Case Title: Randy O'Neill v. James Reemer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2001AP002402

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 13 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2402 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Randy O'Neill and Rita O'Neill,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
James Reemer and Weyerhaeuser Company  
d/b/a Northwest Hardwoods,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  255 Wis. 2d 834, 646 N.W.2d 855 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 14, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. McAlpine   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Daniel C. Arndt and Arndt, Buswell & Thorn, S.C., Sparta, and 
oral argument by Daniel C. Arndt. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, James Reemer, there was a 
brief by Ralph E. Johnson and UAW-GM Legal Services Plan, 
Janesville, and oral argument by Ralph E. Johnson. 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents, 
James 
Reemer 
and 
Weyerhaeuser Company d/b/a Northwest Hardwoods, there was a 
brief by Gerald W. Laabs and Laabs, Skolos & Mills, LLP, Black 
River Falls, and James M. Isaacson and Falkenberg & Isaacson, 
LLC, Cadott. 
 
 
2003 WI 13 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2402  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 282) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Randy O'Neill and Rita O'Neill,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
James Reemer and Weyerhaeuser Company  
d/b/a Northwest Hardwoods,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Randy and 
Rita O'Neill, seek review of an unpublished decision of the 
court of appeals that affirmed the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment dismissing the O'Neills' trespass claim against 
James Reemer, their neighbor, and Weyerhaeuser Company, which 
logged the strip of property in dispute.1  The petitioners assert 
                                                 
1 O'Neill v. Reemer, No. 01-2402, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. April 25, 2002) (affirming a judgment of the circuit 
court of Monroe County, Michael J. McAlpine, Judge). 
No. 
01-2402   
 
2 
 
that the court of appeals erred in concluding that when a right 
of ownership is acquired by adverse possession over a 20-year 
period, the right may nevertheless be lost if within the 
subsequent 30 years title is not recorded as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.33(2) (1999-2000).2  Because we conclude that the 
owner-in-possession 
exception 
to 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement applies to adverse possession claims, we reverse the 
court of appeals decision and remand the action to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
I 
¶2 
The O'Neills and James Reemer own adjoining real 
property in the Township of Little Falls, Monroe County, 
Wisconsin.  The dispute in this case involves a strip of land 
that runs along the boundary between the two properties.  Reemer 
has record title to the disputed strip.  The O'Neills claim 
ownership of the disputed strip based on adverse possession.  
They filed this trespass action after Weyerhaeuser, hired by 
Reemer, logged the strip. 
¶3 
According to affidavits submitted by the O'Neills in 
support of their motion for partial summary judgment, a barbed 
wire fence was erected in 1944 by the O'Neills' predecessor in 
title to keep in livestock.  The disputed strip is the land 
between the fence and the record boundary.  Randy O'Neill's 
father purchased the land in 1958 and conveyed it to the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-2402   
 
3 
 
petitioners in approximately 1999.  The O'Neills and their 
predecessors in title claim to have used the land up to the 
fence for pasturing or hunting from 1944 through to the day 
logging began. 
¶4 
Reemer submitted affidavits in support of his cross 
motion for summary judgment averring that the fence consisted of 
only a few strands of barbed wire and that the disputed strip of 
property was a wild and overgrown natural area.  He argued that 
the 30-year recording requirement precluded the O'Neills from 
asserting ownership by adverse possession. 
¶5 
For purposes of ruling on the summary judgment 
motions, the circuit court assumed that the adverse possession 
claim had ripened in 1964.  Using the reasoning of Shelton v. 
Dolan, 224 Wis. 2d 334, 591 N.W.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1998), the 
circuit court determined that as of 1964 the 30-year period set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.33(2) began to run against the adverse 
possession claim.  Because neither the O'Neills nor their 
predecessors in title recorded any instrument or notice of claim 
to the disputed strip between 1964 and 1994, the circuit court 
concluded that any claim that the O'Neills may have had to 
ownership of the disputed strip based on adverse possession was 
barred as of 1994.  Thus, the circuit court granted summary 
judgment dismissing the O'Neills' adverse possession claim. 
¶6 
In the alternative, the circuit court concluded that 
if the O'Neills' adverse possession claim was not barred by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33(2), there were disputed issues of fact 
regarding whether the fence erected in 1944 was a substantial 
No. 
01-2402   
 
4 
 
enclosure, which would preclude summary judgment for either 
party.3 
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision.  Applying Wis. Stat. § 893.33 as it was interpreted in 
Shelton, the court of appeals concluded that since neither the 
O'Neills nor their predecessor in title had recorded an 
instrument or a notice of claim to the disputed property within 
30 years of the date on which they assert they obtained title by 
adverse possession, the circuit court correctly dismissed the 
O'Neills' claim.  However, in its decision the court of appeals 
raised 
questions 
regarding 
the 
validity 
of 
Shelton's 
construction 
and 
application 
of 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement to adverse possession claims.  The court of appeals 
acknowledged the reasonableness of the petitioners' arguments, 
but observed that it was only the supreme court, not the court 
of appeals, which has the authority to overrule or modify 
Shelton.  O'Neill v. Reemer, No. 01-2402, unpublished slip op. 
at ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. April 25, 2002).  The O'Neills now seek 
review of the decision of the court of appeals. 
II 
¶8 
This case provides us with an opportunity to review 
the issue of whether the owner-in-possession exception to the 
30-year recording requirement set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.33 
                                                 
3 The circuit court also concluded that if Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.33(2) were not a bar and the O'Neills succeeded in 
establishing ownership by adverse possession, they would be 
entitled to damages for any loss under Wis. Stat. §§ 26.05 and 
26.09. 
No. 
01-2402   
 
5 
 
applies to adverse possession claims.  This issue is raised in 
the context of a grant of summary judgment.  We review a circuit 
court's grant or denial of summary judgment independently of the 
circuit court or court of appeals, applying the same methodology 
as the circuit court.  Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 
Wis. 2d 524, 536, 563 N.W.2d 472 (1997).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Here, there is no dispute of material facts relevant to the 
issue before this court.  Instead, we are presented with a 
question of law which is subject to independent appellate 
review.  Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 2001 WI 60, 
243 Wis. 2d 648, 654, 627 N.W.2d 484. 
III 
¶9 
Our discussion in this case centers on statutes 
relating to adverse possession and decisions from this court and 
the court of appeals interpreting those statutes.  The relevant 
statutes create the 30-year recording requirement and the 
owner-in-possession exception to that requirement.  The 30-year 
recording requirement is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.33(2) 
which provides in part: 
[N]o action affecting the possession or title of any 
real estate may be commenced . . . which is founded 
upon any . . . event occurring more than 30 years 
prior to the date of commencement of the action, 
unless . . . within 30 years after the date of 
the . . . event there is [an instrument or notice of 
claim recorded with the register of deeds]. 
No. 
01-2402   
 
6 
 
¶10 The purpose of the 30-year recording requirement is to 
enhance the marketability of title to real estate and protect 
purchasers of real estate from stale claims challenging their 
title or possession.  Herzog v. Bujniewicz, 32 Wis. 2d 26, 32, 
145 N.W.2d 124 (1966).  Under the 30-year recording requirement, 
a person who claims ownership rights as the result of an event 
loses the right to bring a claim based on that event if an 
instrument or notice of claim is not recorded within 30 years of 
the event.  Adverse possession for the period of time necessary 
under the circumstances to obtain title is considered to be an 
"event" covered by the 30-year recording requirement and the 30-
year period commences to run upon the expiration of that period.  
Id. at 31. 
¶11 The 
owner-in-possession 
exception 
to 
the 
30-year 
recording requirement is created by Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) which 
provides in part: 
[The 30-year recording requirement] does not apply to 
any action commenced . . . by any person who is in 
possession of the real estate involved as owner at the 
time the action is commenced. 
The owner-in-possession exception ensures that the rights of 
owners who are in possession of their property are not affected 
if they have not made the filings of record that would otherwise 
be necessary under the 30-year recording requirement.  The 
exception does not impair the purpose of the 30-year recording 
requirement because the expectations of purchasers of property, 
whose 
interests 
are 
protected 
by 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement, are different if the property that they are 
No. 
01-2402   
 
7 
 
purchasing is clearly possessed by a party outside the chain of 
record 
title. 
 
This 
notice 
by 
possession 
and 
resulting 
difference in expectations provides the foundation of the 
owner-in-possession 
exception 
to 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement.4 
¶12 As noted, the court of appeals here applied the 
Shelton 
court's 
construction 
of 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement and the owner-in-possession exception in reaching 
its conclusion that the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment dismissing the O'Neills' adverse possession claim.  The 
plaintiff 
in 
Shelton 
argued 
that 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement did not apply to claims of adverse possession 
because of the owner-in-possession exception.  The court of 
appeals 
rejected 
that 
argument 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
plaintiff's adverse possession claim was properly dismissed 
because 
of 
a 
failure 
to 
satisfy 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement. 
                                                 
4 We note that Wis. Stat. § 706.09 protects purchasers for 
value from certain adverse claims of which they have no notice.  
Although Reemer cites Wis. Stat. § 706.09 as support for his 
argument regarding the interpretation of the owner-in-possession 
exception in Wis. Stat. § 893.33, the issue of whether the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 706.09 would directly bar the 
O'Neills' claim does not appear to have been argued before the 
circuit court or the court of appeals.  Additionally, it was not 
fully briefed or argued in this court.  Accordingly, we make no 
conclusions regarding the direct applicability of Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.09 to this case. 
 
No. 
01-2402   
 
8 
 
¶13 In arriving at its ruling in Shelton, the court of 
appeals looked to two previous decisions of the supreme court, 
Herzog and Leimert v. McCann, 79 Wis. 2d 289, 255 N.W.2d 526 
(1977), to see how to apply Wis. Stat. § 893.33 to ownership by 
adverse possession.  To provide adequate background from which 
to evaluate Shelton, we first address this court's analysis of 
the two cases that serve as the underpinning of the Shelton 
decision. 
¶14 In Herzog, we reviewed whether an adverse possessor 
can qualify for the owner-in-possession exception.  Herzog 
involved a dispute between neighbors regarding the ownership of 
a 1.5-foot strip of property running along the boundary between 
two residential properties.  Similar to the O'Neills, the 
plaintiff, Herzog, sought to introduce evidence of adverse 
possession establishing ownership as of a date that was prior to 
30 years before she brought her action to quiet title in 1964. 
¶15 The evidence indicated that the disputed strip was 
created by a fence that existed in 1912 and continued to exist 
until 1942.  Part of the fence possibly continued to exist as 
late as 1948.  At the time Herzog brought her claim, the fence 
no longer existed but a portion of the disputed strip was 
covered by a concrete driveway used by her. 
¶16 The trial court held that the 30-year recording 
requirement made inadmissible any evidence of acts of adverse 
possession occurring prior to 30 years before the commencement 
of the action, and that the evidence related to acts within the 
30 years was not sufficient to establish title in Herzog by 
No. 
01-2402   
 
9 
 
adverse possession.  Herzog, 32 Wis. 2d at 29.  In analyzing the 
trial court's reasoning, we agreed that the 30-year recording 
requirement's reference to "action affecting possession or 
title" includes adverse possession claims.  Id. at 30-31. 
¶17 We 
concluded, 
however, 
that 
the 
trial 
court's 
interpretation of the 30-year recording requirement as limiting 
Herzog's claim was error because Herzog qualified for the 
owner-in-possession 
exception 
to 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement: 
We think the trial court should have held [that the 
30-year recording requirement] did not apply to the 
plaintiff 
in 
this 
action 
because 
of 
the 
owner-in-possession exception.  For the purpose of 
asserting a claim to the disputed property based upon 
adverse possession, the plaintiff should be considered 
as one "in possession of real estate involved as 
owner." 
Id. at 32.  In reaching this conclusion, we stated that a party 
that has been in possession of land for fifty years should not 
be foreclosed from establishing title to the land.  Herzog, 32 
Wis. 2d at 32. 
¶18 In Leimert, the second case relied on by the Shelton 
court, we addressed whether the 30-year recording requirement 
barred a prescriptive easement claim brought to establish rights 
to use a roadway.  Neighbors Leimert and McCann each owned 
property on an island.  The only point of mainland access was a 
causeway that connected the island to the mainland.  Leimert had 
to use a roadway on McCann's property to access the causeway 
from her property.  The trial court found that Leimert and her 
No. 
01-2402   
 
10 
 
predecessors in title had continuously used the roadway from 
1941 to 1961, which was sufficient to satisfy a finding of 
prescriptive easement. 
¶19 McCann contended that Leimert's claim was barred by 
the 30-year recording requirement.  In analyzing the issue, we 
cited Herzog for the proposition that the 30-year period does 
not commence until after the applicable adverse possession 
period has run.  We therefore concluded that the 30-year period 
began to run in 1961, after the 20-year period necessary to 
obtain a prescriptive easement had ended.  Leimert, 79 Wis. 2d 
at 298.  Since Leimert brought her claim before 1991, she was 
still within the 30-year period so the 30-year recording 
requirement did not bar her claim.  Id. 
¶20 Shelton extended the Herzog and Leimert analysis to 
conclude that a plaintiff cannot bring an adverse possession 
claim if the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the 30-year 
recording requirement, regardless of whether the plaintiff 
qualifies for the owner-in-possession exception.  In Shelton, 
the plaintiff claimed that since the 1930s an access road 
connecting his property to Burris Road had been used by him and 
his predecessors in title.  The access road crossed over 
property owned by the Dolans.  For purposes of its decision, the 
court of appeals assumed without deciding that Shelton or his 
predecessor had obtained title by adverse possession and that 
the requisite 20 years of adverse use had ended sometime in the 
1950s.  The court of appeals concluded that because Shelton did 
not 
perform 
the 
acts 
required 
by 
the 
30-year 
recording 
No. 
01-2402   
 
11 
 
requirement within 30 years of obtaining title by adverse 
possession, the trial court properly dismissed his adverse 
possession claim.  Shelton, 224 Wis. 2d at 344. 
¶21 The analysis of the court of appeals in reaching this 
conclusion was based primarily on Herzog as interpreted by 
Leimert.  Shelton quotes the following statement from Herzog:  
"'Upon the expiration of such period of time [necessary to 
establish adverse possession] the thirty-year period commences 
to run.'"  Id. at 341 (quoting Herzog, 32 Wis. 2d at 31).  Not 
taking 
into 
account 
Herzog's 
later 
discussion 
of 
the 
owner-in-possession 
exception, 
Shelton 
misinterprets 
this 
statement 
to 
mean 
that 
"the owner-in-possession 
exception 
permits proof of a claim of adverse possession but, once title 
by adverse possession is established, the [30-year recording 
requirement] applies."  Id. 
¶22 The Shelton court expressed the difficulty it had in 
interpreting Herzog.  It acknowledged that another reading of 
Herzog is that "the owner-in-possession exception permits proof 
of a claim of adverse possession, and, if the claimant succeeds 
in establishing title, then, by virtue of that same exception, 
the thirty-year rule does not apply."  Shelton, 224 Wis. 2d at 
341.  Nevertheless, the Shelton court interpreted Herzog to 
require application of the 30-year recording requirement even if 
the adverse possessor qualifies for the owner-in-possession 
exception.  It did so because it relied upon language in our 
Leimert decision.  Yet that reliance was misplaced. 
No. 
01-2402   
 
12 
 
¶23 Leimert 
does 
not 
discuss 
the 
owner-in-possession 
exception.  Discussion of the owner-in-possession exception was 
not necessary because the court had already determined that the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement 
did 
not 
bar 
Leimert 
from 
proceeding with her prescriptive easement action, so there was 
no need to discuss whether she qualified for an exception to the 
rule.  Further, Leimert is a prescriptive easement case, and 
Shelton acknowledged that one could argue that a person who has 
a prescriptive easement does have sufficient ownership rights to 
qualify as an owner-in-possession. 
¶24 Thus the Leimert analysis does not address the 
owner-in-possession exception.  Shelton misapplies Leimert in 
concluding 
that 
an 
adverse 
possessor 
qualifying 
for 
the 
owner-in-possession exception nevertheless remains subject to 
the 30-year recording requirement. 
 
¶25 In the concurrence to the court of appeals decision in 
this case, Judge Lundsten writes separately to "emphasize the 
odd result dictated by Shelton's interpretation of prior supreme 
court decisions." O'Neill v. Reemer, unpublished slip op. at ¶12 
(Lundsten, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
He 
questions 
Shelton's 
interpretation which permits claims that are based on 49 years 
of adverse possession but bars claims that are based on 51 years 
of adverse possession:  
Under Shelton, if a person continuously, openly and 
notoriously possesses property, sufficient to satisfy 
"uninterrupted adverse possession" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.25(1)(1999-2000), for forty-nine years prior to 
a legal action, the person may obtain legal title to 
the property.  However, if the legal action arises in 
No. 
01-2402   
 
13 
 
the fifty-first year of such possession, the person 
has no claim because of Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) and its 
thirty-year time limitation.  Shelton, 224 Wis. 2d at 
341-344. 
Id. at ¶13.  Judge Lundsten notes that there does not appear to 
be any greater need to discourage claims after fifty years of 
adverse possession compared with claims prior to fifty years of 
adverse possession.  He concludes by stating that "Shelton draws 
a line that is neither required by the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.33(5) nor supported by sound policy."  Id. at ¶14.  We 
agree. 
 
¶26 The line drawn by Shelton is contrary to the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) because Shelton applies the 30-year 
recording 
requirement 
to 
an 
owner-in-possession 
when 
the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) states that the 30-year 
recording requirement "does not apply to any action brought by 
any person who is in possession of the real estate involved as 
owner at the time the action is commenced." 
 
¶27 Additional text within Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) makes it 
clear that the legislature was differentiating between record 
title and legal ownership.  The owner-in-possession exception in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) refers to "owner."  The very next 
sentence, which sets out a different exception, refers to 
"record title."  Indeed, the sentence after that, which creates 
another exception, also refers to "record title."  This 
distinction has significance.  It is a clear indication of the 
legislature's intent to tie the owner-in-possession exception to 
the legal owner rather than the holder of record title. 
No. 
01-2402   
 
14 
 
 
¶28 Herzog confirms that this was the legislature's intent 
and cites a law review article written by Roy Tulane, an 
attorney primarily responsible for drafting the statutes that 
create 
the 
30-year 
recording 
requirement 
and 
the 
owner-in-possession exception.  Herzog, 32 Wis. 2d at 32.  In 
the article, Tulane writes: 
[The owner-in-possession exception] exempts from the 
operation of the act owners in possession.  The term 
"owner" as therein used means simply the person who, 
either himself or in privity with others, has had 
possession or dominion over the property during the 
last ten or twenty years.  [Footnote references "Wis. 
Stat. (1941) §330.05-.10."] 
Roy Tulane and Ralph Axley, Title to Real Property – Thirty Year 
Limitation Statute, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 258, 264.  The use of the 
words "ten or twenty years" is a reference to the statutory 
periods for adverse possession——ten years if under color of 
title and twenty years if not under color of title.  The 
statutes cited are the adverse possession statutes.  Therefore, 
this quote indicates that use of the term "owner" in the 
owner-in-possession exception was intended to include those who 
own by adverse possession. 
 
¶29 This interpretation of the legislature's intent is 
consistent with the purpose of the 30-year recording requirement 
to make record title more marketable, that is, to shorten the 
period of time within which the record title must be reviewed, 
as compared to before the 30-year recording requirement existed.  
The 30-year recording requirement was not intended to make 
No. 
01-2402   
 
15 
 
record title more marketable as compared to title by adverse 
possession. 
 
¶30 The line drawn by Shelton is also contrary to sound 
policy.  It is illogical to construe a statute with a purpose of 
eliminating stale claims in such a way that after 50 years of 
staleness a right of ownership in record title is resurrected.  
In adverse possession cases, it is the record title to the 
property that has lain dormant and stale.  At the end of the 
applicable adverse possession period, title vests in the adverse 
possessor and the record owner's title is extinguished.  Harwick 
v. Black, 217 Wis. 2d 691, 701, 580 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1998).  
Even though title has been extinguished, Shelton would reignite 
the record owner's title and extinguish the title of the adverse 
possessor, even if the adverse possessor has been in continuous 
adverse possession for over 50 years. 
 
¶31 The more sound result is achieved by permitting the 
adverse 
possessor 
to 
qualify 
for 
the 
owner-in-possession 
exception to the 30-year recording requirement.  Otherwise, one 
who has adversely possessed property for over 50 years would not 
be able to claim title while one who has adversely possessed 
property between 20 and 50 years would be able to do so.  In 
addition, adverse possession claims sometimes involve situations 
in which the parties are operating under the belief that the 
adverse possessor has record title to the property that is being 
adversely possessed.  It is therefore illogical to create an 
expectation that the adverse possessor make a filing of record 
before the incident prompting the lawsuit arises. 
No. 
01-2402   
 
16 
 
¶32 Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that 
Shelton misinterprets Herzog, misapplies Leimert, and draws a 
line 
that 
is 
neither 
required 
by 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33(5) 
nor 
supported 
by 
sound 
policy.5  
Accordingly, we overrule Shelton. 
IV 
¶33 The circuit court noted that if it was error to grant 
summary judgment based on the application of the 30-year 
recording requirement as interpreted by Shelton, there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fence 
constructed in 1944 constitutes a "substantial enclosure" under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.25.  The resolution of this issue affects 
whether the O'Neills can establish ownership of the disputed 
strip by adverse possession. 
¶34 Through affidavits, the O'Neills claim that the fence 
"was maintained as a boundary for the property and as a pasture 
enclosure for the cattle."  Reemer, on the other hand, describes 
the "fence" as barbed wire strung from tree to tree and 
characterizes it as a makeshift method to enclose cattle.  
According to Reemer, it was insufficient to constitute a 
substantial enclosure. 
¶35 Reemer also asserts that the fence is in a wild, 
wooded area and that he and his immediate predecessor in title 
                                                 
5 The plaintiff in Shelton did not petition this court to 
review the court of appeals decision.  At oral argument, Reemer 
conceded that Shelton employed a faulty analysis. 
 
No. 
01-2402   
 
17 
 
did not even know the fence existed.  There is some indication 
that the logging damaged the fence.  However, even prior to the 
logging, the fence appears to have been in a state of disrepair, 
possibly half up and half down. 
¶36 Accordingly, although we have concluded that an owner 
by adverse possession can qualify for the owner-in-possession 
exception, it is not clear whether the O'Neills will be 
successful in their adverse possession claim.  As the circuit 
court noted, there remains a genuine issue of material fact. 
¶37 In sum, we agree with the premise of Herzog that "a 
person who with his predecessors in title has been in possession 
of land for over fifty years ought not to be foreclosed from 
establishing title to the land."  Herzog, 32 Wis. 2d at 32.  
Because 
Shelton 
concludes 
to 
the 
contrary 
based 
on 
a 
misinterpretation of Herzog and misapplication of Leimert, we 
overrule Shelton.  Instead, we reaffirm the conclusion of Herzog 
that the owner-in-possession exception to the 30-year recording 
requirement applies to adverse possession claims.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the court of appeals and remand the action to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.   
¶38 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
  
 
 
No. 
01-2402   
 
 
 
1