Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley

Citation: 2021-Ohio-3225

Docket Number: 2021-0231

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3225.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3225 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. OKULEY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-3225.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including representing multiple clients with conflicting interests, continuing 
to practice law while license suspended, false communication regarding 
lawyer’s services, and failing to cooperate in disciplinary investigation—
Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2021-0231—Submitted March 31, 2021—Decided September 21, 2021.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2019-029. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Okuley, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0076748, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2003.  On 
September 26, 2018, we suspended him from the practice of law for one year with 
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six months conditionally stayed for his intentionally causing a collision with a 
bicyclist, provoking a physical altercation with an eyewitness to the collision, and 
making false statements about the incident to law enforcement and during the 
ensuing criminal, civil, and disciplinary proceedings.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
Okuley, 154 Ohio St.3d 124, 2018-Ohio-3857, 111 N.E.3d 1173.  We denied 
Okuley’s amended motion for reinstatement in November 2019, and that 
suspension remains in effect.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley, 157 Ohio St.3d 1492, 
2019-Ohio-4738, 134 N.E.3d 1204. 
{¶ 2} In a seven-count second amended complaint filed on October 18, 
2019, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged Okuley with professional 
misconduct arising from his representation of multiple clients with conflicting 
interests in litigation and in business transactions.  The complaint further alleged 
that Okuley had continued to practice law while he was under suspension, had 
failed to update his online biographical information following his suspension, had 
failed to cooperate in two of the ensuing disciplinary investigations, and is no 
longer fit to practice law. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and numerous exhibits.  A 
three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct conducted a hearing and 
heard testimony from Okuley and eight other witnesses.  The panel issued a report 
finding that Okuley committed most of the charged misconduct and recommending 
that he be permanently disbarred.1  The board adopted the panel’s report in its 
entirety and no objections have been filed. 
{¶ 4} After independently reviewing the record in this case, we adopt the 
board’s findings of misconduct with one exception, and we permanently disbar 
Okuley from the practice of law in Ohio. 
 
1. The panel unanimously dismissed 13 of the alleged rule violations based on the insufficiency of 
the evidence.  Because those dismissals included dismissing all the violations alleged in Count Four, 
Count Four will not be discussed in this opinion. 
January Term, 2021 
 
3
Misconduct 
Counts One and Two: Conflicts of Interest Relating to the Rivers Edge Building 
{¶ 5} In January 2009, Jerry Mueller, Gerald Smith, and Okuley practiced 
at the law firm of Mueller, Smith & Okuley, L.L.C., which had offices located at 
7700 Rivers Edge Drive in Columbus, Ohio.  The Rivers Edge building was owned 
by 7700 RED One, Ltd. (“RED One”).  RED One was owned by Mueller and Smith, 
Ltd., and B&O Capital, Ltd., which was owned by Okuley and his wife. 
{¶ 6} Mueller left the firm in July 2011 following a dispute.  The terms of 
his departure and valuation of his membership interest in Mueller and Smith, Ltd., 
were set forth in a termination agreement.  Upon Mueller’s departure, Okuley and 
Smith began operating as Okuley Smith, L.L.C., in the Rivers Edge building.  
Mueller and Smith, Ltd., then changed its name to Bluffview Edge, Ltd., and its 
sole member going forward was the Gerald L. Smith Trust. 
{¶ 7} In December 2011, Mueller filed a lawsuit against Smith, Okuley, and 
a number of business entities including RED One, B&O Capital, and Bluffview 
Edge to enforce the terms of his termination agreement (“the Mueller litigation”).  
During the course of that litigation, Okuley appeared as legal counsel for RED One, 
B&O Capital, and himself, and he also represented the interests of Bluffview Edge.  
On one or more occasions, he also provided legal representation to Smith and to 
other related business entities.  Although the parties entered into a formal settlement 
agreement in September 2016, disputes arose regarding the enforcement of that 
agreement.  All told, the Mueller litigation spanned more than seven years. 
{¶ 8} In 2013, the members of RED One adopted a resolution authorizing 
Okuley to serve as that entity’s chief operating officer and tax-matters partner and 
to use the company’s funds to perform necessary repairs and maintenance to the 
Rivers Edge building.  By the end of 2016, the property taxes for the building were 
delinquent, the building had heating and air-conditioning problems, and Okuley 
Smith, L.L.C., was behind in its rent payments. 
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{¶ 9} According to Okuley, B&O Capital in November 2016 was prepared 
to invest in RED One to pay off tax liens on the building and to pay money that was 
owed under the settlement agreement in the Mueller litigation.  To that end, Okuley 
prepared, executed, and recorded a $354,000 mortgage on behalf of RED One in 
favor of B&O Capital—while he represented both RED One and B&O Capital in 
the Mueller litigation.  Following Smith’s death on January 3, 2017, Smith’s heirs 
objected to the mortgage.  That mortgage was never funded and Okuley eventually 
released it. 
{¶ 10} Okuley later arranged for RED One to borrow a total of $65,000 
from Three Sisters Capital, Ltd., a company owned by his wife, his sister, and his 
sister-in-law, to pay approximately one-half of the money owed under the terms of 
the settlement that had been reached in the Mueller litigation.  In an August 2017 
filing with the Ohio secretary of state, Okuley represented that he was the attorney 
for Three Sisters.  He then prepared a mortgage to secure the $65,000 loan.  Okuley 
executed and recorded the mortgage on behalf of RED One on November 1, 2017.  
By that time, Bluffview Edge and Smith’s son, as trustee on behalf of the Gerald L. 
Smith Trust, had filed a motion in the ongoing Mueller litigation to place RED One 
and the Rivers Edge property in receivership.  That motion was granted on 
November 17, 2017, and the building was sold in May 2018.  RED One was 
dissolved and the proceeds of the sale were distributed to various parties, with 
Three Sisters receiving a $30,000 settlement for its $65,000 loan. 
{¶ 11} At Okuley’s disciplinary hearing, Paul Rose, a professor at the Ohio 
State University Moritz College of Law, the college’s director of the Law, Finance, 
and Governance Program, and the Associate Dean for Strategic Initiatives, testified 
regarding the business relationships at issue in this case.  Rose—whose scholarship, 
teaching, and work as a lawyer have focused on corporate and business-entity 
formation and governance—spent approximately 17 hours reviewing documents 
supplied by relator and wrote a comprehensive report. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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{¶ 12} Rose testified that the interests of RED One, Bluffview Edge, and 
B&O Capital were clearly adverse by November 2016 when RED One executed 
the mortgage in favor of B&O Capital.  Not only was Okuley representing clients 
on opposite sides of the transaction, he was acting as the chief operating officer of 
RED One and had an ownership interest in B&O Capital, which also had an 
ownership interest in RED One.  Okuley also represented both sides of the 
mortgage transaction between RED One and Three Sisters.  Moreover, Rose 
testified that those transactions were occurring because RED One was in financial 
distress, Smith’s heirs had clearly expressed concerns in the motion for receivership 
about conflicts of interest, and litigation regarding the various financial interests 
was likely as the parties sought payment from a limited pool of funds. 
{¶ 13} One of the stipulated exhibits submitted at the disciplinary hearing 
was a letter dated March 12, 2013, that Okuley and another attorney at Okuley 
Smith, L.L.C., purportedly had sent to Okuley, Smith, RED One, and Red One’s 
members.  That letter stated that “there could be conflicting interests between the 
various defendants” in the Mueller litigation and that the law firm was willing to 
provide legal representation “[s]o long as there is no actual conflict” and the 
addressees “agree to waive any present conflicts.”  It also informed the addressees 
that they “should discuss the representation by Okuley Smith LLC with any other 
counsel of your choosing.”  But that letter was not signed by any of the addressees.  
And there is no evidence that any of the clients that Okuley represented regarding 
the Mueller litigation or the related mortgages ever gave informed, written consent 
concerning any potential or actual conflicts that might have been created by 
Okuley’s representation. 
{¶ 14} The board found that Okuley’s representation of multiple parties in 
the Mueller litigation and the related transactions created multiple conflicts of 
interest.  For example, Okuley represented RED One and its members, as well as 
Three Sisters, when the interests of those entities were not aligned—most notably 
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when they were on opposite sides of mortgage transactions.  See Columbus Bar 
Assn. v. Ewing, 63 Ohio St.3d 377, 379-380, 588 N.E.2d 783 (1992) (recognizing 
that representation of both the lender and the borrower within the same transaction 
creates a conflict of interest).  The board found that the interests of Okuley’s clients 
were adverse and that there was a substantial risk that Okuley’s ability to consider, 
recommend, or carry out a course of action for any one of his clients was materially 
limited by his responsibilities to his other clients and by his own personal interests.  
Consequently, 
the 
board 
found 
that 
Okuley’s 
conduct 
violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer’s continued representation of a client 
if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client) 
and 1.7(a)(2) (providing that a lawyer’s continued representation of a client creates 
a conflict of interest if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent 
the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client, former client, or third person or by the lawyer’s own personal interests). 
{¶ 15} The board also found that Okuley was unable to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each of the affected clients due to the various conflicts 
of interest.  Moreover, there was no signed writing in which the clients gave their 
informed consent to his representation of those conflicting interests.  And to the 
extent that Okuley’s representation involved one client’s claims for money against 
another client in the same proceeding, those conflicts could not be waived.  
Therefore the board found that Okuley’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(b) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from accepting or continuing the representation of a client if 
such representation would create a conflict of interest, unless the lawyer would be 
able to provide competent, diligent representation to each affected client, each 
affected client gives informed consent in writing, and the representation is not 
otherwise prohibited by rule or law) and 1.7(c)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
accepting or continuing a representation if the representation would involve the 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer 
in the same proceeding). 
{¶ 16} Given the numerous conflicts of interests arising from Okuley’s 
representation of multiple clients—including himself, his wife, Smith, and various 
business entities—regarding the Mueller litigation and the related mortgages 
without first obtaining informed consent to those conflicts in writing, the board also 
found that Okuley violated the following disciplinary rules: 
 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, 
security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless (1) the terms 
of the transaction are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed to the client in 
writing, (2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of obtaining 
independent legal counsel, and (3) the client gives informed consent in a 
writing signed by the client to the essential terms of the transaction and the 
lawyer’s role in the transaction);  
 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.13(a) (providing that a lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting through its constituents and 
owes allegiance to the organization and not to its constituents or any other 
person connected with the organization); and  
 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.13(e) (providing that a lawyer representing an organization 
may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, 
shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the consent requirements of 
Gov.Bar R. 1.7, and that if written consent is required, it shall be given by 
an appropriate official of the organization—not by the individual who is to 
be represented—or by the shareholders). 
{¶ 17} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct. 
 
 
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8
Count Three: Practicing Law While Under Suspension 
{¶ 18} Okuley’s brother, who is also an attorney, worked for Okuley Smith, 
L.L.C., from April 2017 through February 2018.  In February 2018, April Cottle 
met with Okuley and his brother and retained the law firm to represent her in a 
trademark-registration matter regarding one of her business’s products.  Cottle 
corresponded with Okuley by e-mail and signed some documents connected to the 
trademark application electronically in April 2018.  She did not hear anything about 
the status of her matter until Karie Gallegos, a secretary employed by Okuley 
Smith, reached out to her in about late September of that year to confirm Cottle’s 
e-mail address. 
{¶ 19} On October 5, 2018—nine days after we suspended Okuley’s license 
to practice law—someone sent an e-mail to Cottle from Okuley’s e-mail address 
and copied Okuley’s brother and Gallegos on the e-mail.  That e-mail stated that 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office had rejected Cottle’s trademark 
application as being “descriptive.”  The e-mail informed Cottle that the registration 
could be amended and placed on the “Supplemental Register” and that after five 
years, it could then be moved to the principal register.  The e-mail further explained 
that “[w]hat this means is that if you ever needed to litigate on the trademark, you 
would need to prove that the mark was distinctive and not merely descriptive” and 
that “[i]n essence, the registers are a distinction without a significant difference to 
your use of the mark.”  The e-mail included an invoice for $300 and stated that with 
Cottle’s authorization, Okuley’s brother could file the amendment. 
{¶ 20} Gallegos forwarded the October 5, 2018 e-mail to Cottle at a 
different e-mail address on November 8, 2018.  On November 21, 2018, Okuley 
called Cottle to discuss her trademark application and Cottle recorded the call.  
During that conversation, Okuley explained the legal options set forth in the e-mail, 
explained the timing and risks of those options, debated whether the law firm had 
dropped the ball in handling her matter, and suggested that his brother had done 
January Term, 2021 
 
9
most of the work in the matter and had sent the recent e-mail.  Okuley also 
expressed his opinion—based upon his knowledge and experience—that the only 
people who would have had standing to oppose Cottle’s trademark were members 
of Cottle’s own family. 
{¶ 21} At his disciplinary hearing, Okuley admitted that the October 5 e-
mail to Cottle contained legal advice, but he denied that he had sent it.  He claimed 
that he had drafted and sent the e-mail to Cottle in September and had instructed 
Gallegos to resend the e-mail to Cottle using his brother’s e-mail address in 
October.  But the documentary evidence shows that Okuley sent the e-mail to Cottle 
on October 5 and then forwarded it to Gallegos on November 8, 2018, identifying 
it as “the September letter to April,” and instructed Gallegos to forward it to Cottle.  
Gallegos testified, and the documentary evidence verifies, that Gallegos forwarded 
the content of the October 5 e-mail to Cottle later in the day on November 8 from 
her own e-mail address with Okuley Smith.  Additionally, Okuley’s brother 
testified that he had not agreed to continue working on Cottle’s matter, directed 
anyone to prepare a $300 invoice in that matter, or authorized Okuley to send any 
e-mails on his behalf when he left the firm in February 2018.  Okuley later 
explained that he was trying to take care of Cottle while he was suspended from 
practicing law and thought that he had an arrangement with his brother to help him. 
{¶ 22} The board found that Okuley continued to practice law while under 
suspension in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession 
in that jurisdiction) and that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) 
by attempting to mislead Cottle into thinking that his brother was the one who had 
sent her the October 5, 2018 e-mail. 
{¶ 23} We adopt these findings of misconduct. 
 
 
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Count Five: Failure to Respond to a Disciplinary Investigation 
{¶ 24} Relator commenced its investigation of Okuley’s misconduct in 
January 2019.  Okuley has stipulated that from January through August 2019, 
relator sent him four letters of inquiry (two regarding the Cottle matter and two 
regarding Okuley’s online biographical information) and that he failed to respond 
to those letters. 
{¶ 25} At his August 28, 2019 deposition, Okuley testified that due to the 
aftereffects of chronic pain that he suffered as the result of injuries that he had 
sustained in a 2016 automobile accident, he did not really care much about the 
letters from relator.  After that deposition, he responded to the letters regarding the 
Cottle matter, but he never responded to relator’s inquiries regarding the 
biographical information.  The board found—and we agree—that Okuley’s failure 
to respond to those letters of inquiry violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a 
disciplinary authority during an investigation). 
Count Six: False Communication Regarding a Lawyer’s Services 
{¶ 26} Following his suspension from the practice of law in September 
2018, Okuley failed to update the biographical information over which he retained 
control on the Internet.  On January 7, 2019, the law firm’s website still identified 
him as one of the attorneys working at the firm and stated that “Dr. Okuley is 
admitted to practice law in Ohio.”  On that date, his profile on the professional-
networking website LinkedIn stated that he was a patent attorney at Okuley Smith, 
L.L.C.  Neither the firm’s website nor Okuley’s LinkedIn profile indicated that he 
had been suspended from the practice of law.  Even after relator sent Okuley a letter 
asking him to explain why he continued to hold himself out as an attorney on both 
of those websites—and after relator filed its initial complaint in this case—the 
information on those sites remained unchanged. 
January Term, 2021 
 
11 
{¶ 27} The board found that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 7.1 
(prohibiting a lawyer from making or using false, misleading, or nonverifiable 
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services).  We accept this finding 
of misconduct. 
Count Seven: Conduct Adversely Reflecting on Okuley’s Fitness to Practice Law 
{¶ 28} In the final count of its second amended complaint, relator alleged 
that Okuley engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law 
in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  This court has held: 
 
In order to find a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), there must be 
clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer has engaged in 
misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law, even though that conduct is not specifically prohibited by the 
rules, or there must be proof that the conduct giving rise to a specific 
rule violation is so egregious as to warrant an additional finding that 
it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 
 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 
500, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 29} To support its allegation that Okuley had demonstrated that he was 
unfit to practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), relator primarily relied 
upon the facts that Okuley was being treated for depression and “avoidance” when 
his misconduct occurred and that he suffered from posttraumatic migraines after he 
was seriously injured in a 2016 automobile accident.  The board found that although 
Okuley blamed his medical conditions for his failure to respond to relator’s letters 
of inquiry, he presented no medical evidence to establish the existence of those 
conditions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 30} We have never found that the existence of mental or physical 
disorders alone is sufficient to establish that a lawyer has engaged in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  On the contrary, we have expressly declined to find a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) when a relator has relied solely on the fact that a 
respondent has a mental or substance-use disorder to establish the existence of the 
violation, noting that such conditions “often lead to ethical violations but are not 
themselves ethical violations.”  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Allerding, 123 Ohio St.3d 
382, 2009-Ohio-5589, 916 N.E.2d 808, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 31} Here, the board found that Okuley violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by 
falsely stating that (1) his brother was the responsible party in the law firm’s 
handling of Cottle’s trademark registration, (2) he had instructed Gallegos to send 
the October 5, 2018 e-mail to Cottle before he was suspended from the practice of 
law, and (3) he could not access his firm’s website or his LinkedIn profile to remove 
all references to his status as a licensed attorney.  But relator did not allege those 
facts with respect to this count and we have already found that Okuley’s 
misrepresentations regarding the Cottle matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  
Moreover, relator has failed to establish that any other conduct with respect to this 
alleged violation either adversely reflects upon Okuley’s fitness to practice law, 
even though it is not specifically prohibited by the rules, or is so egregious as to 
warrant an additional finding that it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law, as required by our decision in Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-
3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, at ¶ 21.  Consequently, we reject the board’s finding that 
relator has established a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
Sanction 
{¶ 32} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
January Term, 2021 
 
13 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 33} The board found that five aggravating factors are present in this case.  
Okuley has prior discipline, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed 
multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), 
(4), (5), and (7).  The board also found that none of the mitigating factors set forth 
in Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C) are present and noted that although Okuley suggested that 
health issues may have contributed to some of his misconduct, he did not submit 
any evidence to establish those conditions as qualifying mitigating disorders under 
Prof.Cond.R. V(13)(C)(7). 
{¶ 34} In a posthearing brief, relator argued that Okuley’s misconduct 
warranted permanent disbarment.  Although the panel chair gave Okuley the 
opportunity to respond to relator’s brief and to submit character letters after the 
hearing, Okuley did not avail himself of those opportunities. 
{¶ 35} In determining the appropriate sanction for Okuley’s misconduct, 
the board considered several cases in which we imposed indefinite suspensions on 
attorneys who continued to engage in limited instances of the practice of law while 
their licenses were under suspension and then failed to cooperate in the ensuing 
disciplinary investigations.  In those cases, the attorneys largely continued to 
practice law in violation of continuing-legal-education and registration 
suspensions—conduct for which we have routinely imposed indefinite suspensions.  
See Columbus Bar Assn. v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012-Ohio-5004, 979 
N.E.2d 321; Disciplinary Counsel v. Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008-Ohio-
1509, 884 N.E.2d 1070.  In this case, however, Okuley continued to engage in the 
practice of law in violation of a suspension imposed for dishonesty and other related 
misconduct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
{¶ 36} Relying on a number of cases in which we permanently disbarred 
attorneys who continued to engage in the practice of law while their licenses were 
under suspension for professional misconduct, the board recommends that we 
permanently disbar Okuley. 
{¶ 37} For more than 25 years, we have recognized that “[a]bsent any 
mitigating circumstances, the normal penalty for ignoring previous orders of the 
court and continuing to practice law while under suspension is disbarment.”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers, 80 Ohio St.3d 441, 443, 687 N.E.2d 415 (1997), 
citing Disciplinary Counsel v. McDonald, 71 Ohio St.3d 628, 646 N.E.2d 819 
(1995).  Following that line of cases in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Cicirella, 
133 Ohio St.3d 448, 2012-Ohio-4300, 979 N.E.2d 244, ¶ 11, we acknowledged that 
“disbarment is the presumptive sanction for continuing to practice law while under 
suspension.”  We then disbarred Cicirella for drafting living trusts and agreeing to 
perform additional legal services—all while her license was suspended for other 
professional misconduct.  No mitigating factors were present.  Aggravating factors 
included Cicirella’s prior discipline, dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, 
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of her conduct, and harm to a vulnerable client. 
{¶ 38} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher, 135 Ohio St.3d 404, 2013-Ohio-
1510, 987 N.E.2d 678, an attorney continued to represent two existing clients and 
began to represent two additional clients while his license was suspended for 
professional misconduct.  He identified himself as an attorney, counseled those 
clients, appeared and represented them in court, and filed documents on their behalf 
for more than a year.  He also neglected the legal matter of one of those clients and 
offered false testimony during a deposition about his conduct.  Although Fletcher 
cooperated in the resulting investigation and made timely restitution to his clients, 
we agreed with the board’s assessment that those mitigating factors did not justify 
a departure from the presumptive sanction of permanent disbarment. 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
{¶ 39} We have also permanently disbarred an attorney who prepared a 
letter for clients while his license was under suspension for professional 
misconduct, signed the letter using the name of another attorney without that 
attorney’s permission, and prepared a complaint on behalf of those clients.  
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Shabazz, 74 Ohio St.3d 24, 656 N.E.2d 325 (1995). 
{¶ 40} Here, Okuley continued to practice law by giving legal advice to 
Cottle on two occasions after we had suspended his law license and then attempted 
to blame his brother and his secretary for his actions.  The presumptive sanction for 
that misconduct alone is permanent disbarment.  But Okuley also committed 
additional misconduct before and after his license was suspended.  The totality of 
that misconduct, combined with the significant aggravating factors present in this 
case—including Okuley’s failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
misconduct—and the complete absence of mitigating evidence make permanent 
disbarment particularly appropriate here. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} Accordingly, John Joseph Okuley is hereby permanently disbarred 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Okuley. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., and Joanne S. Beasy; Anne M. 
Valentine; and Kent R. Markus, Bar Counsel, and Thomas E. Zani, Deputy Bar 
Counsel, for relator. 
John Joseph Okuley, pro se. 
_________________