Case Title: P. v. Toney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S104995

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 1/22/04 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S104995 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C035564 
ROOSEVELT LORENZO TONEY, 
) 
 
) 
San Joaquin County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SF078107A 
___________________________________ ) 
 
At issue here is the interplay between certain subdivisions of two Penal 
Code statutes, sections 1538.5 and 871.5.1   
Section 1538.5 sets out the procedures for defense motions to suppress 
evidence in criminal cases.  Its subdivision (p) generally prohibits the prosecution 
from refiling dismissed charges if the defendant’s suppression motion “has been 
granted twice.”   
Section 871.5 pertains to actions dismissed at a preliminary hearing by a 
magistrate.2  Section 871.5’s subdivision (a) gives the prosecution the option of 
                                             
 
1   
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2   
The “magistrate,” who in a felony case presides at the preliminary hearing 
to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant to answer 
(§§ 859b, 861), is a judicial officer with “power to issue a warrant for the arrest of 
a person charged with a public offense” (§ 807).  Judges of the Supreme Court, the 
Courts of Appeal and the superior court are magistrates.  (§ 808.)  “[W]hen sitting 
as magistrates,” judges of these courts “have the jurisdiction and powers conferred 
by law upon magistrates, and not those which pertain to their respective judicial 
offices.”  (People v. Crespi (1896) 115 Cal. 50, 54.)   
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asking the superior court “to compel the magistrate to reinstate” the dismissed 
complaint.  
In this felony drug offense case, the superior court granted defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the case, No. SC063235A, on the 
prosecution’s motion.  (§ 1385, subd. (a).)  Thereafter, based on the same charges, 
the prosecution filed a second complaint, No. SF078107A.  At the preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate granted defendant’s suppression motion and dismissed the 
case for insufficient evidence.  (§ 871.)  The prosecution then sought to have the 
superior court “compel the magistrate to reinstate the complaint” under section 
871.5, subdivision (a).  The court denied the motion, citing subdivision (p) of 
section 1538.5, which prohibits the refiling of dismissed charges if the defendant’s 
suppression motion “has been granted twice.”  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  We 
reverse.   
I 
As noted at the outset, we here consider the interplay between certain 
subdivisions of two statutes, sections 1538.5 and 871.5. 
Section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1) describes the procedures governing a 
defense motion to suppress “any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of 
a search or seizure” in a criminal case.   
Subdivision (j) of section 1538.5 pertains to suppression motions in felony 
cases brought before a magistrate at a preliminary hearing.  Pertinent here is that 
part of subdivision (j) allowing the prosecution certain remedies after the 
magistrate grants a suppression motion and does not hold the defendant to answer:  
“[T]he people may file a new complaint or seek an indictment after the 
preliminary hearing, and the ruling at the prior hearing [on the suppression 
motion] shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding, except as limited by 
subdivision (p).  In the alternative, the people may move to reinstate the complaint 
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. . . pursuant to Section 871.5.”  (Italics added.)  We now turn to section 1538.5, 
subdivision (p) and section 871.5. 
Subdivision (p) of section 1538.5 states in relevant part:  “If a defendant’s 
motion to return property or suppress evidence in a felony matter has been granted 
twice, the people may not file a new complaint or seek an indictment in order to 
relitigate the motion . . . as otherwise provided by subdivision (j), unless the 
people discover additional evidence relating to the motion that was not reasonably 
discoverable at the time of the second suppression hearing.”  (Italics added.) 
Section 871.5 provides in subdivision (a):  “When an action is dismissed by 
a magistrate [under various statutes including section 871] the prosecutor may 
make a motion in the superior court within 15 days to compel the magistrate to 
reinstate the complaint . . . .”  And it states in subdivision (c):  “The superior court 
shall hear and determine the motion on the basis of the record of the proceedings 
before the magistrate.”  (§ 871.5, subd. (c).)  
We must determine whether, as construed by the Court of Appeal, these 
provisions precluded the superior court from compelling reinstatement of a 
complaint under section 871.5, subdivision (a) after the magistrate at the 
preliminary hearing had granted defendant’s second suppression motion and 
dismissed a second complaint for insufficient evidence.   
In construing any statute, “[w]ell-established rules of statutory construction 
require us to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may 
adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.”  (Hassan v. 
Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715.)  We begin by 
examining the words themselves “because the statutory language is generally the 
most reliable indicator of legislative intent.”  (Ibid.; People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 86, 94.)  “The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual 
meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.”  (Hassan, supra, at p. 
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715; see also People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1111.)  If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, “we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the 
plain meaning of the statute governs.”  (People v. Robles, supra, at p. 1111; 
People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747.)  With these rules in mind, we 
now discuss in greater detail subdivisions (j) and (p) of section 1538.5, as well as 
section 871.5. 
II 
When the magistrate at a preliminary hearing grants a defense motion to 
suppress evidence, declines to hold the defendant to answer for the charged 
offenses, and consequently dismisses the complaint, subdivision (j) of section 
1538.5 gives the prosecution three options:  It may (1) “file a new complaint”; 
(2) “seek an indictment after the preliminary hearing”; or (3) “move to reinstate 
the complaint . . . pursuant to Section 871.5.”  (Ibid.)   
With respect to the first two options (filing a new complaint or seeking an 
indictment after the preliminary hearing), subdivision (j) of section 1538.5 
conditions the availability of each upon a limitation set out in subdivision (p) of 
section 1538.5.  Subdivision (p) of that same statute prohibits the prosecution from 
filing a new complaint or seeking an indictment if the defendant’s suppression 
motion has already been “granted twice,” unless the prosecution has discovered 
“additional evidence relating to the [suppression] motion that was not reasonably 
discoverable at the time of the second suppression hearing.”  (§ 1538.5, subd. (p).) 
The third option the prosecution has after the magistrate at the preliminary 
hearing has granted a defendant’s suppression motion and dismissed the case is to 
file a motion “to reinstate the complaint . . . pursuant to Section 871.5.”  (§ 1538.5, 
subd. (j).)  Notably, this third option does not have the limitation expressly 
applicable to the first two options under subdivision (p) of section 1538.5.  As 
mentioned earlier, that subdivision, absent new evidence, in plain and unequivocal 
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language expressly prohibits the People from filing a new complaint or seeking an 
indictment after the preliminary hearing if the defendant’s suppression motion 
“has been granted twice.”  But the Legislature did not make the prosecution’s third 
option subject to the limitation contained in subdivision (p). 
To summarize:  When a magistrate at the preliminary hearing grants a 
defendant’s second motion to suppress evidence and then dismisses the case for 
insufficient evidence, subdivision (p) of section 1538.5 prohibits the prosecution 
from filing a new complaint unless the prosecution has discovered new evidence 
pertaining to the suppression motion.  But nothing in that subdivision prohibits the 
superior court from granting the prosecution’s motion under section 871.5, 
subdivision (a) “to compel the magistrate to reinstate the complaint,” even if the 
defendant has twice been successful in having the evidence suppressed.  (See 
§ 1538.5, subd. (p).)   
The Court of Appeal here acknowledged that subdivision (a) of section 
871.5 “facially permits the review of any complaint dismissed pursuant to section 
871.”  But the court concluded that to reinstate a complaint under section 871.5 
would violate section 1538.5’s subdivision (p), which precludes the prosecution 
from filing a new complaint after a defendant’s suppression motion “has been 
granted twice” unless the prosecution discovers new evidence relevant to the 
suppression motion.  To allow reinstatement of the complaint under section 871.5 
would, according to the Court of Appeal, give the prosecution a third chance to 
litigate a defendant’s twice-granted suppression motion.  Not so.   
In determining whether to compel reinstatement of a complaint dismissed 
after the granting of a defendant’s suppression motion by the magistrate at a 
preliminary hearing, the superior court reviews the legal soundness of the 
magistrate’s ruling on the suppression motion (People v. Matelski (2000) 82 
Cal.App.4th 837, 844-846; Vlick v. Superior Court (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 992, 
6 
998-999) based on “the record of the proceedings before the magistrate” (§ 871.5, 
subd. (c)).  Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, a motion brought by 
the prosecution under section 871.5 is not a relitigation of the defendant’s 
suppression motion.  Instead, it is simply a means to have the superior court 
determine the legal propriety of the magistrate’s dismissal of the complaint after 
granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.  
Defendant contends that reinstatement of the complaint in this case would 
violate the two-dismissal rule of section 1387, subdivision (a).  We disagree.  That 
subdivision provides in relevant part:  “An order terminating an action pursuant to 
this chapter, or Section . . . 871 . . . is a bar to any other prosecution for the same 
offense if it is a felony . . . and the action has been previously terminated pursuant 
to this chapter, or Section . . . 871 . . . .”  (Ibid.)  These requirements, defendant 
asserts, are met here.  Defendant notes that the superior court’s dismissal of the 
original complaint charging him with the June 12, 1998 felony drug offenses (No. 
SC063235A) qualifies the action as having “previously been terminated pursuant 
to this chapter,” because the dismissal was under section 1385, subdivision (a), a 
provision appearing in the same “chapter” as section 1387.  (Pen. Code, tit. 10, 
ch. 8.)  Defendant further observes that the dismissal of the June 12, 1998 drug 
offenses in this case (No. SF078107A) qualifies as a second dismissal under 
section 1387 because the magistrate “terminat[ed] the action pursuant to . . . 
Section . . . 871.”  Defendant then argues that after these two dismissals (the first 
by the superior court and the second by the magistrate upon the prosecution’s 
refiling of the dismissed charges), reinstatement of the complaint in case No. 
SF078107A would be barred by section 1387, subdivision (a) as another 
“prosecution for the same offense.”  As we explain below, defendant is wrong in 
characterizing reinstatement of a complaint under section 871.5 as another 
prosecution for the same offense.   
7 
In Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26 (Ramos), this court 
discussed the relationship between section 1387’s two-dismissal rule and section 
871.5’s provision for reinstatement of a complaint.  Ramos was a capital murder 
case in which the magistrate at the preliminary hearing dismissed both the murder 
charge and the financial-gain special-circumstance allegation for insufficient 
evidence.  Thereafter, the prosecution alleged the same charges in a second 
complaint.  A different magistrate held the defendant to answer on the murder 
charge but dismissed the special circumstance allegation.  After this second 
dismissal of the special circumstance allegation, the prosecution filed an 
information in superior court charging the defendant with murder and alleging the 
same special circumstance, but doing so “without seeking reinstatement of the 
dismissed special circumstance allegation under section 871.5.”  (Ramos, supra, at 
p. 29.)  The superior court denied the defendant’s motion to strike the special 
circumstance allegation.  We then granted the defendant’s petition for writ of 
prohibition.  We concluded that after a second dismissal of the special 
circumstance allegation, further proceedings on that allegation were barred by 
section 1387, subdivision (a) as an “ ‘other prosecution for the same offense.’ ”  
(Ramos, supra, at p. 36.)   
Pertinent here is the comment in Ramos that this court’s “interpretation of 
section 1387 [did] not leave the People without means to challenge a second order 
of a magistrate dismissing all or a portion of a complaint.”  (Ramos, supra, 32 
Cal.3d at p. 36.)  We observed that the Legislature in 1980 “added a new Penal 
Code provision—section 871.5—which provides the People with a specially 
designed procedure for challenging a magistrate’s dismissal order.”  (Ibid.)  The 
prosecution in Ramos had not followed that procedure, however.  Instead, the 
prosecution “attempted simply to ignore the second dismissal [of the special 
circumstance allegation] by proceeding directly” to superior court and filing an 
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information alleging the same special circumstance that had already been 
dismissed twice.  (Ramos, supra, at pp. 36-37.)  Ramos thus reflects this court’s 
view that section 1387’s two-dismissal rule will not bar reinstatement of a 
complaint under section 871.5.3   
DISPOSITION 
 
Because the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the superior court’s denial 
of the prosecution’s section 871.5 motion to reinstate the complaint in case 
No. SF078107A., the matter is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                             
 
3   
We do not address another contention by defendant regarding the 
prosecution’s appeal of the superior court’s dismissal of the original complaint, 
No. SC063235A.  Defendant argues that by appealing the merits of the superior 
court’s ruling on defendant’s initial suppression motion, the prosecution is bound 
by the decision rendered in that appeal.  (§ 1538.5, subd. (j).)  But as defendant 
concedes, he failed to raise that issue in the Court of Appeal in this case.  Thus, it 
is not properly before us.  (See Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 
481.) 
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Toney 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 95 Cal.App.4th 941 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S104995 
Date Filed: January 22, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Joaquin 
Judge: Bernard J. Garber 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John D. Phillips, District Attorney, Kevin A. Hicks and David Wellenbrock, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Dennis L. Stout, District Attorney (San Bernardino), Grover D. Merritt and Mark A. Vos, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for California District Attorneys’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
William J. Arzbaecher III, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Erlinda G. Castro, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David Wellenbrock 
Deputy District Attorney 
222 E. Weber Avenue, Room 202 
Stockton, CA  95202 
(209) 468-2400 
 
William J. Arzbaecher III 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 441-3792