Case Title: In re Estate of Kam. ICA mem.

Citation: 110 Haw. 8

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ar Lier

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'D{ 2
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5 Soom
fon 2
sel fh
Bs
‘THE ESTATE OF a z= 8
EDITH I. KAM, aka EDITH ING KAM, Deceased. 2

 

wo. 25398

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(P. NO, 001-0261)
FEBRUARY 27, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

QRINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

The instant appeal arises out of family court and
probate court proceedings relating to Edith Ing Kam (Kan) and her
estate. On September 13 and 16, 2002, the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit (hereinafter, Probate Court], the Honorable Colleen
K. Hirai presiding, entered judgments (1) denying the petition of
respondent-cross petitioner/petitioner-appellant Paz F.
Rbastillas to (a) vacate the Probate Court's July 17, 2000

probate order naming petitioner-cross respondent /petitione!

 

appellee Cedric C.1. Kam (Cedric) as personal representative of
the Kam estate pursuant to Kam’s 1988 will and (b) appoint
Abastillas as personal representative under Kan’'s 1996 will; (2)

granting Cedric's petition for instructions; and (3) denying the
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petition of Abastillas and respondent/petitioner-appellant Robert
A. Smith for allowance of creditors’ claims against Kam’s estate
for legal and personal services rendered. On August 8, 2005, the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) issued a memorandum opinion
[hereinafter, ICA’s opinion] vacating all of the Probate Court’s
judgnents and remanding for further proceedings. Subsequently,
both Cedric and Abastillas filed applications for a writ of
certiorari to review the ICA’s opinion.

We granted both applications in order to address two
questions. First, we granted Cedric’s application in order to
review whether the Probate Court erred in relying on two April
22, 1997 orders entered by the family court of the first circuit
(hereinafter, Family Court) appointing permanent co-guardians of
Kam’s property and voiding certain estate documents, including
Kam’s 1996 will, Specifically, we are faced with a collateral
attack on the April 22, 1997 orders, the question presented being
whether the Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter
its orders or whether they were void ab initio for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and thus not entitled to any effect
in the Probate Court. Second, we granted Abastillas’ application
in order to consider the ICA's conclusion that the Family Court's
1996 findings that, inter alia, Kam lacked capacity to make
reasoned decisions concerning her person and property, have

preclusive effect. Because we agree with the ICA that the Family
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Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter its April
22, 1997 orders and thus hold that the Probate Court erred in
finding them “valid and enforceable,” we now affirm the ICA's
opinion in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the
Probate Court for further proceedings.

1. BACKGROUND
Proceedings in the Family Court

Adult Protective Proceedings (FC-AA-96-0003)

 

 

on June 14, 1996, the Department of Human Services,
State of Hawai‘ (DHS), initiated an adult protective proceeding
in the Family Court (docketed as FC-AA-96-0003) under Hawai'i
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 346-223 (1993),? seeking protection for
Kam, then aged 93. DHS sought protection based on allegations
that Kam was being exploited by her then-attorney, Smith, and his

paralegal, Abastillas. Upon DHS!

 

2% parte motion, the Family
Court entered an Order for Immediate Protection that sane day.
On August 27, 1996, the Family Court followed with an
order in FC-AA-96-0003 appointing @ guardian of Kam’s property.
Snith and Abastilles appeared as parties to the proceedings. on
Septenber 9, 1996, the Family Court entered another order in FC-
AR-96-0003 discharging the first guardian of Kan’s property and
5 URS § 346-223, part of chapter 346, part X, entitled “Dependent Adult
Protective Services,” provides in relevant’ part that “it]he famsiy court shall
have Jurlediction in protective proceedings under ‘this part concerning any

Gependent adult... [who] has been sbused and is threstened with imminent
‘abuse (1

   
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appointing two of her relatives as temporary co-guardians of her
property. Smith and Abastillas again appeared and approved the
order. Also that day, the parties reached an agreement to
resolve the situation without trial, which was summarized as
follows in the findings of fact entered by the Family Court on

October 3, 1996 in FC-AA-96-0003:

A. Paz Abastillas and Robert A. Smith are parties to this
action!
B. The Court appointed Mid, as an

 

Insepencent Hedical Examiner, to examine Edith Ing Kam and
report back to the court:

 

€. Dr. Blanchette examined Edith Ing Kam on July 18) 1996 and
Fendered @ report to the Court dated August 6, 1996:

1D. idith ing Kam does not consent to these proceedings:

FE. Edith ing Kam is an incepacitated adult as evidenced by Dr.

 

Patricia Blancherte’s report in that

 

1, the suffers from Alzheimer's Disease and suffers from
Gomentia of the Alcheiner's Type
3." " Ene does not have the capacity to make reasoned
Gecisions concerning her money and properties; and
4, She lacks the capacity to make and Communicate
Gecisions concerning her person;
F. Edith Ing Kam is a “dependent adult” as defined in HRS
Section 346-2227
G. Pursuant to Section 46-228(1), Hawai's Revised statutes,
[DuS} nay resolve any case “in’an inforeal fashion as 18
appropriate... [.]” In this case, [DHS} has

 

appropriately choaen to resolve this case in such an
{Rfstnel fashion. therefore, findings as to abuse or

 

 

threatened abuse are not required)
H. The relief ordered in this case is in Mrs. Edith Kan’s best
interest?

 

t,t the Pretrial Conference held on Septenber 9, 1996, the
Court was informed that the parties had reached an agreenent
fo settle this case by the entry [of] the Order Appointing
Temporary Co-Guardians of the Property and Continuing
Byisting Orders, filed on September 9, 1996, on the
Understanding that, while parties (Kam, Smith, and
Abastillas] would not sign approval as to forn or substance,

 
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neither would they oppose the entry of the order or protest
feionce entered.

‘The October 3, 1996 findings of fact appear to have been entered
over the objection of Smith and Abastillas,? who argued that
because the case was being settled by tacit consent rather than
adjudicated, there were no grounds for entry of factual findings
which might then have prejudicial preclusive effect in other
pending or future litigation.
2. Guardianship Proceedings (FC-G-96-0299)

on September 4, 1996, the Office of the Public Guardian
filed a petition (docketed as FC-G-96-0299) for appointment of
co-guardians of Kam, as an incapacitated person, pursuant to HRS
chapter $60 (hereinafter, Hawai'i Uniform Probate Code or HUPC),
section 560:5-102 (1993). On October 8, 1996, the Family Court
granted the petition and entered an order appointing the same co-
guardians of Kam's property in FC-AA-96-0003 as co-guardians of
Kam’s person in FC-G-96-0299.

