Case Title: In re Diel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-097


 In re Maria Diel, Kathleen Lafleur,          Supreme Court
 Michael McSweeney, Bernard Parrott,
 Christine Cushion, Cheryl Arbuckle,          On Appeal from
 Sandra Kirkpatrick and Jane Bingham          Human Services Board

                                              April Term, 1992



 John Wesley, Chair

 Thomas F. Garrett, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington, for plaintiffs-
   appellants

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Donelle Smith Staley,
   Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendant-appellee



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
   Specially Assigned


      GIBSON, J.   Petitioners appeal from a decision of the Human Services
 Board denying them recalculated welfare benefits for four months in 1989.
 They argue that the rescission by the Department of Social Welfare of a
 policy change that made them eligible for higher monthly payments under the
 Aid to Needy Families with Children (ANFC) program was void because it
 violated due process and the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  We
 reverse.
      On January 30, 1989, the Department instructed its district offices not
 to consider federal fuel and utility subsidies when calculating the income
 of ANFC recipients.  This instruction reversed prior policy, under which the
 subsidies were considered income.  It raised the prospect of higher payments
 for approximately 750 ANFC recipients who received the subsidies, because
 ANFC payments increase as income decreases.  See 33 V.S.A. { 1103(a); Code
 of Vermont Rules 13170003, at 83-104.  The Department, however, did not have
 sufficient funds to pay higher benefits immediately to all ANFC recipients
 affected by the change, so it instructed the district offices to implement
 the change gradually as they reviewed recipients' files.  Of the seven
 petitioners herein, only petitioner McSweeney received a higher ANFC payment
 under the change.
      As the new policy became effective, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc. threatened
 to sue the Department to force it to implement the change immediately for
 all recipients, arguing that the "phase-in" violated equal protection.
 Seeking to avoid litigation, the Department on February 23, 1989 instructed
 the district offices to revert to the original policy of considering the
 fuel and utility subsidies as income.  On July 1, 1989, the Department
 reinstated the change for all recipients.  At no time did the Department
 provide opportunity for public input.
      After the Department rescinded the change in February, petitioners
 sought "fair hearings" under 3 V.S.A. { 3091.  They conceded that whether to
 count fuel and utility subsidies as income was within the discretion of the
 Department.  They argued, however, that the initial policy change should
 have been implemented simultaneously for all recipients, and that rescission
 of the change without notice or hearing violated due process and the APA, 3
 V.S.A. {{ 801-849.  They sought recalculation of the benefits for the period
 between February and July, with utility subsidies excluded from income.  The
 Board agreed that the phase-in was illegal, and ordered that petitioners be
 awarded the benefit of the change for the month of February.  The Board
 also ruled, however, that petitioners had not established a property right
 sufficient to trigger due process protection and that the APA should not be
 construed to invalidate the Department's rescission of its policy change.
 "An administrative agency's conclusions of law will be upheld on appeal if
 they are fairly and reasonably supported by findings of fact, and absent a
 clear showing to the contrary, any decisions it makes within its expertise
 are presumed correct, valid and reasonable."  Caledonian Record Publishing
 Co. v. Department of Employment and Training, 151 Vt. 256, 260, 559 A.2d 678, 681 (1989) (citations omitted).  In the present case, the questions
 before the Human Services Board concerned the requirements of due process
 and the APA, areas of the law that are not directly within its expertise in
 welfare administration.  Hence, we look to see if the Board's conclusions
 are fairly and reasonably supported by findings of fact, without presuming
 that they are correct.  See id.  The Board's findings are consistent with
 the undisputed facts.  Because they do not support the Board's conclusions
 of law, however, we reverse.
                                     I.
      The Department first argues that petitioners lack standing to challenge
 its policy change, and that this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear
 their appeal.  The Department claims that "[p]etitioners merely hoped to
 benefit in the future" under the policy of excluding utility subsidies from
 income, and that the disappointment of such hopes is not a justiciable legal
 injury.  We disagree.
      The Department cites Sierra Club v. Morton,