Case Title: Brey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP001320

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1320 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Elliot Brey and Estate of Ryan B. Johnson, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Channing H. Mathews, Craig A. Mathews and  
Sentry Insurance, A Mutual Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 393 Wis. 2d 574,947 N.W.2d 205 
PDC No:2020 WI App 45 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 15, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard A. Radcliffe   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Andrew B. Hebl, Kathryn A. Pfefferle, and Boardman & Clark 
LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Andrew B. Hebl.  
 
For the plaintiff-appellants, there was a brief filed by James 
G. Curtis, Garett T. Pankratyz, and Hale, Skemp, Hanson, Skemp & 
Sleik, La Crosse. There was an oral argument by James G. Curtis. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance by James A. Friedman, Daniel C.W. Narvey, and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Defense Counsel by Vincent J. Scipior and Coyne, Schultz, Becker 
& Bauer, S.C., Madison; with whom on the brief was Erik L. Fuehrer 
and Gabert, Williams, Konz & Lawrynk, LLP, Appleton.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 7 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1320 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV223) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Elliot Brey and Estate of Ryan B. Johnson, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Channing H. Mathews, Craig A. Mathews and  
Sentry Insurance, A Mutual Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 15, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   State 
Farm 
Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) asks this court to 
reverse the court of appeals decision1 reversing the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm.  The 
                                                 
1 Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2020 WI App 45, 393 
Wis. 2d 574, 947 N.W.2d 205. 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
2 
 
circuit court determined the State Farm automobile liability 
insurance policy issued to Elliot Brey's mother and her husband 
(the Policy) did not provide underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage 
to Elliot Brey (Brey) for the death of his father, Ryan B. Johnson 
(Johnson), in an automobile accident.2  The Policy limits UIM 
coverage 
to 
compensatory 
damages 
for 
"bodily 
injury . . . sustained by an insured[.]"  Brey was an insured under 
the Policy, but Johnson was not.  The circuit court ruled Brey 
could not recover under the policy because Brey did not sustain 
bodily injury.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded with 
directions to grant summary judgment in favor of Brey, holding 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1) and (2)(d) (2017–18)3 bar an insurer from 
limiting UIM coverage to only those insureds who sustain bodily 
injury or death. 
¶2 
State Farm contends that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) does 
not require insurers to extend UIM coverage to an insured for 
bodily injury or death suffered by a person who was not insured 
under the Policy.  State Farm argues this conclusion is supported 
by the plain meaning of the statute, the court of appeals' decision 
in Ledman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 230 
Wis. 2d 56, 
601 
N.W.2d 312 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999), 
longstanding 
automobile insurance law, and other jurisdictions' interpretations 
of similar statutes.  We agree and hold Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Richard A. Radcliffe, Monroe County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
3 
 
does not bar an insurer from requiring that an insured sustain 
bodily injury or death in order to trigger UIM coverage under an 
automobile liability insurance policy.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Johnson died from injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident in 2015, leaving behind his minor son, Elliot Brey.  State 
Farm insured Brey as a resident relative under the Policy issued 
to Hannah and Jake Brey, Brey's mother and her husband, covering 
a 2007 Honda CRV.  That vehicle was not involved in the accident.  
Johnson, who was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Channing H. 
Mathews, was not insured under any State Farm policy. 
¶4 
Brey intervened in an action brought by Johnson's 
parents against the driver, the owner of the vehicle, and their 
insurance companies, and added State Farm as a defendant, seeking 
to recover damages under the Policy for the death of his father.4  
In pertinent part, the UIM coverage provisions of the Policy 
provided that an insured must have sustained bodily injury caused 
by an accident involving an underinsured motor vehicle in order to 
collect compensatory damages.5     
                                                 
