Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Robert Joseph Ratiner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-689 
____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT JOSEPH RATINER, 
Respondent. 
 
[June 24, 2010] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that respondent Robert 
Joseph Ratiner, a member of The Florida Bar since 1990, be found guilty of 
professional misconduct and disciplined.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, 
Fla. Const. 
 
For the reasons explained below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact 
and recommendations as to guilt.  We also approve the mitigating factors and the 
aggravating factors found by the referee.  With regard to discipline, however, we 
disapprove the referee’s alternative recommendations of disbarment or a two-year 
 
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suspension.  Instead, we impose a public reprimand and a suspension of sixty days, 
followed by two years’ probation with certain conditions. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint alleging ethical violations and seeking 
discipline against respondent, who is plaintiffs’ counsel in a civil suit against E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (DuPont) regarding alleged harm to plaintiffs 
from their exposure to Benlate.  The Bar sought discipline for alleged misconduct 
during a deposition of a representative of DuPont that was held in Wilmington, 
Delaware, during May 14-18, 2007.  The Bar’s complaint charged respondent with 
violations of the following Rules Regulating the Florida Bar:  3-4.3 (Misconduct 
and Minor Misconduct); 3-4.4 (Criminal Misconduct); 4-3.5 (Disruption of a 
Tribunal); 4-4.4(a) (In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or 
knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a 
person.); 4-8.4(a) (A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another.); 4-8.4(b) (A lawyer shall not commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.); 4-8.4(d) (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
 
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justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, 
humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or 
other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, 
ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual 
orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic.). 
 
After the filing of the complaint, the matter was referred to a referee.  The 
Bar presented as evidence to the referee, without objection from respondent, the 
video recording and transcript of the entire five-day deposition.  The Bar also 
presented as evidence to the referee, again without objection from respondent, 
information about respondent’s 2006 diversion to the Bar’s practice and 
professionalism enhancement program to resolve a grievance previously filed 
against him.  The referee possessed all of this evidence prior to conducting the 
summary judgment hearing.  The parties then filed respective motions for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of guilt.  At the hearing on the motions for partial 
summary judgment, the Bar clarified that its complaint was solely based on alleged 
misconduct that was captured in a three-minute video clip involving a 
confrontation between respondent and opposing counsel with regard to 
respondent’s personal laptop computer (―laptop incident‖).  The Bar affirmatively 
advised the referee that it was limiting its complaint to the laptop incident and did 
not intend to address any other video recordings or portions of the transcript from 
 
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the five-day deposition that it submitted to the referee.  The Bar advised the referee 
of the limitation of the complaint because the grievance committee had previously 
considered other instances of alleged misconduct by respondent during the May 
2007 deposition and had found no probable cause for finding professional 
violations except for the laptop incident. 
 
After the hearing, the referee granted portions of the Bar’s motion for partial 
summary judgment, basing his findings of fact and conclusions of law on the Bar’s 
motion, its attachments, and the video clip of the laptop incident.  The referee 
recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating rules 3-4.3, 4-3.5, 4-
4.4(a), 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d).  The referee made the following findings of fact in 
support of his recommendation of guilt. 
During the course of the deposition, [opposing counsel] attempted to 
place an exhibit sticker on the Respondent’s laptop computer. 
Just prior to [opposing counsel’s] attempting to place the exhibit 
sticker on the computer, the Respondent was standing up and 
speaking forcefully towards [opposing counsel]. 
As soon as [opposing counsel] attempted to place the exhibit sticker 
on the computer, the Respondent very briefly touched [opposing 
counsel’s] hand, then attempted to run around the table towards [him]. 
Additionally, the [deponent] expressed that she was very scared as a 
result of the Respondent’s conduct. 
The Respondent’s own consultant had to attempt to calm the 
Respondent down and specifically told the Respondent to ―take a 
Xanax.‖ 
 
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Further, while the Respondent was acting as described above, the 
court reporter stated, ―I can’t work like this!‖ 
Respondent then proceeded to forcefully lean over the deposition 
table, lambast [opposing counsel] in a tirade while proceeding to tear 
up the evidence sticker, wad it up and flick or toss it in the direction of 
[opposing counsel]. 
The Respondent’s conduct during the deposition was outrageous, 
disruptive, and intimidating to the witness, opposing counsel, and 
other persons present during the deposition and otherwise prejudicial 
to the administration of justice. 
 
The referee also granted portions of respondent’s motion for partial 
summary judgment, finding that respondent did not commit any criminal acts 
during the laptop incident and thus concluded that respondent was not guilty of 
violating rules 3-4.4 and 4-8.4(b). 
Nearly a month after the initial hearing, the referee held a sanction hearing.  
The referee heard testimony from respondent, his trial consultant, and one of his 
law partners about respondent’s character and good reputation.  The referee also 
considered affidavits filed by the deponent and the court reporter present during 
the laptop incident. 
After considering the above, the referee ultimately made two alternative 
recommendations as to discipline.  As his primary recommendation, the referee 
recommends that respondent be disbarred.  As to this recommendation, the referee 
stated: 
 
I recognize that disbarment is an extreme sanction. . . .  The 
practice of law is a privilege.  The Supreme Court of Florida has the 
 
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power to revoke the license of an attorney whose unfitness to practice 
law has been duly established.  The Florida Bar, in this case before 
me, has established that unfitness. 
(Citation omitted.) 
 
In making this recommendation, the referee found and considered the 
following aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  In aggravation, the referee 
found that respondent (1) exhibited a pattern of misconduct, (2) committed 
multiple offenses, (3) refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, 
and (4) had substantial experience in the practice of law.  The aggravating factor of 
a pattern of misconduct was based in part on various acts of the respondent during 
the 2007 deposition, for which the grievance committee found no probable cause 
and for which the respondent was not charged.  Those acts included the utterance 
by the respondent of a series of belligerent, abusive, and vulgar comments in the 
course of the 2007 deposition.  The pattern-of-misconduct aggravating factor was 
also based on the conduct underlying a grievance committee report of diversion 
filed in September 2006.  That report related in part to abusive conduct by the 
respondent at depositions in a case beginning in 2002. 
In mitigation, the referee found that respondent had (1) an absence of a prior 
disciplinary history, (2) an absence of a dishonest motive, and (3) emotional 
problems.  The referee also found as additional mitigation the fact that respondent 
 
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―appear[ed] to have an intelligent understanding of the law, as well as the facts 
surrounding the various cases he [was] prosecuting on behalf of his clients.‖ 
As an alternative to the recommendation of disbarment, the referee 
recommends ―Plan B‖—a two-year suspension with conditions.  In making this 
alternative recommendation, the referee stated:  ―Outrageous misconduct in court 
and at depositions must be subject to discipline.  Attorneys who believe they will 
not be sanctioned or disciplined for unprofessional conduct will, by nature, 
continue to try and get away with it.‖ 
Additionally, the referee recommends that the following conditions should 
accompany any imposed discipline:  (1) a requirement that respondent attend 
mental health counseling to address anger management; (2) a requirement that 
future depositions conducted or attended by respondent be videotaped or that he be 
required to have co-counsel present at such depositions; and (3) a requirement that 
respondent write letters of apology to the persons involved in the May 2007 
deposition—the deponent, all court reporters, and the videographer. 
Respondent challenges whether he should be disbarred based on his conduct 
during a single deposition when he has no prior disciplinary history.  Respondent 
initially argued that public reprimand is the appropriate discipline in this case.  
However, at the oral argument, he acknowledged that a short-duration suspension 
with other conditions might be the appropriate suspension.  Respondent further 
 
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argues that the referee failed to consider mitigating factors and improperly 
considered certain matters as aggravating factors.  Finally, he argues that the 
referee’s probationary term that requires all of his future depositions to be 
videotaped is not authorized under the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  The Bar 
answers the issues raised by respondent and in turn raises a single issue on cross-
petition, arguing that a suspension for two years is appropriate because respondent 
has ―habitually terrorized attorneys and others with explosive behavior.‖ 
ANALYSIS 
 
Neither party challenges the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations 
as to guilt.  We therefore approve those findings and recommendations without 
further comment. 
 
First, we consider the respondent’s challenge to the pattern-of-misconduct 
aggravating factor.  A referee’s findings in aggravation carry a presumption of 
correctness and should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the 
record.  See Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 3d 928, 936 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 
848 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 2003); see also Fla. Bar v. Morse, 784 So. 2d 414, 415-
16 (Fla. 2001); Fla. Bar v. Bustamante, 662 So. 2d 687, 687 (Fla. 1995); Fla. Bar v. 
Hecker, 475 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 1985). 
 
Contrary to the respondent’s argument, it is not necessary for misconduct to 
have been a basis for discipline in order for it to be considered in aggravation.  
 
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Here, the respondent’s pattern of engaging in abusive conduct is relevant to the 
appropriate sanction to be imposed for the violations at issue in this case.  We 
therefore reject the respondent’s argument regarding aggravation. 
 
Next, respondent urges us to find additional mitigation in this case, 
specifically: (1) absence of a selfish motive on the part of respondent; (2) his good 
character and reputation; and (3) respondent’s expression of remorse.  Merely 
because there is some evidence pertaining to a mitigating factor does not mean that 
that evidence rises to the level necessary to support a finding of that mitigator.  Cf. 
Ticktin.  Here, we conclude that the referee’s failure to find such alleged mitigation 
is not clearly erroneous.  Therefore, we reject respondent’s argument that we 
should apply additional mitigating factors in considering the appropriate discipline 
to be imposed in this case. 
 
Finally, both parties seek review of the referee’s alternative 
recommendations as to discipline.  Respondent seeks review of the referee’s 
nonfinding of other mitigating factors, the alternative recommendations for 
disbarment or a two-year suspension, and the recommended probationary 
conditions.  The Bar seeks review, arguing in favor of the referee’s recommended 
two-year suspension, with the probationary conditions. 
 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
 
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ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw and 
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 
555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  Here, we disapprove the referee’s alternative 
recommendations for discipline because neither of his recommendations for 
discipline is reasonably based on existing caselaw and the standards.1 
 
The referee reported that he considered the following cases prior to 
recommending discipline: Florida Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2006); 
Florida Bar v. Morgan, 938 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2006); Florida Bar v. Morgan, 791 So. 
2d 1103 (Fla. 2001);2 Florida Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2001); Florida 
Bar v. Martocci, 699 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1997); Florida Bar v. Wasserman, 675 So. 
2d 103 (Fla. 1996); DeBock v. State, 512 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1987); Florida Bar v. 
Hirsch, 342 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1977); Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 
1972); Florida Bar v. Pahules, 233 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1970).  However, it is evident 
                                          
 
 
1.  Referees assigned to enter findings of fact and to make recommendations 
as to guilt in lawyer disciplinary cases should present a single recommended 
sanction having its basis in the case law and the standards. 
 
2.  We disposed of this disciplinary case against respondent Morgan by way 
of an unpublished order. 
 
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from the referee’s report that he found little or no relation between the cases cited 
above and the facts in this case.  The referee acknowledges that his ―review of the 
case law set [forth] reveals that there is no case directly on point with the 
misconduct set forth in the Bar’s complaint.‖  Nonetheless, the referee urges us to 
impose the recommended discipline on respondent, even though there is a dearth of 
caselaw on point that provides support for imposing disbarment or a two-year 
suspension.  The Bar also acknowledges that the existing caselaw does not support 
a recommendation that disbarment or a two-year rehabilitative suspension be 
imposed for the kind of misconduct involved in this case.  We decline to impose 
either of the alternative recommended sanctions.  Rather, we disapprove the 
recommendations as not reasonably based on existing caselaw or standards.3 
We find that two of the cases cited by the referee have some relevance to the 
facts before us: Tobkin, 944 So. 2d at 219, and Morgan, 938 So. 2d at 496.  In both 
                                          
 
 
3.  The referee relied upon standard 7.1 to support disbarment.  Standard 7.1 
provides: 
 
Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages 
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the 
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious 
or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 
However, the report of the referee is unclear as to how he believes that respondent 
knowingly caused serious or potentially serious injury to the public or the legal 
system.  Furthermore, there is nothing in the record on review that provides 
support for such a determination, which is crucial for applying standard 7.1.  Thus, 
we conclude that standard 7.1 is inapplicable here. 
 
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of these cases the respondents were found guilty of violating their professional 
duties and were disciplined by lengthy suspensions for exhibiting behavior that is 
comparable to the misconduct respondent Ratiner displayed in the laptop incident.  
Respondent Tobkin received a ninety-one-day suspension for engaging in 
unprofessional behavior during pretrial discovery.  Respondent Morgan also 
received a ninety-one-day suspension for verbally abusing a judge.  Yet, the instant 
case is distinguishable from the referenced cases.  First, in Tobkin and Morgan 
each respondent exhibited more egregious behavior than that of which respondent 
Ratiner has been found guilty.  In Tobkin, the respondent was charged in a four-
count complaint with violating Bar rules in connection with his representation of 
two plaintiff clients in medical malpractice lawsuits.  See Tobkin, 944 So. 2d at 
219.  Tobkin was found to have exhibited objectionable conduct during pretrial 
discovery and objectionable behavior at a cancer treatment center—snatching 
medical records from opposing counsel—that resulted in security personnel being 
called to restrain him.  See id. at 221-22.  Tobkin was also found guilty of 
disobeying court orders and filing sham pleadings in the course of representing 
clients.  See id. at 226.  In Morgan, the respondent was involved in a hostile and 
disrespectful verbal tirade directed at the presiding judge in open court during a 
felony trial.  See Morgan, 938 So. 2d at 497-98.  By comparison, the misconduct of 
respondent here was directed at opposing counsel in a conference room at a civil 
 
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discovery deposition.  Additionally, both Tobkin and Morgan had been previously 
disciplined for certain similar misconduct.  Respondent Ratiner has not been 
previously disciplined by this Court. 
 
As for relevant standards, standard 7.2 provides:  ―Suspension is appropriate 
when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as 
a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the 
legal system.‖  Here, respondent’s misconduct caused injury to the legal system 
itself.  His unprofessional behavior occurred in Delaware and in the presence of the 
deponent, a member of the public, and others.  It is evident that respondent’s brief 
grabbing of opposing counsel’s hand, his movement around the conference table, 
and his act of tearing off the exhibit sticker and flicking the wadded-up sticker at 
opposing counsel during the laptop incident were intentional acts that he knew or 
certainly should have known violated his professional duties as a Florida attorney.  
Respondent’s unprofessional, belligerent conduct during the laptop incident is an 
embarrassment to all members of The Florida Bar.4 
 
Based on standard 7.2 and the cases discussed above, we conclude that 
respondent Ratiner should be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days.  
                                          
 
 
4.  The referee has suggested and we agree that members of the Bar and law 
students could view the video recording of the laptop incident in the context of a 
course on professionalism as a glaring example of how not to conduct oneself in a 
legal proceeding. 
 
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Even though the suspension term imposed is not one that would require respondent 
to prove rehabilitation prior to reinstatement, we must emphasize that respondent’s 
behavior during the laptop incident was unacceptable and unbecoming of any 
member of the Bar, especially one who has been a practicing attorney for more 
than nineteen years.  In recognition of this, we determine that the sanction of a 
suspension should be coupled with a public reprimand and should be followed by a 
two-year period of probation.  During the probationary period, respondent shall be 
required to undergo mental health counseling and prepare and mail letters of 
apology to the deponent, the court reporters, and the videographer present during 
the May 2007 deposition at issue.  Further, during the probationary period, he shall 
be accompanied by co-counsel approved by the Bar during any depositions and 
other legal proceedings where a judge is not presiding or, alternatively, he shall 
ensure that such appearances or proceedings are video-recorded. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Robert Joseph Ratiner is hereby directed to appear before the 
Board of Governors of The Florida Bar for a public reprimand at a date and time to 
be determined by the Board.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(d).  He is also 
suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, followed by two years’ 
probation under the conditions as set forth above.  The suspension will be effective 
thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that respondent can close out his 
 
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practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If respondent notifies this 
Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to 
protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension 
effective immediately.  Respondent shall accept no new business from the date this 
opinion is filed until the suspension is completed. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Robert Joseph Ratiner 
in the amount of $3,665.83, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Randi Klyman Lazarus, Bar 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, PLC, Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent