Case Title: Stephen Shankman v. State of New Jersey, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-76-04

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Late in the evening of December 16, 1996, Stephen and Dora Shankman were involved in an automobile accident. Stephen was driving southbound on Route 287 when, without warning, near the intersection between Route 287 and Route 78, a large Caterpillar backhoe driven by Salvatore J. Mavuro pulled out in front of the Shankmans car. The vehicles collided, causing catastrophic injuries to the Shankmans. Dora and Stephen filed complaints alleging personal injury claims arising from the accident. Dora s suit named Stephen, Conti, Mavuro and the State as defendants. Stephen s suit named Conti, Mavuro and the State. Dora s complaint alleged that Stephen had been traveling at a high rate of speed at the time the accident occurred. The claim against Stephen was settled by his automobile liability insurer for $400,000 prior to trial. Dora later testified that she had not believed her husband to be negligent and had not wanted to file against him, but was advised by her original attorney that it was typical to name as defendants all who were involved in the accident. Dora s claims against the remaining defendants proceeded to trial, along with Stephen s claims. At trial, the attorneys for both Dora and Stephen unsuccessfully moved to bar any evidence of the settlement. Throughout the trial, the defense was permitted to make references to the complaint s allegations of negligence on Stephen s part and to the fact of the pre-trial settlement. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that they were not to speculate as to the reasons why Dora and Stephen settled their dispute. In respect of Dora s complaint and the allegations that it contained against Stephen, the jury was told it was permitted to consider the speeding charges as evidence of fault against Stephen. In respect of Stephen s claims, the jury found no cause of action. In respect of Dora s claims, the jury found that the State had committed no negligence; however, it concluded that Conti, Dora, and Stephen all had been negligent. It further found that although Conti s negligence and Stephen s negligence were proximate causes of the accident, Dora s was not. The jury assessed forty-two percent of the responsibility for the accident to Conti and fifty-eight percent to Stephen. It awarded damages in the amount of $1,644,000.00. Dora s attorney asked that the jury be polled in respect of the allocations of fault. After the jury was polled, Dora s counsel requested a side bar and voiced his concern that the jury may have reached their verdict improperly by taking an average of their individual calculations of percentages. Counsel requested that the court question the jurors to determine if that was the way they had calculated the damages. The trial court declined counsel s request. Dora and Stephen appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a retrial on the question of liability in respect of Dora s claims. Dora petitioned for certification, contending that she was entitled to a new trial on both liability and damages. Conti Enterprises filed a cross-petition. This Court granted both the petition and cross-petition. HELD: It was reversible error for the trial court not to have engaged in further inquiry with the jurors on the quotient verdict issue, as it arose on this record, in respect of both liability and damages, when requested by counsel to do so. It was error for the trial court to have permitted the jury to consider Dora s pleading in the count against Stephen as evidence of fault against Stephen for whatever measure of significance and weight the jury deemed appropriate. The defense s use of the settlement evidence strayed into prohibited terrain. That misuse was triggered by the erroneous ruling that admitted the allegations of Dora s complaint against Stephen and was compounded when the court instructed the jury that Dora s allegations could be considered evidence of fault. On retrial, the allegations of the complaint may not be used in that manner. A quotient verdict is commonly defined as having occurred when there is a preliminary agreement or understanding among the jurors that each will select a figure as representing his opinion of value or damage and that the sum of said amounts divided by the number of jurors will be accepted by each as his or her verdict, and is in fact so accepted. As a general matter, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a jury s use of an averaging methodology to determine its award. Use of averaged figures for purposes of discussion and deliberation is not improper; rather, it is the advance agreement to be bound to the averaged amount, whatever it may be, that renders a quotient verdict objectionable. The general consensus among the courts that have considered them is that quotient verdicts agreed to