Case Title: Commonwealth v. Alexis

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12465

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12465 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEAN ALEXIS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 5, 2018. - December 14, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  Search and Seizure, 
Exigent circumstances, Warrant, Probable cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Waiver.  Probable 
Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 27, 2016. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James 
F. Lang, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Kafker, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him. 
 
 
 
Emily R. Mello, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Emily A. Cardy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Jean Alexis, was charged with 
numerous crimes stemming from an armed home invasion in Lynn.1  
The day after the home invasion, and following an investigation, 
the police arrested the defendant inside his dwelling without an 
arrest warrant.  The defendant moved to suppress evidence that 
(1) the police observed during a protective sweep of his 
dwelling after he was arrested and (2) the police gathered after 
they obtained a warrant to search his dwelling.2  A judge in the 
Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion to suppress 
because the police created the exigency that prompted their 
warrantless entry into the defendant's dwelling.  A single 
justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth's application for 
leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal and reported the case to 
the full court. 
                     
 
1 The charges are as follows:  home invasion (G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18C), armed robbery (G. L. c. 265, § 17), armed assault in a 
dwelling (G. L. c. 265, § 18A), assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon (G. L. c. 265, § 15A [b]), assault and 
battery (G. L. c. 265, § 13A [a]), and possession of an 
electrical stun gun (G. L. c. 140, § 131J). 
 
 
2 "An arrest warrant 'encompasses the power to enter a 
[suspect's] residence for the purpose of executing the warrant'" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 776 
(2004).  "Generally, a [search] warrant must be secured before a 
search [of the dwelling] is conducted, and warrantless searches 
'are presumptively unreasonable.'"  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 
Mass. 740, 745 (2015), quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 
459 (2011). 
3 
 
 
 
We have held that "where the exigency is reasonably 
foreseeable and the police offer no justifiable excuse for their 
prior delay in obtaining a warrant, the exigency exception to 
the warrant requirement is not open to them."  Commonwealth v. 
Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 803 (1975) (analyzing warrantless search 
under Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution).  See 
Commonwealth v. Molina, 439 Mass. 206, 211 (2003).  In Kentucky 
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011), the United States Supreme 
Court held that where "the police did not create the exigency by 
engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 
Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction 
of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed."  The Commonwealth 
urges us to follow the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court when 
examining a warrantless search of a dwelling under art. 14 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Adopting such an 
approach would render all of the evidence obtained after the 
defendant's arrest admissible.  The defendant argues that, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in King, under art. 
14 the police cannot create the exigent circumstances used to 
justify a warrantless entry to a home, even if they engaged in 
lawful action, such as approaching a house to knock on a door.  
He also contends that the Commonwealth waived the argument that 
probable cause remained for the subsequent search warrant, even 
4 
 
 
if the impermissibly viewed evidence is redacted from the 
affidavit. 
 
We interpret art. 14 to provide greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment where the police have relied on a reasonably 
foreseeable exigency to justify the warrantless entry into a 
dwelling.  Therefore, we conclude that the judge did not err in 
allowing the defendant's motion to suppress evidence that was 
found in plain view during a protective sweep because the 
officers' entry into his home was not justified based on exigent 
circumstances.  We also conclude that the Commonwealth waived 
the argument regarding whether, if the impermissible 
observations from the affidavit were redacted, the search 
warrant was based on probable cause. 
 
Background.  We recite the motion judge's factual findings 
supplemented by the uncontroverted evidence at the motion 
hearing that is consistent with the judge's findings.  
Commonwealth v. Jones–Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).  
"[O]ur duty is to make an independent determination of the 
correctness of the [motion] judge's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Campbell, 475 Mass. 611, 615 (2016).  
On the morning of June 14, 2016, Lynn police officers responded 
to a report of a home invasion.  Shortly thereafter, Detective 
Stephen Pohle arrived at the scene.  Upon arrival, Pohle spoke 
5 
 
 
with the victim, Shomar Garcia, who lived at the apartment with 
his wife and two children.  Garcia conveyed that earlier that 
morning, while he was leaving for work, three African-American 
males forced their way into the apartment, one of them struck 
him in the face with a silver handgun, and they "forced their 
way into the bedroom, where his wife and two children were."  
The men restrained Garcia with duct tape and took his jewelry 
and wallet.  Before leaving the house, the man with the silver 
handgun struck Garcia's six month old baby in the face with the 
gun. 
 
Garcia recognized the man with the silver handgun as 
someone with whom he had attended high school.  Later that 
afternoon, Garcia went to the police station in an attempt to 
identify the perpetrator.  After looking through a "few hundred 
photos," Garcia saw a photograph of the defendant and stated 
with "[one hundred] percent" certainty that the photograph was 
of one of the men who had broken into his home and was the one 
who had hit him and his baby. 
 
Pohle wrote an incident report and filled out an arrest 
warrant application.  Because it was late in the afternoon and 
his shift had ended, Pohle placed the warrant in the "court box" 
6 
 
 
for the next day.3  Pohle testified that although the nature of 
the investigation -- an armed home invasion -- justified an 
after-hours warrant, the decision not to seek one was within his 
discretion.4 
 
Early the next morning, before he began his shift, Pohle 
telephoned the supervisor of the Lynn police department's 
warrant task force, Sergeant Michael Kenny.  Pohle informed 
Kenny, who was on his way to the police station, that the 
defendant had been identified as the perpetrator of the home 
invasion who brandished a handgun and struck the baby with the 
gun.  Pohle also informed Kenny that he was in the process of 
getting an arrest warrant. 
 
At approximately 7 A.M., Kenny arrived at the police 
station and reviewed the department's "hot sheet."5  Kenny 
recognized the defendant's name on the "hot sheet" as a person 
                     
 
3 The "court box" has a mail slot for "paperwork that needs 
to go over to court."  Each morning, a "police prosecutor" 
brings applications for warrants and complaints from the police 
station to the Lynn Division of the District Court Department, 
where a clerk reviews and signs the applications. 
 
4 Detective Stephen Pohle did not recall his rationale for 
not seeking an after-hours arrest warrant. 
 
 
5 A "hot sheet" has "information that's put out to police 
officers within the department that explains incidents, what 
happened, the facts of incidents, [and] suspect information."  
The "hot sheet" "pass[es] on information" to "officers who may 
have not worked [the previous] shift." 
7 
 
 
with whom he had recently spoken while investigating another 
matter.  Kenny also knew where the defendant lived. 
Without an arrest warrant, but believing that there was 
probable cause to arrest the defendant and that exigent 
circumstances existed, Kenny and four other members of the 
warrant task force proceeded to the defendant's address.  The 
officers were dressed in plainclothes and had their badges 
displayed.6  Because of the information available to Kenny at the 
time -- the defendant's identification being fresh, the violent 
nature of the home invasion, the defendant's role in it, his 
possession of a firearm, the involvement of two accomplices, and 
the possibility that they might flee -- he believed that 
immediate action was required.7 
 
Upon arriving at the defendant's address, Kenny and two 
officers approached the front door, while two other officers 
went to the side of the house to secure a perimeter.8  Kenny 
                     
 
6 The officers arrived at the defendant's residence in 
unmarked police vehicles. 
 
 
7 The motion judge found that Sergeant Michael Kenny 
mistakenly believed that the defendant's identification had 
occurred that morning, immediately prior to Pohle's telephone 
call.  Testimony in the record indicates that Garcia had 
identified the defendant the previous day. 
  
