Case Title: Donovan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals

Citation: 

Docket Number: 951196

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Present: All the Justices 
 
EDWARD DONOVAN, ET AL. 
 
v.   Record No. 951196 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                       March 1, 1996 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 
ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
 
Joshua L. Robinson, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the trial court 
properly upheld a decision by the board of zoning appeals 
affirming the zoning administrator's interpretation and 
application of a zoning ordinance. 
 
Rockingham County enacted its first zoning ordinance in 
1969.  At that time, property currently owned by appellants, 
Edward, Jean, Brownie, and David Donovan, Jr., (collectively, 
the Donovans) and used by them as an automobile graveyard, was 
zoned A-1, agricultural.  Automobile graveyards were not a 
permitted use in an A-1 district; however, the 1969 ordinance 
allowed the continuation of nonconforming uses which were in 
existence on the effective date of the ordinance.  The use of 
the Donovans' parcel as an automobile graveyard has continued 
without interruption. 
 
In 1994, the zoning administrator of Rockingham County 
notified the Donovans by letter that they were in violation of 
the Rockingham County Code (hereafter, County Code).  According 
to the zoning administrator, the 1969 ordinance required the 
Donovans to file for an "automobile graveyard permit with a 
 
 
 
 
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screening plan" by 1972 and failure to file for the permit 
terminated the right to continue the nonconforming use granted 
by the 1969 ordinance.  Because the Donovans had not filed for 
such a permit, Rockingham County did not consider the Donovans' 
present operation to be valid nonconforming use.  The zoning 
administrator informed the Donovans that they could validate 
the operation of their automobile graveyard by obtaining a 
special use permit and an automobile graveyard permit with a 
screening plan.
1    
 
The Donovans appealed the decision of the zoning 
administrator to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).
2  Following 
a hearing, the BZA upheld the zoning administrator's decision 
and refused to consider whether that interpretation of the 
ordinance resulted in a conflict between the ordinance and Code 
§ 15.1-492.  The Donovans filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the circuit court.  The Donovans argued that the 
zoning administrator and the BZA incorrectly applied and 
interpreted the 1969 ordinance, and failed to consider the 
Donovan's contention that such an interpretation conflicted 
 
     
1The current zoning classification for the Donovans' 
property, A-2, permits the operation of an automobile graveyard 
with a special use permit.  County Code § 17-27.  Chapter 5 of 
the County Code, enacted in 1973 pursuant to Code § 15.1-28, 
regulates automobile graveyards and includes the current 
screening requirements.  County Code § 5-2. 
     
2The Donovans also filed a screening plan under County 
Code § 5-2, but the county has deferred action on the plan 
pending the outcome of this litigation. 
 
 
 
 
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with their vested rights established by the Virginia 
Constitution and Code § 15.1-492. 
 
The circuit court found that the 1969 ordinance as 
interpreted by the zoning administrator applied to the 
Donovans' property and dismissed the writ of certiorari.  In 
its order, the circuit court stated that the determination of 
whether a zoning ordinance conflicts with a statute is beyond 
the court's jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding because it 
involves the validity of the ordinance, and that the effect of 
the court's holding was "to affirm the decision of the Board of 
Zoning Appeals of Rockingham County."  We awarded the Donovans 
an appeal and, because we conclude that the zoning 
administrator's interpretation of the 1969 zoning ordinance was 
incorrect, we will reverse the order of the circuit court.  
 
The principles relevant to the construction of a zoning 
ordinance are well established.  The words of the ordinance are 
to be given their plain and natural meaning.  McClung v. County 
of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1959).  The 
purpose and intent of the ordinance should be considered but 
the ordinance should not be extended by interpretation or 
construction beyond its intended purpose.  Gough v. Shaner, 197 
Va. 572, 575, 90 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1955).  In reviewing a 
decision of the BZA, we give "great weight" to the 
interpretation of the ordinance by those officials charged with 
its administration, and we will reverse the decision only if it 
 
 
 
 
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is plainly wrong or based on erroneous legal principles.  Cook 
v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Falls Church, 244 Va. 
107, 111, 418 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992); Masterson v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals of the City of Virginia Beach, 233 Va. 37, 44, 
353 S.E.2d 727, 732-33 (1987). 
 
The county does not contest the Donovans' assertion that 
their operation of the automobile graveyard was a valid 
nonconforming use following the adoption of the 1969 zoning 
ordinance.  The county maintains, however, that the Donovans' 
automobile graveyard lost its status as a valid nonconforming 
use because they failed to screen the operation from public 
view by 1972.  Thus, at the time of the county's enforcement 
action, although the cross-references to sections dealing with 
automobile graveyards had been deleted in 1984, the Donovans' 
automobile graveyard no longer was "a lawful use of land" 
entitling them to continue the operation as a nonconforming use 
under the provisions of the current zoning ordinance, County 
Code § 17-161. 
 
The county's position is based on its application of the 
following portions of the 1969 ordinance: 
 
ARTICLE 8--NONCONFORMING USES 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
8-1-1. 
If at the time of enactment of 
this ordinance, any legal 
activity, except those dealt with 
in section 7-2-5, which is being 
pursued, or any lot or structure 
legally utilized in a manner or 
for a purpose which does not 
 
 
 
 
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conform to the provisions of this 
ordinance, such manner of use or 
purpose may be continued as 
herein provided . . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
ARTICLE 7--INDUSTRIAL, GENERAL, 
DISTRICT M-1 
 
. . . . 
 
 
7-2-5. 
Automobile graveyards and 
junkyards in existence at the 
time [of] the adoption of this 
ordinance are to be considered as 
nonconforming uses.  They may be 
allowed up to three (3) years 
after adoption of this ordinance 
in which to completely screen on 
any side open to view from a 
public road . . . .  
 
 
The county contends that even though Chapter 7 relates to 
M-1 districts, the reference in County Code § 8-1-1 to § 7-2-5 
extends the screening requirements of that section to all 
automobile graveyards existing in 1969.  Any other 
interpretation, the county asserts, would allow automobile 
graveyards in districts other than M-1 to remain unscreened, a 
condition inconsistent with the purpose of the ordinance. 
 
We agree with the county's assertion that one of the 
purposes of the 1969 zoning ordinance was to require screening 
of all automobile graveyards, and we will assume, without 
deciding, that County Code § 8-1-1 made the screening 
provisions of County Code § 7-2-5 applicable to all automobile 
graveyards existing on the effective date of the ordinance.  
Nevertheless, a provision requiring that a particular 
 
 
 
 
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nonconforming use be screened from public view is not the same 
as a provision invalidating the nonconforming use itself for 
failure to comply with the screening requirement. 
 
The ordinance identifies certain circumstances which 
result in the termination of a valid nonconforming use:  if the 
use is discontinued for more than two years after the enactment 
of the ordinance, it is deemed abandoned, County Code § 8-1-3; 
if the use is changed to a more limited use, the prior, more 
expansive use is lost, County Code § 8-1-4; and after two years 
advertising structures must be relocated to districts where 
they are permitted uses, County Code § 8-1-1.  The failure to 
screen an automobile graveyard is not identified as a 
circumstance which terminates the status of the use as a valid 
nonconforming use, nor is termination of such status listed as 
the penalty for violation of or failure to conform to the 
screening provisions contained in the 1969 zoning ordinance.  
 
The ordinance is silent as to any specific consequences of 
the failure to screen.  The absence of a specific consequence 
does not render the requirement meaningless, however.  County 
Code § 11-2 states that a violation of the ordinance is a 
misdemeanor which subjects the violator to a fine of up to $250 
for each day the ordinance is violated.  Furthermore, under the 
authority of Code §§ 15.1-491 and -499, the county could have 
enforced the screening requirement by seeking an injunction to 
prevent the Donovans from operating the automobile graveyard 
 
 
 
 
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until they complied with the screening requirement.  McNair v. 
Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 532, 533, 186 S.E.2d 45, 46 (1972).
3  
Enforcement of the screening requirement by injunction would be 
consistent with the purpose of screening all automobile 
graveyards from public view without terminating a valid 
nonconforming use arising under County Code § 8-1-1. 
 
Applying the principles applicable to the construction of 
zoning ordinances, we conclude that the interpretation of the 
1969 zoning ordinance by the zoning administrator as approved 
by the BZA was plainly wrong and based on erroneous principles 
of law.  Nothing in the ordinance provides that the failure to 
screen an automobile graveyard terminates a valid nonconforming 
use.  Therefore, the failure of the Donovans to screen their 
automobile graveyard within three years of the effective date 
of the 1969 ordinance did not terminate the status of their 
operation as a valid nonconforming use.
4
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the circuit 
court and enter final judgment in favor of the Donovans.  
                                                Reversed and
 
final judgment.
                     
     
3The zoning ordinance was amended in 1984 to specifically 
give the zoning administrator the authority to insure 
compliance with the chapter by instituting legal action 
including injunctions.  County Code § 17-200. 
     
4In light of this conclusion, we need not address the 
Donovans' other arguments.