Case Title: Ex parte Peter Ferrari et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130679

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 02/06/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1130679
____________________
Ex parte Peter Ferrari et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: D.R. Horton, Inc. - Birmingham
v.
Peter Ferrari et al.)
____________________
1130726
____________________
Peter Ferrari et al.
v.
D.R. Horton, Inc. - Birmingham
Appellate proceedings from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-13-901249)
MURDOCK, Justice.
D.R. Horton, Inc. - Birmingham ("DR Horton"), filed a
verified petition in the Baldwin Circuit Court, pursuant to
Rule 27(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting preaction discovery
from Peter Ferrari; Peter's wife, Kimberly Ferrari; Ferrari
Capital Partners, LLC; FH Properties, LLC; P6 Holdings, LLC;
and Prince 5 Holdings, LLC (collectively "the Ferrari
defendants"). The trial court granted the petition.  The
Ferrari defendants have petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order and to
dismiss DR Horton's Rule 27(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., petition.
Simultaneously, the Ferrari defendants also have appealed the
trial court's order on DR Horton's petition.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ, and we dismiss the appeal.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Peter Ferrari was employed by DR Horton as a land-
acquisition manager for its Gulf Coast division.  His
responsibilities 
included 
researching 
and 
acquiring 
properties
for DR Horton to develop.  DR Horton asserts that it gave
2
1130679 and 1130726
Ferrari confidential information concerning its business and
land-acquisition strategies, including its geographical
markets for expansion, and that it empowered Ferrari to
arrange land purchases for DR Horton.  
DR Horton asserts that it received information that
Ferrari 
had 
supplied 
third parties 
with 
confidential
information from DR Horton without DR Horton's permission,
including DR Horton's planned land acquisitions, future real-
estate developments, markets for expansion, and plans for
construction.  DR Horton also asserts that it received
information that Ferrari had benefited from DR Horton land
acquisitions apart from his employment compensation.
Based on the information it had received, on July 9,
2013, DR Horton called Ferrari into a meeting with three DR
Horton 
representatives, 
including 
its 
president 
for 
Gulf 
Coast
operations, Scott Whitehurst.  According to Whitehurst,
Ferrari denied making any money "on the side" in DR Horton
related transactions, he denied that his wife Kimberly had
received any money from third parties, and he denied that the
limited-liability companies he and his wife had formed had
received any money from DR Horton related transactions or from
3
1130679 and 1130726
third parties.  DR Horton requested the tax returns of the
Ferrari defendants in order to verify his assertions, but
Ferrari refused to provide such information.  According to
Whitehurst, Ferrari admitted that he had given Brad Zeitlin
priority on property deals with DR Horton, but Ferrari was not
truthful about the scope and number of DR Horton transactions
in which Zeitlin had been involved.  Ferrari also claimed that
he and his wife had formed their limited-liability companies
years before the transactions in question; in fact, however,
the formation of those entities coincided with the business
dealings DR Horton was scrutinizing.  
After 
Ferrari's 
meeting 
with 
the 
DR 
Horton
representatives, DR Horton placed Ferrari on administrative
leave without pay. DR Horton subsequently contacted third
parties that it believed had information concerning Ferrari's
conduct.  Brad Zeitlin agreed to meet with DR Horton
representatives 
to 
discuss 
real-property 
transactions
involving DR Horton and Ferrari.  Zeitlin was interviewed for
over seven hours by a DR Horton attorney who questioned him
about transactions in which he had participated with DR Horton
and Ferrari.  The DR Horton attorney told Zeitlin that it had
4
1130679 and 1130726
reviewed approximately 90,000 e-mails to or from Ferrari as
part of its investigation. According to Whitehurst, who was
also present during the interview, Zeitlin admitted that he
had benefited financially from "tying up" property DR Horton
wanted to purchase and then selling it to DR Horton. 
Whitehurst asserted that Zeitlin admitted that Ferrari had
given him priority over other developers, including DR 
Horton,
which allowed Zeitlin to purchase properties that DR Horton
wanted.  
DR Horton terminated Ferrari's employment effective
July 31, 2013, allegedly because Ferrari had repeatedly
violated several policies of DR Horton as to confidentiality
and the purchase of properties.  
On September 9, 2013, DR Horton filed a petition pursuant
to Rule 27(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., in the Baldwin Circuit Court
for preaction discovery against the Ferrari defendants.   In
1
the petition, DR Horton alleged that Peter Ferrari had
supplied confidential information to third parties and that
those third parties had benefited financially from DR 
Horton's
Rule 27(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., concerns discovery before
1
an action is filed; Rule 27(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., concerns
discovery filed while an action is pending on appeal.
5
1130679 and 1130726
subsequent real-property acquisitions as a result of the
confidential 
business 
information 
revealed 
to 
them 
by 
Ferrari. 
The petition also alleged that Peter and Kimberly Ferrari "may
have received compensation" from the third parties "in
exchange for the confidential information Pete Ferrari
provided them" and that "the Ferraris may be holding this
compensation in their personal bank accounts, in [limited-
liability companies] managed or controlled by Pete Ferrari 
and
Kimberly Ferrari, or other unknown entities."  The petition
stated that DR Horton sought preaction discovery as to this
"possible compensation to further determine if causes of
action exist against [the Ferrari defendants]."  The petition
stated that DR Horton "believes that multiple causes of action
exist against [the Ferrari defendants]" and that 
"[t]he allowance of pre-suit discovery from the
[Ferrari defendants] may prevent a failure or delay
of justice and would benefit all parties by allowing
production of relevant and material information,
records, and documents, disclosing the identity(ies)
of other parties to a potential lawsuit, or
preventing a frivolous lawsuit if no claim exists
against [the Ferrari defendants]." 
Attached to the petition were interrogatories, requests for
production of documents, and notices for video depositions of
the Ferrari defendants.  The document requests sought
6
1130679 and 1130726
financial 
records, 
including 
personal 
bank-account 
statements,
tax returns, and limited-liability-company records. 
On October 11, 2013, the Ferrari defendants filed their
"Objection to Plaintiff's Verified Petition for Pre-suit
Discovery and Motion to Dismiss."  In their filing, the
Ferrari defendants contended that DR Horton's petition was
procedurally and substantively deficient under Rule 27(a).
On October 24, 2013, DR Horton filed a motion requesting
that the court set a hearing on its petition for preaction
discovery.  On October 30, 2013, without holding a hearing,
the trial court entered an order granting DR Horton's petition
for preaction discovery in all respects.  On November 13,
2013, the trial court entered an order expressly denying
DR Horton's motion for a hearing on its Rule 27(a) petition.
On November 14, 2013, the Ferrari defendants filed what
they styled as a "Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Stay,
for Protective Order, and Supporting Brief."  The Ferrari
defendants argued that the trial court erred in failing to
hold a hearing on DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition, and they
reiterated the defects they believed were present in
DR Horton's petition.  On November 22, 2013, DR Horton filed
7
1130679 and 1130726
a response in which it contended that Rule 27 does not require
a hearing on the merits of a petition.  
On March 25, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the
Ferrari defendants' motions filed November 14, 2013.  In the
hearing, the parties argued about whether DR Horton's
Rule 27(a) petition demonstrated what was required in order to
grant preaction discovery and whether a hearing on DR Horton's
petition was required under the rule.  DR Horton's counsel
admitted in the hearing that DR Horton "could theoretically
sue [Ferrari] for breach of fiduciary duty now.  But, if he
was making a profit and essentially taking bribes and
kickbacks from this friend, then the causes of action increase
exponentially."  He further explained that "[w]hat we want to
do is just determine, did he make any money off these
transactions or not.  That's in his financial records that we
can talk to him about so we can sort out what those financial
records say."  He added: "What we're trying to do is, under
Rule 11[, Ala. R. Civ. P.], just assess who are our defendants
and what are our claims, and then we'll bring the action."
Following further arguments by the parties concerning the
propriety of DR Horton's petition, the Ferrari defendants'
8
1130679 and 1130726
counsel interjected that "there is a timing issue that I would
like to address."  Counsel for the Ferrari defendants
proceeded to explain that they had filed their "motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2013, and that "the 90th day
after we filed our motion would have been February the 12th,
...."  Thus, the Ferrari defendants' counsel believed the
motion had been denied by operation of law under Rule 59.1,
Ala. R. Civ. P.  After hearing more arguments concerning
whether the trial court should have held a hearing on
DR Horton's petition, the trial court stated: "Since the Court
has failed to rule on the respondents' Motion to Reconsider
Order and Motion for Protective Order, it's deemed [denied] by
rule of law due to the Court's failure to rule within 90 days.
So tomorrow is your last day to appeal."  
On the same day, March 25, 2014, the trial court entered
an order granting the Ferrari defendants' request for a stay
"of all matters currently pending before this court
... and all discovery in this case ... pending
conclusion of the appeal that this court understands
will be filed on or before tomorrow March 26, 2014,
related to this Court's order granting the Petition
for Rule 27 discovery as filed by [DR Horton] in
this case."  
9
1130679 and 1130726
On March 26, 2014, the Ferrari defendants simultaneously
filed with this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus and an
appeal challenging the trial court's October 30, 2013, order
granting DR Horton's Rule 27 petition for 
preaction discovery.
On April 8, 2014, the trial court entered an order
confirming its understanding that the Ferrari defendants'
"motion for reconsideration" had been denied "by operation of
law due to the passage of more than ninety (90) days without
a ruling as set forth in Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure."  Nothing submitted to us indicates that the
trial court expressly ruled upon the Ferrari defendants'
motion for a protective order.
II.  Appeal or Mandamus
The threshold issue for determination is whether the
issues raised by the Ferrari defendants are properly before
this Court by way of their petition for a writ of mandamus or
their appeal.  The Ferrari defendants purport to invoke both
avenues of review in the alternative. 
The precursor to Rule 27 was a set of statutory
provisions found at Title 7, §§ 491-505, Ala. Code 1940.2
Predecessors to these statutes date back to 1852.  See
2
Ex parte Joiner, 258 Ala. 466, 468, 64 So. 2d 48, 50 (1953).
10
1130679 and 1130726
Noting that "[t]he remedy by appeal 'was entirely unknown to
the common law'" and that, "[c]onsequently, the remedy by
appeal in actions at law and in equity ... exists only when
given by some constitutional or statutory provision," this
Court in American Life Insurance Co. v. Powell, 259 Ala. 70,
76, 65 So. 2d 516, 522 (1953), was clear to the conclusion
that disputes under Title 7, §§ 491-505, were reviewable only
by mandamus:
"[T]he resolvement of two questions presented will
effectively dispose of this appeal.
"The first 
question, 
a 
procedural 
one, calls 
for
determination of the proper method of reviewing
orders granting applications to perpetuate testimony
under Title 7, Section 491 et seq., as amended,
supra. Our conclusion is that such orders are not
appealable, and that mandamus is a proper remedy."
259 Ala. at 72, 65 So. 2d at 518.
Consistent with this Court's holding in Powell, we
expressly held in Ex parte Renovations Unlimited, LLC, 59
So. 3d 679, 683 (Ala. 2010), that "review of a trial court's
grant or denial of a verified petition seeking preaction
discovery pursuant to Rule 27 is by a petition for a writ of
mandamus."  Indeed, since the holding of this Court in Powell,
and fully consistent with this Court's express holding in
11
1130679 and 1130726
Renovations Unlimited, this Court and the Court of Civil
Appeals typically have reviewed dispositions of Rule 27
petitions by way of mandamus petitions.  See, e.g., Ex parte
Psychemedics Corp., 987 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 2007); Vesta Fire
Ins. Corp. v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 395, 411
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (addressing a petition for discovery
pending appeal under Rule 27(b) and treating an appeal as a
petition for a writ of mandamus); Ex parte Norfolk Southern
Ry., 816 So. 2d 469 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Transp., 757 So. 2d 371 (Ala. 1999); and Ex parte Anderson,
644 So. 2d 961 (Ala. 1994).  
3
"'An appeal will ordinarily lie only from a final
judgment; that is, a judgment that conclusively determines the
issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights
There have been a few cases, however, in which either
3
this Court or the Court of Civil Appeals proceeded to address
on its merits an appeal of a Rule 27 order.  See City of
Mobile v. Howard, 59 So. 3d 41 (Ala. 2010); Albert P. Brewer
Developmental Ctr. v. Brown, 782 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 2000); Stoor
v. Turner, 727 So. 2d 38 (Ala. 1998); and Driskill v.
Culliver, 797 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).  It does not
appear, however, that the proper method of review was raised
by the parties, or ex mero motu by the court, in any of these
cases, and, unlike some of the cases addressing mandamus
petitions, there was no discussion of the proper method of
review in any of them.
12
1130679 and 1130726
of the parties.'"  Hamilton ex rel. Slate-Hamilton v.
Connally, 959 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Palughi v.
Dow, 659 So. 2d 112, 113 (Ala. 1995)).  In contrast, an
interlocutory judgment is "[a]n intermediate judgment that
determines a preliminary or subordinate point or plea but does
not finally decide the case."  Black's Law Dictionary 971
(10th ed. 2014).
A ruling on a request for preaction discovery under
Rule 27(a) merely adjudicates a party's right to engage in
certain 
discovery 
procedures 
and 
is 
quintessentially
interlocutory in nature.  Such a ruling does not adjudicate
any substantive claim or right of any party.  Instead, a
ruling on a Rule 27(a) petition is made in contemplation of
and in service to a potential future adjudication.  Just as a
postcomplaint discovery request under Rule 26, Ala. R.
Civ. P., furthers the adjudication of a complaint, and the
issues that have been or will be raised thereunder, so too
does a precomplaint discovery request under Rule 27(a).  The
difference between the two is one of timing, not the nature of
what is sought.  
13
1130679 and 1130726
We acknowledge that federal appellate courts review
dispositions of preaction-discovery petitions by way of
appeal.  See, e.g., Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 912 (3d Cir.
1975) (finding that "[t]he Rule 27(a) order is deemed final
because it is the only matter pending in the district court at
a time when no complaint has yet been filed"); Mosseller v.
United States, 158 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1946) (concluding
that an "order authorizing the taking of the deposition is a
final order for the purpose of appealability, because it
grants all the relief sought in the petition and disposes of
the proceeding").  Some states have followed the federal
example in this regard.  See, e.g., Gernstein v. Lake, 259
Neb. 479, 484, 610 N.W.2d 714, 718 (2000) (concluding that
"the order granting the Gernsteins' petition to perpetuate
testimony under rule 27 is a final, appealable order"); Powers
v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 677 A.2d 534,
536 (Me. 1996) (citing Mosseller and other federal cases in
support of the conclusion that orders on preaction-discovery
petitions are appealable); and Bainum v. Mackay, 15 Utah 2d
295, 296, 391 P.2d 436, 436 (1964) (holding that "[t]his type
of judgment is appealable" and citing Mosseller).
14
1130679 and 1130726
As noted, however, whenever this Court has affirmatively
addressed the issue, we have been consistent and clear in
holding that the proper method of review is a petition for a
writ of mandamus.  Moreover, other states have taken the
position that orders on preaction-discovery petitions are not
subject to appeal. In reaching this conclusion, an Illinois
appellate court explained:
"Thus, rather than constituting a separate and
independent action, a Rule 217 [Illinois's version
of Rule 27] proceeding is dependent upon the
proposed suit and must be viewed as part of that
action.  Since a Rule 217 petition seeks no relief
other than to take a deposition for use in a
contemplated action, an order entered in the course
of the deposition is interlocutory and is subject to
review only upon appeal from final judgment in the
underlying cause."
Frye v. Massie, 115 Ill. App. 3d 48, 53, 450 N.E.2d 411,
414-15, 70 Ill. Dec. 938, 941-42 (1983).  Likewise, the
Supreme Court of Nevada rebuffed an appellant's argument that
a ruling on a preaction-discovery request 
"constitutes a final
judgment because it disposes of the issues presented,"
explaining:
"Although entitled a 'petition, 'a pleading filed
pursuant to NRCP 27 does not commence a separate
action in the district court; instead, the sole
purpose of the petition is to perpetuate testimony
when no action may presently be commenced. Further,
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1130679 and 1130726
an order resolving a petition to perpetuate
testimony provides no relief to a party other than
to permit or deny discovery to the party for use in
a contemplated action.  ...  An order granting or
denying a petition to perpetuate testimony is
interlocutory in nature and does not adjudicate the
rights of any party."
Sunrise Hosp. v. Dailey, 109 Nev. 950, 951, 860 P.2d 162,
162-63 (1993).  We consider such reasoning to be sound and to
align with this Court's frequently expressed understanding of
what constitutes a final, appealable judgment. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the proper avenue for
seeking review of a trial court's disposition of a Rule 27(a)
petition for preaction discovery is by way of petition for a
writ of mandamus, not by way of appeal.  The Ferrari
defendants' appeal of this matter is therefore dismissed.
Possibly because of confusion over the proper avenue for
seeking appellate review of this matter, neither party has
raised the issue of the timeliness of the Ferrari defendants'
petition for a writ of mandamus.  This Court has stated that 
"a 
petition 
challenging 
an 
order 
compelling
discovery is timely only if (1) a protective order
is sought, pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 26(c), within
the time set for compliance with the order, Ex parte
Orkin, Inc., 960 So. 2d 635, 640 n.5 (Ala. 2006)
(citing with approval Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130, 131
(10th Cir. 1990)), and (2) the mandamus petition is
16
1130679 and 1130726
filed no more than 42 days after the denial of the
protective order. 960 So. 2d at 640."
Ex parte Meadowbrook Ins. Grp., Inc., 987 So. 2d 540, 546
(Ala. 2007).
When the Ferrari defendants filed their "motion for
reconsideration" on November 14, 2013, they also requested a
stay of all proceedings and the issuance of a protective
order.  The trial court expressly granted the Ferrari
defendants' motion for a stay of proceedings during this
Court's review of the trial court's disposition of DR Horton's
Rule 27(a) petition, but it did not expressly rule on the
motion for a protective order. On April 8, 2014, the trial
court belatedly ruled on the Ferrari defendants' "motion for
reconsideration," finding that it had been denied 
by 
operation
of law on February 12, 2014. Of course, because the trial
court's order granting preaction discovery was not a final
order, the Ferrari defendants' "motion for reconsideration"
was not a postjudgment motion under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
and, therefore, it was not denied by operation of law pursuant
to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P..  Be that as it may, the trial
court implicitly denied the Ferrari defendants' motion for a
protective 
order 
when 
it 
denied 
their 
"motion 
for
17
1130679 and 1130726
reconsideration."  Regardless of whether the motion for a
protective order was denied on February 12, 2014, or on
April 8, 2014, the Ferrari defendants' petition to this Court
was timely filed within 42 days of the denial of the order.
III.  Analysis
"'"A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary 
remedy 
that 
requires 
a
showing of (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty on the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction
of the court."'
"Ex parte Bruner, 749 So. 2d 437, 439 (Ala. 1999)
(quoting Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 594
(Ala. 1998))."
Ex parte Norfolk Southern Ry., 816 So. 2d at 471.
A.  Necessity of a Hearing
The Ferrari defendants first contend that the trial court
erred in granting DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition because,
they say, Rule 27 requires a trial court to hold a hearing on
a 
preaction-discovery petition before it rules on the 
petition
and that the trial court did not do so.  The Ferrari
defendants note that Rule 27(a)(2) states that after a
petitioner files its petition with the circuit court, 
18
1130679 and 1130726
"[t]he petitioner shall thereafter serve a notice
upon each person named in the petition as an
expected adverse party, together with a copy of the
petition, stating that the petitioner will apply to
the court, at a time and place named therein, for
the order described in the petition. At least thirty
(30) days before the date of hearing the notice
shall be served in the manner provided in Rule 4(c)
for service of summons ...."  
Rule 27(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).  The Ferrari
defendants also observe that, in nearly every case in which
this Court has reviewed a Rule 27(a) petition, the Court has
noted that the trial court held a hearing on the petition.
See, e.g., Ex parte Renovations Unlimited, LLC, 59 So. 3d at
682; City of Mobile v. Howard, 59 So. 3d 41, 43 (Ala. 2010);
Ex parte Norfolk Southern Ry., 816 So. 2d at 471; and Ex parte
Anderson, 644 So. 2d at 962.  Likewise, federal courts
interpret Rule 27, Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Federal Rule 27"), as
requiring a hearing on a preaction-discovery petition.   See,
4
e.g., Petition of Delta Quarries & Disposal, Inc., 139 F.R.D.
68, 68 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that, "as required by the
rule, a hearing was scheduled to determine whether the
Rule 27(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., begins as follows:  "At
4
least 21 days before the hearing date, the petitioner must
serve each expected adverse party with a copy of the petition
and a notice stating the time and place of the hearing."
19
1130679 and 1130726
'perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay
of justice.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3)"). Lastly, the Ferrari
defendants note that on October 24, 2013, DR Horton itself
filed a motion to set a hearing on its Rule 27(a) petition.
For its part, DR Horton argues that "[t]he rule does not
say that there must be a hearing."  It contends that the
parties were able to present all of their arguments in written
form to the trial court.  DR Horton observes that, even though
several cases from this Court reviewing preaction-discovery
petitions recount that the trial courts in those cases held
hearings on the petitions, none of our cases expressly state
that Rule 27 requires that a hearing be held.  It highlights
two opinions from this Court, Ex parte Psychemedics Corp., 987
So. 2d at 587, and Albert P. Brewer Developmental Ctr. v.
Brown, 782 So. 2d 770, 771 (Ala. 2000), in which the Court did
not state that a hearing was held by the trial courts that
entertained the Rule 27(a) petitions.   DR Horton discounts
5
Federal Rule 27 by pointing to the fact that this Court
observed in Ex parte Anderson that there were differences
In their reply brief, the Ferrari defendants attach a
5
copy of the case-action summary from Psychemedics, which
indicates that a hearing was held in that action.  
20
1130679 and 1130726
between Alabama's Rule 27 and its federal counterpart.  644
So. 2d at 964. DR Horton insists that it filed a motion to set
a hearing on its petition "out of an abundance of caution,"
not because the rule requires such a hearing.  Finally, DR
Horton contends that even if Rule 27(a) does require a
hearing, the Ferrari defendants received one on March 25,
2014, when the trial court heard arguments on the Ferrari
defendants' "motion for reconsideration."  
A plain reading of Rule 27(a)(2) indicates that a hearing
must be held on a petition for preaction discovery.  The time
for filing the notice that a petitioner must provide to
persons named in a petition is predicated on a contemplated
hearing date, and the notice itself is supposed to include the
date for the hearing.  Although it is true that the Anderson
Court observed that Alabama's Rule 27 is different in certain
respects from Federal Rule 27, the Anderson Court was not
referring to the requirement that a hearing be held on a
petition 
for 
preaction 
discovery 
when 
it 
made 
that
observation.  The references to a hearing in subsection (a) of
both Federal Rule 27 and the Alabama rule are very similar and
therefore the practice in federal courts is helpful to our
21
1130679 and 1130726
interpretation of Rule 27(a) as to whether a hearing is
required.  The fact that our previous cases have not stated
that a hearing is required simply reflects the fact that the
issue has not been directly raised; it is telling that a
hearing has been held regarding almost all, if not all,
preaction-discovery petitions this Court has reviewed before
this one.
The March 25, 2014, hearing on the Ferrari defendants'
"motion for reconsideration" was not a substantive substitute
for a hearing on DR Horton's preaction-discovery petition. 
Although in that hearing the trial court heard arguments about
the merits of the petition, the trial court concluded the
hearing soon after it was brought to the court's attention
that the Ferrari defendants believed that the "motion for
reconsideration" already had been denied by operation of law.
It is clear that the trial court did not evaluate in the
March 25, 2014, hearing the merits of the parties' arguments
as to whether DR Horton was entitled to preaction discovery.6
In fact, the trial court's October 30, 2013, order
6
granting DR Horton's preaction-discovery petition leaves some
doubt as to whether the trial court even considered the
Ferrari defendants' written arguments in response to the
petition.  In pertinent part, that order stated: "This matter
having come before the Court, and the Court having reviewed
22
1130679 and 1130726
Instead, the trial court simply ruled that the "motion for
reconsideration" had already been denied.
We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to hold
a hearing on DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition before granting
the petition.  Although this conclusion is sufficient to
warrant a vacatur of the trial court's order and an order from
this Court requiring the trial court to conduct such a
hearing, we note that the Ferrari defendants have raised other
possible errors in the trial court's ruling that, for the sake
of judicial economy, necessitate further review by 
this Court.
B.  The Unavailability of Written Interrogatories
The Ferrari defendants argue that the trial court erred
in allowing DR Horton to serve written interrogatories on the
Ferrari defendants because, they say, Rule 27(a) does not
appear to contemplate that such discovery is available in
preaction discovery.  DR Horton does not respond to this
argument.
As noted above, Rule 27(a)(1) states, in part:
the Petition for Pre-Suit Discovery Pursuant Rule 27 of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure filed by [DR Horton], for
good cause shown, it is hereby GRANTED" (capitalization in
original).
23
1130679 and 1130726
"A person who desires to perpetuate that person's
own testimony or that of another person or to obtain
discovery under Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any
matter that may be cognizable in any court of this
state may file a verified petition in the circuit
court in the county of the residence of any expected
adverse party."
(Emphasis added.)  Likewise, Rule 27(a)(3) states, in part:
"If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of
the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, it shall make an order designating or
describing the persons whose depositions may be
taken and specifying the subject matter of the
examination and whether the depositions shall be
taken upon oral examination or written questions; or
shall make an order designating or describing the
persons from whom discovery may be sought under
Rule 34 and specifying the objects of such
discovery; or shall make an order for a physical or
mental examination as provided in Rule 35(a). The
discovery may then be taken in accordance with these
rules."
(Emphasis added.)  Rule 27(a) contemplates discovery that
includes deposition testimony; discovery under Rule 34, which
includes the production of documents (as well as the
examination of real property and other tangible things);  and
7
Rule 34(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
7
"(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other
party a request (1) to produce and permit the party
making the request, or someone acting on the
requestor's behalf, to inspect, copy, test, or
sample any designated documents or electronically
stored information (including writings, drawings,
24
1130679 and 1130726
discovery under Rule 35, which pertains to mental and physical
examinations.   Rule 27(a) does not mention the availability
8
of discovery by written interrogatories or Rule 33, Ala. R.
Civ. P., which concerns discovery by way of written
graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings,
images, and other data or data compilations stored
in any medium from which information can be
obtained, 
translated, 
if 
necessary, 
by 
the
respondent through detection devices into reasonably
usable form), or to inspect, copy, test, or sample
any designated tangible things that constitute or
contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and
that are in the possession, custody, or control of
the party upon whom the request is served; or (2) to
permit entry upon designated land or other property
in the possession or control of the party upon whom
the request is served for the purpose of inspection
and measuring, 
surveying, photographing, testing, or
sampling the property or any designated object or
operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b)."
Rule 35(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
8
"(a) Order for examination. When the mental or
physical condition (including the blood group) of a
party, or of a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party, is in controversy, the
court in which the action is pending may order the
party to submit to a physical or mental examination
by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or to
produce for examination the person in the party's
custody or legal control. The order may be made only
on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to
the person to be examined and to all parties and
shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions,
and scope of the examination and the person or
persons by whom it is to be made."
25
1130679 and 1130726
interrogatories.  The trial court therefore erred in ordering
the 
Ferrari 
defendants 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
written
interrogatories.
C.  The Perpetuation of Evidence under Rule 27
1.  The Perpetuation of Testimony
Next, the Ferrari defendants contend that the trial court
erred by ordering them to submit to depositions and to produce
documents that were not sought by DR Horton for the
overarching purpose stated in Rule 27(a) of preserving
evidence to prevent a failure or delay of justice.  With
respect to the issue of deposition testimony, we note that
Rule 27(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
"A person who desires to perpetuate that person's
own testimony or that of another person or to obtain
discovery under Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any
matter that may be cognizable in any court of this
state may file a verified petition.  ...  The
petition shall be entitled in the name of the
petitioner and shall show: (1) that the petitioner
expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a
court of this state but is presently unable to bring
it or cause it to be brought, ...  (3) the facts
which the petitioner desires to establish by the
proposed testimony and the petitioner's reasons for
desiring to perpetuate it, ... and shall ask for an
order authorizing the petitioner to take the
depositions of the persons to be examined named in
the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating their
testimony or to seek discovery under Rule 34 or Rule
35 from the persons named in the petition."  
26
1130679 and 1130726
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, Rule 27(a)(3) provides, in 
part:
"If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of
the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, it shall make an order designating or
describing the persons whose depositions may be
taken and specifying the subject matter of the
examination and whether the depositions shall be
taken upon oral examination or written questions
...."  
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, Rule 27(a) repeatedly frames the
authority granted therein in the context of preservation, or
"perpetuation."  
DR Horton did not offer in its petition, and it does not
attempt to offer in response to the Ferrari defendants'
mandamus petition, any reason it needs to perpetuate the
testimony of the Ferrari defendants.  Instead, DR Horton
openly stated in its Rule 27(a) petition and at the March 25,
2014, hearing that it sought preaction discovery to determine
what other causes of action it may have against the Ferrari
defendants besides breach of fiduciary duty against Peter
Ferrari.  DR Horton cites Ex parte Anderson for its right to
such preaction discovery.
Anderson itself stated, however, that only preaction
discovery under Rules 34 and 35, and not deposition testimony,
may be compelled for reasons other than perpetuation of
27
1130679 and 1130726
evidence.  44 So. 2d at 962-63.  DR Horton did not allege in
its Rule 27(a) petition, nor does it argue in its response to
the Ferrari defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, that
the deposition testimony it seeks is in danger of being lost. 
This is not surprising because DR Horton does not seek
deposition 
testimony 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
perpetuating 
evidence. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering the Ferrari
defendants to submit to depositions absent a showing by
DR Horton that it has a need to preserve their testimony.
2.  The Perpetuation of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 34
The Ferrari defendants expressly ask this Court to
overrule Ex parte Anderson to the extent that it held that
preaction discovery under Rules 34 and 35 may be sought for
reasons other than the preservation or "perpetuation" of
evidence.  Among other things, the Ferrari defendants point to
Rule 27(a)(3), which, they contend, expressly conditions the
availability of discovery under Rule 34 and 35 as follows: 
"If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of
the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, it shall ... make an order designating or
describing the persons from whom discovery may be
sought under Rule 34 and specifying the objects of
such discovery; or shall make an order for a
physical or mental examination as provided in
Rule 35(a)."
28
1130679 and 1130726
(Emphasis added.)  The Ferrari defendants also note that the
reading of Rule 27(a) in Anderson is contrary to the Committee
Comments to that rule:  "[T]his rule has been modified [from
the federal rule] to allow limited discovery under Rules 34
and 35 for the purpose of perpetuating evidence pursuant to
those rules."  (Emphasis added.)
(a)  The Statutory Precursor to Rule 27
Over the last 160 years, there has been very little
decisional law interpreting or applying Rule 27(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P., and the statutes that preceded its adoption in 1973.
Commenting on those 
precursor statutes, this Court 
observed 
in
1953:
"During a period of almost one hundred years, as
we have heretofore shown, most of the provisions
codified as §§ 491–505, Title 7, Code 1940, were
part of the statutory law of this state and were
resorted to so infrequently that only three cases,
according to our research, reached this court
wherein they were directly involved. Consequently,
there is very little decisional law on the subject."
Ex parte Joiner, 258 Ala. 466, 469, 64 So. 2d 48, 50 (1953). 
Since 1953, there have been only a handful of additional
decisions interpreting Rule 27 or its statutory precursors,
one of which, of course, was Anderson.
29
1130679 and 1130726
Insight into the statutes that were the precursors of
Rule 27 was provided by this Court in American Life Insurance
Co. v. Powell, 259 Ala. at 72, 65 So. 2d at 518, a case
decided on the same day as Joiner:
"The second question [before us] involves the
sufficiency of the affidavits made pursuant to
Section 492, Title 7.  Specifically, we must decide
what is intended by the requirement of Section 492
that 'The applicant must make affidavit before a
circuit or probate judge, or register stating ...
the facts generally expected to be proved by the
witness.'  ...  Our view is that the affidavits do
not meet the requirements of Section 492; that the
applications clearly show that the purpose of each
is discovery, which is not within the purview of the
statutes, supra, authorizing the perpetuation of
testimony; and that the judge of the circuit court
erred in granting the applications."
(Emphasis omitted; emphasis added.)
(b)  The Text of Rule 27 and the Committee Comments
Rule 27 was adopted in 1973; its text has not changed
substantively since that time.  At this juncture, it is
helpful to set out the text of Rules 27(a)(1) and (3) in their
entirety:
"(1) Petition.  A person who desires to
perpetuate his own testimony or that of another
person or to obtain discovery under Rule 34 or 35
regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any
court of this state may file a verified petition in
the circuit court in the county of the residence of
any expected adverse party.  The petition shall be
30
1130679 and 1130726
entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall
show:  (1) that the petitioner expects to be a party
to an action cognizable in a court of this state but
is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be
brought, (2) the subject matter of the expected
action and his interest therein, (3) the facts which
the petitioner desires to establish by the proposed
testimony and the petitioner's reasons for desiring
to perpetuate it, (4) the names or a description of
the persons the petitioner expects will be adverse
parties and their addresses so far as known, and
(5) the names and addresses of the persons to be
examined and the substance of the testimony which
the petitioner expects to elicit from each, and
shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to
take the depositions of the persons to be examined
named 
in 
the 
petition, 
for 
the 
purpose 
of
perpetuating their testimony or to seek discovery
under Rule 34 or 35 from the persons named in the
petition.
"....
"(3) Order And Examination.  If the court is
satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may
prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall make
an order designating or describing the persons whose
depositions may be taken and specifying the subject
matter 
of 
the 
examination 
and 
whether 
the
depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or
written 
questions; 
or 
shall 
make 
an 
order
designating or describing the persons from whom
discovery may be sought under Rule 34 and specifying
the objects of such discovery; or shall make an
order for a physical or mental examination as
provided in Rule 35(a). The discovery may then be
taken in accordance with these rules. For the
purpose of applying these rules to discovery before
action, each reference therein to the court in which
the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to
the court in which the petition for such discovery
was filed."
31
1130679 and 1130726
(Emphasis added.)
The original Committee Comments, as adopted by this Court
along with Rule 27 itself in 1973, read as follows:
"This rule is virtually identical with the
corresponding federal rule.  Certain 'awkward form'
has been eliminated.  See Vermont Rule 27, 8 Wright
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil,
§ 2074 (1970).[ ]  The only change in substance is
9
extending the time for notice in Rule 27(a)(2) from
20 to 30 days.
"This rule supersedes Code of Ala., Tit. 7,
§§ 491-505.  The rule is similar to the statute –-
compare Rule 27(a)(1) 1 with Code of Ala., Tit. 7,
§ 492 –- in requiring the petition to state the
facts which the petitioner desires to establish by
the proposed testimony.  The statute had been
interpreted as requiring 'a narrative of the
testimony to be given by the witness.'  American
Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 259 Ala. 70, 78, 65 So. 516
(1953).  The rule is intended to be somewhat more
Section 2074, Federal Practice & Procedure, quotes with
9
approval from Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56
(9th Cir. 1961):
"'The purpose is to make Rules 34 and 35 applicable
in proceedings to perpetuate testimony. Common sense
says that there will be cases in which they should
be applicable where a deposition is not necessary or
appropriate. It may frequently occur that the only
thing likely to be lost or concealed is a paper or
object that should be subject to inspection, etc.,
under Rule 34, or the physical or mental condition
of a party, who should be subject to physical or
mental examination by a physician under Rule 35.'"
(Emphasis added.)
32
1130679 and 1130726
liberal and to permit the facts to be stated in a
brief, generalized form, as distinguished from a
particularized 
and 
detailed 
statement 
of 
the
proposed testimony.  But the difference is one of
degree only, since all agree that the purpose of the
rule, like that of the statute it will supersede, is
to perpetuate testimony rather than to make
discovery.  See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, Civil. § 2071 (1970).[ ]"
10
Section 2071 states as follows:
10
"The scope of discovery available under this
rule is not as broad as that provided for discovery
generally under Rule 26. Rule 27 is intended only
for the perpetuation of testimony or other evidence.
It is drafted 
"'to apply to situations where, for one
reason or another, testimony might be lost
to a prospective litigant unless taken
immediately, without waiting until after a
suit 
or 
other 
legal 
proceeding 
is
commenced. Such testimony would thereby be
perpetuated or kept in existence and, if
necessary, would be available for use at
some subsequent time.'
"[Petition of Ferkauf, 3 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D. N.Y.
1943).]
"At first, some concern was expressed that this
rule might be used for the purpose of discovery
before action is commenced and might enable a person
to fish for some ground for bringing suit. The early
commentators agreed that this was not the purpose of
the rule, and, despite an occasional intimation to
the contrary, the courts have generally agreed that
to allow Rule 27 to be used for this purpose would
be an 'abuse of the rule.' [Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir. 1961)]."
