Case Title: State ex rel. Moss v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-306

Docket Number: 19951128

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
17956 
The State ex rel. Moss, Appellee, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
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Appellant. 
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[Cite as State ex rel. Moss v. Indus. Comm. (1996), ____ Ohio St.3d ____.] 
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Workers’ compensation -- Denial of application for permanent total 
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disability compensation -- Industrial Commission is exclusive 
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evaluator of disability and Supreme  Court will not substitute its 
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judgment for that of the commission. 
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(No. 95-1128--Submitted February 6, 1996--Decided April 10, 1996.) 
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Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD05-
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694. 
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Appellee-claimant, Lillian G. Moss, was injured in 1979 and 1985 in 
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the course of and arising from her employment with St. Rose Catholic 
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Church.  The claims were collectively allowed for “crushed left shoulder and 
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damaged muscles, compression fracture low back; post traumatic 
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osteoarthritis; aggravation of pre-existing osteoporosis.” 
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In 1991, claimant applied for permanent total disability compensation.  
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Among the evidence before the appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
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was the May 27, 1993 report of Dr. S. S. Purewal.  He stated: 
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“For conditions allowed under Claim # 79-7798, the fractures at the 
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left shoulder are healed, but she has moderate limitation of motion ***.  
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Taking into account these allowed conditions only, and were it not for this 
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patient’s age and general condition, she would be able to return to her former 
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position of employment and, as a matter of fact, she did return to her job after 
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these fractures healed in 1979.  She would not be able to perform any 
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overhead reaching and lifting with her left arm.  ***  [S]he has 15% 
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impairment of the whole person. *** 
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“For conditions allowed under Claim #85-30825, she has generalized 
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severe osteoporosis and osteoarthritic changes consistent with her age along 
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with compression fractures of the thoracolumbar spine, which is not an 
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unusual finding in this age group.  She continues to have back pain and has 
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significant limitation regarding any bending, stooping or lifting; thus, she is 
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not able to return to her former position of employment as a housekeeper.  
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***  [S]he has a 15% impairment of the whole person for the conditions 
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allowed under this claim.  The treatment up to this point has been 
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appropriate, but the condition in general is not curative and worsens with age. 
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“Taking into account the two claims together, she has a 28% 
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impairment of the whole person and she is not able to return to her former 
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position of employment.  She cannot perform any job that would require 
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bending, stooping, lifting of objects over 10-15 pounds, or any overhead 
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reaching with her left arm and shoulder.” 
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In a July 26, 1989 vocational report, Rod W. Durgin, Ph.D., 
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commented: 
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“Assuming that Ms. Moss is physically incapable of returning to any of 
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her previous work experiences and based on the medical reports reviewed, 
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her age (advanced age), education and her non-acquisition of any 
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transferrable work skills, it is my opinion that Ms. Moss would be restricted 
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to a variety of unskilled work that is sedentary in nature. 
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“A computerized analysis reveals that such work constitutes 0.77 % of 
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the job’s existing in her local labor market. *** 
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“* * * It is my opinion that based on the non-availability of jobs for her 
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and her extremely low employability level, Ms. Moss is 100 % 
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unemployable.” 
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The commission on July 8, 1993 denied permanent total disability 
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compensation, writing: 
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“The findings and order are based particularly on the medical report(s) 
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of Dr.(s) Purewal, the evidence in the file and the evidence adduced at 
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hearing. 
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“It is found that the claimant is 78 years old; she has an eighth grade 
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education with an ability to read, write, and do basic math; and she has 
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worked as a housekeeper. ***  All treatment has been conservative.  ***  Dr. 
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Purewal indicates that due to the claimant’s age and her injuries, she would 
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have certain limitations when performing work activity; but she could lift 
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from 10 to 15 pounds.  The claimant has an eighth grade education, but she 
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indicates she can read, write, and do basic math.  Dr. Durgin states that due to 
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the claimant’s age, not the injury, the claimant would have a difficult time 
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obtaining employment within her abilities.  However, there is no evidence 
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that with an ability to read, write, and do math, that claimant would be totally 
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precluded from engaging in various unskilled sedentary forms of gainful 
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employment with lifting abilities up to 10 to 15 pounds.  Accordingly, 
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although the claimant may be limited due to her advanced age of 78, she is 
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not totally precluded from engaging in all sustained remunerative 
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employment due to the two injuries *** when considering her residual 
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capacities and her educational abilities, including the ability to perform work 
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where reading, writing, and basic math are sufficient for the performance of 
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sedentary job duties.” 
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Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
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Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in 
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denying her permanent total disability compensation.  The court agreed and 
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ordered the commission to find claimant permanently and totally disabled 
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pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E. 2d 
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666. 
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This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
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William M. Culbert and Penny McCabe, for appellee. 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Reeve W. Kelsey, 
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Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
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Per Curiam.  Claimant successfully obtained Gay relief from the court 
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of appeals.  That decision, however, was rendered without the benefit of State 
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ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 658 N.E.2d 
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1055; State ex rel. DeZarn v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 461, 659 
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N.E.2d 1259; and State ex rel. Bryant v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
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458, 659 N.E.2d 1256.  Upon review, we find that those decisions dictate 
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reversal of the judgment rendered below. 
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Gay relief cannot be considered without a preliminary determination 
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that the requirements in State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio 
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St. 3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, have not been met.  State ex rel. Sebestyen v. 
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Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 36, 641 N.E.2d 197.  The appellate 
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court, however, never made this determination.  Its decision to issue a writ of 
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mandamus pursuant to Gay was, therefore, premature. 
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Our analysis of the commission’s order reveals Noll compliance.  In so 
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holding, we recognize the significant impediment that claimant’s age presents 
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to her reemployment.  Workers’ compensation benefits, however, were never 
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intended to compensate claimants for simply growing old. 
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Age must instead be considered on a case-by-case basis.  To effectively 
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do so, the commission must deem any presumptions about age rebuttable.  
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Equally important, age must never be viewed in isolation.  A college degree, 
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for example, can do much to ameliorate the effects of advanced age. 
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Pass, DeZarn and Bryant support these propositions.  Collectively, 
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these cases establish that there is not an age--ever--at which reemployment is 
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held to be a virtual impossibility as a matter of law.  Certainly, it would be 
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remiss to ignore the limitations that age can place on efforts to secure other 
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employment.  However, limitation should never automatically translate into 
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prohibition. 
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Each claimant is different, with different levels of motivation, initiative 
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and resourcefulness.  The claimant in Bryant is an excellent example of a 
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claimant who was motivated to work well beyond retirement age and was 
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resourceful enough to find a job that valued the experience that his advanced 
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age brought. 
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This underscores the commission’s responsibility to affirmatively 
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address the age factor.  It is not enough for the commission to just 
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acknowledge claimant’s age.  It must discuss age in conjunction with the 
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other aspects of the claimant’s individual profile that may lessen or magnify 
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age’s effects. 
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In this case, the commission recognized the impediments that 
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claimant’s age imposed on her ability to obtain other work.  The commission, 
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however, did not find these limitations to be a complete bar to reemployment.  
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Given claimant’s relatively low level of impairment, the commission 
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reasoned that, with the claimant’s ability to read, write, and do math, 
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sedentary work was not absolutely precluded.  This conclusion was within 
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the commission’s prerogative as the exclusive evaluator of disability, and we 
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will not substitute our judgment for that of the commission.  State ex rel. 
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Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 
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N.E.2d 936; State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 
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167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946. 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
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Judgment reversed. 
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MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
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DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., dissent. 
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WRIGHT, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. 
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DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  I would affirm the court of appeals in all 
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respects. 
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RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
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