Case Title: BUTLER DAVIS v LOCAL 2033

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14883 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 DONALD E. BUTLER: DONALD W. DAVIS et al., Intervening Plaintiffs and Appellants, LOCAL 2033 M R I C A N FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES et al., Petitioner and Counter-Respondent and Respondent, VS . BUTTE-SILVER BOW et al., Respondents, Counter-Petitioners and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Knight, Dahood, Mackay and McLean, Anaconda, Montana Bernard J. Everett argued, Anaconda, Montana For Petitioner and Counter-Respondent and Respondent: M.F. Hennessey argued, Butte, Montana For Respondents, Counter-Petitioners and Respondents: John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Robert M. McCarthy, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Butte, Montana Filed: FEB F: - 1SRP Submitted: January 14, 1980 Decided : FEB 6 - M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his i s an appeal from a summary judgment i n favor of respondents Butte-Silver Bow and t h e "Union" i s s u e d by t h e District Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , s i t t i n g i n t h e County of S i l v e r Bow. O n February 22, 1978, respondent Local 2033 American Federation of S t a t e , County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Union), f i l e d a p e t i t i o n and complaint f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s - t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of S i v e r BOW, S t a t e of Montana. This a c t i o n w a s brought a g a i n s t respondents Butte-Silver Bow, S t a t e of Montana, and sought a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment i n t e r p r e t i n g c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s of t h e newly formed c o n s o l i - dated C i t y and County government of Butte-Silver BOW, Montana, d e a l i n g w i t h promotions i n t h e S h e r i f f s Department p r i o r t o o r during c o n s o l i d a t i o n . On May 17, 1978, Butte-Silver Bow f i l e d its answer t o t h e p e t i t i o n brought by t h e Union along w i t h a counter- complaint. On January 17, 1979, t h e union and Butte-Silver Bow s t i p u l a t e d and agreed t o d e c l a r e n u l l and void promotion t o higher ranks w i t h i n t h e S i l v e r Bow County S h e r i f f s Department received by i n t e r v e n i n g p l a i n t i f f s / a p p e l l a n t s , Donald E. B u t l e r , Donald W. Davis, Fred E. Guay, Herbert R. M i l l e r , Raymond W. R u s s e l l and G a l e E. Wood ( " S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e r s " ) . The D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d a proposed o r d e r based upon t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n d e c l a r i n g t h e promotions received by t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e r s n u l l and void and f u r t h e r o r d e r i n g t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e r s among o t h e r s t o appear b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t o show cause why t h e order should n o t become f i n a l . The s h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e r s moved t h e c o u r t pursuant t o Rule 24 ( a ) (2) M.R.Civ.P. t o intervene i n t h e a c t i o n ; t h i s motion w a s granted and a complaint i n i n t e r v e n t i o n was f i l e d . O n A p r i l 19, 1979, a l l t h e p a r t i e s moved f o r summary judgment. The D i s t r i c t Court issued i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law and order on June 11, 1979, d e c l a r i n g t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e r s ' promotions n u l l and void. Appellant o f f i c e r s bring t h i s appeal. O n A p r i l 1 2 , 1977, S h e r i f f George P a t r i c k Hagel, t h e duly e l e c t e d , q u a l i f i e d and a c t i n g S h e r i f f of S i l v e r B o w County promoted t h e s i x o f f i c e r s named h e r e i n t o higher ranks within t h a t Department. The promotions they received were e i t h e r from deputy t o sergeant o r sergeant t o l i e u t e n a n t of t h e S i l v e r Bow County S h e r i f f s Department. On May 2, 1977, t h e C i t y of Butte and County of S i l v e r B o w consolidated t h e i r l o c a l governments i n t o one u n i f i e d government under one c h a r t e r . The new government was t o have t h e s t a t u s of a county and incorporated municipality and was named Butte-Silver BOW, Montana. The c h a r t e r had been adopted by t h e v o t e r s on November 2 , 1976 and by i t s terms was n o t t o become e f f e c t i v e u n t i l May 2, 1977. Section 5.05 of t h e Butte-Silver B o w Charter s e t f o r t h t h e provisions governing t h e organization of t h e law enforce- ment department f o r t h e new government. The new law enforce- ment department was t o be formed by combining t h e former C i t y of Butte P o l i c e Department and t h e S h e r i f f s Department of S i l v e r Bow County under t h e S h e r i f f of ~ u t t e - S i l v e r Bow. Section 5.05 ( f ) provides a s follows: "The sheriff shall so organize the new department as to recognize the existing ranks attained by members of the exist- ing police and sheriff departments." - (Emphasis added.) Following their promotions the six appellant Sheriff's Officers assumed the duties of their new ranks under the Silver Bow County Sheriffs Department. On May 2, 1977, the effective date of the Butte-Silver Bow Charter, the new law enforcement department was organized and the six appellant Sheriff's Officers retained their ranks pursuant to section 5.05(f) of the new charter. On May 4, 1977, the Commissioners of the newly formed government of Butte-Silver Bow met and passed Emergency Ordinance No. 2 to govern the method of selection, examin- ation and confirmation of all appointments and promotions within the new law enforcement agency. Section 15 of the Emergency Ordinance provided it would become effective upon passage and approval. It was approved by Chief Executive Mario Micone on May 10, 1977. The District Court declared the promotion received by the six appellant Sheriff's Officers null and void. The following issues have been presented to this Court for review: 1. Did the District Court err in ruling that under Section 5.05 (f) of the Butte-Silver Bow Charter, the pro- motions of appellants on April 11, 1977 were null and void? 2. Did the District Court err in ruling that Sheriff Hagel did not have authority to promote the appellant Sher- iff's Officers on April 11, 1977? The first step in resolving this case is to determine the date the charter became operative. Then it becomes necessary t o determine what e f f e c t t h i s o p e r a t i v e d a t e has on t h e language i n s e c t i o n 5.05 of t h e c h a r t e r . Section 10.02 of t h e Butte-Silver Bow Charter provides t h a t " [ t l h i s c h a r t e r s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e on May 2, 1977." This language i s straightforward and leaves l i t t l e room f o r doubt a s t o i t s meaning. Section 5.05 d e a l s with t h e Chief Law Enforcement Officer and provides: "The S h e r i f f s h a l l be t h e chief law enforce- ment o f f i c e r of t h e government and s h a l l have t h e d u t i e s and powers provided by t h i s c h a r t e r , l a w , ordinance o r r e s o l u t i o n s u b j e c t t o t h e following provisions: " ( a ) The e x i s t i n q p o l i c e department of t h e C i t y of Butte and t h e s h e r i f f ' s department of S i l v e r B o w s h a l l be combined i n t o one department under t h e c o n t r o l and super- v i s i o n of t h e s h e r i f f . The p r e s e n t chief of p o l i c e of t h e C i t y of Butte s h a l l be t h e undersheriff and s h a l l be paid a t l e a s t t h e same s a l a r y received a t t h e t i m e of t h e adoption of t h i s c h a r t e r . " ( b ) The p r e s e n t members of the C i t y of Butte p o l i c e department and t h e deputy sher- i f f s of S i l v e r B o w County s h a l l be members of t h e new department and have t h e same tenure r i g h t s provided by s t a t e law. " ( c ) The p r e s e n t members of both e x i s t i n g departments s h a l l r e c e i v e t h e same compen- s a t i o n , including base pay and longevity allowances, a s they now receive u n t i l such t i m e a s t h e council of commissioners adopts a s a l a r y schedule f o r members of t h e new department. " (d) A l l appointments t o t h e new department s h a l l be made pursuant t o t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law of t h e s t a t e , (Chapter 18, T i t l e 11, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947) except: " ( 1 ) That t h e s h e r i f f s h a l l have t h e powers t h e r e i n given t o t h e mayor i n a mayor-council form of municipal government, t h e council of commissioners s h a l l have t h e powers of t h e c i t y council, and t h e c l e r k and recorder s h a l l have t h e powers of a c i t y c l e r k , and; " ( 2 ) members of t h e department may be can- d i d a t e s f o r any e l e c t e d o f f i c e and may par- t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s notwith- standing t h e provisions of the Metropolitan P o l i c e Law of t h e s t a t e . " ( e ) The council of commissioners s h a l l e s t a b l i s h by ordinance a Law Enforcement Commission c o n s i s t i n g of f i v e ( 5 ) members which s h a l l have t h e powers and perform t h e d u t i e s required of p o l i c e commissions by t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law and such o t h e r d u t i e s as the ordinance may provide. " ( f ) The s h e r i f f s h a l l s o organize t h e new department a s t o recognize the e x i s t i n g ranks a t t a i n e d by members of t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i c e and s h e r i f f departments. " (g) A l l pension r i g h t s p r e s e n t l y provided by s t a t e l a w t o members of t h e e x i s t i n g C i t y of Butte p o l i c e department and t h e members of t h e s h e r i f f ' s department of t h e County of S i l v e r B o w s h a l l continue i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t , provided t h a t t h e council of commissioners may by ordinance i n c r e a s e t h e pension b e n e f i t s , and may i n t h e fu- t u r e provide f o r a uniform pension system i f t h e s a m e i s permitted by s t a t e l a w . " ( h ) When a vacancy occurs i n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e undersheriff a f t e r t h e adoption of t h i s c h a r t e r , t h e s h e r i f f may f i l l such vacancy by appointing a person, q u a l i f i e d by t r a i n i n g and experience, t o f i l l such p o s i t i o n without t h e approval of t h e p o l i c e commission o r council of commissioners, b u t such appointee s h a l l acquire no tenure r i g h t s except those e s t a b l i s h e d tenure r i g h t s he has a t t h e t i m e of h i s appoint- ment. I f such appointed undersheriff s h a l l have been a member of t h e department p r i o r t o h i s appointment and n o t continued i n such p o s i t i o n by t h e s h e r i f f he s h a l l r e v e r t t o t h e former rank he held within t h e depart- ment. A l l o t h e r p o s i t i o n s within - t h e department s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d & such ordinances -- as t h e c o u n c i l o f c o m m i s s i o n e r s s h a l l adopt. " (Emphasis added. ) The emphasized phrases form t h e b a s i s f o r t h e contro- versy presented here. Appellants contend t h a t s e c t i o n 10.02 of t h e c h a r t e r c o n t r o l s and t h a t t h e c h a r t e r d i d n o t become e f f e c t i v e f o r any reason u n t i l t h a t d a t e . They argue t h a t t h e r u l e s governing e f f e c t i v e d a t e s of c h a r t e r s a r e s i m i l a r t o those governing e f f e c t i v e d a t e s of s t a t u t e s and cite t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t s t a t u t e s become e f f e c t i v e on t h e d a t e p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e s t a t u t e . Respondents, however, d i s a g r e e and seek t o have c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 5.05 be e f f e c t i v e from t h e t i m e t h e c h a r t e r was passed on November 2, 1976. They argue t h a t t o r e a c h any o t h e r conclusion would e f f e c t i v e l y d i s - e n f r a n c h i s e t h e e l e c t o r a t e ' s power t o determine t h e make-up of t h e Butte-Silver Bow Law Enforcement Department and would contravene A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 1 of t h e 1972 Montana Consti- t u t i o n d e a l i n g with popular sovereignty. I n support of t h i s premise t h a t t h e word " e x i s t i n g " means a s of t h e d a t e of approval and n o t t h e d a t e t h e c h a r t e r becomes e f f e c t i v e , respondents c i t e an obscure Arizona c a s e , Flowing Wells Co. v. Culin (1908), 1 1 Ariz. 425, 95 P. 111, which i n t e r p r e t s a s t a t u t e concerning c o r p o r a t e d i s s o l u t i o n . A reading of t h e c a s e i n d i c a t e s it is of no h e l p t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s problem. I t i s t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i n Montana t h a t a s t a t u t e speaks a s of t h e t i m e when it t a k e s e f f e c t and n o t a s of t h e t i m e it was passed. Peterson v. Livestock Commission (1947), 120 M t . 140, 181 P.2d 152, 156. I n Peterson t h e p l a i n t i f f had made an a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e Livestock Comrnmission t o o p e r a t e a l i v e s t o c k market a t Polson. The Livestock Commission denied M r . P e t e r s o n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n on t h e ground t h a t t h e p o l i c y expressed by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n Chapter 193 o f t h e Laws of Montana, 1945 was t h a t t h e Livestock Commission should n o t g r a n t l i c e n s e s t o markets i n l o c a l areas contiguous t o p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d and s u c c e s s f u l markets. c his Court noted t h a t t h e law r u l e d upon by t h e Commission was n o t i n e f f e c t when t h e c om mission denied P e t e r s o n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n . W e s t a t e d : "'We do n o t see how an a c t which does n o t by i t s own t e r m s become a r u l e of conduct u n t i l a f u t u r e time can be s a i d t o d i s p l a c e another e x i s t i n g r u l e on t h e same s u b j e c t during t h e i n t e r v a l between t h e time of i t s enactment and t h e time it becomes operative, even though t h e e x i s t i n g r u l e be i n c o n s i s t e n t with it, i n t h e absence of some express o r implied d e c l a r a t i o n of a purpose t h a t such s h a l l be t h e r e s u l t . L e g i s l a t i o n i s n o t e f f e c t i v e f o r any purpose u n t i l it becomes o p e r a t i v e . ' " 181 P.2d a t 156, c i t i n g S t a t e v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1908), 36 Mont. 582, 93 P. 945. The r a t i o n a l e applied t o e f f e c t i v e d a t e s of s t a t u t e s has a l s o been applied by some c o u r t s t o c h a r t e r s of munici- p a l corporations. "The t i m e when a new c h a r t e r , o r an amendment of an e x i s t i n g c h a r t e r , adopted by t h e municipality takes e f f e c t i s sometimes f i x e d . . . by t h e c h a r t e r o r amendment i t s e l f . . . A new c h a r t e r o r an amendment t o a c h a r t e r o r d i n a r i l y i s t o be construed t o o p e r a t e prospect- i v e l y r a t h e r than r e t r o a c t i v e l y . " 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, S 95, p. 224. See a l s o S t a t e v. Devin (1946), 26 Wash.2d 333, 173 P.2d 994; S t a t e v. Kirby (1942), 349 Mo. Respondent treats s e c t i o n 1 0 . 0 2 a s a general provision and urges t h i s Court t o hold t h a t the s p e c i f i c provisions of s e c t i o n 5.05 c o n t r o l . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y p u t s t h e c a r t before t h e horse and asks t h i s Court t o s t a t e t h a t t h e c h a r t e r became e f f e c t i v e on one d a t e , b u t t h a t c e r t a i n of its pro- v i s i o n s became operable before t h e c h a r t e r i t s e l f became operable. This conclusion cannot l o g i c a l l y be supported. The c h a r t e r s p e c i f i c a l l y provides f o r an e f f e c t i v e d a t e ; t h i s e f f e c t i v e d a t e according t o s e c t i o n 10.02 a p p l i e s t o t h e whole c h a r t e r . There i s nothing i n t h e c h a r t e r t o in- d i c a t e an e f f e c t i v e d a t e o t h e r than t h a t set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 10.02. The language i n s e c t i o n 5.05 has no e f f e c t u n t i l t h e c h a r t e r becomes o p e r a t i v e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e promotions of t h e o f f i c e r s i f v a l i d would have t o be recognized. The v a l i d i t y of t h e s e promotions rests on t h e power of t h e s h e r i f f t o make them and i s t h e second i s s u e f a c i n g t h i s Court. The D i s t r i c t Court h e l d t h a t S h e r i f f Hagel d i d n o t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o promote o r c r e a t e new ranks w i t h i n t h e S i l v e r Bow County S h e r i f f s Department a f t e r November 2, 1976. Appellants contend t h i s holding i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s of common and s t a t u t o r y law. They c i t e hornbook law f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a modern s h e r i f f has a u t h o r i t y t o organize and a d m i n i s t e r h i s de- partment u n l e s s p r o h i b i t e d o r l i m i t e d by s t a t u t e . They submit t h a t Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme does n o t l i m i t t h e power and a u t h o r i t y of t h e s h e r i f f t o o r g a n i z e h i s d e p a r t - ment. S e c t i o n 7-32-2101, MCA, e t seq. Respondents contend t h a t under Montana law, a s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e i s l i m i t e d i n t h e amount of d e p u t i e s it may have, however, t h e Board o f County Commissioners may i f it d e s i r e s expand t h e number of d e p u t i e s . Respondents submit t h a t t h e S h e r i f f had t o have t h e consent and approval of t h e County Commissioners before such promotions are v a l i d . Montana law i n t h i s a r e a i s scarce. I t appears t h a t t h e rank i n a s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e i s l i m i t e d t o e i t h e r a n u n d e r s h e r i f f o r a deputy s h e r i f f and t h a t i n c o u n t i e s t h e s i z e of S i l v e r Bow t h e number of d e p u t i e s i s l i m i t e d t o s i x ( s e c t i o n 7-32-2103, MCA). The Board of County Commissioners i s given a g e n e r a l power t o a p p o i n t a g r e a t e r number of county deputy o f f i c e r s than the r n a * m u m number allowed by law when in the judgment of the Board, such greater number of deputies is needed for the faithful and prompt discharge of the duties of any county office (section 7-4-2402, MCA). This statute has been applied by this Court to appointment of additional deputies in the sheriff's office. Rusch v. Board of County Commissioners (1948), 121 Mont. 162, 191 P.2d 670; Hogan v. Cascade County (1907), 36 Mont. 183, 92 P. 529; Jobb v. County of Meagher (1897), 20 Mont. 424, 51 P. 1034. It follows that the Board of County Commissioners would have to approve the appointments especially where, as here, new positions were created. No approval was sought or received from the Commission for the contested appointments. The ap- pointments were therefore void and the District Court acted properly in disallowing them. The judgment of the District Court is hereby affirmed. We concur. Chief Justice CLkC, Q* Justices V Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in this case.