Case Title: State v. Miller

Citation: 668 S.W.2d 281

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1984-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
668 S.W.2d 281 (1984) STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny MILLER, Petitioner-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. March 26, 1984. Wayne E. Uhl, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant; William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., of counsel. William S. Waggoner, Knoxville, for petitioner-appellee. BROCK, Justice. Petitioner, Danny Miller, was convicted of the offense of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment; he appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals where his conviction was affirmed and thereafter he sought discretionary review in this Court which was denied. Miller then filed the instant proceeding seeking post conviction relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, T.C.A., § 40-30-101, et seq. The trial court denied such relief but, upon appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that petitioner had been denied the right to counsel in the proceedings resulting in his conviction and that the error was prejudicial, requiring that his conviction be set aside and a new trial awarded. We granted the State's request for review of that decision. The name of the petitioner is Danny Miller; he has no middle name or initial. At the time of petitioner's arraignment upon the charge of criminal sexual conduct it *282 was discovered that he was misnamed in the indictment as "Danny Ray Miller." At the same time another person named "Danny Ray Miller" was in custody in Knox County awaiting trial on different charges. When this petitioner, Danny Miller, was brought before criminal court judge George P. Balitsaris on April 20, 1979, to be arraigned upon the criminal sexual conduct charge the Assistant District Attorney informed the court that two men named Danny Miller were awaiting trial in that court, whereupon, the court passed the arraignment of the petitioner over to May 4, 1979, to allow the Assistant District Attorney to clear up the confusion respecting the defendant's identity. At the appointed time on May 4, 1979, the petitioner, without counsel, appeared before the court again for his arraignment at which time a dialogue developed during which the petitioner made statements which were later brought out on his cross-examination at trial by the prosecuting attorney in an effort to disparage the petitioner's credibility as a witness. That dialogue at arraignment follows: Thus, counsel was appointed to represent the petitioner in the criminal case and he was properly arraigned, tried and found guilty as above stated. During the trial of the criminal case the prosecutor cross examined the petitioner extensively respecting the above quoted dialogue. That cross examination is as follows: In this post conviction proceeding the petitioner contends that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel, in that, counsel had not been appointed for him at the time the trial judge elicited answers from him at his arraignment which were later used to impeach him on cross-examination at his trial.[1] The State contends that the petitioner's claim that he has suffered a denial of counsel is foreclosed by T.C.A., §§ 40-30-111 and 40-30-112, which provide that post conviction relief may not be granted upon any ground that has been waived or previously determined. T.C.A., § 40-30-112, provides as follows: The State contends that the petitioner had the opportunity during the trial and appellate proceedings in his criminal case to raise the issue which he now seeks to raise in this proceeding for post conviction relief and, therefore, that to the extent that he failed to do so he has waived the right to now insist that he suffered a denial of counsel in those criminal proceedings. We agree. In his criminal trial the petitioner through his attorney did, in fact, object to that portion of the prosecutor's cross examination of the petitioner respecting the dialogue that occurred at arraignment between petitioner and the court in the attempt to ascertain his true identity. Counsel's objections were either general in nature or made upon the ground that the matters attempted to be brought out were irrelevant. Then, upon direct appeal, the petitioner, in the Court of Criminal Appeals, again insisted that the cross examination of petitioner at trial was improper, irrelevant and prejudicial to petitioner's rights. The Court of Criminal Appeals considered this issue and concluded that no prejudicial error was shown, concluding that petitioner at the arraignment hearing had attempted to mislead the trial judge respecting his identity "... by falsely denying that he was the proper defendant before the court," and, thus, that it was fair and relevant for the State to cross examine him about this matter at trial. It is true that the petitioner at his trial and upon direct appeal from his conviction in the criminal case did not characterize his claim of error as constituting a "denial of counsel" as he now attempts to do. However, it is not permissible for a defendant in a criminal case to object to the introduction of evidence at his trial upon one ground, deemed by him to be proper, and then, later in a proceeding for post conviction relief, to assert that admission of the evidence complained of violated a constitutional right; failure to assert the constitutional ground at trial must be held to constitute a waiver of the right to make such an objection. We reaffirm the statement made by Justice McCanless, speaking for the Court, in Arthur v. State, Tenn., 483 S.W.2d 95 (1972), to wit: The court also noted in that case that We agree. Although the petitioner in this proceeding has couched his claim of error in terms of "denial of counsel," the real nature of his claim is that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to cross examine him at trial about statements he made at his arraignment hearing because he was not at that time represented by counsel. His problem is, *286 however, that he had his chance to make that very objection and argument before the trial judge and, later, before the Court of Criminal Appeals but failed to do so, couching his objection, instead, in non-specific terms, such as "Objection, your Honor," or that the arraignment dialogue was "not relevant." If the trial judge committed error in permitting the petitioner to be cross examined respecting the arraignment dialogue, it was error that could and should have been asserted in the criminal case; it was not error of the type that may be presented by a post conviction relief proceeding. In this connection we note that the attorney who represented the petitioner at the trial of his criminal case has been determined by the trial court and by the Court of Criminal Appeals to have rendered competent assistance in that capacity and, further, that no question of competence has been raised concerning the representation of the attorney who represented the petitioner on the appeal from his criminal conviction. In determining the issue of waiver against the petitioner, we have assumed, but have not decided, that petitioner had a constitutional right to be represented by counsel at the time of his dialogue at the arraignment. As the State has suggested, it may well be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have counsel appointed the instant he walks through the door into the courtroom and while the court is engaged in an effort to ascertain his identity and his indigency status in order that counsel may be appointed for him. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed. Costs incurred upon appeal are taxed against the appellee. FONES, C.J., and COOPER, HARBISON, and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. [1] Petitioner also asserted as ground for post conviction relief that the attorney who represented him at his trial gave ineffective assistance, in that, he did not secure a continuance and did not subpoena certain telephone records. This issue, the alleged inefficiency of appointed counsel, was determined against the petitioner by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and is not raised in this Court.