Case Title: Thomas v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 27S02-1703-CR-170

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2017-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
William T. Myers 
Grant County Public Defender 
Marion, Indiana 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Larry D. Allen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 27S02-1703-CR-170 
WILL THOMAS, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the Grant Superior Court, No. 27D01-1404-FA-5 
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 27A02-1602-CR-374 
 
September 7, 2017 
David, Justice. 
Will Thomas was found guilty of Class A felony dealing in a narcotic drug, and now 
appeals his conviction under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  For the 
reasons discussed herein, we find Thomas’s arrest was lawful and the evidence recovered was 
admissible.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conviction.    
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Sep 07 2017, 3:50 pm
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Facts and Procedural History 
 
This case arose from an arrest for dealing in narcotic drugs.  On April 7, 2014, the Joint 
Effort Against Narcotics (“JEAN”) Team Drug Task Force, which included officers from the 
City of Marion Police Department and the Grant County Sheriff’s Office, received a tip from a 
credible confidential informant that two men from Chicago were travelling to Grant County to 
sell drugs.  The informant told JEAN officers that the two men were driving a white minivan 
with a temporary Illinois license plate, and could be found at the Comfort Suites in Marion, 
Indiana. 
Upon receiving this information, Detective Mark Stefanatos (“Detective Stefanatos”) 
began surveillance of a Dodge Caravan that fit the confidential informant’s description.  While 
there, he observed two men, later identified as Will Thomas and Byron Christmas, enter the 
vehicle and drive away. 
 
Detective Stefanatos followed the van and observed it illegally change lanes without 
properly signaling.  Detective Stefanatos then called for a uniformed police officer, Joseph 
Martin (“Officer Martin”), to initiate a traffic stop.  He also called for a canine unit on the scene, 
which arrived within a minute or two.   
 
Officer Martin initiated the stop and approached the vehicle with Detective Stefanatos.  
Officer Martin walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle and spoke with Christmas while 
Detective Stefanatos spoke with Thomas, who was sitting in the front passenger seat.  The 
officers tried to verify each man’s identity and their reason for travelling through Marion, 
Indiana.  Both Thomas and Christmas told officers that they were visiting family, but neither 
man could identify where in Indiana their respective family members lived.  Furthermore, the 
driver, Christmas, was unable to present officers with any form of identification and claimed he 
left his driver’s license in Chicago. 
 
Simultaneous to the traffic stop, officers ran a certified narcotics canine around the 
vehicle with the occupants still inside.  The officers first brought the canine to the vehicle’s rear 
bumper and had it sniff along the driver’s side.  When the canine reached the driver’s door, it 
alerted officers to the presence of narcotics.  Officers removed Thomas and Christmas from the 
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vehicle and conducted a pat-down search for officer safety.  No drugs or weapons were found in 
the course of the pat-down.   
Christmas then gave officers permission to search the vehicle.  The canine was brought 
into the vehicle’s interior, but it no longer detected the presence of narcotics.  No narcotics or 
contraband were found in a subsequent search of the vehicle’s interior.  Officers did not bring the 
narcotics detection canine around the suspects because the canine was also trained as an 
apprehension dog.  Bringing the dog around the suspects ran the risk of causing them injury if 
either of the suspects turned out to possess contraband.   
Christmas and Thomas were each asked whether they would consent to a strip search at 
the police station.  Christmas agreed and was transported to the county jail where no drugs were 
found on his person.  Officers did, however, find Christmas had $750 in cash.  Thomas, on the 
other hand, declined the search.  Given Thomas’s refusal to consent, officers applied for a search 
warrant.  In the meantime, they transported Thomas to the Marion Police Station where he would 
await the results of the search warrant request.  Officers said they transported Thomas because 
they preferred to conduct the search somewhere other than a public roadway.  They also 
expressed concern about the destruction of evidence if Thomas were not transported to the police 
station. 
Upon arrival at the station, Thomas was placed in an interview room, which was 
equipped with video monitoring equipment.  Officers left Thomas alone in the room and 
continued to observe him remotely.  Moments later, Thomas was seen removing something from 
his jacket pocket and placing it in his mouth.  Officers re-entered the room to retrieve what 
Thomas had placed in his mouth.  When Thomas refused to comply, officers forced his mouth 
open and retrieved a small plastic baggie containing 8.5 grams of a gray, crumbly, rock-like 
substance.  The substance later tested positive for heroin. 
  Thomas was charged with Class A felony dealing in a narcotic drug and Class B 
misdemeanor battery.  Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress evidence recovered at the police 
station, alleging officers lacked probable cause to detain him.  The trial court denied Thomas’s 
motion.  After a two-day jury trial, Thomas was found guilty of dealing in a narcotic drug, but 
not guilty of battery.  Thomas appealed.    
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In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed Thomas’s conviction, finding that 
police violated Thomas’s Fourth Amendment rights when they detained and transported him to 
the police station to await a search warrant.  Thomas v. State, 65 N.E.3d 1096, 1103 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2016), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 2017 WL 1160999 (Ind. Mar. 23, 2017).  The 
Court of Appeals further found that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained 
during that detention.  Id.     
The State then sought transfer.  Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A), we granted 
transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion.             
Standard of Review 
Thomas did not seek interlocutory review of the trial court’s denial of the suppression 
motion; instead, the matter proceeded to trial.  Thus, we consider this appeal a request to review 
the trial court’s decision to admit evidence.  Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) 
(citing Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014)).  The trial court has broad discretion to 
rule on the admissibility of evidence.  Guilmette, 14 N.E.3d at 40.  Rulings on the admissibility 
of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and ordinarily reversed when admission is 
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.  Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 
386, 390 (Ind. 1997).  However, when a challenge to such a ruling is predicated on the 
constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013) (internal citations omitted).       
Discussion 
 
Thomas does not dispute the legality of most activities carried out by law enforcement on 
the day of his arrest.  As a starting point, he agrees officers initiated a lawful traffic stop for 
failure to signal while changing lanes.  Thomas also concedes the legality of the canine unit’s 
use, the search of the vehicle’s interior, and the brief detention on the side of the road, which 
included a pat-down search. 
 
Instead, Thomas argues that officers lacked probable cause to transport him to the police 
station because, although a positive canine alert undoubtedly gives officers probable cause to 
search a vehicle, it does not create probable cause to search any of the vehicle’s occupants or to 
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detain them.  Thomas argues that when he was taken to the police station and placed in an 
interrogation room, he was being held in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; therefore, 
any evidence recovered should be deemed inadmissible.    
The State disagrees, arguing that the canine’s positive alert, when coupled with the 
subsequent “ruling out” of the vehicle, provided officers with the probable cause they needed to 
detain both occupants.  Thus, according to the State, when Thomas was observed placing the 
contraband in his mouth, he was lawfully detained and any evidence recovered in that instance 
was properly admitted.   
As an initial matter, we note that Thomas’s argument is partly misplaced.  Whether 
probable cause to search the vehicle gave officers probable cause to search the occupants is 
irrelevant.  Aside from a roadside pat-down that Thomas concedes was lawfully administered, 
Thomas was not searched.  The contraband that officers recovered, which Thomas now claims 
was inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, was observed by officers while Thomas was being 
held in the interrogation room.  Thus, the pertinent question is more accurately framed as 
whether probable cause to detain Thomas and transport him to the police station arose at any 
point during the traffic stop.  However, before we make that determination, we must first 
dispense with whether, at the time Thomas placed the baggie in his mouth, he was in custody for 
purposes of our analysis.   
I. 
Thomas was in custody when he was transported to the police station. 
An arrest arises when the taking or seizure of a person occurs in a way that deprives, 
interrupts, or restricts the person of her liberty or freedom of movement.  Sears v. State, 668 
N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. 1996); Armstrong v. State, 429 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. 1982).  Determining 
whether a person was in custody or deprived of her freedom requires an inquiry into whether 
there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement to a degree associated with a 
formal arrest.  Luna v. State, 788 N.E.2d 832, 833 (Ind. 2003) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).  The inquiry utilizes an objective test that asks whether a reasonable 
person under the same or similar circumstances would believe she was not free to resist the 
entreaties of the police.  Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. 2006). 
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Here, Thomas was first asked whether he was willing to consent to a strip search.  When 
he declined to give consent, officers informed Thomas that if he declined, he would be 
transported to the police station to await the results of a search warrant request.  The record 
makes clear Thomas was given only two choices: either 1) consent to the strip search, or 2) be 
detained at the police station until a judge made a determination on the search warrant.  No 
reasonable person under those circumstances would believe a third choice was available: one in 
which he was free to walk away from police officers at will.  Accordingly, we find that when 
Thomas was transported from the scene of a lawful traffic stop to await the results of a search 
warrant request at a police station, he was in custody. 
II. 
Thomas was lawfully detained when officers observed him placing a plastic baggie 
in his mouth. 
Given the nature of the encounter between Thomas and officers, we turn to the Fourth 
Amendment, which regulates all nonconsensual encounters between citizens and law 
enforcement officials.  Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2003).  The Fourth 
Amendment guarantees that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).  The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies not only to searches and seizures of property, but also to physical 
apprehension of persons, such as arrests.  Roberts v. State, 599 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. 1992).  In 
general, police must have a warrant to make an arrest.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
136 (2009).  An officer may, however, arrest a suspect without a warrant if he observes the 
suspect committing a crime, or if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has 
committed a felony.  Sears, 668 N.E.2d at 666-67 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 417 U.S. 1, 7 
(1985)).  Officers here did not observe Thomas or Christmas in possession of contraband and a 
search of the vehicle’s interior turned up empty.  Thus, to lawfully seize Thomas at the traffic 
stop, transport him to the police station, and detain him in the interrogation room pending the 
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search warrant request results, officers needed probable cause to believe he possessed 
contraband.1   
 
