Case Title: Town of Marbleton v. Town of Big Piney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Town of Marbleton v. Town of Big Piney1986 WY 128719 P.2d 1389Case Number: 86-1Decided: 06/03/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
TOWN OF MARBLETON, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

TOWN OF BIG PINEY, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court of Sublette County, Robert B. Ranck, J.

Edward F. Hess 
(argued), and Warren W. Dill, Jackson, for appellant 
(plaintiff).

Ralph E. Wood, 
Pinedale, for appellee 
(defendant).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The single issue in 
this case is whether a town has implied standing to contest an annexation even 
though it does not qualify for standing under the express terms of the 
applicable standing statute.

[¶2.]     Until it undertook the 
annexation at issue in this case, the town of Big Piney, Wyoming, was located 
about one-half of a mile south of the town of Marbleton. State Highway 189 runs 
north and south through both towns. In order to better control traffic on the 
highway, the Big Piney town council decided to annex the highway right-of-way 
from the town's northern border up to the southern border of Marbleton. The 
council did not intend to annex any land on either side of the 
right-of-way.

[¶3.]     The council held 
several meetings at which the annexation was discussed. There were no objections 
raised by any Big Piney residents or by the owners of the area to be annexed. 
But the town of Marbleton and a man who owned property adjacent to the 
right-of-way both objected. The landowner was concerned because Big Piney did 
not intend to provide any services for the right-of-way other than traffic 
control. The town of Marbleton opposed the annexation because it was in the 
process of annexing the Shortstop Addition which fronted the right-of-way. 
Marbleton hoped to annex the right-of-way and the addition together but would be 
foreclosed from doing so if Big Piney annexed the right-of-way 
first.

[¶4.]     Despite the objections, 
Big Piney annexed the right-of-way. Marbleton then filed a complaint for 
declaratory relief in the district court alleging that the annexation was void 
because the Big Piney town council had not properly followed the statutory 
annexation procedures of § 15-1-404, W.S. 1977. In its answer, Big Piney 
contended that Marbleton lacked standing to challenge the annexation because it 
was neither an owner of the property to be annexed nor a landowner in the 
annexing town. Big Piney quoted § 15-1-409(a), W.S. 1977, which 
states:

"If any landowner in the 
territory proposed to be annexed or any owner of real property in the annexing 
city is aggrieved by the acts of the governing body, he may appeal to the 
district court for a review of the acts or findings 
thereof."

[¶5.]     The parties submitted 
the case to the district court upon a joint motion for summary judgment based 
upon stipulated facts. The court held that Marbleton lacked standing to bring 
the action and granted summary judgment in favor of Big Piney. The court 
explained that "[t]he matter is controlled by statute. The statute sets out who 
may bring an action and impliedly says who cannot."

[¶6.]     We agree with the 
district court and affirm its judgment. Generally, "municipalities can exercise 
only those powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred." Coulter v. City 
of Rawlins, Wyo., 662 P.2d 888, 895 (1983).

"`[I]mplied powers 
include, and are generally held to be limited to, the 
following:

"`1. Powers necessarily 
arising from those expressly granted, and also those reasonably inferred from 
the powers expressly granted.

"`2. Powers essential to 
give effect to powers expressly granted.'" Coulter v. City of Rawlins, supra, 
662 P.2d  at 895 quoting 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 10.12, at 768 (3d 
ed. 1979).

[¶7.]     The town of Marbleton 
concedes that the only statute which expressly authorizes the appeal of an 
annexation is § 15-1-409(a), W.S. 1977. Marbleton further admits that it does 
not qualify for standing under the express terms of this statute because it does 
not own property in the area to be annexed or in the annexing town, Big Piney. 
Marbleton contends, however, that it needs implied standing to give effect to 
the exercise of several of its other express extraterritorial powers. The town 
refers us to its power to condemn property outside its boundaries under § 
15-1-103(a)(xxxv), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, which 
states:

"(a) The governing bodies 
of all cities and towns may:

"(xxxv) Exercise the 
power of eminent domain and take property for public use within and without the 
city limits for any necessary or authorized public 
purpose."

The town also 
relies on its right to approve any incorporation within one mile of its borders, 
as provided in § 15-1-411, W.S. 1977:

"All territory within one 
(1) mile of an incorporated city or town, as it now exists or may hereafter be 
established, is potentially an urban area. No territory within a potential urban 
area may be incorporated as a city or town unless the governing body of the city 
or town causing the potential urbanized area to exist, by resolution, approves 
the proposed incorporation,"

and to approve 
plats filed on land within a mile of the town borders, as stated in § 34-12-103, 
W.S. 1977, which provides in part:

"[A]ny such plat of land 
adjacent to any incorporated city or town, or within one (1) mile of the 
boundaries of any such city or town, shall be jointly approved by both the board 
of county commissioners of said county and the governing body of said city or 
town before same shall be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk 
as aforesaid."

[¶8.]     Marbleton has also 
discussed the power of a mayor to exercise his jurisdiction within one-half mile 
of corporate limits under § 15-3-202, W.S. 1977, but that power has no 
application in this case because it only applies to mayors of first class 
cities.

[¶9.]     Marbleton's argument 
for implied standing never hits home because Marbleton never specifies how the 
express powers it mentions are affected by another town's annexation of nearby 
property. If an annexation does not affect these other express powers, then 
standing to contest the annexation is neither implied nor reasonably inferred 
from those powers.

[¶10.]  Several courts that have faced the 
precise issue presented in this case have held that a town's standing to contest 
an annexation must be expressly created by statute. In City of Westminster v. 
City of Northglenn, 178 Colo. 334, 498 P.2d 343, 344 (1972) (en banc), for 
example, the Colorado Supreme Court had to decide whether a city had standing to 
contest an annexation even though it did not qualify for standing under the 
express terms of the statute. The court held that standing must be express 
because annexation is strictly a statutory proceeding. The Supreme Court of 
Kansas applied the same principle and reached the same result in City of Lenexa 
v. City of Olathe, 228 Kan. 773, 620 P.2d 1153, 1156-1158 
(1980).

[¶11.]  We do not necessarily agree with these 
courts that municipal standing to contest annexations can only be express. We 
need not resolve that question, however, because, even if implied standing is 
possible, it has not been shown in this case that such standing is necessary to 
give effect to one of Marbleton's express municipal powers. Because Marbleton 
has shown neither express nor implied standing to contest this annexation, the 
district court's decision was correct.

[¶12.]  Affirmed.