Case Title: Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Strong

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110573

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 110,573 
 
KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
A Missouri Corporation, 
Appellant/Cross-appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL E. STRONG, Trustee, or Any Successor Trustee, 
Under the DANIEL E. STRONG TRUST 
Dated March 11, 2008, as May Be Amended, et al., 
Appellees/Cross-appellants. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
By its plain language, K.S.A. 26-513(c) establishes a compensation formula with 
two variables:  (1) the fair market value of the property pre-taking, less; (2) the value of 
the remainder. The statute then defines and describes the legally necessary evidence to 
prove up each variable. 
 
2. 
 
The first variable, the pre-taking fair market value, must be proved "by use of the 
comparable sales, cost or capitalization of income appraisal methods or any combination 
of such methods." K.S.A. 26-513(e).  
 
3. 
 
The second variable, the value of the remainder, may be shown by applying any of 
the nonexclusive list of adjustment factors set forth in K.S.A. 26-513(d), which, if shown, 
can prove the reduced value of the post-taking remainder. 
 
2 
 
 
 
4.  
 
The plain language of K.S.A. 26-513 creates a simple and straightforward way to 
determine and prove up the proper compensation for a partial taking. Within that 
framework, appellate courts will not second guess the specific evidentiary decisions of 
the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.  
 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; PAUL C. GURNEY, judge. Opinion filed August 28, 2015. 
Affirmed. 
 
Daniel L. McClain, of The McClain Law Firm, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause 
and was on the briefs for appellant/cross-appellee.  
 
John M. Duggan, of Duggan Shadwick Doerr & Kurlbaum LLC, of Overland Park, argued the 
cause, and Matthew L. Heffner and Charles R. Stinson, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for 
appellees/cross-appellants. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STEGALL J.:  In January 2012, Kansas City Power & Light Company (KCPL) 
condemned a power line easement bisecting two tracts of undeveloped agricultural land 
in southern Johnson County. The land was owned by the trusts for Daniel and Evelyn 
Strong (the Strongs). The easement occupied approximately 12 out of a combined 460 
acres. Court-appointed appraisers awarded the Strongs $96,465 in damages. The Strongs 
appealed. At trial, the jury awarded the Strongs $1,922,559 as compensation for the 
taking. KCPL then appealed directly to this court pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 26-504.  
 
KCPL asserts three claims of error below. First, KCPL claims the district court 
erred in denying its repeated motions to exclude or strike the expert testimony evidence 
offered by the Strongs. KCPL argued below, and reprises the argument on appeal, that 
3 
 
 
 
the evidence was inadmissible pursuant to K.S.A. 26-513(e). Next, KCPL alleges the 
district court improperly permitted the Strongs' experts to testify pursuant to an 
alternative, nonstatutory "development approach" without first laying a foundation that 
development of the property was imminent. Finally, KCPL claims the district court erred 
in admitting evidence regarding a 2004 option contract the Strongs entered into with a 
developer. 
 
The Strongs cross-appealed from certain unfavorable evidentiary rulings, but 
because we find the lower court did not err in admitting any of the evidence KCPL 
objects to, we do not reach the issues raised by the Strongs' cross-appeal. As such, we 
affirm the jury award and the judgment of the district court below.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
KCPL's Motion in Limine 
 
Prior to trial, KCPL filed a motion in limine asserting numerous evidentiary 
challenges. Relevant to this appeal, the motion sought to exclude the opinion testimony 
of the Strongs' expert witnesses and any exhibits showing hypothetical subdivision plans. 
KCPL also sought to exclude from evidence a purchase option contract for the sale of the 
Strongs' property to R.H. Sailors, a developer. The district court granted the motion as to 
the option contract but denied KCPL's motion with respect to the Strongs' experts' 
opinions and exhibits.  
 
KCPL's Expert Testimony 
 
At trial, KCPL presented expert testimony from two appraisers—Laird 
Goldsborough and Kenneth Jaggers. Goldsborough testified that the property had a best 
and highest use of agricultural land with a speculative investment premium. He noted that 
4 
 
 
 
"[s]peculative holding is the consideration that at some point in the future [the land] will 
likely be developed into something else." Goldsborough believed the property would 
eventually be developed. He testified that the speculative investment premium was worth 
more than the pure agricultural value of the land. Considering this, Goldsborough arrived 
at a precondemnation fair market value of $3,501,866.  
 
In Goldsborough's opinion, the easement did not cause any damage to the property 
because it would not affect farming operations. Therefore, to arrive at his appraisal of the 
land after the taking, he simply subtracted the value of the taken acreage. In 
Goldsborough's opinion, the easement reduced the value of the Strongs' land by $94,678. 
 
KCPL's second expert, Kenneth Jaggers, produced similar testimony. Like 
Goldsborough, Jaggers valued the land as agricultural property with an investment 
premium due to the likelihood of development at some point in the future. Jaggers used 
comparable sales of similarly situated properties—agriculture property with speculative 
value—to determine the fair market value of the land prior to the taking. Jaggers testified 
he did not compare sales of farmland with no speculative value, explaining, "I'm sure no 
farmer would buy [the Strongs' land] solely to farm" and that any buyer would do so on a 
speculative basis. Based on these comparable sales, adjusted for size, location, and other 
factors, Jaggers testified the pre-taking value of the land was a combined $4,744,300 for 
both tracts. 
 
Again like Goldsborough, Jaggers opined that "there was no diminution in value to 
the subject property after acquisition of the easement" and the easement caused no 
damage to the remainder of the property. Deducting the acreage affected by the easement 
from his calculations, Jaggers testified that the post-taking value of the property was 
$4,615,900—amounting to a $128,400 loss suffered by the Strongs.  
 
5 
 
 
 
The Strongs' Expert Testimony 
 
The Strongs built their case around the testimony of two experts—James Lambie 
and Troy Smith—and three exhibits (numbered 260-A, 260-B, and 260-C) showing a 
hypothetical concept development that could be built on the property. Exhibit 260-A 
demonstrated what a subdivision might look like without the KCPL easement while 
exhibits 260-B and 260-C depicted two alternative arrangements of lots accommodating 
the KCPL easement. Both exhibits 260-B and 260-C incorporated setbacks between the 
developed lots and the power lines. Daniel Strong testified that exhibits 260-A through C 
were prepared for trial and the subdivision was entirely hypothetical. He admitted the 
land had not been presented to any municipality for annexation.  
 
Lambie is a homebuilder and developer in Johnson County. He testified that his 
opinions were formed as a developer, taking into consideration the factors a developer 
looking to purchase and build on the Strongs' land would consider. Lambie agreed that 
farm income alone would not be sufficient to economically justify paying fair market 
value for the Strongs' property. He said that in working up an offer to purchase land with 
an investment premium, a developer such as himself would utilize a concept plan tailored 
to the property such as contained in exhibits 260-A through C. According to Lambie, a 
developer wants to know, first and foremost, the available acreage for lot placement 
within any tract. He testified that utility easements always reduce such available acreage 
and that lots adjacent to power lines are always the last to sell. In fact, according to 
Lambie, such lots required a price discount of between 50 and 55 percent to sell. Lambie 
testified that if faced with 110-feet tall power line poles on a 70-foot wide easement, such 
as KCPL's, he would not develop lots all the way to the edge of the easement but would 
build in a sizable setback.  
 
6 
 
 
 
Lambie opined that from a developer's perspective, the value of the land prior to 
the taking was $15,000 per acre for a total fictional purchase price of $6.9 million. 
However, Lambie believed the KCPL easement would reduce the amount a developer 
would be willing to pay for the land by $3,680,972 due both to the raw reduction in the 
aggregate number of lots and to the required discount factor that would be applied to 
some of the developed lots.  
 
On cross-examination Lambie admitted that he was not an appraiser and that he 
was unfamiliar with appraisal techniques. In forming his opinions, he stated that he relied 
on the concept plans presented in exhibits 260-A through C. Lambie then stated that his 
damage calculation was not a true valuation but instead represented the amount of money 
a developer would require the Strongs to discount the selling price for their property as a 
result of the KCPL easement.  
 
Further, Lambie admitted he was unfamiliar with Kansas statutes governing 
valuation of property in eminent domain cases. Lambie admitted that he did not realize 
that K.S.A. 26-513(e) required that fair market value be determined by the use of 
comparable sales, costs, or capitalization of income methods or any combination of these 
methods. In fact, Lambie admitted that he did not know what the capitalization of income 
method was, nor did he know how to perform a cost appraisal method. While Lambie did 
know the comparable sales method due to his experience as a realtor, he did not perform 
a comparable sales analysis on the property. Instead, Lambie stated that "I went by what I 
typically have paid for property in the ground and what I know I can pay to make the 
numbers work." He also stated that he did not take into account location, use of property, 
or natural features found on the property as opposed to other properties he had bought to 
develop. Finally, Lambie admitted his valuation was based upon the date of his report, 
January 2013, and not the date of the taking.  
 
7 
 
 
 
At this point, KCPL asked to approach the bench. KCPL's counsel moved to strike 
Lambie's testimony, arguing: 
 
"I know the timing of this is a bit odd and I would ordinarily wait until I've concluded my 
cross, but I don't believe this expert is qualified to offer opinions regarding the valuation 
of this property in this case for several reasons. 
 
 
"Number 1, he's admitted he's not competent and doesn't understand the appraisal 
requirements. Number 2, he's admitted that he didn't follow any of the three required 
methods specified by the Kansas statute. And last, there are two parts in this case, two 
separate tracts of land. He made no attempt whatsoever to distinguish between the two. 
 
 
"We believe it's required, when you submit this case to the jury, at that time they 
separately identify both tracts, the exact value for each tract, which he cannot do.  
 
 
"So we believe that its appropriate to strike this expert's testimony."  
 
After hearing arguments from counsel, the district judge ruled: 
 
"All right, I'm not going to strike him at this juncture. All right. And I don't know all the 
evidence, both when we're done with him and all the examinations from both sides where 
we're going to stand. 
 
 
"I also don't know what additional expert testimony or information is going to be 
provided by [the Strongs'] experts, whether it will tie things up or create a problem with 
respect to what the intent of the use of this testimony is. I mean, he's testified to a lot of 
things. So—some of which I think have a lot of bearing on this case. 
 
 
"But I agree with you to the extent there are some concerns I have in terms of the 
scope and extent to which his testimony is intended to be used, but I don't know that until 
I hear all the evidence, so I'm not going to strike him."  
 
8 
 
 
 
Troy Smith was the Strongs' second expert. Smith is an appraiser and testified that 
he followed K.S.A. 26-513 to determine the value of the Strongs' property as of the 
taking. Smith opined that the highest and best use of the land was future single family 
residential development with an interim agricultural use. Smith testified this was 
consistent with the overall master plan of the surrounding municipalities, which informed 
his determination. Smith noted that farm income alone could never economically justify 
the fair market value of the property testified to by Jaggers. In Smith's opinion, the 
agricultural value of the property was simply an ancillary and interim benefit available 
for a limited time until the land could be developed as a single family residential 
subdivision.  
 
During his direct examination, Smith testified that he spoke with Lambie and 
consulted Lambie's report in order to understand how a developer approaches purchasing 
agricultural land for future development. As Strongs' counsel began to question Smith 
about exhibit 260-A, KCPL objected. KCPL argued that Smith was relying on Lambie's 
opinions and Lambie had admitted he did not use a statutorily approved appraisal method 
to arrive at a fair market value of the land. KCPL also argued that Lambie had admitted 
the hypothetical subdivision would not be built in the near future and thus exhibits 260-A 
through C and Smith's testimony were speculative and inadmissible.  
 
After hearing from Strongs' counsel, the judge stated: 
 
 
"THE COURT:  The first issue. Essentially, as I understand, you're asking me 
to—to preclude [Smith] from testifying. I mean, you're not making an objection to his 
specific question, correct? 
 
 
"[KCPL]:  Your Honor, that's fair, at least to the extent he's relying on the 
unreliable Lambie analysis. 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Well, I think, as [the Strongs] pointed out and 
consistent with my review of the law, first of all, starting from the statutes, it isn't 
exhaustive when you talk about the three approaches that are taken. And then what the 
Kansas Supreme Court, in terms of developmental use and how that fits squarely under 
the three approaches, to the extent it does or doesn't, the Supreme Court has at least 
allowed that concept to be utilized, again, depending upon the case and whether the 
situation warrants it. 
 
 
"And so in terms of what I'm gathering, and I haven't had the benefit of 
reviewing the expert reports and their depositions as far as Mr. Smith, so I can't say with 
certainty where its going to go, but I think he—if he's qualified as an expert, once he's 
qualified in terms of what he utilizes, right or wrong, as an expert, unless it's absolutely 
baseless, then we're going into a different situation, but I think an expert once he's 
qualified in the field of condemnation, when you're talking about appraisals and 
evaluations of land values, I think he's got pretty broad range. And it's not for me to start 
picking apart what he should or should not be considering.  
 
 
"So, again, I'm jumping ahead because I don't know all the testimony that's going 
to come in, and I'm not suggesting that if you got, as we're going through the testimony, a 
specific problem with something that's being asked based upon any factors that you think 
are improper, I'll entertain those, but I think at this juncture, as I understand that question 
posed to me and the issue, I'm not going to preclude him from testifying.  
 
 
"So I think he's going to be allowed to testify."  
 
Following the court's ruling, KCPL inquired as to the state of its motion to strike 
Lambie's testimony:   
 
 
"[KCPL]:  Your honor, based on your ruling, shall we presume that the nature of 
your ruling with respect to our motion to strike Mr. Lambie's testimony—remember, we 
made that motion at the side bar, and I guess I'm just wondering if we should continue to 
10 
 
 
 
raise that—that motion at the end of the case or whether you've already forecast your 
ruling on that? 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, I didn't provide you with a ruling because it was made in 
the middle of his testimony, I think it was made in the middle of your examination of 
him. 
 
 
"[KCPL]:  Correct. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Some of this is dependent upon how much of a record you want 
to make. 
 
 
"I can't tell specifically because, again, you made an objection and it was a pretty 
broad objection. I would not expect there would be any dispute that a lot of his testimony 
would not be objectionable in terms of the scope and the relevancy. However, I don't 
know. It's for you to make the objection. 
 
 
"From what I could gather reading between the lines, and we did it pretty, I think 
the thrust of your objection wanting to strike was not necessarily his entire line of 
questioning— 
 
 
"[KCPL]:  That is correct. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  —but dealing specifically with some of the valuations that he 
placed. 
 
 
"[KCPL]:  You hit the nail right on the head. As far as his knowledge of sewers 
and whatnot, I don't care. The focus of my objection is on his testimony establishing—
purportedly establishing value for these tracts of the property.  
 
 
"And the argument is, is that it's inherently unreliable and established with, I 
believe, cross-examination, and its speculative. It's not based on the approved factors 
11 
 
 
 
authorized by the Kansas statutes, and therefore the jury should not have that 
information. 
 
 
"[The Strongs]:  That objection was waived when [KCPL] didn't make an 
objection when I laid the foundation and he testified on direct. You don't stand back and 
let somebody testify to all their evidence about their before and after values, and then 
after the fact say, oh, by the way, now that I know how he testified I want to move to 
strike. That's been waived, Judge. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Well, here's what I think all of you should do is if you 
want me to revisit this matter beyond what I have already ruled upon, and I—to a degree, 
I indicated, you know, we can bring this back up, I didn't want to stop the process 
because I wasn't inclined to grant your motion at the time it was made anyway. But if you 
want to bring it up you can provide me—I think you framed the two big issues that both 
sides believe are in play, present me with the information that supports your position. 
 
 
"The one thing I'll say, going back, as I was going over the case law and trying to 
familiarize myself with the scope of condemnation and what this trial was going to be all 
about, I think the Supreme Court in a variety of decisions at least invited—again, every 
case is going to be different, but in terms of a developmental aspect, if it could fit, based 
upon the evidence presented, I think at least the scope of that—and that's why originally 
in my motion in limine ruling I did not preclude the defendants from bringing in this 
evidence.  
 
 
"And I think one of the aspects of your objection here may be more specific than 
the general context, but as we get into the developmental approach in the future, 
providing there is requisite foundation that has been laid so it's not entirely speculative, 
then I think we're okay in allowing that frame of evidence to come in.  
 
 
"Ultimately, whether Mr. Lambie is qualified to have offered the specifics of 
what he—that's partially a different question, but I think it falls under that subset of the 
12 
 
 
 
context of the developmental approach, which is not a straight appraiser comparable. 
We're moving into a different area.  
 
 
"So I think I'm looking at a lot of different contexts in trying to bring them 
together. So we can revisit this specifically, but I think you know where I'm standing 
right now as it is." 
 
After this conference, the direct examination continued. Smith testified that in 
order to assess the fair market value of the property pre-taking, he used a comparable 
sales analysis, identifying sales of similar properties and adjusting for location, size, and 
other relevant factors. Using this methodology, Smith appraised the property at a fair 
market value of $4,442,730.  
 
In order to arrive at a damage figure—the reduced value of the property post-
taking—Smith testified that he applied a number of reductions and adjustments to the 
pre-taking fair market value based on the opinions of Lambie and his use of exhibit 260-
C. Smith noted that 178 lots had been removed from the concept plan due to the 
easement. He testified that the setbacks in exhibit 260-C were necessary to ameliorate the 
negative impacts of the easement and make the overall development economically 
feasible. In addition to having fewer lots to build on, Smith testified the easement would 
negatively affect the development as a whole due to factors such as aesthetics, view, and 
neighborhood cohesion (i.e., the easement would essentially cut any development in 
half). When discussing the economic discount necessary to account for these negatives, 
Smith testified that he conducted a comparable sales analysis using other residential lots 
near power line easements. Based on this, Smith opined that the typical discount would 
be between 25 and 30 percent, but he felt that 25 percent was a reasonable discount for 
this property.  
 
13 
 
 
 
Finally, Smith testified that he considered such overall factors as the impact the 
easement would have on the appearance of a subdivision, the impact on the view from the 
lots, and what factors a hypothetical purchaser, a developer, would consider when 
determining how much to offer to pay for the land after the power lines were installed. 
The final result of this valuations process yielded an after-taking value of $2,775,404—
approximately $1.67 million less than the land's pre-taking fair market value. 
 
The Sailors Contract 
 
During KCPL's presentation of evidence, Richard Alexander, a senior planning 
engineer at Johnson County Wastewater, testified about sewer availability in the area of 
the Strongs' property. On cross-examination, the Strongs' counsel asked Alexander if he 
remembered discussing forming a sewer district with Sailors. KCPL immediately 
objected, citing the court's ruling on its pretrial motion in limine.  
 
Upon hearing the objection, the district judge clarified his ruling, stating: 
 
 
"There is I think two parts of the ruling that presently exist with respect to the 
R.H. Sailors contract. One was limiting any discussion to any cost, amounts offered, 
accepted, any of that. And I ruled upon that and that ruling still stands.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"The other piece was the actual contract itself. And I said under the facts as 
presented, I don't think that contract should come in, and part and parcel was the price 
that was contained. And that was the extent of the ruling I made. 
 
 
"And, you know, if [the Strongs' attorney is] going to get into discussions about 
topics with developers and being approached, again, I don't want to start suggesting to 
either of you what should or shouldn't be done, but I want to make it clear that, yes, we 
14 
 
 
 
have a ruling that's in place, and it's going to stay in place unless somebody convinces me 
otherwise.  
 
 
"But I don't think that the matter was that anything ever discussed between the 
Strongs and developer and the aspect of sewerability and sewers on the property is off 
limits because it's a big issue in this case. And it's already started, and I think it's going to 
continue." 
 
Subsequently, the district court allowed the Strongs to elicit testimony from 
Alexander that Sailors was attempting to gain sewer access to the Strongs' property 
because Sailors had an option to buy and develop the land. The district court made it 
clear the contract itself, along with the dollar amounts therein, were inadmissible. The 
Strongs eventually elicited that between 2004 and 2007, Sailors had an option to purchase 
the Strongs' property and that such a purchaser could unilaterally form a sewer district. 
 
Later, when Daniel Strong testified, he indicated that Sailors had previously 
purchased a different 240-acre tract owned by the Strongs. That tract had been annexed 
into the city of Spring Hill and developed. Strong testified that at the time Sailors 
purchased the Spring Hill tract, he also bought an option to purchase the land at issue 
here. Strong testified that in late 2006 or early 2007, Sailors was very interested in the 
Strongs' land due to the size and flexibility it offered to a developer. Strong testified that 
the deal fell through, however, due to a contract dispute. Neither the contract itself, nor 
its specific terms were admitted into evidence.  
  
The Jury Verdict 
 
The jury found the pre-taking fair market value of both tracts to be a combined 
$4,744,300. The jury then found the post-taking value of the remaining property to be 
$2,821,741, thus rendering a verdict in the Strongs' favor in the amount of $1,922,559. 
15 
 
 
 
The various land valuations submitted to the jury, alongside the jury's actual verdict, are 
summarized in the chart below. 
 
Valuations Before and After the Taking (Tracts Combined) 
 
Before 
After 
Difference 
Initial Appraisal 
$4,149,000 
$4,052,535 
$96,465 
Goldsborough (KCPL) 
3,501,866 
$3,407,188 
$94,678 
Jaggers (KCPL) 
$4,744,300 
$4,615,900 
$128,400 
Lambie (the Strongs) 
$6,900,000 
$3,219,028 
$3,680,972 
Smith (the Strongs) 
$4,442,730 
$2,775,404 
$1,667,326 
Jury 
$4,744,300 
$2,821,741 
$1,922,559 
 
The district court memorialized the jury verdict in a journal entry, and KCPL 
immediately filed a supersedeas bond and obtained an order staying execution of the 
judgment pending appeal. This appeal followed.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
1. Did the district court err in denying KCPL's various efforts to exclude the 
testimony of Lambie and Smith along with exhibits 260-A through C? 
 
Standard of Review and Preservation 
 
KCPL first claims the "District Court Erred In Permitting The Strongs To Submit 
The Case On A Damage Theory That Did Not Use A Valuation Method Authorized By 
K.S.A. 26-513(e)." Essentially, KCPL takes the position that the Strongs did not submit 
any legally sufficient valuation evidence to the jury and, therefore, either the jury's 
verdict was unsupported by the evidence or the testimony of Lambie and Smith should 
have been excluded. In either case, the result would be the same—the jury would not be 
16 
 
 
 
permitted to base its verdict on what KCPL contends is legally insufficient valuation 
evidence. As such, the question at the heart of this appeal is a purely legal question 
requiring us to interpret and apply K.S.A. 26-513. Our review of this question is 
unlimited. See State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 320, 342 P.3d 935 (2015) ("Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review."); City of 
Wichita v. Denton, 296 Kan. 244, 257, 294 P.3d 207 (2013) (challenge to the legal basis 
for admission of evidence is reviewed de novo). 
 
As a threshold matter, the Strongs argue KCPL did not preserve its objections 
sufficiently to make this challenge on appeal. Our review of the record allows us to easily 
find that the issue was properly preserved. KCPL asserted this basic objection to the 
substance of the Strongs case throughout the proceedings. KCPL filed a motion in limine 
prior to trial, made motions to strike the testimony of Smith and Lambie, and filed a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence. The parties spend 
considerable energy debating whether a contemporaneous objection was lodged by KCPL 
to certain specific testimony; however, we need not wade into those waters because the 
essence of KCPL's objection was that the Strongs' evidence was legally insufficient. 
KCPL asserted this objection from the beginning of the case and carried it all the way 
through to the end. The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule has been satisfied 
under these facts. See State v. Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 956, 270 P.3d 1165 (2012) 
(contemporaneous objection rule is prudential in nature and not jurisdictional). 
 
Analysis 
 
To resolve this question, we must interpret and apply K.S.A. 26-513, which 
provides in relevant part: 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
"(c) Partial taking. If only a part of a tract of land or interest is taken, the 
compensation and measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of 
the entire property or interest immediately before the taking, and the value of that portion 
of the tract or interest remaining immediately after the taking. 
 
 
"(d) Factors to be considered. In ascertaining the amount of compensation and 
damages, the following nonexclusive list of factors shall be considered if such factors are 
shown to exist. Such factors are not to be considered as separate items of damages, but 
are to be considered only as they affect the total compensation and damage under the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section. Such factors are: 
 
 
(1) The most advantageous use to which the property is reasonably adaptable. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(3) Appearance of the property remaining, if appearance is an element of value in 
connection with any use for which the property is reasonably adaptable. 
 
 
(4) Productivity, convenience, use to be made of the property taken, or use of the 
property remaining. 
 
 
(5) View, ventilation and light, to the extent that they are beneficial attributes to 
the use of which the remaining property is devoted or to which it is reasonably adaptable. 
 
 
(6) Severance or division of a tract, whether the severance is initial or is in 
aggravation of a previous severance; changes of grade and loss or impairment of access 
by means of underpass or overpass incidental to changing the character or design of an 
existing improvement being considered as in aggravation of a previous severance, if in 
connection with the taking of additional land and needed to make the change in the 
improvement. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
(13) That the property could be or had been adapted to a use which was 
profitably carried on. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"(e) Fair market value. 'Fair market value' means the amount in terms of money 
that a well informed buyer is justified in paying and a well informed seller is justified in 
accepting for property in an open and competitive market, assuming that the parties are 
acting without undue compulsion. The fair market value shall be determined by use of the 
comparable sales, cost or capitalization of income appraisal methods or any combination 
of such methods." 
 
KCPL claims the valuation methods used by Lambie and Smith to calculate the 
value of the Strongs' tracts after KCPL's taking was contrary to K.S.A. 26-513(e). The 
Strongs argue that the method utilized by Smith to arrive at his post-taking value is 
expressly permitted by K.S.A. 26-513(d) whereby the pre-taking fair market value is 
subject to downward adjustments based on a nonexclusive list of statutory factors. For 
reasons we discuss below, we find the Strongs' evidence was legally sufficient valuation 
evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 26-513 and was admissible. 
 
Before looking directly at the statutory language, we note that certain factual 
aspects of this case are not in dispute. First, the evidence was overwhelming—and all the 
experts agreed—that the Strongs' property carried a significant investment premium over 
and above its value as agricultural land due to its development potential. Second, the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict with respect to the pre-taking fair 
market value of the property is not in dispute. KCPL's own expert, Jaggers, offered 
testimony—testimony unchallenged on appeal—that the pre-taking fair market value of 
the land was $4,744,300. The jury adopted Jaggers' opinion on the pre-taking fair market 
value as its own. Given this, the narrow issue presented here is whether the Strongs' 
19 
 
 
 
evidence of post-taking value was legally sufficient pursuant to K.S.A. 26-513 to support 
the jury verdict. 
 
The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is the intent of the legislature is 
dispositive if it is possible to ascertain that intent. State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906, 
327 P.3d 425 (2014). The language of a statute is our paramount consideration in 
ascertaining the intent of the legislature. 299 Kan. at 906. Where such language is plain 
and unambiguous, it is determinative of legislative intent. See State v. O'Connor, 299 
Kan. 819, 822, 326 P.3d 1064 (2014). 
 
K.S.A. 26-513(c), applicable to partial takings such as occur with utility 
easements, plainly creates a simple compensation formula with two variables:  (1) the fair 
market value of the property pre-taking, less; (2) the value of the remainder. The statute 
then defines and describes the legally necessary evidence to prove up each variable. The 
first variable—the pre-taking "fair market value"—must be proved "by use of the 
comparable sales, cost or capitalization of income appraisal methods or any combination 
of such methods." K.S.A. 26-513(e).  
 
It is significant that the second variable in subsection (c) does not use the term 
"fair market value" but rather speaks simply of the value of the remainder. We will not 
presume that this word choice was accidental. In fact, we presume the legislature 
deliberately chose the words used and intended those choices to convey a real meaning. 
See Hays v. Ruther, 298 Kan. 402, 406, 313 P.3d 782 (2013). Here, the words chosen by 
the legislature subject the first variable to K.S.A. 26-513(e) while leaving the second 
variable subject to adjustments pursuant to K.S.A. 26-513(d). There, the legislature 
defines and describes a nonexclusive list of factors which, if shown, can prove the 
reduced value of the post-taking remainder. The listed factors include the remaining 
appearance, productivity, convenience, use, view, and cohesion (i.e., whether the 
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remainder has been severed). An additional recognized factor—though not included in 
the legislature's nonexclusive list—is any evidence tending to show what a hypothetical 
buyer would consider in determining a purchase price for the property. See City of 
Mission Hills v. Sexton, 284 Kan. 414, 423, 160 P.3d 812 (2007) (quoting City of Wichita 
v. Eisenring, 269 Kan. 767, 773, 7 P.3d 1248 [2000]) ("'[A]ny competent evidence 
bearing upon market value generally is admissible including those factors that a 
hypothetical buyer and seller would consider in setting a purchase price for the 
property.'").  
 
Applying this statutory scheme to the record before us, we are convinced the 
Strongs' evidence was admissible and sufficient to support the jury's post-taking value 
determination. KCPL is essentially correct that Lambie was not a valuation expert. In 
other words, he expressly testified that he was speaking not as an appraiser using 
accepted fair market value appraisal techniques. Rather, Lambie testified that his 
opinions were those of a professional developer and hypothetical buyer asked to evaluate 
the Strongs' property for purchase. This evidence was certainly relevant to the jury's 
consideration of the adjustment factors permitted by K.S.A. 26-513(d). More importantly, 
it laid the proper foundation for the testimony of the Strongs' true valuation expert—
Smith.  
 
Smith testified as an appraisal expert. He testified that he reached his post-taking 
valuation by applying a number of diverse adjustments to the fair market value of the pre-
taking property. Smith's adjustments were supported by (1) comparable sales of similarly 
burdened property; (2) discount factors accounting for diminution of value due to loss in 
property appearance, view, use, convenience, and cohesion; and (3) previously admitted 
relevant evidence concerning how a hypothetical developer would go about determining 
a purchase price for the property.  
 
21 
 
 
 
The plain language of K.S.A. 26-513 creates a simple and straightforward way to 
determine and prove up the proper compensation for a partial taking. Within that 
framework, we will not second guess the specific evidentiary decisions of the trial court 
absent an abuse of discretion. "Considerable discretion is vested in the trial court in 
admitting or rejecting evidence of value, and the latitude accorded to the parties in 
bringing out collateral and cumulative facts to support value estimates is left largely to 
the discretion of the trial court." Eisenring, 269 Kan. at 773-74. 
 
The jury determined that the post-taking remainder—the second statutory 
variable—had a value somewhere between the valuations properly offered and admitted 
into evidence by the two parties. As such, that determination, along with the resulting 
compensation award, was supported by legally sufficient evidence.  
 
2. Did the district court err in admitting valuation evidence pursuant to a common-law 
"development approach"?  
 
As a second, alternative claim of error, KCPL argues that the district court 
improperly admitted the Strongs' experts' testimony upon an alternative, nonstatutory 
ground called the "development approach." As we explained in State Highway 
Commission v. Lee, 207 Kan. 284, Syl. ¶ 15, 485 P.2d 310 (1971): 
 
 
"The development approach in valuing suburban land imminently suited for 
subdivision and development begins with the selling price of the lots into which the 
acreage may be divided, which is then reduced by the developmental costs and discount 
factors more particularly described in the opinion. Where only a part of the owners' land 
is taken, the compensation and measure of damages are the difference between the value 
of the entire property based upon such calculations, and the value of that portion of the 
tract remaining immediately after the taking based upon such calculations." 
 
22 
 
 
 
KCPL argues that even if this approach is sufficient under our precedents, it was 
improper here because the Strongs' did not introduce any evidence that development of 
their property was imminent. There is support in the record for KCPL's contention that 
the district court admitted the challenged evidence on these grounds. When ruling on one 
of KCPL's many objections, the district judge reasoned: 
 
"Well, I think, as [the Strongs] pointed out, and consistent with my review of the law, 
first of all, starting from the statutes, it isn't exhaustive when you talk about the three 
approaches that are taken. And then what the Kansas Supreme Court, in terms of 
developmental use and how that fits squarely under the three approaches, to the extent 
that it does or doesn't, the Supreme Court has at least allowed that concept to be utilized, 
again, depending upon the case and whether the situation warrants it."  
 
Notably, our precedent describing and applying a "development approach" to 
compensation awards in partial takings cases predates the legislature's adoption of K.S.A. 
26-513(e). See L. 1999, ch. 111, sec. 3. However, based on our holding that the 
challenged evidence was admissible and legally sufficient to support the jury verdict 
pursuant to K.S.A. 26-513, we need not decide here the continuing viability of the 
development approach discussed in Lee. The decision of the district court, having reached 
a legally correct result, will not be disturbed even if the court did assign an erroneous 
reason for its decision. See Hockett v. The Trees Oil Co., 292 Kan. 213, 218, 251 P.3d 65 
(2011).  
  
3. Did the district court err in admitting evidence of the 2004 option contract?  
 
Standard of Review 
 
For its final claim of error, KCPL contends the district court improperly admitted 
evidence of the existence of the 2004 option contract between the Strongs and Sailors. 
23 
 
 
 
Generally speaking, "[t]he district court 'has broad discretion in determining what 
evidence will be allowed in an eminent domain proceeding.'" Mooney v. City of Overland 
Park, 283 Kan. 617, 619, 153 P.3d 1252 (2007) (quoting U.S.D. No. 464 v. Porter, 234 
Kan. 690, 694, 676 P.2d 84 [1984]). When reviewing the admission of evidence, 
relevancy of the evidence is the first consideration, and evidence is relevant if it has any 
tendency in reason to prove a material fact. Sexton, 284 Kan. at 429-30. Relevancy 
encompasses two separate components, materiality and probativeness. Evidence is 
material if the fact it supports is in dispute or in issue and probative if it has a logical 
tendency to prove a material fact. In re Acquisition of Property by Eminent Domain, 299 
Kan. 37, 44, 320 P.3d 955 (2014). Appellate courts review materiality de novo and 
examine the probative nature of the evidence under an abuse of discretion. 299 Kan. at 
44. All relevant evidence is admissible unless it is prohibited by statute, constitutional 
provision, or court decision. Sexton, 284 Kan. at 429. A district court abuses its discretion 
if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court, the decision is 
based on an error of law, or if the decision was based upon an error of fact. In re Eminent 
Domain, 299 Kan. at 45.  
 
Analysis 
 
KCPL claims the existence of the Sailors contract "was irrelevant to both the value 
of the Strong properties at the time of the taking and to their potential use as a residential 
subdivision." The Strongs respond that the existence of the contract was relevant to show:  
(1) development was the most advantageous use of the property to which it is reasonably 
adaptable; (2) the use and productivity of the property remaining; and (3) the property 
could be adapted to a use which could be profitably pursued. 
 
The evidence was introduced to show that a developer was interested in 
developing the property into a single family residential subdivision—so interested that he 
24 
 
 
 
paid an undisclosed sum to obtain an option to purchase the property. This fact is both 
material to the existence of the factors set forth in K.S.A. 26-513(d) and at least 
somewhat probative in that it tends to support the existence of such factors. The fact that 
a developer had previously executed a purchase option contract on the Strongs' property 
leads to a logical conclusion that the land is well suited to the development of a 
residential subdivision. Indeed, we suspect that this is the very reason KCPL sought so 
vigorously to keep this evidence from the jury.  
 
Finally, KCPL claims that the contract was in the distant past and thus not 
relevant. Whether evidence is too remote in time to be admissible lies within the 
discretion of the trial court. Manhattan Ice & Cold Storage v. City of Manhattan, 294 
Kan. 60, 73, 274 P.3d 609 (2012).  
 
KCPL relies on Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 284 Kan. 476, 161 P.3d 730 
(2007), to support its claim that the district court abused its discretion. In Miller, we 
found that a prior purchase price of property was irrelevant in an eminent domain 
proceeding because "the prior value of the subject property must be closely related in 
time and circumstance to the only question before the jury—the fair market value of the 
land at the time of the taking." 284 Kan. at 492. Similarly, in Manhattan Ice & Cold 
Storage, we held that 3-year-old value estimates were too remote in time from the actual 
condemnation to be relevant. 294 Kan. at 73-74.  
 
Here, however, the Sailors contract was never offered to establish a monetary 
value of the property—either pre- or post-taking. The district court properly and carefully 
excluded the contract price from the evidence presented to the jury. The district court did 
allow the fact of the contract to come into evidence because, in the district court's 
discretion, it determined that the fact that a developer pursued the property remained 
relevant, despite the passage of time, to the issues the jury had to resolve. Developer 
25 
 
 
 
interest in specific real estate is not generally the kind of market fact—as opposed to 
actual prices—that is subject to easy, dramatic, and short-lived fluctuations. We cannot 
say that the Sailors contract was so remote in time from the actual condemnation that it 
was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit its existence into evidence.  
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.