Case Title: Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-58

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue1983 WY 133674 P.2d 1276Case Number: 83-58, 83-65, 83-59Case Number: 83-58, 83-65, 83-59Decided: 12/22/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
CATERPILLAR 
TRACTOR COMPANY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
GLORIA 
L. DONAHUE, ADMINISTRATRIX, OF THE ESTATE OF JERRY DONAHUE, DECEASED, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
GLORIA 
L. DONAHUE, ADMINISTRATRIX, OF THE ESTATE OF JERRY DONAHUE, DECEASED, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
CATERPILLAR 
TRACTOR COMPANY, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Carbon County, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
G.G. 
Greenlee and Robert M. Shively of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for Caterpillar Tractor 
Co.

 
 
James 
E. Fitzgerald, Cheyenne, for 
Donahue.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 
Rooney, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Jerry Donahue was 
killed on November 8, 1977, when the front-end loader he was operating rolled 
over and crushed him inside the fiberglass cab. Afterwards, his wife, Gloria 
Donahue, initiated this suit, a wrongful death action, against the manufacturer 
of the loader, Caterpillar Tractor Company (hereinafter Caterpillar). The loader 
involved here was a caterpillar model 988 wheel loader manufactured in 1966. The 
case was tried to a jury on the theory that Caterpillar had negligently 
manufactured the loader in 1966 without a rollover protection structure, also 
known as a ROPS. At the close of the Donahue case in chief and again at the 
close of rebuttal, Caterpillar unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. 
After receiving the case, the jury concluded that Caterpillar was negligent and 
awarded Mrs. Donahue $1,500,000. Caterpillar then moved for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which motion was denied. Caterpillar appealed and 
Donahue cross-appealed.

 
 

[¶2.]     Caterpillar has raised 
the following issues:

 
 
1. 
Whether the plaintiff established the existence of a duty and a breach thereof 
by Caterpillar;

 
 
2. 
Whether there were intervening causes of the accident which rendered any 
negligence of Caterpillar too remote to be a proximate 
cause;

 
 
3. 
Whether the front-end loader's allegedly defective condition was so open and 
obvious that no recovery may be had;

 
 
4. 
Whether the decedent's negligence in operating the front-end loader must be 
deemed a proximate cause of the accident;

 
 
5. 
Whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to admit a film 
depicting a rollover by an identical front-end loader;

 
 
6. 
Whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit certain opinion 
testimony;

 
 
7. 
Whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit certain 
exhibits;

 
 
8. 
Whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit the transcribed 
testimony of a deceased expert;

 
 
9. 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that conforming with the 
custom of an industry was not a substitute for ordinary care but merely evidence 
of what ordinary care may be;

 
 
10. 
Whether the supreme court should grant a remittitur if it does not reverse on 
other grounds; and

 
 
11. 
If this court grants plaintiff's motion to dismiss for the failure to timely 
file a notice of appeal, whether the trial court erroneously denied Caterpillar 
an extension of time to file its notice of appeal.

 
 

[¶3.]     Donahue's sole issue on 
appeal is contingent upon a reversal on Caterpillar's appeal. In such an event, 
Donahue requests this court to accept the theory of strict products liability as 
permissible in Wyoming, thus allowing the jury to consider it on 
remand.

 
 

[¶4.]     Because we have denied 
Donahue's motion to dismiss, we need not consider Caterpillar's final issue. 
Because we are affirming the judgment of the district court, we need not 
consider the issue raised by Donahue in her appeal. 

 
 

[¶5.]     Caterpillar's issues on 
appeal may be broken down into three categories. Caterpillar's first four issues 
address the necessary elements of a cause of action for negligence and whether 
there existed sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the 
essential elements were present. Caterpillar's challenge to one of the 
instructions also concerns the elements of negligence. The second four issues 
concern the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of certain evidence. 
Finally, Caterpillar seeks a remittitur. We shall address the issues in each 
category, discussing the specific facts of the case as they become relevant to 
the issues.

 
 

[¶6.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶7.]     Actionable negligence 
arises where a party breaches a duty thereby proximately causing injury. Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 
(1980). The essential elements of a negligence claim are: 1) a duty, 2) a 
violation of the duty, 3) proximate causation, and 4) an injury. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983).

 
 

[¶8.]     Caterpillar contends 
that Donahue failed to establish that it owed the decedent a duty. This court 
has previously held that the existence of duty is a question to be decided as a 
matter of law. McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, supra; and Medlock v. Van 
Wagner, Wyo., 625 P.2d 207 (1981). This means that the courts must 
decide:

 
 
"* 
* * [w]hether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the 
parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the 
benefit of the other - or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff 
which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the 
defendant. This is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to 
the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; 
and it must be determined only by the court. * * *" Prosser, Law of Torts, § 37, 
p. 206 (4th Ed. 1971).

 
 

[¶9.]     We have previously 
recognized that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to those who use its product. 
The manufacturer is required to exercise reasonable care in the planning, 
designing, and manufacturing of a product in order to ensure that it is 
reasonably safe to use. Maxted v. Pacific 
Car & Foundry Company, Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974).

 
 

[¶10.]  Accordingly, Caterpillar, as a 
manufacturer, had a duty in 1966 to make its front-end loaders reasonably safe. 
This entailed the exercise of reasonable care for the protection of those who 
were expected to use the front-end loader. Decedent, as a user of the front-end 
loader, comes within the class of people to whom the duty was 
owed.

 
 

[¶11.]  Once a duty has been found to exist, it 
is for the jury to decide what amount of care a reasonable man would have 
exercised in order to make his product safe for the consumer. The rationale 
behind turning this decision over to the jury has been explained by 
Prosser:

 
 
"* 
* * Since it is impossible to prescribe definite rules in advance for every 
combination of circumstances which may arise, the details of the standard must 
be filled in in each particular case. The question then is what the reasonable 
man would have done under the circumstances. Under our system of procedure, this 
question is to be determined in all doubtful cases by the jury, because the 
public insists that its conduct be judged in part by the man in the street 
rather than by lawyers, and the jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the 
impact of the law. * * *"

 
 
Prosser, 
supra at 207.

 
 

[¶12.]  But Prosser also 
notes:

 
 
"In 
many cases, however, the court may be required to remove the issue of the 
particular standard from the jury. It is possible to say, in many cases, that 
the conduct of the individual clearly has or has not conformed to what the 
community requires, and that no reasonable judgment could reach a contrary 
conclusion. The court must then direct a verdict for the plaintiff or for the 
defendant, or even set aside a verdict once rendered; or, if the evidence as to 
the facts is in conflict, instruct the jury as to the conclusion it must draw 
from a particular version of the facts. * * *" (Footnote omitted.) 
Id.

 
 

[¶13.]  Caterpillar's position is that it was 
entitled to either a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the issue of whether a reasonable man in 1966 would have installed a rollover 
protection structure (hereinafter ROPS) on a front-end loader. It bases the 
contention upon two points. First, it argues that since no other manufacturer of 
front-end loaders installed ROPS in 1966, a reasonable man would not have 
installed a ROPS either. Second, it alleges that in 1966 it was not feasible to 
have installed a ROPS which would have withstood the rollover which killed the 
decedent here.

 
 

[¶14.]  When reviewing a trial judge's denial of 
motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
this court must presume that all the evidence of the prevailing party is true. 
Further, we leave out of consideration all the opposing party's conflicting 
evidence while inferring from the prevailing party's evidence those conclusions 
which may reasonably and fairly be drawn. White v. Ogburn, Wyo., 528 P.2d 1167 
(1974); and Potts v. Brown, Wyo., 452 P.2d 975 (1969).

 
 

[¶15.]  In Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry, 
supra, we discussed what factors should be considered by the fact finder in 
deciding whether a manufacturer exercised reasonable care in not incorporating 
particular safety features on a product. One of the more significant factors 
there was whether other manufacturers of the same product had included the 
features. But, as we said, that consideration was merely a factor; it was not 
determinative on the issue of negligence. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 
1932). So, Donahue's failure in this case to demonstrate that any other 
manufacturer of front-end loaders was attaching a ROPS in 1966 by itself did not 
justify either a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as 
the trial judge correctly concluded.

 
 

[¶16.]  We noted in Maxted, supra, another factor; this was 
whether a safer design not yet in use was known to be feasible. This information 
could be used to establish that the custom of the industry was unreasonable. 
Donahue presented considerable evidence that the danger from rollovers had been 
long recognized and that during the fifties a push was commenced to install 
canopies and ROPS to front-end loaders.

 
 

[¶17.]  The appellant, Caterpillar, relies 
heavily on Maxted, supra, in support of its position that in 1966 it would have 
been unreasonable to require it to install ROPS as standard equipment. In Maxted 
plaintiff's own experts testified that they had never seen or heard of a 
"jettison device." In this case, however, there was considerable evidence that 
Caterpillar knew, or should have known, the need for ROPS. Caterpillar should 
have also been aware that the industry was capable of producing ROPS. Further, 
that the state of the art with respect to ROPS was such that it was feasible to 
install them at the time of manufacture.

 
 

[¶18.]  As we have previously set out, on appeal 
we resolve conflicts in evidence in favor of the prevailing party. In the 
present case there was conflicting evidence presented on whether it was feasible 
in 1966 to install a ROPS on a front-end loader which could have protected the 
decedent.

 
 

[¶19.]  Evidence at trial established that prior 
to 1966 Caterpillar had experience and information demonstrating the need, 
availability and feasibility of rollover protection structures. Certain 
manufacturers of ROPS were providing what was required in ROPS protection in 
1966. Appellant knew before 1966 that operators of its equipment were being 
killed because the equipment lacked ROPS. Other information about hazards was 
available before 1966. Mr. Farmer, a safety engineer for the state of 
California, knew in 1965 that there was a need for ROPS on rubbertired front-end 
loaders. Though Caterpillar produced evidence to the contrary under the standard 
of review, we do not consider it. Furthermore, Caterpillar admitted that at the 
time of the manufacture of the loader involved here (1966), rollover protection 
structures were being supplied by Tube-Lok, Products Division of Portland Wire 
and Iron Works and Medford Steel.

 
 

[¶20.]  Additional evidence received at trial was 
that: 1) the American Equipment Industry had the technical ability to produce 
adequate ROPS, 2) when appellant finally designed ROPS, it relied on references 
on energy absorption dating back to 1958, 3) ROPS could have been built in 1966, 
which would have withstood the rollover here, and 4) appellant, as a member of 
the National Safety Council, should have known of a 1965 publication of the 
Council which stated that in cases where loader operators were being killed in 
rollovers, cabs sufficient to withstand the weight of the machine would have 
saved the operators.

 
 

[¶21.]  In addition, there was considerable 
evidence to the effect that the manufacturer is in the best position to install 
ROPS. Caterpillar's design reference guide states that "safety must be `built 
into' the product rather than be an `add on' attraction for which the customer 
is responsible." A long-time engineer of Caterpillar agreed that the 
manufacturer is in the best position to see that the vehicle structure and ROPS 
are compatible, and that it is more difficult to add ROPS if it is not designed 
into the vehicle initially. Caterpillar's vice president recognized it should 
"design the greatest degree of safety into the machine." Henry Dean Bordeaux, 
Caterpillar's reconstruction expert, testified that safety should be built into 
a product rather than offered as an add on.

 
 

[¶22.]  Finally, the evidence showed fatalities 
with ROPS are one-third less than those without ROPS, notwithstanding the fact 
that the cases where ROPS save lives are likely under reported. In instances 
where a ROPS is installed and the seat belt is used in rolls of less than one 
full roll, Mr. Bordeaux knew of no deaths on Caterpillar equipment regardless of 
the type of ROPS being used.

 
 

[¶23.]  We next address Caterpillar's contention 
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that:

 
 
"In 
determining whether anyone was or was not negligent, you may consider any 
evidence of any custom of a profession or industry in conducting its operations. 
However, the standard of care is not fixed by custom, as custom cannot overcome 
the requirements of reasonable safety and ordinary care. The standard is always 
ordinary care, and the presence or absence of custom does not alter that 
standard. What others do is some evidence of what should be done, but is not 
conclusive evidence, and is never a substitute for ordinary care. An operational 
practice, although long indulged in, but which does not afford reasonable 
protection to those engaged in that operation, does not relieve from liability 
those responsible if it results in negligently causing injury or 
damage."

 
 

[¶24.]  Caterpillar objects to that instruction 
on the following theory:

 
 
"* 
* * The instruction as given not only reduced the fact that no manufacturer was 
doing what the plaintiff proposed, to insignificance, it presented the jury 
with the opportunity to set the standard of care without regard to what was 
occurring in the entire heavy equipment industry. It detracted severely from the 
ability of defendant's counsel to argue that plaintiff's attack was upon the 
entire industry and lent support to the position that the plaintiff's counsel 
could attack the entire industry and the law would support 
them.

 
 
"In 
an attempt to lessen the prejudicial effect of Instruction 7, defendant offered 
an alternative which changed the words `is never a substitute' to `is not a 
substitute * * *' and left off the last redundant, conclusory and argumentative 
sentence, but even this proposal was rejected by the trial court. * * 
*"

 
 

[¶25.]  However, we have stated 
previously:

 
 
"Custom 
may be evidence bearing upon the question of negligence, but the standard is not 
fixed by custom. The standard is always due care. The presence or absence of 
custom does not alter that standard. Custom may assist in the determination of 
what constitutes due care. What others do is some evidence of what should be 
done, but custom is never a substitute for due care. [Citations.]" Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. 
Like, Wyo., 381 P.2d 70, 76 (1963).

 
 
"* 
* * An operational practice, although long indulged in, but which does not 
afford reasonable protection for those engaged in that operation, does not 
relieve from liability those responsible if it results in negligently causing 
injury or damage." Rocky Mountain 
Trucking Company v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448, 451 
(1959).

 
 

[¶26.]  The instruction here follows the language 
of this court in those two cases. We do not see how the instruction can be 
considered erroneous.

 
 

[¶27.]  Next we address Caterpillar's contention 
that even if it had a duty and it breached the duty, the breach of the duty was 
not a proximate cause of decedent's death. As we have observed before, "[t]he 
law does not charge a person with all the consequences of a wrongful act but 
ignores remote causes and looks only to the proximate cause." Kopriva v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, Wyo., 592 P.2d 711, 713 (1979). Whether a breach of duty is a 
proximate cause of injury is a question of fact for the jury to determine. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, supra; and Endresen v. Allen, Wyo., 574 P.2d 1219 
(1978).

 
 

[¶28.]  Caterpillar argues that the failure of 
decedent's employer to install a ROPS on the front-end loader was an intervening 
cause which made Caterpillar's negligence in not installing a ROPS too remote to 
be the proximate cause of decedent's death. However, the jury concluded that 
decedent's employer was not negligent in failing to attach a ROPS and that the 
employer's action or inaction in no way served as a cause of the accident. These 
were proper questions of fact for the jury to decide. We cannot conclude that as 
a matter of law the jury's findings were erroneous. Accordingly, we cannot 
reverse on this issue.

 
 

[¶29.]  We now turn to Caterpillar's argument 
that the front-end loader's allegedly defective condition was so open and 
obvious that it, as the manufacturer, should not be held liable. The main 
premise behind Caterpillar's argument is that when goods are obviously 
defective, the parties who use them voluntarily assume the risks involved and 
cannot seek recovery if in fact injury results. However, this proposition is 
wrong.

 
 
"* 
* * It seems to us that a rule which excludes the manufacturer from liability if 
the defect in the design of his product is patent but applies the duty if such a 
defect is latent is somewhat anamolous. The manufacturer of the obviously 
defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad 
one. The law, we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it 
in its obvious form." Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713, 718 (1970).

 
 
"[T]he 
bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence case against the maker when 
it is shown that the purchaser knew of the dangerous condition. Thus if the 
product is a carrot-topping machine with exposed moving parts, or an electric 
clothes wringer dangerous to the limbs of the operator, and if it would be 
feasible for the maker of the product to install a guard or safety release, it 
should be a question for the jury whether reasonable care demanded such a 
precaution, though its absence is obvious. Surely reasonable men might find here 
a great danger, even to one who knew the condition; and since it was so readily 
avoidable they might find the maker negligent. * * *" 2 Harper & James, The 
Law of Torts § 28.5, p. 1543 (1956).

 
 

[¶30.]  In Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 
(1979), we held that "assumption of risk" was a form of contributory negligence 
and as such was not an absolute defense. This was because under comparative 
negligence, contributory negligence is not an absolute bar to liability, but a 
basis for apportionment of fault.

 
 

[¶31.]  Further, we must observe that like 
questions concerning a defendant's negligence, the jury must decide if a 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in his use of an obviously defective 
product. However, as a matter of law, the mere use of a dangerous product does 
not constitute negligence, just as the mere acceptance of an extra hazardous job 
cannot be considered negligence. Rocky 
Mountain Trucking Company v. Taylor, supra. There are many compelling 
reasons why individuals may be required to take an extra hazardous job or use 
dangerous equipment. In order for contributory negligence to be found, there 
must be evidence that care commensurate with the risks involved was not used. 
Accordingly, we reject Caterpillar's argument that, since the alleged defect was 
open and obvious, it cannot be held liable as a matter of 
law.

 
 

[¶32.]  This brings us to Caterpillar's next 
claim of error, whether decedent's negligence in operating the front-end loader 
must be considered as a proximate cause of the accident. The issue of decedent's 
contributory negligence was presented to the jury. In the special verdict form 
the jury concluded that, yes, the decedent had been negligent, but, no, his 
negligence was not a proximate cause of his death. Caterpillar now claims that 
this was an inconsistent verdict which mandates a new 
trial.

 
 

[¶33.]  An examination of the record in this case 
reveals that when the verdict was returned, the judge and counsel retired to 
chambers in order to review the verdict for inconsistencies. No challenge to the 
verdict was made at that time. We have previously ruled that challenges to 
irregular or inconsistent verdicts may be waived by the failure to object before 
the discharge of a jury.

 
 
"The 
matter of waiver is grounded, among other things, on the proposition that jury 
trials are time-consuming and costly proceedings and while a litigant is 
entitled to a fair trial, certain it is that he has responsibilities to assist 
the trial court in bringing about such a result. It will not do to permit a 
litigant to remain mute and speculate on the outcome of a jury trial on the 
record made with knowledge of irregularities or improprieties therein that might 
readily and easily have been corrected during the trial and then, when 
misfortune comes his way, to attempt to set the invited result aside by way of a 
new trial because of such matters. It is not fitting for the trial court or this 
court knowingly to reward or condone such conduct. As so aptly stated by Judge 
Rossman in Fischer v. Howard, 201 Or. 
426, 271 P.2d 1059, 1063, 49 A.L.R.2d 1301, a loser should not by design get 
`two bites at the cherry.'" DeWitty v. 
Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734, 736 (1963).

 
 

[¶34.]  Even though time was set aside to review 
the verdict here, no complaint was registered against it. Any questions could 
have been answered before the jury was discharged. The proper time to challenge 
the verdict was when the jury was still able to explain that which Caterpillar 
now considers to be an inconsistency. We will not now entertain Caterpillar's 
challenge to the verdict.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶35.]  We turn to Caterpillar's contentions that 
several of the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence 
were erroneous. Questions of admissibility lie within the discretion of the 
trial court. Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor 
Co., Ltd., Wyo., 648 P.2d 519 (1982). On appeal we will not reverse absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. Barnard v. 
Wendling, Wyo., 627 P.2d 603 (1981). In order to prevail, Caterpillar must 
demonstrate an obvious abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
rulings.

 
 

[¶36.]  Caterpillar's first challenge to a ruling 
of the trial court arises from the court's refusal to admit a film of a 1968 
experiment in which a front-end loader was intentionally rolled over. The trial 
court refused to admit the film because of Caterpillar's failure to comply with 
a court order providing, "defendant will respond to the plaintiff's 
interrogatories and request for production served June 3, 1982 as clearly and as 
precisely as possible in good faith."

 
 

[¶37.]  Rule 37(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides:

 
 
"(b) 
Failure to comply with 
order.

 
 
"(2) 
Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is Pending. - If a party or an officer, 
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of 
this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 
26(f), the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(B) 
An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated 
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in 
evidence."

 
 

[¶38.]  We have previously considered the 
exclusion of evidence by a trial court on the basis of Rule 37(b)(2)(B), supra, 
in Matter of Estate of Mora, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 842, 846 (1980). There we stated, "Broad discretion is given to the 
trial court with regard to sanctions."

 
 

[¶39.]  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure were 
designed to allow ample discovery. The rationale for this is that justice can be 
better served when the element of surprise is removed from a trial. Plaintiffs 
would have been surprised and prejudiced by the admission of this film because 
they were not provided with statistical data of the conditions under which the 
simulated roll-over was conducted. Little sympathy will be shown those who 
undermine the principles of discovery. See Smith v. Ford Motor Company, 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918, 101 S. Ct. 1363, 67 L. Ed. 2d 344 
(1981).

 
 

[¶40.]  Here, Caterpillar has not argued that the 
trial court erred in determining that it violated the court order. Its argument 
has been that the evidence was so relevant that the refusal to admit it was 
error. In such circumstances as these we see no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶41.]  Next, Caterpillar argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing three lay witnesses and one expert 
witness to give their opinions regarding certain issues in the case. The lay 
witnesses' testimony arose in the following manner according to 
Caterpillar:

 
 
"* 
* * By one question or another, directly or indirectly, witnesses Fister 
Pierantoni and Heck were interrogated by plaintiff's counsel with respect to 
their opinions concerning the feasibility (or ability) of Caterpillar to have 
installed rollover protective structures in 1966 as well as the desirability of 
having the manufacturer do so as opposed to having such structures added at a 
later date. Such interrogation was permitted over the foundation objections of 
the defendant Caterpillar. The witnesses referenced were defense witnesses and 
the opinions were elicited on cross examination, not upon the direct examination 
of Caterpillar. * * *"

 
 

[¶42.]  Rule 701, Wyoming Rules of Evidence, 
provides:

 
 
"If 
the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue."

 
 

[¶43.]  Caterpillar complains that its witnesses, 
Fister, Pierantoni and Heck were not experts, but that appellee through 
cross-examination made these witnesses her own experts and elicited testimony in 
support of her case. We see nothing wrong with that tactic if, in fact, it 
happened. This is not a novel tactic, especially in situations where a plaintiff 
has limited funds to prosecute its case. Rule 611(b), W.R.E., permits 
cross-examination on additional matters as if on direct examination. The limits 
to cross-examination are discretionary with the trial court so long as the 
inquiry pertains to relevant matters. Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, Wyo., 
580 P.2d 1123 (1978).

 
 

[¶44.]  The three witnesses had varying technical 
experiences and knowledge about ROPS. Expertise perhaps is a relative matter. 
Even if these witnesses were not experts, for all purposes they were entitled to 
give opinion testimony if their opinions were "rationally based on the 
perception of the witness," and "helpful to a clear understanding of the 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Rule 701, 
W.R.E.

 
 

[¶45.]  A fair reading of the testimony of these 
three witnesses causes us to conclude that their testimony meets the two tests 
required by Rule 701, W.R.E. In any event, it is well settled that the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony are for the trier of 
fact to determine. Continental Motors 
Corporation v. Joly, Wyo., 483 P.2d 244 (1971); and Cimoli v. Greyhound Corporation, Wyo., 
372 P.2d 170 (1962). We find no abuse of discretion.

 
 

[¶46.]  Caterpillar also challenges the trial 
court's determination that Donahue's witness, John Bollard, was an expert, thus 
allowing him to give opinion testimony. Rule 702, W.R.E., 
provides:

 
 
"If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise."

 
 
Under 
that rule, it has been held that the trial court's determination that a witness 
is qualified as an expert will not be reversed except in extreme cases or when a 
clear abuse of discretion is shown. McDaniel v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 534 
(1981). Whether Mr. Bollard was qualified as an expert "is a matter vested 
within the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly and prejudicially 
erroneous, and then only in extreme cases." Reed v. Hunter, Wyo., 663 P.2d 513, 517 
(1983).

 
 

[¶47.]  Here, Caterpillar contends that the 
witness, for all his education and experience in aerospace and structural 
engineering, lacked practical association with the heavy equipment industry. 
However, such an argument properly goes to the weight of the expert's testimony 
and does not establish an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court.

 
 

[¶48.]  Caterpillar also challenges the trial 
court's admission of appellee's exhibit No. 1, a report entitled, "Study and 
Evaluation of Tractor Canopies in Rollover Accidents," on the grounds that, 1) 
there was no foundation for exhibit No. 1; 2) no witness was produced to testify 
to its authenticity; 3) defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the author 
of this document; 4) Caterpillar had no opportunity to cross-examine the 
manufacturers of canopies that were discussed in this report; 5) a picture of a 
crushed operator in an overturned machine was inflammatory; and 6) there was no 
evidence to show that Caterpillar was aware of this 
document.

