket that the defendant was wearing on the day of the 
shooting.  The judge carefully prevented the officer from 
drawing conclusions in this regard.10  Moreover, Devane's 
testimony could have assisted the jury in evaluating what the 
still image depicted, given that he was familiar with the type 
of video surveillance system the post office had as well as the 
 
10 When the prosecutor asked Devane whether the apparently 
visible "C" corresponded with the pattern on the defendant's 
jacket, the judge did not allow Devane to answer, explaining 
that the jury had to reach their own conclusion on that issue. 
40 
 
particular vantage points of the different cameras in that 
system, and had reviewed the video surveillance footage 
"countless times," in his words.  Finally, given the obviously 
grainy quality of the still image and the limited focus of 
Devane's testimony, the jury would have understood that they 
would have to scrutinize the still image carefully themselves 
and draw their own conclusions. 
 
We need not decide, however, whether admitting Devane's 
testimony regarding the still images taken from the post office 
surveillance video was in error because the testimony did not 
prejudice the defendant; still less did it create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Here, a single 
detective described what the still images at issue depicted, 
without at any point actually identifying the defendant as the 
individual seen in them.  This stands in stark contrast to the 
facts of Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 476-477, where four police 
officers gave identification testimony regarding surveillance 
footage.  There, we found that as a cumulative effect of the 
four officers' testimonies, a juror might have "substituted the 
officers' opinions for his or her own."  Id. at 477.  Devane's 
limited testimony here would not have had a similar effect.  
Accordingly, even if Devane's testimony regarding the enlarged 
version of the still image should not have been admitted, 
because the testimony likely had only a slight effect on the 
41 
 
jury and thus did not substantially sway them, admitting the 
testimony was not prejudicial error.  A fortiori, Devane's 
testimony in relation to the original still image did not create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
b.  Opinion testimony as to the defendant's guilt.  The 
defendant argues that when Devane observed that the individual 
depicted in the enlarged still image with an arm outstretched in 
a shooting posture had a "C" on the chest area, Devane was 
opining that the defendant was the shooter, because the 
Commonwealth had introduced evidence that the defendant was 
wearing a jacket with Champion brand logos on the chest area on 
the day of the shooting.  This, the defendant contends, was 
opinion testimony as to the issue of his guilt or innocence, 
which was inadmissible given that "[n]o witness, including a 
police witness, may testify as to a defendant's guilt or 
innocence."  Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 439 
(2011), citing Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 162 
(1982).  We conclude that Devane did not testify regarding the 
issue of the defendant's guilt, or even come close to doing so. 
Devane's testimony that, in examining the still image 
showing an individual with his right arm extended outward, his 
focus was on a potentially identifying design on the 
individual's jacket shown in the still, was proper.  As we noted 
supra, in giving this testimony, Devane did not directly 
42 
 
identify the defendant as the individual seen in the image, nor 
did he even express the view that the clothes the individual 
could be seen wearing matched the clothes that the defendant was 
found wearing on the day of the shooting.  For that reason, the 
testimony at issue did not identify the defendant as the shooter 
and accordingly was not inadmissible as testimony as to the 
defendant's guilt or innocence. 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a full review 
of the record, we discern no error or other reason warranting 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.