Case Title: Allstate Insurance Company v. Revival Chiropractic, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2022-0735

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0735 
____________ 
 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., 
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
REVIVAL CHIROPRACTIC, LLC, 
Appellee. 
 
April 25, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
Once again, we address a dispute over the amount of 
reimbursements for medical expenses that an insurer was required 
to pay under a personal injury protection (PIP) policy.  This dispute 
comes to us by way of a certified question posed by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Revival 
Chiropractic LLC ex rel. Padin v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 21-
10559, 2022 WL 1799759, at *1 (11th Cir. June 2, 2022), which we 
consider under the jurisdiction granted by article V, section 3(b)(6) 
of the Florida Constitution to review questions of Florida law 
 
- 2 - 
certified by federal appellate courts that are “determinative of the 
cause and for which there is no controlling precedent” of our Court. 
Like our recent decision in MRI Associates of Tampa, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 334 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 
2021), this case involves the interaction of the PIP statute’s 
foundational requirement that insurers pay 80% of “all reasonable 
expenses” for medically necessary services with the statutory 
authorization for an insurer to pay 80% of expenses based on the 
statutory schedule of maximum charges if the insurer gives notice 
that it may limit reimbursement pursuant to that schedule.  
Reduced to its bare bones, the question for decision is whether the 
insurer here may pay 80% of a charge submitted by a provider even 
when that reimbursement amount is less than the amount that 
would be reimbursable under the limitations of the statutory 
schedule of maximum charges.  We conclude that the terms of the 
PIP policy in this case expressly authorize such a payment and that 
nothing in the statutory scheme stands in the way of that policy 
provision. 
In analyzing the case, we first briefly review the relevant 
statutory provisions before setting forth the pertinent policy 
 
- 3 - 
provisions.  With that groundwork laid, we discuss the opinion of 
the Eleventh Circuit, which describes the controversy and the 
arguments of the parties, and we examine the decision of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida that is on 
review in the Eleventh Circuit.  We then discuss Florida case law, 
focusing on our decision in MRI Associates.  Finally, we rephrase 
the certified question to more carefully track the facts of the case 
after we have analyzed the relevant statutory and policy provisions 
and explained our conclusion that Allstate was entitled to pay 80% 
of the billed charges at issue here. 
I. 
The statutory requirements governing PIP benefits are set forth 
in section 627.736, Florida Statutes (2017).  Section 627.736(1)(a) 
provides generally that PIP medical benefits must cover “[e]ighty 
percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary medical, 
surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitative services.”  Comprehensive 
provisions regarding “charges for treatment of injured persons” are 
laid out in section 627.736(5).  Subsection (5)(a) requires that 
medical providers “rendering treatment to an injured person for a 
bodily injury covered by personal injury protection insurance may 
 
- 4 - 
charge the insurer and injured party only a reasonable amount 
pursuant to this section for the services and supplies rendered” and 
then enumerates various factors relevant to ascertaining the 
reasonableness of charges.  Subsection (5)(a) moves on to set forth 
provisions creating and governing the schedule of maximum 
charges that may be used to limit reimbursement. 
Subsection (5)(a) states that reasonable charges “may not 
exceed the amount the [provider] customarily charges for like 
services or supplies.”  Subsection (5)(a) then sets forth various 
factors that may be used in determining the reasonableness of 
charges, including “evidence of usual and customary charges and 
payments accepted by the provider involved in the dispute.”  
Provisions related to the schedule of maximum charges are 
contained in section 627.736(5)(a)1.  Under this provision, “[t]he 
insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the [listed] schedule 
of maximum charges” set forth in subsection (5)(a)1.a.-f.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
Various requirements concerning the application of the 
schedule of maximum charges are detailed in subsection (5)(a)2.-5.  
Of particular relevance to the issue in this case, subsection (5)(a)5. 
 
- 5 - 
requires that an insurer provide notice of its election to use the 
schedule of maximum charges: 
An insurer may limit payment as authorized by this 
paragraph only if the insurance policy includes a notice 
at the time of issuance or renewal that the insurer may 
limit payment pursuant to the schedule of charges 
specified in this paragraph. . . .  If a provider submits a 
charge for an amount less than the amount allowed 
under subparagraph 1., the insurer may pay the amount 
of the charge submitted. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
II. 
 
Under the PIP policy provisions at issue in this case, Allstate 
agreed—subject to various conditions—to pay “eighty percent of 
reasonable expenses” for “medically necessary” services.  Allstate’s 
policy further states that “[t]he methodology for determining the 
amount” to be paid “shall, pursuant to the fee schedule limitations 
under Section 627.736(5)(a)1. . . . or any other limitations 
established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the 
Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as enacted, amended or 
otherwise continued in the law, be limited to eighty percent of [a 
listed] schedule of maximum charges” that parallels the statutory 
schedule “(or any other fee schedule limitation which may be 
 
- 6 - 
enacted, amended or otherwise continued in the law).”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
The policy goes on to provide: “If a provider submits a charge 
for an amount less than the amount determined by the fee schedule 
or other limitations established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other 
provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law . . . [Allstate] 
will pay eighty percent of the charge that was submitted.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
III. 
As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Allstate issued separate 
auto insurance policies—both containing the PIP provisions set 
forth above—to Natalie Rivera and Jazmine Padin.  Revival 
Chiropractic ex rel. Padin, 2022 WL 1799759, at *1.  The circuit 
court detailed the genesis of this litigation: 
Padin and Rivera were both involved in car 
accidents, and they sought treatment from Revival.  They 
also assigned to Revival any rights and benefits that they 
had under their respective policies. 
After rendering services to these insureds, Revival 
submitted a charge of $100.  The services corresponded 
to a maximum charge of $149.92 under the statutory 
schedule.  So 80% of the maximum charge under the 
schedule was $119.94, which was higher than the 
submitted charge.  See Fla. Stat. § 627.736(5)(a)1.  
Because the charge of $100 was less than $119.94, the 
 
- 7 - 
statute expressly allowed Allstate to pay the amount 
billed.  Id. § 627.736(5)(a)5.  Instead of paying the 
scheduled amount or amount billed, Allstate chose to pay 
80% of the amount billed—$80. 
Revival also submitted a charge of $75 for a service 
corresponding to a maximum charge of $81.70 under the 
schedule.  Again, instead of paying 80% of the maximum 
charge under the schedule ($65.36) or the amount billed 
($75), Allstate paid 80% of the amount billed ($60). 
Neither Padin nor Rivera paid the remaining 20% of 
the charges submitted to Allstate. 
Revival filed a putative class action against Allstate 
in Florida state court, seeking a judgment “[d]eclaring 
that [Allstate] violated Florida law by paying only 80% of 
the charges submitted where the charges submitted were 
for less than the amounts allowed” under Section 
627.736(5)(a)1. 
 
Id. at *1-2 (alterations in original). 
Allstate removed the case from state court to the Middle 
District Court, where Allstate and Revival filed dueling motions for 
summary judgment.  Id. at *2.  Allstate contended that it had 
complied with the express provisions of its policy, which authorized 
paying 80% of the amount billed, and that its policy provisions were 
consistent with the PIP statute’s “overarching requirement” that PIP 
insurers pay 80% of reasonable medical expenses.  Id.  Allstate 
argued that the provision of subsection (5)(a)5. that an “insurer may 
pay the amount of the charge submitted” was purely permissive.  
Id. (emphasis added).  Revival focused on Allstate’s policy notice 
 
- 8 - 
that it would use the schedule of maximum charges.  Revival 
asserted that Allstate’s election of the schedule of maximum 
charges required it to proceed exclusively under the provisions 
related to that schedule and thus bound it either to pay 80% of the 
charge specified by the schedule or to pay pursuant to subsection 
(5)(a)5.’s provision for full payment of “the amount of the charge 
submitted” when the charge is for “an amount less than the amount 
allowed under” subsection (5)(a)1., governing reimbursement 
pursuant to the schedule of maximum charges.  Id. 
The district court agreed with Revival’s argument, granted 
Revival’s motion, and denied Allstate’s.  Id.  Relying on the canon 
against surplusage,1 the district court reasoned that “Allstate’s 
argument would render § 627.736(5)(a)[5.] unnecessary and 
meaningless because common sense dictates that no insurer would 
ever pay the full amount of [the charge submitted] as provided 
 
 
1.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and 
every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt 
accipienda).  None should be ignored.  None should needlessly be 
given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision 
or to have no consequence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
- 9 - 
under [that provision], if it could, as Allstate argues, pay only 80 
percent of the [charge submitted].”  Revival Chiropractic LLC v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 6:19-cv-445-PGB-LRH, 2020 WL 2483583, at 
*5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020). 
In reaching its conclusion that “there are no clear controlling 
precedents” from our Court on the issue in this case, the Eleventh 
Circuit began by taking note of two decisions from Florida District 
Courts of Appeal that it found to provide support for Revival’s 
position—Hands On Chiropractic PL v. GEICO General Insurance Co., 
327 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), and Geico Indemnity Co. v. 
Muransky Chiropractic P.A., 323 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).  
Revival Chiropractic ex rel. Padin, 2022 WL 1799759, at *3.  The 
Eleventh Circuit observed that these cases determined that “when 
an insurer gives notice that it will reimburse according to the 
scheduled rates, it must either pay 80% of the applicable fee 
schedule or 100% of the bill.”  Id.  The circuit court went on to point 
out that the reasoning of these cases has been “undermined” but 
“not directly repudiate[d],” id., by our decision in MRI Associates, 
which held that “the schedule of maximum charges” is not “an 
exclusive method” of establishing reimbursement rates but “an 
 
- 10 - 
optional method” of limiting reimbursements that is available to 
insurers that give notice that they may use it and that it therefore 
“establishes a ceiling but not a floor,” id. (quoting MRI Assocs., 334 
So. 3d at 585). 
Based on its understanding of the “substantial uncertainty” in 
Florida law, the circuit court certified the following question to us: 
When a personal injury protection insurance policy 
provides notice that it will limit payment pursuant to the 
statutory schedule of maximum charges, may an insurer 
pay 80% of the charge submitted, even when the charge 
submitted is less than 80% of the statutory schedule of 
maximum charges? 
 
Id. at *4. 
IV. 
In MRI Associates, we considered whether an insurer’s election 
to use the schedule of maximum charges was required to be an 
exclusive choice for determining the amount of reasonable charges.  
334 So. 3d at 579, 585.  The provider contended “that section 
627.736(5)(a) contains two mutually exclusive methods of 
calculating the amount of reasonable reimbursement—namely, (1) 
the method set forth in subsection (5)(a) 
’s enumeration of factors 
for determining reasonableness, and (2) the maximum schedule of 
 
- 11 - 
charges set forth in subsection (5)(a)1.”  Id. at 582-83.  Because the 
insurer’s policy allowed the use of both the schedule of maximum 
charges and the other enumerated factors for determining 
reasonableness, the provider argued that the election of the 
schedule was ineffective.  Id. at 583.  We categorically rejected this 
argument that a “hybrid-payment methodology” was prohibited.  Id. 
at 585. 
In explaining our conclusion that the PIP statute does not 
“preclude an insurer that elects to limit PIP reimbursements based 
on the schedule of maximum charges from also using the separate 
statutory factors for determining the reasonableness of charges,” we 
focused on the nature of the notice required by the statute 
concerning use of the schedule of maximum charges.  Id. at 584-85.  
We reasoned that subsection (5)(a)5.’s provision “that ‘an insurer 
may limit payment’ if the policy contains notice that ‘the insurer 
may limit payment pursuant to the schedule of charges’ . . . cannot 
be reconciled with the argument that an election to use the 
limitations of the schedule of maximum charges” must be an 
exclusive election.  Id. at 584.  We noted that the “permissive nature 
of the statutory notice language . . . signals that the insurer is given 
 
- 12 - 
an option that may be used in addition to other options that are 
authorized.”  Id.  We also pointed out that the statutory “notice 
language echoes the underlying authorization to limit 
reimbursements under the schedule of maximum charges: ‘The 
insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the [listed] 
schedule of maximum charges.’  § 627.736(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. 
(emphasis added).”  Id. (alteration in original).   
Based on “the full context of these provisions,” we concluded 
that “a reasonable reading of the statutory text requires that 
reimbursement limitations based on the schedule of maximum 
charges be understood . . . simply as an optional method of capping 
reimbursements rather than an exclusive method for determining 
reimbursement rates”—that is, as “a ceiling but not a floor.”  Id. at 
584-85. 
The two Florida district court decisions mentioned by the 
Eleventh Circuit—Hands On and Muransky—dealt with policy 
provisions materially different from the provisions in Allstate’s 
policy.  See Hands On, 327 So. 3d at 442 n.3 (“Geico contractually 
elected to always pay the billed amount in full where the billed 
amount was less than 80 percent of the 200 percent of the 
 
- 13 - 
applicable fee schedule.”); Muransky, 323 So. 3d at 748 (policy 
provision “indicate[d] Geico’s promise to pay certain charges ‘in the 
amount of the charge submitted’ ”).  In any event, both cases were 
decided before and without the benefit of our decision in MRI 
Associates.  We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that those decisions 
of our district courts have been undermined by MRI Associates.  
Indeed, we conclude that they have been undermined to the extent 
that whatever they might have to say relevant to the issue in this 
case has been superseded by our analysis in MRI Associates.  We 
therefore do not find them useful in our consideration of the issue 
presented by the certified question. 
Unlike the courts deciding Hands On and Muransky, the 
Second District Court of Appeal had the benefit of our decision in 
MRI Associates when it reviewed a trial court ruling that an insurer 
“could not pay [a provider] 80 percent of the amounts [the provider] 
charged, and instead was required to pay either 100 percent of [the 
provider’s] charges or 80 percent of the amount allowed under the 
statutory schedule of maximum charges.”  Progressive Am. Ins. Co. 
v. Back on Track, LLC, 342 So. 3d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).  
Based largely on our reasoning in MRI Associates, the Second 
 
- 14 - 
District reversed the trial court.  Id. at 780, 783.  The court held 
“that a PIP insurer whose policy includes a notice that it will limit 
medical provider reimbursements” under the schedule of maximum 
charges “is not required to calculate all provider reimbursements in 
accordance with the statutory schedule of maximum charges” but 
may pay a provider 80% of the amount of the provider’s charges.  
Id. at 793.  This decision of the Second District issued after the 
Eleventh Circuit certified the question we now consider. 
V. 
“Because the question presented requires this Court to 
interpret provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law—
specifically, the PIP statute—as well as to interpret the insurance 
policy, our standard of review is de novo.”  Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. 
Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc., 141 So. 3d 147, 152 (Fla. 2013). 
As we stated in MRI Associates, “[w]hen ‘interpreting an 
insurance contract,’ this Court is ‘bound by the plain meaning of 
the contract’s text,’ ” 334 So. 3d at 583 (quoting State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011)), and 
“[w]e are similarly bound by the plain meaning of the text of the 
provisions of the PIP statute,” id.  We have also recognized the 
 
- 15 - 
fundamental principle that “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of 
meaning.”  Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 
2022) (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 167).  Provisions in 
the texts of statutes and contracts cannot be viewed in isolation 
from the full textual context of which they are a part.  “Under the 
whole-text canon, proper interpretation requires consideration of 
‘the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and 
logical relation of its many parts.’ ”  Id. (quoting Scalia & 
Garner, supra note 1, at 167). 
Applying these basic principles, we conclude that the 
provisions of both the statute and the policy support Allstate’s 
payment of 80% of the amount of the charges submitted. 
We begin with “the heart of the PIP statute’s coverage 
requirements”—that is, the provision of section 627.736(1)(a) 
requiring PIP insurers to “reimburse eighty percent of reasonable 
expenses for medically necessary services.”  Virtual Imaging, 141 So. 
3d at 155.  Allstate correctly characterizes this 80% of reasonable 
expenses requirement as the “overarching mandate” of the PIP 
statute.  Nothing in the PIP statute can be properly understood in 
isolation from this foundational provision.  And the provision cuts 
 
- 16 - 
strongly against Revival’s argument that Allstate was required to 
pay 100% of the amount of charges submitted.  The point is 
reinforced by the requirement of subsection (5)(a) that providers 
“may charge the insurer and injured party only a reasonable 
amount.”  § 627.736(5)(a), Fla. Stat.  Revival is in no position to 
contend that the charges it submitted were other than for a 
reasonable amount.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 862 So. 
2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[T]here is simply no basis for 
complaining that a payment rate a provider has agreed to accept is 
inadequate and therefore not reasonable.”), approved by Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 961 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 2007). 
Of course, Revival’s position is that Allstate’s election to limit 
reimbursements based on the schedule of maximum charges 
effectively provided an exception to the statutory provision limiting 
reimbursements to 80% of reasonable charges.  But Revival’s 
understanding is based on a misreading of the provisions of both 
section 627.736 and Allstate’s PIP policy.  Revival errs in 
misunderstanding the nature of the statutory authorization to limit 
reimbursements under the schedule when an insurer has given 
statutory notice that it may limit reimbursements under the 
 
- 17 - 
schedule.  It further errs in reading the purely permissive provisions 
of subsection (5)(a)5. as entailing a conditional requirement to pay 
100% of the amount of “the charge submitted” when that amount is 
less than the amount reimbursable under the schedule of 
maximum charges.  Reading Allstate’s policy through the same 
distorted interpretive lens, Revival contends that the policy reflects 
an election to exclusively proceed pursuant to the statutory 
provisions governing the schedule of maximum charges.  Revival’s 
approach subverts the manifest purpose of both the PIP statute and 
Allstate’s PIP policy by ignoring the clear terms of both texts. 
As MRI Associates makes clear, the PIP statute contemplates 
that an insurer providing notice that it may use the schedule of 
maximum charges will not thereby be precluded from paying 80% of 
reasonable charges as otherwise determined under the provisions of 
subsection (5)(a).  334 So. 3d at 585.  The PIP statute thus sets up 
the framework for an insurer to opt into a “hybrid-payment 
methodology.”  Id.  This flows from the permissive language used in 
the notice provisions of subsection (5)(a)5.: “An insurer may limit 
payment” if the insurer gives notice in its policy that it “may limit 
payment” under the schedule of maximum charges.  And it flows 
 
- 18 - 
from the permissive language used in subsection (5)(a)1. that 
establishes the underlying authorization for the schedule of 
maximum charges: an insurer “may limit reimbursement to 80 
percent” of the schedule of maximum charges.  All this language 
denoting permissive limitation establishes that the schedule 
constitutes an optional limitation that may be invoked by an 
insurer—if the insurer’s policy contains the necessary notice—in 
determining reasonableness under the overarching mandate to pay 
80% of reasonable charges. 
Revival in effect contends that Allstate stepped out of this 
statutory framework in which a hybrid-payment methodology is the 
norm and through its policy made an exclusive election of the 
schedule of maximum charges.  But the policy’s terms belie that 
contention.  The policy expressly provides that Allstate will pay 
“eighty percent of reasonable expenses.”  Most pertinent to the 
dispute here, the policy also contains a backstop provision that 
specifically provides for a divergence from the amount reimbursable 
under the schedule of maximum charges when the charge 
submitted is for an amount less than the amount reimbursable 
under the schedule or otherwise under the statute.  In such 
 
- 19 - 
circumstances, Allstate’s policy provides that it “will pay eighty 
percent of the charge that was submitted.”  That provision is 
consistent with the mandate of section 627.736(1)(a) to pay “[e]ighty 
percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary” services.  
And it transgresses no other provision of the statute.  Moreover, in 
addition to giving notice that payments will be limited by the 
schedule of maximum charges, the policy in describing the 
“methodology” for determining the amount to be paid specifically 
makes that determination subject to “any other limitations 
established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the 
Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as enacted, amended or 
otherwise continued in the law.”  (Emphasis added.)  This is in line 
with the permissive language of subsection (5)(a)5.’s notice 
provision and subsection(5)(a)1.’s authorization of the schedule, 
which both signal that the schedule is designed as a non-exclusive 
option.  It is, of course, possible that an insurer could employ policy 
language making an exclusive election of the schedule of maximum 
charges.  But Allstate certainly has not done so. 
We reject the view urged by Revival and adopted by the Middle 
District Court that the provisions of subsection (5)(a)5. require 
 
- 20 - 
payment of no less than the full amount of the charge submitted 
when that amount is below the reimbursement payable under the 
schedule.  This view is logically predicated on understanding 
Allstate’s policy notice that it may use the schedule as an exclusive 
election.  Our rejection of that understanding of Allstate’s policy is a 
sufficient basis for rejecting the derivative understanding of the 
application of subsection (5)(a)5.’s provision regarding payment of 
“the amount of the charge submitted,” which would be 
irreconcilable with an insurer’s options under a policy permitting a 
hybrid-payment methodology.   
But the understanding of that provision as a requirement 
binding on Allstate involves another fundamental problem.  As with 
the misinterpretation of Allstate’s policy notice, it attempts to 
transform permissive language into mandatory language.  The 
pertinent language of subsection (5)(a)5. is entirely permissive: “If a 
provider submits a charge for an amount less than the amount 
allowed under [the schedule of maximum charges], the insurer may 
pay the amount of the charge submitted.”  (Emphasis added.)  
There is no basis for understanding “may pay” as a conditional 
“must pay” or as otherwise displacing the statutory provision—
 
- 21 - 
which is mirrored in Allstate’s policy—limiting reimbursements to 
80% of reasonable charges.  If the legislature wishes to mandate 
something, it is perfectly capable of saying so.  Indeed, few words 
are more common in the language of legislation than “shall” and 
“must.”  Cf. Jewell, 862 So. 2d at 85 (“If the legislature wishes to 
prohibit something, it is perfectly capable of saying so.  Indeed, few 
words are more common in the language of legislation than the 
phrases ‘may not’ and ‘shall not.’ ”). 
And the canon against surplusage does not justify substituting 
“must pay” for “may pay.”  We have recognized that it “is an 
elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and 
effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the 
statute if possible.”  Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 
2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003).  But the “if possible” condition concluding 
our statement of the principle is quite significant.  Accordingly, we 
have acknowledged that the canon against surplusage is “not ‘an 
absolute rule,’ ” nor “a license for the judiciary to rewrite language 
enacted by the legislature.”  Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020, 1030 
(Fla. 2023) (first quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 
385 (2013); and then quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 
 
- 22 - 
675, 680 (1985)).  An effort to find applicable meaning for a 
provision does not warrant distortion of the plain import of the text 
by converting a permissive provision into a mandatory provision.2 
Based on the policy language involved in this case, we reframe 
the certified question as follows: 
Under a PIP policy providing notice that the insurer (a) 
will pay 80% of reasonable expenses for medically 
necessary services, (b) may limit payment pursuant to 
the statutory schedule of maximum charges and other 
statutory limitations, and (c) will pay 80% of a submitted 
charge if that charge is less than the amount 
reimbursable under the schedule or other statutory 
provisions, may the insurer pay 80% of the charge 
submitted by a medical provider, even if the charge 
submitted is for less than the amount reimbursable 
under the schedule? 
 
We answer this question in the affirmative. 
VI. 
Allstate’s policy specifically addresses the circumstances at 
issue in this case.  The policy provides that Allstate will pay 80% of 
reasonable expenses and it expressly permits Allstate to pay 80% of 
 
 
2.  We also note that although there is no apparent likely 
application of the last sentence of subsection (5)(a)5. under the 
terms of Allstate’s policy, that might not be the case under some 
other policy terms. 
 
- 23 - 
the charges submitted.  Nothing in the PIP statute invalidates the 
policy provisions authorizing such payments.  On the contrary, 
those provisions faithfully carry out the statutory mandate to pay 
80% of reasonable expenses for medical services.  Having answered 
the rephrased certified question, we return this case to the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
SASSO, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 21-10559 
 
Richard C. Godfrey of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 
Chicago, Illinois; Peter J. Valeta of Cozen O’Connor, Chicago, 
Illinois; and Alexandra J. Schultz of Cozen O’Connor, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellants 
 
Chad A. Barr of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, Florida; Alyson 
M. Laderman of Akylade, LLC, Longwood, Florida; and Lawrence M. 
Kopelman of Lawrence M. Kopelman, P.A., Plantation, Florida, 
 
for Appellee 
 
Marcy Levine Aldrich and Nancy A. Copperthwaite of Akerman LLP, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
- 24 - 
 
for Amicus Curiae Personal Insurance Federation of Florida