Case Title: Miller v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 436, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SYLVESTER MILLER,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 436, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0408012099 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 30, 2013 
Decided: October 23, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 23rd day of October 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Sylvester Miller, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s July 25, 2013 order denying his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that this appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in March 2005, Miller was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of six counts of Rape in the First 
Degree and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  He was 
sentenced to a total of 95 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
after 92 years for probation.  This Court affirmed Miller’s convictions on 
direct appeal.2  In 2006, Miller filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief, which contained multiple claims of error, including several specific 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Following the submission of 
Miller’s counsel’s affidavit and the State’s response, the Superior Court 
denied Miller’s motion.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s 
judgment.3 
 
(3) 
In his second motion for postconviction relief filed in the 
Superior Court, Miller’s claims of pre-trial and trial error were similar, if not 
identical, to the claims he asserted in his first postconviction motion---
including claims of constitutional violations, juror misconduct, prosecutorial 
misconduct, indictment improprieties, perjured testimony and issues bearing 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937 (Del. 2006). 
3 Miller v. State, 2008 WL 623236 (Del. Mar. 7, 2008). 
 
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on witness credibility.  Miller’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
also largely mirrored those he alleged in his first postconviction motion---
including claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with 
him, misleading him concerning the evidence against him, denying him the 
opportunity for a fair trial, failing to present certain witnesses, failing to 
make proper objections and failing to object to the admission of his 
videotaped interview with police.   
 
(4) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Miller claims that the Superior Court erred and 
abused its discretion by a) denying his claims of pre-trial and trial error on 
procedural grounds; b) denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on substantive and procedural grounds; and c) denying his claim of 
entitlement to the appointment of counsel in connection with his first 
postconviction motion.   
 
(5) 
Miller’s first claim is that the Superior Court erred and abused 
its discretion by denying his claims of pre-trial and trial error on procedural 
grounds.  The Superior Court is required to apply the time and procedural 
bars of Rule 61 to a defendant’s claims prior to deciding the substantive 
merits of those claims.4  The record in this case reflects that the Superior 
                                                 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
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Court properly applied the time and procedural bars to Miller’s claims and 
found them to be time-barred5 and procedurally barred either because they 
were not raised in previous proceedings or because they were previously 
adjudicated.6  Moreover, the Superior Court reviewed the substance of the 
claims and properly determined that none of them merited review due to a 
miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined 
the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction.7  In the absence of any error or abuse 
of discretion on the part of the Superior Court, we conclude that Miller’s 
first claim is without merit. 
 
(6) 
Miller’s second claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
denied his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on substantive and 
procedural grounds.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
governed by well-settled standards.8  In order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable 
                                                 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2), (3) and (4).   
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
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probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.9  
Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding 
and leads to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally 
reasonable.10  The defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective 
assistance, and substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.11  Our review 
of the record reveals no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the 
Superior Court in concluding that Miller had failed to demonstrate 
ineffective assistance in accordance with the Strickland standards and, 
moreover, that the procedural bars of Rule 61 applied to his claims in the 
absence of any evidence of a constitutional violation.12   
 
(7) 
Miller’s third, and final, claim is that the Superior Court should 
have appointed counsel to represent him on the ineffectiveness claims he 
asserted in his first postconviction motion.  The record reflects that Miller’s 
claims of ineffective assistance were fully considered, and denied, in his first 
postconviction motion.  Moreover, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s 
denial of those claims on appeal.  In the absence of any evidence that 
Miller’s allegations of ineffective assistance in his first postconviction 
motion were not fully and fairly considered, or that he experienced any 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
11 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2), (4) and (5). 
 
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prejudice in connection with the adjudication of those claims, we conclude 
that the Superior Court correctly denied Miller’s claim of entitlement to the 
appointment of counsel in connection with his first postconviction motion. 
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice