Case Title: Commonwealth v. Steadman

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11553

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11553 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SCOTT STEADMAN. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 5, 2021. - March 25, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. 
Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Hearsay, 
Disclosure of evidence, Exculpatory, Third-party culprit, 
Consciousness of guilt, Scientific test.  Practice, 
Criminal, Hearsay, Mistrial, Disclosure of evidence, 
Instructions to jury, Capital case, Burden of going 
forward. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 23, 2009.   
 
 
The cases were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., and 
postconviction motions for forensic testing and expert witness 
funds, filed on January 6, 2020, were considered by her.  
 
 
 
 
Brian A. Kelley for the defendant. 
 
Stephanie Martin Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Scott Steadman, 
of murder in the first degree based on both deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty for the death of 
2 
 
Ronald Pratt, who was found in his tent at a campsite with 
forty-six stab wounds.  The defendant was also convicted of two 
counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon for 
altercations with two individuals who shared the campsite with 
Pratt.  The defendant now appeals from his convictions and from 
the denial of two postconviction motions, one requesting 
forensic testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A and the other for an 
advance of expert fees. 
As to his direct appeal, the defendant first argues that 
the trial judge erred by admitting joint venture hearsay 
evidence where there was no joint venture, or, in the 
alternative, where the statement was not in furtherance of the 
joint venture.  Second, the defendant argues that he was 
entitled to a mistrial when, midtrial, he first learned that one 
of the Commonwealth's identified experts had performed an 
additional test on a bloody footprint in evidence.  Third, he 
claims that the trial judge erred by excluding certain third-
party culprit evidence.  Finally, the defendant argues that the 
jury charge should not have included a consciousness of guilt 
instruction. 
We discern no reversible error in our review of the 
defendant's direct appeal.  Having thoroughly examined the 
record, we also conclude that there is no reason to grant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
3 
 
Although we affirm the defendant's convictions, we consider 
his motions related to postconviction forensic testing 
separately, as they are part of a process that is "separate from 
the trial and any subsequent proceedings challenging an 
underlying conviction."  Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 
121-122 (2015).  Our review reveals that the defendant's motion 
for expert fees was premature and thus properly denied.  We also 
conclude, however, that his motion requesting forensic analysis 
meets the modest threshold requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 3.  
We therefore reverse its dismissal and remand to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for our discussion of 
specific issues. 
 
At the time of his death, Ronald Pratt resided in a tent at 
a campsite in Weymouth.  He shared the campsite with a married 
couple, Kristen Fuller and Robert Fuller, who occupied their own 
nearby tent.1  On the morning of July 18, 2009, Pratt got into an 
argument with Derek Royal, a frequent visitor to the campsite, 
about Royal allegedly cutting down Pratt's marijuana plants.  
Royal left, angry.  That afternoon the defendant, Timothy 
Estabrooks, and William Lambert drove to the campsite in the 
 
1 As they share a surname, we refer to the Fullers 
individually by their first names. 
4 
 
defendant's vehicle to visit Pratt.  The group drank alcohol, 
smoked marijuana, and played darts and cards.  Later in the 
afternoon the defendant and Estabrooks drove Lambert home and 
then returned to the campsite.  At some point Kristen felt 
unwell and retired to her tent to sleep.   
Kristen awoke to shouting:  an altercation between the 
defendant, Pratt, and Estabrooks was in progress.  She heard the 
defendant say to Pratt, "Don't disrespect me like that," and 
heard Pratt fall to the ground.  Robert got between the 
defendant and Pratt; in response, the defendant punched him, 
knocking him down.  The defendant and Estabrooks, both wearing 
sneakers, then began to kick Robert in the face.  When Kristen 
tried to intervene, the defendant pushed her down and hit her in 
the face with a lawn chair before resuming his assault on 
Robert.  The defendant warned the Fullers to stay on the ground, 
or he was "going to get his gun."  Shortly thereafter he and 
Estabrooks left the campsite.  Kristen tended to Robert's 
bloodied face, and then they and Pratt, who appeared uninjured 
from the melee, retired to their respective tents for the night.  
The Fullers changed their clothes, putting their bloody laundry 
into a plastic bag. 
Meanwhile, the defendant and Estabrooks returned to 
Lambert's nearby apartment, arriving shortly before 11 P.M.  As 
they continued to drink and watch television, the defendant told 
5 
 
Lambert that he had been in a fight with Pratt, and that they 
"beat [Robert's] ass" when the Fullers tried to intervene.  The 
defendant asked Lambert if he still had a particular Buck 119 
hunting knife, and after Lambert retrieved the knife, the 
defendant took it, a sheath, and a belt from Lambert, saying 
that he wanted to return to the campsite by himself.  He then 
departed the apartment alone. 
Back at the campsite, Robert was awakened by a man yelling 
just outside his tent.  The tent was shaken, and Robert saw a 
knife blade slice into the tent door as a male voice said, 
"You're next, motherfucker. I got a gun."  Robert did not get 
out of the tent at that time. 
At approximately 2 A.M., Weymouth Police Sergeant Kevin 
Malloy was on patrol and observed the defendant walking, 
shirtless, down a street near the campsite.  As he approached 
the defendant, who was at that point in front of a closed fast 
food restaurant, Malloy noticed that the defendant had a 
significant amount of dried blood on his hands.  When Malloy 
asked what happened, the defendant replied that he had fallen 
off a bicycle and was walking to his friend's apartment, giving 
Lambert's address.  Malloy could see no injuries on the 
defendant, nor did he see any bicycle.  After the defendant 
assured Malloy that he could make it to Lambert's, he continued 
on his way. 
6 
 
