Case Title: Miller v. Davis

Citation: 423 So. 2d 1354

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1982-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
423 So. 2d 1354 (1982)
Juanita MILLER
v.
Rosa Bird DAVIS.
81-609.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 22, 1982.
Rehearing Denied December 22, 1982.
*1355 Joseph W. Adams, Birmingham, for appellant.
John T. Roach, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
The plaintiff appeals from denial of her prayer for cancellation of a deed. We affirm.
The plaintiff, Juanita Miller a/k/a Juanita Seltzer, owned a house and lot as tenant in common with her stepsister, Rosa Lee Davis. On October 10, 1972, they conveyed this property to Rosa Bird Davis, who is Rosa Lee's mother and Juanita's stepmother. The following allegations appear in plaintiff's complaint:
The plaintiff brought the present action in 1981, several months after she discovered that she had signed the deed in question.
The case was tried ore tenus without a court reporter. As reflected in the statement of the evidence filed under Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(d), the parties' testimony included the following additional points. The plaintiff testified that the defendant's grandson James spoke to her about signing the papers and accompanied her to the attorney's office. She did not read what she signed because she did not have her glasses. The defendant testified that she never discussed the matter with plaintiff and did not tell James to have the plaintiff sign the papers. She understood from the beginning that the property was being conveyed to her.
In denying relief to the plaintiff, the trial court noted:
The plaintiff then moved for rehearing and filed an amendment to the complaint, consisting of the following addition: "That the deed was executed by the plaintiff by mutual mistake of the parties." The trial court denied rehearing but allowed the amendment to the complaint, stating that the "mistake of the parties was raised and testimony concerning the question was taken at the oral hearing."
The trial court evidently proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiff's primary theory was fraud or undue influence. The cases properly cited by the trial court as controlling were both actions to set aside deeds based upon allegations of fraud. These cases held that:
Taylor v. Godsey, 357 So. 2d  at 981.
The plaintiff does not dispute the trial court's specific finding of no undue influence or fraud. Rather, the plaintiff in brief asserts that the relief sought was from the outset based upon mutual mistake of the parties.
The applicable statute is Code of Ala. 1975, § 35-4-153, which provides:
Cancellation as well as revision or reformation of a deed is a permissible remedy for mutual mistake under the statute. Garnett v. Taunton, 264 Ala. 293, 87 So. 2d 425 (1956). However, the plaintiff has not established statutory prerequisites for relief.
Morgan v. Roberts, 387 So. 2d 170, 172 (Ala. 1980). The plaintiff carries the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Simpson v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 364 So. 2d 289 (Ala.1978).
Other than the plaintiff's assertions, no evidence has been presented that the defendant's intent was contrary to what the deed reflected or that the defendant acted inequitably. The trial court evidently accepted the defendant's testimony that she understood the property was conveyed to her. In view of the ore tenus rule and the plaintiff's burden of proof, we are in no position to question the trial court's conclusion.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court's holding that she was negligent under Taylor v. Godsey, supra, makes negligence a defense to a claim for reformation based on mutual mistake. This result, she argues, is contrary to the holding of Clipper v. Gordon, 253 Ala. 428, 432, 44 So. 2d 576 (1950), where the court noted that mere negligence "will not defeat reformation ... because... mistake nearly always presupposes some negligence." The plaintiff also cites Lovelace v. McMillan, 265 Ala. 290, 90 So. 2d 822 (1956), as a case where reformation was granted to the party who had neglected to read the deed. However, in each of these *1357 cases reformation was allowed upon a showing of the common intent of both parties. Here, the plaintiff was denied "reformation" not because she was negligent but because she failed to show that the defendant shared her misapprehension of the transaction.
Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.
BEATTY, Justice.
The appellant complains that the following sentence from the opinion misstates the facts:
The basis in the record for this sentence is the following from the Rule 10(d) Statement of Evidence: "She knew she got a deed." Clearly, this conclusion precludes arguing that the defendant shared the plaintiff's misconception about the document in question. The plaintiff's contention that the defendant did not know about the deed at the time it was signed, if true, was simply a factor for the trial court to weigh.
OPINION EXTENDED; APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.