Case Title: Doe v. Terry

Citation: 

Docket Number: 052137

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
JOHN DOE 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 052137    
 
January 12, 2007 
 
RUSSELL M. TERRY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Joseph A. Leafe, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the plaintiff 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant, John Doe, was negligent. 
Plaintiff, Russell M. Terry, filed his motion for 
judgment against John Doe, an unknown driver of an automobile.  
Plaintiff alleged that he was injured as a result of John 
Doe's negligence.  At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of 
$175,000.  The circuit court reduced the verdict from $175,000 
to the amount of the ad damnum, $100,000, and the court 
entered a judgment confirming the verdict.  The defendant, 
John Doe, appeals. 
Terry is armed with a jury verdict and, thus, "occupies 
the most favored position known to the law."  Pugsley v. 
Privette, 220 Va. 892, 901, 263 S.E.2d 69, 76 (1980); accord 
Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King, 266 Va. 288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 
545, 547 (2003).  Additionally, we will recite the facts and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Terry, the 
 
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prevailing party in the circuit court.  Atrium Unit Owners 
Ass'n, 266 Va. at 293, 585 S.E.2d at 547. 
Terry was employed as a safety service patrolman for the 
Virginia Department of Transportation and stationed at the 
Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel.  On June 1, 2002, about 3:00 
a.m., Terry entered the tunnel and began to walk towards the 
bottom of the tunnel to clean camera lenses on equipment used 
to monitor vehicular traffic.  He was walking on a "catwalk" 
in the direction of oncoming traffic.  The "catwalk" is 46 
inches above the tunnel's traffic lanes.  The posted speed 
limit in the tunnel is 55 miles per hour. 
After Terry had cleaned three camera lenses, he observed 
three approaching vehicles.  Terry testified as follows:  
"[O]ne [vehicle] was a car followed by a tractor-trailer.  
When the tractor-trailer came by, I nodded my head down so not 
to be hit with the debris that comes with it.  And I picked my 
head back up and started walking again, and that's when I was 
struck in my right forehead." 
Terry further testified during his direct examination: 
 
"Q:  All right.  When the truck – during the 
time frame when there is the three vehicles, there's 
the truck, where was the third vehicle? 
 
"A:  I hadn't yet seen the third vehicle 
coming.  When the truck come by, like I said, they 
travel 55 miles an hour, so everything was like 
within split seconds of one another.  Once the 
tractor-trailer came by I raised my head, and that's 
 
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when I noticed another vehicle had come down from 
the bottom of the tunnel and was working its way 
towards me. 
 
"Q:  All right.  And at any time while you were 
walking that tunnel, did you hear anything in the 
tunnel, other than the sound of traffic? 
 
"A:  Yes.  After the tractor-trailer had 
practically gotten by me and my head was still down 
I heard some people yelling in the tunnel. 
 
"Q:  What kind of yelling did you hear? 
 
"A:  Like catcalls.  Just somebody whooping it 
up coming through there. 
 
"Q:  All right.  And tell us, from the time 
period of hearing the whooping it up until the time 
that something happened to you how much time passed? 
 
"A:  It's hard to say.  Maybe two to three 
seconds.  It was – it was that fast. 
 
"Q:  All right.  And what if anything happened 
during those two to three seconds?  What did you – 
what did you see, hear, feel, anything about that?  
Tell us what – 
 
"A:  Just after I heard the voices I lift my 
head, started walking.  The car was approaching and 
then I was hit with something, and that's it. 
 
"Q:  Do you have any idea what you were hit 
with? 
 
"A:  At the time, no. 
 
"Q:  At the time did you have any idea?  Did 
you see – 
 
"A:  No, I didn't.  Once it hit me I was out 
cold." 
 
 
During cross-examination at trial, Terry gave the 
following testimony about the accident: 
 
"Q:  All right.  Now, you say . . . that you 
were aware of three vehicles? 
 
"A:  I was – 
 
"Q:  Is that my understanding? 
 
"A:  Not necessarily that area.  I was aware of 
three vehicles that had come my direction in my 
approach down to the bottom of the tunnel. 
 
"Q:  The first one was an automobile, right? 
 
"A:  Yes. 
 
"Q:  The second one was a tractor-trailer? 
 
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"A:  Yes. 
"Q:  And when the tractor-trailer passed you, 
you were not aware of the third one? 
 
"Q:  Not at that -- no. 
 
"A:  All right.  And you have indicated that 
you got -- thought something happened just 
milliseconds after the tractor-trailer had passed 
you, right? 
 
"A:  Yes. 
 
"Q:  And in those milliseconds, you had lifted 
your head and had observed that there was another 
automobile approaching from the bottom of the 
tunnel, right? 
 
"A:  Yes. 
 
"Q:  Okay.  So, there was no vehicle right 
there behind the tractor-trailer, correct? 
 
"A:  Not that I'm aware of, no. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Q:  Other than the automobile approaching from 
the bottom of the tunnel?  But you didn't see 
anything airborne coming towards your body, true? 
 
"A:  No, I did not.   
 
"Q:  You don't know what struck you, if 
anything, true? 
 
"A:  Yes, that's true. 
 
"Q:  All right.  You don't know if there was 
something that came towards you and struck you?  You 
don't know where it came from, true? 
 
"A:  Well, no.  Whatever struck me come from my 
front, because it hit me on my head on my right 
side. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Q:  All right.  And you can't tell us whether 
it came from a vehicle's passenger side or the 
driver's side, true? 
 
"A:  That's true. 
"Q:  The catcalls, the yell or what have you, 
was something that you heard, but couldn't identify 
where it came from; is that true? 
"A:  Well, it's something I heard.  It came 
from inside the tunnel." 
 
 
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Raymond R. Gray, Jr., who was also a safety service 
patrolman at the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel, responded to the 
accident scene.  He found Terry unconscious, lying in one of 
the eastbound traffic lanes of the tunnel.  Terry had a "huge 
knot" that looked like a "golf ball" on the side of his head.  
Gray found "pieces of glass all around" Terry. 
Robert Mauldin, a traffic control supervisor at the 
Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel, also responded to the accident 
location.  He also found broken glass in the vicinity where 
Terry was injured. 
 
Doe argues that Terry failed to establish that the 
defendant was negligent.  Continuing, Doe asserts that Terry 
did not present evidence that Doe was the individual who threw 
the object that injured the plaintiff.  Responding, Terry 
contends that he presented evidence that would permit the jury 
to infer that Doe was the individual who threw the bottle that 
injured the plaintiff.  We disagree with Terry. 
 
This Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff in a tort 
action must establish negligence by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  For example, over 100 years ago, we stated in 
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Heath, 103 Va. 64, 66-67, 48 S.E. 
508, 508-09 (1904): 
 
"The party who affirms negligence must 
establish it by proof sufficient to satisfy 
 
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reasonable and well balanced minds.  The evidence 
must show more than a probability of a negligent 
act.  An inference cannot be drawn from a 
presumption, but must be founded upon some fact 
legally established.  This Court has repeatedly held 
that when liability depends upon carelessness or 
fault of a person, or his agents, the right of 
recovery depends upon the same being shown by 
competent evidence, and it is incumbent upon such a 
plaintiff to furnish evidence to show how and why 
the accident occurred – some fact or facts by which 
it can be determined by the jury, and not be left 
entirely to conjecture, guess or random judgment, 
upon mere supposition, without a single known fact.  
C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Sparrow, 98 Va. 630-641, 37 S.E. 
302; N. & W. R. R. Co. v. Cromer's Adm'x., 99 Va. 
763-765, 40 S.E. 54; Southern R. R. Co. v. Hall's 
Adm'r., 102 Va. 135, 45 S.E. 867." 
 
Accord Virginia Ry. & P. Co. v. Winstead, 119 Va. 326, 333, 89 
S.E. 83, 85 (1916). 
 
This basic tort principle has remained intact, without 
equivocation, and we restated this rule in Waters v. Holloman, 
216 Va. 726, 730, 222 S.E.2d 549, 552-53 (1976) (quoting 
Weddle v. Draper, 204 Va. 319, 322, 130 S.E.2d 462, 465 
(1963)): 
"Negligence cannot be presumed from the mere 
happening of an accident.  The burden is on the 
plaintiff who alleges negligence to produce evidence 
of preponderating weight from which the jury can 
find that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
which was a proximate cause of the accident.  The 
evidence produced must prove more than a probability 
of negligence and any inferences therefrom must be 
based on facts, not on presumptions.  It is 
incumbent on the plaintiff who alleges negligence to 
show why and how the accident happened, and if that 
is left to conjecture, guess or random judgment, he 
cannot recover." 
 
7
 
We recently reaffirmed this fundamental precept in Blue Ridge 
Service Corp. v. Saxon Shoes, 271 Va. 206, 218, 624 S.E.2d 55, 
62 (2006):  "It is incumbent on the plaintiff who alleges 
negligence to show why and how the accident happened, and if 
that is left to conjecture, guess or random judgment, he 
cannot recover."  
When a plaintiff files a negligence action against an 
unidentified motorist, the plaintiff has the burden of proof 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
unknown driver of the motor vehicle was guilty of negligence.  
See e.g., Lawson v. Doe, 239 Va. 477, 481-82, 391 S.E.2d 333, 
335 (1990).  And, as we have already stated, the plaintiff 
must produce evidence that proves more than a probability of 
the unknown driver's negligence and any inferences therefrom 
must be based on facts, not presumptions.  Weddle, 204 Va. at 
322, 130 S.E.2d at 465. 
The plaintiff in this case, Terry, failed to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that John Doe, the driver of 
the unknown vehicle, was negligent.  There is no evidence in 
the record that would permit a finder of fact to infer that 
the driver of the unknown vehicle was the individual who threw 
the bottle that struck Terry.  The plaintiff, who was the only 
witness to the accident who testified at trial, stated that 
 
8
there were three vehicles in the tunnel, and that he was 
injured after two of the vehicles passed him.  After the 
tractor-trailer passed the plaintiff, he heard someone 
"yelling" and "voices."  The plaintiff testified:  "Just after 
I heard the voices I lift [sic] my head, started walking.  The 
car was approaching and then I was hit with something, and 
that's it."  The plaintiff's own testimony demonstrates that 
there may have been more than one person in the vehicle from 
which the plaintiff alleges someone threw the bottle that 
injured him. 
The plaintiff does not know whether the unknown driver of 
the car threw the bottle or whether a passenger threw the 
bottle.  He has no idea who threw the bottle.  In response to 
the question, "And you can't tell us whether it [the object 
that struck you] came from a vehicle's passenger side or the 
driver's side, true?," the plaintiff responded, "That's true."  
The plaintiff's conclusion that the driver of the unidentified 
vehicle threw the bottle is based on conjecture, guess, or 
random judgment.  This conclusion is not based upon any fact 
in the record before this Court. 
Terry testified that he heard voices in the tunnel.  We 
are compelled to infer from Terry's direct testimony that 
those voices emanated from the car that the unknown driver was 
 
9
operating.  Even if the voices did not emanate from the car 
that the unknown driver was operating, Terry's testimony that 
he heard voices indicated that other persons were in the 
tunnel, and one of those persons may have thrown the bottle 
that injured Terry.  Terry has the responsibility to present 
evidence from which the jury could infer the driver of the 
unknown vehicle threw the bottle.  The plaintiff failed to 
present such evidence.* 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment 
of the circuit court and enter final judgment on behalf of 
John Doe. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE LEMONS 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that John Doe 
was negligent.  I would therefore affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment in favor of Russell Terry. 
 
The majority’s holding today departs from several well-
established principles.  First, the jury, not this Court, 
determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of 
                     
* In view of our holding, we need not consider the 
litigants' remaining arguments. 
 
10
the evidence.  See Southern Floors & Acoustics, Inc. v. Max-
Yeboah, 267 Va. 682, 686, 594 S.E.2d 908, 911 (2004) 
(“Determining the credibility and the weight of the evidence 
is the province of . . . the jury.”).  Second, “[i]f there is 
evidence to sustain the verdict, this [C]ourt should not 
overrule it and substitute its own judgment, even if its 
opinion might differ from that of the jury.”  Snyder v. 
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1016, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1961).  
Third, a verdict should stand “[w]hen conflicting inferences 
have been resolved by a jury and those necessarily underlying 
the conclusion reflected in the verdict are reasonably 
deducible from the evidence.”  Henderson v. Gay, 245 Va. 478, 
481, 429 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1993).  Finally, Terry, as the 
prevailing party in the circuit court, is entitled to have the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences viewed in the light 
most favorable to him.  Atrium Unit Owners Ass’n v. King, 266 
Va. 288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 547 (2003). 
With these principles in mind, I conclude, unlike the 
majority, that Terry proved how and why the accident happened.  
As the majority tacitly acknowledges, the jury could have 
reasonably inferred from the evidence showing glass and a 
piece of a bottle in close proximity to Terry’s body that the 
object that struck him in the forehead was a bottle.  Nor does 
 
11
the majority dispute that the jury could likewise have 
reasonably inferred that the bottle emanated from the third 
vehicle that passed Terry in the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel 
(the Tunnel) on the morning of the accident.  Terry 
affirmatively stated that the object did not originate from 
the tractor-trailer because that vehicle had already passed 
him when he was struck, and he testified that the object hit 
him within moments of seeing the third vehicle approaching 
from the bottom of the Tunnel and hearing the “catcalls.”  We 
also know the third vehicle was being operated at the time of 
Terry’s accident and the identity of its driver is unknown.  
It is therefore not conjecture or speculation to conclude that 
Doe was present in the Tunnel when the bottle struck Terry. 
 
Thus, the primary issue upon which this appeal turns is 
whether the jury could have reasonably inferred from the facts 
presented that Doe threw the bottle, i.e., that he was 
negligent.  The majority concludes that Terry’s testimony 
indicated there may have been more than one person in the 
third vehicle and that, since he could not say whether the 
offending object came from the passenger or driver side of the 
vehicle, Terry’s “conclusion that the driver of the 
unidentified vehicle threw the bottle is based on conjecture, 
guess, or random judgment.”  I disagree. 
 
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In my view, reasonable minds could draw different 
inferences from the evidence in this case, and under such 
circumstances, it is incumbent upon the reviewing court to 
respect the inference actually drawn by the fact finder.  See 
Hoar v. Great Eastern Resort Mgmt., Inc., 256 Va. 374, 388, 
506 S.E.2d 777, 786 (1998) (“A verdict may be properly based 
upon reasonable inferences drawn from the facts. If facts are 
present from which proper inferences may be drawn this is 
sufficient.”) (quoting Northern Virginia Power Co. v. Bailey, 
194 Va. 464, 470, 73 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1952)); see also Snyder, 
202 Va. at 1016, 121 S.E.2d at 457.  Terry testified that just 
prior to something striking the front, right side of his 
forehead, he heard what he described variously as “some people 
yelling in the [T]unnel” and “catcalls” like “somebody 
whooping it up coming through there.”  Thus, while the jury 
could reasonably have inferred from part of Terry’s testimony 
that there was more than one person in the third vehicle, the 
jury also could have reasonably inferred that Terry heard 
“catcalls” from a single occupant of the third vehicle.  Our 
prior decisions counsel against disturbing the fact finder’s 
resolution of conflicting inferences in favor of the party 
prevailing at trial.  Henderson, 245 Va. at 481, 429 S.E.2d at 
16 (jury is “free to choose among all reasonable inferences” 
 
13
that can be deduced from the evidence); Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 
578, 582, 260 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1979). 
 
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s apparent 
belief that Terry’s burden included an obligation to 
affirmatively disprove the presence of a passenger in the 
vehicle driven by Doe.  Terry’s inability to say whether the 
bottle came from the driver or passenger side of the third 
vehicle did not reduce the jury’s verdict to speculation.  In 
the absence of any affirmative evidence with regard to whether 
there was or was not a passenger in that vehicle, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred that the unknown driver of the 
vehicle threw the bottle.  Terry did not have to prove that 
there was not a passenger in the vehicle in order for the jury 
to have drawn that inference. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.∗ 
                     
∗ I also find no merit in Doe’s second assignment of error 
challenging the timing of the circuit court’s finding that 
Terry’s injuries arose out of the use of a vehicle.  Normally, 
the issue of coverage afforded by an insurance policy is 
decided in a motion for declaratory judgment.  See Rodgers v. 
Danko, 204 Va. 140, 143, 129 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1963).  However, 
based on the record in this case, I cannot say the circuit 
court erred in finding that the parties, prior to the jury 
trial, agreed to submit the coverage issue to it for 
resolution.