Case Title: Lawlor v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 131972

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA: 
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gityo/~(Nl, Friday 
tk 31st 
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October, 2014. 
?resent: 
All 
Justices 
Mark 
c Lawlor, 
Petitioner, 
against 
Record No. 131972 
Keith W. Davis, Warden, Sussex I 
State Prison, 
Respondent. 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed December 16, 2013, and the respondent's motion to dismiss, 
the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be 
anted 
that the wr 
should not issue. 
Mark Eric Lawlor was convicted in the 
rcuit Court of Fairfax 
County of capital murder in 
commission of, or subsequent to, 
r 
or attempted rape, Code § 18.2-31(5), and capital murder 
the commission of abduction with 
ent to defile, Code § 18.2­
31(1), and was sentenced to 
ath on each conviction. 
This Court 
affirmed Lawlor's convictions 
upheld his sentences of de 
in 
Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 738 S.E.2d 847, cert. den 
U.S. 
, 134 S. Ct. 427 (2013). 
The victim, Genevieve Or 
,was found on the floor of the 
living area of her studio apartment. 
door to Orange's 
apartment was unlocked and there were no signs of forced entry. 
Orange had been struck at least 47 t 
s with one or more blunt 
objects. 
Some of Orange's wounds were consistent with having been 
struck wi 
a frying 
Others were consistent with having 
en 
struck 
th a hammer. 
eauent 
cal examinat 
established 
that 
had aspirated blood and sustained defensive wounds to 
her hands 
arms, 
eating she 
been alive 
conscious 
during some part of the beating. 
's body lay near her couch, which was saturated with 
blood. 
was naked from the waist down, her bra and t-shirt had 
been pushed up over her breasts, and semen was smeared on her 
abdomen 
right thigh. 
Her soi 
bloodi 
sand 
underpants had been f 
to the floor nearby. 
A 
metal 
was found near Orange's body. 
Its wooden handle 
broken off and 
was found 
the kitchen sink, near a bent and bloody metal frying 
pan. 
Lawlor resided in Orange's apartment building. 
He also worked 
there as a leasing consultant and had access to ke 
to each 
apartment. 
Testing of 
semen on Orange's abdomen and thigh 
showed DNA consistent 
th Lawlor's DNA. 
At trial, Lawlor's 
admitted 
or had kill 
Orange, but contested the 
allegations of premeditation, rape 
abduction. 
CLAIMS (I), (II) 
& (V) 
In claims (I) and (II), Lawlor alleges the Commonwealth failed 
to disclose exculpatory information as required by Brady v. 
Ma 
, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and 
sented false testimony or 
atto 
~~L......... __  
v. Illinois 
360
allowed it to go uncorrected in violation of 
U.S. 264 (1959), and Gi lio v. Unit 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
As 
Court has stated previously: 
[], the United States 
reme Court held that 
"the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused upon reauest violates due process where the 
2  
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespect 
of the good 
ith or bad faith of the 
secution." 
[373 U.S.] at 87. 
Exculpatory e 
dence is material if there is a rea 
Ie 
probability that the outcome of the 
oceeding would have been 
different 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense. 
"A 
reasonable 
is one which is sufficient to 
in the outcome of 
proceeding. 
Muhammad v. Warden, 274 Va. 3, 4, 646 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2007) 
(citations 
tted) . 
Furthermore, 
s Court has previously held 
that, "to find that a violation of Napue occurred 
. , we must 
dete 
ne first t 
the testimony [at issue] was false, second 
that the 
secution knew of the 
lsity, and finally that 
falsity af 
the jury's judgment." 
Tele 
z v. Commonwealth, 
273 Va. 458, 4 
643 S.E.2d 708, 729 (2007). 
In a portion of claims (I) 
(II), Lawlor alleges Detective 
John Tuller lied in his curriculum v 
which 
Commonwealth 
submitted to t 
defense pursuant to 
§ 19.2-264.3:4, with its 
notice of intent to introduce e 
rt testimony. 
The notice named 
Tuller as the Commonwealth's 
rt in bloodstain pattern 
interpretation. 
In his curriculum vitae, Tuller stated he had 
testified as an expert in b 
ation in six 
cases. 
However, 
two of the cases Tuller 
ified, 
testified only as a 
ct witness. 
Tuller further stated 
was a 
current member of the International Association of Bloodstain 
Pattern Analysts (IABPA). 
However, Tuller's membersh 
with the 
IABPA had expired. 
Tuller cIa 
d he attended a crime scene 
investigation seminar at the Miami Metro-Dade Police Training 
Institute. 
However, the Mi 
Metro-
Police 
rtment has no 
tain 
tern inte 
3  
record of his attendance. 
Finally, Tuller r 
sented t 
in 2003 
he attended the 3loodstain Users Group S 
nar at the Vi 
nia 
Jepartment of Forensic Science (DFS). 
However, DFS 
ed ever 
prese~t 
such a s 
nar. 
The Court rejects these portions of cla 
(I) and (II). 
The 
reco 
, including the affidavits of Lawlor's counsel and the 
manuscript record, demonstrates that the alleged inconsistencies in 
Tuller's curriculum 
tae were known or available to Lawlor at the 
time of his trial. 
Thus, the Court holds that these portions of 
claims (I) and (II) are barred because t 
se non-juri 
cti 
issues could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, 
t 
are not cognizable in a petition 
r a writ of habeas corpus. 
v. Parr 
, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
In another portion of claims (I) 
(II), Lawlor contends 
Tuller lied in 
s testimony to 
trial court when questioned 
about his 
rt qualifications. 
At trial, Tuller repeated his 
assertion he had testified as an expert in bloodstain 
ern 
interpretation in six cases. 
ler also stated all six cases were 
homi 
des, and 
the defendant in each case was convicted. 
However, Tuller testified as an expert in only four cases. 
Additionally, according to Tuller's curriculum vitae, one of the 
cases in which 
had testi 
ed as an expert invol 
a malicious 
wounding and not a homicide. 
Finally, of the six cases Tuller 
identified in his curriculum 
tae, one was Lawlor's 
liminary 
hearing, which had not, at the time of Tuller's testimony, resulted 
in a conviction. 
4  
The Court rejects t 
se portions of claims (I) and (II). 
Because the alleged inconsistencies in Tuller's representation of 
his qualifications were known or available to Lawlor at the t 
of 
his tr 1, the Court hol 
that these 
ions of claims (I) and 
(I ) are barred. 
These non-juri 
ctional issues could have been 
raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, are not cognizable 
in a 
ition 
r a writ of habeas corpus. 
Sla 
215 Va. at 29, 
205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In cla 
(V), Lawlor argues he was denied the effect 
assistance of counsel 
cause counsel failed to investigate and 
confront Detective Tuller's representations rega 
ng his 
lifications to testify as an 
rt. 
Lawlor contends 
thad 
counsel challenged Tuller's 
rt qualifications, there is a 
reasonable probability that t 
court would have sustained Lawlor's 
ection to Tuller's certification as an expert witness, that his 
testimony would have been 
luded, and 
he would not have 
been convicted of c 
tal murder. 
Lawlor argues that had Tuller 
not testified, 
Commonwealth would have had no evidentiary basis 
to argue 
or abducted Orange by moving her from the couch to the 
floor. 
Lawlor further contends that without Tuller's testimony, 
prosecutors would not have been able to rely on his opinions to 
argue Lawlor was capable of preme 
tation. 
Lawlor contends the 
Commonwealth relied on Tuller's opinion that Lawlor had tried to 
clean up the crime scene after the murder to demonstrate 
premeditation. 
Lawlor further contends the Commonweal 
relied on 
Tuller's expert opinion to show the victim was in a vulne 
e 
position when she was attac 
lly, Lawlor contends that had 
Tuller been permitted to testi 
as an expert 
bloodstain pattern 
5  
interpretation despite counsel's objections, counsel could have 
used 
s false statements to impeach h 
before the jury. 
The Court hoI 
that cIa 
(V) fails to satis 
the prej 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Wa 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (:984). 
The reco 
,including Tuller's affidavit 
and attached exh 
ts and the affidavit of Lawlor's trial counsel, 
demonstrates that 
ler's curriculum vitae conta 
multiple 
errors. 
Of t 
six cases in which Tuller claimed to have testifi 
as an expert in bloodstain 
tern 
erpretation, he had testified 
as an expert in only four. 
Tuller was not a current member of the 
IABPA, his membership having 
red years before Lawlor's trial. 
Tuller attended the Miami-Dade Police Training Institute's Crime 
Scene Investigat 
Seminar 
January 2003, not January 2002, as 
Tuller stated. 
The Bloodstain Users Group Seminar Tuller attended 
in 2003 was not a 40 
r course and was not presented by DFS, as 
Tuller's curri 
vitae stated. 
Although 
or's counsel was 
aware of at least one of the 
screpancies in Tuller's curriculum 
tae before trial, counsel fail 
to pursue an ade 
e 
investigation or even ask Tuller about it dur 
their pretrial 
interview with 
In addition, Tuller's testimony that he had 
testifi 
as an e 
rt in blo 
tain pattern interpretation 
six 
cases and that all six 
been 
r cases and had resulted in 
convictions was clearly incorrect 
inconsistent with Tuller's 
curriculum vitae. 
Counsel, however, failed to 
stion Tuller 
about the 
screpancies. 
Assuming, without 
iding, that these inaccuracies would have 
precl 
Tuller from testifying as an expert or, had he been 
permitted to testify as an 
rt, would have impeached his 
6  
expertise, Lawlor cannot show a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome. 
Tuller's expert testimony was not cruci 
to 
prove Law 
r abducted Orange. 
The Commonwealth was not required to 
sent evidence that Lawlor moved Orange from the couch to 
floor to prove he abducted her. 
H[T]he physical detention of a 
person, with the intent to deprive him of his personal liberty, by 
rce, intimidation, or deception, without any asportat 
of the 
ctim from one place to another, is sufficient." 
Scott v. 
COIillllonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526, 323 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1984). 
The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates there was 
overwhelming evidence to prove Lawlor us 
force to physically 
detain Orange. 
Dr. Constance DiAngelo, an Assistant Chief Medical 
Examiner and forensic pathologist, testified Orange sustained 
"severe, heavy trauma" when she was stuck in the 
ad and face over 
thirty times with a blunt object. 
Some of the blows left divots in 
Orange's skull, which was fractured so badly that it opened as if 
it were hinged. 
Dr. DiAngelo testified Orange sustained at least 
seventeen additional 
fensive wounds to her hands and arms. 
Combined with the blood in 
r lungs, this indicated Orange was 
al 
for at least 
rt of 
attack. 
The jury did not require 
Tuller's expert opinion to conclude that Lawlor detained Orange by 
physical force. 
In addition, the jury could reasonably infer, without the 
benefit of Tuller's expert testimony, that Lawlor moved Orange from 
the couch to the floor. 
Dr. DiAngelo testifi 
that the trauma to 
Orange's head occurred while she was on the couch. 
Orange was 
discovered lying on the floor, flat on her back, perpendicu 
r to 
the couch, with her feet near the end of the couch where the pool 
7 
of blood from her head was. 
The jury could reasonably infer from 
this evidence that Orange did not 
llingly move from the couch to 
the floor. 
Further, DiAngelo's testimo 
and the Commonwealth's 
photographs of the blood-soaked couch left no reasonable doubt that 
Orange was attacked there. 
Finally, the Commonwealth did not rely 
on Tuller's expert testimony to argue premeditation. 
Rather, to 
show premeditation, the Commonwealth relied on the location, force 
and number of 
ows to Orange; evidence of Lawlor's rational, 
competent behavior while purchasing and consuming drugs with 
Michael Johnson, who had 
cilitated Lawlor's purchase of drugs; 
Lawlor's ability to plan, as evi 
ed by his obtaining the 
victim's 
ys, traveling to her apartment, and using a back exit to 
avoid detection a 
r the murder; the obvious evidence of his 
ineffectual attempts to clean up the crime scene by placing the 
bloody pan and broken handle in the kitchen; 
s ev 
disposal 
of 
hammer and his 
oody clothes; and 
s lying about his 
knowledge of the crime. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the errors 
alleged 
claim (V), the result of the proceeding would have been 
dif 
rent. 
CLAIM (III) 
In claim (III) (A), Lawlor contends he was denied the right to 
plead guilty and to have his sentence determined by a jury. 
Lawlor 
contends that under Code § 19.2 257, to plead guilty a defendant 
must waive his right to have a jury determine his sentence. 
Lawlor 
argues that when applied to a defendant charged with a capital 
offense, Code § 19.2-257 violates the Sixth Amendment under 
8  
decisions in Blakel 
v. Washi 
542 u. S. 296 (2004), Ri 
v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and 
rendi v. New Jerse 
530 U.S. 
466 (2000), because it requires the judge to determine the 
appropriate sentence on the basis of facts not "reflected in the 
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 
Blakel 
542 U.S. at 
303-04. 
The Court holds that claim (III) (A) is barred because this 
non-juri 
ct 
1 issue could have been raised at trial and on 
direct appeal and, thus, is not 
izable in a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
Sl 
215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim (I I I) (B), Lawlor contends he was 
ed the ef 
i ve 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to protect his right 
to plead guilty and to have 
aggravati 
factors of vileness and 
future dangerousness, which must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt before a sentence of death may be imposed, 
termined by a 
jury. 
Lawlor contends counsel should have argued 
t Code § 19.2­
257 violates the Sixth Amendment because it requires the 
to
J 
determine the appropriate sentence on the basis of facts not 
"reflect 
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 
Blakel , 542 U.S. at 303-04. 
The Court holds that cIa 
(III) (B) fails to satisfy 
prejudice prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. 
Under Code § 19.2-264.4, the sentencing 
ury must consider, among 
other things, "the circumstances surrounding the offense." 
It is 
the ju 
's 
y to consider all the evidence, both favorable and 
unfavorable, 
fore fixing punishment. 
St 
r v. Commonwealth, 
220 Va. 260, 275 76, 257 S.E.2d 808, 819 (1979). 
Thus, even if 
Lawlor had been permitt 
to 
ad 
Ity and have his sentence 
9  
ermined by a jury, the sentencing jury necessarily would have 
had access to the evidence presented in the guilt phase of Lawlor's 
trial, including the evidence adduced at trial of the brutal nature 
of Lawlor's cr 
s. 
n addition, although Lawlor argues a guilty 
ea would have 
rmitted him to show remorse and accept 
respons 
ility in front of the jury, the record, including the 
trial transcr 
, demonstrates that counsel effect 
ly proceeded 
as if Lawlor had entered a guilty plea. 
From opening statement 
through the 
of trial, Lawlor's trial counsel conceded Lawlor 
had murdered Orange. 
The record further est 
ishes that the 
crimes were extremely brutal, t 
t t 
victim suffer 
significantly, that immediately a 
r the murder Lawlor insisted 
had no knowledge of the crimes and attempted to cast su 
icion on 
his neighbor, and t 
a 
er his DNA was discovered on the victim, 
Lawlor insisted he was being framed. 
Under the circumstances, 
Lawlor cannot show that had he been permitted to plead guilty and 
have his sentence 
ermined by a jury, the ju 
would have reached 
a different outcome. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the errors alleged 
in claim (III) (8), the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (IV) 
In cIa 
(IV) (A) 
a port 
of claim (IV) (C), Lawlor 
contends he was denied a fair trial because t 
prosecution used 
four of its f 
peremptory strikes to remove all persons of 
Hispanic and Pacific-Island ethnicity from the jury venire and the 
trial court failed to ensure those strikes were not based upon the 
ethnicity of 
jurors. 
10  
The Court holds that claim (IV) (A) and this portion of claim 
( V) (C) are 
rred because these non-jurisdictional issues could 
have been raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, are not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Sla 
Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim (IV) (B) and another 
rtion of claim (IV) (C), Lawlor 
contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel failed to object to the Co~monwealthls removal of all 
rsons of Hispanic and Pacific-Island ethnicity from the jury 
venire. 
The Co~monwealth used peremptory strikes to remove G 
Alvarez, Fredericka Wall, Vene 
a Fernandez, and Dave Lunasco from 
the venire of twenty-four qualif 
jurors. 
Lawlor all 
s that 
Alvarez, Wall, and Fernandez were 
only members of the panel of 
Hispanic ethnicity, and that Lunasco was the only person of 
Paci 
c-Island ethni 
ty. 
Lawlor contends that the removal of all 
spanic and Pacific-Island jurors was prima facie evidence of 
discrimination, and that counsel unreasonably f 
led to object to 
their exclusion. 
The Court holds that claim (IV) (B) and this portion of claim 
(IV) (C) satisfy neither the performance nor t 
prejudice prong of 
the two 
rt test enunci 
in Strickland. 
The principles 
applicable to 
11 
s of racial motivation for the exercise of 
remptory  strikes on a jury panel in ially were set out by the 
ted States Supreme Court in 
son v. Kentuc 
476 U.S. 79 
(1986), and s 
equently have been refined in decisions of this 
Court. 
11  
215 
As the Court 
s stated previously: 
When a defendant makes a Batson challen 
to the 
use of a peremptory strike, he must show that the 
individual "is a member of a cognizable racial group," 
and "make a prima facie showing that the 
remptory 
strike was made on racial grounds." 
Mere exclusion of 
members of a particular race by usi 
peremptory strikes 
"does not 
self establish such a pr 
facie case under 
Batson." 
To establish a prima fa 
e case, the defendant 
must also "identify facts and circumstances that raise an 
inference that potential jurors were excluded based on 
their race." 
r v. Commonwealth 
271 Va. 362, 407, 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 
(2006) (internal citations omit 
) {citing Yarbr
------="--­
v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 388, 394, 551 S.E.2d 306, 309 (2001) (quoting 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96), and Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 
436, 587 S.E.2d 532, 542 (2003)). 
Once a 
fendant makes a pr 
facie case, the burden 
ifts 
to the Co~~onwealth "to produce race-neutral explanations for 
striking 
juror." 
, 271 Va. at 407, 626 S.E.2d at 412 
---"-­
(quot 
Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587 S.E.2d at 542). 
The 
defendant can then argue the Commonwealth's 
lanations were a 
pretext for unconstitutional discr 
nation. 
Id. 
Lawlor has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination that counsel should have recognized and 
llenged, and that the trial court would have accepted. 
though 
Lawlor asserts that the Commonwealth's perempto 
strikes resulted 
i~ 
exclusion of all 
rsons of Hispanic and Pacific-Island 
ethnicity from the jury, he proffers no basis for his assertio~ 
Lhat the strikes were racially motivated other than observi 
that 
four of the five jurors struck by 
Commonwealth were either of 
12 
Hispanic or Pacif 
Island ethnicity. 
Lawlor does not assert that 
the jurors the Commonwealth chose to strike were members of the 
same race as either Lawlor or the victim, or identify any other 
"'facts and 
rcumstances that raise an inference that potential 
jurors were excluded based on their race. , .. 
Jun 
r 
271 Va. at 
.::...:::::.:.:..:~= 
407, 626 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting Ya 
262 Va. at 394, 551 
-'=-=':"=":'~-"--=---L:"::' 
S.E.2d at 309). 
~hus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was 
ficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding wou 
have been different. 
C:i.,AIM (VI) 
In a portion of claim (VI), Law 
contends 
was denied the 
ffective assistance of counsel because counsel 
il 
to ask Dr. 
W. 
exander Morton, Jr., a psychopharmacologist appointed by the 
trial court to assist Lawlor, to opine whether consumption of "the 
better part of a case of beer and at least two to three eight-balls 
of crack cocaine" would render a person incapable of 
1 
ration 
and premeditation. 
Lawlor contends t 
when the Commonwea 
object 
to s 
testimony and the trial court ruled it was 
inadmiss 
le, trial counsel unreasonably agreed not to present such 
evidence without first arguing it was admissible. 
In support of 
is claim, Lawlor has provided an affidavit from Morton in which 
he states his opinion, to a reasonable degree of scientific 
~ The Court rejects Lawlor's assertion that he is not required to 
show prejudice under Strickland. 
Counsel's failure to object to 
the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes is not a "structural error." 
See Jackson v. Warden, 271 Va. 434, 436, 627 S.E.2d 776, 781 
(2006) . 
13 
certainty, that Lawlor would not have been able to form the 
necessary intent to premeditate after ingesti 
that quantity of 
alcohol and cocaine. 
Court holds that this 
ion of claim (VI) satisfies 
neither the performance nor the prejudice prong of t 
two-part 
test enunciated in Strickla 
The proffered expert opinion, that 
Lawlor did not premeditate at 
time of the killing, was properly 
ruled inadmissible because it went to the "precise or ult 
fact 
issue" in the case and "to have admitted the opinion would have 
invaded the province of the jury." 
Wa 
v. Commonwealth 
219 Va. 
683, 696, 251 S.E.2d 202, 210 (1979) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitt 
). 
In 
tion, the record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that on the eveni 
before the murder, Lawlor and 
Michae 
Johnson purchas 
three "eight-balls," or approximate 
ten 
and a half grams, of coca 
and that together they consumed 
between ei 
and nine grams. 
Johnson testifi 
he and Lawlor 
consumed all of the first and second "ei 
-ball," of which Johnson 
had consumed about two grams. 
Of the third eight-ball, of whi 
son and Lawlor consumed half, Johnson testified Lawlor had 
consumed about a gram of the cocaine and that he had consumed less 
than one gram. 
Johnson testifi 
he and Lawlor 
been 
king 
beer, but was unable to say how much beer Lawlor had actually 
consumed. 
Thus, the evidence established that Lawlor 
consumed 
approximately six grams of cocaine and an unknown quantity of beer. 
Therefore, the proffered opinion, which assumed Lawlor consumed 
"the better part of a case of beer" 
between seven and ten 
of cocaine, was not based on facts in 
dence and would not have 
14  
been admissible. 
See S 
on v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 565-66, 
318 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1984) 
Further, the record, including the trial transcr 
demonstrates that Morton testified as to the hypothetical effect 
that consumption of large quantities of cocaine and alcohol would 
have on a 
son in Lawlor's position. 
Morton testified that 
consumi 
alcohol and cocaine toget 
r negat 
ly impacts an 
individual's ability to think rationally and make 
isions and 
that the consumption of alar 
amount of alcohol and cocaine could 
cause 
olent behavior and cause an individual to become 
"unpredictable, impulsive, and unstable." 
Morton 
that a 
rson consuming three 
a half grams of cocaine over the course 
of an eight hour period would expe 
ence profound psychiatric 
symptoms, including inability to think clearly, paranoia, and 
aggression, and these symptoms would increase at higher doses, 
though the ef 
s would vary depending on the individual. 
Thus, 
Lawlor has fail 
to demonstrate that counsel's 
rformance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proce 
ng would have 
been different. 
In another portion of cia 
(VI), Lawlor contends he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel fai 
to provide Morton with an opportunity to interview Lawlor before 
trial. 
Lawlor contends that had Morton interviewed him, Morton 
would have been able to opine that Lawlor's 
ior drug use and 
addiction affected his reaction to the drugs he consumed in the 
hours before the murder and "further diminished his ability to 
premeditate and 
1 
rate." 
Lawlor contends this opinion would 
15  
have opened the door to other evidence of his history of drug use 
and addiction, which the trial court had found to be inadmissible 
in the guilt phase of the trial. 
The Court holds that this portion of cIa 
(VI) satisfies 
neither the performance nor the prejudice prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland. 
Morton's opinion about Lawlor's 
suscept ility to the effects of the drugs he consumed before 
murder would not have opened the door to evidence of his history of 
drug use and addiction. 
An expert may not relate hearsay ev 
to the jury when providing his opinion testimony. 
Wr 
v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 197, 427 S.E.2d 379, 392 (1993), vacated 
on other 
rounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994); see also Buc~anan v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 416, 384 S.E.2d 757, 773 (1989). 
Lawlor 
fa Is to proffer any 
dence Morton could have gleaned from an 
interview with him that would have been admissible. 
T~us, Lawlor 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was defi 
ent 
or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would ~ave been 
fferent. 
CLAIMS (VII) & (VIII) 
In claim (VIII) (A), Lawlor contends the jury instructions were 
defective because t~ey fail 
to define specific intent, instructed 
the jury they could infer Lawlor's intent from the natural and 
probable consequences of his acts, and fai 
to distinguish 
between premeditated 
rst degree murder and first degree murder in 
the commission of rape or abduction. 
The Court holds that claim (VIII) (A) is barred because 
is 
non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on 
16  
direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
Sla 
on, 215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In a 
rtion of claim (VIII) (B), Lawlor contends 
was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel fail 
to 
request instructions de 
ning specific intent, stating that 
specific 
ent differs from general intent, and explaining the 
difference between 
two. 
Lawlor contends that without such 
instructions, jurors would not have understood that they had to 
find that Lawlor had the specific intent to kill Orange, and 
it was not sufficient to find he had the general intent to do an 
act that resulted in her death, before convicting him of capital 
murder or premeditated first degree murder. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VIII) (B) does not 
satis 
the performance prong of 
two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland. 
Generally, courts now disfavor instructing jurors on 
specific versus general intent and the difference between the two. 
See 
ed States v. Perez 
43 F.3d 1131, 1138 (7th 
r. 
1994) (not 
instructions distinguishing between 
cific 
general intent are not as helpful to juries as those stating 
"pre 
se mental state required for the particular cr 
"); Unit 
=s~t=a~t~e=s__
v~.-=~~=l=i~n, 26 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting 
instructing jury in terms of specific intent 
s been disfavored 
because of t 
confusing and ambiguous nature of such 
instructions); see also Qnited States v~ Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1059 
(5th Cir. 1996) (no error in failing to give instruction defining 
specific intent where t 
al court instruct 
jury on element of 
intent and clearly defined the term "knowingly"); cf. Dixon v. 
United States, 548 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (recogniz 
g lithe movement away 
17  
from the traditional dichotomy of general versus specific intent 
and toward a more specifically defined hierarchy of culpable mental 
states") . 
Here, the record, including the trial transcript and the jury 
instructions, demonstrates the jury was instructed that to find 
Lawlor guilty of capital or premeditated first degree murder, they 
had to find the killing was 
Ilful, deliberate, and premeditated. 
The jury was further instructed: 
will 
1, deliberate, and premeditated means a specific 
intent to kill adopted at some time before the killing 
but which need not exist for any particular length of 
time. 
An intent to kill may be formed only a moment 
before the fatal act is committed, provided the accused 
has time to think and did intend to 
11. 
This instruction properly instructed the jury about the requisite 
intent necessary to support a finding of premeditated murder. 
Any 
additional definition of the term specific intent, which was itself 
used to define "willful, deliberate, and premeditat 
, .. would have 
been redundant and potentially confusing, and counsel was not 
deficient for failing to make a contrary argument. 
Thus, .wawlor 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
rformance was deficient. 
In another portion of claim (VIII) (B), Lawlor contends he was 
denied the ef 
ive assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to adequately object to a jury 
struction that instructed the jury 
they could infer Lawlor's intent from the natural and probable 
consequences of 
s acts. 
Lawlor contends that although this 
instruction has been approved by this Court, it was improper in 
this case because it suggested the jury could determine it was 
Lawlor's purpose to kill Orange because the natural and probable 
18  
consequence of his conduct was to cause her death. 
Lawlor argues 
this blurs the distinction between specific intent to kill and 
general intent to do an act which, while not intended to do so, 
results in death. 
The Court holds that this portion of cIa 
(VI I I) (B) does not 
satis 
the performance prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland. 
7he natural and probable consequence of striking 
Orange 47 times with a blunt object, principally in the head, was 
her death. 
7he instruction properly 
rmitted, but did not 
require, t 
jury to in 
r from the fact that when Lawlor struck 
her 47 times with a blunt object, he intended to kill her. 
Counsel 
was not ineffective for 
iling to object to this instruction. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient. 
In another portion of claim (VIII) (B) and a portion of claim 
(VII), Lawlor contends he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel because counsel failed to ask that the instructions on 
first degree murder use the terms "premeditated first degree 
murder" and "felony first degree murder" to dif 
rentiate between 
premeditated first degree murder and first degree murder in the 
commission of rape, attempted rape, or abduction. 
Lawlor contends 
the instructions given were confusing because they used the term 
"first 
murder" to describe two different theories under 
which Lawlor could be convicted of 
rst degree murder. 
Lawlor 
argues the lack of a descriptive label in the instructions could 
have confused the jury because under Virginia law, voluntary 
intoxication is a defense only to premeditated murder, and not to 
felony first degree murder. 
He further argues that the lack of a 
19  
descript 
label could also have confused the jury because in 
closing argument counsel conceded Lawlor was guilty of first degree 
murder. 
Although counsel argued Lawlor was incapable of 
premeditation and that the murder occurred during an altercation, 
the 
ury could have been confused and assumed couns 
was conceding 
premeditation because the instruction 
not clearly label 
different theories of first degree murder. 
The Court holds that these portions of claims (VI I I) (B) and 
(VII) do not satisfy the performance prong of the two-part test 
enunci 
in Strickland. 
The record, incl 
ng the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that 
jurors were instruct 
The defendant is charged with the cr 
of capital 
murder in the commission of or subsequent to 
or 
attempted rape. 
The Commonwealth must 
beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the following elements of that 
cr 
(1)  That the defendant 
11 
Genevieve 
and 
(2 ) That the killing was will 
, del 
rate, 
and premeditated; and 
(3 ) That the killing was of a 
rson in the 
commission of, or subsequent to rape or 
attempted rape. 
If you 
nd the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the crime 
as charged, then you shall find the 
fendant guilty 
capital murder in the commission of or subsequent to rape 
or attempted rape and shall not fix the punishment until 
your verdict has been returned and further evidence is 
heard by you. 
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth 
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant killed 
Genevieve Orange and that the killing occurred in the 
20  
co~mission of, or subsequent to rape or attempted rape, 
bJt that the killing was not willful, deliberate and 
premeditated, then you shall find the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder and shall not fix the punishment 
until your verdict has been returned and further evidence 
has been heard by you. 
If you find from the 
dence that the Commonwealth 
has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing 
occurred in the commission of, or subsequent to rape or 
attempted 
but the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
(1) 
That the defendant killed Genevieve 
Orange; and 
(2 ) 
That the killing was willful, del 
rate, 
and premeditated; and 
(3 ) 
That the killing was malicious, 
then you shall find the defendant guilty of first degree 
mJrder and shall not fix the punishment until your 
verdict has been returned and further evidence has been 
heard by you. 
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth 
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
killed Genevieve Orange and that the killing was 
malicious but that the Commonwealth has not proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the killing was willful, 
deliberate and premeditated and was not in the commission 
of, or subsequent to rape or attempted rape, then you 
shall find the defendant guilty of second degree murder 
but shall not fix the punishment until your verdict has 
been returned and further evidence is heard by you. 
If you find that the Co~~onwealth has failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the crimes listed 
above, then you 
11 find the defendant not guilty. 
The =ury received a nearly identical instruction on the charge 
of capital murder in 
commission of abduction with intent to 
21  
defile. 
These instructions were not confusing. 
They clearly 
delineated the distinctions between capital murder; premeditated 
first degree murder; first degree murder in the commission of a 
rape, attempted rape or abduction; and second degree murder. 
Counsel was not ineffective for 
iling to argue to the contrary. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient. 
In another portion of claim (VII), Lawlor contends he was 
denied the ef 
ctive assistance of counsel because counsel 
iled 
to realize, until the end of the guilt phase of the trial, that 
Lawlor cou 
be convicted of first de 
murder even if the jury 
found he was incapable of premeditation, if the jury found he 
killed Orange in the commission of rape or abduction. 
Lawlor 
argues that because counsel failed to understand the applicable 
law, counsel based Lawlor's guilt-phase 
fense on the theory that 
Lawlor was so intoxicated at the t 
of the offenses that he was 
incapable of premeditation. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VII) fails to 
satisfy the prejudice prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland. 
Lawlor 
ils to identify any defense theory that 
counsel could have, but did not, argue because of counsel's alleged 
failure to recognize that Lawlor could be convicted of first degree 
felony murder, or to show that such a 
fense would have been 
successful. 
See Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 
, 134 S. Ct. 
1081, 1089 (2014) (per curiam) (even where counsel makes a mistake of 
law, petitioner challenging a criminal conviction still bears the 
burden of showing a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's 
error, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt as to 
22  
petitioner's guilt). 
Thus, 
or has failed to demonstrate that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been dif 
rent. 
In another portion of cIa 
(VII), Lawlor contends he was 
deni 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel focused 
closing argument almost exclusively on voluntary intoxication and 
asked the jury to find him guilty of first degree murder without 
differentiating between premeditated first de 
murder and 
rst 
felony murder. 
Lawlor argues this suggested to the jury 
that counsel was conceding t 
evidence proved premeditation. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VII) satisfies 
neither the performance nor the prejudice prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland. 
The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel argued during closing 
argument that Lawlor's crimes were not premeditated and 
jury 
would not have reasonably believed counsel was conceding the 
evidence was sufficient to prove premeditation. 
Thus, 
~awlor has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was de 
ent or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (IX) 
In a portion of claim (IX), 
~awlor contends he was de 
the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
iled to move for 
a mistrial when jurors overheard portions of a bench conference. 
Lawlor contends that in the guilt phase of the trial during 
counsel's cross examination of Detective Brian Colligan, counsel 
questioned why Colligan initially became su 
icious of Law 
The 
23 
trial court called counsel to a bench conference, during which the 
prosecutor noted the answer to counsel's 
stion included Lawlor's 
prior abduction conviction. 
The trial court told Lawlor's counsel 
he was about to cause a mistrial if he pursued the question and 
that the court was "not going to declare it if you do it." 
Lawlor 
contends defense counsel should have asked for a mistrial at that 
po 
,because the jury could hear both the prosecutor's statement 
and the trial court's admonishment of Lawlor's counsel. 
In support 
of this claim, Lawlor prof 
rs the affidavit of Michael Chick, Jr., 
a member of Lawlor's defense team. 
Chick avers that the courtroom 
was small and that he could hear portions of most of the bench 
conferences, even from his position in the back of the courtroom, 
especially those that were "heated." 
Chick avers that during the 
conference about Colligan's testimony, he heard the t 
al court 
advise counsel "in an angry tone," that he "was not going to 
a mistrial if [counsel] continued with his line of questioning." 
Chick further avers that he told counsel that he heard "that 
conversation, and that it was likely that the jurors could hear it 
too." 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the performance nor the prejudice prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland. 
Lawlor fails to proffer any support 
for his allegation that the jury overheard the prosecutor mention 
Lawlor's prior abduction conviction. 
Although Chick avers he 
overheard portions of many bench conferences, especially those that 
were heated, and that he specifically heard the trial court tell 
counsel he was not going to grant a mistrial, Chick does not state 
that he heard the prosecutor's remark or provide any reason to 
24  
believe the jury heard it. 
Lawlor does not suggest the 
prosecutor's voice was loud or "heated" when he made the cOJTh.'1lent, 
which appears to have been made specifically to prevent any 
dence of the prior conviction from being inadvertently 
introduced during the guilt phase of the tal. 
In addition, while "[rJulings made in words or manner 
indicating antagonism or resentment toward counsel may convey the 
impression that the feeling inc 
s also counsel's client," 
v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 48, 56, 55 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1949), 
Lhe record in the present case, including the t 
al transcripts, 
does not demonstrate such "antagonism or resentment" in the trial 
court's admonishment of counsel during this bench conference. 
Assuming the jury heard the exchange, the tr 
1 judge's warning 
that counsel was about to cause a mistrial, which the court would 
not grant, likely suggested to the jury the court's 
spleasure 
with the possibility that counsel was about to do something that 
would negatively impact Lawlor or that counsel's behavior could 
potentially negatively impact Lawlor. 
Further, the trial court 
instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial that they were to 
base their verdict solely on the instruction of law and the 
evidence presented at trial, that "no statement or ruling or remark 
might make from the bench is intended in any way to indicate to 
you what my personal opinion might be," that 
e purpose of a bench 
conference was to ensure that the only 
dence received by the 
jury was that "which is appropriate and proper under our laws," and 
that the jury should not hold such conferences against either the 
Comrnonwealth or the defendant. 
"It is presumed that a jury will 
follow the instructions given by the trial court." 
Muhamrnad, 274 
25  
Va. at 18, 646 S.E.2d at 195 (citation omitted). 
Thus, Lawlor has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), Lawlor contends he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to move for a mistrial when jurors overheard portions of a second 
bench conference. 
Lawlor contends that while discussing last 
minute changes to jury 
tructions, the trial court loudly 
admonished counsel, stating "[y]ou know, you've had this case for 
two years, and we're now sting here-this is the best you can do 
with jury 
tructions?" 
Lawlor contends that during this 
conference the trial court further admonished counsel for failing 
to include an approved instruction with the wr 
ten instructions 
presented to the court that morning, saying, "I gave you that pile 
back yesterday and said return those instructions to me." 
Lawlor 
alleges that these comments were audible to everyone in the 
courtroom, that they were prejudicial to him because they suggested 
defense counsel was unprepared and uninformed, and that defense 
counsel should have asked for a mistrial. 
In support of this 
claim, Lawlor relies on the affidavits of Chick, Meghan Shapiro, 
and Thomas Walsh, also members of Lawlor's defense team, who each 
aver that they heard the trial court loudly and sharply reprimand 
counsel. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the performance nor the prejudice prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland. 
Assuming the jury heard the trial 
26  
court's comments, Lawlor does not allege that the jury heard the 
rest of the bench conference and does not articulate how the jury 
would have known whether the judge was admonishing defense counsel 
or the prosecutor. 
In addition, the trial court had p 
ously 
instructed the jury that t 
y were to base their verdict solely on 
the instructions and the 
dence, and that "no statement or ruling 
or remark I might make from the bench is intended in any way to 
indicate to you what my personal opinion might be." 
"It is 
presumed that a jury will follow the instructions given by the 
trial court." 
Muhammad, 274 Va. at 18, 646 S.E.2d at 195 (citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (appellate court assumed that, even if jury overheard 
bench conference, they disregarded the information in compliance 
with the judge's instruction directing jury to consider only 
evidence presented at tall. Thus, Lawlor has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have 
n different. 
CLAIM (X) 
In claim (X), Lawlor contends he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because, during the sentencing phase, counsel 
opened the door to the admission of evidence of Lawlor's abuse of 
his former fianc 
,Amanda Godlove. 
Lawlor argues the Commonwealth 
elicited testimony from Godlove that Lawlor had abducted her in 
1998, a cr 
for which he had been convicted, but did not elicit 
any testimony regarding Lawlor's relationship with or violence 
toward Godlove prior to the abduction. 
On cross-
nation, 
Lawlor's counsel asked Godlove about her relationship with Lawlor 
27  
prior to 
abduction, eliciting testimony from Godlove that 
Lawlor had anger control issues, Godlove only agreed to marry 
Lawlor because she was afraid to refuse his proposal, and she ended 
their relationship because she was afraid of Lawlor. 
On redirect, 
the Commonwealth elicited testimony about the tenor of Lawlor's 
entire relationship with Godlove, including specific acts of 
violence toward Godlove. 
Lawlor's counsel objected to this 
testimony, but the trial court found counsel had opened 
door 
for the admission of the evidence through cross-examination. 
Lawlor contends this evidence, which included testimony that Lawlor 
sometimes went into a "white hot rage," that he had thrown an 
ashtray at Godlove, hit her, grabbed her, and twice choked her to 
the point of unconsciousness, would not have been admitted if not 
for counsel's error and that but for the admission of the 
dence, 
the Commonwealth could not have proved the aggravating factor of 
future dangerousness and the jury would not have sentenced Lawlor 
to death. 
The Court holds claim (X) fails to satisfy the prejudice prong 
of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. 
The record, 
including the trial transcript, demonstrates that at the t 
the 
testimony complained of was admitted, Godlove had already testi 
ed 
that prior to the abduction, but after she and Lawlor had ended 
their relationship, Lawlor called her at work and approached her 
office, and as a result of Lawlor's behavior she felt the need to 
have two men escort 
r to her car every night when she left work 
"for [her] safety." 
Godlove testi 
ed she and her mother had 
established a routine whereby s 
would phone her mother every 
night when she left work, and her mother knew how long it would 
28  
then take Godlove to get home. 
Godlove would again call her mother 
as she approached the house, and upon arriving home Godlove would 
pull into the garage but stay in her car, with the windows rolled 
up, the doors locked, and 
r hand on 
remote control for the 
garage door until the door had 
ly closed before getting out of 
her car. 
These measures were to ensure Godlove's safety. 
Godlove 
testified that on the evening of the abduction she had followed 
this routine, but when she got near 
r house she noticed a car 
which was not normally there and which matched the description she 
had of Lawlor's car. 
Godlove then called her mother and asked her 
to meet her at the door. 
Then she drove past her home to see if 
the car followed her. 
When it did not, she turned around and went 
home. 
She pulled into her garage and waited in 
r car, doors 
locked, windows rolled up, hand on the 
ge door opener, watching 
the door in the rear view mirror. 
Before the door closed, Lawlor 
rolled under it and approached the car, demanding to talk with 
Godlove. 
When she told him to leave, he got very angry and started 
banging on the car. 
Godlove's mother saw what was happening and 
told Lawlor she was going to call the police. 
According to 
Godlove's testimony "normally, that would be enough of a deterrent" 
but on this night Lawlor said he did not care. 
Godlove's mother 
opened t 
garage door and motioned to Godlove to drive away. 
When 
Godlove attempt 
to do so, Lawlor climbed onto the hood of the car 
and began hitting and kicking the windshield until he managed to 
put a hole in it. 
Lawlor reached through the windshield, turned 
off the car, opened the door, dragged Godlove out, threw her into 
his car, and drove away. 
Eventually, Lawlor's rage dissipated and 
he freed Godlove after she feigned a severe asthma attack. 
29 
Based upon this testimony, the jury knew Godlove was afraid of 
Lawlo~ long before he abducted her. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to 
demonstrate that but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (XI) 
In claim (XI), Lawlor contends he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to elicit from 
Lawlor's therapist, Mary Fisher, evidence that Lawlor had 
ed 
to her that he had been sexually abused by his father. 
In support 
of this claim, Lawlor p~ovides an affidavit from Fisher in which 
she avers she is a nurse practitioner 
cializing in psychological 
and mental health issues. 
She treated Lawlor in the 
11 of 2005, 
and she diagnosed Lawlor with poly-substance abuse, poly-substance 
dependence, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result 
of being the victim of childhood physical and sexual abuse. 
Fisher 
avers that Lawlor disclosed to her in their initial meetings that 
he had been physically and sexually abused multip 
times and that 
he had been sexually abused by his father. 
sher further avers 
that Lawlor suffered from flashbacks of being sexually abused by 
his father and of his sister being sexually abused by their father. 
Fisher further avers that she provided this information to Lawlor's 
defense team prior to trial. 
Lawlor contends that had the jury 
known he had been sexually abused by his father, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have sentenced him to 
death. 
The Court holds claim (XI) satisfies neither the performance 
nor the prejudice prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland. 
The record, including the trial transcript, 
30 
demonstrates that Fisher testified on Lawlor's behalf during the 
sentencing phase of his trial. 
Fisher testified that she had 
diagnosed Lawlor with PTSD, that such a diagnosis re 
red at least 
one qualifying traumatic event in the patient's past, and that she 
had based her diagnosis of Lawlor, in part, on his "revelation of 
both physical and probable history of sexual abuse" of "himself and 
family members." 
When asked what that revelation of probable 
sexual abuse was, Fisher responded that the revelation was 
"innuendo that he also had a history of sexual abuse himself, 
but I don't 
I 
he ever specifically said that at that 
point until we terminated treatment." 
Fisher further testified that in her init 
I meetings with 
Lawlor there was some "reference made to possible abuse by a peer, 
but 
was not specifically addressed in the short time that we had 
to talk." 
sher went on to explain that when dealing with a new 
patient it was important to ask open-ended questions and establish 
a trusting relationship and that it is not unusual for a patient to 
initially deny having a history of sexual abuse. 
Fisher elaborated 
that she would not have expected Lawlor to immediately disclose all 
of the sexual abuse he suffered. 
Fisher further testified that 
Lawlor had specifically described flashbacks involving traumatic 
events with peers, and "violent incidents between he [sic] and his 
dad and his sister that he was involved in." 
Finally, Fisher testified that toward the end of Lawlor's 
treatment, which lasted several weeks and spanned four to five 
sessions, she had referred Lawlor for inpatient treatment, for 
which he had 
en refused, and that during the intake procedure 
Lawlor reported he had a history of physical and sexual abuse by 
31  
someone he lived with after he ran away from home at t 
age of 
sixteen. 
Thus, despite being asked numerous open-ended questions 
by Lawlor's counsel, Fisher's testimony established that during her 
treatment of Lawlor, he never specifically stated he had been 
sexually abused, although he had suggested that might be the case, 
and that his suggestions of abuse involved peers, not his father. 
The first direct report of sexual abuse, according to Fisher's 
testimony, was in Lawlor's intake report. 
To the extent this 
testimony differs from Fisher's affidavit, this Court need not 
decide which is more credible. 
Counsel could reasonably have 
determined, based on Fisher's testimony at trial, that if asked 
directly if Lawlor had ever reported to her that he had been 
sexual~y abused by his father, Fisher's response would have been, 
"No." 
As Lawlor concedes, he had repeatedly attempted throughout 
the course of the trial to establish that he had been sexually 
abused by his father, and counsel could reasonably have determined 
that asking this question would have been more detrimental than 
helpful to his case. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (XII) 
In claim (XII), Lawlor contends he was denied the effect 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present testimony 
from Dr. James Hopper, a clinical psychologist with expertise in 
the long-term effects of childhood abuse, who was appointed by the 
trial court to assist Lawlor. 
Lawlor contends that Dr. Hopper's 
testimony should have been presented as part of his mitigation 
32 
evidence to put Lawlor's prior bad acts and Orange's murder into 
context by showing Lawlor's criminal acts were rooted in the trauma 
he suffered during his childhood and adolescence. 
Lawlor further 
contends that Dr. Hopper's testimony should have been presented to 
show Lawlor's mental health and substance abuse treatment programs 
had been ineffective because they fail 
to address his underlying 
mental health issues, and to support the central mitigation theme 
that Lawlor was an abused and neglected child who turned to drugs 
and alcohol, that his violent acts had been the result of his 
addictions, and that he should not be sentenced to death. 
Lawlor proffers that Dr. Hopper would have testified the abuse 
and neglect Lawlor suffered as a child negatively affected his 
ability to plan, make decisions, and regulate his emotions and 
behavior. 
Dr. Hopper would have testified that Lawlor's history of 
neglect and abuse and the resulting behavioral and interpersonal 
deficits led Lawlor to addiction and a cycle of sobriety and 
relapse, often involving criminal act 
ty and incarceration, and 
this cycle was exacerbated by the lack of treatment for his 
underlying issues. 
Lawlor 
her proffers Dr. Hopper would have 
testified Lawlor's cocaine and alcohol binge on the night of the 
murder was an inevitable result of his initial success maintaining 
sobriety and a good job, which led him to distance himself from his 
support network and stop attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
meetings. 
When his grandmother and a friend subsequently died, 
Lawlor had completely isolated himself from his support network and 
began a downward spiral. 
The Court holds claim (XII) satisfies neither the performance 
nor the prejudice prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
33 
Strickland. 
The Un 
ed States Supreme Court has held that, in 
determining whether a petitioner has established prejudice based 
upon counsel's failure to present additional mitigation evidence, a 
reviewing court should consider whether a competent attorney, aware 
of the evidence, would have introduced it at sentencing and 
whether, had the jury been confronted with the evidence, there is a 
reasonable probability it would have returned a different sentence. 
v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20 (2009). 
In evaluating this 
second question, a reviewing court must consider all t 
relevant 
evidence the jury would have considered, not just the proffered 
additional mitigation evidence but also any rebuttal evidence the 
prosecution might have offered, and determine if the petitioner has 
shown "a reasonable probability that the jury would have rejected a 
capital sentence after it weighed the entire body of mitigating 
evidence." 
Id. 
Here, the record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates 
that much of the mitigating evidence Lawlor faults counsel for 
failing to introduce was cumulative of the substantial mitigation 
evidence already introduced. 
Many witnesses, including Lawlor's 
family members, probation officers, and Mary Fisher, presented 
evidence that Lawlor was an abused and neglected child who turned 
to drugs and alcohol. 
Dr. Morton, Lawlor's expert 
psychopharmacologist, and Fisher presented evidence that 
individuals who suffer childhood trauma and have untreated 
psychiatric problems often turn to drugs and alcohol to "self­
icate," and that Lawlor's mental health and substance abuse 
treatment programs had been ineffective because they failed to 
address his underlying mental health issues. 
Morton and John 
34 
Sullivan, the clinical coordinator for S 
s to Recovery, a program 
that Lawlor completed just months 
fore he killed Orange, 
presented evidence that Lawlor's addictions had precipitated 
numerous violent acts. 
Morton and Sullivan also presented evidence 
regarding the cycle of addiction, sobriety, and relapse, and Morton 
explained how such cycles may be aggravated by untreated underlying 
psychiatric problems. 
The cumulative mitigating evidence Lawlor 
contends counsel should have introduced would not have 
ded 
Lawlor. 
§~~ i<L._ at 22 (finding no prej udice where 
itioner's 
proffered mitigating evidence "was merely cumulative" of the 
mitigating evidence counsel had presented) . 
In addition, the record, including the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that some of the mitigating evidence Lawlor faults 
counsel for failing to adduce would have contradicted mitigating 
evidence that Lawlor had already introduced. 
Lawlor's mitigation 
witnesses testified Lawlor began to discontinue his participation 
in AA meetings as soon as he graduated from Steps to Recovery and 
his participation was no longer required. 
When Lawlor's friend 
died in July 2008, however, 
ci 
e of support he had generated 
while at Steps to Recovery was still available to him. 
Members of 
that 
rcle gave Lawlor a ride to the memorial, called and 
encouraged him to go to AA meetings, and even went to Lawlor's 
place of employment to persuade him to do so. 
Steps to Recovery 
encouraged graduates to visit and held alumni nights once a month. 
Friends and members of Lawlor's church remained available to and 
supportive of him. 
The proffered expert testimony that Lawlor no 
longer had a support network available to him would have 
contradicted his own witnesses. 
35  
Further, the additional mitigation evidence Lawlor contends 
should have been introduced would have opened the door to rebuttal 
evidence from Dr. Hagan, who had examined Lawlor in accordance with 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1. 
The record, including Dr. Hagan's report, 
demonstrates that Dr. Hagan's rebuttal testimony would have been 
potentially damaging to Lawlor. 
It was Dr. Hagan's opinion that 
Lawlor was not suffering from severe emotional or mental 
disturbance at the time of the murder, and that Lawlor was fully 
able to apprec 
e the criminal nature of his acts and had the 
capacity to control his conduct, as evidenced by Lawlor's 
deliberate and strategic behavior in the hours leading up to the 
murder. 
It was Dr. Hagan's opinion that Lawlor's behavior toward 
others, especially women, was "entirely self-centered and devoid of 
empathy," that Lawlor appeared to have no real concept of guilt or 
remorse and had a "poor reputation for truthfulness," even among 
his biggest supporters, and that Lawlor often responded to 
rejection with "sudden, unpredictable and serious violence." 
Dr. 
Hagan noted that Lawlor had 40 or more se 
s, programs, 
interventions, and treatment providers, as well as prescriptive 
care available to him between 1978 and 2008, and that 
either 
turned down or failed to appear for other services. 
Finally, it 
was Dr. Hagan's opinion that while Lawlor's "dreadful developmental 
circumstances" contributed to his difficulties and shaped his 
character, interpersonal problem-solving ability, and patterns of 
emotional regulation, those circumstances did not cause his attack 
on Orange. 
Cons 
ring all the relevant evidence the jury would have had 
before it, including the Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence, Lawlor 
36  
cannot show a reasonable probability the jury would have rejected a 
capital sentence had counsel submitted the proffered mitigation 
evidence. 
Nor, given the cumulative or conflicting nature of much 
of the evidence and the damaging nature of the Commonwealth's 
rebuttal evidence, was it unreasonable for counsel to decide not to 
submit this evidence. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (XIII) 
In claim (XIII) (A) and a portion of claim (XIII) (C), Lawlor 
contends that, during the guilt phase of his trial, the evidence 
was in dispute whether he raped or attempted to rape Orange. 
Lawlor contends the jury verdict, under the indictment cha 
ng him 
alternately with capital murder in the commission of rape or 
attempted rape, left the dispute unresolved. 
Lawlor argues that 
because the question was unresolved, the prosecutor's questions and 
argument during the sentencing phase of the t 
al asserting that 
Lawlor had raped Orange were improper. 
Lawlor contends this 
confused the jurors and led them to presume he had raped Orange and 
to improperly base their sentencing decision on that presumption. 
The Court rejects claim (XIII) (A) and this portion of claim 
(XIII) (C) because this non-ju 
sdictional issue could have been 
raised at trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable 
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Sl 
on 
215 Va. at 29,
---";~­
205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim (XIII) (B) and a portion of claim (XIII) (C), Lawlor 
contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
37  
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's improper questions and 
argument during the sentencing phase of trial. 
Lawlor contends 
that the prosecutor's questions to Lawlor's mitigation witnesses 
and closing argument improperly asserted that Lawlor had raped 
Orange, and that whether Lawlor had completed the rape was a 
question left unresolved by the jury's verdict. Therefore, Lawlor 
argues, any assertion that he was guilty of a completed rape was 
improper, and he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object 
because the jury was likely to infer counsel conceded that he was 
guilty of rape. 
The Court holds that claim (XI I I) (B) and this portion of claim 
(XIII) (C) fail to satisfy the prejudice prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland. 
"Under Code § 18.2-31(5) willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing is capital murder if committed 
in the cowmission of or subsequent to either rape or attempted 
rape." 
Lawlor, 285 Va. at 222, 738 S.E.2d at 866. 
The jury was 
permitted to find Lawlor guilty if it found either predicate. 
Id. 
at 222, 738 S.E.2d at 867. 
The sentencing phase jury was composed 
of the same jurors who convicted Lawlor during the guilt phase of 
tal. Consequently, the jurors knew during the sentencing phase 
which predicate they had found in the guilt phase. 
Lawlor 
therefore cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's references to rape. 
Thus, Lawlor has failed to 
demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
38  
CLAIMS (XIV) & (XV) 
In claim (XIV) and a portion of claim (XV), Lawlor contends 
the cumulative effect of counsel's deficient performance undermines 
confidence in the jurors' decision. 
The Court holds that claim (XIV) and this portion of claim 
(XV) are without merit. 
As addressed previously, Lawlor has failed 
to demonstrate prejud 
as a result of counsel's alleged errors. 
"Having rejected each of 
itioner's individual claims, there is 
no support for the proposition that such actions when considered 
collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional 
ght 
to effective assistance of counsel." 
Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex 
I State Prison, 267 Va. 318, 340, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305, cert. 
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
In the remaining portion of claim (XV), Lawlor contends the 
cumulative effect of trial errors produced a trial that was 
fundamentally unfair, thereby depr 
ng him of his constitutional 
right to due process. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (XV) is barred 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Sl 
215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
Upon consideration whereof, Lawlor's motion to make the joint 
appendix from the direct appeal part of the record is granted. 
Lawlor's motions for discovery, for expert assistance, and for an 
evidentiary hearing are denied. 
39  
Upon consideration of Lawlor!s motion to strike the Warden!s 
evidence and the Warden's motions to stri 
Lawlor's affidavits, 
the motions are denied. 
The exhibits and affidavits are considered 
pursuant to the appropriate evidentiary rules. 
Upon consideration of the Warden!s motions to amend the motion 
to dismiss and to file a supplemental affidavit, the motions are 
granted. 
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed and the respondent 
shall recover from petitioner the costs expended in his defense 
herein. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
Respondent's costs: 
Attorney's fee 
$50.00 
A Copy, 
Teste: 
Clerk 
40