Case Title: State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5346

Docket Number: 20071715

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-
5346.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DUNCAN v. PORTAGE COUNTY  
BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346.] 
Mandamus — Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to place 
name of candidate for city council on the November 6, 2007 election 
ballot — Writ denied. 
(No. 2007-1715 ─ Submitted October 2, 2007 ─ Decided October 8, 2007.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel a board of elections and its members to place a candidate’s name on the 
November 6, 2007 election ballot for a city council seat.  Because the board 
neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded applicable law by upholding a 
protest to the relator’s candidacy, we deny the writ. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Richard A. Duncan, circulated a petition to be a candidate 
for an at-large seat on the Aurora City Council.  In the petition that he filed with 
respondent Portage County Board of Elections, Duncan listed an address in 
Aurora as his permanent residence.  The board certified Duncan’s name to the 
election ballot, and George Mazzaro submitted by facsimile transmission a protest 
challenging Duncan’s candidacy for the city council seat, claiming that Duncan is 
not a legal resident of Aurora. 
{¶ 3} On September 11, 2007, the board of elections held a hearing on 
the protest.  Duncan submitted an affidavit in which he stated that in August 2000, 
he moved from a unit in his parents’ duplex in Middlefield, Geauga County, Ohio, 
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to his house in Aurora, Portage County, Ohio, with his oldest daughter and had 
resided in Aurora since that time.  Duncan also submitted several documents, 
including checks, utility bills, and a federal income tax return, listing his Aurora 
house as his residence.  During the hearing, however, Mazzaro testified that when 
Duncan ran as a write-in candidate for president of the United States in 2004, he 
listed the Middlefield address as his residence, and that there is no record that 
Duncan has ever filed an Aurora income tax return.  Mazzaro submitted a copy of 
a Portage County auditor’s property report that he had obtained from the county 
website for the Aurora house that lists Middlefield as both Duncan’s residence 
address and mailing address. 
{¶ 4} Duncan conceded that his driver’s license and car registration list 
the Middlefield address as his residence, that he drove to the protest hearing from 
Middlefield, that he stays in Middlefield “off and on,” and that he still receives 
mail at a mailbox that is located at the Middlefield residence.  Duncan claims that 
he stays at the Middlefield unit on occasion to look after his elderly parents.  He 
did not answer a question at the hearing about where he slept most of the time. 
{¶ 5} At the hearing’s conclusion, the board upheld Mazzaro’s protest 
against Duncan’s candidacy and prevented his name from being placed on the 
November 6, 2007 election ballot as a candidate for the at-large seat on the 
Aurora City Council. 
{¶ 6} Less than a week later, Duncan filed this expedited election case 
for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the Portage County Board of 
Elections and its members, to place his name on the November 6, 2007 election 
ballot as a candidate for the at-large Aurora City Council seat.  Respondents 
submitted an answer, and the parties filed evidence and briefs pursuant to the 
accelerated schedule provided by S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court upon the merits. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to the writ, Duncan must establish a clear legal right 
to certification of his candidacy and placement of his name on the November 6 
election ballot, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the board of 
elections to certify his candidacy and place his name on the ballot, and the lack of 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Allen v. Warren 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 8.  
Given the proximity of the November 6 election, Duncan has established that he 
lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Canales-
Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 
N.E.2d 757, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 9} For the remaining requirements, to establish the requisite legal 
right and legal duty, Duncan “must prove that the board of elections engaged in 
fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of statutes or other 
pertinent law.”  Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 139, 2005-
Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 10} Duncan claims that the board of elections abused its discretion and 
clearly disregarded applicable law by upholding the protest of his candidacy 
based on his legal residence.  “An abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.”  State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 
238. 
{¶ 11} “In election cases involving candidate-residence issues, the court 
applies R.C. 3503.02.”  State ex rel. Stine v. Brown Cty. Bd. of Elections, 101 
Ohio St.3d 252, 2004-Ohio-771, 804 N.E.2d 415, ¶ 15.  That statute emphasizes 
the person’s intent to make a place a fixed or permanent place of abode: 
{¶ 12} “All registrars and judges of elections, in determining the residence 
of a person offering to register or vote, shall be governed by the following rules: 
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{¶ 13} “(A) That place shall be considered the residence of a person in 
which the person’s habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the person is 
absent, the person has the intention of returning. 
{¶ 14} “(B) A person shall not be considered to have lost the person’s 
residence who leaves the person’s home and goes into another state or county of 
this state, for temporary purposes only, with the intention of returning. 
{¶ 15} “(C) A person shall not be considered to have gained a residence in 
any county of this state into which the person comes for temporary purposes only, 
without the intention of making such county the permanent place of abode.” 
{¶ 16} There was conflicting evidence before the board of elections here 
concerning Duncan’s appropriate legal residence.  Although Duncan claims to 
have been an Aurora resident since 2000, the evidence indicated that he often 
stays in Middlefield, he listed Middlefield as his address when he ran as a write-in 
candidate in 2004, and his driver’s license and car registration designate 
Middlefield as his home address.  In addition, the Portage County auditor lists 
Middlefield in Geauga County as both Duncan’s residence address and mailing 
address, and he refused to respond to a question about where he usually slept.  “ 
‘We will not substitute our judgment for that of a board of elections if there is 
conflicting evidence on an issue.’ ”  State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 32, quoting 
State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 
185, 724 N.E.2d 771.  “We have applied this principle to deny writs challenging 
decisions of boards of elections on candidate-residence issues.”  Stine, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 252, 2004-Ohio-771, 804 N.E.2d 415, ¶ 21; State ex rel. Herdman v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 593, 596, 621 N.E.2d 1204. 
{¶ 17} Moreover, Duncan failed to submit a complete transcript of the 
protest hearing when he filed this evidence, which would have normally required 
us to presume the regularity of the board’s determination.  See, e.g., Christy v. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 39, 671 N.E.2d 1; Hardy 
v. McFaul, 103 Ohio St.3d 408, 2004-Ohio-5467, 816 N.E.2d 248, ¶ 10.  
Respondents, nevertheless, submitted a complete transcript of the protest hearing 
with their merit brief.  A review of the complete transcript reveals that Duncan 
selectively deleted portions of the transcript from his evidentiary submission that 
were detrimental to his position on the residence issue, e.g., discussion of the 
Portage County auditor’s property report listing Middlefield as Duncan’s address 
and his refusal to respond to the board’s query about where he usually slept. 
{¶ 18} Finally, Duncan’s claim that the protest was improper and 
untimely lacks merit.  Neither R.C. 3513.263 nor R.C. 3501.39 precludes a board 
of elections from filing and considering a protest sent by facsimile transmission.  
Nor has Duncan provided evidence to support his claim that the protest was filed 
on September 4.  Insofar as the parties appear to agree that the protest was filed 
on September 4, it was still timely filed under R.C. 3513.263, which requires that 
written protests against a nominating petition must be filed “not later than the 
64th day before the general election.”  Because the 64th day before the November 
6 general election fell on September 3, the Labor Day holiday, protests could be 
timely filed “on the next succeeding day that is not a Sunday or a legal holiday,” 
i.e., September 4.  R.C. 1.14.  “We have applied R.C. 1.14 to election cases.”  
State ex rel. Commt. for the Proposed Ordinance to Repeal Ordinance No. 146-
02, W. End Blight Designation v. Lakewood, 100 Ohio St.3d 252, 2003-Ohio-
5771, 798 N.E.2d 362, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 19} Even if the protest was untimely, the board was authorized under 
R.C. 3501.39(A)(3) to sua sponte reject Duncan’s candidacy.  State ex rel. 
O’Beirne v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 176, 182, 685 
N.E.2d 502 (“the board can refuse to accept a petition even in the absence of a 
written protest if it determines that it violates the applicable legal requirements”).  
The board’s rejection of Duncan’s candidacy would have been timely under R.C. 
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3501.39(B), which prohibits the board from invalidating any declaration of 
candidacy or nominating petition under R.C. 3501.39(A)(3) “after the fiftieth day 
prior to the election at which the candidate seeks nomination to office.” 
{¶ 20} In conclusion, the board neither abused its discretion nor clearly 
disregarded applicable law by sustaining Mazzaro’s protest and refusing to certify 
Duncan’s name as a candidate for the city council seat at the November 6 
election.  Therefore, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Richard A. Duncan, pro se. 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Leigh S. 
Prugh, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
______________________