Case Title: GROUNDWATER v WRIGHT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ne, 4aig
{IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE CP MONTANA,

1978

LYLE PRANK GROUNDHATER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
WILLOUGHBY R. WRIGHT et al,
Defentants ani Respondents.

‘Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
Honorable Lefoy 1. NeKinnon, Judse presiding.

counsel of Record:
For Aepellants
Donald R. Ronish, Lawistow, Montana
For Respondents:
Janes ¢. Wilkins, Jr., Lawistom, Montana

‘Submitted on briefs: Novenber 8, 1978
Decided: JAN 9 1973
Fil

 
Mr. Chief Justice Prank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of
the Court.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict in
the Fergus County District Court in his condemnation action for

a private road across defendants’ tract to plaintiff's property.
‘The jury found no necessity for the road. Judgment was entered

in favor of defendants.

Plaintiff owns 320 acres of land in Fergus County to
which there is no established access of record. South of this
parcel and across defendants’ property there is a county road
that runs east and west. From this county road there is a trail
which also crosses defendants’ land. The trail runs in a north~
westerly direction and is used by nearby property owners for access.

Plaintiff sought to condemn an access route from the county
road to his property pursuant to sections 93-9902(6) and 93-9923,
R.C.M. 1947. The proposed access would follow the northwesterly
trail and then go directly west. The access would lie wholly
within defendants" property. Plaintiff relies on statutes granting
a right of condemnation for a private road where necessary to pro-
vide access from a highway to a residence or farn.

In the November, 1977 trial the jury found no necessity
for the road. The District Court entered judgment for defendants
and awarded defendants their costs. The District Court later
denied plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment. On December 23
plaintiff filed his notice of appeal and on December 29 moved
the District Court for a new trial. The District Court ruled
that the motion was not timely and that its jurisdiction had been
removed by the appeal.

In his appeal plaintiff raised these issues:

1, Is there evidence sufficient to support the verdict?

2. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to amend

the judgment?
3. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's
motion for a new trial on the ground it lacked jurisdiction?

Plaintiff first argues that the evidence presented does

 

not support the jury verdict. In deciding this issue our func-

tion is to determine whether there is substantial credible evi-

 

dence to support the jury verdict; to this end, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in
the District Court. Noll v. City of Bozeman (1977), ___Mont.
564 P.24 1296, 34 St.Rep. 457; Holenstein v. Andrews (1975),
166 Mont. 60, 530 P.2a 476,

In order to prevail, plaintiff must show that pursuant to

 

sections 93-9902(6) and 93-9923, eminent domain was exercised in

order to provide necessary access from a highway to a residence

 

or farm. ‘The evidence produced at trial shows that plaintiff's
Property is not now being farmed or used as a residence. Plain-
tiff testified that when he retires, he would like to build a home

there and raise cattl:

 

This evidence does not show that the land is presently
being used as a farm or residence and without such a showing the
requisite necessity to condemn a road across another's land is
absent.

" . . . The question of necessity is one of fact
to be determined as other questions of fact in

the light of all the evidence. (Citations omitted.)
Necessity does not mean absolute or indispensible
necessity but reasonable, requisite, and proper

for the accomplishment of the end in view, under
the particular circumstances of the case. (Citations
omitted.)" Montana Power Co. v. Bokma (1969), 153,
Mont. 390, 397, 398, 457 P.2d 769.

This test was not met. Plaintiff does not now reside on the land

and his plans regarding future residence are indefinite. on the

 

Fare occasions when plaintiff visited the land, defendants did
not deny him access. Under these circunstances, plaintiff has
failed to establish that his proposed condemnation was necessary.

‘The same result, on similar facts and under a similar statute, was
reached by the Idaho Supreme Court. McKenney v. Anselmo (1966),
91 Tdaho 118, 416 P.2a 509.

Plaintiff's second contention is that the District court
should have anended its judgment to disallow costs to defendants.
‘This argunent is premised on plaintiff's erroneous belief that
each party partially prevailed and partially lost in the action.

In arriving at this conclusion, plaintiff reli

 

on a jury

 

instruction which states

"IE you find that the proposed road is necessary,
you will then determine the amount of damages

defendants will sustain by the opening of the
westerly 1310 feet, more or less, of this road.

From there on, to the county road, the same is now
a public road-* (inshasis added."

Plaintiff argues that the trial court made a conclusive

 

finding of fact that the northwesterly trail is a public road by
this instruction. He contends that this instruction became the
law of the case and as such, a judgment condemning the trail was
inescapable. Plaintiff claims that because the trail by this
instruction was actually condemned, he prevailed in part of the
action and lost in part. He argues that each party should bear
its own costs under these circunstances.

We recognize that instructions to the jury are the law of
the case. Johnson v. Menmoth Lode (1960), 136 Mont. 420, 348 P.24
267; Ingman v. Hewitt (1938), 107 Mont. 267, 86 P.2d $53. While
these cases stand for the proposition that the jury in reaching
a verdict must follow the instructions as the law of the case, we
do not find that they support plaintiff's argument here that the
judgment should be amended. We are not pursuaded to hold that
an instruction to the jury, such as the one here, should be con-
sidered a judgment or finding of fact. The purpose of this instruc-
tion, when read in its entirety, was to limit the jury's deter-
mination of the amount of damages awardable to defendants if plain~
tiff prevailed. In short, the court was informing the jury that

plaintiff was not expected to compensate defendants for the taking

-4-
of property that already was a public road. Defendants were the
sole prevailing party here and plaintiff was not entitled to an
amended judgment.

Plaintiff further maintains that defendants cannot be awarded

tieir costs under the applicable statute, section 93-9923, R.C.M.

 

1947. ‘This section deals with opening private roads through eminent
domain proceedings and provides that the expenses of the proceed~
ing". . . shall be paid by the person to be benefited." Plain-
tL£€ contends that if he had prevailed, he would have to pay de~
fendants' costs. The issue is thus whether plaintiff who, as

the losing party is not the party benefitted in this proceeding,

can nevertheless be accountable for defendants’ costs.

 

We hold that plaintiff is liable for those costs. The
general rule is that costs are only recoverable when authorized
by statute. Masonovich v. School District No. 1 (1978), __Mont.

+ 582 P.26 p34, 35 St.Rep. 1175 and cases cited therein. In

 

@ proceeding such as this one, the District court is vested with

discretion in awarding costs under the general costs statute:

 

Section 93-8604, R.C.M. 1947. Art. IZ, Section 29, 1972 Montana
Constitution allows defendants their costs as they were the pri-
vate property owners who prevailed and were entitled to their nec-
essary expenses of Litigation.

‘he third issue raised by plaintifé involves his motion
for a new trial following his filing of a notice of appeal. ‘The
District Court denied plaintiff's motion on the ground that be-
cause of the pending appeal it lacked jurisdiction. We agree.

once the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal all proceed-
ings in the District Court were stayed and its jurisdiction renoved.
McCormick v. McCormick (1975), 168 Mont. 136, 541 P.2d 765.

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was further based on
alleged juror misconduct which plaintiff asserts deprived him of
a fair trial. Plaintiff used juror affidavits to prove this allega~

tion.
“gurors will not be permitted to impeach their own
verdict by affidavit subsequent to trial, except
in the single case where their verdict has been
reached by resort to chance; this single expre:
exception excludes all other exceptions under the
rule ‘expressio unius est exclusic alterius'. Sutton
v, Lowry, 39 Mont. 462, 104 P. 545; Komposh v. Powers,
75 Mont.'493, 244°P. 298, aff'd 275 U.S. 504, 48

S.Ct. 156, 73 L.a 396; Hough v. Shishkowsky, 99

Mont. 28,'43 P.2d 247; Schaff v. Shaules, 137 Mont.
357, 352'p.2a 265. In recent times this rule has

been enlarged to permit the use of juror affidavits

to prove any jury misconduct and irregularity by

which a party is deprived of a fair trial, and not
confined solely to that type of jury misconduct in-
volving a verdict reached by resort to chance. Goff

v. Kinzle, 148 Mont. 61, 417 P.24 105. ‘Thus any type
of juror misconduct under subd. 2 of section 93-5603
may be proved by juror affidavit." Rasmussen v. Sibert
(1969), 153 Mont. 286, 293, 294, 456 P.2d 835.

 

 

However, we cannot condone utilizing affidavits of jurors
to impeach their verdict here. There was no requisite showing

of juror misconduct in this case. Plaintiff's argument that the

 

jury ignored the law in reaching their verdict is likewise without
merit. The preceding conclusions are supported by the fact that
the verdict reached is supported by the evidence.

Affirmed,