Case Title: Resor v. Resor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-158

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Resor v. Resor1999 WY 118987 P.2d 146Case Number: 98-158Decided: 08/12/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JOHN 
LAWLER RESOR, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

SARAH PHELPS RESOR, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Teton County Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, 
Judge.

Kim D. Cannon 
and Kathleen G. Healy of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. 
Cannon, representing appellant.

Weston W. Reeves 
of Reeves & Miller, Casper, Wyoming, representing 
appellee.

Katherine L. 
Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming, guardian ad 
litem.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      John Lawler Resor 
(Father) appeals from the district court's order establishing primary physical 
custody of their children with Sarah Phelps Resor (Mother). After examining the 
record, we find the district court considered all of the evidence before it and 
properly used its discretionary power when it determined it was in the best 
interest of the children to be in Mother's physical custody with liberal 
visitation privileges to Father. Contrary to Father's assertions, the decision 
was not based on gender, and the district court clearly considered and provided 
for Mother's relocation to Seattle, Washington, when making its custody 
decision.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Father presents 
the following statement of the issues:

I. Did the trial 
court err in making a custody determination based on a stereotypical assignment 
of the "primary caregiver" label, instead of an articulation of the "best 
interests" of the children?

II. Did the 
trial court fail to exercise its discretion by automatically allowing relocation 
of the children to Seattle without determining whether relocation would be in 
the children's "best interests"?

III. Did the 
trial court fail to apply an appropriate two-step analysis to determine whether 
the move was in the children's "best interests" and whether there were 
sufficient reasons for the move?

Mother submits 
this statement of issues:

I. Whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in the best 
interest of the parties' two minor children to place primary custody in their 
mother, the appellee, subject to extensive visitation rights for the 
father.

II. Whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give primary custody to the 
father because of the mother's intention to move out of Jackson, 
Wyoming.

The Guardian Ad 
Litem submitted a brief as well, presenting the following issue 
statement:

Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion when it permitted relocation of the minor children 
without first determining whether the relocation was in the children's best 
interests[?]

FACTS

[¶3]      The parties were 
married on August 12, 1989, in Teton County, Wyoming. Two children were born of 
the marriage. The first child was born on January 1, 1992, and the second was 
born July 15, 1995. The children resided with their parents in Teton County, 
Wyoming, since their birth. On September 16, 1996, Mother filed a complaint 
asking for a divorce, joint legal custody and primary physical custody with 
Mother, child support, maintenance, attorney's fees, and equitable distribution 
of the parties' debts and assets. Father's answer concerning custody requested 
primary physical custody of the children or joint custody of the children with 
Father exercising primary physical custody, subject to reasonable visitation by 
Mother.

[¶4]      On January 28, 
1997, the district court entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem to 
represent the best interests of the children. On January 30, 1997, the district 
court entered an order concerning temporary custody which provided for shared 
custody as follows:

The parties 
shall share equally in the custody of the minor children during the pendency of 
this action. Custody shall be alternated on a weekly basis commencing Friday 
nights at 6:00 p.m. [Father's] first week of custody shall commence Friday, 
January 31, 1997 at 6:00 p.m.

[¶5]      At the time of 
the temporary order, the trial was scheduled for June 2, 1997. However, the 
trial was delayed until December 17, 1997, leaving the temporary custody order 
in place for nearly one year, rather than four months. The parties conducted 
discovery, designated experts to testify about the custody issue, and presented 
evidence to the district court in a threeday trial. The district court ruled 
from the bench on December 19, 1997, then filed a decree of divorce on February 
25, 1998. The district court awarded joint legal custody to both parents, but 
primary physical custody to Mother with liberal visitation to Father. Father 
filed this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      Our standard of 
review in domestic relation matters was succinctly stated in Reavis v. Reavis, 
955 P.2d 428 (Wyo. 1998):

Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court. It has been our consistent principle that in custody 
matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount 
consideration. The determination of the best interests of the child is a 
question for the trier of fact. We do not overturn the decision of the trial 
court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a 
violation of some legal principle.

[¶7]      A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the district court's decision, and we afford to the 
prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Findings of fact not supported by 
the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the 
evidence cannot be sustained. Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present when 
a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.

Id. at 431 
(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Appellant argues 
the district court failed to make factual findings to support its decision and 
that failure requires reversal of the trial court, or alternatively, "a remand 
to make findings under Reavis. . . ." We reversed in Reavis because there was no 
evidence to support the court's decision, not because it did not make findings 
of fact. Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 434. In Reavis, we suggested that the trial court 
spell out its reasons so that counsel and the reviewing court will know what 
those reasons are, and be in a position to evaluate the soundness of its 
decision. Id. at 431-32. We continue to encourage a trial court relying on 
discretionary power to place on record the circumstances and factors that were 
crucial to its determination. However, it is not required to do 
so.

[¶9]      Additionally, our 
rules do not require the trial court to issue findings of fact "unless one of 
the parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view 
of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in 
the trial." W.R.C.P. 52(a). The district court's scheduling order informed the 
parties "[r] equests for findings of fact or conclusions of law shall be filed 
along with the pretrial memoranda." Neither party made such a request and, as 
such, Father will not be heard to complain of the absence of formal findings. 

[¶10]   In any event, the district court 
made the following announcement from the bench:

The factors that 
I considered as far as the custody of [the children] - and I'm certain we'll all 
agree as we're sitting here that really the most important matter before the 
Court for these last three days was the custody of those two little 
boys.

I took into 
consideration the interaction and the relationship of those two little boys with 
their parents, with their grandparents and also others, who, through the 
testimony, it became quite obvious to the Court that there were others who 
significantly affected [the children].

Also, the 
children's adjustment to their home, school and community; the mental and 
physical health of both Mr. and Mrs. Resor; also the stability of both parents; 
and the report, as I said, of the guardian ad litem.

* * 
*

Also one of the 
- especially with children of this age, a very important factor - and I'm not 
saying the most important factor - but for the Court to consider is who the 
primary caregiver has been.

I saw - and I 
advised counsel of this in chambers this afternoon, Mr. and Mrs. Resor - I saw 
two very loving, fit, capable and caring parents. And in that regard, [the 
children] are most fortunate.

Of course, 
ideally, they should be living with you as a family. But you can't live together 
as husband and wife, and so that's the reason obviously that we've been here, 
that we are here.

I considered 
Mrs. Mead's report, or recommendation, Dr. Hickman, Dr. Enright, and I cannot 
imagine that this temporary custody of one week with the mother and one week 
with the father has been very good for these two small boys, even though there 
was testimony that it really had not been that 
devastating.

I also can't put 
myself in the shoes of Judge Rogers, but I have a feeling that if he would have 
known that that temporary order for custody would go on for - I think it's been 
eleven months - that he probably wouldn't have entered such an 
order.

I have not 
talked to Judge Rogers about it, so I - that's just - I just can't imagine. I 
guess I can't imagine ordering that for eleven months with these two small 
boys.

I do not know 
that I've seen - and I mean this, Mr. Resor - a more devoted, loving father, and 
a hands-on father, as I've seen, as you testified, and also as Dr. Enright 
testified, as well as many other witnesses. Also the family support that those 
young boys have in this community is most impressive. And like I say, they're 
just two lucky little boys.

I also observed, 
Mrs. Resor, and as I told counsel, I feel she's a very devoted, loving, 
conscientious, committed mother. And she's also most fortunate to have the love 
and support of an extended - of a large family.

I am going to 
award - I'm going to - it's going to be what I consider joint legal custody, but 
with primary physical custody to Mrs. Resor. I'm not going to make any kind of a 
ruling that Mrs. Resor can or cannot move out of the 
valley.

The primary 
physical custody for Mrs. Resor will be - she will have the primary physical 
custody of [the children] during the school year with very liberal visitation to 
Mr. Resor. That includes a minimum of one weekend per month. If Mrs. Resor does 
decide to move to Seattle, according to what I understood the testimony of Mrs. 
Resor to be, the school in which she plans on enrolling [the older child] does 
allow for probably a three or maybe even four weekends a month. If that is going 
to be the case, I would - I am going to require that Mrs. Resor accompany the 
children to Jackson for these - for this monthly weekend 
visit.

I am also going 
to order that immediately upon enrollment of [the older child] in St. John's 
school, if you do decide to move to Seattle, that you are to immediately supply 
Mr. Resor with the school schedule so he can plan 
accordingly.

Also, any time 
that Mr. Resor is - if he gives you reasonable notice - I'm not going to say 24 
hours or 48 hours, maybe it might only be six hours of notice to Mrs. Resor that 
he's going to be in Seattle, if you are in Seattle, that he's to be allowed 
visitation.

I'm going to at 
this time - well, not at this time. I'm going to give Mr. Resor almost complete 
summer visitation, which is unusual. Usually courts only give six to eight 
weeks. But I feel that because of the summer, that will be so important to those 
young boys to be with Mr. Resor and his family.

I'm going to 
order that the summer visitation start three days after school is out and that 
the boys are to be back one week before school starts.

Of course, Mr. 
Resor, during this summer visitation - when you have custody or visitation in 
the summer, that if Mrs. Resor wishes to visit the children upon reasonable 
notice, she should be allowed to do so.

I'm going to 
order that only three major holidays, Thanksgiving, Christmas and Easter/Spring 
Break be alternated. And if the parties - this is just the beginning. It's the 
end of this phase of your life, but just the beginning of an awfully lot of hard 
work, I think, on both of your parts, to cooperate and to communicate. And 
unless counsel would want me to, or the parties, I could split Christmas 
vacation up to have one of the parties have Christmas up to Christmas morning 
and then the other half of the Christmas vacation go to the other party. But I'm 
not going to do that unless counsel wants me to.

Maybe if - maybe 
it will be necessary. But I'm going to, as I said, just alternate the three 
holidays, Thanksgiving, Christmas and Easter/Spring Break.

This has been 
especially - these always are hard, but especially hard, because I saw sitting 
before me two intelligent people who are still, I think, very bitter about many 
things. And I can't tell you how important it is that you put aside that 
acrimony. Because after all - and I know you both were sincere when you both 
said to this Court that those two little boys were the most important thing in 
your lives, and I am also confident that neither one of you - neither one or 
both of you will ever sully or deprecate the other parent in front of the other, 
and as well as the families, the Resors and the Phelps, that they will not do 
that either.

We find the 
trial court's decision to be well-reasoned. After hearing considerable evidence, 
the court made a finding that the mother was the primary care-giver of these 
children. We find no indication that the decision was based on gender. As 
evident from the above trial transcript excerpt, the trial court did explain its 
reasoning in the case at bar.

[¶11]   Father insists that Mother either 
give up her plans to relocate or give up the children and suggests that the 
court tell Mother where to live. Not only would such an endeavor be unwise, our 
decisions preclude us from doing so. See Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999); 
Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286-89 (Wyo. 1993). In Martin, we rejected the 
same anticipatory custody provision Father requested in this case. Martin v. 
Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 323 (Wyo. 1990). In that case, the trial court entered a 
joint custody order which provided that if either party moved from Laramie, 
Wyoming, primary custody would vest in the non-moving parent. This Court 
reversed, stating:

The district 
court's anticipatory conclusion that the best interests of the children will be 
served by a nine-month/three-month split in favor of the parent remaining in 
Laramie is an abuse of discretion. As noted above, the test for child custody is 
the best interests of the children, and such a decision cannot be made without 
the district court having before it all facts necessary to make such a 
determination. What those facts may be, if and when one or the other parent 
leaves Laramie, can only be pure speculation at this point in 
time.

Martin, 798 P.2d  
at 323.

[¶12]   We also addressed a parent's 
decision to relocate in Love. In that case the mother had custody during the 
school year and the father had custody over the summer. The divorce decree 
incorporated a stipulation between the parties requiring consent or a court 
order before the children could be moved from Sheridan. Over the next several 
years, both parents lived in Sheridan, and the father participated extensively 
in the children's lives and the children thrived. Love, 851 P.2d  at 1285. The 
mother then decided to move to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and requested 
permission pursuant to the decree. The father opposed the move, arguing that 
regular visitation would be impossible if it was allowed. Id. at 1289. He argued 
that the move would constitute a sufficient change of circumstances to merit 
modification of the custody order. Id. at 1285.

[¶13]   Although we recognized that "the 
current situation of custody and visitation has worked very well for both the 
children and their parents," we affirmed, holding that "`[s] o long as the court 
is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move and 
reasonable visitation is available to the remaining parent, removal should be 
granted.'" Id. at 1288-89 (quoting Arquilla v. Arquilla, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950 
(Ill. 1980)). We also observed, "[f]ather's change in visitation due to mother's 
relocation is unfortunate, but not an unusual result of divorce. " Id. at 1289. 
We concluded the mother had a good faith motive for relocating, although her 
plans were somewhat speculative. Id. So long as reasonable visitation is 
possible, relocation should not be sacrificed to maintain existing visitation. 
Id.

[¶14]   Father argues that the district 
court did not consider whether the move was in the best interests of the 
children. However, the court knew of Mother's plans to relocate and addressed 
the issue by establishing visitation and child support based on Mother's 
residence in Seattle, Washington. We reject Father's suggestion that our case 
law requires a two-part analysis for relocations in custody situations.1

[¶15]   We also reject Father's argument 
that Mother prove relocation is necessary. It is unrealistic to assume that 
divorced parents will remain in the same location after dissolution of the 
marriage or to exert pressure on them to do so. The district court's refusal to 
rule on the relocation issue was not an abdication of its responsibility, as 
Father suggests; rather, the district court's refusal to rule on Mother's 
possible relocation was correct. We recently discussed the constitutional 
implications of such a decision in Watt:

The 
constitutional question posed is whether the rights of a parent and the duty of 
the courts to adjudicate custody serve as a premise for restricting or 
inhibiting the freedom to travel of a citizen of the State of Wyoming and of the 
United States of America. We hold this to be impossible. The right of travel 
enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial parent to have the 
children move with that parent. This right is not to be denied, impaired, or 
disparaged unless clear evidence before the court demonstrates another 
substantial and material change of circumstance and establishes the detrimental 
effect of the move upon the children. While relocation certainly may be 
stressful to a child, the normal anxieties of a change of residence and the 
inherent difficulties that the increase in geographical distance between parents 
imposes are not considered to be "detrimental" factors.

[¶16]   The sound policy reasons which 
support this analysis were articulated by the Supreme Court of 
California:

As this case 
demonstrates, ours is an increasingly mobile society. Amici curiae point out 
that approximately one American in five changes residences each year. Economic 
necessity and remarriage account for the bulk of relocations. Because of the 
ordinary needs for both parents after a marital dissolution to secure or retain 
employment, pursue educational or career opportunities, or reside in the same 
location as a new spouse or other family or friends, it is unrealistic to assume 
that divorced parents will permanently remain in the same location after 
dissolution or to exert pressure on them to do so. It would also undermine the 
interest in minimizing costly litigation over custody and require the trial 
courts to "micromanage" family decisionmaking by second-guessing reasons for 
everyday decisions about career and family.

In re Marriage 
of Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th 25, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 444, 913 P.2d [473,] 480-81 [(1996)]. 
An inhibition upon the right to travel is never imposed upon the non-custodial 
parent who is free to move at will despite the location of the children. The 
motives of the noncustodial parent will not be questioned by the court with 
respect to such relocation, and the custodial parent has no power to inhibit it. 
The inherent inequities of such a situation stand as an additional reason that 
courts have concluded that custodial parents should be permitted to move with 
their children.

Watt, 971 P.2d  
at 615-16 (citations omitted).

[¶17]   In the case before us, the district 
court determined Mother was the primary care giver of these children and found 
it was in the best interest of the children to place them in the primary care 
and physical custody of Mother. Once that decision was made, the "necessity" of 
her move has little, if any, substantive bearing on her suitability to care for 
the children. Geographical relocation does not make a parent who has cared for 
the children less capable of maintaining parental responsibilities and 
obligations. Recently, the Washington Supreme Court insightfully 
explained:

[T]he practical 
result of a marriage dissolution is that parenting and family life will not be 
the same after dissolution. This is so even though a trial court may believe it 
is in the "best interests of the child" to continue to live in the same family 
unit. A child cannot escape the reality that his or her family is no longer the 
same. The trial court does not have the responsibility or the authority or the 
ability to create ideal circumstances for the family.

Marriage of 
Littlefield, 133 Wash. 2d 39, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash. 
1997).

[¶18]   As a final matter, the divided 
custody arrangement suggested by the guardian ad litem and Father are surprising 
and unrealistic. Our cases have consistently and clearly disfavored divided 
custody arrangements. See Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431-34 (Wyo. 1998); 
Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321 (Wyo. 1990); Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 
1098 (Wyo. 1986); Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1055 n. 3 (Wyo. 1983). We 
commend the trial judge for making a difficult and courageous decision, rather 
than trying to keep both parents happy at the expense of the children. 
Considering Mother's expressed intention to move to Washington, disagreement 
over the proper custody arrangement, and the acrimony which was clear in the 
record, this case presents circumstances where divided custody would have 
crossed the line we referred to in Martin. If the trial court had ordered 
divided custody as Father urged, we most likely would have ruled that it was an 
abuse of discretion to do so.

[¶19]   The parties have decided to divorce 
and lead separate lives. Father's proposed custody arrangement suggests that 
they act as if they had not made this decision. The court's objective is not to 
reconstruct a family that is no more, but to provide the framework for a new 
family that can best serve the children. The district court did this admirably 
when it placed the children with their primary caretaker, subject to liberal 
visitation with Father. Once the court determined the children would be best 
served in the primary physical custody of their mother, it would have been error 
to force Mother to choose between losing her children and living in the location 
she has selected for her separate life.

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   Mother presented good faith motives 
for relocation. Father did not argue to the contrary and did not present 
evidence that the move would be detrimental to the children. The move does not 
prevent reasonable visitation. In fact, the district court provided for 
extensive visitation. We do not require any more than this. Therefore, we affirm 
the district court's order.

Footnotes

1 Father 
advocates for the following two-part analysis:

1) 
a determination of the best interests of each 
child;

2) 
careful scrutiny of the relocating parent's reasons for the move, with adequate 
reasons being employment, economic necessity or 
remarriage.