Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF JRH, Minor Child: MJH V. AV and DV

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-05-9

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF JRH, Minor Child: MJH V. AV and DV2006 WY 89138 P.3d 683Case Number: C-05-9Decided: 07/21/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF 
JRH, Minor Child:

 
 
MJH,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
AV and DV,

 
 
Appellees

(Petitioners).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

The Honorable John C. 
Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Bert T. Ahlstrom, Jr., of Ahlstrom Law Offices, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellees:

Christopher M. Wages, of Goodard, Wages & Vogel, 
Buffalo, Wyoming.

            

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice, delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, Chief Justice, files a 
specially concurring opinion, with which GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
biological father, appeals from the district court's order granting the adoption 
of his daughter without his consent.  
We affirm.

 

 
 

[¶2]      Father presents the 
following issue for review:

 
 
Whether the district 
court abused its discretion in holding that the nonconsenting biological father 
in a contested adoption proceeding had willfully failed to pay child support, 
thus allowing the adoption to proceed without his consent pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 2003)?

 
 
Appellees, Mother and 
adoptive Father, present an additional issue for review:

 
 
Whether this appeal must 
be dismissed because it was not timely filed?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Appellant and 
Mother were not married at the time their daughter was born on August 21, 
1999.1  On February 2, 2000, an order was 
entered establishing paternity and requiring Appellant to pay $168.00 per month 
in child support.  Soon thereafter, 
Appellant was convicted of a criminal offense.  As a consequence, he completed the 
Youthful Offender's Program and was placed on intensive supervised 
probation.  In November 2001, 
Appellant was arrested for a felony drug offense.  He was subsequently convicted.   As a result of this offense, 
Appellant served time in the LaramieCounty jail, the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, the Wyoming Honor Farm and the Adult Community Corrections (ACC) 
facility in Cheyenne.  
He was still in the ACC program when the petition for adoption was filed. 
 

 
 
[¶4]      In 2004, 
Appellant petitioned the district court for a reduction in his child support 
obligation.  The district court 
determined that Appellant's net monthly income was $1,200.00 per month and 
entered an order increasing Appellant's support obligation to $254.00 per month 
effective September 1, 2004.  From 
November 2001 through August 2004, Appellant's total support obligation was 
$5,712.00.  He paid only 
$895.10.  From September 1, 2004, 
through the date of the hearing on the necessity of consent, Appellant paid a 
total of $800.00 in child support.  
Appellant made no payments on his arrearages after the petition to adopt 
was filed.  Prior to trial in March 
2005, Appellant had not seen his daughter since June 2002.

 
 

[¶5]      Mother and 
adoptive Father began living together in 2001.  They married prior to the initiation of 
the adoption proceedings.  The 
adoption petition and Mother's consent to the adoption were filed on October 7, 
2004.  Appellant filed his response 
objecting to the adoption on November 10, 2004.  An 
unreported bench trial was held on March 21, 2005, to determine whether 
Appellant's consent to the adoption was necessary.  On April 12, 2005, the district court 
issued its "Findings and Conclusions Regarding Adoption Without Consent" 
(Findings and Conclusions).  The 
court determined that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not required 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 2003) because he had 
willfully failed to pay seventy percent of court ordered child support for a 
period exceeding two years prior to the filing of the petition and had failed to 
bring his support obligation current within sixty days after service of the 
petition to adopt.   

 
 

[¶6]      Following 
issuance of the district court's Findings and Conclusions, a subsequent hearing 
was held in May 2005, regarding the suitability of petitioner as an adoptive 
father.  The district court 
determined that the petition for adoption should be granted and entered the 
Decree of Adoption on May 31, 2005.  
This appeal followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]      Appellant 
contends the district court erred by granting the adoption without his 
consent.  He claims that sufficient 
evidence does not exist to support the finding that his failure to meet his 
child support obligation was willful.  
He contends that his failure to pay the required support resulted solely 
from his incarceration.  

 
 

[¶8]      Mother 
and adoptive father claim that the evidence supports the district court's 
decision.  They also request 
dismissal of this appeal on the basis that Appellant failed to file a notice of 
appeal within thirty days from entry of the Findings and Conclusions.  They claim that the consent 
determination made in the Findings and Conclusions effectively ended Appellant's 
participation in the adoption proceeding and constituted a final appealable 
order.  

 
 

A.  Timeliness of the 
Appeal

 
 

[¶9]      The threshold 
issue in this case is whether the appeal was timely.  "The timely filing of a notice of appeal 
. . . is jurisdictional."  W.R.A.P. 
1.03.  Where we lack jurisdiction, 
an appeal must be dismissed.  Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 241, 247 (Wyo. 2003); Harding v. 
Glatter, 2002 WY 124, ¶ 6, 53 P.3d 538, 539 (Wyo. 2002).  An 
appeal is timely if it is filed with the clerk of the district court within 
thirty days of the entry of the "appealable order."  W.R.A.P. 2.01.  An "appealable order" is defined 
as:

 
 

(a)               
An 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or

(b)               
An 
order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; 
or

(c)               
An 
order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
or

(d)               
An 
order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated 
in Rule 59(a) (4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is taken from such an 
order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal 
by another party; or

(e)               
Interlocutory 
orders and decrees of the district courts which:

(1)               
Grant, 
continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve 
or modify injunctions; or

(2)               
Appoint 
receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
1.05.

 
 

[¶10]   Mother 
and adoptive Father contend that the Findings and Conclusions entered by the 
district court constitute an appealable order.  Appellant 
asserts that the Findings and Conclusions were not in the form of an order and 
cannot constitute an order "in any respect."  See Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 
733 (Wyo. 
1987) ("findings of fact and conclusions of law not in the form of an order' 
cannot be considered as a final order 
for purposes of appeal") (emphasis in original).  Appellant claims that the Findings and 
Conclusions did not make a final determination from which an appeal could be 
taken because the district court had not yet granted the adoption and the 
specific terms of the Findings and Conclusions reflected that further action was 
contemplated.2  He contends his appeal was timely 
because it was filed within thirty days of entry of the Decree of Adoption.  

 
 

[¶11]   Regardless 
of whether the Findings and Conclusions are deemed an "order," our jurisprudence 
permits an appeal from the final decree of adoption.  Geerts v. Jacobsen, 2004 WY 148, ¶ 13, 
100 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Wyo. 2004) ("The general rule is that all provisional or 
interlocutory proceedings in a matter are merged in, and disposed of, by the 
final decree."); In re Adoption of 
CJH, 778 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1989) (the order regarding willfulness of 
failure to pay child support was an interlocutory order and became final upon 
the entry of the final decree of adoption); In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 
1260, 1262 (Wyo. 1985) (appeal was from the final order of adoption even though 
alleged error related to the consent determination).  See also In re Adoption of TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 1, 
46 P.3d 863, 866 (Wyo. 2002) (appeal taken from the district court's order 
granting the adoption); In re Adoption of 
KJD, 2002 WY 26, ¶ 20, 41 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2002) (appeal taken from the 
final decree of adoption); In re Adoption 
of CF, 2005 WY 118, ¶¶ 8-9, 120 P.3d 992, 998 (Wyo. 2005) (appeal from the 
final decree of adoption).

 
 

[¶12]   We 
conclude the appeal was timely filed.  
Appellant filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the 
Decree of Adoption.  Appellant's 
failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the district court 
issued its Findings and Conclusions does not bar our review.    

 
 

B.     
Willful 
Failure to Pay Child Support

 
 

[¶13]   District 
courts have the power and discretion to grant adoptions without parental consent 
"provided all the statutory elements are satisfied."  See In re Adoption of CF, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d  
at 998.  We review adoption decrees 
under the abuse of discretion standard:

 
 
The 
power to grant or deny a petition for adoption is within the discretion of the 
trial court.  Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 
377 (Wyo.1996); Matter of Adoption of 
GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 988 (Wyo.1986). "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria." Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 
(Wyo.1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986)). "In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably have 
concluded as it did." Matter of Adoption 
of BGH, 930 P.2d  at 377-78 (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 
76 (Wyo.1982)). 

 
 

Id., ¶ 10, 
120 P.3d  at 998-999.  Furthermore, 
because the right to associate with one's child is a fundamental right protected 
by the Wyoming 
and United States Constitutions, adoption statutes are strictly construed when 
the proceeding is against a nonconsenting parent, and every reasonable 
intendment is made in favor of that parent's claims.  Id., ¶ 11, 120 P.3d  at 999.  "[T]he party 
requesting adoption bears the burden of proving the existence of at least one of 
the statutory factors by clear and convincing evidence."  Id.  We have defined clear and convincing 
evidence as "that kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the 
truth of the contention is highly probable."  Id.

 
 

[¶14]   The 
district court determined that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not 
required pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (LexisNexis 2003) which 
states:

 
 
(a) 
      In addition 
to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child may be 
ordered without the written consent of a parent or the putative father if the 
court finds that the nonconsenting parent or putative father is unknown and that 
the putative father has not registered under W.S. 1-22-117 and the affidavit 
required by W.S. 1-22-109(a)(iv) has been filed with the petition to adopt or if 
the court finds that the putative father or the nonconsenting parent or parents 
have:

 
 
. . . 

 
 
(ix)       Willfully 
failed to pay a total dollar amount of at least seventy percent (70%) of the 
court ordered support for a period of two (2) years or more and has failed to 
bring the support obligation one hundred percent (100%) current within sixty 
(60) days after service of the petition to adopt.

 
 

[¶15]   Appellant 
concedes that he failed to pay at least seventy percent of the court ordered 
child support for two years or more.  
He also does not dispute that he failed to bring the support obligation 
current within sixty days of the filing of the adoption petition.  He does not contest the district court's 
finding that he failed to make any payments on his arrearage after the petition 
was filed.  Appellant's challenge is 
limited to the district court's finding that his failure to pay was 
willful.  He contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the district court's determination.  He states that the evidence supports his 
position that his failure to pay the required child support was due solely to 
his incarceration and that he "did the best he could."  He relies on In re Adoption of TLC, 2002 WY 76, 46 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2002), as support for his position.  His reliance is 
misplaced.

 
 

[¶16]   In TLC, we reversed a district court's 
consent determination because it improperly found a willful failure to pay 
support because the father was incarcerated.  Id., 46 P.3d 863.   In TLC, the district court found that the 
willfulness element was met because the conduct giving rise to the father's 
incarceration was willful.  
Id., ¶ 33, 46 P.3d  at 874.   Specifically, the district 
court stated that the "[Father's] failure to pay child support from October 8, 
1998, through October 8, 1999, is a consequence of incarceration which was his 
own making and which was willful."  
Id.  We found this approach to be clearly 
erroneous.  We explained "[t]he act 
that must be willful is the failure to pay support.  Incarceration, standing alone, does not 
provide the direct intent necessary to constitute willful failure to pay under 
the pertinent statute."  Id., ¶ 34, 46 P.3d  at 874.  We reasoned that to 
hold otherwise would allow the granting of an adoption without parental consent 
to be "based upon a mere desire to compound the sentence for a parent's past 
crime."  Id., ¶ 34, 46 P.3d  at 874-875.

 
 

[¶17]   However, 
and significantly for purposes of this case, we also noted in TLC that incarceration does not provide 
total justification for nonpayment of child support.  Id., ¶ 36, 46 P.3d  at 875.  We reiterated that 
"[a] parent must always pay child support according to his or her financial 
ability."  Id.  We instructed that the "courts should 
look at whether the parent has demonstrated, through whatever financial means 
available to him, that the parent has not forgotten his statutory obligation to 
his child."  Id.

 
 

[¶18]   In this 
case, the district court did not make a specific finding that Father's willful 
failure to pay was due to incarceration.  
Rather, the finding related to "willfulness" simply 
stated:

 
 

21.             
Pursuant 
to W.S. §1-22-110(a)(ix) Father has willfully failed to pay at least 70% of 
court-ordered support for periods exceeding two years.  Also, Father did not make any payments 
toward arrearages after being served with the petition to adopt 
herein.

 
 
The 
underlying basis for this finding was not set forth by the district court.  

[¶19]   Appellant 
bears the burden of providing this court with a sufficient record to allow 
proper evaluation of the district court's decision.  Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005).  
Appellant failed to do so in this case.  The consent determination hearing was 
unreported and a statement of the evidence was not filed pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
3.03.  As a result, our review is 
limited to the district court's findings of fact.  In re Adoption of TLC, ¶ 14, 46 P.3d  at 
869.  The district court found that 
Appellant's failure to pay the requisite child support was willful and concluded 
that his consent was not required for the adoption.  Although Appellant argues that clear and 
convincing evidence does not support that finding, without a sufficient record 
to review, we must assume that the district court's findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.  Id.  Based upon the record before us, we find 
no error in the district court's determination that Appellant's consent to the 
adoption was not required. 

 
 

[¶20]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The record before us does not contain a transcript of the hearings.  The parties also failed to file a 
statement of the evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.  For the limited purpose of generating 
this contextual portion of the opinion, the following facts are derived from the 
district court's Findings and Conclusions Regarding Adoption Without 
Consent.  

 
 

2The final 
two paragraphs of the Findings and Conclusions 
state:

 
 
The Court 
further concludes it should examine Petitioner . . . in Chambers to determine 
his suitability to be an adoptive father and whether or not that relationship 
would be in the best interest of [JRH].

 
 
The Court 
further concludes that if Petitioner appears to be an appropriate adoptive 
father, a decree of adoption could be entered 
herein.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶21]   I concur in the result of 
this case, but the appeal should have been dismissed as untimely.  The appellant should have appealed from 
the Findings and Conclusions Regarding Adoption Without Consent because, 
thereafter, he was no longer a party to the case.  The adoption statutes clearly envision a 
bifurcated process.  In the first 
hearing, a determination is made whether a defendant's parental rights should be 
terminated or whether the adoption should proceed without his consent.  See Matter of Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1163-64 (Wyo. 1998); Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 
627 (Wyo. 1989); and Matter of Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1263-64 (Wyo. 1985).  The defendant is a party to that 
proceeding.  In the second hearing, 
a determination is made whether the proposed adoptive parent is 
appropriate.  The defendant is not a 
party to that proceeding, does not receive notice of the proceeding, and is not 
served with a copy of the resultant decree.  It simply cannot be that the adoption 
statutes and the amended appellate rules contemplate the defendant taking an 
appeal from something of which he has no official 
knowledge.