Case Title: Taylor v. Pontell, M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 214, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NANCY TAYLOR and 
§ 
CYRIL E. TAYLOR, 
§ 
No. 214, 2010 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiffs Below- 
§ 
 
Appellants, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
JONATHAN PONTELL, M.D., 
§ 
C.A. No. 09C-12-017 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 13, 2010 
   Decided:  September 2, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 2nd day of September 2010, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
Plaintiff-below Nancy Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals from the Superior 
Court’s order granting Defendant-below Jonathan Pontell, M.D.’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings because her claim was barred by a tolling of the statute 
of limitations set forth in 18 Del. C. §6856 (the “Health Care Act”).  Taylor argues 
in this appeal that 10 Del. C. §8818(a) (the “Savings Statute”) is applicable to the 
Health Care Act.  We find no merit to her argument and affirm.   
(2) 
Taylor first consulted Defendant-below, Jonathan Pontell, M.D. (“Dr. 
Pontell”), when he was affiliated with Atlantic Skin and Cosmetic and Surgery 
 2
Group, P.C. of Pennsylvania and Delaware.  Taylor originally inquired about a 
laser procedure to correct wrinkling in her neck area, and Dr. Pontell suggested a 
“mini face lift” for the wrinkling problem and a chin implant to correct a separate 
jowelling issue.  When Taylor asked about the potential risks, Dr. Pontell told her 
that he had never had any issues except one implant dislodged during a subsequent 
dental surgery.   
(3) 
On November 10, 2006, Dr. Pontell performed the procedure and 
inserted a Gortex chin implant.  As soon as the general anesthesia wore off, Taylor 
experienced numbness in her chin area.  Taylor met with Dr. Pontell on November 
12th, November 20th, November 22nd, December 1st, and December 15th and 
complained of the numbness.  On January 19, 2007, Dr. Pontell performed a 
second surgical operation to revise the chin implant.  Taylor again met with Dr. 
Pontell on January 22 2007, January 29th, February 22nd, May 3rd, and in August of 
2007, complaining of her symptoms each time.  She was told they would resolve 
over time.   
(4) 
On October 5, 2007, Taylor consulted a neurologist, Seth Haplea, 
M.D., who diagnosed her condition as slowly improving sensory dysfunction of 
the chin/lower lip status post-chin implant.  Dr. Haplea opined that no treatment 
would aid recovery.  She met with him again two times in January and September 
 3
of 2008, and he felt that because of the length of time since the surgical operations, 
further improvement was doubtful.   
(5) 
On February 19, 2009, Taylor filed a lawsuit against Dr. Pontell in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pennsylvania.  She alleged medical 
negligence for failing to obtain informed consent for the surgical procedure which 
resulted in a permanent nerve injury to Taylor’s face and chin.  On August 14, 
2009, that court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the surgery was 
preformed in Wilmington, Delaware.  On September 11, 2009, Taylor filed a 
notice of appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, which is still 
pending.   
(6) 
On December 1, 2009, Taylor filed this action in the Superior Court 
for New Castle County.  Dr. Pontell moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
asserting that this action is barred by the statute of limitations for medical 
negligence, 18 Del. C. § 6856, because this lawsuit was filed more than two years 
from the date of the alleged medical negligence.  Taylor responded that the 
Savings Statute, 10 Del. C. § 8118(a) applies to this medical negligence case.  The 
Superior Court rejected Taylor’s argument and granted Dr. Pontell’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  This appeal followed.   
(7) 
The parties do not dispute that this action was filed beyond the two 
year limitation period for medical negligence actions within 18 Del. C. § 6856.  
 4
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Savings Statute applies to this medical 
negligence action.  Our review of the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings presents a question of law which we review de novo.1 
(8) 
The Savings Statute provides: 
(a) If in any action duly commenced within the time limited therefor 
[sic] in this chapter, the writ fails of a sufficient service or return by 
any unavoidable accident, or by any default or neglect of the officer to 
whom it is committed; or if the writ is abated, or the action otherwise 
avoided or defeated by the death of any party thereto, or for any 
matter of form; or if after a verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment shall 
not be given for the plaintiff because of some error appearing on the 
face of the record which vitiates the proceedings; or if a judgment for 
the plaintiff is reversed on appeal or a writ of error; a new action may 
be commenced, for the same cause of action, at any time within one 
year after the abatement or other determination of the original action, 
or after the reversal of the judgment therein.2  
With exceptions not relevant to this case, the Health Care Act provides: 
No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim against a health 
care provider for personal injury, including personal injury which 
results in death, arising out of medical negligence shall be brought 
after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which such injury 
occurred[.]3 
 
(9) 
This Court addressed the application of the Savings Statute to the 
Health Care Act in Christiana Hospital v. Fattori.4  In that case, the plaintiffs filed 
their action in both the United States District Court for the Western District of 
                                          
 
1 Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1204 
(Del. 1993) (citations omitted). 
2 10 Del. C. § 8118(a). 
3 18 Del. C. § 6856. 
4 714 A.2d 754 (Del. 1998). 
 5
Pennsylvania and the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania.5  
Both actions were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Plaintiffs then filed 
suit in the Delaware Superior Court.6  The defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint, contending that the claims were barred by the two year statute of 
limitation.7  Plaintiff argued that the Savings Statute applied, and allowed a one 
year extension of the statute of limitations running from the dismissal of the 
Pennsylvania actions.8  The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss but 
certified to this Court an interlocutory appeal which was accepted.9  This Court 
held that the Savings Statute does not apply to actions brought under the Health 
Care Act because the General Assembly expressly restricted the time period for 
initiating a claim for medical negligence to the time period for such claims under 
18 Del. C. § 6856.  We found that the General Assembly intended to “write on a 
clean slate with respect to the limitations period for medical malpractice actions” 
and “break with past legal standards.”10   Accordingly, we held that the Plaintiffs 
actions were barred by a tolling of the two year statute of limitations.11   
                                          
 
5 Id. at 755. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 757. 
11 Fattori, 714 A.2d at 757. 
 6
 
(10) This case is controlled by our holding in Fattori.12  The General 
Assembly has taken no action to address our holding in Fattori or to announce any 
intention for the Savings Statute to apply to medical negligence actions.  Although 
the General Assembly did amend the Health Care Act in 2003, the amendments 
related only to adding an Affidavit of Merit requirement for medical negligence 
actions and did not address the Savings Statute. 13  Because Taylor’s complaint is 
barred by a tolling of the applicable statute of limitations, the Superior Court did 
not err in granting Dr. Pontell’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
12 Taylor argues that our refusal of an interlocutory appeal in PMA v. Reddy, 988 A. 2d 938 (Del. 
2010), indicates the Court has changed its view.  A discretionary refusal of an interlocutory 
appeal has no precedential effect nor does it serve to suggest any point of view on the substantive 
merits of any legal issue in the case.  Compare U.S. v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923) (“The 
denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.”). 
13 See  74 Del. Laws c. 148.