Case Title: Com. v. McLean

Citation: 396 Pa. Super. 23, 578 A.2d 4

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1990-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
396 Pa. Superior Ct. 23 (1990) 578 A.2d 4 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Everett McLEAN, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted July 2, 1990. Filed August 2, 1990. *24 Veronica A. Smith, Asst. Public Defender, Hermitage, for appellant. Lorinda L. Hinch, Asst. Dist. Atty., Mercer, for Com., appellee. Before OLSZEWSKI, MONTEMURO and CERCONE, JJ. OLSZEWSKI, Judge: This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County after conviction for two counts each of unlawful delivery[1] and *25 possession of cocaine.[2] On appeal, appellant calls upon us to determine: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdicts; (2) whether the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence; and (3) whether the sentence imposed was excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm. On April 12, 1989, following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of the above charges. Timely post-verdict motions were filed and denied. On December 29, 1989, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of four-and-one-half-to-nine-years imprisonment relating to the two counts of unlawful delivery of cocaine. No further sentence was imposed as to the remaining counts. Following denial of his motion to modify the sentence, appellant filed the instant appeal. Appellant initially contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts. We disagree. Our standard of review regarding attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence is well-established. In evaluating such a claim, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, here the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, we must determine whether a reasonable jury could have found that all of the elements of the crime charged were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 143, 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989). Instantly, the trial court aptly summarized the testimony as follows: Trial court opinion of July 25, 1989, at pp. 2-3. Our review of the record is in accord with the trial court's recitation of the facts. Keeping in mind our standard of *27 review, there is no question that a reasonable jury listening to the above testimony could have come back with verdicts of guilt as to each charge. Accordingly, we find, as did the trial court, that the evidence was indeed sufficient to sustain each conviction. Nevertheless, appellant maintains that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. He argues that the informant, who originally identified him to the undercover police officer, was a "polluted" and "corrupt" source.[3] He also contends that the testimony of an alibi witness, which would have placed him at a different location during the second sale, effectively contradicted the Commonwealth's case. We disagree. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 381 Pa.Super. 606, 617, 554 A.2d 550, 555 (1989).[4] Keeping in mind this standard of review, we find appellant's claim meritless. Appellant is essentially saying that his alibi testimony is more credible than the testimony of the undercover police officer. Since this determination was properly one for the jury to consider, and in light of record as a whole, we cannot say that the verdict either shocked this Court's conscience or was based upon surmise or conjecture. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rejecting this claim. Finally, appellant contends that his sentence was excessive as it was not tailored to the rehabilitative needs of the appellant nor to the protection of society. We disagree. Appellant's challenge goes to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. As such, we must initially determine if appellant has complied with the rule announced in Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). In Tuladziecki, our Supreme Court determined that under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b), an appellate court may allow an appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence where a substantial question has been raised that the sentence imposed was not appropriate. The procedure to be utilized in order to comply with this section is found in Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) which states: Pa.R.A.P. No. 2119(f), 42 Pa.C.S.A. Instantly, appellant has failed to comply with Tuladziecki and Rule 2119(f). Because the Commonwealth objects to this omission, we find appellant's claims to be waived. Commonwealth v. Smith, 375 Pa.Super. 419, 436, 544 A.2d 991, 999 (1988) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Ross, 375 Pa.Super. 176, 180, 543 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1988), quoting Tuladziecki, supra.[5] Judgment of sentence affirmed. [1] 35 Pa.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30). [2] 35 Pa.S.A. § 780-113(a)(16). [3] The informant did not testify at trial; therefore, we fail to see how he could have had an effect, in any way, on the weight of the evidence. [4] We note that our Supreme Court has recently stated that "a challenge to the weight of the evidence is not appealable." Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 315, 561 A.2d 719, 728 (1989). This statement was based upon a footnote found in Commonwealth v. Nelson, supra. Because neither of the Supreme Court decisions was based on this statement, and because the decision in Nelson does not preclude this Court from reviewing weight of the evidence claims, we shall review the merits of appellant's claim. [5] Even had appellant met the 2119(f) requirements with respect to this case, this would not change the result. While the trial court correctly noted that the new guidelines are not applicable to this case, had they been applied, appellant's sentence on the first count of unlawful delivery would have fallen into the mitigated range, and the sentence on the second count would have fit into the standard range. In addition, the court explained that the sentences were appropriate here due to appellant's past criminal record and failure to mend his ways. Thus, since appellant's claims do not advance a colorable argument that the sentencing court's actions were inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code, or were contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process, no substantial question has been raised which would require our intervention. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 382 Pa.Super. 6, 16, 554 A.2d 919, 924 (1989). Therefore, for either reason, appellant's claims would fail.