Case Title: Jennings v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-500

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-500 
____________ 
 
 
BRYAN FREDRICK JENNINGS, 
 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
October 4, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review Bryan Fredrick Jennings’ appeal of the postconviction 
court’s order denying Jennings’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  This Court has jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
Jennings’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on 
remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017).  This Court stayed Jennings’ appeal pending the disposition of 
Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017).  
After this Court decided Hitchcock, Jennings responded to this Court’s order to 
 
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show cause arguing why it should not be dispositive in this case.  After reviewing 
Jennings’ response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in 
reply, we ordered full briefing on Jennings’ claim that he was denied due process 
by the substitution of judges, without notice, between the time when the 
postconviction court denied his rule 3.851 motion and when the court heard his 
motion for rehearing.   
The crimes underlying Jennings’ convictions and sentence of death, at issue 
in this case, have been summarized as follows: 
In the early morning hours of May 11, 1979, Rebecca Kunash was 
asleep in her bed.  A nightlight had been left on in her room and her 
parents were asleep in another part of the house.  The Defendant went 
to her window and saw Rebecca asleep.  He forcibly removed the 
screen, opened the window, and climbed into her bedroom.  He put 
his hand over her mouth, took her to his car and proceeded to an area 
near the Girard Street Canal on Merritt Island.  He raped Rebecca, 
severely bruising and lacerating her vaginal area, using such force that 
he bruised his penis.  In the course of events, he lifted Rebecca by her 
legs, brought her back over his head, and swung her like a sledge 
hammer onto the ground fracturing her skull and causing extensive 
damage to her brain.  While she was still alive, Defendant took her 
into the canal and held her head under the water until she drowned.  
At the time of her death, Rebecca Kunash was six (6) years of age. 
 
Jennings v. State (Jennings V), 512 So. 2d 169, 175-76 (Fla. 1987) (quoting 
sentencing order), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988); see Jennings v. State 
(Jennings I), 413 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 1982).  Jennings was convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a 
vote of eleven to one.  Jennings V, 512 So. 2d at 173.  His sentence of death 
 
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became final in 1988.  Jennings, 484 U.S. 1079.  Thus, Hurst does not apply 
retroactively to Jennings’ sentence of death.  See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217.  
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Jennings’ motion.1 
We further conclude that Jennings is not entitled to relief on his claim that 
he was denied due process by the substitution of judges on his case between the 
denial of his motion for postconviction relief and his motion for rehearing.  This 
Court has explained that “[t]he essence of due process is that fair notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given to interested parties before 
judgment is rendered.”  Scull v. State, 569 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990); see Huff 
v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993).   
Despite the change in judges, Jennings was given a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard before his motion for rehearing was denied.  See Huff, 622 So. 2d at 
983.  Jennings was also given a meaningful opportunity to raise objections on 
rehearing.  In fact, the new judge, Judge Mahl, reviewed the entire case, as 
Jennings acknowledges, before denying Jennings’ motion for rehearing.  See id.; 
see also Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 249 (Fla. 2001) (The defendant’s “ability 
to raise objections negated any due process concerns.”).  Likewise, Jennings does 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Jennings, 
we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument of Hurst-related 
claims will be stricken. 
 
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not allege “any impropriety or appearance of impropriety by” Judge Mahl on 
rehearing.  Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 1002 (Fla. 2009).   
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the postconviction court’s order 
denying Jennings’ successive motion for postconviction relief.   
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree that Jennings’ right to due process was not violated by the 
reassignment of judges, without notice, between the denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief and his motion for rehearing.  I concur in result only as to the 
Hurst2-related issue.  While I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. 
State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), is now final, as I 
explained in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock, I would apply Hurst retroactively 
to Jennings’ sentence of death.  See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 220-23 (Pariente, J., 
                                          
 
 
2.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
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dissenting); see also Asay v. State (Asay V), 210 So. 3d 1, 32-37 (Fla. 2016) 
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 
(2017).  Applying Hurst to Jennings’ case, I would grant a new penalty phase 
based on the jury’s nonunanimous recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to 
one.  Per curiam op. at 2. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Jeffrey Mahl, Judge - Case No. 051979CF000773AXXXXX 
 
Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee