Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Richard Lee Buckle

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94-027

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94027
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
RICHARD LEE BUCKLE,
Respondent.
[October 12, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the complaint of The Florida Bar and the referee’s report
regarding alleged ethical breaches by Richard Lee Buckle.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the
referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of guilt, but we reject his
recommendation regarding discipline and find that a public reprimand is the
appropriate sanction for the misconduct at issue.  
During his representation of Donald Spaulding, a criminal defendant who had
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been arrested for battery and false imprisonment, respondent Buckle contacted the
alleged victim of the crimes, Lydia Gibas, both by telephone and by letter.  During
the first telephone contact, Gibas terminated the call after learning that Buckle
represented the defendant.  The second telephone contact ended similarly, with
Gibas informing Buckle that she did not wish to speak to him.  Immediately after
the second phone call, Buckle transmitted a letter to Gibas and attached various
religious materials to that letter.  Receipt of this letter prompted Gibas to file a bar
complaint against Buckle.    
 At the formal hearing in this matter, Gibas testified that the letter was
humiliating and disparaged her character and that it caused her to consider
abandoning the criminal complaint against Spaulding.  The referee found that the
letter was “objectively humiliating and intimidating to a reasonable person standing
in Ms. Gibas’ place” and that it had no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, intimidate, or otherwise burden Gibas.  The referee also found that
although Gibas was offended by the religious materials Buckle had attached to the
letter, he had included those materials simply to fulfill his convictions as a religious
person.  The referee further stated his opinion that “the dissemination of religious
materials, though not prohibited, should be carefully reviewed by all senders of
such material, and professional discretion used concerning this type of
1The referee did not expressly state whether it was the letter itself, the religious materials, or both
that violated these rules. We find no violation with regard to the religious materials in and of themselves;
however, we agree with the referee that an attorney should carefully exercise his or her professional
judgment and discretion with regard to the dissemination of religious materials enclosed with legal
correspondence.  
2In aggravation only, the referee considered the testimony of Sheree Weisenberger, who had
received a similar letter and calls from Buckle.  Weisenberger was the alleged victim of another similar
crime perpetrated by Buckle’s client, Donald Spaulding.
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dissemination.”  
Based on the factual findings described above, the referee concluded that
Buckle had violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-4.4 (lawyer shall not use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person); rule 4-8.4(a)(lawyer shall not violate Rules of Professional Conduct);
and rule 4-8.4(d)(lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of
justice, including disparaging, humiliating, or discriminating against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, and others on any basis).1   In aggravation, the referee considered
Buckle’s age of fifty-two, his two prior admonishments, his substantial experience
in the practice of law, a pattern of misconduct,2 multiple offenses, and his refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  Additionally, the referee
commented that throughout the proceedings, Buckle attempted to portray the
complaint against him as one of religious persecution and failed to see how his
actions affected Gibas and the administration of justice.  The referee recommended
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that Buckle be suspended for thirty days, be required to write letters of apology to
Gibas and another woman to whom Buckle had sent a similar letter, and be placed
on probation for two years during which he may not send religious materials in
connection with his practice of law to any opposing litigant, witness, or attorney for
same.  Buckle now seeks review of the referee’s report and recommendation.
Buckle argues that his conduct did not violate any ethical rules and was, in
fact, required by his duty to competently and zealously represent his client.  He
argues that contrary to the referee’s finding, the letter he sent to Gibas had a
substantial purpose other than to intimidate or disparage her.  This purpose, he
contends, was to gain additional information, to find out the position of the victim
with respect to prosecution, and to discover whether or not the victim intended to
pursue prosecution of the case.  The referee expressly rejected this explanation as
lacking credibility.
The referee’s credibility determination in this regard is entitled to deference. 
See Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1999) (stating that “the
referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his
judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent clear and
convincing evidence that his judgment is incorrect”).  The referee found that
Buckle’s explanation was not credible “in that no reasonable attorney would ever
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expect such a letter to actually be answered by the purported victim of a crime.” 
Indeed,  just before Buckle transmitted the letter, Gibas  had specifically informed
him that she did not wish to have any contact with him.  Thus, even more so under
the circumstances of this case, it would be illogical for Buckle to have genuinely
expected a voluntary response from Gibas after having been clearly advised that his
contact was totally unwelcome.  
The referee found that the letter on its face was objectively humiliating and
intimidating to a reasonable person standing in Gibas’ place.  He found that the
intent of the letter was obvious and that its intent was solely to “embarrass,
intimidate, or otherwise burden Ms. Gibas,” by “threatening to explore and exploit
the most personal and important aspects and relationships in [her] life, to hold these
aspects of her life up to public scrutiny, to expose her.”  The referee’s finding in
this regard is supported by competent substantial evidence.  
Most importantly, the letter itself was introduced into evidence and its tone
and content are both clear and direct.  In it, Buckle poses numerous questions and
includes many comments directed to Gibas’ credibility, morality, and judgment and
threatens to “leave no stone unturned” if  she continues to press the charges.  He
essentially threatens to take her away from her job and her children and to expose
her to ridicule, contempt, and hatred.  He also threatens to expose and delve into
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the circumstances surrounding the murder of one of her family members.  As the
referee found, the obvious intent of these threats, comments, and inquiries was to
intimidate Gibas into abandoning her criminal complaint against Spaulding.  
The heart of this matter revolves around the lines of propriety involved in the
conflict between zealous advocacy and ethical conduct.  We must never permit a
cloak of purported zealous advocacy to conceal unethical behavior.  At the same
time, we must also guard against hollow claims of ethical impropriety precluding
proper advocacy for a client.  This Court has recognized that “ethical problems
may arise from conflicts between a lawyer’s responsibility to a client and the
lawyer’s special obligations to society and the legal system. . . . ‘Such issues must
be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment
guided by the basic principles underlying the rules.’ ”  Florida Bar v. Machin, 635
So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1994) (quoting the Preamble to the Rules of Professional
Conduct).  
Certainly, the principles underlying the rules include basic fairness, respect
for others,  human dignity, and upholding the quality of justice.  Zealous advocacy
cannot be translated to mean win at all costs, and although the line may be difficult
to establish, standards of good taste and professionalism must be maintained while
we support and defend the role of counsel in proper advocacy.  In corresponding
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with persons involved in legal proceedings, lawyers must be vigilant not to abuse
the privilege afforded them as officers of the court.  A lawyer’s obligation of
zealous representation should not and cannot be transformed into a vehicle intent
upon harassment and intimidation.  
In representing Spaulding, Buckle was certainly entitled and obligated to raise
issues regarding Gibas’ credibility and to attempt to discover the facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime; however, he was not entitled to use
such inquiries as a ruse for threatening, disparaging, and humiliating Gibas into
abandoning her complaint.  Intimidating her for no other reason than to influence
her to abandon the criminal charges and with no reasonable expectation of gaining
any pertinent information is patently unfair and is clearly prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  Buckle’s threats involving her employment, invasion of
medical privacy, family, and security are simply beyond the bounds of proper
advocacy.  Accordingly, we uphold the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions
of guilt.
We disagree, however, with the referee’s recommendation regarding
discipline.  As noted above, the referee recommended that Buckle be suspended
for thirty days, be required to write letters of apology, and be placed on probation
for two years during which he would be restricted from sending religious materials
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in connection with his practice of law.  In contrast with a review of the referee's
findings of fact, which should be upheld if supported by competent substantial
evidence, this Court has a broader scope of review regarding discipline because it
bears the ultimate responsibility of ordering the appropriate sanction.  See Florida
Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 1999).  In light of several cases
involving similar conduct, we find that a public reprimand is the appropriate
sanction for Buckle’s misconduct in this case.  Florida Bar v. Sayler, 721 So. 2d
1152 (Fla. 1998) (imposing a public reprimand where an attorney sent a frightening
letter to opposing counsel in a workers’ compensation matter which referenced the
murder of a workers’ compensation attorney and attached a copy of a newspaper
article regarding the murder);  The Florida Bar v. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1996)
(imposing a public reprimand where an attorney sent a humiliating, embarrassing,
and disparaging letter to his client’s ex-husband);  Florida Bar v. Johnson, 511 So.
2d 295 (Fla. 1995) (imposing a public reprimand where an attorney sent several
letters to a client with whom he had a fee dispute stating that God told him that the
client would be visited with a variety of biblical curses unless he paid the money he
owed).   
Richard Lee Buckle is hereby publicly reprimanded for his violation of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.  Judgment for costs in the amount of $4,404.99
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is entered against respondent and in favor of The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, FL 32399, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
HARDING, J., dissents as to discipline.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Brett Alan Geer, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa, Florida,
       for Complainant
Richard Lee Buckle, pro se, Bradenton, Florida, and Layon F. Robinson, II,
Bradenton, Florida,
       for Respondent