Case Title: Ramirez v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12340

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12340 
 
JORGE RAMIREZ  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2017. - April 17, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, Severability.  
Statute, Validity, Severability. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on March 21, 2017. 
 
 
The case was reported by Hines, J. 
 
 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Jorge Ramirez. 
 
Kathryn Leary, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  We once again confront the question whether 
the absolute criminal prohibition of civilian possession of a 
stun gun, in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131J, violates the 
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is 
applied to the States by its incorporation into the Fourteenth 
2 
 
 
Amendment.  In Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774 (2015) 
(Caetano I), we held that § 131J did not violate the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms, as interpreted by District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  However, the United 
States Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, concluded 
that each of the three explanations we offered to support this 
holding were inconsistent with propositions stated in Heller, 
and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.  See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 
1027 (2016) (Caetano II).  That case was later dismissed as moot 
after it was "resolved . . . to [the parties'] mutual 
satisfaction," so we did not there revisit the question of 
§ 131J's constitutionality.  But we must revisit it in this 
case, where the defendant was charged in a criminal complaint 
with possession of a stun gun, in violation of § 131J, among 
other crimes, and moved unsuccessfully to dismiss that count of 
the complaint, arguing that § 131J unconstitutionally infringes 
on his Second Amendment rights. 
 
We conclude that the absolute prohibition against civilian 
possession of stun guns under § 131J is in violation of the 
Second Amendment, and we order that the count of the complaint 
charging the defendant with such possession be dismissed with 
prejudice.  
3 
 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the agreed-upon facts relevant to 
this appeal.  On November 5, 2015, at approximately 2:15 A.M., 
Officer Sean Matthews of the Revere police department was on 
patrol when he observed a vehicle with a broken taillight that 
was being operated in what he believed to be a suspicious manner 
in an area where the police had recently received reports of a 
number of motor vehicle break-ins.  The vehicle was occupied by 
three men; the defendant was seated in the rear passenger seat.  
After Officer Matthews activated his cruiser's blue lights, and 
before the vehicle came to a stop, he observed the three men 
moving in a manner that heightened his suspicion.  After a 
backup unit arrived, the three men were ordered out of the 
vehicle and a patfrisk was conducted of the defendant, which 
revealed a stun gun in his pants pocket.  Officer Matthews 
seized the weapon and placed the defendant under arrest for 
possession of a stun gun.  During a subsequent search of the 
vehicle, the police recovered a firearm and a loaded extended 
grip magazine in the back seat, near where the defendant had 
been seated.  The defendant was charged in a criminal complaint 
with possession of a stun gun, as well as with carrying a 
firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm without a license, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and possession of a firearm 
4 
 
 
without a firearm identification card, in violation of G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h). 
 
The defendant moved to dismiss the stun gun charge, arguing 
that § 131J's criminal prohibition of the possession of stun 
guns by civilians violates the Second Amendment, citing the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Caetano II.  The judge denied the 
motion without explanation, and also denied the defendant's 
request for written findings of fact and rulings of law.  After 
the defendant petitioned for relief from the single justice 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and the Commonwealth joined the 
petition, the single justice reserved and reported the petition 
to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  A stun gun, as defined in § 131J, is "a 
portable device or weapon from which an electrical current, 
impulse, wave or beam may be directed, which current, impulse, 
wave or beam is designed to incapacitate temporarily, injure or 
kill."1  A stun gun is not a "firearm," which, as defined in 
                                                          
 
 
1 General Laws c. 140, § 131J, provides: 
 
 
"No person shall possess a portable device or weapon 
from which an electrical current, impulse, wave or beam may 
be directed, which current, impulse, wave or beam is 
designed to incapacitate temporarily, injure or kill, 
except:  (1) a [F]ederal, [S]tate or municipal law 
enforcement officer, or member of a special reaction team 
in a [S]tate prison or designated special operations or 
tactical team in a county correctional facility, acting in 
the discharge of his official duties who has completed a 
training course approved by the secretary of public safety 
5 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in the use of such a devise or weapon designed to 
incapacitate temporarily; or (2) a supplier of such devices 
or weapons designed to incapacitate temporarily, if 
possession of the device or weapon is necessary to the 
supply or sale of the device or weapon within the scope of 
such sale or supply enterprise.  No person shall sell or 
offer for sale such device or weapon, except to [F]ederal, 
[S]tate or municipal law enforcement agencies.  A device or 
weapon sold under this section shall include a mechanism 
for tracking the number of times the device or weapon has 
been fired.  The secretary of public safety shall adopt 
regulations governing who may sell or offer to sell such 
devices or weapons in the [C]ommonwealth and governing law 
enforcement training on the appropriate use of portable 
electrical weapons. 
 
 
"Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a 
fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 or by 
imprisonment in the house of correction for not less than 
[six] months nor more than [two and one-half] years, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment.  A law enforcement officer 
may arrest without a warrant any person whom he has 
probable cause to believe has violated this section." 
 
 
As is apparent, § 131J does not use the term "stun gun."  
But G. L. c. 269, § 12F, a statute pertaining to airport secure 
areas, defines a "[p]rohibited weapon" as, among other things, 
"any stun gun as defined in [G. L. c. 140, § 131J]."  The two 
most well-known electrical weapons that fall within the rubric 
of § 131J are stun guns and "dart-firing electrical shock 
device[s]," better known as Tasers.  See American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Less Lethal Force:  Proposed 
Standards for Massachusetts Law Enforcement Agencies, at 5, 
https://aclum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/reports-less-
lethalforce.pdf [https://perma.cc/F29X-XHWH].  Tasers use 
"compressed nitrogen gas to fire two wires tipped with 
electrical barbs at [a person]," and, "[w]hen the barbs 
penetrate [a person's] skin or clothing, an electrical signal is 
transmitted through the wires, resulting in a paralyzing and 
incapacitating electrical shock."  Id. at 6.  In contrast to 
Tasers, stun guns have the electrodes attached to the device, 
and, when this "charged portion of the stun gun" comes into 
direct contact with a person's skin or clothing, it "completes 
an electrical circuit and delivers an incapacitating shock to 
[the person]."  Id. at 5-6.  For the sake of simplicity, we 
refer to all electrical weapons under § 131J as "stun guns." 
6 
 
 
G. L. c. 140, § 121, is a weapon "from which a shot or bullet 
can be discharged," among other requirements. 
 
The Second Amendment provides, "A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."  In 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, the Supreme Court held that "the 
District [of Columbia's] ban on handgun possession in the home 
violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against 
rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the 
purpose of immediate self-defense."  Noting that "the inherent 
right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment 
right," the Court declared: 
 
"The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire 
class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American 
society for that lawful purpose.  The prohibition extends, 
moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.  Under any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from the home 'the most 
preferred firearm in the nation to "keep" and use for 
protection of one's home and family,' . . . would fail 
constitutional muster" (footnote and citation omitted). 
 
Id. at 628-629. 
 
Although there was no dispute that the firearm at issue in 
Heller was an "arm" under the Second Amendment, the Court 
addressed the meaning of the term "arm."  The Court noted that 
"[t]he 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning 
today," and offered two definitions of the word from legal 
7 
 
 
dictionaries written shortly before the enactment of the Second 
Amendment.  Id. at 581.  The first, in the 1773 edition of 
Samuel Johnson's dictionary, defined "arms" as "[w]eapons of 
offence, or armour of defence."  Id., quoting 1 Dictionary of 
the English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978).  The 
second, in Timothy Cunningham's 1771 legal dictionary, defined 
"arms" as "any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes 
into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another."  
Heller, supra at 581, quoting 1 A New and Complete Law 
Dictionary.  The Court characterized the argument "that only 
those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the 
Second Amendment" as "bordering on the frivolous," declaring 
that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were 
not in existence at the time of the founding."  Heller, supra at 
582.  It also noted that "[t]he term was applied, then as now, 
to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use 
and were not employed in a military capacity."  Id. at 581. 
 
The Court, however, made clear that "the right secured by 
the Second Amendment is not unlimited," and "was not a right to 
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose."  Id. at 626.  The Court recognized 
two important limitations on the right to keep and carry arms.  
First, the Court declared, "Although we do not undertake an 
8 
 
 
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the 
Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms."  Id. at 626-627.  Second, the Court 
recognized that there was a "historical tradition of prohibiting 
the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons'" (citations 
omitted).  Id. at 627.  The Court declared that this historical 
tradition was supported by the limitation explained in United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939), "that the sorts of 
weapons protected [under the Second Amendment] were those 'in 
common use at the time.'"  Heller, supra, quoting Miller, supra 
at 179.  However, a few pages earlier in the Heller opinion, the 
Court had stated that it "read Miller to say only that the 
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as 
short-barreled shotguns."  Heller, supra at 625. 
 
In Caetano I, we considered whether a ban on civilian stun 
gun possession under § 131J violated the Second Amendment, where 
9 
 
 
the possession was outside the home.2  The defendant had been 
arrested after a police officer found a stun gun in her purse 
while she was seated in her vehicle in the parking lot of a 
supermarket.  See Caetano I, 470 Mass. at 775.  The defendant 
told police that she carried the stun gun for self-defense 
against a former boy friend.  See id.  She moved to dismiss the 
complaint, arguing that her possession of the stun gun was 
protected by the Second Amendment because a stun gun is an "arm" 
for purposes of the Second Amendment, is a weapon used primarily 
for self-defense, and is in common use in the United States for 
that purpose.  Id. at 775-776.  We affirmed the denial of the 
motion to dismiss as well as her subsequent conviction, 
concluding, "Without further guidance from the Supreme Court on 
the scope of the Second Amendment, we do not extend the Second 
Amendment right articulated by Heller to cover stun guns."  Id. 
at 779, 783. 
 
We noted that "[t]he conduct at issue in [that] case falls 
outside the 'core' of the Second Amendment, insofar as the 
defendant was not using the stun gun to defend herself in her 
home, . . . and involves a 'dangerous and unusual weapon' that 
was not 'in common use at the time' of enactment."  Id. at 779.  
We determined that a stun gun was a "per se dangerous weapon at 
                                                          
 
 
2 The defendant in that case testified that she was homeless 
but temporarily residing in a hotel.  See Commonwealth v. 
Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 776 (2015). 
10 
 
 
common law," id. at 780, because its purpose was solely for 
"bodily assault or defense."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303 (1980).  We also determined that a 
stun gun was "unusual" because it was not "in common use at the 
time" the Second Amendment was enacted, Caetano I, supra at 780-
781, and was also an "unusual weapon" in terms of the number of 
persons who own them (as compared to firearms) and in terms of 
its use (in that it is not readily adaptable to use in the 
military and is ineffective for hunting and target shooting).  
Id. at 781. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, 
and remanded the case for further proceedings.  In a per curiam 
decision, the Supreme Court declared: 
 
"The [Supreme Judicial] [C]ourt offered three 
explanations to support its holding that the Second 
Amendment does not extend to stun guns.  First, the court 
explained that stun guns are not protected because they 
'were not in common use at the time of the Second 
Amendment's enactment.'  [Caetano I, 470 Mass. at 781].  
This is inconsistent with Heller's clear statement that the 
Second Amendment 'extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that 
were not in existence at the time of the founding.'  [554 
U.S. at 582]. 
 
 
"The court next asked whether stun guns are 'dangerous 
per se at common law and unusual,' [Caetano I, 470 Mass. at 
781], in an attempt to apply one 'important limitation on 
the right to keep and carry arms,' [Heller, 554 U.S. at 
627.  See id.] (referring to 'the historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual 
weapons"').  In so doing, the court concluded that stun 
guns are 'unusual' because they are 'a thoroughly modern 
invention.'  [Caetano I, supra].  By equating 'unusual' 
with 'in common use at the time of the Second Amendment's 
11 
 
 
enactment,' the court's second explanation is the same as 
the first; it is inconsistent with Heller for the same 
reason. 
 
 
"Finally, the court used 'a contemporary lens' and 
found 'nothing in the record to suggest that [stun guns] 
are readily adaptable to use in the military.'  [Caetano I, 
470 Mass. at 781].  But Heller rejected the proposition 
'that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.'  
[554 U.S. at 624-625]. 
 
 
"For these three reasons, the explanation the . . . 
court offered for upholding the law contradicts this 
Court's precedent."  
 
Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1027-1028.  The Supreme Court did not 
opine as to whether electrical weapons are protected under the 
Second Amendment or, if they are protected, whether § 131J is 
nonetheless constitutional.3 
 
Having received guidance from the Supreme Court in Caetano 
II, we now conclude that stun guns are "arms" within the 
protection of the Second Amendment.  Therefore, under the Second 
Amendment, the possession of stun guns may be regulated, but not 
absolutely banned.  Restrictions may be placed on the categories 
of persons who may possess them, licenses may be required for 
their possession, and those licensed to possess them may be 
                                                          
 
 
3 In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito 
expressed his view that electrical weapons are protected by the 
Second Amendment and that Massachusetts's "categorical ban of 
such weapons therefore violates the Second Amendment."  Caetano 
v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028-1033 (2016) (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Alito also stressed that 
this court's decision did "a grave disservice to vulnerable 
individuals like [the defendant] who must defend themselves 
because the State will not."  Id. at 1029. 
12 
 
 
barred from carrying them in sensitive places, such as schools 
and government buildings.  But the absolute prohibition in 
§ 131J that bars all civilians from possessing or carrying stun 
guns, even in their home, is inconsistent with the Second 
Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional. 
 
Having so found, we must now decide whether § 131J is 
facially invalid and therefore must be struck down in its 
entirety, or whether it is only partially invalid and can be 
narrowed in its application to preserve its constitutionality.  
When confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, a court 
strives "to limit the solution to the problem."  Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006).  
As part of limiting the solution to the problem, a court may 
choose to "enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a 
statute while leaving other applications in force, see United 
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960), or to sever its 
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact, United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227-229 (2005)."  Ayotte, supra 
at 328-329.  See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508-509 (2010). 
 
In Ayotte, supra at 329-330, the Supreme Court identified 
three "interrelated principles" that should inform a court's 
approach when it confronts a constitutional flaw in a statute.  
First, a court should "try not to nullify more of a 
13 
 
 
legislature's work than is necessary, for . . . '[a] ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected 
representatives of the people.'"  Id. at 329, quoting Regan v. 
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion).  See 
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008) ("facial challenges threaten to short 
circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the 
will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent 
with the [United States] Constitution").  "Accordingly, the 
'normal rule' is that 'partial, rather than facial, invalidation 
is the required course,' such that a 'statute may . . . be 
declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but 
otherwise left intact.'"  Ayotte, supra, quoting Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985). 
 
Second, "mindful that our constitutional mandate and 
institutional competence are limited," a court should restrain 
itself from "'rewrit[ing] [S]tate law to conform it to 
constitutional requirements[,]' even as [a court] strive[s] to 
salvage it."  Ayotte, supra at 329, quoting Virginia v. American 
Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).  A court's 
"ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail 
quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly 
[the court has] already articulated the background 
14 
 
 
constitutional rules at issue and how easily [it] can articulate 
the remedy."  Ayotte, supra. 
 
Third, "the touchstone for any decision about remedy is 
legislative intent, for a court cannot 'use its remedial powers 
to circumvent the intent of the legislature.'"  Id. at 330, 
quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  "After finding 
an application or portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must 
next ask:  Would the legislature have preferred what is left of 
its statute to no statute at all?"  Ayotte, supra. 
   
Applying these three "interrelated principles," we are 
confident that the Legislature would prefer partial invalidation 
to facial invalidation if the scope of the stun gun statute 
could be narrowed without the "quintessentially legislative 
work" of rewriting State law.  See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329.  
Although stun guns, like handguns, are weapons "typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes," see 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, stun guns, like handguns, are weapons 
that can injure or kill and, in the wrong hands, can be used for 
many unlawful or reckless purposes.  An electrical device or 
weapon falls within the prohibition of § 131J only if the 
electrical current, impulse, wave, or beam it emits "is designed 
15 
 
 
to incapacitate temporarily, injure or kill."4  G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131J.  As we noted in Caetano I, "stun guns deliver a charge 
of up to 50,000 volts," and "are designed to incapacitate a 
target by causing disabling pain, uncontrolled muscular 
contractions, and general disruption of the central nervous 
system."  Caetano I, 470 Mass. at 782, citing Amnesty 
International, Less than Lethal?  Use of Stun Weapons in U.S. 
Law Enforcement, 1-2, 6-7 & nn.17, 18 (2008), https://www 
.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/amr510102008en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JK53-XMR3]. 
 
Our appellate case law reveals that stun guns have been 
used to incapacitate a victim before killing him by 
strangulation, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 713 
(2016) (victim "was assaulted repeatedly with a stun gun and 
eventually strangled to death"); to assault victims to force 
them to submit to unwanted sexual intercourse, see Commonwealth 
v. Gomes, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 2 (2002) ("The assailant drove 
the complainants to a remote area . . . , displayed a stun gun, 
                                                          
 
 
4 Axon Enterprise, Inc. (formerly known as TASER 
International, Inc., until April, 2017), the leading 
manufacturer of stun guns, notes that its conducted electrical 
weapon products, including stun guns, "are often used in 
aggressive confrontations that may result in serious, permanent 
bodily injury or death to those involved" and that its "products 
may be associated with these injuries."  See Axon Enterprise, 
Inc., United States Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-
K, 2017 Annual Report, at 15, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar 
/data/1069183/000106918318000020/a10kaaxn123117.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/Y3WY-SPKR]. 
16 
 
 
and forced them to have sex with him"); and to punish and 
control victims of domestic violence, see Commonwealth v. 
Melton, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 552, 553 (2010) (victim, who "suffered 
frequent beatings, threats of violence and sexual abuse, and 
continuous emotional intimidation," "testified that the 
defendant had used various weapons against her, such as a 
knife, stun gun, and belt, and detailed certain incidents of 
abuse").  Although less lethal than a handgun, stun guns can be 
used to conceal the torture and abuse of another person because 
they "can deliver repeated or prolonged shocks without leaving 
marks."  Caetano I, 470 Mass. at 782, citing Amnesty 
International, supra at 1-2.  See Turner & Jumbelic, Stun Gun 
Injuries in the Abuse and Death of a Seven-Month-Old Infant, 48 
J. Forensic Sci. 1 (2003). 
 
The Legislature was so concerned with the risk of their 
misuse that, in 1986, it initially barred all individuals, 
including law enforcement officers, from possessing electrical 
weapons.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131J, inserted by St. 1986, 
c. 212.  In 2004, the Legislature amended the law to its current 
form, which continues to bar civilian possession of stun guns, 
but exempts law enforcement officers from the ban when using 
electrical weapons in the discharge of their official duties as 
well as those who supply these weapons to law enforcement 
17 
 
 
officers.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131J, as amended by St. 2004, 
c. 170, § 1. 
 
We recognize that declaring § 131J to be facially invalid 
would leave in place no restriction on stun gun possession by 
anyone in Massachusetts.  Unless and until the Legislature were 
to act to replace § 131J with a revised version that would pass 
muster under the Second Amendment, facial invalidation of § 131J 
would mean that there would be no law in place preventing stun 
guns from being sold to or possessed by violent felons, persons 
convicted of domestic violence, convicted drug dealers, 
children, or the mentally ill.  But, having carefully considered 
whether the scope of the stun gun statute could be narrowed to 
render it constitutional without the "quintessentially 
legislative work" of rewriting State law, see Ayotte, 546 U.S. 
at 329, we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it 
cannot be saved. 
 
We are mindful that the Legislature has expressly adopted 
the principle of severability of statutory provisions.  See 
G. L. c. 4, § 6, Eleventh, inserted by St. 1983, c. 210 ("The 
provisions of any statute shall be deemed severable, and if any 
part of any statute shall be adjudged unconstitutional or 
invalid, such judgment shall not affect other valid parts 
thereof").  Where a provision of a statute is held 
unconstitutional, "the valid portions of the statute should be 
18 
 
 
preserved if the invalid provision is separable from the 
remainder of the statute."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 
676, 681 (2013).  But, where § 131J provides that, apart from 
law enforcement officers and suppliers, "[n]o person shall 
possess a [stun gun]," there is no provision that can be severed 
to save its constitutionality.  The invalid provision here is 
"[n]o person," and the statute does not make sense if that 
provision were severed. 
 
We also recognize that the Supreme Court in Heller made 
clear that the Second Amendment does not prevent a legislature 
from enacting statutes that prohibit the possession of arms by 
certain classes of persons who pose a special danger to society, 
such as felons and the mentally ill.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626-627.  In contrast with the ban on stun guns, the State has 
not barred all civilian possession of firearms; instead, it has 
prohibited certain classes of persons from possessing firearms 
by promulgating licensing requirements.  General Laws c. 140, 
§ 129C, mandates that no person "shall own or possess any 
firearm, rifle, shotgun or ammunition unless he has been issued 
a firearm identification card" (FID card) under G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129B.  And § 129B (1) provides that a person shall be issued 
an FID card "if it appears that the applicant is not a 
prohibited person," which includes persons convicted of felonies 
or adjudicated a youthful offender or delinquent child; persons 
19 
 
 
convicted of violent crimes (as defined in G. L. c. 140, § 121) 
or misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment for more than two 
years; persons who have been committed to a hospital or an 
institution for mental illness, alcohol, or substance abuse; and 
persons under the age of fifteen.  Because presumptively lawful 
prohibitions do not burden conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment, they fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment 
and are not subject to heightened scrutiny.  See Chief of Police 
of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 853 (2015).  See also 
Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 240-241 (2013) (we have 
"consistently held, without applying any level of heightened 
scrutiny, that the decisions in Heller and McDonald [v. Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742 (2010),] did not invalidate laws that require a 
person to have a[n] [FID] card to possess a firearm in one's 
home or place of business"). 
 
If the Legislature had made it a crime only for this class 
of "prohibited persons" to possess a stun gun (or a comparable 
class), there could be no doubt that such a statute would be 
constitutional and that it would preserve much of what the 
Legislature intended through its broader ban.  But we cannot 
ourselves limit the application of § 131J to "prohibited 
persons" without engaging in the "quintessentially legislative 
work" of rewriting State law.  See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329.  We 
would first need to decide whether the class of "prohibited 
20 
 
 
persons" should be the same for the possession of stun guns as 
for the possession of firearms, which are more lethal than stun 
guns.  We would then need to decide whether a person must be 
licensed to possess a stun gun, as is required to possess a 
firearm.5  And if we decided that a license should be required, 
we would need to consider if we should adopt the same licensing 
scheme for stun guns as exists for firearms, or some variant of 
that licensing scheme. 
 
We therefore come to the conclusion that we cannot save 
§ 131J through partial invalidation and must declare it to be 
facially invalid.  Because this will invalidate the 
Legislature's absolute ban and leave no lesser restriction on 
the possession of stun guns in its place, and because we 
recognize that the Legislature may wish to do what we cannot 
(revise the statute in a manner that will preserve its 
constitutionality), we will direct that the entry of the 
judgment after the date of our issuance of the rescript in this 
                                                          
 
 
5 We note that prohibited persons may be barred from 
possessing a weapon without there being a licensing system.  
General Laws c. 140, § 122D, prohibits various categories of 
persons from purchasing or possessing "self-defense spray," 
which is defined in G. L. c. 140, § 122C (a), to mean "chemical 
mace, pepper spray or any device or instrument which contains, 
propels or emits a liquid, gas, powder or other substance 
designed to incapacitate."  But, unlike with firearms, 
individuals over the age of eighteen need not be licensed to 
purchase or possess self-defense spray.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 122C (d).  The Legislature simply made it a criminal violation 
for a person to purchase or possess self-defense spray if he or 
she is within a category of persons enumerated in § 122D. 
21 
 
 
case be delayed in order to allow the Legislature adequate time 
to amend the statute in light of this opinion, if it so chooses.  
See, e.g., Moot v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 456 Mass. 
309, 310 (2010) (in earlier case, Department of Environmental 
Protection regulation had been declared to be invalid, but court 
"issued a stay of the entry of judgment after rescript in the 
Superior Court to permit the Legislature to take any action it 
might deem appropriate in light of our opinion"); Goodridge v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 344 (2003) (marriage 
licensing statute declared unconstitutional because it could not 
be construed to permit same-sex couples to marry, but court 
ordered that "[e]ntry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days 
to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem 
appropriate in light of this opinion"). 
 
Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment (a) declaring that the absolute prohibition 
in G. L. c. 140, § 131J, against the civilian possession of stun 
guns is in violation of the Second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and therefore that § 131J in its current 
form, as amended by St. 2004, c. 170, § 1, is facially invalid; 
and (b) vacating the District Court's order denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of unlawfully 
possessing a stun gun in violation of § 131J, and directing the 
judge to allow the motion and to dismiss that charge.  The entry 
22 
 
 
of that judgment shall be stayed for sixty days after the date 
of the issuance of the rescript in this case.  In the meantime, 
to avoid needless delay in the adjudication of the defendant's 
remaining criminal charges, the Commonwealth may treat the 
charge under § 131J as having been dismissed, and may proceed 
with its prosecution of the remaining charges, without awaiting 
the entry of the judgment in the county court to that effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.