Case Title: McGriff v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CEDRIC K. MCGRIFF,  
 
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No 49, 2006  
 
Defendant Below-   
 
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Appellant,  
 
 
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Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
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for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
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§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
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ID # 93002189DI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
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Submitted:  April 30, 2007 
   Decided:  May 18, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, 
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
O R D E R 
This 18th day of May 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) Appellant Cedric K. McGriff appeals the denial of his motion for post-
conviction relief from his convictions of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree 
and Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree.  McGriff initially argued that the 
Superior Court erred in finding that Crawford v. Washington1 did not apply 
retroactively to his case.  This Court heard oral argument on the matter and then 
stayed this appeal pending the United States Supreme Court’s decision on whether 
                                          
 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2
Crawford is to be applied retroactively which was at issue in Whorton v. Bockting.2  
On February 28, 2007 the United States Supreme Court decided that Crawford did 
not apply retroactively in federal habeas corpus review.  We then directed the parties 
to file supplemental memoranda addressing that decision.  McGriff has argued in his 
supplemental memorandum that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow his 
convictions to stand.  After considering all the arguments presented, we find no merit 
to McGriff’s appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) In Bockting, the United States Supreme Court held that “Crawford 
announced a ‘new rule’ of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall within 
the Teague exception for watershed rules.”3  Accordingly, Crawford would not apply 
retroactively to McGriff’s case on federal habeas corpus review.  We have 
consistently followed federal habeas corpus jurisprudence when addressing the issue 
of retroactivity on postconviction review under Delaware’s postconviction rule.4   
(3) Despite acknowledging our recognition of federal habeas corpus 
jurisprudence in construing Delaware’s post-conviction rule,5 McGriff argues that 
“all of the evidence proving the elements of the offense resulting in a life sentence 
                                          
 
2 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007). 
3 Id. at 1184. 
4  See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1126-29 (Del. 1991); Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 
748-49 (Del. 1990); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554-56 (Del. 1990). 
5 McGriff concedes in his Opening Supplemental Memorandum that “Delaware judicial decisions 
have consistently utilized federal habeas corpus decisional law, almost since Delaware’s post-
 3
was proven through the constitutional violation and it would be a miscarriage of 
justice to provide jurisdiction to impose a life sentence under these circumstances . . . 
.”   
(4) McGriff’s argument is unpersuasive.  McGriff was not convicted in 
violation of his right of confrontation.  This Court upheld McGriff’s conviction on 
direct appeal, consistent with the case law applicable at that time.6  Because Crawford 
does not apply retroactively, the caselaw in effect at the time of McGriff’s direct 
appeal has not been overturned and it continues to apply in any postconviction review 
of the proceedings leading to McGriff’s convictions.  The constitutional validity of 
McGriff’s conviction has been formerly adjudicated and upheld.  The Superior Court 
did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed McGriff’s motion for postconviction 
relief because it was barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4).       
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                                                                                                            
conviction rule was promulgated, in construing its own post-conviction rule to deny post conviction 
claims, including claims of retroactivity, under Delaware’s post-conviction rule.”   
6 McGriff v. State, 781 A.2d 534 (Del. 2001).