 
 

[¶49.]  Exhibit No. 1 was admitted as a domestic 
public document authorized by Rule 902, W.R.E., which rule specifically provides 
that "extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is not required" for this type document. The manner in which 
Exhibit No. 1 was received in evidence is consistent with Rule 901(a), and 
(b)(7) & (b)(8), W.R.E. The hearsay objection suggested by appellant is 
satisfied specifically by Rule 803(8), W.R.E., (Public Records and Reports), and 
(16) (Statements in Ancient Documents). Appellant cites no authority that there 
is a right to cross-examine those who prepare documents admitted under Rule 
803(8) and (16), W.R.E., nor do they cite authority allowing the 
cross-examination of manufacturers who are mentioned in the document (Exhibit 
No. 1). The impracticality or impossibility of cross-examining those who prepare 
ancient documents, public records and reports and those referred to in those 
documents is obvious, and we need not elaborate. 

 
 

[¶50.]  Caterpillar argues that a picture 
contained in Exhibit No. 1 is inflammatory, and therefore not admissible. As we 
have often held, we will not consider an error unless there is an objection at 
trial or unless the error amounted to plain error. Wilhelm v. Lake, Wyo., 630 P.2d 499 
(1981). An objection to the picture was not raised at trial nor does it amount 
to plain error.

 
 

[¶51.]  Finally, Caterpillar argues that it was 
not aware of plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 in advance of trial; however, it does not 
cite any authority or give logical reasons why appellee was obligated to make 
appellant aware of this report. In any event, the evidence is that if 
Caterpillar did not know of the exhibit, it should have. Robert Switzer, listed 
as a Caterpillar witness and its representative at trial, said he probably had 
seen the report.

 
 

[¶52.]  The second exhibit admitted by the trial 
court, over the objection of Caterpillar, was Donahue's exhibit 319b. Appellant 
claims that there was insufficient foundation for this exhibit to be 
admitted.

 
 

[¶53.]  Plaintiff used exhibit 319b, together 
with exhibit 311, to show that a roll bar design had been approved and was 
available for 988 loaders in 1966. Exhibit 319b is a 1964 certificate of 
approval from the State of California, Division of Industrial Safety, for a 
canopy on a 988 loader. The certificate was issued to the Tube-Lok Division of 
Portland Wire and Steel Warehouse, a roll bar manufacturer. Exhibit 311 is a 
letter from Caterpillar which refers to the certificate and states that the 
California Division of Industrial Safety had reportedly approved a roll bar 
design of the Tube-Lok Division for the 988 loader. The letter concludes: "Thus, 
approved installations are available for all current models except the 621, J621 
and 980."

 
 

[¶54.]  Both of these exhibits were introduced 
and admitted into evidence through Caterpillar's witness, Switzer, who was 
called by Donahue as an adverse witness. Exhibit 311 was admitted into evidence 
without objection from Caterpillar as a business record. Exhibit 319b was 
referred to in exhibit 311 and the witness testified that he was familiar with 
the certificate, could identify it, and had a copy of it. Defense counsel 
conducted a voir dire examination of the witness and moved that exhibit 319b be 
excluded because it was irrelevant and lacked foundation. A discussion followed 
between the court and counsel because of confusion over the status of the 
certificate. Appellee indicated to the court that the certificate was maintained 
in Caterpillar's files as a business record. The court then admitted the 
certificate as a business record maintained by Caterpillar. Appellant made no 
indication to the court that the certificate was not a business record belonging 
to Caterpillar. No further objection was made and nothing else was discussed. In 
Caterpillar's brief to this court there is no denial of the fact that the 
certificate, exhibit 319b, was part of their business 
records.

 
 

[¶55.]  Whether or not exhibit 319b is a business 
record belonging to Caterpillar, there appears to be sufficient foundation for 
its admission because it is included in exhibit 311 which is a business record 
of Caterpillar's. We hold, therefore, that there is no basis upon which to 
reverse the trial court's ruling to admit exhibit 319b.

 
 

[¶56.]  At trial appellee offered the previously 
recorded testimony of Ovid Holmes and George See taken from an Alaska case in 
which Caterpillar was a party. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Beck, 
Alaska, 593 P.2d 871 (1979). Before the trial in this case both Holmes and See 
died. Appellant made a motion in limine and objected at trial to exclude the 
previously recorded testimony of Holmes and See. The basis of appellant's 
objection at the trial level was that the Alaska case and the pending case were 
factually different. The major difference alleged was that the tractor involved 
in the Alaska case was a model 944, whereas the model involved here was a 
988.

 
 

[¶57.]  Both the Alaska case and this case 
involve: 1) the issue of the lack of ROPS, 2) Caterpillar loaders, one a 1964 
model, and the other a 1966 model, and 3) a rollover accident. The two cases are 
substantially the same; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's decision to allow this previously recorded testimony into 
evidence.

 
 

[¶58.]  On appeal Caterpillar addresses other 
reasons for objecting to the use of the previously recorded testimony. 
Caterpillar urges us to hold that from a policy standpoint, expert testimony 
should not fall within the unavailable witness status of Rule 804(b), W.R.E. 
Caterpillar's rationale for this contention is that "an expert is altogether 
different than a lay witness who has personally observed certain facts which 
would not repeat themselves" and that "the death of an expert does not represent 
the unavailability of evidence, as another expert can be found." Appellant 
reasons that "the prior testimony of a `replaceable' expert should not be 
permitted because it provides no opportunity for a change in plaintiff's 
strategy. * * *"

 
 

[¶59.]  Rule 804, W.R.E., provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) 
Definition of unavailability. - 
`Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the 
declarant:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(4) 
Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; * * 
*

 
 
"(b) 
Hearsay Exceptions. The following are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness.

 
 
"(1) 
Former Testimony. Testimony given as 
a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a 
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a 
civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect 
examination."

 
 

[¶60.]  Rule 804 speaks of the unavailability of 
a witness and not the unavailability of evidence. The rule is not limited to 
non-expert witnesses. Appellant in effect urges us to rewrite the rule and limit 
its application to situations where the evidence is irreplaceable and disregard 
the plain language of the rule that speaks only to the unavailability of the 
witness.

 
 

[¶61.]  The rationale behind Caterpillar's 
argument that Rule 804 should not apply to an expert witness is not, however, 
illogical. Scenarios could be conceived where it would be unfair to admit into 
evidence the prior testimony of a deceased expert witness. Likewise, a factual 
situation could be contrived where denying the admission of previously recorded 
testimony of a deceased expert witness would completely destroy a case. 
Therefore, the trial court should consider the totality of the facts and 
surrounding circumstances of each case to determine whether or not previously 
recorded testimony of a deceased witness should be admitted under Rule 804(b). 
The admission or rejection of this type of testimony is a discretionary decision 
of the trial court and its ruling will not be overturned unless there has been 
an abuse of discretion. We find none.

 
 

[¶62.]  Caterpillar suggests that its strategy 
was different in the Alaska case, and that the motive for cross-examination of 
Holmes and the examination of See was unlike that in the present case. In 4 
Wienstein, Evidence, § 804(b)(1)(04), p. 804-67 (1981), quoting with approval 5 
Wigmore, Evidence, § 1388 P. 111 (Chadbourn rev. 1974), the law is 
stated:

 
 
"* 
* * whether the former testimony was 
given upon such an issue that the party-opponent in that case had the same 
interest and motive in his cross-examination that the present opponent has; 
and the determination of this ought to be left entirely to the trial 
judge."

 
 
As 
previously stated, we find that these two cases are substantially similar so 
that the trial judge had a basis upon which to allow this testimony into 
evidence.

 
 

[¶63.]  Appellant further objected to the 
admission of plaintiff's exhibits 422(9), 422(10) 422(24). These are documents 
from the notebook of Ovid Holmes, and are canopy designs, allegedly dating back 
to the late 1940's and early 1950's. They were received into evidence as part of 
the background and foundation for Mr. Holmes' testimony in the Alaska 
case.

 
 

[¶64.]  We have ruled that the previously 
recorded testimony of Ovid Holmes was properly admitted into evidence. It would 
be inconsistent for us to now say that some of the materials that were used to 
support Mr. Holmes' testimony in the Alaska case were not admissible 
here.

 
 

[¶65.]  We have already addressed the objections 
which Caterpillar made to the admission of the prior recorded testimony of Mr. 
Holmes and Mr. See, and we can find no further objections made by Caterpillar in 
regard to this testimony. Caterpillar did, however, object to the admission of 
exhibits 422(9), 422(10), and 422(24) on grounds other than hearsay. Caterpillar 
objected that these exhibits were irrelevant and lacked 
foundation.

 
 

[¶66.]  We will first address the relevancy 
objection. These exhibits were initially admitted in the Alaska case to show the 
development of the state of the art for ROPS. Each of these exhibits is a 
drawing from Mr. Holmes' notebook showing designs and specifications for certain 
canopies. The trial court here also allowed these exhibits into evidence to show 
the development of the state of the art for ROPS. There was considerable concern 
in this case as to the availability and feasibility of using ROPS in 1966; 
therefore, this evidence is relevant to the determination of this 
case.

 
 

[¶67.]  The lack of foundation objection is 
without merit. Before each exhibit was admitted into evidence, Mr. Holmes in his 
testimony, identifies and explains his relationship to the exhibits. Each 
exhibit is a drawing out of Mr. Holmes' notebook which shows the history of 
ROPS. We find that no rule of evidence was violated by the admission of these 
exhibits.

 
 

[¶68.]  The final evidentiary issue we address is 
that the trial court should have allowed objections other than hearsay, to the 
previously recorded testimony of Mr. Holmes and Mr. See, and to the supporting 
exhibits, plaintiff's exhibits 422(9), 422(10), and 422(24). It is true that 
Rule 804(b)(1), W.R.E., only satisfies the hearsay objection and that all other 
objections to this evidence remain viable. In support of this, Caterpillar 
directs our attention to Louisell and Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence § 487, pp. 
1076, 1077 (1980), which states:

 
 
"Rule 
804(b)(1) addresses only the hearsay issues. Thus, a statement within the 
exception remains excludable on objection based upon some other ground if live 
testimony by the declarant of like effect would be excludable upon such 
objection."

 
 

[¶69.]  The only objections made by Caterpillar, 
other than hearsay, have already been addressed.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶70.]  The final issue we address is whether we 
should grant a remittitur as a condition of an affirmance. In Cates v. Eddy, Wyo. 669 P.2d 912 (1983), 
we stated: "If the verdict is so large or small that it shocks the judicial 
conscience, the court has not only the right, but the duty, to grant remittitur 
or additur accordingly."

 
 

[¶71.]  Here, our judicial conscience is not 
shocked. The decedent was 35 years old when he died. He was married and had 
three children. The jury verdict of $1,500,000 was high, but under the 
circumstances not unreasonably so.

 
 

[¶72.]  Affirmed.

 
 

ROONEY, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶73.]  I would dismiss this appeal for failure 
to file a timely notice of appeal.

 
 
"The 
timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. * * *" Rule 1.02, 
W.R.A.P.

 
 
"An 
appeal * * * shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal * * * within fifteen 
(15) days from entry of the judgment or final order appealed from * * *. The 
running of the time for appeal in a civil case is terminated as to all parties 
by a timely motion made by any party pursuant to any of the rules hereinafter 
enumerated, and the full time for appeal commences to run and is to be computed 
from the entry of any of the following orders made upon timely motion under such 
rules, or when such motions are deemed denied; * * * Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P.; * * * 
Rule 59, W.R.C.P." Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P.

 
 

[¶74.]  Both Rule 50(b) and Rule 59, W.R.C.P., 
provide that motions thereunder shall be deemed denied if not determined within 
sixty days, provided that the court can continue the period for not more than 
ninety days from entry of the judgment.

 
 

[¶75.]  The schedule of the pertinent filings in 
this case is as follows:

 
 
11/17/82 
- Judgment entered

 
 
11/29/82 
- Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions timely filed

 
 
2/15/83 
- Motions deemed denied

 
 
3/2/83 
- Deadline for filing notice of appeal

 
 
3/11/83 
- Notice of appeal filed

 
 
3/15/83 
- Amended notice of appeal filed.

 
 
Obviously, 
the notices of appeal were not timely filed.

 
 

[¶76.]  However, appellant argues that the 
judgment was not final inasmuch as it did not determine the amount of costs, 
and, therefore, the time for filing a notice of appeal would not commence to run 
until the order on costs was filed on March 1, 1983. The judgment provided in 
part:

 
 
"IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall file her statement of costs. The 
costs allowed by the court shall become a part of this 
judgment."

 
 

[¶77.]  Normally, the settlement of the amount of 
costs is not a part of the judgment. It is frequently a post judgment 
computation. Often, it cannot be otherwise. As a collateral order, it does not 
affect the finality of the judgment.

 
 
"A 
judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in action. * * 
*" Rule 54, W.R.C.P.

 
 
Costs 
are the subject of subsection (d) of that rule. It provides that costs be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court directs otherwise 
or unless rules and statutes expressly provide otherwise. The rule treats costs 
as an adjunct to the judgment, although includable 
therein.

 
 

[¶78.]  The separation of the costs from the 
judgment insofar as finality is concerned is illustrated by the fact that an 
appeal may be had relative to the ruling on costs entirely apart from the 
judgment.

 
 
"* 
* * But a final judgment does not always end the lawsuit. Decisions may be 
necessary after an appeal has been taken or after the time for appeal from the 
final judgment has expired. The final judgment rule does not preclude review of 
such decisions. They are themselves subject to the test of finality, but an 
appeal can ultimately be taken from them.

 
 
"* 
* * The following postjudgment orders have been held to be final: * * * an order 
taxing costs; * * * Of course, appeals from such orders do not permit an attack 
on the underlying judgment if it is then final because it has been affirmed on 
an earlier appeal or because the time for appeal has expired. * * *" 9 Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶ 110.14[1], pp. 196-197.

 
 
See 
Hill v. Whitlock Oil Services, Inc., 
450 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1971), 14 A.L.R.Fed. 895; and United States v. 2,186.63 Acres of Land, Wasatch County, Utah, 464 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1972).

 
 

[¶79.]  The definition of a judgment, supra, 
reflects finality to be on that which has to do with the merits of an action. 
Costs are collateral to the merits of an action. They are not included in that 
which gave rise to the action.

 
 
"* 
* * [W]here further action of the court is necessary to give a complete 
adjudication upon the merits, the judgment under which the further question 
arises is to be regarded, not as final, but as 
interlocutory.

 
 
"However, 
a judgment on the merits defining and settling the rights of the parties is not 
rendered interlocutory by the fact that further orders may be necessary to carry 
into effect the rights settled by the judgment. * * *" 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, 
§ 1054, p. 124.

 
 

[¶80.]  The presence or absence of cost 
provisions in an order or judgment, and the scope thereof, may be error, but 
such alone cannot be the basis of determining the finality of the order or 
judgment.

 
 

[¶81.]  The notice of appeal was not timely filed 
in this case and I would dismiss the appeal for that 
reason.