Case Title: CHESTER E BROWN JR V GENESEE CNTY BD OF COMM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 113915

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 3, 2001  
CHESTER E. BROWN, JR.,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 113915  
GENESEE COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except TAYLOR, J.).  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave to consider whether an inmate, who  
claims that a dangerous or defective condition in a jail  
caused injuries, may avoid governmental immunity for tort  
liability under the statutory exception for public buildings,  
MCL 691.1406.  The trial court granted summary disposition to  
defendant-county, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held  
that a jail falls within the exception.  
 
We would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and  
reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to  
defendant.  Although a jail is “open for use by members of the  
public,” an inmate is not a member of the “public” as  
contemplated by the Legislature when it enacted the public  
building exception to governmental immunity.  
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Genesee County jail, injured  
himself when he slipped on water near a shower stall.  He sued  
the county under the public building exception, MCL 691.1406.  
He alleged that improper drainage and the absence of a shower  
curtain had caused water to accumulate on the floor.1  
The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant  
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the ground that the public building  
exception did not apply.  The Court of Appeals initially  
affirmed.  222 Mich App 363; 564 NW2d 125 (1997). It observed  
that the shower area of the jail was not open to members of  
the public.  This Court then remanded the case to the Court of  
Appeals for reconsideration in light of Kerbersky v Northern  
Mich Univ, 458 Mich 525; 582 NW2d 828 (1998). 459 Mich 881  
(1998).  
On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed. 233 Mich App  
1Our resolution of this case does not require us to 
consider whether a structural defect, as opposed to a 
transitory condition, caused the accident. Cf. Wade v Dep’t  
of Corrections, 439 Mich 158; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).  
2  
 
 
325; 590 NW2d 603 (1998).  It noted that Kerbersky mandates  
analysis of the public’s access to the building itself, not  
the specific accident site within the building.  The Court of  
Appeals assumed that a jail is open for use by members of the  
public. Defendant now appeals.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary  
disposition de novo.  Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597  
NW2d 817 (1999).  MCR 2.116(C)(7) permits summary disposition  
where immunity granted by law bars a claim.  Courts must  
consider documentary evidence submitted by the parties.  
Glancy v Roseville , 457 Mich 580, 583; 577 NW2d 897 (1998).  
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.  
Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574  
(1999).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY  
Absent a statutory exception, a governmental agency is  
immune from tort liability when it exercises or discharges a  
governmental function.  
MCL 691.1407(1).  A governmental  
function is “an activity which is expressly or impliedly  
mandated 
or 
authorized 
by 
constitution, 
statute, 
local 
charter  
or ordinance, or other law.” MCL 691.1401(f).  
MCL 45.16 expressly mandates operation of jails: “each  
organized county shall, at its own cost and expense, provide  
3  
at the county seat thereof . . . a suitable and sufficient  
jail . . . and keep the same in good repair.”  Defendant thus  
enjoys 
general 
immunity from tort liability in its maintenance  
and operation of the county jail. See Jackson v Saginaw Co,  
458 Mich 141, 148; 580 NW2d 870 (1998).  
B. PUBLIC BUILDING EXCEPTION  
Several statutory exceptions to immunity exist.2  This  
case implicates the public building exception:  
Governmental agencies have the obligation to 
repair and maintain public buildings under their 
control when open for use by members of the public. 
Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury 
and property damage resulting from a dangerous or 
defective condition of a public building if the 
governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time 
after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the 
condition or take action reasonably necessary to 
protect the public against the condition.  [MCL 
691.1406.]  
For 
this 
exception 
to 
apply, 
a 
plaintiff 
must  
demonstrate:  
(1) a governmental agency is involved, (2) the 
public building in question was open for use by 
members of the public, (3) a dangerous or defective 
condition of the public building itself exists, (4) 
the governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the alleged defect, and (5) the 
governmental agency failed to remedy the alleged 
defective condition after a reasonable period or 
failed to take action reasonably necessary to  
2They include: the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the 
motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public building 
exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary function exception, 
MCL 691.1413; and the governmental hospital exception, MCL 
691.1407(4).  
4  
 
 
 
protect the public against the condition after a 
reasonable period. [Kerbersky, supra at 529.]  
Today we would hold that the plain statutory language also  
requires that the party seeking relief be a member of the  
“public.”  
1. WAS THE JAIL OPEN FOR USE BY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC?  
Mere public ownership of a structure does not satisfy the  
express language of the public building exception.  A building  
must also be open for use by members of the public.  
Kerbersky, supra at 533.3
 When determining the public’s  
access, we analyze the building itself, not the specific  
accident site within the building. Id. at 527.  
Plaintiff claims to have injured himself near a shower  
stall in defendant’s jail.  Under Kerbersky, we examine the  
public’s access to the jail rather than the shower area.  Id.  
Green v Dep’t of Corrections, 386 Mich 459; 192 NW2d 491  
(1971), held that a jail falls within the scope of the  
statutory exception.4  In other decisions, this Court has  
3Examples of publicly owned buildings that are not open 
for use by members of the public include: a city-owned 
apartment used as a private residence, Griffin v Detroit, 178 
Mich App 302; 443 NW2d 406 (1989); a publicly owned building 
that is closed for renovations, Dudek v Michigan, 152 Mich App 
81; 393 NW2d 572 (1986); and a locked building that was not 
designed for public access, Taylor v Detroit, 182 Mich App 
583; 452 NW2d 826 (1989).  
4While we agree with Green that a jail is subject to the 
public building exception, we do not approve the reasoning in 
that decision.  This Court in Green failed to analyze whether 
a jail is open for use by members of the public.  Moreover,  
5  
 
implicitly assumed as much.  See, e.g., Wade v Dep’t of  
Corrections, 439 Mich 158; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).  
We would reaffirm that a jail is open for use by members  
of the public. Family, friends, and attorneys may generally  
visit inmates.  Members of the public may also enter a jail  
for other reasons, e.g., to apply for a job or make a  
delivery.  
The fact that public access to a jail is limited does not  
alter our conclusion.  Schools fall within the exception even  
though members of the public may not enter whenever and  
wherever they please.  See Sewell v Southfield Public Schools,  
456 Mich 670; 576 NW2d 153 (1998); Bush v Oscoda Area Schools,  
405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 (1979).  The public building  
exception applies to buildings with limited access, including  
schools and prisons.  Kerbersky, supra at 534; Steele v Dep’t  
of Corrections, 215 Mich App 710, 715; 546 NW2d 725 (1996).  
2. IS A JAIL INMATE A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC?  
We next consider whether an inmate is a member of the  
“public” who may avoid immunity under the public building  
exception.  To answer this question, we examine the statutory  
text.  
for reasons discussed below, we would overrule Green to the  
extent that it treats inmates as members of the “public” for 
purposes of the statutory exception.  
6  
  
a. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  
Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d  
119 (1999), articulated the proper mode of interpretation:  
The rules of statutory construction are well 
established.  The foremost rule, and our primary 
task in construing a statute, is to discern and 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 
Murphy v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 447 Mich 93, 
98; 523 NW2d 310 (1994).  See also Nation v W D E  
Electric Co, 454 Mich 489, 494; 563 NW2d 233 
(1997).  This task begins by examining the language 
of the statute itself.  The words of a statute  
provide “the most reliable evidence of its intent 
. . . .”  United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 
593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). If the  
language of the statute is unambiguous, the  
Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly 
expressed, and the statute must be enforced as 
written.
 No further judicial construction is 
required or permitted.  Tryc v Michigan Veterans’  
Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).  
“Contextual understanding of statutes is generally  
grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: ‘[i]t is known  
from its associates,’ see Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p  
1060. This doctrine stands for the principle that a word or  
phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.” Tyler v  
Livonia Schools, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999).  
Also, when construing a statute, we presume that every  
word has meaning; our interpretation should not render any  
part of the statute nugatory. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460  
Mich 278, 285; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).  
b. INTERPRETATION  
The first sentence of the public building exception  
7  
articulates the governmental agency’s duty (“to repair and to  
maintain public buildings”) and a limitation of that duty  
(“when [the buildings are] open for use by members of the  
public”).  As discussed above, the limiting phrase explicitly  
restricts the types of buildings to which the duty extends.  
Unless a building is open for use by members of the public, it  
does not fall within the exception.  But this phrase also  
limits implicitly the class of persons who may sue.  It  
excludes persons who are not members of the public, i.e.,  
those persons who are not present in the building as potential  
invitees.  
The Legislature simply could have ended the first  
sentence of the statute after it articulated the duty owed by  
governmental agencies. It instead set forth a limitation of  
the duty.  The Legislature would not have limited the duty to  
buildings that are open to members of the public if it had  
intended to protect persons who are not members of the public.  
By including the public within the protected class, the  
Legislature 
implicitly excluded persons who are not members of  
the public.  See Hoste v Shanty Creek Management, Inc, 459  
Mich 561, 572, n 8; 592 NW2d 360 (1999) (the express mention  
of one thing in a statute impliedly excludes other similar  
things).
 Thus, allowing anyone to sue would effectively  
nullify the limiting phrase.  
8  
 
Read in context, therefore, the duty created in the  
statute protects members of the public from dangerous and  
defective conditions in public buildings. We decline to read  
the statutory language out of context or to “stretch” the  
common, ordinary meaning of the words to include a class of  
persons whom the Legislature expressed no intent to protect.5  
Jail inmates are not members of the public for purposes  
of the public building exception.6  Unlike a person who enters  
a jail, e.g., to meet with an inmate, make a delivery, or  
apply for a job, an inmate does not visit a jail as a  
potential invitee.  Instead, inmates are legally compelled to  
be there.  Inmates thus are not within the class of persons  
the Legislature intended to protect from defects in public  
buildings.7  
5Our concurring colleague believes that a person who is 
not a member of the public may sue for injuries that occur in 
an area of a public building that is open to the public.  The  
statutory text, however, plainly refers to buildings that are  
open to members of the public; it does not refer to areas of  
public buildings that are open to persons who are not members  
of the public.  Moreover, Kerbersky, supra, held that the 
situs of an injury in a public building is not relevant.  
6Our concurring colleague agrees that an inmate is not a 
member of the public, but relies on different language in the 
statute to reach that conclusion.  
7 Our proposed holding today is limited to jail inmates; 
we offer no view regarding other classes of persons.  It is  
worth observing, however, that unlike jail inmates, students 
attending a public school are not legally compelled to be 
there.  They have other choices, including charter schools, 
private schools, and home schooling.  
9  
 
It is undisputed that plaintiff was an inmate when he  
injured himself near a shower stall in defendant’s jail. He  
therefore was not a member of the public for purposes of the  
public building exception.8  
IV. CONCLUSION  
A jail is open for use by members of the public.  
However, jail inmates are not members of the public and thus  
cannot avoid governmental immunity under the public building  
exception.  Accordingly, we would reverse the Court of Appeals  
decision and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary  
disposition for defendant.  
WEAVER and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.  
8The dissent offers no analysis of the text of the public 
building exception to support its view that inmates are 
“members of the public.” Instead, the dissent relies on the 
“logic” in Green, supra, and dicta from other cases.  
Our duty to honor the intent of the Legislature, as 
expressed in unambiguous statutory text, is paramount. This  
Court in Green offered no analysis to support its assertion 
that an inmate “is a member of the public community.”  Id. at  
464.  As we have explained, treating inmates as “members of 
the public” would nullify the limiting phrase in the public 
building exception.  We decline to elevate an isolated,  
conclusory assertion in Green above the plain language of the  
public building exception.  
10  
 
 
                                          
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHESTER E. BROWN, JR.,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v
 No. 113915  
GENESEE COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
MARKMAN J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result reached in the plurality opinion  
because I agree that the public building exception to  
governmental 
immunity is not applicable in this case, although  
I reach this conclusion on the basis of a different analysis  
than that of the plurality opinion’s. Accordingly, I concur  
in the plurality opinion’s reversal of the decision of the  
Court of Appeals and the reinstatement of the trial court’s  
grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant.  
First, I agree with the plurality opinion’s conclusion  
that a jail is “open for use by members of the public,” as  
well as in its analysis in reaching this conclusion.  Second,  
I agree that an inmate is not a member of the public within  
the meaning of the public building exception.  However, I  
respectfully 
disagree with the analysis by which the plurality  
opinion reaches this conclusion.  It reaches such a conclusion  
on the basis of the statutory language that limits the  
government’s duty to repairing and maintaining public  
buildings that are “open for use by members of the public.”  
In contrast, I reach this same conclusion on the basis of the  
statutory language that limits the government’s liability to  
injuries caused by failing to “take action reasonably  
necessary to protect the public against the condition.”  We  
both conclude that a jail inmate is not a member of the public  
for purposes of the public building exception in order to  
avoid rendering the language of the statute meaningless by  
encompassing within the definition of public virtually  
everyone.  The difference in our analyses is that I come to  
this conclusion in order to avoid rendering the term “public”  
as contained in the last sentence of the statute meaningless,  
whereas the plurality opinion comes to the same conclusion in  
order to avoid rendering the term “public” as contained in the  
first sentence of the statute meaningless.  
2  
  
 
Finally, I disagree with the plurality opinion’s  
conclusion that a party seeking relief under the public  
building exception must be a member of the public. 
The  
essential difference between my interpretation of the statute  
and that of the plurality is that I view the statute as a  
“where” statute while it views the statute as a “who” statute.  
In other words, I believe that the statute limits the  
government’s liability to certain places, i.e., public  
buildings that are “open for use by members of the public.”  
In contrast, the plurality opinion asserts that the statute  
limits the government’s liability to certain people, i.e.,  
members of the public.  
I. ANALYSIS  
I agree with the plurality opinion’s conclusion that an  
inmate is not a member of the public within the meaning of the  
public building exception. However, I come to this conclusion  
for reasons different from the plurality opinion’s.  The  
plurality reaches this conclusion on the basis that the  
limitation of the government’s duty to only public buildings  
that are “open for use by members of the public” also  
implicitly limits the government’s duty to only members of the  
public.  Slip op at 8. In my view, the language “open for use  
by members of the public” limits only which buildings are  
3  
public buildings for purposes of the public building  
exception.  Accordingly, a jail is a public building within  
the meaning of the public building exception because it is  
“open for use by members of the public.”  
In my judgment, the important issue in this case is not  
merely whether defendant was a member of the public, but  
rather whether action by the defendant “was reasonably  
necessary 
to 
protect 
the public against the [alleged dangerous  
or defective] condition” of the public building. The public  
building exception statute provides:  
Governmental agencies are liable for bodily 
injury and property damages resulting from a  
dangerous or defective condition of a public 
building if the governmental agency . . . failed to 
. . . take action reasonably necessary to protect  
the public against the condition.  [MCL 691.1406 
(emphasis added).]  
It is clear from the language of the statute, i.e., “necessary  
to protect the public,” that the Legislature intended to limit  
the government’s liability, in that the government only is  
liable for failing to “take action reasonably necessary to  
protect the public.” Thus, the relevant question is whether  
action was “necessary to protect the public.”  Because the  
government is only liable for injuries caused by failing to  
“take action reasonably necessary to protect the public,” if  
a member of the public is injured in a “public building,” the  
4  
government may be liable.1  
However, because this liability is limited to failing to  
“take action reasonably necessary to protect the public,” if  
a person who is not a member of the public is injured in a  
“public building,” the government may only be liable if the  
plaintiff was injured in an area of the building open to the  
public.  This is true because, in order to protect members of  
the public, the government must keep areas of public buildings  
that are open to members of the public free from dangerous or  
defective conditions.2  However, because this liability is  
limited to failing to “take action reasonably necessary to  
protect the public,” the government is not liable for failing  
to repair and maintain areas of public buildings not open to  
the public, unless a member of the public is actually injured  
therein.  See Kerbersky v Northern Mich Univ; 458 Mich 525,  
1 Plaintiff would still have to prove that the injury was 
caused by a dangerous or defective condition of the building 
and that the governmental agency had knowledge of the 
condition and failed to remedy the condition after a  
reasonable period.  
2 Because the government is liable for failing to “take 
action reasonably necessary to protect the public,” the 
government may be serendipitously liable for failing to  
protect a person who is not a member of the public, if that 
person is injured in an area of the building open to the 
public.  This liability does not arise because of some duty 
owed to the person who is not a member of the public; rather, 
it arises from the duty owed to protect members of the public. 
The person who is not a member of the public is merely an 
incidental beneficiary of this duty owed to the public.  
5  
 
 
 
527; 582 NW2d 828 (1998).3  Therefore, in order for the public  
building 
exception 
to apply, plaintiff must establish that (1)  
he was a member of the public, or (2) he was injured in an  
area of the building open to the public.  
The plurality opinion concludes that a party seeking  
relief under the public building exception must be a member of  
the public.  Slip op at 5.  It asserts that the limitation of  
the government’s duty to public buildings that are “open for  
use by members of the public” also implicitly limits the  
government’s duty to only members of the public. Slip op at  
8. I respectfully disagree. The statutory language clearly  
expresses the Legislature’s intent for the government’s duty  
to only apply to certain buildings, but it says nothing about  
limiting the government’s duty to certain people.  
3 Kerbersky held that the government is liable to members 
of the public for injuries caused by dangerous or defective 
conditions of public buildings, regardless of whether the 
accident site was open to members of the public.  However, 
Kerbersky did not distinguish between members of the public 
and persons who are not members of the public.  Thus, 
consistent with Kerbersky, I would continue to hold that the 
government may be liable to members of the public, regardless 
of whether the specific accident site was open to members of 
the public.  However, I would now make the distinction 
mandated, in my judgement, by the statute,  between members of  
the public and persons who are not members of the public. I  
would conclude that, even though the government may be liable 
to members of the public injured in an area of the building 
not open to members of the public, the government is not 
liable to persons who are not members of the public who are 
injured in an area of the building not open to members of the 
public.  
6  
    
  
The plurality opinion contends that “[t]he Legislature  
would not have limited the duty to buildings that are open to  
members of the public if it had intended to protect persons  
who are not members of the public.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in the  
original).  Although I do not know with any certainty what  
motivated the Legislature in this regard, I suspect that it  
included this language to ensure that the public building  
exception would apply to buildings that are open, to some  
degree, to the public, such as jails and office buildings, but  
not to buildings that are altogether closed to the public,  
such as electrical substations and data facilities.  Had it  
merely limited the government’s duty to members of the public,  
without limiting the government’s duty to public buildings  
that are “open for use by members of the public,” the statute  
may well have imposed what the Legislature perceived as an  
unreasonable 
burden 
upon the government to maintain and repair  
such “public buildings” as substations and data facilities at  
an unnecessarily high level. The corollary to the plurality  
opinion’s argument, of course, is that if the Legislature had  
intended to protect only members of the public, it could have  
just as easily stated that proposition, as well.  
A. IS A JAIL INMATE A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE  
PUBLIC BUILDING EXCEPTION?  
In determining whether the government is liable for  
7  
 
  
injuries sustained by a plaintiff under the public building  
exception, the first inquiry is whether the plaintiff is a  
member of the public. 
“The primary goal of judicial  
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent  
of the Legislature.”  McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp, 461  
Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d 57 (2000).  This Court’s obligation  
is to determine the Legislature’s intent “as gathered from  
the act itself.” 
Id. 
MCL 691.1406 provides that a  
governmental agency is liable for failing to do what is  
“reasonably necessary to protect the public” against  
dangerous or defective conditions in public buildings.  The  
logical reading of this statute is that the Legislature  
intended to limit the government’s liability to injuries  
caused by the government’s failure to protect members of the  
public.  It is clear from the plain words of the statute,  
i.e., “necessary to protect the public,” that the Legislature  
did not intend under the public building exception for  
governmental agencies to be liable for injuries caused by the  
government’s failure to do what is necessary to protect  
persons who are not members of the public, such as jail  
inmates.  
A jail inmate is not in the class of persons the  
Legislature intended to protect when it enacted the public  
8  
 
  
 
  
building exception to governmental immunity.4
 This is  
evidenced by the statutory language limiting a governmental  
agency’s 
liability to injuries caused by the government’s  
failure to take action to protect members of the public.  
People who enter jails to visit inmates are members of the  
public whom the Legislature intended to protect.  However, in  
my judgement, an inmate who is legally compelled to be at the  
jail is not a member of the public for purposes of the public  
building exception.  
This Court’s interpretation of a statute must avoid  
denying effect to portions of that statute.
 Piper v  
Pettibone Corp, 450 Mich 565, 571-572; 542 NW2d 269 (1995).  
If we were to interpret “public” to include inmates, we would  
be denying effect to a portion of the public building  
statute. The Legislature intended governmental agencies to  
only be liable for failing to protect members of the public.  
However, if we interpret “public” to include inmates,  
governmental agencies would effectively be liable to everyone  
because, if an inmate is a member of the public, it is  
difficult to conceive of who would not be considered to be  
part of such a class.  The inmate is segregated from the  
4 The government may still be liable to persons who are 
not members of the public, such as jail inmates, if they are 
injured in an area of a public building open to the public, as 
discussed above.  
9  
 
 
 
 
public, he is severely limited in his ability to intermingle  
with the public, and under typical circumstances is confined  
to an area in which the public has no right to be.  I would  
conclude that the statute does not impose liability upon  
governmental agencies for failing to do what is necessary to  
protect inmates of a jail for purposes of the public building  
exception.  Accordingly, I agree with the plurality opinion’s  
conclusion that a jail inmate is not a member of the public  
within the meaning of the public building exception, and thus  
I concur with the plurality opinion’s overruling of that part  
of Green v Dep’t of Corrections, 386 Mich 459; 192 NW2d 491  
(1971), which held that inmates are members of the public  
community whether in or out of jail.5  
5 The dissent criticizes the plurality opinion’s  
overruling of Green. Post at 3. The dissent asserts that, 
“despite the plurality’s misguided belief that we can ignore 
precedent whenever this Court’s reading of a statute would 
lead to a different result than that of a prior Court, I 
continue to find value in respecting precedent.” Id. In my 
judgment, the plurality opinion did not ignore precedent; 
rather, it accurately explained why it was necessary to 
overrule Green in order to enforce the plain meaning of the 
statutory language.  Although I, like the dissent, find 
considerable value in respecting precedent, I also find value 
in enforcing the plain meaning of statutory language.  See  
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 151; 615 NW2d 702 
(2000) (holding that “we are duty-bound to overrule past 
decisions that depart from . . . the plain language of the 
statutory clause . . .”).  I agree with the plurality opinion 
that this Court should not “elevate an isolated, conclusory 
assertion in Green above the plain language of the public 
building exception.” Slip op at 10, n 8. Further, to place 
the Green decision in context, I note that Green was decided  
(continued...)  
10  
 
  
 
B. WAS PLAINTIFF INJURED IN AN AREA OF THE BUILDING OPEN TO THE  
PUBLIC?  
In determining whether the government is liable for  
injuries sustained by plaintiff under the public building  
exception, the second inquiry is whether the plaintiff was  
injured in an area of the building open to the public.  In  
order to protect the public, governmental agencies must  
ensure that all areas of public buildings, to which the  
public has access, contain no dangerous or defective  
conditions.
 It would be illogical to hold that a  
governmental agency must keep all areas of a public building  
free from dangerous or defective conditions, because the  
statute expressly provides that a governmental agency only is  
liable for failing to protect the “public” from those  
conditions.  Thus, governmental agencies are not liable for  
5(...continued) 
during a period in which this Court gave the term  
“governmental function” a narrow reading, while giving broad 
readings 
of 
the 
statutory 
exceptions 
to 
governmental 
immunity. 
In contrast with that prior era, we now interpret the term 
“governmental function” broadly and construe the exceptions 
narrowly. Ross v Consumers Power Co(On Rehearing), 420 Mich  
567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).  Moreover, in Green, the Court 
focused its analysis on whether the building was a pubic 
building, i.e., “open for use by members of the public.”  The  
Court 
never 
discussed whether action was “necessary to protect 
the public.”  Green held, in the context of whether a jail is 
a public building, that an inmate is a member of the public, 
whereas I would now hold in the context of whether action is  
“necessary to protect the public” from a defective or  
dangerous condition of a public building, that an inmate is 
not a member of the public.  
11  
 
failing to keep areas of public buildings to which the public  
does not have access free from dangerous or defective  
conditions, unless that condition, in fact, causes a member  
of the public injury. See Kerbersky, supra at 527.  
Kerbersky, supra at 527, held that “a member of the  
public injured as the result of a defect[ive] or dangerous  
condition of a building that is open to members of the public  
may invoke the public building exception to governmental  
immunity, even if the person is injured in an area of the  
building not open for use by members of the general public.”  
I would reaffirm that holding.  What I would hold today is  
that a person who is not a member of the public cannot invoke  
the public building exception to governmental immunity if  
that person is injured in an area of the building not open to  
the public.  However, a person who is not a member of the  
public may invoke the public building exception if that  
person was injured in a part of the building that is open to  
the public.  In sum, a member of the public can invoke the  
public building exception, regardless of whether the specific  
accident site was open to members of the public, but a person  
who is not a member of the public cannot invoke the public  
building exception unless the accident site was open to  
members of the public.  I reach this conclusion, not  because  
it necessarily conforms with my own views about the proper  
12  
 
contours of governmental immunity, but because I believe that  
it most closely conforms with the language of the public  
building exception.  
The 
Court, 
in 
Kerbersky, 
concluded 
that, 
when  
determining whether a building is a public building for  
purposes of the public building exception, the situs of the  
injury is irrelevant.  However, Kerbersky did not conclude  
that the situs of the injury is irrelevant for all purposes.  
I would concur with Kerbersky, in that, when determining  
whether a building is a public building, the proper inquiry  
is into the public nature of the building itself, not merely  
the specific accident site.  Thus, in deciding that a jail is  
a public building, I examined the jail itself, not merely the  
shower area in which plaintiff was injured.  However, the  
situs of an injury is relevant when determining whether the  
government is liable for failing to “take action reasonably  
necessary to protect the public.”  In Kerbersky, the Court  
concluded that the government is liable to a member of the  
public who is injured as the result of a dangerous or  
defective condition of a public building, regardless of  
whether that person was injured in an area of the building  
open to the public.  Therefore, the situs of an injury is  
irrelevant when determining the government’s liability to a  
member of the public. However, Kerbersky did not make the  
13  
 
 
 
 
distinction between members of the public and persons who are  
not members of the public.  I now make this distinction,  
which is, in my judgment, mandated by the statute.  The  
government is liable for injuries to members of the public,  
regardless of where they are injured in the building, because  
the government is liable for injuries caused by failing to  
take remedial action “reasonably necessary to protect the  
public.”  But, the government is liable to persons who are  
not members of the public only if they are injured in an area  
of the building open to the public because the government is  
only liable for injuries caused by failing to take remedial  
action when such action was “reasonably necessary to protect  
the public.”  Therefore, I would conclude that, even though  
a jail is a public building, the public building exception  
does not apply to an inmate injured in an area of that jail  
not open to the public.6  
6 The plurality opinion asserts that the statute does not 
support my position that the public building exception is 
applicable to people who are not members of the public who are 
injured in an area of a “public building” that is open to the 
public.  Slip op at 9, n 5.  I respectfully disagree. The  
statute provides that governmental agencies are liable for 
injuries caused by its failure to “take action reasonably 
necessary to protect the public against the condition.” 
Clearly, this means that governmental agencies are liable for 
injuries caused by its failure to repair and maintain areas of 
“public buildings” that are open to the public because, in 
that case, action would be “reasonably necessary to protect 
the public.”  What the statute does not support, in my 
judgment, is the plurality’s holding that governmental 
(continued...)  
14  
 
  
  
In the present case, members of the public did not have  
access to the shower area, which is where plaintiff was  
injured. Because plaintiff was not a member of the public  
and was injured in an area of the jail that was not open to  
the public, defendant should not be held liable under the  
public building exception for failing to keep the shower area  
free of defective or dangerous conditions.  
II. CONCLUSION  
The government is generally immune from tort liability.  
However, there are several statutory exceptions that apply to  
this broad grant of immunity, one being the public building  
exception.  I agree with the plurality opinion that a jail is  
a public building “open for use by members of the public.”  
I also agree that plaintiff is not a member of the public.  
However, in my judgment, that is not the end of the inquiry.  
The plurality views this statute as a “who” statute, meaning  
6(...continued) 
agencies are never liable for injuries sustained by people who 
are not members of the public.  
The plurality opinion also asserts that “Kerbersky,  
supra, held that the situs of an injury in a pubic building is 
not relevant.”  Slip op at 9, n 6.  However, as I have already  
noted, Kerbersky only held that the situs of an injury in a 
public building is irrelevant when determining a governmental 
agency’s liability to a member of the public.  It did not hold  
that the situs of an injury is irrelevant when determining a 
governmental agency’s liability to a person who is not a 
member of the public.  This is the distinction I now make, 
which, in my judgment, is mandated by the statute.  
15  
 
 
that it limits the government’s liability to certain people,  
i.e., members of the public.  Therefore, the plurality  
concludes that because plaintiff is not a member of the  
public, he cannot recover under the public building  
exception.  In my judgment, however, it is more consonant  
with the statutory language to view this statute as a “where”  
statute, meaning that it limits the government’s liability to  
certain places, i.e., public buildings that are “open for use  
by members of the public.”  Additionally, the government is  
only liable for injuries caused by failing to take remedial  
action “reasonably necessary to protect the public.”  
Therefore, because plaintiff is not a member of the public,  
it is necessary to determine whether plaintiff was injured in  
an area of the building that was open to members of the  
public.  Because plaintiff is not a member of the public, and  
because he was injured in an area of the building that was  
not open to members of the public, defendant should not be  
held liable under the public building exception for failing  
to protect plaintiff from the alleged dangerous or defective  
condition.  Accordingly, I concur in the plurality opinion’s  
reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and the  
reinstatement of the circuit court’s grant of summary  
disposition in favor of defendant.  
16  
________________________________ 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHESTER E. BROWN, JR.,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
N
o
.  
113915  
GENESEE COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I believe that leave was improvidently granted in this  
case.
 Further, I believe that the lead opinion unwisely  
departs from precedent and reaches out to discuss issues that  
have already been adequately addressed by the courts of this  
state.  I agree with the lead opinion to the extent that it  
recognizes that jails are public buildings “open for use by  
members of the public” for the purposes of the public  
building exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406.  
However, I dissent from the plurality’s decision to examine  
the question whether inmates are members of the public, and  
 
 
 
 
its decision to overrule a prior decision of this Court in  
favor of its own interpretation.  
The issue argued by the parties in this case was whether  
the Genesee County jail is a public building open for use by  
members of the public within the meaning of MCL 691.1406.  
The lead opinion correctly concludes that it is.  Slip op at  
1.  However, rather than resolving the case solely on the  
merits of the question before it, the plurality chooses to  
address the question whether an inmate is a member of the  
public. 
Moreover, the plurality dedicates a solitary  
sentence in a footnote to the fact that the question it deems  
of utmost importance in this case has already been addressed  
by this Court, Green v Dep’t of Corrections, 386 Mich 459;  
192 NW2d 491 (1971).  
I cannot join the plurality’s unsupportable decision to  
“overrule Green to the extent that it treats inmates as  
members of the public for purposes of the statutory  
exception.”  Corrigan, C.J. slip op at 6, n 4.  Rather,  
assuming that the question should even be addressed in the  
context of this case, I would apply Green.  
In Green, the plaintiff was an inmate in the Detroit  
House of Corrections, a municipal facility operated by the  
Department of Corrections. 
He injured himself while  
operating machinery in a prison shop area.  This Court  
2  
 
 
explicitly rejected the argument that the Detroit House of  
Corrections was nonpublic simply because it was not open to  
the public at large.  The Court held that the facility was a  
“public building” for immunity purposes.  The Court also  
stated that, “plaintiff is a member of the community whether  
in or out of jail.” Id. at 464.  
The basis for the present suit is the same as it was in  
Green.  Both cases were granted to examine the same statutory  
language, “[g]overnmental agencies have the obligation to  
repair and maintain public buildings under their control when  
open for use by members of the public.”  MCL 691.1406; see  
also Green at 464.  Other than to effectuate a policy change,  
I see no reason for this Court to depart from the logic Green  
used thirty years ago and that this Court has implicitly  
followed since.  The plurality offers nothing substantial in  
support of its observation that “[j]ail inmates are not  
members of the public for purposes of the public building  
exception.”  Slip op at 9. 
Given Green’s finding to the  
contrary, I believe that the conclusion is erroneous.  
Further, despite the plurality’s misguided belief that  
we  can ignore precedent whenever this Court’s reading of a  
statute would lead to a different result than that of a prior  
Court, I continue to find value in respecting precedent.  The  
plurality proclaims that Green is contrary to legislative  
3  
 
 
intent, and believes that Green made an isolated observation  
about whether prisoners are members of the public.  Given the  
plurality’s distaste for precedent that would support a  
different view than its own, I question whether it gives any  
credence to the fact that the Green Court defined the  
“controlling” issue in that case as “whether the state,  
through the Department of Corrections, may be held to respond  
in damages for tortious injury sustained by a state-sentenced  
convict while he is incarcerated in the Detroit House of  
Correction.” Green at 462.  
I would also note that the plurality completely ignores  
the fact that this Court has historically permitted suits  
arising out of prisoner injuries to be brought under the  
public building exception.  See Johnson v Detroit, 457 Mich  
695; 579 NW2d 895 (1998)(a prisoner hanged himself in a jail  
cell); Hickey v Zezulka, 439 Mich 408; 487 NW2d 106 (1992)(a  
prisoner committed suicide in a jail cell); Wade v Dep’t of  
Corrections, 439 Mich 158; 483 NW2d 26 (1992)(an inmate  
brought slip and fall action).  Thus, the plurality’s plain  
observation not only contravenes Green, but would eliminate  
causes of actions that have been repeatedly recognized by  
this Court as being available.1  
1 The plurality finds these decisions to be of no import 
since they did not squarely address whether prisoners are 
(continued...)  
4  
For these reasons, I believe not only that leave was  
improvidently granted, but that the plurality improvidently  
uses this case as a vehicle for restricting the public  
building exception to governmental immunity.  Therefore, I  
dissent.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
TAYLOR, J., took no part in the decision of this case.  
(...continued) 
members of the public.  However, they did not need to address 
the issue since it had already been decided in Green. Quite 
simply, the plurality today would change an established 
principle of Michigan law.  
5