Case Title: Grafton Partners v. Sup. Ct.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S123344

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/4/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
GRAFTON PARTNERS L.P., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioners, 
) 
 
 
) 
S123344 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A102790 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
) 
ALAMEDA COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Respondent; 
)  
Super. Ct. No. 2002-056106 
 
 
) 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS L.L.P., ) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The present case concerns what is principally a question of statutory 
interpretation.  At issue is Code of Civil Procedure section 631,1 a provision 
prescribing the six means by which parties to a civil lawsuit may waive their right 
to have their disputes adjudicated in a jury trial rather than in a court trial.  
Petitioners contend a contractual agreement that is entered into prior to any dispute 
arising between the contracting parties is not one of the means authorized by 
statute.  In consequence, they claim, their predispute agreement that any lawsuit 
between them and real party would be adjudicated in a court trial, and not by jury 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
2
trial, was unenforceable.  The Court of Appeal agreed with petitioners’ contention, 
as do we, for the reasons that follow.   
I 
In March 1999, petitioners engaged real party in interest 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. (hereafter real party), an accounting firm, to audit 
certain accounts belonging to two of petitioners’ partnerships, Grafton and Allied.  
On March 11, 1999, real party sent petitioners an engagement letter confirming the 
terms of the retainer agreement.  Under the heading “[r]elease and 
indemnification,” the letter released real party from liability in the event of 
misrepresentation by the partnerships’ management and specified that real party 
would not be liable to the partnerships except for willful misconduct or fraud.  A 
waiver followed, expressed in these terms:  “In the unlikely event that differences 
concerning [real party’s] services or fees should arise that are not resolved by 
mutual agreement, to facilitate judicial resolution and save time and expense of 
both parties, [petitioners and real party] agree not to demand a trial by jury in any 
action, proceeding or counterclaim arising out of or relating to [real party’s] 
services and fees for this engagement.” 
On June 27, 2002, petitioners filed a complaint against real party, alleging 
negligence, misrepresentation, and other causes of action based upon real party’s 
asserted failure to disclose and its cover-up of fraudulent business practices that it 
discovered during its audit.  A third amended complaint was filed on March 19, 
2003, and petitioners demanded a jury trial.  The trial court, relying upon the 
waiver contained in the engagement letter, granted real party’s motion to strike the 
jury demand.  
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in the Court of 
Appeal, and that court granted relief in petitioners’ favor.  It concluded that a 
predispute waiver of a jury trial is not authorized by section 631, and that only 
 
3
those waivers authorized by statute are consistent with article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution.  We granted real party’s petition for review. 
II 
When parties elect a judicial forum in which to resolve their civil disputes, 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution accords them the right to trial by 
jury (with limited exceptions not relevant in the present case).2  Our Constitution 
treats the historical right to a jury resolution of disputes that have been brought to 
a judicial forum as fundamental, providing that in “a civil cause,” any waiver of 
the inviolate right to a jury determination must occur by the consent of the parties 
to the cause as provided by statute.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)3 
The statute implementing this constitutional provision is section 631.  It 
holds inviolate the right to trial by jury, and prescribes that a jury may be waived 
in civil cases only as provided in subdivision (d) of its provisions.  (§ 631, subd. 
(a).)  Subdivision (d) describes six means by which the right to jury trial may be 
forfeited or waived, including failure to appear at trial, failure to demand jury trial 
within a specified period after the case is set for trial, failure to pay required fees 
in advance or during trial, oral consent in open court, or written consent filed with 
the clerk or the court. 
                                              
2  
Family law proceedings and other actions as to which a right to jury trial 
did not exist at common law do not fall under this constitutional provision.  
(Cassidy v. Sullivan (1883) 64 Cal. 266.) 
3  
Article I, section 16 provides in pertinent part:  “Trial by jury is an inviolate 
right and shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may 
render a verdict.  A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both 
parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.  In a 
civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as 
prescribed by statute.”  (Italics added.) 
 
4
A 
We begin with a discussion of the relevant state constitutional provision, 
because the one other Court of Appeal decision to have considered whether 
predispute jury trial waivers are enforceable concluded that, although section 631 
does not authorize such waivers, they are permissible without statutory 
authorization.  (Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 
1616 (Trizec).)  The appellate court reasoned that nothing in the applicable 
constitutional provision prohibits such waivers, which it found comparable to the 
arbitration clauses found in many contracts.  (Id. at p. 1618.) 
The difficulty with the analysis in Trizec is that it is inconsistent with an 
established line of cases beginning with an early decision of this court.  In Exline 
v. Smith (1855) 5 Cal. 112 (Exline) and subsequent cases, we interpreted 
substantially similar constitutional language and held that the rules under which 
the parties to a lawsuit may waive a jury trial must be prescribed by the 
Legislature, which is without power to delegate to the courts the responsibility of 
determining the circumstances under which such a waiver may be permitted.  (Id. 
at pp. 112-113; People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 174, 177; Biggs 
v. Lloyd (1886) 70 Cal. 447, 448-449; see also Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc. 
(1935) 4 Cal.2d 668, 679 [section 631 identifies the exclusive means by which the 
right to jury trial may be waived]; Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Service (1993) 16 
Cal.App.4th 696, 700 [same]; Selby Constuctors v. McCarthy (1979) 91 
Cal.App.3d 517, 524 [“Section 631 has been repeatedly interpreted as setting forth 
strict requirements”]; De Castro v. Rowe (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 547, 552 [“It has 
been repeatedly held that trial by jury may be waived only in the manner 
designated by . . . section 631”]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, 
§ 113, p. 131.)  Applying our decisions, and examining the history of the 
constitutional provision, the Court of Appeal in the present case similarly 
 
5
concluded that a waiver of the right to jury trial is permissible only to the extent 
expressly authorized by statute.  In so holding, the Court of Appeal rejected the 
reasoning of the decision in Trizec that, although section 631 does not authorize 
predispute waivers of jury trial, such waivers, like those in arbitration agreements, 
are permissible on nonstatutory grounds.  (Trizec, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 
1618.)  The Court of Appeal in the present case explained that nonstatutory 
authority for waiver of the right to jury trial is not permitted by our Constitution. 
We can find no more succinct and accurate analysis of the relevant 
constitutional provision than that employed by Justice Simons writing for the 
Court of Appeal in its decision below:   
“The California Constitution, as originally adopted in 1849, set out the right 
to a jury trial in the strongest possible terms:  ‘ “[T]he right of trial by jury shall be 
secured to all, and remain inviolate for ever; but a jury trial may be waived by the 
parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law.” ’  (Exline[, supra,] 
5 Cal. 112, 112, quoting Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 3.)  Soon after the 
Constitution's adoption, the Legislature enacted a statute that set out specific 
situations in which a civil jury is deemed waived and then added, ‘ “The Court 
may prescribe by rule what shall be deemed a waiver in other cases.” ’  (Exline, at 
p. 112, quoting § 179 of the Cal. Civil Practice Act [Stats. 1851, ch. 5, § 179, p. 
78].)[4]   
                                              
4 
“Section 179 of the California Civil Practice Act provided:  ‘Trial by jury 
may be waived by the several parties to an issue of fact, in actions arising on 
contract; and with the assent of the Court in other actions, in the manner 
following:  [¶] 1st. By failing to appear at the trial:  [¶] 2d. By written consent, in 
person or by attorney, filed with the Clerk. [¶] 3d. By oral consent in open Court, 
entered in the minutes.  The Court may prescribe by rule what shall be deemed a 
waiver in other cases.’ ”  
 
6
“In Exline the Supreme Court considered a jury waiver that arose under a 
court rule adopted pursuant to the statute (§ 179 of the Cal. Civil Practice Act).  
The Supreme Court concluded that our Constitution forbids the creation of judicial 
rules of waiver, even if such rules are promulgated pursuant to a legislative 
delegation of such power to the judiciary.  The court interpreted the phrase 
‘prescribed by law’ within article I, section 3, of the California Constitution of 
1849, to mean that the Legislature, alone, had the power to determine the 
circumstances under which a jury could be waived.  ‘The Constitution has 
imposed the power as well as the necessity upon the Legislature, of determining in 
what cases a jury trial may be waived, which cannot be transferred or delegated to 
any other department of Government.  The words “ ‘prescribed by law,’ ” look to 
actual legislation upon the subject, and in no just sense can be extended to a 
permission of the exercise of this power to others.  [¶] . . . [T]he power to 
“ ‘prescribe by law’ ” is legislative and cannot be conferred on judicial 
officers . . . .’  (Exline, supra, 5 Cal. at pp. 112- 113.) 
“Since Exline, the constitutional requirement that the Legislature prescribe 
the methods for a civil jury waiver has become firmly rooted.  [This] [c]ourt has, 
on numerous occasions, stricken trial court rules and disapproved of appellate 
court decisions creating nonstatutory waivers.  (See People v. Metropolitan Surety 
Co.[, supra,] 164 Cal. 174, 177-178 [invalidating local rule setting out 
nonstatutory basis for waiver]; Biggs v. Lloyd[, supra,] 70 Cal. 447 [same]; see 
Robinson v. Puls (1946) 28 Cal.2d 664, 666 [disapproving District Courts of 
Appeal cases finding waiver when party with legal and equitable claims failed to 
specify jury issues in its jury demand].) 
 
7
“Post-Exline efforts to modify the California Constitution have reinforced 
the holding of that case.  In the Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879,[5] it was 
proposed that the requirement of legislative action be deleted and the authority to 
waive a civil jury be granted to the parties on their own or acting with judicial 
approval.[6]  The primary argument advanced on behalf of the proposed 
amendments was that the parties should have the freedom to agree to waive a right 
that belonged to them.  Yet, the Convention rejected these proposals and reenacted 
the jury waiver provision without material change.  In relevant part, the new 
provision stated: ‘A trial by jury may be waived . . . in civil actions by the consent 
of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law.’  (Cal. Const. 
of 1879, art. I, § 7.)  Because the Constitutional Convention of 1878- 1879 
reenacted the ‘prescribed by law’ terminology contained in the former versions of 
the California Constitution, it effectively incorporated Exline's construction of that 
phrase.  (See Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 8.) 
“Nearly a century later, in 1970, the California Constitution Revision 
Commission considered the impact of the right to jury trial on overcrowded court 
dockets, but concluded it lacked the expertise to prescribe significant changes, 
                                              
5 
“Comments made during the debate at a Constitutional Convention, 
including failed motions to amend, may properly be referenced for the light they 
shed on provisions actually enacted.  (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 
1232, 1261-1262; id. at p. 1265 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.); Moss v. Superior Court 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 396, 419.)”   
7 
“During the 1878-1879 Constitutional Convention, various delegates made 
proposals to amend the Constitution's jury provision to give parties the express 
power to waive a jury, or to make jury waiver subject to judicial approval.  The 
proposals were voted down.  (1 Debates & Proceedings, Cal. Const. Convention 
1878-1879, pp. 253, 255, 303-305.) [¶] . . . .” 
 
8
while other, more capable bodies were studying the problem.[7]  (Transcript, Cal. 
Const. Revision Com. meeting of July 23, 1970, pp. 97-98.)  The commission did 
adopt one pertinent modification, further clarifying that only the Legislature may 
prescribe the manner in which parties may consent to a civil jury waiver: ‘In a 
civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as 
prescribed by statute.’  (Minutes, Cal. Const. Revision Com. meeting of Oct. 8-9, 
1970, pp. 5-7, italics added.)  Later, the Legislature submitted this revision to the 
voters, who approved it in November 1974.  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 
1974) Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, pp. 26, 70.)  The 
current jury waiver provision, now contained in article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution, retains this language. 
“Hence, California constitutional history reflects an unwavering 
commitment to the principle that the right to a civil jury trial may be waived only 
as the Legislature prescribes, even in the face of concerns that the interests of the 
parties and the courts would benefit from a relaxation of this requirement.” 
The court in the Trizec case, however, failed to acknowledge the judicial 
decisions and the constitutional history described above, commenting merely that 
the constitutional provision “cannot be read to prohibit individuals from waiving, 
in advance of any pending action, the right to trial by jury in a civil case.”  (Trizec, 
supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1618.)  The court drew support from decisions 
enforcing arbitration agreements, pointing out that such agreements also constitute 
a waiver of the right to jury trial, but nonetheless have been approved as a 
permissible means to “ ‘select a forum that is alternative to and independent of, the 
                                              
7  
“Some of the organizations referenced were the California Conference of 
Judges, the Legislature, the Judicial Council of California, the State Bar of 
California and local bar associations. . . .”   
 
9
judicial.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 
Cal.3d 699, 714 (Madden).)   
The analogy to arbitration agreements is not persuasive.  Unlike predispute 
jury waivers, predispute arbitration agreements are specifically authorized by 
statute.  (§ 1281 [“A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract”], 
italics added.)  Moreover, as is demonstrated by the language quoted from our 
Madden decision, arbitration agreements are distinguishable from waivers of the 
right to jury trial in that they represent an agreement to avoid the judicial forum 
altogether.  Specifically distinguishing arbitration from the waiver of jury trial 
authorized by section 631 (and refusing to apply that statute), we observed in 
Madden that a principal feature of an arbitration agreement is that the contracting 
parties agree they will “not submit[] their controversy to a court of law in the first 
instance.”  (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 713.) 
In essence, real party concedes that jury waivers are permissible only to the 
extent they are authorized by statute, and merely claims that the history of article I, 
section 16 of the state Constitution does not suggest that delegates to the 
constitutional convention, subsequent legislators, or the voters by initiative 
measure intended to “suggest any level of specificity concerning, or policy toward 
the nature of, the legislative authorization of jury waivers in civil cases.”  
According to real party, the constitutional provision was not intended to “embody 
any particular policy concerning the conditions under which a jury waiver might 
be appropriate.  Rather, article I, section 16 . . . simply delegates to the 
Legislature — through the provision that waiver methods be ‘prescribed by 
statute’ — the task of making these policy judgments.”   
 
10
In the next section, we shall examine the text of the statute to determine 
whether a predispute waiver of the right to jury trial is consistent with the fairly 
specific language of the statute.  But we reject at the outset real party’s assertion 
that the constitutional provision discloses a neutral policy with respect to the issue 
of waiver of jury trial in a judicial proceeding.  Our decision in the Exline case 
was based in part upon our understanding that the Framers of the Constitution 
intended to restrict to the Legislature the power and obligation to establish rules 
for jury waivers, because “[t]he right of trial by jury is too sacred in its character 
to be frittered away or committed to the uncontrolled caprice of every judge or 
magistrate in the State.”  (Exline, supra, 5 Cal. at p. 113.)  Later cases confirm that 
the right to trial by jury is considered so fundamental that ambiguity in the statute 
permitting such waivers must be “resolved in favor of according to a litigant a jury 
trial.”  (Loranger v. Nadeau (1932) 215 Cal. 362, 368, overruled on other grounds 
in Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, 555.)  Similarly, lower courts have 
observed that the right to trial by jury is so important that it must be “zealously 
guarded” in the face of a claimed waiver (Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 
Cal.App.3d 648, 654).  This has led to consistent interpretation of section 631 as 
providing strict and exclusive requirements for waiver of jury trial (Selby 
Constructors v. McCarthy, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 524) and requiring courts to 
resolve doubts in interpreting the waiver provisions of section 631 in favor of a 
litigant’s right to jury trial.  (Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Services, supra, 16 
Cal.App.4th at p. 699; Byram v. Superior Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 654.)  
These principles of construction inform our interpretation of the statute, as we 
shall explain. 
We agree with the Court of Appeal in the present case that, “[a]s our 
recitation of California’s constitutional history reveals, unless the Legislature 
prescribes a jury waiver method, we cannot enforce it.”  To the extent Trizec 
 
11
Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1616 holds that the right 
to jury trial may be waived in a manner that is without statutory authorization, it is 
disapproved.  
B 
Having confirmed that waiver of the right to jury trial in a civil cause is 
permitted only as prescribed by statute, we turn to the relevant statute, which, as 
we have seen, should be interpreted strictly in order to preserve the right to jury 
trial.  Section 631 is the sole statute governing waiver of a jury in a civil judicial 
proceeding.  In subdivision (a) it provides:  “The right to a trial by jury as declared 
by Section 16 of Article I of the California Constitution shall be preserved to the 
parties inviolate.  In civil cases, a jury may only be waived pursuant to subdivision 
(d).”  (§ 631, subd. (a), italics added.)  Subdivision (d) identifies the six means by 
which the right to a jury may be forfeited or waived, declaring:  “A party waives 
trial by jury in any of the following ways: [¶] (1) By failing to appear at the trial. 
[¶] (2) By written consent filed with the clerk or judge. [¶] (3) By oral consent, in 
open court, entered in the minutes. [¶] (4) By failing to announce that a jury is 
required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice or 
stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without notice or 
stipulation. [¶] (5) By failing to deposit with the clerk, or judge, advance jury fees 
as provided in subdivision (b). [¶] (6) By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, 
at the beginning of the second and each succeeding day’s session, the sum 
provided in subdivision (c).”   
Real party contends that subsection (2) of subdivision (d) (§ 631, subd. 
(d)(2)) permits persons to waive jury trial by contract prior to any legal dispute, so 
long as one of them, subsequently having become a party to litigation concerning 
the legal dispute, files the waiver with the clerk or judge.  Real party asserts the 
provision does not restrict the time at which the waiver agreement may be entered 
 
12
into.  We agree with the Court of Appeal that our decision in Madden, supra, 17 
Cal.3d 699 supports a contrary conclusion. 
Madden, a party to a health care contract that contained an arbitration 
clause, relied upon section 631 in an effort to avoid arbitration of a dispute arising 
out of the contract.  She asserted that the jury waiver contained in the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable because it failed to comply with section 631, yet 
resulted in the loss of the right to trial by jury.  (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 
713.) 
This court disagreed, concluding that section 631 was more limited in its 
application than Madden claimed.  Although an arbitration agreement results in 
the waiver of the right to jury trial, we concluded section 631 applied only once 
litigation had commenced.  We said that the statute “presupposes a pending 
action, and relates only to the manner in which a party to such action can waive 
his right to demand a jury trial instead of a court trial.  It does not purport to 
prevent parties from avoiding jury trial by not submitting their controversy to a 
court of law in the first instance.  Indeed it has always been understood without 
question that parties could eschew jury trial either by settling the underlying 
controversy, or by agreeing to a method of resolving that controversy, such as 
arbitration, which does not invoke a judicial forum.”  (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at 
p. 713, italics added.) 
In other words, it was our view that section 631 applies only once there is a 
pending action—once the parties have “submitt[ed] their controversy to a court of 
law.”  (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 713.)  By inference, only persons who 
already are parties to a pending action may enter into a waiver of jury trial as 
provided by the statute.  And as the Court of Appeal in the present case reasoned, 
“[i]f only parties to a pending action may waive a jury under section 631, then it is 
 
13
logical to conclude that both the execution of the written consent and the filing of 
that consent must occur during the pendency of the civil action.”  
We also note that, although the decision in Trizec, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 
1616, determined that a predispute waiver of jury trial was permissible on 
nonstatutory grounds — a conclusion correctly rejected in the present case by the 
Court of Appeal, as established in the preceding section — Trizec relied upon 
language quoted above from our Madden decision in concluding that section 631 
does not authorize such waivers.  (Trizec, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1618.) 
Real party objects, claiming the circumstance that section 631 “presupposes 
a pending action” (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 713) “does not mean that 
written consents cannot be prepared before the action is instituted and then filed in 
court during the pending action within the meaning of section 631(d)(2).”  It 
claims that the “manner of waiver” referred to in our Madden decision “involves 
merely the effectuation of the waiver.  In this case, the manner of effectuation was 
the filing of the written consent ‘with the clerk or judge.’  (§ 631(d)(2).)”  
Somewhat inconsistently, it claims our Madden decision concerned arbitration 
proceedings, not jury trial waivers pursuant to section 631, rendering mere dicta 
the excerpts from Madden relied upon by the Court of Appeal.  Real party urges 
this court to rely upon the asserted plain meaning of the statute, contending that 
“nothing in the plain language of section 631(d)(2) provides that the written 
consent must be prepared or executed at any particular time, only that it must be 
‘filed with the clerk or judge.’ ” 
We are not persuaded by real party’s claims.  As noted above, because our 
state Constitution identifies the right to jury trial as “inviolate” (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 16), any ambiguity or doubt concerning the waiver provisions of section 631 
must be “resolved in favor of according to a litigant a jury trial.”  (Loranger v. 
Nadeau, supra, 215 Cal. at p. 368; Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Services, supra, 16 
 
14
Cal.App.4th at p. 699; Byram v. Superior Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 654.)  
We believe the language of section 631, subdivision (d) strongly suggests that 
waiver of the right to jury trial must occur subsequent to the initiation of a civil 
lawsuit.  At the very least, section 631, subdivision (d)(2) is ambiguous 
concerning the validity of waivers entered into prior to the emergence of a legal 
dispute.  
We look first to the words of the statute in an attempt to ascertain 
legislative intent, examining the disputed phrases in the context of the statute as a 
whole.  (See Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallager & Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804, 811; 
Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900-901.) 
We observe that the grammar of section 631, subdivision (d) strongly  
supports the inference that both the agreement to waive jury trial and the filing of 
any such agreement must occur subsequent to the commencement of the lawsuit.  
The term “party” at the beginning of section 631, subdivision (d) is the subject of 
each of the following six subsections.  These subsections set out the exclusive 
permissible methods by which a “party” may waive a jury.  (Parker v. James E. 
Granger, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 679.)  Grammatically, the term “party” must 
carry the same meaning for each subsection for which it is the subject.  For five 
out of the six subsections prescribing the exclusive method by which jury trial 
may be waived, the term “party” can refer only to a party to an ongoing lawsuit; 
specifically, the subdivision provides that a “party” waives jury trial by failing to 
appear at the trial, by consent in open court, by failing to demand a jury within a 
specified period after the case is set for trial, or by failing to deposit jury fees in 
advance of or during trial with the clerk or judge.  The word “party” must carry 
the same meaning in the subsection that concerns us, leading to the conclusion that 
a person must be a party to a lawsuit in order to waive jury trial. 
 
15
Similarly, the circumstance that five of the six subsections of section 631, 
subdivision (d) refer to an act or omission that, as a temporal matter, must occur 
entirely during the period following the commencement of litigation strongly 
suggests that the waiver described in subsection (2) also refers to an act that is 
undertaken entirely during the period after the lawsuit was filed.  Specifically, a 
failure to appear, to demand jury trial, or to pay necessary fees ― or an oral 
consent in open court ― must occur in its entirety after the litigation has 
commenced.  If the Legislature had intended a different temporal reach for section 
631, subdivision (d)(2), we believe it would have explicitly stated so — as it did in 
connection with arbitration and reference agreements.  (See §§ 638, 1281.) 
Furthermore, section 631, subdivision (d) is phrased in the present tense.  
The subdivision provides that the party, that is, the party to a lawsuit, permissibly 
“waives” jury trial (thereby agreeing to a court trial) by written consent filed with 
the clerk or the court.  Thus the person must be a party when he or she “waives” 
the right to jury trial; there is no reference in the past tense to any action taken by 
nonparties prior to the initiation of the lawsuit. 
We also observe that, in five of the six subsections of section 631, 
subdivision (d), persons may lose the important right to have their disputes 
adjudicated before a jury (rather than by the court) only by their own act or failure 
to act after the litigation begins.  Specifically, parties to lawsuits may lose their 
right to jury trial by their own failure to appear, to demand jury trial, or to pay 
necessary fees, or by their acts in open court.  Under real party’s theory, however, 
the opposing party in the lawsuit unilaterally can precipitate his or her opponent’s 
loss of the right to a jury trial by filing, once a lawsuit commences, an agreement 
that was entered into prior to the dispute and prior to the filing of a lawsuit.  We 
do not see any textual support for the result that would follow from real party’s 
interpretation. 
 
16
Ordinarily we interpret related statutory provisions on the assumption that 
they each operate in the same manner, and courts may conclude that the 
Legislature would not intend one subsection of a subdivision of a statute to operate 
in a manner “ ‘markedly dissimilar’ ” from other provisions in the same list or 
subdivision.  (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 
307.)  This canon of statutory construction, known as noscitur a sociis, supports 
our interpretation of section 631, as the Court of Appeal recognized.  Under this 
canon, “the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of 
other terms which the Legislature has associated with it in the statute, and . . . its 
scope may be enlarged or restricted to accord with those terms.”  (People v. 
Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see also People 
v. Jones (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 341, 354 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kolkey, J.) [“ ‘a 
word takes meaning from the company it keeps’ ”]; Blue v. Bontá (2002) 99 
Cal.App.4th 980, 990.)  Employing this aid to interpretation, and recalling that any 
doubts in interpreting section 631 should be resolved in favor of preserving the 
right to jury trial, we do not believe the language of section 631 supports real 
party’s view. 
We also do not find any indication the Legislature intended the result 
proposed by real party.  On the contrary, when the Legislature has authorized 
waiver of the right to trial in a court of law prior to the emergence of a dispute, it 
has done so explicitly.  As already noted, for example, section 1281, authorizing 
arbitration agreements, provides that:  “A written agreement to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, 
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of 
any contract.”  (Italics added.)  Section 638, authorizing courts to transfer a 
dispute to a referee upon the agreement of the parties, initially provided that a 
referee may be appointed “upon the agreement of the parties filed with the clerk, 
 
17
or judge, or entered into the minutes” (Stats. 1951, ch. 1737, § 93, p. 4117), but 
that statute was amended in 1982 to include predispute agreements, now 
authorizing a judicial reference “upon the agreement of the parties filed with the 
clerk, or judge, or entered in the minutes, or upon the motion of a party to a 
written contract or lease that provides that any controversy arising therefrom 
shall be heard by a referee . . . .”  (§ 638, as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 440, § 1, 
p. 1810, italics added.) 
As we noted in our Madden decision, the purpose of section 631 is to 
implement article I, section 16 of the state Constitution (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d 
at p. 712), a constitutional provision intended to safeguard the right to jury trial.  
Further, as explained by the Court of Appeal in the present case, article I, section 
16 of the state Constitution requires the Legislature to prescribe the methods by 
which the right to jury trial may be waived, and “[t]he lack of legislative direction 
in section 631 on the enforceability of predispute jury waivers hardly constitutes 
the legislative prescription required by our Constitution.”  Resolving any 
ambiguity in favor of preserving the right to jury trial, as we must, we conclude 
section 631 does not authorize predispute waiver of that right. 
C 
We now address real party’s objections to the conclusion reached by the 
Court of Appeal. 
Real party asserts that nothing in the legislative history of section 631 
explicitly supports the view that the statute was intended to impose a temporal 
limitation on when the written consent is prepared and entered into.   
We find that, to the extent the relevant history provides any guidance at all, 
it yields the opposite conclusion.  The predecessor to section 631 was adopted in 
1851, providing in relevant part that “[t]rial by jury may be waived by the several 
parties to an issue of fact, in actions arising on contract; and with the assent of the 
 
18
Court in other actions, in the manner following: [¶] 1st. By failing to appear at the 
trial: [¶] 2d. By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the Clerk. [¶] 
3d. By oral consent in open Court, entered in the minutes.”  (Stats. 1851, ch. 5, 
§ 179, p. 78.)  The statute was reenacted in 1872 without change, as part of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, and was amended various times to add provisions that 
appear in the current statute. 
In the 1851 and 1872 version of the statute quoted above, a jury waiver was 
permissible under three circumstances that applied equally in contract and 
noncontract actions.  In addition, a jury waiver in actions other than those arising 
out of a contract claim required the assent of the court.  Necessarily, then, waivers 
in noncontract cases could not be accomplished until after the litigation 
commenced.  Yet the three types of waiver available in noncontract actions — 
failure to appear, written consent filed with the clerk, and oral consent in open 
court — were the very same types of waiver that were available in contract 
actions, suggesting that for all actions, a waiver could be accomplished only after 
the commencement of the litigation.  Furthermore, the statute referred to waiver by 
“parties” in “actions,” implying that the waiver would occur in the context of 
ongoing litigation. 
Real party asserts that the predecessor to section 631 was based upon the 
1850 New York Code of Civil Procedure.8  Real party adds that New York courts 
enforce predispute jury waivers.  We agree that the New York statute, which was 
                                              
8  
In 1850, section 796 of the New York Code of Procedure provided:  “Trial 
by jury may be waived by the several parties, to an issue of fact, in actions arising 
on obligations, and with the assent of the court[] in other actions, in the manner 
following:  [¶]  1. By failing to appear at the trial:  [¶]  2. By written consent, in 
person or by attorney, filed with the clerk:  [¶]  3. By oral consent in open court, 
entered in the minutes.”   
 
19
part of the influential Field Code, was the model for our own, but this fact adds 
little weight to real party’s position.  Unlike the California decisions reviewed 
above, New York courts hold that the relevant statute is not the exclusive source of 
authority for waiver of the right to jury trial; rather, waiver is not limited to the 
modes established by the relevant statute.  (Baird v. Mayor of New York (1878) 4 
N.Y. 382 [the right to jury trial is not entitled to special protection, and courts may 
approve waivers “not provided for by any statute”]; R. J. Marshall, Inc. v. Turner 
Const. Co. (1954) 137 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543, aff’d 141 N.Y.S.2d 824; In re Slade 
(1943) 43 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283; West’s New York McKinney’s Forms (2005) Civil 
Practice Law and Rules, Trials, § 7:302(c); but see Moot v. Moot (N.Y. App. 
1915) 108 N.E. 424, 426.)  We have not discovered any New York authority that 
relies upon the statute cited by real party in support of the conclusion that 
predispute waiver of jury trial is permissible.  Indeed, real party does not claim 
that the original New York enactment that formed the basis for section 631 itself 
has been interpreted as authorizing predispute waivers, but merely asserts that 
New York courts have “long enforced predispute jury waivers, albeit often with 
little analysis.”   
Furthermore, this is not the first time we have declined to be guided by the 
practice in an asserted majority of other jurisdictions — including New York — 
when interpreting section 631.  For example, relying upon this state’s unique 
constitutional provision and the exclusive nature of the waiver provisions set out 
in section 631, we declined to follow the asserted majority practice of presuming 
that mutual motions for directed verdict constitute a waiver of jury trial.  (Parker 
v. James E. Granger, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.2d at pp. 679-680; see also Wells v. Lloyd 
(1936) 6 Cal.2d 70, 75 [referring to the majority rule on waiver by mutual motion 
for directed verdict as the “New York rule”]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, 
Trial, § 113(c), p. 131.) 
 
20
Real party’s legislative acquiescence claim is equally unhelpful to its 
position.  It is premised upon the Legislature’s having amended section 631 on 
four occasions subsequent to the decision of the court in Trizec (Trizec, supra, 229 
Cal.App.3d 1616), thereby evidencing legislative acquiescence in the conclusion 
reached by that court.  But the court in Trizec concluded that section 631 does not 
authorize predispute waivers.   
Although real party has supplied material relating to the legislative history 
of section 631, apart from evidence that the California statute was based upon a 
New York model, real party does not claim these materials disclose an express 
legislative intent to authorize predispute jury waivers at the time the predecessor to 
section 631 originally was enacted.  Nor does real party supply evidence that such 
an intent developed and was expressed on any subsequent occasion when the 
Legislature amended the statute. 
Next, real party asserts that its interpretation of section 631’s “plain 
language” serves the settled expectations of many persons who have entered into 
waivers in reliance on the Trizec decision.9  Real party comments that the 
principle of stare decisis is intended to serve such reliance interests, and urges that 
                                              
9  
Real party contends two subsequent decisions have relied upon Trizec, 
supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1616.  Both cases concerned arbitration agreements, 
however.  One referred to the Trizec decision in passing, noting only that the 
decision had approved predispute jury waivers.  (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1117.)  Also in the context of 
interpreting an arbitration agreement, the other case relied upon Trizec’s warning 
that a predispute jury waiver “ ‘must be clearly apparent in the contract and its 
language must be unambiguous and unequivocal, leaving no room for doubt as to 
the intention of the parties.’ ”  (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 
779, 804.)  Because these decisions did not consider whether predispute jury 
waivers are consistent with California law, they do not constitute authority on that 
issue and they add no weight to real party’s claims.   
 
21
we not disturb the result of the Trizec decision.  We note with interest that real 
party does not defend Trizec’s identification of a nonstatutory basis for predispute 
waiver of jury trial, however, apparently acknowledging that a nonstatutory basis 
for a waiver of jury trial is not permitted by our Constitution.  In any event, this 
court, of course, is not bound to follow this decision of a single intermediate 
appellate court, and in past cases we have declined to consider reliance upon Court 
of Appeal decisions when we are called upon to determine for the first time 
whether those decisions were correct.  (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 
Cal.3d 654, 689, fn. 28.) 
Real party draws our attention to asserted anomalies created by the 
conclusion we reach.  First, it points out that section 631 permits parties to forfeit 
the right to jury trial even if the forfeiture is caused by their own negligence in 
failing to file a timely demand for jury trial (see § 631, subd. (d)(4)), or their 
failure to deposit necessary fees in a timely manner.  (See § 631, subd. (d)(5), (6).)  
It would be anomalous, according to real party, to permit loss of the important 
right to jury trial through negligence, while prohibiting a knowing, voluntary, 
written waiver of the right entered into before any dispute has arisen between 
parties to a contract.   
We do not believe our interpretation produces an anomalous result.  The 
forfeiture provisions upon which real party relies were created by the Legislature.  
They form part of a considered procedural scheme intended to create a balanced 
adversarial system and a fair system of public administration of justice—a system 
that can be altered by legislation after due deliberation.   
The Legislature evidently had confidence that the initiation of a lawsuit 
within the adversarial system would sufficiently focus the attention of the litigants 
to produce a considered decision whether to demand — and pay for — a jury trial 
based on an informed understanding of the stakes involved.  Once litigation 
 
22
commences and the time to demand a jury trial approaches, parties ordinarily have 
counsel and their decision whether to demand jury trial is likely to be a part of 
their litigation strategy.  The adversarial system is premised upon the making of 
such considered, strategic decisions.  
Real party next questions why we would recognize the validity of 
arbitration agreements that are entered into in advance of any dispute — 
agreements that waive an entire package of trial rights — but balk at permitting a 
more limited waiver in the form of a predispute waiver of jury trial.  The answer is 
readily apparent: the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme authorizing 
predispute arbitration agreements (§ 1280 et seq.), expressing a strong state policy 
favoring arbitration.  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.)  As was 
stated by the Court of Appeal in the present case, “[t]here is no comparable state 
policy favoring court trials in the judicial forum.  To the contrary there exists a 
long standing public policy in favor of trial by jury.” 
In addition, arbitration (like reference hearings) conserves judicial 
resources far more than the selection of a court trial over a jury trial.  It therefore is 
rational for the Legislature to promote the use of arbitration and reference hearings 
by permitting predispute agreements, while not according the same advantage to 
jury trial waivers. 
Real party asserts that the conclusion we reach would promote an increase 
in the number of arbitration agreements and jury trials, and would isolate 
California commercial enterprises from their counterparts in other jurisdictions 
where predispute waivers of the right to jury trial are permitted.   
To begin with, we find no basis for the unsupported assumptions that our 
conclusion would promote additional jury trials or arbitrations or, if it did so, that 
such a result would contravene public policy.  With respect to the practice of other 
jurisdictions, we acknowledge that the majority of state and federal jurisdictions 
 
