Case Title: Harris v. Harris

Citation: 168 Vt. 13, 714 A.2d 626

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Harris v. Harris  (96-389); 168 Vt. 13; 714 A.2d 626

[Filed 8-May-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-389

Peter Q. Harris                              Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Windsor Family Court

Bonnie L. Harris                             March Term, 1997

Marilyn S. Skoglund, J.

Martha M. Davis, Windsor, for plaintiff-appellant

Emily S. Davis, Joanne M. Ertel, and Todd C. Steadman of Black, Black
  & Davis, White River Junction, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Allen,
          C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Father appeals from a family court order that upheld
  the magistrate's determination of his child support obligation.  He claims
  that there has been no change in circumstances as required by 15 V.S.A. §
  660(a) prior to modifying a child support order.  He also argues that the
  magistrate abused her discretion by (1) establishing child support under 15
  V.S.A. § 656(d) (where combined available income exceeds guidelines)
  without extrapolating from the guidelines, (2) ordering child support that
  exceeds the stated needs of the children, and (3) awarding arrearages. 
  Further, he maintains that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to award
  attorney's fees.  Mother cross-appeals, claiming that the magistrate abused
  her discretion by denying mother post-evidentiary-hearing attorney's fees
  when she awarded all other legal fees. We affirm in all respects.

       The parties divorced in 1988.  The final divorce order granted mother
  sole physical parental rights and responsibilities of the parties' three
  minor children and ordered father to pay $1,378.61 per month to mother in
  child support for the first year.  The child support obligation

 

  was calculated under the child support guidelines and was to be
  recalculated in 1989, 1990 and every two years thereafter.  The order
  specified the method to compute child support in the future, including when
  the parties' combined monthly gross income exceeds the incomes in the child
  support guidelines.  The final order also provided that all disputes
  arising under any of its provisions would be resolved by
  alternative-dispute-resolution procedures detailed in the order.

       In 1990, the parties submitted the matter of child support to an
  arbitrator who calculated father's monthly obligation to be $1,984.44 under
  the 1990 amended child support guidelines. The arbitrator also modified the
  final divorce order by detailing new procedures for determining future
  child support obligations under the 1990 guidelines and when the parties'
  combined available income exceeds the guidelines.  After 1990, the parties
  never agreed on the child support obligation and never had the dispute
  resolved again by arbitration.  In 1994, mother moved in family court to
  modify child support.

       In February 1995, the family court concluded that there had been
  substantial and unanticipated material changes in circumstances since the
  final divorce order in 1988.  The court found that the
  alternative-dispute-resolution provision of the final order did not work
  for recalculating child support because the parties were unable to
  cooperate and father had not acted in good faith under the provision.  The
  court further found an unanticipated change in circumstances in the
  creation of the family court and the office of the magistrate, which was
  specifically designed to determine child support issues.  Accordingly, the
  court modified the 1988 final divorce order by ordering that disputes
  regarding child support be submitted to the magistrate rather than be
  subject to the alternative-dispute-resolution provision of the final order.
  The court concluded that it was in the children's best interest for support
  to be reviewed and, if necessary, recalculated pursuant to applicable
  statutes.

       Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate issued oral findings
  and conclusions of law on October 4, 1995, which we briefly summarize. 
  Father, who is a physician, earned $189,367 from employment in 1994, and
  mother, who is a teacher, earned $20,164.89.  Father paid mother $6,000 per
  year in spousal maintenance and $20,549.16 (12 x $1,712.43) per year

 

  in child support.  The magistrate concluded that mother was unable to
  support the children at the standard of living the children would have
  enjoyed had the parties remained together.  See 15 V.S.A. §§ 650, 654
  (child support should approximate standard of living children would enjoy
  if parents lived together).  Further, the magistrate determined that she
  should set the child support under 15 V.S.A. § 656(d) (use of discretion)
  because she believed that the parties' combined monthly available income
  exceeded the uppermost level of the guidelines.

       On November 16, 1995, the magistrate issued an order establishing
  child support from the date of mother's motion to modify in February 1994
  until the parties' eldest child reached age eighteen in June 1994 at
  $3,682.15 per month (24% of father's gross income).  From June 1994 until
  August 1996, when the second child reached age eighteen, the order set
  child support at $3,221.88 per month (21% of father's gross income).  From
  August 1996 until the youngest child reaches age eighteen, the order set
  child support at 18% of father's gross income.  She concluded that this
  system of determining child support will ensure that the custodial parent
  has adequate funds to support the children in a lifestyle that they should
  enjoy year-round, not simply during visitation with their father.  The
  magistrate also calculated arrearages and ordered father to pay mother's
  attorney's fees of $4,521.60.

       Father appealed to the family court, which affirmed the decision of
  the magistrate.  He now appeals from the decision of the family court. 
  Mother cross-appeals the magistrate's decision to award her less than all
  of her attorney's fees.

                                     I.

       Father first claims that there was no showing before the magistrate of
  a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances, necessary
  under 15 V.S.A. § 660(a) to modify the child support obligation.  Section
  660(a) states that "upon a showing of a real, substantial and unanticipated
  change of circumstances, the court may annul, vary or modify a child
  support order, whether or not the order is based upon a stipulation or
  agreement."  A change in circumstances is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
  modification of a child support order. McCormick v. McCormick, 150 Vt. 431,
  436,