Case Title: Commonwealth v. DiCicco

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11672

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11672 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT DiCICCO. 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 4, 2014. - February 26, 2015. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Practice, Criminal, New trial, 
Postconviction relief.  Evidence, Expert opinion, 
Scientific test.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 27, 1983. 
 
 
A motion for postconviction relief, filed on November 28, 
2007, was heard by Diane M. Kottmyer, J., and a motion for 
additional funds for the services of an expert witness was 
considered by her. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
David J. Nathanson (Michael A. Nam-Krane with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Sara A. Colb, for New England Innocence Project, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Ira L. Gant & Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & Elizabeth A. Lunt, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services Innocence Program & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In 1984, the defendant was convicted by a jury 
of aggravated rape.  In July, 2005, the Superior Court clerk's 
office in Middlesex County located the trial exhibits, including 
the victim's blue jeans and underpants.  They had been stored in 
plastic bags since the trial.  Beginning in January, 2006, the 
defendant filed a series of motions to test the evidence for 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).  These motions were granted and the 
State police crime laboratory (crime laboratory) and Orchid 
Cellmark (Cellmark), an independent laboratory, performed DNA 
testing on the victim's clothing.  The defendant subsequently 
moved for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (1995), relying on the affidavit of 
Eric Carita (Carita), a forensic analyst employed by the 
Connecticut State laboratory,1 who opined that the defendant was 
excluded as the source of the male DNA on the victim's jeans 
based on "potential alleles."2  In July, 2010, a judge in the 
Superior Court (motion judge) held a two-day evidentiary hearing 
                     
 
1 Eric Carita is employed as a forensic science examiner in 
the nuclear deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) casework unit at the 
Connecticut State laboratory.  He has worked at that laboratory 
since 2003.  Carita was the second DNA analyst that the 
defendant retained to examine the results of the DNA testing. 
 
 
2 "A DNA profile for an individual is that combination of 
alleles, or versions of genes, possessed by the individual at 
the loci tested."  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 248 
n.1 (2005). 
3 
 
on the defendant's motion for postconviction relief, at which 
Carita and Christine Lemire, the crime laboratory analyst who 
performed the DNA analysis,3 testified. 
 
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, the judge denied the 
defendant's motion for a new trial in a detailed memorandum of 
decision and order.  In an unpublished memorandum and order 
pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
denial.  See Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 
(2014).  We granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review and conclude that the motion judge did not 
abuse her discretion in determining that, under Commonwealth v. 
Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994), Carita's opinion was not 
sufficiently reliable to be placed before a jury, and the 
defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied. 
 
Background.  We consider the facts as set forth in the 
motion judge's findings after an evidentiary hearing, which are 
supported by the evidence in the record.4  See Commonwealth v. 
Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 372 (2008). 
 
1.  Evidence at the 1984 trial.  In August, 1983, the 
victim was walking home through a parking lot in Waltham 
                     
 
3 Christine Lemire is employed as a DNA analyst with the 
Massachusetts Forensic Technology Center (also commonly known as 
the State police crime laboratory [crime laboratory]).  She has 
worked at that laboratory since 1996. 
 
 
4 See note 22, infra. 
4 
 
sometime after 1:30 A.M. when she was attacked by two men.  One 
of these men, later identified as Vincent Park,5 grabbed the 
victim and forced her to the ground.  While Park pinned the 
victim down, the second man, subsequently identified as the 
defendant, pulled the victim's jeans and underwear down to her 
ankles.  As she struggled, the second man raped her vaginally.  
The first man called the second man "Chick" and said something 
about his "turn." 
 
While the rape was occurring, a van entered the parking lot 
and illuminated the area with its headlights such that the 
victim could see the second man.  This man then stood up and 
urinated on and around the victim.  The two men then ran from 
the parking lot with the van in pursuit.  The victim had trouble 
getting up because she kept slipping on the urine, but on doing 
so, she ran to a telephone booth and called her father.  The 
police were called and the victim went to the hospital, where 
evidence was collected and the victim was interviewed.  Two 
hours after the rape, the victim told police that she thought 
she had seen the second man before and that his name was Robert 
or "Chico."  Additionally, she provided the police with a 
physical description of the second man.  The police took the 
                     
 
5 Vincent Park was later charged with aggravated rape, but 
was found not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility. 
5 
 
evidence, including the victim's clothing, when leaving the 
hospital. 
 
Later that morning, the victim went to the police station, 
looked through two books of photographs, and positively 
identified the defendant as the person who had raped her.  The 
police located the defendant at a local shelter at 6:45 A.M.  
Although the defendant had been scheduled to be at the shelter 
the previous night, he did not arrive until shortly before the 
police looked for him there.  The defendant fit the description 
of the second man provided by the victim.  At trial, the victim 
identified the defendant again. 
 
At trial, the parties stipulated that Mark Grant, a State 
police chemist, would testify to facts contained in his October, 
1983, report, that chemical tests conducted on a stain on the 
victim's underwear did not exclude the defendant as the source, 
but were inconclusive as to anything further.  The tests, 
conducted both on the stain and on a vaginal smear slide taken 
from the rape kit administered to the victim after the attack, 
were positive for the presence of a substance characteristically 
found in semen, but no sperm cells were found. 
 
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a term of not 
more than twenty years or less than eighteen years in State 
prison.  On April 26, 1985, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
defendant's conviction, Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 19 Mass. App. 
6 
 
Ct. 1115 (1985).  After completing his sentence, the defendant 
was found to be a sexually dangerous person and was committed to 
the Nemansket Treatment Center at Bridgewater. 
 
2.  Postconviction proceedings.  In January, 2006, after 
the Superior Court clerk's office located the trial exhibits,6 
the defendant filed a motion for necessary access to test 
evidence for DNA, a motion for funds to do comparison DNA 
testing, and a request for discovery and access to the smear 
slide.  These motions were granted subject to the parties' 
filing a stipulation as to protocols for handling and testing 
the DNA evidence and subject to the availability of the smear 
slide.7 
 
In July, 2006, the defendant's motion for funds for a 
defense expert, Thomas Fedor of the Serological Research 
Institute, to observe the inventory and evidence assessment at 
the crime laboratory was granted.  Later that month, the 
Commonwealth filed a stipulation for release and testing of the 
evidence, wherein the parties agreed that portions of the 
victim's jeans and underpants would be released for testing.  
This stipulation was approved and Fedor was present in November, 
2006, when the clothing was examined at the crime laboratory. 
                     
 
6 Originally the Superior Court clerk's office in Middlesex 
County had indicated that the exhibits were "gone, destroyed." 
 
 
7 The vaginal smear slide had been lost, and therefore was 
not available for testing in 2007 and 2008. 
7 
 
 
a.  Results of the crime laboratory DNA testing.  In 
December, 2006, the victim's clothing was examined at the crime 
laboratory.  No sperm cells or seminal fluid residue was 
detected in the stains on the victim's underpants.  Several 
stains were observed on the exterior and interior of the jeans, 
and sperm cells were detected in three of them.  Cuttings were 
then taken from these three stains (stains 9, 13, and 14).  Only 
stains 13 and 14 are relevant on appeal.8,9 
 
The crime laboratory10 extracted DNA from the above 
mentioned cuttings and performed short tandem repeat (STR) 
                     
 
8 The analysis of stain 9 by the crime laboratory resulted 
in a finding of "insufficient DNA" for comparison in both its 
sperm and nonsperm fractions.  Carita does not offer an opinion 
as to stain 9. 
 
 
9 The samples provided to the defense were subsequently 
tested by Orchard Cellmark (Cellmark), see infra. 
 
 
10 Laboratories that analyze DNA samples for forensic 
casework purposes are required by the Quality Assurance 
Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories to "establish 
and follow documented procedures for the interpretation of DNA 
typing results and reporting."  The Scientific Working Group DNA 
Analysis Methods (DNA working group), a group of individuals 
authorized by Congress to advise the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation on DNA testing, has promulgated interpretation 
guidelines that are generally accepted in the community of 
forensic DNA analysts.  The crime laboratory has adopted the DNA 
working group's Y-STR guidelines, and analysts conducting Y-STR 
analysis are required to comply with these protocols.  The DNA 
working group's guidelines recommend the establishment of 
certain thresholds in the interpretation of Y-STR DNA results. 
 
8 
 
testing/typing (specifically Y-STR testing)11 on stains 13 and 
14.  The Y-STR DNA testing is conducted first by subjecting the 
sample to a process of "differential extraction" which separates 
any sperm cells (sperm fraction) from epithelial cells (nonsperm 
fraction).  On stain 13, the crime laboratory concluded that the 
defendant was excluded as the source of the nonsperm fraction 
DNA,12 but that there was insufficient DNA for analysis in the 
sperm fraction, as the only result was a single "potential 
allele," falling below the threshold at which alleles can be 
positively identified, at Locus DYS456.13  As for stain 14, the 
                     
 
11 Short tandem repeat (STR) testing focuses on different 
places (loci) on the human genome where certain known sequences 
of DNA base pairs repeat themselves.  The repeat sequences at a 
particular locus are called alleles.  Analysts measure the 
number of times these repeat sequences occur in a forensic DNA 
sample to determine whether the sample matches the subject's DNA 
profile.  Y-STR typing is a technique by which analysts separate 
male DNA from female DNA and focus only on the male fragment. 
 
 
12 Alleles were identified ("called") at seven loci and 
potential alleles were identified at an additional four loci. 
 
 
13 Consistent with DNA working group's Y-STR guidelines, the 
crime laboratory conducted validation studies to help establish 
certain thresholds for use in the interpretation of Y-STR DNA 
results.  Based on the data generated in these validation 
studies, the crime laboratory established a "noise threshold," 
which is "based on signal-to-noise analysis internally derived 
from empiric data."  The noise threshold at the crime laboratory 
was established at fifty-five relative fluorescent units (RFUs).  
The crime laboratory also established a "call threshold," which 
is the level at which the laboratory would identify or report a 
peak as an allele given the strength of the result.  The call 
threshold at the crime laboratory was established as three times 
the noise threshold, or 165 RFUs.  Pursuant to the crime 
laboratory's protocol, peaks below the call level, but above the 
9 
 
crime laboratory concluded that there was a mixture of more than 
one male source in the nonsperm fraction, which yielded 
inconclusive results for comparison with the defendant's DNA, 
that is, he could not be included or excluded as one of the 
contributors.  With respect to the sperm fraction, there was 
insufficient DNA for analysis. 
 
b.  Motion for postconviction relief.  In November, 2007, 
the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing 
that the results of the comparative DNA testing done by the 
crime laboratory exonerated him.  In March, 2008, the defendant 
filed a substitute motion for funds and access to do comparison 
DNA testing by the defendant's expert, or, in the alternative, 
for further testing by the Commonwealth and for funds for 
observation of such testing by the defendant's expert.14  On 
September 24, 2008, after a hearing, the judge allowed the 
defendant's motion for funds to have Cellmark take custody of 
                                                                  
noise level, are called "potential alleles," and are designated 
by an asterisk symbol and a number.  Both called and potential 
alleles are "then checked by two DNA analysts to verify that the 
resulting peaks are found in the correct horizontal location 
('binned' correctly) and are shaped correctly (have good 'peak 
morphology') and are not artifacts."  The single potential 
allele detected in the crime laboratory's testing of the sperm 
fraction of stain 13 was approximately seventy RFUs, just over 
the noise threshold established by the laboratory, and 
significantly below the call threshold of 165 RFUs. 
 
