Case Title: Strawn v. State Ex Rel. Anderberg

Citation: 332 So. 2d 601

Docket Number: 47092

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1976-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
332 So. 2d 601 (1976)
Honorable David U. STRAWN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida ex rel. Jon Anderberg, Respondent.
No. 47092.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 21, 1976.
Rehearing Denied June 22, 1976.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Stephen R. Koons, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Franklin D. Kelley, Public Defender, and Jerrold A. Bross, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 307 So. 2d 213, which purportedly conflicts with Adkins v. Smith, 205 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1968); State ex rel. Cacciatore v. Drumright, 116 Fla. 496, 156 So. 721 (1934), and State ex rel. Johnson v. Anderson, 37 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1948). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Constitution of Florida.
Respondent, Anderberg, was charged by information with the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit: petit larceny. At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel called the defendant as a witness. After lengthy examination, cross-examination, and redirect examination of the defendant, defense counsel stated as follows:
The Court then excused the jury from the courtroom at which time defense counsel explained its position to the court in requesting that the jury ask defendant any questions and stated that this had been done in several other courts in this State and that it is in keeping with finding proof *602 and justice in a court of law. The trial judge remarked that no mention had been made to the court that it was defense counsel's intention to request this and determined that it was a highly inappropriate procedure and that making such request in the presence of the jury so contaminated the trial as to require declaration of a mistrial. In explaining to the jury his reason for declaring a mistrial, the trial judge stated inter alia:
Subsequently, pursuant to Rule 3.190(b) and Rule 3.190(c)(2), Florida Criminal Rules of Procedure, defendant moved to dismiss the information on the ground that to try defendant again would constitute double jeopardy since the trial court abused its discretion in directing a mistrial with there being no manifest necessity for mistrial. With detailed explanation pertaining particularly to the need for impartial jury, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss and found that his declaration of mistrial was properly made and, that, therefore, jeopardy had not attached.
Defendant's petition for writ of prohibition to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, was granted, and the District Court determined that prohibition was an appropriate remedy and that defendant's contention of double jeopardy was meritorious. Although recognizing two earlier cases which held to the contrary on the prohibition question, the District Court explicated that the more recent decisions of this Court and the District Courts find that under these circumstances prohibition is the proper remedy. As to the second point, the District Court determined that under the circumstances, the declaration of mistrial was not a matter of manifest, urgent or absolute necessity. The District Court determined that the offer by defense counsel to submit his client to juror interrogation made in the presence of the jury could not have been misconduct or in any event could not have been misconduct of such a nature as to prevent the State from receiving a fair trial.
Initially, we remark that the District Court correctly concluded that prohibition was an appropriate and available remedy to respondent under the circumstances. Cf. State ex rel. Williams v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1956); State ex rel. Manning v. Himes, 153 Fla. 711, 15 So. 2d 613 (1943); State ex rel. Wheeler v. Cooper, 157 So. 2d 875 (Fla.App. 1963).
However, we cannot agree with the District Court's determination that the trial judge erred in declaring a mistrial and that, therefore, jeopardy attached and the charge against respondent should be dismissed. The constitution does not guarantee a defendant a perfect trial (which would be difficult *603 if not virtually impossible), but it does guarantee a fair trial. The trial judge is the man on the ground in full view of the premises. In the conducting of a complicated criminal trial, he finds it necessary to rule many times and, like the referee in an athletic contest, must rule quickly. Generally speaking, he has neither the time, convenient library, nor a staff to research each legal and evidentiary question with which he is confronted in a fast moving trial. It is, therefore, necessary that he be given broad discretion in disposing of such matters.
Sub judice the trial judge was suddenly confronted with a difficult situation created by trial counsel conducting himself in an unorthodox manner. After defense counsel had made the aforementioned remark, the trial judge stated:
The defendant should not now be allowed to take advantage of a confusing situation which he and his counsel created. Cf. Adkins v. Smith, supra. There well may have been better ways, after meditation, to dispose of the crisis but the trial judge exercised his discretion to declare a mistrial, and we are unable to say that his decision was an abuse of that discretion. Since it was not an abuse of discretion to enter the mistrial, the plea of former jeopardy is not available to the defendant as a defense.
At this point, we must restate the following relevant portion of our decision in Adkins v. Smith, supra:
Cf. U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 at 479-480, 91 S. Ct. 547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971); Tyson v. State ex rel. Richmond, 240 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1970); Goodman v. State ex rel. Furlong, 247 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Walker, 294 So. 2d 124 (Fla.App. 2, 1974).
During the course of the hearing on motion to dismiss the information on grounds of double jeopardy, the learned trial judge explained his finding that it was manifestly urgent and necessary to terminate the trial, as follows:
Respondent gave absolutely no notice to anyone that he planned to follow this unorthodox course of action. As above stated, the trial judge indicated that he may have entertained jury questioning and set up an appropriate procedure for it which would safeguard the defendant's rights if counsel had given him the opportunity. The holding that the trial judge did not err in declaring a mistrial does not contradict our earlier holdings in Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958) and Shoultz *607 v. State, 106 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1958). In Ferrara, this Court merely stated:
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial and the plea of former jeopardy is not available to respondent-defendant.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions that it be remanded by them to the trial court with directions that the trial court reinstate the charges and proceed with the trial.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion.
BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., dissent and concur with ADKINS, J.
ADKINS, Justice (dissenting).
Where a jury is discharged for legally insufficient reason and without necessity and without the defendant's consent, the discharge precludes subsequent trial for the same offense. The trial court is armed with discretion in determining what constitutes a manifest necessity or a "legally sufficient reason" for declaring a mistrial. Adkins v. Smith, 205 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1967).
There are two schools of thought as to the desirability of permitting jurors to ask questions of witnesses. On the one hand there are cases which suggest that trial courts should encourage the practice. Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133, 253 S.W. 242 (1923); Schaefer v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 128 Mo. 64, 30 S.W. 331 (1895); State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659, 57 S.E. 340 (1907); Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428, 109 A. 666 (1920); Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1974).
On the other hand there are cases which declare that the practice is dangerous and ought not to be encouraged. Therefore, the privilege should only be extended with great caution. State v. Golden, 353 Mo. 585, 183 S.W.2d 109 (1944); People v. Knapper, 230 App.Div. 487, 245 N.Y.S. 245 (1930); White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132, 268 P. 221 (1928). See also Pacific Imp. Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224 (1921) (where the practice is strongly condemned).
75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 935 contains the following discussion on this question:
In People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 200 N.W.2d 73 (1972), the court considered an appeal from a conviction of first degree murder. In his opening statement defendant's counsel informed the jury that they had the right to ask questions of witnesses if they so desired during the course of the trial. He further stated they should write out these questions and that the trial judge had the right to limit the scope of the questions. The prosecutor objected and the trial judge ruled that the jurors had no right to submit questions to the witnesses, the judge saying, among other things, that he never heard of it being done and knew of no authority that it had ever been done. From the colloquy between the court and the attorney, as recited in the opinion, it is apparent that the judge reacted just as the judge in the instant case. The Supreme Court of Michigan said:
See also People v. Justice, 50 Mich. App. 55, 212 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
It is interesting to note in Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889, 896 (1959), a civil case seeking damages, an attorney sought a mistrial because "questioning by the Court and the jury had
`* * * unintentionally prejudiced our rights of defense in this case'." The motion for mistrial was overruled. The appellate court upheld this ruling of the trial court, pointing out that the trial had been fairly conducted and the court properly denied the motion for mistrial based on the manner in which a juror examined a witness. The court referred to the annotation in 159 A.L.R. 347. This annotation contains the following statement:
By the great weight of authority the granting of permission to a juror to ask questions lies within the sound discretion of the court.
There was nothing improper in the request of defense counsel in the case sub judice and the court could have allowed the jury to question a witness without committing reversible error. This Court has recognized the right of the juror to question a witness and frowned upon any effort to hinder this right.
Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958) involved the propriety of a pamphlet entitled "Handbook for Trial Jurors" which was distributed to all the jurors in one of the judicial circuits. The Court generally approved the contents of the pamphlet but made the following observation:
*610 The use of such a pamphlet was again challenged in Shoultz v. State, 106 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1958). This Court referred to its opinion in Ferrara and declined to reconsider the issue. In its opinion the Court said:
The trial judge in his discretion, could have refused to allow the questioning or he could have permitted it. Rather than exercise his discretion in passing upon the propriety of defense counsel's statement, the judge declared a mistrial.
The mistrial was grounded upon a finding by the trial judge that defense counsel's conduct was improper. There can be no improper conduct on the part of an attorney who places the judge in a position to rule upon some question which involves discretion. The judge may be bitterly opposed to the suggested procedure and he may, in his discretion, disallow the procedure, but it is not improper for the attorney to make the request or attempt to follow the procedure.
Where anything is done during the course of a trial which the court could allow in its discretion, there can be no manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial. In determining that the conduct of the attorney was legally sufficient reason for a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion.
Jeopardy attached and the peremptory writ of mandamus should issue.
BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.