Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V VITO MONACO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2006 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
 
No. 126852 
VITO MONACO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM. 
In this case, we are asked to decide 
whether a violation of the statute that makes it a felony to 
refuse to pay court-ordered support for a former or current 
spouse or for a child, MCL 750.165(1), is subject to the 
ten-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5809(4) or the 
six-year “catch-all” period of limitations in MCL 767.24(5). 
We are also asked to decide whether a violation of this 
statute constitutes a continuing offense. 
We affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that a charge 
of felony nonsupport is subject to the six-year period of 
limitations of MCL 767.24(5).1
 We reject the Court of 
1 The Court of Appeals opinion cites MCL 767.24(4) as
the “catch-all” provision. 
In 2004, the Legislature 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Appeals conclusion that a violation of MCL 750.165(1) is a 
continuing offense. We thus overrule People v Westman, 262 
Mich App 184; 685 NW2d 423 (2004),2 to the extent that it is 
inconsistent with our decision in this case. 
Defendant was charged with criminal nonsupport well 
after the six-year limitations period expired. The Court of 
Appeals thus erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge. 
Accordingly, we 
affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals 
judgment. 
People v Monaco, 262 Mich App 596; 686 NW2d 790 
(2004). We remand this case to the trial court for entry of 
an order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge. 
I 
On August 20, 1984, defendant was ordered to pay child 
support for his two minor children under a default judgment 
of divorce. The order required 
that the Defendant shall pay to the Friend of the
Court for the County of Macomb to be transmitted
to the Plaintiff for the support and maintenance
of the minor children of the parties, the sum of
$43.44 per week per child, for each of the two (2)
minor children . . . until each of the said 
children have attained the age of eighteen or
until further Order of this Court. 
redesignated subsections 4, 5, and 6.  MCL 767.24(5) now
provides the catchall limitations period. 
2 In Westman, supra at 188-189, the Court of Appeals
held that a violation of MCL 750.165 is a continuing
offense. 
The defendant in Westman did not file an 
application for leave to appeal in this Court.
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendant’s youngest child turned eighteen in March 
1994. 
In December 2002, defendant was charged with 
violating MCL 750.165(1), which provides3: 
If the court orders an individual to pay
support for the individual’s former or current
spouse, or for a child of the individual, and the
individual does not pay the support in the amount 
or at the time stated in the order, the individual
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more
than $2,000.00, or both. [Emphasis supplied.] 
The statute does not contain an express limitation of 
actions provision. 
At defendant’s preliminary examination, the prosecution 
presented testimony that defendant’s child support arrearage 
amounted to $57,556.31, and that defendant had made no 
payments on the account since November 2001. 
Defendant’s 
arrearage included both unpaid child support and Family 
Independence Agency (FIA) surcharges. Commencing in January 
1996, a biannual surcharge also attached to defendant’s 
delinquent account. 
The trial court bound defendant over, 
concluding that the judgment was “subject to the enforcement 
of the criminal sanctions.” 
3 MCL 750.165(1) was amended by the Legislature
effective November 3, 1999. 
“Under the amended version of 
MCL 750.165, evidence that an individual refused or 
neglected to pay child support and left the state is no
longer necessary to establish felony failure to pay child
support.” Westman, supra at 187. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge or quash the 
bindover, arguing that the criminal nonsupport charge was 
time-barred under the six-year limitations period contained 
in MCL 767.24(5), the catchall statute of limitations for 
crimes not otherwise specifically provided for in MCL 
767.24. 
Defendant also argued that his prosecution under 
the amended statute violates the ex post facto clauses of 
the United States and Michigan constitutions. US Const, art 
I, § 10, cl 1; Const 1963, art 1, § 10. 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion. 
The court 
ruled that the charge was not time-barred, relying on the 
ten-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5809(4). 
That 
statute provides: 
For an action to enforce a support order that
is enforceable under the support and parenting
time enforcement act, Act No. 295 of the Public
Acts of 1982, being sections 552.601 to 552.650 of
the 
Michigan 
Compiled 
Laws, 
the 
period 
of 
limitations is 10 years from the date that the
last support payment is due under the support 
order regardless of whether or not the last 
payment is made. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
decision on different grounds. 
The panel held that the 
trial court erred in concluding that the matter was governed 
by the ten-year limitations period found in MCL 600.5809(4) 
because 
that 
statute 
pertains 
to 
civil 
actions 
for 
collection on monetary obligations, not to criminal actions. 
Instead, the panel concluded that the crime of felony
4 
 
 
 
 
nonsupport is subject to the six-year period of limitations 
found in MCL 767.24(5). 
The panel then held that defendant’s failure to pay the 
arrearage of his court-ordered child support constitutes a 
continuing violation of MCL 750.165(1), because the court­
ordered amount is both increased and reaffirmed every six 
months when the surcharge for nonpayment is added to the 
support arrearage. 
Expanding on the ruling in Westman, 
supra, in which the Court held that a violation of MCL 
750.165(1) constitutes a continuing crime, the panel held: 
[A] violation may be continuing under either
the “amount owed theory” or the “time ordered 
theory.” 
Under the “amount owed theory,” the 
violation continues as long as an ordered support
goes unpaid. 
The amount ordered is at the same 
time increased and reaffirmed each time the 
surcharge is added. 
For this reason, an “amount
owed” violation may continue even beyond the 
child's eighteenth birthday. 
Under the “time 
ordered 
theory,” 
the 
defendant 
violates 
MCL 
750.165 when he fails to make the weekly support
payment. The defendant also violates MCL 750.165 
at the time each surcharge is added to the account
and, at the same time, becomes due and owing.
[Monaco, supra at 606-607.] 
Applying an “amount owed” continuing violation theory, 
the Court of Appeals held that the statutory period of 
limitations 
on 
the 
felony-nonsupport 
charge 
against 
defendant never began to run because of defendant’s 
arrearage. The panel thus affirmed the trial court’s denial 
of defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony-nonsupport 
charge or quash the bindover. 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
II  
“In reviewing a district court’s decision to bind over 
a defendant, the lower court’s determination regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, but the lower court’s rulings based on questions 
of law are reviewed de novo.” 
People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 
418, 427; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). 
III 
The first issue is the limitations period applicable to 
violations of MCL 750.165(1). 
We concur with the Court of 
Appeals 
that 
the 
appropriate 
limitations 
period 
for 
violations of MCL 750.165 is contained in MCL 767.24(5)4 and 
adopt its analysis appearing at 262 Mich App 601-603: 
MCL 600.5809(4) more specifically addresses
support orders: 
“For an action to enforce a support order
that 
is 
enforceable 
under 
the 
support 
and 
parenting time enforcement act, Act No. 295 of the
Public Acts of 1982, being sections 552.601 to
552.650 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, the period
of limitations is 10 years from the date that the
last support payment is due under the support 
order regardless of whether or not the last 
payment is made.” 
But the statute as a whole clearly applies
only to civil actions, not criminal charges. 
If 
4 
Our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
six-year 
period 
of 
limitations in MCL 767.24(5) applies to violations of MCL
750.165 is in no way intended to alter or weaken the ten­
year period of limitations in MCL 600.5809(4), because, as
stated, the latter statute applies to civil claims for
collection on monetary obligations, not to criminal actions.
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the language of a statute is clear, no further
analysis is necessary or allowed to expand what
the Legislature clearly intended to cover. People 
v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002).
MCL 600.5809 sets forth a ten-year period of
limitations for civil claims seeking enforcement
and 
collection 
of 
a 
noncontractual 
money
obligation. 
It does not identify any criminal
charges whatsoever. 
Even MCL 600.5809(2), which
applies in the criminal context, applies only to
civil forfeiture actions based on a penal statute.
MCL 600.5809(4) clearly identifies actions brought
under the support and parenting time act and makes
no reference at all to criminal charges, let alone
the 
charge 
of 
felony 
nonsupport. 
Further,
although the felony-nonsupport charge is related
to an order of support pursuant to the support and
parenting time act, it is a distinct criminal 
action that is not covered by MCL 600.5809. 
The appropriate statutory limitations period
is set forth in MCL 767.24[(5)]. 
MCL 767.24 
generally identifies . . . different limitations
periods for . . . different crime categories: 
* * * 
“[(5)] All other indictments shall be found 
and filed within 6 years after the offense is
committed. [Emphasis added.]” 
Because MCL 750.165 is not identified in 
[other subsections of the statute], it necessarily
falls under subsection [5], which unambiguously
identifies “all other indictments.” 
It is a 
settled rule of statutory construction that,
unless otherwise defined in a statute, statutory
words or phrases are given their plain and 
ordinary meanings. 
MCL 8.3a; People v Libbett,
251 Mich App 353, 365-366; 650 NW2d 407 (2002).
“There is no broader classification than the word 
‘all.’ 
In its ordinary and natural meaning, the
word ‘all’ leaves no room for exceptions.” Skotak 
v Vic Tanny Int’l, Inc, 203 Mich App 616, 619; 513
NW2d 428 (1994). 
IV  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant was charged with criminal nonsupport under 
MCL 750.165(1) more than eight years after his court-ordered 
support obligation ended. 
Defendant’s prosecution is, 
therefore, time-barred unless a violation of MCL 750.165(1) 
constitutes an offense that continues until an individual 
has fully satisfied the monetary support obligation, i.e., 
until the individual no longer has a support arrearage. 
The Court of Appeals held that a violation of MCL 
750.165(1) is a continuing offense because the FIA’s 
biannual surcharge led to a biannual violation of the 
statute by defendant. Under the Court of Appeals reasoning, 
that violation continues for as long as a payer owes any 
amount. 
We reject the conclusion that a violation of MCL 
750.165(1) is a continuing offense. 
The relevant question in this case is whether the 
Legislature intended a violation of MCL 750.165 to be a 
continuing offense. We review the statutory text to discern 
legislative intent. People v Lively, 470 Mich 248, 253; 680 
NW2d 878 (2004). 
An individual is guilty of felony nonsupport under MCL 
750.165(1) if the individual “does not pay the support in 
the amount or at the time stated in the order . . . .” The 
word “or,” when read in context (“does not pay”), indicates 
that the statute is violated if the individual neither pays 
the ordered amount nor pays that amount when it is due.
8 
 
 
                                                 
 
Thus, the plain language of MCL 750.165(1) directs that the 
crime of felony nonsupport is complete when an individual 
fails to pay support in the amount ordered at the time 
ordered. 
In other words, an individual may be guilty of 
felony nonsupport if the individual either pays the full 
ordered amount after the due date or pays an amount less 
than the ordered amount before the due date and the due date 
passes without the individual making full payment. 
Thus, 
anyone who fails to pay the full ordered amount at the time 
ordered may be prosecuted under MCL 750.165(1) even if that 
individual later becomes current on the obligation. 
The 
Legislature did not specify carrying a support arrearage as 
a means by which an individual could violate MCL 750.165(1). 
Because a person is subject to conviction and punishment 
each time the statute is violated, separate violations of 
the statute cannot constitute a single continuing offense.5 
5 We reject the dissent’s contention that our reading
of the statute is contrary to its plain language. Contrary
to what the dissent believes, our reading of the statute 
does not ignore the word “or” or replace the word “or” with
the word “and,” but merely follows the context of the
sentence in the statute. 
The dissent would ignore the
context and hold that the statute can be violated by meeting
just one of the two conditions listed in the statute. Such 
an interpretation would clearly fail to comply with the
Legislature’s intent, as expressed in the unambiguous words
of the statute. 
Under the dissent’s interpretation, an
individual would violate the statute by failing to pay
support in the required amount even if the payment was not 
yet due.  We do not believe that the words of the statute 
show an intent by the Legislature to hold an individual
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Our 
conclusion 
finds 
further 
support 
when 
MCL 
750.165(1) is compared to MCL 750.161. 
In MCL 750.161(6), 
the Legislature expressly provided: 
Desertion, 
abandonment, 
or 
refusal 
or 
neglect to provide necessary and proper shelter,
food, care, and clothing as provided in this
section shall be considered to be a continuing 
offense and may be so set out in any complaint
or information. . . . [Emphasis supplied.] 
Thus, in this statute, the Legislature expressly provided 
that these acts constitute continuing offenses. 
By 
contrast, no such language appears in MCL 750.165(1). 
“Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently 
omitted from one statute the language that it placed in 
another statute . . . .” Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 
442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993).6 
criminally liable for failing to pay the ordered support
amount without also considering the date the support payment
was due. 
Further, the dissent’s interpretation would also
allow an individual ordered to pay support to avoid 
satisfying the second condition (failure to pay at the time
stated in the court order) by paying a negligible amount 
before the due date. 
Under such an interpretation, an
individual could pay any amount to satisfy the requirement
that payment be made at the time stated in the court order.
We believe that under the unambiguous words of the statute,
the amount of the support order must be considered together
with the date it is due in determining whether a violation
occurred. 
6 We disagree with the dissent’s statement that the
Legislature did not need to include such language in MCL 
750.165 because the nature of felony nonsupport is such that
the Legislature must assuredly have intended that it be
treated as a continuing offense. The plain language of MCL
750.165(1) indicates that a violation occurs as soon as the
due date passes without the individual paying the amount
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
We conclude that the Legislature did not intend that a 
violation of MCL 750.165(1) continue until an individual’s 
monetary support obligation is fully discharged. 
V 
In 
summary, 
the 
crime 
of 
nonsupport 
under 
MCL 
750.165(1) is complete at the time that an individual fails 
to pay the ordered amount at the ordered time. 
Under the 
limitations period of MCL 767.24(5), a prosecutor has six 
years from that point in which to charge such violations. 
Here, because the six-year period of limitations expired 
before defendant was charged with criminal nonsupport, we 
need not reach defendant’s remaining argument that his 
prosecution 
violates 
constitutional 
ex 
post 
facto 
prohibitions. 
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the 
Court of Appeals opinion that is inconsistent with our 
ruling and remand for entry of an order granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the charge. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the 
trial court. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
required. 
Thus, each violation of the felony-nonsupport
statute has a distinct date. 
If the Legislature had meant
for a violation of MCL 750.165(1) to be a continuing
offense, it would have so stated. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 126852 
VITO MONACO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the Court of 
Appeals decision regarding the appropriate statute of 
limitations. A violation of the felony-nonsupport statute, 
MCL 750.165(1), does not fall under the ten-year period of 
limitations in MCL 600.5809(4). 
Instead, as the Court of 
Appeals and the majority recognized, it falls under the six­
year “catch all” provision of MCL 767.24(5). 
I dissent from part IV and the conclusion of the 
majority opinion because I believe that the Court of Appeals 
was correct when it found that felony nonsupport is a 
continuing violation. 
Consequently, I would affirm the 
conclusions of the Court of Appeals. 
Also, I would leave 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
unmolested People v Westman,1 upon which the continuing 
violations theory relies. 
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS ARE DISFAVORED 
Statutes of limitations serve important purposes in our 
criminal justice system. 
Not only do they protect 
defendants from having to defend against stale claims, they 
pressure law enforcement officials to act promptly. 
The 
public is served by them in that wrongdoers are brought to 
justice more quickly. Also, an accused is less likely to be 
deprived of evidence or witnesses lost through the passage 
of time. 
It is apparent that statutes of limitations find their 
base in equitable concerns. 
This fact has led the United 
States Supreme Court to direct that criminal limitations 
statutes “be liberally interpreted in favor of repose[.]” 
United States v Habig, 390 US 222, 227; 88 S Ct 926; 19 L Ed 
2d 1055 (1968), quoting United States v 
Scharton, 285 US 
518, 522; 52 S Ct 416; 76 L Ed 917 (1932) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
1 262 Mich App 184; 685 NW2d 423 (2004). 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In 
Toussie 
v 
United 
States,2 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
recognized that the doctrine of continuing offenses could 
contradict the very goals and purposes of statutes of 
limitations. 
The tension between the two is clear. 
Limitation statutes restrict an accused’s exposure to legal 
proceedings. 
A 
continuing 
violation 
perpetuates 
it, 
decreeing that each day an accused does not eliminate his 
violation of a statute, he violates it again. 
Toussie v 
United States, 397 US 112, 114-115; 90 S Ct 858; 25 L Ed 2d 
156 (1970). 
Courts should not resolve this tension by never viewing 
an offense as a continuing violation.  Rather, they must 
exercise particular diligence before deciding that the 
intent of the legislature was that an offense constitutes a 
continuing violation. 
The Supreme Court gave us this 
guidance in Toussie: 
[A 
conclusion 
that 
a 
violation 
is 
a 
continuing violation should not be made] unless
the explicit language of the substantive criminal
statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature
of the crime involved is such that Congress must 
2 397 US 112; 90 S Ct 858; 25 L Ed 2d 156 (1970). This 
case dealt with the failure to register for the draft. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the failure to register is not
a continuing offense. Congress disagreed and superseded the
Court’s ruling by statute. 
50 USC Appx 462(d). 
Under the 
statute, a person who never registers can be prosecuted for
failing to register up to the age of 31. See United States 
v Kerley, 838 F2d 932, 935 (CA 7, 1988). 
3  
 
 
 
assuredly have intended that it be treated as a
continuing one. [Id. at 115.] 
THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED A CONTINUING OFFENSE IN MCL 750.165(1) 
Whether a continuing violation exists is a matter of 
statutory interpretation. As in all such matters, our goal 
is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent in enacting 
the statute. 
People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 451; 697 NW2d 
494 (2005). 
Our starting point is the language that it 
chose. 
MCL 750.165(1) provides: 
If the court orders an individual to pay
support for the individual’s former or current
spouse, or for a child of the individual, and the
individual does not pay the support in the amount 
or at the time stated in the order, the individual
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more
than $2,000.00, or both. [Emphasis added.] 
Here, the Legislature has created two distinct ways of 
committing the crime: 
(1) failing to pay support in the 
required amount or (2) failing to pay at the time stated in 
a court order. I believe that the “or” used in this statute 
is significant. 
The Legislature intentionally placed it 
there to create two separate ways of committing the offense. 
Wherever possible, every word of a statute should be 
given meaning, and no word should be treated as surplusage 
or made nugatory by court interpretation. People v Warren, 
462 Mich 415, 429 n 24; 615 NW2d 691 (2000). By reading MCL 
4  
 
 
 
750.165(1) as not providing for the possibility of a 
continuing 
violation, 
the 
majority 
has 
rendered 
the 
Legislature’s use of the word “or” nugatory. 
The majority 
interprets the statute as if it reads: “the individual does 
not pay the support in the amount at the time stated in the 
order[.]” But this changes its meaning. 
The majority has replaced the two ways to commit the 
offense of felony nonsupport with one. 
As the majority 
reads the statute, a person is guilty of the offense 
whenever that person fails to pay the full amount ordered at 
the time ordered. It does not matter if the defendant pays 
a partial amount or nothing at all. 
All that matters is 
that the failure to pay occurs at the time for payment 
stated in the support order. 
The majority acknowledges that the Legislature intended 
two separate ways to violate the statute. But its analysis 
strays from its acknowledgement. 
Because the Legislature 
intended two separate ways to commit the offense, “or” 
cannot be read out of the statute as the majority has done. 
The majority’s reading effectively replaces “or” with 
“and.” 
“[T]he individual does not pay the support in the 
amount and at the time stated in the order[.]” 
Again, I 
cannot agree with departing from the language of the statute 
as the majority has done. 
“And” is conjunctive. 
“Or” is 
5  
 
 
 
disjunctive. 
They do not mean the same thing. 
Nothing in 
the text of the statute indicates that the Legislature 
intended “and” but inadvertently used “or” in its place. 
The choice appears intentional. 
The Legislature sought to 
create two means of committing felony nonsupport, and it did 
so by use of the disjunctive “or.” 
Without good cause to conclude otherwise, we must 
assume that the Legislature chose the words of the statute 
purposely and intentionally. 
Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 
Mich 453, 456; 235 NW 217 (1931). 
Because nothing in the 
statute contradicts the conclusion that the choice was 
intentional, the Court should honor the Legislature’s use of 
“or” in MCL 750.165(1). 
The first way to violate the statute is by failing to 
pay the amount ordered. 
There is no limitation in the 
statute on when the failure to pay must occur. 
Therefore, 
nothing prevents it from continuing past the date for 
payment specified in the order.  In fact, an individual, 
such as defendant in this case, fails to pay support “in the 
amount” ordered not only each pay period but each day he is 
in arrears. In this case, defendant continuously failed to 
pay the amount he owed as his arrearage mounted. 
Thus, he 
continued to commit the crime of felony nonsupport. 
6  
 
 
                                                 
 
Accordingly, the amount-owed part of MCL 750.165(1) should 
be read as providing for a continuing offense. 
The majority points to MCL 750.161 as evidence that the 
Legislature 
did 
not 
have 
that 
intention. 
In 
MCL 
750.161(6),3 the Legislature indicates that violation of MCL 
750.161(1) is a continuing offense. 
The majority argues 
that the failure to include a provision similar to MCL 
750.161(6) in the felony-nonsupport statute demonstrates an 
intent not to create a continuing violation. I disagree. 
By enacting MCL 750.161(6), the Legislature indicated 
that each and every offense contained in MCL 750.161(1) is a 
continuing offense. This is despite the fact that, by their 
nature, certain of the offenses could be interpreted 
otherwise. For instance, without the instruction to view it 
as a continuing offense, desertion4 normally would be a one­
time event. 
While a person may repeatedly abandon his or 
her spouse or children, the act is not continuous. 
The 
3 MCL 750.161(6) provides: 
Desertion, abandonment, or refusal or neglect
to provide necessary and proper shelter, food,
care, and clothing as provided in this section
shall be considered to be a continuing offense and 
may be so set out in any complaint or information.
[Emphasis added.] 
4 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001)
defines “desert” as “to leave (a person, place, etc.)
without intending to return[.]” 
7  
 
Legislature’s inclusion of MCL 750.161(6) changes this 
noncontinuous event into a continuous event. 
By contrast, the failure to pay support is by its 
nature continuous. Applying Toussie and given the nature of 
felony nonsupport, the Legislature must assuredly have 
intended that it be treated as a continuing crime. 
As 
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, even a single 
unsatisfied child support payment will grow because the 
court periodically adds a surcharge to it. 
For these 
reasons, the Legislature may not have seen the need to 
include a section such as MCL 750.161(6) in order to tell us 
that felony nonsupport is a continuing offense. 
In any 
event, the language of the “amount owed” portion of the 
statute speaks for itself. 
I would allow it to do so in 
this case. 
Here, defendant did not pay court-ordered support 
continuing over a period of years and resulting in an 
accumulated arrearage of over $57,000. The Court of Appeals 
was right when it found that it was because of defendant’s 
continuing failure to pay support that the lower court 
correctly bound defendant over for trial. 
I do not make this finding of a continuing violation 
lightly. 
I recognize the extra scrutiny required under 
Toussie. 
But I believe that the explicit language of the 
8  
 
 
 
 
substantive 
criminal 
statute 
compels 
this 
conclusion. 
Toussie, 397 US 115.  In MCL 750.165(1), the Legislature 
explicitly and intentionally used the word “or.” 
In so 
doing, it created an “amount owed” offense that, by its 
nature, constitutes a continuing offense. 
By effectuating 
the intent of the Legislature, my interpretation meets the 
requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Toussie. 
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES WERE NOT VIOLATED 
Defendant points out that MCL 750.165 was substantively 
amended effective November 3, 1999, whereas his failure to 
pay child support occurred between 1984 and 1994. Hence, he 
asserts, the charge should have been dismissed as a 
violation of the ex post facto clauses of the state and 
federal constitutions. 
Const 1963, art 1, § 10; US Const, 
art I, § 10. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals that no ex post facto 
violation of law occurred in this case. Because defendant’s 
failure to pay overdue child support is an ongoing violation 
of MCL 750.165, and because it continued after November 3, 
1999, the felony-nonsupport charge against defendant does 
not violate ex post facto prohibitions. 
CONCLUSION 
I concur in the majority’s decision that a violation of 
MCL 750.165(1) is subject to the six-year period of 
9  
 
 
 
 
limitations provided in MCL 767.24(5). 
I dissent from its 
determination that a violation of the statute does not 
constitute a continuing offense. The Legislature evidenced 
a clear intent to make the failure to pay court-ordered 
support a continuing offense. Therefore, I would affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
10