Case Title: State v. Jay D. Krajewski

Citation: 2002 WI 97

Docket Number: 1999AP003165-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 97 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3165-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Jay D. Krajewski,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline R. Erwin   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Christopher A. Mutschler and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Fond 
du Lac, and oral argument by Rex Anderegg. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by 
Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 97 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-3165-CR   
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 158) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jay D. Krajewski,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The issue presented in this 
case is whether the state may require a warrantless blood draw 
for alcohol concentration testing from a person who is arrested 
on probable cause for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant (OWI), when the person refuses to 
submit to a requested blood test under the implied consent 
statute but offers to submit to a breath test in lieu of a blood 
test. 
¶2 
The circuit court for Jefferson County, Jacqueline R. 
Erwin, 
Judge, 
suppressed 
the 
results 
of 
the 
blood 
test 
administered to the defendant, Jay D. Krajewski, following his 
No. 99-3165-CR 
2 
 
arrest for OWI.  The circuit court concluded that a non-
consensual blood draw is unreasonable and unconstitutional when 
a defendant offers to submit to an available and less intrusive 
method of testing for blood alcohol concentration.  The court of 
appeals reversed, determining that the defendant's case was 
controlled by this court's decision in State v. Bohling, 173 
Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993).  The court of appeals ruled 
that the warrantless blood draw met the requirements established 
in Bohling and was lawful.  State v. Krajewski, No. 99-3165-CR, 
unpublished order at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000). 
¶3 
We accepted Krajewski's petition for review and hold 
that a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw from a person 
arrested on probable cause for a drunk driving offense is 
constitutional based on the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, even if the 
person offers to submit to a chemical test other than the blood 
test chosen by law enforcement, provided that the blood draw 
complies with the factors enumerated in Bohling.  We conclude 
that the warrantless blood draw in this case was properly based 
on exigency and complied with factors enumerated in Bohling.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The facts stated below are based upon testimony at 
preliminary and suppression hearings as well as stipulations by 
the parties, documents in the record, and the factual findings 
of the circuit court.  For the purpose of reviewing the circuit 
No. 99-3165-CR 
3 
 
court's decision to suppress Krajewski's blood test, the test 
results are not in dispute.   
¶5 
Wisconsin State Trooper Richard Torrez was on duty in 
the early morning hours of May 2, 1999.  At approximately 1:18 
a.m., he stopped a Volkswagen Jetta traveling west on Interstate 
94 near Johnson Creek in Jefferson County.  The vehicle was 
driven by Jay Krajewski.  Trooper Torrez observed the Krajewski 
vehicle traveling along the fog line on the right side of the 
highway.  After hugging the fog line for approximately 1,000 
feet, the vehicle veered toward the center of the highway, then 
moved back across the fog line close to the rumble strips for 
approximately 2,000 feet.  The vehicle eventually traveled back 
across the fog line to the center of the right lane, then 
switched into the left lane, speeding up by 10 miles per hour as 
it changed lanes.  Torrez followed Krajewski into the left lane, 
prompting the Krajewski vehicle to move back into the right lane 
where it subsequently exited the highway to enter a rest area.  
At that point, Torrez pulled Krajewski over for operating his 
vehicle erratically and in excess of the speed limit. 
¶6 
When Torrez approached the vehicle, Krajewski told him 
that he did not have a driver's license but had a state 
identification card.  Torrez noticed that Krajewski's breath 
smelled of an intoxicant.  Krajewski offered that he had 
consumed three or four beers in the prior 12 hours and had last 
No. 99-3165-CR 
4 
 
consumed alcohol about four hours before he was stopped.1  
Krajewski told Torrez that he was driving from Milwaukee to 
Adams County to check on his parents who had left a phone 
message early in the morning of May 1, asking him to call them 
as soon as possible.  Krajewski said he was worried about his 
parents because he had been unable to contact them during the 
day. 
¶7 
Krajewski agreed to perform field sobriety tests.  
According to Torrez, Krajewski failed each of the three tests 
administered.2  Krajewski then submitted to a preliminary breath 
test (PBT) pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1997-98).3  The 
results indicated that the alcohol concentration in Krajewski's 
blood was 0.20.4  Torrez arrested Krajewski for operating a motor 
                                                 
1 Trooper Torrez testified that Krajewski later altered his 
story, saying that he had four or five beers and that he had 
finished drinking two hours before he was stopped. 
2 Krajewski does not contest the validity or the results of 
the field sobriety tests for the purposes of this appeal. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise specified.   
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235(1)(a) provides that, "'Alcohol 
concentration' means the number of grams of alcohol in 100 
milliliters of a person's blood or the number of grams of 
alcohol in 210 liters of a person's breath."  
No. 99-3165-CR 
5 
 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).5 
¶8 
Trooper Torrez testified at the suppression hearing 
that he was aware that Krajewski had four prior convictions for 
driving while intoxicated.  He also knew that the State Patrol 
had a policy to request a blood sample for second and subsequent 
offenses. 
 
Consequently, 
Torrez 
transported 
Krajewski 
to 
Countryside 
Home 
(Countryside)——a 
county 
nursing 
home 
in 
Jefferson that administers blood draws——to obtain a blood 
sample. 
¶9 
When they arrived, Torrez read the "informing the 
accused" warnings found in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), then asked 
Krajewski if he would submit to a blood draw.  Krajewski 
refused.  Krajewski testified that he told Torrez, "that I did 
not——that I had had a fear of needles and that I did not want to 
have blood withdrawn from me."  Krajewski further testified that 
he offered to give either a breath or a urine sample "clearly at 
least twice." 
¶10 When Trooper Torrez was told that Countryside's policy 
was not to draw blood from a person who did not consent to a 
blood draw, he decided to take Krajewski to Fort Atkinson 
                                                 
5 "[A]n alcohol concentration of 0.1 or more is prima facie 
evidence that [a person] was under the influence of an 
intoxicant."  Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(c).  However, "[i]n cases 
involving persons who have 2 or more prior convictions, 
suspensions, or revocations . . . an alcohol concentration of 
0.08 or more is prima facie evidence that [the person] was under 
the influence of an intoxicant."  Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(cd). 
No. 99-3165-CR 
6 
 
Memorial Hospital, which he believed would draw blood from a 
non-consenting person.  At the hospital, Torrez again read the 
informing the accused form to Krajewski.  Torrez testified that 
Krajewski again refused to submit to a blood draw but said he 
would "dance circles" if he were allowed to contact his parents.  
Torrez took this to mean that Krajewski would submit to a blood 
draw if he could first check on his parents. 
¶11 Sergeant 
Paul 
Wallace 
of 
the 
Jefferson 
County 
Sheriff’s Department, one of four other officers who had been 
called to meet Torrez at the hospital,6 then spoke to Krajewski, 
telling him that the officers were going to obtain a blood 
sample with or without his consent.  Wallace testified that 
Krajewski told him that he wanted to contact his parents.  
According to Wallace, Krajewski stated that he did not want to 
take a test for alcohol concentration because if he submitted he 
would be "[expletive]."  Sergeant Wallace told Krajewski that 
after the blood draw he would help Krajewski contact his 
parents. 
¶12 Krajewski refused to submit but advised Sergeant 
Wallace that he would agree not to resist physically.  A 
registered nurse obtained two blood specimens at approximately 
                                                 
6 Krajewski testified that upon learning that he would be 
taken to a different facility for a blood draw, he told Torrez: 
"Well, you had better call some friends because I'm not going to 
give it willingly." 
No. 99-3165-CR 
7 
 
3:25 a.m.7  The resulting blood test showed that the alcohol 
concentration 
in 
Krajewski's 
blood 
was 
0.219 
grams 
per 
milliliter, significantly greater than the 0.08 limit for 
persons with two or more previous convictions, suspensions, or 
revocations.  See Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(cd).  After the blood 
draw, Krajewski was taken to the Jefferson County Jail.  
Sergeant 
Wallace 
contacted 
Adams 
County 
authorities, 
who 
contacted Krajewski's parents.  They in turn called to report 
that they were fine. 
¶13 The 
state 
charged 
Krajewski 
with 
one 
count 
of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, as a fifth or 
subsequent offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a), 
346.61 and 346.65(2)(e); one count of operating a motor vehicle 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration, 
as 
a 
fifth 
or 
subsequent offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(b), 
346.61 and 346.65(2)(e); and one count of operating after 
revocation, as a second offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 
343.44(1) and 351.08. 
¶14 After the preliminary hearing, Krajewski filed a 
motion to suppress the results of the blood test, alleging that 
                                                 
7 The 
parties 
stipulated, 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
the 
preliminary hearing, that the blood samples obtained by the 
registered nurse were obtained according to normal procedures. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
8 
 
the seizure of his blood had violated his rights under the state 
and federal constitutions.8 
¶15 Both Trooper Torrez and Sergeant Wallace testified 
that they could not remember whether Krajewski offered to submit 
to a breath or urine test.  However, the circuit court stated in 
its order that "[Krajewski] testified unequivocally that he 
requested a breath test instead of a blood test due to his fear 
of needles."  It found that Krajewski "asked to take a breath 
test based on fear of needles.  A blood test was, nonetheless, 
taken pursuant to the officer's policy and stated intent to take 
it by force if necessary."  The circuit court determined that 
Krajewski had impliedly consented to a blood test pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305, but had withdrawn his consent.  It found 
that the officers could have timely administered a breath test 
as requested, and that after initially refusing the blood test, 
Krajewski had submitted "under protest." 
¶16 The circuit court acknowledged that under Bohling, 
"forcible 
blood 
draws 
were 
available 
under 
the 
exigent 
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment."  However, 
relying upon Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 
1998), the court determined that exigent circumstances are not 
present when a defendant consents to undergo a test other than a 
blood test.  It ruled that "[W]hen consent to a less intrusive 
                                                 
8 Krajewski also brought a motion claiming that Wisconsin's 
implied 
consent 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305, 
is 
unconstitutional.  The circuit court denied the motion, and 
Krajewski does not appeal the ruling. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
9 
 
seizure meets a coerced or forcible seizure, the latter method 
is unreasonable."  It therefore granted Krajewski’s motion to 
suppress.  This was the order reversed by the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 For the purposes of this appeal, there are no genuine 
issues of material fact.  We are presented with the question 
whether the results of a test for alcohol concentration were 
obtained in compliance with the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  This is a question of law that this court reviews 
de novo.  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 533. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶18 This case requires us to decide fundamental questions 
about the exigency exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment9 and its relationship to Wisconsin's implied 
consent statute. 
A. Implied Consent 
¶19 Wisconsin has enacted an implied consent statute for 
motor vehicle operators, Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  A person who 
operates a motor vehicle in this state is deemed to have given 
                                                 
9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution are 
virtually identical.  Both establish the right of persons to be 
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Consequently, 
this court interprets the two constitutional provisions in 
concert.  State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶13, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 
623 N.W.2d 516; State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶27, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
10 
 
consent to one or more tests of his or her blood, breath, or 
urine upon the request of a law enforcement officer if the 
person 
is 
arrested 
for 
a 
drunk 
driving 
offense. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2).10 
¶20 Under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a), a law enforcement 
officer may request that a person arrested for OWI provide one 
or more samples of the person's blood, breath, or urine for 
testing.  A law enforcement officer must then read the implied 
consent warning to the person, explaining the nature of implied 
consent, warning of the consequences of refusal to submit to a 
test of the officer's choice, warning about the consequences of 
a prohibited alcohol concentration, and informing the person of 
his 
or 
her 
right 
to 
request 
an 
alternative 
test.  
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4); State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶1 
n.3, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528.   
¶21 The "alternative test" referred to in the statute is 
not a test of the person's choice in lieu of the test requested 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) provides in relevant part: 
Any person who . . . operates a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways of this state . . . is deemed to have 
given consent to one or more tests of his or her 
breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining 
the presence or quantity in his or her blood or 
breath, of alcohol, controlled substances, controlled 
substance analogs or other drugs, or any combination 
of 
alcohol, 
controlled 
substances, 
controlled 
substance analogs and other drugs, when requested to 
do so by a law enforcement officer under sub. (3)(a) 
or (am) or when required to do so under sub. (3)(b). 
 
No. 99-3165-CR 
11 
 
by the officer.  It is an additional test.  The statute reads in 
part: 
 
If you take all the requested tests, you may 
choose to take further tests.  You may take the 
alternative test that this law enforcement agency 
provides free of charge.  You also may have a test 
conducted by a qualified person of your choice at your 
expense.  You, however, will have to make your own 
arrangements for that test. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4). 
¶22 If a person refuses to submit to the officer's 
requested test, the officer is required immediately to take 
possession of the person's license and prepare a notice of 
intent to revoke.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a).  If a court later 
determines that the person improperly refused to provide the 
requested sample or samples for testing, the court is required 
to revoke the person's operating license for a period of at 
least one year.11  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) and (b)(2). 
¶23 In this case, the circuit court found that Jay 
Krajewski "impliedly consented to the chemical testing of his 
blood by driving.  He withdrew that consent and will suffer the 
consequences of his refusal if it is proved."  The circuit court 
therefore 
concluded 
that 
"[t]he 
seizure 
was 
outside 
the 
provisions of § 345.305 [sic] Wis. Stats."  The parties do not 
dispute the circuit court's finding that the blood draw in this 
case was not conducted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305. 
                                                 
11 The length of the revocation is dependent upon the number 
of prior suspensions, revocations and convictions, as calculated 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.307.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10). 
No. 99-3165-CR 
12 
 
B. Searches Outside Implied Consent Statute 
¶24 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
recognize and protect the right of the people "to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."12  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  In most 
instances, searches by law enforcement should be conducted 
pursuant to a search warrant.  State v. Prober, 87 Wis. 2d 423, 
433, 275 N.W.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1978).  Searches conducted without 
a warrant are deemed unreasonable per se unless they fall within 
one of "a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions."  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 
(1971); State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 
(1998); see also State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 227, 455 
                                                 
12 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 11 to the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
Searches and seizures.  SECTION 11.  The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
13 
 
N.W.2d 618 (1990) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 
(1983) ("a few carefully delineated exceptions")).  Two of the 
carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
consent searches and searches based on exigent circumstances.  
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); 
Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). 
C. Warrantless Searches 
¶25 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.305 
does 
not 
explicitly 
authorize the warrantless search of a driver who withdraws 
consent and refuses to provide a requested sample for testing 
under the implied consent statute.  However, the text clearly 
recognizes the possibility of such a search if the search is 
based upon authority outside the statute.  It states: "This 
section does not limit the right of a law enforcement officer to 
obtain evidence by any other lawful means."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(c).   
¶26 We considered this contingency in State v. Zielke, 137 
Wis. 2d 39, 52, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987).  In Zielke, a police 
officer induced Zielke to provide a sample of his blood 
following his involvement in a fatal automobile accident.  The 
procedures "in the implied consent law were concededly not 
followed."  Id. at 40.  The circuit court suppressed the results 
of the blood test, concluding that the implied consent law was 
the exclusive means by which police may obtain chemical test 
evidence of driver intoxication.  Id. at 41.  This court 
reversed, stating: "Chemical test evidence may be otherwise 
legally obtained if it is seized [1] pursuant to a valid search 
No. 99-3165-CR 
14 
 
warrant, [2] incident to a lawful arrest, [3] under exigent 
circumstances supported by probable cause to arrest, or [4] with 
the consent of the driver."  Id. at 52 (citations omitted).  See 
also State v. Gibson, 2001 WI App 71, ¶¶8, 10, 242 Wis. 2d 267, 
626 N.W.2d 73; 
State v. 
Marshall, 
2002 WI 
App 73, 251 
Wis. 2d 408, ¶¶7-12, 642 N.W.2d 571. 
D. Exigent Circumstances 
¶27 The 
search 
in 
this 
case 
was 
based 
on 
exigent 
circumstances supported by probable cause.  The United States 
Supreme Court determined in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, that a 
warrantless blood draw from a person arrested for driving while 
intoxicated was authorized under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  
The Supreme Court said: "We are told that the percentage of 
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking 
stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system."  
Id. at 770.  The Court concluded that the dissipation of alcohol 
in the blood stream constituted an emergency because it 
"threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'"  Id. (quoting 
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 
¶28 One of the questions raised by Schmerber was whether 
the exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol in the blood 
stream justifies a warrantless blood draw in every case in which 
there is probable cause to arrest a person for OWI.  Justice 
Brennan, writing for a deeply divided Court, avoided a clear 
answer to that question.  He noted that Schmerber's involuntary 
blood test had been taken in a hospital environment, not a 
No. 99-3165-CR 
15 
 
"station house."  He added that, "Petitioner is not one of the 
few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious 
scruple might prefer some other means of testing, such as the 
'breathalyzer' test petitioner refused."  Id. at 771. 
¶29 The Schmerber opinion skirted such issues as whether 
the state is ever required to obtain a warrant for a lawfully 
arrested person's chemical test for alcohol concentration and 
whether the state is required to respect an arrested person's 
choice among chemical tests. 
¶30 These questions were taken up in State v. Bohling, 173 
Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), in which this court 
expounded on the exigency required for a warrantless blood draw.  
In Bohling, the court examined the following issue: 
 
[W]hether the fact that the percentage of alcohol in a 
person's 
blood 
stream 
rapidly 
diminishes 
after 
drinking stops alone constitutes a sufficient exigency 
[under the relevant constitutional provisions] to 
justify a warrantless blood draw under the following 
circumstances: (1) the blood draw is taken at the 
direction of a law enforcement officer from a person 
lawfully 
arrested 
for 
a 
drunk-driving 
related 
violation 
or 
crime, 
and 
(2) 
there 
is 
a 
clear 
indication that the blood draw will produce evidence 
of intoxication.   
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 533 (emphasis added). 
¶31 This court concluded that under these circumstances, 
"the dissipation of alcohol from a person's blood stream 
constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood 
draw." Id.   
¶32 The court pounded home the point, explaining that 
Schmerber could be read in either of two ways: The rapid 
No. 99-3165-CR 
16 
 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood steam alone constitutes a 
sufficient exigency for a warrantless blood draw to obtain 
evidence of intoxication following a lawful arrest for drunk 
driving; or the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the blood 
stream, coupled with other factors such as an accident, 
hospitalization, and the lapse of two hours, constitutes exigent 
circumstances for a warrantless blood draw.  Id. at 539.  The 
court chose the former interpretation, thereby rejecting a 
requirement that an officer seek a search warrant in the period 
immediately following arrest.13 
¶33 The court stated the test: 
 
