Case Title: SARR v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
SARR v. STATE2003 WY 4265 P.3d 711Case Number: 02-17Decided: 03/26/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
   

MICHAEL 
W. SARR,

Appellant (Defendant) ,

 
 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee (Plaintiff) .

 
 
 

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs 
County

The Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 

Representing Appellee:

Hoke MacMillan Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Richard Rideout, Special Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rideout.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and KITE, JJ; and 
KALOKATHIS, DJ.

 

            
KALOKATHIS, District Judge.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Michael 
Sarr (Sarr), appeals from a judgment in which he was found guilty of five counts 
of aggravated assault and ordered to pay restitution.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Sarr raises these 
issues:

 

I.                     
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 
into evidence at trial hearsay statements under W.R.E. 804(b)(6) made by a 
nontestifiying victim, and whether Appellant's rights under the confrontation 
clause of the Wyoming Constitution and the confrontation clause of the United 
States Constitution were violated.

II.                   
Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant 
due to the fact that the State did not prove every essential element of the 
crimes for which Appellant was charged.

III.                  
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
ordered Appellant to pay restitution.

IV.               
Was Appellant denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 48?

 

The State presents the issues thus:

 

I.                     
Whether the district court committed reversible error by 
admitting into evidence statements made by the victim who dies prior to 
trial.

II.                   
Whether the State introduced sufficient evidence to convict 
Appellant.

III.                  
Whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering 
Appellant to pay restitution.

IV.               
Whether Appellant was denied his right to a speedy 
trial.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On May 24, 2000, Sarr 
was arrested for misdemeanor domestic violence against Ann Wing.  In conjunction with 
the misdemeanor charge, Undersheriff Pebbles (Pebbles) asked Ms. Wing to provide 
a statement, but she refused.  Sarr pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge 
and was sentenced to jail with a release date of February 2001.  Before the release 
date, Pebbles asked Ms. Barb Rice, who was a friend of Ms. Wing's, to persuade 
Ms. Wing, to come in for an interview.

 

[¶4]      Ms. Wing agreed to 
talk.  She came 
to the sheriff's office on February 8, 2001 for a taped interview with 
Pebbles.  
Present for the interview was Pebbles, the sheriff, Ms. Wing, Ms. Rice, 
and the victim coordinator.

 

[¶5]      During the interview, 
Ms. Wing gave a horrific account of ongoing abuse.  Her account 
indicated that Sarr's abuse ran the gamut from him forcing her to stand in the 
corner, to beating her with a "coup stick" so harshly that she had to have back 
surgery.1  The next day Pebbles went to the residence and 
conducted a consensual search for evidence that would corroborate Ms. Wing's 
story.  He 
recovered a coup stick, pictures, and a shotgun.  He took photographs of the interior of the 
residence where many of the alleged acts occurred.  He also noticed 
holes in the wall consistent with Ms. Wing's account of Sarr throwing objects at 
her.  In 
addition to the evidence recovered on February 9, 2001, the sheriff's department 
had already recovered a 41-caliber pistol, a pistol belt, and a shotgun from the 
residence in May of 2000.  Ms. Wing returned to the sheriff's office for 
a follow-up interview on February 15, 2001.  During that interview, Pebbles asked Ms. Wing 
to clarify details of her previous statements.

 

[¶6]      The interviews, along 
with the corroborating evidence recovered by law enforcement, led to the State 
charging Sarr with seven (7) counts of aggravated assault and battery as 
follows:  Count 
I alleged that on May 6, 2000 Sarr threw Ms. Wing to the ground splitting her 
jaw and intentionally striking her with a vehicle knocking her to the ground in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), Count II 
alleged that on May 6, 2000 Sarr grabbed Ms. Wing by the hair and repeatedly 
bashed her head against a dining room table in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), Count III alleged that on May 6, 2000 Sarr beat 
Ms. Wing with a "coup stick" across her back causing multiple lacerations and 
bruising in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), 
Count IV alleged that between January 1, 2000 and May 25, 2000 Sarr beat Ms. 
Wing with a pistol belt full of 41-caliber shells causing multiple lacerations 
and bruising in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2001), Count V alleged that between November 25, 1999 and May 25, 2000 Sarr 
placed the muzzle of a locked and loaded 41-caliber pistol against Ms. Wing's 
temple while threatening to kill her in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) (NexisNexis 2001), Count VI alleged that between November 25, 
1999 and May 25, 2000 Sarr pointed the muzzle of a shotgun toward Ms. Wing with 
his finger on the trigger and threatened to kill her in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i)(iii) (LexisNexis), and Count VII alleged that between April 
1, 2000 and May 25, 2000 Sarr, while wearing heavy winter boots, kicked Ms. Wing 
in her left eye causing a laceration in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).  Count II was eventually dropped for reasons 
not evident in the record.

 

[¶7]      Shortly after the 
interviews, Ms. Wing drowned in her bathtub.  Left without its principal witness, the State 
proceeded with the case intending to introduce the taped testimony of the 
interviews.  
Sarr objected on the grounds that the taped testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay and that using it violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause 
right.

 

[¶8]      On October 1, 2001 the 
district court held a hearing to determine admissibility.  It issued a 
comprehensive decision letter allowing the taped testimony under the condition 
that it be "sanitized" by excluding irrelevant information such as statements 
concerning abuse in other jurisdictions.

 

[¶9]      At trial, evidence was 
presented concerning the circumstances surrounding Ms. Wing's interview.  Some of this 
evidence came in the form of testimony from Pebbles, who testified that Sarr was 
arrested and pleaded guilty to domestic violence against Ms. Wing in May of 
2000.  At that 
time, Pebbles attempted to persuade Ms. Wing to come forward with information 
concerning Sarr's abuse but found her reluctant to do so.  Later, he contacted 
Ms. Rice and asked her whether or not Ms. Wing would come in and visit with 
him.  Sarr was 
scheduled to be released in the middle of February unless there was some reason 
to hold him, and it was at this time that Ms. Rice contacted Ms. Wing and asked 
her to come in and talk to Pebbles.   Ms. Wing came in for an interview 
immediately prior to Sarr's release date.  During this interview, Pebbles was present 
along with the sheriff, Ms. Rice, and the victim coordinator.  During a second 
interview, only Ms. Rice and Pebbles were present.  In addition to 
Pebbles' testimony, the sanitized tape was played in open court to the 
jury.

 

[¶10]   The only eyewitness to testify was 
Daniel Bryan, a former employee of Sarr's.  His testimony supported Count I, the incident 
alleging that Sarr ran his vehicle into Ms. Wing.

 

[¶11]   After the State presented its case, Sarr 
rested without introducing any evidence.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on five of 
the six counts.  
They found Sarr not guilty of Count VII: kicking Ms. Wing in the head 
while wearing heavy winter boots.  The district court sentenced Sarr to 6-10 
years on each count to be served consecutively.

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶12]   Evidentiary rulings are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of a 
clear abuse of discretion.  Robinson v. State, 
11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 
2000).  
Moreover, a district court's judgment may be affirmed on any proper 
grounds supported by the record.  Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 
1997).  Because 
the matter at hand involves a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, we 
independently review the record as suggested by Lilly v. 
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 144 L. Ed. 117  (1999).

DISCUSSION

 

[¶13]   This is one of those rare cases in which 
the State's entire case, except for Count I, is based upon hearsay statements of 
an unavailable witness.  As such, we are particularly mindful of the 
unusual difficulty facing us.  The principles of law that we apply are 
embodied in W.R.E. 804(b)(6), U.S. Const. amend. VI (confrontation clause), and 
art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  For purposes of this 
appeal, the interpretation of the confrontation clause controls the meaning of 
art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.

 

[¶14]   Rule 804(b)(6) requires that the State 
provide adequate advance notice of its intent to introduce the hearsay 
statements at trial and proffer guarantees of its trustworthiness.  Specifically, as 
noted in State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 
1996):

 

Hopkinson set out all the requirements for the Rule 804(b)(6) 
exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay:

First, the declarant must be unavailable. Second, the 
adverse party must either have been given pretrial notice or a sufficient 
opportunity to prepare for and contest the admission of the hearsay. Third, the 
truth of the matter asserted must be evidence of a material fact. Fourth, the 
hearsay statement must be more probative than any other evidence which could be 
procured through reasonable efforts. Fifth, and finally, the statement must be 
supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; this may be 
established either through other corroborating evidence or by considering the 
motivation and/or behavior pattern of the declarant.

 

930 P.2d  at 366 (quoting Hopkinson v. 
State, 632 P.2d 79, 131-32 (Wyo. 
1981)).

 

[¶15]   While the analysis under Rule 804(b)(6) 
encourages resort to corroborating evidence to determine trustworthiness, the 
requirements of the confrontation clause forbid it.2  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 111 L. Ed. 638 (1990).  Therefore, we must consider separately the 
admissibility under Rule 804(b)(6) before proceeding to a confrontation clause 
analysis.

 

[¶16]   Our review for Rule 804(b)(6) purposes 
focuses on the comprehensive analysis provided by the district court.  With but one 
exception we find no abuse of discretion.  That exception involves the statement of Ms. 
Wing concerning the nature of the injury to her back resulting from the coup 
stick incident.  
She stated that prior to surgery, an MRI was taken of her back, and it 
showed that her vertebrae had been chipped and splintered by the coup 
stick.  In 
regard to these statements, the State carries the burden of demonstrating that 
the hearsay statement must be more probative than any other evidence that could 
be procured by reasonable efforts.  W.R.E. 804(b)(6).  Medical records or 
expert testimony would be more probative than Ms. Wing's recollection as to her 
back injuries.  
The record does not disclose what efforts, if any, were made to procure 
that type of evidence.   Therefore Rule 804(b)(6) was not 
available to admit those statements.

 

[¶17]   In considering the applicability of the 
Confrontation Clause, we are mindful of the following:

 

"First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for 
face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. 
 In the usual 
case , [omission in original] the prosecution must either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to 
use against the defendant."  Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, 
"his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' 
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be 
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness."

 

Wright, 497 U.S.  at 814-15 (quoting Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L. Ed. 597 (1980)).

 
[¶18]   Statements admitted under the residual 
exception, W.R.E. 804(b)(6), do not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the 
hearsay rule.  
Wright, 497 U.S.  at 817.  Such hearsay, even 
though presumptively unreliable, "may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause 
reliability standards if it is supported by a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.'"  Id. (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).

 

[¶19]   The district court composed a detailed 
letter addressing the admissibility of the tapes pursuant to W.R.E. 
804(b)(6).  In 
that analysis, the indicia of trustworthiness included: corroborating facts, the 
circumstances under which the statements were made, and the declarant's 
incentive in providing the statements.  This approach conforms to the requirements of 
Rule 804(b)(6) but is incompatible with Wright 
because it relies upon corroborating evidence.  So we must decide 
whether to remand or whether a de novo review will suffice.  Because the district 
court holds no better position to judge the trustworthiness of the tapes than 
we, a de novo review is appropriate.

 

[¶20]   What follows focuses upon particular 
elements apparent in the record with a view to determining whether or not such 
elements satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause.  Our approach 
considers the totality of the circumstances with the understanding that such 
circumstances provide guidance as to whether or not the statements are 
trustworthy, but they are not a substitute for cross-examination.  We must determine 
whether, "the statement offered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and 
untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of 
supererogation."  
Wright, 497 U.S.  at 819.

 

[¶21]   A review of how other jurisdictions have 
approached this task helps to define the boundary between statements deemed 
trustworthy and those that are not.

 

[¶22]   In cases addressing grand jury 
testimony, courts have focused upon the declarant's motive to lie.  Instances involving 
a defendant implicating others to exonerate himself have been declared 
untrustworthy.  
United States v. Bernardo, 939 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1991).  However, when the declarant is not charged 
with any crime but is merely a suspect, some courts have come to the opposite 
conclusion.  See United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).

 

[¶23]   A recorded statement considered 
"plausible" by the trial court, but not supported by a scintilla of evidence 
independent of the statement, lacked indicia of trustworthiness.  State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19 ¶ 29, 622 N.W.2d 246, ¶ 29 (S.D. 2001).  That court did not conduct a de novo review of 
the tape recording.  
Rather, it focused upon the fact that the state had failed to meet its 
burden.  Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.

 

[¶24]   In a case involving a murder charge 
arising from a domestic abuse situation, State v. Grube, 
531 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1995), found trustworthy the ex parte statements 
contained in an affidavit supporting a protection order.  See also Walker v. North Carolina, 226 F. Supp. 2d 759 
(M.D.N.C. 2002).

 

[¶25]   Michigan identified a variety of factors 
in aid of a determination of trustworthiness:  (1) the spontaneity of the statements, (2) the 
consistency of the statements, (3) lack of motive to fabricate or lack of bias, 
(4) the reason the declarant cannot testify, (5) the voluntariness of the 
statements, (6) personal knowledge of the declarant about the matter on which he 
or she spoke, (7) to whom the statements were made, and (8) the time frame 
within which the statements were made.  People v. Lee, 622 N.W.2d 71, 80 (Mich. App. 2000).  After applying these factors, the court deemed 
trustworthy a statement by an 81-year-old victim of a robbery, who died before 
trial.

 

[¶26]   We have considered the question of 
trustworthiness for Confrontation Clause purposes on prior occasions.  See, Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981); 
State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 1996); 
and Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶27]   In Hopkinson 
the prosecution introduced statements made by the victim prior to his 
death.  We 
stated that in order to comply with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause 
the prosecution must provide sufficient background information concerning the 
circumstances under which the hearsay statements were made to provide the jury 
with an adequate basis to evaluate its veracity. In that case, the prosecutor 
established the history and circumstances surrounding the giving of the 
statement and provided evidence of the defendant's character.  Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 134.

 

[¶28]   The issue of trustworthiness arose again 
in Johnson.  In that case the prosecution introduced 
co-defendant statements made during sentencing.  We found that the statements were reliable 
because (1) the declarant and the defendant were friends, (2) the declarant had 
no apparent reason to lie in his statements, (3) the statements were voluntary, 
and (4) the statements were consistent over time.  Johnson, 930 P.2d  
at 368.

 
[¶29]   Recently, in Robinson, we found that hearsay statements were properly 
admitted under the "against penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule.  Without deciding 
whether the exception was firmly rooted, the statement was deemed trustworthy 
because (1) the statements implicated the victim in misconduct other than the 
crime for which the defendant was convicted, (2) the statements did not invoke 
the confession of an accomplice, and (3) they were not made to shift blame or 
for some other improper motive such as courting favor with authorities.  Robinson, 11 P.3d  at 371.

 

[¶30]   Sarr argues that the Wyoming cases 
described above require that trustworthiness be determined by reference to the 
circumstances under which the statement was made and not from the statement 
itself.  In the 
present case, evidence of surrounding circumstances is slight.  However, the 
totality of the circumstances approach provides a greater degree of flexibility, 
which allows direct reference to the statement itself for indicia of 
trustworthiness.  

 

[¶31]   Turning to the evidence in this case, we 
note those circumstances that detract from a finding of trustworthiness.  The lack of an 
opportunity to cross-examine is one.  The fact that the statement was not under oath 
is another.  The 
fact that the interview occurred 9-15 months after the events took place weighs 
against trustworthiness.  The need to have Ms. Rice persuade Ms. Wing to 
come forth is another negative factor.  The imminence of Sarr's release evidences a 
motive to fabricate in order to keep Sarr behind bars.  Finally, the fact 
that Ms. Rice was a friend of Ms. Wing's and was familiar with domestic violence 
suggests coaching.

 

[¶32]   On the other hand, the record is replete 
with details that support a finding of trustworthiness.  As the district 
court mentioned, Ms. Wing appeared to want the best for Sarr.  She was motivated by 
a desire to see that Sarr received the help he needed for his violent 
behavior.  Her 
timing in giving the account showed that she feared Sarr because of his violent 
behavior and wanted him to remain incarcerated, which makes her statements all 
the more likely to be true.  Why else would she fear him?  Ms. Wing was not 
asked leading questions.  She formulated her own account in response to 
questions seeking clarification.

 

[¶33]   Despite the fact that Ms. Rice persuaded 
Ms. Wing to give a statement, Ms. Wing came down to the sheriff's department on 
her own volition.  
Her hesitancy in relating events suggests that she thought about the 
consequences of her statement, which included the obligation to testify at 
trial.  No one 
expected her to die before trial.  She must have known at the time she gave the 
statements that she might be called upon to testify in front of a jury and come 
face-to-face with Sarr.  Under such circumstances, she would have no 
motive to lie.

 

[¶34]   Furthermore, the tone and tempo of her 
statements and their spontaneity demonstrate their reliability.  She explained the 
horrors she suffered in a detailed, internally consistent manner.  When she did not 
know the answer, she took pains to clarify the extent to which she partially 
knew the answer.  
If a question seeking clarification headed in the wrong direction, she 
would correct it.  
When informed of Daniel Bryan's statement that Sarr tried to run over her 
with the truck, she did not agree with Mr. Bryan's perception of the event and, 
in fact, minimized the incident.  When gaps appeared in her memory, she 
forthrightly admitted to them.  She only testified to what she could remember 
and qualified her answers when she thought she might remember wrongly.  

 

[¶35]   The tape discloses a woman who came into 
the sheriff's department reluctantly to make incriminating statements against 
the man she loved all the while taking every opportunity to insure that her 
statements were truthful and accurate.  Her quest for honesty pervades the tape 
through both her manner in giving her account and in her tone of voice.  For these reasons we 
deem the tape trustworthy.

 

[¶36]   Before a conviction can stand, the 
evidence must satisfy all of the elements of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Sarr argues insufficiency of the evidence as to all counts.  We agree as to 
Counts III and IV but as to the remaining counts we find sufficient 
evidence.

 

[¶37]   In Counts III and IV the State was 
obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sarr's conduct caused "serious 
bodily injury."  
The following definition applies: " Serious bodily injury' means bodily 
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes miscarriage, 
severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (LexisNexis 
2001).

 

[¶38]   Because we have determined that Ms. 
Wing's statement regarding her spinal injury and MRI results was not admissible 
under W.R.E. 804(b)(6), proof of serious bodily injury is wanting as to Count 
III.  As to 
Count IV we have carefully reviewed the record and find no evidence of serious 
bodily injury as defined by statute.

 

[¶39]   We do not condone the conduct alleged in 
Counts III and IV.  
Nor do we believe that the beatings did not cause injury.  But the demands of 
the statute defining serious bodily injury are clear and explicit.

 

[¶40]   As to Counts I, V, and VI, ample 
evidence was presented to support findings of guilt.  But as to these 
counts, Sarr presents additional argument.  He asserts that because the instruction 
allowed a conviction for conduct determined to be "intentional, knowingly or 
recklessly," the verdict must be set aside.  Sarr claims that an instruction in the 
alternative is improper.  Because the evidence is sufficient to support 
any one of the alternatives, we find no error.  See, May v. State, 
2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶41]   The restitution order is based in part 
upon damages resulting from the allegations of Counts III and IV.  These counts have 
been set aside.  
The order of restitution relied upon the validity of those convictions, 
so it too must be set aside.

 

[¶42]   In his final issue, Sarr claims that his 
right to a speedy trial was violated.  At the time of his arraignment on April 16, 
2001, W.R.Cr.P. 483 provided in relevant part:

(b) Speedy Trial.

(1)      It is the responsibility of the court, counsel and the 
defendant to insure that the defendant is timely tried.

(2)      A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days 
following arraignment unless continued as provided in this rule.

* * *

(4)  Continuances not to exceed six months from 
the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:

(A)      On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; or

(B)      On motion of the attorney for the state or the court if:

(i)                   
The defendant expressly consents;

(ii)                 
The state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has 
exercised due diligence; or

(iii)               
Required in the due administration of justice and the 
defendant will not be substantially prejudiced[.]

[¶43]   Sarr initially was scheduled for trial 
on August 13, 2001, 119 days after his arraignment and within the 120-day 
standard set by Rule 48.  The prosecution moved for a continuance of the 
trial date because of a conflict with oral arguments before this Court on 
another case.  
Sarr did not object to the motion and the district court granted 
continuance.  
Sarr's trial commenced on October 11, 2001, 178 days after his 
arraignment.

 

[¶44]   On appeal, Sarr insists his right to a 
speedy trial was violated when the 120-day limit of Rule 48 was exceeded, and, 
accordingly, the charges against him should have been dismissed without 
prejudice.  In 
an alternative argument, Sarr also contends the charges against him should have 
been dismissed pursuant to the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 101 (1972).  Those factors are: (1) the length of delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a 
speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 5, 17 P.3d 715, ¶ 5 
(Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶45]   The delay occasioned by the State's 
requested continuance arguably fits within the exception for the due 
administration of justice in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii).  The basis for the 
continuance was conflict between the trial date in this case and an oral 
argument in another case before this Court.  Sarr presents no cogent argument for why the 
delay occasioned by the continuance should be excluded from the calculation of 
the time between his arraignment and trial.  Furthermore, Sarr never made a written demand 
or otherwise vigorously asserted his right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 
48.  
Accordingly, we find no speedy trial violation under Rule 48 since 
exclusion of the delay caused by the continuance would bring his trial within 
120 days of Sarr's arraignment.

 

[¶46]   Application of the Barker factors does not advance Sarr's claim 
either.  
Assuming the first two factors weigh in favor of Sarr, the latter two 
weigh against such a finding.  Sarr gave no indication during the proceedings 
below that would suggest an assertion of his right to a speedy trial.  The complete failure 
to assert his speedy trial right weighs significantly against finding a 
violation.  Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 656 (Wyo. 
2000).  He has 
also failed to show any prejudice arising out of the delay.  In his brief, Sarr 
claims prejudice through his pretrial incarceration.  Sarr makes no cogent 
argument establishing prejudice beyond the mere citation to his 
confinement.  At 
least some portion of Sarr's pretrial confinement was, however, due to a 
conviction on another crime.  In short, Sarr comes far short of making the 
necessary showing to establish a violation of his right to a speedy 
trial.

 

CONCLUSION

 
[¶47]   Count III of the judgment of conviction 
is reversed and remanded.  As to Count IV, the judgment of conviction is 
reversed but for reasons of double jeopardy cannot be re-tried.  As to Counts I, V, 
and VI, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.  As to the judgment of restitution, it is 
reversed and remanded.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The record shows that the 
term, "coup stick" refers to a long wooden staff curved at one end and wrapped 
in snakeskin.  
It is a symbol of honor in traditional Native American culture.  

2The district court 
understandably might have been influenced to use corroborating evidence in its 
determination of reliability as Johnson 
suggests.  
However, such use of corroborating evidence in Confrontation Clause 
analyses is justified only for the purpose of determining harmless error.  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146, 111 L. Ed. 638 (1990).

3Rule 48 was amended 
effective September 1, 2001.