Case Title: Ardon v. City of Los Angeles

Citation: 

Docket Number: s174507

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
Filed 7/25/11   
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ESTUARDO ARDON, 
) 
 
)                               S174507 
 
Plaintiff  and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
)                     Ct.App. 2/3 B201035 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
          Los Angeles County   
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,           
)                     Super. Ct. No. BC363959                              
        
)                            
  
          Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case, we must decide whether Government Code section 910 (section 910)1 
allows taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal governmental entity for 
the refund of local taxes.  In City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 
455 (City of San Jose), we held that section 910 permits a litigant to bring a class claim 
against a local government.  We later held in Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 758, 792 (Woosley), however, that class claims to recover tax refunds are not 
permitted in certain situations because article XIII, section 32 of the California 
Constitution prevents the judiciary “from expanding the methods for seeking tax refunds 
expressly provided by the Legislature.”  As we explain, neither Woosley, which 
concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 
of the California Constitution, applies to our determination of whether section 910 
permits class claims that seek the refund of local taxes.  We therefore conclude that the 
reasoning of City of San Jose, which permitted a class claim against a municipal 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted. 
 
2 
 
government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permits 
taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Estuardo Ardon (Ardon) is a resident of defendant City of Los Angeles 
(City).  In October 2006, Ardon filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and 
similarly situated individuals challenging the City‟s telephone users tax (TUT) and 
seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years.  Ardon 
asserted that the City‟s municipal code exempts all amounts paid for telephone service 
from the TUT to the extent that those amounts are also exempt from the federal excise tax 
(FET).  Ardon contends that since the FET was improperly collected, so too was the 
TUT.  In December 2006, Ardon received a notice from the Los Angeles City Attorney 
rejecting his attempt to present a tax refund claim on behalf of a class due to lack of legal 
standing.  
Ardon‟s complaint against the City sought, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory 
relief to prevent continued unlawful collection of the TUT, declaratory relief alleging the 
unconstitutional amendment of the TUT by the Los Angeles City Council,2 money had 
and received in unjust enrichment, and violation of the due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  The complaint 
sought certain remedies, including certification as a class action, an accounting of the 
TUT funds collected by the City, and return of money wrongfully taxed.  
                                              
2 
Subsequent to Ardon‟s filing his complaint, the City amended Los Angeles 
Municipal Code section 21.1.3 to remove all references to the FET.  The city council 
passed the amendment to the ordinance on January 9, 2007. (L.A. Ord. No. 178,219.)  In 
the Court of Appeal, the City contended that Ardon must file the refund claim under Los 
Angeles Municipal Code section 21.07 and former section 21.1.2 governing claims for 
refund of overpayment of business or use taxes.  As the court observed, however, those 
code sections do not apply to Ardon‟s claim that the City‟s TUT was an illegal tax.  The 
City does not renew its claim here. Therefore, we do not address any issues involving 
preemption of the municipal code provisions in this case.  
 
3 
 
The City demurred to Ardon‟s complaint and moved to strike all class action 
allegations on the grounds that Woosley prohibited Ardon from filing a claim against the 
City for the refund of taxes on behalf of a putative class.  Instead, the City argued, each 
member of the alleged class must file a government claim with the City before Ardon 
could proceed with a class action lawsuit.  The superior court granted the City‟s motion 
to strike all class allegations.  It also partially overruled and partially sustained the 
demurrer without leave to amend, and stayed other causes of action.  Ardon filed a timely 
appeal from the interlocutory order striking the class allegations.  
A divided Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‟s order refusing to certify the 
class.  In so doing, the panel specifically rejected its own reasoning and contrary holding  
in a factually similar case, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2008) 159 
Cal.App.4th 353 (Oronoz).  The Court of Appeal dissent would have followed the 
opinion in Oronoz, which held that under City of San Jose’s construction of section 910, 
a “claimant” could be an entire class as well as an individual.  (Oronoz, supra, at p. 367.)  
We granted review to resolve the conflict in the appellate courts regarding permissible 
class claims under section 910. 
DISCUSSION 
Before 1959, taxpayer and other claims against the state, local, and municipal 
governments were governed by myriad state statutes and local ordinances.  Finding this 
system too complex, the Legislature enacted the Government Claims Act (the Act), 
which established a standardized procedure for bringing claims against local 
governmental entities.  (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, p. 4133, enacting former Gov. Code, § 700 
et seq. [replacing more than 150 separate procedures for directing claims against local 
governmental entities]; now § 900 et seq.) 3     
                                              
3 
Section 910 states:  “A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person 
acting on his or her behalf and shall show all of the following: [¶] (a) The name and post 
office address of the claimant. [¶] (b) The post office address to which the person 
presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. [¶] (c) The date, place and other 
circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. [¶] 
 
4 
 
Section 910 does not specifically apply to tax refunds, but to all claims against 
governmental entities.  (See City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 454.)  The purpose of 
the claims statutes “is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to 
adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 
litigation.”  (Id. at p. 455.)  As originally proposed, the standardized procedures of the 
Act embodied in section 910 would not have applied to “[c]laims under the Revenue and 
Taxation Code or other provisions of law prescribing procedures for the refund . . . of any 
tax . . . .”  (Recommendation and Study Relating to the Presentation of Claims Against 
Public Entities (Jan. 1959) 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) p. A-12  (proposed 
former § 703, subd. (a), italics added.)  However, the Legislature specifically rejected this 
proposal and instead enacted former section 703, subdivision (a) (now § 905, subd. (a)), 
which exempted from section 910 “[c]laims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or 
other statute prescribing procedures for the refund . . . of any tax . . . .” (Stats. 1959, ch. 
1724, pp. 4133-4134, italics added.)   
The issue in City of San Jose was whether a class claim could satisfy the claim 
requirements of section 910, or whether such class action claims could not be maintained 
against governmental entities.  (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 455.)  The 
plaintiffs had filed a class claim against the City of San Jose under section 910, alleging 
that aircraft noise, dust, vapors, and vibration arising from operations at the San Jose 
Municipal Airport were a nuisance and diminished the market value of their property.  
(City of San Jose, at pp. 453, 455.)  This court adopted a two-part test for determining 
whether the claim satisfied section 910:  “Is there some compliance with all of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred 
so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. [¶] (e) The name or 
names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if 
known. [¶] (f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000) as 
of the date of presentation of the claim . . . together with the basis of computation of the 
amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar 
amount shall be included in the claim.  However, it shall indicate whether the claim 
would be a limited civil case.” 
 
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statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial 
compliance?”  (City of San Jose, at pp. 456-457.)   
In addressing the section 910 class claim, City of San Jose concluded that the word 
“claimant” referred to “the class itself,” not to an individual class member.  The court 
“reject[ed] the suggested necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of the 
purported class.”  (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457.)  The court reasoned that 
“[t]o require such detailed information in advance of the complaint would severely 
restrict the maintenance of appropriate class actions—contrary to recognized policy 
favoring them.”  (Ibid.; see Code Civ. Proc., § 382; see also Vasquez v. Superior Court 
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800.)  The court did not believe that section 910 was “intended to thwart 
class relief.”  (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457.)  Because satisfaction of 
section 910‟s procedural requirements obliged a representative class plaintiff to supply 
information detailing his or her name, address, and other specified information, any 
information beyond this requirement to identify the class itself was sufficient to satisfy 
the “ „some compliance‟ test.”  (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457.)  “Beyond 
this, the sufficiency of the identifying information must be measured by the substantial 
compliance test.”  (Ibid.)  A claim substantially complies with a claims statute if the 
parties have stated sufficient information “to reasonably enable the public entity to make 
an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of 
a lawsuit.”  (Id. at p. 456.) 
Woosley was a constitutional challenge to the state‟s vehicle license fees and use 
taxes imposed on passenger vehicles sold outside California.  The numerous issues 
included the question of whether the trial court had erred in certifying the claim as a class 
claim.  Woosley held that article XIII section 32 of the California Constitution compelled 
an action for tax refunds against the state to be brought in the manner that the Legislature 
specified under the statutes at issue.  (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 789.)4  The court 
                                              
4 
Article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution reads, “No legal or equitable 
process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof 
 
6 
 
concluded that statutes dictating the procedural requirements for obtaining refunds of 
vehicle license fees and use taxes did not authorize class action claims.  (Woosley, at p. 
788; see Veh. Code, § 42231; Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6901 et seq., 6486.)  Rather, the 
language of those statutes indicated that “a claim for a refund of vehicle license fees must 
be filed by „the person who has paid the erroneous or excessive fee or penalty, or his 
agent on his behalf.‟ . . .  [T]he term „person‟ does not include a class, and a class 
representative who files a claim on behalf of all others similarly situated, without the 
knowledge or consent of such other persons, is not the agent of the members of the 
class.”  (Woosley, supra, at p. 790, quoting Veh. Code, § 42231.)  Because article XIII, 
section 32 of the California Constitution requires tax refund claims to be made in the 
specific manner prescribed by the Legislature, we concluded that the particular statutes at 
issue in Woosley did not authorize class claims. 
Regarding class-based refunds for use taxes, Woosley observed that “[a]n 
examination of the entire statutory scheme that governed requests for refunds of sales and 
use taxes when Woosley's claim was filed in 1977 reveals . . . that class claims were not 
contemplated.  If the [State Board of Equalization] denied a claim, that entity was 
required, within 30 days, to „serve notice of its action on the claimant in the manner 
prescribed for service of notice of a deficiency determination.‟ ([Rev. & Tax. Code,] § 
6906.)  [Revenue and Taxation Code] [s]ection 6486, in turn, provided in 1977 that the 
[State Board of Equalization] shall give written notice of a deficiency determination „to 
the retailer or person storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property,‟ either by 
mail or by „delivering it to the person to be served.‟ The language of section 6486 
suggests that notice must be given to each individual taxpayer.  No mention is made of 
notice to a class representative.  The requirement that notice of the denial of a claim must 
be given to each individual taxpayer thus is inconsistent with the use of a class claim.”  
                                                                                                                                                  
to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax.  After payment of a tax claimed to be 
illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner 
as may be provided by the Legislature.” 
 
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(Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 790-791.)  Woosley, therefore, addressed the limited 
question of whether Vehicle Code section 42231 and Revenue and Taxation Code 
sections 6901 et seq. and 6486 permitted class actions by citizens seeking refunds of 
taxes and fees from the state.  When construed in light of article XIII, section 32 of the 
California Constitution, we concluded that the Legislature did not intend to authorize 
class claims for the refund of fees and taxes under those particular statutes.  (Woosley, at 
pp. 789-792.) 
Woosley also stated that “the holding in City of San Jose . . . should not be 
extended to include claims for tax refunds.”  (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 789.)  
However, we did not mean that City of San Jose forbids all class action claims for tax 
refunds; rather, Woosley precluded class claims for tax refunds where the Legislature has 
explicitly set forth procedures for obtaining those refunds and has refused to authorize 
class claims under those procedures.  Specifically, Woosley criticized “[s]everal decisions 
of the Court of Appeal [that] extended the holding in City of San Jose to permit the filing 
of class claims seeking tax refunds, reasoning by analogy to the claims statute construed 
in City of San Jose that the existing tax-refund statutes could and should be interpreted to 
authorize the filing of class claims.”  (Id. at p. 788, italics added.)  It is important to note 
that none of the Court of Appeal decisions this court criticized in Woosley either 
construed or applied section 910.  (See Schoderbek v. Carlson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 
1029, 1033 [property tax statute]; Lattin v. Franchise Tax Board (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 
377, 381 [income tax statute]; Santa Barbara Optical Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 244, 249 [sales tax statute]; Javor v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 939, 948 [sales tax statute].) 
Several cases decided after Woosley have concluded that article XIII, section 32 of 
the California Constitution bars class claims and class actions for the refund of locally 
adopted taxes absent specific state statutory authority.  (See Batt v. City and County of 
San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 65, 74-75 [sustaining demurrer to plaintiff‟s class 
action challenging city‟s transient occupancy hotel tax]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. 
 
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v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 242, 249 [rejecting taxpayer suit 
challenging a municipal home occupation ordinance]; Neecke v. City of Mill Valley 
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 946, 961-962 [rejecting property owner‟s action challenging a city 
property tax].)  As Oronoz observed, however, these cases are distinguishable, because 
they all considered statutes or municipal ordinances enacted to provide specific 
procedures for filing tax claims against governmental entities — procedures that are not 
applicable or required in this case.  (Oronoz, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 365, fn. 9.)  In 
addition, like the Oronoz court, we specifically disagree with the overbroad statement in 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. that “class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees 
and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim 
with the City.”  (Id. at p. 249.)  The statement is especially incorrect “as applied to claims 
against local public entities that are not governed by specific tax refund statutes.”  
(Oronoz, supra, at p. 365, fn. 9.)   
The Court of Appeal here determined that the applicable claims statute in the 
present case is Government Code section 910.  Ardon asserts that section 910 claims 
against government entities are to be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on 
his or her behalf and that, as noted above, in City of San Jose this court held that the word 
“claimant” in section 910 must be equated with the class itself and therefore permits the 
filing of class claims.  Ardon also claims that the Court of Appeal improperly extended 
the reach of article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution “beyond state entities 
and their agents to a local government.”   
By contrast, the City asserts that equating the term “claimant” with “the class 
itself” is inconsistent with the strict compliance standard set forth in Woosley, supra, 3 
Cal.4th 758, for tax refund claims.  But, as Ardon observes, Woosley does not require 
strict compliance with claims statutes in tax refund cases.  The case requires that a court 
analyze the claims statutes before it to determine whether the Legislature intended to 
allow class claims under those statutes.  Here, as City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447, 
held, a class claim by taxpayers for a tax refund against a local governmental entity is 
 
9 
 
permissible under section 910 in the absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth 
in an applicable governing claims statute.  Contrary to the City‟s argument, Woosley 
simply does not apply here because section 910 allows the class claim.   
Our conclusion recognizes the limitations of both City of San Jose and Woosley in 
addressing the availability of class claims for the tax refunds in this case.  City of San 
Jose simply held that section 910 does not preclude class claims against government 
entities.  (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457.)  The action there did not 
involve a challenge to a local tax, but instead asserted nuisance and inverse condemnation 
claims.  (Ibid.)  All that Woosley demands is that a court first examine the claims statutes 
at issue in a claim for a taxpayer refund to determine whether the Legislature 
contemplated a class claim under the applicable California code.  (Woosley, supra, 3 
Cal.4th at pp. 790-792.)  The court did not analyze the applicability of section 910, and, 
in contrast to the City‟s contention, there is no reason to construe section 910 in light of 
Woosley.  As we have discussed, the relevant governing claims statute here is section 
910.  In contrast to the two statutes at issue in Woosley, section 910 states specifically 
that a “claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her 
behalf.”  While the Act contains an exemption for “[c]laims under the Revenue and 
Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund . . . of any tax,” the 
claim here did not involve any applicable municipal code or statute governing claims for 
refunds.  (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (a), italics added.)  City of San Jose held that class 
claims are permitted under section 910.  (City of San Jose, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 
367.)  Therefore, class claims for taxpayer refunds against local governmental entities 
brought under section 910 are also permitted in California. 
In addition, the City contends that article XIII, section 32 of the California 
Constitution mandates that the Legislature must expressly authorize actions for tax 
refunds, and section 910 does not expressly authorize class claims.  Article XIII, section 
32 of the California Constitution states, “No legal or equitable process shall issue in any 
proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the 
 
10 
 
collection of any tax.  After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be 
maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by 
the Legislature.”  Despite the first sentence‟s reference to tax actions against the state, the 
City asks us to read the second sentence of article XIII, section 32 to also preclude tax 
actions against local governments in the absence of express legislative authorization.   
But even assuming article XIII, section 32 is equally applicable to tax actions against 
local governments, we have already determined that section 910 provides the necessary 
legislative authorization for class claims of taxpayer refunds against local governmental 
entities.  Indeed, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that would preclude the 
present action. 
The City further asserts that the public policy underlying article XIII, section 32 
precludes the present action.  In Woosley, we held that article XIII, section 32 “rests on 
the premise that strict legislative control over the manner in which tax refunds may be 
sought is necessary so that governmental entities may engage in fiscal planning based on 
expected tax revenues. [Citation.]”  (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 789.)  The City 
argues that this policy is thwarted where the local government is faced with a potentially 
huge liability in the form of a class action.  But article XIII, section 32 simply prohibits 
courts from “prevent[ing] or enjoin[ing] the collection of any tax” during the pendency of 
litigation challenging the tax.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 32.)  In fact, article XIII, section 
32 does not purport to limit a court‟s authority to fashion a remedy if it determines a tax 
is illegal, including its authority to issue an injunction against further collection of the 
challenged tax.  As Ardon observes, we have held that the important public policy behind 
article XIII, section 32 “ „is to allow revenue collection to continue during litigation so 
that essential public services dependent on the funds are not unnecessarily interrupted.‟ ”  
(State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 633, 638, quoting Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283.)  This policy 
is intended to ensure the uninterrupted flow of tax revenue, so that refunds that are 
authorized must be processed in orderly procedures that the Legislature allows.  That 
 
11 
 
policy favoring fiscal responsibility, however, does not justify precluding legitimate class 
proceedings for the refund of allegedly illegal taxes, and is indeed satisfied here because 
section 910 allows the present taxpayer class claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th 758, does not apply to a potential taxpayer class claim 
brought under section 910.  In addition, neither the explicit language nor the policy 
underlying article XIII, section 32 applies to prevent the present action.  City of San Jose, 
supra, 12 Cal.3d 447, is entirely consistent with our conclusion here.  Class claims for tax 
refunds against a local governmental entity are permissible under section 910 in the 
absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth in an applicable governing claims 
statute.  Consequently, we reverse the Court of Appeal judgment, and remand the matter 
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
JACKSON, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution.
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Ardon v. City of Los Angeles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 174 Cal.App.4th 369 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S174507 
Date Filed: July 25, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Anthony J. Mohr 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Francis M. Gregorek, Rachele R. Rickert; Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, Jon 
Tostrud; Chimicles & Tikellis, Nicholas E. Chimicles and Timothy N. Mathews for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Wolf, Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Francis M. Gregorek, Rachele R. Rickert; Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, Jon 
Tostrud; Chimicles & Tikellis and Timothy N. Mathews for Willy Granados and Jon W. McWilliams as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Patricia Sturdevant; Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Kevin P. Roddy; and Timothy Bittle for NASCAT, Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Association, Consumer Federation of California and Utility Reform Network as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Patricia Sturdevant; Richard Holober; Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, Patrick A. Klingman; Huskinson, 
Brown, Heidenreich & Carlin and Paul E. Heidenreich for Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of California 
and NASCAT as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Edward M. Teyssier; and Joseph D. Henchman for the Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Alan M. Mansfield for Utility Consumers‟ Action Network as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, Noreen S. Vincent and Michael Nagle, Assistant City 
Attorneys, Brian I. Cheng, Deputy City Attorney; Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, William Molinski, Valerie M. Goo 
and Frank D. Rorie; Colantuono & Levin, Michael G. Colantuono, Sandra J. Levin, Amy C. Sparrow and Erwin M. 
Benedicto for Defendant Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S174307 – counsel continued 
 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Julie Van Nostern, Chief Tax Attorney, and Peter J. Keith, Deputy 
City Attorney, for The League of California Cities, The California State Association of Counties and The California 
Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel (Los Angeles) and Albert Ramseyer, Principal Deputy County Counsel, 
for the County of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Francis M. Gregorek 
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz 
750 B Street, Suite 2770 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 239-4599 
 
Sandra J. Levin 
Colantuono & Levin 
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2700 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 542-5700