Case Title: Mobile Gas Service Corporation v. Rosa Robinson et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061727

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 01/30/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1061727
_________________________
Mobile Gas Service Corporation
v.
Rosa Robinson, individually and as administratrix and
personal representative of the estate of Harriett Robinson,
deceased, and as mother and next friend of David McMeans,
Kelvin McMeans, and Harriett Johnson
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-05-3587)
WOODALL, Justice.
Mobile Gas Service Corporation ("the Company") appeals
from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Rosa
Robinson, individually and as administratrix and personal
1061727
2
representative of the estate of Harriett Robinson, deceased,
and as mother and next friend of David McMeans, Kelvin
McMeans, and Harriett Johnson, minors, in Robinson's wrongful-
death/personal-injury action against the Company alleging
carbon-monoxide poisoning at a house Robinson was renting at
306 4th Avenue, Chickasaw.  We reverse and remand.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The Company's Policies
Facts relevant to this appeal occurred as early as 1985.
In two separate incidents that year, a total of nine people
died and others were injured when they were overcome by carbon
monoxide in dwellings located in Mobile County and having
natural-gas service supplied by the Company. In both
incidents, the primary culprit was a customer-owned central-
heating unit situated in a closet or hallway.  In the first
incident, carbon monoxide circulated throughout the residence
because the blower door of the furnace had been removed,
thereby allowing the blower to direct the products of furnace
combustion throughout the building.
The 1985 incidents resulted in a change in the Company's
practices and policies toward customer-owned appliances that
1061727
3
pose potential carbon-monoxide hazards. Until the 1985
incidents, the Company's practice was merely to place a red
warning tag on any customer-owned appliance found to be
hazardous.  Although the service technician would take a copy
of the warning tag to the Company's office, the Company,
nevertheless, initiated gas service at the residence without
any follow-up measures to ensure that repairs were ever made.
As a result of the deaths and injuries in 1985, George
Yon, then "vice president of operations" for the Company,
conducted an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Company's
warning practices.  He discovered that -- in thousands of
cases -- the customers had simply removed the red warning tags
and continued to use the hazardous appliances in their
unrepaired condition.  Consequently, he amended the Company's
policies 
and 
procedures 
in 
various 
written 
segments
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the manual").  As
amended, 
the 
manual 
included 
a 
"hazardous 
conditions
checklist," which stated, in pertinent part:
"Listed below are hazardous conditions which, when
encountered in the field, must result in the
serviceman tagging an appliance out-of-service or
refusing to turn gas on to the premises.  Some
situations will also require that the appliance be
disconnected, such as:
1061727
Actually, the term "red tag" refers to a red envelope
1
into which a customer's copy of the hazardous-appliance report
is placed and that is physically affixed to the appliance. 
4
"!
Appliance producing unsafe levels of
CO [carbon monoxide]
"!
Faulty safety control
"!
....
"!
Situations 
as 
described 
in 
...
Hazardous Appliance Report."
(Second emphasis added.)
Regarding the "Hazardous Appliance Report," sometimes
referred to as a "red tag,"  the manual stated: 
1
"This three-part form and envelope will be used
by [the Company] to notify a customer that an
appliance has been turned off due to a defective and
unsafe condition.  This form will be completed in
triplicate including the obtaining of the customer's
signature.  The signature will provide evidence that
the contents of the form have been explained to the
customer and the customer has been given a copy.
"The top copy will be folded and placed in the
unsealed envelope and attached to the defective
appliance by the string provided.
"The middle copy will be turned in with the
serviceman's service request order for that address.
"The third copy will be left with the customer
or his representative.
"The customer shall be instructed either they or
their contractor complete the form and mail to the
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5
[C]ompany 
in 
the 
self-addressed, 
postage-paid
envelope attached to the appliance.
"If more than one appliance is defective at the
same address, a separate report must be completed
for each.
"Each day the Customer Service Assistant will be
responsible for entering the 'Red Tag' information
into the computer utilizing the Company copies
attached to the servicemen's service request orders.
"The 'Hazardous Appliance Reports' will be kept
on file in the Customer Service Dispatching Office.
This document will be available at all times to
field employees. ...  These forms will be maintained
for no less than five (5) years.
"On customer or contractor copies received by
mail which indicate the work has been completed, the
word 'Mail' will be entered into the tag file where
the serviceman's work number normally appears.  This
action will not clear the appliance red tag from the
computer files [emphasis in original].  Only our
visual inspection will permit clearing from the red
tag system files.
"Subsequently, if we return to the same service
address for any reason, a 'Red Tag' order form will
be issued.  It is the responsibility of the
Serviceman to re-examine that appliance.  If it has
been repaired or replaced, he will issue a filed
service request showing that he 'removed' the tag.
Upon receiving that day's service request forms, the
Customer Service Assistant will update the 'Red Tag
File' showing the 'Tag Removed.'
"However, if the appliance has not been repaired
or replaced, the serviceman will proceed as follows:
"1.
If his order requires the meter to be turned on
(including regular Turn-On, New Sets, Old Sets,
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6
etc.), he will turn on the meter and disconnect
the faulty appliance, if possible.
"2.
If his order requires other services (including
Routine Changes, Change for Test, etc.) and the
meter is on, he will (if possible) disconnect
the faulty appliance and notify the customer
that repairs must be made, and that a report
will 
be 
made 
to 
the 
Building 
Inspection
Services.
"3.
No later than the next regular scheduled work
day, a Service Department clerk will mail to
the proper building inspection authority a copy
of the 'Hazardous Appliance Report' for that
address.  The clerk will then initial and date
the original Company copy to indicate that the
report 
has 
been 
mailed 
to 
the 
proper
authorities.
"4.
All 
local 
and 
county 
building 
inspection
authorities in our service area have indicated
they will inspect the defective appliance(s)
and instruct the owner/occupants to have the
necessary repairs made within ten (10) days.
If corrections have not been made within ten
(10) days, they will instruct [the Company] to
turn off the meter or disconnect the service."
(Emphasis added except as otherwise noted.)
Each red tag contained 48 categories of hazardous
conditions for which an appliance was to be "turned off," with
appropriate boxes to be checked by the service personnel,
including the following:
"B2 ___ Badly corroded burners.
"....
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7
"S1 
___ 
Inoperative 
or 
disconnected 
controls
affecting safe operation of an appliance.
"....
"V4 ___ Products of combustion spill[ing] at [the]
diverter."
A key aspect of the Company's new policies contemplated
the coordination of its service personnel with municipal
building inspectors.  According to Yon, he forged an agreement
with the heads of building-inspection departments in all the
municipalities in which the Company provided service, pursuant
to which the inspectors would enforce customer compliance with
the Company's new red-tag policies.  Under this alleged
arrangement, whenever a customer failed to satisfy the Company
that a red-tagged appliance had been repaired or replaced, the
Company would send a hazardous-appliance report to the
appropriate building inspector, who, in turn, would inspect
the premises and, if necessary, order the Company to
discontinue natural-gas service to that customer until the
repairs were made.
However, the actual implementation of Yon's new policies
encountered 
some 
logistical 
difficulties. 
 
Municipal 
officials
complained that they did not have sufficient inspection
1061727
8
personnel to investigate all the hazardous-appliance reports
that were being sent them.  Consequently, building inspectors
requested that no more such reports be sent.  
Also, Yon's policy of refusing natural-gas service to
customers who ignored red-tag warnings created tension with
the Company's marketing division, which complained that strict
enforcement by the service division was causing a reduction in
the volume of the Company's natural-gas sales.  Yon retired in
1987.  Yon testified at trial that, at the time he retired,
his policies were still in effect and were being enforced.
Yon's successors, however, admittedly did not implement or
enforce his written policies.  In 2002, in particular, Alan
Hobbs removed language from the manual requiring the Company
to disconnect hazardous appliances.
B. The Robinson Residence
Meanwhile, on August 25, 1999, the Company received a
request for natural-gas service at a residence at 306 4th
Avenue in Chickasaw.  The Company's service personnel
inspected the appliances in the house and discovered a
central-heating unit (hereinafter referred to as "the CHU")
similar to the one involved in one of the 1985 incidents,
1061727
9
similarly situated in a central hallway closet, and similarly
defective.  The service technician filled out a hazardous-
appliance report, checking the boxes to indicate that the CHU
had (1) "[b]adly corroded burners," (2) "[i]noperative or
disconnected controls affecting safe operation of [the]
appliance," and (3) "[p]roducts of combustion spill[ing] at
[the] diverter."  Although the occupant was provided with a
copy of the hazardous-appliance report, gas service was,
nevertheless, initiated at the residence.  
In January 2004, Tyrone Wilson purchased the house.
Wilson owned a number of properties, which he, in turn, leased
to residents.  
On May 1, 2004, Rosa Robinson rented the house from
Wilson.  On June 3, 2004, one of the Company's service
technicians visited the residence at Robinson's request to
establish natural-gas service.  An inspection of the premises
revealed that the same hazardous conditions noted in the CHU
in the hazardous-appliance report completed in 1999 were still
present, 
namely, 
(1) 
"[b]adly 
corroded 
burners," 
(2)
"[i]noperative 
or 
disconnected 
controls 
affecting 
safe
operation of [the] appliance," and (3) "[p]roducts of
1061727
10
combustion spill[ing] at [the] diverter."  Indeed, the
technician 
discovered 
that 
the 
"disconnected 
controls"
included an important safety feature that had been "jumped
out," that is, the feature had been deliberately bypassed by
splicing wires.  This unauthorized bypass allowed the CHU to
operate without the blower door in place, which, in turn,
allowed the "products of combustion" -- including carbon
monoxide -- to diffuse throughout the residence.  Thus,
despite the issuance of a red-tag warning in 1999, the CHU had
not been repaired.    
The technician completed another hazardous-appliance
report.  In a space provided for "recommendations," the
technician wrote: "blower door switch."  Having thus retagged
the 
CHU 
for 
the 
unrepaired 
defects, 
the 
technician
extinguished the pilot light to the CHU and turned off the
valve in the natural-gas line leading to it.  However, he
installed a gas meter and turned on the natural-gas service to
the residence.  Robinson promptly delivered her copy of the
hazardous-appliance report to Wilson's secretary.
Approximately a week later, the Company sent a service
technician back to the residence to repair a gas leak in the
1061727
11
backyard.  At that time, the technician observed that the CHU
had not been repaired.
By December 2004, the CHU still had not been repaired.
Robinson made a number of unavailing requests of Wilson to
repair it.  In the meantime, she attempted to heat the house
with electric space heaters and the kitchen range.  Also
residing in the home at that time were Robinson's three minor
children, David McMeans, Kelvin McMeans, and Harriett Johnson,
as well as Harriett Robinson, her elderly mother.  
On December 22, 2004, after Robinson's brother had
visited the family and had discovered the harsh living
conditions, he telephoned Wilson to complain about the lack of
an effective heater in the house.  The next day, Wilson came
to the house and lit the CHU.  Before he left, however,
Robinson remarked to him that the CHU "smell[ed] funny."
Wilson promised to send someone to look at it.
A few minutes later, Robert Harris, an employee of Harry
Balbeuna d/b/a Harry's A/C and Heating ("Harry's Heating"),
arrived, opened the closet where the CHU was located, and
began working.  Robinson left for work while Harris was still
at the house.  According to Harriett Johnson, the minor
1061727
12
daughter, the house subsequently began to warm and Harris
left.
That night, Robinson came home early from her job at a
Wal-Mart discount store and began baking pastries for
Christmas.  She was the last of her family to retire for the
night at approximately 1:00 a.m.  Shortly thereafter, Harriett
Johnson awoke, gasping for air, and fell out of bed.  She was
dizzy and had a severe headache.  She crawled on her hands and
knees to her mother's bedroom and awakened Robinson.  Robinson
was dizzy and her head was hurting.  Robinson then awakened
David, 
who 
also 
complained 
of 
a 
severe 
headache.
Subsequently, they awakened Kelvin, who was also complaining
of a headache, and telephoned the fire department.  By the
time rescue personnel arrived, the family members were
nauseous and vomiting.  
All family members were taken by ambulance to Springhill
Memorial Hospital ("the hospital"), where they were diagnosed
with, and treated for, carbon-monoxide poisoning.  Robinson
and her three children were released from the hospital later
that day, but her mother suffered seizures from the exposure
to the carbon monoxide and died on December 31, 2004.
1061727
13
Later on the day of incident, service technicians from
the Company were summoned to Robinson's residence by the fire
department.  They discovered the CHU in the same unrepaired
hazardous condition as had been noted in June.  As an example,
the blower door had been removed, but, because the safety
feature had been bypassed, the CHU would still operate.  
The technicians tested the air inside the house after
operating the CHU for 15 minutes.  The tests revealed high
concentrations of carbon monoxide throughout the residence.
They retagged the CHU.  This time, however, they also
disconnected the CHU from the natural-gas line and "capped
off" the gas line.  Effective repairs were finally made to the
CHU on or about December 28, 2004.  On December 29, 2004,
technicians 
from 
the 
Company revisited the residence,
determined that the CHU was operating properly, and removed
the red tag.
Robinson sued the Company, as well as Tyrone Wilson d/b/a
T&T General Contractors and T&T Home Rental and Construction
LLC, Harris, and Harry's Heating, seeking compensatory and
punitive damages under theories of negligence and wantonness
for the personal injuries to Robinson and her three minor
1061727
14
children and seeking punitive damages for the alleged wrongful
death of Robinson's mother.  Robinson's theory of liability
against the Company at the trial of the case was that the
Company should never have initiated natural-gas service at
Robinson's residence given its knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the CHU.
Over the Company's objections at trial, evidence was
admitted indicating that the City of Mobile and the City of
Chickasaw had adopted in 1991 and 1993, respectively, the
following ordinances:
"[Mobile] Sec. 45-61. Reconnection of discontinued
gas service.
"Whenever in a building or structure where the
gas service has been discontinued and a hazardous
report from the [Company] has been sent to the
inspection services department of the city, it shall
be necessary that an investigation fee be paid, that
the indicated hazardous conditions be corrected, and
that a visual inspection be conducted by the
mechanical inspection services of the city, and that
an approval by this agency be obtained before
reconnection to the gas supply may be effected."
__________
"[Chickasaw] Sec. 18-158. Investigation of hazardous
conditions.
"Whenever in a building or structure where the
gas service has been discontinued and a hazardous
report from the [Company] has been sent to the codes
1061727
15
inspector, 
it 
shall 
be 
necessary 
that 
an
investigation fee of $10.00 be paid, that the
indicated hazardous conditions be corrected, that an
inspection be conducted by the codes inspector and
that an approval by such inspector be obtained
before reconnection to the gas supply may be
effected."
(Emphasis added.)
The Company moved for a judgment as a matter of law
("JML") at the close of all the evidence.  Its motion was
denied.  Over the Company's objections, the court charged the
jury: "All persons or entities who conduct activities in
Alabama are presumed to know its laws.  Everyone is presumed
to know the law.  Ignorance of the law is no excuse.  Citizens
are deemed to have constructive knowledge of the law."
(Emphasis added.)  Hereinafter, this charge will be referred
to as "the no-excuse charge."
During 
its 
deliberations, 
the 
jury 
submitted 
the
following written question to the court: "Is an ordinance a
law?"  Without advising the Company's counsel of the question
or providing an opportunity for counsel's input, the court
answered the jury's question in the affirmative.  
Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Robinson and against the Company, Wilson, and Harris.  It
1061727
The only issues in this appeal involve the judgment
2
against the Company. 
16
awarded $2,400,000 for the wrongful-death claim.  The jury
awarded compensatory damages of $600,000 for the personal-
injury claim asserted by Robinson and $250,000 for the
personal-injury claim asserted on behalf of each minor child.
Finally, the jury assessed $200,000 in punitive damages
against the Company.   The trial court entered a judgment on
2
that verdict. The Company then renewed its motion for a JML
and moved, in the alternative, for a new trial or a remittitur
of the damages.  That motion was overruled, and the Company
appealed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, the Company contends that it was entitled to
a JML on the grounds (1) that it was not required to assure
that the hazardous CHU had been repaired or replaced before
initiating natural-gas service to Robinson's residence, and
(2) that, even if it was required to assure that the repair
had been made, its breach of any standard requiring it to do
so was not the proximate cause of the incident.  In the
alternative, it insists that it is entitled to a new trial
1061727
17
because the trial court gave erroneous or misleading jury
instructions.
A. Grounds for a JML
Our standard of review of a ruling on a motion for a JML
is well settled.  We "'use[] the same standard the trial court
used initially in granting or denying a JML. ... Regarding
questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the
nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case
or the issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual
resolution.'"  Myrick v. Barron, 820 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting  Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 830 (Ala.
1999)).  We "'determine whether the party who bears the burden
of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual
dispute requiring resolution by the jury,'" and we "'view[]
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertain[] such reasonable inferences as the jury would have
been free to draw.'" Myrick, 820 So. 2d at 83 (quoting
Delchamps, 738 So. 2d at 830-31).
1. Standard of Care
The issue, as the Company correctly frames it, is
"whether [the Company's] actions on the day(s) of its alleged
1061727
18
negligence fell below the required degree of skill and
prudence observed at that time."  The Company's brief, at 83.
It is well established that "'[t]hose dealing with
dangerous commodities, such as [natural] gas, must use a
degree of care commensurate with the dangers involved; this
degree of care is the same degree of care and vigilance which
persons 
of 
skill 
and 
prudence 
observe 
under 
like
circumstances.'"  Sungas, Inc. v. Perry, 450 So. 2d 1085, 1088
(Ala. 1984), abrogated on other grounds, Garner v. Covington
County, 624 So. 2d 1346 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Chilton Butane
Gas, Inc. v. Marcus, 289 Ala. 292, 296, 267 So. 2d 140, 143
(1972)).  "A gas company is guilty of negligence if a leak in
a customer's ... appliances causes injury ..., provided the
company has sufficient notice of such leak ..., and having
such notice (a) negligently inspects or negligently repairs;
(b) agrees and assumes to inspect and repair, and then fails
to do so; [or] (c) refuses to inspect and repair knowing a
dangerous condition exists, and with such knowledge fails to
shut off its gas until the owner can have his pipes and
appliances properly repaired."  Miller v. Wichita Gas Co., 139
Kan. 729, 732, 33 P.2d 130, 132 (1934). 
1061727
19
"[W]hen a [gas] company has actual knowledge of a
dangerous defect in a customer's equipment or appliance, it
has a duty to exercise reasonable care to shut off the service
to such equipment or appliance."  Hegwood v. Virginia Natural
Gas, Inc., 256 Va. 362, 369, 505 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1998)
(emphasis added).  See also Bellefuil v. Willmar Gas Co., 243
Minn. 123, 128, 66 N.W.2d 779, 783 (1954) ("whenever a gas
company is in possession of facts that would suggest to a
person of ordinary care and prudence that an appliance of a
customer 
is 
leaking 
or 
is 
otherwise 
unsafe 
for 
the
transportation of gas, the company has a duty to investigate,
as a person of ordinary care and prudence similarly situated
and handling such a dangerous substance would do, before it
continues to furnish additional gas").  When a gas company has
knowledge of a hazardous defect in a customer's appliance,
"the question whether on the particular facts that gas company
acted diligently to avert the ensuing ... asphyxiation goes to
the jury."  Rosado v. Boston Gas Co., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 675,
678, 542 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1989).  Thus, the Company's argument
for a JML must be rejected if there is substantial evidence
indicating that the Company, armed with its knowledge of the
1061727
20
circumstances and the condition of the CHU, breached the
standard of care in installing a meter at the residence and
providing natural-gas service before the known danger posed by
the CHU had been eliminated.
In that connection, Robinson presented the expert
testimony of George Yon.  Yon had written and implemented
polices and procedures for the Company in response to the
carbon-monoxide deaths and injuries that occurred in 1985.  He
testified that, in literally thousands of cases of which the
Company had record, its customers had continued to use
appliances that the Company had, by its red-tag procedure,
declared to be "out-of-service."  Yon's policies attempted to
address that specific problem by designating certain hazards
as serious enough to require the Company to "turn off the
meter or disconnect the service."  Among such hazards were
those that were present in this case, namely, an "[a]ppliance
producing unsafe levels of CO [carbon monoxide]," because of
"[b]adly corroded burners," "[i]noperative or disconnected
controls affecting safe operation," and "[p]roducts of
combustion spill[ing] at [the] diverter."
During Yon's testimony, the following colloquy occurred:
1061727
The Company does not dispute Robinson's allegation that
3
Midwest Gas Association, Inc., is an entity that "serves 250
[gas] companies in 15 Midwestern states."
21
"Q.
[By Robinson's counsel:] Based on your training
and experience in the policy and procedures
that you wrote, do you have an opinion as to
whether gas service should have been initiated
on June 3, 2004, by Mobile Gas?
"A.
[By Yon:] Absolutely not."
(Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that, after Yon retired, the Company
discontinued these policies, and there was evidence indicating
that 
they 
were 
discontinued 
for 
financial 
reasons.
Nevertheless, similar standards were reflected in training
materials promulgated by the Midwest Gas Association, Inc.  In
3
particular, training "module 322" stated, in pertinent part:
"Follow these six steps to check appliances and
connections.
"1. Locate all gas appliances and gas outlets.
"....
"2. Inspect appliances for unsafe conditions.
"!  Don't establish service if unsafe conditions are
not corrected.
"! Disconnect or turn the appliance off at the
appliance valve to correct unsafe conditions."
1061727
22
(Emphasis added.)  There was evidence indicating that the
Company actually used these training materials in the years
between Yon's retirement and the carbon-monoxide-poisoning
incident at Robinson's residence.  
Thus, there was substantial evidence indicating that gas-
industry standards include the duty to "turn off the meter or
disconnect the service" to a residence containing unrepaired
hazardous appliances of which the Company has knowledge.
Although 
"[p]roof 
of 
industry 
practices 
... 
cannot
conclusively establish the defendant's duty," they are
"admissible for the jury's consideration in its application of
the 'reasonable care' standard."  Dunn v. Wixom Bros., 493 So.
2d 1356, 1360  (Ala. 1986).  Whether the Company has
"effectively shut off the gas" under the circumstances is a
question for the jury.  Fields v. Missouri Power & Light Co.,
374 S.W.2d 17, 24 (Mo. 1963) (emphasis added).
The Company had examined the CHU at Robinson's residence
on three occasions between August 25, 1999, and the time of
the incident that is the subject of the underlying action,
and had observed the same hazardous conditions each time,
despite the Company's red-tag warnings.  Moreover, the Company
1061727
23
had a record of other rental properties owned by Tyrone
Wilson, which its records showed contained appliances that had
been repeatedly tagged for the same hazards.  In other words,
the Company knew in June 2004 when it initiated service at
Robinson's residence that Wilson was notably remiss in
addressing the problems indicated on the hazardous-appliance
reports relating to his properties.  Consequently, the Company
had no reason to trust that repairs to the CHU would be made
expeditiously.  Based on what it knew of the repair history of
appliances in buildings owned by Wilson, the Company could not
close its eyes to the known danger posed by its supply of
natural gas to the residence in the hope that Wilson would
remedy the defects in the CHU before the CHU was put back into
use. 
 
Thus, 
Robinson 
presented 
substantial 
evidence 
indicating
that the Company failed to use the "degree of care
commensurate with the dangers involved; ... the ... degree of
care and vigilance which persons of skill and prudence observe
under like circumstances."  Sungas, 450 So. 2d at 1088.
2. Proximate Cause
The Company also contends that any wrongful conduct on
its part was not the proximate cause of the carbon-monoxide
1061727
24
incident at Robinson's residence.  This is so, because, it
argues, the conduct of Wilson and Harris in putting the
unrepaired CHU back in service on December 23, 2004, was, as
a matter of law, a superseding, intervening cause. We
disagree.
"'"The proximate cause of an injury is that
cause which, in the natural and probable sequence of
events, and without the intervention or coming in of
some new or independent cause, produces the injury,
and without which the injury would not have
occurred."'  Hicks v. Vulcan Eng'g Co., 749 So. 2d
417, 424 (Ala. 1999)(quoting trial court's jury
charge). '[I]f a new, independent act breaks the
chain of causation, it supersedes the original act,
which thus is no longer the proximate cause of the
injury.'  Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist.,
117 Wash. App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093, 1095 (2003).
'[A]n 
[act] 
is 
superseding 
only 
if 
it 
is
unforeseeable.  A foreseeable intervening [act] does
not break the causal relationship between the
defendants' actions and the plaintiffs' injuries.'
Kelly v. M. Trigg Enters., Inc., 605 So. 2d 1185,
1190 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added).
"'Ordinarily, it is a jury question whether
consequences of an act are reasonably foreseeable
....'  Sly v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 387 So. 2d
137, 140 (Ala. 1980)."
Alabama Power Co. v. Moore, 899 So. 2d 975, 979 (Ala. 2004).
It is undisputed that the cause of the carbon-monoxide
incident in this case was the operation of the CHU without the
blower door in place.  Operating the CHU without the blower
1061727
25
door in place "created 'negative pressure in the heating
closet' which pulled the products of combustion into the
conditioned air."  The Company's brief, at 38.  Such operation
was made possible by the manual bypass of the safety device,
of which the Company had actual knowledge.  
Nevertheless, according to the Company, the "injuries
would not have occurred 'but for' the conduct of Mr. Wilson
and Mr. Harris, who negligently put the [CHU] in service with
the blower door off."  The Company's brief, at 39 (emphasis in
original).  According to the Company, it could not, as a
matter of law, have foreseen "that a heating technician, Mr.
Harris, would put a gas heater into service and leave the
blower door off."  The Company's brief, at 46.  We disagree.
As we discussed in the preceding subpart of this opinion,
the Company well knew that Wilson was remiss in addressing the
problems indicated on its hazardous-appliance reports for
rental properties owned by Wilson.  This knowledge was based
on its record of homes owned by Wilson in which appliances had
been tagged, but not repaired.  Thus, the Company had no
reason to trust that a "heating technician" would attend to
the CHU.  In fact, the Company admits that it had no knowledge
1061727
26
of Harris's activities at the Robinson residence until after
the incident.  The Company's brief, at 37.  In other words, it
was not unforeseeable as a matter of law that the CHU would be
placed back in service in the same unrepaired and hazardous
condition in which it was last observed by the Company's
service technician in June 2004.  Whether the activities of
Wilson and Harris were, therefore, an intervening cause of the
accident could not be answered as a matter of law. 
In short, there was substantial evidence indicating that
if the Company had refused to initiate service at the gas
meter in June 2004 because of the hazards it discovered at
that time, this accident would not have occurred.  Thus, the
Company was not entitled to a JML.
B. Grounds for a New Trial
The Company's argument for a new trial based on an
erroneous jury charge, however, stands on better ground.  It
contends that the trial court erred in giving the no-excuse
charge.  It contends that the charge could have referenced
only to the two ordinances, Mobile's ordinance § 45-61 and
Chickasaw's ordinance § 18-158, and that neither ordinance has
any application to this  case.  We agree.
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27
"A party is entitled to have the jury correctly
instructed on the law, provided the requested instruction is
relevant to the case and is not confusing or misleading."
McGregory v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 736 So. 2d 571, 579 (Ala.
1999) (emphasis added).  "[I]t is the duty of the trial court
to instruct the jurors fully and correctly on the applicable
law of the case and to guide, direct, and assist them toward
an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues
involved in their search for truth."  American Cast Iron Pipe
Co. v. Williams, 591 So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1991).  See First
Commercial Bank v. Spivey, 694 So. 2d 1316,  1324 (Ala. 1997)
("[T]he trial court has the responsibility to give the jury
instructions ... that will allow it to adequately respond to
the evidence and the issues presented.").  Thus, depending on
the issues and evidence presented, jury instructions that are
entirely "'proper in many cases, [may be] totally improper in
the instant case.'"  Jefferson v. Fleming, 669 So. 2d 870, 873
(Ala. 1995).
It requires no speculation to conclude that the no-excuse
charge was referable solely to the two municipal ordinances.
The case involved no other statutes or ordinances, and the
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28
jury's question whether "an ordinance [is] a law" was a clear
indication that the jury had made that connection.  Nor can it
be doubted that the combination of the ordinances and the
charge implied to the jury some mandatory duty on the part of
the Company.  That is the unmistakable import of the words
"[i]gnorance of the law is no excuse," meaning that "ignorance
of the law is no excuse for not following the law."  However,
the plain meaning of the ordinances in the context of the
facts of this case belie any such duty.
The ordinances differ in no respect relevant to this
case.  They state, in pertinent part: "Whenever in a building
or structure where the gas service has been discontinued and
a hazardous report from the [Company] has been sent" to the
applicable municipal-inspection authority, approval from such
authority is required "before reconnection to the gas supply
may be effected."  Notably, the ordinances do not require the
Company to disconnect service under any circumstances.
Neither do they require the Company to send a hazardous report
under any circumstances.  Thus, they shed no light on the
dispositive issue, which is whether the Company acted
reasonably in initiating service at the gas meter at the
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29
Robinson residence in June 2004 despite the hazards it
discovered at that time. 
Although there is evidence indicating that service had
been disconnected at 306 
4th 
Avenue 
before 
Robinson's 
tenancy,
there is no evidence indicating that the cause of the
disconnection was the hazards that existed in June 2004.
Certainly, there is no evidence indicating that the Company
ever sent a "hazardous report" to any Chickasaw official.
There is no evidence, therefore, indicating that  the
provisions of the Chickasaw ordinance were ever triggered.
Because the ordinances were inapplicable under the facts of
this case, the no-excuse instruction served no purpose other
than to distract and confuse the jury.
Indeed, the purpose and import of the charge is nowhere
better exemplified than in the following argument by
Robinson's counsel regarding the motion for a JML made at the
close of Robinson's case-in-chief:
"The Chickasaw ordinance says that 'whenever a
building or structure where gas service has been
discontinued' -- okay, so there is no gas service --
'and a hazardous report from [the Company] is sent
to the codes inspector, it shall be necessary that
an investigation fee be paid, investigation of the
hazardous 
conditions 
be 
conducted, 
that 
the
inspection by the codes inspector and an approval by
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30
the codes inspector be obtained before reconnection
to the gas supply may be effected.'
"...[The Company] 
cannot 
reconnect 
to 
the 
supply
under the binding law; and [it] just want[s] to
ignore the law. [It] want[s] to ignore the law. [It]
cannot reconnect without waiting until and having
confirmation that the hazardous appliances have been
repaired.
"So the fallacy of [the Company's] argument is
what [it has] absolute control over, which is this
thing right here, and all the pipes leading up into
it, and the knowledge that the appliances in the
house have deadly hazards associated with them, and
there is not a single one in there on June 3 that
doesn't, [it] know[s] that. [The Company] cannot
legally supply gas. [It] cannot legally do it."
(Emphasis added.)  
It is clear that the jury was led to conclude,
incorrectly, that, somehow, one, or both, of the ordinances
was binding on the Company under the facts of this case, and
that, therefore, the Company had illegally provided gas
service to Robinson's residence.  Because the ordinances were
inapplicable under the facts of this case, the giving of the
no-excuse charge was reversible error.  The judgment is,
therefore, reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
III. Conclusion
In summary, the trial court did not err in denying the
Company's motions for a JML.  However, because of the
1061727
These holdings obviate the need to address other issues
4
argued by the Company.
31
erroneous jury charge, the judgment is reversed and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.4
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Smith, J., concurs in the result.
Murdock, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
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32
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the main opinion except as to Part II.A, as
to which I dissent.