Case Title: Constant v. Hodges

Citation: 292 Ark. 439, 730 S.W.2d 892

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1987-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
730 S.W.2d 892 (1987) 292 Ark. 439 Bruce CONSTANT, et ux, Appellants, v. Sam HODGES, et ux, et al, Appellees. No. 86-312. Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 15, 1987. *893 Ivester, Henry, Skinner & Camp by David P. Henry, Little Rock, for appellants. House, Wallace & Jewell by Don F. Hamilton and Janice W. Vaughn, Little Rock, for appellees. HICKMAN, Justice. This is a suit to enforce a restrictive covenant in several instruments applicable to the Robinwood Subdivision of Little Rock. The appellants owned one of the large lots in Robinwood on the corner of Cantrell Road and Misty Lane, consisting of 1.73 acres. Their house burned in 1983, and the lot remains vacant. The appellants applied to the Little Rock Planning Commission to divide their lot into four smaller lots. Permission was denied. A request was then made to divide the lot into two lots. That request was granted. A request for another split was filed but deferred when this lawsuit was filed. The appellees, several residents of Robinwood, sued to prevent breaking up the lot and to enforce restrictive covenants applicable to Robinwood. The chancellor held the restrictive covenants limited the use of the lot to a single family residence, and it could not be divided. The appellants make two arguments on appeal. First, their land was not subject to such a restriction, and second, the chancellor was wrong in finding the existence of a general plan of development which would permit enforcement of the restrictive covenants in question. The chancellor was unquestionably right and we affirm the decree. It is agreed that there are three relevant instruments. First, a bill of assurance was filed in 1949 which provides in part: "The lands hereinbefore described shall be restricted to detached single-family residences; garages, servants' quarters, and other outbuildings must be clearly incidental to residential use of said land." The bill of assurance said its purpose was to carry out ... "a general plan to develop said lands as a high-class suburban residential property." The parties agree a deed to a predecessor in title of the appellants is applicable and contains this language: "This conveyance is subject to the reservations, covenants, and restrictions set forth in the Bill of Assurance dated November 15, 1949, ... Only one detached single-family residence with only one story at or above ground level ... shall be erected..." The same date the deed was executed, a memorandum of agreement was executed and later filed. It provided in part: Nathaniel Griffin, who was director of city planning in Little Rock in 1977 and has a masters degree in city planning, testified at length about the Robinwood Subdivision. Some of his testimony is especially relevant: W.P. Hamilton, a Little Rock lawyer, testified he was personally familiar with the development of Robinwood. He said: "It is my opinion that the Constants' proposals are inconsistent with the development pattern in the neighborhood and would adversely effect property values." Sam Hodges, one of the appellees, testified that he had lived in Robinwood for 20 years. He said: After hearing the testimony and examining the documents, the chancellor made these findings: On appeal we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee. Sipes v. Munro, 287 Ark. 244, 697 S.W.2d 905 (1985). We do not reverse a finding of fact by a chancellor unless it is clearly wrong. ARCP 52; Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986). Using this criteria, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the chancellor's finding that a general plan of development existed for Robinwood. That is important because if no general plan of development exists, the general rule is that restrictive covenants cannot be enforced. Jones v. Cook, 271 Ark. 870, 611 S.W.2d 506 (1981). The test of whether such a plan exists is "whether substantial common restrictions apply to all *895 lots of like character or similarly situated." Jones v. Cook, supra. In this case the existence of large lots with single family residences has remained unbreached since its inception. The appellants attack the three instruments in detail, arguing that they do not apply for several reasons: The bill of assurance does not prohibit dividing a lot; the trial court did not specify which of the three instruments was binding or a basis for his decision; the deed contained no restrictions in the granting clause, and the only restriction contained therein appears after the habendum clause with none in the granting clause; and the covenant did not "run with the land." On appeal our only duty is to decide if the chancellor was wrong. Indeed, if he reaches the right result but for wrong reasons, he will be upheld. At one point the court remarked: This is apparently what the chancellor did, considered all the instruments, in deciding that the restrictive covenant did exist which prohibited dividing this lot. In reviewing instruments, our first duty is to "give effect to every word, sentence and provision of a deed where possible to do so and give effect to the intention of the parties." Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532 (1974). That intent in this case is gathered from all the instruments. We agree with the appellees that there is little room for doubt that these instruments contain a restrictive covenant that prohibits the action the appellants seek to take. Affirmed. GLAZE, J., not participating.