Case Title: Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist.

Citation: 2013 WI 78

Docket Number: 2007AP001440

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 334 Wis. 2d 620, 800 N.W.2d 518 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 76 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jean A. DiMotto & Jeffrey A. Kremers 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents-
petitioners, there were briefs by Mark A. Cameli, Rebecca 
Frihart Kennedy, Lisa Nester Kass, Amy MacArdy, and Reinhart, 
Boerner Van Deuren, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mark 
A. Cameli and Rebecca Frihart Kennedy. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner, 
there were briefs by G. Michael Halfenger, William J. Katt, Jr., 
Eric G. Pearson, and Foley & Lardner, LLP, Milwaukee, and Susan 
B. Anthony, James H. Petersen and Milwaukee Metropolitan 
 
 
2
Sewerage District, Milwaukee, and oral argument by G. Michael 
Halfenger.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
(L.C. No. 
2003CV5040) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant- 
          Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals1 that affirmed in part 
and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County.2  The questions now before us arise from claims 
by Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc. (hereinafter Bostco), alleging 
                                                 
1 Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. (Bostco), 
2011 WI App 76, 334 Wis. 2d 620, 800 N.W.2d 518. 
2 Judges Jeffrey A. Kremers and Jean A. DiMotto presided at 
different phases in the circuit court. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
2 
 
that Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District's (MMSD) negligent 
operation and maintenance of a sewerage tunnel (the Deep Tunnel) 
beneath Bostco's property resulted in excessive groundwater 
seepage into the Deep Tunnel, thereby causing significant damage 
to Bostco's buildings.  Bostco sought money damages, as well as 
equitable relief. 
¶2 
The parties raise five issues, and we affirm the court 
of appeals on all but one of the issues.  First, MMSD claims in 
its cross-appeal that it is entitled to immunity for its 
construction and maintenance of the Deep Tunnel, under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4).3  Second, if immunity is not accorded, Bostco 
claims that the court of appeals erred when it reversed the 
circuit court's award of equitable relief for Bostco, ordering 
MMSD to abate the excessive seepage of groundwater into the Deep 
Tunnel. 
 
Third, 
Bostco 
claims 
that 
the 
damage 
cap 
in 
§ 893.80(3), which caps the damages recoverable in an action 
against 
governmental 
entities 
at 
$50,000, 
violates 
equal 
protection, both facially and as applied to Bostco's specific 
claims.  Additionally, Bostco contends that the damage cap does 
not apply to continuing nuisances.  Fourth, Bostco claims that 
MMSD's operation and maintenance of the Deep Tunnel constituted 
an unconstitutional taking of the groundwater beneath Bostco's 
property.  Fifth, MMSD argues that Bostco's claim is barred by 
the notice of claim provision of § 893.80(1) (2005-06). 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–
12 version unless otherwise noted.  Although the parties refer 
to the 2005–06 version, the relevant language remains the same 
in the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
3 
 
¶3 
First, we conclude that MMSD is not entitled to 
immunity.  Once MMSD had notice that the private nuisance it 
negligently maintained was causing significant harm, immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) was not available for MMSD.  The 
proper immunity analysis in this case rests on our holding in 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukee 
(City of Milwaukee), 2005 WI 8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59, 691 N.W.2d 
658, that "[w]hether immunity exists for nuisance founded on 
negligence depends upon the character of the negligent acts."  
Where the negligent act was undertaken pursuant to one of those 
functions set forth in § 893.80(4)——that is, legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions——immunity may 
apply.  See id.; see also § 893.80(4).   
¶4 
Here, Bostco's nuisance claim is grounded in MMSD's 
negligent maintenance of its Deep Tunnel, which maintenance 
constituted a continuing private nuisance.  See Physicians Plus 
Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶¶2-3, 254 
Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777 (explaining that when all the 
elements of nuisance are proved and the municipal entity has 
notice that the nuisance was causing significant harm, the 
entity has a duty to abate).  Because MMSD's maintenance of the 
continuing private nuisance is not a legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial function, MMSD is not 
entitled to immunity.  See Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City 
of Altoona, 135 Wis. 2d 431, 439-40, 400 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 
1986) (explaining that the "creation and maintenance of private 
nuisances are simply not recognized as legislative acts subject 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
4 
 
to protection under sec. 893.80(4)"); see also Welch v. City of 
Appleton, 2003 WI App 133, ¶8, 265 Wis. 2d 688, 666 N.W.2d 511 
(explaining that "no statutory or common law immunity doctrine 
empowers a public body to maintain a private nuisance"); Menick 
v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 547 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (concluding "there is no discretion as to maintaining 
the [sewer] system so as not to cause injury"); Wis. Stat. 
§§ 844.01(1) and 844.20(2) (providing statutory procedure for 
seeking abatement of private nuisances).4  The court of appeals' 
determination that MMSD is not entitled to immunity is therefore 
affirmed. 
¶5 
Because MMSD does not have immunity for its negligent 
maintenance of the Deep Tunnel, we also conclude as follows:  On 
the second issue, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3)–(5) do 
not abrogate MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD 
caused by its negligent maintenance of the Deep Tunnel, after 
MMSD had notice that the nuisance was a cause of significant 
harm.  Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' denial of the 
equitable relief of abatement. 
¶6 
Third, we conclude that the monetary damage cap in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does not violate equal protection, either 
facially or as applied to Bostco.  Moreover, the nature of 
Bostco's claim as a continuing nuisance does not render 
§ 893.80(3)'s monetary damage cap inapplicable.  Accordingly, we 
                                                 
4 See also Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 109, 
85 N.W. 668 (1901) (concluding that the "legislative authority 
to install a sewer system carries no implication of authority to 
create or maintain a nuisance"). 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
5 
 
affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court 
properly reduced Bostco's monetary damages to $100,000. 
¶7 
Fourth, with regard to Bostco's inverse condemnation 
claim, we conclude that Bostco forfeited the argument that it 
makes before this court, and we therefore affirm the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
¶8 
Fifth, we conclude that Bostco substantially complied 
with the notice of claim provisions under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) 
(2005–06), and that MMSD therefore had sufficient notice under 
those provisions.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
on that issue as well. 
¶9 
Because 
neither 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
nor 
(3) 
abrogates MMSD's duty to abate this private nuisance, we reverse 
the court of appeals' decision in part, affirm that decision in 
part, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  In particular, we reverse the 
court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's order for 
abatement, in part.  That is, while we affirm the court of 
appeals on all other issues, we reverse that court's decision 
that Bostco was not entitled to equitable relief in the form of 
an order for abatement.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court 
decision that abatement is required, and we remand this matter 
to the circuit court.  Upon remand, a hearing may be held to 
establish whether an alternate method will abate the continuing 
private nuisance MMSD maintains or whether lining the Deep 
Tunnel with concrete is required for abatement. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
6 
 
¶10 This case arises out of MMSD's maintenance of the 
Milwaukee Deep Tunnel, which was constructed in the early 1990s 
to collect and store both storm water runoff and sewage until 
the 
Deep 
Tunnel's 
collections 
could 
be 
transported 
to 
Milwaukee's sewage treatment plant.  
¶11 Boston Store is located in downtown Milwaukee, one 
block west of the Deep Tunnel's North Shore segment. First 
erected in the 19th century, Boston Store consists of five 
interconnected buildings that rest upon wood pile foundations 
that were driven into the ground to support the buildings' 
columns.  At the time of construction, the pilings were below 
the water table and were fully saturated, thereby preventing 
their deterioration. 
¶12 Over time, however, the water enclosing the pilings 
was drawn down, and the Boston Store buildings began to suffer 
substantial structural damage.  On November 16, 2004, Bostco 
filed the amended complaint in this case, alleging that MMSD's 
operation and maintenance of the Deep Tunnel caused the drawdown 
of the water that led to the deterioration of the wood pilings 
underlying Bostco's buildings.  Bostco's claims for relief were 
based on theories of common law negligence, continuing private 
nuisance, inverse condemnation and violations of Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.111, 
setting 
forth 
safety 
standards 
for 
excavation 
projects.  Bostco sought equitable relief to abate the nuisance, 
as well as damages and expenses. 
¶13 The amended complaint gave rise to numerous motions 
that resulted in dismissals of some of Bostco's claims.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
7 
 
Eventually two common law claims were tried to a jury:  
negligence and private nuisance. 
¶14 The jury found that MMSD was negligent in its 
maintenance of the Deep Tunnel near Bostco's building,5 and that 
MMSD's negligence was a cause of Bostco's injury.6  The jury 
awarded Bostco $3,000,000 for past damages and $6,000,000 for 
future damages.7  The jury also found that Bostco was at fault 
for 30 percent of the damages, thereby reducing the $9,000,000 
award to $6.3 million.8 
¶15 In regard to Bostco's nuisance claim, the jury found 
that the negligent manner in which MMSD maintained the Deep 
Tunnel interfered with Bostco's use and enjoyment of its 
property.9  The jury found that MMSD could abate the interference 
                                                 
5 QUESTION No. 1:  "[W]as the District negligent in the 
manner in which it operated or maintained the tunnel near the 
Boston Store?"   
ANSWER:  "Yes."   
6 QUESTION No. 2:  "Was such negligence a cause of the 
claimed damage to the Boston Store foundation?" 
ANSWER:  "Yes."   
7 See Special Verdict Questions Nos. 7 & 8. 
8 See Special Verdict Question No. 5. 
9 QUESTION No. 9:  "Has the manner in which the District has 
operated or maintained the tunnel interfered with the Boston 
Store's use and enjoyment of their building?" 
ANSWER:  "Yes."  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
8 
 
by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost.10  However, the 
jury also found that the interference did not result in 
"significant harm" to Bostco.11  
¶16 On post-verdict motions,12 the circuit court denied 
Bostco's motion asking the court to find that over $2 million in 
damages constituted "significant harm" for purposes of Bostco's 
nuisance 
claim. 
 
Additionally, 
MMSD 
sought 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that MMSD was 
protected by governmental immunity.  The circuit court denied 
MMSD's motion; however, the court agreed with MMSD that the 
$50,000 damages cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) applied, and 
reduced the jury's negligence verdict from $6.3 million to 
$100,000 ($50,000 each for Bostco and Parisian).  After the 
damage cap had been applied, Bostco reasserted its claim for 
equitable relief, which the circuit court had held in abeyance 
pending the determination of damages in the jury trial.  
Specifically, Bostco claimed that a $100,000 damage award on 
$6.3 million of damages constituted an inadequate remedy at law.  
The circuit court granted Bostco's prayer for equitable relief 
                                                 
10 See Special Verdict Question No. 11.  Bostco's experts 
testified that the siphoning of water from near Bostco's 
building could be abated either by lining the Deep Tunnel with 
concrete 
or 
by 
installing 
and 
maintaining 
a 
system 
of 
groundwater monitoring and recharge wells to replenish the 
groundwater that is siphoned into the Deep Tunnel.   
11 See Special Verdict Question No. 10. 
12 The Honorable Jeffrey Kremers, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided at the trial and initial post-verdict phase of 
the proceedings.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
9 
 
and ordered MMSD to abate the nuisance caused by MMSD's 
maintenance of the Deep Tunnel.13   
¶17 Bostco appealed and MMSD cross-appealed.  Bostco 
argued that the circuit court erred when it refused to change 
the jury's finding that Bostco did not suffer "significant harm" 
as to its nuisance claim, as well as the court's summary 
judgment dismissing Bostco's inverse condemnation claim.  On 
cross-appeal, MMSD argued that the circuit court erred (1) by 
failing to hold that MMSD's operation and maintenance of the 
Deep Tunnel were shielded by governmental immunity, (2) by 
granting Bostco's request for abatement, and (3) by not 
dismissing Bostco's complaint for failing to comply with the 
notice of claim provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) (2005–06).14 
¶18 With regard to Bostco's nuisance claim, the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court erred in declining to 
reverse 
the 
jury's 
finding 
that 
Bostco 
did 
not 
suffer 
"significant harm," and that, as a matter of law, suffering more 
than $2 million in past damages constituted significant harm.  
Therefore, the court concluded, Bostco proved its claim for 
private nuisance.  Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. 
(Bostco), 2011 WI App 76, ¶¶92–104, 334 Wis. 2d 620, 800 N.W.2d 
518.  Additionally, although the court of appeals concluded that 
                                                 
13 The Honorable Jean DiMotto, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided over Bostco's claim for equitable relief.  
14 When discussing the parties' notice of claim arguments, 
we refer to the numbering of the provisions as they existed in 
the 2005–06 version of the Wisconsin Statutes, because the 
numbering of the relevant provisions of the statute has since 
changed. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
10 
 
MMSD was not entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), 
the court reversed the circuit court's order for abatement, 
because it concluded that, since § 893.80(3) capped Bostco's 
recoverable damages at $50,000 per claimant, § 893.80(3) and (5) 
precluded such equitable relief.  Id., ¶¶105–07, 123-37.  Also, 
the court concluded that the damage cap under § 893.80(3) did 
not violate equal protection, either on its face or as applied 
to Bostco, id., ¶¶39–60, and that the cap applied to Bostco's 
continuing nuisance claim, id., ¶107.  
¶19 The court of appeals also affirmed the circuit court's 
summary judgment dismissing Bostco's inverse condemnation claim, 
holding that Bostco had failed to allege facts that could show 
that MMSD either physically occupied Bostco's property or that 
MMSD deprived Bostco of all or substantially all of the 
beneficial use of its property.15  Id., ¶¶110–13.  Additionally, 
the court of appeals rejected MMSD's claim that Bostco had 
failed to comply with the notice of claim provision under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1) (2005-06), and deemed that Bostco's notice was 
sufficient.  Id., ¶¶85–91. 
¶20 Bostco 
petitioned 
for 
review, 
and 
MMSD 
cross-
petitioned for review.  We granted both petitions. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
                                                 
15 The court of appeals also affirmed the circuit court's 
decision to dismiss Bostco's excavation protection claim on 
summary judgment.  Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶122.  That claim is 
not before us. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
11 
 
¶21 Whether MMSD is immune from a claim for abatement of 
the private nuisance it negligently maintained, which was a 
cause of significant harm and of which it had notice, when MMSD 
could do so by reasonable means at a reasonable cost, is a 
question of law for our independent review.  See City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶56.   
¶22 This case also requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80.  
Statutory interpretation and application 
present questions of law that we review independently, while 
benefitting from previous discussions of the court of appeals 
and the circuit court.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 
WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  With regard to the 
circuit court's decision to grant equitable relief and order 
abatement, we review that decision for an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Forest Cnty. v. Goode, 215 Wis. 2d 218, 225, 572 
N.W.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶23 Additionally, Bostco asks this court to review the 
circuit court's summary judgment of dismissal of its inverse 
condemnation/takings 
claim. 
 
Rather 
than 
applying 
the 
traditional summary judgment methodology, however, we decline to 
review that claim because the alleged taking as presented to us 
is materially different than the taking alleged in the circuit 
court action.  See Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 
¶15, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Bostco has forfeited its new claim, and we therefore affirm 
the court of appeals on this issue. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
12 
 
¶24 Bostco also claims that the application of the 
statutory damages cap under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) violates the 
equal protection clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Whether 
a statute's limitation violates equal protection presents a 
question of law for our independent review.  See State v. West, 
2011 WI 83, ¶22, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929. 
B.  Discussion's Structure 
¶25 Two competing concepts underlie this controversy:  one 
appurtenant 
to 
abating 
private 
nuisances 
and 
the 
other 
appurtenant to statutory immunity.  One concept requires an 
understanding of the scope of the duty to abate a private 
nuisance that a municipal entity negligently maintained, which 
is a cause of significant harm, and of which the municipal 
entity had notice.16  The other concept requires consideration of 
whether a municipal entity, here MMSD, has statutory immunity 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80, from a claim for abatement 
based on the entity's negligent maintenance of a private 
nuisance.  These two concepts are intertwined in the matter now 
before us.   
¶26 In order to address these competing contentions, it is 
necessary to fully understand the claim that Bostco proved, 
i.e., that MMSD negligently maintained a continuing private 
nuisance that was a cause of significant harm and of which MMSD 
                                                 
16 Our conclusion on the question of negligence is based on 
the jury's findings.  Our analysis is confined to whether, upon 
a finding of negligence, an injured party may seek abatement of 
a private nuisance that continues to be a cause of significant 
harm when the municipal entity has notice of such nuisance.   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
13 
 
had notice.  Given this posture, our task is to apply the law 
that bears on the obligation to abate a nuisance, as it has 
existed for more than 100 years.  We interpret the governmental 
immunity provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 in light of the 
common 
law 
duty 
to 
abate 
negligently 
maintained 
private 
nuisances and statutory provisions such as Wis. Stat. § 844.01 
and Wis. Stat. § 844.17 that specifically speak to abatement of 
private nuisances. 
¶27 After addressing those issues, we briefly address the 
remaining issues.  These include (1) Bostco's claim that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(3)'s damage cap violates equal protection; (2) 
Bostco's inverse condemnation claim; and (3) MMSD's challenge to 
Bostco's notice of claim under § 893.80(1) (2005-06). 
C.  Nuisance 
1.  General principles 
¶28 The tort of nuisance is grounded in a condition or 
activity that unduly interferes with a public right or with the 
use and enjoyment of private property.  Physicians Plus, 254 
Wis. 2d 77, ¶21 n.14.  There are two broad categories of 
nuisance that derive their distinctions from the types of rights 
or interests invaded.  City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶24.  
These broad tort categories are known as public nuisance and 
private nuisance.  Restatement (Second) of Torts, Introductory 
Note to §§ 821-49 (1979); see also Wis. Stat. ch. 844.  It is 
the type of harm suffered or interest invaded that determines 
whether the nuisance is a public or a private nuisance.  City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶26. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
14 
 
¶29 A public nuisance involves the impingement of public 
rights, rights that are common to all members of the public.  
Id., ¶28.  In order to recover for a public nuisance, an 
individual must have suffered harm of a kind different from 
other members of the public who exercised that common right.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 821C.   
¶30 A private nuisance is a condition that harms or 
interferes with a private interest.  Id., § 821A.  We have 
accepted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' characterization of 
private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶25 n.4 (citing Vogel v. Grant-
Lafayette Elec. Coop., 201 Wis. 2d 416, 423, 548 N.W.2d 829 
(1996) and Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 231, 321 N.W.2d 182 
(1982)); see Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 821D.  There is no 
dispute that the nuisance at issue in this case is a private 
nuisance.   
¶31 Wisconsin law employs the following directive for 
those seeking to establish liability for a private nuisance: 
 
One is subject to liability for a private 
nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause 
of an invasion of another's interest in the private 
use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either  
 
(a) [I]ntentional and unreasonable, or 
 
(b) [U]nintentional 
and 
otherwise 
actionable 
under the rules controlling liability for negligent or 
reckless 
conduct, 
or 
for 
abnormally 
dangerous 
conditions or activities.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 822; City of Milwaukee, 277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶32.  Because a nuisance is a result, of which 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
15 
 
negligence or intentional conduct may be the cause, liability 
for a nuisance "is founded on the wrongful act in . . . 
maintaining [the nuisance]."  Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 
¶27 (quoting Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 199 Wis. 575, 
589, 227 N.W. 385 (1929) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Physical occupation of the property of another is not necessary 
to a nuisance claim.  Vogel, 201 Wis. 2d at 426.  For example, 
invasions of noxious odors can rise to the level of a nuisance.  
Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 413, 129 N.W.2d 
217 (1964).   
¶32 Liability for a private nuisance may be based on 
either intentional17 or negligent acts.  City of Milwaukee, 277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶33.  In the case of negligence, as here, liability 
may be predicated on a party's failure to act when he has a duty 
to do so.  See id., ¶34.  The duty to act to abate a nuisance 
arises when one has notice that he is maintaining a nuisance 
that is a cause of significant harm.  See id., ¶35. 
[Some] cases involve changes to otherwise benign 
objects that develop over time and become harmful, 
through no fault of the owner of the object.  In these 
cases, liability is predicated upon the defendant's 
failure to remove the harmful condition after he has 
notice of its existence.   
Id. (citation omitted).   
 
¶33 Furthermore, the duty to abate a nuisance negligently 
maintained, of which one has notice, is a general common law 
                                                 
17 An intentional interference with another's private use 
and enjoyment of property requires that the tortfeasor "must 
either act for the purpose of causing [the interference] or know 
that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from 
his conduct."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 825.   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
16 
 
obligation to which all persons may be subject.  See id. at 
¶¶48, 51; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821D, 824; 
see also Wis JI——Civil 1922.  Moreover, although a municipal 
entity has a duty to abate a known, private nuisance by one of 
any number of methods within the entity's discretion, such 
"discretion" in selecting the particular method by which to 
abate a nuisance does not eliminate the duty to abate, or make 
that duty, itself, discretionary.  Costas, 24 Wis. 2d at 418 
(concluding that "[g]enerally the means whereby [a] nuisance is 
to be abated is left to the direction of the defendant tort-
feasor"). 
¶34 In Physicians Plus, we fully explored the duty of 
municipal entities to abate a nuisance caused by negligent 
maintenance.  There, a tree had grown to the extent that it 
obscured a stop sign at a highway intersection, and that 
untrimmed growth was alleged to have caused a significant 
automobile accident.  Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶1.  We 
explained that because the municipal entities responsible for 
trimming the tree had at least constructive notice of the sign 
blockage, they had a duty to abate the nuisance.  Id., ¶¶2-3.  
This duty arises from the longstanding rule that generally 
municipal 
entities 
are 
not 
shielded 
from 
liability 
for 
maintaining a private nuisance.  See Welch, 265 Wis. 2d 688, ¶8. 
¶35 Similarly, in Costas, we addressed a nuisance that 
arose out of the operation of a sewage system operated by a 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
17 
 
municipal entity, the City of Fond du Lac.18  The City argued 
that no nuisance claim could lie because the sewage plant was 
built and operated according to the plan approved by a state 
agency.  Costas, 24 Wis. 2d at 415 (citing Hasslinger v. Vill. 
of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 290 N.W. 647 (1940), as support for 
                                                 
18 Previously, 
in 
Winchell, 
110 
Wis. 
at 
103-05, 
we 
recognized a municipal entity's obligation to abate a private 
nuisance that the entity caused.  Winchell dealt with an action 
against the City of Waukesha, to abate and enjoin a nuisance 
resulting from the City's emptying its sewage into the Fox 
River, which ran along the side of Winchell's property.  Id. at 
103.  We concluded that the collection and disposal of sewage is 
for the public safety, but that the "authority granted to 
municipalities . . . to construct sewers, [is] subject to the 
general legal 
restrictions resting upon such corporations 
forbidding invasion of private rights by creation of nuisance or 
otherwise."  Id. at 109.  In concluding that the City was 
required to abate the nuisance it had created, we reasoned: 
The great weight of authority, American and English, 
supports 
the 
view that legislative authority to 
install a sewer system carries no implication of 
authority to create or maintain a nuisance, and that 
it matters not whether such nuisance results from 
negligence or from the plan adopted.  If such nuisance 
be created, the same remedies may be invoked as if the 
perpetrator were an individual.  
Id.  We acknowledge that, following Holytz, Winchell's statement 
that "it matters not whether such nuisance results from . . . 
the plan adopted" has been abrogated by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), 
which immunizes such legislative functions as adopting a plan.  
This limited abrogation, however, has no bearing on Winchell's 
still valid conclusion that a governmental entity's negligent 
maintenance of a system or structure, which results in a 
nuisance of which the entity has notice, may give rise to a 
claim against the entity to abate that nuisance.  It has never 
been the law that a governmental entity, by virtue of its 
governmental status alone, may perpetuate an injurious condition 
of which the entity has knowledge.  Our decision reaffirms that 
longstanding 
limitation 
on 
the 
power 
of 
government 
to 
continuously and knowingly invade the rights of its citizens. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
18 
 
this argument).  We concluded that the language in Hasslinger, 
upon which the City relied, was "misleading," and we overruled 
Hasslinger to the extent that it implied "that operation of the 
sewage-disposal plant in accordance with specifications and 
orders and regulations of the state board of health cannot 
constitute a nuisance."  Id.  We explained further that "[t]he 
approval of the method of operation of the sewage-disposal plant 
is pertinent not to the existence of the nuisance but to the 
issue of whether it is feasible or practicable to give 
injunctional [sic] relief for the nuisance."  Id. at 416.  This 
principle has been applied in multiple cases before this court 
and the court of appeals, discussed below.  In the case now 
before us, Bostco has proved that the private nuisance can be 
abated by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost.19   
¶36 In Menick, the plaintiff claimed that the operation of 
a sewage system resulted in the flooding of the plaintiff's 
basement with raw sewage on two occasions, constituting a 
private nuisance.  Menick, 200 Wis. 2d at 741.  As we do here, 
Menick focused on the duty that pertains to a municipal entity's 
nuisance-causing actions, which is the duty to abate the 
nuisance upon notice that the negligently caused condition is a 
cause of significant harm.  The court of appeals concluded that 
although Menick had failed in her proof of her nuisance claim 
because she did not offer an expert opinion as to the legal 
cause of the flooding, the City would not have enjoyed immunity 
from such an action based on private nuisance.  Id. at 744-45.   
                                                 
19 See Special Verdict Question No. 11. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
19 
 
¶37 Factually similar to Menick is the Welch case, in 
which Welch claimed that flooding that occurred after heavy 
rainfalls constituted a private nuisance, attributable to the 
City of Appleton's maintenance of its storm sewer system.  
Welch, 265 Wis. 2d 688, ¶1.  The City asserted that it was 
immune from suit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Id., ¶5.  
The court of appeals concluded that, as a matter of law, "no 
statutory or common law immunity doctrine empowers a public body 
to maintain a private nuisance."20  Id., ¶8.  
¶38 The most recent nuisance case is City of Milwaukee, 
which we decided in 2005.  In City of Milwaukee, we reviewed the 
legal issues surrounding a broken city water main that damaged a 
section of MMSD's Deep Tunnel.  City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 
635, ¶2.  There, MMSD alleged both negligence and nuisance, just 
as Bostco has alleged here, asserting that the City did not 
properly inspect or maintain its pipeline so as to discover the 
leakage before the pipeline ruptured.  Id., ¶3.  
¶39 After a full discussion of the law relating to 
nuisance, we concluded that there was a question of fact as to 
whether the City had notice that its water main was leaking, and 
that such notice was necessary to show that the City was under a 
ministerial duty to abate the nuisance by repairing the water 
pipe before it broke.  Id., ¶9.  We explained:  
                                                 
20 Ultimately, the court in Welch v. City of Appleton, 2003 
WI App 133, 265 Wis. 2d 688, 666 N.W.2d 511, concluded that the 
City's maintenance of its storm sewer was not a private 
nuisance.  Id., ¶8. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
20 
 
[T]he City may be liable for its negligence in failing 
to repair the leaky water main.  However, since there 
exists a material issue of fact as to whether the City 
had notice of the leaking water main, we cannot 
determine whether the City was under a ministerial 
duty to repair its water main prior to the break.  
Thus, we cannot determine whether the City is immune 
under § 893.80(4) from liability predicated upon a 
negligent failure to repair the water main before it 
burst. 
Id.  
¶40 A careful reading of City of Milwaukee is important to 
deciding this case because our decision in City of Milwaukee is 
grounded in a nuisance claim and also because it explains how 
the duty to abate a nuisance intersects with the concept of a 
ministerial duty of a municipal entity.  We explained, 
Since we cannot determine whether the City was on 
notice that its water main was leaking and could 
potentially interfere with the use and enjoyment of 
another's property, we cannot conclude whether its 
duty to repair the leaking main with reasonable care 
before 
it 
broke 
was 
"absolute, 
certain 
and 
imperative," or whether the City's decision not to 
repair the main before the break was discretionary. 
Id., ¶62 (citation omitted).   
¶41 It follows from our explanation in paragraph 62 of 
City of Milwaukee, quoted above, that if the City had notice 
that its water main was leaking before it broke, it had a duty 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
21 
 
to abate the nuisance by fixing the pipe.21  The duty to fix the 
pipe, if the City knew it was leaking, was "absolute, certain 
and imperative"——in other words, ministerial——even though a 
particular method of repairing the leak was not "absolute, 
certain and imperative."22  This conclusion is supported by 
                                                 
21 In Anhalt v. Cities & Villages Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 
WI App 271, 249 Wis. 2d 62, 72, 637 N.W.2d 422, the court of 
appeals relied on our statement in Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee, 80 
Wis. 2d 10, 258 N.W.2d 148 (1977), that "the acts of designing, 
planning and implementing a sewer system are discretionary acts 
protected under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)."  This statement 
comports with our decision today, in that we do not upset the 
rule that acts of designing, planning, and implementing are 
legislative or quasi-legislative acts subject to immunity under 
§ 893.80(4).  Such acts, however, are distinguishable from the 
act of negligently maintaining an existing system or structure 
so as to cause a continuing nuisance, and longstanding law 
demonstrates that the act of maintaining an existing system or 
structure is not a legislative or quasi-legislative function.  
See, e.g., Naker v. Town of Trenton, 62 Wis. 2d 654, 215 N.W.2d 
38, aff'd on reh'g, 62 Wis. 2d 654, 660a, 217 N.W.2d 665 (1974) 
("Once the decision is made and the [system or structure] is 
erected, the legislative function is terminated and the doctrine 
of Holytz that imposes liability for want of ordinary care takes 
over.").  Neither Allstate nor Anhalt decided the question of 
negligent 
maintenance 
that 
we 
reach 
today. 
 
Rather, 
we 
conclusively resolved that question in Milwaukee Metropolitan 
Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukee (City of Milwaukee), 2005 
WI 8, ¶59 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658, in which we 
recognized that a governmental entity is not entitled to 
immunity for a negligent act when such act is not performed 
pursuant to a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial function.  Indeed, our decision in City of Milwaukee on 
that point was intended to clarify any "confusion" created by 
unclear statements in cases such as Anhalt.  See City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59 n.17. 
22 For example, the City could have removed the precise area 
of pipe that was leaking; it could have sealed the leaky pipe 
and left it in place, etc.  The choice of method for abating the 
nuisance, like the decision to initially install a particular 
system, was within the City's discretion.  Costas v. City of 
Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964). 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
22 
 
Physicians Plus, where we explained that a negligently caused 
nuisance resulting in significant harm, of which the municipal 
entity has notice, creates a ministerial duty to abate the 
nuisance.  See Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶59 (reaffirming 
municipal 
entity's 
ministerial 
duty 
to 
properly 
maintain 
structures installed pursuant to municipal entity's legislative 
authority).  
2.  MMSD's nuisance 
¶42 In this case, Bostco proved that MMSD negligently 
caused a continuing private nuisance due to the manner in which 
MMSD chose to maintain the Deep Tunnel.23  MMSD had notice that 
excessively siphoning groundwater from around Bostco's building 
was interfering with Bostco's use and enjoyment of its property 
by damaging the foundation of the building.   
¶43 Here, in contrast to the City of Milwaukee case, no 
further fact-finding is required before concluding that MMSD is 
under a duty to abate.  MMSD knew that excessive siphoning of 
water into the Deep Tunnel was a cause of significant harm to 
Bostco's building, and MMSD could have abated the nuisance, 
i.e., stopped the excessive siphoning, by reasonable means and 
at a reasonable cost.24  Accordingly, the circuit court properly 
                                                 
23 See Sunnyside Feed Co. v. City of Portage, 222 Wis. 2d 
461, 470, 588 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1998) (defining a continuing 
nuisance as "an ongoing or repeated disturbance or harm" that 
"can be discontinued or abated").  
24 This is a fact question that was resolved by the jury.  
Question No. 11 of the Special Verdict asked:  "Can the District 
abate the interference by reasonable means and at a reasonable 
cost so that it no longer interferes with Boston Store's use and 
enjoyment of their building?"  The jury answered this question, 
"Yes."   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
23 
 
concluded that MMSD was required to abate the private nuisance 
caused by MMSD's negligent maintenance of the Deep Tunnel.25   
D.  Municipal Immunity 
¶44 In the context of municipal entities, the obligation 
to abate a known private nuisance is additionally subject to the 
principles of immunity for governmental entities.  We therefore 
turn to interpreting those statutes relevant to an immunity 
analysis:  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and (3).   
¶45 Statutory interpretation requires us to determine the 
statute's meaning, which is assumed to be expressed in the 
language chosen by the legislature.  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 
¶20.  If the meaning of the statute is apparent in the plain 
language, we apply that language.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  We give statutory terms their "common, 
                                                 
25 As discussed above, in accordance with our decision in 
City of Milwaukee, once a governmental entity has notice that 
its negligent maintenance of a system or structure is causing 
damage, it is the manner in which MMSD complies with the 
ministerial duty to fix the problem that is subject to 
discretion; no such discretion exists as to whether MMSD must 
fix the known problem.  Cf. Rolland v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 2001 
WI App 53, ¶12, 241 Wis. 2d 215, 625 N.W.2d 590 (explaining that 
the driver of a bus had a ministerial duty not to drive the bus 
with a wheelchair passenger aboard unless the passenger was 
secured, even though the method of securing the wheelchair was 
discretionary).  This conclusion comports with our statement in 
City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶8, that a governmental 
entity "is immune from suit for nuisance if the nuisance is 
predicated on negligent acts that are discretionary in nature."  
Because negligent maintenance of an existing system or structure 
is not a "legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial function," i.e., is not discretionary, no immunity 
attaches to the entity's negligent maintenance.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
24 
 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.  
¶46 A 
plain 
meaning 
analysis 
may 
be 
assisted 
by 
consideration of statutory context and structure.  See id., ¶46.  
"[T]he statutory context in which a term is used, including the 
language and structure of surrounding or closely related 
statutes, is often highly instructive in determining a term's 
meaning."  State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶20, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 
N.W.2d 848 (citing State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶15, 324 Wis. 2d 
586, 782 N.W.2d 415).  The purpose of the legislation also may 
be useful in ascertaining a statute's meaning.  Sheboygan Cnty. 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶28, 
325 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369.  Furthermore, we are assisted 
by 
prior 
decisions 
that 
have 
examined 
similar 
statutory 
questions.  See DeHart v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶15, 
302 Wis. 2d 564, 734 N.W.2d 394.  Finally, if the statute was a 
legislative attempt to follow the rule of law set forth in a 
particular supreme court decision, a review of that decision 
also informs our understanding of the statute.   
¶47 In regard to the immunity question presented herein, 
initially we are concerned with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), which 
provides in relevant part: 
 
No 
suit 
may 
be 
brought 
against 
any 
. . . 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or any 
agency thereof for the intentional torts of its 
officers, officials, agents or employees nor may any 
suit be brought against such corporation, subdivision 
or agency . . . for acts done in the exercise of 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
25 
 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. 
We begin by noting that § 893.80(4) was intended to codify our 
decision in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962).  See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 
526, 532, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (recognizing that § 893.80(4)'s 
indirect predecessor, Wis. Stat. § 331.43 (1963), was intended 
to codify Holytz); see also Raisanen v. City of Milwaukee, 35 
Wis. 2d 504, 515-16, 151 N.W.2d 129 (1967) (noting § 331.43's 
intermediate enumeration as Wis. Stat. § 895.43).   
¶48 As the Legislative Council Report of 1976 also 
explains:  
 
Prior to 1961 local units of government in 
Wisconsin were generally immune from tort liability 
because of the judicial doctrine of governmental 
immunity. . . .  In 1961 the case of Holytz v. 
Milwaukee (1961), 17 Wis. 2d 26, was decided which 
abrogated the principal of governmental immunity from 
tort liability. . . .  The opinion did not impose 
liability on a governmental body in the exercise of 
its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions, and to that extent a part of 
the immunity doctrine remained intact. . . .  The 
general statute concerning the liability of local 
governmental units for torts [then § 343.80, now 
§ 893.80] was enacted shortly after this decision and 
in many respects draws from the decision for its 
content. 
Therefore, our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) is 
informed by a review of Holytz. 
¶49 In Holytz, we explicitly abrogated common law immunity 
for municipal entities as it existed in 1962.  See Holytz, 17 
Wis. 2d at 39–41.  The abrogation was intended to apply to 
municipal entity liability for all torts, "whether they be by 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
26 
 
commission or omission."26  Id. at 39.  The one limitation on our 
broad abrogation was clearly stated:  our decision was "not to 
be interpreted as imposing liability on a governmental body in 
the exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative 
or quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40.  The second sentence 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) mirrors this limitation of municipal 
entity liability.27   
¶50 The rule as to municipal entity liability has been 
repeated many times since our decision in Holytz and the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 893.80:  as to non-state governmental 
entities, "'the rule is liability——the exception is immunity.'"  
Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10 n.6, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996) 
                                                 
26 The court's abrogation of immunity in Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), was not limited 
to municipalities, and applied to public bodies within the state 
such as counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts, 
sewer districts, drainage districts, and any other political 
subdivisions of the state.  Id. at 40.  Therefore, although 
Holytz and subsequent discussions have referred to "municipal 
immunity," the phrase "governmental immunity" has been used 
interchangeably 
to 
apply 
to 
state 
officers, 
non-state 
governmental entities, and officers or employees of those 
entities.  
27 In Holytz, we also recognized that the State's sovereign 
immunity has its foundation in the Wisconsin Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 27, which provides that "The legislature 
shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may 
be brought against the state."  Accordingly, the effect of 
Holytz has been more relevant to suits against governmental 
entities other than the State, as well as to governmental 
officers and employees. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
27 
 
(quoting Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39).28  See, e.g., Jorgenson v. N. 
States Power Co., 60 Wis. 2d 29, 37, 208 N.W.2d 323 (1973) 
(concluding that a city's failure to authorize the temporary 
removal of a light pole so that it would not injure workers 
digging next to the pole's base did not constitute an exercise 
of a legislative or quasi-legislative function); Naker v. Town 
of Trenton, 62 Wis. 2d 654, 215 N.W.2d 38, aff'd on reh'g, 62 
Wis. 2d 654, 660a, 217 N.W.2d 665 (1974) (concluding that a 
traffic sign, once erected, must be properly maintained or 
liability may follow). 
¶51 Furthermore, 
although 
a 
municipal 
entity 
escapes 
liability for its legislative or quasi-legislative decision 
regarding whether to install a particular system or structure, 
once the municipal entity makes the decision to install, the 
                                                 
28 In contrast to governmental entities, for governmental 
officers acting in their official capacity, we have stated that 
the rule is immunity, and the exception is liability.  See Cords 
v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 539, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).  This 
rule for governmental officers is based on public policy 
considerations that support limiting public officers' personal 
liability for damages, namely, "(1) The danger of influencing 
public officers in the performance of their functions by the 
threat of lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are considering 
entering public service; (3) the drain on valuable time caused 
by such actions; (4) the unfairness of subjecting officials to 
personal liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are more 
appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in public 
[office]."  Lister v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 
72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
28 
 
entity is under a subsequent ministerial duty29 to maintain the 
system or structure in a safe and working order.  As we 
explained in Naker: 
Once the decision is made and the sign is erected, the 
legislative function is terminated and the doctrine of 
Holytz that imposes liability for want of ordinary 
care takes over.  A sign once erected by legislative 
action must be properly maintained. 
Naker, 62 Wis. 2d at 660a. 
¶52 As discussed above, in City of Milwaukee, we explained 
the relationship between municipal immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) and the duty to abate a private nuisance.  We held  
that if the City of Milwaukee had a duty to repair the water 
pipe so that it did not rupture and damage MMSD's tunnel (which 
duty in turn was dependent upon the City having notice that the 
pipe was leaking), such duty was ministerial and there would be 
no immunity under § 893.80(4) for the City's failure to abate 
the nuisance its leaking pipe had created.  City of Milwaukee, 
277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶62.  Therefore, in City of Milwaukee, if the 
City had notice of the leaking water pipe, the nuisance it was 
maintaining would require abatement as a non-discretionary, 
ministerial duty. 
¶53 In the present case, the court of appeals, in 
reversing the circuit court's order for abatement, concluded 
that while Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) does not provide immunity, 
                                                 
29 The decision in Naker, 62 Wis. 2d at 660a, does not label 
the duty to "properly maintain" the sign the town erected as a 
"ministerial duty."  However, the conclusion that it is a 
ministerial 
duty 
flows 
from 
the 
liability 
to 
which 
the 
municipality was subject.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
29 
 
§ 893.80(3) does not allow parties to obtain equitable relief 
against governmental entities because doing so would "render the 
damage cap set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) superfluous."  
Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶129.  The court of appeals concluded 
that because § 893.80(3) is silent about equitable relief, when 
read with § 893.80(5), § 893.80(3) precluded the circuit court's 
order enjoining MMSD from continuing to injure Bostco.  Id., 
¶¶130-31.  To test the court of appeals decision, we turn to the 
language of § 893.80(3), and construe the statute according to 
its plain meaning.  
¶54 Statutory interpretation begins with the words chosen 
by the legislature.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) provides in 
relevant part: 
 
Except as provided in this subsection, the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or 
death in any action founded on tort against any . . . 
governmental 
subdivision 
. . . 
shall 
not 
exceed 
$50,000.  
(Emphasis added). 
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) addresses "the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or death."  
The statute limits the "amount recoverable" "by any person" to 
$50,000.  The words chosen by the legislature should be given 
their plain meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  An order for 
abatement does not entitle "any person" to "recover" any 
"amount." 
 
It 
is 
a 
foundational 
principle 
of 
statutory 
construction 
that 
"no 
word 
or 
clause 
shall 
be 
rendered 
surplusage."  Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 
N.W.2d 817 (1980).  The court of appeals ignored the phrase, 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
30 
 
"the amount recoverable by any person"; however, courts are not 
free to ignore the words or phrases chosen by the legislature.  
See Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶16, 325 Wis. 2d 
135, 785 N.W.2d 302.   
¶56 Also, non-technical words are to be given their 
ordinary and accepted meanings.  Town of LaFayette v. City of 
Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 619, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).  The 
phrase, "amount recoverable by any person," is stated in non-
technical terminology.  In order to give an ordinary and 
accepted meaning to those terms, we conclude that the statute 
describes a relationship.  That relationship is between any 
person who is entitled to recover a damage award against a 
municipal entity and the amount of that monetary liability.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) is to limit the dollar amount of recovery to be paid 
for damages, injuries or death to $50,000 per claimant, but that 
the plain meaning of that provision has no bearing on the 
availability of equitable relief such as abatement. 
¶57 This interpretation is consistent with prior cases 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.80, such as Harkness v. Palmyra-
Eagle School District, 157 Wis. 2d 567, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 
1990),30 in which the court of appeals was asked to consider 
whether § 893.80(4) should be interpreted to preclude equitable 
                                                 
30 Harkness v. Palmyra-Eagle School District, 157 Wis. 2d 
567, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1990), was overruled by DNR v. 
City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994), 
to the extent that Harkness implied that § 893.80(1)'s notice of 
claim requirement applied only to tort claims. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
31 
 
relief.  The court held that in regard to Harkness's claim for 
reinstatement, 
there 
was 
"no 
authority 
indicating 
that 
[§ 893.80(4)] applies to equitable or injunctive relief" for 
such a claim; accordingly, § 893.80(4) did not bar Harkness's 
claim for reinstatement.  Id. at 579-80.  
¶58 Our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) is 
consistent with that statement in Harkness, and consistent with 
the statutory history that we laid out in Anderson v. City of 
Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997).  In Anderson, 
Justice Crooks thoroughly explained the genesis of § 893.80(3), 
and quoted from our opinion in Holytz:  "'[H]enceforward, so far 
as governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule 
is liability——the exception is immunity.'"  Id. at 26 (quoting 
Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39).  Anderson explained the changing 
dollar amounts that could be recovered as damages, showing that 
the bill from which § 893.80(3) evolved began with a $10,000 
limitation, changed to a $25,000 limitation in a Senate 
Amendment, and increased to a $50,000 limitation by the Laws of 
1981, ch. 63, § 2.  Id. at 27 n.9.  Throughout these changes, 
nothing in the legislative history addressed limitations on 
equitable relief of any type.  Without any language in 
§ 893.80(3) to suggest a limitation on equitable relief, we 
decline to read in any such limitation. 
E.  Equitable Relief 
¶59 In the case now before us, the court of appeals 
attempted to fill the legislature's silence in regard to 
equitable relief under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) by construing 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
32 
 
§ 893.80(5) to create limitations in § 893.80(3) that were not 
placed there by the legislature.  Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶130.  
The court of appeals said that the phrase "shall be exclusive" 
in § 893.80(5), limits a plaintiff's recovery to those remedies 
set forth in § 893.80 and because injunctions are not mentioned, 
they are not available against a municipality.  Id.  However, 
there is nothing in either the language or the history of 
§ 893.80 to support the court of appeals' broad limitation of 
remedies and its conclusion that § 893.80(3) precludes actions 
in equity.31  The court of appeals' decision, if affirmed, would 
have far-reaching effects and would overrule extensive precedent 
in regard to the authority of courts to enjoin municipal 
entities.32   
¶60 To obtain injunctive relief, generally one must show 
that the injunction is necessary to prevent the continuation of 
significant harm.  Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 
                                                 
31 The words injunction, enjoin, or similar terms that may 
indicate equitable relief are not present in the statute.  
Furthermore, 
reference 
to 
injunctive 
relief 
would 
be 
inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, such as providing 
a recovery for death.  
32 In addition, the court of appeals' limitation of remedies 
based on statutory silence contradicts our decision in Willow 
Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 235 Wis. 2d 
409, 611 N.W.2d 693, reconsid. denied 239 Wis. 2d 314, wherein 
we expressly affirmed the availability of declaratory relief, a 
nonmonetary remedy that, like equitable relief, is not mentioned 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3).  Id., ¶36 n.12.  Moreover, the court 
of appeals' conclusion in the case before us is also contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 813.02, which has been employed to issue temporary 
injunctions against municipalities.  See Wis. Ass'n of Food 
Dealers v. City of Madison, 97 Wis. 2d 426, 428-29, 293 N.W.2d 
540 (1980). 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
33 
 
90 Wis. 2d 781, 803, 280 N.W.2d 691 (1979).  "The purpose of an 
injunction is to prevent [future] violations."  Id.  In that 
respect, injunctive relief is consistent with the obligation to 
abate a continuing private nuisance, which obligation is imposed 
to prevent future harms.  See, e.g., Menick, 200 Wis. 2d at 745 
(concluding that "there is no discretion as to maintaining the 
[sewer] system so as not to cause injury to residents"). 
¶61 While the legislature may have authority to limit 
equitable relief in some circumstances, there is nothing in the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) to indicate that the 
legislature sought to do so.  When a statute fails to address a 
particular situation, the remedy for the omission does not lie 
with the courts.  It lies with the legislature.  La Crosse 
Lutheran Hosp. v. La Crosse Cnty., 133 Wis. 2d 335, 338, 395 
N.W.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1986).   
¶62 Both before and after Holytz, when the principles of 
immunity have been applied to claims against municipal entities 
for damages, those principles have not been held applicable to 
claims for injunctive relief against ongoing governmental 
activities.  Perhaps one of the clearest recognitions of this 
distinction was our statement in Lister v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Wisconsin System, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 
610 (1976).  In Lister, we explained that the public policy 
considerations that have prompted courts to grant substantive 
immunity for monetary damages do not apply with equal force to 
actions for declaratory or injunctive relief.  Id. at 304; see 
also Scarpaci v. Milwaukee Cnty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 691, 292 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
34 
 
N.W.2d 816 (1980) (reaffirming that policies that underlie 
immunity from damages do not apply with equal force to a suit 
for injunctive relief).  
¶63 However, in Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 
343, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals seemed 
to slip away from precedent in regard to injunctive relief 
against municipal entities, without recognizing that it was 
making a significant change in the law.  Accordingly, Johnson is 
a concern that must be addressed for a number of reasons.  See 
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶¶75–
99, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  
First, because the language in Johnson is so broad, it could be 
interpreted as overruling, sub-silentio, prior decisions of the 
court of appeals that addressed immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), which were, in turn, based on the longstanding 
availability of equitable relief to abate ongoing nuisances.  
See, e.g., Hillcrest, 135 Wis. 2d at 439-40 (explaining that the 
"creation and maintenance of private nuisances are simply not 
recognized as legislative acts subject to protection under sec. 
893.80(4)"); see also, Harkness, 157 Wis. 2d 567, 579-80.  The 
court of appeals does not have the power to overrule prior 
decisions.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 171, 560 N.W.2d 
246 (1997) (concluding that the court of appeals does not have 
the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from another 
court of appeals decision).   
¶64 Second, the court of appeals' decision in Johnson 
(upon which we based part of our decision barring injunctive 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
35 
 
relief in Willow Creek), focused on the wrong language in the 
municipal immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), in that the 
court of appeals emphasized that immunity applied to "any suit."  
See Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d at 350–52.  Instead, the relevant focus 
when considering whether § 893.80(4) grants immunity is on 
whether the action sought to be enjoined was within a limited 
class of municipal decisions that involve the performance of 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions."  As our cases and those of the court of appeals make 
clear, a municipal entity's failure to abate a continuing 
nuisance caused by negligent maintenance of a system or 
structure, 
after 
the 
municipality 
has 
notice, 
does 
not 
constitute a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial act that may be entitled to immunity.  See, e.g., 
Costas, 24 Wis. 2d at 413–19; Hillcrest Golf, 135 Wis. 2d at 
439-40. 
¶65 Third, Johnson relied on the principles of immunity 
that apply to municipal officers.  Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d at 352.  
However, for municipal officers, the rule is immunity, not 
liability.  See Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 539, 259 
N.W.2d 672 (1977).  The Johnson decision's reliance on those 
principles is misplaced because Johnson actually involved a 
municipal entity, and therefore, the rule is liability, not 
immunity.  Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10 n.6.  
¶66 Furthermore, 
the 
Johnson 
decision's 
errors 
were 
uncorrected by our decision in Willow Creek.  We did note that 
"[t]o the extent that the language in Johnson suggests other-
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
36 
 
wise by expanding immunity too broadly, we limit that language."  
Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶34.  We did not describe how the 
language in Johnson was limited.33  However, we now clarify that 
under Willow Creek and Johnson, equitable relief will be barred 
when a municipal entity is entitled to immunity.  Accordingly, 
our analysis in this case would be different if we concluded 
that MMSD were entitled to municipal entity immunity for 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.  Under circumstances when immunity applies, it bars 
claims for both monetary damages and injunctive relief.  Id., 
¶36.  Therefore, when a plaintiff seeks equitable or injunctive 
relief against a municipal entity, a court must first answer the 
threshold question of whether immunity applies.  If a court 
concludes that the actions the plaintiff is seeking to stop 
through a suit in equity are legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial, then the suit must be dismissed 
because the governmental entity is protected by immunity. 
¶67 In addition, City of Milwaukee concluded that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) provides no immunity for a municipal entity's 
ministerial duty to abate.  City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 
¶¶9, 54.  This conclusion is also supported by our discussion in 
Physicians Plus, where we addressed nuisance and the duty of 
municipal entities to abate a nuisance that the entities 
                                                 
33 Moreover, Willow Creek is not a private nuisance case 
such as we have here, where the obligation to abate arises with 
the municipal entity receiving notice of the continuing private 
nuisance, which has resulted in significant harm.  See City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶51-62. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
37 
 
negligently maintained and of which they had notice.  Physicians 
Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶¶2–3, 59.   
¶68 Our conclusion that municipal entities may be subject 
to orders for equitable relief also finds support in statutory 
provisions referring to the availability of equitable relief 
from continuing nuisances, as well as long-standing precedent to 
the same effect.  Currently, Wis. Stat. § 844.01(1) provides 
that "Any person owning or claiming an interest in real property 
may bring an action claiming physical injury to, or interference 
with, the property or the person's interest therein; the action 
may be to redress past injury, to restrain further injury, to 
abate the source of injury, or for other appropriate relief."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 844.17(1) then provides that "Any person whose 
activities have injured or will injure the plaintiff's property 
or interests may be made a defendant."  (Emphasis added.)  
"Person" includes "all partnerships, associations and bodies 
politic or corporate."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26).  These 
statutes, therefore, refer to circumstances wherein a political 
body, such as a municipality, may be subject to an action to 
redress injury to private property caused by a municipal 
entity's negligent maintenance of a private nuisance that caused 
significant harm. 
¶69 Indeed, we expressed such an understanding of the 
common law duty to abate and of immunity in Costas.  Therein, we 
concluded that a private individual could bring an action for 
abatement of a private nuisance against a municipal entity, 
thereby reaffirming the longstanding availability of injunctive 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
38 
 
relief against municipally maintained nuisances.  See Costas, 24 
Wis. 2d at 413–19 (citing Winchell, 110 Wis. 101) (recognizing 
that municipal entities may be subject to actions for equitable 
relief 
from 
ongoing 
nuisances)). 
 
In 
recognizing 
the 
availability of such relief, we relied on Wis. Stat. § 280.01, 
which provided that "any person may maintain an action to 
recover damages for or to abate a private nuisance."  Id. at 
414. 
¶70 In 1973, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 280.01 
and created Wis. Stat. § 814.01, which was identical to current 
Wis. Stat. § 844.01.  See § 16, ch. 189, Laws of 1973.  The 
effect of this amendment was to incorporate § 280.01's relief 
for 
interferences 
with 
private 
property 
into 
the 
newly 
consolidated chapters governing actions to enforce interests in 
real property.  See Drafting File for ch. 189, Laws of 1973, 
Analysis 
by the Legislative Reference Bureau, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  Therefore, since the abrogation 
of municipal immunity in Holytz and its subsequent codification 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.80, not only have we, in Costas, reaffirmed 
the availability of equitable relief for the abatement of 
municipal 
nuisances, 
but 
the 
legislature, 
after 
Costas, 
reaffirmed the availability of such relief when it simply 
renumbered and reorganized former § 280.01 into what is now 
§ 844.01. 
¶71 Therefore, based on the statutory history of Wis. 
Stat. § 844.01, as well as the common law governing nuisance and 
the principles of equitable relief, we reach the ineluctable 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
39 
 
conclusion that a municipal entity may be subjected to claims 
for equitable relief to abate a negligently maintained nuisance 
that is a cause of significant harm and of which the municipal 
entity has notice.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in granting 
Bostco equitable relief.   
¶72 When the circuit court ordered MMSD to abate the 
private nuisance caused by MMSD's negligent maintenance of its 
Deep Tunnel, it applied the appropriate legal standard and made 
a decision that a reasonable court could make.  The circuit 
court's order required MMSD to abate a continuing private 
nuisance, of which MMSD had notice and which MMSD could abate by 
reasonable means and at a reasonable cost.  The circuit court, 
however, went one step too far when, without hearing testimony, 
it concluded that lining the Deep Tunnel was the required means 
of abatement.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' 
conclusion that an order for abatement was improper.  Abatement 
is required.  We therefore affirm the circuit court's order for 
abatement, and remand the matter to the circuit court.  Upon 
remand, a hearing may be held to establish whether another 
method 
will 
abate 
the 
continuing 
private 
nuisance 
MMSD 
maintains, or whether lining the Deep Tunnel with concrete is 
required for abatement. 
F.  Remaining Issues 
¶73 Having concluded that Bostco is entitled to relief in 
the form of abatement of MMSD's continuing nuisance, we now turn 
to Bostco's other asserted claims for relief, beginning with its 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
40 
 
challenge to the limitation of damages set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3), then moving to Bostco's inverse condemnation claim, 
and finishing with MMSD's claim that Bostco failed to comply 
with the notice of claim provisions of § 893.80(1) (2005–06).  
Because we agree with the court of appeals' thorough analyses of 
these issues,34 see Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶¶38–65, 85–91, 108–
117, we address them briefly. 
1.  Limitation of damages under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) 
¶74 Bostco claims that the damage cap under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) is unconstitutional, in that it violates equal 
protection of the law, in contravention of Article I, Section 1 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Section 1 provides:   
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  Specifically, Bostco asserts that 
§ 893.80(3) violates equal protection (1) facially, by affording 
complete relief to plaintiffs injured by governmental actions 
causing less than $50,000 in damages, while arbitrarily limiting 
the amount of recovery by those plaintiffs who suffer greater 
damages; and (2) as applied in this case, because parties who 
                                                 
34 Similarly, because our decision does not "overrule" the 
court of appeals decision, but rather "reverses in part" the 
decision of the court below in the same case, the rule announced 
in Blum v. 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶56, 
326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, does not apply here.  Cf. State 
v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶7 n.3, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238 
(recognizing that supreme court decision "withdrawing language" 
from previous court of appeals decision does not implicate the 
Blum rule). 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
41 
 
settled with MMSD before June 30, 1994, were not limited to the 
amounts 
available 
under 
§ 893.80(3), 
while 
those 
seeking 
recovery after that arbitrarily set date are limited to the 
statutory amounts of recovery. 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3)'s limitation of damages 
provides in relevant part:  
 
Except as provided in this subsection, the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or 
death in any action founded on tort against any 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof and against their officers, officials, 
agents or employees for acts done in their official 
capacity 
or 
in 
the 
course 
of 
their 
agency 
or 
employment, 
whether 
proceeded 
against 
jointly 
or 
severally, shall not exceed $50,000. 
We have had occasion to review this provision on multiple 
occasions, including challenges asserting that the limitation on 
damages violates equal protection.  See Sambs v. City of 
Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980); Stanhope v. 
Brown Cnty., 90 Wis. 2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979).  As noted by 
the court of appeals in this case, we have upheld § 893.80(3)'s 
limitation of damages previously, and Bostco has not persuaded 
us to change our position. 
¶76 With regard to Bostco's facial challenge, we reiterate 
the high standard facing litigants asserting a constitutional 
challenge:  legislative enactments are presumed constitutional, 
and we will resolve any reasonable doubt in favor of upholding 
the provision as constitutional.  See Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 
837.  In the context of an equal protection challenge, we will 
sustain a legislative enactment that creates a distinction 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
42 
 
between treatment of different groups, if there exists a 
rational basis to support that distinction, provided that the 
distinction does not implicate a suspect class or impinge upon a 
fundamental right.  See State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶79, 308 
Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447.  Because Bostco does not assert 
that it is a member of a protected class, or that recovery in 
tort from a governmental entity is a fundamental right, we must 
uphold the damage limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), if 
there exists a rational basis for the legislature to limit the 
amount of damages recoverable by plaintiffs against governmental 
entities.  See Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 837–842.  "The basic test 
is not whether some inequality results from the classification, 
but whether there exists any reasonable basis to justify the 
classification."  Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 371 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 19, 218 N.W.2d 734 
(1974)). 
¶77 In Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 40, we recognized that the 
legislature was free to limit the amount of damages that 
plaintiffs may recover from governmental entities for the torts 
of those entities or their officers.  We have since reiterated 
that principle in Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 371–78, and Stanhope, 90 
Wis. 2d at 837–42.  We now reaffirm the legislature's valid 
limitation of the amount of damages recoverable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3).  The principle we expressed in Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d 
at 842, is as applicable today as it was over 30 years ago: 
It is within the legitimate power of the legislature 
to take steps to preserve sufficient public funds to 
ensure that the government will be able to continue to 
provide those services which it believes benefits the 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
43 
 
citizenry. 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
legislature's 
specification 
of a dollar limitation on damages 
recoverable allows for fiscal planning and avoids the 
risk of devastatingly high judgments while permitting 
victims of public tortfeasors to recover their losses 
up to that limit. 
Accordingly, we conclude that a rational basis exists for the 
damage limitations in § 893.80(3), and therefore reject Bostco's 
facial challenge to that provision. 
¶78 In its as-applied challenge to the damage limits in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), Bostco asserts that there exists no 
rational basis for MMSD to treat its claim any differently than 
those claims that MMSD paid before June 30, 1994, which were not 
subject to the statutory damage limitations.  During the time of 
construction of the Deep Tunnel, MMSD paid certain property 
owners for damages caused by soil settlement in the area in 
which the Deep Tunnel was being constructed.  With the belief 
that it had properly addressed that issue as pertained to 
affected landowners, MMSD established the June 30, 1994, date as 
a cutoff for claims, after which MMSD would no longer compensate 
local landowners for property damage allegedly caused by soil 
settlement. 
¶79 Bostco asserts that the establishment of the June 1994 
date was arbitrary, thereby violating the precept that "every 
person within the state's jurisdiction will be protected against 
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether arising out of 
the terms of a statute or the manner in which the statute is 
executed by officers of the state."  State ex rel. Murphy v. 
Voss, 34 Wis. 2d 501, 510, 149 N.W.2d 595 (1967).  The necessary 
corollary, however, is that some inequality is generally 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
44 
 
insufficient 
to 
demonstrate 
unconstitutional 
disparate 
treatment——again, where there exists a rational basis for the 
unequal treatment, we will sustain the official action as within 
the legislature's power.  See State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 
131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). 
¶80 Here, MMSD made the decision to stop paying claims at 
the end of June 1994, based on its understanding that the 
situation that had necessitated a dedicated claims procedure had 
been ameliorated.  MMSD provided notice to property owners 
before November 1993, affording the owners sufficient time to 
prepare any claims before the cutoff date.  Although any time 
limit for claims against a governmental entity may be deemed 
arbitrary by those whose claims are made after the deadline, the 
same primary principle that justifies limits on damage amounts——
protection of the public fisc——supports the reasonableness of 
imposing a deadline for claims, especially when the deadline is 
avowedly tied to the governmental entity's asserted belief that 
it has addressed the problem necessitating the claims procedure.  
On these bases, Bostco's equal protection challenge fails.35 
                                                 
35 As a final challenge to the damage cap, Bostco asserts 
that continuing nuisances are not subject to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3)'s damage cap because that section limits the damages 
recoverable in "any action founded on tort," and a continuing 
nuisance constitutes multiple, constantly recurring actions.  
See, e.g., Stockstad v. Town of Rutland, 8 Wis. 2d 528, 534, 99 
N.W.2d 813 (1959) ("It is well settled that every continuance of 
a nuisance is in law a new nuisance and gives rise to a new 
cause of action.").  As the court of appeals noted, only one 
nuisance action is before the court, and we therefore need not 
conclude whether the damage cap would apply in a subsequent 
action allegedly based on the same continuing nuisance.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
45 
 
2.  Bostco's forfeiture of inverse condemnation arguments 
¶81 In its complaint to the circuit court, Bostco alleged 
that MMSD inversely condemned Boston Store's property when it 
"physically took portions of the timber pilings which rendered 
them unusable and damaged the Boston Store Building and Parking 
Garage." (Emphasis added.)  Bostco also alleged that MMSD's 
conduct amounted to a taking of private property for public use 
without providing just compensation.  Bostco made the same 
argument in opposing MMSD's motion for summary judgment and at 
the summary judgment hearing.  Bostco, however, did not allege 
that the groundwater beneath Boston Store was taken.  At the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
Bostco 
added 
to 
its 
inverse 
condemnation/takings claim, alleging that in addition to the 
timber piles, MMSD also took the groundwater beneath Boston 
Store. 
¶82 The court of appeals addressed both the timber piles 
and the groundwater arguments, and held that Bostco could not 
establish that either claim met the standard for inverse 
condemnation, namely, that neither the timber piles nor the 
groundwater was physically occupied by MMSD and that Boston 
Store was not "practically or substantially" rendered "useless 
for all reasonable purposes."  Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶¶111-
17. (quoting Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 
Wis. 2d 74, 85, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979)).  The court of appeals 
therefore affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Bostco's 
inverse condemnation/takings claim on summary judgment.  Id., 
¶117. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
46 
 
¶83 Before us, however, Bostco states in its brief that it 
"is no longer pursuing its inverse condemnation claim as a 
taking of the wood piles."  Instead, Bostco argues that MMSD 
"physically took the groundwater" beneath Boston Store.  As 
Bostco is attempting to make a fundamentally different argument 
than that which it raised and tried before the circuit court, we 
decline to address its inverse condemnation/takings claim, 
notwithstanding the court of appeals' decision to reach this 
issue. See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 
Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 ("Arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited."). 
¶84 Bostco attempts to avoid the effects of forfeiture by 
alleging that its complaint before the circuit court "was 
replete 
with 
factual 
allegations 
about 
the 
taking 
of 
groundwater."  We disagree.  Upon review of Bostco's complaint, 
we conclude that no facts relevant to a taking of groundwater 
were raised.  Rather, the portions of the complaint that 
allegedly support a claim for the taking of groundwater consist 
of general recitations of the following arguments:  (1) MMSD 
failed to protect buildings during excavations; (2) MMSD failed 
to properly respond to unexpected inflows of water; (3) MMSD 
failed to properly monitor and recharge lowered groundwater 
levels; (4) the Deep Tunnel damaged Boston Store; and (5) MMSD 
was aware of the risk of structural damage to Boston Store. 
¶85 Most tellingly, Count III of Bostco's complaint, 
entitled "Inverse Condemnation," does not refer at all to 
groundwater, and instead focuses entirely on timber piles.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
47 
 
Because 
Bostco 
has 
not 
preserved 
the 
groundwater–based 
contention for appeal, we decline to address its inverse 
condemnation/takings claim, and therefore affirm the court of 
appeals, albeit on modified grounds. 
3.  Bostco's notice of claim 
¶86 Finally, in its cross-appeal, MMSD asserts that Bostco 
did not serve MMSD with a notice of injury and itemization of 
relief as required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) (2005–06),36 and 
that Bostco's claims therefore should have been dismissed.  
Specifically, MMSD argues that the notice it received was 
insufficient because the notices informing MMSD of the damages 
to the Boston Store buildings and the relief sought were 
submitted by entities who are not parties to this action.  Those 
entities named in the notice of claim and itemization of relief 
were Saks, Inc., a corporation that owns Parisian, Inc., and 
WISPARK Holdings LLC, an LLC owned by the same holding company 
that owns Bostco.  For its part, Bostco argues that the notice 
of claim and itemization of relief from the related entities 
amounted to substantial compliance with § 893.80(1), and that, 
under our case law, such notice is sufficient. 
¶87 In pertinent part, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) provides  
[N]o action may be brought or maintained against any 
volunteer 
fire 
company organized under ch. 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or 
                                                 
36 For ease of reference to the parties' arguments, which 
are based on the 2005–06 version of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), we 
refer to that version of the statutes in this section of the 
opinion. 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
48 
 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action unless: 
 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee; and  
 
(b) A claim containing the address of the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person 
who performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency and the claim is disallowed. 
¶88 The notice of claim provisions serve two purposes:37 
"(1) 
to 
give 
governmental 
entities 
the 
opportunity 
to 
investigate and evaluate potential claims, and (2) to afford 
governmental entities the opportunity to compromise and budget 
for potential settlement or litigation."  E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. 
Cnty. of Oneida, 2011 WI 71, ¶34, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 N.W.2d 
421.  In keeping with these purposes, we have recognized that 
                                                 
37 We refer to "the notice of claim provisions" collectively 
here; these provisions include the "notice of injury provision" 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a), and the "itemization of relief 
provision" under § 893.80(1)(b), also referred to as the actual 
"notice of claim provision."  See Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 
WI 60, ¶¶23, 28, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59.  Reference to 
the "notice of claim provisions" is intended to refer to the 
notices required under both subsections of § 893.80(1). 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
49 
 
the 
notice 
of 
claim 
provisions 
may 
be 
satisfied 
with 
substantial, rather than strict compliance.  See Figgs v. City 
of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 55, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984).  
Accordingly, where a claimant fails to strictly comply with the 
notice of injury provision under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a), the 
claimant may nonetheless satisfy that provision by showing that 
(1) the governmental entity had actual notice of the claim, and 
(2) the governmental entity was not prejudiced by the claimant's 
failure to strictly comply.  See § 893.80(1)(a); see also State 
v. Town of Linn, 205 Wis. 2d 426, 435, 556 N.W.2d 394 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
¶89 Additionally, 
with 
regard 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b), referred to as the itemization or notice of 
claim provision, see Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶28, 
235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59, we have noted that two 
principles guide our analysis of whether a claim is sufficient 
under 
that 
section. 
First, 
the 
claim 
must 
provide 
the 
governmental entity with enough information to decide whether to 
settle the claim.  See Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 10–
11, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981).  Second, we will construe claims so 
as to preserve bona fide claims for judicial adjudication, 
rather than cutting them off without a trial.  See id. 
¶90 Here, Bostco's notice of injury informed MMSD that the 
Boston Store buildings had been damaged by MMSD's operation of 
the Deep Tunnel.  Although the notice and the itemized statement 
of relief were submitted on behalf of Saks, Inc. and WISPARK 
Holdings LLC, the naming of these parties cannot reasonably be 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
50 
 
said to have compromised MMSD's ability to investigate and 
evaluate the nature of the claim, which was the substantial 
damage to the Boston Store buildings.  Moreover, MMSD has not 
suffered any prejudice by not knowing precisely which entity 
owned the property that MMSD was alleged to have damaged; merely 
being required to litigate, without more, does not demonstrate 
prejudice.  See Luckett v. Bodner, 2009 WI 68, ¶43, 318 Wis. 2d 
423, 769 N.W.2d 504. 
¶91 Furthermore, the itemization of relief informed MMSD 
of what relief was being sought, thereby apprising MMSD of 
potential costs for which it might have wanted to budget, and 
allowing MMSD to contemplate settlement for the asserted 
injuries.  Had MMSD sought to compromise or settle the claim 
(which is not the case here), the naming of different corporate 
entities did not interfere with the purposes of the notice of 
claim provisions.  Most notable for purposes of compromise or 
settlement, the same law firm represented Saks, WISPARK, Bostco, 
and Parisian.  See DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 
198, 515 N.W.2d 888, (1994) (recognizing that notice of claim 
statute is satisfied when attorney's address is provided), 
abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town 
of 
LaGrange, 
200 
Wis. 2d 
585, 
547 
N.W.2d 
587 
(1996).  
Furthermore, the close relationships of the entities involved 
would 
have 
allowed 
for 
meaningful 
exploration 
into 
the 
possibilities of settlement, since the same executives were 
involved in the operation and control of the various entities.  
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
51 
 
¶92 In support of its argument that Bostco failed to 
comply with the notice of claim requirements, MMSD relies on the 
court of appeals' statement in Markweise v. Peck Foods Corp., 
205 Wis. 2d 208, 220–21, 556 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1996), that 
"unless the government entity has 'actual knowledge' of both the 
claimant and his or her claim, the investigation and evaluation 
envisioned by the statute is impossible."  That statement, 
however, arose in the context of thousands of potential 
claimants against the City of Milwaukee, many of whom remained 
unknown after the notice of claim.  See id. at 221, 232. 
¶93 Such was not the case here.  MMSD was aware of the 
property damaged, it was aware of the relief sought, and it had 
sufficient information to contact the claimants.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Bostco substantially complied with the notice 
of claim requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), and therefore 
affirm the court of appeals. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 We conclude that MMSD is not entitled to immunity.  
Once MMSD had notice that the private nuisance it negligently 
maintained was a cause of significant harm, immunity under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) was not available for MMSD.  The proper 
immunity analysis in this case rests on our holding in City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59, that "[w]hether immunity exists 
for nuisance founded on negligence depends upon the character of 
the negligent acts."  Where the negligent act was undertaken 
pursuant to one of those functions set forth in § 893.80(4)——
that is, legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
52 
 
judicial functions——immunity may apply.  See id.; see also 
§ 893.80(4).   
¶95 Here, Bostco's nuisance claim is grounded in MMSD's 
negligent maintenance of its Deep Tunnel, which maintenance 
constituted a continuing private nuisance.  See Physicians Plus, 
254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶2-3 (explaining that when all the elements of 
nuisance are proved and the municipal entity has notice that the 
nuisance is a cause of significant harm, the entity has a duty 
to abate).  Because MMSD's maintenance of the continuing private 
nuisance is not a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or 
quasi-judicial function, MMSD is not entitled to immunity.  See 
Hillcrest Golf, 135 Wis. 2d at 439-40 (explaining that the 
"creation and maintenance of private nuisances are simply not 
recognized as legislative acts subject to protection under sec. 
893.80(4)"); see also Welch, 265 Wis. 2d 688, ¶8 (explaining 
that "no statutory or common law immunity doctrine empowers a 
public body to maintain a private nuisance"); Menick, 200 
Wis. 2d at 745 (concluding "there is no discretion as to 
maintaining the [sewer] system so as not to cause injury"); Wis. 
Stat. §§ 844.01(1) and 844.20(2) (providing statutory procedure 
for seeking abatement of private nuisances).38  The court of 
appeals' determination that MMSD is not entitled to immunity is 
therefore affirmed. 
¶96 Because MMSD does not have immunity for its negligent 
maintenance of the Deep Tunnel, we also conclude as follows:  On 
                                                 
38 See also Winchell, 110 Wis. at 109 (concluding that the 
"legislative authority to install a sewer system carries no 
implication of authority to create or maintain a nuisance"). 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
53 
 
the second issue, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3)–(5) do 
not abrogate MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD 
caused by its negligent maintenance of the Deep Tunnel, after 
MMSD had notice that the nuisance was a cause of significant 
harm.  Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' denial of the 
equitable relief of abatement. 
¶97 Third, we conclude that the monetary damage cap in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does not violate equal protection, either 
facially or as applied to Bostco.  Moreover, the nature of 
Bostco's claim as a continuing nuisance does not render 
§ 893.80(3)'s monetary damage cap inapplicable.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court 
properly reduced Bostco's monetary damages to $100,000. 
¶98 Fourth, with regard to Bostco's inverse condemnation 
claim, we conclude that Bostco forfeited the argument that it 
makes before this court, and we therefore affirm the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
¶99 Fifth, we conclude that Bostco substantially complied 
with the notice of claim provisions under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) 
(2005–06), and that MMSD therefore had sufficient notice under 
those provisions.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
on that issue as well. 
¶100 Because 
neither 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
nor 
(3) 
abrogates MMSD's duty to abate this private nuisance, we reverse 
the court of appeals' decision in part, affirm that decision in 
part, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  In particular, we reverse the 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440 
 
54 
 
court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's order for 
abatement, in part.  That is, while we affirm the court of 
appeals on all other issues, we reverse that court's decision 
that Bostco was not entitled to equitable relief in the form of 
an order for abatement.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court 
decision that abatement is required, and we remand this matter 
to the circuit court.  Upon remand, a hearing may be held to 
establish whether an alternate method will abate the continuing 
private nuisance MMSD maintains or whether lining the Deep 
Tunnel with concrete is required for abatement. 
¶101 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part and the cause remanded to the 
circuit court. 
¶102 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶103 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in toto as I believe it reaches the correct 
result under our existing immunity law.  I write separately, 
however, to express my dismay that this court continues to apply 
a series of doctrines that have no connection to the text of the 
municipal immunity statute (Wis. Stat. § 893.80) or our decision 
to abrogate all governmental immunity in Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  Rather than 
utilizing the nuisance approach adopted by the majority, I would 
instead do away with the ministerial duty and known danger 
exceptions and restore our immunity jurisprudence to conform 
with § 893.80(4) and Holytz.  That is, governmental entities, 
officials, and employees should be entitled to immunity only for 
"acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."1  § 893.80(4); see also 
Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 40.  As this court has never fashioned a 
precise definition of that phrase, I recommend that we adopt the 
"planning-operational 
distinction" 
to 
determine 
whether 
governmental 
action 
is 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial."  This test "grants immunity only 
to 
upper-level 
legislative, 
judicial, 
executive 
and 
administrative policy and planning decisions rather than to any 
decision that might be made."  18 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations § 53:16 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2013).  If a 
decision or action does fall into that category, it is 
                                                 
1 Per the immunity statute, municipalities would still be 
shielded from liability for intentional torts committed by 
employees.  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
2 
 
considered "planning level" and is immune from suit.  Id.  On 
the other hand, "[a] decision resulting from a determination 
based on preexisting laws, regulations, policies, or standards 
usually indicates that its maker is performing an operational 
act."  Id.  Immunity would not apply to activities of this 
nature.  Id.  Because the operation and maintenance of a 
sewerage system is by definition "operational," it does not fall 
into the category of actions that are legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial.  Our immunity analysis 
need not go any further to determine that MMSD is not shielded 
by governmental immunity.     
I. 
THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
¶104 To better understand our current governmental immunity 
quagmire, it will be helpful to briefly survey the historical 
development of the doctrine.  The concept of governmental 
immunity goes back to the 18th-century English common law notion 
that "the king could do no wrong," Linda M. Annoye, Comment, 
Revising Wisconsin's Government Immunity Doctrine, 88 Marq. L. 
Rev. 971, 973-74 (2005).  Or, as Sir William Blackstone put it, 
"The king . . . is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even 
of thinking wrong."  1 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 187 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publishing Limited 
2001).  The first known case to apply this concept was Russell 
v. The Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.), in which 
the Court of King's Bench in England held that an unincorporated 
county was not liable for damages caused by a faulty bridge.  In 
setting forth the court's ruling, Justice Ashhurst reasoned that 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
3 
 
"it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than 
that the public should suffer an inconvenience."  Id. at 362.  
Governmental immunity eventually migrated to the United States, 
first landing in Massachusetts with Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 
247 (1812).  Wisconsin subsequently adopted the doctrine in 
Hayes v. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314 (1873).  There, we 
utilized 
reasoning 
similar 
to 
Russell, 
stating 
that 
"[i]ndividual hardship or loss must sometimes be endured in 
order that still greater hardship or loss to the public at large 
or the community may be averted."  Hayes, 33 Wis. at 319.   
¶105 In 1962 this court abrogated the longstanding common 
law rule of governmental immunity in Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 33, 
noting, 
"[t]here 
are 
probably 
few 
tenets 
of 
American 
jurisprudence which have been so unanimously berated as the 
governmental immunity doctrine."  That decision reversed the 
relationship 
between 
injured 
plaintiffs 
and 
government 
tortfeasors, 
as 
we 
held 
that 
"henceforward, 
so 
far 
as 
governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is 
liability——the exception is immunity."  Id. at 39.  However, we 
qualified this sea change in the law by cautioning that 
liability should not attach to a governmental body when it 
exercises its "legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40 (citation omitted).  We 
also said that "[i]f the legislature deems it better public 
policy, it is, of course, free to reinstate immunity."  Id.  As 
the majority opinion observes, the year after Holytz was 
decided, the legislature enacted an immunity statute that 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
4 
 
closely tracked some of our language from that decision, thereby 
codifying the elimination of blanket governmental immunity.  
Majority op., ¶47; see also Ch. 198, Laws of 1963.  The current 
version of the immunity statute provides that no suit may be 
brought 
against 
any 
"political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision or any agency thereof" or its "officers, officials, 
agents or employees" for intentional torts or "acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions."2  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  But while the 
                                                 
2 The text of the immunity statute does not mention the 
state or its employees.  Townsend v. Wis. Desert Horse Ass'n, 42 
Wis. 2d 414, 422-23, 167 N.W.2d 425 (1969).  However, Holytz v. 
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), 
abrogated 
the 
common 
law 
doctrine 
of 
immunity 
for 
all 
governmental entities, state or municipal.  Given our open 
invitation 
for 
the 
legislature 
to 
reinstate 
governmental 
immunity if it thought our decision unwise, the legislative 
silence with respect to state employees amounted to acceptance 
of our decision that "so far as governmental responsibility for 
torts is concerned, the rule is liability——the exception is 
immunity."  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39; see Progressive N. Ins. 
Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶52, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 
417 ("[G]enerally, legislative silence with regard to new court-
made decisions indicates legislative acquiescence in those 
decisions.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Strangely, though, this court has said that "unlike governmental 
immunity as applied to state employees where immunity is the 
rule and liability is the exception, the opposite is true for 
municipal actors, i.e., liability is the rule and immunity is 
the exception."  Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶20 n.11, 326 
Wis. 2d 37, 784 N.W.2d 648 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
This observation is incorrect because the underlined language is 
plainly at odds with our decision in Holytz, and accordingly 
there should be no distinction in the treatment of state and 
municipal entities or their employees.  Four years ago, Justice 
Prosser (joined by Justice Crooks) noted this anomaly in his 
scholarly concurrence in Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 82, 
¶¶46-57, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1.  I now express my 
agreement with Justice Prosser's conclusion that liability is 
the rule and immunity the exception for both municipalities and 
the state.     
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
5 
 
legislature 
codified 
Holytz's 
abrogation 
of 
governmental 
immunity, for the past five decades this court has been chipping 
away at the Holytz decision and the immunity statute.   
II. THE MINISTERIAL DUTY AND KNOWN DANGER "EXCEPTIONS" 
¶106 The first thread of Holytz's newly woven tapestry to 
unravel was Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300-01, 
240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976), where this court laid down the 
discretionary/ministerial test for whether governmental immunity 
applied.  In holding that the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Registrar could not be sued for allegedly misclassifying a group 
of law students as "non-residents" for tuition purposes, we held 
that government employees are immune when exercising discretion, 
but that no immunity attaches to the negligent performance of a 
"ministerial duty."  Id. at 300-01.  We opined that within the 
context of governmental immunity a "duty is ministerial only 
when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving  merely 
the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).  As the 
decision on whether to classify a student as a Wisconsin 
resident for purposes of in-state tuition required "some 
discretion and judgment," the Registrar was entitled to immunity 
and the hapless law students were not allowed to make their case 
that they paid too much tuition.  Id. at 301-02. 
¶107 The ministerial duty concept, though, came directly 
from our decision in Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 332, 73 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 514 (1955).  See Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301 n.18, 19 
(citing Meyer).  The problem with relying on a test from Meyer, 
however, 
was 
that 
case 
was 
decided 
before 
we 
abrogated 
governmental immunity in Holytz.  So while it made sense for 
Meyer to speak of an exception to immunity when immunity was the 
rule, it made no sense for Lister to adopt an exception to a 
concept that had already been retired both judicially and 
legislatively. 
¶108 Justice Prosser has also commented on the bizarre 
development of the ministerial duty exception "from a context in 
which it was valuable and necessary" to "a context in which it 
is unfair and absurd."  Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 82, 
¶64, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (Prosser, J., concurring).  
By "shift[ing] the focus from liability to immunity," Lister 
turned the Holytz decision upside down without even citing to 
that momentous case.  Id., ¶75.  With a sleight-of-hand, Lister 
cut the guts out of Holytz and essentially restored governmental 
immunity.  As Justice Prosser accurately and poignantly put it:  
"[s]o far as government responsibility for torts is concerned, 
immunity has become the rule and liability has become the rare 
exception.  Justice has been confined to a crawl space too 
narrow for most tort victims to fit."  Id., ¶78.      
¶109 Following Lister, this court repeatedly relied on the 
ministerial duty exception to stretch governmental immunity 
beyond both the text of the statute and the Holytz decision.  
For example, we have immunized such conduct as a road test 
examiner's purported negligence in issuing a driver's license to 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
7 
 
an applicant who was allegedly too overweight to drive,3 a 
university instructor's construction of a volleyball net,4 a 
school district benefits specialist's incorrect advice,5 a police 
officer's allegedly negligent management of a busy intersection 
during a rain storm,6 and a high school guidance counselor 
providing 
inaccurate 
information 
regarding 
a 
student's 
scholarship eligibility requirements.7  All of these decisions 
                                                 
3 Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 512, 259 N.W.2d 537 
(1977).  Justice Robert Hansen colorfully summed up the issue 
presented in Lifer: 
How fat is too fat?  Who is too fat to be 
licensed to get behind the wheel and drive an 
automobile?  Plaintiff alleges that the 320-pound 
driver of the auto in which he was a passenger was so 
fat 
that 
she 
should 
not 
have 
been 
granted 
a 
probationary license to drive an automobile, even 
though she passed the road test portion of the 
examination. 
 
At what point on the scales does an overweight 
person suffer a physical disability that prevents him 
or her from exercising reasonable control over a motor 
vehicle?  The plaintiff answers that the duty to 
determine when corpulency becomes disabling is on the 
road test examiner at the time a road test is 
administered. 
 
The plaintiff sues the defendant 
examiner for breaching a duty owed to the plaintiff 
passenger when he passed Jeannine M. Yingling in the 
road test portion of her examination.   
Id. at 506-07.    
4 Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996).   
5 Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 85, 
95, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999).   
6 Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶¶11, 31, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314.   
7 Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶¶9, 
18, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
8 
 
are at odds with Holytz and the immunity statute in that none of 
these actions can fairly be described as "legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4); Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 40.  Yet that is where this 
court has taken immunity law courtesy of the misappropriated 
ministerial duty exception.     
¶110 In addition to having no connection whatsoever to the 
governing statute, the other flaw with the ministerial duty test 
is that it is excruciatingly narrow.  As one court has put it, 
"it would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no 
matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some 
discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved 
only the driving of a nail."  Ham v. Los Angeles Cnty., 189 P. 
462, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920); see also Swanson v. United 
States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 219-20 (N.D. Cal. 1964) ("In a strict 
sense, every action of a government employee, except perhaps a 
conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some degree of 
discretion.").  The upshot of this court's adoption of the 
ministerial duty exception is that we have in essence overturned 
Holytz and rewritten Wis. Stat. § 893.80.    
¶111 The ministerial duty exception is also the progenitor 
responsible for the illegitimate birth of the known danger 
exception.  In Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 531-32, 536-
38, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977), a group of college students were 
injured while hiking at a state park when they fell from an 
unguarded and unmarked 90-foot cliff into a gorge.  The 
plaintiffs sued the manager of the park (a state employee) for 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
9 
 
failing to put up warning signs along the trail.  Id. at 537-38.  
The manager, naturally, asserted governmental immunity.  Id.  
However, instead of asking whether the manager's actions were 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial, as 
Holytz requires for state employees, this court (relying on 
Lister) framed the question as whether the manager had "an 
absolute, certain, or imperative duty to either place the signs 
warning the public of the dangerous conditions existing on the 
upper trail or to advise his superiors of the condition with a 
view toward adequate protection of the public responding to the 
invitation to use this facility."  Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 541.  
Inexplicably, the court held that because the park manager knew 
the park terrain was dangerous, "the duty to either place 
warning signs or advise superiors of the conditions is, on the 
facts here, a duty so clear and absolute that it falls within 
the definition of a ministerial duty."  Id. at 542 (emphasis 
added).  I say inexplicably because the choice to use one of two 
options quite obviously renders the decision discretionary 
rather than ministerial.8  In any event, to circumvent the 
                                                 
8 This court has also inconsistently applied the known 
danger exception, most significantly in Lodl.  In that case, a 
heavy rain storm triggered a power outage that caused the 
traffic lights to go out at a busy intersection.  253 Wis. 2d 
323, ¶6.  A police sergeant investigated the blackout and 
decided to open the folded stop signs that were affixed to the 
poles of the traffic control signals.  Id., ¶7.  Another officer 
arrived on the scene, called for backup, and requested that 
portable stop signs be brought to the intersection.  Id., ¶8.  
An accident occurred minutes later, before the police backup or 
portable signs arrived.  Id., ¶10.  The injured plaintiff sued, 
alleging that the second officer who arrived on the scene had a 
ministerial 
duty 
to 
manually 
control 
traffic 
at 
the 
intersection.  Id., ¶¶11-12.  Extrapolating from our reasoning 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
10 
 
judicially created ministerial duty test we invented what became 
known as the "known danger exception," thus creating an 
exception 
to 
an 
exception. 
 
Unfortunately, 
neither 
the 
ministerial duty test nor the known danger test is grounded in 
Holytz or the immunity statute, so although we reached the 
correct ultimate conclusion in Cords (immunity does not apply), 
we took an incorrect route.   
III. A NEW APPROACH FOR GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE 
¶112 If we were to do away with the ministerial duty and 
known danger exceptions, what test would we use to determine 
whether an action is "legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, 
or quasi-judicial?"  I recommend that this court adopt the 
"planning-operational distinction."  This test, which is used in 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977), we 
explained that a dangerous situation constitutes a known danger 
for immunity purposes only when "there exists a known present 
danger of such force that the time, mode and occasion for 
performance is evident with such certainty that nothing remains 
for the exercise of judgment and discretion."  Id., ¶38 (quoting 
C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 717, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988)).  
With that principle in mind, we concluded that there was no 
known danger, as the second officer had discretion in deciding 
how to respond when he arrived at the intersection.  Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶46-47.  Yet this conclusion was clearly at odds 
with Cords, where we held that the park manager was required to 
take one of two options.  80 Wis. 2d at 542.  For a further 
elaboration of this point, see Justice Bradley's dissent in 
Lodl.  253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶64, 68-69.         
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
11 
 
some form by a majority9 of states that no longer recognize 
governmental immunity,10 grants immunity to "planning level 
conduct" but not to "operational level decisions."  McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53:16.  Planning level 
conduct touches on questions of public policy and includes those 
governmental decisions that involve "the balancing of priorities 
                                                 
9 See Indus. Indem. Co. v. Alaska, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 
1983); Doe v. Arizona, 24 P.3d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 2001) (en 
banc); Steed v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 138 Cal. Rpt. 3d 519, 
528 (Ct. App. 2012); Cooper v. Hollis, 600 P.2d 109, 111 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1979); Dep't of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071, 
1077-78 (Fla. 1982); Julius Rothschild & Co. v. Hawaii, 655 P.2d 
877, 880-81 (Haw. 1982) (per curiam); Jones v. City of St. 
Maries, 727 P.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Idaho 1986); Peavler v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs of Monroe Cnty., 528 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ind. 1988); Fowler 
v. Roberts, 556 So.2d 1, 15 (La. 1989); Jorgensen v. Dep't of 
Transp., 969 A.2d 912, 917 (Me. 2009); Whitney v. City of 
Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (Mass. 1977); Ross v. Consumers 
Power Co., 363 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Mich. 1984) (per curiam); Conlin 
v. City of Saint Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 2000); Jasa v. 
Douglas Cnty., 510 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Neb. 1994); Schoff v. City 
of Somersworth, 630 A.2d 783, 787 (N.H. 1993); Costa v. Josey, 
415 A.2d 337, 341-43 (N.J. 1980); Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson 
Eng'g Ltd., 451 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ohio 1983), superseded by 
Ohio's Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. Ch. 2744 (West 2013); Nguyen v. Oklahoma, 788 P.2d 962, 
964-65 (Okla. 1990); Costopoulos v. Gibboney, 579 A.2d 985, 988 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 
427, 430-31 (Tenn. 1992); Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. 
Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 657-58 (Tex. 2007); Johnson v. Utah Dep't 
of Transp., 133 P.3d 402, 409 (Utah 2006); Avellaneda v. 
Washington, 273 P.3d 477, 482-83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); Darrar 
v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 577 (Wyo. 1996).            
10  "The majority rule is that in the absence of a statute 
granting immunity, a municipality is liable for its negligence 
in the same manner as a private person or corporation.  The 
common-law doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity is a 
viable defense in this country only in a minority of states [14] 
and only in certain circumstances."  18 Eugene McQuillin, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations § 53:3 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2013).   
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
12 
 
and the weighing of budgetary considerations."  Id.  Operational 
decisions, on the other hand, "concern the day-to-day operation 
of 
government 
and 
include 
decisions 
based 
solely 
upon 
engineering or scientific considerations."  Id.  In other words, 
a decision to adopt (or not adopt) a certain policy would be 
shielded by immunity, but the implementation of the policy would 
be subject to traditional tort standards.  Cf. Bowers v. City of 
Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tenn. 1992).  
¶113 This approach is most consistent with the municipal 
immunity statute and Holytz.  To begin with, it would protect 
"the 
essential 
acts of governmental decision-making" from 
"judicial second-guessing or harassment by the actual or 
potential threat of litigation."  Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson 
Eng'g Ltd., 451 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ohio 1983), superseded by 
Ohio's Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. Ch. 2744 (West 2013).  Specifically, budgetary decisions 
would be immunized such that a governmental entity could not be 
sued for inadequately funding a project.  Indus. Indem. Co. v. 
Alaska, 669 P.2d 561, 566 (Alaska 1983).  The planning-
operational distinction, however, would ensure that citizens are 
protected from the negligent acts of governmental employees "at 
the operational level, where there is no room for policy 
judgment."  Jasa v. Douglas Cnty., 510 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Neb. 
1994) (citation omitted).  Finally, it would restore Holytz by 
placing the burden on the government to show that it is entitled 
to immunity, as opposed to the status quo in Wisconsin, where it 
is now the plaintiff's responsibility to prove that immunity was 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
13 
 
pierced.  McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53:16 
(under the planning-operational test, "[t]he governmental entity 
seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of proving that 
the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by 
consciously balancing risks and benefits.").     
¶114 How would this test apply to the present case?  MMSD's 
decision to build the Deep Tunnel system is a planning level 
decision entitled to immunity.  Conversely, had the Deep Tunnel 
never been built, a plaintiff could not successfully allege that 
his basement was flooded as a result of MMSD's inaction.  The 
decision not to build is shielded for the same reasons as the 
decision to build:  it is a question of public policy that 
involves the evaluation of financial, political, economic, and 
social factors.  See Conlin v. City of Saint Paul, 605 N.W.2d 
396, 400 (Minn. 2000).   
¶115 The day-to-day operation and maintenance of the Deep 
Tunnel is, quite obviously, "operational," and thus standard 
negligence principles apply in the same fashion as if the tunnel 
were built by a private organization.  See Whitney v. City of 
Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (Mass. 1977) ("[A] governmental 
entity is not liable for negligence in the planning of sewers 
but may be liable for negligence in their construction and 
maintenance.") 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Contrary 
to 
MMSD's 
assertions, this case was tried to the jury as one of operation 
and maintenance, not design.  At a pre-trial hearing, the 
circuit court stated, "[t]he issue is, okay, as the tunnel is 
being maintained, operated and inspected by [MMSD], is it 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
14 
 
creating a nuisance[?]"  The court made clear that the case 
"doesn't have anything to do with the way [the Deep Tunnel] was 
designed or constructed."  Instead, "it has to do with the 
manner in which it is being operated, which is causing the 
nuisance."   
¶116 The circuit court asked each of the parties to submit 
a date as to when MMSD took over the operation and maintenance 
of the Deep Tunnel.  Both parties agreed that the date MMSD 
began operating the Deep Tunnel was the date the jury would use 
"in determining what, if any acts of negligence . . .  MMSD 
committed."  After briefing and argument, the court settled on 
August 7, 1992, the date MMSD offered as to when the contractor 
certified that the Deep Tunnel project was substantially 
completed.  The court then made the nature of the case clear to 
the attorneys: 
[MMSD] is only responsible[,] and the jury will only 
be asked to assess assuming they find negligence, 
assess damages that occurred to the Boston Store from 
that day forward. 
 
So if the proof were, for example, that all of 
the damages that the foundation, the Boston Store 
suffered occurred before August 7, 1992, then the jury 
should enter zero dollars. 
 
On the other hand, if all the damages occurred 
after August 7, 1992, then whatever those amounts are, 
that's the number the jury should assess.   
¶117 The negligence question submitted to the jury was 
consistent with the circuit court's remarks to the lawyers at 
the pre-trial conference:  "On or after August 7, 1992 was 
[MMSD] negligent in the manner in which it operated or 
maintained the tunnel near Boston Store?"  After a two-and-a-
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
15 
 
half week trial, the jury found that MMSD was negligent and that 
this negligence was the cause of the damage to Boston Store's 
foundation.  Bostco produced a number of expert witnesses during 
the trial to support its argument that the negligent operation 
and maintenance of the Deep Tunnel caused damage to the Boston 
Store, including an engineer who testified that "[t]he Boston 
Store has experienced large structural column movement as a 
result of the operation of the [Deep] Tunnel," and, "[i]f the 
operation of the [Deep] Tunnel continues under the current 
conditions, the Boston Store will experience large structural 
column movements requiring future repair."  (Emphasis added).  
It is our job as an appellate court to search the record for 
evidence to support, not contradict, the jury's findings.  
Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶39, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 
N.W.2d 659.  Here, there is ample evidence in the record to 
buttress the factual conclusion that MMSD's negligent operation 
and maintenance of the Deep Tunnel unsettled Boston Store's 
foundation, causing millions of dollars of damage.   
¶118 As the operation and maintenance of a sewerage system 
is an "operational" rather than "planning-level" decision, this 
is as far as our immunity analysis needs to go.  The conclusion 
that MMSD is liable for damages under this test would also be in 
harmony with more than a century of Wisconsin case law, which 
has reaffirmed that while the decision to build a public works 
project is entitled to immunity, a governmental entity is liable 
if its negligent operation and maintenance of the project causes 
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
16 
 
damages or injury.11  However, I would also add that even if MMSD 
were correct that any negligence on its part related solely to 
the design of the Deep Tunnel, this is not the type of planning-
level decision that should be entitled to immunity.  As the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held in interpreting that state's 
governmental immunity statute, "immunity does not bar an action 
                                                 
11 See Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 320, 253 
N.W.2d 240 (1977) ("[G]overnmental immunity would apply to 
acquisition of the [dam and floodgate] by the town.  However, 
such governmental immunity would not include a failure to 
maintain as to a condition of disrepair or defect or a failure 
to properly operate said floodgate."); Naker v. Town of Trenton, 
62 Wis. 2d 654, 660, 217 N.W.2d 665 (1974) (per curiam) ("Once 
the decision is made and the sign is erected, the legislative 
function is terminated and the doctrine of Holytz that imposes 
liability for want of ordinary care takes over."); Christian v. 
City of New London, 234 Wis. 123, 129, 290 N.W. 621 (1940)("The 
doctrine of the cases dealing with municipally owned waterworks 
is that the municipality must use proper care in maintaining the 
means of storage and distribution, or respond in damages to 
anyone injured."); Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 
184 Wis. 352, 363, 199 N.W. 390 (1924) ("In creating a nuisance 
[in managing a sewage disposal plant] . . . , [the City] must 
respond in damages . . . ."); Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 
Wis. 101, 109, 85 N.W. 668 (1901) (the legislative authority to 
"install a sewer system carries no implication of authority to 
create or maintain a nuisance, and . . . it matters not whether 
such nuisance results from negligence or from the plan adopted.  
If such nuisance be created, the same remedies may be invoked as 
if the perpetrator were an individual."); Welch v. City of 
Appleton, 2003 WI App 133, ¶24, 265 Wis. 2d 688, 666 N.W.2d 511 
("Maintenance of sewers so as not to cause injury is generally 
considered ministerial compared to the discretionary decision 
relating to design or implementation of a system.") (citation 
omitted); Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 547 
N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]hile the decision to install and 
provide a sewer system in a community is a discretionary 
decision, there is no discretion as to maintaining the system so 
as not to cause injury to residents.  The actions of the City in 
operating and maintaining the sewer system do not fall within 
the immunity provisions of [Wis. Stat.] § 893.80.").      
No.  2007AP221 & 2007AP1440.mjg 
 
17 
 
when the conduct was merely a professional or scientific 
judgment."  Fisher v. Cnty. of Rock, 596 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 
1999) (citation omitted).  Immunity only attaches "if in 
addition 
to 
professional 
or 
scientific 
judgments, 
policy 
considerations played a part in making a decision . . . ."  Id. 
(citation omitted).  There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the design of the Deep Tunnel was anything but a 
technocratic decision that was farmed out to an engineering firm 
that MMSD contracted with.  While the decision to build the Deep 
Tunnel was planning-level conduct, the implementation of that 
decision was operational and thus not entitled to immunity.             
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶119 We stated in Holytz that the legislature was free to 
reinstate governmental immunity.  In the five decades since that 
decision, it has not done so.  That choice should be respected 
by this court rather than undermined.          
 
 
    
 
 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶120 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
conclude that the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (the 
District or MMSD) is immune from suit for any monetary damages 
or injunctive relief in the present case.  The District is 
immune because the Deep Tunnel is being operated and maintained 
in the manner in which it was designed.  Neither Bostco nor the 
majority opinion has shown otherwise.   
¶121 Decisions 
regarding 
the 
design 
of 
a 
municipal 
improvement project are, according to case law, legislative, 
discretionary decisions, the type of core decisions for which 
government entities are immune from suit.1  Government entities 
are immune from suit even if the planning, design, and 
implementation of the project are negligent and lead to a 
harmful result, including the maintenance of a nuisance.2   
¶122 If the District were not immune, I would conclude that 
any monetary damages or injunctive relief in the present case is 
limited 
by 
the 
statutory 
cap 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(3).3  Permitting a circuit court to order ad hoc 
abatement of a private nuisance, at unlimited cost, circumvents 
the monetary damage cap and eviscerates the statutory text and 
                                                 
1 Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee (City 
of Milwaukee), 2005 WI 8, ¶9, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  
See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metro. Sewerage Comm'n, 80 
Wis. 2d 10, 15-17, & n.3 (collecting cases), 258 N.W.2d 148 
(1977).  
2 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶8, 44, 50, 58, 59, 
60; Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 16.   
3 I agree that Bostco forfeited its inverse condemnation 
claim and that Bostco substantially complied with the Notice of 
Claim requirements.  See majority op., ¶¶7-8. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
2 
 
legislatively enacted protection of the taxpayer and the public 
purse. 
¶123 Before examining the numerous errata in the majority 
opinion, let me sound an A*L*A*R*M.  The majority opinion 
drastically and fundamentally increases government liability.  
This case alone may result in a mandatory expenditure of over 
$10 million by the District.   
¶124 As a matter of courtesy and comity to the legislative 
branch, the majority opinion should, in my opinion, apply its 
new-found law only to tortious causes of action occurring after 
July 15, 2015.  Such a delayed effective date would give public 
bodies time "to enable [them] to make financial arrangements to 
meet the new liability implicit in this holding"4 and would give 
the state legislature time to consider the enactment of a new 
state policy on government immunity and liability.  Delaying the 
effective date of an opinion that substantially increases 
government liability is not an original thought.  This is 
exactly what the court did in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 
                                                 
4 In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962), the court explained: 
To enable the various public bodies to make financial 
arrangements to meet the new liability implicit in 
this holding, the effective date of the abolition of 
the rule of governmental immunity for torts shall be 
July 15, 1962.  See sec. 66.18, Stats., regarding 
liability 
insurance 
for 
both 
the 
state 
and 
municipalities.  The new rule shall not apply to torts 
occurring before July 15, 1962.  However, for the 
reasons set forth in the supplemental opinion in Kojis 
v. Doctors Hospital (1961), 12 Wis. 2d 367, 373, 374, 
107 N.W.2d 131, 292, this decision shall apply to the 
case at bar. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 26, 42, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), the seminal Wisconsin 
case abrogating government immunity, at least in part.  
¶125 I now turn to a critique of the majority opinion.  The 
first step is to put the case in perspective.   
¶126 Bostco asserts (and the majority opinion agrees) that 
the District is liable in tort for negligently maintaining a 
private nuisance——a sewer system called the Deep Tunnel——that 
has interfered with Bostco's real property, regardless of the 
nature of the District's action that created the nuisance.5  
¶127 The District derives its power to design and construct 
sewer systems from the legislature.  The legislature has 
delegated that authority to cities and their sewerage districts.  
Wis. Stat. § 62.18.  In accordance with its legislatively 
delegated powers, the District designed the Deep Tunnel to be 
built beneath the City of Milwaukee to collect and store excess 
sewage and storm water to prevent basement backups and sewer 
overflows.  Taking into account a plethora of policy, planning, 
regulatory, and budget considerations, the District designed 
Phase One of the Deep Tunnel to be built beneath downtown 
Milwaukee.  One of the District's design decisions dictated that 
nearly half of the Tunnel would be lined with concrete while the 
other half would be porous, allowing groundwater to seep through 
the soil and bedrock beneath downtown Milwaukee and into the 
                                                 
5 See majority op., ¶¶3, 4, 43, 67, 71, 72. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
4 
 
Tunnel.6  Decisions regarding the design of a municipal 
improvement project are, according to case law, legislative, 
discretionary decisions, the type of core decisions for which 
government entities are immune from suit.7   
¶128 Since 
going 
into 
service 
in 
1993, 
the 
Tunnel, 
according to the record, has been operated and maintained by the 
District in the manner in which it was designed to function.  
Both Bostco and the majority opinion have failed to demonstrate 
any way in which the Deep Tunnel is failing to function as it 
was designed to function.  Moreover, neither Bostco nor the 
majority opinion has pointed to any applicable standard, that 
is, to any applicable statute, guideline, or regulation, 
requiring the District to operate or maintain the Deep Tunnel in 
                                                 
6 Some of the other decisions the District made include:  
the route of the Tunnel beneath the City, the Tunnel's length 
(19.4 miles) and diameter (varying between 17 and 32 feet), the 
Tunnel's depth (300 feet below ground), and the Tunnel's 
capacity (405 million gallons of water).  
A stipulation during litigation between the District and 
the Department of Natural Resources in 1986 permitted the 
District to line only portions of the Tunnel.  The District's 
current permit from the DNR requires the Tunnel to have a 
positive inward gradient, that is, to allow water to flow into 
the Tunnel in order to prevent the possible exfiltration of 
wastewater. 
7 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶9.  See also 
Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 15-17 & n.3 (collecting cases).  
In City of Milwaukee, the court referred to these types of 
design decisions as "legislative" functions.  See City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶9, 55, 57, 58, 60, 91.  For the 
sake of consistency, I will refer to them as "legislative" as 
well. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
5 
 
a manner different than the way in which it was designed to 
function.8 
¶129 Even if the District designed the Tunnel in a poor and 
negligent manner and has created a nuisance and injured Bostco, 
the District is immune from suit for that design and for the 
operation and maintenance of the Tunnel in accordance with that 
design.9   
¶130 I dissent because the majority opinion reaches the 
wrong result by revising history, erroneously interpreting cases 
and statutes, isolating and citing language from cases out of 
context, relying on and reinvigorating recanted cases, and 
silently and surreptitiously overturning precedent.  
¶131 This criticism is, alas, easy to level and to prove 
(and I shall).  At the same time it is important to acknowledge, 
and I do, that the law of government tort immunity over the last 
50 years since Holytz has become encrusted with not-always-
consistent case law.  Indeed the law may be described as having 
become once again "knee-deep in legal esoterica," and replete 
with "highly artificial judicial distinctions."10 
                                                 
8 When the court of appeals commented on this court's City 
of Milwaukee decision, it explained in DeFever v. City of 
Waukesha that "[b]ecause MMSD could not point to laws directing 
the City how to inspect, monitor, and repair or replace the 
water main, the City's duty was discretionary rather than 
ministerial."  DeFever v. City of Waukesha, 2007 WI App 266, 
¶12, 306 Wis. 2d 766, 743 N.W.2d 848 (citing City of Milwaukee, 
277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶56-60). 
9 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶8, 44, 50, 58, 59, 
60; Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 16.   
10 Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 30, 32.  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶132 The concurrence bemoans the fact that courts have 
drifted away from the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80, never having 
"fashioned a precise definition of [the] phrase" "legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions."  
Concurrence, ¶1.  Not completely true!   
¶133 Case after case has explained that these terms "have 
been collectively interpreted to include any act that involves 
the exercise of discretion and judgment."11  The concurrence 
might not characterize this definition as "precise," but it is 
just as precise (or imprecise) as the concurrence's recommended 
"planning-operational" distinction as a sound interpretation of 
the statutory words.12     
¶134 Indeed, this court has explicitly "decline[d] the 
invitation to create a planning/operational distinction to be 
utilized in the analysis of state employee immunity," because 
the distinction is "ill-defined and difficult to apply."  Kimps 
v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 24, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996).  The 
planning/operational distinction has not become better defined 
or easier to apply since Kimps.  Cases from other jurisdictions 
(both 
before 
and 
after 
Kimps) 
demonstrate 
that 
using 
a 
"planning-operational" distinction between acts that are immune 
                                                 
11 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶54.  For similar 
statements, see Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, 
¶21, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314; Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. 
v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶¶25, 27, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 
N.W.2d 693; Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 509, 511-12, 259 
N.W.2d 537 (1977); Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 
301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  
12 See concurrence, ¶¶1, 10-11. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
7 
 
and those for which a government entity is liable provides no 
silver 
bullet 
piercing 
the 
difficulties 
associated 
with 
interpreting and applying rules of government immunity and 
liability.13     
¶135 Government immunity and liability is a complicated 
area of jurisprudence with 50 years of Wisconsin case law 
precedent that is not always easy to explain or justify.  
Periodically the court has attempted to synthesize and clarify 
our cases.  This court's decision in Milwaukee Metropolitan 
Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukee (City of Milwaukee), 2005 
WI 8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658, just eight years ago, 
went a long way to clarify the issues presented in the instant 
case——nuisance, negligence, liability, and immunity.  And here 
we are moving away from that decision.14  
¶136 Perhaps our whole body of case law interpreting Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 needs to be carefully revisited.  Indeed, ten 
years ago I wrote that the court has struggled to define the 
proper scope of government immunity, that revisiting the scope 
                                                 
13 The courts have not found this distinction easy to apply 
and decisions have not been consistent within a state or from 
state to state.  For a discussion of this distinction and cases, 
see 18 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53:16 (3d ed. 
rev. 2013). 
14 When a court has "authoritatively construed a statute, 
well-established principles of judicial decision-making require 
that the chosen construction be maintained unless and until the 
legislature either amends or repeals the statute."  Reiter v. 
Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980); Zimmerman v. 
Wis. Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648 
(1968).  The majority opinion does not adhere to this rule of 
statutory interpretation.    
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
8 
 
and limits of government immunity has far-reaching impact, and 
that if this court should undertake such a task it should do so 
only with the benefit of full information, including briefs from 
tort victims, the State of Wisconsin, the League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities, the Wisconsin Counties Association, and the 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance.15   
¶137 The majority opinion does not carefully revisit the 
law and does not have full information.  Instead, unfortunately, 
the majority opinion further muddies the waters. 
¶138 I am writing this dissent to focus attention on the 
mistaken premises upon which the majority opinion is based.  I 
shall proceed by listing each erratum with a brief description, 
followed by a more extensive discussion.16     
ERRATUM I. (¶¶44-65, infra) 
¶139 THE INITIAL BAIT-AND-SWITCH.  The majority opinion 
rests heavily on the old bait-and-switch trick.     
¶140 Here's the basic bait:  The majority opinion (at ¶3) 
declares that it "rests on our holding in Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukee."  I joined this City of 
Milwaukee opinion.  I agreed with it then.  I agree with it now.   
                                                 
15 Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶¶58-
59, 
262 
Wis. 2d 127, 
663 
N.W.2d 715 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
16 I have tried to point out what I view as the major errors 
in the majority opinion.  There are others.  Inconsistent 
statement of legal principles, inconsistent application of legal 
principles, and inconsistent use of language cause additional 
problems.  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶141 Here's the switch:  The majority opinion fails to 
adhere to City of Milwaukee and to Physicians Plus Insurance 
Corp. v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co., 2002 WI 80, 254 
Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777, upon which City of Milwaukee relies.   
¶142 Here's the bait again:  The majority opinion (at ¶3) 
correctly states the rule of law set forth in City of Milwaukee:  
"Whether immunity exists for nuisance founded on negligence 
depends upon the character of the negligent acts."17   
¶143 City of Milwaukee then declares the following rule of 
law regarding the character of the negligent act:  
A municipality is immune from suit for nuisance if the 
nuisance is predicated on negligent acts that are 
discretionary in nature.  A municipality does not 
enjoy immunity from suit for nuisance when the 
underlying tortious conduct is negligence and the 
negligence is comprised of acts performed pursuant to 
a ministerial duty.18   
¶144 The City of Milwaukee court did not decide whether the 
City was immune from suit for failing to repair a leaking main 
                                                 
17 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59.  See also id., 
¶90.   
18 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶8.  See also id., 
¶¶59-60, 90-91.  
See also id., ¶9:  
Decisions 
concerning 
the 
adoption, 
design, 
and 
implementation 
of 
a 
public 
works 
system 
are 
discretionary, 
legislative 
decisions 
for 
which 
a 
municipality enjoys immunity.  Thus, the City is 
immune from suit relating to its decisions regarding 
the adoption of a waterworks system, the selection of 
the specific type of pipe, the placement of the pipe 
in the ground, and the continued existence of such 
pipe. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
10 
 
before it ruptured.  The court declared that the record was not 
sufficiently developed to determine whether the City was under a 
ministerial duty (a non-legislative duty) or a discretionary 
duty (a legislative duty) to repair the leaking main prior to 
its rupture.  The City of Milwaukee court directed that "the 
circuit court must consider this issue on remand."19   
¶145 Here's the switch:  The majority opinion (at ¶41) 
recasts City of Milwaukee to state:  "The duty to fix the pipe, 
if the City knew it was leaking, was 'absolute, certain and 
imperative,'——in 
other 
words, 
ministerial——even 
though 
a 
particular method of repairing the leak was not 'absolute, 
certain and imperative.'"  
¶146 According to the majority opinion (at ¶43 n.25):  
"[I]t is the manner in which MMSD complies with the ministerial 
duty to fix the problem that is subject to discretion; no such 
discretion exists as to whether MMSD must fix the known 
problem."  The majority opinion further states (at ¶51): 
                                                 
19 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶62:  
Having reviewed the record, we determine that the 
facts of the present case are not sufficiently 
developed for us to determine whether the City was 
under a ministerial duty to repair the leaking main 
prior to its break on December 9, 1999. . . . [W]e 
cannot conclude whether [the City's] duty to repair 
the leaking main with reasonable care before it broke 
was "absolute, certain and imperative," or whether the 
City's decision not to repair the main before the 
break was discretionary.  As such, we cannot determine 
whether the City is entitled to governmental immunity 
under § 893.80(4) based on the record before us 
(internal citations omitted). 
See also id., ¶¶90-91. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
11 
 
[A]lthough a municipal entity escapes liability for 
its 
legislative 
or 
quasi-legislative 
decision 
regarding whether to install a particular system or 
structure, 
once 
the 
municipal 
entity 
makes 
the 
decision to install, the entity is under a subsequent 
ministerial duty to maintain the system or structure 
in a safe and working order.20    
¶147 In other words, according to the majority opinion 
(¶¶51, 64), once a municipal entity installs a particular system 
or structure, the entity is under a subsequent ministerial duty 
to maintain the system or structure in a safe manner and is 
liable for any damages negligently caused, no matter the act 
that caused the nuisance or the damage.21   
                                                 
20 This sentence is an example of the majority opinion's 
inconsistent 
and 
confusing 
use 
of 
the 
word 
"maintain."  
"Maintain" is sometimes used to mean "to keep a structure in a 
state of repair."  At other times, the majority opinion uses the 
word "maintain" to mean that a municipality "maintains a 
nuisance," after its actions "created" or "caused" or "resulted 
in" the existence of the nuisance.    
Before a sewer system can be "maintained" in a proper state 
of repair, the system must first be "created."  At times, the 
majority opinion alludes to the fact that the District has 
"created and maintained a nuisance," while at other times, the 
majority 
opinion 
simply 
concludes 
that 
the 
District 
has 
"maintained a nuisance."  See also ¶77, infra. 
This case is unlike Physicians Plus, where an act of nature 
created, caused, or resulted in a nuisance——a tree hanging over 
and obstructing a stop sign.  In the present case, the Tunnel is 
a man-made object created by the District, the existence of 
which has resulted in a nuisance.  The majority opinion 
repeatedly asserts that the District "maintains" the nuisance or 
"keeps [the Tunnel] in that state." 
21 According 
to 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
"[A] 
municipal 
entity's failure to abate a continuing nuisance caused by 
negligent maintenance of a system" after the entity has notice 
does not constitute a discretionary act.  Majority op., ¶64. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶148 The majority opinion flouts the City of Milwaukee rule 
of law that distinguishes between operation and maintenance of 
the Tunnel that may in particular circumstances be legislative 
actions, and operation and maintenance of the Tunnel that may in 
other circumstances be ministerial actions.  The majority 
opinion then imposes liability in a limited amount for damages 
for negligent operation and maintenance of a nuisance and 
unlimited injunctive relief for a nuisance, regardless of 
whether the negligently created nuisance is a result of 
discretionary action or a failure to fulfill a ministerial duty. 
ERRATUM II. (¶¶66 to 86, infra) 
¶149 A CONTINUED BAIT-AND-SWITCH.  After promising to 
adhere to City of Milwaukee, the majority opinion contravenes 
City of Milwaukee in a second way:  It repeatedly relies on 
cases explicitly called into doubt by City of Milwaukee22 and 
asserts (sometimes in slightly different language) that "there 
is no discretion as to maintaining the [sewer system] so as not 
to cause injury."  
¶150 Some cases upon which the majority opinion depends 
were decided before Holytz and the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
                                                                                                                                                             
There are, however, contradictory statements scattered in 
the majority opinion.  See, for example, majority op., ¶66, 
requiring a court to determine first whether immunity applies to 
the actions that caused the nuisance the plaintiff is asking to 
stop.  If immunity applies to the actions, then no relief is 
available, no matter the result.  This is the rule clearly laid 
down in City of Milwaukee. 
22 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶55 n.14, 58 n.15, 
59 n.17. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
13 
 
§ 893.80 (Winchell).23  Others were decided after Holytz and 
§ 893.80 (Costas,24 Hillcrest,25 Menick,26 and Welch27).  These 
cases have all been called into question by subsequent case law, 
especially by City of Milwaukee.28  Thus once again the majority 
opinion has baited us with a promise to adhere to the City of 
Milwaukee 
case 
but 
has 
switched 
to 
repudiating 
City 
of 
Milwaukee.  
ERRATUM III. (¶¶87 to 99, infra) 
¶151 EQUITABLE CLAIM: WIS. STAT. § 893.80(3).  The majority 
opinion bends the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) to conclude 
                                                 
23 Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 
(1901).  See majority op., ¶¶4 n.4, 35 n.18, 69, 98 n.3p. 
24 Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 
N.W.2d 217 (1964).  See majority op., ¶¶31, 33, 35, 41 n.22, 64, 
69, 70. 
25 Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City of Altoona, 135 
Wis. 2d 431, 400 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986).  See majority op., 
¶¶4, 63, 64, 98. 
26 Menick 
v. 
City 
of 
Menasha, 
200 
Wis. 2d 737, 
547 
N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1995).  See majority op., ¶¶4, 36, 37, 60, 
98. 
27 Welch v. City of Appleton, 2003 WI App 133, 265 
Wis. 2d 688, 666 N.W.2d 511.  See majority op., ¶¶4, 34, 37 & 
n.20, 98. 
28 Anhalt v. Cities & Vills. Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 271, 
249 Wis. 2d 62, 637 N.W.2d 422, repeats the mantra oft repeated 
in the majority opinion:  In a suit against a municipal entity 
for negligent operation and failure to maintain an adequate 
sewerage system, the complainant has to show only that the 
sewerage system failed due to negligence, rather than showing 
the negligence stemmed from the municipal entity's failure to 
perform a ministerial duty.  The Anhalt holding, however, does 
not support this refrain.  See discussion at ¶¶80-91, 83-85, 
infra. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
14 
 
that the $50,000 statutory cap does not apply to a court order 
directing a municipal entity to abate a nuisance founded on tort 
for which it is liable.29 
¶152 Espousing an ordinary and reasonable interpretation of 
the phrase "the amount recoverable by any person for any 
damages . . . in any action founded on tort" in § 893.80(3), the 
majority opinion concludes that this phrase means only money 
damages awarded to the complainant.  The majority opinion 
disregards the fact that in many instances there may be no 
substantial 
difference 
for 
both 
the 
complainant 
and 
the 
government 
entity 
between 
a 
monetary 
sum 
awarded 
to 
a 
complaining party to remedy its injury and injunctive relief 
directed to a government entity forcing it to remedy the 
complaining party's injury.30  In either event, the complainant 
recovers and gets the relief sought, and the government entity 
must expend funds.  This statutory phrase, given its ordinary 
                                                 
29 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) provides in relevant part as 
follows:   
Except as provided in this subsection, the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or 
death 
in 
any 
action 
founded 
on 
tort 
against 
any . . . political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision or 
agency thereof and against their 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in their official capacity or in the course of their 
agency 
or 
employment, 
whether 
proceeded 
against 
jointly or severally, shall not exceed $50,000. . . .   
30 Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2011 WI 
App 76, ¶133, 334 Wis. 2d 620, 800 N.W.2d 518 ("From the 
standpoint of the public treasury, there is little difference in 
practice between a monetary damage award given to a plaintiff to 
remedy its harm and in injunction order requiring the defendant 
to abate the harm."). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
15 
 
and reasonable meaning, governs both monetary damages and 
injunctive relief in any action founded on tort.   
¶153 The majority opinion is oblivious to the extreme irony 
in limiting monetary damages to $50,000 for public policy 
reasons while requiring government entities to pay as much as it 
takes to abate a nuisance.   
¶154 The majority opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) 
is 
unreasonable 
and 
absurd, 
as 
it 
renders 
meaningless the $50,000 legislatively mandated limit on the 
amount a government entity must expend when liable for its 
tortious conduct. 
ERRATUM IV. (¶¶100 to 132, infra) 
¶155 EQUITABLE CLAIM CONTINUED: WIS. STAT. § 893.80(3), 
(4), and (5).  The majority opinion offers up a potpourri of 
arguments to support its thesis that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), 
(4), and (5) do not apply to injunctive relief in a tort action 
such as the present case.  In all of its analysis, the majority 
opinion overlooks the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), (4), 
and (5).  The texts are broadly worded, regulating "any action 
founded 
on 
tort," 
"any 
suit," 
and 
"all 
claims 
against 
a . . . governmental subdivision," and declaring that § 893.80 
shall be "exclusive."  
¶156 Clearly Bostco's request for injunctive relief in this 
tort action is encompassed in "any suit."  It is labeled a claim 
and is a "claim" that fits within the statutory phrase "all 
claims."     
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶157 Section 893.80 uses all-encompassing words, like"any 
action founded on tort," "any suit," "exclusive," and "all 
claims" to include injunctive and "all" types of relief for 
negligent tortious conduct within the confines of § 893.80. 
¶158 The majority opinion offers no statute (or precedent) 
excluding 
injunctive 
relief 
from 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80 
or 
excluding the facts of the present case from § 893.80.  
¶159 The 
majority 
opinion 
enables 
a 
court 
to 
order 
abatement of a private nuisance at unlimited cost, thereby 
eviscerating the text and legislatively enacted protection of 
the taxpayer and the public purse.   
ERRATUM V. (¶¶133 to 152, infra) 
¶160 EQUITABLE CLAIM:  MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS. The 
majority opinion fails to discuss injunctive relief in any 
meaningful manner.  The injunctive remedy adopted by the 
majority opinion leaves more questions than answers.  In 
ordering injunctive relief, the majority opinion does not pay 
particular attention to the public consequences and hardships of 
granting injunctive relief, as required by law.  It does not 
recognize that the legislature has declared that the statutorily 
allowed damages are sufficient.  It does not determine whether 
Bostco's contributory negligence reduces the available equitable 
relief.  It disregards the practicability of a court's framing 
and enforcing an injunctive order when the Deep Tunnel is a 
municipal structure highly regulated by state and federal laws 
and overseen by the Department of Natural Resources.    
ERRATUM VI. (¶¶153 to 158) 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶161 UNFUNDED MANDATE: CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.  The 
majority opinion expands government liability and increases 
costs for government entities and taxpayers.  This results in an 
unfunded mandate on government entities.  Increased government 
liability is contrary to recent legislative expressions of state 
policy that reduce government liability and reduce potential 
recovery for tort victims.  The majority opinion is marching in 
the opposite direction from the legislature.   
¶162 On consideration of these serious errata, I dissent. 
I 
¶163 I agree with the majority opinion that the proper 
negligence, nuisance, liability, and immunity analyses rest upon 
City of Milwaukee.  Majority op., ¶3.  The decision in City of 
Milwaukee builds on the Physicians Plus decision and carefully 
analyzes half a century of precedent.31  The rub, as I have 
stated, is that the majority opinion does not adhere to the City 
of Milwaukee decision.   
¶164 The negligent creation and known existence of a 
nuisance are alone insufficient to impose liability on a 
municipal entity.  As City of Milwaukee instructs, once a 
property owner proves the existence of a nuisance and notice to 
the entity, the owner must also prove that the underlying 
tortious conduct giving rise to the nuisance constitutes 
actionable negligence.32   
                                                 
31 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶24-49. 
32 Id., ¶¶6, 7.   
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶165 Once actionable negligence is established, the next 
step under City of Milwaukee is to determine the nature of the 
municipal entity's negligent acts in order to determine whether 
the entity is liable or immune.  As City of Milwaukee explained: 
"[A] municipality may be immune from nuisance suits depending on 
the nature of the tortious acts giving rise to the nuisance.  A 
municipality is immune from suit for nuisance if the nuisance is 
predicated on negligent acts that are discretionary in nature."33   
¶166 City of Milwaukee further explained that "[d]ecisions 
concerning the adoption, design, and implementation of a public 
works system are discretionary, legislative decisions for which 
a municipality enjoys immunity."34  Thus, if the nuisance in the 
present case is predicated on negligent "[d]ecisions concerning 
the adoption, design and implementation of" the Deep Tunnel, 
then such actions are "discretionary, legislative decisions" for 
which the District enjoys immunity.35   
                                                 
33 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶8 (emphasis added); 
see also id., ¶¶58-59, 62, 90. 
34 Id., ¶9.  
35 Id.  
City 
of 
Milwaukee 
makes 
clear 
that 
some 
of 
these 
discretionary, immune decisions include "decisions regarding the 
adoption of a waterworks system, the selection of the specific 
type of pipe, the placement of the pipe in the ground, and the 
continued existence of such pipe."  City of Milwaukee, 277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶9.  Applying these principles to this case, some 
of the District's discretionary decisions, which are immune from 
suit, include decisions regarding the adoption of a Deep Tunnel 
system, the selection of the specific type of Tunnel system, the 
placement of the Tunnel in the ground, and the continued 
existence of the Tunnel.   
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶167 In contrast, if the nuisance is predicated on a 
negligent act in performing a ministerial duty to operate or 
maintain the Deep Tunnel that caused the nuisance, then the 
District is liable.36   
¶168 In City of Milwaukee, the City's water main was 
obviously neither designed nor constructed to leak.  All agreed 
that the water main leaked and then ruptured, causing damage to 
MMSD's sewer.  MMSD in that case did not allege that the City 
was negligent in failing to repair the main after it ruptured.  
MMSD alleged that the City was negligent and created a nuisance 
by failing to monitor and inspect the system to detect leaks, 
and by failing to repair the main before it ruptured.  The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the City had a 
ministerial duty to act while the water main was leaking before 
the main ruptured.37 
¶169 At no time in City of Milwaukee did this court decide 
that the City had a ministerial duty to abate a nuisance merely 
because it had notice of the nuisance.  The court decided only 
that the City may be liable if it had sufficient notice that 
created an "absolute, certain, and imperative" duty to act.38   
                                                 
36 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶9.   
37 Id., ¶¶8, 9, 61. 
38 The majority opinion, ¶¶38-41, 43, recasts City of 
Milwaukee by zeroing in on some sentences of the opinion but not 
reading them in context of the entire opinion.  City of 
Milwaukee did not create a rule whereby a government entity's 
notice of a nuisance automatically creates a general ministerial 
duty to abate the nuisance, as the majority opinion in the 
present case claims.    
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶170 The majority opinion (at ¶¶41, 51) recasts City of 
Milwaukee to state that once the District had notice that it had 
negligently created a private nuisance that caused damage, it 
had a ministerial duty to abate the nuisance.  According to the 
majority opinion, "[O]nce the municipal entity makes the 
decision 
to 
install, 
the 
entity 
is 
under 
a 
subsequent 
ministerial duty to maintain the system or structure in a safe 
and working order."  Majority op., ¶51 (footnote omitted). 
¶171 This 
recasting of City of Milwaukee contradicts 
precedent.  Case law instructs that the court must look at the 
act, and not simply the result.  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, 80 Wis. 2d 10, 258 N.W.2d 148 
                                                                                                                                                             
A reading of the entire opinion reveals that notice was a 
threshold issue but was not dispositive.  City of Milwaukee 
clearly states that the next question to be addressed by the 
circuit court was whether the act was discretionary. City of 
Milwaukee never stated that if the city had notice, a general 
ministerial duty to stop the leaking would necessarily follow. 
A concurring opinion by Justice Prosser in City of 
Milwaukee demonstrates that this court did not remand to the 
circuit court just for the purpose of determining whether the 
City was on notice that the water main was leaking.  Justice 
Prosser stated that "this formulation [in the City of Milwaukee 
of discretionary and ministerial actions] is so narrow that it 
appears 
to 
decide 
the 
case." 
 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
277 
Wis. 2d 635, ¶95 (Prosser, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Butler v. Advance Drainage Systems, Inc., 2005 WI App 108, 
¶40, 282 Wis. 2d 776, 698 N.W.2d 117, quotes City of Milwaukee 
and states that the first step in a negligent nuisance action is 
to determine whether a nuisance is present; the second step is 
to determine the underlying tortious conduct; and the third step 
is to decide whether the defendant's conduct "is 'otherwise 
actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent 
conduct.'"  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
21 
 
(1977), the court explained that "[w]here, when and how to build 
sewer systems are legislative determinations imposed upon a 
governmental body."39  So long as the parts of the sewer system, 
in that case a manhole, were placed at a location in compliance 
with the plans, their placement is an act in compliance with a 
legislative function that is subject to immunity.40  Initial 
planning and implementation decisions are immune even though 
"the placement and subsequent use of the manhole may have 
created a danger."41   
¶172 Allstate 
teaches 
that 
the 
District 
may 
have 
a 
ministerial duty to operate and maintain the Deep Tunnel 
functioning in its original, intended state.  The ministerial 
duty to operate and maintain the Tunnel does not, however, 
require 
making 
improvements 
to 
the 
Tunnel, 
even 
if 
an 
improvement is necessary to avoid harm.42   
¶173 The problem in the present case is that no one 
examines the District's acts.  No one——not Bostco, not the 
witnesses, not the jury, not the circuit court, not the court of 
appeals, and not the majority opinion——identifies the District's 
allegedly 
negligent 
acts 
that 
caused 
the 
nuisance 
or 
characterizes 
the 
negligent 
acts 
as 
either 
discretionary 
                                                 
39 Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 16. 
40 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶58 (citing Allstate, 
80 Wis. 2d at 16). 
41 Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 16. 
42 Id. at 15-16; cf. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 WI 
59, ¶¶45, 48, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
22 
 
(legislative) 
or 
ministerial 
(non-discretionary, 
non-
legislative).   
¶174 Bostco's complaint broadly alleges that two District 
actions 
led 
to 
the 
continuing 
private 
nuisance: 
1) 
the 
District's negligent design and construction of the Tunnel; and 
2) the District's failure to exercise ordinary care in the 
inspection, repair, maintenance, and operation of the Tunnel.   
¶175 The record does not identify any District actions that 
are not related to design and construction.  
¶176 The jury in the present case was never instructed to 
identify which negligent conduct caused the nuisance.  The jury 
was not asked to determine whether the negligent conduct was 
related to the District's design and construction of the Tunnel 
or to the District's maintenance and operation of the Tunnel 
unrelated to the design and its implementation.  The jury was 
thus not instructed about or asked about disaggregating the 
District's negligent legislative acts and the harm caused 
thereby and the District's negligent non-legislative acts and 
the harm caused thereby.43   
                                                 
43 The pertinent portion of the jury instructions reads as 
follows: 
The District is specifically required by law to 
project, plan, design, construct, maintain and operate 
the 
sewerage 
system 
including 
the 
collection, 
transmission 
and 
disposal 
of 
storm 
water 
and 
groundwater. 
As I [the circuit court judge] told you earlier, the 
planning, design and construction of the tunnel are 
not issues in this case. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
23 
 
¶177 The 
circuit court did not differentiate between 
legislative and non-legislative acts in analyzing the District's 
conduct in operating and maintaining the Tunnel.     
¶178 The majority opinion does not attempt to do so, 
although, as I have explained, this distinction is crucial under 
City of Milwaukee.   
¶179 City of Milwaukee clearly instructs that "the proper 
inquiry is to examine the character of the underlying tortious 
acts,"44 because "liability depends upon the existence of 
underlying tortious acts that cause the harm."45  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts illustrates this point as follows: 
[F]or a nuisance to exist there must be harm to 
another or the invasion of an interest, but there need 
not be liability for it.  If the conduct of the 
defendant 
is 
not 
a 
kind 
that 
subjects 
him 
to 
liability . . . the nuisance exists, but he is not 
liable for it.46 
                                                                                                                                                             
The claims in this case involve claims for negligence 
based on the operation, maintenance and inspection of 
the tunnel on or after August 7, 1992.  Evidence of 
events prior to August 7, 1992, was admitted and may 
be considered by you insofar as it bears on the 
knowledge of the parties and actions of the parties 
after August 7, 1992. 
44 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59.  
An accompanying footnote at ¶59 n.18 in City of Milwaukee 
reads:  "Thus, the court of appeals in the instant case 
misstated the law when it concluded that § 893.80(4) immunizes a 
municipality from a cause of action alleging negligence but not 
a nuisance claim that is based in negligence.  Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist. [v. City of Milwaukee], 2003 WI App 209, ¶22, 267 
Wis. 2d 688, 671 N.W.2d 346."  
45 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶25. 
46 Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821A cmt. c 
(emphasis in City of Milwaukee)). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶180 As City of Milwaukee made clear:  
[I]t is incorrect to speak of nuisance "as itself a 
type of liability-forming conduct . . . ."47  
. . . . 
Focusing the immunity analysis on the character of the 
tortious acts underlying the nuisance is important for 
two reasons.  First,  . . . liability for nuisance is 
itself dependent upon whether the underlying tortious 
conduct is actionable.  Second, and more importantly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
does 
not 
immunize 
municipalities for certain results; rather, immunity 
is provided for certain acts.48 
¶181 Indeed, in contrast to its other statements, the 
majority opinion itself recognizes that "when a plaintiff seeks 
equitable or injunctive relief against a municipal entity, a 
court must first answer the threshold question of whether 
immunity applies.  If a court concludes that the actions the 
plaintiff is seeking to stop through a suit in equity are 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial, then 
the suit must be dismissed because the governmental entity is 
protected by immunity."  Majority op., ¶66; see also id., ¶64.      
¶182 In sum, the majority opinion cannot use the District's 
alleged negligent design or construction of the Tunnel in 
determining the District's liability, because those actions 
would be protected by immunity.  The majority has not pointed to 
any 
of 
the 
District's 
alleged 
negligent 
operation 
and 
maintenance of the Tunnel that is not in compliance with the 
                                                 
47 City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
277 
Wis. 2d 635, 
¶26 
(quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 cmt. c (emphasis added)). 
48 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59 n.17 (emphasis in 
original). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
25 
 
manner in which the Tunnel was designed.  The Tunnel is not 
broken; it is functioning in compliance with the "plan adopted," 
as it was designed to function.  Therefore, to create liability, 
the majority opinion must assert that the District negligently 
maintained a private nuisance, that is, that its conduct (its 
failing to repair the Tunnel, which was operating as designed) 
failed to fulfill a ministerial duty to abate.   
¶183 The majority opinion ignores the clear directive in 
City of Milwaukee that "[a] municipality is immune from suit for 
nuisance if the nuisance is predicated on negligent acts that 
are discretionary in nature."49  The majority opinion bends that 
clear rule to hold that the maintenance of a nuisance itself is 
the act which is not discretionary in nature.  According to the 
majority opinion, no longer is the act (that creates the result) 
the basis for liability, but rather the result (the nuisance) 
creates liability no matter what act caused that result.50 
¶184 To repeat, neither Bostco nor the majority opinion has 
alleged that the Tunnel is malfunctioning.  If the Deep Tunnel 
is functioning as designed, in compliance with the "plan 
adopted" and it is not broken, then, according to City of 
Milwaukee and Allstate (and Welch & Anhalt), the District does 
not have a ministerial duty to repair it. 
                                                 
49 Id., ¶8 (emphasis added). 
50 Case law and black letter law instruct that a nuisance 
itself is not a type of liability-forming conduct and that 
immunity is granted for certain acts, notwithstanding their 
results.  City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59 n.17 ("Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) does not immunize municipalities for certain 
results; rather, immunity is provided for certain acts."). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
26 
 
II 
¶185 The second erratum is a continuation of the majority 
opinion's bait-and-switch approach to City of Milwaukee and 
precedent.  After promising to adhere to City of Milwaukee, the 
majority opinion contravenes City of Milwaukee by reviving and 
reinvigorating cases that City of Milwaukee significantly pulled 
back.  
¶186 The majority opinion repeatedly asserts (sometimes in 
slightly different language) the proposition that "there is no 
discretion as to maintaining the [sewer system] so as not to 
cause injury."51  In doing so, the majority opinion depends in 
large part for this refrain on cases that have been called into 
doubt by subsequent case law, especially City of Milwaukee.  In 
City of Milwaukee, this court explicitly cast doubt on case law 
preceding Holytz and the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
(Winchell)52 and on some post-Holytz and post-§ 893.80 cases 
                                                 
51 Majority op., ¶¶4, 60, 95 (quoting Menick, 200 Wis. 2d at 
745).  See also majority op., ¶¶33, 43 n.25, 51. 
52 Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 
(1901), is cited by the majority opinion at ¶¶4 n.4, 35 n.18, 
69, 95 n.38, for the proposition that the "legislative authority 
to install a sewer system carries no implication of authority to 
create or maintain a nuisance"; the "authority granted to 
municipalities . . . to construct sewers, [is] subject to the 
general legal 
restrictions resting upon such corporations 
forbidding invasion of private rights by creation of nuisance or 
otherwise,"; the "legislative authority to install a sewer 
system carries no implication of authority to create or maintain 
a nuisance, and that it matters not whether such nuisance 
results from negligence or from the plan adopted. If such 
nuisance be created, the same remedies may be invoked as if the 
perpetrator were an individual"; and thus, the municipal entity 
has an obligation to abate a private nuisance the entity caused, 
which may include equitable relief. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
27 
 
(Costas,53 Hillcrest,54 Menick,55 and Welch56).  Thus once again 
the majority opinion has baited us with a promise to adhere to 
City of Milwaukee but has audaciously repudiated City of 
Milwaukee. 
                                                 
53 Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 
N.W.2d 217 (1964), is cited by the majority opinion at ¶¶31, 33, 
35, 41 n.22, 64, 69, 70, for the proposition that a nuisance can 
exist even though a sewage plant was built and operated in 
compliance 
with 
state 
plans 
and 
regulations; 
a 
private 
individual can bring an action for the injunctive relief of 
abatement of a private nuisance against a municipal entity; the 
municipal entity's failure to abate that nuisance caused by the 
negligent maintenance of the system or structure after it has 
notice is not a discretionary act that may be entitled to 
immunity; but "generally the means whereby [a] nuisance is to be 
abated is left to the direction of the defendant tortfeasor." 
54 Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City of Altoona, 135 
Wis. 2d 431, 400 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986), is cited by the 
majority opinion at ¶¶4, 63, 64, 95, for the proposition that 
the "creation and maintenance of private nuisances are simply 
not recognized as legislative acts subject to protection under 
sec. 893.80(4)," and the municipal entity's failure to abate 
that nuisance caused by the negligent maintenance of the system 
or structure after it has notice is not a discretionary act that 
may be entitled to immunity. 
55 Menick 
v. 
City 
of 
Menasha, 
200 
Wis. 2d 737, 
547 
N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1995), is cited by the majority opinion at 
¶¶4, 36, 37, 60, 95, for the proposition that a municipal entity 
does not enjoy immunity from an action for negligent creation of 
a 
private 
nuisance; and "there is no discretion as to 
maintaining [a sewer] system so as not to cause injury to 
residents." 
56 Welch v. City of Appleton, 2003 WI App 133, 265 
Wis. 2d 688, 666 N.W.2d 511, is cited by the majority opinion at 
¶¶4, 34, 37 & n.20, 95, for the proposition that there is a 
longstanding rule that generally municipal entities are not 
shielded from liability for maintaining a private nuisance; and 
"no statutory or common law immunity doctrine empowers a public 
body to maintain a private nuisance."  Ultimately though, the 
court of appeals concluded that the City's maintenance of its 
storm sewer was not a private nuisance. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
28 
 
¶187 The majority opinion repeatedly refers to Winchell v. 
City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 (1901).  Majority 
op., ¶¶4 n.4, 35 n.18, 69, 95 n.38.  This court decided Winchell 
in 1901, more than 60 years before Holytz and the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 and before the extensive subsequent case law 
interpreting the statute.  Not surprisingly then, Winchell has 
been called into question repeatedly since 1963 as to its 
persuasiveness and precedential value in a post-Holytz, post-
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 world.57     
¶188 Even Holytz itself called into question all of the 
case law that came before it and gave credence to the idea that 
any court decision published before June 5, 1962, relating to 
government immunity is suspect.58  Holytz aimed to change the law 
that was in the court's view "knee-deep in legal esoterica: 
e.g., 
governmental 
function 
v. 
proprietary 
function; 
relationship of governor to governed," and had "resulted in some 
highly artificial judicial distinctions."59    
¶189 Although the majority opinion relies on Winchell, it 
spends even more time and space on Costas v. City of Fond du 
Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964).  Majority op., ¶¶31, 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶51-53 
n.12, 14.  The court of appeals in City of Milwaukee relied on 
Winchell.  The supreme court then characterized Winchell as a 
case based on obsolete logic. 
58 Also see pre-Holytz cases cited in the concurrence at ¶16 
n.11 (citing Christian v. City of New London, 234 Wis. 123, 129, 
290 N.W. 621 (1940); Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 
184 Wis. 352, 363, 199 N.W. 390 (1924)).     
59 Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 30. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
29 
 
33, 35, 41 n.21, 64, 70.  Even though Costas was decided in 
1964——post-Holytz and post-§ 893.80——the Costas court based its 
holding on Winchell and did not mention either Holytz or Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80.60  Indeed, Costas does not even mention the 
phrase or notion of government immunity.  
¶190 Costas relied heavily on Winchell and overturned an 
observation made in Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 
201, 207, 290 N.W. 647 (1940), that if the sewage treatment 
plant was built according to government specification and was 
operating according to specification, the plant was not a 
nuisance in its creation or operation.61  The Costas court 
disavowed this observation.     
¶191 With regard to Costas, City of Milwaukee noted that 
"the holdings in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage 
Commission, 80 Wis. 2d 10, 15, 258 N.W.2d 148 (1977), and Lange 
v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 318, 321, 253 N.W.2d 240 
(1977), effectively overruled, sub silencio," the language in 
Costas that a city has no immunity for the "plan adopted" for a 
public works system.62  Costas has limited shelf-life and 
relevancy for the present case.   
¶192 The majority opinion then discusses Hillcrest, Menick, 
and Welch.  These cases are not good law standing for the 
proposition for which the majority opinion cites them, namely 
                                                 
60 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶55 n.14. 
61 See 
Hillcrest, 
135 
Wis. 2d 
at 
440-41 
(similarly 
interpreting Costas). 
62 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶55 n.14, 58 n.15. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
30 
 
that the "creation and maintenance of private nuisances are 
simply not recognized as legislative acts subject to protection 
under sec. 893.80(4)."63  
¶193 The majority opinion cites Hillcrest, the first in the 
series of storm sewer decisions by the court of appeals, to 
support its view that municipal entities are not shielded from 
liability for maintaining a private nuisance.  The allegation 
was 
that 
the 
system 
discharged 
water 
that 
damaged 
the 
complainant's land.  Citing and quoting Winchell and Costas, the 
court of appeals concluded that "[t]he creation and maintenance 
of private nuisances are simply not recognized as legislative 
acts subject to protection under sec. 893.80(4)."64 
¶194 In another sewer case, Menick, the sewer system 
flooded the complainant's basement.  Relying on Hillcrest, the 
Menick court concluded that "[t]he actions of the City in 
operating and maintaining the sewer system do not fall within 
the immunity provision of § 893.80."65     
¶195 The 
majority 
opinion 
then 
cites 
Welch, 
another 
overflowing sewer case.  The majority opinion cites Welch as 
supporting the following:  "This duty to abate arises from the 
longstanding rule that generally municipal entities are not 
shielded from liability for maintaining a private nuisance."  
Majority op., ¶34.  In contrast, the court of appeals stated in 
                                                 
63 Majority op., ¶¶4, 63, 95 (quoting Hillcrest, 135 
Wis. 2d at 439-40). 
64 Hillcrest, 135 Wis. 2d at 439-40. 
65 Menick, 200 Wis. 2d at 745. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
31 
 
Welch that there was no private nuisance in that case (as the 
majority opinion admits in footnote 20); that the city was not 
liable because the evidence was that the sewer system was in 
working order, functioning as planned; and that the municipal 
government was immune for the discretionary act of poor design.66  
¶196 The court of appeals further explained in Welch that 
the verb "maintain" means "to keep in a state of repair."67  
There, as here, "it is undisputed" that the sewer system was 
working as designed.  Thus, according to Welch, "there was no 
required pipe 'maintenance.'"68 
¶197 Hillcrest, Menick, and Welch comprise a set of court 
of appeals decisions based on Winchell, Costas, and each other.  
The majority opinion ignores the fact that City of Milwaukee and 
other cases rendered these cases ineffectual.69  
¶198 Although language isolated from the full opinions in 
Winchell, Hillcrest, Menick, and Welch can be made to support 
the majority opinion, these cases do not buttress the majority 
opinion's stance.  The language and the cases are suspect.   
¶199 In City of Milwaukee, Justice Wilcox, writing for the 
six-person majority, called into doubt the validity of the  
explanations for government immunity or liability in the 
                                                 
66 Welch, 265 Wis. 2d 688, ¶¶12, 13, 25-27 (citing Anhalt, 
249 Wis. 2d 62, ¶12 (quoting Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 15-16)). 
67 This court adopted a similar definition of "maintenance" 
in Hocking, 326 Wis. 2d 155, ¶48. 
68 Welch, 265 Wis. 2d 688, ¶25. 
69 See, e.g., Butler, 282 Wis. 2d 776, ¶41. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
32 
 
majority opinion's favorite court of appeals decisions as 
follows:   
Several court of appeals decisions . . . have applied 
the immunity statute to a variety of nuisance claims 
involving sanitary and storm sewers and have utilized 
conflicting rationales to reach results that are not 
entirely consistent. See, e.g., Welch v. City of 
Appleton, 2003 WI App 133, 265 Wis. 2d 688, 666 
N.W.2d 511; Anhalt v. Cities and Vills. Mut. Ins. Co., 
2001 WI App 271, 249 Wis. 2d 62, 637 N.W.2d 422; 
Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 547 
N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1996); Hillcrest Golf & Country 
Club 
v. 
City 
of 
Altoona, 
135 
Wis. 2d 431, 
400 
N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986)[hereinafter Hillcrest]. 
To the extent these decisions have created confusion 
in the area of municipal immunity for nuisances, such 
confusion is a result of three factors.  First, some 
decisions 
have 
continued 
to 
rely 
on 
immunity 
jurisprudence that predated Holytz and § 893.80(4).  
See, e.g., Hillcrest, 135 Wis. 2d at 438-41, 400 
N.W.2d 493.  Second, some decisions employ separate 
analyses for negligence and nuisances grounded in 
negligence.  See, e.g., Welch, 265 Wis. 2d 688, ¶¶8-
13, 666 N.W.2d 511.  Third, some decisions fail to 
stress that a municipality is liable for its negligent 
acts only if those acts are performed pursuant to a 
ministerial duty.  See, e.g., Anhalt, 249 Wis. 2d 62, 
¶26, 637 N.W.2d 422.  
Focusing the immunity analysis on the character of the 
tortious acts underlying the nuisance is important for 
two reasons.  First, as discussed supra, liability for 
nuisance 
is 
itself 
dependent 
upon 
whether 
the 
underlying tortious conduct is actionable.  Second, 
and more importantly, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) does not 
immunize municipalities for certain results; rather, 
immunity is provided for certain acts. 
City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59 n.17.70  
                                                 
70 See also City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶50-62. 
In Butler v. Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc., 2005 WI App 
108, ¶41, 282 Wis. 2d 776, 698 N.W.2d 117, which the majority 
opinion ignores, the court of appeals recognized this court's 
abrogation of Welch and similar cases, explaining: 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
33 
 
¶200 Although City of Milwaukee casts a significant shadow 
on these cases as "utiliz[ing] conflicting rationales to reach 
results that are not entirely consistent,"71 the majority opinion 
reinstates, reinvigorates, and perpetuates these incompatible 
opinions.     
¶201 The majority opinion points to no authority aside from 
the out-of-context language in this small subset of court of 
appeals decisions that appears to state that a municipal entity 
has a general ministerial duty to operate and maintain a sewer 
system in a safe condition for neighboring property owners. 
¶202 Indeed, the majority opinion at ¶41 n.21 dismisses a 
more recent 2001 court of appeals storm sewer case, Anhalt v. 
Cities & Villages Mutual Insurance Co.,72 that is on point here 
                                                                                                                                                             
Welch v. City of Appleton, 2003 WI App 133, 265 
Wis. 2d 688, 666 N.W.2d 511, and Anhalt v. Cities and 
Vills. Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 271, 249 Wis. 2d 62, 
637 N.W.2d 422 were among those [cases] expressly 
noted by the [supreme] court in Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage as applying the immunity statute (because all 
involved 
municipalities) 
"utilizing 
conflicting 
rationales to reach results that are not entirely 
consistent." 
277 
Wis. 2d 635, 
¶59 
n.17, 
691 
N.W.2d 658.  Welch, the court observed, erred in 
employing a separate analysis for negligence and 
nuisances grounded in negligence, and Anhalt "fail[ed] 
to stress that a municipality is liable for its 
negligent acts only if those acts are performed 
pursuant to a ministerial duty."  Id.  To the extent 
that either Welch or Anhalt support the proposition 
that a nuisance claim need not be grounded either in 
intentional 
conduct 
or 
in 
otherwise 
actionable 
negligence, they are no longer good law on that point 
after Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage. 
71 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59 n.17. 
72 Anhalt v. Cities & Vills. Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 271, 
249 Wis. 2d 62, 637 N.W.2d 422. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
34 
 
and undercuts Winchell, Costas, Hillcrest, Menick, and Welch, 
the cases the majority opinion highlights.  In Anhalt, yet one 
more sewer system case, residents claimed destruction to their 
real property from flooding.  The thrust of the residents' 
complaint was that the city negligently designed, planned, and 
implemented an inadequate sewer system that caused a private 
nuisance.  The court of appeals reviewed Winchell, Hillcrest, 
and Menick, the "prominent cases that apply the law of nuisance 
to hold municipalities liable for damages resulting from the 
operation of sewage systems."73   
¶203 The court of appeals declared in Anhalt that no 
authority exists imposing a positive duty on a municipal entity 
to keep its sewer system current with developing needs or to 
remedy an untenable situation.74  Anhalt adheres to Allstate, and 
holds that "the acts of designing, planning and implementing a 
sewer system are discretionary acts protected under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4)."75  The system in Anhalt was operating in the manner 
in which it was designed to operate.  Even though 46 residential 
properties were substantially damaged by the City's operation 
and maintenance of the system according to the design it 
selected, the court of appeals held that the remedy for the 
residents "lies in their power to vote rather than in the 
judicial system."76    
                                                 
73 Anhalt, 249 Wis. 2d 62, ¶18. 
74 Id., ¶16. 
75 Id., ¶12 (citing Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 15-16). 
76 Anhalt, 249 Wis. 2d 63, ¶16.  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
35 
 
¶204 Anhalt, a 2001 court of appeals decision, was followed 
by Welch in 2003, and although the two cases "utilized 
conflicting rationales," they reached the same conclusion:  A 
municipal entity is immune from suit for injuries arising from 
the design, planning, and implementation of a sewer system.  The 
older court of appeals decisions that reached a different 
conclusion, Hillcrest (1986) and Menick (1996), are the basis 
for the majority opinion, which refuses to make the slightest 
admission that the most recent decisions directly contradict its 
holding. 
¶205 Eight years ago in City of Milwaukee and shortly 
before that in Physicians Plus, this court labored to synthesize 
the case law on negligence, nuisance, and government immunity 
and liability.  Today, the majority opinion ignores that 
guidance and reinvigorates and propels repudiated precedent to 
reach a result that neither Wis. Stat. § 893.80 nor our case law 
presently supports.  
III 
¶206 I come to the third erratum——the majority opinion's 
interpretation of the statutory cap on damages in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3).  Even if I agreed with the majority opinion that 
the District is liable in tort for damages and injunctive relief 
for the creation and maintenance of the private nuisance in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
I agree with City of Milwaukee and Butler, which criticize 
Anhalt, 249 Wis. 2d 62, ¶26, as failing "to stress that a 
municipality is liable for its negligent acts only if those acts 
are performed pursuant to a ministerial duty."  City of 
Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶59 n.17; Butler, 282 Wis. 2d 776, 
¶41.  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
36 
 
present case, and I do not, the majority opinion errs in 
concluding that the statutory cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does 
not limit the expenditures a government entity must make to 
comply with an order for injunctive relief in a tort action.   
¶207 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) provides in relevant part:   
Except as provided in this subsection, the amount 
recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or 
death 
in 
any 
action 
founded 
on 
tort 
against 
any . . . political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision or 
agency thereof and against their 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in their official capacity or in the course of their 
agency 
or 
employment, 
whether 
proceeded 
against 
jointly 
or 
severally, 
shall 
not 
exceed 
$50,000. . . . (emphasis added). 
¶208 The majority opinion (at ¶¶54-58) concludes that 
although the statutory cap on damages, injuries, or death 
applies to monetary damages in a tort action, the statutory cap 
does not similarly extend to a court order directing a 
municipality to abate a nuisance founded on tort for which it is 
liable.  
¶209 The majority opinion reaches its unreasonable and 
absurd result by not adhering to the basic rules of statutory 
interpretation.   
¶210 The majority opinion's reasoning turns on the words 
"the 
amount 
recoverable 
by 
any 
person" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(3).  It claims to give the phrase an ordinary and 
reasonable meaning.  It does not.  The majority opinion 
concludes that injunctive relief is not an "amount recoverable 
by any person," without examining the ordinary meaning of these 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
37 
 
words or the meaning of these words in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(3) and in the context of § 893.80 as a whole.  
¶211 The majority opinion fails to acknowledge that insofar 
as a complainant and a government entity are concerned, in many 
instances there is no substantial difference between monetary 
damages awarded to the complaining party so that it can remedy 
its injury and injunctive relief directing a government entity 
to remedy the complaining party's injury.77  In either event, the 
complainant benefits and gets the relief it sought, and the 
government entity must expend funds. 
¶212 I conclude that the phrase "the amount recoverable by 
any person for any damages" in its ordinary and reasonable 
meaning includes monetary damages and equitable, injunctive 
relief against a municipal entity in any action founded on tort. 
¶213 My reading of this phrase is bolstered by the 
legislative policy underlying Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), namely to 
limit the amount of funds expended by a government entity when 
liable "in any action founded on tort."    
                                                 
77 The word "damages" is used in its ordinary and reasonable 
meaning in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3).  In cases involving insurance 
policies in which the insurance company agreed to pay "all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages," 
the 
court 
has 
rejected 
an 
overly 
restrictive 
definition of the word "damages," as understood by a reasonable 
insured.  The court rejected the notion that the word "damages" 
does not encompass the insured's costs of complying with an 
injunctive decree, recognizing that mandatory injunctive relief 
may also be compensatory in nature.  See Johnson Controls, Inc. 
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶31-44, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
38 
 
¶214 The justification for limitations on the amount the 
government expends in any action founded on tort is to protect 
the public purse while providing some relief for damage caused 
by 
government 
entities 
acting 
in 
a 
non-immune 
manner.78  
Wisconsin adopted the concept of government immunity in Hayes v. 
City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 318 (1873), holding:  "Individual 
hardship or loss must sometimes be endured in order that still 
greater hardship or loss to the public at large or the community 
may be averted."  Although the majority opinion reaffirms the 
constitutionality and rational basis for such caps,79 the 
majority opinion is oblivious to the extreme irony in limiting 
monetary damages in any action founded on tort to $50,000 for 
public policy reasons, while requiring government entities to 
pay as much as it takes to abate a nuisance.80  The injunctive 
                                                 
78 Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶33: 
The concerns over the expenditure of both time and 
resources apply with equal force to actions seeking 
injunctive relief as they do to actions for money 
damages.  We recognize, however, that the suits must 
be based in tort to garner the protection of immunity 
consistent with the statute. 
79 See 
majority 
op., ¶¶78-80, 83; Sambs v. City of 
Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 377, 383, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980); 
Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 842, 280 N.W.2d 711 
(1979).  
80 Other courts have recognized this extreme irony.  See, 
e.g., Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 
2008) ("'[T]he notion that Congress would limit liability to 
$500,000 with respect to one remedy while allowing the sky to be 
the limit with respect to another for the same violation strains 
credulity.'" (quoting McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 
475 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir. 2007))). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
39 
 
relief granted in the present case might cost the District 200 
times the statutory damage cap of $50,000. 
¶215 As 
this 
court 
explained 
in 
Sambs 
v. 
City 
of 
Brookfield, 
97 
Wis. 2d 356, 
293 
N.W.2d 504 
(1980), 
"The 
legislature's goal after Holytz was to delineate the liability 
to which governmental units would be exposed as a result of 
Holytz, to reduce the financial strain, and to enable the 
governmental units to plan for the risk of such liability."81 
¶216 The court of appeals got it right:  
The 
"'notion 
that [the legislature] would limit 
liability . . . with 
respect 
to 
one 
remedy 
while 
allowing the sky to be the limit with respect to 
another for the same violation strains credulity'" 
(citation omitted). 
From the standpoint of the public treasury, there is 
little difference in practice between a monetary 
damage award given to a plaintiff to remedy its harm 
and an injunction order requiring the defendant to 
abate the harm.82 
¶217 We are required to read statutes so that no part is 
rendered meaningless or superfluous and so that the statute is 
not rendered unreasonable or absurd.  The majority opinion 
renders the statutory damage cap in the statute meaningless and 
                                                 
81 Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 373.  For purposes of planning and 
budgeting for liability and litigation, damages up to $50,000 
and unlimited injunctive relief are not interchangeable.  See 
Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 52, 357 N.W.2d 548 
(1984). 
82 Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶¶131, 133 (citing Andrews v. 
Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
40 
 
superfluous, unreasonable, and absurd to a significant extent by 
granting unlimited injunctive relief.83   
¶218 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(3) cap applies to injunctive relief in the 
present case.     
IV 
¶219 I now turn to the majority opinion's erroneous 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(3), 
(4), 
and 
(5).  
                                                 
83 The majority opinion cites to Lister v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Wisconsin System, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 304, 240 
N.W.2d 610 
(1976) 
and 
Scarpaci 
v. 
Milwaukee 
County., 
96 
Wis. 2d 663, 691, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980), for the proposition 
that "the public policy considerations that have prompted courts 
to grant substantive immunity for monetary damages do not apply 
with equal force to actions for declaratory or injunctive 
relief."  Majority op., ¶62.  These cases are not pertinent to 
the present case.  Both Lister & Scarpaci addressed the 
liability of individual government officers and enjoined them 
from acting in the future, unlike the present case in which 
injunctive relief will require the District to act and to incur 
expenses in the future.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 303. 
For comments indicating that provisions and limits in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 apply to injunctive relief, see Willow Creek, 235 
Wis. 2d 409, ¶36 (government immunity provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) govern suit founded on tort against a town for money 
damages and injunctive relief; "Although immunity serves as a 
bar to both money damages and injunctive relief based in tort, 
municipalities do not benefit from the shield of immunity in 
actions seeking declaratory relief" (emphasis added)).  The 
majority opinion (¶59 n.32) rewrites Willow Creek to mean that 
because Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) allows a declaratory judgment 
action (an equitable non-monetary remedy), then injunctive 
relief in a tort suit (also an equitable monetary remedy) is 
similarly permitted.  See also E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. County of 
Oneida, 2011 WI 71, ¶¶21-24, 28, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 N.W.2d 421 
(explaining the factors to consider to determine whether certain 
actions are exempt from notice of claim requirements found in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80; court held that a claim for violation of a 
state antitrust statute, ch. 133, which provides for injunctive 
relief, is subject to § 893.80(1)). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
41 
 
According to the majority opinion, these provisions do not apply 
to suits for or claims for injunctive relief in actions founded 
on tort.  Majority op., ¶¶59-80.  The majority opinion delivers 
a potpourri of arguments to support its thesis but ignores the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), which we discussed above; the 
texts of § 893.80(4) and § 893.80(5); and case law precedent 
interpreting these provisions. 
¶220 Subsection (4) is broadly worded: "[N]or may any suit 
be brought against such corporation, subdivision or agency or 
volunteer fire company or against its officers, officials, 
agents 
or 
employees 
for 
acts 
done 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions" (emphasis added).84  Subsection (4) bars "any suit" 
against any governmental subdivision for acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions.  Subsection (4) applies to Bostco's lawsuit.  
¶221 The Court explained in Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. 
Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693, 
that the term "any suit" includes injunctive relief based on 
tort:  
                                                 
84 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) provides as follows: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
42 
 
The "any suit" language contained in the immunity 
statute, however, does not limit suits to money 
damages in tort but also encompasses injunctive relief 
based in tort.  This interpretation furthers the 
policy 
rationales 
underlying 
tort 
immunity 
that 
officials not be "unduly hampered or intimidated in 
the discharge of their functions by threat of lawsuit 
or personal liability."85 
¶222 Permitting Bostco to get relief for a negligence claim 
through the back door by bringing a suit for injunctive relief 
for a nuisance (based on negligence) "contravenes the government 
immunity 
policy of 
this State set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) and consequently would not serve the ends of 
justice."86 
¶223 Subsection (5) is also very broadly worded: "[T]he 
provisions and limitations of this section [893.80] shall be 
exclusive 
and 
shall 
apply 
to 
all 
claims 
against . . . a 
governmental subdivision"  (emphasis added). 
¶224 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(5) reads as follows: 
Except as provided in this subsection, the provisions 
and limitations of this section shall be exclusive and 
shall apply to all claims against a volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or agency or 
against any officer, official, agent or employee 
thereof for acts done in an official capacity or the 
course of his or her agency or employment.  When 
rights or remedies are provided by any other statute 
against 
any 
political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision or agency or any officer, official, agent 
                                                 
85 Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶33 (quoting Scarpaci, 96 
Wis. 2d at 682 (citing Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 299)). 
86 Scott, 262 Wis. 2d 127, ¶4; see also id., ¶55 (declaring 
that permitting damages through the back door of a promissory 
estoppel 
claim, 
an 
equitable 
claim, 
based 
on 
the 
same 
allegations as a negligence claim contravenes Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) and does not serve the ends of justice). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
43 
 
or employee thereof for injury, damage or death, such 
statute shall apply and the limitations in sub. (3) 
shall be inapplicable. 
¶225 Two sentences comprise subsection (5).  I shall 
examine each in turn. 
¶226 The plain language of the first sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(5) includes the words "exclusive" and "all claims" to 
explain that the provisions and limitations (including the 
monetary limitations in subsection (3)) are "exclusive" and 
apply to "all claims" brought in tort.  This very broad, all-
inclusive language sets the stage and tone for interpreting this 
subsection. 
¶227 The majority opinion curiously skips over the word 
"exclusive" and the phrase "shall apply to all claims."  Instead 
the majority opinion reasons that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) (indeed 
all of § 893.80) is silent about equitable relief and therefore, 
that subsections (3), (4), and (5) do not govern actions in 
equity founded on tort.  Majority op., ¶¶55-59, 61.  
¶228 Clearly a request for injunctive relief founded on 
tort is a claim that fits within the statutory phrase in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(5): "all claims."  Indeed, Count II of Bostco's 
complaint is labeled "Claim" and requests equitable relief.  
Count II of the complaint alleges the claim of a continuing 
nuisance (based on negligence) and asserts that abatement by 
concrete lining or recharge wells is the proper relief. 
¶229 Section 893.80 is not silent about injunctive relief 
in tort claims, as the majority opinion proclaims.  Subsection 
(4) addresses "any suit" and subsection (5) addresses "all 
claims" against a government entity.  The words "any suit," 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
44 
 
"exclusive," and "all claims" are all-encompassing.  The only 
reasonable interpretation is that a claim for injunctive relief 
founded on tort is within the all-inclusive scope of the words 
"any suit" and "all claims" and that § 893.80 is an "exclusive" 
provision.    
¶230 In pursuing its myth of silence in regard to equitable 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 893.80, the majority opinion (¶¶57-58, 
63) leans on Harkness v. Palmyra-Eagle School District, 157 
Wis. 2d 567, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1990), to support its 
argument that § 893.80 does not apply to equitable claims.  The 
majority opinion sidesteps the fact, however, that the Harkness 
decision was clearly and emphatically overruled in DNR v. City 
of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994).   
¶231 Harkness held that subsection (4) of § 893.80 (barring 
suit for legislative acts of a government entity) does not apply 
to equitable relief and based this conclusion on two prior 
cases stating that the notice of claim requirements in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1) do not apply to equitable claims.  Harkness 
concluded that if subsection (1) does not apply to claims for 
injunctive relief, then subsection (4) does not apply to 
injunctive relief.  Accordingly, the Harkness court concluded 
that § 893.80(4) does not bar a teacher's equitable claim for 
reinstatement to her previous position.  
¶232 Reviewing the Harkness precedent in DNR v. City of 
Waukesha, the Supreme Court stated, "[W]e now hold that sec. 
893.80 applies to all causes of action, not just those in tort 
and 
not 
just 
those 
for 
money 
damages. 
 
We 
therefore 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
45 
 
overrule . . . Harkness . . . to the extent [it] hold[s] that 
sec. 893.80(1) applies only to tort claims and claims for money 
damages."87  
¶233 Because 
Harkness 
based 
its 
interpretation 
of 
subsection (4) on case law relating to subsection (1), which DNR 
explicitly 
overruled, 
Harkness 
no 
longer 
retains 
any 
precedential value regarding subsection (4).   
¶234 Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 558 
N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996), got it right, as explained by Willow 
Creek.  The narrow issue presented in Johnson was whether the 
complainants were permitted to seek injunctive relief based on 
their claim of negligence against the city.  After reviewing the 
Harkness and DNR cases, the court of appeals concluded, as 
limited by Willow Creek, "that the official immunity provisions 
of § 893.80(4), Stats., . . . are not limited to . . . money-
damage actions [founded on tort], but are equally applicable to 
[tort] actions which . . . seek injunctive relief . . . ."88 
                                                 
87 DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 
N.W.2d 888 (1994), overruled the following language in prior 
cases: Kaiser v. City of Mauston, 99 Wis. 2d 345, 356, 299 
N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[t]his statute applies to claims 
for money damages.  It does not apply to a claim for equitable 
relief"); 
Harkness 
v. 
Palmyra–Eagle 
School 
Dist., 
157 
Wis. 2d 567, 579, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[w]e have 
found no authority indicating that it applies to equitable or 
injunctive relief"); Nicolet v. Village of Fox Point, 177 
Wis. 2d 80, 86, 501 N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[t]he full 
legislative history clarifies that sec. 893.80 never was 
intended to apply to equitable actions"). 
88 Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 352, 558 
N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996).  See  Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 
¶¶33-34 (limiting the Johnson language to tort actions). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
46 
 
¶235 The Harkness case has been relegated to the waste bin 
of history.  The majority opinion's reliance on Harkness is 
misplaced.   
¶236 I now turn to the second sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(5).  It tells us how to harmonize the "exclusive" and 
"all claims" language of § 893.80(5) with other statutes in 
which the legislature may provide rights or remedies against a 
government entity for damage, injury, or death.  The second 
sentence of (5) directs that when a claim is based on another 
statute, the damage limitations of subsection (3) no longer 
apply.89    
¶237 The majority opinion seems to assert that Wis. Stat. 
§ 844.01 
trumps 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80, 
making 
§ 893.80(3) 
inapplicable in the present case.  Majority op., ¶¶768-71. 
¶238 Wisconsin Stat. § 844.01 governs a person claiming 
interference with property who brings an action to redress past 
or further injury to property.  The statute reads as follows:  
Any person owning or claiming an interest in real 
property may bring an action claiming physical injury 
to, or interference with, the property or the person's 
interest therein; the action may be to redress past 
injury, to restrain further injury, to abate the 
source of injury, or for other appropriate relief. 
¶239 Section 844.17(1) explains that a defendant in a Wis. 
Stat. § 844.01 suit may be "[a]ny person whose activities have 
injured or will injure the plaintiff's property or interests" 
(emphasis added).  To define the word "person," the majority 
opinion turns to Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26).  Section 990.01 sets 
                                                 
89 DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 192. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
47 
 
forth definitions of words to be used in interpreting all 
statutes "unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature."  
Section 990.01(26) defines "person."  "Person includes all 
partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate" 
(emphasis added).  
¶240 The majority opinion reasons as follows:  Chapter 844 
contemplates that a body politic, such as the District, may be a 
defendant in an action brought by an owner of property to 
redress injury caused by the District's negligent maintenance of 
a private nuisance and to abate the source of injury.  Thus, 
according to the majority opinion, Wis. Stat. § 893.80 does not 
apply to injunctions that fall within Chapter 844.   
¶241 This reasoning is faulty.   
¶242 First, Chapter 844 is a remedial and procedural 
statute; it does not create liability.  Chapter 844 applies only 
when an owner of real estate has a cause of action under common 
law or otherwise.  Chapter 844 is a codification of remedies 
involving real estate, not "the creation of new or the revision 
of old rights or duties" (emphasis added).  Shanak v. City of 
Waupaca, 185 Wis. 2d 568, 597, 518 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1994).  
In Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 746-47, 547 
N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals, relying on 
Shanak, concluded that a complainant could not base her 
substantive claim for private nuisance against the City of 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
48 
 
Menasha on § 844.01(1).  The substantive basis of the claim must 
be found elsewhere, wrote the court of appeals in Menick.90   
¶243 The substantive basis of Bostco's claim is not Wis. 
Stat. § 844.01, but common law tort and § 893.80 governing a 
government entity's immunity and liability for tortious conduct.   
¶244 Second, the majority opinion is inconsistent when it 
applies Chapter 844 to authorize injunctive relief free of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80, but does not hold that Chapter 844 authorizes 
monetary damages free of § 893.80.   
¶245 Chapter 
844 
governs 
both 
injunctive 
relief 
and 
monetary damages for physical injury to or interference with 
real property.  If the majority opinion is correct that Chapter 
844 trumps the cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) (as well as 
subsections (4) and (5)), then the majority opinion should hold, 
but does not, that Chapter 844 trumps the cap on monetary 
damages awarded to Bostco for the past and future injury to its 
real property caused by the District.    
¶246 Third, in its reliance on Chapter 844, the majority 
opinion pays no attention to an oft-used rule of statutory 
interpretation:  A specific statute trumps a general statute.  
Sometimes it is difficult to determine which is the general 
statute and which is the specific statute.  Not here.  Chapter 
844 is a remedial, procedural statute and is also a general 
statute governing owners of real property bringing a real 
property action against any person.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 is 
                                                 
90 See also Schultz v. Trascher, 2002 WI App 4, ¶¶24-29, 249 
Wis. 2d 722, 640 N.W.2d 130 (Wis. Stat. § 844.01 is a remedial 
and procedural statute).  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
49 
 
a specific, substantive, "exclusive" statute governing the 
liability and immunity of a government entity named as a 
defendant.       
¶247 When the legislature wants to create a specific 
statute that trumps Wis. Stat. § 893.80, it knows how to do so.  
An example of a specific statute that creates government entity 
tort liability was discussed in Morris v. Juneau County, 219 
Wis. 2d 543, 579 N.W.2d 690 (1998).   
¶248 In Morris,91 a statute, then-Wis. Stat. § 81.15 (1991-
92), entitled "Damages caused by highway defects; liability of 
town and county," was specific to highway damages and specific 
to the liability of the town and county.  The statute created a 
right to recover from a government entity for want of repairs of 
a highway.92  Section 81.15 explicitly imposed liability on a 
                                                 
91 Just as the legislature knows how to create liability, it 
also knows how to nullify liability.  The legislature has 
essentially nullified Morris.  The statute imposing liability on 
government entities for highway defects discussed in Morris, 
then-Wis. Stat. § 81.15 (1991-92), was renumbered by 2003 Wis. 
Act 214, and joined with the statute relating to damages and 
injuries caused by snow and ice accumulation.  See Comment, Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 893.83 (West 2006).   
In 2011, the legislature enacted 2011 Wis. Act 132, which 
removed language holding government entities liable for highway 
defects.  Now Wis. Stat. § 893.83 (2011-12) addresses only an 
action to recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of an 
accumulation of snow or ice that has existed for three weeks or 
more upon any bridge or highway.  See Jessica Vanegeren, Man 
suffers after odd accident; Fall River resident has little legal 
recourse after concrete fell from bridge and hit him, Portage 
Daily 
Register, 
Jan. 
27, 
2013, 
available 
at 
http://www.wiscnews.com/news/local/article_5790d188-690c-11e2-
ac15-001a4bcf887a.html (last visited July 5, 2013). 
92 Morris, 219 Wis. 2d at 558. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
50 
 
government entity for certain conduct and limited the amount 
recoverable; 
it 
explicitly 
applied 
the 
procedures 
under 
§ 893.80.93   
¶249 This court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 81.15 provided 
"an exception to the general grant of immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4)"94 for legislative acts, noting "that the general 
immunity given counties under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) is not 
applicable when the conditions of Wis. Stat. § 81.15 are met."95  
Section 81.15, stated the Morris court, is "a specific statute 
tak[ing] precedence over a general statute."96 
¶250 Unlike 
the 
specific 
statute 
in 
Morris 
creating 
government liability for particular acts, Wis. Stat. § 844.01 
does not explicitly apply to government entities and does not 
impose liability on government entities.  Chapter 844 simply 
does not override the substantive rules in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
as the specific provisions of § 81.15 once did. 
¶251 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3), (4), and (5), as 
applicable to actions founded on tort, govern "any suit," "all 
claims," and are "exclusive."  The majority opinion's potpourri 
of arguments does not demonstrate that injunctive relief is 
excluded in the present case.  The broadly worded texts of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(3), (4), and (5) govern a government entity's 
                                                 
93 Id. at 551-57. 
94 Id. at 552. 
95 Id. at 546. 
96 Id. at 552, 557. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
51 
 
tortious acts that cause harm and govern claims for injunctive 
relief for private nuisances founded on tort.  "A nuisance is 
nothing more than a particular type of harm suffered; liability 
depends upon the existence of underlying tortious acts that 
cause harm."97       
V 
¶252 The fifth erratum relates to the majority's discussion 
of——or rather its failure to discuss in any meaningful way——
injunctive relief.  The majority opinion says that injunctive 
relief may be ordered in excess of the statutory caps, no dollar 
limits.  The End!  The majority opinion offers no analysis or 
directions to the circuit court about injunctive relief and 
leaves unanswered numerous questions.  Let me offer several 
comments. 
¶253 First:  When a court exercises its discretion in 
granting an equitable remedy, it "should pay particular regard 
for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary 
remedy of injunction."98  "Where an important public interest 
would be prejudiced, the reasons for denying the injunction may 
be compelling."99  An injunction against maintaining a nuisance 
should not be granted where "the inconveniences and hardships 
caused outweigh the benefits."  McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 
                                                 
97 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶25. 
98 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) 
(citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 
(1941)) (emphasis added). 
99 City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 
U.S. 334, 338 (1933). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
52 
 
Wis. 2d 607, 616-17, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968) (citing Maitland v. 
Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis.  541, 549, 37 N.W.2d 74 
(1949)).100   
¶254 The circuit court did not exercise its discretion in 
the present case by paying particular regard for the public 
consequences or weighing the inconveniences and hardships to the 
parties.  Without holding a hearing, the circuit court based its 
ruling on injunctive relief on the grounds that the monetary 
damages 
were 
inadequate 
and 
that 
Bostco 
was 
suffering 
irreparable harm.101   
¶255 Nor does the majority opinion pay any regard to the 
public consequences of injunctive relief in the present case or 
the weighing of hardships and inconveniences.        
¶256 Second:  Ordinarily, if injunctive relief would cause 
substantial harm to a defendant, the injunction should be denied 
                                                 
100 In granting an injunction, a court considers the 
relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if the 
injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied.  
"The appropriateness of injunction against tort finally depends 
upon a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, 
balanced against each other, and considered together." 4 
Restatement of Torts § 936 cmt b. at 695 (1939).  
101 The circuit court erred in the present case by granting 
injunctive relief without holding a hearing, taking evidence, or 
making findings about the merits of the relief proposed.  See 
Hoffmann v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, ¶27, 262 
Wis. 2d 264, 664 N.W.2d 55 (An ordering of injunctive relief 
"must be based on the merits of the [proposed relief] with a 
record to support that order."). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
53 
 
when monetary damages are available to the complainant.102  In 
the present case, the circuit court and the majority opinion 
conclude that the monetary damages available to Bostco are 
insufficient in amount.  But the legislature has declared that 
the statutorily allowed amount of damages is sufficient. 
¶257 Both the circuit court and the majority opinion defy 
the legislative determination that the government has rendered 
itself immune from liability in excess of the statutory amount.  
As the court held in Sambs, "whatever the monetary limitation on 
recovery, the amount will seem arbitrary because it is based on 
imponderables, [but] the legislature, not the court, must select 
the figure."103  Stanhope echoes the same point: The "monetary 
limitation is one which the legislature determines balancing the 
ideal of equal justice and need for fiscal security."104  
¶258 The balancing of damages, liability, and immunity with 
regard to a government entity is for the legislature, not the 
courts.  Unless a constitutional violation exists, the court 
should respect the legislature's decisions about what amount 
constitutes adequate monetary relief against a government entity 
and about the important public policy of protecting the fisc.105  
                                                 
102 Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 
334, 337-38 (1933); Pure Milk Prods. Co-Op v. Nat'l Farmers 
Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 800, 280 N.W.2d 691 (1979) ("To invoke the 
remedy of injunction the plaintiff must moreover establish that 
the injury is irreparable, i.e. not adequately compensable in 
damages."); Kohlbeck v. Reliance Const. Co., Inc., 2002 WI App 
142, ¶13, 256 Wis. 2d 235, 647 N.W.2d 277. 
103 Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 367. 
104 Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 843.   
105 Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 844:   
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
54 
 
The mere fact that a judgment for damages is not as 
adequate relief from the point of view of the 
plaintiff as an injunction would be is not wholly 
determinative of the question as to whether an 
injunction will be given.  A judgment for damages 
merely shifts to the defendant a harm equal to that 
which the plaintiff has suffered.  This is not true in 
the case of the issuance of an injunction.  The harm 
to the defendant which may follow the granting of an 
injunction 
against 
him 
may 
be 
entirely 
disproportionate to the benefit resulting to the 
plaintiff.     
5 Restatement of Property § 528 cmt. f at 3188 (1944), cited in 
part by McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 618-19, 157 N.W.2d 
665 (1968).    
¶259 Third:  Although the jury verdict plays a very minor 
role in the present case in the appellate courts, the jury 
verdict is instructive on the issue of injunctive relief.  In 
its answer to a special verdict question, the jury concluded 
that the nuisance could be abated by reasonable means and at a 
reasonable cost.  The jury was not asked what the reasonable 
means or costs were and was not instructed on this special 
verdict question.106  The majority opinion does not reveal 
whether this jury finding of reasonableness is binding on the 
circuit court in exercising its discretion in an equity matter.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Courts 
are 
not 
equipped 
or 
empowered 
to 
make 
investigations into the financial resources of various 
public bodies in Wisconsin; the coverage, policy 
limits and cost of available liability insurance; or 
the number of victims of governmental tortfeasors and 
a 
profile 
of 
the 
losses 
they 
have 
suffered. 
Information 
derived 
from 
such 
investigation 
must 
necessarily precede any reasoned evaluation of either 
a limitation on recovery or a requirement of purchase 
of insurance. 
106 Majority op., ¶35 n.19.  See jury instruction at note 
44, supra. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
55 
 
¶260 At trial, Bostco's experts testified that abatement 
could be accomplished by lining the Tunnel or by installing a 
system of groundwater monitoring and recharge wells.  Majority 
op., ¶16 n.10.  The only evidence regarding the cost of 
abatement was a $10 million estimate proposed by one of Bostco's 
experts.107  In contrast, the jury found that Bostco was entitled 
to $3 million for past damages and $6 million for future 
damages.  Taking into account Bostco's comparative negligence, 
this $9 million figure was reduced to $6.3 million; the jury 
found Bostco 30% liable for the damage to the Boston Store 
building.   
¶261 The injunctive relief, which might cost $10 million, 
appears out of sync with the monetary damages. 
¶262 Furthermore, 
although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
(¶31) 
adopts the concept that the law of negligence applies to the 
nuisance in the present case, it is silent about whether the 
contributory negligence the jury attributed to Bostco reduces 
any equitable relief founded on tort and negligence.  
¶263 Case law instructs that all the usual rules and 
defenses to negligence apply to nuisance claims predicated on 
negligence.108 
 
One 
of 
those 
defenses 
is 
contributory 
                                                 
107 No estimate was offered at trial about the District's 
costs of installing and maintaining a system of groundwater 
monitoring and recharge wells to replenish groundwater siphoned 
into the Deep Tunnel.  Majority op., ¶15 n.10. 
108 City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶7, 45. See also 
Physicians 
Plus Ins. Corp., 2002 WI 80, ¶¶25, 31, 254 
Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777.  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
56 
 
negligence.109  Does Bostco have to pay 30% of the cost of 
abatement? 
¶264 Fourth:  What is a reasonable sum that the District 
should 
be 
required 
to 
expend 
on 
abatement 
under 
these 
circumstances?  An analysis of the injunctive relief ordered 
shines light once more on the glaring short-sightedness of the 
majority opinion.  Its statutory interpretation undermines the 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 893.80: to "compensate victims of 
government tortfeasors while at the same time protecting the 
public treasury."110  Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.80 to allow 
unlimited injunctive relief in the present case circumvents the 
monetary cap set by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) and nullifies the 
statute's purpose.111     
¶265 Fifth:  There is a legitimate question about whether 
and how the majority opinion's order that the District "abate 
the nuisance" is to be framed and enforced.   
¶266 The majority opinion explains at one point that "the 
means whereby [a] nuisance is to be abated is left to the 
direction of the defendant tortfeasor."  Majority op., ¶33. 
                                                 
109 Physicians Plus Ins. Corp., 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶31 (citing 
Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 547, 76 N.W.2d 355 
(1956) ("[C]ontributory negligence is a defense in an action for 
damages occasioned by a nuisance grounded upon negligence."); 
McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 392 (N.Y. 
1928) (Chief Judge Cardozo writing that when negligence is the 
basis 
of 
the 
nuisance, contributory negligence principles 
apply)). 
110 See Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 842. 
111 See Bostco, 334 Wis. 2d 620, ¶130. 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
57 
 
Nevertheless, the majority opinion sends the issue back to the 
circuit court to establish the method of abatement.  
¶267 Courts, however, "traditionally have been reluctant to 
enjoin 
as 
a 
public 
nuisance 
activities 
which 
have 
been 
considered and specifically authorized by the government."112  
The 
same 
principle 
should 
apply 
to 
a 
private 
nuisance.  
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently commented on 
the relative competence of courts and agencies to solve 
technical problems as follows:  An "expert agency is surely 
better equipped to do the job than individual [trial] judges 
issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions."  Am. Elec. Power Co. 
v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011).113 
¶268 The Deep Tunnel is a municipal improvement project 
that is regulated by an agency with expertise——the DNR——pursuant 
to state and federal law.  The DNR is not a party in the present 
case, but the District submitted two affidavits from DNR 
employees to the circuit court.  According to the affidavits, 
any changes to the Tunnel must be undertaken in compliance with 
DNR regulations, the Federal Clean Water Act, and other 
applicable law.  The affidavits indicate that the DNR had no 
                                                 
112 North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291, 309 
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 
F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
113 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit recently made a similar comment: "Environmental problems 
require the balancing of many complicated interests, and 
agencies are better suited [than judges] to weigh competing 
proposals and select among solutions."  Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 667 F.3d 765, 797 (7th Cir. 2011).   
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
58 
 
intention of approving the concrete lining that Bostco and the 
circuit court sought. 
¶269 Abatement 
may 
also 
require 
a 
study 
of 
the 
environmental impact, costs, and benefits of both concrete 
lining and alternatives to lining, and other matters regulated 
by state and federal law.     
¶270 The ultimate unanswered question is whether this 
court, or the circuit court, or the DNR, an independent agency 
that is not a party to this action, governs abatement.   
¶271 The injunction remedy adopted by the majority opinion 
leaves more questions than answers.  Litigation may abound. 
VI 
¶272 The final erratum: The majority opinion imposes an 
unfunded mandate on government entities and is contrary to 
legislative policy.  The legitimate legislative concerns of 
protecting the fisc, ensuring funds are available to pay for 
essential services, and keeping property taxes at reasonable 
rates are undermined by the majority opinion. 
¶273 By means of this majority opinion, the court imposes 
an unfunded mandate.  Government entities will now be subject to 
unlimited liability in the form of injunctive relief in cases 
founded on tort, and may not have the concurrent ability to 
raise additional taxes or request additional funds from the 
legislature to pay for the liability the court imposes.  
¶274 Government entities are struggling to fund essential 
services without overburdening the tax base.  State aid to 
government subdivisions has been reduced.  The legislature has 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
59 
 
constrained the ability of government entities to raise funds by 
imposing levy limits.       
¶275 Without 
question, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
expands 
government liability and increases expenses for government 
entities and taxpayers.  This expansion of government liability, 
this increase in the expenditures of government entities, and 
this increase in costs to taxpayers are contrary to recent 
legislative expressions of state policy:  One, reduce government 
liability, and two, reduce recovery for tort victims.    
¶276 The legislature has always been less zealous in 
abrogating government immunity than the courts.114  The majority 
opinion repeats the oft-quoted, poorly understood line from 
Holytz that says "the rule is liability——the exception is 
immunity."  Majority op., ¶50.  The legislature never codified 
the mantra that "the rule is liability."  The 1963 statute the 
legislature enacted in response to Holytz does not direct that 
"the rule is liability——the exception is immunity."  Rather, the 
legislature rendered government entities immune for broadly 
enumerated acts.  And the legislature severely limited the 
dollar amounts for which a government entity would be liable. 
¶277 Of late, the legislature has been decreasing and 
eliminating 
tort 
liability 
for 
government 
entities 
and 
                                                 
114 "[J]udicial abrogation of common law immunity did not 
bind the legislature."  Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 372.  
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
60 
 
decreasing the recovery of tort victims.115  The majority opinion 
is marching in the opposite direction from the legislature. 
* * * * 
¶278 This 
court 
attempted 
to 
synthesize 
the 
law 
on 
negligence, nuisance, liability, and immunity in City of 
Milwaukee.  The majority opinion retreats from City of Milwaukee 
and confuses the law instead of developing the law in a clear 
manner.   
¶279 Because of the numerous errata in the majority opinion 
(many of which I do not enumerate), I dissent. 
¶280 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., 2011 Act 132 (removing statutory language 
holding government entities liable for highway defects); 2011 
Act 2 (e.g., restricting recovery for products liability and 
placing caps on punitive damages and noneconomic health care 
damages). 
No.  2007AP221.ssa 
 
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