Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Gray

Citation: 

Docket Number: 52ag/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Melissa Donnelle Gray, Misc. Docket 
AG No. 52, September Term, 2012 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION – Court 
of Appeals indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland lawyer who had 
been reprimanded and suspended for sixty days, and who failed to: (1) respond to 
discovery requests or timely propound discovery requests on behalf of client; (2) timely 
submit proposed judgment in compliance with court order; and (3) respond to Bar 
Counsel‟s inquiries concerning representation of client.  Such conduct violated Maryland 
Lawyers‟ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 3.2 
(Expediting Litigation), and 8.1(b) (Failing to Respond to Lawful Demand for 
Information from Disciplinary Authority).  
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 52 
 
September Term, 2012 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
MELISSA DONNELLE GRAY 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Harrell 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  January 24, 2014 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. C-12-11190 
 
Argued: January 14, 2014 
 
 
This attorney discipline proceeding concerns a Maryland lawyer who failed to: (1) 
respond to discovery requests or timely propound discovery requests on behalf of her 
client; (2) timely submit a proposed judgment in compliance with a court order; and (3) 
respond to Bar Counsel‟s inquiries concerning her representation of a client.   
 
Melissa Donnelle Gray (“Gray”), Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland, 
was retained by Carmen Bustamante (“Ms. Bustamante”) in connection with a divorce 
case.  Ms. Bustamante filed a complaint against Gray with the Attorney Grievance 
Commission of Maryland (“the Commission”), Petitioner.   
 
On October 23, 2012, in this Court, Bar Counsel filed a “Petition for Disciplinary 
or Remedial Action” against Gray, charging her with violating Maryland Lawyers‟ Rules 
of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 3.2 (Expediting 
Litigation), and 8.1(b) (Failing to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information from 
Disciplinary Authority).  On October 24, 2012, we referred this attorney discipline 
proceeding to the Honorable Susan Souder (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County (“the circuit court”).  On May 6, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a 
hearing.  On June 20, 2013, the hearing judge filed in this Court findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, concluding that Gray violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 8.1(b).1   
                                              
1The hearing judge‟s findings of fact and conclusions of law were dictated into the 
record at the hearing and submitted to this Court in the form of a three-page excerpt from 
the transcript of that hearing.  We note that the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted in this case are difficult to follow as the information is not presented in any 
recognizable, organized or chronological manner.  Although Maryland Rule 16-757(c) 
permits a hearing judge to dictate into the record the judge‟s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, we recommend that, when utilizing dictation, a hearing judge employ 
(Continued...) 
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On January 14, 2014, we heard oral argument.2  For the below reasons, we 
indefinitely suspend Gray from the practice of law in Maryland.  
I.  Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact 
 
In her opinion, the hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.3 
 
On June 14, 1998, this Court admitted Gray to the Bar of Maryland.  At the time 
of her alleged misconduct, Gray maintained an office for the practice of law in Towson, 
Maryland.   
 
In November 2010, Ms. Bustamante retained Gray to represent her in connection 
with her divorce.  On January 20, 2011, on behalf of Ms. Bustamante, Gray filed in the 
circuit court a Complaint for Limited Divorce against Mr. Bustamante.   
In a scheduling order issued in the divorce case, the circuit court ordered that 
discovery be completed by July 25, 2011.  In March 2011, Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel sent 
Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents to Gray.  Gray failed to 
respond to the Interrogatories or Request for Production of Documents.  On June 30, 
2011, Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel filed a Motion to Compel Discovery.  Gray failed to 
respond to the motion or to otherwise prepare written responses to the Interrogatories and 
                                                                                                                                                  
the same care and precision as in preparing and filing a written statement of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  
2Gray did not appear at oral argument.  Bar Counsel submitted on the “Petitioner‟s 
Exceptions and Recommendation for Sanction” and its recommendation for an indefinite 
suspension.   
3We have supplemented the hearing judge‟s findings of fact with undisputed 
information contained in the “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” and evidence 
adduced at the hearing of May 6, 2013, including the date of Gray‟s admission to the Bar, 
the location of her practice, the date on which Ms. Bustamante retained Gray, and the 
date on which Gray filed the Complaint for Limited Divorce.   
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Request for Production of Documents.  On December 9, 2011, over four months after the 
deadline for completion of discovery, Gray sent discovery requests to Mr. Bustamante‟s 
counsel.  And, despite Ms. Bustamante‟s claims that Mr. Bustamante had been misusing 
and concealing assets, Gray failed to obtain Mr. Bustamante‟s testimony under oath in 
response to interrogatories before the scheduled trial date.   
 
On February 6, 2012, the parties reached a settlement, which was placed on the 
record in the circuit court, and the circuit court ordered the parties to submit a proposed 
Judgment of Absolute Divorce within ten days.  Gray agreed to prepare the proposed 
judgment.  Although Gray testified before the hearing judge in the present case that she 
sent a proposed judgment to Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel via e-mail, Gray failed to 
corroborate that claim by producing a copy of that e-mail or other documentation 
indicating that she complied with the circuit court‟s order that a proposed judgment be 
submitted within ten days.  In a letter dated February 22, 2012, the law clerk for the 
circuit court judge assigned to the divorce action reminded Gray that the proposed 
judgment was due.  On April 11, 2012, no response having been received, the circuit 
court ordered counsel for both parties to appear in chambers on April 30, 2012, with a 
proposed judgment.  On May 4, 2012, a Judgment of Absolute Divorce was entered.   
 
In a letter dated April 4, 2012, the Commission notified Gray of Ms. Bustamante‟s 
complaint and requested a written response to the allegations in the complaint within ten 
days.  In a letter dated April 30, 2012, the Commission again notified Gray of the 
complaint.  Gray failed to respond to either letter.   
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II.  Standard of Review 
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge‟s findings of fact; thus, we “treat 
the findings of fact as established[.]”  Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(A).  We review without 
deference the hearing judge‟s conclusions of law.  See Md. R. 16-759(b)(1) (“The Court 
of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge‟s conclusions of law.”).    
III.  Discussion 
A.  Violations of MLRPC 
 
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge‟s conclusions of law.  For the 
below reasons, we uphold all of the hearing judge‟s conclusions of law. 
MLRPC 1.1 (Competence) and MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence) 
 
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”  MLRPC 1.1.  “Compliance with [MLRPC 
1.1] requires more than knowing what to do.  It requires applying the knowledge to the 
client‟s problem. . . . „Evidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or 
preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of [MLRPC] 
1.1.‟”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 397-98, 946 A.2d 1009, 
1015 (2008) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54, 891 A.2d 
1085, 1097 (2006)).  “MLRPC 1.1 is violated when an attorney fails to act or acts in an 
untimely manner, resulting in harm to his or her client.”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. 
Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 222, 46 A.3d 1169, 1177 (2012) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client.”  MLRPC 1.3.  “An attorney violates [MLRPC 1.3] when he/she takes no action 
whatsoever in representing his/her client.”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Shakir, 427 
Md. 197, 205, 46 A.3d 1162, 1167 (2012) (citation omitted).  For example, where an 
attorney “fail[s] to pursue [a] claim after filing [a] complaint,” the attorney 
“demonstrat[es] incompetence and insufficient diligence in the matter, in violation of 
M[L]RPC 1.1 and 1.3 respectively.”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Patterson, 421 Md. 
708, 737, 28 A.3d 1196, 1213 (2011). 
 
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‟s conclusion that 
Gray violated MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3.  After filing the complaint for limited divorce on 
behalf of Ms. Bustamante, Gray not only failed to take appropriate and timely action to 
pursue her client‟s claim, but she also failed to act diligently in representing Ms. 
Bustamante.  Despite Ms. Bustamante‟s allegations that Mr. Bustamante was misusing 
and concealing assets, Gray failed to inquire into or to obtain Mr. Bustamante‟s 
testimony under oath on the matter, either in a deposition or in response to properly 
propounded interrogatories.  Indeed, Gray failed to timely propound any discovery 
requests at all on behalf of Ms. Bustamante, sending her first set of discovery requests to 
Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel over four months after the deadline for completion of 
discovery had passed.  Moreover, Gray failed to respond to discovery requests 
propounded by Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel, including Interrogatories and a Request for 
Production, and failed to respond when Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel filed a Motion to 
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Compel responses to the discovery requests.  In short, Gray failed to respond whatsoever 
to any discovery request served by Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel.   
MLRPC 3.2 (Expediting Litigation) 
 
“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 
interests of the client.”  MLRPC 3.2.  “An attorney violates [MLRPC 3.2] by delaying to 
take fundamental litigation steps in pursuit of the client‟s interest.”  Garrett, 427 Md. at 
226, 46 A.3d at 1179 (citations omitted).  For example, “an attorney who fails to comply 
with discovery requests, and attempts to mitigate his or her shortcomings with „cryptic 
excuses,‟ violates MLRPC 3.2.”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 
322-23, 44 A.3d 344, 359 (2012) (citation omitted).   
 
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‟s conclusion that 
Gray violated MLRPC 3.2.  As discussed above, Gray utterly failed to comply with 
discovery requests and to respond to a motion to compel responses to the discovery 
requests.  Gray also delayed in taking necessary and required steps on behalf of Ms. 
Bustamante, vividly demonstrated by her failure to timely submit a proposed Judgment of 
Absolute Divorce.  Although Gray agreed to prepare the proposed judgment by February 
16, 2012, as ordered by the circuit court, and even though the circuit court judge‟s law 
clerk had sent Gray a reminder letter dated February 22, 2012, as of April 11, 2012, the 
circuit court had not received the proposed judgment, and was required to order counsel 
for both parties to appear in chambers.  As a result of Gray‟s failure to timely prepare the 
proposed judgment as ordered, a Judgment of Absolute Divorce was not entered in the 
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divorce case until May 4, 2012, almost three months after the parties had agreed upon a 
settlement.   
MLRPC 8.1(b) (Failing to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information from 
Disciplinary Authority) 
 
 
 “[A] lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly 
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from [a] disciplinary authority[.]”  
MLRPC 8.1(b).  Pursuant to MLRPC 8.1(b), “an attorney must answer timely requests 
from the [] Commission regarding a complaint in a potential disciplinary matter.”  
Brown, 426 Md. at 323, 44 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted). 
 
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‟s conclusion that 
Gray violated MLRPC 8.1(b).  It is undisputed that Gray failed to respond to two letters 
from the Commission, dated April 4, 2012, and April 30, 2012, regarding Ms. 
Bustamante‟s complaint.   
B.  Sanction 
 
Bar Counsel recommends that this Court indefinitely suspend Gray from the 
practice of law in Maryland.  Gray has not filed a recommendation for sanction. 
 
In Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 717, 73 A.3d 161, 180 
(2013), we stated: 
When we impose sanctions, our goal is not to punish the [lawyer], but 
rather to protect the public and the public‟s confidence in the legal 
profession [and] to deter other lawyers from violating the [MLRPC].  To 
achieve this goal, the sanction should be commensurate with the nature and 
the gravity of the misconduct and the intent with which it was committed.  
In determining an appropriate sanction, we often refer to the American Bar 
Association‟s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which focus on 
the nature of the ethical duty violated, the lawyer‟s mental state, the extent 
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of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer‟s misconduct, and any 
aggravating or mitigating [factor]s. 
 
(Second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Here, as to the nature of the ethical duty violated, Gray violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 
and 3.2 by failing to competently and diligently represent Ms. Bustamante, and by failing 
to take timely and appropriate actions to expedite litigation.  Gray also violated MLRPC 
8.1(b) by ignoring requests from the Commission to furnish information relevant to Ms. 
Bustamante‟s complaint and, indeed, by failing to respond at all.  As to Gray‟s state of 
mind, Gray knowingly disregarded requests from the Commission, and either knowingly 
or negligently mishandled Ms. Bustamante‟s case by failing to respond to or propound 
discovery requests and by failing to submit a proposed judgment within the timeframe 
ordered by the circuit court.  As to the actual or potential injury that Gray‟s misconduct 
caused, Gray‟s misconduct negatively impacted the efficient operation of the courts by 
delaying resolution of the divorce case and causing Mr. Bustamante‟s counsel to file a 
motion to compel discovery responses, and her misconduct also negatively impacted both 
Ms. Bustamante‟s and the public‟s perception of the legal profession.  Gray‟s refusal to 
comply with the requests of the Commission evidenced a disregard of the MLRPC and 
the attorney discipline process. 
 
In Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Davy, 435 Md. 674, __, 80 A.3d 322, 342-43 
(2013), we stated: 
Aggravating factors include: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) 
dishonest or selfish motive; (c) pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple 
offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the [attorney] disciplinary 
proceeding[] by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the 
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[Commission]; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the [attorney] disciplinary proce[eding]; (g) 
refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of the 
victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; [and] (j) 
indifference to making restitution. 
 
(Some alterations in original) (citation and paragraph breaks omitted). 
Here, we note at least three aggravating factors.  First, Gray has two prior 
disciplinary offenses.  In Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Gray (“Gray I”), 421 Md. 92, 
25 A.3d 219 (2011), this Court reprimanded Gray for violating MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 
8.1(b).  And, in Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Gray (“Gray II”), 433 Md. 516, 521-23, 
524-25, 533, 72 A.3d 174, 177-78, 179-80, 184 (2013), this Court suspended Gray from 
the practice of law for sixty days for violating MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, and 8.1(b).4  
Second, Gray has engaged in a pattern of misconduct, violating MLRPC 1.3 and 8.1(b) 
on two prior occasions in addition to the instant case.  Third, Gray has obviously 
committed multiple offenses.  As discussed above, in her representation of Ms. 
Bustamante, Gray violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 8.1(b). 
The following constitute mitigating factors: 
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith 
efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full 
and free disclosure to [the Commission] or cooperative attitude toward [the 
attorney discipline] proceeding[]; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) 
character or reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) mental disability or 
                                              
4In Gray II, 433 Md. at 533, 72 A.3d at 184, we held: “In light of the violations 
committed by [Gray], especially in respect to her failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel 
and her prior disciplinary matters and in light of our prior cases aforesaid, in which we 
have sanctioned attorneys for somewhat similar violations (as to severity of conduct), we 
hold that the proper sanction in the present case is a 60 day suspension.”   
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chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when: (1) there is 
medical evidence that the [lawyer] is affected by a chemical dependency or 
mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused 
the misconduct; (3) the [lawyer]‟s recovery from the chemical dependency 
or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period 
of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct 
and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely; (j) delay in [the attorney] 
disciplinary proceeding[]; (k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (l) 
remorse; [and] (m) remoteness of prior offenses. 
 
Davy, 435 Md. at __, 80 A.3d at 344 (some alterations in original) (citation and 
paragraph breaks omitted). 
 
Here, Gray did not testify at the hearing as to any mitigating factors, nor did the 
hearing judge find any mitigating factors.   
 
In Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254-56, 760 A.2d 1108, 
1119-20 (2000), where an attorney violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.1(b), and where 
his “repeated refusal to comply with the requests of Bar Counsel demonstrated a 
complete „disregard of the spirit and intent of the [MLRPC,]‟” we suspended the attorney 
for sixty days.  We stated that the attorney‟s “violations of the [MLRPC] regarding 
diligence, communication, expediting litigation, and responding to lawful demands of 
Bar Counsel [were] serious.”  Id. at 256, 760 A.2d at 1120.  We imposed the sixty-day 
suspension rather than a greater sanction, however, because the attorney had been a 
member of the Bar of Maryland for over twenty years and had no prior disciplinary 
offenses.  Id. at 254, 760 A.2d at 1119. 
 
In Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Nichols, 405 Md. 207, 212, 216, 218, 950 A.2d 
778, 782, 784, 785 (2008), where an attorney violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 
1.15(d) and (e), 1.16(d), and 8.1(b) in his representation of a client in a bankruptcy 
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matter, we indefinitely suspended the attorney.  In so ordering, we stated: “[The 
attorney]‟s misconduct was due neither to dishonesty nor to criminal conduct, but rather 
due to lack of diligence as well as incompetence in bankruptcy matters.  Indeed, this is 
[the attorney]‟s first disciplinary proceeding in over thirteen years of practicing law.”  Id. 
at 218, 950 A.2d at 785.    
 
In this case, in light of existing caselaw and taking into account the aggravating 
factors present, including Gray‟s prior disciplinary offenses and violations of multiple 
MLRPC, and the sanctions ordered by this Court in those prior disciplinary offenses (i.e., 
a reprimand and sixty-day suspension)5–which, we note, arose out of violations of two of 
the same MLRPC violated here, MLRPC 1.3 and 8.1(b)–we conclude that the appropriate 
sanction for Gray‟s violations of the MLRPC is an indefinite suspension from the 
practice of law in Maryland.  The suspension shall begin thirty days after the date on 
which this Opinion is filed.   
 
  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL 
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK 
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND 
RULE 
16-761(B), 
FOR 
WHICH 
SUM  
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST MELISSA DONNELLE GRAY. 
                                              
5As stated above, in Gray I, 421 Md. 92, 25 A.3d 219, this Court reprimanded 
Gray for violating MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b).  And, in Gray II, 433 Md. at 521-23, 524-
25, 533, 72 A.3d at 177-78, 179-80, 184, this Court suspended Gray from the practice of 
law for sixty days for violating MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, and 8.1(b).