Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF CH, A MINOR. PP v. CAMPBELL COUNTY D-PASS

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-84-2

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF CH, A MINOR. PP v. CAMPBELL COUNTY D-PASS1985 WY 64699 P.2d 830Case Number: C-84-2Decided: 05/17/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE INTEREST OF CH, A 
MINOR. PP, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), 

v. 

CAMPBELL COUNTY D-PASS, 
APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 
 
Dwight F. Hurich 
of Preuit, Sowada & Hurich, Gillette, for appellant 
(respondent).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., and Laura L. Beard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee 
(petitioner).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A petition was filed in 
the juvenile court of CampbellCounty alleging that CH, a 16-year-old 
female minor, had been neglected. PP, the mother of CH, appeals from the order 
of the court relative to the disposition of CH and from the court's refusal to 
grant PP's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that § 
14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B), W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum.Supp., is unconstitutionally vague. 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In accordance with the 
directions of the revised and amended Juvenile Court Act, § 14-6-201 et seq., 
W.S. 1977, the procedure followed in this case was: The petition was filed June 
13, 1984, by the county attorney's office after CH complained to the Campbell 
County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (D-PASS) that one RW, 
a 63-year-old male, had forced sexual relations with her on June 9, 1984. RW was 
not married to PP but was living with her. He was not related to 
CH. On June 13, 1984, a "shelter 
care" hearing was held by the court commissioner and temporary foster care 
placement of CH with D-PASS was approved. A guardian ad litem was appointed for 
CH. The district court judge reviewed 
the temporary custody arrangement at a hearing on June 19, 1984, and he ordered 
continuation of the arrangement, directing that there be no contact between CH 
and RW. On July 5, 1984, an adjudicatory hearing was held. PP moved to dismiss 
the petition on the grounds that the statute defining neglect was 
unconstitutional in that it was so vague and ambiguous that PP could not admit 
or deny the allegations of the petition. The court denied the motion and 
continued the temporary disposition. On August 30, 1984, D-PASS filed a 
predisposition report with the court pursuant to § 14-6-227, W.S. 1977, 1984 
Cum.Supp. By order dated September 6, 1984, the court continued care and custody 
of CH with D-PASS but allowed placement of her with PP. On October 2, 1984, CH 
requested the district court to order replacement of her because "her personal 
relationship with her mother has deteriorated to the point that it would be in 
the best interest of" CH to do so. The court granted the motion on October 15, 
1984.

[¶4.]     The only issue 
presented on appeal is whether or not the words "allowing the commission of a 
sexual offense against a child as defined by law" in § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B) is 
unconstitutionally vague in defining a child who has been abused and, therefore, 
neglected. Following are the pertinent provisions of the revised and amended 
Juvenile Court Act, § 14-6-201 et seq., including the foregoing words in 
context:1

"§ 14-6-201. Definitions.

"(a) As used in this act 
[§§ 14-6-201 through 14-6-243]:

* * * * * 
*

"(xvi) `Neglected child' 
means a child:

"(A) Whose custodian has 
failed or refused to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education 
or medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the child's well being. * * 
*

"(B) Who has been abused by the inflicting or 
causing of physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or 
mental health or welfare of the child, other than by accidental means, including abandonment, excessive or 
unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by 
reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of 
a sexual offense against a child as defined by law:

* * * * * 
*

"(III) `Substantial risk' 
means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility;

"(IV) `Imminent danger' includes threatened harm 
and means a statement, overt act, condition or status which represents an 
immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or physical or mental 
injury." (Emphasis added.)

"§ 14-6-225. Burden of proof required * * *. 

"(a) * * * Allegations of 
conduct showing a child to be neglected must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence." (Emphasis added.)

"§ 14-6-229. Decree where child adjudged neglected, 
delinquent or in need of supervision * * *.

"(a) When a child is 
adjudged by the court to be neglected, delinquent or in need of supervision, the 
court shall enter its decree to that effect and make a disposition as provided 
in this section that places the child in the least restrictive environment 
consistent with what is best suited to the protection of the public safety and 
interest, the physical, mental and moral 
welfare of the child and in accord with the actual facilities presently 
available when the decree is entered.

"(b) If the child is 
found to be neglected the court may:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Transfer temporary 
legal custody to a state or local public agency responsible for the care and 
placement of neglected children * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶5.]     The record reflects the 
following facts of this matter in addition to those related supra: CH said that 
her mother would live with RW for a while and then would live with another man 
but would always again live with RW; that RW began molesting her when she was 
approximately ten years old; that he had sexual intercourse with her on a 
regular basis since she was 11 years old; and that the last time was on June 9, 
1984, when he came to her bedroom and "overpowered her" when she "tried to fight 
him away." CH testified:

"Q Did you ever tell your 
mother?

"A No. I dropped hints at 
her, but I never told her."

PP 
testified:

"Q * * * [D]id you ever 
suspect in the course of that last few years there may be some sort of sexual 
abuse or sexual activity going on between your daughter and * * * 
[RW]?

"A Yes, I had suspected 
something.

"Q Did you inquire * * * 
from your daughter - if something was going on?

"A Yes, I 
did.

"Q Frequently or 
infrequently?

"A Quite 
frequently.

"Q Did you inquire from * 
* * [RW] if something was going on?

"A Yes, I 
did.

* * * * * 
*

"Q Did you in any way 
allow * * * [RW] to get - be involved in this - some sort of sexual offense 
against your child?

"A 
No."

On August 9, 
1982, about two years prior to the petition in this matter, PP advised D-PASS 
that she had caught CH and RW in bed together at least 12 times over the past 
year although both of them denied to her that there was any sexual contact. 
Before D-PASS could investigate the complaint, PP left the area with a new 
boyfriend, taking CH with her.

[¶6.]     In Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 
(1979), we reviewed at length the standard under which we determined whether or 
not a statute was unconstitutionally vague. It is unnecessary to repeat all of 
that there said. In summary, we concluded that, except for vagueness challenges 
involving First Amendment freedoms, we examine the questioned statute for such 
purpose in the light of the facts of the case at hand

"* * * to determine if it 
sets forth the acts or conduct required or forbidden with reasonable certainty 
and in a fashion whereby a person of ordinary intelligence is given fair notice 
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden. * * *" 604 P.2d  at 
1034.

[¶7.]     PP's motion to dismiss 
and her argument to this court is premised on the contention that she did not 
know whether or not the series of sexual intercourses took place between CH and 
RW and that, therefore, she should not be deprived of custody and care of CH 
under a statute which she claims does not convey a warning as to her proscribed 
conduct under the factual situation. She contends that the statutory language 
"commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense" implies an 
intentional act on her part to promote or further the sexual 
abuse.

[¶8.]     Subparagraph (A) of § 
14-6-201(a)(xvi) concerns action or lack of action by a child's custodian as 
determinative of neglect. It includes a failure to provide adequate supervision 
or any other care necessary for the child's well-being as neglect. But the 
petition does not allege violation of subparagraph (A). Subparagraph (B) 
thereof, the subparagraph under which neglect was alleged in the petition, does 
not require the action or inaction to be on the part of the custodian. But since 
such action or inaction can result in a deprivation of care and custody of the 
minor from the custodian, it implies that a custodian of ordinary intelligence 
could have, and would have, done that within his means to alleviate that which 
he knew or should have known constituted the neglect.

[¶9.]     The statute gave notice 
to one of ordinary intelligence that a female child between the ages of 11 and 
16 is considered neglected when she must live with her mother, who in turn is 
living with a man to whom she is not married, whom the mother finds in bed with 
the child at least 12 times over the period of a year, and who is suspected by 
the mother of having sexual activity with, or sexually abusing, the daughter, 
the occurrence of which the daughter "dropped hints" was happening. The notice 
that such constitutes neglect is given by statutory language which provides that 
a child's placement should be that best suited to "the physical, mental and 
moral welfare of the child" and that neglect occurs when a child is abused by 
causing "imminent danger" to her or her "physical or mental health or welfare" 
including "allowing the commission of a sexual offense against a child" 
("imminent danger" being defined as including an "overt act, condition or status 
which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse," and with 
"substantial risk" being defined as a "strong 
possibility").

[¶10.]  Certainly a reasonably intelligent person 
would know that the facts of this case would place CH in the status of a 
neglected child as set forth in the Act. That forbidden is set forth with 
reasonable certainty in the Act as it pertains to the facts of this case. The 
facts of this case do not support a challenge of the Act on the basis of 
unconstitutional vagueness.

[¶11.]  Finally, appellant contends that the 
strict scrutiny test must be applied in determining whether the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague inasmuch as the interference directed by the statute is 
with appellant's fundamental right to have care and custody of her own child, 
citing Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1977); and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982), among others.

[¶12.]  The standard of strict scrutiny does not 
help appellant under the circumstances of this case. In State in Interest of C, Wyo., 638 P.2d 165, 173 
(1981), we said:

"* * * `Strict scrutiny' 
is the standard applied when it becomes necessary to balance a fundamental right 
against a compelling state interest. It requires the establishment of the 
compelling state interest and the showing that the method of achieving such is 
the least intrusive of those methods by which such can be accomplished. 
[Citations.]"

[¶13.]  The compelling State interest here is the 
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child as stated in the Act. The 
fundamental right of PP to have custody and care of the child must be weighed 
against the compelling State interest in not having the child in a home occupied 
by a man with whom the mother is living without marriage, which man has 
continually abused the child through regular sexual intercourse over several 
years. Additionally, the weighing process must also include on the side of the 
compelling State interest the fact that PP has lived with one man without 
marriage for a while and then another without marriage before returning to the 
first one, with this occurring on more than one occasion; PP has found the child 
in bed with one of these men on at least 12 occasions in one year; the child has 
given PP hints of sexual activity between the man and the child; and PP has 
suspected sexual activity between the man and the child. The proof of neglect 
was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, supra. The State's 
effort to accomplish its compelling interest was the least intrusive. Although 
care and custody were taken from PP, the child was allowed to live with PP, 
albeit with direction that there be no contact between the child and the man, 
until the child, at the age of 16, requested placement elsewhere because the 
"personal relationship with her mother has deteriorated to the point that it 
would be in the best interest" of the child. Additionally, the court ordered 
reevaluation of the matter in six months.

[¶14.]  The Act is not unconstitutionally vague 
under the facts of this case regardless of the standard under which such is 
evaluated.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

1 Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 551, 553 (1982), 
provides:

"All portions of the act 
must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must be 
given effect, [citations], all with the purpose of ascertaining and giving 
effect to the legislative intent, [citations]."