Case Title: RICHARD BURNETT V. IMERYS MARBLE, INC., a Delaware corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD BURNETT V. IMERYS MARBLE, INC., a Delaware corporation2005 WY 82116 P.3d 460Case Number: 04-182Decided: 07/27/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RICHARD 
BURNETT,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
IMERYS 
MARBLE, INC.,

aDelaware 
corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
Edward Hansen of Scalley & Reading, P.C., and Karra J. Porter of Christensen 
& Jensen, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah.  
Argument by Ms. Porter.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Richard 
A. Mincer of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Richard Burnett, 
an employee of Thurel Mason Trucking, was injured when he fell off his flat bed 
truck as he was placing tarps over a load of marble he had picked up at a 
facility owned by Imerys Marble, Inc.  
Burnett sued Imerys for negligence asserting Imerys had breached its duty 
of care to Burnett by, among other things, failing to comply with Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) regulations.  The district court determined Imerys 
owed no duty of care to Burnett and granted Imerys' motion for summary 
judgment.  Burnett now 
appeals.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm. 

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Burnett presents 
one issue for review:  "Did the 
trial court incorrectly rule that 30 C.F.R. § 56.15005 did not create a duty on 
the part of defendant Imerys to provide fall protection for Richard 
Burnett?"  Imerys rephrases the 
issue slightly but agrees this is the only issue on appeal.  

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      Imerys owns a 
calcium carbonate mine near Wheatland, Wyoming. Imerys' facilities include a mine 
where the material is extracted, a plant where the material is processed, and a 
warehouse where the material is loaded onto trucks for transport. The warehouse 
is near the processing facility. However, the actual mine site is located 
approximately seventeen miles from the processing and warehouse facilities. 
 

 

[¶5]      Product stored in 
the warehouse is routinely loaded onto commercial trucks for delivery to Imerys' 
customers.  Imerys and the 
commercial trucking companies that deliver its products have an independent 
contractor relationship.  Imerys 
requires that all loads of its product leaving its warehouse either be in an 
enclosed van or "tarped."  "Tarping" 
generally requires the use of two tarps, laid out from atop the load and then 
fastened to the side of the trailer with tie-downs.  Imerys does not provide an area 
specifically for tarping but does specify where it does not want truckers 
tarping their load, which is generally the processing area.   Imerys likewise does not provide 
any fall protection for the tarping process.  However, "tarping" a load is not unique 
for product loaded at Imerys, and a typical tarping procedure does not include 
the use of fall protection.  For 
instance, Burnett, as an employee of Thurel Mason Trucking, tarps approximately 
ninety percent of the loads that he hauls, most of which have no connection to 
Imerys.  The tarps themselves are 
provided by Thurel Mason Trucking, and Thurel Mason Trucking pays its drivers an 
additional ten dollars each time they are required to tarp a load.  Burnett was trained how to tarp his load 
by Thurel Mason Trucking, and no one at Imerys instructed Burnett on how to tarp 
his load. 

[¶6]      On July 2, 2001, 
Burnett arrived at Imerys' warehouse to pick up a load of Imerys' product. After 
Imerys personnel loaded Burnett's flat bed truck to his satisfaction, he asked 
them if they could place the tarps on top of the load with the forklift because 
each tarp weighed about one hundred pounds.  Imerys personnel did so.  Burnett then drove his truck to an open 
area across the road from Imerys' warehouse and began tarping his load. Burnett 
climbed to the top of the load to roll out the tarps.  As he was finishing with the second 
tarp, Burnett lost his footing and fell off the top of the load, hitting the 
trailer and landing on the ground.  
Burnett fell about seven and one half feet and suffered severe injuries, 
including broken ribs and a broken hip. 

 
 
[¶7]      Following 
Burnett's accident, MSHA investigated the incident. MSHA cited Imerys for a 
violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.15005 (2004), which states:

 
 
Safety 
belts and lines shall be worn when persons work where there is danger of 
falling; a second person shall tend the lifeline when bins, tanks, or other 
dangerous areas are entered.  

 
 
Rather 
than contest the citation, Imerys decided to implement a system of fall 
protection, and the citation was terminated. Imerys nevertheless maintains that 
this MSHA regulation does not apply in this instance.   

 
 
[¶8]      On May 31, 2002, 
Burnett filed suit against Imerys asserting, among other things, that Imerys was 
negligent because it breached its duty of care by failing to comply with MSHA 
regulations. Imerys filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the MSHA 
regulations do not create a legal duty to provide fall protection to truck 
drivers who are tarping loads on their own trucks as an ordinary and common part 
of the truck driving business.  Specifically, Imerys argues that the 
regulations do not apply to non-miners not exposed to mine hazards.  Additionally, citing Jones v. 
Chevron, 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986), Imerys claims that even if the 
regulations applied, under Wyoming law an owner is not obligated to protect the 
employees of an independent contractor from hazards which are incidental to, or 
part of, the very work the contractor was hired to perform. 

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court granted Imerys' motion for summary judgment finding that the MSHA 
regulation did not apply because Burnett was not at a mine and was not a miner 
as defined by MSHA.  The district 
court noted Burnett had parked his truck in a vacant field away from Imerys' 
warehouse and processing facility and was miles from where the marble was 
mined.   Therefore, the hazard 
he faced was not related to mining but instead trucking.  Accordingly, the district court concluded 
that Imerys owed no duty of care to Burnett. Burnett now appeals.  

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   We have noted many times: 

 
 
When we 
review the granting of a summary judgment, we employ the same standards and use 
the same materials as were employed and used by the trial court. We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
which the parties have asserted. We review a grant of summary judgment deciding 
a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the trial court's ruling. 

 
 

Act I, 
LLC v. Davis, 2002 
WY 183, ¶9, 60 P.3d 145, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, 
¶13, 42 P.3d 1013, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002); Hirschfield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of 
Teton Cty., 944 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Wyo. 1997)).  Whether 
a regulation imposes a duty of care is a question of law.  Distad 
v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 171 ( Wyo. 1981).     

 
 
 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶11]   As noted in the fact section, 
Imerys was cited by MSHA personnel following Burnett's accident for failure to 
comply with the MSHA regulation.  
The correctness of that decision is not the issue before us.  Instead, the only issue presented by 
this appeal is whether 30 C.F.R. § 56.15005 imposes a duty of care on Imerys for 
Burnett's benefit under Wyoming law.   We have indicated that questions 
regarding whether a statute or regulation defines a duty of care will be 
resolved under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Distad, 
633 P.2d  
at 175.   In 
Distad, we specifically cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286, 
which provides:  

 
 
The 
court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements 
of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is 
found to be exclusively or in part

(a)  to 
protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, 
and

(b)  to 
protect the particular interest which is invaded, and

(c)  to 
protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, 
and

(d)  to 
protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm 
results.  

 
 

Distad, 
at 
175.  A court will not adopt 
an administrative regulation as the standard of care if its purpose is to 
protect a class of persons other than the one whose interests are invaded.  Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 288).  Accordingly, in 
deciding whether the MSHA regulation creates a duty in this instance we must 
look to the purpose of the regulation in question.    

 
 

[¶12]   The MSHA regulations were created 
pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act).  Therefore, to determine whether the MSHA 
regulation creates a duty of care under these facts, it is necessary to consider 
the purpose and scope of the Mine Act itself.  When 
adopting the Mine Act, "Congress was plainly aware that the mining industry is 
among the most hazardous in the country" and designed the Act to improve the 
health and safety at the Nation's mines.  
Herman v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 172 F.3d 1078, 1081 
(8th Cir. 1999).  
Congress 
expressly declared the purpose of this Act as follows:  

 
 
§ 
801.  Congressional findings and 
declaration of purpose 

 
 
Congress 
declares that

            
(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry must 
be the health and safety of its most precious resource--the 
miner;

            
(b) deaths and serious injuries from unsafe and unhealthful 
conditions and practices in the coal or other mines cause grief and 
suffering to the miners and to their 
families; 

            
(c) there is an urgent need to provide more effective means and 
measures for improving the working conditions and practices in the Nation's 
coal or other mines in order to prevent death and serious physical harm, and 
in order to prevent occupational diseases originating in such 
mines;

                        

                        
* * * *

            
(g) it is the purpose of this chapter (1) to establish interim 
mandatory health and safety standards and to direct the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services and the Secretary of Labor to develop and promulgate improved 
mandatory health or safety standards to protect the health and safety of the 
Nation's coal or other miners; (2) to require that each operator of a 
coal or other mine and every miner in such mine comply with such standards; 
(3) to cooperate with, and provide assistance to, the States in the development 
and enforcement of effective State coal or other mine health and safety 
programs; and (4) to improve and expand, in cooperation with the States and 
the coal or other mining industry, research and development and training 
programs aimed at preventing coal or other mine accidents and 
occupationally caused diseases in the industry. 

 
 

30 
U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (emphasis 
added).  As can be seen by the plain language of 
§ 801, the purpose of the Mine Act is to protect miners working in 
mines. 

 
 
[¶13]   Both "miner" and "mine" are defined 
in 30 U.S.C. § 802 (2000), which provides:

 
 
(g) 
"miner" means any individual working in a coal or other 
mine;

(h)(1) 
"coal or other mine" means (A) an area of land from which minerals are extracted 
in nonliquid form or, if in liquid form, are extracted with workers underground, 
(B) private ways and roads appurtenant to such area, and (C) lands, excavations, 
underground passageways, shafts, slopes, tunnels and workings, structures, 
facilities, equipment, machines, tools, or other property including 
impoundments, retention dams, and tailings ponds, on the surface or underground, 
used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the work of extracting such 
minerals from their natural deposits in nonliquid form, or if in liquid form, 
with workers underground, or used in, or to be used in, the milling of such 
minerals, or the work of preparing coal or other minerals, and includes custom 
coal preparation facilities. In making a determination of what constitutes 
mineral milling for purposes of this chapter, the Secretary shall give due 
consideration to the convenience of administration resulting from the delegation 
to one Assistant Secretary of all authority with respect to the health and 
safety of miners employed at one physical establishment[.]

 
 
 
 
[¶14]   Considering these two sections and 
the facts of these circumstances, we must conclude that Burnett is not among the 
class of persons the Mine Act is intended to protect.  First, Burnett is not a miner because he 
is not an individual working in a mine.   While the definition of "mine" is 
broad enough to include milling facilities such as Imerys' processing facility, 
it is clear that Burnett does not work in that facility and is not allowed in 
that facility when tarping his load.  
Burnett does get his truck loaded at the warehouse but no processing 
takes place at the warehouse.  
Furthermore, Burnett was not even at the warehouse when the accident 
occurred.  Instead, he was in an 
open field across from the warehouse.  
Burnett is not a miner.  He 
is a commercial truck driver who occasionally transports products produced in a 
mine.  

 
 
[¶15]   Second, it is clear that the 
purpose of the Mine Act is to protect against the hazards associated with 
mining.  As the district court 
recognized, the hazard that Burnett encountered was not a mining hazard but a 
hazard of his job as a commercial trucker.  Indeed, Burnett acknowledged that tarping 
was a normal part of his job as a trucker.  
He tarped approximately ninety percent of his loads, many of which are in 
no way related to Imerys or other mining operations.  Thus, Burnett's accident was not a 
product of the hazard the Mine Act was intended to protect against.  Accordingly, we must conclude that the 
requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 are not met.  

 
 
[¶16]   Burnett argues that even though the 
Mine Act references the terms "mines" and "miners," the actual regulation at 
issue, 30 C.F.R. § 56.15005, uses the terms "person" and "where there is a 
danger of falling."  Therefore, he 
asserts that § 56.15005 was intended to protect a broader class of persons in 
broader circumstances.  We agree 
that the language of §56.15005 does not use the terms "mine" and "miner" like 
the Mine Act itself.  Nevertheless, 
the regulations must still be considered in the context of the Mine Act under 
which they are promulgated.  Absent 
such a limitation, the words in the MSHA regulations could conceivably extend to 
unfathomable lengths.   
Herman, 172 F.3d  at 1081-82.  
See also Bush & Burchett, Inc. v. Reich, 117 F.3d 932, 
936-37 (6th Cir. 1997).   
Although Congress intended the Mine Act to be given broad interpretation 
to achieve its goals, its coverage is not without limit.  Herman, 172 F.3d  at 1081-82.  When considering the regulations 
associated with the Mine Act to determine if they impose a duty under Wyoming law we must keep 
the intent and purpose of that Act in mind.  When doing so, it is clear that every 
person whose business simply brings him into contact with minerals does not fall 
within the coverage of the MSHA regulation.  Id. at 1082.  

 
 

[¶17]   In that respect, while § 56.15005 
extends to "persons" where there is a danger of falling, the regulation is still 
clearly limited to the operations of a mine.  Indeed, 30 C.F.R. 
56.1 (2004) states, "This part 56 sets forth mandatory safety and health 
standards for each surface metal or nonmetal mine, including open pit mines, 
subject to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977."  Once again, the regulations themselves 
make it clear that their application extends to operations at a mine.  As discussed above, no mining operations 
take place where Burnett's accident occurred.    

 
 
[¶18]   Additionally, we consider the 
reasoning of other courts considering MSHA regulations.  Although not completely analogous 
because the entity cited for a violation of the MSHA regulations was not the 
mine but an entity doing business with the mine, similar reasoning can be found 
in Old Dominion Power Co. v. Donovan, 772 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 
1985).  In Old Dominion the 
court was asked to determine whether the provider of electricity doing work at a 
substation owned and built by the coal company where the electricity provider 
merely reads the meters is an "operator" under the Mine Act.  The court found that the electricity 
provider was not an "operator" and noted, "[p]etitioner's employees rarely go 
upon mine property and hardly, if ever, come into contact with the hazards of 
mining.  They perform no activities 
or functions on mine property that they do not perform elsewhere." Id. at 96.  The court also noted that the portion of 
the MSHA regulations that extends to independent contractors was intended to 
permit enforcement of the Act against independent contractors that have a 
continuing presence at the mine. Id.  See also Northern Ill. Steel 
Supply Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 
2002) (Considering the definition of "operator" and noting that there may be a 
point at which an entity's contacts with a mine would be so attenuated or so 
infrequent that it would be difficult to conclude that services were being 
performed under the Mine Act.). 

 
 
[¶19]   Burnett's contacts with Imerys as 
an employee of Thurel Mason Trucking are similarly attenuated.  Burnett does not perform any activities 
at Imerys that he does not perform elsewhere and has no continuing presence at 
Imerys' mine.  Consequently, we too 
find it difficult to conclude that Burnett's services were being performed under 
the regulations of the Mine Act.  
Therefore, because we find that the requirements of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 286 are not met, we conclude that in these circumstances the 
regulation does not impose a duty on Imerys for Burnett's benefit. We hold that 
the district court was correct to grant summary judgment. 

 
 
 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   For the reasons discussed above we 
find that in this instance the MSHA regulations do not impose a duty of care of 
Imerys.  Burnett cannot maintain his 
negligence action.  We affirm the 
district court's grant of Imerys' motion for summary judgment.