4 As relevant here, Brey sought damages for negligence, loss 
of society and companionship, and wrongful death under the Policy.  
State Farm filed a motion to bifurcate the insurance coverage 
issues from issues of liability and damages, which the circuit 
court granted. 
5 The UIM coverage clauses provide, in relevant part: 
We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an 
insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Both Brey and State Farm moved for summary judgment.  
State Farm sought a declaration that the Policy under which Brey 
was insured did not provide UIM coverage for the death of Johnson, 
because he was not an "insured" under the Policy.  In response, 
Brey acknowledged the terms of the Policy preclude coverage, but 
argued the Policy's requirement that an insured sustain injury was 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) and therefore void and 
unenforceable.  Section 632.32 is sometimes called the "Omnibus 
Statute" because it sets the minimum requirements all motor vehicle 
insurance policies in Wisconsin must satisfy.   
¶6 
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
State Farm based on the language of the Policy, the statutory 
history of Wis. Stat. § 632.32, and the court of appeals' decision 
in Ledman.  In that case, the court of appeals held the Ledmans, 
insured under a State Farm automobile insurance policy, could not 
recover for the wrongful death of their adult daughter in an 
automobile accident under the policy's uninsured motorist vehicle 
provisions.  See Ledman, 230 Wis. 2d at 69.  The Ledman court 
emphasized the policy as a whole showed an "expected nexus of 
bodily injury to the insured as part of the overall general scheme 
                                                 
driver of an underinsured motor vehicle.  The bodily 
injury must be: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident that involves the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of an underinsured motor vehicle 
as a motor vehicle. 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
5 
 
and intent" of the policy, and an alternative reading would produce 
"unreasonable results."  Id. at 67-68.  
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, determining 
Ledman did not govern and holding Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1) and (2)(d) 
bar an insurer from limiting UIM coverage to only those insureds 
who suffer bodily injury or death.  Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 2020 WI App 45, ¶¶24–25, 393 Wis. 2d 574, 947 N.W.2d 205.  
We granted State Farm's petition for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
We review a grant of summary judgment in this case.  
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law."  Kemper Indep. Ins. Co. v. Islami, 2021 WI 53, 
¶13, 397 Wis. 2d 394, 959 N.W.2d 912 (quoting Talley v. Mustafa, 
2018 WI 47, ¶12, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55).  "We independently 
review a grant of summary judgment using the same methodology of 
the circuit court and the court of appeals."  Id. (quoting Talley, 
381 Wis. 2d 393, ¶12).   
¶9 
This case also requires us to interpret and apply the 
Omnibus Statute.  "The interpretation and application of statutes 
present questions of law that we review independently, benefitting 
from the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals."  Eau 
Claire Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. S.E., 2021 WI 56, ¶13, 397 
Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 391 (citing State v. Stephenson, 2020 WI 
92, ¶18, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819). 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
6 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶10 The parties do not dispute that the Policy bars coverage 
for Brey's wrongful death claim because the UIM coverage provisions 
require an insured to sustain bodily injury, and Johnson was not 
an insured under the Policy.  Nonetheless, Brey contends that Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) precludes an insurer from limiting UIM 
coverage to only injured insureds.  Section 632.32(2)(d)——located 
within the definitions section——provides: "'Underinsured motorist 
coverage' means coverage for the protection of persons insured 
under that coverage who are legally entitled to recover damages 
for bodily injury, death, sickness, or disease from owners or 
operators of underinsured motor vehicles."  This case turns on 
whether the UIM coverage clauses comport with this definition. 
A. 
Plain Meaning of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) 
¶11 Our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(d)  
"'begins with the language of the statute.'  If the meaning of the 
language is plain, our inquiry ordinarily ends."  Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 
924 N.W.2d 153 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110)(citation omitted).  Importantly, "ascertaining the plain 
meaning of a statute requires more than focusing on a single 
sentence or portion thereof."  State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶43, 
342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238 (citing Teschendorf v. State Farm 
Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶12, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258).  A 
statute's context and structure are critical to a proper plain-
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
7 
 
meaning analysis.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 
¶11, (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).   
If statutory language is plain, courts must enforce it 
according to its terms, but oftentimes the meaning or 
ambiguity of certain words or phrases may only become 
evident when placed in context, so when deciding whether 
language is plain, courts must read the words in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.  
2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:1 n.1 (7th ed. updated 
Nov. 2021) (citing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015)).  Properly 
applied, the plain-meaning approach is not "literalistic"; rather, 
the ascertainment of meaning involves a "process of analysis" 
focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 52 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee 
County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656); see 
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 355 (2012) ("Literalness may 
strangle meaning." (quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 
44 (1946))).   
¶12 The court of appeals' conclusion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(d) contains an "unambiguous statement" prohibiting 
State Farm from conditioning coverage on an insured sustaining 
bodily injury reflects a literalistic approach to statutory 
interpretation.  See Brey, 393 Wis. 2d 574, ¶22.  That court 
reasoned:  (1) Brey is an "insured"; (2) who is "legally entitled 
to recover damages"; (3) because he has a wrongful death claim 
against the "owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle."  
Id.  The court of appeals erred by strictly construing the 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
8 
 
statutory definition in isolation rather than interpreting it in 
the context of the Omnibus Statute's pertinent text as a whole.   
¶13 We reject this hyper-literal approach.  Statutory 
interpretation centers on the "ascertainment of meaning," not the 
recitation of words in isolation.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶47.  By declining to address statutory context, the court of 
appeals erroneously confined its statutory analysis to the 
definition in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d).  It should have instead 
"interpreted [the definition] in the context in which it is used; 
not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46 (citations 
omitted).  "Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the 
failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial 
interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure 
and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts."  
Scalia & Garner, supra at 167. 
¶14 The statutory context and structure of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(d) indicate UIM coverage exists only when an insured 
suffers bodily injury or death.  "The reason to doubt a literal 
meaning of [a statute] is that it clashes with related statutes." 
Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶24.  A literal interpretation of 
§ 632.32(2)(d) 
clashes 
with 
parts 
of 
the 
same 
statute.  
Section 632.32(5) lists "permissible provisions" contemplating a 
variety of scenarios under which insurers may limit UIM coverage.  
Read in the context of these paragraphs, § 632.32(2)(d) does not 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
9 
 
require insurers to extend UIM coverage when no insured has 
suffered bodily injury or death.6 
¶15 Multiple paragraphs of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5) are 
incompatible with Brey's construction of § 632.32(2)(d).  First, 
§ 632.32(5)(g) states: 
A policy may provide that the maximum amount of uninsured 
motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or 
medical payments coverage available for bodily injury or 
death suffered by a person who was not using a motor 
vehicle at the time of an accident is the highest single 
limit of uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured 
motorist 
coverage, 
or 
medical 
payments 
coverage, 
whichever is applicable, for any motor vehicle with 
respect to which the person is insured. 
§ 632.32(5)(g) (emphasis added).  This paragraph allows an "anti-
stacking" policy provision, permitting insurers to prohibit 
insureds from stacking policies to increase the aggregate coverage 
limit.  It ends by referring to "the person . . . insured."  The 
definite article "the" signals that the noun following it, in this 
case, "person," refers back to a specific instance of that noun 
already mentioned.  See, e.g., Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. 
                                                 
6 Brey argues these subparts are irrelevant because they 
address coverage limits, rather than coverage itself.  The court 
of appeals agreed and rejected State Farm's contextual argument on 
the grounds that the cited "statutory subparts do not identify or 
define the statutory requirements for a UIM claim" and that court 
deemed the argument "conclusory and undeveloped."  Brey, 393 
Wis. 2d 574, ¶25 n.6 (citing State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 
646–47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992)).  The court of appeals 
adopted an atextually narrow reasoning by disregarding subparts 
forming part of the same insurance coverage system and statutory 
scheme, which accordingly provide meaningful context.  In this 
statute, the manner in which coverage applies informs to whom it 
applies:  insureds who have sustained a bodily injury.   
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
10 
 
United States, 197 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 1999).  "Person" was 
introduced at an earlier point——"a person" who suffered "injury or 
death." 
 
