Case Title: Hronek v. St. Joseph's Children's Home

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-85

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hronek v. St. Joseph's Children's Home1994 WY 6866 P.2d 1305Case Number: 93-85Decided: 01/12/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming

Dennis HRONEK, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

SAINT JOSEPH'S CHILDREN'S HOME, a Wyoming 
Corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Walter Urbigkit, Cheyenne, 
for appellant.

John J. Maier, Torrington, 
for appellee.

S. Thomas Throne, Sheridan, 
for amicus curiae Raymond T. Duncan.

John J. Blomstrom, Casper, 
for amicus curiae Eighty-Eight Oil Co.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ., and 
BROWN, J. (Retired).

BROWN, Justice, Retired.

[¶1]      In a declaratory 
judgment action involving mineral interests, the district court granted summary 
judgment to appellee, Saint Joseph's Children's Home. Appellant, Dennis Hronek, 
appeals.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant urges 
the following issues:

FIRST ISSUE:

Res judicata, enforced by full faith and credit, 
precludes litigation of the trust liquidation and distribution issues presented 
in these subsequent proceedings.

SECOND ISSUE:

The expiration of the applicable Colorado Statutes of 
Limitations is binding on Wyoming by the Foreign Law Borrowing Statute, W.S. 
1-3-117.

THIRD ISSUE:

Comity, abstention and forum non conveniens required 
in the exercise of proper discretion to have trial venue yielded to a pending 
proceeding in Colorado.

FOURTH ISSUE:

Concepts of due process and litigative fairness 
require reversal of the summary judgment decision.

FIFTH ISSUE:

The grant of summary judgment was improper and 
legally unjustified whether determined on a basis, which cannot be established 
by the decision, of a factual issues review or from a dispositive principle of 
law; both as to Appellee's Motion when granted and to Appellant's Motion when 
denied. Issues of fact existed and there is no preclusive rule of law which 
justified decision in favor of Appellee where material conflicts in the evidence 
exist.

[¶4]      If the entire New 
Testament can be edited into one short paragraph,1 surely we can edit the issues urged 
by appellant into a single sentence, such as: Was the granting of appellee's 
motion for summary judgment legally correct?

[¶5]      On June 18, 1992, 
Saint Joseph's Children's Home filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
requesting that it be declared the owner of all oil, gas and other minerals on 
and under certain property located in Campbell County, Wyoming. The complaint 
further requested that funds held by or payable by defendant Eighty-Eight Oil 
Company attributable to production on this property be set over to Saint 
Joseph's Children's Home. Eighty-Eight Oil Company and Raymond T. Duncan 
answered the complaint and requested interpleader. Interpleader was allowed and, 
on appeal, each party filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Saint Joseph's 
Children's Home. Throughout the district court proceedings, Mr. Hronek purported 
to act pro se; however, out-of-state counsel lurked in the periphery and 
surfaced from time to time. Attorney tracks are on all instruments filed by Mr. 
Hronek.2

[¶6]      On October 9, 
1973, Leo A. Sims executed an oil and gas lease to Raymond T. Duncan. The oil 
and gas lease covered lands described as Township 47 North, Range 71 West, 6th 
P.M., Section 30: E 1/2, Campbell County, Wyoming. Mr. Sims executed a trust 
agreement dated December 10, 1979 naming Mr. Hronek as trustee of the "Leo A. 
Sims Trust." In the trust agreement as amended, Mr. Sims named himself and his 
sister, Esther Hoskins, lifetime beneficiaries. Principal and income were to be 
used for the benefit of Mr. Sims and his sister. Upon the death of the lifetime 
beneficiaries, the remaining assets in the trust estate was to be distributed to 
Saint Joseph's Children's Home in Torrington, Wyoming. On December 20, 1979, Mr. 
Sims conveyed all of the mineral rights under the E 1/2 of Section 30, Township 
47 North, Range 71 West, Campbell County, Wyoming, to Mr. Hronek as trustee 
under the trust agreement dated December 10, 1979. Mr. Sims died on January 29, 
1983, and his sister died on December 14, 1985.

[¶7]      By its own terms, 
the trust agreement terminated on December 14, 1985 with the death of the last 
lifetime beneficiary, Esther Hoskins. Since the trust agreement terminated, 
there are no issues regarding the internal administration of the trust agreement 
to be litigated. The rules of construction of a trust agreement are simple. A 
trust agreement is governed by the plain meaning contained in the four corners 
of the document. "[A] trust is limited * * * in duration by the terms of the 
trust." 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trusts, § 92 (1992). See also First Nat. Bank & Trust 
Co. of Wyo. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1973) and First Nat. Bank 
& Trust Co. of Wyo. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224, 229 (Wyo. 1966). The reading 
of the trust document is clear. Mr. Sims intended for the proceeds to be used to 
support himself. Upon his death, the proceeds of the trust were to be used to 
support his sister and then all the property passed to Saint Joseph's Children's 
Home. The death certificates filed in the appellate record clearly indicate that 
the lifetime beneficiaries died. Upon their deaths, the equitable interest 
passed to Saint Joseph's Children's Home. "[T]he trust terminates when its 
purpose has been fully accomplished * * *." 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trusts, supra, at § 
92.

[¶8]      The NE 1/4 of 
Section 30, Township 47 North, Range 71 West, Campbell County, Wyoming was 
conveyed on March 20, 1986 by Mr. Hronek, in his capacity as trustee of the "Leo 
A. Sims Trust," to Saint Joseph's Children's Home. The SE 1/4 of Section 30, 
Township 47 North, Range 71 West, Campbell County, Wyoming was omitted from the 
conveyance. The sole basis of Mr. Hronek's claim to the minerals in the SE 1/4 
of Section 30 was that this quarter section was not included in the mineral deed 
executed by Mr. Hronek dated March 20, 1986 and remained in him as trustee. 
Throughout proceedings in the district court and on appeal, Mr. Hronek has 
totally ignored the fact that his interest in the property involved here was as 
trustee of the "Leo A. Sims Trust."

[¶9]      On December 29, 
1992, Saint Joseph's Children's Home filed a motion for summary judgment. In 
support of its motion, the affidavit of J. Matthew Perkins, a professional 
landman, was attached and filed. The affidavit recited that affiant had 
personally examined the instruments we have referred to. The affiant also 
attached copies of these instruments to his affidavit.

[¶10]   We need not cite in great detail 
the law with respect to summary judgment. That area of the law is well settled 
and well known. A summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869 (Wyo. 1990); 
Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 342 (Wyo. 1989). The record is reviewed from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Baros, 780 P.2d  
at 342. A material fact is one which, if proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause or defense asserted 
by the parties. Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 978 (Wyo. 
1988). In summary judgment proceedings, the initial burden is on the moving 
party to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Stundon v. 
Sterling, 736 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1987); England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 
(Wyo. 1986).

[¶11]   Saint Joseph's Children's Home has 
shown in its motion for summary judgment that the mineral rights for the E 1/2 
of Section 30 were conveyed to Mr. Hronek in his capacity as trustee of the "Leo 
A. Sims Trust." The terms of this trust agreement, as amended, provided that 
upon the death of both Mr. Sims and his sister, the trust agreement terminated 
and the property passed to Saint Joseph's Children's Home. The death 
certificates showed that Mr. Sims and his sister, the life beneficiaries of the 
trust, were deceased. The conveyance, terms of the trust agreement as amended, 
and the death certificates are unambiguous and no factual question can be 
developed with respect to these instruments. Clearly, Saint Joseph's Children's 
Home made a prima facie case and satisfied its burden by showing that the 
disputed mineral interest belonged to Saint Joseph's Children's 
Home.

[¶12]   After the moving party has 
established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 
come forward with competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts 
presented by the movant. Jones Land and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of 
Omaha, 733 P.2d 258, 263 (Wyo. 1987). Competent evidence must be evidence that 
would be admissible at trial. Conclusory affidavits are insufficient to rebut 
movant's prima facie case and specific facts must be shown. Davenport v. 
Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 1987). Mr. Hronek's affidavits and other 
materials filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment totally failed 
to rebut Saint Joseph's Children's Home's prima facie case.3

[¶13]   In response to the motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Hronek filed, pro se, an instrument captioned "Defendant 
Hronek's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and His Motion for 
Summary [Judgment]." This instrument stated that there were genuine issues of 
material fact, but did not identify any issues. It further stated that a deed 
"to the property" was made out to Mr. Hronek and that Saint Joseph's Children's 
Home sued him. Mr. Hronek also wanted to depose three members of the clergy. The 
instrument referred to attached affidavits and said Mr. Hronek was offered 
$1,500.00. Mr. Hronek did not say by whom or for what. Mr. Hronek concluded by 
requesting that Saint Joseph's Children's Home's motion for summary judgment be 
denied and that he be granted summary judgment. An affidavit by an out-of-state 
attorney was attached to this response. This instrument stated that the affiant 
drafted the deeds and trust instruments involved in this matter. Another 
affidavit filed by Mr. Hronek stated that a home health care aide (affiant) was 
giving Mr. Sims a bath in the fall of 1982 and, at that time and place, 
according to the affiant, Mr. Sims said, "I have land in Wyoming. I'm going to 
give the orphanage half and Dennis [Hronek] half." The final affidavit was 
executed by a petroleum engineer who defined "production" as understood in the 
oil and gas industry.

[¶14]   At the hearing on the cross-motions 
for summary judgment, Hronek stated, "I request that summary judgment be found 
in my favor because of divine intervention, irregardless [sic] of all of the 
laws * * *." "Divine intervention" is mentioned at least three other times in 
Mr. Hronek's argument.4 Summary judgment was granted in 
favor of Saint Joseph's Children's Home on February 17, 1993. This judgment 
effectively disposed of the counterclaims and cross-claims dangling in the 
declaratory judgment proceedings.

[¶15]   We have identified the only 
documents and instruments that the district court was asked to consider and did 
consider in the summary judgment proceedings. When reviewing a summary judgment 
on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the district court, using 
the same information. England, 728 P.2d  at 1141; Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 162-63 (Wyo. 1986); Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶16]   The thrust of appellant's appeal 
references materials not considered by the district court, nor were those 
materials urged or even brought to the attention of the district court at the 
summary judgment hearing. Fleeting reference is made to some of those materials 
or concepts in the pleadings, but they mostly withered away before the summary 
judgment proceedings.5 Appellant now tries to breathe life 
into these vague concepts and urges entirely new theories. This case should be a 
straightforward appeal from a summary judgment; however, appellant obfuscates 
the real issue by extensive discussion and analysis of issues not before the 
district court. Appellant would have us believe that an issue is proved or 
disproved by an argument which proves or disproves something not at issue. 
Appellant raises and argues as issues: res judicata, statutes of limitation in 
Colorado and Wyoming, comity, abstention, forum non conveniens, due process and 
litigative fairness.6 We do not understand appellant's 
fifth issue except he apparently is saying summary judgment was 
unjustified.

[¶17]   We have previously made reference 
to Mr. Hronek's response to Saint Joseph's Children's Home's motion for summary 
judgment and his own motion for summary judgment. Neither the response, through 
attached affidavits, nor argument at the summary judgment hearing address the 
issues now raised on appeal. In Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446-47 (Wyo. 
1993), we said:

We 
strongly adhere to the rule forbidding us to "consider for the first time on 
appeal issues that were neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court," 
except for those issues which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature. 
Oats v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 1991). We follow this rule because 
"it is unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial court for reasons that were not 
presented to it, whether it be legal theories or issues never formally raised in 
the pleadings nor argued to the trial court." Id.

We are satisfied that the 
Wyoming court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit. The real 
property, that is, the mineral interest, was in Campbell County, Wyoming. The 
money or stake attributable to the mineral interests at issue was in Natrona 
County, Wyoming and Eighty-Eight Oil Company had its principal place of business 
in Natrona County. The venue of this lawsuit may also have been appropriate in 
Campbell County; however, appellant never requested that the venue be changed to 
Campbell County.

The district courts in this state are courts of 
general jurisdiction. * * * As such, they have inherent subject matter 
jurisdiction over any and all cases in which jurisdiction is not specifically 
vested in some court of limited jurisdiction. * * * Once jurisdiction is 
acquired, the district court has the power to hear and determine the matter and 
to render a binding judgment. * * * We adopt the analysis found in Sil-Flo 
Corporation v. Bowen, 98 Ariz. 77, 402 P.2d 22 (1965), and recognize that the 
power to enter a binding judgment is equally present among all district courts 
in the state. In this context, venue is never a consideration. * * * 

[¶18]   Since jurisdiction, with its 
inherent power to render judgment, is present despite any impropriety with 
respect to venue, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the District 
Court of the Eighth Judicial District in and for Converse County properly 
followed § 27-12-601. Subject matter jurisdiction would be present whether it 
did or did not. It is proper, however, to remind our district courts and counsel 
that the remedy with respect to questions of venue is a request to change venue 
to the proper court. Unless specifically mandated by statute, the absence of 
proper venue does not result in a dismissal, a reversal, or a new trial. See 
Sil-Flo, 402 P.2d  at 27. Furthermore, we expect the aggrieved party to make a 
timely objection, or to request a change. Otherwise, venue will be deemed 
proper. Such a result is justified because venue normally is founded upon 
convenience to the parties to the litigation. It does not reach the judicial 
power. Larsen failed to object to venue in the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District in and for Campbell County, and we deem any concerns he may 
have had with respect to venue to have been waived.

Matter of Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶19]   That said in Matter of Larsen is 
equally applicable here. Appellant made a motion to dismiss this case for lack 
of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to change the venue to the District 
Court for Weld County, Colorado. A district court in Wyoming can change the 
venue to another county in Wyoming, but cannot properly change the venue to 
another state. Dismissal of the lawsuit was appellant's remedy if the district 
court for Natrona County did not have jurisdiction or suffered some other 
infirmity. The district court found it had jurisdiction, and we 
agree.

[¶20]   It is well settled that courts of 
one state have no power to affect title to real property located wholly in 
another state. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65 (1909). 
Decrees and judgments purporting to affect title to real property in another 
state are void. Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo. 
1978).

[¶21]   In summary, jurisdiction and venue 
were proper in this case. The motion for summary judgment by Saint Joseph's 
Children's Home was supported by affidavits demonstrating a prima facie case 
that summary judgment should be granted. Mr. Hronek's response to the motion for 
summary judgment totally failed to rebut the prima facie case shown by Saint 
Joseph's Children's Home.

[¶22]   Affirmed.

 

Footnotes
 

1 According to syndicated columnist Lewis 
Grizzard, the New Testament can be condensed into a single paragraph: "He was 
born. He lived. He died. He's coming back and he's not going to be real happy." 
Lewis Grizzard, The Art of Editing, Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 13, 
1993.

2 Mr. Hronek had a strange notion in the 
district court and on appeal that an out-of-state attorney with a power of 
attorney should be allowed to represent him in Wyoming 
courts.

3 It is noted that appellate counsel for 
Mr. Hronek was not involved in the summary judgment proceedings in the district 
court.

4 A cursory examination of the cases 
decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court in more than a hundred years reveals that 
this is only the second time "divine intervention" has been suggested. 
Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 288 P.2d 767, 771 (1955). Considering the 
caption of the case here, appellant may be ill advised to attempt to invoke 
"divine intervention."

5 The appellate record contains several 
counterclaims by Mr. Hronek. It also contains cross-claims against Raymond T. 
Duncan and Eighty-Eight Oil Company. There are also spurious instruments 
purporting to be a cross-claim against S. Thomas Throne. Mr. Throne was never a 
party, but rather the attorney for Mr. Duncan. Mr. Hronek also filed an 
instrument purporting to be a complaint for declaratory judgment. The record 
contains copies of instruments that are illegible. Also, there are numerous 
missing instruments. The index indicates that these instruments are mostly 
correspondence. We assume that these missing and illegible instruments are not 
significant or we would have been advised.

6 Saint Joseph's Children's Home filed 
suit in October 1986 against Mr. Hronek in Weld County, Colorado. This suit was 
dismissed with prejudice by stipulation in April 1988. Appellant alludes to this 
case in connection with several of his issues. The district court did not 
consider the Colorado case in the summary judgment proceeding nor should it have 
been considered. In the Colorado case, Saint Joseph's Children's Home alleged 
mismanagement of the trust and breach of fiduciary duty. Saint Joseph's 
Children's Home asked for an accounting and for $100,000 for specified incidents 
of mismanagement. It also asked for $30,000 for unreasonable compensation Mr. 
Hronek allegedly paid himself as trustee and funds paid to an attorney. The 
Colorado action did not have anything to do with the subject matter of this 
case; that is, the mineral interest in Wyoming and the funds held by 
Eighty-Eight Oil Company. Furthermore, we do not know what happened in the 
Colorado case, except that it was dismissed.