Case Title: Culpepper v. State

Citation: 595 S.W.2d 220

Docket Number: CR 80-35

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1980-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
595 S.W.2d 220 (1980) Byron CULPEPPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 80-35. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 17, 1980. *221 John W. Achor, Public Defender by William H. Patterson, Jr., Chief Appellate Atty., Little Rock, for appellant. Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Ray Hartenstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. STROUD, Justice. Appellant entered a plea of guilty on January 22,1979, to the charge of burglary. The court sentenced appellant to "five (5) years suspended with three (3) years probation; all conditioned on good behavior, steady employment and support of his family," as reflected by judgment entered on the same date. Four months after appellant was sentenced, the State petitioned the court to revoke his probated sentence on the grounds that he had violated the terms of his probation by committing the offense of aggravated robbery. On June 6, 1979, the court granted the petition to revoke the suspended and probated sentence entered on January 22 and sentenced appellant to 15 years imprisonment. Alleging that the trial court erred in increasing his sentence from 5 years to 15 years, appellant brings this appeal. The appellant alleges that the law is unclear and confusing concerning sentencing since the Criminal Code was adopted and that he was denied due process by failure of the trial court to adequately advise him of the potential maximum sentence if he violated the terms of his suspended sentence or probation. We acknowledge that when the Criminal Code became effective on January 1, 1976, the failure of the Act to expressly repeal conflicting previous statutes has led to considerable confusion in this area of our criminal law. Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code, the trial court, in addition to authority to place a defendant on probation, clearly had authority to either: In Canard v. State, 225 Ark. 559, 283 S.W.2d 685 (1955), the court construed these two statutes and pointed out that although previous decisions had sometimes made distinctions: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2331 (Repl.1977) adopted by the legislature in 1973 also made no distinction: A distinction does now exist, however, due to the adoption of the Criminal Code, a portion of which provides in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-803 (Repl.1977) as follows: All sentences are controlled by its provisions and, therefore, any provisions of the prior law that are inconsistent are repealed by implication. Inasmuch as the statute only authorizes the court to suspend imposition of sentence or place the defendant on probation, the suspension of the execution of sentence is no longer authorized and § 43-2326 is repealed by implication. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2324 has been superseded by recodification into several different parts of the new Criminal Code and is also repealed by implication. Finally, § 43-2331, insofar as it conflicts with the provisions of the Criminal Code and specifically insofar as it authorizes the suspension of the execution of sentence is repealed by implication. We agree with appellant that he is entitled to know the effect of his sentence. This is clearly the spirit of the Code which now requires in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1203(4) (Repl.1977) that the defendant be given a written statement explicitly setting forth the terms of the suspension of imposition of sentence or probation; and whereas trial courts have typically used the phrase "on good behavior" in the past, § 41-1203(1) requires as an express condition of every suspension or probation that the defendant "not commit an offense punishable by imprisonment during the period of suspension or probation." The Criminal Code did not repeal Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2305 (Repl.1977) which provides: We should, however, acknowledge that § 41-1208(6) was partially repealed by implication in 1979. The legislature amended Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2332 (Repl.1977) which otherwise deals with the duties, authority and salaries of a probation officer and limited the sentence authorized upon revocation of probation: In an effort to further clarify the confusion between the Criminal Code and previous statutes, we point out that the suspension of imposition of sentence and probation, as was apparently intended by the trial court, is at variance with the Code. Reference is made throughout the Code to suspending imposition of sentence or placing the defendant on probation, but in no instance do we find provision for both.[1] Both terms are defined in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-801(1) and (2), and although both definitions require that the defendant be released "by the court without pronouncement of sentence" (in contradistinction to the actions of the trial court in this case), the two cannot occur simultaneously, as the former is "without supervision" and the latter requires "supervision of a probation officer." The decision of the trial court is accordingly modified and the sentence of appellant is reduced from 15 years to 5 years. [1] The reference in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1206(2) (Repl.1977) to "multiple periods of suspension or probation" is applicable only to multiple offenses.