Case Title: RAWLINSON v. GREEN and NO. 1 PROPERTIES, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-54

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
RAWLINSON v. GREEN and NO. 1 PROPERTIES, INC.2003 WY 2864 P.3d 120Case Number: 02-54Decided: 02/28/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
    

 

BARBARA 
RAWLINSON, and AARON

RAWLINSON, 
ADRIENNE RAWLINSON

and 
KRISTEN RAWLINSON, Minors, by

and 
through their next best friend and

mother, 
BARBARA   
RAWLINSON,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

HELEN 
GREER and NO. 1 PROPERTIES,

INC.,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan and Carol K. Watson of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Gary R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming  

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant Barbara 
Rawlinson purchased a home in Cheyenne in 1994.  A few months after she and her family 
moved into the home, they discovered water seepage in the crawl space.  Ms. Rawlinson and Appellants Aaron 
Rawlinson, Adrienne Rawlinson, and Kristen Rawlinson brought suit against 
Appellees No. 1 Properties, Inc. and Helen Greer, who acted as the real estate 
agency and associate broker for the transaction.  The district court held the two-year 
statute of limitation applicable to professional negligence applied to realtors 
and, consequently, dismissed the Rawlinsons' negligence claims because they did 
not file their complaint within the limitation period.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The Rawlinsons 
present the following issue for our review:  "Does Wyo. Stat. §1-3-107, providing a 
two-year statute of limitation for licensed or certified professionals, apply to 
acts or omissions of a licensed realtor alleged to have been committed in 
1994?"  The appellees phrase the 
issue as:  "Did the District Court 
err in granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' 
negligence claims, on the basis that the statute of limitations barred those 
claims?"

 

            

FACTS

 

[¶4]      This is the 
second time this case has been before the Wyoming Supreme Court for appellate 
review.  In the first appeal, we 
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Cheyenne Board of Public 
Utilities.  Rawlinson v. Cheyenne 
Board of Public Utilities, 2001 WY 6,  
17 P.3d 13 (Wyo. 2001).  We 
recite herein only the facts which are relevant to this 
appeal.

 

[¶5]      In 1994, the 
sellers listed their Cheyenne home for sale through No. 1 Properties.  Ms. Greer was employed by No. 1 
Properties and acted as the listing agent for the sellers.  She was licensed by the Wyoming Real 
Estate Commission as an associate broker.

 

[¶6]      Ms. Rawlinson's 
attorney-in-fact contacted No. 1 Properties and Ms. Greer for assistance in 
locating a home in Cheyenne for Ms. Rawlinson.  No. 1 Properties and Ms. Greer showed 
the attorney-in-fact the sellers' home.  
On December 13, 1994, Ms. Rawlinson and the sellers entered into a 
contract for sale.  Because No. 1 
Properties and Ms. Greer assisted both parties, they acted in the capacity of 
dual agent.

 

[¶7]      Prior to the 
closing, Ms. Rawlinson had the home inspected for structural integrity.  The report noted the soil in the crawl 
space was wet and stated that, consequently, a positive "no-leak" condition 
could not be established.  The 
property sale closed, and the Rawlinsons moved into the home on January 9, 
1995.  In June 1995,  the Rawlinsons discovered water in the 
home's crawl space.

 

[¶8]      After various 
attempts to rectify the water problem, the Rawlinsons filed an action in the 
district court on December 11, 1998.  
The complaint and amendment thereto stated causes of action against the 
sellers, the inspector, the home builder, Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities, 
the City of Cheyenne, and the appellees.1  The Rawlinsons asserted a number of 
causes of action against the appellees, including claims sounding in negligence, 
breach of contract, and fraud.  The 
appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.  The district court granted the 
appellees' motion on the Rawlinsons' claims for fraud and breach of contract, 
and the Rawlinsons did not appeal that determination.

 

[¶9]      As to the 
Rawlinsons' negligence cause of action, the appellees argued the two-year 
statute of limitation for professional negligence set forth at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a) (LexisNexis 2001) applied to that claim.  The appellees maintained the Rawlinsons' 
claims were barred because the limitation period expired prior to the 
commencement of the lawsuit. The district court initially denied the appellees' 
motion for summary judgment on the professional negligence claim, ruling § 
1-3-107(a) did not apply because realtors were not "licensed or certified 
professional[s]" within the meaning of the statute.

 

[¶10]   After this court issued its 
decision in Hulse v. First American Title 
Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 
95, ¶¶57-61, 33 P.3d 122, ¶¶57-61 (Wyo. 2001), 
the appellees renewed their motion for summary judgment.  The district court reconsidered its 
earlier decision and granted the appellees' motion.  The Rawlinsons appealed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Standard of Review

 

[¶11]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  City of Powell v. Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶7, 44 P.3d 63, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2002); Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  
This court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by applying the 
same standards and utilizing the same materials as the lower court.  Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶ 7;  Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist 
Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  This case involves a pure question of 
law, and we do not defer to the district court's decisions on issues of 
law.  
Id.

 

B.        
Two-Year Professional Negligence Statute of 
Limitation

 

[¶12]   The district court ruled § 
1-3-107(a), the two-year statute of limitation applicable to negligence claims 
against licensed and certified professionals, applied to the realtors in this 
case.  Because the Rawlinsons did 
not file their lawsuit within two years after they discovered the water problem, 
the district court dismissed their claims.  
The Rawlinsons argue that the district court misinterpreted Wyoming 
law.  

 

[¶13]   Section 1-3-107(a) states in 
relevant part:

 

(a) 
A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of 
licensed or certified professional or health care services shall be brought 
within the greater of the following times:

 

            
(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or 
omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) 
years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

 

(A)  Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

 

(B)  The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

                        

[¶14]   The question in this case is 
whether a realtor is a "licensed or certified professional" within the meaning 
of § 1-3-107(a).  In answering this 
question, we must apply our well established test for interpreting 
statutes:

 

We 
first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  A "statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability."  Allied-Signal, Inc. [v. 
Wyoming State Board of Equalization], 813 P.2d [214,] 220 [(Wyo. 
1991)].  A "statute is ambiguous 
only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations."  813 P.2d  at 
219-20.

 

If 
we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the 
plain language of the statute.

 

We 
begin by making an "inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and connection.'"  Parker Land and Cattle Company v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 
(1897)).  We construe the statute as 
a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia.

 

State 
Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994).  If 
we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of 
statutory construc­tion to determine the legislature's 
intent.

 

State 
v. Bannon Energy Corporation, 
999 P.2d 1306, 1308-09  (Wyo. 2000) 
(some citations omitted); see also Powder River Coal Company v. Wyoming State 
Board of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶6, 38 P.3d 423, ¶6 (Wyo. 2002). 

 

[¶15]   This court has applied § 1-3-107(a) 
to claims against various types of licensed or certified professionals, 
including physicians, attorneys, surveyors, and chiropractors.  See, e.g., Edwards v. 
Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1998) (physician); Murphy v. Housel & 
Housel, 955 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1998) (attorneys); Bredthauer v. Christian, 
Spring, Seilbach and Associates, 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992) (land surveyors); 
Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo. 1989) (accountant); Echols v. 
Keeler, 735 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1987) (chiropractor).  

 

[¶16]   The State of Wyoming regulates the 
realty profession.  See, 
e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-28-101 to -124; §§ 33-28-201 to -206; §§ 
33-28-301 to -309 (LexisNexis 2001).  
In particular:

 

[I]t 
is unlawful for any person to engage in or conduct, directly or indirectly, or 
to advertise or hold himself out as engaging in or conducting the business, or 
acting in the capacity of a real estate broker, associate broker or a real 
estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a license as a broker, 
associate broker or salesman, as provided in this act.

 

Section 
33-28-101.  Consequently, because 
licensure is required before a person may work in the real estate profession, 
realtors would seem to fall under the plain language of § 1-3-107(a). 

 

[¶17]   Wyoming precedent also supports 
categorizing realtors as licensed or certified professionals within the meaning 
of § 1-3-107(a).  As early as 1981, 
we stated that "a real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be 
honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for breaches of his or 
her statutory duty to the public.'"  Hagar 
v. Mobley, 
638 P.2d 127, 137 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980)).  The Hagar decision also 
stated:

 

Realtors, 
just like doctors, lawyers, engineering consultants, and builders, hold 
themselves out as professionals; it is their job to know their profession.  People rely on and trust them.  Failure to comply with either the 
accepted standards in the field or the standards society is willing to recognize 
as acceptable, is actionable.

 

638 P.2d  at 138; see also Snyder 
v. Lovercheck, 
992 P.2d 1079, 1089 (Wyo. 1999).  "[T]he failure to maintain those 
standards of skill, competency and integrity exposes realtors to, in effect, 
malpractice actions."  Hagar, 
638 P.2d  at 137.  Consequently, the 
law expects a high standard of care from realtors, and courts may define the 
standard of care applicable to realtors by looking to legislative 
enactments.  Id.  In Hulse, 2001 WY 95, ¶60, we 
stated it was obvious the Hagar decision considered a claim against a 
realtor as being grounded in professional negligence.  This court expressly reaffirmed this 
aspect of the Hagar holding in Hulse.

 

[¶18]   In 1997, the legislature 
essentially codified the Hagar decision and clarified the duty of care 
owed by real estate professionals when acting in the capacity of seller's agent, 
buyer's agent, or intermediary agent.  
Hulse, 2001 WY 95, ¶60; § 33-28-303 (agent engaged by seller); § 
33-28-304 (agent engaged by buyer); § 33-28-305 (intermediary agent).  Moreover, in 2000, the legislature 
adopted § 33-28-124 which provides in pertinent part:  "A cause of action arising from an act, 
error or omission in the rendering of services provided by a licensee under this 
act shall be brought within the time limits provided under W.S. 1-3-107."  In Hulse, we expressly stated 
that § 1-3-107(a) was applicable to claims arising after July 1, 2000the 
effective date of § 33-28-124.

 

[¶19]   The Rawlinsons seize upon this 
language in Hulse and argue that only claims arising after 
the effective date of § 33-28-124July 1, 2000fall within the scope of § 
1-3-107(a).  We acknowledge the 
Hulse decision specifically stated the two-year professional negligence 
statute of limitation applies to claims arising after July 1, 2000.  We did not, however, decide in Hulse 
which statute of limitation would apply for claims against realtors arising 
prior to July 1, 2000. 

 

[¶20]   In resolving this issue, the 
preamble to § 33-28-124 is instructive.  
The preamble states in pertinent part:  "AN ACT relating to causes of actions 
involving real estate services; specifying that existing statute of limitations 
for causes of action in the rendering of licensed or certified professional 
services is applicable to causes of action in the rendering of real estate 
services by real estate licensees."  
2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 16.  
While a preamble to a statute is not binding, it is worthy of 
consideration by the court in discerning the legislature's intention in adopting 
a statute.  The preamble to § 
33-28-124 confirms the legislature intended to clarify and codify the existing 
law.

 

[¶21]   This court presumes "that the 
legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with 
reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.  Such legislation should, therefore, be 
construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing 
law.'"  Hoff v. City of 
CasperNatrona County Health Department, 2001 WY 97, ¶30, 33 P.3d 99, ¶30 
(Wyo. 2001) (quoting Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wyo. 
1984)).  When the legislature 
adopted § 33-28-124, the existing law included the Hagar decision which, 
according to Hulse, established that a claim against a realtor was a 
claim for professional negligence.  
Therefore, when we 
construe the clear language of § 1-3-107(a) together with § 33-28-124 and the 
Wyoming statutes which license and regulate realtors 
and in the context of the holdings of Hagar and Hulse, we conclude 
§ 1-3-107(a) applies to all claims against realtors, even those which arose 
prior to July 1, 2000.  

 

[¶22]   We hold that a claim against a 
realtor has always been a claim for professional negligence.  Realtors are licensed or certified 
professionals within the scope of § 1-3-107(a), and the two-year limitation 
period applies to claims against realtors.  
The undisputed record in this case establishes that the Rawlinsons moved 
into the home on January 9, 1995, and became aware of the water problem in June 
1995.  They filed their lawsuit on 
December 11, 1998, well after the two-year limitation period expired.  The district court, therefore, properly 
ruled that § 1-3-107(a) barred their claims and granted summary judgment in 
favor of the appellees.

 

[¶23]   Affirmed. 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1All the other 
defendants have been dismissed from the action.