Case Title: Hairston v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEPHEN HAIRSTON, 
§ 
 
§ No. 53, 2020 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
 
§ of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
§  
 
§ ID No. 1806008732(N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
              
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Appellee. 
§  
 
Submitted: January 13, 2021 
Decided: 
March 19, 2021 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant Stephen Hairston. 
 
Brian L. Arban, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
In 1994, the Delaware General Assembly enacted a statute, applicable to both 
criminal and civil proceedings, that eases the evidentiary burden on the proponent 
of controlled-substance-testing evidence.  The statute, which is found at 10 Del. C. 
§§ 4330–4332 and which we will refer to in this opinion as Subchapter III,1 allows 
for the admission of, and a favorable presumption relating to, written reports from a 
forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist, without the necessity of their appearance 
in court, so long as the report complies with certain requirements.  In criminal 
proceedings, in apparent recognition of the rights of an accused to confront 
witnesses, the statute also requires the State, upon written demand by the defendant, 
to produce at trial certain designated persons, including the testing analyst, or any 
person in the chain of custody as defined by the statute, as prosecution witnesses.  
After Stephen Hairston was indicted on several criminal offenses, including 
serious drug offenses, he served a written demand on the State, which, by the 
unambiguous terms of the statute, required the presence at trial of, among other 
individuals, the officer who seized and packaged the substances that formed the basis 
of Hairston’s drug offenses.  Upon the State’s pretrial motion in limine, however, 
the Superior Court, believing that the seizing and packaging officer was unavailable, 
relieved the State of its obligation to produce him and permitted another officer who 
 
1 Sections 4330 through 4332 of Title 10 comprise Subchapter III of Chapter 43 of Title 10. 
3 
 
was present at the scene of Hairston’s apprehension to appear in the seizing and 
packaging officer’s stead.  The Superior Court’s ruling, according to Hairston, 
erroneously relieved the State of a mandatory statutory duty and violated Hairston’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  
In this opinion, we hold that the Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute 
in question was erroneous as a matter of law and that, absent the appearance of the 
witness identified in Hairston’s demand, it was error for the court to admit the 
forensic chemist’s report and testimony.  We therefore reverse.  
I. 
 
In June 2018, Corporal Lynch and Corporal Bartolo of the Wilmington Police 
Department were on patrol when they observed a sport utility vehicle with dark after-
market window tint.  A vehicle registration inquiry revealed that the vehicle did not 
have a waiver for the after-market window tint as required by Delaware law.  After 
observing the SUV make a turn without signaling, the officers pulled the SUV over. 
Corporal Lynch approached the driver’s side of the SUV.  Stephen Hairston, 
the driver of the SUV, provided Lynch with a copy of the vehicle’s registration.  As 
Corporal Bartolo approached the passenger side of the SUV, he noticed the driver 
look back at the officers “and then reach over into the front passenger area of the 
4 
 
vehicle and retract his hand quickly.”2  Once at the passenger’s window, Corporal 
Bartolo detected an odor of marijuana coming from the SUV and noticed a knotted 
plastic bag containing a powdery substance on top of a cup in plain view at the 
passenger’s feet.   
The officers removed Hairston and the passenger from the SUV to conduct a 
search of the vehicle.  Hairston and the passenger stood near the rear of the SUV 
under the supervision of two additional police officers—Corporals MacNamara and 
Akil—who had arrived on the scene.  As Lynch and Bartolo searched the SUV, 
Hairston fled.  Corporal MacNamara chased Hairston and eventually subdued him.  
Corporal Bartolo left the SUV to assist MacNamara in arresting Hairston and 
bringing him back to the scene of the motor vehicle stop.  Bartolo and MacNamara 
conducted a search of Hairston incident to arrest, which produced $768 in cash, but 
no weapons or contraband.   
Corporal Bartolo testified that, after Hairston was taken into custody and 
searched, he returned to the SUV to assist Corporal Lynch with the vehicle search.  
According to Bartolo, after he returned to the SUV, he observed Corporal Lynch 
recover the plastic bag of a white powdery substance that Bartolo had observed at 
the beginning of the stop from the passenger’s side floor and a small bag of a green 
leafy plant-like substance from the center console.   
 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A49. 
5 
 
Hairston was indicted on drug-related offenses, including aggravated 
possession of heroin and possession of marijuana as well as resisting arrest and 
various motor vehicles offenses.  Before trial, Hairston made a demand on the State 
under 10 Del. C. § 4332 requesting the presence of “all persons involved in the chain 
of custody of any evidence.”3   Trial was initially scheduled for January 2019 but 
was continued three times until September 2019 because Corporal Lynch, who, as 
the seizing and packaging officer, was part of the chain of custody as defined by 10 
Del. C. § 4331, was on medical leave and, according to the State, “unavailable as a 
witness.”4  
Because Corporal Lynch was still on medical leave in September 2019, the 
State filed a motion in limine asking the Superior Court to admit the drug evidence 
and “allow Corporal Bartolo testimony to satisfy the chain of custody of the evidence 
seized.”5  The State argued that, although “Corporal Bartolo was not the officer who 
physically handled the evidence, he personally observed the chain of custody process 
. . . [and therefore his] testimony would suffice as to eliminate any possibility of 
misidentification of the evidence seized.”6  The court granted the State’s motion over 
 
3 Id. at A14. 
4 App. to Answering Br. at B1.  The State does not allege in its motion in limine that Corporal 
Lynch was unavailable, i.e., could not be present to testify because of infirmity or physical illness, 
see D.R.E. 804(a)(4), only that he “was injured in the line of duty and is still out on medical leave.”  
App. to Opening Br. at A17. 
5 Id. at A19. 
6 Id. at A18. 
6 
 
Hairston’s opposition.  Recognizing this as an issue of first impression in Delaware, 
the court based its decision on the general standards for authentication of evidence 
under Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 901(a), observing that, when the 
sponsoring witness 
is a direct eyewitness and participant in the search, and directly 
observed the seizure and packaging, . . . there is, for admissibility 
purposes, a reasonable probability that the evidence offered is what the 
proponent says it is, and that the evidence has not been misidentified, 
and no tampering, or adulteration, occurred for purposes of the seizing 
officer and packaging officer portion of the testimony.7 
 
Thus, at trial, Corporal Bartolo testified in place of Corporal Lynch.  Bartolo 
testified that he “observed the recovery [of the drugs] from the vehicle, transporting 
it to [the police station], the field testing of the substances, packaging, and submitting 
all substances into evidence.”8  Bartolo also testified that the drug evidence presented 
by the State at trial was “in the same, or substantially the same, condition”9 as when 
it was recovered from Hairston’s vehicle.  The State also produced the forensic 
chemist who testified that the proper protocols were followed during the testing of 
the substances recovered from Hairston’s vehicle and that the evidence presented at 
trial did not show any signs of tampering.   
 
7 Id. at A31. 
8 Id. at A60. 
9 Id. at A63–64. 
7 
 
The prosecutor then walked the chemist through her Forensic Chemistry Unit 
Controlled Substances Section Laboratory Report, which showed that one of the 
tested substances, weighing 6.6255 grams, contained heroin and the other, weighing 
2.3363 grams, was marijuana.  At the close of the direct examination of the chemist, 
the State offered—and the court admitted, over Hairston’s “prior objections”10—the 
chemist’s report as a trial exhibit.  The jury returned a guilty verdict against Hairston 
for aggravated possession of heroin, possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, and 
various motor vehicle offenses.  
On appeal, Hairston argues that the Superior Court “erred as a matter of law  
. . . when it relieved the State of its statutory duty to produce the officer who seized 
and packaged the drug evidence.”11  Hairston contends that the plain language of 
Subchapter III requires the State, upon the defendant’s request, to ensure the 
presence of all individuals in the chain of custody, as defined by Section 4331, at 
trial.  Hence, because the State failed to produce Corporal Lynch—the seizing and 
 
10 App. to Answering Br. at B21.  We understand these “prior objections” to have been (i) 
Hairston’s opposition to the State’s motion in limine to allow Corporal Bartolo to testify in lieu of 
requiring the presence of Corporal Lynch under Section 4332, and (ii) an objection made during 
the chemist’s testimony, challenging the chain of custody on the grounds that other persons who 
did not testify at trial had touched the evidence and that their presence was also required under 
Section 4332.  See id. at B19.  Notably, the court overruled the latter objection based on its 
interpretation of Section 4331’s delimitation of chain-of-custody witnesses.  So it would seem as 
though the State enjoyed the benefit of Section 4331’s chain-of-custody restrictions, but at the 
same time was excused from complying with Section 4332’s obligations. 
11 Opening Br. at 8. 
8 
 
packaging officer—at trial, Hairston argues that his drug-related convictions must 
be reversed.12   
For its part, the State contends that Section 4331 and Section 4332 of 
Subchapter III only “eliminate the need for repetitive witnesses and . . . [do] not 
supplant the common law standard for authentication [or D.R.E. 901(a)].”13  
Accordingly, the State argues that the Superior Court properly relied on Delaware’s 
general standards for the authentication of evidence when it found that the State 
could properly establish the chain of custody and authentication of the seized drugs 
through Corporal Bartolo’s testimony.   
II. 
 
Although we generally review the Superior Court’s ruling admitting or 
excluding evidence for abuse of discretion,14 where the Superior Court’s ruling 
involves an interpretation of a statute, our review is de novo.15 
 
12 Hairston argues that the Superior Court’s grant of the State’s motion in limine also denied him 
his constitutional right to confront a witness against him, in violation of the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Because we find that the Superior 
Court erred by allowing the State to produce a substitute witness in place of the seizing and 
packaging officer, we need not address Hairston’s constitutional argument.  
13 Answering Br. at 15.   
14 Milligan v. State, 116 A.3d 1232, 1235 (Del. 2015) (citing Fuller v. State, 860 A.2d 324, 329 
(Del. 2004)). 
15 Dennis v. State, 41 A.3d 391, 393 (Del. 2012) (citing Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 
A.3d 536, 538 (Del. 2011)).  
9 
 
III. 
 
Because the Superior Court approached the issue raised by the State’s motion 
in limine purely as an authentication issue and, in essence, found that authentication 
sufficient to satisfy D.R.E. 901(a) obviates the requirements set forth in Subchapter 
III, we begin our analysis with a comparison of D.R.E. 901(a) and Subchapter III. 
A. 
 
Under D.R.E. 901(a), “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or 
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”16  When the State 
seeks to authenticate by establishing chain of custody, it is not required “to produce 
evidence as to every link in the chain of custody.  Rather, the State must simply 
demonstrate an orderly process from which the trier of fact can conclude that it is 
improbable that the original item has been tampered with or exchanged.”17  This 
Court has ruled that, where there are inconsistencies or gaps in the testimony offered 
to establish the authenticity of the evidence, the “factual discrepancies, and the 
inferences to be drawn from them, go to the weight to be accorded the evidence 
rather than to its admissibility.”18   
 
16 D.R.E. 901(a). 
17 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Del. 1997) (citing Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 153 
(Del. 1987)). 
18 Id. at 1132. 
10 
 
Whereas D.R.E. 901(a) lays down a general rule for the authentication of 
evidence, Subchapter III sets forth the rules for “establishing that physical evidence 
in a criminal or civil proceeding constitutes a particular controlled substance defined 
under Chapter 47 of Title 16.”19  Thus, and despite its subtitle—“Chain of 
Custody”—Subchapter III addresses much more than the issues of authentication 
and chain of custody in a drug case; it establishes a procedural framework for the 
admission and consideration of controlled-substance-testing evidence in both 
criminal and civil proceedings. 
Subchapter III’s first section—Section 4330—begins with a 208-word long 
sentence that sanctions the admissibility of the reports of forensic toxicologists and 
forensic chemists under certain conditions.  To unpack this sentence’s many moving 
parts, we find it helpful to view its constituent parts separately:  
1. For the purpose of establishing that physical evidence in a criminal 
or civil proceeding constitutes a particular controlled substance 
defined under Chapter 47 of Title 16, 
2. A report signed by the forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist who 
performed the test or tests as to its nature shall be prima facie 
evidence, without the necessity of the forensic toxicologist or 
forensic chemist personally appearing in court, that: 
a. the material delivered was properly tested under procedures 
approved by the Division of Forensic Science; 
b. those procedures are legally reliable; 
 
19 10 Del. C. § 4330. 
11 
 
c. the material was delivered by the officer or person stated in 
the report; and  
d. the material was or contained the substance therein stated. 
3. To qualify for this favored evidentiary treatment, the report must: 
a. identify the forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist as an 
appropriately certified individual; 
b. state that the toxicologist or chemist analyzed the materials 
under approved procedures; and  
c. state that the substance is or contains the controlled substance 
specified. 
The second, more concise sentence in Section 4330 states that the provisions 
of the first sentence do not “preclude[] the right of any party to introduce any 
evidence supporting or contradicting the evidence contained in or the presumption 
raised by the report.”20 
Under 10 Del. C. § 4332, “in a criminal proceeding, the prosecution shall, 
upon written demand of a defendant filed in the proceedings at least 5 days prior to 
trial, require the presence of the forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist, or any 
person in the chain of custody as a prosecution witness”21 at trial.  Section 4331 
defines the chain of custody “in the context of controlled dangerous substances” as 
a. 
the seizing officer 
b. 
the packaging officer, if the packaging officer is not also the 
seizing officer; and  
 
