Case Title: People v. Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90969

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90969-Agenda 14-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								JOSHUA T. DAVIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant Joshua T. Davis was found guilty of armed
violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1992)), aggravated battery
(great bodily harm) (720 ILCS 5/12-4 (West 1998)), and battery
(720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 1998)), after it was stipulated at a bench
trial, in the circuit court of Henry County, that, on July 2, 1998,
defendant shot BBs from a Crossman .177-caliber pellet/BB gun
at Matthew Mulder and Cody Junior. Although Mulder sustained
only minor injuries, Junior lost his left eye. The trial court found
that the pellet/BB gun used by defendant was a category I
dangerous weapon within the meaning of the armed violence
statute (720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b) (West 1992)). Accordingly, the
armed violence offense was a Class X felony for which defendant
was sentenced to the minimum term of six years' imprisonment.
Defendant was also sentenced to a concurrent jail term of 364 days
on the simple battery conviction and was ordered to pay
restitution.
	On appeal, a divided court upheld the convictions and
sentences. 318 Ill. App. 3d 893. We granted defendant's petition
for leave to appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	The narrow issue before this court is one of first impression.
We are asked to determine whether a pellet/BB gun, of the sort
used in this case, is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the
armed violence statute.

ANALYSIS
	At the time defendant committed the acts which led to his
conviction, the armed violence statute provided as follows:
			"A person commits armed violence when, while armed
with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined
by Illinois Law." 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1992).(1)
	The legislature defined the term "dangerous weapon" in
section 33A-1. Under that section,"[a] person is considered armed
with a dangerous weapon *** when he carries on or about his
person or is otherwise armed with a category I or category II
weapon." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(a) (West 1992). A category I weapon
is defined as "a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, spring gun, or any
other firearm, sawed-off shotgun, a stun gun or taser as defined in
paragraph (a) of Section 24-1 of this Code, knife with a blade of
at least 3 inches in length, dagger, dirk, switchblade knife, stiletto,
or any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument of like
nature." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b) (West 1992). A category II weapon
is defined as "a bludgeon, blackjack, slungshot, sand-bag, sand-club, metal knuckles, billy or other dangerous weapon of like
character." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(c) (West 1992).
	In addition to being charged with armed violence, defendant
was charged with two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm,
one count of aggravated battery (great bodily harm), and one count
of battery. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the
counts charging armed violence and aggravated battery with a
firearm, arguing that the device used by defendant was not a
"firearm" as defined in the Firearm Owners Identification Card
Act (430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2000)). The State opposed the
motion, arguing that the device used by defendant, although used
to fire BBs, had the capacity to fire tubular pellets and, therefore,
was a firearm. See People v. Green, 50 Ill. App. 3d 980 (1977).
	The trial court initially granted defendant's motion,
dismissing the counts charging armed violence and aggravated
battery with a firearm. The court found that defendant used a
"Crossman 357 model pellet/BB pistol which discharges
ammunition by expulsion of compressed gas from a CO2 cylinder"
and that "the ammunition used by defendant was a globular
projectile (a BB), .177 calibre and the weapon had a maximum
velocity of 500.2 feet per second." Although the weapon was also
capable of firing a tubular projectile of the same caliber, the trial
court concluded that the device used by defendant was not a
firearm. Upon reconsideration, however, the court reinstated the
armed violence count, finding that the device, though not a
firearm, came under the statutory clause "a dangerous weapon or
instrument of like character" in that it was "like a firearm."
	On appeal, two justices agreed with the trial court that
defendant possessed a category I dangerous weapon in that the
device, though not a firearm, came within the scope of the "any
other dangerous weapon or instrument" clause. One justice
dissented in part. Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the
dissenting justice found that the clause at the end of the category
I definition could not be interpreted as encompassing firearm-like
weapons such as the pellet/BB gun in this case. The dissenting
justice, instead, would have found defendant guilty of armed
violence with a category II weapon, holding that the pellet/BB gun
was of "like character" to a slung-shot. 318 Ill. App. 3d at 898
(Homer, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
	Defendant contends that he was wrongly convicted of armed
violence because the pellet/BB gun he used to commit an
aggravated battery on Cody Junior was not a "dangerous weapon"
within the meaning of the armed violence statute. Defendant
argues that the trial and appellate courts erred when they found
that the clause "any other deadly or dangerous weapon or
instrument of like nature," at the end of the definition of a category
I weapon, could be interpreted to encompass the pellet/BB gun he
used. Defendant also denies that the pellet/BB gun comes within
the scope of the category II definition.
	Whether the trial and appellate courts have correctly
interpreted the provisions of the armed violence statute is a
question of law, which this court reviews de novo. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405 (2001). Our purpose when construing a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v.
Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998). Courts should consider the
statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and
the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it. Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 56 (1983). The most reliable indicator of legislative
intent is the language of the statute, which, if plain and
unambiguous, must be read without exception, limitation, or other
condition. People v. Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464, 468 (1999); People
v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). Moreover, criminal or
penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused,
and nothing should be taken by intendment or implication beyond
the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. People v. Laubscher,
183 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (1998); People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435,
444 (1997); People v. Shinkle, 128 Ill. 2d 480, 486 (1989).
	Applying these principles to the present case, we have
carefully examined the statutory definition of a category I weapon
to determine whether the pellet/BB gun used by defendant in this
case properly falls within its parameters. We find that it does not.
	In defining a category I weapon, the legislature specifically
named several weapons-pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, spring
gun, sawed-off shotgun, stun gun or taser, knife with a blade of at
least three inches in length, dagger, dirk, switchblade knife, and
stiletto. Pellet and BB guns are not specifically referred to in this
list of weapons and, consequently, are not per se dangerous
weapons. People v. Ptak, 193 Ill. App. 3d 782, 785 (1990) (any
weapon specifically listed in the definition is considered to be a
per se dangerous weapon). However, in addition to individually
naming certain weapons, the provision also uses two inclusive
clauses-"any other firearm" and "any other deadly or dangerous
weapon or instrument of like nature." We will address each clause
separately.
	The first clause, "any other firearm," comes in the middle of
the provision and at the end of a list of devices generally
recognized as "firearms." The lower courts found that the
pellet/BB gun used by defendant did not fit within this clause
because it was not a "firearm." We agree.
	In section 2-7.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/2-7.5 (West 2000)), the legislature, in reference to "firearms,"
states:
			"Except as otherwise provided in a specific Section,
'firearm' has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 1.1 of
the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act."
	The Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS
65/1.1 (West 2000)) defines "[f]irearm" as "any device, by
whatever name known, which is designed to expel a projectile or
projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas or
escape of gas; excluding, however: (1) any pneumatic gun, spring
gun, paint ball gun or B-B gun which either expels a single
globular projectile not exceeding .18 inch in diameter and which
has a maximum muzzle velocity of less than 700 feet per second
or breakable paint balls containing washable marking colors."
	At the same time, the Air Rifle Act (720 ILCS 535/0.01 (West
2000)) defines "[a]ir rifle" as "any air gun, air pistol, spring gun,
spring pistol, B-B gun, paint ball gun, pellet gun or any implement
that is not a firearm which impels a breakable paint ball
containing washable marking colors or, a pellet constructed of
hard plastic, steel, lead or other hard materials with a force that
reasonably is expected to cause bodily harm." (Emphasis added.)
720 ILCS 535/1 (West 2000).
	Reading these statutes together, it is reasonable to assume that
the legislature did not view BB guns, pellet guns and paint ball
guns as "firearms" and, consequently, did not intend these devices
to be included under the clause "any other firearm" in the armed
violence provision. See Harvel v. City of Johnston City, 146 Ill. 2d 277, 287 (1992) (" 'It is assumed that whenever the legislature
enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter. *** Thus, they should all be construed
together' "), quoting 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction §51.02, at 453 (Sands 4th ed. 1984). Thus, we
conclude, as the trial and appellate courts did, that the CO2
powered pellet/BB gun, which had the capacity to fire .177-caliber
pellets or BBs at a velocity under 700 feet per second, was not a
"firearm" and, accordingly, could not be included in the "any other
firearm" clause of the category I definition of a dangerous weapon.
	The question, then, is whether the pellet/BB gun fits within
the second clause, "any other deadly or dangerous weapon or
instrument of like nature," as the lower courts found. On this
point, we disagree with the lower courts. Applying the doctrine of
ejusdem generis and the last antecedent rule, we find that the
pellet/BB gun did not come within the scope of this clause and,
consequently, was not a category I weapon as defined by the
armed violence statute.
	The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a
statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or
things and then includes "other persons or things," the word
"other" is interpreted as meaning "other such like." Farley v.
Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975), quoting
People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill. 2d 486, 493-94 (1960). See also People
v. Rutledge, 104 Ill. 2d 394, 397 (1984) (acknowledged that,
pursuant to doctrine of ejusdem generis, the clause "any other
dangerous or deadly weapon," as used in statute defining the
offense of unlawful use of weapons, was not intended to include
firearms), quoting People v. Sheldon, 322 Ill. 70, 73 (1926). The
fundamental principle of statutory construction known as the last
antecedent doctrine provides that relative or qualifying words or
phrases in a statute serve only to modify words or phrases which
are immediately preceding. They do not modify those which are
more remote. McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499,
511-12 (1998); In re Application for Judgment & Sale of
Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 169
(1995); People v. Bartlett, 294 Ill. App. 3d 435, 440 (1998)
	In the present case, when defining category I weapons, the
armed violence statute begins by specifically listing firearm-type
weapons by various commonly recognized names, followed by the
clause "any other firearm." The definition then goes on to
specifically include "sawed-off shotgun, a stun gun or taser as
defined in paragraph (a) of Section 24-1 of this Code, knife with
a blade of at least 3 inches in length, dagger, dirk, switchblade
knife, stiletto." The concluding phrase, "any other deadly or
dangerous weapon or instrument of like nature," comes at the end
of the list of blade-type weapons. Applying the doctrine of
ejusdem generis in conjunction with the last antecedent rule, we
find that the phrase "any other deadly or dangerous weapon or
instrument of like nature" was intended to refer only to weapons
or instruments "such like" the class of blade-type weapons which
immediately preceded the clause in the provision, i.e., weapons or
instruments that are sharp and have the ability to cut or stab. We
do not believe that the clause "any other deadly or dangerous
weapon or instrument of like nature" was intended to modify all
of the named weapons and, thus, was not intended to include BB
guns, pellet guns, paint ball guns or any other weapons, which are
not firearms, but are of like nature to firearms.
	We take notice that the armed violence statute has been in
effect since 1967, when it was enacted " 'to respond emphatically
to the growing incidence of violent crime.' " People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 507-08 (1983), quoting People v. Graham, 25 Ill. App.
3d 853, 858 (1975). The General Assembly, concerned with the
possession of weapons during the commission of felonies (People
v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 170 (1982)), adopted the armed
violence statute to " 'discourage those who contemplate a
felonious act beforehand from carrying a weapon when they set
forth to perform the act.' " People v. Drakeford, 139 Ill. 2d 206,
211 (1990), quoting Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d  at 509. Our research has
revealed a number of cases in which BB guns were used in the
course of a crime. See People v. Johnson, 323 Ill. App. 3d 284
(2001) (metal BB gun used to threaten and strike rape victim was
a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the offense of armed
robbery); People v. Williams, 315 Ill. App. 3d 22 (2000) (metal
pellet gun used to hit decedent on the head); People v. Paul, 304
Ill. App. 3d 404 (1999) (BB gun used in armed robbery); People
v. de la Fuente, 92 Ill. App. 3d 525, 536 (1981) (pellet gun used as
a bludgeon was per se dangerous weapon for purposes of armed
robbery); People v. Greer, 53 Ill. App. 3d 675 (1977) (unloaded
gas pellet pistol used); People v. Hill, 47 Ill. App. 3d 976 (1977)
(unloaded, uncocked metal air pistol used to intimidate victim of
robbery; although not a dangerous weapon per se, could be used
as dangerous weapon and supported conviction for armed
robbery); People v. Ratliff, 22 Ill. App. 3d 106 (1974) (.22-caliber
starter pistol used in robbery); People v. Trice, 127 Ill. App. 2d
310 (1970) (same). In none of these cases were defendants ever
charged with armed violence.
	In addition, in cases where armed violence has been charged
and the defendant was armed with a weapon which was not
specifically listed in the statute, reliance was placed on the "any
other dangerous weapon or instrument of like nature" clause
because the weapon was of like nature to the blade-type weapons
listed. See People v. Ptak, 193 Ill. App. 3d 782 (1990) (broken
beer bottle); People v. Thornton, 145 Ill. App. 3d 669 (1986)
(broken beer bottle); People v. Chrisos, 142 Ill. App. 3d 747
(1986) (sharp piece of glass); People v. Samier, 129 Ill. App. 3d
966 (1985) (knife with blade less than three inches); People v.
Hall, 117 Ill. App. 3d 788, 803 (1983) (knife of unidentified
length). Thus, our construction of the armed violence statute-that
BB guns and pellet guns should not be interpreted as coming
within the scope of the "any other deadly or dangerous weapon or
instrument of like nature" clause and, thus, are not category I
dangerous weapons within the meaning of the armed violence
statute-appears to comport with past practice.
	Although we read the statute as not including pellet and BB
guns, we note that, even if there were some ambiguity, we would
be constrained by law to interpret this criminal statute in a lenient
manner. People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 366, 370-71
(1976) (where a criminal statute is capable of two constructions,
courts must adopt the one that operates in favor of the accused).
The rule of lenity is particularly applicable where the criminal
statute operates as an enhancement provision. People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (1983); People v. McCarty, 94 Ill. 2d 28, 34-35
(1983). See also People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 169 (1982);
People v. Hobbs, 86 Ill. 2d 242, 246 (1981); People v. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d 261 (1981). The armed violence statute is an enhancement
provision which "enhances the severity of the underlying felony
and upgrades the punishment available for it to Class X." Alejos,
97 Ill. 2d  at 508. See also People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 168
(1982). The statute mandates a severe penalty, not only to punish
the criminal, but to deter the use of weapons in the commission of
a felony, thus affording society greater protection. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 
at 509. Because of the nature of the armed violence statute, any
ambiguity should be appropriately resolved in defendant's favor.
	In sum, we find, based on established principles of statutory
construction, that BB guns and pellet guns of the sort used in the
case at bar are not dangerous weapons within the meaning of the
armed violence statute.
	For the same reasons, neither was the pellet/BB gun used by
defendant a category II dangerous weapon, as the dissenting
appellate justice found. A category II dangerous weapon is defined
in the statute as "a bludgeon, blackjack, slungshot, sand-bag, sand-club, metal knuckles, billy or other dangerous weapon of like
character." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(c) (West 1992). Again, pellet and
BB guns are not specifically named in this listing. Furthermore,
although a metal pellet/BB pistol might be capable of being used
as a bludgeon, it is not typically identified as such and, under the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, cannot be interpreted to be "of like
character" to the bludgeon-type weapons included in the category
II listing.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we find that defendant was not guilty
of committing armed violence when he discharged the pellet/BB
gun and struck Cody Junior. We vacate defendant's conviction for
armed violence.
Conviction vacated.
 
 
1.      1The 1992 version of the armed violence statute applies in the case
at bar. Although the statute was amended by Public Act 88-680, eff.
January 1, 1995, that amendment was invalidated. See People v.
Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999).