Case Title: Zimmer v. Stephenson

Citation: 403 P.2d 343, 66 Wash. 2d 477

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1965-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
66 Wn.2d 477 (1965) 403 P.2d 343 FRED ZIMMER, Appellant, v. B.M. STEPHENSON, Respondent.[*] No. 37432. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. June 17, 1965. *478 J.D. McMannis, for appellant. Evans C. Bunker and F.L. Stotler, for respondent. HAMILTON, J. In the summer of 1959, plaintiff owned a field of ripe wheat immediately adjoining defendant's property. On the afternoon of July 23, 1959, a dry, hot day in Whitman County, when the wind was allegedly blowing toward plaintiff's land, defendant undertook to plow a fireguard upon and around his land with an industrial type D-6 Caterpillar tractor, a piece of equipment not particularly designed for farm work. During the course of defendant's operation, plaintiff's wheat caught fire. The fire caused a substantial crop loss. More than 2 years, but within 3 years, after the fire, plaintiff initiated this suit seeking damages. In support of his claim, plaintiff alleges, in essence, that the fire was caused by a spark or piece of burning carbon cast onto his property from the exhaust stack of defendant's Caterpillar, and that such would not have occurred had the Caterpillar been properly equipped with a spark arrester or had defendant otherwise observed suitable safety precautions. Following a pretrial conference, the superior court by order dismissed plaintiff's action upon the ground that it had not been commenced within the time limited by law. In so doing the court applied the 2-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.130.[1] Plaintiff has appealed, contending that the 3-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(1),[2] applies. [1] Essentially, the question presented on appeal is whether plaintiff's action is one which would, in common *479 law pleading, be characterized as an "action of trespass" or an "action of trespass on the case." The reason for this return to the honored but ancient distinction in forms of action springs from the case of Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Co., 35 Wash. 1, 8, 76 Pac. 298 (1904), wherein this court stated: We have since followed and reiterated this rule in Denney v. Everett, 46 Wash. 342, 89 Pac. 934 (1907); Welch v. Seattle & Montana R.R. Co., 56 Wash. 97, 105 Pac. 166 (1909); Clark Lloyd Lbr. Co. v. Puget Sound & Cascade Ry. Co., 92 Wash. 601, 159 Pac. 774 (1916); White v. King Cy., 103 Wash. 327, 174 Pac. 3 (1918); Pettigrew v. McCoy-Loggie Timber Co., 138 Wash. 619, 245 Pac. 22 (1926). And, we adhered to the principle of the rule in distinguishing nuisance from trespass in Weller v. Snoqualmie Falls Lbr. Co., 155 Wash. 526, 285 Pac. 446 (1930) and Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn.2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952). In this latter respect, however, we pause to make clear that the theory of nuisance is not here involved. [2] Generally speaking, in common law pleading, trespass was that form of action whereby recovery of damages could be sought for an injury to the person, property, or relative rights of a plaintiff when the injury was committed with force, actual or implied, and was immediate and not consequential. Shipman, Common Law Pleading, ch. 2, § 15, p. 50 (2d ed. 1895). And, trespass on the case was the form of action available for seeking recovery for torts committed without actual or implied force; or if, though the act was committed with force, the matter affected was not tangible, or the injury was not immediate, but consequential. *480 Shipman, Common Law Pleading, ch. 2, § 17, p. 86 (2d ed. 1895). In Clark Lloyd Lbr. Co. v. Puget Sound & Cascade Ry. Co., supra, at page 605, we quoted the traditional distinction between actions in trespass and trespass on the case from 3 Blackstone's Commentaries (Lewis' ed.), p. 123, as follows: We then further pointed out that (p. 605) In the instant case, the superior court concluded that defendant in plowing a fireguard upon his premises was engaged in a lawful act, and that the claimed damages flowing therefrom were consequential rather than immediate or direct. Thus, the superior court applied the 2-year statute. We are constrained to disagree with the superior court for three reasons. [3] First. The action of the defendant, which plaintiff alleges produced the loss claimed, was not simply the act of plowing a fireguard. It was the act of plowing a fireguard with an improperly equipped, spark-emitting tractor on a hot, dry, windy day in close proximity to a field of ripe inflammable wheat. Plaintiff thus alleged a wrongful and affirmative act, not a culpable and passive omission, from which the fire complained of directly and immediately resulted. If plaintiff's allegations be true, defendant's action was as wrongful and direct as though he had stood in his *481 field and thrown a burning coal into plaintiff's field, and the results as immediate. As stated in the early case of Jordan v. Wyatt, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 151, 156, 47 Am. Dec. 720 (1847): In our opinion the action of trespass lies. Second. The actions of trespass and trespass on the case have been, during the era of their use, regarded as concurrent remedies, where they approach the dividing line so closely as to scarcely be distinguishable. Again quoting from Jordan v. Wyatt, supra, pp. 157, 159: In the instant case, the due administration of justice does not require exclusion of the action of trespass. The action of the defendant, as alleged by plaintiff, would, if found to be negligent, constitute the immediate and direct cause of the injury claimed. The merits of the action would be the same under either form of action. No sound reason exists to search for a technical distinction. Third. The direct-indirect distinction between trespass and case is "now rejected by most courts, and would appear to be slowly on its way to oblivion." Prosser, Torts § 13, p. 66 (3d ed.). Restatement, Torts §§ 158, 165, has abandoned the distinction, and now regards any tortious intrusion of foreign matter onto the property of another as a trespass. The common law, along with its forms of action, has long been recognized as capable of growth and expansion in keeping with the necessities of modern society. The writings of Chitty and Coke have long been absent from the library shelves of most practicing attorneys, and, if for no other *483 reason, the fine, though oftentimes indiscernible distinctions, between the ancient writs of trespass and trespass on the case should not be unduly preserved in aid of a statute of limitations. The proper rule should now be as enunciated in Restatement, Torts § 165, p. 390: Under this test, plaintiff alleged an action for negligent trespass upon real property. For the reasons stated, we conclude this action should be governed by the 3-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the superior court is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to permit plaintiff to proceed with his action. DONWORTH, WEAVER, and OTT, JJ., and JOHNSON, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 403 P.2d 343. [1] "An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued." RCW 4.16.130. [2] "Within three years: "(1) An action for waste or trespass upon real property;" RCW 4.16.080(1).