Case Title: Kimberly Wambolt v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.

Citation: 2007 WI 35

Docket Number: 2005AP001874

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1874 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kimberly Wambolt and Wade Wambolt, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., Chong Ae Jones 
and American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 
          Defendants, 
 
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 21, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 31, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Burnett   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Gableman 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Martha H. Heidt, Mondovi; Ardell W. Skow; Doar, Drill & Skow, 
S.C., Baldwin, and Bye, Goff, Rohde & Skow, Ltd., River Falls, 
and oral argument by Martha H. Heidt. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Timothy 
J. Eiden, Trisha A. Vicario, and Hansen, Dordell, Bradt, Odlaug 
& Bradt, P.L.L.P., Menomonie, and oral argument by Timothy J. 
Eiden. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by G. Michael Halfenger, 
Michael S. Heffernan, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison and 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Appellate Practice Section of the 
State Bar of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2007 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1874  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV3) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kimberly Wambolt and Wade Wambolt, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., Chong Ae Jones 
and American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 21, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals' decision and order dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction an appeal of a June 6, 2005, order          
of the Circuit Court for Burnett County.1  The court of appeals 
                                                 
1 See Wambolt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2005AP1874, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2005)(dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction an appeal of an order of the Circuit Court 
for Burnett County, Michael J. Gableman, Judge). 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
2 
 
determined that the June 6 order was not an appealable order 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) (2003-04).2  Rather, it 
concluded that a "Memorandum Decision" entered by the circuit 
court on April 25, 2005, granting Illinois Farmers' motion for 
summary judgment was the final document for purposes of appeal. 
Because the Wambolts' notice of appeal was filed 79 days after 
the April 25 Memorandum Decision, the court of appeals dismissed 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely.  
¶2 
The Wambolts contend that the court of appeals erred 
in determining that the Memorandum Decision entered by the 
circuit court constitutes a "final order" or "final judgment" 
within the meaning of § 808.03(1).  They assert that their 
notice of appeal was timely filed, and that the court of appeals 
therefore has jurisdiction over their appeal.  
¶3 
We 
determine 
that 
because 
the 
circuit 
court's 
Memorandum Decision did not contain an explicit statement either 
dismissing the entire matter in litigation or adjudging the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties, it did 
not constitute a final order or judgment from which an appeal 
may follow under § 808.03(1).  Thus, we conclude that the 
Wambolts' appeal was timely filed, and that the court of appeals 
has jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the court of appeals.  
¶4 
In order to further limit the confusion regarding what 
documents are final orders or judgments for the purpose of 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
3 
 
appeal, we will, commencing September 1, 2007, require a 
statement on the face of a document that it is final for the 
purpose of appeal.3  Absent such a statement, appellate courts 
should liberally construe ambiguities to preserve the right of 
appeal. 
I 
¶5 
The procedural facts of this case are not in dispute. 
The case arises out of the Wambolts' claim for underinsured 
motorist coverage against three insurance companies: Illinois 
Farmers, American Family Mutual Insurance Company ("American 
Family"), and West Bend Mutual Insurance Company ("West Bend").  
In March 2004, Illinois Farmers moved for summary judgment or, 
in the alternative, for a declaration that its coverage 
obligation is subordinate to the obligations of American Family 
and West Bend.  In response, the Wambolts filed a memorandum of 
law opposing Illinois Farmers' motion. 
¶6 
In August 2004, the circuit court filed a Memorandum 
Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment in which it denied 
                                                 
3 Tyler v. The RiverBank, also released today, sets forth 
the same requirement, commencing September 1, 2007, that there 
be a statement on the face of a document that it is the final 
document for purposes of appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). 
2007 WI___, ¶25, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
4 
 
Illinois Farmers' motion for summary judgment.4  Illinois Farmers 
moved the circuit court for reconsideration of the decision 
denying its motion for summary judgment.  A hearing on the 
motion for reconsideration took place in January 2005. 
¶7 
On April 25, 2005, the circuit court issued a 
"Memorandum Decision" on reconsideration of Illinois Farmers' 
motion for summary judgment.  In that decision, the court 
granted Illinois Farmers' motion for summary judgment.  It 
determined that under the relevant law, the Wambolts "have no 
viable claim as to Illinois Farmers."  It then stated that 
"[a]ccordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf 
of Illinois Farmers Insurance Company is granted."  
¶8 
Three days later, Illinois Farmers served the Wambolts 
with a notice of entry of order, which stated that "an Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Illinois Farmers 
Insurance Company was entered on April 25, 2005."  A copy of the 
circuit court's April 25 Memorandum Decision was attached to the 
notice.  
¶9 
On May 9, 2005, the Wambolts filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the April 25 Memorandum Decision, and 
requested a hearing on that motion.  On May 26, 2005, the 
                                                 
4 Following the August 2004 decision, the Wambolts settled 
their claim with American Family, and American Family was 
dismissed from the case.  West Bend moved for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of coverage priority in March 2004.  The 
circuit court granted that motion in its August 2004 "Memorandum 
Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment."  The record indicates 
that West Bend remains in the case but is not a party to this 
review. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
5 
 
Wambolts sent a letter by facsimile to the circuit court 
requesting clarification as to whether the Memorandum Decision 
was intended to be the final judgment in the case.  The letter 
advised the court that memorandum decisions are generally not 
appealable orders.  It noted that the April 25 Memorandum 
Decision did not order the dismissal of Illinois Farmers, and 
that the Wambolts therefore believed that the Memorandum 
Decision was not an appealable order.  The letter also 
reiterated the Wambolts' request for a hearing date on their May 
9, 2005, motion for reconsideration.  That letter stated as 
follows:  
We have received Your Honor's Memorandum Decision, 
dated April 25, 2005, which grants the motion for 
summary judgment filed on behalf of Illinois Farmers 
Insurance 
Company 
(Illinois 
Farmers). 
 
Illinois 
Farmers has filed a "Notice of Entry of Order," 
thereby implying a belief that Your Honor's Order may 
be the Final Judgment for the case.  However, the 
Memorandum Decision does not order the dismissal of 
Illinois Farmers from the action.  
Generally, a trial court's memorandum decision is not 
an appealable order.  See Sprangers v. Philippi, 52 
Wis. 2d 403, 190 N.W.2d 136 (1971).  Based on the case 
law, and the lack of any language specifically 
dismissing Illinois Farmers, it is my belief that the 
Memorandum Decision is not appealable and that an 
additional judgment would be required to dispose of 
the claim on the merits.  But if the Memorandum 
Decision is the Final Judgment, the deadline for 
filing a Notice of Appeal would be June 9, 2005.  I 
would appreciate clarification of Your Honor's intent 
in that regard so as to avoid any confusion or 
litigation in regard to the status of the Memorandum 
Decision.  
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
6 
 
¶10 The circuit court issued an order on June 6, 2005, 
stating two things.  First, it stated that "[i]t is hereby 
ordered 
that 
the 
Plaintiff's 
[May 
9, 
2005] 
Motion 
for 
Reconsideration is denied."  Second, it stated that "for the 
reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision of April 25, 
2005, Illinois Farmers Insurance Company is dismissed from this 
action."  
¶11 On June 15, 2005, Illinois Farmers served the Wambolts 
with a second notice of entry of order, to which it attached the 
June 6, 2005, order.  On July 12, 2005——36 days after the 
circuit court's June 6 order, and 79 days after the circuit 
court's April 25 Memorandum Decision——the Wambolts filed a 
notice of appeal of the circuit court's June 6 order.  
¶12 In a split decision, the court of appeals determined 
that the April 25 Memorandum Decision was final for the purposes 
of appeal under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  Thus, it determined 
that the Wambolts' July 12, 2005, notice of appeal was not 
timely filed under Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1).5  The court of appeals 
                                                 
5 Section 808.04(1) states: 
(1) INITIATING AN APPEAL. An appeal to the court of 
appeals must be initiated within 45 days of entry of a 
final judgment or order appealed from if written 
notice of the entry of a final judgment or order is 
given within 21 days of the final judgment or order as 
provided in s. 806.06(5), or within 90 days of entry 
if notice is not given, except as provided in this 
section or otherwise expressly provided by law. Time 
limits for seeking review of a nonfinal judgment or 
order are established in s. 809.50. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
7 
 
therefore 
concluded 
that 
it 
lacked 
jurisdiction, 
and 
it 
dismissed the Wambolts' appeal.  
II 
¶13 This case presents the issue of whether a memorandum 
decision may constitute a final order or judgment from which 
appeal may follow under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). 
¶14 Determining whether the April 25, 2005, Memorandum 
Decision constitutes a final order or judgment for the purposes 
of appeal is a question of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  Harder v. Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, ¶8, 274 Wis. 2d 324, 
682 N.W.2d 398. 
III 
¶15 Appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) 
are 
a 
fundamental aspect of litigation in this state.  Nevertheless, 
the question of what constitutes a final order or final judgment 
from which a party may appeal continues to arise.  We addressed 
the question less than three years ago in Harder, where we held 
that: 
when an order or a judgment is entered that disposes 
of all of the substantive issues in the litigation, as 
to one or more parties, as a matter of law, the 
circuit court intended it to be the final document for 
purposes of appeal, notwithstanding the label it bears 
or subsequent actions taken by the circuit court. 
274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶2.  However, as this case and others 
demonstrate, despite our best efforts in Harder, uncertainty 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
8 
 
continues.6  Our task, therefore, is to add further clarity in 
answering the questions of whether and how a memorandum decision 
is a final order or final judgment within the meaning of 
§ 808.03(1).  
¶16 We begin our analysis by looking at the statute.  The 
right to appeal derives from § 808.03(1).  It provides:  
A final judgment or a final order of a circuit court 
may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of 
appeals unless otherwise expressly provided by law.  A 
final judgment or final order is a judgment, order or 
disposition that disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties, whether 
rendered in an action or special proceeding, and that 
is one of the following:  
(a) Entered in accordance with s. 806.06(1)(b) or 
807.11(2). 
(b) Recorded in docket entries in ch. 799 cases.  
(c) Recorded in docket entries in traffic regulation 
cases 
prosecuted 
in 
circuit 
court 
if 
a 
person 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Tyler v. The RiverBank, 2007 WI _____,  
____Wis. 2d ____, ____ N.W.2d ____(released today) (whether a 
circuit court's denial of post-trial motions constitutes a final 
order for purpose of appeal); VerHaagh v. Farah, No. 2005AP1966, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. February 27, 2006), petition 
for review filed March 29, 2006 (whether parties and circuit 
court can agree that a decision is not a final judgment or order 
and whether a circuit court's stay of a summary judgment order 
can impact whether a document constitutes a final order); 
Cathedral Place v. KBS Construction, No. 2006AP1199, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. July 12, 2006), petition for review filed 
Aug. 11, 2006 (whether court of appeals has jurisdiction over an 
appeal from a circuit court order vacating an arbitration award 
regardless of whether that order takes an ancillary motion under 
advisement); Sanders v. Sanders, No. 2006AP424, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 7, 2006), petition for review filed July 
6, 2006 (questioning which of several orders in probate 
proceeding constitutes final order for sake of appeal).  
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
9 
 
convicted of a violation may be ordered to pay a 
forfeiture.  
(d) Recorded in docket entries in municipal ordinance 
violation cases prosecuted in circuit court.  
¶17 The first sentence of the statute circumscribes our 
inquiry.  It directs that "unless otherwise expressly provided 
by law," only a final order or final judgment may be appealed as 
a matter of right.  Accordingly, the Wambolts argue that the 
April 25, 2005, Memorandum Decision is not a final order or 
final judgment for purposes of appeal on the ground that 
memorandum decisions cannot be final orders or final judgments 
under § 808.03(1) as a matter of law.  
¶18 Although there are numerous cases that tackle issues 
regarding when an order or judgment is appealable as a matter of 
right, the number of cases that address the issue of whether a 
memorandum decision can be appealed as a matter of right is 
limited.7  The Wambolts rely primarily on two cases in support of 
                                                 
7 As we explained in Harder v. Pfitzinger, whether a 
document constitutes an "order" or "judgment"  under § 808.03(1) 
is no longer an important distinction.  2004 WI 102, ¶14, 274 
Wis. 2d 324, 682 N.W.2d 398.  The traditional distinction 
between judgments, which determine actions, and orders, which 
determine 
special 
proceedings, 
has 
been 
blurred 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.01, which defines actions as including special 
proceedings.  Similarly, the court of appeals has determined 
that "[t]he distinctions between judgment and order for purposes 
of appeal are now largely nonexistent."  Booth v. American 
States Ins. Co., 199 Wis. 2d 465, 473-74, 544 N.W.2d 921 (Ct. 
App. 1996). Rather, what matters is whether the it is a final 
order or final judgment.  Id. at 474.  See also R. George 
Burnett, et al., Wisconsin Trial Practice, § 15.14, (1999). 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
10 
 
their argument.  In Wick v. Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d 191, 313 
N.W.2d 799 (1982), the circuit court issued a memorandum 
decision that a jury award was excessive, and subsequently 
issued an order for a new trial on the issue of damages.  Id. at 
193.  The supreme court determined that the plaintiff's appeal 
from the memorandum decision was "a nullity, for under no 
circumstances is an opinion or memorandum decision of a court 
appealable.  Only orders or judgments which are final and which 
have been appropriately entered in the clerk's office are 
appealable . . . ." Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted). 
¶19 The Wambolts also rely on Vogt v. Schroeder, 129 
Wis. 2d 3, 383 N.W.2d 876 (1986), for the proposition that 
memorandum decisions are not appealable as a matter of right 
under § 808.03(1).  There, this court noted that the court of 
appeals and the parties had treated the memorandum decision as 
an order of the circuit court.  The Vogt court opined that such 
procedure 
"does 
not 
comport 
with 
appropriate 
appellate 
practice." Id. at 24. Nonetheless, the court declined to hold 
"at this point" that neither the supreme court nor the court of 
                                                                                                                                                             
The parties advanced at oral arguments, and we agree, that 
"disposition" in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) refers to the resolution 
of chapter 799 cases, resolution of traffic regulation cases, 
and 
resolution 
of 
municipal 
ordinance 
violations 
under 
§§ 808.03(1)(b)-(d).  These do not require written orders or 
judgments filed with the clerk of court for appeal to follow, as 
is required under § 808.03(1)(a).  Rather, final resolutions 
under § 808.03(1)(b)-(d) may be recorded in docket entries. See 
City 
of 
Sheboygan 
v. 
Flores, 
229 
Wis. 2d 242, 
247, 
598 
N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999); General Tel. Co. of WI, Inc. v. A 
Corp., 147 Wis. 2d 461, 463 n. 1, 433 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
11 
 
appeals 
had 
jurisdiction. 
 
Instead, 
it 
relied 
on 
the 
discretionary right to accept an appeal from a non-final order 
under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).  Id.  
¶20 If our jurisprudence regarding appeals from memorandum 
decisions ended with the above two cases, our task would be 
simple and the answer would be clear.  However, other cases, 
with statements found mostly in footnotes, point in a different 
direction.   
¶21 For example, in Soergel v. Raufman, 154 Wis. 2d 564, 
453 N.W.2d 624 (1990), this court characterized a memorandum 
decision as an "order" sufficient for appeal under § 808.03(1). 
The court stated that "[w]e conclude that this decision is final 
and appealable because under the circumstances of this case no 
further order or judgment was contemplated."  Id. at 566, n.1 
(citing Fredrick v. City of Janesville, 92 Wis. 2d 685, 686-87, 
285 N.W.2d 655 (1979)).  Similarly, in Fox v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Health & Social Services, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 334 N.W.2d 532 
(1983), this court cited Fredrick for the proposition that a 
memorandum decision "is appealable if it constitutes an order or 
judgment that is, a final ruling of the court."  Id. at 517, 
n.1.  
¶22 In State v. Dekker, 112 Wis. 2d 304, 332 N.W.2d 816 
(Ct. App. 1983), the state appealed from a circuit court 
memorandum decision dismissing a criminal complaint.  The court 
of appeals noted that no order or judgment had been entered, but 
wrote the following:  
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
12 
 
In Fredrick the supreme court acknowledged that a 
memorandum opinion or decision may constitute an order 
if it in fact constitutes the final ruling of the 
court. . . . 
 
We 
hold 
that 
the 
trial 
court's 
memorandum decision here constitutes a final order 
because 
the 
trial 
court 
contemplated 
that 
this 
document was to be final. 
Id. at 306, n.1. 
¶23 In Monicken v. Monicken, 226 Wis. 2d 119, 121 n.1, 593 
N.W.2d 509 (Ct. App. 1999) the court of appeals again exercised 
its jurisdiction to hear an appeal based on a memorandum 
decision.  In that case, the court of appeals noted that the 
parties' failure to raise the question of whether a memorandum 
decision may constitute a final order does not waive the issue. 
Rather, the court noted that absent such a final order, it 
lacked jurisdiction to take the appeal in the first place.  Id. 
at 121 n.1, citing Thomas/Van Dyken Joint Venture v. Van Dyken, 
90 Wis. 2d 236, 241, 279 N.W.2d 459 (1979).8  Ultimately, it 
determined, however, that the memorandum decision sufficed for 
appeal under § 808.03(1) "because it disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation and was entered when filed in the clerk's 
office."  Id.  
¶24 In addressing whether memorandum decisions can be 
appealed as a matter of right, this court's decisions appear to 
offer something to all sides.  We agree, generally, with the 
Wambolts that memorandum decisions are not appealable as a 
matter of right.  They usually do not fulfill the initial 
                                                 
8 See also Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and 
Procedure in Wisconsin, §§ 4.2, 4.15 (3d ed. 2003). 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
13 
 
requirement under § 808.03(1) that appeals as of right emanate 
only from final orders or judgments.  Rather, they generally 
serve to explain or memorialize a court's reasoning.  As 
explained more fully below, a court's legal reasoning, standing 
alone, does not constitute a final order or judgment. 
¶25 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that memorandum decisions 
can be and have been appealed as a matter of right.  Such an 
acknowledgement, however, is merely a springboard for our next 
inquiry: under what circumstances is a memorandum decision 
transformed into a final order or final judgment within the 
meaning of § 808.03(1), from which appeal may follow as a matter 
of right?  
IV 
¶26  For guidance in this inquiry, we again examine 
§ 808.03(1).  The second sentence of the statute provides 
direction: "A final judgment or final order is a judgment, order 
or disposition that disposes of the entire matter in litigation 
as to one or more of the parties . . . ." (emphasis added).  
¶27 In examining the second sentence of the statute, we 
explained in our recent decision in Harder that whether an order 
or judgment is final for the purpose of appeal turns on the 
answer to two questions.  The first is whether the document is 
final as a matter of substantive law insofar as it disposes of 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties.  The 
second is whether the document is final because it is the last 
document in the litigation, which is to say that the circuit 
court did not contemplate a subsequent document from which 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
14 
 
appeal could be taken.  Harder, 274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶12 (citing 
Radoff v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 109 Wis. 2d 490, 494, 326 
N.W.2d 240 (1982)). 
¶28 In Harder, the circuit court granted the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment of dismissal.  The same day it 
entered 
a 
document 
labeled 
"Order 
for 
Judgment," 
which 
explicitly 
dismissed 
each 
cause 
of 
action 
against 
each 
defendant, and which stated that "the entire action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice."  274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶6.  After two 
defendants' attorneys served notice of entry of order on the 
other parties, another party submitted a document labeled 
"Judgment" to the court's clerk.  That second document was 
entered almost two months after the order for judgment.  Id., 
¶7.  The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal that would have 
been timely if the "Judgment" document was the final document 
for purpose of appeal, but untimely if the "Order for Judgment" 
was the final document for purpose of appeal.  Id., ¶9.  
¶29 We determined that the language of the circuit court's 
order for judgment constituted an "unequivocal order to dismiss 
all of the claims against each party" and that "[t]he only task 
that remained after the circuit court issued the order for 
judgment was the determination of the amount of costs."  Id., 
¶17. This led to our conclusion, which we set forth in both 
introductory and concluding paragraphs of the opinion, that  
when an order or judgment is entered that disposes of 
all of the substantive issues in the litigation, as to 
one or more parties, as a matter of law, the circuit 
court intended it to be the final document for 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
15 
 
purposes of appeal, notwithstanding the label it bears 
or subsequent actions taken by the circuit court. 
Id., ¶2, ¶19.  
¶30 Harder therefore does three things.  First, it ties 
the determination of whether a circuit court intends a document 
to be final to the question of whether that document disposes of 
all the substantive issues in litigation as to one or more 
parties.9  Second, it establishes that a document containing 
explicit language dismissing an entire matter as to one or more 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting here that the effect of Harder's 
holding is to dispense with the "intent" part of the finality 
test.  Under Harder disposing of all substantive issues with 
respect to a party indicates that the circuit court intended the 
document to be final as a matter of law.  274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶2. 
Thus, an affirmative answer to the question of whether an order 
or judgment disposes of the substantive issues with respect to 
one or more parties entails a negative answer to the question of 
whether the circuit court contemplated that there would be a 
subsequent document from which appeal could be taken.  Further, 
a negative answer to the question of whether an order or 
judgment disposes of the substantive issues obviates the need to 
reach the question of intent, for an order that fails to dispose 
of the substantive issues in a litigation with respect to one or 
more parties cannot be a final order or final judgment under the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). 
The question of whether the document is final as a matter 
of substantive law insofar as it disposes of the entire matter 
in litigation as to one or more of the parties is therefore the 
appropriate focus. Section 808.03(1) defines a final order or 
final judgment as one that "disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties."  Whether such a 
document "disposes of all of the claims brought in the 
litigation as to one or more of the parties," Harder, 274 
Wis. 2d 324, ¶12, is simply a recasting of the question of 
whether that document "disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties" under § 808.03(1). 
Harder therefore serves to refocus our attention on the language 
of the statute itself. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
16 
 
parties disposes of the entire matter as to those parties. 
Third, it demonstrates that neither the label of a document nor 
the subsequent actions taken by the circuit court is dispositive 
of that document's finality under § 808.03(1). 
¶31 Thus, 
under 
Harder, 
a 
memorandum 
decision 
that 
explicitly dismisses the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more parties, disposes of that matter.  Further, where a 
memorandum decision disposes of the entire matter as to one or 
more parties, as a matter of law the circuit court intends that 
memorandum decision to be a final order or judgment for the 
purpose of appeal.  It therefore constitutes a final order or 
judgment under § 808.03(1). 
¶32 The court of appeals determined that because the April 
25 Memorandum Decision "decided" that Illinois Farmers was 
entitled to summary judgment, it disposed of the entire matter 
in litigation as to Illinois Farmers.  Wambolt v. West Bend Mut. 
Ins. Co., No. 2005AP1874, unpublished order, ¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 9, 2005).  However, the court of appeals misconstrued our 
holding in Harder.  Rather than focusing on what it takes for a 
document to "dispose of the entire matter in litigation as to 
one or more parties," it focused on Harder's use of "decide" in 
the following discussion:  
when a circuit court enters an order or a judgment 
that decides all substantive issues as to one or more 
parties, as a matter of law, the circuit court 
intended that to be the final document for purposes of 
appeal, notwithstanding subsequent actions by the 
circuit court or the label the document bears. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
17 
 
Harder, 274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶15 (emphasis added).  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the April 25 Memorandum Decision had 
"decided all substantive issues as to Illinois Farmers" and that 
it was therefore a final order under § 808.03(1).  Wambolt, 
unpublished order, ¶3. 
¶33 The court of appeals' rationale seems to be that 
because the circuit court engaged in legal reasoning and reached 
a conclusion about the law in its April 25 Memorandum Decision, 
it "decided" all substantive issues as to Illinois Farmers.10 
This, however, misinterprets Harder.  To the extent that Harder 
can be read to mean that a memorandum decision that engages in 
legal reasoning and reaches conclusions of law is tantamount to 
"dispos[ing] of the entire matter in litigation as to one or 
more of the parties," we take this opportunity to clarify our 
discussion in Harder.  
                                                 
10 Our decision here moves away from the language in Harder 
that focuses on whether a document has disposed of all of the 
"substantive issues" in litigation.  It is certainly the case 
where substantive issues remain, a document dismissing or 
adjudging only part of the action cannot constitute a final 
order or final judgment for purpose of appeal under § 808.03(1). 
However, the appropriate focus in determining whether the 
document is final is the language of the statute: whether it 
"disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more 
parties." 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
18 
 
¶34 The order for judgment in Harder did not contain legal 
reasoning that led to a legal conclusion.11  Rather, it simply 
and explicitly dismissed all of the causes of action in the 
case.  This contrasts with the April 25 Memorandum Decision in 
the present case, which explains the court's legal reasoning and 
legal conclusion, but does not explicitly dismiss or adjudge the 
case against Illinois Farmers.  The sense in which the order for 
judgment "decided" the case in Harder is therefore different 
than the sense in which the Memorandum Decision decides the 
present case.  "Deciding" a case in the sense of merely 
analyzing legal issues and resolving questions of law does not 
dispose of an entire matter in litigation as to one or more 
parties.  Rather, consistent with Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), the 
circuit court must act by explicitly dismissing or adjudging the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties.12 
¶35 The April 25 Memorandum Decision also does not 
constitute an "unequivocal order to dismiss all of the claims," 
Harder, 274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶17, as to Illinois Farmers; it 
                                                 
11 Note that whether a document contains legal reasoning is 
not the crucial question in determining whether that document 
disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more 
parties.  Rather, what matters is whether the document contains 
explicit language dismissing or adjudging the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more parties. 
12 We use "adjudging" here to cover cases in which it is a 
judgment that disposes of the matter. For example, documents 
disposing of a matter in favor of the party bringing the action 
will often state "it is adjudged that . . . ."  In order to be a 
final judgment for purpose of appeal under § 808.03(1), such a 
document 
will 
require 
that 
or 
similar 
explicit 
language 
adjudging the matter. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
19 
 
contains no language dismissing or adjudging the Wambolts' 
claims.  Further, in contrast with Harder, where the only 
remaining task after the circuit court issued the order for 
judgment was a determination of costs, here there remained an 
important task after the circuit court entered the April 25 
Memorandum Decision, namely, to actually dispose of the case by 
dismissing or adjudging it.13  Thus, the final order in Harder is 
distinct from the Memorandum Decision in this case, and Harder 
does not support the conclusion that the Memorandum Decision was 
a final document for purposes of appeal. Rather, Harder 
establishes that for an order to dispose of an entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more defendants, it must contain 
                                                 
13 Illinois Farmers argues that because only dismissal 
follows from granting summary judgment, the circuit court's 
decision "disposed" of all substantive issues, and therefore 
constitutes a final order.  This is incorrect for the same 
reason that the court of appeals' reasoning is incorrect: 
"deciding" in the sense of memorializing legal reasoning is not 
the functional equivalent of "disposing" of the case, which 
requires an explicit statement dismissing or adjudging an entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more parties.   
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
20 
 
explicit language dismissing or adjudging the entire matter as 
to one or more parties.14 
¶36 Focusing on Harder's use of "dispose" rather than 
"decide" not only comports with the language of § 808.03(1), but 
also is consistent with this state's jurisprudence regarding 
final orders and judgments.  We have consistently articulated 
                                                 
14 Illinois Farmers argues that the view that a final order 
must contain explicit language of dismissal conflicts with the 
court of appeals' decision in Contardi v. American Family Mutual 
Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 104, 273 Wis. 2d 509, 680 N.W.2d 828. 
Contardi involved a "Decision and Order" that stated "the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted."  Id., ¶3 
(emphasis in original).  The court of appeals determined that 
because the words of the document do not indicate that the 
circuit court intended to enter another document, the "Decision 
and Order" constituted a final order for purpose of appeal. Id. 
¶9.  Contardi, however, antedates Harder, according to which 
courts infer intent from whether a document disposes of the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties.  Under 
Harder and the present case, language that merely grants a 
motion for summary judgment does not suffice to dispose of an 
entire matter in litigation. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
21 
 
the test for a document's finality in terms of "dispose" rather 
than "decide."15  
¶37 Additional 
sources support this distinction.  A 
commentator on Wisconsin appellate practice offers the following 
guidance: 
[P]ractitioners are well advised to heed the rules 
limiting appeals to orders and judgments and work with 
the circuit court to ensure that the action or special 
proceeding receives a final disposition by an order or 
judgment 
that 
is 
clearly 
recognizable 
as 
such. 
Attorneys should not attempt to construe decisions as 
orders or judgments. 
Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin, § 4.2 (4th ed. 2006).  Similarly, another commentator 
on Wisconsin practice advises that a "memorandum decision may 
set forth [the court's] findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
However, unless the court specifically orders or adjudges a 
particular 
matter, 
the 
memorandum 
decision 
is 
simply 
a 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 
N.W.2d 321 (1982) ("the judgment of foreclosure and sale 
determines the rights of the parties and disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation"); Bearns v. Dep't of Industry, Labor & 
Human Relations, 102 Wis. 2d 70, 78, 306 N.W.2d 22 (1981) ("We 
believe those cases were properly appealable as of right because 
in each the disposition in the trial court disposed of the 
entire matter in litigation."); State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 
56, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980) ("Orders which '[dispose] of the 
entire matter in litigation' are appealable by right; all other 
orders 
are 
appealable 
only 
by 
permission." 
(brackets 
in 
original)); Leske v. Leske, 185 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 517 N.W.2d 538 
(Ct. App. 1994) ("the pendency of a claim for attorney's fees 
under a specific fee-shifting statute does not render a judgment 
or order nonfinal, provided that the judgment or order disposes 
of all of the substantive causes of action between the 
parties"). See also Radoff v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 109 
Wis. 2d 490, 494, 326 N.W.2d 240 (1982)).  
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
22 
 
memorialization of the court's reasoning."  R. George Burnett, 
et al., Wisconsin Trial Practice, § 15.14 (1999).  
¶38 The Appellate Practice Section of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin further clarifies this distinction in its amicus 
brief.  It notes that a judge may view memorandum decisions 
merely "as expressing his or her reasons for a particular order, 
rather than being the order itself." It warns that focusing on 
whether all substantive issues have been decided "might result 
in an up-tick in late-filed appeals and collateral litigation 
over whether the time to appeal began." 
¶39 Thus, in order to "dispose" of the matter under 
§ 808.03(1), a memorandum decision must contain an explicit 
statement either dismissing the entire matter in litigation or 
adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to one or more 
parties.  This conclusion is consistent with our decision in 
Harder, which was based upon an order explicitly dismissing the 
entire matter in litigation as to several parties.16  Further, 
Wisconsin jurisprudence has consistently focused on whether a 
document 
"disposes" 
of 
a 
matter——rather 
than 
whether 
it 
"decides" a matter——in determining whether that document is a 
final order or final judgment within the meaning of § 808.03(1). 
Finally, this is the view that comports with the sources that 
discuss Wisconsin trial and appellate practice.   
                                                 
16 The focus of our discussion is on final orders and 
judgments 
that 
may 
be 
appealed 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
right. 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). 
Non-final 
orders 
and 
judgments 
are 
appealable 
only 
by 
permission 
of 
the 
court. 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2). 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
23 
 
¶40 Because the April 25, 2005, Memorandum Decision does 
not contain an explicit statement dismissing or adjudging the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties, it is not 
a 
final 
order or 
final judgment within the meaning of 
§ 808.03(1).  Rather, the June 6, 2005, order, which does 
contain an explicit statement dismissing the entire matter 
against Illinois Farmers, is the final, appealable order.  The 
Wambolts' notice of appeal was therefore timely filed, and the 
court of appeals has jurisdiction. 
V 
¶41 Although we have addressed under what circumstances a 
memorandum decision can become a final order or judgment for 
purposes of § 808.03(1), we are mindful that questions regarding 
what constitutes finality may linger, and in other contexts, may 
abound.  In numerous cases, the finality questions continue to 
arise despite our past efforts to provide certainty.17  This is 
unacceptable in our system where the determination of finality 
is the lynchpin for jurisdiction on appeal. 
¶42 We all agree that the rules for appellate procedure 
should be clear.  We nod our collective heads in affirming that 
the rules should not serve as traps for the unwary.  But why, we 
ask, do the unwary continue to be trapped?   
¶43 We have attempted to resolve this dilemma in the past 
by encouraging and urging that there be clear statements of 
finality on the face of the document. In Radoff we encouraged 
                                                 
17 See note 6, supra.  
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
24 
 
the use of a clear statement of finality by heralding the wisdom 
of the practice: "It may be wise for the last document to 
indicate on its face that for purposes of appeal it is the final 
order 
or 
judgment 
and 
that 
no 
subsequent 
document 
is 
contemplated." 109 Wis. 2d at 494.  More recently in Harder we 
focused on the desirability of the practice: "Accordingly, we 
stress again the desirability of drafting the final document——be 
it an order or judgment——to specifically state that it is 
intended to be the final document in the litigation for purposes 
of appeal." 274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶18. See also Heffernan, Appellate 
Practice, § 4.15. 
¶44 Our advice regarding clarity has not had the desired 
effect, and there is no reason to think that simply reiterating 
it here will resolve the confusion. Going forward, we therefore 
will require that final orders and final judgments state that 
they are final for purposes of appeal.18  
                                                 
18 The federal system addresses the need for clarity with 
respect to finality by requiring that courts enter a separate 
document constituting final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 (2006); 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7), 4(b)(6) (2006). In its amicus brief in 
this case, the Appellate Practice Section of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin suggests such a "separate trigger" rule for Wisconsin. 
While a separate document would provide clarity, the federal 
rule has also presented some challenges. See Daniel S. Tomson, 
Note, Rule 58's Dirty Little Secret: The Problematic Lack of 
Uniform Enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 within 
the Federal Court System, 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 767 (Summer 2002).  
Unless and until our current rules are modified, the requirement 
of the statement on finality which we embrace above provides 
additional clarity within our existing appellate procedures. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
25 
 
¶45 A document does not fulfill this requirement with a 
particular phrase or magic words.  Rather, the document must 
simply make clear, with a statement on its face, that it is the 
document from which appeal may follow as a matter of right under 
§ 808.03(1).  
¶46 We anticipate that there may be final orders and 
judgments that arguably dispose of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties, but which do not 
contain a clear statement that they are the documents from which 
appeal of right may follow.19  In such cases, the appropriate 
course is to liberally construe documents in favor of timely 
appeals.20  That is, absent explicit language that the document 
is intended to be the final order or final judgment for purposes 
of 
appeal, 
appellate 
courts 
should 
liberally 
construe 
ambiguities to preserve the right of appeal.  
                                                 
19 Likewise there may be cases in which a document states 
that it is final for purposes of appeal under § 808.03(1), but 
does not actually "dispose of the entire matter in litigation as 
to one or more of the parties" as required by § 808.03(1). Such 
a document cannot be a final order or final judgment under the 
plain language of the statute. Circuit courts should therefore 
be mindful of whether a document stating that it is final for 
purposes of appeal does in fact dispose of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more parties. 
20 See 
Soquet 
v. 
Soquet, 
117 
Wis. 2d 553, 
560, 
345 
N.W.2d 401 (1984), which states that "[t]he general rule is that 
'[s]tatutes giving the right of appeal are liberally construed, 
and an interpretation which will work a forfeiture of that right 
is not favored.'" (quoting 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 67.08 (1974)); Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction (6th Ed. 2003), § 67.10. 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
26 
 
¶47 Such a liberal construction places an impetus for 
clarity on the prevailing party.  It will want to avoid 
extending the time for appeal.  Rather, the interests of the 
prevailing party will be furthered if the document contains 
explicit language regarding finality for purposes of appeal and 
thus  begins the running of the clock for filing notice of 
appeal under § 808.04(1).  As noted in Harder, however, the 
person aggrieved by the final order or judgment may have an even 
larger incentive to include such an explicit statement in the 
document.  In the face of uncertainty, the time to appeal may 
begin to run and the right to appeal may be lost.  Harder, 274 
Wis. 2d 324, ¶18. 
¶48 The clarity provided by requiring that a final order 
contain explicit language dismissing or adjudging the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more parties should forestall 
situations such as the one in the present case.  The Wambolts 
justifiably 
believed 
that 
a 
memorandum 
decision 
did 
not 
constitute a final, appealable order or judgment. This led to 
their May 26, 2005, letter to the circuit court requesting 
clarification about the April 25, 2005, Memorandum Decision. 
With the requirement that a final document state that it is 
final for purpose of appeal, litigants will need look only to 
the face of the document. 
¶49 The decision whether to apply a new rule of law 
prospectively is a matter of policy.  State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 
42, ¶45, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381.  The new requirement 
of a clear statement on the face of a document stating that it 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
27 
 
is the final document from which appeal may follow under 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) is an effort to bring clarity to the 
question of when the clock for filing appeals begins to run. 
However, because implementing the new requirement for cases in 
which final orders or judgments have already been entered would 
cause more confusion than clarity, policy requires that the new 
rule apply purely prospectively.  It will not apply to cases for 
which a final order or final judgment has already been entered, 
because to do so may transform what previously was thought to be 
final 
into 
a 
non-final 
order 
or 
judgment. 
Rather, 
the 
requirement will begin for final orders and final judgments 
entered after September 1, 2007.21 
VI 
¶50 In sum, we determine that because the circuit court's 
memorandum decision did not contain an explicit statement either 
dismissing the entire matter in litigation or adjudging the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties, it did 
                                                 
21 Courts may apply a new rule of law "prospectively" in 
different ways. See Thomas E. Fairchild, Limitation of New 
Judge-Made 
Law 
to 
Prospective 
Effect 
Only: 
"Prospective 
Overruling" or "Sunbursting", 51 Marq. L. Rev. 254, 258-67 
(1967-68). For example, the new rule may be applied only to 
future events, and not to the case in which the rule is 
announced. See id. at 255.  It may also be applied to the case 
in which the rule is announced, and to future events, but not to 
conduct that has already occurred.  Harmann v. Hadley, 128 
Wis. 2d 371, 378, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986).  It may also be applied 
to some future date, as is the case here. See Fairchild, 
Limitation of New Judge-Made Law, at 262; Widell v. Holy Trinity 
Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 121 N.W.2d 249 (1963). 
 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
28 
 
not constitute a final order or judgment from which an appeal 
may follow under § 808.03(1).  Thus, we conclude that the 
Wambolts' appeal was timely filed, and that the court of appeals 
has jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the court of appeals. In 
order to further limit the confusion regarding what documents 
are final orders or judgments for the purpose of appeal, we 
will, commencing September 1, 2007, require a statement on the 
face of a document that it is final for the purpose of appeal. 
Absent such a statement, appellate courts should liberally 
construe ambiguities to preserve the right of appeal. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
No. 
2005AP1874   
 
 
 
1