Case Title: Stephen Todd Booker V. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-121

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-121 
____________ 
 
STEPHEN TODD BOOKER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[August 30, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to 
vacate under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  The order concerns 
postconviction relief from a sentence of death, and this Court has jurisdiction of 
the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Stephen T. Booker was convicted of the 1977 first-degree murder and sexual 
battery of Lorine Demoss Harmon, a ninety-four-year-old woman, and also the 
crime of burglary.  See Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 2000).  In the 
opinion affirming the imposition of the death penalty after resentencing, the Court 
detailed the facts surrounding the murder: 
The victim, an elderly woman, was found dead in her apartment 
in Gainesville, Florida.  The cause of death was loss of blood due to 
several knife wounds in the chest area.  Two knives, apparently used 
in the homicide, were embedded in the body of the victim.  A 
pathologist located semen and blood in the vaginal area of the victim 
and concluded that sexual intercourse had occurred prior to death.  
The apartment was found to be in a state of disarray; drawers were 
pulled out and their contents strewn about the apartment.  Fingerprints 
of the defendant were positively identified as being consistent with 
latent fingerprints lifted from the scene of the homicide.  The 
defendant had a pair of boots which had a print pattern similar to 
those seen by an officer at the scene of the homicide. 
Test results indicated that body hairs found on the clothing of 
the defendant at the time of his arrest were consistent with hairs taken 
from the body of the victim. 
After being given the appropriate warnings, the defendant made 
a statement, speaking as an alternative personality named “Aniel.” 
The “Aniel” character made a statement that “Steve had done it.” 
Id. at 1081-82 (quoting Booker v. State, 397 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. 1981)).  During 
Booker’s first penalty phase, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 
nine to three.  See id. at 1082.  Following that recommendation, the trial court 
sentenced Booker to death.  See id.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Booker’s 
conviction and sentence.  See id.  However, in 1991, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a federal district court ruling which set 
aside Booker’s death sentence because the trial court committed a Hitchcock error.  
 
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See id.1  After a new penalty phase was held, the jury recommended the death 
penalty by a vote of eight to four.  See 773 So. 2d at 1086.  The trial court again 
imposed the death penalty, found the following four aggravating factors, and gave 
each circumstance great weight: (1) the crime was committed while Booker was 
under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Booker had a conviction of a prior violent 
felony; (3) the crime was committed while Booker was engaged in the commission 
of a sexual battery and burglary; and (4) the crime was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  See id.  With regard to mitigating circumstances, the 
Court’s opinion on direct appeal after resentencing reveals: 
The court found two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Booker 
committed the capital felony while he was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbances (great weight); and (2) 
Booker’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially 
impaired (substantial weight).  Finally, the court found nine 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Booker was sexually 
abused as a child (substantial weight); (2) Booker was physically 
abused as a child (substantial weight); (3) Booker was verbally abused 
as a child (moderate weight); (4) Booker’s family life was inconsistent 
(moderate weight); (5) Booker’s education was interrupted repeatedly 
(slight weight); (6) Booker suffered from alcohol and drug abuse 
                                          
 
1.  In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), the United States Supreme 
Court held that a death sentence is invalid where the advisory jury “was instructed 
not to consider, and the sentencing judge refused to consider, evidence of 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.”  Id. at 398-99.  In 1988, this Court denied 
a habeas petition filed by Booker in which he alleged a Hitchcock error.  See 
Booker v. Dugger, 520 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. 1988).  This Court concluded that 
even though the penalty phase jury instruction was erroneous, the error was 
harmless.  See id.  However, in Booker v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 633 (11th Cir. 1991), 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the error was not harmless.  See id. 
 
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(moderate weight); (7) while in prison, Booker substantially improved 
his ability to be a productive citizen and to produce creative valuable 
contributions to American Literature (little weight); (8) Booker 
demonstrated his remorse and attempted to atone for his crime (little 
weight); and (9) Booker was honorably discharged from the United 
States Army (slight weight).  [N.10] 
[N.10]  The trial court considered, but gave no weight to, the 
statements made by Mrs. Zyromski and other members of the victim’s 
family, which urged that Booker be sentenced to life in prison. 
Id. at 1086. On appeal, this Court affirmed Booker’s sentence.  See id. at 1081, 
1096.   
 
On May 18, 2004, Booker filed a motion for postconviction relief in which 
he asserted the following claims:  (1) counsel was ineffective because (a) two 
jurors who said they would not consider mitigating evidence remained on the jury 
simply because they were African-Americans;2 (b) available factual evidence with 
regard to Booker’s prior violent felony conviction was not presented, which would 
have demonstrated to the jurors that the charge actually constituted mitigation 
instead of aggravation; (c) no objection was made under Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), to the reading of testimony from the first trial; to the reading 
of Booker’s 1974 and 1980 judgments to the jury; and to a witness’s testimony 
“summing up” the evidence and the investigation; (d) witnesses who could have 
testified as to mitigation with regard to Booker’s upbringing and his literary 
                                          
 
2.  Booker later amended this claim to reflect that only one juror remained 
on the jury solely because of her race.   
 
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accomplishments were not presented; (e) no objection was voiced to the 
introduction of testimony with regard to Booker’s unrelated collateral crimes; (f) 
no objection was made to the instruction to the jury that it should not consider the 
testimony of the victim’s great niece, Page Zyromski, that she found Booker’s 
remorse to be sincere; (g) no objection was made to numerous improper statements 
by the prosecution during closing argument; and (h) Michael “Mick” Price, who 
was previously employed by the Gainesville Police Department, was not presented 
to rebut the testimony of Dr. Barnard with regard to the issue of malingering and 
Booker’s honesty; (2) the State violated Booker’s attorney-client privilege by 
improperly opening and reading his mail without disclosing this fact to Booker’s 
counsel; (3) Booker was denied his right to equal protection when the trial court 
did not instruct the jury on the length of time that Booker would be in jail if he 
received a life sentence; (4) Florida’s sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (5) the presentation of hearsay during the 
resentencing trial violated the Confrontation Clause under Crawford; (6)  Booker’s 
twenty-seven-year incarceration on death row constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment; (7) Booker has matured into an essential literary voice, and to execute 
him would implicate the freedom of the press and freedom of expression; and (8) 
an unsigned sentencing order in the State’s files creates the prima facie 
 
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presumption that the State improperly drafted the sentencing order or that the trial 
court did not conduct the proper weighing of the evidence.   
After a Huff3 hearing was held, the trial court issued an order granting an 
evidentiary hearing on Claim II, allowing Booker to amend Claims I(a), (b), and 
(d), and summarily denying the remainder of Booker’s motion.  On January 15, 
2005, Booker filed an amendment to his postconviction motion.  The trial court 
held a second Huff hearing on Booker’s amendment and issued a subsequent order 
summarily denying Claims I (a), (b), and (d).   
On September 16, 2005, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Claim 
II, in which Booker had alleged that the State had improperly interfered with his 
mail.  During the evidentiary hearing, Assistant State Attorney Ralph Grabel 
testified that he was not aware of a “mail cover” being placed on Booker’s 
correspondence,4 that he had never read Booker’s mail, and that he was unaware of 
anyone else in the State Attorney’s Office reading Booker’s mail.  Booker’s 
counsel then presented to Grabel a memo from an investigator for the State 
(Michael “Mick” Price)5 addressed to Grabel and his co-prosecutor, Rod Smith, 
                                          
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
4.  In the instant proceedings, the term “mail cover” appears to be used to 
describe a procedure in which the mail of inmates is monitored by prison staff. 
 
 
5.  Prior to working for the State, Price was employed by the Gainesville 
Police Department. 
 
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stating that an employee at Florida State Prison “asked whether or not we wanted 
mail cover on BOOKER.  I declined the offer on the expectation that Johnny 
Kearns [Booker’s attorney on resentencing] would eat us alive if he found out.  If 
you believe otherwise, I’ll simply call Ruise back and he’ll handle it.”  Grabel was 
also shown other dated entries in the memo by Price referencing “mail cover.”  In 
one entry, Price wrote that “on 3-28-97, before leaving FSP, I picked up another 
collection of letters obtained under mail cover.”  In another, Price wrote:   
On 4-10-97, while in the Starke areas hunting GASKINS, I drove past 
FSP and picked up another packet of mail cover.  On 4-11-97, while 
reviewing the above mail cover, I ran across a letter written by 
BOOKER to Betty VOGH (a Gainesvillian who expects to be called 
as a witness) which informs VOGH of the “scuttlebutt” that the 
officers “. . . originators of the lies [Re: hand up dress incident] . . . 
have received suspensions on an unrelated incident.” 
Grabel testified that prior to seeing the memo, he would have said that no 
discussion of “mail cover” had ever occurred.  However, he conceded during the 
hearing that there was apparently a memo sent to him discussing, among other 
issues, “mail cover.”  Grabel verified that Price had been sent to the prison by then-
State Attorney Smith to obtain information about other incidents of a disciplinary 
nature that could be used to rebut the defense’s argument that Booker is now a 
literary person and that his life was worth saving.  However, Grabel reiterated that 
he has never utilized “mail cover” to gain a benefit for the State, and that he did 
not direct anyone to intercept any attorney-client privileged mail of Booker.   
 
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Rod Smith testified that while he was a state attorney, there were certain 
circumstances under which he would have authorized the use of “mail cover”; 
however, he did not request a mail cover on Booker’s mail during the resentencing 
proceedings because it was not necessary.  Smith verified that as lead counsel in 
the case, if “mail cover” were to be ordered, it would have been he (Smith) who 
would have authorized the procedure, and he did not.  When Smith reviewed the 
memos from Mick Price, he conceded that it appeared that some form of “mail 
cover” of Booker’s mail had occurred, but he reiterated that he did not authorize it, 
and if it had occurred, it was conducted without his authority.  Smith also testified 
that the first time he had seen the memo from Price referencing the “mail cover” 
was the week of the evidentiary hearing.  Smith asserted that, to his knowledge, the 
State Attorney’s Office did not monitor Booker’s mail, and he had never 
personally reviewed any mail that had been copied or taken from Booker.   
 
The role of Mick Price in the Booker resentencing proceedings was to 
interview witnesses, and he did not recall any form of “mail cover” on Booker’s 
mail.  However, when Price reviewed the memo that he directed to Smith and 
Grabel, he conceded that it appeared that he had obtained some of Booker’s prison 
mail.  He stated that if he had been picking up “mail cover,” he would have 
delivered it to the State Attorney’s Office because he was working there at the 
time.  However, he testified that the memo did not look familiar to him, and he had 
 
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no recollection of reading Booker’s mail.  Further, on cross-examination, he 
testified that he did not recall having any conversations with Grabel or Smith with 
regard to “mail cover,” he did not recall being asked to obtain “mail cover,” and he 
did not recall bringing any mail back to the State Attorney’s Office.   
 
To rebut Booker’s claims of tampering with legal mail, the State presented 
attorney Johnny Kearns, who represented Booker during resentencing.  Attorney 
Kearns testified that his office was close to Florida State Prison, and either he or 
one of his investigators delivered all legal documents and mail to Booker by hand.  
Kearns stated that he would observe the prison officials check the legal documents 
for contraband, and then they would hand the materials to Booker.  Kearns stated 
that he only sent two letters to Booker through the mail––the first contained a 
money order for stamps, and the second addressed a court status conference and 
informed Booker that his case had been continued.  Kearns testified that Booker 
had authored approximately fifty letters to him.  Booker would write across the 
back of the envelope where it was sealed either the words “legal mail” or a series 
of X’s across the seam.  Kearns testified that it was his understanding that Booker 
was attempting to ensure that any tampering with his legal mail could be observed 
and identified.  Kearns testified that he saw “no visible tampering or opening of the 
mail from the time they were sealed to the time that I received them.”  Kearns saw 
no signs of any tampering.  Kearns further stated that at no time did he have 
 
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concerns that the State had improperly obtained any information that was then used 
to subvert his strategy in representing Booker.  Kearns testified that he would have 
objected to a State investigator obtaining privileged mail and reporting its contents 
to the prosecution.  Kearns stated that he was not aware that Price had been picking 
up Booker’s letters obtained under “mail cover.”  Upon reading the entry which 
discussed the letter from Booker to Betty Vogh, Kearns testified that if he had 
known about Price’s actions, he would have inquired as to why the State was 
reading Booker’s mail; however, he also recognized that the “letter from Mr. 
Booker to Ms. Vogh is not legal mail.”   
On November 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying Claim II.  
The trial court concluded that Booker had failed to present any evidence of 
tampering with his legal mail.  The trial court concluded that Grabel and Smith 
were highly credible witnesses and accorded great weight to their testimony that 
they did not direct that Booker’s mail be intercepted or opened and that they had 
not read any of Booker’s mail.  Although the trial court concluded that Mick Price 
was “quite a bit older and his memory . . . was perhaps not as good as it used to 
be,” it accepted his testimony that he did not tamper with Booker’s legal mail.  
Finally, in reaching the determination that no tampering with legal mail occurred, 
the trial court relied on the testimony of Kearns, who “went out of his way to keep 
 
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Mr. Booker from being concerned about mail tampering by hand delivering any 
communications.”   
Booker appeals the denial of his rule 3.851 motion.   
ANALYSIS 
“Mail Cover”  
The case upon which Booker relies to contend that the attorney-client 
privilege was violated when an agent of the State intercepted his mail is 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).   In that case, Weatherford was an 
undercover agent for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division.  See id. at 
547.  Weatherford was “arrested” with defendant Bursey for vandalizing a 
selective service office.  See id.  While maintaining his cover, Weatherford, at the 
request of Bursey and his counsel, attended two meetings where they discussed the 
upcoming trial.  See id. at 547-48.  At Bursey’s trial, Weatherford appeared as a 
witness and testified with regard to his undercover activities.  See id. at 549.  After 
his conviction, Bursey filed a claim for violation of constitutional rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that Weatherford had communicated defense strategies to 
his superiors and prosecuting officials which he had learned in meetings with 
Bursey and his attorney, which deprived Bursey of the effective assistance of 
counsel and his right to a fair trial.  See id.  The United States Supreme Court 
ultimately concluded that Bursey’s section 1983 claim failed because Weatherford 
 
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did not communicate any defense strategy to the prosecution and did not 
purposefully intrude on the meetings between Bursey and his counsel.  See id. at 
558.  The Court further explained:  
[W]e need not agree with petitioners that whenever a defendant 
converses with his counsel in the presence of a third party thought to 
be a confederate and ally, the defendant assumes the risk and cannot 
complain if the third party turns out to be an informer for the 
government who has reported on the conversations to the prosecution 
and who testifies about them at the defendant’s trial.  Had 
Weatherford testified at Bursey’s trial as to the conversation between 
Bursey and Wise [Bursey’s counsel]; had any of the State’s evidence 
originated in these conversations; had those overheard conversations 
been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of Bursey; or 
even had the prosecution learned from Weatherford, an undercover 
agent, the details of the Bursey-Wise conversations about trial 
preparations, Bursey would have a much stronger case. 
Id. at 554. 
As the above analysis demonstrates, the Weatherford case addressed actual 
attorney-client communications; it did not involve Bursey speaking with or writing 
to a layperson.  Further, the decisions which discuss the constitutional implications 
of intercepting inmate mail focus on legal mail rather than on correspondence with 
laypeople.  See generally Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Interference with legal mail implicates a prison inmate’s rights to access to the 
courts and free speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution.”); Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting claim that “the routine inspection of incoming and outgoing nonlegal 
 
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mail constitutes a violation of [inmates’] civil rights”); Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F. 
Supp. 2d 961, 973-74 (D. Minn. 2005) (“A jailer who opens a prisoner’s legal mail 
outside of the prisoner’s presence may violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).  
Booker does not present any case to support the proposition that if a government 
official or agent reads an inmate’s nonlegal mail, the Sixth or Fourteenth 
Amendments become implicated.  With this status of the law, we conclude that the 
key issue presented by this claim is whether the State interfered with Booker’s 
legal mail, not whether the State (or its agent) ever accessed Booker’s nonlegal 
mail.   
In the order denying postconviction relief, the trial court made very specific 
findings with regard to whether tampering with Booker’s legal mail had occurred: 
The Defendant has failed to present any evidence demonstrating the 
Defendant’s legal mail was tampered with by any agent of the State.  
The Defendant, likewise, failed to present any evidence that 
privileged communications, in any form, were impermissibly 
intercepted, interfered with, or used by any agent of the State.  Not 
only does the evidence not support the Defendant’s claim his legal 
mail was tampered with or that the State knowingly interfered with his 
attorney-client relationship, there is a great deal of evidence to support 
it was not. 
Following the denial of a postconviction claim where the trial court has conducted 
an evidentiary hearing, this Court affords deference to the trial court’s factual 
findings.  See Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1165 (Fla. 2006).  If the trial court’s 
findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not 
 
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substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact.  See id.  The 
same standard applies to the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be 
given to the evidence by the trial court.  See id.    
We conclude that the trial court’s finding that neither the State nor its agent, 
Investigator Mick Price, tampered or interfered with Booker’s legal mail is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Although the extensive facts 
developed during the evidentiary hearing reveal that some sort of “mail cover” 
may have occurred, and that Price may have retrieved mail from Florida State 
Prison, Booker has failed to identify a single piece of legal mail that was 
intercepted or touched by Price.  Booker speculates that Price had collected some 
of Booker’s mail, and, therefore, “all mail in and all mail out of FSP was 
compromised by the ‘mail cover.’ ”  However, Booker offers absolutely no 
substantive proof to support this conclusory statement.  Further, even if we were to 
assume that Price did collect some of Booker’s legal mail under the “mail cover,” 
coprosecutors Rod Smith and Ralph Grabel denied ever having read any of 
Booker’s mail, let alone his legal mail, and the trial court found their testimony to 
be credible.  Cf. Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 272 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting 
Weatherford claim where a document prepared by defense counsel’s investigator 
was allegedly stolen and obtained by the State and noting that “[t]he state attorney 
 
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maintained that he never read nor had access to the stolen document, and defense 
counsel did not challenge that assertion”).   
Further, the most compelling evidence that the State did not access Booker’s 
legal mail was presented by Booker’s resentencing counsel, Johnny Kearns.  
Kearns testified that he or one of his investigators had actually hand-delivered all 
but two pieces of correspondence to Booker, and the two pieces of mail that were 
sent to the prison did not contain any information with regard to the defense 
strategy.  Moreover, Kearns testified that Booker took heightened precautions to 
ensure that his mail was not tampered with by writing either “legal mail” or a 
series of X’s across the seal of the envelope, and Kearns saw “no visible tampering 
or opening of the mail from the time that they were sealed to the time that [he] 
received them.”  Kearns stated that had he suspected that the State was tampering 
with Booker’s legal mail, he would have objected because he “would definitely 
have gotten concerned about” the interception of legal mail.   
Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the 
State did not access, tamper with, or interfere with Booker’s legal mail, and we 
affirm the trial court’s denial of Booker’s Weatherford claim.6   
                                          
 
 
6.  Further, even if Booker had successfully established that the State had 
intruded into Booker’s attorney-client relationship, he would not be entitled to 
relief under Weatherford unless he could show “prejudice in terms of injury to the 
defendant or benefit to the State.”  Pietri, 885 So. 2d at 272 (“Because the state 
attorney had no access to the [allegedly stolen] document, Pietri has failed to 
 
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Abandoned Claims 
 
When a defendant fails to pursue an issue during proceedings before the trial 
court, and then attempts to present that issue on appeal, this Court deems the claim 
to have been abandoned or waived.  See Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 995 (Fla. 
2006).  We conclude that Booker has abandoned the following claims:  (1) counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court instructing the jury not to 
consider witness Page Zyromski’s testimony; (2) counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call Mick Price to rebut Dr. Barnard’s testimony regarding possible 
malingering by Booker; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
testimony regarding the introduction of nonstatutory aggravators that involved 
Booker’s unrelated collateral crimes; and (4) counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to prosecutorial statements during closing argument.  The record reflects 
that although Booker attempted to raise these claims in his initial postconviction 
motion, they were insufficiently pled.  Additionally, during the first Huff hearing, 
Booker did not raise or argue these issues, nor did he request permission to amend 
                                                                                                                                        
demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the state attorney prosecuting the case.”).  
Booker has failed to identify a single fact gleaned from the alleged “mail cover” 
that was used to Booker’s disadvantage or to the State’s advantage at trial.   
 
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the portions of Claim I that addressed these issues.7   Moreover, Booker failed to 
reassert these claims in his amendment to Claim I.  We conclude that Booker 
completely failed to pursue these claims in the proceedings before the trial court, 
and, therefore, they have been abandoned. 
Claims Denied Without an Evidentiary Hearing 
Because the decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on this 
postconviction motion below was ultimately based on written materials before the 
court, the ruling was tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo 
review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003).  Accordingly, when 
we review the summary denial of claims raised in the motion below, this Court 
accepts the movant’s factual allegations as true, and we will affirm the ruling only 
if the filings show that the movant has failed to state a facially sufficient claim or 
that there is no issue of material fact to be determined.  See generally Amendments 
to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (endorsing 
the proposition that “an evidentiary hearing is mandated on initial motions which 
assert . . . legally cognizable claims which allege an ultimate factual basis”).  
However, to the extent there is any question as to whether the movant has made a 
facially sufficient claim requiring a factual determination, the Court will presume 
                                          
 
7.  Instead, Booker specifically requested leave to amend only Claims 1(a) 
(the juror challenge), 1(b) (the circumstances surrounding Booker’s prior felony 
aggravator), and 1(d) (the failure to present available mitigation).   
 
 
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that an evidentiary hearing is required.  See generally id.   It is under this standard 
of review that this claim and the remainder of Booker’s claims will be analyzed. 
I.  The Prior Violent Felony Aggravator.  Booker contends that the trial court 
erred in summarily denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present evidence regarding the inapplicability of the prior violent felony aggravator 
in this case.  In 1980, Booker committed an aggravated battery when he threw a 
flaming substance at a former Florida State Prison guard and burned him.  Booker 
contends that had the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing on this claim, 
Booker would have presented witnesses who would have described the context in 
which this “fire-bomb” incident occurred.  Booker asserts that if counsel had 
presented this testimony to the jury, it would have viewed Booker’s actions in a 
more sympathetic context and would have viewed his conviction for aggravated 
battery as evidence in mitigation rather than aggravation. 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 
call certain witnesses, a defendant must allege in the motion “what testimony 
defense counsel could have elicited from [the] witnesses and how defense 
counsel’s failure to call, interview, or present the witnesses who would have so 
testified prejudiced the case.”  Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004).8  
                                          
 
 
