Case Title: State v. Grainger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 30PA13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA12-531 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 February 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Rowan County 
Nos. 05 CRS 7832; 54174; 54726 
EDY CHARLES BANKS, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
On writ of certiorari to review order entered 5 December 
2011 by Judge Anna Mills Wagoner in Rowan County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2012. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Amy Kunstling Irene, for the State. 
 
NC Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., by Allison Standard, for 
defendant-appellant. 
 
 
CALABRIA, Judge. 
 
 
Edy Charles Banks, Jr. (“defendant”) appeals the trial 
court’s order denying his motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) 
for ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”).  We reverse and 
remand. 
I.  Background 
On 29 November 2007, a jury returned verdicts finding 
defendant guilty of statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, or 
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15 years old by a defendant who is at least 6 years older, 
second degree rape of a person who is mentally disabled, and 
taking indecent liberties with a child in Rowan County Superior 
Court.  For the statutory rape conviction, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to a minimum of 240 months to a maximum of 
297 months.  For the second degree rape and indecent liberties 
convictions, the trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of 
73 months to a maximum of 97 months.  Defendant’s sentences were 
to be served consecutively in the North Carolina Department of 
Correction.  Defendant appealed.  
In an unpublished opinion, this Court found no error in 
defendant’s trial.  State v. Banks, 201 N.C. App. 591, 689 
S.E.2d 245, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 2416, 2009 WL 4931757 
(2009)(unpublished).  On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, 
that his convictions for statutory rape and second degree rape, 
which were based upon the same act of sexual intercourse, 
violated his double jeopardy rights.  Id.  This Court dismissed 
defendant’s argument because it had not been raised before the 
trial court.  Id. 
On 2 September 2011, defendant filed an MAR alleging IAC on 
the basis of his trial counsel’s failure to challenge his 
charges, convictions, and sentences for both statutory rape and 
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second degree rape offenses.  Defendant argued that he was 
improperly convicted and sentenced for both convictions when 
they both arose from a single act of sexual intercourse. 
On 5 December 2011, the trial court, without holding an 
evidentiary hearing, entered an order denying defendant’s MAR, 
concluding that his constitutional rights were not violated 
because defendant was convicted of “separate and distinct 
crimes.” In addition, the court concluded that there was “no 
clear legislative intent to prohibit multiple convictions for 
the same conduct.”  Accordingly, the trial court found that 
defendant 
failed 
to 
establish 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel’s 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the 
trial court’s order.  The petition was granted 8 February 2012. 
II.  Standard of Review 
“When considering rulings on motions for appropriate 
relief, we review the trial court’s order to determine ‘whether 
the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the 
findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the 
conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial 
court.’” State v. Frogge, 359 N.C. 228, 240, 607 S.E.2d 627, 634 
-4- 
 
 
(2005) (quoting State v. Stevens, 305 N.C. 712, 720, 291 S.E.2d 
585, 591 (1982)). 
III.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
MAR.  Specifically, defendant contends that he received IAC when 
his counsel failed to object to defendant’s judgment which 
sentenced him for both statutory rape and second degree rape 
convictions that were based upon a single act of sexual 
intercourse.  We agree. 
To 
prevail 
on 
a 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
first show that his counsel’s performance 
was 
deficient 
and 
then 
that 
counsel’s 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced 
his 
defense. 
Deficient 
performance 
may 
be 
established 
by 
showing 
that 
counsel’s 
representation 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard of reasonableness. Generally, to 
establish prejudice, a defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
  
State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 
(2006)(internal quotations and citations omitted).  In order to 
determine if defendant’s counsel was ineffective, we must first 
determine whether defendant was improperly sentenced for both 
rape convictions. 
-5- 
 
 
 
A.  Double Jeopardy 
 
In the instant case, defendant’s convictions for statutory 
rape and second degree rape were based upon a single act of 
sexual intercourse.  Our Supreme Court has stated: 
Where, 
as 
here, 
a 
single 
criminal 
transaction constitutes a violation of more 
than one criminal statute, the test to 
determine if the elements of the offenses 
are 
the 
same 
is 
whether 
each 
statute 
requires proof of a fact which the others do 
not.  By definition, all the essential 
elements of a lesser included offense are 
also 
elements 
of 
the 
greater 
offense. 
Invariably then, a lesser included offense 
requires no proof beyond that required for 
the greater offense, and the two crimes are 
considered identical for double jeopardy 
purposes. If neither crime constitutes a 
lesser included offense of the other, the 
convictions will fail to support a plea of 
double jeopardy. 
. 
State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 50, 352 S.E.2d 673, 683 (1987) 
(citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 
306 (1932))(citations omitted). 
 
In Etheridge, our Supreme Court held that convictions of 
statutory rape, taking indecent liberties with a child, and 
incest, where the criminal act in question arose out of a single 
transaction, do not violate a defendant’s rights against double 
jeopardy, because “[t]he three are legally separate and distinct 
crimes, none of which is a lesser included offense of another.” 
-6- 
 
 
Id. at 50, 352 S.E.2d at 683.  Our Courts have also held that a 
defendant’s 
double 
jeopardy 
rights 
are 
not 
violated 
by 
convictions for the offenses of crime against nature and second 
degree sexual offense, State v. Warren, 309 N.C. 224, 306 S.E. 
2d 446 (1983), statutory rape and indecent liberties,  State v. 
Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982), and  crime against 
nature and indecent liberties, State v. Copeland, 11 N.C. App. 
516, 181 S.E.2d 722 (1971), when the convictions arose from a 
single sexual act.  Since the instant case cannot be materially 
distinguished from these cases, we must reject defendant’s 
argument that his convictions for both second degree rape and 
statutory rape violated his double jeopardy rights. 
 
B.  Legislative Intent 
 
However, the fact that the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy is inapplicable to defendant’s case does 
not end our inquiry regarding the propriety of defendant’s 
sentence.  The trial court’s order denying defendant’s MAR also 
concluded that there was “no clear legislative intent to 
prohibit multiple convictions for the same conduct.”  Our 
Supreme Court has held that the legislative intent of the 
General Assembly may also control whether multiple punishments 
for the same criminal act may be imposed at the same trial. See 
-7- 
 
 
State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297, 302-05, 698 S.E.2d 65, 67-69 
(2010)(concluding that the General Assembly intended to prohibit 
punishment for convictions of felony death by vehicle and felony 
serious injury by vehicle when the defendant was punished for 
the same conduct by convictions for second degree murder and 
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury).  
Although some cases from this Court have elected to analyze the 
General Assembly’s legislative intent through the lens of double 
jeopardy, rather than as a separate analysis, we find it more 
appropriate to consider legislative intent as an independent 
basis to determine the validity of multiple punishments for the 
same act.  See id.  In the instant case, we consider the 
legislative intent analysis conducted in our decision in State 
v. Ridgeway, 185 N.C. App. 423, 648 S.E.2d 886 (2007).   
In Ridgeway, this Court held that the trial court properly 
allowed the jury to review evidence of both statutory rape and 
first degree rape arising out of a single act of sexual 
intercourse.  Id. at 434, 648 S.E.2d at 894.  However, the Court 
held that upon verdicts of guilty on both theories, judgment on 
one conviction must be arrested. Id.  To reach this conclusion, 
the Ridgeway Court conducted the following analysis regarding 
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the legislative intent behind the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-27.7A, which criminalizes the offense of statutory rape: 
Under the original statutes for rape and 
sexual offense, a plain reading of the 
statutes shows the legislative intent was to 
provide alternate methods by which the State 
can prove the crimes of rape or sexual 
offense: intercourse or a sexual act with a 
child under 13 or intercourse or a sexual 
act with any person by force and against the 
will. See N.C.G.S. 
§§ 
14-27.2, 14 
-
27.4 (2005). 
In 
1995, 
the 
legislature 
adopted a new statute extending protection 
to children between the ages of 13 and 15 
from sexual acts or intercourse by older 
persons. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A (2005). 
Separate convictions for these offenses, 
even 
though 
consolidated 
for 
a 
single 
judgment, ‘have potentially severe adverse 
collateral consequences.’ 
 
Id. at 435, 648 S.E.2d at 894-95 (emphasis added).  Thus, this 
Court has interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A as merely 
providing an extension of one of the “alternate methods by which 
the State can prove the crime[] of rape” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-27.2, 
which 
criminalizes 
first 
degree 
rape. 
 
This 
interpretation is consistent with the classification of both 
offenses as Class B1 felonies. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(a), 
14-27.7A (2011). 
 
In the instant case, the statute under which defendant was 
convicted, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3, criminalizes second degree 
rape and provides the State with additional alternatives of 
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proving rape which would not, standing alone, result in a first 
degree rape conviction.  Specifically, that statute criminalizes 
sexual intercourse with a person “[w]ho is mentally disabled, 
mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person 
performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other 
person 
is 
mentally 
disabled, 
mentally 
incapacitated, 
or 
physically 
helpless.” 
N.C. 
Gen. 
Stat. 
§ 
27.3 
(2011).  
Nonetheless, second degree rape is undoubtedly a lesser included 
offense of first degree rape.  Since the Ridgeway Court 
concluded 
that 
separate 
punishments 
for 
the 
offenses 
of 
statutory rape and first degree rape are prohibited by the 
legislative intent of the General Assembly, we are similarly 
compelled to conclude that separate punishments for statutory 
rape and second degree rape, a lesser included offense of first 
degree 
rape, 
are 
also 
prohibited 
by 
legislative 
intent. 
Consequently, defendant should not have been sentenced for both 
statutory rape and second degree rape after he was convicted of 
these offenses.  On remand, the trial court must arrest judgment 
on either defendant’s statutory rape conviction or his second 
degree rape conviction.  See Ridgeway, 185 N.C. App. at 435, 648 
S.E.2d at 895.   
C.  Ineffective Assistance 
-10- 
 
 
This Court released its opinion in Ridgeway approximately 
three months prior to defendant’s trial and the entry of 
judgment in the instant case.  The logical implication of 
Ridgeway was that defendant could not have been properly 
punished for both statutory rape and second degree rape based 
upon a single act of sexual intercourse.  Thus, an objectively 
reasonable 
attorney 
would 
have 
raised 
an 
objection 
to 
defendant’s 
judgment 
and 
sentence. 
 
Moreover, 
since 
the 
consecutive 
judgments 
imposed 
against 
defendant 
were 
impermissible, defendant was clearly prejudiced by his counsel’s 
failure to raise the issue before the trial court.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel and is entitled to relief.  See Allen, 360 N.C. at 316, 
626 S.E.2d at 286. 
IV.  Conclusion 
In light of this Court’s opinion in Ridgeway, defendant was 
improperly sentenced for his convictions for both statutory rape 
and second degree rape because the General Assembly did not 
intend to subject a defendant to separate punishments for these 
offenses based upon a single act of sexual intercourse.  The 
Ridgeway 
decision 
was 
published 
several 
months 
prior 
to 
defendant’s trial.  Therefore, defendant received ineffective 
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assistance from his trial counsel because counsel failed to 
raise the issue before the trial court.  As a result, we reverse 
the trial court’s order denying defendant’s MAR, and remand the 
case to the trial court to take appropriate action consistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur.