Case Title: Dennis G. Kainen v. Katherine Harris

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-1644

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1644
____________
DENNIS G. KAINEN, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
KATHERINE HARRIS, as
Secretary of State,
Respondent.
[October 3, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Dennis G. Kainen petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus, claiming the
ballot language for the local option vote required by article V, section 10(b)(3)a,
Florida Constitution, is unclear and ambiguous and thus should be invalidated.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b), Fla. Const.
Upon review, we find the ballot language provided by section 101.161(3)(c)
and (e), Florida Statutes (1999), as amended by chapter 2000-361, section 1, at
4035-36, Laws of Florida., is not clearly and conclusively defective to warrant relief
1See, e.g., Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1999) (refusing to invalidate constitutional
amendment approved by voters limiting terms of state officials).
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here.  See Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1992) (no
relief is possible unless the ballot summary is clearly and conclusively defective). 
Thus, the petition is denied.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs with an opinion, in which SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ.,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur.
LEWIS, J., specially concurs with an opinion.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurring.
I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that the ballot language is “not
clearly and conclusively defective” so as to warrant judicial intervention.  However,
while the majority’s straight-forward analysis is certainly complete within itself, it is
important to re-emphasize the extreme caution that a court must exercise and the
high hurdle that must be cleared before a court may act in cases like this.1  We need
only look at the rare instances in which this Court has actually acted to strike a
ballot proposed by the Legislature in order to distinguish the circumstances
2As noted by Justice Ehrlich, such a finding has nothing to do with the good faith of the legislative
drafters:
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presented here.  
In Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982), former Governor Reubin
Askew joined with Common Cause and the League of Women Voters, Inc., in
petitioning the courts to remove from the ballot a proposed constitutional
amendment that appeared to restrict lobbying by former office holders, but that
actually would permit immediate lobbying by removing an existing ban on such
lobbying. 
In an opinion by Justice McDonald the Court expressed caution at the outset
about the parameters for its review of the ballot language:
The Court must act with extreme care, caution, and
restraint before it removes a constitutional amendment
from the vote of the people.  Nevertheless, it is clear and
convincing to us that the ballot language contained in SJR
1035 is so misleading to the public concerning material
changes to an existing constitutional provision that this
remedial action must be taken.
Id. at 156.  Relying on statutory restrictions and a long line of constitutional
precedents, the Court in Askew found that the ballot title and summary failed to
fairly inform the voters of a major consequence of the amendment, i.e., that the
amendment would actually void the existing ban on lobbying.2  Rather, the ballot
     I do not intend to imply that the framers of the joint resolution and
those members of the legislature who voted for it intentionally set out to
mislead or deceive the voters.  That is undoubtedly not the case.  All I say
is that the end result of their well-intentioned efforts was not in compliance
with section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1981).
Askew, 421 So. 2d at 158 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
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title and summary were written in such a way that a voter would believe that by
approving the amendment she was voting to restrict lobbying.  As stated by Justice
Boyd in a concurring opinion:
A person who may vote to adopt the amendment for the
purpose of limiting lobbying by legislators will actually
achieve directly opposite results in removing the present
lobbying ban.
Id. at 156-57.  The essential holding of the Court in Askew was that a change to the
Constitution
must stand on its own merits and not be disguised as
something else.  The purpose of section 101.161 is to
assure that the electorate is advised of the true meaning,
and ramifications, of an amendment.  A proposed
amendment cannot fly under false colors; this one does. 
The burden of informing the public should not fall only
on the press and opponents of the measure – the ballot
title and summary must do this.
Id. at 156.  Of course, section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1999), contains the
statutory mandate that the ballot title and summary be in such clear and
unambiguous language so as to give the voter fair notice of the decision she must
3Section 101.161 requires a ballot summary to be in clear and unambiguous language.  By its terms,
this statutory requirement applies to any constitutional amendment.  Thus, this Court has held that a ballot
summary of an amendment proposed by the Legislature cannot be misleading.  See Grose v. Firestone, 422
So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982); see also Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Term Limits Pledge, 718
So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1998) (striking a citizen initiative from the ballot because of misleading summary); Smith
v. American Airlines, 606 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1992) (removing a proposal of the Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission from the ballot because of misleading summary).
4Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has applied the federal counterpart to this provision in
a variety of contexts including, for example, a noncapital case in which the defendant was sentenced to life
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make.  See Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So. 2d 981,
986 (Fla. 1981).3
Similarly, in our recent decision in Armstrong v. Harris, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
S656 (Fla. Sept. 7, 2000), this Court followed the holding of Askew and found the
language in a proposed ballot title and summary “preserving the death penalty”
violated the fair notice requirements because the ballot summary failed to advise the
electorate of the “true meaning, and ramifications” of the amendment.  Among
other flaws, we found in Armstrong that the ballot summary completely failed to
inform the voters that the provision in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida
Constitution protecting citizens from “cruel or unusual punishments” would be
altered and reduced to provide protection only from “cruel and unusual
punishments.”  In addition, the ballot summary failed to inform the voters that a
myriad of potential punishments other than the death penalty would be substantially
affected by the amendment.4  In essence, we held that if Florida citizens are to be
without parole for larceny, a crime ordinarily punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment and a
$5,000 fine.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1983).  Thus, the cruel and unusual standard
of the federal constitution and the cruel or unusual standard of the state constitution may be implicated in
the imposition of any punishment and in any case, whether it be a capital or a misdemeanor case.
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deprived of this important right they must be told so.
Hence, both Askew and Armstrong present clear-cut cases of flawed ballot
summaries that violate fundamental constitutional safeguards as well as both the
letter and spirit of section 101.161 which was enacted “to assure that the electorate
is advised of the true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment.”  Askew, 421
So. 2d at 156.  As Justice Shaw declared in Armstrong, a Florida citizen is entitled
to vote “with eyes wide open” when asked to nullify an original act of Florida’s
Founding Fathers.
THIS CASE
The circumstances presented here and the ballot summary language involved
are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances presented in Askew and
Armstrong.  Here, the Constitutional Revision Commission itself initially placed a
constitutional amendment on the ballot whereby Florida voters would receive the
local option of changing from an elective system to an appointive system for
selecting trial judges.  In fact, the ballot language chosen by the Legislature and
challenged here actually mirrors the final language actually chosen by the
5Fla. Const. Rev. Comm’n, Transcript of Proceedings 86-87 (Mar. 23, 1998).
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Commission and placed on the ballot as a constitutional amendment authorizing
voters in local areas to go from an elective system to an appointive system.  
More importantly, it appears that the concerns expressed by the petitioners
here simply repeat an earlier debate that took place between the Commissioners
when they were deciding upon ballot language.  Before the ballot language for this
constitutional amendment was finally settled upon, ballot language proposed by a
committee of the Commission stated: “Provides for future local elections to either
retain current election of circuit and county judges or to choose merit selection and
retention.”  Fla. Const. Rev. Comm’n Journal 227 (Mar. 23, 1998) (emphasis
added).  During the debate over this language, Commissioner Lowndes moved to
amend and change this language, explaining:
It was suggested to me by Mr. Morsani, Commissioner
Morsani, this morning that the people that worked in his
shop wouldn’t know what we were talking about if we
said merit selection and retention.  And after he said that,
it occurred to me that we really needed to be more clear
what we’re talking about.5
Commissioner Sundberg responded:
Well, the problem is, it seems to me, that this – that this
will permit a characterization which might be detrimental
to the passage of this – I’m just made uneasy by it.  It
doesn’t – I’m not sure it fully explains.  And I know a
6Fla. Const. Rev. Comm’n, Transcript of Proceedings 88 (Mar. 23, 1998).
7Of course, the Commission could have drafted the ballot language itself and required its use in the
local elections, but, for whatever reason, it did not.  Hence, the Legislature had to act since the amendment
mandated action in the 2000 general election.