20 Id. 
21 10 Del. C. § 4332.  The timeliness of Hairston’s Section 4332 demand is not challenged in this 
case. 
12 
 
c. 
the forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist or other person who 
actually touched the substance and not merely the outer sealed 
package in which the substance was placed by the law-
enforcement agency before or during the analysis of the 
substance.22 
It is noteworthy that the statute does not limit the defendant’s right to demand 
the presence of the individuals identified as being within the chain of custody to 
cases in which the prosecution seeks to avail itself of Section 4330’s presumptions; 
in fact, Section 4330’s (and Section 4331’s23) provisions concerning prima facie 
evidence do not apply to the testimony of witnesses appearing in response to a 
defendant’s demand under Section 4332. 
Thus, Subchapter III establishes a relatively simple framework for the 
introduction and consideration of controlled-substance-testing evidence.  As applied 
in a criminal proceeding, in the absence of a timely demand by the accused, a written 
report of the prosecution’s testing analyst is admissible and presumed to be accurate 
even in the absence of the analyst’s appearance in court so long as the report checks 
the boxes listed in Section 4330.  The prosecution may choose, as it did here, to call 
the testing analyst to testify as to the nature of the tested substance, instead of 
 
22 10 Del. C. § 4331. 
23 Section 4331 allows the State, in a criminal or civil proceeding, to establish the chain of custody 
by submitting into evidence a statement signed by each party in the chain of custody affirming that 
one person delivered the controlled-substance evidence to another on a given date.  So long as 
certain listed conditions are met, the signed statement “is prima facie evidence that the person had 
custody and made the delivery as stated, without the necessity of a personal appearance in court 
by the person signing the statement.”  Id.   
13 
 
offering a qualifying report under Section 4330.  But, regardless of the prosecution’s 
choice, if the accused makes a timely demand under Section 4332, the prosecution 
must require the presence of the analyst or any person in the chain of custody, as 
defined in Section 4331, as a prosecution witness so that, among other things, they 
may be cross-examined by the defendant.  In turn, Section 4331 strictly limits those 
deemed to be in the chain of custody in a manner that, as this Court observed in 
Demby v. State, “eliminate[s] the logistical and financial burden that the State would 
have if it were required to produce at trial every person who handled the evidence, 
irrespective of how tangential the contact might have been.”24 
Viewed in this light, Subchapter III is designed to streamline and facilitate the 
reception of controlled-substance-testing evidence in a way that, under most 
circumstances, reduces the prosecution’s burden.  But though the statute might ease 
the prosecution’s obligations, it does not eliminate them and instead demands 
something—and that, not much—in return. 
The one imposition on the State, according to the plain language of Section 
4332, is a mandatory obligation to produce at trial upon the defendant’s request the 
individuals that the legislature has defined in Section 4331 as the “chain of custody.”  
We find no ambiguity in the requirement that the State produce three witnesses: (1) 
the seizing officer, (2) the packaging officer, if different than the seizing officer, and 
 
24 Demby, 695 A.2d at 1132. 
14 
 
(3) the forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist.25  By their plain terms, Sections 
4331 and 4332 do not contemplate or permit the substitution of another witness in 
the place of the specifically identified witnesses, even if that witness might, in the 
absence of Subchapter III, be an appropriate authentication or chain of custody 
witness under D.R.E. 901(a).  Interpreting the statute in the manner advocated by 
the State, to allow the State to produce any individual so long as that person is able 
to sufficiently establish admissibility under D.R.E. 901(a), would render Section 
4332(a)(1) a nullity and Section 4331 superfluous.       
B. 
 
The 
State 
acknowledges 
that 
Subchapter 
III’s 
requirements 
are 
unambiguous26 and concedes that it did not comply with them.27  But it claims that 
the prosecution’s ability to authenticate the controlled substance that is offered into 
evidence under D.R.E. 901(a) excuses its failure to comply with Subchapter III’s 
clearly stated requirements.  To interpret the statute otherwise, according to the 
 
25 In its definition of the chain of custody, Section 4331 also refers to “other person[s] who actually 
touched the substance and not merely the outer sealed package in which the substance was placed 
by the law-enforcement agency before or during the analysis of the substance.”  10 Del. C. § 4331.  
Hairston objected to the admission of the chemist’s conclusions based on the absence of testimony 
from an analyst other than the testifying chemist.  The court overruled that objection.  See supra 
note 10.  Hairston has not appealed that evidentiary ruling, so we do not address it in this opinion. 
26 During oral argument, Chief Justice Seitz asked counsel for the State whether the statute was 
ambiguous.  Counsel conceded: “No, there’s no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute.”  
Oral 
Argument 
Video 
at 
24:39–24:41, 
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/9467041/videos/215988138. 
27 Id. at 19:08–19:18. 
15 
 
State, would mean that Subchapter III has superseded the common law of evidence 
authentication as embodied in D.R.E. 901(a).  Citing A.W. Financial Services, S.A. 
v. Empire Resources, Inc.,28 the State argues that, because Subchapter III does not 
clearly manifest a legislative intent to supersede the common law, it has not done so.  
And if there has been no superseder of D.R.E. 901(a), it remains as a gateway to the 
admission of drug-testing evidence independent of compliance with Subchapter III.   
The State’s superseder argument based on A.W. Financial Services misses the 
mark.  In that case, this Court noted that we will find an implicit repeal of the 
common law “only ‘where there is fair repugnance between the common law and 
the statute, and both cannot be carried into effect.’”29  But no one—neither Hairston 
nor this Court—contends that Subchapter III supersedes D.R.E. 901(a), which 
continues to state the evidentiary rule governing the authentication and identification 
of evidence.   
As mentioned before, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or 
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”30  In a criminal 
prosecution, the State may satisfy the authentication requirement in one of two ways.  
“The State may have witnesses visually identify the item as that which was actually 
 
28 981 A.2d 1114 (Del. 2009). 
29 Id. at 1122 (quoting 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 16). 
30 D.R.E. 901(a). 
16 
 
involved with the crime, or it may establish a chain of custody which indirectly 
establishes the identity by tracing its continuous whereabouts.”31  Subchapter III 
does not eliminate this threshold evidentiary requirement; instead, it creates an 
avenue for the introduction of controlled-substance-testing reports and delimits 
chain-of-custody witnesses to the seizing officer, the packaging officer, and the 
testing analyst or other person who has actually touched the substance.  In turn, it 
makes clear that a defendant may demand the appearance at trial of certain 
designated individuals in the chain of custody as prosecution witnesses.  The 
defendant may then cross-examine those witnesses—not substitutes of the 
prosecution’s choosing—on the authenticity of the evidence or any other topic 
within the proper scope of cross-examination.  This right does not hinge on the path 
the prosecution takes to authenticate or identify the substance it seeks to admit.  
Here, Hairston made a proper and timely demand on the State to produce “all 
persons involved in the chain of custody of any evidence.”32  Under the plain 
meaning of Sections 4331 and 4332, the State was then required to produce Corporal 
Lynch, the seizing and packaging officer.  Despite the fact that Corporal Bartolo 
participated in the stop and subsequent search of Hairston’s vehicle, he was not 
present for the entire motor vehicle search—including when he assisted Corporal 
 
31 Quinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Del. 2004) (quoting Tricoche, 525 A.2d at 153). 
32 App. to Opening Br. at A14. 
17 
 
MacNamara in pursuing Hairston as he fled the scene of the stop and when he 
assisted Corporal MacNamara in searching Hairston’s person after he was arrested—
and was also not the officer that physically seized and packaged the substances from 
Hairston’s SUV.  Thus, his appearance did not satisfy the State’s obligation to 
require the presence of the seizing and packaging officer as a prosecution witness at 
Hairston’s trial.  In that witness’s absence, it was reversible error to admit the 
forensic chemist’s testimony and report. 
This interpretation of Sections 4331 and 4332 conforms with the “‘elementary 
rule of [statutory] construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause and sentence of a statute.’”33  Where, as in Subchapter III, the General 
Assembly has unambiguously granted a criminal defendant the right to demand the 
presence at trial of certain specified individuals, our role is not to override or create 
an exception to that right.  Instead, we must give it effect.34  
 
 
 
33 State v. Croce, 1997 WL 524070, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 14, 1997) (quoting 2A Norman 
Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992)).  
34 See Chase Alexa, LLC v. Kent Cnty. Levy Court, 991 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Del. 2010) (“The rules 
of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislators, as 
expressed in the statute.  First, the Court must determine whether the statute is ambiguous, because 
if it is not, then ‘the plain meaning of the statutory language controls.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Dir. of Revenue v. CNA Holdings, Inc., 818 A.2d 953, 957 (Del. 2003))). 
18 
 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Superior Court’s judgment as to 
Hairston’s convictions of aggravated possession of heroin and possession of 
marijuana and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.