Case Title: GWENDOLYN COLLINS V COMERICA BANK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 227834

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 2, 2003  
GWENDOLYN COLLINS,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121563  
COMERICA BANK and CATHY MASALSKIS,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
The issue presented in this case concerns when the period  
of limitation begins to run for a claim of discriminatory  
termination of employment under the Civil Rights Act, MCL  
37.2101 et seq.  
I. Background  
Plaintiff Gwendolyn Collins was employed by defendant  
Comerica 
Bank 
as 
a 
customer-service representative.  In August  
1996, defendant1 notified plaintiff that an investigation was  
1 For ease of reference, defendants Comerica Bank and 
Cathy Masalskis will collectively be referred to as  
“defendant.”  
 
being conducted to determine whether she had accepted cash  
gifts 
from 
customers 
or disclosed customer account balances to  
third parties.  
On September 5, 1996, defendant suspended plaintiff,  
apparently for failing to cooperate with the investigation.  
While 
suspended, 
plaintiff was required to be available during  
normal working hours.2  After the investigation was completed,  
defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on September 25,  
1996.  
On September 24, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint  
alleging, inter alia, that the termination of her employment  
was the product of race and gender discrimination.  Defendant  
moved for summary disposition on several grounds.  One of the  
arguments advanced by defendant was that plaintiff failed to  
meet the applicable three-year period of limitation on filing  
discrimination claims, MCL 600.5805(10).  
The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that  
plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination  
arose on the date of termination, September 25, 1996.  
Therefore, 
plaintiff’s 
filing 
of 
the 
complaint 
on  
September 24, 1999, satisfied the statute of limitations.  
The Court of Appeals granted defendant interlocutory  
2 Plaintiff signed the following agreement:  
I, 
Gwen 
Collins, 
understand 
effective  
Thursday, Sept. 5, 1996, I am being suspended 
indefinitely 
with 
pay 
pending 
further  
investigation.
 I understand that I must be  
available to the bank during my normal scheduled 
working hours.  
2  
 
leave to appeal.  Relying primarily on Parker v Cadillac Gage  
Textron, Inc, 214 Mich App 288; 542 NW2d 365 (1995), the Court  
reversed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that  
plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination  
accrued on the last day plaintiff actually worked, September  
5, 1996.  Because plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September  
24, 1999, the Court of Appeals held that it was time-barred.  
Plaintiff sought leave to appeal with this Court.  
II. Standard of Review  
Whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of  
limitations is a question of law, which we review de novo.  
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663  
(2002).  Similarly, we review de novo decisions on summary  
disposition motions.  First Public Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich  
101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003).  
III. Discussion  
In Parker, the plaintiffs were advised on December 3,  
1990, that they would be among the next group of employees to  
be laid off pursuant to a work force reduction plan.  On  
December 21, 1990, the plaintiffs worked their last day.  
However, 
the 
defendant’s 
records 
indicated 
that 
the  
plaintiffs’ “effective date of separation” was January 7,  
1991.
 The plaintiffs filed claims for discriminatory  
termination on January 7, 1994, and the defendant moved for  
summary disposition on the ground that the period of  
limitation had expired.  
The Court of Appeals in Parker rejected the proposition  
3  
 
 
that the period of limitation on a discriminatory employment  
termination claim begins to run on the “effective date of  
separation,” writing:  
A claim of discriminatory discharge accrues on 
the date the plaintiff is discharged.  The last day  
worked is the date of discharge.  Subsequent 
severance or vacation pay does not affect the date 
of discharge.  In this case, plaintiffs filed their 
case more than three years after the date they were 
discharged.  Despite the fact that January 7, 1991,  
may have been plaintiffs’ “effective” date of 
separation, it is undisputed that the last day they 
actually worked was December 21, 1990. [Parker,  
supra at 290 (internal citations omitted).]  
Relying on Parker, the Court of Appeals in the present  
case 
held 
that 
plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory  
termination accrued on the last day she actually performed  
work for defendant. 
Because plaintiff was a suspended  
employee on the date of her termination, the Court of Appeals  
held that the day of her suspension served as her last day  
worked and, according to Parker, the date of her discharge.  
Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial  
of defendant’s motion for summary disposition, disagreeing  
with the trial court that the applicable period of limitation  
began to run on the date plaintiff was actually terminated  
from employment as a result of the investigation. The Court  
of Appeals concluded:  
Because plaintiff’s last day of work was 
September 5, 1996, claims of race and gender 
discrimination were required to be filed on or  
before September 5, 1999. 
Since plaintiff’s 
complaint was not filed until September 24, 1999, 
her discrimination claims were time-barred and the  
trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion  
for 
summary 
disposition 
on 
these 
claims.  
[Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 30,  
4  
 
 
2002 (Docket No. 227834), p 3.]  
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that the limitation  
period for plaintiff’s discrimination claims began to run on  
the date of her suspension, September 5, 1996, even though  
plaintiff’s employment was not terminated until September 25,  
1996.
 The Court did so because the last day plaintiff  
“actually worked” was the date of her suspension on September  
5, 1996, and the Court read Parker as instructing that the  
last day worked is always the date of discharge. We disagree.  
Properly understood, Parker’s “last day worked” holding  
is limited to situations where a discriminatory discharge  
claim has already surfaced.  We agree with Parker’s holding  
because the “effective date of separation” there was not the  
date of discharge.  Rather, where a plaintiff has already been  
subjected 
to 
an 
alleged discriminatory termination, a cause of  
action naturally accrues on the last day an employee worked.  
However, if a discharge has yet to occur, it cannot be  
said that the last day worked represents the discharge date.  
Simply put, a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise  
until a claimant has been discharged. Accordingly, the “last  
day worked” cannot represent the date of discharge, as held in  
Parker, where a claimant’s last day actually worked precedes  
the discharge.  
In the present case, even though plaintiff was suspended  
on September 5, 1996, and in retrospect that date represents  
the last day she actually worked, it was not until September  
25, 1996 that she was actually discharged, or terminated, from  
5  
 
employment. Unlike the plaintiffs in Parker who knew on the  
last day they worked that their employment had been terminated  
and that they were being discharged as employees on that date,  
on September 5, 1996, plaintiff in this case only knew that  
she had been suspended indefinitely.  
On September 5, 1996, plaintiff had not been terminated  
and thus had no causes of action based on her discharge on  
that date.  In fact, although it may have been a foregone  
conclusion that the investigation would lead to plaintiff’s  
termination, it is clear that plaintiff’s official status as  
an 
employee 
was 
nothing other than “suspended” until September  
25, 1996, when her employment was terminated as a result of  
the investigation. 
“Suspended” does not equate with  
“terminated” or “discharged,” and, thus, being suspended does  
not create a cause of action for discharge or termination.  
Accordingly, 
plaintiff’s 
causes 
of 
action 
for  
discriminatory termination had yet to arise on the date of her  
suspension, September 5, 1996, and the limitation period does  
not begin to run before a cause of action accrues.  Plaintiff  
had no causes of action for discriminatory termination on  
September 5, 1996.3  
Because we hold that plaintiff’s causes of action for  
3 We note that Sumner v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 
427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), does not compel a different 
result. Sumner concerned the “continuing violation theory,” 
which is not relevant to a cause of action for discriminatory 
termination of employment, because a termination occurs at a 
fixed time and is not susceptible to being a continuing 
violation.  Plaintiff has filed suit for discriminatory 
termination, not discriminatory suspension.  
6  
discriminatory termination did not arise until the date she  
was 
discharged 
as 
an 
employee, September 25, 1996, plaintiff’s  
filing of her complaint on September 24, 1999 satisfied the  
three-year 
period 
of 
limitation.  Accordingly, the trial court  
properly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on  
this ground.  
IV. Conclusion  
For these reasons, we reverse in part the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for further  
proceedings consistent with this opinion.4
 In all other  
respects, leave to appeal is denied.5  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.  
We concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
4 
 Because the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff’s 
discrimination claims on the basis of a statute of limitations  
analysis, 
it 
did 
not 
address 
defendant 
Masalskis’s 
alternative 
issue 
concerning 
whether 
she 
was 
properly 
served.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should address this matter 
on remand.  
5 We do not disrupt the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
regarding the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims for tortious 
interference of contract and business relations and invasion  
of privacy.  
7