Case Title: State v. Wooden

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92846

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC92846 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
MARK WOODEN,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Paula Bryant, Judge 
 
Opinion issued January 8, 2013 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
A jury found Mark Wooden guilty of two counts of harassment, one under 
§ 565.090.1(2) 1 and one under § 565.090.1(5), and one count of possession of marijuana.  
Wooden's harassment convictions stem from emails he sent to various St. Louis area 
public officials.  On appeal, Wooden argues that his harassment conviction under 
§ 565.090.1(2) is unconstitutional because it punishes him for exercising his right to free 
speech guaranteed under the First Amendment and Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 8.  In the 
alternative, Wooden argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction 
under that provision. Wooden argues that his harassment conviction under § 565.090.1(5) 
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2011, unless otherwise noted. 
 
constitutes plain error because this Court overturned that provision in State v. Vaughn, 
366 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. banc 2012). 
Wooden's emails contained personally offensive language and references to 
sawed-off shotguns, assassinations, and domestic terrorism and did not constitute 
protected speech.  This Court concludes that § 565.090.1(2) is constitutional as applied to 
Wooden and that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.  Because State 
v. Vaughn invalidated § 565.090.1(5) and the State concedes that manifest injustice will 
result if the conviction under that statute is not reversed, the judgment as to count II, as 
conceded, is set aside. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.     
Factual and Procedural History 
Between February 19, 2011, and February 24, 2011, Mark Wooden, a resident of 
the city of St. Louis, sent a number of emails to various St. Louis area public officials.  
The emails contained text, audio attachments, or both.  An alderwoman for the Sixth 
Ward of St. Louis was one of the recipients of these emails.  Wooden did not send any 
email to the alderwoman exclusively, and each email included as many as 40 recipients.  
The alderwoman received the emails at an address displayed on her official website.   
 
On February 19, 2011, the alderwoman received an email from Wooden with a 19 
minute long audio attachment.  The attachment specifically referenced the alderwoman 
and compared her to the biblical character Jezebel who, Wooden stated, abused her 
weaker subjects.  Wooden asserted that, like Jezebel, the alderwoman spent too much 
time caring for the powerful and rich in her community and did not visit or care for the 
poorer neighborhoods in the Sixth Ward.  Wooden repeatedly used the word "bitch" and 
referred to the alderwoman as a "bitch in the Sixth Ward."  In the audio attachment, 
Wooden made reference to dusting off a sawed-off shotgun and indicated that, at one 
point in life, he had personally sawed off the barrel of a shotgun and sanded down the 
edges.  Wooden stated he was going to make "a mess of everything with his sawed-off."  
Additionally, Wooden referred to himself as a domestic terrorist and referred to the John 
F. Kennedy assassination, the murder of a federal judge, and the shooting of a 
congresswoman, presumably the shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and 
murder of United States District Court Judge John Roll.  Wooden's tone throughout a 
majority of the recording was menacing and, at times, maniacal.    
 
The alderwoman received four emails between February 19 and February 21.  On 
February 21, after receiving the fourth email, she emailed Wooden and asked him to stop 
emailing her.  Between February 21 and February 24, Wooden sent three additional 
emails.  At some point, the alderwoman contacted the police because she felt threatened 
by the emails.  She also sought a restraining order because, as she testified at trial, she 
feared for her safety due to the threatening nature of the emails and the references to the 
sawed-off shotgun. 
 
Wooden was arrested February 24, 2011.  The State charged Wooden with one 
count of harassment under § 565.090.1(2) (count I), one count of harassment under 
§ 565.090.1(5) (count II), and one count of possession of marijuana (count III).  Wooden 
moved for dismissal of the harassment charges arguing that they violated his 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.  The circuit court overruled the motion.  The case proceeded to a jury trial, 
 
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and Wooden was found guilty of all three charges.  Wooden was sentenced to one day in 
jail for each count, to be served concurrently.  This case involves the validity of a state 
statute; therefore, this Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.       
Constitutionality of § 565.090.1(2) 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the circuit court's determination of the constitutional validity 
of a state statute de novo.  Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d at 517.  "Statutes are presumed 
constitutional and will be found unconstitutional only if they clearly contravene a 
constitutional provision."  Id.      
Analysis 
Wooden asserts that § 565.090.1(2) is unconstitutional as applied to him because 
his speech was protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 8. 2  Section 565.090.1(2) states: 
1. A person commits the crime of harassment if he or she: 
 
* * * 
 
(2) When communicating with another person, knowingly uses coarse 
language offensive to one of average sensibility and thereby puts such 
person in reasonable apprehension of offensive physical contact or harm[.]   
 
                                             
 
2 Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 8 provides: 
That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, no matter by what 
means communicated: that every person shall be free to say, write or publish, or 
otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all 
abuses of that liberty; and that in all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the 
truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in suits and prosecutions for libel the 
jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts. 
 
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Wooden asserts that his communications were meant as a commentary about the 
performance of his elected governmental representative and, therefore, constituted 
protected political speech.    
 
"[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."  Police 
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).  The ability to criticize the 
government and public officials are undeniably privileges that are afforded to all citizens 
under the First Amendment and Missouri's correlative provision, article I, section 8.  See 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964).  Significantly, "[t]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the 
States to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of 
speech."  Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d at 518 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 
(1973)).   
But the right to free speech "is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances."  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).  "There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."  Id. 
at 571-72.  Unprotected speech includes "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."  Id. at 572.  "It has been well observed 
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
 
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outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."  Id.; see also Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (indicating that the constitution does not protect obscenity, defamation, 
words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, words that impair some other 
constitutional right, speech that incites lawless action, and speech calculated or likely to 
bring about imminent harm the State has the substantive power to prevent).  "Resort to 
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or 
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise 
no question under that instrument."  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 
(1940).      
 
While Wooden's communications with the alderwoman involved criticism of her 
work as alderwoman, Wooden has not carried his burden of demonstrating that 
§ 565.090.1(2), as applied to him, clearly contravenes a constitutional provision.  In 
addition to the criticism of the alderwoman and other St. Louis area public officials, 
Wooden discussed using a sawed-off shotgun, domestic terrorism, and the assassination 
or murder of politicians.  He did so while likening the alderwoman to the biblical 
character, Jezebel, who was eaten by dogs as punishment for her abuse of power, and 
referring to the alderwoman as a "bitch in the Sixth Ward."  These communications are 
words that, taken together, "through their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace" and are not protected by the First Amendment or the 
Missouri Constitution.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.  
 
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Wooden urges this Court to follow the United States Supreme Court case of 
Cohen v. California.  Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket 
bearing the words "F_ _ _ the Draft."  403 U.S. at 16.  Cohen was convicted under a 
statute that prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb(ing) the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct . . . ."  Id.  The Supreme Court 
found the conviction was unconstitutional because it clearly rested on the offensiveness 
of the word used.  Id. at 18.  Wooden argues that his conviction, similar to Cohen, rests 
solely on the offensiveness of the word "bitch" used in his communications.   
 
Cohen is distinguishable from Wooden's case.  Wooden's argument that his 
conviction rests solely on the offensiveness of the language he used completely ignores 
his references to dusting off his shotgun, domestic terrorism, and the assassination of a 
number of politicians.  Unlike in Cohen, where the statute criminalized only "offensive 
conduct," here § 565.090.1(2) required the jury to find Wooden used "coarse language 
offensive to one of average sensibilities" and that such communication "put[] [the 
alderwoman] in reasonable apprehension of offensive physical contact or harm."  Speech 
that causes a fear of physical harm is not speech protected by either the United States or 
Missouri constitutions.  Rather, it falls into the category of words "[that] by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" and do not 
receive constitutional protection.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  The constitutions do not 
afford the luxury of allowing an individual to send threatening communications to 
politicians, pepper them with political speech, and then hide behind the individual rights 
he or she has maliciously abused.  While portions of Wooden's messages constituted 
 
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actual criticism of the alderwoman, there is nothing unconstitutional about punishing 
Wooden for those unprotected portions that placed the alderwoman in "reasonable 
apprehension of offensive physical contact or harm."  Because § 565.090.1(2) punished 
Wooden for his unprotected communications, it is not unconstitutional as applied.       
Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Conviction under § 565.090.1(2) 
Standard of Review 
When judging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate 
courts do not weigh the evidence but accept as true all evidence tending to prove guilt 
together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict and ignore all contrary 
evidence and inferences.  State v. Latall, 271 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo. banc 2008).  "In 
determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, this Court asks 
only whether there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably could 
have found the defendant guilty." Id.       
Analysis 
 
Section § 565.090.1(2) has three elements: 1) the defendant makes a 
communication with another person, 2) during that communication the defendant uses 
"coarse language offensive to one of average sensibility," and 3) "thereby puts such 
person in reasonable apprehension of offensive physical contact or harm."  Wooden 
admits that he made a communication, but he asserts that there was insufficient evidence 
for a juror to reasonably find the final two elements of the crime.   
 
Wooden argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he 
used coarse language offensive to one of average sensibility in his communications.  This 
 
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Court in State v. Koetting, 691 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. banc 1985), held that "[c]oarse 
language directed specifically to an average person is likely to be offensive."  Wooden 
claims that he never directed any coarse language at the alderwoman.  This contention is 
undercut by the audio attachment in which Wooden called the alderwoman the "bitch in 
the Sixth Ward," made reference to making a mess of everything with his sawed-off 
shotgun, and discussed John F. Kennedy getting his "cherry popped."  Moreover, 
Wooden directed these remarks at the alderwoman merely by sending her the email 
containing the attachment.  Taken together, there was sufficient evidence from which a 
juror could reasonably find that Wooden used "coarse language offensive to one of 
average sensibility." 
 
Wooden also argues that there was insufficient evidence to find that the 
alderwoman's fear of harm or physical contact was reasonable.  Wooden argues that the 
fear was unwarranted because he did not make any specific threats of harm and his 
statements were "metaphoric."  As has been noted repeatedly, Wooden singled out the 
alderwoman in his audio attachment, he discussed the assassination of politicians, 
referred to himself as a domestic terrorist, and stated he would make a mess of things 
with his shotgun.  Wooden's claims that the statements were metaphoric is irrelevant.  
There was no way for the alderwoman, or a reasonable juror, to know Wooden's 
subjective intent simply by listening to the audio attachments or reading the email.  The 
lack of specific threats is also unpersuasive.  Section 565.090.1(2) does not require 
specific threats against a person, only a reasonable apprehension of harm.  Nothing in this 
Court's precedent or the plain meaning of the statute indicates that the only way a person 
 
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can be put in reasonable apprehension of harm is through specific threats.  Reviewing all 
the evidence on the record, there was sufficient evidence from which a juror could 
reasonably find that the alderwoman was placed in reasonable apprehension of offensive 
physical contact or harm by the coarse language used by Wooden.     
Conviction Under § 565.090.1(5) 
Wooden also challenges his conviction under count II for violation of 
§ 565.090.1(5).  Wooden argues that he has suffered a manifest injustice because this 
Court in State v. Vaughn ruled that § 565.090.1(5) was unconstitutionally overbroad.  The 
State concedes that allowing Wooden's conviction for count II to stand would constitute a 
manifest injustice.  The judgment as to count II is reversed.    
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment as to count II is reversed.  In all other 
respects, the judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge,  
Fischer, Stith and Draper, JJ., concur.  
Wilson, J., not participating.