Case Title: Payphone Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-2988

Docket Number: 20042128

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Payphone Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 453, 2006-Ohio-2988.] 
 
 
 
PAYPHONE ASSOCIATION OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE; SBC OHIO, 
INTERVENING APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Payphone Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 
109 Ohio St.3d 453, 2006-Ohio-2988.] 
Public Utilities — Pay-phone services — Public Utility Commission’s 
determination to reduce tariff rate was lawful, reasonable, and not 
manifestly against the weight of the evidence — Public Utility Commission 
did not violate the scope of its delegated authority in choosing  method to 
determine overhead loading — Decision affirmed. 
(No. 2004-2128 — Submitted October 25, 2005 — Decided June 28, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 96-1310-TP-COI. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
INTRODUCTION 
{¶1} 
Appellant and cross-appellee, Payphone Association of Ohio 
(“PAO”), and cross-appellant and intervening appellee, SBC Ohio,1 appeal as of 
right from orders of appellee Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) that 
establish rates charged by SBC Ohio to its competitors for pay-phone services.  
We conclude that the PUCO did not commit reversible error, we reject all claimed 
errors, and we affirm the orders. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶2} 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 151 et seq., Title 
47, U.S.Code (the “1996 Act”), which significantly restructured the 
                                                 
1.  SBC Ohio is a registered trade name of the Ohio Bell Telephone Company.  SBC Ohio was 
formerly known as  Ameritech Ohio.   
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telecommunications industry, included a provision addressing pay-phone services.  
Section 276, Title 47, U.S.Code (“Section 276”).  Section 276 was intended to 
ensure that a local exchange carrier (“LEC”) did not subsidize its own pay-phone 
service, either directly or indirectly, and did not discriminate in favor of its own 
pay-phone service.  On September 20, 1996, the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) released In re Implementation of the Pay Tel. 
Reclassification & Comp. Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(1996), 11 Fed. Communications Comm. Record 20541 (Pay Tel.) to implement 
Section 276.  The FCC’s order established procedures to insure that LECs 
provided pay-phone services to competitors under the same terms and conditions 
that they provided services to their own pay-phone operations.  Id. 
{¶3} 
On reconsideration, the FCC required LECs to provide 
independent pay-phone-service providers the option of using either “smart” pay 
phones, which are instrument-implemented,2 or “dumb” pay phones.3  Pay Tel., 
11 Fed. Communications Comm. Record 21233.  The order also required LECs to 
file cost-based tariffs for both types of pay-phone service with their state 
commissions.  If an LEC already had filed tariffs for these services, a state 
commission could conclude that the tariffs complied with the requirements of 
Section 276 and the FCC’s orders.  In that event, further filings were not required.  
Id. 
{¶4} 
On December 9, 1996, the PUCO initiated the proceedings below 
to implement Section 276 and the FCC’s decisions regarding pay-phone services. 
Shortly thereafter, the PUCO directed all LECs operating within Ohio to file 
tariffs with the requisite access-line provisions for smart and dumb pay phones.  
                                                 
2.  An instrument-implemented telephone contains all the circuitry required to execute coin 
acceptance and related functions within the instrument itself and does not require coin-service 
signaling from a central office. 
 
3.  A central-office-implemented telephone requires coin-service signaling from a central office. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
The same entry noted that the PUCO had recently approved a pay-phone tariff for 
dumb pay phones for then Ameritech Ohio. 
{¶5} 
In May 1997, the PUCO instructed each Ohio LEC to review its 
pay-phone tariff to ensure that it was consistent with the requirements of Section 
276 and the FCC decisions.  LECs were ordered to file proposed tariff 
amendments by June 22, 1997.  SBC Ohio filed a letter verifying that its 
previously approved pay-phone tariffs complied with the requirements.  The 
PUCO issued an entry on September 25, 1997, stating that the pay-phone tariffs 
of SBC Ohio and numerous other LECs complied with all federal and state 
requirements. 
{¶6} 
On January 28, 1999, the PUCO granted the PAO’s request for an 
evidentiary hearing.  The PUCO also stated that all approved tariffs would remain 
in effect.  The hearing date, which was originally scheduled in 2000, was 
indefinitely continued while discovery disputes were resolved. 
{¶7} 
Before the hearing was held, on January 31, 2002, the FCC 
released In re Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm. (2002), 17 Fed. Communications 
Comm. Record 2051 (“Wisconsin PSC”).  This order revised and clarified the 
previous FCC decisions regarding pay-phone services.  In Wisconsin PSC, the 
FCC  determined that Bell Operating Companies (“BOCs”) were required to set 
pay-phone-line rates in compliance with a cost-based, forward-looking “new 
services test” (“NST”).  The NST set the direct cost of providing a new service as 
a price floor and then allowed a reasonable amount of overhead to arrive at the 
overall price of the new service.  The FCC also determined that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the pay-phone-line rates of LECs that were not BOCs. 
{¶8} 
In compliance with Wisconsin PSC, the PUCO dismissed all non-
BOC LECs from the proceeding.  The PUCO then revised the issues to be 
considered at hearing.  The PUCO also issued interim rates that became effective 
January 30, 2003. 
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{¶9} 
The evidentiary hearing began on January 29, 2004.  After briefing 
by the parties, the PUCO issued its decision on September 1, 2004.  The PUCO 
accepted the cost studies offered by SBC Ohio, except for the proposed overhead 
loadings, 4 and found that it was appropriate to apply unbundled-network-element 
(“UNE”)5 overhead loadings rather than those obtained by SBC Ohio’s use of the 
Physical Collocation Tariff Order (“PCTO”)6 methodology.  This appeal 
followed. 
PAO’S APPEAL 
First Claimed Error 
{¶10} PAO argues that the PUCO did not comply with federal and state 
law when it approved SBC Ohio’s pay-phone tariff without the telephone 
company ever filing a tariff that complied with the NST. 
{¶11} PAO is correct in stating that SBC Ohio did not file new tariffs 
following the PUCO’s December 19, 1996 entry.  A new filing was unnecessary, 
however, because SBC Ohio had already filed tariffs for smart pay phones on 
April 9, 1985, in case No. 84-834-TP-ATA, and for dumb pay phones on 
September 19, 1996, in case No. 96-844-TP-ATA.  The PUCO recognized that 
SBC Ohio had filed tariffs for dumb pay phones when it issued the December 19, 
1996 entry.  In Finding Five of that entry, the PUCO stated:  “In addition, the 
Commission observes that it has recently approved an Ameritech application to 
provide payphone access lines to dumb payphones (Case No. 96-844-TP-ATA).” 
                                                 
4.  The overhead loading is the amount by which the price or the proposed rate exceeds the direct 
cost. An overhead-loading factor is the overhead loading divided by the direct cost. 
 
5.  The UNE methodology bases overhead allocations for pay-phone-line services on the overhead 
allocations approved for UNE element services. 
 
6. Under the PCTO methodology, the direct cost of a comparable and competitive service is 
calculated. Overhead loading is then calculated by determining the difference between the direct 
cost and the lowest rate of service, including volume and term discounts.  
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶12} The FCC had previously determined, however, that when LECs 
had already filed tariffs for pay-phone-line rates, the state commissions could 
conclude that those existing tariffs were consistent with the requirements of 
Section 276 and other FCC requirements and that no further tariff filing would be 
required.  Pay Tel., 11 Fed. Communications Comm. Record 21233, ¶ 163.  
Because Ameritech Ohio, the predecessor of SBC Ohio, had previously filed pay-
phone-line rates that were consistent with Section 276 and other FCC 
requirements, no further tariff filing was required. 
{¶13} On May 22, 1997, the PUCO issued an entry indicating that the 
pay-phone-line tariffs of all LECs, including SBC Ohio, had become effective on 
or before April 15, 1997.  In the same entry, the commission ordered all LECs to 
review their pay-phone-line tariffs for compliance with Section 276 and with 
other requirements of the FCC and the PUCO.  SBC Ohio made a directed tariff 
review and submitted its review to PUCO staff for approval.  PUCO staff 
recommended approval.  On September 26, 1997, the PUCO found that SBC 
Ohio’s pay-phone tariffs that were in effect in 1997 satisfied the requirements of 
Section 276 and the FCC’s orders, stating:  “The Commission’s Staff has 
reviewed the proposed tariff filings of the carriers identified in Finding (4); has 
concluded that they are consistent with the requirements of the 1996 Act, the 
FCC’s decisions in CC Docket No. 96-128, and the Commission’s May 22, 1997 
Entry in this proceeding, and recommend their approval by the Commission. 
{¶14} “The Commission concurs in Staff’s recommendation and, 
therefore, finds these applications shall be approved.” 
{¶15} Because the PUCO had already reviewed SBC Ohio’s tariffs and 
found them to be consistent with the 1996 Act, no further pay-phone-tariff filings 
needed to be made at that time.  We reject the first claimed error. 
Second Claimed Error 
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{¶16} PAO asserts that when the PUCO determined in January 2004 that 
SBC Ohio’s existing pay-phone-tariff rate had to be reduced because it failed to 
meet the reasonableness standard of the NST, the PUCO was required to 
expressly find that the pay-phone tariff in effect in 1997 violated the FCC pricing 
standard and its own standard and was inconsistent with the 1996 Act.  The 
PUCO refused to address the issue of refunds for any period before the interim 
tariff rates were approved in 2003, finding that the issue had been previously 
considered in the proceedings and that PAO had not presented any new facts or 
questions of law.  The PUCO’s conclusion is reversible on appeal only if 
manifestly against the weight of the evidence.  Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 275, 22 OBR 447, 490 N.E.2d 888, syllabus.  
See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
266, 268, 527 N.E.2d 777.  Moreover, this court will not substitute its own 
opinion for that of the PUCO on questions of fact.  Pennsylvania RR. Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1933), 126 Ohio St. 260, 262, 185 N.E. 49.  Accord Consumers’ 
Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 111, 112, 4 OBR 358, 447 
N.E.2d 749; Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 263, 
264, 513 N.E.2d 243.  With respect to this claimed error, we conclude that the 
determination by the PUCO is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence.  
We reject the second claimed error. 
Third Claimed Error 
{¶17} PAO seeks reversal and remand of this cause with instructions to 
the PUCO to “enforce what SBC Ohio had voluntarily committed to do.”  The 
commitment PAO refers to is an alleged agreement by the BOCs, including SBC 
Ohio, to reimburse or provide a credit for pay-phone charges in the event the NST 
resulted in reduced tariff rates for pay-phone-line service.  The purported 
commitment was contained in three letters, copies of which were supplied to the 
January Term, 2006 
7 
court by PAO.  All three letters were addressed to staff members of the FCC or 
PUCO and bore dates between April 10 and May 16, 1997. 
{¶18} PAO relies entirely on these letters to establish SBC Ohio’s 
commitment to pay refunds back to 1997.  The letters are not properly before the 
court, however, and will not be considered in this appeal.  The first two letters 
were filed with the PUCO as attachments to a PAO witness’s direct testimony.  
