Case Title: Lamb v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lamb v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n1999 WY 102985 P.2d 433Case Number: 98-14Decided: 07/14/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

WILLIAM 
LAMB and DELIA LAMB; S. T. GERGANOFF and SYBIL A. GERGANOFF; and MILTON R. 
MILLER and PEGGY M. MILLER, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 and 

DONALD M. BROWN and JUDITH J. BROWN; BRAD A. LINDSEY; 
LEE A. STERNER and MARGARET M. STERNER; ELSIE HASTINGS, TRUSTEE; JANICE D. PECK; 
JOHN S. LINDSAY and NANCY D. LINDSAY; JAMES J. ISAACS; JACK L. REUBER and RUTH 
E. RUEBER; GEORGE MERRIFIELD and BETTY K. MERRIFIELD; BRUCE S. THOMPSON and 
PAMELA K. THOMPSON; ROBERT P. MANNEN and PATRICIA MANNEN; WESLEY R. COTTIER and 
VIRGINIA L. COTTIER; ROBERT C. JOHNSEN; RICHARD A. WILLIAMS and     MILDRED E. WILLIAMS; 
LIETTE BOLDUC GUESMAN and HARLAN E. GUESMAN, SR.; LAYNE EVANS and ROXANNE EVANS; 
and THOMAS L. PARKER, Appellants (Third-Party Defendants),

 

v.

 

WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, 
Appellee(Defendant).

 

                                 

 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Fremont County, The

Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

 

 

Mr. Robert A. Nicholas of 
Nicholas Law Office, Riverton, WY., Representing 
Appellants.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Michael L. 
Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Ron Arnold, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Representing Appellee.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

  * 
Retired November 2, 1998.

 

   
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

  [¶1]       The primary issue in this appeal 
involves the interpretation of two public access fishing easements purchased by 
the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission in 1964. The district court ruled that the 
landowners along the easements must remove all objects and structures from the 
full 50- foot width of the easements. Because we agree that the owner of an 
easement with defined width, length, and location has the right to the area 
unhampered by structures and other objects, we affirm.

 

                              
ISSUES

 

 [¶2]       Appellants present the following 
issues:

 

1. Did the district court err when it concluded that 
a walking fishing easement with a defined width, which grants fishermen a 50 
foot way along the river to walk within to access and fish the river, forecloses 
the servient estate holder from placing, 
planting, or locating any object within that width, irrespective of whether such 
use unreasonably obstructs public access" for fishermen to fish the 
river?

 

When a walking fishing easement creates a 50 foot way 
above the high water line for "access for public fishing," are fishermen 
entitled to an entirely unobstructed continuous 50 foot width - clear of any 
ordinary reasonable developments made by the servient estate, such as a picnic 
table, fire pit, water pump or other innocuous 
installations?

 

2. Was the district court required to consider the 
uncontroverted surrounding circumstances when construing the meaning of the 
easement and the purpose of the designated width?

 

3. Does the grant of access for public fishing" along 
the streams, to a point fifty (50) feet above and beyond the high water line" 
provide sufficient meaning regarding use as to make the easements unmistakably 
clear and unambiguous?

 

4. Did the district court err, as a matter of law, in 
finding each Third-Party Defendant an indispensable party?

 

5. Did the court err in denying Plaintiffs the right 
to a jury trial on issues of fact concerning what property unreasonably 
interfered with fishermen's access to fish the river?

 

6. Did the district [court] err in denying plaintiffs 
declaratory judgment relief and failing to make specific findings on whether or 
not the obstruction still exists and, if so, whether it unreasonably interferes 
with a fisherman's access along the river?

 

[¶3]      Appellee Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission responds with these issues:

 

I. Whether the district court erred in determining 
that the landowners are prohibited from placing structures and other objects on 
the easements in issue in this case.

 

A. 
Did the district court err in determining the written recorded easements were 
clear and unambiguous documents?

 

B. 
Did the district court err as a matter of law by holding that an easement of a 
clearly defined width grants the dominant estate holder the right to use the 
full width of the easement without obstruction?

 

C. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined that extrinsic 
evidence was not necessary to determine the meaning of an unambiguous 
easement?

 

D. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering removal of all objects 
placed on the easements?

 

II. Whether the district court erred in denying a 
trial by jury on those issues demanded in plaintiffs' 
complaint.

 

III. Whether joinder of the third party defendants 
was proper, irrespective of whether they were indispensable 
parties.

 

IV. Whether the landowners have privity to argue the 
position of the original grantors in asking that the easements be altered or 
rescinded.

 

                               
FACTS

 

 [¶4]       In 1964, the Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission (Game and Fish) purchased two fishing easements along the Jakey's 
Fork and Big Wind River in Fremont County near Dubois. The easements were 
purchased from the landowners along the river at the time, the Blehms and the 
Daniels. Acquired for public fishing access, the easements were to Aextend from 
midstream on each of the said streams in both directions to a point fifty (50) 
feet above and beyond the high water line on each side of both of said 
streams."1 The Daniel 
easement included the following clause:

 

It being the intent and purpose of this instrument to 
grant, within the limits specified, public fishing in and to all of the Big Wind 
River insofar as it traverses and is located upon the lands of the Grantors 
whether or not herein specifically mentioned.

 

 [¶5]       After the easements were executed and 
recorded, the Blehms and the Daniels subdivided the property and sold the lots 
to various individuals, including the appellant landowners. Over time, the 
landowners have placed assorted structures and objects within the boundaries of 
the easements including a deck, a trailer, a clothesline, a rock pile, a fire 
pit, a satellite dish, a metal shed, a root cellar, garbage, fences, gardens, 
wood piles, wooden spools, water pumps, and some 50- gallon drums. In 1992, Game 
and Fish requested, by letter, that the landowners remove structures and 
objects, whether fixed or unaffixed, from the entire 50- foot width of the 
easements.

 

 [¶6]       Several of the landowners refused Game 
and Fish's request for removal. In 1995, as landowners, the Lambs, the 
Gerganoffs, and the Millers filed suit seeking, inter alia, a declaration of 
their rights under the easements. Game and Fish answered and moved to join 
similarly situated landowners pursuant to W.R.C.P. 19. Over objection, sixteen 
other landowners were joined as third party defendants. A number of these third 
party defendants sought to avoid the costs of litigation by entering into 
stipulations with Game and Fish. Pursuant to the stipulations, Game and Fish 
agreed not to default the third party defendants, and all agreed to abide by the 
judicial resolution of the case.

 

[¶7]        Cross motions for summary judgment were 
filed. In their summary judgment materials, the landowners offered evidence of 
contemporaneous documents that they claimed established the parties' intent 
regarding the meaning of the easements. Game and Fish argued that the easements 
were unambiguous, and resort to the landowners' parol evidence was thus 
unnecessary. Game and Fish also contended that the public was entitled to 
unfettered access to the full 50 feet of the easements.

 

 [¶8]       The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Game and Fish and entered an amended order on December 15, 
1997, finding that A[t] he two fishing easement documents contain language which 
is clear and unambiguous making resort to extrinsic evidence improper. " On the 
issue of removal of the property from the easements, the district court agreed 
with Game and Fish that A[t] he dominant estate holder of an easement with a 
defined width is entitled to use the full width as a matter of law. " The 
district court ordered the individual landowners to remove the objects from the 
easements except for (1) those items permitted by Game and Fish, and (2) those 
items that pre-dated the easements. The district court also enjoined the 
landowners from placing additional objects on the easements. The order for 
removal was stayed pending this appeal.

 

                            
DISCUSSION

 

 The 
Fishing Easements

 

 [¶9]       Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 275 
(Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56. The undisputed material facts in this case are that 
the landowners have placed structures and other objects within the boundaries of 
the easements. All that is left for our resolution is the interpretation of the 
fishing easements.

 

[W]e derive the meaning of an easement from its 
language, much as we would in the case of a deed or other written agreement. 
Tibbets v. P & M Petroleum Co., 744 P.2d 651, 652-53 (Wyo. 1987); and see 25 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 75 (1966). If the language of the easement 
is not ambiguous and if the intent of the parties can be gathered from its 
language, that should be done as a matter of law. Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 554 (Wyo. 1992); and see Smith v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 857 P.2d 320 
(Wyo. 1993); Tibbets, 744 P.2d  at 653.

 

 Steil v. 
Smith, 901 P.2d 395, 396 (Wyo. 1995).

 

 [¶10]    
The landowners first claim the easements are ambiguous and invite us to 
ascertain the meaning of the easements by resort to parol evidence, including 
depositions from the individuals who negotiated the easements. We decline to do 
so. Only when a easement is ambiguous do we acquire license to construe that 
document by resort to extrinsic 
evidence. Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 854 
(Wyo. 1996). Ambiguity exists where a document Ais obscure in its meaning 
because of indefiniteness of expression or because it contains a double meaning. 
" Martin v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting 
Ferguson v. Reed, 822 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Wyo. 1991)); Kirkwood v. CUNA Mut. Ins. 
Soc., 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997). Subsequent disagreement by parties 
concerning the meaning of a written agreement does not render the agreement 
ambiguous.  Kirkwood, 937 P.2d  at 
209; Examination Management Servs., Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 
1996). Here, the easements clearly specify the location, width, and length of 
the easements.  The purpose of the 
easements is also clear: for public fishing access. We find no obscurity, 
indefiniteness, or double meaning in these easements. Rather, the parties' 
dispute is one over the meaning of the easements.

 

 [¶11]    
Having concluded that the easements in question are unambiguous, we must 
next determine the extent of the parties' rights under the easements. The 
landowners contend that the easements should be limited to the area reasonably 
necessary to walk along the river and fish. We do not agree. Generally, the 
owner of an easement has the right to the area or strip having definite 
boundaries unhampered by structures and objects placed thereon.  Flower v. Valentine, 482 N.E.2d 682, 687 
(Ill. App. 1985); Diefenderfer v. Forest Park Springs, 599 So. 2d 1309, 1313 
(Fla. App. 1992); Squaw Peak Community Covenant Church of Phoenix v. Anozira 
Dev., Inc., 719 P.2d 295, 299 (Ariz. App. 1986); 28A C. J. S. Easements § 178 
(1996). This rule applies even when the structures do not obstruct" the easement 
holder's use of the easement, Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Waikiki 
Business Plaza, Inc., 719 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Haw. App. 1986), and what is 
reasonable or necessary is not decisive. Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown 
Properties, Inc., 561 P.2d 818, 822-23 (Kan. 1977); Squaw Peak Community 
Covenant Church of Phoenix, 719 P.2d  at 299.

 

 [¶12]    
The rationale for the foregoing rule was summarized in Wilomay Holding 
Co. v. McCoy, 142 A.2d 667, 673 (N. J. Super. A. D. 1958), a case involving a 
10- foot easement for passage, by foot, to a lake. On appeal, the New Jersey 
court affirmed a trial court order that the servient estate holder remove a 
bungalow that had been built over a portion of the easement.  Rejecting the argument that the width of 
the right of way should be limited to what is reasonably necessary for passing, 
the court wrote:

 

Defendants' argument that the language of the 
reservation should be construed to mean that the 10- foot strip south of the XY 
line can be obstructed by bungalows as long as enough of the strip is left open 
so that the upland owners can get to the lake shore, is not persuasive. Pursued 
to its logical extreme, this argument would permit a continuing number of such 
obstructions, and it would be difficult to draw the line as to when the total 
number of bungalows on the strip would have become so numerous that the 
remaining unobstructed portion could no longer be regarded as furnishing 
reasonable access to the lake. When such a degree of obstruction is reached how 
could the holders of the easement have an effective remedy? Which obstructions 
would be subject to removal?

 

 Id. at 
674.

 

 [¶13]    
The landowners attempt to distinguish their case by arguing that the 
instant "walking fishing" easements are substantively different from roadway 
easements, thus deserving special consideration.  However, their argument fails to 
recognize case law extending the rule to easements similar to the fishing 
easements before this court. See Flower v. Valentine, 482 N.E.2d 682 (walking 
easement for beach access); Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Waikiki Business 
Plaza, Inc., 719 P.2d 1119 (pedestrian passageway). For example, Flower v. 
Valentine, involved a 15- foot walking easement for beach access. When the 
parties quarreled over the extent of the easement, the Illinois court invoked 
the general rule that the easement holder "has the right to use the full width 
of the area or strip having definite boundaries unhampered by obstructions 
placed thereon. " 482 N.E.2d  at 687. The Illinois court recognized that natural 
obstructions such as bushes and trees which existed at the time of the grant of 
the easement and were not placed there by the owner of the servient estate have 
been recognized as an exception to this rule. " Id. The court also acknowledged 
that any obstructions erected prior to the grant should not be removed. Id. In 
the present case, the district court applied these general principles when it 
made its ruling.

 

 [¶14]    
Because the length, width, and location of the easements are defined with 
specificity, the district court did not err in concluding that the landowners 
must remove the structures and other objects from the easements. Our ruling 
should not be read to preclude the landowners from using their land within the 
easements in any manner consistent with the purpose of the fishing easements. 
Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 730 (Wyo. 1976). However, appropriate use 
does not include the placement of permanent structures and other objects. If the 
landowners were permitted to do so, they would be given license to retake the 
easements in a piecemeal fashion. We will not permit such a result. The district 
court's entry of summary judgment and order of removal is 
affirmed.

 

 Joinder 
of Third Party Defendants

 

 [¶15]    
The third party defendant landowners argue they should not have been 
joined as parties to this declaratory action. We disagree.

 

 [¶16]    
Under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, joinder of parties is 
governed by Rule 19 and Rule 20. Rule 20, not relied upon in this case, is 
entitled "Permissive joinder of parties." Rule 19 encompasses "[j]oinder of persons needed for [a] just 
adjudication."2 In performing a joinder analysis 
under Rule 19, a court must first determine if the person in question meets the 
criteria contained in Rule 19(a).  
See Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, 
§ 1604, pp. 40-42 (1986). If so, the person is considered a person to be joined 
if feasible. " In cases where joinder is not feasible, the court must then 
examine the four considerations described in Rule 19(b) to determine whether in 
equity and good conscience" the action should proceed. Id. If, in equity and 
good conscience, the action cannot proceed without the person in question, that 
person is considered indispensable and must be joined or dismissal will result. 
Rule 19(b); Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B. V., 762 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 1988); Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330, 332 (Wyo. 
1983).

 

 [¶17]    
In this case, we need not reach the issue of whether the third party 
defendants are indispensable parties under Rule 19(b). We would need to perform 
this analysis only if, after finding a person to be joined if feasible, " the 
claimed indispensable party had not been joined. Because the third party 
defendants were joined in this case, we need only determine if these persons 
meet the criteria contained in Rule 19(a).

 

 [¶18]    
We agree that the third party defendants are persons to be joined if 
feasible" under Rule 19(a), and their joinder was thus proper. Tracking the 
language of Rule 19(a)(2)(i), it is clear that an adjudication in the absence of 
the third party defendants would have, as a practical matter, impaired or 
impeded their ability to protect their interests. The third party defendants 
tell us that, under the declaratory judgment act, no declaration shall prejudice 
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. " Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 1-37-113 
(Lexis 1999).  Relying on this 
statute, they argue that, because they cannot be affected by any declaratory 
judgment rendered in their absence, their ability to protect their interests 
could not be affected by their nonjoinder.

 

 [¶19]    
"Courts in actions seeking declaratory relief should attempt to join 
absentees whose joinder is feasible whenever their interests may be affected by 
the outcome or their presence is needed to adjudicate the dispute effectively. " 
Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1616, p. 
240.  While we agree with the third 
party defendants that no declaration would be binding, in the technical sense, 
in their absence, we must examine practical, not merely legal, impairment of 
non-parties' interests. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 108, 88 S. Ct. 733, 737, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1968). As a 
practical matter, the ability of the third party landowners to protect their 
interests would surely be impeded by a judgment rendered in their absence. 
First, as a legal matter, the third party defendants, if not joined, might have 
been subject to the preclusive doctrine of collateral estoppel in future 
litigation over the interpretation of the easements. See Atchison v. State of 
Wyo., 763 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir. 1985) (affirming Wyoming Federal 
District Court decision that concluded that Wyoming would not, if faced with the 
question, require the parties be identical before applying the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel). Even if this preclusive doctrine did not apply, pragmatism 
tells us it is unlikely that the district court would be willing to alter its 
interpretation of the easements in later lawsuits. Given these concerns, it is 
clear that the third party defendants' interests may have been impaired or 
impeded by a judgment rendered in their absence. We hold that the district 
court's joinder of the third party defendants was proper under W.R.C.P. 
19(a).

 

 Right to 
Jury Trial

 

 [¶20]    
Because the district court properly determined that the landowners' 
declaratory action was appropriate for resolution at summary judgment, we need 
not address the issue of whether the landowners were entitled to a trial by 
jury. The issue is moot.  Shisler v. 
Town of Jackson, 890 P.2d 555, 558 (Wyo. 1995).

 

 [¶21]    
The  decision of the district 
court is affirmed.

 

  

FOOTNOTES

1The 
easement purchased from the Blehms includes the and beyond" language while the 
Daniels easement does not. Also, both easements grant access to only one side of 
the stream at various locations. 

 

2Rule 19, 
W.R.C.P. provides:

 

   Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed 
for just adjudication.

 

(a) 
Persons to be joined if feasible. - A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 
as a party in the action if:

(1) in 
the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties; or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's 
absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to 
protect that interest; or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so 
joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a 
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party 
objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action 
improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.

 

(b) 
Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible.  If a person as described 
in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall 
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court 
include:

 

(1) To 
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to 
the person or those already parties;

 

(2) The 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of 
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided;

 

     (3) Whether a judgment 
rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;

 

     (4) Whether the 
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder.