Case Title: Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., Inc.

Citation: 2014 WI 79

Docket Number: 2012AP000580

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP580   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Russell Adams, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Northland Equipment Company, Inc., Cincinnati 
Insurance  
Company and The League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities Mutual  
Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
347 Wis. 2d 549, 830 N.W.2d 722 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 22, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Thomas E. Greenwald, Rockford, and oral argument by Thomas E. 
Greenwald. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Northland Equipment Company 
and Cincinnati Insurance Company, there was a brief by James M. 
Ryan, Dustin T. Woehl, and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by James M. Ryan.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2014 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP580 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV2126) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Russell Adams, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Northland Equipment Company, Inc., Cincinnati 
Insurance Company and The League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
FILED 
 
JUL 22, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the Rock County 
Circuit Court2 that compelled plaintiff Russell Adams to accept a 
settlement offer from defendant Northland Equipment Company, 
Inc. that Adams' employer's worker's compensation insurer, The 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual Insurance Company 
(LWMMIC), chose to accept.   
                                                 
1 Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., No. 2012AP580, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2013). 
2 The Honorable James Welker presided. 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Adams sued Northland and its insurer, Cincinnati 
Insurance Company, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) (2011-12)3 
for personal injuries Adams sustained while plowing snow for his 
employer, the Village of Fontana.4  Northland offered $200,000 to 
settle Adams' claim.  LWMMIC accepted Northland's offer and 
moved the circuit court to compel Adams to accept it as well.  
The circuit court granted LWMMIC's motion. 
¶3 
Adams contends that the circuit court erred because a 
worker's compensation insurer cannot compel an employee to 
accept settlement of a third party tort claim.  Adams reasons 
that Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) cannot be interpreted to permit the 
circuit 
court 
to 
compel 
settlement 
because 
such 
an 
interpretation would violate his right to a jury trial, which 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution secures.  He 
also contends that the circuit court's order violates procedural 
due process and is the product of an erroneous exercise of 
discretion because, among other things, the circuit court did 
not conduct an evidentiary hearing.   
¶4 
We conclude that a circuit court may compel an 
employee to accept settlement of the claim the legislature 
created in Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  In such a claim, both the 
employee and the worker's compensation insurer share the right 
to sue third parties; the employee and the worker's compensation 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 LWMMIC was named as a defendant, but its interest was that 
of a plaintiff pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1). 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
3 
 
insurer have an equal voice in the prosecution of the claim; 
recovery from the claim is apportioned in the manner described 
in § 102.29(1)(b); and the circuit court is empowered to resolve 
any disputes arising between the employee and the worker's 
compensation insurer during the prosecution of their claim, 
including those disputes involving settlement.   
¶5 
We also conclude that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) does not violate Adams' right to a jury trial 
because the claim § 102.29(1) creates is not the counterpart of 
a cause of action at law recognized at the time of the adoption 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We further conclude that the 
circuit court's authority to compel an employee to accept 
settlement does not violate procedural due process because 
judicial resolution of disputes is part of the statutory claim.  
Lastly, we conclude that the circuit court appropriately 
exercised its discretion by defining the dispute, taking stock 
of the relative positions of the parties and considering matters 
that impacted the fairness of the settlement.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
This case concerns personal injuries Adams sustained 
during the course of his employment with the Village of Fontana.  
On February 21, 2009, Adams was plowing the driveway to the 
Village Hall when the blade of his plow struck the lip of a 
sidewalk.  Adams claims that when the plow came into contact 
with the lip, the truck stopped suddenly and threw him up into 
the ceiling of the cab of the truck, "causing excessive 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
4 
 
compression forces to be applied to his spine."  The truck then 
continued past the end of the driveway, crossed the street, and 
struck a curb, where it came to a final stop and another plow 
operator discovered it.  Adams was not wearing a seat belt at 
the time of the accident.   
¶7 
The plow was equipped with springs that were designed 
to absorb some of the shock when the plow experienced a certain 
amount of resistance.  The springs were to reduce the shock by 
allowing the bottom of the plow to rotate toward the truck, or 
"trip."  In order to function correctly, the springs needed to 
be tight enough to plow snow, but loose enough to trip when the 
plow hit fixed obstacles.  
¶8 
Before 
Adams' 
accident, 
the 
Village 
had 
been 
experiencing problems with the plow Adams used in that it was 
tripping too easily when pushing heavy snow.  The Village 
brought the plow to Northland for repair.  
¶9 
Northland explained that the two Henderson brand 
springs on the plow were worn out and in need of replacement.  
Northland did not have the exact Henderson brand replacement 
springs for the plow, and could not obtain them before an 
expected snowstorm.  Therefore, Northland and the Village 
decided to replace the Henderson brand springs with Western 
brand springs that Northland had on hand.  The replacement 
springs worked without incident for the year and a half prior to 
Adams' accident.  
¶10 As a result of the accident, Adams suffered permanent 
injury to his spine.  He brought personal injury claims against 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
5 
 
Northland and its insurer, alleging negligence in the repair of 
the plow and strict liability for the malfunction of the 
replacement springs.  LWMMIC, which had paid Adams $148,332 in 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits 
for 
medical 
expenses 
and 
temporary total and permanent partial disability as of the date 
of the motion to compel, participated in Adams' suit pursuant to 
the claim created by Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).   
¶11 Northland and Cincinnati Insurance moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that Adams could not prove negligence or 
causation.  They asserted that the deposition testimony of 
Adams' expert, Robert Wozniak, showed that Wozniak could not 
"establish[] a standard for a safe tension level in the snow 
plow's springs" and therefore, Adams could not prove that "this 
accident would not have happened at different tensions."   
¶12 At the summary judgment motion hearing, the circuit 
court pressed Adams' attorney, Thomas Greenwald, on this issue 
asking, "So [Northland] put on [springs] that ha[d] more 
tension.  Now what's the evidence going to be that that was 
negligence?"  
¶13 Greenwald responded that Wozniak was "going to testify 
that that created an unreasonable risk of harm by adding that 
much spring, requiring that much tension, and that unreasonable 
risk of harm was that the plow would not trip when required to 
trip and that that unreasonable risk of harm is what caused this 
event to occur."  As to the basis for this testimony, Greenwald 
explained that Wozniak's opinions were part of a memo Greenwald 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
6 
 
prepared for Wozniak and "asked at his deposition are these 
[Wozniak's] opinions, and [Wozniak said] yes."   
¶14 After explaining that Greenwald would not be allowed 
to prove Adams' case at trial by "present[ing Wozniak] with some 
legal gobbledy gook and ask[ing] him to confirm it," the circuit 
court denied defendant's summary judgment motion.  The court 
explained its decision as follows:  
I think Mr. Greenwald is spitting into an awfully 
strong wind here, and it may be that even this case 
will get dismissed at the end of the plaintiff's case, 
I don't know, but I do think that there is at least 
that minimum quantity of opinion by an engineer that 
says that this is an accident that was caused by 
springs that were too tight.   
How a jury——I'm sure [Wozniak is] going to be 
asked at trial, 'Well, how tight would have been tight 
enough?' And I——it will be interesting to see what his 
answer [i]s.  But I think that this is not a proper 
case that should be decided on summary judgment, and 
for that reason the motion is denied.  
¶15 Four days after the circuit court denied Northland's 
summary judgment motion, LWMMIC received a $200,000 settlement 
offer.  LWMMIC's attorney contacted Greenwald, who informed 
LWMMIC that Adams would not accept the offer.   
¶16 LWMMIC then attempted to negotiate resolution with 
Adams.  It proposed that in exchange for relinquishing control 
of the litigation to Adams, Adams release LWMMIC from liability 
for future worker's compensation payments.  After Adams rejected 
LWMMIC's proposal, LWMMIC unilaterally accepted the settlement 
offer and moved the circuit court to compel Adams to accept it 
as well.   
No. 
2012AP580   
 
7 
 
¶17 The circuit court received submissions from both 
parties and held a hearing on the motion.  LWMMIC explained that 
it wished to accept the settlement offer because of the risks of 
a defense verdict at trial, citing concerns about "comparative 
fault, seatbelt negligence, and damages."  LWMMIC also said that 
it thought Adams' case had "not improved" since the summary 
judgment hearing because Robert Krenz, an expert witness for the 
defense, tested the plow and found that it "actually does 
trip[,] even at just 2 ½ m.p.h. with very little movement of the 
driver."   
¶18 Adams responded that:  (1) a court has no authority to 
compel an employee to accept settlement; (2) if a court had such 
authority, an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the merits of the 
case would be necessary before compelling settlement; and (3) 
the settlement offer in the present case is "grossly inadequate" 
and "not in the best interest" of Adams.  
¶19 The circuit court granted LWMMIC's motion to compel 
settlement.  It concluded that it had the authority to do so 
under Dalka v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2011 WI App 
90, 334 Wis. 2d 686, 799 N.W.2d 923; that an evidentiary hearing 
was unnecessary; and that the risk of a finding of no liability 
at trial exceeded the possibility of a verdict that exceeded the 
settlement offer.  
¶20 Adams appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.  As 
with the circuit court, the court of appeals concluded that 
Dalka controlled the issue of authority to compel settlement.  
As to Adams' argument about the evidentiary hearing, it 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
8 
 
concluded that due process did not require a "mini-trial" of 
Adams' claims because when we affirmed an order compelling a 
compensation insurer to accept settlement in Bergren v. Staples, 
263 Wis. 477, 57 N.W.2d 714 (1953), we did not require a mini-
trial.  Dalka, 334 Wis. 2d 686, ¶12.  Lastly, it concluded that 
the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion because 
it inquired into the nature and strength of the case, assessed 
the risk of a no liability jury verdict, and came to a logical 
conclusion.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 This case requires us to interpret and apply portions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application are questions of law for our independent review, 
although we benefit from the analyses of the court of appeals 
and circuit court.  State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶21, 346 Wis. 2d 
289, 827 N.W.2d 610.   
¶22 Whether 
a 
claim 
made 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) includes the right to a jury trial such that 
compelling an employee to accept settlement violates the 
employee's right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution is also a question of law for our 
independent review.  State v. Schweda, 2007 WI 100, ¶12, 303 
Wis. 2d 353, 736 N.W.2d 49; Vill. Food & Liquor Mart v. H & S 
Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶7, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 
177.   
No. 
2012AP580   
 
9 
 
¶23 Whether a party has been denied procedural due process 
is yet another question of law for our independent review.  
State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  
And finally, we review a circuit court's decision to exercise 
the authority granted to it under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) to 
resolve disputes in the prosecution of a § 102.29(1) claim under 
an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  See Bergren, 263 
Wis. at 485. 
B.  Worker's Compensation Principles 
¶24 "Worker's Compensation is a legislatively enacted 
compromise designed to bring employers and employees together in 
a mutually beneficial scheme of guaranteeing benefits in the 
event of work-related injury and disease."  Nelson v. Rothering, 
174 Wis. 2d 296, 302, 496 N.W.2d 87 (1993).  The major goal of 
worker's compensation is to "provid[e], in the most efficient, 
most dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical 
benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries."  1 Lex K. 
Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 1.03[2], at 1-5 
(2012).   
¶25 By enacting worker's compensation, "the legislature 
intended to impose upon employers an absolute liability, 
regardless of fault; and in return for this burden, intended to 
grant employers immunity from all tort liability on account of 
injuries to employees."  Guse v. A. O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 
403, 406-7, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952).  By entering into an employment 
relationship, then, the employer and employee make it part of 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
10 
 
their relationship to resolve work-related injury disputes 
within the statutory worker's compensation framework.   
¶26 While this statutory scheme provides an employer with 
near immunity in tort, negligent third parties do not enjoy the 
same benefit.  An employee, employer and the payer of worker's 
compensation all may sue a third party in tort under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1).  Nelson, 174 Wis. 2d at 300; § 102.29(1).   
¶27 The distribution of proceeds from a Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29 third party claim "gives effect to the original 
compromise 
underlying 
the 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Act 
by 
specifying what it determined to be a reasonable apportionment 
of proceeds between the parties involved," notwithstanding what 
the common law would have provided.  Nelson, 174 Wis. 2d at 303.  
Stated otherwise, third party claims brought within the scope of 
§ 102.29 are governed by the statutory scheme of worker's 
compensation, not by common law.  See Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland 
Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 177-78, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).   
¶28 We also note that worker's compensation alters more 
than just the common law rights of an employer and employee.  
For instance, we have construed the worker's compensation 
statute as preventing a third party tortfeasor from seeking 
contribution from a negligent employer, "even though the 
employer was substantially more at fault than the third party."  
Id. at 177.  We permitted this harsh result for the third party 
who, unlike the employer and employee, gains nothing from the 
worker's compensation statutes because "worker's compensation 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
11 
 
laws constitute an all-pervasive legislative scheme."  Id. at 
180.   
C.  Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) 
¶29 We begin our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) 
with the language of the statute, through which the legislature 
expressed the statute's meaning.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶20, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; Wis. 
Indus. Energy Group, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2012 WI 
89, ¶15, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.  "If the meaning of 
the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 
WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).   
¶30 We give statutory language "its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  Because "[c]ontext is important to 
meaning," we interpret statutory language "in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole."  
Id., ¶46.  We also review statutory history and consult our own 
prior decisions that examined the same statute as part of our 
plain meaning analysis.  See Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, ¶22 
("statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis"); State 
v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶20, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848 ("when 
engaging in statutory interpretation, we are assisted by prior 
decisions that have examined the relevant statutes"). 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
12 
 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29(1) provides in relevant part: 
(a) The making of a claim for compensation 
against an employer or compensation insurer for the 
injury or death of an employee shall not affect the 
right of the employee . . . to make claim or maintain 
an action in tort against any other party for such 
injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3rd 
party; nor shall the making of a claim by any such 
person against a 3rd party for damages . . . affect 
the right of the injured employee or the employee's 
dependents to recover compensation.  An employer or 
compensation insurer that has paid or is obligated to 
pay a lawful claim under this chapter shall have the 
same right to make claim or maintain an action in tort 
against 
any 
other 
party 
for 
such 
injury 
or 
death. . . .  
(b) . . . Each shall have an equal voice in the 
prosecution of the claim, and any disputes arising 
shall be passed upon by the court before whom the case 
is pending, and if no action is pending, then by a 
court of record or by the department.   
¶32 Adams relies heavily on the first sentence of the 
statute, reading it as providing an employee with an unfettered 
right "to make claim or maintain an action in tort" against a 
third party.  As to the language providing the compensation 
insurer with "the same right" and "an equal voice in the 
prosecution" thereof, Adams says that language is ineffective to 
negate the "guarantee" in the first sentence.  The same holds 
true, according to Adams, for the language providing for 
judicial resolution of disputes.  He says it does not say that a 
circuit court, in resolving disputes, can in any way limit the 
employee's right that the first sentence grants.   
¶33 We disagree with Adams.  The third party claim set out 
in Wis. Stat. § 102.29 differs from a personal injury claim 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
13 
 
under common law because of the nature of the claim the 
legislature created, which we discuss below. 
1.  Shared claim 
¶34 Reading the statute as a whole, we conclude that the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) shows that the claim 
against a third party is a shared claim.  In the case before us, 
it is shared between Adams and the compensation insurer, LWMMIC.  
Section 102.29(1) provides that an employee and a compensation 
insurer have "the same right to make claim" and "an equal voice 
in the prosecution of the claim."  The common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning of these words plainly demonstrates that one 
claimant is not favored over the other.   
¶35 The first sentence of the statute does not alter the 
shared nature of the claim that the statute plainly creates.  
Statutory history also shows how the legislature developed the 
shared claim of Wis. Stat. § 102.29.   
¶36 For example, in 1911, making a claim for worker's 
compensation greatly altered the employee's ability to file a 
tort claim against a third party because when a worker's 
compensation claim was made, it "operate[d] as an [employee's] 
assignment of any cause of action in tort" to the employer.  
Wis. Stat. ch. 110a, § 2394-25 (1911).  In 1913, the legislature 
amended the statute somewhat and added a provision that gave an 
injured employee a choice about whether to accept worker's 
compensation or seek relief for his injuries from a third party.  
The relevant statute in 1913 provided that by making a claim 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
14 
 
against a third party, an employee waived any claim for worker's 
compensation from the employer.  Ch. 110a, § 2394-252. (1913).   
¶37 We 
interpret 
the 
first 
sentence 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) as establishing that, unlike previous versions of 
the law, an employee is able to pursue a claim in tort against a 
third party while maintaining a claim for worker's compensation 
benefits.  However, the claim created in § 102.29 is a shared 
claim.  That is, the employee shares the right to make such a 
claim 
with 
the 
payer 
of 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits, 
generally the compensation insurer.  In such a claim, the 
employee and the compensation insurer have an "equal voice" in 
the claim's prosecution.  Our interpretation harmonizes the 
statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, and is 
consistent with the statutory history underlying § 102.29.  See 
State v. Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶39, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 N.W.2d 
215 (in order to avoid an absurd result, "we must interpret the 
statute . . . in a way that harmonizes the provisions of the 
statute and gives effect to every word").   
¶38 The statutory directive that the right to bring and 
prosecute third party tort claims is shared leads us to the 
conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 102.29 created a new type of claim 
the nature of which is controlled by the statute, not by common 
law.  Sharing the right to bring suit with another party 
necessarily alters the nature of the common law claim.  See 
generally 
Schweda, 
303 
Wis. 2d 
353, 
¶103 
(Prosser, 
J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (illustrating the 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
15 
 
principle that claims often are defined, at least in part, by 
who may bring them).   
¶39 We begin with the decision to file a lawsuit.  An 
employee's decision to sue for work-related injuries under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1)(a) is fundamentally different than it would be 
absent the statute because the employee would not have to give 
the compensation insurer the "opportunity to join in the making 
of such claim."  The employee would be able to make choices at 
the beginning of the lawsuit, such as the timing of filing the 
lawsuit, the venue in which to file the lawsuit, and whom to 
name as defendants, without regard to the compensation insurer.  
See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. Va. L. 
Rev. 167, 168 (2000) ("plaintiff's forum-selection privilege is 
axiomatic 
to 
the 
common-law 
tradition"). 
 
In 
contrast, 
§ 102.29(1)(a) imposes an obligation on both the employee and 
compensation insurer to give the other notice of their actions 
so that both can participate.   
¶40 Furthermore, the shared nature of this third party 
claim is such that when an employee declines to assert a third 
party claim, a compensation insurer can sue for damages that are 
personal to the employee, such as those for pain and suffering, 
without joining the employee.  Threshermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Page, 217 Wis. 2d 451, 462, 577 N.W.2d 335 (1998).   
2.  Division of proceeds 
¶41 The proceeds of a third party claim do not belong to 
the injured employee.  Rather, if the Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) 
third party claim succeeds, § 102.29(1)(b)1.–3. directs how the 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
16 
 
proceeds must be apportioned between the persons entitled to 
bring the claim.  This is a significant departure from the 
common law because the statute's remedy provisions "supersede[] 
the employee's [common law] right to be 'made whole.'"  Id. at 
462.  Therefore, rather than retaining the entire amount of any 
recovery for himself or herself, an employee must share that 
recovery according to the statutory formula.  § 102.29(1)(b)1.-
3.  An employee also may be made to bear, by deduction from the 
damages awarded, some of the compensation insurer's costs of 
collection, including attorney fees.  § 102.29(1)(b)1. and 
(1)(c).  Furthermore, we have repeatedly held that the statutory 
distribution of proceeds scheme is not an embodiment of the 
common law principle of subrogation.  Bergren, 263 Wis. at 482; 
Threshermens, 217 Wis. 2d at 480.  Rather, it is a part of the 
claim created by § 102.29.   
3.  Judicial resolution of disputes 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29 also requires that disputes 
between those who are bringing § 102.29 claims be resolved by 
the circuit court.  However, Adams argues that a compensation 
insurer cannot compel acceptance of a settlement, wherein he 
makes at least an implied argument that settlement is not a 
"dispute" under § 102.29(1).  We briefly explain why we reach 
the opposite conclusion, beginning again with the plain language 
of the statute. 
¶43 After providing that an employee and compensation 
insurer have an "equal voice" in the prosecution of their claim, 
Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1)(b) provides that "any disputes arising 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
17 
 
shall be passed upon by the court before whom the case is 
pending."  By using the term "any," the legislature chose 
language that does not limit the type of disputes on which a 
circuit court must pass.  Additionally, our decision in Bergren, 
in which we held that an employee can compel a compensation 
insurer to accept a disputed settlement, would seem to foreclose 
the possibility that differing opinions about whether to accept 
settlement is not a "dispute" within the meaning of § 102.29(1), 
as Adams contends.  Bergren, 263 Wis. at 483. 
¶44 We also note that although, as the circuit court 
stated, Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) does not provide a great deal of 
guidance on the criteria to be used in settling disputes, the 
statute's mandatory language plainly states that the circuit 
court is empowered to do so.  The statutory provision, "any 
disputes arising shall be passed upon by the court before whom 
the case is pending," is broadly stated, but that does not 
create an ambiguity in the statute's meaning.  See generally 
Phillips v. Parmelee, 2013 WI 105, ¶¶22-23, 351 Wis. 2d 758, 840 
N.W.2d 713 (concluding that the phrase, "any loss rising out 
of," is broadly stated but not ambiguous).   
¶45 Having concluded that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) establishes the nature of the third party claim for 
a worker's injury that includes broad authority for the circuit 
court to settle disputes, we turn to Adams' claim that the 
circuit court's authority cannot be so broad as to require him 
to accept a settlement offer because to do so would violate his 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
18 
 
constitutional right to a jury trial, which is preserved by 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
D.  Jury Trial 
¶46 Adams correctly notes that when given alternative 
statutory interpretations, we will select the interpretation 
that results in a constitutionally sufficient statute.  Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 
872 (1998); Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis. 2d 
175, 185, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974).  Adams then argues that we 
should not interpret Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) in a way that would 
allow a circuit court to compel an employee to accept settlement 
because that would violate the employee's constitutional right 
to a jury trial preserved by Article I, Section 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶47 At the outset, we note that we are not presented with 
a 
choice 
of 
two 
reasonable 
constructions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) 
because 
the 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
not 
ambiguous.  Rather, we evaluate Adams' argument both as an 
alternative justification to our plain meaning interpretation 
and because Adams' arguments seem to include a contention that 
the circuit court order violates not only Article I, Section 5 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, but also § 102.29(1).   
¶48 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides as follows: 
The 
right 
of 
trial 
by 
jury 
shall 
remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law 
without regard to the amount in controversy; but a 
jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
19 
 
in the manner prescribed by law.  Provided, however, 
that the legislature may, from time to time, by 
statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, 
may be based on the votes of a specified number of the 
jury, not less than five-sixths thereof.  
¶49 This provision does not accord all claims a jury 
trial.  Historically, we have applied its protection only to 
civil cases, whereas the jury protection in criminal cases flows 
from Article 1, Section 7.  Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶17; Dane 
Cnty. v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, ¶13, 285 Wis. 2d 519, 699 N.W.2d 
890; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 74, 14 N.W. 912 (1883).  In 
civil cases, we have interpreted Section 5 to mean that the 
right to a jury trial is preserved for a statutory claim if (1) 
the statute codified a cause of action that existed in 1848 when 
Wisconsin's Constitution was adopted; and (2) the cause of 
action was an action at law rather than in equity.  Schweda, 303 
Wis. 2d 353, ¶19; Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16.  
1.  Village Food test 
¶50 The test for whether the constitutional right to a 
jury trial attaches to a statutory claim is set out in Village 
Food: 
[A] party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when:  (1) the cause 
of action created by the statute existed, was known, 
or recognized at common law at the time of the 
adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848; and 
(2) the action was regarded as at law in 1848. 
Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16.  
¶51 While there need not be "specific identity" between 
the statutory claim and a cause of action in 1848, the party 
asserting a constitutional right to a jury trial must prove that 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
20 
 
the two claims differ only slightly.  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, 
¶21.  Put another way, the cause of action in 1848 must be 
"essentially [a] counterpart" to the statutory claim in order 
for Section 5's jury trial protection to apply.  Id. (quoting 
Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶28) (alteration in McGrew). 
¶52 Village Food describes by example the degree of 
similarity between a statutory claim and a cause of action that 
existed in 1848 that one must demonstrate when asserting a 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  The defendant in Village 
Food was accused of violating certain provisions of the Unfair 
Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 
¶3.  We began our discussion by identifying the purpose of 
§ 100.30 as preventing "retailers, distributors, and wholesalers 
 of certain types of goods (namely alcohol, tobacco products, 
and motor vehicle fuel) from selling their merchandise at an 
artificially low price in order to attract patronage and thereby 
cause harm to competing businesses and to consumers of those 
products."  Id., ¶18.  We then examined the mechanism by which 
the statute achieved this goal, a minimum markup formula.  Id., 
¶19.  We also considered the remedies available under the Unfair 
Sales Act and the parties who could bring an action to enforce 
the Act's provisions.  Id., ¶¶20-21. 
¶53 After examining the statutory claim, we proceeded to 
evaluate the sources of law the defendant identified in support 
of its argument that a cause of action counterpart existed in 
1848.  Based on the descriptions in Sir William Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, we concluded that certain 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
21 
 
public trade offenses, "forestalling the market, regrating, and 
engrossing" were "of the same 'nature'" as the case before us.  
Id., ¶27.  Because these public trade offenses were legal and 
not equitable in nature in 1848, we concluded that the defendant 
had a right to a jury trial secured by Article I, Section 5 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶33. 
¶54 Our later decisions in McGrew and Schweda cautioned 
litigants that vague similarities, such as an analogous class of 
actions or shared "doctrinal roots," are not enough under 
Village Food.  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶20; Schweda, 303 
Wis. 2d 353, ¶34.  In McGrew, we compared the speed limit in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h) to the cause of action for common law 
nuisance in 1848.  We concluded that the statute was not the 
counterpart of common law nuisance because "the class of actions 
categorized as 'nuisances' [were] simply too broad to be 
analogized to a speeding violation."  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, 
¶25.  Similarly in Schweda, we concluded that nuisance law was 
too sprawling a concept to constitute a counterpart to certain 
environmental regulations.  Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶¶32-34.   
2.  Village Food application 
¶55 Within this legal context, we evaluate whether the 
claim Adams asserts under Wis. Stat. § 102.29 accords him a 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  We begin by noting that 
although Adams asserts a constitutional right to a jury trial 
that precludes requiring him to settle a § 102.29(1) claim, he 
fails to discuss the Village Food test.  Rather than undertaking 
the sort of analysis our decisions in Village Food, McGrew and 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
22 
 
Schweda conclude is necessary, Adams states in a conclusory 
fashion:  
The 
right 
to 
seek 
compensation 
for 
the 
wrongs 
committed by Northland and its employees is a right 
going back to the early English common law.  It was 
initially referred to as "trespass on the case."  The 
Law of Torts, Dan B. Dobbs, West Group, 2000, Section 
14, p. 26.  It clearly was a right known and 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.   
¶56 Adams' assertion does not constitute a meaningful 
comparison of the claim created in Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) to a 
trespass on the case or to any other cause of action that 
existed in 1848.  Instead, stating his contention in this 
fashion implies that it is sufficient to note that "[a] 
negligence action for damages is an action at law and is 
encompassed by the constitutional jury guaranty."  Windsor 
Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Citation Homes, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 
820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).5  Adopting Adams' contention, which is 
unaccompanied by analysis, would "render the Village Food test a 
nullity because 'present causes of action of all sorts assessed 
under this test will . . . have to be compared [only] generally 
. . . in order to invoke the constitutional protection to a 
trial by jury.'"  Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶40 (quoting Vill. 
                                                 
5 California, like Wisconsin and 46 other states, provides 
for a state constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases 
using language "to the effect that the right shall 'remain 
inviolate.'"  State v. Schweda, 2007 WI 100, ¶89, 303 Wis. 2d 
353, 736 N.W.2d 49 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
23 
 
Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶46 (Wilcox, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part)).   
¶57 In regard to Adams' assertion, we note that under the 
ancient common law, actions that we would categorize as 
negligence claims were sometimes brought as trespass on the 
case.  Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 180, 313 N.W.2d 790 
(1982) (explaining that "[t]respass on the case is the ancestor 
of the present day action for negligence where problems of legal 
and factual cause arise.").  At common law, an injured party is 
entitled to bring a claim against a tortfeasor for injuries that 
party sustained due to the tortfeasor's negligence.  See Nichols 
v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶¶11-12, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 
746 N.W.2d 220 (explaining the elements of common law negligence 
and some of the common law rules for such a claim).  A common 
law negligence claim belongs to the injured party or his estate.  
See Sampson v. Laskin, 66 Wis. 2d 318, 224 N.W.2d 594 (1975) 
(which arose out of personal injuries to two men, one of whom 
died, causing his estate to own the claim).   
¶58 The claim created by Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) is not the 
counterpart of a common law claim maintained to compensate an 
injured person for his injuries.  Rather, by contrast, a 
§ 102.29(1) 
claim 
furthers 
the 
comprehensive 
economic 
regulations that worker's compensation has put in place.  As we 
have explained, "[w]orker's compensation laws are basically 
economic regulations by which the legislature, as a matter of 
public policy, has balanced competing societal interests."  
Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 180.  The remedies prescribed for a 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
24 
 
§ 102.29(1) claim wherein the injured employee shares the 
statutory claim demonstrate part of those economic regulations.  
This includes the worker's compensation payer's right to 
reimbursement, even when the employer was at fault for the 
employee's injury.  Id. at 178-79.   
¶59 There are numerous examples of the legislature's 
comprehensive scheme in this third party statutory claim.  
First, the third party claim is shared with the payer of 
worker's compensation, Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1)(a); second, the 
claim accords the person with whom the claim is shared an "equal 
voice" in bringing the claim and in its prosecution, id.; third, 
the parties must give notice to one another so both parties can 
participate, id.; fourth, proceeds received from the claim are 
apportioned according to a statutory formula wherein the injured 
party has no right to all that is recovered, § 102.29(1)(b); 
fifth, statutory apportionment of recovered damages may preclude 
an injured party from being made whole, Threshermens, 217 
Wis. 2d at 462; and sixth, disputes that arise during the 
prosecution of the claim between the parties entitled to bring a 
third 
party 
claim 
are 
resolved 
by 
the 
circuit 
court, 
§ 102.29(1)(a);  Bergren, 263 Wis. at 483 ("where two claimants 
cannot agree as to the proper prosecution of a claim, then the 
court can pass upon that dispute, without a jury trial").   
¶60 Because an employee's right to sue a third party under 
Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) is part of a statutory scheme that 
creates a statutory claim, abrogates common law remedies and 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
25 
 
provides a required distribution scheme,6 the legislature was 
well within its authority to define and limit the employee's 
claim in such a way that an employee could be compelled to 
accept settlement.  See Threshermens, 217 Wis. 2d at 462 
(explaining that the statutory scheme "supersedes the employee's 
right to be 'made whole'").  Stated otherwise, § 102.29(1) 
abrogates the employee's common law claim against third parties 
and creates a statutory claim that differs so significantly from 
a common law negligence claim that the statutory claim does not 
have a counterpart at common law in 1848.  Accordingly, we 
refuse to interfere with § 102.29(1) by engrafting common-law 
principles on the comprehensive choices the legislature made.  
See Martinez v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 132 Wis. 2d 11, 16, 390 
N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the statutory 
directive for the distribution of proceeds was part of an 
overall statutory scheme that changed common law). 
¶61 Having 
concluded 
that 
Adams 
does 
not 
have 
a 
constitutional right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 
of the Wisconsin Constitution for the Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) 
claim, we now turn to Adams' due process challenge.  
                                                 
6 For example, the employee is not a necessary party when 
the payer of worker's compensation benefits makes a third party 
tort claim based on the employee's injury pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1), even when the payer seeks compensation for the 
employee's pain and suffering.  Threshermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Page, 217 Wis. 2d 451, 462, 480, 577 N.W.2d 335 (1998). 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
26 
 
E.  Due Process 
¶62 Adams argues that the circuit court's order violated 
his procedural due process rights because he did not know why 
LWMMIC accepted Cincinnati's settlement offer and the court did 
not hold an evidentiary hearing at which he could present 
witnesses.  
¶63 We reject Adams' first assertion out of hand.  In a 
letter accompanying its motion to compel, of which Greenwald 
received a copy, LWMMIC explained that the "liability problems 
with [this] case," which had been thoroughly vetted at the 
recent summary judgment motion, caused it to accept the offer.  
LWMMIC "fear[ed] that a trial [would] result in a defense 
verdict," and preferred the certain recovery the settlement 
offer presented.  At the motion hearing, LWMMIC reiterated that 
it wished to accept settlement because the summary judgment 
hearing "laid bare" many deficiencies in Adams' case.  Adams 
cannot reasonably contend that he did not know why LWMMIC wished 
to accept settlement, and we now turn to the type of hearing 
Adams believes is required. 
¶64 Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution protect against government actions 
that deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of the law.  "In procedural due process claims, the 
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected 
interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself 
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
27 
 
such an interest without due process of law." Casteel v. 
McCaughtry, 176 Wis. 2d 571, 579, 500 N.W.2d 277 (1993) (quoting 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).   
¶65 We employ a two-step analysis to determine whether 
there has been a violation of procedural due process.  First, we 
ask "whether there exists a[n] . . . interest which has been 
interfered with by the State"; second, we examine "whether the 
procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 
sufficient."  Id. (quoting Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. 
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). 
¶66 The interest at stake in this case is Adams' statutory 
claim against Northland and its insurer.  Because it is Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1), and not the constitution or the common law 
that gives rise to and defines Adams' claim, his interest is 
coterminous with the statutory claim.  See Bd. of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (explaining 
that property interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law").  Adams' interest is the 
right, together with LWMMIC, to prosecute a claim against a 
third party, subject to judicial resolution of disputes on which 
the two cannot agree.   
¶67 Since Adams' interest is created by statute, and that 
statute limits the right by providing a mechanism for resolving 
disputes, Adams cannot complain that the resolution mechanism 
violates due process.  Judicial resolution of disputes is a 
"built-in" feature of the claim Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) creates, 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
28 
 
not a procedure for depriving Adams of a common law or 
constitutional right.  That the legislature selected judicial 
resolution as the mechanism for balancing (and therefore 
limiting) an employee's right to proceed against a third party, 
rather than a statute of limitations or an assignment as other 
states have done, is immaterial.  See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Lab. 
& Empl. § 9-902 (West 2014) (employer has the exclusive right to 
bring an action against a third party for two months after the 
worker's compensation award, after which the employee may do 
so); Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 348 (2013) (an employee who elects 
to take worker's compensation benefits assigns any claim against 
a third party to the employer).  Because Adams' interest was 
subject to the limitation he challenges, he has not been 
deprived of any constitutionally protected interest; therefore, 
we do not reach the second step of our analysis.  See Casteel, 
176 Wis. 2d at 579.   
F.  Erroneous Exercise of Discretion 
¶68 Adams' final argument is that the circuit court's 
order constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Adams 
faults the circuit court for:  (1) not applying a legal 
standard; (2) not holding an evidentiary hearing at which he 
could have presented live witness testimony that would have 
demonstrated the strength of his case; and (3) failing to use a 
rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion.  
¶69 We begin with Adams' contention regarding a legal 
standard for compelling an employee to accept settlement.  The 
statute gives only the following directive to circuit courts 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
29 
 
faced with a motion to compel:  The employee and compensation 
insurer "[e]ach shall have an equal voice in the prosecution of 
the claim, and any disputes arising shall be passed upon by the 
court 
before 
whom 
the 
case 
is 
pending." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1)(b).  As the circuit court recognized, this does not 
constitute "a great deal of guidance" from the legislature as to 
"how [a] court should deal with these matters."   
¶70 The legislature's decision not to provide a more 
precise standard should not be held against the circuit court.  
Yet by arguing that the circuit court did not apply a precise 
legal standard, this is what Adams does.   
¶71 Adams contends that a court cannot compel an employee 
to accept settlement unless the settlement offer is in the best 
interests of the employee.  Adams appears to import this 
standard from settlements involving minors that also require 
court approval.  See Wis. Stat. § 807.10.  We reject such a 
standard because unlike children, who "are the special objects 
of the solicitude of the courts" and are "entitled to most 
jealous care," employees occupy no such position under the law.  
Jensen v. McPherson, 2002 WI App 298, ¶11, 258 Wis. 2d 962, 655 
N.W.2d 487 (quoting Brandt v. Brandt, 161 Wis. 2d 784, 788-89, 
468 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1991) (further citations omitted)).   
¶72 Employees have the same right as a compensation 
insurer to bring a claim under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) and an 
equal voice in the prosecution thereof.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the standard a circuit court should employ when deciding 
whether to compel a party to accept settlement is one that 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
30 
 
evaluates whether the settlement is reasonably fair to both 
parties.  Fairness, rather than a best interest standard, is 
more in keeping with the language of the statute, which does not 
favor either person entitled to bring the claim.  It also echoes 
the standard under federal law for approving a class action 
settlement, which requires that the settlement offer be "fair, 
reasonable, and adequate."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  The 
federal standard is persuasive because class actions raise 
concerns similar to Adams' about compelling a litigant to accept 
settlement.  See generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 845-46 (1999) ("the certification of a mandatory class 
followed by settlement of its action for money  damages 
obviously implicates the Seventh Amendment jury trial rights of 
absent class members").  We now turn to the process of 
determining whether a settlement offer is fair. 
¶73 Settlement decisions are the product of variables that 
are difficult to quantify and compare.  These include litigation 
costs, settlement costs, stakes in the case, and likelihood of 
success at trial.  Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to 
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 
399, 
417-29 
(1973). 
 
This 
case 
aptly 
demonstrates 
that 
professional estimations of these variables can vary greatly.  
The decision of a circuit court who has examined whether a 
settlement offer is reasonably fair to both parties therefore 
deserves wide latitude.   
¶74 As a result of the briefing and thorough questioning 
on defendants' summary judgment motion, the disputed issues in 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
31 
 
the present case were well defined for the circuit court before 
LWMMIC's motion to compel settlement.  It appeared that Adams 
was going to have to submit evidence beyond what he submitted in 
opposition to the summary judgment motion in order to prove his 
case.  Evidence that could squarely establish a safe level of 
tension for the springs, such as an industrial standard or 
expert testimony, seemed to be absent.  At least at the point of 
the 
summary 
judgment 
motion, 
Adams 
appeared 
to 
rely 
on 
conclusory legal statements from a memo Greenwald prepared for 
Wozniak to prove negligence, rather than on evidence.  While the 
court did not grant defendants' summary judgment motion, we 
agree with LWMMIC that the summary judgment motion exposed many 
of the deficiencies in Adams' case.   
¶75 The circuit court also had the benefit of additional 
materials the parties submitted relating to the motion to compel 
settlement.  These showed that, at least in the opinion of 
LWMMIC, problems with Adams' case had increased since the 
summary judgment proceeding.  For example, additional testing 
had shown that the plow Adams was driving at the time of 
accident did trip, even at low speeds.  Defendants' neurosurgeon 
was going to testify that Adams would not have sustained his 
injuries had he been wearing a seat belt, and defendants were 
arguing that the statutory limit on a reduction of damages for 
not wearing a seat belt did not apply.   
¶76 Adams' response to LWMMIC's motion was that the 
circuit court was obligated to conduct an evidentiary hearing at 
which Adams could "present, through documentary evidence and 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
32 
 
testimony of witnesses, that which he intended to prove [and] 
that which he could prove, in order to demonstrate that this 
proposed settlement was not in his best interests because his 
case was much stronger than what [the circuit court] opined."   
¶77 Adams' 
suggestion 
of 
a 
mini-trial 
is 
not 
only 
unworkable, but it significantly lessens the value of the 
proposed settlement, i.e., stopping the accruing costs of 
litigation.  "The very purpose of the compromise [by settlement] 
is to avoid the delay and expense of such a trial."  Parker v. 
Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Young v. 
Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971)).  If a circuit court is 
not presented with enough information about the case to conclude 
that it would be fair to compel a party to accept settlement, 
the solution is to deny the motion, not to pre-try the case.  
See id. (quoting Young, 447 F.2d at 433) ("In determining the 
adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed settlement, . . . 
'the court does not try the case'").   
¶78 We also agree with LWMMIC that to the extent Adams 
"had some 'smoking gun' witness or testimony that he decided not 
to use in defending the summary judgment motion, such an 
argument runs contrary to the nature of contemporary pretrial 
procedure, the aim of which is to prevent trial by ambush and 
minimize surprises."  
¶79 In addition to fleshing out liability disputes, the 
circuit court ordered the parties to prepare a breakdown of the 
distribution of any recovery under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  
Under the statutory scheme, Adams would receive one-third of any 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
33 
 
recovery remaining after deduction of reasonable costs of 
collection, which could include the attorney fees for both 
Adams' and LWMMIC's counsel, as well as his own attorney fees.  
§ 102.29(1)(b)1. and (1)(c).  LWMMIC would then be reimbursed up 
to the $148,332 it had already paid in compensation, plus 
amounts 
it 
"may 
be 
obligated 
to 
make 
in 
the 
future."  
§ 102.29(1)(b)2.  Any remainder, sometimes called a "cushion," 
would go to Adams.  § 102.29(1)(b)3.   
¶80 With the predicted distribution of recovery before 
him, the circuit court was able to further evaluate the 
settlement.  That LWMMIC was willing to settle for roughly one-
third of what it had already paid in compensation, leaving it 
unreimbursed for two-thirds of the amount it had already paid 
and for all future payments, may have demonstrated the sincerity 
of LWMMIC's concerns about Adams' case.  That LWMMIC would be 
entitled to reimbursement for past and future compensation 
payments, which Greenwald acknowledged would be substantial 
given the nature and extent of Adams' injuries, could also 
inform the circuit court's assessment of the settlement offer.  
If Adams' future medical expenses were so substantial that he 
would be unlikely to receive any cushion, Adams' interest could 
be characterized as primarily in one-third of the recovery after 
deduction of costs.   
¶81 Having defined the dispute, taken stock of the 
parties' positions, and considered matters that impact the 
fairness of the settlement offer to all plaintiffs, the circuit 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
34 
 
court granted the motion to compel, explaining its decision as 
follows: 
I believe based upon the evidence submitted in 
support of and in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment that the risk of a finding of no liability in 
this case exceeds the possibility of recovering 
something beyond $200,000, and for that reason the 
motion is granted.   
We agree with the court of appeals that "[t]he circuit court's 
decision reflected a logical interpretation of the facts 
surrounding the settlement offer and consideration of the 
appropriate factors bearing on the decision," not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  While the circuit court did not 
specifically say that it evaluated the settlement to determine 
whether it was reasonably fair to both parties, we are satisfied 
that the court thoroughly considered matters that bear on that 
standard.  Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 We conclude that a circuit court may compel an 
employee to accept settlement of the claim the legislature 
created in Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  In such a claim, both the 
employee and the worker's compensation insurer share the right 
to sue third parties; the employee and the worker's compensation 
insurer have an equal voice in the prosecution of the claim; 
recovery from the claim is apportioned in the manner described 
in § 102.29(1)(b); and the circuit court is empowered to resolve 
any disputes arising between the employee and the worker's 
No. 
2012AP580   
 
35 
 
compensation insurer during the prosecution of their claim, 
including those disputes involving settlement.   
¶83 We also conclude that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) does not violate Adams' right to a jury trial 
because the claim § 102.29(1) creates is not the counterpart of 
a cause of action at law recognized at the time of the adoption 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We further conclude that the 
circuit court's authority to compel an employee to accept 
settlement does not violate procedural due process because 
judicial resolution of disputes is part of the statutory claim.  
Lastly, we conclude that the circuit court appropriately 
exercised its discretion by defining the dispute, taking stock 
of the relative positions of the parties and considering matters 
that impacted the fairness of the settlement.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
1 
 
¶84 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   The 
lynchpin 
of the majority's analysis lies in its unsupportable assertion 
that the common law right of the employee to bring a tort action 
against a negligent third party was abrogated by the enactment 
of Wis. Stat. § 102.29.  Majority op., ¶27.  Such an assertion 
unfortunately rewrites history, sub silencio overrules almost a 
century of well-settled precedent, and ignores the words of the 
statute. 
¶85 I say "rewrites history," because an examination of 
the history reveals that it is the common law right of an 
employee to bring a tort action against the employer that was 
alone abrogated by the 1911 Worker's Compensation Act——not the 
common law right of an injured employee to bring a common law 
tort action against a negligent third party.  
¶86 As this court pointedly stated in 1927, an examination 
of the legislative and statutory history of the worker's 
compensation law "leave[s] no doubt that the legislature 
intended to preserve the right to maintain an action in tort 
against any person, other than the employer, who is responsible 
for the acts causing injury to a workman."  Cermak v. Milwaukee 
Air Power Pump Co., 192 Wis. 44, 48, 211 N.W. 354 (1927). 
¶87 I say "sub silencio overrules" because without even 
acknowledging its existence, the majority apparently overrules 
almost a century of our precedent that has clearly and 
repeatedly provided that the common law right to maintain a tort 
action against a negligent third party was unaffected by the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 102.29.  
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
2 
 
¶88 In 1915, this court stated "the law [the Worker's 
Compensation Act] does not attempt in any way to abridge the 
remedies which an employee of one person may have at law against 
a third person for a tort which such third person commits 
against him." Smale v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 160 Wis. 331, 
334, 151 N.W. 803 (1915) (emphasis supplied); see also Severin 
v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378, 383, 73 N.W. 2d 477 (1955) ("That 
remedy [a third party action] existed at common law and was 
neither enlarged nor impaired by enactment of sec. 102.29.").1 
¶89 Finally, if the history and a century of precedent 
were not enough, the language of the statute expressly answers 
whether the enactment of the Worker's Compensation Act abrogated 
the right of the injured employee to bring a common law cause of 
action in tort against a negligent third party.  It did not.   
¶90 The statute expressly provides that the bringing of a 
worker's compensation claim "shall not affect the right of the 
employee, the employee's personal representative, or other 
person entitled to make claim or maintain an action in tort 
against any other party for such injury or death . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1).  
¶91 Under 
the 
majority's 
precarious 
analysis, 
it 
determines that because the injured employee's common law right 
to bring a tort action against a negligent third party has been 
abrogated by the Worker's Compensation Act, there is no right to 
a jury trial.  Accordingly, it concludes that a court may compel 
an employee to settle a claim, but offers no meaningful guidance 
                                                 
1 For additional cases see the discussion below. 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
3 
 
on the standard or process to be used.  Instead, it merely 
cautions circuit courts to be "fair."  A standard of "fairness" 
provides no standard at all. 
¶92 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that based on the 
history 
of 
the 
worker's 
compensation 
law, 
longstanding 
precedent, and the express language of the statute, the 
employee's common law cause of action against a third party 
tortfeasor was not abrogated by the Worker's Compensation Act.  
Because an employee's common law cause of action against a third 
party tortfeasor preexisted the Wisconsin Constitution and 
continues to this day, the Wisconsin Constitution requires that 
the right to a jury trial apply to such a claim.   Accordingly, 
I conclude that the court cannot compel settlement here, and I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶93  The majority's analysis of whether Adams has a right 
to a jury trial is misguided from the beginning.  It introduces 
the issue as whether there is a right to a jury trial for a 
statutory claim and then frames its analysis as whether the 
claim created by Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) is the counterpart of a 
cause of action at law that was recognized at the time of the 
adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Majority op., ¶¶5, 48, 
57 (emphasis supplied).  However, this is not the issue.  The 
issue is whether a litigant had a right to sue a third party 
tortfeasor at common law for a work-related injury.   
¶94 Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
protects the right to a trial by jury.  It provides: "The right 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
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of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all 
cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy."  Wis. 
Const. Art. I, §5.  "This section clearly indicates that non-
statutory causes of action at law, where the jury trial was 
guaranteed before the passage of the state constitution, would 
continue to have a guaranteed right to a jury trial attached 
even after the passage of the constitution."  Vill. Food & 
Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶10, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177 (emphasis in original).  Thus, if a 
litigant files suit based on a common law cause of action, and 
the right to a jury trial for that cause of action preceded the 
passage 
of 
the 
state 
constitution, 
the 
litigant 
has 
a 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  
¶95 The common law right of an individual to seek redress 
for an injury caused by another has existed for centuries.  As 
far back as 1768, Blackstone discussed personal actions "whereby 
a man claims satisfaction in damages for some injury done to his 
person or property."  Sir William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on 
the Laws of England 117 (1768).2  Blackstone referred to such 
actions as "trespass upon the case," and noted that such cases 
were assessed by a jury.  Id. at 122, 273-74.  As the majority 
acknowledges, "trespass on the case" is the ancestor of the 
present day action for negligence.  Majority op., ¶56 (quoting 
Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 180, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982)). 
                                                 
2 When ascertaining whether a cause of action existed in 
1848, we often resort to Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries 
on the Laws of England (1778).  State v. Abbott Labs., 2012 WI 
62, ¶34, 341 Wis. 2d 510, 816 N.W.2d 145. 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
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¶96 Actions at common law, such as negligence, are not 
easily abrogated by statute.  It has long been established that 
"[s]tatutes are not to be construed as changing the common law 
unless the purpose to effect such change is clearly expressed 
therein.  To have such effect 'the language [of the statute] 
must 
be 
clear, 
unambiguous 
and 
peremptory.'" 
Maxey 
v. 
Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 399, 288 
N.W.2d 794 (1980) (quoting Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 233 Wis. 467, 474, 290 N.W. 199 (1940)). 
¶97 Because the common law right of an employee to seek 
redress from a third party tortfeasor is a right preceding the 
Wisconsin Constitution, it cannot be abrogated absent clear, 
unambiguous, peremptory statutory language.  As discussed below, 
there is nothing in the history of the Worker's Compensation 
Act, this court's interpretation of it, or the Act's plain 
language to indicate that it was intended to perempt the common 
law right to maintain an action against a third party 
tortfeasor.   
A. 
History 
¶98 Wisconsin has played a significant role in the history 
of worker's compensation law in this country.  On May 3, 1911, 
Wisconsin became the first state in the nation to pass a broad, 
constitutionally valid worker's compensation law.  Borgnis v. 
Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911); Joseph A. Ranney, 
Trusting Nothing to Providence: A History of Wisconsin's Legal 
System 344 (1999).  In response, Employers Mutual Insurance 
Company of Wausau was formed and established in a one-room 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
6 
 
office above a cigar store in downtown Wausau.  On September 2, 
1911, one day after the law became effective, it issued the 
nation's first constitutionally valid worker's compensation 
policy.  Soon thereafter worker's compensation legislation 
became effective in nine other states.3   
¶99 The Wisconsin Industrial Commission was created also 
as a result of the passage of the worker's compensation 
legislation.  Its first chair was Charles Crownhart who 
subsequently served as a justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  
No doubt his knowledge and experience illumined some of the 
early worker's compensation decisions of this court——decisions 
that are sub silencio being overruled by the majority's holding 
today.   
¶100 Prior to 1911 employees had the right to sue their 
employers at common law but often lost because of common law 
defenses. 
 
Robert 
Asher, 
"The 
1911 
Wisconsin 
Workmen's 
Compensation Law: A Study in Conservative Labor Reform," 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, Vol. 57 at 125 (1973).  There was 
no recovery against an employer if it was determined that the 
employee assumed the risk, the employee was negligent in any 
way, or the injury occurred because of the negligence of a 
fellow employee.  However, if the employee was successful, there 
was no limit on the amount the employee could recover.  Id.; 
                                                 
3 Nevada, New Jersey,  California, Washington, Kansas, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Gregory Krohm, 
Workers' Compensation: Wisconsin Pioneers the Nation's First 
Constitutional Worker's Compensation Law (July 2011), available 
at www.wipps.org/media/docs/2010_Krohm_History_WC-July-2011.doc. 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
7 
 
Robert W. Ozanne, The Labor Movement in Wisconsin: A History 
125-26 (1984).   
¶101 The 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Act 
was 
passed 
as 
a 
compromise between the employer's and employee's interests.  
Employers lost their common law defenses, trading them for a no 
fault system under which employees were obliged to accept a 
limited and scheduled amount.  Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 
95 Wis. 2d 173, 180, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980). 
¶102 The abrogation of common law claims against employers 
in the Worker's Compensation Act did not extend to common law 
claims against third party tortfeasors.  When it was first 
enacted in 1911, the Worker's Compensation Act provided that 
making a claim for compensation under the law would "act as an 
assignment of any cause of action in tort which the employee or 
his personal representative may have against any other party." 
§1, ch. 50, Laws of 1911.   
¶103 An amendment to the Worker's Compensation Act in 1913 
provided that the making of a claim by an employee against a 
third party "shall operate as a waiver of any claim for 
compensation."  §1, ch. 599, Laws of 1913.  Although the law 
allowed an employee to assign the employee's common law tort 
claim and elect to either pursue a tort claim against a third 
party or a claim for worker's compensation, it did not eliminate 
the common law right to sue a third party tortfeasor. 
¶104 Even though the common law right to sue a third party 
remained, most employees chose the worker's compensation claim 
and few employers exercised their assignment rights.  Robert L. 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
8 
 
Millender, 
Expanding 
Employees' 
Remedies 
and 
Third 
Party 
Actions, 17 Clev. St. L. Rev. 32, 33 (1968).  This left the 
third party tortfeasor with "a windfall."  Id.  Although there 
was justification to remove tort liability from an employer 
because the employer was liable regardless of fault under the 
Worker's Compensation Act, the third party tortfeasor gave up 
nothing and ended up with the equivalent of immunity due to 
employers' reluctance to sue.  Id.   
¶105 Accordingly, in 1931 the Worker's Compensation Act was 
amended to eliminate the requirement that an employee select 
between a common law tort claim against a third party tortfeasor 
and a worker's compensation claim.  Drafting file for ch. 132, 
Laws of 1931, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. ("The 
third party liability is to be changed so that an injured 
workman may in all cases claim compensation without surrendering 
his right to sue a third party.").  The new language provided: 
The making of a claim for compensation against an 
employer or compensation insurer for the injury or 
death of an employe shall not affect the right of the 
employe or his personal representative to make a claim 
or maintain an action in tort against any other party 
for such injury or death, but the employer or his 
insurer shall be entitled to reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to join in such action. 
§2, ch. 132, Laws of 1931.  Despite slight amendments to the law 
since 1931, it continues to this day to protect the employee's 
common law right to make a claim against a third party 
tortfeasor.  Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).   
B. 
Century of Precedent 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
9 
 
¶106 Consistent with its history, courts have repeatedly 
recognized that the Worker's Compensation Act does not impair an 
employee's common law right to maintain a tort action against a 
third party tortfeasor.  Almost one hundred years ago, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court succinctly expressed the law which 
should be guiding the majority today: "The law does not attempt 
in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one 
person may have at law against a third person for a tort which 
such third person commits against him."  Smale, 160 Wis. at 334. 
¶107 Likewise, in Cermak, 192 Wis. at 47, the court, 
interpreting an early version of the statute, stated "[t]he 
workmen's compensation act clearly evidences a legislative 
intent that the payment of compensation by an employer shall not 
relieve the one whose tortious act caused this injury from 
liability therefor.  This intent is shown by sec. 102.29, 
Stats., which carefully preserves the right to maintain an 
action in tort against such other person whose acts caused the 
injury."4  
¶108  The court explained that although receiving worker's 
compensation benefits "operates as an assignment of any cause of 
action in tort," that assignment "is merely for the purpose of 
repaying to the employer the amount of the compensation paid the 
injured employee."  Id. at 47-48.  Accordingly, it concluded 
                                                 
4 The 
dissent 
in 
Cermak 
also 
agreed 
with 
this 
interpretation, stating "[t]here exists no doubt in my mind that 
the workmen's compensation act preserves to the injured workman 
 . . . such cause of action as may exist at common law against a 
third person."  Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co., 192 Wis. 
44, 51, 211 N.W. 354 (1927) (Rosenberry, J. dissenting). 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
10 
 
that the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act "leave no 
doubt that the legislature intended to preserve the right to 
maintain an action in tort against any person, other than the 
employer, who is responsible for the acts causing injury to a 
workman."  Id. at 48. 
¶109 After the 1931 amendment to the Worker's Compensation 
Act, courts continued to recognize that it did not impair an 
employee's common law right to maintain a tort action against a 
third party tortfeasor:  
The fact that sec. 102.29, Stats., appears in the 
chapter entitled "Workmen's Compensation" does not 
change the character of the action brought against a 
third party, which as we have said, is one at law 
founded in tort. There is nothing in the Workmen's 
Compensation Law which discloses a legislative purpose 
of creating a new remedy for an injury to an employee 
caused by the negligent act of a third party. That 
remedy existed at common law and was neither enlarged 
nor impaired by enactment of sec. 102.29. 
Severin, 271 Wis. at 383; see also Employers Mut. Liability Ins. 
Co. v. De Bruin, 271 Wis. 412, 415, 73 N.W.2d 479 (1955) ("The 
cause of action is one at common law; the fact that it is 
recognized in a section of the Workmen's Compensation Law does 
not change the fact that [the tortfeasor's] liability is based 
upon his wrongful acts."). 
¶110  The court expressed similar sentiments in McGonigle 
v. Gryphan, 201 Wis. 269, 272, 229 N.W. 81 (1930) ("[I]t is 
clear from a consideration of the whole act that it did not 
affect rights of action which existed under the common law in 
any cases except those in which the parties involved sustained 
toward each other the relationship of employer and employee.").  
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
11 
 
¶111 Wisconsin is not alone in interpreting its worker's 
compensation law as preserving the common law right of an 
employee to sue a third party tortfeasor.  Other states have 
likewise determined that their worker's compensation laws do not 
abrogate the common law right to maintain an action against a 
third party tortfeasor.  See, e.g., Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber 
Prods., 
690 
P.2d 
324, 
328 
(Idaho 
1984) 
("the 
workmen's 
compensation law does not disturb the injured employee's right 
to sue a third party for 'legal liability to pay damages'"); 
County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp., 568 P.2d 363, 367-68 (Cal. 
1977) ("The workers compensation statutes governing employer and 
employee actions against third parties do not define the 
substantive law which determines whether an employee or an 
employer will in fact recover.  Instead, the substantive law 
which governs . . . is usually the general tort law.");  St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wood, 416 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ark. 
1967) 
("[The 
worker's 
compensation 
law] 
recognizes 
the 
employee's common law tort action against third persons."); 
Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushong, 56 P.2d 819, 821 (Okla. 1936) 
("There is nothing whatever in the [Worker's Compensation] act 
under which it may be claimed there was a purpose or attempt to 
limit, modify, or cancel the common-law liability of a third 
party for his tortious injury of a workman."). 
C. 
Language of the Statute 
¶112 This precedent is consistent with the plain language 
of the statute.  It expressly provides that the making of a 
claim for compensation against an employer shall not affect the 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
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right of an employee to make a claim or maintain an action in 
tort against any other party.  Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1)(a). 
¶113 The statute states: 
(a) 
The making of a claim for compensation against an 
employer or compensation insurer for the injury 
or death of an employee shall not affect the 
right of the employee, the employee's personal 
representative, or other person entitled to bring 
action to make claim or maintain an action in 
tort against any other party for such injury or 
death, hereinafter referred to as a 3rd party. 
. . .  
(b) 
. . . Each shall have an equal voice in the 
prosecution of the claim, and any disputes 
arising shall be passed upon by the court before 
whom the case is pending . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) (emphasis supplied). 
¶114 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29(1) should not be read as an 
abrogation of the common law right to a jury trial.  As 
discussed above, statutes are not to be read as derogating the 
common law unless the legislative purpose to do so is clearly 
expressed in the language of the statute.  Maxey, 94 Wis. 2d at 
399.  Such "legislative intent to change the common law must be 
expressed 'beyond any reasonable doubt.'"  Kranzush v. Badger 
State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981) 
(citing Grube v. Moths, 56 Wis. 2d 424, 437, 202 N.W.2d 261 
(1972); Burke v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 39 Wis. 
2d 682, 690, 159 N.W.2d 700 (1968)).  Thus, to accomplish a 
change in the common law, "the language [of the statute] must be 
clear, unambiguous, and peremptory."  Maxey, 94 Wis. 2d at 399.   
¶115 Although the juxtaposition of the phrase "any disputes 
arising shall be passed upon by the court," in subsection (1)(b) 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
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with the above emphasized language in subsection (1)(a) may give 
rise to some uncertainty as to its meaning, it most certainly is 
not "clear, unambiguous, and peremptory," in limiting the 
longstanding right of an employee to a jury trial for injuries 
caused 
by 
a 
third 
party 
tortfeasor. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1)(b) may give a court the ability to pass upon other 
disputes that arise during the prosecution of a case.  However, 
it does not——beyond a reasonable doubt——permit a court to compel 
an employee to settle a claim against a third party tortfeasor, 
thereby forcing surrender of the employee's right to a jury 
trial.  To the extent that Dalka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2011 WI App 90, 334 Wis. 2d 686, 799 N.W.2d 923, suggested 
otherwise, I conclude that it was in error.   
¶116 Dalka involved an $8,500 settlement offer to the 
plaintiff where there were consolidated cases with different 
parties, multiple accidents, and disputes over the origin of the 
injury.  In its 12-paragraph decision, the court of appeals 
determined that a court could force an employee to settle its 
third party worker's compensation claims.  It based its analysis 
on Bergren v. Staples, 263 Wis. 477, 483-84, 57 N.W.2d 714 
(1953).  Dalka, 334 Wis. 2d 686, ¶10.   
¶117 However, Bergren was decided in the context of an 
employee who was trying to force an employer to settle.  As 
Bergren noted, unlike employees, employers do not have a common 
law right to an employee's claim for negligence against a third 
party.  263 Wis. at 482.  The Dalka court failed to appreciate 
this distinction.  Consequently, it did not conduct a thorough 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
14 
 
analysis of the issue and is inconsistent with the history, case 
law, and express language of the statute discussed above. 
¶118 In sum, the history and longstanding precedent, 
together with persuasive cases from other jurisdictions, as well 
as the language of the Worker's Compensation Act lead to the 
conclusion that an employee's common law cause of action against 
a third party tortfeasor was not abrogated by the Worker's 
Compensation Act.  Because an employee's common law cause of 
action against a third party tortfeasor preexisted the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
continues 
to 
this 
day, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution requires that the right to a jury trial apply to 
such a claim.  Thus, contrary to the majority, I conclude that 
there is a right to a jury trial for a common law cause of 
action brought by an employee against a third party tortfeasor.   
II 
¶119 The majority compounds its problematic analysis by 
failing to give any meaningful guidance on what standards or 
procedures should be applied in implementing its erroneous 
conclusion. 
¶120 Here, after the League of Wisconsin Municipalities 
Mutual Insurance Company moved to compel settlement, Adams 
requested the opportunity to present evidence in support of his 
opposition to the motion.  He specifically identified witnesses 
he would present in support of his argument that the case had 
more value than the settlement offer.  The circuit court denied 
this request and made its determination to compel settlement 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
15 
 
based on evidence previously entered in support of a summary 
judgment motion.   
¶121 Prior to its ruling, the circuit court made a clear 
request for guidance on what standard to apply to determine 
whether to grant a motion to compel a settlement.  It noted the 
worker's compensation statute did not indicate any procedure for 
it to follow in deciding disputes between parties:  
First of all, I want to say that the legislature 
hasn't given a great deal of guidance with respect to 
how the court should deal with these matters.  The 
legislature has directed that where there is a dispute 
between two parties on how the case should be 
conducted and whether offers of settlement should be 
accepted, the statute imposes the duty to sort that 
out upon the court.  But there's no – there's nothing 
that's been determined about how the court goes about 
that. 
There is a good reason, however, why no guidance is set forth in 
the statute on what standards or procedures to employ when 
considering a motion to compel an employee to settle.  As 
discussed above, such a motion which would deprive the employee 
of the right to a jury trial would be an anathema to the 
history, a century of precedent, and the express language of the 
statute. 
¶122 The circuit court also noted a similar absence of 
guidance from the courts: 
And the only case that deals with this, which is only 
a few months ago, it was unfortunately a case where 
the amount in dispute was only about $8,700 and where 
the judge – trial court apparently dealt with it in a 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
16 
 
rather cavalier fashion, and that doesn't give a great 
deal of guidance.5 
¶123 I agree with the circuit court that the legislation 
and the caselaw offer little guidance on how to make these 
determinations.  The statute merely states that "any disputes 
arising shall be passed upon by the court before whom the case 
is pending."  Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  Likewise, the sole case 
permitting a court to compel settlement noted only that the 
circuit court had determined that settlement was in the 
employee's best interest.  Dalka, 334 Wis. 2d 686.  It did not 
elaborate on what standard a circuit court should apply in 
making that decision and what evidence it should consider.  Id., 
¶3. 
¶124 The standard set forth by the majority today provides 
even less guidance.  It opines with scant explanation that 
"fairness" is a better standard than "best interest."  Majority 
op., ¶72.  Although the majority observes the three standards 
employed by the federal court when approving class action 
settlements (fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy), it chooses 
just one without apparent rhyme or reason.  Id.  The majority 
mandates that the standard a circuit court should employ when 
deciding whether to compel a party to accept settlement is one 
that evaluates whether the settlement is "fair."  Id.  Such a 
solo standard provides no standard at all. 
                                                 
5 The case to which the circuit court was referring was 
Dalka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI App 90, 334 Wis. 2d 
686, 799 N.W.2d 923.   
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
17 
 
¶125 Likewise, the majority offers little guidance on what 
process a circuit court is to use when making the determination 
of whether to grant a motion to compel settlement.  Rather than 
stating what the procedure should be, the majority focuses on 
the procedure suggested by Adams, stating that a "mini-trial" is 
"unworkable."  Id., ¶77.   
¶126 The majority fails to acknowledge that in similar 
circumstances, this court has adopted a mini-trial to assess the 
value of a settlement.  In Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Automobile 
Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982), the court 
considered what procedure should be used to determine whether a 
settlement between a plaintiff and a tortfeasor made the 
plaintiff whole such that a subrogated insurer could share in 
the recovery.  It concluded that a mini-trial conducted by the 
circuit court was appropriate.  Id. at 276-77.  Since then, 
Rimes hearings have become the norm for determining whether a 
plaintiff has been made whole by a settlement.  Schulte v. 
Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 629, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993). 
¶127 The two cases cited by the majority show that 
evidentiary hearings are also used by federal district courts in 
determining whether to approve class action settlements under 
Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23(e).6  See Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 
                                                 
6 Federal Rule Civ. Pro. 23(e) provides:   
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class 
may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised 
only 
with 
the 
court's 
approval. 
The 
following 
procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise: 
    . . .  
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
18 
 
434-35 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the plaintiffs presented 
witness testimony and that the evidence presented by the 
objectors raised nothing of substance to contradict it); Parker 
v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1210 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting the 
objectors' failure to introduce any evidence at the settlement 
hearing).  The majority does not explain why Wisconsin circuit 
courts are unable to manage the same procedure as well as the 
federal courts. 
¶128 Although the contours of the procedure the majority 
sets forth for the circuit courts are unclear, the inadequacy of 
its loose guidelines are illustrated by their application in 
this case.  Here, the majority determines that it was 
permissible for the circuit court to compel settlement based 
solely on the evidence already before it.  Adams' claim was 
terminated without him being able to present evidence in 
opposition to the motion to compel settlement.  Such a procedure 
calls into question whether the court had an adequate basis for 
determining that the settlement was fair and raises due process 
concerns.   
¶129 The majority is obligated to provide the circuit court 
and litigants with some direction on how a circuit court is to 
make a determination to compel settlement.  Its standard of 
"fairness" is no standard at all.  Absent any indication of what 
evidence the court is to consider and how that evidence is to 
                                                                                                                                                             
   (2) If the proposal would bind class members, the 
court may approve it only after a hearing and on 
finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
19 
 
get 
before 
the 
court, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
shirks 
its 
responsibility. 
III 
¶130  In sum, the majority's approach to the right to a 
jury trial is misguided as it overlooks history, sub silencio 
overrules decades of cases, and ignores the words of the statute 
by assuming that an employee's right to pursue a cause of action 
against 
a 
third 
party 
tortfeasor 
comes 
from 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1), and not the common law.  Under its precarious 
analysis the majority determines there is no right to a jury 
trial, and concludes that a circuit court may compel an employee 
to settle its claims.   
¶131 Contrary 
to 
the 
majority, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
employee's common law cause of action against a third party 
tortfeasor was not abrogated by the Worker's Compensation Act.  
Because an employee's common law cause of action against a third 
party tortfeasor preexisted the Wisconsin Constitution and 
continues to this day, the Wisconsin Constitution requires that 
the right to a jury trial apply to such a claim.   Accordingly, 
I conclude that the court cannot compel settlement here, and I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶132 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2012AP580.awb 
 
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