Case Title: MATTER OF ESTATE OF MAGELSSEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14201 I N THE SUPREME CCWlT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 IJS' THE MA?TER OF THE ESTATE O F WILLIAM M A G E L S S E N , Deceased. Appeal f r m : D i s k r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appllant: Church, Harris, Johnson and W i l l i a m s , Great Falls, Mntana Douglas C. Allen argued, Great Falls Mntana George R. Crotty argued, Great Falls, Mntana For Respondent: John M. Schiltz argued, Kalispell, Pbntana Filed : suhitted: October 20, 1978 ~ecided: J U L 3 1 9 7 9 M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Paul McCann, t h e personal representative of t h e e s t a t e of William Magelssen, deceased, appeals from an order of t h e Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court determining attorney f e e s owed t o t h e law f i r m of Hutton, Sheehy and Cromley. This case arose when Paul McCann p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s - t r i c t Court, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-634 MCA, f o r review of compensation owed t o t h e a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e e s t a t e , Hutton, Sheehy and Cromley. The D i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t t h e ordinary s e r v i c e s of probate w e r e 9 5 percent completed a t d a t e of discharge, and t h a t , according t o a c o n t r a c t of employment between Paul McCann and John C. Sheehy, t h e law firm agreed t o handle t h e ordinary s e r v i c e s t o t h e e s t a t e f o r a f e e of 3 percent of t h e e s t a t e valuation f o r f e d e r a l estate t a x purposes. Accordingly, t h e D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t t h e law firm was e n t i t l e d t o 95 percent of 3 percent of t h e e s t a t e value f o r f e d e r a l estate tax purposes. Paul McCann appeals from t h i s determination. The f a c t s giving rise t o t h i s controversy a r e a s f o l - lows. William Magelssen died on September 17, 1976, leaving an e s t a t e valued i n excess of t h r e e and one-half m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . H i s w i l l named J u l i a Magelssen, h i s sister, and Paul McCann a s co-personal representatives. The co-personal representatives engaged John C. Sheehy and h i s firm, Hutton, Sheehy and Cromley, t o provide l e g a l s e r v i c e s f o r them a s co-personal representatives of t h e estate. Later, on October 11, 1976, t h e co-personal repre- s e n t a t i v e s had a meeting i n which t h e attorney f e e s w e r e discussed, and as a r e s u l t of t h i s meeting, attorney Sheehy wrote a l e t t e r confirming t h e conversation and t h e agreed upon fee. The letter, dated October 13, 1976, read i n per- ti nen t p a r t : "Also discussed was our attorneys' f e e i n con- nection with t h e handling of t h e estate. Paul reported t h a t some h e i r s wanted t o hold down t h e c o s t of administration, p a r t i c u l a r l y the attorneys' fees. Paul a l s o s t a t e d he could see a possible ' c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t ' when t h e valu- a t i o n of t h e estate f o r inheritance taxes,oc.curs. Nonetheless I s t a t e d t h a t our firm would charge t h e f u l l 3% of t h e value of t h e e s t a t e f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x purposes f o r t h e ordinary s e r v i c e s t o t h e e s t a t e . " There being no response t o t h i s l e t t e r , t h e law firm continued representing t h e estate with t h e understanding t h a t t h e let- ter s t a t e d the agreed upon fee. Eight months l a t e r , on June 17, 1977, McCann signed t h e f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x r e t u r n on which was recorded an amount f o r attorney f e e s , computed a t 3 percent of t h e value of t h e e s t a t e appraised f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x purposes. J u l i a Magelssen, one of t h e co-personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , died on June 16, 1977, leaving Paul McCann a s t h e s o l e per- sonal representative. John C. Sheehy and h i s law firm continued t o represent t h e estate of William Magelssen u n t i l J u l y 27, 1977, when Sheehy and h i s law firm were discharged by McCann because of personal differences e x i s t i n g between McCann and attorney Sheehy. After t h e discharge, Paul McCann p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t pursuant t o s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-634 MCA, t o review t h e a t t o r - ney f e e s charged by Sheehy and h i s law firm. Pursuant t o t h i s p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t held an evidentiary hearing. A t t r i a l , attorney Sheehy and h i s partner, George Hutton, t e s t i f i e d on t h e work already performed f o r t h e e s t a t e and t h a t which remained t o be done. Attorney Hutton t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n h i s opinion, very l i t t l e work remained t o be done. Attorney Bjarne Johnson, who t e s t i f i e d on be- half of t h e personal representative, s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of work y e t t o be completed. Needless t o say, t h e r e w a s s i g n i f i c a n t disagreement between Sheehy and Hutton on t h e one hand and Bjarne Johnson on t h e o t h e r hand, a s t o what c o n s t i t u t e d ordinary s e r v i c e s and t h e com- p l e x i t y of t h e work entailed. During t h e course of t h e hearing Paul McCann moved t o r e q u i r e attorney Sheehy t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e p r e c i s e number of hours t h a t h i s firm had worked on t h e e s t a t e of William Magelssen, but t h e c o u r t refused t o admit t h i s evidence and a l s o refused t o admit evidence on t h e number of hours needed t o complete t h e estate. The District Court took j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e documents prepared and already f i l e d a s p a r t of t h e e s t a t e proceedings and of o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s engaged i n by t h e attorneys on behalf of t h e e s t a t e . The c o u r t ruled t h a t a c o n t r a c t f o r compensation was contained i n t h e October 13, 1976 letter from Sheehy t o McCann, and t h a t t h i s c o n t r a c t was later r a t i f i e d by McCann i n signing t h e estate t a x r e t u r n which specified t h e same f e e t o be paid. The c o n t r a c t w a s f o r ordinary s e r v i c e s a t a f e e of 3 percent of t h e e s t a t e value a s set f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x purposes. The c o u r t determined t h a t t h e ordinary l e g a l services f o r t h e e s t a t e were 95 percent completed, and set t h e f e e on t h a t basis. The f e e was computed t o be $106,464.42. The c o u r t order a l s o provided f o r adjustment of t h i s f e e i n t h e event t h e f e d e r a l taxing a u t h o r i t i e s revised t h e i r valuation of the e s t a t e . The personal representative makes several assignments of e r r o r . H e contends f i r s t t h a t a v a l i d c o n t r a c t f o r a t - torney f e e s did not e x i s t between t h e personal representa- t i v e s and the l a w firm, and therefore t h e proper measure of compensation should be based on guantum meruit. Secondly, he contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t apply t h e appro- p r i a t e standard of review under s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-634 MCA. Third, he contends t h a t t h e evidence was not s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f i r s t a t t a c k s t h e a l l e g e d c o n t r a c t between him and t h e a t t o r n e y s on t h e theory t h a t a c o n t r a c t f o r f e e s entered i n t o a f t e r t h e inception of t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s void. The p r e v a i l i n g r u l e is t h a t a t t o r n e y f e e c o n t r a c t s made a f t e r t h e establishment of t h e f i d u c i a r y a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p a r e v a l i d i f they are " f a i r and equitable." See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 701, 710. Fairness i s determined by taking account of such rele- v a n t f a c t o r s a s good f a i t h and f u l l - d i s c l o s u r e i n t h e execu- t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e amount of t h e f e e and t h e c l i e n t ' s maturity, i n t e l l i g e n c e , and understsnding, of t h e transac- t i o n . Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 701, 711; Daniels v. Paddock (1965), 145 Mont. 207, 2 2 2 , 399 P.2d 740, 747; Coleman v. Sisson (1924), 71 Mont. 435, 443, 230 P. 582, 584. The bur- den of e s t a b l i s h i n g f a i r n e s s is on t h e attorney. Daniels v. Paddock, supra; 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys -- a t Law, S267. The record contains s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n support of t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e agreed f e e . The t e r m s of t h e at- t o r n e y ' s employment were made unequivocally c l e a r i n t h e October 13, 1976 letter. The personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s acknowledged r e c e i p t of t h e l e t t e r and, a t t r i a l , personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e McCann t e s t i f i e d t h a t he understood t h e mean- i n g of t h e letter. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e s p e c i f i e d f e e arrangement f o r a t least seven more months, during which t i m e t h e a t t o r n e y s continued t o perform l e g a l services f o r t h e e s t a t e . Moreover, a t a l a t e r t i m e , per- sonal representative McCann signed t h e f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x r e t u r n on which t h e 3 percent f e e was c l e a r l y s t a t e d . Nor does t h e evidence i n d i c a t e t h a t McCann w a s inexperienced i n t h e ways of t h e world. Personal representative McCann w a s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y well-educated and experienced man. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he i s t h e o f f i c e r of a major corporation, a c e r t i f i e d public ac- countant and is licensed t o p r a c t i c e l a w i n two states, I l l i n o i s and North Dakota. H e entered i n t o t h e c o n t r a c t with h i s eyes open and with f u l l awareness of t h e implica- t i o n s . W e agree with t h e conclusion of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t he r a t i f i e d t h e f e e agreement. Section 13-325, R.C.M. 1947, now section 28-2-503(2) MCA; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 701, 745. Next, t h e personal representative argues t h a t s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, R.C.M. 1947, now section 72-3-634 MCA, which provides f o r j u d i c i a l review of attorney fees, imparts an "overriding consideration of reasonableness" t h a t e f f e c t i v e l y i n v a l i d a t e s t h e t e r m s of any c o n t r a c t f o r probate-related services. This s e c t i o n provides: "Proceedings f o r review of employment of agents and cornpensat= o f s G a 1 r e p r e s e n t ~ i v e s and employees of e s t a t e -- c o u r t -- t o set disputed fee. Upon t h e f i l i n g of a motion f o r settlement of f e e s by t h e c o u r t f i l e d by an i n t e r e s t e d per- son, t h e personal representative o r t h e person employed by t h e personal representative and af- ter n o t i c e t o a l l i n t e r e s t e d persons, t h e pro- p r i e t y of employment of any person by a personal representative including any attorney, a u d i t o r , investment advisor o r o t h e r specialized agent o r a s s i s t a n t , t h e reasonableness of t h e compen- s a t i o n of any person so employed, o r t h e rea- sonableness of t h e compensation determined by t h e personal representative f o r h i s own s e r v i c e s , s h a l l be reviewed and determined by t h e court. I n any dispute concerning f e e s , t h e c o u r t s h a l l s e t t h e fee. Any person who has received exces- s i v e compensation from an e s t a t e f o r s e r v i c e s rendered may be ordered to make appropriate re- funds." The provision does not restrict the personal repre- sentative's capacity or freedom to contract, except that he may not contract for excessive fees. Nor can this section be read in isolation from other provisions of the probate code. Section 91A-3-713(21), R.C.M. 1947, now section 72-3- 613(21) MCA, specifically authorizes the personal representa- tive to employ, and therefore to contract for, the services of an attorney. Section 91A-3-720, R.C.M. 1947, now section 72-3-633 MCA, entitled "Compensation of Attorney" merely places a ceiling on the amount of compensation payable to an attorney for ordinary services. These provisions establish the boundaries of the personal representative's authority to contract for the services of an attorney. The fee in- volved in the instant case fits within these limits. Accord- ingly, the fee contract was valid under the applicable provisions of the Montana Uniform Probate Code. Personal representative McCann next argues that attor- ney fees based on a fixed percentage of the estate value are against public policy because the attorney will inflate the value of the estate in order to increase his fee. This Court's duty is to construe the law as it is written. Sec- tion 93-401-15, R.C.M. 1947, now section 1-2-101 MCA. If no ambiguity exists in a statute, the letter of the law will not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Vaughn & Ragsdale v . State Board of Equalization (1939), 109 Mont. 52, 60, 96 P.2d 420, 424. The statutory provision governing compensation of attorneys in estate matters is section 91A-3-702, R.C.M. 1947, now section 72-3-633 MCA. In pertinent part it states that "if the services of an at- torney are engaged by the personal representative, the compensation of such attorney shall not exceed one and one half (1 1/2) t i m e s t h e compensation allowable t o t h e personal representative." The personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s allowed a "reasonable compensation" not t o exceed 3 percent of t h e f i r s t $40,000 of t h e reported e s t a t e value and 2 percent of t h e value over $40,000. Section 91A-3-719, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-631 MCA. W e f i n d no public policy i n these applicable s t a t u t e s t h a t would i n v a l i d a t e a fee c l e a r l y coming within t h e i r terms. W e next discuss t h e question of whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court's review of t h e attorney f e e s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 91A- 3-722 was proper. The personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e contends t h a t by invocation of t h i s s t a t u t e t h e D i s t r i c t Court is required t o f i x a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e without reference t o t h e t e r m s of an e x i s t i n g contract. But w e see no reason t o t o t a l l y ignore t h e terms of a c o n t r a c t between an attorney and t h e personal representative. The following e d i t o r i a l comment appears under s e c t i o n " I n view of t h e broad j u r i s d i c t i o n conferred on t h e probate c o u r t by s e c t i o n [91A-3-1053 , de- s c r i p t i o n of t h e s p e c i a l proceeding authorized by t h i s s e c t i o n might be unnecessary. But, t h e code's theory t h a t personal representatives may f i x t h e i r own f e e s - and those of e s t a t e attorneys marks an important departure from much e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e under which f e e s are determined by t h e c o u r t i n t h e f i r s t instance. Hence, it seemed w i s e t o emphasize t h a t any i n t e r e s t e d person can g e t j u d i c i a l review of f e e s i f he d e s i r e s it. Also, i f excessive f e e s have been paid, t h i s s e c t i o n provides a quick and e f f i c i e n t remedy." This comment focuses our a t t e n t i o n of t h e provision's p r i n c i - p a l u t i l i t y . I t provides i n t e r e s t e d persons with j u d i c i a l review t o guard a g a i n s t excessive f e e s set by a personal representative i n t h e exercise of h i s newly conferred discre- tion. I t is a s p e c i a l , formal proceeding i n which i n t e r e s t e d persons obtain a quick and e f f e c t i v e remedy a g a i n s t excessive compensation. Upon t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n under s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, t h e D i s t r i c t Court must determine i f t h e compensa- t i o n paid i s excessive i n l i g h t of a l l t h e circumstances. I n s o doing, the c o u r t is not s e t t i n g t h e f e e , it i s review- i n g t h e f e e arrangement. Naturally, t h e f a c t o r s bearing on reasonableness of court-awarded attorney f e e s must be taken i n t o account i n determining i f a p a r t i c u l a r f e e i s e i t h e r excessive o r reasonable. But under t h e probate code, it is t h e personal representative, not t h e c o u r t , who sets t h e f e e i n t h e first instance. I n explaining t h e national provision, Uniform Probate Code s e c t i o n 3-721, which i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, t h e Uniform Probate Code P r a c t i c e Manual s t a t e s : "The Code's t r a n s f e r of these matters t o the personal representative i n the f i r s t instance, with provision f o r review i n t h e case of dis- p u t e should tend t o promote p r i o r agreement between those i n t e r e s t e d i n estates, on t h e one hand, and those a s s i s t i n g i n administrations, on t h e other. I f more f e e agreements r e s u l t , d i s p u t e s and complaints about f e e s w i l l be fewer, whether t h e amounts involved remain t h e same, o r a r e increased o r decreased." Wellman, Uniform Probate Code P r a c t i c e Manual, 2d Ed. I Val- 1, p. 322. It is c l e a r t h a t a court, when reviewing a fee agreement under a s u b s t a n t i a l l y performed c o n t r a c t , cannot b l i n d i t s e l f t o t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t and make i t s own determination of what i s reasonable. I n t h e present case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t s e c t i o n 91A-3-713(21) (which empowers t h e personal representa- t i v e t o employ an attorney) and s e c t i o n 91A-3-722 (which allows t h e c o u r t t o review t h e employment of attorneys and t h e i r f e e s ) , must be construed together so as t o give e f f e c t t o each provision and make them compatible with each other. D i s t r i c t Applying t h i s standard, the/ Court found t h e amount of t h e f e e t o be reasonable on i t s f a c e as it w a s within t h e l i m i t s of compensation provided f o r i n s e c t i o n s 91A-3-719, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-631 MCA, and s e c t i o n 91A-3-720, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-633 MCA. A f t e r determining t h a t t h e s e r v i c e s w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y performed, t h e c o u r t concluded t h a t i t s t a s k w a s t o apportion t h e agreed com- pensation according t o t h e percentage of ordinary s e r v i c e s completed by t h e a t t o r n e y s a s of t h e d a t e of t h e i r discharge. O n t h e o t h e r hand, t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e con- tends t h a t once an a t t o r n e y is discharged, he can only be compensated on t h e b a s i s of quantum meruit, whereby recovery i s l i m i t e d exclusively t o t h e reasonable value of s e r v i c e s rendered on an hourly b a s i s . Again, he would have t h e c o u r t t o t a l l y d i s r e g a r d t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y performed c o n t r a c t be- tween t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and a t t o r n e y . W e note moreover t h a t s e c t i o n 91A-3-722 sets f o r t h no such measure of compensation. A s i n d i c a t e d previously, t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e can c o n t r a c t f o r an a t t o r n e y ' s s e r v i c e s ( s e c t i o n 91A-3- 713(21)) and under s e c t i o n 91A-3-808, R.C.M. 1947, now sec- t i o n 72-3-612 MCA, t h e e s t a t e is bound by such c o n t r a c t s . Though t h e f e e c o n t r a c t i s open t o review under s e c t i o n 91A-3-722, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 72-3-634 MCA, t h e amount of t h e f e e is n o t automatically converted i n t o a quantum meruit measure of compensation. Indeed, quantum meruit compensation is normally appropriate only where a v a l i d c o n t r a c t does n o t e x i s t . 7 Arn.Jur.2d Attorneys at a, 8232; H a r r i s v. Root (1903), 28 Mont. 159, 72 P. 429. W e emphasize t h a t t h i s i s n o t a case of a t t o r n e y f e e s assessed a g a i n s t an opposing p a r t y and awarded by t h e c o u r t pursuant t o a s t a t u t e . I n such case, t h e c o u r t determines t h e reasonableness of t h e f e e i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , and t h i s Court disapproves r e l i a n c e on contingency f e e c o n t r a c t s i n s e t t i n g t h e f e e . See e.g., S t a t e Department of Highways v. Schumacher (1979) , Mont. , 590 P.2d 1110, 36 St.Rep. 260, 266; S t a t e Highway Commission v. Marsh (1978), Mont. , 575 P.2d 38, 43, 35 St.Rep. 105, 110. I n t h i s case, however, t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e requested j u d i c i a l review and determination of compensation due under a v a l i d , s u b s t a n t i a l l y performed c o n t r a c t f o r s e r v i c e s . Under these circumstances t h e c o u r t must act as both f i n d e r of f a c t and as a r b i t e r between c o n t r a c t u a l l y bound p a r t i e s . W e do not b e l i e v e t h a t s e c t i o n 91A-3-722 was intended t o permit competent, f u l l y informed personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o disavow t h e i r otherwise enforceable c o n t r a c t s f o r a n a t t o r n e y ' s s e r v i c e s . Considering t h e p r i n c i p a l purpose of s e c t i o n 91A-3-722 and t h e exceptional circumstances surrounding i t s invocation i n t h i s case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g quantum -- meruit a s t h e measure of compensation. The c o u r t ' s threshhold determination of reasonableness, followed by an apportionment of t h e agreed f e e t o t h e percentage of t h e job completed, w a s proper. Based on t h e s e f a c t o r s , w e see no e r r o r i n t h e exclusion of evidence a s t o t h e a t t o r n e y ' s a c t u a l t i m e expended i n pro- bate. W e note i n t h i s regard t h a t t h e t i m e f a c t o r has, g e n e r a l l y speaking, played a r e l a t i v e l y minor r o l e i n d e t e r - mination by a c o u r t of reasonable a t t o r n e y f e e s i n probate. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 317, 325; 7 Arn.Jur.2d Attorneys - a t Law, 523%; I n re E s t a t e of Wood (Ohio App. 1977), 379 N.E. 2d - 256, 261. I n t h i s case, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court was f u l l y ad- v i s e d as t o t h e work completed i n r e l a t i o n to t h e work t h a t remained t o be done. Although w e consider t i m e a c t u a l l y spent on probate s e r v i c e s t o be r e l e v a n t t o a determination of reasonableness, w e do n o t f i n d i t s exclusion under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case t o be r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Nor do we f i n d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s provision allowing an adjustment of t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e event t h e e s t a t e value i s l a t e r revised upward o r downward by t h e f e d e r a l taxing a u t h o r i t i e s . The agreed upon considera- t i o n f o r t h e a t t o r n e y ' s s e r v i c e s was 3 percent of t h e e s t a t e value f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x purposes. Fixing t h e f e e i n proportion t o t h a t value was c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i n t e n t of t h e contracting p a r t i e s . The l a s t i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s t h a t t h e evidence d i d n o t support a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e con- t r a c t w a s 95 percent completed a t t h e t i m e of t h e a t t o r n e y ' s discharge. He contends t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l work t h a t re- mains t o be done. W e note t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y contracted t o perform t h e "ordinary services" f o r t h e e s t a t e . The evidence a t t r i a l w a s c o n f l i c t i n g a s t o whether t h e work remaining t o be done w a s of a n "ordinary" o r "extraordinary" nature. I t was t h e c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l determination which f i n a l l y set- t l e d on t h e finding of 95 percent completion. W e w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e our judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t where t h e r e w a s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support a finding of f a c t . Kosmerl v. Barbour (1979), Mont. , 589 P.2d 1017, 1019, 36 St-Rep. 210, 212-13; Gross v. Holzworth (1968), 151 Mont. 179, 185, 440 P.2d 765, 768. The D i s t r i c t Court heard testimony from both s i d e s and was n o t without i t s own knowledge on e s t a t e m a t t e r s i n general and t h i s e s t a t e i n p a r t i c u l a r . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e Concur: Cpief J u s t i c e / u & Q A m ~ o d . / ~ o e l G. Roth, D i s t r i c t ~ o u . h ! t Judge, s i t t i n g i n f o r M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy