Case Title: The People v. Dzemil Balic The People v. Tyrone Mingo

Citation: 

Docket Number: Case No. 94

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 94  
The People &c., 
            Respondent,
        v. 
Tyrone Mingo,
            Appellant.
-------------------------------
No. 95  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Dzemil Balic, 
            Appellant.
Case No. 94:
Susan Epstein, for appellant.
Anthea H. Bruffee, for respondent.
James Ching, amicus curiae.
Case No. 95:
Amy Donner, for appellant.
Dana Poole, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In these appeals, we address what constitutes "reliable
hearsay" that is admissible for purposes of determining the
appropriate risk level of a sex offender under the Sex Offender
Registration Act (SORA).  In People v Mingo, we conclude that,
with the proper foundation, internal documents generated by the
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No. 94, 95
1 Defendant, who was among the class of sex offenders who
were incarcerated, on parole or on probation when SORA became
effective in January 1996, was afforded a redetermination hearing
as a result of a settlement in federal litigation that involved a
challenge to the procedures used to determine sex offenders'
initial risk level determinations (see Doe v Pataki, 3 F Supp 2d
456 [SDNY 1998]).
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District Attorney's office may support a risk level adjudication
but, since Supreme Court did not require such a foundation, we
reverse and remit to afford the District Attorney's office an
opportunity to supply that proof.  We affirm the determination in
People v Balic because the Appellate Division did not err in
designating defendant a level two risk based on a victim's
statement included in a criminal court complaint prepared by a
police officer under oath.
People v Tyrone Mingo
In 1990, defendant Tyrone Mingo pleaded guilty to rape
in the first degree in satisfaction of a series of charges
relating to a 1988 incident in which he pulled a stranger into an
abandoned van and raped her.  The victim managed to escape and
flag down a passing police officer and defendant was arrested at
the scene.  At a SORA redetermination hearing in February 2006,1
defendant was adjudicated a level two risk -- that is, a moderate
risk of re-offense -- based, in part, on the assessment of 30
points under factor one of the Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI)
for having been armed with a dangerous instrument at the time of
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No. 94, 95
2 A risk assessment instrument (RAI) is prepared by the
District Attorney or the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders to
assist the court in its classification of the risk defendant
poses to the community.  The RAI contains a series of factors
that permit the assignment of specified point values depending on
the characteristics of the victim, the circumstances surrounding
the crime, a defendant's prior history of sexual offenses, and
the like.  Point totals under the RAI presumptively place a
person convicted of a qualifying sex offense in one of three
categories -- level one, low risk of re-offense (1 to 70 points);
level two, moderate risk of re-offense (75 to 105 points); and
level three, high risk of re-offense (110 to 300 points).  There
are also override factors that warrant a level three designation
no matter the point totals.  In addition, the level suggested by
the RAI is merely presumptive and a SORA court possesses the
discretion to impose a lower or higher risk level if it concludes
that the factors in the RAI instrument do not result in an
appropriate designation. 
3 Defendant's guilty plea to rape in the first degree --
which required an admission that defendant engaged in "forcible
compulsion" (see Penal Law § 130.35[1]) -- did not establish that
defendant was armed.  Forcible compulsion involves the use of
physical force or a threat that places a person in fear of
immediate death or physical injury (Penal Law § 130.00[8]),
either of which could have been accomplished without a weapon.  
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the rape.2  To establish defendant's possession of a dangerous
instrument, the District Attorney relied on three documents that
are apparently used internally by the District Attorney's office:
a Data Analysis Form, a Grand Jury Synopsis Sheet and an Early
Case Assessment Bureau Data Sheet.3  Various entries on these
forms indicated that, in the course of the incident, defendant
had threatened the victim with a "chrome strip" or "piece of
metal" -- a dangerous instrument.  
Defense counsel objected to the District Attorney's
reliance on these unsworn, unsigned documents, contending they
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did not constitute "reliable hearsay" under Correction Law 
§ 168-n(3) and were therefore inadmissible at the SORA
proceeding.  Defendant did not, however, testify at the hearing,
nor did he offer any evidence rebutting the dangerous instrument
allegations.  Without requiring the People to offer foundation
evidence, Supreme Court relied on the documents, along with the
indictment charging defendant with a weapon possession offense,
to sustain the assessment of 30 points.  This brought defendant
within the moderate risk category (75 to 105 points) and the
court therefore adjudicated defendant a level two offender. 
Absent the assessment of 30 points, defendant would have fallen
within the presumptive level one, low risk category.  
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the level two
designation, concurring with Supreme Court that the internal
documents of the District Attorney's office constituted reliable
hearsay admissible at a SORA proceeding.  The dissent did not
rule out the possibility that the documents could support a point
assessment but was troubled by the District Attorney's failure to
lay a foundation to support the inference that the victim was the
source of the information contained in the documents.  Thus, the
dissent would have reversed and remitted the case to the SORA
court for further proceedings.  This Court granted defendant
leave to appeal and, like the Appellate Division dissenter, we
conclude that a reversal and remittal is warranted.
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No. 94, 95
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People v Dzemil Balic
Dzemil Balic pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the
first degree based on a 2004 incident in which he forcibly
fondled the breasts and buttocks of a woman who attended classes
in a building where he worked as a custodian.  In the RAI
prepared for the SORA proceeding, the District Attorney assessed
defendant 40 points under the prior convictions section as a
result of a 1985 misdemeanor assault conviction that occurred
when defendant was 19 years old.  The People imposed 10 points
for factor eight since defendant's age at the time of that
offense was 20 years or less and 30 points for factor nine
because it viewed the 1985 crime as a prior "sex crime."  Absent
the inclusion of these points, defendant's point assessment would
have resulted in presumptive level one, the low risk category.  
Since the elements of misdemeanor assault do not
require conduct of a sexual nature (see Penal Law § 120.00[1]),
at the SORA hearing the District Attorney relied on the criminal
complaint filed in connection with the prior 1985 prosecution,
which had culminated in defendant entering a guilty plea.  The
criminal complaint was signed under oath by a police officer who
stated that, on the day of the crime, the victim -- a 14-year-old
girl identified by name -- told the officer that defendant had
forcibly fondled her, attempted to remove her clothes, and
threatened that he would shoot her unless she did as he said. 
The People had attempted to locate other information regarding
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No. 94, 95
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the 1985 assault, twice obtaining an adjournment to search for
additional evidence, but discovered that all other relevant
documents had been destroyed by fire or flood.
Defense counsel objected to the assessment of 40
points, arguing that the references to "sexual misconduct" and
"sex crime" in factors eight and nine required that defendant
have a prior conviction of one of the sex offenses enumerated in
SORA and misdemeanor assault did not qualify.  In the
alternative, defendant asserted that the criminal complaint was
insufficient proof that the assault involved acts of a sexual
nature.  Supreme Court rejected both arguments, adjudicating
defendant a level two offender.  The court noted that, even if it
credited defendant's argument that the provisions relied on in
the criminal history section of the RAI required a prior sex
offense conviction and the point values therefore rendered
defendant a presumptive level one risk, an upward departure to
level two would be appropriate given the sexual nature of the
1985 attack.
On defendant's appeal, the People conceded that it had
been improper to assess 40 points for defendant's 1985
misdemeanor assault offense, acknowledging that the SORA
Guidelines indicate points should be assessed under the factors
relied on only when a defendant has been convicted of a prior sex
offense or endangering the welfare of a child.  Defendant should
instead have received only 5 points under factor nine for having
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No. 94, 95
4  In Mingo, defendant pleaded guilty to rape in the first
degree under Penal Law § 130.35.  The defendant in Balic was
convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree under Penal Law 
§ 130.65.  Both of these crimes are "sexually violent offenses"
under SORA (Corr. Law § 168-a[3], [7][b]).  It appears from the
briefs that, by virtue of a federal lawsuit, Mingo's commission
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prior criminal convictions that were neither sex crimes nor
felonies.  Even though the disallowance of 35 points brought
defendant within the presumptive level one range under the RAI,
the District Attorney maintained that the level two designation
should be affirmed because an upward modification was appropriate
given the nature of the conduct underlying defendant's 1985
conviction.  The Appellate Division agreed with the District
Attorney, reasoning that the RAI did not take into account
defendant's prior violent sexual attack on a child, and we now
affirm.
SORA Risk Level Determinations   
SORA requires individuals convicted of sex offenses to
register with law enforcement officials and authorizes the
dissemination of certain information about those individuals to
vulnerable populations and the public.  The length of time that
an offender must register may turn on the crime for which the
offender was convicted or the offender's previous criminal
history.  For example, since 2002, SORA has compelled a defendant
convicted of a "sexually violent offense" to register at least
annually for life (Corr. Law § 168-h[2]; see Corr. Law 
§ 168-a[3][a], [7][b]; L 2002, ch 11, § 13).4  The same is true
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No. 94, 95
of a sexually violent offense may not automatically render him
subject to lifetime registration (see generally Doe v Pataki, 481
F3d 69 [2d Cir 2007]). 
5  Level two offenders who are not sexually violent
offenders, sexual predators or predicate sex offenders can apply
to be relieved of the duty to register after 30 years (Corr. Law
§ 168-h[2]). 
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of a predicate sex offender -- a person who is convicted of a sex
offense or sexually violent offense after having previously been
convicted of such an offense (Corr. Law § 168-a[7][c]; Corr. Law
§ 168-h[2]).  But for others, the registration period depends on
the risk level designation that is assigned at the SORA
proceeding -- level one, evidencing a low risk of re-offense,
level two, a moderate risk, and level three, a high risk. 
Individuals determined to have the lowest risk of re-offense --
level one offenders -- are relieved of the duty to register after
20 years while level two and three offenders must register at
least once each year for life (Corr. Law § 168-h).5  
SORA also contains community notification and
disclosure provisions that vary depending on risk level
designation.  As a result of the 2006 amendments to SORA, law
enforcement agencies can disseminate information relating to
level one offenders to vulnerable populations and the public --
just as they are authorized to do with level two and three
offenders, except that the statute authorizes release of exact
addresses only for level three offenders (see Corr. Law § 168-
l[6]).  The public can obtain information about level one
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No. 94, 95
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offenders by calling a toll-free telephone number maintained by
the Department of Correctional Services (Corr. Law § 168-p[1];
information relating to level two and three offenders is also
publically available on an internet directory (see Corr. Law 
§ 168-q[1]).
A defendant's risk level is adjudicated at a SORA
hearing, which is civil in nature (see People v Windham, 10 NY3d
801 [2008]; Matter of North v Board of Examiners of Sex
Offenders, 8 NY3d 745, 752 [2007]).  Correction Law § 168-n(3)
directs that "[t]he State shall appear by the district attorney .
. . who shall bear the burden of proving the facts supporting the
determinations sought by clear and convincing evidence" (see also
Corr. Law § 168-d[3]).  In determining the appropriate risk
level, "the court shall review any victim's statement and any
relevant materials and evidence submitted by the sex offender and
the district attorney and the recommendation and any materials
submitted by the board, and may consider reliable hearsay
evidence submitted by either party, provided that it is relevant
to the determinations" (Corr. Law § 168-n[3]; see also, Corr. Law
§ 168-d[3]).  The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders has
explained that the information used to determine defendant's risk
level "can be derived from the sex offender's admissions; the
victim's statements; the evaluative reports of the supervising
probation officer, parole officer or corrections counselor; or
from any other reliable source" (Guidelines of the Board of
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No. 94, 95
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Examiners of Sex Offenders, General Principles, paragraph 7 at 5
[2006]).  Beyond this, neither the Legislature nor the Board of
Examiners of Sex Offenders have further specified the types of
evidentiary materials admissible in a SORA proceeding.  But one
thing is undisputed -- the Legislature did not limit the proof to
what would be admissible at a civil or criminal trial. 
Defendants suggest that this Court apply the standards
developed in other administrative and preliminary hearing
contexts to fashion an admissibility standard, such as the multi-
factored analysis employed in federal disability benefits cases
(see e.g. Richardson v Perales, 402 US 389 [1971]) or the
Aguilar-Spinelli test used by New York courts to assess whether
there was probable cause for a search or arrest (see People v
Hetrick, 80 NY2d 344 [1992]).  While the approaches taken in
these other spheres are certainly helpful in identifying factors
relevant to our analysis, SORA proceedings further an important
and unique public safety function and we therefore decline to
adopt wholesale a body of evidentiary rules developed in another
context.
Reliable Hearsay
To determine a standard of admissibility for risk level
determination hearings, we begin by reviewing the evidence New
York courts have consistently deemed reliable in SORA
proceedings.  The Appellate Divisions have routinely upheld
determinations based on information found in case summaries
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No. 94, 95
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prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders and
presentence reports prepared by a probation department for use by
sentencing courts (see e.g. People v Lewis, 45 AD3d 1381 [4th
Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 703 [2008]; People v Craig, 45 AD3d
1365 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 702 [2008]; People v
Ahlers, 10 AD3d 770 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 704 [2005];
People v Burgess, 6 AD3d 686 [2d Dept], lv denied 3 NY3d 604
[2004]; People v Dorato, 291 AD2d 580 [3d Dept 2002]).  The Board
of Examiners of Sex Offenders is charged with producing accurate
case summaries as an integral part of its functions and it has
expertise culling through records to produce a concise statement
of the factual information relevant to defendant's risk of re-
offense.  Similarly, to assist the court in imposing an
appropriate sentence, probation departments are charged with
gathering a wide variety of information for inclusion in
presentence reports -- reports that "may well be the single most
important document at both the sentencing and correctional levels
of the criminal process" (People v Hicks, 98 NY2d 185, 189 [2002]
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).  
Case summaries and presentence reports are prepared
with the knowledge that they will be relied on by courts.  No
foundation is necessary for their consideration at SORA hearings
because such documents are created under statutory mandates and
their origins and function are well-known to SORA courts (see
e.g. People v Fiene, 56 AD3d 921 [3d Dept 2008] [no testimony was
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No. 94, 95
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required to explain the uses of the RAI, the presentence
investigation report or the case summary]).  Of course,
information found in a case summary or presentence report need
not always be credited -- it may be rejected when it is unduly
speculative or its accuracy is undermined by other more
compelling evidence.  But case summaries and presentence reports
certainly meet the "reliable hearsay" standard for admissibility
at SORA proceedings.  
Similarly, Grand Jury testimony has been deemed
sufficiently trustworthy for SORA purposes (see e.g. People v
Imbert, 48 AD3d 297 [1st Dept], lv denied 10 NY3d 714 [2008];
People v Concepcion, 38 AD3d 739 [2d Dept], lv denied 9 NY3d 801
[2007]; People v Dort, 18 AD3d 23 [3d Dept], lv denied 4 NY3d 885
[2005]).  Although not subject to cross-examination, this
evidence is taken under oath, a significant, though not
indispensable, indication of reliability.  Other sworn documents
have also been consistently accepted by SORA courts, including
misdemeanor and felony complaints (see People v Moore, 16 AD3d
190 [1st Dept], lv denied 4 NY3d 889 [2005]; People v Conway, 47
AD3d 492 [1st Dept], lv denied 10 NY3d 708 [2008]).  Similar to
case summaries and presentence reports, no foundation is
necessary to justify receipt of this type of evidence at a SORA
hearing because the circumstances surrounding the development of
the proof is evident from the face of the document and is well-
understood by a SORA court.
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No. 94, 95
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With this in mind, we turn to the purpose underlying
SORA -- to protect the public from sex offenders.  Given the
significance of the mission, an accurate determination of the
risk a sex offender poses to the public is the paramount concern. 
We conclude that hearsay is reliable for SORA purposes -- and,
therefore, admissible -- if, based on the circumstances
surrounding the development of the proof, a reasonable person
would deem it trustworthy.  
It is impossible to list the types of evidence that
will meet this standard because the proof will vary depending on
the circumstances of the case.  If the District Attorney is
relying on facts relating to a prior conviction that involved a
trial, the sources relied on at the SORA proceeding will likely
be different than would be the case if a defendant had waived
indictment and pleaded guilty.  A higher quality of proof may be
expected where the proof relates to a criminal case that was
recently adjudicated versus one that was resolved decades ago. 
Among the factors considered in evaluating the reliability of
proffered hearsay evidence are the age of the conviction and the
efforts made to locate relevant documents; whether the proof is
corroborated either by the nature of the conviction or other
evidence in the record; whether the declarant was under oath or
was acting under a duty to accurately report, record or convey
information; and whether the circumstances surrounding the making
of the statement otherwise bear indicia of reliability.  SORA
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No. 94, 95
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courts must have the flexibility to make reliability
determinations on a case-by-case basis.  
Since accuracy is the goal, the District Attorney
should proffer the best evidence available to illuminate the
relevant facts, with the caveat that the Legislature did not
contemplate that victims of sex crimes be compelled to appear and
testify under oath at SORA proceedings.  As the New Jersey
Supreme Court has observed, such a requirement would undermine
the practice often utilized by prosecutors of entering guilty
pleas in cases involving sex crimes to avoid putting the victim
through the trauma of a criminal trial (see Matter of Registrant
C.A., 146 NJ 71, 97-98 [1996]).
Mingo: The District Attorney's Office Documents
Applying this standard to the internal District
Attorney's office documents in Mingo, the evidence used to
establish that defendant was armed with a dangerous instrument at
the time of the rape may have constituted "reliable hearsay" but
the record is presently insufficient to determine that this is
the case.  It appears that the District Attorney's inability to
locate other types of proof, such as Grand Jury testimony,
stemmed from the fact that the offense was committed almost 20
years ago.  Defendant did not argue at the SORA proceeding that
the District Attorney failed to undertake a diligent search for
additional records or was not proffering the best available
evidence.  
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No. 94, 95
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As the People argue, internal documents generated by a
prosecuting agency share similarities with case summaries and
presentence reports in that all are prepared in furtherance of a
governmental function.  The District Attorney's office documents
may be reliable for reasons similar to the business records
exception to the hearsay rule, that is "records systematically
made for the conduct of a business are inherently highly
trustworthy because they are routine reflections of day-to-day
operations and because the entrant's obligation is to have them
truthful and accurate for purposes of the conduct of the
enterprise" (People v Rawlins, 10 NY3d 136, 150 [2008][internal
quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Cratsley, 86
NY2d 81, 88-91 [1995]).  It may well be that these forms are
generally produced based on information supplied by the victim,
the arresting officer or some other knowledgeable witness under
circumstances bearing indicia of reliability.
But the documents relied on here differ in at least one
significant respect from case summaries and presentence reports.
Since SORA courts are aware of how case summaries and presentence
reports are prepared and, in fact, these documents are generated
with knowledge that they will be submitted to and relied on by
courts, foundation testimony is unnecessary to establish their
admissibility.  But the same is not true with respect to the
unsworn, internal District Attorney's office documents proffered
in Mingo.  Some explanation of how these documents are generated,
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No. 94, 95
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the personnel who prepared them, the sources typically relied
upon for the information contained therein, and the function they
served is needed before they can be viewed as trustworthy. 
Furthermore, where the documents contain a code or shorthand not
readily interpreted by the court, this should be deciphered on
the record to assist the court and facilitate appellate review. 
For example, in a brief submitted in this Court, the District
Attorney explains some of the notations appearing on the Early
Case Assessment Bureau form, indicating that they reveal the
sources of the information contained on the form.  This type of
basic information should be presented at the SORA proceeding,
either through a pre-hearing affirmation, an offer of proof, or
by testimony from a witness with knowledge of the internal
procedures of the District Attorney's office. 
We do not suggest that any formal incantation, such as
the recitation typically preceding the admission of a business
record under CPLR 4518, is required.  Nor will it be necessary in
every case for the District Attorney to call a witness to supply
the requisite foundation.  But, in Mingo, since the SORA court
accepted the forms used by the District Attorney's office without
requiring foundation evidence of any type, the record contains no
information supplying the requisite indicia of reliability. 
Hence, this case should be remitted to the SORA court to provide
the District Attorney an opportunity to establish a foundation
supporting the documents' admissibility.  Defendant remains free
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to rebut the District Attorney's proffer and the SORA court will
determine whether the documents are sufficiently trustworthy to
constitute "reliable hearsay" based on the considerations
identified above. 
Balic: The Criminal Complaint
Remittal is unnecessary in Balic since the criminal
complaint was a sworn statement created by a police officer with
a duty to report.  Here, the record supports the conclusion that
the document constituted reliable hearsay.  The source of the
information in the complaint is clear; the police officer
indicates that he is recounting statements made by the child
victim on the same day as the crime.  Needless to say, a police
officer is charged with the duty to accurately record statements
made by a complaining witness -- and nothing in this record
suggests that the officer did not fulfill this command.  
Defendant argues that the document is unreliable
because, although the police officer was under oath, the
complainant was not.  Thus, defendant suggests that SORA courts
can consider only sworn victim statements.  We find this
assertion to be inconsistent with the broad statutory language
directing the court to consider "any victim statement" (Corr. Law
§ 168-n[3] [emphasis added]).  The Legislature's decision not to
restrict the proof to sworn statements recognizes that there are
circumstances when a sworn statement of the victim is unavailable
either due to the victim's age or mental capacity, or the early
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resolution of the case by a waiver of indictment and guilty plea. 
Moreover, as these appeals demonstrate, sometimes sworn
statements cannot be located due to the age of the conviction and
the unintentional loss or destruction of documents.  Courts in
other jurisdictions with comparable regulatory schemes have
similarly determined that victim statements can be relied on even
if not made under oath (see Matter of Registrant C.A., supra, 146
NJ 71 [victim statements recounted in police and medical reports
constituted reliable hearsay]; Doe v Sex Offender Registry Bd.,
70 Mass App Ct 309 [App Ct of Suffolk 2007], review denied 450
Mass 1110 [2008] [court did not err in relying on victim
statement recounted in police report]).  Of course, where an
unsworn statement is equivocal, inconsistent with other evidence,
or seems dubious in light of other information in the record, a
SORA court is free to disregard it.  
But, in Balic, there is no basis to set aside the
determination that the criminal complaint was sufficiently
reliable to render it admissible at the risk level proceeding. 
Moreover, we reject defendant's assertion that the District
Attorney failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence burden
of proof, particularly since defendant did not actually
controvert the allegations of sexual assault by offering a
contrary account of the 1985 incident and defendant's guilty plea
confirmed that defendant physically assaulted the victim,
partially corroborating the information in the criminal
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No. 94, 95
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complaint.  We therefore decline to disturb Balic's level two
designation.
Accordingly, in People v Mingo, the order of the
Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the
case remitted to Supreme Court for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion; in People v Balic, the order of the Appellate
Division should be affirmed, without costs.  
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Case No. 94:  Order reversed, without costs, and case remitted to
Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion herein.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.
Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief
Judge Lippman took no part.
Case No. 95:  Order affirmed, without costs.  Opinion by Judge
Graffeo.  Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided June 9, 2009