Case Title: Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55

Docket Number: 53693

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 Nev, Advance Opinion SS.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

|GABRIELA SAAVEDRA-SANDOVAL,
Appellant,

v8.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
Respondent.

No, 53693

      
    
 
   
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
   

 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing'a tort action.

Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge.
Affirmed,

Brian K. Griffith and Jorge Corral, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Phillips, Spallas & Angstadt, LLC, and Brenda H. Entzminger and
Jennifer L. Lewkowski, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

/By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

‘To avoid dismissal of a case, NRCP 4(i) requires a party who
{fails to effectuate service of process within 120 days from the filing of the
complaint to demonstrate good cause for the delay of service. In 2004,
NRCP 4()) was amended to also require the party to move to enlarge the
time for service prior to the expiration of the 120-day service period. If the
party fails to move to enlarge the time for service within the 120-day

J - 34030

 
period, “the court shall take that failure into consideration in determining
good cause for an extension of time.” NRCP 4().

In this appeal, we examine the effect of this amendment on
the “good cause” analysis we articulated in Scrimer v, District Court, 116
Nev. 507, 998 P.2d 1190 (2000), to obtain an enlargement of time to
effectuate service of process, We conclude that the 2004 amendment to
NRCP 4(i) requires district courts to first consider if good cause exists for
filing an untimely motion for enlargement of time. Only upon a showing
of good cause for the delay in filing the motion to enlarge time should the

court then employ a complete Scrimer analysis to determine whether good

 

cause exists to enlarge the time for service under NRCP 4(i). Here,

 

because appellant Gabriela Saavedra-Sandoval failed to demonstrate good
cause for filing her untimely motion to enlarge time, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting respondent Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc’s motion to dismiss for failure to effect timely service of
process. We therefore affirm.
FACTS

Tn 2005, Saavedra-Sandoval allegedly slipped and fell while
shopping at a Wal-Mart store in Las Vegas. Saavedra-Sandoval's
resulting injuries prompted her to file a complaint against Wal-Mart on
June 6, 2007. Hight days after Saavedra-Sandoval filed her complaint, the

   
   
   
  
  

process server she hired served process on a co-manager at the Wal-Mart
store where the alleged incident occurred. Wal-Mart's registered agent
under NRS 14.020(1), upon whom service should have been made, is The
Corporation Trust Company of Nevada. In an affidavit, the process server
incorrectly stated that the co-manager was the statutorily designated
agent authorized to accept service of process on behalf of Wal-Mart.

 

 
ney a

 

On October 7, 2008, over one year after Saavedra-Sandoval
filed her complaint, she again improperly served Wal-Mart by serving its
claims investigators with a three-day notice of intent to take default. The
claims investigators forwarded the default notice to Wal-Mart, and Wal-
Mart immediately filed an answer on October 9, 2008, to avoid a default.
Later that month, Wal-Mart moved to amend its answer to include

insufficient service of process as a defonse after discovering that it had

 

never been properly served with the original summons and complaint.
This motion was unopposed, the district court granted the motion, and
‘Wal-Mart filed its amended answer on February 4, 2009.

In an attempt to comply with NRCP 4(j), Saavedra-Sandoval
filed a motion on February 12, 2009, seeking to enlarge the time required
to effect service of process upon Wal-Mart. At the time she filed the
motion, over one year had passed since the expiration of the 120-day time
limit provided in NRCP 4(j) to serve a summons and complaint. Saavedra-
Sandoval argued that good cause existed for her untimely motion because
she retained a process server who personally served a Wal-Mart co-
manager and then subsequently sent a notice of intent to take default, to
which Wal-Mart responded. She did not explain why she did not properly
serve Wal-Mart's registered agent.!_ Wal-Mart opposed Saavedra-

'Saavedra-Sandoval also argues on appeal that Wal-Mart waived its
objection to improper service because Wal-Mart did not include this
objection in its first answer as required by NRCP 12(b). See NRCP
12(h)(1) (@ party waives the defense of insufficient service of process “if it
is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive
pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by [NRCP] 15(a) to be made
as a matter of course”). However, Saavedra-Sandoval did not raise this
argument in the district court, and thus, we will not consider it on appeal.

continued on next page...

 
Sandoval’s motion and concurrently filed a countermotion to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that improperly serving a co-manager of a Wal-Mart
store is not good cause for an enlargement of time. The district court
agreed and denied Saavedra-Sandoval’s motion to enlarge time, finding
that she failed to demonstrate good cause to effectuate service within the
120-day time limit, and granted Wal-Mart's countermotion to dismiss for
failure to effect timely service of process.
DISCUSSION

On appeal, Saavedr:

 

jandoval argues that good cause
supported her motion to enlarge time, and that the district court erred in
denying her motion and dismissing her case for failure to comply with
NRCP 4, This court reviews an order “granting a motion to dismiss for
failure to effect timely service of process ... for an abuse of discretion.”
Abreu_v, Gilmer, 115 Nev. 308, 312-13, 985 P.24 746, 749 (1999).
Saavedra-Sandoval filed her complaint on June 6, 2007; however, she did
not file her motion to enlarge the time for service until February 12, 2009,
over one year after the expiration of NRCP 4()'s 120-day time period for
service of process.

Prior to 2004, NRCP 4(i) required a party to serve the
summons and complaint within 120 days or the action would be dismissed,
unless the party could show good cause for not effectuating service in a
timely manner. See ADKT No. 276 (Order Amending the Nevada Rules of

continued

See Mason _v. Cuisenaire, 122 Nev. 48, 48, 128 P.3d 446, 449 (2006)
(Generally, failure to raise an argument in the district court proceedings
precludes a party from presenting the argument on appeal.”).

 

 
Civil Procedure, July 26, 2004), Subsequently, in 2004, NRCP 4(i) was
amended to add a requirement that a party must file a motion seeking
enlargement of time to serve process before the expiration of the 120-day
time period. See id. ‘The current version of NRCP 4(i) states

If a service of the summons and complaint is not
made upon a defendant within 120 days after the
filing of the complaint, the action shall be
dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice
upon the court's own initiative with notice to such
party or upon motion, unless the party on whose
behalf such service was required files a motion to
enlarge the time for service and shows good cause
why such service was not made within that period.
If the party on whose behalf such service was
required fails to file a motion to enlarge the time
for service before the 120-day service period
expires, the court shall take that failure into
consideration in determining good cause for an
extension of time, Upon a showing of good cause,
the court shall extend the time for service and set
a reasonable date by which service should be
made,

 

Because of this amendment, Nevada's rule differs from the federal rule,
which requires only a showing of good cause for a party's failure to effect
proper service within 120 days. See FRCP 4(m).

At issue in this case is the effect of filing an untimely motion
to enlarge time for service of process under NRCP 4(j).

The 2004 amendment to NRCP 4(i) creates two requirements
to enlarge time to serve process. First, the party on whose behalf service

is required must file a motion to enlarge time and, second, he or she must

demonstrate good cause to do so. The drafter’s note to the Nevada rule
provides clear evidence that the drafters of NRCP 4(i) intended to deviate
from the federal rule by enacting changes to encourage litigants to

 

 
promptly prosecute matters by properly serving the opposing party in a
timely manner. To achieve this objective, “the Nevada rule does not give
the district court discretion to enlarge the time for service in the absence
of a showing of good cause” and “the district court is limited to enlarging
the time for service only upon a motion to enlarge the 120-day service
period.” NRCP 4(j) drafter’s note. Thus, the rule creates a threshold
question for the district court, requiring it to first evaluate whether good
cause exists for a party's failure to file a timely motion secking
enlargement of time. Failure to demonstrate such good cause ends the
district court's inquiry.

In light of this analysis, we must determine whether the 2004
amendment to NRCP 4(i) alters the approach set forth in Scrimer_v.
District Court, 116 Nev. 507, 998 P.2d 1190 (2000),? We conclude that

“In Scrimer, this court described ten factors district courts should
consider when evaluating whether a party has adequately demonstrated
good cause to extend the time for service of process of a summons and
complaint. 116 Nev. at 516, 998 P.2d at 1195-96. The enumerated
‘Scrimer factors are:

(2) difficulties in locating the defendant, (2) the
defendant’s efforts at evading service or
concealment of improper service until after the
120-day period has lapsed, (3) the plaintiffs
diligence in attempting to serve the defendant, (4)
difficulties encountered by counsel, (6) the running
of the applicable statute of limitations, (6) the
parties’ good faith attempts to settle the litigation
during the 120-day period, (7) the lapse of time
between the end of the 120-day period and the
actual service of process on the defendant, (8) the
prejudice to the defendant caused by the plaintiffs
delay in serving process, (9) the defendant's
continued on next page .

 

 

 
only upon a showing of good cause to file an untimely motion to enlarge
time for service should the district court then apply Serimer’s good-cause
factors for the delay in service. However, in the initial analysis of an
untimely motion, some of Scrimer’s factors may be applicable to determine
if good cause exists for filing a tardy motion. The Scrimer factors a court
should consider are those that would impede the plaintiff's attempts at
service and, in turn, could result in the filing of an untimely motion to
enlarge the time to serve the defendant with process: “(2) the defendant's
efforts at evading service or concealment of improper service until after
the 120-day period has elapsed, (3) the plaintiff's diligence in attempting
to serve the defendant, ...and (9) the defendant's knowledge of the
existence of the lawsuit.” Scrimer, 116 Nov. at 516, 998 P.2d at 1196.
‘These factors are not exhaustive, but any additional factors the district
court considers should similarly relate to difficulties encountered by a
party in attempting service that demonstrate good cause for filing a tardy

 

motion because the purpose of NRCP 4(i) is to encourage prompt litigation
of disputes. Only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing the
motion to enlarge time should the court then engage in a complete Scrimer
analysis to determine whether good cause also supports the request for

enlargement of time for service of process under NRCP 4(i).

2. continued

knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit, and (10)
any extensions of time for service granted by the
district court.

 

 
oe

 

Here, Saavedra-Sandoval only addressed the second step of
the analysis required by NRCP 4(i). She argued that good cause existed to
enlarge time for service of process because she enlisted a process server
who improperly served the co-manager of a Wal-Mart store, and then she
subsequently sent a notice of default to Wal-Mart claims investigators, to
which Wal-Mart ultimately responded. However, none of the Scrimer
factors justify an extension of time in these circumstances. Saavedra
Sandoval did not contend that she experienced any difficulty in locating
the person upon whom she was supposed to serve the summons and
complaint, nor did she allege that Wal-Mart evaded service. Additionally,
Saavedra-Sandoval did not use due diligence to properly ascertain Wal-
Mart’s registered agent, information that is readily available through the
Secretary of State's office. Furthermore, NRS 14.020(2) and NRS 14.030
describe the person upon whom service of process for a corporation must
be made, and failure to properly serve that agent by the statutorily
prescribed means is not, by itself, good cause for granting an enlargement
of time to serve process.

When Wal-Mart replied to Saavedra-Sandoval’s notice of
default, it subsequently moved to amend its answer to assert insufficient
service of process as a defense. Saavedra-Sandoval did not oppose this
request. Instead, she filed a motion to enlarge time after the district court
granted Wal-Mart leave to amend, but this was over one year after the
expiration of the 120-day period for effectuating proper service. This
inexplicable lapse in time demonstrates that Saavedra-Sandoval lacked
good cause for filing a late motion to enlarge time for service.

Even if we concluded that good cause to enlarge time existed,
which we do not, Saavedra-Sandoval's request would still fail because she

 
did not address, and the district court did not consider, why she did not
file a motion to enlarge time within the 120-day period. NRCP 4()

 

requires a party to first show good cause for filing an untimely motion.
While good cause for failing to file a timely motion and good cause for
granting an enlargement of time may be the same in some instances,
failure to address the issue of cause for filing an untimely motion ends the
district court’s inquiry. Because we conclude that Saavedra-Sandoval
failed to address, and therefore failed to demonstrate, good cause for
jon of the 120-day deadline

 

waiting for over one year after expi
prescribed in NRCP 4(j) to move for enlargement of time to properly serve
Wal-Mart, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her
motion and granting Wal-Mart's countermotion to dismiss the complaint.
‘The district court reached the proper conclusion for the wrong
reason. It found that Saavedra-Sandoval failed to demonstrate good cause
for granting an extension of time to effectuate service of process but did
not address whether she demonstrated good cause for filing an untimely
motion to enlarge time for service of process. This court will affirm a

district court's order if the district court reached the correct result, even if
for the wrong reason. Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 575, 747 P.2d
}230, 233 (1987).

 

 
oo ee

 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

Hardesty

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