33
1130679 and 1130726
(Emphasis added.)
Beginning in 1986, the committee that drafted Rule 27 and
the original Committee Comments to that rule met and
considered the issue whether Rule 27 allowed preaction
discovery other than for the purpose of preserving evidence. 
Former Justice Lyons explains the intent of the rule and the
result of those meetings in his treatise, Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure Annotated:
"When this rule was promulgated it was viewed by
the advisory committee as a device for amassing of
evidence prior to the institution of an action or
pending appeal but, it was not, in the recollection
of the author, considered as a vehicle for discovery
before commencement of an action in order to
determine whether a cause of action exists.
"During a series of committee meetings covering
a span of approximately one year and commencing in
1986, the committee considered the issue of whether
Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 27 allowed pre-action discovery
independent of the need to perpetuate evidence. At
its meeting on April 24, 1987, the Committee
concluded that 'it was the consensus of the
committee that Rule 27 of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure does not authorize discovery in advance of
the filing of an action except under very limited
circumstances.' Minutes of the Advisory Committee,
April 27, 1986. The committee then approved the
submission to the Supreme Court of revised comments
including what now appears as the final paragraph of
the 
Committee 
Comments. 
The 
final 
paragraph
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)
34
1130679 and 1130726
concludes that the reference to discovery under
Rules 34 and 35 is for the purpose of perpetuating
evidence. The Supreme Court approved and adopted
this revision to the comments by order entered on
April 5, 1988."
1 Champ Lyons, Jr., and Ally Windsor Howell, Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure Annotated 27.1 (4th ed. 2004).
The revision to the Committee Comments that resulted from
the committee's work and that was adopted by the Supreme Court
in 1988 includes the following:
"As is true of the corresponding federal rule,
the primary purpose of Rule 27, like that of the
state statutes it superseded, is to perpetuate
testimony rather than to make discovery.
"See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, Civil § 2071 (1970).
"However, this rule has been modified to allow
limited discovery under Rules 34 and 35 for the
purpose of perpetuating evidence pursuant to those
rules.  This rule permits production and inspection
under Rule 34 and physical or mental examination
under Rule 35, whether or not testimony is
perpetuated.  See Vermont Rule 27; 8 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2074
(1970)."
(Emphasis added.)
(c)  Anderson
The Court in Anderson held that preaction discovery under
Rule 34 may be granted for reasons other than perpetuation of
35
1130679 and 1130726
evidence.   The Anderson Court stated:  "Rule 27, on its face
11
and stripped of its historical background, does not restrict
discovery under Rule 34 to cases where evidence is in danger
of being lost or destroyed."  644 So. 2d at 962.  The Anderson
Court further concluded that Rule 27 "specifically authorizes
'discovery under Rule 34,' without limiting the use of Rule 34
to that of perpetuating evidence."  644 So. 2d at 964.  In
what is perhaps the  most cited passage from the Anderson
opinion, the Court stated: 
"Although Alabama Rule 27 does not give a potential
plaintiff 'carte blanche' to 'fish' for a ground for
filing an action, it nonetheless provides for
preaction 'discovery under Rule 34,' regardless of
any need to perpetuate evidence, provided that the
requirements of the rule are met and that the trial
court is satisfied that such discovery might serve
to prevent a failure or delay of justice."
644 So. 2d at 964.
The Anderson Court also addressed the matter of the
Committee Comments, explaining:
The Anderson Court did not specifically address
11
discovery under Rule 35 because such discovery was not
requested by the plaintiff in that case.  Rule 27 provides for
discovery under Rule 35, which allows physical and mental
examinations of a party, under the same circumstances in which
it provides for discovery under Rule 34, however.
36
1130679 and 1130726
"Although the purpose of the Committee Comments
is to explain and clarify the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Committee Comments to Rule 27
actually raise more questions than they answer. For
instance, the comments state that Rule 27 is
patterned after Federal Rule 27 and Vermont Rule 27
and that the rule's 'primary' purpose is to
perpetuate testimony. This statement with respect to
the rule's 'primary' purpose probably resulted from
the fact that the statutes that the rule superseded
focused exclusively on perpetuating testimony.
However, although the commentators acknowledged in
the third paragraph [of the Committee Comments as
amended in 1988 ] that the rule had been changed so
12
as to allow limited preaction discovery under Rule
34, they stated, nonetheless, and with no supporting
language from the rule itself, that that discovery
was limited to perpetuating evidence. While we are
fully aware of the statement of purpose contained in
the comments to Rule 27, we cannot give precedence
to that statement over the otherwise clear language
contained in the rule. Simply put, Rule 27 speaks
for itself."
644 So. 2d at 963 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Anderson Court
held that "clear language" in Rule 27(a) overrode the
conflicting explanation of the rule in the Committee Comments
and dictated that preaction discovery of documents under
Rule 34, and, by implication, physical and 
mental 
examinations
under Rule 35, could be sought by a prospective plaintiff for
the purpose of facilitating the discernment and evaluation of
The referenced paragraph is quoted in this opinion in
12
the text at the end of Section III.C.2.(b), above.
37
1130679 and 1130726
potential claims rather than for only the perpetuation of
evidence.
Since Anderson was decided in 1994, there have been only
five occasions in which this Court has reviewed trial court
rulings on Rule 27(a) petitions that sought preaction
discovery for reasons other than perpetuation of evidence.  In
none of those cases was the question raised as to whether
Anderson correctly interpreted Rule 27(a) in this regard.  In
2007, for example, this Court applied Anderson's holding in
Ex parte Psychemedics Corp., 987 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 2007), but
specifically observed that "Psychemedics's mandamus petition
does not ask this Court to revisit its decision in Ex parte
Anderson."  987 So. 2d at 588.  
13
The opinion in Ex parte Renovations Unlimited, LLC, 59
13
So. 3d 679, 683 (Ala. 2010), quoted the holding in Anderson. 
That opinion, however, also implied -- and a review of the
mandamus petition filed in the case confirms -- that the
mandamus petitioners did not ask for Anderson to be overruled. 
Instead, they succeeded before this Court by arguing merely
that the Rule 27 petitioners had affirmatively relinquished
their right to pursue legal action against the mandamus
petitioners "by executing [a] release and thus no longer have
'an action cognizable in a court of this state' as required by
Rule 27(a)(1)."  59 So. 3d at 683.  This Court agreed with the
mandamus petitioners, and it ordered the trial court to
dismiss the petition for preaction discovery on this basis.
 
Likewise, the opinion in City of Mobile v. Howard, 59 So.
3d 41 (Ala. 2010), suggests -- and a review of the mandamus
38
1130679 and 1130726
(d)  Anderson Revisited
Today, as noted, we have been asked to revisit Anderson.
Upon reexamination of the text of Rule 27 itself, the
Committee Comments thereto, and the history of both the rule
and the Committee Comments, we respectfully must reject the
notion that "clear language" in Rule 27(a) dictates that
discovery under Rule 34 (and of necessity Rule 35, which in
all instances in Rule 27 is referenced in companionship with
Rule 34) may be obtained for reasons other than perpetuation
of evidence. 
As noted, Rule 27(a)(1) begins as follows: 
"A person who desires to perpetuate that person's
own testimony or that of another person or to obtain
discovery under Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any
matter that may be cognizable in any court of this
petition filed in the case confirms -- that the mandamus
petitioners did not ask for Anderson to be overruled. 
Instead, the Howard Court reversed the trial court's Rule 27
order 
based 
on 
the 
statutory 
privilege 
afforded 
by
§ 12–21–3.1, Ala. Code 1975, and its conclusion that Howard
failed to demonstrate that she "has never tried to obtain the
information she seeks from any source other than the City and
has failed to demonstrate that she is unable to obtain that
information from other sources without undue hardship."  59
So. 3d at 48.  See also Albert P. Brewer Developmental Ctr. v.
Brown, 782 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 2000) (dismissing the proceeding
before us as moot); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 757
So. 2d 371, 373-74 (Ala. 1999) (reversing the trial court's
Rule 27 order on the ground that a federal statute protected
the information sought from discovery).
39
1130679 and 1130726
state may file a verified petition in the circuit
court in the county of the residence of any expected
adverse party."
(Emphasis added.)  Admittedly, this language, at least
considered in isolation, could be interpreted as meaning that
a person seeking testimony under Rule 27(a) may do so only if
he or she "desires to perpetuate that person's own testimony
or that of another person" but that a Rule 27(a) petitioner
seeking discovery under Rule 34 or Rule 35 may do so free of
this condition.  The language does not require such a reading,
however, especially in light of its history, the Committee
Comments adopted by this Court, and the text of Rule 27 taken
as a whole.  Indeed, these factors and others compel us to
conclude that the language is due a different construction.
First, the structure of the sentence -- the use of two
separate infinitive phrases separately referencing deposition
testimony and discovery under Rules 34 and 35 -- can be
explained rather simply (especially in light of the language
of Rule 27(a)(3) discussed below) as an inartful attempt to
address an issue that at one time plagued Federal Rule 27,
i.e., whether a petitioner may obtain preaction discovery
under Rules 34 and 35 only in conjunction with the taking of
40
1130679 and 1130726
deposition testimony.  See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp.,
297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961).  In point of fact, this is
exactly what the 1988 revision to the Committee Comments to
Rule 27 explicitly point to as the import of this particular
language: 
"[T]his rule has been modified to allow limited
discovery under Rules 34 and 35 for the purpose of
perpetuating evidence pursuant to those rules. This
rule permits production and inspection under Rule 34
and physical or mental examination under Rule 35,
whether or not testimony is perpetuated. See Vermont
Rule 27; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, Civil § 2074 (1970)."
(Emphasis added.)  To like effect are the Reporter's Notes to
Rule 27, Vermont R. Civ. P., a rule cited in the foregoing
passage from the Committee Comments and which both the
Committee Comments and the Anderson Court agree was a model
for Alabama's rule:
"This rule is based on Federal Rule 27, as
modified to fit requirements of state practice.  The
procedure under it is the equivalent of that under
12 V.S.A. §§ 1281-1286 (now superseded), with the
principal difference that the rule also permits
production and inspection under Rule 34 and physical
or mental examination under Rule 35, whether or not
a deposition is taken.  In this respect the rule
clarifies an ambiguity in the federal rule. See 8
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2074 (1970)."
41
1130679 and 1130726
(Emphasis added.)14
Similar to the language of our Rule 27(a)(1), Vermont's
14
Rule 27(a)(1) begins by stating:  "A person who desires to
perpetuate testimony or to obtain discovery under Rule 34 or
35 regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of
the state may file a verified petition ...."  Vt. R. Civ. P.
27.
The Anderson Court observed that
"[i]n In re Burlington Bagel Bakery, Inc., 150 Vt.
20, 22, 549 A.2d 1044, 1045 (1988), the Vermont
Supreme Court noted:
"'V.R.C.P. 
gives 
the 
presiding 
judge
discretion 
to 
grant 
a 
petition 
for
preaction discovery if he or she "is
satisfied that the perpetuation of the
testimony or other discovery may prevent a
failure or delay of justice."'"
644 So. 2d at 965.  Nonetheless, the Anderson Court reasoned:
"Burlington Bagel Bakery suggests to us that if the
question was presented squarely to it, the Vermont
Supreme Court might treat Vermont Rule 27 as a
preaction discovery device available for purposes
other than the perpetuation of evidence, if the
production of the evidence would 'prevent a failure
or delay of justice.'"
644 So. 2d at 965 (emphasis added).  The Anderson Court's
quotation from Burlington Bagel Bakery is nothing more than
the Vermont Supreme Court quoting a portion of Vermont's Rule
27, not an explication of the rule.  The Burlington Bagel
Bakery court expressly "d[id] not reach the merits of this
appeal," and instead it reversed the judgment of the trial
court on the ground that the hearing on the matter was
incomplete because "no evidence was given by either party as
to the truth of petitioner's allegation."  150 Vt. at 22-23,
42
1130679 and 1130726
Furthermore, we find it particularly difficult to avoid
the clear language in the Committee Comments, as discussed by
Justice 
Lyons 
and 
quoted 
and 
emphasized 
in
Section III.C.2.(b), above.  Again, the 1988 
revised 
Committee
Comments resulted from meetings specifically held for the
purpose of explaining the original, intended meaning of the
very language of the rule at issue here.  The result was
language  explicitly stating that Rule 27 was drafted "to
allow limited discovery under Rules 34 and 35 for the purpose
of perpetuating evidence pursuant to those rules."  And, of
course, this Court adopted these revised Committee Comments. 
In addition to the history of the rule and the express
guidance provided by the same committee that originally
drafted it, Rule 27 must be read as an integrated whole.  In
particular, the provisions of Rule 27(a)(1) must be read in
pari materia with those of Rule 27(a)(3).  See, e.g., Ex parte
Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405, 406 (Ala. 1993) (observing that
"[s]ubsections of a statute are in pari materia and 'should be
549 A.2d at 1045.  Moreover, Burlington Bagel Bakery was a
case in which the petitioner sought to depose the co-owner of
a bakery "in order to perpetuate testimony to guard against
the 'fading memories of the parties.'"  In re Burlington Bagel
Bakery, Inc., 150 Vt. at 21, 549 A.2d at 1044.
43
1130679 and 1130726
construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of
each'" 
(quoting 
McCausland 
v. 
Tide-Mayflower 
Moving 
& 
Storage,
499 So. 2d 1378, 1382 (Ala. 1986))). 
The pertinent portion of Rule 27(a)(3) reads as follows: 
"If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of
the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, it shall make an order designating or
describing the persons whose depositions may be
taken and specifying the subject matter of the
examination and whether the depositions shall be
taken upon oral examination or written questions; or
shall make an order designating or describing the
persons from whom discovery may be sought under Rule
34 and specifying the objects of such discovery; or
shall make an order for a physical or mental
examination as provided in Rule 35(a)."
(Emphasis added.)  Whatever else Rule 27(a)(3) may require, it
is clear that it begins by expressly conditioning discovery,
including discovery under Rules 34 and 35, on "the court['s
being] satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may
prevent a failure or delay of justice."  See Driskill v.
Culliver, 797 So. 2d 495, 497 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (stating
that "[t]he trial court's duty was to determine if discovery
of the requested information might 'prevent a failure or delay
of justice'" in an action by an inmate seeking preaction
discovery of documents).  Thus, the language of Rule 27(a)
does not "clearly" provide for discovery under Rules 34 and 35
44
1130679 and 1130726
for reasons other than the perpetuation of evidence.  To the
contrary, the only construction of that rule that is
consistent with its history, with the Committee Comments
adopted by this Court, and with an in pari materia reading of
the language in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) of the rule is
that Rule 27 was intended merely to make discovery of
documents 
and 
mental 
and 
physical 
examinations 
available 
under
the same circumstances or conditions under which it makes
deposition testimony available.  To the extent there is any
language in Rule 27(a)(1) that confuses the issue, that
language represents nothing more than an attempt to express
the idea that documents and examinations can be procured
without also taking a deposition.
(e)  Yet Further Considerations
To 
the 
foregoing 
can 
be 
added 
several 
other
considerations that are by no means necessary for the
conclusion reached above, but that do add even more support
for it.  First, we see no reason to believe that the drafters
of Rule 27 would have intended to provide for more liberal
access to preaction physical and even mental examinations
(given the consistent coupling of references to Rules 34 and
45
1130679 and 1130726
35 throughout Rule 27) than to the perpetuation of deposition
testimony. 
Second, as noted, former Justice Lyons in his treatise,
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, provides an
unequivocal and clear explication of the intent of Rule 27
itself and of the 1988 revision to the Committee Comments
explaining that rule.  See Section III.C.2.(b), supra.  To
that explication may be added the following statement by
Justice Lyons, who was not a member of the Court when Anderson
was decided:
"I do not wish to be understood to embrace the
holding of Ex parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 965
(Ala. 1994).  Rule 27 does not provide a vehicle for
pre-action discovery to determine whether a cause of
action exists.  Instead, as the Committee Comments
to Rule 27 state, that rule allows only pre-action
discovery 'under Rules 34 and 35 for the purpose of
perpetuating evidence pursuant to those rules.'
(Emphasis added.)"
Stoor v. Turner, 727 So. 2d 38, 40 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the rationale
and concurring in the result).
As already noted, aside from Vermont's comparable rule,
the other model for Alabama's Rule 27 was Federal Rule 27.  It
is clear from federal authorities that "Rule 27 is intended
46
1130679 and 1130726
only for the perpetuation of testimony or other evidence."  8A
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 2071 (2010).15
Several states have adopted Federal Rule 27 verbatim,
along with the view that Rule 27 exists only for perpetuation
The Anderson Court correctly observed that Alabama's
15
Rule 27 is different than Federal Rule 27, but whether it is
as "significantly different" as the Anderson Court asserted,
see 644 So. 2d at 965, is another matter.  Rule 27(a)(3), Fed.
R. Civ. P., provides, in part:
"If satisfied that perpetuating the testimony may
prevent a failure or delay of justice, the court
must issue an order that designates or describes the
persons whose depositions may be taken, specifies
the subject matter of the examinations, and states
whether the depositions will be taken orally or by
written interrogatories. The depositions may then be
taken under these rules, and the court may issue
orders like those authorized by Rules 34 and 35."
Despite this wording, as the Anderson Court itself observed,
 
"[i]t 
seems 
to 
be 
generally understood 
now 
among
the federal courts and among legal scholars that the
objective of Federal Rule 27 is to perpetuate
testimony and evidence in danger of being lost or
destroyed, for use in a prospective action, and
that, to the extent that use of Federal Rule 34 will
serve to preserve evidence, it should be available
regardless of whether it is used in conjunction with
the taking of a deposition."
Ex parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d at 964 (emphasis added).
47
1130679 and 1130726
of testimony and evidence.   In other states, the language of
16
preaction-discovery rules differs from Federal Rule 27, but
those states likewise interpret their 
rules as not sanctioning
any broader confirmatory or investigatory uses of preaction
discovery.   The language of New York's rule allows for
17
broader 
discovery, 
see 
N.Y. 
Civil 
Practice 
Law 
and
Rules 3102(c), but even the New York courts have limited that
state's rule so that the rule cannot be used by a party to
See, e.g., Rule 27, Haw. R. Civ. P.; Rule 27(a)(1)-(c),
16
Idaho R. Civ. P.; Rule 27, Me. R. Civ. P.; Rule 27, Mass. R.
Civ. P.; Rule 27.01-03, Minn. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct.; Rule
57.02, Mo. R. Civ. P.; Rule 27(a)-(c), Mont. R. Civ. P.; Rule
27, Neb. R. Civ. P.; Rule 1-027, N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct.;
Rule 27, S.C. R. Civ. P.; Rule 27, Utah R. Civ. P.; Rule 27,
Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R.; and Rule 27, W. Va. R. Civ. P.
See, e.g., McNett v. Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co., 856
17
P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Alaska 1993) (discussing Rule 27, Alaska
R. Civ. P.); Block v Superior Court, 219 Cal. App. 2d 469, 33
Cal. Rptr. 205 (1963) (discussing Cal. Code Civ. § 2035.010);
Rozek v. Christen, 387 P.2d 425 (Colo. 1963) (discussing Rule
27, Colo. R. Civ. P.); Frye v. Massie, 115 Ill. App. 3d 48,
450 N.E.2d 411, 70 Ill. Dec. 938 (1983) (discussing Rule 217,
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. Trial Ct.); State v. Jablonski, 590
N.E.2d 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing Rule 27, Ind. R.
Trial P.); Wiles v. Myerley, 210 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1973)
(discussing Rule 1.721-1.729, Iowa R. Civ. P.); Meredith v.
Wilson, 423 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1968) (discussing Rule 27.01-.03,
Ky. R. Civ. P.); In re Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 357 So. 2d
1295 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (discussing La. Code Civ. P.
§ 1429-1430); and Allen v. Allen, 105 Md. App. 359, 659 A.2d
411 (1995) (discussing Rule 2-204, Md. R. P. Cir. Ct.). 
48
1130679 and 1130726
determine if the party has a cause of action. In short, the
federal courts and the overwhelming majority of states do not
permit preaction discovery for purposes other than the
perpetuation of evidence.  In point of fact, we have found no
jurisdiction, federal or state, with a rule similar to
Alabama's Rule 27 that has construed it to permit preaction
discovery to investigate or to confirm the presence of a cause
of action.
Only two states besides Alabama permit broad preaction
discovery not conditioned on the need to perpetuate evidence: 
Pennsylvania and Texas.   We have found no state where it has
18
been determined that a person may conduct preaction discovery
merely to assess or to confirm the availability of a cause of
action without express language to this effect in the
applicable rule or statute.  The difference between Alabama
and the two states -- Pennsylvania and Texas -- where this is
permitted is the fact that, as one law review article
The Courts in a third state, Ohio, are divided as to the
18
meaning of the analogous rule there, which in any event is
significantly 
different 
than 
Alabama's 
Rule 
27. 
Compare 
Benner
v. Walker Ambulance Co., 118 Ohio App. 3d 341, 344, 692 N.E.2d
1053, 1055 (1997), and Cruz v. Kettering Health Network, (No.
24465) 2012-Ohio-24 (Ohio Ct. App., Jan 
06, 
2012) (unpublished
opinion).
49
1130679 and 1130726
explains, "[t]he Alabama rule does not authorize presuit
discovery for investigatory purposes on its face."  Lonny
Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice:
The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 217, 240 (2007) (emphasis added).19
See also Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State
19
Presuit Discovery, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 43, 57 (2010)
(explaining that Alabama's "strong policy favoring presuit
discovery for claim investigation" was created by the Alabama
Supreme Court's construction of Rule 27). 
In Pennsylvania, Rule 4003.8, Pa. R. Civ. P., provides:
 
"(a) A plaintiff may obtain pre-complaint
discovery where the information sought is material
and necessary to the filing of the complaint and the
discovery will not cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to any
person or party.
"(b) Upon a motion for protective order or other
objection to a plaintiff's pre-complaint discovery,
the court may require the plaintiff to state with
particularity how the discovery will materially
advance the preparation of the complaint. In
deciding the motion or other objection, the court
shall weigh the importance of the discovery request
against the burdens imposed on any person or party
from whom the discovery is sought."
In Texas, Rule 202.1, Tex. R. Civ. P., provides:
"A person may petition the court for an order
authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral
examination or written questions either:
50
1130679 and 1130726
  Previous to Anderson, preaction discovery in Alabama
concerned testimony or evidence that was in danger of being
lost or destroyed.  The bright line that existed between
preaction discovery and postcomplaint discovery served to
prevent intrusive investigations before allegations had been
filed against a party.  In erasing this line, the Anderson
Court contended that its interpretation of Rule 27 was 
"consistent with the underlying purpose of both Rule
11, Ala. R. Civ. P., and the Alabama Litigation
Accountability Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-270 et
seq., in that Rule 27 provides a limited means by
which potential plaintiffs (and their attorneys),
within the discretion of the trial court, can
examine evidence before actually deciding whether
they have a reasonable basis for filing an action."
644 So. 2d at 965.  Upon further reflection, we see nothing in
Rule 11 or the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act that
compels a reading of Rule 27 that is contrary to the language
of the rule, to the explicit Committee Comments, to the
history of both the rule and its Committee Comments, and to
the other considerations reviewed above, including the
"(a) to perpetuate or obtain the
person's own testimony or that of any other
person for use in an anticipated suit; or
"(b) to investigate a potential claim
or suit."
51
1130679 and 1130726
uniformly 
accepted 
approach 
in 
other 
jurisdictions 
to 
language
like that at issue here.   Before Anderson, plaintiffs were
20
able to discern whether they had causes of action against
other parties without using preaction discovery.  The same was
true of plaintiffs in the 19 years between the adoption of
Rules 11 and 27 in 1973 and the release of the Anderson
decision in 1994 and, for all that appears, continues to be
true.  Moreover, one of the reasons "[t]his Court has held
that amendments [to complaints] are to be freely allowed,"
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 338 So. 2d
1276, 1279 (Ala. 1976), is to allow litigants a full and fair
opportunity to obtain an adjudication of their rights.  See
also  Atlas Coal Co. v. O'Rear, 161 Ala. 591, 593, 50 So. 63,
64 (1909).
Rule 11, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides only that an
20
attorney's signature on a complaint constitutes a certificate
that the attorney has read the complaint and "that to the best
of the attorney's knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay."  The Alabama Litigation Accountability Act provides
for sanctions against attorneys who file actions that are
"frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious, or
interposed for any improper purpose." See Ala. Code 1975,
§§ 12-19-271 and -272.  
52
1130679 and 1130726
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we overrule Ex parte Anderson's
holding that Rule 27, Ala. R. Civ. P., does not limit
preaction discovery under Rule 34 to perpetuating evidence. 
Given that DR Horton expressly sought preaction discovery not
for the purpose of perpetuating evidence, but for the purpose
of evaluating its claims against the Ferrari defendants, we
grant the Ferrari defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus,
and we instruct the trial court to dismiss DR Horton's
petition for preaction discovery.
1130679 –- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.
Moore, C.J., and Shaw, J., dissent.
1130726 –- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
53
1130679 and 1130726
SHAW, Justice (dissenting in case no. 1130679).
I respectfully dissent.  
I.
I do not believe that the petitioners--the Ferrari
defendants--have demonstrated either a clear legal right to a
hearing or that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
refusing 
to 
grant 
such 
a hearing.
First, I am not convinced
that a "plain reading" of the language of Rule 27, Ala. R.
Civ. P., indicates that a hearing is always per se required
before a petition filed pursuant to that rule can be granted. 
Specifically, Rule 27(a)(2) states that "[a]t least thirty
(30) days before the date of hearing the notice shall be
served."  The lack of an article--such as the word "the" or
"a"--before the word "hearing" makes it unclear to me whether
the rule is contemplating that an actual in-court proceeding
must take place or whether the rule is simply stating that the
parties must have an opportunity to be heard.  See Sharpe v.
State, 560 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (noting
that the word "hearing" can be synonymous with "an opportunity
to be heard" and holding that the use of the latter in Rule
15.4(b), Alabama Temporary Rules of Criminal Procedure, did
54
1130679 and 1130726
not require an "adversarial hearing or oral argument" and
could instead include a party's "respon[se] in writing to the
merits").  I see nothing in the facts of this case indicating
that the Ferrari defendants' challenge to DR 
Horton's 
verified
petition for preaction discovery could 
be communicated 
only in
a hearing and not in writing.  In other words, I see nothing
demonstrating the need for the parties to present arguments
and evidence in open court.  See D.B. Clayton & Assocs. v.
McNaughton, 279 Ala. 159, 160, 182 So. 2d 890, 891-92 (1966)
("[A] 'hearing' ordinarily is defined, in matters not
associated with full trials, as a proceeding in which the
parties are afforded an opportunity to adduce proof and to
argue inferences from the evidence.").
In any event, I believe that Rule 27 should be
interpreted in the same manner as Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
Rule 56(c)(2) states that a motion for a summary judgment
"shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time fixed
for the hearing."  Here, the word "hearing" is preceded by the
article "the," thus making clear that it is referring to a
proceeding, and not just an opportunity to be heard.  Further,
this rule, like Rule 27(a)(2), sets a timeline calculated from
55
1130679 and 1130726
the date of the hearing.  This 10-day period in Rule 56(c)(2),
this Court has held, exists to give the nonmovant the
opportunity to respond before the hearing.  Hill v. Chambless,
757 So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. 2000).
Despite the clear language in Rule 56(c)(2) that an
actual hearing is to occur and the fact that a deadline hinges
on the occurrence of this hearing, this Court has held that a
hearing is not necessarily required. Hill v. Chambless, 757
So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. 2000) ("[T]his Court has stated that a
trial court may, within its discretion, dispense with the
hearing altogether and rule on the [Rule 56] motion without
any further proceedings.").  As we have stated:
"We 
agree 
with 
the 
general 
proposition 
that Rule
56(c) contemplates a hearing before the trial court
rules on a motion for summary judgment. Certainly,
the nature of summary judgment dictates against a
hasty and arbitrary action. As Tharp v. Union State
Bank, 364 So. 2d 335 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978), and
Brown v. Piggly–Wiggly Stores, 454 So. 2d 1370 (Ala.
1984), indicate, the requirement of a 10–day notice
before the hearing on the motion is based on due
process considerations. ... But where, as here, the
policy considerations of the Rule have been fully
satisfied, literal adherence is not required."
Cofield v. City of Huntsville, 527 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Ala.
1988). I see nothing in the language of Rule 27(a)(2)
requiring the conclusion that a hearing is mandated when Rule
56
1130679 and 1130726
56(c)(2), which calls for a hearing more strongly than does
Rule 27(a)(2), has been interpreted otherwise.
Furthermore, to show reversible error resulting from a 
failure to conduct a hearing under Rule 56(c)(2), a party must
demonstrate prejudice. 
 See Lightsey v. Bessemer 
Clinic, 
P.A.,
495 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1986) (stating that, while "Rule 56(c)
does by its language contemplate a hearing upon a motion for
summary judgment," the failure of the trial court to hold a
hearing was harmless); cf. Hilliard v. SouthTrust Bank of
Alabama, N.A., 581 So. 2d 826, 828 (Ala. 1991).  Before
concluding that the Ferrari defendants had "a clear legal
right" to a hearing, I would determine whether they were
actually prejudiced by the trial court's failure to hold a
hearing.  In the instant case, the trial court ruled on the
verified petition more than 30 days after it was served, and
the Ferrari defendants responded to the verified petition
within that time.  There was thus ample opportunity for the
Ferrari defendants to have notice of the petition and to
respond accordingly.  The mandamus petition is silent as to
how the lack of a hearing prejudiced the Ferrari defendants in
any way.  I see nothing indicating that a lack of a hearing in
57
1130679 and 1130726
this case was prejudicial; I would not hold that a trial court
per se exceeds its discretion by failing to hold a hearing
under Rule 27.
II.
The first sentence of Rule 27(a)(1) states:
"A person who desires to perpetuate that person's
own testimony or that of another person or to obtain
discovery under Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any
matter that may be cognizable in any court of this
state may file a verified petition in the circuit
court in the county of the residence of any expected
adverse party."
A person may file a petition if he or she desires "to
perpetuate that person's own testimony or that of another
person" or if he or she desires "to obtain discovery under
Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any matter."  The grammar and
content of the language shows that there are two different
things that may be obtained if desired: testimony to be
perpetuated or discovery under Rule 34, Ala. R. Civ. P., or
Rule 35, Ala. R. Civ. P.  The main opinion "[a]dmittedly"
concedes that the language reads this way but states that it
"does not require such a reading" when read in light of
materials outside the actual text of the rule. ___ So. 3d at
___.  It then suggests that this language "inartful[ly]"
58
1130679 and 1130726
states a different point.  I would not reject a clear meaning
found in the actual text in favor of an "inartful" reading
suggested by outside sources.  
The main opinion goes on to propose that this sentence
actually means that a person may obtain discovery under Rule
34 or Rule 35 only for purposes of perpetuating testimony. 
This is clearly not what the first sentence of Rule 27(a)(1)
says.  However, in support of its selection of this reading,
the main opinion resorts to, among other things, the Committee
Comments.  The pertinent comments state:
"As is true of the corresponding federal rule,
the primary purpose of Rule 27, like that of the
state statutes it superseded, is to perpetuate
testimony rather than to make discovery.
"....
"However, this rule has been modified to allow
limited discovery under Rules 34 and 35 for the
purpose of perpetuating evidence pursuant to those
rules. This rule permits production and inspection
under Rule 34 and physical or mental examination
under Rule 35, whether or not testimony is
perpetuated. See Vermont Rule 27; 8 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2074
(1970). The discovery permitted under Rule 27(a) and
(b) is expressly limited to that available under
Rule 34 and Rule 35."
The Committee Comments--just like Rule 27(a)(1)--make a
distinction between "perpetuat[ing] testimony" and "mak[ing]
59
1130679 and 1130726
discovery."  As the emphasized portions in the first paragraph
indicate, although the "primary purpose" of the rule "is to
perpetuate testimony," the language of the rule and Committee
Comments identify a secondary purpose:  "to make discovery." 
21
The next quoted paragraph states: "However, this rule has
been modified to allow limited discovery under Rules 34 and 35
for the purpose of perpetuating evidence pursuant to those
rules."  This would seem to suggest that a prior federal rule
might not have allowed "discovery" under Rules 34 and 35 for
the purpose of perpetuating evidence but that the Alabama rule
does.  This does not state that discovery under Rules 34 and
35 is only for the purpose of perpetuating evidence because
the next sentence states: "This rule permits production and
inspection under Rule 34 and physical or mental examination
under Rule 35, whether or not testimony is perpetuated."  
The language of Rule 27(a)(1) suggests that a petitioner
may seek to perpetuate testimony and may also seek discovery
under Rules 34 and 35.  The comments above confirm that the
rule allows both purposes (one is primary and the other
If there is a "primary purpose"--here, to perpetuate
21
testimony--then there must be a secondary purpose; otherwise,
the primary purpose would be the only purpose.
60
1130679 and 1130726
secondary) and that discovery under Rules 34 and 35 can be for
perpetuation purposes but is also "permit[ted] ... whether or
not testimony is perpetuated."22
The main opinion also suggests that Rule 27(a)(1) must be
read in pari materia with Rule 27(a)(3).  I freely concede
that subsection (a)(3) seems to imply that if the trial court
is satisfied that the "perpetuation of the testimony may
prevent a failure or delay of justice," then it may grant
discovery under Rules 34 and 35.  However, it seems odd to
describe 
discovery 
under 
those 
rules 
as 
acquiring 
"testimony." 
The production of documents and things and entry upon land for
inspection and other purposes under Rule 34 seem to implicate
no testimony at all.  And although a physical or mental
examination of persons under Rule 35 might result in
testimony, it does not seem that such testimony is of the sort
that could be in need of perpetuation.  Further, if we must
The main opinion cites the reporter's notes to Vermont's
22
version of Rule 27 in support of its holding.  Those notes
state that "the rule also permits production and inspection
under Rule 34 and physical or mental examination under Rule
35, whether or not a deposition is taken."  The notes further
state: "Rule 27(a)(1) provides for a verified petition for
perpetuation 
of 
testimony 
or 
other 
appropriate 
discovery 
...." 
Again, there is a clear distinction between perpetuation of
testimony and "other" discovery.
61
1130679 and 1130726
read the rule in pari materia, what of Rule 27(b), which deals
with discovery pending appeal?  It states, in part:
"If the court finds that the perpetuation of the
testimony or other discovery is proper to avoid a
failure or delay of justice, it may make an order as
provided in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of this
rule and thereupon discovery may be had and used in
the same manner and under the same conditions as are
prescribed in these rules for discovery in actions
pending in the circuit court."
This section characterizes what is available under Rules
34 and 35 as "other discovery [that] is proper to avoid a
failure or delay 
of 
justice," which is clearly distinguishable
from testimony to be perpetuated, but nevertheless references
subsection (a)(3).  Reading the entire rule in pari materia,
I am unconvinced that we should abandon the clear language of
Rule 27(a)(1).  Therefore, I would not overrule this Court's
prior decision in Ex parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961 (Ala.
1994).  
23
I am also not convinced by the petition for a writ of
23
mandamus that the trial court per se exceeded its discretion
in 
ordering answers to written interrogatories.  Rule 27(a)(1)
speaks generally to the perpetuation of testimony, and the
rule as a whole clearly contemplates the use of depositions in
doing so.  Rule 27(a)(4) specifies that "[i]f a deposition to
perpetuate testimony is taken," then it may be used in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 32(a) and (b), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  Interrogatories are answered under oath (Rule 33(a),
Ala. R. Civ. P.), are functionally little different from
62
1130679 and 1130726
Most problematic to me, however, is the paucity of
argument 
by 
the 
Ferrari 
defendants 
on 
this 
issue. 
Specifically, the petition for a writ of mandamus contains one
paragraph advancing the argument adopted by the main opinion. 
Comparing this one paragraph, which cites one case, the
federal rule, and our rule and comments, with the complex,
scholarly, detailed, and lengthy analysis in the main opinion
encompassing many pages, I do not think that the petition
demonstrated "a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought."  I therefore respectfully dissent.24
written depositions, and are generally used in court under
Rule 32(a) in the same manner as depositions. Committee
Comments on the 1973 Adoption of Rule 33, Ala. R. Civ. P.
("[T]he use of interrogatories is limited by Rule 32(a), as
well as by the ordinary rules of evidence.").  Based upon the
argument in the petition, I am hard-pressed to see a material
difference between answering interrogatories for the purpose
of perpetuating testimony and participating in a deposition
for the same purpose.
I express no opinion at this time as to the Ferrari
24
defendants' arguments pretermitted by the holding of the main
opinion, including their other objections to the scope of the
trial court's order, including the scope of any written
interrogatories.
63