Case Title: In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System1988 WY 19753 P.2d 76Case Number: 85-203, 85-205, 85-217, 85-218Decided: 02/24/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
In re: The 
GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN THE BIG HORN RIVER SYSTEM and 
all other sources, State of Wyoming.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellant

 
 
v.

 
 
OWL CREEK 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT MEMBERS; Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes; Landis Webber and 
Barbara Webber, individually and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle Company, Bertha 
Jones and Grace Graboski; United States; City of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation 
District, and Riverton Valley Irrigation District, 
Appellees

 
 
OWL CREEK 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT MEMBERS, Appellants

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes; Landis Webber and Barbara Webber, 
individually and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle Company, Bertha Jones and Grace 
Graboski; United States; City of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation District, and 
Riverton Valley Irrigation District, Appellees

 
 
SHOSHONE AND 
ARAPAHOE TRIBES, Appellants

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, Owl Creek Irrigation District Members, Landis Webber and Barbara 
Webber, individually and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle Company, Bertha Jones and 
Grace Graboski; United States; City of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation District, 
and Riverton Valley Irrigation District, Appellees

 
 
Landis WEBBER 
and Barbara Webber, individually and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle Company, 
Bertha Jones and Grace Graboski, Appellants

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming; Owl Creek Irrigation District Members; Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes; 
United States; City of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation District, and Riverton 
Valley Irrigation District, Appellees

 
 
CITY OF 
RIVERTON, 
Midvale Irrigation District, and Riverton Valley Irrigation District, 
Appellants

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming; Owl Creek Irrigation District Members; Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes; 
Landis Webber and Barbara Webber, individually and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle 
Company, Bertha Jones and Grace Graboski; United States, 
Appellees

 
 
UNITED STATES, 
Appellant

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, Owl Creek Irrigation District Members; Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes; 
Landis Webber and Barbara Webber, individually and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle 
Company, Bertha Jones and Grace Graboski; United States; City of Riverton, 
Midvale Irrigation District, and Riverton Valley Irrigation District; Albert 
Hornecker and Hornecker Livestock Co., Inc., Donald Bath and DHB & Co., and 
PLB & Co., Bradford Bath, Griffin Brothers, Incorporated, Ralph Floyd 
Urbigkit, Charles Richardson and Richard and Elsie Martin, all non-Indian 
parties, Appellees

 
 
Albert 
HORNECKER and Hornecker Livestock Co., Inc., Donald Bath and DHB & Co., and 
PLB & Co., Bradford Bath, Griffin Brothers, Incorporated, Ralph Floyd 
Urbigkit, Charles Richardson and Richard and Elsie Martin, all non-Indian 
parties, Appellants

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, Owl Creek Irrigation District Members; Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes; 
United States; Landis Webber and Barbara Webber, individually and  on behalf of Red Creek Cattle Company, 
Bertha Jones and Grace Graboski; City of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation District, 
and Riverton Valley Irrigation District, Appellees

 
 
Robert W. 
HARVEY and Olga J. Harvey, Mary O. Ahlborn, Owen Barnett and Eva M. Barnett, 
Black Butte Livestock Company, Campbells, Inc., Phyllis L. Crandall and Kenneth 
Ward Crandall, Billy M. and Barbara J. Daniels, Carl Dockery and Carol Dockery, 
Clyde R. Fisher and Gloria A. Fisher, Charles Goldben, Gary V. Kellogg and 
Brenda Joyce Kellogg, Russell E. Long and Irene M. Long, William A. Matthews, 
Arthur D. McCumber, Marvin W. Meyer and Ernestine S. Meyer, Vern Nelson and 
Carolyn R. Nelson, Norwest Bank of Omaha N.A., Norris Edwin Odde and F. Louise 
Odde, William Okie, Kenneth and Iona Outland, Sylvia Paulsen, Jerry D. Redding 
and Shelia C. Redding, Red Lane Watershed Improvement District, C. Duane Rush 
and Katherine C. Rush, Brian F. Sanford and Kathleen Sanford, Norman L. Sanford, 
Newell S. Sessions and Daisy E. Sessions, Barbara Smith, Robert Stewart, Town of 
East Thermopolis, Ve Bar Livestock Company, Raymond C. and Delores J. Weese, and 
Ruth Clare Yonkee, Appellants

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, United States; Owl Creek Irrigation District Members; Shoshone and 
Arapahoe Tribes; Landis Webber and Barbara Webber, individually and on behalf of 
Red Creek Cattle Company, Bertha Jones and Grace Graboski; United States; City 
of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation District, and Riverton Valley Irrigation 
District; Albert Hornecker and Hornecker Livestock Co., Inc., Donald Bath and 
DHB & Co., and PLB Co., Bradford Bath, Griffin Brothers, Incorporated, Ralph 
Floyd Urbigkit, Charles Richardson, and Richard and Elsie Martin, all non-Indian 
parties, Appellees

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General; 
S. Jane Caton, Assistant Attorney General; Steven F. Freudenthal, Special 
Assistant Attorney General with Freudenthal, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & 
Rideout, Cheyenne; Houston G. Williams, Special Assistant Attorney General, with 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper; Michael D. White and David F. 
Jankowski, Special Assistant Attorneys General, with White and Jankowski, 
Denver, Colorado; and Randall T. Cox, Special Assistant Attorney General, with 
Omohundro and Palmerlee, Buffalo, for the State of Wyoming. Argument presented 
by Michael D. White, for Type 1 and 2 Claims, and Randall T. Cox for Type 1, 2 
and 3 Claims; also present at counsel table were A. G. McClintock, Wyoming 
Attorney General, and S. Jane Caton, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Ruth Clare Yonkee, Thermopolis, for 
Red Lane Watershed Improvement District, Town of East Thermopolis;

 
 
C. Edward Webster, II, Cody, for Owl 
Creek Irrigation District;

 
 
Donald P. White of White & 
White, Riverton, for City of Riverton, Midvale Irrigation District and Riverton 
Irrigation District;

 
 
Kenneth Guido, Jr., Washington, District of Columbia for Shoshone 
Tribe;

 
 
W. Richard West, Jr. and Susan M. 
Williams of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington, District 
of Columbia, and B. Kevin Gover and Susan M. Williams of Gover, Williams & 
Stetson, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Thomas W. Fredericks, Dale T. White, and 
Robert S. Pelcyger of Fredericks & Pelcyger, Boulder, Colorado, and William 
J. Thomson and W. Perry Dray of Dray, Madison & Thomson, Cheyenne for 
Shoshone and Northern Arapahoe Tribes;

 
 
Michael S. Messenger of Messenger 
& Jurovich, Thermopolis, for Landis Webber and Barbara Webber, individually 
and on behalf of Red Creek Cattle Company,

 
 
Bertha Jones and Grace 
Graboski;

 
 
F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant 
Attorney General and James J. Clear, Department of Justice, Washington, District of 
Columbia for United States;

 
 
Sky D Phifer of Phifer & Phifer, 
Lander, for Albert Hornecker and Hornecker Livestock Co., 
Inc.,.

 
 
Donald Bath and DHB & Co., and 
PLB & Co., Bradford Bath, Griffin Brothers, Inc., Ralph Floyd Urbigkit, 
Charles Richardson and Richard and Elsie Martin;

 
 
Ross D. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, 
Kahl & Kath, Powell, for Willwood Irrigation District and Deaver Irrigation 
District.

 
 
Oral argument presented by Robert S. 
Pelcyger for Arapahoe Tribes, Type 1, 2, and 3 Claims; C. Edward Webster II for 
Owl Creek Irrigation District, Type 2 Claims; Donald P. White for private 
parties City of Riverton, et al., Type 1 Claims; James J. Clear for United 
States, Type 1 and 2 Claims; Michael S. Messenger for private parties Type 3 
Claims; Sky D Phifer for Hornecker, et al., Type 3 Claims; also present at 
counsel table were Ruth Clare Yonkee; Dale T. White; Thomas W. Fredericks; David 
F. Jankowski; and B. Kevin Gover, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., and W. Richard West, Jr., 
attorneys for the Shoshone Tribes. 

 
 
Before Brown, C.J., Cardine, and 
Macy, JJ. Thomas, Justice and Hanscum, District 
Judge.

 
 
I 
INTRODUCTION

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
district court's order adjudicating rights to use water in the Big Horn River 
System and all other sources within the State's Water Division No. 3. The 
district court modified the special master's recommended decree. All parties 
have appealed from the district court's amended judgment and decree. We affirm 
in part and reverse in part.

 
 
A. Geography and 
History

 
 

[¶2.]     We begin by 
acknowledging the comprehensive reports of both the special master and the 
district court and our use of these reports in our preparation of this section 
of this opinion.

 
 

[¶3.]     Water Division No. 3 is 
essentially identical with what is known as the BigHornRiver drainage basin. (See map in 
original). It is located in Fremont, Hot Springs, 
Washakie, Big Horn and Park counties in northwestern and west central Wyoming and includes parts of YellowstoneNational Park. Other federal entities 
included are the Wind River Indian Reservation, located in the southeastern 
portion of the region, consisting of approximately 4,000 square miles of land 
area, the Shoshone and Big Horn National Forests, the East Fork Winter Elk 
Pasture, the Sheridan County Elk Winter Pasture, the Yellowtail Wildlife Habitat 
Management Area, the Middle Creek Drainage Area of Yellowstone National Park, 
the Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area, and numerous public water 
reserves, water wells and stock driveways upon federal lands administered by the 
Bureau of Land Management.

 
 

[¶4.]     The topography of the 
area is varied. It includes mountain peaks and valleys, high plateaus, terraced 
stream valleys and low desert badlands. Elevations range from 3,870 feet near 
the town of Basin to over 13,000 feet in the 
Wind River Range. On the reservation the 
elevation varies from 4,500 feet at the northeastern corner near the 
Wind RiverCanyon to 12,500 feet in the Wind 
River Range.

 
 

[¶5.]     The primary drainage 
system in the division is the Wind River-Big Horn River which originates in 
northern FremontCounty and leaves the Division at the Wyoming-Montana 
border in northern BigHornCounty. By statutory 
definition the division also includes the Clark's Fork of the YellowstoneRiver, § 41-3-501(a) (iii), W.S.1977, originating in 
northwestern ParkCounty, which drains much 
of the northwestern portion of the region. The Shoshone River, a major tributary 
of the BigHornRiver 
which originates in northern ParkCounty and joins the Big Horn at the 
Yellowtail Reservoir, is the other major drainage system in Division 
3.

 
 

[¶6.]     The history of the 
BigHornBasin 
for purposes of this case begins in the early 1800's when explorers, trappers 
and traders began traveling into northwestern Wyoming, part of the vast hunting grounds of 
the peripatetic Shoshone Indians. Neither group encroached on the other and 
relations were friendly. Nonetheless, in 1865, the United States, hoping to preserve the peace and 
stability, reached an agreement delineating the area within which the Eastern 
Shoshone roamed, a 44,672,000 acre region comprising parts of Wyoming, Colorado and 
Utah. 
Following the Civil War, as the westward movement gained momentum, the 
United 
States government realized the size of the 
region set aside for Indians only was unrealistic, and on July 3, 1868, executed 
the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger with the Shoshone and Bannock Indians, 
establishing the Wind River Indian Reservation.

 
 

[¶7.]     During their first 
years on the reservation, the Shoshone Indians were still dependent on the 
buffalo as the mainstay of their life, but as the supply rapidly decreased, they 
began to rely upon an agricultural economy. During the 1870's the Shoshone 
Indians increased their efforts in both farming and ranching. The Shoshone ceded 
lands beyond the Popo Agie back to the United States in the 1872 Brunot 
Agreement. The Arapahoe moved to the reservation in 1878. By the 1880's it 
wasevident that the agricultural economy of the Indians was failing, and by 
1895, the Indians on the Wind River Indian Reservation were totally dependent on 
the government for food, clothing and shelter. These economic misfortunes 
compelled them to sell more of their land to the United States. 
The First McLaughlin Agreement, or Thermopolis Purchase, was concluded in 1897; 
the Big Horn Hot Springs was the main feature of the lands ceded to the 
United 
States for cash payment. An additional 
1,480,000 acres of reservation land were ceded to the Government in the Second 
McLaughlin Agreement in 1904-1905. The revenue derived helped to develop the 
remaining reservation lands (which came to be known as the "diminished 
reservation"). The United States Government offered the ceded lands for sale to 
others, under the provisions of the homestead, townsite, coal and mineral land 
laws, and reimbursed the Tribes or expended for the benefit of the Tribes the 
money raised by the sales.

 
 

[¶8.]     The earliest non-Indian 
settlements in northwestern and north central Wyoming were near the gold and silver fields in the South 
Pass area of the Wind River Range. These mining 
camps soon expanded into permanent farming and ranching communities which relied 
primarily on cattle ranching and dryland or easily-irrigated farming for 
sustenance. By the mid-1800's, many small communities had been established by 
settlers who had obtained their land under the Congressional land disposal acts. 
By the early 1900's most of the best land in the region was occupied by ranches 
or irrigated farms. Yet the settlers continued to arrive, forcing gradual 
expansion onto the dry basin floors and prompting the development of many 
irrigation projects, often sponsored jointly by private citizens and the 
United 
States. The arrival of the homesteaders in the 
WindRiver Basin significantly 
altered the Indian's economic base. As the number of settlers and their farms 
increased, the number of Indians working their own farms and ranches decreased, 
and they began to rent and eventually to sell their land while hiring themselves 
out as laborers.

 
 

[¶9.]     In 1934, all remaining 
lands which had been ceded to the United States by the 1904 agreement 
were reserved from non-Indian settlement. In 1940, the Secretary of Interior 
began a series of restorations of certain undisposed lands to tribal ownership. 
These lands again became part of the existing Wind River Reservation. In 
addition, the United 
States later reacquired, in trust for the 
Tribes, additional ceded land and certain lands within the diminished 
reservation which previously had passed into private ownership. Since 1953, the 
size of the reservation has remained fairly stable.

 
 
B. Procedural History of the 
Instant Litigation

 
 

[¶10.]  On January 22, 1977, Wyoming enacted § 
1-1054.1, W.S.1957 (now § 1-37-106, W.S.1977), authorizing the State to commence 
system-wide adjudications of water rights. The State of Wyoming filed the complaint commencing this litigation and 
naming the United 
States as a defendant on January 24, 1977, in 
the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶11.]  The United 
States removed the case to the United States District Court 
for the District of Wyoming in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, claiming the state court was without 
jurisdiction in this suit against the United States. The federal district 
court granted the State's motion to remand the case to state court on June 1, 
1977, finding that the McCarran Amendment and § 1-37-106, W.S.1977, provided for 
jurisdiction in the state court.

 
 

[¶12.]  On August 21, 1977, the 
United 
States moved to dismiss in state court, again 
alleging that the state court was without jurisdiction and that the Tribes were 
an indispensable party. The court granted the Tribes' motion for leave to file 
an amicus curiae brief on the dismissal motion. The Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian 
Tribes also moved to intervene, alleging that the United States 
would not adequately represent their interests. The court granted intervention 
on November 21, 1977, and the Tribes entered their appearance. On December 20, 
1977, Judge Joffe denied the United 
States' motion to dismiss and granted  the State of Wyoming partial summary judgment on the 
United 
States' jurisdictional 
defenses.

 
 

[¶13.]  On April 20, 1978, the State moved the 
court to certify this case to the Board of Control pursuant to § 
1-37-106(a)(i)(A)(I), W.S.1977. Judge Joffe entered a First Order of 
Certification and Referral to the Wyoming State Board of Control on August 22, 
1978. The United 
States and the Tribes objected to the 
certification and moved for the appointment of a special master. After receiving 
suggestions, selecting a master and allowing time for objections, Judge Joffe 
appointed the special master on May 4, 1979. The First Order of Certification 
and Referral to a special master, entered on May 29, 1979, charged the special 
master with the duty to:

 
 
"1. Determine the status of those 
rights which are evidenced by previous Court decrees, as set out in Appendix B 
to the Complaint herein, as well as those rights evidenced by certificates 
heretofore issued by the Board of Control, as set out in Appendix C to the 
Complaint herein, which Appendices may be revised to more accurately reflect the 
records of the State Engineer and State Board of Control.

 
 
"2. Determine the status of all 
uncancelled permits to acquire the right to use of water as set out in Appendix 
D and Appendix E to the Complaint herein, which Appendices may be revised to 
more accurately reflect the records of the State Engineer and State Board of 
Control.

 
 
"3. Adjudicate any interest in or 
right to use the water of the Big Horn River System and all other sources within 
Water Division No. 3, State of Wyoming, arising under the permits described 
in paragraph 2, above.

 
 
"4. Determine the extent and 
priority date of the adjudicate [sic] any other interest in or right to use the 
water of the Big Horn River System within Water Division No. 3, State of 
Wyoming, not otherwise represented by the aforedescribed decrees, certificates, 
or permits, including, but not limited to, any appropriate or reserved rights of 
the Arapahoe Tribe, Shoshone Tribe, or of the United States in either its 
proprietary or fiduciary capacity, which may be hereafter identified by said 
Tribes or the United States and which are not subject to the decrees, permits 
and/or certificates described in paragraphs 1 and 2 
above."

 
 
The United States 
filed its initial statement of claims on March 6, 1980, and supplemental claims 
on May 29, 1980. The Tribes filed an additional claim on April 4, 
1980.

 
 

[¶14.]  The case was divided into three phases: 
Phase I, Indian reserved water rights (appeal decided here); Phase II, 
non-Indian federal reserved water rights (completed); and Phase III, state water 
rights evidenced by a permit or certificate (pending).

 
 

[¶15.]  The master approved stipulations allowing 
provisional confirmation of adjudicated rights and settling boundaries and 
dates. He also dismissed the off-reservation hunting and fishing claims and 
denied summary judgment on instream flow claims made by the Bureau of Land 
Management. The trial began January 26, 1981, and concluded December 
1981.

 
 

[¶16.]  The special master signed his 451-page 
Report Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims by and on Behalf of the Tribes in 
the Wind River Reservation on December 15, 1982, covering four years of 
conferences and hearings, involving more than 100 attorneys, transcripts of more 
than 15,000 pages and over 2,300 exhibits.

 
 

[¶17.]  The report recognized a reserved water 
right for the Wind River Indian Reservation and determined that the purpose for 
which the reservation had been established was a permanent homeland for the 
Indians. A reserved water right for irrigation, stock watering, fisheries, 
wildlife and aesthetics, mineral and industrial, and domestic, commercial, and 
municipal uses was quantified and awarded.

 
 

[¶18.]  A final judgment adjudicating the 
non-Indian federal reserved water rights (Phase II), pursuant to stipulation, 
was entered February 9, 1983.

 
 

[¶19.]  The State of Wyoming, the United States, 
the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, and numerous private parties presented 
objections  to the master's report, 
and on May 10, 1983, Judge Joffe entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment approving that portion of the master's report awarding reserved 
water rights for practicably irrigable acreage within the Wind River Indian 
Reservation and refusing to accept that portion of the master's report 
recommending an award of reserved water rights for other than agricultural 
purposes.

 
 

[¶20.]  On May 13, 1983, this case was assigned 
to State District Judge Alan B. Johnson. The United States, the State of Wyoming and the Tribes 
then moved to alter or amend Judge Joffe's decree. On May 24, 1985, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P., the Amended Judgment and Decree from which this appeal is 
taken was entered.

 
 

[¶21.]  A 95-page Supplemental Report was filed 
June 1, 1984, recommending that those individuals who succeeded to the interests 
of an Indian allottee and individuals owning land which had once been part of 
the reservation but was obtained under public land acts and not directly from an 
allottee be awarded state permit priority dates. As to the remaining state water 
rights, the master recommended future proceedings. On May 24, 1985, Judge 
Johnson entered an order deferring acceptance of the June 1, 1984 Supplemental 
and Final Report of the Master, providing:

 
 
"Reservation reserved rights are 
rights created by the courts solely for the protection and enjoyment of Indian 
tribes so that they can make their reservations their homelands. These rights do 
not pass to successors in interest to Indian lands. Therefore, this Court will 
not award to non-Indian parties an 1868 priority date for their water rights." 
(Citations omitted.)

 
 
The court held that non-Indian 
successors were entitled to water rights with priority dates established by 
permits and/or certificates issued by the State of Wyoming, or by evidence 
of appropriation of water for beneficial use and deferred decision on these 
claims.

 
 

[¶22.]  On July 5, 1985, the United States moved for reimbursement of one-half 
the special master's fees and expenses (Phase I costs) on grounds that the 
McCarran Amendment prohibits assessment of costs against the United States. 
The motion was denied.

 
 
II 
JURISDICTION

 
 

[¶23.]  Early in the litigation, the Tribes 
challenged the jurisdiction created by § 1-37-106, W.S.1977, on grounds that 
Article 21, § 26 of the Wyoming Constitution, the so-called disclaimer 
provision, barred any state court adjudications of Indian water rights. On 
appeal the Tribes concede that there is no federal law preventing state courts 
from adjudicating Indian reserved water rights but maintain that the disclaimer 
provision of the Wyoming Constitution barred the district court, as a matter of 
state law, from asserting jurisdiction over their water rights. Because the 
Tribes' claim involves construction of the Wyoming Constitution, not a federal 
question, our decision on this issue is final.  Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 561, 103 S. Ct. 3201, 77 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1983).

 
 

[¶24.]  Article 21, § 26 of the Wyoming 
Constitution states:

 
 
"The people inhabiting this state do 
agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the 
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all 
lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, 
and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United 
States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States and that said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States * * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶25.]  This disclaimer is almost identical to 
those found in the constitutions and enabling acts under which Congress admitted 
most western states into the Union. See 
Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Montana, and Washington); Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, § 3, 28 Stat. 
107, 108 (Utah); Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, § 3,  34 Stat. 267, 270 (Oklahoma); Enabling 
Act of June 20, 1910, § 2, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 558-559, 569 (New Mexico and 
Arizona); Enabling Act of July 7, 1958, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, as amended by Act of 
June 25, 1959, § 2(a), 73 Stat. 141 (Alaska). See also Ariz. Const., Art. 20, 
para. 4; Idaho 
Const., Art. 21, § 19; Mont. Const., Ordinance No. 1; N.M. Const., 
Art. 21, § 2; Utah Const., Art. 3. The disclaimers and 
enabling acts did not establish new bars to state jurisdiction over Indians. 
They were simply intended to make clear that the new states entered the Union 
subject to the same jurisdictional limitations first imposed upon the other 
states by the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832). See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribes, supra 
463 U.S. at 561-563; Comment, State 
Disclaimers of Jurisdiction Over Indians: A Bar to the McCarran Amendment, 18 
Land & Water L.Rev. 175, 180 (1983) (discussing Draper v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 240, 17 S. Ct. 107, 41 L. Ed. 419 (1896)).

 
 

[¶26.]  The argument that the state disclaimer 
should be interpreted to be more protective of the Tribes than the controlling 
federal law, the McCarran Amendment, has been presented to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Courts of Arizona and New Mexico. Each of these 
courts has rejected the argument.  
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116, 1130, 
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 995, 100 S. Ct. 530, 62 L. Ed. 2d 426 
(1979); United States v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 144 
Ariz. 265, 697 P.2d 658, 669 (1985); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, 88 
N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014, 1015 (1976). The persuasive logic of these courts was 
well stated by the Arizona Supreme Court:

 
 
"If one thing is clear on this 
issue, it is that the Enabling Act and the provisions which it required to be 
inserted in the state constitution were intended to ensure supremacy of federal 
policy and federal law with regard to Indian land. The federal policy, asserted 
in the McCarran Amendment, is that the United States is '. . . . to 
represent, as guardian, * * * * the Indian tribes in any state court general 
water rights adjudication proceeding . . . .' Jicarilla, supra, 601 F.2d  
at 1130. There is no clear necessity to read the disclaimer provisions of 
article 20, para. 4 of the state constitution as a cession of exclusive 
jurisdiction. We prefer, if possible, the interpretation which best serves the 
purposes and objectives of federal law and federal policy, which we acknowledge 
as supreme in this area. One of those objectives is that Indian claims to 
surface waters ordinarily be adjudicated in state court as part of a general 
water rights adjudication, with the United States representing Indian 
interests.  San Carlos, 463 U.S. at [564], 103 S. Ct.  at 3212. Unless compelled by unambiguous language, we refuse to 
interpret the provisions of the Arizona Constitution so restrictively as to 
defeat federal policy when supremacy of that policy was the very objective 
Congress sought to accomplish by requiring article 20, para. 4 to be part of the 
organic law of this state." United States v. Superior Court In and For 
Maricopa County, supra, 697 P.2d  at 669. See also Arizona v. San Carlos 
Apache Tribe, supra, 463 U.S.  at 562-563, 103 S. Ct.  at 3211; and Comment, supra, 18 Land & Water L. Rev. at 
198-199.

 
 

[¶27.]  Just one court, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, has held a state constitutional disclaimer to be an independent bar 
to state jurisdiction over Indian water rights.  Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982). But this case was reversed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, supra 463 U.S. 545, 103 S. Ct. 3201, holding that it was not the business of the Ninth 
Circuit to interpret Montana's disclaimer as a bar to state jurisdiction after 
the Montana court had decided to exercise jurisdiction:

 
 
"To the extent that a claimed bar to 
state jurisdiction in these cases is premised on the respective State 
Constitutions, that is a question of state law over which the state courts have 
binding authority. Because, in each of these cases,  the state courts have taken jurisdiction 
over the Indian water rights at issue here, we must assume, until informed 
otherwise, that--at least insofar as state law is concerned--such jurisdiction 
exists." Id., 463 U.S.  at 561, 103 S. Ct.  at 3210.

 
 

[¶28.]  We have never had occasion to consider 
the effect of the Wyoming disclaimer provision upon a water 
case, although it was considered in a civil case involving a collision between a 
motor vehicle and a horse on the Wind River Indian Reservation. State ex rel. 
Peterson v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, Wyo., 617 P.2d 1056 
(1980). There we agreed that the disclaimer provision should be interpreted to 
be consistent with federal law, stating:

 
 

"McClanahan [v. State Tax Commission 
of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1973)] thus suggests that 
interpretation of Article 21, Section 26, of the Wyoming Constitution is largely 
a question of federal law." Id., 617 P.2d  at 1067.

 
 

[¶29.]  We hold that Article 21, § 26 of the 
Wyoming Constitution only bars state jurisdiction over Indian water rights when 
federal law also bars that jurisdiction. Congress's policy under the McCarran 
Amendment is to allow state courts to adjudicate Indian water rights as part of 
general stream adjudications.  
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, supra 463 U.S.  at 564-565, 103 S. Ct. 
at 3212; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145-146, 96 S. Ct. 2062, 2073, 48 L.  
Ed. 2d 523 (1976). Because of the McCarran Amendment, there is no federal 
law which prevents the State from adjudicating the Indian water rights on the 
Big Horn River System. The district court correctly assumed jurisdiction in this 
case.

 
 
III IS THERE A 
RESERVED WATER RIGHT FOR THE WINDRIVER INDIAN 
RESERVATION?

 
 
A. Preliminary 
Matters

 
 
1. Preservation of Objections for 
Review and Standard of Review in General

 
 
Rule 53(e)(2), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

 
 
"(2) In Non-Jury Actions.-In an 
action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings 
of fact unless clearly erroneous. Within 10 days after being served with notice 
of the filing of the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon 
the other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report and upon 
objections thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 
6(d). The court, after hearing, may adopt the report or may modify it or may 
reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions."

 
 
Whether objections to the master's 
report must be made in the district court to preserve an issue for appeal has 
not previously been before this court. But, federal courts construing the 
similar federal rule, F.R.C.P. 53(e), generally hold it unnecessary to make 
objections to a special master's report.  
Henry Hanger and Display Fixture Corporation of America v. Sel-O-Rak 
Corporation, 270 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1959); Shima v. Brown, 77 U.S. 
App. D.C. 115, 133 F.2d 48, 49, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 318 U.S. 787, 63 S. Ct. 982, 87 L. Ed. 1154 (1943). In Mitchell v. All-States Business Products 
Corporation, 250 F. Supp. 403, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), the court 
stated:

 
 
"The Rule provides that 'any party 
may serve written objections,' but it is not necessary to make objections to the 
Master's findings as permitted therein.  
Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp. of America v. Sel-O-Rak 
Corp., 270 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1959). The Rule clearly gives the court the 
power to modify the Master's report upon a motion for action upon the report and 
the failure of the Secretary to timely serve objections does not limit this 
power. 5 Moore, 
Federal Practice para. 53.12 [1]. Cf., Bingham Pump Co. v. Edwards, 118 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656, 62 S. Ct. 107, 86 L. Ed. 525 (1941); United Statesv. 1,674.34 Acres of Land, More or Less, in 
Benton County, Arkansas, 220 F. Supp. 893 (W.D.Ark. 
1963)."

 
 

[¶30.]  We consider the federal courts' 
construction of Rule 53(e), see Centric Corp. v. Drake Bldg. Corp., Wyo., 
726 P.2d 1047 (1986); B-T Ltd. v. Blakeman, Wyo., 705 P.2d 307 (1985); 
and State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County, Wyo., 696 P.2d 54 (1985), and hold that the district court, absent objection, could review 
the special master's report. Rule 52(b), W.R.C.P. It is appropriate that this 
court also review the master's report and actions of the district court. 
Objections are unnecessary to preserve an issue for 
appeal.

 
 

[¶31.]  The bulk of objections made involve the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the awards or deletions from claims. When 
addressing a sufficiency of the evidence question, this court looks only at the 
evidence most favorable to the prevailing party, giving to it every favorable 
inference, and leaving out of consideration entirely evidence in conflict 
therewith.  Allstar Video, Inc. 
v. Baeder, Wyo., 730 P.2d 796, 798 (1986); Wangler v. Federer, Wyo., 
714 P.2d 1209, 1216-1217 (1986); Tremblay v. Reid, Wyo., 700 P.2d 391, 
392 (1985); City of Rock Springs v. Police Protective Association, Wyo., 
610 P.2d 975, 980 (1980).

 
 
2. Collateral 
Estoppel

 
 

[¶32.]  The doctrine of collateral estoppel 
prevents relitigation of "issues which were involved actually and necessarily in 
the prior action between the same parties." Delgue v. Curutchet, Wyo., 
677 P.2d 208, 214 (1984). The State of Wyoming 
is not estopped from litigating the question of intent to reserve water by 
United States v. Hampleman, No. 753, June 26, 1916 (D. Wyo.), because 
the court there decided only that the water rights of the Indian allottees were 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 
The State was not a party to United States v. Parkins, 18 F.2d 642 (D. 
Wyo. 1926), which indicated water had been reserved for the Indians. The case of 
Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620 (1955), does not 
collaterally estop Wyoming from raising the question of intent to reserve water 
because the basis of that decision is that the plaintiffs failed to make their 
case for injunctive relief on the facts; the question of intent to reserve water 
was, therefore, not involved. It is clear that these cases do not collaterally 
estop the State of Wyoming from litigating the question of intent 
to reserve water.

 
 
3. Equitable 
Estoppel

 
 

[¶33.]  It is claimed that the 
United States should be 
equitably estopped from asserting Indian water rights for the reservation 
because the United 
States induced settlers to relocate on the 
ceded reservation lands and other lands in the Division and acquire water rights 
under state law.

 
 

[¶34.]  The practice of the United States of obtaining state water permits 
did not mislead the individual appropriators to believe that the 
United 
States would not seek future water rights with 
an 1868 priority date. The United States should not be estopped 
from claiming a water right priority date for the future projects which would 
defeat the rights of other water users. A finding of affirmative misconduct is a 
prerequisite to invoking the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.

 
 

[¶35.]  This court recognized the element of 
affirmative misconduct in DeWitt v. Balben, Wyo., 
718 P.2d 854, 861-862 (1986) wherein we cited the 
following:

 
 
"Equitable estoppel or estoppel by 
misrepresentation is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a person 
whereby he is precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights 
against another person relying on such conduct; and it arises where a person, by 
his acts, representations, or admissions, or even by his silence when it is his 
duty to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to 
believe that certain facts exist, and the other person rightfully relies and 
acts on such belief, and will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny 
the existence of such facts." (Emphasis added.) 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 59, p. 367 
(1964). See also Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 104 S. Ct. 2218, 81 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1984) 
(reasonable  reliance on definite 
misrepresentation to one's detriment required).

 
 
It is clear that in order to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a government or public agency 
functioning in its official capacity there must be a showing of affirmative 
misconduct.  Greub v. Frith, Wyo., 717 P.2d 323, 326 (1986); Big Piney Oil and Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 
Wyo., 715 P.2d 557 (1986). See also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 1668-69, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947); Utah Power and LightCo. v. 
United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405-409, 37 S. Ct. 387, 391, 61 L. Ed. 791 
(1917).

 
 

[¶36.]  In the case at bar, there is no doubt 
that the United 
States facilitated settlement of non-Indian 
lands in Water Division No. 3. In addition, during the period 1905-1908, the 
United 
States obtained state water permits for some 
145,000 acres of Indian lands on the Wind River Indian Reservation and began 
construction of the irrigation project. Judge Johnson was correct in concluding 
that none of this indicates affirmative misconduct on the part of the 
United 
States.

 
 
4. Burden of 
Proof

 
 

[¶37.]  The record is unclear as to which party 
was given the burden of proof with respect to the existence of a reserved water 
right. Insofar as the special master may have placed the burden of establishing 
its claims to water on the United States, he did not err. It is 
well established that "the burden of proof is on the party asserting the 
affirmative of any issue.  
Morrison v. Reilly, Wyo., 
511 P.2d 970 (1973)." Osborn v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121, 1124 
(1984). See, e.g., Younglove v. Graham and Hill, Wyo., 526 P.2d 689, 693 
(1974) (burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense); 
Hawkeye-SecurityInsurance Company v. Apodaca, Wyo., 524 P.2d 874, 879 
(1974) (burden of showing an exception to statute of limitations is on the one 
claiming the exception). Here, the Tribes and the United States 
asserted "affirmative claims" to reserved water rights for the Indians. The 
master accepted the Tribes' proposal that the parties be realigned, ordering 
that the United 
States and the Tribes be realigned as 
plaintiffs.

 
 

[¶38.]  The McCarran Amendment did not 
contemplate that the United 
States would be absolved from the usual burdens 
once it was joined in litigation. "If we were sued, we would have to prove * * * 
* our Indian Rights * * * *." Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., on S.18, 
1951 at 7. The United 
States has been required to establish its 
reserved water rights.  
United 
States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705, 98 S. Ct. 3012, 3016, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1978); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598, 83 S. Ct. 1468, 1497, 10 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1963); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 638, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1401, 75 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1983). Block v. North Dakota ex 
rel. Board of University and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 288, 103 S. Ct. 1811, 1820, 75 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1983) does not undercut these cases, because 
nothing indicates that the McCarran Amendment attaches any condition that the 
United States be relieved from ordinary burdens of proof in 
litigation.

 
 

[¶39.]  The special master could not have erred 
in requiring the Tribes and the United States to substantiate their 
claim that water had been reserved for the Wind River Indian Reservation. 
Because they prevailed on this issue, they were not harmed in any 
event.

 
 
B. Was There an Intent to Reserve 
Water?

 
 
1. Analysis 
Below

 
 

[¶40.]  Both the special master and the district 
court undertook the rigorous analysis called for by United 
States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. 
at 700, 98 S. Ct. at 3014: "Each time this Court has applied the 
'implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,' it has carefully examined both the 
asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, 
and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be 
entirely defeated."

 
 

[¶41.]  In determining that there was intent to 
reserve water for the reservation, the special master looked to the treaty, the 
decision of Winters v. UnitedStates, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908), and the act admitting Wyoming to the Union. He "analyzed the 348 
'Intent and Purposes' exhibits offered by the State of Wyoming, along with the competent argument of counsel for 
the State of October 7, 1981, supporting the position that 
no reservation of water exists." The master also studied Merrill v. 
Bishop, supra 287 P.2d 620. The foregoing indicates quite clearly that the 
special master did not blindly presume a reserved water right existed, but that 
he examined the law and the evidence relating to intent and simply found against 
the State.

 
 

[¶42.]  Nor did the district court blindly 
presume intent to reserve water. Judge Joffe adopted the report of the special 
master with some exceptions. He rejected the State's argument that there was no 
intent to reserve water because it would not only run counter to his 
interpretation of the intent of Congress but it would also run counter to 
controlling law on the subject. Judge Johnson adopted Judge Joffe's decision on 
intent to reserve water.

 
 
2. The Appeal

 
 
a. Intent to Reserve Water in 
1868

 
 

[¶43.]  The treaty establishing the Wind River 
Indian Reservation, signed on July 3, 1868, ratified on February 16, 1869, and 
proclaimed on February 24, 1869, Treaty of Ft. Bridger, 15 Stat. 673 (1869), is 
silent on the subject of water for the reservation. Yet both the district court 
and the special master found an intent to reserve water. We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶44.]  The case of Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 86 
Or. 617, 169 P. 121, 127 (1917), does not support Wyoming's position that 
because the Wind River Indians did not need water in 1868, there is no basis for 
implying a reserved water right. Unlike the lands involved in Byers, the lands 
in the case at bar did require water to produce crops in 1868. In addition, 
Byers prevailed in that case because her competing water right was granted by 
Congress.  Id., 169 P. 
at 122-123.

 
 

[¶45.]  Congress, by passing the settlement acts, 
intended non-Indian settlers to obtain water rights. An award of Indian reserved 
water rights would damage the interests the settlers had established under state 
law. The settlement acts do not, however, simply by recognizing that water is 
important to settlers, indicate that water was not important to the Indians as 
well. Nor do the acts indicate that Congress did not intend to reserve necessary 
water for the Indians.

 
 

[¶46.]  In 1890, Wyoming was admitted to the United States. 
The act provided that -- "Wyoming * * * * is hereby declared admitted to the 
union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever; and 
that the constitution which the people of Wyoming have formed for themselves be, 
and the same is hereby, accepted, ratified, and confirmed." 26 Stat. 222, 51st 
Cong., Sess. I, ch. 664 (1890). Section 2 of the act provided that the Act of 
Admission did not affect the reservation of YellowstoneNational 
Park nor the right and ownership of the United States to 
the park. Id. 
The constitution which was adopted provided that "the water of all natural 
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the 
boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the State." 
Wyoming 
Constitution, Art. 8, § 1. It also provided that "priority of appropriation for 
beneficial uses shall give the better right." Article 8, § 3. In addition, the 
constitution disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian lands. Wyoming Constitution, 
Art. 21, § 26.

 
 

[¶47.]  This court's decision in Merrill v. 
Bishop, supra, 287 P.2d 620, while indicating that the admission had 
impacted the rights of successors to allottees in the ceded portions of the 
reservation, did not decide the question of intent to reserve water, but held 
only that the allottees' successors failed to prove the facts necessary for an 
injunction. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, on the 
other hand, has twice indicated that the treaty did reserve water for the 
Indians,  both cases being decided 
after Wyoming was admitted to the Union. United States v. Hampleman, supra No. 753, 
June 26, 1916; and United States v. Parkins, supra 18 F.2d 642. The 
United States Supreme Court has said:

 
 
"The Court has previously concluded 
that whatever powers the States acquired over their waters as a result of 
congressional Acts and admission into the Union, however, Congress did not 
intend thereby to relinquish its authority to reserve unappropriated water in 
the future for use on appurtenant lands withdrawn from the public domain for 
specific federal purposes." United States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S.  at 698, 98 S. Ct.  at 3013.

 
 
The GilaNational 
Forest was set aside in 1899, before New 
Mexico was admitted to the Union. 
Thus, the federal courts have determined that admission acts do not indicate 
that Congress abandoned reserved water rights. The fact that the admission act 
reserved to the United States jurisdiction and ownership of Yellowstone National 
Park but is silent as to the Wind River Indian Reservation in no way detracts 
from our conclusion.

 
 

[¶48.]  The equal footing clause contained in the 
Act of Admission does not evidence an intent not to reserve water. The equal 
footing doctrine argument was rejected in United States v. District Court in 
and For County of Eagle, Colorado, 401 U.S. 520, 91 S. Ct. 998, 28 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1971) (U.S. can reserve water before or after admission). See also 
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 70 S. Ct. 918, 94 L. Ed. 1221 (1950) (equal footing clause refers only to political rights and 
sovereignty). The fact that the irrigability of Wyoming was an important factor in the 
decision to admit it does not indicate that anyone intended to deprive the 
Indians of the advantage of water.

 
 

[¶49.]  We now hold that, examining the Act of 
Admission and the constitution as a whole, and considering more recent federal 
pronouncements on the issue, the admission of Wyoming to the Union did 
not evidence an intent by Congress not to reserve water for the 
reservation.

 
 

[¶50.]  The fact that the pre-Winters years 
evidenced some uncertainty in the status of Indian water rights negatives the 
notion that action during these years were indicative of an intent not to 
reserve water for the Wind River Indian Reservation. The master was correct in 
determining that the uncertain acts between 1902 and 1908 reflect only the 
uncertainty in the law, not an intent not to reserve 
water.

 
 

[¶51.]  The Second McLaughlin Agreement, Treaty 
of April 21, 1904, Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1016, does not evidence an 
intent not to reserve water for the reservation. The Indians were eager to 
secure their water rights, Minutes of Council, Shoshone Agency, April 19, 1904, 
at 19, and understood that the agreement would make their water rights firm. 
Id. at 22. The 
agreement contained the following provisions:

 
 
"The said Indians belonging on the 
Shoshone or Wind River Reservation * * * * do hereby cede, grant, and relinquish 
to the United States, all right, title, and interest they may have to all the 
lands embraced within the reservation, except [certain lands]." Article 
1.

 
 
"The balance [of $ 85,000, after per 
capita payments, estimated to be approximately $ 2,000] shall be devoted to 
surveying, platting, making of maps, payment of fees, and performance of such 
acts as are required by the statutes of the State of Wyoming in securing water 
rights from said State for the irrigation of such lands as shall remain the 
property of said Indians * * * *." Article 3.

 
 
"[One hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars was authorized] for the construction and extension of an irrigation 
system within the diminished reservation for the irrigation of the lands of the 
said Indians * * * *." Article 4.

 
 
"It is further understood that 
nothing in this agreement shall be construed to deprive the said Indians of the 
Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, of any benefits to which they are 
entitled under existing treaties or agreements,  not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this agreement." Article 10.

 
 

[¶52.]  A reservation of water with an 1868 
priority date is not inconsistent with the permit provisions of the pre-Winters 
1905 Act. The rejection of the provision which would have given the Indians a 
grace period in which to secure their own permits for allotments on the ceded 
portion of the reservation, H.R. Rep. No. 3700, 58th Cong.,  3d Sess. (1905), is no indication there 
was never any intent to reserve water for the Indians, but only of fear that it 
would delay settlement of the area opened. S.Rep. No. 4263, 58th Cong., 3rd 
Sess. (1905).

 
 

[¶53.]  The fact that contemporary agreements 
indicate that the United 
States knew how to reserve water for Indians is 
of marginal relevance. Congress also knew how to express a relinquishment of 
reserved water rights. See First McLaughlin Agreement, or Thermopolis Purchase, 
supra, Article 1 (Tribes surrender "all their right, title, and interest of 
every kind and character" to water rights appurtenant to ceded lands). It is 
well established that Congress must use such explicit statutory language in 
order to abrogate treaty rights.  
Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1258, 84 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985), citing 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Association, 443 U.S. 658, 690, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3077, 61 L. Ed. 2d 823 
(1979) and Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 88 S. Ct. 1705, 20 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1968). Cf., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
430 U.S. 584, 586, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 1363, 51 L. Ed. 2d 660 
(1977).

 
 

[¶54.]  Inconsistent actions by the 
United 
States do not evidence an intent not to reserve 
water. After the 1905 Act was passed, the United States did seek and obtain 
state water permits for Indian land and continued to seek permits while 
asserting reserved water rights for the reservation after Winters v. United 
States, supra, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207 (1908) was decided. The 
United 
States more strongly asserted its reserved 
water rights when, in 1910, it refused to apply to the State for an extension of 
time in which to complete the irrigation project authorized by the 1905 Act. It 
was in 1911 that Water Commissioner Hampleman first closed the headgates on an 
allottee's ditches claiming that she had no valid state permit. Ultimately the 
case which arose from his actions was decided in favor of the Indians in 1916. 
In the meantime, in 1914, Congress rejected a provision which would have 
protected water rights for allotments: "Any invasion of a prior right of the 
United 
States to the waters of a stream is a trespass, 
and the Government may maintain a suit in equity to protect its right against 
any or all such trespassers." 1913 H.R. 12579,  Indian Appropriations Bill, Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Indian Affairs of the House of Representatives. That this 
provision, sought to be attached to the 1914 Appropriations Act, 38 Stat. 582, 
was not enacted into law is no indication that there was no intent to reserve 
water; the amendment could not be enacted because it was ruled out of 
order.

 
 

[¶55.]  Nor do other cited actions evidence an 
intent not to reserve water. In 1926, the federal district court announced its 
decision in United States v. Parkins, supra 18 F.2d 642, finding against 
a successor to an allottee who had been diverting water without authority. In a 
1939 act appropriating a fund for the Shoshone Tribe, Congress authorized the 
Secretary of the Interior to establish land use districts within the ceded and 
nonceded lands and to acquire, exchange and consolidate lands and water rights. 
In 1953, Congress appropriated funds constituting final payment, pursuant to the 
1905 Act, for certain lands withdrawn and reserved under the 1902 Reclamation 
Act. In 1955, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided the case of Merrill v. 
Bishop, supra 287 P.2d 620, in favor of the State and against allottees' 
successors. These actions are not sufficient proof of intent not to reserve 
water for the Indians.

 
 
b. Subsequent 
Abrogation

 
 

[¶56.]  What we have said above disposes of the 
contention that even if the treaty did reserve water for the Wind River Indian 
Reservation in 1868, the right to water was abrogated by the 1890 Act of 
Admission  and/or the 1905 Act. If 
the actions are not sufficient evidence to show there never was any intent to 
reserve water, they are not sufficient to make the even stronger showing that 
such an established treaty right has been abrogated. The district court did not 
err in finding a reserved water right for the Wind River Indian 
Reservation.

 
 
c. Sensitivity 
Doctrine

 
 

[¶57.]  The sensitivity doctrine does not apply 
to the question of intent to reserve water. United 
States v. New 
Mexico, supra, 438 U.S. 704, 98 S. Ct.  at 3016. At any rate, both the special master and the district 
court were sensitive to existing water rights in determining there was an intent 
to reserve water for the Wind River Indian Reservation.

 
 
IV PURPOSES OF 
THE WINDRIVER INDIAN 
RESERVATION

 
 

[¶58.]  The government may reserve water from 
appropriation under state law for use on the lands set aside for an Indian 
reservation.  Winters v. 
United States, supra 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207. A reserved 
water right is implied for an Indian reservation where water is necessary to 
fulfill the purposes of reservation. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.  Oregon v. United 
States, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S. Ct. 3536, 82 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1984). The quantity of water reserved is 
the amount of water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the lands set aside for 
the reservation. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, supra 426 U.S.  at 138, 96 S. Ct.  at 
2069, and 426 U.S.  at 141, 96 S. Ct.  at 2071 (relying on Arizona v. 
California, supra 373 U.S.  at 600-601, 83 S. Ct.  at 1497-1498, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 578-579 (to the same effect)); United 
States v. New 
Mexico, supra 438 U.S.  at 698, 98 S. Ct.  at 3013. Congress can reserve water for lands withdrawn for 
specific federal purposes.  
Winters v. United States, supra 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207; 
Arizona v. California, supra 373 U.S.  at 597-598, 93 S. Ct.  at 1496; 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S. Ct. 657, 70 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1981), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 1183, 89 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1986). We have already decided 
that Congress intended to reserve water for the Wind River Indian Reservation 
when it was created in 1868, and we accept the proposition that the amount of 
water impliedly reserved is determined by the purposes for which the reservation 
was created.

 
 

[¶59.]  The special master's finding that the 
principal purpose for the creation of the reservation was to provide a permanent 
homeland for the Indians is not a factual determination. The master determined 
the purpose of the Indian reservation from the face of the treaty as a matter of 
law. Where the contract is unambiguous, the meaning or intent is derived from 
the instrument itself as a matter of law.  
Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74, 77 (1983); Goodwin v. Upper 
Crust of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 624 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1981); Amoco 
Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980); Goodman v. Kelly, Wyo., 390 P.2d 244, 247 (1964). The 
legal principles applicable to the interpretation of contracts apply also to 
interpretation of Indian treaties. Washington v. Washington State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing VesselAssociation, supra 443 U.S.  at 675, 99 S. Ct.  at 3069. The purposes of a treaty are ascertained by utilizing 
rules for determining the intent of parties to a contract.  Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439, 41 S. Ct. 158, 160, 65 L. Ed. 344 (1921). The special master 
found as a matter of law that the treaty was unambiguous and ascertained the 
purpose for creation of the reservation from the four corners of the treaty, 
stating:

 
 
"Analyzing the Treaty in its 
entirety, with specific reference to the above cited provisions, it is not at 
all unreasonable to conclude that the principal purpose for entering into this 
Treaty was to provide the Indians with a homeland where they could establish a 
permanent place to live and to develop their civilization just as any other 
nation throughout history has been able to develop its 
civilization."

 
 
The district court ascertained the 
purpose of the reservation from the treaty itself, stating: "On the very face of 
the Treaty, it is clear that its purpose was purely agricultural." This legal 
determination is fully reviewable by this court.

 
 
A. The 
Treaty

 
 

[¶60.]  The Treaty with the Shoshones and 
Bannacks, July 3, 1868, provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"ARTICLE I. From this day forward, 
peace between the parties to this treaty shall forever continue. The government 
of the United 
States desires peace, and its honor is hereby 
pledged to keep it. The Indians desire peace, and they hereby pledge their honor 
to maintain it.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"ARTICLE II. It is agreed that 
whenever the Bannacks desire a reservation to be set apart for their use, or 
whenever the President shall deem it advisable * * * *, he shall cause a 
suitable one to be selected for them in their present country * * * *. The 
United States further agrees that the following district of county * * * * shall 
be and the same is set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation 
of the Shoshone Indians herein named, and for such other friendly tribes as from 
time to time they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to 
admit amongst them; and the United States now solemnly agrees that no persons 
except those herein designated and authorized so to do, and except such 
officers, agents, and employees of the government as may be authorized to enter 
upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by law, shall ever be 
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in 
this article for the use of said Indians, and henceforth they will and do hereby 
relinquish all title, claims, or rights in and to any portion of the territory 
of the United States, except such as is embraced within the limits 
aforesaid.

 
 
"ARTICLE III. The 
United 
States agrees * * * * to construct * * * * a 
warehouse or storeroom * * * *; an agency building for the residence of the 
agent * * * *; a residence for the physician * * * *; and five other buildings, 
for a carpenter, farmer, blacksmith, miller, and engineer * * * *; also a 
schoolhouse or mission building * * * *.

 
 
"The United States 
agrees further to cause to be erected * * * * a good steam circular saw-mill, 
with a grist-mill and shingle machine attached * * * *.

 
 
"ARTICLE IV. The Indians herein 
named agree * * * * they will make said reservations their permanent home, and 
they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere; but they shall have the right 
to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be 
found thereon, and so long as place subsists * * * *.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"ARTICLE VI. If any individual 
belonging to said tribes * * * * shall desire to commence farming, he shall have 
the privilege to select * * * * a tract of land within the reservation of his 
tribe * * * * which tract * * * * shall cease to be held in common * * * 
*.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"ARTICLE VII. In order to insure the 
civilization of the tribes entering into this treaty, the necessity of education 
is admitted, especially of such of them as are or may be settled on said 
agricultural reservations * * * *.

 
 
"ARTICLE VIII. When the head of a 
family or lodge shall have selected lands and received his certificate as above 
directed, and the agent shall be satisfied that he intends in good faith to 
commence cultivating the soil for a living, he shall be entitled to receive 
seeds and agricultural implements for the first year * * * * and for each 
succeeding year he shall continue to farm, for a period of three years more * * 
* *.

 
 
"And it is further stipulated that 
such persons as commence farming shall receive instructions from the farmers * * 
* * and whenever more than one hundred persons on either reservation shall 
enter  upon the cultivation of the 
soil, a second blacksmith shall be provided * * * *.

 
 
"ARTICLE IX. * *  * * the United States 
agrees to deliver at the agency house on the reservation [items of 
clothing].

 
 
"* * * * and in addition to the 
clothing herein named, the sum of ten dollars shall be annually appropriated for 
each Indian roaming and twenty dollars for each Indian engaged in agriculture, 
for a period of ten years, to be used by the Secretary of the Interior in the 
purchase of such articles as from time to time the condition and necessities of 
the Indians may indicate to be proper.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"ARTICLE XII. It is agreed that the 
sum of five hundred dollars annually for three years from the date when they 
commence to cultivate a farm, shall be expended in presents to the ten persons 
of said tribe, who in the judgment of the agent, may grow the most valuable 
crops for the respective year." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶61.]  The court in Colville Confederated 
Tribes v. Walton, supra 647 F.2d 42, did not mandate that a single purpose 
for the reservation be found. Rather, the court applied the specific purpose 
test outlined in United 
States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. 
at 702, 98 S. Ct.  at 3015, in an Indian reserved water case and found two 
primary purposes: "to provide a homeland for the Indians to maintain their 
agrarian society," 647 F.2d  at 47, for which practicably irrigable acreage was 
the measure, and to preserve the "tribes' access to fishing grounds." 647 F.2d  
at 48. See also Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 
Reservation, Montana v. Flathead Irrigation and Power 
Project, 616 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (D.Mont. 1985). The validity of the ninth 
circuit's application of the New 
Mexico test has been drawn into question because the 
standards governing non-Indian federal reserved water rights differ from those 
governing Indian reserved water rights. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, ch. 10 § 133, at 583-584 (1982 ed.); State ex rel. Greely v. 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, Mont., 219 Mont. 76, 712 P.2d 754, 766-767 (1985). See 
also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 105 S. Ct. 2399, 2404, 85 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1985). In United States v. 
Adair, supra 723 F.2d  at 1408, the ninth circuit agreed that non-Indian 
federal reservation reserved water rights cases only provide useful guidelines 
to Indian reserved water rights.

 
 

[¶62.]  The following cases are not authority for 
limiting reserved water for a permanent homeland reservation to irrigation 
because the only reserved water rights sought were for irrigation and related 
uses: Winters v. United States, supra 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207; 
United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D.C. Idaho 1928); 
Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (C.C.A. Idaho 1921); United States 
v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533, 59 S. Ct. 344, 83 L. Ed. 330 (1939). See also 
Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Company, 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667, 
669 (1938) (dicta indicates only an implied reservation for irrigation, but does 
not address the question of reservation of water for other 
uses).

 
 

[¶63.]  It is well established that the judgment 
of the district court will be upheld for any proper reason appearing of 
record.  Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 156 (1981). Considering the well-established principles of treaty 
interpretation, the treaty itself, the ample evidence and testimony addressed, 
and the findings of the district court, we have no difficulty affirming the 
finding that it was the intent at the time to create a reservation with a sole 
agricultural purpose. Indian treaties should be interpreted generously, 
Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, supra, 
470 U.S.  at 247, 105 S. Ct.  at 1258; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 
366-367, 50 S. Ct. 121, 122, 74 L. Ed. 478 (1930), and liberally in favor of the 
Indians, United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117, 58 S. Ct. 794, 798, 82 L. Ed. 1213 (1938); Winters v. United States, supra 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207; McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 174, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1973); Washington  v. Washington State Commercial Passenger 
Fishing Vessel Association, supra 443 U.S.  at 676, 99 S. Ct.  at 3069; 
State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 
Reservation, supra 712 P.2d  at 762-763, United States v. Adair, supra 
723 F.2d  at 1413; United States v. Lower Elwha Tribe, 642 F.2d 1141, 1144 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.  
Makah Indian Tribe v. Lower Elwha Tribe, 454 U.S. 862, 102 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1981), and should not be given a crabbed or 
restrictive meaning.  McClanahan 
v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, supra 411 U.S.  at 176, 93 S. Ct.  at 1264. Nor should treaties be improperly construed in favor of 
Indians, for "'We cannot remake history,'" Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
supra 430 U.S.  at 615, 97 S. Ct.  at 1377, citing DeCoteau v. District County 
Court for Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 449, 95 S. Ct. 1082, 1095, 
43 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1975); In re Wilson, 30 Cal. 3d 21, 36, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336, 346, 634 P.2d 363, 372 (1981) (citing same case), and courts should not 
distort the words of a treaty to find rights inconsistent with its 
language.  Ward v. Race 
Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 16 S. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244 
(1896).

 
 

[¶64.]  Article 7 of the treaty refers to "said 
agricultural reservations." Article 6 authorizes allotments for farming 
purposes; Article 8 provides seeds and implements for farmers; in Article 9 "the 
United States agreed to pay each Indian farming a $ 20 annual stipend, but only 
$ 10 to 'roaming' Indians"; and Article 12 establishes a $ 50 prize to the ten 
best Indian farmers. The treaty does not encourage any other occupation or 
pursuit. The district court correctly found that the reference in Article 4 to 
"permanent homeland" does nothing more than permanently set aside lands for the 
Indians; it does not define the purpose of the reservation. Rather, the purpose 
of the permanent-home reservation is found in Articles 6, 8, 9, and 12 of the 
treaty.

 
 

[¶65.]  The emphasis on education for Indians 
settled on "said agricultural reservations," in Article 7 also helps to define 
the purpose of the reservation. Those words do not refer only to the farm tracts 
selected by individual Indians under Article 6, but to the two Indian 
reservations authorized by the treaty--for the Shoshone in Wyoming (Wind River) and for the Bannack in Utah (Fort Hall). Other 
treaties have emphasized the importance of education in somewhat different 
language. See, e.g., Treaty with the Ute Tribe, March 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619, 
Article 8; Treaty with the Navajo Tribe, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, Article 6; 
Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Cheyenne and Arapahoe, May 10, 1868, 15 Stat. 
655, Article 4; Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 
Article 7. The thrust of all these provisions is that education is especially 
important for those Indians who are settled and engaged in agriculture and are 
no longer roaming. Thus, while Article 7 of the instant treaty emphasizes the 
importance of education for Indians engaged in farming, "said agricultural 
reservations" does have a broader meaning--that the two Indian reservations were 
to be agricultural.

 
 

[¶66.]  Although the treaty did not force the 
Indians to become farmers and although it clearly contemplates that other 
activities would be permitted (hunting is mentioned in Article 4, lumbering and 
milling in Article 3, roaming in Article 9), the treaty encouraged only 
agriculture, and that was its primary purpose. The Court in United States v. 
Shoshone Tribe of Indians, supra 304 U.S. 111, 58 S. Ct. 794, discussing the purpose of this treaty, stated:

 
 
"Provisions in aid of teaching 
children and of adult education in farming, and to secure for the tribe medical 
and mechanical service, to safeguard tribal and individual titles, when taken 
with other parts of the treaty, plainly evidence purpose on the part of the 
United 
States to help to create an independent 
permanent farming community upon the reservation." Id., 304 U.S.  at 117-118, 58 S. Ct.  at 798.

 
 
The Court, while recognizing that 
the Tribes were the beneficial owners of the reservation's timber and mineral 
resources, id., 304 U.S.  at 117, 58 S. Ct.  at 798, and that it was known 
to all before the treaty was signed that the Wind River Indian Reservation 
contained valuable minerals,  
nonetheless concluded that the purpose of the reservation was 
agricultural. The fact that the Indians fully intended to continue to hunt and 
fish does not alter that conclusion. October 4, 1868 Report to the President of 
the Indian Peace Commission; Report of WyomingTerritory Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, October 11, 1870. See also Williams, Personal Recollections of 
Wash-A-Kie, Chief of the Shoshones, 1 Utah Historical Quarterly 101, 104 (1928) 
(the Shoshone left the reservation both before and after the treaty for better 
hunting and fishing grounds in Utah).

 
 

[¶67.]  Agreements subsequent to the treaty 
acknowledge the continuance of non-agricultural activities on the reservation. 
The Brunot Agreement of 1872, 18 Stat. 291, 292, 43rd Cong., Sess. II, ch. 2 
(1874); 1904 McLaughlin Agreement, Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1016; 1896 
Agreement, 30 Stat. 93. The reports of the Indian agents are replete with 
descriptions of and plans for other activities. Yet not one of the cited reports 
neglects to report also on the progress of the farming and ranching operations. 
The primary activity was clearly agricultural.

 
 
B. 
Fisheries

 
 

[¶68.]  Reserved water rights for fisheries have 
been recognized where a treaty provision explicitly recognized an exclusive 
right to take fish on the reservation or the right to take fish at traditional 
off-reservation fishing grounds, in common with others.  United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384, 25 S. Ct. 662, 665, 49 L. Ed. 1089 (1905); Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 
supra 169 P.  at 122; United States v. Adair, supra 723 F.2d  at 1408; 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 175, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2622, 53 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1977); United States 
v. Lower Elwha Tribe, supra 642 F.2d  at 1147; Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, Montana v. Flathead Irrigation and 
Power Project, supra 616 F. Supp.  at 1294; Washington v. Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, supra 443 U.S.  at 661, 99 S. Ct.  at 3062.

 
 

[¶69.]  Instream fishery flows have also been 
recognized where the Indians were heavily, if not totally, dependent on fish for 
their livelihood.  United States 
v. Adair, supra 723 F.2d  at 1409; Colville ConfederatedTribes v. 
Walton, supra 647 F.2d  at 48. In the case at bar, the Tribes introduced 
evidence showing that fish had always been part of the Indians' diet. The 
master, erroneously concluding that a reserved right for fisheries should be 
implied when the tribe is "at least partially dependent upon fishing," awarded 
an instream flow right for fisheries. The district court, however, finding 
neither a dependency upon fishing for a livelihood nor a traditional lifestyle 
involving fishing, deleted the award. The district court did not err. The 
evidence is not sufficient to imply a fishery flow right absent a treaty 
provision.

 
 
C. Mineral and 
Industrial

 
 

[¶70.]  The Tribes were denied a reserved water 
right for mineral and industrial development. All parties to the treaty were 
well aware before it was signed of the valuable mineral estate underlying the 
Wind River Indian Reservation. October 4, 1868, Report of Brevet Major C.C. 
Augur to the President of the Indian Peace Commission; Brunot Agreement, 18 
Stat. 291, 292, 43rd Cong., Sess. II, ch. 2 (1874); United States v. Shoshone 
Tribe of Indians, supra 304 U.S. 111, 58 S. Ct. 794. The question of 
whether, because the Indians own the minerals,  the intent was that they should have the 
water necessary to develop them must be determined, of course, by the intent in 
1868. Neither the Tribes nor the United States has cited this court to 
any provision of the treaty or other evidence indicating that the parties 
contemplated in 1868 that a purpose of the reservation would be for the Indians 
to develop the minerals. The fact that the Tribes have since used water for 
mineral and industrial purposes does not establish that water was impliedly 
reserved in 1868 for such uses. The district court did not err in denying a 
reserved water right for mineral and industrial uses.

 
 
D. Municipal, Domestic and 
Commercial

 
 

[¶71.]  A reserved water right for municipal, 
domestic and commercial uses was included within the agricultural reserved water 
award. Domestic and related use has traditionally been subsumed in agricultural 
reserved rights. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, supra 27 F.2d  at 911 (the treaties fixed the rights of the Indians--"to a continuous use 
of a sufficient amount of water for the irrigation of their lands, and domestic 
purposes"); United States v. Powers, supra 305 U.S.  at 533, 59 S. Ct.  at 
347 ("waters essential to farming and home making"). Practicably irrigable 
acreage (PIA) was established as the measure of an agricultural reserved water 
right in Arizona v. California, supra 373 U.S.  at 601, 83 S. Ct.  at 1498. 
The special master there indicated that PIA was the measure of water necessary 
for agriculture and related purposes. Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special 
Master, to the Supreme Court 265-266 (December 5, 1960) quoted in Colville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra 647 F.2d  at 48. The court properly 
allowed a reserved water right for municipal, domestic, and commercial 
use.

 
 
E. 
Livestock

 
 

[¶72.]  For the reasons stated above, the 
district court did not err in finding a sole agricultural purpose for the 
reservation or in subsuming livestock use within that 
purpose.

 
 
F. Wildlife and 
Aesthetics

 
 

[¶73.]  The special master awarded 60% of 
historic flows for wildlife and aesthetic uses, consistent with his 
determination that the purpose of the reservation was to be a permanent 
homeland. The district court deleted this award, reciting not only that the 
purpose was solely agricultural, but that insufficient evidence had been 
presented to justify an award for these uses. The district court did not err in 
holding that the Tribes and the United States did not introduce sufficient 
evidence of a tradition of wildlife and aesthetic preservation which would 
justify finding this to be a purpose for which the reservation was created and 
for which water was impliedly reserved.

 
 
The district court did not err in 
finding a sole agricultural purpose in the creation of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation. The Treaty itself evidences no other purpose, and none of the 
extraneous evidence cited is sufficient to attribute a broader 
purpose.

 
 
V SCOPE OF THE 
RESERVED WATER RIGHT

 
 
A. 
Groundwater

 
 

[¶74.]  The logic which supports a reservation of 
surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports 
reservation of groundwater. See Tweedy v. Texas Company, 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D.Mont. 1968) ("whether the [necessary] waters were found on the 
surface of the land or under it should make no difference"). Certainly the two 
sources are often interconnected. See § 41-3-916, W.S.1977 (where underground 
and surface waters are "so interconnected as to constitute in fact one source of 
supply," a single schedule of priorities shall be made); Final Report to the 
President and to the Congress by the National Water Commission, Water Policies 
for the Future 233 (1973) (groundwater and surface water "often naturally 
related"); Cappaert v. United States, supra 426 U.S.  at 142-143, 96 S. Ct.  at 2071 (citing additional authority to this effect).

 
 

[¶75.]  Acknowledging the above, we note that, 
nonetheless, not a single case applying the reserved water doctrine to 
groundwater is cited to us. The ninth circuit indicated that groundwater was 
reserved in United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974). 
The United States Supreme Court, however, found the water in the pool reserved 
for preservation of the pupfish was not groundwater but surface water, protected 
from subsequent diversions from either surface or groundwater supplies.  Cappaert v. United States, supra 
426 U.S.  at 143, 96 S. Ct.  at 2071. Nor have the other cases cited 
to us granted a reserved right in underground water. In Colville Confederated 
Tribes v. Walton, supra 647 F.2d 42, there is slight mention  of the underground aquifer and of 
pumping wells, Id. at 52, but the opinion does not indicate that "their 
wells" are a source of reserved water or even discuss a reserved groundwater 
right.  Tweedy v. Texas 
Company, supra 286 F. Supp. 383, did not recognize a reserved groundwater 
right. Pueblo water rights, which include not only surface water but also 
groundwater "interrelated to the surface water as an integral part of the 
hydrologic cycle," State of New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985), do not apply here.

 
 

[¶76.]  The district court did not err in 
deciding there was no reserved groundwater right. Because we hold that the 
reserved water doctrine does not extend to groundwater, we need not address the 
separate claim that the district court erred in determining that the State owns 
the groundwater. The State has not appealed the decision that the Tribes may 
continue to satisfy their domestic and livestock needs (part of the agricultural 
award) from existing wells at current withdrawal rates; therefore, we do not 
address that question.

 
 
B. 
Exportation

 
 

[¶77.]  The district court held that "the Tribes 
can sell or lease any part of the water covered by their reserved water rights 
but the said sale or lease cannot be for exportation off of the Reservation." 
The Tribes did not seek permission to export reserved water, and the 
United 
States concedes that no federal law permits the 
sale of reserved water to non-Indians off the reservation. Because of our 
holding on the groundwater issue, we need not address the separate 
constitutional attack on the prohibition of exportation of 
groundwater.

 
 
C. 
Finality

 
 

[¶78.]  The instant decree made no provision for 
future modification. In Article 9 of the decree in Arizona v. California, 
the Court retained "jurisdiction of this suit for the purpose of any order, 
direction, modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree." Arizona 
v. California, supra 460 U.S.  at 617-618, 103 S. Ct.  at 1391. The Court explained that "the Article was mainly a 
safety net added to retain jurisdiction and to ensure that we had not, by virtue 
of res judicata, precluded ourselves from adjusting the decree in light of 
unforeseeable changes in circumstances." Id., 460 U.S.  at 622, 103 S. Ct.  at 1393.

 
 

[¶79.]  The statute authorizing this general 
adjudication, § 1-37-106, W.S.1977, is in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act.  Section 1-37-102, W.S.1977, 
provides that "such declarations shall have the effect of a final judgment." 
Section 1-37-114, W.S.1977,  
provides: "The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is remedial. Its purpose 
is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity * * * *." This 
court has said that the separate statutory provisions for stream adjudications 
"evince the legislative purpose peradventure of cavil that the adjudication of a 
water right in favor of a claimant shall be final and binding, and that no 
further rights may be claimed by him over and above the award made in the 
adjudication." Campbell v. Wyoming Development Company, 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 
137, reh. denied 55 Wyo. 407, 102 P.2d 745 (1940). We conclude 
that finality in this litigation is appropriate.

 
 

[¶80.]  The Tribes have several avenues available 
to them should unforeseen future problems develop. Rule 60(a), W.R.C.P., 
provides relief from clerical errors. Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., provides relief from 
other mistakes. In addition, § 1-37-110, W.S.1977, provides supplemental 
relief:

 
 
"Further relief based on a 
declaratory judgment may be granted. * * * * If the application is sufficient 
the court, on reasonable notice, shall require any adverse party whose rights 
have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment to show cause why further 
relief should not be granted."

 
 
Clearly the district court did not 
need to retain jurisdiction as a "safety net."

 
 
VI 
QUANTIFICATION

 
 
A. The 
Measure

 
 

[¶81.]  The measure of the Tribes' reserved water 
right is the water necessary  to 
irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservation. In Arizona v. 
California, supra 373 U.S.  at 600-601, 83 S. Ct.  at 1498, a needs test was 
rejected as too uncertain, the Court opting instead for practicably irrigable 
acreage as the measure of a tribal agricultural reserved water right. Two 
subsequent non-Indian reserved water right cases, Cappaert v. United 
States, supra 426 U.S. 128, 96 S. Ct. 2067, and United States v. 
New Mexico, supra 438 U.S.  at 702, 98 S. Ct.  at 3015, indicate 
that necessity is the measure of a reserved water right. And in Washington v. 
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, supra 443 U.S.  at 686-687, 99 S. Ct.  at 3075, 
the Court recognized the propriety of reducing the Indians' proportion of the 
fish harvest as their needs diminished. Nonetheless, the Court declined the 
invitation to re-examine the PIA standard in Arizona v. California, supra 460 U.S.  at 625-626, 103 S. Ct.  at 1394-1395, and reaffirmed the value of the certainty inherent 
in the practicably irrigable acreage standard. The district court was correct in 
quantifying the Tribes' reserved water right by the amount of water necessary to 
irrigate all of the reservation's practicably irrigable 
acreage.

 
 
B. Future 
Lands

 
 

[¶82.]  The Tribes and the United States 
claimed a reserved water right for lands on the reservation not yet developed 
for irrigation, but which were in their view, practicably irrigable acreage. 
Counsel for the State, the Tribes and the United States 
agreed upon a definition of practicably irrigable acreage: "those acres 
susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs." The determination of 
practicably irrigable acreage involves a two-part analysis, i.e., the PIA must 
be susceptible of sustained irrigation (not only proof of the arability but also 
of the engineering feasibility of irrigating the land) and irrigable "at 
reasonable cost."

 
 

[¶83.]  The United 
States presented evidence on all these factors to support 
its ultimate claim for 53,760 practicably irrigable acres (210,000 
acre-feet/year), and Wyoming presented evidence in opposition. The 
special master recommended the following award of reserved water rights for 
future projects:

 
 


North 
      Crowheart

34,993

acres

South 
      Crowheart

4,238

acres

Arapahoe

3,437

acres

Riverton 
      East

3,442

acres

Big Horn 
      Flats

2,410

acres

 
 
48,520

acres

 
 
The Amended Judgment and Decree 
corrected the Riverton East figure by reducing it to 3,019 acres, which resulted 
in the total final award being 48,097 acres.

 
 
1. Arability

 
 

[¶84.]  Over Wyoming's objection that the land classes did 
not consider economic factors and were not sufficiently specific, the master 
adopted this system:

 
 

"Class 1: Class 1 lands are of high quality 
for irrigation, and will yield high returns with minimum production and 
management costs.

 
 

"Class 2: Class 2 lands are good quality with 
only minor deficiencies.

 
 

"Class 3: Class 3 consists of fair quality 
lands having more serious deficiencies than Class 2 lands.

 
 

"Class 4: Class 4 lands are of marginal 
quality for irrigation and are used mainly for shallow-rooted crops or 
pasture.

 
 

"Class 5: Class 5 lands are those lands which 
have been placed into a deferred status pending further investigation. There 
were no lands included in a deferred status.

 
 

"Class 6: Class 6 lands do not meet the 
minimum requirements for arability under the land classification standards 
used."

 
 
The land classification system was 
first utilized to determine all arable acres. The arable acreage was then 
analyzed from an engineering standpoint. The resulting irrigable acres were then 
subjected to stringent economic analysis, including cropping pattern and crop 
yield analysis. The economic analysis requirement was satisfied. Wyoming proposed no 
alternative land classification system. We approve the system adopted by the 
master, finding it reasonable and fair to the parties.

 
 

[¶85.]  The master determined that the arable 
land base was 76,027 acres. Wyoming claims on appeal that the arability 
investigation did not meet Bureau of Reclamation Standards for 60% of the land 
as to the depth to barrier, maximum slope, hydraulic conductivity, barrier 
definition and maximum drain spacing standards. The special master accepted the 
approach of the United 
States as meeting its burden of establishing 
the land base for the determination of arability. There was substantial evidence 
to support this determination,  and 
looking, as we must, only to the evidence of the United States, 
we affirm the master's finding of 76,027 acres of arable land 
base.

 
 
2. Engineering 
Feasibility

 
 

[¶86.]  The State next attacks the design work of 
Dr. Woldzion Mesghinna, the United 
States' irrigation engineer, because he had never before 
designed a system for Wyoming lands and because none of the systems 
he had designed were yet operational. Despite these complaints, Wyoming did not object to 
his admission as an expert witness. The questions raised go only to the 
credibility of the witness, not his competence. Credibility is for the trier of 
fact.  State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984); Crompton v. Bruce, Wyo., 669 P.2d 930 (1983); Matter of Altman's Estate, Wyo., 650 P.2d 277 (1982). The master praised 
Mesghinna's thorough work and found him not only credible, but "detached from 
any preconceived estimates of what should be the result." The State objected 
that Dr. Mesghinna's irrigation design contains some non-arable Class 6 lands, 
perhaps as much as 487 acres. Dr. Mesghinna explained: "In squaring off process, 
which you cannot escape in any work of this kind, we might have included a very 
small portion of Class 6 lands, and with the same token, we have omitted large 
lands which are classified as arable by HKM." Counsel for Wyoming did not contend 
before the special master that this invalidated the design work, but only that 
"it's remarkably important, Your Honor, because it will come up with respect to 
the question of [crop] yields." Wyoming has presented us no cogent argument to 
support the notion that including irrigation for some fields containing some 
Class 6 lands invalidates the design work. The climatological data determines 
water requirements which govern the irrigation system design. Dr. Mesghinna did 
not use inaccurate climatological data. Dr. Mesghinna testified that he had 
never received any of the old, inaccurate solar radiation data from the 
LanderAirport. Instead of relying 
on measurements of solar radiation, Dr. Mesghinna used four equations to 
calculate evaportransportations, relying upon the ratio of actual to possible 
sunshine. The State had ample opportunity to directly challenge HKM, the 
United 
States' agricultural engineer, on the 
reliability of its work, but apparently chose not to do so. The special master 
correctly denied Wyoming's motion, made at the close of 
cross-examination, to strike Dr. Mesghinna's entire testimony for lack of 
foundation. The special master, after weighing the testimony, accepted Dr. 
Mesghinna's climate work and found that it satisfied "any burden of the 
United 
States to prove the climate base for the 
engineering feasibility analysis. The State does not shift the burden back 
merely by asserting that greater efforts could have been made in the data 
collection." Credibility of the witness was for the trier of fact, and the 
master found the witness credible and his data reliable; we accept that 
finding.

 
 

[¶87.]  The master did not abuse his discretion 
in accepting the engineering feasibility work which incorporated 35% project 
efficiencies rather than a 50% project efficiency. It is well established in 
Wyoming that 
it is appellant's burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  Canyon View Ranch v. Basin Electric 
Power Corp., Wyo., 628 P.2d 530 (1981). An abuse of 
discretion is an error of law under the circumstances; it occurs where the court 
could not reasonably conclude as it did.  
Martinez v. State, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 (1980). A ruling which shocks the conscience of this court is held to be an 
abuse of discretion.  Waldrop v. 
Weaver, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1291 (1985). See also Walker v. Karpan, Wyo., 
726 P.2d 82, 90 (1986).

 
 

[¶88.]  The master determined that practicably 
irrigable acreage should be based on present standards. Mr. Floyd Bishop, former 
State Engineer, gave the following testimony as a water resource engineer for 
the State: "The overall efficiency, I think can reasonably be expected to be 
higher than [35%]. I think a close management and husbandry of the water 
resource will provide a 50% overall efficiency in projects of this kind." The 
special master rejected Mr. Bishop's testimony because his overall efficiency 
estimate did not have the components of application, distribution or conveyance 
efficiency, and properly found the United States' claim for unit and 
total diversion to be reasonable and supported by the evidence. He explained 
that Dr. Mesghinna's

 
 
"water duty 'is quite low as 
compared to what is going out right now' in other areas around the 
Reservation."

 
 
The master, therefore, 
found:

 
 
"35. The United States 
claim for unit diversion and total diversion is reasonable and supported by 
convincing and the better evidence, particularly since Dr. Mesghinna's average 
water duty is more restrictive than the present historic use in Water Division 
3."

 
 
Upon the evidence, the master could 
reasonably accept the position of the United States and did not abuse his 
discretion in doing so.

 
 

[¶89.]  The United States' 
evidence indicates that an adequate water supply is available to serve the 
future projects. Mr. Ronald Billstein, the United States' 
water resource planner, explained that any apparent shortages are manageable 
because available soil moisture or efficiency adjustments compensate for the 
shortage and thus there is no actual shortage for agriculture. The Wyoming model, on the other hand, which not only includes 
state-awarded water rights and reservoirs but includes in-stream flow as well as 
diversionary requirements, shows that two stream reaches would contain only 98% 
of the total United 
States claims. The master did not err because 
he did not award the total diversion request of the United 
States.

 
 
3. Economic 
Feasibility

 
 

[¶90.]  The five future projects were reduced by 
10% to compensate for potential error in the arable land base and then subjected 
to economic analysis. After deleting 10% from the acres satisfying the 
engineering feasibility determination (i.e., before the economic analysis) the 
special master found the following acreage within the projects feasible to 
irrigate:

 
 


North 
      Crowheart

34,933

acres

South 
      Crowheart

4,238

acres

Arapahoe

3,437

acres

Riverton 
      East

3,442

acres

Big Horn 
      Flats

2,410

acres

 
 
48,520

acres

 
 
After economic analysis, the special 
master awarded reserved water rights for the following practicably (i.e., 
economically) irrigable acreage:

 
 


Project

Acreage

 
 
Diversion

 
 
 

 
 
 

North 
      Crowheart

34,993

 
 
133,324 
      af/yr

South 
      Crowheart

4,238

 
 
18,181 
      af/yr

Arapahoe

3,437

 
 
15,088 
      af/yr

Riverton 
      East

3,442

 
 
15,837 
      af/yr

Big Horn 
      Flats

2,410

 
 
6,507 
      af/yr

Total

48,520

 
 
188,937 
      af/yr

 
 
It is readily apparent that the 
master found economically feasible, or practicably irrigable, all the acres he 
found to be irrigable from an engineering standpoint. Wyoming has cited no 
evidence in the record indicating that the economic feasibility testimony does 
not apply to the acres the master found to be practicably 
irrigable.

 
 

[¶91.]  The master properly accepted a 4% 
discount rate in determining economic feasibility. Mr. David Dornbusch, 
economist for the United 
States, testified that he used principles 
recommended by the Water Resources Council, that the correct rate was in the 
range of 2 to 4%, and that he used 4% in his calculations. He agreed that the 
better practice is to stay with the original rate even if the discount rate goes 
up during the project and that the WRC rate on the date he testified was up to 7 
1/8%. Wyoming 
would have us decide that there is no lawful basis for using a 4% discount rate 
instead of the 7 1/8% rate required on federal water projects in 1979.  42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17(a); 44 Fed.Reg. No. 
210, October  29, 1979, 18 C.F.R. 
70439. Yet the other economists who testified, Dr. Ronald Cummings for the 
Tribes, Dr. Stephen Goldfeld for the United States in rebuttal and Dr. 
David Brookshire for the State, did not use 7 1/8%. The State's own witness did 
not rely on the regulatory rate of 7 1/8%. Dr. Brookshire testified that a range 
of rates is more appropriate and said that a range of 4-11% was appropriate 
here. Dr. Cummings felt 2-4% would be proper. Dr. Goldfeld placed 2 1/2% as the 
correct rate within his 1-4% range. After weighing the evidence, the master 
concluded "that the preponderance of the evidence clearly supports the 
conclusions of Mr. Dornbusch." The master could not accept the State's evidence 
because Brookshire improperly excluded the household rate and relied on the 
average, rather than the marginal, rate. The master did not err in accepting 
Dornbusch's 4% discount rate.

 
 

[¶92.]  The United States' 
crop yield data was not without a competent foundation. The master criticized 
the approach of the State and found:

 
 
"The future projects incorporate 
state of the art technology and improved approaches to irrigation farming not 
currently used by farmers in the area. Better technology and management makes 
higher yields reasonably foreseeable, and given evidence of current similar 
yields already obtained by farmers in the area, I find the preponderance of the 
evidence clearly supports the projections of the United 
States."

 
 
On cross-examination, Mr. James 
Jacobs, agricultural economist for the State, admitted that at least one farmer 
gets malt barley yields ranging from 90 to 115 bushels per acre. Mr. Douglas 
Agee for the State reported 100 to 115 bushels in the central area near 
Riverton. This alone would provide adequate support for Dornbusch's 100 bushel 
projection. In addition, Dornbusch interviewed 20 to 25 farmers and obtained 
recent averages from them. He departed from the average 83.3 bushel figure for 
malt barley in the Agee Report (prepared for the State) 
because

 
 
"in interviewing the farmers I 
thought pretty uniformly the progressive farmers who were conscientious about 
irrigating, fertilizing and using progressive techniques had for the most part 
entirely, all of them, had yields that were higher than Agee's. The most glaring 
difference was in malt barley, and for that reason I chose to depart from Agee's 
malt barley yield, but stick with his for others."

 
 
The crop yield figures were not 
without foundation.

 
 

[¶93.]  That Mr. Dornbusch made no reduction in 
crop yield projections to account for the time necessary to bring the future 
project areas to full production does not invalidate the crop yield figures. The 
master correctly observed:

 
 
"[Dornbusch] addressed the issue 
from the production cost side of the equation, increasing his per acre costs to 
account for the possibility of lower yields in the initial years of operation. I 
find this cost method reasonable and an acceptable solution to the matter and, 
therefore, make no alteration to the crop yield projections of the 
United 
States."

 
 

[¶94.]  The master did not err in accepting 
Dornbusch's methodology and cost elements derived for on-farm production costs 
and management and labor costs. Dornbusch testified that his analysis of fixed 
costs was based upon the most efficient use of the equipment, rather than unit 
size, because under cooperative Indian management the equipment could be used on 
larger than normal farms. Doug Agee, for the State, challenged this to some 
extent: "They can become more efficient up to a limited size, and then that 
curve starts to back up." The master considered the conflicting testimony and 
determined that

 
 
"the approach taken by Dornbusch [is 
the] more realistic, and his assumptions of tribal cooperation on the projects 
is not only reasonable, but well supported by the preponderance of the 
evidence."

 
 
Sufficient evidence supports the use 
of Dornbusch's figures.

 
 

[¶95.]  The United States' 
management and labor costs used only 20% of actual costs and assumed that 
unemployed Indians would supply labor. The disagreement between  Dornbusch, for the United States, and 
Jacobs, for the State, was over what proportion of labor costs have a zero 
opportunity cost owing to high unemployment on the reservation. Dornbusch's 80% 
was derived from information from the BIA, interviews, and the historic 
experience on the reservation. Jacobs, who would cost farm labor at 75-100%, did 
less thorough work, relying on his own "judgment call." The United States' 
economist provided adequate foundation for his figures.

 
 

[¶96.]  The master's determination that the Wind 
River Indian Reservation embraces practicably irrigable acreage is proper. We 
therefore affirm the district court's award of a reserved water right for future 
projects covering practicably irrigable acreage.

 
 
4. 10% 
Reduction

 
 

[¶97.]  The master erred in reducing the award of 
a reserved water right by 10% on grounds that

 
 
"error is probably inevitable 
whenever a group of people are required to coordinate and analyze such a complex 
matter [land classification] and must rely on a field of expertise which, by its 
very nature, lacks the certainty of complete objectivity. But that concern can 
be addressed by an appropriate percentage reduction in the totals to reflect the 
unavoidable errors that arise in such a study."

 
 
The master specifically found that 
the United 
States met its burden of proof in establishing 
the arable land base. Wyoming, he said, did not 
present a case sufficient to refute the evidence of the United States, 
but did raise "some concerns sufficient to support a percentage reduction." The 
master settled on a 10-15% reduction as appropriate and credited the 
United 
States with the 5% Dr. Mesghinna deducted for 
farmsteads and roads.

 
 

[¶98.]  Even assuming there is a 10-15% margin of 
error in the United 
States' arable land base, it is clear that a 
margin of error works both ways. It is as likely the United States 
claimed 10-15% too few acres as arable as it is that it claimed 10-15% too many. 
Even counsel for the State referred to "the 10 percent plus or minus 
tolerance for accuracy." (Emphasis added.) The master found the 
United 
States had proved the arable land base by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Wyoming may have planted uncertainties in his 
mind, but by his own admission, they did not produce a preponderance of evidence 
to show that any particular acreage was not arable.

 
 

[¶99.]  No independent evidence supports the 
reduction. The figures cited to us as evidence in support of the reduction are 
independent of any margin of error. We have already disposed of the claims that 
the United States' climatological data was without foundation, that the United 
States' efficiencies were reduced at trial, that a Wyoming witness said 50% 
efficiencies were possible, that another witness said only about 30,000 acres 
were irrigable, holding them insufficient to require a reduction in PIA. We 
addressed the inclusion of Class 6 lands and the squaring off process and 
resolved that claim adversely to Wyoming. Although Dr. Mesghinna admitted on 
cross-examination that his arable land might contain houses, cemeteries, dumps, 
gravel pits and the like, he also explained he had reduced the claimed arable 
land base by 5% to account for these. Thus, Wyoming has directed us to no independent 
evidence supporting the 10% reduction.

 
 

[¶100.]            
The master found (1) that the United States met its burden of proof on 
the arable land base, (2) that it proved engineering feasibility not only by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but as the most reasonable conclusion, (3) that 
it proved the diversion requirements "by convincing and the better evidence," 
(4) that its cropping patterns were supported by the evidence and reasonable, 
(5) that its production costs were supported by the preponderance of the 
evidence, (6) that its incremental phase-in of the Indian management and 
normalization factor were supported by the preponderance of the evidence, (7) 
that it proved its reasonable discount rate by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and thus (8) that:

 
 
"59. The claimants for a reserved 
water right have established their asserted case by a 'preponderance of the 
evidence,' which is the standard of proof clearly appropriate in this 
matter."

 
 
We have affirmed each of these 
findings. There should not have been a 10% reduction in the reserved water 
right, and we reverse that part of the decision.

 
 
5. Stagner Ridge and Big Horn Flats 
Extension

 
 

[¶101.]            
In addition to the future project lands the United States 
claimed as practicably irrigable acreage, the Tribes claimed a reserved water 
right for two additional projects, Stagner Ridge and Big Horn Flats Extension. 
It does not appear that these areas were denied a reserved water right because 
they were nonarable or even not feasibly irrigable from an engineering 
standpoint, so we will not address those questions. Rather the reserved water 
right was properly denied because the projects are not economically 
feasible.

 
 

[¶102.]            
Mr. Jack Keller, the Tribes' agricultural irrigation engineer, reduced 
the costs for these projects developed by Stetson Engineers for the 
United 
States by removing the roof from the pumping 
plant, by cutting materials costs and by reducing the sprinkler pressures. 
Keller did not analyze the canal systems and related structures. Lyman 
Willardson, irrigation and drainage engineer and field investigator for the 
Tribes, spent an inadequate amount of time in the field. In addition, Stetson 
Engineers, on whose expertise the master had relied in awarding acreage for the 
five future projects, chose not to include these two projects in the 
United 
States' claim on the basis of costs. Willardson 
testified that only by saving on the other five projects by reducing drainage, a 
practice dangerous to the productivity of the land, would the two extension 
projects become economical. Willardson testified for the United States 
that the bank of 9,000 hp pumps would increase the costs unacceptably for 
projects of this size. The master correctly concluded that the balance tipped 
away from the Tribes.

 
 

[¶103.]            
The comparable land approach to PIA rests on the fact that the lands in 
question are similar to other lands irrigated in the West, and so they, too, 
must be PIA. The master rejected this approach because Keller's cursory 
investigation of only one of the proposed project areas did not prove 
comparability. The comparable costs approach rests on the fact that if the costs 
are comparable to other projects, the acres are practicably irrigable. The per 
acre costs presented by the Tribes were well within the State's range for the 
five future projects. Nonetheless, the figures for the two extension projects 
were based on the cost-cutting the master rightfully 
condemned.

 
 

[¶104.]            
Nor does the Stagner Ridge Project meet the stipulated PIA definition. 
The master found the Tribes' witnesses not credible. Mr. Ronald Bleisner, the 
Tribes' irrigation engineer, admitted he sometimes followed instructions, not 
his conscience. Mr. Willardson, the Tribes' irrigation and drainage expert, was 
not credible because of his hasty investigation. Mr. Cummings' cost figures were 
incomplete; they did not include off-reservation costs. Stagner Ridge meets the 
PIA definition, with its cost/benefit ratio of 1.33, only if the cost figures 
are accepted.  The master found them 
not credible and did not err in excluding Stagner Ridge and Big Horn 
Flats.

 
 
C. Historic 
Lands

 
 

[¶105.]            
The district court awarded a reserved water right for 54,216 practicably 
irrigable acres currently and/or historically irrigated on the reservation, 
defining five types of historic lands:

 
 

[¶106.]            
(a) Adjudicated trust lands are lands with an uncancelled state permit or 
certificate of appropriation;

 
 

[¶107.]            
(b) Unadjudicated but currently irrigated trust lands are those being 
irrigated at the time of trial, but not carrying a state permit or 
certificate;

 
 

[¶108.]            
(c) Type VII trust lands are those previously irrigated but currently 
idle or retired;

 
 

[¶109.]            
(d) Type VIII trust lands are undeveloped arable lands, not currently 
irrigated  but irrigable from 
existing canals (i.e., within or near project areas); and

 
 

[¶110.]            
(e) Indian fee lands are those owned in fee by individual 
Indians.

 
 
1. 
Presumptions

 
 

[¶111.]            
The master did not adopt improper presumptions relieving the 
United 
States and the Tribes from their burden of 
proving that the claimed historic acres met the stipulated definition of 
practicably irrigable acreage.

 
 
"I believe my presumption of 
irrigability regarding these [historically irrigated] lands was fair and that 
all parties fairly understood it. Like any other presumption, it asserts that 
the factual picture is sufficiently strong as to require an opponent's 
answer."

 
 
The master held during the 
proceedings that an uncancelled state permit was prima facie evidence of 
irrigability. The district court accepted this holding.

 
 

[¶112.]            
There is no doubt that this presumption rests on reason.  Quinlan v. Jones, 27 Wyo. 410, 198 P. 352, 354 
(1921). We have no quarrel with the proposition that presumptions are not 
necessary where the facts are available or known, Porter v. Wilson, Wyo., 
357 P.2d 309, 316 (1960); Castor v. Rice, 71 Wyo. 99, 254 P.2d 189, 191 
(1953); Kammerzell v. Anderson, 69 Wyo. 252, 240 P.2d 893, 895 (1952), 
but note that Wyoming also argues that the award for historic lands is improper 
because the facts were not known.

 
 

[¶113.]            
In a pretrial hearing the State of Wyoming agreed to the presumption when it 
argued, on behalf of individual private appropriators, that certificates of 
appropriation were prima facie evidence of a state water right and that the 
burden should be on the contestant to disprove a right to water. The State also 
argued that because it constantly monitors the water to be sure water is being 
used in accordance with the terms of the certificates, one cannot assume water 
is being wasted. The superintendent for Water Division No. 3 testified that he 
knew of no water rights in his division subject to abandonment and that he 
likely would know if there were. The State thus convinced the master that a 
certificate or permit is prima facie evidence that water is being put to 
beneficial use. The special master simply applied this reasoning to Indian lands 
as well, holding that the burden was on the State to show non-irrigability of 
Indian lands carrying a permit or certificate. Thereafter, Wyoming did attempt to 
prove that the claimed adjudicated acreage was not practicably irrigable, and in 
fact met its burden, convincing the master to delete some 5,017 acres of 
adjudicated lands. There is no merit to the contention that Wyoming did not fully 
understand the master's ruling that an uncancelled permit or certificate of 
appropriation was prima facie evidence of PIA.

 
 

[¶114.]            
The "presumption" concerning other historic lands was not a presumption 
at all. Rather, the master took evidence on arability, engineering feasibility 
and economic feasibility and found the United States' evidence to be 
"competent, generally convincing, and in most cases adequate in supporting 
Federal claims." As to the Tribes' claims for Indian fee land, the master found 
the evidence showed the land awarded a reserved water right to be PIA. The 
evidence the master accepted was different from evidence used to prove PIA for 
the future projects but it was sufficient to meet the stipulated definition of 
PIA.

 
 
2. Adjudicated 
Lands

 
 

[¶115.]            
The United 
States was awarded a reserved water right for 
12,395 of the claimed 17,411 acres of land within the reservation covered by an 
uncancelled state permit or certificate of adjudication. Sufficient evidence 
supports the finding that this acreage is economically feasible to irrigate. Mr. 
George Christopolous, then the State Engineer, testified for the State that a 
certificate does not represent a determination that the land is capable of 
sustained irrigation at reasonable cost. The United States 
performed no economic analysis for the adjudicated acres. Yet this court has 
defined beneficial use as the limit of water which can be economically 
used.  Nicholas v. Hufford, 
21 Wyo. 477, 
133 P. 1084, 1087-1088 (1913). We have also indicated that a  certificate is prima facie evidence of a 
water right. Basin Electric Power Coop. v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 
578 P.2d 557 (1978); Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Company, 54 Wyo. 367, 
92 P.2d 568, 571-572 (1939); Laramie Irrigation and Power Company v. 
Grant, 44 Wyo. 392, 13 P.2d 235 (1932); Campbell v. Wyoming Development 
Company, supra 100 P.2d 124; Hamp v. State, 19 Wyo. 377, 118 P. 653, 
663 (1911). We have said that a certificate is evidence of current, as opposed 
to potential future, beneficial use.  
Green River Development Company v. FMC Corp., Wyo., 660 P.2d 339, 346 
(1983). David Dornbusch, economist for the United States, 
testified that the fact that the land is being irrigated means it is 
economically feasible to do so. We acknowledge that the beneficial use standard 
for abandonment of a water right under state law is not identical to the 
definition of PIA, but emphasize that the fact that a state water right has not 
been abandoned for failure to beneficially use the water is a strong indication 
that the land is being productively irrigated. Thus, the master and the court 
did not err in awarding a reserved water right for adjudicated lands without 
formal proof of economic feasibility. Furthermore, once the master correctly 
ruled that a permit or certificate is prima facie evidence of PIA, it was 
incumbent on the State to show specifically which areas were not PIA. Wyoming cites us to no 
evidence showing that any of the adjudicated lands for which an award was made 
were not economically feasible to irrigate. The court did not err in awarding a 
reserved water right for lands carrying a valid state water 
right.

 
 

[¶116.]            
The court nonetheless reduced the United States' 
claimed reserved water right for adjudicated lands, deleting a total of 5,017.1 
acres as follows:

 
 


Type IX lands ("out" land 
      types)

845.9 
      acres

Class 6 
      lands

2,971.7 
      acres

Class 6 
      lands

360.5 
      acres

Type VII (retired) 
      lands

829.0 
      acres

Type VIII lands with no 
      economic analysis

10.0 
      acres

 
 

[¶117.]            
The bases of the reduction were that Wyoming showed 5,007.1 acres to be nonarable by the 
United States' own standards 
and that the United 
States had not proved 10 acres of undeveloped 
land to be economically feasible to irrigate.

 
 

[¶118.]            
The master did not find the 2,971.7 acres of Class 6 lands to be 
nonarable only by finding that they could not be economically irrigated. We have 
already said that any economic analysis is a third step to determine whether 
arable lands can be economically irrigated; the fact that land can be 
economically irrigated does not make it arable. The special master adopted the 
United 
States' definition of Class 6 lands as "lands 
which do not meet the minimum standards or requirements for arability under the 
Land Classification Standards used by HKM, and are nonarable." Mr. Sommers, for 
the State, agreed that Class 6 lands are by definition not arable. Language 
indicating that the master gave Wyoming the benefit of the doubt only 
indicates he found the State's witnesses credible in identifying 3,817 acres of 
Type IX and Class 6 lands. The master did not err in excluding these non-arable 
adjudicated lands.

 
 

[¶119.]            
The master deleted another 360.5 acres of Class 6 adjudicated trust 
lands. The 244.1 acres of Class 6 land are currently irrigated and thus 
economically feasible to irrigate. But we have said that the fact the land is 
economically feasible to irrigate does not make it arable. Thus there is no 
merit to the contention that the 244.1 acres were improperly excluded.  As to the 116.5 acres, the master found 
the State's evidence that the acres were Type VII, currently idle lands, which 
were only possibly arable more credible than the HKM soil logs indicating the 
land is Class 3 or Class 4. The master could not add the 116.5 acres to the Type 
VII award because the necessary economic analysis had not been performed; 
therefore, he eliminated them. The court did not err in deleting these 
acres.

 
 

[¶120.]            
The master excluded 829.0 acres of Type VII land because he thought the 
United 
States did not show the land to be PIA 
with  economic analysis. The record 
reflects that the United 
States did prove its case regarding these Type 
VII, not adjudicated, lands with economic analysis. But it is well established 
that this court will uphold the action of the district court for any proper 
reason appearing in the record.  
Anderson v. Bauer, supra 681 P.2d 1316; Mentock v. Mentock, 
supra 638 P.2d 156. And Mr. Sommers testified for the State that some 837.7 
acres of Type VII land were not arable. Thus, the deletion of 829 acres was 
proper because the land was not arable.

 
 

[¶121.]            
The master and the court did not err in finding that the State rebutted 
the presumption of PIA for 5,017.1 acres of the 17,411 acres of adjudicated 
trust lands claimed by the United States.

 
 
3. Unadjudicated In-Use 
Lands

 
 

[¶122.]            
The United 
States received a reserved water right for 
28,129 of the claimed 34,427 acres of unadjudicated, but currently irrigated, 
trust lands. The master found credible the testimony of Mr. F. T. Kersich of HKM 
Associates, agricultural engineer for the United States, 
that the land was arable. He was satisfied that physical and cultural obstacles 
to irrigation were adequately accounted for. He also accepted the testimony of 
Mr. Dornbusch, the United 
States' economist, that current successful 
irrigation indicates economic feasibility. Thus, there is sufficient evidence 
that the acres awarded a reserved water right are arable and economically 
feasible to irrigate.

 
 

[¶123.]            
Nonetheless, the master deleted a total of 6,298 acres. He refused to 
award a reserved water right for 3,575.9 acres of Class 6 land. The United 
States claims that it is unfair to exclude Class 6 lands when such lands are in 
fact being irrigated in the Midvale and LeClair projects, and that the master 
"placed an insurmountable burden on the United States--to prove that what is 
done in fact is not impossible to do in theory," are not well taken. It was the 
United States which defined 
Class 6 land as not arable, and it was the United States 
which classified these 3,575.3 acres as Class 6 lands. Thus the 
United 
States has essentially admitted that these 
acres are not practicably irrigable and not entitled to a reserved water right. 
The court did not err in excluding these acres.

 
 

[¶124.]            
The master also deleted 879 acres for which the United States' 
soil logs contain notations "which discredit this irrigability." Mr. Sommers' 
testimony for the State pointed out that these notes question the arability of 
these acres. The master found this testimony credible and refused to strike it. 
The comments were: "doesn't appear to have been farmed"; "seeped * * * * too 
expensive to drain"; "subject to flooding"; "many cobbles and boulders on 
surface"; "poor land; water table is high"; "subirrigated"; "alkali on surface * 
* * * subject to floods"; and "probably not used for irrigation." It is clear 
that this testimony and evidence support the deletion.

 
 

[¶125.]            
The court deleted 246 acres of subirrigated land. The master's deletion 
of 1,778 acres of subirrigated land was reduced by stipulation of the parties to 
a deletion of 246 acres in the Johnson Decree. The United States' 
own expert witness, Mr. Billstein, admitted that subirrigated land is nonarable. 
The court did not err in excluding these acres.

 
 

[¶126.]            
The master also deducted another 55.6 acres of Type VII, retired, lands. 
The land is not currently in use and because no economic analysis was done on 
it, it could not be included in the Type VII award. Mr. Sommers, testifying for 
the State that the acreage was idle, may have relied upon the wrong HKM log. 
Wyo. Exh. WRIR 
SS-1001 does identify tract 35-1 (55.6 acres) as Type IV, Class 4 land, but it 
also notes that the tract is "idle hayland." The United States 
does not indicate where the proper soil log is to be found in the record nor 
that Mr. Sommers was questioned about his use of an improper soil log at trial. 
Without some indication that this claim has merit, we will not consider it 
further.

 
 

[¶127.]            
The Tribes' argument that once actual irrigation is shown, the land 
should be considered to be PIA unless the use of  water is demonstrated to be wasteful is 
not well taken. The State's showing that some of the claimed lands are not 
currently irrigated takes those acres out of the proposed rule. The finding that 
the remaining deleted acres are not arable means that they cannot meet the 
definition of PIA.

 
 

[¶128.]            
The master did not err in deleting 6,298 acres of the claimed 34,427 PIA, 
unadjudicated in-use trust lands.

 
 
4. Type VII 
Lands

 
 

[¶129.]            
The United 
States was awarded a reserved water right for 
6,271 of the claimed 7,946 acres of Type VII, previously irrigated but currently 
idle, or retired, land. The master excluded 1,546 acres of Class 4 and Class 6 
lands as "simply too marginal to be awarded a finding of practicable irrigable 
acreage." We have already said that Class 6 lands are not arable and must be 
excluded. Class 4 lands are "lands of marginal quality for irrigation, suitable 
mainly for shallow rooted crops or pasture." The excluded acres were not 
classified as Class 6 for both gravity and sprinkler irrigation. Nonetheless, 
Mr. David Dornbusch, economist for the United States, eliminated even some 
Class 4 gravity/Class 4 sprinkler acres as economically unfeasible. Mr. Sommers 
testified for the State that additional acreage should be deleted because the 
United 
States relaxed its arability standards for 
these historic lands. Mr. Ross Waples, a United States land classifier and soil 
scientist, testified that the lands were properly designated Class 4 sprinkler 
only when "the conditions that would be required to make it arable are met, 
which are drainage and the [soil] amendments." The land conditions not being 
met, the master and the court were justified in deleting this Class 4 acreage as 
just too marginal.

 
 

[¶130.]            
The master also deleted 129.5 acres because they did not meet the 
United 
States' minimum size standards. Mr. Waples 
explained that the size of the parcel "is irrelevant if it can be operated as 
part of a larger field" and admitted that the size standards were not strictly 
followed. The difficulty with this practice is that, even when the small parcels 
were joined with other parcels for management purposes, they either did not meet 
the 40 acre parcel requirement or were separated by a fenced paved county road. 
The master did not err in eliminating these parcels.

 
 
5. IndianFeeLand

 
 

[¶131.]            
The Tribes claimed a reserved water right for a total of 10,374 acres of 
Indian fee lands--land on the reservation owned in fee by individual 
Indians--and proved that 6,155 acres were entitled to reserved water rights. The 
Tribes admit that the omitted 3,943 acres are not currently irrigated, and the 
testimony that Indian fee land was comparable to other reservation lands dealt 
only with irrigated lands. Thus there is no evidence to support inclusion of 
these non-irrigated lands even under the Tribes' comparable lands test for 
PIA.

 
 

[¶132.]            
The master did not accept these acres under the stipulated PIA definition 
because no economic analysis was performed. Keith Higginson, the Tribes' water 
resources engineer, testified that he believed the economic analysis was not 
necessary. The master implicitly agreed with him for the currently irrigated 
acres, but required the economic analysis for non-irrigated acres. The master 
did not rule that a formal benefit/cost analysis was necessary, only that some 
economic analysis was required. Yet Mr. Higginson merely assumed economic 
feasibility because "it was simply, in most cases, a matter of extending the 
ditch or a lateral in order to bring the water to the land." He did not opine as 
to the cost of such activities, nor show the relationship of the tracts to 
existing diversion works.

 
 

[¶133.]            
The master also disallowed 276 acres of Class 6 and subirrigated Indian 
fee land. For the reasons outlined supra, he did not err.

 
 
6. Efficiency 
Increase

 
 

[¶134.]            
In an irrigation system, the more efficient the use of water, the less 
water is needed. A system operating at 25% efficiency uses twice as much water 
as a system operating at 50%. In a 100% efficient  system, the plants would use every drop 
of diverted water. The current average efficiencies for both project and 
non-project lands is 35%; a 50% overall efficiency is probably achievable. The 
district court quantified the reserved water right for historic lands based on a 
40% efficiency.

 
 

[¶135.]            
Sufficient evidence supports the increase. Mr. Bishop for the State 
testified that a 50% overall efficiency was achievable. Mr. Higginson for the 
Tribes testified 40% was possible with the use of hand-moved sprinklers. Mr. 
Thomas Stetson, water duty engineer for the United States, 
said better efficiency could be achieved without a large cost investment but 
with better management. Thus there is evidence to support the master's finding 
that a 5% increase in efficiency is acceptable.

 
 

[¶136.]            
The award does not interfere with the Tribes' right to administer their 
own affairs; it merely quantifies the reserved right for historic lands by 
awarding only the amount of water necessary to irrigate all the PIA. The master 
did not discriminate against the Indians; he had not power to order an 
efficiency increase for non-Indian users in Water Division No. 3. The Tribes 
will not lose 12 1/2% of their reserved water right if they do not expend 
whatever funds or efforts are necessary to achieve a 40% efficiency; the amount 
of water awarded them was reduced under sound principles. It matters not that 
expensive modifications may be necessary in order that the Tribes can fully 
utilize the water awarded on all the historic PIA; expensive construction is 
necessary to irrigate the future PIA for which the Tribes have accepted 
water.

 
 

[¶137.]            
The court did not err in reducing the reserved water right for historic 
lands to the amount necessary to irrigate all the PIA based on an overall 
efficiency of 40%.

 
 
D. Sensitivity 
Doctrine

 
 

[¶138.]            
The sensitivity doctrine takes its name from this 
passage:

 
 
"I agree with the court that the 
implied-reservation doctrine should be applied with sensitivity to its impact 
upon those who have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress' 
general policy of deference to state water law." United 
States v. New 
Mexico, supra 438 U.S.  at 718, 98 S. Ct.  at 3023 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).

 
 
The majority in that case 
said:

 
 
"The quantification of reserved 
water rights for the national forests is of critical importance to the West, 
where, as noted earlier, water is scarce and where more than 50% of the 
available water either originates in or flows through national forests. When, as 
in the case of the Rio Mimbres, a river is fully appropriated, federal reserved 
water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount 
of water available for water-needy state and private appropriators. This reality 
has not escaped the attention of Congress and must be weighed in determining 
what, if any, water Congress reserved for use in the national forests." 
Id., 438 U.S.  at 705, 98 S. Ct.  at 3016-3017.

 
 
The Court indicated that water is 
reserved only to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, id., 438 U.S.  at 700, 98 S. Ct.  at 3014, and that a careful examination of the 
purposes and the amount of water claimed is essential.  Id., 438 U.S.  at 700-702, 98 S. Ct.  at 3014-3015. Yet in Arizona v. California, supra 460 U.S.  at 625, 103 S. Ct.  at 1395, the Court refused to reconsider the PIA 
standard in light of the holdings in New Mexico, supra, and in Washington v. 
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, supra 443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055 (dealing with a right to take fish, not Indian reserved 
water rights). There is strong indication that New Mexico does not apply to Indian 
reserved water rights. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 581-585 (1982 
ed.). The ninth circuit has nonetheless gleaned useful guidelines from it for 
use in Indian reserved water cases.  
United States v. Adair, supra 723 F.2d  at 1408. It is thus not 
clear whether the sensitivity doctrine, requiring the quantification of reserved 
water rights with sensitivity to the impact on state and private appropriators, 
applies here.

 
 

[¶139.]            
Assuming, arguendo, that it does apply, we cannot accept the City of 
Riverton's 
argument that it was ignored by the district court. Neither the provision in the 
Amended Judgment and Decree eliminating the upstream storage requirement from 
the future projects award nor the award of the reserved water rights in 
acre-feet per year rather than cubic feet per second violate the sensitivity 
doctrine.

 
 

[¶140.]            
Deletion of the upstream storage requirement which was intended to 
protect appropriators from sudden depletion by the diversion of water for the 
five future projects does not manifest insensitivity to other water users. The 
doctrine of reserved water rights entitles the Indians to a certain quantity of 
water. The requirement that they must first construct storage facilities to 
supply their entitlement flies in the face of the object of the reserved water 
right--a prior entitlement to the waters. There is no indication that 
elimination of the storage requirement before diversion of future project waters 
will require a gallon for gallon reduction in the water available for other 
users.

 
 

[¶141.]            
The award of a reserved water right in acre-feet per year is an accepted 
means of award.  Arizona v. 
California, 376 U.S. 340, 342-345, 84 S. Ct. 755, 
756-758, 11 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1964); Mimbres Valley Irrigation Company v. 
Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977), aff'd sub nom.  United States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. 696, 98 S. Ct. 3012, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1052. The City has cited us no authority for 
the proposition that the mere form of an award of reserved water can violate the 
sensitivity doctrine.

 
 

[¶142.]            
Nor does this court's elimination of the 10% diversion reduction for 
future projects violate the sensitivity doctrine. The sensitivity doctrine does 
not preclude the award of a fair reserved water right.

 
 

[¶143.]            
In the case at bar, the purpose of the reservation for which water is 
reserved is narrow--agricultural only. The right was quantified based on 
PIA--the master and the court rejecting some 50,000 acres originally claimed by 
the United 
States and the Tribes. The Indians' claim was 
further reduced by requiring an efficiency increase in historic lands. All of 
this evidences a sufficient sensitivity to the water needs of other water 
users.

 
 

[¶144.]            
With the exceptions noted above, we affirm the quantification of the 
reserved water right.

 
 
VII PRIORITY 
DATES

 
 
A. Diminished 
Reservation

 
 

[¶145.]            
We recognized earlier in this opinion that there was indeed a federal 
water right impliedly reserved for the Indians when the Wind River Indian 
Reservation was created by the 1868 Treaty. Therefore, we affirm the rulings 
below that the tribal diminished-reservation lands have a water right with a 
priority date of 1868.

 
 
B. Indian Fee 
Lands

 
 

[¶146.]            
The special master held that land within the reservation held in fee by 
individual Indians which never left Indian ownership held a priority date of 
1868. In United 
States v. Powers, supra 305 U.S.  at 533, 59 S. Ct. 344, the Court said it found nothing to show that Congress intended 
allottees be denied participation in the use of reserved water rights. See also 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra 647 F.2d 42; 
United 
States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, supra 
27 F.2d  at 912. We affirm.

 
 
C. Allottees' 
Grantees

 
 

[¶147.]            
For many years the courts have struggled to define the water rights of 
those who succeed to the lands of Indians.  
United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, supra 27 F.2d  at 912. In 
Skeem v. United States, supra 273 F. 93, the court had held that Indian 
allottees were entitled to a reserved water right with a treaty priority date. 
The recognized rights of the successors were somewhat different from the rights 
of the allottee. The non-Indian successor

 
 
"would, as grantee of the Indian 
allotments, be entitled to a water right for the actual acreage that was under 
irrigation at the time title passed from the Indians, and such increased acreage 
as he might with reasonable diligence place  under irrigation, which would give him, 
under the doctrine of relation, the same priority as owned by the Indians." 
United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, supra 27 F.2d  at 
912.

 
 

United States v. 
Parkins, supra 18 F.2d 642, does not address any claim of right to divert water by virtue of 
succession to a reserved water right. In United States v. Powers, supra 
305 U.S. 527, 59 S. Ct. 344, the Court refused to consider the successors' claim 
to a reserved water right, id., 305 U.S.  at 533, 59 S. Ct.  at 346-347, 
but did note that "the respondents' claim to the extent stated is well founded." 
Id. 305 U.S.  at 532, 59 S. Ct.  at 346. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra 
647 F.2d  at 50, the court reiterated that Indian allottees have a reserved water 
right and relied upon United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321, 342 (9th Cir. 1956), for the proposition that "non-Indian purchasers 
of allotted lands are entitled to 'participate ratably' with Indian allottees in 
the use of reserved water." The court defined the non-Indian successor's 
interest in three ways: The successor cannot acquire a reserved water right for 
more PIA than the Indian owned;  the 
successor's water right carries a treaty priority date; the successor's right is 
to the quantity of water being put to use by the Indian at the time title passes 
and to the water he puts to use with reasonable diligence thereafter.  Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton, supra 647 F.2d  at 51. See also id., appeal after remand, 752 F.2d 397, 401-402 (9th Cir. 1985). The court also held that the state permits 
Walton held were "of no force and effect," because the State had no authority 
over water on the reservation. In a footnote to the opinion, the court begged 
the United States Supreme Court to review the case so that "guidance and 
stability" might be given the issue of allottees' successors rights, "an area of 
great unrest and uncertainty in Western water and land law." Colville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra, 647 F.2d  at 54 n.18. Yet the Court has 
twice denied certiorari.  454 U.S. 1092, 102 S. Ct. 657, 70 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1981); 475 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 1183, 89 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1986). In United States v. Adair, 
supra 723 F.2d 1394, the court reiterated that a non-Indian purchaser may 
succeed to the full quantity of water available to the allottee, id. at 1417, 
and held that the United 
States, as a non-Indian successor, also 
succeeded to the same appurtenant water rights.  Id. at 1419.

 
 

[¶148.]            
In United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939), the 
court held that the state water rights procured by the Indian predecessor 
conferred no valid water right. Likewise, Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton, supra 647 F.2d  at 51, held that the state permits issued for lands 
carrying a reserved water right were "of no force and effect." We hold that the 
mere fact that state permits have been issued does not deprive these allottees' 
successors of a reserved water right with a treaty date 
priority.

 
 

[¶149.]            
Merrill v. Bishop, supra 287 P.2d 620, was a suit by 
allottees' successors to enjoin the state engineer from interfering with their 
headgates. Id. at 620. The actual holding in the 
case was that the injunction must be denied because the successors had not 
proved the facts necessary to allow the courts to tailor an injunction. 
Id. at 
626. It is thus apparent that the master relied only on dicta in Merrill v. 
Bishop. The holding of that case is narrow and does not prevent relitigating 
what was not necessary to the decision.  
Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., Wyo., 714 P.2d 328 (1986); CLS v. CLJ, Wyo., 693 P.2d 774 
(1985). We have already decided that the admission of Wyoming to the Union did 
not abrogate reserved water rights for the reservation. To the extent that 
Merrill v. Bishop indicates otherwise, it is overruled. Merrill v. 
Bishop is not res judicata of Webber, Jones and Graboski's claim to a treaty 
priority date. We have also held that state permits issued for water which has 
been reserved are invalid. Thus, the administrative proceedings are not res 
judicata.

 
 

[¶150.]            
On remand, appellants must be awarded a reserved water right with an 1868 
priority date for the PIA they can show were irrigated by their Indian 
predecessors  or put under 
irrigation within a reasonable time thereafter.

 
 
D. Reacquired 
Lands

 
 

[¶151.]            
We have already held that a non-Indian purchaser from an Indian allottee 
obtains a reserved water right with a treaty priority date, and that his 
non-Indian successor would likewise succeed to the treaty priority date. There 
is no reason then to deny the same priority to an Indian or tribal purchaser. 
Because all the reacquired lands on the ceded portion of the reservation are 
reservation lands, the same as lands on the diminished portion, the same 
reserved water rights apply. Thus, reacquired lands on both portions of the 
reservation are entitled to an 1868 priority date.

 
 
VIII MONITORING 
OF THE DECREE BY THE STATE ENGINEER

 
 

[¶152.]            
The issue of whether the state engineer may monitor the decree is a 
controversy conferring jurisdiction upon this court. A letter from Wyoming to Judge Johnson 
which referred to "the federal government's residual dissatisfaction with Judge 
Joffe's ruling that the State Engineer shall have primary regulatory 
responsibility" indicates previous disputes as to the propriety of the ruling. 
Section 4 of the United 
States' response confirms the contested nature 
of the issue. Sufficient adversary character exists to permit a ruling on this 
question.  Brimmer v. Thomson, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 574, 577 (1974).

 
 

[¶153.]            
The decree does not violate state law. The provision in the Amended 
Judgment and Decree does not purport to give full ownership of the reserved 
water to the State. Thus the argument that the decree divests the Tribes of 
their water in violation of Article 1, § 32 (eminent domain) of the Wyoming 
Constitution is inapposite because monitoring by the state engineer is not a 
taking of property. Article 8, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that the 
water is the property of the state and Article 8, § 5 provides that the state 
engineer has general supervision of the waters of the state. Because Congress, 
in admitting Wyoming to the Union, 26 Stat. 222, ch. 664, ratified the Wyoming 
Constitution, it clearly contemplated that whatever superior rights it might 
temporarily or permanently hold in the waters of this state, the underlying 
ownership and control would remain with the State. Thus the decree does not 
violate Article 21, § 1 (rights to continue after statehood) nor does the decree 
run afoul of Article 21, § 26, which disclaims all right and title to lands 
owned by Indians until title is extinguished by the United States and provides 
that Indian lands remain under the absolute control and jurisdiction of 
Congress, emphasizing that Indian rights remain only so long as the reservation 
exists. Our Declaratory Judgments Act, permitting the court to enter all 
necessary orders, § 1-37-106, W.S.1977, is to be liberally construed to give 
effect to its remedial purposes and relief from uncertainty.  Section 1-37-114, W.S.1977; Brimmer 
v. Thomson, supra 521 P.2d  at 577. Neither the United States 
nor the Tribes have advanced other authority for the proposition that the 
provision violates state law.

 
 

[¶154.]            
Federal law has not preempted state oversight of reserved water rights. 
In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, supra 463 U.S. 545, 103 S. Ct. 3201, the Court merely reiterated that Indian water 
rights in state adjudications must be judged by federal law. In Cappaert v. 
United States, supra 426 U.S.  at 145, 96 S. Ct.  at 2073, the Court said: "Federal water rights are 
not dependent upon state law or state procedures and they need not be 
adjudicated only in state courts." The procedures referred to are state 
procedures for perfecting state water rights, not monitoring of already decreed 
federal water rights. See Colville Confederate Tribes v. Walton, supra 
752 F.2d  at 400 (federal law governs only scope and volume of reserved 
right).  United States v. Rio 
Grande Dam and Irrigation Company, 174 U.S. 690, 19 S. Ct. 770, 43 L. Ed. 1136 (1899) dealt only with interference with a navigable stream, and United 
States v. McIntire, supra 101 F.2d  at 654, held a state appropriation of 
reserved water to be invalid. In Colville  Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra 
647 F.2d 42, the court indicated that state administration of the No Name System 
was inappropriate because the system was entirely within the reservation, but 
conceded that state regulation may be appropriate in some circumstances.  Id. at 52-53. The ninth circuit later 
conceded that the State could assume some regulatory authority on the 
reservation. United 
States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 
1984). See also Federal Youth Center v. District Court in and for the County 
of Jefferson, 195 Colo. 55, 575 P.2d 395, 400 (1978) (Congress intended to 
defer to state administration); United States v. City and County of 
Denver, Colo., 656 P.2d 1, 35 (1982) (U.S. agrees adjudicated federal 
reserved water rights subject to administration by state engineer); United 
States v. Bell, Colo., 724 P.2d 631, 644 (1986) (U.S. must submit to state 
administration). The decree entered in the instant case does not require 
application of state water law to the Indian reservation. The decree recognizes 
reserved water rights based on federal law. The role of the state engineer is 
thus not to apply state law, but to enforce the reserved rights as decreed under 
principles of federal law. This court is also cognizant of the fact that 
exercise of the reserved water rights are intimately bound up with the state 
water rights of off-reservation users. The state water appropriators are not in 
a position to jeopardize the decreed rights of the Tribes. The decree only 
requires the United States and the Tribes first to turn to the state engineer to 
exercise his authority over the state users to protect their reserved water 
rights before they seek court assistance to enforce their rights; it does not 
preclude access to the courts. Incidental monitoring of Indian use to this end 
has carelessly been termed "administration" of Indian water by the state 
engineer. Should the state engineer find that it is the Tribes who are violating 
the decree, it is clear that he must then turn to the courts for enforcement of 
the decree against the United 
States and the Tribes and that he cannot simply 
close the headgates. United States v. Hampleman, supra No. 753, June 26, 
1916. Any fear that the state engineer may be unfair must be dispelled by 
Article 1, § 31 of the Wyoming Constitution which provides that the State "shall 
equally guard all of the various [water] interests involved." The state engineer 
has sworn to uphold this constitution. Thus it is readily apparent that the 
provisions authorizing the state engineer to monitor reserved water rights 
contemplate neither the application of state law nor the authority to deprive 
the Tribes of water without the assistance of the courts in a suit for the 
administration of the decree.

 
 

[¶155.]            
The argument that the instant decree can be administered only by the 
court in a separate suit for administration under the McCarran Amendment must 
fail in light of the admission that an independent water master might properly 
be appointed at this time to administer the decree and in light of the state 
engineer's limited authority. The Treaty of 1868 prohibits only unauthorized 
persons from entering the reservation, but the state engineer would be an 
authorized person upon his appointment to monitor the decree and could properly 
enter the reservation.

 
 

[¶156.]            
The district court did not err in including provisions giving the state 
engineer authority to enforce the decree against state 
appropriators.

 
 
IX EXPENSES OF 
THE SPECIAL MASTER

 
 

[¶157.]            
The partial interlocutory decree settling the non-Indian federal reserved 
rights was final, under Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P., only as to Phase II, non-Indian 
federal reserved water rights. Nor could an appeal have been taken from the 
original orders to pay. The United States' timely notice of 
appeal from the May 24, 1985 Amended Judgment and Decree is sufficient to 
challenge all aspects of the Phase I proceedings, and we address the merits of 
the issue.

 
 

[¶158.]            
The McCarran Amendment prohibits taxing of costs against the 
United States: "No judgment 
for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit [for 
the adjudication or administration of water rights]." 43 U.S.C. § 666. Rule 
54(d), W.R.C.P., provides that "costs against  the United States * 
* * * shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law." Likewise, Rule 
54(d), W.R.C.P., provides that "costs against the state of Wyoming * * * * shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law." Both the federal and state rules 
provide that "compensation to be allowed the master shall be fixed by the court, 
and may be charged against such of the parties * * * * as the court may direct." 
Rule 53(a), W.R.C.P.; Rule 53(a), F.R.C.P.

 
 

[¶159.]            
A number of federal cases have indicated that costs include the special 
master's fees and expenses.  
Norris v. Green, 317 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.Ala. 1965); K-2 Ski Co. 
v. Head Ski Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974); Capra, Inc. v. Ward 
Foods, Inc., supra 567 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds 
Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1983). It 
is apparent, however, that the reason for this practice is to give the district 
court discretion as to whether to charge the losing party the entire master's 
bill.  Capra, Inc. v. Ward Foods, 
Inc., supra, 567 F.2d at 1323-1324; Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979). Costs are generally considered to be the expenses incurred 
by the litigant, not the court system. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, para. 54.70 at 54-317 
(1986). See also Rule 39(e), F.R.A.P. (including as taxable costs the 
preparation and transmission of the record and necessary transcripts, filing 
fees, and premiums paid for appeal bonds); Black's Law Dictionary at 312 (5th 
ed. 1979) ("Fees and charges required by law to be paid to the courts or their 
officers, the amount of which is fixed by statute or court rule; e.g. filing and 
service fees"). Therefore, assessing master's fees does not run afoul of the 
McCarran Amendment.

 
 

[¶160.]            
The United States was 
not the subject of discrimination because it was the only party other than 
Wyoming which 
was required to bear the expenses and fees of the master. Even in original 
proceedings before the United States Supreme Court, the practice is to allocate 
the master's compensation among the states and the United 
States.  
Arizona v. California, 351 U.S. 977, 76 S. Ct. 1042, 100 L. Ed. 1493 (1956).

 
 

[¶161.]            
In the case at bar, the United States insisted upon the 
appointment of a special master, arguing that the Board of Control could not be 
objective. Even though objection was groundless, the court appointed a master in 
order to insure the procedural integrity of the judgment. It was not 
unreasonable to require the United States to pay one-half of the 
master's fees and expenses under such circumstances. In Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 
AFL CIO, CLC, Local 758, 631 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1010, 
101 S. Ct. 565, 66 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1980), the court affirmed the district court's 
order for the union to pay one-third of the master's expenses because the union 
had filed no objection to the appointment of the master and because the union 
had taken an active part in the litigation. In Gary W. v. Louisiana, 
supra 601 F.2d  at 242-244, the court affirmed the order for the State to pay all 
the master's fees, despite its objection to the appointment of the master, 
because its failure to comply with the original injunction necessitated the 
appointment of the master to monitor implementation of the injunction. Where the 
reference to the master was at the defendant's request and over the plaintiff's 
objection, and where, as here, the party requesting the reference made no 
convincing showing that any serious prejudice would result if the reference were 
denied, it was proper to charge the defendant at least half of the expense of 
the reference.  Johnson Fare Box 
Company v. National Rejectors, Inc., 269 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1959). See also 
9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2608 at 798 
("If a reference was unnecessary it is quite common to make the party who 
induced the court to order a reference bear the expense of the reference"). No 
provision for the payment of fees was attached at the foot of the original 
reference to the Board of Control simply because there is no authority for 
assessing the fees and expenses of the Board.

 
 

[¶162.]            
The district court did not err in requiring the United States to 
pay one-half of the special master's fees and expenses.

 
 
X 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶163.]            
The Amended Judgment and Decree is affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
BY THE COURT:

 
 
Brown, C.J., authored Parts III, 
VII, A, B and D.

 
 
Cardine, J., authored Parts I, II, 
IV, V, and VI.

 
 
Macy, J., authored Parts VII C, VIII 
and IX.

 
 
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting in 
which Hanscum, District Judge, joined.

 
 
Hanscum, District Judge, filed a 
separate dissenting opinion.

 
 
Appendix

 
 
THOMAS, Justice, dissenting with 
whom HANSCUM, District Judge, joins.

 
 

[¶164.]            
I differ from the majority with respect to three propositions and must 
dissent from the disposition made in the majority opinion. Except for my three 
points of difference, I am in accord with the resolution of this case as set 
forth in that opinion. My three points of difference are: first, I do not agree 
that reserved water rights, to the extent that they properly are recognized 
under the reserved rights doctrine, should be limited in the manner suggested by 
the majority opinion; second, I believe that there should be a pragmatic 
limitation on the standard for quantification, the practicably irrigable 
acreage, which would eliminate those lands from the quantification formula which 
only could be irrigated by the construction of some future water project; and 
third, but most important, I do not believe that the reserved rights doctrine is 
applicable to that portion of the lands lying north of the "Big Wind River," 
i.e., the ceded portion of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation.

 
 

[¶165.]            
The purpose of establishing an Indian reservation, such as the Wind River 
Indian Reservation, is to provide a homeland for Indian peoples. If one is to 
assume that, pursuant to the reserved rights doctrine relating to water, there 
is an implied reservation of those waters essential to accomplish the purpose of 
the reservation of land, then I cannot agree that the implied reservation of 
water with respect to the Wind River Indian Reservation should be limited, as 
the majority has held in approving the judgment of the district court. The fault 
that I find with such a limitation is that it assumes that the Indian peoples 
will not enjoy the same style of evolution as other people, nor are they to have 
the benefits of modern civilization. I would understand that the homeland 
concept assumes that the homeland will not be a static place frozen in an 
instant of time but that the homeland will evolve and will be used in different 
ways as the Indian society develops. For that reason, I would hold that the 
implied reservation of water rights attaching to an Indian reservation assumes 
any use that is appropriate to the Indian homeland as it progresses and 
develops. The one thing that I would not assume is that using the reserved water 
as a salable commodity was contemplated in connection with the implied 
reservation of the water. I would limit its use to the territorial boundaries of 
the reservation.

 
 

[¶166.]            
Deeming it unnecessary to detail further the formula for allocation of 
water which involves the concept of practicably irrigable acreage ( Arizona 
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 75 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1983)), I am 
convinced that there has to be some degree of pragmatism in determining 
practicably irrigable acreage. It is clear from the majority opinion that there 
was included in quantifying the water reserved to the Indian peoples lands not 
now irrigable but deemed to be practicably irrigable acreage upon the assumption 
of the development of future irrigation projects. I would be appalled, as most 
other concerned citizens should be, if the Congress of the United States, or any other governmental body, 
began expending money to develop water projects for irrigating these Wyoming lands when far 
more fertile lands in the midwestern states now are being removed from 
production due to poor market conditions. I am convinced that, because of this 
pragmatic concern, those lands which were included as practicably irrigable 
acreage, based upon the assumption of the construction of a future irrigation 
project, should not be included for the purpose of quantification of the Indian 
peoples' water rights. They may be irrigable academically, but not as a matter 
of practicality, and I would require their exclusion from any quantification. 
For my purposes, this may be a moot point because I believe that hardly any of 
these lands are situated in the diminished portion of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation, the only lands to which reserved water rights can be 
attached.

 
 

[¶167.]            
My third concern is the error which has been committed in including lands 
north of the "Big Wind River" in the practicably irrigable acreage utilized for 
determining the quantification of the reserved water rights of the Indian 
peoples. In my judgment,  the 
majority has ignored the significance of precedent from this court, to which we 
should accord priority; has failed to recognize the specific treaty history 
attaching to the Wind River Indian Reservation; and has failed to perceive the 
rationale of federal authorities addressing the disestablishment of Indian 
reservations. I would hold that the ceded lands have not been a part of an 
Indian reservation since 1905; and, since the reserved rights doctrine relating 
to an implied reservation of water rights depends upon the existence of reserved 
federal lands, there are no reserved water rights which attach to the ceded 
portion of the Wind River Indian Reservation. The United States Congress 
declared that the Indian peoples did not need these lands for the purpose of 
furnishing them a homeland; and, if that purpose is not present, there cannot be 
any implied reservation of water.

 
 

[¶168.]            
Turning first to the precedent of our court because of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, on several occasions, we have addressed the implications of the 
Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1016 (hereinafter Act of March 3, 1905), which 
approved the Second McLaughlin Agreement, negotiated with the Wind River Indian 
Reservation Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. Our decisions uniformly demonstrate 
recognition of state jurisdiction over the lands of the ceded portion of the 
Wind River Indian Reservation. In some instances, we relied upon the concept of 
"Indian country." In this extraordinarily complex area of law, it seems 
important to promote rationality, if possible, and I would espouse a rule that 
for all practical purposes an "Indian homeland" and "Indian country" are one and 
the same.

 
 

[¶169.]            
In Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620 (1955), this court 
held that water rights appurtenant to lands situated in the ceded portion of the 
reservation could be perfected only by compliance with the statutory 
requirements of the State, thus unequivocally asserting jurisdiction over the 
management of water on the ceded portion of the reservation. The court expressed 
some doubt as to whether the reserved rights doctrine as to implied water 
rights, articulated in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908), pertained to the Wind River Indian 
Reservation, in light of Art. 8, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming, which declares all water within the boundaries of the State to be the 
property of the State, and the adoption of that constitutional provision by the 
United States Congress in the Act of Admission, Act of July 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 
222. The decision, however, was not premised on such broad grounds. The court 
said:

 
 
"* * * * And so we do not pass upon 
the right of the United States or the Indians in so far as it concerns water and 
lands that still remain within an Indian reservation. The federal government 
being in absolute control thereof and having complete jurisdiction there, the 
federal courts may hold that the water rights were impliedly reserved 
notwithstanding the broad language contained in the act of admission of 
Wyoming. * * * 
* The lands involved in this action became a part of the public domain when 
Congress on March 3, 1905, approved the treaty of 1904. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in the case that any of the Indian allotments here in question were 
granted prior to that time. So it is not necessary to consider what the law 
would be if these allotments had been granted while the lands herein involved 
were still contained in an Indian Reservation. It would seem then that the power 
to grant allotments after March 3, 1905, remained pursuant to that treaty, but 
only just as a power existed to acquire a homestead in that area, each with the 
qualification that water rights could be acquired only by appropriation thereof 
with a priority according to the time of the appropriation. If that were not so 
then if it should happen that there are still lands within the ceded area of 
1904 that might now be allotted to Indians, he or they would then have a water 
right superior to all the rights acquired by appropriation during the last 75 
years. To so hold would, we think, go beyond the mere protection of the weak 
against the strong. While Indian  
rights are to be regarded favorably, that should be done within 
reasonable limits. That the Indian allottees herein were not ignorant of the 
laws of appropriation of water is clearly demonstrated by the evidence in this 
case." Merrill v. Bishop, supra, 287 P.2d  at 625.

 
 

[¶170.]            
The question in Blackburn v. State, Wyo., 357 P.2d 174, reh. 
denied 357 P.2d 1111 (1960), was criminal jurisdiction within the lands ceded 
pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1905. The argument was made that those lands 
were "Indian country," and thus, the State of Wyoming had no criminal jurisdiction. The 
distinctive feature in Blackburn v. State, supra, was that the area in 
issue was located on the Riverton Irrigation Project, and compensation was 
authorized for those specific lands by the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 592. 
Congress there provided for the sum of $ 1,009,500 to be credited and expended 
for the benefit of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indians of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation:

 
 
"* * * * To constitute full, 
complete, and final compensation, except as provided in section 5 of this Act, 
for terminating and extinguishing all of the right, title, estate, and interest, 
including minerals, gas and oil, of said Indian tribes and their members of, in 
and to the lands, interests in lands, and any and all past and future damages 
arising out of the cession to the United States, pursuant to the Act of March 3, 
1905 (33 Stat. 1016) of that part of the former Wind River Indian Reservation 
lying within the following described boundaries: * * * *."

 
 

[¶171.]            
In Blackburn v. State, supra, this court noted that the Act of 
August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 592, was amended by the Act of August 27, 1958, 72 
Stat. 935, which provided, in pertinent part:

 
 
"* * * * All of the right, title, 
and interest of the United States in all minerals, including oil and gas, the 
Indian title, to which was extinguished by the Act of August 15, 1953 * * * * is 
hereby declared to be held by the United States in trust for the Shoshone and 
Arapahoe Tribes * * * *."

 
 
We held that any retained mineral 
interest for the Indian peoples, held in trust by the United States, did not 
suffice to make the lands "Indian country" as that term is used in 18 U.S.C.A., 
§§ 1151-1153. This court ruled that, despite a retained interest in mineral 
proceeds, Congress had extinguished Indian title to the ceded 
lands.

 
 
"* * * * Construing the Acts of 
Congress together, we think, as the trial court held, that the title of the 
Indians to the lands in the territory here involved has been extinguished and 
that the only right reserved to the Indians is in the money or proceeds received 
by the United States from the sale or lease of any rights in the land." 
Blackburn v. State, supra, 357 P.2d  at 179.

 
 

[¶172.]            
While this court did rely, in part, on the effect of congressional acts, 
other than the Act of March 3, 1905, in deciding Blackburn v. State, 
supra, it is clear that the same decision would have been reached relying solely 
on that Act. We quoted from Application of De Marrias, 77 S.D. 294, 91 N.W.2d 480, 482-483 (1958), as follows:

 
 
" '* * * * It is provided in the Act 
of Congress ratifying the agreement of 1889: "That the lands by said agreement 
ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed to the United States shall immediately, 
* * * * be subject only to entry and settlement under the homestead and townsite 
laws of the United States, excepting the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of 
said lands, which shall be reserved for common school purposes, and be 
subject to the laws of the State wherein located: * * * *." Section 30, 
Chapter 543, 1891 (26 United States Statutes at Large, p. 1039). * * * 
*

 
 
"'It is readily apparent therefrom 
that the City of Sisseton is not situated on "land within the 
limits of any reservation." Consequently it is not within the purview of the 
term "Indian country"  as defined 
and used in Sections 1151, 1152, and 1153 of Title 18 
U.S.C.A.'

 
 
"The foregoing italicized words are 
not contained in the Congressional Act of March 3, 1905, but we think that 
the  intent is not different. See 
also Tooisgah v. United States, 10th Cir., 186 F.2d 93 [1950]. The 
instant contentions of appellants are overruled." Blackburn v. State, 
supra, 357 P.2d  at 179-180. (Emphasis in original.)

 
 

[¶173.]            
A very similar jurisdictional question arose in State v. Moss, 
Wyo., 471 P.2d 333 (1970). The situs of the crime in that case was on property within the town 
of Riverton, Wyoming, which is situated on a portion of the lands ceded under 
the Act of March 3, 1905, and the court consistently held that Wyoming had 
jurisdiction over such lands which had not been returned to tribal ownership. 
The district court had dismissed a criminal information charging Moss, ruling 
that the State of Wyoming lacked jurisdiction 
over an Indian person in the town of Riverton. The State brought a bill of 
exceptions which this court sustained, holding that jurisdiction did exist. The 
court said:

 
 
"Ramified as is the recounted 
legislative and treaty history of the original reservation, the solution of our 
problem turns on two points, was the treaty and 1905 Act a disestablishment of 
the reservation as to portions ceded, and if so, what was the effect of the 1939 
Act." State v. Moss, supra, 471 P.2d  at 335.

 
 
This court did not give controlling 
effect to Blackburn v. State, supra, saying:

 
 
"* * * * There a different area, a 
portion of the Riverton reclamation project, was under consideration; and while 
that site had been a part of the cession effected by the 1905 Act, it had also 
been the subject of the 1953 Act providing compensation to the Shoshone and 
Arapahoe Tribes 'deemed to constitute full, complete, and final compensation, * 
* * * and extinguishing all of the right, title, estate, and interest * * * * to 
the lands * * * *.'" State v. Moss, supra, 471 P.2d  at 
337.

 
 
Instead, the court limited its 
rationale to the effect of the Act of March 3, 1905 and held that, despite Art. 
9 of that statute, which created a trust relationship in favor of the Shoshone 
and Arapahoe tribes by the United 
States, Indian title had been extinguished as to the ceded 
portion of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation. The court quoted from United States v. La Plant, 200 F. 92 (D.C.S.D. 1911), the part in which the federal court had addressed earlier 
the effect of a provision very similar to Art. 9 of the Act of March 3, 
1905:

 
 
"'* * * * That section declares that 
the United States does not guarantee to find a purchaser for the land, does not 
agree to buy the land, and acts only as trustee. But a trustee has not only the 
legal title, but he has also the right to possession, and the fact that the 
government is to act as trustee for the Indians does not indicate that their 
title has not been extinguished. There is nothing in section 9 providing that if 
the land is not sold it shall be turned back to the Indians. The government 
simply agrees to hold the money realized from the sale of the land, whenever it 
receives it, for the benefit of the Indians.'" State v. Moss, supra, 471 P.2d  at 337, quoting United States v. La Plant, supra, 200 F.  at 
94.

 
 

[¶174.]            
This court also quoted favorably from State ex rel. Hollow Horn Bear 
v. Jameson, 77 S.D. 527, 95 N.W.2d 181 (1959), which had construed an act 
"parallel" to the Act of March 3, 1905, relying on United States v. 
Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 34 S. Ct. 396,  
58 L. Ed. 676 (1914), and Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292 
(8th Cir. 1957). The adopted language states that the Act (36 Stat. 440), 
described by our court to be parallel to the Act of March 3, 
1905:

 
 
"'* * * * Was motivated by a 
congressional purpose to reduce the area of Pine Ridge * * * *. In effect it 
separated the reservation into two parts. That which the act denominates as the 
"diminished" reservation, and which we elect to refer to as the "closed" portion 
of the reservation, was to remain unchanged and to continue to serve the 
purposes of the government in protecting and dealing with the whole Indian 
population of the reservation as in the past. The remainder of the reservation, 
which we will refer to as the "open" portion of the reservation, was to undergo 
change through a process of settlement into homesteads and townsites. It was 
contemplated  that most of this 
surplus area would ultimately be settled, patented in fee, and cease to be a 
part of the reservation and within Indian country. There is no indication that 
allotted lands in this open area were reserved and excepted to serve the 
interest of the Pine Ridge Indians as a whole. It seems apparent that the 
principal reason for reserving these scattered outlying tracts was to permit the 
government to respond completely to its obligations to the respective allottees 
of these tracts. It is equally apparent that as the Indian title to each of 
these tracts was extinguished they would cease to serve in furthering any phase 
of the functions of the government in ministering unto its Indian wards. 
Thereafter such a tract would bear no different relation to those functions than 
would an adjoining tract of the open area, the Indian title to which had been 
extinguished by a homestead patent to a settler. Because the Congress obviously 
did not contemplate the use of these outlying allotted tracts for any purpose in 
connection with the superintendence and protection of its Indian wards after the 
Indian title thereto had been extinguished, we are persuaded that after such an 
extinguishment it intended they should cease to be both a part of the 
reservation and of the Indian country." State v. Moss, supra, 471 P.2d  at 
338, quoting State ex rel. Hollow Horn Bear v. Jameson, supra, 95 N.W.2d  
at 184-185.

 
 

[¶175.]            
The court concluded that the Act of March 3, 1905 had the effect of 
extinguishing Indian title and demonstrated an intent that the land should cease 
to be a part of the reservation and of "Indian country." This court also 
considered the effect of the Act of July 27, 1939, 53 Stat. 1128, describing 
this latter statute as one which:

 
 
"* * * * Inter alia, directed the 
Secretary of the Interior to establish land-use districts within the diminished 
and ceded portions of the Wind River Indian Reservation, to restore to tribal 
ownership all undisposed-of surplus or ceded lands within the land-use districts 
not under lease or permit to non-Indians, and to restore the balance of said 
lands progressively as the non-Indian owned land within a given land-use 
district were acquired." State v. Moss, supra, 471 P.2d  at 
335.

 
 
The court was satisfied that the 
lands within the corporate limits of Riverton had not been included in any of 
the restoration orders pursuant to that statute and simply observed that "* * * 
* on its face it restored nothing but rather directed the Secretary of the 
Interior to restore in certain instances the ceded lands." State v. Moss, 
supra, 471 P.2d  at 339.

 
 

[¶176.]            
In my view, the decisions of this court, premised on a finding that the 
ceded portion was disestablished, are supported by further investigation into 
the language of the treaty and the statutory history of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation. The language incorporated in the 1904 Agreement, which was approved 
by the Act of March 3, 1905, is substantially the same as that which Congress 
used to ratify and amend three agreements with the Indians of the Rosebud 
Reservation. Act of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 254; Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 
1230; Act of May 30, 1910, 36 Stat. 448. Article I of the 1904 Agreement 
provided in pertinent part:

 
 
"The said Indians belonging on the 
Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, for the consideration hereinafter 
named, do hereby cede, grant, and relinquish to the United States, all right, 
title, and interest which they may have had to all the lands embraced within 
the said reservation, except the lands within and bounded by the following 
described lines: * * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Article II provided in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"In consideration of the lands 
ceded, granted, relinquished, and conveyed by Article I of this 
agreement, the United States stipulates and agrees to dispose of the same as 
hereinafter provided under the provisions of the homestead, town-site, coal and 
mineral land laws, or by sale for cash as hereinafter provided at the following 
prices per acre: * * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶177.]            
Examination of other aspects of the 1904 Agreement confirms that it was 
the intention  of Congress to 
disestablish the ceded portion as an Indian reservation and to leave a 
diminished reservation for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. In Article III, 
there is a provision for a sum of $ 85,000 from the sale of the lands to be used 
to make a per capita payment of $ 50 within sixty days of the opening of the 
ceded lands to settlement. Any remaining balance from this sum set aside for per 
capita payment was to be used to do those things necessary to secure water 
rights for any lands remaining the property of the Indians "* * * * whether 
located within the territory to be ceded by this agreement or within the 
diminished reserve."1 Perhaps "diminished" was not 
a word of art in Indian law in 1904. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 104 S. Ct. 1161, 79 L. Ed. 2d 443, reh. denied 466 U.S. 948, 104 S. Ct. 2148, 80 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1984), cert. denied 479 U.S. 934, 107 S. Ct. 409, 93 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1986). In the context in which it was used in the 1904 Agreement, 
however, it could indicate only the intent to diminish the boundaries of the 
then-existing reservation. See Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, , 105 S. Ct. 3420, 3425 n.11, 87 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1985) (indicating express use 
of the term "diminished reservation" is some indication of congressional 
intent).

 
 

[¶178.]            
Two other articles in the 1904 Agreement manifest an intent that funds be 
expended for development of the reservation but only within the diminished 
reservation. Article IV provided for $ 150,000 to be expended on an irrigation 
system "within the diminished reservation." Article VI provided for $ 50,000 to 
be expended for "the erection of school buildings and maintenance of schools on 
the diminished reservation." Further, Article IX of the 1904 Agreement was 
amended by the Act of March 3, 1905 to include an appropriation of $ 35,000 for 
the "survey and field and office examination of the unsurveyed portions of the 
ceded lands, and the survey and marking of the outboundaries of the diminished 
reservation, where the same is not a natural water boundary; * * * *." This 
provision manifests an intent to set apart the diminished reservation by 
establishing boundaries between the diminished and ceded portions. Taken 
together, the language of the 1904 Agreement expresses a congressional intent to 
disestablish the ceded portion from the then-existing reservation with the 
result being a diminished Wind River Indian Reservation.

 
 

[¶179.]            
The amplification of the statutory history demonstrates that Congress 
intended to disestablish the ceded portion of the reservation, consistent with 
the prior holdings of this court. The Wind River Indian Reservation was 
established by Congress as a Shoshone Reservation on July 3, 1868, upon the 
execution of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger with the Shoshone and Bannock 
Indians. In 1878, the Arapahoe Indians were quartered on the reservation, and it 
subsequently became a joint reservation for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. 
Congressional efforts to reduce the size of  the reservation culminated, on October 
2, 1891, in an agreement which was reached with the Shoshone and Arapahoe 
Indians of the Wind River Reservation for the cession of approximately 1,100,000 
acres for a consideration of $ 600,000. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 70, 52d Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 23 (1892). The chairman of the commission which had been appointed to 
negotiate the agreement refused to execute it, however, with his principal 
reason being that it left the Indians with too much land.

 
 
"The Indians are left as now with 
too much land. The same complaints which their superabundance of land now gives 
rise to must necessarily continue. They surrender what is comparatively a small 
portion of their reservation, considering its value, and a portion from which 
but little of their former troubles have arisen. The part surrendered is 
comparatively worthless, and they propose to receive for it what, in the best 
possible light, is an exorbitant price." H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 70, supra, at 
21.

 
 
Congress followed the 
recommendations of the chairman and did not ratify the 1891 Agreement. Instead, 
Congress authorized the reopening of negotiations for the cession of a larger 
portion of the reservation. Act of July 13, 1892, 27 Stat. 
120.

 
 

[¶180.]            
In January, 1893, a new commission was sent to negotiate but with orders 
to reduce the Wind River Indian Reservation to 300,000 acres. That commission 
determined, however, that 650,000 acres were needed for purposes of the 
reservation. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 51, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1894). In the 
course of these negotiations, the representatives of the Indian peoples 
manifested a desire to sell a large portion of the reservation, which they felt 
white ranchers were using without payment or permission, but they refused to 
sell any portion of the reservation south of the Wind 
River. Chief Washakie of the Shoshone Tribe expressed their 
position:

 
 
"I guess we will not trade, I tell 
you now that I will not sell this land on the south side, I am done talking 
about it." H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 51, supra, at 18.

 
 

[¶181.]            
There is no record of any further negotiations of significance until 
April 21, 1896, when Inspector James McLaughlin successfully negotiated an 
agreement to cede 55,040 acres for $ 60,000, including some hot springs (Thermopolis) 
which the government desired to open for public use. That agreement was approved 
by Congress on June 7, 1897. S. Doc. No. 247, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896); H.R. 
Doc. No. 5, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., at 34-36, 406-408 (1897). Although not related 
directly to subsequent negotiations, this agreement did set the stage for 
negotiations that later led to the passage of the Act of March 3, 1905. See J. 
McLaughlin, My Friend the Indian, ch. XXVII (1910); L. Pfaller, James 
McLaughlin, The Man with an Indian Heart, ch. XIII 
(1978).

 
 

[¶182.]            
On March 4, 1904, Representative Mondell of Wyoming introduced H.R. 13481 entitled "A Bill to ratify 
and amend an agreement with the Indians residing on the Shoshone or Wind River 
Indian Reservation, in the State of Wyoming, and to make appropriations for 
carrying the same into effect." 38 Cong. Rec. at 2843 (1904), printed in 
entirety in 38 Cong. Rec. at 5245-5247 (1904). Among the purposes of this bill 
was ratification of the 1891 Agreement, but it, in fact, included substantial 
amendments to that agreement, providing, among other things, for a larger 
cession of land and a change in the manner of payment from a sum certain to 
proceeds from the sale of the land. H.R. Rep. No. 2355, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1904). The purpose of the bill was exactly the same as that of the agreement: 
to reduce the size of the Wind River Indian Reservation to an area better suited 
to the needs of the Indians and the United States. The Committee on 
Indian Affairs commented on H.R. 13481:

 
 
"H.R. No.  proposes to reduce the reservation, as 
suggested by Mr. Woodruff at the time of the making of the Agreement of 1891, 
and in this connection it should be remembered that the instructions to the 
commission in 1891 were to reduce the reservation from 650,000 to 700,000 acres. 
The bill in question still leaves the Indians with 808,500 acres. A careful 
estimate by the General  
Land Office gives 
the area of the lands proposed to be ceded by the above bill at 1,480,000 acres, 
leaving 808,500 acres in the diminished reserve. There are 1,650 Indians on the 
reservation at this time, so that the diminished reserve leaves about 500 acres 
per Indian man, woman, and child, on the reservation.

 
 
"The diminished reserve is by all 
means the best portion of it, although there are some good lands in the ceded 
tract. The diminished reserve is, however, a particularly well-watered, 
well-grassed country, a considerable portion of which is susceptible of 
irrigation, several thousand acres being now under irrigation and farmed by the 
Indians." H.R. Rep. No. 2355, supra, at 3.

 
 

[¶183.]            
The Committee on Indian Affairs favored Mondell's bill but suggested an 
amendment requiring the consent of the Indian peoples. H.R. Rep. No. 2355, supra 
at 2. James McLaughlin, the United States Indian Inspector who had negotiated 
successfully the Rosebud and Devil's LakeAgreements and the 1896 Agreement with the 
Indians of the Wind River Reservation, was chosen to seek the consent of the 
Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes to the amendment. McLaughlin arrived at the Wind 
River Indian Reservation on April 15, 1904, and, six days later, he reached an 
agreement which he described in this way:

 
 
"* * * * Along the lines of the 
'Mondell Bill' as to boundaries and manner of payment, but with some 
modifications of certain of its provisions, which, as I regard it, is in the 
interests of the Government and, at the same time, more beneficial and pleasing 
to the Indians." Letters of James McLaughlin (Microfilm Roll 26 at 
12).

 
 
It is reflected in the minutes of 
the council meeting at which this agreement was discussed that both Inspector 
McLaughlin and the representatives of the Indian peoples understood that 
Congress intended the sale of a large portion of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation, for which compensation was to be made in accordance with the 
Mondell Bill.

 
 
"* * * * The President and the 
Secretary of the Interior are desirous to have you sell your surplus lands and 
open them to settlement as much so as Congress, but at the same time, they are 
desirous to see that the Indians have full compensation for such lands ceded to 
the government. For several years past there has been a sentiment in Congress, 
and one that is growing stronger each succeeding year, opposed to paying the 
Indians a lump sum consideration for their lands.  Instead of stipulating, or providing in 
the agreement, a lump sum consideration for any tract of land, they have 
determined upon giving the Indians the full benefit of the land by paying the 
Indians from the proceeds of the sale of the land as white men settle upon it. 
Several agreements with tribes of Indians that provided for a lump sum 
consideration which were presented to Congress the past two years have not been 
ratified, for the reason that Congress has refused to act upon any such 
agreements, and the said agreements have had to be changed before they could be 
carried out. I have made this explanation that you may know my reasons for not 
being able to entertain a proposition from you people for a lump sum 
consideration. Understand that anything you may receive from these lands will be 
paid to you from the proceeds of sales of same to white 
men.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"In days gone by, years ago, when 
your reservation was set apart, large reservations were possible, because the 
white man did not desire the lands, but the tide of immigration is now pressing 
from both east and west, white men are clamoring for additional lands, and all 
lands that the Indians have no need of, must be opened for settlement, the 
department having charge of the Indians cannot prevent it, and can only secure 
them by giving them homes and allotments in severalty, and that is why I am here 
today, to present to you an agreement for disposing of the lands that you do not 
need. "For the purpose of having the surplus lands of your reservation open to 
settlement  and realizing money from 
the sale of that land, which will provide you with means to make yourselves 
comfortable upon your reservation, a bill has been introduced in Congress called 
the 'Mondell Bill,' which I will read. It has been presented and reported 
favorable from the Committee on Indian Affairs of the House, and is now awaiting 
action on the part of you people before it is taken up in the Senate." 
(Thereafter the Mondell Bill was read to the Indians by Inspector McLaughlin.) 
McLaughlin Letters (Microfilm Roll 26 at 26-27).

 
 

[¶184.]            
There can be no question that the representatives of the Indian peoples 
understood that the agreement and the bill contemplated an outright sale of a 
large portion of the Wind River Indian Reservation. Among the remarks of the 
participants were:

 
 
LONE BEAR, 
ARAPAHOE:

 
 
"I understand what he comes for, and 
I will let him know what I think of it, and I will tell what part of the 
Reservation I want to sell."

 
 
REVEREND SHERMAN COOLIDGE, 
ARAPAHOE:

 
 
"I am glad that Major McLaughlin has 
come to us to purchase a portion of our reservation. The proposed ceded portion 
has not been used by us except for grazing purposes, and I think cash money will 
be of more value among the Arapahoes and Shoshones. I am in favor of the 
'Mondell Bill' along the lines, with slight changes that we discussed with the 
Shoshones last night."

 
 
GEORGE TERRY, 
SHOSHONE:

 
 
"It is not like selling a wagon, a 
horse, or something of that nature, but it is something we are parting with 
forever, and can never recover again."

 
 
McLaughlin Letters (Microfilm Roll 
26 at 32, 35 and 40.)

 
 

[¶185.]            
Clearly, the Indian representatives understood the Mondell Bill. They 
suggested changes in certain provisions relating to the expenditure of the 
moneys to be received from the sale of the lands and requested a resurvey of the 
western boundary of the diminished portion of the reservation to make it conform 
with the 1868 treaty. They also requested a provision that the agreement require 
the signatures of a majority of male Indians over eighteen from both tribes. 
Inspector McLaughlin reported on his negotiations with the Indian peoples in 
this way:

 
 
"The diminished reservation leaves 
the Indians the most desirable and valuable portion of the Wind River 
Reservation and the garden spot of that section of the country. It is bounded on 
the north by the Big Wind River, on the east and southeast by the Big Popo-Agie 
River, which, being never failing streams carrying a considerable volume of 
water, give natural boundaries with well-defined lines; and the diminished 
reservation, approximately 808,000 acres, about three-fourths of which is 
irrigable land, allows 490 acres each for the 1,650 Indians now belonging on the 
reservation. I gave this question a great deal of thought and considered every 
phase of it very carefully and became convinced that the reservation boundary, 
as stipulated in the agreement, was ample for the needs of the Indians belonging 
thereto; that by including any portion of the lands north of the Big Wind River 
or east of the Big Popo-Agie River in the diminished reservation it would only 
be a short time until the whites would be clamoring to have it open to 
settlement,  and the Indians would 
be eventually compelled to give it up. Furthermore, with the exception of about 
20 families (mixed bloods and white men who are intermarried into the tribes) 
there are no Indians occupying lands outside of the diminished reservation." 
Letter of James McLaughlin, United States Indian Inspector, to the Secretary of 
Interior, April 25, 1904, printed in full in H.R. Rep. No. 3700, 58th Cong., 3d 
Sess., supra, pt. 1, at 15-19.

 
 

[¶186.]            
The Mondell Bill, H.R. 13481, resembled the preceding 1891 Agreement in 
that it proposed to disestablish the ceded portion of the then-existing Wind 
River Indian Reservation resulting in a diminished reservation  to be inhabited by the Shoshone and 
Arapahoe Indians. That particular bill, however, was not adopted by Congress. 
Changes to the bill which had been suggested by the Indian peoples and accepted 
by Congress, along with further amendments to the bill such as the Asmus Boysen 
provision2 made it necessary that a new 
bill "be passed in lieu of H.R. 13481." The new bill was H.R. 17994. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 3700, supra, pt. 1, at 1-3. This is the bill which, after extensive 
debate in both houses and the adoption of a committee resolution relating to a 
disagreement between the House of Representatives and the Senate, ultimately 
passed as the Act of March 3, 1905. The intent of H.R. 17994 was consistent with 
and very much the same as that of H.R. 13481 and the 1891 Agreement.3

 
 

[¶187.]            
From the initial negotiation in 1891 to passage of the Act of March 3, 
1905, the history of the 1904 Agreement and the legislation demonstrate that 
Congress intended the cession of a large portion of the then-existing Wind River 
Indian Reservation by disestablishing the ceded portion and recognizing a 
diminished reservation. The provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, H.R. 17994, 
were considered most carefully by Congress. Congressman Mondell had continued 
with his efforts to have H.R. 13481 passed through both houses while James 
McLaughlin remained in Wyoming. Congressman Mondell had offered 
amendments to conform to suggestions by the Committee on Indian Affairs, and as 
amended, the House had passed the bill. 38 Cong. Rec., supra, at 5247-5248. The 
bill then had been read in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs. 38 Cong. Rec., supra, at 5294. The Senate Committee had 
recommended passage with additional amendments. 38 Cong. Rec., supra, at 5671; 
S. Rep. No. 2621,  50th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1904), and the bill had been passed with amendments by the Senate on 
April 27, 1904. 38 Cong. Rec., supra, at 5707. The House was unable to accede to 
the Senate amendments before that session of Congress 
adjourned.

 
 

[¶188.]            
When H.R. 17994 was offered in the third session by Representative 
Marshall, in lieu of H.R. 13481, its purpose was to amend and ratify the April 
21, 1904 Agreement with the Indian peoples residing on the Shoshone or Wind 
River Indian Reservation in the State of Wyoming. 39 Cong. Rec., at 1112 (1905). 
This new bill was sent to the House Committee on Indian Affairs, which split 
over the Asmus Boysen Amendment, but which also proposed the following 
amendment:

 
 

"Provided, that the constitution and laws of 
the State of Wyoming shall not operate to secure any rights, having priority to 
those members of the Shoshone tribe of Indians, to the use of the waters within 
the territory hereby open to sale and settlement, including Big Wind River and 
its tributaries, for purposes of irrigation of the lands comprised within such 
territory, until such time as the United States shall have perfected allotments 
to the members of the Shoshone Indian tribe, either from the lands to be opened 
for settlement or within the diminished reservation of said Indians, and 
completed the necessary steps under the law to secure the desired water rights 
for the said allotments." H.R. Rep. No. 3700, supra, pt. 1 at 
7.

 
 
When the bill was returned to the 
House, it was passed after considerable debate and some difficulty, and with the 
Boysen Amendment removed. The bill then went to the Senate and was referred to 
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. That committee reported back with the 
recommendation of passage with amendments. One of those was to reinsert a 
modified provision for the Boysen Amendment previously struck in the House. Yet 
another amendment removed the House amendment quoted above relating to the 
inhibition on settlers with respect to obtaining perfected water rights under 
Wyoming law 
before the Indians' water rights could be perfected. The bill passed the Senate 
with these amendments and was sent back to the House. After a motion was passed 
to disagree with the Senate amendments, a conference committee was appointed. 
The recommendation of the conference committee was that the House should recede 
from disagreeing with the Senate amendments and after further debate the 
conference report was passed by the House. 39 Cong. Rec., supra, at 3886-3887. 
The bill then was sent in its final form to the president and enacted as the Act 
of March 3, 1905. 39 Cong. Rec., supra, at 3974, 4033.

 
 

[¶189.]            
Representative Marshall spoke on the floor of the 
House:

 
 
"Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from 
Wyoming [Mr. 
Mondell] has well said that this bill has had more careful consideration than 
any bill of this character that has been before the Indian Committee, and there 
is but one possible objection to it, and that is the objection to giving this 
preferential right to 640 acres to Mr. Boysen. I was chairman of the 
subcommittee that considered that question, and we considered it long and 
carefully and conscientiously, and ultimately decided that, as a matter of 
equity, Mr. Boysen was entitled to this preferential right." 39 Cong. Rec., 
supra, at 1945.

 
 
It is of particular moment to note 
that an amendment to inhibit the operation of the constitution and laws of the 
State of Wyoming so as to secure any rights to the use 
of waters within the ceded territory was defeated.

 
 

[¶190.]            
The legislative history subsequent to the passage of the Act of March 3, 
1905 demonstrates an understanding that the ceded portion of the Wind River 
Indian Reservation had been disestablished. A discussion on appropriations for 
the construction of an irrigation project on the Shoshone or Wind River Indian 
Reservation can be found in hearings before the House Committee on Indian 
Affairs relating to H.R. 12579. Indian Appropriation Bill, Hearings on H.R. 
12579, Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., at 
279-281 (1914). In those hearings, Mr. Merritt  offered the following clause to be 
attached as a provision to a $ 25,000 appropriation:

 
 

"Provided, That the use of so much water as 
may be necessary to supply for domestic, stock watering, and irrigation 
purposes, land allotted or to be allotted to Indians on the diminished Shoshone 
or Wind River Reservation, in Wyoming, or set aside for administrative purposes 
within said reservation is hereby reserved, and the failure of any individual 
Indian or Indians to make beneficial use of such water shall not operate in any 
manner to defeat his or her right thereto while said land is held in trust by 
the United States. All laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby 
repealed."

 
 
Mr. Merritt then read from a 
memorandum which stated:

 
 
"'The purpose of this and other 
similar legislation in this bill is to protect the rights of Indians to water on 
Indian reservations and on allotted Indian lands held under trust or by other 
patents containing restrictions on alienation.

 
 
"'To establish more certainly and 
securely water rights of Indians is a matter of the greatest importance in 
administering satisfactorily their affairs. On a number of reservations where 
Indians have been allotted, the land is practically of no value for agricultural 
purposes without irrigation. Water on these reservations is a vital factor in 
developing the Indians living thereon so that they may become self-supporting 
and be raised to a higher standard of civilization.

 
 
"'The Supreme Court in the case of 
Winters v. United States (207 
U.S., 564, 52 L. Ed. 340, 28 S. Ct. 
207), said that "The power of the government to reserve waters and exempt them 
from appropriation under the State laws is not denied, and could not 
be."

 
 
"'The Supreme Court further said in 
this case that there was an implied reservation for the benefit of the Indians 
of a sufficient amount of water from the Milk River for irrigation purposes 
which was not affected by the subsequent act of February 22, 1889 (25 Stat. L., 
676), admitting Montana to the Union, and that the water of the Milk River 
cannot be diverted so as to prejudice the rights of the Indians by settlers on 
the public lands and those claiming riparian rights on that 
river.

 
 
"'It is believed that the general 
principles laid down in the Winters case are applicable to all Indian 
reservations where there are no specific acts of Congress to the contrary. 
However, I find that the very favorable decision of the Supreme Court in the 
Winters case regarding the water rights of Indians has been practically 
nullified by various acts of Congress, and as a result of such legislation the 
water rights of Indians are now dependent on beneficial use in a number of 
reservations where the Government has been, and is now, spending large amounts 
of reimbursable funds, and by acts of Congress these water rights are subject to 
the laws of several of the States wherein these irrigation projects are 
located.'" Memorandum referred by Mr. Merritt, reported in Indian Appropriation 
Bill, Hearings on H.R. 12579, supra, at 280.

 
 

[¶191.]            
This statement of purpose is consistent with a policy, implemented 
following the passage of the Act of March 3, 1905, to encourage all of the 
Indians of the Wind River Reservation to reside only on the diminished portion. 
The annual report of the Secretary of Interior for 1906 included this 
comment:

 
 
"W.B. Hill, superintendent of 
irrigation, has been instructed to make surveys of ditches in use and of those 
necessary to be constructed on the Shoshone Reservation so as to give water to 
each allottee if possible and in order to apply for permit to appropriate waters 
under the laws of Wyoming. He was advised that in the beginning 
only such construction should be made as might be necessary to maintain priority 
of water rights and that any system of irrigation planned should be within the 
diminished reservation. In revising and completing allotments to the Indians on 
that reservation it is the policy of the Office to make new allotments within 
the diminished reservation, and to encourage Indians who have received 
allotments  north of Big Wind River 
to relinquish them and agree to take other lands in lieu thereof within their 
diminished reservation. " H.R. Doc. No. 5, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 155 (1905). 
Also see Letter to Walter B. Hill from Department of Interior, August 11, 1904; 
Act of August 1, 1914 (38 Stat. 582 § 24) (1914).

 
 

[¶192.]            
It is noteworthy that construction for an irrigation project was 
restricted to the diminished reservation; Congress was concerned with protecting 
the water rights of Indians on reservations and certain Indian allotments not 
within reservation boundaries; it was understood that despite Winters v. 
United States, supra, federal action might be necessary to protect Indian 
reservation water rights; and there was a complete absence of any concern for 
protecting any water rights appurtenant to the ceded lands, other than lands 
owned by Indian allottees. All this strongly indicates an understanding of 
Congress that a sufficient interest in the ceded land had not been retained by 
the Indians so that any reserved water rights appurtenant to the ceded portion 
were retained. See also Act of August 1, 1914 (38 Stat. 582, § 24, supra) 
(enacting H.R. 12579, as amended, and providing funds for construction of the 
irrigation system, roads and bridges within the diminished reservation 
manifesting an intent for the Indian peoples to corporately reside within the 
boundaries of the diminished reservation).

 
 

[¶193.]            
The intent to disestablish the ceded portion also is supported by the 
treatment in the 1904 Agreement of Sections 16 and 36 in those surveyed 
townships within the ceded portion of the reservation. An amendment to that 
agreement deleted a provision in Article II for the purchase of lands in lieu of 
Sections 16 and 36 of the ceded portion by the United States 
for $ 1.25 per acre. The deletion of this provision was accomplished by an 
amendment of Representative Mondell who explained that it was believed to leave 
Wyoming 
"authorized under the enabling act to take lieu land." 38 Cong. Rec., supra, at 
5247. The effect of this amendment is to demonstrate further the understanding 
of Congress that passage of the Act of March 3, 1905 not only would disestablish 
the ceded portion but also would extinguish Indian title to the ceded portion. 
The Wyoming Act of Admission provided that Sections 16 and 36 in every township 
in Wyoming 
were granted to the State for the support of common schools and provided that 
the State could select equivalent lands if Sections 16 and 36 had been sold or 
otherwise disposed of by the authority of any act of Congress. Act of July 10, 
1890, 26 Stat. 222, § 4. The obvious concern of this amendment by Representative 
Mondell was that the Act of March 3, 1905 had the effect of removing the ceded 
portion from the disclaimer in Article 21, Section 26 of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming, disavowing any claim of a state 
interest in lands reserved for the Indians. Further, there was a concern that 
such provisions for school lands extended only to public federal lands. See 
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 22 S. Ct. 650, 46 L. Ed. 954 (1902); 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 430 U.S.  at 601 n.23, 97 S. Ct.  at 1370 n.23. If the effect of the Act of March 3, 1905 was to 
restore the ceded lands to the status of public federal lands and to avoid the 
inhibition of the Wyoming Constitution, then Wyoming could claim Sections 16 and 36 in 
townships on the ceded portion of the reservation. Since apparently no payment 
would be required by the United States for Sections 16 and 36, 
the amendment removed the requirement to pay for lieu lands selected because of 
the disposal of Sections 16 and 36. This proviso was different from that 
involved in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, in which the 
United States had been 
required to purchase Sections 16 and 36 for the benefit of South Dakota. Unless the 
ceded portion was disestablished as a reservation, however, the amendment to 
delete the requirement to pay for lieu lands had no 
significance.

 
 

[¶194.]            
A parallel history with respect to the Wind River Indian Reservation 
developed in the executive branch of the federal government. The presidential 
proclamation of June 2, 1906 states:

 
 
"WHEREAS, By an agreement between 
the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes of Indians, belonging to the Shoshone or Wind 
River reservation in the State of Wyoming, on the one part, and James 
McLaughlin, a United States Indian Inspector, on the other part, amended and 
ratified by act of Congress approved March third, nineteen hundred and five (33 
Stat., 1016), the said Indian tribes ceded, granted, and relinquished to the 
United States all the right, title, and interest which they may have had to all 
of the unallotted lands embraced within said reservation, except the lands 
within and bounded by the following described lines:

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power in 
me vested by the said Act and Resolution of Congress, do hereby declare and make 
known that all the unallotted lands in the ceded portion of said reservation, 
except such as may at that time have been reserved for carrying out the 
provisions of said amended treaty relative to the rights of Asmus Boysen, 
allowing him to locate in accordance with the Government surveys not to exceed 
640 acres in the form of a square, of mineral or coal lands in said reservation, 
and to purchase the same, will, on and after the fifteenth day of August, 
nineteen hundred and six, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not 
otherwise, be open to settlement, entry, and disposition under the general 
provisions of the homestead, townsite, coal, and mineral land laws of the United 
States." 34 Stat., pt. 3, at 3208.

 
 
The language found in that 
proclamation expresses "an unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the 
Nation's Chief Executive, of a perceived disestablishment" of the ceded portion 
of the Wind River Indian Reservation. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
supra, 430 U.S.  at 602-603, 
97 S. Ct.  at 1371.

 
 

[¶195.]            
After passage of the Act of March 3, 1905, the Department of the Interior 
of the United States published maps of the Wind River Indian Reservation which 
reflect an understanding of the executive department that the Indian peoples had 
not retained a sufficient interest in the ceded portion of those lands to cause 
the Department of Interior to consider it an Indian reservation. The Department 
of the Interior's map of the State of Wyoming for 1892 shows the Wind River or 
Shoshone Indian Reservation boundaries to exist as stated by treaties prior to 
the 1896 Agreement. The Department of the Interior's map for 1900 shows the 
reservation slightly reduced by the cession under the 1896 Agreement. Similarly, 
the Department of the Interior's maps for 1907 and 1912 reflect a dramatic 
decrease in the boundaries of the Wind River or Shoshone Indian Reservation, 
excluding the ceded land from that area known as the Wind 
River or Shoshone Indian Reservation. Dinsmore, A.F., compiler, 
State of Wyoming, United States Department of the Interior, General Land 
Office, 1892, scale 1:12, 1 sheet; King, H., compiler, Map of the State of 
Wyoming, United States Department of the Interior, General Land Office, 
1900, scale 1:12, 1 sheet; Berthrong, I.P., compiler, State of Wyoming, 
United States Department of the Interior, General Land Office, 1907, scale 1:12, 
1 sheet; Berthrong, I.P., compiler, State of Wyoming, United States 
Department of the Interior, General Land Office, 1912, scale 1:12, 1 
sheet.

 
 

[¶196.]            
This legislative and executive history subsequent to the passage of the 
Act of March 3, 1905 supports only one conclusion: a status of an Indian 
reservation was intended and understood only for the diminished reservation; the 
Indians corporately would reside on the diminished reservation, and any of those 
who continued to live on the ceded portion would do so only as private 
allottees.

 
 

[¶197.]            
Finally, an understanding by the United States that the ceded portion 
was disestablished from the reservation is demonstrated by acquiescence in the 
decisions of this court upholding state jurisdiction over the ceded portion. The 
effect of this unquestioned and consistent exercise of jurisdiction  by the State of Wyoming over certain 
lands within the ceded portion is well expressed in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 
Kneip, supra, 430 U.S.  at 604, 97 S. Ct.  at 1372, 51 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1977), 
in which the court said:

 
 
"* * * * The fact that neither 
Congress nor the Department of Indian Affairs has sought to exercise its 
authority over this area, or to challenge the State's exercise of authority is a 
factor entitled to weight as a part of the 'jurisdictional 
history'."

 
 

[¶198.]            
The cases decided by this court and the very intriguing legislative and 
executive department history all are compatible with federal precedent relating 
to the disestablishment of an Indian reservation. Disestablishment abrogates 
appurtenant rights. Implied water rights on Indian reservations, founded upon 
the reserved rights doctrine, are extinguished by acts of Congress inconsistent 
with recognition of their existence, even though they are not subject to state 
law concerning the abandonment or extinguishment of a water right. See 
United States v. 
Anderson, 
591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.Wash. 1982). There appears to be no question that Congress 
may limit or extinguish Indian title,4 and any rights appurtenant 
to the title, without obtaining the consent of the Indian peoples.  Solem v. Bartlett, supra; 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S. Ct. 216, 47 L. Ed. 299 (1903); Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596, 93 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1986).

 
 

[¶199.]            
The cases hold that when Congress extinguishes the title of Indian 
peoples to a portion of any land, any hunting and fishing rights appurtenant to 
the land, to the extent that recognition of such right is inconsistent with 
extinguishment of the title, is limited impliedly or extinguished also.  Oregon Department of Fish and 
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, supra; Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. 
Department of Game of State of Washington, 391 U.S. 392, 88 S. Ct. 1725, 20 L. Ed. 2d 689, reh. denied 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 64, 21 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1968); 
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 16 S. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244 (1896). Cf.  Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 88 S. Ct. 1705, 20 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1968). In several cases, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has said that water 
rights implied because of the reserved rights doctrine are appurtenant to the 
federal lands actually set aside by Congress. See United 
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 
698, 98 S. Ct. 3012, 3013, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1978) (defining a federally 
implied reserved water right as one reserved for future use "on appurtenant 
lands withdrawn from the public domain for specific federal purposes"). See also 
Arizona v. California, supra; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S. Ct. 2062, 48 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1976); Winters v. United 
States, supra.

 
 

[¶200.]            
The implied water right which is reserved is limited to that amount of 
water necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the land itself was reserved. 
Cappaert v. United States, supra. It should not matter what purpose the 
appurtenant rights were intended to accomplish, and the extinguishment of 
appurtenant water rights by implication should be as inevitable as the 
extinguishment of appurtenant hunting and fishing rights by implication. Once 
the Congress determines that the land previously set aside for some federal 
purpose no longer is required for that purpose, any appurtenant water rights 
reserved by implication no longer are necessary to accomplish the purpose 
initially intended. The issue to be resolved is whether the congressional action 
demonstrates that the land no  
longer is required for the purpose for which it originally was reserved. 
The appropriate inquiry then is whether congressional action manifests an intent 
that land previously set aside for the purpose of the Shoshone or Wind River 
Indian Reservation no longer was required to accomplish the purpose of an Indian 
homeland.

 
 

[¶201.]            
The Supreme Court of the United States in several cases has 
recognized the relevant considerations to be pursued in determining whether 
Congress intended to disestablish a portion of the land from an existing 
reservation. See e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, supra; Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
v. Kneip, supra; Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
supra.

 
 
"* * * * The underlying premise is 
that congressional intent will control. In determining this intent, we are 
cautioned to follow 'the general rule that "doubtful expressions are to be 
resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the 
nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith."' The mere fact that a 
reservation has been open to settlement does not necessarily mean that the 
opened area has lost its reservation status. But the 'general rule' does not 
command a determination that reservation status survives in the face of 
congressionally manifested intent to the contrary. In all cases, 'the face of 
the Act,' the 'surrounding circumstances,' and the 'legislative history,' are to 
be examined with an eye toward determining what congressional intent was." 
(Citations omitted.) Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 430 U.S.  at 586-587, 97 S. Ct.  at 1365.5

 
 

[¶202.]            
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, the Supreme Court 
construed treaty language substantially similar to the language in the 1904 
Agreement relating to the Wind River Indian Reservation. The Supreme Court said 
that such language is "'precisely suited'" to demonstrate an intent to 
disestablish a ceded portion of land from a reservation and creates "an 
unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment." Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 
Kneip, supra, 430 U.S.  at 592, 597, 97 S. Ct.  at 1366, 1368, quoting 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445, 95 S. Ct. 1082,  1093, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300 
(1975). It appears that the face of the act approving the 1904 Agreement 
demonstrates an intent to disestablish the ceded portion. That intent is 
substantiated by an examination of the legislative history.6

 
 

[¶203.]            
The decisions of this court not only are consistent with the legislative 
history relating to the Wind River Indian Reservation but also are consistent 
with the conclusions of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
similar instances. "The face of the act," the "surrounding circumstances," and 
the "legislative history" all serve to manifest a congressional intent to 
disestablish the ceded portion of the Wind River Indian Reservation. It follows 
that the ceded portion has not been an Indian reservation, intended to supply an 
Indian homeland for the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes since 1905. Under those 
circumstances, there is no justification for invoking the reserved rights 
doctrine with respect to those areas identified as practicably irrigable acreage 
on the ceded portion and including them in the quantification of water set aside 
for the Indian peoples. I would eliminate those lands from the formula in their 
entirety.

 
 
HANSCUM, District Judge, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶204.]            
I join in the dissent. Specifically, I would agree with the dissent's 
proposed holding that the implied reservation of water rights attaching to an 
Indian reservation should assume any use that is appropriate to the Indian 
homeland as it progresses and develops.

 
 

[¶205.]            
I depart, however, when Justice Thomas proposes to limit water use to the 
territorial boundaries of the reservation, thus precluding marketability of the 
water. Justice Thomas would hold that, as a matter of law, marketing water off 
the reservation never could be appropriate to the progress and development of 
the Indian homeland.

 
 

[¶206.]            
I disagree. I would go that additional step. I would hold that sale of 
water off the reservation should be permitted, provided that, as a factual 
matter, it could be demonstrated that such marketing contributed to the progress 
and development of the Indian homeland. I can envision a variety of scenarios 
where such showing could be made successfully. To preclude the opportunity of 
proving such a nexus unduly would restrict and hamper the prospective 
development of the Indian homeland in the future.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1An 
examination of the entire agreement, in light of prior events, discloses that 
any property outside the diminished reservation which remained under Indian 
ownership was limited to property which had been selected by individual Indians, 
under authority of the 1868 treaty and subsequent acts, and which was located on 
the portion to be ceded. It pertained to property which the individual Indian 
refused to exchange for a similar tract on the diminished reservation. Specific 
provision was made in Article I of the 1904 Agreement that: "* * * * Any 
individual Indian, a member of the Shoshone or Arapahoe tribes, who has, under 
existing laws or treaty stipulations, selected a tract of land within the 
portion of said reservation hereby ceded, shall be entitled to have the same 
allotted and confirmed to him or her, and any Indian who has made or received an 
allotment of land within the ceded territory shall have the right to surrender 
such allotment and select other lands within the diminished reserve in lieu 
thereof at any time before the lands hereby ceded shall be open for entry." The 
legislative history demonstrates that the policy of the United States of 
America was to request all Indians to take 
allotments within the diminished reservation. It was believed that with the 
exception of 29 allottees, the Indian peoples would surrender their allotments 
on the lands which they had obtained under the 1868 treaty of Fort Bridger and 
"* * * * select other lands within the diminished reservation, where there is an 
abundance of good land for the purpose, and which can be more readily and 
inexpensively irrigated." H.R. Rep. No. 3700, 50th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 
(1905).

 
 

2This 
amendment was to Art. II of the 1904 Agreement to include a provision providing 
that one Asmus Boysen have a preferential choice of 640 acres in the ceded 
portion in exchange for any interest he had under a pre-existing mineral lease 
with the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indians on certain lands of the ceded portion. 
There was a dispute over this amendment because some members of the Indian 
Affairs Committee felt that Boysen's interest would terminate automatically with 
the passage of the Act. Section 13 of Boysen's lease did 
provide:

 
 
"'In the 
event of the extinguishment, with the consent of the Indians, of the Indian 
title to the lands covered by this lease, then and thereupon this lease and all 
rights thereunder shall terminate.'" Quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 3700, 50th Cong., 
3d Sess., pt. 2, at 3 (1905).

 
 
The minority 
report contended that, because of the granting language of the agreement, Indian 
title would be extinguished, and Boysen's interest thereupon would disappear. 
Representative Lacey of Iowa had proposed the amendment to protect any 
interests that one of his constituents might have in Boysen's lease. 
Representative Lacey argued that the provision was necessary because under the 
Mondell Bill the Indian title would not be lost until five years after entry by 
settlers. He argued that the trust would be burdened if the lease were not 
canceled in accordance with the amendment. Ultimately, the House and the Senate 
concurred in this amendment.

 
 

3The majority 
correctly perceive the 1896 Agreement, relating to the Thermopolis hot springs, 
as having divested the Indian peoples of any interest in the water rights to the 
portion of Wind River Indian Reservation ceded by that agreement. It is not 
clear why, having reached that conclusion, the 1891 Agreement, as approved by 
the Act of March 3, 1905, should lead to a different conclusion. The legislative 
history furnishes no hint that Congress might have perceived it was obtaining 
any lesser interest in the land under the 1904 Agreement than that which would 
have been obtained under the 1891 Agreement. The extensive debate on several 
provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, coupled with the lack of any reference 
to the admission of an expressed cession of water rights under the Mondell Bill, 
indicates Congress did not perceive the provision as important. The reference to 
appertaining water rights, in the 1896 Agreement, should not be afforded any 
greater significance than that included in the October 2, 1891 Agreement, which 
also referred to appertaining water rights. The 1896 Agreement contained very 
similar language to the 1891 Agreement, and the 1891 Agreement substantially was 
implemented by the Act of March 3, 1905, which had very similar language to that 
included in the Rosebud Agreement. The Rosebud Agreement was debated extensively 
and passed by the House just prior to Representative Mondell's introduction of 
H.R. 13481, a bill "to ratify and amend an agreement with the Indians residing 
on the Shoshone or Wind River Indian Reservation * * * *." See 38 Cong. Rec., at 
1423, 1643, 1899 and 2843 (1904). Certainly, a sale for a sum certain, provided 
for in the 1891 and 1896 Agreements but not provided for in H.R. 13481 or H.R. 
17994, could not be controlling.  
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 51 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1977).

 
 

4Applying a 
strict concept of title, fee title to Indian lands has been vested in the 
United States of 
America under the doctrine of discovery, with 
the Indian peoples retaining a right to possess and occupy that land. Their 
right of occupancy is good against all except the sovereign, who may terminate 
the right at will, although perhaps just compensation must be provided prior to 
termination. See Oneida Indian Nation 
of New YorkState v. Oneida County, 
New York, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S. Ct. 772, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1974); 
Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 299 U.S. 476, 57 S. Ct. 244, 81 L. Ed. 360 (1937). See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, at 486-493 (1982); P. Maxfield, M. Dieterich & F. 
Trelease, Natural Resources Law on American Indian Lands, at 17-19 
(1977).

 
 

5The Indian 
peoples who participated in the negotiation with respect to the 1904 Agreement 
do not appear to have been weak and defenseless as suggested in the quoted 
language. James McLaughlin described George Terry as a mixed blood spokesman for 
the Shoshone Indians "* * * * whose gift of language and acquirements made him a 
man to be regarded with some respect." James McLaughlin, My Friend the 
Indian, at 296 (1910). George Terry spoke at the counsel meeting in April, 
1904 and explained the Indian peoples' understanding of the 1904 
Agreement.

 
 
"Major 
McLaughlin, our worthy agent, Ladies and Gentlemen: This is no little bargain we 
are entering into. It is not like selling a wagon, horse, or something of that 
nature, but it is something we are parting with forever, and can never recover 
again. These lands that we are about to dispose of have been our lands for ages. 
They have been our lands by inheritance for many, many years before the white 
man came this way. These same lands have been our lands by conquest. Our fathers 
fought with every nation that came near them and came off victorious, and from 
that date to this, they held this land as their own. These lands are our lands 
by treaty stipulations. We have given up vast tracts for this little tract of 
land called the Wind River Reservation. Now, we are glad our Arapahoe friends 
came in, and we will join hands with them and endeavor to pass a measure here 
that will follow the lines of this 'Mondell bill.'" Minutes of Council Meeting 
at the Wind River Reservation, April, 1904, 
Letters of Inspector James McLaughlin, Microfilm Roll 26 at 
40.

 
 
Concluding 
his remarks, Terry said:

 
 
"Now, Major, 
We all thank you very much for the feast, but we want it understood, that we do 
not give our consent to your agreement because you have filled us with beef, 
bacon, sugar, flour and coffee. It has gone upon record that all the white man 
has to do, to get the consent of the Indian to anything he desires, is to fill 
him up with what he likes. I want it to go on record, that notwithstanding the 
fact that we have been feasted, we have considered this bill in a sober and 
thoughtful manner, and for the benefit of every man, woman, and child on the 
reservation." Minutes of Council Meeting at the Wind River Reservation, April, 
1904, Letters of McLaughlin, supra, Microfilm Roll 26 at 
43.

 
 
Of course, 
the understanding of the Indian peoples is relevant only to the extent that it 
explains Congressional intent because the actions of Congress in diminishing an 
Indian reservation do not depend on consent of the Indians.  Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 51 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1977); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S. Ct. 216, 47 L. Ed. 299 (1903).

 
 

6The 
dissenting opinion in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 51 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1977), notes that the 
manner of payment was not approved by the required majority of the Indians. This 
resulted in concerns by the dissenting justices as to compliance with the legal 
meaning of the word "cede." In the case of the 1904 Agreement as to the Wind 
River Reservation, the manner of payment expressly was discussed with the Indian 
representatives from the Wind River Reservation, and they agreed to it. While 
the special master decided that Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, is 
distinguishable because the word "convey" was omitted in Article I of the 1904 
Agreement, that conclusion fails to acknowledge the inclusion of the word 
"convey" in Article II, which refers back to Article I and, in my judgment, 
places undue emphasis on the omission of the word in Article 
I.