Case Title: State v. Morris

Citation: 2012-Ohio-2407

Docket Number: 2010-1842

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Morris, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2407.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2407 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MORRIS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Morris, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2407.] 
Evidence—Standard of review—Decisions on admissibility under Evid.R. 404 
reviewable for abuse of discretion only. 
(No. 2010-1842—Submitted November 1, 2011—Decided June 5, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 09CA0022-M,  
2010-Ohio-4282. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of other-acts evidence under 
Evid.R. 404(B) are evidentiary determinations that rest within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  Appeals of such decisions are considered by 
an appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine the proper standard of review that an 
appellate court is to apply when reviewing an assignment of error claiming that 
the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of 
a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, in 
violation of Evid.R. 404(B).  We conclude that appellate review of a trial court’s 
decision regarding the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under 
Evid.R. 404(B) is conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court for 
further proceedings. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee-defendant, Carl Morris, was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of rape involving a minor.  Appellee-defendant appealed, and one of his 
assigned errors asserted that the trial court had improperly allowed the state to 
introduce evidence of his “other * * * acts to show proof of [his] character in 
violation of Rules of Evidence 404(B) and 403.”  Appellee-defendant pointed to 
several instances of other-acts testimony that the trial court admitted over 
appellee-defendant’s objection. 
{¶ 3} The first portion of challenged testimony was the state’s general 
questioning of the victim’s mother about her sexual relationship with appellee-
defendant.  Over a continuing objection to the line of inquiry, the trial court 
allowed the testimony because “it could be relevant.” 
{¶ 4} The second portion of challenged testimony involved more specific 
statements sought by the state from the victim’s mother about her relationship 
with appellee-defendant.  In these statements, the victim’s mother described 
appellee-defendant’s reaction when she declined his daily sexual advances: he 
was verbally and mentally abusive, and he even kicked the dog.  The state argued 
that these statements showed appellee-defendant’s modus operandi, knowledge, 
January Term, 2012 
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and a plan for subsequent sexual gratification within the meaning of Evid.R. 
404(B).  When the mother further testified that appellee-defendant would 
ejaculate into towels, the state argued that this statement was consistent with the 
victim’s testimony about how the abuse occurred and showed appellee-
defendant’s “modus operandi, knowledge and other acts of evidence” as permitted 
by Evid.R. 404(B).  The court overruled appellee-defendant’s objections to these 
statements. 
{¶ 5} In the final portion of challenged testimony, the state presented 
testimony from the adult sister of the victim. The sister testified about an incident 
in which appellee-defendant had grabbed her and made what she interpreted as a 
sexual proposition.  She also stated that when her mother learned of appellee-
defendant’s conduct, her mother kicked him out of the house for the night.  
Appellee-defendant’s counsel objected to this testimony on the basis that it was 
prejudicial under Evid.R. 403, and a sidebar was held.  The court concluded that 
the conduct could be interpreted by the jury as a sexual advance and that the 
described action was similar enough to rape of a minor that it was admissible 
under Evid.R. 404(B) to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, or absence.”  In response to the concern expressed by appellee-
defendant’s counsel, the court acknowledged a continuing objection several times 
during the trial, and the court ensured that appellee-defendant’s counsel was 
satisfied with the court’s acknowledgment of that continuing objection. 
{¶ 6} At the end of the trial, the court gave a limiting instruction to the 
jury.  The judge cautioned that evidence of other acts was received for the limited 
purpose of deciding whether that evidence proved the absence of mistake or 
accident, or the appellee-defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent or purpose, 
preparation, or plan to commit the offense charged, or knowledge of 
circumstances surrounding the offense charged. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 7} In his merit brief to the appellate court, appellee-defendant 
contended that the trial court abused its discretion and acted unreasonably when it 
admitted the state’s other-acts testimony because none of the incidents described 
in that testimony had the tendency to prove any of the “enumerated exceptions” 
admissible for other purposes under Evid.R. 404(B), involved any element of 
proof required for the commission of the indicted crimes, or had any relevance to 
the charges on which he was eventually convicted.  Appellee-defendant further 
argued that the evidence of his guilt was not overwhelming and that admission of 
the other-acts testimony was not harmless. 
{¶ 8} In its merit brief to the appellate court, the state asserted that the 
testimony was properly admitted because the challenged testimony did not show 
appellee-defendant’s character “in order to show action in conformity therewith,” 
Evid.R. 404(B), but instead showed appellee-defendant’s common scheme, 
motive, and plan, and “idiosyncratic behavior that shows a common plan and 
modus operandi” with respect to his commission of the charged crimes. 
{¶ 9} A divided appellate court concluded that the trial court improperly 
admitted other-acts testimony, that the trial court’s error was not harmless, and 
that the error materially prejudiced appellee-defendant.  The court sustained in 
part appellee-defendant’s assigned error pertaining to the state-proffered other-
acts testimony.  Finding that its resolution of the foregoing was dispositive of the 
appeal, the court declared the remaining assignments of error moot, vacated the 
conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.  2010-Ohio-4282. 
{¶ 10} Thereafter, the state sought certification of an interdistrict conflict 
from the appellate court, which the court denied.  2010-Ohio-5682.  The state 
further requested en banc reconsideration of the matter, but the appellate court 
also denied that request in a divided en banc decision.  2010-Ohio-5973.  We 
initially declined the state’s discretionary appeal but accepted it on 
January Term, 2012 
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reconsideration. 127 Ohio St.3d 1533, 2011-Ohio-376, 940 N.E.2d 986; 128 Ohio 
St.3d 1448, 2011-Ohio-1618, 944 N.E.2d 697. 
II.  Analysis: Standard of review for appeals in which a trial court’s  
decision to admit other-acts evidence is challenged 
{¶ 11} The general principle that guides admission of evidence is that 
“[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible * * * .”  Evid.R. 402.  Evid.R. 403 provides 
exceptions to this general principle and provides circumstances for the exclusion 
of relevant evidence. 
{¶ 12} Another exception to the principle that all relevant evidence is 
admissible is Evid.R. 404(B), which provides: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.” 
{¶ 13} Evid.R. 404 codifies the common law with respect to evidence of 
other acts of wrongdoing.  State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 634 N.E.2d 616 
(1994).  The rule contemplates acts that may or may not be similar to the crime at 
issue.  State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 282, 533 N.E.2d 682 (1988).  If the 
other act is offered for some relevant purpose other than to show character and 
propensity to commit crime, such as one of the purposes in the listing, the other 
act may be admissible.  Id.  Another consideration permitting the admission of 
certain other-acts evidence is whether the other acts “form part of the immediate 
background of the alleged act which forms the foundation of the crime charged in 
the indictment” and are “inextricably related” to the crime.  State v. Curry, 43 
Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).  See also Broom at 282. 
{¶ 14} “The admission of such [other-acts] evidence lies within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary 
decisions in the absence of an abuse of discretion that created material prejudice.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 66.  See 
also State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of 
the syllabus (“The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court”).  “Abuse of discretion” has been described as 
including a ruling that lacks a “sound reasoning process.”  AAAA Ents., Inc. v. 
River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 
553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).  A review under the abuse-of-discretion standard is a 
deferential review.  It is not sufficient for an appellate court to determine that a 
trial court abused its discretion simply because the appellate court might not have 
reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less persuaded by the trial court’s 
reasoning process than by the countervailing arguments.  Id. 
{¶ 15} In its review of this matter, the appellate court concluded that two 
portions of the state’s other-acts testimony did not meet the substantive, legal 
requirements for admissibility under Evid.R. 404(B).1  The court said that the 
wife’s testimony that appellee-defendant would abuse the dog out of sexual 
frustration should have been excluded because it had no relevance to any fact at 
issue in the case and was intended only to show appellee-defendant’s character as 
mean and aggressive.  2010-Ohio-4282 at ¶ 25.  The court also said that the 
sexual-proposition testimony from the victim’s sister should have been excluded 
because the challenged testimony did not describe how the other act was a part of 
a single criminal transaction involving the criminal charges but instead described 
a wholly unrelated incident.  Id. at ¶ 28.  In making these decisions, the appellate 
court rejected the state’s argument, and the trial court’s apparent conclusion, that 
                                                 
1.  The court concluded that the mother’s remaining testimony about her relationship with 
appellee-defendant and how he would ejaculate into towels was properly admitted over appellee-
defendant’s objection because it was not objectionable character evidence.  Rather, the court 
concluded that the testimony was relevant evidence under Evid.R. 401 and 402 and not unfairly 
prejudicial or otherwise subject to exclusion.   
January Term, 2012 
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the proffered other-acts testimony demonstrated appellee-defendant’s common 
scheme, motive, and plan with respect to his commission of the charged crimes. 
{¶ 16} In reaching its conclusions, the appellate court reviewed appellee-
defendant’s assigned error under a de novo standard of review.  De novo review is 
appropriate “where a trial court’s order is based on an erroneous standard or a 
misconstruction of the law * * *.  In determining a pure question of law, an 
appellate court may properly substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
* * *.”  Castlebrook, Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd. Partnership, 78 Ohio App.3d 
340, 346, 604 N.E.2d 808 (1992).  See also In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 
2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 47 (questions of law are reviewed de novo).  
In this case, the appellate court determined that the issue presented by appellee-
defendant was whether, as a matter of substantive law, the state’s other-acts 
testimony “has a tendency to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident” under Evid.R. 404(B); 
i.e., did the other-acts testimony show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident as a legal 
determination?  2010-Ohio-4282 at ¶ 13.  Accordingly, the appellate court 
declined to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. 
{¶ 17} As support for its decision to apply a de novo standard of review, 
the appellate court relied on Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 
181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13.  In Schlotterer, we held that 
although trial court decisions pertaining to discovery orders are generally 
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, whether the information sought is 
confidential and privileged from disclosure under the physician-patient privilege 
of R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) is a question of substantive law that is reviewed de novo.  
Id. at ¶ 13-14.  This is because medical records are generally privileged from 
disclosure, and waiver of the physician-patient privilege specifically requires a 
patient’s express consent.  Id. at ¶ 14-16 (referring to state and federal laws that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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recognize and protect confidentiality in personal medical information, including 
R.C. 2317.02(B)(1), the physician-patient privilege, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(a), the 
public-records exemption of medical records, and 29 U.S.C. 1181 et seq., the 
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996). 
{¶ 18} De novo review, however, does not apply to the situation presented 
in the case now before us.  Here, the substantive law under the rule is clear: 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, although not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, may be 
admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  The 
language of Evid.R. 404(B) indicates that the list of purposes for which evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted is not an exhaustive listing.  
Nonetheless, the appellate court appears to have mistakenly treated this list as an 
exclusive list.  2010-Ohio-4282 at ¶ 13, 25, 32. 
{¶ 19} Moreover, the issue here is the application of that rule to specific 
evidence that is introduced or sought to be introduced.  This is a different issue.  
Whether specific evidence will be admitted is a matter left to the considerable, but 
not unlimited, discretion of the trial court.  The use of the words “may” and “such 
as” in the rule suggests that the trial judge has considerable discretion to 
determine whether the specific evidence is of such a nature that it falls within one 
of the other purposes for which the evidence may be admitted and, if it does, 
whether in fact it should be admitted, considering, among other things, the 
principles set out in Evid.R. 402 and 403.  It is well established that a trial court’s 
decision to admit evidence is an evidentiary determination within the broad 
discretion of the trial court and subject to review on an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.  E.g., Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, at 
¶ 66; Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 20} In appellee-defendant’s merit brief to the appellate court, the 
assigned error was that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion and committed 
reversible error when it permitted the introduction by the state of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts to show proof of appellant’s character in violation of Rules of 
Evidence 404(B) and 403.”  The question presented by appellee-defendant to the 
appellate court was a review of an evidentiary determination: Did the trial court 
erroneously admit the state’s proffered other-acts testimony?  Appellee-
defendant’s argument was not whether the state’s proffered other-acts testimony 
fit, as a matter of law, within an Evid.R. 404(B) enumerated category.  However, 
it is this issue that the appellate court attempted to resolve when it applied a de 
novo standard of review to this matter. 
{¶ 21} Nor have the parties presented for resolution a question of mixed 
law and fact, where a mixed de novo and abuse-of-discretion standard of review 
would be appropriate.  See, e.g., State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-
Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 (appellate review of a suppression motion); 
Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93, 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995) 
(appellate review of a jury instruction that contains an incorrect statement of the 
law). 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of 
other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) are evidentiary determinations that rest 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Appeals of such decisions are 
considered by an appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.  
To the extent that the appellate court reviewed de novo a trial court decision as to 
whether certain evidence was admissible, the appellate court erroneously departed 
from a well-established principle. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Having reviewed the arguments and the record in this case, we 
conclude that an appellate court is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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review when considering an assignment of error that claims that the trial court 
improperly admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in 
order to show action in conformity therewith, in violation of Evid.R. 404(B).  
This matter is remanded to the appellate court with instructions to apply an abuse-
of-discretion standard and, if appropriate, for consideration of appellee-
defendant’s remaining assigned errors, which the appellate court initially 
determined to be moot. 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew Kern, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
David C. Sheldon, for appellee. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew 
E. Meyer and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. 
 
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David E. 
Romaker Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
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