Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: WESAW

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: WESAW2001 WY 1719 P.3d 500Case Number: 00-7Decided: 02/20/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                        
February 20, 2001    

           
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S                  

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

MARKUS 
WESAW,

Appellant

(Employee/Claimant),

v.

QUALITY 
MAINTENANCE,

Appellee

(Employer/Respondent,

 and

 STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel.

DIVISION OF 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION,

Appellee

(Respondent).

  

W.R.A.P 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Fremont 
County

The 
Honorable D. Terry Rogers, Judge 

  

Representing 
Appellant:

Steven 
R. Helling, Casper, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee Quality Maintenance:

Keith M. 
Gingery of Western Law Associates, Lander, Wyoming.

 Representing Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Division of Workers'     Safety and 
Compensation:

           
Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; John 
W. Renneisen,          
Deputy   Attorney General; 
Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Bernard P. Haggerty, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath; Assistant Attorney General.  Argument 
by Mr. Delicath.

 Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS,* GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

* 
concurred prior to retirement

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
Appellant 
Markus Wesaw was denied worker compensation benefits after the hearing examiner 
found that he had filed an untimely written report of injury.  The district court certified his 
petition for review to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.  We hold that the hearing examiner did 
not properly apply applicable law to determine the date of compensable injury 
and remand for hearing.

ISSUES

[¶2]           
Wesaw 
presents these issues for our review:

Was it 
reversible error for the hearing examiner to dismiss Appellant's claims for 
worker's compenation benefits?  

Under 
the facts of this case, this issue includes the following 
sub-issues:

Was 
Appellees' contention that Appellant failed to file a timely injury report 
properly raised?  Should this even 
have been an issue in the case?

If the 
issue of late filing of the injury report was properly raised by Appellees 
(which is denied by Appellant), was there a late filing of Appellant's injury 
report?

If the 
issue of late filing of the injury report was properly raised by Appellees and 
if there was a late filing (both of which are denied by Appellant), was it 
excused?

If the 
issue of late filing of the injury report was properly raised by Appellees, if 
there was a late filing of the injury report and if such late filing was not 
excused (all of which are denied by Appellant), was the presumption of denial, 
created by the late filing, overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a lack 
of prejudice to Appellees in investigating the injury and in monitoring medical 
treatment?

Appellee 
Division rephrases the issues as:

I.  Was the order granting judgment as a 
matter of law supported by substantial evidence, within the Hearing Examiner's 
discretion, and in accordance with law?

A.  Did the Employee receive adequate notice 
of the issues addressed at the hearing?

B.  Was the Employee's injury report 
untimely?

C.  Did the Employee fail to rebut the 
presumption of denial?

D.  Was the decision not to apply equitable 
estoppel proper?

II.  If the Court reverses, should it remand 
for an automatic award of benefits?

Appellee 
Quality Maintenance presents these issues:

Whether 
the Hearing Examiner's Denial of Benefits, based upon the Employee/Claimant 
failure to timely file his injury report within the ten day statutory period as 
prescribed by W.S. §27-14-502(c), was supported by substantial evidence and in 
accordance with the law?

A.  Was the Employee/Claimant afforded due 
process of the law and was he on notice that the issue of late filing was an 
issue?

B.  Did the Employee/Claimant fail to timely 
file his injury report within the 10 day period prescribed by W.S. 
§27-14-502(c)?

C.  Did the Employee/ Claimant fail to rebut 
the presumption of prejudice to the employer or division by clear and convincing 
evidence?

D.  Did the Employee/Claimant fail to show 
substantial evidence supporting equitable estoppel?

E.  If the Court should reverse, should the 
Court remand to allow a hearing in order for the Employer and Division to 
present their evidence, rather than remand for an automatic award of 
benefits?

