Case Title: LaMarre v. Town of China

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021 ME 45

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2021 ME 45 
Docket: 
Ken-20-134 
Argued: 
 March 10, 2021 
Decided: 
 September 16, 2021 
 
Panel: 
 MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
KIMBERLY LAMARRE et al. 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF CHINA et al. 
 
 
CONNORS, J. 
 
[¶1]  The Town of China code enforcement officer (CEO) issued Nicholas 
Namer an after-the-fact permit to allow the placement of a trailer on his lot.  
Kimberly and Anthony LaMarre, abutters, objected, arguing that the trailer was 
not a “recreational vehicle” (RV) within the meaning of the Town of China’s 
Land Use Ordinance allowing such placement.  The Board of Appeals affirmed.  
The Superior Court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) reversed.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80B.  
The Town and Namer appeal to us from that reversal.  Because the operative 
decision of the CEO is deficient for purposes of judicial review, we remand for 
the CEO to issue a reviewable decision, based on record evidence, after 
proceeding in a manner that meets the minimum requirements of 
administrative due process. 
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND1 
A. 
The Permit 
[¶2]  Namer owns a lot with five seasonal camps in China.  In June and 
July 2018, Namer cleared trees and vegetation, installed a gravel pad, and 
placed a “Park Model” trailer on the pad without obtaining a permit.  The CEO 
apparently issued a notice of violation to Namer and his mother, Marie 
Bourque-Namer, in late July 2018.  The CEO later rescinded the notice of 
violation on the grounds that the trailer’s placement complied with the Town’s 
Land Use Ordinance2 and issued an after-the-fact permit.  The LaMarres 
objected to the trailer’s placement and sought review by the Board of Appeals 
of the CEO’s decision.3 
                                         
1  We draw the factual background from the undisputed facts and the procedural record.  See Fair 
Elections Portland, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2021 ME 32, ¶ 11, 252 A.3d 504. 
2  The Town of China Land Development Code contains three chapters relevant to this appeal: 
Chapter 2, Land Use Ordinance; Chapter 9, Appeals; and Chapter 11, Definitions.  For purposes of this 
opinion, we refer to the relevant provisions of the Land Development Code as “the Ordinance.” 
3  More specifically—and confusingly—the CEO stated that in the spring of 2018, he “verbally 
approved” the location of the trailer.  In late July that year, the CEO issued a notice of violation to 
Namer and Bourque-Namer for failing to obtain a permit.  The notice of violation is not included in 
the record, and nothing in the record indicates that this notice was ever in writing.  The record 
includes an email from Bourque-Namer to the CEO dated July 26, 2018, in which she stated that she 
was disturbed by his “assertion” that she violated the Ordinance.  In the email, Bourque-Namer makes 
factual assertions about the trailer, indicates that the CEO had commented that it was a “mobile 
home,” and compares the trailer to other models.  She further stated that she remembered discussing 
the issue “at the time of [their] walkthrough and had pictures on [her] cell phone to show [him]” and 
that she had “ask[ed] [him] for something in writing and [he] asserted that it wasn’t necessary.”  On 
August 8, 2018, Kimberly LaMarre and another abutter complained, stating that they understood 
that the Namers had been told to remove the trailer.  In a “decision” memorialized in writing on 
August 9, 2018, the CEO apparently rescinded his notice of violation.  On August 15, 2018, 
 
 
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B. 
The Ordinance 
[¶3]  The Ordinance allows for “[i]ndividual private campsites,” China, 
Me., Land Development Code, ch. 2, § 5(P)(II) (Apr. 6, 2019), which are defined 
as “[a]ny premises providing temporary accommodation in a recreational 
vehicle or tent and used exclusively by the owner of the property and his or her 
family and friends,” id., ch. 11 (Apr. 6, 2019).  Prior to establishing such a 
campsite, “[a] permit is required from the CEO.”  Id., ch. 2, § 5(P)(II)(h).  The 
Ordinance defines “recreational vehicle” as 
[a] vehicle or an attachment to a vehicle designed to be 
towed, and designed for temporary sleeping or living quarters for 
one or more persons, and which may include a pick-up camper, 
travel trailer, tent trailer, camp trailer, and motor home.  In order 
to be considered as a vehicle and not as a structure, the unit must 
remain with its tires on the ground, and must be registered with 
the State Division of Motor Vehicles. 
Id., ch. 11. 
                                         
Bourque-Namer applied for an after-the-fact permit for the trailer, which the CEO issued on 
August 21, 2018.  Almost a year later, in July 2019, the LaMarres met with the town manager to follow 
up on their complaints.  By this time, there was a new CEO, who told them that a permit had been 
issued but that “the Town was investigating that decision.”  Following a site visit on July 8, 2019, the 
new CEO then orally told the LaMarres that he agreed with the first CEO’s decision to grant the permit 
and that the LaMarres could appeal “this decision” to the Board.  The LaMarres filed their appeal with 
the Board on August 6, 2019, within thirty days after this oral communication. 
 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
The Operative Decision Is That of the CEO. 
[¶4]  If the scope of the Board’s review is de novo, we review the Board’s 
decision on appeal; if, however, the scope of the Board’s review is appellate, we 
review the CEO’s decision directly.  See Mills v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 134, 
¶¶ 13-16, 955 A.2d 258. 
[¶5]  In the absence of ordinance language explicitly providing for 
appellate review, by statute, the Board’s review of the CEO’s decision is de novo.  
30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(C) (2021); Mills, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 14, 955 A.2d 258.  The 
relevant ordinance language here provides: 
Scope of Review: The Board of Appeals may reverse the 
determination of the Planning Board or the Code Enforcement 
Officer if it determines that either: 
 
a. Any finding of fact is unsupported by substantial evidence 
and/or; 
 
b. Any conclusion of law is clearly erroneous. 
 
China, Me., Land Development Code, ch. 9, § 2(B)(IV) (June 1, 1996).  This 
language is similar to ordinance language that we have previously held 
 
 
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provides for appellate review.  See Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 
2005 ME 22, ¶ 11, 868 A.2d 151.  We therefore review the decision of the CEO.4 
B. 
The CEO Did Not Issue a Judicially Reviewable Decision. 
[¶6]  It is black letter law that meaningful judicial review of a decision 
requires that the decision contain findings of fact sufficient to apprise the 
reviewing court of the decision’s basis and that those findings be based on 
substantial evidence in the record.  See Mills, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 19, 955 A.2d 258; 
Chapel Rd. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Town of Wells, 2001 ME 178, ¶¶ 9-10, 787 A.2d 137.  
The administrative record here does not contain a CEO decision with 
reviewable findings of fact based on record evidence. 
[¶7]  Among the records of the activity before the CEO, see supra n.3, the 
most likely candidate for the relevant decision for review is the issuance of the 
after-the-fact permit.  But that permit is merely that—a permit.  It provides only 
that the CEO is authorizing Namer to “locate a camper pursuant to the 
                                         
4  Before the Board hearing, there was some uncertainty as to whether its review would be de novo 
or appellate.  The Board decision itself does not recite the standard of review it applied, and it is 
unclear whether the Board in fact undertook a de novo or appellate review.  Although we have 
previously noted that “[a] town need not use particular language, such as the word ‘appellate’ in 
establishing appellate review” and that “[w]e have on numerous occasions construed an ordinance 
that did not use the word ‘appellate’ to nonetheless require the appeals board to undertake appellate, 
rather than de novo, review,” Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine, 2020 ME 70, ¶ 15, 234 A.3d 214, 
to avoid confusion and uncertainty, we strongly encourage municipalities to use clear language, such 
as expressly including the terms “de novo” and “appellate,” when drafting their ordinances. 
 
 
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application and site plan” and contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law.  
Accordingly, the permit “is insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate 
review.”  Appletree Cottage, LLC v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 177, ¶ 10, 
169 A.3d 396. 
[¶8]  Despite the fact that the LaMarres’ Board appeal identifies the 
decision being appealed as the issuance of the permit, the decision on which the 
parties and the Board have focused is the CEO’s rescission of the notice of 
violation.  Presumably, the parties have done so because this is the only CEO 
position stated in writing and that includes some analysis and statements 
labeled “findings.”  But there is no reviewable record associated with this 
rescission decision. 
[¶9]  The after-the-fact permit was issued pursuant to an application that 
includes evidentiary material, such as a photograph of the trailer.  This material 
cannot provide a reviewable record for the recission, however, because the 
CEO’s decision rescinding the notice of violation was issued a week before that 
permit application was even filed.  The recission decision itself simply states 
that the rescission is “due to new information that [the CEO] discovered when 
meeting with the Namers on 8-7-18 and more carefully investigating facts and 
Ordinance requirements.”  There is no identification of what this “new 
 
 
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information” was, or what other material the CEO reviewed in his investigation 
of the facts.  This is not sufficient to provide a record for appellate review.  See 
Appletree Cottage, LLC, 2017 ME 177, ¶¶ 9-10, 169 A.3d 396. 
[¶10]  In sum, because there appears to be no CEO decision with findings 
of fact tethered to a reviewable record, we must remand. 
C. 
A Remand to the CEO Is Often Necessary when Board of Appeals 
Review Is Appellate. 
[¶11]  This difficulty in identifying a reviewable CEO decision is not 
unusual, and we have remarked on it before.  See id. ¶ 12 n.6 (“[O]rdinances 
governing a CEO’s review of and action on a permit application may not provide 
a mechanism for creating a record adequate for appellate review.”). 
[¶12]  In the vast majority of local permitting processes, an applicant 
seeks a permit, the CEO grants or denies it based on the application, and that is 
the end of the matter, with no appeal.  A two-fold problem arises, however, 
when someone objects to a permit and the scope of the Board’s review is 
appellate. 
[¶13]  First, often by the time interested persons, such as abutters, learn 
of the issuance of a permit to which they object, the decision has already been 
 
 
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made by the CEO based on whatever information the applicant submitted.5  If 
objectors cannot submit their opposing evidence to the Board—a material 
distinction between de novo and appellate review—then they are deprived of 
a critical component of administrative due process.  See Town of Ogunquit v. Cliff 
House & Motels, Inc., 2000 ME 169, ¶ 11, 759 A.2d 731 (stating that the essential 
elements of adjudication include the right to present evidence and rebut 
opposing evidence). 
[¶14]  Second, courts, planning boards, and some boards of appeals 
adjudicate; that is their function.  In contrast, adjudication is not a usual CEO 
task.  Unsurprisingly, when an objection by an interested person comes to the 
attention of a CEO during the permitting process, the CEO is unfamiliar with the 
minimum requirements of due process and the prerequisites for preparing a 
record and a decision sufficient for meaningful appellate review. 
                                         
5  There is no statutory requirement for a CEO to notify abutters of permit applications.  See Viles 
v. Town of Embden, 2006 ME 107, ¶ 12, 905 A.2d 298.  The Ordinance did not impose any such 
requirement either.  Given the lack of clear notice to the LaMarres as to what was happening before 
the CEO with respect to their objections, the Board voted to allow the LaMarres to file their appeal 
after the time period set forth in the Ordinance.  Because the Ordinance itself does not contain a 
good-cause provision extending the filing deadline with the Board, the decision whether good cause 
existed to extend that deadline was one for the Superior Court, not the Board, to make, see id. ¶ 9, and 
we would review the Superior Court’s decision subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard as to the 
court’s determination of the existence of good cause and a clearly erroneous standard as to the 
court’s factual findings.  See id. ¶ 9; Otis v. Town of Sebago, 645 A.2d 3, 4-5 (Me. 1994).  The Superior 
Court here, after looking at the evidence submitted to the Board on this issue, concluded that good 
cause existed.  No one has challenged this good-cause determination. 
 
 
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[¶15]  For these reasons, in order to avoid the frequent necessity of 
time-consuming and costly remands, we strongly urge municipalities to 
provide for de novo review of CEO decisions by boards of appeals.  Because the 
Ordinance here provides for appellate review, China, Me., Land Development 
Code, ch. 9, § 2(B)(IV), we must remand for the CEO to issue a reviewable 
decision.  See Appletree Cottage, LLC, 2017 ME 177, ¶ 12, 169 A.3d 396.  The 
evidence upon which the CEO makes his decision must be identified and 
contained in the record.  See Mills, 2008 ME 134, ¶¶ 19-20, 955 A.2d 258.  
Namer and the LaMarres must be permitted to submit their evidence and rebut 
each other’s evidence, no substantive ex parte communications with the CEO 
should take place, and the CEO’s decision must include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law sufficient to understand the basis for that decision.  See 
id. ¶ 20. 
D. 
On Remand, the CEO Should Consider the Evidence in Light of the 
Language of the Ordinance as a Whole. 
[¶16]  Finally, in assessing the evidence submitted on remand, the CEO 
should consider the following when interpreting the Ordinance.6 
                                         
6  The parties argue that a remand is not necessary because the question whether the trailer is an 
RV is purely legal.  But the issue whether a particular trailer is a “recreational vehicle” within the 
meaning of the Ordinance is a mixed question of fact and law.  See Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 2003 
ME 82, ¶ 8, 828 A.2d 768.  This means that, if the administrative decision maker’s characterization of 
the trailer is reasonable, we will give it deference.  See id. ¶ 9.  (“[W]e review the interpretation of the 
ordinance de novo, but we afford the Board’s ultimate characterization of the structure substantial 
 
 
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[¶17]  The definition of “recreational vehicle,” China, Me., Land 
Development Code, ch. 11, must be read in light of the Ordinance as a whole.  
See Davis v. SBA Towers II, LLC, 2009 ME 82, ¶ 22, 979 A.2d 86.  
Section 5(P)(II)(g) of the Ordinance provides that when “a recreational vehicle, 
tent or similar shelter is placed on-site for more than one hundred and twenty 
(120) days per year, all requirements for residential structures shall be met.”  
China, Me., Land Development Code, ch. 2. 
[¶18]  In rescinding the notice of violation, the CEO read “placed” as 
meaning “occupied,” with the result being that the trailer need never be 
physically moved as long as it is not occupied for more than 120 days of the 
year.  This construction of section 5(P)(II)(g) is contrary to its plain language.  
Compare Placed, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 
2016) (defining “placed” as “[t]o put in or as if in a particular place or position”), 
with Occupy, id. (defining “occupy” as “[t]o fill up” and “[t]o dwell or reside in”).  
Whether this trailer is an RV or not, it must be moved off-site every 120 days or 
be treated as a structure.  China, Me., Land Development Code, ch. 2, 
§ 5(P)(II)(g). 
                                         
deference.”).  Given the limited scope of our review of an administrative decision, we must remand 
for the decision maker to issue a reviewable decision based on record evidence.  See Palian v. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs., 2020 ME 131, ¶¶ 41-43, 47-48, 242 A.3d 164. 
 
 
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[¶19]  Relatedly, the language of the Ordinance indicates that it 
distinguishes between a “vehicle” and a “structure.”  See id., ch. 11 (“In order to 
be considered as a vehicle and not as a structure . . . ”).  Although the Ordinance 
does not define “vehicle,” the dictionary defines “vehicle” as “[a] device or 
structure for transporting persons or things.”  Vehicle, American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language.  Maine statutes similarly define “vehicle” as 
“a device for conveyance of persons or property on a way.”  29-A M.R.S. 
§ 101(91) (2021).  The Ordinance defines a “structure” as “[a]nything built for 
the support, shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, goods or property of any 
kind, together with anything constructed or erected with a fixed location on or 
in the ground, attached or unattached,” including “structures temporarily or 
permanently located.”  China, Me., Land Development Code, ch. 11. 
[¶20]  Finally, the Ordinance defines “recreational vehicle” as a vehicle or 
an attachment to a vehicle “designed” to be towed.  Id.  A trailer that can be 
towed is not necessarily designed to be towed.  See Design, American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (defining “design” as “[t]o create or contrive 
for a particular purpose or effect”). 
 
 
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[¶21]  Whether the Namer trailer fits the Ordinance’s definition given 
these considerations and the evidence and arguments of the interested parties 
is, in the first instance, for the CEO to decide. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court with instructions to remand the matter to 
the Board of Appeals with instructions to 
remand to the code enforcement officer for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amanda Meader, Esq., East Winthrop, and Theodore Small, Esq. (orally), 
Skelton Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, for appellant Town of China 
 
Alton C. Stevens, Esq. (orally), Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, Waterville, 
for appellant Nicholas Namer 
 
Edmond J. Bearor, Esq., and Stephen W. Wagner, Esq. (orally), Rudman 
Winchell, Bangor, for appellees Kimberly and Anthony LaMarre 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2019-50 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY