Case Title: P. v. Tate

Citation: 49 Cal. 4th 635

Docket Number: S031641

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/8/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S031641 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
GREGORY O. TATE, 
) 
 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 933308 
 
____________________________________) 
A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of 
Sarah LaChapelle.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)1  The jury also found that defendant 
personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that 
robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)).  Defendant was sentenced to death.  This appeal is automatic.  We 
will affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.   Guilt trial. 
1. Prosecution case. 
Around 8:00 p.m. on Monday, April 18, 1988, Tanya DeLaHoussaye paid a 
brief visit to Sarah LaChappelle in Sarah‟s home on Hesket Road in Oakland.2  
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
We sometimes identify the victim, Sarah LaChapelle, as Sarah in order to 
differentiate her from her son, Anthony LaChapelle, to whom we generally refer 
as Anthony. 
2 
Sarah‟s burgundy Oldsmobile Cutlass was parked in her driveway.  Sarah was 
wearing a nightgown and said she planned to lie down because she had a cold. 
At 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, April 19, 1988, Anthony LaChapelle, Sarah‟s 
son, went to her home and noticed her Cutlass was not in the driveway.  The front 
door was open, though the outer screen door was closed.  Anthony went in and 
found his mother dead on the living room floor, dressed in a nightgown.  Her body 
had been impaled with a butcher knife and a barbecue fork.  Her ring finger had 
been cut off and was lying near her body.  A chair had been turned over, items had 
been tossed about, and the room was in disarray.  There was a hole in the back 
door.  Anthony called 911. 
An autopsy confirmed that a knife was embedded in the victim‟s back, and 
a barbecue fork was stuck in the side of her neck.  She had multiple stab wounds 
on her back, buttocks, and neck, some inflicted by a knife different from the one 
lodged in her back.  There also were incised, or slicing, wounds on her left 
shoulder, right index finger, and right thumb.  Her back and face exhibited 
numerous puncture wounds, caused by something small and sharp entering the 
body, including one such wound that had penetrated her eye.  In all, her body had 
24 stab wounds and 28 puncture wounds.  These wounds had caused damage to 
her ribs, voice box, pericardial sac, heart, torso, neck, back, right jugular vein, 
right chest cavity, right lung, vertebral column, left kidney, abdominal cavity, and 
left buttock, and well as the tendons and muscles of her right hand.  As noted, her 
ring finger had been detached from her hand, and she had damage to the adjacent 
third and fifth fingers.  She had also suffered multiple blunt force injuries, 
including defensive wounds, to her head, face, arms, and torso.  Her upper jaw 
was fractured, and teeth had been knocked out.  The examining pathologist opined 
that the victim was alive, though not necessarily conscious, at the time these 
injuries were inflicted. 
The victim had a telephone cord wrapped around her wrists and torso.  
There was a 10-inch tear on the front of her nightgown, which had been lifted 
3 
above her waist.  The evidence indicated that the assailant had made a forced entry 
through the back door, that a bloody struggle had occurred in the living room, that 
the assailant thereafter left bloody traces, including bloody footprints, throughout 
the house while looking for items to steal, and that the murder weapons were 
knives and tools found in the victim‟s home. 
Defendant‟s grandmother lived across the street and three houses down 
from the victim‟s residence.  Also living in the grandmother‟s house were 
defendant‟s mother, his brother, his aunt, and several other relatives.  According to 
defendant‟s aunt, he sometimes lived with the family at his grandmother‟s house, 
but he was not living there on the day of Sarah‟s murder. 
Around 6:00 p.m. on April 19, 1988, Oakland patrol officers Sullivan and 
Boyovich were parked on Kingsland Avenue.  They spotted a burgundy 
Oldsmobile Cutlass that was on the stolen vehicle list.  They stopped the vehicle, 
which was the victim‟s car.  Defendant was driving.  He was arrested.  The interior 
of the Cutlass contained a small carving knife and a pair of red pants, as well as a 
radio-television and a videocassette recorder (VCR) that had been taken from the 
victim‟s home. 
After initial resistance, defendant was handcuffed and placed in the police 
car.  Once seated in the police vehicle, he volunteered that he had gotten the 
Cutlass from “a guy named Fred Bush.” 
Defendant was taken to the homicide division of the Oakland Police 
Department to be interviewed.  Defendant‟s sweater had a bloodstain on its sleeve, 
and, when one of the interviewing officers arrived, the bloody shoes defendant had 
been wearing were sitting outside the interview room.  The interview began 
around 9:25 p.m. on April 19 and lasted through much of the night, with periodic 
breaks.3  Only a single portion was recorded.  During the unrecorded initial 
                                              
3  
As indicated below, defendant urges that his statements to the police, and to 
his girlfriend Lisa Henry at the police station, should have been suppressed on 
 
4 
segment, interrogating officers advised defendant they were investigating the theft 
of the Oldsmobile, and that a lady had been “hurt” in the incident.  The officers 
read him his Miranda rights.  He agreed to waive his right to silence, both orally 
and by initialing the written advisement form. 
During the initial unrecorded segment, the officers asked defendant about 
the bloodstain on the sleeve of his sweater.  Defendant said it was from a 
nosebleed.  Defendant further stated the following:  He lived with his 
grandmother, but was staying at the home of his girlfriend, Lisa Henry.4  He was 
at his grandmother‟s between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on April 18, 1988, but 
arrived at Lisa‟s residence around 8:00 p.m.  The next morning, April 19, he got 
up at 10:00 a.m. and went to 55th Avenue and Foothill Boulevard.  There he met 
Fred Bush, who had the burgundy Oldsmobile Cutlass.  Bush was trying to sell a 
small television and a VCR.  He owed defendant $500 because, when defendant 
was arrested and jailed following an earlier fight between the two men, Bush or 
Bush‟s mother had taken defendant‟s jacket, which contained cocaine worth that 
sum.  As a “fair trade” for the debt, defendant gave Bush two rocks of cocaine, 
worth $20 each; in return, Bush gave defendant the television and the VCR, and 
lent him the Cutlass until 11:00 that evening so he could take Lisa to a drive-in 
movie. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
grounds that (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights 
(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) (Miranda); (2) the statements were 
induced by trickery, and were thus involuntary; and (3) Lisa Henry was acting as a 
police agent when she elicited statements from defendant.  The exact 
circumstances under which defendant made various statements to the police, and 
to Lisa Henry at the station, are discussed in greater detail in connection with these 
arguments. 
4  
Hereafter, we sometimes refer to Lisa Henry as Lisa in order to differentiate 
her from her brother Germaine Henry, whom we generally identify hereafter as 
Germaine. 
5 
The recorded portion of the interview began at 10:07 p.m.  At this time, 
defendant was re-Mirandized, and he agreed to continue speaking.  During the 
recorded segment, defendant provided a more detailed version of the account he 
had previously given.  Meanwhile, the officers learned that Fred Bush had been 
taken into custody on April 7, 1988.  (He would thereafter remain in the county 
jail until July 18, 1988.)  Without telling defendant that Bush was in jail, the 
officers asked defendant to identify a picture of Bush.  Defendant positively 
identified, and initialed, the picture. 
The recorded session ended at 10:33 p.m.,5 and the interview resumed at 
11:29 p.m.  Before this latter segment commenced, the officers advised defendant 
that the victim in the case they were investigating was dead. 
In the renewed session, defendant conceded that his grandmother lived near 
the victim, Sarah LaChapelle, and that he knew Sarah‟s son, but he denied ever 
being inside the victim‟s house.  An officer asked defendant whether anything had 
happened at his grandmother‟s residence on April 18, 1988.  Defendant said he 
had gone there once that day to get money from his mother for a bus ticket, but she 
would not give him money.  He had also gone to obtain his gun, and he went into 
his grandmother‟s room for that purpose.  Told that two 911 calls had been made 
from his grandmother‟s address on that day (at 7:04 p.m. and 9:25 p.m.), 
defendant responded, “What if I did go back?  But I didn‟t.”  Defendant insisted 
his family blamed him for everything and did not like him.  When accused of 
lying, defendant muttered to himself, “Going to jail for the rest of your life, man.” 
At length, the officers confronted defendant with the facts that Fred Bush 
was in jail, defendant had been driving the victim‟s car and was in possession of 
property taken from her home, and he had bloodstains on his clothing and shoes.  
Urged to tell the truth in the face of this evidence, defendant responded, “Well, 
what‟s in it for me?”  The officers indicated there would be no deals.  In the early 
                                              
5  
The recorded portion of the interview was played for the jury. 
6 
morning hours of April 20, 1988, defendant was arrested for Sarah LaChapelle‟s 
murder.   
Later on the morning of April 20, and pursuant to a warrant, officers 
searched the residence where Lisa Henry lived with her father and her 15-year-old 
brother, Germaine.  Among other things, the officers seized a watch and chain 
necklace, and a Visa credit card in the victim‟s name.  Lisa gave the watch and 
chain to police after an officer advised her they were looking for evidence that 
might have been taken in the homicide. 
When the search was complete, the police transported Lisa to the station to 
obtain a statement.  Among other things, the officers asked whether defendant had 
given her some rings.  Lisa said he had done so, but had subsequently taken them 
back.6 
At the conclusion of an initial interview, Lisa was allowed to speak with 
defendant, who was in another interview room.  There were several versions of 
how this visit came about, and of what defendant told Lisa.  Sergeant Medsker, 
one of the interrogating officers, testified that Lisa asked if she could see 
defendant, was granted permission to do so, and spoke with him for about five 
minutes.  Immediately thereafter, the officers questioned Lisa on tape about what 
defendant had said.  In this recorded portion of the interview, which was played 
for the jury, Lisa stated that defendant had denied committing the crime, had 
ultimately agreed with Lisa‟s suggestion that “Freddie, Fred did it,” and at one 
point had said he tried to stop Fred.  Lisa indicated she had urged defendant to 
disclose who else was involved in hopes of receiving a lesser sentence, but 
defendant said he would have to stay in jail anyway. 
                                              
6  
At trial, the victim‟s son, Anthony, testified that his mother always wore at 
least two rings, “a diamond ring and another little band.”  When officers executed 
the search warrant at Lisa‟s residence, they had asked her for “what [defendant] 
gave [her],” specifically including “the rings.”  In response, Lisa had given them 
the watch and chain, but told them she “didn‟t have any rings.” 
 
7 
At trial, when asked by the prosecutor if she had requested permission to 
see defendant, Lisa responded only that the officers said they would allow her to 
see and speak with him.  On cross-examination, she denied having asked to see 
defendant.7  Lisa testified that when she asked him about Fred, defendant “didn‟t 
say anything,” and when she asked him what happened with a lady, he was “just 
vague” and “didn‟t really say.”  When the prosecutor sought to refresh her 
recollection by showing her the transcript of her taped police statement, Lisa 
claimed she had misspoken to the officers; they had mentioned Fred and she went 
into the room thinking Fred must have committed the crime, so after her visit with 
defendant, in which she did “all the talking,” she just told them, “Fred did it.” 
Lisa further testified as follows:  Defendant had stayed at her home off and 
on since the end of March, when he was discharged from the hospital after being 
treated for gunshot wounds.  He came to her house around 8:00 p.m. on April 18, 
1988, but he did not stay the night.  When he arrived, he was wearing acid-washed 
jeans with a red jacket.  He subsequently left the house with Lisa‟s father.  Her 
father returned later that evening, but defendant did not.  Lisa saw defendant again 
the next morning; Germaine had let him in while Lisa slept.  Defendant was still 
wearing the jeans and red jacket.  The jacket had a matching pair of red leather 
pants.  Lisa had seen defendant wear jeans under those pants before.  Germaine 
wore the matching jacket and pants to school that day.  That same morning, Lisa 
found a Chase Manhattan Visa card with the name “Sarah” in a paper bag on the 
kitchen table.  Defendant gave her a watch, a necklace, a diamond wedding ring, 
                                              
7  
The dispute over whether it was Lisa or the officers who instigated her visit 
with defendant is further illustrated by an exchange during the taped postvisit 
interview with Lisa.  After obtaining Lisa‟s agreement that the officers had been 
talking to defendant for much of the night, and that they had encouraged him to 
tell the truth, Sergeant Paniagua, one of the interviewing officers, asked Lisa, “Did 
I tell you to do anything else?”  Lisa answered, “No.  You asked me just did I want 
to talk to him, maybe I can talk to him to convince him to tell the truth or to tell 
what happened.”  Paniagua responded, “Okay.”  (See discussion post.) 
 
8 
and a diamond engagement ring.  She did not ask where he got these items and 
assumed they were from his drug dealing activities.  Later that day, defendant 
drove Lisa to the store in a burgundy Oldsmobile Cutlass.  She asked where he had 
obtained the car, but he did not answer.  During the drive, he asked her to give him 
back the rings; she did so.  He dropped her off at her home around 6:00 p.m. 
In his trial testimony, Germaine Henry admitted he had told police 
defendant arrived at the Henry residence on the morning of April 19, 1988, 
carrying a red jogging suit in a pillowcase.  However, he disavowed this statement 
on the stand, saying the jogging suit had been in his possession for weeks.  He 
testified he wore the suit on occasion, but could not remember wearing it on April 
19.  He admitted the pants legs had little soiled spots, as well as dirt that needed to 
be wiped off. 
Thereafter, Germaine‟s tape-recorded statement to the police was admitted 
in evidence and played for the jury.  In this statement, Germaine recounted the 
following:  Defendant was not at the Henry residence on the evening of April 18, 
1988, but arrived the next morning carrying a red jogging suit in a pillowcase.  
Germaine wore the suit to school that day (April 19) after wiping dirt off the pants 
legs.  When he left for school, a burgundy-colored car was parked outside the 
house.  When he got back from school, Lisa was wearing a watch, and defendant 
showed Germaine a ring, which Germaine put on his finger and then returned to 
defendant. 
Defendant‟s aunt, Mamie Jackson, lived with defendant‟s grandmother on 
Hesket Road.  Jackson testified as follows:  Defendant came to the house in the 
late afternoon or early evening of April 18, 1988.  He was wearing a red jogging 
suit.  Jackson was not present when defendant left the house later that night, but 
when she next returned, the grandmother‟s room appeared to have been ransacked.  
The next morning, the victim‟s husband, Sylvester LaChapelle, called Jackson and 
asked if she could see Sarah LaChapelle‟s Oldsmobile Cutlass parked in Sarah‟s 
9 
driveway.  Jackson walked across the street to check, saw the car was not there, 
and relayed this information to Sylvester. 
Serological evidence indicated that the pants of the red leather jogging suit 
and the sleeve of defendant‟s sweater both contained type B human blood, found 
in 19 percent of the Black population.  The victim had type B blood; defendant has 
type O blood.  Other genetic markers in the blood on the sweater were consistent 
with the victim‟s blood and appear in about 1.2 percent of the Black population.  
Other genetic markers in the blood on the red pants were also consistent with the 
victim‟s blood and appear in about 11 percent of the Black population. 
According to the prosecution criminologist, the bloodstains on the pants 
were both “transfer-type” and “spatter” stains.  The criminologist described the 
latter as “blood in flight.”  There was also blood on the jacket of the red jogging 
suit, and on the tops and tongues of defendant‟s Fila tennis shoes.  The print of one 
of these shoes matched a bloody shoeprint found at the crime scene. 
 
2.  Defense case. 
An Oakland Police Department fingerprint specialist testified for the 
defense that he could obtain no fingerprint match with defendant for prints taken 
from the crime scene, the victim‟s car, or various items seized from the victim‟s 
house. 
Defendant testified in his own behalf and denied killing Sarah LaChapelle.  
He gave the following account:  He went to his grandmother‟s house between 4:00 
p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on April 18, 1988.  He was wearing Fila tennis shoes and a red 
leather jogging suit over acid-washed jeans and a sweater.  He sought to obtain a 
gun, and also wanted his grandmother to give him money for a bus ticket, because 
he had learned that the man who had shot him the previous month was after him 
again.  His grandmother did not have enough money to give him.  He went into 
her bedroom without permission and opened drawers to look for a firearm, but he 
did not ransack the room.  He found a .38-caliber revolver under the bed and put it 
in his belt.  As he left, after a stay of about 40 minutes, he heard his name 
10 
broadcast on his grandmother‟s police scanner.  Because he was on probation for 
prior weapons offenses, and feared the police might catch him with the revolver, 
he hid it on a shelf in his old clubhouse adjacent to his grandmother‟s garage.  
Then, carrying the scanner, he jumped over her fence. 
Still listening to the scanner, defendant walked along a creek to 
Hegenberger Road, getting mud on his pants and shoes in the process.  Eventually 
he took a bus to Lisa Henry‟s house, where he rinsed off his pants with a hose.  He 
changed shoes and socks, putting on a different pair of Fila tennis shoes that 
belonged to Germaine.  Lisa‟s father, Reginald Henry, then drove defendant to 
look for drugs defendant had hidden.  When they could not find the drugs, they 
went to a liquor store and bought beer.  They sat in the parking lot, drinking the 
beer, for about 40 minutes.  Then they drove back to the Henry house.  Reginald 
went inside, but defendant did not. 
After several more stops, including one to purchase wine, defendant 
returned to his grandmother‟s house to retrieve the gun.  He was not sure when he 
arrived there.  This time, he did not go into the house.  He proceeded to his old 
clubhouse, obtained the gun, and stayed for about 15 minutes, finishing the wine. 
As he walked toward the front of his grandmother‟s property, defendant 
observed two men, whom he had seen before, coming out of Sarah LaChapelle‟s 
house.  One was carrying a box and the other a pillowcase.  The man with the 
pillowcase saw defendant, dropped the pillowcase, and ran.  Both men were Black.  
One was tall and had a light complexion. 
Defendant looked inside the pillowcase and saw a VCR and a television.  
The front door to the victim‟s house was open, and he entered the residence.  
There he found the victim dead and the house in bloody disarray.  He tried to see if 
the victim was breathing, but was distracted when he heard a noise at the back 
door.  He reached for his gun and dropped it beside the victim‟s body.  He picked 
up the gun, went to the back door, and saw that it had been kicked in.  Because 
11 
Germaine‟s shoes were two sizes too small, he was wearing them like slippers, 
and one fell off. 
Defendant wiped his gun off with a towel.  He took the victim‟s car keys, 
the television, the VCR, and other items, and drove away in her Oldsmobile.  He 
did not call the police to report that she was dead.  Nor did he impart this 
information to his grandmother. 
After leaving the victim‟s house, defendant drove aimlessly.  He threw 
away his bloody socks, and finally fell asleep in the Oakland hills.  The next 
morning, he drove to Lisa Henry‟s residence.  He took off his leather pants, put 
them in the pillowcase containing the television and the VCR, took the pillowcase 
into Lisa‟s house, and put it in a closet.  Germaine asked if he could wear the red 
leather jogging suit to school, and defendant agreed.  He retrieved the red pants 
from the pillowcase and gave them to Germaine.  He did not realize there was 
blood on them. 
After taking a shower, defendant examined the pillowcase‟s contents.  
Along with the television and the VCR, it contained a watch, a chain necklace, 
some rings, and a paper bag with a credit card inside.  He gave the chain, watch, 
and rings to Lisa, then went to sleep on the floor. 
Later, defendant drove Lisa and her friend Yolanda to the supermarket.  
They dropped off some medicine for Yolanda‟s mother and returned to Lisa‟s 
house.  Defendant then placed the television and VCR in the trunk of the 
Oldsmobile and drove to the apartment of his friends Roshan and Judo, intending 
to sell the items.  However, he began drinking and talking with his friends and did 
not get around to selling the television and the VCR. 
On his way back to Lisa‟s house, defendant picked up his friend Arnold 
Haney.  Defendant cooked a pizza for himself and Arnold, but Lisa came home 
and demanded that Arnold, whom she disliked, leave the house.  Defendant and 
Arnold ate the pizza in the car.  Defendant then returned to the house, where 
Germaine gave back the red leather pants he had worn to school.  Lisa started an 
12 
argument that escalated as she and defendant drove around in the Oldsmobile.  
Finally, she threw at him the rings he had given her.  He put the rings in the car‟s 
ashtray, dropped Lisa off, and drove away.  He removed the television and the 
VCR from the trunk and placed them in the passenger compartment, intending to 
sell them.  While he was stopped at an intersection on Kingsland Avenue, an 
acquaintance approached and inquired about purchasing drugs. 
Police had been sitting in a parked patrol car on Kingsland Avenue.  At this 
point, they jumped out of their car and pointed guns at the two men.  After 
defendant complied with their orders to put his hands through the window, crawl 
out onto the ground, and place his hands on his head, one of the officers kicked 
him while handcuffing him.  In the police car following his arrest, defendant 
falsely told Officer Sullivan that he got the Oldsmobile from Fred Bush.  He lied 
because he held a grudge against Bush.  Two months earlier, he and Bush had 
gotten into a fight that led to defendant‟s being arrested and jailed.  When 
defendant fled from the fight, Bush grabbed defendant‟s jacket, the pockets of 
which contained rock cocaine, and gave it to a family member.  This incident 
caused defendant to think of Bush as his enemy. 
At the homicide division, the police took defendant‟s shoes, and he was 
placed in an interview room, where Sergeants Medsker and Paniagua questioned 
him.  They read defendant his rights, and he agreed to talk, but he did not know 
why.  When asked where he got the Oldsmobile, he repeated the lie about Fred 
Bush because he had already told that story to Sullivan.  Moreover, he did not 
think the truth would help and, in any event, he disliked Medsker, whom he knew 
from a previous investigation into the murder of defendant‟s friend.  He also lied 
about getting the VCR and television from Bush in exchange for two rocks of 
cocaine, and lied by denying that he went into Sarah LaChapelle‟s house.  When 
he told these falsehoods, he did not know he was going to be charged with 
homicide. 
13 
B.  Penalty trial. 
 
1.  Prosecution case. 
In aggravation of penalty, the prosecution presented evidence of three other 
instances of defendant‟s violent criminal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (b)): 
In March 1986, following a traffic accident between a truck he was driving 
and a car, defendant pointed two guns at the car‟s owner, then pursued the other 
vehicle at high speed, rammed it twice with the truck, fired three shots at the car, 
and, when finally cornered on foot by California Highway Patrol officers, initially 
resisted their orders and made movements as if to draw the two handguns in his 
belt. 
In September 1987, defendant resisted arrest after a traffic stop by punching 
the officer‟s shoulder, challenging the officer to a street fight, and then rushing at 
the officer, whereupon the officer was forced to fell defendant with his baton. 
In February 1988, several days after his fight with Fred Bush, defendant 
approached Bush‟s sister, Marlena Brown, hit her in the face with the back of his 
hand, placed her in a chokehold, and forced her to telephone Bush under threat 
that if she did not do so, he would shoot her. 
The prosecution presented a single victim impact witness, Sarah 
LaChapelle‟s son Anthony.  Anthony testified as follows:  His son, age 11, and 
daughter, age 7, were both severely affected by Sarah‟s death.  The mention of 
grandparents in the children‟s presence now caused them to cry, so the adults in 
the family avoided talking about the victim in front of the children.  Anthony often 
dreamed about his mother.  Since her death, he could not accomplish anything or 
face his friends.  He began to drink heavily and was arrested for drunk driving.  
His friends advised him to hunt down and kill his mother‟s murderer.  To get away 
from his friends, he moved to Los Angeles, where he again was arrested for drunk 
driving and spent time in jail.  While he was in jail, his father passed away.  
Because of the loss of his parents, Anthony had trouble making business decisions, 
and he lost his contracting business. 
14 
As to his feelings about defendant, Anthony said, “Even now I want to get 
this guy.  I want him to die, so I hope the law gets him for me.” 
 
2.  Defense case. 
Defendant presented an extensive case in mitigation.  His mother, father, 
paternal grandmother, and various friends, acquaintances, school officials, and 
juvenile justice workers testified at length about his family, his childhood, his 
educational difficulties, and his troubles with the law.  A marriage and family 
counselor testified about the effects of child abuse on mental and psychological 
development. 
Regarding defendant‟s childhood and family background, his mother, Rosia 
Carter, testified as follows:  Defendant was born out of wedlock in 1967.  At one 
point, Rosia had tried to abort the pregnancy by taking quinine and mustard 
powder.  Defendant‟s father, Gregory Tate, Sr., ultimately married another woman 
and was involved only intermittently in defendant‟s life.  Rosia was physically 
abused by Gregory, Sr., and by her husband, Wayne Carter.  Defendant also 
suffered childhood physical abuse at the hands of these men, who used drugs such 
as heroin and cocaine.  Among other things, Carter treated defendant harshly about 
defendant‟s bedwetting problem, which did not go away until the sixth or seventh 
grade.  Carter was involved in criminal drug activities and went to prison twice 
during his marriage to Rosia.  During Carter‟s second prison term, Rosia divorced 
him.  In his teenage years, defendant was affected by the deaths of a cousin, 
Clifton Spencer, who was fatally stabbed; a neighborhood youth, Willis Reed, who 
died in a shed fire in Rosia‟s backyard; a friend, Antoine Martin, who died in 
defendant‟s arms after a driveby shooting; and defendant‟s maternal grandfather, 
who had been a constructive force in the family.  After the grandfather‟s death, the 
family “fell apart.”  Several relatives developed drug problems, and there were 
physical fights in which defendant was sometimes involved.  At age 17, defendant 
tried to hang himself in Rosia‟s backyard, got into an altercation with responding 
police officers, then fled.  The officers opined he might be trying to make them 
15 
kill him.8  Once during a violent argument with Rosia, defendant blamed his 
upbringing for his life of crime and drugs. 
Further details of the family background were supplied by Gregory, Sr., and 
defendant‟s paternal grandmother, Zelma Richard.  Both confirmed that Gregory, 
Sr., dropped out of high school, married another woman, Pat Davis, in 1969, 
entered the military, was sent to Vietnam, and came back addicted to heroin.  
Gregory, Sr. recalled a 1968 incident, to which Rosia had also alluded, in which 
Rosia stabbed Davis during a street altercation, causing Gregory, Sr., to slap 
Rosia. 
Gregory, Sr., recounted his further abuse of marijuana and alcohol, and 
admitted he supported his drug habits with crime.  He confirmed that during the 
two periods he and Rosia lived together, they fought, and he hit her.  They argued 
about how defendant was being raised; Gregory, Sr., thought Rosia was 
overprotective and too lenient.  Gregory, Sr., recounted that when defendant was 
17 years old, he briefly lived with Gregory, Sr., in Seattle after escaping from a 
juvenile camp.  Gregory, Sr., was then living in Seattle to avoid arrest for a parole 
violation. 
Richard observed signs that defendant was an angry child who was getting 
into trouble in school and with the law.  Like Gregory, Sr., she believed Rosia was 
too lenient.  When defendant was a teenager, Richard tried to get him to work or 
go to school, and she enrolled him in a trade school, but he did not attend.  She 
generally considered defendant to be smart, helpful, and respectful. 
A friend of Rosia‟s and a jail acquaintance of Wayne Carter‟s confirmed 
the physical abuse Rosia suffered from both Carter and Gregory, Sr.  A crisis 
                                              
8  
A juvenile probation officer confirmed the attempted hanging, which 
occurred on November 7, 1984.  According to the probation officer, Rosia 
indicated that defendant was depressed over the deaths of friends and relatives.  As 
a result of this incident, defendant was referred for psychiatric treatment, a 
standard procedure. 
16 
intervention counselor recalled Rosia‟s efforts to place defendant, then eight years 
old, in a residential school because he was disobeying, fighting, and stealing.  The 
counselor sensed that Rosia was rejecting defendant. 
Three men, all of whom were serving prison terms at the time they testified, 
recounted their relationships with defendant as a child and youth.  Their testimony 
indicated that defendant began drinking beer, smoking, stealing, and committing 
burglaries as early as age six; was smoking marijuana by the fourth grade; “hung 
out” with older people in an effort to “fit in”; had a violent temper and a “don‟t 
care” attitude; and engaged in fights.  One of these witnesses opined that 
defendant was affected by the deaths of Willis Reed, defendant‟s friend Antoine 
Martin, and defendant‟s maternal grandfather. 
Numerous witnesses detailed defendant‟s educational history.  Rosia 
testified that she enrolled him in kindergarten a year early, but he was already 
having problems by the first grade.  He transferred elementary schools several 
times.  He was smaller than the other children, and tended to act aggressively 
toward them.  He was easily distracted and may have been diagnosed with 
dyslexia.  When learning disabilities caused his one-year transfer in third grade to 
a school with smaller class sizes, neighborhood children teased him about going to 
and from school on a “special bus.”  Back in his regular school, he had to repeat 
fourth grade.  During this time, Rosia took him to juvenile authorities to see if they 
could talk to him before he got into trouble.  She tried to place him in a residential 
school, but it already had one student with the same learning disability and could 
not take another.  She took defendant for counseling, but he resisted, and the 
counselor could not break through.  Defendant took some special education classes 
during junior high school.  He was expelled for the remainder of the school year 
during seventh grade when a friend brought a pellet gun to school.  Things 
improved somewhat in ninth grade after defendant‟s transfer to yet another school.  
He joined the gymnastics team in tenth grade, but a foot injury ended his 
participation. 
17 
Teachers, an administrator, a psychologist, and a counselor who had 
contact with defendant while he attended public school testified about his 
behavior, attitude, grades, and test scores.  These witnesses variously confirmed 
that, throughout much of his school career, defendant performed poorly, and he 
attended special classes for educationally handicapped students.  In February 
1975, when he was in the third grade, he attained an IQ score of 96, within the 
average range.  Had the tester known defendant was only eight years old instead of 
nine, the score would have been higher.  In separate evaluations during each of his 
fourth grade years, defendant tested well below grade level in reading, though his 
math scores were solidly at grade level.  In seventh grade, after he was suspended 
for receiving a pellet gun from another student and was placed on home 
instruction for the remainder of the year, defendant received all failing grades.  He 
did earn some B‟s and C‟s during his ninth grade year. 
According to several witnesses, defendant was hot-tempered and 
aggressive, often involved in fights with other students, and a frequent disciplinary 
problem.  One teacher perceived him as a bully, while another reported that, 
though not a high achiever, he could behave when strict control was maintained.  
The Individual Education Plan, or IEP, prepared for defendant early in his school 
career indicated he had visual-motor integration and reading disabilities, was 
overactive, and lacked impulse control.  The IEP also suggested he had emotional 
problems. 
There was evidence that Rosia‟s parenting methods, and her ambivalent 
attitudes toward defendant, contributed to his school problems.  An elementary 
school teacher thought Rosia believed defendant‟s difficulties were the school‟s 
fault.  A high school dean testified that, when he suspended defendant for fighting, 
Rosia at first asserted she did not believe defendant was involved in the incident, 
and she threatened to kick the dean‟s “ass,” though she later came to accept 
defendant‟s complicity.  One witness was a clinical psychologist who, as a 
graduate psychology student, had evaluated defendant during his third grade year.  
18 
She testified Rosia told her, in front of defendant, that he resembled his father, that 
he was “evil,” and that Rosia whipped him to make him angry enough to fight 
other children when that became necessary. 
A juvenile probation officer testified about defendant‟s contacts with the 
juvenile justice system in 1983 and 1984, when he was 16 and 17 years old.  
According to this witness, defendant was arrested for battery in November 1983, 
but the district attorney deemed the incident mutual combat, and defendant was 
released to his stepfather, Carter.  Defendant was arrested for burglary in early 
December 1983, but no wardship petition was filed, and he was released to his 
mother.  Two weeks later, he was arrested on another burglary charge; he was 
declared a court ward and released to his mother under home supervision.  In 
February 1984, he was arrested for yet another burglary and committed to a county 
juvenile camp.  He twice walked away from this camp, but surrendered both times. 
Finally, a licensed marriage and family counselor provided expert 
testimony about the nature of child abuse, the effects it can have on family 
dynamics, and the development, behavior, and maturity of one who has suffered 
it.9  The witness indicated the following:  Child abuse is an act or omission by a 
parent that is developmentally inappropriate and damaging to the child.  A child 
can suffer physical, sexual, or psychological abuse, and parental neglect can also 
qualify as abuse.  Psychological mistreatment can include rejection of the child, 
singling a child out for negative treatment, wishing the child had not been born, or 
terrorizing a child.  Symptoms can include fistfighting by a young child and bed-
wetting by an older child, though the latter problem may also have a physiological 
origin.  The long-term effects of childhood abuse can include cognitive 
difficulties, poor school performance, impulsive behavior, alcohol and drug abuse, 
“acting out” behavior, aggressiveness, running away from home, depression, and 
                                              
9  
This witness had not personally examined defendant or reviewed his 
records, and did not offer a diagnosis of defendant. 
19 
suicide.  People who were abused as children often become immature adults prone 
to temper tantrums.  There is also a correlation between child abuse and a 
“conduct disorder,” a diagnosis that may apply to one who breaks the law before 
age 18.  In the 1970‟s and 1980‟s, child abuse often was not identified, and even if 
identified, the treatment may not have been effective. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Jury selection issues. 
 
 
1.  Restrictions on voir dire. 
 
Defendant claims that by refusing to allow questioning of prospective 
jurors about whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty in light 
of certain specific facts about Sarah LaChapelle‟s murder, the trial court risked 
empanelling a juror who, though perhaps open to either the death penalty or life 
without parole in some cases, would vote for death in this case without regard to 
the mitigating evidence.  The court‟s ruling, defendant urges, violated his rights 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution 
and analogous provisions of the California Constitution.  We find no error. 
The pertinent procedural facts are as follows:  Prior to trial, defendant‟s 
counsel submitted a proposed script to be used by the court in questioning jurors 
during the death qualification voir dire.10  This script first advised a prospective 
                                              
10  
It is undisputed that jury selection in this case was conducted in the same 
manner as in People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703 (Cash):  Each prospective 
juror was questioned individually, and out of the presence of other members of the 
venire, to determine his or her qualifications to serve on a capital jury.  (See 
Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80.)  This was followed immediately 
by voir dire of the same prospective juror concerning his or her general 
qualifications.  In each instance, the prospective juror was questioned first by the 
court and then, in turn, by each counsel.  After each step, the court entertained 
challenges for cause.  All prospective jurors who survived this phase were directed 
to return at a later date.  When they assembled on this date, they were called into 
the jury box according to randomly assigned numbers, whereupon the court 
entertained the parties‟ peremptory challenges.  (Cash, supra, at pp. 718-719.) 
20 
juror that he or she was to hear a summary of the accusations against defendant in 
order to make voir dire more meaningful.  The script then instructed the 
prospective juror not to assume the trial evidence would prove the accusations 
beyond reasonable doubt, not to draw inferences about defendant‟s guilt or 
innocence from the summary, and that guilt or innocence was a jury question to be 
decided on the basis of the evidence.  After setting forth these admonitions, the 
script asked the prospective juror whether, if it were proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that (1) the defendant kicked in the victim‟s back door and entered her home 
with intent to rob, (2) he murdered the victim during that burglary and robbery, 
(3) the victim died of multiple stabbing and puncture wounds and multiple blunt 
instrument blows, (4) the defendant severed the victim‟s ring finger and took her 
wedding rings, and (5) the victim‟s adult son discovered her body, the prospective 
juror would automatically impose either death or life without parole as a penalty.11 
                                              
11  
At trial, and in their briefs, the parties have repeatedly labeled a death 
qualification voir dire question of this type as a “Fields question,” a reference to 
People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329.  Contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, 
however, that decision never provided significant support for the notion that a 
capital defendant has the right to probe prospective jurors about their penalty 
attitudes with respect to specific factual details about the particular case to be 
tried.  In Fields, the defendant urged that, under Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 
391 U.S. 510 (Witherspoon), a pro-life or pro-death prospective juror could be 
disqualified on that ground only if he or she would automatically apply the 
preferred penalty in every capital case.  Hence, the defendant argued, he was 
entitled to rehabilitate prospective jurors who had indicated they would 
automatically vote for life in the particular case by determining whether there were 
hypothetical cases (such as Hitler‟s murder of six million Jews) in which they 
would consider the death penalty.  We rejected that contention, holding that a 
prospective juror was excludable if he or she had stated an inability to consider 
death in the specific case.  (Fields, supra, at pp. 353-358.)  The prospective jurors 
at issue in Fields had indicated they would refuse to vote for death in response to 
the court‟s question whether they would do so “ „in [a] case involving these 
charges and special circumstances[.]‟ ”  (Id. at p. 354, italics partially omitted.)  
We did not suggest in Fields that voir dire may or must go beyond the charges and 
special circumstances to highlight gruesome or inflammatory details about the 
case that might persuade an otherwise pro-life juror to consider death.  A fortiori, 
 
21 
The defense proposal was extensively argued over three separate hearing 
dates, during which the court considered several alternatives.  At the initial 
hearing, on September 3, 1992, the prosecutor objected that the defense‟s 
proposed question was “too detailed” and invited prospective jurors to prejudge 
the evidence.  The court offered the prosecutor the chance to draft an alternative, 
and he agreed to do so. 
The court took the matter up again on September 8, 1992.  Having 
reviewed the prosecutor‟s draft,12 the court proposed its own question.  With the 
prosecutor‟s approval, this version included reference to the assumed facts that a 
woman was robbed, stabbed, and bludgeoned to death in her own home.  Defense 
counsel urged that this was inadequate because it left out the most serious piece of 
aggravating evidence, i.e., that the victim‟s finger was severed.  The court 
responded that it intended to omit this latter detail because whether, and why, the 
finger was severed was a jury issue.  The court said that if a severed finger were 
mentioned, it would “invit[e] inquiries from the jurors why that is significant, and 
so then we are going to have to be feeding them more and more of the facts of this 
case, and we are asking them to prejudge the evidence.” 
The matter was continued again for two days, during which the court 
researched and considered the issues further.  In its final ruling, on September 10, 
1992, the court retreated from its September 8 position, and determined that death 
qualification inquiry about prospective jurors‟ case-specific penalty attitudes 
should be confined to matters embodied in the accusatory pleading.  The court said 
it would read the information to the prospective jurors, and then would ask 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
Fields does not stand for the proposition that gruesome details beyond the bare 
charges may be highlighted during death qualification voir dire to determine 
whether prospective jurors who indicate a willingness to consider both penalties in 
the abstract would nonetheless automatically vote for death in the particular case. 
12  
This draft is not included in the record. 
22 
whether both penalties would be open if the defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder, and the jury further found true the robbery-murder and burglary-
murder special circumstances and that a deadly weapon was used.  In addition, the 
court ruled, counsel could question prospective jurors about the effect on their 
penalty attitudes of (1) the felony-murder rule, (2) the fact that the victim was a 
woman, and (3) the fact that a knife was used in the murder. 
On the other hand, the court indicated, it would not allow counsel to 
explore such details as that the victim was bludgeoned to death and was stabbed 
multiple times and that, when found by her son, she was nude below the waist and 
a finger was severed.  The court expressed the view that, under Witherspoon, 
supra, 391 U.S. 510, death qualification was concerned with a prospective juror‟s 
penalty attitudes in the abstract and should not focus on the specific facts of the 
case at hand.  Questions that went into great detail about the facts of the particular 
case, the court remarked, improperly sought to “indoctrinate[ ] the juror” and get 
the “juror to vote in a specific way.” 
We have had several recent occasions to summarize the relevant law.  At 
the time of trial, as now, a prospective juror could be excluded from service on a 
capital case if the person‟s attitudes toward the death penalty would prevent or 
substantially impair his or her ability to follow the court‟s instructions and the 
juror‟s oath.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 (Witt) [clarifying that 
exclusion is permitted under broader circumstances than those previously 
specified in Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522,which allowed exclusion 
where a prospective juror made “unmistakably clear” that he or she would 
“automatically” vote for or against the death penalty].)  In the process of 
determining prospective jurors‟ capital case qualifications, the court has 
considerable discretion to place reasonable limits on voir dire (People v. Carasi 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1286 (Carasi); People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
1082, 1120 (Zambrano)) and to determine the number and nature of voir dire 
23 
questions (Carasi, supra, at p. 1286; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 540 
(Stitely)). 
“[D]eath-qualifying voir dire seeks to determine prospective jurors‟ 
attitudes about capital punishment only in the abstract, and whether, without 
knowing the specifics of the case, they have an open mind on penalty.  
(Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th [1082,] 1120, quoting People v. Clark (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 583, 597.”  (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1286.)  Thus, “as we have 
said on many occasions, „[d]efendant ha[s] no right to ask specific questions that 
invite[ ] prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of 
the aggravating and mitigating evidence ([ ]Cash[, supra,] 28 Cal.4th 703, 721-
722), to educate the jury as to the facts of the case (People v. Sanders (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 475, 538-539), or to instruct the jury in matters of law (People v. 
Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 959 [(Ashmus)]).‟  (People v. Burgener (2003) 
29 Cal.4th 833, 865; see also, e.g., People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 939-
941 . . . .)”  (Zambrano, supra, at p. 1120.) 
“Nevertheless, voir dire cannot be so abstract that it fails to identify those 
jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair their 
performance under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424.  Rules have developed to 
balance the competing interests.”  (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1286.)  The 
gist of these rules is that the defense cannot be categorically denied the 
opportunity to inform jurors of case-specific factors that could invariably cause an 
otherwise reasonable and death-qualified juror to vote for death regardless of the 
strength of the mitigating evidence.  (Id. at pp. 1286-1287; Zambrano, supra, 
41 Cal.4th 1082, 1120-1123; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 693-694 
(Roldan); People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 285-286; Cash, supra, 
28 Cal.4th 703, 721.) 
In Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, “our lone reversal for limiting death penalty 
inquiry into case-specific facts” (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1286), we 
concluded that such a reaction might be engendered by anticipated penalty phase 
24 
evidence — mention of which the trial court had categorically excluded at all 
phases of voir dire — that, as a juvenile, the defendant had murdered his 
grandparents.  (Cash, supra, at p. 723.)  On the other hand, in Roldan, supra, 
35 Cal.4th 646, we found no facts so similarly inflammatory that reliance on Cash 
was appropriate.  The Roldan evidence suggested that, after the defendant and an 
accomplice robbed participants in a swap meet, then fled, the defendant 
reappeared and fatally shot a swap meet employee who had chased and caught the 
accomplice, even though the victim complied with the defendant‟s order to release 
the accomplice.  (Roldan, supra, at pp. 663-664.)  Seeing no need for specific voir 
dire on details such as these, we explained that Roldan involved “no prior 
murders, no sensational sex crimes, no child victims, no torture.”  (Id. at p. 694.)13 
Here, defendant renews his contention that his counsel should have been 
allowed to question prospective jurors about anticipated evidence that the murder 
victim, Sarah LaChapelle, was bludgeoned as well as stabbed, and in particular, 
that her ring finger had been severed.  However, we find no abuse of the trial 
court‟s broad discretion. 
Closely on point in this regard is our recent decision in Zambrano, supra, 
41 Cal.4th 1082.  There the information charged that the defendant, using a 
dangerous and deadly weapon, had committed the attempted murders, with great 
bodily injury, of a Berkeley couple, the Mishells.  The information further asserted 
that the defendant had committed the first degree murder of Luis Reyna, inflicting 
great bodily injury.  As to Reyna‟s murder, the information alleged a witness-
killing special circumstance.  The prosecution intended to introduce evidence that 
the defendant, a successful contractor and local official, bludgeoned the Mishells, 
                                              
13  
In Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1263, we assumed for purposes of argument 
that premeditated murder while lying in wait and for financial gain is a 
“potentially inflammatory circumstance[ ] analogous to multiple murder and prior 
murder that . . . could transform an otherwise death-qualified juror into one who 
could not decide penalty fairly . . .,” but we did not decide that issue.  (Id. at 
p. 1287.) 
25 
a University of California professor and his wife, in their home because he thought 
they had exposed his extramarital affair, and that he murdered Reyna, a friend and 
colleague, to prevent the victim from testifying against defendant in the Mishell 
case.  There would also be evidence that the murder victim‟s body was found in an 
isolated hilly area, decapitated and dismembered. 
The trial court indicated that, for purposes of death qualification, it would 
read aloud, and paraphrase, the information for the prospective jurors, and would 
permit counsel to question them with respect to the community status of the 
defendant and the victims, and the location of the Mishell assaults, but would not 
grant the defense request to explore the issue of dismemberment.  To ask 
prospective jurors about their reaction to the “method of killing,” the court 
explained, would be inviting them to prejudge the case. 
On appeal, we upheld the trial court‟s ruling as a valid exercise of its broad 
discretion.  Distinguishing Cash, we held that “[t]he sole fact as to which the 
defense unsuccessfully sought additional inquiry — the condition of the adult 
murder victim‟s body when found — was not one that could cause a reasonable 
juror — i.e., one whose death penalty views otherwise qualified him or her to sit 
on a capital jury — invariably to vote for death, regardless of the strength of the 
mitigating evidence.”  (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1122.)  We 
acknowledged that a normal juror would certainly be affected by the condition in 
which the victim‟s body was found, “as by any brutal circumstance of a criminal 
homicide.  But the fact of dismemberment, in and of itself, does not appear so 
potentially inflammatory as to transform an otherwise death-qualified juror into 
one who could not deliberate fairly on the issue of penalty.”  (Id. at p. 1123.) 
Similarly here, the fact that Sarah LaChapelle was beaten as well as 
stabbed, though affecting, is not outside the realm of “brutal circumstance[s]” that 
might be expected in a trial for capital homicide.  And if dismemberment of the 
victim‟s body in Zambrano was not a detail so gruesome, sensational, and 
inflammatory that it could cause a reasonable, otherwise qualified capital juror 
26 
invariably to vote for the death penalty, the victim‟s severed finger in this case 
also does not qualify for that status. 
Defendant urges that, in Zambrano, we made a point of noting there would 
be no evidence the murder victim might have been dismembered while alive, and 
thus perhaps was tortured.  By contrast, defendant notes, the prosecution here 
presented evidence that the victim was likely alive, though not necessarily 
conscious, when the various injuries to her body, including the severed finger, 
were inflicted.  But again, capitally charged homicides are often brutal.  If the 
victim was alive at the time she was stabbed to death — a detail prospective jurors 
would learn — it seems unlikely a reasonable, otherwise qualified juror would 
focus on the additional pain and suffering represented by the severed finger as a 
basis for refusing to consider any penalty but death.  Of course, many would deem 
it offensive that a robber-murderer cut off the victim‟s finger in a crass effort to 
obtain her rings.  But that alone does not seem calculated to transform an 
otherwise fair juror into one who would vote for death regardless of the mitigating 
evidence. 
Defendant‟s proposed script for death qualification voir dire included 
various admonitions against prejudgment, but it would nonetheless have invited 
prospective jurors to focus on specific details about the case at the outset, and to 
begin to form judgments and opinions about the appropriate penalty in advance of 
hearing the trial evidence.  The trial court properly sought to avoid such a 
situation.  The court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying inquiry on the 
subjects about which defendant now complains.  His contention lacks merit. 
 
 
2.  Hardship excusal of Prospective Juror R.W. 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused  Prospective Juror 
R.W., despite defense counsel‟s refusal to stipulate to the excusal, on grounds 
R.W. was a full-time student.  Defendant claims the excusal was not permitted, 
under the governing statute and rules, because R.W. did not affirmatively request 
he be excused and because the record does not show R.W. faced hardship 
27 
sufficient to justify an excusal.  The error, defendant asserts, implicates his federal 
and state constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section of the community.  (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)  We are not persuaded. 
The pertinent facts are as follows:  On September 10, 1992, at the outset of 
jury selection, the trial court directed introductory remarks to the entire venire.  
Among other things, the court explained that the trial would begin in early 
December, and could take as long as four weeks, not counting jury deliberations or 
the hiatus that would occur between the guilt phase and any penalty phase.  The 
daily trial schedule, said the court, would generally be from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. 
on Mondays and Wednesdays, and from 11:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays, with Fridays off.  The court further indicated that, because it was 
responsible for empanelling a fair and impartial jury, an excusal from service on 
the case would not be easy to obtain, but the court nonetheless would consider 
certain kinds of hardship excuses, including significant loss of employment 
income, prepaid vacations, medical problems, and full-time student status.  The 
court said it would take up any prospective juror‟s hardship issues during 
individual voir dire. 
During the subsequent individual voir dires, counsel stipulated to, and the 
trial court granted, hardship excusals to students L.S. and A.K.  On her juror 
questionnaire, Prospective Juror L.S., a self-identified 22-year-old with strong pro-
death penalty views, had indicated she was “currently attending” California State 
University Hayward (Cal State Hayward).14  In response to a question about her 
“job status,” she had circled “full-time student,” and had handwritten that she 
“[c]an‟t afford to miss my classes cuz it‟s already been paid for.”  During voir 
dire, the court obtained L.S.‟s oral representation that she would be taking 17 units 
                                              
14  
This institution has since been renamed California State University, East 
Bay.  We use the prior name for convenience and clarity. 
28 
at Cal State Hayward,15 and that her class schedule primarily fell during daytime 
weekday hours.  Defense counsel indicated she would stipulate to L.S.‟s excusal, 
and the prosecutor concurred.  The court excused L.S., advising her that “we are 
going to excuse you for hardship.  We don‟t want to interrupt your schooling.” 
On his juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.K., self-described as 34 
years old and with strong pro-life views, had indicated he was a full time student 
pursuing a master‟s degree in clinical psychology at the University of California, 
Berkeley.  When A.K. appeared for individual voir dire, the court placed on the 
record that he had supplied official verification of his student status and advised 
him that “because of your school commitment, . . . both sides have stipulated you 
can be excused.” 
Thereafter, the court conducted individual voir dire of Prospective Juror 
R.W.  On his juror questionnaire, R.W. had described himself as 19 years old, and 
had indicated that a life sentence was preferable to the death penalty in all but 
“severe” cases.  Like L.S. and A.K., he had circled “full-time student” on his 
questionnaire.  He indicated he was studying criminal justice at Cal State 
Hayward.  During his death-qualification voir dire, R.W. confirmed that he was 
open to the death penalty in “severe” cases like serial or multiple murder, and said 
he could also consider it in this single-murder case because the victim was stabbed 
to death. 
While examining R.W. during the immediately following general voir dire, 
defense counsel asked what R.W. intended to do with his criminal justice major.  
At this point, the following colloquy occurred:  “The Court:  Can I interrupt for 
just a second?  Are you still in school, Mr. [W.]?  [¶]  Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]:  
Yeah.  [¶]  THE COURT:  Are you a full-time student?  [¶]  Prospective Juror 
Mr. [W.]:  (Nods head.)  [¶]  The Court:  You are a full-time student?  [¶]  
                                              
15  
Voir dire of L.S. took place on September 14, 1992, at the beginning of the 
school term. 
29 
Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]  Yes.  [¶]  the Court:  Where are you going?  [¶]  
Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]:  Cal State Hayward.  [¶]  The Court:  Cal State 
Hayward.  And how many units are you taking?  [¶]  Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]:  
Seventeen.  [¶]  The Court:  And you‟re in school right now; right?  [¶]  
Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]:  Yeah.” 
At this point, defense counsel interjected, “There hasn‟t been any complaint 
about that.  We don‟t have anything written about that.”  The court responded, 
“But I‟ll accept it.”  Defense counsel then asked R.W. if he had a problem sitting 
on a jury for a trial that might take one or two months.  R.W. answered, “It 
depends on the time schedule.”  Counsel repeated the day-to-day schedule the 
court had given earlier, Tuesdays and Thursdays 11:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Mondays 
and Wednesdays 1:30 p.m.to 4:30 p.m., with Fridays off.  The court added, “Plus 
you may be deliberating all day for three or four days or longer.  I don‟t know.  [¶]  
The point is, Mr. [W.], we don‟t want to screw up your semester at school.”  
Defense counsel argued, however, that if the trial schedule could work around 
R.W.‟s school schedule, “and [if] he is not claiming a hardship, we don‟t have to 
insist that he take it.” 
At this point, the prosecutor indicated he would stipulate to R.W.‟s excusal.  
However, defense counsel stated she would not do so, and “want[ed] to hear what 
[R.W.] has to say.”  The court said to R.W. that “I notice here you circled full-time 
student.”  Then the court explained that “[w]e‟ve been letting students off,” 
because they might get so far behind academically that they could not catch up, 
and “[t]hat‟s my concern.”  The court continued:  “And we‟ve let a lot of students 
off here now.  If you think you can do it both ways, that‟s okay.  But if you think 
it‟s going to be a burden, you know, to go to school full time, taking 17 units and 
maybe sitting here as a juror for a month, two months, you let me know now.  
Because if it‟s going to be a real problem, I will seriously consider letting you go.  
[¶]  What do you think?” 
30 
The following exchange then occurred:  “Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]:  This 
is during the month of December?  [¶]  The Court:  December and probably 
January.  [¶]  And that‟s around finals time; right?  [¶]  Prospective Juror 
Mr. [W.]:  Yeah.  [¶]  The Court:  See, that‟s the problem.  [¶]  Prospective Juror 
Mr. [W.]:  Most likely it would probably be a burden.  [¶]  The Court:  I think it 
will.  Yeah.  [¶]  All right.  [Defendant counsel], over your objection I‟m going to 
excuse Mr. [W.]  I don‟t see any point in having this kid lose two months of 
school sitting here.  [¶]  I know you like him as a juror, but on the other hand, he 
should be treated like everybody else.  He is a full-time student.  Seventeen units 
is a big load to carry.  And to sit here for two months I think would unduly burden 
him, and he admitted as much just now.” 
Defense counsel argued that R.W. had not brought up the subject himself, 
had inquired about scheduling, and had “admitted” hardship only after great 
hesitation.  The court responded, “I‟m not here to have kids flunk out of school by 
taking two months sitting here as a juror when we have a lot of other jurors.  I 
know he is 19 years old, he is an African-American.  You probably want to see 
him as a juror.  I understand that.  [¶]  But I don‟t want [R.W.] to blow a whole 
semester at school because of this case.  He can always serve during the summer 
when he is not in school.”  Under these circumstances, the court asserted, “Why 
should he blow two months of school?  It doesn‟t make any sense.  It really 
doesn‟t.”  The court thereupon excused R.W. 
“[A] trial court has authority to excuse a person from jury service for undue 
personal hardship.  [Citations.]  Exercise of that authority is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 665; see also 
People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 986, fn. 15; People v. Lucas (1995) 
12 Cal.4th 415, 488.)16  Under the governing statute, Code of Civil Procedure 
                                              
16  
We have rejected claims that improper excusals of prospective jurors, 
including improper hardship excusals, denied defendants their constitutional rights 
 
31 
section 204, subdivision (b), such excusals “are to be granted only on a sufficient 
showing that the individual circumstances of the prospective juror make it 
unreasonably difficult for the person to serve or that hardship to the public will 
occur if the person must serve in the particular case.”  (Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 
1, 44, fn. 15.)17 
Here it is manifest, and defendant does not dispute, that the court applied a 
blanket policy of granting hardship excusals to prospective jurors who established 
to the court‟s satisfaction they were full-time students with academic schedules 
that would make jury service burdensome.  The court made clear it believed such 
persons would suffer undue hardship and academic loss if forced to sit, during a 
critical period of their fall school terms, on a capital trial that might take two 
months to complete.  Defendant fails to demonstrate that this determination was 
unreasonable. 
Nor did the court act unreasonably by concluding, in each student hardship 
case, that the requisite showing of full-time student status had been made.  L.S. 
and R.W. each were excused after they stated under oath, in their questionnaires 
and/or in oral voir dire, that they were taking 17 units of college credit at Cal State 
Hayward.  A.K. was excused when he provided the court with official verification 
of his full-time student status at the University of California, Berkeley. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
to fair, impartial, and representative juries where the defendants failed to show that 
the excusals resulted in the seating of biased jurors (see People v. Thompson 
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 158), or that a panel from which persons were excused for 
hardship reasons is less representative (see People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 
44, fn. 15 (Visciotti)).  Defendant makes no such showing here. 
17  
Code of Civil Procedure section 204, adopted in 1988 (Stats. 1988, 
ch. 1245, § 2, pp. 4144-4145), provides in subdivision (b) that “[a]n eligible 
person may be excused from jury service only for undue hardship, upon 
themselves or upon the public, as defined by the Judicial Council.” 
32 
Nonetheless, defendant argues that the court excused R.W. improperly 
because (1) R.W. did not affirmatively claim a hardship exemption, but was 
coached and prompted by the court — acting in a misguided sense of paternalism 
toward a minority prospective juror — to say that jury service would burden him, 
and (2) the record does not establish that jury service would actually present an 
unduly burdensome conflict with R.W.‟s class schedule and academic 
responsibilities. 
At the outset, we observe that the record indicates no clear-cut affirmative 
request for excusal in either of the other cases in which student hardship excusals 
were granted.  L.S. did say in her questionnaire that she could not afford to miss 
prepaid classes, but she did not explicitly ask to be excused for that reason.  While 
A.K. brought in documentary support for his claim of student status, his 
questionnaire contained no assertion that jury duty would interfere with this status, 
and the record includes no other indication that he requested excusal. 
Moreover, as a matter of reasonable discretion, we see no impropriety in 
the court‟s effort to protect the interests of one who reported his status as a full-
time student, but did not immediately seek excusal on that basis.  Whether R.W.‟s 
inaction in this respect stemmed from initial ignorance that a hardship excusal 
might be available, or from a willingness to consider serving if service was 
practicable, the law did not require he be penalized, once he was before the court, 
for failing to demand excusal in the first instance. 
Defendant points to California Rules of Court, rule 2.1008 (rule 2.1008), 
formerly rule 860, adopted under authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 
204, subdivision (b).  Rule 2.1008(b) “govern[s] the granting of excuses from jury 
service by the jury commissioner on grounds of undue hardship. . . .”  (Italics 
added.)  The rule specifies, among other things, that “[n]o class or category of 
persons may be automatically excluded from jury duty except as provided by law” 
(id., subd. (b)(1)) and that “[a] statutory exemption from jury service [i.e., for 
undue hardship] must be granted only when the eligible person claims it” (id., 
33 
subd. (b)(2)).  Defendant also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 218, which 
provides that “[t]he jury commissioner shall hear the excuses of jurors summoned, 
in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Judicial Council. . . .  All 
excuses shall be in writing setting forth the basis of the request and shall be signed 
by the juror.”  (Italics added.) 
But these provisions, which apply explicitly to the jury commissioner’s 
preliminary screening of hardship claims received in response to a general jury 
summons, have little or nothing to do with the procedures the trial court itself may 
subsequently employ to resolve hardship issues in the course of jury selection in a 
specific case.  Defendant cites no authority suggesting that the statutes and rule he 
invokes limit the trial court‟s authority, upon its reasonable exercise of discretion, 
to examine and excuse individual prospective jurors on grounds of undue 
hardship. 
Finally, we see no basis to conclude the record demonstrates insufficient 
justification to excuse R.W.  As noted, full-time students L.S. and A.K. had 
previously been excused without objection, and with little inquiry into their 
specific academic burdens.  There appeared no reason to treat R.W. differently.  
He was carrying a full load of 17 units and, upon inquiry by the trial court, he 
conceded that service in a lengthy capital case, under the trial schedule proposed 
by the court, during the “finals time” months of December and January,  would 
“likely” be a burden.  Accordingly, we find no error in the excusal of this 
prospective juror. 18 
                                              
18  
The People read defendant‟s opening brief as arguing that R.W.‟s excusal 
was improper because, among other things, rule 2.1008 does not include full-time 
student status as one of the enumerated grounds for hardship excusal.  According 
to the People, defendant forfeited that particular claim because his counsel did not 
raise it below.  Defendant responds he has never contended the court could not 
excuse for student status; rather, he asserts, he urges only that a student excusal 
should be judged under the most closely analogous ground set forth in rule 2.1008, 
that of “extreme financial burden.”  (Rule 2.1008(d)(3), italics added.)  He claims 
 
34 
 
3.  Excusal of prospective jurors for cause. 
Defendant urges that several prospective jurors were improperly excused on 
prosecution challenges as a result of the death qualification process.  We find no 
merit in defendant‟s contentions. 
The following principles apply:  A prospective juror in a capital case may 
be excused for cause on the basis of his or her death penalty views if, but only if, 
those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror‟s 
duties under the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s oath.  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
412, 424; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 441& fn. 3 (Stewart); People v. 
Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 958 (Heard); People v. Cunningham (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 926, 975.)  Thus, a prospective juror may be excused if his or her views 
on capital punishment would cause him or her invariably to vote either for death, 
or for life, in the case at hand.  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 431 
(Ochoa); People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005; see Morgan v. Illinois 
(1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728.) 
We will uphold the trial court‟s decision to excuse a prospective juror under 
Witt if that decision is fairly supported by the record.  (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 
425, 441; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 975.)  The court must 
have “sufficient information . . . to permit a reliable determination” whether a 
prospective juror‟s views would disqualify the juror from service in a capital case.  
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
his counsel preserved an argument that student hardship must similarly be 
“extreme” by objecting that R.W. did not request an excusal and that the court 
should have determined whether jury service would actually interfere with R.W.‟s 
academic schedule.  Assuming this latter contention was preserved (see People v. 
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6) (Champion), it does not affect our 
conclusions here.  As noted, rule 2.1008‟s strictures on the jury commissioner‟s 
authority to issue hardship excusals do not necessarily apply to hardship excusals 
granted by the trial court during voir dire; in any event, we are satisfied that the 
record supports the trial court‟s finding that service by full-time students in this 
particular case would have constituted a significant, undue burden. 
35 
(Stewart, supra, at p. 445.)  But even where the prospective juror has not 
expressed his or her views with absolute clarity, the court may be left with the 
definite impression that the person cannot impartially apply the law.  Thus where, 
after reasonable examination, the prospective juror has given conflicting or 
ambiguous answers, and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the 
juror‟s demeanor, we must accept as binding the court‟s determination of the 
juror‟s true state of mind.  (E.g., Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9-10; 
Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. 719, 729; Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424-426; 
People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20-21 (DePriest); People v. Avila (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 491, 529 (Avila); People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 14, 16 (Moon); 
Stewart, supra, at p. 451.) 
The erroneous granting of the prosecution‟s Witt challenge against a 
prospective juror requires automatic reversal of the penalty verdict, even if the 
prosecutor had remaining peremptory challenges and could have excused the 
prospective juror.  However, an error of this kind does not require reversal of the 
guilt phase verdict.  (Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 663-666; Stewart, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 454-455; Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 966; Ashmus, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d 932, 956-957, 962.)19  Moreover, the improper excusal for cause 
of a prospective juror for reasons other than his or her views on the death penalty 
does not require reversal of either the guilt or penalty judgments unless the 
defendant can show that the improper excusal resulted in the seating of a biased 
juror, or of a sworn jury that was not fair and impartial.  (People v. Holt (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 619, 656 (Holt).) 
                                              
19  
Thus, the high court has held that the exclusion, through death 
disqualification, of “guilt phase includables” from the guilt phase of a bifurcated 
capital trial does not violate the “fair cross-section” or “impartial jury” guarantees, 
and we have agreed under both state and federal law.  (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 
476 U.S. 162, 173-184; Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, 455; Ashmus, supra, 
54 Cal.3d 932, 956-957.)  Defendant contends otherwise, but does not persuade us 
to reconsider these conclusions here. 
36 
We consider each of the asserted improper excusals under these standards. 
 
a.  Prospective Juror A.S.-P. 
On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.S.-P., who identified 
herself as African-American, indicated she had done graduate work in 
international and multicultural education at the University of San Francisco (USF), 
and had received a Doctor of Education (Ed.D.) degree in 1992. 
On October 6, 1992, court and counsel conducted the sequestered voir dire 
of A.S.-P.  In response to questioning during the death qualification procedure, she 
stated that she had no feelings about the death penalty that might prevent her from 
selecting the appropriate penalty in a capital case, and that after hearing all the 
relevant evidence, she could choose between life and death.  She indicated she had 
reservations concerning the time lapse between the commission of a crime, 
conviction, and execution, and also about the method of execution.  However, she 
asserted, she accepted these circumstances as part of the process, and they would 
neither affect her ability to apply the law nor influence her penalty decision. 
In her general voir dire, which followed immediately, A.S.-P. stated that, 
while she thought it was “impossible” to be completely free of bias, she believed 
she could put any bias aside and be “objective.”  Defense counsel asked A.S.-P. 
about her experience as the victim of a burglary, and about an assault on her niece 
by the niece‟s domestic partner.  A.S.-P. again indicated that, despite these events, 
she could be objective in the instant case. 
Neither party challenged A.S.-P. for cause at the conclusion of her voir 
dire.  The court advised her she had qualified herself to sit on a capital jury, and it 
directed her to return at a subsequent time for peremptory challenges. 
On October 27, 1992, while the voir dire process was still ongoing, the 
prosecutor challenged A.S.-P. for cause.  Asked by defense counsel to explain the 
belated challenge, the prosecutor said that A.S.-P. had claimed she had a doctoral 
degree in her juror questionnaire, and had asked the court bailiff to call her 
“doctor,” but the prosecutor had had a “funny feeling about that,” so he checked 
37 
with USF and discovered that A.S.-P. “has lied to us” and “is not a doctor in 
education.”  The prosecutor stated he had spoken by telephone to Sunny Kidd, an 
administrative aide at USF who, after looking at A.S.-P.‟s file, reported that A.S.-
P. was currently in USF‟s doctoral program, but “has not submitted her 
dissertation yet” and had not been awarded a doctoral degree. 
When defense counsel inquired whether “the basis for the challenge for 
cause is perjury,” the prosecutor confirmed that “[i]t‟s perjury.”  However, the 
court indicated it was not a question of perjury; rather, the court remarked, “It‟s a 
question of [A.S.-P.‟s] credibility in how she answered her other questions.  If she 
purports to be something she isn‟t, how can we lend any credence to the way she 
answered her other questions?”  The court briefly took the matter under 
submission to allow defense counsel to obtain a copy of A.S.-P.‟s questionnaire. 
When the court took up the matter again later the same day, defense 
counsel asserted that the prosecutor had singled out A.S.-P., “an African-American 
woman with a high education,” for investigation, and that the Penal Code did not 
allow a challenge under these circumstances.  In any event, counsel urged, A.S.-P. 
should be called back to explain her questionnaire answers, because she might 
have misinterpreted the question about her academic credentials, and because 
hearsay information the prosecutor had obtained on the telephone should not be a 
sufficient basis for challenge. 
The court responded that it believed “the Penal Code allows the Court to 
take into consideration the veracity of the particular juror if the Court‟s of the 
opinion that there may be some question about the credibility of that particular 
juror and it‟s brought into question.  I think the Court has a right to — to weigh 
and assess that credibility, number one.”  Moreover, the court stated that it seemed 
unlikely A.S.-P. was confused, and that there appeared no reason to disbelieve the 
prosecutor, an officer of the court. 
Counsel insisted she did not disbelieve the prosecutor, but was concerned 
that the person he spoke to at USF — a person who, unlike A.S.-P., was not under 
38 
oath — might have made a mistake.  In response, the prosecutor provided further 
information about his inquiries at USF. 
The prosecutor stated the following:  He wanted to read A.S-P.‟s 
dissertation before deciding whether to retain her as a juror.  For that purpose, 
sometime before October 20, 1992, he called the USF library and spoke to 
librarian Vickie Rosen, who said the dissertation was not on file and not 
catalogued.  He asked Rosen to look for the dissertation, and she spent several 
days doing so.  On October 20, Rosen called him back and said “there is, in fact, 
no dissertation presented by [A.S.-P.].”  He asked Rosen if this meant A.S.-P. had 
no doctorate in education.  Rosen said she assumed so, but she advised him to call 
the administrative office for confirmation.  The following day, he telephoned 
USF‟s postgraduate division and spoke to Kidd, an administrative assistant.  After 
“pull[ing] [A.S.-P.‟s] file,” Kidd reported that “no, there is no dissertation on file 
. . . , [A.S.-P.] has not finished her dissertation, and she has not received a 
doctorate degree.”  The prosecutor purposely refrained from speaking to A.S.-P.‟s 
department chair, or asking USF for a confirmatory letter, because he was afraid 
such matters would “go into [A.S.-P.‟s] file” and would actually compromise her 
efforts to achieve her doctorate. 
The prosecutor argued that the willfulness of A.S.-P.‟s misrepresentation 
was shown by the fact that she had insisted the court bailiff introduce her as 
“doctor.”  Moreover, the prosecutor observed, the court had addressed A.S.-P. by 
that title some 26 times during voir dire without being corrected by her.  The 
prosecutor also indicated he had called USF on the very day he heard 
commentator Charles Osgood speak on the radio about people who misrepresent 
their degrees and awards to obtain employment. 
Defense counsel seemed to concede the possibility that, for whatever 
reason, A.S.-P. had “padded her resumé,” perhaps to maintain “a certain 
consistency” after exaggerating her credentials on an employment application, as 
Charles Osgood had suggested people do.  Counsel nonetheless pressed her 
39 
contention that A.S.-P. should be allowed to appear personally and provide any 
information that might rebut or explain such concerns.  The court refused, 
suggesting again that A.S.-P. was an educated person, could not have been 
confused, and had had numerous opportunities to advise the court she did not have 
a doctorate. 
“[T]he problem with what‟s happened here,” said the court, “is she‟s been 
caught misrepresenting her credentials pure and simple. . . .  [¶]  She‟s telling us 
that she is something she isn‟t.  This casts some question on her veracity in my 
mind.  How can you believe her answers to her other questions?  She is playing 
games with the Court.” 
The court asserted that the prosecutor had presented “pretty good, solid 
evidence,” and that the court would accept his representation.  The court declared 
that “[t]here is no question in my mind, based upon the representations from 
[USF], from the people who are running the program, that [A.S.-P.] doesn‟t have a 
Ph.D. degree or doctor of education.”  Moreover, the court suggested, it did not 
wish to subject A.S.-P. to the “embarrassment” of coming to court and being 
“called on the fact that she misrepresented her credentials.” 
Alluding to defense counsel‟s speculation that A.S.-P. might have 
overstated her credentials on a job application, the court asked, “Wouldn‟t that be 
more grounds to question her credibility and question her character if you‟re 
telling me she‟s padded her credentials in order to gain employment?”  The court 
continued, “She has not been forthright with us in telling us what her credentials 
are.  Maybe that‟s one little white lie, and how many others are there in that 
particular questionnaire.  Now she‟s been caught in perpetrating — I‟m not going 
to say a fraud, but a misconception on this Court and on everybody in this 
courtroom.  [¶]  How can you trust the rest of her answers?  How do I know?” 
Stating again its view that the error could not have been inadvertent, and 
that the misrepresentation raised questions about the veracity of all A.S.-P.‟s voir 
dire answers, the court granted the challenge for cause.  The court made clear that 
40 
it was taking this action because, “based upon her representation and her answers, 
the Court has some question about the veracity of the rest of her answers, because 
apparently she has not been forthcoming with the Court in answering these 
questions truthfully.” 
The next day, the court placed on the record that the excusal of A.S.-P. was 
“based on Wainwright versus Witt, because the impression is that it‟s under [Code 
of Civil Procedure section] 229, and that‟s not correct.” 20  When defense counsel 
objected that A.S.-P.‟s voir dire answers had made her a death-qualified juror, the 
court reiterated that “[i]t‟s a Wainwright versus Witt challenge.  That is the basis 
for the challenge as far as I‟m concerned.” 
On appeal, defendant insists the record was inadequate to justify a Witt 
excusal.  He asserts that all A.S.-P.‟s questionnaire and voir dire answers 
concerning her death penalty views indicated that they would not prevent or 
substantially impair her ability to serve as a capital juror.  Indeed, the People do 
not suggest otherwise. 
This being so, defendant contends, the court, faced with claims that A.S.-P. 
had misrepresented or concealed material information on voir dire tending to show 
disqualifying bias regarding the death penalty, was obliged to make a sufficient 
inquiry to determine the truth of such allegations.  At a minimum, he asserts, this 
required the court to recall A.S.-P. herself, and to hear her explanation, before 
concluding that she had committed misconduct warranting excusal under Witt. 
Finally, defendant insists, the excusal of A.S.-P. under Witt was error, 
requiring at least a penalty reversal, even if there was a proper showing that she 
lied on her questionnaire about holding a doctoral degree.  Any such falsehood, 
defendant urges, bore no reasonable relationship to a conclusion that her death 
                                              
20  
Code of Civil Procedure section 229 states the grounds for a prospective 
juror‟s excusal for bias, actual or implied.   
41 
penalty views would prevent or substantially impair her ability to judge the issue 
of capital punishment fairly. 
However, we need not determine whether A.S.-P.‟s excusal would have 
been proper under Witt.  This is because we are persuaded that, despite the trial 
court‟s single contrary statement, the prosecutor did not challenge A.S.-P. on the 
basis of capital penalty bias, and the excusal of this prospective juror cannot 
properly be characterized as premised on such a ground.  Our reasons for this 
conclusion are several. 
First, neither A.S.-P.‟s questionnaire, nor her voir dire, was confined to 
examination of her death penalty attitudes.  The juror questionnaire asked about 
views on the death penalty, but it also broadly explored how the prospective 
juror‟s background might relate to general bias for or against a party.  Similarly, as 
indicated above, the voir dire of each prospective juror began with death 
qualification but, if no Witt challenge was interposed and granted at this stage, the 
examination then immediately proceeded to noncapital issues.  So it was with 
A.S.-P.  Indeed, as noted above, A.S.-P. stated on her questionnaire, and 
confirmed during general voir dire, that she had been the victim of a burglary, and 
that her niece had suffered an assault.  In response to voir dire questions, A.S.-P. 
stated that whatever biases she might have as the result of these life experiences, 
she believed she could set them aside and be objective in the case at hand. 
Second, contrary to the court‟s statement that Witt was the “basis for the 
challenge” against A.S.-P., the prosecutor did not challenge this prospective juror 
on grounds that her death penalty views disqualified her for service on a capital 
jury.  Instead, the prosecutor twice specified that his challenge was based on a 
claim of perjury. 
Third, in all but one instance, the court itself made clear that it was not 
concerned, in particular, with A.S.-P.‟s death penalty attitudes as a basis for her 
qualifications to serve in a capital case.  While the court strove to avoid the 
prosecutor‟s term “perjury,” the court agreed — indeed, stressed time and time 
42 
again — that the “problem” was A.S.-P.‟s credibility in answering all the 
questions posed to her.  As the court repeatedly stated, if A.S.-P. had lied in 
answering the question about her academic background, one could not be 
confident she had not also done so in the rest of her answers.  The court went so 
far as to suggest that the apparent falsehood called A.S.-P.‟s overall character into 
question. 
Never once, when analyzing the prosecutor‟s challenge and the defense 
objections thereto, did the court indicate it believed the apparent falsehood 
impacted upon A.S.-P.‟s capital qualifications in particular.  Nor did the court do 
so in the course of issuing its ruling in the matter.  The clear gravamen of the 
court‟s remarks was that, insofar as A.S.-P. had deliberately misstated her 
academic credentials, the court could not trust any of her claims that she would be 
a fair and impartial juror. 
Finally, for the reasons stated above, we are not convinced by the post hoc 
rationale the court placed on the record the day after it excused A.S.-P.  Read as a 
whole, the record makes it apparent the court was not focused on A.S.-P.‟s death 
penalty attitudes, but rather on whether she had represented herself honestly as a 
basis for allowing the court, and the parties, to assess her general qualifications for 
jury service. 
The court‟s concerns about A.S.-P.‟s overall credibility were, of course, 
relevant to those qualifications.  A prospective juror‟s misstatement or 
concealment on voir dire of a material fact by itself undermines the selection and 
empanelment of unbiased jurors, and thus the Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury, and constitutes misconduct.  (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 
110-112.) 
We do think the trial court would have been well advised to recall A.S.-P. 
and hear her explanation before excusing her on grounds she had misstated her 
academic credentials.  However, we need not decide whether the trial court erred 
in granting the prosecution‟s challenge for cause on this ground, either because the 
43 
court conducted an inadequate factual inquiry, or because the apparent 
misstatement of academic credentials was an insufficient basis for excusal.  We 
have rejected “[the] assumption that an error in excusing a juror for reasons 
unrelated to the [juror‟s] views on imposition of the death penalty requires 
reversal.  „[T]he general rule [is] that an erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause 
provides no basis for overturning a judgment.‟  [Citation.]”  (Holt, supra, 
15 Cal.4th 619, 656.)  Even if defendant “was denied a juror with scruples against 
the death penalty who could not have been disqualified on Witherspoon-Witt 
grounds, . . . [A.S.-P.] was not excluded on those grounds.  Defendant has a right 
to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to any particular juror.  [Citation.]  
He does not assert that, as a result of the excusal of [A.S.-P.], a juror was seated 
who did not meet those criteria or that, as a result of her excusal, he was tried 
before a jury that was not fair and impartial.”  (Holt, supra, at p. 656.)  
Accordingly, the court‟s excusal for cause of A.S.-P. affords no basis for 
disturbing the guilt or penalty judgments.21 
                                              
21  
We do not, of course, endorse or affirm the trial court‟s 
determination that A.S.-P. misrepresented her credentials.  In fact, we are 
independently aware of contrary evidence.  In 2003, another condemned prisoner, 
seeking to demonstrate on habeas corpus that the same prosecutor falsely claimed 
similar misrepresentations by a prospective juror in his case, submitted to this 
court copies of documents indicating that in May 1992, USF awarded A.S.-P. a 
doctorate in education.  (See In re Robert Young, petn. for writ of habeas corpus 
filed Apr. 23, 2003; order to show cause issued regarding one claim, and all other 
claims dismissed, Oct. 11, 2006, S115318.) 
We have denied defendant‟s request to take judicial notice of these records 
for purposes of the instant appeal.  They are not part of the appellate record and 
were not before the trial court when it excused A.S.-P.  We have consistently 
rejected efforts to augment an appellate record with matters not before the trial 
court.  (People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 157) [judicial notice]; see 
People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1207; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
119, 171, fn. 17; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 585-586.) 
 
44 
 
b. 
Prospective Juror B.E. 
On her juror questionnaire, B.E. answered “no” to questions whether she 
had feelings about the death penalty, and whether any religious or philosophical 
principle would affect her ability to vote for the death penalty in the instant case.  
She wrote that life without parole was a “just punishment for very severe crimes,” 
and indicated that if the death penalty were on the ballot, she would vote for it. 
During oral voir dire, in response to more specific questions, she expressed 
far more uncertainty and ambivalence.  Early in the examination, she twice flatly 
stated that she could never vote to execute another human being.  She also 
declared, when first confronted with the issue, that the death penalty “would not 
be open to” her in a case where the defendant committed a first degree murder by 
stabbing the female victim to death during a residential robbery and burglary.  At a 
later point, she confirmed that she could not, as the jury foreperson, sign a death 
verdict. 
In other portions of her examination, B.E. appeared, albeit reluctantly, to 
soften and retreat from some of the absolute positions she had originally 
expressed.  She acknowledged the death penalty was justified for “heinous” 
crimes, such as serial or child murders, and insisted she had no “hard and fast 
reservations” that would prevent her from voting to impose that penalty “under 
certain circumstances” if the crime involved was bad enough.  When pressed by 
the court, and later by the prosecutor, B.E. protested that it was difficult to say 
what she could do in this case without knowing more about the facts.  However, 
she indicated that, while inclined to life without parole on the facts she did know, 
she could consider both penalties.  She explained that her initial flat refusal to 
consider the death penalty stemmed from a “reservation” about whether she was 
“strong enough within herself” and “had a strong enough sense of herself with 
respect to this particular issue” to undertake “one of the heaviest decisions I would 
ever have to make in my life.”  On reflection, she said, she thought she had 
enough strength to make the “right” and “proper” decision on the facts. 
45 
Defense counsel then sought to ascertain whether there was a distinction 
between B.E.‟s “philosophical” ability to envision the death penalty in this case, 
and her personal ability actually to impose it.  At length, counsel candidly asked if, 
despite her philosophical views, “[y]ou‟re saying that personally you‟re not sure 
that you could impose the death penalty . . . ?”  B.E. responded, “That‟s probably 
— that‟s probably what I am saying.  Based on . . . my understanding of the crime, 
that‟s the only way I know how to express it.” 
Pursuing this issue, the court said to B.E. that, philosophy aside, “The 
question is when you get right down to it, is it something that you could do.  
That‟s all I want to know.”  B.E. answered, “I think I could.  I think I could.”  The 
court suggested to B.E. that her answers were inconsistent, at which point she 
protested, “But had I not said that I can?”  At this point, the court cut off 
questioning and excused B.E.  In doing so, it noted that it had “observed [B.E.‟s] 
demeanor, . . . listened to her answers, her long pauses, her vacillation.” 
This record amply supports the trial court‟s decision to excuse B.E.  
Though her answers were inconsistent and conflicting, they indicated that, even if 
she accepted capital punishment in the abstract for “heinous” crimes, she harbored 
very serious doubts whether, if seated on a capital jury, she could ever personally 
vote to impose the death penalty.  “ „Those answers, in combination with the trial 
court‟s firsthand observations, could give rise to a definite impression that [B.E.‟s] 
views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of [her] 
duties.‟  [Citation.]  We thus defer to the court‟s ruling sustaining the  
46 
 
prosecution‟s challenge[ ] for cause.”  (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1, 22, quoting 
People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1007.)22 
                                              
22  
Defendant contends B.E.‟s answers suggested, at most, that she would have 
extreme difficulty in imposing the death penalty.  Mere difficulty in this regard, he 
asserts, is not alone sufficient to justify a Witt excusal.  However, defendant‟s 
citation to Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425 for this premise is inapposite.  There we 
confirmed that, when the court chooses to rely solely on a prospective juror‟s 
written questionnaire answers to justify his or her excusal, the answers themselves 
must clearly indicate the juror‟s unwillingness or inability to determine the 
appropriate penalty under the instructions.  We indicated that a brief written 
response to a question whether the juror‟s death penalty views would “ „prevent or 
make it very difficult‟ ” to do so would not suffice.  (Id. at pp. 446-447, & fn.12.)  
Here, however, the court and both counsel subjected B.E. to substantial oral 
examination, and the court was able to observe the prospective juror during this 
process.  Under such circumstances, a juror‟s conflicting or ambiguous answers 
may indeed give rise to the court‟s definite impression about the juror‟s 
qualifications, and its decision to excuse the juror deserves deference on appeal. 
 
Contrary to defendant‟s contention, B.E.‟s dismissal is distinguishable from 
that considered in Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, where we found no substantial 
support for the court‟s decision to excuse a prospective juror.  There, the most the 
juror conceded was that there “might” be “past psychological factors” in a capital 
defendant‟s background that “would weigh heavily enough that you probably 
wouldn‟t impose the death penalty.”  (Id. at p. 961.)  Of course, a capital juror 
should be open to consideration of the defendant‟s mental issues as a mitigating 
penalty factor. 
 
Defendant urges the court could not rely on B.E.‟s statement she would not 
sign a death verdict as jury foreperson.  (See People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 
765, 772.)  However, there is no indication the court placed sole reliance on this 
statement. 
 
Defendant complains that any disqualifying answers given by B.E. were the 
result of (1) awkward and legally inaccurate questions by the court, (2) the court‟s 
decision to cut off voir dire too soon, and (3) the court‟s undue restriction on voir 
dire inquiry about prospective jurors‟ attitudes toward the factual details of the 
case.  We find no basis in the record for the first two of these claims, and we have 
already rejected defendant‟s contention that the court allowed too little voir dire 
about the facts of the case. 
 
47 
c. Prospective Juror A.D. 
On his juror questionnaire, A.D., a 68 year old African-American, did not 
answer questions about his views on the death penalty, and said he would need 
more information about a case before expressing any view on life without parole.  
He marked “not sure” when asked how he would vote on a ballot measure to adopt 
the death penalty. 
On voir dire, when first asked whether he personally could ever vote to 
execute a person, A.D. said he “would have to look deep inside of me to really see 
whether that would be possible.”  A.D. said he was reminded that the justice 
system had dealt too slowly and leniently with the man who killed his daughter in 
a car accident, and he “[didn‟t] know” if he could be “impartial” in listening to 
witnesses.  But when asked if the experience in his daughter‟s case predisposed 
him to the death penalty, he responded, “No, no, no, no.  I‟d probably be inclined 
to vote for life without parole.”  A.D. said he was thinking of his own 35-year-old 
son, who was very quiet, but who might do something he regretted if cornered 
with no means of retreat.  When asked if he thought these feelings would affect his 
ability to choose between the two penalties, A.D. answered, “Well, at the moment, 
yes.” 
At this point, the court said, “I think we have a Wainwright versus Witt,” 
and the prosecutor responded, “Clearly.”  However, defense counsel was allowed 
to pursue the matter further.  When counsel suggested that “what I think I hear you 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Nor is there merit to defendant‟s contention that, in evaluating the propriety 
of the trial court‟s decision to excuse, we should place heaviest weight on what 
was said late in the prospective juror‟s examination.  Defendant cites no case, and 
we have found none, in which we overturned the trial court‟s grant of a 
prosecution challenge for cause under Witt on grounds that the prospective juror‟s 
later voir dire answers favored the juror‟s retention, even if the earlier ones did 
not.  The trial court is entitled to consider the entirety of a prospective juror‟s 
examination in deciding whether a Witt excusal is justified. 
48 
saying” is that “you wonder whether or not you could ever vote for the death 
penalty,” A.D. agreed.  When counsel asked if it was possible the facts could 
convince A.D. to agree to that penalty, A.D. answered that “[i]f I said yes to that 
right now, I feel like I would be committing myself” without first hearing the 
evidence.  When counsel suggested that, even if A.D.‟s son would have “some 
impact,” A.D. would consider both penalties and make a decision based on the 
facts, A.D. merely responded, “The instructions of the judge, I will have to 
consider both penalties.”  The court thereupon granted the prosecutor‟s challenge 
for cause, noting, over defense counsel‟s objection, that A.D.‟s demeanor 
supported the decision. 
Though defendant earnestly argues otherwise, the court‟s decision is amply 
supported.  In several different ways, during questioning by both court and 
counsel, A.D. expressed serious doubts that he had the ability ever to impose the 
death penalty, or that it was possible the facts could persuade him otherwise.  That 
he finally agreed he would “have to” follow the court‟s instructions if sworn as a 
juror does not indicate he believed he was actually able to do so.  The court did not 
err in excusing this juror. 
 
d.  Prospective Juror P.M. 
In his juror questionnaire, P.M., a corporate mathematician, stated he had 
no “significant” death penalty views “at the moment,” though imposition of this 
penalty was”[ob]viously” a “serious act,”  Moreover, over much of the course of 
an extended voir dire, he generally agreed that without “enthusias[m]”, “with 
reluctance,” “very conservatively,” and “very cautionar[il]y,” he could, after 
hearing all the evidence, comply with California law, weigh the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and decide whether the death penalty was appropriate, both 
generally and in a case where the defendant committed first degree murder by 
stabbing an African-American female victim to death in her home during a 
residential burglary and robbery.  At one point, P.M. indicated he could sign a 
death verdict as jury foreperson. 
49 
On the other hand, he expressed the view that the death penalty should be 
reserved for “heinous” crimes.  While a single-victim case was not necessarily 
excluded, he suggested, the facts should be “quite extreme” and present “more 
than the ordinary repulsion,” something “not . . . ordinarily read in the 
newspaper.”  At various times, he indicated uncertainty about how the process 
worked, asking whether the existence of one or more aggravating factors was 
necessary for the death penalty, or compelled that penalty.  He indicated his 
feelings were “ambivalent,” saying he could “rethink it many times and never 
reach a permanent sort of conclusion.”  He mused uncomfortably about being 
obligated to “do[ ] what the law dictates,” “comply with what society requires,” 
and be a “pawn of society.”  “The whole thing,” he lamented, “is a social almost 
dilemma.”  He expressed the strong understanding that “rehabilitation” was a 
prime objective of the penal system, and he seemed taken aback when the court 
advised that in a capital case, the defendant‟s potential for progress toward reentry 
into society was not a factor in the penalty decision. 
P.M.‟s feelings appeared to crystallize when, during examination by 
defense counsel, he realized that, at the penalty phase of a capital trial, the 
alternative to death was life without the possibility of parole, a sentence under 
which the defendant would remain forever behind prison walls.  At this point, 
P.M. stated, “It is perhaps the case that I‟m wasting the court‟s time.  There are 
matters upon which people cannot decide.  This may be one of them. . . .  [I]f there 
is the option of life in prison without the possibility of release, that is perhaps 
insurmountably the way to go.”  (Italics added.) 
The court interrupted to ask whether P.M. was saying that if life without 
parole was available, the death penalty was not an option.  P.M. answered, “I am 
saying I‟m very confused,” and he agreed he “sure would” have some difficulty in 
50 
making this decision under those circumstances.  At this point, the court denied 
defense counsel‟s request to ask further questions and excused P.M.23 
The record provides full support for the trial court‟s decision.  P.M. had 
expressed reluctance and ambivalence about his ability to follow the death penalty 
law.  However, he ultimately stated that if he could vote to keep defendant in 
prison for life, without any possibility of release, this alternative might be the 
“insurmountabl[e]” choice, and further efforts to determine his qualifications thus 
might be a “wast[e of] . . . time.”  P.M.‟s brief expressions of “confus[ion]” and 
“difficult[y]” thereafter did not significantly detract from this, his strongest 
statement.  The court could reasonably conclude that P.M.‟s views would prevent 
or substantially impair his ability to consider the death penalty. 
Defendant urges the trial court influenced P.M.‟s “tipping point” by 
wrongly telling this prospective juror that defendant‟s rehabilitation — i.e., his 
redeemability as a person — was not at issue.  The contention lacks merit.  In the 
first place, defendant has forfeited the issue, since his counsel raised no objection 
at trial. 
In any event, the court simply told P.M. that, while all the possibly 
sympathetic factors in defendant‟s background were relevant, “nobody here is 
talking about rehabilitating anybody.  We are talking about penalties pure and 
simple, because he‟s never going to get out.  There is no reason to prepare him to 
get back into society,” no reason “to teach him a trade, to teach him to be a printer, 
unless he is going to be printing books in prison for the rest of his life.”  These 
remarks only highlighted, accurately, that this was not a case in which the penal 
                                              
23  
Though defense counsel requested the opportunity for further questioning, 
she did not object specifically to the excusal itself.  Because the question of 
whether this resulted in a forfeiture of the latter issue is close and difficult, we 
proceed on the assumption that no forfeiture occurred.  (Champion, supra, 
9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6.) 
51 
system was obliged to try to prepare defendant for a return to society.  The court‟s 
comments were permissible. 
Defendant also argues the court erred by denying defense counsel‟s request 
for further questioning after P.M. stated he might “insurmountably” choose life 
without parole over death.  (See People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 845 
[counsel‟s right to attempt to rehabilitate potentially disqualified prospective 
juror].)  Again, we disagree.  After a lengthy voir dire, during which P.M. had 
acknowledged only the most reluctant willingness to consider the death penalty, he 
ultimately stated an “insurmountabl[e]” inclination to vote for life without parole 
over death.  P.M. himself suggested that further inquiry “might be a wast[e] [of] 
the court‟s time.”  Rehabilitation seemed a remote possibility under those 
circumstances, and the court could reasonably conclude that further voir dire 
would not change its impression of P.M.‟s state of mind.  No error occurred. 
 
e.  Prospective Juror M.R. 
In her juror questionnaire, M.R. stated she was against the death penalty 
and felt life without parole was “[b]etter than death.”  On voir dire, M.R., 
continued to indicate her opposition to the death penalty, but she displayed great 
confusion about whether she could vote to impose that penalty, either generally or 
in the instant case.  She first misunderstood a question whether she could vote to 
“execute” someone as asking whether she could convict a guilty person.  Once that 
issue was cleared up, she initially stated she could not vote to execute someone in 
the gas chamber, but then backpedaled, indicated she wasn‟t “really sure,” and 
said she “guess[ed]” it depended “on what the person did.”  As an example, she 
mentioned Charles Manson.   
When the court suggested her willingness to impose the death penalty in 
extreme cases meant she was not opposed to that penalty after all, she said, “I 
guess not.”  But then she changed course again; when the court asked her whether 
her questionnaire response meant she could not vote to send someone to the gas 
chamber, she said, “That‟s true.”  When the court asked her to explain her 
52 
conflicting answers, she said, “Well, I don‟t know how to explain myself, but I 
just — My belief, I don‟t think — You know, I don‟t think anybody should be 
executed to death penalty.” 
Defense counsel finally got a fairly clear statement from M.R. that she 
could vote for death in certain deserving cases, such as Charles Manson‟s.  
Moreover, when counsel asked if M.R. could consider both penalties for someone 
who fatally stabbed a woman during a residential burglary and robbery, M.R. 
initially said, “Yes.”  But when counsel pressed the point by asking again whether 
“[b]oth penalties are something you would consider,” M.R. said, “I would 
consider one of them.”  When the court asked which one, M.R. responded, 
“I would probably say the life.”  When counsel yet again tried to clarify if M.R. 
would seriously consider the death penalty in a case like this one, M.R. said, “Not 
for — I guess not for burglary.  I know it‟s burglary and — ” 
At this point, the court solicited a challenge from the prosecutor and, over a 
defense objection, excused M.R.  As the court explained to defense counsel, 
“[T]his is a failure under Wainwright versus Witt.  In looking at the potential 
juror, listening to her responses, I am satisfied that she‟s a Wainwright versus Witt 
failure.” 
Despite the confusion and inconsistency of her answers, M.R. made it 
reasonably clear that her scruples against the death penalty would probably render 
her unable to consider the death penalty in the case at hand.  The court‟s 
impression in this regard was reinforced, as it said, by its observation of the juror. 
Defendant suggests the excusal was motivated by the court‟s inexplicable 
refusal to understand how a juror could be conscientiously opposed to the death 
penalty, yet willing to impose that penalty in particular cases.  The record does not 
support this inference.  Rather, as indicated, it suggests the court acted on its 
impression that M.R. was hopelessly ambivalent about her death penalty stance 
and, in any event, was unable to consider both penalties in the instant case.  No 
error occurred. 
53 
f. 
Prospective Juror R.F. 
On her juror questionnaire, R.F. did not answer inquiries about her death 
penalty views, except to say she was “not sure” whether she would vote for a 
death penalty measure if one were on the ballot.  In the course of a lengthy voir 
dire by court and counsel, R.F. vacillated among three basic positions:  first, that 
she “honestly didn‟t know” whether she could vote to impose the death penalty; 
second, that she needed full information about the crime and the defendant‟s 
background to answer; and third, that she could choose between the two penalties 
under the process as explained to her.   
However, R.F. alluded to deep personal reservations about her ability to 
make this decision, suggesting at one point that “[S]ubconsciously, I do not know 
whether I could be the one to say, yes, he deserves the death penalty.”  When the 
court asked what good society gets out of the death penalty, R.F. responded, 
“Nothing, really,” while she indicated that life without parole requires “the person 
. . . to sit and think about what he has done.”  She indicated she thought life 
without parole was the worse penalty. 
When the court asked if R.F., acting as jury foreperson, could sign a death 
verdict, she flatly said “no” and maintained that position, explaining that she could 
not assume such a responsibility.  When defense counsel then asked what was the 
difference between voting to impose the death penalty and signing a verdict form, 
R.F. responded, “Put it that way, there is no difference.”  (Italics added.)  Over a 
defense objection, the court thereupon granted the prosecution‟s challenge for 
cause. 
After R.F. had left the courtroom, an extended discussion ensued between 
court and counsel.  The court explained that its ruling was based on Witt, and was 
supported by R.F.‟s confusion, her inconsistent answers, and her demeanor.  
Defense counsel urged that further questioning should have been allowed, and that 
R.F.‟s demeanor did not support the court‟s decision.  The court responded that 
54 
R.F. had had plenty of opportunity to make her position clear, that she had not 
done so, and that an attempt to rehabilitate her would have been futile. 
At this point, the prosecutor pointed out that in response to defense 
counsel‟s last question, R.F. had agreed there was no difference between signing a 
death verdict — an act R.F. clearly stated she could not perform — and voting to 
impose the death penalty.  The court responded, “Yeah.  Anybody reviewing this 
record can read that for themselves.  It‟s in black and white in the record.  And I‟ll 
go to the bank with this ruling.” 
We agree.  Despite her earlier struggles to formulate her death penalty 
views, R.F. achieved clarity when confronted with defense counsel‟s suggestion 
that it was illogical to be willing to vote to impose the death penalty, but unwilling 
to sign the death verdict.  R.F.‟s response could only be understood as her 
concession that she could do neither.  The excusal was proper. 
C. Guilt phase issues. 
1. Admission of defendant’s statements in police custody. 
Defendant urges the trial court erred by declining to suppress his statements 
made in police custody, both to the investigating officers and to Lisa Henry.  As 
discussed below, he insists his Miranda waivers were not knowing and intelligent 
waivers of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because (1) the 
officers prejudicially misled him about the scope of their interrogation, and (2) 
Henry was acting, without his knowledge, as a police agent.  These contentions 
lack merit. 
The following facts disclosed at the in limine suppression hearing (Evid. 
Code, § 402) are essentially undisputed:  Following his arrest on April 19, 1988, 
defendant was brought to the Oakland Police Department‟s homicide division.  
There he was questioned by Sergeants Paniagua and Medsker.  At the outset of an 
initial, unrecorded, session, the officers stated they were investigating the car 
defendant had been driving, because the car was stolen and a lady had been “hurt,” 
55 
but they did not tell defendant the victim had been killed.  They then read 
defendant his Miranda rights.  Defendant waived those rights, both orally and in 
writing, and agreed to talk. 
At the beginning of a subsequent, recorded, session, defendant asked if he 
was in the homicide division.  Paniagua replied that he was.  Defendant said, “So 
I‟m here for a car that was stolen.”  Paniagua explained again that he was 
investigating an incident in which a car was stolen and a lady was “hurt”; and he 
stated that “I‟m not here to trick you into anything.”  Defendant said, “I know you 
ain‟t, just tell me, you just said a car was stolen.”  Paniagua repeated that he was 
investigating “the incident [in] which the car was taken.”  Defendant responded, 
“Whatever you said, okay.”  Paniagua asked if everything was now clear in 
defendant‟s head, and defendant answered, “Yeah.”  Paniagua then re-Mirandized 
defendant. 
During these first two sessions, defendant denied all knowledge and 
involvement in the incident under investigation and maintained he obtained the 
vehicle from Fred Bush in payment for a debt.  Prior to the third, unrecorded, 
portion of the interview, Paniagua advised defendant the victim in the stolen car 
incident was dead.  Thereafter, during this third session, the officers confronted 
defendant with the facts that Fred Bush was in jail, that defendant‟s clothing was 
bloodstained, and that he had been arrested in possession of the victim‟s car, 
television, and VCR.  They accused defendant of lying and urged him to tell the 
truth.  He responded, “Why should I tell the truth?  Well, what‟s in it for me?  I‟m 
going to jail anyway.”  Early in the morning of April 20, 1988, following this third 
session, the officers arrested defendant for Sarah LaChapelle‟s murder. 
Later in the morning of April 20, the officers executed a search warrant at 
the home of Lisa Henry, then brought Lisa to the police station and obtained a 
statement from her.  Defendant was in an adjacent interview room at the time.  
Lisa was allowed to speak with defendant, and, in a recorded interview, she 
reported her conversation to the officers. 
56 
The evidence at the suppression hearing was in dispute about who initiated 
Lisa‟s meeting with defendant.  The officers indicated the following:  They told 
Lisa they had been questioning defendant all night and he was not telling the truth.  
She asked to speak with him, suggesting that maybe she could get him to tell the 
truth.  The officers agreed.  They had not planned to have Lisa talk with defendant, 
they did not tell her to try to get information from him, they suggested no 
questions for her to ask, they said nothing about Fred Bush, and they did not 
consider her a police agent. 
In her recorded statement concerning her conversation with defendant, Lisa 
stated, among other things, that defendant “said he didn‟t do it.  He said Freddie, 
Fred did it.”  According to Lisa‟s statement, defendant also indicated that “he tried 
to stop Fred” and that the victim “was a lady.” 
At one point on the recording, Paniagua asked Lisa, “Did I tell you to do 
anything else?”  Lisa responded, “No, you asked me just did I want to talk to him, 
maybe I can talk to him to convince him to tell the truth or to tell what happened.”  
On the recording, Paniagua reacted by saying, “Okay.  [¶]  Is this a true 
statement?”  Lisa responded, “Yes.”  At the hearing, Paniagua explained that 
Lisa‟s “you asked me” statement was not accurate, but it was not appropriate to 
argue about the matter at that time. 
The trial court rejected defendant‟s argument that he was tricked into 
waiving his Miranda rights when the officers failed to tell him he was suspected of 
a homicide, but simply indicated they were investigating a car theft in which a 
lady got “hurt.”  The court noted, among other things, that defendant expressed 
awareness he was being questioned in the homicide division, and must have 
inferred a killing was involved.  Contrary to the defense‟s contentions, the court 
also found that Lisa Henry had spoken to defendant on her own initiative, and thus 
was not a police agent.  Even if she were, the court further concluded, there was 
no requirement defendant be Mirandized a third time before she spoke to him.  
Accordingly, the court denied the motion. 
57 
As below, defendant urges that he was deceived into waiving his Miranda 
rights when the officers failed to tell him they were investigating a homicide, 
instead substituting their misrepresentation that the lady who owned the stolen car 
had merely been “hurt.”  Hence, he argues, his waiver of his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  We 
disagree. 
At the outset, we agree with the trial court that the evidence indicates 
defendant was not ignorant, when he twice heard and waived his Miranda rights, 
about the nature of the officers‟ investigation.  They told him they were 
investigating the stolen vehicle in which he had been arrested, and they indicated a 
lady had been “hurt” in the incident.  Thus, he understood the matter was more 
serious than mere car theft.  Nor, it appears, was he misled by any ambiguity in the 
officers‟ use of the word “hurt” rather than “killed.”  Recognizing that he was in 
the “homicide” division, he specifically asked the officers if this was so, and they 
indicated it was.  He must certainly have understood that the injury at issue was 
fatal.24 
Even if this evidence were not present, however, we would not accept 
defendant‟s contention.  We conclude the officers did nothing to invalidate 
defendant‟s two separate waivers of his Miranda rights. 
As the high court explained in Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564 
(Spring), the Fifth Amendment simply provides that no person may be compelled 
to be a witness against himself or herself.  (Id. at p. 572.)  But this right can be 
waived, if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  (Ibid.)  The warnings 
required by Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 for a suspect in custody — i.e., that the 
                                              
24  
Indeed, defendant‟s subsequent testimony under oath at trial established his 
knowledge, at the time of his arrest, that he was driving Sarah LaChapelle‟s 
vehicle, and that she was dead.  Defendant testified at trial that, after seeing two 
men emerge from Sarah‟s home, he entered, found her body, and ultimately 
decided to take her car, television, and VCR. 
58 
suspect has the right to refuse to talk, to talk only with counsel present, and to stop 
talking at any time, and that criminal use will be made of any statements the 
suspect does utter — are designed fully to protect the knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination 
in that custodial context.  (Spring, supra, at p. 572.)  Thus, in general, a suspect in 
custody who, having heard and understood a full explanation of these rights, then 
makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, has thereby knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived them.  (Id. at p. 574.) 
“[A] valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all 
information „useful‟ in making his decision or all information that „might . . . 
affec[t] his decision to confess.‟  [Citation.]  „[W]e have never read the 
Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information 
to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his 
rights.‟  [Citation.]”  (Spring, supra, 479 U.S. 564, 576-577.) 
In Spring, the defendant argued that, when confronting him in custody 
about a federal weapons charge, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF) tricked him into waiving his right to silence by failing to warn 
him they would also ask about a Colorado murder.  Hence, he urged, his 
admissions to the ATF agents about this latter crime tainted his subsequent murder 
confession to Colorado authorities.  The Spring court disagreed, holding that mere 
failure by law enforcement officers to advise a custodial suspect of all possible 
topics of interrogation is not trickery sufficient to vitiate the uncoerced waiver of 
one who heard and understood the warnings required by Miranda.  (Spring, supra, 
479 U.S. 564, 576.) 
Defendant points out that, in Spring, the United States Supreme Court left 
open whether, and under what circumstances, “affirmative misrepresentations” by 
the police about the scope of their investigation might vitiate a Miranda waiver.  
(Spring, supra, 479 U.S. 564, 576, fn. 8.)  However, as examples of the “certain 
circumstances” under which the court had previously invalidated Fifth 
59 
Amendment waivers procured by affirmative police misrepresentations, Spring 
cited cases involving falsehoods that were of a coercive nature, and thus 
reasonably calculated to induce false confessions.  (See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois 
(1963) 372 U.S. 528 [misrepresentation by police officers that suspect would be 
deprived of state financial aid for her dependent child unless she cooperated]; 
Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315 [misrepresentation by suspect‟s friend 
that friend would lose his job if suspect failed to cooperate].) 
We have recently confirmed that “[t]he use of deceptive statements during 
an interrogation . . . does not invalidate a confession [as involuntary, unknowing, 
or unintelligent] unless the deception is „ “ „of a type reasonably likely to procure 
an untrue statement.‟ ” ‟  (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299; see 
People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167.)”  (People v. Carrington (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 145, 172 (Carrington).)25  Defendant urges that by deceptively 
minimizing the seriousness of the investigation, the officers induced false 
statements that were later used against him, but his argument fails to persuade. 
At all times before he was informed the victim in the car theft incident 
under investigation was dead, defendant denied all criminal involvement in the 
incident.  The most damaging thing he did during his interrogation by the officers 
was to state falsely that he had obtained the car from Fred Bush in payment for a 
debt.  To be sure, this lie was later exposed and used against him to show a 
consciousness of guilt.  But it is difficult to see how the Fred Bush falsehood was 
induced because the police at first told him the victim was “hurt,” as opposed to 
advising him she had died.  In either case, his motivation to make false 
exculpatory statements was the same; he sought to avoid criminal responsibility 
for the crimes under investigation.  If anything, the motivation to lie to escape 
                                              
25  
This case does not involve ploys or deceptions that amount to the forbidden 
interrogation of a suspect who then has an unwaived Fifth or Sixth Amendment 
right to be free of police questioning.  (See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 
446 U.S. 291; Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387.) 
60 
responsibility would have been even greater had he been advised he was a murder 
suspect.  We therefore reject defendant‟s contention that the officers‟ statements 
the victim had been “hurt” as opposed to killed invalidated his Miranda waiver or 
rendered his statements involuntary, unknowing, or unintelligent. 
We also find no merit in defendant‟s contention that his statements to Lisa 
Henry at the police station were inadmissible because, without providing Miranda 
warnings for a third time, the police used her as an agent to obtain incriminating 
information.  The trial court ruled against this argument on two correct grounds. 
First, “[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not 
implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.”  (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 
292, 296 (Perkins); accord: People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 758 
(Mayfield).)  As the high court explained in Perkins, Miranda protects the Fifth 
Amendment rights of a suspect faced with the coercive combination of custodial 
status and an interrogation the suspect understands as official.  On the other hand, 
even if a suspect happens to be in custody, “[t]here is no empirical basis for the 
assumption that [when] speaking to those whom he assumes are not officers[, he] 
will feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the 
hope of more lenient treatment should he confess.”  (Perkins, supra, at pp. 296-
297.)26 
Defendant stresses a factual distinction between this case and Perkins, 
supra, 296 U.S. 292.  There, suspecting the defendant of a crime unrelated to the 
offense for which he was then incarcerated, the police planted an undercover agent 
in his cellblock to befriend him and elicit incriminating information about the 
unrelated crime.  By contrast, defendant urges, he was “in the throes” of a 
                                              
26  
We are not concerned here with the rule banning the use of police agents to 
obtain information from defendants about crimes with which they have been 
formally charged, and as to which their Sixth Amendment rights to counsel have 
thus attached.  (See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159; United States v. 
Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264; Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201.) 
61 
custodial interrogation about the Sarah LaChapelle case at the time Lisa spoke to 
him about that same incident.  Thus, defendant suggests, he, unlike the defendant 
in Perkins, confronted the coercive combination of circumstances that brings 
Miranda into play. 
We disagree.  We held in Mayfield that the police did not violate Miranda 
when, after the defendant in custody had invoked his right to silence, and thus 
could not be further interrogated, they allowed his father to discuss the case 
privately with him, then extracted a report of what was said.  We so concluded 
because “ „defendant‟s conversations with his own visitors are not the 
constitutional equivalent of [forbidden] police interrogation.‟  [Citations.]”  
(Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 758; see also Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 
520, 528 [police did not engage in forbidden interrogation, for purposes of 
Miranda, by mere placement of officer in room to observe and tape-record 
conversation between suspect in custody, who had invoked right to silence, and 
suspect‟s wife].)27  This conclusion is entirely consistent with Perkins, supra, 296 
U.S. 292; one who voluntarily speaks alone to a friend, even during a break in a 
custodial interrogation, has no reason to assume, during the private conversation, 
that he or she is subject to the coercive influences of police questioning. 
Second, the trial court found, on the particular facts, that Lisa was not, in 
any event, a police agent.  Despite Lisa‟s recorded statement that the officers had 
asked her to speak with defendant, the court accepted the officers‟ testimony in 
court that it was Lisa‟s idea to speak with him, that they did not order or ask Lisa 
to act on their behalf, and that they did not provide guidelines for the meeting.  
Though defendant suggests otherwise, we must defer to these factual and 
credibility determinations, made after the court observed the officers‟ demeanor.  
                                              
27  
The above-quoted statement in Mayfield stands on its own merits, though 
we added, as makeweight, the observation that, in that case, the meeting between 
father and suspect was entirely on their initiative, not that of the police.  (Mayfield, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 758.) 
62 
(E.g., People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 752; People v. Rundle (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 76, 115.)  Also, as a legal matter, we independently agree with the trial 
court that, under these circumstances, Lisa was not a police agent. 
Defendant urges that, even if Lisa initiated the meeting with him, the police 
somehow violated Miranda by “exploit[ing]” her possible status as an accomplice 
or accessory, and his vulnerability in the coercive atmosphere of custody, to obtain 
incriminating statements.  But again, “Miranda forbids coercion, not mere 
strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect‟s misplaced trust” in a 
supposed friend or ally.  (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. 292, 297.)  “Ploys to mislead a 
suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of 
compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda‟s concerns.  [Citations.]”  
(Ibid.) 
Rather, Miranda‟s aim is to ensure that the suspect‟s will to remain silent is 
not overborne by the coercive atmosphere of police questioning in custody.  Both 
“custody” and “police questioning” are necessary to invoke Miranda, and both 
concepts are viewed from the suspect‟s perspective.  (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. 
292, 296.)  Even when the suspect is in the process of a custodial interrogation, 
voluntary statements to someone the suspect does not believe is a police officer or 
agent, in a conversation the suspect assumes is private, simply does not involve 
one of these two critical concerns.  Defendant‟s Miranda rights were not violated, 
and his statements in police custody were properly admitted. 
 
2. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 
Defendant urges the prosecutor engaged in pervasive misconduct at the 
guilt phase of his trial, thereby violating both state law and his Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial.  Singly and in combination, he asserts, 
these instances of misconduct require reversal of the guilt verdict.28 
                                              
28  
Here, as with most issues defendant raises on appeal, he urges that the 
claimed error or misconduct infringes various of his constitutional rights.  Usually, 
 
63 
“The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled.  „A 
prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury 
commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal 
Constitution when they infect the trial with such “ „unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.‟ ”  [Citations.]  Under state law, a 
prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions 
do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‟  [Citation.]  „In order to preserve a 
claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an 
admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of 
misconduct preserved for review.‟  [Citation.]  When a claim of misconduct is 
based on the prosecutor‟s comments before the jury, „ “the question is whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the 
complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” ‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. 
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29 (Friend).) 
Applying these standards, we find no basis for reversal.  Many of 
defendant‟s claims were forfeited by failure to object, and each individually lacks 
merit, because there was either no misconduct or no prejudice.  Even if we 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
even if he raised the issue in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some or all 
of the constitutional arguments he now advances.  However, in each such instance, 
unless otherwise indicated, the appellate claim is either (1) one that required no 
trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) invokes no facts or legal 
standards different from those the trial court was asked to apply, but merely asserts 
that the error or misconduct, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually presented to 
the court, had the additional legal consequence of a constitutional violation.  To 
this extent, defendant‟s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  
Under such circumstances, of course, if we conclude the trial court did not err on 
the issue actually before it, the new constitutional “gloss” must be rejected as well, 
without any need for a separate constitutional discussion.  We proceed 
accordingly.  (See, e.g, People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17; People 
v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-439.) 
64 
consider his strongest claims in combination, we are not persuaded that prejudicial 
misconduct occurred.  We address defendant‟s assertions in turn. 
 
a.  Comment on defendant’s refusal of consent to search. 
In his opening argument, the prosecutor asserted that defendant was 
interrogated by the police, denied involvement, and offered an alibi.  The 
prosecutor then stated, “After the denial by the defendant, a request was made for 
the defendant to consent to the search of the place he was staying at, meaning Lisa 
Henry‟s house.  He denied such consent.”  Defense counsel promptly objected.  
The court responded, “The jury can disregard that.”  When defense counsel asked 
whether the court was going to “assign prosecutorial misconduct,” the court stated, 
“No, I‟m not going to assign prosecutorial misconduct.  I‟m going to ask the jury 
to disregard that.” 
Assuming, as defendant contends, that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by commenting on defendant‟s exercise of his Fourth Amendment 
right to refuse consent to a search and by arguing evidence that would be 
inadmissible at trial, the court‟s response was sufficient to resolve the problem.  
The court immediately “asked” — i.e., politely admonished — the jury to 
disregard the argument, and later instructed the jury that “[s]tatements made by 
attorneys during the trial are not evidence.” 
Defendant insists a far more elaborate cautionary instruction was required, 
such as that suggested in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208 (Bolton).  There 
the prosecutor twice insinuated in his closing remarks that, but for the rules of 
evidence, he could present information about the defendant‟s past crimes.  This 
court found significant misconduct, though no prejudice in light of the 
overwhelming evidence that the defendant was guilty as charged.  In a dictum 
footnote, Bolton contemplated what, short of outright reversal, is an effective 
remedy for improper prosecutorial argument.  Bolton expressed the view that a 
“mere verbal rebuke” may be an insufficient deterrent, and stated that the trial 
court must give a cautionary instruction on request if it believes misconduct 
65 
occurred.  In that instance, Bolton proposed, the court should tell the jury that the 
prosecutor‟s remarks were “unwarranted,” “improper,” “uncalled for,” 
unsupported by any evidence, and an attempt to prejudice the jury, and that, if they 
caused the jury to convict the defendant, the court would have to declare a 
mistrial.  (Bolton, supra, at pp. 215-216, fn. 5.) 
Here, defense counsel asked if the court was going to “assign misconduct,” 
but counsel did not request a Bolton-type instruction.29  Accordingly, and given 
the fleeting nature of the prosecutor‟s remark, the court‟s admonition to the jury to 
disregard it was sufficient to cure any harm.  We see no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court‟s handling of the matter.   
 
b.  Testimony of Mamie Jackson. 
Mamie Jackson, defendant‟s aunt, testified as a prosecution witness.  
Among other things, Jackson indicated that she and other members of defendant‟s 
family lived only a few houses away from Sarah LaChapelle‟s home, that 
defendant sometimes lived there also, and that he arrived there in the late 
afternoon or early evening of April 18, 1988, wearing a red leather suit.  The 
prosecutor asked whether, when defendant entered the house, everyone left.  
Jackson responded simply that when he entered, he went to see his mother in her 
room.  When the prosecutor asked how long defendant was in the house, Jackson 
said she was busy ironing a dress for her daughter and did not time his stay.30 
                                              
29  
Though Bolton suggested that a mere admonition to disregard improper 
remarks may only serve to rub them in (Bolton, supra, 23 Cal.3d 208, 215-216, 
fn. 5), defense counsel may have decided just the opposite here.  Though counsel 
sought to protect the record by asking for an “assign[ment] of misconduct,” her 
failure to request a more elaborate admonition may have stemmed from her 
conclusion that such an instruction would itself call the jury‟s undue attention to 
the prosecutor‟s comment. 
30  
Later, during cross-examination, Jackson stated that she left the house 
before defendant did. 
66 
The prosecutor then asked, “Did you tell the police back in April 19th of 
1988 that when [defendant] entered the house that everyone ran out because 
[defendant] is very violent?”  Defense counsel asserted, “Objection, Your Honor.  
That‟s speculation, it‟s prejudicial, and that‟s — ”  The court interrupted to 
disagree, stating that the witness “said she can‟t remember, so he‟s refreshing her 
memory.”  Counsel argued that the proper way to refresh Jackson‟s recollection 
was to have her read her statement to the police.  The court responded, “He can 
ask her if that refreshes her recollection that that‟s what she told the police.  [¶]  Is 
that what you told the police — . . . Ms. Jackson?”  Jackson answered, “I can‟t 
remember what I said now.”  In response to the prosecutor‟s further questions, 
Jackson confirmed that, earlier that morning, she had “looked over” a signed and 
initialed copy of her police statement. 
The following colloquy then occurred:   “[The Prosecutor]:  As a matter of 
fact, [defendant] has kicked in the door in your house —  [¶]  [Defense Counsel]:  
Objection, Your Honor.  Objection, Your Honor.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor]:  — on 
three occasions?”  The court interrupted to ask the basis of the defense objection, 
and counsel responded “Irrelevant.”  The court sustained the objection, 
admonished the jury to disregard the question, and cautioned the prosecutor to 
“keep it in the ballpark.” 
Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly attempted to use the device of 
refreshing Jackson‟s recollection to inject inadmissible and prejudicial “bad 
character” evidence of defendant‟s violent nature and uncharged violent acts into 
the guilt trial.  He asserts the prosecutor‟s questions also violated the court‟s in 
limine decision to exclude evidence about defendant‟s violence against family 
members from both the guilt and penalty trials. 
As the People assert, defendant forfeited the latter argument by failing to 
object on that basis at trial.  (E.g., People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841; 
People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072.)  In any event, though we are 
persuaded the prosecutor committed misconduct, we see nothing serious enough to 
67 
constitute, or contribute to, grounds for reversal.  Though its reaction was delayed, 
the court ultimately made an appropriate response to the prosecutor‟s tactic.  
Under the circumstances, we conclude, its actions were adequate to obviate any 
prejudicial effect. 
At first, the court apparently thought the prosecutor was just trying to 
demonstrate that Jackson‟s vague trial testimony about defendant‟s presence at his 
grandmother‟s home in the hours before Sarah LaChapelle‟s nearby murder was 
inconsistent with her more contemporaneous police statement, and that she might 
be shading her testimony on the stand so as not to damage her nephew‟s case.  In 
fact, the prosecutor‟s query whether the family had fled when defendant arrived 
did not ultimately produce a damaging answer from Jackson. 
Once the prosecutor made clear his true purpose by asking Jackson whether 
defendant had thrice “kicked in the door” of his grandmother‟s residence — thus 
clearly attempting to inject extraneous evidence of defendant‟s propensity for 
violence — the court responded immediately.  It prevented Jackson from 
answering, sustained the defense objection, instructed the jury to disregard the 
question, and admonished the prosecutor in front of the jury. 
Moreover, the court later instructed the jury that “[i]f an objection was 
sustained to a question, do not guess what the answer might have been.  Do not 
speculate as to the reason for the objection.  Do not assume to be true any 
insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness.  A question is not evidence 
and may be considered only as it enables you to understand the answer.” 
We do not condone the prosecutor‟s improper tactics, but they produced no 
damaging evidence.  Under the circumstances, we are confident the court‟s 
response was sufficient to cure any possible prejudice.  In any event, in view of 
the very strong evidence of defendant‟s guilt, we are persuaded, by any standard, 
that this relatively brief incident did not contribute to the guilt verdict. 
68 
 
c.  Asserted Doyle error; attorney-client privilege. 
During the direct examination of defendant, counsel asked him to explain 
why he had not told Sergeants Medsker and Paniagua what he was now telling the 
jury about what happened at Sarah LaChapelle‟s house.  Defendant responded that 
he did not feel it would do him any good, because he “didn‟t too much like” 
Medsker.  Moreover, he stated, about a week after his arrest, he learned from his 
initial appointed counsel, James Chaffee, that he faced the death penalty, and 
Chaffee advised him not to discuss the case with anybody. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from defendant that, on the 
Friday and Sunday preceding his trial testimony, defendant had “somewhat 
discussed” that testimony with his current counsel.  Learning that current counsel 
was in the same firm as Chaffee, the prosecutor sarcastically repeated, “Oh, they 
were from the same office.”  A defense objection was sustained, and the 
prosecutor was directed to proceed by question and answer. 
The prosecutor then asked whether, when Chaffee first advised him not to 
discuss the case with anyone, Chaffee had made notes of what defendant told him.  
When the defense objected that “we‟re getting into attorney-client confidential 
communication,” the court responded, “He‟s just asking if he made notes.  That‟s 
all.  [Defendant] brought this up himself.”  In answer to the prosecutor‟s question, 
defendant then said, “I don‟t know.  He probably did.  I don‟t know.”  The 
prosecutor next asked if defendant had made notes of his conversation with 
Chaffee, and defendant said no.  At that point, the prosecutor moved on to another 
topic.  
Somewhat later, the prosecutor asked when defendant told Chaffee he saw 
two men coming out of Sarah LaChapelle‟s house.  The court promptly sustained a 
defense objection, ruling that the prosecutor‟s question “go[es] beyond what he 
said Chaffee told him” and “assumes a fact not in evidence.” 
Later still, the prosecutor asked defendant whether “you [made] any effort 
to call the police and tell them that Mrs. LaChapelle was murdered” or “that you 
69 
saw two men coming out of her home.”  Defendant said no.  “As a matter of fact,” 
the prosecutor continued, “you never told that to anyone until this jury heard it for 
the first time.”  Defense counsel objected on grounds of attorney-client privilege, 
and the court sustained the objection. 
Defendant first argues the prosecutor‟s questions about defendant‟s failure 
to report the crime, or to tell the true story before trial, were misconduct under 
Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 (Doyle).  Doyle forbids impeachment of a 
defendant‟s exculpatory trial testimony with cross-examination about his or her 
postarrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings.  (Doyle, supra, at p. 619.)  
Defendant did not object on Doyle grounds below, and thus has forfeited this 
claim. 
In any event, it largely lacks merit.  Insofar as the prosecutor questioned 
why defendant, upon discovering Sarah LaChapelle‟s body, did not promptly call 
the police, the prosecutor was not casting suspicion upon defendant‟s silence 
during a period after he had been arrested, and had heard and decided to exercise 
his Miranda rights.  The prosecutor was simply making the point that if, as 
defendant now claimed, he innocently came upon the horrific murder of his 
family‟s neighbor, it would have been natural to summon assistance immediately.  
Such questions did not violate Doyle, and were not improper. 
When the prosecutor went further, and asked whether defendant had told 
anyone the supposed true facts prior to trial, a defense objection on attorney-client 
privilege grounds was promptly sustained.  If incipient Doyle misconduct lurked in 
this question, it was thus nipped in the bud. 
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor‟s efforts to elicit the content of 
his pretrial conversations with his counsel.  He asserts these efforts were invasions 
of his attorney-client privilege, as well as improper attempts to insinuate that he 
and his counsel colluded to produce “coached” and “rehearsed” testimony.  The 
latter claim was forfeited by failure to raise it below.  In any event, no basis for 
reversal appears.  With one exception, each prosecutorial attempt to probe 
70 
attorney-client conversations was squelched by a successful defense objection 
before any answer was forthcoming.  The single exception, the prosecutor‟s 
question about whether defendant‟s first counsel, Chaffee, took notes of their 
initial conversation, produced an “I don‟t know” answer from defendant.  The 
subject was not pursued.  Defendant cannot have suffered prejudice. 
Finally, defendant urges that the prosecutor exploited his theory of 
collusion between defendant and counsel, and improperly impugned defense 
counsel‟s integrity, by suggesting in his rebuttal that, when preparing for her just 
completed argument, counsel had “created” a “preposterous” defense involving a 
nonexistent “phantom killer,” and said that counsel “wants you to start guessing 
about a phantom killer.” 
The claim is forfeited by failure to object below to the remarks now 
challenged.  In any event, we find no misconduct. 
Personal attacks on opposing counsel, including accusations that counsel 
fabricated a defense or misstated facts in order to deceive the jury, are forbidden.  
(E.g., Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 30-31; Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 
1154.)  On the other hand, the prosecutor may vigorously argue his or her case, 
including the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  (Friend, supra, at p. 30.)  
A substantial portion of defense counsel‟s argument was devoted to the premise 
that defendant was not guilty of special circumstance murder if, though involved 
with another person in the burglary and robbery of Sarah LaChapelle‟s home, he 
was not Sarah‟s actual killer and did not intend to kill.  In support of this theory, 
counsel interpreted the forensic evidence to suggest that, even if defendant was a 
coparticipant in the burglary and robbery, a second burglar and robber was the 
actual killer.  It was in this context that the prosecutor responded by disparaging 
counsel‟s use of the evidence to manufacture a “phantom killer” theory. 
The prosecutor did not accuse defense counsel of factual fabrication or 
deceit; he merely argued, as he was allowed to do, that there was no evidence for 
counsel‟s theory.  The prosecutor‟s language was strong, but well within bounds 
71 
we have previously recognized as permissible.  (See Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 
1082, 1154-1155, and cases cited.)  No misconduct occurred. 
 
d.  Prosecutor’s facial gestures. 
Defendant points to several instances in which the prosecutor smiled, 
smirked, or laughed in response to defendant‟s testimony.  In prompt response to 
defense objections, the court twice strongly admonished the jury to disregard the 
prosecutor‟s reactions, expressions, and gestures, stating that they were irrelevant, 
and that the jury, exercising its common sense under the instructions, was the sole 
judge of the defendant‟s veracity.  The court‟s actions were sufficient to 
ameliorate any undue prejudice. 
 
e.  Alleged self-aggrandizement by the prosecutor. 
On Tuesday, December 15, 1992, just after both sides had rested at the guilt 
trial, the court began to discuss, in the jury‟s presence, the scheduling of closing 
arguments.  The court indicated it would allow the jurors to choose between two 
alternative argument schedules.  The prosecutor began to suggest that one of the 
court‟s proposed schedules — which would postpone arguments from Thursday, 
December 17, to Monday, December 21, thus giving the jury a five-day hiatus — 
might interfere with his long-planned holiday trip.  At this point, defense counsel 
interjected an unspecified objection.  Moments later, after desultory further 
discussion, the prosecutor stated, “I‟ll tell you what I‟m going to do.  I‟m going to 
cancel my flight.”  The court asked the prosecutor whether he “[had] any reason to 
believe” that if the case was argued on Monday, it could not go to the jury on 
Tuesday.  The prosecutor responded, “I think it‟s going to be close.”  In that event, 
the court decided, “we‟ll come back [for arguments] on Thursday afternoon.” 
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s “I‟m going to cancel my flight” 
remark was an improper attempt to garner personal sympathy and admiration from 
the jurors by appearing noble and dedicated.  The claim is forfeited for failure to 
state this ground for objection below. 
72 
In any event, we cannot agree that this brief remark, made in the course of a 
scheduling discussion with the court, rose to the level of calculated self-
aggrandizement.  Nor, we are persuaded, would the jury reasonably have 
understood the comment in that way.  This is especially so since the prosecutor 
soon seemed to retreat from his sacrificial offer, thereafter advising the court that 
Monday arguments would make his ability to travel a “close” issue.  Indeed, as the 
jurors saw, the prosecutor never had to back up his offer, because the court 
accommodated him.  Under these circumstances, we agree with the People that 
defendant‟s claim of improper self-aggrandizement is “tenuous and tangential.”  
We find no misconduct. 
 
f.  Referring to facts not in evidence. 
Defendant complains of an instance during the prosecutor‟s guilt phase 
summation when, in arguing that defendant‟s explanation for how he got blood on 
his clothing (i.e., his gun fell from his pants to the floor near the victim‟s body) 
was incredible, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider the size of a Smith & 
Wesson revolver and used his hands to demonstrate.  Defense counsel objected 
that no evidence had been introduced on this subject.  The court sustained the 
objection, admonishing that “[t]he jury can disregard it.”  Defendant insists the 
court‟s response was, typically, too weak, especially in its use of the equivocal 
word “can.”  However, in light of the general instruction that counsels‟ arguments 
are not evidence, the jury must have understood the argument was improper and 
should not be considered. 
 
g.  Conclusion; cumulative prejudice. 
Defendant asserts that, even if no single instance warrants reversal on its 
own, the pervasive nature of the prosecutor‟s misconduct, the court‟s “quaint” but 
inadequate efforts to control the prosecutor, and the extended jury deliberations 
indicating a close case, all point to a pattern of unfairness and prejudice that render 
the guilt verdict unsustainable.  We disagree.  As we have explained, defendant 
forfeited many of his misconduct claims; others are not well taken.  Though 
73 
several instances of misconduct, or arguable misconduct, occurred, the court for 
the most part took adequate remedial steps.  Moreover, as noted, despite the jury‟s 
careful consideration of the capital charges, the evidence of defendant‟s guilt as 
the lone robber and killer of Sarah LaChapelle was strongly persuasive.  Singly or 
in combination, and judged by any standard of prejudice, the cited instances thus 
cannot have influenced the guilt outcome.  No basis for reversal appears. 
 
3.  Instructional issues. 
 
a.  Burglary instruction based on CALJIC No. 14.59. 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by giving a version of CALJIC No. 
14.59, concerning the elements of burglary.  This standard instruction states, in 
essence, that the jury “should” find the defendant guilty if it unanimously agrees 
he or she entered the premises with the intent to steal or to commit a felony (in this 
case, robbery), and is not required to agree as to which particular crime the 
defendant intended to commit.31  Though the clerk‟s transcript version of this 
instruction included the standard “should” language, defendant further notes the 
court substituted the word “must” when it read the instruction to the jury. 
Defendant asserts that because he was not charged with the substantive 
crime of burglary, and because CALJIC No. 14.59, as given in his case, did not 
include the words “of burglary” after “guilty,” the effect of this instruction was to 
direct a verdict of murder on the sole basis of a jury finding that he made an entry 
into Sarah LaChapelle‟s house with the intent to steal or rob.  He claims he 
thereby suffered a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
                                              
31  
CALJIC No. 14.59 provides:  “If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt and agree unanimously that defendant made an entry with the specific intent 
to steal or to commit _______, a felony, you should find the defendant guilty.  
You are not required to agree as to which particular crime the defendant intended 
to commit when [he] [she] entered.” 
 
74 
process and a fair trial.  (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 
15, 16.)  The contention lacks merit.32 
The court began by instructing the jury on the elements of murder, 
including first degree murder by premeditation and, on a felony-murder theory, by 
a killing in the commission of robbery or burglary.  Addressing the law of felony 
murder, the court explained that if a human being was killed during the 
commission of burglary or robbery, the perpetrator is guilty of first degree murder 
if he or she had the specific intent to commit one of those underlying crimes.  
Similarly, the court instructed, if a person was killed by any one of several persons 
engaged in the commission of burglary or robbery, all those who actively assisted 
the perpetrator in committing the burglary or robbery, with knowledge of the 
perpetrator‟s felonious purpose, are also guilty of first degree murder. 
The court next turned to the special circumstance allegations, noting that 
“[i]f you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you must then 
determine” whether one or both special circumstances is true.  (Italics added.)  The 
court set forth the elements of the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special 
circumstances, duly noting that the murder must have been committed while the 
defendant was engaged in one of those felonies.  Finally, not yet having covered 
the elements, and the necessary specific intents, for burglary and robbery as 
                                              
32  
The People urge the claim is forfeited because defendant requested the 
instruction, thus inviting any error.  Indeed, though defendant argues his request 
was solely in connection with an unsuccessful attempt to obtain instructions on 
burglary as a lesser related offense of murder, his counsel later acquiesced in the 
giving of CALJIC No. 14.59 both before and after the court ruled it would not 
give lesser-related offense instructions on burglary.  Nonetheless, “[t]he invited 
error doctrine will not preclude appellate review [of an assertedly erroneous 
instruction] if the record fails to show counsel had a tactical reason for requesting 
or acquiescing in the instruction.  [Citations.]”  (Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 28.)  
The record here shows no tactical reason why defendant‟s counsel acquiesced in 
the instruction after its ostensible use for defense purposes was foreclosed.  Hence, 
we decline to find forfeiture. 
75 
elements of felony murder and the charged special circumstances, the court gave 
instructions, including CALJIC No. 14.59, on those issues. 
In assessing a claim of instructional error or ambiguity, we consider the 
instructions as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the 
jury was misled.  (E.g., People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 804; People v. 
Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963-964 (Smithey); see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 
502 U.S. 62, 72 & fn. 4.)  Here, we find no reasonable likelihood the challenged 
instruction led the jury to believe it “should” or “must” find defendant guilty of 
Sarah LaChapelle‟s murder just because it concluded he entered her house with a 
felonious or larcenous purpose.  Read as a whole, the instructions clearly informed 
the jurors a first degree felony-murder verdict was appropriate if the victim was 
killed during defendant‟s perpetration of, or knowing participation in, a robbery or 
burglary.  (See Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 680 [rejecting contention, in light of 
instructions as a whole, that failure to include the words “of burglary” after 
“guilty” in CALJIC No. 14.59 created a mandatory presumption the defendant was 
guilty of all charged crimes].)  We find no error. 
 
b.  First degree murder instructions. 
Defendant argues the court erred by instructing on first degree murder 
because the information simply charged him with murder in violation of section 
187, and did not state the degree of the murder, cite the actual first degree murder 
statute (§ 189), or allege the facts necessary for first degree murder.  Thus, he 
asserts, he was charged only with second degree murder.33  “As defendant 
                                              
33  
The People urge the claim is forfeited, because defendant did not object 
below that he received inadequate charging notice.  (See People v. Bright (1996) 
12 Cal.4th 652, 671.)  Defendant responds that his attack is not on the form or 
adequacy of the information, which validly charged second degree murder.  
Rather, he asserts, he challenges the unwarranted first degree murder instructions 
given at his trial, a claim we may review even though he did not object to the 
instructions below.  (§ 1259; see Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 28.)  Because the 
 
76 
acknowledges, however, we have consistently rejected such arguments and have 
concluded that a defendant may be convicted of first degree murder even though 
the indictment or information charges only murder with malice in violation of 
section 187.  (People v. Whisenhunt [(2008)] 44 Cal.4th [174,] 222 
[(Whisenhunt)]; People v. Hughes [(2002)] 27 Cal.4th [287,] 368-370; People v. 
Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 107-108.)  Defendant also contends that Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [(Apprendi)], prohibits [his] conviction on an 
uncharged crime.  His reliance on Apprendi however is misplaced, because he was 
not convicted of an „uncharged crime.‟  ([ ] Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 222.)”  (Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 54.) 
 
c. Failure to require jury unanimity on theory of first degree 
murder. 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury it was 
required to agree unanimously whether he committed premeditated murder or first 
degree felony murder.  He claims a violation of his state and federal constitutional 
rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of a charged crime, a 
unanimous jury verdict, and a reliable guilt determination in a capital case.  (U.S. 
Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16, 17.)34 
As defendant acknowledges, however, we consistently have rejected the 
identical claim.  (E.g., Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 54; People v. Benavides (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 69, 100-101; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712-713 
(Nakahara); People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1132 (Kipp); People v. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
forfeiture issue is close and difficult, we decline to find that defendant forfeited his 
claim.  (Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6.) 
34  
The People claim forfeiture on grounds defendant did not request a 
unanimity instruction below.  We find no forfeiture, because we understand 
defendant‟s argument to be that the court should have given such an instruction 
sua sponte. 
77 
Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394-395.)  Defendant presents no arguments that 
require us to reconsider these conclusions, and we decline to do so. 
 
d.  Instructions assertedly affecting reasonable doubt standard. 
Defendant urges that a series of standard instructions given by the trial 
court unconstitutionally diluted the prosecution‟s burden to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  As defendant acknowledges, we have rejected similar 
arguments as to all the instructions he cites:  CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.2, 
2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90, 8.20, 8.83, and 8.83.1.  (E.g., Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 
53; Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th 174, 221; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
1067, 1138-1139 (Guerra); Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th 705, 713-715; People v. 
Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 148, 151; People v. Monteil (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 
941.)  He asks us to reconsider our conclusions, but we decline to do so. 
 
e.  CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06. 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when, over defense objections, it 
instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.03 (defendant‟s willfully false or 
misleading pretrial statement about the charged crimes as circumstance tending, 
but not alone sufficient, to show consciousness of guilt) and 2.06 (attempt by 
defendant to conceal evidence against himself or herself as circumstance tending, 
but not alone sufficient, to show consciousness of guilt).  He claims violations of 
his rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and reliable determinations of guilt, 
special circumstances, and penalty under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  His arguments lack merit. 
Defendant first asserts that these instructions are impermissibly one-sided 
and argumentative pinpoint instructions that allow juries to draw impermissible 
inferences of guilt.  As he concedes, we have rejected the identical challenges 
many times (e.g., People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 377 (McWhorter); 
People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 291; Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 555; 
People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 303-304), and we do so again. 
Defendant also urges the instructions were improper on the facts of this 
78 
case.  Of course, there was substantial evidence both of willfully false pretrial 
statements, and of concealing or destroying evidence.  When the police told him 
they were investigating the stolen vehicle he was driving, and that the owner had 
been hurt, he lied, saying he obtained the car from Fred Bush.  Moreover, there 
was evidence he threw away his bloody socks, and that Lisa Henry promptly 
washed the red leather suit he was wearing on the day of Sarah LaChapelle‟s 
murder. 
Nonetheless, he urges, his lies and destruction of evidence had no rational 
tendency to prove he was guilty of the charged crime, first degree murder, because 
they had no bearing on the states of mind or specific intent necessary to establish 
that particular offense.  Defendant overlooks that the evidence tended to show his 
fear of apprehension for his involvement in Sarah LaChapelle‟s injury or death, 
and her killer‟s identity was a disputed issue.  In any event, even where mental 
state is the principal issue, we have rejected the notion that consciousness of guilt 
instructions call for impermissible inferences about mental state, or are otherwise 
inappropriate.  (E.g., Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1160; Moon, supra, 
37 Cal.4th 1, 28; Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th 936, 983.)  The claim lacks merit. 
f. 
CALJIC No. 2.51. 
Defendant contends the court should not have given CALJIC No. 2.51, 
which allows the jury to consider the presence or absence of motive as a 
circumstance that may tend to establish guilt or innocence.  He urges that his state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and a reliable guilt 
and penalty determination (U.S. Const. 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., 
art. I, §§ 7, 15) were violated, because CALJIC No. 2.51 lessens the prosecution‟s 
burden of proof and irrationally allows the jury to find guilt on the basis of motive 
alone.  We reject these arguments, as we have in the past.  (E.g., Friend, supra, 
79 
47 Cal.4th 1, 53; People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 314; People v. Cleveland 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 750.)35 
D. Penalty phase issues. 
1. Prosecutorial misconduct. 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct several times 
during his cross-examination of defendant‟s mother, Rosia Carter, who testified 
for the defense, and during his argument to the jury.  To the extent misconduct 
occurred, the court dealt with it promptly and adequately.  We conclude that, 
singly or in combination, the cited instances did not prejudice defendant. 
a. “Burglary gloves” suggestion. 
Rosia testified that, when told a male around 14 years old had died in the shed 
fire in her back yard on December 24, 1983, she first feared it was defendant, who 
was then 16 years old.  The prosecutor reminded her that, assuming this was the 
correct date of the fire, defendant was then “in jail for committing a burglary, 
[was] he not?”  Defense counsel did not object, and Rosia answered that she 
“thought it was a probation violation.” 
The prosecutor then asked, “Incidentally, in February of 1984 did you ever 
receive or go and pick up the gloves that [defendant] used in the burglary from my 
office?”  Before Rosia could respond, defense counsel objected on grounds of 
irrelevance.  The court sustained the objection, and the prosecutor moved on to 
other topics.  We do not condone the prosecutor‟s effort to insinuate defendant‟s 
commission of an unproven burglary.  However, given the brief nature of the 
episode, and the court‟s prompt response, we cannot conclude defendant was 
harmed. 
                                              
35  
The People urge the claim is forfeited inasmuch as defendant invited the 
error by requesting CALJIC No. 2.51.  But the record shows no tactical reason for 
the request; hence, we find no forfeiture on this ground.  (Moon, supra, 
37 Cal.4th 1, 28; see § 1259.) 
80 
b. Suggestion that defendant “hit a store owner with a rock 
three times in the head.” 
The prosecutor cross-examined Rosia at length about her efforts to 
discipline and support defendant through a childhood and youth marked by 
misbehavior and troubles with the law.  In the course of this examination, and 
without objection by the defense, Rosia acknowledged, among other things, that 
she attended court when, in the prosecutor‟s words, defendant “burglarized a 
railroad car in 1981” with two other youths.  The prosecutor then asked, “Did you 
— Did you attend court in July and August of 1983 —  [interruption by the court]  
— for [defendant] when he hit a store owner with a rock three times in the head?”  
Defense counsel objected on grounds that the incident to which the prosecutor was 
referring “[had] been resolved in favor of [defendant]” in that defendant “was 
acquitted of those charges.” 
After a brief discussion between court and counsel, the court instructed the 
prosecutor to “[c]hange [the question] to accused of hitting a store owner in the 
head three times with a rock,” and the prosecutor agreed.  (Italics added.)  “The 
issue,” the court stated to the witness, “is did you go to court?”  Rosia responded, 
“I don‟t know.”  Counsel continued to object and requested an admonishment.  
Again the court explained it had “changed the question to „accused,‟ not convicted 
or that he did it.  And the question was did she go to court.”  On that basis, the 
court overruled the objection. 
Defendant asserts there was little if any relevance to Rosia‟s attendance in 
court, and that the “gratuitous” reference to inadmissible violent conduct by 
defendant was inflammatory and prejudicial.  However, as noted, the prosecutor, 
in asking about Rosia‟s court attendance, sought to rebut what defendant concedes 
was a defense theory that he was an unwanted child who suffered from maternal 
neglect and lack of support. 
81 
Moreover, the defense objection, as well as court‟s response, to the 
prosecutor‟s original misframed question made clear to the jurors that defendant 
had been legally exonerated in the incident to which the question referred, and that 
they should disregard any implication he had committed an assault with a rock.  
That understanding was reinforced when the jury was later instructed, as at the 
guilt phase, that they must not speculate why objections to questions were 
sustained, or what the answers might have been, and that statements or 
insinuations by counsel are not evidence.  The court‟s treatment of the incident 
was sufficient, and we find no prejudice to defendant. 
c. Questions about violence and theft against relatives and 
acquaintances. 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when 
he questioned Rosia about a series of violent acts by defendant as to which 
evidence had not previously been introduced.  The following facts are pertinent: 
At a pretrial Phillips hearing,36 the trial court had specifically excluded, as 
aggravating evidence at the penalty phase (see § 190.3, factor (b) [other criminal 
conduct by defendant involving violence or threat of violence]), evidence of 
assaults by defendant on certain members of his own family — a cousin, Carla 
Spencer, and his aunts Brenda and Mamie Jackson.  Further, the court had 
reserved judgment regarding evidence that defendant lacerated the face and neck 
of Patrick Shields during an assault.37 
                                              
36  
In People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, this court encouraged the use of 
preliminary inquiries, in advance of the penalty phase, to determine whether there 
is substantial evidence to support each element of “other criminal activity” the 
prosecution proposes to introduce as aggravating evidence.  (Id. at pp. 72-73, 
fn. 25.) 
37  
Shields‟s exact relationship to the family is unclear.  At the Phillips 
hearing, the court assumed he was defendant‟s uncle, either biological or “by 
 
82 
In its case-in-chief at the penalty phase, the prosecution did not present 
evidence of any of these incidents.  As noted above, the prosecution confined its 
showing to three instances of defendant‟s criminal violence — a March 1986 
traffic accident, after which defendant, driving a truck, pursued and fired shots at 
the other vehicle; violent resistance to a police officer during a traffic stop in 
September 1987; and an assault on Marlena Brown in February 1988. 
During her direct penalty phase testimony for the defense, Rosia asserted that after 
the death of her father in 1984, the family “fell apart.”  According to Rosia, 
several family members, including Brenda Jackson, Mamie Jackson, and Carla 
Spencer, had drug problems, family tensions sometimes exploded into physical 
fights, and defendant was involved in some of these fights.  Rosia agreed with 
defense counsel‟s assessment “that the world [defendant] saw in 1984 when he 
was 16, 17 was a family with a lot of problems, a lot of drug use.” 
While cross-examining Rosia, the prosecutor began asking about her 
knowledge of acts of violence by defendant against family members and others.  
The prosecutor first queried whether Rosia “witness[ed] the incident where 
[defendant] struck his cousin, Carla Spencer.”  Defense counsel objected, asserting 
that “if she didn‟t witness it, it‟s putting facts before the jury that didn‟t exist.”  
The court sustained the objection on grounds that the question assumed facts not 
in evidence. 
The following colloquy then occurred:  “[The Prosecutor:]  Do you know if 
[defendant] struck his cousin Carla Spencer in October of 1985? [¶]  A.  I know 
that there was some problems with them.  I wasn‟t in the room.  [¶]  [The 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
marriage.”  At the penalty phase, Rosia testified that Shields was the father of 
several of her nieces and nephews.  (See below.) 
83 
Prosecutor:]  Do you know if your son struck his Aunt [Mamie] in October of 
1985?  [¶]  A.  No, I don‟t.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Do you know if your son struck 
your sister Brenda in November of 1985?  [¶]  A.  Well, that could be a yes or no 
answer.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Do you know if your son struck Carla Spencer in 
January of 1986?  [¶]  A.  I don‟t know.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Do you know if 
your son stole your grandmother‟s and grandfather‟s truck in March of 1986 and 
wrecked it because he was mad at your grandmother?[38]  [¶]  A.  He wasn‟t mad 
at my mother.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Was he mad at anybody?  [¶]  A.  No.  My 
mother was out of town, so how could he be mad at her?  [¶]  He just saw the 
opportunity to get a car to drive or a truck to drive.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Do you 
know Trina Berry?  [¶]  A.  Yes, I do.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Do you know if your 
son struck Trina Berry in September of 1987?  [¶]  A.  No, I don‟t.  [¶]  [The 
Prosecutor:]  Do you know Patrick Shields?  [¶]  A.  Yes, I do.  [¶]  [The 
Prosecutor:]  And who is Patrick Shields?  [¶]  A.  He‟s the father of five of my 
nieces and nephews.  [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  Do you know if your son —  [¶]  
[Defense Counsel:]  Your Honor — [¶]  [The Prosecutor:]  — cut Patrick Shields‟ 
throat?  [¶]  [DefenseCounsel:]  I object to this, Your Honor.  There is no evidence 
of that.  It assumes a fact not in evidence, and there is no evidence that it‟s going 
to be presented.  [¶]  The Court:  Sustained.  [¶]  [Defense Counsel:]  It‟s 
extremely — [¶]  The Court:  Sustained.  Sustained.  Sustained.  Sustained.  
Sustained.  Sustained.  Sustained.  [¶]  [Defense Counsel:]  Could we have an 
admonishment?  [¶]  The Court:  The jury may be admonished to disregard that.” 
When defense counsel asked the court for “a little more force,” the court 
declined, noting that this was “not Hollywood.”  Clearly exasperated with the 
                                              
38  
This appears to be a reference to the March 1986 traffic-accident-with-
violence episode the prosecution introduced in its case-in-chief. 
84 
contentious atmosphere, the court asked rhetorically whether counsel wanted it to 
“stand on [its] feet and stomp and hold [its] breath.”  The court noted that it had 
proceeded “legally” by sustaining the defense objection and admonishing the jury, 
and indicated it was “not going to engage in histrionics up here.” 
Defendant urges the prosecutor‟s questions were improper attempts to 
introduce inflammatory aggravating evidence (1) not presented in the People‟s 
case-in-chief, (2) beyond the scope of the direct examination of Rosia (see 
People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1191-1193 [rebuttal evidence or cross-
examination concerning defendant‟s “bad character” must respond specifically to 
particular “good character” evidence presented by defense witness]), and (3) in 
partial violation of the court‟s Phillips order.  Assuming that defense counsel‟s 
“facts not in evidence” objections were sufficient to preserve these issues (see 
Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6), we find no prejudicial misconduct 
under the circumstances.  Our reasons are several. 
First, any direct complaint that the prosecutor violated the Phillips order 
lacks merit.  In that order, the court merely excluded certain evidence from the 
prosecution‟s case-in-chief.  But neither the Phillips order, nor the prosecution‟s 
failure to introduce particular evidence in its case-in-chief, precluded the proper 
introduction of rebuttal evidence.  The issue thus becomes whether the evidence 
the prosecutor sought to elicit from Rosia was proper rebuttal. 
Whether the questions about assaults against Carla Spencer, Brenda 
Jackson, and Mamie Jackson were proper rebuttal examination is a close question.  
Rosia had not testified to specific altercations between defendant and these 
particular persons.  On the other hand, she had stated that family problems in 1984 
concerned these family members, among others, and that the family tensions 
caused fights between defendant and other family members.  The defense effort 
was to suggest defendant had been scarred by his involvement in a failing family 
85 
unit that had lost its patriarch.  Thus, to the extent the prosecutor sought to flesh 
out some of the violent family incidents, to show they continued well after 1984, 
and to demonstrate defendant was less a helpless witness and more a violent 
aggressor in these episodes, the questions appear proper. 
No reason of proper rebuttal appears, however, for the prosecutor‟s 
insinuations concerning the assault on Trina Berry, a nonrelative, and the “throat-
cutting” assault against Patrick Shields, whom Rosia had not mentioned as one of 
the family‟s “problem” members.  We do not condone the prosecutor‟s improper 
efforts to introduce evidence of these incidents.  It was misconduct. 
Still, we conclude no prejudice arose.  The trial court sustained both 
defense objections to this line of questioning.  Its second response was particularly 
emphatic, as it repeated the word “sustained” seven times in a row.  At defense 
counsel‟s request, the court further admonished the jury to disregard “that.”  The 
court‟s immediate reference was to the question whether Rosia was aware that 
defendant cut Patrick Shields‟s throat.  But the jury cannot have failed to 
understand, from the court‟s escalating response to two separate objections, that 
the prosecutor‟s entire series of questions about these violent incidents was 
disapproved, that no evidence about them had been introduced, and that the jurors 
were not to consider either the questions or the answers.  Indeed, the court‟s 
refusal, in the face of a defense request for an even more forceful response, to 
engage in Hollywood “histrionics” by “stand[ing] on [its] feet, stomp[ing], and 
hold[ing] [its] breath,” served, if anything, to bring home further the significance 
of the situation. 
Moreover, Rosia gave “I don‟t know” answers to most of the prosecutor‟s 
questions, including his reference to Trina Berry.  Rosia was never allowed to 
answer the provocative question regarding Patrick Shields.  Her only possibly 
damaging testimony about defendant‟s assaults upon other relatives was her 
concession that defendant had “some problems” with Carla Spencer, and her 
86 
“could be . . . yes or no” response to the question about an assault on Brenda 
Jackson.  In light of the brutal capital robbery-murder, and other evidence the jury 
heard about defendant‟s violence — including evidence that, when he was 18, he 
struck Rosia herself during an argument — there is no reasonable possibility  
(People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448) that any additional information 
Rosia provided about defendant‟s family violence affected the penalty outcome.39 
d. Referring to facts not in evidence; expressing personal 
opinion. 
During his cross-examination of Rosia, the prosecutor asked if she blamed 
herself for how defendant had turned out.  She said she did not feel responsible, 
but “I question myself as to what could I have [done] to change it or better it.”  
The prosecutor said that question was fair and honest, “[b]ut I don‟t believe you‟re 
to blame.”  Before defense counsel could object, the court interrupted to state, 
“Well, that‟s your opinion.  [¶]  The jury may be admonished to disregard that.  
[¶]  Is that forceful enough, [defense counsel]?”  Counsel responded, “Yes, Your 
Honor, given that we didn‟t object at the time.”  Notwithstanding counsel‟s 
                                              
39  
Defendant notes that the prosecutor, during his closing argument, asked the 
jury if it remembered the “series of questions” he asked Rosia about defendant‟s 
assaults on members of his family, including whether Rosia knew defendant had 
“beat[en]” Carla Spencer.  The prosecutor then made the point that defendant 
“beat on all his family.”  Defense counsel objected that Rosia had given a “don‟t 
know” answer to the question about Carla Spencer and that the prosecutor merely 
sought to prejudice the jury.  The court overruled the objection.  We see no basis 
for reversal.  We assume that insofar as the prosecutor referred the jury to a series 
of questions as to which objections had been sustained, he committed misconduct.  
For several reasons, however, we find no prejudice.  First, we have concluded the 
questions about Carla Spencer, and about violence against other members of 
defendant‟s immediate family, were proper (see text discussion, ante).  Second, 
Rosia did not profess complete lack of knowledge of the Carla Spencer incident; 
she said, ambiguously, that she knew defendant and Carla had “problems” but 
“wasn‟t in the room” during the incident to which the prosecutor alluded.  Third, 
in light of the substantial properly admitted evidence of defendant‟s criminal 
violence, including an assault against his own mother, the brief argumentative 
reference to the Carla Spencer incident cannot have affected the penalty outcome. 
87 
concession below, defendant now claims that, by expressing his personal opinion, 
and thus acting as a witness, the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
violating, among other things, defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.  However, as with many other misconduct claims raised by 
defendant in this appeal, we conclude the trial court responded adequately.  Even 
if misconduct occurred, no prejudice arose. 
We reach a similar conclusion with regard to the prosecutor‟s claim in 
argument that the murder victim, Sarah LaChapelle, was “a wholesome, sweet 
grandmother, whose life was committed to helping make poor and disadvantaged 
people‟s lives [better].”  The trial court sustained defense counsel‟s objection, 
agreeing that “[t]here was no evidence of that.  The jury can disregard that.”  The 
court‟s treatment of this fleeting reference was sufficient, and we can discern no 
prejudice.40 
 
e.  Conclusion; cumulative prejudice. 
Defendant claims the pervasive incidents of misconduct were collectively 
prejudicial.  We disagree.  We have identified several instances of clear or 
arguable prosecutorial misconduct — the gratuitous reference to defendant‟s 
“burglary” gloves, the questions and argument about assaults on nonrelatives, and 
the “I don‟t believe you‟re to blame” comment to Rosia.  But the instances were 
relatively minor in context.  The trial court usually made adequate responses to 
well-taken defense objections.  The jury was generally instructed not to consider 
counsels‟ questions, insinuations, or arguments as evidence. 
Moreover, the balance of properly admitted aggravating and mitigating 
evidence weighed very strongly against defendant.  It portrayed him as a 
delinquent child and youth whose escalating violence culminated in the brutal 
murder and robbery of a female neighbor in her own home.  While the evidence 
                                              
40  
Moreover, as the People point out, there was evidence to support the 
prosecutor‟s characterization of the victim as a sweet, wholesome, and 
compassionate grandmother. 
88 
suggested that defendant, as a child, suffered some rough or neglectful treatment 
from the men in his mother‟s life, and that family tensions surfaced after the death 
of his grandfather, it also tended to show that he was raised by a mother who loved 
him and did her best, if imperfectly, to set him on the right path.  There were no 
indications of serious mental or psychological issues.  Under the circumstances, 
we are convinced there is no reasonable possibility that any instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct, whether considered singly or in combination, affected 
the penalty outcome. 
2. Instructional issues. 
a. Jury inquiry whether death or life without parole is the more 
severe punishment. 
On February 2, 1993, the fourth day of penalty deliberations, the jury 
foreperson sent out a note stating, “We need to talk to you.  We seem to be 
irrevocably deadlocked.”  Once counsel were present, the foreperson asked if the 
jury could get further instructions.  The court indicated it could reread particular 
instructions if that would help, and asked whether the issue was “about deciding 
the penalty, about the circumstances and the weighing of the aggravating and 
mitigating [evidence].”  The foreperson responded in the affirmative, then 
indicated that “the other thing to clarify for us, when you‟re weighing the severity 
of the punishment” was whether “death [was] the more severe punishment, or 
[was] life without chance of parole.” 
The court said “I can‟t tell you that,” and stated the issue was not which 
penalty was more severe, but rather “which is the most appropriate punishment in 
this case based upon the evidence.”  The court then reread CALJIC No. 8.88, the 
standard instruction which explains, among other things, that, in order to reach a 
death verdict, “each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances 
are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants 
death instead of life without parole.”  Following this, the court began to reread 
CALJIC No. 8.85, which sets forth the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.  
89 
Halfway through this instruction, the jurors indicated that no further rereading was 
necessary. 
The court then readmonished the jury that “we are not talking about which 
is the worst penalty,” but, instead, which penalty is “justified and appropriate by 
considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances.”  Again, the court stressed that the issue was “whether 
the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating 
circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.” 
Out of the jury‟s presence, defense counsel asserted that, during voir dire, 
several prospective jurors had indicated they thought life without parole was 
worse than death.  In such cases, the court had responded by admonishing that 
jurors should not rely on this belief to impose the death penalty as an act of mercy.  
Counsel now requested that the sitting jurors be similarly admonished.  The court 
declined, noting, among other things, that it did not like to give “off-the-cuff” 
instructions, and that the “so substantial in comparison” instruction reread by the 
court “takes care of the problem.” 
On appeal, defendant asserts that in light of the jury request, the trial court 
had a duty, both under state law (see §1138 [court must give jury requested 
information on point of law]) and pursuant to the Eighth Amendment guarantee of 
a capital jury suitably instructed to avoid an arbitrary and capricious death verdict, 
to clarify for the jury that death is the more severe punishment.  However, we find 
no abuse of the court‟s sound discretion in handling the matter.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97  (Beardslee); People v. Gonzalez 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1213 (Gonzalez).) 
In People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, we upheld, as within the trial 
court‟s discretion, its decision to instruct, pursuant to a jury request, that death is 
the more severe penalty.  This instruction was clearly a correct statement of the 
law, we explained, because the principle “[t]hat death is considered to be a more 
severe punishment than life [without parole] is explicit in California law: CALJIC 
90 
No. 8.88  . . . states in pertinent part, „To return a judgment of death, each of you 
must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.‟ ”  (Harris, supra, at p. 361, italics added.) 
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that CALJIC No. 8.88 itself, by 
stressing that death is warranted only where aggravation “so substantial[ly]” 
outweighs mitigation as to call for that penalty, makes the greater severity of the 
death penalty “explicit.”  It follows that the trial court adequately conveyed this 
principle by reinstructing the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88.  Indeed, by indicating 
that no further rereading was necessary, the jury appeared to signal that the court‟s 
approach had clarified the issue.  We find no basis for reversal.41 
b. Failure to give victim impact instruction. 
As noted above, the prosecution presented one victim impact witness, Sarah 
LaChapelle‟s son Anthony.  He testified that the victim‟s death had hit both him 
and his children hard.  As a result of the murder, he said, he became an “instant 
mental case,” developed a serious drinking problem, lost the ability to run the 
construction business he inherited from his father, and thereafter “never really got 
[him]self together.”  According to Anthony, he still dreamed about his mother and 
still needed help with decisions he should be able to make on his own.  He was 
gently admonished by the court when, at the conclusion of his direct testimony, he 
stated, “And now I still want to get this guy.  I want him to die.  So I hope the law 
gets him for me.” 
The trial court gave all the standard penalty phase instructions, including 
those that set forth the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors (CALJIC No. 
                                              
41  
We are not persuaded otherwise by the trial court‟s admonition to the jury 
that the issue was not which penalty was worse, but instead concerned the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence under the instructions.  In 
context, the court sought only to convey that the jurors should focus on the 
instructions, rather than considering their personal views about the severity of 
particular penalties, as the basis for rendering their penalty verdict. 
91 
8.85), describe the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence by 
which the penalty verdict should be reached (CALJIC No. 8.88), and admonish 
that the jury “must [not] be influenced by bias [or] prejudice against the 
defendant”  (CALJIC No. 8.84.1).  The court refused a defense instruction that 
while evidence had been introduced to show the “specific harm caused by the 
defendant‟s crimes,” such evidence was not to “divert [the jury‟s] attention from 
[its] proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die.” 
Relying on several out-of-state decisions, defendant contends that, under 
both state law and the Eighth Amendment, the trial court should have instructed on 
the proper use of victim impact testimony.  A proper instruction, he suggests, 
would have told the jurors the following:  They could consider victim impact 
evidence, which shows that the victim was a unique individual, as a circumstance 
of the capital crime.  However, the law deems no one life more valuable than 
another.  Thus, the jurors must confine themselves to a “rational inquiry into the 
culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence.”  Further, 
they must not consider the opinions of the victim‟s survivors, or any other 
members of the community, as to the appropriate punishment. 
However, we have repeatedly held that it is not error to refuse an 
instruction substantially identical to that the defendant offered below, or to fail, 
sua sponte, to give an instruction substantially identical to the one defendant 
proposes on appeal.  We have explained that the proffered instructions are 
misleading insofar as they suggest the jury may not be moved by sympathy for the 
victims and their survivors, and that the standard instructions adequately convey to 
the jurors the proper consideration and use of victim impact evidence.  (E.g., 
Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198; People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 
1245; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370; People v. Valencia 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 310; Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th 398, 455; see People v. 
Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1195.)  We adhere to these conclusions here. 
92 
c. Jury inquiry re meaning of duress. 
On the second day of penalty deliberations, the jury submitted a written 
request for clarification of sentencing factors (d) (whether the capital offense was 
committed “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance”) and 
(g) (“[w]hether . . . the defendant acted under extreme duress or the substantial 
domination of another person”), as set forth in CALJIC No. 8.85.  With the 
agreement of both counsel, the court first instructed the jurors that factors (d) and 
(g) are mitigating factors, orally recited both factors, and advised that the jury 
must resolve whether each of these factors was present or absent. 
When the court asked whether this response satisfied the jury, the 
foreperson stated that the jurors wanted a “good legal definition” of duress.  The 
foreperson acknowledged, in response to the court‟s query, that they wished to 
know “what the word means,” then stated that “I think that the other — the part of 
„duress‟ that we are concerned with is how direct or indirect can the duress be, at 
what distance might duress be impacted.”  The court asked for clarification of this 
latter concern, whereupon the foreperson said, “Well, both in a physical and in an 
abstract sense, how does — how does one put another under duress.”  Before 
withdrawing to consult with counsel, the court confirmed, in response to a 
question from another juror, that it was the jury‟s province to decide whether there 
was evidence to support any sentencing factor. 
Court and counsel then conferred outside the jury‟s presence.  Defense 
counsel argued that the jury‟s question suggested it was concerned about whether 
duress could be triggered by long-past events, such as childhood experiences.  
Defense counsel agreed with the court‟s intention to instruct the jury that it should 
use its common sense understanding of duress, that a dictionary defined the word 
to mean “compulsion” or “coercion,” and that whether duress was present was an 
issue for the jury to decide based on the evidence. 
However, defense counsel requested an additional instruction “that the 
application of duress can extend to as far in time as [the jurors] deem appropriate.”  
93 
The court declined this instruction, stating that  “whether or not the duress in this 
case has existed for a long period or a short period of time is a factual issue for 
[the jurors] to determine from the evidence in this case and the inferences 
therefrom.” 
Back before the jury, the following colloquy occurred:  “The Court:  Mrs. 
[S.] [the foreperson], we‟ve given this — tried to give this response a lot of 
thought, and I‟m not so sure this will be a satisfactory answer to you, but this is 
the best thing we can come up with.  First of all, with respect to the definition of 
„duress,‟ I‟m going to tell you to use your common sense understanding of what 
„duress‟ means.  To assist you, in Webster‟s New 20th Century Dictionary 
Unabridged, it can be defined as „compulsion or coercion.‟  All right?  The second 
thing, as I understand Mr. [M.‟s] [another juror] question, is whether or not you 
can have direct or indirect duress and how long can it last.  Is that what you‟re 
asking?  Is that the question?  [¶]  The Foreperson:  If duress can be directed from 
outside.  [¶]  The Court:  Okay.  Now, see, you‟re asking me to testify and give 
you information.  I can‟t do that.  [¶]  The Foreperson:  Oh.  [¶]  The Court:  All I 
can tell you, is that — that you have to decide for yourself based upon the 
evidence that you‟ve received in this case and any reasonable inferences that you, 
as the fact finders, come to.  See, I can‟t tell you stuff that‟s not in the evidence.  
Okay?  [¶]  The Foreperson:  I see.  [¶]  The Court:  So I hope that helps you with 
the definition of duress.  All right?  Okay.  We‟ll send you upstairs.” 
Out of the jury‟s presence, counsel renewed a request for the previously 
proposed additional instruction.  The court reiterated its satisfaction with the 
answer it had given. 
On appeal, defendant claims that three flaws in the court‟s response to the 
jury‟s inquiry violated his rights, under both state law and the federal Constitution, 
to a properly instructed capital penalty jury.  First, he asserts the court was obliged 
to respond to the jury‟s specific question whether duress could be “indirect” and 
imposed from “outside.”  Second, he contends that by saying the jury was asking it 
94 
to provide information “not in the evidence,” the court implied there was no 
factual basis for a finding of duress.  Third, he insists the court‟s instruction that 
the jury was to determine the issue of duress by drawing “reasonable inferences” 
from the evidence interfered with the jury‟s discretion to view the mitigating 
evidence subjectively in making the normative penalty decision. 
Assuming these arguments were preserved by counsel‟s limited request 
below for an instruction on the temporal duration of duress (Champion, supra, 
9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6), we find they lack merit.  The court responded to the 
request for a definition of duress by giving the jury, with the approval of all 
counsel, a dictionary definition of the term as synonymous with coercion or 
compulsion.  (See Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 75 [for purposes of factor (g), the 
phrase “extreme duress” is not unduly vague; “duress” has a generally understood 
meaning of coercion or compulsion, and “extreme” “is generally understood as 
describing the farthest end or degree of a range of possibilities”].)  Defendant cites 
no authority suggesting the court was obliged to “strike out on its own” 
(Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d 68, 97) and expand upon this dictionary definition by 
explicitly addressing issues such as the temporal duration of duress, or its “direct” 
or “indirect” nature.  The court properly instructed that the presence or absence of 
extreme duress was a factual issue for the jury to decide. 
Nor could the jury reasonably have understood the court‟s comments to 
mean there was no factual basis for a finding of duress.  The court merely 
conveyed to the jurors that their specific questions about the meaning of duress 
called upon the court to exceed its proper role by invading the jury‟s province to 
find the facts for itself.  The court repeatedly made clear that it was for the jury to 
decide, from the evidence, whether duress was present. 
Finally, the court did not err by telling the jury to resolve the issue of duress 
by drawing “reasonable” inferences from the evidence.  The penalty decision itself 
is subjective and normative, but it cannot be “factually untethered.”  Instead, it 
95 
must relate to evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in 
section 190.3. 
For this reason, both we and the high court have confirmed that instructions 
and argument admonishing the jury to decide penalty on the basis of the facts and 
the evidence are proper.  (E.g., California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 542-543 
(plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); see id. at pp. 544-545 (conc. opn. of O‟Connor, J.); 
People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 437 [upholding prosecutorial argument 
that jury should decide penalty in accordance “ „with the facts and in accordance 
with the evidence presented to you in this case‟ ”]; People v.Wright (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 367, 443 [upholding prosecutor‟s plea that jury should not decide 
penalty on “ „an emotional basis,‟ ” but on “ „a cool, clear, logical basis‟ ” and on 
“ „the facts and the law‟ ”]; Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1225 [instruction 
that admonished against penalty decision based on “mere sympathy” upheld 
because it warned only against factually untethered sympathy]; see Zambrano, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1176 [prosecutor‟s antisympathy argument merely 
pursued the theme that the particular defendant did not deserve mercy “on the 
basis of the evidence actually presented”].) 
It follows that, in finding the facts that underlie the jury‟s normative 
penalty decision, the jury should rely on the evidence presented and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom.  A court instruction to this effect is not error.  
The court responded properly to the jury‟s request.  No basis for reversal appears. 
3. Challenges to California death penalty law and instructions. 
Defendant raises numerous constitutional challenges to California‟s death 
penalty law, and to the adequacy of the standard instructions directing the jury‟s 
penalty determination.  We affirm the decisions that have rejected similar claims, 
and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows:  Section 190.3, factor (a), is 
neither vague nor overbroad, and does not impermissibly allow arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; 
Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1165.)  The standard penalty instructions are not 
96 
deficient because they fail to identify which sentencing factors are aggravating and 
which are mitigating (Friend, supra, at p. 90; People v. Carpenter (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064), or because they fail to require written findings (Friend, 
supra, at p. 90; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 275) or jury unanimity 
(Friend, supra, at p. 89; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 533) regarding 
the aggravating factors. 
The instructions are not constitutionally faulty insofar as they fail to require 
proof beyond reasonable doubt of each aggravating factor, or findings that 
aggravation outweighs mitigation and that death is the appropriate penalty.  
(People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1067; People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
582, 620.)  Recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment‟s jury trial guarantee (e.g., Cunningham v. California (2007) 
549 U.S. 270; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 
466) have not altered our conclusions in this regard.  (Brasure, supra, at p. 1067; 
Bell, supra, at pp. 620-621.) 
As noted, CALJIC No. 8.88 specifies that the jury may return a sentence of 
death only if each juror is persuaded the aggravating circumstances are “so 
substantial” in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that death is warranted.  
Jurors so instructed need not further expressly be told that life without parole is 
mandatory if aggravation does not outweigh mitigation or if mitigation outweighs 
aggravation, or that life without parole is permissible even if aggravation 
outweighs mitigation.  (Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. Coffman and 
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 124 (Coffman and Marlow).)  Nor need the jury be 
instructed that the law presumes life without parole, rather than death, to be the 
appropriate penalty.  (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th 318, 379; People v. Gutierrez 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 833; Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137; People v. Arias 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 190.) 
The phrases “so substantial” and “warranted” in CALJIC No. 8.88 are not 
unconstitutionally vague.  (Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. Salcido 
97 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 117; Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1, 123.)  
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not defective for failing to inform the jury as to which side 
bore the burden of persuading it that death was appropriate or inappropriate.  
(Friend, supra, at p. 90; Coffman and Marlow, supra, at p. 124.) 
 
The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated violent criminal 
activity under section 190.3, factor (b).  (Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. 
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 499.)  The 1978 death penalty law is not 
unconstitutional insofar as it fails to provide for intercase proportionality review.  
(Friend, supra, at p. 89; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1368; Moon, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 48; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51.)  Nor does 
the death penalty statute deny equal protection to capital defendants.  (Friend, 
supra, at p. 90; People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 913.) 
International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in 
accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.  
(Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1164.) 
E. 
Cumulative error and prejudice. 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the asserted guilt and penalty 
phase errors warrants reversal of his conviction and death sentence even if none of 
the errors is prejudicial individually.  For the reasons set forth above, we conclude 
that any errors or assumed errors were nonprejudicial, whether viewed separately 
or cumulatively.
98 
 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The guilt and penalty judgments are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
Although I concur in the majority opinion, I write separately to address the 
trial court‟s refusal to give Prospective Juror A.S.-P. an opportunity to refute the 
prosecutor‟s assertion that she had lied about her academic credentials.  It is true 
that a defendant “has a right to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to any 
particular juror.”  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656.)  However, where 
hearsay allegations are made regarding the truthfulness of a prospective juror, 
fairness requires that the prospective juror be given an opportunity to respond to 
those charges — fairness not only to the party objecting to the prospective juror‟s 
excusal on this ground but to the juror herself whose reputation has been sullied by 
an allegation of dishonesty. 
We give seated jurors this opportunity when such charges are made against 
them.  “When the trial court discovers during trial that a juror misrepresented or 
concealed material information on voir dire tending to show bias, the trial court 
may discharge the juror if, after examination of the juror, the record discloses 
reasonable grounds for inferring bias as a „demonstrable reality,‟ even though the 
juror continues to deny bias.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 
400, italics added.)  Here, the prosecutor‟s allegations against A.S.-P. went to her 
credibility, with the implication that, if she had lied about her academic 
credentials, she may have lied about other matters, and perhaps did so to conceal 
some bias.  In my view, the court should have dealt with this situation in precisely 
the same manner as if this charge had been made after A.S.-P. had been seated as a 
 
2 
juror.  She should have been called and examined and given an opportunity to 
clear her name.  It is deeply regrettable that the trial court failed to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR: WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Tate 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S031641 
Date Filed: July 8, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Alfred A. Delucchi 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Harry Gruber, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Bruce Ortega and Sara Turner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Harry Gruber 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, Suite 1000 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Sara Turner 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5712