Case Title: Hanvey v. Thompson

Citation: 243 So. 2d 748

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1971-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
243 So. 2d 748 (1971)
Burton Eugene HANVEY
v.
Naomi THOMPSON and Neal D. Thompson.
Ex parte Naomi THOMPSON et al.
8 Div. 394, 394A.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 4, 1971.
*749 Humphrey, Lutz & Smith, Huntsville, for petitioners-appellees.
Bell, Richardson, Cleary, McLain & Tucker and James H. Porter, Huntsville, for respondent-appellant.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
These cases (consolidated on appeal) come to us on a writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, 46 Ala.App. 476, 243 So. 2d 743. The petition for the writ was assigned to another member of the court on preliminary consideration. After the writ was granted, it was reassigned to the writer.
The writ seeks to have us review and reverse the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals which reverses two judgments for the plaintiffs totalling $10,000, after jury verdicts in their favor in the Madison County Circuit Court.
Petitioners (plaintiffs below) contend that the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals (in holding that a certain requested charge should have been given) is a case of first impression in Alabama and is in conflict with a prior decision of our court; and that it construes a statute (Pedestrian Walk and Wait Signals, Title 36, § 58(38), Code of Alabama 1940) which is also a case of first impression in Alabama.
Before the petition was granted, respondent filed a "motion to strike" it. After the writ was granted, respondent filed a "motion to discharge" the writ. In both *750 motions respondent contends that there is no conflict with any prior decision of our court, nor is this a case of first impression in Alabama. Hence, he urges in brief:
While we appreciate his alluding to the burdensome case loads under which this court operated prior to October 1, 1969,[2] we cannot agree with respondent's comment that the legislature can narrowly limit the "types of decisions for the review of which a petition for writ of certiorari could be granted."
In the landmark case of Ex parte Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 176 Ala. 631, 58 So. 315 (1912), this court construed Section 140, Constitution 1901,[3] with respect to our power and authority to superintend and control the Court of Appeals (then newly created). As Justice (later Chief Justice) Anderson writing for the court observed:
Likewise, in Act No. 987, supra, the act creating the present Courts of Appeals, the legislature recognizes the power of this court to control the proceedings and decisions of the Courts of Appeals. Section 10 of the Act is but a copy of that section of the Acts of 1911, quoted supra.
Justice Anderson went on to say for the Court, beginning at page 636, 58 So. at page 317:
Thus, we conclude that the legislature does not possess the power (as respondent suggests in brief) to narrowly limit "the types of decisions for the review of which a petition for writ of certiorari could be granted." We think this power resides in this court.
On December 14, 1970, we amended our existing Rule 39 to provide the method by which we consider applications for writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. It so happens that we chose to limit our review to the same classes of cases prescribed in Section 32, Act No. 987, supra.
*752 And, though we limit our review at this time to those instances delineated in Rule 39, as amended, we still preserve our constitutional right to prescribe the mode and manner in which we will exercise the power to issue writs of certiorari and any other remedial writs which we deem necessary to give us general superintendence and control over the Courts of Appeals. Exparte Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra.
We wish to call the attention of bench and bar to the statement in Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General (In re: Clarence Stallworth v. State of Alabama), 285 Ala. 72, 229 So. 2d 27 (1969), that the clerk of the court is instructed to return, without filing, all petitions for writs when no attempt was made to comply with Act No. 987, Section 32, supra. The court has now decided that this practice is no longer to be followed. All petitions for writs will be filed by the clerk. In the event a petition for a writ does not comply with Rule 39, as amended, it will be subject to being stricken on motion of a party or ex mero motu by the court. To this extent and to the extent that our Rule 39, as amended, is to be followed instead of Section 32, Act No. 987, supra, the Stallworth case is modified. It is not here intended to otherwise modify or overrule Stallworth.
After a careful consideration of the respondent's several motions we have concluded that neither is well taken and each ought to be denied. The full court in consultation has concluded that the petition for writ of certiorari in this case does substantially comply with our amended Rule 39 and sets forth sufficient grounds for our review.
To enable a clear understanding of this opinion, we deem it necessary to recount the relevant facts. Plaintiff, Naomi Thompson, a pedestrian, was injured when struck by an automobile driven by defendant. The accident occurred at the intersection of Holmes and Washington Streets in Huntsville. Holmes is a one way street going west. Washington Street is one way going north. A traffic light facing south and controlling traffic on Washington Street is situated on the northeast corner of the intersection. Also located on this corner and facing south is a light for pedestrians containing the lighted words, "Walk" or "Don't Walk." A similar pedestrian light is positioned on the southeast corner of the intersection, facing west. These lights are synchronized in such a manner that when the pedestrian lights signal "Walk," no traffic moves into the intersection and pedestrians can proceed in any direction, including diagonally. Conversely, no pedestrian can walk when traffic is moving on either street. The plaintiff arrived at the southwest corner of the intersection, looked at the northeast corner and observed that the traffic light was red and that the pedestrian's light signalled, "Don't Walk." Plaintiff proceeded easterly across Washington Street without looking at the pedestrian light facing her on the southeast corner. It was raining at the time and she had an umbrella protecting her from the rain. Two cars were stopped, side by side, on Washington Street in response to the red traffic light that the plaintiff had observed on the northeast corner. The light turned green as plaintiff passed in front of the first automobile. The driver of that vehicle saw the plaintiff and allowed her to clear before driving on. The defendant, who was in the second car, says he did not observe the plaintiff and started forward when the light changed to green. Defendant's automobile struck the plaintiff, thereby resulting in her injuries. The plaintiff testified that she was familiar with this intersection and the manner in which the traffic and pedestrian lights operated.
And, now we address ourselves to the principal question raised, whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in its decision which reversed the Madison County Circuit *753 Court for refusing to give defendant the following written requested charge:
Petitioners contend that the charge is bad and was properly refused by the trial judge because it is vague, abstract and misleading. Petitioners query: In what respect was this plaintiff negligent as a matter of law? Was she negligent because she violated a statute? Then, what statute? Petitioners state that the Court of Civil Appeals decision indicates her negligence was not confined solely to her violation of a statute, but included her other acts. Thus, they contend that the charge is misleading because it does not advise the jury which of her other acts were those constituting negligence as a matter of law.
Respondent replies that the charge is neither vague, abstract nor misleading but is very specific. He contends that it should have been given by the trial court. On submission of the case at oral argument, respondent cited Simpson v. Glenn, 264 Ala. 519, 88 So. 2d 326 (1956), as authority for his position.
After a careful consideration by the entire court in consultation we have concluded that the charge is misleading.
The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals does seem to hold that the plaintiff, Naomi Thompson, was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in violating the statute, and also in not keeping a proper lookout. But, the charge does not so state. The jury is left in a state of uncertainty as to which act or acts of plaintiff constituted her "said negligence."
As petitioners aptly observe in brief:
The case of Simpson v. Glenn, supra, cited by respondent does not militate against our conclusion that the charge is misleading. In that case the charge was:
The facts of that case are stated in the opinion:
Justice Simpson writing for the court concludes:
We think it is readily apparent that there are several distinctions between that charge and the charge in this case. For instance, the charge in Simpson v. Glenn, supra, clearly states that the act of negligence on the part of Mrs. Glenn is her crossing 12th Street at Princeton Alley. This, she did in violation of a city ordinance forbidding pedestrians to cross at other than street intersections. Additionally, there is no other conduct charged as negligence in that case such as the Court of Civil Appeals found to exist in the instant case.
There may also be other reasons why refusal of this charge by the trial court was not error. But, we think our discussion is sufficient to point out that in our view the charge is misleading and the Court of Civil Appeals is in error in holding that the charge should have been given.
Though the issue is not before us we think we may point out that we agree with the Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion in holding that the affirmative charge was properly refused the defendant.
Thus, in view of our conclusions, it results that the Court of Civil Appeals is due to be reversed and this cause remanded to that court for the entry of a decision not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
HEFLIN, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON, MERRILL, COLEMAN and McCALL, JJ., concur.
HARWOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur in the result.
[1]  Act No. 987, Acts of Alabama 1969, Vol. II, p. 1744.
[2]  The effective dates of Act No. 987 (creating the Court of Civil Appeals and redesignating the Court of Criminal Appeals), supra, and Act No. 602 (adding two justices to the Supreme Court), Acts of Alabama 1969, Vol. II, p. 1087.
[3]  "Sec. 140. Except in cases otherwise directed in this Constitution, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state, under such restrictions and regulations, not repugnant to this Constitution, as may from time to time be prescribed by law, except where jurisdiction over appeals is vested in some inferior court, and made final therein; provided, that the supreme court shall have power to issue writs of injunction, habeas corpus, quo warranto, and such other remedial and original writs as may be necessary to give it a general superintendence and control of inferior jurisdictions."