Case Title: State v. Rhoiney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121159

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 121,159 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANDRE CLARK RHOINEY JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6820(e)(3) does not require an appellate court to review an 
identical offense argument for the first time on appeal.  
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; DAVID B. DEBENHAM, judge. Opinion filed December 30, 
2021. Affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Michael J. Duenes, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney 
general, was with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STEGALL, J.:  Andre Clark Rhoiney Jr. directly appeals his convictions for felony 
murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and aggravated assault. 
We find no reversible error and affirm his convictions.  
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On a Friday night in October 2016, Rhoiney was going with his friend, Daniel 
Askew, to a house party in Topeka hosted by Michael Bueno. Askew rode on his 
motorcycle while Rhoiney followed behind him driving his baby blue Ford Expedition. 
On the way, Askew "warm[ed] up" his tires by swerving within his lane. Then, a minivan 
driven by Richea McCain pulled up alongside Askew's motorcycle and Michael 
Stadler—the minivan's passenger—told Askew to drive more carefully.  
 
An argument commenced between Stadler and Askew. It continued for several 
blocks as the two vehicles drove next to each other. During the argument, Rhoiney 
continued to follow both vehicles. Eventually McCain broke off the engagement with 
Askew and turned left onto 29th Street. At that point, Rhoiney also turned left onto 29th 
Street, drove up beside McCain and fired his handgun into the van. McCain ducked and 
continued driving. As she heard another gunshot, Stadler cried out, "Oh, I've been hit. 
I've been hit. . . . In my chest."  
 
 
McCain immediately drove Stadler to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced 
dead. Stadler had two gunshot wounds—one to his right arm and one to the right side of 
his chest. He was shot from an intermediate distance, and an autopsy recovered a bullet 
from Stadler's left chest cavity. 
 
After the shooting, Rhoiney and Askew continued on to Bueno's house. The pair 
arrived shortly after midnight. Several partygoers noticed Askew's and Rhoiney's vehicles 
in Bueno's driveway, later identifying Askew's "crotch-rocket" style motorcycle and 
Rhoiney's "sky-blue" Ford Expedition SUV. During the party, Rhoiney asked Askew to 
"trade" handguns with him. 
 
 
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The next day, Bueno read an article about a shooting that occurred near his house 
the prior evening. The article described the incident as involving "an orange crotch rocket 
and a blue truck" and occurring around 12:15 a.m. Given these "coincidences," Bueno 
contacted the police.  
 
One week later, Rhoiney's SUV was found on fire and hidden in the trees on an I-
70 access road. A Topeka Fire Department fire investigator discovered two liquid 
"trailers" made from gasoline near the SUV, suggesting someone intentionally set fire to 
the SUV, leaving a "burned-out shell of a vehicle." The burned vehicle no longer had a 
license plate or a dashboard VIN number tag, yet investigators were able to recreate the 
VIN which matched a 2000 Ford Expedition registered to a woman with whom Rhoiney 
had fathered a child. Additionally, though the vehicle suffered heavy fire damage, a small 
patch of "baby-blue" paint remained. 
 
 
A few days after that, authorities arrested Rhoiney aboard a Greyhound bus in 
Bluefield, West Virginia. Rhoiney initially gave the police a false name and identification 
card, and the police discovered a pistol hidden near Rhoiney's seat.  
 
The State charged Rhoiney with felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at 
an occupied dwelling or vehicle, and aggravated assault. A jury trial commenced and 
Rhoiney was convicted of criminal discharge of a firearm at a vehicle and aggravated 
assault, but the jury remained deadlocked on the felony-murder charge. The district court 
accepted the two guilty verdicts and declared a mistrial as to the felony-murder charge. 
 
A second jury trial followed on the remaining felony-murder charge. At the 
second trial, several Shawnee County Jail inmates testified about Rhoiney's conduct after 
his first trial, describing Rhoiney as "cavalier" about his case and that he discussed it 
openly regularly. The second jury convicted Rhoiney of felony murder. 
 
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The district court imposed a hard 25 sentence for the felony-murder conviction, 71 
months for the criminal discharge of a firearm conviction, and 13 months for the 
aggravated assault conviction. The district court ordered the felony murder and criminal 
discharge of a firearm sentences to be served concurrently and the aggravated assault 
sentence to be served consecutively to the hard 25 sentence. Rhoiney directly appeals.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
On appeal, Rhoiney raises five claims of error across both trials. First, he argues 
the district court erroneously instructed his second jury on felony murder because the 
instruction impermissibly permitted the jury to convict him under "any mental state." 
Second, he asserts that prosecutorial error in both trials deprived him of his right to a fair 
trial. Third, he argues that the district court erred in both trials by failing to instruct the 
jury on the lesser included offense of discharge of a firearm from a roadway. Fourth, he 
contends that he should have been sentenced for the lesser offense of reckless voluntary 
manslaughter. Fifth, he argues that cumulative error denied him a fair trial. Finding no 
reversible error, we affirm Rhoiney's convictions.  
 
Mental State Instruction  
 
 
Rhoiney's first claim of error—raised for the first time on appeal—alleges that the 
district court improperly instructed the jury on felony murder. He explains that he was 
charged with felony murder for conduct performed "in the commission of a reckless 
discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle." Thus, according to Rhoiney, he was on 
notice that the State was alleging a reckless state of mind, but was not on notice that he 
could be convicted by the "broader" states of mind of either intentional or knowing 
conduct. Thus, his argument goes, the district court improperly broadened the complaint 
 
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in violation of Rhoiney's due process rights when the court instructed the second jury that 
if the State proved Rhoiney acted "intentionally or knowingly" then the State had 
necessarily proved he acted recklessly.  
 
 
Though Rhoiney attempts to style his challenge as a jury instruction error, his 
argument is rooted in a due process challenge, as his counsel made clear during oral 
argument. Accordingly, because Rhoiney did not raise this argument at the district court, 
he cannot raise it on appeal unless an exception applies. Our recognized exceptions 
include (1) the new claim raises only a question of law based on uncontested facts; (2) 
consideration is necessary to serve the ends of justice or prevent denial of fundamental 
rights; or (3) the district court's judgment is correct for the wrong reason. State v. Arnett, 
314 Kan. 183, 185, 496 P.3d 928 (2021). Even so, a "decision to review an unpreserved 
claim under an exception is a prudential one." 314 Kan. at 248. Even if an exception may 
apply, we are under no obligation to review the claim. 314 Kan. at 248. 
 
 
Rhoiney declares, without elaboration, that his case fits within the first two 
exceptions. However, Rhoiney does not explain why these exceptions are applicable to 
his case. And we do not find an exception under these facts because under Kansas law, 
"[i]f recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a 
person acts knowingly or intentionally." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5202(c). Further 
discussion of Rhoiney's argument is not "necessary to serve the ends of justice." 314 Kan. 
at 185. 
 
Prosecutorial Error 
 
 
Rhoiney claims issue with three statements made by the prosecutor at his trials. 
We utilize our familiar two-step process of error and prejudice to evaluate claims of 
prosecutorial error: 
 
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"To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, the appellate court must decide 
whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded 
prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that 
does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is found, the 
appellate court must next determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due 
process rights to a fair trial. In evaluating prejudice, we simply adopt the traditional 
constitutional harmlessness inquiry demanded by Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)]. In other words, prosecutorial error is harmless if 
the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will 
not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there 
is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" State v. Sherman, 
305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). 
 
First, during the State's closing argument in the first trial, defense counsel objected 
to the prosecutor's statement: 
 
"Counsel makes much ado over the fact that, my goodness, we didn't recover 
the murder weapon. Well, you know what? If that's the litmus test, you know, for 
determining whether or not the State can be successful in proving a case, do you realize 
what the import of that would be? Individuals—" 
 
 
The district court sustained Rhoiney's prompt objection, finding the statement 
improperly appealed to the passions of the community. The court then directed the jury to 
disregard the statement.  
 
 
We consider the ameliorating effect of a jury admonition in determining whether 
prejudice existed. State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 383, 353 P.3d 1108 (2015). Further, we 
presume jurors follow instructions provided by the district court. Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 
921, 937, 318 P.3d 155 (2014). Rhoiney fails to demonstrate any resulting prejudice or 
 
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establish that the jury failed to follow instructions. We find that the district court's 
admonition cured any error.  
 
 
The second instance of alleged error arises from the following statements made by 
the prosecutor during the second trial:  
 
"There's no evidence in this case that indicates that Mr. Rhoiney did not have a valid ID. 
The evidence was when he was arrested in West Virginia, the ID that he gave to the law 
enforcement officer was not his identification. There's simply no evidence. It's entirely 
possible that Mr. Rhoiney had a valid Driver's License, but the ID he chose to give to the 
officer in West Virginia didn't have his picture, didn't have his name, and that's consistent 
with him knowing he murdered somebody, and he wants to hide out." 
 
Rhoiney claims the comments about the ID constituted impermissible speculation. 
We disagree. We find that the prosecutor's statement was fair commentary based on the 
evidence which showed:  (1) Rhoiney wanted to swap pistols with Askew; (2) Rhoiney's 
SUV was intentionally set on fire directly before Rhoiney was discovered on a 
Greyhound bus in West Virginia; (3) police discovered a pistol hidden near Rhoiney 
when they arrested him; and (4) Rhoiney intentionally provided false identification to the 
arresting officer. The prosecutor's comment simply explained that these events together 
were consistent with someone who was fleeing a potential murder charge. This comment 
was not error. 
 
 
Rhoiney's final instance of alleged prosecutorial error arises from the following 
statements made by the prosecutor during the second trial: 
 
 
"Now, one thing to keep in mind is there is some discussion by the Defense 
about, well, it was Mr. Askew who was getting into this argument, so he had the 
motivation to want to kill Mr. Stadler. That's beside the point for one reason, but the other 
thing is that doesn't necessary indicate why someone would have a motivation to kill 
 
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someone. I mean, there are road rage incidents all over America all of the time. They 
don't all end in murder, but the more important point here is that when it comes to the 
crime and the defendant's liability for this crime, the State is not required to prove intent, 
and the State is not required to prove motive. 
 
 
"This could be an accidental shooting. As a matter of fact, Mr. Askew's 
testimony was shortly after the shooting, Mr. Rhoiney said to him that he fired a couple 
of shots to scare [Stadler], and that might have been exactly what it was. It could've been 
that Mr. Rhoiney saw this argument going on, and wanting to be a good friend to help 
out, maybe he was upset or offended by the way Mr. Stadler was acting, he just fired a 
couple shots at the vehicle, and the idea being that this will settle him down. This will 
show him, right—without any intent to kill anybody, without any intent to hurt anybody. 
But if in fact, it is the case that he was committing the crime of criminal discharge of a 
firearm at a motor vehicle at the time that happened, and the bullets he fired into that car 
ended up killing Michael Stadler, under the law of the State of Kansas, he is guilty of 
felony murder, because he would have killed Michael Stadler while he was committing 
the other crime." (Emphases added.)  
 
 
Rhoiney objects to these statements, arguing that this passage was not a "summary 
of the evidence, but a disclaimer to excuse the lack of evidence." He frames these 
statements as an acknowledgement by the prosecutor that Askew had motive to kill 
Stadler. He further believes the road rage reference was "intended to inflame the passions 
or prejudices of the jury" and to divert the jurors' attention. 
 
Again, we disagree. The contested statements did not fall outside of the wide 
latitude afforded to prosecutors. The prosecutor's statements were a fair commentary on 
the evidence and a proper legal explanation of what evidence was relevant to the 
elements of the charged crime of felony murder.  
 
 
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Lesser Included Offense Instruction  
 
 
Next, Rhoiney argues the district court in both trials should have provided a lesser 
included offense instruction of discharge of firearm from a roadway. See K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 21-6308(a)(3)(B).  
 
We apply our four-step process to analyzing jury instruction issues:  
(1) reviewability; (2) legal appropriateness; (3) factual appropriateness; and 
(4) harmlessness. State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d 202 (2012). When—as 
here—a defendant does not object to a district court's jury instructions, we apply K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 22-3414(3)'s clear error standard. Under the clear error standard, we will 
reverse only if we are firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict if 
the instruction error had not occurred. State v. Timley, 311 Kan. 944, 955, 469 P.3d 54 
(2020). The defendant bears the burden to establish reversibility, and we review the entire 
record de novo in determining whether he has met that burden. 311 Kan. at 955. 
 
As to Rhoiney's first trial, we agree that a discharge of a firearm from a roadway 
instruction is legally appropriate as a lesser included offense of discharge of a firearm at a 
vehicle. See State v. Jefferson, 297 Kan. 1151, 1170, 310 P.3d 331 (2013). We need not 
discuss whether the proposed lesser included offense was factually appropriate, however, 
because even assuming the district court should have given the instruction, Rhoiney 
cannot establish reversible error.  
 
The physical evidence and testimony clearly established Rhoiney fired at 
McCain's minivan while driving next to her on 29th Street. In addition to McCain's 
testimony that Rhoiney fired directly at her van, investigators found glass matching 
McCain's minivan window and two 9-mm shell casings on 29th Street. Bullet fragments 
were embedded in the van seats and the van dashboard, and pieces of a projectile were 
 
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found on the van's floorboard with a defect from passing through an object—like the 
minivan door. Stadler received two gunshot wounds and was shot from an intermediate 
distance. What is more, Askew testified Rhoiney told him Stadler "was talking some 
more stuff" so he "fired two warning shots at him to scare him." (Emphasis added.) 
Askew also told police that Rhoiney told him Stadler "kept talking shit, so he fired a 
couple shots."  
 
 
Given this overwhelming evidence, we are not persuaded that the jury would have 
reached a different verdict if the lesser included instruction had been given. Any potential 
error in refusing to give the instruction was harmless. 
 
As to the second trial, Rhoiney was only charged with felony murder. "[F]elony 
murder has no lesser included offenses." State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 730-31, 449 P.3d 
429 (2019). As such, it was not error at the second trial for the district court to fail to give 
any lesser included instructions to the jury.  
 
Identical Offense Claim 
 
The jury convicted Rhoiney of felony murder with the underlying crime of 
criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. On appeal, Rhoiney argues that 
the elements of reckless involuntary manslaughter are elementally identical to reckless 
felony murder, and therefore under the identical offense sentencing doctrine, he must be 
sentenced with the penalties for the lower severity crime. 
 
 
Rhoiney admits he failed to raise this claim below. He urges us to review his 
claim, however, arguing that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6820(e)(3)—an "appellate court may 
review a claim that . . . the sentencing court erred in ranking the crime severity level of 
the current crime"—absolves him of any duty to preserve the issue below. Additionally, 
 
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he makes the more traditional argument that an exception to our preservation 
requirements exists because his challenge is purely a legal issue. See Arnett, 314 Kan. at 
185. 
 
 
We recently rejected the argument that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6820(e)(3) requires 
an appellate court to review an identical offense argument for the first time on appeal. 
See State v. Buck-Schrag, 312 Kan. 540, 554-55, 477 P.3d 1013 (2020); State v. Gray, 
311 Kan. 164, 170-71, 459 P.3d 165 (2020). Following in the very fresh footsteps of 
Buck-Schrag and Gray, we find that Rhoiney's identical offense claim is unpreserved and 
we decline to address it. Moreover, we are not persuaded to exercise our discretion to 
hear Rhoiney's claim for the first time on appeal by invoking one of our more traditional 
exceptions to preservation rules. See 311 Kan. at 170. 
 
Cumulative Error  
 
 
We use a de novo standard of review when determining whether "'the totality of 
circumstances substantially prejudiced a defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial.'" 
State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216, 227, 445 P.3d 726 (2019). "Although errors may be 
individually harmless, their collective effect '"may be so great as to require reversal of a 
defendant's conviction."'" 310 Kan. at 227. In assessing the collective effect, we consider 
"'how the trial judge dealt with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy, or lack of 
efficacy, of any remedial efforts); the nature and number of errors committed and their 
interrelationship, if any; and the strength of the evidence.'" State v. Hirsh, 310 Kan. 321, 
345-46, 446 P.3d 472 (2019) (quoting State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 985, 1007, 336 P.3d 312 
[2014]). There is no prejudicial effect "'if the evidence is overwhelming against the 
defendant.'" 310 Kan. at 346. 
 
 
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Here, we found that the State committed prosecutorial error in the first trial when 
it improperly appealed to the passions of the community. Yet we held that the district 
court's prompt instruction to disregard cured this error. We also assumed without 
deciding error in the district court's failure in the first trial to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense of criminal discharge from a roadway. But we concluded that this 
assumed error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. As we recently stated in State v. 
Owens, 314 Kan. 210, 242, 496 P.3d 902 (2021), "[t]he presumed error and harmless 
prosecutorial error affected separate and distinct subject matter and issues. The errors 
were not interrelated in a way that enhanced their prejudicial force. In other words, the 
cumulative impact of the errors is no greater than the sum of their individual parts."  
 
Moreover, the evidence against Rhoiney was overwhelming. The jury heard 
testimony from McCain and Askew detailing Rhoiney's involvement in the shooting. The 
State provided additional corroborating physical evidence recovered from the scene of 
the shooting, as well as evidence of Rhoiney's actions following the shooting, including 
the intentional burning of his SUV, his desire to swap pistols with Askew, his flight to 
West Virginia, and his attempt to evade detection by providing a false ID.  
 
Considering the minor impact of the unrelated errors, paired with the strong 
evidence presented by the State, we find that the cumulative effect of the errors was 
harmless. 
 
Affirmed.