Case Title: State ex rel. Lynch v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-6668

Docket Number: 20070423

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Lynch v. Indus. Comm., 116 Ohio St.3d 342, 2007-Ohio-6668.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LYNCH, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL  
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Lynch v. Indus. Comm., 
 116 Ohio St.3d 342, 2007-Ohio-6668.] 
Exchanging labor for pay on a sustained basis constitutes sustained remunerative 
employment 
sufficient 
to 
terminate 
permanent 
total 
disability 
compensation, even when the labor is the illegal selling of drugs. 
(No. 2007-0423 — Submitted October 9, 2007 — Decided December 19, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-1233, 2007-Ohio-292. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this direct appeal, we review appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio’s determination that appellant Henry Lynch’s ongoing crack-cocaine 
enterprise constituted sustained remunerative employment sufficient to terminate 
permanent total disability compensation.  Lynch was injured in an industrial 
accident in 1967 and was subsequently awarded permanent total disability 
compensation.  In 1997, Lynch was indicted by a federal grand jury on multiple 
charges relating to the possession, sale, and distribution of crack cocaine.  The 
criminal complaint and supporting affidavit alleged that from approximately 
January 1, 1994, through July 17, 1997, Lynch was selling crack from his home.  
Lynch also supplied others with crack for resale.  Lynch’s income from the 
enterprise was estimated at $300 to $500 a week. 
{¶ 2} Lynch pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess 
cocaine with intent to distribute.  See United States v. Lynch (C.A.6, 1999), 181 
F.3d 105 (Table), 1999 WL 282692.  Lynch was then incarcerated, and the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation moved to terminate Lynch’s permanent total 
disability compensation and to have all the compensation paid to Lynch on or 
after January 31, 1994, declared an overpayment.  A notice of the hearing on that 
motion was sent to Lynch’s home. 
{¶ 3} On March 10, 1998, the commission held the hearing, and on 
March 19, 1998, it found that Lynch’s “criminal activities for profit * * * 
constitute[d] sustained remunerative employment.”  Permanent total disability 
compensation was terminated retroactive to January 31, 1994.  That order became 
final. 
{¶ 4} In June 2004, Lynch filed a motion with the commission alleging 
that he had not received notice of the March 10, 1998 disability-termination 
hearing or the actual termination order.  He asked the commission to either reopen 
the issue by exercising its R.C. 4123.52 continuing jurisdiction or permit him to 
file a belated motion for reconsideration pursuant to R.C. 4123.522.  The 
commission granted the latter. 
{¶ 5} Lynch then filed his belated motion for reconsideration of the 
March 19, 1998 order, alleging that the commission had committed a clear 
mistake of law in terminating his compensation.  The commission found that a 
clear error of law had not occurred, and hence it had no continuing jurisdiction to 
reopen the March 19, 1998 order and reexamine the merits of Lynch’s entitlement 
to permanent total disability. 
{¶ 6} Lynch turned to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  That 
court denied the requested writ of mandamus, prompting Lynch’s appeal to this 
court as of right. 
{¶ 7} Lynch first argues that the March 19, 1998 order terminating his 
permanent total disability did not satisfy the procedural requirements of State ex 
rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 692 N.E.2d 188, State ex 
rel. Foster v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 320, 707 N.E.2d 1122, and 
January Term, 2007 
3 
State ex rel. Gobich v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 585, 2004-Ohio-5990, 817 
N.E.2d 398.  These cases held that commission orders must indicate which of five 
identified prerequisites1 is the basis for the exercise of continuing jurisdiction.  
Lynch’s position, however, overlooks a critical point —- these three cases were 
decided after the termination order in his case.  Lynch’s proposition accordingly 
lacks merit. 
{¶ 8} Lynch also claims that the commission cannot consider the activity 
he engaged in to be sustained remunerative employment, because the activity was 
illegal.  We disagree.  Lynch cannot use the illegality of his pursuits as a shield.  
Lynch exchanged labor for pay on a sustained basis.  This constitutes sustained 
remunerative employment for purposes of permanent total disability.  State ex rel. 
Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 
19. 
{¶ 9} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Ward, Kaps, Bainbridge, Maurer & Melvin, L.L.C., and Paul F. Ward, for 
appellant. 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and  Douglas R. Unver, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
______________________ 
                                                 
1.  The five prerequisites are fraud, new and changed circumstances, clear mistake of fact, clear 
mistake of law, and error by an inferior tribunal.  See Nicholls at 458-459, 692 N.E.2d 188.