Case Title: Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45440

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: April 29, 1999 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

SYDNEY RODRIGUEZ, by her guardian ad

litem, GINA RODRIGUEZ,

		Petitioner on Review,

	v.

THE HOLLAND, INC., a Washington corporation,

doing business as BURGERVILLE USA,

	Respondent on Review.

THE HOLLAND, INC., a Washington corporation,

doing business as BURGERVILLE USA,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

      v.

KIM FROSAKER, an individual,

Third-Party Defendant.

(CC 96-07-05514; CA A98544; SC S45440)

	En Banc

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted November 2, 1998.

	John S. J. Marandas, of Marandas & Perdue, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.

	Michael J. Gentry, of Tooze Duden Creamer Frank & Hutchison,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review.

	LEESON, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 

	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	Kristena A. LaMar, Judge.

	153 Or App 701, 957 P2d 203 (1998).

	LEESON, J.

	In this negligence action for personal injuries that
plaintiff sustained at defendant's playground, the issue is
whether plaintiff, who prevailed on her claim, is entitled to an
award of attorney fees.  The trial court vacated the arbitrator's
award of fees, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Rodriguez v.
The Holland, Inc., 153 Or App 701, 957 P2d 203 (1998).  We
conclude that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and reverse.

	The facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff, a young child,
broke her arm when she fell from a piece of play equipment at a
playground owned and operated by defendant.  Defendant denied
liability.(1)  Plaintiff, through her guardian ad litem, and
defendant's insurer exchanged several offers and counteroffers in
an attempt to settle plaintiff's claim.  Ultimately, plaintiff
informed defendant's insurer that she was willing to reduce her
claim to $4,000 and that, if defendant did not pay that amount,
plaintiff would make a demand for $4,000 "plus the award of
attorney fees as allowed by ORS 20.080."(2)  Defendant's insurer
made a counteroffer to settle the claim for $2,500 "[i]n the
spirit of compromise and considering the ORS 20.080 statute * * *."  

	Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint alleging
economic damages in the amount of $613, noneconomic damages in
the amount of $3,600 -- a total of $4,213 -- and attorney fees
under ORS 20.080.  Defendant's answer denied liability and denied
that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.080. 
The circuit court transferred the case to arbitration.  See ORS
36.405 (requiring mandatory arbitration of specified civil
claims). 

	A few weeks before the arbitration hearing, plaintiff
moved to amend her complaint under ORCP 23 A.  At a hearing on
that motion, plaintiff also requested that she be allowed to
reduce her demand for damages to $4,000.  Plaintiff explained
that, as indicated in her earlier demand letter, she had intended
to sue for damages of only $4,000.  However, in drafting the
complaint, she had miscalculated the economic and noneconomic
damages.  The arbitrator allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint
and to reduce her demand for damages to $4,000 but asked her to
provide additional legal authority to support an award of
attorney fees under ORS 20.080.  Plaintiff provided a memorandum
of authorities, and defendant responded to that memorandum.  

	After the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator found for
plaintiff on her claim and awarded her $3,965 in damages and
$6,000 in attorney fees.  He explained that attorney fees were
appropriate because

	"defendant has not sufficiently shown prejudice arising
from plaintiff's correction of her complaint to bring
it within the statute for attorney[] fees.  It is clear
that such fees always were sought. * * *"

Defendant filed exceptions to the award of attorney fees with the
circuit court.  See ORS 36.425(6) (allowing filing of exceptions
to award of attorney fees).  That court vacated the arbitrator's
award of attorney fees, concluding that Wyatt v. Sweitz, 146 Or
App 723, 934 P2d 544, rev dismissed 326 Or 63 (1997), controlled. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, citing Wyatt.  

	We allowed review to determine the meaning of the
phrase "amount pleaded" in ORS 20.080.  That statute provides, in
part:

		"(1) In any action for damages for an injury or
wrong to the person or property, or both, of another
where the amount pleaded is $4,000 or less, and the
plaintiff prevails in the action, there shall be taxed
and allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a
reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney
fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court
finds that written demand for the payment of such claim
was made on the defendant not less than 10 days before
the commencement of the action or the filing of a
formal complaint * * *."  (Emphasis added.)

According to plaintiff, the phrase "amount pleaded" in the
statute refers to the operative complaint in an action, which in
this case is her amended complaint.  Defendant contends that the
phrase refers only to the original complaint in an action.

		Determining the meaning of the phrase "amount pleaded"
in ORS 20.080 is a matter of statutory construction.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (establishing methodology for statutory construction).  We
look first to the text and context of the statute.  Id. at 610. 
Statutory context includes other provisions of the same statute
and other related statutes.  State v. Metcalfe, 328 Or 309, 312,
___ P2d ___ (1999); see State v. Carr, 319 Or 408, 412, 877 P2d
1192 (1994). 

		ORS 20.080 does not define the phrase "amount pleaded,"
and the plain words of the statute do not indicate whether the
phrase refers to the original complaint or to the operative
complaint in an action.  However, the Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080,
because they "govern procedure and practice in all circuit courts
* * * for all civil actions * * * except where a different
procedure is specified by statute or rule."  ORCP 1 A (emphasis
added); see also ORS 1.735 (delegating authority to Council on
Court Procedures to promulgate ORCP).  ORS 20.080 does not
specify a pleading procedure different from the Oregon Rules of
Civil Procedure.

		ORCP 23 A provides that, with leave of the court, a
party may amend a pleading after a responsive pleading is served
and that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
An amended pleading must be complete without reference to the
original pleading or any preceding amended pleading.  ORCP 23 D. 
After an original pleading has been amended, it no longer has
status as a pleading in the action.  The amended pleading
supersedes the previous pleading and becomes the operative
pleading.  See Klemgard et al v. Wade Seed Co., 217 Or 409, 414,
342 P2d 757 (1959) (stating, under a predecessor statute, that

"* * * a pleading loses its status as such when it is superseded
by an amended one * * *"); Mignot v. Parkhill, 237 Or 450, 453,
391 P2d 755 (1964) (same). 

		Because ORS 20.080 does not specify a pleading
procedure different from the ORCP, we conclude that the phrase
"amount pleaded" in ORS 20.080 refers to the demand for damages
in the operative pleading in the action.  In this case, the
operative pleading is the amended complaint that the arbitrator
allowed under ORCP 23 A.  That complaint seeks damages in the
amount of $4,000.  Under ORS 20.080, plaintiff is entitled to a
reasonable amount of attorney fees if she made a written demand
for payment of her claim not fewer than 10 days before she filed
her initial complaint.  Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff
made a written demand for $4,000 at least 10 days before filing
her complaint. 

		According to defendant, allowing anything but the
original complaint to determine the "amount pleaded" in an action
to which ORS 20.080 applies would frustrate the policy underlying
that statute.  That policy is to encourage settlement of small
claims, to prevent insurance companies and tortfeasors from
refusing to pay just claims, and to discourage plaintiffs from
inflating their claims.  See, e.g., Johnson v. White, 249 Or 461,
462-64, 439 P2d 8 (1968) (stating policy underlying ORS 20.080). 
Even if we agreed with defendant's argument it has no force here,
because our only task is to discern the meaning of the phrase
"amount pleaded" in ORS 20.080.  This court's statutory
construction methodology, not policy considerations, guide that
inquiry.  What is more, reduced to its essentials, defendant's
policy argument is an attack on the arbitrator's decision to
allow plaintiff to amend her complaint, a decision to which it
has not objected heretofore.(3)

		We turn to an examination of Wyatt, the case on which
defendant and the courts below relied for their conclusions that
plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees in this
case.  In Wyatt, the plaintiff pleaded two claims for relief, the
first for "timber trespass" and the second for "trespass to
land."  The aggregate amount of the two claims was more than
$4,000.  The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
partial judgment on the pleadings.  The plaintiff then filed a
second amended complaint, seeking a maximum recovery of $3,960. 
After a trial in which the jury awarded the plaintiff actual
damages of $10 and punitive damages of $500, the plaintiff
petitioned for attorney fees under ORS 20.080.  The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees,
reasoning that the plaintiff's original complaint made a "total
demand" of more than $4,000.  The Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff "'took himself out of' ORS 20.080 by making a total
demand of more than $4,000 in his original complaint."  Wyatt,
146 Or App at 734.  In arriving at that conclusion, the Court of
Appeals relied on this court's decision in Johnson.  That
reliance was misplaced.

		In Johnson, the plaintiff sued for personal injury in
one claim, seeking $5,699.20, and for property damage in another
claim, seeking $379.00.(4)  The jury found for the plaintiff only
on the second claim.  The plaintiff sought attorney fees under
ORS 20.080 which, at that time, required that the amount pleaded
be $1,000 or less.  This court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to attorney fees, because the "amount pleaded"
requirement of ORS 20.080 applies to the total demand of a
complaint, regardless of the number of claims.  Johnson, 249 Or
at 464.  Johnson did not pose the interpretive question raised by
Wyatt or by this case, namely, whether the phrase "amount
pleaded" refers only to the original pleading in an action.  As
explained above, we hold that the phrase "amount pleaded" in ORS
20.080 refers to the operative pleading in an action, which can
be an amended complaint in which the demand for damages was
amended with leave of the court under ORCP 23 A.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

1. 	In a third-party action, defendant alleged that third-party defendant Kim Frosaker, plaintiff's babysitter at the time
of the accident, was liable for plaintiff's injuries.  Neither
that third-party action nor the third-party defendant is affected
by plaintiff's appeal.

2. 	The text of ORS 20.080, which provides for an award of
attorney fees to a plaintiff who pleads and prevails on a claim
for $4,000 or less, is quoted later in this opinion.

3. 	Defendant maintained at the Court of Appeals that "this
appeal presents no question of the appropriateness of the
[arbitrator's] allowance of the motion to amend."

4. 	In Johnson, each claim was pleaded as a separate "cause
of action," a term that has been abandoned under the Oregon Rules
of Civil Procedure in favor of "claim for relief."  For purposes
of our analysis, "cause of action" and "claim for relief" are
synonymous.  See Peterson v. Temple, 323 Or 322, 327 n3, 918 P2d
413 (1996) (so stating).