Case Title: State v. Andre Derrick Wingo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1998AP003457-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Andre Derrick Wingo,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 14, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 1, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by Richard D. Martin, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3457-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Andre Derrick Wingo, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Robert C. Crawford, Circuit Court Judge.  
Reversed and remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case 
comes before the court on a petition to bypass the court of 
appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (1993-94).1  Andre 
Derrick Wingo, the defendant, appeals a judgment of conviction 
for soliciting a prostitute and an order denying his post-
conviction motion, both entered by the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Hon. Robert C. Crawford, Circuit Court Judge. 
 We reverse the judgment and order. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether the judgment of 
conviction is valid when the defendant was tried by a jury of 
six, rather than 12, persons.  Although the court and both 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1993-94 text unless otherwise noted. 
FILED 
 
APR 14, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
2 
parties believed that Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96), 
mandating a six-person jury trial in misdemeanor cases, applied 
to this case, that statute did not in fact apply.  Nor did the 
defendant agree, as required by Wis. Stat. § 972.02(2), to be 
tried by a jury consisting of fewer than 12 persons.  We 
therefore conclude that the trial by a six-person jury was 
erroneous.  Accordingly we reverse the conviction and order and 
grant a new trial. 
¶3 
The facts of the case are undisputed.  On March 6, 
1996, the State filed a criminal complaint charging the 
defendant with soliciting a prostitute, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 944.30(1).  The defendant was tried by a six-person jury 
and found guilty on June 18, 1997.  The defendant was sentenced 
to 15 days in jail, which he has served.2 
¶4 
On February 13, 1998, the defendant filed a post-
conviction motion, seeking a new trial.  The defendant claimed 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
his trial by a six-person jury. 
¶5 
In denying the post-conviction motion, the circuit 
court assumed that Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) applied 
to the present case and concluded that the trial counsel was not 
                     
2 Although the defendant has served his sentence, both the 
State and the defendant urge this court to review the case.  The 
defendant asserts that this case is not moot since a reversal of 
conviction has many potential consequences for him, including 
avoiding later charges based on a repeater status.  We agree 
that overturning the conviction has potential legal consequences 
for the defendant and thus conclude that the case is not moot. 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
3 
ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the statute.3  The circuit court made no mention of the argument 
that defendant’s counsel had been ineffective for failing to 
challenge the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) 
(1995-96), on the ground that the statute was not in effect when 
the defendant was charged.4 
                     
3 In State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998), this court declared that Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) 
(1995-96) violated Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
Article I, § 7 states: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
 
4 Neither parties’ briefs to this court address the issue of 
whether Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) was in effect when 
the defendant was charged with the crime.  But on February 29, 
2000, the 
day before 
oral 
argument 
in this 
court, the 
defendant’s appellate counsel advised this court and the State 
that the defendant should not have been tried under Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) 
(1995-96) 
because 
that 
statute 
was 
not 
applicable to his case.  At oral argument counsel for both the 
defendant and the State addressed the issue of the applicability 
of § 756.096(3)(am).  Counsel for the State did not seek to 
submit additional briefs unless the court based its holding on 
the 
defendant's 
claim 
that 
he 
was 
denied 
the 
effective 
assistance of counsel or was prejudiced by being tried by a six-
person jury.  Because we do not base the decision on the claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice, we did not 
seek additional briefing. 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
4 
¶6 
The application of Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-
96) to this case and the validity of a trial by a jury with 
fewer than 12 persons are questions of law this court decides 
independently of the circuit court. 
¶7 
Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) was created by 
§ 2 of 1995 Wis. Act 427, and reads as follows: "A jury in 
misdemeanor cases shall consist of 6 persons."  The 1995 act was 
made applicable to "actions commenced on the effective date of 
this subsection."  1995 Wis. Act 427, § 7.  The act was adopted 
on June 7, 1996, and published June 20, 1996.  Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 991.11 (1995-96), an act "which does not expressly 
prescribe the time when it takes effect shall take effect on the 
day after its publication . . . ."  Since 1995 Wis. Act 427 did 
not "expressly provide when it takes effect," the act took 
effect on June 21, 1996.  Therefore the act applied to actions 
that were commenced on or after June 21, 1996. 
¶8 
The criminal complaint charging the defendant with 
solicitation of a prostitute in this case was filed on March 6, 
1996, which is the date this "action was commenced."  Therefore 
Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) was not yet in effect and 
was not applicable to the defendant’s trial. 
¶9 
When this case was tried in June 1997, Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) had been in effect for nearly a year 
and apparently all involved in the defendant’s trial, including 
the judge, the prosecutor and defense counsel, erroneously 
assumed that the six-person jury statute applied.  However, Wis. 
Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) was not applicable. 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
5 
¶10 In fact, the law in effect when the defendant was 
tried, Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(a),5 provided that in all criminal 
cases a jury must consist of 12 persons, unless both parties 
agree on a lesser number as provided in Wis. Stat. § 972.02.  
Section 972.02(2) expressly provided that "any time before 
verdict the parties may stipulate in writing or by statement in 
open court, on the record, with the approval of the court, that 
the jury shall consist of any number less than 12." 
¶11 According to the record before us, the parties did not 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 972.02(2).  They did not stipulate in 
writing or by statement in open court, on the record, with the 
approval of the court, that the jury could consist of fewer than 
12 persons.  Thus the parties did not comply with the statutory 
requirements for a trial by a jury with fewer than 12 persons. 
¶12 The question for the court is what is the effect of 
the parties’ failure to comply with the statutory requirements 
to obtain a trial by a jury with fewer than 12 persons.  Two 
cases make clear that when the statutory procedural requirements 
relating to waiving a trial by jury or to reducing the number of 
jurors are not followed, the conviction must be reversed and the 
cause remanded for a new trial. 
¶13 In State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 464 N.W.2d 
839 (1991), the prosecution and defense counsel consented in 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(a) stated:  
A jury in criminal cases shall consist of 12 persons 
unless both parties agree on a lesser number as 
provided in s. 972.02. 
 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
6 
open court to waiver of a trial by jury.  Mr. Livingston was 
present in the courtroom at the time his counsel consented, but 
he did not stipulate in writing or by his own statement in open 
court on the record that he waived a jury trial.  This court 
insisted in Livingston that for a waiver of jury trial to be 
effective, the waiver must comply with one of the specific means 
of effecting a waiver provided in § 972.02(1), namely a written 
statement or a statement in open court on the record by the 
defendant personally.6  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569.  "The 
record must clearly demonstrate the defendant's personal waiver; 
the 
personal 
waiver 
may 
not 
be 
inferred 
or 
presumed."  
Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569-70.  The court held in Livingston 
that when a defendant has not waived a jury trial according to 
the procedures set forth in § 972.02(1), the proper remedy is 
reversal of the conviction and a new trial. Livingston, 159 
Wis. 2d at 573. 
¶14 In Livingston the issue was whether the defendant 
waived a jury pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  In this case, 
the 
issue 
is 
whether 
the 
defendant 
agreed, 
pursuant 
to 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) (1989-1990) stated in relevant 
part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, 
criminal cases shall be tried by a jury of 12, drawn 
as prescribed in ch. 805, unless the defendant waives 
a jury in writing or by statement in open court or 
under s. 967.08(2)(b), on the record, with the 
approval of the court and the consent of the State. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 967.08(2)(b) (1989-1990) provided for waiver 
of jury trial by telephone. 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
7 
§ 972.02(2), to be tried by a jury consisting of fewer than 12 
persons. 
¶15 The two statutes, §§ 972.02(1) and 972.02(2), set 
forth substantially the same procedural requirements whether a 
defendant forgoes a jury trial or agrees to be tried by a jury 
consisting of fewer than 12 persons. Both statutes require that 
the defendant make his or her wishes about the jury known in 
writing or by a statement in open court.  Both statutes also 
require the consent of the State and the approval of the court. 
¶16 The court of appeals has held that the statutory 
procedural safeguards for waiver of trial by jury apply equally 
to waiver of a full 12-person jury.  State v. Cooley, 105 
Wis. 2d 642, 645-46, 315 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1981).  In Cooley, 
the defense counsel, not the defendant, consented to proceed 
with an 11-person jury.  Because the defendant had not 
personally consented to proceed with a jury consisting of fewer 
than 12 persons, the court of appeals reversed the conviction 
and remanded for a new trial.  Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d at 645-46.  
This court cited Cooley with approval in the Livingston case.  
See Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569. 
¶17 The Livingston and Cooley cases treat waiver of a jury 
trial and agreement to proceed with a jury with fewer than 12 
persons in the same manner.  Accordingly we conclude that when a 
defendant does not comply with the procedural requirements 
relating to waiving a jury trial or agreeing to reduce the 
number of jurors, the conviction must be reversed and the cause 
remanded for a new trial. 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
8 
¶18 Because Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) did not 
apply to the trial of the present case and the defendant did 
not, as required by § 972.02(2), personally agree in writing or 
by a statement in open court to be tried by a jury consisting of 
fewer than 12 persons, the conviction must be reversed and the 
cause remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit 
court are reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3457-CR 
 
 
1