Case Title: Commonwealth v. Jackson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11341

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11341 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GARRET JACKSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 14, 2020. - February 4, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Jury and Jurors.  Constitutional Law, 
Jury.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Challenge to 
jurors, Voir dire, Capital case.  Evidence, Photograph, 
Inflammatory evidence, Relevancy and materiality, 
Impeachment of credibility.  Witness, Impeachment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 2, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
Houston Armstrong, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Garrett 
Jackson, of murder in the first degree with deliberate 
premeditation in connection with the shooting death of Tommy 
                                                          
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
Speed on February 11, 2009.2  The cause of death was a gunshot 
wound inflicted to the back of his skull at close range, and the 
identity of the shooter was the central issue at trial.  In this 
direct appeal from his convictions, the defendant asserts 
reversible error on the part of the trial judge in (1) allowing 
the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of two prospective 
jurors over the defendant's objections pursuant to Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 
377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); 
(2) admitting a graphic autopsy photograph; (3) allowing 
rebuttal testimony about overheard telephone statements of a 
Commonwealth witness imparting that she altered her testimony 
upon receipt of death threats; and (4) denying the defendant's 
request to conduct consequent voir dire of that witness, to 
determine whether to recall her.  For the reasons stated infra, 
we neither discern reversible error nor detect any other basis 
to exercise our G. L. c. 278, § 33E, authority to reduce or set 
                                                          
 
 
2 The jury also convicted the defendant of numerous firearm 
offenses.  These other charges included possession of a firearm 
without a license, carrying a loaded firearm, and unlicensed 
possession of ammunition.  For the first charge, the judge 
imposed a sentence of eighteen months, deemed served, concurrent 
with the life sentence for murder.  For the carrying charge, the 
defendant received another term of eighteen months, also to run 
concurrently with the life sentence, but from and after the 
sentence on the possession charge, and also deemed served.  The 
Commonwealth dismissed the ammunition charge as duplicative. 
3 
 
aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.  We affirm all 
his convictions. 
 
Background.  The jury could have found the following facts 
based upon the evidence at trial, with certain details reserved 
for subsequent discussion of the legal issues. 
 
1.  "Crack" cocaine sales in the Lenox housing development.  
At the time of his death, the victim was thirty-eight years old, 
and had been selling "crack" cocaine in the area around the 
Lenox public housing development (Lenox) in the South End 
section of Boston for many years.  He ran a solo operation and 
had acquired master keys that opened several of the Lenox 
buildings, facilitating his access to resident clientele.  The 
victim was the preferred local source for area addicts, both 
because of the dependable quality of his product and because he 
was personally well liked.  When he was present in and around 
Lenox with crack cocaine, however, the victim expected customers 
would come to him for all of their needs before turning 
elsewhere, and he insisted other crack dealers relinquish all 
area sales to him. 
The defendant, known as "G-Wiz," also sold crack cocaine in 
the Lenox area, operating with two associates called "Blaze" and 
"Nasty."  The three young3 men were together "all the time," 
                                                          
 
 
3 At the time of the shooting, the defendant was twenty-two 
years old. 
4 
 
typically loitering in the area outside a pizzeria and adjoining 
shops along the southeastern side of Lenox,4 a public space the 
victim was also known to frequent and where a core group of at 
least twenty individuals from the area "hung out" and people 
came looking to buy crack cocaine. 
G-Wiz, Blaze, and Nasty habitually operated out of certain 
Lenox apartments where they converged to "bag up" their product 
for sale while using building hallways to meet customers and 
transact business.  At different times, the young men arranged 
to use the respective apartments of Renee Ruspus, known as 
"Kookie," and Gina Huffman5 in this manner.  In exchange for use 
of their respective apartments and consistent building access, 
G-Wiz and associates supplied Huffman and Kookie with crack 
cocaine.  In late October 2008, the last time that Huffman 
recalled G-Wiz, Blaze, and Nasty coming to use her apartment, 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant was barred from Lenox, owing to a Boston 
housing authority (BHA) trespass notice issued in June 2007.  
His presence on any BHA property, including Lenox, was grounds 
for his immediate arrest.  The area in front of the pizzeria and 
other shops across from the southeastern border of Lenox was not 
BHA property.  Notably, BHA personnel continued to see him in 
and around Lenox frequently. 
 
 
5 Huffman lived in a building on the southeastern border of 
Lenox, and her kitchen window faced the pizzeria and other 
adjacent shops across the street.  Her arrangement with G-Wiz 
began near the end of September 2008 and lasted for a period of 
roughly two months, when G-Wiz, Blaze, and Nasty came to her 
apartment weekly to "bag up."  Kookie testified that she saw the 
victim daily over a period of five years; it was unclear for how 
long and exactly how often the men used her apartment. 
5 
 
she told the defendant that the crack cocaine he gave her was 
"bunk," meaning it was heavily cut with baking soda and 
contained very little stimulant, and that the victim sold better 
quality crack cocaine.  The defendant reacted in anger, 
complaining to his associates that the victim had "screwed 
[them] over" by "selling [them] crap and keeping the good stuff 
for himself." 
Throughout the remainder of 2008, and in early 2009, the 
victim continued to monopolize crack cocaine sales in the Lenox 
area.  During a conversation with the younger men outside the 
pizzeria, he told them, "Y'all wait until I get my money and 
then y'all can have the rest."  Another time, the defendant was 
heard complaining to the others that "when [the victim] was out 
there they couldn't eat," meaning no one else could make any 
money on which to live. 
In the weeks before the shooting, the victim and other 
crack cocaine dealers, including G-Wiz and Blaze, were all 
outside the pizzeria when a man approached them looking to buy 
crack cocaine.  The victim quickly claimed the customer for 
himself, leaving the others to grumble about the "effed up" 
situation and how "somebody has got to be out of here."  Inside 
the pizzeria, the defendant and others continued complaining 
that it was "time for somebody to take a walk . . .  so somebody 
else can get some money." 
6 
 
2.  The shooting.  At around 7:30 P.M. on the evening of 
February 11, Judy Brown, another client of the victim, went to 
Lenox to buy some crack cocaine from him, which they had 
discussed by telephone about one-half hour earlier.  Kookie also 
testified that she had been looking to buy crack cocaine from 
the victim at about that same time; she found him just inside 
the front door of the building behind the one where Huffman's 
apartment was, arguing with the defendant.  She saw Brown 
inside, waiting.  Brown also had seen the defendant and the 
victim as she approached the front of the building.  Both were 
standing on the raised entry platform just outside the front 
door, the victim in the doorway, holding the door partway open 
to his right while facing out, and the defendant about one or 
two feet to the victim's left, leaning against the outside wall 
and directly in front of Brown as she climbed the steps to reach 
the platform.  Brown asked the defendant if he was waiting to 
see the victim.  When he shook his head "no," she asked the 
victim to speak privately.  The victim invited her inside, 
pushing the door open wider while standing with his body up 
against it to let her pass.6  No more than two seconds after 
                                                          
 
 
6 At trial, another client of the victim's, Patricia Ross, 
also testified that at around 8 P.M. on the night of the 
shooting she had walked through the first floor hallway of that 
same building, on her way home.  She was very drunk and high on 
marijuana, but recalled seeing the victim there and teasing him.  
She saw Brown and Kookie there, too. 
7 
 
Brown passed through the door and into the hallway, the blast of 
a single gunshot deafened her.  Moments later, the defendant ran 
out the building's back door and into a waiting black truck, 
which sped off. 
 
3.  The police investigation.  At about 8:11 P.M., Boston 
police dispatch reported that a person had been shot inside one 
of the Lenox buildings.  Upon arrival at the dispatched address 
minutes later, police found the front door to the building 
closed but unlocked.  When they pulled open the door, the victim 
was already dead, lying face down in a pool of blood on the 
floor.  His feet were just inside the door, and his body 
extended diagonally to the left across the entryway and into the 
first-floor hallway, his right shoulder near the bottom left 
corner of an internal stairway that faced the front door and led 
straight up to the second floor.  On the second step of that 
stairway, crime scene investigators located a spent nine 
millimeter shell casing. 
 
The victim, who was about six feet, two inches tall, had 
suffered no injuries apart from the fatal gunshot wound.  The 
bullet had entered the back of his skull, leaving a rim of soot 
around the entrance wound, indicating that the shooter had held 
the gun no more than two feet away when fired; the bullet had 
8 
 
torn through several critical areas of the brain7 on its 
trajectory through the victim's skull.  Police found a spent 
nine millimeter projectile, bent on one side, lying on the floor 
at the opposite end of the hallway, near the building's back 
exit.  The projectile was on the floor below a small dent in the 
wall tile in the upper corner of the hallway (about two feet 
below the ceiling, on the wall immediately to the left of the 
back doorway).  The murder weapon was never found. 
On May 27, three months after the shooting, Patricia Ross 
walked past a police cruiser parked in the area, and casually 
threw a crumpled up lottery ticket with her telephone number 
written on it through the window as she passed; officers 
promptly telephoned the number they found scrawled on the back 
of the ticket and arranged to interview Ross.  Ross had known 
the victim for twenty-five years and considered him a good 
friend.  She told police about a conversation that took place 
about three weeks earlier, at a friend's apartment on the second 
floor of the Lenox building where the victim was shot -- right 
at the top of the stairs inside the building's front door.  When 
she arrived, several people were inside, including G-Wiz and 
                                                          
 
 
7 At trial, the medical examiner testified that the 
resulting brain damage would have caused the victim's heart and 
lungs to cease function almost instantaneously. 
9 
 
Blaze, who were sitting at a table with others, bagging up crack 
cocaine to sell.  There was a gun on the table. 
Ross commented that whoever had shot the victim was "effed 
up."  The defendant had a smile on his face and said "what you 
thought."  She was crying, and again he said, "Tricia, what you 
thought."  Ross told police that the defendant had also stated 
that the victim was making too much money, and that the victim 
took a shot to the back of the head.  The defendant and another 
man sitting at the table had looked at each other and smiled. 
Discussion.  1.  Peremptory challenges.  A challenge to the 
peremptory strike of a potential juror is subject to a three-
step burden-shifting analysis.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-95; 
Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-491.  First, to rebut the presumption 
that the strike was proper, the challenger "must make out a 
prima facie case" that it was impermissibly based on race or 
other protected status "by showing that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose."8  Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005), 
quoting Batson, supra at 93-94.  Second, "[i]f a party makes 
such a showing, 'the burden shifts to the party exercising the 
challenge to provide a "group-neutral" explanation for it.'"  
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 493 (2020), quoting 
                                                          
 
 
8 We clarified the first step in the burden-shifting 
analysis in Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 493 (2020). 
10 
 
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 545 (2017).  Third and 
finally, "the 'judge must then determine whether the explanation 
is both "adequate" and "genuine."'"  Sanchez, supra, quoting 
Oberle, supra.  At each step of this analysis, we review a 
judge's decision allowing the peremptory strike of a potential 
juror for abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 
593, 599 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 
320 (2017).  We find abuse of discretion when we determine that 
a decision resulted from "a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Here, the defendant contends that the trial judge erred by 
failing to conclude that the Commonwealth's peremptory 
challenges of two prospective jurors were improper.  Relative to 
defense counsel's challenge to the strike against juror no. 115, 
a Hispanic female member of the first venire panel, the 
defendant claims that the judge abused his discretion in 
performing the "step one" analysis, when he ruled that defense 
counsel had failed to make a showing of any "pattern" and 
declined to require the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral 
reason for the challenge.  Relative to defense counsel's later 
challenge to the strike against juror no. 13, a black female 
11 
 
member of the second venire panel, the defendant argues that 
accepting the prosecutor's proffered reasons for the strike as 
"adequate" and "genuine" race-neutral explanations pursuant to 
"step three" of the legal analysis amounted to abuse of judicial 
discretion.  To assess these claims of error, we first examine 
in some detail how jury empanelment unfolded. 
 
a.  Empanelment process generally.  Jury empanelment in the 
defendant's case spanned two days in May 2011.  Ultimately, the 
trial judge determined to sit a jury of sixteen, entitling each 
side to sixteen peremptory strikes pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
20 (c), 378 Mass. 889 (1979).  During the process, the judge 
conducted group questioning of two venire panels, and individual 
voir dire of eighty-nine jurors:  sixty-nine from the first 
panel, and twenty from the second.  Before commencing individual 
voir dire, the judge identified both the defendant and the 
victim as African-American men and told the venire that he would 
inquire about any "feelings or attitudes about African-American 
people, or more generally people of color"9 that might interfere 
                                                          
 
 
9 During review of counsels' motions in limine, the judge 
agreed to ask this question during individual voir dire at 
defense counsel's request.  Specifically, defense counsel 
requested that the judge use the language "people of color," 
explaining:  "I like the phrase of color, because of color 
includes not only African American, but it includes Asian and 
Hispanics.  In other words, anybody who is not white is of 
color . . . ."  Recognizing that in the instant case the 
defendant and victim were both African-American, he added "for 
the record, when I use of color, it's a more expansive term." 
12 
 
with jurors' ability to judge the case impartially, based only 
on the evidence. 
 
