Case Title: State v. Brazzle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 116649

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 116,649 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY MICHAEL BRAZZLE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
If a defendant argues he or she lacked the intent to distribute drugs, evidence about 
a prior crime committed by the defendant may be material, especially if evidence 
establishes similarities between the prior crime and the charged crime. 
 
2.  
A party's failure to argue in a petition for review why the Court of Appeals erred 
in an invited error analysis means the party has waived any argument before this court as 
to why the invited error doctrine did not apply.  
 
3. 
 
Appellate courts weighing sufficiency do not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value because a conviction of even the 
gravest offense can be based on circumstantial evidence. Thus, even if the State does not 
present direct evidence that a defendant charged with unlawfully possessing the 
 
2 
 
 
 
controlled substance oxycodone did not have a prescription for the drug, circumstantial 
evidence could establish the lack of a prescription.  
 
4.  
Proof of the identity of a substance by circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to 
affirm a conviction in a drug prosecution even if no scientific test results are admitted or 
available. 
 
5.  
 
 
Under K.S.A. 60-404, a timely interposed objection is required before this court 
can overturn a verdict because a district court erroneously admitted evidence.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 55 Kan. App. 2d 276, 411 P.3d 1250 (2018). 
Appeal from Riley District Court; MERYL D. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed July 10, 2020. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Barry K. Disney, senior deputy county attorney, argued the cause, and James W. Garrison, 
assistant county attorney, Barry Wilkerson, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on 
the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, C.J.:  Anthony Michael Brazzle petitions this court for review of the 
Court of Appeals' decision affirming his drug-related convictions, including possession of 
 
3 
 
 
 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of oxycodone. He argues the 
district court erred in admitting K.S.A. 60-455 evidence related to two prior 
methamphetamine sales to undercover detectives about a week before the events at issue, 
the district court clearly erred in instructing the jury on possession of oxycodone, and 
insufficient evidence supported his conviction for possession of oxycodone.  
 
We find no reversible error and affirm Brazzle's convictions.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Law enforcement officers arrested Brazzle after he drove away from the Royal 
Inn, a hotel in Riley County. Law enforcement officers had the Inn under surveillance 
because they had learned about an uptick in drug usage and distribution at the hotel. The 
officers saw a car come to the hotel and leave about 10 to 15 minutes later. As the car 
pulled out of the parking lot, the driver, later identified as Anthony Brazzle, committed a 
traffic infraction. The officers followed Brazzle and initiated a traffic stop. Brazzle was 
alone in the vehicle. Brazzle first reported his name was Marcus Brazzle, but he 
eventually admitted he was Anthony Michael Brazzle.  
 
During the stop, K9 Officer Andrew Toolin arrived and walked his dog around the 
vehicle. After the dog alerted, Toolin searched the vehicle. He found a small, gray pill 
under the driver's floorboard. Toolin identified the pill, which had a "K 57" marking on it, 
as oxycodone hydrochloride by using "a common method of drugs.com." Toolin said law 
enforcement officers in the United States use this website to identify pills. Toolin also 
found a glass smoking device with white residue under the driver's seat and brass 
knuckles in the front driver's door panel.  
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Underneath the passenger seat, Toolin found a plastic baggie containing a Crown 
Royal bag. The Crown Royal bag contained two small ziplock baggies of a crystal-like 
substance Toolin believed was methamphetamine; another glass smoking device; U.S. 
currency totaling $128; more small, gray pills with a "K 57" marking; and unused, small 
ziplock plastic baggies. Toolin testified that the baggie containing the Crown Royal bag 
was easily within reach of the driver's seat.  
 
Toolin testified the two baggies with the crystal-like substance weighed 3.4 grams 
and 5.7 grams. Toolin said this was "a lot" of methamphetamine and, in his training and 
experience, these amounts were consistent with a distributable amount of 
methamphetamine. He added that a normal amount for a user to possess is anywhere 
from a quarter gram to a gram at a time.   
 
Later testing performed by a Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) forensic 
scientist confirmed the bags contained methamphetamine with a net weight of 2.98 grams 
and 5.28 grams, respectively. One of the glass smoking devices also tested positive for 
methamphetamine. No evidence established that the gray pills were tested.  
 
Toolin testified, citing his training and experience, that smaller ziplock baggies are 
used to package illegal drugs. He also testified the $128 found with the 
methamphetamine was in denominations allowing a distributor to make change and drug 
dealers commonly store money used for that purpose with the drugs the dealer plans to 
distribute.   
 
 
5 
 
 
 
The State originally charged Brazzle with possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal use of a weapon. The 
State later added a charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, oxycodone.  
 
Before trial, the State filed a motion to determine admissibility of K.S.A. 60-455 
evidence. The State sought to admit testimony from an undercover detective who had 
purchased methamphetamine from Brazzle about a week before his arrest. Following a 
hearing, the district court permitted the State to present this evidence to show whether 
Brazzle intended to distribute the methamphetamine found during the car stop.  
 
At trial, over objection from Brazzle's attorney, the undercover detective testified 
he and his undercover partner had connected with Brazzle through another person who 
told the detective to come to the Royal Inn hotel. Once there, Brazzle sold the detectives 
3.5 grams of methamphetamine for $200. A few days later, Brazzle offered to again sell 
methamphetamine to the testifying detective at Royal Inn, but the detective asked to 
move to a different location. The detective said he also received unused plastic baggies 
from Brazzle and the only reason to have these baggies is to distribute methamphetamine. 
   
Brazzle presented no evidence.  
 
The district court instructed the jury that the prior crime evidence could "be 
considered solely for the purpose of proving the defendant's intent with the controlled 
substances." The district court also instructed the jury on the statutorily created rebuttable 
presumption of an intent to distribute if any person possesses 3.5 grams or more of 
methamphetamine. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2). And at Brazzle's request, the 
district court instructed the jury that possession with intent to distribute includes the 
 
6 
 
 
 
lesser offense of possession of methamphetamine. The jury convicted Brazzle on all 
counts as charged.  
 
The district court denied Brazzle's motion for a departure sentence and sentenced 
Brazzle to 105 months' imprisonment for the primary offense of possession with intent to 
distribute methamphetamine. The district court ran Brazzle's other sentences concurrent 
with the 105-month sentence. During the same hearing, the district court ran the sentence 
concurrent with Brazzle's 55-month sentence in another case. And finally, the district 
court ran the concurrent sentences consecutive to Brazzle's 20-month sentence imposed 
based on a probation violation in an earlier case.  
 
On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Brazzle's convictions. State v. 
Brazzle, 55 Kan. App. 2d 276, 411 P.3d 1250 (2018). This court granted Brazzle's 
petition for review. 
 
1. 
ADMISSION OF K.S.A. 2019 SUPP. 60-455 EVIDENCE NOT ERROR 
 
As announced in State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 57, 144 P.3d 647 (2006), K.S.A. 
2019 Supp. 60-455 governs the admissibility of all evidence of other crimes and civil 
wrongs. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-455 provides in relevant part:  
 
  
"(a) Subject to K.S.A. 60-447, and amendments thereto, evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove such 
person's disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the 
person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
"(b) Subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448, and amendments thereto, such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident." 
 
This court has instructed district courts to use a three-prong test when applying 
this provision and has identified the standard of review for each step.  
 
First, the district court must determine whether the fact to be proven is material. 
Courts answer this question by considering whether the "fact has some real bearing on 
the decision in the case." State v. Torres, 294 Kan. 135, 139, 273 P.3d 729 (2012). An 
appellate court reviewing this determination gives no deference to the district court, 
examining this prong independently. State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 811, 441 
P.3d 52 (2019).  
 
Second, a district court "must decide whether the material fact is disputed, and if 
so, whether the evidence at issue is relevant to proving the disputed material fact. In 
doing so, the trial court considers if the evidence has any tendency in reason to prove the 
disputed material fact." Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. at 811. In Garcia-Garcia, as in most 
other recent cases, we have identified the appellate standard for review as whether the 
district court committed an abuse of discretion. 309 Kan. at 811; see, e.g., State v. 
Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387, 1392, 430 P.3d 11 (2018); State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 715, 721, 
333 P.3d 179 (2014); Torres, 294 Kan. at 139-40.  
 
