Case Title: ELISSA A. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of the First Restatement of the Elissa A. Omohundro Revocable Trust Agreement dated April 8, 2005; WILLIAM D. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of the First Restatement of the William D. Omohundro Revocable Trust Agreement dated April 8, 2005; and the MC FAMILY OF COMPANIES, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company V. TIMOTHY S. SULLIVAN and KAREN L. SULLIVAN, husband and wife; WILLIAM J. NOVOTNY, JR. and MARILYN J. NOVOTNY, husband and wife; DAVID J. GOEHRING and LYNDA A. GOEHRING, husband and wife; BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the William L. Grala Family Trust dated October 19, 2004, created under the First Restated William L. Grala Trust dated September 26, 2001; and BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the First Restated Babette L. Grala Trust dated September 26, 2001

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0027

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
ELISSA A. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of the First Restatement of the Elissa A. Omohundro Revocable Trust Agreement dated April 8, 2005; WILLIAM D. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of the First Restatement of the William D. Omohundro Revocable Trust Agreement dated April 8, 2005; and the MC FAMILY OF COMPANIES, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company V. TIMOTHY S. SULLIVAN and KAREN L. SULLIVAN, husband and wife; WILLIAM J. NOVOTNY, JR. and MARILYN J. NOVOTNY, husband and wife; DAVID J. GOEHRING and LYNDA A. GOEHRING, husband and wife; BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the William L. Grala Family Trust dated October 19, 2004, created under the First Restated William L. Grala Trust dated September 26, 2001; and BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the First Restated Babette L. Grala Trust dated September 26, 20012009 WY 38202 P.3d 1077Case Number: S-08-0027, S-08-0028Decided: 03/13/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ELISSA 
A. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of the First Restatement of the Elissa A. Omohundro 
Revocable Trust Agreement dated April 8, 2005; WILLIAM D. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of 
the First Restatement of the William D. Omohundro Revocable Trust Agreement 
dated April 8, 2005; and the MC FAMILY OF COMPANIES, LLC, a Wyoming limited 
liability company,

 
 
Appellants

 
 
(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
TIMOTHY 
S. SULLIVAN and KAREN L. SULLIVAN, husband and wife; WILLIAM J. NOVOTNY, JR. and 
MARILYN J. NOVOTNY, husband and wife; DAVID J. GOEHRING and LYNDA A. GOEHRING, 
husband and wife; BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the William L. Grala Family Trust 
dated October 19, 2004, created under the First Restated William L. Grala Trust 
dated September 26, 2001; and BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the First Restated 
Babette L. Grala Trust dated September 26, 2001,

 
 
Appellees

 
 

(Plaintiffs).

 
 
TIMOTHY 
S. SULLIVAN and KAREN L. SULLIVAN, husband and wife; WILLIAM J. NOVOTNY, JR. and 
MARILYN J. NOVOTNY, husband and wife; DAVID J. GOEHRING and LYNDA A. GOEHRING, 
husband and wife; BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the William L. Grala Family Trust 
dated October 19, 2004, created under the First Restated William L. Grala Trust 
dated September 26, 2001; and BABETTE L. GRALA, Trustee of the First Restated 
Babette L. Grala Trust dated September 26, 2001,

 
 
Appellants

 
 
(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
ELISSA 
A. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of the First Restatement of the Elissa A. Omohundro 
Revocable Trust Agreement dated April 8, 2005; WILLIAM D. OMOHUNDRO, Trustee of 
the First Restatement of the William D. Omohundro Revocable Trust Agreement 
dated April 8, 2005; and the MC FAMILY OF COMPANIES, LLC, a Wyoming limited 
liability company,

 
 
Appellees

 
 

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

 
 
The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants in Case No. S-08-0027:

 
 
Kendal 
Hoopes, Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; Anthony T. Wendtland, 
Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Messrs. Hoopes and 
Wendtland. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellees in Case No. S-08-0027:

 
 
Kim 
P. Cannon and Sasha Johnston, Davis & Cannon, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Cannon.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files a dissenting opinion in 
which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellants 
(hereinafter referred to as Omohundro Trusts) own interests in Tract 6 of the 
Twin Lakes subdivision near Buffalo, Wyoming, and Appellees (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as the Sullivan Group) own Tracts 1 through 4.  The parties dispute whether, under the 
subdivision restrictive covenants, Omohundro Trusts were required to obtain 
consent from all of the landowners before they could take action which would 
allow the City of Buffalo (herein referred to as the City) to obtain the water 
rights appurtenant to the subdivision lands.  The district court ruled, on summary 
judgment, that the restrictive covenants unambiguously required the approval of 
the owners of all of the tracts.  We 
agree and, consequently, affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Omohundro 
Trusts present this issue for our consideration in Case No. S-08-0027:  

 
 
Can 
the covenants and restrictions contained in the Covenants for Twin Lakes, Buffalo, Wyoming, 
which document specifically states that the restrictive covenants were 
created for and imposed upon Tracts 1-5, be extended by implication to also 
restrict the use of Tract 6?

 
 
The 
Sullivan Group lists three issues in Case No. S-08-0027:

 
 
1.  Is there any reason, as a matter of law, 
that the Exhibit B lands could not be burdened in favor of the Exhibit A lands 
for whose benefit the Covenants were imposed?

 
 
2.  Is there any ambiguity in the language 
of Section 3.13 of the Covenants?

 
 
3.  Does the plain language of Section 3.13 
of the Covenants support the District Court's declaratory judgment that the 
consent and approval of all Landowners is necessary before the Developer can 
take any action, step or procedure to annex the Exhibit B lands to the City of 
Buffalo under terms which would allow the City to receive ownership and control 
of a portion of these territorial water rights?

 
 
In 
its cross-appeal in Case No. S-08-0028, the Sullivan Group states the following 
issue:

 
 
            
If the Supreme Court does not simply affirm the District Court's summary 
judgment based on the plain meaning of the Covenants, may the Court consider 
uncontroverted facts and contextual evidence concerning the water rights which 
were the subject of Section 3.13 of the Covenants in the course of its de novo review?

 
 
Omohundro 
Trusts restate the issue in Case No. S-08-0028 as:

 
 
            
Should this Court, in construing the Covenants, consider extrinsic 
evidence that contradicts the plain language of the document and is asserted for 
the purpose of enlarging and adding to the restrictive covenant at 
issue?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
In 
1994, Gerald Kaufmann acquired a 209 acre ranch known as the Crain property and 
its appurtenant water rights.  The 
City owned an easement across the Crain property for a water line, and the 
existing ranch house was supplied with City water.  Mr. Kaufmann entered into a "Water 
Connector's Agreement" with the City in which the City agreed to provide six 
additional residential water taps to the property.  The agreement also provided that, if the 
property were ever subdivided into more than seven parcels so that additional 
water taps were requested, the City would have the option to acquire the water 
rights appurtenant to all of the property.    

 
 

[¶4]        
After 
executing the Water Connector's Agreement, Mr. Kaufmann conveyed the property to 
Twin Lakes L.C. (Twin Lakes), a company in which he and William Omohundro were 
members.  Twin Lakes subdivided the 
property into six lots.  Tracts 1 
through 4 were vacant lots, each a little larger than 35 acres.  Tract 5 was approximately 11 acres and 
included the existing ranch house.  
Tract 6 was the largest, at just over 50 acres.  Twin Lakes executed and filed the 
restrictive covenants now at issue, then sold the lots.  

 
 

[¶5]        
Omohundro 
Trusts, the current owners of Tract 6, entered into an agreement in 2006 giving 
MC Family of Companies, LLC the option to purchase the property.  They have plans for Tract 6 to be 
annexed into the City and subdivided into approximately 90 residential 
lots.  The Sullivan Group includes 
the current owners of Tracts 1 through 4.1  In a complaint for declaratory judgment, 
the Sullivan Group asserted that the restrictive covenants require the approval 
of the owners of Tracts 1 through 5 before Omohundro Trusts could proceed with 
the development and annexation plans on Tract 6 because, pursuant to the Water 
Connector's Agreement, such action would allow the City to acquire the water 
rights appurtenant to all of the property.  
The development plans have been put on hold pending the outcome of this 
litigation.    

 
 

[¶6]        
The 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and each supported its motion 
with extrinsic evidence to aid the court in interpretation of the 
covenants.  The district court ruled 
that it would not consider any extrinsic evidence, granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Sullivan Group and enjoined Omohundro Trusts from taking any action 
that would result in the transfer of the water rights to the City.  It ruled that the restrictive covenants 
were unambiguous and that they obligated Omohundro Trusts to obtain approval 
from the other tract owners before annexing and developing Tract 6.  Omohundro Trusts appealed the summary 
judgment and injunction in Case No. S-08-0027, and the Sullivan Group appealed 
the district court's refusal to consider the extrinsic evidence in interpreting 
the covenants in Case No. S-08-0028.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      Pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyo. Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  "A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted."  Id.  We review a summary judgment decision 
using the same materials and following the same standards as the district 
court.  Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2007 WY 161, ¶ 9, 169 P.3d 61, 64 (Wyo. 2007).  Summary judgment involves a purely legal 
determination; consequently, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).  
  

 
 
[¶8]      Interpretation of 
covenants imposing restrictions or conditions on the use of land is a matter of 
law for the courts.  Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Ass'n, 2002 
WY 94, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Wyo. 2002).  Interpretation of unambiguous covenants 
is, therefore, properly addressed in a motion for summary judgment.  Boley v. Greenough, 2001 WY 47, 
¶ 10, 22 P.3d 854, 857-58 (Wyo. 2001).  On the other hand, if covenants are 
ambiguous, their interpretation generally raises genuine issues of material fact 
and summary judgment is precluded.  
Jackson Hole Racquet Club Resort 
v. Teton Pines Ltd. Partnership, 839 P.2d 951, 958 (Wyo. 
1992).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Covenants are 
contractual in nature and are interpreted according to principles of contract 
law.  Goglio, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d  at 1079.  A court's goal is to determine and 
effectuate the intention of the parties, especially the grantor or 
declarant.  Stevens v. Elk Run Homeowners' Ass'n, 
Inc., 2004 WY 63, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 2004).  We first examine the language of the 
covenants and give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.  Seven Lakes Dev. Co., L.L.C. v. Maxson, 
2006 WY 136, ¶ 10, 144 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 2006).  We consider the whole document and not 
just one clause or paragraph.  Stevens, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d  at 1166.  A disagreement between the parties as to 
the meaning of covenants does not give rise to an ambiguity.  Hansen v. Little Bear Inn Co., 9 P.3d 960, 964 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶10]   In the document entitled "Covenants 
for Twin Lakes, Buffalo, Wyoming," Tracts 1 through 5 are referred to as 
"Exhibit A' lands," while Tract 6 is referred to as "Exhibit B' lands."  Section 3.13 of the restrictive 
covenants is at the heart of this dispute:

 
 
            
3.13 NO FURTHER SUBDIVISION.  
Except as expressly provided herein, no lot may be split or subdivided 
for purposes of creating an additional home site except upon the written consent 
of 100% of all lot owners within the development as well as the consent of the 
owners of those lands adjoining the development, said lands being described on 
Exhibit "B" attached.  Lot line 
adjustments between adjacent property owners shall be permitted with the consent 
of the Architectural Control Committee provided that such adjustments are made 
in accordance with all applicable statutory, governmental, and local rules and 
regulations and that any such adjustment shall not necessitate or require more 
than a total of five (5) water taps to be furnished to the entire development 
from the City of Buffalo . . . .

 
 
            
Attached to these covenants as Exhibit "C" is an agreement between the 
City of Buffalo and Gerald M. Kaufmann (predecessor to the declarant) relative 
to the supplying of water taps from the water system of the City of Buffalo to 
lots within the development and those lands on Exhibit "B" attached hereto.  The terms and provisions of said 
agreement are incorporated herein by reference and all owners shall be bound by 
its provisions.  Notwithstanding any other provision in this 
declaration, any action, step or procedure (including without limitation, the 
further subdivision of any lot within the development) or the omission of any 
act, step or procedure which would allow or entitle the City of Buffalo to take 
possession, ownership, and control of the irrigation water rights applicable to 
the development on Exhibit "B" lands as set forth in said attached agreement 
shall require the written consent and approval of 100% of all lot owners within 
the development as well as the record owner(s) of Exhibit "B" 
lands.

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)  

 
 
[¶11]   The parties agree that the planned 
development and annexation of Tract 6 is an "action . . . which would allow or 
entitle the City of Buffalo to take possession, ownership, and control of the 
irrigation water rights applicable to the development on Exhibit B' lands," or 
Tract 6.  The Sullivan Group, 
relying on the bolded portion of Section 3.13 of the covenants, asserts that 
such action requires "the written consent and approval" of all owners of Exhibit 
"A" lands "as well as the record owner(s) of Exhibit B' lands."  Omohundro Trusts, on the other hand, 
contend that when the entire document is considered, that provision of Section 
3.13 should be interpreted to apply only to actions taken by owners of Exhibit 
"A" lands.  

 
 
[¶12]   The district court agreed with the 
Sullivan Group that approval of all owners was required.  It ruled in relevant 
part:

 
 
The 
covenants are unambiguous.  Section 
3.13 of the covenants requires all landowners of lands described in Exhibit A to 
the covenants to consent to any action that results in a transfer of Exhibit B 
water rights.  The proposed 
annexation would result in the transfer of these water rights from the current 
owner to the City of Buffalo.  The 
[Sullivan Group landowners] own property described in Exhibit A, and they have 
not consented to the petition to annex.  
The actions taken by the [Omohundro Trusts] are contrary to the 
requirements of the covenants.  

 
 
[¶13]   As we stated earlier, we consider 
all parts of the covenants in interpreting a provision.  The recitation paragraphs of the 
restrictive covenants begin:

 
 
            
A.        
Declarant is the owner of that certain property in the County of Johnson, 
State of Wyoming, which is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto.

 
 
            
B.        
Declarant has established a general plan, set forth in this declaration, 
for the subdivision, improvement and development of the real property, and 
desires to secure the harmonious and uniform development of the real property in 
accordance with the said general plan.

 
 
            
NOW, THEREFORE, declarant hereby declares that the real property 
described on Exhibit "A" is, and shall be, held, conveyed, hypothecated and 
encumbered, subject to the following limitations, restrictions and covenants and 
all of which are declared and agreed to be for the purpose of enhancing, 
maintaining and protecting the value and attractiveness of the real 
property.  Said limitations, 
restrictions and covenants shall run with the land, shall be binding on and 
inure to the benefit of all parties, and their successors and 
assigns.

 
 
 
 
The 
recitations explicitly provide that Tracts 1 through 5, described in "Exhibit 
A," are subject to the limitations, restrictions, and covenants.  The covenants contain no provision 
subjecting Tract 6 to those limitations.  
Moreover, the "general plan" set forth in the declaration includes only 
Tracts 1 through 5.  

 
 
[¶14]   The definitions section of the 
restrictive covenants also focuses on Tracts 1 through 5.  The terms "development" and "property" 
are defined to "mean and refer to all that certain real property which is 
described on Exhibit A.'"  The term 
"lot" is defined as "any of the separate plots of land within the 
development."  The term "owner" 
refers to the record owner of any lot.  
  

 
 
[¶15]   Omohundro Trusts argue that because 
the recitals at the beginning of the covenants mention only Exhibit "A" lands 
and the definitions of "development or property" and "lot" include only Exhibit 
"A" lands, the covenants cannot, or were not intended to, impose any burden on 
Exhibit "B" lands.  However, that 
interpretation is in direct conflict with the plain language of Section 
3.13.

 
 
[¶16]   When all of the language of Section 
3.13 is examined, its meaning is clear.  
The first paragraph prohibits further subdivision of a lot without 
consent of all of the owners of lots and the owners of "those lands adjoining 
the development, said lands being described on Exhibit B' attached."  No one questions that the provision 
creates a right in lands outside of those described in the recitation paragraphs 
of the covenants.  That right is 
intended to run with the Exhibit "B" lands, just as all of the covenants are 
intended to run with the lands described in Exhibit "A."  When the developer subdivided the entire 
property, it apparently deemed it important to restrict future subdivision of 
the Exhibit "A" lands by giving the owners of Exhibit "B" lands the right to 
approve the subdivision of its neighbors' property.  Neither party contends that the 
developer lacked the power to create that right in these covenants even though 
Exhibit "B" lands are not included in the definition of "property" or 
"lot."  

 
 
[¶17]   The second paragraph of Section 
3.13 contains equally clear language.  
First, it incorporates Exhibit "C," the Water Connector's Agreement with 
the City, into the covenants.  
Accordingly, that agreement must be considered in analyzing the "four 
corners" of the covenants.  The 
Water Connector's Agreement applies to all of the lands in the "Crain 
[p]roperty" including both Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" lands; provides that if 
the Crain property is divided into more than seven (7) parcels resulting in 
requests for additional water taps, the City shall have the right to demand that 
the water rights "appurtenant to the Crain [p]roperty" be transferred to the 
City reserving to the Crain property only enough water to maintain the 
reservoirs; requires the developer to deposit a deed to those water rights into 
escrow for transfer when those contingencies occur; and requires those water 
rights to be beneficially used and maintained in good standing, and if they are 
not so used for a period of three years, gives the City the right to demand 
transfer of those rights.    

 
 
[¶18]   Under the terms of the Water 
Connector's Agreement, the owners of any portion of the Crain property have an 
equal interest in maintaining the Crain property water rights and in preventing 
any action that would cause those rights to be transferred to the City without 
the agreement of the owners of all of the property.  In light of this agreement, it is 
understandable that the developer would create, and that potential buyers would 
want, covenants that would restrict the right of all owners, including both 
Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" owners, from taking any action that would give the 
City the right to acquire the water rights attributable to all of the property. 
 Apparently, Omohundro Trusts have 
since negotiated a revised agreement with the City that would result in only the 
water right appurtenant to Exhibit "B" lands being transferred to the City upon 
subdivision of that property.  
However, the parties' intent at the time the covenants were created is 
the relevant question and, under the original terms of the Water Connector's 
Agreement, subdivision of Exhibit "B" lands would have resulted in the City 
being entitled to demand transfer of the entire Crain property water 
rights.    

 
 
[¶19]   Twin Lakes owned all of the lands 
at the time the covenants were executed.  
The legal description of Exhibit "B" lands is attached to the 
covenants.  Omohundro Trusts do not 
cite any authority that would prohibit a declarant from creating different 
benefits and burdens on separate parcels of land described in the 
covenants.  While the remainder of 
the covenants, as provided by the recitals and the definitions, apply only to 
Exhibit "A" lands, the language of Section 3.13 creates a limitation on any 
actions related to water rights on Exhibit "B" lands.  No legal reason has been identified which 
would prohibit the owner of all of the lands from creating such a 
restriction.

 
 
[¶20]   Omohundro Trusts suggest that the 
district court read language into Section 3.13 that does not exist when it ruled 
the restrictive covenants unambiguously required the consent of all landowners 
to its subdivision plans.  They 
argue the interpretation urged by the Sullivan Group and accepted by the 
district court results in adding "by the owner of the Exhibit B' lands" to 
modify the action requiring consent of all owners.  However, no such insertion of language 
is necessary because the language chosen by the declarant was all-inclusive. 
 In fact, Omohundro Trusts' 
interpretation is one that requires the court to insert language where it does 
not exist.  They want this Court to 
conclude the covenants mean only an action "by the owners of Exhibit A' lands" 
requires the consent of all.  
Section 3.13 does not contain that limitation.  Instead, it expressly applies to "any 
action," and is even preceded by the explicit phase, in bold-faced type, "Notwithstanding any other provision in this 
declaration."  By its language, 
that caveat includes the recitation paragraphs that Omohundro Trusts claim 
should be interpreted as applying the restrictions in the covenants only to 
Exhibit "A" lands.  Therefore, it 
appears the declarant explicitly chose very broad language in Section 3.13 to 
insure that the rights of the future owners of all of the lands in the Crain 
property were equally protected from the possibility that their water rights 
could be ceded to the City because of the actions of one of their 
neighbors.

 
 
[¶21]   Before the district court, and in 
their appellate briefs, Omohundro Trusts contend the language of the covenants 
is unambiguous and nothing beyond the documents themselves should be 
considered.  However, they then 
claim if this Court agrees with the district court's interpretation, a question 
of fact is somehow created, where none existed before.  They claim that factual question iswhat 
was the declarants' intent?  We do 
not understand this circular reasoning.  
The question of law for this Court is the intent of the declarants as 
expressed by the unambiguous language in the document.  While giving lip service to the concept 
that differing interpretations do not create questions of fact, Omohundro Trusts 
suggest that the parties' divergent opinions on the meaning of the covenants do 
just that.

 
 
[¶22]   Although the parties offered 
evidence that they contended addressed the facts and circumstances surrounding 
execution of the covenants and asked the district court to consider that 
evidence in interpreting the covenants, the district court declined to do so and 
relied solely upon the language of the covenants.  We have often stated the law on this 
issue and have done so recently in Ecosystem Res. L.C. v. Broadbent Land 
& Res., L.L.C., 2007 WY 87, ¶ 
10, 158 P.3d 685, 688 (Wyo. 2007):

 
 
[E]ven 
if a contract is unambiguous, we can examine evidence of the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the deed to arrive at the parties' intent.  Hickman, ¶¶ 6-11, 71 P.3d  at 
257-58.  Relevant considerations may 
include the relationship of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and 
the parties' purpose in making the contract.  Id.

 
 

[¶23]   Omohundro 
Trusts offered the affidavit of William Omohundro as support for its reading of 
the covenants in its summary judgment motion.  As a member of Twin Lakes, Mr. Omohundro 
was one of the declarants to the covenants.  He stated in his affidavit: 

 
 
As 
expressly stated throughout the Covenants, it was always the express intent of 
the Twin Lakes owners at all times to burden only Tract Nos. 1-5 with the 
Covenants.  To the extent that the 
Covenants otherwise identify or reference the Tract No. 6[] lands, it was always 
the express intent of the Twin Lakes owners that they make such references only 
to provide additional protections for the Tract No. 6 parcel but not to burden 
the Tract No. 6 with the Covenants in any way or to obligate any owner of Tract 
No. 6 to any of the owners of Tract Nos. 1-5 under the Covenants in any 
way.  

 
 
[¶24]   If this averment was intended to be 
evidence of the declarants' subjective intent with regard to the effect of the 
covenants on Tract 6, it was not relevant, and, therefore, not admissible.  A party's subjective intent is not 
relevant in contract interpretation cases because we use an objective approach 
to interpret contracts.  Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 231 (Wyo. 2000).  In Shrum v. Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 
(Wyo. 1977), in the context of an ambiguous contract, we stated:  

 
 
There 
remains a genuine dispute as to the meaning of the contract term cows.' One 
says it means one thing, the other, another.  It must be realized that all that is 
before the court is the subjective expressions of the plaintiffs' buyer agent 
and the defendants and those expressions are at opposite poles.  One or the other may or may not 
represent what the parties really intended by their transaction.  The intent of the parties can only be 
ascertained by an objective not subjective approach in contract situations.  The subjective intent of the parties is 
ordinarily irrelevant.  An objective 
test is applied.  A party's 
intention will be held to be what a reasonable man in the position of the other 
party would conclude his manifestations to mean.  Calamari & Perillo, Law of 
Contracts, HB, § 12, p. 14; 13 Williston on Contracts, 3d Ed.  (Jaeger), § 1536, p. 
11.

 
 

See 
also, 
Williston on Contracts, §§ 30:6, 31:4 (unambiguous contracts); 33:39 (ambiguous 
contracts) 4th Ed. (1999).  Thus, 
evidence of the declarants' subjective intention is not relevant or admissible 
to interpret the contract, whether its language is ambiguous or not.  

 
 
[¶25]   Moreover, Omohundro Trusts' 
proffered evidence was just a rehash of their interpretation of the 
covenants.  Omohundro Trusts offered 
no evidence of the declarants' objective intent other than the language of the 
covenants themselves.  To the extent 
that the proposed extrinsic evidence was inconsistent with the express language 
of the document, it was not admissible.  See, e.g., Collins v. Finnell, 2001 WY 74, ¶ 10, 29 P.3d 93, 98 (Wyo. 2001); Frost Constr. 
Co. v. Lobo, Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998).  The relevant facts and circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the document can be gleaned from the covenants 
themselves and the documents attached thereto, including the Water Connector's 
Agreement with the City.2  

 
 
[¶26]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
owner of Tract 5 is not involved in this case.

 
 

2In 
their cross appeal, the Sullivan Group claims the district court erred by 
refusing to consider their proposed extrinsic evidence, which included evidence 
of the historical ownership, administration and use of the water rights 
appurtenant to the entire Crain property.  
Because we conclude that the district court properly interpreted the 
unambiguous language of the covenants, it is unnecessary for us to address the 
cross appeal.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶27]   I respectfully dissent.  I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that the pertinent language in the restrictive covenants is 
unambiguous.  Objectively, the 
language is ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations regarding the 
necessity of consent from all Exhibit "A" lot owners before subdivision of 
Exhibit "B" lands can occur.  The 
interpretation of an ambiguous restrictive covenant raises genuine issues of 
material fact that preclude summary judgment.  Jackson Hole Racquet Club Resort, 839 P.2d  at 958.  I would reverse the 
grant of summary judgment and remand for trial.

 
 

[¶28]   In interpreting restrictive 
covenants, we endeavor to effectuate the intent of the declarant.  Stevens, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d  at 
1166.  We must consider the entire 
document, not a single sentence or paragraph in isolation.  Id.  The declaration of restrictive covenants 
at issue here is a twenty-seven page document.  As the majority opinion recognizes, the 
entire document, with the possible exception of the single sentence at the heart 
of this dispute, applies only to Exhibit "A" lands.  That sentence is:

 
 
Notwithstanding 
any other provision in this declaration, any action, step or procedure 
(including without limitation, the further subdivision of any lot within the 
development) or the omission of any act, step or procedure which would allow or 
entitle the City of Buffalo to take possession, ownership, and control of the 
irrigation water rights applicable to the development on Exhibit "B" lands as 
set forth in said attached agreement shall require the written consent and 
approval of 100% of all lot owners within the development as well as the record 
owner(s) of Exhibit "B" lands.

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 
[¶29]   This sentence does not specify 
whose actions are restricted or what lands are to be burdened by the 
restrictions.  The Omohundro Trusts 
assert that this sentence is consistent with the rest of the document and is 
intended to restrict actions taken by the owners of Exhibit "A" lands, and to 
burden only Exhibit "A" lands.  The 
Sullivan Group contends that the sentence is intended to restrict actions taken 
by the owners of both Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" lands, and to burden both 
properties.  Because the sentence is 
silent about whose actions are restricted, and which properties are to be 
burdened, both interpretations are plausible.  When language can reasonably be 
interpreted more than one way, it is ambiguous.  See, e.g., 
Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 592 (Wyo. 1994).  

 
 

[¶30]   The majority accepts the Sullivan 
Group's position.  In reaching that 
result, the majority relies upon two propositions that are not warranted by the 
language of the document.  First, in 
paragraph 18, the majority states that it is "understandable that the developer 
would create, and that potential buyers would want, covenants that would 
restrict the right of all owners, including both Exhibit A' and Exhibit B' 
owners, from taking any action that would give the City the right to acquire the 
water rights attributable to all of the property."  While it may be understandable that 
potential buyers of Exhibit "A" lots would want the right to control development 
of Exhibit "B" property, there is no specific unambiguous language in the 
document reflecting the intent of the declarant/developer to convey that right 
to the Exhibit "A" owners.  The 
observation by the majority may be a fair inference to be gleaned from the 
document, but it is, at most, an inference.  Another, and conflicting, inference that 
could also be drawn from the document is that the declarant/developer did not 
intend to provide Exhibit "A" lot owners with veto power over the development of 
Exhibit "B" lands.  Neither 
inference finds direct support in the language of the restrictive 
covenants.  If an inference must be 
made about the developer's intent, it should, at this stage of the legal 
proceedings, be made in favor of the Omohundro Trusts, the party opposing 
summary judgment.  Mathisen, 
¶ 9, 169 P.3d  at 64.

 
 

[¶31]   Second, 
and perhaps more significantly, the majority 
concludes that the restrictions created by the disputed sentence are 
"all-inclusive," applying to both Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" lands.  Again, I do not believe that 
interpretation is supported by the language of the entire document or the 
specific language of the sentence in dispute.  The sentence is found in the second 
paragraph of Section 3.13, a section entitled "No Further Subdivision."  The first paragraph of this section 
provides that Exhibit "A" lands cannot be further subdivided without the consent 
of all owners of Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" lands.  It is undisputed that this restriction 
applies only to the further subdivision of Exhibit "A" lands.  The paragraph does not mention 
subdivision of the Exhibit "B" lands, or give any indication of an intent to 
restrict further subdivision of the Exhibit "B" lands.  

 
 
[¶32]   The Omohundro Trusts assert that 
the sentence is intended to burden the Exhibit "A" property only.  Their suggested interpretation is 
buttressed by the parenthetical phrase in the sentence immediately following the 
restricting language: "(including without limitation, the further subdivision of 
any lot within the development)."  
It is undisputed that the terms "lot" and "development" as used in the 
document refer only to Exhibit "A" lands.  
The limiting nature of the parenthetical phrase is difficult to reconcile 
with the "all-inclusive" interpretation adopted by the majority.  The phrase is not addressed in the 
majority's analysis and raises a question: If the declarant/developer intended 
to be all-inclusive and restrict development of all property, why was the 
parenthetical example limited to further subdivision of Exhibit "A" 
property?  It is abundantly clear 
that further subdivision of Exhibit "A" lands and its impact on water rights was 
considered and addressed in the document.  
There is no corresponding explicit unambiguous language in the document 
in general, or in Section 3.13 in particular, evidencing an intent to restrict 
further subdivision of Exhibit "B" lands.

 
 

[¶33]   In the final analysis, I am 
convinced that there is more than one objectively reasonable interpretation of 
the disputed sentence.  
"The 
only way to shake out what the parties intended or did not intend is by the 
adversary process of a trial."  Shrum, 559 P.2d  at 1387.  Accordingly, 
I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case to allow the 
district court to resolve the ambiguity at trial.