Case Title: WARNER a/k/a RODRIGUEZ v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-27

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
WARNER a/k/a RODRIGUEZ v. STATE2001 WY 6728 P.3d 21Case Number: 00-27Decided: 08/01/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

 

                
THOMAS EUGENE WARNER, a/k/a                 

THOMAS 
RODRIGUEZ,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Hughes, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Hughes.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Cooley.

   

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
Appellant 
Thomas Eugene Warner appeals his convictions and sentences for second degree 
sexual assault and indecent liberties with a minor, contending that 
constitutional speedy and fair trial violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and 
unfair sentencing require that we reverse his conviction and sentence.  Finding no reversible error, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Warner 
states the issues as follows:

 

1.  Did the trial court err in permitting 
the testimony of Dr. Shana Tubach, pediatrician, on the State's rebuttal, 
depriving Appellant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, and err in 
denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial?

 

2.  Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial 
misconduct when he specifically mentioned uncharged misconduct evidence in 
closing that the court had ruled inadmissible and when he vouched for and 
commented on the credibility of witnesses?

 

3.  Was Appellant deprived of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial?

 

4.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
in determining the length of Appellant's sentences?

 

 

The 
State presents these issues for our review:

 

I.  Whether the trial court erred in 
permitting the testimony of Dr. Shana Tubach on rebuttal, and whether the trial 
court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial on this 
claim?

 

II.  Whether the prosecutor improperly 
mentioned uncharged misconduct evidence, and whether he improperly vouched for 
or commented on the credibility of the witnesses?

 

III.  Whether Appellant was deprived of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial?

 

IV.  Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining the length of Appellant's 
sentences?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In 1978, 
when he was fifteen years old, Warner began living with his half-sister, her 
husband, and their three children in Cheyenne.  He lived there continuously until 1981, 
returned briefly for a few months in 1983, and visited during the summer of 
1984. In November of 1989, one of the children, CM, then a ninth-grader, 
reported to a school counselor that her uncle had molested her. The Department 
of Family Services (DFS) conducted an investigation in February of 1990, and 
closed the case without action.  
Warner moved to Georgia and returned for a visit in 1997.  During that visit, Warner apologized to 
two of the children for molesting them.  
That apology was witnessed in part by the mother and another person, and 
the mother reported him to police. 

 

[¶4]           
On 
September 2, 1997, the investigating police officer located Warner at a downtown 
bar and interviewed him outside.  
The officer testified that he was investigating Warner for felony sexual 
assault crimes, but informed Warner that he was not under arrest, and was free 
to leave at any time.  After Warner 
agreed to speak with him, the officer described the allegations, and at that 
time, Warner admitted to the investigating officer that he had molested the 
children.  Warner agreed to go to 
the police station where he then refused to speak further without an 
attorney.  At trial, the officer 
testified that after Warner stated his intention to leave without making a 
statement, he received Warner's permission to take a photograph.  The officer testified that he took the 
photograph because Warner had earlier mentioned that he planned to return to his 
daughters in Norcross, Georgia, as soon as possible, and the officer wanted to 
have a photograph on file in the event that an arrest warrant issued.   Because he was not in custody, 
Warner was free to and did leave.  

 

[¶5]           
The 
State's investigation indicated that Warner had harmed all three children  and, on September 12, 1997, a warrant 
was issued for his arrest.  At some 
point, Warner apparently returned to Georgia, because in February of 1999, 
following a stop for a traffic violation in Georgia, the warrant showed on an 
NCIC check, and Warner was returned to Wyoming for trial on two counts of second 
degree sexual assault, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v), and two counts of 
immoral acts with a minor, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a). The amended 
information stated that he had committed all crimes during the period of 
February 1983 through May 1983, and, at that time, the sexual assault victim was 
less than twelve years of age and Warner was at least four years older than the 
victim.  In 1983, Warner was 19 
years old. 

 

[¶6]           
Warner 
was arraigned on March 3, 1999, and, on June 23, 1999, filed a motion to dismiss 
for lack of speedy trial.  That 
motion was denied after hearing.  In 
a pretrial hearing concerning the admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) of Warner's 
uncharged sexual abuse of another child, SP, the trial court 
stated:

 

I don't think the court can either 
grant or deny the motion.  The 
notice is here.  He's got, I think, 
the testimony of the earlier witnesses.  
So we'll decide as these witnesses are called.  I think we'll have to hear their 
testimony initially outside the presence of the jury.  So I'm going to proceed on that 
basis.  

 

Trial 
was held on July 12-14, 1999.  
During the trial, the court excused the jury, and the prosecutor 
questioned CM about her personal observations of Warner's sexual abuse of SP as 
an offer of proof for admission of the 404(b) evidence.  Following that proffer, the trial court 
ruled that separate uncharged acts perpetrated against SP were 
inadmissible.  

 

[¶7]           
Despite 
this ruling, during cross-examination of the DFS social worker, the prosecutor 
conducted the following cross-examination:

 

Q.  [Prosecutor]that's the date you 
interviewed [CM], isn't it?

 

A.     It 
is.

 

Q.    And the 
date you reduced this report to writing was, I believe from your prior testimony 
the 16th?

 

A.     That is 
correct.

 

Q.    Two 
weeks later, okay.  You noted in 
your report that you started out with talking to [CM] about good touch/bad 
touch, body parts, had a good understanding, it was then asked if anyone had 
ever touched her and she responded that her Uncle Tom had, Tom [Warner], [CM] 
also expressed that Tom had also abused her cousin 

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  Objection, Your 
Honor.

 

Q.  [Prosecutor]  
[SP]-

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  This is getting into 
prior information.  May we approach, 
Your Honor?

 

[The 
Court]:  Well, I'll sustain the 
objection.

 

[Prosecutor]:  I'll rephrase.  In the course of this interview as 
reflected by your report, did [CM] identify to you someone else that had been 
abused?

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  Objection, Your 
Honor.  This is 

 

[The 
Court]: Overruled.

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  Your Honor, -- Your 
Honor, may we approach the bench?

 

[The 
Court]:  No, no, you may 
not.

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  I would like to make a 
record, Your Honor.

 

[The 
Court]:  Ask your  Ask another 
question, Mr. Forwood.

 

            
* * *

[Prosecutor]:  You reflected in your notes that [CM] 
identified someone else that had been abused?

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:  Objection to 404(b), Your 
Honor, previous court ruling 

 

[Court]:  That question has been asked and 
answered.  Would you please ask the 
next question?  

 

 

Based on 
this conduct of the prosecutor, the defense counsel renewed its motion for 
judgment of acquittal and moved for mistrial.  Although the district court determined 
that the prosecutor's question was improper, it found that because the testimony 
thus far indicated that Warner had made admissions, no prejudice had resulted 
and denied both motions.  

 

[¶8]           
Defense 
counsel presented Ms. Huylar, the Department of Family Services social worker 
who, in 1990, had investigated CM's allegations against Warner.  Ms. Huylar described her investigation 
of the allegations and testified that the investigation ended by her 
determination that the allegations could not be substantiated.  On rebuttal and over defense's 
objection, the State had a pediatrician testify as an expert concerning proper 
forensic interview technique and the general behavior of child abuse 
victims.  Before cross-examination, 
the defense requested a mistrial which was denied.  The jury convicted Warner, and he was 
sentenced to consecutive sentences on each of the four counts.   This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Speedy 
Trial

 

[¶9]           
Warner 
contends that his right to speedy trial was violated because trial occurred 658 
days after the filing of the criminal complaint.  W.R.Cr.P. 48 governs the time period 
between arraignment and trial; however, delays between the time charged and the 
time of trial are subject to the Sixth Amendment.  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 655-56, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690, 2693-93, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992); 
Jennings v. State,  4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 2000).  This Court 
examines de novo the constitutional question of whether a defendant has been 
denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  We review the district court's factual 
findings for clear error.

 

[¶10]       
The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.    In deciding whether a 
defendant has been denied a speedy trial, courts must balance 1) the length of 
the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his 
right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant.  Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 
655 (Wyo. 2000); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 533 92 S. Ct. 2182, 
2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  None 
of these factors alone is sufficient to establish a speedy trial violation, 
"[r]ather they are related factors and must be considered together with such 
other circumstances as may be relevant."  
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.   "The determinative dynamic in our 
inquiry is whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, 
that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair 
trial."  Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 112 (Wyo. 1992).  When a 
speedy trial violation is found to have occurred, the charges must be 
dismissed.  Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 522, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188.

 

[¶11]       
The 
State contends that the district court properly denied Warner's motion to 
dismiss for speedy trial violation because the pretrial delay resulted when 
Warner fled the jurisdiction before a warrant could issue for his arrest.  Although we disagree that the record 
supports the State's contention, we find that an application of the four Barker 
factors leads us to conclude that Warner was not denied his right to a speedy 
trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

 

 

A.                 
 Length of Delay

 

[¶12]       
"[T]o 
trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval 
between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 
presumptively prejudicial' delay."  
Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 651-52, 112 S. Ct.  at 2690.  The State concedes that the 658-day 
delay is presumptively prejudicial.  
See Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 655-56.  Accordingly, we shall examine the other 
three factors.

 

 

B.        Reason for the 
Delay

 

[¶13]       
The 
State contends that the length of the delay was caused by Warner's fleeing the 
jurisdiction.  The record shows that 
at the time of the interview, police knew Warner was visiting from Georgia and 
planned to return to Georgia.  The 
record also shows that the police told Warner that he could not return to his 
half-sister's home where he was staying during his visit.  The State was unable to show that Warner 
knew that a warrant for his arrest had issued, or that the police attempted to 
serve it on Warner either in Cheyenne or Georgia.  According to Doggett, when the 
reason for delay is failure of the police to use reasonable diligence to seek 
the defendant and serve the arrest warrant, the record warrants a finding of 
official negligence, and this factor will weigh in favor of the defendant.  Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 656-57, 112 S. Ct.  at 2693.  The State 
has not proved that Warner caused the delay; however, the record is insufficient 
to determine whether the police did not use reasonable diligence to seek out 
Warner and serve the arrest warrant.  
Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

 

 

C.        
Defendant's Assertion of His Right

 

[¶14]       
This 
factor would weigh heavily against Warner if it were shown that he knew of the 
warrant for his arrest at the time that it issued rather than when he was 
actually arrested.  The record does 
not show that Warner knew the warrant had issued.  After he was arrested, he timely filed 
motions to dismiss asserting violation of his right to speedy trial, and this 
factor again weighs in his favor.

 

 

D.        
Prejudice to the Defendant

 

[¶15]       
Warner 
does not suggest that the reason for the delay entitles him to relief; instead, 
he contends that the delay prejudicially impaired his defense.  As the United States Supreme Court 
recognized, the importance of presumptive prejudice increases with the length of 
delay.  Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 
655-56, 112 S. Ct.  at 2692-93.  

 

Between 
diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay, official negligence in bringing an 
accused to trial occupies the middle ground.  While not compelling relief in every 
case where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is 
negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate 
exactly how it has prejudiced him.   

 

Id. 
at 
656-57, 112 S. Ct.  at 2693.  

 

[¶16]       
We agree 
with Warner that the length of his delay is not so substantial that he is 
relieved of showing actual trial prejudice.  He states that the delay allowed the 
witnesses to extensively discuss their statements with each other, and left him 
unable to locate a police officer who had investigated the 1989 charges and 
found them to be unsubstantiated.  
The State points out that a DFS worker who did testify at trial, not a 
police officer, found the charges to be unsubstantiated.  Warner does not point to any exculpatory 
evidence that was lost, and any prejudice by the witnesses' discussions with 
each other would have been minimal.  
This factor, therefore, weighs heavily in favor of the 
State.

 

[¶17]       
Balancing 
these factors in accordance with Barker, we hold that Warner cannot 
establish a Sixth Amendment violation.  
Any official negligence responsible for the delay between the date that 
the warrant issued and arrest does not weigh in Warner's favor although, after 
arrest, he timely asserted his speedy trial rights.  Also, Warner did not demonstrate any 
impairment of his defense, and the delay was not so long that dismissal should 
be virtually automatic.  No other 
facts or particular circumstances exist that require us to decide that factors 
in Warner's favor outweigh his failure to make the required showing of 
prejudice, and we find no speedy trial violation.

 

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 

[¶18]       
Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶9, 
__ P.3d __, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 
(Wyo. 1974)).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error, as the State concedes exists 
in this case, affected the accused's "substantial rights."  The accused's right to a fair trial is a 
substantial right.  Wyo. Const. art. 
1, §§ 6, 9, 10; and see e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 
(Wyo. 1978).  "Before we hold that 
an error has affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of 
a conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  
Earll, ¶9.

 

[¶19]       
The 
trial court ruled that any uncharged misconduct against SP was 
inadmissible.  During the State's 
cross-examination of DFS social worker, Ms. Huyler, the prosecutor inquired 
several times about defendant's abuse of SP.  Defense counsel vigorously objected; 
however, while agreeing that the inquiry was improper, the trial court 
determined that defendant had not been prejudiced and continued the trial.  On appeal, Warner contends that, by 
inquiring, the prosecutor committed misconduct warranting reversal and remand 
for new trial.  

 

[¶20]       
Inquiry 
into evidence previously ruled inadmissible may be allowed when 
cross-examination may properly impeach the defendant, or when the defendant has 
"opened the door."  Rubio v. 
State, 939 P.2d 238, 244 (Wyo. 1997); Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 (Wyo. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818 (1999).  "When the defendant initiates a line of 
questioning, the prosecutor is entitled to make a permissible inquiry without 
crossing into prosecutorial overkill." Id.   The defense did nothing that would 
permit this line of questioning, and we find that the trial court correctly 
ruled that the prosecutor's inquiries were improper and error.  We must, however, separately consider 
the ruling that Warner was not prejudiced by the prosecutorial misconduct.  

 

[¶21]       
"Appropriate 
objections and subsequent curative instructions may cure an error at 
trial."  Rubio,  939 P.2d  at 244.  In this case, the trial court did not 
issue a curative instruction to cure the error at trial.   We must also consider that 
although the trial court initially sustained defense counsel's objection, the 
prosecutor rephrased the question and again inquired about the same uncharged 
abuse of SP.  That objection was 
overruled, but as the trial court's later statements indicate, overruling was a 
mistake.  The prosecutor then asked 
the same question a third time before the court controlled the line of 
questioning.  The prosecutor 
emphasized the abuse of another child, and the error was not cured. 

[¶22]       
Under 
our harmless error analysis, we must judge whether the jury's verdict might have 
been different but for the prosecutorial misconduct.  We described the standard for evaluating 
trial error to be in consonance with the standard followed by the United States 
Supreme Court:  

 

Some 
aids to right judgment may be stated more safely in negative than in affirmative 
form.  Thus, it is not the appellate 
court's function to determine guilt or innocence.  Nor is it to speculate upon probable 
reconviction and decide according to how the speculation comes out.  Appellate judges cannot escape such 
impressions.  But they may not make 
them sole criteria for reversal or affirmance.  Those judgments are exclusively for the 
jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence legally sufficient to sustain 
the conviction unaffected by the error.

 

But this 
does not mean that the appellate court can escape altogether taking account of 
the outcome.  To weigh the error's 
effect against the entire setting of the record without relation to the verdict 
or judgment would be almost to work in a vacuum.  In criminal causes that outcome is 
conviction.  This is different, or 
may be, from guilt in fact.  It is 
guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen.  And the question is, not were they right 
in their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict.  It is rather what effect the error had 
or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision.  The crucial thing is the impact of the 
thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total 
setting.

 

            
This must take account of what the error meant to them, not singled out 
and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.  And one must judge others' reactions not 
by his own, but with allowance for how others might react and not be regarded 
generally as acting without reason.  
This is the important difference, but one easy to ignore when the sense 
of guilt comes strongly from the record.

 

            
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a 
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress.  But if one cannot say, with fair 
assurance after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected.  The inquiry cannot be 
merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase 
affected by the error.  It is 
rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.  If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, 
the conviction cannot stand.

 

Kotteakos 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-65, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 90 L.Ed. 1557  (1946) (citations and footnotes 
omitted); and see, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993).

 

[¶23]       
Among 
the factors to be considered are the nature and gravity of the error, the 
prosecutor's duty to do justice and refrain from improper methods, the likely 
impact on the average juror, the quality of the prosecution's case, and the 
closeness of the case.  
Earll, ¶16.  Our review of the record shows that 
the evidence against Warner was formidable.  Generally, the primary issue in child 
molestation cases is the defendant's credibility versus that of the child's, but 
in this case, Warner voluntarily and unequivocally admitted to his actions at 
least twice to witnesses other than the victims.  Uncharged misconduct evidence is 
generally excluded, however, because it is highly prejudicial.  But see Sturgis v. State, 
932 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo. 1997).  In Warner's case, these three questions 
about uncharged misconduct against SP followed the State's case-in-chief.  Although the State charged Warner with 
four counts of sexual abuse of two victims for a four-month period in 1983, the 
trial court admitted uncharged misconduct evidence against the victims that 
revealed Warner had continuously abused them over a period of years.   The volume of admissible uncharged 
misconduct testimony was so great that it is doubtful that the jury's verdict 
was swayed by three questions concerning another victim.  Accordingly, we conclude that no factor 
indicates that the jury's verdict was based on this inadmissible evidence, and 
we find that the error is harmless.

 

 

Expert Rebuttal Evidence

 

[¶24]       
After 
the defense rested, the prosecution notified the court that it would present a 
rebuttal witness.  That witness 
offered expert testimony on proper forensic interviewing techniques of child 
abuse victims, the frequency with which physical evidence of sexual abuse is 
found, and the general behavior of child abuse victims.  The defense's objection during the 
testimony on grounds that the testimony was improper rebuttal was overruled, and 
a subsequent motion for mistrial on grounds of discovery violations and improper 
rebuttal evidence was denied.  

 

[¶25]       
The 
record shows that despite a pretrial order requiring the prosecution to provide 
discovery under W.R.Cr.P. 16 and 26.2, the expert testified without notice to 
the defense.    In 
Sievewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo. 2000), we held that when a 
defendant alleges that the State has failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 26.2, the 
district court is required to hold a hearing and determine if any discovery 
violation has occurred, and the failure for the district court to hold a hearing 
is reversible error.  Id. at 
28.  In this case, Warner waited 
until after the expert had testified before moving for a mistrial on grounds 
that he had not received pretrial notice that the expert would testify and had 
not been given her curriculum vitae, but he did not specify a W.R.Cr.P. 26.2 
violation.  Under these 
circumstances, Sievewright would not apply; instead, we apply an abuse of 
discretion standard to the trial court's failure to grant a motion for mistrial 
for violation of the pretrial order.  
See Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Wyo. 2000).  "[A] mistrial is an extreme and drastic 
remedy which should be resorted to only when there has been an error so 
prejudicial that justice could not be served by continuing the trial."  Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214, 
1220 (Wyo. 1987).   The 
discovery violation did not warrant granting a mistrial.

 

[¶26]       
Warner 
contends that Ms. Huylar testified that she did not recall her interview with CM 
and refreshed her memory from her report.  
He contends that the defense's direct examination elicited only that Ms. 
Huylar's report indicated CM's mother was doubtful about the allegations, that 
CM alleged repeated intercourse, and that CM's physical examination did not show 
any evidence of repeated penetration.  
In direct examination Ms. Huylar did not offer any opinion about CM's 
credibility, her delay in reporting the abuse, how victims behaved as a result 
of threats or any other topics addressed by Dr. Tubach.  Those issues were brought out during the 
State's cross-examination of Ms. Huylar.  
That cross-examination effectively had Ms. Huylar concede that her 
interviewing technique of CM was different as "night and day" from what she 
currently does, and that it was "common" for a child to refuse to speak further 
and say nothing had happened.  
Plainly, the record supports Warner's contentions that the State's 
rebuttal evidence was not admitted to rebut any evidence presented by the 
defense.

 

[¶27]       
In 
sexual assault cases, expert testimony may be used to explain a victim's 
behavior.  Chapman v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶12, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶12 (Wyo. 2001).  The admission of evidence in rebuttal 
which is objected to as not proper rebuttal but which tends to discredit the 
defendant's case is within the discretion of the trial judge.  State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 
345, 324 P.2d 831, 839 (1958), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850 (1960).   Rebuttal evidence is also proper 
if it tends to refute or contradict the effect of the opponent's evidence.  Id. Rebuttal evidence would also 
be proper to explain the effect of the opponent's evidence; however, it is 
improperly admitted if rebuttal evidence concerns issues not raised by the 
opponent.  Id.  

 

[¶28]       
The 
expert evidence offered in this case can be classified as falling within the 
emerging field of "social framework and syndrome" evidence and is considered a 
proper subject for expert testimony, particularly in sexual assault cases.  See Ryan v State, 988 P.2d 46, 54 
(Wyo. 1999); Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 928 (Wyo. 1999).  The question presented, however, is 
whether the State may offer this type of expert testimony to rebut Ms. Huylar's 
testimony concerning the facts of her investigation.   On similar facts, we found that a 
DFS investigator had been offered by the defense as a hostile witness with 
expertise discrediting the credibility of the victim.  Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 905 
(Wyo. 2000).  Consequently, the 
defense opened the door to the State's cross-examination of that witness 
eliciting testimony that the investigator did believe that the victim had been 
truthful during the investigation.  
Id. at 906.  In this 
case, the defense's direct examination did not raise any issues that the State 
could properly rebut by an expert witness whom it had prepared but failed to 
give notice of to the defense.  The 
trial court erred in admitting this evidence.  

 

[¶29]   Evidentiary rulings that are in 
error will not be disturbed on appeal if the error is harmless.  Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 52.  Warner contends that the error is 
reversible because the State effectively used the rebuttal expert to vouch for 
the credibility of CM.  Expert 
testimony vouching for the victim's credibility violates W.R.E. 702; however, 
incidental bolstering of the victim's credibility alone does not make the expert 
testimony improper.  Chapman, 
¶20.  Testimony about the 
general symptoms common to victims of sexual abuse and how those symptoms relate 
to the victim is permissible; testimony that the expert believed the victim's 
account or determined that the victim "had been raped" is reversible error.  Id.  Warner claims that the prosecutor used 
hypothetical questions that were thinly concealed references to the specific 
facts of CM's testimony in an attempt to bolster her credibility.  Warner does not present an argument that 
use of a hypothetical question is reversible error, and we will not address 
it.  We do not reverse when an 
expert's testimony has the incidental effect of supporting the victim's 
credibility.  Id.  Incidental bolstering of the victim's 
credibility alone does not make the expert testimony improper.  Focusing on general information within 
her expertise and testifying how those symptoms related to the victim do not 
violate our rule against vouching.  
Id.

 

[¶30]       
Our 
concern, therefore, is whether it is harmless error to improperly admit expert 
rebuttal testimony.  The factors 
examined in our earlier harmless error analysis are applicable here, and we 
again conclude that this error is also harmless, primarily because evidence 
against Warner was overwhelming, and this inadmissible evidence was not the 
basis for the jury's conviction.  
Additionally, we do not find that the two errors combined to deprive 
Warner of a fair trial.  

 

[¶31]       
Nevertheless, 
the record indicates that not only did the prosecutor violate a W.R.E. 404(b) 
pretrial ruling, the prosecutor ignored the pretrial order requiring that he 
notify the defense of expert witnesses, sought to circumvent that order by 
having a prepared expert witness testify on rebuttal rather than in his 
case-in-chief, and, in doing so, has walked a fine line.  Our rule is well-settled that the 
prosecution must present all of his evidence on an issue and is prohibited from 
splitting its presentation of the evidence in order to gain an unfair advantage 
over the defense.  Alexander, 
78 Wyo. at 345, 324 P.2d  at 839.  In 
addition, the prosecutor's failure to disclose his expert injected potentially 
reversible error into this case.  
Seivewright, 7 P.3d  at 28.   Paying attention to the rule that 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play is harmful error, Ryan, 
988 P.2d  at 52-53, we have satisfied ourselves that Warner was not 
prejudiced by any deliberate, intentional, or reckless conduct on the part of 
the State, and this conviction is affirmed.

 

 

Length of Sentences

 

[¶32]       
Warner 
was sentenced to terms of incarceration of not less than four nor more than six 
years for each of two convictions for second degree sexual assault.  He was also sentenced to terms of not 
less than three years nor more than six years for each of the two counts of 
immoral acts with a minor.  All 
terms of confinement are to be served consecutively to each other.  Warner challenges this lengthy 
sentence.  When a criminal sentence 
is within the limits set by statute, the sentence will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion.  Smith v. 
State, 922 P.2d 846, 848 (Wyo. 1996).  
We review a legally prescribed sentence; however, the defendant has the 
high burden of showing an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct which is 
prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct offending the public sense of fair play.  Id.  We do not engage in lengthy analyses 
of comparable sentences for similar offenses except in cases where the mode of 
punishment is unreasonable, or where the relative length of sentence is extreme 
when compared to the gravity of the offense.  Id.  at 849.

 

[¶33]       
Warner 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in ignoring the unusual 
circumstance that he had committed these crimes many years ago while a troubled 
teenager.  The record shows that the 
trial court discussed the length of time since the abuse, Warner's behavior in 
"his contemporary life," and whether the maximum sentence of sixty years was 
appropriate on these particular facts.  
The court concluded that the maximum sentence was not justified in this 
case, but that a substantial sentence was required.  

 

[¶34]       
The 
ultimate issue is whether or not the court could have reasonably concluded as it 
did.   Suval v. State, 6 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 2000).  In 
evaluating the reasonableness of a criminal sentence, we give consideration to 
the crime and its circumstances along with the character of the defendant.  Id.  The trial court discussed the unique 
facts of this case and imposed a sentence after deliberate consideration of 
them.  We find no abuse of 
discretion.

 

[¶35]       
The 
order of judgment and sentence is affirmed.