Case Title: State v. Leyh

Citation: 2022-Ohio-292

Docket Number: 2020-0819

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Leyh, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-292.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-292 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LEYH, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Leyh, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-292.] 
Appellate law—App.R. 26(B)—Under App.R. 26(B), the determination whether 
appellate counsel was deficient and prejudiced an applicant is to be made 
after the appeal has been reopened and the parties are afforded the 
opportunity to have counsel, transmit the necessary record, and 
substantively brief the issues—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed. 
(No. 2020-0819—Submitted April 28, 2021—Decided February 8, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 29298, 2019-Ohio-3640. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} Under App.R. 26(B), a defendant in a criminal case may apply to 
reopen his direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence based on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.  The issue in this case is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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whether the Ninth District Court of Appeals erred in denying appellant Clarence 
Leyh’s application to reopen his appeal.  Because Leyh’s application shows that 
there is a genuine issue as to whether he was deprived of the effective assistance of 
appellate counsel, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this 
case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Leyh pleaded guilty to an indictment that charged him with two 
counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(5)/(C)(1), fourth-
degree felonies; two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 
2907.05(A)(1)/(C)(1), fourth-degree felonies; one count of sexual imposition in 
violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(1)/(C), a third-degree misdemeanor; and one count of 
sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(3)/(C), a third-degree 
misdemeanor.  On December 21, 2018, the trial court sentenced Leyh to one-year 
prison terms for each felony offense and 60-day jail terms for each misdemeanor 
offense.  The trial court ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively to 
each other and ordered the misdemeanor sentences to be served concurrently with 
each other and with the felony sentences.  Leyh received an aggregate prison term 
of four years and was adjudicated a Tier I sex offender. 
{¶ 3} The trial court’s sentencing entry stated that it had “performed an 
analysis concerning allied offenses in regard to State v. Johnson and finds that the 
charges to the Indictment are not allied offenses of similar import, and do not merge 
for purposes of sentencing herein.”1  The entry also stated that “[n]either the state 
nor defense counsel objected to the Court’s determination.” 
{¶ 4} On January 22, 2019, Leyh’s trial counsel filed the notice of appeal.  
Counsel contemporaneously filed a docketing statement indicating that the record 
 
1.  We assume that the citation in this judgment entry is to our decision in State v. Johnson, 128 
Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, abrogated by State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 
2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
would include “a full or partial transcript of proceedings prepared for [the] appeal 
by a court reporter appointed by the trial court, who [counsel] served with a 
praecipe that [counsel] also filed with [the] court.”  The record does not reflect that 
a praecipe was ever served upon the court reporter or filed with the court. 
{¶ 5} On March 5, 2019, the clerk of court notified the parties that the 
record had been filed with the court of appeals and that the record consisted of a 
transcript of the docket and the journal entries.  The notice did not reflect that the 
record included a full or partial transcript of proceedings prepared by the court 
reporter. 
{¶ 6} On April 12, 2019, Leyh’s appellate brief was filed.  Counsel raised 
one assignment of error: “THE TWO COUNTS OF GROSS SEXUAL 
IMPOSITION 
UNDER 
R.C. 
2907.05(A)(1) 
AND 
GROSS 
SEXUAL 
IMPOSITION UNDER R.C. 2907.05(A)(5) ARE ALLIED OFFENSES OF 
SIMILAR IMPORT AND SHOULD HAVE MERGED FOR SENTENCING 
PURPOSES.”2  (Capitalization sic.)  Counsel appended a copy of Leyh’s 
presentence-investigation report (“PSI”) to the brief. 
{¶ 7} In its merit brief in the court of appeals, the state pointed out that Leyh 
had “failed to ensure that a transcript of the sentencing hearing was made a part of 
the appellate record.”  The state further noted: “A review of the record bears no 
indication that Appellant filed a praecipe with the court reporter to prepare 
transcripts of the hearing.  Thus, no transcripts were ever prepared or transmitted 
to the clerk of the court of appeals.”  Leyh’s appellate counsel still took no action 
to secure the hearing transcripts for Leyh’s appeal. 
 
2.  Leyh is currently serving four one-year consecutive sentences.  If his allied-offense argument 
has merit, then he would be sentenced on only two fourth-degree felonies, each carrying a maximum 
prison term of 18 months, R.C. 2929.14(A)(4).  If Leyh were given the maximum sentence—18 
months for each offense to be served consecutively—then that would result in his serving a three-
year prison term.  Leyh’s current expected release date, after serving four years, is November 21, 
2022.  His release date on a three-year term would be November 21, 2021.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} The state separately moved to strike the confidential PSI pursuant to 
R.C. 2951.03(A)(2) and (D)(1) and 9th Dist.Loc.App.R. 7.  The state’s unopposed 
motion was granted in a May 22, 2019 magistrate’s order, striking the PSI from the 
record. 
{¶ 9} On September 11, 2019, the court of appeals unanimously overruled 
Leyh’s single assignment of error without reaching the merits.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that due to the incomplete record, it was compelled to presume regularity 
in the lower-court proceedings and affirm the trial court’s judgment.  2019-Ohio-
3640, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 10} On November 13, 2019, represented by new appellate counsel, Leyh 
filed a timely application to reopen his direct appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  An 
affidavit by Leyh’s new appellate counsel supported Leyh’s allegation that his 
original appellate counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to include the 
sentencing-hearing transcript and the PSI in the appellate-court record to 
substantiate his claim that the trial court erred by failing to merge allied offenses of 
similar import.  Leyh further argued that counsel’s failure to include the transcript 
and the PSI in the record prejudiced him by requiring the court of appeals to 
presume regularity in the trial-court proceedings due to the incomplete record. 
{¶ 11} Although the state did not oppose Leyh’s App.R. 26(B) application, 
in a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals denied it on February 19, 2020.  The 
court of appeals subsequently denied Leyh’s application for reconsideration and en 
banc consideration by the same two-to-one vote. 
{¶ 12} On September 1, 2020, we accepted Leyh’s discretionary appeal 
which proffered the following proposition of law: 
 
In order to ensure that an appellant who has been convicted 
of a felony offense has a meaningful right to appeal, a district court 
must grant an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen when there are 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
one or more colorable issues identified in that application, and prior 
appellate counsel failed to ensure that a complete record—including 
all relevant transcripts—was made for appellate review. 
 
See 159 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2020-Ohio-4232, 151 N.E.3d 639. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 13} Concluding that Leyh failed to show that “there was a reasonable 
probability that he would have been successful” if the sentencing-hearing 
transcripts and PSI had been included in the record, the court of appeals determined 
that there was no genuine issue presenting a colorable claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel and accordingly denied Leyh’s application to reopen 
his appeal under App.R. 26(B).  9th Dist. Summit No. 29298, at 4 (Feb. 19, 2020).  
Based on the structure and text of App.R. 26(B), however, we conclude that the 
court of appeals erred by requiring Leyh to provide a demonstrable showing of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and a likelihood of success on the merits 
of his direct appeal—in effect, that Leyh would have won the appeal but for 
counsel’s deficient performance—as a condition to granting Leyh’s application to 
reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B). 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 14} Because the Ninth District’s decision involves the interpretation and 
application of a rule of appellate procedure, it presents a question of law, and we 
review questions of law de novo, see State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-
Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 9 (the interpretation of a statute is a matter of law 
that is reviewed de novo); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 
2009-Ohio-2496, 909 N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13 (a lower court’s interpretation of the law 
is reviewed de novo). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Application for Reopening a Direct Appeal Under App.R. 26(B) 
{¶ 15} In State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), 
superseded by rule as stated in State v. Davis, 119 Ohio St.3d 422, 2008-Ohio-
4608, 894 N.E.2d 1221, this court held that claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel were not cognizable in postconviction proceedings pursuant to 
R.C. 2953.21.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Ineffective-assistance-of-
appellate-counsel claims could, however, be raised in a timely application for 
reconsideration pursuant to former App.R. 26 in the court of appeals or in a direct 
appeal to this court.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Alternatively, if those 
deadlines expired, an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim could also 
be raised in an application for delayed reconsideration in the court of appeals 
followed by a delayed appeal to this court.  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 16} One year after this court announced its decision in Murnahan, and 
in direct response to that decision, App.R. 26 was amended to establish a procedural 
mechanism to adjudicate and, if warranted, reopen a direct appeal based on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  See Davis at ¶ 13 (“To be sure, 
App.R. 26(B) emanates directly from Murnahan”).  See also 1993 Staff Notes to 
App.R. 26 (the amendment to App.R. 26 was in response to this court’s opinion in 
Murnahan).  In Davis at ¶ 26, this court stated: 
 
App.R. 26(B) creates a special procedure for a thorough 
determination of a defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  The rule creates a separate forum where persons with 
allegedly deficient appellate counsel can vindicate their rights. 
 
{¶ 17} Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under App.R. 
26(B) are subject to the two-pronged analysis enunciated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  See State v. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, ¶ 14, id. at ¶ 23 
(O’Connor, C.J., concurring), id. at ¶ 28 (Fischer, J., concurring); State v. Reed, 74 
Ohio St.3d 534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456 (1996); see also 1993 Staff Notes to App.R. 
26 (“The term ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ is intended to comprise the two 
elements set forth in Strickland”). 
