Case Title: State v. Grigsby

Citation: 351 N.C. 454

Docket Number: 364PA99

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 364PA99
FILED: 7 APRIL 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CRAIG DARRYL GRIGSBY
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___,
___ S.E.2d ___ (1999), vacating a conviction and sentence for
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury entered by Gore, J., on 30 October 1997 in
Superior Court, New Hanover County, and remanding for entry of a
verdict for a lesser included offense and for resentencing. 
Heard in the Supreme Court 15 February 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Laura E. Crumpler
and Donald R. Esposito, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General,
for the State-appellant.
Nora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellee.
FREEMAN, Justice.
On 14 April 1997 defendant was indicted on charges of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon.  
A jury found defendant guilty as charged.  On 30 October 1997
defendant was sentenced to 133 to 169 months’ incarceration for
the assault conviction and to 117 to 150 months’ incarceration
for the robbery conviction, to run consecutively.  The Court of
Appeals concluded that each element of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury was supported by evidence in the
Upon asking whether it could consider the lighter fluid
1
in determining whether defendant had assaulted Love with the
intent to kill, the jury was instructed it could not, that it
could consider only the knife for that purpose.
record but that the evidence was insufficient as to defendant’s
intent to kill.  It accordingly vacated defendant’s conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury and ordered the case be remanded for entry of a
guilty verdict on the lesser included offense.  State v. Grigsby,
___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1999).  We reverse and remand
for reinstatement of the conviction and judgment entered by the
trial court on 30 October 1997.
The victim, David Love, testified that around 7:00 a.m. on
10 January 1996 he arrived at TGI Friday’s restaurant in
Wilmington, North Carolina, where he worked as assistant general
manager.  He heard a buzzer from the locked back door of the
restaurant and let in a beer salesman to check inventory.  Some
time later, Love heard the buzzer sound again, and, assuming it
was the salesman, he unlocked and opened the door.  He was
immediately grabbed by his hands and thrown to his knees.  His
assailant, whom he later identified as defendant, appeared to be
very agitated and started yelling and repeatedly demanding to
know how many people were in the building and how much money was
there.  Defendant began tying Love’s hands with duct tape, and
Love told defendant not to hurt him, that he would give him
whatever he wanted.  Leaving Love on his knees with his hands
bound, defendant put down the knife he had carried in with him
and went over to a bag and pulled out a can of lighter fluid,
threatening to burn Love if he did not get what he wanted.   
1
At this point, Love, who had been robbed before, noted
defendant had made no attempt to disguise himself and began to
fear for his life:  “[I]f you’re going to rob a place and you’ve
got a deadly weapon with you, you[‘d] better cover your face up
unless you’re not planning on leaving any witnesses.”  Love
figured he would “rather be stabbed to death than burned to
death” and lunged for the knife while defendant was pulling the
can of lighter fluid from his bag.  Defendant then jumped onto
Love’s back, but Love had a firm grip on the knife, which was an
“assault-type” knife with finger holes.  Love started “wailing
[sic] away” at defendant with the knife and was certain he had
stabbed defendant.  Defendant then started running for the back
door; but Love, who thought defendant might have another knife or
gun under his coat, managed to stab him once more in the back or
shoulder.  Defendant then fled out the back door.  Love
discovered shortly afterwards that he, too, had been stabbed and
his lung punctured.  He later surmised that, although he had held
the knife the entire time after defendant put it down, he had
been cut when defendant jumped on his back and grabbed his arms. 
Love said that the entire episode took only about five minutes,
and the struggle itself less than a minute, but he felt nothing
but ”total fear.”  Although Love was offering to give defendant
whatever he wanted, defendant was not listening to him, but was
“like a machine.” 
An acquaintance of defendant’s later testified that during
the preceding year defendant had asked him if he knew where to
find a gun.  About a week before the robbery, defendant asked the
witness, who had baby-sat for defendant’s sister, if he knew how
to drive from the restaurant to Hampstead, where defendant’s
sister lived.  He had also accompanied defendant to a pawnshop to
buy a knife (different from that used in the robbery), which the
witness later gave away. 
Another witness testified that during the same two-week
period in early January 1996 when the robbery occurred and while
defendant had been staying at his sister’s, defendant asked where
he could get a gun.  The witness did not know, and said so, and
that was the end of the matter.   But when the witness saw
defendant shortly after the scuffle with Love, defendant remarked
to him that “if [he] had had a gun, [he] would have gotten away
with it.” 
The only issue before this Court is whether the evidence was
sufficient as to defendant’s intent to kill to withstand
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.  The
elements of this charge are (1) an assault, (2) with a deadly
weapon, (3) an intent to kill, and (4) infliction of a serious
injury not resulting in death.  State v. James, 321 N.C. 676,
687, 365 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988).  In order to withstand a motion
to dismiss this charge, the State must present “substantial
evidence” of each element.  Id.  “‘Substantial evidence is that
amount of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”  State v. Alexander, 337 N.C.
182, 187, 446 S.E.2d 83, 86 (1994)(quoting State v. Porter, 303
N.C. 680, 685, 281 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1981)).  “When considering a
motion to dismiss, ‘[i]f the trial court determines that a
reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn from
the evidence, it must deny the defendant’s motion and send the
case to the jury even though the evidence may support reasonable
inferences of the defendant’s innocence.’”  Id. (quoting State v.
Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 79, 252 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1979)).  “[T]he
evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the
State and . . . the State is entitled to every reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom.”  Id.  
The Court of Appeals
correctly determined that substantial evidence supported each of
the three elements of the lesser included offense, assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.  We conclude that, in
addition, evidence in the record supports the intent-to-kill
element of the greater offense.  “An intent to kill is a mental
attitude, and ordinarily it must be proved, if proven at all, by
circumstantial evidence, that is, by proving facts from which the
fact sought to be proven may be reasonably inferred.”  State v.
Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 708, 94 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1956), quoted in
Alexander, 337 N.C. at 188, 446 S.E.2d at 87.  “[T]he nature of
the assault, the manner in which it was made, the weapon, if any,
used, and the surrounding circumstances are all matters from
which an intent to kill may be inferred.”  Alexander, 337 N.C. at
188, 446 S.E.2d at 87 (quoting State v. White, 307 N.C. 42, 49,
296 S.E.2d 267, 271 (1982)).  Moreover, an assailant “must be
held to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate act.” 
State v. Jones, 18 N.C. App. 531, 534, 197 S.E.2d 268, 270, cert.
denied, 283 N.C. 756, 198 S.E.2d 726 (1973).
 
Considered in the light most favorable to the State, the
following facts and circumstances surrounding defendant’s assault
of Love reasonably support the inference that defendant’s intent
was not only to rob or to injure, but to kill:  that defendant
leapt onto Love’s back once Love seized defendant’s knife and
that he struggled with Love, causing Love to be seriously
injured; that defendant threatened Love before and after the
scuffle without appearing to hear Love’s acquiescence in his
demands (cf. State v. Irwin, 55 N.C. App. 305, 285 S.E.2d 345
(1982)(evidence that defendant had threatened to kill victim if
demands were not met was conditional intent to kill, or specific
intent not to kill if the victims complied)); that defendant had
attempted to obtain and had subsequently regretted  not being
equipped with a gun at the assault; and that defendant had
instead obtained and chosen to use an assault-type knife with
finger-holes, designed to enable an assailant to repeatedly stab
a victim without losing his grip.
  
We hold that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, supports the charge of assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and that the trial
court did not err in submitting that charge for the consideration
of the jury.  The Court of Appeals thus erred in vacating and
remanding this case for entry of judgment and sentencing on the
lesser included offense.
REVERSED.