Case Title: Scott Paper Co. v. DEP'T L. & INDUS.

Citation: 440 P.2d 818, 73 Wash. 2d 840

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1968-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
73 Wn.2d 840 (1968) 440 P.2d 818 SCOTT PAPER COMPANY, Respondent, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Respondent, CECIL McDOUGLE, Appellant.[*] No. 39395. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. May 9, 1968. *841 William A. Stiles, Jr., for appellant. Lewis A. Bell (of Bell, Ingram & Smith), for respondent. WALTERSKIRCHEN, J.[] The phase of this case now before us had its inception January 26, 1959, when claimant, Cecil McDougle, filed with the Department of Labor and Industries an application to reopen his prior 1955 claim. He asserted that his original injury, which had been compensated by an award for 30 per cent permanent partial disability, had been aggravated on November 12, 1958, when he assisted his brother-in-law. The case was before us previously, in 1964, McDougle v. Department of Labor & Indus., 64 Wn.2d 640, 645, 393 P.2d 631 (1964), wherein we said: We also said, at 641: Thus the prior order awarding 30 per cent permanent partial disability has inherent in it a finding that claimant retains 70 per cent ability, i.e. 70 per cent of his ability to *842 perform the work he had performed prior to the award, which was all hard physical labor. In White v. Department of Labor & Indus., 48 Wn.2d 413, 414, 293 P.2d 764 (1956), we said: In Kleven v. Department of Labor & Indus., 40 Wn.2d 415, 416, 243 P.2d 488 (1952), we said: In Cirillo v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 121 N.J.L. 511, 514, 3 A.2d 596 (1939), the court made this statement, which we approve: We have defined disability in Henson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 15 Wn.2d 384, 391, 130 P.2d 885 (1942), as follows: In reversing the trial court in McDougle, supra, we directed it to This was done. The supervisor again denied the claim to reopen for aggravation. Claimant again appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which overruled the supervisor, and directed the supervisor and the Department of Labor and Industries to reopen the claim pursuant to the Board's decision. Plaintiff, Scott Paper Company, appealed to the superior court, which reversed the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. Claimant again appealed to this court, and we are now considering this case for the second time. [1] We have repeatedly said that the burden is upon the party attacking the findings and decision of the Board to establish the incorrectness thereof by a preponderance of the evidence.[1]Chalmers v. Department of Labor & Indus., 72 Wn.2d 595, 434 P.2d 720 (1967); Stampas v. Department of Labor & Indus., 38 Wn.2d 48, 227 P.2d 739 (1951); LaLone v. Department of Labor & Indus., 3 Wn.2d 191, 100 P.2d 26 (1940). In Sayler v. Department of Labor & Indus., 69 Wn.2d 893, 896, 421 P.2d 362 (1966), this court said: In Allison v. Department of Labor & Indus., 66 Wn.2d 263, 268, 401 P.2d 982 (1965), we expressed the rule thus: In the context of what was competent, credible, evidence before the Board in the instant case, we should keep in mind our statement in Floyd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 68 Wn.2d 938, 942, 416 P.2d 355 (1966): Also, in speaking of the testimony of physicians relative to medical aspects of labor and industries cases, we said, in Groff v. Department of Labor & Indus., 65 Wn.2d 35, 45, 395 P.2d 633 (1964): [2] While appeals in workmen's compensation cases to this court are no longer tried de novo (see Benedict v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wn.2d 12, 385 P.2d 380 (1963), and Groff v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra), it often becomes the duty of the appellate court to evaluate the evidence in a written record in testing conclusions and inferences which have been drawn from the facts an exploration for sufficiency of the probative evidence to support findings of fact and an analysis of findings when the evidence is undisputed, uncontradicted, and unimpeached. Benedict v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra at 14. Such is the situation here. Looking, then, at the evidence, we note that, in the initial hearing, claimant's counsel asked him: "Did you do any lifting or any type of physical exertion on or about November 12, 1958?" (Italics ours.) The record shows no answer to this question, the examiner having interrupted with a question on another subject. Counsel for claimant then resumed his interrogation with the following questions: Later, counsel again asked: This constituted the only competent evidence in the initial hearing relative to the incident. It should be noted that the principal thrust of each of the above questions was something other than the manner in which the aggravation was sustained and the unanswered initial question asked about "lifting or any type of physical exertion." (Italics ours.) At the hearing, after we remanded in McDougle, supra, in response to questions making specific inquiry concerning the circumstances surrounding the aggravation incident, claimant testified as follows: Further in the testimony, claimant was asked: Still further in the hearing, claimant was asked: Later, a question was asked claimant: Claimant, interrupting, answered: Thus, when direct inquiry was made of the only witness who testified concerning the aggravation incident as to the manner in which the incident occurred, the testimony shows that no direct lifting was done, that the sacks *847 weighed a maximum of 70 pounds each, and were moved by two people. Moreover, the attending physician testified that no specific instructions had been given claimant as to what he could lift, and that lifting 50 pounds would not be beyond claimant's "lifting power." Based on the evidence in this case, there is no more reason to find that claimant lifted the sacks by himself than there is to find that he assisted in sliding the sacks. Under the evidence of this case, where we are dealing with a man with a 30 per cent disability (established by department order) who had, prior to his initial injury, worked in the woods, operated a small farm where he milked six cows, made hay, and prepared ground for a garden all very hard work we conclude that there is just as much reason to say that the conduct of assisting in sliding, or even lifting, two sacks of grain was to be contemplated within the scope of the prior award as to say that it was not. Therefore, not only does the evidence not preponderate against the Board's findings, but the court's findings lack substantial evidence to support them. When the supervisor said: and later, when the trial court found that: they were apparently speaking of claimant in terms of his own personal knowledge of his physical condition on the date of the aggravation, a condition which equates more nearly with 100 per cent rather than 30 per cent disability. [3] It is thus apparent that, in construing the test we set forth in McDougle, supra at 645, when we said, *848 "whether it is something that one with his disability would not reasonably be expected to be doing" (italics ours), they have mistakenly assumed we were speaking of claimant's subjective personally known condition as of the date of the aggravation instead of the department-established disability, i.e. 30 per cent permanent partial disability. We, therefore, hold that, when subjected to the proper criteria, claimant's conduct was such as could reasonably be expected of a man with his disability. Therefore, appellant failed to sustain the burden of proof, and the findings of the trial court are not supported by substantial evidence and the judgment, therefore, must be reversed. The order of the trial court is set aside. The case is remanded and the trial court is directed to remand the case to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals for enforcement of its order in so far as it requires the supervisor to reopen the claim and determine the extent of claimant's aggravation and to award him the increase thus determined. FINLEY, C.J., HAMILTON, HALE, and McGOVERN, JJ., concur. July 22, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 440 P.2d 818. [] Judge Walterskirchen is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] "In all court proceedings under or pursuant to this title the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same." RCW 51.52.115.