Case Title: STATE v THOMSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13050 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, D O U G L A S C. T H O M S O N , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and P h i l l i p s and Douglas D. Dasinger, Kalispell, Montana Douglas D. Dasinger argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz , Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Jack Yardley, County Attorney, argued, Livingston, Montana David DePuy , Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Livingston, Montana Submitted: December 8, 1975 Decided : JAN 2 8 1376 ' ; p 2 " , : " .'q-y Filed: . . * M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict of guilty. Defendant Douglas C. Thomson was convicted on two counts, possession and s a l e of dangerous drugs i n Park County, the Honorable Robert H. Wilson, presiding. Prior t o t r i a l , defendant moved t o suppress any evi- dence obtained a s a r e s u l t of a search warrant. The motion, a f t e r hearing, was denied. The appeal i s based on the denial of the motion t o suppress, and on two jury selection procedural matters. One Paul H a l l e t t was a prisoner i n the Livingston c i t y j a i l , having been arrested on a fraudulent check charge. O n t h e evening of November 16, 1974, Hallett asked t o see an o f f i c e r and asked i f the o f f i c e r would l i k e c e r t a i n information r e l a t i n g t o drug s a l e s by defendant. H a l l e t t was l a t e r interviewed by the county attorney. O n the basis of the information received t h e county attorney prepared an application f o r a search warrant. In the e a r l y morning hours of November 17, 1974, the application was presented t o D i s t r i c t Judge Jack D. Shanstrorn i n h i s home. Two police o f f i c e r s , the county attorney, and Hallett met with Judge Shanstrom. After examining t h e application, Judge Shanstrom placed Officer Warren and the informant H a l l e t t under oath and examined each of them f o r about twenty minutes. The examination included discussions of Hallett ' s information about defendant and was one Adams, wholthen under a deferred imposition of sentence from Billings f o r drugs. The Judge was familiar with both defendant and Adams and examined t h e informer Hallett extensively i n d e t a i l on h i s knowledge of both subjects, the drugs, and t h e location of the drugs. Based on the application and on h i s independent examination of the informant H a l l e t t a s t o both h i s own involvement and h i s knowledge, Judge Shanstrom issued the search warrant. Prior t o t r i a l a t a hearing on the motion t o suppress Judge Robert H. Wilson presided, Judge Shanstrom t e s t i f i e d and was cross-examined. Judge Wilson denied the motion t o suppress. Judge Wilson t r i e d the case with a jury. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s basic issue on appeal i s whether the search warrant was issued on probable cause. Defendant approaches h i s argument--that there was not probable cause shown--in a s o r t of two pronged manner. F i r s t , he suggests t h a t because Judge Shanstrom questioned the informant about features within the ~ u d g e ' s own knowledge, such a s Adam's p r i o r conviction and defendant's reputation, t h a t he was not a "detached magistrate". W e need not dwell long on t h i s . It i s c l e a r from Judge Shanstrom's testimony t h a t he was examining t h e informant t o determine t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of h i s information. The informant was, i n a sense, an i t i n e r a n t unknown who was being held i n j a i l on another charge, but he was a named person. Judge Shanstrom was the n e u t r a l member of the j u d i c i a l branch of government whose duty it i s t o determine whether there was probable cause f o r the issuance of a search warrant. The probable cause f o r t h e issuance of a warrant was s t a t e d i n the application but the source of t h a t information was a named in- formant whose r e l i a b i l i t y had not been previously tested. Judge Shanstrom' s examination of t h a t informant on information known t o the Judge made a reasonably r e l i a b l e t e s t of t h a t information neces- sary t o support r e l i a b i l i t y and thus probable cause. Defendant c i t e s United States v. United States D i s t r i c t Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 T , ed 2d 752, and Coolidge v. N e w Hamp- s h i r e , 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, f o r the propo- s i t i o n t h a t a "neutral and detached" magistrate i s required. Neither case i s appli-cable here. Both cases involved attorneys general, one without j u d i c i a l approval; the other the attorney general acting a s a j u s t i c e of peace issuing h i s own search warrant, i n e f f e c t . The second prong of the defendant's a t t a c k i s t h a t the informant's r e l i a b i l i t y was not established because he was un- known a s t o r e l i a b i l i t y . That i s why Judge Shanstrom examined the informant--an independent means of establishing r e l i a b i l i t y . Rut, defendant argues t h a t t h e application must i n and of i t s e l f e s t a b l i s h both (a) the r e l i a b i l i t y of the informant and (b) the underlying circumstance giving r i s e t o the probable cause. In State ex r e l . Glantz, 154 Mont. 132, 137, 461 P.2d 193, t h i s Court said: 11;1; J, - ik whenever an informer's statements a r e r e l i e d upon a s probable cause, there must be a demonstration of t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o r c r e d i b i l i t y of the informer. I I See: State v. Paschke, 165 Mont. 231, 527 P.2d 569, 31 St.Rep. 847; State v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692, 31 St.Rep. Ordinarily, the r e l i a b i l i t y of the informer has been shown by the informer's reputation a s an upstanding c i t i z e n o r by past performance; and i n e i t h e r event these f a c t s can be s t a t e d i n the application. But here, a s previously s e t out, these f a c t s did not e x i s t so the issuing magistrate tested t h a t r e l i a b i l i t y i n a manner, under oath, designed t o independently s a t i s f y the magistrate of the accuracy of the information. W e hold t h i s t o s a t i s f y the showing of probable cause necessary f o r the issuance of the warrant. O n o r a l argument, counsel c i t e d S t a t e ex r e l . Townsend v. D i s t r i c t Court, I4on t . - - 9 P. 2d , 32 St.Rep. --- 1163, f o r the proposition t h a t the a f f i d a v i t f o r search warrant cannot be supplemented by o r a l statements t o the magistrate. That i s correct and here we point out t h a t the a f f i d a v i t was wholly s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause, but being based on hearsay from an informant, t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h a t informant may be checked by the maglstrate. It i s no doubt desirable t o have a written re- cord of t h a t examination, but the exigencies of the nighttime situa- t i o n did not permit such. The Judge t e s t i f i e d and was subject t o cross-examination. H i s only concern was a s t o the r e l i a b i l i t y of the hearsay, and he so t e s t i f i e d . Thus, here o r a l testimony i s not supplementing probable cause---it i s merely providing a d i r e c t t e s t of r e l i a b i l i t y by a conscientious magistrate. The cases on unnamed informants a r e not i n point. The two procedural matters i n jury selection complained of arose i n t h i s manner: Prior t o t h e exercise of peremptory challenges, outside the presence of the jury, counsel f o r defendant challenged f o r cause the seating of a prospective juror, J. E. Gaab, on t h e grounds t h a t he was an employee of t h e State Fish and Game Depart- ment and had been i n law enforcement work. The challenge was denied. M r . Gaab did not s i t a s a t r i a l juror, but defendant claims e r r o r because he was obligated t o use a peremptory challenge. In defendant's b r i e f on appeal it i s stated t h a t "Pros- pective juror, J. E. Gaab, admittedly was a law enforcement officer". In point of f a c t juror Gaab was an o f f i c e r of the Montana Fish and Game department. Section 95-1909 (d) ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s t h a t "Each party may challenge jurors f o r cause, and each challenge must be t r i e d by the court". Subsection (2) l i s t s those reasons f o r which a challenge f o r cause may be taken. That subsection a l s o provides t h a t a challenge f o r cause may be taken "for any other reason which the court determines". Of the reasons l i s t e d i n section 95-1909 only the f i n a l one would provide a reason f o r challenging a law enforcement o f f i c e r f o r cause. Section 95- 1909 (d) (2) (x) s t a t e s : "For the existence of a s t a t e of mind on the part of the juror i n reference t o the case, o r t o e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s , which w i l l prevent him from acting with e n t i r e impartiality and without prejudice t o the substantial r i g h t s of e i t h e r party. I t That section does not s p e c i f i c a l l y exclude law enforce- ment o f f i c e r s from serving a s jurors i n a criminal case. Not being s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r , law enforcement o f f i c e r s must stand on an equal footing with any other c i t i z e n a s a prospective juror. Since defendant does not a l l e g e t h e existence of any p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which would place him within t h e s t r i c t u r e s of subsection (x), other than the f a c t tha.t he i s a f i s h and game o f f i c e r , no basis e x i s t s f o r h i s disqualification f o r cause. The bare f a c t t h a t he i s connected with law enforcement does not, without more, necessitate a finding t h a t he would not be an i m - p a r t i a l juror. In State v. Allison, 122 Mont. 120, 129, 131, 199 P, 2d 279, the Court s t a t e d : "It i s a d i f f i c u l t matter a t b e s t t o ascertain the r e a l s t a t e of mind of a prospective juror with respect t o detecting the existence of bias o r pre- judice against one accused of crime. For t h a t reason t h i s court has s a i d (State v. Russell, 73 Mont. 240, 249, 235 Pac. 712, 715) t h a t the determination of the qualification of a juror t o serve i n a case before the 1 court must be l e f t largely t o the sound discretion 1 of the t r i a l court. Again i n State v. Huffman 89 Mont. 194, 296 Pac. 789, 790, t h i s court said: * * the t r i a l court i s the judge of the weight t o be given t o the testimony adduced on a v o i r d i r e examination. I f 1 Assumedly, the d i s t r i c t court could have removed juror Gaab f o r cause even without a c l e a r showing of impartiality i f t h e court had any doubt a s t o the j u r o r ' s s t a t e of mind. Such a determina- tion is within t h e sound j u d i c i a l discretion of the court. Where the court does not exercise i t s discretion i n removing a juror f o r cause when a challenge i s made, t h i s Court may reverse a conviction only where there i s demonstrated a c l e a r abuse of discretion. In the i n s t a n t case no such abuse of discretion can be shown by de- f endant. While a f i s h and game warden is a law enforcement o f f i c e r i n a narrow sense, the authority of those o f f i c e r s i s limited i n scope by Chapter 1, T i t l e 26, Revised Codes of Montana. Section 26-110 (2), R.C.M. 1947, substantially s t a t e s the law enforcement d u t i e s of wardens: "They s h a l l enforce the laws of t h i s s t a t e and the r u l e s of the commission with reference t o the protection, preservation, and propaga- t i o n of-game and fur-bearing animals, f i s h and game birds. 11 The i n s t a n t case deals with a violation of the general criminal law of the s t a t e of Montana, s p e c i f i c a l l y the Montana Dangerous Drug Act. Prospective juror Gaab, a s a game warden, has no connection with offenses committed i n violation of the drug laws of t h i s S a t e . H e has no power a s a law enforcement o f f i c e r i n t h a t respect and he stands a s a private c i t i z e n . Without a showing of impartiality there can be no abuse i n discretion by the t r i a l court i n refusing t o allow t h a t juror t o be removed f o r cause. In State v. Cadotte, 1 7 Mont. 315, 316 (1895), t h i s Court found no e r r o r i n refusing t o remove a juror f o r cause where the juror was a brother-in-law of the county attorney who was prose- cuting. There the Court said: 11 Furthermore, the examination of t h i s juror wpon h i s voir d i r e does not a t a l l tend t o show any -- b i a s , e i t h e r implied or actual." It i s c l e a r then t h a t , unless the juror f a l l s within one of the categories of section 95-1909, he w i l l not be removed f o r cause without a showing o f - W a r t i a l i t y . In t h i s case there i s not only no showing of&qartiality, there i s not even an allegation o f i m p a r t i a l i t y . The bare f a c t of Gaab's position a s a game warden i s not enough t o c r e a t e a doubt a s t o h i s impartiality, without more. The d i s t r i c t court record indicates t h a t Gaab was removed a s a juror through a peremptory challenge by defendant. In Allison the Court recognized t h a t even i f a doubt did e x i s t as t o the j u r o r ' s s t a t e of mind, the f a c t t h a t the defendant l a t e r removed the juror through t h e exercise of a peremptory challenge precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of any prejudice t o the defendant. In distinguishing State v. Sims, 51 N.M. 467, 188 P.2d 177, the Court stated: 11;'; $ . 9c In t h e case a t bar, however, the defendant had three peremptory challenges l e f t a t the time the court overruled the challenge against the witness Leemhius and immediately following defendant's taking of exception t o the c o u r t ' s overruling said challenge, the defendant exercised h i s s i x t h peremptory challenge t o remove said juror. In t h e case a t bar the court did not, a s i n the Sims case, force the objectionable- juror upon the defendant a f t e r t h e l a t t e r had exhausted a l l h i s peremptory challenges, and so f a r a s prejudice t o the r i g h t s of the defendant i s concerned, Leemhius did not s i t on t h e jury which t r i e d the defendant. The f a c t t h a t defendant regarded jurors Jensen and Ronnin a s undesirable gave him no r i g h t t o have Leemhius excused f o r b i a s i n order t h a t defendant might get r i d of one o r two other jurors, no showing having been made t h a t those prospective jurors were not qualified. I I Defendant was not e n t i t l e d t o the removal of Gaab a s a juror f o r cause, and even i f he had been so e n t i t l e d he was i n no way harmed i n h i s defense since Gaab did not s i t on the jury. Next and l a s t , defendant claims e r r o r i n the answers on v o i r d i r e examination of jurors when juror Richard Cain was alleged t o have answered i n the negative a question a s t o whether any potential juror was a member of a law enforcement agency o r con- nected with a law enforcement agency. Defendant then alleges t h a t M r . Cain was a member of the Police Commission of the c i t y of Livingston. These allegations by defendant do not appear i n the record. They come by way of counsel's a f f i d a v i t . The s t a t e pre- sented a counter-affidavit from juror Cain denying t h a t such questions w e r e even asked. Aside from the f a c t t h a t a police commissioner under Montana law, Chapter 18, T i t l e 11, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, i s not a law enforcement o f f i c e r and thus the answer would have been technically proper i n any event, we do not accept a f f i d a v i t s t o supplement an appellate record i n t h i s manner. S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, - Mont . - 2 540 P.2d 312, 32 St.Rep. 906. Finding no e r r o r , t h e judgment i s affirmed. W e Concur: 1 L%- J u s t i c e s .