Case Title: Needham v. Superior Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: S276395

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2024-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
NICHOLAS NEEDHAM, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S276395 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G060670 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
M-16870 
 
 
July 1, 2024 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Kruger, Jenkins, and Evans 
concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Liu concurred.   
 
1 
 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S276395 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA or the Act) 
(Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 6600 et seq.), a person convicted and 
imprisoned for certain sex offenses may be civilly committed for 
treatment in a secure facility following completion of a prison term.  
The Act sets out the procedures for formally evaluating a defendant 
as a potential sexually violent predator (SVP), as well as for initiating 
and litigating a commitment petition.  In People v. Superior Court 
(Smith) (2018) 6 Cal.5th 457 (Smith), we concluded the People2 may 
share discovery of the defendant’s treatment records with their 
retained expert.  (Id. at pp. 469–472.)  Here we resolve two additional 
questions regarding the People’s retained expert.  We hold that, 
although the People may call their retained expert to testify at trial, 
both to contest the testimony of other witnesses and to offer an 
independent opinion as to whether the defendant qualifies as an SVP, 
the People’s retained expert may not compel a defendant to be 
interviewed or participate in testing before trial.  We reverse the 
Court of Appeal’s contrary judgment and remand the case for trial.   
 
1  
Subsequent unspecified statutory provisions will refer to the 
Welfare and Institutions Code.   
2  
The Act provides that the county board of supervisors shall 
designate either the district attorney or county counsel to assume 
responsibility for pursuing SVP proceedings.  (§ 6601, subd. (i).)  For 
ease of reference, we refer to the county’s designated counsel as the 
district attorney, the People, or the prosecution.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2016, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
referred defendant Nicholas Needham for evaluation as a possible 
SVP.  (§ 6601, subd. (a)(1).)  The State Department of State Hospitals 
(DSH) appointed two evaluators, Dr. Jeremy Coles and Dr. Michael 
Musacco, who each determined that defendant had a mental disorder 
making him likely to engage in sexual violence unless civilly 
committed and treated as provided by the SVPA.  (§ 6601, subds. (c), 
(d).)  The Orange County District Attorney’s Office then petitioned to 
commit defendant as an SVP.  (§ 6601, subd. (i).)   
Before the probable cause hearing, Dr. Coles submitted an 
updated evaluation, changing his opinion and concluding that 
defendant did not qualify for commitment.  As required by statute, the 
DSH appointed two other evaluators, Dr. Yanofsky and Dr. Korpi.  
(§ 6601, subds. (e), (g).)  Dr. Yanofsky concluded defendant qualified 
as an SVP, while Dr. Korpi opined he did not.  Doctors Coles, Musacco, 
and Korpi testified at the probable cause hearing.  The trial court 
concluded there was probable cause to believe defendant was an SVP 
and ordered a trial.  (§ 6602, subd. (a).)  Subsequently, however, Dr. 
Yanofsky submitted an updated evaluation indicating he, too, had 
changed his opinion and no longer believed defendant qualified as an 
SVP.   
The People retained Dr. Craig King as an expert and sought 
discovery of defendant’s evaluations and records.  Following a hearing 
and over defense objection, the trial court granted the request, relying 
on Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th 457.  The court later ruled that Dr. King 
could interview “and/or . . . test” defendant as well as obtain 
defendant’s additional medical records.  Dr. King interviewed 
defendant for three to four hours, covering various aspects of 
defendant’s treatment, sexual behavior, and coping skills.  The 
interview was audiotaped.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
Defendant filed three motions to preclude Dr. King from 
testifying at trial.  He argued, inter alia, that 1. Dr. King should not 
have been granted access to defendant’s treatment records, 2. the Act 
did not authorize Dr. King to interview or test defendant, and 3. 
Dr. King should not be allowed to testify that, in his opinion, 
defendant qualifies as an SVP.  The court denied these motions.   
Defendant sought a writ of mandate/prohibition to prevent 
Dr. King from conducting any further interviewing or testing of 
defendant and from testifying at trial.  The writ petition characterized 
the court’s order as having permitted Dr. King to do an “evaluation” 
of the defendant, although the court’s order did not use that term.  In 
resolving defendant’s petition, the Court of Appeal accepted that 
nomenclature.  This characterization is not precisely accurate, 
however.  As we explain, the Act and accompanying regulations set 
out in great detail all that is encompassed in a formal precommitment 
evaluation and provide it is to be done by DSH evaluators.  What the 
court order permitted was an independent interview and testing by 
Dr. King, which, as discussed post, is not authorized under the Act.  
The Court of Appeal summarily denied defendant’s writ petition.  We 
granted defendant’s petition for review and transferred the matter to 
the Court of Appeal with direction to issue an order to show cause.  A 
divided Court of Appeal thereafter granted defendant’s writ petition 
and directed the trial court to exclude Dr. King’s testimony.  
(Needham v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 114, 125–129.)  We 
granted the People’s petition for review from that ruling.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The SVPA, Updated/Replacement Evaluations, and 
the Civil Discovery Act 
The SVPA “provides for the involuntary civil commitment of 
certain sex offenders before the end of their prison or parole revocation 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
terms.”  (Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 190 (Walker); 
see § 6600 et seq., eff. Jan. 1, 1996.)  The Act sets out with specificity 
how the SVP process is to be initiated, who may evaluate a person for 
possible SVP treatment, and how that formal evaluation is to be 
conducted.  “[T]he Legislature expressed concern over a select group 
of criminal offenders who are extremely dangerous as the result of 
mental impairment, and who are likely to continue committing acts of 
sexual violence even after they have been punished for such crimes.  
The Legislature indicated that to the extent such persons are 
currently incarcerated and readily identifiable, commitment under 
the SVPA is warranted immediately upon their release from prison.  
The Act provides treatment for mental disorders from which they 
currently suffer and reduces the threat of harm otherwise posed to the 
public.  No punitive purpose was intended.”  (Hubbart v. Superior 
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143–1144 (Hubbart).)  An SVP action 
is a special civil proceeding.  (Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 641, 648 (Reilly); Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
802, 815 (Moore).)   
“The trial represents the final step in 
the ‘complex 
administrative and judicial process’ required to civilly commit an 
individual as an SVP.  [Citation.]  The process leading up to a trial 
begins when the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
screens inmates at least six months before their release date (§ 6601, 
subd. (a)), and refers any potential SVP to DSH for a ‘full evaluation’ 
(id., subd. (b)).  DSH then designates two practicing psychologists or 
psychiatrists to evaluate the inmate in accordance with a 
‘standardized assessment protocol,’ which requires ‘assessment of 
diagnosable mental disorders, as well as various factors known to be 
associated with the risk of reoffense among sex offenders.’  (Id., subd. 
(c).)  If the two mental health professionals agree that the inmate 
qualifies as an SVP (or if only one reaches this conclusion and two 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
subsequently appointed professionals concur), the DSH Director 
forwards a request for a commitment petition, along with . . . 
supporting documents, to the county in which the inmate was last 
convicted.  (Id., subds. (d)–(f), (h).)  If the county’s designated counsel 
agrees, the petition for commitment is filed in superior court.  (Id., 
subd. (i).)”  (Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 190–191.)  If the court 
finds probable cause that “the individual named in the petition is 
likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon 
his or her release,” the case proceeds to trial.  (§ 6602, subd. (a).)   
Among the protections afforded to the defendant are the rights 
to counsel, discovery of reports and evaluation materials, retention of 
experts, trial by jury and proof of his status beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (§§ 6603, subd. (a); 6604.)  The statutory provisions are 
augmented by title 9, chapter 15 of the California Code of Regulations, 
which particularizes the “standardized assessment protocol” called for 
by the Act.  (§ 6601, subd. (c); see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 4000–
4020.1.)  The protocol describes, among other things, the 
qualifications required of evaluators; the questions they are to address 
in their evaluation report; the extensive records they are to review; a 
face-to-face clinical interview of the defendant, with directions as to 
what the interview should include; the items required for inclusion in 
the evaluator’s forensic report; detailed citations to all documents and 
other sources relied upon; notation of the evaluation procedures 
employed; and detailed requirements for the evaluator’s findings.  The 
protocol also contains express provisions for how the evaluator is to 
interact with the subject.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 4011–4013.)  
The evaluator must write a forensic report, which the DSH certifies 
as the “official evaluation” before providing a copy to the court and 
parties.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4014.1; see id., § 4014.)   
An SVP commitment requires a finding that the person suffers 
from “a currently diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or 
she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”  (§ 6600, subd. 
(a)(3), italics added.)  We have rejected due process and equal 
protection challenges against the SVPA due in part to the Act’s 
requirement that a currently diagnosed mental disorder has been 
proved.  (See Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1158, 1162, 1169–
1170.)   
Sporich v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 422 addressed 
whether the People were entitled to updated DSH evaluations of the 
defendant before trial and held that, at the time of its decision, “[a]n 
order for additional precommitment mental examinations to establish 
currency is simply not authorized by the SVP Act.”  (Id. at p. 427.)  As 
a result, it rejected a claim that the SVPA implicitly countenanced 
such exams.  The People alternatively argued that, even if the SVPA 
did not authorize updated evaluations, the mental examination 
provisions of the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et 
seq.; CDA) independently entitled them to examine the defendant.  
Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020, subdivision (a) provides in 
part that “[a]ny party may obtain discovery . . . by means of a physical 
or mental examination of . . . a party to the action . . . in any action in 
which the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of 
that party or other person is in controversy in the action.”  A party 
seeking such examination must seek leave of the court.  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 2032.310, subd. (a).)  The court may grant a motion for a 
mental exam “only for good cause shown” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320, 
subd. (a)).  Recognizing an SVP proceeding is civil in nature, Sporich 
assumed the CDA applied but concluded the People failed to show 
good cause for additional examinations.  (See Sporich, at pp. 427–428.)   
After Sporich, the Legislature added what is now section 6603, 
subdivision (d).  (See Sen. Bill No. 2018 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) § 2; 
Stats. 2000, ch. 420, § 2, p. 3139.)  The provision expressly grants the 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
People the right to seek updated or replacement evaluations under 
certain circumstances:  “If the attorney petitioning for commitment 
under this article determines that updated evaluations are necessary 
in order to properly present the case for commitment, the attorney 
may request the State Department of State Hospitals to perform 
updated evaluations.  If one or more of the original evaluators is no 
longer available to testify . . . [the People, as petitioner] may request 
the State Department of State Hospitals to perform replacement 
evaluations.  When a request is made for updated or replacement 
evaluations, the State Department of State Hospitals shall perform the 
requested evaluations and forward them to the petitioning attorney 
and to the counsel for the person subject to this article.  However, 
updated or replacement evaluations shall not be performed except as 
necessary to update one or more of the original evaluations or to 
replace the evaluation of an evaluator who is no longer available to 
testify for the petitioner in court proceedings.  These updated or 
replacement evaluations shall include review of available medical and 
psychological records, including treatment records, consultation with 
current treating clinicians, and interviews of the person being 
evaluated, either voluntarily or by court order.  If an updated or 
replacement evaluation results in a split opinion as to whether the 
person subject to this article meets the criteria for commitment, the 
State Department of State Hospitals shall conduct two additional 
evaluations in accordance with subdivision (f) of Section 6601.”  
(§ 6603, subd. (d)(1), italics added.)  Evaluators are “no longer 
available to testify” if they failed to adhere to department protocol, 
had their licenses suspended or revoked, are unavailable to testify, or 
have resigned or retired.3  (§ 6603, subd. (d)(1); see 6603, subd. (d)(2).)  
 