 
8 
 
 
 
In other decisions, we have emphasized the relevancy aspect of this inquiry 
requires two assessments:  "the probative value of the evidence to be admitted and 
whether that evidence is being admitted for the purpose of proving a material fact." State 
v. Boggs, 287 Kan. 298, 308, 197 P.3d 441 (2008). Boggs and other cases listing these 
two assessments identify a standard of review for each:  "The probative value of the 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; the materiality question requires a legal 
determination as to the elements or a particular offense and is therefore reviewed de 
novo." 287 Kan. at 308. These statements track those we use in any context when 
examining relevance. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 306 Kan. 431, 435, 394 P.3d 868 
(2017) (citing State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 817, 235 P.3d 436 [2010]).  
 
Although not explaining the difference, the 60-455 cases that do not separately 
discuss the two aspects of relevance likely do not include the materiality review in this 
second prong simply because the court has already examined materiality in analyzing the 
first prong. Because we recognize that a side-by-side comparison of the two lines of cases 
might cause some momentary confusion, we clarify that the two approaches do not vary 
substantively.  
 
Turning to the third prong, the district court must determine whether the risk of 
undue prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value. An appellate 
court again reviews this for abuse of discretion. State v. Thurber, 308 Kan. 140, 202, 420 
P.3d 389 (2018). See also State v. Satchell, 311 Kan. ___, 2020 WL 3479152, at *7 
(2020) (clarifying that the risk of undue prejudice must "substantially outweigh" the 
evidence's probative value, despite occasional shorthand references in some cases 
omitting the word "substantially").  
 
9 
 
 
 
 
If the evidence fulfills the three prongs, it is admissible, but the district court must 
give the jury a limiting instruction "telling the jury the specific purpose for which the 
evidence has been admitted (and reminding them that it may only be considered for that 
purpose)." Torres, 294 Kan. at 140; see Haygood, 308 Kan. at 1393.  
 
1.1. 
Evidence Material to Intent to Distribute 
 
Brazzle argues the district court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of 
his selling methamphetamine to undercover detectives twice about a week before the car 
stop. The parties, the district court, and the Court of Appeals primarily focused on our 
caselaw arising from charges of possession of drugs, which we often refer to as "simple" 
possession, as opposed to Brazzle's charged offense of possession with the intent to 
distribute. See State v. Rosa, 304 Kan. 429, 436-37, 371 P.3d 915 (2016); Boggs, 287 
Kan. at 312; State v. Graham, 244 Kan. 194, 198, 768 P.2d 259 (1989) (cited in PIK 
Crim. 4th 51.030, Comment II, C[3]); State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, Syl. ¶ 3, 551 P.2d 
1247 (1976); State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168, 176, 523 P.2d 397 (1974), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 556 P.2d 387 (1976), disapproved on other 
grounds by Gunby, 282 Kan. at 54-55.  
 
But in State v. Preston, 294 Kan. 27, 33, 272 P.3d 1275 (2012), we observed that 
the analysis of the materiality and relevance of 60-455 evidence might be different when 
the charge is possession with intent to distribute as opposed to simple possession. Preston 
did not further discuss the issue because the parties' arguments made no distinction. Here, 
they do.  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
The State contends that Brazzle, through his counsel, argued his possession, if any, 
was simply for personal use rather than distribution. The State argues the prior crime 
evidence was relevant to Brazzle's intent to distribute the drugs. Cf. 294 Kan. at 33. The 
State also argues our 60-455 caselaw on simple possession—citing most specifically the 
reasoning in Boggs, 287 Kan. 298—should not guide the outcome here. The State 
accurately notes that in Boggs and similar cases "possession proved the offense." In other 
words, the other crimes evidence simply proved propensity. But, as the State argues, "the 
fact or material element of intent to distribute was not obvious from the mere fact the 
Defendant was in possession of the controlled substance." Rather, for example, evidence 
that a defendant repeatedly used a particular location for or method of distributing drugs 
might bear on a jury's decision about whether the possession was intended for distribution 
rather than personal use.  
 
The Court of Appeals found merit to the distinction, explaining that "[n]ot only 
was Brazzle's knowledge of the contraband and intent to exercise control over the 
contraband questioned but so was his intent in possessing the contraband, i.e., whether he 
intended the drugs and contraband for personal use or for distribution." (Emphasis 
added.) 55 Kan. App. 2d at 280. The panel held evidence of Brazzle's prior 
methamphetamine sales, "a week prior to his arrest in this case at a location he had just 
left before the traffic stop in this case is highly probative of his intent to distribute the 
methamphetamine he possessed rather than to possess it for personal use." 55 Kan. App. 
2d at 280. We agree that Brazzle both put the issue of intent to distribute in dispute and 
that the evidence was material.  
 
As to the question of whether the issue was disputed, Brazzle's counsel 
acknowledged before trial that "obviously the intent or possession is the big issue in this 
 
11 
 
 
 
case." Then, during the trial, Brazzle's counsel requested and received an instruction on 
simple possession as a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. See 
State v. Bates, No. 117,419, 2019 WL 1412600, at *9 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished 
opinion) ("simple possession is a lesser included offense of the crime of possession with 
intent to distribute"). And during closing argument, his counsel argued baggies alone 
were not enough to show that someone intended to distribute. 
 
As to the point of whether this dispute impacts the admissibility of the other 
crimes evidence, we note that this appears to be an undecided question in Kansas, at least 
post-Gunby. The parties do not cite, nor have we found, a post-Gunby case from this 
court addressing this exact issue. A case from the Court of Appeals addressing a limiting 
instruction issue has reasoned that a jury could infer the defendant's intent to distribute 
the marijuana from evidence of prior sales of marijuana. State v. Pearson, No. 114,298, 
2017 WL 1367030, at *6 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). But in that case, the 
parties agreed the evidence was admissible to prove intent, and the issue before the Court 
of Appeals was whether the lack of a limiting instruction amounted to reversible error.  
 
Courts from other jurisdictions have reached the same holding as did the Court of 
Appeals, however. One example is Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 572 (Wyo. 2000).  
 
There, the defendant argued the district court erroneously admitted evidence of his 
prior drug transactions in a prosecution for possession of marijuana and possession with 
intent to deliver psilocybin mushrooms. The defendant admitted he possessed the 
marijuana and mushrooms, but his defense, announced by his counsel during opening 
statement, was that he possessed the mushrooms for personal consumption.  
 
 
12 
 
 
 
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held "[e]vidence establishing that 
Trujillo had engaged in narcotics transactions, one as a seller and another in which he 
would be 'fronted' a pound of marijuana, was . . . particularly relevant to the issue of 
intent." 2 P.3d at 572. See also United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 
1990) (when defendant asserted that he was only a user of drugs, prior evidence 
suggesting previous drug deals was admissible to prove intent in prosecution for 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine). While 
arguably Brazzle's arguments were more subtle, his attorney clearly placed in issue the 
question of whether Brazzle was guilty of "simple" possession or possession with the 
intent to distribute.  
 
Given this dispute, the prior crimes evidence could be material to the question of 
whether Brazzle intended to personally use the drugs or to distribute them. We say "could 
be" because other crimes evidence may not always be material to prove an intent to 
distribute. Here, we conclude the similarity between the prior crimes evidence and the 
evidence of the alleged crime bears on the decision of whether Brazzle intended to 
distribute the methamphetamine. State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, 157, 551 P.2d 1247 
(1976) ("The similarity of offenses is a key factor in relevancy."). See generally State v. 
Seacat, 303 Kan. 622, 629-31, 366 P.3d 208 (2016) ("reaffirm[ing] the principle that 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455[b] is an inclusionary rule" and "subject to limited exceptions, 
evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs is admissible if it proves some other material 
fact"). 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
1.2. 
Evidence's Probative Value 
 
Next, we must consider whether the evidence was probative. "Probative evidence 
is evidence that furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward proof." Preston, 294 Kan. at 
34. The Court of Appeals held that the prior sales were "highly probative" of Brazzle's 
"intent to distribute the methamphetamine he possessed rather than to possess it for 
personal use." 55 Kan. App. 2d at 280.  
 
We agree. Brazzle had sold methamphetamine to undercover detectives at the 
Royal Inn, the location Brazzle was leaving when he committed the traffic offense that 
led to the search of his car. On another occasion, Brazzle invited detectives to the Inn to 
purchase more drugs, but the detectives asked to move to another location. During one of 
these transactions, Brazzle sold 3.5 grams—the amount that creates a rebuttal 
presumption of an intent to distribute. Brazzle also provided baggies. The detective 
testified the baggies were for distributing methamphetamine. Both prior transactions were 
close in time to the crimes charged.  
 
We conclude that under these facts the prior crimes evidence was probative of 
whether Brazzle had the intent to distribute.  
 
1.3. 
Risk for Undue Prejudice Did Not Substantially Outweigh Probative Value  
 
Brazzle finally argues the unduly prejudicial effect of the evidence far outweighed 
its probative value. "[T]o demonstrate an abuse of discretion, [Brazzle] must show that 
unfair or undue prejudice arising from the admission of the evidence substantially 
outweighed its probative value." State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 53, 194 P.3d 563 (2008).  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
This court has recognized at least three types of prejudice that can arise from other 
crimes and civil wrong evidence:  
 
"'"First, a jury might well exaggerate the value of other crimes as evidence proving that, 
because the defendant has committed a similar crime before, it might properly be inferred 
that he committed this one. Secondly, the jury might conclude that the defendant deserves 
punishment because he is a general wrongdoer even if the prosecution has not established 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the prosecution at hand. Thirdly, the jury might 
conclude that because the defendant is a criminal, the evidence put in on his behalf 
should not be believed."'" Gunby, 282 Kan. at 48-49 (quoting State v. Davis, 213 Kan. 54, 
58, 515 P.2d 802 [1973]).  
 
Recently, in a sex crime case involving evidence under 60-455(d), this court 
discussed nonexclusive factors a district court should consider in evaluating probative 
value and prejudicial effect to protect due process rights: 
 
"In evaluating the probative value of evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs, 
the district court should consider, among other factors:  how clearly the prior act was 
proved; how probative the evidence is of the material fact sought to be proved; how 
seriously disputed the material fact is; and whether the government can obtain any less 
prejudicial evidence. In evaluating the possible prejudicial effect of evidence of other 
crimes or civil wrongs, the district court should consider, among other factors: the 
likelihood that such evidence will contribute to an improperly based jury verdict; the 
extent to which such evidence may distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; 
and how time consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct." State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 
526, 541, 439 P.3d 909 (2019).  
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Even more recently, in a case that did not involve a sex crime, this court 
encouraged district courts to state on the record the factors considered in weighing the 
admissibility of 60-455(b) evidence and to use the nonexclusive Boysaw factors. State v. 
Claerhout, 310 Kan. 924, 930-31, 453 P.3d 855 (2019). But Claerhout ultimately held 
that a "generalized, superficial weighing" of probative value against undue prejudice was 
not necessarily reversible error if an appellate court could find such a deficiency 
harmless. 310 Kan. 924, 930-31. But see Concannon, Evidence, Kansas Annual Survey 
of Law, 141-42 (KBA 2020) (noting Claerhout did not explain why the Boysaw factors 
applied to a case that did not include a charge of a sex offense).  
 
The district court and the Court of Appeals decided Brazzle's case before Boysaw 
and Claerhout were published. Neither court thus discussed the Boysaw analysis. Given 
that and given Claerhout's holding that superficial analysis can be deemed harmless, we 
need not dwell on whether the district court should have considered the Boysaw factors 
because any failure to do so was harmless.  
 
Even without evidence of the prior crimes, the State presented evidence from 
which the jury could deduce that Brazzle intended to distribute methamphetamine: the 
quantity of the drugs and the possession and distribution of baggies. As to the quantity, as 
previously noted, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2) creates "a rebuttable presumption of 
an intent to distribute if any person possesses . . . 3.5 grams or more of heroin or 
methamphetamine." See 2 Uelmen and Haddox, Drug Abuse and the Law Sourcebook    
§ 8:2 ("Certainly the most relevant factor in establishing an intent to distribute is the 
quantity of the drug possessed. Does it exceed what an ordinary user would possess for 
his own personal use?"). Evidence at trial established that one of the seized bags 
contained 2.98 grams of methamphetamine and the other 5.28 grams. As to the baggies, 
 
16 
 
 
 
Toolin testified the baggies found in the Crown Royal bag were, in his training and 
experience, an indication that the plan was to distribute the drugs.  
 
Yet the other crimes evidence of prior sales strengthened the inference of intent to 
distribute. Not only did Brazzle distribute the drugs to the undercover detectives, he 
provided them with unused baggies. One of these detectives echoed Toolin's opinion that 
the presence of baggies suggested the plan was to distribute the drugs.  
 
We must weigh this probative value against the potential prejudice. The evidence 
could have led to the jury exaggerating the value of the prior crime evidence as proving 
Brazzle intended to distribute methamphetamine because he had distributed it before—
once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer. Cf. State v. Everett, 296 Kan. 1039, 1047-48, 
297 P.3d 292 (2013) (prior crimes evidence "was like putting a neon sign over Everett 
that read, 'propensity to manufacture methamphetamine'"). But the jury instruction given 
by the district court mitigated this prejudice by telling the jury to consider the prior sales 
solely for proving intent. On balance, under an abuse of discretion standard, when one of 
the major issues in the case was whether Brazzle's intent was possession or distribution, 
we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.  
 
We hold that the district court did not err in admitting the prior crimes evidence 
under K.S.A. 60-455.  
 
2. 
INVITED ERROR PRECLUDES BRAZZLE'S JURY INSTRUCTION CLAIM  
 
Brazzle argues the jury instruction on possession of oxycodone was clearly 
erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that he illegally possessed oxycodone 
 
17 
 
 
 
without a prescription. The Court of Appeals held that because Brazzle advocated for the 
version of the instruction the district court gave to the jury, he could not claim error on 
appeal. Brazzle, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 281-82. Brazzle's petition for review sets out the 
same arguments he raised to the Court of Appeals and does not address the Court of 
Appeals' invited error holding.  
 
We hold Brazzle's failure to argue in his petition for review why the Court of 
Appeals erred in its invited error analysis means he has waived any argument he might 
have as to why the invited error doctrine did not apply. See Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(a)(4)(C) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 53) ("The court will not consider issues not presented 
or fairly included in the petition."); State v. Tims, 302 Kan. 536, 539-40, 355 P.3d 660 
(2015) (noting that defendant's failure to seek review over procedural and jurisdictional 
conclusions on petition for review constitutes a waiver of those issues, but considering 
appeal on question reserved). Cf. State v. Fleming, 308 Kan. 689, 694, 423 P.3d 506 
(2018) ("Before the Court of Appeals and us, Fleming presents four reasons the invited-
error doctrine should not apply."). See also State v. Sasser, 305 Kan. 1231, 1235, 391 
P.3d 698 (2017) ("Whether the invited error doctrine applies is a question of law over 
which this court has unlimited review."). 
 
3. 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS BRAZZLE'S POSSESSION OF OXYCODONE 
CONVICTION  
 
Brazzle next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction 
for possession of oxycodone. This issue arises because it would have been legal for 
Brazzle to possess the oxycodone if the drug had been properly prescribed for him. See 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5706(a); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5702(b); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 65-
 
18 
 
 
 
4116(c)(3). Brazzle argues (1) the State presented no evidence showing he did not have a 
prescription for oxycodone and (2) the only evidence establishing that the pills were 
oxycodone was Toolin's testimony about comparing a pill to an image identified as 
oxycodone on drugs.com. 
 
3.1. 
Standard of Review 
 
A portion of Brazzle's sufficiency of the evidence challenge hinges on statutory 
interpretation, a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Chavez, 310 Kan. 
421, 425, 447 P.3d 364 (2019). Once this court interprets the relevant statutes, the 
remaining question is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Brazzle's 
possession of oxycodone conviction. "'When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged 
in a criminal case, this court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to 
determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" Rosa, 304 Kan. at 432-33. 
 
3.2. 
Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Prescription  
 
The parties and the Court of Appeals discuss whether the State had to establish 
that the defendant did not have a prescription for oxycodone or whether Brazzle had to 
present an affirmative defense and prove he did. We need not delve into the complex 
statutory construction issue about whether the existence of the prescription is an 
affirmative defense. That is because, at the heart of Brazzle's argument, is his assertion 
the State failed to present sufficient evidence because it did not present direct evidence 
that he did not have a prescription for oxycodone.  
 
 
19 
 
 
 
But it is a well-established principle that appellate courts weighing sufficiency do 
not distinguish "'between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value' 
because '"[a] conviction of even the gravest offense can be based entirely on 
circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom. If an inference is a 
reasonable one, the jury has the right to make the inference."' [Citations omitted.]" State 
v. Rizal, 310 Kan. 199, 209-10, 445 P.3d 734 (2019). 
 
Here, circumstantial evidence suggests the oxycodone was part of Brazzle's illicit 
drug inventory. He stored methamphetamine, currency, most of the discovered 
oxycodone pills, and unused plastic bags in a Crown Royal bag that was inside a plastic 
bag. Another pill was found loose under the driver's floorboard. See State v. Stank, 288 
Wis. 2d 414, 439, 708 N.W.2d 43 (2005) (listing several factors supporting sufficiency of 
illegal distribution of oxycodone, including proximity to large quantities of other drugs 
and cash). While the district court did not task the jury with determining whether Brazzle 
intended to distribute the oxycodone, we hold the same factors provide circumstantial 
evidence that Brazzle's possession was illegal. The jury could infer that if the bag 
contained drugs that Brazzle intended to distribute he would not put his own prescription 
medications in the same bag.  
 
3.3. 
Sufficient Evidence Establishes the Pills Were Oxycodone  
 
Finally, Brazzle argues that Officer Toolin's testimony about comparing the 
appearance of the pills to an image of a pill identified as oxycodone on drugs.com could 
not prove the pills were oxycodone.  
 
 
20 
 
 
 
Both parties cite State. v. Northrup, 16 Kan. App. 2d 443, 825 P.2d 174 (1992), a 
case of first impression in Kansas in which the Court of Appeals held that "proof of the 
identity of a substance by circumstantial evidence may be sufficient in a drug prosecution 
where no chemical tests are admitted or available." 16 Kan. App. 2d at 449. Northrup 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession and 
sale of marijuana to an informant. At trial, the district court denied the State's attempt to 
admit the alleged marijuana into evidence. And no expert testimony or laboratory 
analysis was admitted that identified the substance as marijuana.  
 
The Northrup Court of Appeals panel reasoned that, although "scientific chemical 
analysis of a substance will provide the most reliable evidence as to the identity of that 
substance," such evidence is not the only evidence that will sustain a criminal conviction. 
The panel followed the path of many other jurisdictions that had "concluded that the 
proof of marijuana or another controlled substance may be sustained by circumstantial 
evidence." 16 Kan. App. 2d at 448-49. See also Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 113, 
702 A.2d 741 (1997) ("[T]he great weight of authority from other state and federal courts 
recognizes that circumstantial or indirect evidence may be sufficient, standing alone, to 
establish the nature of a controlled substance."); Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 968 
(Wyo. 1996) ("The prosecution may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the identity 
of the controlled substance because 'unlawful distribution of a substance, which by its 
nature is to be consumed, should not escape prosecution because the state could not seize 
a sample of the substance.'"). But see State v. Jones, 216 N.C. App. 519, 526, 718 S.E.2d 
415 (2011) ("'[S]cientifically valid chemical analysis [, rather than visual inspection,] is 
required' to identify controlled substances that are defined in terms of their chemical 
composition.").  
 
 
21 
 
 
 
At one point, Brazzle argues that a prescription drug can be identified only by its 
chemical structure; but he also recognizes Northrup held circumstantial evidence may be 
sufficient. His main argument seems to be that the circumstantial evidence presented here 
was insufficient.  
 
In Northrup, the panel discussed "a leading case in this area," United States v. 
Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976), where the Fourth Circuit set out nonexclusive 
factors to consider in determining if the State presented sufficient proof:  
 
"'Such circumstantial proof may include evidence of the physical appearance of the 
substance involved in the transaction, evidence that the substance produced the expected 
effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit drug, evidence that the 
substance was used in the same manner as the illicit drug, testimony that a high price was 
paid in cash for the substance, evidence that transactions involving the substance were 
carried on with secrecy or deviousness, and evidence that the substance was called by the 
name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in his presence. [Citations 
omitted.]'" 16 Kan. App. 2d at 453 (quoting Dolan, 544 F.2d at 1221).  
 
See also State v. Chapman, 252 Kan. 606, 618, 847 P.2d 1247 (1993) (discussing 
Northrup and the Dolan factors to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 
bind the defendant over on methamphetamine-related charges). 
 
Brazzle argues that considering these factors, the only one touched on by the State 
in his case was the appearance of the pills. The State counters that uncontroverted 
testimony established that the oxycodone was located next to a large quantity of 
methamphetamine, baggies, and currency. While not explicitly enumerated as factors in 
Northrup and Dolan, those cases made clear that the list was nonexclusive, and the 
 
22 
 
 
 
factors mentioned by the State seem relevant to proving that the pills were some type of 
controlled substance.  
 
Here, there was no objection to Toolin's testimony regarding how he identified the 
pill found on the driver's side of the car as oxycodone "[u]sing a common method of 
drugs.com," which he said law enforcement in the United States use to identify pills. And 
the State points out that there was no objection to the pills being entered into evidence. At 
trial, the State introduced both the pill found on the driver's side of the car and the other 
pills with the same appearance and markings found with the methamphetamine. 
Moreover, although not mentioned by the State, Toolin testified that he received training 
to become a police officer and to become a K9 handler. He also said that as a K9 handler, 
he has contact with controlled substances regularly.  
 
The Court of Appeals majority noted this was an issue of first impression, but that 
other courts generally address reliance on physical characteristics and a website to 
identify a pharmaceutical drug in terms of hearsay exceptions or witness qualifications. 
Brazzle, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 283. According to the majority, any defect in Toolin's 
testimony related to unpreserved evidentiary issues:  "the State's alleged failure to qualify 
him as an expert, for his lack of foundation to testify about the identity of the pills, and 
for the hearsay nature of the information upon which he relied." 55 Kan. App. 2d at 284. 
It also held Toolin's testimony, assuming it was admissible, "provided the jury with 
uncontroverted evidence that the gray pills found in the vehicle were oxycodone 
hydrochloride," which was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the gray pills were 
oxycodone hydrochloride. 55 Kan. App. 2d at 284.  
 
 
23 
 
 
 
Judge Atcheson dissented on this point and would have reversed Brazzle's 
possession of oxycodone conviction for insufficient evidence. He found Toolin's 
testimony required the jurors to "guess about how Officer Toolin managed this Internet 
magic." He reasoned that the State had not presented evidence about "what drugs.com is, 
what kind of information it offers, who sponsors it, or why it might be reliable" in 
identifying drugs or how Toolin went about identifying the drugs on the website. 55 Kan. 
App. 2d at 288 (Atcheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Atcheson 
also challenged the majority's reasoning that other courts who have considered this issue 
have generally addressed it in terms of hearsay exceptions or witness qualifications, 
arguing the cases cited did not apply. 55 Kan. App. 2d at 288-89 (Atcheson, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 
Judge Atcheson's points go to the foundation of the evidence and the weight of 
Toolin's testimony that the pills were oxycodone. The court admitted his testimony on 
this point without objection. A timely interposed objection is required before we can 
overturn a verdict because the district court improperly admitted evidence. See K.S.A. 
60-404 ("A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there 
appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make 
clear the specific ground of objection."); see State v. Ballou, 310 Kan. 591, 612-14, 
448 P.3d 479 (2019). And we must disregard Officer Toolin's testimony for us to say the 
evidence was insufficient.  
 
If Brazzle had challenged this issue in the district court, the State would have had 
a chance to answer the questions Judge Atcheson and Brazzle raise and the district court 
could have determined whether the State did enough to establish a proper foundation for 
 
24 
 
 
 
Toolin's opinion. If not, the district court could have sustained an objection to the 
testimony.  
 
We thus agree with the majority that Brazzle has tried to recast an evidentiary 
ruling as a sufficiency argument. But, given Toolin's testimony, the evidence was 
sufficient.  
 
In summary, when we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, 
we determine that a rational fact-finder could have found Brazzle guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
HENRY W. GREEN, J., assigned.1 
STEVE LEBEN, J., assigned.2 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Judge Green, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed  
to hear case No. 116,649 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 2019 
Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.  
 
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  Judge Leben, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed 
to hear case No. 116,649 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 2019 
Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. 
Nuss.