Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer

Citation: 2015-Ohio-493

Docket Number: 2014-0968

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-493.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-493 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MEYER, F.K.A. GEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-493.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Practice of law while license under suspension—
Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2014-0968—Submitted August 20, 2014—Decided February 19, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2012-080. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Rebecca Christine Meyer, f.k.a. Gee, Attorney 
Registration No. 0076007, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2003.  
She was admitted to the practice of law in Kentucky in 2002.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline1 has recommended that we 
indefinitely suspend Meyer from the practice of law in Ohio based on findings 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
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that she violated five professional-conduct rules by continuing to engage in the 
practice of law while her license was under suspension and by failing to respond 
to relator’s, disciplinary counsel’s, demand for information regarding her conduct.  
We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and indefinitely suspend 
Meyer from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Background 
{¶ 2} On January 15, 2009, the Supreme Court of Kentucky suspended 
Meyer for her failure to pay bar dues for the 2008-2009 biennium and her failure 
to comply with her continuing-education requirements for the 2007-2008 
reporting period.  She was likewise suspended and fined by this court for her 
failure to comply with the continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) requirements of 
Gov.Bar R. X for the 2008 and 2010 reporting periods.  In re Continuing Legal 
Edn. Suspension of Gee, 127 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2010-Ohio-6302, 938 N.E.2d 368.  
She cured that deficiency, paid her monetary sanctions, and was reinstated to the 
practice of law in Ohio on June 14, 2011.  In re Reinstatement of Gee, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 1521, 2011-Ohio-2877, 948 N.E.2d 963. 
{¶ 3} On March 22, 2012, the Supreme Court of Kentucky suspended 
Meyer for 61 days based on findings that she violated the Kentucky Rules of 
Professional Conduct by failing to abide by the terms of her prior suspension 
order, engaging in the practice of law while her license was under suspension, and 
failing to respond during the resulting disciplinary investigation.  Kentucky Bar 
Assn. v. Gee, 363 S.W.3d 343 (Ky.2012).  We issued a reciprocal-discipline order 
on June 5, 2012, which provides that she will not be reinstated to the practice of 
law in Ohio until she is reinstated to the practice of law in Kentucky.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gee, 132 Ohio St.3d 1229, 2012-Ohio-2754, 971 N.E.2d 
952. 
{¶ 4} And on November 29, 2012, we suspended Meyer for an additional 
18 months, with six months stayed on conditions, based on findings that she 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
continued to engage in the practice of law in Ohio during her CLE suspension, 
made false and misleading statements to disciplinary counsel during his 
investigation, and failed to notify the Office of Attorney Services that she had 
changed her last name from Gee to Meyer in 2004.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Meyer, 134 Ohio St.3d 180, 2012-Ohio-5487, 980 N.E.2d 1029. 
{¶ 5} Meyer has not been reinstated to the practice of law in Kentucky, 
and our June 5 and November 29, 2012 suspensions remain in effect. 
Current Misconduct 
{¶ 6} In a complaint certified to the board in October 2012, relator 
alleged that Meyer failed to comply with the terms of this court’s June 5, 2012 
suspension order by failing in two pending cases to timely notify the court and 
opposing counsel of her suspension and by participating in a case-management 
conference on behalf of a client.  The complaint further alleged that although 
Meyer received relator’s letter of inquiry regarding her conduct, she failed to 
respond. 
{¶ 7} After Meyer failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the 
complaint, the secretary of the board certified her default to this court, and on 
February 14, 2013, we imposed an interim default suspension pursuant to former 
Gov.Bar R. V(6a)(B)(1).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer, 134 Ohio St.3d 1460, 
2013-Ohio-476, 982 N.E.2d 735.  Pursuant to former Gov.Bar R. V(6a)(C), we 
granted Meyer’s motion for leave to answer and remanded the case to the board 
on August 26, 2013.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer, 136 Ohio St.3d 1465, 2013-
Ohio-3661, 992 N.E.2d 1151.  However, the interim default suspension remains 
in effect.  Id. 
{¶ 8} Meyer answered relator’s complaint on August 12, 2013, and 
admitted all of the material facts, but denied relator’s allegations that her conduct 
violated the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.  She later entered into agreed 
stipulations of fact and misconduct in which she admitted the factual allegations 
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of the complaint and agreed that her conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(1) 
(requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation if the representation will 
result in a violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or other law), 
3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the 
rules of a tribunal), 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a 
jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction), 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a 
demand for information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation), and 
8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  The parties stipulated that an alleged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) should be dismissed.  
They also moved to waive the panel hearing and have the matter decided on their 
stipulations. 
{¶ 9} The panel assigned to hear the case adopted the parties’ 
stipulations of fact and misconduct and issued an entry unanimously dismissing 
the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of fact and misconduct.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and agree 
that Meyer’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(1), 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 8.1(b), and 
8.4(d). 
Sanction 
{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
January Term, 2015 
5 
 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).2  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 11} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the panel and 
board agreed that Meyer has prior disciplinary offenses and initially failed to 
cooperate in the disciplinary process, which resulted in the imposition of an 
interim default suspension.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a) and (e).  But while 
the parties stipulated and the panel agreed that the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive was a mitigating factor, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b), the 
board found that Meyer possessed a selfish or dishonest motive because she 
continued to practice law in Ohio while under suspension.  Despite this 
difference, the board agreed with the panel that an indefinite suspension is the 
appropriate sanction for Meyer’s misconduct. 
{¶ 12} We typically impose an additional indefinite suspension of an 
attorney’s license when the attorney has continued to practice law during a 
previous suspension imposed for violations of the Rules for the Government of 
the Bar or the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Freeman, 126 Ohio St.3d 389, 2010-Ohio-3824, 934 N.E.2d 328, ¶ 14, citing 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006-Ohio-6, 839 N.E.2d 
924 (imposing an indefinite suspension on an attorney who practiced law during 
the suspension imposed in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield, 91 Ohio St.3d 364, 
745 N.E.2d 411 (2001) for multiple violations including neglect of client matters 
and failure to promptly pay funds to a client) and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Jackson, 86 Ohio St.3d 104, 712 N.E.2d 122 (1999) (imposing an indefinite 
suspension on an attorney who practiced law during a reciprocal suspension 
imposed following his suspension in Hawaii for misconduct requiring payment of 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
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restitution to clients).  We agree that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate 
sanction here. 
{¶ 13} Accordingly, Rebecca Christine Meyer is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  In addition to meeting the requirements set forth 
in Gov.Bar R. V(25), to be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio, Meyer must 
demonstrate that she (1) has maintained compliance with the terms of her Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) contract—including any recommendation 
by OLAP or her treatment professionals to extend the duration of that contract, (2) 
has been reinstated to the practice of law in Kentucky, (3) has complied with all 
prior orders of this court, and (4) has engaged in no further misconduct.  Costs are 
taxed to Meyer. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Rebecca Christine Meyer, pro se. 
_________________________