Case Title: Commonwealth v. Rossetti

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12815

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12815 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANDREW M. ROSSETTI. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     January 7, 2020. - June 15, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Continuance without a finding, Dismissal, 
Appeal by Commonwealth, Sentence.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Pittsfield Division 
of the District Court Department on February 28, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to revise or revoke sentence was considered by 
William A. Rota, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Megan L. Rose, Assistant District Attorney (Jeanne M. 
Kempthorne, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Cara M. Cheyette for the defendant. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The instant case is a companion case to 
Commonwealth v. Beverly, 485 Mass.     (2020), and Commonwealth 
v. Ellsworth, 485 Mass.     (2020).  For the reasons stated in 
2 
 
Beverly, supra at    , we conclude that the sentencing judge 
imposed an illegal sentence by entering a continuance without a 
finding and immediately dismissing a charge absent any terms and 
conditions, or probation.  For the reasons discussed therein, 
however, we nevertheless decline to remand this case for 
resentencing as to the illegal sentences. 
1.  Background.  The facts underlying the instant case 
involve an altercation between the defendant and his then-
girlfriend.  The defendant sent her an electronic text message 
threatening to kill her, before arriving at her house with a 
friend.  The defendant forced his way onto the front porch of 
the home, breaking two locks on the storm door in the process.  
Police were called to the scene.  While the victim spoke with 
police, the defendant sent her a text message requesting that 
she "[c]ome out and say it wasn't us."  The defendant was 
subsequently arrested.  Upon being arrested, he began yelling 
and called the victim a "snitch" and an "f'ing bitch."  The 
commotion drew the attention of a neighbor. 
The defendant was charged with breaking and entering in the 
nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, disturbing the 
peace, vandalizing property, threatening to commit a crime, and 
witness intimidation.  A plea hearing was held on March 24, 
2017.  At the hearing, the defendant admitted to sufficient 
facts as to all five counts.  The Commonwealth asked that the 
3 
 
defendant be found guilty of disturbing the peace, and that the 
charge be placed on file, and the defendant agreed.  As to the 
remaining four charges, however, the parties disagreed as to the 
appropriate sentencing disposition.  The Commonwealth asked that 
the defendant be sentenced to eighteen months in a house of 
correction on each charge, to be served concurrently, and 
indicated that the victim was in agreement with this 
recommendation.  Given that he had already served approximately 
thirty days in pretrial detention, the defendant requested that 
he be sentenced to thirty days in a house of correction, with 
credit for time served, and a one-year suspended sentence on 
each charge, to be served concurrently.  The probation 
department indicated that the defendant was not a candidate for 
probation, given his lengthy criminal record and the fact that 
he had previously violated probation twice on prior convictions. 
During the hearing, the judge asked the Commonwealth to 
identify the felony that the defendant had intended to commit as 
part of the breaking and entering charge.  The Commonwealth 
expressed uncertainty, but asserted that it was not necessary to 
identify the underlying felony for the purposes of the 
sentencing proceedings.  The sentencing judge then found facts 
sufficient for a guilty plea and entered a continuance without a 
finding as to the breaking and entering charge, expressing his 
belief that it was "wildly overcharged."  The judge ordered the 
4 
 
dismissal of the breaking and entering charge for 4 P.M. that 
day and did not set any conditions or terms on the dismissal.  
The judge found the defendant guilty of disturbing the peace and 
filed the charge.  He accepted the defendant's guilty plea on 
the other charges, sentencing him to six months in a house of 
correction on each remaining charge, to be served concurrently. 
 
The Commonwealth did not object to the entry of the 
continuance without a finding during the plea hearing.  Nor did 
it seek a stay of execution of the defendant's sentence.  On May 
19, 2017, however, the Commonwealth filed a motion requesting 
that the judge revise or revoke the continuance without a 
finding under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a), as appearing in 474 
Mass. 1503 (2016) (rule 29).  On May 26, 2017, the sentencing 
judge denied the Commonwealth's motion without a hearing or 
opinion.  The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal. 
 
The Appeals Court consolidated this case for oral argument 
with Commonwealth v. Beverly, as both cases involved the legal 
question whether a judge may enter a continuance without a 
finding and immediately dismiss a charge without any terms and 
conditions, or probation.  See Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 95 
Mass. App. Ct. 552 (2019).  The Appeals Court dismissed the 
appeal, concluding that rule 29 was an inappropriate mechanism 
for the Commonwealth's challenge because a continuance without a 
finding is not a "sentence."  Id. at 556-557.  We subsequently 
5 
 
granted the defendant's application for further appellate 
review. 
2.  Discussion.  As an initial matter, and as discussed in 
Beverly, 485 Mass. at    , one of our companion cases, the 
Commonwealth apparently conceded that the instant case was moot 
during oral arguments before the Appeals Court.  For the reasons 
discussed in that case, id. at    , we nonetheless choose to 
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of both of these 
cases.  We reserve, however, our discussion of resentencing for 
Ellsworth, 485 Mass. at    , the only one of the three cases in 
which the issue was properly briefed by both parties, and 
wherein the Commonwealth did not previously concede the issue of 
mootness. 
As explained in Beverly, 485 Mass. at    , rule 29 was the 
appropriate vehicle for the Commonwealth to challenge the entry 
of the continuance without a finding as an illegal sentence.  
Further, as discussed in Beverly, supra at    , we hold that 
entry of a continuance without a finding, without the imposition 
of any terms and conditions, or probation, amounts to an illegal 
sentence in violation of G. L. c. 278, § 18. 
At issue in the instant case is the sentencing disposition 
entered as to the charge of breaking and entering in the 
nighttime with the intent to commit a felony.  It is evident 
from the record that the judge believed that the Commonwealth 
6 
 
had "wildly overcharged" the defendant on that count, and that 
this influenced his sentencing decision.1  Regardless of the 
judge's opinion as to the propriety of bringing this charge, 
once he decided to enter a continuance without a finding on this 
count, he was required to impose some term, condition, or a 
period of probation pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 18.  The 
sentencing judge did not have the authority to dismiss the 
charge without any conditions, under the guise of entering a 
continuance without a finding, so as to undercut what he 
believed to be "wild overcharging" by the Commonwealth.  
Continuances without a finding cannot be dismissals in disguise.  
Without terms and conditions, or probation, such dispositions 
violate G. L. c. 278, § 18, and raise constitutional questions 
regarding the separation of powers.  See Beverly, 485 Mass. at    
.  Thus, the entry of the continuance without a finding in the 
                     
 
1 We note that the judge did have the authority to decline 
to accept the defendant's plea if he found that there was an 
inadequate proffer as to whether a felony did in fact serve as 
the basis for the charge of breaking and entering with the 
intent to commit a felony.  See Commonwealth v. Hart, 467 Mass. 
322, 325 (2014) ("A judge may not accept a guilty plea unless 
there are sufficient facts on the record to establish each 
element of the offense" [quotations and citation omitted]).  
This would not have resulted in a dismissal; rather, if the 
Commonwealth remained unable to make a proffer as to this 
element sufficient for a plea, the case would proceed to trial 
on the issue whether the Commonwealth had proved this element of 
the offense.  The judge was not permitted, however, to enter a 
continuance without a finding in order to avoid the more 
extensive work involved in deciding whether a felony actually 
existed that the defendant had intended to commit. 
7 
 
instant case amounted to an illegal sentence.  Because the 
Commonwealth apparently previously conceded the issue of 
mootness, did not seek to stay the sentence that has now been 
fully served, and did not adequately brief the issue of double 
jeopardy, we do not consider the issue of resentencing in the 
instant case.  See id. at    .  Regardless, in Ellsworth, 485 
Mass. at    , we conclude that resentencing would not be just 
under the circumstances, and impose our holding in these cases 
prospectively from the date of this decision. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed in Beverly, 485 
Mass. at    , we conclude that the continuance without a finding 
entered in the instant case constituted an illegal sentence, as 
it contained no terms and conditions.  We further conclude, 
however, that vacating the disposition and ordering that the 
defendant be resentenced is not just in the circumstances of 
this case.  Rather, for the reasons articulated in Ellsworth, 
485 Mass. at    , our holding shall apply prospectively from the 
date of this decision.  Accordingly, the continuance without a 
finding disposition in the instant case may be retained, and is 
thus affirmed, but cannot be imposed in any such future case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.