Case Title: Kelly v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 610, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
AARON KELLY,
 
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No. 610, 2008
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Cr. No. 0712013625
Plaintiff Below, 
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  June 4, 2009
Decided:  August 27, 2009
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Michael C. Heyden, Esquire, (argued), Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, (argued) Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellee.
BERGER, Justice:
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In this criminal appeal we consider whether the trial court committed reversible
error when it limited cross-examination of the complaining witness.  Appellant was
charged with assault in a correctional facility, and claimed self-defense.  Appellant
believed that the complaining witness was going to rape him, and he wanted to
introduce evidence that the complaining witness was serving his time for committing
rape.  The trial court concluded that the nature of the crime would be too prejudicial,
and that all the jury could be told was that the complaining witness had committed
felonies.  We conclude that the trial court’s ruling impermissibly restricted  appellant’s
defense.  Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2007, Aaron Kelly was incarcerated at the Delaware Correctional
Center, serving a three-year sentence for attempted burglary.  David Veru was housed
in the cell next to Kelly.  He had been incarcerated for 19 years, and was serving a life
sentence for raping a woman.  During recreation time on November 17, 2007, when
all the cells in the section were unlocked for one hour, Kelly went to take a shower.
Veru went to the same shower a few minutes later.
Although there is a dispute as to what precipitated it, the two men began
fighting.  According to Veru, he was attacked by Kelly for no reason.  According to
Kelly, Veru grabbed his genitals and would not let go until Kelly hit Veru several
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times.  After the initial altercation at the shower, the fight continued (or was renewed)
inside and in front of Kelly’s cell.  Veru testified that he was so enraged by Kelly
having beaten him in the shower that he “went crazy” and decided to “avenge” himself.
Veru returned to his own cell, and put a lock into a sock to use as a weapon.  He then
returned to Kelly’s cell and swung at Kelly’s head while Kelly’s back was turned.  The
lock-in-a-sock either missed or grazed Kelly’s shoulder, and flew out of Veru’s hand.
The two resumed their fight, and Kelly knocked Veru to the ground.  When the prison
guards came to stop the fight, Kelly was kicking Veru, who was curled up on the
ground.  Kelly suffered little, or no, physical injury.  Veru suffered fairly serious
injuries.
At trial, Kelly claimed that he acted in self-defense.  He testified that for about
two months before this incident, Veru made sexual advances, and that each time, Kelly
rebuffed Veru.  When Veru approached Kelly in the shower, Veru grabbed Kelly’s
genitals, causing great pain.  Kelly had to punch Veru six times to get Veru to let go.
Kelly then returned to his cell.  He was putting on his sneakers, with his back to the
cell door,  when Veru came up behind him and swung at him with the lock-in-a-sock.
According to Kelly, Veru said, “I’m going to make you my bitch.”  Kelly said they
both started swinging at each other and “exchanging blows.”  Veru fell to the ground
shortly before the prison guards arrived.  They told Kelly to back off, and he did.
Allen v. State, 644 A.2d 982, 985 (Del. 1994).
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Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295, 304 (Del. 2006) (Quotations and citations omitted.).
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Veru was not charged with any crime.  Kelly was charged with and convicted
of assault in a correctional facility.  This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal is whether Kelly should have been allowed to present
evidence that Veru had been convicted of first degree rape.  The trial court decided that
the probative value of knowing the specific crime was outweighed by  substantial
prejudice.  Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Kelly could present evidence that
Veru was convicted of felonies, but could not provide a description of the crimes or
their titles.  We review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.   If
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we conclude that there was an abuse of discretion, we then must determine whether the
error caused “significant prejudice so as to have denied  [Kelly] a fair trial.”2
The facts about the altercation itself were largely undisputed.  Veru and Kelly
got into a fight – first in the shower area, and then, moments later, in the area around
Kelly’s cell.  Kelly is physically larger than Veru, and it is apparent from their
respective injuries that Kelly “won” the fight.  The questions for the jury were  whether
Veru was the aggressor, whether Kelly believed Veru was threatening to sexually
assault him, and whether Kelly used more force than he believed was necessary to
11 Del. C. § 464.
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defend himself.  Kelly testified that Veru had been making sexual overtures; that he
grabbed Kelly’s genitals in the shower; and that when Veru came at Kelly with the
lock-in-a-sock, Veru said that he was going to make Kelly his bitch.  Kelly’s witnesses
were other inmates, who testified that Veru was taunting Kelly and that Veru had
homosexual relationships in prison.  Veru denied making sexual advances toward
Kelly, and claimed that Kelly attacked him in the shower for no reason.  Prison guards
described Veru as a model prisoner with no history of homosexual activity. 
It is within this factual framework that we must consider the discretionary
evidentiary ruling. Under certain circumstances, justification is a defense to criminal
charges:
(a) The use of force upon or toward another person is
justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the defendant
against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present
occasion.
(b) . . . [A] person employing protective force may estimate
the necessity thereof under the circumstances as the person
believes them to be when the force is used, without retreating . . . .
(c) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section
if the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect the
defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat . . . .3
Tice v. State, 624 A.2d 399, 402 (Del.1993).
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538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del.1988).
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One of the essential elements of a claim of self-defense is the defendant’s subjective
belief that force was necessary for self-protection.  While evidence of Veru’s rape
conviction is not admissible to prove that Veru was attempting to rape Kelly, it may
be admissible to establish Kelly’s state of mind:
Since one of the factors that influences the reasonable belief of a
defendant, threatened with imminent assault, is the defendant’s
knowledge or awareness of the victim’s past acts of violence, these
instances are relevant for their proper non-character purpose.  Subject to
the satisfaction of the requirements articulated in Getz, the defense was
entitled to use this evidence . . . to show the fear experienced by the
defendant, and thus, establish the subjective state of mind required to
assert the claim of self-defense.4
Under Getz v. State,  the decision to admit evidence of other crimes turns on
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whether:  1) the prior crime is material to an issue in dispute; 2) it is to be admitted for
a proper purpose; 3) the prior crime has been proven by “plain, clear and conclusive”
evidence; 4) the prior crime is too remote in time; and 5) the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  The trial court did not conduct a Getz
analysis, although it did decide that the rape conviction would be highly prejudicial.
After considering the Getz factors, we are satisfied that the evidence should have been
admitted.  Kelly’s knowledge that Veru is a rapist was material to his belief that Veru
was threatening to rape him.  It would be admitted for a proper purpose, as noted
Cf. DRE 609 (Prior convictions may be admitted for impeachment if not more than 10 years have
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elapsed since conviction or release, whichever is later.).
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above.  The prior conviction could be proven conclusively through court records.
Although the conviction was 17 years old, we find no remoteness problem because
Veru has been incarcerated since that conviction.   Finally, while the fact that Veru
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committed rape undoubtedly is prejudicial, it has significant probative value in
assessing Kelly’s professed fear of being sexually assaulted.
Having determined that Kelly should have been allowed to examine Veru about
the fact that he had been convicted of rape, the question becomes whether the trial
court’s error requires reversal.  We find that it does.  Kelly is a significantly larger man
than Veru.  Thus, for Kelly’s claim of self-defense to be at all credible, the jury would
have to accept that Kelly thought Veru was about to sexually assault him.  Both Veru
and Kelly were convicts, so the jury did not learn much about Kelly’s state of mind
when it heard how many felonies Veru had committed.  The critical fact was Veru’s
rape conviction, which  could explain both the nature and severity of Kelly’s response.
Because we conclude that Kelly was significantly prejudiced by the exclusion of this
evidence, we must reverse for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of conviction for assault in a correctional
facility is reversed, and this matter is remanded for a new trial.  Jurisdiction is not
retained.