Case Title: Townes v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 040979

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
LORENZO TOWNES 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 040979 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
March 3, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA*
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 
J. Samuel Johnston, Judge 
 
Pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.6(A), the Commonwealth 
successfully petitioned the Circuit Court of Campbell County 
(trial court) to civilly commit Lorenzo Townes as a sexually 
violent predator.  In this appeal, the dispositive issue we 
consider is whether Townes was subject to the statutory scheme 
for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 18, 1973, Townes was convicted in the Circuit 
Court of Campbell County of statutory rape in violation of 
former Code § 18.1-44 and was sentenced to eighteen years’ 
imprisonment.  A conviction under former Code § 18.1-44 is 
                     
* In the trial court this case was styled “Jerry W. Kilgore, 
Attorney General of Virginia, ex rel. Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. Lorenzo Townes.”  While Code § 37.1-70.6 directs the Attorney 
General to initiate the proceedings for civil commitment of an 
alleged sexually violent predator, Code § 37.1-70.16 makes clear 
that in doing so the Attorney General acts as counsel for the 
Commonwealth in such proceedings.  Thus, the Commonwealth is not 
a relator with only a beneficial interest in the action but is 
the real party in interest.  Accordingly, we have amended the 
name of this case to reflect the proper style. 
 
defined as a predicate “sexually violent offense” for the 
determination of a person as a “sexually violent predator.”  
Code § 37.1-70.1.  Townes completed serving his sentence for 
this offense on January 22, 1991.  However, as the result of 
convictions for other offenses, none of which were sexually 
violent offenses, committed by Townes while he was in prison, 
Townes remained continuously in prison until April 2, 2002, when 
he was granted parole.  Townes violated his parole almost 
immediately and was returned to prison on April 15, 2002 to 
complete his remaining sentence. 
On April 2, 2003, the Director of the Virginia Department 
of Corrections notified the Commitment Review Committee that 
Townes, who was scheduled to be released from prison on August 
15, 2003, was subject to review for civil commitment by the 
Commitment Review Committee because he had committed a sexually 
violent offense and had been identified through testing as being 
likely to re-offend.  Code § 37.1-70.4.  Following an 
examination of Townes by Dr. Stephen M. Herrick, a licensed 
clinical psychologist and certified sexual offender treatment 
provider, as required by Code § 37.1-70.5(B), the Commitment 
Review Committee completed its assessment of Townes and on May 
21, 2003 forwarded to the Attorney General a recommendation that 
Townes be committed as a sexually violent predator. 
2 
On June 25, 2003, the Commonwealth filed in the trial court 
a petition for the civil commitment of Townes.  By order entered 
that same day, counsel was appointed for Townes as required by 
Code § 37.1-70.2.  The trial court subsequently entered an order 
for the appointment of Dr. Evan Nelson, a clinical psychologist, 
as a mental health expert to aid in Townes’ defense. 
On July 18, 2003, the trial court conducted a probable 
cause hearing as required by Code § 37.1-70.7.  After hearing 
testimony from Dr. Herrick, the trial court determined that 
there was probable cause to believe that Townes is a sexually 
violent predator and ordered that Townes remain in custody until 
a full hearing on the Commonwealth’s petition could be 
conducted. 
On September 19, 2003, Townes filed several motions to 
dismiss the Commonwealth’s petition.  Townes contended in one of 
the motions that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he 
had completed his sentence for the 1973 rape conviction and, 
thus, was not incarcerated for a predicate sexually violent 
offense at the time the Commonwealth’s petition was filed.1  The 
                     
1 Townes also challenged the validity of the 1973 rape 
conviction because Townes was a juvenile at the time of the 
offense and allegedly was not afforded adequate due process when 
he was transferred from the juvenile court to the circuit court 
for trial as an adult.  Although Townes reasserts this argument 
on appeal, it is not germane to our resolution of the 
dispositive issue and, accordingly, we will not address it.  We 
note, however, that in 2003 the legislature amended Code § 37.1-
3 
trial court subsequently ruled that although Townes had 
completed his sentence for the 1973 rape conviction, he was 
subject to commitment as a sexually violent predator because he 
remained incarcerated on other offenses. 
During the trial on the commitment petition, the 
Commonwealth presented evidence from Dr. Herrick, a Department 
of Corrections employee, two probation and parole officers, and 
the police officer who had arrested Townes on the 1973 rape 
charge.  Townes presented evidence from Dr. Nelson and Townes’ 
aunt and brother.  Because our resolution of this appeal does 
not require an examination of the evidence presented by these 
witnesses, we need not recount the substance of their testimony. 
Although the two expert witnesses differed in their 
opinions, the trial court determined that Townes is a sexually 
violent predator.  The trial court specifically found that the 
evidence established that Townes suffers from an antisocial 
personality disorder that makes it difficult for him to control 
his predatory behavior, and which makes it likely that he will 
engage in sexually violent acts in the future.  The trial court 
further determined that Townes was in need of in-patient 
                                                                  
70.2 to include the provision that “[i]n no event shall a 
prisoner or defendant be permitted, as a part of any proceedings 
under this article, to raise challenges to the validity of his 
prior criminal sentences or institutional convictions.”  Acts 
2003, chs. 989 and 1018. 
 
4 
treatment and that there was no suitable less restrictive 
alternative to in-patient treatment.  Accordingly, in an order 
dated February 9, 2004, the trial court, pursuant to Code 
§ 37.1-70.10, ordered that Townes be committed to the custody of 
the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and 
Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment and 
confinement in a secure facility.  We awarded Townes this 
appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Along with Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d 
___ (2005) (today decided) and McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2005) (today decided), this case involves 
the procedures required to be followed in order for the 
Commonwealth to have a prisoner who has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense declared to be a sexually violent 
predator and to have that prisoner involuntarily committed to a 
secure mental health facility at the time of his release from 
prison.  Those procedures are set out in Chapter 2, Article 1.1 
of Title 37.1, commonly referred to as the Sexually Violent 
Predators Act (SVPA).  Code § 37.1-70.1 through Code § 37.1-
70.19.  We have reviewed those procedures in some detail in 
McCloud and need not do so again here. 
Townes contends that the trial court erred in finding that 
he remained subject to the SVPA despite the undisputed fact that 
5 
he had completed serving his sentence for the 1973 rape 
conviction, which the Commonwealth’s petition stated was the 
sexually violent predicate offense supporting the assertion that 
Townes is a sexually violent predator.  The Commonwealth 
responds that “[t]he General Assembly did not specifically 
require that the prisoner be currently serving a sentence for 
the sexually violent offense, only that he be in prison and have 
[been convicted of] one of the four predicate offenses” 
identified in Code § 37.1-70.1 that constitute sexually violent 
offenses. 
In relevant part, Code § 37.1-70.4 provides: 
. . . . 
B. The Director of the Department of Corrections 
shall establish and maintain a database of prisoners 
in his custody who are incarcerated for sexually 
violent offenses.  
 
C. Each month, the Director shall review the 
database of prisoners incarcerated for sexually 
violent offenses and identify all such prisoners who 
are scheduled for release from prison within 10 months 
from the date of such review who receive a score of 
four or more on the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual 
Offender Recidivism or a like score on a comparable, 
scientifically validated instrument as designated by 
the Commissioner.  Upon the identification of such 
prisoners, the Director shall forward their name, 
their scheduled date of release, and a copy of their 
file to the [Commitment Review Committee] for 
assessment. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Code § 37.1-70.5(A) provides: 
6 
Within 90 days of receiving notice from the 
Director pursuant to § 37.1-70.4 regarding a prisoner 
who is incarcerated for a sexually violent offense, 
the [Commitment Review Committee] shall (i) complete 
its assessment of such prisoner for possible 
commitment pursuant to subsection B and (ii) forward 
its recommendation regarding the prisoner, in written 
form, to the Attorney General pursuant to subsection 
C. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
The Commonwealth’s contention that the language of these 
statutes does not limit the application of the SVPA to those 
prisoners who are currently serving a sentence for a sexually 
violent offense as defined by Code § 37.1-70.1 ignores the 
present tense of that language.  Grammatically the phrase “who 
is incarcerated for a sexually violent offense” simply does not 
purport to include prisoners incarcerated on offenses other than 
statutorily defined sexually violent offenses.  The Commonwealth 
contends, however, that this Court should accept the 
Commonwealth’s interpretation of these statutes because to do 
otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the SVPA.  We disagree. 
It cannot be seriously disputed that a person subjected to 
an involuntary civil commitment proceeding has a substantial 
liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital.  
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990).  “Civil commitment 
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process protection.”  Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  Accordingly, we are of opinion that, 
7 
although civil in nature, a statutory scheme such as the SVPA 
that permits an involuntary commitment process to be initiated 
by the Commonwealth is subject to the rule of lenity normally 
applicable to criminal statutes and must therefore be strictly 
construed. 
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s interpretation, when 
strictly construed, the clear and unambiguous language of Code 
§§ 37.1-70.4 and 37.1-70.5 requires that a prisoner must be 
serving an active sentence for a sexually violent offense as 
defined by Code § 37.1-70.1 at the time he is identified as 
being subject to the SVPA.  Moreover, the Commonwealth’s 
interpretation of the law would require us to add language and 
broaden the scope of the act by applying it to prisoners “who 
are or previously have been incarcerated for sexually violent 
offenses.”  Courts cannot add language to the statute the 
General Assembly has not seen fit to include.  Holsapple v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (2003), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 164 (2004).  “Nor are they 
permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial 
interpretation.”  Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 544 
S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001)).2
                     
2 Code § 37.1-70.1, the SVPA’s definitional statute, does 
define a “sexually violent predator” as “any person who . . . 
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.”  (Emphasis 
added).  However, the statute’s use of the present perfect tense 
8 
The Commonwealth concedes that at the time Townes was 
identified by the Director and referred to the Commitment Review 
Committee he had completed serving his sentence for the 1973 
rape conviction.  Accordingly, we hold that since Townes was no 
longer “incarcerated for a sexually violent offense” at the time 
of the Director’s notice to the Commitment Review Committee in 
this case, the trial court erred in ruling that Townes was 
subject to the provisions of the SVPA as a sexually violent 
predator.3
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and dismiss the Commonwealth’s petition. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
                                                                  
here in a passive construction is not relevant, as the 
definition describes a person who has been determined to be a 
sexually violent predator, not a prisoner who is subject to the 
process for making that determination. 
 
3 Because Townes was not subject to commitment under the 
SVPA, we need not consider his further assignment of error 
challenging the trial court’s determination that the evidence 
was sufficient to declare him to be a sexually violent predator. 
9