Case Title: State v. McDaniels

Citation: 237 Kan. 767, 703 P.2d 789

Docket Number: 57,372

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
237 Kan. 767 (1985)
703 P.2d 789
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY ALLEN McDANIELS, Appellee.
57,372

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 26, 1985.
Jerry Wells, assistant district attorney, argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, Jerry L. Harper, district attorney, and Kathryn Welch, legal intern, were on the brief for the appellant.
Harry E. Warren, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, C.J.:
This is an appeal in a criminal action by the State from the trial court's order denying the State's motion to rescind its diversion agreement with the defendant. We hold this court is without jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
On January 25, 1984, Jeffrey McDaniels (defendant-appellee), Dwight Thuro, and Thomas Green were arrested for stealing four tires and wheels from a pickup truck belonging to Turner Chevrolet in Lawrence, Kansas. At the time they were initially stopped by the police, Thuro was driving the car; Green and *768 McDaniels were passengers. The tires were found in the trunk of the car. Thuro and McDaniels immediately confessed that they had stolen the tires and wheels from Turner Chevrolet. Green did not confess. All three were charged with felony theft (K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 21-3701). Thuro eventually pled guilty to the charges.
On April 27, 1984, McDaniels was granted a twelve-month diversion, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2907. The diversion agreement provided that the charges against the defendant would be dismissed with prejudice after twelve months, if he complied with certain specific conditions. The following conditions are pertinent:
....
....
In the statement provided pursuant to the diversion agreement, and after it was made, McDaniels swore to the following:
On July 20, 1984, McDaniels was called by the State as a witness in codefendant Thomas Green's preliminary hearing. On direct examination, when asked why Green left with the car during the theft, defendant said, "I don't know. He just didn't want to be there." When asked why Green came back, defendant replied, "Well, we told him. He didn't want to be there while we was taking them. He left, and we told him to come back and pick us up when, you know." Finally, the prosecutor queried, "So *769 when he left, he knew that he was to come back to pick up the tires from you, is that correct?" Defendant answered, "Yeah."
On recross, Green's attorney asked, "It was your understanding though that [Green] didn't want to have anything to do with it?", to which defendant replied, "Yeah."
The prosecutor did not inquire as to what was meant by "it." Nor did the prosecutor attempt to refresh McDaniels' memory with, or impeach him with, his previous sworn statement.
Subsequently, Green's case was dismissed at the close of the preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause. The trial court's decision was affirmed by this court in State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146, 697 P.2d 1305 (1985).
The State, believing the defendant had given contradictory statements under oath, filed a motion to rescind diversion because the defendant had breached two of the conditions in the agreement. First, he had failed to testify "truthfully and willingly" against Green at the preliminary hearing. Second, by failing to testify truthfully, he had committed perjury which is a violation of the law.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, heard arguments from both counsel, and concluded:
The State appealed from the court's order claiming it was error, and that the court should have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant breached his contract with the State.
K.S.A. 22-2911(1) deals with a defendant's failure to fulfill the diversion agreement and provides as follows:
The statute does not provide that the district or county attorney may seek appellate review if the court finds the defendant had not failed to fulfill the terms of the agreement.
*770 Therefore, the threshold question in this case is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
In In re Waterman, 212 Kan. 826, 830, 512 P.2d 466 (1973), this court stated:
The statutes authorizing appeals by the prosecution in criminal actions are found at K.S.A 22-3602 and 22-3603.
K.S.A 22-3602(b) provides that appeals may be taken by the prosecution as follows:
"(2) From an order arresting judgment;
"(3) Upon a question reserved by the prosecution."
K.S.A. 22-3603 provides:
In order to have a final appealable judgment under K.S.A. 22-3602, a sentence must have been imposed or the imposition of the sentence suspended, or the case dismissed prior to trial. State v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 274, 689 P.2d 885 (1984). As long as the trial court has not terminated the case, and it is still pending in that court, an appeal taken by the State is interlocutory in nature. State v. Freeman, 234 Kan. 278, 670 P.2d 1365 (1983). In order for an interlocutory appeal to be allowed, it must fit within the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3603.
The State argues the trial court's order denying revocation of the diversion agreement was essentially an order "suppressing evidence" within the meaning of the statute. The appellee, on the other hand, argues that cases brought under the statute have always dealt with evidentiary questions and that since the trial court's order does not involve an evidentiary question, this appeal does not fall within the provisions of K.S.A 22-3603.
*771 The purpose of K.S.A. 22-3603 is to permit appellate review of pretrial rulings which may be determinative of the case. State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 680 P.2d 257 (1984); State v. Martin, 233 Kan. 148, 660 P.2d 563 (1983). As this court stated in State v. Newman, 235 Kan. at 35:
The primary reason for allowing the State to take interlocutory appeals from suppression orders which substantially impair its ability to prosecute the case is to avoid later problems with double jeopardy. In this case, even though the defendant may eventually have his charges dismissed with prejudice, jeopardy has not attached. Therefore, the State may appeal after the dismissal, and if the appeal is sustained, the defendant may be tried. Accordingly, the potential for a double jeopardy problem which exists in other cases where interlocutory appeals are permitted does not exist in this case.
Also, the possibility still exists that the defendant may violate his diversion agreement and the trial court, after conducting a hearing, may decide to revoke the diversion and proceed to trial.
We find in this case evidence was neither suppressed nor excluded within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, there is still a chance the defendant may be brought to trial. If he is, the State's ability to prosecute the case will not be impaired in any way. Accordingly, we hold the trial court's order was not appealable under K.S.A. 22-3603.
The State further argues that if this case is not entertained as an interlocutory appeal, the State should be allowed to restyle the case as an action in mandamus. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which lies to compel performance of a mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant and a want of any other appropriate and *772 adequate remedy. See Arney v. Director, Kansas State Penitentiary, 234 Kan. 257, 671 P.2d 559 (1983). In this case, the trial court exercised its power of discretion in finding the State had not done everything it could have to get the desired testimony out of the defendant at Green's preliminary hearing. The court then reviewed the evidence and concluded the defendant had not breached his agreement to testify willingly and truthfully against Green. Clearly, the judge had no "mandatory duty" to find the diversion agreement had been breached. If such a duty existed, the K.S.A. 22-2911 hearing requirement would be rendered meaningless.
The extraordinary remedy of mandamus is not appropriate in this case where only a factual issue  whether the defendant breached the agreement  is involved.
At the present time, there is no statute which provides for an appeal to be taken by the State from a trial court's order denying revocation of a diversion agreement. We note that in a closely analogous situation  probation  the State is also without an avenue to appeal from a trial court's decision denying revocation of probation when the State thinks the terms of probation have been violated.
Until the legislature chooses to create a right in the State to appeal from a pretrial order denying the State's request to revoke diversion, the State may not appeal prior to the completion of the diversion and the dismissal of the case by the district court.
The appeal is dismissed.