Case Title: Mabon v. Wilson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52348

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: April 13, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LON THURSTON MABON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JANICE R. WILSON,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0212-12568; CA A121483; SC S52348)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 1, 2005.
Lon Thurston Mabon, in propria persona, argued the cause and
filed the brief for himself.
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause
for respondent on review.
Before Gillette, Presiding Justice, and Durham, Riggs, 
De Muniz,** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.***
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Edward J. Jones, Judge. 198 Or App 340, 108 P3d 598 (2005).
**Chief Justice when decision was issued. 
***Justice Wallace P. Carson, Jr., Chief Justice when the
case was argued, did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This is a case in the nature of quo warranto brought
under ORS 30.510, set out post, in which plaintiff Mabon
challenges the right of defendant Wilson to sit as a judge of the
Circuit Court for Multnomah County.  The case was heard by
another judge of that court, who dismissed it on the merits for
failure to state a claim.  The Court of Appeals, in a wide-ranging opinion, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the
matter because, under ORS 30.510, only the Multnomah County
District Attorney could initiate such a case, and he had not done
so.  Mabon v. Wilson, 198 Or App 340, 108 P3d 598 (2005).  We
allowed Mabon's petition for review and, for the reasons that
follow, now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Mabon's theory on the merits is that Wilson is not
qualified to sit as a circuit court judge because she has not
taken the oath required of persons who would hold that office. 
We therefore begin by setting out the relevant oaths.  The oaths
of office that Supreme Court and circuit court judges must take
in Oregon are virtually identical.  The oath that each Supreme
Court judge must take is provided for by Article VII (Amended),
section 7, of the Oregon Constitution, which states:
"Every judge of the supreme court, before entering
upon the duties of his office, shall take and
subscribe, and transmit to the secretary of state, the
following oath:
"'I, _________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support the constitution of the United States,
and the constitution of the State of Oregon, and that I
will faithfully, and impartially discharge the duties
of a judge of the supreme court of this state,
according to the best of my ability, and that I will
not accept any other office, except judicial offices,
during the term for which I have been elected.'"
The oath taken by circuit court judges is prescribed by Article
VII (Original), section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, which
provides that "* * * Circuit Judges * * * shall take the same
oath as the Supreme Judges."  The oath to which Judge Wilson
subscribed states:
"I, Janice R. Wilson, do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support the constitution of the
United States, and the constitution of the State of
Oregon, and that I will faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of a judge of the circuit court of
this state, according to the best of my ability, and
that I will not accept any other office, except
judicial offices, during the term for which I have been
elected."
This case is one in a series of disputes in which Mabon
has challenged the right of sitting judges to hold their offices
on the ground that those judges have not taken and subscribed to
the "required, qualified, original, identical, exact, true,
correct, certain, and complete Oath as required by the Oregon
Constitution * * *."  (Mabon's words.) (1)  Mabon purported to
commence the action under ORS 30.510, set out post, a statute
that, inter alia, provides a judicial mechanism by which to
challenge the right of a person to hold a particular public
office.  Wilson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, asserting that the oath that she had taken met all legal
requirements.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.
Mabon filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit
court judgment in the Court of Appeals.  After he had filed his
opening brief in that court, counsel for Wilson moved to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the Court of Appeals lacked
jurisdiction because the case had not been initiated in the
circuit court by the district attorney.  Mabon requested a stay
while he attempted to obtain the district attorney's
participation.  The Court of Appeals, however, denied Mabon's
motion for a stay and dismissed the appeal.
Mabon petitioned for reconsideration.  The Court of
Appeals denied reconsideration but also, on its own motion,
reinstated the appeal.  The court took that action because it
recognized that it always has jurisdiction to determine whether
the trial court from which an appeal is taken itself had
jurisdiction.  Mabon, 198 Or App at 343.  As noted, the court
then went on to reach the jurisdictional question on its merits
and to hold that the district attorney's participation in the
type of case that Mabon wished to prosecute was mandatory.  Id.
at 357.  We then allowed Mabon's petition for review.
As noted, Mabon attempted to utilize the procedure set
out in ORS 30.510 in bringing this action.  That statute is a
statutory substitute for the common-law writ of quo warranto.  It
provides, in part:
"An action at law may be maintained in the name of
the state, upon the information of the district
attorney, or upon the relation of a private party
against the person offending, in the following cases:
"(1) When any person usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil
or military, or any franchise within this state, or any
office in a corporation either public or private,
created or formed by or under the authority of this
state[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
The answer in this case turns on the interpretation of
the meaning and scope of the two emphasized clauses in ORS
30.510.  Those clauses state that an action may be maintained
"upon the information of the district attorney, or upon the
relation of a private party."  The first clause makes it appear
that only the district attorney may bring a proceeding under ORS
30.510 and that, as a consequence, Mabon's case properly was
dismissed.  However, the second clause casts doubt on the
foregoing interpretation because of its reference to such actions
being brought "on the relation of a private party."  Mabon is a
private party; does the second clause authorize him to bring the
present action?  That is a question of statutory interpretation
that, at least initially, requires examination of the words of
the statute, the context in which those words appear (including
the history of the evolution of the statutory wording over time),
and the case law construing those words.  See generally PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (describing template for construing statutes); see also
State v. Perry, 336 Or 49, 55, 77 P3d 313 (2003) (noting that
historical background of statutes provides further context).
In addition to the express words of ORS 30.510, quoted
above, we find two contextual statutes, ORS 30.530 and ORS
30.610, that aid our analysis.  We set out those statutes here,
in order to facilitate our examination of the text of ORS
30.510(1).
ORS 30.530 provides:
"Whenever an action is brought against a person
for any of the causes specified in ORS 30.510(1), the
district attorney, in addition to the statement of the
cause of action, may separately set forth in the
complaint the name of the person rightfully entitled to
the office or franchise, with a statement of the facts
constituting the right of the person thereto.  In such
case, judgment may be given upon the right of the
defendant, and also upon the right of the person so
alleged to be entitled, or only upon the right of the
defendant, as justice may require."
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 30.610 provides, in part:
"The action[] provided for in ORS 30.510 * * *
shall be commenced and prosecuted by the district
attorney where the same [is] triable.  When the action
is upon the relation of a private party, as allowed in
ORS 30.510, the pleadings on behalf of the state shall
be signed by the relator as if the relator were the
plaintiff[;] * * * in all other cases the pleadings
shall be signed by the district attorney[.] * * * When
an action is commenced on the information of a private
person, as allowed in ORS 30.510, having an interest in
the question, such person, for all the purposes of the
action, * * * shall be deemed a coplaintiff with the
state."
In our view, the contextual clues provided by the words
of those statutes point in the same direction.  First of all, ORS
30.530 makes it clear that the district attorney has control over
the proceedings brought under ORS 30.510, even to the extent of
being entitled to name the person whom the district attorney
believes should be granted the office presently held by the
defendant.  There is no suggestion that the legislature intended
to give any private party a similar right to advocate for a
claimant to the office or any voice in determining whether the
district attorney should or should not address the issue.
Second, we find the directive in ORS 30.610 that all
actions of the kind involved in this case "shall be commenced and
prosecuted by the district attorney" to be a strong indicator
that it is the district attorney who must bring such proceedings. 
The statute also provides us with a hint as to the role that may
be played by an interested private party:
"When an action is commenced on the information of a
private person, as allowed in ORS 30.510, having an
interest in the question, such person, for all the
purposes of the action, * * * shall be deemed a
coplaintiff with the state."
That wording indicates that the district attorney's participation
cannot be dispensed with; instead, the private party only may
participate with the district attorney, as a "coplaintiff".
We find no contextual statutory wording that points in
the opposite direction.
In summary, and in spite of the ambiguity of ORS 30.510
when one considers certain of the words of that statute in
isolation, we are satisfied that the statutory scheme as a whole
contemplates that the district attorney must participate in cases
like the present one.  That said, we nonetheless look to the
history of the statute to determine whether that history
undercuts in any way our preliminary assessment of the meaning of
the wording of ORS 30.510.  And, finally, we examine the case law
decided under ORS 30.510 and its predecessors, in order to
determine whether this court in the past has interpreted the
statute in some other way.
We turn first to the statutory history.  ORS 30.510 and
its contextual statutes are a statutory substitute for the
ancient writ of quo warranto ("by what warrant?") under which,
since at least the thirteenth century, English kings could
inquire as to the right of their subjects to hold and exercise
certain profitable franchises.  See, e.g., Sir Frederick Pollock
and Frederic William Maitland, I The History of English Law 572
(2nd ed 1898) (describing use of writ by Edward I to rein in what
he perceived to be abuses of seignorial authority).  The writ
never has been used in its common-law form in Oregon, however. 
Instead, the territorial legislature enacted a statutory version
of the writ, together with directions as to who could seek to
utilize it, in 1853.  That statute provided, in part:
"An action may be brought by the prosecuting
attorney of the district, in the name of the territory,
upon his own information, or upon the complaint of a
private party against the party offending, in the
following cases:
"1.  When any person shall usurp, intrude into, or
unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, civil or
military, or any franchise within this territory, or
any office in a corporation created by the authority of
this territory."
An Act Regulating Proceedings to Vacate Charters and Letters
Patent and to Prevent the Usurpation of an Office or Franchise,
ch I, § 5 (1854), in The Statutes of Oregon Enacted and Continued
in Force by the Legislative Assembly, at the Session Commencing
5th December 1853 140 (1854) (emphasis added).
Except for the reordering of certain phrases and the
substitution of the title "district attorney" for "prosecuting
attorney," the statute's words (and the wording of the
predecessors to ORS 30.530 and ORS 30.610) remain essentially the
same as they were in 1853.  Certainly, there is no basis in the
few adjustments that have been made to the wording for concluding
that the statutes have any meaning substantially different from
the meaning that they had in 1853.  See Mabon, 198 Or App at 354-56 (stating that law unchanged in its essentials from first
version to version presently in force and providing
illustrations).  In sum, we find nothing in the history of the
statutes that alters our preliminary assessment of their scope
and impact on the issue presented by this case.  We turn to the
case law.
The case law respecting ORS 30.510 and its contextual
statutes, both in their present and earlier forms, is extensive. 
Fortunately, however, we are not the first to look down this
road, and the effort made by others makes it possible for us to
shorten the trip.  The Court of Appeals, in its extensive and
admirable effort in this case, undertook a survey of what it
characterized as the "over 140 years of muddled case law"
surrounding ORS 30.510 and its predecessor statutes.  See Mabon,
198 Or App at 347-54 (reporting survey).  We shall not attempt to
reproduce that extended survey here; we simply note that it is
exhaustive and interesting, and we commend the Court of Appeals
for it.  More importantly, we agree with that court that,
although the case law contains a number of cases in which it does
not appear that the district attorney participated (but nothing
was made of the absence), only two cases actually discussed the
requirement of district attorney participation.  We turn to those
cases.
The first of those cases was State ex rel. v. Cook, 39
Or 377, 65 P 89 (1901).  In Cook, a private relator brought an
action under the predecessor of ORS 30.510 in which he asserted
that he, and not the current holder of the position, was entitled
to be the Morrow County road supervisor.  The defendant demurred
on the ground, inter alia, that the district attorney had not
initiated the action.  The district attorney then attempted to
cure that defect by "[having] his appearance noted upon the
journal, showing not only that the prosecution was being carried
on with his express assent and approval, but that the case had
been so commenced."  Id. at 378.  But that belated endorsement
was insufficient, in the court's view, to satisfy the statute. 
The court stated:
"The legislative intendment, as gathered from [the
statutory predecessors to ORS 30.510, 30.530, and
30.610] * * * would seem to be that, whether the
purpose of the action be to oust the intruder only, or
to go further, and to instate the person entitled to
the office, the action should be brought in the name of
the state, either upon the information of the
prosecuting attorney of the district where it is
triable, or on the relation of a private party.  In
either case, it is made the duty of the prosecuting
attorney to commence and prosecute the action. * * *
The prosecuting attorney himself must set it in motion,
and be responsible for its conduct and prosecution; and
in doing this he could not do less than to sign the
complaint in his official capacity."
Id. at 381-82 (citation omitted; emphasis added).  The court went
on to hold that failure of the district attorney to be involved
from the outset was fatal to the case, so that a judgment in
favor of the private relator had to be reversed.  Id. at 382-83.
The second case was In re State v. Millis, 61 Or 245,
119 P 763 (1912).  That case was an action, brought by the
Attorney General and certain private parties, seeking to oust the
defendants from their asserted positions as directors of a
railroad.  Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground
that it had not been commenced by the appropriate prosecuting
attorney.  The trial court agreed, sustained the demurrer, and
dismissed the case.  On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal, holding that not even the Attorney General could
exercise the power conferred on prosecuting attorneys by the
predecessors to ORS 30.510, ORS 30.530, and ORS 30.610.  Millis,
61 Or at 252, 254.
The Court of Appeals, at the conclusion of its own
survey of the case law, made the following observation:
"In sum, having reviewed the prior judicial
constructions of ORS 30.510 and ORS 30.610 and their
predecessors, we are persuaded that the rule of Cook
and Millis survives, notwithstanding the occasional
case that appears to lack the involvement of the
district attorney.  In those cases, no matter the
reason the court in fact heard the case, the court
never overruled Cook and Millis."
Mabon, 198 Or App at 354.  We agree with that summary.  And, when
that summary is combined with the apparent import of the words of
ORS 30.510, viewed in the context of other related statutes, the
conclusion is inescapable that only a district attorney may
initiate statutory proceedings in the nature of quo warranto in
Oregon.  No other persons have the power to initiate such
proceedings on their own.
The foregoing conclusion is fatal to Mabon's case.  He
is not a district attorney, and he has not been able to obtain
the assistance of a district attorney in prosecuting this matter. 
The absence of that public official's participation defeats
Mabon's claim.  The trial court correctly dismissed it and the
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that dismissal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Mabon's challenge to the adequacy of the oath that
Judge Wilson took is set out more fully in Mabon v. Wilson, 198
Or App 340, 342 n 1, 108 P3d 598 (2005).