Case Title: Eychaner v. Gross

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91496

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91496-Agenda 12-March 2002.
FRED EYCHANER et al., Appellees, v. THEODORE GROSS et 								al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 3, 2002.
 
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Fred Eychaner and Betty Lou Weiss, were directors
of the Auditorium Theatre Council (Council). Plaintiffs brought an
action against defendants, Roosevelt University and its president,
Theodore Gross (collectively Roosevelt), in the circuit court of
Cook County. In the claims and counterclaims that developed in
this case, the Auditorium Theatre Council, Inc. (ATC Inc.), and
Roosevelt, respectively, asserted their authority to control and
operate the Auditorium Theatre (Theatre). Specifically, plaintiffs
and ATC Inc. claimed that Roosevelt placed the right to control
and operate the Theatre into a charitable trust with ATC Inc. as
trustee.
	At the close of a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of
Roosevelt and rejected all theories supporting ATC Inc.'s control
of the Theatre. The trial court, inter alia, declared Roosevelt the
sole and exclusive owner of the Theatre. The court also ordered an
accounting of ATC Inc.'s funds to separate public donations from
operating revenues.
	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed these
orders and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 321 Ill.
App. 3d 759. We allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse the judgment of the
appellate court, affirm the order of the trial court, and remand the
cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	During the 10-week bench trial, the court received
approximately 400 documents and heard testimony from 37
witnesses, all of which generated 98 record volumes. The bench
trial adduced the following facts.

Setting
	The Auditorium Building is located in downtown Chicago,
bordered by Michigan Avenue on the east, Congress Parkway on
the south, and Wabash Avenue on the west. The building was
designed and built in the late nineteenth century by the renowned
architects Louis Sullivan and Dankmar Adler. The building
originally contained a hotel, commercial office space, and the
Theatre, which comprises approximately 40% of the entire
building. The Auditorium Building, including the Theatre, with its
near-perfect acoustics, was recognized as an architectural
masterpiece. However, by the end of World War II, the building,
including the Theatre, was abandoned and in a state of disrepair.

Cast
	In 1945, Roosevelt was incorporated as an Illinois not-for-profit corporation. In 1946, it became possible for Roosevelt to
purchase the Auditorium Building and, to that end, the University
solicited and received donations. In 1947, Roosevelt purchased the
building, protected the Theatre from further deterioration, and
converted the remaining space for use as Roosevelt's campus.
	In the mid 1950s, Roosevelt began exploring ways to restore
the Theatre. On September 11, 1958, a committee of Roosevelt's
board of trustees recommended to the full board that a separate
not-for-profit corporation be created to restore and operate the
Theatre under that corporation's "trusteeship." On September 25,
the full board rejected the proposal amid concerns of giving away
rights to the University's property. The board recommended that
"[t]he University should remain the 'trustee' of the Auditorium
Theatre."
	At a December 4, 1958, board meeting, trustee Beatrice
Spachner submitted "a plan for the restoration of the Auditorium
Theater and its operation under the auspices of Roosevelt
University." On February 17, 1959, Roosevelt's board of trustees
established the Auditorium Restoration and Development
Committee (ARDC), composed of Roosevelt Board members and
faculty, and community representatives. The ARDC was directed
to examine Spachner's Theatre restoration plan.
	On October 29, 1959, the ARDC reported to Roosevelt's
board of trustees. At that meeting, the board passed a motion
tentatively approving a fund drive to restore the Theatre, subject
to the following conditions: that the committee's fund-raising
efforts not impair Roosevelt's financial resources or credit; that
Roosevelt's legal counsel recommend to the board "the legal entity
and manner of contract" that would enable Roosevelt to obtain its
objectives; and "[t]hat the University not lose ownership or control
of the Auditorium Theatre."
	The ARDC oversaw the drafting of a resolution to implement
the fund drive. Attorney Elmer Gertz was the principal drafter of
the resolution. In a letter dated January 21, 1960, Gertz asked
Kenneth Montgomery, Roosevelt's attorney, to review the draft
resolution. Gertz stated:
		"[A] draft of the resolution has been agreed upon. I am
sending a copy of it herewith. It is the consensus of all
involved in this situation that it is best not to form any
separate corporation, foundation, trust or other legal
entity, but to proceed in the manner set forth in the
resolution." (Emphasis added.)
Gertz asked for Montgomery's ideas on the resolution, specifically
on the subject of tax exemption.
	The ARDC presented the draft resolution to Roosevelt's
trustees at their February 11, 1960, board meeting. The proposed
resolution renamed the ARDC the Auditorium Theatre Council
(Council) and authorized it to raise funds for and to restore the
Theatre. Several trustees continued to express concerns that the
proposed resolution was not sufficiently explicit in its description
of Roosevelt's control over the ARDC. They questioned whether
the resolution complied with the board's October 29, 1959, motion
that Roosevelt "not lose ownership or control of the Auditorium
Theatre." Criticizing the proposed resolution, trustee Lerner stated
that the "Theater would be given away in perpetuum, under this
proposal. No [Roosevelt] trustee who understands the word 'trust'
should vote for it."
	As reflected in the minutes of the board meeting, Gertz
responded to these concerns:
		"[Gertz] was not attempting to make policy for the Board,
he said, but had simply tried to realize its intent as derived
from the Board's own earlier resolutions and statements
of policy. He went on to say that no separate corporation
had been proposed because this arrangement would be
even more subject to the objection that the University
would be prevented from exercising control over the
Auditorium. He asserted that any action taken by the
proposed Auditorium Council could be changed or
rescinded by the Board of Trustees."
The resolution was tabled to allow the ARDC to address the
concerns that had been raised.
	On February 18, 1960, the ARDC presented a revised
resolution to Roosevelt's board of trustees. The revision renamed
the ARDC the Auditorium Theater Council. The revision made
Roosevelt's control more explicit and further limited the authority
of the Council. Language stating that the Council would "fully
control" the fund-raising, restoration, maintenance, management,
and programming for the Theatre was deleted, leaving the Council
only "responsible" for fund-raising and restoration and "charged
with the responsibility of carrying out the details of" the fund-raising campaign and the management, programming, and
operation of the Theatre. Language that would have allowed the
Council to "adopt such procedures *** as it may deem necessary"
was dropped. Language was added to ensure Roosevelt board
approval, on an annual basis, of all new members to the Council's
executive committee. Language was added to ensure the board's
involvement in establishing a development reserve amount for the
Theatre, with all Theatre revenues above that amount being
transferred to Roosevelt's unrestricted funds. Language was added
requiring the Council to make periodic progress reports regarding
the restoration to the board, to provide information requested by
the board, to make annual reports of operations to the board, and
to submit to an annual audit by accountants. Finally, language was
added requiring that the actions and programming of the Council
"be in harmony with the aims of the University in serving the
educational and cultural aspirations of the community."
	The revised resolution, as quoted in the minutes, reads in its
entirety:
		" 'Resolved, that it is the intent of the Board of Trustees
of Roosevelt University, for and on behalf of the
University to implement as described hereinafter the plan
for the restoration and operation of the Auditorium
Theater which was submitted by the [ARDC] to the Board
at its meeting of October 29, 1959, and incorporated in its
minutes of that date.
			IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED
			(1) That the [Council] be now authorized and directed
to take such steps as it may deem necessary to carry out a
fund drive for the restoration of the Theater with due
regard for safeguarding the right, title and interest of the
University in and to the Theater and protecting the
resources and credits of both the University and the
Council.
			(2) That the Council be responsible for raising funds for
the restoration of the Theater and for the supervision and
administration of its restoration.
			(3) That the Council be empowered to secure the
services of a professional fund-raising executive and staff
to guide and operate the campaign for funds.
			(4) That the Council have authority to supervise the
work of reconstruction, select engineers, architects,
contractors, approve plans and specifications and contract
and pay for the work performed, making periodic progress
reports to the Board and providing requested information.
			(5) That a special fund be established to be known as
the Auditorium Restoration Fund, segregated and separate
from other funds of the University, that contributions for
the restoration be deposited in this fund, and that the fund
be used for no other purpose than the restoration and
operation of the fund drive.
			(6) That the Council not contract, purchase or enter into
obligations of any kind with any supplier or other person
for the furnishing of work, services, or materials, or for
any other purpose, unless funds or pledges are available
for that purpose, and unless arrangements with any such
person are in a form approved by legal counsel and
embody the following provisions, among others, (a) a
waiver of mechanics' liens; (b) the contracting parties will
look only to the Restoration Fund for payment and no to
any other fund of the University; and (c) the contracting
parties will not hold the University nor any member of the
Council or University liable or any reason whatsoever.
			(7) That the Council nominate for Board approval
persons of its selection to be members of an Executive
Committee charged with the responsibility for carrying
out the details of the fund-raising campaign and for the
management, maintenance, budgeting, programming,
financing and operation of the restored Auditorium
Theater.
			(8) That until such time as the Executive Committee of
the Council is formed the Executive Committee of the
[ARDC], members of which have already been approved
by the Board, be responsible for the fund-raising
campaign.
			(9) That the Executive Committee of the Council be
composed of not more than 25 persons; that the initial
membership of the Executive Committee be divided into
three groups, with terms ending respectively in 1961,
1962, and 1963; and that the Council nominate annually
persons for Board approval to serve terms of three years
as the initial terms of the original group end.
			(10) That the Executive Committee of the Council
organize itself and select such officers and committees as
it deems necessary.
			(11) That after the restoration of the Theater, any funds
remaining in the Auditorium Restoration Fund be
transferred to an Auditorium Theater Operating Fund to
be used only for the maintenance and operation of the
Theater and be disbursed by direction of the Executive
Committee of the Council.
			(12) That any surplus resulting from the operation of
the Theater be retained in a development reserve, and that
when an adequate sum, as determined by the Executive
Committee of the Council in consultation with the
Executive Committee of this Board, has been
accumulated, any amount above that reserve be
transferred to the unrestricted funds of the University.
			(13) That the actions and programming of the Council
be in harmony with the aims of the University in serving
the educational and cultural aspirations of the community.
			(14) That the Council or Executive Committee not
conduct any capital, operating or maintenance fund-raising campaign other than the initial Restoration
Campaign without consent of the Board.
			(15) That the Council through its Executive Committee
prepare annual reports of its operations for the Board, and
that an annual audit of the Council's operations be made
by a firm of certified public accountants.' "
Discussion on the resolution followed.
	Some trustees proposed additional amendments based on their
concerns that the revised resolution did not sufficiently describe
the control that the University would have over the Council.
Kenneth Montgomery, Roosevelt's attorney, opposed any
additional amendments as unnecessary. He described the Council
as an "agency" of the University and assured the board that
nothing would "prevent the Board of Trustees from 'deactivating'
the Auditorium Council and Committee [ARDC], who would owe
their origin and authority to the Board."
	Trustee Gerald Gidwitz, an ARDC member and supporter of
the revised resolution, similarly assuaged the board as reflected in
the minutes:
		"The Committee [ARDC] considered that adequate
protection for the University's interest inhered in the
Board of Trustees' right to reconstitute or abolish the
Auditorium Council and Committee, or to alter, modify,
or abolish its powers in any way that the Board of
Trustees might see fit. He said that the Board could
change its mind about the terms of the resolution at any
time in the future and he therefore urged that the
resolution be passed without amendment."
In response to a request, Gidwitz agreed that his statement "could
be incorporated in the minutes as reflecting the agreed
understanding within the Board on the control which the Board
could exercise over the Auditorium Council and [its] Executive
Committee."
	Upon this agreed understanding, the Roosevelt University
board of trustees rejected the proposed amendments. The board
adopted the revised resolution by a vote of 18 to 7.
	Subsequent to the February 18, 1960, board meeting,
Montgomery wrote a letter to the United States Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), in which he sought a determination on behalf of
Roosevelt that contributions to the Council would be tax
deductible. Montgomery asked the IRS to grant Roosevelt's
request because contributions to the Council were "in fact
contributions to [Roosevelt] because the Council is its agent." The
IRS ruled that contributions to the Council would be tax
deductible to the donor, stating: "Since it appears that
contributions to the Council will inure entirely to your
[Roosevelt's] benefit such contributions will be considered
contributions to you."
	The Council employed architects, engineers, construction
experts and others to determine a plan to restore the Theatre. The
cost of restoration was estimated at a minimum of $2.75 million.
Roosevelt would often advance funds for the restoration of the
Theatre. On October 31, 1967, the Theatre was reopened to the
public.
	The Council operated the Theatre under the supervision and
control of Roosevelt. At the March 4, 1971, meeting of
Roosevelt's board of trustees, Chairperson Jerome Stone reported
that Standing Policies and Operating Procedures (SOPs) had been
developed for the Theatre. According to the minutes, Stone
reported: "This statement reaffirms and supplements the Board's
resolution of February 18, 1960 establishing the Council." At its
April 22, 1971, meeting, the board approved the SOPs. They
mandated procedures the Council was to follow for the day-to-day
operation of the Theatre and further secured the University's
control over Theatre operations. For example, the SOPs mandated
that all Theatre employees be paid by the University and be subject
to University regulations.
	In the late 1970s, some Council members posited that fund-raising for the Theatre would improve if the Council could obtain
its own tax-exempt status from the IRS. According to the minutes
of the December 20, 1977, meeting of the Council's executive
committee, the Council and Roosevelt were discussing "the
establishment of a 'Shell Corporation' for the purpose of separate
tax-exempt status of the [Council]."
	Robert Gorman, the University's attorney, revised a draft of
the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the proposed
corporation. In a letter dated October 22, 1979, Gorman opined:
			"In review, the Articles of incorporation and By-laws
establish a separate Illinois not-for-profit corporation
named the Auditorium Theatre Council. It is explicitly set
forth in the Articles of Incorporation and in the By-laws
that this new corporation is for fund raising purposes only
and has no duties, rights, or operating responsibilities in
connection with the Auditorium Theatre. ***
* * *
			If the Board of Trustees approves the establishment of
a new corporation, the Auditorium Theatre Council will
exist in two legal capacities. In one capacity it will
continue to exist as it has in the past as an unincorporated
agency of Roosevelt University operating under, and
subject to, the direction and control of the Board of
Trustees of Roosevelt University. The books and accounts
of the Auditorium Theatre Council will also continue to
be subject to inspection by[,] and among the fiscal
responsibilities and duties of[,] the Roosevelt Controller.
The use, maintenance, operation and restoration of the
Auditorium Theatre will continue in the identical fashion
it has always done pursuant to the Resolution of the Board
of Trustees of Roosevelt University dated February 18,
1960, and the [1971 SOPs].
			In its other legal capacity the Auditorium Theatre
Council will exist as an Illinois not-for-profit corporation
in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws submitted. It will use the name 'Auditorium Theatre
Council.' However, the corporation will exist and be used
for the solicitation of funds only. It will not affect in any
way whatsoever the operations of the *** Council and the
*** Theatre which will continue in the same manner as in
the past."
Gorman concluded that the articles of incorporation and bylaws of
the proposed corporation, Auditorium Theatre Council, Inc. (ATC
Inc.), "are satisfactory and not in conflict with the interests of
Roosevelt University."
	Beatrice Spachner, University trustee and chairperson of the
Council, reported on the Council's fund-raising efforts at the
October 25, 1979, meeting of Roosevelt's board of trustees. She
stated that potential donors hesitated to contribute to the Council
because it was not separately identified as a not-for-profit
corporation organized for tax-exempt purposes. According to
Spachner: "To overcome this concern of contributors, it was
concluded that an affiliate of the Council should be incorporated
only for the purpose of raising funds *** for the restoration,
operation and maintenance of the Auditorium Theatre. *** [T]his
will be the only function of the Corporation."
	Both the Council and ATC Inc. would share similar names,
and would have largely the same membership. However, the
resolution authorizing the incorporation of ATC Inc. expressly
stated:
		"This corporation is authorized for fund raising purposes
only. The corporation will have no rights whatsoever for
the use, operation, maintenance, or restoration of the
Auditorium Theatre. The use, operation, maintenance and
restoration of the Auditorium Theatre will continue,
without change, to be the responsibility of the Auditorium
Theatre Council in its separate legal capacity as an
unincorporated agency of Roosevelt University subject to
the control of the Roosevelt University Board of Trustees
as set forth in the [1971 SOPs]. *** In the event that at
any time in the future [ATC Inc.] should exceed any of
the duties, rights, or powers granted it by this resolution,
the Board of Trustees hereby reserves the right to
terminate any uses, duties or rights of [ATC Inc.] in
connection with the *** Theatre."
Roosevelt's board of trustees adopted the resolution.
	On September 8, 1981, ATC Inc. filed its articles of
incorporation with the State of Illinois and was incorporated under
the General Not For Profit Corporation Act (see 805 ILCS
105/101.01 et seq. (West 2000)). According to its articles of
incorporation, ATC Inc.'s corporate purpose was, in pertinent part:
		"To raise funds and gifts from individuals and
organizations for the restoration, operation and
maintenance of the Auditorium Theatre *** and the
presentation of educational, civic and cultural programs
therein, with due regard for safeguarding the right, title
and interest of Roosevelt University in and to the Theatre,
so that it will serve as a cultural center for the people of
Chicagoland."
ATC Inc. subsequently obtained an IRS ruling that ATC Inc. was
a tax-exempt organization and that donations to it would be tax-deductible by the donor.
	Subsequent to the incorporation of ATC Inc., the University
updated the 1971 SOPs. The 1983 SOPs stated in pertinent part:
			"The purpose of the *** Council is to maintain, operate
and continue the restoration of the internationally famed
Auditorium Theatre of Roosevelt University. The Council
will operate the Theatre for the benefit of the faculty and
students of Roosevelt University and also, subject to the
academic priorities of the University, to make artistic,
cultural and educational contributions to the people of
Greater Chicago through the sponsorship of events in the
performing arts."
The 1983 SOPs are substantially similar to those of 1971.
Significantly, the 1983 SOPs distinguish the identity and the
function of the Council from those of ATC Inc. The 1983 SOPs
recount that the University created the Council through the 1960
resolution of Roosevelt's board of trustees and that the University
created ATC Inc. through the board's October 25, 1979,
resolution. The 1983 SOPs state that the "sole purpose" of ATC
Inc. "is to solicit funds for the Auditorium Theatre."

Dialogue
	The University paid the Theatre's operating costs, such as
insurance and employee payroll, from the University's general
account. Roosevelt was supposed to be repaid from the Theatre
revenue account. However, by the late 1980s, the Theatre's
operating expenses exceeded its revenues. The Theatre lost more
money than fund raising could offset. The general funds that
Roosevelt expended were not reimbursed. Theatre losses and the
operating deficit increased. Roosevelt paid this deficit by
transferring money from its endowment fund to Theatre accounts.
	On July 1, 1986, Roosevelt trustee Robert Mednick met with
Council chairperson Jack Whitney to discuss this problem.
According to a July 7, 1986, letter from Mednick to Whitney, they
agreed that if the Theatre's cumulative operating deficit increased
over approximately $250,000, the Theatre would be discontinued
due to a lack of community support. An April 29, 1987, letter by
a Council officer reflected the understanding that if the cumulative
deficit exceeded this amount "at any time, Roosevelt may close
down the Council."
	The Theatre's cumulative operating deficit eventually totaled
over $400,000. However, despite the above-stated understanding,
the University kept the Theatre open and continued to support the
Theatre. Eventually, during the 1990s, the Theatre attracted large
Broadway productions such as "Miss Saigon," "Les Miserables,"
"Phantom of the Opera," and "ShowBoat." These productions and
other popular programs enabled the Council to increase its
revenues from ticket sales and to repay the funds transferred to the
Theatre accounts from the University's other accounts.


Strife
	Beginning in the late 1980s, the Council and Roosevelt
disputed their respective rights over the Theatre. As reflected in a
November 15, 1988, letter from Council chairperson Edward Weil
to University President Gross, the Council recognized signs of
success. "Things are coming together nicely in the operation of the
Theatre and at the same time the Council is starting to get the
favorable recognition it deserves, and is beginning to tap into
major funding sources." However, a June 26, 1989, memo from
Gross to a committee of University trustees reflected the
University's view: "The distinction that must continually be made
is between authority and responsibility: the RU Board of Trustees
has authority over the Theatre; the [Council] has the responsibility
to manage the Theatre." (Emphases in original.)
	A rift grew between the parties. In 1989, Roosevelt informed
the Council that a Council fund-raising campaign, initiated
without the approval of Roosevelt's board of trustees, possibly
violated the 1983 SOPs. At the April 14, 1989, meeting of the
Roosevelt board, Gross reported this and other violations. He
suggested options including "[d]rawing up a new agreement that
retains our ownership of the theatre but that establishes the
[Council] as a no[t]-for-profit, separate corporation which pays $1
a year rent to the university and is responsible for its own
operating budget and its own fund-raising."
	On July 10, 1989, the Council's executive board agreed with
Gross' recommendations. The group also concluded that the
Council should continue to manage the day-to-day operations of
the Theatre.
	At its July 20, 1989, meeting, the Roosevelt board of trustees
approved a resolution concerning "the organizational structure
between Roosevelt University and the Auditorium Theatre." The
resolution stated that the Council "has responsibility for the artistic
direction of the Theatre and the executive director of the Theatre
reports directly to the president of the University with regard to
budgetary and general operating matters."
	The Council viewed this resolution essentially as Roosevelt
transferring authority for managing the Theatre from the Council
to Roosevelt. The Council's executive board rejected Roosevelt's
resolution.
	On August 1, 1989, the Council's executive board presented
to Roosevelt a proposal to change the relationship between the
University and the Council. The proposal acknowledged that
Roosevelt owned the Theatre. Under the proposal, subject to
conditions such as repayment of funds to Roosevelt, the Council
would be disbanded and all operating authority would be
transferred to ATC Inc., which would conduct fund raising
independently of the University. Roosevelt rejected this proposal.
	On August 24, 1989, the Council's executive board resigned.
The Council assumed "no further responsibility" for Theatre
operations and advised University trustees to prepare to do so.
	As a result of this discord, Roosevelt and the Council reached
a disharmonious decision. The Council would continue its day-to-day operations of the Theatre; members of the Council's executive
board rescinded their resignations; and Gross was elected
chairperson of the Council. At its October 10, 1989, meeting,
Roosevelt's board of trustees approved the following resolution:
		"The Auditorium Theatre is an aesthetic and financial
asset of Roosevelt University, an integral unit led by an
Executive Director who reports to the President of the
University. The President serves as Chairman of the
Auditorium Theatre Council. The Executive Director is
assisted by the Auditorium Theatre Council in
programming, fund-raising, special events, and other
activities directly related to the Theatre.
			Although Roosevelt University retains final authority
over all matters pertaining to the Auditorium Theatre, the
Board of Trustees recognizes that the Auditorium Theatre
Council must remain as autonomous as possible,
contingent upon sound fiscal management. The University
endorses the concept that Roosevelt University and the
Auditorium Theatre are one entity. Roosevelt University
wishes to assist the Auditorium Theatre in all of its efforts
and supports the principle that, as a matter of first priority,
all revenues raised in its behalf be placed in the account
of the Auditorium Theatre for its continuing
advancement.
			The Auditorium Theatre should now be presented as the
Auditorium Theatre of Roosevelt University."
Whatever understanding the parties may have reached faltered
from the beginning. Roosevelt and the Council constantly disputed
their respective powers over the Theatre and the ownership of the
Theatre's operating revenues.
	Throughout the early 1990s, the parties conducted continuous
negotiations regarding various forms of agreements to change their
relationship to each other and to the Theatre. For example, in
1991, John Blew, Council and ATC Inc. secretary, presented
another proposal for transfer of Theatre operations from the
Council to ATC Inc. His proposal included several justifications.
First, pointing to the Council's board, Blew stated that the Council
had an opportunity to move the board's composition "into a higher
tier by attracting a group of more influential and higher profile
members who both have more money themselves and, perhaps
more important, have greater access to other sources of major
funding." (Emphasis in original.) Blew posited that it was
"essential for such broad development that there be a separate
legal entity and organization with its own identity and mission in
place. The 'heavy hitters' we are talking about will simply not lend
their names and prestige to an 'advisory committee' or anything of
the sort." Blew suggested that operating the Council through ATC
Inc. was a necessary condition to strengthening the Council's
board.
	Blew also recommended that the relationship between the
Council and ATC Inc. be clarified. According to Blew: "The
minutes of meetings of the two 'mirror' organizations which now
exist-the unincorporated association and the corporation-are not
in acceptable shape. Most of our own board members don't really
know or understand the organizational structure." Blew continued
that "if producers, artists and vendors were aware of the structure
or lack thereof, they might be reluctant to enter into contracts with
respect to the Theatre. It is not a healthy situation, and it is one
which should not be permitted to continue."
	In the course of his proposal, Blew acknowledged: "There is
no question but that the University owns the Theatre and controls
the Council-period." Roosevelt rejected the proposal.
	Through 1993 and 1994, Roosevelt and ATC Inc. discussed
a license or lease agreement under which Roosevelt would transfer
Theatre operations to a reorganized ATC Inc. On June 22, 1993,
ATC Inc. sent a letter to the IRS inquiring into the corporation's
tax-exempt status if it took over Theatre operations. In the letter,
ATC Inc. represented to the IRS, under penalty of perjury, that the
Council operated the Theatre as a "part" of, or "unit within," the
University since 1960 and that a "proposal" had been made to
transfer Theatre operations to ATC Inc. prospectively. The IRS
determined that the proposed reorganization would not affect the
tax-exempt status of ATC Inc. By December 1994, the parties had
agreed on neither the terms of a license nor the makeup of the
proposed reconstituted ATC Inc.
	During this time, ATC Inc. made additional proposals to
Roosevelt regarding the Theatre. In mid-1994, ATC Inc. offered
to purchase the Theatre from Roosevelt for $1 million, but the
University rejected the offer. In November 1994, ATC Inc. offered
to purchase the Theatre for $3 million, which offer the University
rejected.
	At a December 15, 1994, meeting of the Council's executive
committee, Gross requested that the committee recommend the
transfer of $1.5 million out of the $3 million then contained in the
Theatre's operating accounts into Roosevelt's general accounts.
Roosevelt wanted to use the $1.5 million to finance its new
Schaumburg campus. The money would be transferred from the
Theatre's operating revenues and not from contributions. The
Theatre's executive director stated at this meeting that the transfer
would not impair Theatre operations. ATC Inc. members objected
to the transfer. It was agreed that no action would be taken on the
request pending receipt of an opinion from Roosevelt's counsel
regarding the legality of the proposed transfer.


Adversaries
	The next day, plaintiffs brought this lawsuit. In July and
November 1995, the Roosevelt University board of trustees
approved resolutions that: (1) dissolved the Council; (2) withdrew
any and all powers given to ATC Inc.; and (3) authorized a new
not-for-profit corporation to manage and operate the Theatre,
known as the Auditorium Theatre of Roosevelt University (AT of
RU).
	In their complaint, plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting
defendants and ATC Inc. from directing the transfer of any money
from ATC Inc. to Roosevelt for non-Theatre purposes. Also,
plaintiffs sought a declaration that Roosevelt had placed the
Theatre "in the public domain for the benefit of the people of
Chicagoland," with the Council and its successor, ATC Inc., as
trustee. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that, inter alia: ATC
Inc. had legal title to all funds donated and all revenue generated
from its operations; any transfer of money from ATC Inc. to
Roosevelt for non-Theatre purposes would violate the articles of
incorporation and bylaws of ATC Inc.; and such transfer would
violate the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 (805
ILCS 105/101.01 et seq. (West 2000)).
	Roosevelt filed an answer, in which the University raised
defenses. Roosevelt claimed that ATC Inc.'s sole corporate
purpose was to raise funds for the Theatre and that the board of
trustees of the University, the owner of the building, had never
granted ATC Inc. authority or power to restore, maintain, or
operate the Theatre. Roosevelt also claimed that ATC Inc. did not
succeed the Council created in 1960. Among its defenses,
Roosevelt claimed: "there is absolutely no legal doctrine involving
the dedication of private property to the 'public domain,' at least
without a governmental taking though a condemnation proceeding
with just compensation."
	Roosevelt also filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs and ATC
Inc. for declaratory and injunctive relief. Roosevelt sought a
declaration that the University owns all right, title, and interest in
the Theatre. Roosevelt sought a further declaration that: the
University has the sole power and authority to restore, maintain,
and operate the Theatre; that the University granted a revocable
license to the Council to perform those tasks; and that ATC Inc.
has no right to perform those tasks, but was created solely for fund
raising purposes. Roosevelt also sought, inter alia, an accounting
of ATC Inc.'s funds and an injunction to prevent ATC Inc. from
operating the Theatre.
	ATC Inc. filed its own counterclaim against Roosevelt. The
corporation asserted a number of alternative legal theories in
support of its claimed control of the Theatre.
	The trial court granted Gross' motion to dismiss all claims
against him as legally insufficient (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West
2000)). Also, granting Roosevelt's motion for partial judgment on
the pleadings (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2000)), the trial
court held that: (1) Roosevelt had the authority and right to restore,
maintain, and operate the Theatre; (2) ATC Inc.'s sole right is to
raise money for the Theatre; and (3) the positive net operating
revenues from Theatre performances are the property of the
University.
	In a Rule 23 order, the appellate court reversed the orders of
the circuit court and remanded the cause for a trial. Eychaner v.
Gross, Nos. 1-95-3614, 1-96-1412 cons. (1997) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court
determined that disputed questions of material fact existed
regarding the parties' relationship. The appellate court also held
that plaintiffs' claims were legally sufficient.
	On remand, plaintiffs and ATC Inc. (hereafter referred to as
plaintiffs) amended their pleadings. They, inter alia, altered their
trust theory to assert an "express trust" of the right to restore,
maintain, and operate the Theatre, which they referred to as the
"Auditorium Theatre Trust." Plaintiffs maintained their allegations
that the Council was the trustee and ATC Inc., as legal successor
to the Council, became, and remains, the trustee. In its
counterclaim against Roosevelt and Gross, ATC Inc. alleged, inter
alia: (1) an express charitable public trust; (2) constructive trust;
(3) breach of contract based on the 1960 resolution and SOPs; (4)
equitable estoppel; and (5) promissory estoppel.
	At the close of a bench trial, on September 28, 1998, the court
entered judgment in favor of Roosevelt on its counterclaim and
denied plaintiffs' theories of relief. The trial court declared the
University to be the sole and exclusive owner of the Theatre. The
trial court: ordered plaintiffs to turn over control of the Theatre to
the newly formed AT of RU; barred the Council and ATC Inc.
from operating and controlling the Theatre; and ordered an
immediate accounting of Theatre operations. On September 29,
the trial court made an express written finding making these orders
immediately enforceable (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).
	A divided appellate court reversed these orders and remanded
the cause for further proceedings. 321 Ill. App. 3d 759. The
appellate court held that the trial court's conclusion that there was
no express trust was clearly erroneous. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 779.
Based on that holding, the court declined to address plaintiffs'
alternative claims. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 780-81. A concurring justice
wrote separately to disagree with the dissent. 321 Ill. App. 3d at
785 (Cahill, P.J., specially concurring). The dissenting justice
concluded: "Because there is enough admissible evidence to
support the trial judge's view that this was a takeover attempt by
an instrumentality of Roosevelt University, I would affirm his
conclusion that there is no trust." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 788 (Wolfson,
J., dissenting). We allowed defendants' petition for leave to
appeal.(1)
	We subsequently granted leave to DePaul University and the
Illinois Institute of Technology to file an amicus curiae brief in
support of defendants' appeal. We also granted leave to the
Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois to file an amicus
curiae brief in support of plaintiffs.


ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
	The parties disagree as to our standard of review of the trial
court's decision. Defendants contend that we should review the
trial court's decision under the "manifest weight of the evidence"
standard. Plaintiffs contend that the "clearly erroneous" standard
is the proper standard of review. The appellate court employed the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 770.
	The trial court heard witness testimony and resolved conflicts
of fact. In a bench trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence and
make findings of fact. In close cases, where findings of fact
depend on the credibility of witnesses, it is particularly true that a
reviewing court will defer to the findings of the trial court unless
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Chicago
Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d 120, 124 (1985). The
findings of the trial court as to the existence of a trust will not be
disturbed on review unless such findings are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Zukerman, 218 Ill. App. 3d
325, 330 (1991) (and cases cited therein). This standard also
applies regarding the existence of an agency relationship. Martin
v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 47 (1994). A decision
is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an
opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Rhodes v.
Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 242 (1996); Leonardi
v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106 (1995);
Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995). "The court on
review must not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of
fact." Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill. 2d 425, 434 (1991).
	Nevertheless, the trial court also construed and ruled on the
legal effect of documents. In reviewing the trial court's
conclusions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. See
Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 70-71 (2001); Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998); T. O'Neill & S. Brody, Taking Standards
of Appellate Review Seriously: A Proposal to Amend Rule 341, 83
Ill. B.J. 512, 516 (1995). We now turn to the merits of the issues
before us.

II. Express Charitable Trust
	Plaintiffs claim that the 1960 resolution of Roosevelt's board
of trustees, together with the surrounding circumstances, created
an express charitable trust with the Council and its successor, ATC
Inc., as trustee in charge of restoring and operating the Theatre.
The trial court rejected plaintiffs' claim, and concluded that
Roosevelt created the Council as its agent for restoring and
operating the Theatre. The appellate court reversed and remanded
for further proceedings, finding "legal and factual errors in the trial
court's resolution of the charitable trust issue." 321 Ill. App. 3d at
771.
	Before this court, plaintiffs, as appellees, not only defend the
appellate court's judgment, but also request, as cross-relief, that
we declare the existence of the alleged trust. We decline plaintiffs'
request. The record contains ample evidence that supports the trial
court's findings of fact.
	The controlling legal principles are quite settled. A trust "is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the
person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties
to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which
arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it."
(Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Trusts §2 (1959). In
Illinois, creation of an express trust requires: (1) intent of the
parties to create a trust, which may be shown by a declaration of
trust by the settlor or by circumstances which show that the settlor
intended to create a trust; (2) a definite subject matter or trust
property; (3) ascertainable beneficiaries; (4) a trustee; (5)
specifications of a trust purpose and how the trust is to be
performed; and (6) delivery of the trust property to the trustee.
Zukerman, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 329; In re Estate of Wilkening, 109
Ill. App. 3d 934, 940-41 (1982); Price v. State, 79 Ill. App. 3d 143,
148 (1979).
	"A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to
create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is held
to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable
purpose." (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Trusts §348
(1959). Charitable trusts have similar characteristics as private
trusts (Restatement (Second) of Trusts §348, Comment a (1959)),
and the methods of creating both types of trusts are the same
(Restatement (Second) of Trusts §349, Comment a (1959)).
However, charitable trusts need not specify definite beneficiaries
(Restatement (Second) of Trusts §364, Comment a (1959)) and
may be perpetual (Restatement (Second) of Trusts §365, Comment
a (1959)).
	Each of the requisite elements of an express trust must be
established. If any one of the necessary elements is not described
with certainty, no trust is created. Wilkening, 109 Ill. App. 3d at
941; accord In re Frain, 222 B.R. 835, 837 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998)
(applying Illinois law); In re Marchiando, 142 B.R. 246, 249-50
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (same). "Stated otherwise, any attempt to create
an express trust that omits one or more of the formal requirements
automatically fails." 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §46, at 74 (1992). The
requirement that each of the necessary elements of an express trust
be established has long been the law in Illinois. See, e.g., Tucker
v. Countryman, 414 Ill. 215, 221 (1953); Marble v. Estate of
Marble, 304 Ill. 229, 235 (1922).
A. Trust Element of Intent
	The trial court found that Roosevelt did not intend to create an
express charitable trust through the 1960 resolution, but rather
intended to create the Council as its agent. As earlier emphasized,
an express charitable trust arises, by definition, "as a result of a
manifestation of an intention to create it." Restatement (Second)
of Trusts §§2, 348 (1959). "The intention of the settlor to presently
create a declaration of trust is essential." (Emphasis in original.)
Kavanaugh v. Estate of Dobrowolski, 86 Ill. App. 3d 33, 39
(1980). Indeed, "the primary focus in determining the existence of
a trust must be on the intent of the settlor to establish a trust at the
time of the creation of the alleged trust ***." 76 Am. Jur. 2d
Trusts §64, at 92 (1992). It is not enough that the settlor secretly
intends to create a trust. No trust will arise unless there is an
outward expression of the settlor's intention at the time of the
trust's purported creation. Kavanaugh, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 40;
Restatement (Second) of Trusts §4, Comment a (1959).
	"It is immaterial whether or not the settlor knows that the
intended relationship is called a trust, and whether or not [the
settlor] knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which
is called a trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts §23, Comment
a (1959). As a learned treatise explains:
		"In many cases the owner of property in disposing of it
has no very clear idea of the precise nature of the
disposition that [the owner] intends to make. The
distinction between a trust and other juridical
relationships is not always an easy one to draw, even for
the trained lawyer. It is often difficult to tell whether the
owner of property is creating a trust or making some other
disposition. A trust is created if in substance what [the
settlor] intends to create is the relationship that lawyers
know as a trust. In most cases, and particularly where the
intention is manifested in an instrument drawn by a
competent lawyer, there is no difficulty in determining
whether the owner of property has manifested an intention
to create a trust." 1 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts §23, at
249-50 (4th ed. 1987).
As otherwise stated: "There must be a particular intent to confer
benefits through the medium of a trust, and not through some
related or similar device." G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §46, at
489-91 (rev. 2d ed. 1984).
	The manifestation of intention to create a trust "may clearly
appear from written or spoken words or may be determined by
interpretation of the words or conduct of the settlor in the light of
all the circumstances." Restatement (Second) of Trusts §4,
Comment a (1959). No particular form of words or conduct is
necessary for the manifestation of intent to create a trust.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts §23, Comment a (1959). Indeed,
"[a] trust may be created although the settlor does not use the word
'trust ***.' " Restatement (Second) of Trusts §24, Comment b
(1959). "Acts prior to and subsequent to, as well as acts
contemporaneous with the manifestation which it is claimed
creates a trust, may be relevant in determining the settlor's
intention to create a trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts §24,
Comment b (1959). "The question in each case is whether the
settlor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship
that to lawyers is known as a trust." 1 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts
§24, at 250 (4th ed. 1987); accord Price, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 148.



1. The Resolution Standing Alone
	Plaintiffs claim that the 1960 resolution "comprehensively
defined the relationship between Roosevelt and the Council."
Plaintiffs contend that the 1960 resolution of the Roosevelt
University board of trustees, by itself, manifests the University's
intent to create a charitable trust, in which the Council acts as
trustee over the right to restore and operate the Theatre for the
benefit of the public. When a document makes clear the existence
of a trust, no particular form of words is necessary. A court will
support an intention to create a trust wherever such intention can
be fairly collected from the language of the instrument. Zukerman,
218 Ill. App. 3d at 330. "In determining that intent the court must
consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used
[citations], and the intent must be ascertained by considering the
entire document." First National Bank of Chicago v. Canton
Council of Campfire Girls, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1981).
	Assuming, without deciding, that restoration and operation of
the Theatre constitute possessory interests in real property that can
be held in trust, it is clear that the 1960 resolution, standing alone,
did not manifest an intent on the part of Roosevelt to create a
charitable trust. We earlier quoted the resolution in its entirety. On
its face, the resolution lacks many indicia that are consistent with
charitable trusts.
	Initially, the resolution does not contain any words of
alienation or conveyance, i.e., there are no words of transfer of an
interest in the property from a "settlor" to someone or something
that might be a "trustee." Plaintiffs point to certain "rights" that
the resolution transferred to the Council. The resolution
"authorized and directed" the Council to raise funds for the
Theatre restoration. The resolution made the Council
"responsible" for supervising the restoration. The resolution also
"empowered" the Council to hire a fund-raiser and staff and gave
the Council "authority to supervise" the reconstruction while
reporting to the Roosevelt University board of trustees. According
to plaintiffs: "Virtually every paragraph of the Resolution grants
broad discretion to the Council as trustee. *** Thus, the
Resolution itself contains overwhelming evidence of Roosevelt's
intent to authorize and empower the Council to act as fiduciary for
the public and, in that capacity, to possess, restore and operate the
Theatre, and hold and spend donations and Theatre revenues."
(Emphasis added.)
	Plaintiffs specifically discuss paragraph 12 of the 1960
resolution, which authorized the Council to retain any Theatre
operating surplus in a development reserve. Plaintiffs describe
paragraph 12 as expressing "Roosevelt's intent that the Theatre
would be operated by the autonomous independent Council, using
Theatre revenues to defray all expenses." According to plaintiffs,
paragraph 12 gave the Council the "widest discretion to determine
the adequacy of the development reserve, not only to assure the
future of the Theatre for the public, but also to provide Roosevelt
with additional protection from liability. Once an adequate reserve
was established, Roosevelt would share in surpluses to support its
academic mission." Indeed, plaintiffs go so far as to argue that
Roosevelt, by paragraph 12 of the 1960 resolution, gave away its
fundamental right of ownership of the Theatre. According to
plaintiffs, paragraph 12 indicates the durable nature of the trust by
providing that the Council "would continue to fulfill its mission"
for an indefinite period of time by building a development reserve
to fund the ongoing preservation of the Theatre.
	It is clear that plaintiffs fail to distinguish the concepts of
agency and trust. It must be remembered that "[t]here are a number
of widely varying relationships which more or less clearly
resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term 'trust'
is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships."
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, ch. 1, topic 2, at 15 (1959). "An
agency is not a trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts §8 (1959).
An agent is one who undertakes to manage the affairs of another,
on the authority and for the account of the latter, who is called the
principal, and to render an account to the principal. See Mills v.
State National Bank, 28 Ill. App. 3d 830, 834 (1975). Thus, when
A puts his or her property in the hands of B to keep or manage, A
creates, as between A and B, the relation known as principal and
agent. In re Estate of Morys, 17 Ill. App. 3d 6, 9 (1973). An agent
is subject to the control of the principal. Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §8, Comment b (1959); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §13, at 45
(1992).
	In this case, the resolution never uses the word "rights" in
connection with the restoration and operation of the Theatre.
Rather, the resolution delegated duties to the Council. The only
time the resolution uses the word "rights" is when Roosevelt
preserved and safeguarded its own property rights in the Theatre. 	The intent to grant authority to take action with respect to real
property is not the same as the intent to permanently alienate or
transfer an ownership interest. See Olson v. Etheridge, 177 Ill. 2d 396, 406 (1997) (distinguishing an assignment of rights from a
delegation of duties). Although the resolution makes the Council
responsible for performing these duties, nothing in the resolution
indicates an intent to alienate any alleged "rights" from Roosevelt.
Rather, the delegation of duties to the Council created an agency
relationship. For example, an apartment building owner directs her
property manager to manage the building with discretion to make
decisions concerning building maintenance and finances.
However, the delegation of these duties does not alienate the same
rights from the owner, who can always step in and make decisions
on her own relating to those matters. Also, the building owner
retains the ultimate power to prevent the manager from taking any
action with respect to her property or to discharge the manager
altogether.
	In this case, the resolution specifically directs that the Council
act with "due regard for safeguarding the right, title and interest of
the University in and to the Theatre." This is a clear expression of
Roosevelt's intent to retain, rather than transfer, its property rights
in and to the Theatre.
	The 1960 resolution lacks other indicia that are consistent
with charitable trusts. The resolution contains no words of delivery
or any provision directing a delivery of property or an interest in
property. The resolution states no "charitable" or "public" purpose,
or any purpose to benefit anyone else. Also, the resolution does
not state any purpose to confer benefits through the medium of a
trust.
	Further, the 1960 resolution contains a number of provisions
that are inconsistent with the creation of a trust. The resolution
states that the legal title to and all rights in the Theatre are to
remain in Roosevelt, which precludes an alienation or transfer of
such rights to a "trustee" as would be necessary for a trust. The
resolution affirmatively states that it is intended to benefit its
author, Roosevelt.
	Also, the 1960 resolution contains many restrictions on the
Council. Pursuant to the resolution, the Council was required to
report periodically to the board regarding the restoration of the
Theatre and to provide the board with requested information. The
Council had to deposit all funds raised into a special, segregated
University account. The Council could not enter into any
contracts, purchases, or obligations unless certain criteria were
met, including having the money on hand to pay for the obligation.
The Council's programming for the Theatre was required to be in
harmony with the University's aims. The Council had to prepare
an annual report for Roosevelt's board of trustees and submit to an
annual audit. Also, all nominees for the Council's executive
committee required approval of Roosevelt's board of trustees.
These controls on the Council indicate an agency relationship.
	The 1960 resolution, standing alone, cannot be read as a trust
instrument. Every provision of the resolution is more consistent
with the intent to create an agency relationship than the intent to
create a trust, and the resolution lacks elements that are required
to create a trust.

2. Parol Evidence
	Plaintiffs additionally rely on parol evidence, i.e., evidence
outside of the resolution itself, to prove their claim of an express
charitable trust. It is settled that an express trust may be
established by parol evidence. However, one seeking to establish
an express trust by parol evidence bears the burden of proving the
trust by clear and convincing evidence. The acts or words relied
upon must be so unequivocal and unmistakable as to lead to only
one conclusion. If the parol evidence is doubtful or capable of
reasonable explanation upon any other theory, it is not sufficient
to establish an express trust. Maley v. Burns, 6 Ill. 2d 11, 18
(1955); Cusack v. Cusack, 339 Ill. 108, 120 (1930); Zukerman,
218 Ill. App. 3d at 330.
	We note plaintiffs' contention that the clear-and-convincing
burden of proof does not apply to their attempt to prove the
existence of the express trust using parol evidence. Plaintiffs
contend that the clear-and-convincing burden of proof applies only
to attempts to establish trusts with oral statements or other parol
evidence, or attempts to modify written trusts through oral
statements. According to plaintiffs, the express trust is based on
the 1960 resolution, "as defined in part by the contemporaneous
circumstances surrounding the Resolution's enactment and the
later conduct of the parties."
	We cannot accept this argument. This court explained long
ago:
		" 'Where the trust does not appear on the face of the deed
or other instrument of transfer, a resort to parol evidence
is indispensable. It is settled by a complete unanimity of
decision that such evidence must be clear, strong,
unequivocal, [and] unmistakable ***.['] *** 'As a
general rule, the policy of the law requires that everything
which may affect the title to real estate shall be in
writing,-that nothing shall be left to the frailty of human
memory or as a temptation to perjury; and whenever this
policy of the law has been broken in upon and parol
evidence admitted, the courts have been ever careful to
examine into every circumstance which may affect the
probability of the alleged claim, as the lapse of time, the
means of knowledge and circumstances of the witness;
and it will not grant the relief sought where the claim has
been allowed to lie dormant for an unreasonable length of
time or where the evidence is not very clear in support of
the alleged right ***'." Keuper v. Unknown Heirs of
Mette, 239 Ill. 586, 592 (1909).
In this case, plaintiffs offer evidence outside of the purported trust
instrument, i.e., the 1960 resolution, as additional proof of their
claim. Such evidence must be so clear and convincing as to lead
to only one conclusion. See Maley, 6 Ill. 2d  at 18.
	Turning to the merits, plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erroneously excluded certain parol evidence offered at trial and
ignored other parol evidence admitted at trial. Plaintiffs presented
parol evidence from several sources: (a) the official actions of
Roosevelt, the purported settlor, through its board of trustees; (b)
statements by individual trustees and executives of Roosevelt and
by others; and (c) statements made to the public. The evidence
consisted of both exhibits and witness testimony.
	The trial court considered that most of the parol evidence that
plaintiffs presented "were not pertinent to the legal intent of the
parties." (Emphasis in original.) The court concluded that
"statements made by individuals are immaterial. The only one that
could create an express trust was Roosevelt acting through its
Board of Trustees. They never did so."
	This narrow view of admissible evidence was erroneous. All
of the circumstances are relevant in determining the settlor's intent
to create an express trust. See Price, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 148;
LaThrop v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 42 Ill. App. 3d
183, 188 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 375 (1977); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §24, Comment b (1959); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts
§§65, 66 (1992).
	However, this evidentiary error does not compel reversal. It
is the judgment of the trial court, and not what else may have been
said by the trial court, that is on appeal to a court of review.
Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382,
387 (1983). In a nonjury case the whole record is before the
reviewing court. Any error which may have been committed in
ruling upon the admission or exclusion of evidence is unimportant.
If there is competent evidence sufficient to sustain the trial court's
decision it will be affirmed, regardless of the views of the trial
court as to the competency of the evidence at trial. Newman v.
Youngblood, 394 Ill. 617, 625 (1946).
	In this case, the record contains ample evidence to support the
trial court's conclusion that Roosevelt did not intend to create an
express charitable trust through the resolution but, instead,
intended to create the Council as an agent for restoring and
operating the Theatre.
	Plaintiffs posit that the official actions of Roosevelt show that
the University intended to establish a charitable trust to protect the
University's real estate tax exemption. We recounted at length the
history that gave rise to and the debate that surrounded the
resolution's adoption on February 18, 1960. The record includes:
the rejection of the suggestion that a separate entity run the
Theatre under its own "trusteeship"; the October 29, 1959, motion
passed by Roosevelt's board of trustees requiring that under the
ultimate arrangement Roosevelt not lose "ownership or control"
of the Theatre; and the Trustees' direction on February 11, 1960,
that the resolution be revised to comply with the conditions of the
October 29, 1959, motion. Also surrounding the February 18,
1960, resolution was the "agreed understanding," based on trustee
Gidwitz's statement that Roosevelt would exercise unlimited
control over the Council and could change the terms of the
resolution, including paragraph 12, at any time. These official
actions of the Roosevelt University board of trustees clearly show
that the University never intended to relinquish its ownership and
control over the Theatre.
	Also, subsequent official actions of Roosevelt demonstrated
its intent to create an agency relationship through the 1960
resolution. The 1971 SOPs expressly "reaffirm[ed] and
supplement[ed]" the 1960 resolution. The 1983 SOPs, expressly
recounting the 1960 resolution, mandated that the Council operate
the Theatre for the benefit of Roosevelt. The 1983 SOPs also
recounted that the "sole purpose" of ATC Inc. was "to solicit
funds" for the Theatre. Notably, in July 1995, Roosevelt's board
of trustees dissolved the Council.
	However, plaintiffs contend that Roosevelt expressed its
intent to create a charitable trust in two documents approved by
Roosevelt. The Council's 1962 bylaws and ATC Inc.'s 1981
bylaws each state that Roosevelt would "take no unilateral action
to terminate the availability" of the Theatre as long as the property
was used for purposes consistent with the objectives set forth in
the bylaws. In the Council's 1962 bylaws, Roosevelt additionally
stated that it would not "sell the building without undertaking to
provide for the continued functioning of the Council program."
	This evidence is not clear and convincing. The above
statements can be viewed consistently with an agency relationship.
Accordingly, they are insufficient to establish an express charitable
trust.
	Plaintiffs next point to statements of individual Roosevelt
officials made subsequent to the resolution's adoption on February
18, 1960, to prove that the University intended by that resolution
to create an express charitable trust. However, these statements are
outweighed by ample evidence. Statements from officials of
Roosevelt, the Council, and ATC Inc. establish that, through the
resolution, Roosevelt did not intend to create an express charitable
trust but, rather, intended to create an agency relationship with the
Council.
	The IRS ruled in 1960 that contributions to the Council would
be tax deductible because the Council was not a separate entity
from Roosevelt. In 1993, ATC Inc. represented to the IRS, under
penalty of perjury, that the Council had operated the Theatre as a
"part" of or "unit within the University" since 1960 and that a
"proposal" had been made to transfer Theatre operations to ATC
Inc. prospectively. Thus, ATC Inc. admits that the Council never
was an entity separate from Roosevelt.
	In addition to the evidence already discussed, the record
contains additional evidence against plaintiffs' claim of an express
charitable trust. The trial court heard the testimony of Roosevelt
University trustees Gidwitz, Stone, Mednick, Newman, Anixter,
and Gross. The court summarized their testimony as follows:
		"Six Roosevelt trustees testified in the case at bar. All
agreed that during each's tenure on the Roosevelt Board,
the University never placed the Theatre in trust nor did it
take any action to divest itself of any control over the
Theatre. These same individuals all testified that they
never heard of a purported public trust until the onset of
this litigation."
The trial court heard the testimony of these witnesses, observed
their demeanor, and assessed their credibility. The court's findings
based thereon are entitled to deference. See Chicago Investment
Corp., 107 Ill. 2d  at 124.
	Also, members of ATC Inc.'s executive committee testified
at trial. They conceded that ATC Inc.'s offers to lease or buy the
Theatre from Roosevelt were attempts by the corporation to gain
the control over the Theatre that it lacked. They testified that such
actions would have been "unnecessary and superfluous" if ATC
Inc. actually had control of the Theatre. As John Blew, secretary
of the Council and of ATC Inc., stated to University President
Gross: "There is no question but that the University owns the
Theatre and controls the Council-period."
	Plaintiffs point to the following as evidence of trust intent. On
April 5, 1960, Harland Allen, chairperson of Roosevelt's board of
trustees, and Beatrice Sprachner, University trustee and Council
chairperson, jointly issued a statement "for the purpose of
clarifying any misunderstandings which may exist regarding plans
for restoration and operation of the Auditorium Theatre." The
"Seven-Point Statement" was printed in several Chicago
newspapers the next day. It explained that the Council would
"have full authority and responsibility for the restoration campaign
and the operation of the theater" and would have "full authority
and responsibility for the programs that go into the theater and for
supervision of theater operations."
	Plaintiffs point to additional statements by individual
Roosevelt trustees and executives. For example, on March 4,
1960, Allen announced in a press release:
		"The University's trustees have been impressed by and
are fully cognizant of the public trust which the ownership
of the Theater has imposed upon them. *** By creating
the Auditorium Theater Council *** the Board hopes to
establish the reconstruction and operation of the Theater
as a project from which the entire community will benefit
and of which every citizen of the community can justly be
proud."
In the April 1960 edition of "Progress," a Roosevelt publication,
Dr. Edward Sparling, University president, reported in his column
in pertinent part:
		"Ever since Roosevelt University purchased the
Auditorium building as its home in 1946 we have held the
theater itself in trust for the people of Chicago.
* * *
			The recent action of the Board of Trustees, in granting
permission to an independent civic group-the Auditorium
Theater Council-to restore and operate the Auditorium
Theater, frees Roosevelt University of the financial
burden carried these years, and also frees it from any
financial liability in regard to the restoration and operation
of the theater. It makes available to the people of Chicago
this added cultural and educational facility.
* * *
			The Auditorium Theater Council is taking a large
burden from the University's shoulders, leaving all those
dedicated to the academic program free to develop and
expand the educational service to the community for
which the University was founded and for which it lives."
Also, President Sparling, wrote a letter to the Chicago Tribune,
which was printed on April 6, 1960. He stated that the University
"has held the theater in trust for the community."
	Additionally, Spachner spoke at a 1961 fundraiser. There,
Spachner described to potential donors the goals of the Council
and referred to the Theatre as a community treasure "held in trust."
In a January 2, 1962, letter, Elmer Gertz, principal drafter of the
resolution, referred to a "trust imposed upon the property."
	These statements do not constitute unequivocal evidence that
Roosevelt intended to create an express charitable trust though the
1960 resolution. None of these statements refer to the resolution
creating a trust. To the contrary, most of these statements declare
that Roosevelt held the Theatre "in trust" or was cognizant of the
"public trust" that ownership of the Theatre involved. "A
charitable trust is not created unless the settlor manifests an
intention to impose enforceable duties. *** A charitable trust is
not created if the settlor manifests an intention to impose merely
a moral obligation." Restatement (Second) of Trusts §351,
Comment c (1959). Terms such as "held in trust" or "public trust"
can be loosely made and could broadly refer to other relationships.
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, ch. 1, topic 2, at 15 (1959).
	For example, Gertz' letter of January 2, 1962, states in
pertinent part:
			"By resolution of its governing body, Roosevelt
University created an agency, The Auditorium Theatre
Council, and authorized this agency to raise funds to
restore the Auditorium Theatre, to carry on the restoration
out of the funds so raised, and to operate the Theatre
when restored." (Emphases added.)
Gertz opined that pledges of funds had become enforceable
promises and that Roosevelt was obligated to proceed with the
restoration and subsequent operation of the Theatre. He further
opined:
			"This obligation on the part of the University will
continue so long as the Theatre continues to serve the
purposes for which it was restored and without financial
drain on the University. The University could not destroy
the trust imposed upon the property by a sale of the
Theatre to a private corporation or by demolition of the
building." (Emphasis added.)
Again, this evidence speaks of a "trust" on the part of Roosevelt,
not the Council. Indeed, the letter expressly states that the
resolution created an agency relationship with the Council. This is
consistent with Gertz's January 21, 1960, letter to Roosevelt's
attorney, in which he stated: "It is the consensus of all involved in
this situation that it is best not to form any separate *** trust or
other legal entity, but to proceed in the matter set forth in the
resolution."
	We note that Gertz testified at trial. During his testimony, he
referred to the resolution as constituting "a trust intended for the
Auditorium Theatre." The trial court expressly weighed Gertz's
statements that were contemporaneous with the resolution,
assessed the credibility of his trial testimony, and assigned little
weight thereto. This determination is particularly entitled to
deference. See Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 180 (1989).
	This evidence could establish that Roosevelt created an
agency relationship with the Council. Therefore, it is insufficient
to establish an express charitable trust.
	Plaintiffs also posit that statements made to the public show
that the University intended to establish a charitable trust.
Plaintiffs introduced various statements made in press releases,
newspaper articles, fund-raising brochures, and a magazine
published by a local savings and loan institution. This material
generally discussed the degree of day-to-day autonomy the
Council would have in restoring and operating the Theatre and
how the Council would utilize donations to it. Plaintiffs called
witnesses who testified that they relied on these communications
in connection with fund-raising.
	However, independence of spirit or conduct is not
determinative of the Council's legal status as intended by
Roosevelt through the resolution. Determinative of a principal-agent relationship is whether the principal has the right to control
the actions of the agent, not whether the principal actually
exercises that right. Darner v. Colby, 375 Ill. 558, 560-61 (1941);
See Reith v. General Telephone Co. of Illinois, 22 Ill. App. 3d 337,
339 (1974) (and cases cited therein).
	In this case, Roosevelt gave the Council, as with many types
of agents, broad day-to-day authority to conduct its
responsibilities. However, the question is not the extent of the
Council's day-to-day authority over the Theatre, but rather
whether Roosevelt retained the right to exercise control if that ever
became necessary. Overwhelming evidence proves that Roosevelt
intended to and did retain the right to control the actions of the
Council. For example, surrounding the 1960 resolution was the
"agreed understanding," based on trustee Gidwitz's statement, that
Roosevelt would exercise unlimited control over the Council and
could change the terms of the resolution at any time. Further, the
1971 and 1983 SOPs mandated procedures the Council was to
follow for the day-to-day operation of the Theatre and further
secured Roosevelt's control over Theatre operations. The parties
were aware that Roosevelt controlled both the Council and the
Theatre. Indeed, Roosevelt exercised the ultimate control over the
Council by dissolving it.
	The circumstances giving rise to the 1960 resolution, the
circumstances surrounding its adoption by Roosevelt's board of
trustees, and the subsequent acts that show Roosevelt's intent in
adopting the resolution amply and clearly support the findings of
the trial court. As noted above, the appellate court in this case
reversed and remanded for further proceedings based on what it
perceived to be "legal and factual errors in the trial court's
resolution of the charitable trust issue." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 771.
However, the appellate court should have considered all of the
facts and circumstances to determine if the trial court's findings
were supported by sufficient evidence. Had the appellate court
done so, including any evidence erroneously excluded, it would
have upheld the trial court's findings because they were based on
more than sufficient evidence. As the appellate court dissent
observed:
			"[T]he evidence, including the exhibits the judge
declined to consider, does not lead inexorably to the
success of the plaintiffs' position. The test for the judge's
factual determinations is whether they are supported by
the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.] That is,
after looking at all the admissible evidence, even, for
purpose of argument, the newspaper clippings, can we say
a conclusion opposite that of the trial judge is 'clearly
evident'? [Citation.] If we cannot say that, we are
engaging in impermissible second-guessing." 321 Ill.
App. 3d at 786-87 (Wolfson, J., dissenting).
We agree.
	The trial court was presented with a considerable amount of
evidence, including witness testimony. Ruling against plaintiffs,
the court found that Roosevelt, by the 1960 resolution, did not
intend to create an express charitable trust, with the Council as
trustee for the benefit of the public. Rather, the trial court found
that Roosevelt created the Council to act as Roosevelt's agent.
	It is true that the record contains some evidence that supports
plaintiffs' claim. However, the record contains ample evidence to
support the trial court's findings. It must be remembered that it
was the trial court who saw the witnesses and heard them testify.
"It is axiomatic that a reviewing court may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.
Findings of fact are entitled to deference, and this is particularly
true of credibility determinations." Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d  at 180;
accord Chicago Investment Corp., 107 Ill. 2d  at 129. This court
has long observed:
		" 'Underlying this rule is the recognition that, especially
where the testimony is contradictory, the trial judge as the
trier of fact is in a position superior to a court of review to
observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying, to
determine their credibility, and to weigh the evidence and
determine the preponderance thereof. We may not
overturn a judgment merely because we might disagree
with it or might, had we been the trier of facts, have come
to a different conclusion.' " Greene v. City of Chicago, 73 Ill. 2d 100, 110 (1978), quoting Schulenburg v. Signatrol
Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356 (1967).
Regardless of which particular pieces of evidence the trial court
may have cited in its decision, the court's findings were supported
by evidence. Given the entire record on appeal, we cannot say that
the trial court's factual findings were against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
	In this appeal, the controlling issue is whether Roosevelt
intended to create an express charitable trust. The trial court's
finding, supported by ample evidence, that Roosevelt did not so
intend controls the disposition of the remaining issues.

B. Remaining Trust Elements
	Two additional requirements of an express trust are: the
existence of a definite subject matter or trust property, sometimes
referred to as the corpus of the trust; and delivery of the trust
corpus to the trustee. Zukerman, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 329.
	In this case, the trial court determined: "the Theatre cannot be
the corpus of the trust because Roosevelt has held title in the
Theatre since it purchased it in the 1940's and has safeguarded its
right, title, and interest since that time." The court ruled that as a
matter of law, a trust corpus was limited to tangible property and
interests in real property and other intangibles could not be held in
trust. Thus, the trial court concluded that the right to restore and
operate the Theatre could not constitute the trust corpus.
	Further, the trial court found that the alleged trust failed for
lack of delivery of the trust corpus. According to the court,
plaintiffs failed to show that Roosevelt had ever relinquished its
right, title and interest in the Theatre. The trial court also found
that its determination that there was no charitable trust obviated
the need to consider the remaining requirements of an express
trust.
	The appellate court assigned error to the trial court's legal
conclusion that the right to restore and operate the Theatre could
not be the corpus of an express charitable trust. 321 Ill. App. 3d at
776-78. The appellate court noted that, "[i]n rejecting the fact that
the right to operate, restore and maintain the Theatre could
constitute the corpus of the trust, the court incorrectly analyzed the
issue of delivery of the trust corpus." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 778. The
appellate court also assigned error to the trial court's failure to
consider the remaining trust elements. "With that approach the
trial court failed to consider a variety of circumstances that
indicate trust intent contrary to the recognized principle of law that
proof of intent may be demonstrated by surrounding
circumstances." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 779. The appellate court held
that, based on these perceived errors, the trial court's conclusion
that there was no express trust was clearly erroneous. 321 Ill. App.
3d at 779.
	We disagree. The appellate court dissent correctly reasoned:
			"I do not agree the trial judge's finding of a lack of
intent to create a trust rests on his apparently mistaken
view that intangible rights cannot be the corpus of a trust.
The judge's first finding that there was no such intent had
nothing to do with the corpus issue.
* * *
			Lack of a permissible corpus was a second, alternative
reason offered by the trial judge. It is not the sine qua non
of his decision." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 787 (Wolfson, J.,
dissenting).
The record supports this position.
	The trial court expressly found: "One thing was abundantly
clear at the time of the passing of the 1960 Resolution-The Board
of Trustees of Roosevelt was not going to create anything that
would diminish their interest in or power over the Theatre."
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court expressly determined that
Roosevelt did not intend to create a trust of any sort, regardless of
what the corpus might be, how that corpus would be delivered,
and whether the remaining trust elements were present. "In any
event, we need not accept the trial court's legal conclusion, as long
as its factual determinations are supported by the record. As stated
above, the relevant findings were amply supported in this case.
Thus, there is no basis for any finding of error." People ex rel.
Illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 186 Ill. 2d 267, 282
(1999).
	The trial court found that Roosevelt did not intend to create a
trust of any sort. This finding, supported by ample evidence,
compels the conclusion that no trust was created, and obviates
consideration of the remaining trust elements. See, e.g., Wilkening,
109 Ill. App. 3d at 941-42.

III. Remaining Issues
A. Agency
	The appellate court assigned error to the trial court's finding
that Roosevelt, through the 1960 resolution, intended to create an
agency relationship with the Council. The appellate court
concluded: "For the reasons previously discussed, we cannot say
the factual and legal errors which formed the basis of the [trial]
court's analysis regarding the trust issue did not erroneously cause
the court to find [an] agency relationship." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 780.
However, for the reasons earlier stated in this opinion, we
conclude that the trial court's finding of agency, amply supported
by the evidence, must be upheld. See Zych, 186 Ill. 2d  at 282.

B. Plaintiffs' Alternative Contentions
	Since the appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded
on the express charitable trust claim, the appellate court expressly
declined to address plaintiffs' alternative claims of relief. 321 Ill.
App. 3d at 780-81. Plaintiffs assert them here; none are
meritorious.
	Plaintiffs contend that we should declare a constructive trust
over ATC Inc.'s funds, to ensure that representations to the
donating public are carried out and donations are not diverted. A
constructive trust is one raised by operation of law as
distinguished from an express trust. Suttles v. Vogel, 126 Ill. 2d 186, 193 (1988). A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that
may be imposed to redress unjust enrichment caused by a party's
wrongful conduct. Charles Hester Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois
Founders Insurance Co., 114 Ill. 2d 278, 293 (1986). The
proceeds of the alleged wrongful conduct must exist as an
identifiable fund traceable to that conduct, such that it can become
the res of the proposed trust. People ex rel. Nelson v. Bates, 351 Ill. 439, 443 (1933); Moore v. Taylor, 251 Ill. 468, 472-73 (1911).
	In this case, the funds at issue are donations not from the
public but rather from Theatre operating revenues. As the trial
court found:
		"It is also clear to this Court that [defendants] have never
*** assumed control over any public contributions to the
Theatre, never interfered with any of the [appurtenances]
of the Theatre, nor jeopardized the Theatre continuing as
a cultural center for the public's benefit. Significantly,
there has been no injustice nor injury to the public as their
monies, gifted upon the Theatre, were expended, for that
purpose and that purpose only.
* * *
			The only thing that cannot be done is spend donations
given to the Theatre, by the public, for anything but the
Theatre. However, this is not an issue in this case. There
is no evidence that Roosevelt ever attempted to do that.
No one has ever said that in this lawsuit. They may have
said it to the media, but never in this suit."
Moreover, the trial court ordered that all donations to the Theatre
must be accounted for and restricted to Theatre use. We agree with
the appellate court dissent (321 Ill. App. 3d at 788 (Wolfson, J.,
dissenting)) that there is no evidence of an identifiable fund
traceable to any wrongful conduct in this case. See In re Estate of
Franke, 124 Ill. App. 2d 24, 33-34 (1970). Accordingly, this claim
fails.
	We consider plaintiffs' next three claims collectively.
Plaintiffs claim an express bilateral contract. Plaintiffs contend
that the 1960 resolution and the seven-point statement constituted
a contract between Roosevelt and the Council, and ATC Inc. as
successor, which was later amended by the 1971 and 1983 SOPs.
	Plaintiffs claim that Roosevelt is equitably estopped to deny
the authority of ATC Inc. to operate the Theatre. Plaintiffs contend
that although Roosevelt purportedly reserved the right to terminate
any allegedly unauthorized conduct by ATC Inc., Roosevelt never
took any action. According to plaintiffs, ATC Inc. relied upon
Roosevelt's inaction and the University is now estopped to deny
ATC Inc.'s "continuing right to operate the Theatre."
	Plaintiffs also claim a license by estoppel. They contend that
Roosevelt granted the Council, and now ATC Inc., a license to
restore and operate the Theatre and that Roosevelt is estopped to
revoke the license.
	For plaintiffs to prevail on any of these theories of entitlement
to control over the Theatre, they must prove that the Council was
granted and held rights or interests in the Theatre greater than that
retained by Roosevelt, which were then legitimately transferred to
ATC Inc., and that those rights were not revocable. Without these
legal and factual prerequisites, plaintiffs' claims cannot succeed.
	Plaintiffs contend that the Council and ATC Inc. became
"fused." Plaintiffs argue that the role of ATC Inc. gradually
expanded subsequent to its creation and eventually "took over the
rights and duties of the unincorporated Council" as its "successor."
Plaintiffs rely on ATC Inc.'s bylaws as empowering it to operate
the Theatre. The bylaws state that ATC Inc.'s purposes are, inter
alia, "[t]o restore[,] modernize and operate the Auditorium
Theatre." As additional proof, plaintiffs point to contracts that
ATC Inc. entered into with vendors and others in its own name.
	We cannot accept this contention. All of plaintiffs' claims of
control fail because neither Roosevelt nor the Council ever granted
to ATC Inc. the right to restore and operate the Theatre.
	The trial court found as follows. Although Roosevelt and
ATC Inc. were in negotiations regarding their relationship to the
Theatre, by the time the present lawsuit was filed, no transfer of
rights to or control of the Theatre had been accomplished. The trial
court found that ATC Inc. was solely a fund-raising arm, initially
of the Council, and now of the AT of RU. The court further found:
		"[Plaintiffs] ask this court to assert that ATC, Inc. has
ownership rights to all the funds and assets in the Theatre.
They maintain that [the Council] and ATC, Inc. were
blended together and that they became one and they now
own the funds and the assets of the Theatre. It is true the
groups usually had the same membership. However, these
groups had different minutes, reported to the IRS in
different ways, were established for different purposes
and were treated differently by the trustees of Roosevelt.
Even most of the group opposing Roosevelt, when called
upon to testify, indicated that they recognized and
reported the differences between the [Council] and ATC,
Inc. The overwhelming amount of evidence clearly
showed that the groups never merged. ATC, Inc. never
had any right to governance. All they could do is raise
money for the restoration of the Theatre. They never had
any rights to the funds. After reviewing the documents,
after hearing the testimony, after examining ever[y] piece
of evidence, the Court finds that all these counts fail.
ATC, Inc. has no ownership rights, there is no equitable
or promissory estoppel and the transfer of funds to
Roosevelt, from [the Council] and ATC, Inc. Is proper."
Ample evidence supports the trial court's findings.
	We earlier recounted the circumstances surrounding the
creation of ATC Inc. and its relationship with Roosevelt and to the
Theatre. This evidence includes the following. By its resolution,
Roosevelt's board of trustees expressly authorized the
incorporation of ATC Inc. "for fund raising purposes only." This
sole purpose of ATC Inc. is reflected in its articles of
incorporation. The 1983 SOPs distinguished the identity and
function of the Council from those of ATC Inc. and expressly
stated that the sole purpose of ATC Inc. was to solicit funds for the
Theatre.
	This evidence includes ATC Inc.'s own actions. In 1993, ATC
Inc. represented to the IRS that the Council operated the Theatre
as a unit of Roosevelt and that ATC Inc. did not operate the
Theatre. Indeed, in their trial testimony, members of ATC Inc.
admitted that ATC Inc.'s negotiations with Roosevelt to purchase
or lease the Theatre from Roosevelt: (1) were attempts to gain the
control over the Theatre that it lacked; and (2) would have been
"unnecessary and superfluous" had ATC Inc. actually had control
over the Theatre. Indeed, as John Blew, ATC Inc. and Council
secretary acknowledged to Roosevelt: "There is no question but
that the University owns the Theatre and controls the
Council-period."
	Also, the trial court found that the language in ATC Inc.'s
bylaws, which purportedly allows ATC Inc. to do more than raise
funds, was "inconsistent with all the other evidence presented."
The court found that ATC Inc.'s articles of incorporation limited
its corporate purpose to fund raising. Any action by ATC Inc. to
operate the Theatre was ultra vires. Ample evidence supported this
finding. All of plaintiffs' alternative claims were based on the
erroneous factual premise that ATC Inc. legitimately operated the
Theatre. More than sufficient evidence supports the trial court's
rejection of this premise.
	The trial court's findings are not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. See Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d  at 106. We find no basis
to disturb the trial court's rejection of these claims. See Zych, 186 Ill. 2d  at 282.
	In response to these findings, ATC Inc. invokes this court's
equitable power. "Courts of equity possess original and inherent
power to recognize, execute and control trusts and trust funds."
Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary Society, 375 Ill. 220, 233 (1940). Equity considers the general charitable purpose
of a settlor as the substance of the gift and the mode indicated in
the trust document for effectuating this purpose as a mere incident
of the gift. First National Bank of Chicago v. Elliott, 406 Ill. 44,
55-56 (1950); Missionary Society, 375 Ill.  at 233.
	Where a literal execution of a charity becomes impossible,
impracticable, or inexpedient, and the settlor has manifested a
general intent to create a charitable trust, a court, in the exercise of
its ordinary equity powers, will not allow the trust to fail. Rather,
the court will execute the trust cy pres, i.e., as near as the court can
according to the trust's original purpose. Missionary Society, 375 Ill.  at 233; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 338-39 (1908);
accord Restatement (Second) of Trusts §399 (1959). When a
definite charitable trust is created, the failure of the particular
mode in which it is to be effectuated does not destroy the charity;
equity will substitute some other mode so that the substantial
intent of the settlor shall not depend on the insufficiency of the
formal expression of the trust document. Webb v. Webb, 340 Ill. 407, 420 (1930). Accordingly, a court of equity has the power to
substitute one trustee in place of another for the purpose of
administering a charitable trust. See Mason v. Bloomington
Library Ass'n, 237 Ill. 442, 449 (1908).
	These principles make clear, as ATC Inc. concedes, that this
court's exercise of its equitable power in this regard is linked to
Roosevelt's trust intent. However, as we previously discussed, the
trial court found that Roosevelt did not intend to create a trust of
any sort, which finding is supported by ample evidence. Since
Roosevelt did not intend, by the 1960 resolution, to create a
charitable trust, then there is no charitable trust intent for this court
to effectuate.
	As an alternative request for cross-relief, plaintiffs ask that we
reassign this case to a new trial judge on remand. Supreme Court
Rule 366(a)(5) permits a reviewing court, in its discretion, to make
any order or grant any relief that a particular case may require. 155
Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5). This authority includes the power to reassign
a matter to a new judge on remand. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Smoller, 218 Ill. App. 3d 340, 346-47 (1991); People v. Austin,
116 Ill. App. 3d 95, 101 (1983). Plaintiffs refer to four
circumstances that allegedly call into question the trial court's
impartiality. The trial court allegedly ignored principles of trust
law and excluded relevant evidence. Also, in the course of ruling
on Roosevelt's counterclaim, specifically the breach of fiduciary
count against Eychaner and Weiss, the trial court commented on
plaintiff Eychaner's motive for bringing this litigation. The court
found that Eychaner was liable and that Weiss was not. Lastly,
subsequent to its decision, the trial court held the Council's
executive director in direct criminal contempt, a ruling which the
appellate court reversed.
	We decline plaintiffs' request. A trial judge is presumed to be
impartial, and the burden of overcoming this presumption rests on
the party making the charge of prejudice. See In re Marriage of
Petersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d 325, 339 (2001); In re Marriage of
Hartian, 222 Ill. App. 3d 566, 569 (1991). "To conclude that a
judge is disqualified because of prejudice is not, of course, a
judgment to be lightly made." People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 179
(1979).
	A judge's rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis
for a claim of judicial bias or partiality. Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474, 490-91, 114 S. Ct. 1147,
1157 (1994). Allegedly erroneous findings and rulings by the trial
court are insufficient reasons to believe that the court has a
personal bias for or against a litigant. Hartian, 222 Ill. App. 3d at
569. Also, it is clear that ordinarily the fact that a judge has ruled
adversely to a party in either a civil or criminal case does not
disqualify that judge from sitting in subsequent civil or criminal
cases in which the same person is a party. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d  at 178;
see Nehring v. First National Bank in DeKalb, 143 Ill. App. 3d
791, 805 (1986).
	Rather, the party making the charge of prejudice must present
evidence of prejudicial trial conduct and evidence of the judge's
personal bias. Petersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 339; Hartian, 222 Ill.
App. 3d at 569. This personal bias can stem from an extrajudicial
source. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778, 793, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1710 (1966); Petersen, 319 Ill.
App. 3d at 339; Hartian, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 569.
	In this case, plaintiffs do not offer any evidence of judicial
bias or prejudice stemming from an outside source. Rather,
plaintiffs base their claim on the trial itself. Judicial bias or
prejudice can also stem from the facts adduced or the events
occurring at trial. Liteky, 510 U.S.  at 551, 127 L. Ed. 2d  at 488,
114 S. Ct.  at 1155. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court
has explained:
		"[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a
basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during
the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or
even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,
ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.
They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from
an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal
such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make
fair judgment impossible." (Emphases in original.) Liteky,
510 U.S.  at 555, 127 L. Ed. 2d  at 491, 114 S. Ct.  at 1157.
Accord Petersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 340; People v. Damnitz, 269
Ill. App. 3d 51, 57 (1994).
	The four circumstances to which plaintiffs refer as evidence
of judicial bias do not display such deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Rather, the
circumstances arise in the context of allegedly erroneous findings
and rulings, which are insufficient to show judicial bias against
plaintiffs. Further, the trial court expressly based its remarks
regarding Eychaner on his credibility as a witness, "which is
clearly within the purview of the trial court." McCormick v.
McCormick, 180 Ill. App. 3d 184, 194 (1988). Accordingly, we
decline plaintiffs' request to reassign this case to another judge on
remand.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court,
which reversed the order of the circuit court of Cook County, is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.



Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed;
cause remanded.



	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
1.      1We note that plaintiffs, as appellees in this court, claim that this
court lacks jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiffs contend that defendants
failed to perfect their appeal to this court in compliance with Supreme
Court Rule 315(a). The arguments raised in connection with this issue
were the very same arguments presented to us in plaintiffs' motion to
strike defendants' petition for leave to appeal. We denied that motion,
and we see no reason to reconsider our decision.