Case Title: McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. v. Welden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-238

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. v. Welden1995 WY 102897 P.2d 1310Case Number: 93-238, 93-242Decided: 06/29/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

McGARVIN-MOBERLY CONSTRUCTION CO., a Wyoming 
corporation,

 Petitioner,

v.

Billy J. WELDEN and Josephine R. Welden, 

Respondents.

 

Billy J. WELDEN and Josephine R. 
Welden,

 Petitioners,

v.

Dan A. HUNTER, Personal Representative of the Estate 
of Bertha Pauline Hunter, deceased; and McGarvin-Moberly Construction Co., a 
Wyoming corporation,

 Respondents.

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Washakie County, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

Patrick J. Murphy of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, and Thomas E. Hames of Cook, 
Kotel & Fitch, Denver, CO, for McGarvin-Moberly Const. 
Co.

Terry W. Mackey, Cheyenne, 
and C. Bradley Smith and Steve Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, for Billy J. Welden and Josephine R. 
Welden.

Harold E. Meier of Lonabaugh 
& Riggs, Sheridan, for Dan A. 
Hunter.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
MACY, and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Our sole concern 
in this case is the degree of participation in discovery and trial proceedings 
that should be afforded to a defendant in a personal injury case founded on 
negligence when default, but no judgment by default, has been entered against 
that defendant. After default was entered by the clerk of the trial court, the 
judge permitted the defendant in default to participate fully in the proceedings 
as they related to the damage issue. The judge did, however, foreclose that 
defendant from discovery relating to the issue of fault. Our analysis of the 
form in which the legislature has cast our comparative negligence statute leads 
to the conclusion that the issue of fault, as distinguished from liability, is 
no longer separable from the issue of damages. The two are intertwined to the 
extent that one cannot defend on the issue of damages without being permitted to 
participate with respect to the issue of fault. The defendant in default must be 
permitted to participate in proceedings which address the issue of relative 
fault because it is a significant factor in any damage award. We affirm the 
order of the district court permitting the participation of the defendant in 
default on the issue of damages, but we reverse that aspect of the court's order 
denying discovery relating to the issue of fault.

[¶2]      This court 
granted a Petition for Writ of Review, filed by McGarvin-Moberly Construction 
Company (McGarvin-Moberly), and it also granted a Petition for Writ of Review 
Pursuant to W.R.A.P. Rule 13, filed by Billy J. Welden and Josephine R. Welden 
(Weldens), who are plaintiffs in the case. In addition to the petitions and 
briefs of McGarvin-Moberly and the Weldens, the defendant who was not in 
default, Dan A. Hunter, personal representative of the estate of Bertha Pauline 
Hunter (Hunter), appeared in this court.

[¶3]      McGarvin-Moberly 
advances the question for consideration in this way:

Where default, but no default judgment, has been 
entered against one defendant in a multi-defendant comparative fault case, and 
where that defaulted defendant has "appeared" and complied with the Melehes v. 
Wilson requirements prior to any default judgment, should the trial court allow 
the defaulted defendant to present evidence, and argument, as 
to

A. 
       
plaintiffs' unliquidated damages, and

B. 
       the 
allocation of fault among all the parties pursuant to the Wyoming comparative 
negligence statute, W.S. § 1-1-109?

The Weldens state these 
issues:

A. 
       Under 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, can a defendant "in default for failure to 
appear" cure the default and participate in discovery and at trial on damage 
issues, merely by filing a motion to set aside a default that is neither void 
nor voidable - a motion that was denied by the district 
court?

B. 
       After 
entry of a valid default, do the defaulted party's rights to participate in the 
litigation terminate (assuming the Court refuses to set the default 
aside)?

In response to the 
McGarvin-Moberly Petition for Writ of Review, Hunter states the issue in this 
way:

The only issue presented is whether the Court erred 
in allowing McGarvin-Moberly to participate at all after default, and the extent 
of the participation, if any, whether as to fault, allocation of fault or 
damages.

[¶4]      This action arose 
out of a chain collision at a construction site on May 29, 1992. 
McGarvin-Moberly was the contractor for a project on Highway 310 between 
Greybull and Lovell. Three or four cars were stopped at the construction site 
when the Hunter vehicle approached the stopped cars from the rear. The Weldens 
were in a car at the front or near the front of the line and Mrs. Hunter failed 
to stop her car. It collided with the last car in the line causing a chain 
reaction so that the car behind the Weldens rear-ended their 
vehicle.

[¶5]      In their 
complaint, the Weldens alleged negligence on the part of Mrs. Hunter, who was 
driving the Hunter vehicle, and McGarvin-Moberly. They claimed the negligence of 
these defendants was the direct and proximate cause of their injuries and 
damages. McGarvin-Moberly failed to file an answer to the complaint within the 
twenty days provided in WYO.R.CIV.P. 12. On the thirty-third day, the clerk of 
the district court entered default against McGarvin-Moberly for failure to 
answer in accordance with WYO.R.CIV.P. 55(a). On the same day the Weldens moved 
for entry of a default in accordance with WYO.R.CIV.P. 55(b)(2).1 

[¶6]      Sixteen days 
later, McGarvin-Moberly filed an entry of appearance with a motion to set aside 
the entry of default. McGarvin-Moberly filed its answer to the complaint the 
same day. After a hearing on the McGarvin-Moberly motion to set aside the entry 
of default, at which Weldens and McGarvin-Moberly appeared, the trial court 
issued a decision letter in which it found culpable conduct on the part of 
McGarvin-Moberly's insurance agent. An order then was entered reflecting the 
findings of the decision letter, which denied the McGarvin-Moberly motion to set 
aside the entry of default. McGarvin-Moberly attempted to seek relief from the 
court's order by a petition for writ of review filed in this court, but that 
writ of review was denied.

[¶7]      The Weldens then 
filed a Written Objection to Any Further Appearance in This Action by Defaulting 
Defendant McGarvin-Moberly and, later, filed a motion to bar further 
participation in the case by McGarvin-Moberly. The court held a hearing on that 
motion and ruled McGarvin-Moberly would be allowed "to participate fully in the 
discovery process and on issues concerning proximate cause and damages, and to 
participate in the jury trial on those same issues." The Weldens then asked the 
trial court to reconsider and vacate its ruling and, following additional 
arguments, the trial court issued a decision letter in which it stated 
McGarvin-Moberly could participate in the discovery process at trial concerning 
the issue of damages only. Hunter then requested the trial court to clarify the 
ruling from the bench as incorporated in its decision letter. The court 
conducted a telephone conference and entered an Order on Defendant 
McGarvin-Moberly's Further Participation, which provided:

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Bar Defendant McGarvin-Moberly from further participating in this case 
is hereby DENIED to the extent that Defendant McGarvin-Moberly shall be 
permitted to participate in the discovery process and at trial solely on the 
issue of Plaintiff's damages.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the default entered 
against Defendant McGarvin-Moberly established McGarvin-Moberly's liability to 
each of the Plaintiffs.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Bar Participation and To Strike is GRANTED to the extent that Defendant 
McGarvin-Moberly shall be prohibited from participation in the discovery process 
and at trial (or in the absence of trial at the W.R.C.P. Rule 55 damages 
hearing) on issues of said Defendant's liability to Plaintiffs, proximate cause, 
allocation of fault and apportionment of damages.

Following Petitions for Writ 
of Review in this court, we consolidated those and granted 
them.

[¶8]      As the trial 
court correctly discerned, there is a difference between an entry of default 
under WYO.R.CIV.P. 55(a) as compared to a default judgment under WYO. R.CIV.P. 
55(b). A defendant who is in default still may contest the issue of unliquidated 
damages. In Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Spitzer 
v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592 (Wyo. 1989) (emphasis added)), we spoke to the 
distinction between default and a default judgment:

The distinction between an entry of default and a 
default judgment must here be recognized. Entry of default is normally a 
clerical act which may be performed by the clerk of court, and it does not 
constitute a judgment. The entry of 
default generally forecloses the party found to be in default from making any 
further defense or assertion with respect to liability or an asserted claim. 
Although the entry of default generally establishes the fact of liability 
according to the complaint, it does not establish either the amount or the 
degree of relief.

The default judgment, on the other hand, in addition 
to the fact of liability, defines the amount of liability or the nature of the 
relief. This is generally done separately from the entry of default. Only in those situations where the damages 
sought are liquidated and claimed in the complaint may the court grant relief 
without further proceedings.

[¶9]      In Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 1000, we also articulated the purpose to be served by a default 
judgment:

[¶10]   We note that:

[T]he default judgment must normally be viewed as 
available only when the adversary 
process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. In 
that instance, the diligent party must be protected lest he be faced with 
interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights. The default 
judgment remedy serves as such a protection. Furthermore, the possibility of a 
default is a deterrent to those parties who choose delay as part of their 
litigative strategy. (Emphasis added.)

H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder 
Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. 1970). See also, Chandler Leasing Corp. v. UCC, 
Inc., 91 F.R.D. 81, 83 (1981); United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy, 
755 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Default judgments provide a deterrent 
to delay in judicial proceedings. Byrd v. Keene Corp., 104 F.R.D. 10, 11 (1984). 
We agree with the view of the Tenth Circuit, which stated:

[A] 
workable system of justice requires that litigants not be free to appear at 
their pleasure. We therefore must hold parties and their attorneys to a 
reasonably high standard of diligence in observing the courts' rules of 
procedure. The threat of judgment by default serves as an incentive to meet this 
standard.

Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, 
Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1444-45 (10th Cir. 1983) (citations 
omitted).

The provision in the rules 
for default judgment encourages diligence on the part of the parties and 
encourages them to hear and argue the case on the merits. We prefer decisions on 
the merits when the rules justify avoiding default. Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶11]   The application of WYO.R.CIV.P. 55 
becomes complex and difficult in a situation such as this where we find multiple 
defendants in a negligence action, only one of whom is in default. The Weldens 
and Hunter contend the entry of default has the same effect on a defendant in 
default as would the failure of the plaintiff to meet an applicable statute of 
limitations. They contend the right of the party in default to participate must 
be terminated, and the only remedy which would justify further participation by 
the defendant in default in the case is through a motion to set aside the 
default. They argue, after this court denied McGarvin-Moberly's Petition for 
Writ of Review seeking to reverse the ruling of the district court on its motion 
to set aside the default, it had no remaining right to defend in the case. 
McGarvin-Moberly asserts the other parties fail to perceive the distinction 
between a "default" and a "default judgment," and reliance upon "default 
judgment" cases is inappropriate to explain the effect and scope of a 
"default."

[¶12]   We have noted the appearance of 
McGarvin-Moberly and its attempt to have the entry of default set aside. 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 55(b)(2) justifies the ruling by the trial court permitting 
McGarvin-Moberly to defend on the issue of damages, and it is clear the ruling 
of the district court was correct. In Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 997, we said the 
"default judgment, on the other hand, in addition to the fact of liability, 
defines the amount of liability or the nature of relief." Even though 
McGarvin-Moberly has been adjudged liable by virtue of the entry of default, the 
damage aspect of the case has not been resolved, and the jury will determine the 
nature of relief, the amount of damages, and the percentage of fault 
attributable to Weldens, Hunter and McGarvin-Moberly.

[¶13]   McGarvin-Moberly's situation is 
distinguishable from those cases in which no appearance occurred until after the 
entry of the default judgment. Weldens and Hunter rely upon Vanasse; Melehes v. 
Wilson, 774 P.2d 573 (Wyo. 1989); Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 
1986); Hochhalter v. Great W. Enterprises, Inc., 708 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 1985); U.S. 
Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1983); and Booth v. 
Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1976). In each case, the appearance 
occurred after the default judgment. While appearance after entry of default, 
but before default judgment, does not save a defendant from being in default, 
that defendant is entitled to three days written notice of an application to the 
court by the plaintiffs for entry of judgment based on default. WYO.R.CIV.P. 
55(b)(2).

[¶14]   The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit said the notice requirement enables the defendant in 
default to appear at the subsequent hearing or trial on the question of damages 
and to protest the amount to be assessed against him. Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 
141 F.2d 956 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 718, 65 S. Ct. 47, 89 L. Ed. 577, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 813, 65 S. Ct. 112, 89 L. Ed. 647 (1944). A 
Michigan court stated the proposition in this way:

If a defaulted party has a mandatory constitutional 
right to be notified of the proceeding, he must have a corresponding right to be 
heard at the proceeding. To interpret the section otherwise would be to make the 
notice requirement a mockery.

Am. Central Corp. v. Stevens 
Van Lines, Inc., 103 Mich. App. 507, 303 N.W.2d 234, 236-237 
(1981).

[¶15]   A number of other courts have 
arrived at the same determination holding that, in the assessment of damages 
following entry of default, a defaulting defendant has the right to participate 
in the proceedings and introduce affirmative evidence on its own behalf in 
mitigation of damages. J & P Constr. Co. v. Valta Constr. Co., 452 So. 2d 857 
(Ala. 1984); Dungan v. Superior Court in and for Pinal County, 20 Ariz. App. 
289, 512 P.2d 52 (1973); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 
584, 510 S.W.2d 555 (1974); Harbour Tower Dev. Corp. v. Seaboard Equip. Co., 179 So. 2d 405 (Fla.Ct.App. 1965); Pittman v. Colbert, 120 Ga. 341, 47 S.E. 948 
(1904); Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind. App. 308, 395 N.E.2d 308 (1979); Greer v. 
Ludwick, 100 Ill. App.2d 27, 241 N.E.2d 4 (1968); Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Bissanti Design/Build Group v. McClay, 32 Mass. App. 
Ct. 469, 590 N.E.2d 1169 (1992); Lindsey v. Drs. Keenan, Andrews & Allred, 
118 Mont. 312, 165 P.2d 804 (1946); Evans v. Bowlin, 9 Mo. 406 (1945); Gallegos 
v. Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 547 P.2d 1160, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 
(1976); Napolitano v. Branks, 128 A.D.2d 686, 513 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1987); St. Louis 
& San Francisco R.R. Co. v. Zumwalt, 31 Okla. 159, 120 P. 640 (1912); 
Bashforth v. Zampini, 576 A.2d 1197 (R.I. 1990); Adkisson v. Huffman, 225 Tenn. 
362, 469 S.W.2d 368 (1971); Northeast Wholesale Lumber, Inc. v. Leader Lumber, 
Inc., 785 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Synergetics By and Through Lancer 
Indus., Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Midwest 
Developers v. Goma Corp., 121 Wis.2d 632, 360 N.W.2d 554 (Ct.App. 
1984).

[¶16]   In the context of this body of law, 
we must account for the effect of our statutory provisions relative to 
contributory negligence. The statute provides, in pertinent 
part:

(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery 
in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the 
contributory negligence of the said person is not more than fifty percent (50%) 
of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.

(b) The court may, and when requested by any party 
shall:

(i) If a jury trial: 

(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor whether or not a party; and

(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its 
determination of the percentage of fault.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(c) 
The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of 
this section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person 
recovering and enter judgment against 
each defendant in the amount determined under subsection (d) of this 
section.

(d) Each 
defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount 
determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the 
percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or 
(ii) of this section.

WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988) 
(emphasis added).2

The identifiable damage 
factors under this statute are: (1) the total amount of damages and (2) the 
percentage of fault attributable to each actor. The formula requires the court 
to reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of fault attributed 
to the person recovering and then to apportion those damages in its judgment 
with respect to the amount of fault attributed to each defendant. While our 
pertinent authorities antedate significant adjustments to the statutory formula, 
this clearly is a jury function. Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
647 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1982); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Campbell County v. Ridenour, 
623 P.2d 1174, reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶17]   Both the Weldens and Hunter espouse 
a rule that, in effect, would deprive McGarvin-Moberly of the statutory formula 
and result in liability on the part of McGarvin-Moberly for the entire amount of 
damages the Weldens might establish. While the approach of the adverse parties 
is understandable, we cannot recognize such a rule.

[¶18]   The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York has spoken to this problem in the context 
of unliquidated damages in this way:

While a default judgment constitutes an admission of 
liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof where (as 
here) the amount is not liquidated and is not susceptible of mathematical 
computation. The defendant may appear and offer proof regarding the amount of 
damages.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

We believe that any rationale strong enough to 
justify allowing a defendant who has defaulted to appear and offer proof with 
respect to the amount of damages would equally justify allowing such defendant 
discovery with respect to the amount of damages. There would be little point in 
allowing a defendant to contest the amount of damages if the defendant is not 
permitted adequately to prepare for the hearing on damages. We therefore hold 
that Rule 26(b)(1) authorizes a defendant who has defaulted to conduct discovery 
regarding the amount of unliquidated damages in preparation for an inquest on 
damages under Rule 55(b)(2).

Clague v. Bednarski, 105 F.R.D. 552, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted).

[¶19]   More than 100 years ago, the 
Supreme Court of the United States offered this wisdom:

[I]f the suit should be decided against the 
complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants 
alike - the defaulter as well as the others. If it be decided in the 
complainant's favor, he will then be entitled to a final decree against all. 
[Where the charge is joint fraud.] But a final decree on the merits against the 
defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be 
incongruous and illegal.

Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554, 15 Wall. 552, 21 L. Ed. 60 (U.S.Tex. 1872).

The Supreme Court of the 
United States noted the absurdity of conflicting rulings resulting in a holding 
of no fraud by anyone and a holding that the defaulting defendant was guilty of 
fraud. We perceive a parallel absurdity under our comparative negligence statute 
in which the jury potentially could find more than fifty percent fault on the 
part of a plaintiff and, yet, the ruling would be that a defaulting defendant is 
responsible for all of the damages.

[¶20]   The interests of Hunter and 
McGarvin-Moberly are disparate as they relate to the percentage of fault, but 
that is the second factor with respect to individual responsibility, the first 
being the amount. In order to defend the question of damages, McGarvin-Moberly 
must be able to defend on the question of the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor. The right to defend under our modern rules would be hollow absent 
the right of participation and discovery.

[¶21]   The sanction attached to the ruling 
relating to the default of McGarvin-Moberly is not insignificant. That ruling 
forecloses a cross-claim by McGarvin-Moberly against Hunter; a third-party 
complaint by McGarvin-Moberly against S & L Industrial (a subcontractor on 
the project); and prevents McGarvin-Moberly from arguing it was not liable 
because it was not guilty of negligence. The Weldens do not have to prove duty 
or breach of duty with respect to McGarvin-Moberly, and the jury will be 
instructed it should answer "yes" to the question "did McGarvin-Moberly's 
negligence constitute a proximate cause of the damages and injuries to the 
Weldens?"

[¶22]   We uphold the ruling of the 
district court that McGarvin-Moberly is entitled to appear and defend the 
question of damages. Because, by our comparative negligence statute, the 
question of fault is inextricably intertwined with the amount of damages that 
may be awarded against any defendant, we perceive the trial court's initial 
ruling that McGarvin-Moberly could "participate fully in the discovery process 
and on issues concerning proximate cause and damages * * *" was the correct 
ruling. We affirm the order of the trial court from which these petitions for 
review were sought except for that aspect of the order denying McGarvin-Moberly 
discovery regarding fault.

[¶23]   The order of the district court is 
reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance 
with this opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice, Retired, dissenting.

[¶24]   The majority of the court holds 
that a defendant need not answer plaintiff's complaint in a negligence case and 
no detriment results from entry of default if one other defendant has answered. 
The holding is contrary to law, reason, and long-established practice, and I 
must dissent.

[¶25]   A multi-vehicle accident occurred 
May 29, 1992, on U.S. Highway 310. McGarvin was the main contractor on a road 
construction project. Construction safety and signs responsibility at the site 
had been subcontracted to S & L Industrial.

[¶26]   Welden was the lead car in a group 
of three that approached the work site and stopped as directed by the flag girl. 
A fourth car, driven by Bertha Hunter, did not stop and rammed the car in front 
of her. A chain-reaction accident occurred as each car successively slammed into 
the one in front.

[¶27]   The Weldens, on January 20, 1993, 
filed a negligence action against McGarvin and Mrs. Hunter's estate (she died of 
unrelated causes after the accident). Weldens alleged neck and back injuries. 
McGarvin's answer was due on February 18. McGarvin neglected to answer timely, 
and on March 3 the clerk of court entered default against McGarvin. On March 19, 
McGarvin filed a motion to set aside the entry of default. The motion was 
denied. McGarvin filed a petition for review challenging that decision, and this 
court denied the petition.

[¶28]   The district court entered an order 
on October 26, 1993, prohibiting McGarvin from participation in the discovery 
process and at trial on issues of liability, proximate cause, and allocation of 
fault, but allowed McGarvin to defend upon the issue of damages. McGarvin's 
petition for review challenges the order of prohibition.

The court in its opinion states as 
follows:

Our analysis of the form in which the legislature has cast 
our comparative negligence statute leads to the conclusion that the issue of 
fault, as distinguished from liability, 
is no longer separable from the issue of damages. The two are intertwined to 
the extent that one cannot defend on the issue of damages without being 
permitted to participate with respect to the issue of fault. The defendant in 
default must be permitted to participate in proceedings which address the issue 
of relative fault because it is a significant factor in any damage 
award.

Maj. op. at 1 (emphasis 
added). The conclusion is unsupported by authority and is simply incorrect. The 
premise of the court's opinion is twofold:

(a) that fault is distinguished (different) from 
liability, and

(b) that our comparative negligence statute does not 
permit trial of fault separate from damages.

Contrary to premise (a), the 
term fault cannot be distinguished from liability but is included within the 
term liability. Thus, a party at fault in a personal injury case is liable for 
the damages caused.

[¶29]   The word liability includes fault. It is a broad 
legal term referred to as "of the most comprehensive significance, including 
almost every character of hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, or 
likely." It includes "any kind of debt or liability, either absolute or 
contingent, express or implied," "every kind of legal obligation, 
responsibility, or duty." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). The word fault is defined as "[n]egligence; an 
error or defect of judgment or of conduct." Id. Negligence which proximately 
causes damage is fault and is a legal obligation to pay for such damage. The 
legal obligation to pay is, by definition, liability. Liability is a broad term 
that includes fault. Fault, a narrow term describing an obligation arising out 
of negligence, is included within liability and, in the context of a personal 
injury claim (this case), is not distinguishable at all.

[¶30]   Again, contrary to the court's 
asserted premise in paragraph (b) above, the legislature has not cast our 
comparative negligence statute in a form that fault and damages are no longer 
separable, but rather, in the clearest terms, keeps fault separable from 
damages. Thus, W.S. 1-1-109(b) (1988) provides for the use of separate special 
verdicts for the determination of: (a) the total amount of damages and 
(b) the percentage of fault, stating as follows:

(b) The court may, and when requested by any party 
shall:

(i) If a jury trial:

(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor whether or not a party[.]

The statute requires that 
the court shall, when requested by a party, find separate special 
verdicts. In this case the plaintiff is not only requesting but demanding 
separate verdicts to allow McGarvin to defend damages only. Fault and liability, 
as those terms apply to a tort, personal injury action and are used in our 
comparative negligence statute, are synonymous. Our comparative negligence 
statute does not see fault and damages as inseparably intertwined, but intends 
that the court and jury keep fault and damages totally separate and never 
intertwined.

[¶31]   The recommended verdict form in our 
Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions, drafted to meet the provisions of the statute 
and conform to the practice in every Wyoming district court, is as 
follows:

VERDICT

We, the jury, present the following answers to the 
questions submitted by the court:

1. Considering all of the fault at one hundred 
percent, what percentage of the total fault is attributable to each of the 
following persons?

________ (Plaintiff) ..... 
(0% to 100%) ________ 

________ (Defendant) .... 
(0% to 100%) ________ 

________ (Defendant) .... 
(0% to 100%) ________

[Add spaces for codefendants 
and actors.]

Total 100%

2. Without 
considering the percentage of fault found in question one, what total amount 
of damages do you find was sustained by

____ (Plaintiff) 
.............. $ ____

Wyoming Pattern Jury 
Instructions (1993 Rev.) wherein the committee expressed "thanks to Judge Rogers 
and Judge Lehman for their thoughts and comments on certain 
instructions."

[¶32]   W.S. 1-1-109 was amended in 1994, 
again demonstrating legislative intent to maintain the separate nature of fault 
and damages by first defining fault as creating a liability arising out of 
negligence and proximate cause, as follows:

"Fault" includes acts or omissions, determined to be 
a proximate cause of death or injury to person or property, that are in any 
measure negligent * * *

and then by providing that 
the jury

determine the total amount of damages sustained by 
the claimant without regard to the 
percentage of fault attributed to 
the claimant, and the percentage of fault attributable to each 
actor[.]

The plain meaning - the only 
meaning that can be derived from the above statutes and its predecessor - is 
that fault and damages are separable; that they are 
not inextricably intertwined; that they are separable, separate, and must be 
kept separate by the court and jury.

[¶33]   In Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 
996-97 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592 (Wyo. 1989)), 
we said that entry of default "forecloses the party found to be in default from 
making any further defense or assertion with respect to liability" but left open 
for contest the amount of damages, if any, incurred. By definition, and as our 
legislature has stated, negligence that is the proximate cause of an accident 
equals fault, and fault is included in the broad term liability. In this case 
default was entered in accordance with W.R.C.P. 55. Fault is included within the 
term liability, but the defaulting party here is allowed to defend the liability 
(fault) issue contrary to Vanasse. If this court is going to overturn Vanasse, 
it should so state in clear and unequivocal language.

[¶34]   No case has been found that 
directly deals with the question here presented. Perhaps that would indicate 
that no one has heretofore even seriously suggested that any court would allow a 
defendant in default to defend fault contrary to the language of decided cases 
(see the string citation on of the majority opinion).

[¶35]   I would affirm the order of the 
trial judge prohibiting the defendant in default from defending the issue of 
fault-liability, but permitting full defense of the issue of damages, if any. 
The defaulting defendant would appear on the verdict form much in the same 
posture as a non-party. Other defendants not in default could argue liability 
and might claim that the defaulting defendant was liable for the total damage. 
That is the detriment resulting from default. It is better than what would occur 
if McGarvin as the only defendant were 100 percent liable for the total damage 
of plaintiff. In this scenario, defendant McGarvin will probably pay less than 
all of plaintiff's damages, and perhaps nothing. That is a real advantage to a 
defaulting defendant in a multi-party case and enough of a benefit in this kind 
of case. In the above suggested disposition, W.R.C.P. 55 and W.S. 1-1-109 may be 
read together and harmonized so as to endow both with a full measure of meaning 
in these circumstances.

[¶36]   The construction of our Rule 55 and 
§ 1-1-109 fashioned by the majority obliterates the usual, reasonable and 
understood effect of default and allows McGarvin-Moberly to gain a defensive 
posture as favorable as though default had never occurred. I agree that 
McGarvin-Moberly must be permitted to defend on the issue of damages. I do not 
agree that it should be allowed to defend the issue of fault after 
default.

[¶37]   Accordingly, I dissent and would 
dismiss the writs of review as improvidently granted.

 

FOOTNOTES

1 WYO.R.CIV.P. 55 (emphasis added) 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Entry. - 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 
to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's 
default.

(b) Judgment. - 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:

(1) By the 
Clerk. - When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain, or 
for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that 
amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for 
failure to appear and is not a minor or an incompetent 
person;

(2) By the 
Court. - In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall 
apply to the court therefor; * * * If 
the party against whom a judgment by default is sought has appeared in the 
action the party (or, if appearing by representative, the party's 
representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for 
judgment at least three days prior to the hearing on such application. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to 
the parties when and as required by any 
statute.

(c) Setting 
aside default. - For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of 
default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it 
aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).

(d) Plaintiffs; 
counterclaimants; cross-claimants. - The provisions of this rule apply whether 
the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party 
plaintiff, or party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases 
a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c).

2 WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 was superseded in 
1994 by an amendment that substantially changed the format of the statute, but 
the amendment does not affect the result of this case. The application of the 
formula is the same under either version of the 
statute.