Case Title: Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County School Dist. No. 1,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-300

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County School Dist. No. 1,1995 WY 136901 P.2d 404Case Number: 94-300Decided: 08/23/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Cynthia 
Ann KAHRS, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

The 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR PLATTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, a body corporate and 
politic under the laws of the State of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Bruce 
S. Asay of Murane & Bostwick, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Tracy 
J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, Powell, and Raymond B. Hunkins 
of Jones, Jones, Vine & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]  Appellant Cynthia Ann Kahrs appeals from 
the district court's order which granted a summary judgment in favor of Appellee 
Board of Trustees for Platte County School District No. 1.

[¶2]  We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]  Kahrs presents the following issues on 
appeal:

Issue 
1: Did the District Court err as a matter of law in holding that a prior 
administrative hearing precluded the Plaintiff's/Appellant's state causes of 
action?

A. 
Does the Plaintiff's claim of breach of contract survive the motion for summary 
judgment?

B. 
Does the Plaintiff's claim for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing survive the motion for summary judgment?

Issue 
2: Did the Plaintiff/Appellant comply with the Governmental Claims 
Act?

FACTS

[¶4]      Kahrs was 
employed by the school district as a continuing contract teacher. On April 4, 
1990, the superintendent delivered a notice to Kahrs in which he recommended 
that she be discharged from her teaching position. The notice stated that Kahrs 
was entitled to have a hearing before the board. Kahrs requested that such a 
hearing be held.

[¶5]      A hearing was 
held before a hearing examiner and the board. Before the evidentiary portion of 
the hearing began, Kahrs's attorney subjected each board member to a voir dire 
examination. Kahrs did not object to any board member participating in the 
hearing. After the hearing was concluded, the board entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order in which it determined that good cause existed 
for the termination of Kahrs's employment. Kahrs did not appeal to the state 
district court.

[¶6]      Kahrs filed an 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. She 
asserted claims against the board for breach of her employment contract, 
violation of her due process rights, age discrimination, and handicap 
discrimination. The federal district court entered a summary judgment in favor 
of the board which resolved all the federal issues involved in the lawsuit. The 
federal district court specifically denied Kahrs's due process and 
discrimination claims. After dismissing all Kahrs's federal claims, the federal 
district court ruled that it did not have pendent jurisdiction over her state 
law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

[¶7]      Kahrs filed a 
lawsuit in the state district court. In that suit, she presented claims for 
breach of her employment contract and/or promissory estoppel, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. The board filed a motion for a summary judgment, claiming that 
(1) Kahrs's action was barred under the collateral estoppel doctrine, (2) Kahrs 
failed to comply with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, (3) Kahrs failed to 
allege any facts which would support a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and (4) Kahrs could not maintain a claim for breach of the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. After holding a hearing on the 
motion, the district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the board. 
Kahrs appealed to this Court.1

DISCUSSION

[¶8]  Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Wyo. 1995); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give 
that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn 
from the record. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995). We accord no 
deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶9]  The district court decided that, under 
the collateral estoppel doctrine, Kahrs could not maintain her action in the 
state district court because she was precluded from relitigating the issues 
which the board had previously decided. Kahrs argues that the collateral 
estoppel doctrine does not bar her action.

[¶10]  This Court has held that both the res 
judicata doctrine and the collateral estoppel doctrine apply to final 
adjudicative determinations which have been rendered by administrative 
tribunals. Slavens v. Board of County Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 1993). The collateral estoppel doctrine is otherwise known as the 
"issue preclusion" doctrine. RKS v. SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Wyo. 1994). We 
have opined that, since administrative agency decisions deal primarily with 
issues rather than with causes of action or claims, collateral estoppel is the 
appropriate preclusion doctrine to be applied to final administrative agency 
decisions. Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 686. The collateral estoppel doctrine prevents 
relitigation of issues which were involved actually and necessarily in a prior 
action between the same parties. Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, 
Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶11]  Courts should consider four factors in 
determining whether the collateral estoppel doctrine applies:

(1) 
whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with 
the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication 
resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel 
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.

Slavens, 
854 P.2d  at 686 (emphasis in original).

[¶12]  This case is very similar to the Slavens 
case. Kahrs, like the plaintiffs in Slavens, would be able to recover under her 
remaining claims (breach of contract and/or promissory estoppel and breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) only if the courts were to 
rule that the termination of her employment was improper. Id. The propriety of 
the termination was directly at issue in the hearing held before the hearing 
examiner and the board. Consequently, the issues which were presented in the 
hearing and in this lawsuit were identical. The board reached a final decision 
on the merits when it found that good cause existed for the termination of 
Kahrs's employment. Kahrs did not appeal to the state district court for a 
judicial review of that final decision. The board and Kahrs were parties to the 
administrative proceeding and are parties to this lawsuit. Kahrs had a full and 
fair opportunity during the hearing to litigate the propriety of the 
termination. She was allowed to present evidence and to dispute the evidence 
which had been presented in support of her employment being terminated. Indeed, 
the federal district court specifically found that "the notice and opportunity 
to be heard provided to the plaintiff more than adequately fulfilled the 
requirements of due process, and that plaintiff received the kind of fair and 
impartial hearing guaranteed by Wyoming law." That finding has a preclusive 
effect. See Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106-07 (Wyo. 1994). Therefore, 
all the requirements for the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine 
were satisfied in this case, and the district court properly ruled that Kahrs 
was precluded from bringing this action in the state district court.

[¶13]   We are particularly mindful of the 
fact that Kahrs did not appeal to the state district court for a judicial review 
of the board's decision to terminate her employment. As a continuing contract 
teacher, Kahrs was required to follow the statutory procedure for contesting the 
termination. Her failure to seek a full judicial review of the board's decision 
prohibited her from instituting any subsequent action in the matter. Slavens, 
854 P.2d at 686-87; see also Joelson v. City of Casper, Wyoming, 676 P.2d 570, 
572-73 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶14]   Kahrs argues that the collateral 
estoppel doctrine cannot apply to the board's decision in this case because the 
board did not have the authority to determine its own liability for the tort and 
breach-of-contract claims which she presented in the state district court 
action. Kahrs relies on the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act as being authority 
for her argument. She points out that WYO. STAT. § 1-39-117(a) (1988) states in 
pertinent part: "Original and exclusive jurisdiction for any claim under [the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act] shall be in the district courts of 
Wyoming."

[¶15]   Kahrs misunderstands how the 
collateral estoppel doctrine applies in this case. She may not relitigate the 
dispositive issue of whether or not good cause existed for the termination of 
her employment. The board had not only the authority to decide whether or not 
the termination was justified but also a statutory responsibility to decide that 
question. WYO. STAT. §§ 21-7-106 (1992) (amended 1993), -108 (1992) (repealed 
1993), -110 (1992) (amended 1993); see also Brasel & Sims Construction Co., 
Inc. v. State Highway Commission of Wyoming, 655 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1982).2 Kahrs will not be allowed to 
relitigate the termination issue simply because she styled her claims as being 
governmental claims.

[¶16]  Kahrs also asserts that, under Article 
1, Sections 6 (due process) and 35 (impairment of contractual obligations) of 
the Wyoming Constitution, "an individual has a right to contract and once 
established, that contractual obligation cannot be extinguished without due 
process of law." Kahrs specifically contends that her constitutional rights were 
violated because the board did not act as an unbiased and impartial tribunal 
when it conducted the contested case hearing. She argues that the board was 
biased because it had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the hearing. 

[¶17]   Kahrs was precluded from 
relitigating this issue in the state district court because the federal district 
court had finally and conclusively decided the issue in the earlier litigation. 
See Sandstrom, 880 P.2d  at 106-07. The federal district court expressly stated 
that Kahrs's "counsel had a full and fair opportunity to inquire into the 
[b]oard member[s'] bias and the effect of the board's special session; and 
counsel did, in fact, conduct voir dire questioning. Each member questioned 
indicated that [he] would be open-minded, and counsel failed to object on bias 
or prejudice grounds."

[¶18]  Kahrs maintains that she had the right 
under the provisions of W.R.A.P. 12.12 to bring an independent action in the 
state district court for the recovery of money. W.R.A.P. 12.12 
provides:

The 
relief, review, or redress available in suits for injunction against agency 
action or enforcement, in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a 
declaratory judgment based on agency action or inaction, in actions seeking any 
common law writ to compel, review or restrain agency action shall be available 
by independent action notwithstanding any petition for review.

This 
Court previously rejected Kahrs's position when we stated: "W.R.A.P. 12.12 is 
not an exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 
687. We do not see any reason in this case to depart from our earlier precedent. 
Since we have determined that the collateral estoppel doctrine precluded Kahrs 
from maintaining her state district court action, we do not need to decide 
whether Kahrs complied with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. See Slavens, 
854 P.2d  at 687.

[¶19]   The board argues that it is 
entitled to receive the maximum fees and costs available to it as a prevailing 
party under W.R.A.P. 10.05 because a reasonable cause did not exist for Kahrs's 
appeal. Since we are persuaded that a reasonable cause did exist, we refuse to 
make the necessary certification and, therefore, deny the board's request. See 
Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 626 (Wyo. 1993); Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 
1252 (Wyo. 1993).

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   We hold that the district court did 
not err by granting a summary judgment in favor of the board and that the board 
is not entitled to be awarded fees and costs pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05.

[¶21]  Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
Kahrs does not argue on appeal that the district court erred when it granted a 
summary judgment on her negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress 
claim.

2 
Kahrs relies on several unpublished federal district court orders as being legal 
precedent for her contention that the board did not have authority to decide 
this matter. Those cases were significantly different than this case and are not 
persuasive authority: Frost v. School District No. 1, Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming, No. 91-CV-0206-B (D.Wyo. May 6, 1992) (no full and fair opportunity to 
litigate); Hill v. Goshen County School District No. 1, No. 92-CV-0302-B (D.Wyo. 
Sept. 14, 1993) (reduction in force); Fernow v. Board of Trustees for Washakie 
County School District No. 2, No. 93-CV-0169-J (D.Wyo. June 3, 1994) (bias shown 
in voir dire of school board members). Kahrs also cites Scott v. School District 
No. 6, 815 F. Supp. 424 (D.Wyo. 1993), as being authority for her contention. 
Scott is not in point because it does not discuss a collateral estoppel 
issue.