in advance conflict with the jury s function. The decisional law of this State is in accord with that condemnation. (pp. 15-18) In Cavallo v. Hughes, the Appellate Division recommended that whenever the issue of a quotient verdict arises, the trial judge should specifically inquire whether there was a prior agreement. Cavallo instructs the trial courts not to begin and end an inquiry into an allegation that an illegal quotient verdict occurred with a myopic focus on whether there exists any evidence that the jurors agreed to average their views. Proof of such averaging is, alone, insufficient to have unearthed an illegal quotient verdict. We agree with Cavallo s added measure of instruction. Prompt follow-up questioning should be requested by counsel and provided by the trial court when there may be reason to question whether the verdict is the product of a prior agreement to be bound, instead of being the product of the jury s collective appraisal. (pp. 19-21) 3. Enough was uncovered in the exchange that took place between the trial court and jurors to raise the specter of a prior agreement among the jurors and to raise an uneasy uncertainty about whether the liability percentages, which admittedly were derived by averaging, reflected each juror s acceptance of those percentages as his or her final appraisal on that issue. The trial court committed error in declining to inquire further to resolve those uncertainties when asked to do so by counsel. Having been confronted by a specific request from counsel to inquire further, the trial court was duty bound to engage in further inquiry and to remove doubt about an illegal quotient verdict from the record for a reviewing court. (pp. 21-23) 4. Quotient verdicts are impermissible when jurors have agreed in advance to be bound by an average amount of damages or of liability percentages, without preserving the right and duty to assent finally and comfortably to the number derived from the average. Our present model jury charges emphasize to jurors that each must maintain his or her individual judgment when deliberating. The Appellate Division panel below got this exactly right when it concluded that it could not tell for certain that averaging and an advance agreement to be bound thereby had occurred but that, because the suggestion of a prior agreement was there and because counsel made the precise request that he was required to make to protect his client s interest, the trial court s failure to inquire further constituted reversible error. (pp. 23-25) Because the issue of damages was so closely intertwined with the liability determination, the failure to have engaged in the inquiry that counsel requested necessitates a new trial on both damages and liability. We have no confidence that damages were not tainted by the ambiguity about the jurors methodology. Counsel s request that the jurors be questioned about their methodology was stated broadly to encompass both liability and damages and was rejected at the outset by the trial court. It was reversible error for the trial court not to have engaged in further inquiry with the jurors on the quotient verdict issue, as it arose on this record, in respect of both liability and damages, when requested by counsel to do so. (pp. 25-26) Against the backdrop of our liberal joinder practice that sanctions pleading in the alternative, it would be entirely discordant were we to permit factual assertions, which have been made by a pleader in one count against one party, to be used as an admission against that pleader in an issue in another alternative or inconsistent count in the same cause of action. Dora was asleep at the time of the accident and did not know what the facts would show at trial in respect of her claims against Stephen, Conti Enterprises, and the State of New Jersey. That her complaint alleged facts in support of a negligence claim against Stephen (based on driving in excess of the speed limit) was not an admission by her. We agree with the Appellate Division s finding of error in the trial court s instruction permitting the jury to consider Dora s pleading in the count against Stephen as evidence of fault against Stephen for whatever measure of significance and weight, the jury deemed appropriate. (pp. 27-29) Under our Rules of Evidence, parties may not introduce evidence of a settlement in order to show liability. However, evidence of a prior settlement is admissible when it is offered for a different purpose. The defense s use of the evidence in this case strayed into prohibited terrain. That misuse was triggered by the erroneous evidential ruling that admitted the allegations of Dora s complaint against Stephen and was compounded when the court instructed the jury that Dora s allegations could be considered evidence of fault. On retrial, the allegations of the complaint may not be used in that manner. If the fact of the settlement with Stephen is advanced as being relevant, the prejudicial effect of any mention of that settlement should be weighed against any probative value that is asserted. When the probative value of an asserted bias by a plaintiff wife against her husband s co-defendants is minimal and cumulative, and the prejudicial value of the settlement is as great as it appeared to be in the initial trial of this matter, then the settlement should not be admitted. (pp. 30-31) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED by this opinion and these matters are REMANDED to the Law Division for retrial on liability and damages. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA s opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. Plaintiff-Cross-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, its agents, servants and employees, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, its agents, servants and employees, SALVATORE J. MAVURO, JR., JOHN DOES 1-5, (said names being fictitious), ABC CORPORATION 1-5 (said names being fictitious), and ABC PUBLIC ENTITIES 1-5 (said names being fictitious), Defendants, and CONTI ENTERPRISES, its agents, servants and employees, Defendant-Cross-Appellant. DORA SHANKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, its agents, servants and employees, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, its agents, servants and employees, SALVATORE J. MAVURO, JR., STEPHEN SHANKMAN, JOHN DOES 1-5, (said names being fictitious), ABC CORPORATION 1-5 (said names being fictitious), and ABC PUBLIC ENTITIES 1-5 (said names being fictitious), Defendants, and CONTI ENTERPRISES, its agents, servants and employees, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant. Argued March 28, 2005 Decided July 13, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Kenneth S. Javerbaum argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks & Zarin, attorneys). William H. Mergner, Jr., argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Leary, Bride, Tinker & Moran, attorneys). Stephanie Ann Mitterhoff argued the cause for cross-respondent (Bramnick, Rodriguez, Mitterhoff, Grabas & Woodruff, attorneys). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a consolidated personal injury case involving claims by a husband and wife against multiple defendants. The posture of the appeal is influenced by the fact that the wife s claims included a count of negligence against her husband, the driver of the vehicle in which she was injured, that was settled prior to trial. Chief among the issues raised before us is an allegation that an illegal quotient verdict was rendered by the jury. In their appeal to the Appellate Division, plaintiffs Dora and Stephen Shankman contended that the jury appeared to have used a quotient method in reaching its verdict, and that the trial court had a duty to inquire further of the jury to determine whether an illegal quotient verdict had occurred when the court was asked directly to do so by Dora s counsel. The Appellate Division agreed that the trial court erred in declining to inquire of the jurors under the circumstances, and set aside the jury s verdict on liability apportionment. Dora has petitioned for certification, contending that she is entitled to a new trial on both liability and damages. Defendant Conti Enterprises primarily asserts that the jury verdict was proper and should be restored. Conti also filed a cross-petition concerning certain evidential issues. Specifically, it contends that it should be permitted to inform the jury that Dora sued her husband and that she alleged in her pleading that he was speeding at the time of the accident. Further, Conti contends that the trial court correctly allowed the jury to hear that Stephen s insurance company had settled with Dora. We granted the petition, 182 N.J. 427 (2005) and cross-petition, 182 N.J. 428 (2005), and now hold that a new trial on both liability and damages must occur. We further hold that the Appellate Division correctly restricted on retrial what the jury may be told in respect of Dora s pleadings and the fact that Stephen s insurer had settled. You are not to speculate as to the reasons why the plaintiff and defendant settled their dispute in regard to this lawsuit. You should not be concerned about the amount, if any, that may have been paid to resolve the claim against Mr. Shankman. In respect of Dora s complaint and the allegations that it contained against Stephen, the jury was told: There was some discussion about pleadings in this case which is a concept that may be new to many of you. And you have heard that Dora Shankman and her complaint in this case charged Steven [sic] Shankman with driving their vehicle at a high rate of speed and with negligence proximately causing her injuries in her complaint. You may consider those charges of Dora Shankman as evidence of fault against Steven [sic] Shankman and you may give that evidence whatever significance and whatever weight you deem appropriate. The jury began deliberations on a Friday and continued late into the afternoon. Eventually, the court and counsel conferred on whether the jury should be excused for the weekend. They also discussed the fact that the court clerk, who normally operated the courtroom video-recording system, could not stay later than 5:20 p.m. that afternoon, but that the trial court could wait until 6:00 p.m. for the jury s return. It was decided that the court clerk would instruct the judge on how to operate the video-recording system for the interval in which the clerk would not be present, thereby solving that problem, and that the jurors would be brought back into the courtroom to inform them about the arrangements being made for them to deliberate until 6:00 p.m. The jury s return also permitted the court to inquire whether the jurors might be able to conclude their deliberations by that time. THE COURT: Okay. We have -- let me just ask you while you re out here. We have made arrangements to stay until six o clock. Do we feel that you re going to be done by six o clock because if you re not I will excuse you and then we re going to have to come back Monday? But that s really the outside limit of when we can stay until. JURY FOREPERSON: I think we re going to need Monday. THE COURT: You are going to need Monday. JURY FOREPERSON: We don t need much time, but I don t think half an hour THE COURT: Well UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I think there s a possibility. There s a possibility. Yeah. THE COURT: Well, if you want to try, go ahead. JURY FOREPERSON: I think that s what we ll do. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The jury resumed deliberating and shortly thereafter, announced that it had reached a verdict. In respect of Stephen s claims, it found no cause of action. In respect of Dora s, the jury found that the State had committed no negligence; however, it concluded that Conti, Dora, and Stephen all had been negligent. It further found that although Conti s negligence and Stephen s negligence were proximate causes of the accident, Dora s was not. The jury assessed forty-two percent of the responsibility for the accident to Conti and fifty-eight percent to Stephen. It awarded damages in the amount of $1,644,000.00. Dora s attorney asked that the jury be polled in respect of the allocations of fault. THE COURT: Okay. The -- as to Question 9B, the answer was 42 percent, was that your vote, Juror No. 1? JUROR NO. 1.: No. THE COURT: Okay. 2? JUROR NO. 2: I m sorry, I don t THE COURT: You just have to tell me if you agree with the vote. JUROR NO. 1: Yeah. We agree with it, that s a different question. I m sorry. THE COURT: I m sorry. The answer was 42 percent. Was that your vote? JUROR NO. 1: No, it was not my vote. THE COURT: Okay. No. -- Juror No. 2? MR. MERGNER [counsel for Stephen] : That s not the question. MR. STAEHLE [counsel for the State]: That s not the question Your Honor. UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: Yeah, it s MR. MERGNER: Do you agree that that s the verdict? THE COURT: Well, that s not how MR. STAEHLE: Do you agree with THE COURT: That s not -- that s not MR. STAEHLE: Do you agree with the verdict. MR. JAVERBAUM [counsel for Dora] : No. I THE COURT: No. MR. JAVERBAUM: I want to know how each juror voted. THE COURT: That s not how I usually do it. So you MR. MERGNER: Well, then you should first ask him was it 8 to 1 or 9 to -- 9 to zero. JURY FOREPERSON: It might be easier if I were to explain what we did, but I don t want to speak out of line. THE COURT: Well, no. I just need to know if it was not unanimous, they re trying to find out whether the count is correct. So Question 9B was not unanimous. JURY FOREPERSON: The count is UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: Yes. JURY FOREPERSON: The number is accurate as to what we decided on, but stop me if THE COURT: Go ahead. JURY FOREPERSON: What we had done was we voted, each nine of us what we saw the percentage to be and then we averaged so we came up with a consensus. THE COURT: Okay. But so the JURY FOREPERSON: But nobody voted 58 to 42 specifically as an individual. THE COURT: All right. Then I guess the proper question is do you agree with the verdict. MR. STAEHLE: Yes. MR. MERGNER: Right. MR. STAEHLE: Yes, Your Honor. That s the proper question. THE COURT: Okay. I have done it the other way though too. JURY FOREPERSON: That s what we were wrestling with. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. Then we will -- then we will ask that. So Question 9B, the answer is 42 percent. Do you agree with that verdict? (Jury polled as to 9B, 9 to 0) THE COURT: Okay. Question 9C was 58 percent. Do you agree with that verdict? (Jury polled as to 9C, 9 to 0) THE COURT: And you wanted 11 too? MR. JAVERBAUM: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. The figure of $1,644,000. Did you agree with that figure? (Jury polled as to 11, 9 to 0) THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You re done. Based upon the foreperson s statements, Dora s counsel requested a side bar and voiced his concern that the jury may have reached their verdict improperly by taking an average of their individual calculations [of percentages]. Counsel requested that the court question the jurors to determine if that was the way they had calculated the damages. The trial court declined counsel s request, stating I don t think that I m supposed to. I think there s caselaw that says that I may not inquire into their deliberations. The jury was then dismissed. Dora and Stephen appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a retrial on the question of liability in respect of Dora s claims. Upon reviewing the transcript of the last day of trial, the panel determined that the exchange between the court and the jurors, in which the jurors revealed that they had averaged their individual liability assessments, in the totality of the circumstances made it fairly inferable that a quotient verdict occurred. Acknowledging that it could not know for sure what had transpired without the benefit of having had further inquiry by the trial court, the panel determined that it could not regard the trial court s dereliction in not performing that inquiry as harmless error. The panel concluded that that would be unfair to Dora, who had requested the inquiry at the time the juror averaging was revealed. The panel also found reversible error in the trial court s instruction about Dora s complaint and the allegations that it contained against Stephen, explaining that the [court s] statement that Dora s complaint was evidence of [Stephen s] fault had the clear capacity to affect the jury s deliberations, both as to existence of fault and the percentage of fault. The court remanded for further proceedings, but added that because Dora had not appealed on the quantum of damages, retrial of the cause would be limited to the issue of liability only. A motion for reconsideration resulted in reaffirmation of the limited remand. [Marks v. State Road Dept., 69 So. 2d 771, 773 (Fla. 1954).] See generally Annotation, Comment Note - Quotient Verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335, 339 (noting universal agreement on definition of quotient verdicts ). As a general matter, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a jury s use of an averaging methodology to determine its award. 58 Am. Jur 2d New Trial 287 (2004). Use of averaged figures for purposes of discussion and deliberation is not improper; rather, it is the advance agreement to be bound to the averaged amount, whatever it may be, that renders a quotient verdict objectionable. Ibid. [T]he verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror. . . . The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S. Ct. 154, 157, 41 L. Ed. 528, 531 (1896). Citing somewhat differing rationales, the general consensus among the courts that have considered them is that quotient verdicts agreed to in advance conflict with the jury s function. Some courts have denounced such verdicts as illegal, analogizing them to gambling, or as a resort to chance, because at the time the agreement is made the jurors do not know the ultimate amount to which they have been committed. See, e.g., Clark v. Foster, 391 P.2d 853, 855-56 (Idaho 1964); Blevins v. Al Weingart Truck & Tractor Serv., Inc., 349 P.2d 896, 901-02 (Kan. 1960); Westbrook v. Hutchison, 10 S.E.2d 145, 151 (S.C. 1940); Dothan v. Hardy, 188 So. 264, 268 (Ala 1939); Long v. Collins, 82 N.W. 95, 96 (S.D. 1900); Dixon v. Pluns, 33 P. 268, 269 (Cal 1893); N. Texas Producers Ass n v. Jenkins, 342 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Marshall s Adm x., 158 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942); Honigsberg v. New York City Transit Auth., 249 N.Y.S.2d 296, 300 (NY Trial Ct 1964). Others criticisms have emphasized that the determination is not based upon the deliberate judgment of each member of the jury. See, e.g., Ehalt v. McCarthy, 138 P.2d 639, 647 (Utah 1943); Burke v. Magee, 42 N.W. 890, 891 (Neb. 1889). Similarly, several courts have commented on the problematic capacity of a quotient verdict to permit a single member of the jury to exert disproportionate influence on the verdict by recommending an amount that is substantially higher or lower than the amounts recommended by the rest of the jury. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R. Co., supra, 158 S.W.2d at 143; Killion v. Dinklage, 236 N.W. 757, 759 (Neb. 1931) rev d on other grounds, Schrage v. Miller, 242 N.W. 649 (Neb. 1932); Southern R. Co. v. Williams, 21 So. 328, 329 (Ala. 1896); N. Texas Producers Ass n, supra, 342 S.W 2d at 195; Louisville & N.R. Co., supra, 158 S.W.2d at 142. To be sure, the slight variation in criticism is overwhelmed by the consensus that quotient verdicts are flawed, ultimately, because of the prior agreement to be bound. See generally Quotient Verdicts, supra, 8 A.L.R. 3d at 335. See also Marks v. State Road Dept., supra, 69 So. 2d at 773 (noting that [q]uotient verdicts are universally condemned ). The decisional law of this State is in accord with that condemnation. [Ibid.] The Appellate Division has adhered consistently to Pushcart s statement of the rule. See Gray v. Pope, 236 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1989); Cavallo v. Hughes, 235 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1989); Cerf v. Smolderer, 39 N.J. Super. 222 (Law. Div.), certif. denied, 22 N.J. 221 (1956). The only significant permutation in the law occurred in Cavallo, supra, when the Appellate Division recommended that whenever the issue of a quotient verdict arises the trial judge [should] specifically inquire whether there was a prior agreement. 235 N.J. Super. at 398 n.2 (holding nonetheless that trial court s failure to do so was not plain error). We note with approval that development because it taught the trial courts not to begin, and end, an inquiry into an allegation that an illegal quotient verdict occurred with a myopic focus on whether there exists any evidence that the jurors agreed to average their views. Proof of such averaging is, alone, insufficient to have unearthed an illegal quotient verdict. The objectionable aspect of such agreements is that jurors who participate in quotient verdicts agree, without knowing in advance what the quotient will be, to be bound by it and to foreclose the opportunity for further discussion and for comparison and evaluation of individual juror s positions, . . . [and such verdicts are thus arrived at] through a process of chance or gambling and are not founded upon discussion, deliberation, reasoning, and collective judgment in which each juror has an opportunity for individual participation. [Cavallo, supra, 235 N.J. at 398 (quoting Quotient Verdicts, supra, 8 A.L.R.3d at 340).] In Cavallo, the Appellate Division recognized that the trial court already had a sufficient explanation of what had occurred during deliberations enabling both the trial court and the reviewing court to be satisfied that, after engaging in an exercise of averaging, the jury nonetheless confirmed its approval of the averaged amount by the required number [so] that the final percentage of fault represent[ed] its collective appraisal of the issue to be decided. Supra, 235 N.J. Super. at 398. We agree with the Appellate Division in Cavallo that that jury s verdict did not need to be set aside as an illegal quotient verdict. And, we agree with the added measure of instruction that Cavallo offered -- prompt follow-up questioning should be requested by counsel and provided by the trial court when there may be reason to question whether the verdict is the product of a prior agreement to be bound, instead of being the product of the jury s collective appraisal. Id. at 398 n.2. With that fillip added by Cavallo, our case law requires no further adjustment, only application. [Model Jury Charge (Civil), 1.12(Q) General Provisions and Outline for Standard Charge (1998). In our view, the Appellate Division panel below got this exactly right when it concluded that it could not tell for certain that averaging and an advance agreement to be bound thereby had occurred but that, because the suggestion of a prior agreement was there and because counsel made the precise request that he was required to make of the court to protect his client s interest, the court s failure to inquire further constitutes reversible error in this matter. In only one respect do we diverge from the Appellate Division s judgment. Because the issue of damages was so closely intertwined with the liability determination, we conclude that the failure to have engaged in the inquiry that counsel requested in this matter necessitates a new trial on both damages and liability. The Appellate Division s brief comment that Dora did not appeal on the quantum of damages shortchanges the breadth of her argument about the quotient method that she asserted was used by the jury in reaching its verdict. Indeed, the jurors ready response to use of averaging to come up with consensus did not appear to have been an explanation about how liability percentages alone were calculated. The Foreperson s explanation suggested a sweeping application. We have no confidence that damages were not tainted by the ambiguity about the jurors methodology. Moreover, Dora s counsel specifically requested that the court engage in further inquiry on the damages calculations. In sum, counsel s request that the jurors be questioned about their methodology was stated broadly to encompass both liability and damages and was rejected at the outset by the trial court. We hold that it was reversible error for the trial court not to have engaged in further inquiry with the jurors on the quotient verdict issue, as it arose on this record, in respect of both liability and damages, when requested by counsel to do so. Thus, we reverse and remand for retrial on liability and damages on Dora s claims. See footnote 1 [McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 N.E.2d 720, 729 (App. Ct. Ill. 1959).] The widow plaintiff in McCormick, was uncertain about the cause of the accident in which her husband was killed. Id. at 725. She brought a wrongful death claim against the truck driver involved in the collision and a Dram Shop Act claim against proprietors of the tavern that had served her husband that evening. Id. at 724. Although the claims were mutually exclusive, the widow was permitted to plead both counts together where she was in doubt about what the facts were and what the evidence would show. Id. at 725. And, the alternative allegations were not permitted to be used as admissions against her as the pleader. Id. at 729. Dora s state of knowledge about the facts that would support the counts of her complaint was similar to that of the widow in McCormick. Dora was asleep at the time of the accident and did not know what the facts would show at trial in respect of her claims against Stephen, Conti Enterprises, and the State of New Jersey. That her complaint alleged facts in support of a negligence claim against Stephen (based on driving in excess of the speed limit) was not an admission by her, and we so hold. We agree with the Appellate Division that found error in the trial court s instruction permitting the jury to consider Dora s pleading in the count against Stephen as evidence of fault against Stephen that the jury may give whatever measure of significance and weight it deemed appropriate. The complaint s allegations did not provide probative and relevant evidence to be weighed with the rest of the evidence; instead, they were extraneous and confusing. On retrial, the jury should not be so instructed. See footnote 2 The Appellate Division also addressed the issue of the trial court s admission of evidence that Dora s claim against Stephen had been settled. The Appellate Division stated that the trial court found evidence that a settlement had been reached between Dora and Stephen to be relevant to establish bias. Bias was the Appellate Division s description. The trial court allowed the settlement to be mentioned because it feared that the jurors would be confused and misled if they learned of Dora s allegations against Stephen, but did not learn that she ultimately settled with him. Presumably, the Appellate Division thought that the settlement explained Dora s reasons for pointing the finger at Conti, and not Stephen. In any event, the bias focus, the panel noted, became lost during trial, to the point that defense counsel in summation invited the jury to infer that settlement sprang from a recognition of Stephen s fault. We harbor the same grave reservations that troubled the Appellate Division about the prejudicial use of the settlement evidence. Under our Rules of Evidence, parties may not introduce evidence of a settlement in order to show liability. N.J.R.E. 408. However, evidence of a prior settlement is admissible when it is offered for a different purpose. Ibid. The defense s use of the evidence in this case strayed into prohibited terrain. In our view, that misuse was triggered by the erroneous evidential ruling that admitted the allegations of Dora s complaint against Stephen and was compounded when the court instructed the jury that Dora s allegations could be considered evidence of fault. On retrial, the allegations of the complaint may not be used in that manner. If on retrial, the trial court is confronted again with an argument that the settlement is relevant in some way to the re-presented cause of action, then we suggest that the trial court would be assisted in its evaluative process by engaging in the weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect required by our Rules of Evidence. Thus, if the fact of the settlement with Stephen is advanced as being relevant, the prejudicial effect of any mention of that settlement should be weighed against any probative value that is asserted. N.J.R.E. 403. When the probative value of an asserted bias by a plaintiff wife against her husband s co-defendants is minimal and cumulative, and the prejudicial value of the settlement is as great as it appeared to be in the initial trial of this matter, then the settlement should not be admitted. Admission of evidence about the settlement would put at risk the very policy rationale behind N.J.R.E. 408. That risk -- that the jurors will be prejudiced and draw an inappropriate inference of liability -- is a risk that is better avoided when engaging in N.J.R.E. 403 weighing. STEPHEN SHANKMAN, Plaintiff-Cross-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, etc., et al., Defendants, and CONTI ENTERPRISES, etc., Defendant-Cross-Appellant. DECIDED July 13, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY