Case Title: Seafirst Mortg. Corp. v. Specialty Concrete Const.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Seafirst Mortg. Corp. v. Specialty Concrete Const.1985 WY 188708 P.2d 1245Case Number: 85-104Decided: 11/18/1985SEAFIRST MORTGAGE CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

SPECIALTY CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, A PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
SEAFIRST MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

SPECIALTY CONCRETE 
CONSTRUCTION, A PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 
 
Barry G. 
Williams, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, signed the briefs 
and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellant.

Peggy Taylor 
Pfau, Daly, Maycock, Anderson and Taylor, Gillette, signed the brief on behalf 
of appellee. Appellee submitted the case upon its brief.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee, plaintiff 
below, performed work on property located in Campbell County, Wyoming under contract with Earl D. Manous and 
Shirley J. Manous. The work was completed on October 10, 1983. Having not 
received payment for said work, appellee filed a mechanic's and materialman's 
lien on January 31, 1984. A civil action was commenced and the lien was reduced 
to judgment on July 11, 1984.

[¶2.]     Appellant, Seafirst 
Mortgage Corporation, the successor in interest to a mortgage dated November 30, 
1983 on the same property, was never given notice of the lien, nor was it joined 
in the civil action. Prior to a sale of the property by appellee to enforce the 
judgment, appellee brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that 
appellee's mechanic's lien was prior to the interest of appellant, and seeking 
to enforce said lien by foreclosure free and clear of any interest of appellant. 
Appellee moved for summary judgment and appellant filed a motion to dismiss; the 
case was argued to the district court as a matter of law.

[¶3.]     The district court, in 
granting summary judgment to appellee, found that appellee's lien has priority 
over appellant's mortgage as a matter of law, and that appellant "should not be 
able to avail itself of the statute of limitations defense at this time, as it 
was not available to the original defendants, Manous' in the foregoing action." 
The court also held that appellee "shall be able to foreclose its lien, free and 
clear on any interest of Seafirst."

[¶4.]     Appellant words the 
issues on appeal:

"A. WHETHER OR NOT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE APPELLEE'S ACTION IN THE LOWER COURT 
WAS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RELATING TO MECHANIC'S AND 
MATERIALMAN'S LIENS AND SPECIFICALLY THE FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT COULD NOT 
AVAIL ITSELF OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS IT WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE OWNERS 
OF THE PROPERTY IN A PREVIOUS ACTION?

"B. WHETHER OR NOT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPELLEE COULD FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S 
LIEN FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY INTEREST OF THE MORTGAGE OF THE 
APPELLANT?"

[¶5.]     We 
reverse.

[¶6.]     Section 29-2-109, W.S. 
1977,1 provides for a statute of 
limitations pertinent to mechanic's and materialman's liens. All such actions 
must be commenced within 180 days after filing of the lien statement. It is 
undisputed in this case that a suit was commenced within 180 days against the 
owners of the property, but not against the mortgage interest holder, i.e., 
appellant.

[¶7.]     The general rule is 
that failure to join a mortgage interest holder in a lien foreclosure action is 
not fatal to such action, but that if not joined, the mortgage interest holder's 
interests are not affected by such action.

"In the absence of a 
statute declaring otherwise, mortgagees, holders of deeds of trust, and other 
encumbrancers, whether prior or subsequent to the mechanic's lien, are proper, 
but not necessary, parties to the action to enforce or foreclose such lien. The 
plaintiff's failure to join such parties is not fatal to his action, but the 
result is that the rights of such persons acquired prior to the commencement of 
the foreclosure suit are not affected by the proceedings. * * *" 53 Am.Jur.2d 
Mechanics' Liens, § 364, p. 889.

[¶8.]     In this case, the trial 
court held that the statute of limitations was not available to appellant, the 
mortgage interest holder, inasmuch as it was not available to the original 
defendants. We fail to see the relevancy of the availability or nonavailability 
to the original defendants. The statute clearly states that no lien shall 
continue to exist except by virtue of the provisions of this chapter for more 
than 180 days after the lien is filed, absent an action to foreclose. No action 
was brought within 180 days to foreclose the interest of appellant, and thus the 
lien cannot affect appellant's interest.

[¶9.]     Although Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 
(1936), involved a lien action against property held by tenants by the 
entireties, the language is pertinent to this case. We there said, quoting from 
Hiller v. Schulte, 184 Mo. App. 42, 
167 S.W. 461, 462:

"`* * * And it is well 
settled that, where parties are thus brought in by an amendment, the suit as to 
them is begun at the time of such amendment making them parties. The amended 
petition as to them is the filing of a new suit. And as an action to enforce a 
mechanic's lien must be brought within 90 days after the filing of the lien, 
after the lapse of that time new parties cannot be brought in by amendment and 
be thus affected by the proceeding' (citing many cases and authorities)." 54 P.2d  at 822-823.

And quoting from 
Redlon v. Badger Lumber Co., 194 Mo. 
App. 650, 189 S.W. 589, 590, we there said:

"`Without doubt, it is 
incumbent upon every lien claimant, suing to establish a mechanic's lien, to 
make the mortgagee a party to the suit if the claimant desires to bind the 
interest of the mortgagee. Aside from any statute, the ordinary principles of 
law would seem to require this. * * * There would seem, then, to be no question 
but that, if the lien claimant desires to bind the interest of the mortgagee, 
the latter must be made a party within the 90 days and before judgment is 
obtained. * * *'" 54 P.2d  at 823.

We there also 
quoted from 40 C.J. 394:

"`Where the owner or an 
encumbrancer or other person acquiring an interest in the property which cannot 
be affected by the foreclosure proceeding in his absence from the record is 
originally omitted and thereafter brought in by amendment, the statutory bar 
will operate in his favor if the period expired before the date of the amendment 
because as to him the suit is commenced at the date of the amendment making him 
a party.'" 54 P.2d  at 823.

[¶10.]  Because of our holding that appellee's 
lien is not prior to and has no effect on appellant's mortgage interest, we need 
not address appellant's second issue; clearly appellee cannot foreclose its 
interest free and clear of appellant's interest.

[¶11.]  Reversed.

1 Section 29-2-109, 
provides:

"All actions to 
foreclose or enforce a lien under this chapter shall be commenced within one 
hundred eighty (180) days after the filing of the lien statement. No lien shall 
continue to exist except by virtue of the provisions of this chapter for more 
than one hundred eighty (180) days after the lien is filed unless an action to 
foreclose the lien is instituted."