Case Title: Fowler v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.

Citation: 665 S.W.2d 713

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1984-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
665 S.W.2d 713 (1984) Grady FOWLER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONSOLIDATED ALUMINUM CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson. February 27, 1984. *714 Tim Edwards, Memphis, for plaintiff-appellee. Glen G. Reid, Jr., Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., Memphis, for defendant-appellant. BROCK, Justice. In this worker's compensation case the only issue presented on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in commuting to a lump sum his award to the employee of benefits for an 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, resulting from an injury to the employee's back which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The final decree of the trial court provides for the commutation of the plaintiff's benefits to a lump sum, as follows: The applicable statute is as follows: Obviously, this statute vests discretion in the trial court to permit or to refuse commutation of an award into a lump sum. Smith v. Gallatin Nursing Home, Tenn., 629 S.W.2d 683 (1982); Kelley v. 3-M Co., Tenn., 639 S.W.2d 437 (1982). But, as we have held in a different context, In exercising the discretion thus vested, the court must consider all of the relevant facts before it in light of what is deemed to be the legislative policy represented by the statute and conclude whether or not commutation is to be permitted. *715 In construing this statutory provision, as well as all others in the worker's compensation laws, we are further enjoined by T.C.A., § 50-6-116: From the very beginning, this Court has been ever mindful of the remedial nature of this legislation and the law had been uniformly construed so as to secure for the beneficiaries of the law every protection that a liberal construction would authorize. Baxter v. Jordan, 158 Tenn. 471, 14 S.W.2d 717 (1929); Curtis v. Hamilton Block Company, 225 Tenn. 275, 466 S.W.2d 220 (1971). In Smith v. Gallatin Nursing Home, supra, and Kelley v. 3-M Co., supra, we have noted that commutation, in a particular case, may have adverse consequences for the employee as well as for the employer. Accordingly, the court should consider the interests of both the employee and the employer in exercising its discretion, remembering, however, that the worker's compensation laws and this section, in particular, were enacted for the benefit of the employee. In the Smith case we observed: Before the trial judge decides to commute an award he ought to be able to ascribe a good reason therefor arising from the evidence produced before him. The employee bears the burden of showing that it is in his best interest that the award be commuted rather than paid in installments. The reason most commonly advanced for commuting an award is that the plaintiff has some special need for receiving the money in a lump sum, as in the Smith and Kelley cases, supra. See, also, 82 Am.Jur.2d Workmen's Compensation § 654 (1976). In the instant case, the reasons advanced by the trial court for commuting this award appear to us to be insufficient. The mere fact that the employee manages his own income and might be able to earn interest on the commuted amount if he invested the same prudently has been held to be an insufficient reason for granting commutation. Court of Flags v. Outland, Fla.App., 382 So. 2d 443 (1980); Hulse v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 133 Cal. Rptr. 678, 63 Cal. App. 3d 221 (1976). We agree with that conclusion and, accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing commutation of the award in this case. The provision of the trial court's decree commuting the plaintiff's award is reversed and set aside; in all other things the decree of the trial court is affirmed. Costs incurred upon appeal are taxed against the appellee and surety. This case is remanded to the trial court for further appropriate proceedings, if any. FONES, C.J., and COOPER, HARBISON and DROWOTA, JJ., concur.