Case Title: Lecours v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.

Citation: 163 Vt 157, 657 A.2d 177

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
LECOURS_V_NATIONWIDE_MUTUAL_INS_CO.93-558; 163 Vt 157; 657 A.2d 177

[Filed 06-Jan-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                           No. 93-558


Patrick Lecours and                       Supreme Court
Elizabeth A. Peters
                                          On Appeal from
     v.                                    Chittenden Superior Court

Nationwide Mutual Insurance               October Term, 1994
Company, James A. Mullen,
Individually and d/b/a Mullen
Insurance Agency, and David
Schramm


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Alan D. Overton  of Kolvoord, Overton & Wilson, Essex Junction, for
 plaintiffs-appellants 

Samuel Hoar, Jr. and Shapleigh Smith, Jr. of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp,
 Burlington, for  defendants-appellees 




PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


  JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Chittenden Superior
Court declaring that plaintiff Patrick Lecours directed reduction of his
uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) coverage with defendant Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) to the statutory minimum.  We affirm. 

  On August 19, 1992, plaintiff Elizabeth A. Peters was severely injured when
Lecours's Bronco, which she was driving, was struck head-on by an oncoming
vehicle whose driver had liability limits of only $20,000/$40,000, well below
Peters's damages from the accident. Lecours made a claim against Nationwide
for the excess under his UM coverage, and filed the present declaratory
judgment action after Nationwide rejected the claim on grounds that Lecours's
UM coverage was the same as that of the driver of the other vehicle.  Lecours
requested that the reduction in his UM coverage be declared ineffective as a
matter of law. 

  The trial court found that in 1990 Lecours had shifted his automobile
coverage to Nationwide to get better rates.  Lecours's initial Nationwide
policy provided $100,000/$300,000 liability coverage and $100,000/$300,000 UM
coverage for his Honda automobile.  On November 1, 1991, Lecours called his
insurance agent, David Schramm, to advise that he planned to buy a second
vehicle and wanted to add it to his policy.  Schramm testified that Lecours
was interested in reducing the size of the new premium and elected to lower
the UM limits in the policy to $20,000/$40,000.  On the same day as the call
to Schramm, Lecours paid an October 9, 1991 bill from Nationwide, omitting,
however, the UM-related premium, which then still reflected the prior
$100,000/$300,000 coverage. 

  Based on the Mullen Agency microfilm records and Schramm's testimony, the
court found that the agency entered the reduction in UM coverage along with
the second-vehicle coverage on November 14, 1991, effective November 1, 1991.
 The court also found that Lecours received a new policy declaration sheet
and premium notice setting forth the addition of the Bronco and the change in
the UM coverage.  One day later, Nationwide sent an additional policy
declaration and premium bill, reflecting a small premium reduction.  The
court found that Lecours did not protest the UM reduction until after the
accident some nine months later and that it was more likely than not that he
had directed that UM coverage be lowered to the statutory limits.  The
present appeal followed. 

  Plaintiffs argue that Nationwide did not prove that Lecours's decision to
reduce the UM coverage was informed and hence the court's finding that
Lecours had directed the reduction was erroneous.  The thrust of plaintiffs'
argument is that Nationwide had an obligation under the statute to disclose
to plaintiffs the options for UM coverage and the potential consequences of a
reduction in coverage.  Because Nationwide's agents were unfamiliar with UM
requirements, Lecours contends he could not have made a knowing and
intelligent decision to reduce coverage. 

  In reviewing a matter on appeal, we examine the trial court's findings of
fact only for clear error.  V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2).  Factual findings are viewed
in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, disregarding modifying
evidence.  Mullin v. Phelps, No. 93-143, slip op. at 12 (Vt. June 24, 1994).
"A finding will not be disturbed merely because it is contradicted by
substantial evidence; rather, an appellant must show there is no credible
evidence to support the finding."  Highgate Assocs. v. Merryfield, 157 Vt.
313, 315, 597 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1991); see also Kimbrell v. Great American
Ins. Co.,