Case Title: Niesig v. Team I

Citation: 76 N.Y.2d 363, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493, 558 N.E.2d 1030

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 1989-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS NIESIG, APPELLANT, v. TEAM I, ET AL., 
RESPONDENTS, v. DETRAE ENTERPRISES, INC., THIRD-PARTY 
RESPONDENT.76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 
(1990).
July 5, 1990

2    No.    155
Decided July 5, 1990
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York 
Reports.

Emily M. Bass, Monique Y. Patterson, NY City, for Appellant.
Patrick J. Crowe, Mineola, for third-party Respondent DeTrae.
Frederick B. Simpson, Locust Valley, for Respondent J.M. Frederick Const.
James R. Sandner, James D. Bilik, Claude I. Hersh, NY City, for NYS United Teachers; 
Robert Abrams, Attorney General (O. Peter Sherwood, Peter H. Schiff, Peter G. Crary of 
counsel) pro se; Michael S. Oberman, Douglas R. Pappas, NY City, for Legal Aid 
Society; Julius L. Chambers, Charles S. Ralston, Ronald L. Ellis, NY City, for NAACP 
Legal Defense & Ed. Fund; Vanessa Merton, NY City, for Plaintiff Employment 
Lawyers Assn.; Kim Gandy, Washington, D.C., for National Organization for Women; 
Janice Goodman, Audrey S. Feinberg, Kent Hirozawa, NY City, for Comm. Civil Rights, 
Assn. of Bar, CNY; amicus curiae.

KAYE, J.:

     Plaintiff in this personal injury litigation, wishing 
to have his counsel privately interview a corporate defendant's 
employees who witnessed the accident, puts before us a question 
that has generated wide interest:  are the employees of a 
corporate party also considered "parties" under Disciplinary Rule 
7-104(A)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
prohibits a lawyer from communicating directly with a "party" 
known to have counsel in the matter?[n 1]  
The trial court and the 
Appellate Division both answered that an employee of a counseled 
corporate party in litigation is by definition also a "party" 
within the rule, and prohibited the interviews.  For reasons of 
policy, we disagree.
     As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was injured when 
he fell from scaffolding at a building construction site.  At the 
time of the accident he was employed by DeTrae Enterprises, Inc.; 
defendant J.M. Frederick was the general contractor, and 
defendant Team I the property owner.  Plaintiff thereafter 
commenced a damages action against defendants, asserting two 
causes of action centering on Labor Law § 240, and defendants 
brought a third-party action against DeTrae.
     Plaintiff moved for permission to have his counsel 
conduct ex parte interviews of all DeTrae employees who were on 
the site at the time of the accident, arguing that these 
witnesses to the event were neither managerial nor controlling 
employees and could not therefore be considered "personal 
synonyms for DeTrae."  DeTrae opposed the application, asserting 
that the Disciplinary Rule barred unapproved contact by 
plaintiff's lawyer with any of its employees.  Supreme Court 
denied plaintiff's request, and the Appellate Division modified 
by limiting the ban to DeTrae's current employees.
          The Appellate Division concluded, for theoretical as 
well as practical reasons, that current employees of a corporate 
defendant in litigation "are presumptively within the scope of 
the representation afforded by the attorneys who appeared [in the 
litigation] on behalf of that corporation."  (149 AD2d 94, 95.)  
Citing Upjohn Co. v United States (449 US 383), the court held 
that DeTrae's attorneys have an attorney-client relationship with 
every DeTrae employee connected with the subject of the 
litigation, and that the prohibition is necessitated by the 
practical difficulties of distinguishing between a corporation's 
control group and its other employees.  The court further noted 
that the information sought from employee witnesses could instead 
be obtained through their depositions.
          In the main we disagree with the Appellate Division's 
conclusions.  However, because we agree with the holding that 
DR-7-104(A)(1) applies only to current employees, not to former 
employees, we modify rather than reverse  its order, and grant 
plaintiff's motion to allow the interviews.[n 
2]
          We begin our analysis by noting that what is at issue 
is a Disciplinary Rule, not a statute.  In interpreting statutes, 
which are the enactments of a co-equal branch of government and 
an expression of the public policy of this State, we are of 
course bound to implement the will of the Legislature; statues 
are to be applied as they are written or interpreted to 
effectuate the legislative intention.  The Disciplinary Rules 
have a different provenance and purpose.  Approved by the New 
York State Bar Association and then enacted by the Appellate 
Divisions, the Code of Professional Responsibility is essentially 
the legal profession's document of self-governance, embodying 
principles of ethical conduct for attorneys as well as rules for 
professional discipline (see, Code of Professional 
Responsibility, Preliminary Statement, McKinney's Cons Law of NY, 
Book 29, at 355).  While unquestionably important, and respected 
by the courts, the Code does not have the force of law (see, 
Matter of Weinstock, 40 NY2d 1, 6).
          That distinction is particularly significant when a 
Disciplinary Rule is invoked in litigation, which in addition to 
matters of professional conduct by attorneys, implicates the 
interests of nonlawyers (see, S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. 
Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437, 443).  In such 
instances, we are not constrained to read the rules literally or 
effectuate the intent of the drafters, but look to the rules as 
guidelines to be applied with due regard for the broad range of 
interests at stake.  "When we agree that the Code applies in an 
equitable manner to a matter before us, we should not hesitate to 
enforce it with vigor.  When we find an area of uncertainty, 
however, we must use our judicial process to make our own 
decision in the interests of justice to all concerned."  (Id. 
[quoting Foley & Co. v Vanderbilt, 523 F2d 1357, 1360 {2d Cir, 
Gurfein, J., concurring}].)
          DR 7-104(A)(1), which can be traced to the American Bar 
Association Canons of 1908, fundamentally embodies principles of 
fairness.  "The general thrust of the rule is to prevent 
situations in which a represented party may be taken advantage of 
by adverse counsel; the presence of the party's attorney 
theoretically neutralizes the contact."  (Wright by Wright v 
Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash2d 192, 197, 691 P2d 564, 567.)  By 
preventing lawyers from deliberately dodging adversary counsel to 
reach--and exploit--the client alone, DR 7-104(A)(1) safeguards 
against clients making improvident settlements, ill-advised 
disclosures and unwarranted concessions (see, G. Hazard & W. 
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 434-435 [1986 Supp]; C. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics § 11.6, at 613 [Practitioner's ed 1986]; 
Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client:  The 
Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U Pa L Rev 683, 686 
[1979]).
          There is little problem applying DR 7-104(A)(1) to 
individuals in civil cases.  In that context, the meaning of 
"party" is ordinarily plain enough:  it refers to the 
individuals, not to their agents and employees (see, S. Gillers & 
N. Dorsen, Regulation of Lawyers:  Problems of Law and Ethics 433 
[2d ed 1989]).  The question, however, becomes more difficult 
when the parties are corporations--as evidenced by a wealth of 
commentary, and controversy, on the issue (see, e.g., Wyeth, 