{¶ 18} In accordance with the Strickland analysis, an applicant must show 
that (1) appellate counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, id. at 687, 
and (2) there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694.  See Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-286, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).  “A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Strickland at 694.  As explained hereafter, App.R. 26(B) itself 
prescribes sequential stages for the two-pronged Strickland analysis. 
App.R. 26(B)’s Two-Stage Procedure 
{¶ 19} App.R. 26(B) establishes a two-stage procedure to adjudicate claims 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  See Simpson at ¶ 12 (“App.R. 26(B) 
* * * creates a two-step process”); see also 1993 Staff Notes to App.R. 26 (the 
amended rule presents a two-stage procedure).  “The first stage involves a threshold 
showing for obtaining permission to file new appellate briefs.”  Id., quoting 
Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d at 66, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (an applicant must “ ‘put forth a 
colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel’ ”). 
{¶ 20} At that first stage, the applicant must apply to have his appeal 
reopened following the procedure set out in App.R. 26(B)(1) through (4).  Simpson, 
164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 12.  A timely App.R. 
26(B) application must contain “[o]ne or more assignments of error or arguments 
in support of assignments of error that previously were not considered on the merits 
in the case by any appellate court or that were considered on an incomplete record 
because of appellate counsel’s deficient representation.”  App.R. 26(B)(2)(c).  It 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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must additionally contain “[a] sworn statement of the basis for the claim that 
appellate counsel’s representation was deficient with respect to the assignments of 
error or arguments raised pursuant to division (B)(2)(c) of [App.R. 26] and the 
manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal, 
which may include citations to applicable authorities and references to the record.”  
App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  The application must contain “[a]ny parts of the record 
available to the applicant and all supplemental affidavits upon which the applicant 
relies.”  App.R. 26(B)(2)(e). 
{¶ 21} The application for reopening “shall be granted if there is a genuine 
issue as to whether the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel 
on appeal.”  App.R.  26(B)(5).  The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate a 
“genuine issue” as to whether there is a “colorable claim” of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.  State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696 (1998).  
Indeed, “[a] substantive review of the claim is an essential part of a timely filed 
App.R. 26(B) application.”  Davis, 119 Ohio St.3d 422, 2008-Ohio-4608, 894 
N.E.2d 1221, at ¶ 26.  If a court of appeals denies the application, then it must state 
its reasons for the denial in its judgment entry.  App.R. 26(B)(6). 
{¶ 22} If the court of appeals grants the application, then the matter 
proceeds to the second stage of the procedure, which “involves filing appellate 
briefs and supporting materials with the assistance of new counsel, in order to 
establish that prejudicial errors were made in the trial court and that ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in the prior appellate proceedings prevented these 
errors from being presented effectively to the court of appeals.”  1993 Staff Notes 
to App.R. 26(B).  See Simpson at ¶ 13 (when an application is granted, the case 
proceeds to the second stage and is treated as if it were an initial direct appeal with 
briefing and oral argument). 
{¶ 23} If an applicant who proceeds to stage two is indigent and not 
represented by counsel, App.R. 26(B)(6)(a) directs the court of appeals to appoint 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
counsel to represent the applicant, and App.R. 26(B)(6)(b) directs the court of 
appeals to impose any conditions that are necessary to “preserve the status quo 
during the pendency of the reopened appeal.”  App.R. 26(B)(7) states that the case 
shall thereafter proceed as an initial appeal in accordance with Ohio’s Rules of 
Appellate Procedure “except that the court may limit its review to those 
assignments of error and arguments not previously considered.”  “The time limits 
for preparation and transmission of the record pursuant to App.R. 9 and 10 shall 
run from journalization of the entry granting the application.”  Id.  Further, “[t]he 
parties shall address in their briefs the claim that representation by prior appellate 
counsel was deficient and that the applicant was prejudiced by that deficiency.”  Id.  
Under App.R. 26(B)(8), the court of appeals may order an evidentiary hearing if it 
determines that one is necessary.  See Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-
6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 24} App.R. 26(B)(9) then directs the court of appeals to decide whether 
original appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance to the applicant under the 
Strickland analysis, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  App.R. 
26(B)(9) states: 
 
If the court finds that the performance of appellate counsel 
was deficient and the applicant was prejudiced by that deficiency, 
the court shall vacate its prior judgment and enter the appropriate 
judgment.  If the court does not so find, the court shall issue an order 
confirming its prior judgment. 
 
To put it differently, the prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the 
applicant establishes at the second stage that the direct appeal was meritorious and 
failed because appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance under the two-
pronged Strickland standard.  See 1993 Staff Notes to App.R. 26(B). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 25} Thus, the two-stage procedure prescribed by App.R. 26(B) requires 
that the applicant seeking permission to reopen his direct appeal show at the first 
stage that there is at least a genuine issue—that is, legitimate grounds—to support 
the claim that the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal.  See App.R. 26(B)(5).  If that showing is made and the application is 
granted, the applicant must then establish at the second stage the merits of both the 
direct appeal and the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  See 
App.R. 26(B)(9). 
The Ninth District’s Application of App.R. 26(B) 
{¶ 26} This case concerns the Ninth District’s determination at the first 
procedural stage that Leyh’s prior appellate counsel’s failure to include in the 
record Leyh’s sentencing-hearing transcript and/or PSI did not present a “genuine 
issue” as to whether Leyh had a “colorable claim” of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  The court of appeals acknowledged that Leyh’s original 
appellate counsel’s performance was deficient by failing to file a complete record 
for review on appeal.  9th Dist. Summit No. 29298, at 4 (Feb. 19, 2020) (“Leyh has 
established that that appellate counsel was deficient”).  The state does not contest 
that determination. 
{¶ 27} The court of appeals nevertheless denied Leyh’s application to 
reopen because the application did not show that “there was a reasonable 
probability that he would have been successful” had the sentencing-hearing 
transcripts and PSI been included in the record for his direct appeal.  Id.  The court 
of appeals erred, however, by requiring that Leyh establish at the first procedural 
stage a showing of virtual, if not certain, success of his App.R. 26(B) claims.  That 
showing is far beyond that which App.R. 26(B) contemplates or requires before 
granting the applicant permission to reopen his direct appeal. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
Genuine Issue as to Whether Counsel’s Deficient Performance Prejudicially 
Affected the Outcome of the Appeal 
{¶ 28} Leyh’s App.R. 26(B) application, which included his new appellate 
counsel’s affidavit, sufficiently set forth “the manner in which the deficiency 
prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal,” App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  Counsel’s 
affidavit declares: “It is my opinion that appellate counsel’s nonfeasance prejudiced 
Mr. Leyh, as otherwise the Court of Appeals would have considered the merits of 
the appellate brief on a complete record, instead of an incomplete record.”  Indeed, 
the Ninth District’s opinion makes indisputably clear that prior appellate counsel’s 
failure to include Leyh’s sentencing-hearing transcript and/or his PSI in the record 
inexorably prevented the court of appeals from considering the merits of whether 
the trial court erred in failing to merge Leyh’s convictions for purposes of 
sentencing.  Prior appellate counsel’s failure compelled the Ninth District to apply 
the presumption of regularity and to overrule Leyh’s assignment of error and affirm 
the trial court’s judgment.  2019-Ohio-3640 at ¶ 7.  See also Knapp v. Edwards 
Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980) (“When portions of 
the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the 
record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned 
errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the court’s 
proceedings, and affirm”).  Nor could the court of appeals consider the stricken PSI 
that was improperly attached to Leyh’s appellate brief. 
{¶ 29} Leyh readily fulfilled App.R. 26(B)(2)(d)’s requirement that an 
applicant set forth the manner in which his original appellate counsel “prejudicially 
affected the outcome of the appeal.”  By precluding the court of appeals from 
considering the merits of Leyh’s assignment of error and instead compelling the 
court to overrule it based on the presumption of regularity, counsel’s deficient 
performance did not just prejudicially affect the outcome of Leyh’s appeal: it 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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predetermined the outcome of the appeal by preventing the court of appeals from 
even considering the merits of the appeal, thus ensuring that the appeal would fail. 
{¶ 30} By any measure, Leyh’s substantiated assertion that appellate 
counsel’s deficient representation prejudicially affected the outcome of his appeal 
presented a genuine issue as to whether Leyh was deprived of the effective 
assistance of appellate counsel, readily satisfying the basic elements that are 
necessary to sustain such a claim under the standard in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  See Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-
6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 26 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring) (appellate counsel’s 
failure to raise disproportionate sentencing issues demonstrated at least a genuine 
issue as to whether applicant had a colorable claim that he was prejudiced by his 
appellate counsel’s deficient performance).  And under App.R. 26(B)(5), the 
application “shall be granted if there is a genuine issue as to whether the applicant 
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 31} Here, however, the court of appeals faulted Leyh’s App.R. 26(B) 
application, because his “limited argument * * * contained no citations to the parts 
of the record upon which he relied as is required by App.R. 16(A)(7) [sic.].”  9th 
Dist. Summit No. 29298, at 2 (Feb. 19, 2020).  Of course, the parts of the record 
upon which Leyh’s App.R. 26(B) application relied—the sentencing-hearing 
transcript and the PSI—were not part of the record, because (1) the sentencing-
hearing transcript was never transcribed and (2) the PSI was stricken from the 
record.  App.R. 26(B)(1)(e) requires that the application include “[a]ny parts of the 
record available to the applicant.”  (Emphasis added.)  The sentencing-hearing 
transcript and Leyh’s PSI plainly were not yet part of the record. 
{¶ 32} The court of appeals further faulted Leyh’s App.R. 26(B) attorney 
for failing to attest to her actual knowledge of the substance of the sentencing-
hearing transcript or PSI in her App.R. 26(B)(2)(d) sworn statement: “Without 
knowing how the transcript of the sentencing hearing and [PSI] would have 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
supported Mr. Leyh’s arguments in support of his assignment of error, if at all, it is 
impossible to say whether he was prejudiced by the fact that this Court did not 
consider his assignment of error on the merits.”  9th Dist. Summit No. 29298, at 3 
(Feb. 19, 2020).  But that statement reveals a premature expectation on the part of 
the court of appeals because the preparation and transmission of those items for 
inclusion in the record on appeal does not occur until the second procedural stage, 
after a court of appeals grants an App.R. 26(B) application and the matter has been 
fully briefed.  See App.R. 26(B)(7). 
{¶ 33} Aside from erroneously requiring that the second-procedural-stage 
showing be made at the first procedural stage, at which mere permission to proceed 
is sought, the Ninth District’s insistence on a full-blown presentation of the merits 
of the direct appeal and the claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at 
that point ignores practical realities.  Before an application to reopen has been 
granted, the applicant has no right to an App.R. 26(B) attorney.  See Morgan v. 
Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 21. And until an 
App.R. 26(B) application has been granted, an indigent applicant—particularly an 
incarcerated applicant—may not be able to afford any trial-court transcripts that 
had not been requested and prepared for his direct appeal. 
{¶ 34} Perhaps most fundamentally, the court of appeals denied Leyh’s 
App.R. 26(B) application based on its determination that Leyh failed to establish 
the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, i.e., that there was “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the appeal 
would have been different,” id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  
But that determination erroneously conflates the two-stage procedure under App.R. 
26(B), collapsing the second-stage’s ultimate ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-
counsel determination under App.R. 26(B)(9) into the first-stage’s threshold 
determination whether there is a genuine issue as to whether the applicant was 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal under App.R.  26(B)(5).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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See Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 29 
(Fischer, J., concurring) (acknowledging concern that the “review of applications 
for reopening under App.R. 26(B) has evolved from reviewing for genuine issues 
that could have been argued on appeal to reviewing the merits of those issues”). 
{¶ 35} As we have noted, the structure and text of App.R. 26(B) plainly 
contemplate stages of analysis.  In this case, Leyh had to show only at the first stage 
of the procedure a genuine issue that he was deprived of the effective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  He was not required to conclusively establish ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel just to be allowed to argue in a reopened appeal that 
he was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel.  Contrary to the 
reasoning of the court of appeals, Leyh did not have to prove that he would win the 
reopened direct appeal and prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel as a precondition to reopening the direct appeal for further legal 
proceedings to contest the trial court’s alleged failure to merge allied offenses. 
{¶ 36} The fact that the trial court’s journal entry recited that the court 
performed without objection by any party an allied-offense analysis pursuant to 
Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, before deciding 
not to merge Leyh’s offenses does not necessarily insulate that decision from 
appellate review.3  Leyh’s sentencing-hearing transcript—and perhaps his PSI—
either will or will not bear out whether the trial court performed a proper merger 
analysis and was without objection from the parties.  But those are issues for the 
court of appeals to consider in the first instance in a reopened appeal. 
 
3.  Indeed, there were several opinions in Johnson: the lead opinion, which was joined by three 
justices (including the authoring justice); one opinion concurring in judgment, which was joined by 
three justices (including the authoring justice); and a second concurring opinion, which was 
accepted by two justices (the authoring justice and one of the justices who also concurred in the lead 
opinion).  Five years later, in Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, at ¶ 16, this 
court abrogated Johnson and determined that the allied-offense analysis from that decision was 
“incomplete.” 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
{¶ 37} We note that the determination that a genuine issue of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel exists is not a determination of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.  See State v. Fain, 188 Ohio App.3d 531, 2010-Ohio-2455, 
936 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.) (Cunningham, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“[A] court’s determination that an App.R. 26(B) claim is colorable is not 
determinative of the court’s ultimate disposition of a reopened appeal”), abrogated 
on other grounds by State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 
N.E.2d 509.  Under App.R. 26(B), the determination whether appellate counsel was 
deficient and prejudiced the applicant is to be made after the appeal has been 
reopened and the parties are afforded the opportunity to have counsel, transmit the 
necessary record, and substantively brief the issues.  See App.R. 26(B)(6) through 
(9).  To prevail, the applicant will still have to establish that ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel undermined at least one meritorious direct-appeal issue.  And 
courts of appeals are in the best position to recognize whether a person has received 
deficient representation from appellate counsel and whether he has also been 
prejudiced by that deficient representation.  Morgan, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-
Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, at ¶ 6; Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d at 65, 584 N.E.2d 
1204. 
{¶ 38} We further emphasize that the mere failure to order a transcript does 
not necessarily create a genuine issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
when a transcript is not necessary to support a particular argument.  Additionally, 
an App.R. 26(B) application based on a claim that that prior appellate counsel failed 
to effectively argue a particular assignment of error may require a more 
particularized showing that counsel’s alleged deficient performance prejudicially 
affected the outcome of the appeal.  But those are issues to be considered on a case-
by-case basis as the circumstances may require. 
{¶ 39} In this case, however, the court of appeals jumped the analytical gun 
by requiring under App.R. 26(B)(5) not just a genuine issue of ineffective 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
assistance of appellate counsel but proof positive of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  Contrary to the appellate court’s determination, Leyh’s 
application to reopen his appeal showed a genuine issue of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel warranting a reopening of the appeal pursuant to App.R. 
26(B)(5). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 40} The Ninth District’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded 
to that court for further proceedings pursuant to App.R. 26(B)(6) through (9). 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 41} Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B) plainly states that a 
defendant who seeks to reopen an appeal because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must present a colorable claim that appellate counsel was deficient and that 
this deficiency “prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.”  Today, though, 
the majority disregards the rule, as well as decades of precedent.  It says that all a 
defendant need show is that counsel was deficient; no colorable showing of 
prejudice is required. 
{¶ 42} I’d follow the rule this court has adopted.  And I’d stick to our 
precedent.  Because the majority does neither, I dissent. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 43} Clarence Leyh was convicted after pleading guilty to four felony 
counts of gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.05, for having sexual contact with his 
16-year-old daughter.  Two of Leyh’s gross-sexual-imposition counts were for 
purposely compelling the victim to submit to sexual contact by force or threat of 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
force, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1).  The other two gross-sexual-imposition 
counts were for having sexual contact with the victim while she was substantially 
impaired, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(5).  According to the indictment, each of 
the offenses occurred sometime in December 2017. 
{¶ 44} On appeal, Leyh argued that the felony counts of gross sexual 
imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) were allied offenses of a similar import to the 
counts under R.C. 2907.05(A)(5) and thus should have merged for the purposes of 
sentencing.  See R.C. 2941.25.  He claimed that he had inappropriately touched the 
victim on only two occasions and that the (A)(1) and (A)(5) charges simply 
represented different theories by the prosecutor to reach the same conduct. 
{¶ 45} Leyh’s challenge on appeal ran into two problems.  First, the trial 
court stated in its journal entry that it had conducted a merger analysis.  The journal 
entry provided: “The Court performed an analysis concerning allied offenses in 
regard to State v. Johnson[, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 
1061,] and finds that the charges to the Indictment are not allied offenses of similar 
import, and do not merge for purposes of sentencing herein.  Neither the state nor 
defense counsel objected to the Court’s determination.” 
{¶ 46} Second, the record did not support Leyh’s merger argument.  
Significantly, Leyh’s counsel had failed to ensure that a transcript of the sentencing 
hearing was filed as part of the record on appeal.  Thus, there was nothing in the 
record to suggest that the trial court erred in failing to merge the counts. 
{¶ 47} The court of appeals concluded that because Leyh failed to include 
sufficient materials in the record to allow it to review his assignment of error, it 
could not reach the merits of his argument.  As a result, the court of appeals 
presumed regularity in the trial-court proceedings and affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment. 
{¶ 48} Leyh subsequently acquired new counsel, who filed an application 
to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B).  Leyh’s sole argument was that his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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prior counsel’s failure to file a complete record prejudiced him because the court 
of appeals could not consider his assignment of error on the merits. 
{¶ 49} The court of appeals denied Leyh’s application.  It noted that App.R. 
26(B)(2)(d) required that an application for reopening contain a sworn statement of 
the basis for a claim that appellate counsel was deficient and “the manner in which 
the alleged ‘deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ”  
(Emphasis added in Leyh.)  9th Dist. Summit No. 29298, at 3 (Feb. 19, 2020), 
quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  While the attorney who filed the application included 
a sworn statement, she averred only that, in her opinion, a competent attorney 
would have included the omitted materials and that she believed the failure to do 
so prejudiced Leyh.  But she did “not attest to have actual knowledge of the 
substance of the hearing transcript or the report, and, therefore, [was] unable to 
make the argument that the outcome would have been different.”  Id.  “Without 
knowing how the transcript of the sentencing hearing and presentence investigative 
report would have supported Mr. Leyh’s arguments,” the court found it “impossible 
to say” that Leyh had made a colorable claim that he was prejudiced by their 
absence.  Id. at 3-4. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 50} The majority holds that the court of appeals improperly required Leyh 
to show prejudice from his appellate counsel’s failure to ensure that the sentencing 
transcript and presentence-investigation report were made part of the record on 
appeal.  The majority is wrong. 
A.  The showing required to reopen an appeal 
{¶ 51} Up until today, we have been clear about the requirements to reopen 
an appeal.  Under App.R. 26(B) and our existing precedent, an applicant must make 
a colorable showing of two things to reopen his appeal: (1) that appellate counsel 
performed deficiently and (2) that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the 
result of the appeal would have been different.  In the first step, the applicant 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
submits an application to reopen his appeal.  State v. Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 
2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, ¶ 12.  Our inquiry in this first step asks whether 
the applicant has demonstrated “a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on appeal.”  State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696 (1998).  
If the claim is found to be colorable, the application moves to the second step—the 
appeal is reopened and proceeds in the ordinary course.  Simpson at ¶ 13.  We are 
concerned here with the first step, the threshold question of whether Leyh has 
established a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
{¶ 52} We recently reaffirmed that we apply the two-pronged test set forth 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984), to determine whether an application for reopening presents a colorable 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Simpson at ¶ 14; see also App.R. 
26(B)(2)(d).  The first prong of this test is concerned with deficiency: counsel’s 
performance must have been objectively unreasonable.  Simpson at ¶ 14, citing 
Strickland at 687.  The second prong looks for prejudice: the applicant must show 
a “reasonable probability that the result of the appeal would have been different but 
for counsel’s error.”  Simpson at ¶ 14, citing Strickland at 688, 694.  Establishing a 
genuine issue as to ineffective assistance of counsel requires a colorable showing 
as to both Strickland prongs.  See Simpson at ¶ 12; App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). 
{¶ 53} The two-pronged Strickland standard is reflected in the language of 
App.R. 26(B).  An application to reopen must include a sworn statement of both 
(1) “the basis for the claim that appellate counsel’s representation was deficient” 
and (2) “the manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of 
the appeal.”  App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). 
{¶ 54} The prejudice requirement “arises from the very nature * * * of the 
right to * * * effective * * * representation.”  (Emphasis in original.)  United States 
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006).  
Thus, “[c]ounsel cannot be ‘ineffective’ unless his mistakes have harmed the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
defense (or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have)” and a violation 
of the right to effective representation “is not ‘complete’ until the defendant is 
prejudiced.”  Id. 
B.  Leyh has failed to make a colorable showing that counsel’s deficient 
performance affected the outcome of his appeal 
{¶ 55} I agree with the majority that Leyh has met the first part of the test 
for reopening an appeal: he has made a colorable showing that his counsel was 
deficient for failing to supply record materials that would allow the court to evaluate 
the merger argument.  The problem, though, is that Leyh has not satisfied the 
second part.  He has not set forth anything to indicate that he was prejudiced by this 
failure. 
{¶ 56} Under the second-prong of the test, Leyh must make a colorable 
showing that his prior counsel’s deficient performance “ ‘prejudicially affected the 
outcome of the appeal.’ ”  Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 
N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 12, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  To meet this prong, Leyh was 
required to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the result of the appeal” 
would have been different absent his prior counsel’s deficient performance.  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 14, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 57} And here, Leyh offers nothing.  He does not contend that the 
outcome of his appeal would have been different had the omitted materials been 
included in the record.  All Leyh submitted in his application was his counsel’s 
affidavit.  And the only statement in the affidavit that even comes close to dealing 
with prejudice is the following: “It is my opinion that appellate counsel’s 
nonfeasance prejudiced Mr. Leyh, as otherwise the Court of Appeals would have 
considered the merits of the appellate brief on a complete record, instead of an 
incomplete record.” 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
{¶ 58} This statement falls far short of the requirement that Leyh make a 
showing that counsel’s deficient performance “ ‘prejudicially affected the outcome 
of the appeal.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Simpson at ¶ 12, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  
At best, all Leyh argues is that there is a possibility that the omitted materials might 
have changed the result of his appeal.  Thus, if we follow the rule and our precedent, 
Leyh’s application to reopen should be denied. 
C.  The Majority Reads the Prejudice Requirement Out of the Rule 
{¶ 59} The majority acknowledges App.R. 26(B)(2)(d)’s threshold 
requirement “that an applicant set forth the manner in which his original appellate 
counsel ‘prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ”  Majority opinion, 
¶ 29, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  It says that requirement is satisfied here because 
the failure to include a transcript precluded the court of appeals from considering 
the merits of the appeal.  Id. 
{¶ 60} But an inability to consider the merits of an argument does not 
necessarily equate with prejudice.  As the rule itself makes clear, something is 
prejudicial only when it “affect[s] the outcome of the appeal.”  (Emphasis added.)  
App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  The affidavit submitted by Leyh’s attorney makes no assertion 
that a transcript would contain anything that would affect the outcome of the appeal.  
Indeed, Leyh’s application is entirely bereft of any substantiation that he lost his 
appeal because of his attorney’s deficiency.  Thus, under the plain terms of the rule, 
Leyh has failed to present grounds to reopen the appeal. 
{¶ 61} The majority also makes much of the fact that App.R. 26 creates a 
two-stage process, with an applicant required at the first stage to present only a 
genuine issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  It is true, of course, 
that an applicant need not definitively prove that he suffered ineffective assistance 
of counsel at the initial, reopening stage.  But what he must do is present at least a 
colorable claim both that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency  
“ ‘prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ”  Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 12, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  So 
there has to be something in the record beyond mere speculation that counsel’s 
deficiency caused prejudice.  Here, the problem is not that the appellate court 
required Leyh to prove the merits of his ineffective-assistance claim to reopen the 
appeal.  The problem is that Leyh did not submit any evidence of prejudice at all.  
Without any evidence of possible prejudice, Leyh cannot meet the colorable-claim 
requirement. 
{¶ 62} The majority’s approach ignores the requirement set forth in our rule 
and affirmed by our precedent that the application for reopening include a sworn 
statement explaining “the manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the 
outcome of the appeal.”  App.R. 26(B)(2)(d); see Simpson at ¶ 12.  This 
requirement is consistent with the directive in App.R. 26(B)(5) that “[a]n 
application for reopening shall be granted if there is a genuine issue as to whether 
the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.”  
(Emphasis added.)  As the 1993 Staff Notes to App.R. 26(B) explain, “[t]he term 
‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ is intended to comprise the two elements set forth 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,] that 
is, deficiency in the representation and prejudice resulting from such deficiency.”  
The fatal flaw in the majority’s holding—and the basis for the court of appeals’ 
denial of Leyh’s application—is that Leyh’s application failed to set forth how the 
outcome of his appeal had been affected by his counsel’s deficient performance.  
Absent such a showing, Leyh failed to establish even a colorable claim for 
reopening under the rule. 
{¶ 63} The majority suggests that the need to make a colorable claim of 
prejudice puts Leyh in a catch-22 because the sentencing-hearing transcript is not 
a part of the record precisely because of his counsel’s deficient performance.  But 
an application for reopening is a postconviction remedy collateral to a direct appeal, 
which means an applicant may attach to his application material that is not a part 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
23 
of the trial record.  See Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 
N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 9, 11-12, citing App.R. 26(B)(2)(e).  Under App.R. 26(B)(2)(e), an 
applicant must provide with his application “[a]ny parts of the record available to 
the applicant and all supplemental affidavits upon which the applicant relies.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The rule clearly envisions a scenario in which a defendant 
seeking to reopen his appeal may need to supplement an incomplete record to show 
a genuine issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
{¶ 64} There is nothing that prevented Leyh from ordering the transcript of 
the sentencing hearing for use in connection with his application for reopening.  
And if the omitted portions of the trial record did in fact demonstrate that an allied-
offense argument would have had merit, Leyh could have attached the relevant 
portions of the trial record to the affidavit he filed with his application for 
reopening. 
{¶ 65} The majority also posits that there may be situations in which a 
defendant may not be able to obtain a transcript to substantiate a claim of ineffective 
assistance.  But the affidavit submitted by Leyh’s attorney does not indicate that 
that is the case here.  And even if that had been the case, nothing precluded Leyh 
from submitting other materials in an attempt to meet his burden to show “the 
manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.”  
App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  For example, in her sworn statement, Leyh’s attorney could 
have explained why, based on her review of the case file, the offenses should have 
merged.  Or Leyh might have included an affidavit from his trial attorney providing 
insight into the factual underpinnings of each offense and an account of what had 
transpired during the sentencing hearing.  Quite simply, Leyh failed to make any 
attempt to present a colorable claim of prejudice, and instead insisted that prejudice 
should be presumed.  Because Leyh did not make the required showing as to the 
“manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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as required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(d), the court of appeals properly denied his 
application to reopen. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 66} The court of appeals did not err in denying Leyh’s application for 
reopening.  App.R. 26(B) provides a straightforward procedure for advancing a 
claim that deficient representation affected the outcome of an appeal.  Leyh 
submitted nothing to indicate that the outcome of his appeal would have been 
different had his prior counsel ensured that additional record materials were before 
the appellate court.  He thus failed to make a colorable claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority departs from 
the plain text of App.R. 26(B) and decades of well-reasoned precedent.  I would 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and reject Leyh’s proposition of law.  
Because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven 
DiMartino Guest, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Addison M. Spriggs, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
_________________