Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ELMER CHAVEZ V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0069

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ELMER CHAVEZ V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING2009 WY 46204 P.3d 967Case Number: S-08-0069Decided: 03/31/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ELMER 
CHAVEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ethelyn 
Boak, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John William Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Elmer 
Chavez applied to the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division for 
reimbursement of medical expenses relating to his back surgery in 2006.  Mr. Chavez claimed that the surgery was 
necessary because of a work-related injury he suffered in 1989.  The Division denied the benefits.  Mr. Chavez requested a hearing on 
the denial of his benefits, and the matter was referred to the Medical 
Commission.  The Commission affirmed 
the Division's denial of benefits, and Mr. Chavez appealed to the district 
court.  The district court affirmed 
the denial of benefits, and Mr. Chavez now raises the matter for our 
review.  We, too, will affirm the 
denial of benefits.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Chavez raises two issues for our review, which we have reworded 
slightly:

 
 
1.  Whether 
the Medical Commission Panel erred in failing to analyze the case as "involving 
injuries which occur over a substantial period of time," resulting in a decision 
not in accordance with law.

 
 
2.  Whether 
the Medical Commission erred in failing to invoke and apply the "second 
compensable injury" rule in this case, resulting in a decision not in accordance 
with law.

 
 
This 
case is easier to understand, however, if we begin the discussion with an issue 
listed by the Division:

 
 
A.  Was 
the decision of the Medical Commission denying benefits to Mr. Chavez 
supported by substantial evidence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Chavez was employed as a veterinary technician by the Goshen Veterinary Clinic 
in Torrington, Wyoming, from 1979 to 1981, and again from 1983 to 1991.  His duties included routine chores and 
assisting with surgery at the clinic, but the majority of his time was spent 
working with cattle at the local livestock auctions.  Starting in approximately 1981, Mr. 
Chavez began getting occasional chiropractic treatments for a "sore back" and 
related problems.

 
 

[¶4]        
On 
November 17, 1989, Mr. Chavez injured his back while working with a 
cow.  After this incident he began 
experiencing "extreme" pain "worse than it had ever been."  He was treated by a chiropractor over 
the next few weeks, and the condition improved over time.  He was released from further treatment 
on January 27, 1990, after informing his chiropractor that he was able to resume 
his normal activities without pain or discomfort.

 

[¶5]        
Mr. 
Chavez testified that he continued having pain in his back and leg.  Some days were "pretty bad," but there 
were also days when the pain "wasn't present."  He did not seek any additional treatment 
over the next fifteen months, until the spring of 1991 when he told a 
veterinarian he worked with that his back hurt and his legs felt numb.  The veterinarian suggested that he see a 
doctor.  Mr. Chavez went to his 
primary care physician, who referred him to Dr. Beehler, a neurosurgeon in 
Scottsbluff, Nebraska.  
Dr. Beehler diagnosed a "large disc herniation" between the fourth 
and fifth lumbar vertebrae, and operated on Mr. Chavez on May 9, 1991.  During the surgery, Dr. Beehler 
discovered a calcifying disc and spur that could not be completely removed, and 
the doctor predicted that Mr. Chavez "may well have trouble in the 
future."  A short while after the 
surgery, however, Dr. Beehler reported that Mr. Chavez was "definitely 
improving," and that his back pain was "pretty well cleared," although he still 
had "a little pain in the left lower extremity."

 
 

[¶6]        
After 
his 1991 surgery, Mr. Chavez continued to suffer from lower back pain, and from 
occasional numbness in his left leg.  
In November 2005, Mr. Chavez consulted with Dr. Beer, a neurosurgeon 
in Cheyenne.  He told Dr. Beer that 
he had a "10-year long history of low back pain," with the symptoms becoming 
much worse over the past few months.  
Dr. Beer performed surgery to decompress and fuse the third, fourth, and 
fifth lumbar vertebrae.  According 
to Mr. Chavez, this surgery was successful in alleviating most of the pain 
in his back and legs.

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
Workers' Compensation Division paid for Mr. Chavez's chiropractic treatments 
after the 1989 incident.  It also 
paid for his surgery in 1991, and for pain management treatments afterward.  However, the Division declined to pay 
for the 2006 surgery, based on a determination that the surgery was not related 
to the work injury he had suffered in 1989, and that the need for medical 
treatment was due to pre-existing degenerative disc disease and arthritis in 
addition to natural aging and the activities of day-to-day living.  Mr. Chavez requested a hearing on the 
denial of his benefits, and the matter was referred to the Medical 
Commission.  

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
Commission convened its hearing on February 27, 2007.  It received into evidence a large number 
of Mr. Chavez's past medical records, and heard testimony from Mr. Chavez.  The Commission also considered the 
deposition testimony of Dr. Beer, offered into evidence by Mr. Chavez, and 
the telephonic testimony of Dr. Ruttle, who was called as a witness by the 
Division.  The conflicting testimony 
from these two doctors will be examined in detail in the discussion 
below.

 
 

[¶9]        
The 
Commission affirmed the denial of benefits.  Mr. Chavez appealed that decision 
to the district court.  After the 
district court affirmed the Commission's decision, Mr. Chavez filed the appeal 
before us now.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶10]     
Our 
review of an administrative agency's action is governed by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in pertinent part that the 
reviewing court shall:

 
 

(i)            
Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 
 

(ii)          
Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A)       Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
(B) 
      Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
(C)       In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)       Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E)       Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  We recently established that the 
substantial evidence standard will be applied any time we review an agency's 
findings of fact, and explained that the appropriate question under this 
standard is whether there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's decision.  
Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 
(Wyo. 2008).  This is the standard 
we apply to the issue of whether the Commission's denial of benefits to Mr. 
Chavez was supported by substantial evidence.

 
 

[¶11]     
Mr. 
Chavez's remaining issues raise the question of whether the Medical Commission 
misapplied the law.  With regard to 
issues of this type, we have stated that:

 
 
The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are questions of law over which our review authority is 
plenary. . . . We do not afford any deference to the agency's determination, and 
we will correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying 
the law.

 
 

State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div. v. Garl, 
2001 WY 59, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 2001).  In other words, we review de novo an agency's conclusions of 
law.  Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 561.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.        
Substantial evidence

 
 

[¶12]     
In 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in this case, the Medical 
Commission stated that, "[b]ased on the referral, pre-trial conference, and the 
parties' disclosure statements," the issue before it was "Whether the 
Employee/Claimant's current medical treatment on his low back is related to the 
work injury of November 17, 1989."  
In its Conclusions of Law, the Commission accurately stated that the 
employee/claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "the injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi); 
Bruns v. TW Services, Inc., 2001 WY 
127, ¶ 12, 36 P.3d 608, 613 (Wyo. 2001).  We have explained that "An injury arises 
out of and in the course of employment when a causal connection exists between 
the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the 
employment."  Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 101, ¶ 8, 160 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 
2007).  

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
evidence before the Commission included Dr. Beer's medical opinion that 
Mr. Chavez's 2006 surgery was related to the 1989 injury, and Dr. Ruttle's 
medical opinion that it was not.  
The Commission accepted the opinion of Dr. Ruttle.  Our task is to review the entire record 
and determine whether it contains relevant evidence that "a reasonable mind 
might accept" as supporting the Commission's choice.  Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  This task is made easier because the 
Commission's Order explains in some detail why it found Dr. Ruttle's 
opinion more persuasive than Dr. Beer's.

 
 

[¶14]     
The 
parties do not dispute that there was a connection between Mr. Chavez's 
2006 surgery and his 1991 surgery.  
When Dr. Beehler performed the 1991 surgery, he could not completely 
remove a calcifying 
disc and spur in Mr. Chavez's back, and the doctor predicted "trouble in the 
future."  That prediction came true, 
leading to Mr. Chavez's 2006 surgery.  
In their testimony to the Commission, Dr. Beer and Dr. Ruttle agreed that 
there was a close relationship between the 2006 surgery and the 1991 
surgery.

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
two doctors disagreed, however, on whether the medical problems addressed by the 
two surgeries were caused by the workplace injury Mr. Chavez had suffered 
in 1989.  Dr. Beer testified that 
the 1989 injury was not resolved or healed, and Mr. Chavez continued to 
suffer "identical pain for years."  
He testified that Mr. Chavez had degenerative disc disease that had 
been "accelerated" by the 1989 injury.  
He believed that Mr. Chavez's "original L4-5 disc herniation" was caused 
by the 1989 injury, and that the back condition requiring surgery in 1991, and 
again in 2006, was a natural extension of that original 
injury.

 
 

[¶16]     
Dr. 
Ruttle testified to the contrary.  
Dr. Ruttle agreed that Mr. Chavez had suffered a work-related injury 
in 1989, but believed that Mr. Chavez "recovered" and "got better" after 
that, largely because he was released from further treatment by the chiropractor 
and then went untreated for approximately fifteen months.  Dr. Ruttle explained that 
Mr. Chavez's prior medical history indicated that he was "a patient who 
knew when to go and get treatment when his back bothered him."  Dr. Ruttle also found it significant 
that when Mr. Chavez sought treatment from Dr. Beehler, who performed the 
1991 surgery, Mr. Chavez told the doctor that he had been suffering back 
pain for more than ten years, but apparently made no mention of the 1989 
incident as a cause of that pain.  
In addition, Dr. Ruttle noted that Mr. Chavez had complained of back 
pain and obtained chiropractic treatments for several years prior to the 1989 
injury.  Accordingly, 
Dr. Ruttle provided his opinion that Mr. Chavez's surgeries in 1991 
and 2006 were not related to the 1989 incident, but instead were necessary due 
to the "recurrence of what was a chronic, preexisting problem." 

 
 

[¶17]     
The 
Commission noted several reasons for affording more weight to the opinion of 
Dr. Ruttle and less to that of Dr. Beer.  Dr. Beer had based his opinion on an 
incomplete medical history, and was not aware that Mr. Chavez had 
complained of back pain and sought treatments prior to the 1989 injury.  Dr. Beer's opinion was based, in part, 
on a belief that Mr. Chavez had not suffered pain in his legs until after 
the 1989 incident.  However, records 
from Mr. Chavez's chiropractic treatments indicated complaints of leg pain 
dating from at least 1983.  The fact 
that Dr. Beehler had found a calcifying disc and spur in Mr. Chavez's back 
during the 1991 surgery indicated that it was a long-standing problem.  That was more consistent with Dr. 
Ruttle's belief that Mr. Chavez suffered from a chronic, preexisting problem, 
and less consistent with Dr. Beer's belief that the condition was caused by an 
injury in 1989.

 
 

[¶18]     
When 
an agency "disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for doing so 
based upon determinations of credibility or other factors," its decision is 
sustainable under the substantial evidence test.  Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  Particularly when faced with conflicting 
medical opinions, the agency had the 

 
 
responsibility, 
as the trier of fact, to determine relevancy, assign probative value, and 
ascribe the relevant weight given to the evidence presented.  Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Wyo. 1997).  The Commission is in the best position to 
judge and weigh medical evidence and may disregard an expert opinion if it finds 
the opinion unreasonable or not adequately supported by the facts upon 
which the opinion is based.  Id.; Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 
(Wyo. 1996).

 
 

Spletzer 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 90, ¶ 21, 116 P.3d 1103, 1112 (Wyo. 2005).  We do not re-weigh the evidence, but 
defer to the agency's decision so long as it is based on relevant evidence that 
a reasonable mind might accept as supporting that decision.  Id., ¶ 22, 116 P.3d  at 
1112.

 
 

[¶19]     
There 
is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's choice to 
accept Dr. Ruttle's opinion over Dr. Beer's, and we defer to that 
choice.  Based on Dr. Ruttle's 
opinion, there were at least two bases for the Commission's conclusion that Mr. 
Chavez was not entitled to benefits.  
First, Dr. Ruttle opined that there was no causal connection between the 
2006 surgery and the 1989 work-related injury, making the 2006 surgery 
non-compensable.  Second, Dr. Ruttle 
believed that Mr. Chavez suffered from a preexisting condition, also making the 
2006 surgery non-compensable.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F).  The 
Commission's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and its 
legal conclusions were sound.  We 
therefore affirm the Commission's decision to deny Mr. Chavez benefits for 
his 2006 surgery.1    

 
 

1.         
Injuries which occur over a substantial period of time

 
 

[¶20]     
While 
many workers' compensation cases involve acute injuries caused by a specific 
incident, Wyoming law also allows for claims involving injuries that occur over 
substantial periods of time.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) provides as follows:

 
 
The 
burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a 
substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical 
authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that:

 
 
(i)  There 
is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which 
the work is performed and the injury;

 
 
(ii)  The 
injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a 
result of the employment; 

 
 
(iii)  The 
injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

 
 
(iv)  The 
injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally 
exposed outside of the employment; and 

 
 
(v)  The 
injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the 
relation of employer and employee.

 
 
Mr. 
Chavez claims that the Medical Commission was required to analyze his case under 
this statute.  Its failure to apply 
the statute is, according to Mr. Chavez, reversible error.  As noted earlier, whether the Commission 
correctly applied the law is a question we review de novo.

 
 

[¶21]     
Mr. 
Chavez admits that he never cited this statute to the Medical Commission, and 
never argued that it should apply.  
However, Mr. Chavez now urges that the Medical Commission had a duty 
to invoke and apply the law that supports his claim, even if he did not advance 
that theory at the hearing.  He 
cites two cases in support of his argument.  The oldest is Pino v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 996 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 2000).  Although Mr. Pino had not mentioned the 
second compensable injury rule during his agency hearing, we concluded 
that

 
 
the 
hearing examiner failed to recognize that the issue before the agency was one of 
a second subsequent injury rather than simply one of proximate causation.  Like a trial judge instructing a jury, 
the [agency] has an obligation to invoke and apply the rules of law that support 
a claimant's theory of the case.  It 
may be that this Court has explained the case in more detail and with more 
specificity than did [Mr.] Pino, but the fact remains that his theory of 
the case encompassed a second compensable injury.  The hearing examiner should have invoked 
and applied the rule.

 
 

Id. 
at 687.  Following Pino, in Carabajal 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 119, ¶ 21, 
119 P.3d 947, 954 (Wyo. 2005), 
we noted that, "In the context of the second compensable injury rule, we have 
recognized that the hearing examiner has an obligation to invoke and apply the 
rules of law that support a claimant's theory of the case." (Punctuation 
omitted.)  We therefore ruled that, 
where the information presented by the claimant "was sufficient to alert the 
hearing examiner to" the theory, the hearing examiner "should have applied the 
second compensable injury rule."  Id.

 
 

[¶22]     
Both 
of the cases cited by Mr. Chavez involved the agency's failure to invoke and 
apply the second compensable injury rule.  
It is not clear that the Medical Commission should also be required, of 
its own accord, to invoke and apply the statute relating to injuries occurring 
over a substantial period of time.  
That is particularly true where, as here, the claimant does not merely 
fail to explain or mention that his injuries occurred over a substantial period 
of time, but instead actively asserts a contrary theory  that the injury was 
related to and caused by a single work-related incident.  We need not decide whether the 
Commission is under such an obligation, however, because our reading of the 
record shows that the information presented by Mr. Chavez was not sufficient to 
alert the hearing examiner to an unspoken theory that his injuries occurred over 
a substantial period of time.

 
 

[¶23]     
We 
have explained that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603 "was intended to require a 
higher burden of proof for workers claiming benefits for illnesses or injuries 
developing over time without a definite triggering accident or event."  Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety & Comp. 
Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000).  
Applying this statute, we upheld an award of benefits to a worker who had 
experienced "constant jostling of his spine in the truck cab and heavy labor 
attendant to the truck driving."  KG Const., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, 
¶ 24, 120 P.3d 145, 151 (Wyo. 2005).  
Significantly, in that case a doctor testified that these work conditions 
were a "major contributing factor" to the injury.  Id., ¶ 14, 120 P.3d  at 149.  We also ordered that benefits must be 
awarded to a worker whose "heavy occupation as a diesel mechanic for years 
required him to engage in repetitive, constant lifting and bending," and, 
significantly, whose doctor testified that this work was the cause of his 
medical problems.  Baxter v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 2004 WY 
138, ¶ 13, 100 P.3d 427, 431-32 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

[¶24]     
On 
appeal, Mr. Chavez claims that his "degenerative back 
injury . . . resulted gradually from the hard physical labor of 
wrestling day-in and day-out with large bovines in the sale barn."  While the record does contain evidence 
of Mr. Chavez's hard work, it contains no evidence suggesting that his work was 
the cause of his degenerative back condition.  Both Dr. Beer and Dr. Ruttle 
described Mr. Chavez's condition as degenerative disc disease, and agreed that 
the condition could develop over a period of time.  Dr. Beer stated that the term 
degenerative disc disease could be used to describe either a natural aging 
process or the process triggered by an acute injury, and he identified the 1989 
injury as the acute injury triggering the process in Mr. Chavez.  He did not attribute the problem to any 
work-related activity other than the 1989 incident.  Dr. Ruttle stated that the 
progression of the condition could have been triggered by trauma, natural 
progression, or day-to-day activities, and specifically denied that it was 
caused by Mr. Chavez's work.

 
 

[¶25]     
The 
statute Mr. Chavez relies on, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a), explicitly requires a claimant to prove that the 
injury occurring over time was caused by the conditions of his work.  Mr. Chavez presented no evidence to 
the Commission to suggest this causal connection.  In the absence of evidence of that 
required causal connection, there was insufficient information to alert the 
Commission to this unspoken theory.  
Moreover, even if the Commission had considered Mr. Chavez's case 
under this statute, it could not have awarded benefits without evidence that his 
work conditions were the cause or a contributing cause of the condition for 
which Mr. Chavez underwent surgery in 2006.  In this situation, the Commission did 
not err in failing to apply this statute to Mr. Chavez's case, or in 
failing to analyze the injury as one occurring over a substantial period of 
time.

 
 

2.         
Second compensable injury rule

 
 

[¶26]     
In 
a similar argument, Mr. Chavez next claims that it was error for the Commission 
not to apply the second compensable injury rule to his case.  This rule has been explained as 
follows:

 
 
We 
have long recognized that an industrial accident can give rise to more than one 
compensable injury.  Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936).  We 
generally refer to this principle as the "second compensable injury rule."  The second compensable injury rule 
applies when "an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring 
additional medical intervention."  
Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 

Carabajal, 
¶ 12, 119 P.3d  at 951.  "In 
other words, a subsequent injury is compensable if it is causally related to the 
initial compensable work injury."  
David v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 22, ¶ 11, 151 P.3d 280, 287 
(Wyo. 2007) (punctuation omitted). 

 

[¶27]     
Mr. 
Chavez claims that "Dr. Beer clearly connected [Mr. Chavez's 2006] fusion 
to his work activities," and claims that "was sufficient to warn the 
[Commission] that a second compensable injury analysis was needed."  We reject this claim.  As discussed above, Dr. Beer's opinion 
was that Mr. Chavez's 2006 surgery was causally related to the initial 
compensable work injury he received in 1989.  If the Commission had accepted Dr. 
Beer's opinion, that might have been a sound basis for awarding benefits to 
Mr. Chavez under the second compensable injury rule.  What Mr. Chavez overlooks, however, 
is that the Commission explicitly chose to give more weight to the opinion of 
Dr. Ruttle, who testified that Mr. Chavez's 2006 surgery was not the result of 
the incident in 1989.  This 
testimony supported the Commission's finding that the 2006 surgery was not 
causally related to the compensable work injury that occurred in 1989.  Based on this finding, the Commission 
concluded that the 2006 surgery was not compensable.  In these circumstances, again, we cannot 
say that the Commission erred, and we affirm its decision in all respects. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Dr. 
Ruttle testified, and the Medical Commission found, that neither Mr. Chavez's 
2006 surgery nor his 1991 surgery was related to his 1989 injury.  The Division had already paid for the 
1991 surgery, but that does not mean it was also required to pay for the 2006 
surgery.  Each new claim invokes a 
new and separate administrative decision, and each time, the employee has the 
burden of proving he is entitled to benefits.  See, e.g., David v. State  ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div., 2007 WY 22, ¶¶ 8-10, 151 P.3d 280, 285-87 (Wyo. 
2007).