[A] warrantless blood sample taken at the direction of 
a law enforcement officer is permissible under the 
following circumstances: (1) the blood draw is taken 
to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person 
lawfully 
arrested 
for 
a 
drunk-driving 
related 
violation or crime, (2) there is a clear indication 
that 
the 
blood 
draw 
will 
produce 
evidence 
of 
intoxication, (3) the method used to take the blood 
sample is a reasonable one and performed in a 
reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw. 
Id. at 533-34. 
¶34 Krajewski attempts to reframe this analysis, asserting 
that Bohling is "not instructive" in deciding this case.  He 
                                                 
13 The court cited a number of court decisions interpreting 
Schmerber to support its conclusion: State v. Bentley, 92 Wis. 
2d 860, 861-62, 286 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1979); United States v. 
Reid, 929 F.2d 990, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1991); State v. Baker, 502 
A.2d 489, 493 (Me. 1985); Gregg v. State, 374 So. 2d 1301, 1302 
(Miss. 1979); State v. Milligan, 748 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Or. 
1988). 
 
State 
v. 
Bohling, 
173 
Wis. 2d 529, 
542-44, 
494 
N.W.2d 399 (1993). 
No. 99-3165-CR 
17 
 
concedes that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in a person's 
bloodstream creates an exigency because it threatens the 
destruction of evidence and that this exigency justifies a 
forcible blood draw when the person refuses to submit to any 
chemical test.  However, he asserts that once the person offers 
to submit to a different chemical test, the exigency disappears 
and the officer may not proceed with an involuntary test without 
a search warrant.  
¶35 Krajewski contends that, absent a search warrant, a 
law enforcement officer has authority to order an involuntary 
blood draw from an arrested person who has requested a different 
chemical test only when: (a) there is not enough time under 
Wis. Stat. § 885.235 to honor the request;14 (b) the person has 
made an unreasonable request for a different chemical test (such 
as a test of chemical deposits on hair); or (c) the person has 
made no request at all for a different chemical test.  A 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235, 
Chemical 
tests 
for 
intoxication, provides in part: 
(1g) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was under the 
influence of an intoxicant or had a prohibited alcohol 
concentration or a specified alcohol concentration 
while 
operating 
or 
driving 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
. . . evidence of the amount of alcohol in the 
person's blood at the time in question, as shown by 
chemical analysis of a sample of the person's blood or 
urine or evidence of the amount of alcohol in the 
person's breath, is admissible on the issue of whether 
he or she was under the influence of an intoxicant or 
had a prohibited alcohol concentration or a specified 
alcohol concentration if the sample was taken within 3 
hours after the event to be proved (emphasis added). 
No. 99-3165-CR 
18 
 
person's "offer to submit to an alternative form of testing" is 
the sine qua non of Krajewski's "dissipating exigency" theory.  
¶36 We reject this analysis.  Krajewski is correct in 
asserting that the relevant basis for exigency here is that 
evidence is likely to be destroyed.  See State v. Smith, 131 
Wis. 2d 220, 230, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).  We do not agree, 
however, that the exigency disappears as soon as a person agrees 
to submit to a breath test as opposed to a blood test.15 
                                                 
15 The circuit court relied heavily on Nelson v. City of 
Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998), for the principle that 
exigent circumstances are negated when a defendant offers to 
submit to a test other than the test requested by law 
enforcement.  Nelson can be distinguished on its facts.  We 
believe that, to the extent its opinion went beyond the special 
facts of the case, the Nelson court was not correct in its 
explanation of exigency. 
Nelson involved a California implied consent statute that 
granted persons arrested for driving while intoxicated the 
choice of which type of sample they would give——a breath, blood, 
or urine sample.  See Cal. Veh. Code § 23157 (1997-98) (current 
version at Cal. Veh. Code § 23162 (2001-2002)); Nelson, 143 F.3d 
at 1201.  The Ninth Circuit determined that no exigent 
circumstances exist justifying the nonconsensual taking of a 
blood sample from a person who agrees to give a different sample 
of his or her choice.  It stated that: 
When an arrestee requests but is denied the choice of 
an available breath or urine test, the exigency used 
to justify the warrantless blood test continues only 
because of the City's failure to perform the requested 
alternative test.  Whenever a DUI arrestee consents to 
a breath or urine test, and such tests are available, 
the administration of either the breath or urine test 
would preserve the evidence and end the exigency. 
Nelson, 143 F.3d at 1205.   
No. 99-3165-CR 
19 
 
¶37 The exigency upon which a warrantless blood draw is 
premised is the dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream.  See 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71; Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539-40.  
An arrested person's offer to submit to one chemical test rather 
than another does not slow this dissipation.  The evidence 
remains on a course to be destroyed. 
¶38 The evidence continues to dissipate during any time 
that elapses while the person is transported from a hospital to 
the site of the instrument for testing breath alcohol.  It 
continues to dissipate during any wait for the arrival of a 
certified instrument operator.  See Wis. Admin. Code § TRANS 
311.  It continues to dissipate if the person conveniently 
regurgitates immediately before the breath test is to be 
administered so that the certified operator must wait for 20 
minutes before the collection of a breath specimen.16  It 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nelson is distinguishable from this case because in Nelson, 
the drivers did not withdraw their consent to give some sample 
under the statute.  They had a statutory right to provide a 
sample of their choice.  Because several of the drivers offered 
to provide precisely what the statute required, in the manner 
the statute required, no exigent circumstances existed to allow 
the officers to require a different type of test.  We believe 
the decision assumes that the drivers will fully cooperate and 
take the tests.  Wisconsin's implied consent law does not grant 
drivers a statutory right to choose which test will be 
administered.  See State v. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, ¶13 n.8, 
247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 N.W.2d 867.  In Wisconsin, a driver 
impliedly consents to take the test requested by a law 
enforcement officer.  When the driver refuses to take that test, 
the driver has withdrawn his or her consent——officers must yield 
to that decision or proceed in a lawful manner outside the 
statute. 
16 Wisconsin Admin. Code § TRANS 311.06 (1997), provides in 
relevant part: 
No. 99-3165-CR 
20 
 
continues to dissipate if the person fails to give a sufficient 
breath specimen and/or if the person has a change of heart and 
refuses altogether to submit to a test. 
¶39 There is no assurance that a person who refuses to 
consent to a blood draw under the implied consent statute and 
refuses to give consent to a blood draw outside the implied 
consent statute will peacefully cooperate with authorities in 
submitting to a breath test.  In State v. Krause, 168 Wis. 2d 
578, 484 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1992), a driver with three OWI 
convictions refused and resisted law enforcement efforts to 
secure a chemical test following his arrest for a fourth drunk 
driving incident.  When the driver learned that the police 
intended to secure a blood sample, he became violently upset, 
stating that he did not "believe in needles" and did not want to 
get AIDS.  At least three sheriff's deputies were required, at 
the hospital, to subdue the driver, placing a pillowcase over 
his head, tying down his feet, and holding his arms while a 
medical technician drew blood.  Id. at 585.  The court upheld 
the reasonableness of the search.  The truth is, the officers 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) Procedures for quantitative breath alcohol 
analysis shall include the following controls in 
conjunction with the testing of each subject: 
(a) Observation by a law enforcement person or 
combination of law enforcement persons, of the test 
subject for a minimum of 20 minutes prior to the 
collection of a breath specimen, during which time the 
test subject did not ingest alcohol, regurgitate, 
vomit or smoke. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
21 
 
would have had equal or greater difficulty obtaining a valid 
breath sample from such a recalcitrant person. 
¶40 The 
exigency that 
exists 
because 
of 
dissipating 
alcohol does not disappear until a satisfactory, useable 
chemical test has been taken.  Securing a breath test rather 
than a blood test may not be satisfactory to law enforcement 
because an officer may want to determine whether the person is 
also under the influence of controlled substances.  Blood 
samples 
are 
the 
most 
direct 
means 
of 
measuring 
alcohol 
concentration in the blood and of obtaining evidence of 
controlled substances in the blood.  A breath test is not likely 
to reveal the presence of a controlled substance.  In 1994 the 
court of appeals reviewed a case in which a driver's blood test 
showed a blood alcohol concentration of only .049% but the 
concurrent presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active 
ingredient in marijuana.17  Having a breath test in hand in that 
instance would not have eliminated the exigency. 
¶41 Even when a person submits to a breath test in lieu of 
a blood test——outside the provisions of the implied consent 
statute——the test may be subject to challenge on grounds that 
the person's consent to the test was not given freely and 
voluntarily.  State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 716, 312 N.W.2d 
                                                 
17 See 
State 
v. 
Sanders, 
No. 
93-2284-CR, 
93-2286-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1994).  Unpublished 
opinions of the court of appeals have no precedential value and 
may not be cited as precedent or authority.  Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.23(3).  This case is cited merely to illustrate a 
potential fact situation. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
22 
 
795 (1981).  The person would likely argue that he or she 
submitted to the breath test because he or she feared needles 
and had no other choice to avoid a blood draw: it was either a 
breath test or the feared needle. 
¶42 A law enforcement officer who arrests a person for 
operating under the influence has three options for obtaining a 
blood sample from the person.  First, the officer may ask the 
person to submit to a blood draw under the implied consent 
statute.  Second, the officer may order a blood draw based upon 
exigent circumstances.  Third, the officer may seek a search 
warrant to secure a blood draw.18  If a person, after refusing a 
blood test under the implied consent statute, could extinguish 
the legal basis for a warrantless blood draw merely by agreeing 
to take a different chemical test, the exigency exception to the 
warrant requirement would turn upon the means used for executing 
the search rather than the urgency involved in the steady 
dissipation of alcohol.  In effect, the arrested person would 
dictate the terms of investigation, limiting the police to a 
single option for a blood test——a search warrant.19 
                                                 
18 In normal circumstances, the officer should pursue the 
first option, requesting and urging a person's cooperation and 
voluntary compliance under the implied consent statute, before 
exploring the other options.  The officer's incentives for 
seeking compliance under the implied consent statute are 
discussed in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 48-50, 403 N.W.2d 
427 (1987). 
19 Obtaining a search warrant to authorize a blood draw may 
present practical difficulties.  The principal difficulty is 
reaching a judge or court commissioner after normal working 
hours.  Many counties have only one judge.  Judges cannot always 
be found at their office or home. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
23 
 
¶43 This is not the law.  This court will not vest drivers 
who have been arrested for operating under the influence with 
the authority to veto constitutional searches to vindicate their 
personal choice in police procedure. 
¶44 The state must show probable cause to arrest a person 
for a drunk driving offense and probable cause to search that 
person for alcohol or controlled substance concentration if the 
state seeks a search warrant for a blood draw.  The exigency 
exception approved in Schmerber requires proof of the same two 
elements, and these elements can be reviewed in a suppression 
hearing following a warrantless search.  Exigency relieves the 
state of the burden of obtaining a warrant before a search.  It 
does not relieve the state of establishing, in a hearing after 
the search, that it met the requirements for a constitutional 
search 
without 
a 
warrant, 
including 
the 
requirement 
of 
reasonableness. 
¶45 Krajewski's arguments do not really bear on exigency.  
They bear on the reasonableness requirements in the third and 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, when a law enforcement officer seeks a warrant 
by telephone under Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(d), either the judge 
or the officer must be at a location with equipment to record 
the proceedings.  This court recently reviewed a case in which 
the authorities inadvertently failed to record a telephone 
application for a warrant.  State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 
Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690. 
In any event, there is no assurance that a drunk driver 
presented with a search warrant will abandon his or her 
resistance and politely submit to a blood test.  As Krajewski 
succinctly put it, he did not want to take a test for alcohol 
concentration because if he did he would be "[expletive]." 
No. 99-3165-CR 
24 
 
fourth prongs of the Bohling test, which the state must satisfy.  
Under these prongs, the state must show that "the method used to 
take the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in a 
reasonable manner," and "the arrestee presents no reasonable 
objection to the blood draw."  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534. 
E.  Reasonableness of Blood Test 
 
¶46 Krajewski does not dispute that a blood draw can be a 
legitimate tool for law enforcement officers in a drunk driving 
case.  Rather, he contends that an involuntary blood draw is 
inadmissible when a person offers "to submit to a less intrusive 
test." 
¶47 Krajewski's argument does not attack the method used 
to secure his blood sample, nor does it suggest a less intrusive 
method of obtaining a blood specimen from him or others.  In 
fact, he offers no objection to the manner in which the blood 
draw was performed in this case.  Krajewski and the State 
stipulated that the blood draw was taken in a hospital by a 
registered nurse.  Thus, the blood draw was effected in a 
reasonable manner.  See State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, ¶15, 
238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240.  In short, Krajewski has no 
complaint under the third prong of the Bohling test. 
F.  No Reasonable Objection 
¶48 Krajewski 
does 
offer 
several 
objections 
to 
his 
involuntary blood draw under the fourth prong.  He contends that 
he had a fear of needles, that he offered to take a breath test, 
that he was entitled to take a "less intrusive" test than a 
blood test when he offered to do so, and that he had a right to 
No. 99-3165-CR 
25 
 
refuse medical treatment.  We address each of these objections 
in turn. 
¶49 The circuit court found that "the defendant asked to 
take a breath test based on fear of needles."  The record does 
not provide evidence that Krajewski explained the basis for his 
alleged fear; but it does provide evidence——in the testimony of 
Sergeant Wallace——that Krajewski was reluctant to take any 
chemical test for alcohol concentration and that he eventually 
submitted to a blood draw without incident.  Consequently, while 
we do not dispute for purposes of this case that Krajewski 
expressed a fear of needles, we see no reason to treat his 
alleged fear as different from an articulated preference for a 
different chemical test. 
¶50 In Krause, the defendant told officers that he did not 
believe in needles and that he did not want to get AIDS.  168 
Wis. 2d at 585.  The court of appeals correctly observed that 
"These isolated comments do not establish that Krause is 'one of 
the few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious 
scruple might prefer some other means of testing.'" Id. at 588 
(citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).20 
                                                 
20 The same conclusion has been reached in other states.  
See Stanger v. Department of Revenue, 780 P.2d 64, 65 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1989); Glazner v. State, 318 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1984); Borgen v. Director of Revenue, 877 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1994); Ruch v. Conrad, 526 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Neb. 1995).  
Pennsylvania courts have consistently rejected the fear-of-
needles justification for refusal.  See Com. D.O.T. Bur. of Dr. 
Lic. v. Mease, 610 A.2d 76, 78 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (citing 
other Pennsylvania cases). 
No. 99-3165-CR 
26 
 
¶51 The implied consent statute limits the viable excuses 
of a medical or physical nature for refusal to submit to a 
chemical test: 
 
The person shall not be considered to have refused the 
test if it is shown by a preponderance of evidence 
that the refusal was due to a physical inability to 
submit to the test due to a physical disability or 
disease unrelated to the use of alcohol, controlled 
substances, controlled substance analogs or other 
drugs. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.c. 
¶52 We think this provision represents a valid standard to 
apply in situations outside the statute.  It is a standard that 
will permit a different chemical test for a person who shows 
that he or she is a hemophiliac or suffers from some other 
ailment that renders him or her unable to reasonably submit to a 
blood test.  Krajewski has not satisfied this standard.  
Ironically, a person who alleges fear of needles to prevent a 
blood draw may in fact be physically unable, as the result of an 
accident, to submit to a breath test.  This is another situation 
in which exigency clearly remains, even after the person offers 
to take a different chemical test. 
¶53 Krajewski objects that it was not reasonable to 
subject him to an involuntary blood draw when he offered to take 
a breath test.  A similar argument was presented in State v. 
Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, 247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 N.W.2d 867, 
where the driver refused the requested blood test and asked if 
he could take a breath test.  The driver ultimately submitted to 
a blood draw but argued later that the blood draw was 
No. 99-3165-CR 
27 
 
unreasonable and unconstitutional.  The court of appeals relied 
upon Bohling and Thorstad to reject the driver's position.  The 
court noted that Wodenjak's offer to take a breath test 
distinguished his case factually from Bohling and Thorstad but 
it concluded that the holdings in those cases still apply when a 
defendant offers to take a different chemical test.  Id. at 561.  
We agree. 
¶54 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(2) 
authorizes 
tests 
of 
"breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining the 
presence or quantity" of alcohol in a person who operates a 
motor vehicle upon Wisconsin highways.  Wisconsin statutes have 
recognized chemical tests for intoxicants since at least the 
late 1940s.  See Wis. Stat. § 85.13(2) (1949-50).  Breath, 
blood, and urine tests are reliable and admissible in evidence.  
See Wis. Stat. § 885.235. 
¶55 In 
enacting 
the 
implied 
consent 
statute, 
the 
legislature authorized a law enforcement officer to request his 
or her choice among these three chemical tests and to request 
more than one chemical test from a person arrested for a drunk 
driving offense.  In the absence of compelling evidence 
otherwise, we must presume that the legislature had good reasons 
for giving law enforcement officers the right to choose among 
chemical tests.  These reasons could include the fact that one 
test may be better able to detect the presence of controlled 
substances than another; one test may be more efficacious as 
evidence before a jury than another; one test may be less 
susceptible to attack in court than another; one test may be 
No. 99-3165-CR 
28 
 
more readily available on any given occasion than another;21 and 
tests taken in a hospital permit observation of an intoxicated 
person by a medical professional before the person is taken to 
jail.  These reasons are equally valid for chemical tests taken 
outside the implied consent statute. 
¶56 We note that in Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, ¶2 n.3, and 
in this case, officers testified that they could not remember 
the two drivers asking for a different chemical test.  Courts in 
both cases accepted the drivers' statements of what they 
requested.  However, many defendants would likely "remember" 
asking for a breath test after submitting to a blood draw if the 
rule proposed by Krajewski were adopted by this court.   
¶57 Blood draws to test for alcohol concentration are so 
commonplace, so accepted, so likely to be reasonable in their 
execution that a person's mere preference for a different test 
cannot be viewed as significant in a constitutional sense. 
¶58 This is also part of the answer to Krajewski's third 
objection, that he was entitled to take a "less intrusive" test 
when he offered to do so.   
                                                 
21 The court of appeals recently considered a case in which 
an officer took a driver to a hospital for a blood test after 
the officer was informed that the county's intoxilizer room was 
not operational.  See State v. Salm, No. 01-2443-FT, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2002).  Unpublished opinions of 
the court of appeals have no precedential value and may not be 
cited as precedent or authority.  Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.23(3).  
This case is cited merely to illustrate a potential fact 
situation. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
29 
 
¶59 Krajewski points to Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 
(1985) for the proposition that a government search should not 
be "more intrusive than reasonably necessary to accomplish its 
goals."  The proposed search in Winston involved surgery under a 
general anesthetic to remove a bullet lodged in a suspect's 
chest.  The Supreme Court concluded that the "magnitude" of the 
intrusion made this "search" unreasonable even though it was 
likely to produce evidence of a crime.  Id. 
¶60 We do not perceive the intrusion here and the 
intrusion in Winston as comparable.  The intrusion in the usual 
blood draw is slight and does not constitute an unreasonable law 
enforcement practice.  It does not threaten the individual's 
safety or health.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly 
refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search 
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."  
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).  
See also U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985); Illinois 
v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
U.S. 433, 447 (1973). 
¶61 Krajewski also objects that he is constitutionally 
entitled to refuse medical treatment if he is willing to submit 
to a breath test.  He cites no authority to support this novel 
proposition, which if accepted, would justify refusal to submit 
to a blood draw both under the Fourth Amendment and the implied 
consent statute.  Considering the long history of authorized 
blood tests in the United States, this objection is meritless.  
We do not accept it.  
No. 99-3165-CR 
30 
 
¶62 To attack the blood test using the Bohling factors, 
Krajewski has made several general objections that could have 
been offered by any driver arrested for operating under the 
influence.  Acceptance of any one of these general objections by 
this court would undercut the implied consent statute and create 
chaotic consequences for enforcement of the law.  The objections 
are artful but they are not reasonable.  The surest way for a 
driver to avoid a blood draw for alcohol concentration is never 
to drink and drive. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 In summary, we reaffirm that the rapid dissipation of 
alcohol in the bloodstream creates an exigency that justifies a 
nonconsensual test of the blood, breath, or urine of a person 
arrested for driving while intoxicated or other similar drunk-
driving related offenses, so long as the test is administered 
pursuant to the factors enumerated in Bohling.  Specifically, 
the blood draw must be taken "to obtain evidence of intoxication 
from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related 
violation or crime," there must be "a clear indication that the 
blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication," the blood 
sample must be taken by a reasonable method and in a reasonable 
manner, and the arrestee must present "no reasonable objection 
to the blood draw."  Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 534.  We further 
hold that a person's agreement to submit to a test of the 
person's choice does not negate the exigency, nor render 
unconstitutional a nonconsensual test of the officer's choice. 
No. 99-3165-CR 
31 
 
¶64 We 
conclude 
from 
the 
facts 
presented 
that 
the 
nonconsensual blood draw administered to Krajewski complied with 
the standards established in Bohling, as it was taken to obtain 
evidence of intoxication after Krajewski was arrested for 
driving while intoxicated, there was probable cause to believe 
that the blood draw would produce evidence of intoxication, the 
blood sample was taken in a reasonable manner, and Krajewski 
presented no reasonable objection.  The blood draw was therefore 
reasonable and constitutional. 
¶65 We therefore affirm the court of appeals decision 
which summarily reversed the circuit court order granting 
Krajewski's motion to suppress the results of the blood test 
administered in this case. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶66 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
sets forth a blanket rule employing the exigent circumstances 
exception allowing forced blood draws in OWI cases.  Such a 
blanket exception to the warrant requirement runs afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment, and renders meaningless the option of ever 
securing a search warrant for an OWI blood draw.  In addition, I 
write separately to clarify any implication in the majority 
opinion that exigent circumstances might exist in cases where it 
is a controlled substance, not alcohol, that allegedly forms the 
basis for an arrest.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶67 In State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 494 
N.W.2d 399 (1993), this court determined in a 4-3 decision that 
exigent circumstances in OWI cases are based "solely on the fact 
that alcohol rapidly dissipates in the bloodstream."  At the 
same time, and somewhat inconsistently, the Bohling court set 
forth four factors that must be satisfied for the police to 
forego a warrant: 
 
(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of 
intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a 
drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is 
a clear indication that the blood draw will produce 
evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take 
the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in 
a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw. 
173 Wis. 2d at 533-34 (footnote omitted). 
¶68 The dissent in Bohling observed that "the majority 
opinion holds that the exigency created by the dissipation of 
alcohol makes seizure of a blood sample without a warrant 
reasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment."  173 Wis. 2d at 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
548 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
Although 
the 
dissent 
acknowledged that the exigent circumstances exception may be 
applied to the seizure of blood, it rejected the Bohling 
majority's 
blanket 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement, 
concluding that law enforcement officers and courts must examine 
the facts on a case-by-case basis to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 549-550. 
¶69 After Bohling, this court devised another blanket 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
based 
on 
exigent 
circumstances.  In State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 425-26, 
511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), the court held that based on the 
destructibility of the evidence, a no-knock search is reasonable 
any time the police have a warrant, supported by probable cause, 
to search a residence for evidence of drug dealing. 
¶70 Subsequently, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 93O 
(1995), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the common law 
knock and announce principles form a part of the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness inquiry.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the Court in Wilson peppered its decision with language warning 
that blanket exceptions to the knock and announce requirement 
were impermissible. 
¶71 After Wilson, this court decided State v. Richards, 
201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996).  The court in Richards 
explained that it took the case to address the vitality of 
Stevens in light of the Supreme Court's warning in Wilson.  Id. 
at 848.  Nonetheless, this court did not heed the warning.  It 
reaffirmed the Stevens rule, holding that exigent circumstances 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
were always present in the execution of search warrants 
involving felonious drug delivery, based in part on the 
potential for the disposal of drugs prior to entry by the 
police.  Id. at 847-48. 
¶72 The 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
promptly 
overturned 
us, 
abrogating the blanket rule.  See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 
U.S. 385 (1997).  The Court concluded that a concurring opinion 
in Richards, not the majority, had correctly stated the law 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 391, 395.  The concurring 
opinion repeated the concerns of the dissent in Bohling, 
emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment requires an assessment of 
reasonableness based on the facts of each particular case.  
Richards, 201 Wis. 2d at 878 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).   
¶73 The Supreme Court's decision in Richards thus calls 
into question the basis for Bohling.  Richards, along with this 
court's statement in Bohling that exigent circumstances in OWI 
cases are based "solely on the fact that alcohol rapidly 
dissipates in the bloodstream," Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539, 
suggests 
that 
Bohling 
embodies 
an 
impermissible 
blanket 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
¶74 This blanket exception in Bohling may have been 
blurred by the court's articulation of the four factors that 
must be satisfied to justify a warrantless blood draw.  At least 
some of these factors suggested that the determination of 
whether a given warrantless search was reasonable remained case-
by-case based on individualized circumstances. 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶75 Today's majority opinion brings Bohling into focus.  
In practice, application of the four factors rarely, if ever, 
results in an individualized determination of reasonableness, 
and the exigent circumstances exception for blood draws in OWI 
cases embodies the type of blanket rule forbidden under 
Richards. 
¶76 The first and second of the four Bohling factors 
amount to no more than probable cause to arrest for drunk 
driving.  However, probable cause is already a requirement under 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  
See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621. 
¶77 The third factor has been held to be satisfied by any 
taking of blood in a "medical setting" or "medical environment."  
State v. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, ¶12, 247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 
N.W.2d 867, review denied, 2001 WI 117, 247 Wis. 2d 1036, 635 
N.W.2d 784 (unpublished table decision); State v. Thorstad, 2000 
WI App 199, ¶15, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240, review denied, 
2000 WI 121, 239 Wis. 2d 310, 619 N.W.2d 93 (unpublished table 
decision).  In reality then, the blood draw will satisfy this 
factor in virtually all cases. 
¶78 Thus, the fourth factor is the only one that might 
seem to suggest that warrantless blood draws in OWI cases would 
remain subject to a case-by-case, particularized reasonableness 
determination as required by the Fourth Amendment.  However, the 
majority has eviscerated that factor today.   
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶79 The majority adopts the statutory standard for refusal 
under the implied consent statute as the constitutional standard 
for a reasonable objection.  Majority op. at ¶¶51-52.  Under 
this standard, the only reasonable objection is a physical 
inability to submit to the test.  This standard leaves no room 
for, among other things, a legitimate objection based on 
religious grounds.  Thus, only in the most rare of cases will 
the fourth factor ever preclude a warrantless blood draw. 
¶80 Any veil of uncertainty created by disparate language 
within Bohling is lifted by the majority opinion.  Under the 
majority's 
opinion, 
if 
not 
also 
before 
it, 
the 
exigent 
circumstances exception for blood draws in OWI cases is a 
blanket rule that runs afoul of Richards. 
¶81 Moreover, the majority's blanket rule runs afoul of 
its own framework.  The majority opinion states that a law 
enforcement officer who arrests a person for operating under the 
influence has "three options for obtaining a blood sample," one 
of which is that the officer "may seek a search warrant to 
secure a blood draw."  Majority op. at ¶42.  However, because an 
officer may now obtain a forced blood draw without a warrant in 
virtually every case where the suspect refuses the test, the 
availability of this third "option" is rendered meaningless. 
¶82 Finally, I note that the majority opinion discusses 
obtaining a blood draw to test for controlled substances.  The 
majority states:  "Securing a breath test rather than a blood 
test may not be satisfactory to law enforcement because an 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
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officer may want to determine whether the person is also under 
the influence of controlled substances."  Majority op. at ¶40. 
¶83 The majority's discussion referencing testing for 
controlled substances needs clarification to the extent it might 
be interpreted as an endorsement of any future application of 
the exigent circumstances exception to testing for controlled 
substances. 
¶84 First, to the extent the majority's discussion of 
controlled substances makes such a suggestion, it is dicta.  The 
case before us did not involve any alleged controlled substance 
use. 
¶85 Second, and more importantly, any suggestion that the 
exigent circumstances exception should apply to testing for 
controlled substances is inapposite to the emergency nature of 
the exception.  Citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770-71 (1966), the majority emphasizes that the "dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood stream constituted an emergency because it 
threatened the destruction of evidence."  Majority op. at ¶27 
(internal quotations omitted). 
¶86 The same purported threat of rapid destruction of 
evidence 
may 
not 
be 
present 
when 
considering 
controlled 
substances.  Indeed, evidence of controlled substance use 
generally dissipates much more slowly from the body than 
evidence of alcohol use.  See State v. Jones, 895 P.2d 643, 644 
(Nev. 1995); Emily J. Sovell, State v. Hanson:  Has the Exigent 
Circumstances Exception to the Warrant Requirement Swallowed the 
Rule?, 45 S.D. L. Rev. 163, 185 (2000). 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
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¶87 In sum, the majority opinion sets forth a blanket rule 
under the exigent circumstances exception allowing warrantless 
blood draws in OWI cases.  Because the Fourth Amendment does not 
countenance such a blanket rule, I respectfully dissent. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissent 
 
 
 
No.  99-3165-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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