Case Title: Billy Ray Davis v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR04-340

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 04-340 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION BILLY RAY DAVIS Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered September 29, 2005 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, NO. CR. 2000-1073, HONORABLE MARION A. HUMPHREY, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM Appellant was convicted of two counts each of criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder, committing a terroristic act, and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to a term of 1,080 months' imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeal affirmed. Davis v. State, CA CR 01-1073 (Ark. App. June 5, 2002). Appellant subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, which was denied without a hearing. Appellant was allowed to file a belated appeal because he was never served with a copy of the court's order denying his Rule 37 petition. In his petition, appellant asserted the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to renew his motion for directed verdict at the close of the State's case, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Ronnie Smith's being called back to testify after being excused by both the State and appellant, (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to appellant's being charged with multiple counts; (4) counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena Yolanda Smith's medical records, and (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena key witnesses for the defense. On appeal, appellant argues that he was entitled to a hearing on his claims. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687. Thus, a defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and second, that the errors "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Id. at 693. In reviewing a denial of relief under Rule 37, we must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 38, 26 S.W.3d 123, 125 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt in that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by a mere showing of error by counsel or by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 448, 954 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1997) (citing Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990) (per curiam)). We must consider the totality of the evidence before the factfinder, and we will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the lower court's findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Noel, supra. As stated, appellant argues that he is entitled to a hearing on his claims for postconviction relief. He claims that the trial court did not reference any portion of the record in support of its decision to deny the petition without a hearing; therefore, the order should be reversed. Under Rule 37.3(a), the trial court has discretion to deny relief without a hearing. Where the court concludes, without a hearing, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, Rule 37.3(a) requires that the court make written findings specifying the parts of the record that form the basis of the court's decision. E.g., Carter v. State, 342 Ark. 535, 538, 29 S.W.3d 716, 718 (2000) (per curiam). If the trial court fails to make such findings, it is reversible error, unless the record before this court conclusively shows that the petition is without merit. See id. As discussed below, we find no merit to any of appellant's claims; therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling on appellant's petition without a hearing. Appellant claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence. On direct appeal, the court of appeals refused to entertain appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because the issue was not preserved for appellate review. Davis, slip op. at 3. The following is an excerpt from appellant's direct appeal explaining the facts and circumstances surrounding the directed-verdict motion: The State put on evidence establishing the following course of events. On the night of February 12, 2000, appellant drove his car behind Janice Smith's car, following it to the commuter parking lot at the end of I-630 in Little Rock. While following Janice's car, appellant bumped his vehicle into Janice's back bumper. Janice drove well over the speed limit trying to evade appellant, but appellant persisted. Janice was to meet her fiancé, Timothy Hampton, at the commuter lot to pick him up. Janice's friend, Yolanda Smith, was a passenger in her car. Yolanda was appellant's ex-girlfriend. When they arrived at the lot, appellant exited his vehicle and approached Janice's parked car on the passenger side. The car doors were locked, the windows were up, and appellant began beating on Yolanda's window. Timothy walked up and asked appellant to stop. Appellant shot Timothy in the face, and then he shot Yolanda in the head through the window of the car. Both of these victims survived. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict challenging the State's proof of the level of intent on the charges, which was denied. Appellant testified for the defense that Timothy was armed and attacked him such that he shot Timothy in self-defense. Appellant stated that because his finger was already on the trigger, the gun accidentally went off a second time, hitting Yolanda in the head. Appellant's counsel renewed the directed-verdict motion, and it was again denied. The State then presented one rebuttal witness. Consideration of jury instructions followed immediately. The jury deliberated upon the evidence and convicted appellant. His convictions resulted in a ninety-year prison sentence. Id. at 1-2. In denying Rule 37 relief, the trial court ruled that appellant did not state how counsel's failure to renew the motion for directed verdict would have changed the outcome of the trial. According to the trial court, appellant's conclusory allegation was not sufficient to warrant relief. We agree. Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts and which lack allegation or showing of prejudice are insufficient to warrant Rule 37 relief. See Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 413, 39 S.W.3d 791, 795 (2001) (per curiam). In his petition, appellant simply stated that counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion, but did not provide any facts to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's conduct. Although on appeal, appellant goes into detail regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, we will not allow appellant to expand his petition to include information not put before the trial court. We therefore affirm the denial of relief. Appellant went on to claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Ronnie Smith's being called as a rebuttal witness after he had been excused following his earlier testimony but remained in the courtroom to hear other witness testimony. In denying relief, the trial court held that when a rebuttal witness is in violation of Ark. R. Evid. 615, the sequestration rule, exclusion of that witness's testimony should only be exercised "when the noncompliance is had with the consent, connivance, or procurement of the attorney calling the rebuttal witness." According to the court, counsel had no basis to object to Smith being called as a rebuttal witness because there was no such evidence. The trial court has narrow discretion in refusing the testimony of a rebuttal witness who has violated the sequestration rule. Ford v. State, 296 Ark. 8, 19, 753 S.W.2d 258, 263 (1988). That discretion is more readily abused by excluding said testimony than by admitting it. Id. Moreover, violation of the sequestration rule through no fault of the party calling the witness is a matter that goes to the witness's credibility, rather than competency to testify. The power to exclude the testimony of a witness who has violated the rule should rarely be exercised. Id. In the Ford case, this court held: Our general rule is that the trial court's narrow discretion on this issue can be exercised to exclude the witness only "when the noncompliance is had with the consent, connivance, or procurement of a party or his attorney." There being no evidence in the case before us that the State had any prior knowledge of the existence of the witness, whether she was in the courtroom, her potential as a rebuttal witness, or to what she might testify, we find no error in the trial court's decision to permit the testimony. Id. (internal citations omitted). Because there was no complicity on the part of the State when the witness remained in the courtroom, there was no basis for the trial court to exclude the rebuttal testimony. Without a basis for an objection, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument. Sanford v. State, 342 Ark. 22, 28-29, 25 S.W.3d 414, 420 (2000). The ruling below is affirmed. On appeal, appellant does not present an argument on the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness regarding appellant's being charged with multiple counts. All claims raised below but not argued on appeal are considered abandoned. See Echols v. State, 344 Ark. 513, 519, 42 S.W.3d 467, 471 (2001). Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred. Appellant also argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena Yolanda Smith's medical records. The trial court denied relief, ruling that counsel had a copy of the medical records; therefore, there was no need to subpoena them. While it is unclear whether counsel had a copy of the medical records; regardless, we find that appellant failed to show how those records would have changed the outcome of his trial. According to appellant, the State did not prove that Yolanda Smith had been shot; however, he cites no specific information from the medical records that would substantiate this claim. Yolanda Smith testified, as did Janice Smith and Tim Hampton, that appellant shot her in the head. Because appellant has failed to show how counsel's procurement of the medical records, if she did not already have them, would have changed the outcome of appellant's trial, there has been no showing of prejudice. Without such a showing, we cannot grant postconviction relief. Appellant's final claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena his sister and doctors from the emergency room to testify to Yolanda Smith's injuries. In denying relief, the trial court ruled that such decisions were matters of trial strategy and not grounds for postconviction relief. We agree with the trial court that matters of trial strategy are not within the purview of Rule 37. See State v. Goff, 349 Ark. 532, 541, 79 S.W.3d 320, 326 (2002) (per curiam). We therefore affirm the ruling below. Affirmed.