 
8 Kenny described the dwelling as a "four-room rooming 
house" that "looks like a single-family house from the front."  
"There's a porch that goes up to the front door," and the front 
door is "clear glass."  "To the left and right of [the] door are 
8 
 
 
understood that the officers' presence might prompt the 
defendant to flee or destroy evidence.  Kenny's plan was to 
knock on the door to determine if the defendant was home, 
question him, and, if the opportunity arose, arrest him.  As 
Kenny ascended the front porch steps, the defendant saw the 
officers through the glass front door.  The defendant turned 
around and ran toward the back of the house.  One of the 
officers who was setting up a perimeter observed the defendant 
climbing through a window in the back of the house.  The officer 
shouted at the defendant to show his hands.  Instead, the 
defendant retreated into the house, out of the officer's view.  
Because of the volatile situation and the nature of the crimes 
involved, the officers forced their way through the front door.  
As they entered, they noticed the defendant coming toward them 
from the back of the home.  The officers ordered the defendant 
to the ground and handcuffed him in the hallway. 
After the defendant had been restrained, the officers 
conducted a protective sweep of the house and secured the 
premises.  During the protective sweep, Kenny made a plain view 
                     
windows, and the windows are to each separate room in the 
rooming house."  "When you walk in the front door, to the right 
is a door that goes to a bedroom," and "[o]n the left, is 
another door that goes to a bedroom."  "There is an open living 
room area, and . . . behind that is a kitchen area [with] stairs 
on the right . . . going to the second level." 
9 
 
 
observation of some jewelry on top of a refrigerator in the 
defendant's room that matched the description of the jewelry 
taken during the home invasion.9 
 
After the dwelling had been secured, Kenny prepared an 
application for a search warrant.  In his affidavit, Kenny 
relayed Garcia's account of the violent home invasion, Garcia's 
identification of the defendant, and that the defendant was 
brandishing a silver handgun.  He also included the plain view 
observations of the suspected stolen property he had seen during 
the protective sweep. A clerk-magistrate of the Lynn Division of 
the District Court Department approved the search warrant. 
 
During the execution of the search warrant, the officers 
seized items of evidentiary significance, including jewelry, a 
wallet, an electrical stun gun, and various identification cards 
bearing the defendant's name.  Also discovered were articles of 
clothing that matched the description given by Garcia of the 
clothes worn by the home invaders.  Following the search warrant 
execution, Garcia confirmed that the sweatshirt and the pants 
were consistent with the clothing worn by the defendant during 
the home invasion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Warrantless arrest.  Historically, the 
Massachusetts Constitution has carefully protected the home from 
                     
 
9 A description of the jewelry that had been taken from 
Garcia was in Pohle's incident report. 
10 
 
 
the intrusion by the government without a warrant, with certain 
delineated exceptions.  See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 
676, 684 (2010); Molina, 439 Mass. at 211.  The existence of 
exigent circumstances that make it impracticable to obtain a 
warrant is one such exception.  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 
Mass. 204, 213 (2014).10 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the warrantless arrest of the 
defendant in his home was justified because the defendant's 
reaction to the lawful police presence outside his home created 
exigent circumstances.  In making this argument, it maintains 
that the United States Supreme Court, in King, 563 U.S. at 469, 
abrogated prevailing Massachusetts jurisprudence when it held 
that "the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do 
not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened 
violation of the Fourth Amendment."  In other words, if the 
conduct of the police before their entry into the apartment was 
                     
 
10 Police may have reasonable grounds to believe that 
obtaining a warrant would be impracticable when the delay in 
doing so would pose a significant risk that the suspect may 
flee, evidence may be destroyed, or the safety of the police or 
others may be endangered.  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 
204, 213 (2014).  Although often used interchangeably in the 
cases, "impractical" is not "impracticable."  See J.A. Grasso, 
Jr., & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law 
§ 14-1[c][2] (2018).  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1136 (1963) defines "impractical" as "not wise to put 
into or keep in practice or effect," while "impracticable" is 
defined as "incapable of being performed or accomplished by the 
means employed or at command," id. 
11 
 
 
entirely lawful, the exigent circumstances exception applies.  
Id. 
The defendant contends that the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable because the 
police created the exigency themselves by not procuring a 
warrant before going to the defendant's residence.  He claims 
that the warrantless entry into his home violates his rights 
under art. 14, notwithstanding the fact that police officers may 
lawfully knock on a door and make inquiries.11 
 
The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 require that all searches 
and seizures be reasonable, and case law has held that all 
warrantless entries into a home are presumptively unreasonable.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 744-745 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Polanco, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 764, 769 (2018).  
Because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, however, "the warrant requirement is subject to 
                     
 
11 For the first time on appeal, the defendant contends that 
the officers' presence on his porch violated his rights under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  This argument is 
misplaced.  Neither the Federal nor the Massachusetts 
Constitution prohibits police from knocking on a citizen's door 
and making an initial inquiry.  See Commonwealth v. Leslie, 477 
Mass. 48, 57 (2017) ("a police officer, like any other citizen, 
has an implied license to walk up the path to the front door of 
a home and knock on the front door").  Contrast Collins v. 
Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (Fourth Amendment does 
not permit police officer, uninvited and without search warrant, 
to enter curtilage of home to search vehicle). 
12 
 
 
certain reasonable exceptions."  Ramos, supra at 745, quoting 
King, 563 U.S. at 459.  The Commonwealth may justify a 
warrantless entry into a home if the police had probable cause 
and exigent circumstances.  Molina, 439 Mass. at 209.  Under the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, 
"there must be a showing that it was impracticable for the 
police to obtain a warrant, and the standards as to exigency are 
strict."  Forde, 367 Mass. at 800. 
 
In Forde, we held that "a warrantless entry into a dwelling 
to arrest in the absence of sufficient justification for the 
failure to obtain a warrant" is impermissible.  Id. at 806.  We 
concluded that "where the exigency is reasonably foreseeable and 
the police offer no justifiable excuse for their prior delay in 
obtaining a warrant, the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement is not open to them."  Id. at 803.  Forde was 
decided solely on the basis of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
805-806. 
 
Later, in Molina, a case decided eight years before the 
Supreme Court's decision in King, we held:  "The Fourth 
Amendment . . . and art. 14 . . . scrupulously guard against the 
intrusion of the government into a citizen's home without a 
warrant."  Molina, 439 Mass. at 211.  We stated that "[t]he 
exigent circumstance requirement is not satisfied by virtue of 
altercations resulting from a warrantless arrest at the home, 
13 
 
 
where there is no showing of exigent circumstances leading to 
the warrantless arrest itself."  Id. 
 
In King, 563 U.S. at 462, the Supreme Court held that where 
"the police did not create the exigency by engaging or 
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth 
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of 
evidence is reasonable and thus allowed."  In an eight-to-one 
decision, the Court concluded that as long as "the police do not 
gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened 
violation of the Fourth Amendment," they may knock on a 
suspect's door and announce their presence, and the exigent 
circumstances rule may still apply.  Id. at 469.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gentle, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 249 (2011).  
"Molina and King thus appear inconsistent with each other as a 
matter of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."  Gentle, supra at 
251.  Our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment tracked that of 
the dissent in King.  As the sole dissenter, Justice Ginsberg 
reasoned, "How 'secure' do our homes remain if police, armed 
with no warrant, can pound on doors at will and, on hearing 
sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search 
for evidence of unlawful activity?"  King, supra at 475 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 
In Molina, we did not address whether art. 14 offers more 
protection than the Fourth Amendment in situations where, as 
14 
 
 
here, law enforcement's lawful conduct created the exigent 
circumstances that are in turn used to justify a warrantless 
search.  We take the opportunity to address this issue now. 
 
Our interpretation of art. 14 frequently aligns with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  However, we have sometimes held that art. 14 may 
provide more substantive protection to individuals than that 
provided by the Fourth Amendment.12  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 154 (2016) ("'probable cause [(not 
reasonable suspicion)] is the appropriate standard that must be 
met for a strip or visual body cavity search to be 
constitutionally permissible' under art. 14" [citation 
omitted]); Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) 
(declining to abandon inadvertence requirement of plain view 
                     
 
12 See Commonwealth v. Gentle, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 250 
(2011); Cordy, Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts 
Constitution, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 815, 821 (2011) ("the [Supreme 
Judicial Court] has repeatedly concluded that [art.] 14's 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are 
broader and more restrictive of police power than those of the 
Fourth Amendment"); Grasso, "John Adams Made Me Do It":  
Judicial Federalism, Judicial Chauvinism, and Article 14 of 
Massachusetts' Declaration of Rights, 77 Miss. L.J. 315, 340 
(2007) ("the [Supreme Judicial Court] has often recognized its 
authority and duty to interpret and enforce cognate provisions 
of the Massachusetts Constitution that afford greater 
protections than its federal counterpart"); Wilkins, The 
Massachusetts Constitution -- The Last Thirty Years, 44 Suffolk 
U. L. Rev. 331, 337 (2011) ("In the past three decades, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has resisted urgings to relax the 
requirements of art. 14 to conform to the Supreme Court's 
revisions of Fourth Amendment law" [footnotes omitted]). 
15 
 
 
exception to warrant requirement under art. 14, as Supreme Court 
did under Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 
Mass. 658, 668 (1999) ("under art. 14, the balancing of 
interests requires that Massachusetts citizens should not be 
subjected to unjustified exit orders during routine traffic 
stops"); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373–375 (1985) 
(retaining more stringent test under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
108 [1964], and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 [1969], 
rather than totality of circumstances standard); Gentle, 80 
Mass. App. Ct. at 250 ("Although the Supreme Judicial Court's 
interpretation of art. 14 has often converged with the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
when the Supreme Judicial Court has diverged it has emphasized 
its obligation to undertake an independent review of the State 
Constitution and the court's freedom to interpret the State 
Constitution to provide a different balancing of the interests 
of privacy and the police . . ."). 
 
Although we have not specifically answered the question 
whether art. 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth 
Amendment in these circumstances, we have repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of a person's right to privacy in the home.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 260 (2010) ("In 
view of the 'sanctity of the home,' 'all details [in the home] 
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from 
16 
 
 
prying government eyes'" [citation omitted]); Molina, 439 Mass. 
at 209; Balicki, 436 Mass. at 12 n.14 ("Nowhere are expectations 
of privacy greater than in the home, and '[i]n the home . . . 
all details are intimate details" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Marquez, 434 Mass. 370, 374 (2001); Commonwealth 
v. Straw, 422 Mass. 756, 760 (1996) ("it is in the home that a 
person's expectation of privacy is at its highest"); 
Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 68 & n.9 (1987) (art. 14 
affords greater privacy protection from government eavesdropping 
for conversations that occur in home); Forde, 367 Mass. at 805 
("The right of police officers to enter into a home, for 
whatever purpose, represents a serious governmental intrusion 
into one's privacy"). 
 
In the present case, balancing the interests of law 
enforcement with the rights of people to be protected from 
warrantless searches in the home, we conclude that art. 14 
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in these 
circumstances and that under art. 14 the police cannot avail 
themselves of the exigency exception to the warrant requirement 
when it was foreseeable that their actions would create the 
exigency, even if their conduct was lawful.  See Molina, 439 
Mass. at 210; Forde, 367 Mass. at 803. 
 
Here, before arriving at the defendant's home, Kenny knew 
that Pohle was in the process of getting an arrest warrant but 
17 
 
 
had not secured one.  Moreover, Kenny testified that his plan 
was to knock on the door to see if the defendant was home, 
question him, and if the opportunity arose, arrest him.  Based 
on his testimony, it was evident that Kenny went to the 
defendant's home with the purpose of making an arrest without a 
warrant.  There is nothing in the record indicating that it was 
impracticable to get a warrant. 
Likewise, it was reasonably foreseeable that the five 
police officers approaching the defendant's home could cause the 
defendant to attempt to flee.13  In fact, Kenny testified that he 
understood that the officers' presence might prompt the 
defendant to flee or destroy evidence.  See Forde, 367 Mass. at 
801.  The officers also set up a perimeter around the house to 
prevent the defendant from discarding evidence or escaping. 
 
There is no question that the police had developed probable 
cause to arrest the defendant prior to arriving at his home.  
Pohle decided not to pursue an after-hours arrest warrant, even 
though he testified that there was a procedure in place to get 
one.  There is also no question that it is generally permissible 
for police to approach a person's home and knock on the door.  
Commonwealth v. Leslie, 477 Mass. 48, 57 (2017).  However, Kenny 
had the opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant the morning of 
                     
 
13 Although the officers were in plain clothes, Kenny 
testified that their badges were displayed. 
18 
 
 
the arrest.  Forgoing multiple opportunities to procure an 
arrest warrant further highlights the unreasonableness of the 
arrest.  See Forde, 367 Mass. at 799, 801. 
 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth made no showing that it was 
impracticable to obtain an arrest warrant.  There was no 
evidence that there was a risk that the defendant would flee, 
destroy evidence, or be a risk to the officers' safety if the 
police followed the normal course and secured a warrant.  See 
Tyree, 455 Mass. at 687-691.  Compare Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 
213.  The crime occurred the previous day, and there was no 
evidence that the defendant even knew or had reason to know that 
he was a suspect before the police arrived at his home.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 217, cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1079 (2007) (exigent circumstances existed where witnesses 
to shooting told police that shooters had run into building and 
officers knocked on door and received no answer notwithstanding 
noises coming from apartment). 
The Commonwealth argues that because of the nature of the 
crime, the defendant's role in it, his possession of a firearm, 
the involvement of two accomplices, and the possibility that 
they might try to flee, the situation called for immediate 
action.  However, the police could have set up surveillance 
while they waited for the warrant and arrested the defendant if 
he left his house.  To this point, even though the Commonwealth 
19 
 
 
argued that the defendant might have fled, it did not articulate 
any basis to conclude that there was a risk of flight.  See 
Tyree, 455 Mass. at 689 ("the police had no reason to believe 
that the suspects were likely to flee the residence in the time 
it would have taken to procure a warrant to search the 
premises"); Molina, 439 Mass. at 210.  As in Molina, supra at 
211, "[t]his is a situation where the officers could have, and 
should have, secured a warrant. . . .  The exigent circumstances 
that emerged during the arrest were a result of the officers' 
appearance at the dwelling."  Considering all of the 
circumstances, the arrest of the defendant in his dwelling 
without a warrant was unreasonable.  Because the defendant's 
warrantless arrest in his apartment was unlawful, the police 
cannot rely on the plain view doctrine to allow the postarrest 
observations in evidence.  Forde, 367 Mass. at 807. 
 
2.  Waiver.  In a postargument letter invited by the court, 
the defendant contends that the Commonwealth waived any argument 
regarding the validity of the search warrant that was sought and 
executed after the defendant was arrested because the argument 
was raised neither below nor on appeal.  We agree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 634 (2006) ("Our 
system is premised on appellate review of that which was 
presented and argued below").  Contrast Commonwealth v. Perkins, 
478 Mass. 97, 107 (2017).  Nevertheless, we take this 
20 
 
 
opportunity to discuss the nexus requirement to issue a search 
warrant for a dwelling. 
 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, a search 
warrant may issue only on a showing of probable cause.  
Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 237 (2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018).  Probable cause means a "substantial 
basis" to conclude that "the items sought are related to the 
criminal activity under investigation, and that they reasonably 
may be expected to be located in the place to be searched at the 
time the search warrant issues" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521 (2017).  "Information 
establishing that a person is guilty of a crime does not 
necessarily constitute probable cause to search the person's 
residence."  Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983).  There must be probable cause to 
conclude not only that an individual committed a crime, but also 
that there is a nexus between the crime and the items sought, 
and the location to be searched.  The nexus to search a 
residence for evidence of a crime "may be found in the type of 
crime, the nature of the . . . items [sought], the extent of the 
suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as 
to where a criminal would be likely to hide [items of the sort 
sought]" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  See Perkins, 
478 Mass. at 104. 
21 
 
 
Some cases involving the search of a dwelling have used an 
articulation of the nexus standard that has sometimes been 
interpreted as being more stringent, particularly in cases 
involving searches of residences for drugs.  See, e.g., Perkins, 
478 Mass. at 104; Commonwealth v. Colondres, 471 Mass. 192, 201, 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 347 (2015); Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 
Mass. 721, 725-726 (2012); Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 
636, 644-646 (2012); Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 440-
441 (2009).  In one of those cases we stated:  "The affidavit 
need not convince the magistrate beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
must provide a substantial basis for concluding that [drugs or 
instrumentalities of the drug trade] will be found on the 
specified premises."  Pina, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  A "substantial basis" means 
no more and no less than that "[a]n affidavit must contain 
enough information for an issuing magistrate to determine that 
the items sought are related to the criminal activity under 
investigation, and that they reasonably may be expected to be 
located in the place to be searched at the time the search 
warrant issues."  Cinelli, 389 Mass. at 213.  "In determining 
whether an affidavit justifies a finding of probable cause, the 
affidavit is considered as a whole and in a commonsense and 
realistic fashion" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 386 (2018). 
22 
 
 
 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant stated that 
the defendant was identified by the victim, was seen brandishing 
a silver handgun, and struck Garcia and his baby during the home 
invasion with the gun.  The affidavit also stated that Kenny 
observed jewelry fitting the description of stolen jewelry 
during the protective sweep.  The search warrant was approved by 
a clerk-magistrate, and the police seized significant evidence, 
including articles of clothing that matched Garcia's description 
of the clothes worn by the home invaders. 
 
Here, probable cause to issue the search warrant remained 
even without considering Kenny's plain view observation of 
jewelry matching the description of the stolen jewelry.  The 
defendant used a handgun to strike Garcia and his child during 
the commission of the home invasion.14  It is reasonable to 
expect that the handgun specified in the warrant was an item 
that could reasonably be located in the home of a person who had 
participated in an armed home invasion the previous day.  
Cinelli, 389 Mass. at 212-213.  See Commonwealth v. Luthy, 69 
Mass. App. Ct. 102, 105 (2007) ("The connection between the 
items to be seized and the place to be searched does not have to 
be based on direct observations; it may be found by looking at 
the type of crime, nature of the items, the suspect's 
                     
 
14 The defendant did not fire the handgun during the home 
invasion. 
23 
 
 
opportunity to conceal items, and inferences as to where the 
items are likely to be hidden").  In Commonwealth v. James, 424 
Mass. 770, 778 (1997), we held that the defendants had no reason 
to dispose of the instrumentalities used in a murder -- knives, 
sneakers, and a face mask -- because the defendants were unaware 
that they were suspects and "all of [the] items [were] durable, 
of continuing utility to the defendants, and it was reasonable 
to expect that they would be kept at home, particularly as they 
are not inherently incriminating to possess."  We noted, 
however, that a defendant who has fired a handgun in the 
commission of a murder "would not keep at home an incriminating 
handgun which could be readily identified as the murder weapon 
through ballistics tests."  Id. at 778 n.15.  The defendant here 
did not fire his firearm, but used it to strike Garcia and his 
baby.  That a person would keep a handgun that was not 
vulnerable to ballistic testing in his or her home is not a 
remarkable proposition.  See United States v. Cowling, 648 F.3d 
690, 696 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 940 (2012) 
("people generally keep [firearms] at home or on their persons" 
[quotation and citation omitted]); United States v. Jones, 994 
F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (firearms are "the type[] of 
evidence likely to be kept in a suspect's residence").  The fact 
that the handgun was ultimately not discovered is of no 
consequence.  Had the argument been preserved, it is likely that 
24 
 
 
the evidence seized as a result of the search would not have 
been suppressed. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court judge allowing 
the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.