Case Title: State v. Hood

Citation: 2012-Ohio-6208

Docket Number: 2010-2260

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Hood, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-6208.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-6208 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HOOD, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hood, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-6208.] 
Reconsideration—Evidence—Criminal law—Confrontation Clause—Admission of 
cell-phone records—Cell-phone records, if properly authenticated, are 
business records and are not testimonial under Crawford v. Washington— 
Lack of authentication of records, not their hearsay nature, makes 
admission of records unconstitutional under Confrontation Clause—
Authentication may be provided only by custodian or other witness who is 
qualified to testify that records were kept in ordinary course of regularly 
conducted business—Error in admission of evidence harmless when other 
evidence of guilt is overwhelming. 
(No. 2010-2260—Submitted December 27, 2012—Decided December 31, 2012.) 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
__________________ 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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PFEIFER, J. 
Reconsideration 
{¶ 1} This matter is before us upon a motion for reconsideration filed by 
appellee, the state of Ohio.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 11.2(A)(4) allows a motion for 
reconsideration of a decision on the merits of a case.  “We have invoked the 
reconsideration procedures set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. XI to correct decisions which, 
upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in error.” State ex rel. Huebner v. 
W. Jefferson  Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 N.E.2d 339 (1995). 
See also Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 
541, 697 N.E.2d 181. 
{¶ 2} The state does not ask this court to reconsider the judgment in this 
case, but instead requests that we modify certain portions of the opinion that were 
not outcome-determinative.  For the most part, the state’s concerns center around 
the statement in the original opinion, “A hearsay violation itself violates the 
Confrontation Clause, and thus requires a heightened harmless-error analysis.” 
State v. Hood, ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2012-Ohio-5559, ___ N.E.2d ___, ¶ 40.  We 
agree that that statement and supporting language was overbroad and was made in 
error.  Upon reconsideration, we modify the opinion to clarify that it is not the 
hearsay nature of the cell-phone records at issue that made their admission 
constitutional error.  Instead, it was their lack of authentication as business 
records that made their admission unconstitutional under the Confrontation 
Clause, because without that authentication, the records cannot be considered 
nontestimonial.  We do not agree with the state that the trial court’s error in 
admitting the unauthenticated records was not constitutional error. 
{¶ 3} Accordingly, we vacate our decision in State v. Hood, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ____, 2012-Ohio-5559, ___ N.E.2d ___, and replace it with the opinion 
issued today on reconsideration. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
 
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Merit Opinion 
{¶ 4} The issue we address in this case is whether, in general, cell-phone 
records produced by a cell-phone company constitute testimonial evidence that 
implicates a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We find that 
ordinarily such records, if properly authenticated, are business records and are not 
testimonial.  However, in this case, the cell-phone records were not properly 
authenticated at trial, and their admission violated the defendant’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  We hold that the admission of the cell-phone records was 
error, but that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 5} In the early morning hours of January 26, 2009, defendant-
appellant James Hood allegedly was one of four men who burst into a Cleveland 
home and robbed at gunpoint nearly a dozen people who had gathered to celebrate 
the birthdays of friends and family.  A co-conspirator, Samuel Peet, was shot dead 
during the course of the robbery.  Hood was arrested and charged with murder 
and multiple counts of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping.  
As part of the proof to establish Hood’s involvement in the crimes, the state 
introduced cell-phone records that it argued showed his communication with the 
other co-conspirators and his whereabouts during the early morning in question.  
The issue we address is whether the introduction of that evidence violated the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Crime 
{¶ 6} In the late evening of January 25, 2009, a group of friends gathered 
in the basement of Sharon Jackson’s home on Parkview Avenue in Cleveland to 
play cards and celebrate the birthdays of Denotra Jones and her son, Rodney.  
Among the guests that evening was one of the alleged co-conspirators, Terrence 
Davis, also known as “TD.”  According to Rodney Jones, Davis’s presence was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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unusual: he had not joined the group in over a year, and Davis left the party 
several times throughout the evening.  TD had met earlier that day with Samuel 
Peet and the other co-conspirators—Hood and Kareem Hill—and told them about 
the party. 
{¶ 7} Jerrell Jackson, homeowner Sharon Jackson’s son, was the first 
person to be confronted by the assailants.  He had walked some guests to their 
cars at around 5:00 A.M.; when he went back inside, there were four men in the 
hallway wearing masks and carrying guns.  Jerrell noticed that one gun was an 
Uzi.  Jerrell ran down into the basement, yelling a warning to everyone.  Sharon 
Jackson, who had fallen asleep on a couch in her basement, was awakened by the 
commotion; she saw Jerrell being followed into the basement by four men 
wearing masks and carrying guns.  She described the guns as two 9mm handguns, 
one Uzi, and one handgun with a long chrome barrel.  The robbers made the 
victims strip, then searched the clothing and took money and cell phones. 
{¶ 8} Nine of the eleven victims testified at trial.  They described the 
same basic facts—men in dark clothing, wielding guns, stormed into the 
basement, ordered some of them to remove their clothes, and stole money and cell 
phones from them at gunpoint.  Some witnesses differed on the number of 
assailants, from two to four, but the victims were robbed in two separate rooms of 
the basement.  At some point, gunshots were heard.  One of the co-conspirators, 
Peet, was later found dead nearby, in a yard several houses away.  Several of the 
victims were able to identify him as one of the assailants due to his distinctive 
coat.  He had been shot twice from close proximity; on his body were two cell 
phones belonging to victims and $345 cash. 
{¶ 9} Earlier that morning, around 4:00 a.m., police received a report of 
a male pointing a gun at another male in the area of East 104th Street and Sophia 
Avenue, near where Hood lived.  En route to the scene, officers observed a green 
Jeep Cherokee stopped in the middle of Parkview Avenue with its lights on.  As 
January Term, 2012 
 
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the officers approached, the Jeep sped away.  The officers pursued the Jeep and 
were able to get a partial plate number, “EOF,” before losing sight of the vehicle.  
The same officers were called to help investigate the Parkview Avenue break-in 
and were told that a sport utility vehicle was involved in the crime.  Shortly after 
the break-in, a green Cherokee, license plate EOF 7079 was spotted at a local 
McDonald’s.  Cash, a mask, and two victims’ cell phones were found inside.  
Hood, his co-defendant Kareem Hill, and William Sparks had been removed from 
the vehicle and arrested.  At the time of his arrest, Hood had $411.25 in cash in 
his possession.  Hill eventually testified against Hood. 
Kareem Hill’s Testimony 
{¶ 10} Hill initially lied to police and denied any involvement in the 
crimes.  But when a latex glove found at the scene tested positive for Hill’s DNA, 
Hill pleaded guilty to reduced charges and agreed to testify truthfully against 
Hood. 
{¶ 11} Hill knew his co-conspirators Hood, Davis, and Peet from the 
neighborhood where he grew up.  Hill was 18 at the time of the crimes; Hood was 
older—he was 29 at the time of the trial, according to his attorney.  In the hours 
before the robbery, Hill and Hood met Davis and Peet at a bar.  The four 
discussed robbing a card game on Parkview Avenue.  Davis left the bar to go to 
the party.  Davis eventually returned to the bar and laid out the specifics about the 
party situation. 
{¶ 12} They all left the bar—Davis and Peet in one car, and Hill and Hood 
in Hill’s green Jeep Cherokee.  Hood and Hill went to Hood’s house on Sophia 
Avenue to pick up guns.  Hood went into his house and returned to the vehicle 
with a semiautomatic pistol, an Uzi, and latex gloves.  Hill and Hood then drove 
to Parkview Avenue, where they saw Peet standing in a driveway near the target 
house; they let Peet get into the back seat of the Jeep.  Peet had a gun. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 13} The three waited in the car.  When Davis approached and informed 
them that the back door of the target house was open, Hood and Peet left the 
vehicle while Hill parked on the next street.  Hill then cut through back yards to 
meet the others.  All had weapons and wore hats or masks; Hill, Hood, and Davis 
wore latex gloves.  Hill carried a black handgun, Peet carried a long silver 
revolver, Davis carried a black pistol, and Hood carried an Uzi. 
{¶ 14} Hill testified that he and his cohorts took money and cell phones 
from the victims.  At one point, there was an argument between Hood and Peet—
Hood had accused Peet of stealing money from the pile of cash that was to be 
divided.  Davis broke up the altercation by announcing it was time to leave. 
{¶ 15} Hill ran up the stairs and outside; he was outside when he heard 
gunshots from inside the house.  He never saw Peet leave the house.  Hill and 
Hood left in Hill’s Jeep while Davis went off in another direction. 
{¶ 16} Hill and Hood returned to Hood’s house on Sophia to drop off the 
guns.  Hood went inside.  Hood returned to the Jeep, and the two picked up Hill’s 
friend, William Sparks, who Hill says had called him for a ride to McDonald’s. 
Hill let Sparks drive.  They went to McDonald’s, where police stopped and 
arrested the three.  The state ultimately did not pursue charges against Sparks. 
Cellular-Phone-Record Testimony 
{¶ 17} At trial, the prosecution introduced cell-phone records for Hood, 
Hill, and Davis that detectives claimed to have subpoenaed from cellular-phone 
companies.  Detective Carlin described the subpoena process: 
 
We have to go to a county prosecutor.  We can’t just go and 
say we want these records.  The phone companies have rules on 
that.  They just don’t give them out. 
We obtain an authorization for a subpoena and then we 
respond to—there is a subpoena person in the prosecutor’s office 
January Term, 2012 
 
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* * *.  We provide them with the numbers, they then type up the 
subpoenas, and based on their records and their relationship with 
the phone companies, they know, with the prefix numbers, what 
company that subpoena needs to go to and they direct the subpoena 
to that company. 
 
{¶ 18} Carlin testified that the cell-phone records were obtained through 
that process; however, the subpoenas are not in the record. 
{¶ 19} The records purport to show cell phone activity by Hood, Hill, and 
Davis on the night and early morning in question.  During Hill’s testimony, the 
prosecution used the records to ask Hill about certain calls that were placed by his 
phone or received by his phone.  Those calls included ones made by Hill’s cell 
phone to Davis’s cell phone and vice versa, some right around the time of the 
crimes.  Indeed, Detective Carlin testified that Davis first became a suspect in the 
robberies when the phone records were reviewed.  There was also a call from one 
of the stolen cell phones to Hill’s phone; Hill claimed that Hood had called Hill’s 
number to see whether the stolen phone worked.  The records showed Hill trying 
to contact Davis several times just before and after the robberies; Hill testified 
that Hood borrowed his phone to make those calls. 
{¶ 20} When the prosecution first attempted to use cell-phone records in 
its direct examination of Hill, the defense objected, claiming that the records 
lacked verification or certification of their authenticity.  The prosecution argued 
that the records fell under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule and 
that Hill could verify the records based on his own knowledge.  The court 
determined that the prosecution could use the records to have Hill testify as long 
as another witness would authenticate the records. The prosecutor stated that 
Detective Carlin, who subpoenaed the records, would testify as to how she 
obtained them.  The defense argued that Detective Carlin could not authenticate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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business records of another entity, and entered a continuing objection on the 
record. 
{¶ 21} On cross-examination, the defense used the phone records to poke 
holes in Hill’s version of events.  For instance, phone records showed that Hill’s 
cell phone was calling Hood’s cell phone at 2:42 a.m.  Hill could not explain why 
he would have called Hood at a time when, according to Hill, the two men were a 
few feet apart, in the same car. 
{¶ 22} After the cross-examination, Hood renewed his objection to the 
cell-phone records after the state related that it would use Detective Carlin’s 
partner, Detective Henry Veverka, to verify the records.  The trial court remarked 
at that time: “I’ve done the case law research on it and my gut reaction is to 
subpoena Verizon on that basis.  I guess Veverka would just have to come in and 
say that he issued it, how he’s familiar with the business records of the company.  
That would be the testimony that would be proper.” 
{¶ 23} Detective Veverka testified that the records were obtained through 
subpoena.  He also testified about his experience interpreting cell-phone records, 
which he learned mostly on-the-job through other detectives, including experience 
in using information from providers to determine geographic locations of the cell 
phone at the time calls were made, based upon cell-tower data.  Veverka testified 
that Hood did not have his cell phone with him at the time of his arrest.  He 
reviewed call logs for the days at issue, as well as cellular-tower records.  He 
testified as to State’s Exhibit 187, which contained tower records for Hood’s cell 
phone.  Those records indicated which cell tower Hood was near when he used 
his phone. 
{¶ 24} Through the records, Veverka was able to ascertain that between 
10:00 p.m. through 3:00 a.m., 15 calls were made or received on Hood’s phone.  
The last of those 15 calls was at approximately 2:42 a.m.; the next call was at 6:24 
a.m.  He was able to determine through tower records that Hood was in the 
January Term, 2012 
 
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vicinity of the robbery when he used his cell phone.  Through another record 
containing a log of calls to and from Hood’s cell phone, Veverka was able to 
determine the dates and duration of the calls and the phone numbers involved. 
{¶ 25} From his examination of the cell-phone records, Veverka 
concluded that Hood, Hill, and Davis were all in the vicinity of the targeted house 
at the time the robberies were committed. 
{¶ 26} Defense counsel cross-examined Veverka.  He admitted that 
although he knew more about interpreting cell-phone records than his fellow 
detectives, he did not have any expertise in cell phones or towers.  He admitted 
being unaware that different towers have different powers, and admitted that 
phone company experts could provide maps and charts showing which towers 
serve which areas. 
{¶ 27} The records Veverka testified about were admitted into evidence.  
The documents sent to the jury contained some alterations from the detective—he 
wrote the phone numbers of the suspects on the documents and color-coded the 
records to highlight phone calls involving the different participants in the robbery.  
Hood’s counsel objected, stating that the records had not been verified as a 
business record, had not been identified by any phone company, and contained the 
detective’s personal notes, and that the alleged subpoenas were not in the record.  
The trial judge overruled the objection. 
Verdict and Appeal 
{¶ 28} The jury convicted Hood on one count of murder pursuant to R.C. 
2903.02(B), “caus[ing] the death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s 
committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the 
first or second degree,” and acquitted him on one count of murder as defined in 
R.C. 2903.02(A), “purposely caus[ing] the death of another.”  Further, the jury 
convicted Hood of nine counts of kidnapping, nine counts of aggravated robbery, 
and one count of aggravated burglary, as well as two firearm specifications for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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each count, which were merged for purposes of sentencing into a single 
specification.  The trial court had granted Hood’s motion for acquittal on two 
counts of kidnapping and two counts of aggravated robbery when two of the 
victims failed to testify.  The court ultimately sentenced Hood to an aggregate 
term of 21 years to life in prison. 
{¶ 29} Hood appealed his convictions to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals; among other things, he argued that the trial court had erred “by allowing 
cell phone records to be admitted into evidence without being properly 
authenticated in violation of the Confrontation Clause.”  The appellate court held 
that “[a]ssuming arguendo that these records were inadmissible and violative of 
appellant’s right to confront the witnesses against him, any error on the part of the 
trial court in this regard was harmless.” State v. Hood, 8th Dist. No. 93854, 2010-
Ohio-5477, ¶ 27.  The appellate court applied the harmless-error standard 
applicable to constitutional error: 
 
Before constitutional error can be considered harmless, we must be 
able to “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 
824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.  Where there is no reasonable possibility that 
the unlawful testimony contributed to a conviction, the error is 
harmless and therefore will not be grounds for reversal. State v. 
Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623, paragraph three 
of the syllabus, vacated on other grounds in (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 
98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. 
 
Id. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 30} The appellate court determined that the admission of the cell phone 
records did not contribute to Hood’s conviction and affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court. 
{¶ 31} Hood sought jurisdiction in this court on the following proposition 
of law: 
 
 
Cell phone records are not admissible as business records 
without proper authentication.  The admission of unauthenticated 
cell phone records under the business records exception violates 
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
 
{¶ 32} The matter is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 128 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2011-Ohio-828, 942 N.E.2d 384. 
Law and Analysis 
Confrontation Clause 
{¶ 33} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in its 
Confrontation Clause, preserves the right of a criminal defendant “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”  In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court of the 
United States stated that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to 
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  
The key issue is what constitutes a testimonial statement: “It is the testimonial 
character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject 
to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.” Davis v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273, 
165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 34} In Crawford, the court suggested that business records are “by 
their nature” nontestimonial.  Id. at 56.  In State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 
2006-Ohio-4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, this court stated that business records “are not 
‘testimonial in nature because they are prepared in the ordinary course of 
regularly conducted business and are “by their nature” not prepared for 
litigation.’  ” Id. at ¶ 82, quoting People v. Durio, 7 Misc.3d 729, 734, 794 
N.Y.S.2d 863 (2005).  Whether a business record meets a hearsay exception is 
immaterial in regard to the Confrontation Clause; it is the nontestimonial 
character of the record that removes it from the purview of the Confrontation 
Clause:  
 
Business and public records are generally admissible absent 
confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the 
hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the 
administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial. 
 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 
314 (2009). 
{¶ 35} A Confrontation Clause issue can arise “ if the regularly conducted 
business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.” Id. at 321.  In 
Melendez-Diaz, for instance, the items of evidence at issue were reports by a 
company that provided forensic analysis on seized substances to establish whether 
they were illegal. 
{¶ 36} But the regularly conducted business activity of cell-phone 
companies is not the production of evidence for use at trial.  The fact that records 
are used in a trial does not mean that the information contained in them was 
produced for that purpose.  Even when cell-phone companies, in response to a 
January Term, 2012 
 
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subpoena, prepare types of records that are not normally prepared for their 
customers, those records still contain information cell-phone companies keep in 
the ordinary course of their business.  In United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 
673, 679 (10th Cir.2011), the defendant argued that the documents produced by 
the cellular-phone company were not merely phone records but were instead 
exhibits prepared especially for trial to prove the commission of a crime.  The 
information contained in the exhibits was similar to that contained in the exhibits 
at issue in this case: “The phone records provide information about each call 
made or received by Ms. Yeley–Davis's number, including the number making 
the call, the number receiving the call, and the date and duration of the call.” Id. at 
677.  The court rejected the defendant’s argument: 
 
Ms. Yeley–Davis contends that the phone records and 
authenticating documents in Exhibit 5 are testimonial because they 
were prepared solely for use at trial to prove the conspiracy. * * * 
Specifically, she argues that the records were not telephone bills, 
but rather “exhibits prepared especially and only for trial.” * * * 
Ms. Yeley–Davis is correct that the phone records in Exhibit 5 are 
not telephone bills.  This does not mean, however, that these 
records were created simply for litigation—they were not. Rather, 
these records were kept for Verizon's business purposes. 
 
Id. at 679. 
{¶ 37} Likewise, in United States v. Green, 396 Fed.Appx. 573, 575 (11th 
Cir.2010), the court held that subpoenaed records from the defendant’s cell phone 
carrier were not testimonial: “[The defendant’s] cell phone records and cell tower 
location information qualified as business records under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) 
which, by their nature, are non-testimonial for purposes of the Sixth 
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Amendment.”  The court noted that “documents which are routinely recorded for 
a purpose other than preparation for a criminal trial are non-testimonial for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 574-575. 
{¶ 38} Unlike the laboratory reports that the court found to be testimonial 
in Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming v. New Mexico, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 
180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), the culling and configuration of cell phone records does 
not require the undertaking of a scientific process or an interpretation of results 
from experimentation.  It reflects only a formatting of information that already 
exists as a part of the company’s day-to-day business. 
Authentication of Business Records 
{¶ 39} Because cell-phone records are generally business records that are 
not prepared for litigation and are thus not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause 
does not affect their admissibility.  But in this case, there is no assurance that the 
records at issue are business records.  Evid R. 803(6) governs the admission of 
business records: 
 
“To qualify for admission under Rule 803(6), a business record 
must manifest four essential elements: (i) the record must be one 
regularly recorded in a regularly conducted activity; (ii) it must 
have been entered by a person with knowledge of the act, event or 
condition; (iii) it must have been recorded at or near the time of the 
transaction; and (iv) a foundation must be laid by the ‘custodian’ 
of the record or by some ‘other qualified witness.’ ” 
 
State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 171, quoting 
Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence Treatise 600, Section 803.73 (2007). 
{¶ 40} Here, there was simply no foundation laid by a custodian of the 
record or by any other qualified witness.  Detective Veverka was not a custodian 
January Term, 2012 
 
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of the records.  He did not prepare or keep the phone records as part of a regularly 
conducted business activity.  Nor was he an “other qualified witness” under the 
rule.  A “qualified witness” for this purpose would be someone with “enough 
familiarity with the record-keeping system of the business in question to explain 
how the record came into existence in the ordinary course of business.” 5 
McLaughlin, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence Section 803.08[8][a] (2d Ed.2009); 
United States v. Lauersen,  348 F.3d 329, 342 (2d Cir.2003).  Tellingly, in the 
midst of discussions regarding the lack of authentication of the records, the trial 
judge remarked, “My gut reaction is to subpoena Verizon.”  That did not happen. 
{¶ 41} In Yeley-Davis, both the certification authenticating Yeley–Davis’s 
phone records and the affidavit authenticating the phone records of her two 
alleged co-conspirators stated that the records were kept in the course of 
Verizon’s regularly conducted business. 632 F.3d at 677. In this case, there is no 
such authentication.  The records in this case lacked a certification or affidavit 
authenticating them, and no “custodian or other qualified witness” testified that 
the phone records were business records. 
{¶ 42} Thus, the cell-phone records in this case were not authenticated as 
business records, and that fact affects their status in regard to the Confrontation 
Clause.  If the records had been authenticated, we could be sure that they were not 
testimonial, that is, that they were not prepared for use at trial.  Without knowing 
that they were prepared in the ordinary course of a business, among the other 
requirements of Evid.R. 803(6), we cannot determine that they are nontestimonial.  
We thus find that the admission of the records in this case was constitutional 
error. 
Harmlessness Review 
{¶ 43} In determining whether admission of the cell-phone records was 
harmless, the court below applied the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard of review. Hood, 2010-Ohio-5477, at ¶ 27.  “Where constitutional error 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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in the admission of evidence is extant, such error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt if the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof 
of [the] defendant’s guilt.” State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 452 N.E.2d 1323 
(1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.  The court below concluded, “Considering 
Hill's devastating testimony against appellant, we cannot find that the admission 
of the cell phone records contributed to appellant's conviction.” Id. at ¶ 30.  We 
agree that the admission of the cell-phone records was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 44} The evidence of Hood’s guilt was overwhelming.  We first note 
that jurors did not have to believe that Hood pulled the trigger to find him 
responsible for Peet’s death; they just had to find that he participated in the 
criminal act that led to Peet’s death.  Kareem Hill was a co-conspirator and 
eyewitness; Hill’s DNA was found at the scene.  His version of events inside the 
house was consistent with testimony from the victims.  He provided detailed 
testimony against Hood. 
{¶ 45} Hill’s testimony was, by itself, disastrous for the defense.  And it 
was corroborated by other evidence.  Hood’s DNA was found in Hill’s vehicle, on 
a cigar tip in the front ashtray; Hood could not be ruled out as a contributor to 
DNA found on the right and left rear interior passenger doors of Hill’s vehicle.  
Peet could not be ruled out as a contributor of part of the mix of DNA found on 
the interior left rear passenger door, corroborating Hill’s testimony that Hood and 
Peet had been together in Hill’s vehicle. 
{¶ 46} When police surrounded Hill’s vehicle in the McDonald’s parking 
lot following the robbery, Hood was inside.  Also in the vehicle were cell phones 
stolen during the robbery, as well as cash.  A large amount of cash was found in 
Hood’s possession. 
{¶ 47} What role did the cell-phone records play in Hood’s conviction?  
Upon review, we conclude that the records were of minimal probative value and, 
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at most, merely cumulative in effect.  Veverka testified that cell-tower logs placed 
Hood in the vicinity of the crime.  But there were no calls to or from Hood 
between 2:52 a.m. and 6:24 a.m. on the morning of the crime.  The break-in 
occurred at around 5:00 a.m., so the cell towers do not place him in the vicinity at 
the crucial time. 
{¶ 48} In one respect, the phone records could even be seen as weakening 
the state’s case against Hood.  As the defense pointed out during its cross-
examination of Hill, the records reflect calls made between Hill and Hood at times 
when the two men were, according to Hill, together in Hill’s car.  Hill had no 
explanation why two people would communicate by phone when they were both 
inside the same car. 
{¶ 49} Terrence Davis’s records were also introduced.  The records reveal 
no contact with Hood, but there is contact with Hill.  This does back up Hill’s 
testimony that conversations regarding planning occurred between someone using 
Hill’s phone and Davis. 
{¶ 50} But the key evidence—the evidence that places Hood inside the 
house participating in the crimes—does not depend in any way on the cell-phone 
records.  DNA evidence proves that Hill was there and Hill placed Hood there, 
armed with an Uzi, wearing latex gloves, and participating in the robberies.  
Victim testimony corroborated to a large extent Hill’s version of events inside the 
house.  Hood was in the vehicle containing the spoils of the robberies soon after 
they occurred.  We thus conclude that the admission of the cell-phone records did 
not contribute to Hood’s conviction and that their admission was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 51} We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, 
C.J., 
and 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’DONNELL, 
and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 52} I concur in judgment only.  I would modify the original majority 
opinion as suggested in the memorandum in support of reconsideration filed by 
the amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio.  The opinion as modified should 
specifically clarify that violations of the Confrontation Clause and violations of 
evidentiary hearsay rules are not coextensive. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Melissa M. Prendergast, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, 
Solicitor General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Samuel Peterson, 
Assistant Attorney General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, state of Ohio. 
______________________