 
14 In support of this motion, the defendant submitted an 
affidavit of Thomas Fedor. 
10 
 
the useable samples from the crime laboratory and subject them 
to further DNA testing. 
 
With respect to stain 13, Cellmark concurred with the crime 
laboratory's conclusion as to the nonsperm fraction, that the 
defendant was excluded as the source.  With respect to the sperm 
fraction, where the crime laboratory testing had revealed a 
single potential allele, insufficient for analysis, Cellmark's 
testing detected no male DNA at all.  Cellmark's testing of the 
stain 14 sample also detected no male DNA in the sperm fraction, 
and concurred with the crime laboratory that the defendant could 
not be excluded as a contributor of the male DNA detected in the 
nonsperm sample. 
 
In March, 2010, the defendant filed a document entitled, 
"Submission of New Forensic Analysis and Motion for Immediate 
Relief," together with an affidavit of Carita.  The defendant 
had retained Carita to review the test data from the analyses of 
the crime laboratory and Cellmark.  In his affidavit, Carita 
stated an opinion that excluded the defendant as the source of 
DNA found in both stain samples (13 and 14) taken from the 
victim's jeans.  The Commonwealth filed an opposition to the 
defendant's motion along with an affidavit of Lemire.  In April, 
2010, the judge found that, notwithstanding certain limitations, 
the Carita affidavit stated an opinion that might be admissible 
in evidence.  Accordingly, she ordered an evidentiary hearing, 
11 
 
explaining that the defendant would have the burden of 
establishing both the admissibility of Carita's opinion and that 
any DNA evidence that would be admissible satisfied the standard 
for a new trial. 
 
3.  Evidentiary hearing.  A two-day evidentiary hearing was 
held, at which both Carita and Lemire testified15 and the 
laboratory reports were admitted in evidence. 
 
a.  Carita's testimony.  Consistent with his affidavit, 
Carita testified that the defendant was excluded as the donor of 
DNA extracted from the nonsperm fractions of stains 13 and 14.  
Although both laboratory reports and Lemire concurred that the 
defendant was excluded as the source of the nonsperm fraction of 
                     
 
15 At the hearing, the defendant did not call Fedor, his 
previous expert, as a witness, but stated that he was relying 
solely on the test results of the crime laboratory and Cellmark, 
along with Carita's testimony.  Until he filed the Carita 
affidavit in March, 2010, the defendant had relied on an 
affidavit submitted by Fedor.  Fedor did not personally analyze 
the DNA, but he had reviewed the test data from the crime 
laboratory.  Fedor agreed with the crime laboratory that the 
defendant was excluded as the source of the DNA on the nonsperm 
fraction of stain 13.  He disagreed, however, with the crime 
laboratory's conclusion that there was insufficient data to 
include or exclude the defendant as the source of the DNA from 
the nonsperm fraction of stain 14, concluding that the defendant 
was excluded as its source.  Fedor did note that, "[a]dmittedly, 
there is the problem of 'extraneous DNA,'" but qualified this 
statement given his speculation that the cuttings were taken 
from the area of the victim's jeans that would have been 
"potentially soaking in the assailant's urine."  Fedor did not 
address the crime laboratory's conclusion that the partial DNA 
profile obtained from stain 14 indicated the presence of more 
than one source.  The record does not indicate that Fedor drew 
any conclusions regarding the sperm fractions of either cutting. 
12 
 
stain 13, only Carita testified that the defendant was also 
excluded as the donor of DNA extracted from the nonsperm 
fraction of stain 14.  Although he agreed with the crime 
laboratory (and Cellmark) that the DNA from the nonsperm 
fraction of stain 14 was a mixture from more than one male, 
Carita based his opinion of exclusion on the fact that "two 
possible genetic markers" identified by the crime laboratory as 
potential alleles at one location (DYS458) were inconsistent 
with the defendant's allele at that location.16  Additionally, 
Carita testified that the defendant also was excluded as the 
donor of the DNA extracted from the sperm fraction of stain 13.  
His opinion was based on the single potential allele, measured 
at approximately seventy relative fluorescent units (RFUs), at 
DYS456, far below the "call" threshold of 165 RFUs established 
by the crime laboratory.  See notes 12 and 13, supra. 
 
Carita acknowledged in his testimony that his opinion was 
not in accord with the crime laboratory's Y-STR interpretive 
guidelines, and offered no evidence that the Scientific Working 
Group DNA Analysis Methods (DNA working group) Y-STR guidelines 
explicitly permit an exclusion to be based on a single potential 
allele.  He contended, however, that his conclusions were 
nevertheless permissible under the provisions of the DNA working 
                     
 
16 Both the crime laboratory and Cellmark had concluded that 
there was insufficient data to render such a conclusion. 
13 
 
group's Y-STR guidelines, which state that "the interpretation 
of the results of casework is a matter of professional judgment 
and expertise . . . not every situation can or should be covered 
in a preset rule."  Carita went on to testify that he relied on 
the Connecticut State laboratory interpretive guidelines, which 
bind him in his consulting work, to form his opinion, but these 
were not introduced in evidence. 
 
b.  Motion judge's ruling.  After hearing, the judge ruled 
that, given the limited data from the low-level DNA procured 
from the victim's clothing, Carita's opinions with respect to 
the sperm fraction of stain 13 and the nonsperm fraction of 
stain 14, which were based exclusively on potential alleles, 
were not sufficiently reliable to be placed before a jury.  With 
respect to the sperm fraction of stain 13, the judge found that 
Carita cited no authority for the proposition that an exclusion 
may be based on a single potential allele in the absence of any 
other data, and that the potential allele on which he relied did 
not meet "the requirements of the laboratory's calling 
threshold, which gives absolute confirmation that a genetic 
marker is DNA and not a possible artifact."  The judge also 
found that although Carita agreed that the detected DNA in the 
nonsperm fraction of stain 14 was a mixture, he cited no 
authority for the proposition that an exclusion may be based on 
two potential alleles at one locus in such a mixed sample where 
14 
 
the possibility of stutter17 cannot be eliminated.  Although the 
judge acknowledged that it is permissible to use potential 
alleles in the interpretation of a DNA profile, "[i]n this case 
. . . given the minimal amount of DNA, Carita is not using 
potential alleles to interpret results.  His opinions are based 
solely on peaks identified as potential alleles in the context 
of very limited data obtained from low-level DNA."18 
 
After concluding that Carita's opinions with respect to the 
sperm fraction of stain 13 and the nonsperm fraction of stain 14 
would not be admitted in evidence, she went on to find that the 
newly discovered DNA evidence which would be admissible lacked 
the materiality, weight, and significance necessary to 
demonstrate that it would likely have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations. 
 
Discussion.  "Motions for a new trial are addressed to the 
'sound discretion' of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 663-664 (2011), citing Commonwealth 
v. De Christoforo, 360 Mass. 531, 542 (1971).  See also Mass. R. 
                     
 
17 Stutter, "a very common artifact," is a byproduct of the 
process used to amplify DNA and will result in peaks that occur 
before and after a real peak.  Accordingly, stutter peaks may 
mask true peaks. 
 
 
18 In making her findings, the judge pointed out that the 
findings in the report of Cellmark, an independent laboratory 
hired by the defendant, were consistent with the crime 
laboratory findings in all material respects, and both stood in 
stark contrast to Carita's opinion as to the adequacy of the 
data to make an exclusion. 
15 
 
Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  "Judges 
are to apply the standard set out in Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) 
rigorously," and "grant such a motion only if it appears that 
justice may not have been done" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 504 (1992).  
"[A]n appellate court will examine the motion judge's conclusion 
only to determine whether there has been a significant error of 
law or other abuse of discretion."  DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. at 
664, quoting Commonwealth v. Wolinski, 431 Mass. 228, 235 
(2000). 
 
1.  The exclusion of Carita's opinion.  In Lanigan, 419 
Mass. at 25-26, we adopted, in part, the standard for the 
admissibility of expert testimony delineated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In so doing, we held that "a 
proponent of scientific opinion evidence may demonstrate the 
reliability or validity of the underlying scientific theory or 
process by some other means, that is, without establishing 
general acceptance,"  Lanigan, supra at 26, as "the touchstone 
of admissibility is reliability, and not necessarily general 
acceptance within the scientific community."  Commonwealth v. 
Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 796 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185-186 (1997).  However, we noted that, 
"in most cases general acceptance will be the significant, and 
16 
 
'often the only, issue.'"  Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304, 310 
(2000), quoting Lanigan, supra.  Accordingly, "a party seeking 
to introduce scientific evidence may lay an adequate foundation 
either by establishing general acceptance in the scientific 
community or by showing that the evidence is reliable or valid 
through an alternate means."  Canavan's Case, supra. 
 
Under Daubert-Lanigan, the motion judge, in her role as 
gatekeeper, "has a significant function to carry out in deciding 
on the admissibility of a scientific expert's opinion."  
Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25.  Conclusions based on personal 
observation or clinical experience are subject to this analysis.  
Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 313.  The expert's opinion must 
"have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his 
discipline," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, and the motion judge must 
assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying [an 
expert witness's] testimony is scientifically valid and whether 
that reasoning or methodology is properly applied to the facts 
in issue."  Lanigan, supra at 26, quoting Daubert, supra at 592-
593. 
 
Accordingly, if the process or theory underlying an 
expert's opinion lacks sufficient reliability or an expert 
cannot provide a reliable factual basis for his conclusions, the 
trial judge must exclude the opinion from reaching the trier of 
fact.  Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26.  See Canavan's Case, 432 
17 
 
Mass. at 315.19  The defendant, as the proponent of the expert 
testimony at issue, has the burden to establish that Carita's 
opinion is reliable.  See Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 
Mass. 300, 328 n.41 (2010), citing Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 
314.  We review a judge's determination to admit or exclude 
expert testimony under Daubert-Lanigan for an abuse of 
discretion.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 844 (2012).  
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 844 (2011).  As we 
have held previously, "the admissibility of DNA test results 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis."  Commonwealth v. 
Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 871 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. 
Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 (1991).20 
 
a.  Stain 13.  The defendant argues that Carita's opinion 
regarding the sperm fraction of stain 13 is admissible for a few 
reasons.  First, he contends that the opinion meets the Daubert-
Lanigan standard as it is "based on reliable data from which 
[Carita] drew a logical conclusion."  The defendant notes that 
the motion judge never found that the potential allele found in 
                     
 
19 See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2014) (expert opinion may be 
given if "[a] the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data, [b] the testimony is the product of reliable principles 
and methods, and [c] the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case"). 
 
 
20 "[A] judge's determination on the reliability of 
scientific testimony is no different from other evidentiary 
decisions by a trial judge that are reviewed on appeal under an 
abuse of discretion standard of review."  Canavan's Case, 432 
Mass. 304, 311 (2000). 
18 
 
the sperm fraction of stain 13 was unreliable.  Further, both 
Carita and Lemire testified that potential alleles were used in 
the work of DNA analysts.  Both individuals additionally agreed 
that the potential allele was correctly designated and that it 
had the hallmarks of correct binning and good peak morphology.  
See note 13, supra.  Moreover, the potential allele occurred at 
a smaller locus, making it more efficiently amplified and, the 
defendant contends, reliable.  The defendant argues that 
excluding Carita's opinion because of factors such as potential 
DNA degradation21 is improper, as both experts agreed that 
degradation would not change the defendant's allele at DYS456. 
 
Second, the defendant argues that Carita's opinion was 
reasonable, and that Carita's reliance on a single potential 
allele is "merely application of accepted methodology to a 
specific context."  He contends that Carita did follow the Y-STR 
interpretation guidelines set forth by the DNA working group, as 
promulgated in January, 2009, which state that interpreting 
evidence is a matter of "professional judgment and expertise" 
and "[n]ot every situation can or should be covered by a preset 
rule."  Further, the defendant contends that Carita's conclusion 
                     
 
21 As the motion judge found, degradation "relates to the 
DNA molecule breaking up . . . over time," or due to exposure to 
certain other factors.  A proper environment for DNA storage is 
in breathable material (e.g., paper) and in a cool, dark, dry 
environment.  Degradation of DNA can occur as a result of 
ultraviolet light, chemicals, or microbes, in addition to 
improper packaging and handling. 
19 
 
aligns with § 1.1.1.1. of the DNA working group's Y-STR 
guidelines, which states that the "analytical thresholds are 
defined as the minimum and maximum intensity thresholds between 
which data are reliable for use in allele designations."  
Accordingly, he contends that the lack of a specific DNA working 
group guideline governing exclusion on single potential alleles 
is of no import. 
 
Last, the defendant argues that the motion judge 
misunderstood her gatekeeping role under Daubert-Lanigan.  He 
contends that the motion judge's issue with Carita's 
interpretation of the data and her concerns over factors such as 
possible degradation ought to have gone only to the opinion's 
weight, rather than its admissibility, and remained a question 
for a jury to determine. 
 
After reviewing the record before the judge below, we 
cannot say that she abused the discretion afforded to her under 
Daubert-Lanigan in excluding Carita's testimony.  Carita's 
opinion that the defendant was excluded as the contributor of 
the sperm fraction of stain 13 was based solely on a single 
below-threshold peak.  He acknowledged that this potential 
allele did not meet the crime laboratory's calling threshold, 
which would have provided "absolute confirmation that a genetic 
marker is DNA and not a possible artifact," but nevertheless was 
20 
 
"probably true" DNA.22  Although it is undisputed that such 
potential alleles may be used for interpretational purposes 
along with other data when examining an individual's DNA 
profile, it was not an abuse of discretion to find that, in the 
absence of any authority substantiating Carita's opinion, a 
single potential allele without any other data is not enough to 
exclude an individual.  As Lemire testified, "[T]here's just not 
enough data . . . to generate any comparison . . . ." 
 
Based on the record on appeal, Carita provided virtually no 
support for his opinion except to testify that the DNA working 
group does not explicitly prohibit this practice and that he 
once before had rendered a similar exclusion opinion based on a 
single potential allele.  Aside from this testimony, the 
defendant offered no evidence to establish that Carita's opinion 
was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community or 
otherwise was sufficiently reliable.  Carita cited to no 
scientific authority, in either his affidavit or in his hearing 
                     
 
22 The motion judge appears to have erred in her finding 
that Carita admitted that he had not complied with DNA working 
group guidelines in reaching his opinion.  Although it is 
accurate that Carita did not comply with the crime laboratory's 
protocols that had been promulgated in accord with the DNA 
working group's advice that each laboratory "prepare guidelines 
for formulating conclusions resulting from comparisons of 
evidentiary samples and known reference samples," see § 4.1 of 
the DNA working group's Y-STR guidelines, he did not violate any 
explicit DNA working group provision.  However, this fact does 
not change our over-all assessment that, for a myriad of other 
reasons, the judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling 
Carita's opinion inadmissible. 
21 
 
testimony, to support his ultimate conclusion, instead relying 
solely on his "judgment and expertise."23  Nor did the defendant 
supply the judge with written guidelines for Carita's laboratory 
in Connecticut or any other laboratory which supported the 
reliability of Carita's opinion.  See Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 
at 315, quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 
(1999) (no rule requires court "to admit opinion evidence that 
is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert"). 
 
Carita pointed to no error in Lemire's analysis and did not 
challenge Cellmark's conclusions that it found no DNA at all in 
the sperm fraction of stain 13.  Although it is accurate that 
Lemire agreed that the potential allele in question was likely 
real human DNA, she explained that, under the DNA working group 
and the crime laboratory's protocols, she could not confirm this 
conclusion, as the potential allele registered below the call 
threshold and she had no other results to interpret.  She 
explained that although the peak in question resembled real DNA, 
it could have just been noise given its registration below the 
                     
 
23 In support of Carita's opinion, the defendant's brief 
cites to a single article entitled "DNA for the Defense Bar," 
issued by the Department of Justice's National Institute of 
Justice (2012), which was not before the motion judge and to 
which the Commonwealth objects.  The defendant neither argues 
that this publication qualifies as a learned treatise nor that 
it would have been admissible at the evidentiary hearing.  As 
such, it does not affect our calculus as to whether the judge 
abused her discretion in deeming Carita's opinion inadmissible. 
22 
 
call threshold.  Further, while acknowledging that a potential 
allele may be used for interpretation, Lemire repeatedly 
testified that in order to use potential alleles below threshold 
in her analysis she would need additional information at any 
given profile in order to utilize that information for an 
interpretation.24  This was all the more convincing to the judge 
given Lemire's testimony that the tested sample is "low template 
DNA," and it is possible that inhibition25 and degradation may 
have been factors in the sample.26 
 
b.  Stain 14.  The defendant also argues that Carita's 
opinion regarding the nonsperm fraction of stain 14 ought to be 
admissible.  Testing indicated that this fraction was likely a 
                     
 
24 The defendant takes issue with the fact that Lemire used 
alleles below threshold to support a conclusion of inclusion in 
her testimony in a different case.  However, there, unlike here, 
Lemire had "additional information beyond simply . . . a 
potential allele below threshold" to aid her analysis.  The 
judge concluded that the cases were sufficiently dissimilar such 
that Lemire's conclusions are not inconsistent. 
 
 
25 As the motion judge found, inhibition "relates to the 
ability to generate an STR profile."  In the quantification 
system, there is an internal positive control that is used as an 
indicator as to "whether inhibitors or chemicals or anything 
intrinsic to the DNA . . . sample may be compromising or not 
allowing the method to work effectively."  However, even where 
inhibition is not detected at the quantification stage, it may 
be present at different sites and affect the analysis. 
 
 
26 Although Carita testified that he saw no evidence of 
these factors in the sample, he also qualified his testimony to 
state that the sample involved a very small amount of DNA, so he 
could see no appearance of inhibition, and "the profile's too 
low to determine whether there could or could not have been 
degradation." 
23 
 
mixture of DNA from more than one male.  Data were retrieved at 
just four loci and only two alleles (out of a potential 
seventeen or eighteen) were called.  Of these two called 
alleles, one at DYS393 matched the defendant, while the other at 
DYS389I was inconsistent with his profile.  Two other potential 
alleles (one at DYS389I and the other at DYS391) were also 
consistent with the defendant.  Of chief significance to 
Carita's opinion was the identification of two additional 
potential alleles at another locus, DYS458, which did not match 
the defendant.  Lemire and Carita agreed that the presence of 
these two potential alleles at the same location likely 
indicated a mixture of DNA from more than one source.  Carita, 
however, inferred from these two potential alleles that the 
defendant definitively could be excluded as the contributor of 
the nonsperm fraction of stain 14.  Lemire, on the other hand, 
testified that the data obtained were insufficient for 
comparison.  Cellmark's test results agreed with Lemire's 
conclusion. 
 
As with the sperm fraction from stain 13, discussed above, 
we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the judge 
to rule Carita's opinion inadmissible.  As an initial matter, 
the two potential alleles at DYS458 that form the basis of 
Carita's opinion were just fifteen RFUs above the crime 
laboratory's noise threshold.  Lemire testified that sufficient 
24 
 
DNA was not found such that one could eliminate the possibility 
of "stutter" from this mixed sample.27  She explained that the 
two potential alleles in question, at just fifteen RFUs, gave 
rise to the possibility of a peak which would be consistent with 
the defendant's known DNA profile at DYS458 in a "stutter" 
position.28  She explained that if there were sufficient DNA in 
the sample, which there was not, an analyst could determine 
whether there was DNA present from something other than a 
stutter artifact.  However, Lemire explained that here the 
defendant could not be excluded because the data were too 
limited to evaluate whether there was something more than 
stutter present.29  Carita testified that "there was no stutter 
available for evaluation," as it was a "low-level sample." 
 
The appellate record is devoid of any reliable authority to 
support Carita's conclusion that an individual can be excluded 
                     
 
27 In mixed samples, stutter and alleles can overlap, 
thereby complicating interpretation. 
 
 
28 Stutter occurs when, during the amplification process, a 
fragment one repeat unit smaller or larger than the true allele 
is produced.  As a result, stutter generates a peak that is 
actually one repeat unit off from the main peak.  A stutter 
artifact of a 15 allele (such as that of the defendant at the 
DYS458 locus) could appear at a 16 allele because of the stutter 
effect.  See note 17, supra. 
 
 
29 Lemire testified that, according to the crime 
laboratory's Y-STR guidelines, had there been peaks present 
above the call threshold at this loci she would have been able 
to evaluate whether the potential alleles at fifteen RFUs were 
more than just stutter. 
25 
 
as a donor based on these two potential alleles that (1) are in 
a low-level mixed sample, (2) register merely fifteen RFUs above 
the noise threshold, and (3) may represent a stutter peak.  He 
does not point to any DNA working group or crime laboratory 
guideline or other scientific authority that permits his 
conclusion.  Carita did not merely use these potential alleles 
to aid in his over-all interpretation of a DNA profile, but 
instead he made below-threshold peaks the sole basis for his 
opinion. 
 
2.  Admissible evidence as factor in jury deliberations.  
We also must consider whether the defendant has established that 
the DNA evidence that is admissible casts meaningful doubt on 
the justice of his conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 
Mass. 303, 305 (1986); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) ("trial judge 
. . . may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that 
justice may not have been done").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 516 (2001), overruled on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230 (2009); Commonwealth v. 
Pike, 431 Mass. 212, 218 (2000). 
 
The relevant question is not whether the verdict would have 
necessarily been different, but "whether the new evidence would 
probably have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations."  
Grace, 397 Mass. at 306.  Additionally, the new evidence must 
demonstrate such materiality, weight, and significance that the 
26 
 
motion judge could find that "there is a substantial risk that 
the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the 
evidence been admitted at trial."  Id.  As rule 30 (b) motions 
are attacks on final decisions, they are "granted only in 
extraordinary circumstances," Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 
86, 93 (2004), and the defendant has the burden of producing a 
"credible reason" to reverse the final decision that "outweighs 
the risk of prejudice to the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 662 (1998), quoting Fanelli, 412 Mass. at 
504. 
 
Both the crime laboratory and Cellmark agreed that the 
defendant was excluded as the source of the DNA recovered from 
the nonsperm fraction of stain 13.  The defendant argues that 
this stain must have been deposited by the assailant's urine at 
the time of the attack, by virtue of the victim's trial 
testimony that the assailant urinated "on and around me" and 
that she slipped in urine while attempting to stand.30  
Accordingly, the defendant argues that because these cells 
                     
 
30 Although urea, a substance typically found in urine, was 
not detected in the sample, the defendant argues that this 
substance might have dissipated in the intervening twenty-three 
years between when the pants were collected in evidence and when 
they were submitted for DNA testing.  We note that this is 
possible, as a crime laboratory's chemist averred in her report 
that the failure to detect semen and urine is unremarkable as 
such fluids do not have cell walls and break down more easily 
than epithelial cells. 
27 
 
indisputably do not belong to him, he could not have been the 
assailant. 
 
However, as noted by the judge, there is no scientific 
method of ascertaining whether these cells were deposited by the 
assailant or by any one of the many individuals who handled the 
evidence after the commission of the crime.  The pants in 
question were taken from the victim at the hospital, turned over 
to the police, and admitted in evidence at trial.  For over 
twenty years the evidence was indisputably stored in plastic 
bags, an environment incapable of protecting against 
contamination.31  The defendant's argument that the epithelial 
cells present in stain 13 necessarily came from the assailant's 
urine is a statement of conjecture, at best. 
 
It remains the defendant's burden to demonstrate the 
importance of newly available evidence, see Grace, 397 Mass. at 
306, and there is simply no way of determining when and under 
what circumstances the male DNA obtained from the nonsperm 
fraction of this stain was deposited.  Lemire specifically 
testified that she was unable to draw any conclusions as to the 
time or manner by which the DNA was deposited and she had no 
scientific way of assessing whether the evidence had been 
                     
 
31 The crime laboratory's DNA Y-STR report states, 
"[e]xtraneous DNA may be present on common articles such as 
clothing, shoes, etc.  This extraneous DNA often manifests 
itself as a low level minor male contributor in a DNA result, 
and may have no probative value in a case." 
28 
 
contaminated prior to its arrival at the crime laboratory.  
Accordingly, the judge could not determine whether the exclusion 
of the defendant as the contributor of this DNA had any 
significant probative value, thereby diluting the defendant's 
argument of materiality and undermining claims that the jury 
would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been 
admitted at trial. 
 
In sum, the newly available, admissible evidence would have 
shown that (1) the DNA, if any, contained in the sperm cells of 
both stains and the nonsperm cells of stain 14 were insufficient 
to either include or exclude the defendant as their donor; and 
(2) it is not possible to determine the significance of the fact 
that the defendant was excluded as a source of the nonsperm 
cells in stain 13.  We agree with the judge that this evidence 
would not be capable of casting meaningful doubt on the jury's 
verdict that the defendant was the perpetrator of the rape. 
 
3.  Additional expert funds.  The defendant first filed a 
motion for funds to do comparison DNA testing in January, 2006.  
In May of that year, the motion was granted in the amount of 
$4,000.  Subsequently, in July, 2006, the defendant filed a 
motion for funds in the amount of $5,000 for his defense expert 
at the time (Fedor) to observe the inventory and assessment of 
evidence at the crime laboratory.  This motion was granted. 
29 
 
 
Nearly two years later, in March, 2008, the defendant filed 
a substitute motion for funds and access to do comparison DNA 
testing by the defendant's expert, or, in the alternative, for 
further testing by the Commonwealth and for funds for 
observation of such testing by the defendant's expert.  A second 
motion for funds was filed in September, 2008, and the judge 
permitted the defendant's motion in the amount of $6,575 to have 
Cellmark take custody of usable samples from the crime 
laboratory and subject them to independent DNA testing. 
 
In October, 2009, the defendant moved for funds in the 
amount of $5,500 for the attendance of Fedor and "a like amount" 
for the attendance of a representative from Cellmark at an 
evidentiary hearing.  As of March, 2010, the motion judge did 
not believe, based on the record as it existed (which included 
an affidavit submitted by Fedor as well as reports from both the 
crime laboratory and Cellmark), that the defendant was entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. 
 
Subsequently, the defendant filed a document entitled 
"Submission of New Forensic Analysis and Motion for Immediate 
Relief," alongside the aforementioned Carita affidavit.  The 
defendant had not sought court approval to retain Carita, and 
according to his affidavit, Carita had reviewed test data from 
the crime laboratory's analysis on a voluntary basis up until 
that point.  The Commonwealth filed an opposition, but in April, 
30 
 
2010, the judge found that, notwithstanding certain limitations, 
the Carita affidavit stated an opinion that might be admissible 
in evidence.  Accordingly, the motion judge granted an 
evidentiary hearing, ordering the parties to "explore the 
possibility of minimizing the cost to the Commonwealth" by 
taking video testimony of Fedor and a Cellmark representative. 
 
The defendant filed, and the judge allowed, a motion for 
funds for the attendance of an expert witness in the amount of 
$4,500 for Carita to attend the evidentiary hearing.  In his 
motion, the defendant made clear that this request was "an all 
inclusive authorization, covering preparation, travel, and court 
time."  The hearing took place on July 9 and 23, 2010, at which 
both Carita and Lemire testified.  As discussed above, the 
motion judge ultimately found that Carita's opinions would not 
be admissible at trial. 
 
Approximately one year later, in May, 2011, the defendant 
sought additional funds to cover the remainder of Carita's bill, 
explaining that the original funds sought constituted an 
underestimate based on an expected one-day evidentiary hearing.  
The motion judge denied the motion without prejudice to renew.  
On September 1, 2011, the defendant filed a renewed motion for 
funds with an accompanying affidavit detailing Carita's dates of 
service, work performed, and time spent traveling.  The 
defendant asserted that Carita was retained because the cost of 
31 
 
transporting Fedor and an expert from Cellmark was 
"substantial," and counsel had been "unsuccessful" in making 
video conferencing arrangements.  The motion judge denied this 
motion as well, basing her decision on the defendant's failure 
to seek prior approval to retain Carita and her view that 
Carita's testimony was unreliable, inadmissible, and put forth 
solely "to supplement an inadequate record." 
 
Rule 30 (c) (5) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), and as 
explained by the Reporters' Notes to Rule 30, Mass. Ann. Laws 
Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1710-1711 
(LexisNexis 2014), "gives judges discretion to allow for the 
payment of costs associated with the preparation and 
presentation of a new trial motion" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 555, cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003).  See Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 
Mass. 184, 204, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 923, and cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 973 (2003).  Further, where an indigent defendant seeks 
to obtain additional evidence in connection with a motion for 
postconviction relief that would likely raise a meritorious 
defense warranting a new trial, the judge has discretion to 
grant a motion for funds to hire an expert.  See Mitchell, 438 
Mass. at 555.  A judge considering such a motion for expert 
funds must consider "not only the potential admissibility of the 
32 
 
expert's testimony and its cost, but also the 'desirability or 
necessity' of the testimony to the requesting party's case."  
Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 153 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lockley, 381 Mass. 156, 161 (1980). 
 
The judge likely factored the above considerations into her 
assessment when granting the initial $4,500 for Carita to appear 
and testify at the evidentiary hearing, given that she ordered 
the hearing only after receiving Carita's affidavit and finding 
that Carita presented an opinion that "might be admissible."  At 
that point, the motion judge had before her the substance of 
Carita's testimony, which did not vary at the hearing. 
 
Although the judge would have had discretion to deny the 
defendant's initial request for funds, see Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 
at 152-153, her initial approval strongly supports the inference 
that she deemed Carita's services to be reasonably necessary.  
And although the defendant did not seek explicit permission to 
retain Carita, the judge implicitly provided such permission 
when granting $4,500 for Carita to appear and testify at the 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
Accordingly, it appears that the judge predicated the grant 
of additional expert funds on whether she ultimately agreed with 
the substance of Carita's opinion, and when denying the 
defendant's renewed motion for funds, she explicitly stated that 
"[h]ad the Court realized the extent to which the opinions of 
33 
 
Mr. Carita that led to the evidentiary hearing were not based on 
any accepted or reliable scientific methodology, the Court would 
not have allowed" the original funds for Carita's attendance and 
testimony. 
 
Carita adequately documented the services he performed and 
the time spent assisting the defendant's case.  He testified on 
behalf of the defendant over the course of an (unanticipated) 
two-day evidentiary hearing and assisted defense counsel in 
drafting proposed findings of fact.  Additionally, although the 
judge took issue with the fact that the defendant did not obtain 
explicit permission to retain Carita, up until the point at 
which the defendant sought and the judge granted funds, Carita 
had provided his services pro bono.  Once the judge granted the 
funds requested by the defendant so that Carita could attend the 
evidentiary hearing, it was not unreasonable for the defendant 
to believe he had the judge's permission to retain Carita.  
Although the defendant's initial request assured the judge it 
would be an "all inclusive authorization," the evidentiary 
hearing lasted one day longer than anticipated. 
 
It was only in hindsight, after her ultimate finding on the 
admissibility of his opinion, that the judge denied additional 
funds.  This is impermissible.  See Zimmerman, 441 Mass. at 152-
153 (judge should consider not only potential admissibility of 
expert testimony, but also "desirability or necessity" to the 
34 
 
requesting party's case).  See also Lockley, 381 Mass. at 161.  
Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the 
defendant's supplemental request to pay Carita for additional 
services rendered.32 
 
Conclusion.  The denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial is affirmed and the denial of supplemental expert funds is 
reversed.  The case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
32 It would have been permissible for the judge to deny the 
request for additional funds if they were not justified because 
the additional expenses had been foreseeable (but not approved 
in advance) or because the amount was unreasonably high for the 
services rendered.