Case Title: In re. D.M.

Citation: 162 Vt. 33, 641 A.2d 774

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_DM.93-050; 162 Vt. 33; 641 A.2d 774

[Opinion Filed April 1, 1994]

[Motion for Reargument Denied May 5, 1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-050


 In re D.M.                                   Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Orleans Family Court

                                              January Term, 1994



 Amy Marie Davenport, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Barbara L. Crippen,
   Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellee

 Henry Hinton, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for juvenile

 Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant father

 Robert Paolini and Charles Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-
   appellant mother


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   J.M., the father, and G.M., the mother, of D.M. appeal
 the termination of their residual parental rights.  We affirm.
      In November 1987, D.M., then age nine, reported to a neighbor that she
 had been physically abused by both parents and sexually abused by her
 father.  D.M. was placed in the custody of the Department of Social and
 Rehabilitation Services (SRS) and lived with the neighbor for one month.  A
 medical examination uncovered evidence that the child had suffered physical
 and sexual abuse.
      Based on this evidence, the father was charged with lewd and lascivious
 conduct, and SRS petitioned to have D.M. declared a child in need of care or

 

 supervision (CHINS).  The father was convicted in May 1988.  By stipulation
 of all concerned parties, the merits order in the CHINS proceeding was
 entered contingent on the father's conviction being upheld on appeal.
      Originally, the SRS case goal called for eventual reunification of
 parents and child.  To that end, in the disposition order issued September
 14, 1988, the court mandated individual therapy for D.M., and supervised
 social and therapeutic visits between D.M. and her mother and siblings.  By
 agreement of the parties at the disposition hearing, the order also
 precluded contact between D.M. and her father until he had successfully
 participated in sex offender therapy.  While incarcerated pending his
 appeal, the father refused to participate in any treatment programs for sex
 offenders, because they required him to admit the abusive acts.
      An administrative review of the SRS case plan was held in November
 1989.  Reports showed that the therapeutic visits between mother and
 daughter had not been entirely productive, because the mother refused to
 believe D.M.'s allegations of abuse and implicitly blamed her for upsetting
 the family and causing her father to be jailed.  The goal of the plan
 remained reunification, but with the caveat that a permanent plan, which
 might include adoption, would be developed if six months passed without
 significant progress in the mother-daughter therapy sessions.  Rather than
 improve, the relationship deteriorated further after the mother explicitly
 and angrily blamed D.M. for the family's problems.  D.M. became depressed
 and expressed thoughts of suicide.
      At the next administrative review in May 1990, the SRS case plan was
 altered to reflect a goal of adoption instead of reunification.  The plan
 called for individual therapy for the mother and D.M., dropping the joint
 therapy sessions originally recommended.  D.M. continued occasional visits

 

 with her mother and siblings under the condition that no mention be made of
 the abuse, court proceedings, or adoption.  The second eighteen-month case
 review, in October 1990, continued to call for adoption.
      The father's conviction was reversed in February 1991, and the case
 was dismissed in January 1992.  As stipulated, the CHINS finding was vacated
 and a new merits hearing was held in the spring and summer of 1991.  In an
 order dated October 8, 1991, the family court again ruled D.M. to be a CHINS
 based on findings that her father had sexually abused her.  By that time,
 D.M. had been in foster care for four years.  In preparation for the
 disposition hearing, SRS filed a report proposing a goal of long-term foster
 care and eventual adoption, "because reunification would not be in the best
 interest" of D.M.  The family court issued a disposition order dated
 November 22, 1991, in which the court found that the parents did not believe
 D.M.'s allegations, were mentally incapable of coping with her, and did not
 want her in their home.  The court concluded that the parents were unfit and
 demonstrably incapable of providing an appropriate home for D.M., and that
 separation was necessary for the child's welfare.  Custody and guardianship
 of D.M. was transferred to SRS.
      At an administrative review hearing in April 1992, SRS changed its case
 goal to termination of residual parental rights.  On October 23, 1992, the
 father filed a motion for relief from the October 8, 1991 merits order,
 alleging that justice required reconsideration of the order in light of
 newly discovered evidence.  The family court denied the motion without a
 hearing.  In an order dated January 12, 1993, the family court terminated
 the residual parental rights of the mother and father.  The court found
 sufficient stagnation in the child's relationship with each parent to

 

 qualify as a substantial change in material circumstances, and that
 termination would be in the best interest of D.M.
      On appeal, both parents challenge the conclusion of a substantial
 change in circumstances, but for different reasons.  The father does not
 disagree with the finding of stagnation, but argues that SRS was the cause,
 and therefore the finding cannot serve as the basis for termination of his
 parental rights.  The mother contends that any stagnation in her
 relationship with her daughter falls short of a substantial change in
 circumstances.  She also takes issue with the conclusion that termination of
 her rights is in D.M.'s best interest.
                                     I.
      Before turning to the appeals of the termination order, we first
 address the father's argument that the family court improperly denied his
 motion for relief, and that at the very least he was entitled to a hearing
 on the matter.  The motion was filed pursuant to V.R.C.P. 60, which in
 relevant part provides
           On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
           relieve a party . . . from a final . . . order . . . for
           the following reasons:  (2) newly discovered evidence
           which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
           time to move for a new trial . . .; or (6) any other
           reason justifying relief from the operation of the
           judgment.

 V.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), (6) (applicable to family court proceedings under
 V.R.F.P. 3, 2).  We review the trial court's decision on this motion for
 abuse of discretion only.  Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 627, 629,