Case Title: KELLY v GRAND JURY OF L C COUNTY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-26T00:00:00Z

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I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 WILLIAM T . K E L L Y , P l a i n t i f f , VS . G M N D JURY O F LEWIS AND C L A R K COUNTY, STATE O F M O N T A N A ; and ROBh'RT L. W O O D A H L , Attorney General of t h e S t a t e of Montana, Defendant. THE STATE O F M O N T A N A on t h e r e l a t i o n of WILLIAM T. KELLY, Relator, VS . T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , i n and f o r t h e County of Lewis and Clark, and t h e H O N O R A B L E GORDON R. BENNETT, Presiding Judge, Respondent. No. 13438 No. 13439 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record : For P l a i n t i f f and Relator: Gordon R. Bennett, D i s t r i c t Judge, Helena, Montana Patrick J. Foley argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Defendant and Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: July 7, 1976 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Relator seeks a w r i t of prohibition and an order from t h i s Court i n substance vacating the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order compelling him t o t e s t i f y before the Lewis and Clark County grand jury u n t i l a hearing has been held on the l e g a l i t y and jurisdiction of the grand jury. These proceedings a r i s e from the issuance of subpoenas by the Lewis and Clark County grand jury t o r e l a t o r William T. Kelly, ordering him t o appear, t e s t i f y , and produce physical evidence requested by the attorney general before t h a t investigatory body on May 18, 1976. Relator f i l e d an action against the grand jury and the attorney general i n the d i s t r i c t court and moved t o quash the subpoenas. The d i s t r i c t court s e t a hearing on r e l a t o r ' s motion f o r May 28, 1976; but t h a t hearing was s e t aside by order of t h i s Court on June 18, S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, Mont . Y P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 537, f o r the reason t h a t r e l a b r ' s p e t i t i o n was not verified. O n June 24, 1976 a special a s s i s t a n t attorney general f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court an a f f i d a v i t and motion t o compel the t e s t i - mony of r e l a t o r before the grand jury. O n the same day, June 24, D i s t r i c t Judge Gordon R. Bennett issued an order t o compel r e l a t o r ' s testimony and t o produce physical evidence before the grand jury, pursuant t o section 95-1807, R.C.M. 1947. Relator again moved f o r a hearing on h i s motion t o quash the subpoenas which were returnable on July 7, 1976. This motion was supported by a f f i d a v i t and v e r i f i e d . The d i s t r i c t court has not considered nor acted upon r e l a t o r ' s motion f o r a hearing on h i s motion t o quash. Rather, the d i s t r i c t court submitted the issues t o t h i s Court by i t s p e t i t i o n of June 23, 1976, No. 13410, requesting, i n e f f e c t , a declaratory judgment. A t t h a t time, r e l a t o r renewed h i s application t o t h i s Court, praying f o r the following r e l i e f : (1) an order t o show cause why a w r i t of prohibition o r other appropriate w r i t should not issue to the d i s t r i c t court and the Hon. Judge Bennett, requiring t h a t the order of June 24 t o compel testimony be permanently s e t aside and vacated; and (2) an order staying said d i s t r i c t court order u n t i l such time as t h i s Court has decided the merits of t h i s application. O n July 1, 1976 t h i s Court s e t both matters f o r o r a l argument and stayed a l l proceedings i n the d i s t r i c t court u n t i l further order of t h i s Court. O n July 7 , 1976 o r a l argument was heard and the Court took the matter under advisement. Many issues concerning the conduct of the attorney general's o f f i c e , the impanelling of the grand jury, and statutory and con- s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of r e l a t o r a r e raised by r e l a t o r ' s motion t o the d i s t r i c t court and h i s application here. However, a l l conten- tions can be decided by the resolution of three questions: 1. Does the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order of June 24, 1976 effectively grant r e l a t o r transactional immunity from prosecution under section 95-1807, R.C.M. 1947? 2. Does r e l a t o r have standing t o question the l e g a l v a l i d i t y of the grand jury? 3. I s r e l a t o r required t o t e s t i f y pursuant to the grand jury subpoenas and the d i s t r i c t court order of June 24, 1976? Respondent through the attorney general, has maintained by a f f i d a v i t , b r i e f and o r a l argument t h a t it has granted r e l a t o r trans- actional immunity from prosecution by v i r t u e of i t s order of June 24, pursuant t o section 95-1807, K.C.M. 1947, which provides: I I Compelling testimony: immunity from prosecution. Before o r during t r i a l i n any j u d i c i a l proceeding a j u s t i c e of the supreme court o r judge of the d i s t r i c t court, upon request by the attorney pro- secuting o r counsel f o r the defense, may require a person t o answer any question o r produce any evidence t h a t may incriminate him. I f a person i s required t o give testimony o r produce evidence, i n accordance with t h i s section, i n any investigation or proceeding he cannot be prosecuted o r subjected t o any penalty or f o r f e i t u r e , other than a prosecution o r action for perjury o r contempt, f o r o r on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he t e s t i f i e d or produced evidence." Kelator contends section 95-1807 cannot confer immunity upon a grand jury witness, and therefore, he may a s s e r t ' h i s r i g h t , under the F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana Constitution, t o refuse t o t e s t i f y against himself before the grand jury. H i s principal arguments a r e t h a t the words "grand jury" a r e not con- tained i n the s t a t u t e , and the functioning of a grand jury i s not a " t r i a l " as t h a t word i s used therein. Relator's construction of section 95-1807 i s overly technical. In S t a t e v. Lambert, Mont . , 538 P.2d 1351, 1352, 32 St.Rep. 805, 807, defendant contended he could not be compelled t o t e s t i f y a f t e r grant of immunity under section 95-1807 i n a p r e t r i a l hearing because such hearing was not a " j u d i c i a l proceeding". This Court held the subpoena power of a court r e l a t e s t o the p r e t r i a l hearing. In defining a ' I j u d i c i a l proceeding", the Court i n Lambert quoted with approval from a North Carolina case t o the e f f e c t t h a t a j u d i c i a l proceeding "'includes every ~ r o c e e d i n g of a j u d i c i a l nature before a competent court o r before a tribunal o r o f f i c e r clothed with j u d i c i a l o r quasi-judicial powers . l l l In State ex r e l . Adami v. D i s t r i c t Court, 124 Mont. 282, 287, 220 P.2d 1052, the Court said: "A grand jury is a p a r t of the court and must conduct i t s e l f i n compliance with t h e s t a t u t e s and Constitution i n the same manner a s any other p a r t of the j u d i c i a l system." Thus, while a grand jury is an i n q u i s i t o r i a l body, i t s pro- ceedings a r e generally regarded as j u d i c i a l i n nature. 38 Am Jur 2d, Grand Jury, $1. Section 95-1807 s t a t e s t h a t i f one "is required t o give testimony o r produce evidence * * * i n any investigation o r proceeding" he cannot be prosecuted therefor. The use of the word "investigation" i s not inadvertent; a grand jury inquiry i s an investigation within the scope of a j u d i c i a l proceeding. Relator r e l i e s upon S t a t e v. Saginaw, 124 Mont. 225, 220 P. 2d 1021, i n asserting t h a t immunity s t a t u t e s do not apply t o grand . jury witnesses. Saginaw is distinguishable f o r two reasons. F i r s t , the s t a t u t e there involved was d i f f e r e n t , and the r e l a t i o n of c e r t a i n words not contained i n section 95-1807 was held t o exclude grand juries. Second, the decision r e s t s firmly on the f a c t t h e defendant voluntarily t e s t i f i e d before the grand jury without objection and without asserting h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t . I n the i n s t a n t case r e l a t o r has asserted t h a t r i g h t and the d i s t r i c t court has ordered him t o t e s t i f y under immunity from prosecution, pursuant t o the applicable s t a t u t e . Finally, the policy and purpose of immunity s t a t u t e s i s t o aid prosecuting o f f i c e r s i n the apprehension of criminals. They render witnesses' privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable with respect t o matters about which they t e s t i f y , thus inducing witnesses t o t e s t i f y and turn s t a t e ' s evidence. S t a t e v. Lambert, supra. Therefore, we hold the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order t o compel testimony pursuant t o section 95-1807 effectively granted r e l a t o r transactional immunity from prosecution. Relator next contends t h a t he has standing t o prosecute t h i s action because the grand jury is i l l e g a l and is wasting public funds. He r e l i e s on S t a t e ex r e l . Adami v. D i s t r i c t Court, 124 Mont. 282, 287, 220 P.2d 1052, which held t h a t a taxpayer of the county i n which a grand jury sits has standing t o seek a w r i t of prohibition t o end l i t i g a t i o n and save expense when a grand jury a c t s without o r i n excess of i t s jurisdiction. I n t h a t o r i g i n a l proceeding, the r e l a t o r sued on behalf of himself and a l l other county taxpayers i n order t o prohibit the further expenditure of public funds. A f a i r reading of the application i n the i n s t a n t case shows t h a t such i s not the purpose of t h i s r e l a t o r . H i s f l e e t i n g reference t o Adami does not e s t a b l i s h a claim t h a t h i s purpose i s t o cease the waste of taxpayer's money. Therefore, r e l a t o r does not have standing t o challenge the grand jury's existence on the basis of Adami. The substance of r e l a t o r ' s application is a broad and detailed a t t a c k upon t h e composition and conduct of the grand jury under the direction of the attorney general's s t a f f . He a s s e r t s the grand jury operation, directed a t him through the d i s t r i c t court's order of June 24, threatens irreparable injury t o h i s s t a t e and federal constitutional r i g h t s , including h i s r i g h t against self-incrimination, h i s r i g h t t o due process of law, and h i s r i g h t t o protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. Relator seeks a protective order which w i l l afford him the oppor- t u n i t y t o e s t a b l i s h the i l l e g a l i t y of t h e grand jury. The asserted privilege against self-incrimination forms the principal wedge with which relator attempts to gain access to the courts for a determination of the merits of his illegal grand jury claim. From this purported privilege flow all of relator's claims of violation of due process of law, for he contends that with the protection of the privilege a hearing is required on the propriety of the grand jury's formation and actions. Further alleged due process violations against relator are related to the selection and alleged manipulation of the grand jury and its witnesses. Compare: A et al. v. District Court of Second Judicial District v. Attorney Q., Intervenor, Colo. - 3 550 P.2d 315. We have already held relator has effectively been granted transactional immunity from prosecution on the basis of any testimony or physical evidence which he might give before the grand jury. With the granting of immunity comes the dissolution of the privilege against self-incrimination. Section 95-1807, R.C.M. 1947. Without the protection of such privilege, and with immunity from prosecution, all of relator's claimed violations of due process of law are for naught. He is not a defendant in any criminal action. He cannot be a putative defendant in any criminal action for offenses concerning which he may testify. As a mere witness before a grand jury, immune from its indictment powers, he is not an adversary to the prosecution with the right of notice and hearing, and he has no legal interest in the grand jury's composition or operation. In short, relator has alleged no present or potential injury to his constitutional rights which gives him standing to attack the legality of the grand jury. No case c i t e d by r e l a t o r i n support of h i s standing argument is analogous t o the f a c t s here. Relator is not a defendant; cannot be a defendant i n t h i s matter (save f o r con- tempt o r perjury, section 95-1807, R.C.M. 1947); has shown no injury t o himself; and, can claim no privilege which protects him from t e s t i f y i n g . I n view of the foregoing, i n No. 13438, the d i s t r i c t court's order of June 24, 1976 t o compel testimony i s v a l i d and of f u l l force and e f f e c t . I n No. 13439, the w r i t of prohibition i s denied and t h i s matter i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r further proceedings. Remittitur s h a l l issue forthwith i n both cases. &JA-$? J u s t i c e r % & p W e Concur: / PY*b Jus ices. Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I dissent. I do not disagree that some of the matters raised by the petitioner may be premature. He may not be considered a prospective defendant. The transactional immunity may protect all of his rights from unlawful invasion. He may or may not have standing to object in his present posture. However, my problem arises from the fact that we are making a fact determination without a proper record. These facts should be determined by the district court upon a hearing before the district court. It would be my position that if the petitioner claims a violation of a constitu- tional right by a proper petition before the district court, he has standing to be heard and his complaint determined by that court. There is never any unnecessary delay in granting the right to be heard on any legitimate motion before any court in a judicial proceeding. P 4 &