Case Title: Natl. City Bank v. Beyer

Citation: 2000-Ohio-126

Docket Number: 19982531

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Natl. City Bank v. Beyer, 89 Ohio St.3d 152, 2000-Ohio-126.] 
 
 
 
NATIONAL CITY BANK, N.E., CROSS-APPELLEE, v. BEYER ET AL., APPELLEES AND 
CROSS-APPELLANTS; STATE OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Natl. City Bank v. Beyer (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 152.] 
Wills — Testamentary trust — Determination of testator’s intent in distribution 
of trust corpus from testamentary trust — Probate court’s judgment 
awarding trustee fees and expenses affirmed. 
(No. 98-2531 — Submitted December 1, 1999 — Decided June 21, 2000.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Huron County, No. H-
98-006. 
 
Donald G. Van Horn and Mildred R. Van Horn were husband and wife.  
They had a daughter, Virginia Beyer.  On October 24, 1967, Donald Van Horn 
executed his last will and testament.  In his will, Van Horn created a testamentary 
trust.  National City Bank (“NCB”) is the trustee.1 The trust states that the 
trustees, in their sole discretion, can provide income from the trust to either his 
wife, Mildred Van Horn, his daughter, Virginia Beyer, or her children for support.  
Upon Mildred Van Horn’s death, the trustees, in their sole discretion, can provide 
income from the trust to Virginia Beyer and/or her children for support.  Item 5.2 
C of Donald Van Horn’s will provides: 
 
“At the death of my daughter, Virginia, if she leaves lineal descendants 
surviving, then the assets of this trust estate shall be divided into as many equal 
trust shares as my said daughter has children then living, plus an equal share for 
the lineal descendants per stirpes of any child of my daughter, who may have died 
leaving lineal descendants surviving. 
 
“As to each trust share for the benefit of a lineal descendant of my 
daughter, Virginia, the Trustees shall pay to the beneficiary or beneficiaries 
thereof such amount of the income—and if the income is insufficient, from the 
 
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principal of said trust share—as the Trustees, in their discretion deem necessary 
or proper to provide for or to help provide for the beneficiary’s suitable support, 
maintenance, comfort and education.  Any undistributed income shall at the end 
of each year be accumulated and added to the principal of the trust share from 
which it was derived. 
 
“The assets of such trust share shall be distributed free from trust to the 
beneficiary thereof when he or she reaches the age of twenty-five (25) years.  If 
such beneficiary dies before the assets of his or her trust share [have] been fully 
distributed to him or her, then the undistributed portion shall be distributed 
forthwith and free from trust to his or her issue, if any, but in default of any such 
issue, shall be distributed pro rata to the share of those, if any, who claim through 
the same parent as the deceased beneficiary, but in default of any such, then such 
share shall be added pro rata to the other trust shares, and if any of those trust 
shares have been distributed to the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof, and the 
trust terminated, then distribution shall be made directly to the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the trust share that has been thus ended.” 
 
Virginia Beyer had three children—Sophie, Katherine, and Elizabeth.  On 
June 29, 1969, approximately two years after her father executed his will, 
Virginia Beyer died.  At the time of Virginia Beyer’s death, Sophie Beyer was 
five years old, Elizabeth Beyer was seven, and Katherine Beyer was nine.  On 
February 27, 1976, Donald Van Horn died.  On July 24, 1983, Katherine Beyer 
was committed to the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital in New Jersey.  On June 2, 
1990, Mildred Van Horn died.  At the time of Mildred Van Horn’s death, Sophie, 
Katherine, and Elizabeth Beyer had all reached the age of twenty-five.  However, 
prior to any distribution from the trust, Katherine died, intestate, childless, and 
unmarried, on December 31, 1990. 
 
In 1992, the trustee, NCB, distributed a one-third share of the testamentary 
trust corpus to Sophie Beyer and a one-third share to Elizabeth Beyer pursuant to 
 
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the terms of the trust.  Thereafter, Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer tried to persuade 
NCB to divide Katherine Beyer’s one-third share of the trust and to distribute it to 
them equally.2 
 
NCB declined to distribute Katherine Beyer’s share to Sophie and 
Elizabeth Beyer.  NCB was informed of a claim by the Trenton Psychiatric 
Hospital against Katherine Beyer’s estate.3  As a result, NCB apparently became 
aware that Kathrine Beyer’s estate could be a beneficiary of Katherine Beyer’s 
share of the trust.  NCB claimed its hesitation to distribute Katherine Beyer’s 
share was due to an ambiguity in the language in Item 5.2 of the Van Horn will.  
NCB asserted that Item 5.2 C of Van Horn’s will was ambiguous as to whether 
the “language providing for the death of a beneficiary before distribution, only 
applies to beneficiaries who have not reached the age of twenty-five (25) years or 
if it applies to all distribution situations.”  In other words, NCB contended that the 
intent of the language of Item 5.2 C could be read to divest Katherine Beyer of 
her share of the trust only if she died before the age of twenty-five.  Alternatively, 
NCB believed that Item 5.2 C could be interpreted to mean that Katherine Beyer 
was to be divested of her share of the trust if she died before her share was 
distributed to her, regardless of her age.  NCB believed that the “correct” 
interpretation of the trust would determine whether NCB should distribute 
Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust to Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer or to Katherine 
Beyer’s estate. 
 
In 1991, by letter through her counsel, Shelley M. Draper, Sophie Beyer 
requested that NCB distribute one-half of Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust 
assets to Sophie Beyer pursuant to language in Item 5.2 C of the Van Horn will.  
Subsequently, Sophie Beyer acquired new counsel, Barbara Schneider.  In 1993, 
Sophie Beyer yet again retained new counsel, Karen Sinchak, who wrote a letter 
to NCB, requesting once more that NCB distribute Katherine Beyer’s share of the 
Van Horn trust to Sophie Beyer.  Subsequently, Sophie Beyer changed counsel 
 
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again.  In 1993, her new counsel, Daniel G. LaPorte, met with an NCB 
representative several times in an attempt to negotiate a settlement.  In 1994, 
LaPorte informed NCB that he would file a declaratory action, on behalf of 
Sophie Beyer, in the Court of Common Pleas of Huron County, Probate Division, 
seeking instruction as to the proper distribution of Katherine Beyer’s share of the 
Van Horn trust.  The action was never filed. 
 
On November 7, 1996, NCB filed a declaratory action in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Huron County, Probate Division.  NCB’s complaint included, 
among others, the following defendants—the state of New Jersey, Sophie Beyer, 
and Elizabeth Beyer.  Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer filed an answer and three 
counterclaims.4  The first asked the court to construe the trust in their favor.  The 
second sought indemnity equal to the amount of the trust assets against NCB in 
the event that the court construed the trust language in favor of the estate of 
Katherine Beyer and New Jersey.  The third sought a refund of trustee fees and 
expenses for administration of the trust by NCB subsequent to December 31, 
1990, on the basis that NCB had failed to distribute the trust proceeds within a 
reasonable time. 
 
On January 7, 1997, New Jersey filed an answer and a counterclaim 
asking the court to construe the trust language in favor of the estate of Kathrine 
Beyer.  On March 27, 1997, the state of New Jersey, through the New Jersey 
Attorney General, was appointed administrator of Katherine Beyer’s estate.  On 
April 14, 1997, Sophie Beyer moved the court to dismiss New Jersey as a party 
for lack of standing. 
 
Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer, and New Jersey all filed motions for 
summary judgment.  NCB filed a motion for partial summary judgment against 
Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer’s counterclaims. 
 
As a threshold matter, the probate court held that New Jersey had 
standing.  The probate court also interpreted Item 5.2 C of Van Horn’s will to 
 
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mean that Katherine Beyer’s death prior to the distribution of her share of the trust 
did not divest her estate of the right to her share of the trust.  Thus, the probate 
court held that Katherine Beyer’s trust share should be distributed to her estate 
subject to administration by the state of New Jersey.  After a hearing, the probate 
court also granted NCB trustee fees and expenses earned by NCB after December 
31, 1990. 
 
Elizabeth and Sophie Beyer appealed.  The court of appeals reversed the 
judgment interpreting the trust in favor of New Jersey and remanded the cause to 
the probate court to distribute Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust to Sophie and 
Elizabeth Beyer.  Although the issue of standing was made moot by its first 
holding, the court of appeals also found that New Jersey had no standing because, 
inter alia, “no claim was ever filed against New Jersey in its capacity as 
representative of the estate of Katherine Beyer.” Finally, the court of appeals also 
affirmed the probate court’s judgment that awarded NCB its trustee fees and 
expenses. 
 
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Day, Ketterer, Raley, Wright & Rybolt, Ltd., John A. Murphy, Jr. and 
Todd A. Harpst, for cross-appellee. 
 
Mary Clare Cullen, for appellees and cross-appellants. 
 
White, Getgey & Meyer Co., L.P.A., David P. Kamp and Barbara F. 
Florez, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  There are three issues for our consideration.  
The first issue is whether Katherine Beyer’s one-third share of Donald Van 
Horn’s trust fund should be distributed to her estate, as administered by the state 
of New Jersey, or to her sisters Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer.  To answer this 
 
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question we must ascertain how Donald Van Horn intended the trust corpus from 
his testamentary trust to be distributed.  The second issue is whether the state of 
New Jersey had standing to challenge distribution of Katherine Beyer’s share of 
the trust.  The third issue is whether the trustee fees and expenses awarded to 
NCB for administering the trust subsequent to December 31, 1990, were properly 
awarded by the probate court. 
 
Construing the terms of the trust pursuant to Van Horn’s intent, we find 
that Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust should pass to Sophie and Elizabeth 
Beyer equally.  This makes the issue of whether New Jersey has standing moot.  
We also find that the appellate court did not err in affirming the probate court’s 
judgment that awarded NCB trustee fees and expenses for administration of the 
trust subsequent to December 31, 1990.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Katherine Beyer’s Share of the Trust 
 
The fundamental rule in the construction of a trust is to ascertain the intent 
of the settlor.  Domo v. McCarthy (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 612 N.E.2d 
706, 708.  In determining the intent of a testamentary trust, we must look to the 
testator’s intent as evidenced in his or her will.  This court has used the following 
guidelines to interpret a testamentary trust: 
 
“ ‘1. In the construction of a will, the sole purpose of the court should be 
to ascertain and carry out the intention of the testator. 
 
“ ‘2. Such intention must be ascertained from the words contained in the 
will. 
 
“ ‘3. The words contained in the will, if technical, must be taken in their 
technical sense, and if not technical, in their ordinary sense, unless it appear[s] 
from the context that they were used by the testator in some secondary sense. 
 
“ ‘4. All parts of the will must be construed together, and effect, if 
possible, given to every word contained in it.’ “  Ohio Natl. Bank of Columbus v. 
 
7 
Adair (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 26, 30, 8 O.O.3d 15, 17, 374 N.E.2d 415, 417-418, 
quoting Townsend’s Executors v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477, syllabus. 
 
We find that Item 5.2 C of Van Horn’s will contains language that is 
instructive in determining how Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust should be 
distributed.  Item 5.2 C states: 
 
“At the death of my daughter, Virginia, if she leaves lineal descendants 
surviving, then the assets of this trust estate shall be divided into as many equal 
trust shares as my said daughter has children then living, plus an equal share for 
the lineal descendants per stirpes of any child of my daughter, who may have died 
leaving lineal descendants surviving. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The assets of such trust share shall be distributed free from trust to the 
beneficiary thereof when he or she reaches the age of twenty-five (25) years.  If 
such beneficiary dies before the assets of his or her trust share has [sic] been fully 
distributed to him or her, then the undistributed portion shall be distributed 
forthwith and free from trust to his or her issue, if any, but in default of any such 
issue, shall be distributed pro rata to the shares of those, if any, who claim 
through the same parent as the deceased beneficiary, but in default of any such, 
then such share shall be added pro rata to the other trust shares, and if any of those 
trust shares have been distributed to the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof, and 
the trust terminated, then distribution shall be made directly to the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the trust share that has been thus ended.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
We find that the contingency requiring lineal descendants to reach  the age 
of twenty-five evidences intent by Van Horn that such contingency is a condition 
precedent to the vesting of an interest in the trust fund in those descendants.  The 
interest would then become possessory once all prior interests have terminated. 
 
However, a vested interest may be subject to divestment upon the 
occurrence of a named event.  See Papiernik v. Papiernik (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 
 
8 
337, 343, 544 N.E.2d 664, 670.  We believe that was precisely Van Horn’s intent 
in using the following language found in Item 5.2 C of his will: “[I]f such 
beneficiary dies before the assets of his or her trust share has [sic] been fully 
distributed to him or her, then the undistributed portion shall be distributed 
forthwith and free from trust to his or her issue, if any, but in default of any such 
issue, shall be distributed pro rata to the shares of those, if any, who claim 
through the same parent as the deceased beneficiary, but in default of any such, 
then such share shall be added pro rata to the other trust shares * * * .”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
We find that this language indicates that a lineal descendant’s right to the 
proceeds from the trust fund is contingent upon the descendant’s surviving 
distribution of the trust share to him or her.  In other words, under this trust, 
Virginia Beyer’s lineal descendants have a vested interest in the trust corpus if 
they reach the age of twenty-five, but are subject to divestment if they die before 
the proceeds from the trust are distributed to them. 
 
We also find that the trust language subsequent to the divesting language 
evidences an intent by Van Horn that, should a descendant who is vested die 
before his or her interest is fully distributed to him or her, that share would gift 
over to other family members.  A gift-over provision to relatives indicates an 
intent by the testator that property from a trust remain in the family.  See Casey v. 
Gallagher (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 42, 40 O.O.2d 55, 227 N.E.2d 801. 
 
We also find that Item 6 of Van Horn’s will provides insight into his intent 
in distributing trust assets.  Item 6 is a spendthrift clause, which provides: 
 
“No principal or income payable or to become payable under any trust 
created by this will shall be subject to * * * attachment by any creditor * * * .  If * 
* * either principal or income would * * * become payable to others than the 
beneficiary thereof, then the trust interest of such beneficiary shall terminate * * * 
.” 
 
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This language provides that beneficiaries cannot alienate the corpus of the 
trust prior to the actual receipt of the trust share to the beneficiary.  Any attempt 
to do so would terminate that beneficiary’s interest in his or her trust share.  Thus, 
a spendthrift clause also indicates an intent to have trust proceeds stay within 
those named as beneficiaries.5  All of the named beneficiaries in Van Horn’s trust 
are family members or their descendants. 
 
In interpreting a testamentary trust, we must look to all the parts of the 
will.  Adair, 54 Ohio St.2d at 30, 8 O.O.3d at 17, 374 N.E.2d at 418.  Together, 
Items 5 and 6 of the Van Horn will evidence an intent by Van Horn to keep the 
trust corpus from being alienated outside the bloodlines of his family or their 
descendants.  Further, the specific language in Item 5.2 C of Van Horn’s will 
divests a beneficiary of his or her share of the trust should he or she die before the 
share is fully distributed to him or her, and directs how that share is gifted over to 
his or her other family members.  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment 
that, in creating the testamentary trust, Van Horn’s intent was to keep the corpus 
from being alienated outside the bloodlines of the family members or their 
descendants. 
 
Prior to Mildred Van Horn’s death, Sophie, Elizabeth, and Katherine 
Beyer all had reached the age of twenty-five.  Thus, each had acquired a vested 
interest in the trust corpus because each had a present fixed right to future 
enjoyment of the trust assets.  See Tax Comm. v. Oswald (1923), 109 Ohio St. 36, 
52, 141 N.E. 678, 682.  When Mildred Van Horn died on June 2, 1990, Sophie, 
Elizabeth, and Katherine Beyer’s respective vested interests became possessory.  
However, Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust had not been distributed to her 
before she died on December 31, 1990.  Therefore, pursuant to the language in 
Item 5.2 C of the will, she was divested of her share when she died before her 
share was distributed to her.  If Katherine Beyer had left an heir, then the 
language in Item 5.2 C would have directed her share to be distributed to her 
 
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children.  However, because Katherine Beyer died childless, Item 5.2 C directed 
that Katherine Beyer’s share of the testamentary trust be distributed pro rata to 
Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer. 
 
This distribution also comports with the intent of the spendthrift clause.  
Because Katherine Beyer’s estate is subject to the lien of the Trenton Psychiatric 
Hospital, distribution of Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust to her estate would 
run afoul of Van Horn’s intent to keep the trust assets “in the family,” as 
evidenced by the spendthrift clause in the trust. 
 
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment pertaining to the 
distribution of Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust.  Katherine Beyer’s share of 
the trust should be distributed to Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer equally. 
Trustee Fees and Expenses 
 
In answering NCB’s complaint, Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer asserted a 
counterclaim seeking “a refund of all Trustee fees * * * and other trust expenses 
taken by Plaintiff [NCB].”  NCB moved for partial summary judgment against 
this counterclaim.  Following a hearing, the probate court by entry on March 10, 
1998, granted NCB’s motion for partial summary judgment against Sophie and 
Elizabeth Beyer’s counterclaim for “Trustee Fees and Expenses.”  The appellate 
court affirmed the award of trustee fees and expenses. 
 
On cross-appeal to this court, Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer assert that they 
should not have to pay NCB trustee fees and expenses after December 31, 1990, 
because of NCB’s unreasonable delay in distributing the proceeds of the Van 
Horn trust. 
 
Sup.R. 74 addresses trustee compensation.  Subsection (E) states: 
 
“The court may deny or reduce compensation if * * * after hearing, the 
court finds that the trustee has not faithfully discharged the duties of the office.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
11 
 
“[U]sage of the term ‘may’ is generally construed to render optional, 
permissive, or discretionary the provision in which it is embodied.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  State ex rel. Niles v. Bernard (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 31, 34, 7 O.O.3d 119, 
120-121, 372 N.E.2d 339, 341.  Thus, pursuant to the language in Sup.R. 74(E), a 
court has discretion whether to reduce or deny a trustee compensation.  “The term 
‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies 
that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  State v. 
Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149. 
 
Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer allege that NCB should not be awarded 
trustee fees and expenses because it failed to distribute the trust assets within a 
reasonable time.  The record indicates that a hearing to determine whether to 
award NCB trustee fees and expenses was scheduled for February 24, 1998.  On 
March 10, 1998, the probate court awarded NCB trustee fees and expenses by 
entry.  The probate court did not issue a decision on the issue although the entry 
that granted NCB summary judgment did refer to “the facts presented.”  However, 
either there was no transcript made of this hearing, or it was not included in the 
record certified to this court.  Thus, we must presume regularity of the probate 
court’s judgment awarding NCB trustee fees and expenses.  Wells v. Spirit 
Fabricating, Ltd. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 282, 288-289, 680 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 
(Absent relevant evidence, an appellate court must presume the regularity of the 
trial court’s proceedings and judgment.). 
 
Notwithstanding our presumption of the regularity of the probate court’s 
proceedings and judgment awarding NCB trustee fees and expenses, we also find 
that, pursuant to the arguments made and the evidence that was certified in the 
record, the probate court did not abuse its discretion.  Arguably, there is evidence 
to support a finding that NCB was reasonable in its actions, just as there is some 
evidence to support a finding that NCB was not reasonable in its actions.  Sophie 
and Elizabeth Beyer have challenged the award of fees and expenses to NCB, but 
 
12 
have failed to provide the court with a transcript of the proceedings of the hearing 
to enable this court to evaluate the evidence upon which the probate court based 
its judgment.  The evidence that does exist outside the hearing and is before this 
court is of such a nature and quantity to be insufficient to find that the probate 
court’s judgment awarding trustee fees and expenses to NCB was unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment that awarded 
trustee fees and expenses to NCB. 
Conclusion 
 
We find that (1) it was Donald Van Horn’s intent that Katherine Beyer’s 
share of the trust fund should pass to Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer in equal shares, 
(2) the issue of New Jersey’s standing is moot, and (3) NCB was entitled to 
trustee fees and expenses. 
 
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
CARR, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
COOK, J., not participating. 
 
DONNA J. CARR, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
Akron National Bank & Trust Company was an original trustee.  
However, National City Bank became the trustee as successor to Akron National 
Bank & Trust Company. 
 
2. 
From the record it appears that Elizabeth Beyer was not 
represented in this action by counsel until 1997.  Yet, it is asserted that Elizabeth 
Beyer also sought part of Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust.  As Sophie Beyer’s 
sister, Elizabeth Beyer would be treated the same as Sophie Beyer for purposes of 
distribution of Katherine Beyer’s share of the trust.  Thus, for purposes of 
 
13 
reviewing the history of this case, we include Elizabeth Beyer’s claim together 
with Sophie Beyer’s claim. 
 
3. 
Katherine Beyer had been confined to the Trenton Psychiatric 
Hospital since July 24, 1983.  The County Adjuster from Somerset County New 
Jersey initiated an action to recoup the money New Jersey was expending in 
caring for Katherine Beyer while she was in the hospital.  On December 20, 1984, 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County, issued a support order 
holding Katherine Beyer’s estate liable for support provided to her by New 
Jersey. 
 
4. 
Sophie and Elizabeth Beyer filed separate answers, which 
contained identical pleadings. 
 
5. 
We note that where a parent attempts to utilize a spendthrift clause 
to preclude a creditor from reaching his or her child’s inheritance, such a 
spendthrift clause might be against public policy if it interferes with a parent’s 
obligation for his or her child’s support.  However, that is not the situation in this 
case.  Katherine Beyer is Donald Van Horn’s granddaughter.  Thus, Van Horn 
had no obligation to support her. 
__________________ 
 
CARR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Because the majority’s 
disposition of the issue of trustee fees and expenses recharacterizes the nature of the 
proceedings below, contradicts this court’s holding in Carrabine Constr. Co. v. Chrysler 
Realty Corp. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 222, 25 OBR 283, 495 N.E.2d 952, and applies the 
wrong standard of review for summary judgment proceedings, I must respectfully dissent 
in regard to this issue. 
 
The Beyers filed a counterclaim against NCB for breach of fiduciary duty, 
requesting a refund of all trustee fees and expenses paid since December 31, 1990.  The 
majority correctly indicates that NCB filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
this counterclaim.  The probate court did not rule on this summary judgment motion in its 
 
14 
January 30, 1998 judgment entry.  Rather, on January 30, 1998, the probate court issued 
an order in which it set NCB’s motion for partial summary judgment for a February 24, 
1998 hearing.  (See Appendix I.  \\Webserver\ftp\Pubs\Opinions\2000\982531 
APPENDIX I.doc.)  The probate court proceeded to hold this hearing, and in a March 10, 
1998 entry, the court stated that the “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment * * * is 
hereby granted.”  (See Appendix II.  \\Webserver\ftp\Pubs\Opinions\2000\982531 
Appendix II.doc.) 
 
In this instance, then, we are left with a situation in which the probate court 
thought that it was holding a summary judgment hearing and thought that it was entering 
a grant of partial summary judgment.  The majority, however, has altered the character of 
the February 24, 1998 hearing.  Instead of attributing to the probate court an awareness of 
what it was doing, the majority states that the hearing in question was not in actuality a 
summary judgment proceeding but was, instead, a hearing pursuant to Sup.R. 74(E).  
Even assuming arguendo that the proceeding should have been conducted under Sup.R. 
74(E), the record indicates that the probate court thought it was conducting summary 
judgment proceedings, resulting in what the probate court intended to be a grant of partial 
summary judgment on the Beyers’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
The majority erroneously concludes that because the record does not include a 
transcript of the February 24, 1998 hearing, the court must assume the regularity of the 
probate court’s ruling on NCB’s summary judgment motion and affirm the decision.  
Although this rationale may indeed control if the February 24, 1998 proceedings were 
conducted under Sup.R. 74(E), this rule cannot be applied to the summary judgment 
hearing that took place on that day. 
 
In Carrabine, this court held that “[a] trial court is precluded from considering 
supplemental oral testimony introduced for the first time at a hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment under Civ.R. 56.”  Id. at syllabus.  Therefore, even if the transcript of 
the February 24, 1998 hearing were included in the record, this court would ignore any 
evidence not properly present in the record, just as the probate court and the court of 
 
15 
appeals below could only consider that evidence that was properly before the probate 
court pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C).  In recharacterizing the February 24, 1998 proceedings, 
the majority has inadvertently altered not only the nature of what appears to have 
transpired below, but also the nature of this court’s review.  Instead of addressing this 
issue on the merits, or lack thereof, of the evidence supporting and opposing summary 
judgment, the decision today denies the parties the de novo review to which they are 
entitled in favor of a presumed regularity. 
 
The majority also states that “[n]otwithstanding our presumption of the regularity 
of the probate court’s proceedings and judgment awarding NCB trustee fees and 
expenses, we also find that, pursuant to the arguments made and the evidence that was 
certified in the record, the probate court did not abuse its discretion.”  There is no 
discretion in the review of a motion for summary judgment; by its very definition, 
summary judgment may only be awarded in instances in which a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  This court has previously explained that, pursuant to Civ.R. 
56(C), summary judgment is proper only if “(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact 
remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; 
and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one 
conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom 
the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to [the nonmoving] 
party.”  Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 
364 N.E.2d 267, 274; Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264, 
274.  The holding of this court today departs from this clear standard. 
 
Given the foregoing considerations, I find especially notable the majority’s 
statement that “[a]rguably, there is evidence to support a finding that NCB was 
reasonable in its actions, just as there is some evidence to support a finding that NCB was 
not reasonable in its actions.”  This is precisely the reason why I would hold that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Beyers’ counterclaim and would 
reverse on this issue. 
 

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[Cite as Natl. City Bank v. Beyer, 89 Ohio St.3d 152, 2000-Ohio-126.] 
20 
 
 
 
 

2