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ballot language cannot fully explain it.  I’m not sure this is
an improvement.  It seems to me it may work against the
proposition.6
Commissioner Lowndes’ proposed change was thereafter adopted by the
Commission and the actual ballot summary was put before the electorate and
approved in the November 1998 general election.  The ballot summary actually
submitted and approved by the voters stated:
Provides for future local elections to decide whether to
continue electing circuit and county judges or to adopt
system of appointment of those judges by governor, with
subsequent elections to retain or not retain those judges;
provides election procedure for subsequent changes to
selection of judges; increases county judges’ terms from
four to six years; corrects judicial qualifications
commission term of office; allocates state courts system
funding among state, counties, and users of courts.
(Emphasis added.)  As noted above, the language now proposed by the Legislature
for the local option vote is not unlike the ballot language finally settled upon by the
Commission.  Hence, the language cannot be said to conflict with the
Commission’s own description of this issue in the ballot summary of the judicial
amendment already approved.7  Both focus on a choice between an elective or an
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appointive system.  Because the wording is so similar it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to conclude that the legislative summary is misleading.
The petitioners, much like Commissioner Sundberg, as advocates for a
change in Florida’s method of selecting trial judges, may have valid concerns that
the ballot language does not clearly explain the merit selection and retention system
that will now be offered to voters as an alternative to popular elections.  However,
those concerns alone provide an insufficient basis for this Court to intervene. 
Perfection is not required, and common sense suggests that no matter how the
ballot language is worded there will always be those who fear the wording itself
favors passage or defeat.  This Court has no authority to redraft the ballot
language, and, of course, this Court may not consider the merits of a ballot issue.  
Finally, while everyone may have different views as to precisely how this
question should be phrased, and whether it contains an adequate explanation of the
alternative appointive system, it can hardly be asserted that the ballot language
contains the serious flaws that this Court found in Askew and Armstrong.  
For all of these reasons I concur in the  majority’s decision to deny the
application for a writ of mandamus.
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J. concurring.
8Article V, section 10(b)(3)a., Florida Constitution (1999), provides:
A vote to exercise a local option to select circuit court judges and county court
judges by merit selection and retention rather than by election shall be held in
each circuit and county at the general election in the year 2000.
9The 1999 statute phrased the ballot question as follows: "Shall circuit court judges in the (number
of the circuit) judicial circuit be selected through merit selection and retention?"  
§ 101.161(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Section 101.161(3)(e) included the same language, but concerned
county court judges.
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I concur with the majority and write to explain my reasoning.  This challenge
comes before this Court as a result of the November 1998 passage of article V,
section 10(b)(3)a. of the Florida Constitution, a constitutional amendment
proposed by the Constitutional Revision Commission ("CRC").8  This amendment
provides voters with the "local option" of deciding whether to select county court
judges and circuit court judges by "merit selection and retention rather than by
election" and mandates that the vote "shall" be held in the 2000 general election. 
Article V, section 10(b)(3)a. did not contain a provision setting forth the
ballot question to be used for the local option referendum.  Consequently, in 1999,
the Florida Legislature enacted section 101.161(3)(c) and (3)(e), Florida Statutes
(1999), in order to place the local option question on the ballot in each county and
circuit and to provide for the language of the ballot summary.9  
Based on concerns that the ballot question language contained in the 1999
10The stated purpose of the 2000 amendment is reflected in its legislative history:
The [1999] statute does not define what is meant by "merit selection and retention."
. . . . 
Under this bill, the ballot language explains the merit selection and retention process rather
than only using the phrase "merit selection and retention."
. . . .
. . . The amendment eliminated the phrase "merit selection" and rewrote the ballot
question so that voters would choose between "election by a vote of the people" and
"selection by the judicial nominating commission and appointment by the Governor with
subsequent terms determined through a retention vote by the people."
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Election Reform, CS for HB 1955 (2000) Staff Analysis 3, 5-6 (Mar. 29,
2000).
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version of sections 101.61(3)(c) and (e) would not be understandable to voters,10
the Legislature amended the ballot summary during the 2000 legislative session to
provide:
"Shall the method of selecting circuit court judges in the . . . (number
of the circuit) . . . judicial circuit be changed from election by a vote of
the people to selection by the judicial nominating commission and
appointment by the Governor with subsequent terms determined by a
retention vote of the people?"     
"Shall the method of selecting county court judges in . . . (number of
the circuit) . . . judicial circuit be changed from election by a vote of
the people to selection by the judicial nominating commission and
appointment by the Governor with subsequent terms determined by a
retention vote of the people?"
Ch. 2000-361, § 1, at 4036, Laws of Fla.  The Legislature approved this
amendment on May 3, 2000, and the amended legislation became law on July 1,
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2000.  On August 14, 2000, the petitioners filed the original mandamus action in this
Court challenging the 2000 revision of section 101.161 on the grounds that the
provision failed to provide fair notice to voters because it did not contain the words
"merit selection and retention."
Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that "[w]henever a
constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the
people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed
in clear and unambiguous language."  Because the constitutional amendment itself is
not placed on the ballot, it is essential that the ballot summary "give the voter fair
notice of the decision he [or she] must make."  Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d
151, 155 (Fla. 1982).  As we explained in Askew, the "wisdom" of a proposed
amendment or other public measure is "not a matter for our review."  Id. (citation
omitted).    
As we stated in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General–Limited Political
Terms in Certain Elective Offices, a "ballot summary may be defective if it omits
material facts necessary to make the summary not misleading."  592 So. 2d 225,
228 (Fla. 1991).  Two ways in which a summary may be clearly and conclusively
defective are by "fail[ing] to specify exactly what [is] being changed, thereby
confusing voters," or "giv[ing] the appearance of creating new rights or
11The Uniform Rules of Procedure for Circuit Judicial Nominating Commissions use the word
"select" rather than "nominate."  See, e.g., Section VI, entitled "Final Selection of Nominees" ("[T]he
commission shall select no less than three nominees . . . . The names of such nominees selected by the
commission shall be certified to the governor . . . .") (emphasis supplied).  
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protections, when the actual effect is to reduce or eliminate rights or protections
already in existence."  Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla.
1992).  The focus of the judicial inquiry is on the accuracy of the ballot and
summary.
I find that the ballot summary in this case is not misleading because it: (1)
properly advises the voters of the change from the current method of selecting
circuit court judges and county court judges; and (2) explains the method of merit
selection and retention in a manner that is neither misleading nor ambiguous. 
Although the petitioners point out that the word "merit" is not used in the summary
and that the Judicial Nominating Commission does not "select" but rather
"nominate[s]" candidates for judicial office, the possibility of using different terms
or a more complete explanation does not render this summary defective.11  Thus,
unlike in our recent decision in Armstrong v. Harris, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S656 (Fla.
Sept. 7, 2000), where the ballot title and summary failed to clearly explain the
elimination of an existing substantive state constitutional right,  the ballot title and
summary in the instant case utilizes plain language in an attempt to promote voters'
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understanding of the ballot initiative and to provide voters with "fair notice." 
Askew, 421 So. 2d at 155.   
The language that the CRC chose for the ballot summary in 1998, which  led
to the adoption of article V, section 10(b)(3)(a), lends support to the conclusion
that the 2000 ballot summary is not misleading.  The ballot summary drafted by the
CRC did not mention "merit retention and selection," but instead stated that the
amendment "[p]rovides for future local elections to decide whether to continue
electing circuit and county judges or to adopt system of appointment of those
judges by governor, with subsequent elections to retain or not retain those judges." 
Fla. Const. Rev. Comm'n, Revision 7 Ballot Summary (1998).  In fact, the CRC
rejected using the words "merit selection and retention" because the majority of the
CRC felt that the summary should instead include a "description of the process." 
Fla. Const. Rev. Comm'n, Transcript of Proceedings 86-87 (Mar. 23, 1998).
Finally, I address the question of the timeliness of the petitioners' challenge,
which once again places this Court in a position of having to make a last-minute
assessment of a proposed ballot summary.  Certainly a resolution of the issue of
whether the ballot summary is misleading before the election is vastly preferable to
an after-the-fact challenge.  However, as I stated in my recent concurring opinion in
Armstrong, "currently no time limits or established procedures exist for a challenge
12For example, because the Florida Constitution requires that proposed amendments and revisions
be filed with the Secretary of State at least ninety days before an election, Justice Overton has urged the
Legislature to enact a mechanism whereby interested parties may challenge ballot language within thirty
days of the filing of the amendment or revision.  See Askew, 421 So. 2d at 157.  Similarly, Justice Overton
recommended that this Court create an expedited process to settle such challenges within thirty days of the
challengers’ filing.  See id.  He also urged that the Court's process provide for the correction of defective
ballot language.  See id.
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to the ballot title and summary" in other than citizen-proposed constitutional
amendments.  25 Fla. L. Weekly at S661 (Pariente, J. specially concurring).  I again
join Justice Overton's repeated requests to "devise a process whereby misleading
language can be challenged and corrected in sufficient time to allow a vote on the
proposal."12  Id.; see Askew, 421 So. 2d at 157 (Overton, J., concurring specially);
Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d 486, 497 (Fla. 1994)
(Overton, J., concurring specially); Florida League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 401-02
(Overton, J., dissenting); Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1356 (Fla. 1984)
(Overton, J. concurring specially).
HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J. specially concurring.
I concur with the majority’s view and write to outline the principles that
should, in my view, be considered and applied in analyzing the present issues. 
13This is clearly distinguished from article V, section 10(a), Florida Constitution, which provides
a specific ballot question concerning the issue of retention of appellate judges and justices.  
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First, the relief sought here is mandamus and as I suggested and reasoned in
Armstrong v. Harris, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S656 (Fla. Sept. 7, 2000), such relief is
available only to enforce a right that is clear and certain which calls for mere
ministerial application of the principle involved.  See Florida League of Cities v.
Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla.  1992).  Mandamus proceedings are not available
to be used as a mechanism to establish the existence of a right previously unknown
and unstated.  It is from this procedural posture and standard that the analysis must
commence.
Article V, section 10(b)(3)(a) of the Florida Constitution requires that a
certain vote concerning the manner or method of selection of certain judges occur
during the 2000 general election.  Importantly, this recently amended constitutional
provision does not provide the specific words to be utilized as a ballot question,
nor does it attempt to explain or internally contain the precise meaning or process
involved in this “merit selection and retention.”13  Thus, the form of the ballot
question to be presented to the electorate must be either words selected directly
and only from the constitutional provision itself or from something external.  In
either event, it is necessary for some source to actually form the ballot question to
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be submitted to Florida citizens.
I cannot conclude that the constitutional provision which requires a “merit
selection and retention” vote to be held in the 2000 general election is self-
executing as to the form of the ballot question.  See Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846
(Fla. 1960).  Further, I do not believe that a two-step process of providing the
explanatory summary ballot language as appeared in connection with the 1998
constitutional amendment vote (which produced the requirement for this vote), but
providing absolutely no explanatory summary in connection with this year 2000
vote by merely lifting limited words from the amended constitutional section, is
appropriate under existing law.  In my view, although generated from multiple and
different perspectives, fundamental Florida jurisprudence has developed to require
that ballots be fair and provide sufficient information to enable the electorate to
have fair notice of the decision to be made by the vote, whether the ballot contains
a summary or the actual provision to be implemented.  See Wadhams v. Board of
County Commissioners, 567 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1990); Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.
2d 151 (Fla. 1982);  Hill v. Milander, 72 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1954).  Here, with the
constitutionally mandated vote requiring implementation, section 101.161(1),
Florida Statutes (1999), as amended by chapter 2000-361, § 1, Laws of Florida,
along with its interpretive decisions become applicable.  
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I certainly agree with the position of the petitioners to the extent that the
words and placement of words to be included or omitted from the proposed ballot
question are not those I would have necessarily chosen, had that decision been
within my jurisdiction or responsibility.  Utilization and placement of the word
“selection” along with the omission of the words “merit selection” are legitimate
criticisms.  However, that is not the issue to be decided by this Court.  Most
assuredly, the ballot question should include the concept of a methodology change
from the current direct vote of the people, and also some reference as to what the
new method involves.  However, so very often a description of things or concepts
through words from the English language defies absolute precision.  Such
descriptions can be honestly expressed through the utilization of multiple and
various words in many combinations.  In the present context, the windows through
which the word or words utilized should be measured are those of both one having
legal training and the general Florida citizen.  The eyes of a legal scholar should be
applied to determine if, based upon application of such specialized knowledge, the
effect or impact of the word or words used or omitted produces a result different
from that as understood by Florida citizens, or causes some unrevealed outcome. 
The eyes of the average voter must be then applied to ascertain whether he or she
can comprehend the true decision to be made by the vote.  Semantics and linguistic
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distinctions will always complicate the analysis, but we cannot apply the view of
either the legal scholar or the average citizen to the exclusion of the other.  Most
assuredly, this blending produces conflict at times, but such is the very nature of
the English language which itself resists scientific precision.  To be sure, this
inevitable conflict is not based upon ill will or bad motives, but is simply inherent in
the art of language and the eyes through which the words are understood.
I think it is important to note that if this Court were to invalidate the present
ballot question, it has no authority to simply rewrite the question to be that which it
deems “correct.”  Attempting to revert to the 1999 version of the ballot question as
set forth in section 101.161(3)(c) and (3)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), would be
disastrous, because such does not even give the public instruction that the
“election” concept as to trial judges would be eliminated.  Certainly, legal scholars
would understand the current Florida system of “merit selection and retention,” but,
in my view, we have failed miserably in our attempts to help the average citizen of
Florida understand the full process.  Further, in a similar manner, I suggest that
reverting only to words contained in the amended constitutional provision itself
would, under existing law, properly suggest that the “election” methodology would
be replaced, but would not further illuminate for Florida citizens what the “merit
selection and retention” process would involve.  I must conclude that a decision to
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invalidate the present ballot question, which would result in either of the foregoing
alternatives, does not solve the alleged problem, but would merely substitute one
concern for greater problems.  Additionally, if judicial invalidation of the ballot
question would result in the alternative that no ballot question would exist and,
therefore, no submission of an issue to the electorate as mandated by the
constitution would occur, we would be generating a totally unacceptable result. 
This alternative would thrust the Court unnecessarily and unacceptably into
producing direct noncompliance with a constitutional mandate.
Stepping back from the present foray in attempting to understand and
analyze the totality of the circumstances, I suggest that common sense directs that
we must look back to and understand just what the people of Florida instructed
through our organic law in 1998 when the constitutional provision which has
generated this dispute was adopted.  Although I concede that such election is over
and in the past, we must understand its circumstances to understand the alternatives
available today.  All agree that the ballot summary presented to the electorate in
1998 made reference to the decision being whether to continue electing trial judges
or adopting a system of having those judges appointed by the Governor subject to
14The 1998 ballot summary provided in pertinent part:
Provides for future local elections to decide whether to continue electing circuit
and county judges or to adopt system of appointment of those judges by Governor,
with subsequent elections to retain or not retain those judges;  provides election
procedure for subsequent changes to selection of judges . . . .
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subsequent election concerning retention.14  If one considers that which was
presented to the electorate on the ballot for adoption in 1998 as an indication of
what the citizens of Florida directed to occur during the 2000 general election, the
inescapable conclusion is that the present ballot question is very similar to that
ballot summary which was presented to the voters in 1998.  There are certainly
distinctions and differences, but in the final analysis, viewing a totality of the
circumstances and all of the alternatives facing the people of Florida, the ballot
question is not ambiguous or misleading so as to cause us to prohibit or forbid the
question as presently phrased from being presented to the electorate as required by
our organic law.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in result only.
I concur in result only because there is no basis for this Court to grant relief. 
However, my concurrence is not an indication that I find that this Court has
jurisdiction in this case.  To the contrary, I find no basis for mandamus, which is a
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writ limited to the enforcement of a clear legal right.  See Florida League of Cities v.
Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1992).  Mandamus simply does not fit a situation
where it is claimed that the Legislature acted unconstitutionally by placing on the
ballot a referendum question framed with misleading or ambiguous language.
Furthermore, I do not agree with the concurring opinions contrasting this
case with Armstrong v. Harris, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S656 (Fla. Sept. 7, 2000), in
concluding that Armstrong is an example of a case where this Court should strike
ballot language that the Legislature has placed on the ballot and this case is an
example of when this Court should not.
First, this case differs from Armstrong because this case does not involve a
constitutional amendment proposed by the Legislature.  This case involves the
implementation of a provision of the constitution about which there is no question
as to the provision’s constitutional efficacy.  Clearly, the only question here is
whether the constitutional provision is self-executing.  However, the provision does
not frame a question.  Thus, the power to frame the question, and thereby
implement the constitutional provision, plainly rests with the Legislature.  See
Greater Loretta Improvement Ass’n v. State, 234 So. 2d 665, 669 (Fla. 1970).
Second, this case does not have even the same circular jurisdictional
foundation as was the case in Armstrong and Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151
15In my dissent in Armstrong, I wrote that I could find no basis for the judiciary to strike a
constitutional amendment proposed by the Legislature.  See id. at S661 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
16See id. at S658.
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(Fla. 1982).  Both of those cases cite article V, section 3(b)(5), Florida
Constitution, as their jurisdictional basis.  Article V, section 3(b)(5), is this Court’s
“pass through” jurisdiction in respect to judgments of the circuit courts.  Neither of
those cases demonstrates any provision in article V, section 5(b), granting the
circuit court jurisdiction in those cases.15  Here, this petition does not even claim
jurisdiction in the circuit court, but rather original jurisdiction in this Court.
Finally, I conclude that a comparison with Armstrong, which finds
jurisdiction in this Court and then gives to this Court a basis to act in “clear cut”
cases, demonstrates the fallacy of this Court’s exercise of power in respect to
referenda placed on the ballot by the Legislature without express constitutional
authority to do so.  What is claimed to be “clear cut” by a deeply divided court
obviously is not.16
Decisions as to what is or is not misleading in most instances involve value
judgments on the part of the decision-maker.  For that reason, I continue to believe
that separation of powers concerns should cause this Court not to exercise such
jurisdiction on the basis of implied or inherent power.
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Original Proceeding - Writ of Mandamus
Bruce Rogow and Beverly A. Pohl of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale,
Florida,
for Petitioners
Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel and Kerey Carpenter, Assistant General
Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida; and Tom Warner, Solicitor General, Richard A.
Hixson, and T. Kent Wetherell, II, Deputy Solicitors General,  on behalf of
Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, Florida, 
for Harvey M. Alper, Joseph W. Little and Henry P. Trawick, Amici Curiae
A. J. Barranco, Jr. and Kimberly L. Boldt of Barranco, Kircher, Voeglsang &
Boldt, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Kendall Coffey and Manuel A. Diaz of Coffey,
Diaz & O’Naghten, L.L.P., Miami, Florida, 
for Diaz Amici Curiae
John K. Shubin of Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for The Cuban American Bar Association, The Hispanic National Bar 
Association, The Black Lawyers Association, Inc., and The Florida
Association for Women Lawyers - Miami-Dade County Chapter, 
Amici Curiae
John A. DeVault, III and Allan F. Brooke II of Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans &
Coxe, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,
for Former Presidents of the Florida Bar, Amici Curiae
Maggie Moody, Council Director, Civil Justice Council, Florida House of
-25-
Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida; and Thomas R. Tedcastle, General Counsel,
Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida,
for The Florida House of Representatives, Amicus Curiae