Case Title: Scott v. Burwell's Bay Improvement Ass'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
R. FORREST SCOTT, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100149 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
April 21, 2011 
BURWELL’S BAY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY 
Westbrook J. Parker, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in ruling that a party seeking to establish ownership of 
riparian rights by adverse possession, or, alternately, a 
prescriptive easement to use those rights, failed to prove 
these claims by clear and convincing evidence.  The principal 
issue we must decide is whether the evidence was sufficient 
under that standard to show that the use of the riparian 
rights was exclusive and continuous for the required period of 
time. 
BACKGROUND 
In our prior consideration of this case, we gave an 
extensive history of the ownership of the riverfront property 
and the riparian rights that are the subject of the dispute 
between the parties.  Burwell’s Bay Improvement Association v. 
Scott, 277 Va. 325, 327-29, 672 S.E.2d 847, 848-49 (2009).  We 
will not repeat the full history of the case here, but need 
only summarize the relevant background that is more fully 
recounted in our prior opinion. 
Since 1960, Burwell’s Bay Improvement Association 
(“Burwell’s Bay”) has owned a tract of land, commonly referred 
to as the “Public Acre,” along the navigable waters of the 
James River in Isle of Wight County.  In 1925, pursuant to 
former Code § 1998 (1924), Edwin T. Poole obtained an order 
granting him the right to construct a wharf and pier extending 
into the James River from the riverfront of the Public Acre, 
which then was owned by Isle of Wight County, and to charge 
the public set fees for its use.  Over time, Poole’s wharf was 
expanded to include a pavilion and attached piers resting on 
pilings placed in the subsurface lands of the James River 
within the area between the mean low-water mark and the line 
of navigation. 
Through a chain of successive recorded transfers, the 
pavilion and piers were acquired by members of the Bracey 
family, including R. Forrest Scott, in 1989.  The Bracey 
family performed extensive renovations to the pavilion and 
began using it as a family retreat.  The pavilion and the 
connecting piers in the riparian area of the Public Acre were 
destroyed by a hurricane in 2003.  Although a number of 
pilings that supported the original structures remain in 
place, no reconstruction has occurred. 
In 2006, Burwell’s Bay received approval from the 
Virginia Marine Resources Commission (“VMRC”) to construct a 
 
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pier from its property into the riparian area formerly 
containing the pavilion and piers that had been destroyed in 
2003.  This pier would extend past and around the pilings that 
still remain from the destroyed pavilion and piers, and would 
limit access from any reconstructed facilities to the line of 
navigation. 
On March 7, 2007, Scott and other members of the Bracey 
family filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Isle of Wight 
County seeking a declaratory judgment that they “own riparian 
and other rights on and adjacent to” the Public Acre, to 
determine the extent of those rights, and to enjoin the 
construction by Burwell’s Bay of the proposed pier or any 
other structure within the riparian area of the Public Acre 
that would interfere with the Bracey family’s rights.  The 
Bracey family alleged that their ownership of the riparian 
rights arose either from their chain of title through Poole or 
by adverse possession.  Alternately, they contended that even 
if they did not own the riparian rights in question, they had 
obtained a prescriptive easement to the use of the riparian 
area encompassed by the pavilion and its piers. 
In its first consideration of the case, following a bench 
trial, the circuit court found that the 1925 court order gave 
Poole the right to construct and maintain riparian structures 
over the waters of the James River adjacent to the Public 
 
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Acre, that the Bracey family had acquired those riparian 
rights by title, and that Burwell’s Bay’s proposed pier would 
interfere with those rights.  We awarded Burwell’s Bay an 
appeal and reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
agreeing with Burwell’s Bay that the 1925 court order granted 
Poole only a personal, non-transferable license.  Id. at 331, 
672 S.E.2d at 850.  We noted, however, that while the circuit 
court had based its ruling on the nature of the rights granted 
by the 1925 order, it had also denied Burwell’s Bay’s motion 
to strike the Bracey family’s evidence supporting the 
alternate claims of adverse possession and prescriptive 
easement.  Id. at 332, 672 S.E.2d at 851.   Accordingly, we 
remanded the case for a determination of whether the Bracey 
family had obtained riparian rights by adverse possession or a 
prescriptive easement to use those rights.  Id. 
On remand, the circuit court took no additional evidence, 
but considered the matter based upon the prior record and 
additional argument of the parties received in a hearing held 
on September 11, 2009.  By an order dated October 28, 2009, 
the court ruled that the Bracey family had “not proven by 
clear and convincing evidence their claim of adverse 
possession, prescription, or adverse use of the riparian 
rights of Defendant.”  Accordingly, the court entered judgment 
for Burwell’s Bay.  We awarded the Bracey family this appeal. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
Before examining the merits of the Bracey family’s claim 
that the circuit court erred in ruling that they had not met 
their burden of proving adverse possession or prescription, we 
must determine the appropriate standard of review to be 
applied in this case.  The Bracey family contends that the 
application of the facts of a given case to determine whether 
there has been adverse possession or prescription with regard 
to a real property right presents a question of law that we 
should review de novo.  See, e.g., Quatannens v. Tyrrell, 268 
Va. 360, 365, 601 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2004).  Burwell’s Bay 
contends that the court’s judgment that the Bracey family had 
not met the burden of proving their claims by clear and 
convincing evidence necessarily involved its determination of 
the underlying facts and must be upheld unless plainly wrong.  
Martin v. Moore, 263 Va. 640, 646, 561 S.E.2d 672, 676 (2002). 
Both parties are essentially correct.  Issues of adverse 
possession and prescription present mixed questions of law, 
reviewed de novo, and fact, to which the reviewing court gives 
deference to the determination of the trial court.  Unlike 
Quatannens, the case relied upon by the Bracey family, where 
the facts were “largely undisputed,” 268 Va. at 365, 601 
S.E.2d at 618, in the original trial of this case the parties 
 
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extensively disputed the nature of the Bracey family’s use of 
the riparian rights through their ownership of the pavilion 
and whether they could prove the applicable time periods 
required for adverse possession and prescription.  Although 
the circuit court did not make express findings of fact, it 
was the trier of fact of the disputed issues.  Thus, we must 
give deference to the court’s judgment by reviewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Burwell’s Bay, the 
prevailing party.  Taking that view of the evidence, we will 
then apply it to the law of adverse possession and 
prescription de novo. 
Adverse Possession or Prescriptive 
Easement of Riparian Rights 
 
Initially, we note that the submerged lands of the James 
River adjacent to the Public Acre starting at the mean low-
water mark are held in trust for the benefit of the public by 
the Commonwealth, which exercises control over the 
construction of wharfs, piers and other riparian structures 
thereon through the oversight of VMRC.*  See Code § 28.2-1200 
                     
* On brief, Burwell’s Bay contends that the Bracey 
family’s claims of adverse possession and prescriptive 
easement must fail because they would affect the title of the 
subsurface lands of the James River belonging to the 
Commonwealth.  No such claim was asserted by the Bracey family 
in their complaint.  Rather, they were clearly asserting 
claims only to apportion Burwell’s Bay’s riparian rights that 
are appurtenant to the Public Acre. 
 
 
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et seq.  However, it has long been recognized that while the 
Commonwealth holds the title to the bed of a navigable river, 
such as the James River, the owners of the adjacent land have 
certain riparian rights for the use of the river.  Taylor v. 
Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 773, 47 S.E. 875, 880 (1904).  The 
term “riparian rights” refers to a specific set of five 
benefits that accrue to the owner of land adjacent to a 
navigable river.  Specifically, the owner has 
“The right to be and remain a riparian proprietor 
and to enjoy the natural advantages thereby 
conferred upon the land by its adjacency to the 
water.” 
 
“The right of access to the water, including a right 
of way to and from the navigable part.” 
 
“The right to build a pier or wharf out to navigable 
water, subject to any regulations of the State.” 
 
“The right to accretions or alluvium.” 
 
[And,] “[t]he right to make a reasonable use of the 
water as it flows past or laves the land.” 
 
Id. at 773, 47 S.E. at 880-81. 
 
To prove adverse possession of riparian rights against 
the true owner, “the plaintiff ‘must show actual, hostile, 
exclusive and continuous possession for the period of the 
statutory bar’ by ‘acts of such notoriety that the true owner 
has actual knowledge, or may be presumed to know, of the 
adverse claim.’ ”  Custis Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 214 Va. 388, 392, 200 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1973) (quoting 
 
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Leake v. Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 976, 103 S.E.2d 227, 234 
(1958)).  Likewise, a party may obtain a prescriptive easement 
to use riparian rights in a similar manner.  Leake, 199 Va. at 
977-78, 103 S.E2d at 235.  In either case, the claimant must 
prove all the elements by clear and convincing evidence.  
Harkleroad v. Linkous, 281 Va. 12, 18, 704 S.E.2d 381, 383-84 
(2011). 
The Bracey family contends that the circuit court erred 
in failing to award them ownership of the riparian rights at 
issue because the evidence shows that they have met each of 
the requirements for adverse possession for the statutorily-
mandated period of fifteen years.  Code § 8.01-236.  Likewise, 
they contend that, even if they have not acquired title to the 
riparian rights, the court should have granted them a 
prescriptive easement to use those rights because the evidence 
shows that the use has extended for more than the twenty years 
required to obtain an easement by prescription.  See, e.g., 
Hafner v. Hansen, 279 Va. 558, 563, 691 S.E.2d 494, 497 
(2010). 
Burwell’s Bay responds that the circuit court’s judgment 
that the Bracey family did not prove by clear and convincing 
evidence their claims of adverse possession of the riparian 
rights, or a prescriptive easement for the use thereof, should 
be upheld.  This is so, Burwell’s Bay contends, because the 
 
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evidence failed to show that the Bracey family’s occupation of 
the riparian area was continuous for the requisite periods 
because their occupation began in 1989 and ended when the 
pavilion was destroyed in 2003.  Burwell’s Bay further 
contends under the facts of this case that the Bracey family 
cannot use the doctrine of tacking to claim the period of 
occupation by the previous owners of the pavilion, nor can 
they use the continued presence of a number of the pilings as 
evidence of their continued occupation of the riparian area 
after 2003.  Thus, Burwell’s Bay maintains that the Bracey 
family occupied the riparian area for at most approximately 14 
years, a period insufficient to establish either adverse 
possession or prescription. 
While in most respects the law of adverse possession and 
prescription are consistent in application, “[t]he character 
of the acts necessary to vest one with a title by adverse 
possession [or a prescriptive right] varies with the nature of 
the property involved, the conditions surrounding it, and the 
use to which the property may be adapted.”  Leake, 199 Va. at 
976, 103 S.E.2d at 234.  “Where the land is . . . under the 
water . . . the acts of [adverse] ownership must indicate a 
change of condition, showing a notorious claim of title, 
accompanied by the essential elements of adverse possession.”  
Id. 
 
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Likewise, a claim to riparian rights over navigable 
waters presents a unique condition of the property that 
requires a special consideration of the “use to which the 
property may be adapted.”  The construction and maintenance of 
permanent structures in a river clearly “indicate a change of 
condition, showing a notorious claim of title” to riparian 
rights.  Accordingly, there is no question that the Bracey 
family’s ownership of the pavilion constituted both an 
“actual” and “hostile” assertion of the right to occupy the 
riparian area adjacent to the Public Acre, and that their 
occupation was “continuous” between 1989 and 2003. 
However, in 2003 when the pavilion was destroyed, leaving 
only a number of the associated pilings, the principal 
evidence of the Bracey family’s occupation of the riparian 
area ended.  In order to assert a continuing claim to the 
riparian rights, it would be necessary for the Bracey family 
to have shown that they continued to exert “actual” control 
over the riparian area by acting to exclude others from 
entering it, or by taking positive, visible actions to 
reconstruct the destroyed structures.  Between 2003 and 2007, 
when they filed their complaint for declaratory judgment, 
however, the record contains no appreciable evidence of such 
action taken by the Bracey family to assert any continuing 
claim over the riparian area formerly occupied by the pavilion 
 
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and its associated piers.  Thus, we hold that the Bracey 
family did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
they had asserted an adverse claim to ownership of the 
riparian rights for the requisite period of time. 
Alternately, the Bracey family contends that even if they 
cannot show that they asserted a continuing claim to the 
riparian rights after 2003, they still can establish the 
requisite time periods for adverse possession or prescription 
by including the period of occupation by the prior owners of 
the pavilion under the doctrine of tacking.  We disagree. 
The doctrine of tacking, that is, the combining of 
successive occupations or uses of property by adverse or 
prescriptive claimants to establish the requisite time period 
for the claim asserted, is little discussed in our case law.  
Clearly, however, the party making a claim where tacking is 
asserted must prove when the adverse or prescriptive period 
began to run.  McNeil v. Kingrey, 237 Va. 400, 405, 377 S.E.2d 
430, 433 (1989); Clatterbuck v. Clore, 130 Va. 113, 121, 107 
S.E. 669, 672 (1921).  Therefore, the claimant must introduce 
clear and convincing evidence to prove the date or period of 
time when all of the elements of proof for adverse possession 
or prescription were first established.  The doctrine of 
tacking does not permit a litigant to add periods of time that 
include the actions of a predecessor in title when such 
 
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actions were by right, permission, or agreement.  See, e.g., 
Harris v. Deal, 189 Va. 675, 689-90, 54 S.E.2d 161, 167-68 
(1949); Edmunds & Abernathy v. Pike, 136 Va. 270, 274-75, 118 
S.E. 91, 92 (1923); Sims v. Capper, 133 Va. 278, 287-88, 112 
S.E. 676, 679 (1922).  In order to tack successive claims, a 
party must establish that any prior period of possession that 
is to be included in their claim was adverse, as defined by 
Virginia law.  Calhoun v. Woods, 246 Va. 41, 45, 431 S.E.2d 
285, 287-88 (1993).  Tacking does not allow time to be added 
simply because the activities of prior occupiers were similar 
to the uses that are asserted by a subsequent claimant.  
Rather, the evidence must show that the prior occupants were 
asserting the same claims to possession of, or a prescriptive 
easement over, the property in question. 
Here, the evidence showed that the two most recent prior 
owners of the pavilion were Le Bay, Inc. and John Read.  Scott 
testified that Read had partitioned off part of the pavilion 
and “lived in that for a period of time” and also stored some 
materials “for his construction outfit.”  No evidence was 
presented as to what Le Bay, Inc.’s activities were.  
Moreover, no evidence was presented that Read or Le Bay, Inc. 
ever asserted an exclusive claim to the riparian rights at 
issue. 
 
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Additionally, the Bracey family’s own evidence showed 
that the pavilion and its attached piers had long been 
considered as open to the public for various uses by the 
Bracey family’s predecessors in title.  Following its 
construction, the pavilion was viewed as an extension of the 
Public Acre, and continued to be so viewed even after the 
Public Acre was sold by the County to Burwell’s Bay.  While 
undoubtedly the prior owners of the pavilion from time to time 
operated it for commercial purposes, it is equally clear that 
government bodies, civic groups, and members of the public 
also used the facilities as a matter of course. 
This evidence falls well below the clear and convincing 
standard required to prove adverse possession or prescriptive 
use of the riparian rights by the immediate prior occupants.  
Thus, the Bracey family could not use tacking to establish the 
requisite time periods prior to the destruction of the 
pavilion in 2003.  Accordingly, the Bracey family failed to 
present clear and convincing evidence of an exclusive, 
continuous claim to ownership or use of the riparian rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in ruling that the Bracey family had not met its burden of 
proving either ownership by adverse possession of the riparian 
 
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rights or a prescriptive easement to their use.  Accordingly, 
the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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