Case Title: State v. Tellez

Citation: 111 Ariz. 34, 523 P.2d 62

Docket Number: 2785

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1974-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
111 Ariz. 34 (1974) 523 P.2d 62 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Benny Nunez TELLEZ, Appellant. No. 2785. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. June 3, 1974. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Shirley H. Frondorf, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. John M. Neis, Pima County Public Defender by Charles Babbitt, Asst. Public Defender, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the court sitting without a jury finding the defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated battery, § 13-245 A.R.S., and a sentence of two to three years in the Arizona State Prison on each count to be served concurrently. We must answer three questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On the evening of 2 November 1972, two undercover narcotics agents of the City of Tucson observed the defendant having a cup of coffee in a Dunkin' Donuts Coffee Shop on South 16th Avenue and Interstate 10. He appeared to be "nodding" and the officers suspected that he was under the influence of narcotics. Officer Gomez engaged the defendant in conversation and indicated to the defendant that he, Officer Gomez, was in need of some heroin. After conversation with the two officers, the defendant agreed to take the officers where they could "score." The officers gave the defendant $17 for two "papers" and the defendant had them drive to the house of a known drug user and dealer in *35 Tucson. The defendant left the two officers in the car. He returned a few minutes later and, according to the testimony of the officers, indicated that he had obtained the heroin. A discussion then ensued as to where Officer Gomez was going to "fix" and the officers suggested a rest-room at a service station. However, the defendant insisted that they go to his house. After the three arrived at defendant's house and after some discussion, the officers pulled their guns, informed the defendant that they were police officers, and attempted to place him under arrest. Defendant fought back vigorously hitting the officers in the face and kicking one of the officers in the groin. In the process, the defendant claims he was severely beaten. He was taken to the hospital where he refused medical attention and then to the police station where he was later charged with two counts of aggravated battery and one count of unlawful offer to sell narcotics, § 36-1002.02 A.R.S. The defendant admitted a prior conviction and waived trial by jury. The trial court acquitted the defendant on the charge of offer to sell narcotics, but found him guilty of both counts of aggravated battery. From a sentence of two to three years on each count to be served concurrently, the defendant appeals. REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS CONVICTION Prior to the commencement of the trial the following transpired: The Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at that time stated as follows: On direct examination the defendant testified: On cross-examination by the State the following transpired (without objection by defendant's counsel): It is clear that the prosecutor violated the mandate set down in Rule 180 in cross-examining or alluding to the defendant's previous convictions during trial when the defendant had admitted his prior convictions. State v. Gastelum, 75 Ariz. 271, 255 P.2d 203 (1953). We find no prejudice, however. First, the door was opened by the defendant during direct examination. Secondly, the trier of fact, the trial court, was already aware of the fact *36 of the prior conviction and the information was not new to the court. Admittedly, the State did indicate, by the cross-examination, that the defendant had more than one prior conviction. We still find no prejudice since it could be considered in response to the direct testimony which indicated that defendant had only one prior conviction. Third, the purpose of the rule is to prevent the prejudicial information from reaching the ears of the jury. The trial court is presumed capable of disregarding this information in reaching its decision. We find no prejudicial error. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT? Section 13-245 A.R.S. reads as follows: The defendant testified that he did not hit the officers; that he did not know they were officers; and that they just started beating him when he refused to turn over the heroin he allegedly purchased. His testimony was weak on cross-examination and at the conclusion the trial court stated: We have read the evidence and believe it supports the contention of the State and the finding of the trial court. The testimony was in direct conflict and the court resolved that conflict. We find no error. INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL Defendant also contends on appeal that he did not receive effective representation from his privately retained counsel and therefore his conviction should be set aside. We do not agree with this contention. The effectiveness of counsel is not measured by his success. State v. Bustamante, 103 Ariz. 551, 447 P.2d 243 (1968). However, in this regard it should be noted that the defendant was found not guilty of the more serious charge, unlawful offer to sell narcotics, and counsel was able to obtain defendant's release on his own recognizance both before and after trial. We have stated: We have read the record and we do not believe it supports defendant's contention. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.