Case Title: Bernice Spiegelberg v. State

Citation: 2006 WI 75

Docket Number: 2004AP003384

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP3384 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Bernice Spiegelberg, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin and Department of 
Transportation, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 4, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Hawley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants, the cause was argued by 
Robert M. Hunter, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs (in the court of appeals and supreme court) was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Dan 
Biersdorf, E. Kelly Keady, and Biersdorf & Associates, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Dan Biersdorf.  
 
 
2006 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP3384  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV1214) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Bernice Spiegelberg, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and Department of 
Transportation, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Winnebago County, Robert A. Hawley, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes to us 
on certification from the court of appeals.  The certified 
question is whether, when a partial taking affects multiple 
contiguous tax parcels that have common ownership, the property 
is to be valued based on:  (1) the fair market value of the 
combined acreage as a single property or (2) the sum of the fair 
market values of each individual tax parcel.  We conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) (2003-04),1 which determines the method by 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
2 
 
which just compensation is to be determined for a partial 
taking, permits a flexible approach such that the individual 
characteristics of each property may be considered, according to 
each property's highest and best use, in order that the property 
owner receives just compensation for the taking.  Because 
valuing the tax parcels separately produced a value consistent 
with the most advantageous use of this property, the circuit 
court correctly chose the method of appraisal employed by 
Bernice Spiegelberg's appraiser.  Therefore, we affirm the 
judgment and order of the circuit court that awarded $84,200 to 
the property owner. 
I.  BACKGROUND2 
¶2 
Bernice Spiegelberg owns five contiguous tax parcels, 
consisting of approximately 150 acres of land.  The Department 
of Transportation (DOT) condemned a portion of Spiegelberg's 
land.  The taking consisted of a fee acquisition totaling 11.08 
acres from three of the five parcels.  With the exception of her 
residence, Spiegelberg leased all five tax parcels together for 
use as a farm. 
¶3 
The DOT determined the value of the partial taking by 
valuing the farm as a single entity, before and after the 
taking, and then subtracting the "after" value from the "before" 
value.  The DOT's appraisal valued all the farm as a single 
entity worth $368,300 before the taking and $349,400 after the 
                                                 
2 The facts are taken from the stipulation of the parties. 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
3 
 
taking.  Based on those calculations, its appraiser set the fair 
market value of the taking of Spiegelberg's property at $18,900.   
¶4 
Spiegelberg, on the other hand, obtained an appraisal 
for the partial taking based on the sum of the values of the 
five individual tax parcels both before and after the taking.  
Using a comparable sales method of valuation, Spiegelberg's 
appraiser arrived at the following "before" fair market values:  
(a) Parcel 1:  $152,700; (b) Parcel 2:  $113,400; (c) Parcel 3:  
$89,000; (d) Parcels 4 and 5:  $114,000; (e) improvements:  
$63,500.  The sum of the fair market values of the parcels and 
improvements "before" was $532,700, and the sum of their fair 
market values "after" was $448,500.  The appraised fair market 
value for all of the land taken was $84,200. 
¶5 
Before the circuit court, each party submitted jury 
instructions and special verdict forms consistent with its 
theory of valuation for the property that was taken.  In August 
of 2004, the DOT brought a motion in limine seeking to exclude 
Spiegelberg's appraisal.  The circuit court denied the DOT's 
motion.  It also held that Spiegelberg's jury instructions and 
special verdict would be used at trial.  Counsel then discussed 
how to proceed from those determinations with regard to proof of 
valuation.  The parties entered into an oral stipulation on the 
record wherein they agreed that since the court had concluded 
that Spiegelberg's theory of valuation was correct, the DOT had 
no evidence to present of the fair market value of the property 
that was taken.  The parties concluded that if the circuit court 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
4 
 
was correct, the value set by Spiegelberg's appraisal correctly 
established the value of the taking.   
¶6 
In November, a signed stipulation was submitted by 
both parties.  In addition to the facts already related, it 
included the following recitation:  (1) prior to the taking, the 
five tax parcels either had direct access to existing roads or 
could have been provided access through the property owned by 
Spiegelberg; (2) the taking caused damage to only three of the 
five tax parcels; (3) David Gagnow completed an appraisal for 
the DOT, which valued all five tax parcels, both before and 
after the taking, as one parcel; (4) Kurt Kielisch completed an 
appraisal for Spiegelberg based on the fair market value of each 
individual parcel, both before and after the taking and then 
calculated the sum of those values; (5) the circuit court's 
ruling resulted in the DOT not having evidence to present on the 
value of the taking; (6) based on the court's ruling "the 
damages in this case under the analysis before and after the 
taking [is] $84,200[,] consistent with the analysis presented by 
[Spiegelberg]"; (7) if upon appeal it is determined that the 
circuit court erred:  (a) the damages under the before and after 
analysis will be "blank based" upon the appraisal submitted by 
the DOT; and (b) the case "will be remanded to [the] circuit 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
5 
 
court for a trial on the value of the part taken as a separate 
entity."3   
¶7 
The DOT appealed, and the court of appeals certified 
the question of what method of valuation should be used to 
accord just compensation to a condemnee whose affected property 
consists of contiguous individual tax parcels.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
We interpret a statute whose meaning is in dispute 
without deference to the circuit court.  State v. Rasmussen, 195 
Wis. 2d 109, 113, 536 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1995); Racine Marina 
Assocs., Inc. v. City of Racine, 175 Wis. 2d 614, 618, 499 
N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1993).  This case also requires us to 
review 
the 
circuit 
court's 
application 
of 
a 
statute 
to 
stipulated facts.  When the facts are not disputed, we decide 
the remaining question of law independent of earlier court 
decisions.  State v. Trentadue, 180 Wis. 2d 670, 673, 510 N.W.2d 
727 (Ct. App. 1993).  However, we benefit from the analysis of 
the previous court's decision.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 
262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.   
                                                 
3 The Kielisch Appraisal included a "part taken analysis" 
whereby the value 
of 
the 
taken 
land 
was 
also analyzed 
separately.  That analysis resulted in a valuation for the 
taking of $62,200.  Because this statutory choice of appraisal 
method under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) is less than the other 
statutory choice, a "before and after" valuation, it was not 
chosen.   
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
6 
 
B. 
Just Compensation.   
¶9 
When property is taken through the power of eminent 
domain, the legislature has directed that the property owner is 
to receive "just compensation" for the taking.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09. Here, only a portion of Spiegelberg's property was 
taken so we begin by examining § 32.09(6), the partial taking 
subsection of § 32.09.  Section 32.09(6) states, in relevant 
part: 
In the case of a partial taking of property other 
than an easement, the compensation to be paid by the 
condemnor shall be the greater of either the fair 
market value of the property taken as of the date of 
evaluation or the sum determined by deducting from the 
fair market value of the whole property immediately 
before the date of evaluation, the fair market value 
of the remainder immediately after the date of 
evaluation, assuming the completion of the public 
improvement and giving effect, without allowance of 
offset for general benefits, and without restriction 
because of enumeration but without duplication, to the 
following items of loss or damage to the property 
where shown to exist:  
(a) Loss of land including improvements and 
fixtures actually taken. 
. . .  
(e) Damages resulting from actual severance of 
land . . . .  
¶10 The issue before us, and the issue the parties' 
arguments center on, is how to interpret the statutory term, 
"fair market value of the whole property" found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6).  Both parties' valuation methods subtracted the 
appraised fair market value of what remained after the taking 
from an appraised fair market value of the property before the 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
7 
 
taking.  Further, the specific calculations used in each of the 
party's valuations are not in dispute.  The debate lies in 
whether it is appropriate to appraise the "before" and "after" 
values with regard to the five individual tax parcels and then 
sum those differences as a part of the valuation of the taking, 
or whether all of the contiguous Spiegelberg property should be 
appraised as a single unit, both before and after the taking.  
The answer to this question turns on whether the "whole 
property" 
language 
of 
§ 32.09(6) 
requires 
that 
contiguous 
parcels be valued together as a single unit, or whether they can 
be valued individually with a sum total then calculated for 
their collective appraised values. 
1. 
The DOT's position 
¶11 The DOT submits that the appraisal method chosen by 
the circuit court, which analyzed the summation of the values of 
various parcels of property, does not meet the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 36.09(6).  The DOT argues that the whole of 
Spiegelberg's property functioned as a single economic entity, a 
farm comprising 150 acres of land, and consequently the property 
must be valued as a single entity to properly determine the 
"fair market value of the whole property."   
¶12 The DOT contends that the "unit rule" requires that we 
adopt a single-unit valuation approach to contiguous, commonly-
owned tax parcels, as its appraisal has done.  It cites Jonas v. 
State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235 (1963), in support of this 
contention.  However, our decision in Jonas actually turned on 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
8 
 
the "unity of use," a very different principle from the "unit 
rule."   
¶13 In Jonas, a seven-acre parcel owned by one corporation 
and located on the east side of a street was condemned.  Id. at 
640.  A second corporation owned a parcel of one and one-half 
acres on the west of that same street.  Id.  The corporations 
operated as one concern.  Id.  Jonas contended that there was a 
unity of use between the two parcels and that in order to fully 
compensate for the damages arising from the condemnation, both 
parcels had to be valued.  Id.  We concluded that it was 
possible that when "two or more distinct parcels . . . are used 
as a unit, the parcels may be treated as one and the taking of 
part or all of one of them treated as a partial taking of the 
combined whole."  Id. at 642.  
¶14 The possible application of the unity of use rule in 
condemnation cases does not support the DOT's assertion that 
Spiegelberg's entire farm must be valued as a single parcel 
because all of it has been used as a farm.  The unity of use 
rule permits a condemnee to receive compensation when a taking 
from one property must be considered in terms of its effect on 
another property, in order for those affected by the taking to 
be fully compensated.  See City of Milwaukee v. Roadster LLC, 
2003 WI App 131, ¶18, 265 Wis. 2d 518, 666 N.W.2d 524 
(concluding that a parking lot that was condemned was "occupied" 
by its owner who used it for access to a business on an adjacent 
lot; and therefore, the city "took" an essential portion of the 
business when it took the parking lot).  The unity of use rule 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
9 
 
does not require that property that currently has a single use 
be valued only for that single use.   
¶15 Other cases cited by the DOT do refer to the "unit 
rule," which differs from the unity of use rule.  Unit rule 
cases address the separate interests that may be found in a 
condemned property.  For example, a property may have a fee 
owner and one or more leaseholders.  Those properties that are 
subject to multiple interests are given one value for the 
entirety of the condemned property and then that value is 
apportioned among those who have an interest in the property.  
See, e.g., Van Asten v. DOT, 214 Wis. 2d 135, 140, 571 N.W.2d 
420 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that "the unit rule . . . stems 
from the common law theory that anything that was attached to a 
freehold was annexed to and considered to be a part of it.  
. . .  The unit rule requires that improved real estate be 
valued in respect to its gross value as a single entity as if 
there was only one owner.").  This is a far cry from the DOT's 
position, which is if one person owns multiple parcels that are 
affected by a partial taking, all of the parcels must be valued 
as though they were one parcel.4  There is only one interest in 
                                                 
4 The unit rule is also discussed in Green Bay Broadcasting 
Co. v. Redevelopment Authority of Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 
342 N.W.2d 27 (1983) (explaining that "[t]he unit rule is 
designed to protect the interests of the condemnor . . . .  The 
condemnees . . . are indeed constitutionally entitled to just 
compensation, but contracts between the owners of different 
interests in the land should not be permitted to result in a 
total sum which is in excess of the whole value of the undivided 
fee."). 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
10 
 
the property for which Spiegelberg seeks compensation, her fee 
simple interest.  
2. 
Spiegelberg's position 
¶16 Spiegelberg argues that the "whole property" may be 
the smallest distinct parcel of land that can be independently 
sold; and therefore, her assessment method comports with the 
statutory language.  Furthermore, Spiegelberg cites Wisconsin 
case law holding that statutes concerning just compensation for 
property taken in an eminent domain proceeding must be liberally 
construed in favor of the condemnee.  See Standard Theatres, 
Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 743, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984).  
Spiegelberg emphasizes that the DOT's presumption that the legal 
distinction of parcels should be ignored in favor of a rule that 
would treat contiguous parcels as one parcel is contrary to our 
holding in Standard Theatres.  She contends that there is no 
reason not to value separate tax parcels separately; they have 
separate legal descriptions; they can be developed distinctly 
according to their zoning; and they can be bought and sold 
freely, without further subdivision or attachment to other land.  
Finally, Spiegelberg argues that we should recognize this 
"reality" of real estate, but contends that at a minimum, 
separate legal tax parcels should be valued separately if it is 
beneficial to the property owner to do so.  This, Spiegelberg 
asserts, is in accord with our decision in Standard Theatres, as 
well as the legislative directive of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6).  
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
11 
 
3. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6) 
¶17 In order to address the parties' arguments, we must 
interpret and apply the phrase, "fair market value of the whole 
property" found in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6).  When we interpret a 
statute, we rely on the criteria set out in State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  In Kalal, we explained that: 
[T]he 
purpose 
of 
statutory interpretation 
is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be 
given its full, proper, and intended effect. 
Id., ¶44.  Context is also important when determining the plain 
meaning of a statute, as is the purpose of the statute and its 
scope, if those qualities can be ascertained from the language 
of the statute itself.  Id., ¶¶46-48.  These are all intrinsic 
sources for statutory interpretation.  Id.  However, if 
statutory language is ambiguous, we often consult extrinsic 
sources such as legislative history.  Id. at ¶48.   
¶18 The 
disagreement 
between 
the 
parties 
in 
their 
interpretations of the phrase, "fair market value of the whole 
property," centers on the words, "whole property."  Those two 
words can be understood by reasonably well-informed individuals 
in two or more senses.  For example, in some circumstances those 
words could be interpreted as the DOT suggests as requiring all 
the property affected by the taking to be valued as one unit.  
Or, "whole property" could be interpreted as the cumulative 
value that is derived by taking the sum of the individual 
effects of the taking on each parcel, as Spiegelberg suggests.  
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
12 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous.  Id., 
¶47.5 
¶19 The word "whole" is not defined in the statute.  Non-
technical words that are not defined in a statute are to be 
given their ordinary meanings.  Town of LaFayette v. City of 
Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 619, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).  We 
may consult a dictionary to aid in statutory construction of 
undefined words.  Id.  We do so for "whole."  A dictionary 
defines "whole" as:  "a complete amount or sum : a number, 
aggregate, or totality lacking no part, member, or element."  
Webster's 
New 
Collegiate 
Dictionary, 
1338 
(1977). 
 
This 
definition suggests that the use of the word "whole" when taken 
in the context of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) means that no part of a 
property is to be left out in determining the property's fair 
market value.  Stated otherwise, an appraisal that complies with 
the statute must address the complete property, in its totality.  
Accordingly, the word "whole" does not require that a valuation 
of contiguous tax parcels employ a particular method of 
appraisal, but rather that no part of a property affected by a 
partial taking be omitted from the valuation used to establish 
just compensation. 
                                                 
5 Even though we may use legislative history as an assist in 
interpreting an ambiguous statute, State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110, it does not assist us here because the 
legislature provided no history for its insertion of "fair 
market" and "whole" in the 1961 amendments to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6).  
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
13 
 
¶20 Neither 
the 
dictionary 
definition 
nor 
our 
understanding of it establishes which definition of "whole 
property" is correct because both the DOT's and Spiegelberg's 
interpretations come within the definition.  However, there are 
other contextual directives within Wis. Stat. § 32.09 and our 
interpretation of the compensation that is due to a condemnee 
that assist us in:  (1) choosing the correct appraisal method 
for Spiegelberg's property and (2) comparing the Spiegelberg 
appraisal and the DOT appraisal to those statutory directives. 
¶21 First, to assist in our construction of the statutory 
language, "fair market value of the whole property," we consider 
"fair market value," which has a well-established meaning.  In 
Pinczkowski v. Milwaukee County, 2005 WI 161, 286 Wis. 2d 339, 
706 N.W.2d 642, we interpreted "fair market value" as: 
Fair market value is "the amount for which the 
property could be sold in the market on a sale by an 
owner willing, but not compelled, to sell, and to a 
purchaser willing and able, but not obliged, to buy." 
Id., ¶18 (citations omitted).  We note that Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6) requires that just compensation will take into 
account the fair market value.  Both appraisals said that they 
were based on this standard.   
¶22 Second, 
we 
have 
consistently 
held 
that 
when 
compensating condemnees in eminent domain proceedings, the 
"highest and best use" of the property should be considered in 
the valuation.  In Bembinster v. DOT, 57 Wis. 2d 277, 203 N.W.2d 
897 (1973), we explained: 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
14 
 
It is well established that market value in an 
eminent-domain 
proceeding 
is 
to 
be 
based 
not 
necessarily on the use to which the property was being 
put by its owner at the time of taking but rather on 
the basis of the highest and best use, present or 
prospective, for which it is adapted and to which it 
might in reason be applied.   
Id. at 283 (citations omitted).  The Spiegelberg appraisal 
(Kielisch Appraisal) was based on the highest and best use that 
included residential development, as is described more fully 
below.  Kielisch Appraisal, p. 17.  The DOT appraisal (Gagnow 
Appraisal) limited its inquiry of the property's highest and 
best use to farming.  Gagnow Appraisal, pp. 11-12. 
¶23 Third, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) provides two valuation 
choices:  (1) "the fair market value of the property taken" or 
(2) "the sum determined by deducting from the fair market value 
of the whole property immediately before the date of evaluation, 
the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the 
date of evaluation."  We are required by § 32.09(6) to employ 
that 
valuation 
choice 
that 
will 
provide 
the 
"greater" 
compensation to the property owner.  Although both the DOT 
appraisal and the Spiegelberg appraisal use the before and after 
method, the Spiegelberg appraiser also used a before and after 
method that best fit the unique characteristics of the land.  
Therefore, although the appraisal with the higher value may not 
always come within the statutory directive, here it fits the 
spirit, as well as the letter, of § 32.09(6) and it results in 
greater compensation to the property owner. 
¶24 Fourth, the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(2) that 
the "most advantageous use" be considered and the concept of 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
15 
 
"highest and best use" also are helpful to our deciding whether 
the circuit court correctly selected the Spiegelberg appraisal.  
In Clarmar Realty Co. v. Redevelopment Authority of Milwaukee, 
129 Wis. 2d. 81, 383 N.W.2d 890 (1986), we explained: 
[Section] 32.09, Stats., governs the determination of 
"just compensation" in eminent domain proceedings in 
this state.  It requires that "[i]n determining just 
compensation the property sought to be condemned shall 
be considered on the basis of its most advantageous 
use but only such use as actually affects the present 
market value."  . . .  The term "most advantageous" 
use as it appears in this section is synonymous with 
"highest and best" use . . . . 
Id. at 90 (emphasis added).   
¶25 In Clarmar, we also set out three conditions for the 
valuation of prospective uses: 
[O]ur standards have permitted admission of evidence 
of prospective land uses in condemnation cases under 
three conditions:  (1) if the prospective use is the 
"most advantageous" use of a condemned parcel; (2) if 
the prospective use is "reasonably probable"; and (3) 
if 
the 
prospective 
use 
is 
not 
imaginary 
or 
speculative.   
Id. at 91-92 (citing Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 598, 70 
N.W. 208 (1955)).  When considering the "highest and best use," 
we note that it accounts for the effect of such proposed use on 
the present market value of the property.6  Therefore, even if an 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(2), which requires consideration 
of the most advantageous use that is synonymous with highest and 
best use, provides:   
In determining just compensation the property 
sought to be condemned shall be considered on the 
basis of its most advantageous use but only such use 
as actually affects the present market value. 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
16 
 
owner chooses not to engage in the most profitable use, such use 
may nevertheless make the property more valuable to the owner in 
the event of a sale.  This value, based on "highest and best 
use," is what is to be valued in condemnation.  For example, in 
Utech v. City of Milwaukee, 9 Wis. 2d 352, 101 N.W.2d 57 (1960), 
we held that the owner's choice of present use was not 
conclusive in determining the "most advantageous use" because 
the present use may be unrelated to the value of the real 
estate.  Id. at 357.   
¶26 Here, 
the 
Spiegelberg 
appraisal 
considered 
the 
property's use for residential large lot development, as well as 
its current use as a farm.  Kielisch Appraisal, p. 18.  The 
consideration of residential development and recreational use 
was reasonable as each parcel was readily saleable and the 
zoning permitted those uses.  Therefore the proposed uses were 
not speculative.  
¶27 Fifth, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(2), 
and 
our 
past 
interpretations of its requirements, assist in our analysis.  As 
we mentioned above, § 32.09(2) directs that when determining 
just 
compensation, 
a 
court 
should 
consider 
the 
"most 
advantageous use but only such use as actually affects the 
present market value."  The Spiegelberg appraisal followed this 
directive.  It examined: 
the highest and best use of the subject property, 
including an analysis of its present and future 
utility.  [And] [t]he specific location, extent and 
utility of the land and its Market Value in the real 
estate market considered as if vacant and available 
for use. 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
17 
 
Kielisch Appraisal, p. 7.  Even though all of the property, with 
the exception of the improvements, had been leased for farming, 
the Kielisch Appraisal examined the potential use of the 
parcels, 
before 
the 
taking, 
as 
"residential 
large 
lot 
development land for parcels 1-3 and as a recreational land use 
with a potential of having some residential improvements for 
parcels 4 and 5."  Kielisch Appraisal, p. 18.  After the taking, 
that potential was diminished, not just because of the acres 
taken, but also because of other factors.  Kielisch Appraisal, 
p. 19-22.  For example, the acres taken from parcel 3 left it 
"with a fraction of the lands not affected by the Shoreland or 
the Wetland overlay district zoning," thereby reducing the 
potential to build upon it.  Kielisch Appraisal, p. 19.   
¶28 The approach used in the Kielisch Appraisal is also 
consistent with our interpretation in Van De Hey v. Calumet 
County, 40 Wis. 2d 390, 161 N.W.2d 923 (1968), of how to 
determine "the most advantageous use" set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(2).  Van De Hey involved a partial taking under subsec. 
(6), wherein 5.53 acres were taken from a 186-acre farm.  Id. at 
392.  The strip of land taken also had three driveways for 
public highway access, which the condemnation limited to one 
public highway access after the taking.  Id.   
¶29 During the course of the trial, the expert for 
Van De Hey testified about the before and after values of the 
farm, and in doing so, he took into account the sales of several 
parcels of land from one-half to five acres as residential lots 
in the vicinity of the Van De Hey property.  Id. at 394.  
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
18 
 
Objection was made that this was improper because "the value of 
a total piece of property could not be determined by taking the 
cumulative value of the lots into which the parcel could be 
divided."  Id.  We disagreed, and held that the valuation method 
was proper because Van De Hey's expert was able to establish 
"the potential residential use of that part of the farm which 
could be put to such residential use if the access had not been 
restricted."  Id.  In addition, this testimony was held 
appropriate under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(2).  As we explained: 
The measure of compensation for a partial taking 
as set forth in sec. 32.09(6)(b), Stats., contemplates 
the damage to the property from the deprivation or 
restriction of access to the highway from abutting 
land, and sec. 32.09(2), Stats., provides the most 
advantageous use of 
the 
property 
which 
actually 
affects the present market value shall be used in 
determining just compensation.  A foundation for this 
testimony was made by the evidence of the adaptability 
of the land to subdividing. 
Id. at 395.  The Spiegelberg appraisal is consistent with 
Van De Hey; the DOT appraisal is not. 
¶30 We derive the following conclusions from our statutory 
analysis of the terms chosen by the legislature:  (1) "fair 
market value" relates to the price a willing buyer would pay to 
a willing seller; (2) the requirement to consider the "whole 
property" does not require that an individual assessment always 
treat contiguous, commonly owned tax parcels separately or as a 
single unit, but requires that no portion of the property be 
left out of an assessment; (3) the requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(2) that a property's "most advantageous use but only 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
19 
 
such use as actually affects the present market value" be 
considered as a part of a valuation is linked to the 
determination of the "fair market value" required by § 32.09(6); 
and (4) how to apply the language of § 32.09(6) to arrive at 
just compensation depends upon considerations related to each 
property's individual characteristics.   
¶31 Because Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) does not specify whether 
contiguous, commonly-owned tax parcels should be separately 
appraised or appraised as a collective unit, we conclude that 
when the property's "highest and best" use that affects its 
present 
market 
value 
is 
most 
appropriately 
appraised 
by 
considering the contiguous tax parcels separately, that is the 
appropriate appraisal method.  Conversely, when, according to 
the above-addressed rules, the "highest and best use" is more 
adequately represented through an appraisal of the property as a 
single unit, that approach is the one that is appropriate.  
Which method is required by § 32.09(6) will depend on the unique 
qualities of the specific property affected by the taking and 
its "fair market value."  The ascertainment of the property's 
"fair market value" depends upon the common law definition of 
"highest and best use," which we have determined is synonymous 
with the "most advantageous use" set out in § 32.09(2).  And 
finally, just compensation is to take into account the principle 
of Standard Theatres: 
[W]e note that this court has recognized that the rule 
of strict construction should be applied to the 
condemnor's power and to the exercise of this power.  
This is because the exercise of the power of eminent 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
20 
 
domain has been characterized as an "extraordinary 
power," and the rule of strict construction is 
intended to benefit the owner whose property is taken 
against his or her will.  Conversely, statutory 
provisions in favor of the owner, such as those which 
regulate the compensation to be paid to him or her, 
are to be afforded liberal construction. 
Standard Theatres, 118 Wis. 2d at 742-43 (citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
¶32 In summary, it is undisputed that at the time of 
condemnation each of the tax parcels could have been sold as a 
separate individual property.  Therefore, such sales were a 
readily available prospective use, in conformity with Van De Hey 
and Carazalla.  Sale of the property as separate tax parcels 
would have been more advantageous, or the highest and best use, 
as compared with the sale of the property as a single unit.  It 
also would have garnered a greater payment for Spiegelberg.  
That she had not yet used the land as separate tax parcels or 
for a venture other than farming is not dispositive, as we 
explained in Utech.  It is undisputed that the before-and-after 
appraisal that separately considered each of the individual tax 
parcels 
favored 
Spiegelberg, 
in 
conformity 
with 
Standard 
Theatres.  According to these factors, the circuit court 
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
21 
 
correctly determined that the Spiegelberg appraisal complied 
with Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) and the DOT appraisal did not.7 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶33 We 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6), 
which 
determines the method by which just compensation is to be 
determined for a partial taking, permits a flexible approach 
such that the individual characteristics of each property may be 
considered, according to each property's highest and best use, 
in order that the property owner receives just compensation for 
the taking.  Because valuing the tax parcels separately produced 
a value consistent with the most advantageous use of this 
property, the circuit court correctly chose the method of 
appraisal 
employed 
by 
Bernice 
Spiegelberg's 
appraiser.  
                                                 
7 We appreciate the dissenting opinion's concern with the 
status of the relatively undeveloped record.  Dissent, ¶¶42-67.  
For example, the dissent is concerned with the lack of a 
"platted subdivision of the property or a certified survey."  
Id. at ¶60.  However, this concern is misplaced.  The dispute in 
this case was not about whether Spiegelberg could create a 
subdivision with her property.  But rather, whether valuing the 
five separate parcels individually or valuing them as a unit 
satisfied the valuation direction of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) that 
"the fair market value of the whole property" be considered.  
The State said the statute required valuing the five parcels as 
one unit and Spiegelberg said valuing each separate tax parcel 
and then summing those values satisfied the statute.  We agreed 
with Spiegelberg.  
No. 
2004AP3384   
 
