Case Title: State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins

Citation: 1996-Ohio-211

Docket Number: 19951258

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Zimmerman, Appellant, v. Tompkins, Dir., Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996),     Ohio St.3d      .] 
Mandamus to compel Director of Ohio Department of Human Services to 
restore relator’s full compensation, transfer relator to the position to 
which he had been promoted, and report to law enforcement 
officials alleged criminal violations committed by employees who 
submitted “Report for Leave” forms in relator’s name without his 
consent or authorization -- Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-1258 -- Submitted March 5, 1996 -- Decided May 8, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APD02-228. 
 
The Ohio Department of Human Services (“ODHS”) employed appellant, 
James A. Zimmerman, as a Programmer Analyst 3.  During his employment, Ohio 
Civil Service Employees Association, Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO represented 
Zimmerman and other public employees and entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement which covered them.  The collective bargaining agreement contained a 
grievance and arbitration procedure.   
 
In September 1994, certain ODHS employees submitted “Request for 
Leave” forms in Zimmerman’s name which indicated that he had been tardy for a 
total of fifty-seven minutes over six different days.  Zimmerman was not 
compensated for the time he was allegedly tardy.  In January 1995, Zimmerman 
 
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advised appellee, ODHS Director Arnold R. Tompkins, that the leave forms were 
fraudulent and were submitted without Zimmerman’s consent or authorization.    
Tompkins subsequently informed Zimmerman that ODHS had found no violation 
of the collective bargaining agreement or any law.  Tompkins also noted that 
Zimmerman had failed to timely assert his rights under the collective bargaining 
agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedure.   
 
In February 1995, Zimmerman filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County for a writ of mandamus compelling Tompkins to (1) restore his 
full compensation, and (2) report the alleged criminal violations committed by 
ODHS employees to law enforcement officials.  Zimmerman alleged that the 
fraudulent leave forms and unauthorized taking of his wages and services violated 
several provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) 
(theft), 2913.42(A) (tampering with records), 2921.45 (interfering with civil 
rights), Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code (federal civil rights), the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 16, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution.   
 
3
 
After the court of appeals converted Tompkins’s “motion to dismiss and/or 
for summary judgment” into a motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals 
granted the motion and denied the writ.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Philip Wayne Cramer, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Cynthia A. Cooper and Jack W. 
Decker, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
____________________  
 
Per Curiam.  Zimmerman asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting 
Tompkins’s motion for summary judgment and denying the requested writ of 
mandamus.  Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, 
it must be determined that  (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to 
be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) 
it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one 
conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving 
party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for 
summary judgment is made.  State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio 
 
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St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. 
(1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274. 
 
In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Zimmerman had to establish a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of Tompkins 
to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law.  State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 217, 218-219, 631 N.E.2d 150, 152.  The court of appeals determined 
that as to Zimmerman’s claim for a restoration of compensation, the collective 
bargaining agreement constituted an adequate legal remedy precluding a writ of 
mandamus. 
 
Zimmerman contends that the allegations of his complaint were deemed 
admitted when Tompkins failed to timely file his answer.  However, the dismissal 
motion filed by Tompkins which was subsequently converted by the court of 
appeals to a summary judgment motion tolled the time to file an answer until the 
summary judgment motion was resolved.  Civ.R. 12(A) and (B); see, generally, 6 
Moore’s Federal Practice (2 Ed.1988) 56-83 to 56-84, Paragraph 56.08, fn. 9 
(Fed.R.Civ.P. 12[b][6] motion to dismiss converted into motion for summary 
judgment tolls time to file answer until adverse ruling on converted motion).  In 
 
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addition, when the respondent is a state officer like Tompkins who is sued in his 
representative capacity, courts must look beyond simple admissions resulting from 
the failure to timely serve a responsive pleading.  State ex rel. Shimola v. 
Cleveland (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 110, 112, 637 N.E.2d 325, 326. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party does not 
produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production 
at trial.  Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 
N.E.2d 1095, paragraph three of the syllabus; State ex rel. Morley v. Lordi (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 510, 513, 651 N.E.2d 937, 940.  When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in Civ.R. 56, the nonmoving party 
may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit 
or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine triable issue.  Civ.R. 56(E); Jackson v. Alert Fire & Safety 
Equip, Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 48, 52, 567 N.E.2d 1027, 1031. 
 
Tompkins supported his motion for summary judgment with an affidavit and 
incorporated exhibit establishing that the collective bargaining agreement 
provided a grievance and arbitration procedure.  To the extent that Zimmerman 
alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement, the grievance and 
 
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arbitration procedure provided therein constituted an adequate remedy at law 
which precluded extraordinary relief in mandamus.  State ex rel. Johnson v. 
Cleveland Hts./Univ. Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 189, 
192-193, 652 N.E.2d 750, 752; State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 34, 641 N.E.2d 188, 196.  The fact that this 
procedure may no longer be available to Zimmerman due to the time limits set 
forth in the collective bargaining agreement does not render this remedy 
inadequate.  Johnson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 193, 652 N.E.2d at 753.  Where a plain and 
adequate remedy at law has been unsuccessfully invoked, a writ of mandamus will 
not lie to relitigate the same issue.  State ex rel. Nichols v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 205, 209, 648 
N.E.2d 823, 827. 
 
Zimmerman also alleged violations of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code and 
the United States and Ohio Constitutions as to his alleged reduction in 
compensation.  Yet, Zimmerman failed to introduce summary judgment evidence 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact, instead relying on the conclusory 
allegation of his unsworn complaint that he had “no plain and adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of the law.”  Zimmerman did not adduce evidence that these 
 
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violations were any different from the alleged violations of the collective 
bargaining agreement.   
 
In addition, Zimmerman possessed an adequate remedy at law as to his 
federal civil rights and federal constitutional claims by a Section 1983 action in 
state common pleas court or federal district court.  State ex rel. Peeples v. 
Anderson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 559, 560-561, 653 N.E.2d 371, 373; see 
Weinfurtner v. Nelsonville-York School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 
348, 355-356, 602 N.E.2d 318, 323.  Further, as to the alleged state constitutional 
violation, it is evident that Zimmerman alleged only a de minimis deprivation of 
property and that the agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedure provided 
sufficient notice and opportunity to contest the administrative action.  See, 
generally, Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp., AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 175, 624 N.E.2d 1043; Green 
Local Teachers Assn. v. Blevins (1987), 43 Ohio App.3d 71, 77-78, 539 N.E.2d 
653, 659-660.  The court of appeals properly granted summary judgment on 
Zimmerman’s compensation claim. 
 
Zimmerman’s complaint also contained a claim for a writ of mandamus 
compelling Tompkins to report the alleged criminal violations committed by 
 
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ODHS employees in connection with his leave forms.  Zimmerman informed 
Tompkins of these alleged violations, but Tompkins refused to report them to law 
enforcement officials.  Zimmerman can report these alleged violations to law 
enforcement officials himself.  See R.C. 124.341(A) (“If the employee reasonably 
believes that a violation or misuse of public resources is a criminal offense, the 
employee, in addition to or instead of filing a written report with the supervisor or 
appointing authority, may report it to a prosecuting attorney, director of law, 
village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, to a 
peace officer *** or *** to the inspector general ***.”).  This remedy is complete, 
beneficial, and speedy as to Zimmerman’s assertion that Tompkins violated R.C. 
2921.22(A) by failing to report the alleged criminal conduct.  Therefore, 
Zimmerman was not entitled to a writ of mandamus on this claim either.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Tipton v. Schisler (Sept. 24, 1991), Scioto App. No. 90CA1926, 
unreported, 1991 WL 192733 (Harsha, J., concurring) (mandamus does not lie to 
compel city solicitor and city prosecutor to file criminal charges where relator 
possesses adequate remedy by filing criminal charges himself under Crim.R. 3). 
 
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Tompkins and denied the requested 
mandamus relief.  The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.      
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
WRIGHT, J., not participating. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment only.     I write separately for two 
reasons.  First, the lead opinion cites Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, for the proposition that a nonmoving party in 
a summary judgment matter must produce evidence “* * * on any issue for which 
that party bears the burden of production at trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  That is not 
an accurate statement and, in fact, that proposition in Wing was modified in 
Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___. 
 
Second, it should be pointed out that the lead opinion does have it right 
when it says that a summary judgment motion has to, in some way, be “supported” 
as provided in Civ.R. 56.  This is what a majority of this court held in Dresher, 
 
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supra.  Clearly, Dresher did not change the rule for a court’s deciding a summary 
judgment motion. Further, it is interesting to note that the Honorable Walter 
Herbert Rice, Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, Western Division, ruled, on March 14, 1996, in the case of Frilling v. Anna 
(Mar. 14, 1996), S.D. Ohio No. C-3-95-194, unreported, that “* * * a court is 
entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a 
particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits 
submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id. at 9.  Further, Judge Rice, quoting from Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 
U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 274, said, “Of course [the 
moving party] always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court 
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 6. 
 
Accordingly, when the Ohio Hospital Association uses inaccurate and 
inflammatory language, as it did in the March 15, 1996 edition of the Ohio 
 
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Hospital Association News concerning the Dresher case, the causes of justice and 
accuracy are not well served.  The article, in part, said that “[t]he Dresher decision 
is likely to affect motions for summary judgment in all civil lawsuits, requiring 
courts to continue frivolous litigation through at least the plaintiff’s presentation 
of evidence during trial, after which a trial judge could issue a directed verdict in 
favor of the defendant.  The ruling is likely to increase the pressure on defendants 
to settle frivolous cases in order to avoid the higher cost of going to trial.”  See 
Exhibit “A” attached.  Those who might need some assurance can be assured that 
trial judges have been ruling on summary judgment motions for years and they 
understand that a properly supported motion for summary judgment should be 
granted.  Conversely, a naked summary judgment motion that does not point to 
anything in the record to support the motion is not well taken.  As to “frivolous 
litigation” and “frivolous cases,” I respectfully refer those who might be 
concerned to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11 and the cases thereunder, and to 1, Parts 
1 & 2, Anderson’s Ohio Civil Practice (1992) 240-4 to 240-6, 297-298, Sections 
3.784, 3.785, 8.75 and 8.77.