Case Title: Abdool v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC14-582, SC14-2039

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-582 
____________ 
 
DANE PATRICK ABDOOL, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-2039 
____________ 
 
DANE PATRICK ABDOOL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[April 6, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Dane Patrick Abdool appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his 
conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851, and he also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
 
 
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corpus.1  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of Abdool’s 
postconviction guilt phase claims and deny his guilt phase habeas claim, but we 
vacate his death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The facts of this case were fully set out in this Court’s opinion on direct 
appeal.  See Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208 (Fla. 2010).  Briefly, between the late-
evening hours of February 24, 2006, and the early-morning hours of February 25, 
2006, after the two engaged in consensual sex, 19-year-old Abdool drove 17-year-
old Amelia Sookdeo to a remote area, bound her with duct tape, doused her with 
gasoline, and set her on fire, causing her death.  Id. at 213-14.   
On February 19, 2008, after hearing the evidence summarized in this Court’s 
decision on direct appeal, including Abdool’s statement to police implicating 
himself in the victim’s death, testimony by others as to incriminatory statements 
Abdool had made to them before and after the victim’s murder, and physical and 
DNA evidence tying Abdool to the scene, Abdool’s jury found him guilty of first-
degree murder.  Id. at 212-14.  The next day, the penalty phase commenced, and as 
this Court explained in its decision on direct appeal, “the State presented the 
testimony of an expert medical witness who described for the jury the type of 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  Because we 
remand for a new penalty phase, we do not address Abdool’s penalty phase claims. 
 
 
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intense pain and suffering Amelia experienced before she died,” as well as victim 
impact statements from three of the victim’s family members.  Id. at 214. 
During the penalty phase, the defense presented testimony from several of 
Abdool’s relatives and friends, which established that “Abdool grew up in a faith-
based home with his mother and stepfather, who loved and cared for him and 
provided for his needs.”  Id.  As this Court stated in its opinion on direct appeal, 
“[i]t was clear from their testimonies that Abdool is well-liked by friends and 
acquaintances and much loved by his family.”  Id. 
In addition, the defense presented expert testimony from Nancy Cowardin, 
who “evaluated Abdool to determine his level of education.”  Id.  Ms. Cowardin 
testified that, while “Abdool’s IQ is in the normal range[,] he has attention deficit 
disorder, dyslexia, and a mild learning disability and that he reads and does math at 
the level of a ten- to eleven-year-old or someone who is in the sixth grade.”  Id. at 
215.  Ms. Cowardin further testified “that she could not make a connection 
between her conclusions regarding Abdool’s educational level and the crime, but 
that kids with learning disabilities can make social blunders and can ‘misthink 
things through.’ ”  Id. 
In addition to Ms. Cowardin, the defense presented expert testimony from 
Dr. Karen Gold, a clinical and forensic psychologist: 
Dr. Gold testified that she met with Abdool on three occasions and 
performed numerous tests and evaluations.  In relevant part, Dr. Gold 
 
 
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testified that Abdool is immature, is intellectually limited but not 
retarded, has attention deficit disorder, is hyperactive, has impulse 
control issues and obsessive compulsive disorder, is meticulous, and 
has grandiose delusions, and that his emotional age is younger than 
his actual age.  Dr. Gold also stated that Abdool knew right from 
wrong and that he was competent to stand trial. 
 
Id. 
 
 
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Daniel Tressler, a 
forensic psychologist, “who stated that in his opinion, Abdool did not have impulse 
control disorder[,] that there was no evidence that he was substantially impaired at 
the time of his offense,” and that “Abdool knew the difference between right and 
wrong.”  Id.  Dr. Tressler further “concluded that Abdool’s actions were not caused 
by any of his personality disorders.”  Id.  
 
Following the penalty phase presentation, the jury recommended death by a 
vote of ten to two.  Id.  After conducting a Spencer2 hearing, at which no additional 
evidence was presented, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and 
sentenced Abdool to death, finding that the aggravating circumstances3 outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances.4  Id. at 215-16.  
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
3.  The trial court found the heinous atrocious or cruel (HAC) and cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravators. 
 
4.  The trial court found four statutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) no 
significant history of prior criminal activity (moderate weight); (2) the capital 
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
 
 
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mental or emotional disturbance (little weight); (3) the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired (little weight); and (4) the age 
of the defendant (19) at the time of the crime (moderate weight).  It also found the 
following 48 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and afforded them very little to 
moderate weight: 
Abdool (1) voluntarily spoke with law enforcement officers (very 
little weight); (2) ultimately took responsibility for his actions (very 
little weight); (3) had a biological father who was an alcoholic (very 
little weight); (4) had a biological father who was a gambler (very 
little weight); (5) is hyperactive and has attention deficit disorder 
(little weight); (6) is developmentally delayed (moderate weight); (7) 
repeated the third grade (little weight); (8) was affected by his 
parent’s divorce (little weight); (9) moved to the United States at a 
young age (very little weight); (10) is estranged from his biological 
father (very little weight); (11) is intellectually dull (moderate 
weight); (12) was not placed in a special education class (little 
weight); (13) has arrested development and social skills (moderate 
weight); (14) is emotionally underage (moderate weight); (15) has 
islets of ability (very little weight); (16) was affected by having to 
repeat the ninth grade (very little weight); (17) is free from prejudice 
(very little weight); (18) was unable to successfully complete classes 
to obtain a GED (very little weight); (19) is a good student in welding 
(very little weight); (20) was Baker Acted after a 2004 automobile 
accident (very little weight); (21) moved in with his uncle temporarily 
due to family tension (very little weight); (22) suffers from obsessive 
compulsive disorder symptoms (little weight); (23) has features of 
borderline personality disorder (very little weight); (24) has grandiose 
delusions (very little weight); (25) suffers from impulse control 
disorder (very little weight); (26) has communication disorder features 
(very little weight); (27) is a good soccer player (very little weight); 
(28) has attention deficit disorder (little weight); (29) has learning 
disabilities (moderate weight); (30) suffers from dyslexia (very little 
weight); (31) has processing glitches (moderate weight); (32) 
functions on a fourth to sixth grade level (moderate weight); (33) 
misthinks things through (moderate weight); (34) has low self-esteem 
(very little weight); (35) was a poor student (moderate weight); (36) 
has the love and support of family (little weight); (37) was taunted by 
 
 
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On direct appeal,5 this Court affirmed Abdool’s conviction and death 
sentence.  Id. at 212.  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied 
Abdool’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  Abdool v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 149 (2011). 
                                          
 
other kids for being held back in school (very little weight); (38) 
suffered from depression (very little weight); (39) dropped out of high 
school (very little weight); (40) has a good relationship with siblings 
(very little weight); (41) is unable to function independently of his 
family (little weight); (42) suffers from separation anxiety disorder 
(little weight); (43) is a victim of racial bias (very little weight); (44) 
experiences feelings of inadequacy when compared to his younger 
brother (very little weight); (45) failed to pass the FCAT (very little 
weight); (46) is a responsible trusted employee (very little weight); 
(47) is a model inmate (very little weight); (48) demonstrated good 
behavior at trial (very little weight). 
Abdool, 53 So. 3d at 215 n.6. 
 
 
5.  Abdool raised the following claims on direct appeal:  
(A) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of 
acquittal because the evidence did not prove premeditation; (B) the 
trial court erred in allowing Detective Bobby Gammill to state his 
opinion on whether Amelia’s death was accidental; (C) the trial court 
erred by allowing the State to call the victim’s father because he 
presented no relevant evidence; (D) the trial court erred by ordering 
defense counsel to turn over the raw data used by its mental health 
expert prior to the penalty phase; (E) the prosecutor elicited improper, 
inflammatory, and irrelevant evidence during the penalty phase, 
rendering the proceeding unfair; (F) the victim impact evidence was 
irrelevant and prejudicial and denied Abdool due process; (G) the trial 
court improperly found CCP and failed to consider weighty 
mitigation; (H) the death sentence is not proportionate; and (I) 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring[ v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)].  In addition, [this Court] consider[ed] 
(J) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. 
Abdool, 53 So. 3d at 216 (footnote omitted). 
 
 
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In 2012, Abdool filed a motion for postconviction relief.  Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief on all claims.  Abdool appeals 
the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief and also petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  
II.  POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
A.  Ineffective Assistance During the Guilt Phase 
Abdool first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt 
phase for (1) failing to file a motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) failing 
to address the issues of racism and religious prejudice during jury selection; and 
(3) failing to consult and retain an independent arson expert.6  For the reasons 
below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief on these claims. 
(1)  Motion to Suppress 
Abdool first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt 
phase for failing to file a motion to suppress his statement to police, in which 
Abdool admitted responsibility for the victim’s death, and which the State also 
                                          
 
 
6.  In addition, Abdool argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue that the police violated his rights, as a Trinidadian National, under 
the Vienna Convention.  However, this claim is procedurally barred, as we have 
held it is properly raised on direct appeal.  See Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 
(Fla. 2011) (holding the defendant’s claim under the Vienna Convention “is 
procedurally barred because [he] could and should have raised it on direct 
appeal”). 
 
 
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used in support of its argument that the CCP and HAC aggravators applied to 
Abdool’s case.  Because Abdool has not established that he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s alleged deficiency, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim, 
without addressing whether trial counsel was deficient. 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has explained that, to prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy two requirements: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)). 
Regarding Strickland’s deficiency prong, there is a strong presumption that 
trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id.  The defendant bears the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
 
 
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‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  
Regarding the prejudice prong, “Strickland requires defendants to show 
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. . . .  [A] ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  
Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 621 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694).  
Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s 
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  Moreover, “when a defendant fails to make a 
showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a 
showing as to the other prong.”  Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 692 (Fla. 
2003) (quoting Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001)). 
Abdool has not established prejudice.  The evidence that Abdool committed 
first-degree murder is not limited to his statement to police or its alleged fruits 
(most notably a surveillance video showing Abdool purchasing some of the items 
used in the murder while the victim waited in his car).  Police linked tire tracks at 
 
 
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the scene to Abdool’s vehicle, found Abdool’s DNA on a glove at the scene, and 
discovered during their investigation that Abdool had suffered recent burns to his 
body.  Further, several witnesses testified to statements that Abdool made prior to 
the murder indicating that he intended to harm or kill the victim.  Then, after the 
murder, Abdool gave an account to a former coworker, which was consistent with 
his statement to police: 
[T]he coworker testified that Abdool told her that he and [the victim] 
were fighting, he kicked her out of the car, put duct tape on her to 
scare her, and she yelled at him to “do it, do it, do it.”  He said that 
[the victim] then gave him a lighter, which he only flicked to scare 
her, but that she came towards him and caught fire.  He also stated 
that “a person can only go so far, can only take so much.” 
Abdool, 53 So. 3d at 213-14. 
 
Just as Abdool’s statement and its alleged fruits are not the only support for 
his conviction, other evidence supports the application of the CCP and HAC 
aggravators in his case.  Abdool’s use of a gas can, duct tape, and gloves and his 
act of driving the victim to a remote location, coupled with the fact that “Abdool 
spoke of killing [the victim] several months before the murder,” id. at 223, are 
sufficient to support the CCP aggravator.  Likewise, HAC was established not just 
by Abdool’s statement to police that the victim ran around screaming after he set 
her on fire.  In addition, Abdool’s coworker’s testimony regarding his statement to 
her established that the victim was conscious when the fire started, and evidence 
presented at trial established the victim’s “lungs contained soot from inhaling her 
 
 
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own burning flesh, the pain she experienced from burning alive was immense, and 
experts testified that [she] could have remained conscious for seconds to a couple 
of minutes after she was set on fire.”  Id. at 225. 
 
Given this other evidence of Abdool’s guilt and in support of the CCP and 
HAC aggravators, Abdool has not established prejudice, namely a reasonable 
probability that he would have received a different result but for trial counsel’s 
alleged deficiency.  Our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.  See Henry, 
948 So. 2d at 621 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief on this claim. 
(2)  Jury Selection 
 
Abdool next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address 
the issues of racism and religious prejudice during voir dire because potential 
jurors might have assumed Abdool was Muslim and associated the victim’s 
burning death with Muslim religious practices.  We disagree because Abdool has 
not established deficiency or prejudice.  
As the circuit court found, trial counsel’s “decision not to inquire as to the 
potential jurors’ anti-Muslim bias was a reasonable one, as the evidence at trial 
established that Mr. Abdool was a Christian from Trinidad, making it clear to the 
jury that it was unlikely he was associated with Middle Eastern terrorism.”  See 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (“Counsel cannot be 
 
 
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deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial counsel’s 
strategic decisions.  Moreover, strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and 
counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”) 
(citations omitted).   
In any event, there is no prejudice.  As the circuit court concluded, Abdool’s 
claim that had trial counsel asked the right questions they could have uncovered 
juror bias toward Muslims (or perceived Muslims) is speculative since Abdool 
failed to establish that a biased juror actually served on the jury.  Rather, the one 
juror who asked about Abdool’s religious background during voir dire stated that 
he could give him a fair trial regardless of Abdool’s religion or race, and this juror 
did not serve on the jury.  See Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324-25 (Fla. 
2007) (holding a defendant must show an actually biased juror served to establish 
prejudice under Strickland); see also Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 584 (Fla. 
2008) (“A mere conclusory allegation that the outcome would have been different 
is insufficient to state a claim of prejudice under Strickland; the defendant must 
demonstrate how, if counsel had acted otherwise, a reasonable probability exists 
that the outcome would have been different[.]”). 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim. 
 
 
 
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(3)  Arson Expert 
Abdool next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult 
and retain an independent arson expert.  He claims that, had trial counsel done so, 
trial counsel would have been able to rebut the testimony of the State’s arson 
expert regarding how far away the ignition source was from the victim, the 
position of the victim when she was splashed with gasoline, and how many times 
gasoline was applied.  Abdool contends that this evidence would support his 
argument that he accidentally set the victim on fire in an attempt to scare her.  We 
affirm the circuit court’s denial because Abdool has not established deficiency or 
prejudice. 
This Court has explained that, in deciding whether trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to call an expert to rebut the State’s expert, “a number of 
factors should be considered[:]” 
First among these are the attorney’s reasons for performing in an 
allegedly deficient manner, including consideration of the attorney’s 
tactical decisions.  See State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 
1987); Lightbourne v. State, 471 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 1985).  A second 
factor is whether cross-examination of the State’s expert brings out 
the expert’s weaknesses and whether those weaknesses are argued to 
the jury.  Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1990).  See Rose 
v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 297 (Fla. 1993)[.]  The final factor is whether 
a defendant can show that an expert was available at the time of trial 
to rebut the State’s expert.  See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 
1446 (11th Cir. 1987). 
State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 354 (Fla. 2000). 
 
 
 
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Examination of these factors supports the circuit court’s conclusion that trial 
counsel was not deficient.  First, as the circuit court concluded, trial counsel made 
a strategic decision not to consult an independent arson expert because “they did 
not want to highlight the burning death of [the victim] through the testimony of a 
second expert.”   
Second, trial counsel was able to bring out the weaknesses of the State’s 
arson expert’s testimony on cross-examination, namely that the State’s expert 
could not testify conclusively that there was more than one application of gasoline, 
or that the fire ignited within inches of the victim as opposed to up to a foot away.  
The State’s expert further acknowledged that, while he could not rule out the 
possible scenario that the victim was set on fire while she was standing and that 
additional gasoline was then added to her body, in his opinion there was only one 
heat source that ignited and spread to other parts of the body.  Trial counsel also 
elicited from the State’s expert that “there’s no way of telling” why there were two 
different trails of scorched earth, weakening the State’s argument that the two trails 
meant that Abdool doused the victim with gasoline more than once.  In addition, 
the State’s expert acknowledged the possibility of trial counsel’s hypothetical 
suggesting that the fire could have been set by someone who splashed gasoline 
while wearing a glove, lit a lighter while still wearing the glove, causing the glove 
 
 
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to ignite, and then threw the glove in the direction where the gasoline had been 
splashed, accidentally igniting the vapors. 
Last, although the arson expert Abdool retained for postconviction, John 
Lentini, was available to testify at trial, rather than rebut the trial testimony of the 
State’s arson expert, he largely agreed with it.  Specifically, during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, Mr. Lentini acknowledged that he could not 
identify anything in the State’s expert’s testimony with which he disagreed, and he 
further testified that “[a]ll of the conclusions and possible scenarios, that [the 
State’s expert] testified about at trial . . . are all possible scenarios.”  Though Mr. 
Lentini testified that he “would have definitely directed counsel to ask better 
questions” had he been retained, he did not specify what those questions would 
have been and instead appeared to take issue more with the State’s characterization 
of its expert’s testimony rather than with the expert’s testimony itself.   
Accordingly, because trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to 
limit the jury’s exposure to evidence regarding how the victim burned to death and 
brought out the weaknesses in the State’s arson expert’s testimony through cross-
examination, trial counsel was not deficient.  See Riechmann, 777 So. 2d at 355.  
But, in any event, because the expert Abdool faults trial counsel for failing to 
consult and retain actually provided information that is consistent with the 
testimony presented by the State’s arson expert, there is no prejudice.  See Henry, 
 
 
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948 So. 2d at 621 (“Strickland requires defendants to show ‘there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  . . .  [A] ‘reasonable probability’ is a 
‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
III.  HABEAS PETITION 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
In his habeas petition, Abdool argues that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to argue on direct appeal that the police violated his rights, as a 
Trinidadian National, under the Vienna Convention.  We disagree. 
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims are properly presented in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841, 863 (Fla. 
2013).  “The standard of review for ineffective appellate counsel claims mirrors the 
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”  Id.  Specifically, to 
be entitled to habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, the defendant must establish  
[first, that] the alleged omissions are of such magnitude 
as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency 
falling measurably outside the range of professionally 
acceptable performance and, second, [that] the deficiency 
in performance compromised the appellate process to 
such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
 
 
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Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 
So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)).  Further, “appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on appeal.”  Valle v. Moore, 
837 So. 2d 905, 908 (Fla. 2002).   
 
Abdool’s Vienna Convention claim is without merit, as we have consistently 
rejected virtually identical claims, and Abdool offers no reason why we should 
recede from our precedent.  See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000) 
(concluding defendant “failed to establish that he has standing [to bring Vienna 
Convention claim], as treaties are between countries, not citizens”); Conde v. State, 
860 So. 2d 930, 953 (Fla. 2003) (“[E]ven if [the defendant] had standing to assert a 
right to consular assistance under the Vienna Convention and were to show that 
right was violated, this would not be grounds for suppression of an otherwise 
voluntary confession.”).  Accordingly, as appellate counsel cannot be ineffective 
for failing to raise a meritless claim, see Valle, 837 So. 2d at 908, we deny relief. 
IV.  Hurst 
Next, we consider whether Abdool is entitled to relief after the United States 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  
Because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two, we 
conclude that Abdool’s death sentence violates Hurst.  See Kopsho v. State, 209 
 
 
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So. 3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017).  We must then consider whether the Hurst error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: 
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction. 
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 68 (Fla. 2016) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-998 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2017). 
 
Because the jury in this case recommended death by a vote of ten to two, 
“we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigation.”  Kopsho, 209 So. 3d at 570.  “We can only determine 
that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.”  Id.  Therefore, 
because we cannot say that there is no possibility that the error did not contribute 
to the sentence, the error in Abdool’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Accordingly, we vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty 
phase.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 69.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Abdool’s guilt phase 
claims, but we remand for a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst.7 
 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Lisa Taylor Munyon, Judge - Case No. 482006CF002848000AOX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
James V. Viggiano, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julissa Fontán, Maria 
E. DeLiberato, and Chelsea Rae Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
                                          
 
 
7.  We also affirm the trial court’s denial of his cumulative error claim.  See 
Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 86 (Fla. 2008) (“[The appellant] is not entitled to relief 
on his cumulative error claim because the alleged individual claims of error are all 
without merit, and, therefore, the contention of cumulative error is similarly 
without merit.”) (quoting Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 65 (Fla. 2005)). 
 
 
- 20 - 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Scott A. Browne, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent