Case Title: Ballard v. Lewis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S00-1311-PL-716

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
May 07 2014, 10:44 am
‘The Redistricting Statute for Marion County assigns the task of redrawing the County's
legislative districts to the judiciary ifthe County's legislative and executive branches become
deadlocked over required redistricting. Peterson v, Borst, 786 N.F.2d 668, 672, 676 (Ind), re'g
denied, 789 N.E.24 460 (Ind. 2003). Inthe case before us the Indianapolis Marion County
County Council and Mayor Gregory Ballard agreed on an ordinance

 

 

ividing the County into
legislative districts, and the legal question is whether that was done too early to satisty the

Redistricting Statute, A divided panel of trial court judges answered that question “yes” and then

 

 

drew new legislative districts. We hold that because this ease does not present a redistricting
impasse that requires judicial intervention, Mayor Ballard is entitled to summary judgment,

Accordingly, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural Background

Inthe fall of 2011, the majority ofthe City-County Coun
the Republican Party, as was Mayor Ballard. An eletion forthe Council's twenty-nine seats!
‘occurred on November 8, 2011. In that election, members from the Democrat

10 a majority of seats on the Council and thus would become the Council's majority upon being,

 

Council”) were members of

 

Panty were elected

‘wom into office on January 1, 2012. The Plaintiffs in this action ~ Councillors Maggie Lewis,
John Barth, and Vernon Brown (together “Councillor Lewis") ~ were either elected or re-elected
to the Council in that 2011 election, and all three are members ofthe Democratic Party

On November 22, 2011, Mayor Ballard signed an order establishing new precinct
boundaries forthe County. On December 5, 2011, Couneil President, Ryan Vaughn, introduced
Proposal 383, 2011 (“Proposal 353") tothe Council. Proposal 383 was a plan to reconfigure the
twenty-five distrits for elections tothe Council beginning in 2015, using the precinct boundaries
2011 order and data from the 2010 federal decennial
census. After conducting four public hearings the Counil's Rules and Publi Policy Committe
forwarded Proposal 353 along tothe full Council

established in the Mayor's November

 

" The Council presently consists of twenty-nine memibers: twenty-five elected by the respective voters of |
cach of the twenty-five districts and four members elected from an at-large district containing the entre
County
‘On December 19, 2011, the Council voted to approve Proposal 353 by a vote of fifteen to
fourteen, with all fifteen Republican Councillors voting for the Proposal and thirteen Democratic
Councillors and one Libertarian Councillor voting against the Proposal. On the same day,
Councillor Vaughn signed Proposal 353 as Council President. Proposal 353. was renamed
“Ordinance 61, 2011” (“Ordinance 61"). On December 22, 2011, Ordinance 61 was presented to
Mayor Ballard who approved and signed the Ordinance on January 1, 2012.

Later in 2012, the Council, then with a majority of Democratic members, approved an
ordinance that would have established different Council districts. All sixteen Democratic
Councillors voted for that ordinance, and all thirteen Republican Councillors voted against it.
Mayor Ballard vetoed that ordinance in December 2012. The Council did not vote to override the
0 that ordinance did not become law.

 

In February 2013, Councillor Lewis filed a complaint against Mark A. Sullivan, Patrick J
Dietrick, and Beth A. White eac

 

‘or her official capacity as a member of the Marion County
Election Board (“MCEB"). The complaint sought a declaration that Ordinance 61 failed to comply
‘with the “temporal parameters” of Indiana Code section 36-3-4-3, the Redistricting Statute for
Marion County (“Redistricting Statute"), Specifically, the complaint alleged that with Ordinance
61, the Council divided the County into districts in the year 2011, rather than during the year of
2012 as required by the Statute, The complaint also asked the court to enjoin the MCEB and
anyone else from using the districts established in Ordinance 61 to conduct the 2015 municipal

elections. In addition, Councillor Lewis urged the court to draw new districts for the County.

‘The court granted Mayor Ballard’s request to intervene as a defendant, and Mayor Ballard
‘and members of the MCEB filed an answer tothe complaint. Mayor Ballard moved fo

 

summary
judgment, and Councillor Lewis moved for partial summary judgment. The partes filed a joint
stipulation of facts with exhibits. Responses to the summary judgment motions were als filed.

five-member trial court then held oral argument on the competing summary judgment motions,

(On July 17, 2013, three of the five trial court judges hearing this ease joined in an order

 

denying Mayor Ballard’s motion for summary judgment and granting Councillor Le
for partial summary judgment. The order declared that with Ordinance 61, the Council “divided
the county by ordinance on December 19, 2011,” not during 2012 as required by the Redistricting
‘Statute; the order concluded that although Ordinance 61 was a validly-enacted ordinance, it failed
to satisfy the requirement for “mandatory redistricting” during 2012. (Appellant's Appendix
(App.”) at 212-16) Two judges dissented and wrote that Councillor Lewis’ claims should be
dismissed because Ordinance 61 complied with the Redistricting Statute’s requirement for
redistricting in 2012.

lai

 

 

(On August 26, 2013, the trial court issued a final judgment that, withthe assistance of a
‘master, divided the County into twenty-five new Council districts. The final judgment also ordered
‘payment ofthe master’s $6,000 fee? Three judges concurred in the final judgment, and two judges,
continued to dissent on the merits ofthe ease. (App. at 238.)

Mayor Ballard appealed and requested transfer pursuant to Appellate Rule S6(A). This
‘Court granted transfer and assumed jurisdiction over this appeal. The partis filed briefs and
presented oral argument to this Court. Common Cause Indiana filed a brief of amicus curiae
substantively aligned with Councillor Lewis.

Standard of Review

‘The standard of review for partial summary judgment isthe same as that used inthe tral
te only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and thatthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allen
v. Great American Reserve Ins, Co, 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1161 (Ind. 2002). Where the challenge to

the trial court’s summary judgment ruling presents only legal issues, not factual ones, the issues

 

court: summary judgment is appropri

 

final judgment ordered the Council and Mayor Ballard to spit equally the cot of the master. (App.
at 238.) However, in an “Onder Regarding Payment ofthe Master” issued less than two weeks later, the
court (1) declared that is final judgment ha ordered Councillor Lewis and Mayor Ballard to split equally
the master’s fee and (2) ordered the Marion County Auditor to issue payment tothe master. (App. at 258-
59.)

» The Court expresses is appreciation to the partis for their joint factual stipulation with exhibits and 19
the trial court judges fo their careful, detailed statements of the rationales for their rulings, all of which
{facilitate appellate review.
are reviewed de novo, Robertson v. B.O., 977 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ind. 2012). Similarly, a question
‘of statutory interpretation i subject to our de novo review. Pinnacle Prop, Dev. Grp., LLC v. Cit
of Jeffersonville, 893 N.E.2d 726, 727 (Ind. 2008).

Discussion
Mayor Ballard's primary appellate argument is that because Ordinance 61 met the

Redistricting Statutes requirement for redistricting during 2012, the trial court erred by awarding
‘Councillor Lewis partial summary judgment, denying his motion for summary judgment, and later

 

redistricting the County.

The version ofthe Redistricting Statute applicable here reads, in part

The city-county legislative body shall, by ordinance, divide the
whole county into twenty-five (25) districts that:

(1) are compact, subject only to natural boundary lines (such as
railroads, major highways, rivers erecks, parks, and major industrial
ccomplexes);

(2) contain, as nearly as is possible, equal population; and
(3) do not eross precinet boundary lines.

This division shall be made during the second year after a year in
which a federal decennial census is conducted and may also be made
‘at any other time, subject to IC 3-11-1.5-32.

Ind, Code § 36-3-4-3(a) (2007 Replacement Vol.) (emphasis added),* The statute further provides,
“If the legislative body fails to make the division before the date prescribed by subsection (a) or
the division i alleged to violate subsection (a) or other law, a taxpayer or registered voter ofthe
county may petition the superior court ofthe county to hear and determine the matter.” LC. § 36-
3-4-3(d). The statue also declares that the trial court “shall hear and determine the matter as a five
(5) member panel of judges from the superior court” and provides for selection of the five-member

 

“The version quoted above was in effect during 201! and 2012. The Redistricting Statute was amended in
2013, but the parties agree thatthe 2013 amendments donot apply to this ease.

5
panel. Id, In the action, the trial court “may appoint a master to assist in its determination and
‘may draw proper district boundaries if necessary.” Id,

‘The parties and tril court agree that for purpose of this ease the second year afte
‘hich a federal decennial census is conducted means 2012. And they refer to the “division” that

 

year in

 

“shall be made” during 2012 as “mandatory redistricting” and to the “division” that “may also be

‘made” at other times as “permissive redistricting.” They disagree, however, whether Ordinance

61 constitutes mandatory redistricting during 2012.

 

 

Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for judicial construction, but when a statute
is susceptible to more than one interpretation, itis deemed ambiguous and is thus open to judicial
‘construction. Thatcher v. City of Kokomo, 962 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ind. 2012). Where there is
ambiguity, courts resort to the rules of statutory construction so as to give effect to the General
Assembly's intent. Adams v, State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind, 2012).

Here, ambigui
divide” the County into legislative districts and that the

 

arises from the statutory requirement that the Council “by ordinance,
lvision” be made “during” 2012.

 

‘Mayor Ballard argues the trial court erred by concluding the Council divided the County
by Ordinance 61 on December 19, 2011. He contends that Ordinance 61 satisfies the requirement
for mandatory redistricting because Ordinance 61 divided the County into districts during 2012 ~
‘when he signed it on January 1, 2012, He invokes a rule of statutory construction providing that
statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia (on the same subject) and
should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme. See Klotz v. Hoyt,
900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2009); Horseman v, Keller, 841 N.F.2d 164, 168 (Ind. 2006). In particular,
‘Mayor Ballard relies on the statute that addresses the adoption of ordinances:

(@) _Anordinance or resolution passed by a legislative body is
considered adopted when it is:

(1) Signed by the presiding officer; and
2) ifsubjectto veto ether approved by the executive o
passed over the executive's veto by the legislative
body, under section 16 ofthis chapter.

(©) Unless a legislative body provides in an ordinance or
resolution for a later effective date, the ordinance or
resolution takes effect when itis adopted.

 

 

LC. § 36-3-4-14 (2011 Supp.) (emphasis added)’ Ordinance 61 likewise provides, “
‘ordinance shall be in full force and effect upon adoption and compliance with IC § 36-34-14.”
(App. at 7) Mayor Ballard thus concludes tha, by operation of statute and Ordinance 61s own
language, the division of the County by ordinance oceurred during 2012,

 

this

Mayor Ballard offers several altemative arguments. These include that (1) even if
Ordinance 61 failed to comply strictly with the requirements for redistricting during 2012, it
substantially complied with the requirement; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief;
and (3) under the circumstances, it was “unnecessary” forthe trial court to redraw the distits.

Councillor Lewis disagrees with the foregoing arguments and offers equally sound
arguments in defense of the trial coun’s decision. According to Councillor Lewis, the
Redistricting Statute should be construed to requi
‘ordinance in 2012, ‘Thus, Ondinance 61 does not satisfy the requirement that the Couneil divide

 

‘more than merely the Mayor's signature on an

the County in 2012 because all of she Council's activities occurred in 2011. Councillor Lewis
contends the Redistricting Statue’s reference tothe “legislative body” dividing the County (with
‘no mention of the executive) indicates the need for the Council to undertake redisticting-related
activities in 2012, and stresses that redistricting isa legislative function rather than an executive

‘Councillor Lewis further argues that allowing the outgoing Couneil to redistrict atthe end
‘02011 would conflict withthe will of the electorate as expressed most recently in the November

 

* Councillor Lewis does not deny that Ordinance 61, though ultimately approved by Mayor Ballard, was
subject to his veto under Indiana Code section 36-3-4-14
8, 2011 election. Also, Councillor Lewis offers a different in pari materia argument, contending
‘that despite Mayor Ballard’s November 22, 2011 order fixing new precinet boundaries, Indiana
Code section 3-11-1.5-38(€)(1) 2011 Supp.) would have allowed Mayor Ballard to change
precinet boundaries before January 1, 2012, thus showing the General Assembly intended forthe
Council not to perform its redistricting duties before January 1, 2012. Finally, in response to
Mayor Ballard’s alternative arguments, Councillor Lewis argues that Ordinance 61 did not
substantially comply with the requirement for redistricting in 2012, te trial court had jurisdiction

to grant relief, and it was necessary forthe trial court to redraw the districts

Both sides present reasonable arguments about how the Redistricting Statute should be
construed and, in particular, whether Ordinance 61 constitutes mandatory redistricting. Faced with
‘wo reasonable interpretations of the Redistricting Statute, we determine it proper, asa matter of
judi
<drawing in what is presumptively a matter for the legislative and executive branches of local

 

ial restraint - which we discuss below — to adopt the interpretation that avoids judi

 

‘government to address,

‘Courts must be careful to avoid substituting their own judgments forthe judgments ofthe
‘more politically responsive branches. Sloan v, State, 947 N.E.24 917, 923 (Ind. 2011; Fraley
Minger, 829 N.E.24 476, 492 (Ind. 2005); Sanchezv, State, 749 N.E.2d 509, $16 (Ind, 2001). This,
is especially 0 in redistricting cases® Such cases reflect a general hesitance of courts to step into
‘what Justice Felix Frankfurter called the “political thicket” of legislative reapportionment.
Colegrove v, Green, 328 U.S. $49, 56, reh'g denied, 329 US. 825 (1946)

Judicial restraints also suggested in the structure of our Redistricting Statute and precedent

applying it. The Redistricting Statute explicitly assigns the duty of dividing the County to the

 

© See Kingman Patk Civic Ass'n v, Williams, 924 A.24 979, 983-88 (D.C. 2007) (stating, when discussing
how to construe a redistricting state, “we must always bean mind the important principle that electoral
redistrieting is primarily the responsibilty of the legislature and is not a judicial function”); Inte
‘Constitutionaity of House Joint Resolution 25E, 863 So.2d 1176, 1178 (Fa. 2003) stating court would act

ith judicial restraint in reviewing legislative reapportionment plan “so as not to usurp primary
responsibilty for reapportionment, which ress with the Legislature”); Newhold v. Osser, 425 Pa. 478, 484,
230 A.2d 54, 57 (1967) (stating that in redstricting/reapportionment cases “courts have uniformly
approached the granting of relief in this area with the greatest caution and an effort to minimize judicial
ierference with legislative prerogatives”),

    

 
“legislative body.” And, by requiring that the division be made “by ondinanee,” the statute implies
‘an important role for the executive, as well. As the executive, a Mayor may approve or veto an
ordinance; he or she must return a vetoed ordinance tothe legislative body with a message stating
his or her reasons for the veto, and that veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the
legislative body. See 1.C. § 36-3-4-16 (2007 Replacement Vol) The tril court's role, however,
is contingent. The court becomes involved only “lif the legislative body fails to make the divi

 

before the date prescribed .... or the division is alleged to violate subsection (a) oF other law” and:
‘petition is filed asking the court to determine the matter; in that case, the court “may draw proper
district boundaries if necessary.” LC. § 36-3-4-3(@).

Eleven years ago, this Court issued a redistricting plan in Peterson, but judicial resolution

 

‘was required by the facts of that case, Democratic Mayor Peterson vetoed a redistricting ordinance
known as the “Borst Plan,” which was supported by the Council's Republican majority. The veto

 

left the County’s legislative and executive branches of government at loggetheads. No
redistricting ordinance was enacted in 2002 ahead of the May 2003 primary election, and distrct-
drawing by the judiciary was required to fill the void. See 786 N.E.2d at 670-71. Even so, we

explained that we acted with “great reluctance” i

 

resolving the] politically-charged redistricting
issue.” Id. at 678. We noted the need for courts to act “circumspectly” in such cases. Id, at 672
ich, 431 U.S, 407, 414-15 (1977). And we stressed that although we were
providing a redistricting plan, the Council remained free, subject to a mayoral veto, to adopt a
different plan if it could be done
Collectively, these passages reflect a preference for judicial restraint and deference tothe pol

(quoting Connor

 

 

1¢ for the upcoming primary election. Id. at 678.
1

 

process.

Inthe present case, Ordinance 61 was approved by the Council and by Mayor Ballard, and
it was formally adopted in 2012. See ILC. § 36-3-4-14(a). The trial court judges were divided on
the question of whether Ordinance 61 constituted mandatory redistricting during 2012, but al five
agreed that Ordinance 61 was lawfully enacted, having been signed into law by the Mayor on
January 1, 2012. (App. at 213, 217-18.) While recognizing Ondinance 61 as mandatory
redistricting is just one reasonable construction ofthe Redistricting Statute, we adopt it because it

allows legisatively-adopted districts to remain in place and avoids the need for districts drawn by
‘court. This reasonable construction of the statute is consonant with judicial restraint and leaves
redistricting inthe hands of the two branches of local government responsible for that task in the
first instance,

Finally, we note the disputed legal issue in this case has been one of timing, namely,
‘whether the Council acted too early. The complaint does not allege that Ordinance 61 was
substantively defective. That is, the complaint does not allege that Ordinance 61 failed to
incorporate data from the 2010 census, nor does it allege that Ordinance 61°s districts are not

 

‘compact or that they cross precinet boundary lines or fil to contain, as nearly as is possible, equal
population. See LC. § 36-3-4-3(a). Today’s decision upholds a redistricting ordinance whose
substance is unchallenged in the compl

 

7
Conclusion

‘We reverse the tial court's order of final judgment and remand this cause fo the trial court
\ith instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Mayor Ballard. We also reverse any order

‘requiring Mayor Ballard to pay part of the cost of the master.

Dickson, CJ., and Rucker, David, Massa and Rush, JJ, concur.