Case Title: RICE v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICE v. STATE2004 WY 130100 P.3d 371Case Number: 03-116Decided: 11/03/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
   

 

GLEN 
ERIC RICE,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. Fetsco, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Fetsco.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Glen 
E. Rice (Rice), entered a conditional plea of guilty to the crime of possession 
of marijuana with intent to deliver, thereby preserving his right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence against him.  The police initially contacted Rice when 
he was found sleeping in his automobile at a convenience store/gas station in 
Gillette.  During the course of the 
ensuing events, the police employed a drug detection dog that was already at the 
scene, to "sniff" the exterior of Rice's car.  Rice made incriminating statements in 
response to questions posed to him by the police officer and Rice also 
voluntarily produced a tin of marijuana he had on his person.  Rice was arrested at the scene for 
possession of marijuana.  A later 
search of Rice's car revealed about 70 pounds of marijuana packed in luggage 
located in the trunk of the car.  We 
will affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Rice raises this 
issue:

 

            
Whether [Rice] was illegally seized and therefore the trial court erred 
in denying [his] motion to suppress evidence and 
statements.

 

The 
State contends that the district court properly denied Rice's motion to 
suppress.

 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 

[¶3]      Rice was asleep 
in his automobile, in the parking lot of a convenience store, in Gillette, 
Wyoming, when he was first contacted by the Gillette Police Department at about 
10:00 p.m. on November 27, 2002.  
The police were checking on Rice because the parking lot had signage that 
indicated the parking was for customers only.  The police had not received a complaint 
from the owner that night but had received frequent complaints in the past.  On the scene was Gillette Police Officer 
Greg Brothers.  According to Officer 
Brothers, he awakened Rice and questioned him.  Officer Brothers checked Rice's Illinois 
driver's license, and there were no "wants or warrants," so it was returned to 
him and he was told that he was free to leave.  In his testimony, Rice related that his 
driver's license was not returned to him until a week after he was released from 
jail on bond, and he was not told that he was free to go.  As events further transpired, after 
Officer Brothers allowed Rice the freedom to leave in his car, and upon Officer 
Brothers' request, Rice agreed to answer some additional questions.  During the course of that exchange, Rice 
eventually admitted there might be a "joint" in his car that had been left there 
by "friends."  Officer Brothers 
first asked Rice if he could search the car and Rice refused.  Officer Brothers then asked Rice for his 
consent to have his narcotics dog examine the exterior of his car.  Rice at first declined to consent but 
when asked a second time, Officer Brothers testified that Rice consented.  Rice testified that he did not 
consent.  The dog alerted to at 
least two areas of the car, the trunk and the open driver's side front 
door.  Rice then admitted he had a 
Carmex tin containing marijuana in his pants pocket and voluntarily produced it 
for Officer Brothers.  Rice was 
arrested and taken to jail.  Rice's 
car was searched, including the trunk of the car.  The car was then taken to the Gillette 
Police Department, and the following day the police obtained a search warrant to 
further examine the contents of the car.  
The police were able to describe with great accuracy the things to be 
searched for because the contents of the car had already been 
examined.

 

[¶4]      The more refined 
details pertinent to the motion to suppress will be set out in our 
discussion.

 

[¶5]      In a felony 
information filed in the district court on December 11, 2002, Rice was charged 
with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.1  On January 8, 2003, Rice filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence found in his car and on his person, as well as the 
statements he made to the police.  
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion to 
suppress.

 

[¶6]      On February 24, 
2003, judgment was entered on Rice's conditional plea of guilty.  The plea was conditioned upon 
recognition of his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress.  Rice was sentenced to 
serve a term of five to eight years in a state penal 
institution.

 

  
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      We apply these 
standards to our evaluation of the district court's decision to deny the motion 
to suppress:

 

A 
trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress a statement on the 
grounds that it was made involuntarily is reviewed de novo.  In conducting such a review, we defer to 
the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  This Court considers all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination 
because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess 
the credibility of witnesses.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyoming 
Constitution Article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that confessions be voluntary.  A statement that is obtained by coercion 
is not trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the person who made 
it.  A defendant is deprived of the 
right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is admitted at his 
trial.  A statement is considered to 
be voluntary if the defendant makes it of his own free and deliberate choice, 
and not because of intimidation, coercion or deception.  The prosecution has the burden to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is 
voluntary.  Lara v. State, 
2001 WY 53, ¶ 9, 25 P.3d 507, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001); also see Hadden v. State, 
2002 WY 41,¶ 17, 42 P.3d 495, ¶ 17 (Wyo.2002);  and Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 
13, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 13 (Wyo.2002).

 

Goulart 
v. State, 
2003 WY 108, ¶ 6, 76 P.3d 1230 ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003). 

When 
we review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  When the district court has not made 
specific findings of fact, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is 
supportable by any reasonable view of the evidence.  We consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's ruling because of the district court's 
ability to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions" at the hearing on 
the motion.  The constitutionality 
of a particular search or seizure is, however, a question of law which we review 
de novo.  Meek v. State, 2002 
WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002) (supporting citations 
omitted).

 

Innis 
v. State, 
2003 WY 66, ¶ 13, 69 P.3d 413, ¶ 13 (Wyo. 2003).

 

      "The 
investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment 
safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a 
crime."  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
220 (citing Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683 [(Wyo.1982)];  see also Putnam [v. State ], 995 
P.2d [632] at 637 [(Wyo.2000)];  and 
McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).  We have a dual inquiry for evaluating 
the reasonableness of an investigatory stop:  (1) whether the officer's actions were 
justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 223 (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879); see also United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).  An officer's conduct is judged by an 
objective standard which takes into account the totality of the 
circumstances.  Putnam, 995 
P.2d at 637;  Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81;  
United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th 
Cir.1996).

 

            
Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 52, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 1138, ¶ 11 
(2001).  In applying this test, the 
Court has "consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the 
fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry."  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 
39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996).  "The government has the burden of 
demonstrating that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable 
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the 
conditions of an investigative seizure."  
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993) 
(quotation marks omitted).

            

Damato 
v. State, 
2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704-5, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003); also see 
Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, ¶¶ 9-14, 74 P.3d 1220, ¶¶ 9-14 (Wyo. 
2003).

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      At the hearing on 
the motion to suppress, Officer Brothers testified that at 10:00 p.m., on 
November 27, 2002, he was patrolling the lot of a convenience store/gas station 
to ensure that there was no one loitering there.  The store was in the process of 
closing.  That store had made 
numerous complaints of people loitering in its parking lot, and sometimes the 
police went in there as a preventative measure.  Officer Brothers explained that when 
people loiter in the lot, there is not room for customers to come in and 
park.  Although there was one other 
unoccupied vehicle in that area of the lot, Officer Brothers took special note 
of a white Buick on the north side of the store because it appeared that the 
driver's seat was reclined.  The car 
had Illinois plates, and a check through dispatch revealed that the car belonged 
to Glen Rice.  The car was validly 
licensed and registered.

 

[¶9]      Officer Brothers 
decided to contact the occupant of the vehicle to check on his well-being and to 
tell him that he had to move his car from the parking lot.  Officer Brothers walked up to the window 
and knocked on it to make contact with the occupant of the car, who was sleeping 
in the reclined driver's seat.  The 
occupant, who turned out to be Rice, appeared to awaken and look at Officer 
Brothers but then "laid back down and acted like he was sleeping again."  Officer Brothers rapped on the window 
again, and this time Rice "picked up his cell phone and acted like he was 
talking on his cell phone and pointed to the passenger seat."  Rice still did not appear to notice 
Officer Brothers, so he knocked on the window again.  On that third attempt, Rice awakened and 
noticed Officer Brothers.  Rice 
opened his car door, got out of his car (not at the police officer's request), 
and began to speak with Officer Brothers.  
Rice smoked a cigarette while they talked.

 

[¶10]   Officer Brothers asked Rice if 
everything was okay and informed him that he could not sleep in the store 
parking lot nor could he be in the parking lot if he was not a customer.  Rice told Officer Brothers that he was 
just traveling through and stopped to rest.  Officer Brothers asked Rice for 
identification, and Rice asked Officer Brothers about motels in the area.  Rice gave Officer Brothers his Illinois 
driver's license and an Illinois State ID card.  Officer Brothers then had some casual 
conversation with Rice and he related, after "a bit of a pause," that he was 
coming from Seattle and was headed to Rapid City.  In response to Rice's inquiry, Officer 
Brothers told Rice it was about a three-hour drive to Rapid City and that he 
should take a break before he headed out on the road.  Rice did not appear to be nervous.  Dispatch had checked on Rice's driver's 
license and determined that there were no warrants or other problems, so Officer 
Brothers returned the license and the ID card to Rice and testified that at that 
point he told Rice he was free to go.  
Officer Brothers also gave Rice directions to some local 
motels.

 

[¶11]   Officer Brothers turned to walk 
away but then, after a pause of several seconds (maybe 30 seconds), he turned 
back and asked Rice if he could ask him some additional questions.  Rice indicated that he did not object to 
answering more questions.  By this 
time Gillette Police Officer Ben Gauthier was also on the scene.  Neither police vehicle was blocking 
Rice's egress from the parking lot, and neither police officer had activated the 
emergency lights on his patrol car.  
Officer Brothers waited until after Rice was informed that he was free to 
go before asking additional questions because "[f]rom my training and 
understanding that is the proper procedure, that we cannot detain anyone against 
their will."  In his mind, Officer 
Brothers thought that Rice was aware that he did not have to answer any further 
questions and that he was free to leave had he chosen to do 
so.

 

[¶12]   Officer Brothers asked Rice if 
there were any drugs or controlled substances in his vehicle.  Officer Brothers related that Rice 
"didn't respond to me, just got a blank look and then stepped up against the 
side of his vehicle and placed his head probably within a foot of the side glass 
of the vehicle and just stared into the vehicle."  Officer Bothers then repeated his 
question and again Rice did not respond.  
Officer Brothers further testified that "[Rice] eventually looked back up 
at me and asked me what the question had been.  I repeated the question and received the 
same response.  He again placed his 
face rather close to the window of the vehicle and acted as if he was looking 
through the vehicle and didn't respond to me."  That happened a couple of times, and 
then Officer Brothers finally asked Rice if he was okay.  Rice responded that "he didn't know what 
I was looking for."  When Officer 
Brothers iterated that he was checking to see if there were any controlled 
substances in the vehicle, Rice said a friend might have left a joint in the 
vehicle.  Officer Brothers testified 
that at this point Rice was still free to leave.

 

[¶13]   Officer Brothers asked Rice if he 
could look in the vehicle, and Rice said he would rather he did not.  Officer Brothers then asked Rice if he 
could run his narcotics dog around the exterior of the vehicle, and Rice 
consented.  Officer Brothers 
testified that Rice was still free to leave and that he would have allowed him 
to leave if Rice had wanted to.  
Officer Brothers retrieved his dog from his car and proceeded to take the 
dog around the car on a lead (he did not want the dog running free because they 
were near two busy streets).  The 
dog alerted to the trunk of the vehicle first.  As the sniffing process continued, the 
dog came to the open driver's side door (that Rice had opened and left open 
during this contact), and the dog alerted to the interior of the car.  Officer Brothers testified that in his 
mind, Rice was still free to leave at that point and that he had not allowed the 
dog to enter the interior of the car because Rice had not consented to 
that.

 

[¶14]   At that point, Officer Brothers 
informed Rice that he thought there were drugs in the car and asked him where 
they were.  Rice indicated that he 
thought the dog had not found anything, but Officer Brothers said that the dog 
had.  Rice then repeated that there 
might be a joint in his car left there by a friend.  Officer Brothers asked if he knew where 
it was.  Rice initially responded 
that it was not in his best interests to answer the question.  When Officer Brothers repeated his 
question, Rice told him he had a joint in his pocket.  He reached into his pocket and brought 
out a Carmex container.  Rice 
opened the lid and revealed a green leafy substance that looked and smelled like 
marijuana.  Officer Brothers also 
asked if Rice had any weapons, and Rice said he had a knife and started to reach 
for it.  Officer Brothers stopped 
him, out of concern for his personal safety, and handcuffed Rice and placed him 
under arrest for possession of a controlled substance.

 

[¶15]   After placing Rice under arrest, he 
conducted a pat down search of his person and retrieved a "stiletto-type knife 
that is activated by pushing the blade, is spring loaded and shoots open."  As the search continued, Officer 
Brothers placed all the items found in the search of Rice's person on the 
driver's seat in Rice's car.  When 
Officer Brothers leaned into the car while placing the search items on the 
driver's seat, he detected a strong odor of fresh marijuana.  Rice was placed in Officer Gauthier's 
car and transported to jail.  About 
10-15 minutes transpired from the time Officer Brothers first contacted Rice 
until the time that he was arrested.

 

[¶16]   A second backup police officer, 
Sergeant Mark Ziska, then arrived on the scene.  Ziska was Officer Brothers's supervisor, 
and Officer Brothers informed Ziska of what he intended to do next.  Photographs were taken of Rice's vehicle 
and the crime scene.  Officer 
Brothers brought out his canine again and had him search the interior of the 
vehicle.  The dog alerted to a 
suitcase that was located on the passenger seat of Rice's car.  Brothers found marijuana in that 
suitcase.  The dog was then removed 
from the car (this is part of the search procedure), and the search was resumed 
anew.  The dog alerted to drugs in 
the backseat as well, stuffing his nose deep into the seam where the seat and 
backrest meet.  Officer Brothers 
found nothing in the backseat, so he used the keys he had to Rice's car to open 
the trunk.  In the trunk Officer 
Brothers found several pieces of luggage that were stuffed full of plastic bags 
of marijuana.

 

[¶17]   At this point, Officer Brothers 
called Detective Steve Wageman to the scene.  Wageman determined that Rice's car 
should be driven to the police department sally port, and Officer Brothers was 
directed to go to the county attorney's office to begin the process of getting a 
search warrant for the purpose of further searching the automobile.  A warrant was obtained and the luggage 
from the trunk was searched, revealing about 70 pounds of marijuana.  Additional photographs were also 
taken.

 

[¶18]   Officer Gauthier testified that he 
arrived on the scene as Officer Brothers was returning the driver's license to 
Rice and telling him he was free to go.  
Gauthier participated in much of the "consensual" conversation between 
him, Rice, and Officer Brothers.  
Gauthier observed Rice retrieve the Carmex container from his pocket and 
give it to Officer Brothers.  He 
also observed the arrest.

 

[¶19]   Rice testified also.  Rice claimed he had been parked at the 
store for about 10 minutes when a uniformed police officer awakened him as he 
was trying to "catch my thoughts".  
He wanted to clear his head and ready himself to get some sleep.  When he heard the knock at the window of 
his car, he awakened and got out of the car.  Shortly after he was contacted by the 
police officer, his watch alarm went off (he had set it to go off in ten 
minutes, which was 10:00 p.m.).  The 
police officer asked for his ID, a request that Rice did not believe he could 
refuse.  Continuing, Rice testified 
that he gave his driver's license, state ID card, and insurance card to the 
officer and they were never returned to him nor was he told that he was free to 
leave.  Rice related that the 
interrogation was not interrupted by a pause, as Officer Brothers claimed, and 
that he did not consent to the search of the exterior of his car by the 
canine.  Rice conceded that the 
police officers asked about his welfare, that the conversation was cordial, and 
that they gave him directions to a motel.  
He conceded that he was not threatened in any way and that he had not 
been formally arrested when he gave up his Carmex container with the marijuana 
in it.  Rice did relate that the 
second question he was asked (after "are you okay") was if he was using 
methamphetamine and if he had marijuana in his car.  Rice estimated the encounter lasted "ten 
to 30 minutes."

 

[¶20]   After hearing all of the offered 
evidence and the arguments from counsel, the district court took the matter 
under advisement and issued a decision letter.  In its decision letter, the district 
court found that Officer Brothers returned Rice's driver's license and ID card 
to him and told him he was free to go.  
The district court resolved other conflicts in the facts in favor of the 
State as well, finding that the police officers were the more credible witnesses 
and that Rice consented to the initial canine sniff of the exterior of his 
car.  When Rice was confronted with 
the results of the canine sniff, he voluntarily produced a container with 
marijuana in it and was arrested for possession of marijuana.  The district court's brief decision 
letter articulated this reasoning:

 

[Rice] 
argues first that Officer Brothers has no right to ask [Rice] for identification 
given the circumstances of the case and as set forth in United States v. 
McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994).  While this Court believes that 
McSwain is distinguishable in that the officers here had had 95 calls 
about loitering in the Kwik Stop parking lot, assuming arguendo that 
McSwain applies, here the purpose for the McSwain rule vanished 
once the officer returned [Rice's] driver's license and told him that he was 
free to go.

 

[Rice] 
next argues that the methodology undertaken here by the police was little more 
than a trained ruse, that ruse being that once an officer tells someone that 
they are free to go there is an immediate, wrongful and coercive request for 
permission to search for some other information which may lead to the discovery 
of contraband.  Rather, the Court 
finds that the nature of the Officer's inquiry here was in accordance with the 
holding in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).

 

Finally, 
the Court has reviewed this case in the context of the holding in Damato v. 
State, 2003 WY 13, and finds that the factual situation of the case at bar 
is distinguishable.  Once again, in 
the present case, the evidence is that the Officer concluded his business with 
[Rice], returned [his] driver's license and, at that point, [Rice] was free to 
go.  Unlike Damato, no 
pat-down of defendant was conducted and, in fact, the testimony was that during 
the initial encounter the Officer never touched [Rice].  Moreover, [Rice] here produced the lip 
balm canister for the Officer after Duke [the canine] walked around the exterior 
of [Rice's] Buick and alerted at several locations.

 

[¶21]   Rice contends that: (1) The initial 
investigatory stop was invalid; (2) the scope and duration of the investigatory 
stop exceeded Officer Brothers' justifications for detaining Rice; (3) Officer 
Brothers had no reasonable suspicion to retain Rice's identification cards and 
run a criminal background check, detaining him the entire time; and (4) even if 
this Court finds his identification was returned to him and Rice was informed he 
was free to go, the investigatory stop continued, and Rice was detained the 
entire time until he was arrested.  
Because his detention was illegal, Rice continues, the statements Rice 
made and the marijuana seized must be suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous 
tree."

 

[¶22]   Rice acknowledges that our review 
here is limited to a consideration of the Federal Constitution's Fourth 
Amendment because no analysis based on Wyoming's parallel constitutional 
provision was offered below (nor was it offered in Rice's appellate brief).  See Damato, ¶¶ 8 and 
11.  Rice also concedes this case 
does not involve a traditional "traffic stop," but he does characterize it as an 
"investigatory stop."  The State's 
argument is also premised on the assumption that this was an "investigatory 
stop," and the district court's reasoning also appears to have adopted that 
stance.  See Eckenrod v. 
State, 2003 WY 51, ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 635, 639-40, ¶ 13 (Wyo. 2003).2

 

[¶23]   In essence, Rice challenges the 
authority/reasonableness of the police "contacting" him at all, as he lay 
sleeping in his automobile in a convenience store parking lot.  Failing that, Rice contends that if the 
"contact"/investigatory stop is deemed reasonable, that its scope was 
unreasonable.  The police had no 
"suspicions" about Rice, beyond requiring him not to park in the parking lot, 
and to move on if his condition permitted (hence, the inquiry as to whether he 
was okay).  Under the standard of 
review we have identified above, it is incumbent on this Court to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the investigatory stop and whether it was reasonably related 
in scope and time to the circumstances that justified the interference in the 
first instance.  Of course, an 
individual's valid consent to search, as well as purely voluntary admissions, 
obviates the requirement of "suspicion" or probable cause.  Rice contends that he did not consent, 
but the district court, in the process of weighing the credibility of the 
witnesses (Rice and the police officers), determined that the police officers 
were more credible.

 

[¶24]   The State contends that it has an 
"obvious" interest in preventing motorists from sleeping in their cars in 
convenience store parking lots.  
Thus, the limited intrusion into Rice's protected rights was 
reasonable.  The police officer 
articulated the purposes of his contact with Rice to be to inquire about his 
well-being and tell him to move along if, in fact, he was all right.  We agree that the police officer's 
initial contact with Rice was reasonable under these circumstances.  Continuing, the State also contends that 
Rice voluntarily got out of his car (leaving the driver's side car door open) 
and engaged in a conversation with the police directed to ascertaining Rice's 
well-being and to get him to move along, in particular to a motel to get some 
rest.  Rice concurred with the 
characterization of his contact with the police as cordial.  Since the entire encounter, from start 
to Rice's arrest, lasted only10 to 15 minutes, the initial discussion could only 
have been a few minutes.  We 
conclude that the scope and duration of the police officers' initial contact 
with Rice was also reasonable.  The 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the district court's 
conclusion that at the end of that reasonable period of detention, Rice's 
driver's license and other papers were returned to him, and he was informed that 
he was free to go.

 

[¶25]   This case falls into a discrete 
category of cases that involve a police officer merely walking up to a person 
seated in an automobile in a public place and directing a question to the 
occupant.  The general rule is that 
this alone does not constitute a seizure and, thus, does not invoke Fourth 
Amendment protection.  4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.3(a), at 97-98 (fn.45) (1996 3d ed. and 
2004 Pocket Part at 36-37).  That 
footnote collects many cases that are directly in point for the instant 
case.  These cases turn on their 
individual factual circumstances, and the factual circumstances of this case 
place it well within the general rule.  
See, e.g., People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 71-76 (Colo. 1998) 
(police stopping to inquire of occupants of parked car is a consensual 
encounter; request for identification without more does not convert consensual 
encounter into seizure that invokes protection of Fourth Amendment; analysis 
requires consideration of totality of circumstances); and State v. 
Reason, 951 P.2d 538, 540-45 (Kan. 1997) (police contact with two 
individuals asleep in a parked car in a public park was voluntary encounter; any 
investigatory detention ended when police informed defendant he was free to go; 
consent to search vehicle was voluntary).  
Rice cites several cases that are only tangentially in point.  Those cases are not persuasive here 
(which the district court found as well) where the critical factor is Rice's 
consent to a search of the exterior of his car, as well as the voluntary 
production of a controlled substance that was in his possession.  These factors justified his arrest and 
the subsequent searches of his automobile.3

 

[¶26]   The district court found, and the 
record supports the finding, that when Officer Brother's asked Rice to consent 
to talk with him further, he tacitly agreed to do so by freely answering the 
officer's questions.  That further 
discussion eventuated in an admission by Rice that there might be a "joint" in 
his car and a request by Officer Brothers to search Rice's car.  Rice did not consent to a search of his 
car by Officer Brothers, but the district court's finding that Rice did consent 
to allow Officer Brothers to have his drug detection canine sniff around his car 
is not clearly erroneous and is supported by the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing.  The district 
court's finding that Rice's subsequent admission that he possessed marijuana, 
accompanied as it was by a voluntary production of evidence of that possession 
to Officer Brothers, is not clearly erroneous either.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶27]   We have carefully examined the 
record in this case in the light of the applicable standards of review.  We conclude that the district court's 
factual findings are not clearly erroneous and that the district court's denial 
of the motion to suppress is not contrary to the applicable legal 
principles.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1§ 
35-7-1031.  Unlawful manufacture or 
delivery; counterfeit substance; unlawful 
possession.

            
(a)  Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any 
person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or 
deliver, a controlled substance.  
Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

(i)  Methamphetamine or a controlled substance classified in 
Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is guilty of a crime and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, or fined not 
more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both;

(ii)  Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, 
II or III, is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not 
more than ten (10) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), 
or both;

(iii)  A substance classified in Schedule IV, is guilty of a 
crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than two (2) years, 
fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00), or 
both;

(iv)  A substance classified in Schedule V, is guilty of a 
crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, 
fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or 
both.

 

Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 35-7-1031(a) (LexisNexis 
2003).

 

   2We accept the 
parties' and the district court's concessions that this incident was an 
"investigatory stop."  However, we 
will conclude that closer analysis reveals it to be a "consensual" or 
"voluntary" encounter.

 

  3We have had 
several occasions to rule on searches similar to the one at issue in this 
case.  None of those cases is 
directly pertinent to the resolution of this matter, but we mention them here so 
as to refer our readers to other cases related to, and fleshing out, this 
issue:  State v. Williams, 
2004 WY 53, 90 P.3d 85 (Wyo. 2004) (no separate finding of exigency required 
where there is probable cause for search based on dog's alert to presence of 
narcotics); Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, 97 P.3d 781 (Wyo. 2004) 
(prolonged detention resulted in Fourth Amendment violation); Barch v. 
State, 2004 WY 79, 92 P.3d 828 (Wyo. 2004) (excessive detention invalidated 
search); Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, 95 P.3d 802 (Wyo. 2004) (dog sniff 
not search under Fourth Amendment).