Case Title: In re Adoption of AMP

Citation: 2012 WY 132, 286 P.3d 746

Docket Number: 2012-wy-132

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF AMP, a minor child. DLH v. JLA and JJA2012 WY 132Decided: 10/12/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF AMP, a minor child.
 
DLH,
 
Appellant
(Respondent),
 
v.
 
JLA and 
JJA,
 
Appellees
(Petitioners).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Goshen County
The Honorable Keith 
G. Kautz, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
John R. Hursh, 
Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
James A. 
Eddington, Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, 
Wyoming.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN,* HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, 
DLH, challenges the district court’s order granting the adoption of his 
four-year-old son, AMP, without Appellant’s consent.  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
The parties raise the 
following issue:
 
Whether the district 
court abused its discretion in granting JJA’s adoption of AMP 
without Appellant’s consent pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv), due 
to Appellant’s willful failure to pay child support for a period of one year 
prior to the filing of the adoption petition, and his failure to bring his child 
support obligation current within 60 days after service of the 
petition.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Appellant 
and JLA are the biological parents of AMP, who was born on October 
11, 2007.  They lived together for a period of time but never 
married.  Appellant moved to Mississippi to live with his 
father in June of 2009.  In July, 2009, an order was entered 
establishing paternity and requiring Appellant to pay $259.00 per month towards 
the support of AMP.
 
[¶4]        
Shortly after his 
arrival in Mississippi, Appellant found part-time employment at a sporting goods 
store, and worked there until December, 2009, when he was terminated for “Job 
Abandonment.”  He paid child support while employed, but 
stopped making support payments in January, 2010.  In 
November, 2010, Appellant enlisted in the United States Air Force.  
He moved out of his father’s home in January, 2011 to begin basic 
training, and he completed his training in March, 2011.  As of 
January, 2012, Appellant had not made a child support payment since January, 
2010.
 
[¶5]        JLA 
and JJA began living together in August, 2010 and married in 
December of that year.  They maintain a home in Torrington, 
Wyoming, and AMP resides with them.  On March 4, 
2011, JJA filed a petition in district court seeking to adopt 
AMP.  JLA joined the petition.  
The petition alleged that Appellant’s consent to the adoption was not 
required pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) because he had willfully 
failed to contribute to the support of AMP for a period of one year immediately 
prior to the filing of the petition to adopt.  Appellant was 
served with notice of the petition on April 6, 2011.  He was 
also provided the statutorily required notice that he had 60 days to pay his 
past due child support obligation, which amounted to $5,064.68.
 
[¶6]        
Appellant responded 
to the petition by filing a note with the clerk of court, stating 
 
I, [DLH], will 
not relinquish my rights as the father of [AMP].  I do not 
give permission to [JJA] to adopt [AMP].
 
For the past year I 
have not been able to pay my child support due to the fact that I was unemployed 
and could not find employment.  I have recently joined the 
United States Air Force and graduated Basic Military Training on March 
11.  I am now receiving steady payment and plan to start 
making child support payments regularly.
 
Appellant did not 
otherwise appear in the action.  A hearing was held and a 
final decree of adoption was entered on June 16, 2011.  On 
September 19, 2011, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Final 
Decree of Adoption.  The motion alleged that the decree should 
be set aside because Appellant was a member of the United States Air Force when 
served with the adoption petition and was entitled to appointment of counsel to 
represent him pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app. § 
521.  Appellees resisted the motion. 
 After holding a hearing, the district court granted the 
motion and set aside the decree of adoption.
 
[¶7]        
Subsequently, 
Appellant obtained counsel and filed an answer contesting the allegations in the 
petition.  A trial was held on February 17, 2012. 
 Although he conceded that he had not paid any child support 
for more than one year prior to the filing of the petition, he contended that 
the failure to make the support payments was not willful.  He 
also conceded that he had not paid the arrearages within 60 days of service of 
the petition to adopt, but contended that the failure to pay arrearages was also 
not willful.
 
[¶8]        
On February 22, 2012, 
the district court issued a decision letter finding in favor of 
Appellees.  The district court concluded that clear and 
convincing evidence established that the adoption should be granted without 
consent due to Appellant’s willful failure to pay child support from March, 2010 
to March, 2011, and his failure to bring the support obligation current within 
60 days after service of the petition in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-110(a)(iv).  The Final Decree of Adoption was entered on 
February 28, 2012.  Appellant timely filed this 
appeal.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶9]        
If all statutory 
elements are met, the power to grant or deny a petition for adoption is within 
the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not disturb the court’s 
decision absent a clear abuse of that discretion.  In 
re Adoption of SDL, 2012 WY 78, ¶ 6, 
278 P.3d 242, 244 (Wyo. 2012).  In determining 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate question is whether 
the court could reasonably have concluded as it did. 
 Id.  Our review also entails an 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court’s 
decision.  JO v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs. (In 
the Interest of RE), 2011 WY 170, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d 1092, 1096 
(Wyo. 2011).  We apply our traditional principles of 
evidentiary review when a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting an adoption without consent.  On appeal, the 
evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, 
assuming all favorable evidence to be true while discounting conflicting 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.    
EOS v. JLS (In re Adoption of RMS), 2011 WY 78, 
¶ 8, 253 P.3d 149, 151 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]     JJA 
and JLA petitioned for adoption without Appellant’s consent pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2009), which provides, in 
relevant part, as follows:
 
§ 
1-22-110.  When adoption permitted without consent.

(a) . . . [T]he adoption of a child may be ordered without the 
written consent of a parent or the putative father if the court finds that . . . 
the nonconsenting parent or parents have:
 
            
. . .       
(iv) Willfully 
failed to contribute to the support of the child for a period of one (1) year 
immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt and has failed to bring 
the support obligation current within sixty (60) days after service of the 
petition to adopt[.]
 
[¶11]     
A district court’s 
determination that a parent’s consent for an adoption is not required 
effectively terminates that parent’s parental rights.  In 
re RMS, ¶ 10, 253 P.3d  at 151.  
Because the right to associate with one’s child is a fundamental 
right protected by the Wyoming and United States Constitutions, adoption 
statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is against 
a nonconsenting parent, and every reasonable intendment is made in 
favor of that parent’s claims.  MJH v. 
AV (In re JRH), 2006 WY 89, ¶ 13, 138 P.3d 683, 686 (Wyo. 
2006).  The party requesting adoption bears the burden of 
proving the existence of at least one of the statutory factors by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Id.  Clear and 
convincing evidence is “that kind of proof which would persuade 
a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly 
probable.”  Id., ¶ 13, 138 P.3d  at 
686-87.
 
[¶12]     
Appellant concedes 
that he made no child support payments during the one-year period from March, 
2010 to March, 2011.  Indeed, Appellant acknowledged that his 
last support payment was a $56.00 payment made in January, 2010.  
He contends, however, that his non-payment of child support was not 
“willful,” as required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv).  
He claims that he was “willing to make his court-ordered child support 
payments but was financially unable to do so” because he was unable to find 
work.  Appellant asserts that his enlistment in the military 
constituted an effort to better himself and provide for his son, and that from 
November, 2010 through March, 2011, he was “concentrating on succeeding in Basic 
Training and getting his career off to a favorable start.”  
Appellant contends that he accrued pay while in Air Force basic training 
in January, February, and March of 2011, but asserts that he could not make his 
child support payments because he did not receive his pay until basic training 
was completed in March.  Appellant further contends that his 
failure to bring his support obligation current within 60 days of the adoption 
petition does not satisfy Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) because 
“[p]erformance was impossible due to his economic status[.]”
 
[¶13]     
As used in the 
adoption statute, “willfully” means “intentionally, knowingly, purposely, 
voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and without justifiable excuse, as 
distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, 
heedlessly or thoughtlessly.”  ADA v. SA, 2006 WY 49, ¶ 
9, 132 P.3d 196, 201 (Wyo. 2006).  We recently 
examined the relationship between a parent’s alleged “financial inability” to 
pay child support and the statutory standard of willful nonpayment in In re 
Adoption of RMS.  In that case, mother claimed that 
her failure to pay child support was not willful because she was unemployed and 
did not have the ability to pay.  Id., ¶ 13, 
253 P.3d  at 152.  In support of her assertion that 
“simple proof of her failure to pay is insufficient as a matter of law to 
justify terminating parental rights,” mother cited to this Court’s opinion in 
TOC v. TND (In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, ¶ 27, 46 P.3d 863, 873 (Wyo. 2002), where we stated:
 
Clearly, by inclusion 
of the modifying term “willfully” the statute draws a distinction, as it must, 
between the parent who though financially able to pay his court-ordered child 
support is unwilling to do so, and the parent who though willing to pay his 
court-ordered child support is financially unable to do so. “A natural parent’s 
failure to support his or her child does not obviate the necessity of the 
parent’s consent to the child’s adoption, where the parent’s financial condition 
is such that he or she is unable to support the child.” 2 Am.Jur.2d 
Adoption § 88 (1994).1
 
 In 
RMS, however, we concluded that the mother’s interpretation 
of TLC was overly broad:
 
Although we have 
stated that a parent’s inability or lack of means to pay may refute an 
allegation of willful failure to pay child support, that does not mean a 
parent’s unemployment, and resulting inability to pay child support, is always 
excusable. A parent has the responsibility to pay child support in accordance 
with his or her financial ability. MJH [v. AV, 
2006 WY 89], ¶ 17, 138 P.3d [683,] 687 [(Wyo. 2006)]; TOC 
[v. TND, 2002 WY 76], ¶ 36, 46 P.3d [863,] 875 
[(Wyo. 2002)]. In determining the willfulness of the parent’s failure to pay, 
the “courts should look at whether the parent has demonstrated, through whatever 
financial means available to him, that the parent has not forgotten his 
statutory obligation to his child.” TOC, ¶ 36, 46 P.3d  at 
875. Willfulness is rarely shown directly and there is often conflicting 
evidence on the element. Consequently, it is “within the district court’s 
province to weigh the evidence and judge [the] credibility of the witnesses.” 
CJ [v. SA, 2006 WY 49], ¶ 18, 132 P.3d [196,] 203 
[(Wyo. 2006)].       

Id., ¶ 14, 
253 P.3d  at 152.  With respect to the facts in 
RMS, we noted that mother had voluntarily ended her 
employment shortly after the child support order was entered, thereby 
terminating her means of providing support.  Id., ¶ 16, 
253 P.3d  at 153.  We also emphasized that 
“Although [Mother] testified that she applied for jobs after that, without 
success, she did not take other steps to improve her prospects of becoming 
employed such as registering with an employment service or finishing 
the GED program to enhance her education.” 
 Id.  Further, we found it noteworthy 
that the mother received $100 for babysitting her cousin, but “did not pay any 
of that money toward her child support obligation, despite the fact that her 
parents were paying for her living expenses.” 
 Id.  In light of these facts, we 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
clear and convincing evidence showed that the mother had willfully failed to 
support her child.  Id., ¶ 17, 253 P.3d  at 
153.       
[¶14]     
In the present case, 
the evidence established that Appellant stopped making child support payments in 
January, 2010, shortly after termination of his employment with a sporting goods 
store near his father’s home in Mississippi.  Although 
Appellant claims that he did not “voluntarily” relinquish his employment, the 
record reveals that Appellant’s employment was terminated for “Job Abandonment” 
on December 22, 2009, after he did not receive authorization for time off from 
the store manager.  Appellant testified that he looked for 
employment from January to May, 2010, but that he was unable to find a job. 
 He stated, however, that he did not enlist a job service 
agency to help him with his employment search.  Additionally, 
although Appellant had enrolled at a community college in the fall of 2009, and 
took courses while he was employed part-time, he did not return to school in the 
spring of 2010 and did not seek other forms of training to improve his 
employment prospects. 
 
[¶15]     
In May, Appellant 
became interested in joining the Air Force.  Notably, however, 
Appellant did not enlist in the Air Force until November, approximately six 
months later.  Appellant stated that, from May to November, he 
“was still looking for a part-time job, [but] didn’t want to have to go in and 
tell [prospective employers] I need a job[,] and get the job[,] and then six 
months later say I have to quit because I am going into the 
military[.]”  Appellant testified that he helped his extended 
family by babysitting and painting, but stated he did not ask to be compensated 
for this work.  Further, despite the fact that Appellant was 
physically and mentally capable of working, and had free access to the use of 
his father’s lawn mower, he testified that “There in Jackson[, Mississippi], 
there is a lot of lawn mowing business, and I couldn’t find anybody that would 
have me mow their lawn.”  Appellant stated that he did not mow 
his father’s lawn because his father had not asked him to do so. 
 During the time that Appellant lived in Mississippi, from 
June, 2009 to January, 2011, his father provided him with housing, food, 
utilities, and transportation, and occasionally provided money to use for 
entertainment or eating out.  Appellant, however, did not use 
any of this money to contribute to his child support obligation.  
When asked how he spent his time, aside from communicating with an Air 
Force recruiter during the months of May to November, Appellant stated that he 
would “[h]ang around the house, help my dad clean up, anything he needed 
to do, needed around the house.”
 
[¶16]     
In January, 2011, 
Appellant moved to Texas for basic training, which he completed in 
March.  Pay stubs introduced at the adoption hearing indicated 
that Appellant had received over $2,000.00 from his employment with the Air 
Force in January and February.  It is undisputed that 
Appellant did not contribute any of this pay to the support of his child. 
 Appellant testified, however, that he did not receive any pay 
during his time in basic training.  He stated that “I think 
what happened is when you go to basic [training], you can get kicked out of the 
basic if you don’t meet the standard; so then I think they don’t pay you until 
you actually graduate[.]”  The district court determined that 
Appellant’s testimony was not credible, and concluded that Appellant’s pay stubs 
were the best evidence of his compensation during basic training. 
 We note, however, that the district court’s finding that 
Appellant received pay during this period is not critical to the analysis of 
whether Appellant’s nonpayment was willful.  Even if the 
district court had accepted Appellant’s testimony, the court was still 
confronted with undisputed evidence that Appellant did not contribute any of his 
pay towards his child support obligation in March, when his basic training 
ended, or at any time prior to the adoption hearing in this case.  
Appellant’s failure to pay his child support obligation in March, 2011, 
is especially significant in light of the fact that he was not served with the 
petition for adoption until April 6th.
 
[¶17]     
With respect to his 
failure to pay child support after his basic training ended, Appellant testified 
that he attempted to create a “military allotment” in March so that his child 
support payments would be automatically deducted from his paychecks.  
He stated that “I tried to set up an allotment, and the finance, they 
didn’t have any – they don’t – They are not exactly on top of things sometimes, 
and they messed up on my paperwork for it.”  He later 
testified, however, that “I talked to financing in Texas, and they wouldn’t do 
it, and then the first time I was able to get it was in the fall [of 2011] to 
actually start the filing of the papers that I needed to set up the allotment.” 
 In answers to interrogatories, Appellant had stated that “My 
first attempt to put in place a military allotment was delayed this fall [2011], 
and I have restarted that process.”  As of the date of the 
hearing, no child support payments had been made from his military income by 
allotment or otherwise.
 
[¶18]     
When Appellant was 
asked why he did not submit his monthly child support obligation, or pay any of 
his arrearages in March or April of 2011, irrespective of his attempt to create 
an allotment, Appellant stated:
 
I called to set up, 
trying to send money, and just send money; and they said I couldn’t; I had to 
have a bank account; and they couldn’t give me the bank account 
number.  And then I had to set up an allotment for 
that.  They wouldn’t, per se, give me a bank account number to 
send money in to. 
 
Appellant stated that 
he had not thought of obtaining a cashier’s check or money order to submit his 
child support payment.  While Appellant claimed that he had 
considered using money from his first military paycheck to pay child support, he 
acknowledged that this plan did not come to fruition.  
Further, although Appellant stated in answers to interrogatories that he 
had “received some money and will be sending it to the Court this morning,” no 
payment had been made as of the hearing date, and Appellant testified that the 
funds he had planned to use to pay his child support were from an anticipated 
tax refund.
 
[¶19]     
The district court 
found that Appellant was not a credible witness, and summarized its findings 
with respect to Appellant’s credibility in its decision letter: 
 
21.  
The Court finds [DLH’s] claims of seeking employment completely 
incredible.  He did not consult any employment 
agency.  He remained unemployed for over a year.  
He did not expand his job search [or] move to a location with 
jobs.
 
22.  
From January 11, 2011, to March 14, 2011, [DLH] was in basic 
training.  He claimed that he was not paid for his time in 
basic training.  When confronted with pay stubs showing he 
accrued $2,262 in wages prior to March 2011, [DLH] acknowledged that he 
must have been paid, but he was unable or unwilling to disclose when those 
payments occurred.
 
23.  
. . . The Court finds that the pay stubs accurately reflect 
[DLH’s] net income.
 
. . .
 
25.  
The Court in general finds [DLH] lacking in credibility, based on 
his attempts to mis-state his income for the Air Force, his incorrect 
explanation of his job termination, and his lack of effort at obtaining 
employment.
 
Based, in part, on 
these credibility findings, the court concluded that clear and convincing 
evidence established that Appellant had willfully ignored his obligation to 
support his son:
 
[DLH] 
willfully ignored his obligation to support his son.  He 
abandoned a job which enabled him to pay support.  Then he 
willingly accepted financial assistance from his father, but never passed along 
any of that assistance to his son.  [DLH] claims that 
he looked for work, but in fact he never contacted an employment agency or 
office.  He decided to enlist in the Air Force, and was 
content to not work while waiting for the right opportunity to open with the Air 
Force.
 
[DLH] did not 
petition to have his support obligation reduced.  Although he 
performed some various services for family members, he determined not to ask 
them for pay.  He did not contact the Court or [JLA] to 
arrange for some partial payment.  Instead, [DLH] 
completely ignored his obligation to support A.M.P. from January 
[2010], to the present.
 
While in the Air 
Force, [DLH] received housing in addition to his net pay.  
He could have contributed significant portions of his net pay to 
support A.M.P.  The Air Force paid [DLH] 
for his basic training, which ended [on] March 14, 2011. [DLH] did not 
contribute any of that pay to the support of A.M.P.  
The Air Force regularly paid [DLH] twice a month after he was 
served with notice of this case.  [DLH] chose not to 
contribute any of that pay to the support of A.M.P.
 
Clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that [DLH] willfully failed to pay support 
for more than one (1) year before this petition was filed on March 4, 
2011.  He had a job which he abandoned.  He 
did very little, if anything, to obtain employment.  He could 
have paid some of [the] funds his father gave him to support, but chose not to 
do so.  Likewise, he chose not to charge family members for 
babysitting or house painting. [DLH] was and is capable of 
working.
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)
 
[¶20]     
The district court’s 
conclusion that Appellant willfully failed to contribute to the support of his 
child is supported by the evidence.  As in 
RMS, the evidence shows that Appellant did not make a 
reasonable effort to find employment and support his son. 
 In re RMS, ¶ 17, 253 P.3d  at 153. 
 Appellant was unemployed for the entire year in 2010, but did 
not engage the assistance of a job service agency and did not seek to advance 
his employment prospects by enrolling in college courses or other job training 
programs.  Further, despite Appellant’s claim that he did not 
receive compensation during his time in basic training, the evidence 
unequivocally established that Appellant received military pay in March, before 
he was served with the adoption petition.  He did not 
contribute any of that pay to his child support obligation.  
Additionally, Appellant’s credibility was seriously undermined by his 
shifting testimony as to the timing of his attempt to create a military 
allotment and the fact that no child support payments had been made via 
allotment or otherwise as of the date of the adoption hearing, nearly a year 
after he completed basic training.  We must ultimately defer 
to the district court’s assessment of witness credibility.  
Despite Appellant’s claim that his failure to pay child support was not 
willful, the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that Appellant 
had willfully ignored his obligation to support his child. 
 
[¶21]     
The evidence also 
supports the district court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to bring his 
child support obligation current within 60 days.  This fact 
was undisputed.  Nonetheless, Appellant attempts to argue that 
this non-payment was not willful.  We note, however, that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) makes no reference to “willfulness” in conjunction 
with the obligation to make up arrearages within 60 days.  
Rather, the statute states that adoption may proceed without the consent 
of a parent if the parent has “Willfully failed to contribute to the support of 
the child for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition to adopt and has failed to bring the support obligation current 
within sixty (60) days after service of the petition to adopt.” 
(Emphasis added.)  In the second clause of the statute, as 
opposed to the first, “failed” is not modified by the word “willfully,” 
indicating that the obligation to bring child support payments current exists 
irrespective of the delinquent parent’s state of mind.  
Because it is undisputed that Appellant did not pay his accumulated 
arrearages, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in 
determining that this element of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) was 
satisfied.        
 
[¶22]     
Affirmed.
[¶23]     
FOOTNOTES
 
1As we 
noted in RMS, the discussion in TLC related to use 
of the word “willfully” in subsection (ix) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a), 
rather than subsection (iv).  Nonetheless, we determined that 
the analysis in TLC was relevant in interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-110(a)(iv).