Case Title: In re Joseph Hurley, Esq.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 151 152

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN RE JOSEPH A. HURLEY
,  
ESQUIRE 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
     Nos. 151/152, 2020 
 
     Court Below – Superior Court 
     of the State of Delaware 
 
 
     C.A. Nos.  S20M-03-003 
 
 
N20M-03-010 
 
Submitted: 
May 26, 2021 
Decided:   
July 28, 2021 
 
Before V
ALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant Joseph A. Hurley. 
 
Ryan T. Costa, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, 
Delaware; for Appellee the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justice: 
 
This appeal regards a civil contempt order.  Appellant Joseph A. Hurley represents 
Clay Conaway, a former college athlete charged with raping six women.  After the case 
attracted media attention, the Superior Court entered an order prohibiting counsel from 
making public comments except to the extent permitted under Rule 3.6 of the Delaware 
Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct (“DLRPC”).  Hurley twice spoke to reporters while 
the order was in force.  The court held that both sets of comments violated the order and 
found Hurley in civil contempt of court. 
On appeal, Hurley argues that the Superior Court erred by holding that there was a 
substantial likelihood his comments would materially prejudice pending proceedings.  For 
the reasons that follow, this Court affirms the Superior Court’s contempt order and denies 
Hurley’s motion for judicial notice. 
I. 
RELEV
ANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
The contempt findings arose out of Hurley’s representation of Conaway in connection 
with multiple rape charges.2  The case attracted extensive media coverage from local and 
national outlets.3  
 
1 The Court granted an unopposed motion to consolidate these appeals because they present similar 
and related legal issues.  In re Hurley, Nos. 151 & 152, 2020 (Del. May 27, 2020) (ORDER). 
2 State v. Conaway, 2019 WL 3431594, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 30, 2019). 
3 App. to Opening Br. 44 (No. 152, 2020) (hereafter, “AA_”). 
 
3 
 
In July 2019, the Superior Court granted a motion to sever the charges against 
Conaway, resulting in six separate proceedings. 4  The first trial was held in September 2019.5  
Conaway was convicted of Rape in the Fourth Degree.6   After the conviction but before 
sentencing, the Superior Court entered an order (the “Gag Order”) in each of the six criminal 
cases.7  The Gag Order prohibited counsel from making public statements except to the 
extent allowed under Rule 3.6 of the DLRPC: 
1) The parties in these proceedings have a right to have 
the merits decided by a fair and impartial jury.  Without an order 
limiting publicity, I find that any comments beyond what is 
allowed in Rule 3.6 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Professional 
Conduct Rules would cause a substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice to these rights as well as to the integrity of the criminal 
justice system;   
2) Counsel for the State of Delaware (the ‘State’) and 
counsel for the Defendant are prohibited from public comment 
about these matters except as permitted under Rule 3.6 of the 
Delaware Lawyers’ Professional Conduct Rule.8 
 
4 See Conaway, 2019 WL 3431594, at *1. 
5 AA44. 
6 Id. 
7 Ex. A to Appellees’ Opp’n to Appellant’s Mot. to Take Judicial Notice 1-5 (Nos. 151, 2020 & 152, 
2020) (Oct. 2, 2019) (footnote omitted). 
8 Id. (footnote omitted). 
4 
 
The Superior Court held a sentencing hearing in November 2019.9  During the 
hearing, the prosecution argued that Conaway’s lack of remorse was partially explained by 
his parents’ attitude towards the charges and the victims.10  Defense counsel did not object.11 
After the sentencing hearing, Hurley gave an interview with a reporter from the News 
Journal.12  As reported by the News Journal, Hurley said he was “horrified” by the 
prosecutor’s statements: 
After the hearing, Conaway’s attorney Joe Hurley 
strongly criticized arguments made by [the] state prosecutor 
. . . in which she pointed to comments made by Conaway and 
his parents . . . to demonstrate what the state saw as a lack of 
remorse and possibly learned attitudes. 
“Arguing that the defendant is so attractive that girls 
flock to him and he can’t help it . . .  This is not a defense to rape.  
It’s an excuse,”  [the prosecutor] said. 
Hurley said he was “horrified” that [the prosecutor] 
implicitly blamed Conaway’s parents for his actions. 
“There’s no excuse for that,” Hurley said.  “Why would 
you do that to a parent?”13 
 
9 See App. to Opening Br. 28-42 (No. 151, 2020) (hereafter, “A_”). 
10 A29 to 31, at 2:21-4:3. 
11 See id. (showing no objections).  Hurley claims that he did not object to these statements because 
his co-counsel took the lead during the sentencing hearing, and “[t]he . . . protocol with which the 
Appellant was familiar for several decades was . . . that when there are multiple Attorneys 
representing a single client, . . . the Attorney who ‘has the floor’ with regard to the particular point 
of advocacy . . . is the only Attorney who should address the Court.”  Opening Br. 6 (No. 151, 2020). 
12 See A8. 
13 A8-9 (emphasis added). 
5 
 
Approximately two weeks later, the prosecution filed a letter with the Superior Court 
claiming that Hurley violated the Gag Order.14  Hurley submitted a letter denying that he 
violated the order.15  On December 18, 2019, the Superior Court advised counsel that “[t]he 
submissions on whether or not Mr. Hurley should be cited from criminal contempt are under 
advisement.”16  The court also reissued the Gag Order.17 
In February 2020, the jury in the second criminal case found Conaway guilty of 
Unlawful Sexual Contact.18  Shortly afterwards, Hurley gave a videotaped interview with a 
reporter from the News Journal.  During the interview, the reporter asked Hurley how he felt 
about Conaway being convicted of a misdemeanor charge.  Hurley responded, “There was 
a reasonable basis for it, even though she put herself there.”19  
A few days later, the prosecution filed a letter with the Superior Court alleging that 
Hurley had violated the Gag Order by making several additional statements to the press, 
including the videotaped interview quoted above.20  Hurley responded that his comments 
did not violate the order.21 
 
14 A8-11. 
15 A14-17. 
16 A18. 
17 A19-23. 
18 AA49. 
19 See, e.g., AA84, at 18:2-6 (emphasis added). 
20 AA49-51. 
21 AA52-62. 
6 
 
In March 2020, the Superior Court held a teleconference regarding Hurley’s 
purported violations of the Gag Order.22  There was no dispute that Hurley “kn[ew] or 
reasonably should [have] know[n]” that both interviews “w[ould] be disseminated by means 
of public communication.”23  The sole question before the court, therefore, was whether 
Hurley knew or reasonably should have known that his comments “w[ould] have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding . . . .”24 
The court held that both of Hurley’s statements violated the Gag Order.  Regarding 
the first interview, the court found that Hurley knew or should have known that disparaging 
the prosecutor weeks before the second trial was scheduled to begin had a substantial 
likelihood of prejudicing that proceeding: 
[T]his is something that was done close in time to the trial of 
December 2nd . . . .  [T]his would have a substantial likelihood 
of material[ly] prejudicing a judicial proceeding by creating the 
impression publicly that the state prosecutor was off the rails and 
was doing something so horrific to make the prosecutor look 
really in a terribly demeaning way.25 
Regarding the second interview, the court found that Hurley knew or should have 
known that attacking the victim’s credibility had a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the 
four remaining cases: 
I’m looking at, “even though she put herself there.”  Again, you 
take this in context to the fact we have had [gag] orders in each 
 
22 AA67-94. 
23 See DLRPC 3.6(a). 
24 See id. 
25 AA82, at 16:9-22. 
7 
 
of these cases, we have ongoing cases, and we have 
complaining witnesses in maybe four more cases as well.  [The 
comments to Rule 3.6 provide that] a lawyer cannot attack the 
credibility . . . of a witness or [the] expected testimony of a 
witness. 
 
In the way this comes out, it would appear to me to be 
too much.  It is . . . victim blaming.  There is no comparative 
negligence in criminal law.  And it is an argument that is painting 
a better picture for Mr. Conaway . . . to try to get that out in the 
court of public opinion for the upcoming four trials. 
 
So I am finding that this is a violation.26 
Thus, the court found Hurley in civil contempt of court and ordered that he deposit 
$5,000.00 with the court as a remedial measure: 
This is civil contempt.  This is not criminal contempt.  So 
what I am going to require you to do is pay $5,000 payable to 
the Sussex County Prothonotary.  That money will be held by 
the Court in one of its accounts.  And you will pay this money 
within ten business days.  And upon conclusion of all the trials, 
all four more if that’s what we have, if there are no further issues 
with respect to the publicity order, then you will get that money 
back.  It’s that simple. 
The purpose of the order, again, is remedial.  You are not 
being punished.  This is not a criminal matter at all.  It is 
designed to provide some incentive to keep things in bounds and 
to enable the Court to have a process that is fair to getting a jury 
which is impartial, recognizing the competing interests that we 
have in play.27 
Hurley appeals the contempt order. 
 
 
26 AA89, at 23:7-22. 
27 AA90-91, at 24:9-25:2.  See also Order of Civil Contempt as to Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, 
State v. Conaway, S20M-03-003 & N20M-03-010 (Mar. 13, 2020). 
8 
 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination that a party or 
attorney was in contempt of court.28  Factual findings are reviewed for clear error.29 
Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo.30 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
The Superior Court has the “inherent authority . . . to impose either civil or criminal 
sanctions for contempt.”31 The standard of proof required in a civil contempt proceeding is 
a preponderance of the evidence.32  Whether a contempt sanction is civil or remedial depends 
 
28 See In re Hurley, 237 A.3d 69, 2020 WL 4333589, at *3 n.22 (Del. July 28, 2020) (TABLE) (“If 
there is no issue of law, we review the court’s sanctions in a contempt proceeding for an abuse of 
discretion.” (citing In re Ramunno, 586 A.2d 1202, 1990 WL 255488, at *1 (Del. 1990) (TABLE))); 
Harris v. Frank-Harris, 86 A.2d 1118, 2014 WL 1003588, at *2 (Del. Mar. 7, 2014) (TABLE) 
(“Husband first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Husband was in 
contempt of the separation agreement . . . .” (emphasis added)); Guest v. Guest, 839 A.2d 665, 
2003 WL 22931400, at *2 (Del. Dec. 8, 2003) (TABLE) (“Mother’s claim of abuse of discretion is 
unavailing.  In the absence of a transcript of the hearing at which Mother was found in contempt of 
the Family Court’s . . . order . . ., this Court has no adequate basis for evaluating the merits of 
Mother’s claims.” (emphasis added) (citing Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334, 1336–37 (Del. 1992))); 
Ramunno v. State, 1990 WL 140057, at *2 (Del. Sept. 11, 1990) (“The basis for appellant’s appeal 
. . . is the claim that the [Family] Court abused its discretion in finding the appellant guilty of criminal 
contempt and in so finding as a matter of law.” (emphasis added)). 
29 See, e.g., Harris, 2014 WL 1003588, at *2 (“Findings of fact will be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous” in an appeal from a contempt sanction (citing Clark v. Clark, 47 A.3d 513, 516-17 
(Del. 2012))). 
30 See, e.g., Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 788 (Del. 2003) (“This Court reviews Constitutional claims 
de novo to determine if the trial court committed an error of law.” (citing Seward v. State, 
723 A.2d 365, 375 (Del. 1999))). 
31 DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Del. 1996) (citing Young v. United States ex rel. 
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987)). 
32 See, e.g., Wilm. Fed. of Tchrs. v. Howell, 374 A.2d 832, 838 (Del. 1977) (“[W]e find that the 
School Board met its burden of establishing contemptuous conduct by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” (citations omitted)).  C.f. City of Wilm. v. Gen. Teamsters Loc. Union 326, 321 A.2d 123, 
125-26 (Del. 1974) (“The Vice Chancellor had some doubt as to the precise nature of the proceeding, 
9 
 
upon “the character and purpose of the sanction imposed.”33  “A fine is ‘considered civil and 
remedial’ if it either ‘coerce[s] the [sanctioned party] into compliance with the court’s order, 
[or] . . . compensate[s] the complainant for losses sustained.”34  
The Gag Order prohibited counsel from making “public comment . . . except as 
permitted under Rule 3.6.”35  Under Rule 3.6, a lawyer is prohibited from making a public 
statement that the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, “will have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter:”   
(a) 
A lawyer who is participating or has participated 
in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an 
extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know will be disseminated by means of public 
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
matter.36   
Comment five to Rule 3.6 provides several examples of “subjects which are more 
likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they 
refer to . . . a criminal matter.”  One of the likely-prejudicial subjects is “the character, 
credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a . . . witness . . . .” 
 
as indicated by his statement to the effect that the evidence was insufficient to convict ‘even under 
the preponderance of evidence rule.’  This is significant because the standard of proof required in a 
criminal contempt proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
33 DiSabatino, 671 A.2d at 1349. 
34 Id. (most alterations in original) (citing United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994)). 
35 AA48, at ¶ 2. 
36 DLRPC Rule 3.6(a). 
10 
 
The Rule 3.6 prohibition is subject to one safe harbor that is relevant to this appeal.  
Subsection (c) allows a lawyer to make a statement the lawyer reasonably believes necessary 
“to protect a client from substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated 
by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.”  Such statements “shall be limited,” however, to 
“information . . . necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.”  This Opinion refers to 
the subsection (c) safe harbor as the “Self-Help Safe Harbor.” 
Notwithstanding Hurley’s suggestion to the contrary,37 it is clear that the Superior 
Court imposed a civil contempt sanction designed to induce cooperation with the Gag Order, 
not a punitive criminal sanction.38  The Superior Court therefore applied the correct burden 
of proof to its civil contempt finding.39  Hurley also concedes that he knew or should have 
known that his comments were likely to be published.40  The sole questions on appeal, 
therefore, are whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by holding that Hurley knew, 
or reasonably should have known, that his public comments had a substantial likelihood of 
 
37 See Opening Br. 10 (No. 151, 2020) (relying on cases addressing criminal contempt sanctions to 
suggest that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to the Superior Court’s determination 
in this case). 
38 See AA90-91, at 24:9-25:2. 
39 See, e.g., Howell, 374 A.2d at 838.  C.f. In re Hurley, 2020 WL 4333589, at *4 (holding that the 
trial court found Hurley in criminal, rather than civil, contempt of court because the monetary 
sanction was punitive). 
40 See, e.g., Opening Br. 7 (No 152, 2020) (“It is clear, without dispute, that the Appellant recognized 
public dissemination that may occur should remarks be considered newsworthy.  This is not an issue 
in the case.”). 
11 
 
materially prejudicing pending proceedings; and if not, whether Hurley’s comments were 
protected by the Self-Help Safe Harbor. 
A. 
The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Holding that 
Hurley’s Comment Regarding the Prosecutor Violated the Gag Order 
After the sentencing hearing in the first trial, Hurley told a reporter that he was 
“horrified” by the prosecutor’s comments.41  The Superior Court found that Hurley knew or 
should have known there was a substantial likelihood that his comment would materially 
prejudice upcoming proceedings “by creating the impression . . . that the state prosecutor 
was off the rails . . . and doing something . . . horrific . . . .”42  The court noted that Hurley 
knew when he made this comment that the second trial was scheduled to begin soon and that 
the prosecutor would be involved in the second trial.43 
Hurley’s main argument on appeal is that he did not violate the Gag Order because 
there was not a substantial likelihood that his comments could cause material prejudice to 
pending proceedings.  Hurley contends that given the extensive media attention, his 
comments could not change the hearts and minds of prospective jurors.  The Court rejects 
this argument.  The extensive media coverage would likely increase the risk of harm by 
broadcasting problematic comments to a wider audience.  Hurley does not explain how 
 
41 A8-9. 
42 AA82, at 16:19-22. 
43 See id. 
12 
 
existing press coverage mitigated his comments; and a lawyer’s “statements are likely to be 
received as especially authoritative.”44  
More fundamentally, Hurley does not grapple with the Superior Court’s holding that 
disparaging the prosecutor weeks before the second trial was scheduled to begin would 
materially prejudice pending proceedings.  Hurley also undermines his own position by 
claiming that he spoke with the reporter to protect Conaway from undue prejudice.45  It is 
difficult to understand how Hurley could have simultaneously thought his comments would 
be helpful and that his comments would not influence potential jurors.  Thus, none of 
Hurley’s arguments show that the Superior Court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings 
or abused its discretion in holding that there was a substantial likelihood that his comments 
would materially prejudice pending proceedings. 
Next, Hurley argues that his comment qualified for the Self-Help Safe Harbor.46  This 
argument also fails.  It was not reasonably necessary for Hurley to express “horror” to set the 
record straight.  Hurley could have given a narrower denial focusing on the facts the 
prosecutor supposedly got wrong.    Further, Hurley did not make his comment in response 
to adverse “publicity.”  Rather, he made his comment in response to the prosecutor’s 
statements in the courtroom.  The Self-Help Safe Harbor is not designed to give lawyers an 
alternative to making timely objections.  It is designed to allow lawyers to exercise self-help 
 
44 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (citations omitted). 
45 See Opening Br. 18-19 (No. 151, 2020). 
46 Id. 
13 
 
in response to comments made outside the courtroom.  Hurley also places undue emphasis 
on protecting the parents’ reputation.47  Setting aside whether the prosecutor’s statements 
were advisable, the Self-Help Safe Harbor allows a lawyer to make public comments to 
protect their client, not third-parties.  Thus, much of Hurley’s argument misses the mark.48 
Finally, Hurley appears to suggest that his statements were protected under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  In Gentile, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the substantial-likelihood-of-material-prejudice standard because lawyers are “key 
participants in the criminal justice system,” with “special access to information,” whose 
“extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding.” 49  Hurley’s 
passing reference to the First Amendment does not explain how the Superior Court erred in 
finding that his comments created a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the Superior Court’s finding that Hurley’s public 
comments regarding the prosecutor violated the Gag Order. 
B. 
The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding that 
Hurley’s Victim-Blaming Comment Violated the Gag Order 
After Conaway was convicted at the second trial, Hurley told a reporter in a 
videotaped interview that “[t]here was a reasonable basis” for the verdict, “even though [the 
 
47 Id. at 12. 
48 See, e.g., id. 
49 501 U.S. at 1074 (first citing In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J. 1982); and then citing In re 
Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1982)). 
14 
 
victim] put herself there.”50  The Superior Court held that Hurley knew or should have 
known there was a substantial likelihood that his comment would materially prejudice 
upcoming proceedings by undermining the credibility of the complaining witnesses51 and 
by “painting a better picture for Mr. Conaway . . . in the court of public opinion.”52  The court 
also noted that Hurley’s statement ran afoul of the comments to Rule 3.6, which “provide 
that a lawyer cannot attack the credibility . . . of a witness.”53  
Hurley argues that the Superior Court erred by failing to consider the context of his 
statement, including observing his demeanor and the extensive media coverage surrounding 
the Conaway prosecution.54  Hurley also makes a passing reference to freedom of speech 
protections under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The Court rejects Hurley’s arguments.  Hurley’s core complaint seems to be that the 
Superior Court would have made a different decision if it had watched the videotaped 
interview.  This is incorrect.  The record shows that the court watched the video multiple 
times.  The court also offered to play the video during the contempt hearing, but Hurley 
refused.55  Hurley’s argument therefore boils down to an assertion that the court could have 
 
50 See, e.g., AA84, at 18:5-6. 
51 AA89, at 23:6-22. 
52 Id. at 23:18-20. 
53 DLRPC Rule 3.6 cmnt. 5. 
54 See Opening Br. 8-10 (No. 152, 2020). 
55 See AA83, at 17:16-23 (“THE COURT:  We have the interview and I have looked at the interview 
more than once. . . .  I have the video here if you would like me to play it.  Is there any need to do 
that? . . . MR HURLEY:  I’m not asking for that.” (emphasis added)). 
15 
 
viewed the evidence differently.  This falls far short of demonstrating that the Superior Court 
relied on clearly erroneous factual findings.56 
Hurley’s other arguments fare no better.  The presence of extensive media coverage 
increases the risk of prejudice for the reasons stated above.  Likewise, Hurley’s passing 
reference to freedom of speech protections does not change the analysis.  As noted above, 
the United States Supreme Court has upheld the substantial-likelihood-of-material-prejudice 
standard.57  And here, the Superior Court properly applied the substantial-likelihood-of-
material-prejudice standard.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the Superior Court’s finding 
that Hurley’s public comments regarding the victim violated the Gag Order. 
C. 
This Court Denies Hurley’s Motion for Judicial Notice 
Hurley has asked the Court to take judicial notice of several publications regarding 
the Conaway prosecution.58  The reasoning of this motion is unclear.  As best the Court can 
decipher, Hurley seeks to admit these articles to show that his comments were not widely 
disseminated.59  But there is no dispute that Hurley’s remarks were published,60 and Hurley 
concedes he knew that his comments were likely to be published when he spoke to the 
 
56 See, e.g., Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 483 (Del. 2003). 
57 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (first citing In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J. 1982); and then citing 
In re Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1982)). 
58 Appellant’s Am. Mot. Seeking the Court to Take Judicial Notice ¶¶ A-D (No. 152, 2020) 
(Jan. 26, 2021). 
59 See id. at ¶ C. 
60 See, e.g., A8-9 (recounting Hurley’s published remarks disparaging the prosecutor); AA89, at 
23:7-22 (recounting Hurley’s published victim-blaming comments).  
16 
 
reporters.61  And Hurley’s motion offers no explanation regarding why the extent to which 
his comments were not more broadly published would change the outcome of this appeal.  
For these reasons, the Court denies Hurley’s motion for judicial notice. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons provided above, this Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Superior 
Court as reflected in its March 13, 2020 order of civil contempt.  Hurley’s motion for judicial 
notice is DENIED. 
 
61 See, e.g., Opening Br. 7 (No. 152, 2020) (“It is clear, without dispute, that the Appellant recognized 
public dissemination that may occur should remarks be considered newsworthy.  This is not an issue 
in the case.”).