Case Title: Rowan v. Rowan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rowan v. Rowan1990 WY 15786 P.2d 886Case Number: 89-73Decided: 02/08/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES STEPHEN ROWAN, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

TAMMY BETH ROWAN, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, John T. Langdon, J.

Ronald G. 
Pretty, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Rhonda Sigrist 
Woodard, Hanes, Burke & Woodard, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The primary 
question to be resolved in this case is whether it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to award initial child support of $200 per month for each of 
two minor children, which amount was to be increased to $250 per month after 
three months and to $300 per month two months later, in light of the decision of 
the father to return to college to train for a career different from the one he 
had been pursuing immediately prior to the divorce. Additional questions are 
presented with respect to whether the trial court committed an abuse of 
discretion in refusing to receive into evidence a diary kept by the father; in 
terminating the appointment of a guardian ad litem; and in defining the 
visitation rights for the father. The father urged that the amount of child 
support should have been determined by the amount of his earnings while he was 
pursuing his education for a different career; the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem should have been continued even though the children were residing in 
another state and no meaningful communication was occurring between them and the 
guardian ad litem; the court should have permitted the introduction into 
evidence of a diary the father kept during his visitation periods that 
incorporated comments by the children; and the court erred in apparently 
preferring the interests of the children over those of the noncustodial parent 
in setting visitation privileges. We find no abuse of discretion in the Judgment 
and Decree entered by the trial court, and it is affirmed.

[¶2]      In his statement 
of the issues, the father sets out these propositions:

"I. Did the court err by 
its refusal to allow the children their own input into the divorce. Should the 
court have terminated the employment of the Guardian-Ad-Litem such as to deny 
the children their due process right and was the court in error for not allowing 
the visitation diary of the plaintiff to be introduced such as to allow the 
court some input as to the children's feelings.

"II. In the determination 
of visitation rights for the noncustodial parent: Should the court give 
preference to the interests of the children or of the noncustodial 
parent.

"III. Was the child 
support level set by the court unequitable and too high given the Appellant's 
income at the present time. Should the court have set the child support level at 
the Appellant's income that he had prior to being terminated from his employment 
or at his present income."

In her brief, as 
appellee, the mother states these to be the issues:

"I. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in finding that a guardian ad litem was not 
necessary in order to protect the best interests of the minor children of the 
parties in this case.

"II. Whether the 
visitation schedule ordered by the district court was within its 
discretion.

"III. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to pay the child support set 
forth in the judgment and decree.

"IV. Whether appellant 
should be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees for filing an appeal 
without reasonable cause for appeal."

[¶3]      This divorce 
action was filed on October 19, 1987. It had its actual inception when the wife 
left the marital home, taking the children with her. The principal focus of the 
conflict was over who would have custody of the children, the mother or the 
father. While the case was pending, the father was allowed to have the children 
for a period of visitation. When the visit occurred, he assumed custody of the 
children and moved in with his parents who had frequently cared for the children 
while both the mother and father worked. Eventually, the district court placed 
temporary custody of the children with the mother pending the entry of the final 
decree of divorce.

[¶4]      On March 9, 1988, 
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, a guardian ad litem was appointed to 
represent the children. Although the record is not entirely clear as to why a 
guardian ad litem was appointed, we understand that the husband sought the 
appointment of, and was willing to pay for, the services of the guardian ad 
litem because he wanted the children to have some input into whether their 
custody should be placed with the mother or the father. We note that the 
children were three years old and eight months old at the time the divorce was 
commenced. The record does not demonstrate what contribution, if any, the 
guardian ad litem made in these proceedings, but it does show he requested to be 
relieved of his duties. His request was granted on June 14, 
1988.

[¶5]      We first address 
the issue relating to the award of child support payments from the father to the 
mother. The pertinent provisions of the decree are:

"[THE COURT] FINDS as 
follows:

"4. [Father] has a duty 
to provide toward the support of the minor children. [Father] has a bachelor's 
degree and master's degree in business administration and management, and is 
reasonably capable of providing toward the children's support in an amount which 
begins at $200 per month per child and increases to $300 per month per child on 
May 1, 1989;

"5. Although [father] was 
terminated from his employment in July, 1988, his unemployment from July, 1988, 
until shortly before November 8, 1988, was due to his choice not to seek 
employment. [Father's] current level of employment is due to his choosing to 
work part-time and pursue a Ph.D. rather than seek a job for which he is 
presently qualified;

* * * * * 
*

"WHEREFORE, IT IS 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED;

"4. Commencing December 
1, 1988, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, the [father] 
shall pay to [mother] through the Clerk of the Court of Laramie County District 
Court in Cheyenne, Wyoming, the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200) per month per 
child for the support of [daughter] and [son] until March 1, 1989, at which time 
he shall pay the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250) per month per child on 
the first day of each month until May 1, 1989, when said payments shall become 
Three Hundred Dollars ($300) per month per child and shall continue on the first 
day of each month thereafter until the children reach the age of nineteen years 
or become emancipated."