8.  Although Nelson was a noncapital case that involved Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850, we have applied the pleading requirements enunciated 
 
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If the claim is insufficiently pled, a defendant should be given leave to amend hi
claim; however, if the claim is not amended, then the denial may be with prejudice.  
s 
See 875 So. 2d at 583-84.   
In his initial motion, Booker failed to allege the names of the witnesses he 
would have presented to testify with regard to the alleged “fire-bomb” incident 
which resulted in his conviction for aggravated battery.  In accordance with 
Nelson, the trial court provided Booker with an opportunity to amend this claim.  
In his amendment, Booker proceeded to name himself, inmate Gary Trawick, and 
inmate William White as witnesses who might testify as to the alleged threats that 
the guard had made against Booker in the context of a “guard riot” that occurred 
after an inmate had fatally stabbed a prison guard.  Booker also named attorney 
Susan Cary, a death row liaison from the Palm Beach County public defender’s 
office, who would have testified that litigation may have stemmed from the guards’ 
post-stabbing conduct.    
We conclude that the trial court properly denied this claim without an 
evidentiary hearing because this claim as amended was still insufficiently pled.  In 
the amended motion, Booker made equivocal statements about the substance of the 
witnesses’ testimony.  For example, Booker stated that “inmates Trawick and 
White might have testified to the threats which the guard, Mr. Thomas, made 
                                                                                                                                        
in Nelson to rule 3.851 motions to vacate.  See Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 
821-22 (Fla. 2005).   
 
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against Mr. Booker.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  With regard to attorney Cary, Booker 
stated that Cary “believes that there may have been litigation stemming from the 
guards’ post-stabbing conduct which the Department of Corrections may have 
settled.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Thus, while not totally speculative, there is clearly 
a lack of specificity as to the substance of the testimony that these witnesses would 
have offered.  Cf. Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 821-22 (Fla. 2005) (concluding 
that a 3.851 claim of ineffective assistance was legally insufficient where the 
substance of the testimony was not described in the motion and the motion did not 
allege the specific facts to which the witness would testify).  Further, Booker failed 
to allege such pivotal facts as what first-hand knowledge attorney Cary possessed 
with regard to the “fire-bomb” incident and whether inmates Trawick and White 
had actually witnessed prison guard Thomas threaten Booker.  With these 
omissions, we conclude that Booker’s amended claim failed to comply with the 
pleading requirements announced in Nelson.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s 
summary denial of this claim.   
Moreover, even if this claim had been sufficiently pled, we conclude that 
Booker still would not have been entitled to relief.  The record of the resentencing 
proceedings demonstrates that the State initially sought to present multiple 
witnesses to expand upon the “fire-bomb” incident, including an expansion upon 
possible motives involved in the incident.  Counsel for Booker objected to this 
 
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expansion, contending that the additional testimony would cause the prior violent 
felony to become a feature of the trial.  The trial court agreed, concluded that the 
prejudice of this type of testimony would outweigh any probative value, and 
sustained the objection.  The trial court further sustained objections to the 
presentation of testimony with regard to the medical treatment that the guard 
received for his burns and the length of time that he was hospitalized for the 
injuries.  The trial court only allowed testimony with regard to the incident itself. 
Thus, the trial court precluded the introduction of evidence with regard to 
matters prior to the attack or after the attack and when the guard was transported to 
the hospital.  Given the strict parameters established by the trial court with regard 
to the admission of evidence of the “fire-bomb” incident, we conclude that, had 
counsel for Booker attempted to introduce expanded testimony that attempted to 
address broad circumstances and motives under which the incident may have 
occurred, it similarly would have been precluded by the trial court.  Therefore, we 
conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to offer witnesses to 
present this testimony.  See generally Marquand v. State, 850 So. 2d 417, 431 (Fla. 
2002) (“Trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to hire and call a witness whose 
testimony would not be relevant or admissible . . . .”). 
II.  Counsel’s Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigation.  Under this 
claim, Booker alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence 
 
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of the full scope of Booker’s accomplishments as an influential figure on the 
literary scene.  According to Booker, his counsel failed to educate himself on the 
topic of poetry.  As a result, counsel could not effectively respond to the State’s 
assertion that a poet should not be treated differently than anyone else.  Booker 
contended that, had counsel been better prepared, he could have shown that sparing 
Booker’s life has precedence in literature.   
As with the prior issue, when Booker initially raised this claim in his 3.851 
motion, he did not name the witnesses that defense counsel should have called, and 
he failed to outline the specific substance of their testimony.  Rather, Booker made 
general statements such as the following: 
Counsel failed to present available evidence of the full scope and 
extent of Mr. Booker’s accomplishment as an influential figure on the 
national and international literary “scene.”  Numerous witnesses could 
have been called to explain to the jury Mr. Booker’s accomplishment 
in this regard, as could exhibits of Mr. Booker’s work, which would 
have explained the person in a unique and powerful fashion. 
As with the prior violent felony claim, the trial court provided Booker with an 
opportunity to amend his motion with respect to this issue.  In his amendment, 
Booker named six witnesses, stating that they would educate the jury on the 
literary tradition into which Booker’s work fits and more accurately educate the 
jury on his contributions to the rich vein of American and international letters into 
which his works feed and from which he has derived his themes.  He also asserted 
that three additional witnesses who were experts on the poet Ezra Pound could 
 
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have been called “to show why and how [Pound] had been freed from a death 
sentence.”  In denying this claim, the trial court stated during the Huff hearing: 
I’ve already indicated that the weight to be given to this particular 
mitigating circumstance is extremely slight.  The fact that one has 
learned a skill, whether it’s poetry or cabinet-building or whatever it 
may be, the practice of law, is not a reason not to impose the death 
penalty. 
 
If Shakespeare committed this crime, regrettably, I think we 
would be missing a lot of enjoyable plays.  You’re not excused from 
following the law because, especially after the fact, you become adept 
at some skill.   
In the order summarily denying this claim, the trial court elaborated: 
During the penalty phase, trial counsel presented more than ample 
evidence of Defendant’s literary accomplishments while on death 
row.  This Court placed little weight on this evidence.  Any alleged 
failure to present additional and cumulative testimony would have not 
resulted in a life sentence. 
As with the prior issue, we conclude that the instant claim was insufficiently pled 
under Nelson.  Booker failed to specify what the precise testimony of each of these 
witnesses would have been, how their testimony would have differed from the six 
poetry experts who testified during Booker’s resentencing, or how counsel was 
deficient in selecting those six experts who did testify.    
 Moreover, even if this claim had been sufficient, Booker cannot demonstrate 
that his counsel was ineffective.  Following the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that 
 
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for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements 
must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
During the resentencing proceedings, trial counsel called the following six 
witnesses to testify with regard to Booker’s literary accomplishments while he has 
been incarcerated: 
(1) Professor Deborah Tall, professor of English at Hobart and 
William Smith College, as well as editor of Seneca Review; (2) Ms. 
Suzann Tamminen, Editor-In-Chief at Wesleyan University Press; (3) 
Professor Hayden Carruth, Professor Emeritus at Syracuse University 
(by video); (4) Professor Stuart Lavin, writer and professor at 
Castleton State College; (5) Professor Stuart Friebert, poet and 
professor at Oberlin College; and (6) Professor Williard Spiegleman, 
professor of English at Southern Methodist University. 
Booker, 773 So. 2d at 1085 n.8.   
Professor Tall testified that Booker is “a remarkably original writer and 
very, very skilled in his use of language,” that he “has tremendous insight into 
character, into his own and others,” and that “he writes like no one else.  I mean, 
very very valuable poems.”  She also testified that Booker’s book “Tug” earned the 
 
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endorsement of the first African-American to win the Pulitzer Prize, Gwendolyn 
Brooks.  Professor Hayden Carruth made the following statements via videotape 
with regard to Booker as a poet: 
I don’t think of anyone else whom I would compare with him.  I can’t 
think of other people who had done work similar to his, in somewhat 
similar situations, particularly in recent years.  Black writers who have 
also been in prison, people like Ethridge Knight (phonetic).  But also 
black writers who have not been in prison. 
. . . . 
People are interested in him.  He is doing work that is on the 
one hand significantly connected to the work of his colleagues, black 
writers, and on the other hand, new and different and original.  
(Inaudible).  In that sense I think he is comparable to a good many 
poets. 
 
When asked what Booker’s place is in the literary community, Carruth responded:  
“He’s a person of consequence, he’s a person of great intelligence and perception.”  
Professor Lavin testified that Booker’s style was “visionary” and that Booker 
“transmutes . . . language.  He actually transforms it.  So when you read his work, 
it evokes something beyond just what the words themselves say.”  Professor 
Friebert testified with regard to Booker’s involvement in translating the work of 
“arguably Albania’s most important poet” into English.  Professor Friebert also 
read one of Booker’s poems, titled “Prospectus,” to the jury.  Finally, on cross-
examination, Friebert verified that poet Ezra Pound was prosecuted as a traitor, but 
was later pardoned due to the intercession of individuals who admired his work.   
 
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Trial counsel is not deficient for failing to present cumulative evidence.  See 
Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 237 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 103 
(2006).  Given the extensive testimony with regard to Booker’s accomplishments 
and value as a poet, had defense counsel called the nine witnesses listed in 
Booker’s amendment, their testimony would merely have been cumulative to that 
of the six individuals who testified during the resentencing proceeding.  Moreover, 
Booker cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present 
cumulative evidence, especially in light of the fact that the trial court noted in its 
denial order that (1) it gave little weight to this mitigator in its sentencing order, 
and (2) “[a]ny alleged failure to present additional or cumulative testimony would 
not have resulted in a life sentence.”  See also Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932 (“It is 
highly doubtful that more complete knowledge of appellant’s childhood 
circumstances, mental and emotional problems, school and prison records, etc., 
would have influenced the jury to recommend or the judge to impose a sentence of 
life imprisonment rather than death.”).  Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s 
summary denial of this claim. 
III.  Jury Instruction.  Booker next claims that the trial court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that the failure to give an instruction to the jury 
regarding the amount of time that Booker was facing in prison if he received a life 
sentence violates equal protection.  This claim is procedurally barred because 
 
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claims that address the adequacy or constitutionality of jury instructions must be 
raised on direct appeal.  See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1280 (Fla. 2005).  
Indeed, on direct appeal, Booker asserted that “the trial court erred by refusing to 
inform the jury regarding the consecutive sentences Booker received for his prior 
burglary, sexual battery, and aggravated assault convictions.”  Booker, 773 So. 2d 
at 1087.  This Court denied Booker’s claim on the merits, noting that “[t]he 
introduction of this evidence would open the door to conjecture and speculation as 
to how much time a prisoner serves of a sentence and distract jurors from the 
relevant issue of what is the appropriate sentence for the murder conviction.”  Id. at 
1088 (quoting Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 11 (Fla. 1999)).  Thus, Booker already 
has challenged the propriety of this jury instruction, and he is procedurally barred 
from raising subsequent challenges in the instant proceeding.  See Thompson v. 
State, 759 So. 2d 650, 665 (Fla. 2000) (stating that substantive challenges to jury 
instructions are procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings because the 
claims could and should be raised on direct appeal).  The trial court properly 
denied this claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
IV.  Crawford.  Booker next claims that the trial court erred in summarily 
denying his claim that that the presentation of hearsay materials to the jury violated 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  In Crawford, the United States 
Supreme Court held that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth 
 
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Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”  Id. at 68.  However, in Chandler v. Crosby, 
916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 382 (2006), we held that 
Crawford does not apply retroactively.  See id. at 729.  Booker’s resentencing 
proceedings were held in 1998, roughly six years before the decision in Crawford 
was issued.  Therefore, Crawford is inapplicable to Booker, and we conclude the 
trial court’s summary denial of this claim was appropriate. 
V.  Length of Incarceration.  Booker contends that the trial court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that his incarceration for almost thirty years on death 
row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  We conclude that the trial court 
properly denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing.  Booker has already 
asserted on direct appeal that “to execute him after he has already spent over two 
decades on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”  Booker, 773 So. 2d 
at 1096.  In rejecting this claim, we noted that no federal or state court has 
accepted the argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long 
delay.  See id.  Additionally, in Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2003), this 
Court affirmed the trial court’s summary denial of a claim that the defendant’s 
extended stay on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  See id. at 
 
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389 (“Despite his length of stay, under this Court’s clear precedent, the trial court 
did not err in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on his claim of cruel and 
unusual punishment.”).  We similarly affirm the trial court’s summary denial of 
this claim. 
 
VI.  Newly Discovered Evidence.  In his final claim, Booker asserts that the 
trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that newly discovered evidence 
has emerged which demonstrates that to execute him at this time would serve no 
legitimate penological purpose and would infringe upon the First Amendment right 
of the public to continue reading his work.  In this claim, Booker contends that his 
literary talent has continued to mature, and that numerous editors would testify to 
the value of preserving his unique and important voice.  According to Booker, the 
American public has acquired an interest in his work, such that the public’s interest 
in vengeance is outweighed by its interest in benefiting from Booker’s literary 
voice.  Booker asserts that because of the great benefits to society that he can offer, 
his life should be spared.   
 
We conclude that the trial court properly denied this claim without an 
evidentiary hearing.  Booker has cited no decision, Florida or otherwise, for the 
proposition that a death row inmate’s literary accomplishments constitute newly 
discovered evidence that mandates vacation of a death sentence.  Booker similarly 
 
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- 30 -
provides no legal support for his First Amendment claim.  Therefore, we affirm the 
summary denial of this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the rule 3.851 
motion. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Alachua County,  
Robert P. Cates, Judge - Case No. 77-2332-CFA 
 
Harry P. Brody and Jeffrey M. Hazen of Brody and Hazen, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee