Case Title: Morse v. Curtis

Citation: 172 S.E.2d 495, 276 N.C. 371

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1970-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
172 S.E.2d 495 (1970)
276 N.C. 371
Patricia MORSE
v.
Kathryn F. CURTIS, doing business as Camp Illahee.
Bleecker MORSE
v.
Kathryn F. CURTIS, doing business as Camp Illahee.
No. 7.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
March 11, 1970.
*497 Uzzell & DuMont by Harry DuMont, Asheville, and Francis M. Coiner, Hendersonville, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Landon Roberts, Asheville, Ralph H. Ramsey, Jr., Ramsey, Hill & Smart, Brevard, for defendant-appellant.
BRANCH, Justice.
The question here presented for decision is: Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial judge's action in overruling *498 defendant's pleas in bar and allowing plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's entire First Further Answer and Defense?
Defendant first contends that when plaintiff Patricia Morse filed her claim with the Industrial Commission and the defendant thereafter admitted liability, the North Carolina Industrial Commission was invested with exclusive jurisdiction. In support of this position defendant cites and relies upon G.S. § 97-9 and G.S. § 97-10.1. We quote both sections:
The General Court of Justice consists of an appellate division, a Superior Court division, and a District Court division. The Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction and has jurisdiction in all actions for personal injuries caused by negligence, except where its jurisdiction is divested by statute. Article IV, Section 2, North Carolina Constitution; G.S. § 7A-240, G.S. § 7A-242; Bryant v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 548. By statute the Superior Court is divested of original jurisdiction of all actions which come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163, 130 S.E.2d 39; Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706; Hedgepeth v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 209 N.C. 45, 182 S.E. 704. Conversely,
In the case of Hanks v. Southern Public Utilities Commission, 210 N.C. 312, 186 S.E. 252, the facts show that Curtis E. Hanks died by reason of injuries received while employed by Southern Public Utilities Company. His employer filed a report of the accident which resulted in Hanks' death with the Commission on its required forms in December 1929. Hanks' administrator filed an action in Superior Court of Wilkes County under provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. This action remained in fieri in Wilkes County Superior Court until 8 January 1935, when a voluntary nonsuit was taken. The first action taken before the North Carolina Industrial Commission by the Administrator of Hanks' estate was a formal petition for award and request for hearing on 23 March 1935more than five years after the date of death. The Workmen's Compensation Act at that time provided that right to compensation would be barred unless a claim was filed within one year of death. The defendant denied liability and contended that the plaintiff was barred because claim had not been filed within one year after the employee's death and *499 because plaintiff had elected to proceed under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in Wilkes County Superior Court. The North Carolina Industrial Commission denied compensation and upon appeal the Superior Court overruled the Commission. This Court in reversing the action of the Superior Court stated:
See also Pratt v. Central Upholstery Co., 252 N.C. 716, 115 S.E.2d 27.
The filing of plaintiff's claim with the Industrial Commission invoked its jurisdiction. When its jurisdiction is invoked, the Commission's first order of business is to determine if the claim is properly before it and then proceed according to law. Letterlough v. Atkins, supra.
In the instant case there has been no recovery in either forum. The Industrial Commission has made no final order or adjudication of any kind. A fortiori, it has merely continued consideration of plaintiff's claim without taking any action to determine whether the parties are subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The only order determining any matter with finality is the one now before us from the Superior Court. Absent an unchallenged determination of jurisdiction coupled with action resulting in recovery by plaintiff, or a challenge to its jurisdiction resulting in a final appellate holding establishing the Commission's jurisdiction, plaintiff was not precluded from filing her action in Superior Court because she had previously filed claim with the Industrial Commission and defendant had thereafter admitted liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Consequently, Judge McLean, sitting without a jury, by consent of the parties, followed the proper procedure in determining the pleas in bar by hearing evidence offered by the parties, finding facts, reaching conclusions of law, and thereupon entering judgment. His determination of these particular pleas in bar necessarily exercised the inherent judicial power of the court to determine its jurisdiction. Manifestly, this determination of jurisdiction is subject to appellate review. Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 137 S.E.2d 806; Jones v. Standard Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328, 162 S.E. 741. By the judgment entered the trial judge overruled defendant's pleas in bar.
The findings of fact included the following:
Based on these findings of fact, Judge McLean, inter alia, concluded as a matter of law:
In the landmark case of Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137, the Court enumerated elements ear-marking a contract as creating the relationship of employer and independent contractor as follows:
Considering the relationship of employer-employee and employer-independent contractor in the case of Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 162, 59 S.E.2d 425, the Court said:
We recognize the often-repeated rule that findings of fact by a trial judge are conclusive when supported by competent evidence, even when there is conflict in the evidence, but an exception to a finding of fact not supported by competent evidence must be sustained. Horton v. Redevelopment Commission, 264 N.C. 1, 140 S.E.2d 728; Textile Insurance Co. v. Lambeth, 250 N.C. 1, 108 S.E.2d 36.
The question crucial to decision in this case is whether the trial court correctly concluded that "The plaintiff, Patricia Morse, during the 1964 camp season and up to and including August 15, 1964, was not an employee of the defendant, but was an independent contractor." If this conclusion was correctly reached, then defendant's pleas in bar were correctly overruled because the statute expressly provides that the Workmen's Compensation Act only applies where the employer-employee relationship exists. G.S. § 97-2; Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966); Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Elon College, supra.
We must, therefore review the record to determine if the record evidence supports the findings of fact upon which this conclusion was based.
A portion of the evidence pertinent to decision in this case is summarized in part and quoted in part, as follows:
Plaintiff Patricia Morse, then age 20, sustained an injury on the premises of defendant on 15 August 1964; she had entered into a written contract (which has not been made a part of the record) to work as a counselor and head of the "saddle seat program" during the summer of 1964 for a salary of "$400 and something" plus board, lodging and laundry. Plaintiff, Patricia Morse, testified:
The record further shows that there were more than five persons employed by defendant and that defendant listed Patricia Morse as an employee for Federal Insurance Contribution Act (F.I.C.A.) and for state and federal income tax purposes; that the F.I.C.A. taxes were paid by defendant for Patricia Morse for the year 1964. On 15 August 1964 no saddle seat riding was scheduled. On that day Patricia Morse and the other counselors were instructed by defendant to go down and move their personal automobiles so that the campers' parents could park their automobiles in that space. Although Patricia did not have a personal car on the premises, she accompanied the other counselors and, when the automobiles were moved, she and two other counselors went into a pump house on the premises to get out of the rain and to smoke a cigarette. After smoking a cigarette, plaintiff started out of the pump house to return to her cabin and her raincoat caught in the pump gears, causing her to react so as to receive serious injuries.
A careful review of the record, including the evidence, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and an application of the legal principles hereinbefore set forth, clearly establish that plaintiff Patricia Morse did not possess the independence and other characteristics necessary to constitute her an independent contractor. Rather, a review of the record evidence, which is substantially uncontroverted, compels a conclusion of law that, at the time she was injured the relation of employer-employee existed between defendant and Patricia Morse.
We note here, parenthetically, that defendant admitted liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the Industrial Commission and orally affirmed this admission upon argument in this Court.
The record evidence does not support the trial judge's findings upon which he based his conclusions of law that Patricia Morse was an independent contractor and that the Superior Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.