Case Title: FITZPATRICK v CRIST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12746 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE S T A T E O F M O N T A N A 1974 BERNARD J A M E S FITZPATRICK , Petitioner, ROGER W. CRIST, WARDEN MONTANA S T A T E PRISON, Respondent. Counsel of Record: For Petitioner: David J. Patterson, argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted : November 12, 1974 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court. On April 15, 1972, petitioner Bernard Fitzpatrick and on April 17, 1972, one Gus Gardner were arrested for the murder of a fellow inmate a t the Montana S t a t e Prison i n Deer Lodge, Montana. During the t r i a l on February 28, 1973, Gardner was granted a directed verdict of not g u i l t y , but p e t i t i o n e r w a s convicted of second degree murder and sentenced t o a term of twenty years, t o be served consecutively with t h e f i v e year term he was serving a t the time of h i s a r r e s t . Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged c e r t a i n evidentiary matters upon appeal t o t h i s Court, which affirmed h i s conviction on December 4, 1973. S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, Mont . , 516 P.2d 605, 30 St.Rep. 1052. On April 22, 1974, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d pro se a "Petition f o r W r i t of Habeas corpus" with t h i s Court. Among other things, he alleged t h e d i s t r i c t court prejudiced h i s r i g h t s by f a i l i n g t o make timely appointment of counsel; t o arraign him i n t h e manner required by law; o r t o grant him a speedy ttial as demanded. On t h e same day t h i s Court issued ail order r e f e r r i n g the p e t i t i o n t o the Montana Defender Project i n order t h a t it ascertain the v a l i d i t y of p e t i t i o n e r ' s allegations and take appropriate action. The Montana Defender Project i s a c l i n i c a l l e g a l a i d program supervised by t h e University of Montana Law School and s t a f f e d by senior law students. Professor David J. Patterson and student Ken Green spent several months investigating p e t i t i o n e r ' s claims and from prison records, l e t t e r s , and the l i k e , were a b l e t o construct a f a c t u a l framework s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t h i s Court f o r the purpose of a c t i n g upon the petition. Finally, it was agreed among a l l concerned t h a t i n order t o expedite matters t h i s proceeding would be considered a post-conviction hearing, (See Chapter 26, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, Sections 95-2601-2608), r a t h e r than an application f o r habeas corpus under t h e Montana Rules of Criminal Procedure. The b r i e f s with attached exhibits submitted i n p e t i t i o n e r ' s lehalf by t h e Montana Defender Project bring t o l i g h t these events: After h i s "arrest" on April 15, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r w a s taken t o a segregation c e l l within t h e main walls of t h e prison. Three days l a t e r a complaint charging murder was issued and an i n i t i a l hearing was held i n the deputy warden's office. Petitioner and Gardner were informed of t h e i r r i g h t s , including t h e r i g h t t o appointed counsel. Petitioner requested appointed counsel a t t h a t t i m e . On April 26, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r was transferred from h i s segre- gation c e l l t o a maximum security c e l l (one used f o r disciplinary purposes) where he stayed u n t i l July 19, 1972. On May 4, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r sent a l e t t e r t o the Honorable Sid Stewart, then d i s t r i c t judge of t h e t h i r d j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , re- questing a court appointed attorney. While awaiting word on t h i s request, p e t i t i o n e r had h i s wife contact t h e l a w firm of Sandall, Moses 6 Cavan of Billings, Montana, about the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e - presenting him and Gardner. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r , D. Frank Kampfe, Esq., of t h a t firm, made an appointment t o v i s i t p e t i t i o n e r t o discuss the case and make f e e arrangements. On May 18, 1972, William Taylor, Esq., of Deer Lodge v i s i t e d p e t i t i o n e r a t the prison. Apparently Taylor was sent by Judge Stewart i n response t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s l e t t e r of May 4. After d i s - cussing the case with p e t i t i o n e r , Taylor advised petitioner he would not represent him. Kampfe v i s i t e d p e t i t i o n e r and Gardner a t t h e prison on May 30, 1972. Gardner paid Kampfe $800 a s a r e t a i n e r and informed him t h a t he (Gardner) might be a b l e t o r a i s e t h e money needed t o represent both defendants. Petitioner claimed an i n a b i l i t y t o pay anything. On July 5 , 1972, Kampfe withdrew from the case because of a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t within h i s law firm. He returned $700 t o Gardner, keeping t h e other $100 f o r t i m e and expenses incurred i n making the v i s i t t o t h e prison. Kampfe a l s o advised t h e Montana Defender Project of the case and asked t h a t defendants be contacted a s soon a s possible. On July 12, 1972, t h e Montana Defender Project n o t i f i e d pep titioner t h a t t h e Defender Project did not represent anyone a t t h e trial level. Professor Patterson, however, offered t o keep p e t i t i o n e r advised of the proceedings against him and informed him of h i s r i g h t t o court appointed counsel. On July 15, 1972, three months a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , p e t i t i o n e r was s t i l l i n maximum security and without the a i d of counsel. On t h i s date, i n a l e t t e r t o t h e Montana Defender Project, peti- tioner expressed h i s disappointment with the project's i n a b i l i t y t o represent him and mentioned h i s d i f f i c u l i t i e s i n g e t t i n g l e g a l assistance; h i s confinement i n maximum security since April; and, h i s ignorance of t h e situation. He closed with a plea t o have 1 I someone from t h e ~ e f e n d e r ' s Project come down and t a l k t o us and let u s know j u s t what i s going on. I I On July 25, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r sent these papers t o the d i s t r i c t court : I. A motion t o f i l e and proceed i n forma pauperis; 2. A motion f o r appointment of counsel; 3. A demand f o r s p e e e t r i a l ; and 4. A motion t o dismiss. A l l of these papers were received and f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court on July 27, 1972. On August 22, 1972, over four months (126 days) a f t e r the i n i t i a l appearance, p e t i t i o n e r ' s preliminary hearing began. Peti- tioner t e s t i f i e d he w a s indigent and requested appointed counsel. The hearing therefore w a s continued f o r a week t o allow appointment of counsel. The s t a t e , however, did take depositions of four major witnesses then present. On August 24, 1972, Judge Stewart appointed James J. Masar, Esq., of Deer Lodge t o represent petitioner. From t h e i n i t i a l hearing, where p e t i t i o n e r f i r s t requested appointment of counsel, t o the a c t u a l appointment there was a delay of over four months (128 days). On August 28, 1972, t h e preliminary hearing was completed. The order binding petitioner and Gardner over t o t h e d i s t r i c t court f o r t r i a l was issued on October 4 , 1972, and the Information against them was f i l e d on October 12, 1972. The t r i a l of both defendants began on February 26, 1973, and lasted two days. From the date of the demand f o r speedy t r i a l t o the date of the t r i a l over seven months (216 days) had elapsed. In l i g h t of the above facts, petitioner contends: 1. The four month delay between the i n i t i a l hearing and the preliminary hearing violated section 95-902, R.C.M. 1947. 2. The four month delay i n the appointment of counsel de- prived petitioner of h i s right t o effective counsel. 3. The seven month delay between the demand for speedy t r i a l and the t r i a l deprived petitioner of h i s right t o a speedy t r i a l . A t the outset it should be observed that we are proceeding on the assumption petitioner has not waived these issues, despite h i s failure t o r a i s e them e a r l i e r . W e do not reject the general proposition that such questions should be interposed a s promptly a s possible, but only say that the unusual facts of t h i s case make a clear cut determination of waiver d i f f i c u l t . Unless there i s substantial evidence of waiver, constitutional claims must be heard on t h e i r merits. The basic right t o counsel i s firmly established by the United States and Montana Constitutions and the Montana Code of Criminal Procedure. The narrow issue here i n when t h i s right attaches and whether a four month delay i n the appointment of counsel, while the defendant i s confined i n maximum security, renders counsel in- effective. W e are convinced that under both federal and Montana law petitioner's right t o appointed counsel attached no l a t e r than h i s i n i t i a l hearing; that petitioner did not waive h i s right t o appointed counsel; and that the delay i n the appointment of counsel was prejudicial t o petitioner's case. Our law provides that any arrested person must be brought without unnecessary delay before a judge for an i n i t i a l appearance, and that it is the duty of that judge t o advise defendant of h i s right t o counsel, and of h i s right t o have counsel assigned by a court of record. Sections 95-901 and 95-902, R.C.M. 1947. Obviously the court's duty cannot end with a mere reading of his rights to defendant; if defendant requests counsel to be appointed the court without unnecessary delay must determine indigency and appoint counsel accordingly. How can this duty be fulfilled by delaying the appointment of counsel for four months while the state prepares its case and the defendant lingers in a prison or a jail? The length of the delay here, coupled with petitioner's plight during the interim, shocks one's concept of fundamental fairness and due process. Federal cases compel the same result. See: Escobedo v, Illinois, 378 U . S . 478, 84 S,Ct. 1758, 12 L ed 2d977; United States v . Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1 8 L ed 2d 1149. Our holding on the issue of delay in appointing counsel for petitioner is buttressed by a showing of actual prejudice. One defense petitioner raised at trial was that of alibi. The delay saw a release from the state prison of many potential alibi witnesses and caused a loss of memory in those who remained, On April 15, 1972, the date of petitioner's arrest, the section of the prison to which petitioner was assigned contained 112 inmates, By August 24, 1972, the date counsel was appointed, 65 of these inmates had been released. This turnover of inmates seriously undermined counsel's ability to conduct interviews to see who could verify petitioner's alibi. Another defense concerned the interchange and labeling of prisoner clothing. Introduced in evidence at trial were three articles of blood stained clothing. Only one of these articles-- a pair of prison issued levis--bore petitioner's name. Petitioner contends that on the day of his arrest he could account for all the lev* issued to him, but the *l$y in appointing counsel made it impossible for his attorney to investigate and prove such a contention. Unquestionably, the deprivation of counsel for four months rendered these defenses virtually meaningless. W e also believe the seven month delay between the demand for speedy t r i a l and the t r i a l i t s e l f violated petitioner's r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The United Sta tes and the Montana Constitutions guarantee an accused the right t o a speedy t r i a l . The United States Supreme Court and t h i s Court have adopted essentially the same t e s t I t t o determine whether a t r i a l i s speedy". Compare Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, with State v. Lagerquist, 152 Mont. 21, 445 P.2d 910. Barker describes t h i s t e s t a s a balancing t e s t "in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." It identifies the factors involved as : 1. Length of delay; 2. Reason for delay; 3. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s assertion of the right; and 4. Prejudice t o defendant. Applying t h i s t e s t t o the instant case, we find: Length of delay: Seven months. W e emphasize t h i s delay is not considered a per - se violation of petitioner's right t o a speedy t r i a l , but under the circumstances here i t is thought long enough t o s h i f t t o the s t a t e the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice t o petitioner. Reason for delay: The s t a t e ' s contention that it took much t i m e t o gather and analyze the evidence used against petitioner a t h i s t r i a l i s unsatisfactory because the record here explains t h i s caused no more than two and one-half months of the delay. Moreover, the evidence gathering process started before petitioner demanded a speedy t r i a l . It i s not seriously contended that petitioner or h i s counsel contributed t o the delay. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s assertion of the right: petitioner's written demand for speedy t r i a l seven months before h i s trial began is a matter of record. Prejudice t o defendant: Barker explained what lay a t the heart of t h i s fourth factor: "* * * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: ( i ) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, be- cause the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappearduring a delay, the pre- 'udice is obvious. There is also prejudice ii defense iitnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always retlected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. " (Emphasis added). To the same effect is State v . Mielke, 148 Mont. 320, 322, 420 P.2d 155, citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L ed 2d 627. We think petitioner was clearly prejudiced with respect to all three interests discussed in Barker. First, when petitioner was arrested he was serving a sentence at the "honor farm" of the state prison, but thereafter he was placed in maximum security for over three months. Without more, the state merely asserts such con- finement was lawful and necessary. This is hardly sufficient to carry the state's burden. Second, petitioner's predicament maximized, rather than minimized, his anxiety and concern. This is amply demonstrated by his letter of July 15, 1972, to the Montana Defender Project and by his motion for speedy trial of July 27, 1972, wherein he alleged physical and mental anguish of such a nature as to inhibit him from assisting in his own defense. The state's position that any man accused of a serious crime will suffer some anxiety and concern and that minimization of these emotions is largely subject to individual quirks of personality utterly fails to come to grips with the stark realities here. Third, what has already been said about the delay in appointment of counsel impairing petitioner's alibi defense applies even more strongly to the problem of speedy trial, since petitioner's trial was delayed another six months after counsel was finally appointed. From the foregoing, it is plain the state by its unexcused inaction deprived petitioner of effective representation by counsel and a speedy trial. Since we have decided the case on these issues, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether section 95-902, R . C . M . 1947, was violated. The judgment of conviction of February 28, 1973, is-set aside and the sentence vacated, with prejudice. ..................................... Chief Justice We Concur: Justices.