Case Title: DiEnes v. SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

Citation: 21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1968-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
442 P.2d 468 (1968) 21 Utah 2d 147 Judith H. DiENES and Dianne D. McMain, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. No. 11048. Supreme Court of Utah. June 10, 1968. *469 Max K. Mangum of Mulliner, Prince & Mangum, Salt Lake City, for appellants. Rex J. Hanson and Merlin R. Lybbert of Hanson & Baldwin, Salt Lake City, for respondent. ELLETT, Justice: This is a suit by beneficiaries upon an insurance policy containing the following language: The point involved in this appeal is the interpretation of the quoted language: Does it mean that the plaintiffs can recover if death resulted from an injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, even though the physical condition of the insured may have been a contributing factor in causing his death? Or does it mean that the death of the insured must be caused solely through external, violent and accidental means? The plaintiffs claim the former, the defendant the latter. At the pretrial conference, the court recognized the problem and stated it clearly. However, instead of ruling on it, he made the following order: "The parties will be prepared to argue this matter at the time of trial and will provide the Trial Court with a brief in connection therewith." Under Rule 16, U.R.C.P., the court at pretrial should consider among other things, "(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." This provision permits and contemplates that disputed issues of law should be recognized and ruled upon, if possible, before the case is called for trial. 3 Moore's Federal Practice 1125 § 16.16. By making a determination of what the applicable law is, the court greatly assists counsel in their attempts to settle the matter, and if settlement cannot be effected, then the parties know better how *470 to marshal the evidence for trial. It would have been better, in this case, if the pretrial judge had ruled on the issue of law which he recognized instead of passing it on for a ruling by the trial judge on the day of trial. However, a jury trial was had and the matter fully tried and verdict given for the defendant. Before instructing the jury, the trial court in chambers stated to counsel: The plaintiffs' request for an instruction on their theory of the case was refused. Instead, the court instructed in the language of the policy and thereby left the interpretation of the language of the policy to the jury. The trial court advised plaintiffs' counsel that he would not permit him to argue that the insuring agreement was ambiguous and that in his argument to the jury plaintiffs' counsel would be governed by the law as stated in the court's instructions. Despite his holding that the policy was not ambiguous, the court had further conversation with counsel as follows: The law is stated in Corbin on Contracts, § 559, as follows: The rule for interpreting an insurance policy is stated in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Larson in Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 561, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073, as follows: It will be noted that the policy in the instant case in not that the insurer will pay if death results solely from external, violent and accidental means, as the usual policy provides. Instead, it promises payment if death results from injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. The exclusionary provision is not the usual case where no payment will be made for death caused in whole or in part from disease, etc. The exclusion here is that "no benefits * * * shall be paid for accidental death * * * caused by * * * disease." A case squarely in point was before the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1950, wherein it was held: While Utah has no statute which renders unenforcible in favor of the insurer any agreement that is not plainly expressed in the application and policy, the law is clearly to the effect that no ambiguous statement is to be enforced against an insured. See Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra. We think the proper interpretation to be placed upon the language of the provisions of the policy involved in the instant case is that plaintiffs may recover if the insured died as a result of injuries sustained solely by external, violent and accidental means. It is no defense to the action to claim that a normal person would not have died as a result of the injuries received. Even though the life of the insured hangs by a precarious thread, the beneficiaries under this type of policy can recover when death results from injuries and would not have occurred at that time expect for those injuries. By instructing in the language of the policy, the trial court erroneously permitted the jury to determine the legal effect thereof. From the general verdict renderd by the jury, it is not possible for us to know whether the jury found as a fact that death *472 was caused by a heart attack independent of injuries received in the accident or whether death resulted from a heart attack induced by such injuries and which otherwise would not have occurred at that time. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a trial of the issue as to whether death resulted from injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, i.e., whether the insured died from a heart attack resulting from those injuries. Costs to plaintiffs. CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. HENRIOD, J., concurs in the result. [1] The name Lifeco has been changed to Safeco. [2] Standard Life Ins. Co. of the South v. Foster, 210 Miss. 242, 49 So. 2d 391, 395.