Case Title: CARL S. OLSEN V. CANDY M. OLSEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0121

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
CARL S. OLSEN V. CANDY M. OLSEN2011 WY 30Case Number: No. S-10-0121Decided: 02/23/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

CARL 
S. OLSEN,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.CANDY M. OLSEN,Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Carl 
S. Olsen, pro 
se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Candy 
M. Olsen, pro se.

 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this divorce 
action, the district court granted custody of the parties' children to Candy M. 
Olsen (Wife), divided the parties' property, ordered their real property be sold 
to pay a debt to Wife's mother and granted a judgment in favor of Wife's mother 
for any deficiency remaining after the proceeds of the sale were applied to the 
debt.  Carl S. Olsen (Husband), 
acting pro se, challenges the 
district court's property disposition and child custody rulings and claims the 
district court erred in some of its evidentiary rulings.  We summarily affirm the district court's 
factual findings and evidentiary rulings because Husband failed to provide a 
sufficient record on appeal.  We 
reverse the district court's order granting judgment for the deficiency in favor 
of Wife's mother because a creditor cannot participate in a divorce action.               

            
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Husband presents 
several issues on appeal:  

 
 

1.    
The 
court has appeared to rush to conclusions or decisions in this case based upon 
assumptions of which there are not sufficient facts or evidence to 
support.

 
 

2.    
Contrary 
to Wyoming law, the judge didn't recuse himself for bias.

 
 

3.    
Error 
of law  the court allowed [a]n incomplete Financial Affidavit by one party, but 
complained of the other party's Financial Affidavit.

 
 

4.    
Error 
of law: It is contrary to law for a court to assign who will claim minor 
children without a waiver of release.

 
 

5.    
Error 
of law:  It is contrary to the law 
to dismiss admissions and other documents merely because they were filed pro 
se.

 
 

6.    
Contrary 
to Wyoming law, the court considered improper testimony:  both testimony that was not given under 
oath and testimony that was hearsay.

 
 

7.    
Any 
and all debts incurred by the Appellee, without the explicit consent and/or 
agreement of the Appellant, are her liability alone and the Appellant should not 
be held liable for such debts, as per Wyoming Statute.

 
 

8.    
The 
court did not adequately consider the applicable factors in deciding who should 
have physical custody of the children.

 
 
Wife 
did not file a brief on appeal.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties 
married on February 14, 2000, and three children were born into the 
marriage.  Although the divorce 
complaint is not included in the record on appeal, the clerk's index indicates 
that it was filed by Husband on January 15, 2009.  After a trial, which apparently was not 
reported, the district court issued a decision letter granting the divorce and 
awarding primary physical custody of the children to Wife.  

 
 
[¶4]      The decision 
letter also divided the assets and liabilities of the marriage.  The primary asset was commercial 
property, from which Husband claimed he operated a construction business.  The property was valued at $132,700. 
 The trial evidence indicated that 
Wife's mother, Kathy Judd, had loaned the parties $140,000, and they still owed 
a balance of $131,300 on the loan.  
The district court set over one half of the outstanding debt to each 
party and ordered the property be sold to pay the debt.  The district court further 
ordered:

 
 
            
Each party shall apply their respective proceeds from the sale of this 
property to the debt owed to Kathy Judd . . . .  If each party does not receive 
sufficient funds to retire their portion of the debt in full, then Kathy Judd 
shall have judgment against each party for the remainder. 

 
 
Husband 
appealed from the district court's judgment.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      The district court has broad discretion to divide marital 
property in a divorce.  Sanning v. Sanning, 2010 WY 78, ¶ 8, 233 P.3d 922, 923 (Wyo. 2010); Root v. Root, 2003 WY 36, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d 41, 44 
(Wyo. 2003).  See also, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-1141 (LexisNexis 2009).  We review the district court's 
disposition of marital property using the abuse of discretion standard.  Sanning, ¶ 8, 233 P.3d  at 923.  See also, Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 
82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the property 
disposition shocks the conscience of this court and appears to be so unfair and 
inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it."  Hall v. Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 1228, 1230 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 

[¶6]      Child 
custody decisions are also 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

 
 
It 
has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs 
of the children are to be given paramount consideration. The determination of 
the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of fact. We do not 
overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a 
violation of some legal principle. Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 
(Wyo. 1999), quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 

Buttle 
v. Buttle, 2008 
WY 135, ¶ 15, 196 P.3d 174, 178 (Wyo. 2008), quoting Testerman v. 
Testerman, 2008 WY 112, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

A.   Factual 
and Evidentiary Rulings

 
 
[¶7]      Husband's issues 
one, two, three, five, six and eight, question the propriety of the district 
court's factual and evidentiary determinations.  For example, he claims there was 
insufficient evidence to support the district court's factual findings that he 
did not adequately support his family, committed domestic violence against Wife 
and wrote the letter in which Wife recanted her allegation of domestic 
violation, and Ms. Judd loaned the couple $140,000.  He claims that by deciding in favor of 
Wife on many of the issues in the divorce proceeding, the judge demonstrated 
that he was biased against Husband.  
Husband also argues the district court erred in allowing some of Wife's 
evidence to be admitted while rejecting some of his 
evidence.

 
 
[¶8]      The problem with 
Husband's argument is that he did not provide a transcript of the trial or a 
statement of the evidence in accordance with W.R.A.P. 3.03.2  "When the appellant fails to provide an 
adequate record on appeal, we must accept the district court's findings as 
being based upon sufficient evidence.'"  Painovich v. Painovich, 2009 WY 116, ¶ 
9, 216 P.3d 501, 504 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 37, 
199 P.3d 1072, 1083 (Wyo. 2009).  
Our reasoning in Schluck v. 
Schluck, 2008 WY 92, ¶ 3, 189 P.3d 877, 878 (Wyo. 2008) is 
apt:

 
 

            
We reject Husband's contention of error for the simple reason that 
Husband has failed to provide this Court with an adequate record to permit 
rational review of the district court's decision. The record presented for our 
review consists only of the pleadings filed by the parties, the district court's 
decision letter and its order. Husband has not provided a transcript of the 
trial, nor has he submitted a statement of the evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
3.03. Lacking a properly authenticated 
transcript, or an appropriate substitute for the transcript, the reliability of 
the district court's decision and the competency of the evidence upon which that 
decision is based must be presumed. 

            
 

(citations 
and footnote omitted).  

 
 
[¶9]      Because Husband 
failed to provide a transcript of the trial or provide a statement of the 
evidence under W.R.A.P. 3.03, we accept that the district court's findings were 
supported by sufficient evidence and its evidentiary rulings were not 
erroneous.  Consequently, we 
summarily affirm the district court's rulings on those 
issues.

            

 
 

B.   Income Tax 
Credit

 
 
[¶10]   Husband claims the district court 
did not have jurisdiction to order that Wife was entitled to claim the children 
as dependents for income tax purposes in 2009.  He argues the determination of which 
parent is entitled to the credit is a matter of federal law and he has not 
signed the appropriate release or waiver to allow Wife to claim the credit.   

 
 
[¶11]   In Leseberg v. Taylor, 2003 WY 131, ¶ 9, 78 P.3d 201, 203 (Wyo. 2003), we ruled that federal law "does not preempt Wyoming 
courts from allocating the dependent tax credit in the same manner they allocate 
other marital assets in divorce proceedings."  As such, the district court was within 
its authority when it ruled that Wife was entitled to the credit.  In order to avoid a contempt finding, 
Husband is required to execute the forms required by the Internal Revenue 
Service.  See, Walker v. Walker, 925 P.2d 1305, 1307 
(Wyo. 1996) (stating, in the context of an order to sell real property, a 
district court's order "necessarily requires the parties to execute the 
documents necessary" to implement the order).  

 
 

C.   Allocation 
of Debt and Judgment to Nonparty

 
 
[¶12]   The only remaining issue involves 
the district court's rulings that Ms. Judd loaned the parties $140,000, each 
party was responsible for one half of the balance, the real property would be 
sold to pay the debt, and Ms. Judd was entitled to a judgment against each party 
for one half of any deficiency that remained after the proceeds of the property 
sale were applied to the debt.  

 
 
[¶13]   The district court has the 
authority and responsibility to dispose of the parties' assets and 
liabilities.  See, § 20-2-114; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 12, 91 P.3d 922, 925 (Wyo. 2004).  As part 
of that task, the district court can order sale of the real property to 
facilitate the division of assets and payment of debt.  Parsons v. Parsons, 2001 WY 62, ¶¶ 
10-12, 27 P.3d 270, 272-73 (Wyo. 2001); Walker, 925 P.2d  at 1307.  Because there is an inadequate record on 
appeal, there is no basis for us to review the district court's rulings that the 
parties owed a debt to Ms. Judd, the parties are each responsible for one half 
of the debt, and the property should be sold to pay the debt.  

 
 
[¶14]   The district court's ruling that 
Ms. Judd was entitled to a judgment against each party for any deficiency 
remaining after the proceeds of the sale are applied to the debt is another 
matter.  The district court granted 
a judgment to a nonparty in this action.  
In Nielson v. Thompson, 982 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 1999), we considered whether a judgment creditor was entitled to 
intervene in the parties' divorce action.  
We stated:

 
 

While 
this Court has said that third parties claiming rights in property that is 
subject to a property settlement may intervene or be joined, we were not 
addressing the rights of a judgment creditor. Merritt v. Merritt, 586 P.2d 550, 554 (Wyo.1978). Some states, notably those with community property 
laws, permit creditors to intervene in divorce actions as a matter of course. 
Elms v. Elms, 4 Cal. 2d 681, 52 P.2d 223, 224 (1935); Malcolm v. 
Malcolm, 75 N.M. 566, 408 P.2d 143, 144 (1965); Fletcher v. National Bank 
of Commerce, 825 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex.App.1992); Boyle v. Boyle, 194 
W.Va. 124, 459 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1995). On the other hand, several states bar 
creditors from intervening in divorce cases. Eberly v. Eberly, 489 A.2d 433, 446 (Del.Supr.1985); Poteat v. Poteat, 632 S.W.2d 511, 512 
(Mo.App.1982); Foundation Sav. & Loan Co. v. Rosenbaum, 113 Ohio App. 
501, 171 N.E.2d 359, 360 (1960); Bailey v. Bailey, 312 S.C. 454, 441 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1994). We are convinced that the authority of the court in a 
divorce action to divide property is simply ancillary to its authority to 
dissolve the marriage. The primary subject of a divorce action is the 
dissolution of the marriage, and the only proper parties to such an action are 
the spouses seeking to be divorced. In re Marriage of Soriano, 44 Wash. App. 420, 722 P.2d 132, 133 (1986) 

 
 

Id. 
at 712.  Ms. Judd was not an 
appropriate party in the divorce action; consequently, the district court 
committed an error of law by granting a judgment in her favor.  On remand, the district court should 
revise its order to delete the judgment in favor of Ms. Judd.  

 
 
[¶15]   Affirmed in part and reversed and 
remanded in part.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 20-2-114 states:

 
 
     In granting a divorce, the court shall make such 
disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the 
property was acquired and the 
burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either 
party and children. The court may decree to either party reasonable alimony out 
of the estate of the other having regard for the other's ability to pay and may 
order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and profits thereof as is 
necessary be assigned and set out to either party for life, or may decree a 
specific sum be paid by either party.

 
 

2Rule 3.03 states:

 
 
If 
no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means including appellant's recollection. 
The statement shall be filed and served on appellee within 35 days of the filing 
of the notice of appeal. Appellee may file and serve objections or propose 
amendments within 15 days after service. The trial court shall, within 10 days, 
enter its order settling and approving the statement of evidence, which shall be 
included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal.