Case Title: Terry v. Sperry

Citation: 2011-Ohio-3364

Docket Number: 20100810

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Terry v. Sperry, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3364.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3364 
TERRY, APPELLEE, v. SPERRY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Terry v. Sperry, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3364.] 
Township zoning — R.C. 519.21(A) — Exemption for viticulture. 
(No. 2010-0810 — Submitted April 20, 2011 — Decided July 12, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 08-MA-227, 
186 Ohio App.3d 798, 2010-Ohio-1299. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The exemption from township zoning in R.C. 519.21(A) does not require for 
its application that viticulture be the primary use of property engaged 
in the vinting and selling of wine. 
  __________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to interpret R.C. 519.21(A) to determine 
when a winery may be exempt from township zoning regulations. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} Appellant Gayle Sperry owns property and resides in Milton 
Township at 3020 Sylvandale, Berlin Center, a.k.a. 3020 Scenic Drive.1  She and 
her son and daughter-in-law, appellants Kristofer and Evelyn Sperry, operate 
Myrddin Wine Company, L.L.C., d.b.a. Myrddin Winery, at this location. 
{¶ 3} The property is in an R1 residentially zoned district.  According to 
the Milton Township Zoning Resolution, Section 5 B, R-1, Residential District, 
and Section 4, Definitions, the following uses are permitted: agriculture, single-
family dwellings, churches and other places of worship, schools, home 
occupations as defined in Section 4, automobile parking spaces, and accessory 
buildings.  “Home occupation” is defined as an occupation conducted in a 
dwelling unit or small garage that meets the following criteria: 
{¶ 4} “a. No person other than members of the family residing on the 
premises shall be engaged in such occupation conducted entirely in the dwelling 
unit, or garages containing 600 square feet or less. 
{¶ 5} “b. The use of the dwelling unit of the home occupation shall be 
clearly incidental and subordinate to its use for residential purposes by its 
occupants, and not more than 25% of the total floor area of the swelling unit shall 
be used in the conduct of the home occupation; 
{¶ 6} “c. There shall be no change in the outside appearance of the 
building or premises or other visible evidence of conduct of such home 
occupation other than one sign as permitted in Section 8C of this Ordinance; 
{¶ 7} “d. Sufficient offstreet parking shall be provided based on the type 
of home occupation and such occupation shall not create traffic, parking, 
sewerage, or water use in excess of what is normal in a residential neighborhood. 
                                                 
1 Appellants contend that the property is approximately two acres, but appellee states that it is only 
0.75 acres. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 8} “e. No equipment or process shall be used in such occupations 
which creates noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference 
detectable to the normal senses off the lot, if the occupation is conducted in a 
single family residence, or outside the dwelling unit if conducted in other than a 
single family residence.” 
{¶ 9} Before starting the winery, Kristofer Sperry contacted the Milton 
Township zoning inspector at the time and inquired whether a winery could be 
located on his mother’s property.  He was told that the business was allowed and 
that a written approval or permit did not need to be issued.2  The Sperrys then 
procured federal and state permits to operate a winery on their property. 
{¶ 10} The property itself contains 20 grape vines, of which 12 were 
harvested.  The Sperrys also obtained grapes and grape juice from outside 
sources.  The grapes were destemmed, crushed, and fermented, and the wine is 
bottled, aged, labeled, and sold, on the premises.  Shelf-stable foods were also 
sold.  Five percent of the sales of bottled wine sold at the winery were from 
grapes planted, cultivated, and harvested on the property. 
{¶ 11} In January 2008, based on neighbor’s calls, Jenifer Terry, zoning 
inspector for Milton Township, filed a complaint for preliminary and permanent 
injunction seeking to enjoin the Sperrys’ use of the property as a retail business 
and restaurant in a residentially zoned district, R-1.  After stipulations of fact were 
filed with the common pleas court, the parties filed motions for summary 
judgment.  They agreed that the issues before the court were the following: 
{¶ 12} “1. Are the winery activities conducted on the property an 
Agricultural Use of the Property as defined in Section 519.01 of the Ohio Revised 
Code? 
                                                 
2 According to appellee, a zoning permit is issued only to construct a building.  A request to 
engage in a home occupation did not require an application, nor would the zoning inspector issue 
any written approval or permits when allowing home occupations.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 13} “2. Is the Myrddin Winery exempt from zoning regulation by 
Milton Township pursuant to Section [519.21(A)] of the Ohio Revised Code?” 
{¶ 14} The trial court answered both questions negatively and granted 
summary judgment to the zoning inspector.  The court also entered an order 
permanently restraining the Sperrys from operating a winery on their property.  
The Sperrys then filed a notice of appeal to the Seventh District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 15} The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the trial 
court that the primary use of the property was not viticulture (the growing of 
grapes), but rather the vinting (the making) of and selling of wine.  The court of 
appeals concluded that both R.C. 519.01 and R.C. 519.21(A) required that 
viticulture be the primary use of the property in order to qualify for the agriculture 
exemption from township zoning. 
{¶ 16} We accepted the Sperrys’ discretionary appeal.  The Sperrys 
contend that under R.C. 519.21(A) their winery is exempt from township zoning 
regulations because they also engage in viticulture on the property within the 
meaning of the statute. 
{¶ 17} We agree with appellants that the exemption from township zoning 
in R.C. 519.21(A) does not require for its application that viticulture be the 
primary use of property engaged in the vinting and selling of wine, and therefore 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Law and Analysis 
Township Zoning Power 
{¶ 18} Ohio townships have no inherent or constitutionally granted police 
or zoning power.  Yorkavitz v. Bd. of Columbiana Twp. Trustees (1957), 166 Ohio 
St. 349, 351, 2 O.O.2d 255, 142 N.E.2d 655.  “Accordingly, the zoning authority 
possessed by townships in the state of Ohio is limited to that which is specifically 
conferred by the General Assembly.”  Bd. of Bainbridge Twp. Trustees v. 
Funtime, Inc. (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 563 N.E.2d 717. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 19} In addition, “[a]ll zoning decisions, whether on an administrative 
or judicial level, should be based on the following elementary principles which 
underlie real property law.  Zoning resolutions are in derogation of the common 
law and deprive a property owner of certain uses of his land to which he would 
otherwise be lawfully entitled.  Therefore, such resolutions are ordinarily 
construed in favor of the property owner.  Restrictions on the use of real property 
by ordinance, resolution or statute must be strictly construed, and the scope of the 
restrictions cannot be extended to include limitations not clearly prescribed.” 
(Citations omitted.)  Saunders v. Clark Cty. Zoning Dept. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 
259, 261, 20 O.O.3d 244, 421 N.E.2d 152.  Furthermore, exemptions from 
restrictive zoning provisions are to be liberally construed.  State ex rel. Moore Oil 
Co. v. Dauben (1919), 99 Ohio St. 406, 124 N.E. 232, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
The Zoning Exemption of R.C. 519.21(A) 
{¶ 20} R.C. 519.02 authorizes township trustees, in the interest of the 
public health and safety, to adopt resolutions limiting the size and location of 
buildings and other structures and the uses of land for trade, industry, residence, 
recreation, or other purposes.  That power, however, is limited by R.C. 519.21.3  
                                                 
3      {¶ a}  R.C. 519.21 provides: 
{¶ b} “(A) Except as otherwise provided in division (B) of this section, sections 519.02 to 
519.25 of the Revised Code confer no power on any township zoning commission, board of 
township trustees, or board of zoning appeals to prohibit the use of any land for agricultural 
purposes or the construction or use of buildings or structures incident to the use for agricultural 
purposes of the land on which such buildings or structures are located, including buildings or 
structures that are used primarily for vinting and selling wine and that are located on land any part 
of which is used for viticulture, and no zoning certificate shall be required for any such building or 
structure. 
{¶ c} “(B) A township zoning resolution, or an amendment to such resolution, may in any 
platted subdivision approved under section 711.05, 711.09, or 711.10 of the Revised Code, or in 
any area consisting of fifteen or more lots approved under section 711.131 of the Revised Code 
that are contiguous to one another, or some of which are contiguous to one another and adjacent to 
one side of a dedicated public road, and the balance of which are contiguous to one another and 
adjacent to the opposite side of the same dedicated public road regulate: 
{¶ d} “(1) Agriculture on lots of one acre or less; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
That statute is divided into three subsections and, in general, prevents townships 
from prohibiting the use of land for agricultural purposes (R.C. 519.21(A)), limits 
a township’s ability to regulate agriculture in platted subdivisions (R.C. 
519.21(B)), and limits the regulation of farm markets (R.C. 519.21(C)).  This case 
does not involve a farm market, and although the Sperry property is located in a 
platted subdivision, Milton Township has not adopted any zoning regulations that 
it would be permitted to adopt by R.C. 519.21(B).  Thus, the section at issue here 
is R.C. 519.21(A). 
{¶ 21} R.C. 519.21(A) provides that “sections 519.02 to 519.25 of the 
Revised Code confer no power on any township zoning commission, board of 
township trustees, or board of zoning appeals to prohibit the use of any land for 
agricultural purposes or the construction or use of buildings or structures incident 
to the use for agricultural purposes of the land on which such buildings or 
structures are located, including buildings or structures that are used primarily 
for vinting and selling wine and that are located on land any part of which is used 
                                                                                                                                     
{¶ e} “(2) Buildings or structures incident to the use of land for agricultural purposes on lots 
greater than one acre but not greater than five acres by: set back building lines; height; and size; 
{¶ f} “(3) Dairying and animal and poultry husbandry on lots greater than one acre but not 
greater than five acres when at least thirty-five per cent of the lots in the subdivision are developed 
with at least one building, structure, or improvement that is subject to real property taxation or that 
is subject to the tax on manufactured and mobile homes under section 4503.06 of the Revised 
Code. After thirty-five per cent of the lots are so developed, dairying and animal and poultry 
husbandry shall be considered nonconforming use of land and buildings or structures pursuant to 
section 519.19 of the Revised Code. 
{¶ g} “Division (B) of this section confers no power on any township zoning commission, 
board of township trustees, or board of zoning appeals to regulate agriculture, buildings or 
structures, and dairying and animal and poultry husbandry on lots greater than five acres. 
{¶ h} “(C) Such sections confer no power on any township zoning commission, board of 
township trustees, or board of zoning appeals to prohibit in a district zoned for agricultural, 
industrial, residential, or commercial uses, the use of any land for a farm market where fifty per 
cent or more of the gross income received from the market is derived from produce raised on 
farms owned or operated by the market operator in a normal crop year. However, a board of 
township trustees, as provided in section 519.02 of the Revised Code, may regulate such factors 
pertaining to farm markets as size of the structure, size of parking areas that may be required, set 
back building lines, and egress or ingress, where such regulation is necessary to protect the public 
health and safety.” 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
for viticulture, and no zoning certificate shall be required for any such building or 
structure.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, R.C. 519.21(A) provides two 
circumstances under which the use of a property is exempt from township zoning 
regulations: (1) the property is used for agricultural purposes or (2) the 
construction or use of buildings or structures on the property is incident to an 
agricultural use of the land. 
The Meaning of “Agriculture” 
{¶ 22} R.C. 519.21(A) begins by saying that township zoning boards may 
not  prohibit  the use of land for agricultural purposes.  The zoning inspector 
argues that the Sperrys’ activities on their property do not constitute an 
agricultural use.  To determine if the property is exempt from township zoning, 
however, we must examine the statutory meaning of “agriculture.”  For purpose 
of the township zoning statutes, R.C. 519.01 defines “agriculture” generally as 
“farming; ranching; aquaculture; apiculture; horticulture; viticulture; animal 
husbandry, including, but not limited to, the care and raising of livestock, equine, 
and fur-bearing animals; poultry husbandry and the production of poultry and 
poultry products; dairy production; the production of field crops, tobacco, fruits, 
vegetables, nursery stock, ornamental shrubs, ornamental trees, flowers, sod, or 
mushrooms; timber; pasturage; any combination of the foregoing; the processing, 
drying, storage, and marketing of agricultural products when those activities are 
conducted in conjunction with, but are secondary to, such husbandry or 
production.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 23} Viticulture is “the cultivation or culture of grapes esp. for wine 
making.”  Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.2003) 1399.  
According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) 2553, “vint” 
means “to make (wine) from fruit.”  When we consider the statutory definition of 
“agriculture,” the Sperry property may potentially be seen to have a use for 
agriculture either in viticulture (the growing of grapes) or in processing and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
marketing of agricultural products (the vinting and selling of wine).  The statute 
does not establish a minimum number of vines needed for cultivation to constitute 
viticulture; the growing and harvesting of grapes on the Sperry property thus 
satisfies the term “viticulture.”  To qualify as “agriculture” under R.C. 519.01’s 
definition, the Sperrys’ vinting and selling activity must be secondary to the 
production of agricultural products (i.e., the grapes).  In this case, however, only 
five percent of the winery’s sales are derived from grapes produced on the 
property.  Because the vinting and selling of wine on the Sperry property are not 
secondary to the viticulture activities, the winery operation does not fall within 
the general definition of “agriculture.” 
Use of Buildings or Structures Incident to the Use for Agricultural Purposes 
{¶ 24} Even though the winery itself does not constitute an agricultural 
use by the general definition of “agriculture,” there is a second circumstance 
under which the use of the building for vinting and selling wine may still be 
exempt from township zoning.  The exemption in R.C. 519.21(A) specifically 
provides that the township has no power to prohibit the “use of buildings or 
structures incident to the use for agricultural purposes of the land on which such 
buildings or structures are located, including buildings or structures that are used 
primarily for vinting and selling wine and that are located on land any part of 
which is used for viticulture.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 25} The court of appeals focused on the meaning of the phrase 
“incident to” and determined that the General Assembly intended that the 
agricultural purpose must be the primary use of the property.  The court, however, 
appeared to give no import to the phrase “including buildings or structures that 
are used primarily for vinting and selling wine and that are located on land any 
part of which is used for viticulture.”  When we engage in statutory interpretation, 
our first duty is to determine whether the statute is clear and unambiguous. 
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 52, 2006-
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
Ohio-6498, 858 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 15.  “ ‘[W]here the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the statute as written, 
making neither additions to the statute nor subtractions therefrom.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, 
quoting Hubbard v. Canton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 
2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 26} We conclude that the language is clear and unambiguous.  If there 
is agricultural use of the property (viticulture), the township may not regulate the 
zoning of buildings that are used primarily for vinting and selling wine.  The 
General Assembly included a specific example of what constitutes “the use of 
buildings or structures incident to the use for agricultural purposes of the land on 
which such buildings or structures are located” when it followed that phrase with 
“buildings or structures that are used primarily for vinting and selling wine and 
that are located on land any part of which is used for viticulture.”  Therefore, 
under R.C. 519.21(A), a township may not prohibit the use of buildings for the 
vinting and selling of wine on a property as long as the property also cultivates 
grapes for wine making. 
{¶ 27} Contrary to the court of appeals’ determination, there is no 
requirement in R.C. 519.21(A) that the vinting and selling of wine be a secondary 
or subordinate use of the property or that viticulture be the primary use of the 
property.  A township may not prohibit the use of a property for vinting and 
selling wine if any part of the property is used for viticulture.  As appellee’s 
counsel acknowledged in oral arguments, “any” can mean one vine.  Appellee 
nonetheless argues that we should apply a commonsense approach and require a 
more substantial viticulture operation.  However, that would be contrary to the 
plain language of the statute.  Had the General Assembly intended that viticulture 
must be the primary use of the property to qualify under R.C. 519.21(A) for 
exemption from township zoning, it could have easily expressed that requirement, 
as it did in the definition of “agriculture” in R.C. 519.01 or as it did in R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
519.21(C), requiring that a farm market receive 50 percent or more of its gross 
income from produce raised on farms owned or operated by the market operator 
before being exempt from regulation. 
{¶ 28} We therefore hold that pursuant to R.C. 519.21(A), a township has 
no zoning authority over the use of buildings or structures for the vinting and 
selling of wine on property that is also used for viticulture. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Because Myrddin Winery conducts an exempt use of the property 
pursuant to R.C. 519.21(A), the zoning regulations by Milton Township do not 
apply.  We reverse the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Mark S. Finamore and Veronica Buetel, for appellee. 
 
Wright Law Co., L.P.A., and David S. Pennington, for appellants. 
______________________