Case Title: State v. Anzai

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAWUBRAHY

*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIZ)~

STATE OF HAWAT'T,

BETTY ANZAT

No, 27258

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1, Defendant -Appel lant /Cross-Appellee.

 

APPEAL PROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT

(By: Moon, C.J.,

(CR. NO. 4-1-0024)

‘SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.)

Defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Betty Anzai appeals

from the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit's april 19, 2005

Judgment? convicting

her of and sentencing her for theft in the

second degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

§§ 708-830(8) (Supp. 2005)* and 708-831(1) (b) (1993). on

 

\ me Honorable 01

308)

 

(8) sop
(a)

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2 RS § 708-8312)

mete

offense of theft in the second degr

theses

wrog K. Nakamura presided over this matter.
) provides in relevant part

feing,

‘A person conceal or takes possession of the

Goods or merchandise of any store or retail
Seeablisnment, with intent to defraud.

A person giters the price tag or ctner price
fmarking on goods or merchandise of any store or
Fetail establishment, with intent to defraud.

A person transfers the goods or merchandise of any
fcore of retail eatablishment from one container to
another, with intent to defraud.

 

 

 

() provides:

in the second degree. (1) A person commits the
if the person commits

 

(continued...)
appeal, Anzai contends that the trial court erred when it
adnitted duplicate (as opposed to the original) register receipts
regarding the value of the stolen items into evidence. The state
of Hawai'i (hereinafter, the state or the prosecution] cross-
appeals, challenging the trial court's denial of its motion to
sentence Anzai as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5 (1993),
quoted intra.

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted and having given due consideration to the arguments

advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve the

 

parties’ contentions as follows.

(2) Anzai contends that the pricing information as
shown on the duplicate register receipts entered into evidence as
Exhibit 4A was inadmisaible hearsay and, thus, should have been
excluded by the trial court. Anzai further argues that, even
assuming that there is a hearsay exception for admitting the
duplicate register receipta into evidence, the State failed to
vduly identify” or properly authenticate the duplicate register
receipts.

In State v. Long, 98 Hawai'i 348, 48 P.3d 595 (2002),
this court held that a “‘lack of foundation’ objection generally

is insufficient to preserve foundational issues for appeal

 

>. scontinued)
(b) of property or services the value of which

exceeds §3001-]

(gold emphasis in original.) Theft in the second degree is a class c felony.
uke § 708-633 (2)

 

-2-
because such an objection does not advise the trial court of the
problems with the foundation." Id. at 353, 48 P.3d at 600.
However, the Long court noted that “an exception is recognized
when the objection ie overruled and, based on the context, it is

Ids

 

evident what the general objection was meant to convey.
‘Thus, a specific objection is not necessary “where the defect is
obvious from the context.” Long, 98 Hawai'i at 354, 48 P.3d at
601.

Here, after Decker and Hirayama testified with respect
to the duplicate register receipts, the State moved Bxhibit 4A
into evidence, Defense counsel then conducted a voir dire
examination of Hirayama’s testinony. After Hirayama stated that

he gave both the original and duplicate register receipts to

 

Decker, the following dialogue occurre:

(By defense counsel]: Thank you. Qbiection, Your Honor.
(tae coure) « Okay, ive received.
(by the prosecution): Thank you

Accordingly, it is clear that Anzai’s trial counsel made only a
general objection againet the admission of Exhibit 4A into
evidence.

Nonetheless, auch general objection will be sufficient
to preserve an issue for appellate review only if “the defect is
obvious from the context.“ Long, 98 Hawai'i at 354, 48 P.3d at
601. At trial, it appears that Anzai was objecting to the use of
duplicate, as opposed to original, register receipts by the
State. As such, Anzai was likely objecting to the admission of

the duplicate register receipts on the basis of @ lack of

 
foundation. However, on appeal, Anzai claims that Exhibit 4A was
erroneously admitted into evidence inasmuch as (1) the duplicate
register receipts constitute hearsay and (2) the prosecution
failed to establish a proper foundation for the duplicate
register receipts. Consequently, based on Anzai‘s own assertions

on appeal, Anzai’s trial counsel could have objected on at least

 

two different grounds to the admission of Exhibit 4A into
evidence. Moreover, unlike in Long, defense counsel in the

did not even state that the objection was based on

 

inatant ©

 

insufficient foundation. Accordingly, we hold that Anzai failed
to sufficiently preserve her hearsay and lack of foundation
contentions for appellate review.

(2) On cross-appeal, the State contends that the trial
court exred in denying its motion to impose a mandatory term by

concluding that Anzai’

 

resentencing on December 12, 1995 cannot
be considered a “conviction” for the purpose of calculating the
ten-year time limit under HRS § 706-606.5(2). The State
maintains that, because *[a] conviction eccurs on the date
judgment is entered[,]* HRS § 706-606.5(7) (c), and a resentencing
is considered a judgment, the ten-year time limit can be measured

from the December 12, 1995 resentencing. Inasmuch as Anzai

‘Anais final contention on appeal is that, “with the exclusion of
the receipes (Gxhibit 4A}, the State failed to introduce the substantial
evidence of the value of the itens necessary to support the charged offense of
theft in the second degree (shoplifting property of a value exceeding $300)”
(Capital letters altered.) However, implicit in Ancai’s argument is that,
With the admission of Exhibit 4A, the state had introduced the substantial
evidence of the value of the irene necessary to support the charged offence:
Noreover, HRS § 708-820(0) (Supp. 2005) unequivocally provides that "printed
resister receipta|) shall be prima facie evidence of value and ownerahip of

S goods oF merchandise.”

 

   

 
committed the instant offense on December 26, 2003, the State
contends that the instant offense was committed within ten years

from December 12, 1995, and, thus, Anzai is subject to the

 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
HRS § 706-606.5(2) provides in relevant part:

(2) Except as in subsection (3), a person shall not be
sentenced to a mandatory minimum period of imprisoanent
under thie section unless the instant felony offense was
committed during such period as follows:

 

 

   

‘ai * 2
‘where the prior Felony conviction was for a
Class 8 felony!)
(Bmphasis added.) HRS § 706-606.5(7) (c) states that, for the

ction 706-606.5, “[a] conviction occurs on the date

 

purpose of
judgment ie entered.” Furthermore, HRS § 641-11 (1993) provides
in relevant part that *[t]he sentence of the court in a criminal
je shall be the judgment." See also State v, Rodriquez, 66

Haw, 124, 133, 706 P.24 1293, 1300 (1985) (noting that this court

 

hi

 

read “‘conviction’ to mean ‘judgment’ or ‘sentence [1‘*).
In the instant case, if we were to accept the state's
position that the ten-year time period in HRS § 706-606.5(2) can
be measured from the resentencing of the prior felony conviction,
such a construction would lead to the absurd result that there
can be multiple convictions for the sane offense. Inasmuch as
*{t]he legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result,
and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible,
inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality(,]* state vi
Naititi, 104 Hawai'i 224, 232, 87 P.3d 893, 901 (2004) (internal

quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted), we conclude

 
that the ten-year time period in HRS § 706-606.5(2) be measured
from the initial sentencing of the prior felony conviction.

Thue, inasmuch as the instant felony committed on December 26,
2003 did not occur within ten years after Anzai‘s prior felony
conviction on February 18, 1993, we hold that the trial court did

not err when it denied the State's motion to impos

 

a mandatory
term. Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial court’s April 19,
2005 judgment is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 13, 2006.

on the briefs: ofp
Ble PiLeisae

Darren W. K. Ching,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for plaintift-appellee/
cross-appellant Peau Cade ree

Gregory 7. Grab, for
defendant -appeliant/

cross-appellee (jeme, Autiys B+