Case Title: FARMERS ALLIANCE MUTUAL INS CO v

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 95-425 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1996 FARMERS ALLIfiATCE MUTITAL INSUR&TCE: COMP.LVY, a Kansas Insurance corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, KRISTI H O L E W , Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent CERTIFZED QUESTION FROM: The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, The Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom presiding COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Robert Savage; Habedank, Cumming, Best & Savage, Sidney, Montana (argued for Farmers Alliance) For Respondent: Donald D. Sommerfeld; Towe, Ball, Enright, Mackey & Sommerfeld, Billings, Montana (argued for Kristi Holeman, Personal Representative) For Amicus: Peter F. Habein; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana (argued for Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company) Susan P. Eoy, Garlington, Lohn &Robinson, Missouia, Montana (argued for Alliance of American Insurers) Gene R. Jarussi; Jarussi &Bishop, Billings, Montana (argued for Montana Trial Lawyers Association) ..-:,..* ** . . - # , . . . . 9 r"" '@*,& ;- ‘ f < ; q ./ ? Heard: May 2 0 , 1996 sf-: . , :~. .LA A k d Submitted: June 25, 1926 ~ ~ ~ i d ~ d : aeptamber 1 2 , Justice W . VJilliam Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court The United States District Court for the District of Montana, . - - Bliiings Division, bas zertified the folLowing question to this Court pursuant to Rule 44, M.R.Appp.F. We answer the certified question "no." The certified question is: Section 33-23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of the uninsured motorist coverage available under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance. Does Section 3 3 - 23 -203, MCA, prohibit the stacking of the medical payment coverage and the -insuredmotorist coverage available under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance where a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle listed within that policy? In the insurance policy at issue, a premium is charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy for medical payment co*Jerage and a premium is charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy for -insurance coverage. The premium for the -insured motorist coverage is included as part of the premium for the uninsured motorist coverage. In its Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court of Montana, the District Court submitted a statement of agreed facts The facts that this Court finds dispositive of the question are as follows : 4. That, at approximately 0450 hours, on November 9, 1991, a vehicle insured by the Plaintiff under the policy issued to Wade and Diana Brown, namely a 1971 Ford pickup with VIN FlOGKL66406, being driven by Lori Watson, in which Scott Hankel and Gary Lee Leonard were passengers, was involved in a one-vehicle accident in Jefferson County, Montana, on Interstate 90 at milepost 233.4, 15.6 miles west of Whitehall, Montana. 5. Subsequent thereto, at approximately 0510 hours, at [sic] 1983 Ford pickup truck, V1N 1FTHF26LSDPA15458, owned by Darrel. M. Storey and driven by Darrel Maynard Storey, Jr., was traveling east on Interstate 90 when the driver lost control of the vehicle as he attempted to slow for the accident scene and went into a sideskid. The Storey vehicle struck the right roar corner of the trailer attached ts the subject 1971 Ford pickup, VIN F30GRL66406. Such contact pushed the trailer into the ditch and onto its Left side. The Storey vehicle then rapidly rotated. Mr. Leonard's coat became entangled on the bitch of the Storey pickup which caw-sed Mr. Leonard to be dragged under the Storey vehicle until after it went backwards into the ditch on the south side of the road. 1 . Leonard died as a result o f the injuries sustained. 6. The Storey vehicle was insured by State Farm A u t o Insurance Company under Pnli.cy PJo 1.3E 522.2-495-225 add State Farm subsequently paid out its policy limits under the liability portion of its policy limits in the amount of $25,000. 7. Prior to signing a Release, the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard made demand upon Plaintiff for the uninsured (underinsured) motorist coverage and auto medical payment coverage provided for in the Business Auto Policy of Wade and Diana Brown. 8. Plaintiff has refused to make any payments of uninsured (underinsured! motorist coverage and auto medical payment coverage to the heirs and/or Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, deceased. Answering the question certified by the United States District Court requires this Court to construe § 33-23-203, MCA. In construing a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The rules of statutory construction require the language to be construed according to its plain meaning. Stratemeyer v. L~ncoln County (Flont . 1996) , 915 P.2d 175, 178, 53 St.Rep. 245, 250 (citing Clarke v. Massey (19951, 271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088). If the language is clear and unambiguous, then no further interpretation is required; we will resort to legislative history only if the intent cannot be determined f r o m t h e plain wording of the statute. Clarke, 847 F.id at 1088. Where the intention of the legislature can be determined from che piain meaning of the words used in a statute, the courts may not go further and apply other rneans of interpretation. Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088 (citing Tongue River Glec. Coop. v. Montana Power Co. (1981), 191 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864). The question certified is a narrow one. We are asked only trj determine whether § 33-.23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of woptional" coverages--here, the medical payments and underinsurance coverages. We do not consider whether the terms of the insurance contract prohibit stacking. Rather, our analysis is confined to an interpretation of § 33-23-203, MCA. Accordingly, this Court's recent decision in Chilberg v. Rose (1995) , 273 Mont . 414, 903 P. 2d 1377, is not controlling in this case as Chilberq is a multiple policy case and does not interpret § 33-23-203, MCA. In addition, we note that Sayers 'J. Safeco Ins. Co. of America i1981), 192 Mont. 336, 628 P.2d 659, cited with approval in Chilberq, is contrary to § 33-23-203, MCA, as Savers approved the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage under a single policy. Thus, under § 33-23-203, MCA, Savers is no longer good law because under the terms of S 33- 23-203, MCA, stacking of uninsured motorist coverage for multiple vehicles lnsured under a single policy is expressly prohibited unless the policy specifically provides otherwise. Section 33-23- 203, MCA, provides: (1) Unless a motor vehicle liab~lity policy specifically provides otherwise, the limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy, including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage, 4 n m s t be determined as follows, regardless of the number of motor vehicles insured under the policy: . ' (a) the l~rnlt of insurance coverage available for any one accident is the Limit specified for the motor vehicle involved in the accident; (bj if no motor vehicle insured under the policy is involved in the scciclent, the limitof insurance coverage available for any one accidest is the highest limit of coverage specified for any one motor vehicle insured under the policy; and (c) the limits of coverage specified for each motor vehicle insured under the policy may not be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available under the policy for any one accident. (2) A motor vehicle liability policy may also provide for other reasonable limitations, exclusions, or reductions of coverage which are designed to prevent duplicate payments for the same element of loss. From the language of the statute, it is clear that "stacking" is not allowed "unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise." It is equally clear that the "anti-stacking" provisions of the statute apply to a "motor vehicle liability policy" (MVLP) . The term MVLP is defined in § 33-23-204(2), MCA, as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against liability now or hereafter required under Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. " (Emphasis added. ) The dissenters argue that 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, refers to required "policiesti rather than required "co~erages.'~ It makes no sense, however, to discuss "policies" in a vacuum. A policy of insurance is nothing more than the coverages which are provided within the policy. In 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, the legislature was obviously correlating the anti-stacking stiitutes with the fact that policies with specific types of coverage are required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. In particular, the per person, per vehicle and property damage coverages mandated by § 61-6-103(2), 5 FICA. In interpreting 33-23-204(2), I K A , three points are apparent; it is directed at insurance against iiabiiity. Secondly, it is directed at insurance coverage which is "required" by law: and finally, it is concerned with liability icsuraace which is not only required, but is required by both part 1 and part 3. There are only three variatirjl?~ of insurance coverage whiilh meet the above criteria; that is, liability coverage which is required by both the MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act. Those three coverages are the per person, per vehicle and property damage coverages which are required by S 61-6-103(2), MCA, and which are incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Liability Act by § 61-6-301, MCA. Unlilce the third-party coverage mandated by MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, underinsurance and medical payment do not qualify as insurance against liability. Rather, underinsurance and medical pay coverage are designed to protect the first party insured. Furthermore, there is nothing in MIJSRA, the Motor Vehicle Liability Act or Title 33, chapter 23, MCA, which would "require" underinsurance and medical pay coverage. To the contrary, the MVSRh specifically excludes coverages which are in excess of the required per person, per vehicle and property damage coverage. The MVSRA, § 61-6-103(8), provides as follows: Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy, and the excess or additional coverage is not subject to the provisions of thls part, With respect to a policy which grants the excess or addlti~nal coverage, the term "motor vehicle liability policy" applies only to that part of the coverage which is required by this section. As Justice Erdrnann's dissent points cut, the above pro-,?ision specifically refers to coverage which is required "by this secticlr." Although '*this section" refers to the MVSRA, the Motor Vehicle Liability Act has also incorporated those same "c~verage'~ requirements; $25,000 because of bodily injury to any one person, $50,000 for bodily injury in any one accident* and $10,000 fcr property damage. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicle Liability Act which would suggest that the liability coverage requirements incorporated from MVSRA are any broader than those required under MVSRA. Since MVSRA specifically does not require any excess or additional coverage such as underinsurance, it is reasonable to conclude that the Motor Vehicle Liability Act likewise treats medical pay coverage and underinsurance as in 'IexcessN or in addition to the coverages which are specifically required by both Acts in question. Title 61, chapter 6 , parts 1 and 3. As medical payment coverage and underinsured motorist coverage are "excess or additional coverage" which are not required under either the MVSRA or the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, we determine that these coverages are not part of the MVLP under § 33-23-204 ! 2 ) , MCA . Accordingly, the prohibition against stacking required coverages in § 33-23-203, MCA, does not apply to underinsurance and medical payment coverage. This Court has recognized that "Montana has no statutory insurance requirement concerning underinsured motorists." Grier v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. !1931), 248 Mont. 457, 455-59, 812 P.2d 347, 3 4 9 . While coverage in excess of the minimum amounts mandated by 51-6-103(2), MC~rder 33-23-203 (I;, MCA. - , i the majority was only construing 5 61-6-103, MCP., they wosld be ccrrect in their i . r . t e r ; r e c a z i o n . However, in the present case the Fecieral Giscrict Court has requested our interpretaticc of § 33-23-203, MCA. When several statutes apply to a given sitnarion, this Cocrt's '-i J ~ ; is t ? adopt a construction that will qive - effect to all. Section ;-2-L01, NCA; See also Schuman v. Besrrom (1Y85), 214 Mcnt. 410, 693 P.26 536. -- The aefinition of NVLP in S 61-6-103!13, MCA, applied by tne majority to g 33-23-203, MCA, is restricted by its own terms to Part 1 of Chapter 6 and to only those pclicies certified under SS. 61-6-133 or -i34, MCA, for individuals who are required zo provide proof of financial responsibi.lity.' § 01-6-131, YCA. The Language of S 61-5-:03 (8: , A , reas~nakly constraed, means The cajority relies on S 1-2-107, M3A, as authcriry to apply the definition of IWLP in the MVSRA in Title 61 to rhe + slcii +--I<: lng statute in Title 33. Secti2;r i - 2 - 1 Q 7 , MCA, prcviees, , . however, that the defirrclon of a phrase in cne part of the co5e may be applied to the same phrase - i q - ansther uerceu7 A - wkLert. i ccntrary intention plaizly appears," Here, the plair language of 5 6;-5-133 (i), MCA, restzict-s the defi~itton of W J L P "as t l ? e tern is used in : h i s part" ard then cnLy for policies certifie" under S § 61-5-133, - 4 , - - XCA. - C A % . w3.cld be difficult to enyw~isicn z clearer expression of legislative ictenz. The 1,egislzture inten6ed that the defifiitlon of MVLP in S 51-6-103(1), MCA, be restricted to the MVSEA. that the strict require~orrs of the MVSRA apply to the 1iabil;ty c s ~ ~ c r z g ~ rea;ired by scbser--icn ( 2 ) (b:, but not t- the adjitic-al L - , ~r excess cs:-eraqes avziLaE;li; in a x;n_:c;r ertified f,zr z~ :'>,- ,a? +.".: " " GL .,ey, 18,' -? , i n ~ s cons~ruction : s further supported by reviewing Fart 3 sf Chapter 5 which contains the mandatory liability limizs far a l l Montana dri~~ers. As noted, S 33-23-204 (2: , MCA, defines KVLF as any policy required uncer Title 61, Chapcer 5, Parts 1 & 3. Policies can be lssued under either Par- 1 or Part 3 and the two parts are independent. Transamerica Ins. Co. v . Xoyle i 1 3 5 3 1 , 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 920. Part 3 of Chapter 6 references and incorporates only the liability limits ccctaiced in S 61-6-103, FICA, and the remaining provisio~s of the MVSRA are not incorporated into Part 3. If, ,at subjecr + ~ - -herefore, a policy is issaed under Part 3, it ' - r-' Lu L . . _he prcnlslons of Part I. - - See Boldr, 443 P.23 at 35-36; Tra~sanerica, 6 5 5 P.2d at e22-23. ?he facts incll~ied with the certified question do not reflect that the policy was issued under Zart 1, and it is apparerit frcn the policy Lrself that it w a s issued under P a r : 3. I therefore believe the majority's conciusion that the definitioc of MVLP in the MVSBA apclies in its entirety tc ' Fclicies issuec under the ?4VSnnA (Part 1: contain a cumber of restricti.orrs not fcun5 in joiizies issued ucder the mandatcry liakility provisions (Part 3). For instance, ~ n d e r the NVSRA the liability of tne insurer is absolute afser an accident occurs and there are restrictions as cc cancellation and increasing premiums. & § 61-5-103(6)- ( 7 1 , MCA. g 33-23-203? PICA, is in error and ignores the refsrecce r c Part 3 only to policies issued under the MVSRA: Other policies not affected. (1; This pr:, :&art 1; shall not be held to apply tc or affecr. poiicies f - . a,~torr.obile insarance a~ga~irst ~1abilit-y which rtay now or hereafter be repire5 by a2y ccher L a w c r ' LI1:is srate . . . . 'iere .the policy was issaed u : i d e r Parc 3 ar,d the rescricti-,-e definitiofi of MVLF in Part I clearly was cot ictecded ro apply to policies issued under the part repiri-g mandatory liability limits for a11 drivers. - Even if an TMVLP ander 5 33-23-263, KCA, was as limited as chc majcrity holds, the clear language of S 32-23-2833, K C ? . , still leads . . to the conciusion char the szacite ~rohibics S S a C K I r i g o f underinsured mccorist and medicai pay coverages. ectisn 33-23-203 (13, MCA, provides that stacking is prohibited f ~ r insurance coverage "available under any such [KJL?] policy." :Znphasis aicied.: The Legislarcre dic! r?ot grohibis stacking for in~urar~ce caverage "required" by the policy, whicil according to cke - . r2aJ o r : 'ty is ocly the iiaciii~,y lizitc f o ~ r d in 5 5I-0--lC3:2, I, " ~3 ) P2A, t-at r a t , ~r3hibited sca~king for -_.oi;erages "availablev under the colicy. Under tne plain ianjliage of D 33-22-263, MCA, stackkg cf b.oci- . . - mea;ca~ payaent and undericsured mctorist ccvsraqes is prohibited . .- since both were "available' under the policy. wnere the languaue G . , -- a stat-;te is ;;lair,, l~r.avpm7 i.-il.l-U~, el..-7, and .---'--- , L . ~ r ~ e furcti-,r: cf ~ - Eke c0c-Z is sln~iy to ascertain and Secisr? :what is i n ? . e r r n s c r s L I , U ~ t 3 n ~ e ~, I - c~ntained -i . - , - . - - 3 ' - 3.2 , 5s i~serc h;is I - --vs ~ d e z . . omitted or orrit what has been inserted. Secitisn 1 - 2 - X i , NCA. Xeese v. Iieese ii381), 136 Mont. 1a1, E 3 7 P.2d ii63. Further, : h e =ajority1s conclusion thac an XVLF policy, as it is used in § 33-23-203, MCA, is limiied to the $25,000/$50,090,' $10,000 requirements of § 61-6-163 ( 2 : (b), MCA, is simply not consisterc with the other language of § 33-23-203, XCA. Becrion 33-23-203 (1) , MCA, provides that stacking is prohibited for insurance coverage "available under any su-oh LMVLP; policy Ly under uninsured mctorist coverage." includinq limirs c E liabiii" (Emphasis added.) Znzer ~ h e ma?orityls interpretation, an MVL? ii~cluder; only the found in S 61-6-1C3(2~ (b), MCA. Clea--I ,ly, uninsured r n c : o r i s r coverage is not repired by that provision, b~: is specifically recognized by the Legislature 2s being available ur.der an MVLF. Lr, an effort to a v ~ i d this clear statctory language, tne xajority coccLudes chat ucinsured coverage is required ccverage. cnics-cred c-xjeraqe, La c h ~ dearee it is required, is not recuirei d kv Fart I of Chapter 6 , Title 61, MCA, but rather by 5 33-23-20? - I MCA.' The language ir S 6 1 - 5 - ? . 0 3 i 8 i C MCA, relied upon by the I r ? Yemp 7.r. Allstate 1 ~ s . CC. (1975), 193 Mcnt. 5 2 6 , 531, 6CI P.2d 20, 25, this Cc~Jrt, i n a stacking case predating 5 33-23-203, MCA, neld that: 'vru;oncana's urinsured motorist statute is coc . , 3ajorit-y, cirarly states thar when a p c i : c ) ; 9r;;ncs cc7~eracre in e - - - - c iiir~r m F the c=uerz.ge i-q?aired by 22 :,?VLP, term ~ ~ V L P vapplies . . c ~ L y cs thzic cf , h e co~j-ra~f- , I Is rt.q,jire+ , sectl37. L' , zdjej,: sirice ..i.-'7s-.-1: u A . . ,_c_c. c.ul,_ qe 1s not required by 5 6i-6-103, MCA, che najority's Logic breaks dcwn. Finally, the phrase "inciuding the ].inits of liability under uni~sured motor-isr co-reraqe" in S 33-23-233, C also de~onstrates that the ieoislature inter.ded that the stacking prohibition apply to coverages other than those required by 5 6i-6-i03 !,2 1 (b'j , MCA, an6 uninsured motorist coverase. ?he rerm "including" is rct a limii;izg ce-m, but instead is used as an illiistratii~e device. A cumber of courts have neld that the term "includir,g" used ir, similar contexts is not all-inclusive. i?h;llps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd. (lY41), 313 U . S . 177, 51 S. Ct. 845, 85 1. Ed. 1271; Federai ' a n d Bank of S c , P a ~ i v. Bismarck iumber C i c . i13411, 314 Z . S . 95, 62 S. Ct. 1 86, 1 , . Ed. 65; S c h a b v. Ariyoshi [Eaw. I977), 564 P.26 1 3 5 ; Ccfinert y v. Mecrcpclitan Disc. Comm'n ;Mass. 1986), 495 N.E.2d 84C; Cumberland Reclamatior, v. Secretarq. Dep't of interior (6cn Cfr. I991), 925 "2d 161. S E f : also 2A C. Sands, Sutkerland Statutorv Ccnstruition S 47.23 at 114 (4th ee. 19ec: . zandatory, 1~ the sense that the insured has the right tc -~-je,-+ -- , -- :r - , wricin~ s i ; c ? : ccverage i n pollcies issiled in Nontana." he ~ a j o r i c ~ ' ~ holding in chis r a s e tha.t uni~sured mstorist coverage is ri.quire6 col-erage is in dil-ect conflict with cur holding in m. . . Tnis Court's prior cleclsion; i r r this area are ad-itredly , . , ccnf;~i~cr a ar.3 ~23j~rity ad& z r , c-zfasigr, by ~istir.j216;~-~13c2 . , sev-rai s ; s e s t h a t clear>; apply tr tkis slt~~ation. v ! , ~ -.A- 7.4-. - . , ~. . Lie; i~rn~ts far poi;cies . iss~j~ei under --- iLr- MT,7SX.EA f 0 ; - "ha3 drivers" an6 unirisured motorist coverage. Since sta-cking has - , n - ; - x , - e : - been appiieci to ; : a b i l i t y cc-jera~es," the only type cf coverage in Monrana for which sracking is prchibired is ncw cninsurea motorist coverage. The plain language of the statute is simply not that narrow. The practical result of tne majority's decisisn is absurd. Since the majority opinion recognizes che prohibition against che stacking c r f ~ninsured coverage limits, if Leonard had been struck and killed by a driver with no liability insurance a , all, stacking wozld not be allowed and ~ h e xaxin~m his esrate could have . recovered under rhe poiicy would be $ S C , O O C . under ;he aajority's interpretation, however, since the driver who strack Leonard had the r~ini~urn iimics, the vehicles ucder the policy can be stacked and Leonard's estate is entitled to $350,0CO. Statutes should be read and eonstr~ied so as tc avoid absurd resul-rs if a reascnable constructign can avoid it. Christenot v . State (I995j, 272 - ' See Ailstate Lnsurapce ConpaiLy v. Skor;pa (1533) , 1 3 Norit. . , Fed. Rep. 355, which addressed the issue of stackicg -iability- . , - pc;licies and concluded t h a t tnls _oar: 5 ~ s lsariy reccgrizc;d a - , . , - , distirrc:isn betweerr i;abL~.lty cc7.rerage and r e rnotcri.sc csverage cizing Jacobson -J. Implement Dealers W2t. Ins. Co. ; 1982; , . . 196 M o n t . 542, 644 P.2d 908, and Cnaffee v . Lynited States Fid. & -. -dar. Co. '19'793, 191 Nonc. 1, i9i F.8d i102. Mcnc . 3 9 5 , 9C1 T 2.5 541 8 - Darby S ~ a r , Lzd. v . Cepartment of Reven*~e - - (1195), 3 , 3 7 6 , ,G5 p~zd. 11:~ T would therefor? ans:~Jer certified q u e s h ~ c oresegred ic . . . this Tcart in ~1.- affirrxarL\-o a i d ksid L ^ , , " , 3,;.~2;2C3i 'J-" I l - n i prohibits the stacki~g cf medical payment coverage and uncierir.sured mctcrist coverage Justice Kar1.a P I . Gray, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion. While I think the Court does a relatively creditable job of attsmpting to mesh statxtes which simply do not track well, I : am uzabie to join in its analysis. Plainly stated, the question before us is whether the anti- stacking provision contai~~eci in 5 33-23-2C3(i!, XCA, is limited to liability coverages required by law or applies to all coverages contained in a vehicle insurance policy. The Court concludes that the statute prohibits only the stacking of required liability coverages, as the Court creatively defines such coverages. It is my view that, while the statute is not a model of clarity, the legislature's intent to more broadly prohibit stacking is apparent therein, On that basis, I would answer the certified question in the affirmative. The Court begins with the "motor vehicle liability policy" (MVLP) language contained in § 33-23-203, MCA, and looks first to 5 33-23-204, MCA, for a definition of that term; that detinition is stated as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against liability now or hereafter required under Title 51, chapter 6 ; parts i and 3.'! 1 agree that chis appears co be a rational starting point. Moreover, I generally agree with the Court's interpretation that the definition of MVLP contained in § 33-23-204, MCA, addresses the third-party per person, per vehicle and property damage liability coverages required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. Finally, I agree that the first-party med pay and underinsuraace coverages at issue in this case are not liability coverages within the definitional parameters of W7LE contained in S 33-23-204, MCA. Tnat saic?, it is important to recall that our resolutiori of the certified question before us turns on the proper interpretation of 5 33-23-203, MCA, rather than § 33-23-204, MCA. In my view, it is the Court's attempt to force feed the S 33-23-204, MCA, definition of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1), MCA, that results in a legally flawed and logically inconsistent analysis which disregards the actual language used by the legislature in 5 33-23-203 (I), MCA. Inserting the 5 33-23-204, MCA, definition of MVLP into § 33- 23-203(1), MCA, produces the following rough reading of the first pertinent portion of that statute: "the limits of liability coverage required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 . . . cannot be stacked." The problem I have with such a reading is that the legislature did not use language even approximating such a reading; it clearly used different words, and words clearly at odds with the Court's interpretation, in 5 33-23-203(1), MCA. What the legislature said is that the iimits of "insurance coverage available" cannot be stacked. It is my view that, if the legislature had intended to limit the anti-staclcing provision to "liability coverage required by law," it could and would have done so. It did not. A more reasonable interpretation of 5 33-23-203(1), MCA, is that the legislature intended precisely what it said: to prohibit stacking of any and all "insurance coverage available" in an automobiie insurance poiicy, inciuding the med pay and underfnsiirznce coverages a : : issue here. i n t i l a : : regard, 1 ccjnclude that neither the definition contained in § 33-23-204, MCA; nor that contained in 61-6-103, MCA, is logically transferable to the t, 1 in; , , s of insurance coverage availablei' language contaiaed in B 33-23-203;l), MCA. Therefore, while the geaeral ruie contained in § 1-2-107, MCA, is that definitions contained in one part of the ?~?ontana Code Annotated are applicable to the saw? wor4 or phrase wherever it occurs, I would apply the exception to that rule also contained in 5 1-2-107, MCA, and conclude in this case that "a contrary intention plainly appears" with regard to inserting definitions of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1), MCA. This conclusion is further buttressed by the remaining--and, in my view, largest--barrier to the Court's interpretation of § 33- 23-203 (I), MCA. The critical portion of the statute reads "the limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy, including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage. . . . " With the Court's definition of "such policy" inserted, the statute reads "the limits of coverage required under Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 [the $25,000/$50,000/$10,000 amounts of third-party liability coverage! including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage." Whether or not one agrees with the Court's creative interpretation that uninsured motorLst coverage is actually reauired by § 33-23-201, MCA, and 1 do not, an inconsistency results on the face of § 33-23-203(1), MCA, when both the Court's definitron of MVLP and the "includingn clause are considered. It is ciear that notblng ~n 'i'ltie 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3, requires uninsured motorist coverage; the Court's own anaiy-'- % b i P makes that clear in pointing out that the ii 33-23-204, E4CA/Title 61 required coverages are third-party per person, per vehicle and Froperty damage liability ccverage. it 5s equally clear that the "including" clause refers back to what preceded it in the statute-- "such policy"--defined by the Court as t i l e § 33-23-204, MCA, definitior sf MVL9. The "inciudingN clause simply cannot broaden, by any rule of logic, grammar or law of which I am aware, the statutory definition of MVLP which the Court has inserted into the statute. For these reasons, it is my view that the Court's analysis is flawed. A more reasonable reading of § 33 -23-203 (1) , MCA, requires a conclusion that the legislature intended to prohibit the stacking of all coverages contained in an automobile insurance policy insuring more than one vehicle. I invite the legislature to revisit the statutes addressed in this case by both the Court and the dissenting opinions with an eye toward clarifying statutes which simply do not mesh well under any analysis. I dissent.