Accordingly, 
this 
paragraph 
presupposes 
"the 
person . . . insured" is "a person" who suffered "bodily injury or 
death."  As a whole, this paragraph permits insurers to limit "the 
maximum amount of . . . [UIM] coverage . . . for bodily injury or 
death suffered by a person who was not using a motor vehicle at 
the time of an accident" to "the highest single limit 
of . . . [UIM] coverage . . . for any motor vehicle with respect 
to which the person is insured."  § 632.32(5)(g).  In this case, 
the person insured——Brey——did not suffer bodily injury or death. 
Johnson died, but he was not insured under the Policy.   
¶16 Second, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(f)——also allowing "anti-
stacking" provisions——similarly contemplates a nexus between an 
insured and the bodily injury.  It states: 
A policy may provide that, regardless of the number of 
policies involved, vehicles involved, persons covered, 
claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on the policy, 
or premiums paid, the limits for any coverage under the 
policy may not be added to the limits for similar 
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available for bodily 
injury or death suffered by a person in any one accident. 
§ 632.32(5)(f) (emphasis added).  Using the phrase, "insurance 
coverage available for bodily injury or death suffered by a person 
in any one accident," § 632.32(5)(f) ties "coverage" to "bodily 
injury or death" suffered by a person in an accident.  Similar to 
paragraph (5)(g), this paragraph presumes coverage is for a person 
injured in an accident.  Interpreting § 632.32(2)(d) to require 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
11 
 
UIM coverage even if no insured person was injured conflicts with 
§ 632.32(5)(f) and (g), which permit limits on coverage for insured 
persons who suffer bodily injury.  Interpreting § 632.32(2)(d) to 
apply anti-stacking provisions only to injured insureds while 
allowing 
uninjured 
insureds 
to 
circumvent 
them 
would 
be 
nonsensical.7  
¶17 Third, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j)——allowing "drive-other-
car" exclusions——further supports State Farm's interpretation of 
§ 632.32(2)(d), under which insurers may require insureds to have 
suffered bodily injury or death to trigger UIM coverage.  This 
exclusion "keep[s] an insured from using insurance coverage of one 
car to provide coverage on another vehicle the insured owns but 
has not insured."  Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶8, 352 
Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373.  The drive-other-car exclusion 
targets the "'free rider' problem.  'Wisconsin courts have long 
recognized that the purpose of the drive other cars exclusion is 
to provide coverage to the insured when he or she has infrequent 
or casual use of a vehicle other than the one described in the 
policy, but to exclude coverage of a vehicle that the insured owns 
or frequently uses for which no premium has been paid.'"  Id., ¶36 
(quoting Westphal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶11, 266 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) allows "reducing 
clauses," under which insurers may reduce the limits for "[UIM] 
coverage for bodily injury or death resulting from any one 
accident" by amounts paid by third parties, or under worker's 
compensation or disability benefits laws.  § 632.32(5)(i).  This 
reducing clause statute, like the anti-stacking provisions, 
specifies "coverage" is for "bodily injury or death." 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 569, 669 N.W.2d 166).  To interpret § 632.32(2)(d) to 
require an insurer to extend UIM coverage for an accident involving 
neither an insured nor a covered vehicle would render it at 
striking odds with § 632.32(5)(j), which expressly permits an 
insurer to exclude from UIM coverage an insured who is injured 
while driving a vehicle not covered under the policy.   
¶18 Fourth, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) permits an insurer to 
"provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other 
applicable law.  Such exclusions are effective even if incidentally 
to their main purpose they exclude persons, uses or coverages that 
could not be directly excluded under sub. (6)(b)."8  In Vieau v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. & Acuity, 2006 WI 31, ¶40, 
289 Wis. 2d 552, 712 N.W.2d 661, we upheld a definitional exclusion 
denying an injured insured UIM coverage under his mother's policy, 
under which he was otherwise covered as a relative, because he 
owned his own vehicle.  We concluded, "Were we to decide this case 
otherwise, a family of five with five vehicles could pay one 
premium on one policy with UIM coverage and potentially collect 
UIM proceeds five times.  We cannot support such a result."  Id.  
Given that an otherwise insured accident victim can be excluded 
from UIM coverage under his mother's policy because of the 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(b) 
identifies 
certain 
categories of persons whom "[n]o policy may exclude from the 
coverage afforded or benefits provided[,]" including, for example, 
"[p]ersons related by blood, marriage or adoption to the insured" 
or "[a]ny person who is a named insured or passenger in or on the 
insured vehicle, with respect to bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom, to that person."  
§ 632.32(6)(b)1.-2. 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
13 
 
insurer's "own-other-car" exclusion, it would be incongruous for 
the same statutory scheme to mandate that insurers provide UIM 
coverage for an accident victim who is not insured under any 
policy.  Id., ¶¶25–26. 
¶19 We explained in Vieau that "the main purpose of the 
[drive-other-car] exclusion is to prevent resident relatives who 
own their own vehicles from piggybacking on the . . . UIM coverage 
of a single insured."  Id., ¶29.  Banning insurers from mitigating 
"piggybacking" problems related to insureds receiving UIM coverage 
for accidents involving non-insureds——when those non-insureds 
could have contracted for UIM coverage——clashes with the coverage 
limitation permitted under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e). 
B.  Statutory and Legislative History of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(d) 
¶20 The history of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) fortifies our 
plain-meaning analysis.  Statutory history, which involves 
comparing the statute with its prior versions, "may also be used 
as part of 'plain meaning analysis.'"  James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 
58, ¶26, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Richards v. 
Badger Mut. Insurance Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
N.W.2d 581).  Unlike legislative history, prior versions of 
statutory provisions were enacted law; as such, statutory history 
constitutes an intrinsic source that "is part of the context in 
which we interpret the words used in a statute."  Richards, 309 
Wis. 2d 541, ¶22; see also United States v. Franklin, 2019 WI 64, 
¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 259, 928 N.W.2d 545 (quoting Richards, 309 Wis. 
2d 541, ¶22).  
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
14 
 
¶21 We have long recognized a distinction between statutory 
and legislative history.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9 
("Although it is proper to look at a statute's background in the 
form of actually enacted and repealed provisions, the legislative 
history, which was never enacted, should rarely be permitted to 
supplant the statutory words as they are ordinarily understood." 
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 430 (1989))).  Legislative history, 
as the byproduct of legislation, is extrinsic evidence of a law's 
meaning and becomes relevant only to confirm plain meaning or when 
a statute remains ambiguous even after "the primary intrinsic 
analysis has been exhausted[.]"  State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶109, 
273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (Sykes, J., concurring); see also 
Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon County, 2019 WI 50, ¶9, 386 Wis. 
2d 632, 926 N.W.2d 731 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  
Although we sometimes discuss statutory and legislative history 
jointly for readability, each source serves a distinct role in 
statutory interpretation.  See James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶¶26–31. 
¶22 In 2009, the legislature overhauled the UIM statutory 
landscape.  Known as the "Truth in Automobile Insurance Law" (TAIL) 
and enacted as part of Governor Jim Doyle's budget, 2009 Wisconsin 
Act 28 revised the automobile insurance statutes in favor of 
enhanced coverage for consumers.  See 2009 Wis. Act 28; Robert L. 
Jaskulski, Politics & Wisconsin Automobile Insurance Law, Wis. 
Law., Nov. 2010, at 14.  As relevant, the law made UIM coverage 
mandatory instead of optional, increased the amount injured 
persons could recover under uninsured and underinsured motorist 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
15 
 
coverage, and prohibited reducing clauses and anti-stacking 
provisions.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 632.32(4), (6)d.-g. & 631.43(3) 
(2009–10).  Significantly for this case, 2009 Wisconsin Act 28 
also defined "underinsured motor vehicle" as a motor vehicle 
"involved in an accident with a person who has underinsured 
motorist coverage."9  See Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(e)1. (2009–10).  
Underinsured motorist coverage was understood to protect "a driver 
and any passengers who are injured if they are hit by another 
driver who is found to be liable for the accident but 
has . . . coverage that is less than the amount needed to 
compensate a covered person for his or her damages."  Legislative 
                                                 
9 The full definition provided: 
(e) "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor 
vehicle to which all of the following apply: 
1. The motor vehicle is involved in an 
accident with a person who has underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
2. At the time of the accident, a bodily injury 
liability insurance policy applies to the 
motor vehicle or the owner or operator of the 
motor vehicle has furnished proof of financial 
responsibility for the future under subch. III 
of ch. 344 and it is in effect or is a 
self−insurer under another applicable motor 
vehicle law. 
3. 
The limits under the bodily injury 
liability insurance policy or with respect to 
the proof of financial responsibility or 
self−insurance are less than the amount needed 
to fully compensate the insured for his or her 
damages. 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(e) (2009–10). 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
16 
 
Reference Bureau, Budget Brief:  Mandatory Motor Vehicle Insurance 
[Budget Brief 10–1] (2010).   
¶23 This expanded UIM coverage system was short-lived; in 
2011, the legislature repealed or amended many of the 2009 changes.  
Most pertinent, the legislature repealed the definition of 
"underinsured motor vehicle" in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(e), but 
retained 
the 
definition 
of 
"uninsured 
motor 
vehicle" 
in 
§ 632.32(2)(g) as well as the definition of "underinsured motorist 
coverage" in § 632.32(2)(d).  See 2011 Wis. Act 14; Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(d), (g) (2011–12).  Brey contends the 2011 repeal of 
the definition of "underinsured motor vehicle" left § 632.32(2)(d) 
to require insurers to provide UIM coverage to their insureds 
regardless of whether an insured actually sustained bodily injury 
in an accident.  We disagree. 
¶24 In repealing Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(e)——the definition 
of "underinsured motor vehicle"——the legislature did not broaden 
UIM coverage for tort victims, but rather increased coverage 
flexibility for insurers.  As noted previously, the statutes did 
not 
define 
"underinsured 
motor 
vehicle" 
prior 
to 
2009.  
Consequently, insurers had used one of two definitions:  in some 
policies, "underinsured motor vehicle" was "defined as one insured 
by a policy with liability limits less than the insured's UIM 
coverage limits (limits of coverage)."  Taylor v. Greatway Ins. 
Co., 2001 WI 93, ¶33, 245 Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916 (Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J., dissenting).  In others, it was defined "by comparison 
of the at-fault driver's liability limits with the damages 
sustained by the insured (limits of damages)."  Id.  The 2009 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
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addition of § 632.32(e) restricted insurers to the "limits of 
damages" definition.  See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3153 ("'Underinsured 
motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle to which all of the following 
apply: . . . The limits under the bodily injury liability 
insurance policy are less than the amount needed to fully 
compensate the insured for his or her damages.").   
¶25 In 
2011, 
the 
legislature 
repealed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(e) in its entirety.  See 2011 Wis. Act 14, § 15c.  A 
Legislative Council memo recognized that by "return[ing] the 
definition of underinsured motorist coverage to the status of that 
law prior to being revised by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28," the repeal 
"leaves that term undefined in the statutes, to be defined by each 
individual insurance policy, as it was prior to 2009 Wisconsin Act 
28."  Margit Kelley, Wis. Legis. Council Amendment Memo, 2011 
Assembly Bill 4: Assembly Amendments 1 and 7 (Jan. 28, 2011).10  
The repeal thereby expanded insurers' options for contractually 
defining UIM coverage.  
¶26 Adopting 
Brey's 
(and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals') 
interpretation of the repeal of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(e) would 
preclude insurers not only from requiring that the vehicle be 
"involved in an accident with a person who has underinsured 
                                                 
10 Both Assembly Amendments 1 and 7 were adopted and included 
in the final version of 2011 Wis. Act 14.  See Margit Kelley, Wis. 
Legis. Council Act Memo, 2011 Wisconsin Act 14: Motor Vehicle 
Liability Insurance (Apr. 20, 2011).  In both memos, the author 
incorrectly states "the definition of underinsured motorist 
coverage" was repealed, instead of the definition of underinsured 
motorist vehicle.  This does not affect our analysis. 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
18 
 
motorist coverage" under § 632.32(2)(e)1., but also from utilizing 
the "limits of damages" definition under § 632.32(2)(e)3.  Because 
the repeal of the definition of "underinsured motor vehicle" 
expanded rather than constrained insurers' definitional choices——
allowing insurers to utilize either the "limits of coverage" or 
"limits of damages" definition——Brey's interpretation fails in 
light of the statute's history. 
¶27 The 2011 legislative changes not only expanded insurers' 
contractual freedom by repealing the definitional requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(e), they also narrowed the required scope 
of UIM coverage generally.  For example, 2011 Wisconsin Act 14 
made 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage 
optional 
rather 
than 
mandatory; reduced the minimum limits from $100,000 per person and 
$300,000 per accident to $50,000 per person and $100,000 per 
accident; reintroduced anti-stacking and reducing clauses as 
permissible policy provisions; and removed the requirement that 
each application for an umbrella or excess liability policy include 
a written offer of UM and UIM coverages.  See Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Summary of the 2011–12 Wisconsin Legislative Session, at 
26.  Additionally, the 2011 enactments required an insurer to 
provide notice of UIM coverage availability only once, and declared 
an insured's acceptance or rejection of UIM coverage need not be 
in writing.  Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) (2011–12).  Further, the law 
considered the absence of a premium payment for UIM to be 
"conclusive proof that the person has rejected such coverage."  
§ 632.32(4m)(b).  Collectively, these 2011 enactments evince a 
"textually or contextually manifest" purpose to permit greater 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
19 
 
limitations on UIM coverage and expand insurer flexibility——goals 
entirely inconsistent with a mandate that insurers provide UIM 
coverage to insureds who are not involved in any accident at all.  
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 ("[A] plain-meaning interpretation 
cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose.").11 
C. Wrongful Death Claims Under UIM/UM Policies 
¶28 "Wrongful death actions are derivative tort actions."  
Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2015 WI 58, ¶22, 362 Wis. 2d 668, 866 
N.W.2d 602 (citing Ruppa v. Am. States Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 
646, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979)).  In Christ, we explained:  
[E]ven though the wrongful death statute creates a 'new 
action' and 'allows a person to recover his or her own 
damages sustained because of the wrongful death of 
another,' the person's right of action depends not only 
upon the death of another person but also upon that other 
person's entitlement to maintain an action and recover 
if his death had not occurred.   
Id. (citations omitted).  In order for a wrongful death claim to 
exist, "the decedent must have had a valid claim for damages 
against the defendant at the time of his death."  Id., ¶23.  At 
the time of his death, Johnson could not have recovered damages 
                                                 
11 Neither the court of appeals' decision in Ledman v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 230 Wis. 2d 56, 601 
N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1999), which did not address the UIM statutory 
provisions, nor the litany of other states' interpretations of 
similar statutes, which State Farm cites in support of its 
interpretation, are necessary to resolve this case.  Rather, under 
a plain-meaning analysis, confirmed by legislative history, Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) unambiguously does not bar an automobile 
liability policy from requiring that an insured sustain bodily 
injury in order to trigger UIM coverage. 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
20 
 
under the UIM coverage provisions of the Policy because he was not 
an insured.  Consequently, Brey cannot maintain a derivative action 
against State Farm.  See id. ("If the decedent would have been 
barred from making a claim, the decedent's statutory beneficiary 
also would be barred."). 
¶29 Several Wisconsin cases confirm the derivative nature of 
wrongful death actions in the context of UIM/UM coverage 
specifically, concluding an accident victim must possess an 
independent claim for UIM coverage in order for a wrongful death 
claim to proceed.  For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113, ¶51, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 683 
N.W.2d 75, "an insured [Mrs. Langridge] who suffered no bodily 
injury [sought] to recover for her spouse's wrongful death" under 
their policy's UIM coverage "after the tortfeasor's 'limits of 
liability for bodily injury' had been fully paid."  The 
tortfeasor's per person liability limit exceeded the per person 
UIM limit in the Langridges' policy, which accordingly afforded no 
UIM coverage for the accident causing Mr. Langridge's death.  We 
held that under the Langridges' policy, "Mrs. Langridge had a 
derivative claim for her husband's bodily injury.  She had a right 
to pursue that derivative claim whether or not she suffered bodily 
injury, but only until the tortfeasor's per person limit of 
liability was exhausted.  She did not have her own independent 
claim under the policy."  Id., ¶55.   
¶30 In holding that Mrs. Langridge's claim was limited to 
the tortfeasor's per person liability limit, this court concluded 
that "Mrs. Langridge's reading of the policy," under which the 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
21 
 
tortfeasor was underinsured as to her since the policy limits were 
paid to the estate and not Mrs. Langridge,  
[E]ssentially transforms UIM into a form of life 
insurance for a spouse killed in an automobile accident.  
This is not consistent with a reasonable insured's 
understanding of the UIM policy.  Another way of saying 
this is that a tortfeasor's motor vehicle would likely 
be transformed into an 'underinsured motor vehicle' 
whenever another insured had a wrongful death claim.  
This would untether the definition of 'underinsured 
motor vehicle' from the concept it was intended to 
define. 
Id., ¶¶51–52. 
¶31 In Bruflat v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance 
Co., 2000 WI App 69, ¶19, 233 Wis. 2d 523, 608 N.W.2d 371, abrogated 
on other grounds by Day v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 2011 WI 24, 332 
Wis. 2d 571, 798 N.W.2d 199, the court of appeals described the 
purpose of UM policies as "[compensation for] an insured who is 
the victim of an uninsured motorist's negligence to the same extent 
as if the uninsured motorist were insured."  In that wrongful death 
dispute, the court identified the deceased son (insured as a 
resident relative under his father's policy) as the victim——not 
the insured father.  Id., ¶20.  Other decisions by this court 
similarly link the insured to the bodily injury sustained in the 
accident for purposes of UIM coverage.  See, e.g., Bethke v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 2013 WI 16, ¶19, 345 Wis. 2d 533, 825 N.W.2d 482 
("UIM coverage provides additional coverage to insured automobile 
accident victims when a liable party has inadequate means of 
payment."); Pitts v. Revocable Trust of Knueppel, 2005 WI 95, ¶28, 
282 Wis. 2d 550, 698 N.W.2d 761 ("Underinsured motorist coverage 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
22 
 
is intended to protect motorists against inadequately insured 
tortfeasors." (emphasis added)).   
¶32 The court of appeals has also linked UM and UIM coverage 
to the injured insured.  See, e.g., Mullen v. Walczak, 2002 WI App 
254, 257 Wis. 2d 928, 653 N.W.2d 529 (holding that although an 
injured accident victim was entitled to recover damages under his 
policy's UM coverage for emotional distress from witnessing his 
wife's death, these damages——since they arose from his wife's 
bodily injury——were subject to her "each person" limit, which had 
already been exhausted by a wrongful death claim brought on behalf 
of her estate).  Collectively, these cases illustrate that UIM/UM 
insurance protects the insured accident victim, conditioning 
coverage on a nexus between the insured and the bodily injury or 
death suffered.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) precludes 
insurers from affording coverage to only those insureds who are 
injured in an auto accident.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶33 We conclude the circuit court properly granted State 
Farm's motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals erred 
in reversing it.  The Policy affords UIM coverage to only an 
insured who sustained bodily injury caused by an accident involving 
an underinsured motor vehicle.  Brey's father was not insured under 
the Policy.  While Brey is an insured under the Policy, he was not 
involved in the accident in which his father was killed and 
therefore 
sustained 
no 
bodily 
injury. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(2)(d) plainly does not preclude an insurer from limiting 
UIM coverage to insureds who sustain bodily injury or death.  With 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
23 
 
respect to the car accident involving Brey's father, the Policy 
does not provide any UIM coverage for Brey nor does the law require 
it.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No. 
2019AP1320   
 
 
 
1