Case Title: In Re Marriage of Kouba

Citation: 257 N.W.2d 35

Docket Number: 2-58769

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1977-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
257 N.W.2d 35 (1977) In re the MARRIAGE OF George Edward KOUBA and Lyla Doris Kouba. Upon the Petition of George Edward KOUBA, Appellant, and concerning Lyla Doris KOUBA, Appellee. No. 2-58769. Supreme Court of Iowa. August 31, 1977. *36 Donald G. Juhl, of Arends & Juhl, Toledo, for appellant. Fairall, Fairall & Baker, Marshalltown, for appellee. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS, and McCORMICK, JJ. REYNOLDSON, Justice. Petitioner-husband has appealed from a dissolution decree awarding respondent-wife monthly alimony to be paid by "petitioner, or his heirs, fiduciaries, or assigns if he dies," until "death or remarriage of respondent." Petitioner acknowledges the issue is one of law. The facts are undisputed. These parties were married December 13, 1947. Six children were born of the marriage. Four are now adults. Trial court's decree incorporated the parties' stipulation dividing a small amount of property and custody of the minor children. Respondent retained custody of the youngest daughter, born August 10, 1969. The other minor daughter, born July 30, 1959, resided with petitioner following separation of the parties. He retained custody of this child. Trial court's uncontested fact-findings furnish insight into the provisions of its alimony award: The following provisions of the dissolution decree relate to alimony: Appealing, petitioner asserts trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering his "heirs, fiduciaries, or assigns" to pay alimony after his death because they were neither parties to the action nor served process to bring them within the court's jurisdiction. He contends we should overrule In re Estate of Roberts, 257 Iowa 1, 131 N.W.2d 458 (1964), and hold a trial court has no authority to order alimony to continue beyond the husband's death without his stipulated consent. I. Petitioner argues trial court could not enter a binding judgment against his "heirs, fiduciaries, or assigns" because they were not served with notice in this dissolution proceeding. It is a basic principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that ordinarily one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he or she is neither designated as a party nor made a party by service of process. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41, 61 S. Ct. 115, 117, 85 L. Ed. 22, 26 (1940); Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 234 Iowa 1241, 1244, 15 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1944). Respondent makes no attempt to argue the now-unidentifiable "heirs, fiduciaries, or assigns" would be in privity with petitioner and therefore bound by the decree under the doctrine of res judicata. See Mauer v. Rohde, et al., 257 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1977), filed today; National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 260 Iowa 163, 171, 147 N.W.2d 839, 844 (1967); A. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion at V-123 (1969). In any event, we are not required to resolve that question; it is obvious trial court used those words to indicate the alimony award would be a charge on petitioner's estate. II. We thus reach the ultimate issue, whether Roberts, supra, 257 Iowa 1, 131 N.W.2d 458, should be overruled by holding as a matter of law a trial court is without power to order continuation of alimony beyond the death of the obligor, unless he or she consents. The rationale in Roberts starts with the prevailing rule that courts do have such power if a statute so provides. 24 Am. Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 643, at 764-765 (1966). The Roberts court, interpreting § 598.14, The Code, 1962, held its broad language supplied the necessary authority: "§ 598.14 Alimonycustody of children changes. Six years after Roberts, the 63rd General Assembly repealed and overhauled our code chapter on divorce and annulment (Ch. 1266, Acts 63rd G.A.1970), but nonetheless reenacted the above statute in substantially the same language: "§ 598.21 Alimonycustody of children changes. The Code, 1977. There is no significant statutory change which would justify abandonment of the Roberts decision or signal the legislature's nonacquiescence in our interpretation of the predecessor statute. To the contrary, in such circumstances our law of statutory construction applies a presumption the legislature intended the former construction to continue. See Terpstra v. Schinkel, 235 Iowa 547, 551-552, 17 N.W.2d 106, 109 (1944); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Burbank, 209 Iowa 199, 206, 216 N.W. 742, 745 (1927); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.09, at 256-261 (Sands Ed. 1973). Petitioner cites numerous decisions since Roberts in which we have limited or approved limitation of alimony payments to the life of the obligor. In re Marriage of Rose, 228 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa 1975); In re Marriage of Ringus, 226 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Iowa 1975); In re Marriage of Dally, 222 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 1974); In re Marriage of Dowie, 215 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Iowa 1974); In re Marriage of Carney, 206 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Iowa 1973); In re Marriage of Jennerjohn, 203 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Iowa 1972); Hutcheson v. Hutcheson, 197 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Iowa 1972); Sherrard v. Sherrard, 175 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Iowa 1970). He argues these cases demonstrate we have overruled Roberts, sub silentio. Petitioner's thesis overlooks In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1974). We there provided alimony for a wife during a fixed period of time. Alimony payments were to be made until the youngest child was graduated from high school to permit the wife to continue as a full-time mother, and for a year and one-half thereafter to permit her to obtain a master's degree or otherwise rehabilitate her nursing career, interrupted by sixteen and one-half years as a homemaker and mother. We provided, "Payments shall not terminate on respondent's [husband's] death but in that event shall be a charge on his estate." The decisions petitioner relies on illustrate nothing more than an alimony payment limitation which will be applied in most situations. The very nature of marriage, dissolution, and attendant circumstances defies imposition of precise mathematical formulae and inflexible rules. See Behrle v. Behrle, 228 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1975). There is no language in the opinions petitioner cites which implies a trial court is without power to make alimony a charge on an obligor's estate. Petitioner offers a number of policy considerations for rejecting the Roberts holding. Respondent counters with policy reasons for maintaining flexibility in this regard. Many are relevant factors which might be considered by the legislature in future statutory changes, or by the court in fixing duration of alimony payments. None are controlling here in view of the narrow jurisdictional issue petitioner selected for this appeal. III. There is submitted with this appeal respondent's application for allowance of attorney fees on appeal. Counsel's certificate of services includes $1240 for time spent and $42 for costs of printing briefs. As costs are taxed to petitioner, printing expense will be reimbursed. In making this determination we consider petitioner's immediate financial resources, other obligations imposed upon him, and the fact we are not fixing the total fee, only the amount petitioner should pay. Beeh, supra, 214 N.W.2d at 176. *39 We hold petitioner shall pay $500 toward respondent's attorney fees, to be taxed as part of the costs. We modify the decree entered below by substituting for the words "or his heirs, fiduciaries, or assigns" the words "or his estate in the event he dies before respondent's remarriage or death," in the last above-quoted paragraph from the decree. As modified, trial court's decree is affirmed. MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.