Case Title: Ex parte Amanda Holderfield.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1150165

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 07/01/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1150165
____________________
Ex parte Amanda Holderfield
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Amanda Holderfield
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-14-1589;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-14-1250)
MURDOCK, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether
a motion to modify or set aside a restitution order in a
1150165
criminal case should be treated as a motion for a new trial
under Rule 24.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., with regard to tolling the
time for taking an appeal.  We reverse the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the appeal in this case
as untimely, and we remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Proceedings Below
Amanda Holderfield was convicted of second-degree
assault.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-21.  On April 7, 2015, 
Holderfield was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment; that
sentence was suspended, and Holderfield was ordered to serve
3 years' supervised probation, to undergo mental-health
treatment and substance-abuse treatment, to pay $100 to the
Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund, and to pay
restitution of $2,219.99 to the "City of Gardendale Municipal
Works Comp Fund."  On May 6, 2015, Holderfield filed a "Motion
to Set Aside Order of Restitution and Request Hearing."  On
June 
15, 
2015, 
the 
Jefferson 
Circuit 
Court 
denied
Holderfield's motion to set aside the restitution order.  Four
days later, on June 19, Holderfield appealed.
The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Holderfield's
appeal, without an opinion.  In its order dismissing the
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1150165
appeal, that court concluded that Holderfield's appeal was
untimely because, it reasoned, (1) the motion to set aside the
restitution order was not equivalent to a Rule 24.1 motion for
a new trial and thus did not toll the time for filing an
appeal and (2) the appeal was not filed within 42 days after
entry of the restitution order. 
This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether
the filing of Holderfield's motion to set aside the
restitution order tolled the time for filing an appeal.
II. Standard of Review
"This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo."  Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.
2003).  See also Sheffield v. State, [Ms. 1121172, May 30,
2014] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2014) (applying a de novo
standard of review when determining whether the Court of
Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to consider an appeal); Ex
parte Walker, 152 So. 3d 1247 (Ala. 2014)(to same effect).
III.  Analysis 
The issue in this case is whether a motion to modify or
to set aside a restitution order is equivalent to a motion for
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1150165
a new trial under Rule 24.1 with regard to tolling the time
for filing an appeal. 
Rule 4(b)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a notice of
appeal by a defendant in a criminal case must be filed within
42 days after the pronouncement of sentence.  If a motion for
a new trial under Rule 24.1 is filed within 30 days after the
pronouncement of sentence, the time for filing the notice of
appeal is tolled; in that event, the notice of appeal must be
filed within 42 days after the denial of the motion for a new
trial. 
In Ex parte Hitt, 778 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 2000), this Court
noted that motions to amend or correct a sentence are governed
by Rule 24, Ala. R. Crim. P., and that the filing of such a
motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal.  We
stated in Hitt:
"It is clear, under Alabama's rules of civil,
criminal, and appellate procedure, that the time
within which a notice of appeal must be filed is
tolled by the filing of a timely posttrial motion
for a new trial. See Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule
24.1, Ala. R. Crim. P.; and Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P.
Once the posttrial motion is disposed of, the 42–day
period within which a party can file a notice of
appeal begins to run anew.  ...
"....
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"Motions to amend or correct a sentence are not
specifically mentioned in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, but this Court has held that such
posttrial motions are governed by Rule 24. Pickron
v. State, 475 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 1985). See, also,
Rose v. State, 598 So. 2d 1040 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992). Further, if timely filed, such a motion may
be presented to the court for a ruling after the
30–day period. See Rule 24.3, Ala. R. Crim. P.;
Pickron, 475 So. 2d at 599–600."
Hitt, 778 So. 2d at 161-62.
In Dixon v. State, 920 So. 2d 1122, 1127 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:  "A motion to set
aside or modify a sentence falls under the purview of
Rule 24.4[, Ala. R. Crim. P.]."  See also State v. Monette,
887 So. 2d 314, 315 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ("A motion to
alter, amend, or vacate a sentence is the functional
equivalent of a motion for a new trial and 'should be treated
the same procedurally as a motion for new trial or a motion in
arrest of judgment....'" (quoting Melvin v. State, 583 So. 2d
1365, 1366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991))).
However, as Holderfield noted in her petition to this
Court, precedents of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this
point are conflicting.  In its order dismissing Holderfield's
appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on two of its
previous decisions -- Holt v. State, 628 So. 2d 1038 (Ala.
5
1150165
Crim. App, 1993), and Martinez v. State, 602 So. 2d 504 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992) -– both of  which state that a motion to
reconsider a sentence does not toll the time for filing a
notice of appeal.  We note that Holt and Martinez were decided
before this Court's decision in Hitt and that the order of the
Court of Criminal Appeals in this case did not attempt to
reconcile Holt and Martinez with Hitt or Dixon.  See also
Esters v. State, 894 So. 2d 755, 758 n.4 (Ala. Crim. App.
2003) ("Caselaw appears to be in conflict in regard to the
effect of Rule 24 on ... counsel's motion to reconsider
Esters's sentences and Esters's pro se motion to vacate his
sentences.").  The Dixon court noted the conflict identified
in Esters and stated that the better approach is to treat a
motion to amend a sentence as a motion governed by Rule 24. 
We reaffirm our statement in Hitt that a motion to modify
or to set aside a sentence is equivalent to a motion for a new
trial under Rule 24.1.  If such a motion is filed within 30
days after pronouncement of sentence, it will toll the time
for filing a notice of appeal.  
We similarly conclude that this tolling principle extends
to motions to modify or to set aside a restitution order.  A
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1150165
restitution hearing is a component of a criminal sentencing
proceeding, and restitution is a component of the criminal
defendant's punishment.  See Hill v. Bradford, 565 So. 2d 208,
210 (Ala. 1990); Ex parte Stewart, 74 So. 3d 944, 950-51 (Ala.
2011) (explaining that an order of restitution "is a part of
the criminal sentence"); Ala. Code 1975, § 15-18-67
("[R]estitution hearings shall be held as a matter of course
and in addition to any other sentence which it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution or
otherwise 
compensate 
such 
victim 
for 
any 
pecuniary 
damages."). 
Restitution may be ordered at the time a sentence of
imprisonment is imposed, or it may be ordered at a later
date.   Although a restitution hearing may be held, or a
1
Nothing in this opinion should be read as altering the
1
principle, as stated in Ex parte Walker, 152 So. 3d 1247, 1252
(Ala. 2014), that a
"determination that a defendant's conviction of a
criminal offense is ripe for appeal consists of
pronouncement 
of 
both 
a 
determination 
of 
a
defendant's guilt and a sentence.  When both a
determination of guilt and a sentence are evident
from the record, a judgment of conviction is set
forth, and a defendant's case is ripe for appeal." 
That is, a delay in ordering restitution will not alter the
time in which to file an appeal from an otherwise final
judgment of conviction and determination of sentence.
7
1150165
restitution order entered, subsequent to the pronouncement of
the other components of the sentence, see Hill, 565 So. 2d at
210,  when, as here, restitution is ordered when the remainder
2
of the sentence is imposed, a motion to modify or to set aside
that restitution is treated as a motion for a new trial under
Rule 24.1.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissing Holderfield's appeal, and we remand the cause to
that court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., concurs specially.
Bolin and Wise, JJ., dissent.
A restitution order entered after the remainder of the
2
sentence is a separately appealable order.  See Heupel v.
State, 113 So. 3d 695, 698 n.3 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
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1150165
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
In light of this Court's language in Ex parte Stewart, 74
So. 3d 944, 950-51 (Ala. 2011), and Hill v. Bradford, 565 So.
2d 208, 210 (Ala. 1990), stare decisis compels me to concur
with the statement in the majority opinion that restitution is
a component of a criminal sentence.  I, however, disagree with
that principle.  An order to serve a period of imprisonment
and an order to pay restitution to the victim of the crime are
part of a criminal defendant's punishment for committing an
offense against the State and the victim.  But, in my opinion,
a criminal sentence is an order of imprisonment –- the loss of
a defendant's freedom -- whereas an order of restitution
addresses the defendant's payment of compensation to the
victim for his or her injuries.  Each order is a component of
a defendant's punishment, and not a component of his or her
sentence.
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