Case Title: SWEET v EDMONDS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12994 I N T H E SUPREME COlJRT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 CLINTON SWEET, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - KENNETH E D M O N D S , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Joseph P. Hennessey argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson and Gallagher, B i l l i n g s , Montana Ronald R. Lodders argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted : September 10, 1976 Dec ided : fi c i : j Filed : M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal by p l a i n t i f f Clinton Sweet from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granting defendant Kenneth Edmonds' motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . P l a i n t i f f w a s injured when h i s automobile was s t r u c k by another automobile driven by defendant. P l a i n t i f f ' s subsequent negligence a c t i o n a g a i n s t defendant w a s t r i e d i n January 1975 before a jury i n Yellowstone County. A t t h e c l o s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e i n c h i e f , defendant moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e grounds p l a i n t i f f was con- t r i b u t o r i l y negligent and t h e proof w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t any negligence on t h e p a r t of defendant was a proximate cause of t h e c o l l i s i o n . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted defendant's motion. After c a r e f u l examination of t h e record, w e hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have allowed t h e c a s e t o go t o t h e jury. The c o l l i s i o n occurred i n t h e e a r l y morning hours a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Sixth S t r e e t West and Broadwater Avenue i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. A t t h a t point Broadwater w a s a four l a n e through s t r e e t and t h e r e was a s t o p sign on Sixth. The posted speed l i m i t was twenty-five miles per hour. The street w a s d r y , t h e weather was c l e a r , and t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was lit by a street l i g h t on t h e corner. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d a t t h e t r i a l t h a t he approached Broadwater from t h e south, stopped a t t h e s t o p sign on Sixth, and looked i n both d i r e c t i o n s f o r t r a f f i c . H e s a i d he was turning r i g h t onto Broadwater when he was h i t from behind by defendant's automobile which was proceeding e a s t on Broadwater i n t h e f a r r i g h t hand lane. P l a i n t i f f conceded he had a c l e a r view t o t h e w e s t of about one c i t y block when stopped a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , but maintained he never saw defendant's automo- b i l e . Defendant t e s t i f i e d he was d r i v i n g about t h i r t y m i l e s per hour and saw p l a i n t i f f ' s automobile only a second before t h e c o l l i s i o n . Defendant argues p l a i n t i f f v i o l a t e d t h e right-of-way r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d by s e c t i o n 32-2172, R.C.M. 1947, and was con- t r i b u t o r i l y negligent a s a matter of law by e n t e r i n g Broad- w a t e r when defendant's automobile w a s s o c l o s e a s t o c o n s t i t u t e an immediate hazard. The defense of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence, by d e f i n i t i o n , r e q u i r e s proof of both negligence and proximate cause. Grabs v. Missoula Cartage Co., Mont. , 545 P.2d 1079, 33 St.Rep. 154; G i l l e a r d v. Draine, 159 Mont. 167, 171, 496 P.2d 83. W e s a i d i n Erickson v. P e r r e t t , Mont . I 545 P.2d 1074, 1077, 33 St.Rep. 109: "We note t h a t t h e m e r e happening of an accident i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence of neg- ligence. Flansberg v. Montana Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 58, 460 P.2d 263; F r i e s v. Shaughnessy, 159 Mont. 307, 310, 496 P.2d 1159. Further when t h e breach of a s t a t u - t o r y duty is a l l e g e d , t h a t duty required by s t a t u t e must be t h e e f f i c i e n t o r proximate cause of t h e damages f o r negligence t o be predicated on t h e v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e . J o k i v. McBride, 150 Mont. 378, 436 P.2d 78; Rauh v. Jensen, 161 Mont. 443, 445, 507 P.2d 520." Defendant has computed from testimony i n t h e record concerning t h e p o i n t of impact and t h e r e s p e c t i v e speeds of t h e two vehi- cles t h a t he w a s only about ninety-six f e e t away when p l a i n t i f f began turning onto Broadwater. A s p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he had a clear view t o t h e west of about one c i t y block, defendant concludes p l a i n t i f f was negligent i n not seeing him and i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t i f p l a i n t i f f d i d s e e defendant's automobile he was negligent i n turning onto Broadwater i n t h e f a c e of obvious danger. O n t h e o t h e r hand, p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he stopped a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , looked t o t h e west, and d i d not see defendant's automobile. I n Jessen v. O'Daniel, 136 Mont. 513, 523, 349 P.2d 107, w e s a i d : " * * * A m o t o r i s t i s not required t o look f o r m i l e s up a road i n order t o a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e r e a r e no v e h i c l e s approaching. A l l t h a t is required of him i s t h a t he look s u f f i c i e n t l y f a r t o be s u r e t h a t t h e r e a r e no approaching v e h i c l e s which, i n t h e mind of a reasonably prudent person, would be l i k e l y t o cause an accident i f he proceeded i n t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . " It i s undisputed t h a t defendant was d r i v i n g i n excess of t h e l e g a l speed l i m i t , a f a c t which p l a i n t i f f w a s not bound t o a n t i c i p a t e . Grabs v. Missoula Cartage Co., Mont . I 545 P.2d 1079, 33 St.Rep. 154. Defendant a l s o t e s t i f i e d he d i d not s e e p l a i n t i f f ' s automobile u n t i l immediately before t h e c o l l i s i o n . A favored d r i v e r cannot r e l y a b s o l u t e l y on h i s right-of-way; he must a c t reasonably and maintain a proper look- o u t . Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co., 94 Mont. 2 0 4 , 215, 2 1 P.2d I n McGuire v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 195, 536 P.2d 768, 32 St.Rep. 600, we said: " I t has long been held by t h i s Court t h a t t h e l a w does not favor d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s and t h e evidence t h e r e f o r e w i l l be viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o a p p e l l a n t s , as having proved what it tends t o prove. Johnson v. Chicago, M. & S t . P. R. Co., 71 Mont. 390, 394, 230 P. 52. This Court has a l s o long held t h a t c a s e s should not be withdrawn from a jury unless reasonable and fair-minded men could reach only one conclusion from t h e f a c t s . I n r e E s t a t e of Hall v. Milkovich, 158 Mont. 438, 492 P.2d 1388." The f a c t s here do not d i c t a t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent. W e cannot say defendant's automobile w a s so c l o s e t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n when p l a i n t i f f turned onto Broadwater a s t o c r e a t e an immediate hazard a s a matter of law. Whether p l a i n t i f f could reasonably expect t o complete t h e t u r n s a f e l y was a question f o r t h e jury. The jury should a l s o have been allowed t o d e t e r - mine whether p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n s were t h e proximate cause of t h e c o l l i s i o n r a t h e r than defendant's excessive speed o r h i s f a i l u r e t o keep a proper lookout. S i m i l a r l y , t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t should not have been granted on the basis that plaintiff failed to prove a causal relationship between defendant's acts and the collision. The evidence was undisputed that: (1) defendant was driving in excess of the legal speed limit; (2) he had been drinking prior to the collision; and (3) he did not see plaintiff's automobile until immediately before the collision. When viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, this evidence is sufficient to enable a jury to reasonably find defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the collision. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. We concur: f,- I Chief Justice 'U Justice