Case Title: Sublett v. Hipps

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tammy J. SUBLETT v. Sharon L. HIPPS and
Daniel Berry

96-1340                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 2, 1997


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- standard of review. -- In appeals from
     the granting of summary judgment, the appellate court need
     only decide if the granting of summary judgment was
     appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented
     by the moving party in support of the motion left a material
     question of fact unanswered.  

2.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- burden of sustaining motion on movant. --
     The burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is
     always the responsibility of the moving party; all proof
     submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
     party resisting the motion, and any doubts and inferences must
     be resolved against the moving party.  

3.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- when proper. -- Summary judgment is
     proper when a claiming party fails to show that there is a
     genuine issue as to a material fact and when the moving party
     is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

4.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- shifting burden upon establishment of prima
     facie case. -- Once a moving party establishes prima facie
     entitlement to summary judgment by affidavits, depositions, or
     other supporting documents, the opposing party must meet proof
     with proof and demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
     material fact.

5.   Civil procedure -- application of statute of limitations -- commencement
     date subject to 120-day service requirement. -- Under Rule 3 of the
     Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, an action is commenced by
     filing a complaint with the clerk of the proper court; the
     effectiveness of the commencement date, however, is dependent
     upon meeting the requirements of Rule 4(i), which provides in
     part that service of process on a defendant must be
     accomplished within 120 days after the filing of the
     complaint.

6.   Limitation of actions -- appellee A satisfied defense requirement by
     showing failure to commence litigation within three years. -- The
     touchstone for a limitations defense to a tort action is when
     the cause of action was commenced; where appellee A raised the
     statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in his answer
     and showed, pursuant to case law, appellant's failure to
     commence the litigation within three years, that was all that
     was required.

7.   Limitation of actions -- statute of limitations ran on cause of action --
     summary judgment for appellee A upheld. -- Because the accident
     underlying the litigation occurred on January 8, 1992, and
     service on appellee A was not obtained within 120 days after
     appellant filed her complaint on January 3, 1995, and no
     extension was sought, the statute of limitations ran on the
     cause of action; the trial court was correct in granting
     summary judgment in favor of appellee A.

8.   Negligence -- prima facie case -- requirements. -- To establish a
     prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that he
     sustained damages; that the defendant was negligent; and that
     such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages.

9.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- pivotal admission by appellant -- judgment
     for appellee B affirmed. -- Grants of summary judgment are
     affirmed where, as in this case, the plaintiff-appellant has
     made a pivotal admission that goes to the heart of the case;
     here, appellant admitted in her deposition that appellee B did
     not cut her off when she changed lanes and, further, that
     appellee B did nothing wrong; these drastic admissions, which
     contradicted her complaint, not only failed to create a
     genuine issue of material fact under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c) but
     also appeared to concede lack of fault on appellee B's part;
     appellant failed to meet proof with proof, as well; the
     supreme court affirmed the trial court's order granting
     summary judgment to appellee B.

     Appeal from Faulkner Circuit Court; Charles E. Clawson, Jr.,
Judge; affirmed.
     Helen Rice Grinder and George D. Ellis, for appellant.
     Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Thomas E. Osment,
Jr., for appellee Sharon L. Hipps.
     Matthews, Sanders & Sayes, by: Margaret M. Newton and Mel
Sayes, for appellee Daniel Berry.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice. 
     Appellant Tammy J. Sublett appeals an order granting summary
judgment in favor of appellees Sharon L. Hipps and Daniel Berry. 
We find no error in the trial court's order, and we affirm.
     On January 3, 1995, Sublett filed a complaint against Hipps
and Berry to recover damages for personal injury arising from an
automobile accident.  Sublett alleged that at about 8:15 a.m. on
January 8, 1992, she was travelling south on Interstate 430 in
Little Rock when Hipps, who was moving in the same direction in an
adjacent lane, abruptly moved in front of her and decelerated
rapidly.  Sublett alleged that Hipps's maneuver caused her to
strike the rear of Hipps's pickup truck, and she in turn was rear-
ended by Berry's sport-utility vehicle.  Sublett asked for joint
and several liability against Hipps and Berry on several theories
of negligence and damages in the amount of $175,000.00.
     On April 5, 1995, Hipps answered, denying all allegations of
fault and affirmatively pleading for the application of comparative
fault.  On September 29, 1995, Hipps filed a pleading designated as 
a third-party complaint against Berry, asking for indemnification
or, in the alternative, for contribution.  On November 27, 1995,
Berry filed his answer to the original complaint as well as the
third-party complaint and denied all allegations of fault.  He also
pled the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
     Berry next moved for summary judgment on the ground that both
the complaint and third-party complaint were barred by the three-
year statute of limitations for negligence actions under Ark. Code
Ann.  16-56-105 (1987).  He asserted that although Sublett filed
her complaint in a timely manner, she did not obtain service on him
within 120 days pursuant to Rule 4(i) of the Arkansas Rules of
Civil Procedure and also failed to move for an extension within
that same period.
     Sublett responded to Berry's motion for summary judgment and
argued that any objection to the untimely service of the complaint
under Rule 4(i) was waived when he filed his answer.  She contended
that while Berry's answer raised the statute of limitations as a
defense, his defense was waived because he answered the complaint
without moving to dismiss or otherwise raising the issue of
insufficiency of process, as required by Rule 4(i).
     Hipps then moved for summary judgment and maintained that the
undisputed facts showed the following: that Hipps was driving in
the lane to the left of Sublett; that Sublett admitted there was
adequate distance between the cars when Hipps made the lane change;
that Sublett admitted Hipps signaled before entering Sublett's
lane; and that Sublett applied her brakes, began sliding, and rear-
ended Hipps.
     Sublett responded to Hipps's motion for summary judgment and
cited three factual bases to support her allegations of negligence:
(1) traffic was heavy; (2) the pavement was wet; and (3) Hipps
turned into Sublett's lane 50 feet in front of her, which a juror
could conclude was done in violation of the statute which creates
a duty to change lanes only when it can be done "with safety." 
Ark. Code Ann.  27-51-302(1) (Repl. 1994).
     The trial court issued a letter opinion in which it determined
that Sublett's claim against Berry was barred by the statute of
limitations and that Sublett's deposition testimony established
that Hipps did nothing wrong and, thus, did not cause the accident. 
Orders dismissing Sublett's claims against both Berry and Hipps
were entered.  

             I. Berry's Motion for Summary Judgment
     The standard of review for appealing the grant of summary
judgment is well-established:
          In these cases, we need only decide if the granting
     of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the
     evidentiary items presented by the moving party in
     support of the motion left a material question of fact
     unanswered.  The burden of sustaining a motion for
     summary judgment is always the responsibility of the
     moving party.  All proof submitted must be viewed in a
     light most favorable to the party resisting the motion,
     and any doubts and inferences must be resolved against
     the moving party.  Our rule states, and we have
     acknowledged, that summary judgment is proper when a
     claiming party fails to show that there is a genuine
     issue as to a material fact and when the moving party is
     entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 261-62, 937 S.W.2d 653, 656
(1997).  See Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996). 
Once a moving party establishes prima facie entitlement to summary
judgment by affidavits, depositions, or other supporting documents,
the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Milam v. Bank of
Cabot, supra; Renfro v. Adkins, supra.
     Sublett contends, as her first point, that Berry waived a
defense of insufficiency of service of process under Ark. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(1) because he failed to move to dismiss the complaint on
that ground and further failed to raise the defense in his answer. 
She concedes that service was not accomplished on Berry within 120
days because counsel was under the false impression that he had
died without insurance coverage.  Sublett further admits that no
attempt was made to seek an extension from the court within the
120-day period from the filing of the complaint.  Nevertheless, she
contends that Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136,