The PUCO’s attorney examiner granted SBC Ohio’s motion to strike the letters 
because their introduction as evidence violated earlier orders in which the PUCO 
held that refunds for any period of time prior to the imposition of the interim rates 
were not within the scope of the proceedings.  The PUCO affirmed its attorney 
examiner’s ruling, striking the letters both on interlocutory appeal and on 
rehearing.  The third letter was never introduced or proffered at the hearing.  
Instead, it was attached as an exhibit to PAO’s application for rehearing, which 
was filed October 1, 2004.  The PUCO found that the third letter could have been 
provided during the hearing, that it had not been, and that it was not part of the 
record. 
{¶19} In its third and fourth claims of error, PAO makes substantive 
arguments based on these letters as if they were part of the record in this case.  
Because they were not in evidence, we disregard PAO’s arguments concerning 
them.  We reject the third claimed error. 
Fourth Claimed Error 
{¶20} PAO argues that “[r]equiring SBC Ohio to live up to its 
commitment to provide reimbursement of overcharges would not constitute 
retroactive ratemaking.”  This argument anticipates an argument by SBC Ohio 
that refunding overcharges made before the interim rates were imposed in 2003 
would amount to retroactive ratemaking.  PAO argues that retroactive ratemaking 
presupposes the existence of a tariff that was duly filed and approved under 
applicable law.  PAO then renews the faulty argument made in connection with its 
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first two claimed errors that SBC Ohio’s pay-phone tariff was never filed or 
approved. 
{¶21} PAO’s arguments are unconvincing.  They rely on the erroneous 
premise that no tariffs were ever filed or approved.  They also depend upon the 
existence of refund commitments by SBC Ohio that were not proven.  We reject 
PAO’s fourth claimed error. 
Fifth Claimed Error 
{¶22} PAO argues that the PUCO applied the NST to Ameritech Ohio 
and dismissed all non-BOCs from the case without considering the consequences 
or whether the dismissal contradicted state policy.  We conclude to the contrary 
that the PUCO’s decision to dismiss all parties other than PAO and Ameritech 
Ohio from the proceedings complied with state and federal law and was a 
reasonable exercise of its discretion. 
{¶23} The purpose of the PUCO’s proceedings in this case was to 
implement Section 276 of the 1996 Act, which refers specifically to BOCs.  The 
PUCO’s decision to limit the scope of the pay-phone proceedings to SBC Ohio’s 
tariffs was in accord with Wisconsin PSC, 17 Fed. Communications Comm. 
Record 2051.  In that case, the FCC examined Section 276 and determined that 
Congress had granted it authority only over the pay-phone-line rates of BOCs, 
such as SBC Ohio.  Id. at ¶ 42.  Therefore, the FCC required only BOCs, not all 
LECs, to charge cost-based rates for pay-phone lines.  Id.  See New England Pub. 
Communications Council, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm.  (C.A.D.C.2003), 
334 F.3d 69, 78  (“We must presume that when Congress referred to ‘Bell 
Operating Companies’ rather than ‘local exchange carriers,’ it acted 
deliberately”). 
{¶24} The PUCO’s decision to limit the proceedings was reasonable, 
given that the proceeding was established to implement Section 276 of the 
Telecommunications Act and the relevant FCC decisions, which do not apply to 
January Term, 2006 
9 
non-BOCs.  Moreover, the PUCO had already reviewed the pay-phone rates of 
numerous non-BOCs and had found them in compliance with the 1996 Act. 
{¶25} PAO has cited no statutory or legal authority that requires the 
PUCO to apply a particular test to the pay-phone rates of non-BOC providers.  
The PAO points only to R.C. 4927.02, which states that it is the policy of Ohio to 
“[p]romote diversity and options in the supply of public telecommunications 
services and equipment throughout the state.”  The PAO has made no showing 
that there is a lack of diversity or options for pay-phone service in areas served by 
non-BOCs.  As the agency with the expertise and statutory mandate to implement 
the statute, the PUCO is entitled to deference.  Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, 2004-Ohio-6767, 820 N.E.2d 885, at ¶ 51; 
Migden-Ostrander v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 451, 2004-Ohio-3924, 
812 N.E.2d 955, at ¶ 23. Neither state nor federal law requires the application of 
the NST to the pay-phone rates of non-BOCs.  When a statute does not prescribe a 
particular formula, the PUCO is vested with broad discretion.  Columbus v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 23, 24, 10 OBR 175, 460 N.E.2d 1117.  The 
PUCO has determined that further review of non-BOC rates is not required at this 
time.  That decision was lawful and reasonable.  We reject the fifth claimed error. 
SBC OHIO’S CROSS-APPEAL 
First Claimed Error 
{¶26} SBC Ohio argues that it is unlawful for the PUCO to exceed the 
scope of authority delegated to it by the FCC.  We cannot quarrel with this self-
evident statement.  SBC Ohio, however, has failed to demonstrate that the PUCO 
exceeded its scope of authority. 
{¶27} SBC Ohio argues that the PUCO erred in choosing a method to 
determine overhead loading when it established intrastate pay-phone-line rates.  
SBC Ohio correctly states that the FCC delegated to the states the authority to 
require BOCs to file tariffs with state commissions and that the FCC indicated 
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10 
that it would rely on the state commissions to ensure that the tariffs complied with 
the requirements of Section 276.  The FCC stated that any one of three methods of 
determining overhead loading could satisfy the NST:  (1) the PCTO 
methodology; (2) the Open Network Architecture (“ONA”) Tariff Order 
methodology; or (3) the UNE factors.  Wisconsin PSC, 17 Fed Communications 
Comm. Record 2051, at ¶ 52-54.  SBC Ohio chose the PCTO methodology. 
{¶28} PAO advocated use of the UNE overhead loading, which produced 
lower overhead and, consequently, lower rates.  The PUCO agreed with the PAO 
and adopted the UNE overhead-loading factor, concluding that the PCTO 
methodology “fail[ed] to rise to the reasonableness standard of the NST.”  On 
rehearing, the PUCO examined Section 276 and concluded that it was 
“insufficient to adhere blindly to the outcome of a particular methodology,” that 
the outcome of any methodology had to be evaluated pursuant to a reasonableness 
standard, and that the overhead loadings produced by SBC Ohio’s use of the 
PCTO methodology were not reasonable. 
{¶29} SBC Ohio argues that the PUCO committed reversible error when 
it rejected the PCTO methodology because (1) the PCTO methodology has been 
deemed acceptable by the FCC and (2) one methodology should not be preferred 
to the others.  The PUCO determined that the overhead-loading factors produced 
by the application of the PCTO methodology were “inordinately high for a 
competitive service” and, therefore, did not satisfy “the reasonableness standard 
of the NST.”  Having found SBC Ohio’s proposed overhead-loading factors to be 
unreasonable, the PUCO applied the UNE methodology, stating that it was 
“deemed by the FCC to be in compliance with Section 276 of the Act.”  The 
application of the UNE methodology produced an overhead-loading factor that 
the PUCO deemed reasonable.  SBC Ohio’s claim that this decision violated the 
scope of the PUCO’s delegated authority and constituted an unlawful substitution 
of its judgment for the FCC’s is without merit.  The FCC itself has stated that 
January Term, 2006 
11 
“states that continue to use UNE overhead allocations for payphone services are [] 
in full compliance with section 276 and our precedent.”  Wisconsin PSC, 17 Fed. 
Communications Comm. Record 2051,  at ¶ 54.  Although states are not required 
to use the UNE methodology, they are permitted to use it.  Id. at ¶ 58. 
{¶30} The PUCO, not SBC Ohio, has the authority to determine rates in 
this matter.  The PUCO neither violated the scope of its delegated authority nor 
unlawfully substituted its judgment for that of the FCC.  To the contrary, the 
PUCO acted according to the FCC’s expectations and properly exercised the 
authority delegated to it.  We reject the first error claimed by cross-appellant SBC 
Ohio. 
Second Claimed Error 
{¶31} SBC Ohio argues that the PUCO is required under R.C. 4903.09 to 
make a complete record of its proceedings, including a transcript of the testimony 
and the exhibits, and to issue findings of fact and written opinions setting forth the 
reasons for its decisions.  Ideal Transp. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1975), 42 Ohio 
St.2d 195, 71 O.O.2d 183, 326 N.E.2d 861.  SBC Ohio’s argument is a correct 
statement of the law.  We conclude, however, that SBC Ohio has not established 
that the PUCO violated R.C. 4903.09. 
{¶32} The purpose of R.C. 4903.09 is “ ‘to enable this court to review the 
action of the commission without reading the voluminous records in Public 
Utilities Commission cases.’ ”  MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 306, 311, 513 N.E.2d 337, quoting Commercial 
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1951), 156 Ohio St. 360, 363, 46 O.O. 
210, 102 N.E.2d 842.  This court has stated that strict compliance with the terms 
of the statute is not required.  Tongren v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
87, 89, 706 N.E.2d 1255.  The detail need be sufficient only for this court to 
determine the basis of the PUCO’s reasoning.  Allnet Communications Serv., Inc. 
v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 202, 209, 638 N.E.2d 516.  The PUCO 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
is required only to set forth “some factual basis and reasoning based thereon in 
reaching its conclusion.”  Id.  See Ohio Domestic Violence Network v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 311, 323, 638 N.E.2d 1012.  
{¶33} Upon consideration of the record of the proceedings on appeal and 
the factual basis and reasoning of the PUCO, we conclude that the PUCO 
complied with and satisfied the requirements of R.C. 4903.09.  We reject the 
second error claimed by cross-appellant SBC Ohio. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
{¶34} R.C. 4903.13 provides that “[a] final order made by the public 
utilities commission shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by the supreme court 
on appeal, if, upon consideration of the record, such court is of the opinion that 
such order was unlawful or unreasonable.”  See Constellation NewEnergy, 104 
Ohio St.3d at 540, 820 N.E.2d 885.  “Under the ‘unlawful or unreasonable’ 
standard specified in R.C. 4903.13, this court will not reverse or modify a PUCO 
decision as to questions of fact when the record contains sufficient probative 
evidence to show that the PUCO’s determination is not manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence and is not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show 
misapprehension, 
mistake, 
or 
willful 
disregard 
of 
duty.” 
MCI 
Telecommunications Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d at 268, 527 N.E.2d 777.  See, also, AT 
& T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
549, 555, 728 N.E.2d 371.  This court has consistently refused to substitute its 
judgment for that of the commission on evidentiary matters.  See, e.g., AK Steel 
Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 81, 765 N.E.2d 862.  “The 
burden is on the appellant to show that the commission’s decision is against the 
manifest weight of the evidence or is clearly unsupported by the evidence.”  Id. at 
86, 765 N.E.2d 862.  This burden is difficult to sustain.  This court has 
consistently deferred to the PUCO’s judgment in matters requiring the PUCO to 
apply its special expertise and discretion.  Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
Comm. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 749 N.E.2d 262; AT & T 
Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d, 150, 
154, 555 N.E.2d 288; Cleveland Elec. Illum Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1976), 46 
Ohio St.2d 105, 108, 75 O.O.2d 172, 346 N.E.2d 778.  Finally, due deference 
should be given to the statutory interpretations made by an agency that has 
substantial expertise and to which the General Assembly has delegated 
enforcement responsibility.  Weiss v. Pub. Util. Comm. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 15, 
17-18, 734 N.E.2d 775, citing Collinsworth v. W. Elec. Co. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
268, 272, 586 N.E.2d 1071. 
{¶35} To the extent that PAO’s and SBC Ohio’s claimed errors are 
directed at factual determinations made by the PUCO, both parties have failed to 
show that the record lacks probative evidence sufficient to show misapprehension, 
mistake, or willful disregard of duty on the part of the PUCO or that the PUCO’s 
determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence.  To the extent 
that PAO’s and SBC Ohio’s claimed errors are directed at the expertise of the 
PUCO, they have failed to convince this court that it should substitute its 
judgment for that of the PUCO. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶36} We conclude that PAO as appellant and SBC Ohio as cross-
appellant have failed to show that the PUCO committed reversible error.  The 
PUCO’s decisions were reasonable and lawful. 
Order affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Philip F. Downey, and Stephen 
M. Howard, for appellant and cross-appellee Payphone Association of Ohio. 
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14 
 
Bailey Cavalieri, L.L.C., William A. Adams, and Dane Stinson; and Jon F. 
Kelly and Mary Ryan Fenlon, for cross-appellant and intervening appellee SBC 
Ohio. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Duane W. Luckey, Thomas G. Lindgren, 
and Werner L. Margard III, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Thomas E. Lodge, and Carolyn S. Flahive, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Telecom Association. 
______________________