Case Title: Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corporation

Citation: 285 So. 2d 7

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1973-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
285 So. 2d 7 (1973)
Eddie HAMMONDS, Petitioner,
v.
BUCKEYE CELLULOSE CORPORATION et al., Respondents.
No. 43303.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 10, 1973.
Rehearing Denied November 19, 1973.
Ted R. Manry, III, and Charlie Luckie, Jr., of MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for petitioner.
Byron Butler, Perry, John E. Mathews, Jr. of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, and Paul E. Raymond and William M. Barr of Raymond, Wilson, Karl, Conway & Barr, Daytona Beach, for respondents.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 271 So. 2d 179, Fla. App., which purportedly conflicts with Knox v. Spratt, 19 Fla. 817 (1883); Beekman v. Sonntag Investment Co., 67 Fla. 293, 64 So. 948 (1914); Triplett et al. v. Brevard Properties, Inc., 94 Fla. 869, 115 So. 534 (1927); Sperling et al. v. Davie, 41 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1949); Johnson v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 169 So. 2d 36 (Fla.App. 1964); South Florida Citrus Land Co. v. Waldin, 61 Fla. 766, 55 So. 862 (1911); and Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1956). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution F.S.A. (as amended 1973).
Petitioner filed a complaint and amendments thereto against respondent, The Buckeye Cellulose Corporation, Canal Timber Corporation, Gibson Paperwood Company, Inc., T.B. Upchurch, T.B. Upchurch, Inc., and Upchurch Milling Co. for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of certain described property to petitioner. Attached to petitioner's complaint and amendments were copies of the various contracts, options, agreements, and deed mentioned in the complaint or its amendments pursuant to Rule 1.130, F.R.C.P. 30 F.S.A. Petitioner's complaint alleged, as follows:
In his first amendment to the complaint, petitioner added The Buckeye Cellulose Corporation and Mrs. Pete Gibson as additional defendants in the cause, and additionally alleged that,
In a second amendment to the complaint, petitioner restated paragraph 18 with a slight variation and further alleged:
All of the defendants except respondent answered the complaint as amended. Contesting the sufficiency of the complaint, respondent moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action for specific performance. The trial judge in his order dismissing the complaint stated that,
The District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the cause and held, inter alia, that petitioner may have a cause of action against Upchurch and his Upchurch Corporations which he proposed to represent as agent, but the respondent was not bound by any *11 agreements between such potential stockholder and a third party even though the respondent had notice thereof and held that the amended and re-amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which specific performance was authorized against Buckeye.
The sole issue presently before this Court is the sufficiency of petitioner's complaint as amended. We do not agree with the trial court's order of dismissal and the affirmation thereof by the District Court. To state a cause of action, Rule 1.110, F.R.C.P. 30 F.S.A., requires that the complaint contain:
The bill of complaint presently challenged before this Court comports with the requirements set out in Rule 1.110(b), F.R.C.P. 30 F.S.A., and is sufficient on its face to state a cause of action. See Pizzi v. Central Bank & Trust Co., Fla., 250 So. 2d 895; Knox v. Spratt, supra; Beekman v. Sonntag, supra; Triplett v. Brevard Properties, Inc., supra; Sperling v. Davie, supra. A complaint need only state facts sufficient to indicate that a cause of action exists and need not anticipate affirmative defenses. Johnson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra. This Court stated in Pizzi v. Central Bank & Trust Co., supra at 896:
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a good cause of action, and for purposes of passing on a motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must assume that all facts alleged in the complaint are true. Odham v. Foremost Dairies, 128 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1961); Connolly v. Sebeco, supra; Simon v. Tampa Electric Co., 202 So. 2d 209 (Fla.App. 1967); Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311 (Fla.App. 1970).
We hold that the complaint as framed states a cause of action and the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the complaint. At this stage of the proceedings, we comment that this decision deals only with pleadings and is not to be construed as dispositive of this case which must be finally determined after a trial on further pleadings and evidence.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause is remanded with instructions to remand to the trial court for further pleadings and trial of the issues of fact and final judgment.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
CARLTON, C.J., and BOYD, J., dissent.