Case Title: People v. Diaz

Citation: 

Docket Number: S205145

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 4/6/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S205145 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H036414 
DORA DIAZ, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC954415 
 
____________________________________) 
 
We granted review to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal regarding 
whether a trial court has the duty to instruct a jury to consider a criminal 
defendant‟s out-of-court statements with caution when the statements at issue form 
the basis of a prosecution for making criminal threats.  We also asked the parties 
to brief whether we should continue to require courts to instruct that a defendant‟s 
out-of-court statements must be viewed with caution even in the absence of a 
request.   
We hold that the cautionary instruction is applicable when the statements at 
issue are criminal threats.  However, the trial court is no longer required to give 
the instruction sua sponte.  In the present case, the failure to give the instruction, 
even if error, was harmless.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Defendant Dora Diaz was charged and convicted of one count of willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 664, 
 
2 
subd. (a))1 and three counts of threatening to commit a crime resulting in death or 
great bodily injury (§ 422).  The jury found defendant guilty on all four counts and 
the trial court sentenced her to a prison term of life, with the possibility of parole 
after seven years, for the attempted murder and a consecutive three-year four-
month prison term for the three criminal threats.   
The criminal threats charges stemmed from statements defendant made 
during and after the attempted murder of Eduardo Morales.  On September 5, 
2009, Eduardo lived in a two-room apartment in San Jose with his mother, Marta 
Rosales, his sister-in-law, Indira Pineda, and three other family members.  
Defendant had recently ended a relationship with Eduardo.  Between 1:00 a.m. 
and 1:30 a.m., Eduardo was asleep in the apartment‟s living room when he awoke 
to knocking on the window and door.  He peeked out the window and saw 
defendant and two women he did not recognize yelling at him to come out.  While 
putting on his shoes to go outside, he heard one of the apartment‟s windows break.  
He opened the door and asked the women why they were doing this to him.  The 
three women grabbed Eduardo by his hair, which was long, and dragged him into 
the driveway.  Marta called 911 to report that her son was being assaulted.  
The three women began hitting and kicking Eduardo in his face and chest.  
Eduardo was knocked to the ground and covered himself.  During the attack, the 
women were calling him names and one yelled, “Puro catorce,” which an expert 
later testified constituted a declaration that the Norteño street gang was 
responsible for the attack.   
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
3 
Defendant then stepped back, snapped her fingers twice, and whistled.  
Three men, including one who looked like defendant‟s 16-year-old son, emerged 
and joined in the beating.  One of the men had a knife with a four- or five-inch 
blade; he began stabbing Eduardo.   
Marta came out of the apartment and pleaded with the assailants to cease 
the attack on her son.  Eduardo called out to tell her that he had been stabbed.  
Possibly alerted by the sound of sirens, some of the assailants retreated to a dark-
colored Lincoln Town Car.  Defendant remained and lifted Eduardo‟s shirt so she 
could view his wounds.  When looking at the wounds, defendant laughed.  
Defendant then argued with Marta and Eduardo‟s sister-in-law, Indira, who also 
had come out of the house.  Defendant and Indira grabbed at each other and 
exchanged words.  Eventually, defendant ran off.   
The three counts of criminal threats correspond with statements allegedly 
made by defendant to Eduardo, Marta, and Indira during the attack.  Each testified 
concerning the statements.  Eduardo testified that when defendant lifted his shirt to 
view his wounds, she told him “that if [he] did not die this time, that [he] surely 
would the next time and that she was going to finish off [his] whole family.”  He 
further testified that he saw defendant arguing with Indira and calling her names, 
but he could not recall whether defendant had said anything else to Indira.   
Marta testified that defendant told Eduardo, “If you don‟t die from this one, 
you‟ll die next time around.”  She further testified that defendant threatened her, 
saying “you‟re going to pay for this” and that defendant “would kill every member 
of [Marta‟s] family one by one.”  She recalled defendant also telling Indira, 
“you‟re going to pay for this.”  Marta‟s husband, Alvaro Hernandez, testified that 
defendant told his wife that she was going to kill everyone.   
Indira testified that while the women were dragging Eduardo out by his 
hair, defendant “was telling him, „I‟m going to kill you.”  Later, she said, 
 
4 
defendant told Eduardo that “if he didn‟t die from this one, he would die from the 
next one.”  Indira further testified, “she did say that she could possibly kill all of 
us . . . Marta, Eduardo, and whoever else lived there.”  Indira testified that 
defendant told her specifically, “You‟re going to pay for this . . . I‟m going to kill 
you.”   
Prior to jury deliberations, the trial court provided standard instructions on 
the elements of the crimes, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the 
treatment of circumstantial evidence, and credibility considerations when 
assessing witness testimony.  Defendant did not request, nor did the court provide 
on its own motion, CALCRIM No. 358, which instructs the jury to “[c]onsider 
with caution” any unrecorded statement made by the defendant tending to show 
his or her guilt.2 
On appeal, defendant argued that omission of this instruction was reversible 
error.  The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant‟s conviction, holding that any 
error in omitting the instruction was harmless in light of the other instructions the 
jury received and the evidence in the case.  The Court of Appeal expressly 
disagreed with People v. Zichko (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1055 (Zichko).  In 
Zichko, a defendant who had been convicted of making criminal threats argued 
that the trial court had erred in failing to give CALJIC No. 2.71, which, like 
                                              
2  
CALCRIM No. 358 provides:  “You have heard evidence that the 
defendant made [an] oral or written statement[s] (before the trial/while the court 
was not in session).  You must decide whether the defendant made any (such/of 
these) statement[s], in whole or in part.  If you decide that the defendant made 
such [a] statement[s], consider the statement[s], along with all the other evidence, 
in reaching your verdict.  It is up to you to decide how much importance to give to 
the statement[s].  [¶]  [Consider with caution any statement made by (the/a) 
defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or 
otherwise recorded.]”   
 
5 
CALCRIM No. 358, advises jurors that “[e]vidence of an oral admission of [a] 
[the] defendant not made in court should be viewed with caution.”  Zichko held 
that the cautionary instruction is not to be given in a criminal threats case, in 
which the statement constitutes the criminal act itself.3  (Zichko, supra, at 
p. 1058.)  It reasoned that the cautionary instruction should be given only when the 
statement reflects an “admission.”  Zichko concluded that in a criminal threats 
case, where the statements constitute the criminal act itself, they do not constitute 
admissions because the truth of the threats is immaterial.  (Id., at p. 1060.)  It also 
concluded that the cautionary instruction is “inconsistent with the reasonable 
doubt standard of proof.”  (Ibid.)  Zichko reasoned that giving the cautionary 
instruction in a criminal threats case may lead a jury to believe it could find a 
defendant guilty “even if it did not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statements were made, as long as the jury exercised „caution‟ in making its 
determination.”  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that 
Zichko “seems to have created a false dichotomy between a statement that 
constitutes a crime and a statement that is evidence of a crime.”   
II.  ANALYSIS  
A.  Applicability of the Cautionary Instruction to Criminal Threats 
As we explain below, case law recognizes that the purpose of the 
instruction — to aid the jury in evaluating whether the defendant actually made 
                                              
3 
CALJIC No. 2.71 provides:  “An admission is a statement made by [a] [the] 
defendant which does not by itself acknowledge [his][her] guilt of the crime[s] for 
which the defendant is on trial, but which statement tends to prove [his][her] guilt 
when considered with the rest of the evidence.  [¶]  You are the exclusive judges 
as to whether the defendant made an admission, and if so, whether that statement 
is true in whole or in part.  [¶]  [Evidence of an oral admission of [a] [the] 
defendant not made in court should be viewed with caution.]” 
 
6 
the statement — is served regardless of whether the statement constitutes all or 
part of the criminal act and whether it is admitted for its truth.  Contrary to the 
reasoning of Zichko, we see no conflict between the cautionary instruction and the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In 1872, the Legislature codified as part of the Code of Civil Procedure 
certain instructions regarding the effect of evidence, to be given to the jury “on all 
proper occasions.”  (Code Civ. Proc., former § 2061.)  These included instructions 
“that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust, and the 
evidence of the oral admissions of a party with caution.”  (Code Civ. Proc., former 
§ 2061, subd. 4; see People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 799.)  Code of Civil 
Procedure former section 2061 was not limited to criminal cases, and the statutory 
requirement has long been reflected in the pattern jury instructions applicable to 
both civil and criminal cases.4   
The Legislature repealed Code of Civil Procedure, former section 2061 in 
1965 when it adopted the Evidence Code.  (Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 127, p. 1366, 
operative Jan. 1, 1967.)  The Law Revision Commission explained that because 
“the section is but a partial codification of the common law, the repeal should have 
                                              
4  
(See CALJIC No. 29-D (1st ed. 1946) [“The law of this state admonishes 
you to view with caution the testimony of any witness which purports to relate an 
oral admission of the defendant [or an oral confession by him]”]; Cal. Jury 
Instructions, Civil, No. 8 (1938) [“evidence of the oral admission of a party, other 
than by his own testimony in this trial, ought to be viewed by you with caution”]; 
see also CACI No. 212 (2014 ed.) [“A party may offer into evidence any oral or 
written statement made by an opposing party outside the courtroom.  [¶] . . . [¶]  
You should view testimony about an oral statement made by a party outside the 
courtroom with caution”]; BAJI No. 2.25 (2014 ed.) [“A statement made by a 
party before trial that has a tendency to prove or disprove any material fact in this 
action and which is against that party‟s interest is an admission.  Evidence of an 
oral admission not made under oath should be viewed with caution”].) 
 
7 
no effect on the giving of the instructions contained in the section or on the giving 
of any other cautionary instructions that are permitted or required to be given by 
decisional law.”  (Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code (Jan. 1965) 
7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1965) com. on repeal foll. Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2061, p. 358.)  Subsequently we held, citing the Law Revision Commission‟s 
report, that the repeal had no effect on the court‟s obligation to give the 
instructions contained in the former statute.  (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 
441, 455, fn. 4 (Beagle).)  
In order to evaluate the circumstances in which the cautionary instruction is 
applicable, we begin with the considerations that give rise to the need for caution.  
The extrajudicial admission of a party — that is, any statement by a party to an 
action that is offered against that party — is admissible in evidence regardless of 
its hearsay character.  (Evid. Code, § 1220; see Code Civ. Proc., former § 1870, 
subd. 2, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 58, p. 1360, 
operative Jan. 1, 1967.)  “This kind of testimony is considered dangerous, first, 
because it may be misapprehended by the person who hears it; secondly, it may 
not be well remembered; thirdly, it may not be correctly repeated.”  (People v. 
Gardner (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 829, 832.)  Even witnesses with the best 
intentions often cannot report the “ „exact language‟ ” used by a defendant, and 
therefore may convey, through errors and omissions, an inaccurate impression of a 
defendant‟s statements.  (People v. Bemis (1949) 33 Cal.2d 395, 399.)  “ „No other 
class of testimony affords such temptations or opportunities for unscrupulous 
witnesses to torture the facts or commit open perjury, as it is often impossible to 
contradict their testimony at all, or at least by any other witness than the party 
himself.‟  (2 Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence, 620.)”  (Ibid.)  Even if 
the party testifies, it may be difficult to convincingly dispute evidence of an 
extrajudicial admission because the party has an obvious interest in the outcome of 
 
8 
a case.  “It was undoubtedly such considerations that led the Legislature to make 
the admitting of extrajudicial admissions into evidence conditional on the giving 
of a cautionary instruction.”  (Ibid.)  The cautionary instruction “is designed to aid 
the jury in determining whether an admission or confession was in fact made.”  
(Id. at p. 400.) 
We recognized in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 (Carpenter) 
that “[t]he rationale behind the cautionary instruction suggests it applies broadly.”  
(Id. at pp. 392-393.)  In Carpenter, the defendant was charged with murder and 
attempted rape.  An eyewitness testified that, prior to the killing, the defendant 
told the victim, “ „ “I want to rape you.” ‟ ”  (Id. at p. 392.)  We noted that the 
statement of intent “was part of the crime itself,” and we reiterated our observation 
in Beagle that “ „[f]or purposes of requiring . . . cautionary instructions, we have 
not distinguished between actual admissions [citation] and pre-offense statements 
of intent [citation].  [Citations.]‟ ”  (Carpenter, at p. 392, quoting Beagle, supra, 6 
Cal.3d at p. 455, fn. 5 [cautionary instruction required with respect to arsonist‟s 
preoffense statement].)  We also reiterated the reason for not excluding preoffense 
statements from the ambit of the instruction:  “[A]lthough the risk of conviction 
because of a false preoffense statement alone is less than the risk of conviction 
upon a false confession or admission, „we find the risk of an unjust result 
sufficient to justify our broader rule.‟ ”  (Carpenter, at p. 392, quoting Beagle, at 
p. 455, fn. 5.)  Finally, we observed that “ „[t]he purpose of the cautionary 
instruction is to assist the jury in determining if the statement was in fact made.‟  
[Citation.]  This purpose would apply to any oral statement of the defendant, 
whether made before, during, or after the crime.”  (Carpenter, at p. 393.)  
Consistent with Carpenter, CALCRIM No. 358 does not use the term 
“admissions” and requires caution regarding “any statement made by (the/a) 
 
9 
defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or 
otherwise recorded.”5 
The Attorney General argues that Carpenter‟s assertion that the instruction 
applies to “any oral statement of the defendant” constitutes dicta set out in the 
context of statements that tend to prove the crime — admissions and preoffense 
statements of intent — and should not be extended to statements that constitute the 
criminal act itself.  Although Carpenter did not actually address a statement that 
constituted the charged criminal act, its reasoning applies fully to such statements.  
The risk that a witness will report the defendant‟s statement inaccurately or falsely 
is just as great in a case involving a threat as in a case involving a confession or a 
preoffense statement of intent.  And the risk that inaccurate or false testimony will 
lead to an unjust result is just as great when the statement constitutes the charged 
criminal act as it is when the statement merely provides evidence of the criminal 
act.   
The court in Zichko misinterpreted Carpenter as holding that “the 
instruction applies to any oral admission.”  (Zichko, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1059, italics added.)  Zichko then reasoned that the instruction did not apply to a 
verbal threat because a threat did not fall within its definition of an “admission.”  
(Ibid.)  Both the language and rationale of Carpenter make clear, however, that the 
instruction applies to any oral statement by the defendant, used to show guilt, 
regardless of whether it fits any particular definition of “admission.”  Zichko also 
went astray in focusing on the circumstance that the statements at issue constituted 
                                              
5  
In contrast, the CALJIC instruction discussed in Zichko, supra, 118 
Cal.App.4th 1055, requires that “Evidence of an oral admission of [a] [the] 
defendant not made in court should be viewed with caution.”  (CALJIC No. 2.71.)   
 
10 
a criminal act whose truth was not material.  “[W]hether defendant‟s statements 
were „verbal acts‟ and therefore not hearsay (Evid. Code, §§ 125, 1200) or 
admissions but admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, 
§§ 1204, 1220) does not determine whether they should be viewed with caution.”  
(People v. Ramirez (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 347, 352; see People v. McKinnon 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 679 [cautionary instruction applicable to defendant‟s oral 
threats, used to prove his guilt of murder].)  The cautionary instruction is 
concerned with the reliability and credibility of the witness who testifies about the 
defendant‟s statements.  Such concerns are present regardless of whether the 
statement is offered for its truth or as a verbal act whose truth is not relevant.  For 
this reason, the cautionary instruction applies to statements that are not admitted 
for their truth, such as a statement admitted to show the defendant‟s state of mind 
or a false exculpatory statement admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt.6  
                                              
6  
In limiting application of the cautionary instruction to “admissions,” Zichko 
found support in the circumstance that the CALJIC version of the cautionary 
instruction at issue in that case directs the jury to determine “whether [the] 
statement is true in whole or in part.”  (CALJIC No. 2.71 and quoted by Zichko, 
supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.)  Zichko noted that there would be no reason to 
instruct a jury to determine whether a threat was true because a threat may be a 
crime “even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out.”  (§ 422 and quoted by 
Zichko, at p. 1060.)  The pattern jury instructions, however, “are not themselves 
the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.”  
(People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.)  In contrast to the CALCRIM 
instructions (which include one cautionary instruction that is applicable to all oral 
statements of the defendant), CALJIC includes separate instructions tailored to 
different types of statements:  a defendant‟s oral confession (CALJIC No. 2.70), 
an admission not amounting to a confession (CALJIC No. 2.71), and a preoffense 
statement of intent, plan, motive, or design (CALJIC No. 2.71.7).  The 
circumstances that the CALJIC instruction drafted to apply to admissions includes 
language that may not be appropriate when the defendant‟s statements are offered 
as proof of a verbal act, and that the CALJIC drafters have not created an 
instruction specifically applicable to statements offered as proof of a verbal act, do 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
11 
(See People v. Brackett (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 13, 17-20; People v. Mendoza 
(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 667, 675-676; but see People v. La Salle (1980) 103 
Cal.App.3d 139, 151 [criticizing the definition of “admission” in CALJIC 
No. 2.71 because it could apply to nonhearsay], disapproved on other grounds in 
People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 496 & fn. 12.)  Thus, the cautionary 
instruction applies to any extrajudicial oral statement by the defendant that is used 
by the prosecution to prove the defendant‟s guilt — it does not matter whether the 
statement was made before, during, or after the crime, whether it can be described 
as a confession or admission, or whether it is a verbal act that constitutes part of 
the crime or the criminal act itself.  We disapprove People v. Zichko, supra, 118 
Cal.App.4th 1055 to the extent it reaches a contrary conclusion. 
Echoing Zichko, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at page 1060, the Attorney 
General argues that, in the context of a criminal threats case, the cautionary 
instruction conflicts with the requirement that the elements of the offense, 
including the threat itself, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Attorney 
General contends that the cautionary instruction could mislead jurors to believe 
they could find a defendant guilty of making a criminal threat without proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the threat was made, as long as they exercise 
caution in making that determination.  This argument is not persuasive.  The 
cautionary instruction does not conflict with the reasonable doubt instruction 
because the two instructions serve distinct purposes and aid the jury in different 
ways.  The reasonable doubt instruction informs the jury that it must find the facts 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
not support the conclusion that a cautionary instruction is inapplicable to criminal 
threats.   
 
12 
required for conviction to be proved with the specified level of certainty before it 
may convict the defendant.  (CALCRIM No. 220.)  The cautionary instruction, on 
the other hand, advises jurors that in deciding whether to believe a witness‟s 
testimony about the defendant‟s statements, they must exercise particular caution.  
The two instructions, together, inform the jury that it must determine whether each 
of the elements of the crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
in making that determination it must exercise special caution in considering one 
particular type of evidence. 
Furthermore, nothing in the wording of the instructions would suggest to a 
jury that the cautionary instruction was meant to apply in lieu of — rather than in 
addition to — the reasonable doubt instruction.  The CALCRIM instructions given 
in the present case permit a conviction for criminal threats only if the People prove 
all of the elements of the offense.  (See CALCRIM No. 1300.)  The reasonable 
doubt instruction informed the jury, “Whenever I tell you the People must prove 
something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I 
specifically tell you otherwise].”  (CALCRIM No. 220.)  The language of the 
cautionary instruction does not reference the People‟s burden of proof or the 
elements of the offense, or in any other way suggest to jurors that the instruction 
was meant to create an exception to the rule that all elements of the crime must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.7   
                                              
7  
Also unavailing is the Attorney General‟s contention that the language in 
CALCRIM No. 358 directing a jury to “decide how much importance to give to 
the statement[s]” indicates that the cautionary instruction was never intended to be 
given when the statement constitutes the criminal act itself.  Because the 
instruction is not itself authority, whether or not it was so intended does not affect 
our analysis.  (See People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 48, fn. 7.)  In any 
event, it is not clear that the language directing a jury to consider the importance 
of the statement is inapplicable in a criminal threats case.  In such a case, the jury 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
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B.  Trial court’s duty to instruct on its own motion 
We asked the parties to brief whether the cautionary instruction should 
continue to be required in the absence of a request by the defendant.  As we 
explain below, the trial court‟s sua sponte obligation to give the cautionary 
instruction was originally based on Code of Civil Procedure former section 2061.  
Following that statute‟s repeal, we continued to recognize the obligation without 
analyzing whether the requirement is warranted.  We now conclude that in light of 
a change in the law that requires the general instructions on witness credibility to 
be given sua sponte in every case, the cautionary instruction is not one of the 
general principles of law upon which a court is required to instruct the jury in the 
absence of a request.  The cautionary instruction does not reflect a legal principle 
with which jurors would be unfamiliar absent the instruction, and the defendant 
may not always want the instruction to be given.  Nevertheless, the instruction 
may be useful to the defense in highlighting for the jury the need for care and 
caution in evaluating evidence of the defendant‟s statements.  Finally, we explain 
that the fact that the Legislature has imposed a sua sponte duty to give the 
instruction in certain circumstances in juvenile cases does not require that all 
criminal defendants receive the same treatment under equal protection principles.   
“It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial 
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by 
the evidence.  [Citations.]  The general principles of law governing the case are 
those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
must determine not only whether the statement was made but also whether it was 
intended to “be taken as a threat” and whether it caused the victim to “fear for his 
or her . . . safety.”  (§ 422.) 
 
14 
which are necessary for the jury‟s understanding of the case.”  (People v. 
St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531; see People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 
488.)  We long ago held that, under Code of Civil Procedure former section 2061, 
a trial court in a criminal case was obligated to advise the jury on the court‟s own 
motion to consider a defendant‟s extrajudicial statements with caution.  (People v. 
Bemis, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 399.)  After the repeal of Code of Civil Procedure 
former section 2061 we continued to so hold (see Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 392), but none of our cases has until now carefully examined whether the 
cautionary instruction is one of those “general principles of law” so “necessary for 
the jury‟s understanding of the case” that the instruction must be given by the trial 
court even when the defendant does not request it.   
Our early cases identified the language of Code of Civil Procedure former 
section 2061 — requiring that the cautionary instruction be given “by the Court on 
all proper occasions” — as the basis for imposing a sua sponte duty on the trial 
court to give the cautionary instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Koenig (1946) 29 
Cal.2d 87, 94 [“In view of the code section . . . such a cautionary instruction 
should have been given” (italics added)]; People v. Cornett (1948) 33 Cal.2d 33, 
40 [“It is clear that in view of the foregoing code section the trial court should have 
given such a cautionary instruction” (italics added)]; People v. Bemis, supra, 33 
Cal.2d at p. 399 [noting that “the Legislature [made] the admitting of extrajudicial 
admissions into evidence conditional on the giving of a cautionary instruction”]; 
People v. Ford, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 799 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., former 
§ 2061‟s language that the jurors “ „are . . . to be instructed by the court on all 
proper occasions‟ ” to view “ „oral admissions of a party . . . with caution‟ ”].) 
After the repeal of Code of Civil Procedure former section 2061 in 1967, 
our seminal case addressing the trial court‟s sua sponte instructional duties 
respecting a criminal defendant‟s out-of-court admissions was Beagle, supra, 6 
 
15 
Cal.3d 441.  There we affirmed that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give 
this instruction.  (Id. at p. 455.)  As primary authority, we cited People v. Ford, 
supra, 60 Cal.2d at page 799, a case based on the statutory provision.  (Beagle, at 
p. 455.)  We observed in a footnote that “Although Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2061, requiring the cautionary instruction, was repealed effective January 
1, 1967, the repeal does not affect the decisional law,” citing the Law Revision 
Commission comment to that effect discussed above.  (Id. at p. 455, fn. 4.)  We 
also cited two Court of Appeal decisions:  People v. Blankenship (1970) 7 
Cal.App.3d 305 and People v. Reed (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 37.  (Beagle, supra, at 
p. 455, fn. 4.)  Those Court of Appeal decisions likewise observed that cases like 
Ford and Bemis remained valid despite the repeal of Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2061, because, the Law Revision Commission‟s comment to the repealed 
section suggested the repeal “should have no effect on the decisional law requiring 
cautionary instructions.”  (Blankenship, at p. 310; accord, Reed, at p. 43, fn. 2.)  
We have since affirmed this rule without discussion in a number of cases, all of 
which trace back to our holding in Beagle.  (See People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 1187, 1200 [citing Beagle]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 
1315 [citing Beagle]; People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1224 [citing 
Beagle]; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 166 [citing Beagle]; see also 
People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1021 [citing Williams, Bunyard, Heishman, 
and Beagle]; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 392 [citing Beagle, Lang, and 
Ford].)   
Reconsidering the issue in light of the general principles regarding the 
court‟s duty to provide instructions, we conclude that the instruction need not be 
given sua sponte.  The cautionary instruction on admissions is no longer 
“necessary for the jury‟s understanding of the case” (People v. St. Martin, supra, 1 
Cal.3d at p. 531, italics added) because courts are now required to instruct the jury, 
 
16 
in all criminal cases, concerning the general principles that apply to their 
consideration of witness testimony.  (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 
864, 883-884.)   
Although instructions on witness credibility were included in the pattern 
instructions given at the time that Beagle was decided in 1972, no authority 
required that they be given sua sponte.  (See CALJIC No. 2.20 (3d ed. 1970) 
[Credibility of Witnesses].)  The standard CALJIC instruction included a 
statement that the jurors are the exclusive judges of witness credibility, which 
Penal Code section 1127 requires to be given in every criminal case.  It also 
included the list of factors affecting witness credibility contained in Evidence 
Code section 780, which provides examples of matters that may be relevant to 
witness credibility.  No case or statute, however, required that the jury be 
instructed on these factors.   In 1975, we stated that “the substance” of CALJIC 
No. 2.20, including the factors that affect witness credibility, “should henceforth 
always be given.”  (People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 883 [holding 
that courts should no longer instruct juries to consider with caution the testimony 
of the complaining witness in a rape case].)   
Consistent with the instructions required by Rincon-Pineda, current 
instructions advise the jury to consider, among other things, how well a witness 
could “see, hear, or otherwise perceive the things about which the witness 
testified,” how well the witness was “able to remember and describe what 
happened,” and whether the witness‟s testimony was influenced by “bias or 
prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a personal 
interest in how the case is decided.”  (CALCRIM No. 226.)  These general 
instructions, like the cautionary instruction, “aid the jury in determining whether 
[the defendant‟s extrajudicial statement] was in fact made.”  (People v. Bemis, 
supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 400.)  Consequently, the erroneous omission of the 
 
17 
cautionary instruction has frequently been held to be harmless error in light of 
such general instructions on witness credibility.  (See People v. Dickey (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 884, 906; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 393; People v. Bunyard, 
supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1225.)  Because courts must now instruct the jury on these 
general factors in every case, we conclude that the cautionary instruction on 
defendant‟s statements is no longer so necessary to the jury‟s understanding of the 
case as to require the court to give it sua sponte.   
The cautionary instruction regarding a defendant‟s statements stands in 
contrast to instructions that convey a legal principle with which jurors would be 
unfamiliar in the absence of instruction from the court.  This distinction is 
illustrated by People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, in which we held that the 
trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on its own motion that possession of 
recently stolen property is insufficient by itself to establish guilt of theft-related 
offenses.  We compared the instruction at issue with instructions concerning the 
corpus delicti rule and the requirement that the testimony of an accomplice be 
corroborated.  Those instructions reflected legal rules that certain types of 
evidence are insufficient, alone, to establish guilt — rules of which the jurors 
would not be aware without instruction.  (Id. at pp. 1136-1137.)  In contrast, the 
rule that possession of stolen property is insufficient in itself to establish guilt of 
theft is “merely a specific application of the general instruction governing 
circumstantial evidence.”  (Id. at p. 1138.)  We explained that “ „an instruction that 
tells the jury what kinds of rational inferences may be drawn from the evidence 
does not provide any insight jurors are not already expected to possess.‟  
[Citation.]  Such instructions, although helpful in various circumstances, are not 
vital to the jury‟s ability to analyze the evidence and therefore are not instructions 
that must be given to the jury even in the absence of a request.”  (Id. at p. 1139.)  
Likewise, the cautionary instruction concerning the defendant‟s extrajudicial 
 
18 
statements may be helpful in some circumstances but is not “vital to the jury‟s 
ability to analyze the evidence.”  (Ibid.)   
Furthermore, it is more appropriate to permit defendants to determine 
whether to request the instruction than to require the trial judge to give it in every 
case.  In People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 782-784 (Livaditis), we held 
that the cautionary instruction regarding defendant‟s admissions need not be given 
at the penalty phase of a capital case in the absence of the defendant‟s request.  
We reasoned that at that phase, “whether a particular statement is aggravating or 
mitigating is often open to interpretation.”  (Id. at p. 783.)  Because advising 
caution might not be in the defendant‟s interest in that context, a trial court need 
not give the cautionary instruction unless it is requested by the defendant.   
In Livaditis, we distinguished a case that rejected the defendant‟s argument 
that the cautionary instruction should not have been given at the guilt phase 
because the defendant‟s statements were both exculpatory and inculpatory — 
People v. Vega (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 310 (Vega).  (Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
pp. 783-784.)  Vega reasoned that because the CALJIC instruction given in that 
case referred to defendant‟s admission, and defined an admission as a statement 
tending to prove guilt, the jury would understand that only statements tending to 
prove guilt should be viewed with caution.  (Vega, at p. 317.)  We later reached 
the same conclusion in People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 1200.  In 
Livaditis, we reasoned that at “a penalty phase, the distinction between mitigation 
and aggravation is often more blurred than the distinction between a statement that 
incriminates and one that does not.  A statement, for example, that the defendant is 
sorry he stabbed the victim to death is both mitigating and aggravating.  It admits 
guilt but also expresses remorse.”  (Livaditis, at p. 784.)   
Although the line between mitigating and aggravating statements may tend 
to be more blurred than the line between incriminating statements and exculpatory 
 
19 
statements, the difference is only a matter of degree.  A statement that is 
exculpatory on its face could be incriminating if proved to be false.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Mendoza, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at pp. 675-676 [defendant‟s 
exculpatory statements to police that were proved to be false, showing 
consciousness of guilt, constituted admissions to which the cautionary instruction 
applied].)  It is not uncommon that the statements of a defendant contain both 
incriminating and exculpatory elements.  In Vega, for example, the defendant was 
charged with robbery, vehicle theft, and kidnapping.  In some of his statements to 
police, he admitted taking the vehicle but stated that he did not intend to keep it 
and took it only “temporarily because of an emergency.”  (Vega, supra, 220 
Cal.App.3d at p. 317.)  The decision in Vega recognized that “it is not uncommon 
that a single statement may tend to prove guilt or innocence, depending upon the 
state of the remaining evidence and the issue for which it is being considered.”  
(Id. at pp. 317-318.)  Despite its recognition that a statement may include both 
incriminating and exculpatory elements, Vega declined to require the trial court to 
modify the instruction in such circumstances and relied upon the jury to 
understand the word “admission” and apply it only to incriminating statements.  
(Id. at p. 318.)  A defendant, however, might prefer not to rely on the jury‟s ability 
to discriminate between those incriminating admissions it should view with special 
caution and those exculpatory statements that are not subject to the instruction.  Or 
a defendant might not contest that the incriminating portions of his or her 
statements were made, and wish to avoid any risk that the jury might apply the 
cautionary instruction to portions of the statements that he or she wanted the jury 
to accept.  Therefore, it is appropriate to allow the defendant to make the strategic 
decision whether to request the instruction. 
It is true that we have rejected the argument that we should eliminate the 
court‟s sua sponte duty to give an instruction directing the jury to consider an 
 
20 
accomplice‟s statement with distrust — an instruction that also derived from Code 
of Civil Procedure former section 2061, subdivision 4.  (People v. Guiuan (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 558.)  The majority in Guiuan stated that “[i]t has long been one of the 
instructions on the „general principles of law‟ that trial courts must give on their 
own initiative. . . .  The repeal of [section 2061] did not purport to abrogate this 
requirement, and it was continued by our decisional law.”  (Id. at p. 569.)  
Nevertheless, we did not feel constrained in Guiuan to maintain the instructional 
duty precisely as it was set forth in the statute.  Although we concluded that the 
duty to give the instruction regarding accomplice testimony had not been 
abrogated, we modified the instruction‟s language to require “ „care and caution‟ ” 
rather than “ „with distrust.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  In addition, in order to remove the burden 
on the trial court to modify the instruction when accomplice testimony is presented 
by, or is favorable to, the defendant, we modified the language of the instruction to 
refer “only to [accomplice] testimony that . . . incriminate[d] the defendant.  (Ibid.)  
As Guiuan demonstrates, the language of former section 2061, even as 
perpetuated in our decisions after its repeal, need not inhibit the continuing 
development and refinement of the common law rules that it embodied. 
The People urge us to conclude not only that the cautionary instruction 
concerning a defendant‟s extrajudicial statements need not be given on the court‟s 
own motion but also that it should never be given, even when a defendant requests 
it.  We decline to do so.  Although the instruction is not absolutely necessary to the 
jury‟s understanding of the case whenever there is evidence of a defendant‟s 
extrajudicial statements, it can be useful in highlighting for the jury the need to 
carefully consider a type of evidence that is particularly vulnerable to distortion, 
whether intentional or accidental.  (See People v. Bemis, supra, 33 Cal.2d at 
pp. 399-400.) 
 
21 
Both parties argue that the recent adoption of section 859.5 favors their 
position, but none of their arguments is persuasive.  Section 859.5, subdivision (a) 
requires that custodial interrogations of juvenile murder suspects be recorded.  If 
such an interrogation is not recorded, the court must instruct the jury to “view with 
caution the statements made in [the] custodial interrogation.”  (§ 859.5, 
subd. (e)(3).)  The Attorney General argues that the Legislature‟s imposition of a 
sua sponte duty on the court to give the cautionary instruction under these narrow 
circumstances implies a considered decision not to require it more generally for all 
oral admissions, and thus supports the conclusion that the instruction need not be 
given sua sponte.  The decisional law at the time the Legislature adopted section 
859.5, however, required the cautionary instruction on admissions to be given sua 
sponte.  There is no reason to believe that, in requiring a special cautionary 
instruction in cases in which law enforcement has not complied with the statutory 
requirements for recording the statements of juveniles suspected of homicide, the 
Legislature implicitly intended to change the law applicable to other cases.   
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the Legislature‟s adoption of 
section 859.5, subdivision (e)(3) demonstrates that, contrary to the Attorney 
General‟s argument, the Legislature concluded that the general instructions 
concerning witness credibility are not an adequate substitute for a cautionary 
instruction concerning a defendant‟s statements.  We disagree.  There is no 
indication that the Legislature thought that the general instructions on witness 
credibility would be insufficient in cases not addressed by section 859.5.  The 
special instruction contemplated in section 859.5 is intended to be a remedy for 
law enforcement‟s failure to follow that law.  (§ 859.5, subd. (e).)   
Finally, defendant contends that elimination of the sua sponte duty to give 
the general cautionary instruction concerning admissions would create an equal 
protection problem, because defendant is assertedly similarly situated to the 
 
22 
juvenile defendants to whom section 859.5 applies.  Defendant is not similarly 
situated to juvenile murder suspects who are interrogated in custody in violation of 
section 859.5.  No law requires that a defendant‟s admissions be recorded.  In 
adopting section 859.5, the Legislature explicitly recognized the special problems 
created by the custodial interrogation of juvenile suspects, and the corresponding 
need for accurate recordings of those interrogations, particularly in murder cases.  
(Sen. Bill No. 569 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) § 1 [legislative findings].)  These 
special problems clearly are not applicable in defendant‟s case, in which the oral 
admissions at issue were not made during a police interrogation and defendant was 
not a murder suspect.   
C.  Harmless error  
We need not decide whether the new rule we announce today — 
eliminating the court‟s sua sponte duty to give the cautionary instruction on 
defendant‟s extrajudicial statements — applies retroactively because, in any event, 
the omission of the cautionary instruction was harmless.  We apply the standard 
for state law error:  Whether it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached 
a result more favorable to defendant had the instruction been given.  (People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836.)  Failure to give the cautionary instruction 
is not a violation of federal due process warranting the “more stringent standard” 
of review for federal constitutional error.  (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 393.)  
“Since the cautionary instruction is intended to help the jury to determine whether 
the statement attributed to the defendant was in fact made, courts examining the 
prejudice in failing to give the instruction examine the record to see if there was 
any conflict in the evidence about the exact words used, their meaning, or whether 
the [statements] were repeated accurately.”  (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 
1210, 1268.)   
 
23 
Concerning the convictions for criminal threats, the testimony of Eduardo, 
Marta, and Indira regarding the substance and meaning of defendant‟s threatening 
statements was largely consistent.  Each testified that defendant told Eduardo that 
if he did not die this time, he would die the next time.  Each also testified that 
defendant said she would kill their entire family.  Even though Eduardo could not 
remember all that had been said to Indira, Marta and Indira both testified that 
defendant had told Indira that she was going to “pay for this.”  The minor 
variations in the exact wordings of these statements are not the sort of 
inconsistencies that would cause a jury to question whether the statements were 
actually made, even when the testimony is viewed with caution.  Not only was this 
testimony generally consistent, but there was no evidence contradicting these 
witnesses‟ testimony that the statements were made.  (See People v. Dickey, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 906 [“Where there was no such conflict in the evidence, but 
simply a denial by the defendant that he made the statements attributed to him, we 
have found failure to give the cautionary instruction harmless.”].)   
Defense counsel did make two arguments in an attempt to cast doubt on the 
prosecution‟s evidence of criminal threats.  First, defense counsel contended that if 
defendant had made the threats, the jury would be able to hear these threats on a 
911 call that Marta made during the attack.  The prosecution played a recording of 
the call for the jury and the court provided a translated transcript.  The recording 
of the 911 call contains roughly 60 seconds during which a female voice can be 
heard screaming but the actual words are mostly incomprehensible.  Given the 
recording‟s inconclusive nature, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would 
have been more likely to find it exonerating had the trial court given the 
cautionary instruction. 
Second, in an apparent attempt to suggest to the jury that the witnesses had 
conspired to present false testimony, defense counsel asked Eduardo, Marta, and 
 
24 
Indira whether they had discussed the attack prior to trial.  After each replied in 
the negative, the defense suggested to the jury in closing arguments that this was 
“a really bad, huge fat lie.”  No evidence suggested that the witnesses had 
coordinated their testimony.  It is unlikely that this argument would have been 
significantly bolstered by provision of the cautionary instruction. 
Furthermore, the instructions provided by the trial court concerning witness 
credibility informed the jury of the need to evaluate the witnesses‟ testimony for 
possible inaccuracies and determine whether the statement was in fact made.  The 
jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 226, which sets out the numerous factors 
the jury may consider in deciding whether a witness‟s testimony is credible.  
“[W]hen the trial court otherwise has thoroughly instructed the jury on assessing 
the credibility of witnesses, we have concluded the jury was adequately warned to 
view their testimony with caution.”  (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 680; see Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 392 [finding trial court‟s instruction 
on witness credibility prevented prejudice where there was no evidence that the 
statements were not made].)   
Turning to the attempted murder conviction, defendant argues that the trial 
court‟s failure to give the cautionary instruction was prejudicial because the 
evidence of the defendant‟s statements was used to prove the intent element of 
attempted murder and the finding that the attempted murder was deliberate and 
premeditated.  In addition to the evidence of defendant‟s criminal threats discussed 
above, Indira testified that defendant told Eduardo, as the women dragged him out 
by his hair, that she was going to kill him.  A police investigator who interviewed 
Marta three days after the stabbing testified that Marta told him that defendant had 
shouted “Die! Die! Die!” during the attack.  Although, in her testimony, Marta 
denied relaying those words to the investigator, she testified that she remembered 
defendant saying “If you don‟t die from this one, you‟ll die from the next one.”   
 
25 
The absence of the cautionary instruction was not prejudicial as to the 
attempted murder conviction or the finding that the attempted murder was 
deliberate and premeditated.  Although the prosecution referred to the “Die! Die! 
Die!” language in closing arguments, it expressly acknowledged that it was 
uncertain whether this statement was made.  Although the statement described by 
Marta in court was different from the statement described by the investigator, her 
testimony also strongly suggested an intent to kill.  No evidence contradicted 
Indira‟s statement that defendant told Eduardo she was going to kill him, and the 
circumstantial evidence strongly supported the prosecution‟s theory that defendant 
had planned the attack.  The jury heard testimony from Eduardo, Marta, and Indira 
that defendant snapped her fingers and whistled to call forth associates — young 
gang members — who were lying in wait, and that one of them stabbed Eduardo 
repeatedly in defendant‟s presence.  In light of all the evidence, it is not reasonably 
probable that the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to defendant 
on the attempted murder count had the trial court provided the cautionary 
instruction.  Accordingly, we conclude that the omission of the cautionary 
instruction in this case was harmless. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.  
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Diaz 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 208 Cal.App.4th 711 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S205145 
Date Filed: April 6, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Ron M. Del Pozzo 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Dallas Sacher and Syda Kosofsky, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Stan Helfman, Christopher J. Wei, 
Luke Fadem and Masha A. Dabiza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dallas Sacher 
100 N. Winchester Boulevard, Suite 310 
Santa Clara, CA  95050 
(408) 241-6171 
 
Masha A. Dabiza 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5515