Case Title: FISCUS v BEARTOOTH ELECTRIC COOP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14301 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA CLAYTON R . FISCUS, Plaintiff and Appellant, BEARTOOTH ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana Richard Anderson argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hutton and Cromley, Billings, Montana Brent Cromley argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: December 12, 1978 Decided: 2 ' 1g71 Filed: FEE - !:7q M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Plaintiff-appellant, Clayton R. Fiscus, brings t h i s matter t o t h i s Court, asking t h a t , because t h e holding i n Fiscus v. Beartooth E l e c t r i c (1974), 164 Mont. 319, 522 P.2d 87, has been overruled by Piper v. Lockwood Water Users Ass'n (1978), Mont. - , 573 P.2d 646, 35 St.Rep. 9, 13, t h a t he now be given h i s day i n court. The immediate events giving rise t o t h i s appeal a r e a s follows. O n June 10, 1974, pursuant t o t h i s Court's decision rendered i n Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric, supra, t h e D i s - t r i c t Court entered summary judgment i n favor of Beartooth and a g a i n s t Fiscus. The case lay dormant on its thus dismissed s t a t u s u n t i l February 3, 1978, when Fiscus moved t o vacate the judgment and dismissal. B r i e f s w e r e f i l e d f o r and against t h e motion i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h e Honorable Charles Luedke pre- siding. The court made no r u l i n g on t h e motion, and on March 30, 1978, Fiscus' motion became "deemed denied" under Rule 59(d) and (g) , M.R.Civ.P. Fiscus then f i l e d t h i s appeal. For t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n , see Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec- tric, supra. The i s s u e a t t h i s point is a narrow procedural one, namely, whether t h e doctrine of e i t h e r "law of t h e case" o r res judicata bars appellant from pursuing a claim against Beartooth E l e c t r i c . Appellant argues t h a t he has never had h i s claim ad- judicated and t h a t he has never been i n court t o have such made, on t h e m e r i t s , t h e f a c t u a l and t h e l e g a l determina- t i o n s of t h e case. H e argues t h a t he has been procedurally barred by order of t h i s Court dated 1974. Appellant acknowledges t h a t " t h e law of the case" and res judicata a r e t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s generally applicable t o bar those attempts by a d i s s a t i s f i e d l i t i g a n t t o reopen a matter which has been decided. H e argues t h a t a l l general r u l e s , however, have t h e i r exceptions, and t h a t under t h e circumstances of t h i s case, they should be allowed under t h e exception of t h e general r u l e . Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed., 1968), defines res judicata thus: "A matter adjudged; a thing j u d i c i a l l y acted upon o r decided; a thing o r matter s e t t l e d by judgment . . . Rule t h a t f i n a l judgment o r de- cree on m e r i t s by c o u r t of competent jurisdic- t i o n is conclusive of r i g h t s of p a r t i e s o r t h e i r p r i v i e s i n a l l l a t e r s u i t s on p o i n t s and matters determined i n former s u i t . . . And t o be applicable, r e q u i r e s i d e n t i t y i n thing sued f o r as w e l l as i d e n t i t y of cause of a c t i o n , of persons and p a r t i e s t o action, and of q u a l i t y i n persons f o r o r a g a i n s t whom c l a i m is made . . . The sum and substance of t h e whole r u l e i s t h a t a matter once j u d i c i a l l y decided i s f i n a l l y decided . . ." I n Western Montana Production C r e d i t Ass'n v. Hydro- ponics, Inc. (1966), 147 Mont. 157, 161, 410 P.2d 937, 939, t h i s Court, c i t i n g Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e , said: "'The t e r m res judicata i s o f t e n used t o denote two things i n r e s p e c t t o t h e e f f e c t of a v a l i d , f i n a l judgment: (1) t h a t such judgment, when rendered on t h e merits, i s an absolute bar t o a subsequent a c t i o n , between t h e same p a r t i e s o r those i n p r i v i t y with them, upon t h e same c l a i m o r demand; and ( 2 ) t h a t such a judg- ment c o n s t i t u t e s an estoppel, between t h e same p a r t i e s o r those i n p r i v i t y with them, as t o matters t h a t w e r e necessarily l i t i g a t e d and determined although t h e claim o r demand i n t h e subsequent a c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t . Under t h e f i r s t proposition t h e judgment operates a s a bar * * *. Under t h e second proposition t h e judgment prevents t h e p a r t i e s from r e l i t i g a t i n g only those matters t h a t were determined.' 1-B Moore F.P. 621-622, S 0.405. "The f i r s t proposition is properly c a l l e d res judicata while t h e second i s c a l l e d c o l l a t e r a l estoppel. " A s t o t h e concept "law of t h e case", Black's d e f i n i t i o n includes t h e following: "The decision, judgment, opinion o r r u l i n g s on former appeal o r w r i t of e r r o r become ' l a w of t h e case. ' . . . "The d o c t r i n e expresses p r a c t i c e of c o u r t s generally t o r e f u s e t o reopen what has been de- cided . . . [ I l t expresses t h e r u l e t h a t f i n a l judgment of highest c o u r t i s f i n a l determination of p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s . . . "The d o c t r i n e is generally deemed applicable whether former determination i s r i g h t o r wrong. . . . But some cases hold t h a t d o c t r i n e is inapplicable where p r i o r decision i s unsound, . . . o r i n c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s w e r e announced o r mistake of f a c t w a s made on f i r s t appeal 1 1 . . . "Law of t h e case" has been explained by t h e Montana Court thus: "'The r u l e i s w e l l established and long adhered t o i n t h i s state t h a t where, upon an appeal, t h e Supreme Court, i n deciding a case presented states i n its opinion a p r i n c i p l e o r r u l e of l a w necessary t o t h e decision, such pronouncement becomes t h e l a w of t h e case, and must be adhered t o throughout i t s subsequent progress, both i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t and upon subsequent appeal; and t h i s , although upon i t s subsequent consideration t h e Supreme Court may be c l e a r l y of opinion t h a t t h e former decision i s erroneous. * * * it is a f i n a l adjudication from t h e consequences of which t h i s c o u r t may n o t d e p a r t , nor t h e p a r t i e s r e l i e v e themselves ( c i t i n g cases).' Carlson v. Northern Pac.R.Co., 86 Mont. 78, 281 Pac. 913, 914. "'Whether t h e opinion is r i g h t o r wrong, it is t h e law of t h e case, was binding upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and i s binding upon us.' Anderson v. Border, 87 Mont. 4 , 285 Pac. 174, 176." Apple v. Edwards (1949), 123 Mont. 135, 139-40, 2 1 1 P.2d 138, 140. I n contravention of t h e r i g i d standards a r t i c u l a t e d above, appellant cites t h e c o u r t t o Perkins v. K r a m e r (1948) , 1 2 1 Mont. 595, 600, 198 P.2d 475, 477, f o r t h e following p e r t i n e n t language: "The d o c t r i n e of res judicata, i f applicable, does n o t prevent t h e c o u r t from c o r r e c t i n g mani- f e s t e r r o r i n its former judgment. Thus i n Cluff v. Day, 1 4 1 N.Y. 580, 36 N.E. 182, 183, t h e c o u r t said: 'There i s no i r o n r u l e which precludes a c o u r t from c o r r e c t i n g a manifest e r r o r i n i t s former judgment, o r which r e q u i r e s it t o adhere t o an unsound d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e law. I t may, f o r cogent reasons, r e v e r s e o r q u a l i f y a p r i o r d e c i s i o n , even i n t h e same case. But t h e c a s e s i n which t h i s w i l l be done a r e exceptional, and t h e power should be sparingly exercised.' "When t h e p r i o r d e c i s i o n is by a divided c o u r t , a s here, . . . t h e c o u r t w i l l t h e more r e a d i l y d e p a r t from it, i f erroneous. [ C i t a t i o n omitted.]" I n Perkins, t h e defendants contended t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s precluded from maintaining h i s a c t i o n , because of t h e holding i n a previous case, which was described a s being "an appeal from t h e judgment entered i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t a f t e r r e v e r s a l " by t h e s t a t e Supreme Court. 121 Mont. a t 597-98, 198 P.2d a t 476. The Court acknowledged t h a t t h e question presented t h e r e w a s t h e same a s t h a t presented before, but s a i d t h a t it had n o t precluded p l a i n t i f f from r e l i e f i n t h e e a r l i e r case. 1 2 1 Mont. a t 598, 198 P.2d a t 476. Appellant a l s o d i r e c t s our a t t e n t i o n t o a r e c e n t c a s e of t h i s Court, S t a t e v. Zimmerman (1977), - Mont. I 573 P.2d 174, 34 St.Rep. 1561. W e b e l i e v e t h a t he does s o i n c o r r e c t l y because t h e above case i s a criminal m a t t e r and t h e p r i n c i p l e s applying t h e r e t o cannot always be conveyed s t r a i g h t a c r o s s t h e board and applied t o a c i v i l proceeding. The problem t h e r e involved r e l a t e d t o double jeopardy, a l e g a l concept decidedly a p p l i c a b l e t o criminal cases only. While w e c i t e d a number of c i v i l cases i n Zimmerman, i n our b r i e f discussion of t h e "law of t h e case", r e l y i n g on Zimmerman i s i n t h i s c a s e i l l - a d v i s e d . The r e c i t a t i o n i n those c a s e s concerning t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e exception t o t h e general r u l e i s opposite t o t h i s case. The exception i s t h a t t h e general r u l e w i l l n o t be applied i n those cases where r e v e r s a l w a s based on an unrelated matter. Here t h e i s s u e is n o t unrelated. Thus t h e exception should not apply W e f i n d t h a t Perkins i s c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s case and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n i t s r u l i n g . Next a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of access t o t h e c o u r t s has been denied him. 1889 Mont. Const., A r t . 111, 5 6, i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e t h a t he suffered h i s i n j u r i e s . However, he does not develop t h i s claim with case l a w o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t y and w e f i n d no m e r i t t o it. Recognizing t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n i n t h i s appeal i s probably d e f e c t i v e under t h e Montana law on t h e " r u l e of t h e case" a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t under f e d e r a l decisions i n t e r p r e t i n g Rule 60(b), which i s i d e n t i c a l t o Montana's Rule 6 0 ( b ) , d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n s of t h e case could be a r r i v e d a t . Appel- l a n t , i n support of h i s argument, cites a number of f e d e r a l cases, which we w i l l discuss individually i n t h i s opinion. Klapprott v. United S t a t e s (1949), 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.ed. 266, is a n a t u r a l i z a t i o n case and does n o t i n our opinion m e e t t h e s i t u a t i o n here where an appel- l a t e c o u r t overruled a l a t e r decision. There t h e c o u r t simply held t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f had been s o e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y victimized by t h e government t h a t t h e f e d e r a l r u l e 60(b) (6) would be invoked t o cure t h a t outrage where t h e government had f a i l e d t o provide evidence required i n a matter of l a w i n t h e denaturalization process. There i s no question t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f came under and deserved t o come under ~ u l e 60 (b) (6) . This i s n o t a case t h a t supports t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n here which is whether t o change t h e decisional l a w s e v e r a l years a f t e r a f i n a l judgment was entered a g a i n s t him and whether t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a p r e r e q u i s i t e of "any o t h e r reason j u s t i f y i n g r e l e a s e from judgment". Appellant next c i t e s Ackermann v. United S t a t e s (1950), 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.ed. 207. This c a s e l i k e Klapprott s t a n d s f o r t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t only i n an e x t r a - ordinary c a s e should Rule 60(b) be granted. There i s con- s i d e r a b l e a u t h o r i t y holding t h a t when a d e c i s i o n is l a t e r overruled by a c o u r t , t h a t it i s n o t "extraordinary" as contemplated i n Klapprott. W e do n o t f i n d t h a t i n t h e c a s e c i t e d , Ackermann, i s a u t h o r i t y f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . The n e x t case c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t i n support of h i s p o s i t i o n i s Tsakonites v. Transpacific C a r r i e r s Corp. (S.D. N.Y. 1970), 322 F.Supp. 722, which comes t h e c l o s e s t t o a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n here. However it i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n our opinion from t h e Montana "law of t h e case" d o c t r i n e because t h e r e never would have been a Tsakonites c a s e except f o r t h e f a c t t h a t sometimes various c i r c u i t s have c o n f l i c t - i n g holdings as they r e l a t e t o s p e c i f i c i s s u e s of l a w . It i s i n those s i t u a t i o n s t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i s more w i l l i n g and u s u a l l y w i l l g r a n t c e r t i o r a r i f o r t h e purpose of resolving t h e c o n f l i c t by announcing a f i n a l r u l e t o be uniformly applied t o a l l t e n c i r c u i t s . This, of course, is one of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e f e d e r a l system and our s t a t e j u d i c i a l system i n t h a t t h e r e t h e r e a r e intermediate c o u r t s of appeal while here t h e Supreme Court i s t h e c o u r t of appeals i n t h e r u l i n g s i n t h e D i s t r i c t Courts. H e r e we have no intermediate c o u r t s of appeal and when t h i s Court renders a d e c i s i o n on a l e g a l i s s u e , t h a t i s and should be t h e end of t h e matter. I n Tsakonites t h e a p p e l l a n t had attempted t o go t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n 1967 following an adverse r e s u l t i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t of t h e Court of Appeals. However, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court denied h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i and thus d i d n o t hear, consider and r u l e upon t h e i s s u e which caused him t o l o s e below, t h e i s s u e t h e r e r e l a t i n g t o whether h i s maritime employer had s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s with America t o come under t h e Jones A c t . It was n o t u n t i l Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis (1970), 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L Ed 2d 252, reh. denied, 400 U.S. 856, t h a t t h e Supreme Court r u l e d upon t h e very i s s u e it had declined t o i s s u e i n i t s earlier opinion i n Tsakonites. The c r i t i c a l f a c t o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Tsakonites from t h e Hellenic Lines c a s e and t h i s appeal i s t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court d i d n o t o v e r r u l e a previous d e c i s i o n of i t s own. I t had n o t r u l e d as w e have i n t h i s case, b u t chose t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r Tsakonites i n t h e Hellenic Lines c a s e t o consider t h e matter and r e s o l v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s of t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t s on t h e i s s u e t h a t Tsakonites and Hellenic Lines had before them i n 1967. This case, however, a s it relates t o t h e Supreme Court t h a t issued it, i s without any d i r e c t i v e from o t h e r c o u r t s , as i n t h e f e d e r a l system. For t h a t reason w e think it i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Appellant next cites t h e G r i f f i n v. S t a t e Board of Education (E.D. Va. 1969), 296 F.Supp. 1178, case, which involved t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e V i r g i n i a t u i t i o n g r a n t laws, a d e n i a l of t h e equal p r o t e c t i o n clause. This deci- s i o n , w e f i n d , supports t h e respondent i n t h i s m a t t e r i n view of t h e f a c t while t h e r e w a s a change i n t h e d e c i s i o n a l l a w it was made prospectively and operated t o preserve t h e r u l i n g i n 1955 and t h e l a w of t h e c a s e being a p p l i c a b l e up through 1969. Respondent c i t e s a number of f e d e r a l cases i n support of its position, two of which w e think a r e of import f o r discussion. T i t l e v. United S t a t e s (9th C i r . 1959), 263 F.2d 28, c e r t . denied 359 U.S. 989, reh. denied, 360 U.S. 914, a case where M r . T i t l e whose appeal had been dismissed i n 1956 moved t o reopen h i s case i n 1958, and asked t h e court, a s i n t h i s case, t o invoke Rule 60 a t the expense of t h e "law of the case". There t h e c o u r t said: "Appellant recognizes t h a t t h e r e a r e reasons of public policy f o r assuring t h e f i n a l i t y of judgments, but suggests t h a t under r u l e 60 (b) (5) , Fed.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., a s p e c i a l r u l e should be adopted i n denaturalization cases relaxing t h e s t r i c t n e s s of t h e ordinary r u l e . I n support of t h i s , appellant r e f e r s t o t h e language of t h e dissenting J u s t i c e s i n Ackermann v. United S t a t e s , 1950, 340 U.S. 193, 202, 7 1 S . C t . 209, 95 L.Ed. 270. W e a r e , of course, bound by t h e majority opinion i n Ackermann, j u s t a s we a r e i n Zucca. Rule 60(b) was not intended t o provide r e l i e f f o r e r r o r on t h e p a r t of t h e court o r t o afford a sub- s t i t u t e f o r appeal. [Citations omitted.] Nor is a change i n t h e j u d i c i a l view of applicable law a f t e r a f i n a l judgment s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r va- c a t i n g such judgment entered before announcement of t h e change. [Citations omitted.]" 263 F.2d a t 31. This Ninth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals case c l e a r l y recognizes t h a t post-judgment change i n decisional l a w affords no avenue f o r reopening judgments. It is a recognition of t h e "law of t h e case" doctrine which is t h e law i n Montana. The second case w e consider t h a t respondent c i t e d is Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, (1st C i r . 1972), 453 F.2d 645. This case involved a d r a f t e e who had secured a permanent injunction a g a i n s t induction. After precedential support f o r t h e injunction was removed, t h e government moved f o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e injunction. The D i s t r i c t Court provided r e l i e f f o r t h e government, but t h e F i r s t C i r c u i t Court of Appeals reversed on t h e "law of t h e case" grounds. I n s o holding under Rule 60 it noted t h a t it would n o t allow t h e vacation of a judgment g r a n t i n g t h e i n j u n c t i o n s t a t i n g : "TO hold otherwise would destroy t h e c e r t a i n t y which allows controversies t o be deemed judi- c i a l l y concluded . . . " ' I t should be noted t h a t while 60 (b) ( 5) au- thorized r e l i e f from a judgment on t h e grounds t h a t a p r i o r judgment upon which it is based has been reversed o r otherwise vacated, it does n o t a u t h o r i z e r e l i e f from a judgment on t h e ground t h a t t h e law applied by t h e c o u r t i n making i t s adjudication has been subsequently overruled o r declared erroneous i n another and unrelated proceeding.' 7 Moore's Federal Prac- t i c e 1160.26[3] a t 3 2 5 . " 453 F.2d a t 650. (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) These cases show t h a t t h e r e i s ample support i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s t h a t they f e e l bound by t h e "law of t h e case" and t h a t when a d e c i s i o n a l l a w change occurs, subsequent t o f i n a l judgment i n a p a r t i c u l a r case, t h e "law of t h e case" i s t h a t f i n a l judgment should not be a l t e r e d . The judgment o f t h e District Court is affirmed and t h e appeal is dismissed. W e concur: 8 Honorable R. D. McPhillips, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy.