Case Title: Allen v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 377 P.2d 201, 92 Ariz. 357

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1962-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
92 Ariz. 357 (1962) 377 P.2d 201 Charles W. ALLEN, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and Baum & Adamson Tire & Automotive Service, Respondents. No. 7538. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. December 28, 1962. *358 Boyle, Bilby, Thompson & Schoenhair, and W.E. Dolph, Jr., Tucson, for petitioner. James D. Lester, Phoenix, Donald J. Morgan, Edward E. Davis, C.E. Singer, Jr., Lorin G. Shelley, Ben P. Marshall, Phoenix, of counsel, for respondent Industrial Commission. JENNINGS, Justice. By certiorari we here review an award of the Industrial Commission (hereinafter called Commission) denying Charles W. Allen (hereinafter called petitioner) further compensation for injuries sustained in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on June 1, 1956. On June 1, 1956 petitioner was employed by Baum & Adamson Tire & Automotive Service (hereinafter called Baum & Adamson) as a service salesman. On that date he was involved in an accident.[1] As a result of the accident, petitioner suffered the loss of his right eye by enucleation and sustained a 30% permanent partial functional disability of his right (major) hand. Petitioner subsequently returned to work for Baum & Adamson at his previous wage and performed substantially the same duties as he performed before the accident. The Commission found that petitioner's injuries resulted from an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment; that his physical condition became stationary on February 12, 1958; that because petitioner sustained multiple scheduled *359 injuries, compensation had to be awarded, pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1044, Subsection C,[2] as if such injuries were unscheduled; and that since petitioner returned to work at the same rate of pay as that received prior to his injury he suffered no loss of earning capacity as a result of the accident. Petitioner was therefore denied further compensation. Upon rehearing the Commission affirmed its previous findings and award. Thereafter, petitioner brought the matter before this Court by writ of certiorari. We set the award aside in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ariz. 56, 347 P.2d 710 (1959). Following the decision of this Court the Commission held additional hearings and thereafter entered its findings and award wherein it was ordered that the "applicant take nothing further by reason of his claim for benefits heretofore filed herein". The findings and award of the Commission were affirmed on rehearing and the matter again brought before this Court by writ of certiorari. We stated in our earlier opinion of this case that the findings of the Commission should be affirmed if supported by competent evidence. However, we held that the findings of the Commission were not supported by competent evidence and therefore set the award aside. In order for us to vary from our original position in this case it is necessary to determine whether the evidence presented to the Commission since that time is sufficient to now sustain the findings of the Commission. The petitioner contends that the evidence does not sustain the findings and therefore the award should be set aside. The findings of the Commission are in part as follows: The Commission contends that Finding No. 5 is supported by the evidence. The "new evidence" upon which the Commission relies to sustain such finding is that the petitioner has continued in the employ of Baum & Adamson; that petitioner made $7,102 during the calendar year of 1960; that petitioner is earning about the same as two other employees of Baum & Adamson;[3] and that petitioner's employer testified that he was satisfied with petitioner's performance as a commercial tire salesman. The Commission contends that these factors support their position that petitioner has a capacity to perform and earn comparable to an experienced salesman in spite of his handicap. The evidence which the Commission contends supports Finding No. 5 is substantially the same now as it was in the previous case. True, petitioner is making more per month now than he was before the injury. However, there is ample testimony in the record to support petitioner's contention that "the pay for persons engaged in the business in which petitioner is employed *361 has risen considerably since the date of the injury and that the increase was due, at least in part and probably to a major extent, to general business conditions and inflation." Ralph R. Bailey, a witness for the Commission, testified that the basic wage for commercial tire salesmen had increased by about one-third since 1956. He stated that the basic guarantee or wage "may have increased by one hundred or two hundred a month since that time." Three other witnesses testified that the general scale of wages for commercial tire salesmen had increased since 1956 due to economic conditions. Although petitioner's employer testified that he was satisfied with petitioner's performance he also stated that his reasons for retaining him on the payroll was his loyalty to a loyal employee and that he did not "feel that Mr. Allen was anywhere near as capable of doing the job after the accident as he was before." He also testified that "we sort of had to modify our job to suit Mr. Allen's physical requirements and physical ability." In support of Finding No. 7 the Commission relies upon the medical report of the doctors[4] wherein it was stated: The doctors concluded: On July 17, 1961 Drs. Schwartzmann and Cortner were called to testify with reference to the report at a hearing held by the Commission. Dr. Schwartzmann testified in part as follows: Dr. Cortner testified in part as follows: Once again the evidence disputes the finding of the Commission. For, as stated in our earlier opinion: The Commission contends that the evidence supports the finding that the petitioner's disabilities do not decrease his ability to secure employment related to his regular occupation[6] and the finding that the petitioner is employable and eligible for advancements, promotions and raises as a commercial tire salesman.[7] The only "new evidence" in support of these findings was the testimony of two competitive employers in Tucson. Although both witnesses[8] testified that the petitioner was "employable" as a commercial tire salesman and eligible for advancements, promotions and raises, both stated that they would not employ petitioner with his present handicap if they needed to fill one position comparable to that which petitioner occupies if both petitioner and another person equally qualified but without petitioner's handicaps were available. In addition, Chester A. Vasey, manager of the Firestone Store in Tucson, testified as follows: Petitioner's employer testified on this point as follows: And Dr. Cortner testified that he thought petitioner would have difficulty in obtaining work if he were thrown out on the open labor market. His testimony on this point was as follows: *366 The "new evidence" submitted to the Commission since our last decision in this case is not sufficient to cause us to vary from our original position that "the award of the Commission denying permanent compensation to petitioner is not supported by competent evidence." The award is set aside. BERNSTEIN, C.J., UDALL, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concurring. [1] At the time of the accident petitioner was 36 years old and had been employed by Baum & Adamson for about nine years. [2] Subsection C provides: "In cases not enumerated in subsection B of this section, where the injury causes permanent partial disability for work, the employee shall receive during such disability compensation equal to fifty-five per cent of the difference between his average monthly wages before the accident and the amount which represents his reduced monthly earning capacity resulting from the disability, but the payment shall not continue after the disability ends, or the death of the injured person, and in case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of compensation." [3] Petitioner's employer testified that one of his employees earned $7,500 during 1960 and that another earned $6,000. [4] Petitioner was examined in group consultation by Drs. C.A. Guarino, J.W. Cortner, and J.R. Schwartzmann on March 8, 1960. [5] In addition, petitioner's present job was tailored to accommodate his handicaps. [6] Finding No. 8. [7] Finding No. 10. [8] One witness was an assistant manager and had done no actual hiring.