Case Title: KLAHN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
KLAHN v. STATE2004 WY 9496 P.3d 472Case Number: 02-259Decided: 08/13/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
         

 

JOHN 
S. KLAHN,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      John S. Klahn 
(Klahn) appeals a conviction on one count of sexual exploitation. Klahn contends 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his challenges for 
cause on three potential jurors.  
While we conclude the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
the challenge to one of the potential jurors, we affirm Klahn's conviction 
because there was no showing that the error was 
prejudicial.

 

ISSUE

[¶2]      The parties agree 
that the sole issue raised in this appeal is:

Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Klahn's challenges for 
cause?

 

FACTS

[¶3]      In January 2001, 
Klahn's neighbor discovered three nude photographs of her fourteen-year-old 
daughter, GW, in Klahn's home.  
Klahn was charged with one count of exploitation of a child in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003)1 and one count of taking indecent 
liberties with a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 
2003).2

 

[¶4]      The sole issue 
raised in this case relates to jury selection.  During voir dire, the district 
court and the parties examined in chambers members of the jury pool who each had 
indicated that they harbored potential prejudice that might affect their ability 
to be fair and impartial.  The 
examinations of three potential jurors are relevant to this appeal.  The first, Juror #139, indicated she had 
life experiences that she believed could affect her ability to sit on the jury 
panel:

 

                        
THE COURT:  Go 
ahead.

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Well, based on the information that I have concerning the 
case, I need to be real honest, you know.  
That was the whole point of being a juror was to be completely 
honest.  I was molested when I was 
seven by an 18-year-old. And in those days that was not something you ever 
brought to trial or pressed charges.  
You just ignored it, you know.

            
Consequently, many, many years later my five-year-old daughter was 
molested by a 16-year-old boy.  And 
that involved the legal system.

            
Can I go into this trial and be honest, you know, and give this guy a 
fair chance?  Probably, based on all 
the facts. But I will tell you this:  
It's not going to take much.  
And if I even  I mean I wouldn't  it wouldn't take much evidence for me 
to say guilty because of my strong convictions.

            
I feel spared  basically, show no mercy.  That's my attitude.  That's not probably something you want 
to hear.  And I'm sure I'm going to 
be the first one out the door.  I'm 
going to be honest with you.  I'm 
going to be very, very vocal.

 

THE 
COURT:  Now, [Juror #139], the Court would instruct you if selected as 
a juror about the law of the case and about the standard you would have to 
apply.  And you've already heard 
before anyone charged with a crime can be convicted a juror has to be convinced 
that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the 
crime.

            
Could you look at the evidence and make that type of analysis in your own 
mind if selected as a juror?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Well, let's say hypothetically if I saw a picture of a minor, 
nude pictures taken by a gentleman; and this girl was a minor, like I said, it 
wouldn't take much.  I wouldn't be 
able to hear 

 

THE 
COURT:  I really don't want to ask you a hypothetical and I don't want 
you to relay to us necessarily what your verdict would be on some hypothetical 
or assumed set of facts, because you haven't heard anything 
yet.

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Right.

 

THE 
COURT:  As [defense counsel] pointed out in the courtroom, there's no 
evidence against this man presented to you yet.

            
But my question to you is, if selected as a juror, would you promise to 
hear both sides of the case and only convict if you were convinced by the  
beyond a reasonable doubt that each element of the crime had been presented to 
you?  Could you promise to do 
that?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  I don't know.  I 
don't know if I could do that. I'm already  I guess something like this is  I 
don't know.  I can't explain it to 
you.  Being a victim and having my 
daughter be a victim,  I'm probably 
not going to be as fair as other jurors who are not emotionally involved; not so 
much with this case, but from previous experience.  And I'll just be quite 
honest.

 

THE 
COURT:  The attorneys are very glad to have all of that information, 
because all of us have prejudices. Everybody does.  And not everybody is as honest at 
disclosing those, and that's something they want to know.  But having a prejudice or life 
experience does not preclude you from being a good juror.  In fact, sometimes the best jurors have 
life experience.

            
Without commenting on the level of evidence it will take to tip you over, 
if selected as a juror, you know, would you base the case only on the evidence 
presented in the courtroom?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Uh-huh.

 

THE 
COURT:  Another way of looking at this, I suppose, would be to say if 
your husband were the guy on the stand, could you judge it in that way? You see 
what we're getting at here?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Yeah.

 

THE 
COURT:  Counsel, do you have any questions for [Juror 
#139]?

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  But 
you haven't really come to the conclusion that the Defendant here is 
guilty?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Not without hearing the facts, no. I'm just saying I might not 
have to hear all of the facts. That's all I'm saying. Something that might be 
presented to me, whatever it might be, it would be easier for 
me.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  But 
you would be willing to listen to all of the evidence?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Sure.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Go 
ahead, [defense counsel].

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Are you telling us you would have a problem holding the 
State to their burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt when you say it 
wouldn't take much?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  I'm saying you (indicating) are going to present evidence and 
you're (indicating) going to come in here and counter evidence, whatever they 
have, and counter.  That's obviously 
how it works.  I'm saying it's not 
going to take much.  That's all I'm 
saying.  I'm not going to be in 
there arguing with myself and say, is he or is he not?  I have the evidence in front of me.  I don't know.  It might be easier to sway me the other 
way because of previous experience.  
I'm being honest with you.  I 
don't know how I'm going to be, whatever, happens.  You guys asked the question, was there a 
chance anybody might be slightly biased; and I raised my hand.  That's why I'm 
here.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Do you believe the prosecutor should have to prove this 
beyond a reasonable doubt?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  Well, the burden of proof is upon them, obviously; they have 
to prove the guilt.  But your job is 
to try to counter that, too.  So I  
just depends on what the facts are. Just not going to take 
much.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Do you believe they ought to have to prove 
it?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  To prove that he is guilty?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Uh huh.

 

JUROR 
#139]:  Yeah, I  can I also make a comment, to be 
honest?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNEL]:  
Sure.

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  I don't think that we would be at trial if they didn't feel 
that they had proof.  That is just  
I don't think it would go that far.  
There would be no case.  So 
that kind of  you know, I am not the kind of  I'm sure I'm not making a lot of 
points here in this room, but  I'm not going to lie to you, 
either.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  So you have a problem with the presumption of innocence, 
also?

 

[JUROR 
#139]:  No, I do not.  I 
believe that not everybody is guilty.  
I don't believe that.  I mean 
we have to have it.  Not everybody 
is going to be guilty.  There are 
innocent people.  I do believe 
that.  It's just that this subject 
matter kind of hits a little close to home.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Okay.  We do 
appreciate your honesty about your feelings.

 

[¶5]      The second 
potential juror, #124, knew some of the defense witnesses and questioned their 
credibility:

 

[THE 
PROSECUTOR]:  [Juror #124], you just feel that you couldn't be at all 
fair and impartial here?

 

[JUROR 
#124]:  To be quite honest today, no.  I've got a splitting headache and I'm 
tired.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Were 
you the one that works at night, too?

 

[JUROR 
#124]:  I worked all 
night.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  So 
you don't get much rest, either?

 

[JUROR 
#124]:  No, sir.  But  I 
can't, in all honesty, say that I could be impartial.  I really can't.  And I know that's not fair.  I know that.  But I have to be 
honest.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Which defense witnesses do you know?

 

[JUROR 
#124]:  [Names three 
people.]

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  And you have knowledge about them you've gained outside of 
Court that is going to affect how you judge their 
credibility?

 

[JUROR 
#124]:  Yes, 
sir.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  And you've  and you feel they are not particularly 
credible based on what you know about them outside of Court; is that what you're 
saying?

 

[JUROR #124]:  Yes, sir.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Did you know [the victim], 
also?

 

[JUROR #124]:  No, I don't know her.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Would it be hard for you to 
set aside your outside knowledge of these witnesses and judge their credibility 
with kind of a blank slate?

 

[JUROR #124]:  I think so.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  Thanks.

 

THE COURT:  [Juror #124], bottom line is a good 
juror can know something about the case, can know witnesses.  A good juror can 
have prejudices.  
That's okay, because we all do. The key is, would you promise to set 
aside those prejudices and judge the case based only on the facts presented from 
witnesses in the courtroom?  Could you do that?

 

[JUROR #124]:  Yeah.

 

THE COURT:  Thanks for coming in and talking with 
us.  I'll let 
you go ahead and be at ease here for a few minutes.

 

[JUROR #124]:  Okay.

 

[¶6]      The third potential 
juror, #90, had family members who were molested as children:

THE COURT:  If you would have a seat there 
sir.

            
You indicated in the courtroom that you had something you wanted to maybe 
talk about in private.  Go ahead.

 

[JUROR #90]:  Yes, I have been exposed in two 
different relationships that somebody has been molested.  One is my wife that 
I was married to for 12 years.  Secondly, my girlfriend, her daughter also 
was molested; and I've just seen what has happened to them. Basically, with my 
wife, I think part of our divorce was because of that.  And just seeing the 
child growing up, I just didn't like the situation that had happened.

 

THE COURT:  You see an impact based on their 
victimization, then?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Uh-huh.

 

. . . .
  

THE COURT:  As I've been telling a lot of people, 
[Juror #90], the key to being a good juror is to be able to judge a case based 
only on the facts presented by the witnesses in the courtroom.  So, it's okay to 
have prejudices.  
It's  you know, hopefully everybody agrees that we should uphold the 
law, for example.  
But, of course, both sides want you to be able to judge a case only on 
the facts introduced in the courtroom, because that gives them equal 
opportunity.

You think you could do that despite your prior 
experiences?

 

[JUROR #90]:  I  at this time I really couldn't 
tell you truthfully.  
Being truthful, I'm basically biased.  Okay?  I'll be truthful with you in this 
circumstance just because of that and stuff I've seen.

Like my girlfriend, her husband was convicted.  He was, you know, 
incarcerated.  
They let him out, and he did it again.

 

THE COURT:  Was that in Wyoming?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Yes, it was.  It was here in Buffalo.

 

THE COURT:  How long ago was that, do you remember?

 

[JUROR #90]:  It would have to be 25 years ago, 
30 years ago, perhaps.

 

THE COURT:  So her daughter is now an adult 

 

[JUROR #90]:  Yes.

 

THE COURT:  -- I take it?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Yep.

 

THE COURT:  Well, I think you understand the 
basics of what we're getting at, [Juror #90].  You know if you were charged with some crime 
you would want jurors that were able listen [sic] to both sides before they 
decide.

[The prosecutor] and [defense counsel] might have some 
questions for you.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  [Juror #90], we understand what 
you're saying.  
But are you really saying that you right now feel that Mr. Klahn is 
guilty?

 

[JUROR #90]:  No, I don't at this time.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Could you listen to the evidence 
from both sides and make a determination?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Perhaps, perhaps.  But I couldn't sit 
here and say truthfully yes or no.  Yes, I could listen to it.  Still, I have those 
feelings 

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.

 

[JUROR #90]:  -- that I can't get rid of.  I'm only human. 
Sure, I believe you're innocent until you're proven guilty.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Does your experience make you 
 your job as a juror is going to be to figure out the facts.  You know, you're 
not like passing moral judgment; but you're deciding what the facts are.  Does your 
experience, you feel, affect your ability to judge the facts?

 

[JUROR #90]:  No, I think I could judge the facts.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Are you going to be less 
inclined to make the State prove it beyond a reasonable doubt because of your 
experience?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Yeah, it's definitely got to be 
proven to me.  
Again, I'd have to listen to both sides.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  So exactly how do you think 
your bias would affect your job as a juror?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Not fairly, for one, not being 
fair.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  So you would have trouble 
giving my client the benefit of a reasonable doubt?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Basically.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Just because he's 
accused?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Just because of circumstances I've 
been brought and been exposed to the situation and seeing exactly what has 
happened to them people.  I'm not saying he's guilty or not guilty, but 
I have a real problem with it.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Would you want to have you on 
your own jury if you were charged with something like that?

 

[JUROR #90]:  Would I want to be on my own 
jury?  I feel 
like I wouldn't be on that kind of jury, because I wouldn't do something like 
that.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  Thank you.

 

THE COURT:  Thanks for coming in and talking with 
us, [Juror #90].  
If you want to go back out into either the courtroom or hallway, we'll be 
back out there in a few minutes.

 

[¶7]      Klahn moved the court 
to excuse each of these three jurors for cause.  The court denied the motions:

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  . . .  I move that [Juror 
#124] be excused, largely based on her having prejudged as to the credibility of 
defense witnesses, that [Juror #150] be excused, because she didn't feel she 
could be impartial, that [Juror #139] be excused for the same reason, that 
[Juror #76] be excused due to the possibility of severe economic hardship.

 

THE COURT:  [Prosecutor]?

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  I believe that as we talked to 
them more, I think [Juror #124], [Juror # 150], and [Juror #139], especially, 
said she was not prejudicial against the Defendant, had not made up her mind and 
was not prejudicial or biased.  And I think all three of them said that.  So, we would 
oppose, you know, them being struck for cause.

 

THE COURT:  The Court would grant your motion 
with respect to [Juror #150], excuse her for cause.  The Court will deny 
the motion with respect to the others.

 

. . . .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'd make a motion to excuse 
[Juror #90] for cause.  He was the one that had two, a wife and 
girlfriend [sic] molested.  Went back and forth on whether he could 
fairly judge the facts.  But he did say he was biased, and to me the 
weight of his statements was that he would have trouble being fair to Mr. Klahn 
based on the accusations.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I kind of agree with 
what [defense counsel] is saying, but he did indicate he was willing to listen 
to both sides. And he also said he had not made up his mind as to Mr. Klahn's 
guilt or innocence, so we would oppose that cause request.  And we have 
none.

 

THE COURT:  The court is going to deny the motion 
to excuse [Juror #90] for cause.  I'm sure that counsel are glad that he was 
open with us, though, for purposes of determining how to exercise peremptory 
challenges.

 

[¶8]      At the conclusion of 
a two-day trial, the jury convicted Klahn of sexual exploitation of a child but 
acquitted him on the indecent liberties count. This appeal followed.

 

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The test we apply to 
determine if a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause is whether or not 
that juror would be able to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the 
evidence adduced at trial and the court's instructions.  Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 
1996) (citing Munoz 
v. State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1993)).  The question of whether a juror is biased is 
a question of fact reserved for the trial court.  Id.; Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1000 (Wyo. 
1984).  We 
review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion.  Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 
635; Munoz, 849 P.2d  at 1302.  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily and capriciously."  Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶7, 78 P.3d 1045, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Brock v. State, 967 P.2d 26, 27 (Wyo. 
1998) and Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998)).  If a 
defendant fails to challenge a juror, and then later accepts the jury panel, 
then he waives any objection to the service of a particular juror.  Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 
635; Munoz, 849 P.2d  at 1302.

 

[¶10]   We begin by considering if the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied Klahn's challenges for cause against 
the three jurors.  
There is no dispute that each of the three jurors exhibited some 
prejudice.  The 
only question is whether or not the jurors demonstrated an ability to set aside 
that prejudice and serve on the jury fairly and impartially. We have 
consistently held that if a juror can judge witness credibility and make a 
determination based on the evidence adduced at trial in conjunction with the 
jury instructions, then a trial court does not abuse its discretion when denying 
a challenge for cause even if the juror has some connection to witnesses or 
parties to the case.  
Kerns, 920 P.2d 632 (court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying challenge for cause on juror who was a 
cousin of a witness because juror had stated he could judge the credibility of 
witnesses based on trial evidence alone); Arner v. 
State, 872 P.2d 100 (Wyo. 1994) 
(relationship or acquaintance with a police officer involved in the 
investigation of the case does not establish bias per 
se); Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033 (Wyo. 1986), 
on rehearing, 731 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1987) 
(court did not abuse its discretion in denying challenge for cause on juror who 
was familiar with murder victim); Krahn v. Pierce, 
485 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 
1971).  Simply 
put, if a prospective juror can set aside any supposed bias and decide a case 
only on the evidence presented in court, then there are no grounds for a 
successful challenge for cause.  Munoz, 849 P.2d  
at 1302.  It is 
the trial court's prerogative to give considerable weight to a potential juror's 
statement that he or she could fairly and impartially serve on a jury.  Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 636.

 

[¶11]   Klahn claims that the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause against the three 
prospective jurors.  
Klahn exercised peremptory challenges on each of the jurors and objected 
to the jury as empanelled.

 

[¶12]   After reviewing the entire record of 
the voir dire, we partially agree with Klahn.  The voir dire of Juror #90 is especially troubling.  As noted in the 
facts above, this juror's ex-wife and his girlfriend's daughter were molestation 
victims.  
Initially, the juror hedged on his ability to make a judgment based upon 
the evidence from both parties.  In response to two direct questions, the 
juror backed off that position and declared that he could judge the facts and 
hold the State to its burden of proof.  Immediately thereafter, however, an exchange 
took place with defense counsel in which the juror indicated that he could not 
be fair.  It is 
worth setting out again the excerpt from that part of the juror's voir dire:

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So exactly how do you think your bias 
would affect your job as a juror?

 

[JUROR # 90]: Not fairly, for one, not being fair.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you would have trouble giving my 
client the benefit of a reasonable doubt?

 

[JUROR # 90]: Basically.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just because he's accused?

 

[JUROR # 90]: Just because of circumstances I've been 
brought and been exposed to the situation and seeing exactly what has happened 
to them people. I'm not saying he's guilty or not guilty, but I have a real 
problem with it.

 

After this exchange, the juror was asked a final question 
about whether he would want himself on his own jury.  The juror demurred 
by stating that he would not be on that kind of jury because he would not do 
"something like that."  The trial court then passed the juror for 
cause.

 

[¶13]   There is no definitive statement from 
Juror #90 to the effect that he could put aside his family history and be a fair 
juror.  The 
examination ended after the juror had clearly stated that he could not be fair 
and would have trouble giving Klahn the benefit of a reasonable doubt because of 
his personal circumstances.  There was no attempt to rehabilitate the 
juror.  Our 
deference to a trial court on rulings for challenges for cause is subject to 
that court's full exploration of whether a juror's perceived bias would prevent 
him or her from rendering a fair and impartial verdict.  Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 
636.  The 
failure to rehabilitate a juror while passing for cause is an abuse of 
discretion.  See People v. Luman, 994 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Colo. App. 1999).  Juror #90's statements that he could not be 
fair were not rehabilitated by either the court or the prosecution:  There is no 
statement from the Juror that he would be able to consider the case only on the 
evidence presented in court under the law, as instructed, without regard to his 
stated bias.  
Therefore, we must conclude that the juror was unable to set aside his 
bias and that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the 
challenge for cause.

 

[¶14]     The next Juror, #124, knew several of the 
defense witnesses and expressed skepticism of their credibility.  The juror stated 
that it would be hard for her to set aside personal knowledge of these witnesses 
and judge them by only their testimony in this case.  In response the 
trial court asked:

 

THE COURT: [Juror #124], bottom line is a good juror can 
know something about the case, can know witnesses. A good juror can have 
prejudices. That's okay, because we all do. The key is, would you promise to set 
aside those prejudices and judge the case based only on the facts presented from 
witnesses in the courtroom? Could you do that?

 

[Juror #124]: Yeah.

 

It is a close call as to whether or not this was a 
sufficient rehabilitation of Juror #124. After emphatically stating her bias 
against Klahn's witnesses, the only question relating to her ability to set 
aside her prejudices and make a decision based on the facts of this case is 
answered with what can only be characterized as a tepid "yeah."  Ideally, a full 
exploration of Juror #124's perceived bias should have proceeded until a 
definitive answer one way or the other was obtained.  Nevertheless, we do 
not find an abuse of discretion in the case of this juror in light of our 
deference to the district court on the question of whether to grant a challenge 
for cause.  
However, we reiterate that the better practice in these situations would 
be to examine the potential juror closely in order to determine as definitively 
as possible if they could judge the matter fairly and impartially.

 

[¶15]   The final juror, #139, was a victim of 
abuse, as was her daughter. Juror #139 expressed concern that her experience 
would make it difficult for her to sit on the jury. However, in her case, the 
record clearly shows that after extensive questioning from the court and the 
parties, the juror was able to affirm an ability to make a judgment based only 
on the evidence adduced at trial while holding the State to its burden of 
proof.  Here, 
the trial court, after fully exploring the juror's perceived prejudice and 
having the opportunity to listen to her answers and observe her demeanor, 
concluded that there were no grounds for a challenge for cause.  There was no abuse 
of discretion by the trial court in denying Klahn's challenge for cause on Juror 
#139.

 

[¶16]   Demonstrating that the trial court 
erred by not dismissing a juror challenged for cause is only the first 
step.  Once it 
has been established that a juror should have been dismissed on a challenge for 
cause, our precedent holds that:

 

It is sufficient that appellant challenged the unqualified 
juror for cause, the court denied the challenge, appellant did not accept the 
jury because of it, and he exhausted his peremptory challenges.

 

Munoz, 849 P.2d  at 1302 (quoting Lee v. 
State, 743 P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 
1987)); Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 635.  In other words, a 
"trial court's denial of a proper challenge for cause is prejudicial when it 
forces the challenging party to use a peremptory challenge which could otherwise 
have been used to excuse another juror."  Lee, 743 P.2d  at 
299; Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253, 256 (Wyo. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S. Ct. 2048, 85 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1985).  In effect, the rule 
in Wyoming has been that as long as the defendant exhausted his peremptory 
challenges and preserved the error by refusing to accept the panel, reversal was 
automatic regardless of whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice.

 

[¶17]   Here, Klahn exercised all of his 
peremptory challenges. After the jury was selected in this case, Klahn declared 
that he did not accept the panel.  At that time, however, Klahn did not identify 
on the record any of the seated jurors as to whom he would have exercised a 
peremptory  
challenge.  
On appeal, Klahn contends, for the first time, that he would have 
exercised a peremptory challenge on Juror #165 and Juror #94 had he not been 
forced to use peremptory challenges on the three jurors identified above.3  Under our precedent as it is currently 
constituted, Klahn has made the requisite showing of prejudicial error.

 

[¶18]   Our standard for establishing 
prejudicial error when a challenge for cause is improperly denied was adopted in 
1979.  Parks v. State, 600 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wyo. 1979) (citing 
Foster v. State, 240 Ga. 858, 242 S.E.2d 600, 602 
(1978)).  
Recently, there has been a movement away from an automatic reversal 
standard towards a requirement that there be a showing of prejudice before an 
otherwise valid conviction will be reversed.  The evolution of this movement was set out in 
an opinion issued by the Arizona Supreme Court last year:

 

In 2000, the Supreme Court in [United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S. Ct. 774, 145 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2000)], in examining Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
24(b), held that an erroneous denial by the district court of a challenge for 
cause of a juror, followed by the defendant's use of a peremptory challenge to 
remove that juror, does not deprive the defendant of any "rule-based or 
constitutional right" if the defendant is subsequently convicted by an impartial 
jury.  528 U.S. 
at 307, 120 S. Ct. 774.  Specifically, the Court held the 
following:

 

We . . . hold that a defendant's exercise of peremptory 
challenges . . . is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for 
cause.  
Martinez-Salazar and his co-defendant were accorded 11 peremptory 
challenges, the exact number . . .  allowed.

 

                        
Id. at 317, 120 S. Ct. 774.

 

The Court acknowledged the important role peremptory 
challenges play in "reinforcing a defendant's right to trial by an impartial 
jury."  Id. at 311, 120 S. Ct. 774.  However, the Court 
pointed out that "such challenges are auxiliary; unlike the right to an 
impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, peremptory challenges are not 
of federal constitutional dimension."  Id. (citing [Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80, 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988)]; Stilson v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586, 63 L. Ed. 2d 1154, 40 S. Ct. 28 (1919)).  Thus, a defendant's exercise of a peremptory 
challenge to cure a trial court's error in denying a challenge for cause, 
without more, does not violate the constitutional right to an impartial 
jury.  Id. at 313, 120 S. Ct. 774.

 

The Court, however, rejected the Government's argument that 
the federal rule should be construed to require that a defendant use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror the trial court should have struck for 
cause "to preserve the claim that the for-cause ruling impaired the defendant's 
right to a fair trial."  Id. at 314.  Instead, the Court 
concluded that "Martinez-Salazar had the option of letting [the venireperson] 
sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction, pursuing a Sixth Amendment challenge 
on appeal."  Id. at 315, 120 S. Ct. 774.  Martinez-Salazar 
made a strategic choice when he elected to remove the juror.  Id. Martinez-Salazar's due process rights were not 
violated, because, in the Court's view, "[a] hard choice is not the same as no 
choice." Id.

 

In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, expressed reservations about the majority's conclusion that 
Martinez-Salazar could have opted to leave the challenged juror on the jury, and 
upon conviction, pursue a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal.  Id. at 318-19, 120 S. Ct. 774.  He questioned 
whether the "normal principles of waiver" would not "disable a defendant from 
objecting on appeal to the seating of a juror he was entirely able to prevent." 
Id. at 318, 120 S. Ct. 774.  Because this 
question was not presented, he believed that the majority should not have 
addressed it.  
Id. at 319, 120 S. Ct. 774.  Accordingly, Martinez-Salazar left open the question of whether a 
harmless error analysis would apply to a defendant's use of a peremptory 
challenge to cure a trial court's erroneous denial of a  challenge  for  cause.    See William  T.  Pizzi & Morris B. 
  

Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on 
Appeal, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1391, 1403-06 (2001).

 

Despite the question left open by Martinez-Salazar, several state courts, citing Martinez-Salazar, have adopted the rule that, absent a 
showing of prejudice, a defendant's use of a peremptory challenge to cure a 
trial court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause does not violate any 
right based on the state constitution, rule or statute.  See, e.g., Green v. Maynard, 349 S.C. 535, 564 S.E.2d 83, 86 (S.C. 2002); State v. Verhoef, [2001 SD 58], 
627 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (S.D. 2001); State v. Fire, 
145 Wash. 2d 152, 34 P.3d 1218, 1225 (Wash. 2001); State v. Lindell, [2001 
WI 108], 629 N.W.2d 223, 250, PP112-13, 245 Wis.2d 689 (Wis. 2001).

 

In Verhoef, the South Dakota 
Supreme Court held that Martinez-Salazar "clearly 
sets aside" prior case law that any federal constitutional right was denied when 
a defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove a juror the trial should have 
struck for cause, thereby losing a peremptory challenge that could have been 
used on another juror.  627 N.W.2d  at 441. The court further found no 
principled basis for interpreting state statutory or constitutional provisions 
as granting broader rights than the United States Constitution. Id. at 442.

 

Fire and Lindell both held that 
because the right to peremptory challenges is not a constitutional right, a 
defendant's curative use of a peremptory challenge should be reviewed for 
harmless error. Fire, 34 P.3d  at 1222; Lindell, 629 N.W.2d  at 250, P111.

 

In Fire, the Washington Supreme 
Court acknowledged conflicting lines of Washington appellate cases on this 
issue. 34 P.3d  at 1222.  One line of cases held that even though no 
biased juror sat on a trial, "prejudice occurs in the deprivation of one 
peremptory challenge to which a defendant is entitled." Id. at 1222-23 (citing State v. 
Stentz, 30 Wash. 134, 70 P. 241 (Wash. 1902)).  Another line of cases held that when a 
defendant uses a peremptory challenge to cure a trial court's error, a further 
showing of prejudice is needed before reversal is required.  Id.  Relying on Martinez-Salazar, the Fire 
court held that

 

if a defendant through the use of a peremptory challenge 
elects to cure a trial court's error in not excusing a juror for cause, exhausts 
his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection, and is 
subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not 
demonstrated prejudice, and reversal of his conviction is not warranted.

 

                        
Id. at 1225.

 

Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted Martinez-Salazar and overruled State v. Ramos, 211 Wis.2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 
1997), a case that had established a rule similar to [State v. Huerta, 175 Ariz. 262, 855 P.2d 776 (1993) 
(requiring automatic reversal of a conviction where a defendant uses a 
peremptory strike to remove a prospective juror whom the trial court should have 
excused for cause.)] Lindell, 629 N.W.2d  at 236, 
P53, 245, PP91-93, 252, P120. In its discussion, the Lindell court stated the following: "Another disturbing 
element of the Ramos decision is that it requires a 
new trial in cases where the trial was nearly perfect and the verdict is 
unquestionably sound.  
Yet, we examine error in other situations  both statutory and 
constitutional  for harmful effect." 629 N.W.2d  at 249, P107 (footnotes 
omitted).

 

To be sure, a few courts have rejected Martinez-Salazar.  See, e.g., People v. 
Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 307 (Colo. 2000) (rejecting both Ross and Martinez-Salazar, 
and holding that "[o]ur decisions have consistently recognized that, under 
Colorado law, a defendant suffers reversible prejudice if he is forced to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror whom the trial court failed to remove for 
cause and he exhausts his peremptory challenges"); Gamble v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 367, 374 (Ky. 2002) 
(holding, without discussing Martinez-Salazar, that 
prejudice is presumed when a defendant is forced to exhaust his peremptory 
challenges against prospective jurors who should have been excused for cause); 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 296, 533 S.E.2d 4, 8 n. 2 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (forcing a defendant to use a peremptory challenge 
to remove a juror the trial court should have struck for cause is prejudicial error 
because the defendant is denied his statutory right to exercise his full 
complement of peremptory strikes on a panel free from members who should have 
been struck for cause).

 

Nevertheless, a majority of state courts, both before and 
after Martinez-Salazar, hold that the curative use 
of a peremptory challenge violates neither a constitutional right, nor a 
rule-based or statute-based right.  These courts require a showing of prejudice 
before a case will be reversed when a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to 
remove a juror the trial court should have excused for cause.

 

State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶¶10-20, 68 P.3d 418, ¶¶10-10 (Ariz. 2003).4  The Arizona Supreme Court went on to adopt 
the harmless error analysis overturning its precedent that adopted the automatic 
reversal rule.  
Hickman, 68 P.3d, ¶¶39-40.

 

[¶19]   We concur with the reasoning expressed 
in Hickman.  Peremptory strikes do not implicate any 
constitutional right.  
Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S.  at 313, 120 S. Ct. 
at 780. Green v. Maynard, 349 S.C. 535, 564 S.E.2d 83, 86 (2002); Lindell, 629 N.W.2d  at 251-52.  The concept of 
harmless error is recognized by rule in Wyoming.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
52(a) ("Harmless Error: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."); see also W.R.A.P. 9.04.  It simply does not make any sense to require 
a new trial where a verdict is constitutionally sound.  We examine error 
for harmful effect in other situations, including those where the claim of error 
is statutorily or constitutionally based.  See generally, Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶11, 84 P.3d 320, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2004) ("Restrictions on the right to confront witnesses are subject to the 
harmless error analysis."); Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶50, 73 P.3d 1041, ¶50 (Wyo. 
2003) ("A deprivation of the right to be present at all critical stages of a 
trial is subject to harmless error analysis."); Simmons 
v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶15, 72 P.3d 803, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2003) (prosecutorial misconduct reviewed for harmless error); Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶¶30-31, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶¶30-31 
(Wyo. 2003) (failure to swear jury pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-107 can 
constitute harmless error); and Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, ¶26, 48 P.3d 1063, ¶26 (Wyo. 
2003) ("The erroneous admission of statements taken in violation of a 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights is subject to harmless error 
analysis.").  
Accordingly, we hold that a harmless error analysis will apply to a 
defendant's use of peremptory challenge to cure a trial court's erroneous denial 
of a challenge for cause and overrule our precedent to the extent that it 
espouses an automatic reversal rule.

 

[¶20]   Applying this analysis to this case, we 
conclude that the district court's error in denying the challenge for cause to 
Juror #90 was harmless.  "An error is harmful if there is a 
reasonable  
possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
defendant if the error had never occurred."  Seward v. State, 
2003 WY 116, ¶13, 76 P.3d 805, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477 (2002) and Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1999)).  There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that any of the jurors who served on the 
panel were not qualified to serve.  All of the jurors  including the two 
identified by Klahn as likely recipients of a peremptory challenge if he had had 
one available  were passed for cause.  We find no abuse of discretion by the 
district court in those determinations.  Since there is no demonstration by Klahn that 
the jury was not impartial and that he was denied a fair trial, he cannot meet 
his burden of showing harmful error.

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   We hold that absent a showing of 
prejudice a defendant's use of peremptory challenge to cure a trial court's 
erroneous denial of a challenge for cause does not violate any statutory or 
constitutional right and cannot constitute reversible error.  The jury that 
decided Klahn's case was fair and impartial.  No unqualified juror served on the panel. 
Therefore, we affirm Klahn's conviction and sentence.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

     1§ 6-4-303.  Sexual exploitation of 
children[.]

       . . . .

       (b)  A 
person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child if, for any purpose, he 
knowingly:

       . . . .

             (iv) 
Possesses child pornography . . . [.]

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-4-303(a)(ii) (Lexis Nexis) defines "child pornography" as:

 

". . . any visual 
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, computer or 
computer-generated image or picture, whether or not made or produced by 
electronic, mechanical or other means, of explicit sexual conduct, where:

(A)  The 
production of the visual depiction involves the use of a child engaging in 
explicit sexual conduct;

            
(B)  The visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a child 
engaging in explicit sexual conduct;

(C)  The visual 
depiction has been created, adapted or modified to appear that a child is 
engaging in explicit sexual conduct; or

(D)  The visual 
depiction is advertised, promoted, described or distributed in a manner that 
conveys the impression that the material is, or contains, a visual depiction of 
a child engaging in explicit sexual conduct."

 

    2§ 14-3-105.  Immoral or indecent 
acts[.]

     (a)  Except under circumstances constituting 
sexual assault in the first, second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 
through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties with any child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause 
or encourage another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is 
guilty of a felony.

 

  3Juror 
#165, who served on the jury panel, informed the court that she had been the 
victim of date rape and had a niece who had been sexually molested.  The juror noted at 
one point that with these experiences it would be hard for her to decide the 
case based only on the facts presented at trial.  Klahn acknowledges that the Juror was 
rehabilitated and there was no basis for a cause challenge.  However, he insists 
that he would have exercised a peremptory on the juror, if he had had any 
remaining.  
Klahn also states that he would have excused Juror #94, who expressed a 
belief that Playboy magazine was offensive.

 

  4For a 
list of the state court decisions that required a showing of prejudice before 
the Martinez-Salazar decision, see Hickman, 68 P.3d ¶8.