Case Title: Stevens v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 477, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID STEVENS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 477, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 0801023670 and  
§  0801024647 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 7, 2009 
  Decided: May 11, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of May 2009, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, David Stevens (Stevens), pled guilty 
on May 29, 2008 to two counts of felony theft and three counts of second 
degree forgery.  The Superior Court sentenced Stevens as a habitual offender 
to a total period of ten years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 
serving nine years in prison for probation.  The Superior Court also 
discharged Stevens as unimproved from three unrelated prior terms of 
probation. This is Stevens’ direct appeal. 
 
2 
(2) 
Stevens’ counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Stevens’ counsel asserts that, based upon 
a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Stevens’ attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Stevens with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Stevens also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Stevens has raised four 
issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Stevens’ 
points, as well as to the position taken by Stevens’ counsel, and has moved 
to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3 
(4) 
In his response to his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Stevens 
includes four numbered paragraphs, which assert: (i) it took the court 104 
days to indict him; (ii) his attorney did not listen to him; (iii) the Superior 
Court failed to rule on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (iv) the 
State added charges against him.  We address these claims in order. 
(5) 
Stevens’ suggestion that he was not indicted in a timely way 
has no factual basis.  Stevens’ guilty plea was the result of two different sets 
of criminal charges.  On the first set of charges, he was arrested on January 
21, 2008 and indicted twenty-nine days later on February 19, 2008.  On the 
second set of charges, he was arrested on March 25, 2008 and indicted 
twenty days later on April 14, 2008.  Both sets of charges were resolved on 
May 29, 2008 when Stevens pled guilty.  There is nothing in the record to 
support any suggestion that there was unnecessary delay in Stevens’ case.2  
Moreover, Stevens’ knowing and intelligent guilty plea waived any 
objection to alleged errors occurring prior to the entry of his plea.3  
Accordingly, we reject Stevens’ first claim on appeal. 
(6) 
Stevens next complains that his “lawyer was always fast to talk 
but slow to listen.”  Even if we construe this broadly as a claim for 
                                                 
2 See Michaels v. State,  __ A.2d __, 2009 WL 684142 (Del. Mar. 17, 2009). 
3 See Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988). 
 
4 
ineffective assistance of counsel, it is well established that this Court will not 
consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on 
direct appeal.4  Accordingly, we will not address this vague allegation here. 
(7) 
Stevens next contends that the Superior Court erred by failing 
to rule on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We disagree.  Stevens, 
through his counsel, entered a guilty plea in May 2008.  On July 30, 2008, 
he filed a pro se request to withdraw his plea, even though he was still 
represented by counsel.  The Superior Court continued his sentencing, which 
was scheduled for August 1, 2008, in order to give Stevens the opportunity 
to retain substitute counsel to file a motion to withdraw his plea.  On the 
rescheduled sentencing date, September 5, 2008, Stevens appeared with his 
original counsel who indicated that he would not file a motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea because grounds did not exist to support such a motion.  
Stevens then requested another opportunity to obtain substitute counsel to 
help him.  The Superior Court refused Stevens’ request to continue the 
sentencing hearing again.  The Superior Court’s refusal to continue the 
proceedings under these circumstances so that Steven could file a proper 
                                                 
4 Collins v. State, 420 A.2d 170, 177 (Del. 1980). 
 
5 
motion to withdraw was neither unreasonable nor capricious.5   Accordingly, 
we find no merit to Stevens’ argument on appeal. 
(8) 
Finally, Stevens contends he was charged with two counts and 
then the State later added two more charges against him.  There simply is no 
factual support for this contention.  Moreover, even assuming this claim was 
supported by the record, Stevens’ guilty plea waived any objection to defects 
in the indictment that occurred prior to the entry of his plea.6 
(9) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Stevens’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Stevens' counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Stevens could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
5 See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1018 (Del. 1985). 
6 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d at 312-13.