Case Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Kingsley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107370

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF: §
§ No. 138, 2008
LEONARD KINGSLEY, §
Respondent. § Board Case No. 31, 2007

Submitted: May 6, 2008
Decided: June 4, 2008

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER

This 4" day of June 2008, it appears to the Court that:

() This is a disciplinary proceeding filed by the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (“ODC”) against Leonard Kingsley (“Kingsley” or “Respondent”), On
March 14, 2008, the Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) filed a Report
(copy attached) finding professional misconduct and recommending that
Respondent be disbarred. Respondent filed an objection to the Board’s
recommendation, seeking instead a five-year suspension, with conditions. As
explained more fully herein, the ODC supports the Report and recommendation of
the Board imposing disbarment, but filed limited objections to the limitations
imposed on admission pro hac vice, temporary practice of law, and application for
admission to the Delaware Bar. The ODC also objected to the language in page

eight of the Report, which characterized as “testimony” the colloquy between
counsel for the ODC and the Board during the legal argument portion of the
hearing.

(2) Respondent is not a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of
Delaware. He is a member of the Bars of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
the State of New Jersey. From February 27, 2006 to June 30, 2006, Respondent
was an employee of a public accountant, Ralph V. Estep, and would prepare wills,
trusts, powers of attorney, and deeds for Estep’s Delaware clients. He would also
meet with Estep’s Delaware clients to discuss estate planning matters. Estep,
however, was not a Delaware attorney and was not, at any relevant time,
authorized to practice law in the State of Delaware or in any other state or
jurisdiction. The ODC filed a complaint against Estep for the unauthorized
practice of law and Estep stipulated to the entry of a Cease and Desist Order with
the ODC on October 30, 2006 (the “Estep Cease and Desist Order”).!

(3) In June 2006, the ODC advised Respondent that “his activities with
respect to rendering legal advice on Delaware law were in violation of the Rules.”
Thereafter, Respondent and Estep modified their working arrangement.
Respondent formed his own legal practice in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and

Estep would retain Respondent as outside counsel, paying him a retainer of $8,000

' Because it appeared that Estep violated the Order, the ODC brought contempt charges. The
Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law held a hearing and found Estep in contempt. This
‘Court affiemed those findings. See Jn re Estep, 933 A.2d 763 (Del. 2007) (per curiam).

2
per month. Respondent continued to draft wills, trusts, powers of attomey, and
deeds for Estep’s Delaware clients, and on occasion, meet with them to discuss
estate planning matters as he previously had done.” The Board found that the
record did not reflect that Respondent ever monitored this arrangement to ensure
that Delaware counsel met with the clients to confirm that the documents
Respondent prepared complied with the clients’ wishes.

(4) Despite the Estep Cease and Desist Order, Estep continued to meet
with clients and had them execute documents prepared by Respondent. In August
or September 2006, Respondent learned that Estep had been convicted of a felony
for terroristic threatening involving a gun. Thereafter, he ceased to name Estep as
a personal representative, but did not bring the problem to the attention of other
clients for whom he had named Estep as the personal representative because he
‘was merely outside counsel.’ Respondent terminated his relationship with Estep

by September or October 2007.

* Respondent ceased meeting with Estep and any of the clients for the inital interview and
understood that Estep would arrange for a Delaware attomey to be present when the clients came
in to meet with Estep to sign the documents. Using this process, Respondent prepared legal
‘documents for approximately twenty individuals and couples and forwarded the documents 10
Estep for presentation to the Delaware clients by Estep in the presence of Delaware counsel

The Board noted that Respondent acknowledged this was a filing on his part but did not notify
any clients because “he lacked access to the whole database as he was no longer an employee but
‘merely outside counsel.”
(5) In August 2007, the ODC filed a Petition for Discipline (“Petition”)
against Respondent, alleging that he had violated the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Professional Conduct Rules”) by practicing law in
Delaware by drafting estate planning documents for more than seventy-five
Delaware residents and assisting Estep in giving advice to Delaware residents on
estate planning matters (Counts I-III). ‘The ODC also alleged that: Respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rule 5.5(b)(1) by
maintaining a systematic and continuous legal presence in Delaware, establishing
an office in Delaware for the practice of law by identifying the location of his law
practice as “The Kingsley Law Firm”, 1308 Kynlyn Drive, Wilmington, Delaware,
and by working and practicing law in Estep’s office in Wilmington (Counts IV-
V1); Respondent violated Rule 5.5(b)(2) by holding out to the public, through the
identification in Delaware of the location of his law practice, that he was admitted
to practice in Delaware (Count VIN); and Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c)
prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a

tribunal by drafting estate planning documents, including wills, trusts and powers

 

of attorney, and giving advice to Estep’ clients in knowing violation of the Estep
Cease and Desist Order (Counts VII-IX).
(© Respondent failed to file an answer or request an extension and the

ODC requested that the allegations and charges be deemed admitted pursuant to
Rule 9(d)(2) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
Respondent did not respond to this request, and the Panel Chair of the Board
advised the parties that the allegations and charges would be deemed admitted
pursuant to Procedural Rule 9(d)(2), with the appropriate disciplinary sanction
being the sole remaining issue to be determined at the hearing.

(7) The day before the hearing was scheduled, Respondent asserted that
the Board lacked jurisdiction over him. Following briefing on this issue, a Panel of
the Board found that they did have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the
allegations asserted in the Petition and that Respondent's failure to respond in a
timely way to the ODC’s Petition waived his defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction. The Panel also determined that the allegations and charges in the
Petition were deemed admitted.

(8) Following the sanctions hearing, the Board concluded Respondent

 

“violated duties to the publi

 

to clients, to the legal system[,] and to the profession

by preparing wills, trusts, deeds and other estate planning documents for
citizens of Delaware, many of whom he never met, even though he was not
licensed to practice in Delaware.” Regarding intent, the Board found that
Respondent's actions after the ODC contacted him in June “presents a close

que

 

mn of whether his conduct went beyond negligence to a knowing violation”

of the Professional Conduct Rules. The Board found that the ODC failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly violated Rules 5.5(a)
or 5.5(6\1) in Counts LIV and VI or Rule $.5(b)2) in Counts V and VI. With
regard to Counts VIII and IX, however, the Board found that Respondent's
violations of the Estep Cease and Desist Order after October 30, 2006 were
knowing because the allegations in Counts VIII and IX were deemed admitted.
‘The Board also found that Respondent's actions of naming Estep and his firm as
the trustee of trusts to which his clients transferred property caused “serious harm”
to the clients for which he drafted estate planning documents.‘ Thereafter, the
Board recommended disbarment because Respondent knowingly violated a prior

order to cease and desist.*

 

(9) Respondent, in his objections to the Board's recommendations, noted

 

that he “is not unwilling to accept responsibility in this case” and that he “is willing

to give [the ODC] all that the office seeks, save the term ‘disbarment.”* The ODC

* The Board found that “[tJhe record reflects thatthe clients did not understand or necessarily
seek this work. Due to the lack of a Delaware lawyer's meeting with the clients to understand
their wishes and confirm that the documents drafted were appropriate to implement their inten,
this occurred atleast in the case of [one client}, necessitating the hiring of a Delaware attorney to
re-drat their estate planning documents.
* In support of this conctusion, the Board relied on In re Tomwe, 929 A.2d 774 (Del. 2007). The
Board noted that in that case “she knowingly violated a prior order to cease and desist entered
‘against her.” which was similar to this case where “the allegation that [Respondent] di the same
or at least knowingly assisting Estep in violating a Cease and Desist Order directed to him
has been deemed admitted
© Respondent admits his willingness “to enter into a voluntary five year, ten year, or even
permanent, agreement not to scek admission to the Delaware bar and not to seek admission pro

 

 

 

 

6
supports the Board’s recommendation of disbarment because it “will deter non-
Delaware lawyers from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Delaware

and from violating orders from this Court,” but objected to the limitations imposed

 

on admi

 

jon pro hac vice, temporary practice of law, and application for
admission to the Delaware Bar and also to the characterization of the colloquy
between counsel for the ODC and the Board during the legal argument portion of
the hearing as “testimony.”

(10) This Court has the inherent and exclusive authority to discipline
members of our Bar.” We also have the authority to discipline non-Delaware
attomeys who provide legal services in this State in violation of our Professional
Code of Conduct.” While the Board’s recommendations on the appropriate
‘sanction to be imposed are helpful, they do not bind this Court.” “[W]hen the
record establishes a lawyer's willingness to violate the terms of his suspension
order, disbarment is appropriate as a prophylactic measure to prevent further

misconduct by the offending individual.”"' The Board relied on Jn re Tomwe'? in

hac vice or practice even temporarily in Delaware for five years, ten years, ot permanently, as
the [ODC] sees fit."

” Ine Shamers, 873 A.24 1089, 1096 (Del. 2005); Jn re Fountain, 878 A.2d 1167, 1173 (Del.
2005),

* See Towne, 929 A.2d at 778.

° See Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct Rulle 8.5.

"© Fountain, 878 A.2d at 1173

"Towne, 929 A.2d at 781 (quoting ABA Standard 8.1 Commentary) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted),
support of imposing disbarment. In that case, this Court disbarred a non-Delaware

attomey who had practiced law in Delaware without being admitted to the

Delaware Bar. In agreeing with the Board that disbarment was the appropriate

sanction, we explained:

permits out-of-state lawyers to provide legal services in Delaware under four

‘exceptions set forth in Rule 5.5(c)'* and two exceptions in Rule 5.5(d).'* Apart

929
Pi

 

Glover was not merely suspended from practicing law in Delaware;
she was never admitted to the Delaware bar and never authorized to
practice here. Glover has demonstrated, by her past conduct, that she
is unwilling or unable to conform to the standards governing members
of this profession. In 1991, to further her legal practice, Glover
‘committed serious federal crimes. At the same time, again to further
her legal practice, Glover practiced law in Delaware without being
admitted to the Delaware bar. She agreed to the entry of a Cease and
Desist Order, and then disregarded it. Glover was punished for her
crimes and disbarred in three jurisdictions, but as soon as she resumed
her legal practice, Glover resumed her unauthorized practice of law in
Delaware."

(11) Rule 5.5 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct

/A.2d 774 (Del. 2007).
781 (internal citation omitted).

Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduet Rule 5.5(c) provides:

yer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or in a foreign
jon, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may
provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: (1) are
undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this,
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matte; (2) are in or reasonably
related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another
jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law
or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;

  

8
from these exceptions, Rule 5.5 prohibits a lawyer who is not admitted to practice

 

in Delaware from establishing an office or having a “systematic and continuous

presence” in Delaware for the practice of law."®

An out-of-state lawyer is also
prohibited from holding out to the public or otherwise representing that he is
admitted to practice law in Delaware.”

(12) After carefully considering Respondent’s violations, the findings of the
Board, and our prior precedents, we find that Kingsley did establish a “systematic
and continuous presence” in Delaware for the practice of law in violation of the

Professional Conduct Rules and his duties owed as a professional. Kingsley was

‘on notice that his activities with respect to rendering legal advice on Delaware law

 

were in violation of the Rules. After he established a practice in West Chester,

 

(G) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or
other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if
the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for
‘which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (4) are not within paragraphs.
(©Q) oF (6)3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice
in. jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.

'* Rule 5.5(d) provides:

A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this
jurisdiction that: (1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational
affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice
admission; or (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal
law or other law of this jurisdiction.

"© Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5(b); Rule 5.5 emt. 4
"7 id at Rule 5.5()2); Rule 5.5 emt. 4
Pennsylvania, he continued to practice law in Delaware. Estep retained Kingsley
and paid a regular retainer for Kingsley to draft wills, trusts, powers of attorney,
and deeds for Estep’s Delaware clients, and on occasion, meet with them to discuss
estate planning matters as he previously had done.'*

(13) We agree with the Board that Kingsley’s violations of duties owed as a
professional were serious enough to warrant the sanction of disbarment. The ABA

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions recommend that, absent aggravating or

 

mitigating circumstances, “(sJuspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer

knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty as a professional and

‘causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.""”

“Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct
that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a

benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to

‘a client, the public, or the legal system.” Kingsley’s knowing violation of the

Estep Cease and Desist Order violated his ethical duties and seriously undermined

In Estep, we noted that this arrangement “constitute{4) a transparent, neférious attempt to
circumvent the Cease and Desist Order and continue with “business as usual."” In re Estep, 933
‘A.2d 763, 771 (Del. 2007). We also noted that as part of this practice, Kingsley claimed to “help
[Estep] with his legal problems, including counseling {Estep} in terms of how to ‘limit the scope
‘of inquiries from various branches of the Delaware goverment.” 1d. at 768

ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline 7.2 at 24 (2005), available at
btp:/iwwww.abanet.org/cprtegulation/standards_sanctions pt.

fd aT

 

 

 

10
the legal system. Disbarment in the context of an attomey not admitted in
Delaware means “the unconditional exclusion from the admission to or the
exercise of any privilege to practice law in this State.”"' Accordingly, we conclude
that disbarment is appropriate.”

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) The Respondent is disbarred and prohibited and suspended from

providing ad

 

to any Delaware clients on matters of Delaware law, including

without li

 

ion drafting wills, powers of attomey, deeds of trust, and other
estate planning documents for Delaware clients under Delaware law;

(2) Within five business days of receipt of this order, Respondent shall
request in writing that the Philadelphia Estate Planning Council no longer list his
law firm address in Delaware and refrain in all respects from identifying his law
firm address as being in Delaware;

(3) The contents of the Board’s report shall be made public;

(4) The Respondent shall pay the costs of these disciplinary proceedings,
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure,

promptly upon presentation of a statement of costs by the ODC;

2 Tomwe, 929 A.24 at 781 (quotation omitted).

® The ODC’s limited objections to the practice limitations recommended by the Board to
accompany disbarment are sustained. The ODC's objection to the characterization of the
colloquy between counsel for the ODC and the Board during the legal argument portion of the
heating as “testimony” is also sustained.

 

ul
(5) The Respondent shall fully cooperate with the ODC in its efforts to

 

monitor his compliance with this Order;

(6) This Order shall be dit

 

‘eminated by the ODC in accordance with Rule

14 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

BY THE COURT:

(s/Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice

12
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE
IN THE MATTER OF CONFIDENTIAL
LEONARD KINGSLEY,

‘Board Case No, 31, 2007
RESPONDENT.

Before Lewis H. Lazarus, Esq., Maxine Rosenthal, and Karen L. Valiburs, Esq
Patricia Bartley Schwartz Esq, for Petitioner, OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
Leonard Kingsley (Pro Se) for Respondent, LEONARD KINGSLEY, ESQ.

Dated: March 14, 2008
OPINION OF THE BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE.

 

INTRODUCTION

‘This isa disciplinary proceeding filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (*ODC” or
“Petitioner” against Leonard Kingsley (“Respondent:" of “Kingsley”). This proceeding arises
‘out of a complaint filed by the ODC against a public accountant, Ralph V. Estep (“Estep”) for
the unauthorized practice of law. Estep stipulated to the enty of a Cease and Desist Order with
the ODC on October 30, 2006. Among other things, he agreed that the preparation of estate
planning documents by & non-Delaware lawyer constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
‘Because it appeared that he violated the Order by preparing documents forfour sets of clients
between October 30 and November 13, 2006, the ODC brought contempt charges. The Board
‘on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (“UPL Board") held a hearing and on May 25, 2007 found
Estep in contempt. Estep appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed the UPL. Board’ findings in
‘per curiam opinion on August 15,2007. Jn the Matier of Estep, 933 A.2d 763 (Del. 2007) (en
bane) (Per curiam,

‘The present matter was brought by the ODC against Kingsley for hi role in Estep's
scheme, Kingsley didnot timely respond to the allegations in the ODC’s petition. He did,
however, raise a threshold issue of whether the Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”)
has subject matter jurisdiction over a non-Delaware lawyer not admitted in Delaware. The Board
‘ound that it did have subject matter jurisdiction and conducted a hearing on sanctions. This is
the opinion ofthe Board on subject matter jurisdiction and the appropriate sanctions for
Kingsley’s admitted conduct.

BACKGROUND
A. Pelitioner’s Allegations

  

‘This matter came before the Board by the filing by the ODC on August 8, 2007 of a
Petition for Discipline (the Petition”) against Kingsley. The ODC alleges that Respondent, an
attomey not admitted to practice in Delaware, violated the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Professional Conduct Rules”) by practicing law in Delaware by drafting
‘state planning documents for more than seventy-five (75) Delaware residents and assisting
Estep in giving advice to Delaware residents on estate planning matters. Petition, Counts I-11
‘The ODC alleges that this conduct violates Rule 5.5(a) which provides that “A lawyer shall not
practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of regulation of the legal profession or assist another
individual in doing so." I

 

 

‘The ODC further alleges that Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in
violation of Rule 5.5(b) (1) by maintaining a systematic and continuous legal presence in
Delaware, establishing an office in Delaware forthe practice of law by identifying the location of
his law practice as “The Kingsley Law Firm”, 1308 Kynlyn Drive, Wilmington, Delaware, and

 
by working and practicing law in Estep’s office at $08 Main Street in Wilmington, Delaware.
Petition, Counts 1V-VI.

Petitioner elso alleges that Respondent violated Rule 5.5(b) (2) by holding out to the
public through the identification in Delaware of the location of his law practice that he was
‘admitted to practice law in Delaware. Petition, Count VIL

Finally, the ODC alleges that Respondent violated rule 3 4(c) prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal by drafting estate planning
‘documents, including wills, trusts and powers of attorney, and giving advice to Estep's clients in
knowing violation of a Cease and Desist Order against Estep entered by the Supreme Court of
the State of Delaware dated October 30, 2006. Petition, Counts VIII-X.

 

B. Respondent's Failure to Answer/ Panel Chair Deems Admitted the
Allegations end Charges in the Petition

 

“The Petition having been served on August 12, 2007, Rule (4) 2) of the Delaware
Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“Procedural Rules”) required an answer tobe filed
within 20 days or by Sepiember 4, 2007. Respondent failed to file an answer or request an
extension. On September 6, 2007, the ODC requested the Panel Chair ofthe board of
Professional Responsibility to find thatthe allegations and charges in the Petition be deemed
admitted pursuant to Procedural Rule 94)(2). That Procedural Rule provides in pertinent part
that “In the event the respondent fails to serve an answer within the prescribed time, all ofthe
‘allegations and charges inthe petition shall be deemed admitted, such thatthe sole remaining
issue to be determined by the board shall be the appropriate disciplinary sanction.” Respondent
<did not respond to this request. On September 19, 2007, the Panel Chair advised the partes that
the allegations and charges inthe Petition would be deemed admitted pursuant to Procedural
Rule 9€€X2) withthe appropriate disciplinary sanction the sole remining issue to be determined
atthe heating scheduled for September 26, 2007.

©. Respondent in Advance of Hearing Contends that Board of Professional Responsibility
‘Lacks Jurisdiction

By letter dated September 25, 2007, Respondent asserted thatthe Board of Professional
Responsibility lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the allegations in the Petition. Respondent
contended that Rul 5 of the Procedural Rules grants jurisdiction to the Board over (1) Persons
‘admitted to practice; 2) Former Judges; and (3) Incumbent Judges. As he was in none ofthese
categories, Respondent asserted the Board lacked jurisdiction. On September 26, 2007, the
‘Board convened and, in light ofthe assertion of potential lack of jurisdiction, requested the
parties to provide briefing onthe jurisdiction issue and adjourned the hearing,

D. Analysis
“The Panel as determined thatthe Board has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the

allegations asserted in ODC's Petition. Further, because Respondent failed to respond to the
Petition ina timely way, the Pane! finds that he has waived his defense of lack of personal

 

3
Jurisdiction and that the allegations and charges of the Petition are deemed admitted, The
‘hearing reconvened on December 19, 2007 for the purpose of determining the appropriate
sanctions. The Panel first addresses the jurisdiction issues and then turns tothe sanctions,

1. ‘The Bosrd has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve claims of violation ofthe

‘Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct

Respondent grounds his argument upon the failure of Rule $ of the Procedural
Rules expressly to authorize jurisdiction over a lawyer not admitted to practice in Delaware.
‘The Pane! acknowledges that the language of Rule 5 does not expressly address jurisdiction over
a lawyer who practices in Delaware but is not admitted in Delaware. However, following the
adoption of the Procedural Rules, the Delaware Supreme Court promulgated Rule 8.5(a) ofthe
Professional Conduct Rules effective July 1, 2003. That rule provides in pertinent part that “A,
lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject tothe disciplinary authority ofthis
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.” The
{question thus becomes whether the Board is empowered as an arm of the Delaware Supreme
Cour to adjudicate allegations by the ODC that a lawyer not admitted in Delaware has violated
fone oF more of the Professional Conduct Rules.

 

‘The Panel finds that the Delaware Supreme Court answered this question in the
affirmative last year in n the Matter of Valerie Glover Tonwe, 929 A.24.774 (Del. 2007) (Per
‘curiam). Tome involved a petition by the ODC alleging that Ms. Glover Tonwe (“Glover”) had
violated Rule 3.4(c) ofthe Professional Conduct Rules. Like Respondent here, Glover was not
admitted to practice in Delaware. In rejecting an argument by Glover that Rule 19 ofthe Rules of|
the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law provided the sole basis forthe ODC to institute &
disciplinary proceeding to prosecute an alleged violation of a Professional Conduct Rule, the
‘Supreme Court held:

 

We agree with Glover, thatthe ODC could have relied upon UPL
Rule 19 to seek enforcement of the Cease and Desist Order. But,
in this case, the same conduct that would have supported a finding
‘of contempt under UPL Rule 19, also would constitute knowing
disobedience ofa court order in violation of Rule 3.4(c). The ODC,
‘na proper exercise of ts discretion, elected to proceed under the
lawyer disciplinary rues.

‘Ud. at 778 (emphasis supplied).

As here, the ODC alleged violations of the Professional Conduct Rules by a
lawyer not admitted to practice in Delaware. As here, the respondent contended that the ODC
lacked discretion to proceed with a disciplinary proceeding before the Board but could only
proceed before the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. And asthe Delaware Supreme
Court found in Tonwe thatthe ODC in the exercise of its discretion could elect to proceed under
the lawyer disciplinary rule, the Panel finds that the Delaware Supreme Court would sanction
the same result here. Accordingly, the Panel holds that it has subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate the Petition,
2. Respondent Waived Any Argument thatthe Board Lacks Personal Jurisdiction
cover His Conduct

Procedural Rule 15(b) provides that “{e}xcept as otherwise provided in
these Rules, the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Superior Court of the State of Delaware shall
apply to the extent practicable” to disciplinary proceedings. Superior Court Rule 12(h) provides
that “defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person ... is waived .. ft is neither made by
motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading.” As noted above, Procedural Rule
'9(4)(2) requires an answer toa petition within 20 days after service of the petition, absent an
extension. As Respondent failed to answer the petition or otherwise move within twenty days of
its service, the Panel finds that Respondent has waived the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction. Moreover, forthe reasons set forth inthe Panel Chait’s letter tothe parties of
‘September 19, 2007, the allegations and charges ofthe Petition are deemed admitted. See also In
re Fountain, 913 4.24 1180, 1181 (Del. 2006).

“The sole remaining isue to be addressed is the Panel's finding of the appropriate
‘sanction based on the evidence submitted atthe hearing of December 19, 2007 to which we now
tum.

 

‘Atthe sanctions hearing, counsel for the ODC, Patricia Bartley-Schwartz, Esq.
and Kingsley were the sole participants. The ODC relied upoa the following exhibits which were
admitted into evidence without objection by Kingsley:

‘ODC 1- Reveiver's First Report January 5, 2007) to Court of Chancery in In the
Matter of Estep, C.A. No. 2535-N;

‘ODC 2- Deposition of Leonard Kingsley (February 21, 2007) in In the Matter of
Estep, C.A.No. 2535-N;

ODC 3 -Partial Transcript of Hearing Before the Board on the Unauthorized of
William Welsh) (Testimony of Leonard Kingsley, Esquire);

ODC 4- Delaware Supreme Court decision in In the Matter of Estep, No. 647
(August 15, 2007) (en bane) (per cura

 

 

"Prior the sanctions hearing, Respondent requested snd the Car granted permission vo make a submission
providing background concerning the evidence forthe sanctions hearing. On December 14, 2007 Respondent
‘obit «"Meoraadum io Clarify msm the Peto for Dcpline an ems Addressed in ODC's Let to
the Bourd Dstd September 24,2007 o Determine Appropriate Sanctions” (ation o Caf"). On December 17,
2007, he ODC objected to the Motion to Clarify othe exten contains fatal ering cori tothe dered
‘tried allegaon. The Bond stands by iting tht Respondent has sdmited the allegations ofthe Complaint.

5
ODC 5- Correspondence from Ralph V. Estep tothe Justice ofthe Peace (May 8,
2007) and Justice of the Peace Order in Durnan w. Estep (May 15,2007);

DC 6- Philadelphia Estate Planning Council Membership Directory for Leonard
Kingsley, Esquire; and

‘ODC 7- Admitted Facts and Admissions of Conduct Constituting the
‘Unauthorized Practice of Law (June 6, 2006) submitted to the Board on the
‘Unauthorized Practice of Law in In she Matter of Estep, UPL. Board File 05-1

Respondent submitted no exhibits, part from the material in his Motion to
(Clarify. The Board's factual findings are based on the above exhibits, the Petition as deemed
‘admitted, those portions of the Motion to Clarify the Board found relevant to the sanctions
Jhearing, and the testimony atthe sanctions heating.

, The Allegations Deemed Admitted by Respondent
Petitioner's allegations admitted by Respondent are as follows:

1, ‘The Respondent is not and has never been a member ofthe Bar of the Supreme
Cour of Delaware.

2. The Respondent is a member of the Bars ofthe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and the State of New Jersey.

3. The Supreme Court of Delaware has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 8.5 which states
that a “lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction ifthe lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal
services in this jurisdiction.”

4. From February 27, 2006 until June 30, 2006, the Respondent was employed by
Ralph V. Estep (“Estep”), an accountant, who has an office located at $08 Main
Street in Wilmington Delaware. Estep isnot, and at ll relevant times was not,
‘authorized to practice law inthe State of Delaware or in any other state or
jul

5. While employed by Estep, the Respondent drafted wills trusts, powers of attomey
‘and deeds for Estep's Delaware clients, On occasion, the Respondent met with
Estep's Delaware clients to discuss estate planning matters,

6. In.June 2006, the ODC advised the Respondent that his activities with respect 10
rendering legal advice on Delaware law were in violation ofthe Rules.

7. Soon, thereafter, the Respondent opened “The Kingsley Law Firm” in West
Chester, Pennsylvania. The Respondent continued to draft wills trusts, powers of|
attorney and deeds for Estep’s Delaware clients and, on occasion, would meet
with Estep's Delaware clients to discuss estate planning matters.

8. The Respondent also identified 1308 Kynlyn Drive, Wilmington Delaware as an
address for The Kingsley Law Firm,

9. Prior to October 30, 2006, the Respondent had drafted estate planning documents
including wills, tists, powers of attomey and deeds for more than seventy-five
(75) of Estep's Delaware clients. [names omitted]

10, On October 30, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court ordered Estep to cease and
<desist immediately his unauthorized practice of law in Delaware which including
drafting estate planning documents (“Cease and Desist Order”). The Cease and
Desist Order is attached as Exhibit |. Thereafter, the Respondent drafted estate
planning documents for Estep's Delaware clients and, on oceasion, met with
Estep's Delaware clients to discuss estate planning. Those clients include but are
not limited to

Easter Burch
Yolanda & William Welch
Bruce Abbott

Vivienne Titus

. 21 30, Works as ofl

Respondent isnot licensed to practice law in Delaware. He was admitted in
‘Pennsylvania in 2003, to the Easter District of Pennsylvania in May of 2004, and to the
state and federal cours in New Jersey in December of 2006. From February 27, 2006
until June 30, 3006, Kingsley was an employee of Estep earning $85,000 annually
payable in monthly installments. Estep is not un attorney. He maintained an office at SOS
Main Street in Wilmington, Delaware. Estep’s routine practice was to meet with clients
to discuss estate planning, No Delaware attorney was present during those meetings.
Estep would take notes reflecting his conversations with the clients. He then sent the
notes to Kingsley, During this time, Kingsley prepared wills, trsts, powers of attorney
and deeds for approximately 30 individuals and couples who resided in Delaware, based
‘on Estep’s notes He sent is draft to John Bialecki, Esq., a member ofthe Delaware bar
for his review. Kingsley then made any changes requested by Bialecki and forwarded the
‘completed documents to Estep who presented them to the clients.

 

"kingly ested that alongwith Estep he met wth 1020 ofthe cients rectly in Estes office ring this time
period and took is own notes" ae if [Estep] was prope, make sure that hi ots accurately elected what |
Feat the testimony a given or by th lent” | ODC-3 at 247248

7
44. June 30, 2006 to October 30, 2006: Kingsley Terminates His Employment
Relationship with Estep but Does Essentially the Same Work on Retainer as

(On June 6, 2006, as part ofthe proceeding initiated by the ODC in January of
2006 against Estep forthe unauthorized practice of law, Estep entered in to “Admitted Facts and
‘Admissions of Conduct Consttuting the Unauthorized Practice of Law”. ODC 7. Among other
things, Estep agreed that “the drafting of wills and trusts by a non-lawyer who is not authorized
‘to practice law by the Delaware Supreme Court constitutes the uneuthorized practice of law and
‘that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by drafing wills and truss.” 1d. at 11.
‘Schwartz testified that as part of ODC's investigation she learned that Kingsley worked for
Estep. She called him in June, 2006 and told him “You are engaging inthe unauthorized practice
of law. You are assisting Mr. Estep.” Sanctions Hearing, Tr. at 74, She also told him “You
should leave this employment. You are going to seriously jeopardize your ability to be a
Delaware lawyer.” ld. Kingsley acknowledges that he spoke to Schwartz, that she told him he
was “on the ODC’s radar,” and that she told him to cease his employment with Estep but denies
‘that she informed him that he was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. fd. at $1. The
(ODC’s allegation that “In June 2006, the ODC advised Respondent that his activities with
respect to rendering legal advice on Delaware law were in violation of the Rules” has been
deemed admitted. Petition, $6.

 

 

Following the conversation with Schwartz, Kingsley testified that he
‘understood that ODC’s primary objection to Estep’s practice was that “it was unacceptable to
have a Delaware atomey simply review this without their [sc] actually being face-to-face time
between the Delaware attomey and the client." /d. Estep and Kingsley modified their practice in
that Kingsley 1) ceased his employment with Estep, 2) formed his own legal practice with an
office in West Chester, Pennsylvania, “Kingsley Law Fim, P.C.", 3) secured a retainer of $8000
‘per month to represent Estep, 4) continued to draft wills, trusts, powers of attorney and deeds for
Estep’s Delaware clients based on Estep's notes, 5) ceased meeting with Estep and any ofthe
clients forthe initial interview and 6) understood that Estep would arrange for a Delaware
attorney ~ Bialecki through August 2006 and then McCracken after that ~to be present when the
clients came in to meet with Estep to sign the documents. As Kingsley testified, “my
‘understanding of the ODC's discussions with Mr. Estep was that their problem was that no
attorney was meeting face o face with the clients. And so my understanding was that we
resolved tha... And so, I thought that the change in the process that Mc. Estep had putin effect
‘where Mr. Bialecki or Me. McCracken was present to present these documents to the
sufficient under Delaware law.” Id at $7. Using this process, Kingsley prepared legal
documents for approximately 20 individuals and couples and forwarded the documents to Estep
for presentation to the Delaware clients by Estep in the presence of either Mr. Bialecki or Mr.
MeCracken. The record reflects no effort by Kingsley to determine whether the new
arrangement was working to ensure that Delaware counsel met with the clients to ensure thatthe
documents he prepared complied with their wishes.

 

 

 

‘Sometime in August ot September of 2006, Kingsley learned that Estep had
been convicted ofa felony for terroristic threatening involving a gun. Tr. at 52-53. Thereafter,
gsley ceased to name Estep as a personal representative as itis impermissible to name &

 
‘convicted felon to such a roe. dat 5S. Kingsley did not bring that problem to the attention of
other clients for whom Kingsley hed named Estep asthe personal representative. ld. Kingsley
‘acknowledged that was a failing on his part but testified that he lacked access to the whole
‘database as he was no longer an employee but merely outside counsel. fd. at $5-56.

©. October 30, 2006 to November 13, 2006: Estep Meets with Four More Clients
‘Who Execute Documents Prepared by Kingsley; Kingsley Ceases Preparing
Estate Planning Documents After He Learns of Cease and Desist Order
Entered Agninst Estep

(On October 30, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court entered an order in Inthe
“Maiter of Ralph Estep (*Cease and Desist Order") approving the Admitted Facts and Admissions
‘of Conduct Consttuting the Unauthorized Practice of Law to which Estep and the ODC were
parties. The Order provided that Estep was “to cease and desist the unauthorized practice of law
immediately." Nonetheless, Estep met with Faster Burch, Yolanda and William Welch, Bruce
‘Abbott, and Vivienne Tits after the entry of the Cease and Desist Order and had them execute
‘documents prepared by Kingsley between October 30 and November 13, 2006. The ODC’s
allegation that “by drafting estate planning documents including wills trusts and powers of
attorney after October 30, 2006, fhe] knowingly disobeyed the Cease and Desist Order in
violation of Rule 3.4)" was deemed admitted by Kingsley’ failure to answer. Petition, $27.
‘The same applies to the ODC's allegation that “by giving legal advice to Estep’s Delaware
cliens after October 30, 2006, he] knowingly disobeyed the Cease and Desist Order in violation
of Rule 3.4(¢)." Jd. at $29.

 

 

£. November 13, 2006 to September 30, 2007: A Court-Appointed Receiver
‘Takes over Estep's Practice; the Board on Unauthorized Practice of Law
‘Takes Discovery Regarding Estep, Including of Kingsley; the UPL. Board
Recommends Sanctions Against Estep; the ODC Brings This Action; and
Kingsley Terminates Relationship with Estep

“The Delaware Supreme Court appointed Peter Gordon, Esq. as receiver for
Estep's practice on November 9, 2006. He collected 283 files of Estep’s. He advised all clients,
of Estep's ofthe Cease and Desist Order and the finding that Estep had engaged in the
‘unauthorized practice of law. Each client was told that he or she could meet free of charge for
‘one hour with a member of the Delaware Bar to review their estate planning documents.

 

In reaction toa letter from Wachovia Bank tht it intended to limit Estep’s
authority to manage certain trust accounts, Estep decided on Kingsley's recommendation in
December of 2006 to resign as a trustee in favor of Kingsley. ODC-2 at Pages 14-19.
Kingsley prepared appropriate documentation to implement this decision. fd. Kingsley
testified that he received no compensation for his service as Trustee and that he was agreeable
to resigning as trustee if any of the beneficiaries objected. [dt Pages 19-20. Funds from trust
accounts maintained in Delaware pursuant to trusts established for Delaware clients were
‘moved toa trust account in Pennsylvania over which Kingsley had control. 1d. at Pages 38-43
Kingsley denied thatthe funds were put to private us. ld. at 87-88. He also testified that he

 
hhad no knowledge of any impropriety by Estep regarding the use of trust funds and the ODC
resented no evidence to the contrary.”

Following a hearing in April, 2007, the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law (“UPL Board”) issued is findings of fact and recommendations for sanctions against
Estep. The Board found that he had engaged in contemptuous conduct and recommended that
he disgorge all fees. On August 15, 2007, the Supreme Court upheld the UPL Board's
findings and added additional fines foreach alleged violation totaling $17,000. Kingsley
testified that he had terminated his relationship with Estep by September or October of 2007.
Tr a68.

The goals ofa disciplinary proceeding and the applicable standard:

‘The Delaware Supreme Court has set forth the goals ofthe disciplinary
system and the applicable standard:

“The objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system are to protect the public,
to protect the administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal
profession, and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. To further
these objectives and to promote consistency and predictability in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions, the Court looks to the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions as a model for determining the
appropriate discipline warranted under the cireumstances of each case.
‘The ABA framework consists of four key factors to be considered by the
Court: (a) the ethical duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the
‘extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct,
‘and (d) aggravating and mitigating factors.

‘In Re Bailey, 821 A.24 851, 866 (Del. 2003). The Delaware Supreme Court has also emphasized
thatthe purpose of the rules isnot to punish lawyers. Jn Re Reardon, 759 A. 24 568, 575 (Del.
2000), citing Jn Re Benge, 754 A.24 871, 879 (Del. 2000).

1. The Ethical Duty Violated

“The Board finds that Respondent violated duties tothe public, to clients,
to the legal system and to the profession. He did so by preparing wills, trust, deeds and other
‘estate planning documents for citizens of Delaware, many of whom he never met, even though
‘he was not licensed to practice in Delaware. The record reflects that he relied upon notes of an
‘ecountant, Estep, who interviewed clients and sent Respondent his notes. Kingsley was not
‘aware that any Delaware lawyer met with the clients prior to his drafting of wills, trusts and other
estate planning documents. Moreover, when he sent his draft to Delaware attomeys for review

 

 

Fe ODC i ot clam that any of Kingley's conduct post November, 2006 volt any rae and thus presented
ro evidence regirding Kingly's improper we of out funds. Counsel stated this was no relevant 1 what the ODC
intended to present othe Panel. Tr. 80, The lous sose inthe sanctions hearing in the context of sponses 10
‘questions foo the Panel regarding whether Kingsley had cooperated wit the Retivr.

10
prior tothe clients’ meeting with Mr. Estep for review and signature, there is no evidence that he
‘Sent the notes. Thus, no Delaware attorney was in a position to determine whether the documents
he drafted appropriately reflected and carried out the wishes ofthe clients as reflected in Mr
Estep’s notes, Further, the record reflects that following the consent by Estep on June 6, 2006 to
Cease and Desist Order with the ODC, Respondent and Kingsley arranged for & Delaware
attorney also to be present with Estep forthe clients to sign the documents, but the Delaware
attorney played no meaningful rol.

In finding that Kingsley's practice of preparing will, rust and other estate
planning documents tobe governed by Delaware law for Delaware residents constitutes the
practice of law, we recognize thatthe Delaware Supreme Court has not definitively addressed
‘exactly what conduct in ths area constitutes the practice of law. The Estep Court noted that it
‘as not required to speak tothe issue because Estep had stipulated to certain conduct so the
Court did not need “to promulgate a comprehensive definition.” [dat 8. Nonetheless, the Panel
believes that the Delaware Supreme Court would find that a person drafting estate planning
documents to meet the requirements of Delaware law for Delaware clients based on notes and
recommendations from a non-lawyer and without any substantive review of the notes and
interview ofthe clients by a Delaware attomey to ascertain their wishes would constitute the
practice of law, See Ine Devaney, 870 A.24 53 (D.C. 2005) (sanctioning attomey licensed 10
[practice in state who advised a testator re changes to her will and drafted codicil re same). See
‘generally Jay M.Zitter, 1D., Drafting of Will or Other Estate-Planning Activities as legal or

Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 ALRSth 323 at §§ 4 and 5 (2007) (collecting cases holding
that preparation of wills or trusts constitute the practice of law).

2. Respondent's Mental State

‘The Pane! finds that by preparing estate planning documents for Estep's
clients prior to October 30, 2006 without proper supervision by a Delaware attomey, Respondent
failed to heed a substantial risk that his practice would be deemed to constitute the unauthorized
practice of law and/or the assistance ofa non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. A
reasonable lawyer in his position—drafting estate planning documents as a non-Delaware lawyer
for Delaware clients where he knew the question ofthe propriety of such activity in Delaware
‘was unsetled -- would have taken greater steps to ensure that a Delaware attomey exercised
appropriate supervision,

‘The ODC stipulate that as of June 6, 2006, “the Delaware Supreme Court
hnas not addressed whether the drafting of will and trusts or probating of estates by a non-lawyer
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Delaware.” ODC-7 at § 10. See also Tr. at 76-77.
‘The ODC was hoping that eventually the Estep case would make its way to the Supreme Court
‘so that it might issue a definitive ruling. Id. in that context, it appears thatthe practice ofa non-
Delaware lawyer drafting estate planning documents to be reviewed by a Delaware lawyer was
similarly unsetld.

 

Following his conversation with counsel forthe ODC, Respondent
testified that he acted with Estep to change their practice to cure what he understood the ODC's
‘objection to be by ensuring that « Delaware attomey not only reviewed all of his work but also

n
was present a the signings of all documents to discuss the documents with the clients. While as
the Delaware Supreme Court found, the mere presence of the Delaware attorney was insufficient,
the ODC did not present clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knew thatthe Delaware
attorney performed so minimal a role a the closings. Stated differently, the Board finds an
absence of clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knew, as the Delaware Supreme Court
later found, thatthe Delaware attorneys abdicated ther ethical responsibilities by failing to play
‘a meaningful role when they met with the clients prior to signing the documents drafted by
Kingsley. Thus, there was insufficient documentary evidence or testimony from Kingsley or the
Delaware attomeys or Estep that, following the conversation between Kingsley and the ODC,
Kingsley was aware of the minimal role played by the Delaware lawyers in presenting the
documents he drafted tothe clients.

In similar circumstances the Delaware Supreme Court and other courts
have rejected a finding of a knowing violation. See n Re Doughty, 832 A.2d 724, 734 (Del.
2003) (accepting Board’s finding that Respondent, while out of compliance, did not knowingly
‘violate a court rule); In Re Mekler, 669 A.24 655, 666-67 (Del. 1995) (Respondent's genuine but
erroneous belief that he had been granted a continuance supported finding that he did not
knowingly violate a Court's scheduling order). See also In Re Mitchell and n Re Hilaire, 901
F.2d 1179, 1189 (3d Ciz, 1990)(discharging rule to show cause regarding suspended lawyer and
attorney who failed to supervise him because rules governing suspended attorneys were unclear,
‘even though conduct filed to meet even the most lenient applicable standards).

 

Having sai tht, the Board notes that Kingsley’s conduct at least after
June 30, 2006 presens a close question of whether his conduct went beyond negligence o a
‘knowing violation. Unlike in Counts VII and IX below, in Counts I-IV and VI the ODC did not
allege that Kingsley knowingly acted in violation of a disciplinary ule. Accordingly, it was it
‘burden atthe sanctions hearing to establish by clear and convincing evidence that be acted
knowingly. In that regard, the deemed admission that his activities in rendering legal advice
‘were in violation of the disciplinary rules (Petition, 6) does not allege a state of mind. We note
‘as wel the absence of a written record as to what was communicated to Kingsley in his
conversation with the ODC in June. Had he done nothing following that conversation, we might
find differently. But he ceased working for Estep and he worked to change the practice to require
the Delaware lawyers in a memorandum of understanding tobe present prior to signing to ensure
that the clients wishes were being carried out. On the record presented, we cannot conclude that
the ODC has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knew thatthe Delaware
lawyers, as later found by the Delaware Supreme Court, would abdicate their responsibilities
‘Thus, as to Counts FIV and VI, the Board finds that the ODC has failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly violated Rules 5.5(a) or $.5(0)(1)."

 

 

“Fhe Bond notes that ODC-5, eter fam Esep to Justice of he Peace Cour 12 dated May 8, 2007 doesnot
support the allegation that Kingsley give advice about Delaware lav ina Delaware procecding. Inthe eter Estep
ques tha a certed copy of tansrp of proceedings in Durnan . Estep JP12-07-002919 be sent 0 Kingsley
[Estep ape to receive the tanecrp, The OD acknowledged tht thad no evidence that Kingsley participa
amare ate roving 0 1617 King sed an per an wine eng wd is
ot raft the Teter 59.

 

 
‘As to Counts V and VIL, the Board similarly finds tha: Kingsley acted
negligently in using his home address to identify his law firm “Kingsley Law Fim, P.C.” ina
listing with the Philadelphia Estate Planning Council. The ODC introduced no evidence that any
of the 75 clients for whom Kingsley had drafted estate planning documents had relied on
Kingsley based on their having seen this or any other listing of his law firm with a Delaware
‘address. Respondent testified that he never communicated with any of the clients identified inthe
Petition using « Delaware address. 1d. at 48. Kingsley testified that the Philadelphia Estate
Planning Council is not a marketing organization and that its website is for members only. Tr. at
447. He further testified that he listed the home address asthe place where he preferred to receive
railings from the organization /d, The record reflects that Kingsley’ letterhead and business
‘card make no mention of a Delaware address, [dt 47-48. The Board finds that the evidence
‘establishes that Kingsley negligently identified his law fim as having a Delaware address in
Violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2) without knowingly or consciously intending to market himself to the
public as being a Delaware law fim.

 

Finally, the ODC’s allegation that Kingsley knowingly violated the Cease
‘and Desist Order as alleged in Counts VIII and [X has been deemed admitted. We do note that
‘the Cease and Desist Order was not directed to Kingsley. The ODC acknowledged that it had no
authority that an attorney could be found to have violated an order not directed at him. Tr, at 20-
21, Its argument is that Kingsley knowingly facilitated Estep in disobeying an order of the
‘wibunal by continuing to draft estate planning documents and not taking steps to stop Estep's
conduct. Respondent's failure to ensure, following the entry of the Cease and Desist Order on
‘October 30, 2006, that his arrangement with McCracken was working to provide active
involvement by Delaware counsel reflects a conscious disregard fora known risk,

 

From the beginning of his association with Estep to the conduct of the
disciplinary proceeding, Respondent has disregarded know risks. In undertaking his role
initially, he researched the law and found no definitive case law that authorized his conduct, He
‘sought no formal opinion from Delaware counsel. When the ODC contacted him directly and
‘advised that he cease his employment with Estep because he was in violation of the Delaware
Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct, Respondent called and then cancelled an appointment
with Delaware counsel, He then resigned ftom Estep's employ and negotiated a memorandum
of understanding with Delaware counsel, first Bislecki and then McCracken, to be present when
the clients signed the documents so that it would not be Estep alone who presented the documents
[Respondent drafted to the cliens. Again, he sought no opinion from Delaware counsel thatthe
new arrangement would comply with Delaware law and the record reflects no effort by
Respondent to ascertain whether the Delaware lawyers were in fact acting to “ensure that all the
documents complied with what the client wanted done in tems of testamentary provisions.”
‘ODC-3 at 251. When served withthe Petition inthis action, Respondent chose not to answer ina
‘timely manner orto retain Delaware counsel. As a consequence, the ODC’s allegations that he
knowingly disobeyed a Supreme Court Order in violation of Rule 3.4 (c) are deemed admitted,
‘See Petition at {4 27 and 29; n re Fountain, 913 A.2d at 1181. Due tothe unsettled nature of
‘Delaware law and the failure of proof by clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knowingly
assisted inthe unauthorized practice of law prior to October 30, 2006, the Panel finds that his
violations reflected negligence. But his deemed admission that he knowingly violated a Supreme

 

 
Court Order after October 30, 2006 requires the Panel to conclude that his violations after
October 30, 2006 were knowing.

3. ‘The Extent of the Actual or Potential Injury to the Clients Caused by the
Lawyer's Misconduct

‘The ODC contends that Kingsley’s actions caused actual injury and
serious potential injury tothe clients for which he drafted estate planning documents. Its first
Contention is that for atleast $0 of the clients, Kingsley inserted Estep or entities he controlled as
executors of his client's estates or as trustee of truss. At the sanctions hearing, the testimony was
that a convicted felon cannot serve as personal representative and that Kingsley did not name
him as a personal representative after learning about the felony conviction. Tr. at 52-56,
‘Nonetheless, Kingsley acknowledged that he took no steps upon leaming of Kingsley's status to
‘ring that problem tothe attention ofthe clients, /d. at $5. He testified that at that point he did
not have access tothe whole database. Id, at $5-S6. The Pane! finds that minimally Respondent
should have advised Estep to notify all clients for whom he was acting as personal representative
that they would need to have a new person appointed and tht his failure to do so delayed the
time that remedial steps could be taken.

‘The ODC also contends that Estep’s clients were harmed because several
‘of their documents were improperly executed under Delaware law. ODC-1 at Paragraph 11
‘While true, the Panel finds that that harm isnot fairly attributable to Kingsley who gave no
advice regarding the proper procedures in Delaware for execution ofa wil.

“The more serious harm is that by engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law Kingsely named Estep and his firm asthe truste of trusts to which the clients transferred
property, including their homes. The record reflects thatthe clients did not understand or
‘necessarily seek this work. Due to the lack of a Delaware lawyer's meeting with the clients to
‘understand their wishes and confirm that the documents drafted were appropriate to implement
their intent, this occurred atleast in the case of William and Yolanda Welsh, necessitating the
hiring of a Delaware attomey to re-draft thei estate planning documents,

4. Sanetion

“The ODC seeks a sanction of disbarment. The Pune! inquired as to how
an attomey who is nota member ofthe Delaware bar can be disbarred. The ODC advised that a
‘Delaware lawyer not barred in Delaware can be disbarred so as to preclude their taking the
Delaware bar for five years and also from appearing po hac vice or under Rule 5.5 which allows
‘an attomey not admitted in Delaware to practice on a temporary basis. Tr. at 14-15.

“The most analogous case is In re Tomwe, 929 A.24 774 (Del. 2007). There
‘a non-Delaware attorney consented to the entry of a cease and desist order approved in 1991 by
the Delaware Supreme Court. That Order directed that Tonwe “shall immediately cease and
‘desist from the performance of any and all legal services in Delaware fora fee, or for no fee,
including, without limitation, the offering and providing of assistance in legal matters, until such
time as she is properly admited to practi as a member ofthe bar of the State of Delaware.

 

4
1d. at 3, Ms. Glover was also convicted in 1991 of bribing a federal immigration official and
served 37 months in prison. She was disbarred in Ohio and Pennsylvania. In 2002, she was re-
instated in Pennsylvania. From 2003-2008, she had a substantial practice in Delaware of over
100 clients advising them on matters of personal injury that occurred in Delaware. The Board’s
findings of misconduct are set forth below:

In ight of the factual record, the Board finds Respondent engaged
in the practice of law within the State of Delaware. Between July.
1, 2003 and June, 2005, Respondent established a continuing
lawyer-client relationship with approximately 100 Delaware
citizens. Respondent provided legal services through the
‘negotiation and settlement of her clients” insurance claims, all of
Which involved Delaware motor vehicle accidents and Delaware
auto insurance policies, which more likely than not mandated the
application of Delaware insurance law to claims arising under the
policy.

 

In representing dozens of Delaware clients, on a continuing basis
since July 1, 2003, the Respondent established a systematic and
continuous presence in Delaware for the practice of law in
violation of [Delaware Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct]
Rule 5.5 (O(1). She regularly counseled clients on matters of
Delaware law and negotiated settlements with insurance companies
regarding Delaware auto insurance policies. Furthermore, the
representation of Delaware clients comprised a substantial portion
‘of her eascload and generated consequential attorney's fes.

Respondent agreed in a 1991 Statement and Order of Voluntary
Compliance to cease and desist from the performance of any and
all legal services, including the offering or providing of assistance
in legal matters, in Delaware until she is properly admitted to
practice as e member of the Delaware bar... tis undisputed that
‘since that time Respondent has provided legal services to multiple
Delaware citizens on a recurring basis, including conducting a
deposition for a matter pending before the Delaware Superior
‘Court, and representing a client at an arbitration hearing within the
State of Delaware,

 

‘The Board specifically concludes thatthe Respondent's violation of
Rulles 5.5(0)(1) and 3.4(¢) have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.

1d. at 9-10

1s
“The Panel finds thatthe misconduct sanctioned in Tomwe is similar to the
‘misconduct here. Most significantly, she knowingly violated a prior order to cease and desist
‘catered against her. Here the allegation that Kingsley did the same here or at least knowingly
assisting Estep in violating a Cease and Desist Order directed to him has been deemed admitted.

‘The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions recommend that,
absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction forthe unauthorized
‘practice of law where a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed
85 professional which causes injury to  elient, the public or the legal system isa reprimand,
‘ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline 7.3 at 388 (2006 Fal). These same standards
provide that “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct
that isa violation of a duty owed as @ professional and causes injury or potential injury to a
client, the public or the legal system,” /d. at 7.2. Finally, “disbarment is generally appropriate
When @ layer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional
‘with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially
Serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” dat 7.1 The ABA Standards also
\permit the disciplinary board to impose other sanctions as may be appropriate,

 

Here we find that Kingsley acted negligently regarding Counts I-VI
Further, we find thatthe claims in Counts VIII and IX that Kingsley knowingly assisted another
in violation ofa Court order are deemed admitted, Taking in to account the professional
‘misconduct here, the Board recommends thatthe appropriate sanction is that:

1) Respondent be disbarred and prohibited from providing advice to
any Delaware clients on matters of Delaware law, including
‘without limitation drafting wills, powers of attorney, deeds of trust
and other estate planning documents for Delaware clients under
Delaware lav, until such time as the Respondent shall have passed
the Delaware bar exam and been admitted to practice in Delaware;

2) Respondent be prohibited from acting pro hac vice on any matter
in Delaware for a period of five years;

3) Respondent shall be prohibited for five years from eng the
temporary practice of law pursuant Delaware Supreme Court Rules
$5055.15,

 

4) After five years from the date of disbarment, Kingsley may apply
for admission to the Delaware Bar but shall bear the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that he has successfully
‘completed the bar exam and that he is fit o practice law;

5) Within five business days of receipt ofthis order request in writing
that the Philadelphia Estate Planning Couneil no longer lst his law
firm address in Delaware and refrain in all respects from

16
identifying his law firm address as being in Delaware;
6) Thecontents ofthis report be made public; and

7) Respondent shall pay the costs ofthese proceedings.

5. Aggravating or Mitigating Factors
Once a preliminary sanetion is recommended, the ABA Standards and the

 

Delaware Supreme Court require the pane! to examine whether any aggravating or mitigating
factors counsel a greater or lesser sentence. In Re Steiner, 817 A.24 793, 796 (Del. 2003) Here,
the Panel finds the following aggravating factors: dishonest or selfish motive, and a pattern of
‘misconduct with multiple offenses. In mitigation, the Board notes the Respondent's inexperience
in the practice of law and the absence of a prior disciplinary record. The Panel does not believe
‘that these factors require a modification of the recommended sanction,

wy Lo Legs

Tewis H. Lazarus, Esa,
Panel Chair

By:
Maxine Rosenthal

By:

Karen L, Valihura, Esq,

Dated: March 14,2008

7
identifying his lawfirm adress as being in Delaware:
6) The contents of tis report be made publi; and
7) Respondent shall pay the costs of these proceedings.

5. Angravating or Mitieating Factors

‘Once a preliminary sanction is recommended, the ABA Standards and the
Delaware Supreme Court require the panel to examine whether any aggravating or mitigating
factors counse! a greater ot lesser sentence. In Re Steiner, 817 A.24 793, 296 (Del. 2003) Here,
‘the Pane! finds the following aggravating factors: dishonest or selfish motive, and a pattern of
misconduct with multiple offenses, fn mitigatio, the Board notes the Respondent's inexperience
in the practice of law and the absence of prior disciplinary record. The Panel does not believe
that these factors requie a modification ofthe recommended sanction.

By:
Cowie FL Lararvs, Bog
Panel Chair

By

 

Dated: March 14,2008,
‘entifying his law firm address as being in Delaware;
6) The contents ofthis report be made public; and
7) Respondent shall pay the costs ofthese proceedings.

5. Asgravating or Mitigating Facts

‘Once preliminary sanction is recommended, the ABA Standards and the
‘Delaware Supreme Court require the panel to examine whether any aggravating or mitigating
factors counsel a greater of lesser sentence. In Re Steiner, 817 A.24 793, 796 (Del. 2003) Here,
‘the Pane finds the following aggravating factors: dishonest or selfish motive, and a patern of
‘misconduct with multiple offenses. In mitigation, the Board notes the Respondent's inexperience
{nthe practice of law and the absence of a prior disciplinary record. The Panel does not believe
that these factors require a modification ofthe recommended sanction.

By:

 

By:

 

By: lose
aren C. Valihar, Bog.

Dated: March 14,2008