Case Title: Ashland Chem. Co. v. Jones

Citation: 2001-Ohio-184

Docket Number: 20001154

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ashland Chem. Co. v. Jones, 92 Ohio St.3d 234, 2001-Ohio-184.] 
 
 
 
ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. JONES, DIR., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Ashland Chem. Co. v. Jones (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 234.] 
Environmental protection — Ohio Adm.Code 3745-21-07(G)(2) does not apply 
to a chemical distribution facility that stores, transfers, and ships 
photochemically reactive materials to its customers. 
(No. 00-1154 — Submitted April 4, 2001 at the Lawrence County Session — 
Decided July 11, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-764. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  Appellant, Ashland Chemical Company, 
owns and operates a chemical distribution facility on Darrow Road in Akron, 
Ohio.  Appellant uses the facility to store, transfer, and ship various chemical 
products to its customers.  The stored chemicals are transferred from stationary 
tanks or tank cars into smaller, portable containers in accordance with customer 
specifications.  To accomplish this task, three container-filling lines pump various 
types of chemicals, including liquid organic materials such as photochemically 
reactive materials, into the smaller containers.  No coating operations, chemical 
manufacturing, or chemical reaction takes place at this facility. 
 
On October 6, 1995, appellant submitted an application for a permit to 
install (“PTI”) these lines.  Appellee, the Director of Environmental Protection, 
granted these applications on March 13, 1996.  Thereafter, on June 25, 1996, 
appellant submitted applications for three permits to operate (“PTO”) the lines.  
The applications were forwarded to the Akron Regional Air Quality Management 
District (“Akron Agency”), the local air pollution control agency, for initial 
review.  In reviewing the applications, the Akron Agency determined that the 
three PTOs were subject to Ohio Adm.code 3745-21-07(G)(2), an administrative 
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rule that regulates the amount of organic compounds, including hydrocarbons and 
photochemically reactive materials, that can be discharged into the atmosphere 
per hour and per day.  The prior PTIs had not stated that the lines would be 
subject to this rule.  The Akron Agency submitted its recommendations to 
appellee, and appellee incorporated the administrative rule into the draft PTOs. 
 
When appellant received a copy of the draft PTOs, it objected to the 
proposed enforcement of Ohio Adm.code 3745-21-07(G)(2) on the ground that it 
did not believe its facilities fell within the scope of the rule.  After receiving 
appellant’s written comments, the Akron Agency agreed to remove any reference 
to Ohio Adm.code 3745-21-07(G)(2).  However, appellee disagreed and 
ultimately issued the PTOs subject to the requirements of Ohio Adm.code 3745-
07-21(G)(2). 
 
Appellant filed an appeal with the Environmental Review Appeals 
Commission (“ERAC”), disputing the applicability of Ohio Adm.code 3745-07-
21(G)(2).  Following a hearing, ERAC concluded that the administrative rule did 
not apply to the container-filling lines at the Darrow Road facility, and ordered 
that mention of this rule be removed from the PTOs.  Appellee appealed to the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals, which overruled ERAC’s decision.  The cause is 
now before this court upon allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
We are asked to decide whether Ohio Adm.code 3745-21-07(G)(2) applies 
to a chemical distribution facility that is involved in the transfer, packaging, and 
shipping of photochemically reactive materials. 
 
Ohio 
Adm.code 
3745-21-07(G)(2) 
regulates 
the 
discharge 
of 
photochemically reactive material into the atmosphere: 
 
“(G)  Operations using liquid organic material: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(2) A person shall not discharge more than forty pounds of organic 
material into the atmosphere in any one day, nor more than eight pounds in any 
January Term, 2001 
3 
one hour, from any article, machine, equipment, or other contrivance used under 
conditions other than described in paragraph (G)(1) of this rule for employing, 
applying, evaporating or drying any photochemically reactive material, or 
substance containing such photochemically reactive material, unless said 
discharge has been reduced by at least eighty-five percent.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The parties have stipulated that appellant’s facilities are not being used for 
“applying,” “evaporating,” or “drying” any photochemically reactive material, as 
set forth in the administrative rule.  The only issue is whether appellant’s facilities 
are “employing” any photochemically reactive material in its operations. 
 
The term “employing” is not defined in the Ohio Revised Code or the 
Ohio Administrative Code.1  From the inception of this dispute, appellee has 
argued that the term “employing” should be interpreted to mean “using” in its 
broadest sense, and that Ohio Adm.Code 3745-21-07(G)(2) applies to the 
container-filling procedures at the Darrow Road facility, since appellant is 
“employing” or “using” the chemicals in its distribution process. 
 
ERAC, however, declined to adopt this broad definition of the term 
“employing.”  Instead, ERAC held that the term “employing” must be given a 
meaning narrower than “using,” as argued by appellee. 
 
ERAC applied two rules of statutory construction in making this 
determination.  It applied R.C. 1.42, which states, “Words and phrases shall be 
read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common 
usage.”  (Emphasis added.)  ERAC also applied a related rule of statutory 
                                                          
 
1. 
A public information bulletin of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency defines 
“employing” as “the use of photochemically reactive materials in any type of production 
equipment in normal, day-to-day work functions.  It could also mean the use of photochemically 
reactive materials in any type of equipment that a company uses to form a final product or 
intermediate (by-product) that the company sells.”   Frequently Asked Questions on Title V and 
STARShip 
III 
(ftp://ftp.sconet.state.oh.us/Opinions/2001/001154att.pdf) 
 
See 
  Both parties contend that this guidance 
document supports their competing interpretations of the term “employing.”  However, we find 
that the document itself is ambiguous and does not squarely answer the question before us. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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construction known as noscitur a sociis, “it is known from its associates.”  Under 
this doctrine, where the meaning of a word is unclear, a court will look at the 
surrounding words to ascertain the doubtful word’s meaning.  2A Singer 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (6 Ed. 2000), Section 47:16. 
 
Under these rules of statutory construction, ERAC looked at the words 
“applying,” “evaporating,” and “drying,” which follow the term “employing.”2  
ERAC concluded that the term “employing” “must not be construed to its widest 
extent and must take its meaning from the terms with which it is associated in 
paragraph (G)(2); that is ‘applying, evaporating or drying.’ ” 
 
Furthermore, ERAC found that a narrow construction of the term 
“employing” was appropriate when subsection (G)(2) was read in context with the 
other subsections in the regulation.  According to ERAC, “if the correct definition 
of ‘employ’ were simply ‘to use,’ then there would be no need for the other 
subsections of the regulation.”  ERAC also reasoned that even “[t]he title of 
subsection (G), ‘Operations using organic material,’ indicates that the 
subsequently described operations will be using organic material in some more 
specific way.  To reassign the general definition of ‘use’ to ‘employ’ in paragraph 
(G)(2) would make the use of the term in the title redundant.” 
 
The court of appeals found that the interpretation adopted by ERAC was 
unlawful and that ERAC erred in applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis.  The 
court reasoned that according to State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. 
Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 354, 588 N.E.2d 116, noscitur a sociis 
should be used only where all the words listed together have analogous meaning.  
Since the words “employing,” “applying,” “evaporating,” and drying” are not 
                                                          
 
2. 
ERAC stated that “applying” is defined “to mean ‘to employ for a particular purpose’ or 
to ‘put on or adapt for a special use,’ ” whereas the terms “evaporating” and “drying” “refer to the 
change which occurs when a product is either converted into vapor leaving only the dry solid 
portion behind (evaporating) or becomes free from moisture (drying).” 
January Term, 2001 
5 
analogous and each has its distinct meaning, the court said the maxim was 
inapplicable. 
 
Instead, the court of appeals focused on that portion of R.C. 1.42 that 
states that words shall be construed according to common usage.  It then 
construed “employing” according to its common dictionary meaning, which is “ 
‘to make use of; use * * * to put or bring into action or service; employ for or 
apply to a given purpose,’ ” quoting Webster’s New World College Dictionary (2 
Ed. 1972).  The court of appeals found that the administrative rule applied, since 
appellant was using organic materials in its filling lines.  Under its broad 
interpretation, the court also determined that paragraph (G)(2) of the rule acts as a 
catchall and covers those procedures not addressed in subsections (D) and (E), 
thereby ensuring that all operations using photochemically reactive materials are 
subject to regulation. 
 
Our job is to decide whether the court of appeals was correct in reversing 
the decision of ERAC.  R.C. 3745.06 provides that the court of appeals must 
affirm an administrative decision issued by the Environmental Review Appeals 
Commission if that decision is supported by “reliable, probative, and substantial 
evidence and is in accordance with law.” 
 
Regardless of whether the statutory language is construed pursuant to the 
doctrine of noscitur a sociis or R.C. 1.42, the result would be the same, since both 
rules of statutory construction require that words be read in context. 
 
In looking at the common usage of the term “employing,” we find that 
even under the dictionary definition of the term “employing,” as quoted by the 
court of appeals, “employing” is not defined solely to mean “to use.”  Instead, it is 
also defined as “to make use of; use * * * to put or bring into action or service; 
employ for or apply to a given purpose.”  Under this definition, appellant’s 
facilities are not employing photochemically reactive chemicals, because its 
container-filling lines are not putting the chemicals into any type of action or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
service.  Nor are the facilities applying the chemicals to a given purpose.  Instead, 
the chemicals are simply being transferred from one container to another for 
shipment and are not being used to form any final product. 
 
Moreover, considering the context, we believe that ERAC was correct in 
interpreting the term “employing” in narrow terms.  If the correct interpretation of 
the term “employing” were simply “using,” then the terms “applying,” 
“evaporating,” and “drying” as used in paragraph (G)(2) would become 
superfluous.  For instance, as ERAC noted, the term “applying” is defined in the 
dictionary to mean “to employ for a particular purpose” or to “put on or adapt for 
a special use.”  If we were to accept the court of appeals’ broad definition of 
“employing” to encompass virtually any use, then the term “applying” would be 
rendered meaningless.  This could not have been the intent behind the regulation. 
 
Similarly, if we construe the term “employing” in its broadest sense, there 
would have been no need to include the other subsections within the regulation, 
which refer to specific processes.  See, e.g., Ohio Adm.Code 3745-21-07(G)(1), 
which limits the amount of discharge that can result from baking or heat-curing 
liquid organic material or substances containing liquid organic material. 
 
Moreover, subsections (D) and (E) regulate the storage and loading of  
photochemically reactive materials when they are placed, stored, or held in either 
large stationary containers (over five hundred gallons) or mobile containers such 
as tank trucks, trailers, and railroad tank cars.  The regulations of subsection (D) 
(the storage and transfer of the organic chemicals) describe the processes at 
appellant’s facility, except that the regulations apply only to operations over a 
certain threshold size (sixty-five thousand gallons).  This, too, lends credence to 
the view that facilities such as appellant’s were not intended to be subject to 
regulation.  Thus, a more narrow interpretation of the term “employing,” as found 
by ERAC, comports with this purpose. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
Furthermore, contrary to the court of appeals’ opinion, there is simply no 
evidence that Ohio Adm.Code 3745-21-07(G)(2) was intended to serve as a 
catchall.  The language used in the regulation does not justify this conclusion. 
 
In sum, when the term “employing” is interpreted according to its 
common usage and when read in context, it cannot be interpreted to mean “using” 
in the broadest sense.  Because we find that ERAC’s interpretation of Ohio 
Adm.code 3745-21-07(G)(2) was lawful and supported by reliable, probative, and 
substantial evidence, we hold that the court of appeals erred in reversing the 
decision of ERAC. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate 
the order issued by ERAC. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Robert L. Brubaker and Katerina 
M. Eftimoff, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Bryan F. Zima, Douglas A. 
Curran and Laura J. Motes, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Brickler & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell and Anne Marie Sferra, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Martin S. Seltzer, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Chemistry Technology Council.