Case Title: ALCARAZ v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALCARAZ v. STATE2002 WY 5744 P.3d 68Case Number: 01-33Decided: 04/12/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

DOMINIC 
ALCARAZ, 

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel  

 Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General  

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Dominic Alcaraz 
stole money from his employer and was convicted of felony larceny.  The district court ordered him to pay 
$5,617.35 in restitution to compensate the employer for the total cost of a 
surveillance system which was installed to investigate the thefts.  Mr. Alcaraz appealed claiming the 
district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay for the entire 
system.  We agree and reverse and 
remand for a determination of what portion of the total cost of the system can 
reasonably be required as restitution when the standard herein set forth is 
applied.  

[¶2]      Mr. Alcaraz 
presents the following issue for our review:  "Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion when it ordered [Mr.] Alcaraz to pay for the surveillance camera 
equipment and costs of installation used to detect his crime?"  The State of Wyoming rephrases the issue 
as:  "Whether the district court 
abused its discretion in ordering restitution?"  In his reply brief, Mr. Alcaraz states 
an additional issue:  "Whether [the 
state] has failed to respond to all of [Mr. Alcaraz's] arguments which would 
require reversal of the restitution order?"

FACTS

[¶3]      The facts 
establishing Mr. Alcaraz's criminal conduct are not in dispute.  Mr. Alcaraz worked for Mr. D's Food 
Center, a grocery store in Lander, and was in charge of cleaning the floors at 
night while the store was closed.  
On May 1, 2000, Mr. Alcaraz was at work when he opened a drawer and stole 
approximately $300 from the store's safe room.  On May 20, 2000, he stole approximately 
$400 from a desk drawer in the customer service area.  The store owner became suspicious and 
installed surveillance equipment in the customer service area.  On June 23, 2000, the owner placed $600 
in marked bills in a bank bag on a desk in that area of the store.  The following morning, the surveillance 
cameras showed Mr. Alcaraz stealing $300 from the bank bag.  The next night, the owner again placed 
marked money in a bank bag in a desk in the same area of the store.  The Lander Police Department operated 
the surveillance equipment that night and recorded Mr. Alcaraz removing money 
from the bank bag.  An officer 
subsequently found $240 in marked money in Mr. Alcaraz's front pocket, and he 
arrested Mr. Alcaraz.

[¶4]      Mr. Alcaraz 
pleaded guilty to felony larceny under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The district 
court sentenced him to a prison term of not less than two years nor more than 
four years.  It suspended the prison 
sentence and placed Mr. Alcaraz on supervised probation, ordering him to serve 
six months of jail time on weekends to be completed within three years.  The district court also ordered him to 
pay $100 to the crime victims compensation fund and $5,617.351 in restitution to compensate the 
store owner for the total cost of the surveillance equipment as well as 
installation.  Mr. Alcaraz 
appealed.

[¶5]      

Appellate 
review of ordered restitution is confined to a search for procedural error or a 
clear abuse of discretion.  The 
amount of restitution fixed by the trial court should be supported by evidence 
sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the loss.  A challenge to the amount of restitution 
set by the court must demonstrate an abuse of discretion. "Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Brock v. State, 967 P.2d 26, 27 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998)).

Stowe v. 
State, 10 P.3d 551, 553 (Wyo. 2000) (some citations omitted).

[¶6]      Mr. Alcaraz 
contends the district court improperly ordered him to pay restitution for the 
total cost of the surveillance equipment the store owner installed to determine 
who was stealing money from the store.  
In Wyoming, restitution is authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 
(LexisNexis 2001), which reads:

            
In addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, 
upon conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay 
restitution to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless 
the court specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that 
no reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.  

[¶7]      A sentencing 
judge is authorized in a criminal case to order a defendant convicted of a crime 
to pay to the victim of his crime actual pecuniary damages suffered by that 
victim as a result of the defendant's criminal activity.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b) (LexisNexis 
2001).  For purposes of restitution, 
"pecuniary damage" includes all damages "a victim could recover against the 
defendant in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Mr. Alcaraz does 
not argue the district court was unauthorized to order restitution; rather, he 
questions whether the total cost of the surveillance equipment and its 
installation are pecuniary damages resulting from his criminal activity; i.e., 
could the store owner recover the cost of the surveillance equipment in a civil 
action. 

[¶8]      Neither party 
suggested a civil cause of action which could arise out of the same facts under 
which the store owner could recover against Mr. Alcaraz.  However, we note the most closely 
applicable cause of action would be conversion.  We have defined conversion as any 
distinct act of dominion wrongfully executed over one's property in denial of 
his right or inconsistent with it. Cross 
v. Berg Lumber Company, 7 P.3d 922, 929 (Wyo. 2000).  In essence, "[c]onversion occurs when a 
person treats another's property as his own denying the true owner the benefits 
and rights of ownership.'"  Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Coronado Oil 
Company, 884 P.2d 971, 975 (Wyo. 1994)).  In order to establish a cause of action 
in conversion, a plaintiff must show that:

"(1) he 
had legal title to the converted property; (2) he either had possession of the 
property or the right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the 
defendant exercised dominion over the property in a manner which denied the 
plaintiff his rights to use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the 
defendants lawfully, or at least without fault, obtained possession of the 
property, the plaintiff made some demand for the property's return which the 
defendant refused; and (5) the plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the 
property."

Id. 
at 929-30 (quoting Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 556 (Wyo. 1998)).  The 
proper measure of damages for conversion of property is the actual value of the 
property converted and may include reasonable expenses incurred in an effort to 
recover possession of the property.  
In Cross, 7 P.3d  at 932, we 
held recovery costs are a species of special damages and upheld an award of 
special damages for the cost of numerous attempts to retrieve a converted road 
grader including the hiring of an airplane to search for the grader.  Although Mr. Alcaraz paid back the 
amount of cash he stole, the store owner could recover special 
damages.

            
When a conversion occurs, the injured party should receive full 
compensation for his actual losses.  
The damages in an action for conversion are measured by the sum of money 
necessary to compensate the plaintiff for all actual losses or injuries 
sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong.  Special damages may be recovered in an 
action for conversion for any injury proximately resulting from the 
conversion.

18 Am. 
Jur. 2d Conversion § 117 at 230-31 
(1985); see also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 927(2)(b) (1979) (damages may include the amount of any further 
pecuniary loss of which the deprivation has been a legal cause).  Compensation for time and money spent in 
pursuit of the property may be recovered as special damages.  18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 117 
(1985).

[¶9]      To justify 
restitution for the surveillance system costs, Mr. Alcaraz's criminal conduct 
must have been a proximate cause of the store owner's purchasing the 
surveillance equipment.  We have 
identified legal causation as conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing 
about the injuries set out in the complaint.  Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1091 
(Wyo. 1985).  If, however, the 
conduct created only a condition or occasion for the harm to occur, it would be 
regarded as a remote, not a proximate, cause and would not be a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm.  
Id. at 
1092.

[¶10]   We have considered causation in the 
context of restitution in two cases.  
In Fales v. State, 908 P.2d 404, 412 (Wyo. 1995), Ms. Fales was ordered to pay $11,532.04 in restitution for 
damages sustained when one of her cohorts stole a van.  Ms. Fales took a ride in the van; 
however, she was not charged with any crime linked to the van, nor did she 
admit  having anything to do with 
its theft or destruction. 908 P.2d  at 412.  
Instead, Ms. Fales was charged with accessory before the fact to burglary 
and of burglary for her involvement in a crime spree at the local junior high 
school and the high school.  Id. at 407.  We determined the prerequisite of a 
sufficient relationship between Ms. Fales' criminal activity and the damage to 
the van did not exist and, therefore, the restitution order was improper.  Id. at 413.

[¶11]   In Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 
1992), we held the district court properly ordered Mr. Dreiman to pay 
restitution for the costs the victim incurred to change her locks which she did 
because he continually telephoned and contacted her.  We held Mr. Dreiman's admitted 
harassment was a substantial factor in causing the victim to purchase the new 
locks.

[¶12]   Costs related to surveillance 
equipment were allowed as restitution in a case involving burglary in State v. Smith, 831 P.2d 1082 (Wash. 
1992) (en banc).  There, Mr. Smith 
burglarized a bank and tripped three surveillance cameras which then 
photographed different areas of the bank.  
The bank incurred costs for the use of technicians who worked on the 
cameras and for the development and replacement of the film. 831 P.2d  at 
1083.  The court ordered Mr. Smith 
to pay restitution to the bank for those costs.  The applicable statute required in 
pertinent part:  "Restitution 
ordered by a court pursuant to a criminal conviction shall be based on easily 
ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of property.'"  Id. at 1084 (quoting former RCW 
9.94A.142(1)).  The Washington 
Supreme Court held the funds spent by the bank were "property" that was lost as 
a direct result of the crime and, therefore, the award of restitution was 
proper.  Id.  In that situation, Mr. Smith's criminal 
conductburglarywas a proximate cause of the costs incurred to investigate the 
crime.  

[¶13]   In this case, the district court 
found a sufficient relationship between Mr. Alcaraz's criminal conduct and the 
store owner's purchase of the surveillance equipment.  The store owner testified that, had Mr. 
Alcaraz not been stealing, the store would not have purchased the surveillance 
equipment.  While we defer to the 
district court's finding of fact concerning proximate cause, its decision to 
award the total cost of the surveillance system disregards the fact that the 
benefits of the surveillance equipment will inure to the store owner long after 
the equipment was used to apprehend Mr. Alcaraz. 

[¶14]   "The stated goal of the damages 
remedy is compensation of the plaintiff for legally recognized losses."  Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies ch. 
3, § 3.1 at 281 (2d ed. 1993).  This 
means the store owner should be fully indemnified for his loss but he should not 
receive a windfall.  Id.  The store owner admitted the 
surveillance equipment would be used after the individual stealing money was 
apprehended and its continued benefit was another reason why he purchased the 
equipment.  Overcompensation is 
undesirable not only because it is unjust but also because it provides the wrong 
incentives to both parties.  Id. 
at § 3.3(7).

[¶15]   The goal in awarding damages is to 
make the injured party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure an 
injury in terms of money.  22 Am. 
Jur. 2d Damages § 26 (1988).  This occurs when the victim is in the 
same financial position he would have been in had the wrong not been 
committed.  Id.  We have said, "In computing damages, 
the primary objective [is] to determine the amount of loss, applying whatever 
rule is best suited to that purpose.'"  
Cross, 7 P.3d  at 933 (quoting 
O's Gold Seed Company v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 
761 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 1988)). 

[¶16]   The store owner could not have 
recovered the full cost of the entire system from Mr. Alcaraz in a civil action 
and, therefore, cannot be awarded that amount as restitution.  The store owner incurred certain costs 
in recovering the stolen money including the purchase price of the surveillance 
equipment.  However, that total 
purchase price must be reduced in consideration of the value the system will 
provide to the store owner over its useful life.  The law will not put a victim in a 
better position than he would have been in had the wrong not been done.  22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 27 (1988). The measurement of 
loss is not an exact science.  Under 
these circumstances, the district court should allocate to Mr. Alcaraz a 
reasonable proportion of the cost of the purchase and operation of the 
surveillance equipment used to apprehend him, considering all factors including 
the equipment's expected useful life and depreciation.  We conclude the district court abused 
its discretion in ordering the entire purchase price of the equipment as 
restitution and remand for an evidentiary determination of the proper amount 
under the standard herein set forth.  

[¶17]   Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1The victim requested $5,614.95 in 
restitution for the surveillance equipment.  Both parties agree the additional $2.40 
ordered by the district court was a mistake.