Case Title: Wilson v. Pulaski Ass'n of Classroom Teachers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mike WILSON, Olan Ashbury, Johnny Mass and
Mike McNew v. PULASKI ASSOCIATION OF
CLASSROOM TEACHERS, Deen Minton, President,
Lois Hughes, Vice President, and Sandra Roy

96-1048                                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                            Supreme Court of Arkansas
                       Opinion delivered October 23, 1997


1.    Courts -- supreme court does not render advisory opinions. --
      The supreme court neither renders advisory opinions nor
      answers academic questions.

2.    Judgments -- mootness doctrine -- exception applicable. -- A
      case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no
      practical legal effect on an existing legal controversy; an
      exception to the mootness doctrine, however, allows review for
      appeals involving the public interest and the prevention of
      future litigation; here, although a teachers' strike ended
      more than one year earlier, it was clear that the ability of
      public employees to withhold their services involved a
      question of significant public interest, the resolution of
      which would certainly preclude future litigation.

3.    Injunction -- preliminary injunction -- chancery court's discretion -- when
      chancellor's ruling will be reversed. -- An order granting or denying a preliminary
      injunction is within the chancery court's discretion; the supreme court will not reverse a
      chancellor's ruling on a preliminary injunction unless there has been an abuse of
      discretion. 
4.    Injunction -- preliminary injunction -- requirements for granting. -- Arkansas Rule
      of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1) provides that where a preliminary injunction is to be given
      without notice to the adversary of the one requesting it, it must be alleged by affidavit or
      verified complaint that, absent the injunction, irreparable harm will result to the appellant;
      where notice is given, a hearing must be held at which such irreparable harm must be
      shown; the prospect of irreparable harm or lack of an otherwise adequate remedy is the
      foundation of the power to issue injunctive relief. 

5.    Equity -- jurisdiction of with respect to public employees -- proof required for equity
      to act. -- Equity will exercise jurisdiction to restrain acts or threatened acts of public
      corporations or of public officers, boards, or commissions that are ultra vires and beyond
      the scope of their authority, or that constitute a violation of their official duty, whenever
      the execution of such acts would cause irreparable injury to, or destroy rights and
      privileges of, the complainant, which are cognizable in equity, and for the protection of
      which there would be no adequate remedy at law;  for equity to act, there must be proof
      of (1) irreparable harm and (2) no adequate remedy at law. 
       
6.    Injunction -- proof required -- appellants failed to challenge chancellor's ruling that
      no irreparable harm had been suffered -- chancellor's order affirmed. -- For a
      chancellor to grant a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish irreparable
      harm; this is true in all instances where injunctive relief is sought, regardless of whether
      the party may additionally prove that an activity is illegal per se; here, appellants were
      precluded from establishing that the chancellor had abused her discretion because they did
      not challenge her ruling that no irreparable harm had been suffered; where appellants
      made no attempt to prove irreparable harm but instead asked that the supreme court's
      longstanding posture on equity jurisdiction be changed without the support of any
      convincing legal authority, the court declined to do so; the chancellor's order was
      affirmed.


      Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Sixth Division; Annabelle C. Imber, Chancellor;
affirmed.
      Ramsay, Bridgforth, Harrelson & Starling, by:  Spencer F. Robinson, for appellants.
      Roachell Law Firm, by:  Richard W. Roachell, for appellee.

      W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
      This action was filed by Mike Wilson and a group of taxpayers of Pulaski County Special
School District who have children in the Pulaski County School District against the Pulaski
Association of Classroom Teachers, the collective bargaining representative of certified employees
of the school district.  Appellants filed a lawsuit challenging the legality of a teachersþ strike.
      A teachersþ strike began on August 19, 1996.  On August 23, 1996, appellants filed suit
in the Pulaski County Chancery Court seeking a preliminary injunction to stop the strike.  A
hearing was held on August 23, 1996.  The chancery court denied the preliminary injunction
based upon the findings that appellants did not meet the burden of proving that a teachersþ strike
was illegal and that the appellants did not meet the burden of proving irreparable harm.  
      On August 28, 1996, a federal district court, through its jurisdiction over Pulaski county
and the teachers association in a suit regarding Pulaski County desegregation, enjoined the strike
and ordered the parties to mediate.  Following this order, the strike ended.
      Despite the ending of the strike, appellantsþ challenge the chancellorþs denial of the
preliminary injunction claiming that the chancellor erred by failing to find that a teachersþ strike
is illegal per se pursuant to Arkansas law and that due to this illegality, the preliminary injunction
should have been ordered.  As a procedural matter for granting preliminary injunctions, appellants
contend that a showing of irreparable harm is not necessary in instances where an activity is
illegal per se.  Appellants do not challenge the finding by the chancellor that they did not prove
that they had suffered irreparable harm.  We do not agree with appellantsþ characterization of the
standard for granting preliminary injunctions and affirm the chancellorþs denial of the preliminary
injunction.
      Appellee challenged the jurisdiction of this court based upon the doctrine of mootness
relying upon the traditional rule that this court will not render advisory opinions.  It is true that
appellants have requested an order from this court enjoining a teachersþ strike  in the event that
the teachers attempt to strike again in the future.  This is speculative in nature, and no one knows
if the teachers will ever do such.  It is well settled that this court does not render advisory
opinions nor answer academic questions.  See, Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547,