Case Title: State v. Dowdy

Citation: 2012 WI 12

Docket Number: 2010AP000772-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP772-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Carl L. Dowdy, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 330 Wis. 2d 444, 792 N.W.2d 230 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 14, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT   
 
COUNTY: 
MILWAUKEE 
 
JUDGE: 
MARTIN J. DONALD 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.       
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Bryan J. Cahill and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Bryan J. Cahill. 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and the Wisconsin State 
Public Defender by Dustin C. Haskell, Kelli S. Thompson, Colleen 
D. Ball and the Office of the State Public Defender, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
2012 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP772-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF1138) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Carl L. Dowdy, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 14, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Dowdy, 2010 
WI App 158, 330 Wis. 2d 444, 792 N.W.2d 230, that reversed an 
order by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court1 granting the 
defendant's petition to reduce the length of his probation from 
ten 
years 
to 
seven 
years, 
thereby 
discharging 
him 
from 
probation.  The defendant, Carl L. Dowdy (Dowdy), brought his 
                                                 
1 The Honorable M. Joseph Donald presided. 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
2 
 
petition pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) (2009-10).2  Dowdy 
argued that § 973.09(3)(a) authorizes the circuit court to 
"modify the terms" of probation and hence authorizes the circuit 
court to reduce the term, or length, of probation.  The circuit 
court agreed and found cause for reducing the length of Dowdy's 
probation. 
¶2 
The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that the circuit court had neither statutory nor 
inherent authority to reduce the length of Dowdy's probation.   
¶3 
We granted Dowdy's petition for review.  He presents 
the following four issues: 
(1) 
Does Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) grant a circuit court 
authority to reduce the length of probation? 
(2) 
If a circuit court does not have statutory authority 
to reduce the length of probation, does a circuit 
court have inherent authority to do so? 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) (2009-10) states that 
"[p]rior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, 
for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period 
or modify the terms and conditions thereof." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
On July 19, 2011, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3) by recreating subsection (3)(d).  See 2011 Wis. Act 
38, §§ 93b, 93c.  The new subsection (3)(d), which went into 
effect on August 3, 2011, expressly grants a circuit court 
authority to discharge a probationer before the expiration of 
his or her probation period, subject to six requirements.  See 
id.; infra note 8. 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
3 
 
(3) 
If a circuit court has inherent authority to reduce 
the length of probation, what standard applies when 
exercising that authority: the "for cause" standard 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) or the standard that 
applies to sentence modification?3 
(4) 
In this case, did the circuit court appropriately 
exercise its discretion to reduce the length of 
Dowdy's probation from ten years to seven years? 
¶4 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does not 
grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of 
probation.  Rather, the plain language of § 973.09(3)(a) grants 
a circuit court authority only to "extend probation for a stated 
period" or to "modify the terms and conditions" of probation.  
When subsection (3)(a) is read in context, it is clear that the 
authority to "modify the terms and conditions" of probation does 
not include the authority to reduce the length of probation.  
Accordingly, in this case, the circuit court erred as a matter 
of law when it relied upon § 973.09(3)(a) to reduce the length 
of Dowdy's probation.  On that basis, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
¶5 
We decline to decide today whether a circuit court has 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation, and if so, 
what standard applies.  Neither Dowdy's petition to the circuit 
                                                 
3 The standard that applies to sentence modification was 
most recently articulated in State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶¶35-
52, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828.  See also State v. Ninham, 
2011 WI 33, ¶¶88-90, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451. 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
4 
 
court nor the circuit court's order was grounded in the court's 
alleged inherent authority.  As a general rule, issues not 
raised in the circuit court will not be considered for the first 
time on appeal.  Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 
N.W.2d 140 (1980). 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
On February 27, 2002, the State charged Dowdy with one 
count of second degree sexual assault by use or threat of force 
or violence in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2001-
02).4  The complaint alleged that on February 22, 2002, Dowdy 
forcibly engaged an acquaintance, Lawanda M., in nonconsensual 
penis-to-vagina sexual intercourse by holding her arms over her 
head and forcing her legs apart. 
¶7 
Dowdy pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a 
two-day jury trial.  On June 18, 2002, the jury found Dowdy 
guilty of the charged offense. 
¶8 
On July 23, 2002, the circuit court sentenced Dowdy to 
15 years imprisonment, comprised of seven years of initial 
confinement and eight years on extended supervision.  The court 
then stayed the sentence in favor of a ten-year period of 
probation, identifying as "an overwhelming factor" Dowdy's 
likelihood of rehabilitation.  As conditions of probation, the 
court imposed one year of confinement with work and treatment 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2001-02) provides that 
whoever "[h]as sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another 
person without consent of that person by use or threat of force 
or violence" is guilty of a Class BC felony. 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
5 
 
release privileges and ordered Dowdy to: pay all costs, 
surcharges, and special assessments; undergo alcohol and other 
drug abuse (AODA) assessment; have no contact with the victim; 
seek and maintain full-time employment; participate in sex 
offender evaluation and treatment; and comply with any other 
conditions imposed by the Department of Corrections (DOC).   
¶9 
On October 19, 2007, five years into his probation, 
Dowdy filed a pro se motion to modify his sentence.  The circuit 
court summarily denied Dowdy's motion. 
¶10 Two years later, on July 15, 2009, Dowdy, through 
counsel, petitioned the circuit court to reduce the length of 
his probation from ten years to seven years.  The petition was 
brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), which, according 
to Dowdy, "allows the court to modify the term of probation for 
cause."  As grounds for his petition, Dowdy maintained that he 
had complied with the conditions of his probation and did not 
pose a threat to the community.  Specifically, Dowdy alleged 
that he had no contact with the victim; had completed anger 
management counseling at the request of his probation agent; had 
been alternately employed full-time, employed part-time, or 
seeking employment; had participated in sex offender treatment 
since 2003 and was twice terminated from treatment only because 
he continued to deny his offense; had voluntarily attended a 
weekly men's group through church; and lacked AODA or mental 
health needs. 
¶11 On September 29, 2009, the circuit court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on Dowdy's petition, at which the victim's 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
6 
 
advocate and Dowdy's three probation agents testified.  All four 
opposed Dowdy's petition.  The victim's advocate testified that 
the victim was "very opposed" to a reduction in the length of 
Dowdy's probation, in light of her belief that Dowdy's sentence 
was too lenient from the start.  
¶12 Christy Mueller (Mueller), Dowdy's first probation 
agent, testified that Dowdy often lied about his whereabouts, 
was 
uncooperative 
with 
sex 
offender 
treatment, 
and 
was 
argumentative.  She offered, and Dowdy accepted, an alternative 
to revocation (ATR) for violations of probation that included 
"possession of cell phone, having contact with minors, failing 
to comply with his electronic monitoring, and failing to pay his 
fees for supervision."  Dowdy asked to be transferred from 
Mueller's supervision in November 2003.  In her opinion, they 
did not get along because Dowdy "was constantly fighting [her] 
against the rules." 
¶13 Janelle Petryniec (Petryniec), Dowdy's probation agent 
from December 2003 through January 2008, testified that Dowdy 
was mostly compliant with probation but had two violations, the 
first 
for 
"fighting" 
and 
the 
second 
for 
"his 
sexual 
relationships."  While acknowledging that Dowdy attended sex 
offender treatment, Petryniec described how Dowdy misled a 
doctor into excusing him from a month of treatment.  Still, 
Petryniec noted, Dowdy never tested positive for drugs or 
alcohol, was self-employed, and had no contact with the victim. 
¶14 Finally, Shannon Kloss (Kloss), Dowdy's probation 
agent at the time, testified that Dowdy was non-compliant with 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
7 
 
probation 
and 
specifically 
with 
curfew 
and 
sex 
offender 
treatment. 
 
Reviewing 
a 
report 
on 
Dowdy's 
sex 
offender 
treatment, Kloss explained that Dowdy exhibited "high" treatment 
needs in regard to criminal thinking and deceptiveness and had a 
progress score of "zero out of four" in both areas.  At the same 
time, Kloss, like Petryniec, testified that Dowdy never tested 
positive for drugs or alcohol, never contacted the victim, and 
never refused sex offender treatment. 
¶15 At the close of the hearing, the circuit court felt 
that it needed a better sense of Dowdy's risk and so ordered the 
DOC to conduct a sex offender risk assessment of Dowdy and 
provide a report to the court. 
¶16 Two days after the hearing, on October 1, 2009, the 
State moved the circuit court to deny Dowdy's petition on the 
grounds that the court lacked the statutory authority to reduce 
the length of Dowdy's probation.  The State explained that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) authorizes the court only to "extend 
probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions 
thereof" and does not mention reducing the length of probation. 
¶17 In his response, Dowdy argued that since Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a) authorizes a circuit court to "modify the terms" 
of probation, it necessarily authorizes a circuit court to 
reduce the term, or length, of probation. 
¶18 On January 20, 2010, the DOC filed with the circuit 
court its report assessing Dowdy's risk of sex offender 
recidivism.  The report, prepared by licensed psychologist 
Christopher T. Tyre (Tyre), a supervisor in the DOC's Chapter 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
8 
 
980 Forensic Evaluation Unit,5 concluded that Dowdy is a "'low 
risk' sexual offender."  Tyre diagnosed Dowdy as having an 
antisocial personality disorder but noted that he has "made 
significant changes in his life," and as a result, the 
"manifestations of this diagnosis appear to be in remission or 
waning."  Tyre noted that while Dowdy was initially in denial of 
his 
culpability 
in 
the 
sexual 
assault, 
he 
now 
"clearly 
understands that at the time he was only focused on himself," 
and "despite [the victim's] protestations, he forced her to 
engage in an act of penis-to-vagina intercourse." 
¶19 On February 15, 2010, Dowdy filed with the circuit 
court a report prepared by Michael S. Kotkin (Kotkin), a 
licensed psychologist retained by Dowdy.  Different from Tyre, 
Kotkin reported that Dowdy still believes that the victim did 
not tell the truth.  According to Kotkin, Dowdy "indicate[d], 
'My sexual offense occurred because I thought the victim, in my 
case, needed sex.'"  Nevertheless, Kotkin concluded that Dowdy 
presents a "low to low-moderate" risk of recidivism and that 
"there is some basis" for the notion that an additional three 
years 
of 
probation 
would 
serve 
neither 
Dowdy's 
nor 
the 
community's best interests. 
¶20 The circuit court conducted a second hearing and 
granted Dowdy's petition to reduce the length of his probation 
from ten years to seven years.  The circuit court determined 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 governs "Sexually Violent Person 
Commitments." 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
9 
 
that it had clear authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a)6 to 
"extend, or shorten, or lengthen probation depending on the 
defendant and the issues that are presented."  In Dowdy's case, 
the court found good cause to reduce the length of probation, 
reasoning that Dowdy had "managed to meet just about every 
condition [of probation] except the completion of sex offender 
treatment."  In regard to sex offender treatment, the court 
found Dowdy's "biggest problem" to be his denial, namely, his 
refusal to believe that the victim did not consent.  However, as 
the court explained, as long as Dowdy remains in denial, he will 
never complete treatment; he will progress only to a certain 
point and then have to start over.   
¶21 On February 17, 2010, the circuit court entered its 
order reducing the length of Dowdy's probation to seven years.  
By that time, Dowdy had been on probation for nearly seven-and-
a-half years, and consequently, the order resulted in Dowdy's 
discharge from probation. 
¶22 The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Dowdy, 330 Wis. 2d 444.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court "had neither statutory nor inherent authority to 
order the reduction" of Dowdy's probation.  Id., ¶1.  In regard 
to statutory authority, the court of appeals determined that 
"the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does not grant 
                                                 
6 While the circuit court cited Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2), we, 
like the court of appeals, assume that the circuit court meant 
to reference § 973.09(3)(a).  See State v. Dowdy, 2010 WI App 
158, ¶7 & n.2, 330 Wis. 2d 444, 792 N.W.2d 230. 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
10 
 
a circuit court the authority to reduce a probation period."  
Id., 
¶16. 
 
Instead, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded, 
§ 973.09(3)(a) authorizes a circuit court "to 'extend probation 
for a stated period,' and, as a separate grant of authority, to 
'modify' an identified set of terms or conditions of the 
probation."  Id., ¶18.  The court of appeals rejected Dowdy's 
argument that the authority to "modify the terms" of probation 
entails authority to modify, by extending or reducing, the term 
of probation, explaining that such an interpretation would 
render the statute's use of the word "extend" surplusage.  Id., 
¶17.  In addition, examining § 973.09 as a whole, the court of 
appeals noted that the legislature did not use the plural word 
"terms" to denote length or duration.  Id., ¶19. 
¶23 The court of appeals declined to decide whether a 
circuit court has inherent authority to reduce the length of 
probation.  Id., ¶¶22, 31.  However, even assuming that such 
inherent authority existed, the court of appeals concluded that 
it must be subject to the same parameters as the circuit court's 
well-established inherent authority to modify sentences.  Id., 
¶¶28, 31 (citing State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 
Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524).  In Dowdy's case, the relevant 
parameter would be the circuit court's inherent authority to 
modify a sentence based upon the showing of a "new factor."  See 
id., ¶35.  However, the court of appeals determined that because 
post-sentence conduct does not qualify as a "new factor" for 
purposes of sentence modification, id., ¶35 (citing State v. 
Kaster, 148 Wis. 2d 789, 804, 436 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1989)), 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
11 
 
Dowdy's claimed rehabilitation would not qualify as a "new 
factor" 
for 
purposes 
of 
probation 
modification, 
id.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that even assuming 
the circuit court had inherent authority to reduce the length of 
Dowdy's probation, such authority could not have been invoked in 
response to Dowdy's claimed rehabilitation.  Id., ¶22. 
¶24 Dowdy petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on March 16, 2011.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 In 
this 
case, 
we 
must 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a) to determine whether it grants a circuit court 
authority to reduce the length of probation.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo 
while benefiting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
27, ¶5, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652. 
¶26 Assuming 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does grant a 
circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation, then 
a court may exercise that authority only "for cause."  Whether 
cause exists under § 973.09(3)(a) is subject to the circuit 
court's discretion.  State v. Jackson, 128 Wis. 2d 356, 365, 382 
N.W.2d 429 
(1986). 
 
We 
will 
uphold 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary determination so long as the court reasonably 
applied the facts of record to the appropriate legal standard.  
See State v. Ringer, 2010 WI 69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 
N.W.2d 448. 
III. ANALYSIS 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 To determine a circuit court's authority with respect 
to probation, we must look to the statutes.  See Grobarchik v. 
State, 102 Wis. 2d 461, 467, 307 N.W.2d 170 (1981).  Under the 
doctrine of separation of powers, it is for the legislature to 
prescribe the penalty for a particular crime and the manner of 
its enforcement, and it is the duty of the court to impose that 
penalty.  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 594 N.W.2d 772 
(1999); Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 467.  Accordingly, "[i]f the 
authority to fashion a particular criminal disposition exists, 
it must derive from the statutes."  Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 
467; see also State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 553, 350 
N.W.2d 96 (1984).  Probation is one such disposition.   
¶28 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a), the legislature 
has granted a circuit court authority to impose probation.  
Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 648.  Section 973.09(1)(a) provides, in 
relevant part, that if a person is convicted of a crime, a court 
may, by order, impose and stay a sentence and "place the person 
on probation to the [DOC] for a stated period, stating in the 
order the reasons therefor."  In addition, "[t]he court may 
impose any conditions which appear to be reasonable and 
appropriate."  § 973.09(1)(a). 
¶29 Included within a circuit court's statutory authority 
to 
impose 
probation 
is 
the 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a) to "extend probation for a stated period or 
modify the terms and conditions thereof."  Section 973.09(3)(a) 
is the focus of the case before us today.  We must interpret 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
13 
 
§ 973.09(3)(a) to determine whether it grants a circuit court 
authority to reduce the length of probation.   
¶30 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  To that end, statutory interpretation begins 
with the language of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning is 
plain, our inquiry ends.  Id.   
¶31 We give statutory language "its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  In addition, statutory language is 
not interpreted in isolation but rather in context, that is, in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes.  Id., ¶46.  Our interpretation should give reasonable 
effect to every word, so as to avoid surplusage or absurd 
results.  Id.  If this analysis yields a plain statutory 
meaning, then the language is unambiguous, and there is no need 
to consult extrinsic sources of legislative intent.  Id.  
Indeed, we must "'presume that a legislature says in a statute 
what it means and means in a statute what it says . . . .'"  
Id., ¶39 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253-54 (1992)). 
¶32 If, however, a statute is "capable of being understood 
by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses," then 
the statute is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  Generally, only if a 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
14 
 
statute is ambiguous will we aid our interpretation with 
extrinsic sources.  Id., ¶50.  This general rule "prevents the 
use of extrinsic sources of interpretation to vary or contradict 
the plain meaning of a statute . . . ."  Id., ¶51. 
¶33 Applying 
the foregoing principles to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a), we conclude that the statute does not grant a 
circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation.  Our 
conclusion is based upon the statute's plain language. 
¶34 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) grants 
a circuit court authority only to "extend probation for a stated 
period" or to "modify the terms and conditions" of probation.  
Section 973.09(3)(a) clearly authorizes a circuit court to 
extend the length of probation.  Noticeably absent from the 
statute, however, is any authority to "reduce" probation for a 
stated period.   
¶35 Still, Dowdy argues that a circuit court's authority 
to "modify the terms and conditions" of probation encompasses 
the authority to reduce the length of probation.  Dowdy reasons 
that the word "modify" commonly means to reduce or lessen in 
severity.  By authorizing the circuit court to "modify the 
terms" of probation, Dowdy argues, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) 
necessarily authorizes the circuit court to reduce the term, or 
length, of probation.  We disagree. 
¶36 It is true that the word "modify" can mean to reduce 
or make less severe, but it is also true that "modify" commonly 
denotes change or alteration generally.  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1161 (3d ed. 1992); see also 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
15 
 
State v. Fisher, 2005 WI App 175, ¶10, 285 Wis. 2d 433, 702 
N.W.2d 56.  In other words, while the word "modify" could mean 
to change by reducing or lessening, it could also mean to change 
by extending or increasing.  If, as Dowdy suggests, the phrase 
"modify the terms" in Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) authorizes a 
circuit court to change, by reducing or extending, the length of 
probation, then the statute's specific grant of authority to 
"extend probation for a stated period" is superfluous.  We 
cannot interpret § 973.09(3)(a) in a manner that renders an 
entire phrase of the statute needless.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
¶37 Furthermore, Dowdy's interpretation of the phrase 
"modify the terms" rests on the faulty premise that the plural 
word "terms" is the same as the singular word "term," which is 
synonymous with length.  Dowdy is correct that ordinarily, when 
construing statutes, we follow the rule that "the plural 
includes the singular."  See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1).  However, 
that general rule must yield to the "manifest intent of the 
legislature."  § 990.001.  The plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a), which authorizes a circuit court to "extend 
probation for a stated period," evinces the legislature's intent 
for the word "period" to mean the duration or length of 
probation.  To construe the word "terms" as "term" and hence 
synonymous with length would be to deprive the word "period" of 
independent meaning.  Again, our principles of statutory 
interpretation 
preclude 
such 
a 
result. 
 
See 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46; 
Graziano 
v. 
Town 
of 
Long 
Lake, 
191 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 812, 822, 530 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]here the 
legislature uses similar but different terms in a statute, 
particularly within the same section, we may presume it intended 
the terms to have different meanings.").  Instead, we must 
strive to give the plural word "terms" independent, reasonable 
effect.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
¶38 The plural word "terms" has a special definitional 
meaning in the law.  Black's Law Dictionary defines the plural 
word "terms" as "[p]rovisions that define an agreement's scope; 
conditions or stipulations."  Black's Law Dictionary 1482 (7th 
ed. 1999).  As that definition makes apparent, the word "terms" 
is synonymous with the word "conditions."  See id. at 290 
(defining "condition").  In fact, in the law, the words are used 
interchangeably 
and 
often 
appear 
together 
as 
"terms 
and 
conditions."  See, e.g., Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., 
LLC, 2010 WI 134, ¶8, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476; Ehlinger 
v. Hauser, 2010 WI 54, ¶10 n.7, 325 Wis. 2d 287, 785 N.W.2d 328; 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt., 2010 WI 52, ¶¶32, 44, 325 
Wis. 2d 176, 784 N.W.2d 579; Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & 
Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 44, ¶10, 324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) is no exception.  By providing 
that a circuit court may "modify the terms and conditions" of 
probation, the legislature authorized a circuit court to change 
the 
conditions 
imposed 
upon 
a 
probationer, 
namely, 
the 
obligations upon which his or her probation depends.  See 
Edwards v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 79, 83-84, 246 N.W.2d 109 (1976) 
(making clear that the circuit court had authority under 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
17 
 
§ 973.09(3)(a) to modify for cause the probationer's condition 
that she refrain from consorting with her co-defendants); State 
v. Schell, 2003 WI App 78, ¶13, 261 Wis. 2d 841, 661 N.W.2d 503 
(discussing 
§ 973.09 
and 
using 
the 
plural 
word 
"terms" 
interchangeably with the "conditions" of probation).  By 
interpreting § 973.09(3)(a) in this manner, we give independent, 
reasonable effect to both the phrase "modify the terms and 
conditions" of probation and the phrase "extend probation for a 
stated period."  
¶39 The statutory context of Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) 
confirms our interpretation.  Section 973.09(1)(a), the statute 
from which a circuit court's authority to impose probation 
derives, provides that a court may place a person on probation 
"for a stated period" and also may "impose any conditions" of 
probation.  Subsection (1)(a) thus confirms that the legislature 
drew a distinction between the "period" or length of probation 
and any imposed "conditions" of probation.  Interpreting 
subsection (3)(a) in light of subsection (1)(a), it is even more 
clear that a circuit court's authority to "modify the terms and 
conditions" of probation does not include the authority to 
reduce the length of probation. 
¶40 As 
Dowdy 
points 
out, 
however, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(a) uses the singular word "term," in addition to 
"period," to mean a length of time.  Similarly, § 973.09(2) 
outlines the minimum and maximum "original term of probation" 
that may be imposed for different quantities and classes of 
misdemeanor and felony offenses.  There is no doubt that in the 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
18 
 
context of § 973.09(2), "term" means a length of time.  Still, 
the legislature's use of the singular word "term" in § 973.09(2) 
does not change our interpretation of the plural word "terms" in 
§ 973.09(3)(a).  As evident by the succeeding subsections of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09, the legislature consistently used the 
plural 
word 
"terms" 
in 
relation 
to 
the 
"conditions" 
of 
probation.  See, e.g., §§ 973.09(3)(a) ("terms and conditions"); 
973.09(3)(bm)2. 
("terms 
and 
conditions"); 
973.09(3)(bm)3. 
("terms and conditions"). 
¶41 Finally, the succeeding subsections of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3) confirm that a circuit court's authority under 
subsection (3)(a) with respect to the length of probation is 
limited to extension.  First, subsections (3)(b) and (3)(bm), 
which concern a circuit court's duty to conduct a probation 
review hearing upon notice of a probationer's failure to pay 
restitution or supervision fees, speak only to a circuit court's 
authority to extend probation or to modify its conditions.  See 
§§ 973.09(3)(b) ("If payment as ordered has not been made, the 
court shall hold a probation review hearing prior to the 
expiration date, unless the hearing is voluntarily waived by the 
probationer with the knowledge that waiver may result in an 
extension of the probation period or in a revocation of 
probation. If the court does not extend probation, it shall 
issue a judgment for the unpaid restitution . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.)); 973.09(3)(bm)2. ("A waiver of a probation review 
hearing under this subdivision shall include an acknowledgement 
by the probationer that waiver may result in an extension of the 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
19 
 
probation period, a modification of the terms and conditions of 
probation or a revocation of probation." (Emphasis added.)); 
973.09(3)(bm)3. ("If the [DOC] proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the probationer owes unpaid fees under s. 304.074, 
the court may, by order, extend the period of probation for a 
stated period or modify the terms and conditions of probation." 
(Emphasis added.)).7  Second, subsection (3)(c) lists three 
                                                 
7 In their amicus curiae brief, the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender and the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers rely on Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(bm)4. to argue that the 
plural word "terms" must mean the length of probation.  Section 
973.09(3)(bm)4. states, in relevant part, that "[i]f the court 
does not extend or modify the terms of probation under subd. 3., 
it shall issue a judgment for the unpaid fees . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.)  The amicus curiae maintain that § 973.09(3)(bm)4. can 
be read only to mean that a circuit court may "extend . . . the 
terms of probation," and consequently, the plural word "terms" 
must refer to a length of time.  We might agree with the amicus 
curiae, were it not for the statute's qualifying language of 
"under subd. 3."  Section 973.09(3)(bm)3., to which subsection 
(3)(bm)4. refers, makes clear that the word "extend" modifies 
only "the period of probation," not "the terms and conditions of 
probation." 
The amicus curiae make the same argument by relying on 
language in State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 350 N.W.2d 96 
(1984).  The Sepulveda court stated: "This court recognized in 
Huggett that inherent within the probation statute is the 
court's continued power to effectuate the dual purposes of 
probation, namely rehabilitating the defendant and protecting 
society, through the court's authority to modify or extend 
probationary terms."  Id. at 554 (emphasis added); see also 
State v. Schell, 2003 WI App 78, ¶13, 261 Wis. 2d 841, 661 
N.W.2d 503.  Again, however, we point out the significance of 
the qualifying language.  The Sepulveda court was merely 
paraphrasing our discussion of Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) in 
Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978).  
Huggett makes more than clear that a circuit court's authority 
to extend probation relates to the "period" of probation.  See 
id. at 794, 795, 799, 801, 803.  
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
20 
 
circumstances that "may constitute cause for the extension of 
probation" but is silent as to any circumstances that may 
constitute cause for the reduction of probation.  § 973.09(3)(c) 
(emphasis added).  In fact, in all of § 973.09(3), the only 
mention of a probation reduction in any form is in subsection 
(3)(d), which authorizes the DOC to discharge a probationer "if 
the person has completed 50 percent of his or her period of 
probation."  § 973.09(3)(d).  Notably, subsection (3)(d) grants 
only the DOC, not a circuit court, the authority to discharge a 
probationer before the expiration of his or her probation 
period.8  Had the legislature intended for a circuit court to 
have such statutory authority, it simply could have said so. 
                                                 
8 Notable still, when the legislature created Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(d), it proposed language that would have expressly 
granted a circuit court authority to discharge a probationer 
before the expiration of his or her probation period.  See 2009 
Wis. Act 28, § 3392d (proposing that § 973.09(3)(d) include 
language permitting "[t]he court [to] modify the person's period 
of probation and order the person discharged from probation if 
the person has complied with the conditions of his or her 
probation, has paid restitution ordered under s. 973.20, and has 
paid all ordered court costs, fines or forfeitures, and 
supervision fees").  However, the Governor successfully vetoed 
that language.  See id.; State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(providing that legislative history may be consulted "to confirm 
or verify a plain-meaning interpretation").  
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
21 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶42 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does not 
grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of 
probation.  Rather, the plain language of § 973.09(3)(a) grants 
a circuit court authority only to "extend probation for a stated 
period" or to "modify the terms and conditions" of probation.  
When subsection (3)(a) is read in context, it is clear that the 
authority to "modify the terms and conditions" of probation does 
not include the authority to reduce the length of probation.  
Accordingly, in this case, the circuit court erred as a matter 
of law when it relied upon § 973.09(3)(a) to reduce the length 
of Dowdy's probation.  On that basis, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
¶43 We decline to decide today whether a circuit court has 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation, and if so, 
what standard applies.  Neither Dowdy's petition to the circuit 
court nor the circuit court's order was grounded in the court's 
                                                                                                                                                             
In fact, on July 19, 2011, after we received the parties' 
briefs in the instant case, the legislature recreated Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(d) 
and 
this 
time 
successfully 
added 
language 
expressly granting a circuit court authority to discharge a 
probationer before the expiration of his or her probation 
period.  See 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 93b, 93c.  The new statute 
went into effect on August 3, 2011, id., and lists six 
requirements that must be met in order for a circuit court to 
discharge a probationer, see id., § 93c.  Significant for our 
purposes today, these six requirements, which function as 
conditions precedent to a probationer's discharge, would be 
meaningless if a circuit court had broad discretionary authority 
under § 973.09(3)(a) to reduce the length of probation for 
cause. 
No. 
2010AP772-CR   
 
22 
 
alleged inherent authority.  As a general rule, issues not 
raised in the circuit court will not be considered for the first 
time on appeal.  Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 443. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶44 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I write 
to make four points.   
¶46 I.  The majority opinion errs in declaring that the 
defendant, Carl L. Dowdy, forfeited the right to obtain review 
in this court of the question whether a circuit court has 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation.  Under the 
well understood rule of forfeiture, the case law applying the 
rule, and rules of appellate practice, it is clear that the 
defendant did not forfeit the right to have this court decide 
the inherent authority issue.  Neither party argued or briefed 
the forfeiture issue.  The court has taken its own detour and 
its conclusion is contrary to accepted practice.  Thus, this 
court should address whether circuit courts have inherent 
authority to reduce the length of probation.     
¶47 II.  I would hold that circuit courts possess inherent 
authority to reduce the length of probation.  
¶48 III.  This court should also delineate the scope of a 
circuit court's inherent authority to reduce the length of 
probation.  I would hold that a circuit court may exercise its 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation only "for 
cause."1  The "for cause" standard means that a circuit court 
will exercise its inherent authority when doing so advances the 
                                                 
1 "For cause" is the standard set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a), which is applicable to a circuit court's 
discretionary authority to extend the period of probation and 
modify the terms and conditions of probation. 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
dual purposes of probation: "to rehabilitate the defendant and 
to protect society without placing the defendant in prison."   
¶49 Because the purposes of probation and sentencing are 
not the same, I conclude that the scope of a circuit court's 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation is not the 
same as the scope of a circuit court's inherent authority to 
modify a sentence.   
¶50 Had this court addressed the issue of inherent 
authority and its scope, it would have been appropriate to 
remand the matter to the court of appeals to determine whether 
the circuit court's order is consistent with the circuit court's 
inherent authority, as defined by this court.   
¶51 IV.  Because this court has not decided whether 
circuit courts possess the inherent authority to reduce the 
length of probation and a probationer is not limited to bringing 
only one motion to reduce the length of probation,2 the defendant 
is free to petition the circuit court again to reduce the length 
of his probation and argue that it has inherent, but not 
statutory, authority to do so.  
I 
¶52 The majority refuses to address the issue of a circuit 
court's inherent authority to reduce the length of probation.  
The majority opinion avoids deciding the issue by mistakenly 
relying on the well-recognized rule that "issues not raised in 
                                                 
2 See State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 69, 590 N.W.2d 918 
(1999) (holding that Wis. Stat. § 073.09(3)(a) allows circuit 
courts to modify conditions of probation and extend probation at 
any time before the period of probation expires).   
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal."3     
¶53 Neither party argued (orally or in writing) that 
either party forfeited the right to have this court decide the 
issue of a circuit court's inherent authority in the present 
case.  Once again, the court is on a detour of its own, without 
briefs or argument.  Although the majority does not use the word 
"forfeiture," it clearly invokes a forfeiture rule. 
¶54 "[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely 
assertion of a right"4 and it applies to a losing party at trial 
who wishes to raise an issue in an appellate court that he or 
she failed to raise in the circuit court.  In the present case, 
however, the majority opinion applies the forfeiture rule to the 
party who won in the circuit court (the defendant) and is 
furnishing this court with a new argument supporting the circuit 
court's order. 
¶55 This court explained forfeiture in State v. Ndina, 
2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612,  as follows:  
[S]ome rights are forfeited when they are not claimed 
at trial; a mere failure to object constitutes a 
forfeiture of the right on appellate review.  The 
purpose of the "forfeiture" rule is to enable the 
circuit court to avoid or correct any error with 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶5 (citing Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 
443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980)).  
4 State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 
N.W.2d 612.  Ndina distinguished between forfeiture and waiver. 
The latter applies to certain "fundamental" or "important" 
rights that are not lost simply by the party's failure to 
object; they must be "knowingly" and "expressly" relinquished. 
Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶31. 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
minimal 
disruption 
of 
the 
judicial 
process, 
eliminating the need for appeal.  The forfeiture rule 
also gives both parties and the circuit court notice 
of the issue and a fair opportunity to address the 
objection; encourages attorneys to diligently prepare 
for and conduct trials; and prevents attorneys from 
"sandbagging" opposing counsel by failing to object to 
an error for strategic reasons and later claiming that 
the error is grounds for reversal.5  
¶56 The defendant in the instant case proceeded correctly 
and nevertheless has a forfeiture called on him.  Several rules 
governing forfeiture come into play in the instant case, all 
favorable to the defendant so that forfeiture should not be 
declared.   
¶57 First, a victorious party in the circuit court, here 
the defendant, need not raise alternative arguments in the 
circuit court to fortify the circuit court's ruling to preserve 
these arguments for review in this court.  (See second rule 
below.)  Furthermore, a circuit court need not give alternative 
grounds for a ruling.  
¶58 Second, the general rule is that a respondent in the 
court of appeals (here, the defendant) may advance, and the 
court of appeals can consider, a ground for sustaining the 
circuit court's order or judgment, even if it was not raised in 
the circuit court.  See, e.g., Glendenning's Limestone & Ready-
Mix Co. v. Reimer, 2006 WI App 161, ¶14, 295 Wis. 2d 556, 721 
N.W.2d 704; Doe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 2001 WI App 
199, ¶7, 247 Wis. 2d 564, 635 N.W.2d 7.   
¶59 In the present case, the State lost in the circuit 
court and appealed to the court of appeals.  The State argued in 
                                                 
5 Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30 (citations omitted). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
the court of appeals that the circuit court lacked statutory 
power.  The State further argued, for the first time, that even 
though the circuit court probably had inherent authority to 
reduce the length of probation, the circuit court did not 
exercise that authority properly. 
¶60 In response to the State, the defendant argued in the 
court of appeals that the circuit court reached the correct 
result not only on its stated ground of statutory power, but 
also on the basis of a ground upon which the circuit court did 
not rely, namely its inherent authority to reduce the length of 
probation.  The defendant lost in the court of appeals on both 
arguments and sought review in this court on the issue of the 
power of a circuit court to reduce the length of probation. 
¶61 Third, on review in this court, this court will affirm 
a circuit court's judgment or order on a new ground, even if the 
circuit court reached its result for the wrong reason, as long 
as the record is adequate and the parties have had an 
opportunity to brief the issue here.  Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & 
Light Co., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 30, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991); State v. 
Alles, 106 Wis. 2d 368, 391-92, 316 N.W.2d 378 (1982).  
¶62 Fourth, in his petition for review in this court the 
defendant correctly preserved the issue of a circuit court's 
inherent authority, stating the issue presented to this court as 
follows:  "If the circuit court did not have statutory authority 
to reduce the length of Dowdy's probation, did the court have 
inherent authority to do so?"  This statement in the petition 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
for review protected the defendant's right to argue the issue of 
inherent authority before this court.6   
¶63 The State's response to the defendant's petition for 
review did not assert that the defendant had forfeited his right 
to review of the issue of a circuit court's inherent authority.7  
Both parties thoroughly briefed the issue of a circuit court's 
inherent authority in this court. 
¶64 Thus, on the basis of these four rules of appellate 
practice, the rule of forfeiture does not apply here.  The issue 
of a circuit court's inherent authority to reduce the length of 
probation is properly before this court, and this court should 
address it. 
¶65 Finally, even if the rule of forfeiture does apply 
(and it does not), this case clearly falls into the class of 
cases in which this court ignores the rule of forfeiture and 
exercises its discretion to address an issue.8  Forfeiture "is 
not absolute and exceptions are made."9  The rule of forfeiture 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6). 
7 A response to the petition may contain "any perceived 
defects that may prevent ruling on the merits of any issue in 
the petition."  Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.62(3)(c).   
8 Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 444.  For cases in which an appellate 
court exercised its discretion to address an argument or issue 
and ignore the forfeiture rule, see, e.g., Apex Electronics 
Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998); Binder v. 
Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 613, 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976); Dalka v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI App 90, ¶¶5-6, 334 Wis. 2d 686, 
799 N.W.2d 923. 
9 Wirth, 93 Wis. 2d at 443.    
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
is "one of administration and does not involve the Court's power 
to address the issues raised."10   
¶66 In numerous cases, the court has declared that it is 
appropriate to address an issue when "all new issues raised are 
legal questions, the parties have thoroughly briefed the issues 
and there are no disputed issues of fact."11   
¶67 The present case is one in which the rule of 
forfeiture could appropriately be overlooked by this court.  The 
issue of the circuit court's inherent authority to reduce the 
length of probation is a question of law, and no disputed facts 
exist.  The circuit court's inherent authority in this realm 
"'is one of sufficient public interest to merit decision.'"12   
¶68 The issue arises frequently, and deciding the issue 
will assist the State, future defendants and probationers, and 
circuit courts.  Several circuit court cases in which the 
circuit courts operated with the understanding that they had 
authority to reduce the length of probation consistent with 
probation's 
purpose 
of 
rehabilitating 
the 
defendant 
and 
protecting the public are set forth in the Nonparty Brief and 
Appendix of the Wisconsin State Public Defender and the 
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  An informal 
survey of members of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers reported that circuit courts in counties across 
the state have reduced the length of probation.   
                                                 
10 Id. at 444.    
11 Id.    
12 Id. (quoting Binder, 72 Wis. 2d at 618). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶69 By casting doubt on the general understanding of 
circuit courts about their inherent authority to reduce the 
length of probation, the court of appeals decision eliminates a 
critical tool currently used by circuit courts that provides 
flexibility to ensure the terms and conditions of probation are 
effective.   
¶70 Deciding the issue in the present case will not work 
an injustice on either the State or the defendant, both of whom 
briefed the issue at length.    
¶71 For these reasons, I conclude that the court has erred 
in relying on a forfeiture and that the court should decide 
whether a circuit court has inherent authority to reduce a 
defendant's length of probation. 
II 
¶72 I turn now to the question whether a circuit court has 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation.        
¶73 Neither party disputes that circuit courts have 
inherent authority to reduce the length of a defendant's 
probation.  I agree with the parties on this issue.  
¶74 Circuit courts have "inherent, implied and incidental 
powers."13  These terms are used together, separately, and also 
interchangeably in the case law14 "'to describe those powers 
                                                 
13 State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995), quoted with approval in 
State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶73, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350.   
14 See, e.g., In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 517-18, 238 
N.W.2d 63 (1976); State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 
385 (1929). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
which must necessarily be used' to enable the judiciary to 
accomplish 
its 
constitutionally 
and 
legislatively 
mandated 
functions."15  Rather than use these three terms——inherent, 
implied, and incidental——to describe a circuit court's powers in 
the present case, I use the term "inherent authority," as do the 
parties and the court of appeals. 
¶75 Case law teaches that "an inherent power is one 
without which a court cannot properly function."16  The question 
then is whether a circuit court needs authority to reduce the 
length of probation to accomplish its constitutionally or 
legislatively mandated functions, that is, whether a circuit 
court needs this authority for its orderly functioning as a 
court in imposing probation and governing the terms and 
conditions of probation as the legislature has provided.    
¶76 It is well established that the legislative branch 
mandates criminal penalties.  Discussing judicial powers, the 
court has treated probation like sentencing as follows:  "[L]ike 
sentencing, 
the 
legislature 
has 
specifically 
granted 
the 
judiciary the authority to impose probation as an alternative to 
                                                 
15 Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 16 (quoting State v. Holmes, 
106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)) (emphasis added). 
"Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
generally 
exercised 
inherent 
authority in three areas: (1) to guard against actions that 
would impair the powers or efficacy of the courts or judicial 
system; (2) to regulate the bench and bar; and (3) to ensure the 
efficient and effective functioning of the court, and to fairly 
administer justice."  Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶73 (citation 
omitted).  
16 State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 580, 297 N.W.2d 808 
(1980). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  Without such statutory 
authority, a court could not place a defendant on probation."17  
¶77 In discussing the constitutional separation of powers 
doctrine with regard to sentencing——that is, the respective 
powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches over 
sentencing——the court has treated probation like sentencing as 
follows:  "Like sentencing, the legislature has constitutional 
authority to offer probation as an alternative to sentencing, 
the judiciary has authority to impose probation, and the 
executive branch has the authority to administer probation."18  
The court has explicitly declared that "probation and probation 
revocation are within shared powers" of the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of government.19  
¶78 With regard to a circuit court's authority to modify a 
sentence, the court has declared:  "The power to modify a 
sentence is one of the judiciary's inherent powers."20   
                                                 
17 State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 648, 594 N.W.2d 772 
(1999).  
Although the similarities between probation and sentencing 
noted by the Horn court influence my conclusion that circuit 
courts 
have 
inherent 
authority 
to 
reduce 
the 
length 
of 
probation, the Horn court noted that probation and sentencing 
are not one and the same.  Probation itself is not generally a 
sentence.  Probation is an alternative to sentencing.  See ¶52, 
infra. 
18 Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 648. 
19 Id.  
20 State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶11, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 
N.W.2d 524 (citing with approval Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 
101, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970)). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶79 With regard to a circuit court's authority over 
probation, the court has declared that "'inherent within the 
probation statute is the court's continued power to effectuate 
the dual purposes of probation, namely, rehabilitating the 
defendant and protecting society, through the court's authority 
to modify or extend probationary terms.'"21      
¶80 The court has not explicitly stated that circuit 
courts possess inherent authority to reduce the length of 
probation, although existing case law leads to the conclusion 
that reduction of the length of probation falls within a circuit 
court's inherent authority over probation, just as modification 
of a sentence falls within a circuit court's inherent authority 
over sentencing.  
¶81 The 
State, 
the 
defendant,22 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections,23 the American Bar Association,24 and circuit courts 
                                                 
21 Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 68 (quoting State v. Sepulveda, 119 
Wis. 2d 546, 554, 350 N.W.2d 96 (1984)).  For discussions of the 
goals of probation being rehabilitation and protection of 
society and modification of the terms and condition of probation 
to promote these goals, see Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 
798, 803, 266 N.W.2d 403; Edwards v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 79, 83, 
246 N.W.2d 109 (1976); Prue v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 109, 114, 215 
N.W.2d 43 (1974).  
22 See Brief of Petitioner at 42-46; Brief of Respondent at 
27-29. 
23 A Department of Corrections (DOC) regulation acknowledges 
the circuit court's inherent power to reduce the length of 
probation:  "A [probationer] shall be discharged upon the 
issuance of a discharge certificate by the secretary at the 
expiration of the term noted on the court order . . . unless: 
(a) The court has subsequently modified the term and extended or 
reduced it . . . ."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.17(2) (Dec. 
2006) (emphasis added).   
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
across the state25 assume or affirmatively adopt the principle 
that a circuit court has authority to reduce the length of 
probation.  These sources view this authority as essential to 
the judicial function of imposing probation.  Unless circuit 
courts have inherent authority to reduce the length of probation 
when necessary to effectuate the dual purposes of probation, a 
circuit court's ability to impose and govern probation fairly 
and effectively will be undermined.  
¶82 That a circuit court has inherent authority to reduce 
the length of probation does not conflict with former Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(d) 
(2009-10), which allowed the Department of 
Corrections to "modify a person's period of probation and 
discharge the person from probation if the person has completed 
50% of his or her period of probation," or the recently modified 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Note to this DOC regulation makes the point even 
clearer:  "[Probationers] are discharged at the expiration of 
the term noted on the court's order . . . unless the term has 
been extended by subsequent court action or unless a discharge 
at an earlier time is merited because of an action by a court, 
the governor, or department."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.17, 
Appendix, Note: DOC 328.17 (Dec. 2006) (emphasis added).  The 
DOC regulation reflects the settled notion that circuit courts 
have the inherent authority to reduce a defendant's length of 
probation. 
24 ABA, Standards Relating to Probation § 4.2 (1970) ("The 
sentencing court should have authority to terminate probation at 
any time.  Such authority should be exercised prior to the term 
fixed in the original sentence if it appears that the offender 
has made a good adjustment and that further supervision or 
enforced 
compliance 
with 
other 
conditions 
is 
no 
longer 
necessary.").   
25 See Nonparty Brief and Appendix of the Wisconsin State 
Public Defender and the Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers at 7.  
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
§ 973.09(3)(d), which allows a circuit court to discharge a 
probationer 
when 
specific 
statutory 
conditions 
are 
met, 
including a petition by the Department of Corrections to a 
circuit court to reduce the length of probation.26   
¶83 Because probation is a power that the judicial branch 
shares with the legislative and executive branches, a circuit 
court may not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the 
power of the other branches with regard to probation, and the 
legislative and executive branches may not unduly burden or 
substantially interfere with the judiciary's function with 
regard to probation.27  I conclude that a circuit court's 
authority to reduce the length of probation does not unduly 
interfere with the powers of the legislative or executive 
branches regarding probation.     
¶84 Although the legislature has granted the Department of 
Corrections (an executive branch agency) powers relating to the 
                                                 
26 The 
conditions 
are: 
"(1) 
The 
[D]epartment 
[of 
Corrections] petitions the court to discharge the person from 
probation. (2) The probationer has completed 50 percent of his 
or her period of probation. (3) The probationer has satisfied 
all conditions of probation that were set by the sentencing 
court. 
(4) 
The 
probationer 
has 
satisfied 
all 
rules 
and 
conditions of probation that were set by the [DOC]. (5) The 
probationer has fulfilled all financial obligations . . . . (6) 
The 
probationer is 
not required to register [as a sex 
offender]."  See 2011 Wis. Act 38.  
27 "The focus of this evaluation [of the powers of the 
legislative and judicial branches] is whether one branch's 
exercise 
of 
power 
has 
impermissibly 
intruded 
on 
the 
constitutional power of the other branch."  Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d  at 15.  See also Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 648-50; State v. 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 38, 68-69, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1981); State 
v. Fearing, 2000 WI App 229, ¶20-21, 239 Wis. 2d 105, 619 
N.W.2d 115. 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
reduction of the length of probation, a circuit court's 
exercising judicial power to reduce the length of probation does 
not unduly interfere with the powers the legislature has granted 
the executive branch.   
¶85 The Department of Corrections and the circuit courts 
are separate entities in separate, coordinate branches of the 
government.  The Department of Corrections and the circuit 
courts are charged with different responsibilities regarding 
probation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(3)(d), as revised, allows 
the Department of Corrections to exercise its legislatively 
mandated powers and petition circuit courts to reduce the length 
of probation for stated reasons in certain situations.  It does 
not follow that circuit courts are powerless to reduce the 
length of probation when the Department of Corrections does not 
file a petition.28  The Department of Corrections' powers to 
reduce the length of probation or to petition courts to reduce 
the length of probation are reasonable regulations of probation 
that do not conflict with a circuit court's inherent authority 
                                                 
28 See Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 651-2 ("[B]y vesting the 
administration of probation, including probation revocation, in 
the executive branch, the legislature has not withdrawn the 
judiciary's power . . . ."). 
Cf. 
State 
v. 
Stenklyft, 
2005 
WI 
71, 
¶¶97-105, 
281 
Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part in an opinion that, along with an 
opinion by Crooks, J., represents the majority of the court) 
(holding 
that 
although 
sentencing 
is 
an 
area 
of 
shared 
constitutional powers, it violates separation of powers for the 
legislature to remove a circuit court's inherent authority to 
modify a sentence by granting the power to decide when to modify 
a sentence to an executive actor). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
to reduce the length of probation in exercising its discretion 
regarding probation.   
¶86 On the basis of the constitution, statutes, and 
precedent, I would recognize the existence of a circuit court's 
authority to reduce the length of probation.   
III 
¶87 A 
crucial 
question 
remains 
about 
the 
inherent 
authority of circuit courts to reduce the length of probation:  
"What limitation should be placed upon such power in the 
interest of promoting justice in the administration of criminal 
law[?]"29 
 
A 
circuit 
court's 
inherent 
authority 
is 
a 
discretionary power that must be exercised within defined 
parameters.30   
¶88 The parties dispute the scope of a circuit court's 
authority to reduce the length of probation. 
¶89 The State urges that the circuit court's inherent 
authority should be exercised in the same narrow circumstances 
in which a circuit court may modify a sentence: (1) to correct 
formal or clerical errors or an illegal or void term of 
                                                 
29 Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) 
(relating to a circuit court's inherent authority to modify a 
sentence).  Hayes was overruled in part by State v. Taylor, 60 
Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973), regarding an issue not 
relevant to a circuit court's inherent authority to modify 
sentences. 
30 Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶12 (relating to modifying 
sentences). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
probation; (2) if a "new factor" is presented;31 or (3) if the 
probation is unduly harsh or unconscionable.32   
¶90 The defendant argues that circuit courts may exercise 
their inherent authority to reduce the length of probation "for 
cause."  "For cause" is the standard set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a), 
governing 
when 
a 
court 
"may 
extend 
probation . . . or 
modify 
the 
terms 
and 
conditions" 
of 
probation.  
¶91 The court of appeals held that if circuit courts 
possessed this inherent authority, its exercise should be 
governed by the standards applied to modification of sentences.33  
The court of appeals determined that the "preference for 
finality logically applies to sentencing in the general sense, 
including its probationary component."34 
¶92 I conclude that a circuit court has inherent authority 
to reduce the length of probation "for cause."  A circuit court 
should apply the same standard for deciding a motion to reduce 
the length of probation as it applies to a motion to modify the 
terms and conditions of probation.35  In other words, a circuit 
                                                 
31 See id., ¶¶13-25 (discussing what constitutes a "new 
factor" for purposes of sentence modification).  
32 See id., ¶12.  
33 State v. Dowdy, 2010 WI App 158, ¶31, 330 Wis.2d 444, 792 
N.W.2d 230.  The court of appeals concluded that none of those 
narrow standards were met by the defendant in the present case. 
Dowdy, 330 Wis. 2d 444, ¶¶34-36.  
34 Id., ¶32.  
35 Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
court may exercise its inherent authority to reduce the length 
of probation when doing so advances the dual purposes of 
probation: "to rehabilitate the defendant and to protect society 
without placing the defendant in prison."36   
¶93 The court of appeals' adoption of the "modification of 
sentence" standard is erroneous for several reasons.     
¶94 As a result of the court of appeals' decision, which 
applies a different standard to a motion to modify the terms and 
conditions of probation motion than is applied to a motion to 
reduce the length of probation, a circuit court may remove every 
term and condition of probation but be unable to reduce the 
length of probation.  Thus, the probationer will be on probation 
in 
name 
only 
because the duration of probation is not 
technically over.  This is an absurd result.   
¶95 In addition to avoiding this absurd result, the "for 
cause" standard is appropriate because it does not equate 
probation with sentencing, as the court of appeals did.  
¶96 I recognize that probation is closely related to 
sentencing; it is one possible disposition upon conviction.  
Nonetheless, probation is not generally considered a sentence.37  
                                                 
36 See Edwards v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 79, 83, 246 N.W.2d 109 
(1976)(probation "is granted with the goals of rehabilitation 
and protection of society in mind.").  See also Gray, 225 
Wis. 2d at 68; Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d at 554; State v. Hays, 173 
Wis. 2d 439, 445, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992). 
37 Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 647 (citing Prue v. State, 63 
Wis. 2d 109, 114, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974)); Hays, 173 Wis. 2d at 
444; State v. Meddaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 204, 211, 435 N.W.2d 269 
(Ct. App. 1988).  See also Fearing, 239 Wis. 2d 105,¶6.  
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
Probation is a legal term with a meaning different from 
sentencing;38 probation is an alternative to sentencing.39  
¶97 Crucially, 
probation 
has 
different 
purposes 
than 
sentencing.  It is commonly understood that there are four main 
purposes of sentencing: (1) deterrence; (2) rehabilitation; (3) 
retribution; and (4) segregation.40  Probation, on the other 
hand, has two primary purposes: (1) rehabilitation; and (2) 
protecting society without imprisoning the defendant. 
¶98 The narrow constraints on circuit courts' inherent 
authority to modify sentences are motivated by the importance of 
finality in sentencing.41  Finality is crucial to achieve 
effective deterrence and to send a clear retributive message.   
¶99 Without a strong emphasis on finality in sentencing, 
defendants and potential offenders would come to believe that 
sentences are freely modifiable and that offenders need not 
serve their full sentences.  For this reason, the deterrent 
effect of criminal sentences would be reduced.   
¶100 Retribution would be similarly undermined.  From a 
retributive perspective, sentencing courts attempt to give 
defendants their "just deserts" based on the severity of the 
                                                 
38 Prue v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 109, 116, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974). 
39 State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 594 N.W.2d 772 
(1999) 
(citing 
Garski 
v. 
State, 
75 
Wis. 2d 62, 
69, 
248 
N.W.2d 425 (1977)).  See also State v. Gereaux, 114 Wis. 2d 110, 
113, 338 N.W.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1983).  
40 See State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 574 
N.W.2d 660 (1998).    
41 See Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶12. 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
offense and the harm to society.  Retribution is a backward-
looking exercise——examining the harm done and determining what 
sentence is required for the defendant to repay a debt to 
society.  Future developments should not change this backward-
looking analysis.  If there were less finality in sentencing, 
the message that the sentence chosen coincides with the debt a 
defendant owes to society would be undermined.42   
¶101 Thus, finality is crucial to ensure that two main 
purposes 
of 
sentencing——deterrence 
and 
retribution——are 
fulfilled. 
¶102 As noted above, probation, in contrast, has two 
primary purposes: (1) rehabilitation, and (2) protecting society 
without imprisoning the defendant.  Finality is not necessary to 
achieve either purpose.   
¶103 Rehabilitation is forward-looking.  Some defendants 
may progress more quickly than others.  Predicting how long it 
will take before probation is no longer necessary for an 
individual 
defendant 
is 
difficult. 
 
Requiring 
continuing 
probation for a defendant who no longer needs probation is 
misguided; it is not necessary for public safety and is wasteful 
of the state's limited resources.  Continued probation is not 
justified by an interest in finality.  "For cause" in this 
context 
allows 
a 
court 
to 
consider 
the 
progress 
and 
rehabilitation of the probationer.   
                                                 
42 See Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶23 ("Crochiere's early 
release would undercut the seriousness of the offense . . . ."). 
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶104 Accordingly, 
the 
limits 
on 
sentence 
modification 
should not be transplanted onto a circuit court's inherent 
authority to reduce the length of probation.  Rather, circuit 
courts should be able to reduce the length of probation under 
the same standard as they can modify the terms and conditions or 
extend the length of probation——that is, when doing so is 
necessary to achieve probation's dual goals.   
¶105 To be effective, probation must be flexible.43  A 
circuit court must be cognizant of changing circumstances and 
the changing needs of the individual probationer to determine 
when modification of the terms and conditions and the length of 
probation is warranted to achieve probation's dual goals.44   
¶106 Even in the sentencing realm, where finality is of 
great value, this court has noted that "[i]t is more important 
to be able to settle a matter right with a little uncertainty 
than to settle it wrong irrevocably."45  In the context of 
probation, where flexibility rather than finality seems crucial, 
courts should be amenable to reductions in the length of 
                                                 
43 Prue, 63 Wis. 2d at 114 ("The trial court should have 
leeway 
if 
probation 
is 
to 
be 
an 
effective 
tool 
of 
rehabilitation."). 
44 Under Crochiere, successful rehabilitation explicitly 
does 
not 
constitute 
a 
"new 
factor" 
warranting 
sentence 
modification.  See Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶¶17-23.  In the 
probation context, it would seem that complete, successful 
rehabilitation should warrant a reduction of the length of 
probation or discharge from probation, particularly when there 
is a risk that the conditions of continuing probation could 
undermine the probationer's progress. 
45 Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105, 175 N.W.2d 625 
(1970).  
No.  2010AP772-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
probation, rather than setting the length of probation wrong 
irrevocably.   
IV 
¶107 Finally, because this court has not decided whether 
circuit courts possess the inherent authority to reduce the 
length of probation and a probationer is not limited to bringing 
only one motion to reduce the length of probation, the defendant 
is free to petition the circuit court again to reduce the length 
of his probation and argue that it has inherent, but not 
statutory, authority to do so. 
¶108 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  The defendant 
did not forfeit the right to have this court decide the inherent 
authority issue.  I conclude that a circuit court has inherent 
authority to reduce the length of probation "for cause," that 
is, a circuit court may exercise its inherent authority to 
reduce the length of probation when doing so advances the dual 
purposes of probation:  "to rehabilitate the defendant and to 
protect society without placing the defendant in prison." 
No.  2010AP772-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶109 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does 
not provide statutory authority for a circuit court to reduce 
the length of probation.  I write separately, however, to 
address the issue of inherent authority because I conclude that 
Dowdy did not forfeit his right to have this court address that 
issue.     
¶110 No party disputed that a circuit court has the 
inherent authority to reduce the length of probation.  The issue 
is not whether the court has such authority.  It does.  Rather, 
the issue is what are the parameters of that authority.   
¶111 A circuit court must exercise its inherent authority 
within "defined parameters."  State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, 
¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524.  Although the parties agree 
that the court has inherent authority, they disagree about the 
proper standard for the circuit court's inherent authority to 
reduce the length of probation.  Dowdy advocates for the "cause" 
standard.  By contrast, the State asserts that the circuit 
court's inherent authority to reduce the length of probation 
should be limited in the same way that a circuit court's 
inherent authority to reduce a sentence is limited——in this 
No.  2010AP772-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
case, based on the presence of a "new factor."1  Upon close 
examination, both of these standards are problematic. 
¶112 I am not persuaded that Dowdy's proposed standard, 
"cause," sufficiently circumscribes the court's exercise of 
inherent authority.  Rather, the "cause" standard begs the 
question.  If a circuit court can reduce the length of probation 
for cause, what constitutes cause to reduce the length of 
probation?   
¶113 According to the court of appeals, "the law places no 
limitation on what the trial court may consider as cause" when 
extending probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a).  State v. 
Edwards, 2003 WI App 221, ¶14, 267 Wis. 2d 491, 671 N.W.2d 371.  
I 
fear 
that 
such 
an 
amorphous 
standard 
would 
provide 
insufficient guidance to circuit courts.    
¶114 Likewise, I am not persuaded that the State's "new 
factor" standard, which is transposed wholesale from the 
standards for sentence modification, is workable in the context 
of probation modification.  The purposes of sentencing and 
probation are distinct, and the distinction makes a difference.   
¶115 There are several purposes of imposing a criminal 
sentence, only one of which is the defendant's rehabilitation.  
See C.J. Abrahamson's dissent, ¶97.  By contrast, the dual 
purposes of imposing probation are "to protect the public from 
                                                 
1 In addition to its inherent authority to modify a sentence 
when a "new factor" is presented, a circuit court may exercise 
its inherent authority to modify a sentence to correct formal or 
clerical errors, to correct an illegal or void sentence, or to 
modify an unduly harsh or unconscionable sentence.  State v. 
Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524.  
No.  2010AP772-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
criminal conduct and to help the probationer become a useful 
member of society."  Wagner v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 70, 77, 277 
N.W.2d 849 (1979).  Both purposes of probation have been served 
when a probationer has been rehabilitated.  When a probationer 
becomes a useful member of society, he or she has been 
rehabilitated, and the public is protected from criminal 
conduct. 
¶116 Because rehabilitation is so essential to the court's 
purpose for imposing probation in the first instance, a circuit 
court should be able to consider whether a defendant has been 
rehabilitated when deciding a motion to reduce the length of 
probation.  Accordingly, we have stated that "[p]robation 
modification provides the circuit court with a means of 
rewarding post-sentencing rehabilitation . . . ."  State v. 
Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997).   
¶117 However, our case law makes clear that, for purposes 
of 
sentence 
modification, 
a 
defendant's 
post-sentencing 
rehabilitation cannot be considered a new factor.  Id. at 7-8.  
Thus, if we were to accept the State's proposed standard and 
adopt the sentence modification parameters wholesale, we would 
significantly undermine the circuit court's inherent authority 
by preventing the circuit court from considering rehabilitation, 
the underlying purpose of probation.   
¶118 Accordingly, I conclude that neither of the standards 
offered by the parties is suited to define the parameters of the 
circuit court's exercise of inherent authority.  One standard is 
too broad, providing virtually no definition to guide the court, 
No.  2010AP772-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
and the other is too narrow, appearing to render the court's 
inherent authority illusory.  The parties' proposed standards 
provide no middle ground.   
¶119 I conclude that a third alternative is necessary.  
This is an important issue that affects the lives of a multitude 
of people and the administration of justice.  This court should 
craft a standard that is sufficiently defined to provide 
parameters for the circuit court's inherent authority, but that 
would allow the circuit court to take into account the 
defendant's 
rehabilitative 
progress 
in 
some 
fashion 
when 
determining whether probation reduction is warranted.     
¶120 For the reasons fully set forth by the Chief Justice, 
I conclude that Dowdy did not forfeit the inherent authority 
issue.  See C.J. Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶52-71.  Because I think 
it would be unwise for this court to craft, sua sponte, a new 
standard without further input from the parties, I would request 
supplemental briefing about the proper standard for the circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
inherent 
authority. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully dissent.   
 
 
No.  2010AP772-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1