Case Title: Commonwealth v. Alemany

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12180

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12180 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDWIN J. ALEMANY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 5, 2021.  -  October 4, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Criminal Responsibility.  Insanity.  Intoxication.  
Mental Impairment.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Instructions to jury, Opening statement, Argument by 
prosecutor, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 15, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on December 31, 2018, was 
considered by Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (John P. 
Pappas, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted Edwin J. Alemany, the 
defendant, of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
felony-murder for strangling and stabbing Amy Lord.  He also was 
2 
 
convicted of a number of other offenses, including armed 
robbery, aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, and attempted murder, for the attacks on Lord, Alexandra 
Cruz, and Kayleigh Ballantyne.1  The sole issue before the jury 
was whether the defendant was criminally responsible for his 
conduct during the three assaults.  Following his convictions, 
the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that his trial 
counsel had conceded his guilt and proceeded with an insanity 
defense over his objection.  His request for a hearing and his 
motion were denied.  The defendant's appeal from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial was consolidated with his direct 
appeal. 
The defendant contends that the judge's instructions on 
criminal responsibility were erroneous; the prosecutor made 
several improper remarks in his opening statement and closing 
argument; and the motion judge, who was not the trial judge,2 
erred in denying his request for a hearing and his motion for a 
 
1 The defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the 
first degree, kidnapping, carjacking, intimidation to steal from 
a depository, four counts of armed robbery, armed robbery while 
masked, armed assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to 
rape, burning of personalty, two counts of attempted murder, 
three counts of assault and battery, aggravated assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, armed assault with 
intent to murder, and robbery.  He was convicted on all charges 
except assault with intent to rape. 
 
 
2 The trial judge had been appointed an Associate Justice of 
this court. 
3 
 
new trial.  He also asks the court to review the case under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a thorough review of the record, we 
decline to exercise our authority under § 33E to grant a new 
trial or reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first 
degree, and we affirm the judgments. 
Background.  We recite the relevant facts that the jury 
could have found.  On July 23, 2013, over the course of twenty 
hours, the defendant committed three separate violent attacks, 
killing one woman, Amy Lord, and injuring two others, Alexandra 
Cruz and Kayleigh Ballantyne.  There was an overwhelming amount 
of evidence consisting of victim and witness accounts, out-of-
court and in-court identifications, surveillance footage, and 
forensic evidence. 
At 4:23 A.M., the defendant approached Cruz and hit her on 
her jaw as she was walking to work in the South Boston section 
of Boston.  The defendant rendered Cruz briefly unconscious and 
dragged her into a parking lot where he choked her and told her 
that if she screamed, he would kill her.  Cruz pleaded with the 
defendant to stop and the defendant responded, "Bitch, just know 
that you're going to die today."  When the defendant briefly 
turned away, Cruz ran across the street.  The defendant then 
told Cruz, "I fucked up," and that he was looking for someone 
else.  He threw her belongings toward her and told her not to 
call the police because he knew where she worked.  Cruz ran to 
4 
 
work, and about one hour later, a police officer came to the 
store.  The next day, Cruz identified the defendant in a 
photographic array as her attacker and later identified him in 
court. 
Around 5:38 A.M., Amy Lord, when leaving her apartment 
building, was attacked by the defendant in the vestibule of her 
building.3  He then forced her into her car, with a mask covering 
his face, and drove to five different automated teller machines 
forcing Lord to withdraw $960 in total from her bank account. 
The defendant then brought Lord to a secluded area.  He 
took off her clothes, beat her, stabbed her over forty times, 
strangled her,4 and left her naked body lying on an isolated path 
in a wooded area. 
The defendant left the area in Lord's car, and over the 
next forty minutes he purchased gasoline at a station in the 
Roslindale section of Boston, drove back to South Boston, and 
set fire to Lord's car. 
The defendant then began to spend Lord's money, paying cell 
phone bills; buying a new cell phone, lottery tickets, and 
 
3 Amy Lord's face as depicted in the bank surveillance 
footage supported that she had been beaten.  Additionally, 
Lord's contact lens was found in the vestibule of her apartment 
building, and there was impact damage to a wall there. 
 
4 At trial, the medical examiner opined that Lord died from 
the combination of sharp force injuries to her neck and asphyxia 
by strangulation. 
5 
 
alcohol; and hiring a livery car to take him to his friend Eric 
Cataloni's home in Roslindale.  The defendant spent the evening 
eating and drinking with Cataloni, the defendant's brother, and 
another friend.  At around 10:30 P.M., Cataloni drove the 
intoxicated defendant to South Boston; and he passed out on the 
back seat. 
When the defendant arrived home, he banged on the front 
door; his girlfriend, Elisabeth Stephenson, and their toddler 
daughter were asleep inside.  After Stephenson and the defendant 
began to argue, Stephenson left the apartment with their 
daughter, fleeing to her nearby car, and driving around 
aimlessly.  When she returned a short time later, she saw the 
defendant walking away from the apartment. 
Twenty minutes later, at around midnight, Ballantyne saw 
the defendant on the opposite side of the street as she walked 
toward her apartment.  As she entered the passcode to her front 
door, she felt a person -- the defendant -– directly behind her.  
The defendant pushed her and she hit her head on the floor.  The 
defendant stood over her and stabbed her left arm five times, 
her left breast two times, her left rib once, and the left side 
of her face.  Ballantyne pleaded with him to take the contents 
of her purse and her cell phone, and she screamed for help and 
kicked the defendant.  One of her kicks knocked the defendant 
over, and he fled.  Ballantyne crawled to her apartment, used 
6 
 
her keys to open the door, and got her roommates' attention.  
Her roommates and neighbors who had heard Ballantyne's screams 
called 911. 
Before she was taken to a hospital, Ballantyne described 
her attacker as a Hispanic male, five feet, eight inches tall, 
medium build, with a "buzz cut," and wearing a dark shirt and a 
Boston Red Sox baseball cap.  Ballantyne's roommate went to the 
hospital with her and encountered the defendant, who had his 
hand wrapped and was upset because he was not receiving 
treatment.  Ballantyne's roommate noticed that the defendant 
matched the description of the attacker and texted their other 
roommate, who was still at their apartment with law enforcement, 
regarding the defendant's presence at the hospital. 
The defendant was taken into custody at the hospital, read 
Miranda warnings, and questioned by police after waiving his 
Miranda rights.  The defendant told the police that he had 
injured his hand trying to defend himself during an altercation 
with a man at a gasoline station.  Detectives obtained the 
surveillance video recording from the gasoline station; although 
it captured the defendant, it did not show any such attack. 
After he was interviewed, the defendant was arrested for 
the stabbing of Ballantyne.  Subsequent investigation revealed 
that the defendant was included as a contributor to blood stains 
found in a trail leading from where Ballantyne was attacked, and 
7 
 
that Lord was included as a contributor to blood stains found on 
the defendant's sneakers.  At trial, defense counsel conceded 
that the defendant had attacked Cruz, Lord, and Ballantyne, but 
argued that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. 
The defendant's expert, Dr. Keith Ablow, testified that, at 
the time of the three attacks, the defendant had been suffering 
from a major mental illness.  According to Ablow, the defendant 
had been diagnosed with a dissociative disorder, major 
depression, alcohol use disorder, and borderline personality 
disorder.  The defendant's mother had schizophrenia and the 
defendant reported that when he was around twelve years old, he 
had been abused sexually by an older male.  The defendant also 
began using drugs at around age thirteen, and, at fourteen, he 
was hit on the head by a brick and rendered unconscious.  The 
defendant had spent much of his adolescent years in the custody 
of the Department of Youth Services, where he had had six 
hospitalizations, with reports of suicidal and homicidal 
thoughts.  After turning eighteen, he was in and out of jail, 
and when not incarcerated, he would self-medicate with alcohol 
and drugs.  Ablow opined that, at the time of the incidents, the 
defendant substantially could not appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his actions, nor could he conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law. 
8 
 
By contrast, the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Martin Kelly, 
who also interviewed the defendant, opined that the defendant 
only suffered from an antisocial personality disorder.  In 
Kelly's opinion, the defendant had had no mental disease or 
defect at the time of the crimes, or at any other point, that 
resulted in the lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct, or the lack of 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law.  Kelly opined that the defendant seemed guarded and 
careful throughout his interview, reflecting on answers, and 
never distracted.  The defendant had not had any recent 
hospitalizations, and there was no evidence that he had been 
treated for a suicidal act. 
Discussion.  1.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues 
that the judge's instructions on criminal responsibility were 
erroneous because when explaining the third possible method of 
proof open to the Commonwealth, the judge stated that even "if 
the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct and to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law, the lack of such 
capacity was solely the result of voluntary intoxication," when 
he should have said that "if the defendant lacked substantial 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
9 
 
law, the lack of such capacity was solely the result of 
voluntary intoxication."  The defendant argues that use of the 
word "and" instead of the word "or" varied from the 2018 Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide (2018 model jury instructions) and 
reduced the Commonwealth's burden of proof, creating a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The 
Commonwealth argues that we must look at the jury instruction as 
a whole and that a deviation from a model jury instruction, 
standing alone, does not render the instruction erroneous.  The 
defendant did not object at trial.  Accordingly, if there was 
error, we review the challenged instruction to determine whether 
it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 745 (2011), cert. 
denied, 566 U.S. 1026 (2012).  We conclude that the judge's 
instructions contained an error of law but that the error did 
not result in a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
justice. 
The judge instructed the jury in accordance with the 2013 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (2013 model jury 
instructions) that were applicable at the time of trial: 
"Remember that the Commonwealth must prove to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant was criminally responsible 
at the time the crime was committed.  That is, the 
defendant did not lack criminal responsibility at the time.  
Therefore, it's the Commonwealth's burden to prove at least 
one of the following beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
10 
 
"Number one, that at the time of the alleged crime the 
defendant did not suffer from a mental disease of defect.  
Or, number two, that if the defendant did suffer from a 
mental disease or defect, he nonetheless retained the 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of or 
criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law.  Or, number three, that if the 
defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct and to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law, the lack of 
such capacity was solely the result of voluntary 
intoxication by alcohol or other drugs" (emphasis added). 
 
With respect to the third way in which the Commonwealth may 
prove a defendant did not lack criminal responsibility, the 
current (2018) model jury instructions provide:  "3.  That, if 
the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law, his lack of such 
capacity was solely the result of voluntary intoxication by 
alcohol or other drugs" (emphasis added).5 
 
5 The 2013 model jury instructions read, in relevant part: 
 
"[I]t is the Commonwealth's burden to prove at least one of 
the following beyond a reasonable doubt:  1.  That at the 
time of the alleged crime the defendant did not suffer from 
a mental disease or defect; or 2.  That if the defendant 
did suffer from a mental disease or defect, he nonetheless 
retained the substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct and to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law; or 3.  [Where 
there is evidence the defendant consumed drugs or alcohol] 
That if the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct 
and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, 
his lack of such capacity was solely the result of 
voluntary intoxication by alcohol or other drugs" (footnote 
omitted). 
11 
 
The instructions the judge provided at the defendant's 2015 
trial conformed precisely with the model instructions in place 
at the time of the trial, which were adopted in 2013.6  We have 
 
 
The complete text of the 2013 model jury instructions is 
available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/23 
/murder-instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ23-UXYK]. 
 
The 2018 model jury instructions read, in relevant part: 
 
"[I]t is the Commonwealth's burden to prove at least one of 
the following beyond a reasonable doubt:  1.  That at the 
time of the alleged crime, the defendant did not suffer 
from a mental disease or defect; or 2.  That if the 
defendant did suffer from a mental disease or defect, he 
nonetheless retained the substantial capacity to appreciate 
the wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct and to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; or 3.  
[Where there is evidence the defendant consumed drugs or 
alcohol] That, if the defendant lacked the substantial 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law, his lack of such capacity was solely the result 
of voluntary intoxication by alcohol or other drugs" 
(footnote omitted). 
 
6 At that time, Massachusetts had adopted the Model Penal 
Code (MPC) test for criminal responsibility:  "A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 
546-547 (1967).  The MPC test for criminal responsibility 
combined the rule set out in M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 
(1843), which assessed the capacity of a defendant to know right 
from wrong, see Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 711 
(1958), and the "irresistible impulse" rule, which assessed 
whether criminal conduct was the result of irresistible impulse 
produced by mental disease or defect, see Commonwealth v. Clark, 
292 Mass. 409, 414 (1935).  If mental illness causes a defendant 
to lose the capacity to know right from wrong or to conform his 
12 
 
urged trial judges to follow the model jury instructions 
verbatim, Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 353 (2016), and 
the trial judge did so here.  Nonetheless, the instructions 
contained an error of law.  The error did not, however, rise to 
the level of a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice.7 
We disagree with the defendant that this error lowered the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof, and we conclude that the error 
was unlikely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 618 (2010).  When a 
defendant raises an insanity defense, the burden is on the 
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was criminally responsible.  See Commonwealth v. 
 
or her conduct to the requirements of the law, the defendant 
cannot be held criminally responsible.  See McHoul, supra. 
 
7 In their briefs, neither the defendant nor the 
Commonwealth mentions the 2013 model jury instructions, or the 
fact that the judge's instruction precisely matched the model.  
The Commonwealth submitted a post argument letter pursuant to 
Mass. R. A. P. 22 (c) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1651 
(2019), acknowledging this.  Notably, the Commonwealth's brief 
also appears to misquote the 2018 model jury instructions.  The 
Commonwealth states:  "The defendant compares the instruction 
given to the model instruction which reads, in the relevant 
portion, 'Or, number two, that if the defendant did suffer from 
a mental disease or defect, he nonetheless retained the 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of or 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law'" (emphasis in brief).  Under the second 
possible method of proof open to the Commonwealth, the 2018 
model instructions properly use the word "and," not the word 
"or," as the Commonwealth suggests.  The 2013 instructions also 
use the word "and," not the word "or," in the second prong. 
13 
 
Dunphe, 485 Mass. 871, 878 (2020).  Here, the instruction, even 
including the error, adequately conveyed to the jury that the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that where the 
defendant may have had a mental illness that resulted in his 
lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his actions, at the relevant time, his voluntary intoxication 
was the sole cause of his incapacity, not his mental illness. 
The Commonwealth can satisfy its burden in several ways.  
Most simply, the Commonwealth can prove that the defendant did 
not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged 
criminal conduct.  See Dunphe, 485 Mass. at 879 ("If the 
Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the 
crime, the defense of lack of criminal responsibility fails").  
If, however, the defendant did have a mental disease or defect 
at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, the Commonwealth 
can prove that such disease or defect did not cause the 
defendant "to lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 811 (2016).  See Commonwealth v. 
DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 431 (2011) ("The source of the lack of 
substantial capacity is the critical factor in determining 
whether the defendant is criminally responsible").  In effect, 
14 
 
this means the Commonwealth must prove that mental illness did 
not cause the defendant to lose the capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his or her conduct, and that mental illness did 
not cause the defendant to lose the capacity to conform his or 
her conduct to the law. 
If mental illness caused the defendant to lose the capacity 
for either aspect of the test (the capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his or her conduct, otherwise known as the 
M'Naghten rule, or the capacity to conform his or her conduct to 
the law under the "irresistible impulse" rule), the defendant 
cannot be held criminally responsible.  This is true even where 
the defendant also consumed alcohol or drugs -- and thereby 
potentially aggravated the mental illness -- so long as the 
mental illness remained the cause of the lack of capacity.  
DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 431-432.  However, where the defendant's 
loss of capacity resulted solely from the voluntary consumption 
of alcohol or drugs, the defendant may be held criminally 
responsible.  See id. at 431 ("a defendant whose lack of 
substantial capacity is due solely to [voluntary consumption of 
alcohol or drugs, intoxication and even alcoholism or drug 
addiction], and not to any mental disease or defect, is 
criminally responsible").  Thus, even if a defendant had a 
mental disease or defect at the time of the crime, and even if 
the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality 
15 
 
of his or her conduct or to conform that conduct to the law, the 
defendant may be held criminally responsible if the Commonwealth 
proves that the defendant's loss of capacity was the result of 
voluntary intoxication. 
The provisions of the model jury instructions at issue here 
-- whether considering the 2013 or 2018 instructions -- 
encompass these three concepts.  They instruct that, in order 
for a defendant to be held criminally responsible, the 
Commonwealth must prove either (1) the defendant did not suffer 
from a mental illness; (2) if the defendant suffered from a 
mental illness, such illness did not cause the defendant to lose 
the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct 
and to conform his or her conduct to the law; or (3) if the 
defendant suffered from a mental illness that caused a loss of 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or 
to conform his or her conduct to the law, such loss of capacity 
was solely the result of the voluntary consumption of alcohol or 
drugs. 
With respect to the second prong, the word "and," which 
appears in both the 2013 and the 2018 model jury instructions, 
is the correct word to use because the Commonwealth must prove 
both that mental illness did not cause the defendant to lose 
capacity to appreciate right from wrong and that mental illness 
did not cause the defendant to lose capacity to conform his or 
16 
 
her conduct to the law.  In the third prong, however, the word 
"or" is the correct word to use, because if the Commonwealth 
proved only, for example, that the defendant lost capacity to 
appreciate criminality because of voluntary intoxication, the 
defendant still could be held criminally responsible.  The 
Commonwealth would not also need to prove that the defendant's 
loss of capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law was the result of voluntary intoxication.  Thus, the 
2013 model jury instructions were incorrect. 
Taken in context, the use of the word "and" instead of the 
word "or" in the third prong of the instruction did not affect 
the jury's understanding of the instruction and therefore lower 
the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.  "In this process, we 
require the Commonwealth to prove negatives beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  that the defendant did not have a mental disease or 
defect at the time of the crime and, if that is not disproved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that no mental disease or defect 
caused the defendant to lack substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law."  Lawson, 475 Mass. at 811, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 849-850 (1999), 
citing Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967).  
If the Commonwealth cannot meet its burden with regard to the 
second prong -- that the defendant "retained the substantial 
17 
 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his 
conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law" -- then the Commonwealth moves on to the third prong.  The 
instruction provided in this case was clear that if the 
Commonwealth had not met its burden of proof on the second prong 
then the jury would consider whether such loss of capacity was 
the result of voluntary intoxication.  While the use of the word 
"and" in the third prong was incorrect because the Commonwealth 
would have failed to meet its burden even if only one of the 
subfactors of the second prong were proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt (and the instruction on the second prong makes that 
clear), the instruction in context does not create any 
meaningful ambiguity and did not rise to the level of a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 270 (1998), S.C., 456 
Mass. 1017 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 
(2011). 
If the jury considers the third prong, it is only because 
the Commonwealth has failed to prove that the defendant retained 
the substantial capacity both to appreciate the wrongfulness or 
criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  The use of the word "and" instead of 
"or" in the third prong does not, as the defendant suggests, 
leave the jury with the impression that the Commonwealth only 
18 
 
need to be held to its burden of proof if both elements of the 
third prong were present.  The jury's consideration of the third 
prong is evidence that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden 
in the second prong because it failed to prove both elements -- 
that the defendant retained the substantial capacity (1) to 
appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct and 
(2) to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  The 
salient question is not whether both elements are present, but 
whether the defendant's voluntary intoxication resulted in 
either element.  To consider whether the defendant's voluntary 
intoxication resulted in both elements, by using the word "and" 
instead of "or," does not lessen the Commonwealth's burden of 
proof. 
Even if the instruction is not read in context, it required 
the jury to consider whether the defendant's loss of capacity 
was the result of voluntary intoxication if the defendant lacked 
substantial capacity both to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct and to conform his conduct to the law.  Under our 
jurisprudence, however, a defendant is not criminally 
responsible either if the defendant did not know right from 
wrong or if the defendant could not conform his or her conduct 
to the law.  Taken together with the law on intoxication, a 
defendant can be held criminally responsible if the defendant 
(1) knew right from wrong but (2) could not conform his conduct 
19 
 
to the law only because of voluntary intoxication.  The alleged 
error in the instruction, read literally, suggests that 
voluntary intoxication is relevant only where a defendant did 
not know right from wrong and could not conform his or her 
conduct to the law.  Thus, a jury following these instructions 
could not find a defendant criminally responsible who knew right 
from wrong but could not conform his or her conduct to the law 
as a result of voluntary intoxication.  For this reason, we 
agree with the Commonwealth that, if anything, this error 
heightened the Commonwealth's burden of proof by requiring the 
Commonwealth to prove that both the defendant's lack of capacity 
to appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his conduct and 
his lack of capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law were solely the result of voluntary intoxication. 
The defendant attempts to analogize his case to Berry, 457 
Mass. at 618, and DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 437, where the court 
ordered new trials based on deficient instructions on criminal 
responsibility, by arguing that the jury could have 
misinterpreted the instructions here to mean that, even if the 
defendant's mental illness by itself caused the defendant to 
lack substantial capacity, the defendant's criminal 
responsibility defense would fail if the defendant consumed 
drugs or alcohol that contributed to his incapacity.  The 
20 
 
asserted error in the instruction (the use of "and" instead of 
"or"), however, does not further this argument. 
The instruction was clear that voluntary intoxication had 
to be the sole reason for the loss of capacity, not just a 
contributing factor.8  The defendant also misapprehends 
Commonwealth v. Goulet, 374 Mass. 404, 414-416 (1978).  There, 
the judge initially instructed, in effect, that the Commonwealth 
"must show the defendant to have had substantial capacity both 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his 
conduct to the law."  Id. at 415.  Contrary to the defendant's 
contention, we did not take issue with this instruction and it 
conforms with the second prong of the 2018 instruction. 
2.  Opening and closing remarks.  The defendant argues that 
certain of the prosecutor's remarks in his opening statement and 
closing argument were made to inflame the jury's emotions and 
 
8 The judge also instructed that a "defendant's lack of 
criminal responsibility must be due to a mental disease or 
defect.  Intoxication caused by the voluntary consumption of 
alcohol or drugs by itself is not a mental disease or defect.  
Where a defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality or wrongfulness or to conform his conduct to the law 
solely as a result of voluntary intoxication, then he is 
criminally responsible for his conduct.  However, the 
consumption of alcohol or drugs may trigger or intensify, make 
worse, a defendant's preexisting mental disease or defect.  If 
it did so here, and the mental disease or defect then caused the 
defendant to lose substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law, the defendant is not 
criminally responsible for his conduct." 
21 
 
invoke the jury's sympathy for Lord's family and their fear of 
the defendant.  Where the defendant objected, we review for 
prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 
759 n.5 (1998).  Where the defendant did not object at trial, we 
review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  In either event, we consider the remarks in 
the context of the whole opening or closing, as well as the 
entire case.  See Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673 
(2015), S.C., 483 Mass. 571 (2019).  The judge instructed the 
jury before opening statements and during his final charge to 
the jury that opening statements and closing arguments are not 
evidence.  After the closing arguments, the judge instructed the 
jury that the case must be decided based upon evidence and not 
upon emotion or sympathy. 
a.  Opening statement.  The defendant argues that 
references in the opening to Lord's "forever age," likening the 
offenses to a "real life horror story," and warning the jury 
that the person accused was sitting ten feet away from them, 
were irrelevant to any material issue and warrant a new trial.  
The defendant did not object to these statements at trial. 
"The proper function of an opening is to outline in a 
general way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to 
be able to prove or support by evidence" (citation omitted).  
22 
 
Commonwealth v. Hoilett, 430 Mass. 369, 372 (1999).  We have 
cautioned prosecutors that their opening statements should "not 
slip into emotionally provocative argument."  See Commonwealth 
v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 322 n.4 (2000).  A prosecutor may use 
the opening to set the scene, however, even if that scene is 
unfavorable to the defendant.  See Kent K., 427 Mass. at 759 
n.6.  In addition, "[t]he prosecutor is entitled to tell the 
jury something of the person whose life [has] been lost in order 
to humanize the proceedings" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 566 (2002). 
The prosecutor's opening statement did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Before the 
prosecutor mentioned Lord, he discussed the two other victims, 
Cruz and Ballantyne, and their respective ages, twenty-two and 
twenty-one.  The proximity in the victims' ages (among other 
similarities) provided some explanation for why the defendant 
targeted these particular victims; without that, the 
Commonwealth otherwise presented no clear evidence of motive or 
any connection between the victims and the defendant.  Compare 
Kent K., 427 Mass. at 759-760 (references to victim's age 
relevant to theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty).  In the 
course of his opening, the prosecutor mentioned Lord's age only 
once.  Compare Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 494 
23 
 
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1003 (1998). 
Describing the alleged crimes as part of a "horror story" 
did not rise past the level of excusable hyperbole.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 472 (1998) ("grisly" 
depiction of victim's murder not improper).  The evidence 
presented at trial was that the defendant brutally attacked 
three women, killing one, in the span of twenty hours.  Cruz was 
attacked while walking to work; Lord was abducted as she was 
about to leave her apartment for an exercise class, robbed, 
taken to a secluded park, and stabbed more than forty times; and 
Ballantyne was attacked while walking home from work.  While 
certainly dramatic, the statement was rooted in the evidence 
ultimately presented at trial, and the jury would have been able 
to sort out any hyperbole.  See Santiago, 425 Mass. at 500. 
Finally, telling the jury that the person accused of the 
crimes was sitting ten feet away from them is not particularly 
troubling.  After all, the person accused of the crimes was the 
defendant -- who was present in the court room -- and a number 
of witnesses identified him as the perpetrator of the crimes 
throughout the trial.  That the defendant did not object to 
these statements at trial is some indication that the tone and 
manner of the statements were not unfairly prejudicial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 (1995).  In sum, the 
24 
 
prosecutor's remarks did not result in a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
b.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's emotions in his 
closing argument by referring to the victim as "forever twenty-
four years old" and with numerous descriptions of how Lord's 
death affected her parents.  We conclude that certain of the 
prosecutor's statements were improper.  Nonetheless, the remarks 
do not warrant reversal of the defendant's convictions.  The 
prosecutor's closing spanned thirty-five pages of transcript, 
primarily focused on the defendant's mental state, and referred 
to testimony and evidence that indicated that the defendant was 
aware of right and wrong and could, when he chose, conform his 
conduct to the rule of law. 
We begin with portions of the closing to which the 
defendant did not object.  "Thus, we consider, 'in the context 
of the arguments and the case as a whole,' whether the improper 
statement created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 
Mass. 189, 201 (2017).  In the beginning of the closing, the 
prosecutor remarked: 
"Amy Elizabeth Lord, forever twenty-four years old, the 
daughter of Cindy and Dennis Lord.  For twenty-four years 
they raised and loved their daughter, and then on July 
23rd, 2013, they were dealt the cruelest of blows.  They 
had to hear the words that no parent should ever have to 
25 
 
hear.  After going missing, their daughter was gone, the 
victim of a brutal abduction, robbery, and murder.  No more 
gym, no more job, no more family trips.  Amy Lord, forever 
twenty-four, will never walk down the aisle with her dad on 
her wedding day." 
 
Although reference to Lord's age as "forever" being twenty-four 
was unnecessary, it was not excessive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 644 (2017) (enthusiastic rhetoric, 
strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole do not require 
reversal).  As mentioned supra, the prosecutor is permitted to 
humanize the defendant.  See Rodriguez, 437 Mass. at 566.  The 
reference to Lord never being able to "walk down the aisle with 
her dad on her wedding day," however, exceeded the bounds of 
excusable hyperbole.  This statement had no relevance to the 
defendant's guilt and was an improper appeal to the passions or 
sympathies of the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 65 Mass. 
App. Ct. 305, 312 (2005).  Nonetheless, when considering the 
case as whole, the statement did not result in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Niemic, 472 Mass. 
at 673. 
The evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, see 
Commonwealth v. Silvelo, 486 Mass. 13, 18 (2020), and the only 
real issue at trial was whether the defendant could be held 
criminally responsible for his conduct.  See Niemic, 472 Mass. 
at 674 (considering "whether the Commonwealth's case was so 
overwhelming that the errors did not prejudice the defendant" 
26 
 
[citation omitted]).  Two mental health experts testified at 
length, and defense counsel made clear in his own closing 
argument that the defendant's mental health and state of mind 
were what the jury had to decide.  The prosecutor, too, spent 
much of his closing discussing whether the evidence suggested 
that the defendant had had the requisite mental state to be held 
criminally responsible for the crimes.  Although some of the 
prosecutor's argument inappropriately appealed to the jurors' 
sympathies, the statements did not go to the heart of the 
defense strategy.  See Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 201. 
Furthermore, the evidence of the brutal nature of the 
murder was overwhelming.  The defendant took off Lord's clothes, 
beat her, stabbed her more than forty times, strangled her, and 
left her naked body.  It is "unlikely that the prosecutor's 
argument had an inflammatory effect on the jury beyond that 
which naturally would result from the evidence presented."  
Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 35 (2016).  The prosecutor's 
comments about Lord's family were unlikely to have affected the 
jury's deliberations, especially in light of the judge's 
curative instruction.  The judge, alert to the prosecutor's use 
of potentially inflammatory words, also advised the jury after 
the prosecutor's closing that they were not to focus on any 
labels the prosecutor used and to focus on the offense conduct.  
That the jury acquitted the defendant of one charge -- assault 
27 
 
with intent to commit rape -- is some evidence that they 
complied with this instruction.  See id. 
The defendant also argues that two additional remarks from 
the prosecutor were improper, because they improperly suggested 
that the jurors should place themselves in Lord's shoes.  The 
prosecutor stated, 
"You're thinking to yourself, she's out of the car.  You're 
thinking to yourself, Amy, run.  Just run, just go.  It's 
so easy.  No one will catch you.  He won't catch you.  
Imagine, if you will, just think of the fear he put her in 
in that vestibule. . . ." 
 
And he continued: 
 
"Collectively you fifteen fair and impartial jurors walked 
Amy Lord's last walk, and you stood in the very spot where 
her life ended at the hands of Edwin J. Alemany." 
 
It is improper for a prosecutor to ask a jury to put 
themselves in the victim's shoes because it "distracts attention 
from the actual issues, and invites the jury to decide guilt or 
innocence on the basis of sympathy."  Commonwealth v. 
Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 420 (2011).  See Rutherford, 476 
Mass. at 646 (improper to ask jury to imagine victim's final 
thoughts).  The Commonwealth argues that, by telling the jury 
that they walked Lord's last walk and stood in the spot where 
she was killed, the prosecutor properly referenced the view, see 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 201 (2011), and reminded 
the jury of the sequence of events leading to her death.  Even 
if the statements were close to the line or if the jury did not 
28 
 
understand them as a reference to the view, they did not create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice for the 
reasons discussed supra.  Following the prosecutor's closing, 
the defendant objected at sidebar to "the reference to Cindy 
Lord and Dennis Lord, what they were doing, how they were 
feeling. . . .  I just think that's a patent asking for emotion 
that just doesn't have a place in this court, in this trial."9  
Following this objection, the judge instructed the jury: 
"To the extent there was a reference to Mr. and Mrs. Lord, 
I just ask you to focus on their testimony they gave in 
this court and why they were on the witness stand, why Mrs. 
Lord was on the witness stand, and not on anything else." 
 
The defendant did not object to this supplemental instruction. 
Another objected-to portion of the prosecutor's closing 
that referenced Lord's mother was an attempt to illustrate the 
planning and consciousness of guilt of the defendant: 
"You've seen the signatures in the upper two left-hand 
corners, Exhibits 28, 29, and 30, ladies and gentlemen, Amy 
Lord at the Bank of America, at the Sovereign Bank[,] and 
at the Citizens Bank, identified by her mother, Cindy Lord. 
 
9 The prosecutor stated in his closing: 
 
"What are Cindy and Dennis Lord doing that night?  What are 
they doing that night?  You know what they're doing.  
They've come in from Wilbraham, they're scratching and 
clawing for every shred of information that they can get 
about their daughter who's gone missing.  Okay?  Teetering 
on the brink, waiting, hoping, praying for good news.  And 
you know the devastating news they got that night.  That 
excruciatingly painful news that was delivered by 
Detectives Sheehan and Cecil.  And as their world became 
unplugged and blown apart, what is the selfish man doing at 
that moment?" 
29 
 
 
"Why did Cindy Lord have to be in that position?  Why was 
she put in a position where she had to come into Suffolk 
Superior Court and identify her daughter on those stills 
from those banks?  It was this defendant's plan, his 
actions, what he did that day." 
 
The prosecutor was directing the jury's attention to the fact 
that the defendant evaded the bank cameras.  It was reasonable 
for the prosecutor to reference evidence relevant to the 
defendant's intent, including evidence of the defendant's mental 
state.  See Commonwealth v. Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 432 (2017) 
(prosecutor permitted to argue during closing argument that "the 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility was weak, and that 
although the defendant may suffer from mental illness, he was 
criminally responsible").  As we have stated, a prosecutor is 
entitled to argue the Commonwealth's case "aggressively and 
resourcefully" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Shelley, 
374 Mass. 466, 472 (1978), S.C., 381 Mass. 340 (1980) and 411 
Mass. 692 (1992).  Although evidence of the defendant's plan to 
murder Lord and of his consciousness of guilt is relevant to his 
mental state at the time of the crime, and to the defense theory 
of lack of criminal responsibility, the prosecutor's envelopment 
of this argument in details about Lord's mother overstepped the 
bounds of proper argument. 
30 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the prosecutor also described what 
the defendant was doing after he killed Lord and compared it to 
what Lord's parents were doing: 
"What are Cindy and Dennis Lord doing that night?  What are 
they doing that night?  You know what they're doing.  
They've come in from Wilbraham, they're scratching and 
clawing for every shred of information that they can get 
about their daughter who's gone missing.  Okay?  Teetering 
on the brink, waiting, hoping, praying for good news.  And 
you know the devastating news they got that night.  That 
excruciatingly painful news that was delivered by 
Detectives Sheehan and Cecil.  And as their world became 
unplugged and blown apart, what is the selfish man doing at 
that moment?" 
 
The prosecutor then recounted that the defendant was eating, 
drinking, and setting off firecrackers with a friend. 
Although certain of the prosecutor's references to Lord's 
parents were improper, the objected-to statements regarding the 
prosecutor's references to Lord's parents were not prejudicial 
in light of the judge's instruction following the closing 
argument.  See Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 201 ("We presume that the 
jury follow the judge's instructions and have held that even 
such general instructions can diminish prejudice suffered by the 
defendant").  In addition to the curative instruction, the judge 
instructed after closing arguments that the case must be decided 
based upon evidence, and not based upon emotion or sympathy. 
3.  Motion for a new trial.  Following his convictions, the 
defendant moved for a new trial and requested a hearing.  The 
defendant argues that he raised a substantial issue meriting an 
31 
 
evidentiary hearing and that the motion should not have been 
denied without a hearing.  He argued, as he does on appeal, that 
his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights were violated because his counsel acknowledged his guilt 
at trial while pursuing a defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility over his objection.10  The defendant also averred 
that his counsel told him that if he did not want to raise the 
insanity defense, the judge would remove the defendant from the 
court room, and that counsel would stop representing him.  
Counsel confirmed with the defendant's appellate counsel that, 
had the defendant said he did not want to pursue an insanity 
defense, counsel would have withdrawn from the case. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is 
within the sound discretion of the motion judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 498 (2020).  A judge may 
rule on a motion for a new trial based on the affidavits or 
other supporting material, without an evidentiary hearing, if no 
"substantial issue" is raised.  Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 
 
10 The defendant relies on defense counsel's closing 
argument to support his contention.  In closing argument, 
defense counsel said to the jury, "I'm telling you that beyond a 
reasonable doubt that man is guilty of everything he's been 
charged with, beyond a reasonable doubt.  Perhaps beyond any 
doubt. . . . [But] I ask you to consider . . . the defense 
that's been offered to you. . . .  I ask that you find him not 
guilty by reason of insanity." 
32 
 
Mass. 398, 404 (2015).  "A defendant's submissions in support of 
a motion for a new trial need not prove the factual premise of 
that motion, but they must contain sufficient credible 
information to 'cast doubt on' the issue" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 348 (2004). 
In determining whether a substantial issue exists and 
therefore an evidentiary hearing should be held, "a judge 
considers the seriousness of the issues raised and the adequacy 
of the defendant's showing on those issues" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Welch, 487 Mass. 425, 445 (2021).  "We review a 
judge's decision to deny a motion for a new trial without 
holding an evidentiary hearing 'for a significant error of law 
or other abuse of discretion.'"  Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 
Mass. 155, 162 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 482 
Mass. 838, 843-844 (2019).  The issue the defendant raised meets 
the requirement of seriousness.  "[I]t is the defendant's 
prerogative, not counsel's, to decide on the objective of his 
[or her] defense."  See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 
1505 (2018).  The Sixth Amendment and art. 12 guarantee the 
defendant the right to maintain his or her innocence.  See id. 
at 1508.  If counsel admitted guilt over a client's express 
objection it would be a structural error that requires a new 
trial without any need to show prejudice.  See id. at 1511.  A 
"defendant always retain[s] exclusive authority to make 'certain 
33 
 
fundamental decisions' regarding his [or her] own defense, 
including whether to insist on his [or her] innocence . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 484 Mass. 799, 819, cert. denied, 141 
S. Ct. 683 (2020), quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983). 
Whether the defendant has made an adequate showing on this 
issue is a different question entirely.  Welch, 487 Mass. at 
445.  "[T]he defendant's submissions 'need not prove the 
[motion's] factual premise . . . but they must contain 
sufficient credible information to cast doubt on the issue.'"  
Id., quoting Upton, 484 Mass. at 162.  In this case, whether the 
defendant has made an adequate showing that he was deprived of 
his Sixth Amendment right to refrain from admitting guilt 
depends on whether he presented sufficient credible evidence 
that cast doubt on whether he "expressly assert[ed] [at trial]" 
that "the objective of 'his defence' [was] to maintain 
innocence."  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509. 
In 2015, we declined to consider "whether it is manifestly 
unreasonable to pursue [] a strategy [of conceding that the 
defendant killed the victim] (regardless of its merits) without 
the defendant's consent, or whether prejudice should be presumed 
in such circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 470 Mass. 765, 
771 n.10 (2015).  Since then, however, as discussed, the United 
States Supreme Court decided McCoy.  There, the Court concluded 
34 
 
that the "[a]utonomy to decide that the objective of the defense 
is to assert innocence" belongs to the defendant.  Id. at 1508.  
A violation of this "Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy" 
constitutes structural error.  Id. at 1511.  The Court did not, 
however, conclude that it is manifestly unreasonable to pursue a 
strategy of conceding guilt without the defendant's express 
consent.  Where a defendant complains about counsel's admission 
of guilt only after trial, the defendant's autonomy is not 
overridden.  See id. at 1505 ("when counsel confers with the 
defendant and the defendant remains silent, neither approving 
nor protesting counsel's proposed concession strategy, '[no] 
blanket rule demand[s] the defendant's explicit consent' to 
implementation of that strategy" [citation omitted]), quoting 
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181, 192 (2004).  See Atwater v. 
State, 300 So. 3d 589, 590 (Fla. 2020). 
The judge was entitled to discredit the defendant's 
affidavit that he submitted with his motion for a new trial 
stating that he had objected to his counsel's use of the 
insanity defense on multiple occasions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 112 (2009).  The defendant also averred 
that he had not known that pursuing an insanity defense meant 
35 
 
conceding guilt to the crimes charged and that had he known, he 
would have objected in open court.11 
The defendant's appellate counsel also submitted an 
affidavit, in which he described conversations he had had with 
the defendant's trial counsel, Jeffrey Denner and Michelle 
Hubbard.  According to the affidavit, Denner and Hubbard told 
appellate counsel that the defendant never objected to the 
insanity defense.  To the contrary, the defendant agreed with 
them that the insanity defense was his best available option 
considering the evidence in the case.12  Denner also told 
appellate counsel, however, that the attorneys never discussed 
with the defendant that raising an insanity defense required 
conceding that the defendant had killed Lord.13  The motion judge 
was within her discretion to discredit the defendant's affidavit 
as self-serving, see Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 673 
(1998), and to disbelieve that the defendant objected to his 
 
11 The defendant does not explain why he did not object upon 
hearing argument and testimony regarding his concession of 
guilt. 
 
12 At one point during trial, defense counsel reported to 
the judge that the defendant "can't quite understand why I'm not 
attacking everybody viciously, you know, because everyone is 
lying." 
 
13 This is not surprising considering that the logic 
inherent in an insanity defense presupposes an admission that 
the defendant committed the acts in question but seeks to prove 
that he or she is not responsible for the acts.  See McHoul, 352 
Mass. at 546-547. 
36 
 
counsel's use of the insanity defense.  Significantly, neither 
of the defendant's trial counsel submitted an affidavit.  This 
is a notable omission and was a factor the judge could consider.  
Commonwealth v. Lys, 481 Mass. 1, 6 (2018). 
The trial record supports the judge's determination that 
the defendant's affidavit was not credible and that therefore no 
substantial issue had been raised.  The record shows that the 
defendant was aware of how to make his needs and concerns known 
during trial.  At one point he had indicated to trial counsel 
that he was not feeling well.  The next day, before trial, he 
told counsel that he was not well, and the judge arranged for 
emergency medical technicians to examine him.  He was also 
brought to Massachusetts General Hospital for evaluation. 
The defendant had numerous opportunities before and during 
the trial when he could have raised his concerns with defense 
counsel or the judge.  For example, the defendant provided 
notice of an insanity defense one year before trial and was 
interviewed by his expert.  In addition, the issue of a defense 
of not guilty by reason of insanity thoroughly and repeatedly 
was pursued during the jury selection process in the defendant's 
presence.  The defense attorney stated in his opening that the 
defense was based on mental illness, not that the defendant did 
not commit the attacks.  During the trial, defense counsel 
attempted to elicit information from Commonwealth witnesses that 
37 
 
would strengthen his defense of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, and Ablow and Kelly testified extensively regarding 
his mental health.  Notwithstanding the defendant's claim in his 
affidavit that had he known that he was conceding that he was 
the perpetrator he would have objected in open court, the 
defendant remained silent on numerous occasions when the defense 
strategy was abundantly clear. 
The facts here differ significantly from those in McCoy.  
In McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1506-1507, the defendant maintained his 
innocence -- to his counsel and in open court -- while his 
counsel "told the jury there was 'no way reasonably possible'" 
that they could hear the prosecution's evidence and reach "any 
other conclusion than Robert McCoy was the cause of these 
individuals' death."  Counsel further told the jury that the 
evidence was "unambiguous," "my client committed three murders," 
and that the defense "took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor]" 
with respect to the issue whether the defendant had killed the 
victims.  Id.  Unlike counsel in this case, counsel in McCoy 
presented no defense at all, as the concession of guilt at the 
guilt phase of the trial was an unsuccessful attempt to avoid 
the death penalty at the sentencing phase.  Id. at 1507. 
The motion judge did not err in concluding that the 
defendant failed to present a substantial issue warranting an 
evidentiary hearing, where, although the issue raised was 
38 
 
serious, the defendant did not make an adequate showing of a 
credible claim.  See Welch, 487 Mass. at 446 (no substantial 
issue that warranted hearing where claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel constituted serious issue but motion judge 
who was also trial judge did not credit certain assertions of 
defendant and "[w]hat he observed indicates that any 
communication issues were likely of the defendant's own 
making"); Upton, 484 Mass. at 162-163 (no substantial issue 
warranted hearing where claimed due process violation 
constituted serious issue but evidence not sufficiently credible 
because defendant failed to present affidavits from counsel 
regarding alleged undisclosed plea agreement); Goodreau, 442 
Mass. at 355 n.9 (no substantial issue that warranted hearing 
where defendant presented no evidence that counsel failed to 
investigate all available defenses and where motion reflected 
defense counsel's belief that he had valid theories of defense 
with supportive evidence); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 
253, 257-258 (1981) (adequacy of defendant's showing on issue of 
newly discovered evidence not sufficient to warrant evidentiary 
hearing where affidavit presented no indicia of reliability and 
constituted hearsay solely admissible for impeachment).14 
 
14 We note, however, that a client's autonomy is an issue 
separate from counsel's competence.  "[W]e do not apply our 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence" to the 
defendant's claim.  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510-1511.  See 
39 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in its entirety under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  No such 
relief is warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed. 
 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See also 
Miranda, 484 Mass. at 822 (applying traditional ineffective 
assistance rules because defense counsel and defendant shared 
same principal objective of outright acquittal); Atwater, 300 
So. 3d at 590 (applying ineffective assistance analysis to issue 
regarding counsel's failure to consult with defendant).