3  
The statute excludes from the definition of “no longer available 
to testify” those evaluators who have resigned or retired who, in the 
 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
The accompanying regulations also provide that DSH has the “sole 
authority to designate evaluators for” updated or replacement 
evaluations.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4020.1, subd. (c).)   
As noted in the bill analysis by the Assembly Committee on 
Public Safety, the author asserted the new law “ ‘would permit the 
prosecuting attorney to request DMH[4] to prepare updated 
evaluations to support the filing of a[n] SVP commitment or 
recommitment petition.  These updates are occasionally necessary, for 
instance, where an evaluation has become stale with the passage of 
time or because the treating doctor is no longer available to testify in 
court.  Without the update, the petition could be denied, or at least 
delayed until a new evaluation is obtained.  In such instances, SB 
2018 would avoid foreseeable delays by allowing the state’s attorney 
to request updated evaluations in needed cases. . . .  These updated 
evaluations will help ensure that those who are still dangerous will be 
committed, and those who do not meet the SVP criteria will not be 
committed inappropriately.”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 2018 (1999–2000 Reg Sess.) as amended May 1, 2000, 
p. 3.)  Both this analysis and a similar one by the Senate Public Safety 
Committee discussed the impact of the Sporich decision.  (See id. at 
p. 6; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2018 (1999–
2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 11, 2000, p. 6.)  Albertson v. 
Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796 (Albertson), observed:  “The 
district attorney has an interest in obtaining information concerning 
the individual’s current mental state for two reasons:  to avoid 
 
“most recent evaluation of the person subject to this article, opined 
that the person subject to this article does not meet the criteria for 
commitment.”  (§ 6603, subd. (d)(2)(D).)   
4  
The State Department of Mental Health was the precursor to 
the State Department of State Hospitals.  (See Reilly, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 647.)   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
committing a person who does not currently suffer from a qualifying 
mental disorder, and to support the commitment of a person who does 
suffer from a qualifying mental disorder.”  (Id. at p. 802.)  We went on 
to hold that “[i]t is evident from its language and history that section 
6603[(d)] was intended by the Legislature . . . [to clarify] the trial 
court’s authority to order updated mental interviews and evaluations, 
as well as the district attorney’s right of access to treatment 
information.”  (Albertson, at p. 804; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, 
§ 4020.1.)   
As this review demonstrates, the Act aims to balance the rights 
of a proposed conservatee, the need to protect public safety and 
provide treatment, and the goal of properly litigating a commitment 
proceeding.  It makes clear that, while the prosecutor can request that 
updated or replacement evaluations be conducted, the evaluations 
themselves must be done by DSH.  The structure and language of the 
Act make clear that the terms “evaluation” and “evaluator” are terms 
of art.  (See §§ 6601, subds. (a)–(h), 6603, subds. (d), (j), (k)(1).)  A 
precommitment evaluation is a particularly defined process, engaged 
in only by a DSH-appointed evaluator.  For the reasons discussed 
below, the Act does not give the People’s expert the authority to 
conduct a precommitment evaluation, nor does it authorize 
independent interviews or tests of the defendant at that stage of the 
process.   
B.  Smith and Experts Retained by the People 
Albertson explained that, in light of section 6603, subdivision 
(d), the prosecution “may obtain access to otherwise confidential 
treatment information concerning an alleged SVP to the extent such 
information is contained in an updated mental evaluation.”  
(Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 807.)  The Legislature later added 
what is now section 6603, subdivision (k), which provides:  
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
“Notwithstanding any other law, the evaluator performing an updated 
evaluation shall include with the evaluation a statement listing all 
records reviewed by the evaluator pursuant to subdivision (d).  The 
court shall issue a subpoena, upon the request of either party, for a 
certified copy of these records.  The records shall be provided to the 
attorney petitioning for commitment and the counsel for the person 
subject to this article.  The attorneys may use the records in 
proceedings under this article and shall not disclose them for any 
other purpose.”  (§ 6603, subd. (k)(1); see Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
pp. 464–468.)  Smith reasoned “updated evaluation” in this provision 
included replacement evaluations.  (Id. at pp. 467–468.)  Evaluations 
and supporting materials are released to counsel subject to a 
protective order to ensure they are used only in connection with 
commitment proceedings.  (See id. at pp. 464, 472.)   
Although section 6603, subdivision (k)(1) authorized disclosure 
of treatment records relied upon by evaluators in performing an 
updated or replacement evaluation, the Smith defendant argued that 
confidentiality laws precluded “the government from sharing those 
records with its retained expert.”  (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 469.)  
Smith rejected the claim:  “So long as attorneys do not disclose the 
confidential records for any other purpose, subdivision [(k)](1) at the 
very least suggests that attorneys may disclose them ‘in proceedings 
under this article.’  [Citation.]  Given the ‘critical’ importance of expert 
testimony in an SVP proceeding [citation] — and the likelihood that 
counsel will need expert assistance to grasp the scientific nuances 
underlying another expert’s opinion — the disclosure most needed by 
each party ‘in proceedings under this article’ [citation] would almost 
certainly be to its retained expert.”  (Ibid.)  Smith observed that 
“[a]lthough the SVP determination requires proof that the person has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, the bulk of the evidence 
at trial typically focuses on whether the person has a diagnosed 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
mental disorder that makes it likely he or she will engage in sexually 
violent behavior.  [Citation.]  Accordingly, the civil commitment trial 
usually turns on the quality and credibility of the expert witnesses 
and the extent to which their evaluations are persuasive.”  (Id. at pp. 
470–471.)  “A key way in which one party counters an opposing 
expert’s opinion is to uncover and challenge the expert about the bases 
for his or her opinion.  [Citations.]  This is particularly true for a 
mental health professional’s assessment of whether an individual 
qualifies as an SVP.  Because an evaluator exercises professional 
judgment within the legal framework specified by the SVPA, the 
evaluator’s ‘legally accurate understanding of the statutory criteria is 
crucial to the Act’s proper operation.’ ”  (Id. at p. 471.)  Smith also 
reasoned the opportunity to cross-examine evaluators “would be a 
hollow one if the district attorney does not have the assistance of an 
expert to interpret and explain the significance of the specialized 
information at issue.  [Citations.]  Without an expert’s assistance in 
preparing the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, ‘the risk of an 
inaccurate resolution . . . is extremely high.’  [Citation.]  An expert 
would also need to examine the relevant records to offer an opinion 
about the potential SVP’s mental health.”  (Id. at pp. 471–472.)  Smith 
concluded:  “Our society uses trials to advance the search for truth.  
That search generally works best when each side — and each side’s 
experts — have access to the records and information on which the 
opposing side’s experts rely.  The Legislature adopted this reciprocal 
model in the current version of the SVPA.”  (Id. at p. 473.)  While 
Smith established that the People’s retained experts may review all 
the available discovery, here we consider whether those retained 
experts may testify at trial and, if so, whether they may offer their 
own opinion as to a defendant’s status as an SVP.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
C.  The People’s Retained Expert May Not Compel a 
Defendant to Participate in an Interview or Testing 
The People first contend the prosecuting agency in an SVP 
proceeding may retain an expert, not only to assist in trial preparation 
and presentation, but also to independently examine a defendant.  
They assert that nothing in the SVPA precludes the practice.  SVP 
trials are, as noted, “ ‘ “special proceedings of a civil nature,” ’ wholly 
unrelated to any criminal case.”  (Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 815.)  
At such trials, the rules of evidence apply.  (Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th 
at p. 191; see Evid. Code, § 300.)   
Initially, we reject the People’s reliance on the CDA, rather than 
the SVPA, to answer the question here.  The People suggest the CDA 
“supports the People’s right to retain private experts, the right to have 
those experts examine an alleged SVP, and the right to call that expert 
to render an opinion at trial” based on that examination.  Only the 
first assertion is correct.  The CDA generally applies to SVP trials, 
which are special civil proceedings.  (See People v. Jackson (2022) 75 
Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Jackson).)  However, as the title of the act suggests, 
the CDA primarily concerns discovery between parties.  Although the 
CDA regulates the exchange of information between the parties with 
regard to experts (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2034.210–2034.730) and 
provides for the exclusion of expert testimony as a sanction if a party 
fails to comply with its provisions (see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 2034.300, 2034.310), the admission of expert testimony is governed 
by the Evidence Code, not the CDA.   
Indeed, even if the CDA contains terms that may generally be 
applicable in a civil proceeding, such provisions must yield to more 
specific requirements of the SVPA.  On this point, Jackson is 
instructive.  In that case, the trial court excluded the defendant’s 
expert as a sanction for failing to comply with the CDA’s reciprocal 
discovery provisions.  (See Jackson, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 16–
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
18.)  Jackson reasoned that SVP defendants had both a statutory (see 
§ 6603, subd. (a)) and due process right to defense experts.  In light of 
those protections, exclusion of such experts would only be 
countenanced “ ‘for the most egregious discovery abuse . . . in which 
the record demonstrates a willful and deliberat[e] violation which was 
motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage at trial such as 
the plan to present fabricated testimony.’ ”  (Jackson, at p. 24.)  
Jackson went on to conclude the discovery violation at issue there did 
not rise to that level and exclusion of the defense expert was improper 
notwithstanding that the CDA appeared to authorize such exclusion.  
(Id. at pp. 24–27.)   
Similarly here, although the CDA generally allows one party, 
upon a proper showing, to conduct a mental examination of another 
party (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2032.020, subd. (a); 2032.310, subd. (a), 
2032.320, subd. (a)), those provisions conflict with the SVPA’s express 
mandates concerning the conduct of updated or replacement 
evaluations and the dissemination of a defendant’s confidential 
records.  As discussed, the Legislature added what is now section 
6603, subdivision (d)(1), allowing the People to request updated 
evaluations from the DSH as “necessary in order to properly present 
the case for commitment,” or replacement evaluations if “one or more 
of the original evaluators is no longer available to testify for the 
petitioner in court proceedings . . . .”  We have recognized “the 
updated 
evaluations’ 
primary 
purpose 
is 
evidentiary 
or 
informational.”  (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 648.)  The statutory 
scheme expressly authorizes release to the People of all evaluations 
and supporting documents.  But the right is limited to evaluations 
conducted by DSH.  
The materials to be consulted and relied upon by DSH 
evaluators are quite extensive and all of them are discoverable by the 
People.  But nowhere does the Act authorize independent interviewing 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
or testing by a People’s retained expert before a civil commitment has 
been imposed after a jury trial.  Allowing such independent 
precommitment interviews and testing would permit an end run 
around the Act’s careful and particularized balancing of the competing 
interests at play.  As the Court of Appeal majority below observed, 
permitting an independent examination would permit a People’s 
expert to interact with the defendant “free of the restrictions the 
Legislature imposed in [section 6603,] subdivision (d)(1).”  (Needham 
v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 126.)   
The Act limits how formal evaluations are conducted and by 
whom.  An initial “full evaluation” of defendant must be conducted by 
DSH “in accordance with a standardized assessment protocol . . . .”  
(§ 6601, subds. (a)(2), (b), (c).)  The initial evaluations must be 
conducted by “two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists, or one 
practicing psychiatrist and one practicing psychologist, designated by 
the Director of State Hospitals.”  (§ 6601, subd. (d).)  If one of those 
evaluators does not concur that a defendant qualifies as an SVP, the 
DSH must appoint two additional independent evaluators, who “shall 
not be a state government employee, shall have at least five years of 
experience in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders, and 
shall include psychiatrists and licensed psychologists who have a 
doctoral degree in psychology.”  (§ 6601, subd. (g); see § 6601, subds. 
(e), (f).)  As noted, evaluators must also follow the detailed DSH 
assessment protocol (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4000 et seq.; 
Needham v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 125, fn. 2), 
and any updated or replacement evaluation must also be performed 
in accordance with the statute.  The DSH has the “sole authority to 
designate evaluators” for updated or replacement evaluations.  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4020.1, subd. (c).)  Section 6603 expressly provides 
that an evaluator who “has failed to adhere to the protocol of the 
[DSH]” constitutes one who is no longer available to testify so as to 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
permit the People to request a replacement evaluation.  (§ 6603, subd. 
(d)(2)(A); see generally Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 651–657.)  By 
contrast, no provision of the Act mentions interviews or testing by a 
People’s expert before commitment.  Thus, it contains no regulation of 
the qualifications that would be required of a People’s expert nor does 
it control how such independent interviewing or testing would be 
conducted.  The protocol also expressly regulates the manner in which 
the evaluator may interact with the defendant.5  Allowing 
independent examination and testing by a People’s expert could 
potentially undermine these safeguards.6   
 
5  
For example, the protocol requires an evaluator to “assess the 
Individual’s ability to” communicate, comprehend, and retain verbal 
communication and make accommodations to conduct the interview.  
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4013, subd. (a).)  An evaluator must attempt 
to obtain informed consent when possible, “maintain a position of 
neutrality with regard to the SVP law,” explain “the limits of 
confidentiality and the Evaluator’s professional and legal obligation 
as a mandated reporter” (id., subd. (c)(1)), and give no legal advice or 
feedback to the individual as to the evaluator’s “professional opinion 
about whether the Individual meets” the criteria for certification (id., 
subd. (c)(2)).  The protocol also provides that an evaluator should 
employ only those tests, instruments and risk factors that have 
“gained professional recognition or acceptance in the field . . . .”  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4005.)   
6  
The People’s reliance on People v. Landau (2013) 214 
Cal.App.4th 1 is misplaced.  We note that Landau largely assumed 
the People could retain an expert to testify and concluded the expert 
could properly examine the defendant under general CDA provisions.  
We disapprove Landau to the extent it so concluded.  The People also 
suggest they “have not requested a compelled mental health 
evaluation pursuant to [the CDA].  [We note that the people in their 
briefing continue to use the term “evaluation.”  As explained above the 
use of that term in this context is misplaced.]  They selected a less 
intrusive means of obtaining an evaluation.  Needham had a choice as 
to whether he wished to participate in an evaluation.  He chose to 
 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Other provisions of the SVPA expressly allow the People’s 
expert to examine a defendant after commitment.  If a committed 
person later petitions for conditional release or discharge, the People 
“shall represent the state and may have the committed person 
evaluated by experts chosen by the state.”  (§ 6608, subd. (g); see 
§ 6605, subd. (a)(3).)  Further, after a commitment, the DSH “shall 
have a current examination of [the person’s] mental condition made 
at least once every year” and prepare an annual report regarding 
whether the person still qualifies as an SVP or whether conditional 
release or unconditional discharge “is in the best interest of the person 
and conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the 
community.”  (§ 6604.9, subds. (a), (b); see People v. McKee (2010) 47 
Cal.4th 1172, 1192–1193 (McKee).)  These different provisions support 
the conclusion that, although the Legislature contemplated 
examinations by both DSH and the People’s expert after commitment, 
it did not intend to authorize independent examinations by a 
prosecution’s retained expert before a commitment has been ordered.7   
 
participate in the process and provided his written consent to 
Dr. King.  [Citation.]  An order compelling a mental health 
examination was therefore unnecessary.”  This assertion is somewhat 
misleading.  Although it is true that defendant signed a consent form 
upon Dr. King’s arrival at the jail to interview him, he did so only after 
the court had ordered, over defense objection, that Dr. King could 
conduct an interview and test him.  Indeed, large portions of 
defendant’s three motions to exclude Dr. King’s testimony were 
devoted to arguing the interview was improper and should not have 
been allowed.  (See discussion, ante.)   
7  
In light of our conclusion based on statutory interpretation of 
the SVPA, we need not address defendant’s constitutional claim that 
compelling him to be interviewed by the People’s retained expert 
would deny him due process.  (See Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court 
(Hunter) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245, 1275, fn. 31; People v. Williams (1976) 
16 Cal.3d 663, 667.)   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
D.  The People’s Retained Expert May Testify at Trial 
and Offer an Opinion on the Subject of SVP 
Qualification 
Having concluded that a People’s expert may not, under the Act, 
interview or test a defendant before a commitment has been ordered, 
we turn to the question of whether such an expert may nonetheless 
offer an opinion at trial as to whether the defendant qualifies as an 
SVP.  Generally, an expert may testify in the form of an opinion if it 
is “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience 
that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact” and is based 
on matter “of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert 
in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony 
relates . . . .”  (Evid. Code, § 801, subds. (a), (b).)  However, “[t]he court 
may, and upon objection shall, exclude testimony in the form of an 
opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on matter that is 
not a proper basis for such an opinion.  In such case, the witness may, 
if there remains a proper basis for his opinion, then state his opinion 
after excluding from consideration the matter determined to be 
improper.”  (Evid. Code, § 803.)   
We have recognized that “expert testimony is critical in an SVP 
commitment proceeding, in which the primary issue is not, as in a 
criminal trial, whether the individual committed certain acts, but 
rather involves a prediction about the individual’s future behavior.”  
(McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1192.)  That inquiry is a subject beyond 
common experience, and a jury would be aided by expert testimony on 
the matter.  Indeed, Smith affirmed that an SVP trial “usually turns 
on the quality and credibility of the expert witnesses and the extent 
to which their evaluations are persuasive.”  (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th 
at p. 471.)  An expert’s testimony may “assist the trier of fact in 
determining whether the evaluator has ‘accurately understood the 
statutory criteria.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Understanding the methods and 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
reliability of diagnostic testing and evaluation undergirding an 
assessment of whether a person is an SVP constitutes “a subject that 
is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert 
would assist the trier of fact . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see 
Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 469; McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1192.)  
So long as an expert’s opinion is not based on improper matter, the 
Evidence Code would not preclude the relevant testimony of any 
expert, including one presented by the People.   
Mirroring the reasoning of the Court of Appeal majority below, 
defendant argues the SVPA contemplates only evaluators appointed 
by DSH be allowed to testify at trial and that allowing the People to 
retain experts to testify undermines the nonpunitive nature of the Act.  
The majority below reasoned in part:  “Virtually the entire scheme 
revolves around the independent experts who evaluate the defendant 
and testify concerning defendant’s mental state. . . .  To permit the 
People to retain a testifying expert would create the possibility that 
an expert with a clear bias — an expert hired to support the People’s 
view, rather than provide an independent analysis — could lead to the 
deprivation of a person’s liberty even where some independent experts 
find it unwarranted, or for reasons independent experts find 
unconvincing.  That result is inconsistent with the design of the SVPA 
procedure.”  (Needham v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 
127.)   
Initially, the Court of Appeal majority’s suggestion that any 
expert presented by the People must, of necessity, be biased, 
misconstrues the nature of expert testimony.  Not every professional 
disagreement signifies an impermissible bias.  Even among experts, 
reasonable minds may simply differ.  As with any compensated expert 
or, indeed, any witness, the opposing party is free to pursue the 
question of bias and the trier of fact is permitted to consider whether 
its presence undermines witness credibility.  Yet the mere fact that a 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
party has called the expert to testify, or that the expert has previously 
testified for one side or the other, standing alone, would not establish 
disqualifying bias (see People v. Buffington (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 
446, 454–456), and nothing in the SVPA suggests an intent to exclude 
the People’s expert from trial because such expert would be inherently 
biased.8  Indeed, although Smith did not decide the issue here, Smith 
reasoned, in part, the People may share discovery of a defendant’s 
confidential treatment records with their expert because it was 
necessary for the People to adequately challenge the testimony of DSH 
evaluators.  Smith observed:  “Unfortunately, as the legislative 
history suggests, the [DSH] ‘ “has not ensured that it conducts these 
evaluations in a consistent manner” ’ and sometimes ‘ “evaluators did 
not demonstrate that they considered all relevant information.” ’  
[Citations.]  A key way in which one party counters an opposing 
expert’s opinion is to uncover and challenge the expert about the bases 
for his or her opinion.  [Citations.]  This is particularly true for a 
mental health professional’s assessment of whether an individual 
qualifies as an SVP.  Because an evaluator exercises professional 
judgment within the legal framework specified by the SVPA, the 
evaluator’s ‘legally accurate understanding of the statutory criteria is 
crucial to the Act’s proper operation.’ ”  (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 
471.)  As Smith observed, there are legitimate reasons the People may 
wish to call its own expert to challenge the conclusions of the DSH 
evaluators.   
Nor is permitting the expert to testify — rather than merely 
consult behind the scenes — inconsistent with the design of the SVPA 
 
8  
As noted by the district attorney, Dr. King has not only worked 
as a People’s expert but has previously “contracted with the DSH to 
conduct sexually violent predator evaluations.”  (See, e.g., Jackson, 
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 11–14; People v. Presley (2021) 65 
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1137.)   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
procedure.  Although the SVPA’s detailed provisions for the conduct 
of evaluations precludes additional evaluations not provided for by 
statute, nothing in the Act limits the presentation of relevant, 
otherwise admissible expert testimony.  (See Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th 
at p. 472 [“nothing in the text of the SVPA bars the government from 
sharing otherwise confidential information in its possession with the 
expert”]; People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 
909, fn. 7 [“nothing in the SVPA appears to preclude the use of 
Department 
employees, 
including 
staff 
psychologists 
and 
psychiatrists directly involved in the treatment of an already 
committed person, as the initial designated evaluators”].)   
In suggesting we have “reache[d] a compromise” outcome that 
creates an “end run” around the statute (conc. & dis. opn. of Groban, 
J., post, at pp. 5, 10), the dissenting opinion asserts we have provided 
“no explanation for why the Legislature would give the People a right 
the majority believes to be critical to the SVP proceeding (a testifying 
expert) but then simultaneously hamstring the People by barring the 
expert from interviewing the defendant, even though DSH evaluators 
are allowed to . . . interview the defendant.”  (Id. at p. 5)  Similarly, 
the dissenting opinion reasons that “[i]f the Legislature believed the 
People already had the authority under the Evidence Code to hire 
their own testifying expert to opine on a person’s status as an SVP, 
then it is unclear why it believed that, without giving the People the 
authority to seek updated or replacement evaluations, the People 
might fail to prove their case at trial and ‘the petition could be 
denied.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 9–10.)   
We take the second point first.  Contrary to the dissenting 
opinion’s suggestion, the People’s ability to call its own expert does not 
obviate the need for current information acquired through an updated 
or replacement evaluation as to whether a defendant currently suffers 
from a mental disorder that makes him or her a danger to others or 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
likely to engage in sexual violence.  (See § 6600, subd. (a)(1)).  The 
ability to present expert testimony is not a replacement for updated 
information concerning defendant’s current mental status.  As a 
result, the statutory scheme permits the People to seek updated or 
replacement evaluations from the DSH when appropriate.  At the 
same time, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that access to 
such an evaluation, along with the ability to subpoena records 
reviewed by the evaluator (see § 6603, subd. (k)(1)), properly balances 
the People’s need for information with the state’s interest in 
controlling how evaluations are conducted, and by whom.   
Nor does the provision governing the conduct of updated or 
replacement evaluations indicate that other expert testimony 
relevant to the proceedings is barred.  That section 6603, subdivision 
(d)(2) permits the People to request updated or replacement DSH 
evaluations only in certain circumstances thus says nothing about the 
People’s ability to retain and call on a non-evaluating expert to 
provide testimony relevant to the issues in the proceeding.   
The Court of Appeal majority’s analysis also misconstrues the 
role of DSH evaluations in the statutory scheme.  As noted, DSH may 
forward a case for the filing of a commitment petition only if two 
evaluators, either the initially appointed evaluators or the later 
appointed independent evaluators, both “concur that the person has a 
diagnosed mental disorder so that the person is likely to engage in 
acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and 
custody . . . .”  (§ 6601, subd. (d); see id., subd. (f).)  “[T]he requirement 
for evaluations is not one affecting disposition of the merits; rather, it 
is a collateral procedural condition plainly designed to ensure that 
SVP proceedings are initiated only when there is a substantial factual 
basis for doing so.”  (People v. Superior Court (Preciado) (2001) 87 
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130.)  Combined with the requirement that a court 
find “probable cause to believe that the individual named in the 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 
behavior upon his or her release” (§ 6602, subd. (a)), “[t]he Legislature 
has imposed procedural safeguards to prevent meritless petitions 
from reaching trial.”  (People v. Scott (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1060, 
1063.)  Once these procedural safeguards have been met, “rather than 
demonstrating the existence of the two evaluations, the People are 
required to show the more essential fact that the alleged SVP is a 
person likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 
behavior.”  (People v. Superior Court (Preciado), at p. 1130.)  As we 
observed in Reilly, “the Legislature did not intend that courts 
interpret section 6601’s procedural requirements with unnecessary 
strictness to prevent the trier of fact from ultimately determining each 
individual’s SVP status,” and the Legislature has “clearly expressed 
[a] preference that SVPA commitment petitions be adjudicated on 
their merits” (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 656), with the People 
bearing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (see § 6604).  
If, despite such preference for adjudication on the merits, the 
Legislature wishes to limit the People’s evidence at trial to DSH 
evaluations, they remain free to articulate such a limitation.  To date 
they have not done so.9   
 
9  
The different roles played by the initial DSH evaluations and a 
later opinion by an expert, whether called by the People or the 
defense, undermines the dissenting opinion’s suggestion that there is 
no distinction between “a DSH-designated expert’s evaluation under 
the SVPA” and “an expert’s opinion regarding whether a person 
qualifies as an SVP.”  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Groban, J., post, at p. 4.)  
As explained, the detailed provisions of the SVPA regarding who 
conducts formal evaluations, and how they must do so, ensures that 
an SVP petition will only be filed in limited and specifically controlled 
circumstances.  Once that procedural safeguard has been met, the 
scheme permits an adjudication on the merits based on relevant and 
admissible evidence, including expert testimony.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
The Court of Appeal majority’s view further ignores the extent 
of prosecutorial discretion built into the SVPA scheme.  As discussed, 
the statute requires DSH to forward a request to file a commitment 
petition if either both of its evaluators concur a defendant qualifies as 
an SVP or, if they disagree, two subsequently appointed independent 
evaluators so concur.  (§ 6601, subds. (d)–(f).)  However, upon 
receiving such request, the People are required to file a commitment 
petition only “[i]f the county’s designated counsel concurs with the 
recommendation . . . .”  (§ 6601, subd. (i).)  The SVPA thus empowers 
the People to disagree with initial evaluations that a defendant is an 
SVP by declining to file a commitment petition.   
We have also acknowledged the People retain discretion to 
disagree with evaluators after the filing of such petition.  As Reilly 
observed, “although initial evaluations conducted under section 6601 
must agree, a lack of concurrence between updated or replacement 
evaluations does not require dismissal of the petition.  [Citation.]  
Rather, the updated evaluations’ primary purpose is evidentiary or 
informational.  [Citation.]  Mandatory dismissal is not required where 
one or both of the later evaluators conclude the individual does not 
meet the criteria for commitment.”  (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 
648.)10  The People may thus disagree with postfiling evaluations that 
 
10  
The dissent suggests our reliance on Reilly is “inapt” because 
“we specifically identified in Reilly the remedy the People should take 
if they want to challenge DSH evaluations:  request updated 
evaluations from the DSH, not hire a testifying expert.”  (Conc. & dis. 
opn. of Groban, J., post, at p. 13.)  As we have explained, the 
Legislature amended the SVPA to allow the People to obtain updated 
evaluations for the purpose of giving them access to the latest 
information regarding a defendant’s current mental condition.  (See, 
ante, at pp. 6–9.)  Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, nothing in Reilly 
nor the SVPA suggests an updated evaluation should be used as a 
vehicle to challenge a prior evaluation or that the People may seek an 
 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
a defendant does not qualify as an SVP by presenting the case for the 
jury’s consideration.  As discussed, Smith reasoned the People’s 
opportunity to cross-examine DSH evaluators at trial “would be a 
hollow one if the district attorney does not have the assistance of an 
expert to interpret and explain the significance of the specialized 
information at issue.”  (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 471.)  Smith thus 
recognized the People may challenge at trial the evaluators’ 
conclusions and to argue a contrary viewpoint.   
The SVPA fully contemplates the People may disagree with the 
evaluators assigned to a particular case and exercise their discretion, 
either in refusing to file a commitment petition as an initial matter or 
to continue with a properly filed petition notwithstanding evaluators’ 
subsequently changed opinions.  Although the SVPA circumscribes 
who may conduct formal evaluations of a defendant, it is silent as to 
the type of evidence that may be presented at trial.  Nothing in the 
Act suggests a legislative intent to allow the People to continue with 
a commitment proceeding notwithstanding evaluators’ changed 
opinions but simultaneously to hamstring them by not allowing them 
to present expert testimony to counter the new opinions and bolster 
its contrary view of the case.  Indeed, the Legislature could have 
required dismissal of the petition if the evaluators no longer agreed 
defendant qualified as an SVP.  It did not do so.  It would seem 
incongruous that the SVPA contemplated the People may retain an 
expert to assist in the prosecution of its case, as Smith acknowledged, 
yet bar the testimony of that same expert to assist the trier of fact.  
Contrary to the Court of Appeal majority’s suggestion, the SVPA 
allows a finding that a defendant qualifies as an SVP even if the 
evidence is in conflict, and the People may present admissible 
 
update simply because they disagree with an evaluator’s initial 
conclusions.  For the reasons discussed, updated evaluations cannot 
adequately replace the role of a retained expert.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
evidence to support its case, including the testimony of an expert.  As 
Smith observed, it is ultimately for the fact finder to evaluate the 
credibility of any witness, whether they be evaluators or experts 
retained by either side.   
The dissenting opinion acknowledges that dismissal of an SVP 
petition is not required even if evaluators have changed their minds 
regarding defendant’s qualification for commitment.  (Conc. & dis. 
opn., post, at pp. 12–13.)  However, the dissent suggests that “in a case 
where every neutral DSH evaluator agrees at the time of the 
commitment trial that the defendant should not be committed, it may 
well be quite difficult for the People to convince a jury that they should 
nonetheless commit the defendant as an SVP, and the People may well 
wish to dismiss the case in such circumstances.”  (Id. at p. 13.)   
That may sometimes be the case but it may not be so in every 
case.  If the Legislature intended that petitions should always be 
dismissed under such circumstances, it could simply have said so.  
Instead, the Legislature has taken care to articulate a highly 
structured process with the exercise of both medical and legal 
judgment and discretion at several points in that process.  Experience 
teaches that experts are not infallible and serious consideration 
should accompany final resolution of the merits of an SVP petition, 
which has such significance for both the alleged SVP and society as a 
whole.  For us to adopt a rule that hamstrings a balanced 
consideration runs counter to “the Legislature’s clearly expressed 
preference that SVPA commitment petitions be adjudicated on their 
merits.”  (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 656.)  Allowing the People to 
present expert testimony challenging the bases for the evaluators’ 
changed opinions ensures that the jury will be fairly and fully 
informed as they consider the case.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
The Court of Appeal majority below reached a contrary 
conclusion, reasoning that various provisions of the SVPA implicitly 
barred the People from calling an expert witness other than 
evaluators from DSH.  Its statutory analysis misses the mark.  First, 
the majority noted that, in describing a defendant’s trial rights, 
section 6603, subdivision (a) stated a defendant had “the right to 
retain experts . . . .”  The majority asked rhetorically:  “If the 
Legislature envisioned both parties retaining testifying experts, why 
only say defendant?”  (Needham v. Superior Court, supra, 82 
Cal.App.5th at p. 126.)  The structure of section 6603 provides the 
answer.  Subdivision (a) enumerates various rights to which a 
defendant facing an SVP trial is entitled.  These include not only the 
right to a jury trial, but to the assistance of counsel, retention of 
experts, and the right to request DNA testing.  In addition, it 
authorizes the appointment of counsel or experts for indigent 
defendants.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 
§ 1405.)  This provision simply does not address the rights of the 
People.   
The Court of Appeal majority pointed to section 6603, 
subdivision (b), which provides that the People have “the right to 
demand that the trial be before a jury.”  The majority suggested “the 
statute addresses the People’s rights at trial and makes no mention 
at all of retaining an expert.”  (Needham v. Superior Court, supra, 82 
Cal.App.5th at p. 126.)  But nothing in subdivision (b) suggested it 
was meant to be an exhaustive list of rights granted to the People at 
an SVP trial.  As noted, “an SVPA civil commitment proceeding is a 
special proceeding of a civil nature” (People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
529, 532) as to which “the Legislature may provide for a jury trial” 
(Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4th 644, 656, fn. 7).  Subdivision (b) 
specifically enumerates the People’s right to a jury trial because, as a 
special proceeding of a civil nature, they would otherwise not have 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
such a right at an SVP trial.  (See People v. Rowell (2005) 133 
Cal.App.4th 447, 451–452; see also In Re De La O (1963) 59 Cal.2d 
128, 150–151.)   
A similar observation applies to the Court of Appeal majority’s 
reliance on section 6603, subdivision (k)(3), which provides:  “This 
subdivision does not affect any right of a party to seek to obtain other 
records regarding the person subject to this article.”  The court below 
suggested this was significant because the use of the term “party” 
demonstrated that “prior delegations specifically to the defendant 
were intentional,” and “the provision entitles either party to ‘obtain 
other records,’ not to retain other witnesses.”  (Needham v. Superior 
Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 127.)  This construction ignores the 
import of subdivision (k).  That subdivision provides that an evaluator 
“performing an updated evaluation shall include with the evaluation 
a statement listing all records reviewed by the evaluator,” and “[t]he 
court shall issue a subpoena, upon the request of either party, for a 
certified copy of these records.”  In this context, subdivision (k)(3) 
states that nothing in this subdivision affects any right to obtain other 
records pertaining to defendant.  Subdivision (k)(2) provides it does 
not affect any right to object to introduction of subpoenaed evidence 
as more prejudicial than probative, immaterial or otherwise 
inadmissible.  While subdivision (k)(2) preserves the standard 
application of the rules of evidence to the admissibility of information 
obtained during discovery, it does not regulate what trial witness may 
be called or by whom.  
Neither does section 6603, subdivision (e), cited by the Court of 
Appeal majority below, support its reasoning.  That provision states:  
“This section does not prevent the defense from presenting otherwise 
relevant and admissible evidence.”  Applying the principle of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., “the expression of one thing in a statute 
ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things” (In re J.W. (2002) 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
29 Cal.4th 200, 209), the court below asserted section 6603, 
subdivision (e) “strongly suggests that the People, by contrast, are 
confined to the evidence that the SVPA carefully designates.”  
(Needham v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 127.)  This 
reasoning is not persuasive.  Even if one reads subdivision (e) in the 
manner the Court of Appeal majority does, that “[t]his section” 
prevents the People from admitting certain relevant and admissible 
evidence, subdivision (e) itself does not describe that evidence, nor 
does section 6603 enumerate what evidence may or may not be 
admitted at trial.  As such, subdivision (e) would only have the effect 
described by the majority below if one already understood section 
6603, subdivision (d), the provision regarding when an updated or 
replacement evaluation may be obtained, as a substantive limit on the 
admissibility of expert testimony.  We have already rejected that view 
and subdivision (e) adds little to the analysis.   
Further, even assuming there exists ambiguity in the 
application of section 6603, subdivision (e), the legislative history of 
that provision belies the Court of Appeal majority’s conclusion.  
Current subdivision (e) was added in 2001 in the same bill that also 
added current subdivision (d)(2), which defines what it means for an 
evaluator to be “no longer available to testify” for purposes of 
obtaining a replacement evaluation under subdivision (d)(1).  (See 
Stats. 2001, ch. 323, § 2, pp. 2454−2455.)  According to the bill author, 
a problem arose from the initial failure of the Act to define that phrase 
because courts instead used Evidence Code section 240’s definition of 
witness unavailability, which “does not cover cases in which an 
evaluator has been replaced by the DMH.”  (Sen. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1142 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended July 5, 2001, p. F.)  Thus, the definition of “no longer 
available to testify” was added in section 6603, subdivision (d)(2) to 
expand the People’s ability to seek a replacement evaluation.  In this 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
context, the Legislature also added current subdivision (e) “to state 
that a determination that an evaluator is unavailable to testify for the 
petitioner (DMH and the district attorney) shall not prevent the 
defense from present[ing] relevant evidence.  This amendment was 
taken to clarify that a former evaluator can be called as a witness for 
the defense in an SVP matter.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 1142, supra, at pp. K–L.)  This legislative history 
confirms that, rather than restricting the admissibility of evidence 
presented by the People, the bill was intended to assure they could 
request replacement evaluations when an evaluator has been replaced 
by DSH, even if the evaluator would not technically be “unavailable” 
as the Evidence Code generally uses that term, and to clarify that this 
provision did not preclude the defense from calling the former 
evaluator to testify.   
We find unpersuasive defendant’s argument that allowing the 
People’s expert to testify would deny him due process because it would 
deprive him of a fair trial.  Initially, that the People’s retained expert 
may testify notwithstanding that the expert may not have interviewed 
or tested a defendant does not undermine the fairness of the 
proceedings.  Indeed, even as to a DSH evaluator, although the 
relevant protocol requires “a reasonable attempt to conduct a face-to-
face interview with” a defendant, the protocol acknowledges that a 
defendant may refuse to participate, at which point the evaluator 
“shall document the refusal and inform the [defendant] that even 
without an interview, a[n] SVP forensic report shall be written and 
submitted.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4013, subds. (b), (c).)  Cases have 
noted that defendants may refuse to meet with evaluators, in which 
case an evaluator’s opinion is “based on documentary evidence such 
as state hospital records, police reports, probation reports, and prison 
records.”  (People v. Roa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 428, 445; see also 
People v. Hoffman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 976, 978; People v. 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
Burroughs (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 404; People v. Angulo (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 1349, 1354–1356.)  None of these cases suggested that an 
opinion based on evidence other than an interview or testing was 
fundamentally unfair.  Ultimately, whether an expert has or has not 
examined a defendant, and why, would go to the weight to be accorded 
to the expert’s conclusions by the fact finder, not the admissibility of 
the expert’s testimony.  (See People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
587, 638; see also People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 327–328.)   
Further, as discussed, we reject the premise of defendant’s 
argument that such testimony contravenes the SVPA.  As the 
dissenting justice below reasoned:  “The parties have the opportunity 
to challenge pretrial the admissibility of their opponent’s proposed 
expert testimony via motions filed pursuant to Evidence Code sections 
402 and 405.  If the testimony is admitted, the experts are subjected 
to the crucible of cross-examination.  And then the trier of fact decides 
[whom] to believe.  I am not convinced that proceeding in this well-
established 
manner 
threatens 
the 
fairness 
of 
future 
SVP 
proceedings.”  (Needham v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 130 (dis. opn. of Goethals, J.).)  We agree.11   
We emphasize that, although the People’s retained expert is not 
precluded from testifying at trial, the defense may challenge the 
admissibility of such testimony in a particular case under the 
Evidence Code like any other expert, including, e.g., whether the 
person qualifies as an expert (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a)) or would 
present an opinion based on improper matter (see Evid. Code, §§ 801, 
subd. (b), 803).  Further, in light of an SVP defendant’s “due process 
right to a timely trial,” the People may not unduly delay the 
proceedings for the purpose of retaining an expert, and “the trial court 
 
11  
We disapprove People v. Sloan (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 698, 702–
703, which held to the contrary.   
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
must take due account of the individual’s interests in prompt 
adjudication and take decisive steps to guard against unjustified 
delay.”  (Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 368.)   
E.  Conclusion 
In summary and as relevant here, the SVPA provides a highly 
structured process under which a convicted sex offender may be civilly 
committed after completion of a sentence.  A formal evaluation of the 
defendant is a central part of that process.  As discussed, such a 
formal, precommitment evaluation may only be conducted by 
evaluators appointed by DSH using the procedures and assessment 
protocol specified by the SVPA and relevant regulations.  Independent 
interviews and testing by outside experts are distinct from the highly 
regulated evaluation process and the Act makes no provision for them.  
Updated and replacement evaluations may be conducted before or 
after a commitment petition is filed.  Both a defendant and the People 
are entitled to a jury trial, which is civil in nature and at which the 
People bear the burden of proof.  Both parties are entitled to discovery 
as the Act provides.  While the CDA generally applies to civil 
proceedings, contrary provisions of the Act take precedence over the 
CDA.  Except where the Act provides otherwise, the trial is conducted 
under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Code.  The People 
may discover, subject to a protective order, all the reports and relied-
upon information compiled during an evaluation.  (See §§ 6601, subds. 
(d), (h)(1), 6603, subd. (k); Smith, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 464–468.)  
They may retain independent experts and reveal to their expert 
otherwise privileged information about the defendant contained in the 
evaluations and supporting materials.  (See Smith, at pp. 469–472.)  
Under the Act, a People’s retained expert is not authorized to compel 
a defendant to participate in interviews and testing before the 
defendant is committed as an SVP.  Either party may call a DSH 
evaluator to testify at the commitment trial.  The People’s qualified 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
expert may testify and give an opinion as to whether the defendant 
meets the statutory definition of an SVP.  The Act also sets out 
different procedures that apply after a defendant has been committed.  
Ultimately, if the Legislature disagrees with our interpretation of the 
SVPA, it may revisit this area to clarify its intent regarding the 
testimony of the People’s expert or to provide additional safeguards or 
clarifications.   
For guidance on remand, we observe the following.  If the 
district attorney chooses to call Dr. King, he may not rely in any way 
on his interview with defendant as a basis for his opinion, which must 
conform to Evidence Code section 803.  This conclusion does not 
conflict with the rule from People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 
which affirmed that, in forming an opinion, an expert may rely on 
information inadmissible as evidence and describe such matter to the 
fact finder in general terms.  (Id. at pp. 679, 685–686.)  While the 
Evidence Code permits an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible 
matter, it does not permit the expert to rely on matter that is 
“precluded by law.”  (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b); see also id., §§ 802, 
803.)  Because the SVPA does not authorize an independent expert to 
interview a defendant before commitment, Dr. King’s interview of 
defendant would constitute matter precluded by law within the 
meaning of the Evidence Code.  Should the district attorney choose to 
call a different or additional expert, any new expert would not be able 
to interview defendant nor rely on Dr. King’s interview in forming an 
opinion.   
 
 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  The matter is 
remanded with directions to return the matter to the superior court 
for trial.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
1 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S276395 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
 
The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA or Act) (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)1 allows for indefinite civil 
commitment of a person, not for a crime he or she has previously 
committed, but for a crime which he or she might commit in the 
future.  Recognizing this as an extraordinary deprivation of 
liberty, the Legislature set forth multiple procedural safeguards 
designed to ensure that a person is committed as a sexually 
violent predator (SVP) only where a jury finds, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he or she suffers from a “currently 
diagnosed mental disorder” that makes him or her likely to 
recommit after having been punished for prior sexually violent 
crimes.  (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3).)  The SVPA’s detailed statutory 
provisions and its implementing regulations set forth in 
meticulous detail who may conduct expert evaluations 
regarding a person’s SVP status (psychiatrists and licensed 
psychologists designated by the State Department of State 
Hospitals (DSH) (§ 6601, subd. (d))); when those evaluations 
must be conducted (§ 6601, subd. (a), § 6603, subd. (d)); how 
those evaluations must be conducted (§ 6601, subd. (c)); and the 
criteria to be used in conducting the evaluations and 
determining whether a person qualifies as an SVP (§ 6600; see 
also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 4000–4020.1).  As the majority 
rightly concludes, it would conflict with these statutory 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
provisions and regulations to allow the People to retain an 
expert to interview or test the SVPA defendant.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 12–16.)  But it is precisely this reasoning that leads me to 
a contrary conclusion from the majority with respect to the 
question of whether the People can retain their own expert to 
testify at trial on whether a person should be civilly committed.  
Because the SVPA provides in painstaking detail who should 
assess the defendant and how that assessment should be done, 
and because the statute says nothing about permitting the 
People to retain their own testifying expert, I believe the answer 
to this question is “no.”    
The majority’s decision undermines the SVPA’s carefully 
calibrated procedural safeguards by allowing the People to 
simply retain their own expert who may testify free from the 
constraints of the statutory scheme.  Under the majority’s 
holding, a retained expert for hire will be able to opine at trial 
that an SVPA defendant should be civilly committed as an SVP, 
even though that expert has not conducted the evaluation per 
the statute’s “standardized assessment protocol” (§ 6601, subd. 
(c)) and has not even interviewed, met with, or tested the 
defendant.  The majority’s holding frustrates the SVPA’s “clear 
intent that the state exercise maximum caution before depriving 
persons of their liberty on the basis of potential future crimes.”  
(People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 932 
(conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) (Ghilotti).)   
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the People may 
retain their own expert to testify at an SVPA trial.   
I.  DISCUSSION 
   
The SVPA contemplates that as many as eight evaluators 
designated or appointed by the DSH will evaluate the defendant 
and testify on whether he or she should be civilly committed as 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
an SVP: two initial evaluators; two more evaluators if the first 
two disagree; two more if the initial evaluators are no longer 
available to testify at trial such that the appointment of 
replacement evaluators is necessary; and two more if the 
replacement evaluators disagree.  (§§ 6601, subds. (d)–(g), 6603, 
subd. (d)(1).)  The SVPA not only designates who must conduct 
the SVP evaluations, it also details every possible scenario 
regarding what should be done if the evaluators disagree, or if 
the evaluations become stale due to the passage of time, or if the 
evaluators become unavailable to testify at trial.  (§§ 6601, subd. 
(e), 6603, subd. (d).)  
The SVPA also provides extensive detail on how these 
evaluations are to be performed.  Evaluators must conduct their 
evaluations “ ‘in accordance with a standardized assessment 
protocol’ [developed by the DSH] that considers ‘diagnosable 
mental disorders, as well as various factors,’ including ‘criminal 
and psychosexual history, type, degree, and duration of sexual 
deviance, and severity of mental disorder.’ ”  (Ghilotti, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 910, quoting § 6601, subd. (c).)  As the majority 
acknowledges, the assessment protocol describes everything 
from the qualifications required of evaluators; the questions 
they are to address in their evaluations; the test or instruments 
the evaluators should use in making their assessment of the 
defendant; which records they are to review; how to conduct a 
face-to-face clinical interview of the defendant; and the items 
and citations required for inclusion in the evaluators’ forensic 
reports.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, 
§§ 4000–4020.1.)   
The majority shows fidelity to these provisions in correctly 
concluding that, because the SVPA “limits how formal 
evaluations are conducted and by whom,” the People do not have 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
the right to independently examine or test the defendant.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 14.)  The majority persuasively explains that 
“independent precommitment interviews and testing would 
permit an end run around the Act’s careful and particularized 
balancing of the competing interests at play” (ibid.) as shown by 
the Act’s “express mandates” concerning evaluations (id. at 
p. 13).  The majority goes on to conclude, however, that though 
“the SVPA circumscribes who may conduct formal evaluations” 
of the defendant, it is purportedly “silent” as to who might testify 
at trial.  (Id. at p. 24.)  I disagree.  If we believe that the 
elaborate statutory scheme enunciated by the Legislature 
precludes importing an unstated right to examine the 
defendant, then the scheme should similarly foreclose the 
People from having an unstated right to call a testifying expert.   
The majority would have the SVPA’s detailed structure 
delineating precisely how and by whom an SVPA defendant 
must be evaluated disappear based upon its apparent conclusion 
that the statute’s tight control over evaluations means only that 
the People cannot hire an expert to conduct a “formal, 
precommitment evaluation,” but they may still hire an expert to 
give an “opinion” at trial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.)  In other 
words, the majority believes that a DSH-designated expert’s 
evaluation under the SVPA is somehow separate and distinct 
from an expert’s opinion regarding whether a person qualifies 
as an SVP.  This is a distinction without a difference.  Both a 
privately retained expert’s “opinion” and a DSH-designated 
“evaluation” perform exactly the same function:  They offer an 
expert’s view on the ultimate question of whether the defendant 
should be civilly committed.  By requiring a formal evaluation, 
the SVPA simply provides the process for how a DSH expert’s 
opinion regarding whether someone qualifies as an SVP must 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
be reached.  The majority misreads the statute when it 
concludes that the People can retain their own expert who will 
simply bypass all of the procedural requirements imposed on the 
DSH experts in forming his or her opinion.  Contrary to the 
majority’s belief, the statute’s detailed structure setting forth 
precisely how and by whom an evaluation must be conducted 
tells us that the People cannot simply retain an expert who 
testifies without having adhered to any of these procedural 
safeguards.   
The majority also provides no explanation for why the 
Legislature would give the People a right the majority believes 
to be critical to the SVP proceeding (a testifying expert) but then 
simultaneously hamstring the People by barring the expert from 
interviewing the defendant, even though DSH evaluators are 
allowed to — and, in fact, must “make a reasonable attempt to” 
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4013, subd. (b)) — interview the 
defendant.  The People do not ask for this curious result, I 
suspect because the People and I have reached the same 
conclusion:  The question of whether the People should be 
allowed to examine the defendant must be answered in the same 
way as the question of whether the People may retain an expert 
to testify at trial as to a person’s SVP status.  While the majority 
reaches a compromise — the People may retain a testifying 
expert, but that expert may not interview or test the 
defendant — this outcome only ensures that the People’s expert 
is necessarily deprived of the most useful data point for drawing 
a conclusion on whether the defendant qualifies as an SVP; i.e., 
talking to and examining the defendant.  The better read of the 
statute’s elaborate expert evaluation provisions is that the 
Legislature did not intend for the People to call their own 
testifying expert at trial.         
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
On their own, the SVPA’s directives regarding who must 
conduct SVP evaluations and how those evaluations must be 
conducted evince the Legislature’s intent to limit the types of 
expert opinions on which the People may rely at trial.  But there 
is more:  The SVPA expressly provides that only one party — 
the defendant — has “the right to retain experts” to “perform an 
examination or participate in the trial on the [defendant’s] 
behalf.”  (§ 6603, subd. (a), italics added.)  Contrary to the 
majority’s view that the SVPA “is silent as to the type of 
evidence that may be presented at trial” (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 24), this provision clearly states that the defendant, and only 
the defendant, has the right to present a testifying expert at 
trial.  The SVPA contains no similar provision granting the 
People the right to retain an expert to perform an examination 
of the defendant or to testify at trial as to whether the defendant 
qualifies as an SVP.  In fact, immediately below the subdivision 
providing the defendant with the right to retain a testifying 
expert, the SVPA describes the rights afforded the People, and 
it gives the People only “the right to demand that the trial be 
before a jury.”  (§ 6603, subd. (b).)  As the Court of Appeal 
majority queried, “[i]f the Legislature envisioned both parties 
retaining testifying experts, why only say the defendant?”  
(Needham v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 114, 126 
(Needham).)   
The majority responds to the Court of Appeal’s question 
by observing that section 6603, subdivision (a) pertains only to 
the defendant’s rights at trial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.)  The 
majority further observes that nothing in section 6603, 
subdivision (b) suggests “it was meant to be an exhaustive list 
of rights granted to the People at an SVP trial.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 26.)  These observations fail to answer why the Legislature 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
chose to expressly give the defendant, but not the People, a 
statutory right to a testifying expert at trial.  A more 
straightforward interpretation is the one the Court of Appeal 
majority supplied:  The principle of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius — “ ‘the expression of one thing in a statute ordinarily 
implies the exclusion of other things’ ” — applies and shows a 
clear legislative intent that only the defendant may retain a 
testifying expert to opine at trial on the ultimate issue of 
whether the defendant meets the statutory criteria for 
commitment as an SVP.  (Needham, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 126, quoting In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209.)  The 
People are limited to relying on the DSH evaluators’ expert 
opinions at trial.     
Additional support for this interpretation is found in 
sections 6605 and 6608, which govern the procedures for 
obtaining either unconditional or conditional release after the 
defendant has already been committed.  Unlike at the initial 
commitment trial, the People are expressly allowed to “have the 
committed person evaluated by experts chosen by the state” for 
the purpose of an unconditional or conditional release hearing.  
(§§ 6605, subd. (a)(3), 6608, subd. (g).)  Thus, while the People 
are allowed to choose their own experts after commitment for 
the purpose of evaluating and determining whether the 
committed person still qualifies as an SVP, the statute affords 
the People with no similar right prior to commitment.  These 
provisions also afford the defendant with the right to “appoint[]” 
experts (§ 6608, subd. (g)) or be “evaluated by experts” (§ 6605, 
subd. (a)(3)), illustrating that the Legislature knows how to 
expressly afford both parties a right to testifying experts when 
it wishes to do so.  They also show that the Legislature’s choice 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
to not expressly afford the People with the right to retain a 
testifying expert for the commitment trial was purposeful.       
The majority contends that, because the SVPA is silent on 
whether the People may retain a testifying expert, the People 
may do so under the general provisions of the Evidence Code.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17–18, 24.)  Again, I read the statutory 
language differently.  Section 6603, subdivision (e) states “[t]his 
section does not prevent the defense from presenting otherwise 
relevant and admissible evidence” at trial.  (Italics added.)  
Though the majority is correct that the statute is noticeably 
silent as to the People’s right to broadly present evidence, 
including expert testimony, at trial, that silence was 
intentional.  The Legislature originally contemplated adding 
section 6603, subdivision (e) to clarify that “a former evaluator 
who is unavailable pursuant to this bill for reasons other than 
those set out in Evidence Code section 240 can be called as a 
witness for the state or the defense in an SVP matter.”  (Sen. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1142 (2001–
2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2001, p. L, italics added.)  
The amendment the Legislature adopted, however, specifies 
that only the defense may present “otherwise relevant and 
admissible evidence.”  (§ 6603, subd. (e).)  The majority counters 
that section 6603, subdivision (e) was added only to clarify that 
a former evaluator who has been deemed unavailable to testify 
under section 6603, subdivision (d)(2) can nevertheless “ ‘be 
called as a witness for the defense in an SVP matter.’ ”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 29, quoting Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 1142, supra, at pp. K–L.)  While this may be 
true, the language the Legislature elected to use is quite broad.  
The Legislature could have specified that the defense may call 
as a witness a former evaluator who has been deemed 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
unavailable to testify under subdivision (d)(2), but it instead 
chose to more expansively state that the defense may present 
“otherwise relevant and admissible evidence.”  (§ 6603, subd. 
(e).)   
The statute’s provision for updated and replacement 
evaluations provides yet another indication that the People may 
not retain testifying experts to opine on a person’s SVP status 
at the commitment trial.  Section 6603, subdivision (d)(1) states 
that, if the People determine that updated or replacement 
evaluations “are necessary in order to properly present the case 
for commitment [at trial], the [People] may request the [DSH] to 
perform updated evaluations” or “to perform replacement 
evaluations.”  The Legislature added this provision in response 
to Sporich v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 422, which 
held that the People had no statutory authority to obtain 
updated evaluations.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7–9.)  By adding 
this provision, the Legislature addressed a problem raised by 
Sporich:  If the People were not able to obtain updated or 
replacement evaluations, they might not be able to prove at trial 
that the defendant suffers from “a currently diagnosed mental 
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety 
of others.”  (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)  Notably, 
however, the Legislature did not authorize the People to hire 
their own expert to conduct an independent evaluation or to 
provide an independent opinion regarding whether the 
defendant qualifies as an SVP.  Instead, the Legislature 
provided a means for the People to obtain updated or 
replacement evaluations from the DSH.  If the Legislature 
believed the People already had the authority under the 
Evidence Code to hire their own testifying expert to opine on a 
person’s status as an SVP, then it is unclear why it believed 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
10 
that, without giving the People the authority to seek updated or 
replacement evaluations, the People might fail to prove their 
case at trial and “the petition could be denied.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2018 (1999–2000 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended April 11, 2000, p. 5; see also maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 8.)   
Importantly, the People may not seek updated or 
replacement evaluations from the DSH simply because they 
disagree with the DSH evaluators’ opinions.  Instead, the 
evaluations must be stale (i.e., more than a year old) and, thus, 
in need of updating (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4020; see also id., 
§ 4020.1), or the evaluator who conducted the initial evaluation 
must be “no longer available to testify” (§ 6603, subd. (d)(1)).  
And while a retired evaluator is generally considered to be 
unavailable to testify, the statute prohibits the People from 
replacing a retired evaluator who previously determined that 
the defendant did not meet the criteria for commitment.  
(§ 6603, subd. (d)(2)(D).)  That is, the People may not replace an 
evaluation that concludes the defendant is not an SVP with a 
new evaluation that concludes the alleged SVP is an SVP.  
(Ibid.)  The Act thereby deliberately limits the circumstances by 
which the People may seek updated or replacement evaluations.  
The majority’s holding, however, creates an end run around 
these provisions:  Even where an evaluator cannot be replaced 
because his or her “most recent evaluation” found that the 
defendant “does not meet the criteria for commitment” (§ 6603, 
subd. (d)(2)(D), italics added), the People can now simply hire 
their own expert to testify that the defendant does meet the 
criteria for commitment.  Essentially, the majority’s holding 
allows the People to obtain a replacement expert opinion “free of 
the restrictions” of section 6603, subdivision (d)(1).  (Needham, 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
11 
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 126.)  The majority does not explain 
why the Legislature would impose a set of constraints on the 
People’s ability to obtain updated or replacement evaluations 
from the DSH but would, at the same time, impose zero 
constraints on the People’s ability to seek a separately retained 
expert’s opinion as to whether someone qualifies as an SVP. 
Indeed, it is not clear why the People would ever seek an 
updated or replacement DSH evaluation — the opinion of which 
is unknown at the time of the People’s request — when, under 
the majority’s holding, the People may simply hire their own 
expert who they can control, have unfettered access to, and 
know what his or her intended testimony will be prior to trial.  
The majority rejects the “Court of Appeal majority’s suggestion 
that any expert presented by the People must, of necessity, be 
biased” since “[n]ot every professional disagreement signifies an 
impermissible bias.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  The majority 
fails to acknowledge, however, that evaluators are designated 
by the DHS without regard to what their eventual opinion might 
be.  In contrast, testifying experts are retained to support the 
party’s position at trial, and it seems unlikely that the People 
would retain and pay an expert for the purpose of giving an 
opinion that is adverse to the People’s position at the 
commitment trial.  This is not a function of “bias” (ibid.); it is 
instead a function of how our trial system works.  Lawyers seek 
to present trial witnesses that support their own position and 
not the position of their adversary.     
Moreover, pursuant to the majority’s holding, even where 
none of the updated or replacement evaluations conclude that 
the person being tried currently suffers from a mental disorder 
that makes him or her presently dangerous and likely to 
reoffend, the People could nevertheless retain their own expert 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
12 
to contrarily opine that the person does, in fact, qualify as an 
SVP.  It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which two initial 
DSH evaluators agree that the defendant qualifies as an SVP, 
allowing the People to file an initial commitment petition under 
section 6601, subdivision (i), but then the initial evaluators 
change their minds, or the replacement evaluators disagree 
with the initial evaluators’ opinions.  As we recently 
acknowledged in our decision in Camacho v. Superior Court 
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, years-long delays between the probable 
cause hearing and trial occur with some frequency.  (Id. at p. 376 
& fn. 2.)  During such delays, SVPA defendants are “placed in a 
state hospital” (§ 6602.5, subd. (a)) and receive “mental health 
treatment while they await trial” (Camacho, at p. 393).  This is 
how the statute is supposed to operate:  “Pretrial treatment of 
the underlying mental disorder that caused the state to seek 
commitment in the first place may ultimately facilitate the 
individual’s release before trial.”  (Ibid.)  Simply put, treatment 
might work.  Under the majority’s holding, however, a scenario 
could arise in which several years pass between the probable 
cause hearing and trial and, during that time, the DSH 
evaluators all submit updated evaluations opining that the 
defendant has been successfully treated and no longer qualifies 
as an SVP.  And yet the People could retain their own expert to 
opine — without having conducted the evaluation contemplated 
by the SVPA or even meeting with the alleged SVP — that the 
person still qualifies as an SVP.  As long as a jury agrees with 
the People’s expert’s view, the defendant would be committed 
even though the People’s expert did not follow the SVPA’s 
detailed evaluation protocols.            
The majority emphasizes the “prosecutorial discretion 
built into the SVPA scheme.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  Quoting 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
13 
Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 648, the majority 
observes that “ ‘[m]andatory dismissal is not required where one 
or both of the later evaluators conclude the individual does not 
meet the criteria for commitment.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  
The issue in Reilly was whether dismissal of an SVP petition 
was mandatory based on legal errors in the initial DSH 
evaluations; we held that dismissal was only mandatory if the 
errors were material.  (Reilly, at p. 646.)  The majority reads 
statements we made in Reilly, such as a need to avoid 
“ ‘unnecessary strictness’ ” in interpreting the statute and a 
desire for “ ‘commitment petitions be adjudicated on their 
merits’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, quoting Reilly, at p. 656), as 
support for the conclusion that the People have the right to 
present their own testifying expert.  But Reilly says nothing 
about the People’s right to retain a testifying expert and reading 
it to provide guidance on this issue seems especially inapt since 
we specifically identified in Reilly the remedy the People should 
take if they want to challenge DSH evaluations: request 
updated evaluations from the DSH, not hire a testifying 
expert.  (Reilly, at p. 657.) 
Moreover, no one is contending that mandatory dismissal 
is required, even in a case where the updated or replacement 
evaluations agree that the person no longer meets the statutory 
criteria for commitment as an SVP.  The point is that, in a case 
where every neutral DSH evaluator agrees at the time of the 
commitment trial that the defendant should not be committed, 
it may well be quite difficult for the People to convince a jury 
that they should nonetheless commit the defendant as an SVP, 
and the People may well wish to dismiss the case in such 
circumstances.  (Gray v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 
322, 329 [if the new evaluations agree “that the subject person 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
14 
does not at the present time meet the criteria of the Act, the 
prosecuting attorney might well elect to dismiss the proceeding” 
(fn. omitted)].)  Given the significant impairment of liberty 
occasioned by commitment, my view is that this is exactly the 
balance the Legislature intended to strike.  The Legislature did 
not intend for the People to be able to circumvent the scheme by 
hiring their own expert to contradict the DSH evaluators’ 
opinions that the defendant no longer qualifies as an SVP.    
The majority additionally suggests that the DSH 
evaluations are just screening tools used to determine whether 
a petition for commitment should be filed, and that the 
evaluations are not relevant to the question of what evidence 
should be presented at trial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21 [the “role 
of DSH evaluations” is “ ‘to ensure that SVP proceedings are 
initiated only when there is a substantial factual basis for doing 
so’ ”].)  But while the initial evaluations performed under section 
6601, subdivision (d) are indeed used to determine whether SVP 
proceedings should be initiated, the majority ignores section 
6603 which, as explained above, clearly contemplates that the 
evaluators will present their opinions at trial.  (See, e.g., § 6603, 
subd. (d)(1) [“If one or more of the original evaluators is no 
longer available to testify” for the People at trial, the People may 
request the DSH “to perform replacement evaluations” (italics 
added)].)  Thus, section 6603 makes clear that the evaluation 
process is not just an initial screening process because the 
section lays out a procedure for DHS evaluators to testify at 
trial.  The majority’s reading of section 6601 as merely relating 
to “screening” fails to interpret the statutory scheme as a whole. 
Lastly, the majority relies on our decision in People v. 
Superior Court (Smith) (2018) 6 Cal.5th 457, wherein we held 
that the People are entitled to a consulting expert.  The majority 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
15 
posits that it would be “incongruous” to find, as we did in Smith, 
that the People may retain a consulting expert to help them 
understand the DSH evaluations and to cross-examine DSH 
evaluators at trial, and “yet bar the testimony of that same 
expert to assist the trier of fact.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  I 
disagree.  In Smith we recognized that consulting experts can 
provide valuable assistance to the People — short of 
testifying — such as helping the People to “grasp the scientific 
nuances underlying another expert’s opinion” (Smith, at p. 469) 
and assisting with cross-examination of the defendant’s experts 
or the DSH evaluators (id. at p. 471).  In addition, consulting 
experts can identify legal errors made by the defendant’s experts 
or the DSH evaluators and assist the People in raising those 
errors with the court.  They can also help the People to assess 
whether to proceed with the case at all, especially if updated 
evaluations determine that the defendant no longer meets the 
statutory criteria for commitment as an SVP.  I believe it is 
perfectly consistent with the SVPA’s statutory scheme to permit 
the People to retain a consulting expert to advise the People and 
help them understand the strength of their case while also 
prohibiting the People from presenting a testifying expert at 
trial — an expert who has not adhered to any of the detailed 
requirements set forth in the statute.      
II.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, the SVPA lays out in meticulous detail who may 
evaluate SVPA defendants and how they must go about 
determining whether a defendant should be civilly committed.  
Such details include what to do if an evaluator retires or if an 
evaluation becomes stale, the assessment protocol evaluators 
must use, and how evaluators should conduct a face-to-face 
interview with the alleged SVP.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5; see also 
NEEDHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
16 
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 4000–4020.1.)  The statute also 
expressly gives the defendant the right to call his or her own 
testifying expert but provides no such right to the People.  
(§ 6603, subds. (a) & (b).)  Given the important liberty interests 
at stake, we should not import into the statute a right that is 
not described in the statute itself.  The majority not only grants 
the People a right that the Legislature expressly omitted — i.e., 
the right to call a testifying expert at trial to opine on whether 
the defendant qualifies as an SVP — it hamstrings that right by 
forbidding the People’s expert from interviewing or testing the 
defendant.  If the Legislature wishes to afford the People with 
the authority to retain and call a testifying expert, it can — 
consistent with due process requirements — enshrine such a 
right in the statute via future legislation.  But this court should 
not write such authority into a carefully calibrated statutory 
scheme that does not permit it.   
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the People may 
retain a testifying expert under the SVPA.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
I Concur: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Needham v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 82 Cal.App.5th 114  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S276395 
Date Filed:  July 1, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Orange  
Judge:  Elizabeth G. Macias 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Martin Schwarz, Public Defender, Laura Jose, Chief Deputy Public 
Defender, Adam Vining, Assistant Public Defender, and Elizabeth 
Khan, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Yvette Patko, Deputy District 
Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Elizabeth Khan 
Deputy Public Defender 
801 Civic Center Drive West, Suite 400 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 
(657) 251-6090 
 
Yvette Patko 
Deputy District Attorney 
300 North Flower Street 
Santa Ana, CA 92703 
(714) 347-8780