Case Title: American Physical Therapy Ass'n v. Fed. of State Boards of Physical Therapy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 051750

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 
 
AMERICAN PHYSICAL THERAPY ASSOCIATION 
 
v.  Record No. 051750     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 21, 2006 
FEDERATION OF STATE BOARDS OF 
PHYSICAL THERAPY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John E. Kloch, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether the trial court erred 
in holding that Code § 8.01-246(2), the five-year statute of 
limitations governing actions on written contracts, barred 
this contract action in its entirety. 
The American Physical Therapy Association (the APTA) is a 
non-profit organization devoted to "foster[ing] advancements 
in physical therapy practice, research, and education in the 
United States."  Its members include physical therapists, 
their assistants, and students.  During the period 1953-54, 
the APTA developed the National Physical Therapy Examination 
(the Examination), which remains the only licensure 
examination in the physical therapy field in the United 
States.  On January 1, 1993, by a document entitled "Transfer 
Agreement" (the Agreement), the APTA transferred the duties of 
administering the Examination to the Federation of State 
                     
∗ Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
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Boards of Physical Therapy (the Federation), a distinct entity 
incorporated to assume such duties.  The APTA, however, 
retained oversight over certain aspects of the Examination, 
including the Examination fee.  Section 4.08 of the Agreement, 
entitled "Sale of the Examination and Related Products," 
states: 
The Federation shall establish prices for the 
Examination that are generally consistent 
(taking inflation into account) with prior 
levels and which are not unduly burdensome to 
candidates. 
 
When the Federation assumed ownership of the Examination, the 
fee was $90.  The Federation increased the fee to $185 on 
January 1, 1995, and on July 1, 2000, it increased the fee to 
$285 and imposed additional "sitting fees." 
On November 8, 2004, the APTA filed a bill of complaint 
against the Federation alleging, among other claims, that the 
fee increases breached Section 4.08.  The APTA included in its 
allegations of breach of contract the Federation's proposed 
fee increase to $350 for 2005, which the Federation 
subsequently adopted on January 1, 2005.  The Federation filed 
a demurrer and special plea of the statute of limitations 
asserting that, as pled by the APTA, the breach of contract 
occurred on January 1, 1995 when the Federation increased the 
fee to $185.  Citing Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps 
Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 379 S.E.2d 316 (1989), the 
 
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Federation argued that the original breach continued and the 
subsequent fee increases only created additional damages.  
Thus, the Federation contended that the APTA's breach of 
contract claim accrued more than five years before the APTA 
filed this action and was time-barred. 
Following briefing and argument of counsel, the trial 
court entered an order sustaining the Federation's special 
plea of the statute of limitations and dismissing all the 
APTA's claims based on an alleged breach of Section 4.08.  We 
awarded the APTA an appeal. 
 
The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that Code § 8.01-246(2) bars the APTA's 
claims that the Federation breached Section 4.08 because the 
three fee increases the Federation imposed gave rise only to 
one cause of action that accrued on January 1, 1995 when the 
Federation first increased the fee. 
In Westminster, upon which the trial court and the 
Federation rely, we held that where from the inception of a 
lease, the landlord failed to enforce a provision pertaining 
to uniform hours of operation for all tenants in a shopping 
center, the complaining tenant's cause of action accrued on 
the day of the landlord's initial breach.  See id. at 549, 379 
S.E.2d at 319. 
 
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In contrast, the APTA asserts that the proper analysis is 
that set out in Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. v. McDonnell, 
234 Va. 235, 360 S.E.2d 841 (1987).  In that case, we examined 
whether intermittent discharges of raw sewage and other 
pollutants from a county pumping station onto a landowner's 
property gave rise to one cause of action that accrued in 
1969, when the first discharge occurred, or separate causes of 
action that accrued with each discharge.  We explained that 
"[i]f the wrongful act is of a permanent nature and one that 
produces 'all the damage which can ever result from it, [then] 
the entire damages must be recovered in one action,' and the 
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the 
wrongful act," but if the wrongful acts are not continuous and 
"occur only at intervals, each occurrence inflicts a new 
injury and gives rise to a new and separate cause of action."  
Id. (quoting Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 118 Va. 428, 435, 
87 S.E. 558, 560 (1916), aff'g on rehearing, 118 Va. 428, 87 
S.E. 558 (1915)).  Because not all of the injury to the 
landowner's property occurred with the first discharge in 1969 
and because the discharges took place at intervals, we 
determined the landowner could bring his claims for damages 
that occurred in that five-year period directly preceding the 
filing of his lawsuit.  Id. at 239, 360 S.E.2d at 844.  
Whether the Federation’s actions constituted a single 
 
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continuing breach contemplated by Westminster or a series of 
separate breaches addressed in Hampton Roads depends on the 
relevant facts. 
 
In this case, Section 4.08 mandates that the Federation 
"shall establish prices for the Examination" that comply with 
the requirements set out in that section.  The term "shall 
establish prices" does not, as the Federation suggests, impose 
an obligation such as that of the landlord in Westminster that 
is "continuing in nature" and remains "each day whether the 
Federation increases, maintains, or decreases the Exam fee."  
Rather, as the APTA argues, the term contemplates a distinct 
obligation that arises each time the Federation imposes a new 
fee.  Furthermore, by referring to "prior levels" in 
determining whether the new fees are consistent and not unduly 
burdensome, the Section contemplates that the new fee will not 
be evaluated by reference back solely to the amount of the 
original fee.  As in Hampton Roads, the first injury did not 
inflict "all the damage which can ever result," 234 Va. at 
239, 360 S.E.2d at 843; rather, each time the Federation 
imposed a new fee, a new injury occurred and a separate cause 
of action accrued.  Under these circumstances, the 
Federation’s actions constituted distinct, separate breaches 
of the Agreement, and the APTA is entitled to bring its claims 
 
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for those breaches of contract that occurred in the five years 
preceding its filing of this suit. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the ruling of the trial 
court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.