Case Title: RPM v. State, Dept. of Family Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-95-8

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
RPM v. State, Dept. of Family Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services1996 WY 68917 P.2d 169Case Number: C-95-8Decided: 05/21/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
RPM,

 Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND 
SOCIAL SERVICES; and State of Wyoming, ex rel., RPB, minor 
child,

 Appellees (Petitioners). 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

RPM, 
pro se.

William 
U. Hill, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Cynthia 
L. Harnett, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY and LEHMAN, JJ., and PRICE, District 
Judge.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      We review 
appellant RPM's contention that the district court erred in determining, in this 
paternity action, RPM's liability for past and future child support without RPM 
having been afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      RPM raises these 
issues:

I. 
Whether the district court violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1 § 6 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming in denying the Appellant an opportunity to be heard?

II. 
Whether the district court erred (abused its discretion) in refusing to consider 
Appellant's motion in request for court intervention or assistance, and refusing 
to consider Appellant's motion for relief from judgment, or in the alternative, 
notice of appeal?

[¶4]      Appellee, the 
Department of Family Services (Department), rephrases the issues, 
thus:

I. 
Whether Appellant has provided cogent argument and pertinent authority on any 
issue?

II. 
Whether Appellant was entitled to additional rights beyond those afforded by 
Wyoming paternity statutes?

III. 
Whether the district court provided appropriate disposition of each of 
Appellant's motions?

 

[¶5]      On February 17, 
1995, the Department filed a petition to establish paternity and provide for 
child support, alleging that RPM was the father of the child RPB and that RPM 
had failed to provide financial support for the child. RPM was incarcerated in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary at the time the petition was served. RPM filed 
his answer to the petition on March 1, 1995, and admitted that he was the father 
of RPB and that the child had received public assistance.1 RPM claimed he was indigent,2 thus representing himself in this 
matter. The mother of the child also answered, admitting all of the allegations 
of the petition.

[¶6]      By notice entered 
of record on March 24, 1995, the matter was set for hearing. By motion filed on 
April 5, 1995, RPM asked the trial court:

[RPM] 
is an inmate presently incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentiary * * *. Due 
to this incarceration, and due to his poverty, [RPM] is unable to make 
arrangements to personally appear and is not represented by counsel. [RPM] 
respectfully moves this Court to intervene and assist in making the necessary 
arrangements for this respondent to either appear in person, or by telephone 
conference.

By 
letter filed with the district court on May 4, 1995, RPM asked for information 
pertaining to the paternity matter.

[¶7]      By order entered 
on May 8, 1995, the district court found RPM to be the father of RPB and ordered 
RPM to pay $665.00 in attorney's fees and court costs and $11,547.00 for accrued 
child support (May 1987 through April 1995). The district court also found that 
RPM had imputed earnings of $600.00 per month (and that the child's mother also 
had that same amount of earnings3) and established RPM's obligation 
to pay current child support at $150.00 per month.

[¶8]      In Murray v. 
Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 608 (Wyo. 1995), we held that:

The 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
each provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 6. "`It is basic that, before a property interest can be 
terminated, except in emergency situations, due process must be afforded to 
litigants in the form of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard.'" Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, Inc. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989, 997 (Wyo. 
1989)) (emphasis in original). It would have been a simple matter to allow Peter 
to participate in the divorce hearing via conference call. Peter, however, was 
denied his day in court.

[¶9]      We repeated that 
finding in a different, but not distinguishable, context in Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 47-48 (Wyo. 1995) (it is abuse of discretion for trial court to modify 
visitation provisions of divorce decree without affording incarcerated father an 
opportunity to be heard or otherwise providing for development of an evidentiary 
record). We note here that in Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1993), we 
affirmed an order modifying the child support obligation of an individual who 
had been sentenced to life in the penitentiary. The opportunity to be heard was 
not at issue in that case because the appellant was allowed to participate by 
telephone conference call.4 Also see Throndset v. Hawkenson, 
532 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D. 1995), and In Interest of F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 209 
(N.D. 1979) (prison inmate's right to appear satisfied by appearance through 
counsel or by deposition); Barnes v. Fucci, 563 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 
1990) (imprisoned mother entitled to appear for termination of parental rights 
hearing); Smith v. Alaska Department of Revenue, 790 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Alaska 
1990) (no right for prisoner to be heard where there are only legal issues, but 
no factual dispute); Whitney v. Buckner, 107 Wn.2d 861, 734 P.2d 485, 488 (1987) 
(prisoners must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to prosecute their domestic 
relations actions); Clemans v. Collins, 679 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Alaska 1984) 
(hearing required to determine indigent prisoner's ability to pay child support 
while incarcerated).

[¶10]   We reverse5 because the district court failed 
to accommodate some sort of appearance for RPM. Hand-in-hand with the district 
court's failure to afford RPM a meaningful opportunity to be heard, we note that 
the record does not support the district court's findings with respect to child 
support; indeed, to the extent there is relevant information in the record, it 
contradicts the district court's findings.

[¶11]   We affirm that portion of the 
district court's order which determined that RPM is the father of RPB because 
RPM admitted his paternity. The remaining portions of the order are reversed and 
this matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.

PRICE, 
District Judge, concurring in result only.

[¶12]   I concur with the result in this 
decision but do not join in the majority's opinion because of the Court's 
failure to give guidance to the district court on handling this situation. Also, 
the opinion should give warning to pro se litigants that they should not just 
sit back on the date their case has been set for trial or for 
hearing.

[¶13]   It should be noted that RPM's 
"motion" filed on April 5, 1995, was entitled "Motion in Request for Court 
Intervention or Assistance." The motion also acknowledged the date and time of 
the hearing. Not only did RPM not attempt to participate by phone on the hearing 
date, he did nothing to require a hearing on his motion. The Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not specifically address this issue. However, WYO. R. CIV. P. 
6(c)(2) references "a request for hearing . . . by the moving party or any party 
affected by the motion. . . ." Also, RPM did not make a specific motion or 
request to appear by phone as is allowed under WYO. U.R.D.C. 802. In 1984, this 
Court said that a pro se litigant would not be granted greater rights than any 
other litigant and he must expect the same treatment as if represented by an 
attorney. It was pointed out that even though a person has a right to act as 
their own attorney, they should be restricted to the same rules. To do 
differently is to unjustly reward ignorance. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 984 
(Wyo. 1984). More recent cases have been somewhat softer on the pro se litigant 
by indicating that some leniency should be accorded; "however, the 
administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to procedural rules and 
requirements of the court." Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 240 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶14]   My direction to trial courts faced 
with this situation would be to require all notices of setting to state that 
appearance by phone will be considered by the court upon request and that if 
granted, the person attending by phone should be given the proper phone number 
to call and the cost paid by the person attending by phone.

[¶15]   In summary, I vote to reverse in 
part as announced in the majority decision. I agree that a litigant should have 
a right to attend a hearing by phone if he is unable to make arrangements for 
in-person attendance because he is in jail; however, I think the incarcerated 
person must make the request and then set up the phone call themselves, 
including arrangements for payment of the call. It should not be up to the court 
to provide attendance and set up the call. 

 FOOTNOTES

1 
RPM denied portions of the complaint, asserting that he had made attempts to 
provide for the support of the child and that he would be obligated to provide 
support after he had been granted parental rights to the child, but not for 
support prior to receiving those rights.

2 
RPM admitted he received income of $55.00 per month and that "an agreeable 
amount of [child] support can be made" and he would agree to notify the court of 
any changes in his address or earnings.

3 
These earning amounts were based on the ability of RPM and the mother to secure 
full-time, minimum wage employment.

4 
The use of the telephone conference call is not mentioned in the opinion. 
However, the order of the district court from which the appeal was taken, and 
which appears in the Court's file of the Glenn case, acknowledges that Glenn 
appeared by telephone conference call.

5 
RPM's brief contained cogent argument and pertinent authority.