Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 104245

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,245 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
FRANCIS SMITH, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When considering a challenge to the admission of evidence, the first step is to 
determine whether the evidence is relevant. Relevant evidence is evidence having any 
tendency in reason to prove any material fact. Relevance is established by a material or 
logical connection between the asserted facts and the inference or result they are intended 
to establish. Once relevance is established, the second step requires the court to apply the 
statutory rules governing admission and exclusion of evidence. These rules are applied 
either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the trial court's discretion. 
 
2. 
A district court abuses its discretion when:  (a) no reasonable person would take 
the view adopted by the judge; (b) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (c) substantial 
competent evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion 
is based. 
 
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3. 
 
Evidence the defendant possessed legal pornography of any particular sexual 
orientation is not probative to rebut or impeach the defendant's claim that he or she does 
not actively engage in the particular sexual practice portrayed in the pornography. 
 
4. 
 
Under the nonconstitutional harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-261, the burden 
of demonstrating harmlessness is on the party benefitting from the error. That party must 
show there is no reasonable probability the error affected the trial's outcome in light of 
the entire record. 
 
5. 
 
A jury instruction directing the jurors that "[y]ou must presume that the defendant 
is not guilty until you are convinced from the evidence that [the defendant] is guilty" 
should have substituted "unless" for "until." But use of the word "until" was not cause for 
reversal.  
 
6. 
The district court did not commit error by instructing the jury that "[i]f you have a 
reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, 
you must find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of 
any of the claims required to be proved by the State, you should find the defendant 
guilty." While not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.  
 
7. 
An illegal sentence is one imposed by a court without jurisdiction; a sentence that 
does not conform to the statutory provision, either in character or term of the punishment 
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authorized; or a sentence that is ambiguous with regard to time and manner in which it is 
to be served. 
 
8. 
K.S.A. 22-3717(u) provides that the parole (now prisoner review) board shall 
order electronic monitoring as a condition of parole for inmates sentenced to parole for 
life.  
 
Appeal from Bourbon District Court; MARK ALAN WARD, judge. Opinion filed June 27, 2014. 
Convictions affirmed, sentences vacated in part, and remanded. 
 
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.  
 
Terri L. Johnson, county attorney, argued the cause, and Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor 
general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Francis Smith directly appeals his convictions of four sex offenses. The 
charges stem from an incident during which Smith touched two girls, who were 13 and 
15 years old, while photographing them in provocative poses wearing two-piece, bikini-
style bathing suits. Smith orchestrated the photo session and had the teenage girls touch 
each other for some of the photographs. He was convicted of two counts of aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child and two counts of indecent liberties with a child. A 
majority of the court affirms his convictions, but we remand on a sentencing issue. 
 
Smith raises seven issues:  (1) whether the trial court erroneously admitted prior 
crimes evidence to prove motive and intent; (2) whether the trial court erroneously 
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admitted photographs of the covers of pornographic magazines and videos taken from his 
house; (3) whether the trial court's jury instruction on burden of proof was clearly 
erroneous; (4) whether the sentencing court erroneously used a prior conviction for 
multiple sentencing purposes; (5) whether the sentencing court exceeded its authority by 
entering orders prohibiting contact with the victims; (6) whether the sentencing court 
erroneously ordered lifetime electronic monitoring; and (7) whether the sentencing court 
erroneously imposed lifetime postrelease supervision for the off-grid offenses.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Smith was charged with and convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child against the 13-year-old victim (H.D.) and two counts of indecent 
liberties with a child against the 15-year-old victim (M.M.) based on events occurring on 
May 20, 2008. That day, H.D. and M.M. skipped school and went to Smith's house. 
Smith had become a family friend after meeting H.D.'s father through work. H.D. and her 
two older brothers frequently watched movies and played video games at Smith's house.  
 
There is conflicting evidence whether the incident was planned, but Smith took 
multiple Polaroid photographs of H.D. and M.M. in their bikini swimsuits, which were 
later shown to H.D.'s father, leading to a police investigation. Twenty-four photographs 
were admitted into evidence at trial, although some are duplicates. It is necessary to 
describe the photos to understand their content and context to the issues discussed. 
 
A few photos are of H.D. and M.M. from the waist up in bikini tops. In the 
remaining photos, H.D. and M.M. had removed their pants and are wearing bikini 
bottoms. The photos include images of H.D. and M.M. standing with their legs spread 
apart; sitting or standing with their arms or legs intertwined while pressing their lips 
together or open-mouthed touching tongues; and some show H.D. and M.M. positioned 
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with their heads towards a wall while their legs are spread open towards the camera. In 
one photo, H.D. and M.M. are on their hands and knees with their legs spread open 
towards the camera, their heads turned towards each other with lips pressed together.  
 
A detective interviewed H.D. and M.M. These interviews were recorded and 
played for the jury. In her interview, M.M. said Smith had already bought H.D. the bikini 
she wore in the photographs and that "Smith told [H.D.] whenever he bought it that he 
wanted pictures and [H.D.] said Ok." When asked whether there was anything Smith did 
or said that the detective should know about, M.M. said H.D. wanted to wash her hair 
before taking the pictures and Smith suggested H.D. shower. When asked what M.M. 
thought he meant, M.M. said Smith was not going to leave "[b]ut once we said that we 
were just going to wash our hair he said ok I'm going to go to Walgreens." M.M. also said 
Smith told them to act like they were kissing and told them "that we were hot a lot." She 
explained she and H.D. were "iffy" about the pictures in which Smith had both girls face 
the wall so their heads were positioned away from the camera because "he is old and we 
are young."   
 
When asked if anything happened besides picture taking, M.M. said Smith would 
adjust their bikini bottoms as they were lying on the floor, which she said "would gross 
us out" and "it is nasty." When asked whether Smith's hands touched their bottoms, M.M. 
said "yes and usually whenever [Smith] would be fixing [H.D.]'s he would pull it up or 
whatever and then he would tap her and he'd go back and take a picture." 
 
M.M. also said that after Smith adjusted their swimsuit bottoms for the picture 
with them on their hands and knees and their bottoms towards the camera, Smith went 
back to take the picture and said, "[Y]eah, [H.D.] knows I like young girls." M.M. told 
the detective Smith later took them to Walmart after giving them $50 each. On the way, 
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Smith asked the girls if their boyfriends would like the pictures more if they were topless 
and offered them $200 to take pictures with their tops off next time.   
 
In her police interview, H.D. said Smith had suggested taking the photographs to 
submit to some people in California who could get her and M.M. modeling jobs and that 
Smith paid each girl $50 after taking the photographs. H.D. denied Smith touched the 
girls during the photo session but amended this statement later at trial and admitted he 
had touched them. H.D. said Smith had told her "many times," including "a couple days 
ago," that he is "interested in young girls."  
 
After interviewing H.D. and M.M, law enforcement officers went to Smith's 
residence. Smith admitted taking pictures of the girls from their waist up but denied 
taking the other pictures. He said a lady he did not know, possibly M.M.'s aunt, took the 
other photographs. Smith acknowledged he paid the girls $50 but denied the money was 
for the photographs. He admitted possessing a set of the photographs but said he had 
disposed of those photographs.  
 
Smith consented to a search of his residence, during which officers discovered and 
photographed several DVDs and magazines depicting young females in sexual positions 
and containing titles such as "Barely Legal," "Teenage Nymphos," "Teach the Young, 
Make them Cum," "Just 18," "Just Popped," "Cherry Pop," "Ripe," and "Wild Cherries." 
The search also uncovered a DVD entitled "Luxurious," which allegedly depicted a "she-
male." As Smith was being arrested and handcuffed after the search, he said he would not 
have engaged in any improper action with the girls because he was gay and liked "he-
shes" or females with male genitalia.  
 
At trial, M.M. testified that Smith began taking the photos in his living room while 
she and H.D. were wearing bikini tops and jeans. Smith then proposed they act like they 
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were kissing and suggested they take more pictures in an empty bedroom. She said Smith 
decided how the girls should pose and instructed them to spread their legs apart. And 
when describing how Smith touched the girls, M.M. testified that at various times Smith 
"took his finger (indiscernible) [H.D.]'s bottoms and pulled 'em out"; spread their legs 
further apart; and spread their legs apart while holding their knees. Discussing the photos 
in which the two teenagers were touching, M.M. described how Smith instructed at 
different times that she place her leg over H.D.'s, that the girls touch their lips together to 
look like they were kissing, or that the girls press their arms together. M.M. testified she 
was not sexually aroused by the photos and that it bothered her when Smith touched her 
because it was "awkward."   
 
H.D. testified it was Smith's idea to take the pictures and that they had discussed it 
beforehand. She also contradicted her earlier statement that Smith did not touch her and 
M.M while he took the photographs. She testified Smith adjusted their swimsuit bottoms 
and repositioned their legs. When the prosecutor asked, "When you say he adjusted your 
bottoms, what part of your swimsuit did he adjust?" H.D. responded, "Around the crotch 
area." H.D. said she believed Smith was sexually aroused when the photographs were 
taken because of the way he had H.D. and M.M. position themselves. She said Smith told 
them not to tell anybody about the photographs; but if anyone asked, they were to say 
M.M.'s aunt took the photographs. 
 
H.D. further testified that Smith told her on several occasions he loved her and 
was attracted to young girls. She said Smith on an earlier occasion tried to give her a 
purple vibrator while she and Smith were alone at his house. She testified Smith said he 
did not "know if [H.D.] would appreciate [the vibrator] or not or if [H.D.] would accept 
it, but it's worth it." H.D. said she did not accept the vibrator. One of her brothers later 
discovered a purple vibrator in Smith's house. Smith also gave H.D. two pair of thong 
underwear, which she accepted. She testified Smith gave her the underwear shortly after 
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her 13th birthday, explaining that Smith said he "figured since [H.D. was] getting older 
[she] would probably be getting into things like that." Her brothers later discovered the 
underwear and threw them away.   
 
H.D.'s sister and brother testified about Smith's relationship with H.D. The sister 
testified H.D. said she liked going to Smith's house because "he would give her kind of 
odd jobs, you know, do the dishes for $20 or . . . he would just give her money a lot." 
H.D. testified that Smith would pay her for "[d]oing small chores, like dishes or just 
picking up." Smith would also pay H.D.'s brothers money, but H.D. described this as 
"[n]ot a lot, to do some outside work once in a while." One of H.D.'s brothers described 
Smith as "always kind of flirty after a while" and said Smith "started to get a little bit too 
friendly" before he gave H.D. the two thongs. 
 
Smith testified that he took the photographs to give to the girls, who were not 
going to see each other over the summer. He denied being sexually aroused while taking 
the photographs.  
 
Prior to trial, Smith moved for an order in limine prohibiting admission of any 
evidence relating to the pornography discovered at his house, arguing its prejudicial 
effect outweighed any probative value. The State argued the pornographic magazines and 
videos were relevant to prove Smith's sexual desires, which was an essential element of 
the crimes charged. Specifically, the State wanted the evidence to prove Smith was 
attracted to young girls to contradict his assertion that he was gay. The district court 
denied the motion.  
 
At trial, photographs of the covers of magazine and DVDs were admitted in 
conjunction with a detective's testimony about why he took each photograph of this 
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material. In the testimony, the detective referenced each publication's title and generally 
stated the "woman on the front cover is underdeveloped."  
 
The State filed a pretrial motion to admit Smith's 1993 convictions for aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child, aggravated criminal sodomy, and rape. The State argued 
these prior crimes were relevant under K.S.A. 60-455 to show motive and intent. At the 
hearing on the motion, the State added an argument that the court should follow the 
newly amended statute, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d). Smith argued that statute was still 
subject to K.S.A. 60-445 constraint in which the value of the prior convictions evidence 
was substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice. In ruling the prior convictions 
evidence was admissible, the trial court found the prior convictions both relevant and 
probative of intent and motive. 
 
The State's theory for the first aggravated indecent liberties charge was that Smith 
"solicited [H.D.] to engage in fondling or touching of the person of another in a lewd 
manner, with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of [H.D.], the defendant or 
another." Its theory for the second was that Smith "fondled or touched the person of 
[H.D.], in a lewd manner, with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either 
[H.D.], or the defendant or both." Similarly, the State's theory for the first indecent 
liberties charge was that Smith "solicited [M.M.] to engage in lewd fondling or touching 
of the person of another with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of 
[M.M.], the defendant or another." And the State's theory for the second was that Smith 
"fondled or touched the person of [M.M.], in a lewd manner, with intent to arouse or 
satisfy the sexual desires of either [M.M.], or the defendant or both." The jury convicted 
Smith on all four charges.  
 
The district court imposed a hard 40 life sentence for each aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child conviction and ordered they be served consecutively, i.e., Smith 
10 
 
 
 
would not be parole eligible for 80 years. The other two grid-box sentences for indecent 
liberties with a child were imposed to run concurrent to each other and to the hard 40 
sentences. 
 
Smith timely appealed directly to this court. We have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 
22-3601(b)(1) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed for off-grid crime; 
appeal docketed prior to July 1, 2011). 
 
PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE 
 
Smith begins by challenging the district court's admission into evidence of his 
1993 crimes. He argues this prior crimes evidence was not relevant to establish motive 
and that, to the extent it was relevant to show his intent, the convictions' remoteness 
rendered them more prejudicial than probative. The State counters that the evidence was 
properly admitted under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d); the evidence was also admissible 
to prove the relevant material issues of motive and intent; and any error in admitting the 
prior crimes evidence was harmless. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Appellate review of a trial court's decision to admit evidence is a two-step process. 
First, the appellate court determines whether the evidence is relevant. State v. Phillips, 
295 Kan. 929, 947, 287 P.3d 245 (2012). Evidence is relevant if it has a "tendency in 
reason to prove any material fact." K.S.A. 60-401(b). "Relevance is established by a 
material or logical connection between the asserted facts and the inference or result they 
are intended to establish." Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, Syl. ¶ 7. Relevant evidence is both:  (1) 
material, i.e., the fact has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case 
and is in dispute; and (2) probative, i.e., has "'any tendency in reason to prove'" the fact. 
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State v. Boleyn, 297 Kan. 610, 622, 303 P.3d 680 (2013) (quoting State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 
494, 505, 186 P.3d 713 [2008]). Materiality is reviewed de novo, while probativity is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. 297 Kan. at 622. 
 
If the evidence is relevant, the court next applies the statutory provisions 
governing admission or exclusion of evidence. Phillips, 295 Kan. at 947. "These rules are 
applied either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the district court's discretion, 
depending on the rule in question." State v. Hughes, 286 Kan. 1010, 1020, 191 P.3d 268 
(2008). Whether the probative value of otherwise relevant evidence outweighs its 
potential for undue prejudice is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Phillips, 295 Kan. 
at 949; State v. Wilson, 295 Kan. 605, 621, 289 P.3d 1082 (2012). 
 
A district court abuses its discretion when:  (1) no reasonable person would take 
the view adopted by the judge; (2) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial 
competent evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion 
is based. State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941, 960, 318 P.3d 140 (2014). But "[w]hen the 
adequacy of the legal basis of a district judge's decision on admission or exclusion of 
evidence is questioned, we review the decision de novo." State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 
47-48,144 P.3d 647 (2006). 
 
Analysis 
 
Smith begins his argument by contending "evidence of prior bad acts cannot be 
admitted just to show that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, but rather, the 
prior bad acts must be probative of some other material fact at issue." We are compelled 
to point out that in sex crime cases K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455(d) permits admission of 
evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct for any relevant and probative matter, 
including proving the defendant's propensity to engage in the charged conduct. See State 
12 
 
 
 
v. Bowen, 299 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 7, 323 P.3d 853 (2014); State v. Remmert, 298 Kan. 621, 
627-28, 316 P.3d 154 (2014) (citing State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460, Syl. ¶ 3, 303 P.3d 662 
[2013] [Prine II]); State v. Spear, 297 Kan. 780, 789, 304 P.3d 1246 (2013); Prine II, 297 
Kan. at 476. Nonetheless, because the trial court admitted the evidence for the specific 
purpose of proving Smith's intent, we begin by analyzing its ruling on that basis. See 
Prine II, 297 Kan. at 479-80 (concluding district court erred in admitting prior sex crime 
evidence to prove intent, absence of mistake or accident, or plan). 
 
The evidence was relevant. Each crime charged required the State to prove Smith 
acted with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his own, H.D.'s, or M.M.'s sexual 
desires. The charges were based upon his lewd touching of H.D. and M.M. during the 
photography session and his directions during the photography session that they lewdly 
touch each other. 
 
Smith offered an innocent explanation for his conduct during the photography 
session. Accordingly, Smith's intent was a disputed, material fact at issue in the trial. See 
State v. Boggs, 287 Kan. 298, 314, 197 P.3d 441 (2008) (intent underlying act critical to 
determining its character when act susceptible to both an innocent interpretation and a 
criminal one; defendant's proffer of innocent explanation puts intent in dispute). But cf. 
State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 727, 200 P.3d 1 (2009) (Prine I) (intent not a disputed fact 
in child molestation case when charged acts were criminal in themselves; if crimes 
occurred as victim described them, criminal intent would be indisputable). The prior 
convictions for sex crimes involving a child had a tendency in reason to prove Smith 
committed the acts here with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his own, H.D.'s, or 
M.M.'s sexual desires. That Smith sexually abused a child "in the past, given today's 
jurors' common understanding of the psychology of those who commit such crimes, 
actually 'shed[s] some light' on the existence of intent in this case." Prine I, 287 Kan. at 
726.  
13 
 
 
 
 
Smith also argues the remoteness of the 15-year-old convictions render them more 
unduly prejudicial than probative. But the remoteness of a prior conviction generally 
affects the evidence's weight rather than its admissibility. State v. Cross, 216 Kan. 511, 
Syl. ¶ 7, 532 P.2d 1357 (1975). This court has stated plainly that "[r]emoteness in time, 
standing alone, is insufficient to establish reversible error in the admission of a prior 
conviction." State v. Carter, 220 Kan. 16, 20-21, 551 P.2d 821 (1976); see also State v. 
Breazeale, 238 Kan. 714, 723, 714 P.2d 1356 (remoteness of 10-year-old convictions 
affected weight of prior crimes evidence rather than its admissibility), cert. denied 479 
U.S. 846 (1986).  
 
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the scales tipped in 
favor of the probative value of this prior crimes evidence. We decline to find error in 
admitting the evidence to prove Smith's intent. Accordingly, we need not address Smith's 
claim that it was error to admit the evidence to prove motive because error in that regard, 
if any, would have been harmless given its admissibility to prove intent. See Prine II, 297 
Kan. at 480-81 (error admitting prior sex crime evidence to prove intent harmless when 
evidence would have been admissible for another purpose—demonstrating propensity 
under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 60-455[d]). 
 
ADMISSIBILITY OF PORNOGRAPHIC PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
While searching Smith's house, the officers discovered DVDs and magazines in a 
closet. The officers photographed the covers of the magazines and DVDs, and the State 
presented those photographs at trial. Smith argues the photographs of the covers should 
have been excluded. 
 
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Standard of Review  
 
As noted above, we review the district court's decision to admit evidence in two 
steps:  (1) review of whether the evidence was relevant, assessing materiality de novo and 
probativity under an abuse of discretion standard; and (2) review of the application of the 
statutory rules governing admission or exclusion of evidence. See Phillips, 295 Kan. at 
947. Because it is essential to resolving the claim here, we reiterate that a trial court may 
exclude relevant evidence upon finding its probative value is outweighed by its potential 
for producing undue prejudice. See K.S.A. 60-445; State v. Leitner, 272 Kan. 398, 415, 
34 P.3d 42 (2001). That determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
Phillips, 295 Kan. at 947; Wilson, 295 Kan. at 621. 
 
Admissibility Analysis 
 
Before trial, Smith filed a motion in limine to exclude the police photographs of 
pornographic material found in the residential search, arguing their probative value was 
outweighed by their prejudicial effect. At a hearing on the motion, Smith noted law 
enforcement officers found the actual material out of plain sight in a bedroom closet; the 
material had not been shown to the girls or discussed with them; there was no evidence 
the girls had seen the material; and the girls' bikini-clad poses in Smith's photographs did 
not replicate or appear to be patterned after poses depicted on the magazine covers. Smith 
argued the photographs were irrelevant to the charges against him and would be 
extremely prejudicial because the jury might be so offended that it would convict him of 
the charged crimes just to punish him for possessing pornography. 
 
The State responded that the pornography was relevant because the State had "to 
prove why these pictures [of H.D. and M.M.] were taken." Specifically, the prosecutor 
said she would be trying to convince the jury that the pictures "were taken by Mr. Smith 
15 
 
 
 
for the intent to arouse his sexual desires, or the child's sexual desires." The prosecutor 
then pointed out that "in the course of the investigation Mr. Smith claimed he was gay" 
and that "he/she's or women with penises, is what aroused him." Therefore, the 
prosecutor argued the jury should know what sexual material Smith had in his home to 
decide whether "those photographs [of the girls] were taken to appeal to his sexual 
desires." The prosecutor argued that if the situation were reversed and the pornography 
uncovered in Smith's house had all been "homosexual magazines," then Smith would be 
arguing the gay pornography proved he had no heterosexual desire for the girls.  
 
The district court agreed the State needed "to show this intent to arouse" and, upon 
the showing at the limine hearing, found the evidence's probative value outweighed its 
potential prejudicial effect. But the court cautioned that the evidence might develop 
differently at trial, which might prompt a different ruling at that time. 
 
Smith renewed his objection at trial, stating: 
 
"[T]here's comments that the Detective's [sic] made in his report about that the 
individuals were—they're illegal or they're underage or they're minors, or makin' any type 
of conclusion of the photographs, because there's several of 'em on the covers of the 
magazines or the DVD's that simply appear to be younger women with small breasts. I 
mean, unless he was present when those photographs were taken, he can't make a 
determination whether they're underage or whether the items are illegal or not."  
 
In response, the State argued the photos were relevant to show intent because Smith 
repeatedly claimed he was gay and did not like girls. The district court again ruled the 
evidence was admissible, while granting defense counsel a standing objection. 
 
The fallacy in the relevancy argument as framed by the State derives from the 
prosecutor's fundamental misstatement about what the State had to prove to the jury 
16 
 
 
 
under what it characterizes in its brief as the unique circumstances of this case. The 
prosecutor's declaration that the State had "to prove why these pictures were taken" 
certainly advanced the State's argument on the pornography's relevance, but it did not 
comport with the manner in which the State was alleging Smith committed the offenses 
with which he was charged.  
 
The charging document set forth two ways by which Smith allegedly took 
aggravated indecent liberties with the girls, both of which involved fondling or touching. 
The prosecution theory on two counts was that when Smith arranged the girls' poses, he 
touched them in a lewd manner with the intent to sexually arouse himself or the girls. The 
intent to arouse related to Smith's purpose in touching the girls. The second prosecution 
theory, applicable to the two counts of indecent liberties, was that when Smith told the 
girls to strike provocative poses, he solicited the girls to fondle or touch each other in a 
lewd manner with the intent to sexually arouse himself or the girls. Again, the intent to 
arouse related to Smith's purpose in directing the girls to touch each other. 
 
Consequently, the act of photographing the girls was not the actus reus of any of 
the charged offenses. Rather, all charges emanated from the acts of arranging the poses. 
Likewise, the mens rea of the charged offenses required the specific intent to arouse or 
satisfy sexual desires be related to the alleged acts of fondling, touching, or soliciting 
fondling or touching. Therefore, contrary to the prosecutor's argument for admitting the 
pornography, the State did not have to prove the reason Smith took the photographs was 
to arouse or satisfy his and/or the girls' sexual desires. Indeed, Smith could have 
committed the charged crimes without having any film in his camera. In short, Smith's 
motive or purpose for taking photographs was immaterial.  
 
Accordingly, even if Smith's possession of pornography depicting young, 
underdeveloped women had some tendency in reason to prove Smith's motive for taking 
17 
 
 
 
the photographs, that fact was not material and, therefore, not relevant. In addition, the 
State mischaracterizes the pornography evidence as being nongraphic and similar to the 
pictures taken by Smith. This is not simply true. Some of the pornographic material 
admitted into evidence shows genital penetration, while the photos taken of H.D. and 
M.M. do not. Also, the pornography evidence includes magazine cover pages with the 
provocative written titles of articles inside.  
 
In sum, the disputed material facts were:  (1) whether Smith touched the girls in a 
lewd manner with the intent to arouse or satisfy his or the girl's sexual desires; and (2) 
whether Smith solicited the girls to touch each other in a lewd manner with the intent to 
arouse or satisfy his or the girl's sexual desires. The State failed to connect the relevancy 
dots between Smith's possession of the pornography admitted into evidence and the 
allegations it was seeking to prove.  
 
Likewise, the State's alternate rationale for admitting the pornography—refuting 
Smith's declaration that he is gay and did not like girls—is not compelling. Recently, in 
Boleyn, 297 Kan. at 621-27, we addressed whether the trial court erred in admitting 
homosexual pornography found in the defendant's home for the purpose of impeaching 
defendant's declaration that he was not gay. We first noted that "evidence of 
homosexuality is generally irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible at a trial involving the 
sexual molestation of a child." 297 Kan. at 624.   
 
"'It is no more reasonable to assume that a preference for same gender adult sexual 
partners establishes a proclivity for sexual gratification with same gender children than it 
is to assume that preference for opposite gender adult sexual partners establishes a 
proclivity for sexual gratification with opposite gender children.' State v. Blomquist, 39 
Kan. App. 2d 101, Syl. ¶ 2, 178 P.3d 42 (2008)." 297 Kan. at 624.  
 
18 
 
 
 
We then discussed that an exception to that general proposition can exist when the 
State is offering evidence of the defendant's alleged homosexuality to show the defendant 
lied under oath when the defendant testified he or she was not gay. 297 Kan. at 624. "But 
we [held] that evidence [the defendant] merely [possessed] homosexual pornography 
would not be probative to rebutting or impeaching [the defendant's] claim of not being 
gay." 297 Kan. at 626. We found the defendant's possession of homosexual pornography 
to be particularly irrelevant in Boleyn because the defendant also possessed heterosexual 
pornography. More fundamentally, we cautioned against inferring too much about a 
person's actual sexual practices from the pornography he or she possesses, quoting 
Weinberg, Williams, Kleiner & Irizarry, Pornography, Normalization, and 
Empowerment, 39 Arch. of Sex. Behav. 1389, 1391 (2012): 
 
"'We believe it is unassailable that the central function of pornography is the creation or 
enhancement of sexual fantasy and/or arousal. That is, it presents bodies, behaviors, and 
situations in a way that is intended to sexually inspire or excite the viewer, regardless of 
whether such bodies, behaviors, and situations would be available or even desirable for 
the viewer to experience in real life.'" (Emphasis added.) Boleyn, 297 Kan. at 627. 
 
In short, Boleyn held that homosexual pornography discovered in the defendant's 
home along with heterosexual pornography was irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible to 
prove the defendant lied about being heterosexual, i.e., about not being gay. 297 Kan. at 
626-27. In Smith's case, the State seeks a different result for essentially the same 
proposition—that heterosexual pornography found in Smith's home was relevant to prove 
Smith lied about being gay, i.e., about not being heterosexual. 
 
The State's argument is logically inconsistent with our holding in Boleyn. If 
possession of homosexual pornography is not relevant to prove a person's sexual 
practices, then possession of heterosexual pornography is likewise not relevant for that 
19 
 
 
 
purpose. The district court erred in permitting the admission of the pornographic 
photographs. 
 
Harmless Error Analysis 
 
Having held it was error to admit the evidence, we must determine next whether 
the error was harmless under the statutory, nonconstitutional harmless error rule set out in 
K.S.A. 60-261. See 297 Kan. at 627. Under K.S.A. 60-261, this inquiry "requires us to 
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of 
the trial in light of the entire record." 297 Kan. at 627. The burden of demonstrating 
harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261 is on the party benefiting from the error. State v. 
McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 9, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). 
 
Notably, the State did little to single out the photographs of the magazine and 
DVD covers during its case. The prosecutor mentioned the magazines were found in 
Smith's home but were not seen by the victims. The prosecutor said only, "You can look 
at the covers and compare them to the photographs taken of the girls. You decide." Later, 
the prosecutor referenced the photographs again and said, "He claimed he was gay, but he 
had pornographic magazines in his house with titles like 'Pop my Cherry.'" 
 
The only disputed issue in this case was whether the acts were done for the 
purpose of arousing or satisfying Smith's sexual desires. The evidence in that regard was 
substantial. It included evidence of Smith's prior sexual advances towards H.D.:  her 
testimony Smith told her he loved her and was attracted to young girls; a detective's 
testimony H.D. told him Smith said he "would not make her do anything against her 
will"; evidence Smith purchased thong underwear and a vibrator for H.D.; and H.D.'s 
brother testifying that Smith "started to get a little bit too friendly" with H.D. and he was 
"always kind of flirty after a while."  
20 
 
 
 
 
It also included the bulk of the evidence, which centered on what occurred while 
Smith was taking the photographs. We start with the content of the Polaroids themselves, 
which are strong evidence of Smith's intent when touching or having the girls touch each 
other during the picture taking session. And the pictures are of H.D. and M.M. in bikini-
style swimsuits, with the girls striking increasingly sexually provocative poses as the 
session progressed. The jury also watched M.M.'s interview with police in which she 
described how Smith positioned the girls and encouraged them to "simulate" kissing by 
touching their lips and tongues together. M.M. also related how Smith spread their legs 
further apart, touched their bottoms when adjusting their swimsuits, and tap H.D.'s 
bottom before going back and taking the picture. 
 
Even more damaging was M.M.'s testimony regarding one pose in which Smith 
positioned the girls on their hands and knees, with their legs spread apart towards the 
camera, and after adjusting their bikini bottoms for this pose, Smith went back to the 
camera and said, "[Y]eah, [H.D.] knows I like young girls." Similarly, H.D. testified that 
Smith adjusted their swimsuits "[a]round the crotch area" and said she believed Smith 
was sexually aroused when taking the pictures because of the way he had the girls pose. 
Additional evidence included both H.D. and M.M. testifying that Smith told them not to 
tell anyone about the photographs, and M.M. testifying how Smith offered to pay them 
$200 to take topless pictures next time.   
 
In addition, the jury heard and saw evidence of Smith's prior crimes—four 1993 
convictions that occurred in one case consisting of two aggravated indecent liberties with 
a child convictions, one aggravated criminal sodomy conviction, and one rape conviction. 
Two of these—the aggravated indecent liberties with a child convictions—were for the 
same or similar crimes with which Smith was charged in this case (aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child and indecent liberties with a child). And this evidence had to have 
21 
 
 
 
negatively impacted Smith's credibility, which was at issue because he claimed his 
actions during the photography session were innocent.  
 
Taken together, the jury had more than enough evidence to find that Smith 
intended to arouse or satisfy his own, H.D.'s, or M.M.'s (or some combination of the 
three) sexual desires while touching H.D. and M.M. and directing them to touch each 
other during the photo session. In light of the entire trial record, we conclude there is no 
reasonable probability the photographs of the pornographic magazine and DVD covers 
affected the trial's outcome. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569-70, 256 P.3d 801 
(2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
We hold the error in admitting photographs of the magazine and DVD covers was 
harmless.  
 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
 
At trial, the jury was given the following reasonable doubt instruction: 
 
 
"The State has the burden to prove the defendant guilty. The 
defendant is not required to prove he is not guilty. You must presume 
that the defendant is not guilty until you are convinced from the evidence 
that he is guilty. 
 
 
"The test you must use in determining whether the defendant is 
guilty or not guilty is this: 
 
"If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the 
claims required to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant 
not guilty; or 
22 
 
 
 
 
"If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the 
claims required to be proved by the State, you should find the defendant 
guilty." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Smith claims two errors within this instruction require reversal. He argues the use 
of the word "until" in the first paragraph was error, and he argues the last two paragraphs 
erroneously employed the word "any." As summarized below, this court previously 
declined to hold either of the claimed defects amounted to reversible error, and we follow 
that precedent again in this case.    
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
"For jury instruction issues, the progression of analysis and corresponding 
standards of review on appeal are:  (1) First, the appellate court should consider the 
reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising 
an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to 
determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) 
finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error 
was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 
Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012)." State v. Plummer, 
295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 (2012). 
 
With regard to the first step, reviewability, Smith did not object to the jury 
instruction on either ground. But if after the first step, an appellate court determines the 
issue has not been properly preserved, relief may still be granted if the giving or failure to 
give an instruction was clearly erroneous. K.S.A. 22-3414(3). 
 
23 
 
 
 
"To determine whether an instruction or a failure to give an instruction was 
clearly erroneous, the reviewing court must first determine whether there was any error at 
all. To make that determination, the appellate court must consider whether the subject 
instruction was legally and factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the 
entire record." 
 
 
"If the reviewing court determines that the district court erred in giving or failing 
to give a challenged instruction, then the clearly erroneous analysis moves to a 
reversibility inquiry, wherein the court assesses whether it is firmly convinced that the 
jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred. The 
party claiming a clearly erroneous instruction maintains the burden to establish the degree 
of prejudice necessary for reversal." State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶¶ 4-5, 286 
P.3d 195 (2012). 
 
 
A. Use of the word "until" does not create reversible error 
 
 
Smith claims the following language in the reasonable doubt instruction is 
erroneous:  "You must presume that the defendant is not guilty until you are convinced 
from the evidence that he is guilty."  
 
 
This same instructional language was issued in State v. Wilkerson, 278 Kan. 147, 
158, 91 P.3d 1181 (2004). In that case, Wilkerson objected to the instruction at trial. On 
appeal, the court held the instruction "'would have been improved by the substitution of 
the word 'unless' for the word 'until.'" 278 Kan. at 158. But the court also held the error 
did not require reversal because "[t]he whole of the instructions given in this case, when 
read together, accurately stated the law. The jury could not reasonably have been misled 
by them, and thus the instructions did not constitute reversible error . . . ." 278 Kan. at 
158. This court has continued to adhere to that rule. See State v. Cofield, 288 Kan. 367, 
377-78, 203 P.3d 1261 (2009); State v. Anderson, 287 Kan. 325, 342-43, 197 P.3d 409 
24 
 
 
 
(2008); State v. Davis, 284 Kan. 728, 739, 163 P.3d 1224 (2007) (finding no clear error in 
this "oft-made, always rejected" issue).  
 
 
Smith does not argue the instructions as a whole did not accurately state the law, 
and he raises no new arguments as to why the error is clearly erroneous. He appears to 
urge the court to find clear error as punishment for trial courts' repeated use of the 
instruction despite the caselaw to the contrary. This is not the standard for clear error and 
does not serve as a basis for reversal. Smith presents no compelling reason to depart from 
this court's precedent. The use of the word "until" was not clear error. 
 
 
B. The "any" and "any" language is not erroneous 
 
 
Smith also takes issue with the following language in the reasonable doubt 
instruction: 
 
 
"The test you must use in determining whether the defendant is 
guilty or not guilty is this: 
 
 
"If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the 
claims required to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant 
not guilty; or 
 
"If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the 
claims required to be proved by the State, you should find the defendant 
guilty." (Emphasis added.) 
 
The same "any" and "any" language was challenged in State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 
1101, 1120, 1124, 299 P.3d 292 (2013), which held the instruction was legally 
appropriate, although not preferred. See State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, Syl. ¶ 7, 299 P.3d 
309 (2013) (same).  
 
25 
 
 
 
 
Smith argues that this language is error by analogy to another reasonable doubt 
instruction. In Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921, 923-930, 318 P.3d 155 (2014), this court 
held a district court errs by instructing the jury:   
 
"If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims required to be proved 
by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt as 
to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, you should find the 
defendant guilty." (Emphasis added.)  
 
This court held the use of the word "each" in the first sentence of this reasonable 
doubt instruction effectively told the jury it may acquit the defendant only if it had a 
reasonable doubt as to all of the elements the State was required to prove—rather than 
acquitting if it had a reasonable doubt as to any single element. 298 Kan. 921, Syl. ¶ 6. 
To support his claim that the instruction was clearly erroneous, Smith relies on language 
in the Court of Appeals' decision in Miller v. State, No. 103,915, 2012 WL 401601 (Kan. 
App. 2012) (unpublished opinion), aff'd 298 Kan. 921, 318 P.3d 155 (2014), that was 
critical of the "any" and "any" reasonable doubt instruction.  
 
But this argument was raised and rejected in Herbel and Smyser. In both cases, we 
held that using the words "each" and "any" in the incorrect order in a reasonable doubt 
instruction was sufficiently different than the "any" and "any" instruction to preclude an 
analytical comparison. Smyser, 297 Kan. at 205-06; Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1122. Consistent 
with Herbel and Smyser, we hold the reasonable doubt instruction issued at Smith's trial 
was legally appropriate and not clearly erroneous.   
 
26 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE  
 
Smith argues his 272-month sentence imposed for Count III, indecent liberties 
with a child, is illegal because a prior conviction that had already been considered was 
used to enhance his criminal history score, in violation of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11). He 
seeks remand for resentencing. The State concedes the error but disagrees that remand is 
the appropriate remedy. The State argues the error is harmless because the sentence runs 
concurrent to the 80-year-to-life aggregate sentence imposed for his aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child convictions in Counts I and II. Smith does not address the State's 
harmless error analysis. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"'The question of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which this court 
has unlimited review. An illegal sentence is a sentence imposed by a court without 
jurisdiction, a sentence which does not conform to the statutory provision, either in 
character or the term of the punishment authorized, or a sentence which is ambiguous 
with regard to the time and manner in which it is to be served.' [Citation omitted.]" State 
v. LaBelle, 290 Kan. 529, 532, 231 P.3d 1065 (2010).  
 
Error Analysis 
 
Smith alleges his sentence violates K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11), which states:  
 
 
"Prior convictions of any crime shall not be counted in determining the criminal 
history category if they enhance the severity level or applicable penalties, elevate the 
classification from misdemeanor to felony, or are elements of the present crime of 
conviction. Except as otherwise provided, all other prior convictions will be considered 
and scored." 
 
27 
 
 
 
Some additional facts are necessary to appreciate the issue. As stated earlier, 
Smith had four prior sex offense convictions:  two for aggravated indecent liberties with a 
child; one for aggravated criminal sodomy; and one for rape. Each prior conviction was 
classified as a person felony for criminal history purposes. In this case, Smith's two 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child convictions are Jessica's Law offenses under 
K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C). Generally, those convictions carry life sentences with 
mandatory minimum prison terms of not less than 25 years. K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1). 
 
But Smith was sentenced under K.S.A. 21-4643(b)(1) to life imprisonment with a 
mandatory minimum of 40 years for each aggravated indecent liberties conviction 
because he had previously been convicted of a crime listed in K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1). The 
district court did not specify which prior convictions were used to impose the hard 40 
sentences. See LaBelle, 290 Kan. at 538 ("[C]ourts are not required to specify at 
sentencing how particular convictions or adjudications are used. . . . [But] we hold that 
the preferred judicial practice is to put on the record the specific use for each conviction 
or adjudication . . . .").  
 
The district court also ordered the hard 40 sentences to run consecutively, 
resulting in a mandatory minimum of 80 years' imprisonment. Smith is not contesting the 
district court's authority to enter the hard 40 sentences on Counts I and II. But he argues 
the process used to arrive at the sentences is relevant to his sentencing challenge on 
Count III because using two prior convictions to impose them precluded the court from 
using those priors again when calculating Smith's criminal history score on Count III. 
Smith is correct. Imposing the hard 40 sentences left only two prior convictions available 
for calculating the sentence for Count III. 
 
One of Smith's remaining prior convictions was used to qualify him as a persistent 
sex offender, requiring the district court to double his gridblock sentences on both 
28 
 
 
 
indecent liberties with a child convictions under K.S.A. 21-4704(j). Using that prior 
conviction to classify Smith as a persistent sex offender precluded using it to calculate 
Smith's criminal history score. See State v. Moore, 274 Kan. 639, 651, 55 P.3d 903 
(2002) (district court erred in failing to remove prior conviction from criminal history 
after using it  to classify defendant as a persistent sex offender). So Smith had only one 
prior adult person felony conviction available for use in calculating his criminal history 
score when sentencing him for the indecent liberties with a child conviction in Count III.  
 
But Smith received an "A" criminal history classification, meaning Smith's 
criminal history included three or more adult convictions for person felonies. See K.S.A. 
21-4709. This resulted in the 272-month sentence Smith now challenges. The State 
concedes that this was error, and we agree. 
 
The only remaining question is the appropriate remedy, if any. The State argues 
the error was harmless because Smith's sentence on Count III runs concurrent to his 80-
year minimum aggregate life sentence for the aggravated indecent liberties with a child 
convictions. In other words, as a practical matter, Smith will be serving those sentences 
long after he completes the concurrent sentence for indecent liberties with a child 
imposed under Count III.  
 
Prejudice Analysis 
 
The State argues remand is not required based on State v. Riley, 259 Kan. 774, 
778, 915 P.2d 774 (1996). There, the defendant was convicted of three offenses and the 
sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The court held that the district court properly 
calculated the defendant's sentence for the primary crime, which in that case was the 
conviction for which the longest sentence was imposed. But it improperly computed the 
29 
 
 
 
sentences for the other two crimes, so the court concluded remand for resentencing was 
unnecessary because the defendant was not prejudiced by the error. 259 Kan. at 780.  
 
The prejudice requirement announced in Riley that precluded remand has been 
followed in multiple conviction cases for erroneous nonbase sentences that run 
concurrent to controlling base sentences for primary offenses. See, e.g., State v. Bolin, 
266 Kan. 18, 25, 968 P.2d 1104 (1998) (declining to remand defendant's multiple 
conviction cases for resentencing when sentences for nonbase crimes were erroneous but 
sentences for primary crimes were both controlling and correctly calculated). But these 
cases do not specifically address whether a defendant is required to show prejudice by 
specifically addressing whether an illegal sentence claim is subject to a harmless error 
analysis. 
 
"An 'illegal sentence' is:  (1) a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; 
(2) a sentence that does not conform to the applicable statutory provision, either in 
character or the term of authorized punishment; or (3) a sentence that is ambiguous with 
respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served." State v. Taylor, 299 Kan. 5, 8, 
319 P.3d 1256 (2014). This court has held that a violation of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) 
renders a sentence illegal. See LaBelle, 290 Kan. at 534. Illegal sentences, or sentences 
imposed without the trial court's jurisdiction, are void. See State v. McCarley, 287 Kan. 
167, 175, 195 P.3d 230 (2008). Finally, appellate courts have a clear duty to set aside 
void sentences and impose valid ones. See Chambers v. State, 199 Kan. 483, 485, 430 
P.2d 241 (1967).  
 
We hold that remand for resentencing on Count III is required even though it will 
not affect the time Smith ultimately serves.  
 
30 
 
 
 
NO-CONTACT ORDER 
 
At sentencing, the trial court ordered that Smith not have contact with the victims 
or the victims' families. On appeal, Smith argues the trial court lacked authority to 
impose a no-contact order, and the State concedes it was improper. We agree. See State v. 
Bowen, 299 Kan. ___, 323 P.3d 853, 867 (2014); State v. Plotner, 290 Kan. 774, 781, 235 
P.3d 417 (2010); State v. Post, 279 Kan. 664, 665-69, 112 P.3d 116 (2005). In those 
cases, the appropriate remedy was to vacate the no-contact order but leave the remainder 
of the sentence intact. See Bowen, 323 P.3d at 867. Because the no-contact order was 
illegal, we must vacate that portion of Smith's sentence.  
 
LIFETIME ELECTRONIC MONITORING SENTENCE 
 
It is unclear from the sentencing hearing transcript whether the trial court ordered 
lifetime electronic monitoring at that hearing. It appears the issue was raised by the State, 
but the transcript recites that the trial court's response was inaudible. The parties agree 
that lifetime electronic monitoring was ordered at sentencing; so we accept their joint 
representations.  
 
The State correctly concedes that lifetime electronic monitoring was improper 
under State v. Jolly, 291 Kan. 842, 848, 249 P.3d 421 (2011). In Jolly, this court held 
K.S.A. 22-3717(u) "plainly states that the parole board shall order electronic monitoring 
as a condition of parole." 291 Kan. at 848. We likewise hold it was improper for the trial 
court to sentence Smith to lifetime electronic monitoring, and we vacate that portion of 
his sentence.   
 
31 
 
 
 
LIFETIME POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION SENTENCE 
 
In his last sentencing challenge, Smith argues the district court erred by sentencing 
him to lifetime postrelease supervision instead of parole. The sentencing transcript simply 
states the court "will order a post-release provision of life" without discussing to which 
counts the postrelease order was attached. And the sentencing journal entry lists lifetime 
postrelease supervision for all four crimes of conviction. This is pertinent because only 
two of those sentences—the aggravated indecent liberties convictions in Counts I and 
II—carried indeterminate life sentences. The two convictions for indecent liberties with a 
child in Counts III and IV are grid offenses. The State concedes the district court erred by 
imposing lifetime postrelease supervision without distinguishing between the aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child and indecent liberties with a child sentences. 
 
Both parties are correct that lifetime postrelease supervision cannot be imposed in 
conjunction with an indeterminate life sentence. In State v. Harsh, 293 Kan. 585, 265 
P.3d 1161 (2011), this court held that there is a distinction between lifetime parole and 
lifetime postrelease supervision. And an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes 
occurring after July 1, 2006, under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643, is parole eligible after 
serving the mandatory minimum sentence. 293 Kan. at 589-90 (citing K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 
22-3717[b][5] and [u]). For Counts I and II, Smith was similarly sentenced to life 
imprisonment for two Jessica's Law offenses. The district court erred by imposing 
lifetime postrelease supervision for these counts, and we vacate that portion of Smith's 
sentence.  
 
As we held in Harsh, parole is separate and distinct from the sentence and will be 
granted, if at all, by the Kansas Prisoner Review Board (successor to the Kansas Parole 
Board). The proper remedy is simply to vacate the lifetime postrelease supervision 
imposed on Counts I and II. See 293 Kan. at 590.  
32 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:  I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "there is no 
reasonable probability the photographs of the pornographic magazine and DVD covers 
affected the trial's outcome." In assessing whether the State has met its burden of proving 
harmless error, we must evaluate the error "in light of the entire record." State v. Ward, 
292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).  
 
Here, the entire record before us reveals that the State used the erroneously 
admitted evidence to entice the jury to convict Smith based upon facts that were not 
relevant to the stated elements of the charged crimes. Without the distraction of deciding 
Smith's motive and intent in taking the photographs or considering the pornographic 
nature of the images depicted in the photographs, one or more rational jurors could 
reasonably have decided that Smith touched the girls and directed the girls to touch each 
other for the purpose of setting the scene to be photographed. That would not have 
constituted the lewd touching with intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires required by 
the charging document, even if we all believe that Smith intended to subsequently use the 
resulting photographs as pornography for his sexual arousal or satisfaction. That distinct 
probability belies harmless error; just one not guilty vote would have affected the trial's 
outcome. 
 
The majority acknowledges that the State misunderstood what it had to prove to 
the jury. Indeed, it recites examples of the prosecutor's legally incorrect and potentially 
confusing arguments to the jury, e.g., that the jury could decide the case by comparing 
the girls' photographs to the pornography photographs or by deciding that Smith was not 
gay. Of course, Smith's being aroused by looking at the provocative photographs or even 
his being aroused by looking at the underage girls as they posed according to his 
33 
 
 
 
directions did not make him guilty of lewd touching with an intent to arouse. It is 
unfathomable to me that an appellate court would affirm a conviction for lewd touching, 
which resulted in an 80-year prison sentence, when the State prosecuted the defendant on 
the basis that his prurient motive for photographing underage girls in bathing suits 
established his guilt.  
 
It is likewise curious to me that the majority fails to hold the State accountable for 
continuing its meritless arguments on appeal. For instance, in the section of its initial 
appellate brief arguing that Smith's prior convictions were relevant to this prosecution, 
the State asserts that Smith's "motive in taking the pictures was an issue"; that "[t]he 
relevant question [was] why did he take the pictures"; and, finally, that "[b]ecause the 
State must prove that [Smith] took the photographs with the 'intent to arouse,' evidence as 
to the reason why [Smith] took the photographs is material, relevant, and probative." 
Then, in arguing the relevance of the pornography photographs, the State again ignores 
that the gravamen of the charged offenses is lewd touching, not photography or even 
lusting after young girls. There, the State declares that "because the [S]tate must prove 
that the photos of the victims were taken with the intent to arouse the sexual desires, Mr. 
Smith's sexual desires come into play." Additionally, the State claimed that "the 
pornographic photos [were] admitted for the purpose of countering the statement that 
[Smith] was gay and didn't like girls."  
 
This court has declared that a party is not permitted to change its theory on appeal. 
See Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 276 Kan. 393, Syl. ¶ 7, 77 P.3d 130 (2003). Yet, 
the majority apparently finds it permissible for this court to sua sponte change the theory 
of prosecution on appeal in order to save the State's erroneously obtained convictions. 
There is nothing fundamentally fair about that. 
 
34 
 
 
 
Moreover, most of the evidence the majority relies upon to find harmlessness 
actually just supports the State's theory that Smith took the photographs to use for his 
sexual arousal and satisfaction, rather than being probative on the disputed issue of 
whether Smith only touched the girls to arrange their poses. See State v. Boleyn, 297 Kan. 
610, Syl. ¶ 1, 303 P.3d 680 (2013) ("Evidence is probative if it has any tendency in 
reason to prove a fact."). For example, Smith's statement while at the camera that "yeah, 
[H.D.] knows I like young girls" simply explains why he was placing the girls in 
provocative poses and photographing them. If he wanted to immediately satisfy his 
sexual desires through his touching, one would have expected him to do so in a less 
innocuous fashion. There was scant actual evidence that had any tendency in reason to 
prove Smith touched the girls in a lewd manner or that the touching was done with an 
intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. To get the convictions, the State had to tie the 
inadmissible pornography and the irrelevant arguments on sexual orientation to the 
immaterial act of photographing the girls in bikinis striking provocative poses. Proving 
that the defendant performed reprehensible acts is not the same as proving that the 
defendant performed the charged criminal acts.  
 
In short, I would reverse and make the State try to convict Smith based upon acts 
that are actually elements of the crimes with which he is charged.   
 
LUCKERT and BEIER, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.