Case Title: State Ex Rel. Grammer v. Tippecanoe Circuit Court

Citation: 377 N.E.2d 1359

Docket Number: 478S74

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
377 N.E.2d 1359 (1978)
STATE of Indiana On the Relation of Gilbert E. Grammer, Jr., Relator,
v.
The TIPPECANOE CIRCUIT COURT and Warren B. Thompson, As Judge of Said Court, Respondents.
No. 478S74.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
July 11, 1978.
*1360 John H. Meyers, George J. Heid, Lafayette, Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for relator.
Warren B. Thompson, James A. Kizer, Pros. Atty., Lafayette, for respondents.
HUNTER, Justice.
This matter is before us on an action for writ of prohibition and writ of mandate concerning criminal discovery techniques. Gilbert Grammer, Jr., was charged by information with second-degree murder on September 14, 1977.
The discovery matters began with a routine Motion for Pre-Trial Discovery filed by the defendant and a routine Response to Discovery filed by the prosecuting attorney. The response included a list of witnesses, a list of the physical evidence obtained by the state, copies of police reports, and a copy of defendant's statement.
Defendant then filed extensive Interrogatories to be answered by the prosecuting attorney on October 17, 1977. The state has never answered these interrogatories but did file a belated Motion for Protective Order which was granted on February 15, 1978. The defendant also filed a Request for Admissions on November 30, 1977. This Request was denied by the trial court as not applicable to criminal cases.
Defendant now contends that it was error for the trial court to grant the protective order because it was filed three months *1361 after the deadline for filing objections to interrogatories as set out in Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 33. He also contends that Ind.R.Tr.P. 36 does apply to Criminal cases. The defendant is obviously arguing for extremely radical pretrial discovery in criminal cases which has never been previously allowed either in this state or under the federal rules.
It is true that there has recently been an expansion of criminal discovery practices. This Court has established that the trial court has the inherent power, within certain limitations, to order various types of discovery in criminal cases, Antrobus v. State (1970) 253 Ind. 420, 254 N.E.2d 873; Bernard v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 688, 230 N.E.2d 536; Ind.R.Crim.P. 21.
It is also clear, however, that discovery in favor of a criminal defendant is not required by the constitutional guarantee of due process. Wardius v. Oregon, (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82; Bernard v. State, supra. Therefore, one of the paramount factors in criminal discovery in this state is the discretion of the trial court in ordering disclosures and balancing the discovery privileges between the parties, State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, (1974) 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E.2d 433.
The use of depositions and motions to produce has been upheld in criminal cases under appropriate circumstances, Murphy v. State, (1976) Ind., 352 N.E.2d 479; Carroll v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 696, 338 N.E.2d 264; State ex rel. Keller, supra.
The use of interrogatories in criminal proceedings was not brought up until 1976 in Gutowski v. State, (1976) Ind. App., 354 N.E.2d 293. Gutowski had filed written interrogatories to be answered by the complaining witness. The trial court ruled that the witness need not answer the interrogatories and the Court of Appeals upheld this. However, the court pointed out that its holding was based on Gutowski's waiver of pretrial discovery by his failure to pursue his rights with diligence. The court made no clear general ruling on the use of interrogatories in criminal cases.
In considering the use of interrogatories in the present case, it is necessary to keep in mind the different purposes to be served by discovery in civil and criminal cases. A primary purpose of civil discovery is a narrowing of the issues and interrogatories are often used for this purpose. Interrogatories are seldom employed as a complete discovery device but are usually used in preparation for more detailed requests. However, in a criminal case, the charging information must be very specific. It is required to state "the nature and elements of the crime charged in plain and concise language." Ind. Code. § 35-3.1-1-2(a)(4) (Burns 1975). Since a criminal case starts in such a specific manner, it is not necessary in most instances to use the overbroad device of interrogatories to narrow the issues.
Furthermore, while interrogatories are a relatively inexpensive discovery device, they have been recognized as cumbersome and not suitable for complicated factual situations. Repetitious interrogatories are the most abused of all discovery devices and often become tools for harassment. Costanzi v. Ryan, (1978) Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 1333; 2 HARVEY: INDIANA PRACTICE 682.
In considering the use of any discovery device the trial court must keep in mind the goals of facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth. As the United States Supreme Court has said, "increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system." Wardius, supra, at 412 U.S. 474, 93 S. Ct. 2211.
It appears to us that the use of interrogatories in criminal trials will not usually advance either of these goals. At the time a criminal charge is filed, the prosecution ordinarily knows or can readily ascertain the evidence available to it. This evidence is usually reported in written form and can be made available to the defense with a minimum of effort. In the over-whelming *1362 number of cases, production of these materials is sufficient to satisfy the goals of discovery. Most significantly, except in rare cases, the only person who definitely knows the truth of the charge is the accused. Therefore, the most valuable source of information belongs exclusively to the defense after counsel is appointed.
In the case at bar the extensive use of interrogatories approaches or equals the ridiculous. The defendant had already been given an adequate response to discovery including a list of the state's witnesses, copies of police reports and a copy of defendant's statement. The use of repetitious questions directed to the prosecutor is not only inefficient but is unreasonable and oppressive. The questions could all have been more appropriately and efficiently asked of the defendant himself or of the specific witnesses.
We are setting out the interrogatories in toto to indicate the absurdity of the defendant's requests:
While it is true that criminal discovery has been expanded by allowing various civil discovery techniques to be applied to criminal cases, the very nature of the criminal case setting belies the wisdom of an indiscriminate application of civil discovery procedures. We cannot allow interrogatories to be used as a device to force the state to formulate material already available as a matter of public record. We *1365 have consistently held that it is not the duty of the prosecutor to bear the burden of assembling the defense counsel's evidence. State v. Wright, (1978) Ind., 372 N.E.2d 453; Ortez v. State, (1975) Ind. App., 333 N.E.2d 838; Bernard, supra.
Interrogatories are never proper in a criminal case when their function can be served by another, previously recognized discovery technique. Furthermore, the use of interrogatories must be strictly controlled in criminal cases and should only be used under exigent circumstances. There was no error in the instant case in granting the protective order of the state since no exigent circumstances were shown and the information asked for in the interrogatories could have been obtained through the use of other, established discovery techniques. The defendant cannot complain about the timeliness of the filing of the motion for a protective order since the interrogatories were incorrectly used. Furthermore, since criminal discovery is largely discretionary, the trial court is not necessarily bound by the limiting language contained in the civil rules, Gutowski, supra, and State ex rel. Keller, supra.
The second error alleged by the defendant is the denial of his Request for Admissions. The request for admissions is used in civil cases as a device to get uncontested facts out of the way. It is unnecessary to use this device in criminal cases as there is already a mechanism established for this purpose. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-3-1 (Burns 1975) provides for an omnibus hearing and pretrial conference. At the time of this hearing, the statute provides:
Ind. Code § 35-4.1-3-1(b).
Furthermore, the prosecutor is under the constitutional duty to disclose any exculpatory evidence to the defense. United States v. Agurs, (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342; Brady v. Maryland, (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the request for admissions.
For all the foregoing reasons there was no error in the orders and rulings of the trial court in this case.
Therefore the petition and the relief requested in this original action are denied.
GIVAN, C.J., and PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs in result.