Case Title: Dorador v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 4804

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1978-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dorador v. State1985 WY 210711 P.2d 417Case Number: 85-109Decided: 12/31/1985JOE DORADOR, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOE DORADOR, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel; Denise Nau, 
Asst. Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen.; Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div.; John Renneisen, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen.; Michele V.K. McKellar, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, RAPER and ROONEY, (Ret.), JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

[¶1.]     An information dated 
September 11, 1984, filed in the Laramie County District Court charged appellant 
Joe Dorador in the first count with delivery of a controlled substance. In the 
second count of the information he was charged with conspiracy to deliver 
heroin, a controlled substance.1 Appellant was convicted by a jury 
of both charges and given concurrent sentences. Only the conspiracy conviction 
is appealed.

[¶2.]     According to appellant 
the issue on appeal is:

"Whether the trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence the tapes and transcripts containing statements 
of the alleged co-conspirator when there was no independent evidence of the 
conspiracy."

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Count II of the 
information charged appellant with conspiring with Billy Jaramillo to deliver 
heroin. The information further alleged that "* * * In furtherance of this 
conspiracy Billy Jaramillo * * * purchased a quantity of heroin from defendant 
which Jaramillo then delivered to a confidential informant. * * 
*"

[¶5.]     In connection with the 
investigation by the Cheyenne Police Department that led to the arrest of 
appellant, the services of a confidential informant were used. The informant was 
equipped with a wireless microphone referred to here as a "body mike," where 
conversations a short distance away were recorded on cassette tape by a monitor. 
With the "body mike" on the informant and the receiving unit monitored by a 
local police officer, the latter listened to and recorded conversations 
concerning drug transactions between the informant and appellant on June 2, 
1984; the informant and Jaramillo on June 13, 1984; and the informant and 
Jaramillo on June 15, 1984. These recorded conversations were admitted into 
evidence at trial without objection, together with transcriptions taken from the 
tapes. The evidence connecting appellant with Billy Jaramillo and the drug 
transactions on June 13 and 15, 1984, is provided through statements of Billy 
Jaramillo on the tapes made on those two days, and the transcripts of the two 
tapes.

[¶6.]     At the close of the 
state's case, appellant made a motion for directed verdict as to the conspiracy 
count alleging the state's failure to present a prima facie case of conspiracy. 
At that time the trial court reserved a ruling. The motion for a directed 
verdict was renewed at the end of the trial and in the alternative, appellant 
requested that the court strike and exclude from evidence the tapes and 
transcripts containing the statements of Billy Jaramillo. The motion was denied. 
The court found that there was sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy 
to admit the statements of the co-conspirator, Billy Jaramillo. These statements 
were admitted into evidence under the provisions of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence, which provides that a statement is not hearsay 
if:

"(2) The statement is 
offered against the party and is * * * (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy."

[¶7.]     We have held that in 
order for extra-judicial statements of a co-conspirator to be admitted against a 
defendant under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), W.R.E., there must be prima facie evidence of 
a conspiracy, independent of the co-conspirator's declaration. Grable v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 663 (1982); and Jasch v. State, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1327 
(1977).

[¶8.]     In proving the 
substantive crime of conspiracy, the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt; 
however, in the proof of a conspiracy, as a prerequisite to the admission of 
statements of an alleged co-conspirator, only a prima facie showing of 
conspiracy is required. It is only the prima facie showing that we are concerned 
with here.

[¶9.]     In State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 817, 87 S. Ct. 39, 17 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966), 
the court defined prima facie in the context of the quantum of proof required to 
establish a conspiracy as a prerequisite to the admission of a co-conspirator's 
statement. Quoting from the Minnesota case, this court in Jasch said, at 
1334:

"`* * * The term "prima 
facie" in this context is rather a nebulous one that defies exact definition. It 
can probably be defined only in terms of sufficient evidence to permit the trial 
court reasonably to infer that there existed a conspiracy. * * 
*'"

This court 
further said:

"* * * [A] conspiracy is 
usually established by circumstantial evidence and the order of proof is not 
significant, as long as the record as a whole shows facts from which the 
existence of a conspiracy can be inferred. Neither does it need be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt because that doctrine applies only to the issue of 
guilt." Id., 
at 1334.

[¶10.]  We will now consider the testimony at 
trial to determine if there was prima facie evidence of a conspiracy independent 
of the co-conspirator's (Jaramillo's) declaration. In the taped recording 
between appellant and the informant, June 2, 1984, the conversation involved 
drug transactions. Appellant said, "Heroin, I like to keep it where it's 
moderate, you know, so [I] can get off on $40.00 you know * * *." He was asked 
by the confidential informant: "You dealing a lot right now?" Appellant replied: 
"A fair amount [inaudible] . . . I arrange, but. . . ." In that same 
conversation the name of Billy was mentioned. No surname was mentioned; however, 
there was other evidence that appellant and Billy Jaramillo were related, 
apparently through marriage.

[¶11.]  On or about June 15, 1984, Billy 
Jaramillo delivered heroin to the confidential informant. Before the delivery 
the informant and Jaramillo got into Jaramillo's car and drove to a local 
laundromat near appellant's house. From his parked car Jaramillo walked toward 
appellant's house. Jaramillo was gone about ten minutes and returned with heroin 
which he delivered to the informant, who said he did not actually see Jaramillo 
enter appellant's house, it being around the corner from the parked car. 
However, the investigating officer monitoring the transaction between Jaramillo 
and the informant saw Billy Jaramillo enter appellant's 
residence.

[¶12.]  Several days after the heroin transaction 
with Jaramillo, the informant went to appellant's residence, and at trial 
testified regarding the purpose of this visit.

"Q. What, if anything, 
occurred on that occasion?

"A. I was talking to Joe 
[appellant] about heroin, to see if he would sell again directly to 
me.

"* * * * 
*

"Q. Now, when you got to 
the Dorador [appellant] residence, did you see Joe 
Dorador?

"A. Yes, 
sir.

"Q. And where was he when 
you first saw him?

"A. He was coming out of 
his front door and going to his car.

"Q. And then did you 
approach him and have a conversation?

"A. Yes, 
sir.

"Q. And what was that 
conversation?

"A. I stated that I was 
unhappy with Billy [Jaramillo], in buying from Billy, and I wanted to deal with 
him, I wanted to buy through him.

"Q. And what, if 
anything, did Joe Dorador say in response to that?

"A. He said - he stated 
that he didn't really - he indicated he really didn't know me that well, and 
that if I wanted to continue buying heroin from him I would have to go through 
Billy.

"Q. And was there any 
other conversation about what we're talking about?

"A. I tried to push the 
issue and told him I wouldn't deal with Billy anymore, and that if I couldn't 
buy directly that I wouldn't buy. He stated that he didn't want it to happen, 
but that is the way it would have to be arranged."

[¶13.]  This conversation at appellant's 
residence took place after the delivery of heroin by Jaramillo to the informant. 
However, reference was made to previous buys from appellant through Billy 
Jaramillo. From the testimony produced at trial the court could reasonably infer 
that there was a conspiracy between Jaramillo and appellant to deliver heroin on 
or about June 13, 1984. The state discharged its initial burden by producing 
evidence, independent of declarations by a co-conspirator, of a conspiracy. The 
state having met its initial burden, the court properly received into evidence 
the tapes and transcripts of conversations between the informant and 
Jaramillo.2

[¶14.]  The state argues that appellant failed to 
make a timely objection to the admission of the tapes and transcripts containing 
statements of Billy Jaramillo, the alleged co-conspirator, thus, did not 
properly preserve this issue on appeal. Appellant counters with a novel 
explanation why no objection was made to the admission of the tapes and 
transcripts. The state urges us to address the timely objection issue in the 
context of plain error.

[¶15.]  In view of our disposition of the only 
issue raised by appellant, the matters that counsel suggest we address are 
unnecessary. However, we are not necessarily that convinced that appellant's 
objection was timely.

[¶16.]  We hold that there was sufficient 
independent evidence of a conspiracy between appellant and co-conspirator 
Jaramillo to allow the admission of the extra-judicial statements into 
evidence.

[¶17.]  Affirmed.

1 Delivery of a controlled 
substance is proscribed by § 35-7-1031(a)(i), W.S. 1977. The controlled 
substance involved here (heroin) is listed in § 35-7-1014(c)(x), W.S. 1977; 
conspiracy is defined in § 6-1-303, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).

2 Sequentially, the 
statements of the co-conspirator were admitted into evidence before most of the 
independent evidence of a conspiracy was admitted. However, the order of proof 
is not significant. Jasch v. State, 
Wyo., 563 P.2d 1327 (1977); and State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 
(1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 817, 87 S. Ct. 39, 17 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966). That is 
particularly applicable here because no objection was made to the introduction 
of the statements of the co-conspirator.