Probable cause to arrest arises when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has 
knowledge of facts and circumstances, which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to 
believe that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.  Sears, 668 N.E.2d at 667 
(citing Green v. State, 461 N.E.2d 108, 112 (Ind. 1984).  The amount of evidence necessary to 
satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless arrest is evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.  Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 536 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1078 (1998).  Rather than requiring a precise mathematical computation, probable cause is 
grounded in notions of common sense.  Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. 1998) (citing 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-36 (1983)).  
 
To determine whether probable cause arose at any point during the traffic stop, we first 
turn to guidance from the ultimate authority on federal constitutional matters: the United States 
Supreme Court.  The parties direct our attention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s case in Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).  Unfortunately, we find that neither Pringle, nor any other 
Supreme Court case discussing probable cause, address the precise facts presented in this case – 
i.e., where suspects are detained after a trained canine alerts to the presence of narcotics in a 
vehicle while the suspects are inside, the suspects are removed, and an interior search of the 
vehicle is fruitless.     
In Pringle, police conducted a lawful traffic stop for speeding, and officers were given 
consent to search the vehicle.  Id. at 368.  But unlike the case at bar, officers in Pringle actually 
found cocaine and cash in the glove compartment.  Id.  Police arrested all three occupants – the 
driver and two passengers.  Id. at 368-69.  The question the Court faced was whether the 
defendant’s mere presence in the vehicle as a passenger created probable cause to believe he had 
committed a crime.  The Court said yes, finding “it an entirely reasonable inference from these 
                                                          
 
1 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that a search incident to an arrest is permissible where the arrest is 
lawful.  Sears, 668 N.E.2d at 666.  Presumably, officers could have searched Thomas upon arrest, after establishing 
probable cause.  But for reasons we will not attempt to rationalize, officers chose not to conduct a search incident to 
arrest.  Instead, they sought to legitimize their search in the eyes of the law by obtaining a search warrant.  Thus, the 
only question before us is whether, at the time Thomas was detained in the interrogation room, such detention was 
lawful – in other words, supported by probable cause.   
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facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control 
over, the cocaine.”  Id. at 372.  While Pringle does not directly answer the question presented 
here, its holding is helpful to the extent that it instructs us that officers may arrest any and all 
occupants of a vehicle, provided probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed.2  
We take the principles espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court and we seek further guidance in our 
own state’s precedent to determine whether probable cause existed.   
In searching through our own jurisprudence, we find our Court has also not yet addressed 
the question directly.  The closest we came to addressing the question was in State v. Hobbs, 933 
N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010), where we cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent, but only to hold 
that a dog sniff on a vehicle was not a “search” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  That is not quite the question we now confront.   
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has addressed the question twice, although in 
each instance they have reached opposite results.  The latest decision on the issue happens to be 
the case before us.  There, the Court of Appeals cited a lack of probable cause for the arrest as 
the reason for finding the evidence inadmissible.  Prior to that, in Richard v. State, 7 N.E.3d 347, 
349-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), our Court of Appeals found that probable cause existed.   
The facts in Richard are substantially similar to the ones presented here.  Officers 
conducted a traffic stop when they observed a vehicle in front of them repeatedly cross the center 
line.  Id. at 348.  Two occupants were seated in the front of the vehicle – Christopher Fields was 
in the driver’s seat and the defendant, Charla Richard, sat in the passenger side.  Id.  Officers 
recognized both occupants and arrested Fields on the basis of an outstanding warrant.  Id.  Then, 
with Richard still seated inside, a canine trained in narcotics detection was passed around the 
vehicle and it alerted officers to the presence of narcotics near the driver’s door.  Id.  Officers 
asked Richard to exit the vehicle and they conducted a search.  Id.  As they searched, officers 
noticed Richard favored one side.  Id.  When she was asked to raise her right arm, a small tin 
containing meth fell out of her shirt and onto the ground.  Id.  Richard was arrested and she 
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search under both the federal and state 
constitution.  Id.  The trial court denied the motion, and she was subsequently convicted.  Id.  
                                                          
 
2 An exception to this rule is where one occupant is “singled out” as the culprit.  In such a scenario, probable cause 
to search and seize other vehicle occupants may not exist.  See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1984). 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction, finding, in part, that the canine’s alert provided 
probable cause to believe there were drugs in the vehicle.  Id. at 349-50.                    
  The State contends that we should heed the reasoning of our Court of Appeals in 
Richard and adopt a rule that allows for the arrest of a vehicle’s occupants where there is 
probable cause to believe that the occupants possess drugs.  To the extent that this is the rule in 
Richard, we are inclined to agree with the State, but we depart from the Richard panel on the 
amount of evidence needed to establish probable cause.  We rely on numerous facts to make a 
probable cause determination, not just the canine’s alert.  In fact, we believe it is unlikely that 
any of the facts presented here would have, on their own, armed officers with the probable cause 
necessary to conduct a lawful arrest.  The case we are presented with, however, offers much 
more than a single canine alert to support a probable cause finding.   
Officers had knowledge of facts and circumstances which would warrant a person of 
reasonable caution to believe that Thomas was in possession of narcotics.  Here, a reliable 
confidential informant provided officers with specific information about illicit activities being 
carried out and offered a detailed description of the vehicle involved.  Officers had the 
opportunity to confirm that description when they arrived at the hotel.  Then, when officers 
legally pulled the vehicle over, Thomas seemed nervous, raising the specter of suspicion that 
criminal activity was afoot.  Heightening officers’ suspicions were the inconsistent answers 
Thomas and Christmas gave officers about their travel through the county; neither could identify 
where the family members they were visiting lived.  Thomas’s companion was also traveling 
across state lines without a license or any other form of identification, which officers knew from 
their experience is often true of drug dealers transporting contraband.  Finally, tipping the scale 
from reasonable suspicion into probable cause, a trained canine alerted the officers to narcotics 
in the vehicle while the occupants were inside, and then no longer detected narcotics in the 
vehicle when the occupants were removed.  At that point, the sum of those facts would warrant a 
reasonable person to believe at least one of the two occupants took the drugs with him when he 
exited the vehicle and likely still possessed the narcotics.  
Despite Thomas’s attempt to trivialize this last point as “process-of-elimination,” we 
think the inference created when the canine sensed narcotics and then ceased sensing them upon 
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the occupants’ exit from the vehicle is a key component of a probable cause finding.  We agree 
that the canine alert, by itself, may not have been enough to give officers probable cause to arrest 
Thomas.  But here, officers already had high suspicions and solid reason to believe that criminal 
activity was afoot.  Then, a highly trained canine alerted to the presence of narcotics while the 
suspects were inside the vehicle, but it no longer detected the narcotics when the suspects were 
not inside.  Knowing the facts available to the officers and the inferences drawn from a 
combination of the canine alert and subsequent absence of alert, common sense dictates that 
someone moved the contraband between sniffs.  The totality of these circumstances convinces us 
that officers had knowledge of facts and circumstances which would warrant a reasonable person 
to believe one of the two occupants took the drugs with him when he exited the vehicle and 
likely still had them on his person.          
In sum, we’re convinced officers met the probable cause threshold necessary to detain 
Thomas.  What occurred here is an example of good policing in a difficult situation.  Officers did 
everything by the book – they made a lawful stop after observing a lane change without 
signaling; they ran a trained canine simultaneous to the lawful stop, so as to not change the 
character of the stop; and after being alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle, they 
asked for and received consent to search the interior.  Then, rather than risk the suspect being 
bitten by the apprehension canine, they transported the suspect to the police station and applied 
for a search warrant – a step that was, in hindsight, likely unnecessary since they had already 
attained the requisite probable cause to arrest Thomas and could have conducted a search 
incident to arrest.  It was while being lawfully detained that Thomas was observed with the illicit 
contraband.  We agree with the State in that a finding adopting Thomas’s argument – one in 
which officers with a mountain of facts pointing to the existence of crime have no alternative but 
to let suspects walk free because a search cannot be conducted at the site of the traffic stop – 
would place an untenable burden on officers after probable cause for criminal activity has 
already been established.              
Conclusion 
 
The totality of the circumstances presented here convinces us that officers had probable 
cause to believe Thomas was in possession of narcotics.  Therefore, transporting him to, and 
detaining him at, the police station to await the results of the search warrant request did not run 
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afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  When Thomas was observed putting the plastic baggie 
containing a narcotic drug into his mouth, he was lawfully detained.  Any evidence recovered in 
that instance cannot be said to be “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and its admission did not violate 
Thomas’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to admit 
the evidence and we reinstate Thomas’s conviction.    
 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.