Case Title: Daniels v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 506, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMEL DANIELS, 
)
)
No. 506, 2003
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)
Court Below:  Superior Court
)
of the State of Delaware in
)
and for New Castle County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)
Cr. ID No. 0107003610 
)
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  August 18, 2004
Decided:  October 5, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, JACOBS,  RIDGELY, Justices and
NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,* constituting the court en banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Darryl K. Fountain, Esquire, Law Office of Darryl K. Fountain, Wilmington,
Delaware, attorney for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware,
for Appellee.
RIDGELY, Justice:
*Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV § 12.
We affirmed Price’s conviction in September 2004.  See Price v. State, Del. Supr.,
1
ID No. 0106010693, Steele, C.J. (September 8, 2004).
2
A Superior Court jury convicted Jamel Daniels of First Degree Murder and
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  Daniels was sentenced
to life imprisonment without probation or parole for murder and an additional twenty
years for the weapons offense.  He contends in this appeal that during closing
argument the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence and thereby denied his due
process right to a fair trial.  We have reviewed the record and find that the prosecutor
did not exceed the permissible range of argument.  Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
Daniels was part of a drug distribution ring led by Leon Price which operated
between New York City and West Chester, Pennsylvania.  In April 2001, New Castle
County police and paramedics found the body of  Kensworth Griffith on the side of
a road in Christiana Hundred.  Griffith had been shot four times, twice from behind
with a .45 caliber weapon, once in the stomach with a .25 caliber weapon, and once
in the foot.  Following an investigation, Daniels and Price were arrested for Griffith’s
murder.  Price was separately tried and convicted in April 2003.   Daniels was tried
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and convicted in June 2003.
At Daniels’ trial, witnesses testified that Griffith owed Price money for drugs
he sold on Price’s behalf and that Price was very angry about being unpaid.  Another
state witness familiar with Price and Daniels through their drug activities testified that
Daniels was Price’s “right-hand man.”  He testified that Daniels stayed with Price in
his apartment for several months in early 2001.  Price owned two guns, a .45 caliber
Glock and a .25 caliber Derringer.  Both he and Daniels had been seen in possession
of these weapons. 
Trial Transcript of Jamel Daniels on June 2, 2003 at 31.
2
Id.
3
3
 The State presented testimony from two of Price’s and Daniels’ associates who
witnessed the killing, Jose Martinez and Jamil Mosley.  Martinez and Mosley were
also from New York and assisted Price in selling drugs.  On the day Griffith was
killed, the two traveled with Daniels and Price to a gas station in West Chester,
Pennsylvania, to pick up Griffith.  According to Mosley, Price offered Griffith an
opportunity to discharge his debt through additional drug sales.  Griffith  entered the
vehicle, and the five drove to Delaware, eventually pulling off to the side of Adams
Dam Road.  Martinez and Mosley testified that Daniels and Price exited the vehicle
and told Griffith to get out also.  After he did, Price and Daniels shot Griffith several
times outside the car and left his body on the side of the road.
The State introduced physical evidence consisting of a bullet from Griffith’s
body and shell casings found at the scene which had been fired from a .45 caliber
Glock.  The State also introduced a fresh, partially-smoked cigarette butt that was
found near Griffith’s body.  Forensic analyst Teri Lawton testified to the results of
DNA testing she performed on the cigarette butt.  She testified:
The DNA profiles of the evidentiary samples . . . are consistent with
being mixtures of the known DNA profiles of the reference samples. .
Therefore, Jamel Daniels and Lou Price are not excluded as DNA
contributors. . . .2
When asked to explain this finding, Lawton responded that “[e]ssentially, it means
that both of Jamel Daniels and Lou Price’s DNA profiles were present in the
mixture.”   Lawton further stated that no other DNA profiles were found in the sample
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taken from the scene. 
Trial Transcript of Jamel Daniels on June 6, 2003 at 32-33.
4
4
During her closing argument the prosecutor referred to the testimony of
Martinez and Mosley which identified Daniels and Price as shooters and the physical
evidence that corroborated the testimony against them.  She said:
In addition to the evidence that – in addition to the testimony that was
presented, the State also presented evidence, physical evidence and that
evidence is very important, because it does two things.
One, it corroborates the testimony of the witnesses, and secondly, it
paints a very vivid picture, and one of the most important pieces of
evidence is the Newport cigarette butt, State’s Exhibit 5.  This is
important for a number of reasons.
First of all, it’s important because it tells you that the defendant was at
the scene on April 10 , 2001, and at the scene, I mean at the scene, not
th
in the car, merely watching what happened, but at the scene.  As you
recall from Detective DiNardo, he testified that the cigarette butt, which
was fresh, actually still had ash attached to it when he collected it, was
only feet away from Kenny’s body, and inches away from the .45 caliber
casings which were fired from the Glock.  
So, that tells you that the defendant was not in the car, but was actually
physically standing there at the scene, outside of the car.4
Daniels objected to these statements, contending they mischaracterized the
DNA evidence.  The trial judge overruled the objection.  He noted that the prosecutor
did not argue that the DNA evidence, standing alone, put Daniels at the scene.
Instead, the trial judge found the argument to be based on inferences that could be
drawn from the evidence and that the defense was free to argue the contrary.   Daniels
appeals this ruling.
Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 (Del. 1980).
5
Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 545 (Del. 1971) quoting ABA Standards, the
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Prosecution and Defense Function (approved Draft, 1971).
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
7
Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 1960).
8
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
9
Cf. United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 1948) (“No prosecution is
10
tried with flawless perfection; if every slip is to result in reversal, we shall never succeed in
enforcing the criminal law at all.”).
See Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540 (Del. 1979); Edwards v. State, 320 A.2d 701 (Del.
11
1974).  See also SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 52(a) (“Any error . . . which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.”).
5
II.
At trial a prosecutor may argue “legitimate inferences of the appellant’s guilt
that flow from the evidence.”   However, it is “unprofessional conduct for the
5
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the
inferences it may draw.”6
Closing statements are “an aspect of a fair trial which is implicit in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”   As such, they come within the
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prosecutor’s obligation “to see that justice be done by giving [a] defendant a fair and
impartial trial.”    It is thus “as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper
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methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.”9
Not every improper remark, however, requires reversal.   Only comments that
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prejudicially affect the “substantial rights” of the accused compromise the integrity
of the verdict and the fairness of the trial.   We review a claim of prosecutorial
11
Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002).
12
Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 569 (Del. 1981).
13
Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d at 204.  See also Brockenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 855
14
(Del. 1987); Boatson v. State, 457 A.2d 738, 742 (Del. 1983); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 570
(Del. 1981).
6
misconduct de novo to determine whether the conduct was improper or prejudicial.12
In determining the prejudicial effect of improper prosecutorial argument, we assess
three aspects of trial: (1) the closeness of the case; (2) the centrality of the issue
affected by the alleged error; and (3) the steps taken to mitigate any subsequent effects
of the alleged error.13
III.
Daniels argues that the prosecutor mischaracterized the significance of the DNA
evidence.  We have carefully reviewed the prosecutor’s argument and find no
misconduct in this case.  The prosecutor’s argument referred to the physical evidence
which included the fresh cigarette butt and the circumstances under which this
evidence was found near Griffith’s body.  She did not directly mention the DNA
evidence which linked both Daniels and Price to the fresh cigarette butt, nor did she
characterize the specific testimony of the forensic analyst.  Rather, she argued an
inference which could be drawn from the evidence that both Daniels and Price were
at the scene.  A jury could infer that they shared a fresh cigarette at the murder scene
outside the car just as they shared the task of killing Griffith.    
When the prosecutor’s argument is viewed in the context of all the evidence,
we agree with the trial judge’s assessment of that argument, namely that the
prosecutor here argued an inference which could be drawn from the evidence.   In
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overruling Daniels’ objection, the trial judge correctly observed that both sides were
free to argue the inferences which could be drawn by the jury from the evidence.  In
Daniels’ counsel told the jury:
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You are to decide the significance of the DNA evidence, not the
prosecution. . . . The cigarette butt found outside, on the ground,
according to Teri Lawton, doesn’t put the defendant at the scene.  It
puts his DNA at the scene. . . . It’s just as likely Lou Price, when he
got out of the car, put the cigarette there. . . .
Trial Transcript of Jamel Daniels on June 6, 2003 at 50.
See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 762 (Del.1987); Hooks, 416 A.2d at 204.
16
See Hughes, 437 A.2d at 570 (discussing “crucial significance” of blood evidence
17
and prosecutor’s disregard for timing of statements made by defendant).  See also Price, ID No.
0106010693, at 11 (denouncing as “astonishing” prosecutor’s disregard of trial judge’s order in
closing arguments but finding no prejudice); Hunter, 815 A.2d at 736 (providing that the
prosecutor’s suggestion that role of defense counsel was to “trick” jury into acquitting defendant
held improper); Boatson v. State, 457 A.2d 738, 742 (Del. 1983) (holding curative instruction
sufficient where prosecutor during summation referred to statements neither in evidence nor made
by defendant); Hooks, 416 A.2d at 207-08 (recounting prosecutor’s improper, but nonetheless
curable, statements to jury attacking defendant’s religion and character).  See generally Deangelis
v. Harrison, 628 A.2d 77, 80 (Del. 1993) (collecting cases).
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fact, that is exactly what happened here.   The comments of the prosecutor objected
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to by Daniels were reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence which
the jury was free to accept or disregard in favor of the alternative inferences argued
by defense counsel.
A prosecutor is not confined to a mere repetition of the testimony in closing
argument.   Nor does the existence of alternative inferences make her argument of the
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inferences of guilt to be drawn from the evidence improper.  This case is
distinguishable from Hughes and other prosecutorial misconduct cases.   We hold
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that the trial judge properly overruled the objection to the prosecutor’s argument in
this case and that a Hughes analysis of the prejudicial effect of improper prosecutorial
argument is not warranted in this case.
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.