Case Title: Obrien v. Island Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1988-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 87-061


Charles P. O'Brien                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Windham Superior Court

The Island Corporation                       November Term, 1988



Silvio T. Valente, J.

Thomas W. Costello and Ardith L. Baldwin of Thomas W. Costello, P.C.,
  Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellant

Miller, Cleary & Faignant, Ltd., Rutland, for defendant-appellee Island
  Corp.

Lisa Chalidze of Hull, Webber & Reis, Rutland, for defendant-appellee
  Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant Island
Corporation (Island) following a jury verdict in its favor and the grant of
summary judgment for defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna).
We affirm.
     The action resulted from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a
building owned by Island and insured by Aetna.  At the time of the accident,
plaintiff was employed by a corporation which had leased the premises from
Island.  One of plaintiff's duties was to keep the boiler on the premises
operating so as to prevent the pipes and the heating system from freezing.
In the course of this employment he entered the boiler in order to remove
ashes from a firebox platform and became trapped therein when the door
closed upon his leg.
     In his complaint plaintiff alleged that Island reserved control over
the premises, breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to provide him
with premises which were reasonably safe and free from latent defects, and
failed to warn him of dangerous and defective conditions on the premises.
In an amended complaint, he alleged that Island breached a statutory duty
created by 21 V.S.A. { 241(b) relating to the operation of boilers.  The
allegations against Aetna were that it failed to fully and properly inspect
the area in question and to warn plaintiff of the danger.  We first address
plaintiff's claims against Aetna.
                                    I.
     Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting Aetna's
motion for summary judgment.  The undisputed material facts are that Aetna
issued a policy of insurance to Island prior to the date of the injury to
plaintiff.  The policy contained a condition relating to inspection which
reads in pertinent part as follows:
         The company shall be permitted but not obligated to
         inspect the named insured's property and operations at
         any time.  Neither the company's right to make
         inspections nor the making thereof nor any report
         thereon shall constitute an undertaking, on behalf of or
         for the benefit of the named insured or others, to
         determine or warrant that such property or operations
         are safe or healthful, or are in compliance with any
         law, rule or regulation.

Aetna did not inspect Island's premises before the date of plaintiff's
injuries.
     Plaintiff maintains that Aetna may be liable under Section 324A of the
Restatement of Torts (Second)(1965).  In Derosia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1
Vt. L.W. 359 (Sept. 21, 1990), we held that an insurance carrier could be
subjected to liability where it undertook to render a specific service to
its insured which was necessary for the protection of a third person and its
failure to exercise reasonable care in so doing resulted in (a) an increased
risk of harm to the person, (b) the assumption by the actor of a duty owed
to the third person, or (c) harm to the third person resulting from reliance
on the understanding.  Id. at 360.
     The fundamental problem with plaintiff's argument, however, is that
Aetna did not contract or promise to inspect the premises and thus it did
not undertake to assume Island's duty.  It simply obtained its insured's
permission to inspect the property.
     Plaintiff further contends that Island relied upon Aetna to inspect the
premises, and that evidence of the reliance raised an issue of material fact
which should have precluded the grant of summary judgment.  An examination
of the testimony upon which plaintiff relies discloses that  Island relied
upon safety inspections by carriers other than Aetna.  Accordingly, we find
no error in the grant of Aetna's motion for summary judgment.
                                    II.
     Plaintiff also makes a variety of claims against Island, none of which
warrant reversal.  The majority of plaintiff's claims are directed at the
court's instructions to the jury.  Specifically, plaintiff argues that the
court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury that it must
determine whether or not defendant Island, in its lease arrangement with
Railroad Salvage Company, retained control over the boiler in question at
the time of plaintiff's injury as a condition precedent to any liability on
the part of defendant.  Plaintiff also argues that the court, through its
jury instructions, erroneously restricted the jury's consideration of
control to the lease arrangement between Island and Railroad Salvage, that
our rule relating to landlord liability should be changed, that the court
erred in not granting his motion for a mistrial, and that the court erred by
failing to charge the jury on his theories of breach of warranty and strict
liability.
                                    A.
     The trial court instructed the jury that it must determine whether
Island retained control over the boiler in question at the time plaintiff
was injured and that, if it so found, Island then had the duty to keep the
premises in a safe and suitable condition.  It further instructed the jury
that by statute a person shall not operate, cause to be operated or permit
to be operated any boiler or pressure vessel under his control or ownership
in a manner which causes or is likely to cause harm to other persons or
property, (FN1) and that a violation of this statute could be considered as
evidence of negligence.
     The court's instruction that the jury had to determine whether Island
retained control of the premises was required by plaintiff's theories for
recovery.  He had alleged and offered proof that Island had reserved
control over the premises "and, in particular control over said furnace."
He argued to the jury that "the question for you . . . is what measure of
control was reserved."  When the instruction was given our law was well
settled that a landlord could not be subject to liability founded on
negligence unless the landlord reserved control over the area where the
injury occurred.  Waite v. Brown, 132 Vt. 20, 25,