The father urges 
that the amount of child support should have been determined by the amount of 
his earnings while he was pursuing his education to prepare and qualify him for 
a different career. He contends, as he did in the trial court, that he was 
unable to make such support payments because of his low earnings at the time the 
divorce was granted and because of his decision to return to college to train 
for a different career than the one he had been pursuing immediately prior to 
the divorce. He vigorously asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
in making its determination concerning child support 
payments.

[¶6]      The decision of 
the district court to set child support at $300 per month per child was clearly 
within its discretion. We have held previously that voluntary assumption of 
obligations which interfere with a parent's ability to pay child support will 
not sustain a petition to have the child support obligation changed. See Booker 
v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1981); Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1986). 
The district court's decision to set child support at a level consistent with 
the father's earning capacity, rather than with his desire not to work full-time 
and, instead, pursue a new career goal, is not an abuse of discretion. As we 
noted in Nuspl, ascertainment of the compromise between the obligations of a 
parent to pay child support, and the voluntary assumption of obligations by that 
parent which interfere with the former obligation, rests in the sound discretion 
of the trial court after its consideration of all the proper and relevant 
circumstances. Here, the district court took into account all relevant and 
proper circumstances, and we perceive no abuse of 
discretion.

[¶7]      The father's 
concern is that he is charged with making child support payments that are 
excessive in light of his income while attending college to qualify him for an 
alternative career. In this proceeding, the issue is the propriety of the 
amount, not the collectibility, of the child support payments. As we have noted, 
the father chose to pursue a different career rather than continue the 
employment for which he already was qualified. In light of the facts and 
circumstances, there is no abuse of discretion, or even unfairness, in providing 
for an adequate amount for child support.

[¶8]      The principal 
focus of appellant's issue relating to the guardian ad litem is the district 
court's decision to discontinue the use of the guardian ad litem to represent 
the children's interests in this divorce. The father urged that the appointment 
should have been continued even though the children were residing in another 
state and no meaningful communication was occurring between them and the 
guardian ad litem. Appellant noted in his brief that sixteen states allow, or 
require, the appointment of a guardian ad litem in child custody matters, 
although he cited no statutes. No such requirement exists under Wyoming law and, 
to the extent that the guardian ad litem served any function in this case, it 
was merely as a convenience to the district court. More important to our 
disposition of this issue, however, the record demonstrates that appellant made 
no concrete objection in the district court to the withdrawal of the guardian ad 
litem. In fact, none of these issues, which appellant has so superficially 
called to our attention in this appeal, were called to the attention of the 
district court at all. Hence, we apply our usual rule that an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court absent special 
circumstances. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1989). No such special 
circumstances are present here.

[¶9]      Coupled with the 
guardian ad litem issue, the father pursued, as a related issue, the trial 
court's refusal to admit as evidence a diary that he had kept in which he had 
chronicled the time he spent with his children, their activities together, and 
concerns the children expressed to him about the behavior they observed in the 
mother's home. The father argued that the court should have permitted the diary 
to be introduced into evidence. Although the admissibility of this diary, which 
appears to be filled primarily with self-serving observations by the father, is 
very doubtful, we choose to rely on a more fundamental rule concerning 
admissibility of evidence which obviates the need to determine whether the diary 
was, or was not, admissible. In a case tried to the court, a ruling erroneously 
excluding evidence is ordinarily considered harmless if other evidence has been 
allowed on the same point, the theory being that the evidence erroneously 
excluded would have been merely cumulative. Harrington v. Harrington, 660 P.2d 356 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting, 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 20 
at 111-12 (1977)). An abundance of evidence was presented on the custody issue 
from both parents, friends, relatives, and mental health professionals. 
Admission of the diary, even if it could somehow have been considered properly 
admissible, would have been mere surplusage, and the refusal of its admission 
was harmless under these circumstances. 

[¶10]   In support of his second issue, the 
father argues that the district court abused its discretion in implementing a 
visitation schedule which made it virtually impossible for the father to visit 
his children, and that the court erred in apparently preferring the interests of 
the children over those of the non-custodial parent in establishing visitation 
privileges. This argument is directly opposed to the language of Section 
20-2-113, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), which states, in pertinent 
part:

"(a) In granting a 
divorce * * *, the court may make such disposition of the children as appears 
most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children." (Emphasis 
added.)

The definition 
of rights of visitation is an aspect of the determination of custody, and it has 
been our consistent principle that in custody matters the welfare and needs of 
the children are to be given paramount consideration. E.g., Fanning v. Fanning, 
717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1982); Leitner 
v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1965). The decision of the trial court with 
respect to such matters will not be disturbed by this court unless we can 
identify a clear abuse of discretion. Bereman; Gill v. Gill, 363 P.2d 86 (Wyo. 
1961); Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1 (1926).

[¶11]   The record shows that when the 
divorce decree was entered, the mother had moved to Las Vegas, Nevada, where she 
had found suitable employment, and the father had moved to Greeley, Colorado, 
where he was pursuing an advanced degree in psychology. The father essentially 
argues that the visitation order generally used by the district court should 
have been implemented rather than the one that was used. We note, at the outset, 
that the visitation provisions usually found in divorce decrees involve parents 
who still live within the same geographic area, if not within the same 
community. Clearly, this case does not fit the usual pattern. The visitation 
schedule established by the district court provided:

"[The father] shall have 
one 11 day visitation period at his residence, counting traveling to and from 
same, in the months of September, November, March and May in the even numbered 
years. During the odd-numbered years, commencing in 1989, he shall have one 11 
day visitation period at his residence, counting traveling to and from same, in 
the months of October, December, April and June. It is contemplated that 
November and December visitations shall encompass Thanksgiving and Christmas. 
During November and December, the children shall be returned to [the mother's] 
residence on the day before the last day of the month. During the other months, 
visitation shall commence on the fifth (5th) day of the month and shall 
terminate on the fifteenth (15th) day of the month. Visitation shall begin no 
earlier than 9:00 a.m. and terminate not later than 5:00 p.m., local time of the 
residence of [mother], and all shall be at [father's] regular place of 
abode.

"During those months that 
[the father] does not have regular 11 day visitations he shall be entitled to a 
weekend visitation with the children, commencing at 9:00 a.m. Saturday morning 
and terminating at 5:00 p.m. Sunday evening. During the weekend visits, the 
children shall remain within ten miles of [the mother's] 
residence.

"[The father] shall be 
responsible for all expenses incident to initiation and termination of 
visitation periods. No such visitation shall interfere with the programmed 
educational training of the children. [The father] shall keep [the mother] 
notified of where the children can be reached during all weekend visitations and 
any planned deviation from his regular place of abode during the 11 day 
visitation. When the older child reaches school age, this visitation will be 
modified so as not to interfere with regular school 
activities."

[¶12]   The record reflects, and the 
parties do not dispute, that this visitation schedule was implemented, at least 
in part, based on testimony of a psychologist who testified concerning a young 
child's need, especially during the formative years, to be with the parent with 
whom the child has most closely bonded and not to be absented from that parent 
for periods of time much longer than ten days. The district judge acknowledged 
this need in his decision letter. We have held that the establishment of 
visitation schedules is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such 
determinations will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion. In Henson v. 
Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1963), we noted that:

"Courts, though they be 
possessed of the reputed wisdom of Solomon, are conscious of their human 
fallibility, and the law recognizes that man is without that fore-vision which 
ensures that his judgment of today will, in light of unforeseen new conditions, 
prove to be adequate or even proper tomorrow."

[¶13]   We conclude upon review of this 
record, that the visitation schedule established by the district court was 
within its sound discretion and was, perhaps, a device approaching Solomon's 
wisdom in resolving the bitter dispute that arose between these parents. We can 
only hope that the parents are better able, and more willing, to consider the 
children's best interests since time and circumstances will no doubt necessitate 
future alterations to the visitation schedule imposed at the time of the divorce 
decree. The briefs reveal that the father has not taken advantage of the 
visitation schedule, and has not seen his children, since November of 1988 
because of the difficulties it imposed upon him. That is purely a matter of 
choice on his part. It is our perception that the schedule is fair and 
reasonable considering the ages of the children. In summary, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the visitation schedule imposed by the district 
court.

[¶14]   The mother, as appellee, asks that 
we certify that there was no reasonable cause for this appeal pursuant to Rule 
10.05, W.R.A.P. We have carefully and thoughtfully considered this request and 
decline to make the certification. Appellee shall recover the other costs 
provided for in Rule 10.05.

[¶15]   The Judgment and Decree of the 
district court is affirmed.