On the first day of empanelment, the judge conducted 
individual voir dire10 of more than fifty members of the first 
venire panel, and ten jurors were seated.  These included six 
white females, two white males, one Asian-American female, and 
one nineteen year old Asian-American male.  The judge excused 
about twenty other prospective jurors for cause, three of these 
over defense counsel's express objection.11  The remaining 
twenty-three jurors subject to individual voir dire on the first 
day were dismissed following peremptory strikes by trial 
counsel.  The Commonwealth exercised strikes against twelve 
                                                          
 
 
10 The judge questioned each prospective juror consistently, 
first about any responses they had to questions he had posed to 
the venire as a group, next about the answers supplied to or 
information missing from the written questionnaire, and then 
about any feelings about black people or people of color 
generally that might interfere with the duty to judge the case 
impartially.  After instructing a potential juror to step down, 
the judge conferred with the attorneys, rarely granting requests 
for specific follow-up questioning, and then either excused the 
juror or declared him or her "indifferent."  The prosecutor and 
defense counsel were then afforded the opportunity to raise 
challenges.  If neither attorney raised a challenge, the juror 
would be seated. 
 
 
11 Of these three, one was a black woman from Honduras, 
another was an Indian-American pharmacy student, and the third 
was a white man who had been in prison for seventeen years, 
including after an escape.  Defense counsel apparently grew 
heated while arguing the objection to dismissing the woman from 
Honduras, protesting "She's black.  We don't have any blacks," 
and telling the judge "you were slanted." 
13 
 
prospective jurors; defense counsel struck eleven more 
prospective jurors, with whom the prosecutor had been content.  
On this first day of empanelment, neither counsel objected to 
any of the other's strikes.  The record reveals little about the 
demographics of the struck jurors apart from that the 
Commonwealth's strikes included one against a black male 
community college student and two more against Hispanic men. 
 
b.  Juror no. 115.  The defendant did not raise his first 
Batson-Soares challenge to a Commonwealth peremptory strike 
until the second day of empanelment, after the judge already had 
conducted individual voir dire of eleven prospective jurors.  Of 
these eleven, the judge excused six for hardship or cause, 
dismissed two who were subject to peremptory strikes, and seated 
three, bringing the total number empanelled to thirteen.  All 
three of these newly seated jurors were women, and all parties 
agreed that two of them were Hispanic and that one of those two 
had "very dark skin."  The record also reveals the prosecutor's 
impression that the third female juror seated on the second 
morning was "non-white." 
Juror no. 115 was a forty-four year old female born in 
Puerto Rico, and a single mother to three children, ages twenty-
six, twenty-four, and twenty-two.  During her voir dire, she 
told the judge that she had not responded to any of the group 
questions the day before, and had no "feelings about black 
14 
 
people or in general people of color that might affect [her] 
ability to fairly judge the case."  Her formal education ended 
upon receiving her high school diploma, and she was then 
employed by the city of Boston as a student lunch monitor at a 
public elementary school.  A little more than one year before, 
juror no. 115 had pleaded guilty to a charge of disturbing the 
peace.  Her sentence was one year of probation, which she had 
recently completed.  The judge found her indifferent.12  The 
Commonwealth exercised a peremptory challenge, whereupon defense 
counsel stated, "I make a Soares challenge.  Person of color." 
 
In asserting this challenge, defense counsel did not 
specify what protected group he was claiming as the target of 
the strike's improper discriminatory purpose.  At different 
points throughout his "step one" Batson-Soares argument, he 
referred to black people, Hispanics, Asians, and minorities in 
general.  When the judge said he could not determine whether 
juror no. 115 is "Hispanic or black," defense counsel responded, 
"She's Puerto Rican."  The judge then recognized that juror no. 
115 was "Hispanic," but stated that Hispanics can also be black 
or white, and he was uncertain here if juror no. 115 was black 
                                                          
 
 
12 On her juror questionnaire, in response to the question 
about "anything else in [her] background, experience, 
employment, training, education, knowledge, or beliefs that 
might affect [her] ability to be an impartial juror," she had 
checked "yes," and wrote in the space below, "employed, had 
probation a year ago." 
15 
 
or white.  The defendant then returned to his vaguely defined 
objection that persons "of color" were being improperly struck.  
The judge then stated, "I don't know that that's a proper Soares 
basis, but it doesn't matter."  He then asked defense counsel 
where he saw a pattern. 
 
In his response, defense counsel referred variously to 
blacks, Hispanics, and minorities in general.  He referred to 
prior Commonwealth peremptory strikes of one African-American 
and two Hispanic prospective jurors and then stated, "[W]e 
didn't start off with very many [people of color]," adding that 
the small number did not "reflect their percentage in the 
community."  He then referenced four members of the first venire 
panel who were "of color" and had been excused because of 
illness, inability to speak English, and inability to remain 
impartial in a case involving drug dealing.  Counsel then moved 
on to more general commentary that in some parts of the country 
"close to probably [twenty-five] percent plus are minority," but 
that in the defendant's lifetime the minority would become the 
majority.  He concluded:  "So I suggest to you that challenging 
the first young black,[13] challenging two Hispanics, challenging 
a third Hispanic, so four out of six that they ultimately could 
                                                          
 
 
13 At the outset of his "step one" argument, defense counsel 
also stated that "all young people, whether they be black or 
white," were also being struck. 
16 
 
challenge, I call that a pattern."  After being presented with 
this diffuse objection, and a back-and-forth discussion with 
counsel that seemed to indicate that the juror's protected 
category was Hispanic, but not black, the judge concluded that 
he "[did] not find a pattern," and then declined to inquire as 
to the basis for the Commonwealth's challenge.14 
On appeal, the defendant's claim challenging the strike 
against juror no. 115 is more focused, as he expressly 
designates her Hispanic ethnicity as the relevant protected 
group for purposes of the Batson-Soares "step one" analysis.  He 
contends that the relevant facts and circumstances, including 
the Commonwealth's proportionally greater number of peremptory 
strikes against Hispanic members of the venire, raise an 
inference that the Commonwealth's peremptory strike against 
juror no. 115 was unlawfully premised on her Hispanic heritage.  
Based on the totality of the circumstances here, we cannot 
conclude that the judge abused his discretion in determining 
that the defendant had not carried the Batson-Soares "step one" 
                                                          
 
 
14 The prosecutor nevertheless volunteered his opinion that 
one of the female jurors who had been seated was Asian, and that 
the two Hispanic males against whom he had exercised peremptory 
challenges were white.  The judge characterized the latter 
assessment as "a judgment call" he was "[in]capable of making," 
and then stated that one of the seated female jurors who was 
"certainly Hispanic" was also "perhaps" black, judging from her 
dark skin color, and that juror no. 115 was a "much more neutral 
color."  He repeated his finding that, in any event, no pattern 
had been shown and permitted the peremptory challenge. 
17 
 
burden of production to raise an inference of discriminatory 
intent based on juror no. 115's Hispanic heritage. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we note that defense counsel at 
trial was unfocused in his objection, which confused matters.  
"The test in Soares and Batson does not apply to challenges to 
members of all minority ethnic or racial groups lumped together, 
but instead applies to challenges to 'particular, defined 
groupings in the community.'"  Lopes, 478 Mass. at 600 n.5, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 307 n.17 (2012).  
See Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 305-306 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 561 U.S. 1015 (2010) (declining to assume that 
"minorities," African-American jurors, and Hispanic jurors are 
part of same "cognizable group" for Batson purposes where 
defendant provided no factual support for that claim).  See also 
People v. Smith, 81 N.Y.2d 875, 876 (1993) (rejecting 
defendant's contention that Batson challenge may be based on 
exclusion of "minorities" in general, regardless of race).  Such 
diffuse objections, presented without specific factual bases for 
each protected category, make the already difficult Batson-
Soares analysis many times more complicated to sort out.  On 
appeal, the defendant directs us to the juror's Hispanic 
heritage, and thus we focus our inquiry there. 
"In the course of determining whether an inference of 
discriminatory purpose is warranted with respect to a 
challenged juror, judges should consider, among any other 
18 
 
relevant factors, (1) the number and percentage of group 
members who have been excluded from jury service due to the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge; (2) any evidence of 
disparate questioning or investigation of prospective 
jurors; (3) any similarities and differences between 
excluded jurors and those, not members of the protected 
group, who have not been challenged (for example, age, 
educational level, occupation, or previous interactions 
with the criminal justice system); (4) whether the 
defendant or the victim are members of the same protected 
group; and (5) the composition of the seated jury" 
(footnotes omitted). 
Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 512.  See also Lopes, 478 Mass. at 598-
599.  Of course, "[t]his list of factors is neither mandatory 
nor exhaustive; a trial judge and a reviewing court must 
consider 'all relevant circumstances' for each challenged 
strike" (footnotes omitted).  Sanchez, supra at 513, quoting 
Jones, 477 Mass. at 322 n.24. 
 
We begin by recognizing that neither the victim nor the 
defendant is Hispanic.  Although not dispositive, as peremptory 
challenges based on protected status are prohibited in any case, 
"[w]e have . . . turned a keen eye toward the use of peremptory 
challenges on jurors who are members of the same protected class 
as the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 
393 (2018).  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 465-466 
(1991) (single Commonwealth peremptory challenge can rebut 
presumption of propriety where target is sole member of 
protected group of which both defendant and prospective juror 
are members).  In contrast, the specific basis for inferring 
19 
 
bias in jury selection that arises in an interracial killing is 
not present when the defendant and victim share membership in 
the same protected group.  See Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 
1, 11 (2013).  See also Commonwealth v. Roche, 377-378 & n.3 
(1998) (where both defendant and victim were white, judge erred 
by denying defendant's peremptory challenge of only black 
prospective juror because there was no additional evidence of 
racial motive for challenge). 
We next turn to the numbers-based considerations, although 
mindful that "the numbers considered in isolation are [commonly] 
inconclusive."  Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 303, quoting United States 
v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 802 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 
U.S. 1075 (2014).  Out of the thirty-nine jurors declared 
indifferent at the time of the Batson-Soares challenge, five 
were Hispanic.  Hispanics thus represented twelve percent of the 
jurors declared indifferent.  At the time of juror no. 115's 
individual voir dire, two Hispanic jurors (whom the judge also 
thought "could be" black) had been seated out of the total of 
thirteen jurors then empanelled; thus, Hispanics made up about 
fifteen percent of the jury seated at that point.15  More 
significant is the percentage of strikes.  Out of the five 
                                                          
 
 
15 Two additional Hispanic jurors were later seated, such 
that Hispanics constituted one-quarter of the sixteen empanelled 
jurors.  Because none of them was selected as an alternate, they 
constituted one-third of the deliberating jurors. 
20 
 
potential "indifferent" Hispanic jurors, three had been struck 
by the Commonwealth, representing a strike rate of sixty 
percent.  In contrast, the Commonwealth had struck eleven out of 
the thirty-four non-Hispanic jurors, representing a strike rate 
of approximately thirty-two percent.  This difference, while 
noteworthy, is not as dramatic or glaring as that in other cases 
where the raw numbers and percentages have been dispositive in 
raising a "step one" inference.  See Soares, 377 Mass. at 473 & 
n.7 (prosecutor used forty-four total strikes against twelve out 
of thirteen prospective black jurors [ninety-two percent] and 
thirty-two out of ninety-four white prospective jurors [thirty-
four percent]).  See also Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 411 Mass. 
313, 316-317 (1991) ("In this case, because the prosecution 
disproportionately excluded sixty-seven per cent of the 
prospective black jurors and only fourteen per cent of the 
available whites, the defendant established a prima facie 
rebuttal of the presumption").  Compare Commonwealth v. Green, 
420 Mass. 771, 777 (1995) (no "step one" inference found where 
defense counsel challenged two of four [fifty percent] black 
prospective jurors and eight out of nineteen [forty-two percent] 
non-black prospective jurors).  We are also dealing with only 
three strikes of Hispanic jurors, thereby requiring careful, 
individualized consideration of those strikes to place them in 
proper context. 
21 
 
 
Each of the two strikes the Commonwealth had exercised 
against Hispanic venire members prior to juror no. 115 also 
appeared to be made for obvious reasons that did not raise any 
inference of bias.  During his individual voir dire, juror 
no. 51 stated that he knew defense counsel's paralegal, who was 
present in court throughout the trial, because he "[went] way 
back" with the paralegal's brother -- a convicted murderer well 
known for his community outreach work during the forty years he 
had been in prison.  The Commonwealth had asked that juror no. 
51 be released for cause since he had expressed a "fairly close 
relationship" with a convicted murderer; he only exercised the 
peremptory strike after the judge declined to excuse juror no. 
51 for cause.16  The other Hispanic venire member subject to 
prior Commonwealth strike, juror no. 19, told the judge she 
could not "be honest," and was clearly nervous about sitting on 
a case of murder in the first degree, explaining, "I just can't 
go like hearing the fingerprints and the gun . . . ." 
                                                          
 
 
16 The judge had found that juror no. 51 only knew the 
paralegal in passing and that this would not affect his ability 
to judge the case fairly.  The Commonwealth nonetheless 
questioned his ability to judge impartially.  Juror no. 51's 
individual voir dire also revealed that during the 1980s, he had 
been employed as a juvenile diversion officer in the 
neighborhood where the murder occurred, and that he had been 
arrested seven years before, in connection with an alleged 
altercation with his son, although domestic violence charges 
were promptly dismissed. 
22 
 
Another factor for consideration is any apparent disparate 
questioning or investigation of prospective jurors.  There was 
none.  As indicated, see note 9, supra, the judge was extremely 
consistent in his individual voir dire procedure.  The number 
and length of the inquiries depended upon whether the particular 
prospective juror had replied to any of the group questions, 
left portions of the written questionnaire incomplete, or 
completed the questionnaire in a manner calling for follow-up 
inquiry.17  The prosecutor very rarely sought to supplement 
questioning unless the judge had missed an incomplete 
questionnaire response, and no correlation with prospective 
juror race or ethnicity is apparent from the record.  This 
factor does not support a step one inference. 
We also consider any notable similarities between juror 
no. 115 and other non-Hispanic jurors challenged by the 
Commonwealth.  As the Commonwealth emphasizes, juror no. 115's 
relatively recent conviction of disturbing the peace, a race-
neutral explanation for the Commonwealth's strike, was readily 
apparent from the record.  This race-neutral reason for striking 
juror no. 115 was strengthened by the fact that the Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
17 The only notable factor involving the questioning of 
seated jurors is that several had not answered any group 
questions and had fully completed the questionnaire in such a 
manner that the judge apparently discerned no basis for further 
questioning, so the exchange was minimal.  There is no record 
evidence of any other factor contributing to that brevity. 
23 
 
had previously struck four other potential jurors because of 
their recent experience with the criminal justice system.18  Her 
questionnaire also indicated that she had three children, ages 
twenty-six, twenty-four, and twenty-one:  at the time of trial, 
the defendant was twenty-four years old, and he had been twenty-
two years old at the time of the shooting. 
 
In sum, this case did not involve Hispanic victims or 
defendants; the composition of the jury, two Hispanic jurors out 
of the total of thirteen jurors empanelled at the time of the 
strike (thirteen percent), was consistent with the percentage of 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic prospective jurors declared 
indifferent (five Hispanic prospective jurors out of thirty-nine 
total, or fifteen percent); there were obvious neutral grounds 
for the challenge -- particularly juror no. 115's recent 
probationary status -- that the record suggests had resulted in 
similar challenges to non-Hispanic jurors; and the questioning 
of all jurors was standardized.  Although the Commonwealth's 
strike rate for Hispanic jurors was higher than for non-Hispanic 
                                                          
 
 
18 The Commonwealth did not strike three other indifferent 
venire members who had prior records of relatively minor 
offenses or had household or family members with such records, 
but in each case the offenses were older, and there is no record 
indication that any of them had checked "yes" to the catch-all 
question on the juror questionnaire about whether there was 
"anything else . . . that might affect . . . [their] ability to 
be a fair and impartial juror," as juror no. 115 had (and in the 
space provided below, wrote "had probation a year ago"). 
24 
 
jurors, the statistics must be analyzed in context.  The two 
other Hispanic jurors struck by the Commonwealth were challenged 
for seemingly obvious reasons not based on their membership in a 
protected group, one of them following an unsuccessful 
Commonwealth challenge for cause.  Based upon the totality of 
the facts and circumstances here, we therefore conclude that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to find that the 
defendant had made a prima facie showing of impropriety in the 
prosecutor's peremptory challenge of prospective juror no. 115. 
See Issa, 466 Mass. at 11.  We reach this conclusion, but also 
emphasize, as we have on numerous recent occasions, that a 
"trial judge is strongly encouraged to ask for an explanation as 
questions are raised regarding the appropriateness of the 
challenges."  Lopes, 478 Mass. at 598, citing Issa, supra at 11 
n.14. 
 
c.  Juror no. 13.  Following the ruling with respect to 
juror no. 115, the judge conducted voir dire of the last four 
members of the first venire panel.  The judge introduced the 
case to a second venire panel, posed the same series of group 
questions asked of the first panel, and then commenced 
individual voir dire.  Six of the first seven prospective jurors 
were excused,19 and one, a Hispanic man, was seated. 
                                                          
 
 
19 Two of these six were Asian-American.  Of the six, two 
were not qualified due to either residency or extremely limited 
25 
 
The defendant's second Batson-Soares challenge to the 
prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike followed the attempted 
strike of the next prospective juror, a forty-four year old 
black female resident of the Dorchester section of Boston who 
had not continued formal education past high school and was 
employed as a preschool teacher (juror no. 13).  During her voir 
dire, she told the judge that she recognized one of the named 
police witnesses as her mother's first cousin; she did not know 
him well, had not seen him in a long time, and they had no 
interaction apart from acknowledging one another on the street 
in the event of a chance encounter.  She was confident that she 
could judge his testimony fairly and impartially.20 
Juror no. 13 also had two sons, then ages twenty-four and 
twenty-one.  In response to further inquiries based on her 
questionnaire, she explained that the younger son had been 
arrested seven years before, at age fourteen, when he was 
                                                          
 
English comprehension, and three were excused for health-related 
hardship.  The last of the six, a male prospective juror, who 
evidently was not black himself, was excused for cause when he 
explained that his wife and father had both been the victims of 
violent crime, and he expected some difficulty judging the case 
impartially after that experience, because the perpetrators were 
black. 
 
 
20 The prosecutor later explained that juror no. 13's 
maternal relative had played a relatively minor role in the 
investigation.  It was not certain that he would be called, but 
his name would be raised in connection with another key 
Commonwealth witness (Brown). 
26 
 
"caught in a stolen car."  The charge was "thrown out" almost 
immediately, and he was not prosecuted.  The older son had been 
in trouble for marijuana possession about two years earlier, but 
paid a fine and "got [it] thrown out."  Finally, juror no. 13 
elaborated upon her own experience as an eyewitness at a murder 
trial involving a shooting in the Roxbury section of Boston 
about eight to ten years prior.  Given that the people involved 
"ran around the corner," she had not seen the actual shooting 
occur.  Two years passed between the shooting and her trial 
testimony; "by [that] time . . . [she] didn't remember." 
The judge found juror no. 13 indifferent, whereupon the 
prosecutor exercised his fifteenth peremptory strike.  Defense 
counsel immediately challenged the strike, stating, "Tell me 
she's not black. . . .  He's excusing her because of her 
color. . . .  I'm challenging [the strike] because I believe it 
is based on race."  While also noting the Commonwealth's prior 
strikes against other prospective jurors "of color," defense 
counsel expressed his "opinion [that juror no. 13] is the second 
person who appears as African-American."  The judge proceeded by 
"count[ing] up the challenges of [black prospective jurors] or 
Hispanic [prospective jurors who] could be black,"21 whereupon he 
                                                          
 
 
21 The judge counted "one person who I thought clearly was 
black"; "three that I characterized as Hispanic male or female," 
noting, "I don't know if they were black"; and juror no. 13, 
"who I would think is black." 
27 
 
found "a pattern of excusing people who are African-American or 
perhaps have African blood" and asked the prosecutor to explain 
the reason for the challenge. 
The prosecutor responded that "a combination of . . . 
factors" had led him to exercise the strike against juror 
no. 13.  To begin, she had two sons around the same age as the 
defendant, both of whom had been arrested, and he thought at 
least one of them would have been prosecuted by the office of 
the district attorney for the Suffolk district.  Further, he 
"sensed some sort of hostility" in the "tone of her voice" when 
speaking about her mother's first cousin, the police witness.  
The judge then asked defense counsel for argument concerning the 
adequacy and genuineness of the stated reasons. 
Defense counsel dismissed the perceived "hostility" toward 
the police witness as pretext.  The relationship was so distant 
that the potential witness was basically "a stranger," and juror 
no. 13 had answered that she would evaluate his testimony "like 
anything else."  As for having two sons who were in their early 
twenties and had experience with the criminal justice system, 
defense counsel denounced that explanation as "subterfuge," 
explaining, "in this country young African-American males, it's 
like one out of two is either on probation or in jail or on 
parole."  He then opined that juror no. 13's sons were "fine" -- 
the incidents were isolated and minor, and the charges were 
28 
 
quickly dismissed.  Emphatically noting that juror no. 13 had 
not indicated any bias against the police, he added, "Candidly 
if I was in her shoes I would have animosity."  The judge then 
permitted the challenge, for several stated reasons, discussed 
in detail infra.  Defense counsel stated that he rejected the 
judge's findings as "disingenuous," since involvement with the 
criminal justice system, on account of systemic racism, was 
essentially a proxy for race. 
On appeal, the defendant characterizes this Batson-Soares 
"step three" ruling as an abuse of judicial discretion.  Upon 
examining the judge's findings, we discern no abuse of 
discretion. 
"An explanation is adequate if it is 'clear and reasonably 
specific,' 'personal to the juror and not based on the 
juror's group affiliation' (in this case race) . . . and 
related to the particular case being tried. . . .  An 
explanation is genuine if it is in fact the reason for the 
exercise of the challenge.  The mere denial of an improper 
motive is inadequate to establish the genuineness of the 
explanation." 
 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 464-465 (2003).  The 
trial judge must "make an independent evaluation of the 
prosecutor's reasons and . . . determine specifically whether 
the explanation was bona fide or a pretext."  Commonwealth v. 
Calderon, 431 Mass. 21, 26 (2000).  "A trial judge has 
considerable discretion in ruling on whether a permissible 
ground for [a] peremptory challenge has been shown, and [this 
29 
 
court] will not disturb that ruling so long as it is supported 
by the record."  Oberle, 476 Mass. at 545, citing Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804, 811 (2000). 
Here, the judge specifically concluded that the reasons 
given were "reasonably specific" and "personal to [this] juror," 
and not based on her race.  He later placed even more elaborate 
findings on the record to explain his reasoning.  In his 
estimation, "the fact that the witness's two children had been 
involved with the criminal justice system" was a "legitimate 
reason for exercising a peremptory challenge," because someone 
"who has experienced her children being arrested and 
prosecuted[22] . . . may harbor a bias, conscious or unconscious 
against the Commonwealth."  Anecdotally, he also added that it 
was common for prosecutors to be concerned that people with a 
family member who had experienced the criminal justice system as 
a defendant possibly may continue to feel some animosity towards 
the government.23  Here, in addition to juror no. 13, the record 
                                                          
 
 
22 The defendant correctly points out that neither of juror 
no. 13's sons was fully "prosecuted" where she specifically 
stated that the charge had quickly been dropped in each 
instance.  We think that the fact that charges issued is enough 
to substantiate the point here. 
 
 
23 Although the judge did not address it specifically, the 
prosecutor's claim to have sensed "hostility" in juror no. 13's 
"tone of . . . voice" when talking about the police witness who 
happened to be her mother's first cousin, standing alone, would 
not have been an adequate rationale.  The defendant is correct 
that this is the type of "[c]hallenge[] based on subjective data 
30 
 
reflects that four other "indifferent" venire members had a 
family member or partner who was arrested and experienced the 
criminal justice system as a defendant.  The prosecutor 
exercised peremptory challenges against two of them,24 but was 
content to have the other two empanelled.25  Juror no. 13 was the 
only "indifferent" venire person whose arrested family members 
were her children, however, and at the time of the peremptory 
strike, both were young men of the same approximate age as the 
defendant.26  Given the deference owed trial judges, particularly 
                                                          
 
such as a juror's looks or gestures, or a party's 'gut' feeling 
[that] should rarely be accepted as adequate because such 
explanations can easily be used as pretexts for discrimination."  
Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 465. 
 
 
24 Juror no. 42 indicated that her domestic partner had been 
involved in some prior criminal incidents, including an arrest 
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in 1993 
and a 1995 domestic violence arrest.  Juror no. 21 of the second 
venire panel explained that her brother had pleaded guilty to 
felony robbery and assault as a juvenile in New York. 
 
 
25 Juror no. 36 had a brother who had been convicted of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, and juror 
no. 58 indicated that her husband had an "old" arrest for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence and had also 
been arrested for assault as a college student, for fighting. 
 
 
26 There is no record evidence to suggest that the 
Commonwealth declared itself "content" with any other venire 
member who was parent or guardian to a child of that approximate 
age.  To the contrary, the only other identifiable "indifferent" 
venire member with children in that age range was juror no. 115, 
who was also subject to a strike by the Commonwealth.  The 
prosecutor also claimed to recall striking a white female juror 
on that basis on the first day of empanelment, but there is no 
independent record evidence to support or disprove that claim. 
31 
 
involving credibility determinations, we cannot conclude that 
the trial judge abused his discretion here in evaluating juror 
no. 13.27 
 
2.  Evidentiary issues.  The defendant challenges the 
admission in evidence of a graphic autopsy photograph and 
certain police witness testimony expressly admitted for the 
limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of Ross.  He also 
contends that the judge improperly denied his request to conduct 
a voir dire of Ross in connection with that testimony.  There 
were no errors. 
 
a.  Admission of autopsy photograph.  Based upon 
foundational testimony from the medical examiner who performed 
the victim's autopsy, and defense counsel's earlier questioning 
concerning the bullet's flight path, the judge permitted the 
Commonwealth to introduce an autopsy photograph of the victim's 
head with a metal probe inserted through the gunshot wound.  The 
image shows one end of a metal probe protruding from the entry 
                                                          
 
 
27 We nevertheless acknowledge the need for careful 
consideration of strikes based on minor offenses, particularly 
those involving young black men who have been subject to 
disparate treatment in the criminal justice system.  See Report 
by the Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School, 
Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System (Sept. 
2020).  See also State v. Holmes, 334 Conn. 202, 205-206 (2019) 
(affirming negative views of police and fairness of criminal 
justice system as race-neutral reason for peremptory strike, but 
referring "systemic concerns" to jury selection task force, 
appointed by chief justice, to consider measures intended to 
promote selection of diverse jury panels). 
32 
 
wound in the back of the victim's skull, about four inches from 
the top, slightly right of center, and the other end protruding 
out from his right eye socket. 
 
Defense counsel did not object;28 he requested that the 
judge issue a jury instruction regarding the photograph, and the 
judge granted that request by forewarning the jury about the 
gruesome nature of the autopsy photographs, and explaining the 
need to consider them dispassionately for their evidentiary 
value.  On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled to a 
new trial based upon the unfairly prejudicial effect of the 
image, which he characterizes as irrelevant to the jury's 
determination of any contested fact in the case.  We reject the 
argument and conclude that the trial judge properly assessed the 
probative value of the image and mitigated any risk of unfair 
prejudice with an appropriate limiting instruction. 
 
It lies within the sound discretion of a trial judge to 
"determine whether the inflammatory nature of a photograph 
outweighs its probative value."  Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 
                                                          
 
 
28 On direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the first 
degree pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we review an unpreserved 
error to determine whether it resulted in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, which exists if the 
error is "likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  
Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 768 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  No application of that standard is necessary 
here, given that we discern no error. 
33 
 
Mass. 427, 431 (2001).  Although "'special caution is warranted' 
in some circumstances, such as where the body has been altered 
[(as during an autopsy)] after the injuries were inflicted," 
Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 143 (2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016), quoting Cardarelli, supra, it is equally 
well established that "photographs indicating the force applied 
and portraying the injuries inflicted may properly be admitted 
on the issue of whether the murder was committed with . . . 
premeditation and deliberation."  Commonwealth v. Keohane, 444 
Mass. 563, 573 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 406 Mass. 
397, 406-407 (1990). 
 
The path of the bullet, from the back of his head, through 
the victim's skull, and out his eye, was indisputably pertinent 
to the Commonwealth's theory of murder in the first degree:  
deliberately premeditated execution, accomplished by ambushing 
the victim from behind.29  Further, despite the grisly nature of 
the photograph, it provided an alternative that avoided the 
                                                          
 
 
29 Although the defense did not actively contest the medical 
examiner's opinion regarding the cause and manner of death, it 
did not stipulate to that opinion.  Thus, it remained incumbent 
upon the Commonwealth to produce sufficient evidence to support 
a conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the shooter 
intentionally killed the victim and that he or she did so with 
deliberate premeditation.  That the shooter transported a loaded 
gun to the crime scene and then shot the victim in the head at 
close range and by surprise from behind was sufficient to 
demonstrate deliberately premeditated murder.  See Commonwealth 
v. Andrews, 427 Mass. 434, 440-441 (1998), and cases cited. 
34 
 
prosecutor from having to place an even more disturbing image 
before the jury, showing the bullet hole through the globe of 
the eyeball.  During a sidebar conference, the prosecutor 
explained that typical practice for demonstrating the wound 
track would involve introducing photographs of both the entry 
and exit wounds.  Since the exit wound here involved the bullet 
coming through the victim's eye socket and out his eyeball, the 
Commonwealth suggested that the photograph with the metal stake 
inserted through the wound track, which showed the victim's head 
in profile, would be less graphic.  The transcript suggests that 
both defense counsel and the judge agreed with that assessment. 
 
Finally, the autopsy photograph also informed conflicting 
arguments concerning the bullet trajectory.  The Commonwealth's 
theory of the case was that just as the victim stepped across 
the threshold into the building, the defendant, who was standing 
just outside the open front door, reached through the entryway 
holding a semiautomatic firearm and shot the victim in the back 
of the head:  the bullet traveled straight through the victim's 
skull and out his eye socket with such force that it hit the 
wall at the far opposite end of the hallway, where it left a 
small dent in the tile about two feet below the ceiling, on the 
wall immediately to the left of the rear exit.  The lead 
homicide detective testified that crime scene investigators had 
located the spent nine millimeter projectile lying on the floor 
35 
 
just beneath the dent in the tile, which he described as a "kind 
of gouge in the wall consistent with a ricochet." 
 
The defense emphatically dismissed the plausibility (or 
even possibility) of this theory, based upon its spatial 
inconsistency with the medical examiner's description of the 
wound track as slightly down and to the right, the position of 
the six foot, two inch tall victim at the time he was shot, and 
the Commonwealth's allegation that the shorter defendant fired 
the shot at close range on a level surface.  Introduction of the 
autopsy photograph during the medical examiner's testimony30 
enabled the Commonwealth to clarify for the jury that the 
medical examiner's description of the wound track as "slightly 
downward and slightly to the right" assumed that the victim was 
standing upright with his head held straight and facing forward 
at the time he was shot.31  She also testified that there was no 
                                                          
 
 
30 It was defense counsel who first raised the issue of the 
bullet trajectory as opposed to the wound trajectory as 
described in the autopsy report -- during cross-examination of 
the lead detective and before the medical examiner had 
testified.  During a sidebar discussion, defense counsel 
explained that the line of questioning was part of an effort to 
"deal with" what counsel referred to during questioning as 
"quote, unquote a ricochet" at the opposite end of the hallway. 
 
 
31 The upright and forward-facing orientation, with head 
straight, arms down by sides, and palms out is known as "the 
standard anatomic position" and serves as a customary frame of 
reference in the field. 
36 
 
way for her to determine the actual positioning of the 
defendant's head at the time he was shot. 
 
We have examined the color photograph, and we conclude that 
it is not unnecessarily gruesome or shocking, especially in 
light of its relevance as proof of a premeditated shooting 
through the back of the head and its probative value on the 
highly contested issue of the bullet's trajectory.  Its 
prejudicial effect was also mitigated by the judge's careful 
instruction of the jury.  The judge twice instructed the jury, 
once immediately prior to the relevant medical examiner 
testimony, and again during the final charge, as to the need to 
consider the photographic evidence dispassionately and to avoid 
being swayed by emotion or sympathy.  It is appropriate to 
consider the "effectiveness of limiting instructions in 
minimizing the risk of unfair prejudice" when weighing the 
relative probative value of evidence in light of any unfair 
prejudice.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 note (2020).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 807 (1990).  It was proper 
for the judge to rule the photograph admissible in evidence 
here. 
 
b.  Admission of impeachment testimony and denial of 
request for voir dire.  On the fifth day of trial, over the 
defendant's objection, and after conducting a potential witness 
voir dire, the judge decided to permit the Commonwealth to call 
37 
 
a police witness for the limited purpose of impeaching the 
credibility of Ross.  The officer's testimony recounted an 
overheard telephone conversation between Ross and an unknown 
individual in which Ross stated that she had "changed [her] 
whole testimony" to be more favorable to the defendant because 
she was "not trying to get [herself] killed for nobody," and her 
family had been threatened.  On appeal, the defendant claims 
that he is entitled to a new trial because the testimony had no 
impeachment value, and even if it did, it was unduly 
prejudicial.  He claims that once the jury heard evidence of 
threats, they were likely to intuit that the defendant was a 
dangerous person whom they should be hesitant to acquit.  For 
the reasons explained infra, we discern no abuse of discretion 
in allowing the testimony. 
As described supra, on her own initiative, Ross had reached 
out to police by covertly dropping her telephone number into a 
squad car about three months after the murder.  She told police, 
and later the grand jury, about a conversation in early May 
2009, at a friend's apartment on the second floor of the 
building where the victim was shot.  The defendant and Blaze 
were sitting at a table with others, bagging up crack cocaine to 
sell, and there was a gun on the table.  Ross stated that 
whoever shot the victim was "effed up."  The defendant looked at 
her with a smile on his face and said "what you thought."  She 
38 
 
started crying and asked him "what did you do," and he again 
said, "Tricia what you thought."  He subsequently remarked that 
the victim was making too much money, and acknowledged that the 
victim took a shot to the back of the head.  At trial, Ross 
qualified this testimony significantly, raising questions as to 
her credibility. 
At the outset of her trial testimony, Ross explained that 
the victim had been her "good friend" for twenty-five years, and 
then spontaneously told the jury, "I'm not here voluntarily.  I 
was arrested.  I was forced to come here."  Although she never 
flatly denied the most important elements of the story she told 
to police and the grand jury, she substantially downplayed their 
significance.32  Ross also made spontaneous statements 
ingratiating herself to the defendant.33  She further claimed 
that the police had come to her house repeatedly in May 2009, 
she gave them her telephone number because she "had no choice," 
                                                          
 
 
32 For example, she admitted that she had spoken with the 
defendant at her friend's apartment in May 2009, but added that 
"[h]e was there for maybe a hot second, if that."  She testified 
that there was "a weapon" on the table but added, "[W]ho knows 
who it belonged to.  It could have belonged to anyone in there."  
When she stated, "[W]hoever did that [to the victim] is effed 
up," the defendant did smile and say "what you thought," but he 
was not talking to her.  When she asked, "What did you do?" and 
he said "Tricia what you thought," he was not talking to her 
then, either. 
 
 
33 Ross told the jury, "This young man used to watch my 
children"; stated, "I very strongly doubt he did this"; and 
indicated that he was "not a bad guy." 
39 
 
and they told her she had to make a statement.  She also stated 
that she was "force[d]" to testify before the grand jury. 
The defense cross-examination of Ross was brief, 
establishing that she had not seen the defendant in the vicinity 
of the building at around 8 P.M. on the night of the shooting 
and eliciting agreement that the police had badgered her and put 
words in her mouth.  That testimony was effectively impeached by 
the testimony of the lead homicide detective on the case, who 
told the jury how Ross had thrown the crumpled lottery ticket 
with her number scrawled on it into the window of their cruiser 
and denied that police had provided her with the defendant's 
name or "fed" other information to her. 
Prior to the police witness's impeachment testimony, the 
judge clearly explained to the jury that the anticipated subject 
of the testimony would be an overheard partial telephone 
conversation that occurred just after Ross's testimony.  The 
judge instructed that if they found the officer's testimony 
credible, they could consider it only for a limited purpose: 
"You may consider such evidence as bearing only on the 
issue of Ms. Ross's credibility.  You may not consider the 
testimony concerning what [the police witness] may have 
overheard her say as proof of any of the substantive facts 
contained in these out-of-court statements, specifically 
statements allegedly made by Ms. Ross, which I anticipate 
coming in that she may have been threatened.  These 
statements may have bearing on her state of mind and 
ultimately on her credibility, but that's the limited 
purpose for which you may consider the testimony of [the 
40 
 
police witness] concerning the subject of this telephone 
conversation." 
 
The judge repeated essentially the same instruction as part of 
his final charge to the jury, specifically stating that they 
were only to consider the officer's testimony for its 
implications concerning the credibility of Ross's in-court 
testimony, and that it could not be used to establish the truth 
of any of Ross's out-of-court statements.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Lester, 486 Mass. 239, 253 (2020) (jury instruction regarding 
limited admissibility of prior inconsistent statement may be 
incorrect where statement carries dual relevance). 
The police impeachment witness testified that he had known 
Ross, in his role as a community service officer, for about 
sixteen years.  He had assisted in transporting her to court to 
ensure her appearance at trial, but had not been present in the 
court room during her testimony.  On that date, she never 
mentioned to him that she was frightened.  After Ross testified, 
the officer brought her to a private room in the court house.  
When she asked if she could make a telephone call, he stepped 
out of the room to allow her privacy, but from a few feet away, 
he could still hear her side of the conversation through the 
closed door.  Multiple times during the conversation, she told 
the person on the other end of the line, "I changed my whole 
testimony.  I'm not trying to get myself killed for nobody."  
41 
 
She stated that "Jimmy Jacks" had threatened to kill her, and 
she had received forty telephone calls threatening to kill her 
and her children.  According to the officer, Ross also told the 
person on the other end of the line, "I even told them that [the 
defendant] babysat my kids," "I told them that they locked me up 
and they made me testify and they made me say certain things," 
and "I told them that he didn't do it."  She also stated that 
during her testimony, the defendant had looked up at her and 
smiled and she smiled back. 
We agree with the Commonwealth and the trial judge that the 
officer's testimony was admissible for the purpose of impeaching 
Ross's credibility.  She had substantially changed her 
testimony, putting her credibility at issue.  The judge also 
gave a proper limiting instruction.  In these circumstances, we 
discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's weighing of its 
probative versus its prejudicial value.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 403. 
Finally, contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial 
judge's decision to deny the defendant's belated request to 
conduct a voir dire of Ross was not an abuse of discretion.  The 
record supports the Commonwealth's argument that the defendant 
was aware of the threats Ross had allegedly received in 
connection with her involvement in the case.  Further, the judge 
offered to have Ross brought back to court so that the defendant 
42 
 
could recall her, which defense counsel declined.  In these 
circumstances, it was well within the judge's discretion not to 
permit a voir dire of Ross. 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant requests that we exercise our statutory authority to 
reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree in order to 
prevent a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, 
although he makes no substantive argument in support of that 
request.  There was ample evidence at trial to support the 
conclusion that the shooter had deliberately premeditated 
killing the victim and to identify the defendant as the shooter.  
Although there were tensions between defense counsel and the 
trial judge, who held him in contempt due to an outburst during 
the jury selection process but deferred sentencing until after 
the trial, our careful review of the entire transcript revealed 
nothing improper in the judge's conduct of the trial itself, and 
we are confident the defendant was not prejudiced as a result.  
Finding no other basis, relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
is unwarranted. 
Judgments affirmed.