Case Title: James Terry v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-383

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
1.  Jurisdiction in this case cannot be based on conflict with Yashus v. State,
745 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  Although Yashus appears to be a decision of
the Second District, it actually is a decision of the Fifth District decided by a panel
of judges from the Second District sitting as the Fifth District.  A corrected opinion
has been published.  See Yashus v. State, 796 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). 
This Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to intra-district conflict.
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-383
____________
JAMES TERRY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 24, 2002]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review the opinion in Terry v. State, 778 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the opinions in Yashus v. State, 745 So.
2d 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999),1 and McFadden v. State, 773 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th
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DCA 2000).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons expressed below, we resolve the certified conflict by approving the decision
below and disapproving McFadden to the extent it conflicts with this decision.
James Terry (Terry) pled guilty to one count of aggravated battery and two
counts of violating probation pursuant to a written negotiated plea agreement with
the State.  Terry’s plea agreement provided:
Cap of midrange of the guidelines DOC on all three cases concurrent. 
Court may sentence defendant as a habitual offender on the aggravated
battery, term of probation to follow in the Court’s discretion.  No
probation to follow on the VOP cases.
On February 2, 1996, the trial court accepted Terry’s plea, but deferred sentencing
until March 12, 1996.  On March 12, the trial court sentenced Terry to 54 months in
prison followed by 60 months’ probation.  The trial court announced that Terry was
to be designated an habitual offender and also issued a written order to this effect. 
Terry served his full prison term and then began serving probation, but in
1999 was charged with violation of probation, which he admitted.  On March 14,
2000, the trial court held a hearing on Terry’s admission and conducted a sentencing
proceeding.  The trial court sentenced Terry to fifteen years in prison (with credit
for time served) as an habitual offender.  On appeal to the Fifth District, Terry
challenged the habitual offender sentence.  See Terry v. State, 778 So. 2d 435 (Fla.
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5th DCA 2001).  The Fifth District affirmed Terry’s sentence, but certified conflict
with Yashus and McFadden.  See id. at 437.
The decision below certified conflict on the issue of whether it is proper to
sentence a defendant as an habitual offender following violation of probation when
the defendant’s original sentence was within the sentencing guidelines range, but
where the defendant’s plea agreement contemplated habitual offender treatment and
the defendant was declared to be an habitual offender at the time of the original
sentencing.  
In essence, Terry claims that because his original sentence was within the
guidelines range, it did not have the legal effect of an enhanced sentence.  Therefore,
he argues, it is contrary to law to impose an enhanced sentence for the first time
after violation of probation.  The State replies that Terry’s sentence is proper
pursuant to King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996), Walker v. State, 682 So. 2d
555 (Fla. 1996), and Dunham v. State, 686 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1997).  We agree with
the State.
In King, the defendant was convicted by a jury.  At sentencing, the trial judge
found that King qualified as an habitual offender, but imposed a guidelines sentence
of ten years in prison followed by two years’ probation.  The defendant was not
designated as an habitual offender.  After serving the prison time, King violated his
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probation.  The State filed a notice of its intent to seek habitual felony offender
sentencing.  The judge sentenced King to thirty years in state prison as an habitual
offender.  On appeal, the issue presented to this Court was whether a trial judge,
upon revocation of probation, can lawfully impose an habitual offender sentence
despite having declined to impose such a sentence at the original sentencing.  See
King, 681 So. 2d at 1138.  We concluded:
Having served the imprisonment portion of his sentence under the
guidelines, King cannot be sentenced as an habitual offender upon
revocation of probation.  Hybrid split sentences of incarceration
without habitual offender status followed by probation as an habitual
offender are not authorized by section 775.084 and are in fact
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 1140.  We also concluded, however, that “a hybrid split sentence of
incarceration under the guidelines followed by probation as an habitual offender,
although not authorized by statute or rule, is not an illegal sentence unless the total
sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum for the particular offense at
issue.”  Id.  
In King, we went on to discuss the conflict case, Davis v. State, 623 So. 2d
547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).  In Davis, the defendant agreed to a hybrid split sentence
as part of a negotiated plea agreement.  The defendant pled guilty to burglary of a
structure and was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by two
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years’ probation.  The defendant was not sentenced to prison as an habitual
offender, but the sentence form provided that he would serve his probation as an
habitual offender.  The district court found the trial court could not impose a hybrid
split sentence, i.e., incarceration without habitual offender status followed by
probation as an habitual offender.  See id. at 548.  In King, however, we
disapproved Davis and found that a trial court can impose a negotiated sentence that
is not specifically authorized by statute; “However, we distinguish those instances
where a defendant agrees to such a sentence as part of an otherwise valid plea
agreement and the negotiated sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for
the particular offense involved.”  681 So. 2d at 1140.  Thus under King, a hybrid
split sentence of incarceration under the guidelines, followed by probation as an
habitual offender, is permissible as long as the defendant has a valid plea agreement
to this effect and as long as the negotiated sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum for the particular offense involved.  
In Walker, the defendant pled guilty to the crime charged with the
understanding that he would be sentenced to five and one-half years’ probation and
that he would be treated as an habitual offender if he violated probation.  Walker
was eventually sentenced according to the plea agreement and appealed.  On appeal,
the district court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence in a per curiam
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opinion with citation to King.  We agreed that Walker’s sentence was proper but
disapproved the district court’s reasoning, reiterating language from King that
“where a defendant agrees to such a sentence as part of an otherwise valid plea
agreement and the negotiated sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for
the particular offense involved, the court may impose incarceration under the
guidelines followed by probation as an habitual offender.”  682 So. 2d at 556.  As to
the defendant, we stated that “the record reveals that Walker’s sentence was part of
a plea bargain, that he understood the consequences of the sentence, and that the
negotiated sentence did not exceed the maximum allowed by law for the offense of
delivery of cocaine.”  Id.  Similarly, in Dunham v. State, 686 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.
1997), we stated:
In Walker, as in the instant case, the defendant was determined to be a
habitual offender but as part of a plea bargain was not sentenced as
such.  Instead, he was sentenced to five years in prison followed by
five years' probation, a sentence well below the sentencing guidelines,
with the understanding that in the event of a subsequent probation
violation he could be sentenced as a habitual offender.  Thereafter,
when he violated his probation, he was sentenced as a habitual
offender.
     In Walker, we relied upon our prior decision in King v. State, 681
So.2d 1136 (Fla.1996), in which we approved such a hybrid sentencing
arrangement if the defendant had agreed to it at the time of his original
sentencing.
686 So. 2d at 1356.  See also Rodriguez v. State, 766 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA
-7-
2000) (defendant not entitled to have habitual offender status stricken because the
habitual offender adjudication was the result of a plea bargain and would not be
disturbed).  
The law from King, Walker, and Dunham is clear; if a defendant agrees to a
hybrid split sentence as part of an otherwise valid plea agreement and the negotiated
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the particular offense involved,
the court may impose incarceration under the guidelines followed by probation as an
habitual offender.  In the instant case, the negotiated plea agreement gave the trial
court discretion to sentence Terry as an habitual offender, which the trial court did. 
The plea agreement also provided that Terry’s prison sentence was to be capped at
the mid-range of the guidelines, which it was.  Therefore, even though Terry’s actual
prison time was within the guidelines, he agreed to allow the trial court to decide
whether to impose habitual offender status at the time of sentencing.  
We note that the hybrid split sentence discussed in King is slightly different
from the split sentence in this case.  In King, the hybrid split sentence imposed was
a sentence of incarceration without habitual offender status, and thus under the
guidelines, followed by probation as an habitual offender.  Even so, we noted that if
this sentence had been imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement this Court would
have upheld it.  See King, 681 So. 2d at 1140.  Here, Terry’s split sentence was a
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sentence of incarceration with habitual offender status, under the guidelines,
followed by probation as an habitual offender, all pursuant to a valid plea agreement. 
If anything, the facts of the instant case present an even stronger reason to uphold
the sentence.  In other words, if we would have upheld King’s sentence had it been
imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, then Terry’s sentence should be upheld
because it was not only imposed pursuant to a plea agreement but also allowed the
trial court to impose habitual offender status at the time of original sentencing, which
it did.  Terry was on notice that if he violated probation he could face an habitual
offender sentence because he was designated an habitual offender at the time of
sentencing.
As to the certified conflict with McFadden v. State, 773 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000), we disapprove McFadden to the extent it conflicts with this decision. 
On appeal, McFadden argued the trial court erred in sentencing him as an habitual
offender upon revocation of his probation since he did not receive an habitual
offender sentence at his original sentencing.  The Fourth District agreed, concluding
that because McFadden was initially sentenced to only two years’ probation, his
original sentence fell short of an habitual offender term and thus “McFadden cannot
be sentenced as an habitual offender upon revocation of probation, notwithstanding
his plea agreement to be treated as an habitual offender.”  Id. at 1238.  
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At sentencing, McFadden was designated an habitual offender as part of a 
plea agreement in exchange for his guilty plea to the charge of robbery with a
firearm, but was given a sentence that fell short of an habitual offender term.  Upon
violation of probation, McFadden was given an habitual offender sentence.  Under
King, Walker, and Dunham, this type of hybrid split sentence pursuant to a plea
agreement is clearly proper.
We therefore approve the decision of the Fifth District in this case and
disapprove the decision of the Fourth District in McFadden.
It is so ordered.  
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D00-794
(Brevard County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
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Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Kellie A. Nielan, Bureau Chief, and Bonnie
Jean Parrish and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent