Case Title: Belinda Snopek v. Lakeland Medical Center

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003645

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3645 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Belinda Snopek and Russell Snopek,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Lakeland Medical Center,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 537, 573 N.W.2d 213 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 10, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Bradley, J., joins 
 
 
Wilcox, J. concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Prosser, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Lori Gendelman, Jeffrey J.P. Conta and Otjen, Van Ert, 
Stangle, Lieb & Weir, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Lori 
Gendelman. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by Richard J. Steinberg, Richard D. Steinberg and Steinberg Law 
Offices, S.C., Brookfield and oral argument by Richard D. 
Steinberg. 
 
 
No.  96-3645 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3645 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Belinda Snopek and Russell Snopek,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Lakeland Medical Center,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JAN 21, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Lakeland Medical Center 
(Lakeland), a medical facility previously owned by Walworth 
County, seeks review of a published court of appeals’ decision1 
which held that Belinda Snopek was not time-barred from suing 
Lakeland for an injury she sustained in 1979 but for which she 
did not bring suit until discovery of the injury in 1995.  At 
the time of Snopek’s injury in 1979, a plaintiff had to give a 
governmental entity notice of the injury within 120 days after 
the injury-causing event before bringing an action against that 
governmental entity.  In 1986 the legislature amended the 
statute to require a notice of injury for medical malpractice 
claims within 180 days from when the injury was discovered or 
should have been discovered.  The issue presented by this case 
                     
1 Snopek v. Lakeland Medical Center, 215 Wis. 2d 537, 573 
N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1997).  
No.  96-3645 
 
2 
is whether this 1986 legislative amendment can be applied 
retroactively.  Because the legislature clearly stated its 
intent that the amendment would only apply to injuries occurring 
after the date of enactment of the statute, we hold that the 
legislative amendment requiring notice of injury within 180 days 
of discovery can be applied prospectively only.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals’ decision.  
¶2 
The facts underlying this action are these.  On June 
20, 1979, Snopek was treated at Lakeland for injuries she 
sustained in an automobile accident.  The parties do not dispute 
that at that time, Lakeland was owned and operated by Walworth 
County and therefore was a governmental subdivision or agency 
for purposes of the notice of injury statute.  Accordingly, 
before a party could bring an action against Lakeland, Lakeland 
as a governmental agency, was entitled to notice of injury.   
¶3 
Snopek 
had 
injured 
her 
knee 
in 
the 
automobile 
accident.  From the time of the accident until 1995 Snopek had 
intermittent pain, swelling and weakness in her knee.  In 
February 1995, during arthroscopic knee surgery, the surgeon 
discovered a piece of plastic lodged in Snopek’s knee.  Because 
Snopek’s knee improved considerably after removing the plastic, 
her physician concluded in June 1995 that her knee problems had 
been caused by the plastic left imbedded in her knee from the 
accident in 1979.  
¶4 
On July 31, 1995, Snopek filed a Request for Mediation 
with the Medical Mediation Panel.  Later, on December 8, 1995, 
Snopek filed a summons and complaint alleging that Lakeland was 
No.  96-3645 
 
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negligent in its acts and omissions in Snopek’s care.  In its 
answer Lakeland alleged that Snopek failed to file a notice of 
injury and notice of claim and therefore her claim was barred 
because she failed to timely meet a condition precedent.  
Lakeland then filed a motion for summary judgment.  Lakeland 
asserted that the notice statute in effect at the time of the 
accident, Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (1977) (reprinted below),2 which 
required the plaintiff to give notice of injury within “120 days 
after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim,” 
governed this action.  Snopek countered that the applicable 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. 895.43 (1977) provides: 
(1) No action may be brought or maintained against 
any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof . . . upon a claim or cause of action 
unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency . . . ; and 
(b) A claim containing the address of the claimant 
and an itemized statement of the relief sought is 
presented to the appropriate clerk or person who 
performs the duties of a clerk . . . and the claim is 
disallowed.  Failure of the appropriate body to 
disallow within 120 days after presentation is a 
disallowance.  Notice of disallowance shall be served 
on the claimant by registered or certified mail . . . 
.  No action on a claim against any defendant fire 
company, 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
nor 
against any defendant . . . employe, may be brought 
after 6 months from the date of service of the notice, 
and the notice shall contain a statement to that 
effect. 
(c)  
No.  96-3645 
 
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notice statute was the one in effect at the time she discovered 
her injury, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m) (1993-94) (reprinted below),3 
which requires notice of injury within 180 days from when the 
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered her injury. 
¶5 
The Circuit Court for Walworth County, Judge James L. 
Carlson presiding, determined that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m), the 
statute in effect when Snopek discovered her injury, was 
controlling.   
¶6 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
order.  Snopek v. Lakeland Medical Center, 215 Wis. 2d 537, 540, 
573 N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1997).  The court of appeals reasoned 
that the notice statute is a procedural condition precedent to 
bringing or maintaining an action against the governmental 
entities listed in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and therefore can be 
applied retroactively.  See id. at 540.  This court accepted 
                     
3  References to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 
version unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as provided in subs. (1m) and (1p), no 
action may be brought or maintained against any 
volunteer 
fire company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof . . . upon a claim or cause of action 
unless: 
. . .  
(1m) With regard to a claim to recover damages for 
medical malpractice, the time period under sub. (1)(a) 
shall be 180 days after discovery of the injury or the 
date 
on 
which, 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence, the injury should have been discovered, 
rather than 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim. 
 
No.  96-3645 
 
5 
Lakeland’s petition for review of the court of appeals’ 
decision. 
¶7 
The issue presented by this case is whether the 1986 
amendment which changed the prescribed time within which to give 
notice of injury for medical malpractice claims from 120 days 
after the injury-causing event to 180 days after the injury is 
discovered or should have been discovered, can be applied 
retroactively.  The question of whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m) 
can be applied retroactively is a question of law which this 
court reviews de novo.  In re Marriage of Schulz v. Ystad, 155 
Wis. 2d 574, 596, 456 N.W.2d 312 (1990) (citing Chappy v. LIRC, 
136 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987)).   
¶8 
Generally, 
statutes 
are 
applied 
prospectively.  
Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 597.  “Strong common-law tradition 
defines the legislature’s primary function as declaring law to 
regulate future behavior.  Thus, as a matter of justice, no law 
should be enforced before people can learn of its existence and 
conduct 
themselves 
accordingly. 
 
In 
short, 
retroactivity 
disturbs the stability of past transactions.”  Id. (citing 
Employers Ins. v. Smith, 154 Wis. 2d 199, 453 N.W.2d 856 
(1990)).  
¶9 
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule.  
A statute may be applied retroactively if: 1) by express 
language or by necessary implication, the statutory language 
reveals legislative intent that it apply retroactively, Schulz, 
155 Wis. 2d at 597; or 2) the statute is remedial or procedural 
rather than substantive, Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17-
No.  96-3645 
 
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18, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981).  If a statute falls under the second 
exceptionthat is, it is remedial or proceduralit nonetheless 
cannot be applied retroactively if the legislature clearly 
expressed its intent that it be applied prospectively only, or 
retroactive application would impair contracts or vested rights. 
 Modica v. Verhulst, 195 Wis. 2d 633, 643, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. 
App. 1995).   
¶10 The parties in this case do not argue, and we find no 
support for the first exception to prospective application of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m).  Section 893.80(1m) contains no express 
language, nor is there a necessary implication, that the statute 
apply retroactively.  See, e.g., Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 597.   
¶11 Snopek argues that the notice of injury statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1m), applies retroactively because it falls 
within the second exception to prospective applicationit is a 
condition precedent which is procedural.  Lakeland agrees that 
the notice of injury statute is a condition precedent.  However, 
Lakeland asserts that the change in the time in which plaintiffs 
must act, from 120 days from the injury-causing event to 180 
days after discovery of the injury, is substantive and therefore 
applied prospectively only. 
¶12 We agree that the notice of injury statute is a 
condition precedent.  A condition precedent limits “'the time 
within which a certain prescribed act, necessary to the 
enforcement of [the plaintiff’s] cause of action, shall be 
done.’”  Ocampo v. Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 509, 137 N.W.2d 477 
(1965) (quoting Troschansky v. Milwaukee E.R. & L. Co., 110 Wis. 
No.  96-3645 
 
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570, 571, 86 N.W. 156 (1910)).  It is well-established that the 
notice of injury statute which sets the time (previously 120 
days from the injury-causing event and now 180 days from the 
discovery of the injury) within which a certain prescribed act 
(notice of injury) shall be done, is a condition precedent to 
the plaintiff’s right to recover from a governmental entity such 
as county-owned Lakeland.  Ocampo, 28 Wis. 2d at 508-10.  
Failure of a party to fulfill the procedure of giving a 
governmental entity a notice of injury within the prescribed 
time results in such party losing the right to proceed with an 
action 
against 
the 
governmental 
entity. 
 
Id. 
(citing 
Troschansky, 110 Wis. at 571).  See also Modica, 195 Wis. 2d at 
643. 
¶13 A procedural statute is usually an exception to the 
general rule that a statute is applied prospectively.  See 
Gutter, 103 Wis. 2d at 17-18.  However, we must further 
determine whether the legislature clearly expressed its intent 
that the statute apply prospectively only.  See Modica, 195 
Wis. 2d at 643.   
¶14 When the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m) 
in 1985 Wis. Act 340, it clearly expressed its intent that the 
statute be applied prospectively only.  In a non-statutory 
provision 
entitled 
“Initial 
applicability” 
the 
legislature 
specified that § 893.80(1m) “first applies to claims arising 
from occurrences on the effective date of this subsection.”  
1985 Wis. Act 340, § 75(14).  In other words, § 893.80(1m), 
requiring notice of injury within 180 days from when the injury 
No.  96-3645 
 
8 
was, 
or 
should 
have 
been 
discovered, 
first 
applies 
to 
occurrences happening on the effective date of the act, June 14, 
1986.  Although the legislature did not define “occurrences,” we 
determine that, as in most insurance contracts, “occurrence” 
refers to the event or accident which causes harm.  See, e.g., 
Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 
737-40, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984); Welter v. Singer, 126 Wis. 2d 
242, 248, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1985).  By specifying the 
initial applicability of § 893.80(1m), the legislature clarified 
that the notice conditions to bringing and maintaining an action 
for medical malpractice against the governmental entities listed 
in the statute would apply prospectively only.   
¶15 Our conclusion is supported by reviewing 1985 Wis. Act 
340, § 75(14) within the context of § 75.  Throughout § 75 the 
legislature provided different time frames for the initial 
applicability of the different subsections of the act.  Most 
notably, in § 75(9) the legislature provided that the amendment 
to Wis. Stat. § 655.009(1) providing that a complaint in a 
medical malpractice action must not specify the amount of money 
to which a plaintiff believes he or she is entitled, “first 
applies to claims 
filed 
on 
the 
effective date of 
this 
subsection.”  1985 Wis. Act 340, § 75(9).  To have a valid claim 
on the effective date of the subsection the injury must have 
occurred before the effective date.  However, comparing § 75(9) 
with § 75(14) which provides that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m) first 
applies to “claims arising from occurrences on the effective 
date of this subsection” indicates that the legislature made a 
No.  96-3645 
 
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distinction between claims and occurrences, the latter being the 
triggering event for initial application of § 893.80(1m).   
¶15a Because the legislature expressed its intent that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1m) first apply to occurrences on the effective 
date of the subsection, occurrences which give rise to claims, 
the legislature intended that § 893.80(1m) apply prospectively. 
 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision.  
Snopek’s claim is barred because she failed to comply with the 
statute in effect at the time of her injury which required 
filing a notice of injury with Lakeland “within 120 days after 
the happening of the event giving rise to [her] claim.” 
¶15b Because the legislature clearly expressed its intent 
for prospective application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m), we need 
not determine whether retroactive application of the statute 
would impair contracts or vested rights. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 96-3645.ssa 
 
1 
¶16 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).    
The determinative issue according to the majority opinion is the 
meaning of 1985 Wis. Act 340, § 75(14).  Neither party raised or 
argued this provision in its briefs to this court.  Although the 
majority opinion sets forth a reasonable interpretation of 
§ 75(14), I would have preferred that the court give the parties 
an opportunity to brief the issue of the applicability of 
§ 75(14). 
¶17 The majority opinion relies on the definition of 
occurrence in "most insurance policies" to define the word 
"occurrence" as used in the 1985 Act.  I have doubts whether 
definitions of occurrence in insurance policies are helpful in 
interpreting the initial applicability provisions of the Act.  
In any event, the majority appears to believe that most 
insurance contracts define "occurrence" as a single event or 
accident which causes harm and triggers the application of the 
statute.   
¶18 Yet in a case cited by the majority opinion the 
insurance policy defines "occurrence" to mean "an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which 
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured."  Kremers-Urban Co. 
v. American Employers Ins., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 731, 739, 351 
N.W.2d 156 (1984); see also the insurance policies appearing in 
1 Miller's Standard Insurance Policies Annotated passim (4th ed. 
1995).   
No. 96-3645.ssa 
 
2 
¶19 Here, Snopek alleged that the defendants negligently 
failed in their 1979 treatment to identify a foreign object in 
her right knee and that the continuing presence of that foreign 
object caused her intermittent pain, swelling and weakness until 
the object was discovered in 1995 during arthroscopic surgery.  
These allegations indicate the possibility of an occurrence of 
the "continuous or repeated exposure" variety, rather than a 
single event or accident. 
¶20 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
¶21 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  96-3645.jpw 
 
1 
¶22 JON P. WILCOX, J. (Concurring).   While I agree with 
the result, I disagree with the majority’s statement in 
paragraph 12 that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m) (1995-96) is a 
procedural statute.  Majority op. at 6-7.  Rather, I believe 
this court’s decision in Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 
342, 349, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996), dictates that the 180-day 
waiting period in § 893.80(1m), the notice of claim statute at 
issue in this case, is effectively a statute of limitations.   
¶23 The general rule of statutory construction is that 
statutes are to be construed as relating to future and not past 
acts.  Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 
(1981).  However, if a statute is procedural or remedial, rather 
than substantive, the statute is generally given retroactive 
application, as long as the retroactive application does not 
disturb contracts or vested rights.  Id.   
¶24 The distinction between substantive and procedural laws 
is well established.  If a statute prescribes the method, i.e., 
the legal machinery, used in enforcing a right or remedy, it is 
procedural.  City of Madison v. Town of Madison, 127 Wis. 2d 96, 
102, 377 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Steffen v. Little, 
2 Wis. 2d 350, 357, 358, 86 N.W.2d 622 (1957) (setting forth the 
rule, its exception and its qualification).  A remedial statute 
relates to remedies or modes of procedure which do not create new 
or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of a 
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.  City of 
Madison, 127 Wis. 2d at 102.  However, if the law creates, 
No.  96-3645.jpw 
 
2 
defines or regulates rights or obligations, it is substantive.  
Id.  
¶25 This court recently considered the relationship between 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.80 (1993-94), 893.13 (1993-94) and 893.23 
(1993-94), statutes governing notice of claims, tolling of 
statutes of limitation and the tolling provision for statutory 
stays, respectively.  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 342.  In Colby, the 
issue was whether the premature filing of a summons and complaint 
which was subsequently dismissed because of the failure to comply 
with the provisions of § 893.80(1)(b), was sufficient to toll the 
statute of limitations.  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 346.  In reaching 
its decision, the court looked to a virtually identical tolling 
provision in the statutory framework of the state of New York.  
The Colby court noted that New York’s statute tolled the statute 
of limitations when the commencement of an action was to be 
stayed by statutory prohibition, thereby extending the period of 
limitations.  Id. at 354.  For example, in New York, a plaintiff 
who wanted to file suit against the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority had up to 1 year and 30 days from the accrual of the 
cause of action, which included the 30-day waiting period, to 
commence the suit.  Id. at 354-55.     
¶26 In response to the inconsistent tolls resulting from 
the various waiting periods, the New York legislature enacted a 
statute in an attempt to achieve uniformity.  Id. at 355-56, 357 
n.8.  The statute specifically eliminated any tolls for waiting 
periods between the service of a notice of claim and the 
commencement of the action and it lengthened the statute of 
No.  96-3645.jpw 
 
3 
limitations to 1 year and 90 days for all such actions.  Id. at 
356, 357 n.8.   
¶27 Without similar legislative action, the Colby court 
concluded that the interplay between Wis. Stat. § 893.23 (1993-
93), the tolling provision for statutory waiting periods, and 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 (1993-94), in effect, created a statute of 
limitations equal to 3 years and 120 days when filing a claim 
under § 893.80(1)(b).  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 357-58.  By virtue 
of the statutory stay under § 893.23, the court determined that 
the 120-day waiting period, which is required prior to the 
commencement of an action against the county, must be added to 
the statutory limitation of 3 years in order to obtain the time 
within which the action may be brought.  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 
357-58.  The court stated that § 893.80(1)(b) requires the 
plaintiff to first provide the county with a notice of claim, 
followed by either a denial of the claim, or the expiration of 
the 120-day disallowance period, prior to the filing of a summons 
and complaint, all of which must be completed within the 3-year 
and 120-day period of limitations.  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 357-58. 
  
¶28 At first glance, one might question the applicability 
of Colby.  That Colby looked at the notice of claim provision, 
paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) (1993-94), rather than 
the notice of injury provision, paragraph (a), or subsection (1m) 
is insignificant.  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 347.  Subsection (1m) 
merely extends the time period under subsection (1)(a) from 120 
days to 180 days for medical malpractice claims.  The notice of 
No.  96-3645.jpw 
 
4 
injury and notice of claim provisions of § 893.80(1) are 
unambiguously 
stated 
in 
the 
conjunctive; 
therefore, 
both 
provisions must be satisfied before the claimant may commence an 
action against a governmental agency.  Vanstone v. Town of 
Delafield, 191 Wis. 2d 586, 593, 530 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1995).  
Accordingly, Colby speaks to § 893.80(1) as a whole, rather than 
one provision or the other. 
¶29 Colby dictates that the waiting periods contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 (1993-94) are, in effect, statutes of 
limitations.  Statutes of limitations are substantive, not 
procedural, statutes because they create and destroy rights, 
Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 149, 493 
N.W.2d 40 (1992), and therefore, can only be applied to causes of 
action accruing on or after the statute’s effective date.  
Because § 893.80(1m) is a substantive statute which did not 
become effective until June 14, 1986, I also conclude that it can 
not be applied retroactively to the 1979 alleged malpractice. 
¶30 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.   
¶31 I am authorized to state that Justice David T. Prosser 
joins in this concurring opinion.   
 
 
No.  96-3645.jpw 
 
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