22 
 
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the circuit court that 
awarded $84,200 to the property owner.8 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
                                                 
8 Spiegelberg has moved to strike the portion of the State's 
reply brief that raises Spiegelberg's alleged failure to comply 
with Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) because this issue was not raised 
prior to the filing of the State's reply brief.  We held 
Spiegelberg's motion in abeyance and addressed the § 32.05(5) 
issue at oral argument with both Spiegelberg and the State.  We 
do not rely on § 32.05(5) in our opinion.  Accordingly, we deny 
Spiegelberg's motion to strike. 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority's flexible approach in determining which is the 
correct method of valuation.  It depends on the facts which 
address the individual characteristics and unique qualities of 
the property.  I likewise substantially agree with the legal 
standards the majority sets forth.  However, I do not join the 
majority's application of those standards here because it is 
impossible to meaningfully apply them on the inadequate record 
before us. 
¶35 We cannot determine on this record what is the most 
advantageous use of Spiegelberg's property.  Without more, we 
cannot decide whether it is reasonably probable that the 
separate parcels will be used for residential or recreational 
use.   
¶36 The problem in this case arises because on the morning 
of the first day of the jury trial, before any evidence was 
admitted, the circuit court chose the exclusive method of 
valuation.  The circuit court took no evidence, and it made no 
determinations with respect to the applicable legal standards 
set forth by the majority.  
¶37 Further proceedings are necessary to determine whether 
the individual characteristics and unique qualities of the 
property should preclude either Spiegelberg's valuation method 
or the DOT's.  I would therefore reverse the circuit court and 
remand for those proceedings.  Spiegelberg could then seek to 
show that the use she proposes is the most advantageous and is 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
2 
 
reasonably probable, and the circuit court could apply the 
standards articulated today by the majority.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶38 I substantially agree with the legal standards set 
forth by the majority.  It correctly determines that just 
compensation in this case is pegged to "fair market value of the 
whole property" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) (2003-04).1  
Majority op., ¶21. 
¶39 In addition, the majority correctly recognizes that 
the "most advantageous use" standard should apply: 
In determining just compensation the property 
sought to be condemned shall be considered on the 
basis of its most advantageous use but only such use 
as actually affects the present market value. 
Section 32.09(2) (emphasis added); see also majority op., ¶24 & 
n.6. 
¶40 The majority also correctly acknowledges that the case 
of 
Clarmar 
Realty 
Co. 
v. 
Redevelopment 
Authority, 
129 
Wis. 2d 81, 383 N.W.2d 890 (1985), provides the test for the 
types of potential uses that may be considered in determining 
what is the most advantageous use.   See majority op., ¶¶24-25.  
Under Clarmar, the prospective use must be: 
(1) the most advantageous use; 
(2) reasonably probable; and 
(3) not imaginary or speculative. 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version. 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
3 
 
Id., ¶25 (citing Clarmar, 129 Wis. 2d at 91-92). 
¶41 In addition, the majority correctly determines that 
the application of § 32.09(6) to arrive at just compensation 
depends upon the facts presented and each property's individual 
characteristics.  See majority op., ¶30.  Likewise, it correctly 
determines 
that 
whether 
contiguous, 
commonly-owned 
parcels 
should be valued as a unit or separately to arrive at just 
compensation will depend upon the unique qualities of the 
specific property affected by the taking.  Id., ¶31.  
II 
¶42 Having 
set 
forth 
these 
standards, 
the 
majority 
nonetheless fails to meaningfully apply them.  This is not 
surprising because the inadequate record before us makes that 
impossible. 
¶43 In order to see how the majority went wrong, it is 
important to first understand precisely what did and did not 
occur in the circuit court proceedings. 
¶44 The DOT filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit 
Spiegelberg from introducing evidence or making arguments using 
a calculation of the property's value "based upon the existence 
of hypothetical subdivision of such property."  Spiegelberg 
opposed the motion, asserting "there is nothing 'hypothetical' 
about the division of [the] property."  The parties each 
submitted 
proposed 
jury 
instructions 
and special verdicts 
reflecting their respective theories of valuation. 
¶45 On the first day scheduled for trial, the circuit 
court briefly heard argument from the parties with respect to 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
4 
 
the 
DOT's 
motion. 
 
With 
little 
explanation, 
the 
court 
tentatively denied the motion, stating that it would "give that 
a little more thought at this point." 
¶46 The 
circuit court 
then 
conducted 
an 
in-chambers 
conference that was not recorded and that addressed the proposed 
jury instructions.  When the court and parties were back on the 
record, the court recounted: 
Okay.  And we had an in-chambers conference . . . 
and my ruling still would be that as far as the jury 
instructions would be consistent with my prior ruling 
as far as denying the motion in limine and going 
essentially with [counsel for Spiegelberg]'s jury 
instructions as to the jury looking at separate tax 
parcels as far as the diminution of value for his 
clients individually.  And I guess we are kind of 
contemplating here as to what's the next step, 
essentially whether it's an offer of proof from both 
sides and just how we want to proceed. 
Spiegelberg's counsel explained that he and the DOT had agreed 
that under the court's ruling, only Spiegelberg had relevant 
evidence to offer on the question of damages.  Counsel 
continued: 
[T]here was basically going to be a stipulation by us 
and that we understand the Court's ruling and that if 
that ruling is affirmed so that if these are to be 
looked at as if it is appropriate to look at as 
separate tax parcels, then the plaintiffs' number 
would control . . . and if the court of appeals says 
no, they have to be treated as a whole all together, 
then it would be the [DOT]'s evidence. 
 
¶47 At that point in the proceedings, the circuit court 
indicated its approval of the parties' stipulation and set forth 
its rationale for denying the DOT's motion in limine: 
 
Yes, 
that's 
an 
excellent 
concept 
there.  
Essentially, I just wanted to make part of the record 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
5 
 
I see no distinguishing traits of a certified survey 
map versus a separate tax parcel.  That's part of my 
reason and rationale for that.2  So I guess we have a 
transcript here.  I don't know if we need to make 
anything more as a matter of record other than to have 
a stipulation and order then. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶48 The 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
rule 
on 
the 
most 
advantageous use of the property.  It did not inquire into 
whether 
residential 
development 
or 
recreational 
use 
of 
Spiegelberg's 
property as 
separate 
parcels 
was 
reasonably 
probable.  It did not examine the individual characteristics or 
unique qualities of the property.  The court took no evidence 
with respect to these legal standards that the majority sets 
forth.  It did not make any findings of fact.  Rather, its 
determination came down to one thing:  It saw "no distinguishing 
traits of a certified survey map versus a separate tax parcel."  
¶49 Over two months later, the parties filed a brief 
stipulation.  Only a few undisputed facts were presented.  The 
recitals in the stipulation included that "the subject property 
is comprised of 150.36 (gross) acres of agricultural land held 
as five contiguous separate tax parcels by the plaintiff."3 
                                                 
2 If the circuit court had some other reason or rationale, 
it is not clear from the record. 
3 The other undisputed facts in the stipulation were as 
follows: 
(A) "The five tax parcels are contiguous except for the 
two roads that cut through the parcels as shown in Exhibit A." 
(B) "[T]he taking consisted of a total fee acquisition of 
11.08 acres (9.21 acres of new right-of-way and 1.87 acres of an 
existing right-of-way) from three of the five separate legal 
parcels, as shown in Exhibits B and C." 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
6 
 
¶50 The three-page, double-spaced stipulation primarily 
consisted of the parties' offers of proof and a recitation of 
the procedural history of the case.  It incorporated the report 
of Spiegelberg's appraiser as her offer of proof, and stated 
that as a further offer of proof she "would establish that 
before the taking, the five tax parcels either had direct access 
to existing roads or could have been provided access by the 
plaintiff through property owned by plaintiff." 
¶51 The stipulation also incorporated the report of the 
DOT's appraiser as its offer of proof, and stated that as a 
further offer of proof it "would establish that the subject 
property had not been transferred for five years prior to the 
taking, [and] had been used in its consolidated form, as a dairy 
farm, which at the time of the taking the plaintiff had leased, 
with the exception of the residence, for use as a farm." 
¶52 The circuit court entered judgment on the stipulation, 
and the DOT appealed. 
 
¶53 Having detailed what did and did not occur in the 
circuit court proceedings, I turn to the majority's analysis.  
The majority concludes that "the circuit court correctly 
determined 
that 
the 
Spiegelberg 
appraisal 
complied 
with 
                                                                                                                                                             
(C) Exhibit A was a one-page aerial map of the property 
before the taking.  Exhibit B was a one-page aerial map of the 
property after the taking.  Exhibit C was three pages of DOT 
project plat maps. 
The majority's use of the stipulation conflates undisputed 
facts with disputed facts.  The first two of seven "facts" in ¶6 
of the majority opinion actually come from Spiegelberg's offer 
of proof, which was competing with the DOT's offer of proof. 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
7 
 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6) and the DOT appraisal did not."  Majority 
op., ¶32.  Putting aside whether the circuit court can be said 
to have actually made any such determination, the majority's 
conclusion largely rests on two determinations, neither of which 
holds water on the inadequate record before us.   
¶54 First, the majority determines that the Spiegelberg 
appraisal's 
"consideration 
of 
residential 
development 
and 
recreational use" was "reasonable" because each parcel was 
"readily saleable" and the zoning "permitted" those uses.  Id., 
¶26.  Therefore, reasons the majority, the proposed uses were 
"not speculative."  Id.  In making this determination, the 
majority first introduces the concept of "readily saleable" 
without defining it, thereby begging the question of whether 
this is the same standard as that required under Clarmar:  
"reasonably probable." 
¶55 If the standards are the same, then the majority has 
apparently 
concluded that 
Spiegelberg's 
proposed 
uses are 
"reasonably probable" as a matter of law.4  Based on what facts? 
¶56 Second, the majority determines that Spiegelberg's 
appraisal "followed [the] directive" that just compensation 
should be based on the most advantageous use.  Majority op., 
¶27.  This is a curious determination for an appellate court to 
make on the record here because the parties' respective 
                                                 
4 If the standards are not the same, then it remains unclear 
why the majority opinion has failed to apply the reasonably 
probable standard.  Perhaps the answer is that the proper 
standard cannot be meaningfully applied on the inadequate record 
before us. 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
8 
 
appraisals show that the most advantageous use remains in 
dispute. 
¶57 Spiegelberg's appraisal report states that "[t]he land 
use [in the area] is changing from agricultural to residential.  
There are several newer residential developments starting in the 
area."  In the report, her appraiser opines that "[t]he Highest 
and Best Use of the property lying to the south of [a highway 
cutting through the northernmost parcel] is for residential 
development . . . ." 
¶58 The DOT's appraisal report, in contrast, states that 
"[a]t this time the neighborhood is considered to be in the 
stable to slow growth life stage."  The DOT's appraiser opines 
that whether vacant or as currently improved the highest and 
best use is for "agricultural and recreational use."  It also 
states that "[a] portion of the subject is in a designated flood 
plain" and "[a] portion of the subject is in a designated 
wetland."  In addition, the DOT's appraisal report notes that in 
order for the land to be used for residential purposes, 
"[p]rivate systems would be required; well for water and a 
mound, conventional or holding tank for sewerage."   
¶59 The majority is apparently concluding, as a matter of 
law, that the most advantageous use of the property as affects 
present value is as separately-sold parcels for residential 
development or recreational use.  This requires an unspoken 
finding by the majority that the report of Spiegelberg's 
appraiser is credible while the report of the DOT's appraiser is 
not.  Even if this court could make such a finding, how can the 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
9 
 
majority make this finding on the record before us?  What facts 
support it? 
¶60 Moreover, the record leaves unclear the significance 
of some of the few undisputed facts.  For example, the parties 
stipulated that Spiegelberg's property is divided into five tax 
parcels.  Also, Spiegelberg conceded at oral argument that there 
has not been a platted subdivision of the property or a 
certified 
survey. 
 
The 
majority 
does 
not 
explain 
the 
significance or insignificance of these facts with respect to 
whether the prospective use of the land for residential 
development or recreational purposes is reasonably probable. 
¶61 It appears the record is silent as to the significance 
or insignificance of these facts.  At oral argument, counsel for 
the DOT attempted to provide some explanation.  It does not 
support the majority's conclusion: 
There is no evidence in the record as far as I'm 
aware that would support a determination by the court—
—by this court or by the trial court——that the parcels 
needed no further permits.  It's true that the 
properties could be sold——theoretically. . . .  The 
tax key number as far as I'm aware really doesn't mean 
anything per se with regard to the property.  It is a 
methodology, which is developed by——as far as I'm 
aware——by 
. 
. 
. 
the 
assessor 
for 
purposes 
of 
identifying the property. 
¶62 In their stipulation, the parties recognized the 
distinct possibility that the record might be inadequate for a 
reviewing court to reach the conclusion the majority does, that 
Spiegelberg's appraisal is admissible evidence as a matter of 
law and the DOT's is not.  One of the few paragraphs in the 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
10 
 
stipulation representing the substance of the parties' agreement 
provides as follows: 
If, upon appeal it is determined insufficient 
facts exist to establish the correct jury instructions 
and special verdicts for the damage analysis before 
and after the taking, the matter will be remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with the ruling by the appellate court. 
¶63 Indeed, Spiegelberg even concedes in her brief that 
the only information in the record as to the most advantageous 
use is contained in the appraisal reports.  She also recognizes 
that a remand for further factual development is necessary if an 
inquiry into most advantageous use is required: 
Other than what the appraisers describe as the Highest 
and Best Use, the record contains no information about 
what might be the most advantageous use for the 
subject property.  The only thing addressed at the 
hearing was the existing use.  The trial court was 
obviously not concerned about this issue since it 
reached its ruling without making any inquiry about 
the most advantageous use.  Spiegelberg also contends 
that the ruling by the trial court and the position 
which it supports in this case does not rely upon such 
a determination.  In the event this Court, though, 
believes that a ruling on this issue does require an 
inquiry into the most advantageous use for the subject 
property, then this case will need to be remanded to 
the trial court for testimony on that use. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶64 The final statement from this passage in Spiegelberg's 
brief is sage advice.  The majority should have followed it. 
¶65 At oral argument Spiegelberg reiterated this passage 
from her brief, in response to questioning about the lack of an 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
adequate 
record, 
or 
circuit 
court 
determination as to the issue of most advantageous use.  Counsel 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
11 
 
for Spiegelberg said:  "I understand that and it's partly 
because of what you're addressing right now why I put that 
passage in our papers because I can certainly see the court 
having a question about that."  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, 
when asked what rule should result from this case, counsel said: 
The rule would be one where this court would recognize 
the smallest legal division that's possible . . .  
provided that there was an inquiry into the highest 
and best use, and that that subdivision was consistent 
with that highest and best use. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶66 Unlike the majority, I recognize that the record is 
inadequate for this court to meaningfully apply the proper legal 
standards.  We cannot determine with any confidence whether 
Spiegelberg's proposed use of the land as separate parcels is 
"reasonably probable" and 
not "speculative." 
Clarmar, 129 
Wis. 2d at 92.  On this record we cannot determine whether the 
proposed use is the "most advantageous use but only such use as 
actually affects the present market value."  Section 32.09(2) 
(emphasis added).   The circuit court, not this court, should 
resolve the factual disputes raised by the parties' appraisal 
reports as to the most advantageous use.  Additional proceedings 
are 
necessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
individual 
characteristics and unique qualities of the property should 
preclude either Spiegelberg's valuation approach or the DOT's. 
¶67 I would therefore reverse the circuit court and remand 
for further proceedings.  At those proceedings, the circuit 
court could apply the proper legal standards after Spiegelberg 
has an opportunity to introduce evidence to support her theory 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
12 
 
that her proposed use of the property is the most advantageous 
use and is reasonably probable.  "If an owner of land wishes to 
assert that the land being taken in eminent domain is not at the 
present time being used at its highest potential, it is 
incumbent upon [the owner] to establish this fact."  Julius L. 
Sackman, 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12B.14, at 12B-139 – 12B-
140 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis added). 
¶68 Ultimately the majority's analysis is unsatisfying at 
best.  On the inadequate record before us, the proper legal 
standards simply cannot be meaningfully applied.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2004AP3384.awb 
 
 
 
1