Case Title: Schuler v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 
Kevin Andrew Schuler 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v–
State of Indiana 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: September 13, 2018 | Decided: December 4, 2018 
Appeal from the Harrison Superior Court, No. 31D01-1308-MR-508 
The Honorable Vicki L. Carmichael, Special Judge 
On Direct Appeal 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 04 2018, 3:24 pm
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David, Justice 
Defendant Kevin Andrew Schuler pled guilty to the murder of Asenath 
Arnold and to felony murder for the death of Gary Henderson at the 
hands of his accomplice Austin Scott.  Schuler was sentenced to life 
without parole for the murder charge and received a consecutive sixty-
five-year sentence for the felony murder.  Schuler raises four issues in this 
appeal, arguing a violation of his Miranda rights, insufficient evidence to 
support his sentence, that his sentence was inappropriate, and failure of 
the trial court to meet certain requirements in its sentencing statement.  
We affirm the trial court on each of Schuler’s first three claims but remand 
this matter for a new sentencing statement.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Asenath Arnold was found dead in her Harrison County farm home on 
the morning of August 3, 2013.  Arnold, a mostly-bedridden fifty-seven-
year-old woman, had been brutally beaten in her bedroom; her head was 
significantly disfigured, and blood was splattered on the walls and pooled 
underneath her bed.  Gary Henderson, who slept in an upstairs bedroom 
in the same home, was also found dead with multiple stab wounds. 
Later that day in adjacent Floyd County, New Albany police officers 
responded to a call about gun shots fired in a residential neighborhood.  
Police located Austin Scott and Defendant Kevin Schuler shortly 
thereafter and placed them under arrest.  After Miranda warnings were 
given to both individuals, Scott offered that he “killed a man last night” 
and that Schuler killed someone as well.  (Tr. Vol. 3 at 238, Tr. Vol. 5 at 
104, 107).  Police confirmed that Harrison County was working a double 
homicide and took Schuler to the Floyd County Sherriff’s Department for 
further questioning. 
At the police station, interrogators learned that Schuler and Scott were 
driving a four-wheeler early that morning and stopped at Arnold and 
Henderson’s farmhouse to siphon gas from a tractor.  Schuler knew the 
home because he had done work on the property a few years earlier.  
Schuler admitted to police that he followed Scott into the home where 
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Scott pulled out a knife, went upstairs, and killed Henderson.  The two 
took several items from the house including rifles and prescription 
medication but returned when Schuler realized he left his backpack at the 
scene.  Schuler and Scott re-entered the home to see if they could find any 
more pills.  At some point, Schuler found a singletree—a wooden bar 
normally used to hold horses together—on the property and carried it into 
the house. 
Once Schuler and Scott were back in the house, Arnold called out to the 
intruders and started to emerge from her bedroom on the first floor.  
Schuler punched Arnold and she stumbled back to her bed.  Schuler then 
took the singletree and struck Arnold on top of her head.  Arnold prayed 
and pleaded with Schuler for her life.  According to Scott, Schuler swung 
the singletree with two hands “like a sledgehammer,” striking Arnold at 
least twice and as many as four times.  (St. Ex. 30-4 at 47:53-52:00).  In 
addition to Schuler hitting Arnold with the singletree, Scott also stabbed 
her in the face.  Although he couldn’t be completely sure whether he or 
Scott killed Arnold, Schuler told police, “I’m almost positive I killed her.”  
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 250).  An autopsy determined Arnold died of multiple blunt 
force injuries and sharp force wounds to the head.  Schuler and Scott took 
Arnold’s rings and medication before leaving the home. 
Schuler was charged with three counts of murder, Class A felony 
robbery, Class A felony burglary, and Class D felony theft.  The State 
subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, alleging 
that Schuler intentionally killed Arnold while committing the crime of 
robbery.  Schuler ultimately pled guilty to Count 1, murder, and Count 2, 
felony murder, and in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss its request for 
the death penalty and instead requested a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9.  The parties agreed 
that the trial court alone would conduct the sentencing hearing to 
determine whether life without parole or a term of years would be 
imposed.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court verbally gave its 
reasons for the ultimate sentence, including a discussion of potential 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  Schuler was sentenced to life without 
parole on Count 1 and sixty-five (65) years on Count 2 to be served 
consecutively. 
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The present appeal ensued, which we accepted under mandatory 
review pursuant to Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(A)(1)(a).  
Additional facts will be presented below as necessary. 
Discussion and Decision 
Schuler raises four issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:  (1) 
whether Schuler’s Miranda rights were violated during a custodial 
interrogation; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Schuler intentionally killed Asenath Arnold; (3) 
whether Schuler’s sentence was inappropriate; and (4) whether the trial 
court’s sentencing statement complied with Harrison v. State and reflects 
appropriate sentencing considerations.  We will analyze each issue in 
turn. 
I. Schuler’s Miranda rights were not violated. 
Schuler first argues that his Miranda rights were violated when police 
failed to stop all questioning after he requested his attorney during a 
police interrogation.  Schuler was interrogated on two separate occasions 
by Harrison County Detective Nick Smith:  first after Schuler was stopped 
and arrested in New Albany and second when Schuler was taken to the 
Floyd County Police Department about an hour later.  During the second 
interrogation, the following interaction took place:  
--- 
DET. SMITH:  All right.  You have the right to remain silent. Anything 
you say can and will be used against you in court.  You have the right to 
consult with an attorney and have that attorney present during 
questioning.  If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for 
you before any questioning at — at no cost.  If you choose to answer any 
questions we'd ask you now, you still have the right to stop answering 
questions at any time, that never changes.  Do you understand that?  
MR. SCHULER:  Have my attorney now?  
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DET. SMITH:  It's up to you.  If you ask me for an attorney, I can't ask 
you no more questions.  
MR. SCHULER:  This isn't recorded or nothing.  
DET. SMITH:  Everything we do is recorded, buddy.  I've got to tell 
your story and I've got to tell the truth.  I don't want to hide nothing.  If 
you want an attorney, tell me now, and then I will not ask you any 
questions. 
MR. SCHULER:  I — I want my attorney, but I’ll answer, you can ask 
me questions however. 
DET. SMITH:  You got to be specific, buddy.  I mean, if you're telling 
me you want an attorney, I cannot talk to you any more.  
MR. SCHULER:  You — you can go ahead and talk to me, that's fine.  
DET. SMITH:  Are you — I can't really even ask you.  Are you saying 
you want to talk to an attorney before you talk to me?  
MR. SCHULER:  No, you can go ahead.  
DET. SMITH:  Are you positive?  
MR. SCHULER:  Yes.  
DET. SMITH:  Okay.  So you want to talk to me?  
MR. SCHULER:  Yes, sir.  
DET. SMITH:  Okay.  Did you mean a minute ago that you wanted an 
attorney first?  
MR. SCHULER:  Oh, no, I have an attorney.  I don't know if I'm 
supposed to talk to him first or you.  It doesn't matter, I'll go ahead and 
talk to you.  
DET. SMITH:  Only if you want to, buddy.  
MR. SCHULER:  Yeah. 
--- 
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(Tr. Vol. 2 at 156-57).  In the course of the interrogation that followed this 
exchange, Schuler gave details about the two murders and admitted that 
he at least played a role in the death of Asenath Arnold—eventually 
stating, “I’m almost positive I killed her.”  (Tr. Vol. 2 at 244, 250).   
Before entering his guilty plea, Schuler moved to suppress these 
statements, arguing that he unambiguously and unequivocally requested 
an attorney.  Thus, the interview should have stopped, and any statements 
made after this invocation of his right to counsel should have been 
suppressed.  The trial court, however, denied Schuler’s motion and 
proceeded to accept his guilty plea.  
Schuler asks our Court to find that his Fifth Amendment right to an 
attorney was violated and that his motion to suppress should have been 
granted.  When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, we review this 
denial in a manner similar to other sufficiency issues.  Hartman v. State, 
988 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. 2013).  We do not reweigh evidence and there 
“must be substantial evidence of probative value in the record to support 
the trial court’s decision.”  Id.  Within this sufficiency review, we review 
all issues of law de novo.  Id.  
To the extent Schuler claims his request for an attorney was 
unambiguous and unequivocal, we disagree.  When a person is 
questioned by law enforcement officers after being taken into custody, 
that person must first “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and 
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).  Once the accused requests counsel, “the interrogation 
must cease until an attorney is present.”  Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 
1102 (Ind. 2010) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 
1883, 68 L.E.2d 378 (1981)).  This request, however, must be 
“unambiguous and unequivocal.”  Carr, 934 N.E.2d at 1102 (citing 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 379, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259, 176 L.E.2d 
1098 (2010)).   
Police investigators are not required to stop questioning “if a suspect 
makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a 
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reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood 
only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.”  Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) 
(emphasis in original).  If a defendant’s statements are unclear, police may 
ask clarifying questions to determine whether the accused has actually 
requested counsel.  See Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Ind. 2002).  
However, as Schuler argues, “an accused’s postrequest responses to further 
interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of 
the initial request itself.”  Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 
495, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (emphasis in original).  See also Sleek v. State, 499 
N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ind. 1986) (“Even if [an accused’s] request was perceived 
to be inherently ambiguous, or equivocal in light of the preceding events, 
any further questioning should have been narrowly limited to clarifying 
whether [the accused] actually wished to have counsel present.”). 
At issue here is Schuler’s statement, “I want my attorney, but I’ll 
answer, you can ask me questions however.”  In examining courts’ prior 
treatment of similar statements, we cannot agree that this statement is an 
outlier or even on the bleeding edge of Miranda’s jurisprudence.  In Davis, 
for example, the Supreme Court of the United States found the 
defendant’s statement, “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer,” to be 
ambiguous and therefore not a request for counsel.  512 U.S. at 462, 114 
S.Ct. at 2357.  Similarly, in Bailey, 763 N.E.2d at 1003, our Court found the 
statement, “I may need a what do you call it … a [sic] appointed … oh 
appointed attorney” to be an ambiguous request for counsel, and in Taylor 
v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind. 1997), the statement, “I guess I really 
want a lawyer, but, I mean, I’ve never done this before so I don’t know” 
was also found to be an ambiguous request.  Schuler’s statement, in light 
of the circumstances, was arguably more ambiguous than the statements 
made in each of these cases.    
Schuler argues, however, that Detective Smith failed to honor his plain 
request for an attorney.  In support, Schuler points to Anderson v. State, 961 
N.E.2d 19, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, a case in which our Court 
of Appeals found the defendant’s statement, “I really would like to talk to 
an attorney or something,” to be an unequivocal invocation of a right to 
counsel.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the addition of “or 
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something” to the otherwise clear request for counsel did not make the 
statement equivocal.  Id. at 27.  Rather, the phrase “or something” 
appeared to be a habit of speech, and given the reality of an interrogation 
room, the court was satisfied that the entire statement was a clear request 
for an attorney.  Id.  
Schuler’s statement, “I want my attorney, but I’ll answer, you can ask 
me questions however” does not carry the same unambiguous tones of the 
Anderson statement.  A reasonable officer in light of the circumstances 
would have found Schuler’s statement to be ambiguous.  The phrase “but 
I’ll answer, you can ask me questions however” was not a habit of speech; 
it was permission to continue questioning.  Even so, Detective Smith 
confronted the issue directly, asking, “Did you mean a minute ago that 
you wanted an attorney?”  (Tr. Vol. 2 at 157).  Schuler responded, “Oh, no, 
I have an attorney.  I don’t know if I’m supposed to talk to him first or to 
you.  It doesn’t matter, I’ll go ahead and talk to you.”  (Id. (emphasis added)).  
Schuler’s statements, at minimum, show that he was aware of his right to 
an attorney but chose to speak with the detective anyway.  Furthermore, 
we do not think Detective Smith’s clarifying questions injected any 
retrospective doubt into Schuler’s ambiguous statement.  The detective 
acted as any reasonable police officer would in this circumstance and even 
made sure Schuler understood that the interview would stop if he was 
truly requesting an attorney. 
A defendant’s statement is either “an assertion of the right to counsel or 
it is not.”  Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (citation omitted).  Here, Schuler’s 
statement was not an unambiguous request for counsel.  We are satisfied 
Schuler’s Miranda rights were honored during this custodial interrogation 
and affirm the trial court’s denial of Schuler’s motion to suppress.  
II. There was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Schuler intentionally killed Arnold.  
Schuler next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for a life without parole 
sentence.  We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a statutory 
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aggravating circumstance in the same way we review the sufficiency of 
evidence to convict.  Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 609 (Ind. 2007).  We 
examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences 
supporting the verdict and do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness 
credibility.  Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).  We look to see if 
the evidence “constitutes substantial evidence of probative value from 
which a reasonable trier of fact could find the existence of the aggravator 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Krempetz, 872 N.E.2d at 609 (citing Fleenor v. 
State, 622 N.E.2d 140, 151 (Ind. 1993)).   
In general, when the State seeks to impose a sentence of life without 
parole for murder, it must allege at least one aggravating circumstance 
listed in the life without parole statute.  Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a).  In this 
case, the State alleged Schuler committed murder by intentionally killing 
Arnold while committing burglary.1  Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1).  A 
person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, “when he engages in the 
conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.”  Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a).  
Intent to kill may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon 
in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury.  Landress v. State, 
600 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 1992).  A deadly weapon includes “material that 
in the manner it … is used … is readily capable of causing serious bodily 
injury.”  Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-86(a)(2).  
In the present case, there was substantial evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Schuler intentionally killed Arnold during the commission of a 
burglary.  Although a singletree isn’t generally used as a weapon, the 
manner in which Schuler used it was readily capable of causing serious 
bodily injury.  Schuler admitted as much, noting that he used both hands 
to swing the singletree down on top of Arnold’s head and was “almost 
positive” that he killed her.  (Tr. Vol. 2 at 250).  The inference of Schuler’s 
intent to kill can be further bolstered by Scott’s statements that he saw 
Schuler strike Arnold with the singletree “like a sledgehammer” at least 
                                                 
1 Schuler does not contest that this criminal act took place during the commission of a 
burglary. 
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twice (St. Ex. 30-4 at 48:13–48:23) and a forensic pathologist’s report that 
the blunt force injuries directly contributed to Arnold’s death.  
We affirm the trial court court’s finding of the aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt that Schuler intentionally killed 
Arnold during the burglary of Arnold’s home.2 
III. Schuler’s sentence of life without parole is  
    appropriate. 
Schuler argues that his sentence is inappropriate and urges us to 
exercise our constitutional power to review and revise his sentence.  Ind. 
Const. Art. 7, § 4.  Under our appellate rules, we will revise a sentence 
only if we find that it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 
and the character of the offender.”  Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).  Our goal in 
applying 7(B) review is not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence, but 
rather to leaven the outliers.  McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 566 (Ind. 
2018).  In conducting this review, we “defer to the trial court’s sentence 
and impose on the defendant the burden of persuading us that a revised 
sentence is warranted.”  Id.  (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 946 (Ind. 
2014)).  
Schuler argues the trial court abused its discretion by considering the 
Indiana Risk Assessment System (“IRAS”) as an aggravating circumstance 
or counterweight to a mitigating circumstance, not giving proper 
consideration to his age and brain development, and placing weight on 
the victims’ innocence.  We disagree and find no abuse of discretion. 
First, courts may properly consider offender assessment instruments 
such as the IRAS as supplemental tools during the sentencing phase of a 
                                                 
2 Schuler argues that the trial court relied on conjecture that Schuler killed Arnold only 
because she recognized him.  That argument, however, goes to Schuler’s motive rather than 
intent.  Even if we were to accept this argument as true, the trial court still could have found 
this aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt based on the way Schuler used the 
singletree as a deadly weapon.  
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trial.  Malenchick v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind. 2010).  While the IRAS 
itself does not serve as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, it 
nevertheless “may be considered by a trial judge in reaching an informed 
sentencing decision.”  Id. at 574.  Although the trial court in this case did 
reference the IRAS during sentencing, it did not place any special weight 
on the IRAS findings.  Instead, the court mentioned it briefly before 
moving on to a host of other factors it considered during sentencing. 
Second, Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(c)(7) allows a court to consider 
as a mitigating circumstance whether the defendant was less than 
eighteen at the time the murder was committed.  Schuler points to Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2465, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), 
arguing “youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of 
incarceration without the possibility of parole.”  While we agree with this 
general proposition, Miller dealt with two fourteen-year-old offenders that 
received a mandatory life without parole sentence.3  Id. at 465, 132 S.Ct. at 
2460.  Here, the trial court pointed out that Schuler was eighteen years old 
at the time he committed the murder, that the law treats eighteen-year-
olds as adults, and that Schuler seemed to comprehend the consequences 
of murder when he asked the detective, “I’m going to spend the rest of my 
life in prison, aren’t I?”  (Tr. Vol. 7 at 155).  It was within the court’s 
discretion to not place great weight on Schuler’s age. 
Third, there is a presumption that a trial court that conducts a 
sentencing hearing “renders its decision solely on the basis of relevant and 
probative evidence.”  Veal v. State, 784 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 2003).  There 
is no indication here that the trial court placed any significant weight on 
victim impact when it mentioned “two innocent victims who will never 
have Christmas with their families.”  (Tr. Vol. 7 at 156).  Schuler fails to 
persuade us otherwise. 
                                                 
3 In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down Alabama’s and Arkansas’s 
mandatory life without parole statutes for offenders under the age of eighteen, citing the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.  567 U.S. at 489, 132 S.Ct. at 2475.  
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Schuler also argues that a term of years is a more appropriate sentence 
than life without parole.  He argues that his age, troubled family history, 
and lack of substantial criminal history should weigh in favor of his 
character.  While it is true that “a trial court should reserve maximum 
sentences for classes of offenses that constitute the worst of the worst,” 
Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011), Schuler did not receive 
the maximum sentence in this case.  Instead of being sentenced to death or 
to consecutive life sentences for the murder and felony murder charges, 
Schuler received a life without parole sentence and a sixty-five-year 
consecutive sentence.  We are also not persuaded that Schuler’s sentence 
is an outlier.  See, e.g., Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 229 (Ind. 2015) 
(defendant’s sentence of life without parole was appropriate for the 
double murder of two coworkers despite alleging troubled childhood and 
lack of criminal history); Krempetz, 872 N.E.2d at 605, 615 (affirming 
consecutive life without parole, forty-five year term, and twenty-year term 
sentences when an 18-year-old defendant committed intentional murder 
during the robbery of a woman where the defendant had no criminal or 
juvenile history but admitted to drug use). 
We therefore conclude that Schuler’s sentence was appropriate in light 
of the nature of the offense and his character.  
IV. The sentencing statement did not comply with  
    the dictates of Harrison v. State. 
Schuler’s final argument is that the trial court failed to comply with the 
requirements set forth in Harrison v. State and impermissibly considered 
nonstatutory aggravators when it sentenced him to life imprisonment 
without parole.  We review a trial court’s sentencing order for an abuse of 
discretion.  Rice, 6 N.E.3d at 943 (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 
490 (Ind. 2007)).  An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court enters a 
sentencing statement explaining the reasons for imposing the given 
sentence, “but the record does not support the reasons or the sentencing 
statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and 
advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter 
of law.”  Id.  
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When trial judges exercise discretion over the sentence imposed for the 
death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, the court must comply 
with the requirements outlined in Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 
(Ind. 1995).  See also Rice, 6 N.E.3d at 943 (affirming the use of Harrison 
factors when the judge alone makes the sentencing determination after the 
defendant enters a guilty plea).  Under Harrison, we require that 
sentencing findings in capital cases:  
(i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance 
found, (ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which 
lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, 
(iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in 
determination of the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial 
court’s personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate 
punishment for this offender and this crime.   
Harrison, 644 N.E.2d at 1262 (internal citations omitted).  These 
requirements are in place to “insure [sic] the trial court consider[s] only 
proper matters when imposing [a] sentence…and to enable the appellate 
court to determine the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”  Id.  
The trial court in the present case verbally discussed its sentencing 
decision from the bench.  Examining the trial court’s statements at 
sentencing, we can only make out the rough silhouettes of each Harrison 
factor, none of which come into clear focus. 
As to the first and second Harrison factors, the trial court clearly 
identified the aggravating circumstance of an intentional killing during 
the commission of a robbery, but also referenced “other aggravating 
circumstances,” none of which are readily identifiable from the court’s 
statements.  (Tr. Vol. 7 at 156).  While the life without parole sentencing 
statute requires only one aggravating circumstance, see Ind. Code § 35-50-
2-9(a), we have consistently held that, in the context of life imprisonment 
without parole, courts must, “limit the aggravating circumstances eligible 
for consideration to those specified in the…statute.”  Clippinger v. State, 54 
N.E.3d 986, 991-92 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 383 
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(Ind. 2000)).  Without any clear indication of what “other aggravating 
circumstances” the court considered, we cannot ensure only proper 
matters were considered.   
Similarly, it is not clear to us that the sentencing statement meets the 
third Harrison factor.  Although the trial court found that the “aggravating 
circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances,” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 156), 
it is hard to assess how the court balanced the factors without specific 
identification of any mitigating factors.  While courts are not required to 
find mitigating circumstances, see Clippinger, 54 N.E.3d at 992, the court 
here at least hinted at several factors it considered in determining 
Schuler’s sentence.  Without specificity, it is difficult for us as an appellate 
court to review the imposition of the sentence.  
 As to the final Harrison factor, the court’s statements imply that it came 
to the personal conclusion that the sentence was appropriate.  At the 
beginning of its statement, the trial court noted, “nothing I do here today 
is probably going to allow you to see [Schuler] outside of prison walls…I 
have to decide whether life in prison or a term of years is appropriate.”  
(Tr. Vol. 7 at 152).  After discussing the various factors at issue in the case, 
the trial court concluded by “impos[ing] a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for the murder of Asenath Arnold.”  (Tr. Vol. 7 at 
156).  But without clear substance between these two statements, we 
cannot say with certainty that “[t]he court’s balancing of the evidence 
emphatically displays its discrete, individualized sentencing.”  Azania v. 
State, 730 N.E.2d 646, 653 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 
760, 790 (Ind. 1997)).  
For these reasons, we do not think the requirements of Harrison have 
been met.  If a sentencing statement does not meet the requirements of the 
law, “we are unwilling to affirm [a] sentence of life without parole.”  
Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1129 (Ind. 2003).  There are three options, 
then, that we must consider: “(1) remand the matter to the trial court for 
clarification or a new sentencing determination; (2) affirm the sentence if 
the error is harmless; or (3) independently reweigh the proper aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.”  Id.  As a practical matter, we have 
previously given trial courts the opportunity to revise a sentencing 
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statement if it does not conform to the requirements of Harrison.  See, e.g., 
Clippinger, 54 N.E.3d at 987, 991-92 (reweighing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances after an initial remand for a clearer sentencing 
statement); Brown, 783 N.E.2d at 1129 (electing to independently evaluate 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances after already remanding for a 
revised sentencing order).  We elect to follow the same course here.  As in 
Harrison, we must “stand firm and require a clear demonstration that the 
essential operations” of the life without parole sentencing process have 
taken place.  644 N.E.2d at 1264 (citation omitted). 
We therefore remand this matter to the trial court for a clearer 
sentencing statement that complies with the dictates of Harrison. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that Schuler’s Miranda rights were 
not violated, there was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to 
prove the necessary aggravating factor of an intentional killing during the 
commission of a robbery, and that Schuler’s sentence is appropriate.  We 
remand this matter, however, for a more specific sentencing statement 
consistent with Harrison.  
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 | December 4, 2018 
Page 16 of 16 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T 
Brent Westerfeld 
Andrew J. Borland 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Andrew A. Kobe 
Jesse R. Drum 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Joshua Otto Schalk 
Harrison County Prosecuting Attorney 
Corydon, Indiana