Case Title: PAULS VALLEY TRAVEL CENTER v. BOUCHER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100169

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
PAULS VALLEY TRAVEL CENTER v. BOUCHER  PAULS VALLEY TRAVEL CENTER v. BOUCHER 2005 OK 30 112 P.3d 1175 Case Number: 100169 Decided: 05/03/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA PAULS VALLEY TRAVEL CENTER and COMPSOURCE OKLAHOMA, Petitioners, v. STEPHANY MAURINE BOUCHER and the WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. I ¶0 Claimant sought, in the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC), benefits for two separate on-the-job injuries. The trial judge denied an award for the first claim. He granted benefits for the second, finding the injury was not the result of an idiopathic condition. A three-judge panel affirmed. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the award, ruling as a matter of law, that the latter injury was the result of an idiopathic condition. On certiorari granted upon claimant's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE REVIEW PANEL'S ORDER IS REINSTATED. H. Lee Endicott, III, and Donald A. Bullard, Bullard & Hoehner, P.C., Oklahoma City, for Petitioner. John Sprowls, Pauls Valley, Oklahoma, for Respondent. ¶1 The broader question presented for our review is whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) failed to apply the proper standard of review when it vacated the three-judge panel's award for medical treatment and compensation. The narrow issue before us is whether the trial tribunal's order - that claimant's injury was not idiopathic but compensable because it arose out of her employment - is supported by competent evidence. I. ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION ¶2 The facts are uncontested. Stephany Maurine Boucher (claimant or Boucher), a cashier ¶3 Boucher - the sole witness at the hearing - testified she had a non-work related injury to the same knee in 1999 (a possible internal derangement). ¶4 The trial judge found 1) the first incident not to be compensable because the worker was on a personal mission ¶5 Employer challenged, as unsupported by competent proof, the trial tribunal's finding that Boucher's injury was not the result of an idiopathic condition and that it arose out of her employment. Employer asserts there was no evidence to show that claimant's injury was anything else than an idiopathic episode. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of a claimant's employment presents a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge. III. A. ARGUMENTS ON CERTIORARI ¶7 Boucher's certiorari petition urges 1) COCA's ruling violates the applicable review standard because there was competent evidence to support the trial judge's order that her injury was not the result of idiopathic harm, 2) there was no evidence that her injury resulted from an idiopathic condition; on the contrary, the proof indicates it resulted from on-the-job walking - a risk factor peculiar to her employment,19 and 3) even if the injury were occasioned by idiopathic harm it is nonetheless compensable.20 ¶8 Employer responds COCA's ruling was correct because the record is devoid of evidence that claimant's knee injury was anything other than an idiopathic episode.21 Employer urges claimant failed to offer evidence of an employment-related strain that caused her injury; rather, her testimony and other evidence confirms her injury occurred because her knee simply gave way. Neither did she offer proof her injury resulted from an employment-related hazard that increased the risk of injury from an idiopathic harm. In short, employer insists claimant's injury was clearly the result of an idiopathic harm, unrelated to the risk of her employment. B. CLAIMANT'S KNEE STRAIN IS IPSO FACTO AN ON-THE-JOB INJURY. EMPLOYER FAILED TO REFUTE THE CAUSAL NEXUS, ESTABLISHED BY CLAIMANT'S EVIDENCE, THAT HER INJURY WAS NOT THE RESULT OF AN IDIOPATHIC EPISODE. ¶9 A compensation claimant must satisfy a two-pronged statutory test by evidentiary showing that the bodily injuries for which benefits are sought 1) occurred "in the course of" the employment22 and 2) "arose out of" the employment.23 These elements are separate and distinct. Both must be established before recovery may be allowed. Not all injuries that occur on the job are compensable. This is so because a connection must be shown between the conditions of one's employment and the encountered causative risk that resulted in the worker's harm. Risks not reasonably connected with the claimant's work - those which are purely personal - are not compensable if they constitute the sole cause of the employee's injury.24 ¶10 Neither party suggests that implicated here is the first prong of the statutory test - that which requires the injury to have been "in the course of employment." Today's certiorari deals solely with the second prong's requirement of compensation law's evidentiary pattern - whether claimant's injury arose out of her employment. To establish that an injury occurring on the job arose out of employment, a claimant must show 1) the nature of the work performed at the time of the injury, which may be established by lay testimony, and 2) a nexus between the work activity and the harm for which compensation is sought. The latter must be established by expert medical opinion.25 ¶11 Harm suffered by a worker, which consists of a strain, constitutes an accidental injury if it occurred while one was going about one's work performance in the usual and ordinary manner though nothing unusual occurred to cause the strain.26 Strain and exertion arising out of and in the course of employment constitutes ipso facto an accidental injury.27 In short, the strain stands recognized as one's accidental injury.28 A claimant with a pre-existing disease or infirmity may experience an internal injury of a sudden, unusual and unexpected nature which will nevertheless be deemed accidental in character, although its external cause is attributable to ordinary work performed in a usual manner and without any connected untoward movement.29 ¶13 Once claimant has established that injury arose out of employment, the burden shifts to the employer to refute work-related causation. Proof of an idiopathic harm that caused the injury is a liability-defeating defense: a mere legal conclusion of injury from an idiopathic condition will not suffice. Employer has not made here the required showing. Dr. H's report provides a diagnosis of claimant's injury but offers no opinion as to its cause. ¶15 There is competent evidence to support the trial tribunal's order. COCA's analytical scheme presses its review of the record far beyond the boundary line drawn by the standard of review allowed by law for appellate-court re-examination of the trial tribunal's findings. IV. SUMMARY ¶16 Claimant's knee strain is ipso facto an on-the-job injury. Once a claimant, as this one did here, has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to refute the presence of a causal nexus between the worker's injury and her employment. To effectively refute this burden, employer must prove idiopathic harm is the sole cause of employee's injury. A mere legal conclusion of idiopathy is not enough. Employer's proof does not meet the required showing. There is competent evidence to support the order of the three-judge review panel. Our statutory duty clearly calls for its sustension. ¶17 On certiorari previously granted, COCA's opinion is vacated and the review panel's order is reinstated. ¶18 WINCHESTER, V.C.J. AND LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR AND COLBERT, JJ., CONCUR. ¶19 WATT, C.J., DISSENTS. FOOT