Case Title: State v. Gwynn

Citation: 362 N.C. 334

Docket Number: 158PA07

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRYANT LAMONT GWYNN
No. 158PA07
FILED: 12 JUNE 2008
1.
Homicide--felony murder–second-degree murder instruction not required--
underlying felony not in conflict
The Court of Appeals erred in a robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree
murder under the felony murder rule case by granting defendant a new trial based on the
erroneous conclusion that the trial court should have instructed the jury on second-degree murder
as a lesser-included offense, because: (1) when the State proceeds on a theory of felony murder
only, the trial court should not instruct on lesser-included offenses if the evidence as to the
underlying felony supporting felony murder is not in conflict and all the evidence supports
felony murder; (2) in the instant case, the State proceeded on a theory of felony murder only,
relying on robbery with a dangerous weapon as the underlying felony; (3) evidence of the
elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon was not in conflict when defendant initially
received permission to access the victim’s property in a limited or temporary manner but
ultimately used a dangerous weapon to remove the stolen property from the victim’s possession;
and (4) although the victim permitted defendant to access the property in a limited and
temporary manner prior to an anticipated sale, the victim in no way granted defendant
permission to depart with the property.
2.
Homicide–felony murder–manslaughter instruction not required–self-defense
inapplicable
Although defendant raised two additional arguments which the Court of Appeals did not
address including that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter and that the trial court erred by denying his request to
instruct the jury on self-defense, additional consideration of these issues on remand is
unnecessary because: (1) the evidence of robbery with a dangerous weapon was not in conflict,
and thus it follows that defendant was not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter given that,
like second-degree murder, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of felony murder; and (2)
evidence at trial did not establish any of the exceptional circumstances under which self-defense
may serve as a defense to felony murder.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 182 N.C. App. 343,
641 S.E.2d 719 (2007), vacating defendant’s conviction and
sentence imposed in a judgment entered on 16 November 2005 by
Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Superior Court, Forsyth County, and
ordering a new trial.  Heard in the Supreme Court 17 March 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the state-appellant.
Kathryn L. VandenBerg for defendant-appellee.
MARTIN, Justice.
A jury found defendant Bryant Lamont Gwynn guilty of robbery
with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder under the felony
murder rule.  The Court of Appeals granted defendant a new trial
because it concluded that the trial court should have instructed
the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense. 
We reverse.
The evidence admitted at trial showed the following:  On 22
September 2003, defendant arranged to buy two pounds of marijuana
from the victim.  Although the victim expected defendant to pay
him a large sum of money for the marijuana, defendant did not
bring payment with him because he intended only “[t]o go over
there and rob [the victim].”  To that end, defendant enlisted
Calvin Carter and Ahmad Powell to accompany him.  He also brought
a loaded nine-millimeter handgun, which he planned to use to rob
the victim.
Carter drove the men to the arranged meeting place. 
Defendant rode in the rear seat behind the driver and Powell rode
in the front passenger seat.  The victim initially greeted them
and entered the backseat of the vehicle.  At the victim’s
request, Carter drove the men to the victim’s car.  Defendant and
the victim then exited the vehicle and approached the victim’s
car to retrieve the marijuana.  The victim showed defendant the
marijuana and the two walked back to Carter’s vehicle.
Defendant entered Carter’s vehicle first and sat in the rear
seat behind the driver.  Shortly thereafter, the victim walked up
to Carter’s vehicle on the passenger’s side, at which time
defendant saw the victim place a gun in his coat pocket.  Just
before entering the vehicle himself, the victim tossed the
marijuana into the center of the backseat.  The victim then sat
down on the edge of the backseat with his legs outside the
vehicle and his back turned toward defendant.  The victim asked
defendant, “Are you going to get this weed?”  Defendant responded
immediately by shooting the victim six times in the back and once
in the chest.
Defendant then told the victim to “get out of the car.”  The
victim fell out of the vehicle, landing facedown on the road. 
Defendant instructed Carter to drive away, and they left with the
victim’s marijuana.  A few minutes later, the victim’s sister
discovered him shortly before he died.  Meanwhile, Carter,
Powell, and defendant went to defendant’s house and divided up
the marijuana, with defendant keeping the largest share.  After
the crime, defendant bragged to Carter and Powell, saying
multiple times, “I told you I was going to do it.”
At the close of the evidence, defendant requested jury
instructions on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense
of felony murder, as well as instructions on manslaughter and
self-defense.  The trial court denied the request on the basis
that the evidence of the underlying felony of robbery with a
dangerous weapon was not in conflict.  The jury convicted
defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon and felony murder,
and the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment
without parole.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
trial court should have instructed the jury on second-degree
murder because “[t]he element of use of force to obtain the
marijuana was in doubt” as to the underlying felony of robbery
with a dangerous weapon.  The Court of Appeals agreed and granted
defendant a new trial.  State v. Gwynn, 182 N.C. App. 343, 346,
641 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2007).  This Court allowed the state’s
petition for discretionary review.
[1] In State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 572 S.E.2d 767
(2002), we comprehensively explained that when the state proceeds
on a first-degree murder theory of felony murder only, the trial
court must instruct on all lesser-included offenses “[i]f the
evidence of the underlying felony supporting felony murder is in
conflict and the evidence would support a lesser-included offense
of first-degree murder.”  Id. at 565, 572 S.E.2d at 773 (citation
omitted).  Conversely, when the state proceeds on a theory of
felony murder only, the trial court should not instruct on
lesser-included offenses “[i]f the evidence as to the underlying
felony supporting felony murder is not in conflict and all the
evidence supports felony murder.”  Id. at 565, 572 S.E.2d at 774
(citation omitted).  In the instant case, the state proceeded on
a theory of felony murder only, relying on robbery with a
dangerous weapon as the underlying felony.  Therefore, as the
Court of Appeals correctly observed, defendant’s argument turns
on whether the evidence of robbery with a dangerous weapon was in
conflict.  See Gwynn, 182 N.C. App. at 345, 641 S.E.2d at 721.
Under N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a), “[t]he essential elements of
robbery with a dangerous weapon are:  (1) an unlawful taking or
an attempt to take personal property from the person or in the
presence of another; (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or
other dangerous weapon; (3) whereby the life of a person is
endangered or threatened.”  State v. Haselden, 357 N.C. 1, 17,
577 S.E.2d 594, 605 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 417, 508 S.E.2d 496, 518 (1998)),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 988 (2003); see N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a)
(2007).
Evidence of these elements is not in conflict when, as here,
the defendant initially receives permission to access the
victim’s property in a limited or temporary manner but ultimately
uses a dangerous weapon to “‘remov[e] the stolen property from
the victim’s possession.’”  State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 146, 150,
478 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 111, 347 S.E.2d 396, 401 (1986)); e.g.,
State v. Hope, 317 N.C. 302, 306, 345 S.E.2d 361, 364 (1986).  In
State v. Hope, the defendant entered a store, tried on one of the
coats for sale, and eventually left the store wearing the coat
while displaying a firearm to threaten store employees who
attempted to stop him.  317 N.C. at 306, 345 S.E.2d at 364.  On
these facts, this Court held that the elements of robbery with a
dangerous weapon were satisfied even though “nothing in evidence
indicated that the victims cared if customers tried clothing on
inside the store.”  Id.  As this Court explained, because
“neither [of the store employees] gave the defendant permission
to take the coat from the store,” the elements of robbery with a
dangerous weapon were satisfied when defendant used the threat of
deadly force to depart the store with the coat without paying for
it.  317 N.C. at 306-07, 345 S.E.2d at 364; see also Sumpter, 318
N.C. at 111-12, 347 S.E.2d at 401-02 (observing that the taking
for purposes of armed robbery in Hope occurred when “the
defendant departed from the store with the coat”).
In the present case, the evidence of robbery with a
dangerous weapon was not in conflict.  The evidence here showed
that the victim gave defendant limited and temporary access to
the marijuana by tossing it into the backseat of the vehicle
shortly before entering the vehicle himself.  As defendant
himself conceded, the victim only did so because he was
“expecting payment” from defendant.  The victim’s own words
confirmed this expectation, as he asked defendant, “Are you going
to get this weed?”
Thus, as in Hope, the evidence showed that although the
victim permitted defendant to access the property in a limited
and temporary manner prior to an anticipated sale, the victim in
no way granted defendant permission to depart with the property. 
See Hope, 317 N.C. at 306, 345 S.E.2d at 364; see also State v.
Buckom, 328 N.C. 313, 318, 401 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1991) (“[I]f a
jeweler places diamonds on a counter for inspection by a
customer, under the jeweler’s eye, the diamonds remain under the
protection of the jeweler.” (citation omitted)).  Rather, the
uncontroverted evidence established that defendant only acquired
possession of the marijuana by shooting the victim seven times
and fleeing the scene, thereby “‘removing the stolen property
from the victim’s possession.’”  Barnes, 345 N.C. at 150, 478
S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Sumpter, 318 N.C. at 111, 347 S.E.2d at
401); e.g., Hope, 317 N.C. at 306, 345 S.E.2d at 364. 
Accordingly, the evidence of robbery with a dangerous weapon was
not in conflict, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to instruct the jury
on second-degree murder.  See Millsaps, 356 N.C. at 565, 572
S.E.2d at 774.
[2] We observe in closing that defendant raised two
additional arguments which the Court of Appeals did not address: 
(1) that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct
the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter; and (2)
that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the
jury on self-defense.  We conclude, however, that additional
consideration of these issues on remand is unnecessary.
First, because the evidence of robbery with a dangerous
weapon was not in conflict, it follows that defendant was not
entitled to an instruction on manslaughter given that, like
second-degree murder, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense
of felony murder.  See Millsaps, 356 N.C. at 565, 572 S.E.2d at
774; see also State v. Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 591-92, 386 S.E.2d
555, 559-60 (1989) (observing that manslaughter is a lesser-
included offense of felony murder).  Second, as defendant himself
concedes, our holding also renders his self-defense argument
meritless, as the evidence at trial did not establish any of the
exceptional circumstances under which self-defense may serve as a
defense to felony murder:  “(1) a reasonable basis upon which the
jury may have disbelieved the prosecution's evidence of the
underlying felony; (2) a factual showing that defendant clearly
articulated his intent to withdraw from the situation; or (3) a
factual showing that at the time of the violence the dangerous
situation no longer existed.”  State v. Bell, 338 N.C. 363, 387,
450 S.E.2d 710, 723 (1994) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 515
U.S. 1163 (1995); accord State v. Moore, 339 N.C. 456, 467-68,
451 S.E.2d 232, 238 (1994).  Accordingly, defendant’s remaining
arguments necessarily fail.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.  Defendant’s conviction and sentence for
felony murder remain undisturbed.
REVERSED.