This court takes judicial notice that shortly
thereafter, on October 29, 1996, the chief justice of this court
entered two standing orders bearing on the analysis of this case.

one order, titled “Assignment of District and District Family

 

} the copy of the objections included in the record on appeal in this
do not bear @ file stamp of the clerk of the Family Court

      

> Soe Antea Section 1.c.
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Court Judges,” (hereinafter, October 29, 1996 Standing Order ret
District Judges] provides in relevant part as follows:

Pursuant to article VI, §§ 2 and 6!" of the Constitution of the
State of Hawai'i, (the chief justice does) hereby assign the

Severs) district iudoes, including the several diserier Zasily
Hespective circuit, on an as neeaed basis, to hear such circuit
court matters az shall be aseigned by the appropriate
Adniniaerative Juage of the Circuit Court of that circuit, who
Shall coordinate such assigonents with the Administrative Judge of
the District Court oF the Senior Family Judge of that circuit,
applicable; provided that all temporarily assignea district and
Gistrict family judges shell also Near such matters as nay be
Gealgned to them by their respective edministrative judge. This
Seder shall be effective upon filing end shall remain in effect
Until Stherwise ordered:

 

 

 

  

 

(Emphasis in original.) The other order, titied “order
Designating Circuit Judges of the First Judicial Circuit of the
State of Hawai'i to Act as Circuit Family Judges,” (hereinafter,
october 29, 1996 Standing Order re: First Circuit Judges)
provides in relevant part as follows:

Pursuant to (HRS) § $72

sveral cis!
Of the Circuit Court of the First Judician Circuit toast ag
Sircuis family Jussse, on an as needed basis, co hear such family
Gourt matters as shali be assigned to then by the Senior Fanily
Suage of the First Circuit, who shall coordinate such assignments
WHER the appropriate Administrative Jvage of the Firet circuit
Court; provided that all acting circuit family juages shall also
hear such cizeuit court matters as may be assigned to then by
thelr respective adninistrative judge. This designation shail be
effective upon the filing of this order and shall remain in effect
Gneil otherwise ordered.

(ehe chief justice dot

 

hereby

 

 

  

 

(Emphases in original.)

 

‘Article VI, section 2 provides in zelevant part that “[e)he chief
justice my assign... « judge of the district court to serve temporarily on
the circuit court.” aw. Const, art. VI, $2- Article VI, section 6 provides
in relevent part that "[tJhe chief Justice may assign judges from one circuit
court to another for tenporary service.” Haw. Const. art. VI, § 6.

 

 

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On December 6, 1996, the co-guardians of Kan’s person
filed a motion in the Family Court for leave to file a petition
for appointment of guardians of Kan’s property pursuant to the
HUEC and HRS chapter 346.* In an affidavit in support of the
notion, counsel for the movants declared that “consolidation of
the guardianship of the property proceedings with the
[guardianship of the person proceedings] would be in the best
interests” of all parties concerned. Counsel for the movants
added:

Although the Probate Court normally has Jurisdiction over
Proceedings for the appointuent of a guardian of the property
nger (HRS) § 560:5-102, both that section and [HRS] § 346-235
Provide that where a proceeding for appointment of the
Guardianship of the person is pending, 2 proceeding for
Bppointnent of a guardian of the property nay be consolidated with
that proceeding in the Fanily Court, as the applicable cireait
Court and Fanily Court, in the exercise of their discretion, shall
Setermine.

 

On January 2, 1997, the Family Court entered an order granting
the notion.

on February 10, 1997, the co-guardians of Kan’s person
filed a petition in the Family Court to be appointed co-guardians

of Kam’s property in FC-G-96-0299. On February 25, 1997, the co-

* Although certain of the procedural facts of the Fanily Court
proceedings do not appear in the record on appeal in the instant cose, this
Eourt may take Judicisl notice of the records and files in FC-G-96-0299. See
303 Howai's 26, 29 m7, 79 P.38 119, 122 n.7
(2003) (noting thet, where record on appeal does not provide sufficient
information, court may take Judicial notice of record in related case!

 

 

* This court takes judicial notice of the fact that The Honorable John
J. Bryant, Jr-, who entered the January 2,.1997 order, was at that tine
Judge of the district ranily court of the first circuit appointed parsuant to
ns'§ $71-8 (1993).

 
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guardians of Kam’s person filed a motion in the Family Court in
FC-G-96-0299 to void a will and certain other estate documents
executed by Kam in 1995-96 in favor of Abastillas and Abastillas‘
daughters. The February 25, 1997 motion alleged that Kam had
executed the documents while lacking testamentary capacity and
under the undue influence of Smith and Abastillas. Smith and
Abastillas were not parties in FC-G-96-0299, did not appear in
the action, and no opposition was made to the petition or motion.
on April 22, 1997, the Family Court found that it had
jurisdiction under the HUPC and entered an order in FC-G-96-0299
granting the February 10, 1997 petition and making the co-
guardians the permanent co-guardians of Kam’s property. That
same day, the Family Court entered a second order pursuant to the
HUPC in FC-G-96-0299 wherein it granted the February 25, 1997
motion and declared the 1995-96 will and estate documents null
and void. No appeals were taken from any of the Family Court
orders.”
B. Proceedings in the Probate Court

On January 8, 2000, Kam died. Cedric initiated the

instant case on ay 5, 2000 by filing a petition (docketed as P.

 

* tis court takes judicial notice of the fact that The Honorable
Darrell ¥.C, Choy, who entered the April 22, 1997 ordera, was at that tine a
Suage of the district fanily court of the first circuit eppointed pursuant to
ings 573-8

 
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No. 00-1-0281) pursuant to HRS § 560:3-401 (1993),* for probate
of the 1988 will and trust in favor of Kam’s children, Cedric and
Edvard W.L. Kam, Jr. On July 17, 2000, the Probate Court entered
an order and judgment admitting the 1988 will to probate,
appointing Cedric personal representative of Kan’s estate, and
issuing letters testamentary to him.

on September 11, 2000, Smith and Abastillas filed a
petition as creditors of Kan’s estate for unpaid legal and
personal services rendered to Kam in 1995 and 1996. on
October 11, 2000, Cedric objected to the creditors’ petition,
alleging that the services rendered were part of a schene to
unduly influence and exploit Kan, and were of no benefit to her.
That same day, Cedric also filed a petition for instructions
seeking direction as to how to proceed with administration of the
estate given the conflicting claims made by Smith and Abastillas.
on October 19, 2000, at 4:21 p.m., Abastillas and Smith filed a
reply to Cedric’s objection, attaching approximately 300 pages of
documents supporting their creditors’ claim. At a 9:00 a.m.
October 20, 2000 hearing on the creditors’ petition, Abastillas
also voiced claims that she vas the rightful personal

representative of Kam’s estate under the 1996 will. With resi

 

to the petition itself, the Probate Court found as follows:

 

wes § $60:3-403,
commenced,” outlines

nature; how

 

entitled “Formal testacy proceedings,
Procedure for probate of a Will.

 

 
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The court first finds that [Abastillas and Smith's] reply filed on
October 19 at 4:21 in the afternoon ie untimely.

‘The court further examining this document notes that there are 28
exnibsts attached an part of this reply meno. These exhibits
Gerteinly sheuid have been attached ss pore of the original
Petition, and if they were known in the exercise of reasonable due
Eiligence would have been or should have Deen discovered by.
Creditors 30 a2 to file this st the time che original petition was
filed. Tne court finding that this docusent is untinely filed
Gisregaras ana does not consider ie in connection with the
Petition filed on behalf of Abestillas and Smith

 

Having reviewed the timely fled and properly subaitted matters
presented to the court, the court fings simply thet the
Petitioners in this case, Abestillas and Smith, have failed to
establish factual and/or legel basis which would warrant their
Satitlenent for payment of claims ae requested or alleged. The
petition ts denies.

On Novenber 8, 2000, the Probate Court entered a written order
denying the creditors’ petition of Smith and Abastitlas.

on Novenber 2, 2000, Abastillas followed through on her
statements at the October 20 hearing, filing a petition to vacate
the July 17, 2000 probate order and to instead have admitted to
probate the 1996 will with her as personal representative of the
estate, On November 13, 2000, Abastitlas filed her objections to
fedric’s October 11, 2000 petition for instructions. In her
objection, Abastillas argued, inter alia, that the Aprii 22, 1997
Family Court order in FC-G-96-0289 purporting to void the 1995-96
estate docunents was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and thus should not be given effect by the Probate Court. she
also contended that the rulings in FC-AA-96-0003, including the
October 3, 1996 findings of fact, had no preclusive effect

because they were not actually litigated.

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On December 1, 2000, Cedric’s petition for instructions
came for hearing before the Probate Court. After hearing
argunents from counsel regarding jurisdiction, the Probate Court
took the matter under advisement.’ On December 13, 2000, Cedric
filed his objection to Abastillas’ petition to vacate the
July 17, 2000 probate order. Abastillas filed her reply on
Decenber 21, 2000.

on January 12, 2001, Abastillas’ petition to vacate was
heard in the Probate Court. At the close of the hearing, the
Probate Court denied Abastillas’ petition, finding that the April
22, 1997 Family Court order validly voided the 1996 will and thus
the July 17, 2000 order admitting to probate the 1988 will
remained in effect. At a hearing on May 11, 2001, the Probate

court agri

 

4 to certify the various probate orders for
interlocutory appeal.

on January 2, 2002, the Probate Court entered orders
(2) granting Cedric's October 11, 2000 petition for instructions,
(2) denying Abastillas’ Novenber 2, 2000 petition to vacate, and
(3) certifying the orders for interlocutory appeal. on
September 13, 2002 and September 16, 2002, the Probate Court
entezed judgments (1) denying the September 11, 2000 creditors’

petition of Smith and Abastillas; (2) granting Cedric’s

 

> Te appears the petition wae granted by minute order on Decenber 28,
2000, but the minute order is not part of the record on appeal.

 

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October 11, 2000 petition for instructions; and (3) denying
Abastillas’ November 2, 2000 petition to vacate the July 17, 2000
order for probate of the 1988 will and instead appoint her as
representative under the 1996 will. The judgments were certified
for interlocutory appeal, and Abastillas and Smith filed notices
of appeal from all three on October 11, 2002.7 In granting
Cedricts petition and denying that of Abastillas, the Probate
Court ruled that the April 22, 1997 order voiding the 1996 will
and July 17, 2000 order directing probate of the 1988 will were
“valid and enforceable and remain in effect.”
C. Broceedings Before the ICA and Supreme Court

On appeal, Abastillas again argued, inter alia, that
(1) the Family Court orders of April 22, 1997 were void for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the Family Court's
rulings in FC-AA-96-0003 had no preclusive effect because they
were not actually litigated. Abastillas and smith also argued
that: (1) the Probate Court’s denial of their creditors’
petition for the untimeliness of their reply brief was improper

under HRS § 560:

 

-804 (1993)"" and Hawai'i Probate Rules (HPR)

 

% on October 16, 2002, Smith voluntarily dismissed ae inedvertently
{Led his appeals from the orders granting petition for instructions and
Genying petition to vacate because he wae not a party to either of these,
Petitions. Accoraingiy, he is a party only to the appeal of the denial of the
Ereditors’ petition.

 

   

HRS § 560:3-804 provides for the manner of presentation of crediters’
elaine.

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Rule 63; and (2) the Probate Court erred in not assigning the
creditors’ petition, as a contested matter pursuant to HPR Rules
19 and 20," to the civil trial calendar or retaining it for a
deferred hearing. On August 8, 2005 the ICA issued a seventy-
three page memorandum opinion vacating all three of the Probate
Court's judgments and renanding to the Probate Court for further

proceedings. ICA’s Opinion at 72-73.

 

In its opinion, the ICA concluded that: (1) the Family
Court’s April 22, 1997 orders were null and void for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction with the result that the 1996 will
was never voided and the Probate Court erred both in denying
Rbastillas’ petition to vacate and in granting Cedric’s petition
for instructions; and (2) the Family Court's rulings in FC-AA-96-
0003 had preclusive effect. As to subject matter jurisdiction,
the ICA concluded:

Regarding the family court's jurisdiction to enter, in FC-G
No. 96-0285. (Guarcianship Proceedings), the April 22, 1987 “order
Granting Motion to Void Estate Planning Documents, Filed February
26;"1997," Abastillas argues that the family court is of “Limited
jurisdiction,” does not have the power to probate or void a will,
and, therefore, Abastillas was "free toy and did, ignore the

notion before [the Fanily Court] because [tne Fanily Court’ s)

Order was a ‘complete nullity’; its defectiveness is not subject

 

 

 

 

4 HER Rule 63 provides:
Rcreditor seeking paym
by (a) delivering the cla
£0 the personel representative, or (b) filing the claim and
affidavit with the court and timely serving @ copy of the claim to
the personal representative.

  

» HER Rule 20(a) provides:
The court by written order may retain a contested matter on the
regular probate calendar or may assign the contested matter to the
civil trials calendar of the circuit court.

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to waivers ond it may be attacked, directly or collaterally, at
any tine in any court.”" This argument has merit.

on october 8, 1996, based on the provisions of Hawaii's
Uniform Probate Code, HRS $§ 560:5-101 and ~102, the family court
sppointes. . . co-guardiane of Mee. Kan's person

 

lon February 10, 1997, allegedly based on the provisions of
Hawaii's Uniform Probate Code, [the co-guardians] filed a
"Petition for Appointment of Co-Gusrdians of the Property.” On
Apri 22, 1997," [the Fanily Court] entered... an “Order
Granting Petition for Appointment of Co-Guardians of the Property,
Filed February 10, 1997." This order stated that the family court
had “gurdediction pursuant to #.R-S. § 560:5-102" and appointes «

© “Co-Guardians of the Property of (Mrs.] Kam. - . without
bond{.J” (The Fanily Court also entered) an “Order Granting
Notion to Void Estate Planning Documents, Filed February 25,
1597."

 

   

In the Guardianship Proceedings, we conclude that: (1) the
fenily court had jurisdiction over the "guardian of the person"?
{2} no later than Jancary 1, 1997, the family court did not have
jurisaiction over the "guerdien of the property”; and (3) ARS
Chapter 560, saweii's Uniform Probate Code, did not authorize the
Family court to enter its two April 22, 1987 orders, and,
therefore, those orders are void ab initic.

 

HRS §§ 560:5-101 and -102 [(1993)] state as follows:

560:5-101 Definitions and use of terme. Unless
otherwise epparent from the context, in ehis chapter

(2) “Guardiensnip proceeding” Le a proceeding to
appoint a guardsen of the person for an
Sheapacstates person oF # minor?

 

(3) A “protective proceeding” is a proceeding under
the provisions of section S€0:5-401 to determine
thee a person connot effectively manage oF apply
the person's estate to necessary ends, either
because the person lacks the ability or is
Stherwise inconvenienced, of because the person
{e"s'mincr, and to secure administration of the
person's estate by 2 guardian of the property or
Sther appropriate reliefs

 

 

 

(4) A “protected person” is a minor or other
for whos guardian of the property has been
appointed of other protective order has Deen
ade:

 

(5) A Sward" 49 @ person for whom a guardian of the
Person has been appointed. A "minor werd” is
Binor for whom a guardian of the person has Been
Sppointea solely Because of minority.

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560:5-102 Suriediction of subject matter:
consolidation of proceedings. The court has jurisdiction
over protective proceedings and the family court has
Suristiction over guardianship proceedings. where
Brotective and guardianship proceedings relating to the sane
Person have been initiated, tney say be consolidated in the
Eourt or in the family court aa the court and the family
court in the exercise of their discretion shall determine.

  

Prior to Janvary 1, 1997, in HRS § $60:1-201(5) [(2993)],
Hewais'a Uniform Probate Code stated that *‘Court’ means the
Cireule court having jurisdiction in Matters relating to trusts
an the estates of decedents, missing persons, protected persons,
Minors and incapacitated persons.” ‘This definition of "Court™
Yncludes oth che probate court ond the family court. Te
‘allowed the following interpretation of HRS § S60:5-i02: “the
[probate court and the family court have) jurisdiction over
protective proceedings and the family court hae jurisdiction over
Suerdianship proceedings.”

 

Commencing January 1, 1997, Mawaii's Uniform Probate Code
states, in ARS 9 560:1-201, thet “*Court’ means the circuit court
in this State having jurisdiction in matters relating to the
altaize of decedente” and, in HRS § Se0:1-202(e), that "(t]ne
Court Aas jurisdiction over protective proceedings [HRS § 560:5~
G01] and the fanily court hae jurisdiction over guardianship
Proceedings.” These changes require the following interpretation
SERS § 560:5-102:" “The (probate) court has jurisdiction over
protective proceedings [including sll proceadings involving a
Guardian of the property] and the family court has jurisdiction
Sver guardianship [of the pezsen] proceedings.”

 

  

(thus, no ater than January 2, 1997, the family court did.
not have jurisdiction over the “guardian of the property," and HRS
Chapter 560, Hawaii's Uniform Probate Code, as amended effective
Senuary 1, 1999, did not authorize the fanily court to enter the
eo April’ 22, 1997 ordere in the Guardianship Proceedings.

 

ICA's Opinion at 57-63 (some brackets in original and sone

brackets added). Because the Family Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to enter the April 1997 orders, the ICA concluded

that the Probate Court’s grant of the petition for instructions

 

\ the ICA opinion here contained a footnote with the text of HRS § $71-

The text of that statute is set forsh and considered herein in

Section Tit.A, intza, at note 22 and surrounding text.

as
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and denial of the petition to vacate were wrong." ICA's Opinion
at @2.

As to Abastillas’ argument that the Family Court's
rulings in FC-AA-96-0003 had no preclusive effect because the

Assues were never actually adjudicated but instead were settled,

 

the ICA disagreed, concluding

Regarding adjudication, on September 9, 1996, (the Fenily
Court) entered an "Order Appointing Temporary Co-Guardians of the
Property and continuing Existing Orders” stating ehat ene “[E] fal
set. for Septenber 23 and 24, 1996 is taken off the calendar,” and
Crdering that the “[plarties snail subst proposes finsings within
Seven days[.]" saith, a5 “Party Pro Se” and “counsel for Faz
Abastillas” "refused" to approve this erder. However, on October
3, 1996, the court entered a finding that "(alt the Pretrial
Cinference held Septenber 9, 1996, the Court was informed that the
parties hed reached an agreenent fo settle this case by the entry,
{of} the Order Appointing Tenporary Co-Guardians of the Property
and Continuing Existing Orders « - . on the understanding that,
While parties (Mre.] Kam, .. . Saithy and... Abastillas would
ot sigh approval as to form or substance, neither would they

 

 

 

'S the ICA algo found error, separate and independent from the
Jurisdictional issue, in the Probate Court's sudgnents granting Cedric’
Betition for instructions and denying Abastillas’ petition to vacate. In 20
Eoncluding, the Ich reasoned:

(the Family Court's) October 3, 1996 finding that Mrs. Kam
aid “not have the capacity to make reasoned decisions concerning
her money and properties” is expressly based on Or- Blanchette's
examination of Hrs. Kam on July 16, 1996. Based on (this) valid
Einaing, [the Family Court} decided that various “estate planning
Gocunente executed by (Mrs.] Kam be and are hereby declared null
and vold[.]” The first of those decurents is dated July 1, 1995,
Gnd the last i¢ cated Hay 24, 1996. All of these docunents were
Guecuted prior te Dr. Slanchette’s examination of Mes. kam on July
3f, 1996. Adnittedly, the record indicates that Mrs. Kam showed
Signs of Alzheimer’s no later than April ef 1996. Dr. Vit Pately
who made this diagnosis based upon an April 19, 1996 interview,
Beated that "(cloncerns this examiner would have is essentially
need for innediate protection of patient's property and financial
Fesources to which is most vulnerable for exploitation because of
her significant and clear dementia.” (The Family Court] did not,
however, fin thet Mrs. Kan dia "not have the capacity to make
Feasoned decisions concerning her money and properties” when she
Gxecuted the documents declared null and void by [the Family
Court's) April 22, 1997 order

 

 

 

 

ICA's Opinion at €2 (sone brackets in original and sone added) .

16
uns

os

the

voiding the

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

oppose the entry of the order or protest it once entered.”
Therefore, Abastillas did not disagree with the settlesent. In
effect, ner non-cisagreenent is the stipulation referred to in HRS
§ 346-240(c) (1953) ],0" and the acceptance referred to In HRS $
346-241 (e) (119931.

 

 

Consequently, in light of the following rule of law and
subject to one exception to be discussed in the next. parts!" we
Concivde that Abastilias is bound by [the Family Court*s}
Gecisions.

In Doe y. Doe, 99 Hawas't 1, $2 7.34 298 (2002), the chiia’s
nother files 2 petition for paternity againet the alleges
father. ‘The Hawai's Supreme Court decided that. the doctrine
of issue preclusion barred the child’ s mother from Bringing
the paternity action because the divorce decree between the
Rother snd her forner husband had declared that the ehild
Was the son of the mother and her former husband, and the
Hnague of paternity was essential to the portion of the final
Judgnent Gf divorce that ordered the former haeband to nake
Bupport paysents and provided for custody and visitation.
‘The opinion of s majority of the court states, in relevant
part, as follows:

 

 

 

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars
relitigation of an issue where: (1) the Lssue decided
in the prior adjudication is,

presented in the action in question; (2) there is 2
inal judgnent on the merits; (3} the iteve decided in
the prior adjodication wae essential to the final
judgment) and (4) the party against whon issue
preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with
party to the prior adjudication. -Tesue preclusion
Gan be raised defensively by one who uss not a party
in the prior adjudication.

    

Exaht c. Bratt, 106 Hawes: 37, 40, @4 F.3d $45, 5¢7 (Hawas’s App.
2008)

 

§ 346-240(c) provides in relevant part
If facts eufficient to sustain the petition are established in
court, or are stipulated to by all parties, the court shall enter
fan order finding that the dependent adult has been abused ana
Threatened with imminent abuse and shell state the grounds for the
finding

§ 346-241(2) provides:
The court shall conduct @ dispoeition hearing concerning the terms
and conditions set forth in the proposed provective order and
proposed protective services pian unless each of the appropriate
Parties accepes the order and plan, in which event, the court may
Spprove the order and plan without’ hearing.

exception referred to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction
April 22, 1997 orders. See ICA's Opinion at 57-61.

v
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

ICA’s Opinion at 56-57.
With respect to the denial of the Smith and Abastillas’
creditors’ petition, the ICA found:

At [the time the petition and papers in connection therewith were
filed], HER Rule 10(c) stated, in relevant part, as follows: "

 

(c) Time to File Pleadings or Reports. A party
objecting or responding to's petition mst file the
objection or response with ene court and serve[) it on
Gnterested persona within 30 days of service of the petition

 

 

anc notice of nearing{] . . - ., Unless otherwise cxdered by
the court, pleadings in response to a response. oF
objection{]"..- . shall be filed with the court and served

fon counsel for parties who have appeared in the proceeding
ho less than 12 hours prior eo the time set for the hearing
3s originally set[sl

In light of the record prior to the September 11, 2000
petition, especially given the actions by the family court and the
Probate court, we conclude that (1) (seith and Abastilias] knew or
Enould heve khown the various burdens they would face when they

ferted their claims for costs, fees, and state excise taxes, and
Should neve confronted and satisfied those Burdens in their
Septenber 11, 2000 petitions (2) when the October 20, 2000 hearing
was scheduled, (Saith and Abastillas) knew or should have knows
that if Cedric used all of the 30 days permitted for him to file
his objection, (Smith and Abastillas} would not have much ime to
Eimely file s reply to Cedrie’s objection whien wes no less than
‘Fa hours before the hearing? (3) the court did not consider (Seith
and Abastillas") reply because 1t was not timely fileg? (8) the
Court's decision that mich of what the reply said shovid have &
Sold in the original petition was only one of the reasons why the
Court did not excuse the untimely filing; (5) the applicable
Standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard; (6) an
Bouse of discretion occurs if the trisl court has “clearly
exceeded the bounds of reeson or disregarded rules or principles
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of @ party
Litigent(,1* Amfac Ing v Haikiki Beachcomber Inv, Co., 74 Haw:
as, 114, 839 B20 10, 26 (1992) (citation omitted; and?) the
court dig not abuse its discretion

 

 

 

 

 

 

ICA’s Opinion at 66-68. The ICA also rejected Abastillas’

argument that the Probate Court should have deferred hearing on

 

HDR Rule 10(c) was substantively. amended effective July 1, 2003. As
anended, it is silent with respect co "pleadings in response to a response oF
Objection.” [Foctnote in original.)

we
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

the creditors’ petition or reassigned it for civil trial as a
contested matter under HPR Rules 19 and 20. Instead, the ICA
concluded that it was within the Probate Court's discretion
whether to retain the matter or assign it to the civil trials
calendar, and that the Probate Court did not abuse its discretion
in retaining and dismissing it. ICA's Opinion at 68-72. Despite
the foregoing, however, the ICA vacated the Probate Court's
denial of creditors’ petition “in light of [its] decision
vacating the final judgments pertaining to the probate of the
Will and the petition for instructions{.]” ICA's Opinion at 72.

After the ICA denied Abastillas’ motion for
reconsideration on August 25, 2005, Cedric filed an application
for a writ of certiorari on September 6, 2005, which was granted
by this court on September 14, 2005 over the opposition of
Rbastillas. Cedric’s application assigned two points of error
with respect to the ICA’s jurisdictional conclusion: 1) the
ICA's reliance on the amended version of the HUPC was in error
because that version was not in effect when the Family Court
entered its orders on April 22, 1997; and 2) in the alternative,
the Family Court had jurisdiction under HRS chapter 346.

on September 23, 2005, Abastillas filed a cross~
application for a writ of cextiorari, which was granted by this
court on September 29, 2005. Abastillas assigned one point of

error -- namely, the ICA gravely erred in giving the October 3,

w
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1996 Fanily Court findings preclusive effect because the issues
were not “actually litigated or “finally decided.” With leave of
this court, Cedric and Abastillas filed supplemental briefs on
the issue of whether the Family Court had subject matter
jurisdiction to enter its April 22, 1997 orders.
TT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

wwhether a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction
is a question of law reviewable de nova.” In xe Dos Children, 96
Hawai'i 272, 283, 30 P.34 878, 889 (2001).
B.  Gonclusions of Law

“A trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
nove, under the right/wrong stendard of review.” Child Support
Enforcement Agency v. Ros, 96 Hawai" 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70
(2001) (quoting State vs Bh Loe, 94 Hawai'i 207, 209, 10 P.3d
728, 730 (2000)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

TTI, pIscussion

A. The Family Court Did Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction to
Enter Its April 22, 1997 Orders.

The Probate Court granted Cedric’s petitions for
instructions to proceed with probate of Kan’s 1988 will and
denied Abastillas’ petition to vacate the prior order for probate
of the 1988 will because it concluded that Kan’s subsequently

executed estate documents had been voided by the “valid and

20
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enforceable” April 22, 1997 order of the Family Court. The ICA,
in turn, concluded that the Family Court’s order was not valid or
enforceable because that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to enter it. In his application, Cedric argues that the ICA
gravely erred in so concluding because it failed to consider the
effective date of the 1996 amendnents to the HUPC. Specifically,
he argues that the amendments stripping the Family Court of
jurisdiction in guardianship of the property proceedings did not
take effect with respect to the instant case until July 1, 1997,
such that the Family Court still had jurisdiction as of April 22,
1997. In the alternative, Cedric argues that the Family Court
had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders pursuant to
HRS chapter 346. Abastillas responds that the ICA did not err
because the discrepancy in the effective date is a legislative
error that should be disregarded by this court in favor of the
legislature's intended January 1, 1997 effective date.**
Rbastillas also argues in the alternative that the Family Court
never had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders of
April 22, 1997, even prior to the 1996 amendments. For the

reasons set forth below, we agree with the ICA’s conclusion

 

™ pbastillas’ third argument ie that Cedric should be precluded from
raising his Jurisdictional argument because he did not argue it in the circuit
Court or make a notion for reconsideration before the ICA, This contention is,
Without merit, as it has long been settled that parties may raise arguments as
fo subject matter jurisdiction at any stage in the case.” Sse, gig. Bush
Hawaisan Homes Conm’g, 76 Hawail 128, 133, 610 P.24 1272, 3277 (1998)
(stating that the quection of subject satter jurisdiction “is valic at any
stage of the case”):

 

 

 

a
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

(although for different reasons) that the Probate Court erred in
relying on the April 22, 1997 orders because the Family Court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter those orders under
either the HUPC or HRS chapter 346.

1. The Family Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction over

Guardianship of Property Proceedings under the HUPC

Before or After January 1, 1997.

As noted by the ICA, the definition and subject matter
jurisdiction provisions of the HUPC relating to protection of
persons and their property, HRS $$ 360:5-101 and -102, when read
together, state in relevant part: “The court has jurisdiction
over [guardianship of the property proceedings] and the family
court has jurisdiction over guardianship [of the person]
proceedings.” See supra Section I.c (quoting ICA's Opinion at
98-59). Prior to 1997, “court” was in turn defined’ as “the
Sircuit court having jurisdiction in matters relating to trusts
and the estates of decedents, missing persons, protected persons,
minors and incapacitated persons.” HRS § 560:1-201(5) (emphasis
added). Because the ICA concluded, based on HRS § S71-11

(1993),** that family courts have exclusive jurisdiction over

 

# the definition of “court” was qualified by the general proviso:
“Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles which
are applicable to specific Articles or Parts, and unless the context otherwise
Fequires s+. ARS § 56011-203.

7 mms § 571-11 sta

 

in relevant part as follows:

 

Durkediction; children. Except ar otherwise provided in this
chapter, the court shall have exclusive originel jurisdiction in
(continued...)

2
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

minors, it concluded that the HUPC’s definition of “court,” which
refers to the circuit court having jurisdiction over the estates
of minors, included “both the probate court and the family

court.”# ICA's Opinion at 59. The ICA then inserted this

 

1, . continued)
proceedings:

 

(2) Concerning any person who is alleged to have committed an
act pricr to achieving eighteen years of age which would
Constitute « violation or attempted violation of any
federal, state, or local law or municipal
ordinance. = «

(2) Concerning any child Living of found within the elrcuit:

(A) Who Se neglected az to or deprived of educational
Services Because of the failure of any person oF
agency to exercise that degree of care for which it is
Uegaily responsible

(8) Who Ae beyond the control of the child’s parent or
Cther custodian or whose behavicr 1s injurious te
the child's own or Others’ welfare;

 

(C) Who is neither attending school ner receiving
‘ducational services required by law whether through
the child's own misbehavior or nonattendance OF
otherwise: oF

(0) Who Ae An violation of curfew.

(3) To determine the custody of any child or appoint = guardian
Of the person of any child.

(6) For judicial consent to the marriage, employment, oF
enlistment of a child, when such consent is required by
io.

(7) For the treatment or commitment of a mentally dk
nentally retarded, or mentally ill child.

 

(6) Onder the Interstate Compact on Juveniles under chapter $82.
(9) For the protection of any child under chapter 567,

©» me ICR did not articulate any reasoning for its conclusion: rather,
At simply quoted the definition of “court” in HRS § 560:1-201, stated that it
included both probate and family courts, and added a footnote setting forth

(continued...)

 

23
*** FORPUBLICATION ***

 

definition of “court” into HRS § 56

 

“102, yielding the

following result:

 

“the (probate court and the family court have]
jurisdiction over [guardianship of the property] proceedings and
the family court has jurisdiction over guardianship [of the
person] proceedings.” ICA's Opinion at 60 (first alteration in
original). In other words, the ICA concluded that under the UEC
prior to January 1, 1997, family courts had concurrent
jurisdiction with probate courts over protective proceedings
(dite, guardianships of the property). This interpretation of
HRS $8 56

 

-102 and $60:1-201 is wrong in relevant part for the
reasons set forth below.

The key difference between family courts and probate
courts is that family courts can be presided over by either
circuit or district judges, while probate courts are circuit
courts that, as a general rule, can be presided over only by
circuit judges. A circuit court, on the one hand, is a court of
general jurisdiction that happens to have included within its
Jurisdictional authority probate jurisdiction. See HRS § 603-
21,6 (1993) ("The several circuit courts shall have power to
grant probate of wills, . . . to appoint guardians of the
property, . . . and to do all other things as provided in (the

HUPC].”) (Emphasis added.). The circuit courts are presided over

 

2(. continued)
the text ‘Sf HRS $ 571-11 as apparent justification for the statement. ICA's
Opinion at 59.

a
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

by circuit judges. HRS §§ 603-3 and -4 (1993). A family court,
on the other hand, may be presided over by either a circuit judge
ox a district judge. See HRS § 571-4 (1993) (providing that
circuit judges designated by the chief justice of the supreme
court shall be judges of the family court); HRS § 571-8 (1993)
(establishing district family courts and providing that the chief
justice of the supreme court “nay appoint one or more district
family judges for each judicial circuit”). That a circuit judge
has the sane authority whether sitting in family court or in
probate is expressly recognized by section 571-4: “Wothing in
(HRS chapter 571] shall be construed to limit the jurisdiction
and authority of any circuit judge, designated as judge of a
family court, to matters within the scope of [HRS chapter 571].”
See alse October 29, 1996 Standing Order re: First Circuit
Judges (providing for the converse proposition in the first
circuit, ise., that the jurisdiction and authority of any first

circuit judge not designated

 

a judge of the famity court is
not limited to matters without the scope of HRS chapter $71 if a
family court matter is assigned to him or her by the Senior
Family Judge of the First Circuit).

Returning to HRS § 560:1-201, which defines “court” as
“circuit court,” it is thus clear that the meaning of the term
“court” as used therein would include any circuit judge, whether

sitting in family court or probate, but would exclude any

2s
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

district judge, whether sitting in family court or otherwise. In

 

other words, HRS § 560:5-102 should have been read as follows:
“The [probate court and the circuit family court have]
jurisdiction over (guardianship of the property] proceedings and
the [circuit or district] family court has jurisdiction over
guardianship [of the person] proceedings.” Here, as noted supra
note 7, Judge Choy was, at the time he entered the April 22, 1997
orders, a district judge appointed under HRS § 571-8, not 2
circuit judge sitting by designation in family court under HRS §

571-4, and thus he lacked original jurisdiction over

  

guardianships of the property under HRS § 560:5-102 as it stood
prior to the 1996 amendments to the HUPC.

We note that Judge Bryant's January 2, 1997 order
purporting to grant leave to file the guardianship of the
property petition in response to the request to consolidate the
proceedings was insufficient to remedy this lack of jurisdiction
and give the district family court authority over the
guardianship of Kan’s property, It is true that a district
family court proceeding pursuant to a proper consolidation order

would have had the same authority over guardianships of the

 

property as a circuit court. HRS § 560:5-102 ("Where protective
and guardianship proceedings relating to the same person have
been initiated, they may be consolidated in the court or in the

family court as the court and the family court in the exercise of

26
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

their discretion shall determine.”) (Emphasis added.). However,
the consolidation provision of HRS § 560:5-102 is not applicable
here because neither was the guardianship of the property
proceeding first properly initiated in the circuit court, nor was
there an order from the circuit court transferring or ceding
jurisdiction to the district family court in the exercise of
discretion. The January 2, 1997 order was insufficient because
Judge Bryant was a district family judge, see supra note 6, and
thus lacked the authority to unilaterally consolidate the
guardianship proceedings; were it otherwise, a district court
would be allowed to assume the authority of a circuit court of
its own accord and the consolidation provision of HRS § 560:5-102
would effectively swallow the rest of the statute in
contravention of the statutory language regarding joint exercise
of discretion by the circuit and district courts.

We note, too, that the October 29, 1996 Standing Order
ret District Judges is insufficient to allow district judges to
unilaterally assume jurisdiction over guardianships of the
property. Although that order is a necessary predicate to
district judges’ exercise of circuit court jurisdiction (in the
absence of any other enabling statute or order) because it
authorizes them to preside in circuit courts as needed, it is not
sufficient because it allows district judges to hear only those

circuit court matters “as shall be assigned by the appropriate

2
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Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court” in coordination with
the Senior Family Judge or Administrative Judge of the District
Court. October 29, 1996 Standing Order re: District Judges. In
the instant case, there was no order from the Adninistrative
Judge of the First Circuit, in coordination with the Senior
Family Judge of the First Circuit, assigning either Judge aryant
or Judge Choy to hear the guardianship of Kan’s property.
Accordingly, the April 22, 1997 orders cannot be sustained in
reliance on the October 29, 1996 Standing Order re: District
Judges.

Finally, with respect to whether the district family
courts had jurisdiction over guardianships of the property under

the HUPC after the 1996 amendments, the answer is the same --

 

they did not -- because, even after the anendnents, the tern
“court” in the HUFC was still defined as “circuit court.” HRS §
$60:1-201 (1997). Accordingly, and thus without having to
consider the parties’ arguments regarding the effective date of
the 1996 amendments (since district courts hed original
jurisdiction over guardianships of the property neither before
nor after the amendments), we agree with the ICA’s ultimate
conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction for the April 22,
1997 order voiding the 1995-96 estate documents was lacking under

the HUPC.

2
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

we Jurisdiction Pursuant to

 

2. The Family Court Did Not
RS Chapter 346

Cedric argues in the alternative that even if the
Family Court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to HRS chapter
560, it nevertheless had jurisdiction under HRS chapter 346 even
though it did not expressly act pursuant to that authority. HRS
§ 871-14(10) provides that the family courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction for “the protection of dependent adults
under (HRS) chapter 346, part X." As set forth supra note 1, HRS
§ 346-223 provides that “[t)he family court shall have
jurisdiction in protective proceedings under this part concerning
any dependent adult . . . [who] has been abused and is threatened
with imminent abuse[.]” Abastillas counters that HRS chapter 346
is also inapplicable in this case. We agree with Abastillas for
the reasons set forth below.

As the title of chapter 346, “Department of Human
Services,” makes clear, this statute is for the benefit of DHS
and does not create a right to proceed for private litigants.
See HRS § 346-227 (1993) (“Upon receiving 2 report that abuse of
a dependent adult has occurred and is imminent, the department.

(Emphasis added.); HRS §

 

shall cause an investigation. . .
346-228 (1993) ("Upon investigation the department shall take
action . . . and shall have the authority to. . . [s]eek an

order for inmediate protection [under HRS § 346-231) . . . .”)

2
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

(Emphasis added.) HRS § 346-231(a) (1993) (stating that “she
department shall seek an order for immediate protection”)
(emphasis added); HRS § 346-231(e) (1993) (stating that “orders
under section 346-232 and [346-231] may be obtained . . . by the
department”) (emphasis added); HRS § 346-231(f) (1993) ("If a
written order for immediate protection is issued, the department
shall file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the court . .
") (Emphasis added.). In other words, even assuming that DHS
had authority to have the 1996 will voided in FC-AA-96-0003, that
authority could not provide a jurisdictional basis for an order
to that effect (1) in another action (2) sought by a party other
than DHS. Here, the motion to void the 1995-96 estate documents

 

brought in FC-G-96-0299, not FC-AA-96-0003, and by the co-
guardians of Kan’s person, not DHS. Therefore, HRS § 346-231
does not provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction."

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Family
Court did not have jurisdiction over guardianships of the

property under either HRS chapter $60 or HRS chapter 346 such as

H we briefly note two sdditional, independent jurisdictional defects
under chapter 346. First, prior to the issuance of orders under sections 346-

 

231 end -232, the court mist find probable cause that abuse Ls imminent. HRS
fF 3ee-23i (ce). “No such finding war made in FC-G-96-0299. Second, chapter 346
Ctearly states that s consolidation order i required before a fenily court

      

Broceeding under chepter 246 may exercise Jurisdiction under the HUPC. Seg
HRs § 346-235 (1993) (CA proceeding for the appointment of a guardian of the
person or of the property under article V of (the MUFC) may be consolidated
ith the proceedings onder this part a5 the applicable circuit court and the
Yaniiy court, in the exercise of their discretion, shall permit."). As set
forth above in Section IIL-A:1, dvdge Bryant's January 2, 1987 Order was not
sufficient in this regard

20
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

to validly enter its April 22, 1997 orders. Accordingly, those

orders were void ab initio and should not have been given any

effect in the Probate Court proceedings below. As such, the ICA
correctly concluded that the Probate Court erred as a matter of
law in finding that the 1997 order voiding the 1995-96 estate
docunents was “valid and enforceable.”

B. The Relevance and Preclusive Effect of the Family Court's
Hulings in FCWAA-96-0003 Are Not Properly Before the Court
at This Time.

Although the Family Court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to enter its orders of April 22, 1997, and thus the
judgments on the petition for instructions and petition to vacate
must therefore be vacated and remanded to the Probate Court for
further proceedings, we next consider the ICA’s conclusion that
“Abastillas is bound by (the Family Court's) decisions” in FC-AA-
96-0003 with respect to, inter alia, Kam’s capacity." ICA’s
Opinion at 57. In her application, Abastillas charges that the
ICA committed grave error in so holding because those findings
were not actually litigated. For the reasons set forth below, we

hold that neither the preclusive effect nor relevance of the

% an the portion of its opinion set forth supra note 15, the ICA also
reasoned that the finaings in FC-AR-96-0003 were irrelevant (or at least not
Geterminative) with respect to Ken's capacity to execute the 1995-36 estate
Gocunents because those findings only establish Kan’ s capacity as of July 18,
1896, while the challenged estate docusents were all executed prior to that
ante. “Because the Family Court orders contain no findings aa £0 Kam's
cepecity at the tines of execution of the estate docusents, the ICA reasoned
That the Probate Court's judgments denying the petition to’ vacate and the
petition for instructions were wrong wholly epert from the jurisdictional
Sefect. ICA’s Opinion at 62.

2
*** FORPUBLICATION ***

Family Court findings in FC-AA-96-0003 are properly within the
scope of appellate review, and thus the ICA’s conclusions in both
regards were superfluous and must be disregarded on remand.

To begin, we note that nowhere in the record does it
appear that the Probate Court gave preclusive effect to, or
mentioned in any way, the Family Court rulings in FC-AA-96-0003.
Instead, the oral and written rulings of the Probate Court refer
only to the “valid and enforceable” April 22, 1997 order of the
Family Court voiding the 1995-96 estate docunents, which was
entered in FC-G-96-0299. In other words, the Probate Court was
giving preclusive effect to the Family Court's orders in FC-G-96-
0299, not to the rulings entered in FC-AA-96-0003. while the
April 1997 orders of the Fanily Court in FC-G-96-0299 may well
have (erroneously) relied on the earlier rulings in FC-AA-96-
0003, the ICA on appeal was not directly reviewing the April 1997
order (or any other Family Court ruling, for that matter) for
errors rather, it was reviewing the September 2002 judgaents of
the Probate Court.

The foregoing highlights @ crucial distinction, because
the issue of whether a judgnent is being attacked directly or
collaterally determines the scope of review. “A collateral
attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a
proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling,

correcting or modifying such judgment or decree.” Kapiolani

2
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

 

Estate v. Atcherly, 14 Haw. 651, 661 (1903), quoted in First

Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, 70 Haw. 392, 398, 772 P.2d 1187, 1191
(1989). In this case, the instant proceedings were instituted

not to impeach any Family Court orders, but instead to settle the
administration of Kam's estate; accordingly, the challenge to the
1997 Family Court orders represents a collateral attack.

‘The rule in this jurisdiction is that the scope of
appellate review of a judgment or order being collaterally
attacked (as opposed to directly reviewed) is limited to the
question of jurisdiction. See First Hawaiian Bank, 70 Haw. at
398, 772 P.2d at 1191 ("If it is only a question of error or
irregularity and not of jurisdiction, it cannot be raised on
collateral attack.”) (Brackets omitted.) (Quoting Gamino v.
Greenwell, 2 Haw. App. 59, 63-64, 625 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1981)
(citing Kapiolani Estate, 14 Haw. at 664 (Frear, C.J.,

concurring)).). Con

 

quently, the ICA was faced with only two

 

possible issues: (1) the question whether the Family Court had
jurisdiction to enter its April 22, 1997 orders in FC-G-96-0299
(ists, a collateral attack question); and (2) in the event that
the Family Court had jurisdiction to enter those orders, the
question whether and to what extent the Probate Court properly
applied the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion in giving the
orders preclusive effect in the adjudication of Cedric’s and

Abastillas’ petitions (

 

a direct review question). Having

2
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correctly answered the first question in the negative, the ICA
had no need or authority to further consider either the second
question or any other issue pertaining to the prior Family Court
proceedings. In other words, it was error for the ICA to
consider either the preclusive effect or the relevance of the
Family Court orders in FC-AA-96-0003 because those issues were
not properly within the scope of either direct review or
collateral attack.

C. The Probate Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denving

‘Smith and Abaststiae" Es?
Although not directly raised in Cedric’s application,

we also now address that part of the ICA’s decision vacating the

 

relevance and the precivsive effect of the Family Court's
56-0003 may become issues on remand, ‘such questions can be
‘and facts not presently in the record,
tne following contingencies that must
Cone to pase before the issues of either relevance or preciusive effect cosld
be" studied on appeal: (1) the Probate Court on remand grante Abestilias"
motion to vacate the order sanitting the 1988 will to probate and denies
Cedric’ petition for instructions; (2) ¢ contest ensues between the 1986 and
1996 wilisy (3) Cedric asserts that the 1996 will ia invalid Because Kam
Lacked capacity to execute it; (4) Cedric proffers, and the court secepts,
foundational evidence that Ken's capacity (or lack thereof) in July 1996 is
relevant to (or determinative of) ner capacity at the time the 1995-96 will
and estate docunents were executed; and (3) Cedric proffers the Fanily Court
Eindinge in Fc-AkW96-0005 ang asserts that Abastillas is collaterally estopped
From challenging fan's (lack of) capacity in July 1896, Factoring in
additional vagaries such as the weight given to the evidence by the trier of
Fact (which will be Beyond the scope of appellate review) and shether other
evidence, if any, of Ram's capacity 1s proffered (which would bear on whether
the preclusive effect, if any, given to the Fanily Court rulings by the
Probate court could be considered harnful exror on appeal), it becomes cl
that the iseves were snd are too abstract, speculstive, and unripe for
Gecision at this tine. Accordingly, we hold that the {CA's conclusions in
this regard, even when viewed prospectively, are premature and contravene this
court's long-standing prohibitions against rendering advisory opinions, Wong
62 Haw. 391, 394795, 616 F.2d 201, 204 (1980), and deciaing
Gnripe questions, Tre. of Office of Haualian Affaire’ v. Yamasaki, 69 Hau. 154,
171-92, 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1967). Ke such, the Probate Court 18 free to
consider ge nove Both the relevance and preclusive effect of the Family
Court's rulings in FC-AA-96-0003, should those issues arise on remand.

 
 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

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Probate Court's judgment with respect to Smith and Abastillas’
petition for allowance of creditors’ claims.” As the IC
demonstrated at length in its opinion, that petition was denied
for reasons of procedural default (i.e., untimeliness of Smith
and Abastillas’ reply under HPR Rule 10(c) and failure to include
the available, relevant information in their original petition)
and in an exercise of discretion wholly unrelated to either the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Court in 1997
or to the issue of issue preclusion. Nevertheless, the ICA
vacated the Probate Court’s judgment on the creditors’ petition
“in light of [its] decision vacating the final judgments
pertaining to the probate of the will and the petition for

instructions{.]” ICA’s Opinion at 72. For the reasons set forth

 

below, we reverse that part of the ICA's opinion.
First, we agree with the ICA that the proper standard
of review of both the decision not to excuse @ procedural default
and the refusal to assign the matter for civil trial (or retain
for a deferred hearing) is abuse of discretion. With respect to

excuse of procedural default, we have previously held in similar

® Me reach the ICA's vacatur of the creditors’ petition judgment
because we deen t assigned as error by inplication. ‘That is to say, Cedric
Challenged the ICA's conclusion that the Probate Court's judgment on
Rbastillas’ petition to vacate ang Cedric's petition for instructions were
defective due to the Fanily Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction to
eater its April 1997 orders. Secause the ICA vacated the creditors’ petition
Scdgnent not for any Sndependent error, but only in light of the vacatur of
the other two judgnents, Cedric's challenge to the propriety of the ICA's
rulings as to the latter two judgments necessarily implicates the ICA's ruling
fas to the former

 

 

 

 

 

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circunstances that a court has discretion to accept or reject an
untimely filed brief. See, e.g., Yee v, Okamoto, 44 Haw. 119,
120, 32 P.2d 854, 855 (1960) (stating that the court has
discretion whether to accept or reject a late brief based on the
reasons for the untimeliness). With respect to the Probate
Court's handling of the creditors’ petition, HPR Rule 20, which
governs assignment of contested matters, employs the word “may,”
which denotes discretion. See HPR Rule 20(a) (“The court by
written order may retain a contested matter on the regular
probate calendar or may assign the contested matter to the civil
trials calendar of the circuit court.”) (Emphasis added.); State
va Kahawai, 103 Hawai'i 462, 465, 63 P.3d 725, 728 (2004) ("The

term ‘nay’ [used] in describing the court’s power . . . denote:

discretion.

 

Second, we agree with the ICA that the Probate Court
did not abuse its discretion. Here, the Probate Court acted
within ite discretion to reject smith and Abastillas’ reply
because (1) it was untimely under HPR Rule 10(c) in that it was
filed less than 72 hours before the hearing date, and (2)
contained material that could and should have been included in
the initial petition. The Probate Court also acted within its
discretion in summarily dismissing the creditors’ claim without
assigning the matter for civil trial or deferred hearing because,

especially without the material in the reply, it did not clearly

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SSS

exceed the bounds of reason in concluding that Smith and
Nbastilles had failed to establish factual and legal bases for
their claims.

Despite (or, more precisely, because of) our agreement
with the ICA that the Probate Court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the creditors’ petition, we cannot agree with the
ICA's decision to nevertheless vacate that judgment and remand.
Where the Probate Court's judgment was not based on an abuse of
discretion and where the ICA’s vacatur of the other two Probate
Court judgments was on grounds not implicated in the creditors’
petition judgment, there was no basis for the ICA to also vacate
the judgment on the creditors’ petition. That Abastillas now has
a chance of prevailing on her heirship claim does not alter or
excuse the unrelated defects in her and Smith's creditors’
petition. Accordingly, that portion of the ICA's opinion
vacating the September 13, 2002 judgment of the Probate Court
denying the creditors’ petition of Smith and Abastillas must be
reversed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the ICA’s August 6,
2005 memorandum opinion in part and affirm in part.
Specifically, (1) that portion of the ICA's opinion vacating the
September 13, 2002 judgment of the Probate Court denying the

September 11, 2000 petition of Abastillas and Smith for allowance

2
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of creditors’ claims against Kan's estate for legal and personal
services rendered is reversed and the judgment of the Probate
court is affirmed for the reasons set forth above: (2) that
portion of the ICA’s opinion vacating the September 13, 2002
judgment of the Probate Court denying the Novenber 2, 2000
petition of Abastilles to vacate the Probate Court's July 17,
2000 probate order naming Cedric as personal representative of
the Kam estate pursuant to Kan’s 1988 will is affirmed for the
reasons set forth abover and (3) that portion of the ICA's
opinion vacating the Septenber 16, 2002 judgment of the Probate
Court granting Cedric’s October 11, 2000 petition for
instructions is affirmed for the reasons set forth above.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the Probate Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On the writ and supplemental briefs:

Edward R. Bendet

and Denis Lee, .
(of Bendet, Fidell, Sakai :

& Lee) for petitioner-cross~
respondent /petitioner- :
appellee Cedric C.1. Kam aA ons
Roger Y. Dewa, Pease 0 ease Bw

for respondent-cross-
petitioner/petitioner-
appellant Paz F. Abastillas
and for respondent /petitioner-
appellant Robert A. Smith

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