Case Title: The People v. Shareef Evans

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 51  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Shareef Evans,
            Appellant.
William B. Carney, for appellant.
Jennifer Hagan, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether
defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a
statute of limitations defense.  Based on the record before us, we
conclude that he was not.
On October 3, 1993, defendant, fifteen years old at the
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No. 51
time, shot and killed a cab driver in Queens.  Nearly eight years
later, he was indicted on three counts of murder in the second
degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1], [2] and [3]) and one count of
manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20).  The
manslaughter count was subject to a five-year statute of
limitations (see CPL 30.10 [2] [b]).   
Following a bench trial, defendant was acquitted of
murder but convicted of manslaughter.
Defendant then appealed his conviction and at about the
same time, through assigned counsel, filed a motion pursuant to CPL
440.10 to vacate his conviction.  In his motion he claimed, as
relevant to this appeal, that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to raise the statute of limitations defense with respect to
the manslaughter count1.  Trial counsel saw fit to provide two
affirmations with respect to the motion, one for each side. In the
affirmation provided for defendant, he stated that he did not
consider raising any defense at all and that "perhaps [he] was
mistaken and maybe [he] had missed something."  In the  affirmation
he provided the People, he averred that "had [he] considered a
statute of limitations defense, [he] would not have raised it,
because [he] would have wanted the court to consider the
manslaughter charge as an alternative to potentially finding
defendant guilty of the greater charge of murder."  Instead of
1  There were actually two CPL 440.10 motions; one by the
defendant pro se, the other filed by assigned counsel.  We are
dealing here with the one filed by counsel.
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No. 51
deciding the motion on the merits, Supreme Court found that
sufficient facts appeared on the record with respect to the issues
raised to permit adequate review on direct appeal and denied the
motion.  Defendant sought leave to appeal the denial of his motion
and to consolidate that appeal with his direct appeal, but a
Justice of the Appellate Division denied that application.
Defendant then proceeded with his direct appeal.  The
Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction finding, as
relevant here, that defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel involved matters outside the record, and that those matters
may not be reviewed on appeal (69 AD 3d 649 [2d Dept 2010]).  To
the extent that the claim could be reviewed, the court held that
counsel's failure to raise the statute of limitations defense
reflected a legitimate trial strategy of a reasonably competent
attorney, noting, in addition, that counsel adequately
cross-examined the People's witnesses, and provided a cogent
summation. 
A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal
and we now affirm.
As an initial matter, defendant here found himself in a
dilemma when the trial court denied his 440.10 motion because, in
its view, the issue was sufficiently preserved on his direct
appeal, only to find that the appellate court disagreed.  As a
result, trial counsel's affirmations, concerning his failure to
raise the statute of limitations defense, were never properly
considered by any court. Although the attorney's affirmations are
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No. 51
not dispositive of the ineffective assistance claim, they plainly
are relevant.  This problem could have easily been remedied had the
Appellate Division granted leave on the 440.10 motion and
consolidated it with the direct appeal - a solution we hope our
appellate courts will consider in the future should this situation
arise.2  But because the Appellate Division denied defendant leave
on his 440 motion, we are limited to a review of the record before
us.  And, unless it is clear from the record that there could not
have been any legitimate trial strategy for failing to raise the
statute of limitations defense, we must deny defendant relief (cf.
People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 483-484 [2005]).  Here, we agree with
the Appellate Division that on the record before us, it cannot be
said that counsel did not provide meaningful representation (see
People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]).
We have previously ruled that the single error of failing
to raise a statute of limitations defense may qualify as
ineffective assistance. In People v Turner (5 NY3d 576 [2005]), we 
2  See Edelstein, 3/3/2008 NYLJ 4 (col 4) "Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, NY Collateral Review."  The federal courts
have recently resolved the problem that arises when an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves such "mixed
claims" relating to both record-based and nonrecord-based issues
(see Massaro v United States, 538 US 500 [2003]).  An ineffective
assistance counsel claim may be brought in a collateral 
proceeding, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the
claim on direct appeal.  When such a claim is brought on direct
appeal, the federal courts have reasoned, appellate counsel and 
the court must proceed on a trial record that was not developed
precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim 
and is often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose (id. at
504-505).  
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No. 51
held that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
five-year statute of limitations with respect to a manslaughter
count.  There, counsel had objected to the submission of the
manslaughter count, so it was clear from the record that counsel
did not want the jury to consider it as an alternative to murder,
yet trial counsel inexplicably failed to support the objection by
raising a clear statute of limitations defense.  But we have also
recognized that in many cases a defendant who thinks his chances of
acquittal are small may welcome giving the jury an opportunity to
consider a lesser charge (id. at 483-484 citing People v Boettcher,
69 NY2d 174 , 182 n 3 [1987]). 
The issue here, then, is whether counsel's failure to
raise the defense reflects a legitimate trial strategy of a
reasonably competent attorney.  In People v Satterfield (66 NY2d
796, 799 [1985]), we held that in ineffective assistance cases,
counsel's subjective reasons for a decision are immaterial, so long
as "viewed objectively, the transcript and the submissions reveal
the existence of a trial strategy that might well have been pursued
by a reasonably competent attorney" (emphasis added).  Here, there
is no dispute that the manslaughter count was barred by the statute
of limitations and that such a defense, if raised by trial counsel,
would have been successful.  But at the time of trial, defendant
was facing second degree murder charges with an admission that he
had fired the shot that caused the cab driver's death.  Therefore,
had the manslaughter count been dismissed prior to verdict, the
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No. 51
trier of fact would have been left with murder as the only choice
if defendant was to be found criminally responsible for the
homicide.  So allowing the trial court to consider the manslaughter
count would be a legitimate strategy.  And it is clear from the
record that the defense counsel in this case wanted the court to do
just that.  During summation, he specifically requested that the
court consider the manslaughter count on the theory that defendant
stated that he took out the weapon to stop a robbery.  Based on
differing trial strategies, defense counsel then argued that
defendant should be acquitted of all of the counts or be convicted
only of manslaughter. 
As to the other issue raised on this appeal, we reject
defendant's claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to move to reopen the suppression hearing since, on this record, it
is clear that it would not have resulted in a different ruling. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed. 
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People v Shareef Evans 
No. 51
JONES, J.(dissenting):
On this record, I believe that defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.  
Defendant was convicted in 2001 of manslaughter in
connection with a murder which occurred in 1993.  At the same
trial, he was acquitted of murder.  There is no dispute that the
manslaughter was time-barred.  The sole issue is whether the
failure to object to the conviction was a deliberate trial
strategy or amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Following his conviction, defendant filed a pro se
motion pursuant to CPL 440.10.  He contended that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to
object on the ground that the five year statute of limitations
relating to the manslaughter charge had expired (see CPL
30.10[2][b]).  Supreme Court denied defendant's motion.  The
court accepted the People's contention that defendant could raise
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 
A Justice of the Appellate Division denied defendant's
application for leave to appeal from the denial of the motion.   
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No. 51
On direct appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the
judgment of conviction.  Although trial counsel submitted
affirmations acknowledging ignorance of the statute of
limitations defense, the court held that they were matters
outside the record, which could not be reviewed.  On the record,
however, the court held, among other things, that defense counsel
provided effective assistance.  It concluded that "[c]ounsel's
failure to raise the statute of limitations as a defense to the
first-degree manslaughter count reflect[ed] a legitimate trial
strategy of a reasonably competent attorney" (69 AD3d 649, 650
[2010]).  This conclusion was speculative and unsupported by the
record.  
This record is sufficient to resolve defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his favor.  As a
threshold matter, I disagree with my colleagues regarding the
relevancy of trial counsel's affirmations (see Majority Opn, at
3).  An affirmation by trial counsel regarding his internal
deliberations on how to proceed is immaterial (see People v
Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799 [1985] ["counsel's subjective
reasons for a decision are immaterial"].  It is how trial counsel
proceeded on the record which is of importance in this matter. 
It is clear on this record that neither the court nor the parties
recognized that the manslaughter charge was time-barred (cf.
People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269 [2003]).  Moreover, acknowledging that
the manslaughter charge was time-barred on the record would not
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No. 51
have removed the charge from consideration.  Contrarily, it would
have been objective proof of defense counsel's trial strategy to
have the time-barred manslaughter charge considered by the trial
court; in addition, it might have constituted a waiver of the
defense (see id.).  In Mills, the defendant had been charged with
second degree murder, but in a pretrial motion and a subsequent
charge conference, he affirmatively requested that lesser
included offenses be submitted to the jury (id. at 272).  The
trial court considered the request, conditioned upon "defendant's
'understanding that, if convicted of any lesser included offense,
he has waived his objection on statute of limitation[s] grounds'"
(id.).  Unlike Mills, where there was an objective basis in the
record to conclude that the affirmative request for the lesser
included charges was a form of trial strategy, this record fails
to demonstrate such a deliberate choice by defense counsel. 
Because the record clearly demonstrates that defendant should not
have been charged with manslaughter, as its statute of
limitations had run and no tolling provisions applied, and
neither party nor the court recognized that the charge was time
barred, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim can
be resolved on the existing record alone (see People v Benevento,
92 NY2d 708 [1998]), and, for the forgoing reasons, should be
resolved in defendant's favor.  
Effective assistance of counsel is a right guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
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article I, § 6 of the State Constitution (see People v Baldi, 54
NY2d 137, 146 [1981]).  It is a right that exists "to protect the
fundamental right to a fair trial" (Strickland v Washington, 466,
US 668, 684 [1984]).  A defendant's "constitutional rights are
violated if a defendant's counsel fails to meet a minimum
standard of effectiveness, and defendant suffers prejudice from
that failure" (People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 479 [2005]).  
In rare cases, "a single failing in an otherwise
competent performance is so 'egregious and prejudicial' as to
deprive a defendant of his constitutional right" that it can
bring about ineffective assistance of counsel (id. at 480).  It
is most obvious when counsel "fail[ed] to raise a defense as
clear-cut and completely dispositive as a statute of limitations. 
Such a failure, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, is
hard to reconcile with a defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel" (id. at 481).  
Similar to the case at bar, in Turner, the defendant
was indicted for murder in the second degree.  At trial, the
prosecutor asked that the jury be instructed to consider the
lesser included offense, manslaughter in the first degree, which
was time-barred.  Defense counsel objected, but failed to
specifically invoke the statute of limitations.  The defendant
was acquitted of second degree murder, but convicted of first
degree manslaughter.  After his conviction, the defendant
unsuccessfully tried to raise the statute of limitations issue 
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No. 51
through his appellate counsel.  Appellate counsel failed to argue
that issue on direct appeal, and his conviction was affirmed.  
This Court subsequently considered the issue on
defendant's second petition for a writ of error coram nobis. 
Although the ultimate issue in Turner involved ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, the question "depend[ed] on how
strong defendant's statute of limitations defense was" (5 NY3d at
481).  The Turner Court concluded that the statute of limitations
defense "was a winning argument [and] that trial counsel could
not reasonably have thought that the defense was not worth
raising."  
In the Turner case, because trial counsel objected to
the manslaughter charge without arguing that the charge was time-
barred, no reasonable explanation existed for failing to raise
that specific defense.  The record in Turner, as in the instant
case, did not support the conclusion that counsel had waived the
defense.  Though the circumstances of ineffective assistance of
counsel in Turner differ from that of this case, the principle
remains the same.  Defendants were convicted of manslaughter
despite the existence of the clear-cut and dispositive defense of
the statute of limitations to those charges.  Such a failure to
raise the defense is clearly prejudicial to a defendant who is
acquitted of all other charges save for the time-barred charge. 
Particularly given that counsel could have advised the court on
the record that the manslaughter charge although time barred, but 
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No. 51
still could be considered.  Thus, I submit, where it is clear, as
it is on this record, that no consideration regarding the
expiration of the time to prosecute had been given, it should not
be presumed that defense counsel's failure to raise the defense
was a legitimate strategy.  
Furthermore, the majority urges that when future,
similar cases are presented, the Appellate Division should
consolidate a defendant's CPL 440.10 motion with his or her
direct appeal in order to allow review of matters de hors the
record.  However, this does not solve the predicament that the
instant defendant finds himself in.  Defendant has had two CPL
440.10 motions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel denied
and as a result of the majority's opinion, his direct appeal has
now been exhausted.  While the majority's suggestion seeks to
remedy this procedural dilemma, for this defendant, this holding
effectively forecloses him from a legitimate avenue and basis for
future CPL 440.10 motions because the majority has definitively
held that defense counsel's failure to object to the manslaughter
charge was a reasonable trial strategy despite the lack of record
support for such a conclusion.  The conclusion that defense
counsel's reference to the manslaughter charge in his summation
was trial strategy, without further evidence that counsel or the
trial court were aware of this statute of limitations issue, is
unfounded speculation.
In sum, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
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No. 51
claim rests on a single issue, which is indisputable.  The People
charged defendant with manslaughter after the expiration of the
five-year statute of limitations, and trial counsel failed to
raise the statute of limitations as a defense.  Moreover, at no
point during the bench trial was there any discussion on the
record regarding the statute of limitations of the manslaughter
charge.  Thus, without discussing on the record that the statute
of limitations had run, contrary to the majority's conclusions,
trial counsel's references to the manslaughter charge cannot be
said to be a trial strategy.  Given that such a defense may be
forfeited or waived (Mills, 1 NY3d at 274 ["New York courts have
long recognized that the statute of limitations defense . . . can
be forfeited or waived by a defendant"]), there is nothing in
this record to suggest that trial counsel consented to having the
manslaughter charge considered even though the time to prosecute
that crime had run.  Therefore, in light of the prejudice to
defendant, trial counsel's failure to raise the statute of
limitations defense, on this record, constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the Appellate Division
order and vacate the judgment of conviction.    
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Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Pigott. Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Smith concur. Judge Jones
dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion. 
Decided March 31, 2011
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