Talking to the Other Side's Employees and Ex-Employees, 15 
Litigation No. 4 [Summer 1989]; Comment, Ex Parte Communications 
with Corporate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney 
Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 Northwestern U L 
Rev 1274 [1988]; Miller & Calfo, Ex Parte Contact with Employees 
and Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary:  Is it Ethical?, 
42 Business lawyer 1053 [1987]; Stahl, Ex Parte Interviews with 
Enterprise Employees:  A Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44 Wash & Lee L 
Rev 1181 [1987]; American Bar Foundation Annotated Code of 
Professional Responsibility 336-337 [1979]; Kurlantzik, The 
Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 Conn B J 
136 [1977]).
          The difficulty is not in whether DR 7-104(A)(1) applies 
to corporations.  It unquestionably covers corporate parties, who 
are as much served by the rule's fundamental principles of 
fairness as individual parties.  But the rule does not define 
"party," and its reach in this context is unclear.  In litigation 
only the entity, not its employee, is the actual named party; on 
the other hand, corporations act solely through natural persons, 
and unless some of their employees are also considered parties, 
they are effectively read out of the rule.  The issue therefore 
distills to which corporate employees should be deemed parties 
for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1), and that choice is one of policy.  
The broader the definition of "party" in the interests of 
fairness to the corporation, the greater the cost in terms of 
foreclosing vital informal access to facts.
          The many courts, bar associations and commentators that 
have balanced the competing considerations have evolved various 
tests, each claiming some adherents, each with some imperfection 
(see, generally, Annot., Right of Attorney to Conduct Ex Parte 
Interviews with Corporate Party's Nonmanagement Employees, 50 ALR 
4th 652 [1986] [collecting cases]).  At one extreme is the 
blanket rule adopted by the Appellate Division and urged by 
defendants, and at the other is the "control group" test--both of 
which we reject.  The first is too broad and the second too 
narrow.
          Defendants' principal argument for the blanket 
rule[n 3]--correlating the corporate "party" 
and all of its 
employees--rests on Upjohn v United States (449 US 383).  As
the Supreme Court recognized, a corporation's attorney-client 
privilege includes communications with low- and mid-level 
employees; defendants argue that the existence of an 
attorney-client privilege also signifies an attorney-client 
relationship for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1).
          Upjohn, however, addresses an entirely different 
subject, with policy objectives that have little relation to the 
question whether a corporate employee should be considered a 
"party" for purposes of the Disciplinary Rule.  First, the 
privilege applies only to confidential communications with 
counsel (see, CPLR 4503), it does not immunize the underlying 
factual information--which is in issue here--from disclosure to 
an adversary (see also, Upjohn v United States, 449 US at 
395-396, supra).  Second, the attorney-client privilege serves 
the societal objective of encouraging open communication between 
client and counsel (see, Rossi v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Greater New York, 73 NY2d 588, 592), a benefit not present in 
denying informal access to factual information.  Thus, a 
corporate employee who may be a "client" for purposes of the 
attorney-client privilege is not necessarily a "party" for 
purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1).
          The single indisputable advantage of a blanket 
preclusion--as with every absolute rule--is that it is clear.  No 
lawyer need ever risk disqualification or discipline because of 
uncertainty as to which employees are covered by the rule and 
which not.  The problem, however, is that a ban of this nature 
exacts a high price in terms of other values, and is unnecessary 
to achieve the objectives of DR 7-104(A)(1).
          Most significantly, the Appellate Division's blanket 
rule closes off avenues of informal discovery of information that 
may serve both the litigants and the entire justice system by 
uncovering relevant facts, thus promoting the expeditious 
resolution of disputes.  Foreclosing all direct, informal 
interviews of employees of the corporate party unnecessarily 
sacrifices the long-recognized potential value of such sessions.  
"A lawyer talks to a witness to ascertain what, if any, 
information the witness may have relevant to his theory of the 
case, and to explore the witness' knowledge, memory and 
opinion--frequently in light of information counsel may have 
developed from other sources.  This is part of an attorney's 
so-called work product." (IBM v Edelstein, 526 F2d 37, 46 [citing 
Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495].)  Costly formal depositions that 
may deter litigants with limited resources, or even somewhat less 
formal and costly interviews attended by adversary counsel, are 
no substitute for such off-the-record private efforts to learn 
and assemble, rather than perpetuate, information.
          Nor, in our view, is it necessary to shield all 
employees from informal interviews in order to safeguard the 
corporation's interest.  Informal encounters between a lawyer and 
an employee-witness are not--as a blanket ban assumes--invariably 
calculated to elicit unwitting admissions; they serve 
long-recognized values in the litigation process.   Moreover, the 
corporate party has significant protection at hand.  It has 
possession of its own information and unique access to its 
documents and employees; the corporation's lawyer thus has the 
earliest and best opportunity to gather the facts, to elicit 
information from  employees, and to counsel and prepare them so 
that they will not make the feared improvident disclosures that 
engendered the rule.
          We fully recognize that, as the Appellate Division 
observed, every rule short of the absolute poses practical 
difficulties as to where to draw the line, and leaves some 
uncertainty as to which employees fall on either side of it. 
Nonetheless, we conclude that the values served by permitting 
access to relevant information require that an effort be made to 
strike a balance, and that uncertainty can be minimized if not 
eliminated by a clear test that will become even clearer in 
practice.
          We are not persuaded, however, that the "control group" 
test--defining "party" to include only the most senior  
management exercising substantial control over the 
corporation--achieves that goal.  Unquestionably, that narrow 
(though still uncertain) definition of corporate "party" better 
serves the policy of promoting open access to relevant 
information.  But that test gives insufficient regard to the 
principles motivating DR 7-104(A)(1), and wholly overlooks the 
fact that corporate employees other than senior management also 
can bind the corporation.  The "control group" test all but  
"nullifies the benefits of the disciplinary rule to 
corporations."  (Comment, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate 
Parties:  The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications 
with One of Adverse Interest, 82 Northwestern U L Rev 1274, 1288 
[1988]; see also, Morrison v Brandeis Univ., 125 FRD 14, 16-17 [D 
Mass]; Massa v Eaton Corp., 109 FRD 312, 313-314 [WD Mich].)  
Given the practical and theoretical problems posed by the 
"control group" test, it is hardly surprising that few courts or 
bar associations have ever embraced it.[n 
4]
          By the same token, we find unsatisfactory several of 
the proposed intermediate tests, because they give too little 
guidance,  or otherwise seem unworkable.  In this category are 
the case-by-case balancing test (see, B. H. by Monahan v Johnson, 
128 FRD 659 [ND Ill]; Morrison v Brandeis Univ., supra), and a 
test that defines "party" to mean corporate employees only when 
they are interviewed about matters within the scope of their 
employment (Committee on Professional Ethics, Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York, Op 86-46 [1982]; Committee on 
Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Associations, Formal Op 
82-7 [1982]).  The latter approach is based on Rule 801(d)(2)(D) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a hearsay exception for 
statements concerning matters within the scope of employment, 
which is different from the New York state rule (see, Lochiavo v 
Port Authority of New York, 58 NY2d 1040; Kelly v Diesel Constr. 
Div. of Carl A. Morse, Inc., 35 NY2d 1).
          The test that best balances the competing interests, 
and incorporates the most desirable elements of the other 
approaches, is one that defines "party" to include corporate 
employees whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are 
binding on the corporation (in effect, the corporation's "alter 
egos") or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its 
liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel.  All 
other employees may be interviewed informally.
          Unlike a blanket ban or a "control group" test, this 
solution is specifically targeted at the  problem addressed by DR 
7-104(A)(1).  The potential unfair advantage of extracting 
concessions and admissions from those who will bind the 
corporation is negated when employees with "speaking authority" 
for the corporation, and employees who are so closely identified 
with the interests of the corporate party as to be 
indistinguishable from it, are deemed "parties" for  purposes of 
DR 7-104(A)(1).  Concern for the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege prompts us also to include in the 
definition of "party" the corporate employees responsible for 
actually effectuating the advice of counsel in the matter (see, 
Polycast Technology Corp. v Uniroyal, Inc., 129 FRD 621, 
625-628-629 [SDNY]; G. Hazard & W. Hodes, op. cit. at 436-437).
          In practical application, the test we adopt thus would 
prohibit direct communication by adversary counsel "with those 
officials, but only those, who have the legal power to bind the 
corporation in the matter or who are responsible for implementing 
the advice of the corporation's lawyer, or any member of the 
organization whose own interests are directly at stake in a 
representation." (C. Wolfram, op. cit. § 11.6, at 613).  This 
test would permit direct access to all other employees, and 
specifically--as in the present case--it would clearly permit 
direct access to employees who were merely witnesses to an event 
for which the corporate employer is sued.
          Apart from striking the correct balance, this test 
should also become relatively clear in application.  It is rooted 
in developed concepts of the law of evidence and the law of 
agency, thereby minimizing the uncertainty facing lawyers about 
to embark on employee interviews.  A similar test, moreover, is 
the one overwhelmingly adopted by courts and bar associations[n 5] 
throughout the country, whose long practical experience persuades 
us that--in day-to-day operation--it is workable.[n 
6]
          Finally, we note the particular contribution made by 
the various amici curiae in this case; by highlighting the 
diverse contexts in which the question may arise, their 
submissions  have enlarged our comprehension of the broad 
potential impact of the issue presented.   In so doing, however, 
they have also alerted us to the wisdom of flagging what is in 
any event implicit in our decisions--that they are limited by 
facts before us and the questions put to us.  Today's decision 
resolves the present controversy by allowing ex parte interviews 
with nonmanagerial witnesses employed by a corporate defendant; 
even in that limited context, we recognize that there are 
undoubtedly  questions not raised by the parties that will yet 
have to be answered.  Defendants' assertions that ex parte 
interviews should not be permitted because of the dangers of 
overreaching, moreover, impel us to add the cautionary note that, 
while we have not been called upon to consider questions relating 
to the actual conduct of such interviews, it is of course assumed 
that attorneys would make their identity and interest known to 
interviewees and comport themselves ethically.
          Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should 
be modified, without costs, by reversing so much of the Appellate 
Division order as denied plaintiff's motion to permit ex parte 
interviews of current DeTrae employees and, as so modified, the 
Appellate Division order should be affirmed and the certified 
question answered in the negative.

F O O T N O T E S

1.  DR 7-104(A)(1) reads:

"During the course of the 
representation of a client a lawyer shall not * * * [c]ommunicate 
or cause another to communicate with a party the lawyer knows to 
be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has 
the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or 
is authorized by law to do so."

          Employees individually named as parties in the 
litigation, and employees individually represented by counsel, 
are not within the ambit of the question presented by this 
appeal.  Nor, obviously, are direct interviews on consent of 
counsel, or those authorized by law, or communications by the 
client himself (unless instigated by counsel).

2.  Two subsidiary matters deserve mention.  First, we 
reject DeTrae's claim that this appeal must be dismissed for 
mootness by reason of the fact that all potential witnesses are 
now former employees available for interview.  In that plaintiff 
disputes this assertion, and represents that he seeks an ex parte 
interview with a current DeTrae employee and possibly employees 
of the other entities, the appeal is not moot and we need not 
consider whether the appeal would otherwise fall within an 
exception to the mootness doctrine (see, Matter of Sharon B., 72 
NY2d 394, 397).  Second, in the trial court and the Appellate 
Division the parties litigated the right to pursue both oral and 
written discovery of the same entity.  In the Appellate Division 
plaintiff prevailed on his claim that he was entitled to both 
depositions and written interrogatories of defendants, and no 
appeal is taken from that determination.

3.  This rule was adopted only in one formerly-reported 
decision and three bar association ethics committee opinions 
(see, Committee on Professional Ethics, Bar Ass'n of Nassau 
County Opinion No. 2-89 [1989]; Los Angeles County Formal Ethics 
Opinion 410 [1983]; New York County Lawyers' Association, Opinion 
No. 528 [1964]).  The formerly-reported decision, Hewlett-Packard 
Co. v Superior Court (Jensen) (205 Cal App 3d 43, 252 Cal Rptr 
14), was "depublished" by the California Supreme Court and thus 
is without precedential significance.  Moreover, on November 28, 
1989, the California Supreme Court approved a new disciplinary 
rule which permits attorneys to initiate ex parte interviews with 
certain employees of a corporation (see, Cal Prof Conduct Rule 
2-100; Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v State, 213 Cal App 3d 131, 
261 Cal Rptr 493).

4.  A "control group" test was adopted in Fair 
Automotive Repair, Inc. v Car-X Service Systems, Inc. (128 Ill 
App 3d 763, 471 NE 2d 554), Maxwell v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. 
(No. 80-4239 [D Kan, Oct 28, 1980]), and three bar association 
opinions (Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Op 369 [1977]; Arizona 
State Bar Ass'n Op 203 [1966]; Idaho State Bar Ass'n Op 21 
[1960]).

5.  See, e.g., Wright by Wright v Group Health Hosp., 
103 Wash2d 192, 691 P2d 564, supra; Bey v Village of Arlington 
Heights, 50 Fair Empl Prac Cas (BNA) 1375 (ND Ill); Chancellor v 
Boeing Co., 678 F Supp 250 [D Kan]; Porter v Arco Metals Co., 642 
F Supp 1116 (D Mont); Frey v Dept of Health and Human Servs., 106 
FRD 32 (EDNY); Shealy v Laidlaw Bros., Inc., 34 Fair Empl Prac 
Cas (BNA) 1223 (D SC); Sobel v Yeshiva Univ, 38 Emply Prac Dec 
par 32,479 (SDNY); see also, ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct 71-303 to 71-304 (1984).  Among bar 
associations the test has, for example, been adopted in ABA 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op 
1410 (1978); Alabama State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op RO-83-81 (1983); 
Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op 71-1 (1971); Committee on Ethics, 
Colorado Bar Ass'n, Op 69 (1985); District of Columbia Bar Ass'n 
Rule 4.2 (March 1, 1990); Bar of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op 87-6 
(87-R2), issued by the Supreme Court July 12, 1989; Idaho State 
Bar Ass'n, Formal Op 22 (1060); Professional Ethics Committee, 
Board of Overseers, Bar of the State of Maine, Op 94 (1989); 
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, State Bar of 
Michigan, Op CI -526 (1980); Committee on Legal Ethics and 
Professional conduct, Ohio State Bar Ass'n, Op 81-5 (1981); 
Professional Guidance Committee, Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Guidance 
Inquiry 88-30 (1988); State Bar of Texas, Op 342, 23 Baylor L Rev 
877 (1968); Standing Committee on Legal Ethics, Virginia State 
Bar, Legal Ethics Op 905 (1987).

6.  Given the nationwide experience with the test we 
now adopt, we find no basis for the assertion made in the 
concurrence that the test will unnecessarily curtail informal 
fact-gathering or itself generate litigation.  Above all, our 
test is decidedly different from the Appellate Division's blanket 
ban (concurring opn, p 1); in this very case, for example, we are 
reversing the Appellate Division's prohibition and permitting 
interviews of employee-witnesses to an accident, which would not 
be allowed under a blanket ban.  Finally, in order to put to rest 
any possible confusion, we make clear that the definition of 
"party" we adopt for the purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) is not 
derived from the Official Comment to ABA Model Rule 4.2 
(concurring opn, p 3).

BELLACOSA, J. (concurring):

          I agree that the Appellate Division blanket test too 
broadly precluded ex parte interviews by defining the term 
"parties" as used in Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) to include all 
current employees of a corporate defendant.  The Court instead 
adopts an "alter ego" definition which, as I see it, will 
function almost identically with the rejected test.  Also, there 
is a sacrifice of an unnecessarily disproportionate amount of the 
truth-discovering desideratum of the litigation process.  Lastly, 
there may be a circularity in the identification of and 
application to the "alter ego" test group, which could prolong 
pre-trial discovery and allow the shield of DR 7-104(A)(1) to be 
fashioned into a sword.
          These concerns could be avoided by limiting "parties", 
for the purposes of this professional responsibility rule, only 
to those who are in the "control group" of the corporate 
defendant; that is, "only those among the most senior management 
who exercise substantial control over the corporation" (see, 
Comment, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The 
Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications With One of 
Adverse Interest, 82 Northwestern Univ L Rev 1274, 1288, n 85).
          To be sure, that test is far from perfect itself.  But 
the "control group" definition better balances the respective 
interests by allowing the maximum number of informal interviews 
among persons with potentially relevant information, while 
safeguarding the attorney protections afforded the men and women 
whose protection may well be of paramount concern -- those at the 
corporate helm and the fictional entity itself, the corporation.  
Also, this approach is more consistent with the ordinary 
understanding and meaning of "party", and more reasonably fits 
the purpose for which the disciplinary rule exists; a 
professional responsibility purpose quite distinct from 
enactments in public law prescribing the rights and protections 
of parties to litigation.
          Discovery of the truth and relevant proofs is the end 
to which litigation is the means.  The fewer parties to whom 
counsel can informally turn in the quest for facts on behalf of a 
client's cause, the more cumbersome becomes the realization of 
this goal.  The Appellate Division's blanket definition and the 
"alter ego" test more severely limit access to parties with 
relevant information than does the control group test which I 
urge.  One commentator has noted, "any rule that limits the 
attorney's access to the truth necessarily contravenes a basic 
aim of our legal system" (Comment, Ex Parte Communications with 
Corporate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney 
Communications With One of Adverse Interest, 82 Northwestern Univ 
L Rev 1274, supra, at 1279; see also, Leubsdorf, Communicating 
With Another Lawyer's Client:  The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's 
Interests, 127 Pa L Rev 683, 695, and n 47).  Therefore, I 
believe the cost of the new "alter ego" test is too high and an 
unnecessary price to pay.
          The Court defines "party" as "corporate employees whose 
acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the 
corporation * * * or imputed to the corporation for purposes of 
its liability" (Majority opn, at 12).  Similar language to this 
definition is found in the Official Comment to ABA Model Rule 4.2 
and caused one commentator to note that "[t]his language is 
probably the foggiest of all" (Wyeth, Talking to the Other Side's 
Employees and Ex-Employees, 15 Litigation No. 4 [Summer 1989], at 
10).  One consequence is that the determination of who qualifies 
for the Disciplinary Rule's protection under the "alter ego" test 
may ironically replace a useful and straightforward ex parte 
interview with a whole new and expensive litigation tier.  There 
is, after all, a begging-the-question twist:  the purpose of 
pre-trial discovery -- or the ultimate litigation question 
itself -- may well be which employees fit into the protected 
"party" category under the "alter ego" classification.  Who 
comprises the much narrower and fewer corporate "control group" 
is a relatively less complicated and conflicted problem.
          I emphasize that attorney-client communications are 
unaffected by this case.  This privilege, however, serves 
different purposes and policies (see, Upjohn Co. v United States, 
449 US 383; Rossi v Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 73 NY2d 588).  
Also, an attorney representing an adverse party seeking to 
interview any corporate employee who has individually retained 
counsel would be bound by the prohibition of DR 7-104(A)(1).
          In sum, blanket protections from disclosure by a 
corporate defendant's employees may be appropriate and necessary 
when the alternative is a violation of the attorney-client 
privilege (Upjohn Co. v U.S., 449 US 383, supra; Rossi v Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield, 73 NY2d 588, supra).  That can be remedied 
and controlled after the fact, rather than by shutting down the 
opportunities for appropriate fact-gathering at the outset.  The 
narrower restriction seems particularly suited to the situation 
before us, inasmuch as we are free to make a policy choice 
somewhat on a tabula rasa, save for the guidance only of the 
specialized Code of Professional Responsibility, not some broad 
public policy legislative enactment.  After all, "[i]t is not the 
purpose of the rule (DR 7-104[A][1]) to protect a corporate party 
from the revelation of prejudicial facts." (Wright v Group Health 
Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 200, 691 P.2d 564, 569 [1984]).

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion 
herein and, as so modified, affirmed.  Certified question 
answered in the negative.  Opinion by Judge Kaye.  Chief Judge 
Wachtler and Judges Simons, Alexander, Titone and Hancock concur.  
Judge Bellacosa concurs in a separate opinion.