Case Title: Virgilio v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Virgilio v. State1992 WY 63834 P.2d 1125Case Number: 90-209Decided: 06/04/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vernon VIRGILIO, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; Gerald M. Gallivan, Defender Aid Program; and 
Timothy F. Marion, Student Intern, for appellant. Argument presented by 
Leonard D. Marion.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Jennifer Gimbel, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, and Wilhelm F. Bierman, Student 
Intern, for appellee. Argument presented by Jennifer Gimbel.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Vernon Virgilio 
appeals his convictions for aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled 
substance and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Virgilio brings 
the following issues:

ISSUE I

     Whether the appellant 
was convicted contrary to law where the prosecutor presented an improper basis 
of criminal liability and the court's instructions were ambiguous and could have 
been interpreted by the jury to mean that mere knowledge of the criminal act was 
sufficient for a conviction?

ISSUE II

     Whether the appellant 
was improperly denied instructions on his theory of the case, i.e., mere 
presence with knowledge was insufficient to convict?

ISSUE III

     Whether the trial 
court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the admissability of 
testimony relating to appellant's prior bad acts?

[¶4]      In July 1989, 
agents from the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) were 
investigating the sale of LSD in the Casper area. Using an informant, the DCI 
agents arranged a purchase of the drug from Brooke Snyder through James Bryan. 
In the afternoon of July 17, Bryan purchased 50 "hits" of LSD for the agents 
from Snyder. The agents told Bryan they wished to purchase more and arranged to 
meet him later that day at a convenience store parking lot.

[¶5]      At the store 
parking lot, Bryan was sitting in the passenger seat of appellant Virgilio's 
vehicle. The agents followed the vehicle to an apartment where Bryan introduced 
Virgilio to the agents. In Virgilio's presence, Bryan and the agents discussed 
purchasing LSD. Virgilio offered to drive Bryan to where the LSD was available 
because he said he wanted to get some LSD for himself.

[¶6]      One of the agents 
told Virgilio not to drive very fast so the agent could follow him. They also 
arranged to meet at a car wash if the agents lost Virgilio and Bryan. After 
meeting at the car wash, Virgilio and Bryan left to arrange for the purchase. 
They returned to report to the agent that Brooke Snyder would sell 26 "hits" of 
LSD for $3.50 each. That would have totalled $91.00, but Virgilio suggested the 
agents give them $90.00 to keep things simple. The money was handed to the 
appellant, Virgilio, who handed it to Bryan. Virgilio told the agents to stay at 
the car wash until he and Bryan returned.

[¶7]      Concerned that 
Virgilio and Bryan might drive off with the money or with the drugs after using 
their money to purchase them, the agents drove to an area near Brooke Snyder's 
residence to observe the transaction. Virgilio and Bryan left the residence and 
saw the agents. Virgilio told the agents that it was not safe where they were 
and to meet at the car wash. The drugs were delivered to the agents at the car 
wash.

[¶8]      Virgilio was 
charged with delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance, pursuant to W.S. 35-7-1014(d)(xii), 35-7-1031 and 
35-7-1042, on September 6, 1989. He was found guilty of aiding and abetting the 
delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance on May 9, 1990. He was subsequently sentenced to four to six years in 
the penitentiary.

[¶9]      In his first 
issue, appellant contends that a combination of the State's closing argument and 
the jury instructions concerning the law relating to an aiding and abetting 
conviction resulted in error. We find no error in the argument, the 
instructions, or a combination of the two.

[¶10]   To determine the propriety of a 
closing argument, we examine it in its entirety. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 166 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 
(1982). The purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to offer ways of 
viewing the significance of the evidence. Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 605 
(Wyo. 1984). The scope of permissible argument by counsel to the jury is within 
the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear or 
patent abuse of discretion. Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 132 (Wyo. 1980). The 
court should allow a wide latitude of comment on the evidence. State v. Spears, 
76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 561 (1956).

[¶11]   To convict a person of aiding and 
abetting the commission of a substantive offense, it must be proven that the 
crime in question was committed by someone and that the person charged as an 
aider and abettor associated himself with and participated in the accomplishment 
and success of the criminal venture. Tompkins v. State, 705 P.2d 836, 840 (Wyo. 
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986). 
Appellant does not contest that the substantive crime was committed. Instead, he 
contends that the State's closing ignored the other elements necessary for an 
aiding and abetting conviction.

[¶12]   Appellant focuses on statements 
made by the State concerning appellant's knowledge of the drug transaction that 
transpired. He contends that the closing argument focused on knowledge instead 
of criminal intent. Reading the State's argument, however, in its entirety, we 
find the State's argument did not rely on whether appellant knew that a drug 
transaction was transpiring. Throughout the State's argument are references to 
actions appellant took to further the drug transaction. The argument details the 
conversations between the DCI agents, Bryan and appellant, appellant's driving 
Bryan to get the drugs, and appellant's calculating the sale price of the LSD. 
We find the State's argument was not as characterized by appellant. The argument 
was proper comment upon the evidence.

[¶13]   Appellant dovetails his argument 
concerning the State's closing by contending that the argument caused jurors to 
misunderstand their instructions. He argues that the instructions do not define 
"criminal intent," and the State's argument suggests that knowledge is equal to 
criminal intent. We have already discussed and rejected the contention that the 
State's argument was misleading. Furthermore, the instructions do define 
"criminal intent." Instruction 7, which is based on Wyoming Pattern Jury 
Instruction - Criminal 3.203, states:

     To be an accessory 
before the fact, a person must intend that his acts or words secure the 
commission of the crime. Merely assenting to or assisting in the commission 
of the felony without knowledge that a crime is going to be committed, or that 
the defendant's actions are going to aid in the commission of the felony, is not 
criminal. [Emphasis added]

The instruction 
defines concisely "criminal intent." See United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436, 
441 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S. Ct. 1935, 104 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1989) and Black's Law Dictionary 336 (5th Ed. 1979). We find no error in 
the instructions by themselves or in combination with the State's closing 
argument.

[¶14]   In his second issue, appellant 
contends that the court erroneously refused the following two 
instructions:

DEFENDANT INSTRUCTION 
"D"

     Evidence, though 
demonstrating Defendant's proximity to an illegal substance and to a person who 
did have control over the illegal substance, is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction where it did not establish any type of working relationship between 
the parties regarding the illegal substance, but merely an association. 

DEFENDANT INSTRUCTION 
"C"

     Mere proximity to an 
illegal substance, mere presence on the property where the illegal substance is 
located or mere association, without more, with the person who does have control 
of the illegal substance or the property on which it is found is insufficient to 
convict the Defendant.

[¶15]   The trial court has a duty to give 
defendant's instruction presenting his theory of defense if the instruction is 
supported by competent evidence. Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 75 (Wyo. 
1984). However, the court may refuse an instruction which is argumentative or 
unduly emphasizes one aspect of the law. Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 154 (Wyo. 
1989). A court may refuse an instruction if the concept is covered by other 
instructions. Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 256 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶16]   Both of defendant's offered 
instructions concerned the effect and proximity to the alleged substance as 
affecting the type of relationship between an accessory and the principal. They 
both were more argument than law and unduly emphasized the effect of proximity 
to an illegal substance or to the principal as sufficient to convict an 
accessory to a crime. The law was adequately covered in other instructions 
including Instruction 4, which stated:

The necessary elements of 
the crime of accessory before the fact to the felony charge are:

     1. The crime occurred 
within the County of Natrona on or about the date of July 17, 1989; 
and

     2. Delivery of a 
controlled substance was committed by someone as a principal; and

     3. The Defendant did 
aid and abet in the commission of that offense or did counsel, hire, command or 
procure the commission thereof, the elements of which are set forth in another 
instruction.

     If you find from your 
consideration of all of the evidence that each of these elements has not been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty.

     If, on the other hand, 
you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these 
elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant guilty[;]

Instruction 6, 
which stated:

     A person aids and 
abets the commission of a crime if he knowingly and with criminal intent aids, 
promotes, encourages, or instigates the commission by act or 
advice[;]

and Instruction 
7, supra. These instructions left room for the argument appellant could 
present to the jury but sought to present in his two offered and refused 
instructions. The court did not err in refusing the two offered 
instructions.

[¶17]   In his final issue appellant 
objects to testimony by a Casper police officer and a DCI agent concerning his 
prior drug involvement. The DCI agent testified that in 1987 he purchased 
marijuana from appellant. The Casper police officer testified that he purchased 
marijuana from appellant in 1985. The court overruled objections to the 
testimony.

W.R.E. 404(b) 
states:

     Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

[¶18]   The principal test of admissibility 
under Rule 404(b) is whether or not it tends directly or through inference to 
prove or disprove a consequential fact such as intent or knowledge. Grabill v. 
State, 621 P.2d 802, 808 (Wyo. 1980). Appellant's defense of the case was that 
he did not know until it was too late that a drug transaction was in progress 
and that after he learned what was transpiring he never formed the requisite 
intent necessary for him to be guilty of aiding and abetting the offense. One 
allowable means to show knowledge and intent is to present evidence of a 
defendant's involvement in other drug transactions. United States v. 
Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Wixom, 529 F.2d 217, 220 (8th Cir. 1976). As appellant's knowledge and intent were at issue 
in this case, the evidence was properly admitted.

[¶19]   Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶20]   Almost inextricably in our recent 
decisions, two results appear pervasively considered and frequently applied: bad 
acts evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) is justified within the circumstance of the 
case by some application and the evidence presented by the defense seems somehow 
insufficient to justify a theory of the defense instruction for the accused to 
litigatively submit his or her case to the jury for acquittal.

[¶21]   This decision confines both results 
in a rather stark circumstance. This court rejects the theory of defense 
instruction and then accepts introduction of the bad acts evidence by 
justification of the defendant's theory of defense for which an instruction to 
outline the theory for the jury was then rejected. The bad acts are admissible 
to offset a theory of defense which cannot be described in instructions to the 
jury. Somehow that just does not seem right to me.

[¶22]   In first concept, it is my 
persuasion that we demean the intelligence of the jury in denial of a theory of 
defense instruction. If we make our own appellate fact finding to ascertain that 
the evidentiary justification is so minimal, then why are we so concerned about 
permitting the jury to realistically determine the case based on the 
presentation provided by the defendant? If theory of defense looks weak in fact 
finding exercise by the appellate court, it should look weak in review by the 
anticipated intelligent jury. Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1992); McInturff 
v. State, 808 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1991); Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo. 1990). Cf. 
Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822 (Wyo. 1991) and Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 (Wyo. 
1990). In structure and decision with failure of the trial court to instruct the 
jury on the theory of the defendant's case, this appeal presents the almost 
identical issue found in Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶23]   Furthermore, it has been the 
concept for this court to almost entirely swallow the admissibility of bad acts 
evidence sugarcoated by the uniform analysis that there is always an exception 
to the generally stated non-admissibility rule appropriate to justify 
introduction of the extraneous information to be used for the jury in a 
determination of present guilt. My sense of fairness and standard of propriety 
is mathematically quadrupled where first a reasonable theory of defense 
instruction is denied and then bad acts evidence is introduced as if the 
instruction would be given. W.R.E. 404(b) evidence seems to appear in nearly 
every criminal appeal.1

[¶24]   The case law is legion in nearly 
any jurisdiction that a theory of defense instruction should be given if 
supported by any credible evidence which can include solely the testimony of the 
defendant. Oien, 797 P.2d 544.2 This court has consistently stated 
the rule in both principled and constitutional terms that the defendant, in 
order to provide an opportunity for a proper defense, is entitled to his theory 
of the defense instruction. However, the results are almost as consistent in 
recent appeals where the denial of a theory of defense instruction is now 
justified by extended effort to find a basis for that denial of either the 
theory of defense instruction was not factually sustained or was inadvisably 
phrased for usage. Thom, 792 P.2d 192; Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1989); 
Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1988); Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 
1987); Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 1986). Cf. Dice, 825 P.2d 379.3

[¶25]   I will continue to dissent until 
the trial bench, trial counsel and this court enforce a fundamental principle 
that the defendant should be granted the opportunity to have the jury assess 
guilt upon rejection of the defendant's perspective of why an acquittal could be 
justified. I will not be so dogmatic about the continuum of bad acts evidence 
inevitably introduced and almost universally approved by this tribunal, except 
to continue to raise a small voice from a more than 400-year history of our 
system of law that guilt should be determined on facts of the incident and not 
based upon rumor, reputation or conviction by prejudice extracted from the 
defendant's asserted bad acts history and reputation.

[¶26]   This is a case where a crime was 
committed with the principal actor in commission being someone other than this 
appellant, Vernon Virgilio. However, this appellant got netted in the drug 
arrests, whether guilty or innocent. Factually and actually, Virgilio was either 
innocent of a crime, he was close enough to the action to be properly 
responsible for aiding and abetting, or, in fact, he could have been a principal 
in the crime involving delivery of a controlled substance. The difficulty in 
this case, created by the improvidence of instructions and the overlay of his 
past history, is that the jury did not decide the case within welldefined rules 
of law using evidence of guilt produced by trial testimony. The guilty verdict 
was decided because of his previous history of involvement with drugs and the 
denial of a proper instruction stating his theory of defense. Whether Virgilio 
was guilty, somewhat guilty or realistically innocent, he did not receive a fair 
trial and, consequently, I dissent.

[¶27]   Obviously, from the evidence 
presented, Virgilio, who was not a principal target in the investigation, was 
found to be "standing around" when a drug deal went down and the proper question 
suitably instructed should have been whether he committed a crime in conjunction 
with those persons about whose actions the investigation had been directed and 
who were then found to be involved in the illegal conduct during the 
investigative process. Since his theory of defense instruction of 
non-involvement was denied and the instructions which were given were confusing 
and ambiguous, the principal element of conviction became his asserted bad acts 
conduct, undesirable reputation and the fact that he was available to have been 
a participant - whether he was or was not.

[¶28]   Starting with the principle 
established in American law, except when unobserved in some recent adjustments 
for Wyoming law, that a defendant is entitled to a properly phrased theory of 
defense instruction if there is some evidence to support that theory, Dice, 825 P.2d 379; Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 
(1896), we then come to the rule equally recognized in a multitude of cases that 
"mere presence" is insufficient to justify an accessory before the fact, 
principal or aiding and abetting criminal conviction. With those unquestionable 
rules resolved, I search in this case to find justification factually and 
procedurally to sustain conviction. Essentially, there was a clean theory of 
defense instruction denied and the cloudy instructional process actually used 
permitting presentation of evidence and usage in final argument was that "he was 
there so he must have been guilty." The key to the prosecution was "Mr. Virgilio 
and Mr. Bryan [were] both present," as stated in closing argument by the 
prosecutor. United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 921 (6th Cir. 
1972).

[¶29]   It was the stated defense of 
Virgilio, although denied for submission to the jury, that he did not instigate 
the deal, had no part in promoting the deal, received no benefit from the deal 
and was not a functioning participant to make the deal occur. Why then was he 
denied the well-established, generally used theory of defense instruction? It 
surely cannot be at this stage with the parade of references having been made in 
our cases to the constituent constitutional right that a theory of defense 
instruction is not available. It is just as obvious that he was denied any 
theory of defense instruction stating his litigative concept. It sometimes seems 
and is suggested in this majority opinion that the theory of defense instruction 
is totally misunderstood. The affirmative theory of defense instruction is 
simply not the same as a general instruction that the state has the duty to 
prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority 
recites the elements of the accessory before the fact charge, the elements of 
aiding and abetting and then states: "These instructions left room for the 
argument appellant could present to the jury but sought to present in his two 
offered and refused instructions. The court did not err in refusing the two 
offered instructions." Maj. op. at 1128. Something is missed in understanding 
and something was missed in the jury instructions consequently given. 
Simplistically, what the majority has said is that Virgilio was not entitled to 
a theory of defense instruction of any kind. For a comparison, see how the trial 
court properly instructed the jury in Dice, 825 P.2d 379 regarding the theory of 
defense.

[¶30]   Virgilio asked as his mere presence 
instructions:

Defendant Instruction 
"C"

      Mere proximity 
to an illegal substance, mere presence on the property where the illegal 
substance is located or mere association, without more, with the person who does 
have control of the illegal substance or the property on which it is found is 
insufficient to convict the defendant.

Defendant Instruction 
"D"

     Evidence, though 
demonstrating defendant's proximity to an illegal substance and to a person who 
did have control over the illegal substance, is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction where it did not establish any type of working relationship between 
the parties regarding the illegal substance, but merely an 
association.

No mere presence 
instruction was given, although it is the universal rule of law applicable to 
these kinds of cases. The majority's justification for denial apparently is that 
it "unduly emphasized the effect of proximity * * *." Maj. op. at 1128. That is 
what a theory of defense instruction is intended to do. It states the position 
of the litigant for the jury to compare the requirements for conviction with the 
contention of innocence. See Pinkney v. United States, 380 F.2d 882, 886 (5th 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 908, 88 S. Ct. 831, 19 L. Ed. 2d 876 
(1968).

[¶31]   The mere presence rule is not a 
vacuous concept; it defines a basic principle of criminal guilt requiring 
knowledgeable action - activity assisting in planning and preparing for the 
perpetration. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 166 (1981). It is within the criteria 
of intent and action for the mere presence rule to determine when additional 
proof is lacking that guilt cannot be found. The United States Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1991) 
had occasion to comprehensively analyze both the rule and principle of 
instruction in a case charging lawyers in a law firm with criminal bankruptcy 
complicity in hiding assets. The case did have an additional feature where the 
jury asked for further instructions regarding standing around guilt concerns. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in finding error in failure to reinstruct 
during deliberations, stated:

     It is well established 
that a person who sees a crime being committed has no legal duty to either stop 
it or report it. The government is incorrect in stating that such a general duty 
exists under Colorado law, C.R.S. § 18-8-115, or federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 4. 
Moreover, as the government seeks to do, a lawyer's ethical duty of good faith 
under the Code of Ethics, the Uniform Commercial Code or the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts cannot be bootstrapped into a legal duty to act. Thus, 
without a duty there can be no conviction of the observer who does not actively 
participate in the crime by some conduct. King v. United States, 402 F.2d 289, 
291 (10th Cir. 1968); Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797-98 (10th Cir. 
1934). The government argues in substance that the jury could rely on the 
evidence without instruction on the legal consequences of the facts.

     The jury should have 
been instructed in a way that there was no possibility that the conviction was 
based on an incorrect legal basis. The questions from the jury certainly pointed 
up the problem. See Bollenbach [v. United States], 326 U.S. [607] at 612-13, 66 
S.Ct. [402] at 405-06 [90 L. Ed. 350] [(1946)]. Absent such an instruction, 
"[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the jury may have convicted on an improper 
basis." [United States v.] Kline, 922 F.2d [610] at 613; see also United States 
v. Munz, 504 F.2d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 1974); Michaud v. United States, 350 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1965).

* * * * * *

     It is difficult to see 
how the "good faith" in the Restatement [(Second) of Contracts] substitutes for 
an instruction from the court.

Id. at 1214. The 
case should equally tell us that like a duty from the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, the lack of duty from mere presence is a subject requiring 
instruction to the jury so they will not convict on an improper 
basis.

[¶32]   The cases are almost unnumbered in 
similar decisional status, but a selected segment in citation is demonstrative 
of the underlying principle conceptually derived in text from an opinion of 
Circuit Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 
1938), which in varying arrangements has since been consistently applied in most 
state and federal jurisdictions. The opinion enunciated that the definitions of 
aiding and abetting or accessory

all demand that he in 
some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in 
something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it 
succeed. All the words used - even the most colorless, "abet" - carry an 
implication of purposive attitude towards it.

Id. at 402. That 
definition was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. 
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S. Ct. 766, 770, 93 L. Ed. 919 (1949) and remains 
the foundational concept of guilt requiring action and intent and consequent 
non-guilt from mere presence. Peoni was cited with approval by restated text in 
Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 921 (Wyo. 1984) where the general rule of Haight 
v. State, 654 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 1982) was quoted and many accommodating citations 
from other jurisdictions were also listed.

[¶33]   In a nearly identical situation of 
drug delivery as presented by this appeal, where the verdict was reversed and 
remanded, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978) said:

     Proof that a defendant 
was merely associated with a criminal, or that defendant was present at the 
scene of a crime is not, without more, sufficient to sustain a conviction for 
aiding and abetting a criminal venture. United States v. Martinez, [555 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1977)], supra. To be upheld, the conviction must be based on 
evidence that the "defendant was associated with the criminal venture, 
participated in it as something he wished to bring about, and sought by his 
actions to make it succeed." United States v. Martinez, supra, United States v. 
Anthony, 474 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1973). To prove association, there must be 
evidence to establish that the defendant "shared in the criminal intent of the 
principal." United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977). To prove 
participation, there must be evidence to establish that the defendant engaged in 
some affirmative conduct; that is, there must be evidence that defendant 
committed an overt act designed to aid in the success of the venture. Proof of 
mere negative acquiescence will not suffice. United States v. Martinez, supra; 
United States v. Smith, supra.

[¶34]   Logical consideration of this 
appeal regarding the denied theory of defense instruction requested by Virgilio 
invokes a two-stage progression. Aschliman v. State, 589 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. 
1992). The first inquiry is what is the correct rule of law regarding mere 
presence and the second aspect then is how will that rule be properly 
communicated to the jury. In recognition first of the pervasive law of the right 
of an accused to a theory of defense instruction, neither of these questions 
provide a controversial status or any kind of justification within the scope of 
this case to properly sustain the majority decision.

[¶35]   In first concept, even predating 
the clear recitation by Judge Hand in Peoni, the homicide case of Hicks v. 
United States, 150 U.S. 442, 14 S. Ct. 144, 37 L. Ed. 1137 (1893) included both 
questions of mere presence and improper instruction. In that case, the improper 
instruction required murder conviction reversal on a charge of aiding and 
abetting. The United States Supreme Court recognized the specific affirmative 
requirement for encouragement or assistance in commission of the offense in 
order to provide the basis for criminal guilt.

[¶36]   The second inquiry is proper 
instruction to provide relevant standards for decision by the jury. That rule is 
also decisively provided by another extraordinary jurist, Justice Frankfurter, 
for American law when in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S. Ct. 402, 405, 90 L. Ed. 350 (1946) he established:

Discharge of the jury's 
responsibility for drawing appropriate conclusions from the testimony depended 
on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the required 
guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria.

As restated in 
Nye & Nissen, 69 S. Ct.  at 771, Justice Frankfurter in dissent again said, 
"only when a jury has been properly instructed as to the relevant standards to 
be applied to the evidence does a basis exist for determining whether evidence 
sufficient to support the verdict was presented to it."

[¶37]   These two principles, neither 
complex nor controversial, establish the proper principle of law and provide an 
instruction to give the jury a basis for its verdict determination.4 Several different styles of 
restatement or recitation of the Judge Hand explanation in Peoni of the required 
standard for guilt are found within the federal courts, each uniformly following 
the Peoni/Nye & Nissen theme. "To aid and abet one must share in the intent 
to commit the offense, as well as participate in some manner to assist its 
commission." United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436, 441 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S. Ct. 1935, 104 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1989). See also United 
States v. Fischel, 686 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1982).5 

[¶38]   When characterized in proximity and 
presence, the rule is stated:

     This court has held 
many times that association with other persons involved in a criminal enterprise 
is not sufficient to prove knowing participation in a conspiracy. * * * 
"[P]roximity to the crime does not suffice to tip the balance," and even "actual 
presence at the scene of the crime is not sufficient."

United States v. 
Littrell, 574 F.2d 828, 833 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Caro, 569 F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1978)). Proof of mere association or presence at the 
scene of the crime in raising a mere suspicion of guilt of the offense charged 
is not sufficient. United States v. Wright, 450 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1971); 
Lucero v. United States, 311 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom. 
Maestas v. United States, 372 U.S. 936, 83 S. Ct. 883, 9 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1963). 
Presence alone is not sufficient to constitute the requisite "slight evidence" 
of willful participation or knowledge. United States v. Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272 
(9th Cir. 1979). Weaver was a case involving drug delivery with a very similar 
factual situation to that with which we are presented in this 
appeal.

[¶39]   The court in United States v. 
Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1975) first recognized the fundamental 
nature and application of the In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 
1072, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) standard:

"It is critical that the 
moral force of the common law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves 
people in doubt whether innocent men are condemned. It is also important in our 
free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have 
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense 
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost 
certainty."

After 
application of that fundamental criteria of criminal law, the court then recited 
the standing around rule: "It is established, however, that the mere presence of 
an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to establish his guilt." 
Carter, 522 F.2d  at 682 (citing Hicks, 150 U.S. 442, 14 S. Ct. 144 and variant 
additional authorities).

     To be guilty of aiding 
and abetting a crime, the defendant must willfully associate himself with the 
criminal venture and seek to make it succeed through some action on his part. * 
* * The government must prove more than mere presence at the scene of the crime 
even if coupled with knowledge that the crime is being committed.

United States v. 
Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1470 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 882, 116 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1992). See also United States v. McMahon, 562 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1977). Rephrased, "mere knowledge that a crime is being 
committed, even coupled with presence at the scene, ordinarily is not sufficient 
evidence upon which to base a conviction of participation in the crime." United 
States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Nye & Nissen, 
69 S.Ct. 766). See also Stevens v. Johnson, 575 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.N.C. 1983). 
Sitting in the truck when the drug deal was consummated was also not sufficient 
in Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272.

[¶40]   The rule is similarly stated in the 
context of the affirmative burden of proof which for "aiding and abetting of a 
criminal offense is to show that the defendant `willfully associated himself in 
some positive way with the criminal venture by showing that he has joined the 
enterprise as something he wishes to bring about and by seeking to make it 
succeed by some action on his part.'" United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 
1031 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 612 F.2d 1272, 1275 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S. Ct. 1060, 62 L. Ed. 2d 782 
(1980)). The case references Nye & Nissen as further authority. See also 
United States v. Anthony, 474 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1973). A drug case within the 
same rule concept required reversal in United States v. Jackson, 526 F.2d 1236 
(5th Cir. 1976). Similarly in a well recognized drug case, although the 
conviction was affirmed on sufficiency of the evidence, it was 
stated:

Thus, to sustain this 
conviction, the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom must show that 
defendant knew that a narcotics distribution was occurring, that he associated 
himself with the act, that he participated in it with a desire that it be 
accomplished, and that he committed some overt act designed to make it a 
success. Defendant must have shared the criminal intent or purpose and assisted 
in the accomplishment of that purpose.

United States v. 
Martinez, 555 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977). Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272 was 
similar, except the conviction was reversed and the sufficiency of the evidence 
was not sustained. That court quoted Nye & Nissen, which quoted Peoni, and 
then stated:

     Although Weaver was 
present at the scene, mere presence does not make one an aider and abetter. * * 
* Aside from this, there was no showing that Weaver assisted the perpetrators of 
the crime. Nor was there a showing that Weaver shared in the criminal intent of 
the principals * * *.

Weaver, 594 F.2d  
at 1275.

[¶41]   The critically important concept is 
not just that lawyers and jurists know what the law may be, but also that the 
factfinding jury, United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 469 n. 5 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995, 96 S. Ct. 2208, 48 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1976), is properly 
instructed to understand the standard for an acquittal or a guilty verdict. 
Specifically, such a well phrased instruction is illustrated by United States v. 
Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2nd Cir. 1977):

"The mere presence of a 
defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the 
defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere negative acquiescence by 
a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is 
not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. An aider and abettor must have 
some interest in the criminal venture."

See also United 
States v. Sacks, 620 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Horton, 488 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S. Ct. 2405, 40 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1974) (involving a trial to the court where one conviction was 
reversed).

[¶42]   The structure of California law 
which is illustrative generally of state court decisions is similarly 
informative. In first instance, we find the right to the theory of defense 
instruction:

     The operative 
principle * * * is simply that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any 
defense which is supported by substantial evidence * * * and that in determining 
whether such evidence exists, the trial court must not weigh the credibility of 
witnesses, nor focus on the fact there is a conflict in the evidence, but must 
resolve any doubts as to the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence in 
favor of the defendant.

People v. Wu, 
235 Cal. App. 3d 614, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 878 (1991). Within this initial 
perspective, the courts of California first comprehensively addressed the aiding 
and abetting instructional requirement and, specifically, whether it was aiding 
or abetting:

We suggest that an 
appropriate instruction should inform the jury that a person aids and abets the 
commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful 
purpose of the perpetrator, and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, 
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice 
aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the 
crime.

People v. 
Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 68-69, 674 P.2d 1318, 1326 (1984). This 
synthesized instruction is considered and supported by more extensive recitation 
from Beeman in the monumentally extended case of People v. Pitts, 223 Cal. App. 3d 606, 273 Cal. Rptr. 757, 921 (1990), where it is stated and quoted:

     People v. Beeman, * * 
* sets forth the requirements for imposition of liability upon a theory of 
aiding and abetting:

"[T]he weight of 
authority and sound law require proof that an aider and abettor act with 
knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or 
purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, 
the offense. [Citations.]

"When the definition of 
the offense includes the intent to do some act or achieve some consequences 
beyond the actus reus of the crime [citation], the aider and abettor must 
share the specific intent of the perpetrator. By `share' we mean neither that 
the aider and abettor must be prepared to commit the offense by his or her own 
act should the perpetrator fail to do so, nor that the aider and abettor must 
seek to share the fruits of the crime. [Citation.] Rather, an aider and abettor 
will `share' the perpetrator's specific intent when he or she knows the full 
extent of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with 
the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator's commission of the crime. 
[Citations.]" (People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 
674 P.2d 1318.)

Accord Matter of 
Jose T., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1455, 282 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1991), although the evidence 
showed more than presence in providing evidence of willful participation and the 
conviction was affirmed. The California Supreme Court in People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1, 221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392 (1985) approved the Beeman instruction 
and reversed the murder conviction involved in the case when not 
given.

[¶43]   A like principle has existed within 
Montana law for an extended period:

     Mere presence at the 
time a crime is committed, without interfering, does not make one a party to a 
crime unless his interference was a duty by reason of some position held by him, 
or unless noninterference was designed by him and operated as encouragement or 
protection; nor does the mere concealment of knowledge that a crime is about to 
be committed constitute such person an accomplice (1 Wharton's Criminal Law 
[11th Ed.] 316 and 341), no matter how reprehensible such conduct may be * * 
*.

State v. 
McComas, 85 Mont. 428, 278 P. 993, 995 (1929). More than mere presence at the 
scene of a crime is necessary to establish criminal responsibility. State ex 
rel. Murphy v. McKinnon, 171 Mont. 120, 556 P.2d 906 (1976). Accord State v. 
Nordahl, 208 Mont. 513, 679 P.2d 241 (1984).

[¶44]   Current Illinois law states that 
"[m]ere presence does not render one accountable under the statute; there must 
be proof of the required intent and that defendant aided, abetted or attempted 
to aid another in the perpetration of the crime." People v. Evans, 87 Ill. 2d 77, 
57 Ill.Dec. 622, 429 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1981). The test is intent to promote an 
action to facilitate. People v. Mason, 211 Ill. App.3d 787, 156 Ill.Dec. 166, 
570 N.E.2d 642 (1991), which followed Evans and cited In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068. See also People v. Hammond, 214 Ill. App.3d 125, 157 
Ill.Dec. 907, 573 N.E.2d 325 (1991) which reversed for an inappropriate 
instruction and is not totally dissimilar from the erroneous instruction given 
to the jury in this case.

[¶45]   The general principle that mere 
presence at the scene of a crime without more does not make an accused a party 
to the crime is recognized in Beggs v. State, 568 So. 2d 377 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990) 
and earlier in Hudson v. State, 249 Ala. 372, 31 So. 2d 774 (1947), where 
presence in the vicinity of a moonshine still was not sufficient to warrant 
conviction. Accord Radke v. State, 52 Ala. App. 397, 293 So. 2d 312 (1973), aff'd 
292 Ala. 290, 293 So. 2d 314 (1974); Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 573 A.2d 831 
(1990); Com. v. Costa, 407 Mass. 216, 552 N.E.2d 106 (1990); Com. v. Whitehead, 
379 Mass. 640, 400 N.E.2d 821 (1980); and People v. Christopher, 161 A.D.2d 896, 
557 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1990) (which also addressed community of purpose).

[¶46]   Nebraska case law follows the 
Montana rule and statement that "evidence of mere presence, acquiescence, or 
silence is not enough to sustain the State's burden of proving a defendant 
guilty [of aiding and abetting]." State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610, 
636 (1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 216, 112 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1990). 
That rule is similarly stated in Mares v. State, 801 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App. 1990) 
and James v. State, 144 Tex.Crim. 126, 161 S.W.2d 285 (1942).

[¶47]   We have in this case a proper 
instruction denied, an improper instruction given and a principle 
ignored:

     The trial court must 
charge the jury on the defendant's sole defense, even without a written request, 
if there is some evidence to support the charge. * * * Having presented some 
evidence on his sole defense, he was entitled to the jury instruction * * 
*.

Tarvestad v. 
State, 261 Ga. 605, 409 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1991). Here, as in the quoted Georgia 
case, the instructions "as a whole failed to fairly present [Virgilio's mere 
presence] defense to the jury." Id. at 515. The mere presence - non-guilt - 
principle is just very simply a settled universally accepted rule of law, except 
perhaps now in Wyoming.

[¶48]   I could reword the instruction into 
somewhat better phraseology, but that was not the decision made by the trial 
court nor now affirmed here. What appears here to have been determined is that 
Virgilio, for some unstated reason, was not entitled to a theory of defense 
instruction to assert this absolutely determined principle of law. Simply 
stated, and it cannot be said otherwise, Virgilio was denied his theory of 
defense instruction. There is no justification for the denial and, overtly, that 
denial cannot be said to be harmless error.

[¶49]   By virtue of the number of the 
theory of defense instruction problems, I am lead to try to establish some 
justified basis for this departure from fundamental criminal (and civil) legal 
principles and consequently determine what this court really means in repetition 
that a theory of defense instruction should be given and then denies its 
appropriateness. This case and some of our other recent cases of like kind 
suggest the syllogism:

1. It is accepted in the 
law that the defendant is entitled to his theory of defense instruction if there 
is any evidence adduced to support the theory. This right is a basic ingredient, 
constitutional in nature, and guaranteed as a constituent of opportunity to 
defend.

2. It is equally well 
established as a principle of law uniformly applied that presence alone at the 
scene of the crime without evidence to demonstrate involvement is insufficient 
to justify conviction of aiding and abetting.

3. The defendant's 
evidence and trial strategy in this case was directed to a defense that fit 
specifically within those two principles.

4. Upon appropriate 
request, the trial court refused in this case to give a theory of defense 
instruction.

5. That decision can be 
justified as a matter of law in this case only if one of the following applies, 
none of which are actually considered or used in justification for the illogical 
and inconsistent result presented:

     (a) for some reason it 
is determined that the defendant is not entitled to the theory of defense 
instruction; perhaps within the factual situation, the theory of defense would 
not constitute a defense in fact;

     (b) no evidence was 
presented to justify that defense in this case even though the rule is well 
established that the evidence to justify a theory of the defense can be 
supported sufficiently by the sole evidence provided by the testimony of the 
defendant, which it was here; or

     (c) the defendant, 
having the duty to furnish an appropriately stated theory of defense 
instruction, may be foreclosed from use because the instruction is 
argumentatively phrased in that although textually accurate, it is fact specific 
to the events of this case.

There is 
something about the syllogism and the conjectural three factors, never actually 
discussed, which demonstrate circular reasoning with an achieved result denying 
due process or any real right of the accused to actually defend.

[¶50]   There is another supposition which 
does develop as a mutation found only in comments in some Wyoming cases which 
is, as again suggested here, that the theory of defense instruction is 
appropriately unavailable because the defendant has a right to present his 
argument in closing. That suggestion lacks reason, constitutional validity and 
any support in case law precedent. See Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d 486. Urbigkit, C.J., 
dissenting. Cf. State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1991) and Frasier v. State, 
410 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 1991).

[¶51]   Without question of fact in this 
case, Virgilio's evidence and trial strategy was directed to a defense that 
utilized principles of law enunciated in his proposed and rejected instruction. 
He wanted the jury to know the general principle of law that just because he was 
there, he could not be convicted on that basis alone. Since he had an acceptable 
defense and it fit within his concept of the facts, the trial court's rejection 
and this majority's decision can only be justified if (a) another theory of 
defense instruction of equivalent substance was given, or (b) there was no 
evidence to support the instruction.

[¶52]   I could understand with 
disagreement a concept here to justify affirming the conviction that the 
proposed instructions were unartful and that Virgilio waived a proper 
instruction to which he otherwise would have been entitled by failure to present 
a proper instruction. Consequently, we could phrase this case in terms for 
appellate confirmation as an ineffectiveness of counsel resolution. I would not 
agree, but it would make rational sense. The disposition that is made does 
not.

[¶53]   The case as structured for defense 
on presence but not participation is then further removed from proof of guilt 
for conviction following denial of the theory of defense instruction by 
application of bad conduct and reputation evidence relating to the prior 
criminal history of Virgilio. This is the prosecutorial usage of W.R.E. 404(b) 
parade of dirty wash approach presently authenticated, preclusively achieving 
conviction by dominating evidence of bad reputation and prior misconduct. The 
phraseology of the instructions which were given in conjunction with the use of 
the overlay of bad evidence, evil reputation characterizations and the denial of 
the proper theory of defense instruction combined to provide essentially a 
court-directed guilty verdict.

[¶54]   An example of the bad acts evidence 
is found in the testimony at trial of a witness whose purpose was not to prove 
that Virgilio had been guilty of a prior controlled substance offense, but 
rather to illuminate the details to use prior history to prove present guilt. 
The witness, a special investigator for the Wyoming Division of Criminal 
Investigation, testified about the 1987 occurrence in full detail as if it were 
the criminal offense presently presented for determination of guilt.6 He obviously was appropriately 
primed with a prosecutorial evidentiary harpoon. Langley v. State, 813 P.2d 526 
(Okla. Cr. 1991). He added to evidence of the crime for which the 1987 
conviction was achieved further evidence of an uncharged offense of burglary and 
thievery of the controlled substance from another individual. The witness had no 
knowledge of any event which was presently before the trial court as a 
circumstance of the present charge. Another witness was called to separately 
testify about 1985 events involving marijuana. In essence, two prior crimes were 
retried in detail with evidentiary harpoons added to provide persuasion of 
present guilt. Proof of a prior conspiracy was achieved by providing evidence of 
crimes previously committed and for which appropriate sentences had been entered 
and served.

[¶55]   The problems in this case with 
denied theory of defense instruction and the usage of bad acts evidence as the 
principal evidence of guilt are, as claimed by Virgilio, even more exacerbated 
by the inadequacy of the instructions that were given to define the elements of 
the charged offense. In appellate brief, Virgilio states:

     Specifically, jury 
instruction number seven (7) is particularly ambiguous. It provides:

To be an accessory before 
the fact, a person must intend that his acts or words secure the commission of a 
crime. Merely assenting to or assisting in the commission without knowledge 
that a crime is going to be committed, or that the defendant's actions are going 
to aid in the commission of the felony, is not criminal. (emphasis 
added).

* * * This instruction 
follows the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions with respect to aiding and 
abetting. Far from being informative, the instruction is confusing if not 
inaccurate. As already mentioned, mere knowledge and acquiescence in the 
criminal activity does not rise to the level of criminal liability contemplated 
in the law. Yet the instruction implies that mere assent, without 
knowledge, is not criminal. By applying simple deductive logic, a jury could 
have believed that mere assent, with knowledge, is indeed criminal. This 
is clearly inaccurate and inconsistent with the law. Criminal intent, or evil 
motive, is required, not merely knowledge of the criminal activity. Instruction 
seven, to be an accurate interpretation of the law, should have read something 
like this: mere assent, even with knowledge, is not criminal. In a law 
review comment discussing this very problem, the author recommended the 
following instruction: "Even if you find that the defendant was practically 
certain that his conduct would facilitate the crime charged, you may not, from 
that fact alone, infer that he intended that the crime be committed, but it is a 
fact which you may consider in attempting to determine the defendant's 
intention." Comment, Jury Instructions in Aiding and Abetting Cases, 1968, 68 
Col.L.Rev. 774.

     Furthermore, several 
important legal terms were left undefined in the instructions. Instruction 
number six (6) reads, "[a] person aids and abets the commission of a crime if he 
knowingly and with criminal intent aids, promotes, encourages, or 
instigates the commission by act or advice" (emphasis added). * * * Reasonable 
jurors could interpret the meaning of criminal intent differently. Some might 
reasonably believe that guilty knowledge is what is meant, when in fact evil 
motive is required.

     The last part of 
Instruction Ten (10) provides, "[i]t is necessary, however, to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant was aware of the common purpose and was a 
willing participant in the conspiracy.["] (emphasis added). * * * The "willing 
participant" terminology is again ambiguous and fails to inform the jury that 
what is actually required by law is that the defendant must have been a 
willing participant and have criminal intent before finding him 
guilty.

     In an effort to 
apprise the jury of what is not criminal activity, the defense submitted two 
"mere presence" instructions for the purpose of making the distinction between 
"mere knowledge" and "criminal intent". Haight [v. State], supra [654 P.2d 1232] 
at 1238 [(Wyo. 1982)]. Both of these instructions were denied by the trial 
court. * * * Not having the benefit of these instructions, the jury could very 
well have determined Mr. Vi[r]gilio's guilt because he witnessed or observed 
criminal activity undertaken by Mr. Bryan, and not because of his criminal 
intent, which the law requires.

     In sum, Mr. Virgilio's 
argument on appeal goes to the minimum standard on which to convict. The law 
requires not only knowledge of criminal activity, but also specific criminal 
intent. The jury in the case below, influenced by the prosecution's "knowledge 
alone" theory, coupled with vague jury instructions, and without the benefit of 
"mere presence" instructions, could have arrived at the result they did by 
basing their collective decision on evidence of Mr. Virgilio's knowledge rather 
than intent.

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶56]   The evidence of guilt in the case 
was not exactly fanciful and the result may well have been identical if the 
clearly appropriate theory of defense instruction had been given, if that 
defense had been correlated to proper instructions to be given, and if less 
reliance on bad acts evidence to convict had been required. None of these are, 
however, the facts portrayed procedurally in this appellate record. Virgilio was 
neither given access to his constitutional right to properly defend nor was he 
offered due process by proper application of determined principles of law in 
what was done to secure his conviction.

[¶57]   Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 See, for example, 
Pearson v. State, 811 P.2d 704 (Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; Eatherton 
v. State, 810 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; Ramos, 806 P.2d 822; Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1990); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352 
(Wyo. 1990); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1990), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; 
Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1990); Miller v. State, 784 P.2d 209 (Wyo. 
1989); Martin v. State, 780 P.2d 1354 (Wyo. 1989); Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972 
(Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1989); 
Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316 (Wyo. 1989); Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 1091 (Wyo. 
1989); Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1989); Campbell v. State, 772 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1989); Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049 (Wyo. 1989); Schwenke v. State, 
768 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1989); and Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987), 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting. Compare, however, where evidence adverse to the 
state's witnesses regarding "bad acts" was not admissible: Johnson v. State, 806 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, J., dissenting, and Ramos, 806 P.2d 822, 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

2 For a sequential list of 
theory of defense cases, see Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d 486.

3 In addition to Dice and 
Oien, recent cases where the consistent rule was recognized include McInturff, 
808 P.2d 190 and Ramos, 806 P.2d 822. See the basic law in Stevenson v. United 
States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 (1896). A list of cases is 
included in Oien, 797 P.2d  at 546 n. 4 and an extended listing and discussion is 
provided in the Bouwkamp dissent.

4 It is interesting to 
note that few of the mere presence/active participation in the perpetration 
cases discuss jury instructions. Most reversals or considered reversals come on 
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain guilt. Obviously, within these cases, 
that is a difficult burden on appeal because an adverse jury verdict has already 
been rendered when the "any evidence" test to sustain is normally applied. See, 
for example, the sufficiency cases: Longoria, 569 F.2d 422; United States v. 
Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); and, conversely, Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204 
and King v. United States, 402 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1968) which consider the 
adequacy of instruction rather than the sufficiency of the evidence.

5 "Moreover, flight and 
false exculpatory statements standing alone will not lead to a conviction absent 
other independent evidence." United States v. Abraham, 617 F.2d 187, 191 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied 447 U.S. 929, 100 S. Ct. 3027, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1123 
(1980).

6                       
Q. As a result of your investigation do you know where Mr. Virgilio and 
Mr. Howell obtained that marijuana?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was 
that?

A. On that same date they 
had burglarized a house that was owned or at least occupied by a Rick, I will 
have to think of the last name, Rickie Hendricks. They entered that house, knew 
that Rickie had marijuana in that house and had stolen a quarter pound of 
marijuana out of that house.

Q. As a result of those 
actions was Mr. Virgilio convicted of delivery of a controlled 
substance?

A. Yes, he 
was.