Case Title: Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Brenner

Citation: 2020-Ohio-142

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Brenner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-142.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance 
sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to promptly notify the 
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, 
Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that 
corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-142 
WARREN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. BRENNER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Brenner,  
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-142.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client 
and failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter—Conditionally stayed six-month suspension. 
(No. 2018-0822—Submitted May 8, 2019—Decided January 22, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the  
Supreme Court, No. 2018-018. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Andrew Jay Brenner, of Mason, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0085066, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2009. 
{¶ 2} In a complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on April 
17, 2018, relator, Warren County Bar Association, charged Brenner with 
professional misconduct arising from his neglect of a legal matter, his failure to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
reasonably communicate with his clients regarding that matter, and his failure to 
cooperate with relator’s investigation.  Brenner did not participate in relator’s 
investigation and failed to answer the complaint.  Consequently, his default was 
certified to this court. 
{¶ 3} Although Brenner timely responded to our June 15, 2018 show-cause 
order, we imposed an interim default suspension on August 7, 2018.  Warren Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Brenner, 155 Ohio St.3d 1280, 2018-Ohio-3116, 121 N.E.3d 393.  We 
also granted Brenner’s motion for leave to answer the complaint and remanded the 
case to the board for further proceedings.  153 Ohio St.3d 1456, 2018-Ohio-3118, 
103 N.E.3d 834.  On remand, the board granted relator’s motion to file an amended 
complaint and a panel of the board later considered the cause on the parties’ 
consent-to-discipline agreement, see Gov.Bar R. V(16). 
{¶ 4} The parties stipulated that in June 2016, Larry Buchanan, the principal 
for Security Self Storage, Inc. (“Security”), retained Brenner to represent the 
company in a small-claims case that Buchanan had filed in municipal court against 
one of Security’s former tenants. 
{¶ 5} Although Brenner participated in the litigation and discussed the 
defendant’s discovery requests with Buchanan, he did not complete the discovery 
responses or produce them to the defendant.  Brenner also failed to inform 
Buchanan that the defendant had filed motions to compel discovery and to deem its 
requests for admissions admitted.  In the absence of responses to those motions 
from Brenner, the court granted the motions and ordered Security to provide its 
discovery responses by a set date. 
{¶ 6} Because Brenner did not comply with the court’s order, the defendant 
filed a motion to find Security in contempt, and the court set a date for the contempt 
hearing.  Brenner did not appear at the contempt hearing and the court found 
Security in contempt of its discovery order, dismissed Security’s complaint with 
prejudice, and entered a judgment of $10,092.50 plus $1,455 in attorney fees on a 
January Term, 2020 
3 
 
counterclaim the defendant had filed.  Brenner did not notify Buchanan of that 
judgment.  Buchanan received notice of the judgment through other sources and 
paid it in full; he then filed a disciplinary grievance and also filed a malpractice 
action against Brenner in common pleas court.  The court entered a default 
judgment against Brenner in the malpractice action on January 5, 2018. 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulated and the board found that Brenner’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter), and 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information from a disciplinary 
authority).  Relator agreed to dismiss six additional alleged rule violations. 
{¶ 8} The parties stipulated that the only aggravating factor present is 
Brenner’s failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(B)(5).  As mitigating factors, the parties agreed that Brenner does not have 
a prior disciplinary record, did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive, did not 
personally gain from his misconduct, demonstrated a cooperative attitude in this 
proceeding during his interim suspension, and presented evidence of his good 
character or reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5).  Although 
the parties acknowledged that Brenner suffers from anxiety and depression and 
entered into a two-year contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”) on November 5, 2018, they have not suggested that his disorders qualify 
as a mitigating factor pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). 
{¶ 9} The board recommends that we accept the parties’ consent-to-
discipline agreement and suspend Brenner from the practice of law for six months 
with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions recommended by the parties. 
{¶ 10} In support of that sanction, the parties and the board cite Dayton Bar 
Assn. v. Wilcoxson, 153 Ohio St.3d 279, 2018-Ohio-2699, 104 N.E.3d 772.  We 
suspended Wilcoxson’s license on an interim basis as a result of his initial failure 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
to answer the disciplinary charges against him but later granted Wilcoxson’s motion 
to terminate the interim suspension and remanded the case to the board.  We 
ultimately found that Wilcoxson—like Brenner—neglected a client’s legal matter, 
failed to keep the client informed about the status of that matter, and then failed to 
respond to the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  But Wilcoxson notably also 
failed to take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client’s interest upon his 
withdrawal from the representation.  Id. at ¶ 7.  Just one aggravating factor was 
present—Wilcoxson’s failure to properly notify his client that he did not maintain 
professional-liability insurance.  Mitigating factors included the absence of prior 
discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, Wilcoxson’s payment of 
restitution, and evidence of his good character and reputation.  We adopted the 
parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement and suspended Wilcoxson for six months, 
all stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, we agree that Brenner’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), and 8.1(b) and that a six-month suspension, all stayed 
on the recommended conditions, is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.  
We therefore accept the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 
{¶ 12} Accordingly, Andrew Jay Brenner is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that 
he (1) comply with his November 5, 2018 OLAP contract, (2) follow any treatment 
and counseling recommendations arising from that contract, (3) make restitution to 
Security Self Storage, Inc., in the amount of $14,114.76 plus judgment interest 
accruing from January 5, 2018, (4) serve a one-year term of monitored probation in 
accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), and (5) engage in no further misconduct.  If 
Brenner fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and 
he will serve the full six-month suspension.  In addition, the interim default 
suspension imposed on August 7, 2018, is terminated.  Before Brenner may resume 
the practice of law, however, he must apply for reinstatement and demonstrate that 
January Term, 2020 
5 
 
he has fully complied with this court’s August 7, 2018 interim-default-suspension 
order.  Costs are taxed to Brenner. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
__________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 13} I join the majority opinion in this case accepting the parties’ consent-
to-discipline agreement.  I write separately, however, to respectfully disagree with 
the viewpoint proposed in the dissenting opinion, which would reject the consent-
to-discipline agreement based on the flawed conclusion that the Supreme Court 
Rules for the Government of the Bar require this court to impose specific conditions 
on any term of monitored probation in an attorney-discipline case. 
{¶ 14} As I have stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 31-35 (Fischer, J., concurring), 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-4171, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, ¶ 60 (Fischer, J., dissenting), and Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sullivan, ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-124, ____ N.E.3d ____, ¶ 40 (Fischer, J. concurring), 
neither the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar nor decades of this 
court’s case law addressing attorney discipline supports such a requirement. 
{¶ 15} While I agree that a more specific term of monitored probation can 
be useful and is in some cases necessary, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Bennett, 
146 Ohio St.3d 237, 2016-Ohio-3045, 54 N.E.3d 1232, ¶ 19, I disagree with the 
dissenting opinion’s view that such specific conditions must be attached every time 
this court decides to order a sanction of monitored probation.  Thus, I disagree with 
the dissenting opinion’s conclusion that specific conditions must be attached to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
monitored probation in Andrew Jay Brenner’s consent-to-discipline agreement.  I 
join the majority opinion and agree that Brenner’s consent-to-discipline agreement 
is appropriate under the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar and 
this court’s precedent. 
 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} Because the Rules for the Government of the Bar require this court 
to impose specific conditions whenever we impose a period of probation and 
because neither the consent-to-discipline agreement in this case nor the report of 
the Board of Professional Conduct includes any conditions for the probation 
imposed on respondent, Andrew Jay Brenner, I would reject the consent-to-
discipline agreement and remand this matter to the board for further proceedings.  
For these reasons, I dissent. 
{¶ 17} Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(4) provides that when this court imposes a 
term suspension on an attorney, it may also impose “[p]robation for a period of time 
upon conditions as the Supreme Court determines.”  (Emphasis added.)  But rather 
than imposing those specific conditions itself, the majority relies on Gov.Bar R. 
V(21) to provide the conditions of probation by default.  However, the probation 
procedures established in Gov.Bar R. V(21) were never intended to provide the 
tailored conditions of probation needed to protect the public from future misconduct 
while promoting the attorney’s rehabilitation. 
{¶ 18} Gov.Bar R. V(21)(A)(1), (3), (4), and (5) state that when this court 
has imposed probation, the relator is required to “[s]upervise the term and 
conditions of probation,” appoint and receive reports from one or more monitoring 
attorneys, and investigate reports of a violation of the conditions of probation.  
Gov.Bar R. V(21)(B)(1) through (3) direct a monitoring attorney to “[m]onitor 
compliance by the respondent with the conditions of probation imposed by the 
January Term, 2020 
7 
 
Supreme Court” (emphasis added), provide reports to the relator “regarding the 
status of the respondent and compliance with the conditions of probation,” and 
“[i]mmediately report to the relator any violations by the respondent of the 
conditions of probation.”  And pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(21)(D), probation may 
not be terminated unless all costs of the proceedings as ordered by this court have 
been paid, “the respondent has complied with the conditions of probation, and no 
formal disciplinary proceedings are pending against the respondent.” 
{¶ 19} Our conditions of probation are important because when a relator 
has probable cause to believe that a respondent has committed “a significant or 
continuing violation of the conditions of probation,” Gov.Bar R. V(21)(E) directs 
the relator to “file a petition for the revocation of probation, reinstatement of any 
stayed suspension, and citation for contempt” with the director of the board.  If a 
panel of the board, after a hearing, finds “clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent is guilty of a significant or continuing violation of the conditions of 
probation,” it reports the violation to this court.  Gov.Bar R. V(21)(H). 
{¶ 20} One purpose of imposing probation is to “provide the Court with a 
more immediate penalty if probation is violated.”  1989 Staff Notes to Gov.Bar R. 
V.  Therefore, when a panel files a certified report regarding a probation violation, 
we may issue “an order reinstating any period of suspension previously stayed by 
the Supreme Court, pending the entry of a final order by the Supreme Court,” 
Gov.Bar R. V(21)(I).  But reinstating a suspension that was previously stayed is not 
the sole penalty available to the court for a probation violation; after this court 
issues a show-cause order (and holds a hearing if any objections are filed), it “shall 
enter an order as it finds proper in accordance with [Gov.Bar R. V(17)],” Gov.Bar 
R. V(21)(K). 
{¶ 21} Therefore, because it is incumbent on this court to impose specific 
conditions of probation, Gov.Bar R. V(21) provides little guidance for the day-to-
day supervision, monitoring, and rehabilitation of the respondent.  Gov.Bar R. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
V(21)(C)(1) through (3) require the respondent to have in-person meetings with the 
monitoring attorney at least once a month during the first year of probation; to 
provide his monitoring attorney with a written release or waiver for use in verifying 
the respondent’s compliance regarding medical, psychological, or other treatment; 
and to cooperate with the monitoring attorney’s efforts to monitor the respondent’s 
compliance with the conditions of probation.  But these three generic requirements 
cannot be expected to establish clear goals and expectations of monitoring for all 
forms of  misconduct.  Instead, conditions tailored to the facts and circumstances 
of a respondent’s misconduct must be imposed to protect the public and rehabilitate 
the respondent. 
{¶ 22} This court’s imposition of specific conditions of probation is 
therefore “essential to the scheme” of probation established by Gov.Bar R. V(21).  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, ¶ 43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The Rules 
for the Government of the Bar give this court—and only this court—the authority 
to impose those conditions, id. at ¶ 42, and the “failure to attach conditions to 
probation is more than a missed opportunity to set the criteria and goals for 
professional redemption, it is an abdication of our duty under the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar,” id. at ¶ 41.  When this court does not provide guidance to 
the relator, the respondent, the monitoring attorney, and the board as to the 
conditions of probation—conditions specifically designed by this court to protect 
the public and rehabilitate the respondent—it undermines the effectiveness of the 
probation scheme established by Gov.Bar R. V(21). 
{¶ 23} For these reasons, “[a] term of probation should have sufficient 
conditions tied to a respondent’s violations to protect the public from further 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct” while also providing supervisory 
activities “tailored to benefit a respondent.”  Halligan at ¶ 45 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
January Term, 2020 
9 
 
{¶ 24} In a consent-to-discipline case, the parties have the opportunity to 
design the most appropriate conditions based on the facts and circumstances of the 
case.  The relator, which must supervise the term of probation, and the respondent, 
who must serve it, share an interest in ensuring that the conditions of probation 
promote the disciplined attorney’s rehabilitation while protecting the public and 
making good use of the time and energy of the relator, the respondent, and the 
monitoring attorney.  When the relator and the respondent enter into a consent-to-
discipline agreement stipulating that the sanction for the respondent’s misconduct 
should include monitored probation, the parties need to include conditions of 
probation.  Conditions are essential to monitored probation and must be set by this 
court when probation is imposed, but neither the board nor this court has authority 
to modify a consent-to-discipline agreement to add conditions that the parties 
omitted, see Gov.Bar R. V(16)(B) and (C); Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D); see also Gov.Bar 
R. V(12)(I) (“If applicable, the panel shall include in its report any conditions of 
probation”).  Therefore, consent-to-discipline agreements that include monitored 
probation but do not specify its conditions should be rejected by the board or, failing 
that, should be rejected by this court. 
{¶ 25} In this case, neither the consent-to-discipline agreement nor the 
board’s report includes any conditions of probation.  I am therefore constrained to 
reject the consent-to-discipline agreement, and I would remand this matter to the 
board for further proceedings that would permit the imposition of specific 
conditions for the one-year term of monitored probation.  Appropriate conditions 
related to overseeing respondent’s office-management practices include the 
following: (1) respondent shall meet in person with his monitoring attorney on a 
monthly basis as required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(1), (2) respondent shall provide 
his monitoring attorney with a written release or waiver for use in verifying 
compliance regarding medical, psychological, or other treatment as required by 
Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(2), (3) respondent shall cooperate and work with the monitor, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
who shall act as a mentor and provide guidance to respondent regarding the proper 
operation and management of a law practice, (4) respondent, with the relator or 
monitoring attorney, shall design a comprehensive plan to ensure that he is 
reasonably diligent in the representation of his clients; in the event respondent 
cannot act with reasonable diligence in representing his clients, the relator or 
monitoring attorney may limit the number of active cases respondent may maintain, 
(5) respondent shall maintain an active-case list or a docketing system and shall 
give the monitoring attorney an inventory of active cases each month, (6) 
respondent shall give the monitoring attorney access to nonconfidential client 
materials and files, ledgers, and account statements as needed to allow the 
monitoring attorney to review respondent’s active cases to ensure his compliance 
with the Rules of Professional Conduct, see Allen Cty. Bar Assn. v. Williams, 95 
Ohio St.3d 160, 2002-Ohio-2006, 766 N.E.2d 973, ¶ 16, and (7) prior to the 
termination of probation, as part of his continuing-legal-education requirements 
under Gov.Bar R. X, respondent shall complete at least six hours of continuing-
legal-education courses on law-office management and operations. 
{¶ 26} In some cases, making the stay of a suspension subject to conditions 
is a sufficient method to compel compliance with our disciplinary order and the 
additional sanction of monitored probation is not necessary.  (The Rules for the 
Government of the Bar do not provide any specific procedure for the relator or a 
monitoring attorney to supervise the conditions of a stayed suspension.)  However, 
since the majority accepts the consent-to-discipline agreement, and given the way 
the agreement in this particular case is structured, we should also include the 
following requirements agreed to by the parties as conditions of probation rather 
than conditions of the stay: (1) respondent shall comply with his November 5, 2018 
contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, (2) respondent shall follow 
any treatment and counseling recommendations arising from that contract, (3) 
respondent shall make restitution to Security Self Storage, Inc., in the amount of 
January Term, 2020 
11 
 
$14,114.76 plus judgment interest accruing from January 5, 2018, before 
respondent may apply to terminate probation, and (4) respondent shall engage in 
no further misconduct. 
{¶ 27} “An effective attorney-probation system—one that follows the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar—requires the considered input of this court in 
establishing the conditions of probation.”  Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-
Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  Because no specific conditions are imposed for respondent’s term of 
probation, I dissent from the court’s decision today. 
 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Kenneth E. Peller, Bar Counsel, and Dwight A. Packard II, for relator. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Ian D. Mitchell, for respondent. 
________________________