Case Title: State ex rel. Smith v. McGee

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2748

Docket Number: 2014-1009

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Smith v. McGee, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2748.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2748 
THE STATE EX REL. SMITH, APPELLANT, v. MCGEE, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Smith v. McGee, Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-2748.] 
Mandamus—Procedendo—Adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law—
Court of appeals’ dismissal of petition for writs affirmed. 
(No. 2014-1009—Submitted January 13, 2015—Decided July 9, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 26003. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals 
dismissing a petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo.  Appellant, Darryl 
Smith, sought the writs to compel appellee, Judge Frances McGee, to vacate 
Smith’s conviction in one case and reinstate probation in another.  We affirm 
because Smith has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way 
of appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} Smith alleges that he was convicted of nine counts of rape, two 
counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of the unauthorized use of a 
motor vehicle, with specifications, in 1986.  He was sentenced to 16½ to 30 years 
in prison.  In 1999, Smith alleges he was classified as a sexually oriented 
offender, after Megan’s Law, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2560, was enacted.  He alleged in his petition that he was released on parole in 
June 2006. 
{¶ 3} Smith alleged that he was convicted of failure to verify in 2007, 
sentenced to three years in prison, which was suspended, and placed on five years 
of community control. 
{¶ 4} In 2008, Ohio enacted the Adam Walsh Act, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
10, which led to the reclassification of all sex offenders. Smith claimed that he 
was reclassified as a Tier III offender, arrested, and convicted in 2008 of failure to 
notify under the Adam Walsh Act,  He was sentenced to three years in prison for 
the 2008 conviction and was ordered to serve the three-year term imposed in 2007 
concurrently with the sentence imposed for the new conviction.  Smith alleged 
also that his parole from his original conviction was revoked, that he has been in 
prison since 2008, and that he has been denied parole on several occasions. 
{¶ 5} On June 11, 2012, Smith filed motions for de novo resentencing in 
the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas in the 2007 and 2008 cases. 
{¶ 6} Smith argued in his motions for de novo resentencing that portions 
of the Adam Walsh Act were held unconstitutional in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, and thus that he had improperly 
been reclassified as a Tier III offender.  He asked that his 2007 and 2008 
convictions be vacated and the community-notification and registration orders 
imposed on him in 2007-CR-2847 before the Adam Walsh Act was enacted 
should be reinstated. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 7} Judge McGee, after construing Smith’s motions for de novo 
resentencing as a petition for postconviction relief, denied both motions.  Smith 
appealed the decision in the 2008 case, but it is not clear whether he appealed the 
decision in the 2007 case. 
{¶ 8} On November 21, 2013, Smith filed this action seeking writs of 
mandamus and procedendo, asserting that Judge McGee must vacate his 
conviction in the 2008 case, reclassify him as he was classified before the Adam 
Walsh Act became effective, and reinstate the community-control sanctions 
imposed in the 2007 case. 
{¶ 9} Judge McGee filed a motion to dismiss, which the court of appeals 
granted. Smith has now appealed to this court. 
Analysis 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of procedendo, Smith must show a clear 
legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the 
court to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law.  State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio 
St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899 (1995).  A writ of procedendo is proper when a 
court has refused to enter judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to 
judgment.  State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 73 Ohio 
St.3d 180, 184, 652 N.E.2d 742 (1995). 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Smith must establish a clear 
legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of Judge McGee to 
provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, 
¶ 6. 
{¶ 12} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss.  
We therefore accept the allegations in Smith’s complaint as true.  State ex rel. 
Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 1010, ¶ 8.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Even if his allegations are true, however, Smith has not established the right to 
writs of procedendo or mandamus. 
{¶ 13} Regardless of the merits of his arguments, Smith has an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law that precludes both writs.  Specifically, 
Smith appealed Judge McGee’s denial of his motion for de novo resentencing in 
one case and could have appealed the denial of his motion in the second case.  
Appeal is an adequate remedy precluding writs of procedendo and mandamus.  
State ex rel. Ward v. Reed, 141 Ohio St.3d 50, 2014-Ohio-4512, 21 N.E.3d 303,  
¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 
247, 250, 673 N.E.2d 1281 (1997), and State ex rel. Sevayega v. McMonagle, 122 
Ohio St.3d 54, 2009-Ohio-2367, 907 N.E.2d 1180, ¶ 1. 
{¶ 14} Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Smith’s petition for writs of 
procedendo and mandamus because Smith had or has an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
_____________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 15} Smith was convicted of several counts of rape and other offenses 
and imprisoned.  State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 10114, 1987 WL 
17799 (Oct. 2, 1987).  After the enactment of Megan’s Law, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, he was classified as a sexually oriented 
offender, subject to various reporting requirements.  In 2008, Megan’s Law was 
supplanted by the Adam Walsh Act, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, which has been 
the subject of much litigation in Ohio, including, notably, State v. Bodyke, 126 
Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 16} Smith alleges that he is currently in prison based on his convictions 
for failure to comply with certain reporting requirements under the Adam Walsh 
Act.  He asserts that he should be subject to the reporting requirements of 
Megan’s Law, not the more onerous reporting requirements of the Adam Walsh 
Act, some of which have been held unconstitutional.  Smith is proceeding pro se 
and, not surprisingly, given the dense thicket that is post-Bodyke sentencing 
litigation, his arguments are somewhat muddled.  The bottom line is that he could 
be right in asserting that he is being held unjustifiably for violating reporting 
requirements that he might not have been required to follow. 
{¶ 17} This case is substantially similar to State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 
444, 2011-Ohio-1481, 946 N.E.2d 192.  In that case, a defendant convicted of 
rape before Megan’s Law was enacted was reclassified as a Tier III sexual 
offender under the Adam Walsh Act.  He was then convicted for failure to register 
under provisions of the Adam Walsh Act.  Once some of the reporting 
requirements in the Adam Walsh Act were held unconstitutional in Bodyke, 
Gingell’s original classification under Megan’s Law was reinstated.  We vacated 
Gingell’s conviction for violating the reporting requirements under the Adam 
Walsh Act, but we did not determine whether he met the reporting requirements 
imposed by Megan’s Law.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 18} To afford substantial justice to the pro se relator in this case, I 
would grant the writs and require the trial court to determine which reporting 
requirements Smith is subject to and the current state of his compliance with those 
requirements. 
{¶ 19} I dissent. 
 
LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_____________________ 
 
Darryl Smith, pro se. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
____________________