Case Title: In re Estate of Andernovics

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89386

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89386-Agenda 19-January 2001.
In re ESTATE OF BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS (Peggy L. Parrish, 
Appellant, v. Rolf Hackman, Ex'r of the Estate of Budris
Andernovics, Deceased, Appellee).
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.
 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The primary question presented in this appeal is whether
section 18-7(a) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS
5/18-7(a) (West 1998)) or section 2-610 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West 1998)) applies when
an estate files a nonspecific response to a probate complainant's
claim, demanding strict proof of that claim. In February 1989,
plaintiff, Peggy L. Parrish, filed a 10-count complaint against the
estate of Budris Andernovics, alleging that Andernovics breached
an oral contract to make a will. Subsequently, plaintiff argued that
she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the estate's
failure to deny explicitly her claim constituted an admission under
section 2-610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The estate argued
that section 18-7(a) of the Probate Act allowed it to demand strict
proof rather than directly admit or deny plaintiff's claim.
	The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument, denied her claim
on the merits, and ordered her to pay attorney fees as a sanction for
failure to comply with a discovery order. The appellate court
affirmed. 311 Ill. App. 3d 741. Plaintiff now appeals. We affirm
and hold that a trial court has discretion under section 18-7(a) of
the Probate Act to demand plaintiff prove her claim when an estate
files a response neither admitting nor denying the claim, but
demanding strict proof of it.


I. BACKGROUND 

	Plaintiff's complaint sought monetary damages and specific
performance of an oral contract to make a will. Plaintiff alleged
that she and Andernovics reached an agreement, allowing plaintiff
to deed certain parcels of encumbered real estate to him. Plaintiff
further alleged that Andernovics agreed to pay the mortgages on
the parcels and deed the property back to plaintiff in his will, along
with fee title to another parcel of property and a life estate in a
third parcel.
	Plaintiff filed her complaint in probate. Rather than admitting
or denying plaintiff's claim, the estate's executor filed a
nonspecific response that stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
			"NOW COMES ROLF HACKMAN, duly appointed
Executor of the Estate of BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS,
deceased by Holland and Holland, his attorneys, to defend
against the claim of PEGGY L. PARRISH against said
Estate, and hereby demands strict proof of said claim."
	 Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
the estate's answer constituted an admission pursuant to section
2-610 of the Code. Following a hearing, the trial court denied
plaintiff's motion. The estate then filed several interrogatories and
a request to produce, and plaintiff effectively failed to respond to
discovery.
	Plaintiff sought interlocutory review in the appellate court
under Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), arguing that
she should have been granted judgment on the pleadings. The
appellate court denied plaintiff's request for appeal. Meanwhile,
the trial court entered an order compelling plaintiff's discovery
responses. Nevertheless, plaintiff persisted in disregarding the
interrogatories and requests to produce. Several months later, the
estate filed a motion for sanctions. Plaintiff then renewed her
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
	As a sanction for plaintiff's failure to comply with the
discovery order, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice. On review, the appellate court reversed and remanded,
instructing the trial court to issue a more lenient sanction. In re
Estate of Andernovics, No. 3-93-0510 (1993) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	On remand, the trial court granted the estate attorney fees
totaling $4,035. The trial court further directed that plaintiff and
her attorney were jointly and severally liable for payment of the
sanction. The trial court also conducted a hearing on the merits of
plaintiff's claim. At the hearing, plaintiff submitted evidence only
as to the value of the real estate and other items subject to the
alleged oral contract to make a will. Further, plaintiff held
steadfast to her position that the estate's answer constituted an
admission. The trial court rejected plaintiff's claim, finding in part
as follows:
			"There is authority that in a suit for specific
performance of a contract to make a will the evidence and
the existence of the contract and its terms must be clear
and explicit and so convincing that it will leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court. Greenwood v. Commercial
National Bank of Peoria, 130 N.E.2d 753, 7 Ill. 2d 436
(1955).
			The Claimant elected to file a claim in this estate matter
rather than a separate law suit. When the claimant files a
claim in an estate [proceeding,] the Probate Act [citation]
applies. It has been suggested that the representatives of
an estate must be allowed a great deal of latitude in filing
answers to claims. The Probate Act specifically sets forth
that a claim which is presented by the claimant or his
attorney or to which no pleading has been filed within the
time provided by the Act may be taken as proved or the
Court may require the claimant to prove his claim. Here
the Executor in his Answer demanded that the claim be
proven. When the claimant filed the claim under the
Probate Act the claimant must comply with that Act.
Therefore, if a claim is filed in probate, the Probate Act
applies. The Probate Act and the Code of Civil Procedure
recommend that sections be liberally construed to the end
that controversies and rights of the parties may be
speedily and fairly determined.
			Arguably, the Answer filed by the Estate is an
admission under [section 2-610(b) of the] Code ***.
However, this Court finds that the admission is as to facts
well pleaded and not as [to] conclusions of law. This
Court further *** exercise[s] its discretion *** to require
that the Claimant prove her claim notwithstanding any
admission made by the Estate. 755 ILCS 5/18-7(a). ***
			The claim in this case is anything but routine. As a
result the Claimant should have submitted her cause and
proved her claim. She has not done so. The Plaintiff's ***
Claim is denied."
	The appellate court affirmed under reasoning similar to that
of the trial court. We granted leave to appeal to consider primarily
whether section 18-7(a) of the Act preempts section 2-610 of the
Code.



II. ANALYSIS
A. Section 18-7(a) of the Act Versus Section 2-610 of the Code
	Plaintiff contends that the estate's answer constituted an
admission and therefore she was entitled to judgment on the
pleadings. In support of this claim, plaintiff relies upon section
1-6 of the Act. Section 1-6 provides that the Code shall apply to
all probate proceedings except as otherwise provided in the Act.
755 ILCS 5/1-6 (West 1998). Plaintiff further points to section
2-610 of the Code, requiring that pleadings be specific. Section
2-610 provides in pertinent part:
			"(a) Every answer and subsequent pleading shall
contain an explicit admission or denial of each allegation
of the pleading to which it relates.
			(b) Every allegation *** not explicitly denied is
admitted, unless the party states in his or her pleading that
he or she has no knowledge thereof sufficient to form a
belief, and attaches an affidavit of the truth of the
statement of want of knowledge, or unless the party has
had no opportunity to deny." 735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West
1998).
Plaintiff invokes section 2-610 and In re Estate of Jensik, 34 Ill.
App. 2d 130, 133 (1962) (allegations in an estate claim not
answered are deemed admitted), arguing that, because the estate
failed to deny explicitly the allegations contained in her complaint,
the allegations must be deemed admitted.
	Relying upon section 18-7(a) of the Act, the estate disagrees
with plaintiff. Section 18-7(a) provides in pertinent part that"[a]
claim which is consented to by the representative *** or to which
no pleading has been filed *** may be taken as proved or the court
may require the claimant to prove his claim." 755 ILCS 5/18-7(a)
(West 1998). The estate contends that section 18-7(a) satisfies the
"except otherwise provided" language in section 1-6, thereby
taking the issue outside the scope of section 2-610.(1)
	Citing In re Estate of Grimsley, 7 Ill. App. 3d 563, 566
(1972), plaintiff urges us to reject the estate's contention. In
Grimsley, the Department of Mental Health filed a claim against
the decedent's estate for unpaid hospitalization expenses. In an
unverified answer, the estate alleged that it had not received any
statements of unpaid expenses but did not deny that the charges
were owed and did not request proof of the claim. The trial court
denied the claim for failure to prove details surrounding the
decedent's hospitalization. The appellate court reversed, finding
that the Civil Practice Act (now the Code of Civil Procedure)
required that the undenied allegations be deemed admitted without
the necessity of requiring proof.
	The court in Grimsley found that the subject provision of the
Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 3, par. 199, now 755 ILCS
5/18-7 (West 1998)) was "directed to instances where no answer
has been filed." Grimsley, 7 Ill. App. 3d at 566. Under Grimsley,
plaintiff argues that section 18-7(a) does not apply because the
estate filed an answer.
	The issue before us is one of statutory construction. Statutory
construction presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.
Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995).
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's intent. Solich v. George & Anna
Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,
81 (1994). To determine the legislature's intent, courts first look
to the statute's language. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers,
Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368-69 (1998). We accord a statute's
language its plain and commonly understood meaning. In re
Petition to Annex Certain Territory, 144 Ill. 2d 353, 362 (1991).
	The plain language of section 18-7(a) allows the trial court
wide latitude in allowing claims or requiring proof of claims. If 
"[a] claim *** is consented to by the representative," the trial
court may accept the claim as plead or may require proof of the
claim. (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18-7(a) (West 1998).
Likewise, if "no pleading has been filed," the trial court may
accept the claim as plead or may require proof of the claim. 755
ILCS 5/18-7(a) (West 1998). Thus, Grimsley cannot be read as
holding that section 18-7(a) is directed solely to instances when
no answer has been filed. Section 18-7(a) also plainly applies
when the estate consents to a claim. Accordingly, assuming the
estate's response should be construed as an admission of her
claim, this determination does not take the case at hand outside the
purview of section 18-7(a). Construing section 18-7(a) in
conjunction with section 2-610 of the Code, we believe no
reasonable distinction may be drawn between a claim that is
"consented to" by an estate and a claim that is "admitted" by an
estate. Given this conclusion, the trial court was within its
discretionary authority to demand that plaintiff prove her claim.(2)
	Nonetheless, in opposition to this determination, plaintiff cites
In re Estate of Brauns, 330 Ill. App. 322 (1947), maintaining that
Brauns stands for the broad proposition that the sufficiency of an
answer to a probate claim must be determined under the Code.  In
Brauns, the plaintiff filed a claim based upon judgment notes
allegedly executed by the decedent. As a consequence, Brauns was
decided under the specific provision of the Civil Practice Act that
addressed allegations concerning the execution of a written
instrument. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 10, par. 159. Accordingly,
Brauns has no relevance to the instant case because plaintiff does
not allege the execution of a written instrument.
	In sum, we hold that a trial court may, in accord with section
18-7(a) of the Act and section 2-610 of the Code, require a
complainant to prove a claim when an estate files a nonspecific
response, neither admitting nor denying the claim but demanding
strict proof.
	Our decision on this issue is consistent with the long-standing
principle that claims against an estate should be scrutinized with
care and should not be allowed except on clear proof. See In re
Estate of Winan, 77 Ill. App. 2d 462 (1966) (abstract of op.);
Bonamer v. Mahanna, 339 Ill. App. 277 (1950) (abstract of op.);
Floyd v. Estate of Smith, 320 Ill. App. 171 (1943); In re Estate of
Teehan, 287 Ill. App. 58 (1936). The careful scrutiny of claims can
only be accomplished through the discretionary authority of the
trial court. The allowance of a disputed claim based on a purely
technical application of section 2-610 of the Code is at odds with
the unequivocal language in section 18-7(a) of the Act and its
purpose.
	Prior to the adoption of our current probate act, this court held
that our county and circuit probate courts possessed legal and
equitable powers to justify all claims against the estate "to
ascertain the true facts, and charge the executor with the amount
justly chargeable against [the estate], and no more." Millard v.
Harris, 119 Ill. 185, 199 (1887). We view the discretionary
authority afforded to the trial court by section 18-7(a) of the Act
as an expression of the intrinsic supervisory role assumed by the
court in probate matters. Unlike most civil litigation involving a
dispute between two parties, a probate proceeding implicates any
number of creditors and any number of beneficiaries. A review of
the Probate Act of 1975 as a whole reaffirms the trial court's
function as an overseer to the payment of claims against the estate
and the distribution of the remaining assets to the beneficiaries and
creditors. One task of the court in that role, as announced in
Millard, is to ensure only just claims are charged against the
estate. To achieve this end, the trial court must be free to require
proof of claims.
	Section 18-11 of the Act provides additional support for our
interpretation that the trial court possesses discretion in allowing
all claims. In pertinent part, section 18-11(a) provides:
			"(a) The representative may at any time pay or consent
in writing to all or any part of any claim *** to the extent
the claim has not been disallowed by the court ***. ***
At the request of any interested person the representative
must establish the propriety of his allowance of any
claim." (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18-11(a) (West
1998).
Thus, even the affirmative allowance of a claim by an estate's
representative remains subject to the review of the trial court.
Moreover, the propriety of the estate's allowance of a claim may
be raised by any interested third party, requiring the estate to bear
the burden of establishing "the propriety of [the] allowance of any
claim." 755 ILCS 5/18-11(a) (West 1998). Hence, it is ultimately
the trial court's province to allow or disallow any claim, even
those consented to or admitted by the estate.


B. Sanctions 

 	Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly ordered
that she pay attorney fees as a sanction for her failure to comply
with discovery. We reject plaintiff's contentions on this point.
	It is well settled that a trial court may order sanctions against
a party refusing to comply with discovery. 134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c). A
party disputing a sanction order for failure to comply with
discovery must establish that noncompliance was reasonable or
justified under the circumstances. Hartnett v. Stack, 241 Ill. App.
3d 157, 172 (1993).
	The record indicates that the estate filed its initial
interrogatories and request to produce in December 1989. Plaintiff
filed answers to interrogatories and a response to request to
produce, consisting in large part of objections. In June 1990, the
estate filed a motion to compel discovery.  Plaintiff argued that she
need not comply because she was entitled to judgment on the
pleadings. In August 1990, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
	The trial court entered an order compelling discovery in April
1992, requiring plaintiff to comply within 28 days. Rather than
abiding by the court's order, plaintiff sought leave to appeal under
Supreme Court Rule 308. The appellate court denied plaintiff's
motion. Notwithstanding the denial, plaintiff maintained her
refusal to comply with discovery and disregarded the order to
compel. In May 1993, the estate filed a motion for sanctions. As
a sanction for plaintiff's misconduct, the trial court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded, instructing the
trial court to issue a more lenient sanction. No. 3-93-0510
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate
court stated, however, that plaintiff was incorrect in her position
and she was obligated to proceed with discovery after the
application for leave to appeal under Rule 308 had been denied.
Nevertheless, after the remand plaintiff maintained her position
that she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
	Therefore, we agree with the appellate court's observation:
		"[Plaintiff] exhibited a stubborn refusal to comply with
discovery rules from early on in this case. Despite the fact
that her reliance on Grimsley might have justified her
initial noncompliance with discovery, once [the appellate
court] denied her leave to appeal under Rule 308 all
subsequent refusals to comply on her part were patently
unreasonable." 311 Ill. App. 3d at 746.
Considering plaintiff's disregard for the trial court's authority
subsequent to the appellate court's denial of leave to appeal, we
conclude that the trial court's award of attorney fees was not
improper. Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993) (holding that the decision to impose a
particular sanction under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion of
the trial court and, thus, only a clear abuse of discretion justifies
reversal). While we might have arrived at a different conclusion,
we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 241 (1988).
	We also reject plaintiff's argument that she should not be
sanctioned due to the estate's failure to comply with Supreme
Court Rule 201(k) (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k)). Rule 201(k) provides:
		"Every motion with respect to discovery shall incorporate
a statement that counsel responsible for trial of the case
after personal consultation and reasonable attempts to
resolve differences have been unable to reach an accord
***." 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k).
	Strict compliance with Rule 201(k) is generally required and
litigants are not entitled to seek sanctions without first exercising
reasonable attempts to resolve discovery differences. Here,
technical compliance with the rule was no longer an issue at the
point the appellate court denied plaintiff leave to appeal. In other
words, as the appellate court stated, plaintiff was obligated to
comply with the trial court's order compelling discovery and could
no longer refuse discovery based on her theory of the case when
the appellate court denied her interlocutory review under Supreme
Court Rule 308.
	In a related argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court's
calculation of fees was improper because the court failed to
consider whether the estate's attorneys billed at an hourly rate
comparable to other firms in the community. We reject plaintiff's
claim on this point as well.
	We agree that, pursuant to Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, the community's usual and customary
charges are a relevant factor to consider in formulating an award
for attorney fees. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a)(3). Other factors include
the skill and standing of the attorney employed; the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; the degree of responsibility in the
management of the cause; the time and labor required; and the
amounts involved and the benefits resulting to the client. See 134
Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a). No exact formula exists in determining a proper
award. While each factor is relevant, no single factor is conclusive
or dispositive. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 288
Ill. App. 3d 743, 758-59 (1997) (finding that time records, while
important, are not conclusive).
	As the appellate court observed, "[t]he trial court undertook
a nine-hour, 2½-day hearing on this issue, during which the estate
sought over $18,000 in fees. Testimony concerning the hours
worked and service rendered by the attorneys was heard." 311 Ill.
App. 3d at 746. Our review of the record indicates that the trial
court adequately considered the relevant factors in this case, and
plaintiff fails to present a persuasive argument that the trial court
abused its discretion. See Boatmen's, 155 Ill. 2d  at 314 (holding
that a sanction award will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion). Thus, we affirm the appellate court's ruling on the
amount of attorney fees.

III. CONCLUSION
	We hold that, under section 18-7(a) of the Probate Act, a trial
court has discretion to demand a probate complainant prove her
claim in cases when an estate files a nonspecific response, neither
denying nor admitting the claim, but demanding strict proof. In
addition, we hold that the trial court properly imposed sanctions
upon plaintiff for failure to comply with discovery.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
 



1.      1We note that section 2-1301(d) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d)
(West 1998)) similarly provides that "[j]udgment by default may be
entered for want of an appearance, or for failure to plead, but the court
may in either case, require proof of the allegations of the pleadings upon
which relief is sought." While the estate could arguably rely upon
section 2-1301(d) of the Code to support its claim, we find that section
18-7(a)'s substantially analogous language preempts section 2-1301(d)
under these circumstances. See 755 ILCS 5/1-6 (West 1998).

2.      2While plaintiff's complaint was verified, the allegations of a
verified complaint do not constitute evidence, except by way of
admission, and, therefore, could be of no assistance to plaintiff in
proving her claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-605(a) (West 1998).