FACTS

[¶3]           
Wesaw 
was exposed to sulfuric acid on October 15, 1998.  His supervisor, Nels Carlson, entered 
the room soon after and was told of the incident.  Carlson told Wesaw that he would report 
the incident to workers' compensation but reassured him that no permanent injury 
was likely because "you can take a bath in it."  Wesaw's throat felt sore later that 
night, but he went to work the next day. At that time, his supervisors announced 
to employees that a large sulfuric acid leak had occurred the previous day, 
necessitating repairs that would not allow work.  Wesaw was sent home, and he rested that 
day and over the weekend. Wesaw's wife was concerned about his illness, but 
Wesaw repeated his supervisor's statement that you could bathe in the substances 
and not be hurt.  Both Wesaw and his 
wife testified that Wesaw was convinced that his illness was due to his asthma 
condition, and he took those medications that weekend.  Although he felt ill, he returned to 
work on Monday and Tuesday.  He 
became too ill to work on Tuesday, was driven home by his employer, and sought 
medical treatment. The next day, October 22, 1998, he was diagnosed with 
"dysphagia, which is pain with swallowing, and inhalation injury."  

[¶4]           
He filed an 
injury report on November 3, 1998, by telephone.  On November 5, 1998, the Division issued 
an "Initial Review: Notice of Lack of Information" letter requesting an 
explanation by December 3, 1998, why his injury report had not been submitted 
within the ten-day limit required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a).  Wesaw wrote back on November 20, 1998, 
that he reported the accident as soon as he knew that he would have to be 
treated and could no longer work.   
The Division apparently accepted this explanation because it was not the 
basis for denial when it issued a "Final Determination" letter dated December 8, 
1998, denying benefits stating that the "incident" did not meet the definition 
of an injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi); his condition was 
preexisting; and the evidence did not show that he had suffered a work 
injury.

[¶5]           
Wesaw objected 
to the denial, and the matter was eventually set for hearing on August 5, 
1999.  The employer's disclosure 
statement, filed after the deadline set forth in the prehearing order, 
identified a timeliness issue for failure to file an injury report within ten 
days as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a).  At the hearing, Wesaw objected to 
consideration of the issue, contending that he had not received proper 
notice.  The record indicates that 
Wesaw believed the timely notice issue was limited to the time difference 
between October 22 and November 3, and he argued that W.R.C.P. 6 counted only 
work days.  The opposing attorneys 
never stated that they were also contending that the date of injury was October 
15, 1998.  The Division's attorney 
asked the hearing examiner for a clarification whether late filing was an issue, 
and at that point, the hearing examiner allowed evidence on the issue but 
reserved ruling on whether notice had been proper. Wesaw proceeded to present 
evidence limited to establishing that he had suffered a compensable, 
work-related injury following a chemical exposure incident.  He testified that he immediately 
notified his employer of the incident, but kept working and was diagnosed with 
an inhalation injury on October 22, 1998.  
He then rested his case.  

[¶6]           
At the close of 
Wesaw's case, the opposing attorneys both moved for judgment at that time, 
claiming that Wesaw's testimony indicated that he was aware he had been injured 
on October 15, 1998, and therefore, had not timely filed nor had he presented 
any evidence rebutting the statutory presumption of prejudice.  Wesaw's attorney argued that due process 
and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 required specific notice that both of these 
issues would be raised at the hearing, and these requirements had not been 
complied with before the hearing. 

[¶7]           
The hearing 
examiner determined that Wesaw was aware that he had been injured on October 15, 
1998, and was statutorily required to file an injury report within ten days of 
that date.  The order found that his 
failure to timely file the report raised a rebuttable presumption that his claim 
should be denied, and he did not meet his burden of rebutting the presumption by 
clear and convincing evidence that no prejudice resulted when the accident could 
not be investigated and medical treatment monitored. Benefits were denied, and 
this appeal followed.  

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶8]           
When the 
district court certifies directly to this Court an administrative agency's 
decision, we review that agency decision "under the same appellate standards 
applicable to the reviewing court of the first instance."  In re Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d 450, 453 (Wyo. 
1993).  Our judicial review is 
limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 which 
provides:

To the extent necessary to make a 
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

* * *

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

* * *

(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (LEXIS 
1999).

      

The interpretation and correct 
application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act is a 
question of law over which our review authority is plenary.  Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 1997); 
Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299 (Wyo. 1991). 
Conclusions of law made by an administrative agency are affirmed only if they 
are in accord with the law. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996); 
Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Comp. Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 
1992).  We do not afford any 
deference to the agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by 
the agency in either interpreting or applying the law.  Matter of Gneiting, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 
1995);  City of Casper v. 
Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 587 (Wyo. 1994).

DeLauter v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 994 P.2d 934, 936 (Wyo. 
2000).

       

[¶9]      In reviewing 
findings of fact we examine the entire record to determine if there is 
substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. Weidner v. Life Care Centers of 
America, 893 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1995).  If the 
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on 
appeal.  Id. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
the agency.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  Id.

Date of Compensable 
Injury

[¶10]       
Although 
the parties devote most of their arguments to the untimeliness issue, we will 
first address the law applicable to determining the date of a compensable 
injury.  Since 1936, this Court has 
held that the notice and claim requirements of the workers' compensation 
statutes do not begin to run until the 
employee becomes aware that an accident has caused an injury, and that the term 
"injury" as used in the compensation statutes means compensable injury.  Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 
530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936).  
Under previous versions of the filing statutes and statute of 
limitations, we have consistently applied the concept of a "compensable injury" 
to determine timeliness of notice and claims.  Big Horn Coal Co. v. 
Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo. 1972) (interpreting the 
previous version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502); Aanenson v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 842 P.2d 1081, 1082-83 (Wyo. 1992) (applying 
"compensable injury" concept to statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-12-503).  The burden to show the 
actual time of the compensable injury, its cause, and its relation to his 
employment at the time of injury is placed on the employee.  Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 401 P.2d 708, 709 (Wyo. 1965).  

[¶11]       
"[W]hen 
determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be 
asked:  When would a reasonable 
person, under the circumstances, have understood the full extent and nature of 
the injury and that the injury was related to his or her employment?"  Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1082.  This question necessarily requires a 
careful evaluation of all facts to determine when an employee reasonably 
understood the nature and seriousness of his condition and that it was 
work-related.  Our previous 
decisions have never burdened an employee with filing claims for incidents or 
trivial injuries to avoid timeliness issues.  Big Horn Coal Co., 502 P.2d  at 
188 (citing Potter v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 80 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 
1956)).  However, the employee may 
not ignore these requirements for compensable injuries because notice 
requirements and the statute of limitations exist to allow employers to 
investigate claims, monitor medical care, and avoid stale claims.  Sherwin Williams Co. v. Borchert, 
994 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo. 2000).  
The finder of fact is charged with determining the time and cause of a 
compensable injury; however, whether an employee's claim is to be barred for 
failure to timely file notice or a claim is a mixed question of fact and 
law.  Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 
1080.  

[¶12]       
The 
hearing examiner did not make any basic findings of fact, concluding only that 
"[t]he date the general nature of the injury became apparent to the 
Employee/Claimant was October 15, 1998."  
We review this legal conclusion de novo, but, preliminarily, we 
will address Wesaw's contention that the 1996 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-502 are significant to determining the date an employee becomes aware he 
has suffered a compensable injury.  
The amendments are highlighted below, and the statute now states, in 
pertinent part:

§ 27-14-502. Employee's injury 
report to employer and division;  
presumption raised by failure to file report;  release of 
information.

            
(a) As soon as is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours 
after the general nature of the injury became apparent, an injured employee 
shall, in writing or by other means approved by the department, report 
the occurrence and general nature of the accident or injury to the 
employer.  In addition, the 
injured employee shall within ten (10) days after the injury became 
apparent, file an injury report with the employer and the division in 
a manner and containing information prescribed by division rule and regulation. 
 If the injured employee is 
physically unable to comply, a personal representative of the employee, his 
dependents or a personal representative of the dependents in case of death 
shall, following notification by the employer or department of reporting 
requirements, make and file the report for the injured 
employee.

(b) If an injured employee, any 
dependent or personal representative makes a written report of the injury 
to the employer or his representative, the employer shall acknowledge receipt of 
the report in writing either upon the report or a copy of the 
report.

