Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 51, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HENRY R. TAYLOR, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 51, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 83003848DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  July 10, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided:  August 7, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 7th day of August 2009, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below,1 it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Henry R. Taylor, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 5, 2009 order denying his motion to 
correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  
We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
In June 1983, Taylor was indicted on two counts of Burglary in 
the Second Degree, one count of Felony Theft, and one count of 
                                                 
1 The Court also has considered the appellant’s “motion for permissive writing,” which 
was filed on July 13, 2009. 
 
2 
Misdemeanor Theft.  On October 25, 1983, Taylor pleaded guilty to a single 
count of Burglary in the Second Degree.  The remainder of the charges were 
dismissed.  Taylor was sentenced to 1 year of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended for 1 year of probation.  Taylor subsequently violated his 
probation and was sentenced to 6 months of Level V incarceration.   
 
(3) 
In July 1989, Taylor again was indicted on a charge of Burglary 
in the Second Degree.  He was found guilty of that charge by a Superior 
Court jury.  Taylor subsequently was sentenced as a habitual offender.2  One 
of the charges upon which the State based its motion to have Taylor declared 
a habitual offender was his 1983 second degree burglary conviction.  His 
current claim of an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a) is grounded in his 
contention that his 1983 guilty plea was invalid because of discrepancies in 
the indictment. 
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Taylor claims that a) there was insufficient 
support presented by the State for his habitual offender status; b) he was 
deprived of his right to notice and a hearing regarding his habitual offender 
status; and c) his counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to his 
habitual offender status. 
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. titl 11, § 4214(b). 
 
3 
 
(5) 
Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal 
sentence “at any time.”  Relief under Rule 35(a) is available when the 
sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits or violates double 
jeopardy.3  A sentence also is illegal when it is ambiguous with respect to 
the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, 
omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its 
substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not 
authorize.4  The narrow function of Rule 35(a) is to correct an illegal 
sentence, not to re-examine alleged errors occurring prior to the imposition 
of sentence.5 
 
(6) 
Because Taylor alleges error only with respect to the habitual 
offender proceedings, which occurred prior to the imposition of sentence, he 
is not entitled to relief under Rule 35(a).6  Moreover, Taylor’s claim, which 
is, in essence, a claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, is 
time-barred under Rule 35(b).7  Even if viewed on the merits, Taylor has 
presented inadequate factual support for his claim that his 1983 second 
degree burglary conviction was invalid and, therefore, could not properly 
serve as a predicate felony in support of his later sentencing as a habitual 
                                                 
3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 181, 2009, Jacobs, J. (June 19, 2009). 
7 Id. 
 
4 
offender.  For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Taylor’s claims are 
without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice