Case Title: The Sierra Club v. Office of Planning, State of Hawaii.

Citation: 109 Haw. 411

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

---000-

THE SIERRA CLUB, a California non-profit corporation
registered to do business in the State of Hawai'i,
Appellant /Plaintiff-Appellee,

OFFICE OF PLANNING, STATE OF HAWAT'I,
‘Appellee/Defendant-Appellant,

 

and

THE LAND USE CONMISSION OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I:
LAWRENCE N.C. ING, in his capacity as Vice-Chairperson of
the LAND USE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF HAWATI; CASTLE &
COOKE HOMES HAWAII, INC., a Hawai'i corporation; PACIFIC

HEALTH COMMUNITY, INC., a Hawai'i corporation: CITY AND

COUNTY OF HONOLULU; ‘and NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD NO. 25,

Appellees /Defendants-Appellees ws

No. 26174

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No, 02-1-1759)

JANUARY 27, 2006

 

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFEY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

Appellee/Defendant-Appellant State Office of Planning,
State of Hawai'i (SOP), appeals from the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit's September 23, 2003 final judgment entered in
favor of Appeliant/Plaintiff-Appellee The Sierra Club (Sierra

Club). SOP and Appellees/Defendants-Appellees The Land Use

 

ded over this matter.

 

szabeth fe pre!

 

\ the Honorable Eden

note
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Commission of the State of Hawai'i (the LUC), Castle & Cooke
Homes Hawaii, Inc. (Castle & Cooke), and Pacific Health
Community, Inc. (Pacific Health) (hereinafter, collectively,
Defendants) contend that the circuit court erred by vacating the
decision of the LUC.

Based on the following, we affirm the circuit court's
September 23, 2003 final judgment.

1. BACKGROUND

on November 14, 2000, Castle & Cooke and Pacific Health
applied to the LUC to amend a land use boundary for 1,247,983
acres of land in an agricultural district, owned by Castle §
Cooke. The petition asked the LUC to reclassify the land as an
urban district, so that Castle & Cooke could develop the Koa
Ridge Project (hereinafter, the Project], consisting of thousands
of homes, a commercial center, elementary school, park,
church/day care, recreation center, and the Pacific Health
Center. According to the Project's “Infrastructural Report,”
Castle & Cooke would eventually construct a thirty-six-inch
sewage transmission line for the purpose of transporting
wastewater from the Project to the Waipahu Wastewater Treatment
Plant, as well as a new water transmission line to provide water
to the Project. The construction of these lines would require

Castle & Cooke to tunnel underneath Kamehameha Highway, the H-1
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Freeway, the H+2 Freeway, and Farrington Highway, all of which
are state land.

on July 9, 2001, SoP filed a “Statement Of Position of
The Office Of Planning In Partial Support Of The Petition.” on
guly 18, 2001, and by a written order dated August 13, 2001, the
LC granted Sierra Club’s and Appellees/Defendants-Appellees
Neighborhood Board No. 25"s petitions to intervene. On August 3,
2001, Appellees /Defendants-Appellees City and County of Honolulu
filed a “Statement Of Position Of The Department Of Planning And
Permitting, City And County Of Honolulu.”

on August 7, 2001, Sierra Club filed a motion with the
WC to stay proceedings in Castle & Cooke and Pacific Health's
petition until they complied with Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
Chapter 343, otherwise known as the Hawai'i Environmental Policy
Act (HEPA) (hereinafter, Chapter 343 or HEPA). Sierra Club
asserted that the plan to construct the transmission lines
underneath these highways and freeways involved the “use of state
lands,” thereby triggering the requirement for an environmental
assessment [hereinafter, EA] pursuant to HRS § 343-5 (1993 &
Supp. 2000). Sierra Club argued that absent an EA, Castle &
Cooke and Pacific Health were not entitled to have the LUC grant
their application to reclassify the land. Castle & Cooke and
Pacific Health filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Sierra Club's

motion on August 14, 2001, admitting that an EA was required but
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arguing that it would be prepared later. The LUC entered
written order denying Sierra Club's motion on September 26, 2001.

on dune 27, 2002, the LUC filed its “Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order.” As part of its
decision, the LUC reclassified 762.453 acres from an agricultural
district to an urban district without requiring Castle & Cooke
and Pacific Health to prepare an EA.

on duly 23, 2002, Sierra Club filed a notice of appeal
to the First Circuit Court. After an oral argument hearing on
January 21, 2003, the circuit court entered its “order Vacating
Decision and Order of the State Land Use Commission Filed
June 27, 2002 In Docket No. A00-734 and Remanding Petition For
Land Use District Boundary Amendment For Further Proceedings” on
September 23, 2003. The circuit court ruled that the Project is
an “applicant action” that proposes the use of state land within
the ambit of HRS § 343-5(c) (1993), and Castle & Cooke and
Pacific Health must therefore complete an EA before the LUC can
grant their application to amend the land use boundary. Final
Judgment was entered on September 23, 2003. on October 23, 2003,

SOP filed this timely appeal.?

 

+ Sierra Club argues that SOP lacks standing to appeal because “{t}he
only agency which is ‘aggrieved’ end thereby has standing to appeal in #
situation like this one is the agency entrusted with the implementation of the
particular legisietion at issue." Pursuant to HRS § S2-1é(8) (1993), however
“the term ‘person aggrieved’ shall include an agency that 1 @ party’ tos
contested case proceeding before that agency or another agency." Eecause SOP
es 2 party to the contested case proceeding before the Luc, S0P is s “person
sggrieved” and hee standing to appeal
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TT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of decision made by the circuit court upon its
Feriew of an agency's decision iss secondary appesi. The
Standard of review is one in which this court must determine
Ghether the circust court was right or wrong in ite
Geciaion, applying the. standards set forth in HRS § 91-14 (9)
(11993)]" to the agency's decision.

 

1 Dae Won Sa 7 van, 87
Hawai‘ 217, 229, 983 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1998) (alteration in
original) (quoting Bracg v, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 81
Hawai'i 302, 304, 916 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1996). HRS § 91-14,
entitled “Judicial review of contested cases,” provides in

relevant part:

(a) Upon review of the record the court may affirm
the decision of the agency or renand the case with
instructions for forther proceesings: or It may reverse or
odify the decision and order if the substantial rights of
the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
Scninistrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders

 

(2) Im violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions: oF
(2) Th excess of the statutory authority or

Suciediction of the agency: oF

(3) Hae upon snleweul procedures or

(4) Affected by other error of law or

{3} Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole

(6) Bebitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
Guereise of discretion

 

 

 

“[U]nder HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under
subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural
defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection

(5) and an agency's exercise of discretion under subsection

(6)." Ine Hawaiian Elec, Co., 61 Hawai'i 459, 465, 918 P.2d
561, 567 (1996) (citing Outdoor Circle v. Harold K.L. Castle

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‘Trust Estate, 4 Haw. App. 633, 638-39, 675 P.2d 784, 789 (1983)).
Thus, statutory interpretation is “a question of law reviewable
de nove.” State v. Levi, 102 Hawai'i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173,
1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arcee, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 926 P.2¢
843, 852 (1996)). With respect to statutory interpretation, we

have state

 

When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is
fo ascertain and give effect tothe intention of the
legislature, unich is to be obtained primarsly from the
Language contained in the statute iteelf. And we must read
statueory language in the content of che entire statute and
Sonstrue it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

 

State farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co, v, Gepava, 103 Hawai'i 142, 145,
80 P.3d 321, 324 (2003) (quoting Teover vs Adams, 102 Hawai'i
399, 409, 77 P.3d 83, 93 (2003)).
IIT. DISCUSSION
A. Qverview of the Environmental Review Process
HRS § 343-1 (1993) states the purpose of HEPA:

The legislature finds that the quality of humanity’
environment is critical to humanity's well Being, that
fomenity's sctivities have broad and profound effects upon
the interrelations of all conponents of the environment, and
that an environmental review process will integrate the
Feview of environmental concerns with existing planning
processes of the State and counties and alert decision
Bikers co significant environmental effects which may result
Eom the inplenentation cf certain actions. “The legislature
further finds that the process of reviewing environmental
effects is desirable because environnental consciousness is
Schanced, cosperstion and coordination are encourages, and
public participation during the review process benefits all
Porties involved and society as 6 whole.

Tt is the purpose of this chapter to establish «
systen of environmental review which will ensure that
environnental concerns are given spprepriate consideration
in'decision raking aleng with economic and technical
considerations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

 
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We described HEPA’s environmental review process in

 

Price v. Obavashi Hawaii Corp.

Once & proposed action is subject to the environmental
review process, an environmental assessment is made by the
applicant. and is used to evaluste the possible environmental
effects of @ proposed action. The agency reviewing the

joment then determines if there are “significant”
environmental impacts anticipated. If there is a
Getermination that there may be “significant” environmental
Impacts, the accepting agency then files an (environmental,
impact Statement] [(JEIS{)] preparation notice with the
[Office of Environmental Quality control}. {(JOBGCI}], which
in turn publishes the notice in the OBQC bulletin.
Publication of this notice initiates # J0 day consultation
period during which the public and interested agencies or
Deganizations nay submit written comments regarding adverse
effects of the proposed action. The proposing agency oF
applicant must respons in writing and address all concerns
and questions before proceeding with the development of the
EIS. "Once this phase of the process is complete, the
applicant then begins preparation of the E18.

 

 

 

81 Hawas'i 171, 160, 914 P.2d 1364, 1373 (1996) (internal

citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted) .

B. The Project Constitutes an “Action” that Triggers the
ivenent For an ER S nil “
By_an Applicant.

Defendants firet assert that the circuit court erred in
determining that the petition for reclassification triggered HRS
§ 343-5/s EA requirement because such a petition does not
constitute an “action” within the meaning of Chapter 343. We
disagree.

HRS § 343-5(a) (1993) provides, in relevant part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided, en environmental
assessnent shall be required for actions which:

(1) “Propose the use of state of county lands or the
use of stata or county funds, other than funds
to be used for feasibility of planning studies
for possible future prograzs of projects which
the Agency hae not approves, adopted, or funded,
or funds to be used fer the acguisition of
uninproved real property: provided that the

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agency shall consider environmental factors and
Svailavle alternstives in ite feasibility or
Planning stuaies{-)
(Emphases added.). HRS § 343-2 (1993 & Supp. 2000), in turn,
defines “action” as “any program or project to be initiated by
any agency or applicant.” Thus, according to the plain and
unanbiguous language of the statute, the Project is an “action”
because it is a “project to be initiated” by applicants Castle &
Cooke and Pacific Health.

Additionally, the Project proposes the use of state
lands inasmuch as the construction of the sewage and water
transmission lines will require tunneling beneath state highways.
See Citizens for Prot. of N. Kohala Coastline v. County of

Hawai'i (hereinafter, Citizens], 91 Hawai'i 94, 103, 979 P.2d

 

1120, 1129 (1999) (“[C)onstruction of two underpasses under a
state highway constitutes use of state lands for purposes of HRS
343-5(a) (1) (1993).”); Kahana Sun .

Maui (hereinafter, Kahana Sunset), 86 Hawai'i 66, 74, 947 P.2d
378, 386 (1997) (holding that the proposed drainage system, which
would run under state land, was “part of the larger project,”
and, thus, the EA “must address the environmental effects of the

entire proposed development”). Accordingly, the Project is an

 

action that proposes the use of state lands, and an EA that
addresses the environmental effects of the entire Project is

required.
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Defendants agree that an EA will eventually be
zequired: they contend, however, that an EA is not required at
the reclassification stage. Sierra Club disagrees, and cites HRS
§ 343-5(c) in support:

lbenever an applicant proposes an action specified by
subsection (a) which requires approval of an agency, and
Woich is not a Specific type of action declared exempt under
+ the agsney ceceiving the request for approval
a sed
fo determine unether
fenent shall be required:

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.)

In response, Defendants assert that an EA is not
required at the reclassification stage because it is not the
Yearliest practicable time” for the ER to be prepared. The
meaning of “earliest practicable time” within the context of HRS
§ 343-S(c) is thus determinative, as will now be discussed.

c. “'s Consideration of the Reclassification wi

1. The Requirement For an EA at the Reclassification Stage
Would Not be Premature.

Defendants assert that the preparation of an EA is
premature at the reclassification stage because HRS § 343-5 will
require Castle 6 Cooke and Pacific Health to prepare and submit
an EA at a later time. For the following reasons, this argument

is without merit.
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2. Although reclassification petitions do not trigger
the EA teauirenent aaa-perse matter, ai FA can

Defendants assert that the legislative history of
Chapter 343 and the cannon of statutory construction, “sxpressio
niu " [the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of others], counsel against an interpretation that an
EA can be required at the reclassification stage. Specifically,
Defendants argue that: (1) the legislature’s rejection of a
proposal to make Chapter 343 applicable to all district boundary
amendments evinces its intent that Chapter 343 is never
applicable to district boundary amendments and (2) because HRS
§ 343-5(a) (7) (1993)? specifies that an EA is required for
actions which propose reclassification of land classified as
conservation, the “expressic unius eat exclusio alterius” canon

dictates that an EA is not required for actions which propo:

 

 

reclassification of land classified as agricultural. The
assertions are unavailing.
We agree that a reclassification petition for non-

conservation lands, in and of itself, does not trigger the EA

quirement. It does not follow, however, that the EA

 

 

> HRS § 343-5(a) provides in relevant pert:

 

Except as otherwise provided, an environmental
‘assessment shail be required for actions which

1) Propose any reclassification of ony lend
classifies as conservation district by the state
lend use comission under chapter 2051-1

 

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requirement can never be triggered at the reclassification stage.
Had the legislature intended to exempt all reclassification
petitions from the EA requirement, it could have easily so
indicated. Therefore, an EA can be required at the
reclassification stage if one of the triggers set forth in HRS

§ 343-5(a) applies to the proposed project. In the instant case,
reclassification is the initial step of a project that proposes
theuse of state lands; it is the proposed use of state land that
triggers the EA requirement, and the request for approval of the
reclassification petition that provides the earliest practicable
time at which to prepare the EA.

b. The requirement of an BA was triggered at the
reclassification stage because Castle i Cooke and
Eacitic Health proposed the Project, which
requires the LUC to approve the reclassification.

Defendants next assert that the EA requirement cannot
be triggered at the reclassification stage because the LUC is not
an agency that can “receiv(e] the request for approval” pursuant
to HRS § 343-S(c). This argument is without merit.

Pursuant to HRS § 343-5(c), as set forth supra, if the
following three elements are present, “the agency receiving the
request for approval shall prepare an environmental assessnent of
[the] proposed action at the earliest practicable time”: (1) an

applicant proposes an action specified by HRS § 343-5(a); (2) the

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action requires approval of an agency: and (3) the action is not
exempt under HRS § 343-6 (1993).*

With respect to the first element, as discussed in
Section IIT.B., supca, the Project constitutes an action
specified by HRS § 343-5(a). Defendants assert, however, that
castle & Cooke and Pacific Health have not “proposed” the Project

to the LUC inasmuch as the LUC merely reclassifies land and it

 

has no authority to approve projects. Defendants’ assertion
diminishes the important role played by the LUC. As was done in
the instant case, the LUC must consider the entire project in
determining whether to reclassify land. Pursuant to HAR § 15-15-
50 (2000),* the reclassification petition must include, inter
alia’

(6) Type of use or development being proposed, including
without Limitation, a description of any planned
Gevelopaent, residential, golf course, open space,
resort, comercial, of industrial use!

+ nas § 3

 

6 provides, in relevant part:

(a) _Afver consultation with the affected agencies,
tthe councii shall adopt, amend, oF repeal necessary rules
for the purposes of this chapter in accordance with chapter
St including, but not limited to, rules which shall:

 

in) Establish procedures whereby specific types of
factions, because they will probably have minimal
Gr no significant effects on the environnent,
are declared exenpt from the preparation of a
‘sesessaent(-)

 

Pursuant to HRS § 343-6(a) (7), Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 11-
200-6 (1996) wae adopted, which Lists exenpt classes of action. No party has
asserted that the action in the instant case if exempt

 

+ HAR Chapter 18 was adopted pursuant to HRS $ 205~7 (1993), which
authorizes the LUC to “adopt, amend or repeal rules relating to matters within
its Jurisdiction in the manner prescribed in chapter 81.”

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(7) A statement of projected munber of lots, lot siz
funber of unite, densities, ‘selling price, intended
market, and development timetables?

 

aa

Seuelomnent upon the environment, agracultare,
Fecreational, cultural, historic, scenic, flora and
Eaune, groundwater, or other resources of the areal]

(Emphasis added.). Indeed, in its Decision and Order in the

instant case, the LUC conducted a detailed review of the entire
project before granting the district boundary amendment, and
placed conditions thereon based on this review. For example, the
“proposal for Reclassification” section of the Decision and order
describes the Project in great detail. There is another section
on the “Need for the Proposed Development” as well as the “Socio-
Economic Impacts” of the Project, the “Impact on Resources of the
Area,” and the noise and air quality impacts of the Project.
Additionally, the LUC conditioned the reclassification on Castle
& Cooke and Pacific Health's compliance with twenty-six
conditions, one of which stated that Castle & Cooke and Pacific
Health “shall develop the reclassified area in substantial
compliance with the representations made to the Commission

1.4 + Failure to so develop the reclassified area may result
in reversion of the reclassified area to its former
classification, or change te a more appropriate classification.”
Therefore, Castle & Cooke and Pacific Health have “proposed” the

Project to the LUC and, but for the LUC’s comprehensive review of

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the Project as a whole, it would not have approved the
reclassification petition. Thus, the first element is present.

The second element is also present because the Project
requires the LUC’s approval of the reclassification petition
before the Project cen proceed. HRS § 343-2 defines “approval”
as "a discretionary consent required from an agency prior to
actual implementation of an action.” In turn, “discretionary
consent” is defined as “a consent, sanction, or reconmendation
from an agency for which judgment and free will may be exercised
by the issuing agency, as distinguished from a ministerial
consent.” The State Land Use Law refers to the granting of a
petition for a district boundary amendment as an “approval” by
the LUC. See HRS § 205-4(g) (Supp. 2000) (stating that the LUC
“shall act to approve the petition, deny the petition, or to
modify the petition”) (emphasis added). Therefore, the LUC is an
agency from which Castle & Cooke and Pacific Health require a
discretionary approval to amend the land use district before the
Project can go forward.

‘Third, no party has asserted that the action is exempt

 

under HRS § 343-6.
Accordingly, all three elements being present, the LUC,

as the agency that has received the request for approval of the

boundary anendnent petition, is required by statute to prepare an

EA of the proposed action at the earliest practicable time.

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c. the fact that the project may change does not
the earliest practicable time.

Defendants assert that since only one EIS will be
required for the Project pursuant to HRS § 343-5(g) (1993), if
we require the EA to be prepared at the reclassification stage,
the resultant EIS may not contain adequate information for
decision-makers and for public conment in later stages.
Defendants state that the description of the Project presented to
the LUC is “preliminary” and “conceptual”, reasoning that “the
project that is ultimately built, as a result of the actions of
other agencies, may be very different from the one described to
the LUC as justification for adjustment of land use
classification.” SOP and the LUC additionally assert that “an EA
covering the whole petition area . . . may cover more land that
[sic] will be permitted for the project, or if reclassification
is for part of the land or has conditions, the scope and nature
of the project may change.” Defendants therefore conclude that

an EA prepared at the reclassification stage would not provide

 

cision-makers with meaningful information.

‘These arguments are without merit. while projects
indeed may change in response to public input, actions of
agencies, economic conditions, or other factors, requiring early
$ HRS § 343-5(q) provides that “(a) statement that is accepted with

respect to a particular action shall satisfy the requirements of this chapter
Sna'no other statenent for the proposes action shall be required.”

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environmental assessment comports with the purpose of HEPA to
“ensure that environmental concerns are given appropriate
consideration in decision Making,” HRS § 343-1, and provides a
safeguard against a “post hoc rationalization{] to support action
already taken.” Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 105, 979 P.2d at 1131
(brackets in original) (quoting Citizens for Responsible Gov't v.
City of Albany, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1199, 1221, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d
102, 114 (1997).

a.
purpose of HEPA.

In Citizens, we stated the importance of early
environmental assessment:

Requiring early environmental assessment of the
Mahukona project conports with HRS $ 43-5(e]”s express
Bandate. that environmental review be undertaken at the
Sgarlieet practicable tine.” this result also finde support
sn the spirit and intent of HEPA to “establish a system of
envizennental review which will ensure that environmental
Concerns are given appropriate consideration in decision
making along with economic and technical considerations
(and) ‘alert decision makers to significant environentl
fects which may result from the implenentation of certain
Sections." HRS'§ 345-1 (1393).

Consonant with these policies, both federal and state
courts have recognized that envirennental review must occur
early enough to function practically as an input into the
Secition making process. In construing the Net ional
Environnental Policy Act (NEFA), for exanple, the United

for the Ninth cirevit cautioned that
"Jala assessment aust be “presared easly enous so that it
san satve oractically as an incortant contribution to the
‘SGecieion making process and wall not be used to rationalize
‘Siustiiy decisions already nade.” Save the Yaak Committee
LE Block, 80 Ftd Tid, Te (seh cir 1987) (queting 40
ExF.R."§ 1502-5 (1967]). It further stated that federal
fequired to “integrate the NEPA process with
ether plenning st the earliest possible tine to insure thet
planning end decisions Feflect environmental values. *
Ad, (enphasis added) (citing Andrus v Sierra Club, 442'0.s.
S47, 351, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 60 Lied.za 943 (2978) (citations
emitted); and Caliternis v. Sioek, 690 F.2a 753, 761 (3th
Gir, 1982)). According to the LAR. Bleck court, “[t]ne

 

 

 

    

  

  

 

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rationale behind this rule de that inflexibility may occur
f delay in preparing an £2 is allowed: ‘after maior

investeent of both tise and aonev, itis [isely that nore
gnriconentai tamil be tolerateg."* Id. (quoting

Eee, 14e F.2d 406, 411-72 (Sth Cir-1sea)  Teatation
omitted) |. “See algo Sierra Club v. Peterson, 727 F.24 1409,
{ha (ove. cies 186s) (the Els Ts 3 decision-making tool
Intended to ‘ingure that... environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in
Seciesonmakine. Pitherefore, she sporcpriate time for

 

 

fer retains of options")
(ellipsis points and emphasas in original) (citation
omitted); "Rodgers, Enviromental Law § 9.7, at 923 (2d. ed.
1554) heen’ s purpoee ie to cequie considetation of

 

before oot ad be
hs
‘Accordingly, deck pe envire
sonsiderations cat most easily be nade when other basic
Secisicos ere alec being made, that is, during che eatiy
siaass of proiect conceptualization and planning. ere,
Because the deveiopaent and general dimensions of the

Project have bean known to Chalsn fron the start, there
Should be no difficulty in providing “meaningful
informatica” for HRS chapter 343 environmental review.
Moreover, at this early stage; environmental review under
Hes's, 343-5 would be an integral part of the decision-making
process. Indeed, io require the DOT or OLR. rather than
‘Suture “micht call tor a burdensone reconsideration oi

fationstizetien! Ito support action alreacy tanen-’”

 

Cieizens for Responsible Government v. City of Albany, 56
Golo hep. teh iiss, lal, 66 Cal Retr, 2a 102, 114 (1997)
(brackets in original)

Ada at 104-05, 979 P.2d at 1130-31 (alterations in original)
(some emphases added and sone in original) (footnote omitted) .

We agree with the reasoning of Citizens that early environmental
assessment conports with the purpose of HEPA to alert decision-
makers early in the development process because, “{a]fter major

investment of both time and money, it is likely that more

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environmental harn will be tolerated.” Id. at 105, 979 P.24 at
1131 (quoting JAR. Block, 640 F.2d at 718).7

Therefore, Defendants’ contention that the preparation
of an EA is premature at the reclassification stage is without
merit.

2. The Requirement of an EA at the Reclassification Stage
Would Not be Duplicative.

Defendants next assert that requiring an EA at the
reclassification stage would be duplicative because HRS Chapter
208 (“Land Use Commission”) requires the LUC to apply a more
Figorous procedure in considering environmental impacts on land
use reclassifications than would be required by an ER. To this
fend, Defendants cite to the concurring opinion in Pearl Ridge
Estates Comty, Ass'n v, Lear Siegler, Inc., 65 Haw. 133, 648 P.2¢
702 (1982) (Nakamura, J., concurring). This argument is
unavailing.

‘The concurring opinion in Pearl Ridge was based on the

fact that the law in effect at that time stated that boundary

 

tle 4 Cooke asserts that Citizens supports the proposition that an
EA is not required for a boundary anendnent because in that case, we affirsed
the district boundary anendnent by the Hawai"t County Council without
requiring an EA, notwithstanding that the reclassification wes for a project
that involved the use of state lands. Castle ¢ Cooke misconstrues the holding
in that case. In Citizens, the iesue waa whether the Haweit County Counc?
Mes responsible for provescing the coundary amendment petition. We held that,
because the boundary’ anendnent petition involved less than fifveen acres of
Jang, the Hawai'i County Council, 26 opposed to the LUC, was the proper agency
to process the petition. 91 Hawai'i ot 107, 979 F.2d at 1133, We did oot
Geckde whether an EA was of uss not required to assist the decisica-naling of
the Hawai'i County Council)

   

  

 

 

 

 

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amendments were subject to approval “only as reasonably necessary
to accommodate growth and development, provided there are no
significant adverse effects upon agricultural, natural,
environmental, recreational, scenic, historic, or other resources
of the area.” Pearl Ridge, 65 Haw. at 139, 648 P.2d at 706
(Nakamura, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting HRS § 205-
16.1 (1976)). On the other hand, “HRS § 343-4 simply ensures
agency consideration of environnental concerns before a decision
is rendered.” Bearl Ridoe, 65 Haw. at 142, 648 P.2d at 708
(Nakamura, J., concurring). The concurring opinion concluded
that because “[a]n obligation te engage in an environmental
assessment pales in comparison with the()] stringent preconditions
for the approval of a boundary amendment (,]” ida at 142-43, 648
P.2d at 708 (Nakamura, J., concurring), engaging in an EA
pursuant to Chapter 343 ‘would have served no constructive
purpose in light of the actual constraints imposed on the
Commission by HRS § 205-161." Ida at 142, 648 P.2d at 707
(iakamura, J., concurring). However, HRS § 205-16.1 was repealed
in 1985, 1985 Haw. Sess. L. Act 230, $ 6 at 420, and eventually
replaced with HRS § 205-17 (1993), applicable in the instant
case, which provides in relevant part:

In ite review of any petition for
reclassification of district boundaries pursuant to
this chapter, the commission shall specifically
SonsiGer the’ following:

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(3) The impact of the proposed
feclassification on the following areas of
State concern:

(A) Preservation or maintenance of
Important natural systems or
hobitate:

(8) Maintenance of valued cvitural,

historical, or natural resources;

(c)_ Maintenance of other natural
Fesources relevant to Hawaii's
economy, including, Eut not limited
toy agricultural Fesources(.]

 

(Emphasis added.). The new statutory language does not impose
more stringent requirements for reclassification of district
boundaries than the requirements of an EA, and thus the rationale
of the Pearl Ridge concurrence is not applicable to the instant
case. In addition, reading HRS Chapters 205 and 343 in park
materia, the preparation of an EA pursuant to Chapter 343 would
assist the LUC in considering the environmental impacts as
required by Chapter 205.

Defendants finally contend that, if an BA was required
at the reclassification stage, the LUC did in fact consider
factors required to be addressed by an EA under Chapter 343, and
“in the underlying proceedings before the LUC, other agencies,
the parties and the public had a full opportunity to consider all
the factors considered in an EA/EIS[.]” On the record before us,
we cannot accept this “functional equivalent of 2 required 5A”
argunent. The LUC did not make a finding that the information
presented at the contested case hearing was the equivalent of an

EA, and we have previously stated that “[i]t would be overly

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speculative for this court to make @ determination as to whether
the information adduced at the contested case hearing was the
functional equivalent of the required environmental assesenent.”
Kahana Sunset, 86 Hawai'i at 74, 947 P.2d at 386.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court
did not err in concluding that the “earliest practicable time” to
prepare an EA in the instant case was at the boundary amendment
stage. Ne therefore affirm the circuit court's September 23,
2003 final judgment vacating the LUC''s June 27, 2002 Decision and

order.

on the briefs: Gop
Deborah cay Enerson .
and John W.K. Chang, Berson ner
Sepsty netomneye Generel,
for appellee/defendant- Decuehy .

appellant Office of Planning,
State of Hawai't

Deputy Attorneys General, Kone 6, Duligs re
for appellees/defendants~
appellees The Land Use

Commission of the State of

Hawai'i and Lawrence N.C. Ing,

in his capacity as Vice-

Chairperson of the Land Use

Commission of the State of

Hawai'i

Isaac Hall for

appellant /plaintiff-appeliee
The Sierra Club

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William W. L. Yuen
for appeliee/defendant-
appellee Pacific Health
Community, Inc.

Bruce L. Lamon
(of Goodsill Anderson Quinn
& Stifel) for appellee/
defendant-appellee Castle

& Cooke Homes Hawaii, Inc.

Lori K.K. Sunakoda,
Deputy Corporation Counsel,
for appellee/defendant-
appellee City and County
of Honolulu (no brief filed)

Neighborhood Board No. 25
c/o Richard G. Poirier

for appellee/defendant-appellee
Neighborhood Board No. 25

(no brief filed)

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