            
(c) Failure of the injured employee, any dependent or personal 
representative to report the accident or injury to the employer and to 
file the injury report in accordance with subsection (a) of this section 
is a presumption that the claim shall be denied.  The presumption may be rebutted if the 
employee establishes by clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the 
employer or division in investigating the injury and in monitoring 
medical treatment.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 (LEXIS 
1999); 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 82, Sec. 1.

[¶13]       
As Wesaw points 
out, primarily these amendments have substituted the term "injury" for 
"accident" and, in his view, do not require a report until an injury has been 
correctly diagnosed by a doctor.  
Plainly, the statutory amendments do not state that.  Our rules of statutory interpretation 
are well-established:

We 
decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.  In effectuating the plain 
language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.  We construe the statute 
as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia.  If, on the other hand, we determine that 
the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory 
construction to determine the legislature's intent.  

In Re 
Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Wyo. Dept. of Transportation v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo. 1999)).  

[¶14]       
The 
statute at issue here is subject to only one interpretation and is not 
ambiguous.  Furthermore, the 
statutory language "after the general nature of the injury became apparent" 
remains unchanged, and these amendments do not replace our previous decisions 
applying the statute's requirements from the date a compensable injury is 
discovered.  We do find, however, 
that the plain language of subsection (c) indicates that the statutory 
presumption does not arise unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours 
and failed to file an injury report within ten days.  Here, the employer raised only the issue 
whether Wesaw reported within ten days.  
Unmistakably, this contention is insufficient to raise the statutory 
presumption of claim denial.  
Although this determination is sufficient to require reversal and remand 
for a hearing on the merits, the Division's position that it would have 
presented evidence that no report to the employer was made at all causes us to 
presume that both timeliness contentions will be made and the statutory 
presumption of denial will again arise.   We must, therefore, apply the 
rules of law previously discussed to determine the date of compensable 
injury.

[¶15]       
At the close of 
Wesaw's case, the hearing examiner requested argument from the Division and 
employer about when the injury became apparent.  Both argued that Wesaw, by testifying 
that liquid 
splashed on his face and caused a burning sensation, coughing, and a red face, had 
testified that the injury was apparent to him on October 15, 1998.  Wesaw, however, was not claiming to have 
been burned.  Wesaw seeks 
compensation for an inhalation injury.  
The only symptom that he experienced indicating an inhalation injury on 
October 15, 1998, was a sore throat which he did not believe was serious.  As more symptoms appeared, Wesaw 
attributed his worsening illness to a recurrence of asthma; he self-medicated 
and continued to work, reassuring his wife that the exposure incident was not to 
blame because his supervisor had told him the chemicals were harmless.  This testimony establishes that not only 
was he unaware of both the seriousness and the nature of his injury, but also he 
did not believe it was work-related.  
Arguably he was not acting reasonably in determining his illness was not 
caused by the chemical exposure; however, that is not dispositive of the 
issue.  When he became too ill to 
work, he sought medical care and described the exposure incident to a doctor. 
 The attending doctor testified that 
based on his history she diagnosed an inhalation injury.  Because an inhalation injury can only be 
confirmed by further testing, Wesaw was referred to a pulmonary specialist.  Following tests in January of 1999 the 
specialist diagnosed a lung injury apart from asthma most likely caused by 
chemical exposure on October 15, 1998.  
These facts show that, although Wesaw may have recognized the causal 
relationship on October 21, 1998, when he first sought medical care, he did not 
understand the nature and seriousness of his injury until he received the 
doctor's diagnosis on October 22, 1998.  
Because its rules count only workdays, the Division concedes that if the 
date of injury is October 22, 1998, his November 3, 1998, injury report was 
filed within the ten-day requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a) and 
complied with the statute.

[¶16]       
The 
Division contends that the hearing examiner's decision is supported by 
Beitel v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1242 (Wyo. 1999).  Beitel 
reported an injury to the workers' compensation division on March 18, 1997, 
although he had begun receiving chiropractic treatment for his pain in January 
of 1997, and told his doctors his pain was caused by a work-related injury 
suffered on October 9, 1996.  The 
hearing examiner determined that the injury was apparent to Beitel no later than 
when he began receiving treatment and his failure to report until March was 
untimely.  Id. at 
1246.  Beitel is not 
inconsistent with this decision or previous decisions that identified the date 
of injury by the date reported to a physician when the employee was unaware of 
the nature or seriousness of his injury.  
Big 
Horn, 502 P.2d  at 188; Curnow 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 899 P.2d 875, 878 (Wyo. 1995).  Wesaw's 
case does not appear to be different from Big Horn, 
Curnow, or 
Beitel.  

[¶17]       
Knowledge 
of the "full extent and nature of the injury" must be distinguished from an 
"incident" or an "accident" before the notice and claim requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-502 and 503 are triggered.  We find that the testimony thus far 
indicates that the general nature of Wesaw's injury was apparent on the date of 
his diagnosis, October 22, 1998, and he had not suffered a compensable injury on 
October 15, 1998, which started the ten-day filing period.  

[¶18]       
Although 
the evidence received thus far indicates that the correct date of compensable 
injury was October 22, 1998, the opening arguments of the employer and Division 
indicate that each planned to present evidence that Wesaw was not exposed to 
sulfuric acid at all and never suffered an injury.  The hearing examiner's decision at the 
close of Wesaw's case prevented presentation of further evidence.  We will, therefore, remand for a hearing 
of all evidence to determine the existence and date of a compensable injury 
consistent with this opinion.  

Timeliness 
Issues

[¶19]       
The 
Division has raised other timeliness issues in this appeal.   In addressing those, we begin by holding that unless the 
Division or employer properly notifies the employee that it is raising a 
specific timeliness issue under either Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-502 or 503, 
these issues need not be considered at a hearing, and Wesaw's burden is limited 
to proving all essential elements of his claim, namely, that he suffered a 
compensable work-related injury.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. 
Div. v. Espinoza, 
924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 1996); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LEXIS 
1999).  Because the timeliness issues under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 are many and will impose various burdens of proof 
depending on the precise issue, due process and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 
require specific notice.  In this 
case, Wesaw was not given specific notice of any § 502 issues that would give 
rise to the statutory presumption that the claim be denied.  We conclude this based upon a record 
showing that the Division did not raise any timely notice issues, the employer's 
notice in its disclosure statement briefly claimed that he had not complied with 
the ten-day filing requirement and was mailed after the deadline set in the 
prehearing order.  Wesaw contends 
that this notice was not specific enough to satisfy due process or Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-107 and further contends that notice is proper only if given in the 
"Final Determination" letter.  

[¶20]       
We have 
previously held that issues not given in the Division's "Final Determination" 
letter can be raised in pleadings such as disclosure statements.  Ireland v. State ex. rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Comp. Div., 998 P.2d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2000).  
 Ireland also 
ruled that "[p]leadings are used to give parties notice of the nature of claims 
and defenses, to narrow the issues, and to guide the parties and the court in 
the conduct of the case.  If the 
pleadings and notice of hearing are to mean anything in a contested case 
hearing, the hearing examiner must be limited to considering only those issues 
presented in the notice and pleadings."  
Id. 
(citation omitted).  Ireland, 
however, does not permit the hearing examiner to reserve ruling whether 
timeliness is at issue until the hearing.

[¶21]       
If both 
the 72-hour employer notice and the ten-day reporting requirements of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-502(a) are at issue, the employee may have the burden of rebutting 
a statutory presumption of denial by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Division and employer were not prejudiced.  
Due process and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 demand that an employee know 
before the hearing the specific nature of claims under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-502(a).  Ireland, 998 P.2d  at 401; White v. Board of Trustees 
of Western Wyoming Community College District, 648 P.2d 528, 535 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983)); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-107(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999).  
Without 
a timely prehearing ruling that these issues were properly raised, Wesaw 
properly limited his case to proving that he had suffered a compensable 
work-related injury.  Upon remand, 
Wesaw must receive specific notice of all timeliness issues, and, if applicable, 
the notice must state the contended date of compensable injury and whether the 
employee has the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-502(c).  A prehearing 
ruling that the issues have been properly raised is required or, in accordance 
with Ireland, 
the 
hearing examiner is not permitted to consider the issues.  

[¶22]       
Reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.