Case Title: State v. Lee

Citation: 348 N.C. 474

Docket Number: 544PA96

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 544PA96
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOHNNY DEAN LEE
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32 to
review a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment
entered by Sitton, J., on 31 March 1995 in Superior Court,
Catawba County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree
murder and first-degree sexual offense.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 20 November 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery,
III, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Jonathan P.
Babb, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
J. Scott Hanvey for defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
On 6 December 1993, defendant was indicted for first-
degree murder in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-17 and first-degree
sexual offense in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-27(a)(1).  Defendant
pled not guilty to both charges.  On 29 March 1995, the jury
returned verdicts of guilty as charged on both counts.  Following
a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended that defendant receive
a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder
conviction.  Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to
two consecutive life terms for the convictions.
On 31 March 1995, defendant filed notice of appeal.  In
accordance with Rule 25 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
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Procedure, an order was entered on 19 March 1996 dismissing
defendant’s appeal because he had failed to perfect it within the
time period allowed.  Having lost his statutory right to appeal,
defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court
pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure.  We granted review on 7 February 1997.
Based substantially on the testimony of Brenda Finch,
the evidence presented at trial tended to show the following
facts.  In January 1993, defendant began having an extramarital
affair with Brenda Finch.  Brenda was married to Brian Finch and
had one child from the marriage, Robbie, the two-year-old victim
in this case who was murdered and sexually assaulted.
In October 1993, Brenda left her husband Brian and
moved into defendant’s home.  She left Robbie in the care of his
natural father upon leaving the marital home.  Two weeks later,
on Friday, 22 October 1993, Brenda picked Robbie up from a sitter
and took him to defendant’s home.  No incidents occurred on that
Friday.  On the following day, however, Brenda heard Robbie
scream while she was inside defendant’s house.  Brenda had gone
inside the house for only a moment, leaving Robbie and defendant
alone in the front yard.  When Brenda asked what happened,
defendant asserted that he had to “tap” Robbie on the behind
because the child had gotten too close to the road.
The following Sunday, 24 October 1993, another incident
occurred.  At approximately 4:00 p.m., Brenda went to work at
K-Mart and left defendant to care for Robbie.  That evening at
7:00 or 8:00 p.m., she called defendant from work to inquire
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about Robbie.  Defendant told her that he could not talk at the
moment because Robbie had fallen out of the bathtub, hit his head
pretty hard, and was screaming.  At 10:00 p.m., Brenda arrived
home and found Robbie sleeping on the couch.  The next morning,
she noticed a bruise on each side of Robbie’s face.  Defendant
said that the bruise on the left side of his face was from
Robbie’s falling out of the bathtub.  The other bruise, he said,
resulted from defendant accidentally hitting Robbie in the face
with a door that he opened, not knowing that Robbie was behind
it.  Both injuries occurred while Robbie was in defendant’s
exclusive care from 4:00 to 10:00 p.m. on that Sunday.
On Monday, Brenda went to work at about 6:00 p.m. and
left Robbie in the care of his natural father, Brian.  Brian saw
the bruises on his son’s face and immediately became very upset. 
Brenda explained to Brian that defendant had told her that the
injuries were accidental.  Brian responded by explaining that he
did not want it to happen again.  Later that evening, however,
Brian took Robbie to visit three neighbors and asked each
neighbor to look at Robbie’s bruises.  He discovered also that
evening that his electricity had been cut off and therefore
returned Robbie to Brenda at about 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. after she
had gotten off work.
On Tuesday, 26 October 1993, Brenda stayed home with
Robbie for most of the day.  In the afternoon, she left Robbie
with Brian while she did laundry for two hours.  At this point,
both Brenda and Brian noticed that Robbie was behaving strangely. 
Brenda saw Robbie walk directly into a door, and Brian noticed
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that Robbie, a typically active child, was lethargic and not
interested in toys or other people.  Despite these observations,
Brenda took Robbie back to defendant’s home and put him to bed.
On Wednesday, 27 October 1993, Brenda asked defendant
to take care of Robbie for a few hours while she retrieved her
property from Brian’s home.  Robbie remained in defendant’s care
for about two hours while Brenda was gone.  After moving, Brenda
again left Robbie in defendant’s care for about an hour while she
went to a job interview.  Upon returning from the interview,
Brenda saw that Robbie had two new bruises on his arm and new
bruises on both sides of his neck.  In contrast to how she had
left him, he was now also vomiting, he had diarrhea, and his eyes
were crossed.  After inquiring about what happened to bring about
these changes in Robbie, defendant admitted that he may have
caused the bruises.  The bruise on Robbie’s arm, he said, came
from his grabbing Robbie too tight when he tried to stop him from
falling off the couch.  The neck bruises, he said, were possibly
caused by his holding Robbie too tight under his chin while he
wiped his nose.  Brenda gave Robbie medicine for the vomiting and
decided to take him to the emergency room the next morning.  That
evening, she stayed up with him all night because he woke up
every hour wanting something to eat or drink.
The next day at about noon, Brenda took Robbie to the
emergency room at Catawba Memorial Hospital where Dr. Steven
Williamson examined him.  Dr. Williamson noted the bruises on
Robbie’s face and neck and his difficulty in walking straight. 
After a CAT scan was taken, Dr. James Owsley, the attending
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radiologist, read it as being normal.  This reading was later
found to be incorrect because the report did show bleeding in
Robbie’s brain.  At the time, however, there was no explanation
for the problems that Robbie was experiencing.  Dr. Williamson,
who remained troubled by the symptoms, made an appointment for
Robbie with a pediatrician for the following morning at 8:00 a.m. 
Robbie was released at about 2:30 or 3:00 p.m., and he and Brenda
returned to defendant’s home.
Three hours later, Brenda went to work at K-Mart and
left Robbie in defendant’s care once again.  When she arrived
home at about 10:00 p.m., she found Robbie sleeping on the couch. 
His pants were soaking wet, which was unusual because Robbie was
potty trained and did not typically wet himself.  After removing
the wet pants, Brenda placed a towel across Robbie, and then she
and defendant went to bed.  This was at about midnight.  Brenda
could hear Robbie snoring in the other room as she dozed off.  At
some point during the night, Brenda woke up and saw defendant
standing over Robbie.  She asked defendant if Robbie was all
right, and he replied that Robbie was fine.  After this exchange,
both Brenda and defendant went back to sleep.  At about 5:00
a.m., however, Brenda woke up, checked on Robbie, and thought
that he looked dead.  Brenda yelled to defendant to call 911, but
he said that he did not believe that 911 could do anything. 
Brenda then called 911.  The police and paramedics subsequently
arrived and took Robbie to Glen R. Frye Hospital, where he was
pronounced dead.  Later, it was determined that Robbie died from
head trauma that resulted in massive bleeding over the surface of
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both sides of his brain causing a subdural hematoma and
compression of the brain stem.
Several physicians testified to the myriad bruises and
injuries found on Robbie’s body on the morning of his death. 
Dr. Dennis Kimbleton observed Robbie that morning and said that
he had bruises on his face, chin, jaw, arms, knee, hip,
shoulders, and lower leg.  Dr. Sara Sinal, a pediatrician,
testified to the large number of bruises and explained that the
location of the bruises indicated that the injuries were not
inadvertent.  Also, Dr. Sinal stated that the brain injury that
Robbie had was a common injury in child abuse cases and that
based on that injury as well as the other physical traumas, she
believed that Robbie had died from battered child syndrome. 
Dr. James Parker, the pathologist who performed the autopsy,
testified that in his opinion Robbie had been physically abused
and that the two severe brain hemorrhages were the result of
trauma to the skull from a blunt object, such as a club, bat, or
hand.  Dr. Sam Auringer, another State witness, testified that
bleeding between the hemispheres of a child’s brain is a
relatively specific sign for child abuse due to shaking and that
in his opinion, Robbie had been severely abused.  Dr. Gregory
Davis reviewed the autopsy report, CAT scan, and photographs and
testified that, in his opinion, Robbie died as a result of child
abuse.  Dr. Davis also stated that the injuries were not the kind
that would result from falling out of a bathtub; he explained
that the brain injury was indicative of child abuse and that the
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location and pattern of the bruises on Robbie’s body indicated
that the injuries were not accidental.
Dr. Kimbleton and Dr. Parker also testified to an anal
injury that was discovered on Robbie on the morning of his death. 
Dr. Kimbleton observed that Robbie’s rectum was bruised and
stretched and that there was blood in his rectal canal and a
smear of blood in the crease between his right and left buttock. 
Dr. Parker, when performing the autopsy, also observed this tear
in the lining of Robbie’s rectum and noticed that his anal canal
was dilated wider than normal.  A Caucasian hair, not matching
defendant’s hair, and several dark pubic hairs were found in the
area of Robbie’s buttocks.
In defendant’s first assignment of error, he asserts
that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad
acts, thus violating Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence.  Having not objected to this evidence at trial,
defendant alleges this error for the first time on appeal under
the plain error rule.  The plain error rule holds that the Court
may review alleged errors affecting substantial rights even
though the defendant failed to object to admission of the
evidence at trial.  State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 313, 488
S.E.2d 550, 563 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d
___, 66 U.S.L.W. 3491 (1998).  This Court has chosen to review
such “unpreserved issues for plain error when Rule 10(c)(4) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure has been complied with and when
the issue involves either errors in the trial judge’s
instructions to the jury or rulings on the admissibility of
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evidence.”  Id. at 313-14, 488 S.E.2d at 563.  The rule must be
applied cautiously, however, and only in exceptional cases where
“after reviewing the entire record, it can be
said the claimed error is a ‘fundamental
error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so
lacking in its elements that justice cannot
have been done,’ or ‘where [the error] is
grave error which amounts to a denial of a
fundamental right of the accused,’ or the
error has ‘“resulted in a miscarriage of
justice or in the denial to appellant of a
fair trial”’ or where the error is such as to
‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings’
. . . .”
 
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)
(quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th
Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed.
2d 513 (1982)).  Thus, the appellate court must study the whole
record to determine if the error had such an impact on the guilt
determination, therefore constituting plain error.  Id. at 661,
300 S.E.2d at 378-79.
A review of the evidence in the present case reveals
that this is not the exceptional case where such a pervasive
defect or plain error occurred which would have tainted all
results and denied defendant a right to a fair trial.  Defendant
alleges that admission of statements that he made to Investigator
John Little in a taped interview about his prior assault
conviction, probation, and alcoholism violated Rule 404(b).  The
taped interview, which was played for the jury in its entirety,
contained the following:
Defendant Lee:  . . . I still told the patrol
officer that was there I’m on probation.  In
1988, I was out in Colorado and a guy and I
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got into a fight and I got the better part of
the deal, and the Colorado police didn’t like
the fact that I came from North Carolina and
beat up on the people out there.  And, at
that time, I was a serious heavy drinker.
Since then, I changed that and I cleaned up
my act.
[Investigator] Little:  Okay.
Defendant Lee:  My probation officer, Ralph
Pittman, he has that information.
Defendant Lee states later:
  
I, I, don’t have any children.  It’s in my brain, 
you know, there’s some research that alcoholism 
is genetic and all that, so I’m like that’s not 
a gene I care to pass on.
In addition to statements from the taped interview, defendant
alleges that Brenda Finch’s testimony that defendant bought
marijuana during the week of Robbie’s death was inadmissible. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court improperly
admitted Detective Rob Ennis’ testimony that Brenda Finch said
that defendant was a “pot” smoker and drank alcohol.  Admission
of this evidence is simply not so fundamental or prejudicial that
a miscarriage of justice has occurred.  Evidence that defendant
drank alcohol and smoked “pot” is inconsequential to the
determination of whether defendant committed the murder.  There
is no way that this evidence could have amounted to a grave error
which denied a fundamental right of the accused.
Similarly, admission of the evidence that defendant got
into a fight and was convicted for it several years ago in
Colorado is not especially probative of whether he repeatedly
abused and sexually assaulted a small child.  In the wake of
other evidence showing that defendant repeatedly abused the
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child, including admissions by defendant that he caused several
bruises apparent on the victim’s body, admission of this evidence
certainly could not have created a miscarriage of justice.  We
conclude that plain error did not occur, thus, this assignment of
error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court committed plain error by admitting Detective
Rob Ennis’ testimony regarding statements Brenda Finch made to
him in an interview on 2 February 1995.  Defendant argues that
this evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay and that the trial
court improperly allowed the statements in evidence under the
prior consistent statement exception to the hearsay rule.
Under Rule 801 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,
hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at trial, that is offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c). 
“Any hearsay statement as defined in Rule of Evidence 801(c) is
inadmissible except as provided by statute or the Rules of
Evidence.”  State v. Pickens, 346 N.C. 628, 644, 488 S.E.2d 162,
171 (1997).  One exception to the general bar against admitting
hearsay is the prior consistent statement exception to the
hearsay rule.  Under this exception in North Carolina, there is a
liberal policy in allowing prior consistent statements to be
admissible even when the witness has not been impeached.  State
v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 48, 473 S.E.2d 596, 606 (1996).  To be
admissible, the prior consistent statement must first, however,
corroborate the testimony of the witness.  State v. Singletary,
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344 N.C. 95, 107, 472 S.E.2d 895, 902 (1996).  To constitute
corroborative evidence,
the prior statement of the witness need not
merely relate to specific facts brought out
in the witness’s testimony at trial, so long
as the prior statement in fact tends to add
weight or credibility to such testimony.  Our
prior statements are disapproved to the
extent that they indicate that additional or
“new” information, contained in the witness’s
prior statement but not referred to in his
trial testimony, may never be admitted as
corroborative evidence.  However, the
witness’s prior statements as to facts not
referred to in his trial testimony and not
tending to add weight or credibility to it
are not admissible as corroborative evidence. 
Additionally, the witness’s prior
contradictory statements may not be admitted
under the guise of corroborating his
testimony.
State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573-74 (1986)
(citations omitted).
In the instant case, defendant contends that the trial
court erred by allowing Detective Rob Ennis to testify that: 
(1) Brenda Finch told him that defendant said he was abused as a
child, (2) Brenda Finch told him that her husband was afraid
defendant would beat up her minor child, (3) Brenda Finch told
him that she believed defendant may have done something to
Robbie, (4) Brenda Finch told him that defendant got mad because
he believed Robbie’s autopsy report was wrong, (5) Brenda Finch
told him she knew defendant injured the victim, and (6) Brenda
Finch told him she and defendant tried to get their stories
straight.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, all of the above
statements save the first item are admissible in evidence as
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prior consistent statements which corroborate and add weight to
the trial testimony of Brenda Finch.  The second statement,
concerning Brian Finch’s belief that defendant would beat up
Robbie, adds credence to Brenda’s testimony that she told Brian
about Robbie’s bruises and that Brian got very upset about them. 
The statement also adds weight to Brenda’s testimony that she
immediately told Brian that the injuries were an accident because
she did not want Brian to think defendant beat up Robbie.  The
third statement, in which Brenda admitted that defendant might
have done something to Robbie, corroborates Brenda’s testimony
about defendant admitting to her that he had grabbed Robbie and
was therefore responsible for putting the bruises on Robbie’s arm
and chin.  The fourth statement, which concerned defendant
believing that the autopsy report was wrong, corroborates
Brenda’s testimony that she had read the autopsy report three
weeks after Robbie’s death and had confronted defendant with the
autopsy report.  The fifth statement, in which Brenda said that
she knew defendant injured Robbie, corroborates Brenda’s
testimony that defendant admitted to inadvertently causing
Robbie’s bruises.  The sixth statement in its entirety read: 
“She said in the past [that defendant] had asked her a lot of
questions about the times and dates that she [had] noticed
Robbie’s bruising period.  She said it was like he was wanting to
get their stories straight.”  This statement adds weight to
Brenda’s testimony that she still loved defendant and did not
believe until he was incarcerated that he had abused or harmed
Robbie.  Finally, although the first item concerning defendant
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being abused as a child did not corroborate any trial testimony,
this error clearly did not constitute plain error.  Having found
that five of the statements were admissible and that the sixth
statement failed to constitute plain error, we therefore conclude
that this assignment of error is also without merit.
In his third assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by failing to intervene during the
prosecutor’s closing argument when the prosecutor made arguments
allegedly unsupported by evidence.  Defendant argues that the
prosecutor stated that defendant and the victim made certain
statements when there was no evidence to indicate that defendant
or the victim made such statements.  As defendant failed to
object to the prosecutor’s argument at trial, we are limited to
determining “whether the argument was so grossly improper that
the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu.” 
State v. Woods, 345 N.C. 294, 312, 480 S.E.2d 647, 655, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1997).  We find that it
was not.
The prosecutor argued that:  
(1) Defendant said, “Ain’t no use in giving
that kid CPR, he’s dead, but I got to do
something, can’t just sit here.” 
(2) Defendant said, “I don’t want this kid
around, don’t you understand, Brenda.” 
(3) Defendant said, “Knowing that I might
hurt this kid.  Who cares.  He ain’t mine. 
Well, I’ll get rid of this pain, hit him. 
That’s what I got for you, boy.”
(4) Defendant said, “Went too far, killed
him.  Should have known I was going to.  I
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intentionally put those bruises on him. 
Damn.  First Degree Sex Offense.”
(5) Defendant said, “Better take the kid to
the hospital.  Because I just knocked him. 
Might be  suffering from brain damage.  Cover
my tracks.”
(6) Defendant said, “Hey Robbie, how you
doin’ old boy?  Wake up.  Wake up.  Wake up,
you little bastard.”
(7) Defendant said, “Get him out of the way;
I want mama to myself and, I never blamed it
on mama, I never blamed it on Brian, I don’t
know what happened.”  
(8) Robbie said, “No, mama, no, don’t let him
beat me no more.  Mama, don’t take me in the
house, if you take me in there, I’m going to
die.”
These statements made by the prosecutor during closing
argument were not intended as statements of fact, but were
instead offered as hypothetical thoughts that defendant and the
victim may have had during the week of the homicide.  In the
past, we have held that it is not improper for a prosecutor to
argue or propose what thoughts the victim may have had while
being victimized if the inference is supported by the record. 
Id.  We have also held that it is not improper for a prosecutor
to argue or suggest to the jury what the defendant may have been
thinking in committing a crime when the argument is a reasonable
inference based on facts in evidence.  State v. Shank, 327 N.C.
405, 410-11, 394 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1990).  In the instant case,
the prosecutor’s comments during his closing argument were also
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.  The trial court,
therefore, did not err by failing to intervene.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
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In his fourth assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu
during closing argument when the prosecutor characterized the
defendant as a “mean,” “bad,” and “dangerous” man.  In his
closing, the prosecutor hypothesized that the victim may have had
the following thoughts during the last week of his life: 
(1) “I’m going back to where the mean or bad man stays”; and
(2) “Mama, don’t take me back to the place where the bad man
lives.”  The prosecutor also argued during his closing that
defendant should be considered a dangerous man.  
Once again, because defendant did not object to these
arguments at trial, the standard of review is whether the
argument was so grossly improper that the trial court erred by
failing to intervene ex mero motu.  State v. Woods, 345 N.C. at
312, 480 S.E.2d at 655.  As previously discussed, it is not
improper for the prosecutor to argue what thoughts the victim
could have had as long as the argument is a reasonable inference
based on the evidence.  State v. Woods, 345 N.C. at 305, 480
S.E.2d at 651.  In this case, the two hypothetical thoughts that
the prosecutor argued the victim may have had are both reasonable
inferences based on the evidence.  Both statements could be drawn
from Brenda Finch’s trial testimony that defendant bruised
Robbie.  Due to the bruising, Robbie could have had fearful
thoughts about defendant and not have wanted to be left alone
with him.  The prosecutor’s characterization of defendant as
dangerous is also a reasonable inference which may have been
derived from Brenda Finch’s testimony that defendant bruised
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Robbie or from the various expert witnesses who testified that
Robbie was abused.  Clearly, these arguments were not so grossly
improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
In his fifth assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the
first-degree murder conviction made at the close of the State’s
case and at the close of all the evidence submitted at trial. 
Defendant argues that the court should have granted his motions
because there was insufficient evidence to support the murder
conviction.  Defendant asserts that the State failed to offer any
direct evidence linking him to the homicide and therefore raised
only a suspicion of guilt.  We shall consider only the appeal of
the denial of the motion made at the close of all the evidence
since defendant introduced evidence at trial and therefore waived
his right to appeal the motion made at the close of the State’s
case.  N.C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983); State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162,
171, 393 S.E.2d 781, 787 (1990).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the State must offer
substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense and
substantial evidence that defendant is the perpetrator.  State v.
Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997). 
Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995). 
When deciding whether substantial evidence exists, “‘the trial
judge must view all the evidence, whether competent or
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incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the
State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from
it and resolving any contradiction in the evidence in its
favor.’”  State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 28-29, 460 S.E.2d 163,
168 (1995) (quoting State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 328, 451
S.E.2d 131, 137 (1994)).  The motion should not be granted
against the State “‘if there be any evidence tending to prove the
fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as
a fairly logical and legitimate deduction.’”  State v.
Stephenson, 218 N.C. 258, 263, 10 S.E.2d 819, 822-23 (1940)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431, 154 S.E. 730, 731
(1930)).  The trial court is “not required to determine that the
evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior
to denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”  Franklin, 327 N.C.
at 172, 393 S.E.2d at 787.  Also, contradictions and
inconsistencies do not warrant dismissal; the trial court is not
to be concerned with the weight of the evidence.  Id. 
Ultimately, the question for the court is whether a reasonable
inference of defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the
circumstances.  State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114,
117 (1980).  If, upon consideration of all the evidence, only a
suspicion of guilt is raised, then the evidence is insufficient,
and the motion to dismiss should be granted.  State v. Wilson,
345 N.C. 119, 125, 478 S.E.2d 507, 511 (1996).
In this case, the jury found defendant guilty of first-
degree murder by torture.  “First-degree murder by torture
requires the State to prove that the accused ‘intentionally
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tortured the victim and that such torture was a proximate cause
of the victim’s death.’”  State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 492, 488
S.E.2d 576, 588 (1997) (quoting State v. Stroud, 345 N.C. 106,
112, 478 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139
L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997)); see State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466,
479-81, 406 S.E.2d 579, 586-88 (1991)).  Torture is defined as
“‘the course of conduct by one or more persons which
intentionally inflicts grievous pain and suffering upon another
for the purpose of punishment, persuasion, or sadistic
pleasure.’”  State v. Anderson, 346 N.C. 158, 161, 484 S.E.2d
543, 545 (1997) (quoting Crawford, 329 N.C. at 484, 406 S.E.2d at
589).  Course of conduct is defined as “‘the pattern of the same
or similar acts, repeated over a period of time, however short,
which establish[es] that there existed in the mind of the
defendant a plan, scheme, system or design to inflict cruel
suffering upon another.’”  Id. (quoting Crawford, 329 N.C. at
484, 406 S.E.2d at 589).  The “‘presence or absence of
premeditation, deliberation and specific intent to kill is
irrelevant’” in determining whether the evidence is sufficient
for first-degree murder by torture.  Id. (quoting State v.
Evangelista, 319 N.C. 152, 158, 353 S.E.2d 375, 380 (1987)).  
When viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the murder
conviction.  The evidence at trial tended to show that defendant
intentionally tortured the victim, Robbie Finch, by subjecting
him to repeated physical abuse from Saturday, 23 October 1993, to
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Friday, 29 October 1993, and that this abuse was the proximate
cause of Robbie’s death.  During this one-week period, Robbie
consistently emerged from defendant’s care with myriad bruises,
many of which defendant admitted to causing under the guise of
either punishment or protection.  On Saturday, 23 October 1993,
defendant hit Robbie allegedly to punish him.  On Monday,
25 October 1993, Robbie had visible bruises on both sides of his
face after spending six hours alone with defendant on Sunday.  On
Wednesday, 27 October 1993, after being alone with defendant for
about four hours, Robbie had new bruises on his arm and visible
bruises on both sides of his neck, he was vomiting, he had
diarrhea, and his eyes were crossed.  This evidence taken
together tends to show that defendant engaged in a course of
conduct where he repeatedly abused or tortured Robbie.
The State’s evidence also tended to show that Robbie
died from a brain injury which was the result of the severe
physical abuse.  Dr. Sara Sinal, Dr. James Parker, Dr. Gregory
Davis, and Dr. Sam Auringer all testified that Robbie’s death was
the result of a brain injury which caused massive bleeding in his
brain.  Each doctor also testified that the rampant bruises and
head injury did not appear accidental, but were more likely the
result of severe child abuse, battered child syndrome, or shaken
baby syndrome.  In addition, Dr. Parker testified that Robbie
probably died around 2:00 a.m. on Friday morning based on the
amount of blood that was in his brain.  Dr. Parker explained that
Robbie would have survived only a few hours after receiving the
head injury.  Brenda testified that she saw defendant standing
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over Robbie that night between midnight and 5:00 a.m. 
Considering all this evidence together in the light most
favorable to the State, it seems clear that a jury could
reasonably find that defendant committed first-degree murder by
torture.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled. 
Defendant has failed to show that there was insufficient evidence
to support the murder conviction.
In his sixth assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the first-
degree sexual offense conviction.  Defendant argues that there
was insufficient evidence to support this conviction as well. 
Again, we find defendant’s contention to be without merit.  When
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence
tended to show that the jury could find that the sexual assault
occurred between Thursday afternoon and about 2:00 a.m. on Friday
morning when Robbie was still alive.  Dr. Williamson, the
physician who examined Robbie on Thursday, made no mention of an
anal injury.  The attending nurse who aided in the exam also made
no mention of this injury.  No evidence, therefore, suggested
that the sexual assault occurred before Thursday night,
28 October 1993.
On Friday morning when Robbie was discovered dead, it
was determined that he had a tear in his rectum that was about
two inches into his anal canal.  Skin abrasions adjacent to the
anal opening were apparent, and there was mucus and blood around
his anus.  According to Dr. James Parker, the pathologist who
examined Robbie, it was likely that Robbie was penetrated by an
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object that was two to three inches in length and three-fourths
of an inch in diameter while he was still alive sometime before
2:00 a.m. on Friday morning.  Only Brenda Finch and defendant had
access to Robbie from Thursday afternoon until 2:00 a.m. on
Friday morning when Robbie died.  Robbie was left alone with
defendant from 6:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. on Thursday night
because Brenda had to be at work.  When she returned home, she
noticed that Robbie’s underpants were wet.  She removed the pants
and placed a towel over the lower half of his body.  Later that
night, she awoke to find defendant standing over Robbie.  Viewing
all of this evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
taking into consideration evidence that defendant had exclusive
access to Robbie, had an opportunity to commit the assault, and
had demonstrated ill will toward Robbie by repeatedly bruising
him, the jury could reasonably find that defendant sexually
assaulted Robbie on Thursday night, when he had exclusive care of
him, or Friday morning, when Brenda saw defendant standing over
him.  Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss the first-degree sexual offense charge. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
In his last assignment of error, defendant argues that
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at
trial was violated because his attorney failed to make objections
to inadmissible evidence.  To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must satisfy a two-prong test which was
promulgated by the United State Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  In State v.
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Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562-63, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985), this
Court expressly adopted the two-part Strickland test as the
standard to be applied for ineffective assistance claims.  Under
this two-prong test, the defendant must first show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as
defined by professional norms.  Id. at 561-62, 324 S.E.2d at 248. 
This means that defendant must show that his attorney made
“‘errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’”  Id.
at 562, 324 S.E.2d at 248 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).  Second, once defendant satisfies the first
prong, he must show that the error committed was so serious that
a reasonable probability exists that the trial result would have
been different absent the error.  Id. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
698.  Thus, defendant must show that the error committed was so
grave that it deprived him of a fair trial because the result
itself is considered unreliable.  Id. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
693.
In the instant case, defendant argues that counsel’s
failure to object to allegedly inadmissible character and hearsay
evidence denied him his right to effective assistance.  The
character evidence that defendant argues was inadmissible is as
follows:  (1) testimony regarding defendant’s prior assault,
probation, alcoholism, and marijuana smoking; (2) testimony that
defendant bought marijuana during the week of Robbie’s death; and
(3) four photographs of defendant’s living room, which showed a
small sign stating, “Notice.  Anyone found here at night will be
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found here in the morning,” and another sign stating, “Tact, the
ability to tell a man to go to hell and make him happy to be on
the way.”  Two of the photographs showed a mannequin head on a
table in the living room with a knife through it.  The hearsay
testimony which defendant argues was inadmissible and therefore
should have been objected to by his attorney is the same evidence
that defendant objected to under his second assignment of error.  
Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim based on his
attorney’s failure to object to the character and hearsay
evidence must fail.  First, all of the character evidence to
which defendant’s attorney failed to object was admissible
evidence except one item.  In this opinion, we addressed the
admissibility of this same character evidence under the first
assignment of error.  There, we concluded that all of the
testimony concerning defendant’s assault, probation, drinking,
and marijuana smoking was admissible.  Since we concluded that
this evidence was admissible, the defense attorney’s failure to
object to it cannot constitute ineffective assistance.  The first
part of the Strickland test is not satisfied where defendant
cannot even establish that an error occurred.  The admission,
without objection, of evidence that defendant drank alcohol also
does not constitute ineffective assistance because even if
defendant could show that this error fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, defendant could not show that the
error deprived him of a fair trial.
Failure to object to the four photographs also did not
constitute ineffective assistance since the photographs were
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authenticated, relevant, and admissible.  All of the photographs
of defendant’s living room were admissible to show the
circumstances of Robbie’s death and explain Brenda Finch’s trial
testimony regarding incidents which occurred at defendant’s home. 
The photographs helped the jury visualize the living room and
better understand certain testimony, such as Brenda’s testimony
about Robbie falling off the living room couch and defendant
grabbing him.  Brenda also testified about coming home from work
the night prior to Robbie’s death and finding him lying on the
living room couch with his pants soaking wet.  The photographs
were also relevant to show how Robbie could have hurt or injured
himself in defendant’s home.  The photographs were authenticated
by Brenda Finch during her testimony, and the judge instructed
the jury to consider the exhibits only for the purpose of
illustrating her testimony alone.  The mere fact that defendant
owned what he now considers inappropriate items and that the
photographs displayed these objects does not make the photographs
inadmissible.  “It has long been the law in this State that a
photograph, despite its unpleasant depiction, is competent
evidence when properly authenticated as representing a correct
portrayal of conditions observed by the witness and used to
illustrate the witness’s testimony.”  State v. Lowery, 318 N.C.
54, 72, 347 S.E.2d 729, 741 (1986).  The photographs were
admissible, and the failure of his attorney to object to their
admission was not error.  Since the failure to object to the
evidence was not error, defendant again cannot satisfy the first 
part of the Strickland test.  Thus, defendant has no ineffective
assistance claim on these grounds as well.
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Lastly, the failure by defendant’s attorney to object
to the hearsay evidence was not negligent conduct and therefore
did not constitute ineffective assistance.  We analyzed the
admissibility of the six hearsay statements defendant points to
under his second assignment of error.  There, we concluded that
all of the hearsay statements except the first were admissible as
prior consistent statements which corroborated Brenda Finch’s
trial testimony.  Since the items were found to be admissible, it
cannot be error for the defense attorney to remain silent. 
Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 347 S.E.2d 729 (holding that trial counsel
properly did not object to testimony as inadmissible hearsay
because statements were in fact admissible as statements of a
party opponent or statements made by co-conspirators).  We also
determined in that analysis that admission of the first statement
constituted harmless error, and thus, failure to object to its
admission could not have deprived defendant of a fair trial. 
Thus, we conclude that defendant’s seventh assignment of error is
also without merit.
Having considered and rejected all of the assignments
of error presented by defendant, we conclude that defendant’s
trial was free from prejudicial error.  The sentences against
defendant should therefore remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR.