Case Title: Ex parte Smokerise Homeowners Association et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Smokerise Homeowners Association et al. v. Melvin Wayne Abernathy et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050168

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:01/12/2007 EXPARTE SMOKERISE
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741
((334) 242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may
be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050168
_________________________
Ex parte Smokerise Homeowners Association et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:   Smokerise Homeowners Association et al. 
v.
Melvin Wayne Abernathy et al.
(Elmore Circuit Court, CV-02-236;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2021002)
1050168
2
NABERS, Chief Justice.
This petition for a writ of certiorari challenges the
judgment entered by the Elmore Circuit Court in favor of
Melvin Wayne Abernathy, Neda J. Abernathy, Smokerise, LLC, and
James M. Scott, individually and as a general partner of
Smokerise, LLC, the defendants in the proceeding below
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the respondents").
The Smokerise Homeowners Association, Anthony and Linda
McLeod, Cecil and Adrienne Brendle, and Brenda and Frederick
Sides (hereinafter referred to collectively to as "the
petitioners") filed an action involving certain restrictive
covenants applicable to Smokerise, a residential subdivision
in Elmore County.  After the trial court entered a summary
judgment for the respondents, the petitioners appealed the
judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals.  That Court affirmed
the judgment without an opinion, Smokerise Homeowners Ass'n v.
Abernathy (No. 2021002, May 5, 2005), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.
Civ.App 
2005) 
(table); 
 
the 
petitioners 
subsequently
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review that
decision.  We granted the petition, issued the writ, and
directed the parties to submit briefs.  After reviewing those
briefs and the record, we now quash that writ.
1050168
3
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The events underlying this proceeding span 15 years.  The
Smokerise subdivision was developed in the early 1990s by
Smokerise, LLC, and James M. Scott (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the developer").  Before the subdivision
development began, the developer in 1987 conveyed to the
Abernathys approximately 75 acres that are contiguous to, and
lie generally east of, the Smokerise subdivision ("the
Abernathy tract").  
By 
1991 
the 
developer 
had 
begun 
marketing 
the
residential lots in the Smokerise subdivision.  According to
the subdivision plat, many of the lots were configured along
streets terminating in cul-de-sacs, over which  through
traffic could not travel.  In March 1991 the Sideses
contracted with the developer to purchase lot 13 in the
Smokerise subdivision.  The developer executed a similar
contract with the McLeods in April 1991 to buy lot 12.  Both
lots 12 and 13 are on a cul-de-sac.   
Three filings relating to the Smokerise subdivision were
made in the Elmore County Probate Court and are pertinent
here.  The first was the developer's filing in August 1991; in
that filing, it recorded plat 4 and the restrictive covenants
1050168
We refer to the street serving lots 12 and 13 as a "cul-
1
de-sac" even though, because of the existence of the 15-foot
road, it was not totally closed to through traffic.
4
for the subdivision ("the August 1991 filing").  That plat
reflected a 15-foot-wide access road ("the 15-foot road")
between lots 12 and 13 of the subdivision.  The 15-foot road,
which was outside the subdivision boundary, provided access
between the Abernathy tract and the cul-de-sac serving lots 12
and 13.   The pertinent restrictive covenants in the August
1
1991 filing stated: 
"2.(B). 
 
Dwelling 
Site: 
... 
Parcels 
may 
be
subdivided into smaller lots or parcels if said
parcel contains at least 2-1/2 acres with suitable
road frontage. 
"....
"9. Nuisances: ... All parcels covered by these
restrictions shall be limited to residential use
only and no noxious or offensive trade or activity
shall be conducted upon this parcel nor shall
anything be done thereon which may be or become an
annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood.
"....
"12. Driveways and Road: ... There shall be no
easements or rights of access granted across any
platted lot to any contiguous lands except as shown
on the plat, and, except as may, in the future, be
granted across lot 6 and lot 12."
(Emphasis supplied.)
1050168
5
By September 1991, the developer and the Abernathys were
in disagreement concerning access to the Abernathy tract.  In
anticipation of defending against a claim by the Abernathys,
the developer negotiated with the Sideses and the McLeods to
acquire additional access across their lots to the Abernathy
tract.  In connection with those negotiations, on September
10, 1991, the developer filed the second of the three
pertinent probate records, a modification to the August 1991
filing entitled "Correction to Restrictive and Protective
Covenants for Smokerise Subdivision, Plat 4" ("the covenant
modification").  The developer did not refile a subdivision
plat in September 1991.  The covenant modification stated:
"There shall be no easements or rights of access
granted across any platted lot, to any contiguous
lands except as shown on the plat, and, except as
may, in the future, be granted across lot 6 and
across a 45-foot wide parcel of land on the southern
end of lot 13, the same being parallel to the 15-
foot strip between lots 12 and 13."   
(Emphasis supplied.) This modification thus replaced the
original language in covenant 12, which contemplated access
"across lot 6 and lot 12," with language allowing access
"across lot 6 and across a 45-foot wide parcel of land on the
southern end of lot 13 ...."  The modification also stated
that the developer was "the current owner of all the lots
1050168
The 45-foot parcel was approximately 50 feet long and
2
generally rectangular in shape. 
6
comprising [the] plat [filed in August 1991]."  
The developer drafted, but did not sign, the following
letter to the McLeods dated September 19, 1991, concerning the
negotiations for additional access:
"[We] have amended the plat on Smokerise to
eliminate any possibility of easements or roads
being granted through Lot 12 to the [Abernathy
tract] behind you. This means we will be conveying
you the entire interest in [lot 12] and will not be
asking you to take the 45' strip we earlier talked
about.
"I worked out with Captain Sides that any road which
could possibly go to the [Abernathy tract] behind
you would come through his Lot 13 instead." 
(Emphasis supplied.) The McLeods attested that they never
received this letter.
The McLeods closed on their purchase of lot 12 on October
2, 1991.  The Sideses purchased lot 13 the following day.
When the developer conveyed lot 13 to the Sideses, it excepted
and retained title to the 45-foot-wide strip of land on the
southern end of lot 13 that was parallel to the 15-foot road
between lots 12 and 13--the same parcel referenced in the
covenant modification ("the 45-foot parcel").   Mr. Sides
2
attested that, when he agreed that the developer could retain
1050168
7
title to the 45-foot parcel, he understood that the Abernathys
owned the land behind his lot, that the Abernathys planned to
build a home there in which to retire, that three or four
homes would be built on the Abernathy tract for members of
their family, and that the 45-foot parcel would be used as a
private drive for that family.  
During 1992 the Sideses embarked on their plans to build
a house on lot 13.  To assist the Sideses in positioning the
house on lot 13, in August 1992 the developer sold them an
additional 20 feet of property that was north of and
contiguous to lot 13.  Because that 20-foot parcel was not in
lot 13 of the plat filed in August 1991, yet another recording
in the probate court--the third of those pertinent here--was
made in probate court in August 1992 to reflect that boundary
change to lot 13 ("the second amendment").  
 
The materials filed with the second amendment included a
modified version of the plat ("plat 4A") that was signed by
the developer, the Sideses (then the owners of lot 13), and
the necessary county officials.  The McLeods owned lot 12 when
the second amendment was filed, but they did not sign plat 4A
or any of the other instruments that were recorded with the
second amendment.  Another set of restrictive covenants for
1050168
8
the subdivision also was recorded with the second amendment.
That set restated the restrictive covenants exactly as they
were  stated in the August 1991 filing.   Specifically,
covenant 12 filed with the second amendment read exactly as it
had in August 1991; it prohibited access through the
subdivision to contiguous land "except as may, in the future,
be granted across lot 6 and lot 12."  Covenant 12 as rendered
in August 1992 did not use the language in the covenant
modification to the covenants that had been filed in September
1991 and that specifically contemplated access between the
Smokerise subdivision and the Abernathy tract by way of the
45-foot parcel. 
The Abernathys’ dispute with the developer concerning
access to their 75-acre tract intensified in 1992.  Early in
1992 the Abernathys filed a private condemnation action
against the developer in the probate court, seeking to acquire
access to the Abernathy tract across lot 12 of the Smokerise
subdivision.  In that action, the Abernathys alleged that
improvements in the subdivision and the public dedication of
the street serving lots 12 and 13 denied them access to a
public road that had previously provided ingress to and egress
from the Abernathy tract.  The Abernathys prevailed on their
1050168
9
condemnation claim in the probate court, but the developer
appealed that decision to the circuit court.  
In an effort to settle that condemnation litigation, in
May 1993 the developer conveyed to the Abernathys fee simple
interest in the 60-foot-wide parcel of property between lots
12 and 13 ("the 60-foot parcel") that it then owned ("the 1993
conveyance").  That 60-foot parcel comprised two segments: 
the 15-foot road and the 45-foot parcel, which the developer
had retained in October 1991 when it sold that lot to the
Sideses.  The settlement agreement in the condemnation
litigation contemplated that the 60-foot parcel would be the
access point between a public road in the subdivision and the
Abernathy tract, that the Abernathys would develop and sell
residential lots on their 75-acre tract to the general public,
 and that, with respect to their own development, the
Abernathys would abide by the restrictive covenants applicable
to the Smokerise subdivision.  Except for the developer, none
of the McLeods, the Sideses, or any other landowner in the
Smokerise subdivision was a party to the condemnation action.
During the same period in which the developer settled the
condemnation action, the Brendles negotiated and committed to
purchase lot 14-A in the Smokerise subdivision.  That lot is
1050168
10
across the street from the 15-foot road between lots 12 and 13
shown on the subdivision plat.  Before that purchase, the
Brendles asked the real-estate agent marketing the subdivision
for the developer about the purpose of the 15-foot road.  The
Brendles attested that the agent advised them that it was a
private road used to access the Abernathy tract for hunting.
The Brendles purchased lot 14-A  in October 1993.  Before they
purchased the lot, they were  furnished a copy of the
materials filed with the second amendment.   Even though the
covenant modification  was recorded approximately two years
before the Brendles purchased lot 14-A, there is no evidence
indicating that the Brendles reviewed that modification, which
contemplated access to the Abernathy tract over the 45-foot
parcel.  Further, there is no evidence indicating that the
Brendles actually knew in October 1993 about the condemnation
litigation that had been settled several months before their
purchase or knew that the developer had retained title to the
45-foot parcel when it conveyed lot 13 in 1991 and
subsequently conveyed the 60-foot parcel, which included the
45-foot parcel, to the Abernathys. 
Early in 2002 the Abernathys began clearing trees and
constructing a road on the 60-foot parcel.  Before that, the
1050168
11
15-foot road had been cleared, but the 45-foot parcel remained
wooded.  The petitioners learned that the Abernathys had filed
a plat with county authorities in the spring of 2002 seeking
approval to subdivide the Abernathy tract into 29 homesites.
Concerned that the Abernathys’ construction and use of the 45-
foot parcel as a road  tract would alter the secluded nature
of the Smokerise subdivision, the petitioners sued in June
2002 to prevent the use of the 45-foot parcel by the
Abernathys as a road, and to declare the Sideses as the
"rightful owners" of the 45-foot parcel.  
Specifically, the petitioners asked the circuit court to
reform (a) the October 1991 deed in which the developer
conveyed lot 13 to the Sideses and retained title to the 45-
foot parcel and (b) the May 1993 deed in which the developer
conveyed the 45-foot parcel to the Abernathys as one of the
two segments constituting the 60-foot parcel.  The gist of the
petitioners’ complaint is that those conveyances were invalid
because, they argued,  each violated restrictive covenant 12
as it read in the August 1991 filing and the second amendment
(granting access to contiguous land through the subdivision
only over lots 6 and 12) and covenant 2(B) (prohibiting the
subdivision of parcels of less than 2.5 acres).  The
1050168
The trial court denied the respondents’ motion for a
3
summary judgment to the extent that the trespass claim sought
damages for removal of trees "beyond the 45' strip."  The
petitioners dismissed that claim before they filed their
appeal.   
12
petitioners' complaint also asserted a nuisance claim against
the Abernathys, alleging that the  construction of a road on
the 45-foot parcel  had already caused, and the projected
volume of traffic over that road would cause, "hurt,
inconvenience and damage."  Finally, under a trespass theory,
the petitioners claimed damages from the Abernathys related to
their removal of trees from the 45-foot parcel.   
 
The parties filed cross-motions for a summary judgment in
the trial court.  On June 12, 2003, that court entered a
summary 
judgment 
for 
the 
respondents 
on 
all 
of 
the
petitioners’ claims.   The petitioners appealed, and this
3
Court transferred that appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals
pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.  That court affirmed
the summary judgment, without an opinion, and the petitioners
then sought review in this Court. 
   
II.  Issue Presented and Standard of Review
The 
petitioners 
appeal 
the 
trial 
court’s 
adverse
disposition of their deed-reformation, nuisance, and trespass
1050168
The petitioners also sought an injunction in the trial
4
court to prevent the Abernathys from clearing trees on the 45-
foot parcel or from using the name "Smokeridge" in marketing
their residential development.  The petitioners do not make
any arguments concerning those claims for injunctive relief in
this appeal.
13
claims.   Because the trial court entered a summary judgment
4
on those claims, the following standard applies:  
"'This Court's review of a summary judgment is
de novo. We apply the same standard of review as the
trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine
whether the movant has made a prima facie showing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  In
making such a determination, we must review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce "substantial evidence" as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Ala. Code 1975,
§ 12-21-12. "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of
such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in
the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably
infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved."'"
Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dow
v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.
2004)) (citations  omitted). Further, when reviewing a summary
judgment, we consider the record in a light most favorable to
the nonmovant and resolve all reasonable doubts against the
movant, Prowell v. Children's Hosp. of Alabama, [Ms. 1041131,
1050168
14
May 12, 2006] ___ So. 2d ____, ____ (Ala. 2006), and we
consider questions of law de novo.  Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc.
v. Bailey's Constr. Co., [Ms. 1050433, July 28, 2006] ____ So.
2d _____ (Ala. 2006).
III.  Analysis
 A. Deed-Reformation Claim    
The Abernathys’ title to and right to use the 15-foot
road to access  the Abernathy tract are not in dispute.  The
plats included with the August 1991 filing and the  second
amendment depicted that road, which was situated between lots
12 and 13, as being outside the boundary of the Smokerise
subdivision.  The petitioners knew of the existence of the 15-
foot road and the intended use of it as the means of access to
the Abernathy tract before they purchased their  lots.
Accordingly, they do not contest the Abernathys’ interests in
the 15-foot road.   
The petitioners’ claims address exclusively the 45-foot
parcel the developer retained when it conveyed lot 13 to the
Sideses in October 1991 and then subsequently conveyed to the
Abernathys (along with title to the 15-foot road) in May 1993.
The petitioners contend that the trial court should have
reformed the deeds for those two transactions and transferred
1050168
Addressing the petitioners' actual knowledge of the key
5
transactions, the trial court made the following factual
findings in its June 12, 2003, order: "[T]he exhibits tend to
establish that both [the McLeods and the Sideses] were fully
15
title to the 45-foot parcel to the Sideses, because those
conveyances violated restrictive covenants 12 and 2(B).  The
petitioners argue that they have standing to seek that relief
because when a developer adopts a general scheme for
development and restricts the use of lots in the development,
"such restrictions create equitable easements in favor of the
owners of the several lots which may be enforced in equity by
any one of such owners."  Allen v. Axford, 285 Ala. 251, 259,
231 So. 2d 122, 129 (1969).     
Chronologically, the pivotal transactions concerning the
45-foot parcel were the covenant modification in September
1991, the  retention by the developer of the 45-foot parcel
when it conveyed lot 13 in October 1991, and the May 1993
conveyance (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the key
transactions").  In denying the deed-reformation claim, the
trial court concluded that, during the early 1990s, the
petitioners had actual notice of the key transactions and the
intended use of the 45-foot parcel as access to the Abernathy
tract.  The trial court attributed significant weight to
5
1050168
aware of the intended use of the 60' foot strip at the time of
the negotiation and purchase of their lots"; "the conveyance
[of lot 13 in which the developer retained title to the 45-
foot parcel] and subsequent condemnation proceedings ... made
the intended use of the 45' strip abundantly clear ...."; and
"[c]learly the compensation and acreage adjustment to the
[petitioners’] lots and the condemnation proceedings either
put the  [petitioners’] on notice or should have placed them
on notice of the actions or intended actions of the ...
Abernathys and even more clearly to the matter of ownership of
the 45-foot strip of land." 
The application of those defenses in an action to enforce
6
a restrictive covenant involves mixed questions of law and
fact.  See Tubbs v. Brandon, 374 So. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (Ala.
1979).  As discussed in Tubbs, a plaintiff must "delay in
asserting his rights" before laches is invoked, and estoppel
16
evidence indicating that in September 1991 the developer had
negotiated with the McLeods and the Sideses--then under
contract to buy lots 12 and 13–-for the purpose of the
developer's 
acquiring 
additional 
property 
to 
access 
contiguous
lands.  It concluded that the Sideses and the McLeods had
received consideration from the developer in connection with
its retention of title to the 45-foot parcel.  That court also
found that certain petitioners had knowledge of,  and were
bound by actions taken in, the condemnation litigation between
the Abernathys and the developer.  Based on its findings of
actual knowledge, the trial court ruled that the deed-
reformation claim was barred by the equitable defenses of
laches and estoppel.  
6
1050168
requires evidence "of [the plaintiff's] intent not to enforce
his rights." Id.  Reliance on either of these doctrines
assumes that the plaintiff failed to assert a known right or
a right of which he reasonably should have known.   
17
 
The petitioners effectively argue that they presented
evidence in the trial court that disputed the argument that
they had actual knowledge in the 1990s of the key transactions
and the intended use of the 45-foot parcel.  When the evidence
is viewed, as it must be, in the light most favorable to the
petitioners, their argument has merit.  Notwithstanding, even
if there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the
extent of the petitioners' actual knowledge, the trial court
correctly entered a summary judgment for the respondents for
the following reasons. 
 
The trial court made the following conclusions of law in
its June 12, 2003, order:  
"The legal issues of establishing the rightful owner
of the disputed [45-foot] strip of land, the
[Abernathys' right of] use of the land, and the
original owner's [i.e., the developer's] right to
except certain lands from the subdivision are
decided in favor of the [respondents]." 
 
These legal findings concerning the Abernathys' use and title
to the 45-foot parcel were correct because the petitioners had
constructive notice that that parcel was to be  used as a
1050168
18
means of access to contiguous property. 
The recordation of the covenant modification in September
1991 
is 
instrumental 
here. 
 
The 
original 
wording 
of
restrictive covenant 12 prohibited access from any platted lot
in the Smokerise subdivision to contiguous lands "except as
shown on the plat, and except as may, in the future, be
granted across lot 6 and lot 12."  When the developer recorded
the covenant modification, the revised language permitted
access "across a 45-foot wide parcel of land on the southern
end of lot 13 ...." 
To avoid the clear language in the covenant modification,
the petitioners argue that the filing of the modification was
not effective.  The developer filed that modification after
the Sideses and the McLeods contracted to purchase their
respective lots, but before the closing of those transactions.
Neither the Sideses nor the McLeods executed or approved the
covenant modification. Because the Sideses and the McLeods had
an equitable interest in their lots when the covenant
modification was filed, the petitioners contend that the
modification was ineffective absent the consent of the Sideses
1050168
When parties enter into an executory contract to purchase
7
real property, the vendee has an equitable interest in title
before the vendor transfers legal title. Grass v. Ward, 451
So. 2d 803, 805 (Ala. 1984). 
19
and the McLeods.   Stated differently, the petitioners argue
7
that, based on the authority of Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala.
530, 30 So. 488 (1900), the Sideses' and McLeods' equitable
interests could not be "diminished" without their consent.
Neither party has directed us to an Alabama decision that
addresses whether a party holding equitable title to realty
must consent to a filing concerning that property made by the
record owner during the period between the execution of a
purchase agreement and the transfer of legal title.  The
petitioners rely on Louventhal v. Home Insurance Co., 112 Ala.
108, 20 So. 419 (1896), in support of their argument.  In that
case the plaintiff made a claim under a fire-insurance policy
for damage to certain property  she had contracted to
purchase.  This Court held that the plaintiff owned equitable
title to that realty, and that that interest prevented the
defendant from denying payment on a policy exclusion that
excluded damage to property "not owned by the insured in fee
simple." 112 Ala. at 112,  20 So. at 420-21.  Louventhal did
not, however, address the issue presented here.    
1050168
20
In Boyce v. Cassese, [Ms. 1040891, April 28, 2006] __ So.
2d ____ (Ala. 2006), this Court considered a recordation
situation involving constructive notice.  The plaintiffs in
Boyce agreed to purchase land  adjacent to a golf course.
Only four days before closing, an easement agreement was
recorded that granted a golf club operating the adjacent
course the right to use the land the plaintiffs were
purchasing during golf tournaments.  That easement was not
recorded when the plaintiffs contracted to buy the land, and
they closed on the purchase without actually knowing of its
existence.  After the plaintiffs learned of the easement, they
sued to invalidate the easement agreement, rescind their
realty purchase, and recover damages on multiple tort
theories.  Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' lack of notice of
the easement before closing, this Court held that the easement
ran with the land and that it was binding on the plaintiffs.
The Court also reasoned that the recordation of the easement
charged the plaintiffs with constructive notice for purposes
of applying statute-of-limitation defenses on the various tort
claims:
"'Under Ala. Code 1975, § 35-4-90, the
proper 
recordation 
of 
an 
instrument
constitutes "conclusive notice to all the
1050168
21
world of everything that appears from the
face" of the instrument. Thus, purchasers
of real estate are "presumed to have
examined the title records and knowledge of
the contents of those records is imputed
[to them]."'
"Haines v. Tonning, 579 So. 2d 1308, 1310 (Ala. 1991)
(quoting Christopher v. Shockley, 199 Ala. 681, 682,
75 So. 158, 158 (1917), and Walker v. Wilson, 469 So.
2d 580, 582 (Ala. 1985)).
"It is undisputed that the Golf Club recorded
the license agreement and the amendment to the
license agreement on January 24, 1997, a few days
before the Boyces acquired their interest in the
property. Because the agreement was recorded at the
time the Boyces obtained title to the property, they
are charged with notice of the recorded agreement as
of that time. This action was filed in April 2002,
more than five years after the Boyces obtained title
to the property and more than five years after the
Boyces are charged with notice of the encumbrance
against their property. For this reason, the Boyces'
claims 
of 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
and 
fraudulent
suppression against the Casseses are time-barred."
___ So. 2d at _____ (emphasis supplied). 
As in Boyce, the respondents argue that, when the covenant
modification was filed in September 1991, the developer owned
all the lots in the Smokerise subdivision.  Accordingly, they
contend that any person who subsequently purchased a lot in
the subdivision took title to the lot subject to the terms of
that modification. Applying the recordation principles stated
in Boyce, we agree with the respondents. 
1050168
22
We also reject the petitioners' argument that the covenant
modification was ineffective under Ala. Code 1975, § 35-2-53.
Section 35-2-53 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny plat
or map ... may be vacated by the owner ... of the lands at any
time before the sale of any lot therein by a written
instrument declaring the same to be vacated, executed,
acknowledged and recorded in like manner as conveyances of
land ...." (Emphasis supplied.)  It further states that
"[w]hen lots have been sold, the plat or map may be vacated,
in the manner herein provided by all the owners of lots in
such plat or map joining in the execution of such writing."
(Emphasis supplied.) According to the petitioners, the
covenant modification  partially vacated the August 1991
filing; neither the McLeods nor the Sideses signed the
modification instrument.  Because the McLeods and the Sideses
held equitable interests in lots 12 and 13 when the covenant
modification was filed, the petitioners argue, the recordation
of the covenant modification did not satisfy the requirement
in  § 35-2-53 that "all the owners of lots in [the] plat ...
join in the execution of [the modification] writing."  This
argument fails because it contravenes the ordinary meaning of
the words "owner" and "sale" in § 35-2-53.  Black's Law
1050168
We also reject the petitioners' two other arguments as
8
to why the covenant modification was ineffective. First, they
argue that the governing body for the subdivision property,
the Elmore County Commission, must have approved the filing of
the covenant modification. That Commission approved the plats
that were recorded in August 1991 and with the second
amendment in 1992, but it did not approve the covenant
modification.  Section 35-2-52, Ala. Code 1975, provides that
maps and plats must be approved by the governing body in which
lands are situated if more than 10,000 persons reside in the
subject city or police jurisdiction.  Because § 35-2-52 does
not reference restrictive covenants, there was no requirement
that the Commission approve the covenant modification. 
Additionally, the petitioners argue that the filing of
the second amendment "revoked" the covenant modification.
23
Dictionary 1137, 1364 (8th ed. 2004), defines an "owner" as
"[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey
something," and a "sale" as "[t]he transfer of property or
title for a price."  The McLeods and the Sideses could not
possess or use lots 12 and 13 when the covenant modification
was filed; accordingly, at that time they were not "owners" of
those lots within the ordinary meaning of § 35-2-53.  Further,
the plain meaning of the word "sale" in that statute connotes
the time at which legal, not equitable, title is transferred
by deed for a price.  The developer thus had the exclusive
right under § 35-2-53 to file the covenant modification  in
September 1991 because it then owned all the lots in the
subdivision.   
8
1050168
Assuming 
that 
the 
modification 
was 
ineffective, 
the
petitioners posit that the language in covenant 12 of the
second amendment, i.e., that access could be granted only as
shown on the plat or across lots 6 and 12,  controlled. The
McLeods owned lot 12 when the second amendment was filed, but
they did not sign that amendment. Therefore, the purported
restatement of restrictive covenant 12 in the second amendment
was a nullity because all owners of lots in the subdivision
did not sign that amendment. See above discussion of Ala. Code
1975, § 35-2-53.
24
Our conclusion is buttressed by Jefferson County v.
Mosley, 284 Ala. 593, 226 So. 2d 652 (1969).  In that case
Dillard delivered a right-of-way deed to the County in 1945.
Six years later, Dillard conveyed property to Mosley and
delivered a deed to him that, in its description, included the
same land Dillard had previously conveyed to the County.  The
deed transferring the property from Dillard to the County was
not recorded until after the Dillard-Mosley transaction.
Mosley's deed stated that the title he received from Dillard
was subject to unspecified public roads, easements, or rights-
of-way.  The Mosley Court was confronted with the issue
whether Mosley was an innocent purchaser with respect to the
County's right-of-way interest or took title subject to that
interest.  In ruling for the County, this Court stated: 
"It is difficult to understand how Mosley could
1050168
25
have read the deed and not have seen the exception
clause. Whether he saw it or not, he is presumed to
have knowledge of it and the consequences are the
same in either case.[Citation omitted.]
"So far as the record discloses, Mosley made no
effort to ascertain whether, in fact, there were any
public roads, easements or rights-of-way across the
land described in the deed from Dillard to him prior
to the present controversy. After the controversy
arose, apparently he had no trouble in ascertaining
such information, as is evidenced by the map or
drawing which is in the record.
"It seems to us that a reasonably prudent man
who obtained a deed containing an exception such as
was included in the deed from Dillard to Mosley would
have made inquiry from his grantor as to why such an
exception was included. If such an inquiry had been
made, Mosley would no doubt have been advised of the
right-of-way deed executed by Dillard to Jefferson
County in 1945."
284 Ala. at 601, 226 So. 2d at 658-59.  Similar to Mosley, the
operative probate record here–-the covenant modification--
constituted 
notice 
to 
the 
petitioners 
that 
access 
to
contiguous lands could be granted over the 45-foot parcel.
Their deed-reformation claim thus fails.    
 
In summary, regardless of whether the McLeods and the
Sideses consented to the covenant modification, that September
1991 filing was effective and constituted "notice to the
world" that access between platted lots in the subdivision and
contiguous land could be granted over the 45-foot parcel.
1050168
26
Because that modification was duly recorded before the
developer sold any lots in the subdivision, the petitioners--
subsequent purchasers of those lots--were charged with
constructive notice of its terms as a matter of law.  Under
these circumstances, the developer did not violate restrictive
covenant 12 (as revised in September 1991) when it conveyed
access to the Abernathys.  Moreover, the developer did not
breach covenant 2(B) when it sold lot 13 to the Sideses in
1991 but retained the 45-foot parcel.  That restriction stated
that lots in the subdivision could be subdivided only "if said
parcel contains at least 2-1/2 acres with suitable road
frontage."  Even though the 45-foot parcel contained only a
fraction of an acre when it was parced from lot 13, covenant
2(B) was not violated because, notwithstanding its terms, the
petitioners had constructive notice before their respective
purchases of lots that that parcel subsequently could be used
as access to contiguous land.  Because the respondents did not
violate restrictive covenants 12 or 2(B), the trial court
correctly entered a summary judgment for them on the deed-
reformation claim.
               
B. Nuisance Claim
The petitioners made two principal factual allegations in
1050168
27
their common-law nuisance claim against the Abernathys: (1)
that the clearing of trees, the use of road machinery, and the
construction activities on the 45-foot parcel caused hurt and
inconvenience to the petitioners, and (2) that the future use
of the 45-foot parcel as a means of access to the Abernathy
tract would significantly increase the volume of traffic
through 
the 
 
subdivision, 
causing 
further 
hurt 
and
inconvenience.  Finding that the Abernathys' use of the 45-
foot parcel was "within the legally prescribed and permitted
uses," the trial court concluded that "[n]othing in the
pleadings [rose] to the proof required to prevail on a
nuisance count."   
The construction of a road on the 45-foot parcel to access
the Abernathy tract was reasonably foreseeable after the
developer recorded the covenant modification in September
1991.  The petitioners have not shown that the Abernathys used
the 45-foot parcel in a manner inconsistent with its intended
use.  Furthermore, the petitioners' argument that the future
traffic volumes over the 45-foot parcel will constitute a
common-law nuisance is speculative.  Accordingly, summary
judgment for the respondents was correctly entered on the
nuisance claim. 
1050168
28
  C. Trespass Claim
The petitioners' trespass claim against the Abernathys
assumed that the Abernathys did not have the right to enter
the 45-foot parcel to construct a road or to remove trees from
that parcel.  That parcel was part of the 60-foot parcel the
developer conveyed to the Abernathys in May 1993.  Because the
developer was authorized by the restrictive covenants for the
subdivision to retain the 45-foot parcel when it conveyed lot
13 in October 1991, its subsequent conveyance of that parcel
to the Abernathys  was valid.  Given that the Abernathys owned
and had the right to possess the 45-foot parcel after May
1993, the trial court correctly ruled for the respondents on
the trespass claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court of Civil Appeals
correctly affirmed the trial court's  summary judgment for the
respondents on all claims. The writ of certiorari previously
issued in this proceeding is due to be quashed.
 
WRIT QUASHED.      
See, Harwood, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.