At some point in the early morning hours, Lambert was 
awakened by the defendant returning to his apartment.  When 
Lambert asked why he was there so late, the defendant replied 
that "the cops [were] after [him]," and that he had "hucked" 
Lambert's knife away "somewhere around [the fast food 
restaurant]."  Lambert continued to press the defendant about 
what was going on, and the defendant ultimately stated, "Just 
say you won't see Ron around here anymore." 
The defendant removed his clothes and sneakers, put them in 
a plastic bag, and asked Lambert to put them "in the 
incinerator."  Lambert took the bag and put it in his own car's 
trunk because, although his apartment building did have an 
incinerator, he knew it was not functioning.  The defendant fell 
asleep on Lambert's futon. 
Several hours later, the defendant and Estabrooks left 
Lambert's apartment and traveled to the home of Karen Chase in 
Brockton, arriving at approximately 8 A.M.  Chase was 
Estabrooks's former mother-in-law, and he was living with her at 
the time.  Chase saw the defendant use her hose to wash off his 
body and shoes on her back porch, which Estabrooks explained was 
because they had just come from the beach.  She agreed to let 
Estabrooks use her washing machine and dryer.  Chase testified 
that, during their interaction, Estabrooks showed her a shirt 
with a ten-inch circle of blood on it and said, "I think Scott's 
7 
 
in trouble."  The defendant and Estabrooks left Chase's home 
together around 11 A.M. 
At the campsite, Kristen awoke that morning to the sound of 
Robert shouting.  As she emerged from her tent, she noticed a 
tear in its screen that hadn't been there when she had gone to 
sleep.  She found her husband outside and walked over to Pratt's 
tent, which had had its door ripped open.  Inside, Pratt lay on 
his side in a pool of blood, dead.   
Kristen changed her clothes, packing them into the couple's 
laundry bag, and she and Robert left the campsite.2  The two 
split up.  At 8:36 A.M., Kristen called 911 from a nearby pay 
telephone, and when first responders arrived minutes later, she 
led them to the campsite.  Robert, meanwhile, walked in a 
different direction, wishing to avoid police contact due to 
outstanding warrants for failure to register as a sex offender.  
He was located and arrested on those warrants several hours 
later, and was ultimately sent to a hospital for treatment for 
his head injuries. 
That afternoon the police questioned Lambert at his 
apartment.  He became distraught upon learning that they were 
investigating Pratt's death.  During their conversation, Lambert 
 
2 Kristen testified that she threw the laundry bag 
containing their dirty clothes into the woods as she left the 
campsite.  It was never recovered. 
8 
 
received a telephone call from the defendant, who stated he was 
downstairs.  Lambert led the police to the rear of his building, 
where they found the defendant and arrested him, as well as 
Estabrooks, who was sleeping in the front seat of the 
defendant's nearby vehicle.  Two pairs of sneakers were 
recovered from the vehicle, both of which had what appeared to 
be bloodstains on them.  No weapons were found in searches of 
the defendant's vehicle, the campsite and surrounding woods, the 
area of the nearby fast food restaurant, Lambert's apartment, 
and the area around Lambert's building. 
An autopsy later showed that Pratt suffered forty-six 
sharp-force injuries, including a fatal deep wound to his right 
jugular vein.  Forty-five were consistent with having been 
inflicted by a hilted Buck 119 hunting knife.   
Approximately 105 samples were submitted to the State 
police laboratory, forty-one of which were collected for 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.  Among them were samples 
from a pair of size ten and one-half white New Balance sneakers, 
one of the two pairs of sneakers found in the defendant's 
vehicle.3  Red-brown stains soaked into fabric on the right 
 
3 The other pair were Starter brand and were size nine and 
one-half.  Chase testified that Estabrooks's shoe size was nine 
and one-half.  Forensic analysis of a bloodstain on the Starter 
sneakers showed a DNA profile matching that of Estabrooks. 
 
9 
 
sneaker's tongue tested positive for the presence of "dilute" 
human blood, meaning its appearance was consistent with having 
come in contact with water.  DNA analysis from that sneaker 
revealed a major DNA profile that matched Pratt's, with the 
defendant being a possible contributor to a second, minor DNA 
profile.4  No DNA analysis was performed on any of the samples 
taken from the campsite, or on the clothes Robert was wearing 
when he was hospitalized, which he had turned over to the 
police. 
Procedural history.  In September 2009, the defendant was 
indicted on one count of murder in the first degree, for the 
death of Pratt, and two counts of assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon, for attacks on the Fullers.  He was tried 
before a jury in the Superior Court in Norfolk County in 
February 2013.  At trial, in addition to challenging the 
sufficiency of the affirmative evidence that he was the killer, 
the defendant sought to induce reasonable doubt by suggesting 
that Robert had murdered Pratt, and by questioning the adequacy 
of the police investigation of the case.5  The jury returned 
 
4 The DNA analyst testified that the odds of a match such as 
Pratt's occurring in a randomly selected unrelated individual 
were between one in 118.8 quadrillion and one in 62.93 
quintillion.  She also testified that the Fullers and Royal were 
excluded as possible matches to the minor DNA profile. 
 
5 Because we first articulated this type of defense in 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980), it has come to be 
10 
 
guilty verdicts on all three offenses, with the murder 
conviction resting on both deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  He was sentenced to life in prison without 
parole. 
The defendant filed his direct appeal on February 25, 2013.  
Following several similar unsuccessful motions,6 on January 6, 
2020, the defendant filed his latest motion for postconviction 
forensic testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, which was 
accompanied by a motion for funds for an expert to perform one 
of the requested analyses.7  The motion judge, who was also the 
 
commonly referred to as a "Bowden defense."  See id. at 486 
("The fact that certain tests were not conducted or certain 
police procedures not followed could raise a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jurors").  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 722 n.6 (2021) 
(describing Bowden defense). 
 
6 On April 26, 2017, the defendant filed an ex parte motion 
for DNA expert funds that was denied without prejudice, to be 
refiled in more detail.  On May 31, 2018, the defendant filed a 
"renewed" motion for funds for an expert and a c. 278A request 
for forensic scientific analysis.  After a hearing, the motion 
judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the motion on the 
procedural ground that the defendant had not sought a stay of 
his direct appeal.  We denied his request for a stay, but 
allowed that we would accept filing of his next c. 278A motion 
in this court, transmit it to the trial court to be decided, and 
then consolidate any appeal therefrom with his direct appeal. 
 
7 The defendant's reason for filing a separate motion for 
expert funds, and then only for one of his sought-after 
analyses, is unclear.  His motion invokes G. L. c. 278A, § 10, 
which explains how the costs of analysis ordered pursuant to 
c. 278A are to be paid.  No such analysis has been ordered in 
his case, nor is there any guarantee that any will be.  Although 
we reverse the dismissal, at the preliminary § 3 stage, of his 
11 
 
trial judge, denied the motions without a hearing or written 
decision, and those denials were entered on the docket on 
February 19, 2020.  The defendant appealed from those denials on 
May 29, 2020. 
Discussion.  1.  Direct appeal.  The defendant raises four 
issues on direct appeal, arguing (1) that the trial judge erred 
by admitting joint venture hearsay evidence where there was no 
joint venture, or, in the alternative, where the statement was 
not in furtherance of the joint venture; (2) that a late-
disclosed forensic test on a bloody footprint from Pratt's tent 
caused sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial; (3) that 
third-party culprit evidence of Royal's past convictions should 
have been admissible both for its truth and to bolster the 
defendant's Bowden defense; and (4) that the judge had no basis 
in the evidence to instruct the jury on consciousness of guilt.  
The defendant also asks us to exercise our extraordinary 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to 
reduce the degree of guilt.  We consider each argument in turn. 
 
motion for postconviction forensic testing, it does not follow 
that he will prevail at the subsequent § 7 hearing.  Moreover, 
the choice of who performs the requested analysis is not 
unilateral; G. L. c. 278A, § 8, requires that the prosecuting 
attorney and defendant agree on an accredited "forensic services 
provider," or, if unable to agree, to submit a list of possible 
providers for the court to choose from.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that the defendant's motion for funds was premature and 
affirm its denial. 
12 
 
a.  Joint venture hearsay.  The defendant challenges the 
admission, through Chase, of Estabrooks's hearsay statement, "I 
think Scott's in trouble."  The judge allowed the testimony on 
the theory that the statement was made in furtherance of an 
ongoing joint venture between Estabrooks and the defendant.  The 
defendant now argues that this was an abuse of discretion, 
claiming that there was insufficient independent evidence of a 
joint venture and, in the alternative, that the statement was 
not made in furtherance of any joint venture.  The defendant is 
incorrect on both counts. 
"We recognize an [exemption from] the hearsay rule whereby 
'statements by joint venturers are admissible against each other 
if the statements are made both during the pendency of the 
cooperative effort and in furtherance of its goal.'"  
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 319 (2007).  Before 
admitting such coventurer hearsay, a trial judge must first 
determine, based on a preponderance of admissible evidence other 
than the offered statement, that a criminal joint venture 
existed between the declarant and the defendant, and that the 
offered statement was made during and in furtherance of the 
joint venture.  Bright, supra. 
The defendant first insists that the trial judge neglected 
to make the preliminary finding of an ongoing joint venture.  
13 
 
Although it is true that that the judge did not make such a 
finding explicitly, either orally or in writing, our view is 
that this is because the defendant essentially conceded the 
existence of the joint venture.8  In any event, we are satisfied 
that there was no abuse of discretion here, as there was ample 
evidence to support the existence of the joint venture.  
Estabrooks made the statement in question with a bloody shirt in 
hand after asking to use Chase's laundry.  Chase had witnessed 
the defendant using her hose to rinse off his body and shoes.  
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 521 (2016), a fair 
inference is that the two were working in concert to conceal or 
destroy evidence of the murder:  "the joint venture was clearly 
ongoing."  Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 875 (2021) 
("[the declarant] was washing one of the cars likely used in the 
crimes -- presumably in an attempt to conceal evidence -- 
moments before making the statements"). 
The defendant also objects that the statement in question 
did not further the joint venture.  Instead, he argues, it had 
the opposite effect:  according to the defendant, the statement 
 
8 At argument for the pretrial motions in limine on this 
point, defense counsel made only a single passing reference 
questioning the existence of the joint venture.  The substantive 
argument focused exclusively on whether the statement was made 
in furtherance of the venture. 
14 
 
was the disclosure of a crime, rather than an attempt to hide 
one.  He analogizes it to the statement of a coventurer in 
Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 706 (1976).  There, the 
victim of a mugging chased and cornered one of his assailants, 
who told him, "I didn't do it.  She did it."  Id.  We held the 
statement to be inadmissible, both because the joint enterprise 
of escape had failed and because "if any escape enterprise could 
possibly be said to have continued, it was not a 'common' one," 
as the declarant's statement served to exculpate himself at the 
expense of his coventurer.  Id. at 710-711. 
Estabrooks's circumstances were markedly different.  He and 
the defendant were not confronted by police or otherwise 
confined, and were in the midst of washing away blood evidence.  
This brings the case closer to Chalue, 486 Mass. 847.  There, we 
rejected a defendant's similar argument that statements made to 
third parties "objectively served to thwart the joint venture by 
unnecessarily disclosing incriminating information," holding 
that the declarant's statements were better understood as 
"trying to enlist [the third parties'] loyalty by giving them 
enough information that they would feel complicit in the crimes, 
and therefore not speak up."  Id. at 875.  Similarly, here a 
fact finder could have reasonably found that Estabrooks's 
statement to Chase, made with bloody shirt in hand and with the 
defendant washing himself of blood outside, was an attempt to 
15 
 
enlist her aid in concealing the crime.  The judge did not abuse 
her discretion in admitting it.9  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) (abuse of discretion only where judge 
makes "clear error of judgment in weighing the [relevant] 
factors" and "decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
b.  Brady violation.  The defendant also contends that the 
trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial when, several days 
into the trial, both the prosecutor and defense counsel first 
learned that the Commonwealth's footwear expert had performed an 
additional test on the bloody footprint found in Pratt's tent.  
We conclude that the disclosure of the additional test at trial 
caused no prejudice to the defendant. 
We review the denial of a request for a mistrial for an 
abuse of discretion.   Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 19 
(2011).  "Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), 
 
9 After joint venturer hearsay is admitted by a judge, the 
jury must still "make an independent determination of the 
existence of a common undertaking" by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 430, 434 
(2012).  The defendant's brief suggests that the judge did not 
accurately charge the jury on the requisite level of proof.  The 
judge instructed the jury twice on this subject.  It is true 
that, when the evidence was offered, she did not explain that 
the finding was to be by a preponderance of the evidence.  But 
any prejudice to the defendant was ameliorated by her 
overstating the standard in her closing charge, where she 
instructed the jury that they had to find evidence of the joint 
venture beyond a reasonable doubt. 
16 
 
'[t]he Commonwealth must disclose to the defense any material, 
exculpatory evidence over which the prosecution has control.'" 
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 531 n.9 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 476 (2018).  "[W]here, as 
here, there has been disclosure but no evidence of bad faith, 
the question becomes whether the defendant had sufficient time 
to adjust to the disclosure in shaping and preparing his 
defense.  Stated another way, the defendant must show 
prejudice."  Lao, supra at 20. 
The expert's initial testing had been inconclusive.  The 
Commonwealth had disclosed his initial reports, which stated 
that the print lacked sufficient detail for him to form any 
opinion about whether it matched any footwear relevant to the 
investigation.  With the new test, little changed:  the 
resulting photograph was slightly more detailed, but the expert 
nevertheless concluded that he still was unable to form an 
opinion about a match.  Defense counsel, arguing that he would 
have sent the new photograph to his own expert had it been 
timely disclosed, moved for a mistrial.  The judge denied the 
motion but offered the defendant the opportunity to submit the 
photograph to his own expert.  Defense counsel declined, stating 
that he was prepared to go forward with the trial.  Ultimately 
neither party called the expert as a witness.   
17 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the expert's second test 
was sufficiently material and exculpatory evidence that placed 
it within the ambit of Brady, we find that the defendant has not 
demonstrated sufficient prejudice from its delayed disclosure to 
merit a new trial.  First, we fail to see how the newly 
disclosed test and photograph could have caused prejudice where 
they had no impact on the substance of the expert's proffered 
testimony, which was, both before and after the new test, that 
he was unable to form an opinion about a match to the footprint.  
See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 377 Mass. 887, 895 (1979) (no 
prejudice from late disclosure where additional time would not 
have "materially improved" examination of witness).  Moreover, 
it is unlikely that the defendant would have sought testimony 
about additional analysis of the footprint by the Commonwealth, 
however inconclusive, as it would have undermined his forcefully 
argued Bowden defense.10   
To the extent that the defendant argues that an analysis of 
the photograph by his own expert could have bolstered his 
defense, the judge offered defense counsel the opportunity to do 
just that, but counsel instead elected to proceed with the trial 
as scheduled.  We have held that if defense counsel is provided 
 
10 Indeed, in his closing argument, defense counsel 
proclaimed that the jury "should be shocked, really, that the 
Commonwealth deliberately refused to examine the shoes that 
Robert Fuller was wearing at the time that he was arrested." 
18 
 
an opportunity to assess late-disclosed evidence and declares 
they are ready to go forward, there is reason to find no 
prejudice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 426 Mass. 67, 
71 (1997) ("It is an indication that prejudice was negated when 
the defendant's trial counsel stated that she was ready for 
trial after the two-day continuance and did not seek any further 
delay when the fingerprint evidence was offered by the 
prosecution on the fifth day of the trial"); Commonwealth v. 
Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 150 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973 
(1981) (no prejudice from late disclosure where judge continued 
case for one day and defendant did not request more time for 
investigation).  Such is the case here. 
c.  Third-party culprit evidence.  The defendant sought, by 
means of a pretrial motion in limine, to introduce facts 
regarding prior convictions of Royal related to attacks near 
homeless encampments in 1990 and 1997.  The defendant now argues 
that the judge improperly excluded that evidence, which both 
limited his ability to point to Royal as a third-party culprit 
and impeded presentation of his Bowden defense, specifically his 
argument that Royal's criminal record should have driven the 
police to investigate him further.  We determine that there was 
no error. 
Arguing that a third party was the true culprit is, of 
course, "a time-honored method of defending against a criminal 
19 
 
charge."  Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  "We 
have given wide latitude to the admission of relevant evidence 
that a person other than the defendant may have committed the 
crime," although "this latitude is not unbounded."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-801 (2009).  
Where the proffered evidence is hearsay not otherwise subject to 
an exception, it is admissible only if it "is otherwise 
relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and 
there are other substantial connecting links to the crime" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 801.  Additionally, 
the evidence "must have a rational tendency to prove the issue 
the defense raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or 
speculative."  Id., quoting Rosa, supra.  Without these 
safeguards, "the admission of feeble third-party culprit 
evidence poses a risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth, 
because it inevitably diverts jurors' attention away from the 
defendant on trial and onto the third party, and essentially 
requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the third-party culprit did not commit the crime."  Silva-
Santiago, supra.  For the purposes of our review, "the exclusion 
of third-party culprit evidence is of constitutional dimension 
and therefore examined independently."  Id. at 804 n.26. 
Here, of course, the defendant was not precluded from 
introducing all third-party culprit evidence, just evidence of 
20 
 
Royal's prior convictions, and their factual underpinnings.  
Indeed, the judge permitted the jurors to hear evidence that, 
the morning before Pratt's murder, Pratt had accused Royal of 
cutting Pratt's marijuana plants without permission, which led 
to a loud argument and Royal angrily leaving the campsite.  The 
judge also allowed examination of a police investigator 
regarding the investigation of Royal as a possible suspect.   
The first item the defendant unsuccessfully sought to 
introduce was the transcript of a hearing where Royal pleaded 
guilty as a joint venturer to manslaughter.  The transcript 
contained a prosecutor's statement of the facts of the case that 
described Royal's participation, alongside others, in 
humiliating, tying up, and beating a homeless man in a Quincy 
park in 1990.  The victim, who had been staying at the same 
campsite as Royal, died from his injuries.  Royal was a 
cooperating witness and was sentenced to from three years to 
three years and one day of incarceration on his guilty plea.  
The defendant also sought to introduce, through copies of the 
convictions and a police report, that Royal had been convicted 
of three additional offenses stemming from a single 1997 
encounter:  armed robbery, assault and battery, and assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  The police report 
contained the recounting by the victim, a homeless man, of how 
21 
 
Royal and another tied him up in a wooded area in Quincy, beat 
him with a tree branch, and robbed him. 
We conclude that the defendant has not established that 
Royal's crimes bore "substantial connecting links" to the murder 
of Pratt.  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801.  Most 
significantly, the attacks occurred twelve and eighteen years 
before Pratt's death.  See Andrade, 488 Mass. at 532 (defendant 
must show third-party act is "closely connected in point of time 
and method of operation" to crime of which defendant is accused 
[citation omitted]).  We are not aware of, and the defendant has 
not identified, any cases where we have allowed the admission of 
third-party culprit evidence of acts occurring so long before 
the charged crime.11  Compare Commonwealth v. Harris, 395 Mass. 
296, 301 (1985) (evidence of attack by third party not similar 
enough to admit where, among other differences, crimes were two 
months apart), with Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267 
(1979) (finding "substantial connecting links" between crimes 
committed three days apart that were "of the same type, 
committed by similar methods in the same vicinity of Boston, by 
 
11 We acknowledge that there is some merit to the 
defendant's argument that the temporal gap is not so large as it 
looks, as Royal was incarcerated after each conviction.  But 
that consideration is not enough to overcome the many 
dissimilarities.   
22 
 
three males of similar description . . . [using] similar 
weapons"). 
Furthermore, when comparing the current case to Royal's 
past crimes, "examination reveals more variances than 
similarities with regard to these offenses."  Commonwealth v. 
Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 292 (2011).  Pratt was killed while he 
slept; the victims of Royal's attacks were confronted while 
awake, tied up, and subjected to humiliation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hunter, 426 Mass. 715, 717 (1998) (where victim 
was strangled to death, evidence that third party had placed 
hands on neck of another during argument was not similar enough 
to be admissible).  Pratt was stabbed by a single individual; 
both of Royal's attacks were accomplished with accomplices.  
Pratt's killer used a knife; Royal's victims were beaten with 
tree branches.  See Morgan, supra (difference between .22 
caliber firearm and .45 caliber firearm "significant" to 
admissibility).  To be sure, there are some similarities -- all 
three attacks involve violence in wooded areas near homeless 
encampments -- but on the balance, we discern no error in the 
judge's decision to exclude the evidence. 
Our inquiry does not end there, however, as the defendant 
also argues that the evidence of Royal's past crimes should also 
have been admitted as part of his Bowden defense.  Again we 
begin with the recognition that the defendant was not precluded 
23 
 
from presenting a wide-ranging Bowden defense generally, 
including a third-party culprit Bowden defense.  The only 
limitation at issue relates to Royal's prior convictions, and 
the accompanying factual details.   
In evaluating that limitation, we recognize that "the 
exclusion of evidence of a Bowden defense is not constitutional 
in nature and therefore is examined under an abuse of discretion 
standard."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 804 n.26.  Furthermore, 
"third-party culprit information is admissible under a Bowden 
defense only if the police had learned of it during the 
investigation and failed reasonably to act on the information."  
Id. at 803.  Before the introduction of such evidence, the judge 
should "conduct a voir dire hearing to determine whether the 
third-party culprit information had been furnished to the 
police," id., and whether "its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," Commonwealth v. 
Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 809 n.9 (2018).  Because no such voir dire 
occurred here, "we must determine based on the record before us 
whether the judge abused her discretion by excluding the 
proffered testimony."  Silva-Santiago, supra at 804.   
We conclude that here the probative value of the evidence 
of Royal's prior convictions, and their factual details, was 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  The 
remoteness in time and the factual dissimilarities of Royal's 
24 
 
past crimes mean they were of marginal relevance to the police 
investigation.  See Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 317 
(2009).  Conversely, allowing admission of not just the fact of 
the convictions but the narratives of the underlying events 
would have distracted the jury and prejudiced the Commonwealth.  
This is particularly true where there was negligible evidence of 
Royal's involvement in Pratt's murder, and the defense's focus 
was on Robert as the third-party culprit, not Royal, which was 
supported by Robert's undisputed presence at the campsite at the 
time of the murder, his flight, and an attack against him by a 
hatchet-wielding Pratt a few weeks earlier.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 278 (2014).  
In any event, the defense had ample opportunity to 
challenge the adequacy of the police investigation, both of 
Royal and as a whole.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 487 Mass. 
265, 271 n.7 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 
320, 332 (2014) (that judge allowed some but not all Bowden 
evidence defendant sought to admit significant to finding no 
abuse of discretion).  For example, defense counsel was able to 
elicit from a police investigator that criminal history checks 
were run on persons of interest to an investigation only 
"sometimes," that he never ran one on Royal himself, and that he 
was unaware of whether anyone ever did so.  The same witness 
testified that Royal was not interviewed until over a week after 
25 
 
Pratt's death, and then only for ten minutes, while standing in 
front of a diner.  The Bowden defense was adequately before the 
jury, and in sum, we discern no abuse of discretion regarding 
the exclusion of the prior conviction evidence. 
d.  Consciousness of guilt.  The final claim of the 
defendant's direct appeal is that the trial judge erred by 
instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt.  Because no 
objection was preserved, we review for error that creates a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 67, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 
1072 (2012). 
"An instruction on consciousness of guilt is appropriate 
where the jury may draw an inference of guilt 'from evidence of 
flight, concealment, or similar acts, such as false statements 
to the police, destruction or concealment of evidence, or 
bribing or threatening a witness.'"  Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 
472 Mass. 16, 33 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Morris, 465 
Mass. 733, 737-738 (2013).  The defendant argues that no such 
evidence was in the record here.  This contention is without 
merit.  First, the jury could have readily inferred that the 
defendant lied to Sergeant Malloy about the source of the dried 
blood on his hands.  The defendant claimed that he was bloodied 
by falling off a bicycle, but Malloy saw no bicycle nearby, nor 
did he observe any injuries on the shirtless defendant.  Second, 
26 
 
the jury could also have readily inferred that the defendant 
endeavored to hide or destroy evidence, by "hucking" Lambert's 
knife away, by ordering Lambert to incinerate his clothes, or by 
washing off blood at Chase's home in Brockton.  The judge's 
instruction was supported by the evidence, and she did not err 
in giving it.12  See Morris, supra at 738. 
e.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E, review.  Finally, having 
reviewed the record, we conclude that there is no reason to 
order a new trial or otherwise exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for this extremely atrocious, premeditated 
murder.  We therefore affirm the defendant's convictions. 
2.  General Laws c. 278A motion.  We now turn to the 
defendant's postconviction c. 278A motion for forensic testing.  
A defendant who has been convicted of a crime but asserts his or 
her "factual innocence" may move for postconviction forensic 
testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  
Broadly speaking, this is a two-step process.  First, a judge 
will examine the defendant's motion to ensure that it contains 
sufficient information to meet the requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3.  This "threshold determination . . . [is] based 
 
12 We also note that the judge "took careful steps to 
preserve the neutrality of the instruction" by explaining that 
there were numerous reasons that innocent people may behave as 
the defendant did, and that someone experiencing feelings of 
guilt is not necessarily guilty, as even the innocent may feel 
guilty.    See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 Mass. 562, 574 (2018). 
27 
 
primarily on the moving party's filings, and is essentially 
nonadversarial."  Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 503 
(2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016).  Then, for the second step, 
"[i]f the judge finds that the preliminary requirements at the 
motion stage have been satisfied, a hearing will be scheduled 
. . . [where] the defendant must establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence each of the factors enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b)."  Randolph v. Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 3 (2021).   
Here, the defendant appeals from the motion judge's 
dismissal of his c. 278A motion at the first step.  He argues 
that the judge erred in determining that his filing failed to 
satisfy the requirements of § 3.  We agree with the defendant. 
"[T]he determination of whether a motion meets the 
requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 3, such that the moving party 
is entitled to proceed to a hearing, [is] a limited, threshold 
inquiry.  A judge conducting this inquiry is not called upon to 
make credibility determinations, or to consider the relative 
weight of the evidence or the strength of the case presented 
against the moving party at trial . . . ."  Wade, 467 Mass. at 
505-506.  The movant need only "point to the existence of 
specific information that satisfies the statutory requirements, 
. . . and need not make an evidentiary showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Clark, 472 Mass. at 130, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 41 (2014), S.C., 
28 
 
487 Mass. 1036 (2021).  "In other words, at the motion stage, 
the movant's burden is low."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 
Mass. 799, 804 (2019).  In examining whether the movant met that 
low burden, our review is de novo.  Wade, supra at 506. 
a.  Timeliness.  As an initial matter, we address the 
Commonwealth's contention that the defendant did not pursue his 
appeal within the statutorily prescribed period, thereby 
depriving us of jurisdiction to hear it.  See Nissan Motor Corp. 
in U.S.A. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 407 Mass. 153, 157 (1990).  
When a motion made under c. 278A is denied, § 18 mandates that a 
party wishing to appeal "shall file a notice of appeal with the 
court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment."  Here, 
the denial of the defendant's motion was entered on the Superior 
Court docket on February 19, 2020.13  In ordinary times, the 
defendant's thirty-day appeal period would have expired on March 
20.  March of 2020, however, was far from ordinary, and on March 
13 we issued the first of several standing orders in response to 
the emerging COVID-19 pandemic.  The cumulative effect of those 
orders was to extend the defendant's deadline well past May 29, 
 
13 The marginal notation indicates that the judge denied the 
motion on February 13, but "entry of the judgment" under the 
statute did not occur until "that date on which notation of the 
judgment or order was actually entered on the docket."  
Commonwealth v. Mullen, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 138 (2008).  
Defense counsel has represented to this court that he did not 
receive notice of the denial from the trial court until May 20. 
29 
 
the date on which his notice of appeal was filed.  The appeal is 
therefore timely, and we turn to the merits of the defendant's 
motion. 
b.  Merits.  To proceed to the hearing stage, a defendant's 
motion and accompanying documents must include five items of 
information listed in G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b).14  The Commonwealth 
 
14 Specifically, G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b), requires that the 
movant provide: 
 
"(1) the name and a description of the requested forensic 
or scientific analysis; 
 
"(2) information demonstrating that the requested analysis 
is admissible as evidence in courts of the commonwealth; 
 
"(3) a description of the evidence or biological material 
that the moving party seeks to have analyzed or tested, 
including its location and chain of custody if known; 
 
"(4) information demonstrating that the analysis has the 
potential to result in evidence that is material to the 
moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the 
crime in the underlying case; and 
 
"(5) information demonstrating that the evidence or 
biological material has not been subjected to the requested 
analysis because: 
 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of 
the conviction; 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party's attorney 
were not aware of and did not have reason to be aware of 
the existence of the evidence or biological material at the 
time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
30 
 
does not dispute that the defendant's motion contains the first 
three.15  We therefore turn to the remaining two. 
i.  Evidence material to identification.  Section 3 (b) (4) 
requires the movant to identify how the requested analysis "has 
the potential to result in evidence that is material to the 
moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime."  
The word "potential" is key.  To meet this requirement the 
moving party need only show that the requested analysis "could 
be material to the question of . . . identity," and not whether 
it "would have had any effect on the underlying conviction" 
(emphases added).  Wade, 467 Mass. at 508. 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying case 
was aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of 
the evidence or biological material, the results of the 
requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of 
the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the analysis and either the moving party's 
attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied 
the request; or 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
 
15 The defendant's motion properly identifies the requested 
analyses (DNA testing, footwear impression analysis, and blood 
spatter analysis), G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (1), explains how the 
results would be admissible, G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (2), and 
describes the material to be analyzed (a bloody footprint on the 
door of Pratt's tent, a blood spatter pattern found on the 
Fullers' tent, swabs of blood collected from rocks near the 
campsite, and blood on items of clothing collected from the 
campsite and Robert), G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (3). 
31 
 
We are satisfied that the defendant's motion identifies how 
the requested tests could be material to identifying Pratt's 
killer.  No DNA testing was ever done on any of the items 
collected from the campsite or from Robert.  Testing of any of 
the blood found on those items has the potential to link someone 
other than the defendant to the murder of Pratt, be it Robert or 
someone else.16  That there is an independent explanation for the 
presence of some individuals' blood at the campsite goes to the 
of weight of the evidence, which we do not evaluate at this 
stage.  A comparative forensic analysis of the footprint could 
confirm that it was not made by any of the recovered footwear, 
implicating a third party or weakening the Commonwealth's 
contention that the defendant wore the size ten and one-half New 
Balance shoes while killing Pratt.  As for the blood spatter on 
the Fullers' tent, the results of a forensic analysis could be 
inconsistent with Robert's testimony, bolstering the defendant's 
contention that Robert killed Pratt.17  The results of each test 
 
16 For example, if the blood from the footprint inside of 
Pratt's tent was found to contain two DNA profiles, one matching 
Pratt's, and the other matching no other known profile, then 
that would potentially suggest a third party was involved in the 
murder, a fact material to the identification of the defendant 
as the killer. 
 
17 In 2017, previous appellate counsel for the defendant 
received a notification from the office of the district attorney 
for the Norfolk district that the report of one of the 
testifying forensic experts in the case had been amended 
following a regular audit.  The amendments included 
32 
 
have at least the potential to be material to the identification 
of the defendant as Pratt's killer. 
The Commonwealth's arguments to the contrary are 
unavailing, and largely ask the court to improperly weigh the 
trial evidence against the probable -- rather than the possible 
-- results of the testing.  The fact that it was undisputed that 
Robert had bled at the campsite goes to the weight of any match 
to Robert's DNA; it does not erase all possibility that the 
analysis could be otherwise material to the killer's identity.  
Similarly, the semipublic nature of the campsite does not render 
the requested testing meaningless but is something a fact finder 
might weigh in evaluating the probative value of any analysis on 
blood found there.18  The information in the defendant's motion 
satisfies § 3 (b) (4). 
 
reclassification of the blood on the Fullers' tent from 
"projected blood" to blood "consistent with spatter stains." 
 
18 In Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 300-301 (2017), 
S.C., 486 Mass. 193 (2020), cited by the Commonwealth on this 
issue, we found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's 
determination, after a G. L. c. 278A, § 7, hearing, that the 
proposed testing of cigarette butts in the general vicinity of a 
shooting victim would not be material to identification of the 
shooter.  Moffat is of little value to the Commonwealth here for 
three reasons.  First, as discussed supra, the standard of proof 
at the § 7 stage is significantly higher than at the § 3 stage.  
Second, the standards of review involved are different; our 
review in Moffat was for an abuse of discretion, while here our 
review is de novo.  Finally, the requested tests are 
distinguishable on the facts.  In Moffat, the cigarettes were 
found on a public roadside nearly 200 feet from the victim, were 
collected several days after the crime occurred, and had no 
33 
 
ii.  Explanation for no prior analysis.  Section 3 (b) (5) 
requires a movant to explain why the requested analysis was not 
available at the time of his or her conviction using one of five 
enumerated reasons.  The defendant's motion relies on the fourth 
reason, stating that, pursuant to § 3 (b) (5) (iv), "a 
reasonably effective attorney would have sought the analysis" 
but failed to do so.  According to the defendant, where there 
was some evidence that two other individuals, Robert and Royal, 
possessed motivation to attack Pratt, a reasonably effective 
attorney would have ensured that at least some of the blood from 
the campsite exterior would be tested, and that analysis would 
be done on the footprint in Pratt's tent and the blood spatter 
on the Fullers' tent.  The Commonwealth responds that the 
defendant's trial counsel made a strategic decision to not 
pursue such testing, both because such additional investigative 
efforts could impede presentation of his Bowden defense and 
because the tests could undermine his defense against the 
charges for the assault and battery of the Fullers.  
The problem with the Commonwealth's argument is that even 
if its assessment of the defendant's trial strategy were 
 
evident connection to the shooting beyond proximity.  Id.  Here, 
the items sought to be analyzed were found at the somewhat 
secluded campsite, were collected hours after Pratt's murder, 
and -- as all involve blood -- have a clear potential connection 
to a stabbing death. 
34 
 
correct, that would not be dispositive here.  As we have said, 
"a determination that the failure of [the defendant's] trial 
counsel to seek [the requested analysis] was a reasonable, 
strategic decision, and not manifestly unreasonable, does not 
preclude a determination that 'a reasonably effective attorney' 
would have done so."  Wade, 467 Mass. at 511.  Rather, we have 
stressed that "G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (iv), [requires] 
information demonstrating only that 'a' reasonably effective 
attorney would have sought the requested analysis, not that 
every reasonably effective attorney would have done so."  Id.  
Mindful of the low burden imposed at this stage in the 
proceedings, our view is that the defendant's motion 
sufficiently explains that a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the testing he requests, testing that could have 
implicated Royal, Robert, or someone else.  That such tests 
would have come with some risk to the defendant is not 
dispositive.  See id. at 510 ("That there was a risk that 
pretrial DNA testing might inculpate [the defendant] is a risk 
that a reasonably effective attorney in these circumstances 
might have chosen to incur, particularly where there already was 
some evidence of a third party's involvement"). 
In sum, our case law has repeatedly stressed the 
circumscribed nature of the § 3 inquiry and the minimal burden 
on the defendant to proceed.  The defendant need not prove 
35 
 
anything at the § 3 stage, but rather must only furnish some 
quantum of information that satisfies the statutory 
requirements.  Requiring too much of a movant at the initial, 
§ 3 motion stage would significantly undermine c. 278A's goal of 
"provid[ing] increased and expeditious access to scientific or 
forensic testing."  Wade, 467 Mass. at 509.  The more robust 
evidentiary analysis of the defendant's proof is to be faced at 
the § 7 hearing stage.19 
This is not to say that § 3 is toothless.  It continues to 
serve the important function of weeding out wholly unmeritorious 
testing requests.  Motions that omit one of its requirements, or 
merely parrot the statutory language in a conclusory manner, can 
and should be dismissed.  See Donald, 468 Mass. at 48 ("a § 3 
motion must do more than merely recite the elements").  Here, 
however, the defendant's motion and accompanying documents 
contain sufficient information to clear § 3's low bar. 
 
19 Other provisions of the statute reinforce the 
comparatively preliminary nature of the § 3 inquiry.  The 
initial evaluation of the § 3 motion can be done by any judge, 
while a § 7 hearing must be conducted, if possible, by the same 
judge who presided over the underlying trial.  G. L. c. 278A, 
§§ 3, 6 (b).  The Commonwealth "may" file a response to the § 3 
motion, and then only to "to assist the court"; should a motion 
proceed to a hearing, however, the Commonwealth "shall" file a 
response, and that response "shall include any specific legal or 
factual objections."  G. L. c. 278A, §§ 3 (e), 4 (b), (c).  
Moreover, the statute mandates that a motion deemed insufficient 
under § 3 is to be dismissed without prejudice, further 
highlighting § 3's threshold status.  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e). 
36 
 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions are affirmed.  The 
order denying the defendant's motion for expert fees is 
affirmed.  The order dismissing the defendant's motion for 
postconviction testing is reversed, and the case is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.