Case Title: State v. Armstrong

Citation: 103 Ariz. 174, 438 P.2d 411

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1968-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
103 Ariz. 174 (1968) 438 P.2d 411 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John L. ARMSTRONG, Appellant. No. 1546. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. March 6, 1968. *175 Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., James S. Tegart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Chris T. Johnson, Phoenix, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Justice. This criminal appeal is from a conviction for the crime of robbery with a prior conviction. Since the matters raised have been repeatedly passed upon by this Court, they will be, in the main, disposed of summarily. Appellant urges that he was not assigned counsel prior to his preliminary examination. As to this, we have held that unless there is a showing of prejudice, there is no error. State v. Smith, 99 Ariz. 106, 407 P.2d 74; State v. Mangrum, 98 Ariz. 279, 403 P.2d 925. Appellant urges that the assistant county attorney committed prejudicial error in his argument to the jury. This claim arises out of the fact that appellant had a co-defendant who entered a plea of guilty and was given five years probation. Defense counsel told the jury: In reply, the assistant county attorney stated: We do not countenance either party to a lawsuit alluding to matters which do not appear in evidence as part of the record, but we have held repeatedly that remarks invited by a defense attorney will not ordinarily be considered as reversible error. State v. Jackson, 100 Ariz. 91, 412 P.2d 36; State v. Gortarez, 98 Ariz. 160, 402 P.2d 992. The appellant complains of the testimony of a police officer, viz.: Defense counsel did not object to the testimony at the time of the trial nor was it presented to the lower court on a motion for new trial. We have repeatedly held that matters which were not raised in the lower court will not be considered as grounds for reversal in this Court. State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 407 P.2d 59, cert. denied 384 U.S. 979, 86 S. Ct. 1878, 16 L. Ed. 2d 689; State v. Evans, 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P.2d 1106. Notwithstanding, it is clear that this testimony constitutes either an admission or confession, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, and as such is controlled by the decision in State v. Owen, 96 Ariz. 274, 394 P.2d 206. See also *176 State v. Goodyear, 100 Ariz. 244, 413 P.2d 566. The voluntariness must be resolved by the trial court outside the presence of the jury. The cause will be remanded for a determination of voluntariness in accordance with our decision in State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2, 401 P.2d 404. Appellant was charged in the information with being convicted in the County of Maricopa, State of Arizona, on August 24, 1960, of the offense of "Drawing Check on No Account, a felony." At his arraignment, he denied the prior conviction, pleading not guilty to the charge. During the trial, appellant took the stand and testified in response to questions from his counsel: On cross-examination appellant enlarged somewhat on his testimony: Thereafter, the court took the view that, having admitted the prior conviction from the witness stand, it was unnecessary to submit the matter to the jury and, consequently entered judgment that the appellant had been previously convicted of a felony. By A.R.S. § 13-1649, there is increased punishment for a second conviction of a felony in this instance, because the offense of robbery is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding five years, by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than ten years. By Rule 180, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., a defendant who is charged with a previous conviction is required to answer at his arraignment whether he has been so previously convicted. If he answers that he has, the answer is conclusive of the previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings. If he answers that he has not, the question whether he has shall be tried to the jury. A little over a year ago we resolved the question now raised, stating that an admission on cross-examination is surely the strongest evidence available to prove a prior conviction. State v. Seymour, 101 Ariz. 498, 421 P.2d 517. And we cited to the overwhelming weight of authority holding that a prior conviction may be established by a defendant's own testimony. We did not cite the comparatively recent case of Beard v. State, 216 Md. 302, 140 A.2d 672 (1958), whose language we consider particularly appropriate, from which we quote at length: Our attention has been directed to the case of State v. Furth, 5 Wash. 2d 1, 104 P.2d 925. There, the defendant's request for trial by jury on a charge of being an habitual criminal was denied. The court, undertaking to determine the fact without a jury, found that defendant was an habitual criminal on evidence which did not include admissions by defendant. We agree with the Washington Court in its conclusion that the state constitution's provision guaranteeing the right of trial by jury was violated, but we do not think that is authority against the effect of the judicial admission in this case. Judgment affirmed except insofar as it relates to the voluntariness of appellant's confessions and as to that remanded to the superior court for appropriate action. McFARLAND, C.J., and UDALL, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur. BERNSTEIN, Justice (dissenting). I dissent from the majority opinion because of the cavalier manner in which they dispose of the right to trial by jury in this case. The issue presented is whether the trial court properly withdrew from the jury's consideration the question of whether the appellant had suffered a prior felony conviction. Certainly the rule of stare decisis is entitled to great weight and should be adhered to unless the reason for the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decisions are clearly erroneous and manifestly wrong. The doctrine is a flexible one. Stare decisis is indeed persuasive but it is not an iron chain always leading to a necessary conclusion. Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv. L.Rev. 409; White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 358 P.2d 712. In the instant case the trial court was of the opinion that since the appellant had generally admitted a prior conviction (not necessarily a felony) while on the witness stand it was therefore unnecessary to submit this issue to the jury. Consequently, the court dismissed the jury and entered a judgment that appellant had been convicted of the prior felony charged in the information. In my opinion it was error for the trial court to take the question of the prior conviction away from the jury. Aside from the appellant's own testimony in this case no other evidence of prior conviction was before the court and jury prior to the jury verdict. The court passed judgment on the verdict of guilty of the crime of robbery and thereafter directed the jury to return on the following morning as "there is another issue to be submitted for their (sic) decision." The minutes of the court show: The trial court's minutes on date of sentencing, June 11, 1964 recite "(Defendant convicted by jury of ROBBERY, a felony) (Defendant convicted by Court of prior conviction)." (Emphasis added.) The court under the authority of A.R.S. § 13-1649[1] thereafter sentenced appellant for a period of not less than fifteen years nor more than twenty years. It is true, as the majority states, that in State v. Seymour, 101 Ariz. 498, 421 P.2d 517, we attempted to resolve the question of whether it is necessary for the jury to make a determination of prior conviction where the defendant generally admits a conviction while on the witness stand. In Seymour, supra, this court concluded that Rules 180 and 291, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., must be read in pari materia. I agreed then and I do now with this statement. However, a review of the legislative history, analyzed below, will show that reading these two rules together leads to a result directly contrary to this court's holdings in Seymour, supra, and the instant case. Rule 180, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. provides: In State v. Seymour, 101 Ariz. 498, 501, 421 P.2d 517, 520 we said: A simple tracing of the legislative history of Rule 291 will show that like Rule 180 it finds its origin in the Penal Code of California. See West's Ann.Cal. Code, Penal, § 1158. The Arizona Penal Code of 1887 set out below dealt with prior conviction § 1714.[2] The language "unless the defendant admits the prior conviction" in Rule 291, read "unless the answer of the defendant admits the charge" in § 1714 P.C. 1887. (Emphasis added.) As was said in State v. Seymour, supra, the legislature intended that the two sections be read in pari materia. The language "unless the answer of defendant" continues through all revisions of our codes from the Penal Code of 1887 until the 1939 Annotated Code. Rule 291 does not appear in the Arizona Code Annotated 1939, since it was deemed by the compiler to have been superceded by § 44-1913[3] which inferentially abolished special verdicts. In promulgating Rule 291 apparently this court felt it would be read with reference to Rule 180 and thereby sought to simplify its language by removing the redundant language: "* * * the answer of * *". As a matter of statutory construction where a previously existing law is carried forward it will be presumed to be the same in legal effect as to its original form, even though the language is changed, unless it appears unmistakably that it was intended to change the meaning. State ex rel. Conway v. Glenn, 60 Ariz. 22, 131 P.2d 363; Peterson v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co., 56 Ariz. 231, 107 P.2d 205. Under this interpretation of Rule 291 and for the further reasons set out below State v. Seymour, supra, should be overruled. "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government." Ariz.Const. Art. 2, § 1, A.R.S. One of the most sacred and fundamental principles of our system of law is the right to trial by jury; and it "shall remain inviolate." Ariz.Const. Art. 2, § 23. This court should see that it does so remain. *180 In Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 141 P. 841 we said that Art. 2, § 23, "does not give the right to a trial by jury, but its purpose is to guarantee the preservation of the right * * * as it existed when the Constitution was adopted." In Brown v. Greer, supra, we pointed out that the law in force when the Constitution was adopted contained paragraph 1389, R.S. Arizona 1901 which provided: In granting a new trial "in order that such right may not be denied him" this court said: In like manner we today cannot ignore the fact that Rules 180 and 291 existed when the Constitution was adopted as § 887 and § 973 respectively in P.C. 1901 and are therefore inviolately preserved and guaranteed under Art. 2, § 23. Brown v. Greer, supra, has been the leading case on the provisions of this constitutionally guaranteed right, and has been consistently followed. Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479, 16 A.L.R.3d 1362; State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 397 P.2d 217. In Rothweiler, supra, we expanded the right to trial by jury as interpreted by Brown v. Greer, to include some crimes not known to the common law, such as a charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In holding that a charge of this nature was triable by jury, this court said: Surely here "the severity of the penalty" is much more harsh under A.R.S. § 13-1649, which provides increased punishment for prior conviction, and appellant's right to a trial by jury under a charge of prior conviction is a constitutionally protected inviolate right. The Supreme Court of Washington faced with a similar problem said: Fundamentally, a jury is the finder of facts; and "[j]udges shall not charge juries *181 with respect to matters of fact nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law." Ariz.Const. Art. 6, § 12. When the defendant, Armstrong, at arraignment answered in denial as to the prior conviction, an issue of fact was created which must be tried as any other issue of fact by the jury. Rule 180, supra. Rule 180 like 291 finds its origins in § 44-1004 C. '39, and its predecessors dating back through § 887 P.C. '01 to § 1556 P.C. 1887.[4] Its language, substantively unchanged, was adopted from California. See West's Ann.Pen.Code § 1025 (the California statute was originally passed in 1873-74). When the early legislature adopted § 1556, now Rule 180 as to prior convictions, they required this to be a question for the jury because the fact determination goes to the very essence of a man's substantive rights his liberty. At his arraignment an accused may waive jury, plead guilty and admit to prior convictions; in which case a jury is not necessary and the court may properly pass judgment and sentence upon the plea. But if the defendant does not waive trial by jury, pleads not guilty and denies prior conviction then the question of his guilt and prior conviction must be determined by the jury. In this case the state introduced no evidence of prior conviction to the jury. The fact that defendant admitted from the witness stand, in answer to his own counsel's questions, that he had been convicted of other charges does not constitute a withdrawal of his answer in denial or an admission of the specific[5] prior conviction charged in the information, or the presumption of innocence that accompanies him throughout the trial. When the defendant answered in denial at arraignment the prior conviction charged in the information it was in effect a plea of not guilty. In Pruitt v. State, 37 Ariz. 400, 294 P. 629 the defendant was charged with robbery. He entered a plea of not guilty. During the course of the trial defense counsel in a statement to the jury admitted guilt, and the court thereafter instructed the jury "* * * I shall, therefore, not submit to you for your consideration the question of his being not guilty * * *". In reversing and ordering a new trial we noted that this was an obvious peremptory instruction to the jury to find the defendant guilty, and we said: The state has the burden of proving all the material elements in the charge including prior conviction, beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appellant is clothed with the presumption of innocence as to the material facts of prior conviction just as he is as to all other material facts of the charged crime. State v. Pennye, 102 Ariz. 207, 427 P.2d 525. See also State v. Miles, 3 Ariz. App. 377, 414 P.2d 765; People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 77 N.E.2d 812, 11 A.L.R.2d 865. The majority of this court relies heavily on the Maryland case of Beard v. State, 216 Md. 302, 140 A.2d 672, to support its position in reaffirming its decision in State v. Seymour, supra. However, there are certain crucial differences between the Maryland case and the case at hand which must be noted. First, Maryland has no provisions at all similar to our Rules 180 and 291. Second, that portion of Beard v. State, supra, quoted by the majority has little weight, if at all, in light of the following language not quoted by the majority: Consequently, it is obvious that the Maryland court disposed of the issue of prior conviction by a determination that the general verdict of guilty included within it a finding by the jury of a prior conviction. I believe that State v. Seymour, supra, was incorrectly decided and therefore should be overruled. The sentence heretofore entered should be vacated for the reasons set forth above. The trial court should resentence the defendant on the robbery conviction alone in the event this case is affirmed after a hearing on the issue of voluntariness. [1] Increased punishment for subsequent conviction; prior conviction within state "A. A person who, having been previously convicted for * * * any offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, commits any crime after such conviction, shall be punished upon conviction of such subsequent offense as follows: "1. If for an offense punishable for a first conviction by imprisonment for a term exceeding five years, by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than ten years." [2] "1714. (Sec. 1714). Whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged in an indictment, the jury, if they find a verdict of guilty of the offense with which he is charged, must also unless the answer of the defendant admits the charge find whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction. The verdict of the jury upon a charge of previous conviction may be: `We find the charge of previous conviction true,' or, `We find the charge of previous conviction not true,' as they find that the defendant has or has not suffered such conviction." (Emphasis added.) [3] "44-1913. Verdict may be general or special. The jurors shall in all cases render a general verdict, except as provided in section 337 [§ 44-1916]" ... § 337 [44-1916] reads as follows: "44-1916. Acquittal because of insanity Form of verdict. If the jurors acquit the defendant on the ground that he was insane or mentally defective at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged their verdict shall so state." [4] "1556. (Sec. 1556). When a defendant, who is charged in the indictment or information with having suffered a previous conviction, pleads either guilty or not guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he must be asked whether he has suffered such previous conviction. If he answers that he has, his answers shall be entered by the clerk in the minutes of the court, and shall, unless withdrawn by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having suffered such previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings. If he answers that he has not, his answer shall be entered by the clerk in the minutes of the court, and the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction shall be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of `not guilty,' or in case of a plea of `guilty,' by a jury impaneled for that purpose. The refusal of the defendant to answer is equivalent to a denial that he has suffered such previous conviction. In case the defendant pleads `not guilty,' and answers that he has suffered the previous conviction, the charge of the previous conviction shall not be read to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial." [5] The Information charged that appellant had been "on August 24, 1960, in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, convicted of the offense of drawing check on No Account, a felony, Cause No. 36463, Section 13-1649, A.R.S. 1956." The State, however, never proved the specific offense charged in the Information.