Case Title: RATHBUN v ROBSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-222 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NONTANA 1983 LOWELL A. RATHBUN, Plaintiff and Appellant, GARY G. ROBSON, GEORGE A. CALRSON and ELEANOR L. CAXLSON, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Musselshell, The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jon A. Oldenburg, Lewistown, Montana For Respondents: Lynaugh, Fitzgerald & Skaggs; William P. Fitzgerald, Eillings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: February 10, 1933 Decided: April 7, 1983 Filed: 4 p ~ 7 - 1385 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s c a s e comes from t h e District Court of t h e F o u r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of M u s s e l s h e l l . P l a i n t i f f commenced t h i s a c t i o n seeking a judgment d e c l a r i n g him t o be t h e h o l d e r of a n easement a c r o s s p r o p e r t y owned by d e f e n d a n t s . A t t h e trial c o u r t , and i n t h i s Court , t w o easement t h e o r i e s were p r e s e n t e d ; easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n , and easement by n e c e s s i t y . The District Court h e l d a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f i n both i n s t a n c e s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , we a r e asked to d e c i d e whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n v e r b a t i m a d o p t i o n , and by p h o t o g r a p h i c r e p r o d u c t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n of law. A p p e l l a n t is t h e owner of a tract of land d e s c r i b e d a s t h e e a s t 1/2 o f t h e west 1/2 o f s e c t i o n 34. The a t t a c h e d map shows a p p e l l a n t s p r o p e r t y and t h e claimed easement r o u t e . A p p e l l a n t h a s h e l d an i n t e r e s t i n t h e land s i n c e 1957 when h i s mother, Mrs. Rathbun, t r a n s f e r r e d ownership to him and h i s b r o t h e r . S i n c e t h a t t i m e , a p p e l l a n t h a s become t h e sole owner. There a r e t w o r o u t e s t o t h e p r o p e r t y ; a w e s t e r n a c c e s s r o u t e o v e r which a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s an easement, and an e a s t e r n r o u t e which is s t e e p and s e a s o n a l l y impassable. U s e of e i t h e r r o u t e r e q u i r e s one to cross p r o p e r t y owned by a t l e a s t one of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . I n o t h e r words, a p p e l l a n t 1 s p r o p e r t y is land-locked . The land was i n i t i a l l y purchased from M u s s e l s h e l l County i n 1934 by T.D. Cox. The purchase by Cox included t h e west Sr;! o f t h e west o f s e c t i o n 34; however, i n 1942 t h a t p o r t i o n was s o l d by Cox and was e v e n t u a l l y t r a n s f e r r e d to r e s p o n d e n t s J e r r y C a r l s o n and Kathleen Beslanowitch. It is o v e r t h i s p o r t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s an easement by n e c e s s i t y . From 1934 to 1946 Cox l i v e d on s e c t i o n 34. I n t h e 1 9 3 0 ' s he conducted farming and logging o p e r a t i o n s . During t h e s e y e a r s he used t h e western a c c e s s r o u t e f r e q u e n t l y . I n 1946 h e s o l d t h e l a n d t o Mrs. Rathbun, a p p e l l a n t ' s mother. She owned t h e land u n t i l 1957. During t h e s e e l e v e n y e a r s t h e land was v a c a n t . H e r v i s i t s t o t h e p r o p e r t y were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e c o u r t as spora- d i c and i n t e r m i t t e n t . A p p e l l a n t h a s never l i v e d on t h e p r o p e r t y . Much of t h e t i m e s i n c e 1957, a p p e l l a n t h a s r e s i d e d o u t - o f - s t a t e . H e h a s v i s i t e d t h e land on t h e a v e r a g e of once or twice a y e a r , and t h e r e were y e a r s i n which he would make no v i s i t . These v i s i t s were made t o "check t h e p r o p e r t y . " A p p e l l a n t owns o t h e r nonadjoining land i n t h e v i c i n i t y which is l e a s e d f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s , however, c o n c e r n i n g t h e land i n s e c t i o n 34, n e i t h e r a p p e l l a n t n o r h i s lessee have used t h e land f o r any p r o d u c t i v e u s e . T h i s d i s p u t e arose i n t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s when a real estate a g e n t on b e h a l f of a p p e l l a n t went t o view t h e p r o p e r t y . The a g e n t l e a r n e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s t i t l e d i d n o t i n c l u d e an easement. The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t wished to s u b d i v i d e and s e l l t h e p a r c e l s . The r e s p o n d e n t s d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h t h i s pro- posed land use and made t h e i r f e e l i n g s known. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n was t h a t any access a c r o s s t h e i r land was p e r m i s s i v e , and t h e r e could be no access to any s u b d i v i s i o n . However, t h e r e s p o n d e n t s also t e s t i f i e d t h a t i f a p p e l l a n t wished t o p u t t h e l a n d to o t h e r p r o d u c t i v e u s e s , such a s logging o r mining or a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s , t h e y would allow access. To e s t a b l i s h an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n t h e burden is on t h e moving p a r t y to show s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s . H e o r h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t must have used t h e r o u t e o p e n l y , n o t o r i o u s l y , exclu- s i v e l y , a d v e r s e l y , c o n t i n u o u s l y and u n i n t e r r u p t e d f o r t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d . S c o t t v. Weinheimer ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 140 Mont. 554, 374 P.2d 91. Once t h e moving p a r t y e s t a b l i s h e s t h e s e e l e m e n t s a d v e r s e use is presumed and t h e burden is then on t h e owner to show t h a t t h e use w a s p e r m i s s i v e . OIConnor v. Brodie ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3 Ga be / Mont. 1 2 9 , 454 P.2d 920; Glantz v. G a b & ? - ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont. 134, 212 P. 858. I f t h e owner shows p e r m i s s i v e u s e , no easement can b e a c q u i r e d s i n c e t h e t h e o r y of p r e s c r i p t i v e easement is based on a d v e r s e use. Wilson v. Chestnut ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 484, 525 P.2d 24. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t use of t h e w e s t e r n access r o u t e from 1934 t o t h e p r e s e n t time h a s been p e r m i s s i v e , t h e r e - f o r e any presumption of a d v e r s e use was e f f e c t i v e l y r e b u t t e d . W e a g r e e . There was e v i d e n c e t o i n d i c a t e p e r m i s s i v e use beginning i n 1934. S e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d concerning local customs t h a t began i n t h e homes t e a d i n g days concerning access across a n o t h e r ' s l a n d . There e x i s t e d an u n d e r s t a n d i n g among landowners t h a t per- m i s s i o n was n o t r e q u i r e d e v e r y time a p e r s o n needed to cross h i s n e i g h b o r ' s l a n d . P e r m i s s i o n was a u t o m a t i c i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l c l o s e d t h e g a t e s and r e s p e c t e d h i s n e i g h b o r ' s p r o p e r t y . " ' * * * A use of a n e i g h b o r ' s land based upon mere n e i g h b o r l y accommodation or c o u r t e s y is n o t a d v e r s e and cannot r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p - t i v e easement. Thus where t h e use of a way by a n e i g h b o r was by e x p r e s s o r implied per- m i s s i o n of t h e owner, it was h e l d t h a t t h e c o n t i n u o u s use of t h e way by t h e neighbor was n o t a d v e r s e and d i d n o t r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p - t i v e r i g h t * * * I u Wilson v. C h e s t n u t , 164 Mont. a t 491, 525 P.2d a t 27. ( C i t i n g 2 Thompson on Real P r o p e r t y (1961 Replacement), Easements, 5 3 4 5 ) . See also Ewan v. Stenberg ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 63, 5 4 1 P.2d 60. Evidence of t h i s l o c a l custom, w i t h o u t more, w a s s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h p e r m i s s i v e u s e . I n T a y l o r v. Petranek ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 173 Mont. 433, 438, 568 P.2d 120, 123, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "Here t h e r e c o r d is r e p l e t e w i t h t e s t i m o n y from b o t h p l a i n t i f f ' s and d e f e n d a n t ' s w i t - n e s s e s t h a t t h e homesteaders who i n i t i a l l y l i v e d i n t h e a r e a developed common p r a c t i c e of a l l o w i n g o t h e r s to c r o s s t h e i r l a n d s t o reach S u f f o l k . T h i s e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t to sup- p o r t a use p e r m i s s i v e i n its i n c e p t i o n and n o t under a claim of r i g h t ." N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g l o c a l custom, t h e r e was o t h e r e v i d e n c e to show t h a t use of t h e w e s t e r n access began and remained per- m i s s i v e . There were s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by r e s p o n d e n t s and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s ; t h e f i r s t o c c u r r e d i n 1934 when both f o r k s of t h e w e s t e r n access a t t h e Goulding Creek Road were locked by t h e Robsons. Apparently, t h e g a t e s were l e f t open and c a t t l e g o t loose. There were two o t h e r g a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d and m a i n t a i n e d by r e s p o n d e n t s . On t h e map t h e y are d e s i g n a t e d a s g-1 and g-2. I n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 ' s J . W . T r a v i s , who t h e n owned t h e west 1/2 of t h e w e s t 1/2 o f s e c t i o n 34 d r o v e a p o s t i n t o t h e middle o f g-2, w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of p r e v e n t i n g f u r t h e r v e h i c u l a r t r a f f i c . A l s o , i n t h e 1 9 6 0 ' s George C a r l s o n padlocked g-1 w i t h a c h a i n . H e r e t a i n e d t h e o n l y key. The g a t e has remained locked t o t h e p r e s e n t t i m e . Although t h e p r e s e n c e of gd.tes a l o n e w i l l n o t d e f e a t a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e y are s'trong e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g per- m i s s i v e u s e . Hayden & H i l l v. Snowden & Walters ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 1 6 576 P.2d 1115. The e v i d e n c e of l o c a l custom, coupled w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c e of g a t e s , c l e a r l y s u p p o r t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t use of t h e w e s t e r n access h a s always been per- m i s s i v e . Next, a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t an easement by n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s o v e r t h e w e s t 42 o f t h e west a o f s e c t i o n 3 4 . T h i s Court h a s r e c e n t l y s t a t e d : " G e n e r a l l y , a way of n e c e s s i t y is d e f i n e d as f o l l o w s : ' [wlhere an owner of land conveys a p a r c e l t h e r e o f which has no o u t l e t to a high- way e x c e p t o v e r t h e remaining l a n d s of t h e g r a n t o r or o v e r t h e land of s t r a n g e r s , a way o f n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s o v e r t h e remaining l a n d s o f t h e g r a n t o r . ' ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) S i m i l a r l y , a way of n e c e s s i t y is found when t h e owner of l a n d s r e t a i n s t h e i n n e r p o r t i o n conveying to a n o t h e r t h e b a l a n c e , across which h e must go f o r e x i t and a c c e s s . " Schmid v. McDowell ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . , 649 P.2d 431, 433, 39-3t;~ep. 1 3 1 ~ - - 1 3 i 6 ; ---.- A p p e l l a n t b a s e s h i s argument on t h e second p a r t of t h e d e f i n i t i o n ; where t h e owner r e t a i n s an i n n e r p o r t i o n . I n t h i s case a p p e l l a n t ' s p r e d e c e s s o r t r a n s f e r r e d t h e west 1/2 o f t h e w e s t 1/2 i n 1942, r e t a i n i n g t h e i n n e r p o r t i o n , t h e east % o f t h e west %. A p p e l l a n t ' s claim must f a i l f o r t h e same r e a s o n d i s c u s s e d i n Schmid; t h e r e a s o n f o r a l l o w i n g a way of n e c e s s i t y d o e s not e x i s t . The land o v e r which t h e way of n e c e s s i t y is claimed h a s no access t o a p u b l i c road. I n o t h e r words, even i f a p p e l l a n t were g r a n t e d a way of n e c e s s i t y across t h e west % o f t h e west % t h e r e would be no b e n e f i t ; " t h e b a s i c r e a s o n f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of a way of n e c e s s i t y , namely, t o p e r m i t communication w i t h t h e out- s i d e world, is n o t p r e s e n t ."' - . Schmid - , - - -. - Mont. a t - 649 P.2d a t 433, 39 St.Rep. a t 1317. ( C i t i n g Daywalt v. Walker F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t asserts e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t s p h o t o g r a p h i c r e p r o d u c t i o n and v e r b a t i m a d o p t i o n of t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w . While we d i s a p p r o v e of t h e p r a c t i c e , " [ o l u r u l t i m a t e t e s t . . . is whether t h e y are s u f f i c i e n t l y comprehensive and p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r d e c i s i o n , and whether t h e y are supported by t h e e v i - dence p r e s e n t e d . " I n R e Marriage of J e n s e n ( 1 9 8 1 ) ' - - Mont . I ---- I 6 3 1 P.2d 700, 703, 38 St.Rep. 1109, 1113. They c l e a r l y m e t t h e test. The t r i a l c o u r t is a f f i r m e d . We concur: Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring: I join the opinion of the majority but merely want to comment on the last issue, that of the trial court's reproducing the proposed findings and conclusions of the prevailing party and adopting them as its own. The judicial trial process is demeaned when the trial courts engage in these practices. It shows that the trial courts have given little or no thought to the decision making process other than to decide who wins. Winning counsel can, of course, be proud that the trial court has adopted verbatim their proposed findings and conclusions. But losing counsel and their clients have a reasonable expectation that the trial court, before deciding the case, carefully considered their case. Verbatim parroting of proposed findings and conclusions can do nothing but deflate these expectations.