Case Title: STATE HWY COMM N v DUNKS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 12712 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 THE STATE OF MONTANA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellant, WILLIAM L . DUNKS and CHARLOTTE M . DUNKS, husband and wife, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Jack A . Holstrom argued, Helena, Montana Harry C . Alley and Leo J. Kottas, J r . , Helena, Montana For Respondents: Burgess, Joyce, Prothero, Whelan and O'~eary, Butte, Montana Robert T . O'Leary argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: November 19, 1974 Decided : FEB 1 3 1.975 Filed: FFF - - * ";75 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the d i s t r i c t court, Jefferson County, granting a m i s t r i a l . The o r i g i n a l action was brought by the State Highway Commission f o r the condemnation of c e r t a i n land owned by William L. Dunks and Charlotte M. Dunks. On August 23, 1973, the jury returned a verdict i n the amount of $35,000. That jury consisted of twelve men and women, plus one a l t e r n a t e juror, Irene Buhl. It was not established with c e r t a i n t y when the jury began i t s deliberation, but when i t did Irene Buhl went i n t o the jury room with the regular members of the jury. It was a l s o not established precisely how long she was i n the jury room and exactly a t what time the b a i l i f f removed her. It i s c e r t a i n t h a t it a l l took place between 1 1 a.m. and 1 2 noon. The State Highway Commission claims Irene Buhl was i n t h e jury room f o r only f i v e t o ten minutes. Dunks claim the time was more l i k e twenty t o t h i r t y minutes. After Mrs. Buhl was removed from the jury room, she went t o lunch with the jury members and s a t with them during lunch. After lunch, she s a t outside the jury room with the b a i l i f f . The evidence does not indicate how long it was a f t e r the return from lunch be- fore the jury returned the verdict. In t h e i r b r i e f Dunks s t a t e it was "shortly thereafter". N o one i s c e r t a i n what went on i n the jury room while Irene Buhl was present. The State Highway Commission submitted t o the court an a f f i d a v i t from t h e foreman of the jury which s t a t e s i n part: "* * * Irene L. Buhl, the a l t e r n a t e juror, s a t i n only a few minutes i n the jury room when the jury r e t i r e d around 11:30 a.m., and t h a t Mrs. Buhl, i n no way participated i n any discussion o r delibera- t i o n concerning the a c t u a l above-entitled case a s the jury was dismissed f o r lunch, and when the jury returned from lunch she had been excused from the jury panel. "2. The Affiant further s t a t e s t h a t t o the best of h i s information and believe the presences of Mrs. Buhl, the a l t e r n a t e juror i n no way prejudiced o r i n any way seriously caused i n j u s t i c e t o t h e defendants. I I The b a i l i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t he could not hear what went on while Irene Buhl was i n the jury room, but he thought they talked about going t o lunch. After the return of the verdict, defendant Dunks moved f o r a m i s t r i a l because Mrs. Buhl had been i n the jury room during part of t h e deliberations. The court, a f t e r a hearing on the motion, granted the motion f o r mistrial. From t h a t order the Highway Commission appeals and assigns three issues f o r review. However, we a r e of the opinion t h a t a l l three issues can be resolved by answering t h e f i r s t issue: "Whether the ~ e s p o n d e n t s ' Motion f o r a N e w T r i a l , granted by an Order of the presiding t r i a l Judge, dated the 17th day of October, 1973, was a manifest abuse of discretion?" I n reviewing jury deliberation cases it can readily be seen the solemnity placed on such deliberations by the judiciary and the legislature. Once the jury r e t i r e s t o the jury room, the judge i s not permitted t o t a l k t o the jury d i r e c t l y without the presence of both counsel. Section 93-5106, R.C.M. 1947; United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, cert.den. 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1016, 10 L ed 2d 12. Neither i s the b a i l i f f allowed t o communicate with the jury except t o ask i f two-thirds of them have reached a deci- sion. Section 93-5105, R.C.M. 1947. N o w we a r e called upon t o decide i f it be e r r o r t o have an a l t e r n a t e juror communicate with the jury a f t e r it has r e t i r e d . Appellant Commission submitted an a f f i d a v i t from the foreman of the jury t o the e f f e c t t h a t Irene Buhl did not deliberate i n the case, and her presence i n no way prejudiced respondents. W e cannot allow t h a t t o be the deciding factor. The foreman does not necessarily know a l l t h a t was said i n the jury room and what pre- j u d i c i a l e f f e c t it might have had on the other jury members. H e cannot guarantee Irene Buhl did not somehow influence a jury member other than himself. Respondents c i t e several cases which support the proposition t h a t an a l t e r n a t e juror i n the jury room a t the time of deliberations i s reversible e r r o r : People v. King, 216 N.Y.S.2d 638; People v. Britton, 4 Cal.2d 622, 52 P.2d 217; People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal.App. 2d 75, 40 P.2d 891; Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa.Super. 516, 67 A.2d 746. Appellant points out t h a t a l l the above c i t e d cases a r e criminal cases, therefore they a r e not applicable t o the i n s t a n t case. With t h a t argument we cannot concur. It i s t r u e l e g a l principles have been applied l e s s s t r i n g e n t l y t o c i v i l j u r i e s than criminal j u r i e s , however, we cannot conclude t h a t there i s a double standard t h a t can be applied t o the s a n c t i t y of a j u r y ' s delibera- tions based on criminal o r c i v i l process. There a r e c i v i l cases dealing with m i s t r i a l s because of the number of jurors participating i n the deliberation. City of F l a t - I Rivet v. Edgar, (Mf.'i"~67), 412 S.W.2d 537, d e a l t with two jurors who because of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s convictions, refused t o join the jury deliberations. The court held t h e defendant i n t h a t case did not receive a f a i r t r i a l . Johnson v. Holzemer, 263 Minn. 227, 116 N.W.2d 673, concerned a verdict reached by the jury a f t e r a juror, unable t o perform her duties a s a juror, was dismissed and no a l t e r n a t e juror replaced her. There the court held the verdict was void. True, these cases concern fewer than the required number of jurors deliberating, r a t h e r than more, however they do i l l u s t r a t e the importance of having the required number of jurors during deliberation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court i n Schankweiler v. Penn.Lighting Co., 275 Pa.50, 118 A. 562, i n deciding what constituted interference with the jury decision making function, stated: "That confidence i n t r i a l by jury may be preserved, and t h a t p a r t i e s may f e e l a verdict i s based on an honest consideration of the evidence * * * every appearance of e v i l must be avoided, and every precaution taken t o guard against a l l matters tending i n the s l i g h t e s t degree t o corrupt o r influence the verdict. * * *" Rule 47(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides i n pertinent part: "* * * A n a l t e r n a t e juror s h a l l not join the jury i n i t s deliberation unless called upon by the court t o replace a member of the jury.9~ * *" Here, the a l t e r n a t e juror was not c a l l e d on t o replace a member of the jury. The evidence i n t h i s matter i s i n c o n f l i c t regarding t h e time spent i n the jury room by the a l t e r n a t e juror. The jury foreman has offered an opinion that no harm was done. These a r e not the con- t r o l l i n g considerations. Public policy, a s stated by the Pennsylvania Court, requires t h a t t o maintain confidence i n the jury system I I every appearance of e v i l must be avoided, and every precaution taken t o guard against a l l matters tending i n the s l i g h t e s t degree t o corrupt or influence the verdict." (Emphasis added) I f unauthorized persons i n t e r f e r e with t h i s process we a r e not a t l i b e r t y t o make a r b i t r a r y exceptions based on time, a c t u a l harm, nor the f a c t t h a t during the t r i a l the person involved was a sworn a l t e r n a t e juror. I f such were the case we would soon damage the solemnity associated with t h e jury system and loss of f a i t h i n i t s usefulness would soon follow. The t r i a l judge did not abuse h i s discretion. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. J u s t i c e W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e J .................................... Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, dissenting: I would reverse the order granting defendants a new trial and r e i n s t a t e the jury verdict. This r e s u l t i s based on two grounds: (1) waiver; (2) harmless e r r o r . After discovery and removal of the a l t e r n a t e juror from the jury room, defendants w i t h f u l l knowledge thereof did not move f o r a m i s t r i a l . Instead, defendants permitted the jury t o continue i t s deliberations and return i t s verdict without objection. When the verdict was not t o t h e i r l i k i n g , they moved f o r a new t r i a l 22 days l a t e r . Defendants a r e not e n t i t l e d t o have t h e i r cake and e a t i t too. The record i s barren of any objection by defendants between the time of discovery of the presence of the a l t e r n a t e juror i n the jury room and the time defendants moved f o r a new t r i a l . They did not object when the jury returned i t s unanimous verdict i n open court on August 23. They did not object p r i o r t o entry of judgment on the verdict on September 5. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' f i r s t objection was t h e i r motion f o r new t r i a l on September 14. Objections involving i r r e g u l a r i t e s i n jury proceedings known t o a party a t the time and not objected t o a r e waived; they cannot be raised f o r the f i r s t time upon motion f o r a new t r i a l following an adverse jury verdict. Seder v. Peter Kiewit sons' Company, 156 Mont. 322, 479 P.2d 448. Additionally, I believe the e r r o r was harmless under the circumstances of t h i s case. N o prejudice t o defendants i s indicated except an unfavorable verdict. The verdict was unanimous. The insignificance of the e r r o r i s demonstrated more eloquently than a thousand words by defendants' f a i l u r e t o object o r move f o r a m i s t r i a l . The majority hold t h a t the presence of the a l t e r n a t e juror i n the jury room i n i t s e l f is reversible error. I disagree with t h i s blanket holding. I I A new t r i a l can be granted only f o r an e r r o r materially affecting the substantial r i g h t s " of the aggrieved party. Section 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947. Prejudice i s never presumed but must a f f i r m a t i v e l appear. Martello v. Darlow e t a l . , 151 Mont. 232, 441 P.2d 175; Conway v. Fabian, 108 Mont. 287, 89 P.2d 1022. The e r r o r must be of such character t h a t r e f u s a l t o grant a new t r i a l "appears t o the court inconsistent with substantial justice". Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P. In m y view, none of these requirements f o r a new t r i a l i s present i n t h i s case. A prima f a c i e case of manifest abuse of discretion i n awarding a new t r i a l i s made by discrediting the grounds specified f o r a new t r i a l o r showing t h a t existing e r r o r did not materially a f f e c t the substantial r i g h t s of the moving party. Tigh v. College Park Realty, 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57. Such i s the case here, i n m y opinion. For these reasons, I m u l d deny defendants a new t r i a l and r e i n s t a t e the jury verdict and judgment entered thereon. Justice.