Case Title: Newman v. Walker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042699

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
SHARON M. NEWMAN 
 
v.  Record No. 042699  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   September 16, 2005 
LEONARD WALKER, JR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-229(D), a statute of 
limitations is tolled when a defendant uses any direct or 
indirect means to obstruct the filing of an action.  In 
this case, we conclude that a defendant’s affirmative 
misrepresentation about his identity at the scene of an 
automobile accident invokes this statute and tolls the 
running of the statute of limitations for the ensuing 
personal injury action if the defendant designed or 
intended his misrepresentation to obstruct the filing of 
the action.  Thus, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court sustaining a plea of the statute of 
limitations. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Sharon M. Newman allegedly sustained personal injuries 
on June 17, 2000 when a truck owned by Hastings Village, 
Inc. struck the motor vehicle she was operating.  At the 
scene of the accident, the driver of the Hastings Village 
truck identified himself to a police officer as Kareem A. 
 
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Brooks.  Relying on that information, Newman filed a motion 
for judgment on June 11, 2002 against Brooks and Hastings 
Village.  Both defendants filed grounds of defense, 
admitting that there was an incident involving the 
specified vehicles but denying that Brooks was the driver 
of the Hastings Village truck. 
About a month after the accident, the liability 
insurance carrier for Hastings Village contacted Hastings 
Village about the accident and reported that Brooks was 
driving the company’s vehicle.  Hastings Village advised 
the insurance carrier that it did not employ anyone by the 
name of Kareem A. Brooks.  Hastings Village then confronted 
one of its employees named William Walker, Jr., and Walker 
admitted that he had been driving the Hastings Village 
truck at the time of the accident. 
In September 2003, soon after Newman had answered 
interrogatories and asked to depose Brooks, she learned for 
the first time that Brooks was not the driver of the 
Hastings Village truck.  On October 1, 2003, the attorney 
for the defendants advised Newman’s attorney that an 
investigator had found out that Walker had stolen Brooks’ 
identification, had taken the Hastings Village truck 
without permission, and was driving it at the time of the 
accident. 
 
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With this new information, Newman moved to file an 
amended motion for judgment naming William Walker, Jr., as 
a defendant and as the driver of the Hastings Village 
truck.  Brooks and Hastings Village admitted in their 
grounds of defense to the amended motion for judgment that 
Walker had identified himself as Brooks at the scene of the 
accident.  After attempting unsuccessfully to serve process 
on Walker, Newman discovered that Walker’s name was 
actually Leonard Walker, Jr.  On February 26, 2004, the 
circuit court permitted Newman to change the name of the 
defendant-driver from William Walker, Jr., to Leonard 
Walker, Jr.1 
 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Newman’s 
uninsured motorist carrier, then moved to dismiss the 
action pursuant to the applicable two-year statute of 
limitations.  See Code § 8.01-243(A).  Nationwide asserted 
that Walker was not named as a defendant in the action 
until January 12, 2004, more than two years after the date 
of the accident.  Newman responded that, pursuant to the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-229(D), the statute of 
limitations was tolled during the period when Walker 
“falsely and fraudulently identified himself to both the 
                                                 
1 On June 4, 2004, the circuit court granted Newman’s 
request to nonsuit Brooks and Hastings Village, leaving 
Leonard Walker, Jr. as the sole defendant. 
 
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plaintiff and the . . . police officer as Kareem Brooks.”  
Walker’s use of false identification in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-204.1(B), according to Newman, obstructed her 
ability to file this action against the proper defendant. 
 
Relying on Grimes v. Suzukawa, 262 Va. 330, 551 S.E.2d 
644 (2001), the circuit court, in a letter opinion, 
concluded that Newman “failed [to] present any evidence to 
establish that Mr. Walker’s conduct constituted a direct or 
indirect means to obstruct the filing of [Newman’s] tort 
action[] within the meaning of Code § 8.01-229(D).”  Thus, 
the circuit court granted Nationwide’s motion to dismiss.  
Newman appealed to this Court. 
ANALYSIS 
The sole issue on appeal is whether Walker’s 
misrepresentation by using stolen identification at the 
scene of the accident was a “direct or indirect means 
[used] to obstruct the filing of [this] action,” thereby 
tolling the statute of limitations.2  Code § 8.01-229(D).  
                                                 
2 Amicus curiae in support of Newman urges this Court 
to reverse the judgment of the circuit court on the theory 
that there was an equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations due to Walker’s actions and that Walker is 
therefore estopped from asserting the bar of the statute of 
limitations.  Newman relied only on the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-229(D) before the circuit court.  Thus, we will not 
address the issue of estoppel.  In her opposition to the 
plea of the statute of limitations filed in the circuit 
 
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The provisions of Code § 8.01-229(D) state that “[w]hen the 
filing of an action is obstructed by a defendant’s . . . 
using any other direct or indirect means to obstruct the 
filing of an action, then the time that such obstruction 
has continued shall not be counted as any part of the 
period within which the action must be brought.” 
Newman argues that she should receive the benefit of 
the tolling provision in Code § 8.01-229(D) because she was 
the victim of Walker’s fraudulent misrepresentations about 
his identity upon which she relied in filing this action.  
Citing Hawks v. Dehart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966), 
Newman contends that Walker’s concealment of relevant facts 
was the sort of fraud involving moral turpitude sufficient 
to toll the running of the statute of limitations.  
Finally, Newman distinguishes this Court’s decision in 
Grimes by arguing, among other things, that Walker’s giving 
false information to the police officer at the scene of the 
accident, unlike the defendant’s wearing a mask in Grimes, 
was an affirmative misrepresentation about his identity. 
 
In response, Walker contends that our decision in 
Grimes is controlling.  Citing Hawks and Culpeper National 
Bank v. Tidewater Improvement Co., Inc., 119 Va. 73, 89 
                                                                                                                                                 
court, Newman did, however, characterize Walker’s conduct 
at the scene of the accident as fraudulent. 
 
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S.E. 118 (1916), Walker argues that, under provisions of 
Code § 8.01-229(D), a statute of limitations is tolled when 
a defendant conceals the existence of a cause of action.  
According to Walker, Newman knew at the time of the 
accident that she had a cause of action just as the 
plaintiff in Grimes did when the defendant sexually 
assaulted her.  Like the defendant in Grimes, Walker 
contends that, although he concealed his identity, he did 
not do so in order to obstruct Newman’s filing of this 
action.  Thus, in Walker’s view, the statute of limitations 
was not tolled. 
We do not agree with Walker’s argument implying that a 
statute of limitations is tolled under Code § 8.01-229(D) 
only when a defendant acts to conceal the existence of a 
cause of action.  See Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 12, 307 
S.E.2d 234, 236 (1983) (suggesting that the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-229(D) apply when a defendant prevents service 
of process).  In Culpeper National Bank, one of the cases 
cited by Walker, the plaintiff brought an action of 
assumpsit against a bank and its president to recover the 
proceeds of a note that had been delivered to the bank to 
be discounted by it.  119 Va. at 74, 89 S.E. at 118.  The 
bank pled two statutes of limitations.  Id. at 75, 89 S.E. 
at 119.  The issue with regard to the plea was whether the 
 
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bank, “by any indirect way or means, obstructed the 
prosecution of [the] suit” by participating in some 
fraudulent act “which kept the plaintiff in ignorance of 
its rights.”3  Id. at 82-83, 89 S.E. at 121.  Quoting Foster 
v. Rison, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 321, 345 (1867), we stated 
that ignorance of the existence of a debt was not 
sufficient to toll a statute of limitations unless that 
ignorance came about from the fraud of the defendant.  
Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 119 Va. at 83, 89 S.E. at 121; accord 
Jones v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 165 Va. 
349, 360-61, 182 S.E. 560, 564-65 (1935).  In that context, 
we then explained the kind of concealment that would toll 
the statute of limitations: 
 
“Mere silence by the person liable is not concealment, 
but there must be some affirmative act or 
representation designed to prevent, and which does 
prevent, the discovery of the cause of action.  
Concealment of a cause of action preventing the 
running of limitations must consist of some trick or 
artifice preventing inquiry, or calculated to hinder a 
discovery of the cause of action by the use of 
ordinary diligence, and mere silence is insufficient.  
There must be something actually said or done which is 
directly intended to prevent discovery.  Mere silence 
                                                 
3 The relevant portion of the tolling provision in 
effect at that time, Code § 2933 (1904), which is a 
predecessor to Code § 8.01-229(D), stated that “[w]here any 
such right . . . shall accrue against a person who . . . by 
any other indirect way or means shall obstruct the 
prosecution of such right the time that such obstruction 
may have continued shall not be computed as any part of the 
time in which the said right might or ought to have been 
prosecuted.” 
 
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or concealment by a debtor may not, without 
affirmative misrepresentation, toll the running of the 
statute.  Where, however, a debtor by actual fraud 
keeps his creditor in ignorance of the cause of 
action, the statute does not begin to run until the 
creditor had knowledge, or was put upon inquiry with 
means of knowledge that such cause of action had 
accrued.  Fraudulent concealment must consist of 
affirmative acts of misrepresentation, mere silence 
being insufficient.  The fraud which will relieve the 
bar of the statute must be of that character which 
involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect of 
debarring or deterring the plaintiff from his action.” 
 
Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 119 Va. at 83-84, 89 S.E. at 121 
(quoting 2 H.G. Wood, Wood on Limitations 1422 (4th ed. 
1916)). 
Subsequent to Culpeper National Bank, we decided 
several more cases involving the question whether a statute 
of limitations had been tolled because a defendant had 
concealed a cause of action.  For example, in Hawks, the 
other case cited by Walker, the plaintiff filed an action 
against a doctor for damages allegedly caused by the 
doctor’s negligence in leaving a surgical needle in the 
plaintiff’s neck during an operation.  206 Va. at 811, 146 
S.E.2d at 187.  The plaintiff alleged that the doctor had 
“knowingly, actively and negligently conceal[ed] from the 
plaintiff the fact of the presence of such needle in her 
neck.”  Id. at 814, 146 S.E.2d at 190.  Again explaining 
the character of fraud necessary to toll the statute of 
limitations, we stated that it must involve moral turpitude 
 
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and the “defendant must intend to conceal the discovery of 
the cause of action by trick or artifice.”4  Id. (quoting 
Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Laburnum Constr. 
Corp., 195 Va. 827, 840, 80 S.E.2d 574, 582 (1954)).  We 
concluded that the plaintiff had not established “such 
trick or artifice or purpose” by the doctor.  Id.; accord 
Horn v. Abernathy, 231 Va. 228, 234, 343 S.E.2d 318, 321 
(1986); Morriss v. White, 146 Va. 553, 570-71, 131 S.E. 
835, 840 (1926); see also Mid-Atlantic Bus. Communications, 
Inc. v. Virginia Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 269 Va. 51, 58, 
606 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2005) (defendant’s continuing to 
consider plaintiff’s claim and failing to respond to 
certain letters was not ”an affirmative act . . . designed 
to thwart” the plaintiff’s ability to file a lawsuit within 
the six-month limitations period). 
 
In all these cases, the focus was whether the 
defendant had used any direct or indirect means to conceal 
the cause of action, thereby tolling the statute of 
limitations.  We had no occasion to address Code § 8.01-
229(D) or its ancestor statutes in regard to what other 
                                                 
4 When we decided Hawks, the relevant tolling provision 
was set forth in Code § 8-33 (1957), a predecessor to Code 
§ 8.01-229(D).  In pertinent part, that former section 
tolled a statute of limitations when a defendant used “any 
other indirect way or means [to] obstruct the prosecution” 
of an action. 
 
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direct or indirect means would obstruct the filing of an 
action and thus toll a statute of limitations. 
 
However, we did so in Grimes.  There, the issue was 
not whether the defendant had concealed the cause of action 
but whether, by wearing a mask when he committed the 
crimes, he had obstructed the plaintiff’s filing an action 
against him.  262 Va. at 332, 551 S.E.2d at 646.  We 
concluded that the defendant had not done so because the 
“use of the mask was intended to conceal his identity and 
not to obstruct [the plaintiff’s] filing of an action.”  
Id.  Thus, the applicable statute of limitations was not 
tolled under the provisions of Code § 8.01-229(D).  Id.  In 
reaching this decision, we stated that “[a] plaintiff who 
seeks to rely upon the tolling provision in Code § 8.01-
229(D) must establish that the defendant undertook an 
affirmative act designed or intended, directly or 
indirectly, to obstruct the plaintiff’s right to file her 
action.”  Id. 
 
While it is true that Walker’s use of stolen 
identification at the scene of the accident concealed his 
identity as the wearing of a mask did in Grimes, there is 
nevertheless an important distinction between the two 
cases.  When Walker gave the police officer stolen 
identification, he affirmatively misrepresented his 
 
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identity.  The defendant in Grimes never misrepresented 
anything about his identity; he merely concealed it with 
the mask.  In other words, Walker “undertook an affirmative 
act.”  Id. 
Although our earlier cases dealt with concealment of 
the existence of a cause of action, the principles 
enunciated there are applicable in this case.  Fraudulent 
concealment, whether of a cause of action or of a 
defendant’s true identity, “ ‘must consist of affirmative 
acts of misrepresentation. . . . The fraud which will 
relieve the bar of the statute must be of that character 
which involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect of 
debarring or deterring the plaintiff from his action.’ ”  
Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 119 Va. at 83, 89 S.E. at 121 (quoting 
Wood, supra, at 1422). 
 
Walker’s actions at the scene of the accident involved 
this type of fraud.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred in holding that Walker’s conduct did not 
constitute a direct or indirect means to obstruct Newman’s 
filing of this action.  However, before a final resolution 
can be made as to whether the applicable statute of 
limitations barred Newman’s action against Walker, the 
circuit court must make two factual determinations that 
were not previously necessary to its judgment sustaining 
 
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the plea of the statute of limitations: (1) whether 
Walker’s use of stolen identification was “designed or 
intended, directly or indirectly, to obstruct” Newman’s 
filing of this action, Grimes, 262 Va. at 332, 551 S.E.2d 
at 646; and (2) if so, the period of time such obstruction 
continued, see Code § 8.01-229(D). 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.