Case Title: Brett v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-86

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brett v. State1998 WY 96961 P.2d 385Case Number: 97-86Decided: 08/11/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
James 
Edward BRETT, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Washakie County, Gary P. Hartman, J.

 

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Steven S. 
Singer,* Director, Scott J. Newton and Galen Woelk, Student Interns, 
of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program. Argument by Scott J. Newton and Galen 
Woelk, for Appellant (Defendant).

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney 
General. Argument by Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, for Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

* Orders granting Singer's 
motions to withdraw as counsel on behalf of the Appellant entered on May 18, 
1998.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,[fn**] 
JJ.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      James Edward 
Brett (Brett) appeals from his judgment and sentence after a jury found him 
guilty of burglary, in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-3-301. Brett claims that the 
trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury with his proffered 
instructions concerning the definition of the word "deprive" as it is used in 
the larceny statute, the definition of "felony," the crime of unauthorized use 
of a vehicle, and his defense theory of the case instruction concerning 
self-intoxication. The trial court must instruct the jury on each and every 
element of the crime charged and on the defendant's theory of the case, if that 
theory is supported by competent evidence and is an accurate statement of the 
law. The proffered instruction defining "deprive" as the intent to permanently 
deprive the lawful owner of possession and the instruction concerning 
self-intoxication should have been given to the jury. Therefore, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant Brett 
presents two issues for our review:

Issue I: Whether 
the trial court erred when it refused to properly instruct the 
jury?

Issue II: 
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to give a self-intoxication 
instruction to the jury when the evidence clearly warranted 
one?

The State, as 
appellee, presents only one issue:

Whether the 
trial court properly instructed the jury.

FACTS

[¶3]      On September 17, 
1996, the victim was closing the shop where he worked. When the victim opened 
the side door of the building, he saw his 1979 Chevrolet pickup being driven 
away. The victim yelled at the driver and ran across the parking lot and into 
the street, trying to stop the vehicle. As the pickup went past him, he grabbed 
the door handle and the mirror on the passenger side, looked into the window, 
and saw Brett driving. The victim let go of the vehicle after he observed who 
was driving.

[¶4]      The victim was 
standing in the street when a fellow who knew him came along. The victim flagged 
him down and asked for a ride. The pair followed the victim's pickup until it 
turned right at an intersection, using the turn signal. However, by the time 
they arrived at the intersection, they could no longer see the pickup. They 
drove around the block and did not see the pickup, so the victim went back to 
his place of employment to finish locking up the building and called the 
police.

[¶5]      After he called 
the police to report his vehicle stolen, the victim drove his employer's truck 
to look for his vehicle. As he was driving up the street, he saw his pickup 
parked in a local automotive parts store parking lot. He parked the service 
truck behind the pickup and walked over and looked in the window to see if his 
key was still in the ignition. When he saw that the key was missing, he opened 
the door to look inside. He smelled beer and saw a pack of cigarettes on the 
seat. The victim neither drinks nor smokes, so he surmised the man who took his 
truck left them there. The victim then called the police from the phone inside 
the store and informed them that he had located his 
vehicle.

[¶6]      When the police 
officer arrived, he inspected the vehicle and drove the victim to the police 
station to complete some paperwork. After the paperwork was complete, the 
officer drove the victim back to the service vehicle and his own vehicle in the 
parking lot. The victim then took it upon himself to drive around and look for 
the person who took his vehicle. He found Brett in front of a local gas station. 
The victim drove to a nearby relative's home and called the police to inform 
them that the suspect was at the gas station. After making that call, he watched 
Brett until police arrived.

[¶7]      A police officer 
approached Brett, told him he needed to talk to him about a vehicle theft, 
patted him down for weapons and discovered an unopened bottle of vodka, three 
beers, and a full pack of cigarettes in his pockets. Shortly thereafter, the 
victim arrived and identified Brett as the person he observed driving his 
pickup. Brett was then handcuffed, placed in a patrol car and taken to the 
police department.

[¶8]      On September 19, 
1996, a criminal complaint and warrant were issued, alleging Brett was guilty of 
burglary, in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-3-301. Brett pled not guilty, and a 
jury trial was held on November 26, 1996.

[¶9]      During the jury 
instruction conference, Brett offered several jury instructions which were 
refused by the trial court. Defense counsel properly preserved the issue for 
appeal by specifically objecting to the trial court's decision not to present 
his proffered instructions to the jury. The jury found Brett guilty of the crime 
of burglary, and the judge sentenced Brett to twenty-eight to sixty months in 
the state penitentiary, with credit for time served. This appeal timely 
followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10]   Brett contends that the 
instructions which were given did not present elements of the crime charged 
which related to his defense. He also contends that the trial court improperly 
refused to give an instruction presenting his theory that he was intoxicated to 
the point of being unable to form the intent to steal. Whether a defendant had 
the requisite intent to steal is a question of fact for the jury, based on 
proper instruction on the law from the trial court. Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶11]   It is well established that a trial 
court has a duty to instruct the jury on the general principles of law 
applicable to the case before it. A trial court is given wide latitude in 
instructing the jury, and we will not find reversible error as long as the 
instructions given to the jury correctly state the law and adequately cover the 
relevant issues. Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶12]   When determining whether the charge 
to the jury properly expressed the issues actually raised by the evidence, we 
look at the charge in its entirety, reading all of the instructions together. 
Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 663 (Wyo. 1993); Baier, 891 P.2d  at 756; Hatheway 
v. State, 623 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1981). Jury instructions should inform the 
jury about the applicable law so the jury may apply that law to its findings on 
the material factual issues. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo. 1997). 
"It is critical that instructions correctly articulate Wyoming law because it is 
from the instructions that a jury decides if someone is to be found guilty or 
not guilty." Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 548 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶13]   Failure to instruct the jury on an 
essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, requiring reversal 
of the defendant's conviction. Compton, 931 P.2d  at 940. Similarly, "[a] trial 
court violates Wyoming's constitutional due process guarantee when it fails to 
give to the jury the defendant's theory of the case or defense instruction if 
that theory properly articulates Wyoming law, is not presented by another 
instruction, and has competent evidence to underpin the request." Wilkening v. 
State, 922 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Oien, 797 P.2d at 548). Such a 
denial of due process is reversible error per se. Oien, 797 P.2d  at 
549.

[¶14]   When an instruction has been 
offered presenting the defendant's theory of the case, or defense, that 
instruction or a similar instruction must be presented to the jury if it is 
supported by competent evidence. Stapleman, 680 P.2d  at 75 (citing Goodman v. 
State, 573 P.2d 400, 408 (Wyo. 1977); Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 
1970)). We look to the record to determine if competent evidence presented at 
trial required an instruction presenting the defendant's theory. Stapleman, 680 P.2d  at 75. In reviewing the record for competent evidence, we view the evidence 
in a light as favorable to the accused as is justifiable. Id.; Eatherton v. 
State, 761 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 1988). The instruction must be given if a jury 
could reasonably conclude the evidence supports the defendant's position, even 
if the court deems the evidence to be weak or unworthy of belief. Stagner v. 
State, 842 P.2d 520, 523 (Wyo. 1992).

DISCUSSION

[¶15]   Brett was charged with, tried, and 
convicted of burglary. Wyoming Statute § 6-3-301(a) (1997) provides that "[a] 
person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a 
building, occupied structure or vehicle, . . . with intent to commit larceny or 
a felony therein." Brett claims that the trial court's failure to give his 
proffered jury instructions denied him his right to due process of law 
guaranteed by the Wyoming and United States Constitutions.

Proposed Jury 
Instruction A

[¶16]   Brett contends the trial court 
erred when it refused to give his proffered instruction defining 
"felony:"

Defendant's 
Proposed Instruction No. A

"Felony" means 
that the crime may be punished by death or by imprisonment for more than one (1) 
year. All other crimes are misdemeanors. . . .

Source: W.S. § 
6-10-101

[¶17]   Brett contends the jury was 
confused when it was told that one of the elements of burglary was that he had 
to intend to "commit larceny or a felony therein." However, it is clear from the 
record that the prosecutor presented argument and evidence that the felony Brett 
intended to commit when he entered the truck was larceny. No evidence or 
argument was presented concerning any other felony. When no competent evidence 
is presented to support a defendant's theory of the case instruction, that 
instruction is properly refused. An instruction which merely defined the term 
"felony" would not have assisted the jury and may have been confusing or 
misleading. The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proposed 
instruction A.

Proposed Jury 
Instruction C

[¶18]   Brett also claims the trial court 
erred when it refused to give the statutory definition of "unauthorized use of a 
vehicle." He contends that evidence presented at trial tended to show that he 
did not intend to take the vehicle permanently. He urged the jury to find that 
he only intended to make temporary use of the vehicle. In support of that 
argument, he tendered the following instruction:

Defendant's 
Proposed Instruction No. C

Wyoming Statute 
§ 31-11-102, defines the crime of Unauthorized Use of Vehicle as 
follows:

Any person who 
without specific authority of the owner or his authorized and accredited agent 
willfully, wantonly, maliciously takes possession of, or drives, propels or 
takes away, or attempts to take possession of, drive, propel, or take away a 
vehicle, which was the property of another, for the purpose of temporarily 
making use of the vehicle . . . upon conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, a fine of not more than 
$1,000.00, or both.

[¶19]   While we agree that the above is a 
correct statement of the law and that evidence was presented from which a 
reasonable jury might have found that Brett was not guilty of burglary, but was 
guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle, we repeatedly have held that "[t]he 
prosecutor is vested with the exclusive power to determine who to charge with a 
crime and with what crime to charge them." DeLeon v. State, 896 P.2d 764, 768 
(Wyo. 1995) (citing Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 417 (Wyo. 1990)). The 
proposed instruction asked the trial court to instruct the jury on an additional 
uncharged offense which did not constitute a lesser-included offense. Contrary 
to defense counsel's objection at trial, the trial court need not instruct the 
jury so that the jury may "review any similar type offenses and make a decision 
accordingly." "A defendant is entitled to an instruction on another crime only 
if that crime is a lesser included of the charged offense, otherwise no 
instruction is to be given." DeLeon, 896 P.2d  at 768 (citing State v. Keffer, 
860 P.2d 1118, 1133-34 (Wyo. 1993)). "[I]n the absence of any proof that the 
prosecution is based on improper reasons such as race or religion, we cannot and 
will not disturb that decision." DeLeon, 896 P.2d  at 768. Brett makes no such 
claim here, and we affirm the district court's decision to refuse to give the 
instruction.

Proposed Jury 
Instruction D

[¶20]   Brett's proposed jury instruction D 
regarding the meaning of the word "deprive" in the larceny statute directly 
tracks the definition of the word found in WYO. STAT. § 6-3-401 
(1997):

Defendant's 
Proposed Instruction No. D

"Deprive" 
means:

(A) To withhold 
property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a 
major portion of its economic value or with intent to restore only upon payment 
of reward or other compensation; or

(B) To dispose 
of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. . . 
.

Source: W.S. § 
6-3-401(a)(ii)(A) and (B).

[¶21]   Brett asserts a violation of his 
constitutional right to due process occurred when the trial court failed to give 
this proposed instruction, which defines an element of the crime of larceny. The 
State does not argue that the instruction did not accurately reflect the law in 
Wyoming, or that the issue was sufficiently covered by other jury instructions. 
The jury was instructed that larceny "means the act of stealing, taking and 
carrying, leading or driving away the property of another with intent to deprive 
the owner or lawful possessor." The State contends that the "only logical 
conclusion possible from the State's evidence" was that Brett intended to 
permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle. We disagree.

[¶22]   If the evidence at trial fairly 
raised the question that Brett may not have intended to permanently deprive the 
owner of his vehicle, an instruction presenting that issue to the jury must be 
given. Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400, 409 (Wyo. 1977). Viewing the record in 
the light most favorable to Brett, we must determine whether there is competent 
evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Brett intended only to 
make temporary use of the vehicle.

[¶23]   In addition to remarks made by both 
attorneys in their opening and closing remarks, which indicate that Brett's 
intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim of his property was at 
issue, the evidence showed that Brett only drove the truck four blocks and 
walked away from the vehicle, the undamaged truck was recovered within half an 
hour, in plain view, in the middle of the parking lot, and none of its contents 
were missing. While the trial court may not have been convinced that Brett did 
not intend to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle, that determination 
is not for the trial court or this Court. It is a factual issue for the jury to 
decide.

[¶24]   The trial court failed to provide 
the jury with the statutory definition of a term which described an essential 
element of the crime of larceny, which was fairly raised by Brett and was 
material to this case. "[T]he failure to give any instruction on an essential 
element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, requiring reversal of the 
defendant's conviction." Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 662 (Wyo. 1993) 
(citations omitted.). Therefore, we reverse the conviction based on the trial 
court's failure to properly instruct the jury.

Proposed Jury 
Instruction E

[¶25]   Finally, Brett contends that the 
trial court erred when it refused to give the following 
instruction:

Defendant's 
Proposed Instruction No. E

Evidence has 
been introduced tending to show that at the time the crime of Burglary as 
defined in Instruction No. ____ was allegedly committed, the defendant was 
suffering from self-induced intoxication.

Self-induced 
intoxication is a defense to the crime of Burglary if the defendant was 
intoxicated to such a degree that he was unable to formulate the intention to 
commit larceny or to commit the felony, being the larceny of a vehicle worth 
more than $500.00, at the time he entered the vehicle without 
authority.

Intoxication is 
self-induced if it is caused by substances which the defendant knows or ought to 
know have the tendency to cause intoxication and which he knowingly and 
voluntarily introduced or allowed to be introduced into his body unless the 
substances were introduced into his body pursuant to medical advice. The fact 
that the defendant was dependent upon the intoxicating substance is not relevant 
in determining whether his intoxication was self-induced.

Accordingly, if 
you find that the defendant, at the time of the unauthorized entry alleged in 
Instruction No. ____ was suffering from self-induced intoxication to such a 
degree that there is a reasonable doubt in your minds whether the defendant 
possessed the mental ability to form the intention to commit larceny or to 
commit the felony, being the larceny of a vehicle worth more than $500.00, at 
the time he entered the vehicle without authority as required by Instruction No. 
_____, then you should find the defendant not guilty of the crime of 
Burglary.

Source: [WYO. 
STAT.] § 6-1-202 [and] WPJIC 8.18 Self-induced 
Intoxication.

[¶26]   Again, the State does not argue 
that the instruction did not accurately reflect Wyoming law or that the issue of 
intoxication was sufficiently covered by other instructions to the jury. The 
right to a self-intoxication instruction rests upon whether the offered 
instruction is sufficient to inform the court of the defendant's theory and 
there must be competent evidence in the record to support the theory. Goodman, 
573 P.2d  at 408 (citations omitted). Brett was charged with a crime of specific 
intent, burglary. His intent at the time he entered the vehicle is a separate 
element of the offense charged. Id. at 411 (quoting State v. Caldrain, 115 N.H. 
390, 342 A.2d 628, 629 (1975)). The jury may consider whether intoxication could 
prevent the formation of the requisite intent if there is competent evidence of 
intoxication. Id.

[¶27]   In determining whether the issue of 
voluntary intoxication was fairly raised, we must view all the evidence in a 
light favorable to the defendant. Id. at 412. Aside from the numerous references 
to the intoxication issue during opening and closing arguments by both counsel, 
the police report showed that "the suspect had the strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from his person and breath, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, 
and the suspect was a little unsteady on his feet." Brett was carrying a half 
pint of vodka and three cans of beer when he was stopped. Brett left his 
cigarettes in the victim's vehicle and when the officer told him he knew what 
kind of cigarettes he smoked, Brett asked the officer how he knew what brand he 
smoked. Brett even asked the officer if he was a lawyer. In all, of ninety-one 
pages of witness testimony, thirty-three pages refer in one way or another to 
Brett's level of intoxication. Competent evidence was developed in the record 
during trial to support the requested instruction. "[T]he assurance of a fair 
trial requires an affirmative consideration of the intoxication issue by the 
jury under proper instructions." Id. It was, therefore, error for the trial 
court to refuse the intoxication instruction. Id.

CONCLUSION

[¶28]   The trial court erred in 
instructing the jury, denying Brett his right to due process under the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions. We reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring and 
dissenting.

[¶29]   I agree that this conviction must 
be reversed because of the failure of the trial court to instruct on the 
statutory definition of the word "deprive" found in WYO. STAT. § 6-3-401 (1997). 
I would not, however, find any error in the failure to give the requested 
instruction on the defense of involuntary intoxication.

[¶30]   My understanding of the evidence in 
the record differs from that described in the majority opinion. The only 
evidence in the record, from which intoxication might be inferred, is found in 
the testimony of the victim that he could smell beer in his pickup when he 
recovered it and in the report of the arresting officer that is summarized in 
this way:

The suspect had 
the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his person and breath, his 
eyes were watery and bloodshot, and the suspect was a little unsteady on his 
feet.

While this 
information is reiterated several times in the record, it is the same 
information, and its weight is not enhanced by repetition. Even when confronted 
with the notation in his report, the arresting officer was unequivocal and 
unwavering in his testimony that, in his opinion, Brett was not intoxicated. 
This is a subject about which the lay person can give an opinion (State v. 
Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539 (1947)), although the experienced officer 
well might have qualified as an expert. Brett did not 
testify.

[¶31]   The evidence upon which the 
majority relies would serve to establish that Brett had consumed intoxicating 
beverages, and, in the absence of the opinion of the officer, might suffice for 
purposes of the instruction. Even in that event, however, it is nothing more 
than an invitation to the jury to speculate, which is not permissible. See 
Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d 1049 (Wyo. 1984). Given the state of the evidence 
in this case, the district court did not err in refusing to give the instruction 
on voluntary intoxication. While the proffered instruction was a correct 
statement of the law, it was not supported by the 
evidence.