Case Title: F.B. v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-1156

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC02-1156
____________
F.B., a child,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[July 11, 2003]
CANTERO, J.
We review F.B. v. State, 816 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which
certified conflict with T.E.J. v. State, 749 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  As explained below, we
approve the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding that the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove one element of a crime does not constitute fundamental error,
and therefore this claim must first be raised in the trial court to be preserved for
appellate review.
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I. The Decisions in Conflict
The operative facts of the two cases are essentially the same.  In F.B., the
petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on the charge of petit theft of items valued at
$100 or more but less than $300, a first-degree misdemeanor.  816 So. 2d at 700;
see § 812.014(1)(a), (2)(e), Fla. Stat. (1999) (declaring the theft of items valued at
$100 but less than $300 to be a first-degree misdemeanor).  Although the State
presented evidence about the items taken, it offered no evidence of their value. 
Petitioner failed to object, however, or to move for judgment of acquittal on this
ground.  Petitioner raised the claim for the first time on appeal, asserting
fundamental error.  The Fourth District held that under State v. Barber, 301 So. 2d
7 (Fla. 1974), the issue must be preserved for appeal.  816 So. 2d at 701; accord
Joseph v. State, 830 So. 2d 911, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing F.B. and
affirming burglary of occupied dwelling conviction because insufficient evidence
claim was not preserved).  Similarly, in the conflict case, T.E.J. argued for the first
time on appeal that a delinquency adjudication for first-degree petit theft must be
reduced to second-degree because the State failed to prove the value of the stolen
items.  749 So. 2d at 558.  Without mentioning Barber, the Second District Court
of Appeal, relying on our decision in Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104, 107 (Fla.
1.  Since these two cases were decided, the Fourth District has followed
F.B. and Barber in another case, see Joseph, 830 So. 2d at 911, and the Third
District has followed T.E.J., see Stanford v. State, 833 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 4th DCA
2002).
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1974), receded from on other grounds by Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968
(Fla. 1980), concluded that the “failure of proof on the essential element of value
was fundamental error” and reversed.  749 So. 2d at 558; accord E.R. v. State, 806
So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing third-degree grand theft conviction as
fundamental error, relying on T.E.J., because the State failed to prove that the value
of the property exceeded $300 and ordering the conviction reduced to second-
degree petit theft).1
II. Barber and Negron
The courts in F.B. and T.E.J. relied on two different cases from this Court
for their opposite holdings.  In State v. Barber, 301 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1974), the
respondents were convicted of two counts of breaking and entering with intent to
commit grand larceny.  As did the petitioner here, on appeal they alleged that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction on the element of the value of the
property stolen.  The respondents contended that the State thus failed to present a
prima facie case and that this constituted fundamental error.  Citing a line of prior
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decisions, we rejected that argument and held that “unless the issue of sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a verdict in a criminal case is first presented to the trial
court by way of an appropriate motion, the issue is not reviewable on direct appeal
from an adverse judgment."  Id. at 9.   Because the issue was not preserved below,
we held that it “was not open to appellate review.”  Id.
Three months after Barber, we decided Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104
(Fla. 1974), on which the Second District relied in T.E.J.  After resolving the
conflict issue presented, this Court turned to the petitioners’ contention “that there
was fundamental error committed as to them in that they were convicted of grand
larceny when the State’s evidence did not support a conviction of grand larceny.” 
306 So. 2d at 107.  Again, the petitioners claimed that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence of the value of the items stolen.  Without referring to Barber, we
reviewed the record and held that the evidence was insufficient to support a grand
theft conviction.  Id. at 108.  We reversed for entry of a petty larceny conviction. 
Id. at 109.
Although Negron tacitly rests on the assumption that the petitioners’
insufficient evidence claim constituted fundamental error, the Court did not address
that issue.  Thus, while the Second District’s reliance on Negron is understandable,
we again remind the courts that 
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this Court does not intentionally overrule itself sub silentio.  Where a
court encounters an express holding from this Court on a specific
issue and a subsequent contrary dicta statement on the same specific
issue, the court is to apply our express holding in the former decision
until such time as this Court recedes from the express holding.
Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added).  As explained
below, we reaffirm Barber, which did expressly rule on the issue, and recede from
Negron to the extent it conflicts with Barber.
III. Preservation and Fundamental Error
We first review the principles underlying the requirement to preserve error for
review and the requisites for determining fundamental error, which may be raised
for the first time on appeal.  In general, to raise a claimed error on appeal, a litigant
must object at trial when the alleged error occurs.  J.B. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1376,
1378 (Fla. 1998).  “Furthermore, in order for an argument to be cognizable on
appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection,
exception, or motion below.”  Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982). 
This Court has explained that
[t]he requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based on
practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of a judicial
system.  It places the trial judge on notice that error may have been
committed, and provides him an opportunity to correct it at an early
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stage of the proceedings.  Delay and an unnecessary use of the
appellate process result from a failure to cure early that which must be
cured eventually.
Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).  The requirement of
contemporaneous objection thus not only affords trial judges the opportunity to
address and possibly redress a claimed error, it also prevents counsel from
allowing errors in the proceedings to go unchallenged and later using the error to a
client’s tactical advantage.  See J.B., 705 So. 2d at 1378.
The sole exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies where the
error is fundamental.  Id.  We have stated that “in order to be of such fundamental
nature as to justify a reversal in the absence of timely objection the error must reach
down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Brown v. State,
124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960) (holding that the alleged error “did not permeate or
saturate the trial with such basic invalidity as to lead to a reversal regardless of a
timely objection”).  Thus, an error is deemed fundamental “when it goes to the
foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a
denial of due process.”  J.B., 705 So. 2d at 1378; see also State v. Johnson, 616
So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993) (stating that “for an error to be so fundamental that it can be
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raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision
under review and equivalent to a denial of due process”).  “The doctrine of
fundamental error should be applied only in rare cases where a jurisdictional error
appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its
application.”  Smith v. State, 521 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988); see also Hopkins v.
State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 1994) (noting that “this Court has cautioned that
the fundamental error doctrine should be used ‘very guardedly’”).
IV. Insufficiency of the Evidence and Fundamental Error
As the foregoing discussion suggests, rarely will an error be deemed
fundamental, and the more general rule requiring a contemporaneous objection to
preserve an issue for appellate review will usually apply.  We find that the interests
of justice are better served by applying this general rule to challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence.  Any technical deficiency in proof may be readily
addressed by timely objection or motion, thus allowing the State to correct the
error, if indeed it is correctable, before the trial concludes.  See Johnson v. State,
478 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (noting that “[h]ad counsel complied with
the rule and specifically brought the ground now urged to the trial court’s attention,
the error, if any, might have been cured by allowing the state to re-open its case and
2.  We note that a motion or objection must be specific to preserve a claim
of insufficiency of the evidence for appellate review.  A boilerplate objection or
motion is inadequate.  See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 894-95 (Fla. 2000).
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supply the missing, technical element of age”).
The deferential standard of review appellate courts apply to claims of
insufficiency of the evidence – i.e., “whether, after all conflicts in the evidence and
all reasonable inferences therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on
appeal, there is substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict and
judgment” – further supports our holding.  See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120,
1123 (Fla. 1981) (clarifying the difference between sufficiency and weight of the
evidence and defining the appellate court's task in reviewing a claim of insufficiency
of the evidence).  In light of this standard of review and the interests the
contemporaneous objection rule serves, we hold that, with two exceptions, a
defendant must preserve a claim of insufficiency of the evidence through timely
challenge in the trial court.2
The first exception is based on the longstanding appellate rule under which, 
in death penalty cases, this Court is required to review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the conviction.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(i).  This Court
always reviews such cases to determine whether competent, substantial evidence
supports the verdict, regardless of whether the issue is preserved for review or even
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raised on appeal.  See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2000); Woods v.
State, 733 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1999); Archer v. State, 613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993).
The second exception to the requirement that claims of insufficiency of the
evidence must be preserved occurs when the evidence is insufficient to show that a
crime was committed at all.  This exception is illustrated in two cases.  In Troedel
v. State, 462 So. 2d 392, 399 (Fla. 1984), we reversed one of the defendant’s two
burglary convictions because “[t]here was no evidence of more than one such
unlawful entry.”  We held that “a conviction imposed upon a crime totally
unsupported by evidence constitutes fundamental error.”  Id.  We applied this rule
in Vance v. State, 472 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1985), in which the petitioner was charged
with two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was convicted on
each of the lesser-included offense of improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon
under section 790.10, Florida Statutes (1981), which prohibits such exhibition “in
the presence of one or more persons.”  Relying on Troedel’s fundamental error
pronouncement, we held that because section 790.10 was only violated once in the
single episode, the second conviction was “totally unsupported by evidence.”  472
So. 2d at 735. 
Thus, an argument that the evidence is totally insufficient as a matter of law
to establish the commission of a crime need not be preserved.  Such complete
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failure of the evidence meets the requirements of fundamental error – i.e., an error
that reaches to the foundation of the case and is equal to a denial of due process. 
See, e.g., Stanton v. State, 746 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (citing
Troedel and stating that “a person who takes temporary possession of contraband
for the sole purpose of turning it into the authorities, and promptly does so, is [not]
guilty of a crime”); Griffin v. State, 705 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
(reversing conviction because a “conviction is fundamentally erroneous when the
facts affirmatively proven by the State simply do not constitute the charged offense
as a matter of law”); Harris v. State, 647 So. 2d 206, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
(reversing conviction and stating that “[c]onviction of a crime which did not take
place is a fundamental error, which the appellate court should correct even when no
timely objection or motion for acquittal was made below”); Nelson v. State, 543
So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (reversing conviction as fundamental error
because defendant’s conduct did not constitute the crime of which he was
convicted).
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, we reaffirm, with the two discrete exceptions explicated
above, the longstanding rule that claims of insufficiency of the evidence must be
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specifically preserved for appellate review.  Accordingly, we approve the Fourth
DCA’s decision in F.B. and disapprove the decision in T.E.J. 
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D01-1158
(Broward County)
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Marcy K. Allen, Assistant Public
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Maria J.
Patullo, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent