Case Title: Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association v. Skinner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200132

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: October 22, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
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1200132
____________________
Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association
v.
Suzanne Peoples Skinner
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-17-901787)
MITCHELL, Justice.
After a fire at James and Suzanne Skinner's house, their insurer
sought a judgment declaring that it did not owe either of them coverage. 
1200132
The circuit court entered summary judgment for Suzanne while the claim
against James remained pending.  A year later, with the claim against
James still pending, the circuit court certified the judgment in Suzanne's
favor as final and thus immediately appealable under Rule 54(b), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  Because the circuit court exceeded its discretion in doing so, we
set aside the Rule 54(b) certification and dismiss this appeal. 
Facts and Procedural History
In November 2016, a fire damaged the Skinners' house in
Chunchula.  The Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association ("AIUA"),
which insured the house, investigated the fire and came to believe that it
was caused by arson.  AIUA further concluded that James Skinner and
Don Dockery were the only two people in the house when the fire began,
and thus the only two possible arsonists.  
AIUA filed a complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court against the
Skinners and Dockery, claiming alternatively that: (1) if James started
the fire, neither Suzanne nor James was owed coverage under their
insurance policy; and (2) if Dockery started the fire, he owed damages to
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AIUA to compensate it for its outlay in covering the Skinners' loss.  The
parties later agreed to dismiss Dockery from the case.
Suzanne moved for summary judgment, contending that even if her
husband James had started the fire, his guilt had no bearing on AIUA's
coverage obligation to her.  The circuit court agreed, ruling that: (1) the
language of the insurance policy did not exclude coverage to Suzanne
based on the alleged arson of James acting alone; and (2) to the extent the
policy purported to do so, that exclusion was void as against public policy
under Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, 363 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978). 
Accordingly, the circuit court entered summary judgment for Suzanne.  A
year later, with the claim against James's estate still pending,1 the circuit
court -- on its own initiative and without explanation -- certified the
summary judgment in favor of Suzanne as final under Rule 54(b).  AIUA
timely appealed to this Court.
1James died during the course of this litigation.  His estate was
substituted for him as a defendant.
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Standard of Review
We review the certification of a judgment as final under Rule 54(b)
to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.  Cox v.
Parrish, 292 So. 3d 312, 315 (Ala. 2019).
Analysis
As a threshold matter, we must address whether the circuit court
exceeded its discretion in authorizing this appeal.  This Court will
scrutinize the propriety of Rule 54(b) certifications even in cases where no
party addresses this "fundamental issue."  Summerlin v. Summerlin, 962
So. 2d 170, 172 (Ala. 2007); see also Cox, 292 So. 3d at 315;  Wright v.
Harris, 280 So. 3d 1040, 1043 (Ala. 2019); Richardson v. Chambless, 266
So. 3d 684, 686 (Ala. 2018).  Here, Suzanne argues that the certification
was improper, and AIUA offers no defense of the circuit court's action. 
We agree with Suzanne.  A trial court may certify as final a
judgment disposing of one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties
in an action, if it determines that there is no just reason for delay in
enabling an appeal.  Rule 54(b).  But, as this Court has repeatedly
emphasized, Rule 54(b) provides only a narrow exception to the "policy
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disfavoring appellate review in a piecemeal fashion."  Smith v. Slack Alost
Dev. Servs. of Alabama, LLC, 32 So. 3d 556, 562-63 (Ala. 2009). 
Accordingly, "Rule 54(b) certifications should be entered only in
exceptional cases."  Wright, 280 So. 3d at 1047 (citing Dzwonkowski v.
Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363 (Ala. 2004)).  
Piecemeal appeals are particularly inappropriate when the issues on
appeal may be mooted by resolution of the remaining claims.  See, e.g.,
Cox, 292 So. 3d at 315-16; Richardson, 266 So. 3d at 687-88; Lighting Fair,
Inc. v. Rosenberg, 63 So. 3d 1256, 1264-65 (Ala. 2010).  And that is the
case here.  The circuit court's summary judgment holds that Suzanne is
owed coverage even if James started the fire.  That holding makes a
difference only if, in its still-pending claim against James's estate, AIUA
establishes that James did start the fire.  On the other hand, if AIUA
cannot prove that, then it will not matter if the circuit court erred in
granting Suzanne's motion for summary judgment; Suzanne will be owed
coverage anyway.
In Richardson, this Court held that a near-identical relationship
between claims was "dispositive" against Rule 54(b) certification.  266
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So. 2d at 689.  There, the plaintiff had originally sued one defendant on
claims arising from an allegedly faulty home inspection and later
amended his complaint to add a fraudulent-transfer claim against another
defendant.  See id. at  685-86.  The circuit court entered summary
judgment for the latter defendant and certified it under Rule 54(b).  Id. at
686.  But this Court set the certification aside and dismissed the appeal,
reasoning that if the original defendant later prevailed against the
plaintiff on the claims against him, the fraudulent-transfer claim would
necessarily fail too.  Id. at 689-90.
Here, as in Richardson, "it is readily apparent that future
developments in the trial court" could moot the issues presented in this
appeal.  Id. at 689-90.  Neither the circuit court nor the parties have
pointed to any considerations to overcome this " 'major negative in the
Rule 54(b) equation.' "  Lighting Fair, 63 So. 3d at 1265 (quoting Spiegel
v. Trustees of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1988)).  Indeed, as
mentioned, the circuit court gave no reasons for its sua sponte
certification, and no party offers any reasons in defense of that action.  We
see nothing in the record to suggest that this case is one of the exceptional
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instances in which a piecemeal appeal might be appropriate.  We therefore
conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the
summary judgment for Suzanne as final for purposes of appeal.
Conclusion
We set aside the Rule 54(b) certification of the summary judgment
and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  See Dzwonkowski, 892
So. 2d at 363 ("A nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal.").  In
doing so, we express no opinion about the merits of the judgment or the
legal issues involved.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
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