Case Title: NORBERT ROBERT SCHULTZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
NORBERT ROBERT SCHULTZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 162169 P.3d 81Case Number: 06-229Decided: 10/17/2007
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
NORBERT ROBERT 
SCHULTZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Eric Alan Johnson, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; 
Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Brian J. 
Hunter and Hiliary Wilson, Student Interns, Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Hunter.

                                    

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
For his 
part in a "road-rage" incident, Norbert Schultz was convicted of unlawful 
possession of a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault and 
battery.  In this appeal, he 
maintains that the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings 
mandating reversal.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. 
Schultz states these two issues:

 
 
1.         
Did the court commit evidentiary errors that justify a new 
trial?

 
 
2.         
Did the cumulative effect of all trial errors adversely affect the 
Appellant's substantial rights?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Brandon 
and Zoey Peterson were driving on Interstate 80 from Laramie toward Cheyenne.  
While they were passing a tractor-trailer, a small white car came up 
behind and flashed its high-beam headlights at them.  After passing the tractor-trailer, the 
Petersons moved back into the right-hand lane, expecting the white car to 
pass.  Instead, it pulled in close 
behind them, with headlights still on high beam.  Mr. Peterson slowed down, hoping 
the white car would pass.  When it 
did not, Mr. Peterson moved over into the left lane and slowed down even 
more.  The white car finally passed 
and moved out in front, and Mr. Peterson returned to the right 
lane.

 
 

[¶4]           
Angry, 
Mr. Peterson flashed his high beams at the white car.  In response, the driver of the white car 
slammed on his brakes.  
Mr. Peterson swerved into the left lane to avoid a rear-end 
collision, and the two vehicles drew nearly side-by-side.  At that point, the driver of the white 
car stretched his arm out the window, aimed a handgun at the Petersons' vehicle, 
and fired five or six shots.  Four 
shots hit the passenger door of the Petersons' vehicle, one breaking the 
window.  After the shots were fired, 
Mr. Peterson called 911 on his cell phone and reported the incident.  The white car dropped behind until the 
Petersons lost sight of it.

 
 

[¶5]           
Upon 
receiving the report of the incident, Lieutenant Guenther of the Wyoming Highway 
Patrol closed the eastbound lanes of Interstate 80.  The officer had no description of the 
driver, but knew that the vehicle involved was a small, white passenger 
car.  Mr. Schultz was one of the 
drivers stopped by the roadblock.  
Because he was driving a white car, Lieutenant Guenther approached him 
and said he was "investigating a possible road rage incident or some sort of 
drive-by shooting."  Mr. Schultz 
denied knowing of any such incident, so the officer let him leave.  

 
 

[¶6]           
Two days 
later, the Wyoming Highway Patrol issued a press release describing the incident 
and asking for assistance in locating the white car.  They were contacted by a person who 
witnessed the entire incident, and had written down the license plate number of 
the white car.  The license plate 
was registered to a vehicle belonging to Mr. Schultz.  After obtaining an arrest warrant and a 
search warrant, Lieutenant Guenther arrested Mr. Schultz, and seized a 
handgun that turned out to be the one fired at the Petersons' vehicle. 

 
 

[¶7]           
Eventually, Mr. Schultz was charged 
in district court in AlbanyCounty.  At trial, Mr. Schultz contended that the 
prosecution did not prove that the incident occurred in AlbanyCounty.  He also contended that he had fired the 
weapon in self-defense after the Petersons' vehicle tried to push him off the 
road.  The jury found 
Mr. Schultz guilty on all three of the counts 
charged.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]           
Mr. 
Schultz maintains that seven different evidentiary rulings made by the trial 
court were in error.  We examine 
each in turn, keeping in mind that rulings on the admission of evidence are 
generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and are upheld absent 
a clear abuse of discretion.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, 
¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).  We give considerable deference to the 
trial court's evidentiary rulings, and uphold them on appeal if we find they had 
a legitimate basis.  Id.  If we conclude that an evidentiary 
ruling was in error, we then ask if the error was prejudicial.  The appellant must show that the verdict 
might have been different if the trial court had made the correct ruling.  Smyth v. Kaufman, 2003 WY 52, ¶ 29, 
67 P.3d 1161, 1169-70 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶9]           
Appellant's first evidentiary 
challenge involves Ms. Peterson's testimony, as the prosecution's first 
witness, about her husband's call to 911 after the 
shooting:

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  What happened as you 
got closer to Cheyenne?

 
 
A.        As we 
got closer to Cheyenne, we were told  [Mr. Peterson] 
was told by dispatch that  

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Objection, Your Honor, 
hearsay.

 
 
The Court:  Overruled.

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Continue the objection, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The Court:  That's fine [Defense Counsel].  Go ahead.

 
 
The Witness:  We were told that at a certain median, 
we would see a cop with his lights on.  
We were supposed to turn on  turn off our headlights so that only our 
park lights and cab lights were showing so that the cop knew it was us.  At the next median, we were to pull over 
and see that cop.

 
 
Mr. Schultz continues to 
maintain that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay.  

 
 

[¶10]       
Hearsay 
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  W.R.E. 801(c).  When an out-of-court statement is not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead to explain the 
subsequent conduct of the person who heard it, that statement is not 
hearsay.  Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 853-54 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Ms. Peterson's testimony was 
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  It was offered to explain the Petersons' 
subsequent conduct in stopping to meet with the police.  It was not hearsay, and the trial court 
had a legitimate basis for ruling it admissible.

 
 

[¶11]       
Mr. 
Schultz's brief hints that the testimony should have been excluded under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) because he was denied his constitutional 
right to confront the witnesses against him.  Even a cursory reading of Crawford reveals that it does not apply 
to testimony offered "for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted."  541 U.S.  at 59 n.9, 124 S. Ct.  at 1369 
n.9.

 
 

[¶12]       
Next, Mr. 
Schultz contends that the trial court improperly curtailed his counsel's cross 
examination of Mr. Peterson by sustaining an objection to an argumentative 
question.  To evaluate this 
contention, the testimony must be considered in context.  Mr. Peterson had testified that 
after he flashed his high beams, the driver of the white car slammed on the 
brakes, and Mr. Peterson swerved into the left lane to avoid a 
collision.  Counsel for Mr. Schultz 
continued with this cross examination:

 
 
Q.        When 
you swerved after he hit his brakes, did you do anything 
else?

 
 
A.        
Anything else like what?

 
 
Q.        Well, 
I want to know.  Did you do anything 
else?  When he hit his brakes and 
you testified on Direct that you swerved, did you do anything 
else?

 
 
A.        I 
swerved into the left lane just kind of re-collected for a second, because I 
just about got in a wreck.

 
 
Q.        Did 
you do anything else with your vehicle?

 
 
A.        Just 
drove straight down the road.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  Well, what I don't 
understand is, you were one car length behind him, 
correct?

 
 
A.        
Yeah.

 
 
Q.        You 
flashed your lights, correct?

 
 
A.        
Yeah.

 
 
Q.        He 
hit his brakes?

 
 
A.        
Yeah.

 
 
Q.        Okay, 
you swerved?

 
 
A.        
Yeah.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  Now, I would expect 
when he slammed on his brakes, his speed got slower, did it 
not?

 
 
A.        
Yeah.

 
 
Q.        And 
you didn't hit him?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        You 
swerved, correct?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  Yet here we are.  He's in front of you.  He slams on his brakes.  You didn't slow your speed down.  You swerve.  He is slowing down yet he is now still 
beside you?

 
 
A.        Well, 
I would have had to hit my brakes so I didn't hit him  

 
 
Q.        Well 

 
 
A.         as 
I swerved.

 
 
Q.        I 
specifically asked you, Mr. Peterson, if you did anything else besides 
swerve.  Now you are saying, I 
swerved and I hit my brakes.  Now, 
which one did you do?  Did you 
swerve or did you swerve and hit your brakes?

 
 
A.        Well, 
I did both.  I just thought that 
kind of comes with swerving is  so you don't run into 
them.

 
 
[Prosecution]:  Your Honor, I would object that this is 
argumentative.

 
 
The Court:  The objection is 
sustained.

 
 
Mr. Schultz claims it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to sustain the objection, because 
counsel for Mr. Schultz was denied the opportunity to demonstrate 
inconsistencies in Mr. Peterson's testimony.

 
 

[¶13]       
W.R.E. 
611(a) provides as follows:

 
 
The court shall exercise reasonable 
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting 
evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) 
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.

 
 
Under this rule, the trial court has 
"wide discretion in controlling the mode and order of interrogating witnesses to 
effectuate an efficient and orderly trial process."  Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1162 
(Wyo. 
1997).  We uphold decisions 
concerning the examination of witnesses unless the trial court "flagrantly 
abused that discretion."  Seaton v. State Highway Comm'n, Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶14]       
Our 
caselaw indicates disapproval of argumentative questions.  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 11, 
153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007); Cederburg 
v. Carter, 448 P.2d 608, 611 (Wyo. 1968).  See also Friesen v. Schmelzel, 78 
Wyo. 1, 9, 318 P.2d 368, 370 (Wyo. 1957) ("[T]here was 
no true attempt to impeach, but rather an effort to discredit by an 
argumentative question.").  An 
argumentative question is one that does not attempt to solicit information, but 
challenges the witness with inferences from testimony already in evidence.  "For instance, evincing disbelief in his 
demeanor, the cross-examiner might ask . . . How can you reconcile those 
statements?'"  1 Kenneth S. Broun, 
McCormick on Evidence § 7, at 28 
(6th ed. 2006).  The questions that prompted objection in 
Mr. Schultz's case were these:  
"I specifically asked you, Mr. Peterson, if you did anything else 
besides swerve.  Now you are saying, 
I swerved and I hit my brakes.  Now, 
which one did you do?  Did you 
swerve or did you swerve and hit your brakes?"  The question is argumentative and the 
district court properly sustained the objection.

 
 

[¶15]       
This 
analysis also applies to another of Mr. Schultz's suggestions of 
error.  Lieutenant Guenther 
testified on direct examination that bullets found in the gun seized from Mr. 
Schultz's home were hollow points.  
A report from the Senior Analyst of the State Crime Laboratory, admitted 
by stipulation, indicated that the bullets were round points.  After suggesting inconsistency between 
hollow points and round points, counsel for Mr. Schultz asked Lieutenant 
Guenther, "Do you think that you are more qualified as to firearms than Robert 
Christensen, senior analyst of the State Crime Laboratory who the State has 
already  we have already agreed is an expert as to firearms and 
trajectory?"  The trial court 
reasonably exercised 
its discretion in sustaining the prosecution's objection that this question was 
argumentative.

 
 

[¶16]       
Mr. 
Schultz's next assertion of error involves the six bullets found in his gun when 
it was seized.  The trial court 
admitted the bullets into evidence over an objection to their relevance.  Again, to assess the trial court's 
ruling, it is necessary to consider the context.  Five or six bullets were fired at the 
Petersons' vehicle.  The magazine 
clip of Mr. Schultz's gun held eight bullets, but only six were in it when 
the gun was seized.

 
 

[¶17]       
Relevant 
evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact of 
consequence to the action more probable or less probable.  W.R.E. 401.  The prosecution suggested that the six 
bullets raised an inference that Mr. Schultz had a habit or practice of not 
loading the clip to full capacity.  
This was relevant because it made it more probable that Mr. Schultz had 
fired every bullet in the clip at the Petersons' vehicle, and cast doubt on his 
claim that he fired only to keep the Peterson vehicle from running him off the 
road.  In addition, if four of six 
bullets (two-thirds) struck the Petersons' vehicle rather than four of eight 
(one-half), it was more probable that Mr. Schultz was aiming at the 
Petersons' vehicle, not firing into the air as he claimed.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that the six bullets were relevant 
evidence.

 
 

[¶18]       
Mr. 
Schultz further contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that 
the bullets were hollow points, information he contends was "designed to inflame 
the jury."  No such objection was 
made at trial, so we apply a plain error standard of review.  Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, 
¶ 16, 165 P.3d 83, 89 (Wyo. 2007).  
However, Mr. Schultz's brief contains no plain error analysis, and no 
cogent argument or pertinent authority to support the contention.  We decline to consider it further.  See Kinstler v. RTB South Greeley, LTD., 
2007 WY 98, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 

[¶19]       
Next on 
Mr. Schultz's list is testimony from Lieutenant Guenther that the incident took 
place in AlbanyCounty.  Mr. Schultz contends that, because venue 
was at issue, this testimony about the location of the incident was improper 
because it involved an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, and because it 
presented an opinion that Mr. Schultz was guilty.  The 
challenged testimony was elicited during the prosecution's direct examination of 
Lieutenant Guenther:

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  After following up on 
the actual reported location of this incident, Trooper Guenther, can you, first 
of all, tell the jury whether or not you are familiar with the boundaries of 
AlbanyCounty versus LaramieCounty?

 
 
A.        I 
am.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  And if the prior 
witnesses have all testified that this happened before Buford, does that mean 
that it happened in AlbanyCounty?

 
 

[Defense Counsel]:  Objection, Your Honor.  He is invading the province of the 
jury.  That is an element to be 
established by the jury, not an element to be testified to by the 
witness.

 
 
The 
Court:  Objection is 
overruled.

 
 

[Defense Counsel]:  Continuing objection, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The 
Witness:  Yes.

 
 
[Prosecution]:  Which side of Buford is the county line 
on?

 
 

A.                 
The 
actual shooting occurred in AlbanyCounty. 

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  And witnesses have all testified before 
335.  What is the actual mile marker 
on Interstate 80 that's the cutoff between LaramieCounty and AlbanyCounty?

 
 

A.                 
Approximately 
336.6.

 
 

Q.                
So if 
you are traveling eastbound on Interstate 80 at Mile Marker 335, are you in 
AlbanyCounty or are you in LaramieCounty?

 
 

A.                 
Albany 
County.

 
 

[¶20]       
Opinion 
testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact."  
W.R.E. 704.  Still, the 
prosecution may not elicit opinion testimony from a witness, lay or expert, 
concerning the guilt of the accused.  
Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Wyo. 1990); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66 
(Wyo. 
1989).  This rule is narrow in 
scope, however, applying only where the prosecutor solicits "an express opinion 
as to the guilt of the defendant."  
Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 
1022 (Wyo. 
1999).  Testimony need not be 
excluded unless it contains "an actual conclusion about the guilt or innocence 
of the accused party."  Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d 271, 277 (Wyo. 
2001).  An interpretation of 
evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation is important in 
establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the inference of guilt, 
is not in the same category as a conclusion about the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant.  Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 616 
(Wyo. 1993). 

 
 

[¶21]       
Lieutenant 
Guenther's testimony that the incident took place in AlbanyCounty did not opine directly on Mr. 
Schultz's guilt or evidence.  It 
provided "related information offered to assist the jury in resolving the 
factual issues placed before it."  
Id. at 617.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it allowed this testimony.

 
 

[¶22]       
Next, Mr. 
Schultz claims evidentiary error in this testimony from Ms. Peterson on 
direct examination by the prosecution:

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  And do you recall 
whether or not you heard [Mr. Peterson] refer to Mile Marker 335 at some 
point?

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Objection, Your Honor, 
hearsay.

 
 
The Court:  Overruled.

 
 
The Witness:  What was that again?  I'm sorry.

 
 

Q.                
Do you 
recall whether you heard [Mr. Peterson] say 335 to anybody sometime during that 
incident?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.  He said it to the 911 
dispatch.

 
 
As noted above, the Petersons' 
location at Mile Marker 335 indicated that the incident took place in AlbanyCounty.  Mr. Schultz's brief claims that the 
challenged evidence "eviscerated [his] defense as to venue," and that the 
testimony was clearly inadmissible hearsay.

 
 

[¶23]       
The State 
concedes that the testimony was hearsay, but asserts that it was properly 
admitted under an exception to the rule excluding hearsay.  "A statement describing or explaining an 
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition, or immediately thereafter," is a present sense impression, and not 
excluded by the hearsay rule.  
W.R.E. 803(1).  Three 
elements must be established to satisfy the present sense impression 
exception.  Moe v. State, 2005 WY 149, ¶ 11, 
123 P.3d 148, 151 (Wyo. 2005).  The 
declarant must have perceived an event or condition.  Mr. Peterson perceived the event of 
passing Mile Marker 335.  The 
declarant must have uttered a statement describing or explaining the event.  Mr. Peterson told the dispatcher he had 
just passed Mile Marker 335.  The 
declarant must utter the statement while, or immediately after, perceiving the 
event.  The record does not reveal 
the precise amount of time that passed between Mr. Peterson's noticing Mile 
Marker 335 and reporting that location to the dispatcher, but it does indicate 
that Mr. Peterson began trying to call 911 immediately after the shots were 
fired, and as he was calling, he saw Mile Marker 335.  When his call to 911 was answered, he 
told the dispatcher his location.  
The situation is like the one described in this treatise passage, which 
we have previously endorsed:

 
 
The 
phrase "immediately thereafter" accommodates the human realities that the 
condition or event may happen so fast that the words do not quite keep 
pace, and proving a true match of words and events may be impossible for 
ordinary witnesses, so it would be foolish to require a statement to be truly 
simultaneous with the event or condition. The exception allows enough 
flexibility to reach statements made a moment after the fact, where a small 
delay or "slight lapse" . . . is not enough to allow reflection, which would 
raise doubts about trustworthiness.

 
 
4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird 
C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 
§ 434, at 384-85 (2d ed. 1994) (quoted in Moe, ¶ 13, 123 P.3d at 152).  The time between Mr. Peterson's 
perception of the Mile Marker and his report to the dispatcher was not enough to 
allow reflection or raise doubts about its trustworthiness.  The trial court did not err in admitting 
this evidence of a present sense impression.

 
 

[¶24]       
Last on 
the list is Mr. Schultz's assertion that the trial court erred concerning this 
bit of testimony:

 
 
Q.        Oh, 
one more question.  Lieutenant 
Guenther, did Mr. Schultz ever ask you if the [Petersons] were 
okay?

 
 

[Defense Counsel]:  Objection, Your Honor, 
relevancy.

 
 
The 
Court:  What's the relevance, 
Counsel?

 
 
[Prosecution]:  Your Honor, he indicated that he had no 
intention of hurting anybody.

 
 
The 
Court:  Objection is 
overruled.

 
 
The 
Witness:  I don't recall him ever 
asking if they were all right.

 
 
On 
appeal, Mr. Schultz continues to question the relevance of this testimony.  Because aggravated assault, the crime 
charged, does not include the element of intent to hurt someone, Mr. Schultz 
maintains that it is irrelevant whether or not he intended to hurt anybody.  In light of Mr. Schultz's claim of self 
defense, and his assertion that he only intended to fire into the air, we find 
no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision overruling the 
objection.  

 
 

[¶25]       
Mr. 
Schultz also contends that this testimony was unfairly prejudicial, and should 
have been excluded under W.R.E. 403.  
His brief contains no explanation of why it was unfairly prejudicial, 
merely a bald statement that it "was patently unfair."  The single case cited in support of this 
contention reached a conclusion that we adopt here:  "Unsupported allegations that the 
evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . are not enough."  Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1355 
(Wyo. 
1990).

 
 

[¶26]       
Finally, 
we must reject Mr. Schultz's claim of cumulative error.  When no errors have occurred, a claim of 
cumulative error cannot be recognized.  
Marquez v. State, 941 P.2d 22, 
26 (Wyo. 1997); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 342 
(Wyo. 
1995).  We affirm the trial court's 
judgment in all respects.