Case Title: In re Paternity of BC

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-99-2

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Paternity of BC1999 WY 107984 P.2d 482Case Number: C-99-2Decided: 07/19/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
RE THE PATERNITY OF BC, a minor. KC, Appellant (Petitioner)

v.

JRE, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sheridan County Honorable Leonard McEwan, 
Judge.

Robert W. Brown 
and Jonathan A. Botten of Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, WY, Argument by Mr. 
Botten, representing appellant.

H. W. Rasmussen 
and Newton S. Ludwig of Attorneys At Law Of Wyoming, P. C., Sheridan, WY, 
Argument by Mr. Ludwig, representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

PER 
CURIAM.

[¶1]      Pursuant to the 
request of Appellee JRE (Father), the district court modified the custody of the 
minor child, BC, ordering an arrangement which changes custody of BC annually 
from Mother to Father. Finding no evidence which supports this arrangement as 
being in the best interests of the child, and finding the evidence allows but 
one conclusion, we reverse and remand with instruction to continue Mother's 
custody under the terms and conditions existing prior to the district court's 
recent modification.

ISSUE

[¶2]      A single issue is 
presented for review:

Whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in modifying custody and ordering 
alternating years of custody of the minor child.

FACTS

[¶3]      BC was conceived 
when Mother was sixteen years old and Father was twenty. Shortly after the 
birth, Father petitioned for a declaration of paternity and visitation 
privileges. The district court granted Father's request, and in 1995, Father was 
entitled to visitation every day while Mother completed high school, as well as 
six hours on every Wednesday and alternating weekends.

[¶4]      In 1997, Father 
petitioned to modify the custody arrangement. Prior to the date set for hearing, 
Father petitioned the district court for an expedited hearing, alleging he had 
just learned that Mother was leaving Wyoming to attend school in Missouri and 
would be gone before the hearing date set by the court. The hearing date was 
moved forward, and the matter came before the court on July 28, 
1997.

[¶5]      The following 
facts are taken from the statement of the evidence presented at a second hearing 
on July 31, 1998, which was unrecorded, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03. Mother 
offered two witnesses - herself and a licensed psychologist. Mother presented 
documentary evidence and testimony demonstrating she already had completed her 
course of studies in Missouri, and became a certified surgical technician on 
July 23, 1998. Upon graduation, she had secured a full-time job with the 
hospital at which she had interned.

[¶6]      While attending 
school, Mother lived with BC in a clean and safe home, providing pictures of the 
home to the district court. She also provided pictures of an apartment into 
which she planned to move the following month. Regarding child care, Mother 
stated BC was enrolled with a licensed day care while she was in school, and the 
arrangement would continue when she began her new job. In addition, Mother 
arranged for a day care provider to stay at her apartment while she was on call 
so that BC's schedule would not be unduly interrupted if she had to 
leave.

[¶7]      Mother also 
testified that she has accommodated Father's visitation beyond what was required 
by court order and has allowed telephone access at all reasonable times. Mother 
further stated that on two occasions during visitation with Father, the child 
had fallen and been hurt. Mother presented several photographs of Father's yard 
in a cluttered condition and his porch lacking a 
guardrail.

[¶8]      The psychologist, 
who has extensive experience in therapy and has frequently made custody 
recommendations to courts, admitted she had not interviewed the child in the 
past year. However, she testified that she could make general recommendations 
regarding custody and visitation for a child of three. She stated that in her 
experience and opinion, it is traumatic for a three-year-old child to be parted 
from his primary care giver for more than two weeks at a time. She also 
testified that behavioral problems can occur with children who are not allowed 
to have a consistent bond with their primary care giver, while conceding that 
every case is different, and she could not make generalizations to a specific 
case.

[¶9]      Father presented 
only his own testimony. He stated he enjoyed spending time with the child and 
wanted to exercise his right to be involved in his child's life. He also stated 
there was no reason to be concerned with a change of households and that he was 
sure the child would adjust. Father testified that his current employment, 
obtained four to six months prior to the hearing, requires him to work from 
midnight to 8 a.m. Father stated that if he had custody, five nights a week he 
would put the child to bed at the home of his mother at approximately 8 p.m. and 
then catch some sleep until approximately 11: 30 p.m., when he must leave for 
work. Father assured the court that he could safely supervise the child during 
the day because he catches up on his sleep while the child is napping. Father 
rebutted Mother's testimony, stating that her cooperation in visitation has been 
for her own convenience, and that the photographs of the yard showed either the 
child's toys or items owned by neighbors.

[¶10]   We will quote verbatim from the 
Statement of Evidence or Proceedings regarding the conclusion of the July 31, 
1998, hearing:

34. After the 
evidence was concluded, the attorneys for the parties made closing arguments. 
The Court asked [Mother] if she was satisfied with her custody and visitation 
proposal presented to the Court on the day of the hearing. She said that she 
was. The Court then announced that its decision was "probably going to make both 
parties mad." The Court then stated, "What's good for the goose is good for the 
gander." The Court then ordered that the custody and visitation proposal 
presented to the Court by [Mother] on the day of the hearing would apply for the 
first year, and that the next year the order would be reversed, with [Father] 
having custody as set forth in the proposed order and [Mother] having visitation 
as set forth in the proposed order. The Court further explained that primary 
custody and visitation would alternate in each succeeding 
year."

The Court also 
denied [Father's] petition for order to show cause and admonished [Father] to 
fix the porch at his house trailer.

(Emphasis 
added.) Mother filed this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11]   Custody, visitation, child support, 
and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 199).

A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the district court's decision, and we afford to the 
prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Findings of fact not supported by 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained. Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present "when a 
material factor deserving significant weight is ignored."

Id. (quoting 
Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996)) (internal citations 
omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶12]   The disposition of this case may be 
made in a summary fashion, pursuant to our recent holding in Reavis, supra. 
There, we stated that we must rely on the district court's articulation of the 
factors which were considered and how those factors support its conclusions. Id. 
Here, the only factor expressed by the court was the equalization of gender 
opportunity for native fowl. This is clearly an unacceptable basis for awarding 
custody of a child:

The district 
court's ruling makes no mention of the . . . individual [child] that [is] 
affected by this order, nor does the district court attempt in any way to 
address [the child's] individual needs. . . .

The problems for 
children who are required to alternate between residences has been recognized by 
many courts. Implicit in the authorization to award divided custody is that the 
court do so after becoming reasonably satisfied that for the child the positive 
aspects outweigh the negative.

. . . 
.

The district 
court's order, calculated to avoid a parental "upper hand," appears to stem from 
the belief that splitting the prize down the middle is the fairest means to 
resolve an impasse. . . . We . . . firmly reject the indiscriminate resolution 
of a custodial dispute via mathematical equity.

Reavis, 955 P.2d  
at 434 (citations omitted).

[¶13]   In this case, Father admitted he 
had no concerns with Mother's care of the child, and gave no reason, other than 
to satisfy his own rights, why the child should be removed from the concededly 
supportive environment of Mother's care. During Mother's custody of BC, she has 
completed schooling, secured a good job, provided a safe home, and has arranged 
for a steady and professional child care provider while she is at work. In 
contrast, Father admits that the child would have to spend five out of seven 
nights in another home, and that during the day, with only a few hours of sleep, 
he would be caring for the child. Furthermore, the record, as stipulated to by 
the parties, clearly indicates that the custody ordered by the district court 
would be a drastic change for BC.

[¶14]   It is clear that the evidence 
allows only one conclusion:

The [child's] 
best interests are unquestionably promoted by the continuance of Mother' primary 
nurturing role, with Father continuing to exercise liberal visitation. The order 
of the district court is reversed and the matter is remanded with instruction to 
award primary custody to Mother.

Reavis, 955 P.2d  
at 434.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   As we stated in Reavis and 
reiterate here, every case regarding the custody of children requires careful 
weighing of relevant factors, looking to the unique and individual family 
relationships in order to reach a resolution in the best interests of the 
children in that family. Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431. We will not tolerate a 
cavalier attitude toward the children whose futures depend upon judicial 
pronouncements. The order of the district court is reversed, and we remand the 
matter for disposition in accordance with this opinion.