Case Title: In re Hunter

Citation: 167 Vt. 219, 704 A.2d 1154

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Hunter  (96-490); 167 Vt. 219; 704 A.2d 1154

[Filed 3-Oct-1997]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 3-Nov-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-490

In re William Hunter                         Supreme Court

                                             Original Jurisdiction from
                                             Professional Conduct Board

                                             June Term, 1997

       William A. Hunter, Cavendish, pro se, appellant

       William M. Dorsch of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch, Special Bar
  Counsel, Burlington, for appellee

PRESENT:   Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Allen, C.J. 
           (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       PER CURIAM.   Respondent William A. Hunter challenges the Professional
  Conduct Board's recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of
  law for three years.  His principal contention is that the recommendation
  is unduly harsh because the Board failed to consider several mitigating
  factors and refused to reopen the case to take new evidence on his mental
  condition.  He also argues that if we accept the Board's recommendation, we
  should impose the sanction retroactively to the date that he voluntarily
  ceased practicing law.  We adopt the Board's recommendation and impose the
  three-year sanction effective as of January 10, 1997.

       The Board's recommendation is based on stipulations in which
  respondent acknowledged having violated multiple provisions of the Code of
  Professional Responsibility on numerous occasions involving many different
  clients and cases.  Most instances concerned neglect of client matters,
  such as failing to appear for scheduled court hearings, failing to timely
  file legal documents and memoranda, failing to follow client instructions,
  failing to keep clients abreast of developments in their cases, failing to
  respond to client telephone calls and written correspondence, and failing
  to timely forward client files to new attorneys.  See DR 1-

 

  102(A)(5), (7) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to administration
  of justice or that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); DR
  6-101(A)(3) (neglecting legal matters).

       The most serious incidents involved respondent (1) arranging the loan
  of an elderly client's funds to another client without adequately securing
  the loan or disclosing to the elderly client that the borrower was also his
  client; (2) reloaning those same funds, again without informing the client
  or obtaining adequate security, to a corporate client for which he served
  as director; and (3) executing and signing the promissory note and mortgage
  deed nearly one and one-half years after the loan was made, but backdating
  the documents to the date of the loan. Based on these admissions,
  respondent acknowledged violating DR 5-101(A) (failing to disclose
  conflicting personal interest in legal matter), DR 5-105(C) (representing
  multiple clients without disclosing conflicting interests), and DR 9-102
  (failing to handle client funds properly).

       Following a one-day sanctions hearing in which numerous witnesses
  testified on respondent's behalf, a hearing panel recommended that
  respondent be disbarred.  The parties then presented briefs and oral
  argument before the Board.  In September 1996, two months after the Board
  hearing and approximately one week before the Board filed its original
  final report, respondent moved to reopen the matter so that he could share
  with the Board what he had recently learned through therapy and treatment
  about his personal problems and psychological condition during the period
  in which his transgressions had occurred.  The Board informed respondent
  that he could decide if he still wanted to reopen the matter after
  reviewing its final report.  In the final report, with the exception of one
  dissenting member, the Board declined to adopt the hearing panel's
  recommendation, but instead recommended that respondent be suspended from
  the practice of law for three years.

       Respondent then renewed his motion to reopen, this time including a
  doctor's affidavit stating that respondent had displayed symptoms
  suggesting Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) with depression, but that he
  seemed to have responded well to an antidepressant prescribed to reduce
  those symptoms.  On January 10, 1997, the Board denied respondent's motion
  to reopen and filed a slightly revised final report.  On appeal, respondent
  argues that (1) the Board abused

 

  its discretion by denying his motion to reopen; (2) the Board failed to
  give sufficient weight to several mitigating factors; (3) the Board
  exaggerated the number of violations and failed to distinguish between
  those committed before and after this Court disciplined him in 1994; (4)
  the recommended sanction was unduly harsh; (5) if this Court adopts the
  Board's recommended sanction, it should make the three-year suspension
  retroactive to the date he voluntarily ceased practicing law; and (6) the
  Board chair erred in denying his request that she and other Board members
  disqualify themselves from his case.

                                     I.

       We first consider respondent's argument that the Board chair should
  have disqualified herself and certain other Board members from
  participating in his case.  In May 1995, while representing Attorney
  Vincent Illuzzi in disciplinary proceedings before the Board, respondent
  filed suit in federal district court, claiming that four members of this
  Court and fourteen members of the Board had violated Illuzzi's
  constitutional rights.  Soon thereafter, in his own disciplinary
  proceeding, respondent sought the recusal of the members of the Board whom
  he had sued on behalf of Illuzzi.  The Board chair denied the motion.

       We find no abuse of discretion.  Indeed, although four members of this
  Court ultimately decided not to take part in the Illuzzi disciplinary
  action upon which the federal suit was based, we emphasized that recusal is
  not compelled merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue a judge. 
  In re Illuzzi, 164 Vt. 623, 624,