23
permit predispute waiver of the right to jury trial.  (See Annot., Contractual Jury 
Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases (1996) 42 A.L.R.5th 53 [collecting cases]; 
Annot., Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases (1989) 92 
A.L.R.Fed. 688 [collecting cases].)  But there is no indication that in other 
jurisdictions there are constitutional provisions like California’s that have been 
interpreted as requiring exclusively legislative authorization for waiver of the right 
to jury trial in civil cases.  (See, e.g., Baird v. Mayor of New York, supra, 74 N.Y. 
382; Lowe Enterprises v. Dist Ct. (Nev. 2002) 40 P.3d 405, 410; Malan Realty 
Investors, Inc. v. Harris (Mo. 1997) 953 S.W.2d 624, 625-627.)  Moreover, real 
party has not cited, and our research has not disclosed, any case holding that 
language such as that found in section 631 would authorize predispute waiver of 
jury trial.10   
We believe that real party’s contention concerning the practice of other 
jurisdictions is better addressed to the Legislature, which can evaluate the benefit 
of joining these other jurisdictions, study the problems identified by courts in other 
jurisdictions with respect to predispute waivers (especially in the context of form 
consumer agreements (see fn. 12, post)), and provide safeguards that are best 
suited to protect litigants against such problems.11   
                                              
10  
Rather, our research has disclosed at least one decision reaching a contrary 
result.  (See Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, supra, 953 S.W.2d at pp. 625-
627 [finding that a rule of court similar to section 631 applies only to pending 
actions, even though predispute contractual waivers not authorized by the rule 
nonetheless should be permitted].) 
11  
For example, the Legislature recently incorporated a variety of safeguards 
and constraints in legislation relating to premarital support and property 
agreements.  (See Fam Code, §§ 1612, 1615, as amended by Stats. 2001, ch. 286, 
§§ 1, 2 [requiring that the agreement be in writing and providing various 
protections for the party against whom enforcement is sought relating to the issue 
of voluntariness, including the timing of the waiver agreement, the presence of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
24
Pacific Legal Foundation, as amicus curiae in support of real party, 
contends we should uphold freedom of contract in connection with predispute 
waivers.  Putting aside consideration of the state Constitution and the language of 
section 631, we observe that even those jurisdictions permitting predispute waiver 
of the right to jury trial do not uncritically endorse unregulated freedom of 
contract; rather, they seek to protect the constitutional right to jury trial with a 
number of safeguards not typical of commercial law, including requirements that 
the party seeking to enforce the agreement bear the burden of proving that the 
waiver clause was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, restrictions on the types 
of contracts that may contain jury waivers, presumptions against a finding of 
voluntariness, inquiries regarding the parties’ representation by counsel as well as 
relative bargaining power and sophistication, and consideration of font size and 
placement of the waiver clause within the contract.12  Safeguards such as these 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
counsel, explicit explanation of the rights being waived, language proficiency, and 
other matters].) 
 
12  
Some (perhaps most) of the courts endorsing predispute jury waivers, 
pointing to the paramount constitutional standing of the right to jury trial, impose a 
presumption against finding a waiver of the constitutional right, or at least require 
that the waiver have been knowing and voluntary.  (Medical Air Technology Corp. 
v. Marwan Inv., Inc. (1st Cir. 2002) 303 F.3d 11, 18; Paracor Finance, Inc. v. 
General Elec. Capital Corp. (9th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 1151, 1166, fn. 21; Telum, 
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp. (10th Cir., 1988) 859 F.2d 835, 837; K.M.C. Co. 
v. Irving Trust Co. (6th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 752, 758; National Equipment Rental, 
Ltd. v. Hendrix (2d Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 255, 258; Cooperative Finance Ass’n., 
Inc. v. Garst (N.D. Iowa 1995) 871 F.Supp. 1168, 1171 [collecting cases]; Malan 
Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, supra, 953 S.W.2d at p. 627; Fairfield Leasing 
Corp. v. Techni-Graphics (N. J. Super. App. Essex Co. Law Div. 1992) 607 A.2d 
703, 706; 47 Am.Jur.2d (1998) Jury, § 72, pp. 777-778; Annot., Contractual Jury 
Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, supra, 42 A.L.R.5th § 5, pp. 82-83.)   
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
25
may be effectively drawn by the Legislature, which may determine which 
limitations best serve both private and public interests, keeping in mind potentially 
divergent concerns faced by business entities negotiating commercial contracts, on 
the one hand, and consumers presented with form contracts, on the other.  Our 
reluctance to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature in this context 
must be especially marked, because of the state constitutional requirement that 
waiver of the right to jury trial be prescribed only by statute.  That reluctance is 
fortified by our awareness of the difficulties experienced in other jurisdictions, 
where disagreements persist concerning such matters as allocation of the burden of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Many courts, indulging a presumption against waiver and requiring that the 
waiver be knowing and voluntary, have been forced to examine particular waiver 
clauses to evaluate font size, use of italics, and the position of the waiver clause 
within the contract (see National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, supra, 565 
F.2d at p. 258; RDO Financial Services Co. v. Powell (N.D. Tex. 2002) 191 
F.Supp.2d 811, 813; Cooperative Finance Ass’n, Inc. v. Garst, supra, 871 F.Supp., 
at pp. 1171-1172; Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, supra, 607 A.2d at 
p. 706 [relying upon the U. Com. Code and refusing to enforce an inconspicuous 
“non-negotiated jury waiver clause” in a form contract when the resisting party 
was not represented by counsel]; 7 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d (2005 
Supp.) § 42:4), and to determine whether the parties were represented by counsel 
and to examine the parties’ relative bargaining power.  (RDO Financial Services 
Co. v. Powell, supra, 191 F.Supp.2d at p. 813; Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. 
Sevaux (N.D.Ill. 1994) 866 F.Supp. 1102, 1105-1106; Lowe Enterprises, L.P. v. 
Dist. Ct., supra, 40 P.2d at pp. 410-411; Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-
Graphics, supra, 607 A.2d at p. 706.)  There is disagreement whether the party 
seeking to enforce or the party seeking to avoid the waiver clause should bear the 
burden of proof that the contract was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.  
(Medical Air Technology Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., supra, 303 F.3d at p. 18, 
fn. 3; RDO Financial Services Co. v. Powell, supra, 191 F.Supp.2d at p. 813; 
Annot., Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, supra, 92 
A.L.R.Fed. at p. 695.) 
 
26
proof when a party resists enforcement of a contractual waiver of jury trial.  (See 
fn. 12, ante.) 
In sum, after considering the history of California’s constitutional and 
statutory provisions governing waiver of the right to jury trial, we conclude that it 
is for the Legislature, not this court, to determine whether, and under what 
circumstances, a predispute waiver of jury trial will be enforceable in this state. 
Real party and some of the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of real 
party suggest that, because predispute waivers of the right to jury trial assertedly 
have become commonplace in the commercial context, in reliance upon Trizec, 
supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1616, our decision should apply only prospectively.  In 
light of the nature of the interests at stake, we do not believe that it would be 
appropriate to apply our decision prospectively.  Ordinarily, judicial decisions 
apply retrospectively.  (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1023, 
Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 372.)  Although 
prospective application may be appropriate in some circumstances when our 
decision alters a settled rule upon which parties justifiably relied, ordinarily this is 
only when a decision constitutes a “ ‘clear break’ ” with decisions of this court or 
with practices we have sanctioned by implication, or when we “disapprove[] a 
longstanding and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous 
body of lower-court authorities.”  (People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 401.)  
The decision in Trizec, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1616, a single Court of Appeal 
decision that erroneously interpreted our state Constitution, is hardly the kind of 
“uniform body of law that might be justifiably relied on . . . .”  (Burris v. Superior 
Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1023.) 
Moreover, in light of our determination that governing California 
constitutional and statutory provisions do not permit predispute jury waivers, it 
would not be appropriate to enforce such a waiver and thereby deny the right to 
 
27
jury trial to a party who has timely and properly requested such a trial and 
complied with other applicable statutory prerequisites.  Our decision will not deny 
any party a substantial right or his or her day in court—real party has not put forth 
any theory under which parties have a substantial right not to have future disputes 
resolved by a jury.  Our decision simply will deny to those who might have acted 
in reliance upon Trizec, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1616, a benefit that they never had 
the right to obtain — that is, a predispute waiver of the right to a jury trial.  Under 
our decision, of course, once a dispute arises the parties may elect to waive a jury 
trial (pursuant to the means set forth in section 631) and have the matter 
determined by the court. 
III 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
SPENCER, J.* 
                                              
*  Honorable Vaino Hassan Spencer, Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article 
VI, section 6, of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I reluctantly concur in the majority opinion.  While the majority’s 
conclusion adheres to a strict parsing of Code of Civil Procedure1 section 631, 
subdivision (d) (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15), I write separately to urge the 
Legislature to enact legislation expressly authorizing predispute jury waivers.  
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) 
As the majority acknowledges, our decision is out of step with the authority 
in other state and federal jurisdictions, most of which have permitted predispute 
jury waivers.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-23.)  The Texas Supreme Court recently 
observed that “nearly every state court that has considered the issue has held that 
parties may agree to waive their right to trial by jury in certain future disputes, 
including the supreme courts in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Nevada, and 
Rhode Island.  The same is true of federal courts.”  (In re Prudential Ins. of 
America (Tex. 2004) 148 S.W.3d 124, 132-133, fns. omitted (In re Prudential).)  
Only the Supreme Court of Georgia (Bank South, N.A. v. Howard (Ga. 1994) 444 
S.E.2d 799), and now our court, have reached a different conclusion.  
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 
otherwise noted. 
 
2 
Section 631, subdivision (d)(1) through (6), currently provides the only 
means by which parties may waive jury trial in a civil case.  Although our state 
Constitution declares that the right to a jury trial is “inviolate” (Cal. Const., art I., 
§ 16), and we have described such right as “sacred in its character” (Exline v. 
Smith (1855) 5 Cal. 112, 113), the Legislature has prescribed methods by which a 
party may impliedly waive, i.e., forfeit, the right to a jury trial by failing to 
undertake certain actions, such as depositing necessary fees.  (See § 631, subd. 
(d)(1), (4), (5), (6).)  As real party PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. argues, it 
makes little sense to authorize such forfeitures, and yet categorically prohibit 
knowing and voluntary jury trial waivers simply because they are made before any 
dispute arises. 
Although the Court of Appeal here concluded that section 631, subdivision 
(d)(2) does not authorize predispute jury waivers, it nonetheless described such 
waivers as offering an “attractive middle ground” between jury trials and 
arbitration; agreements between parties to resolve future disputes by court trial 
would minimize fears of excessive jury awards while affording greater procedural 
safeguards than those available in arbitration.  The Texas Supreme Court 
explained the appeal of a predispute jury waiver this way:  “[I]f parties are willing 
to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable to enforce that agreement rather 
than leave them with arbitration as their only enforceable option.  By agreeing to 
arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right to 
appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of 
the reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, 
and retain their right to appeal.  The parties obtain dispute resolution of their own 
choosing in a manner already afforded to litigants in their courts.  Their rights, and 
the orderly development of the law, are further protected by appeal.  And even if 
the option appeals only to a few, some of the tide away from the civil justice 
 
3 
system to alternate dispute resolution is stemmed.”  (In re Prudential, supra, 148 
S.W.3d at p. 132.)  
As the majority emphasizes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10, 13), we long ago 
evinced the belief that any “ambiguity” in section 631 “should be resolved in favor 
of according to a litigant a jury trial.”  (Loranger v. Nadeau (1932) 215 Cal. 362, 
368, overruled on other grounds in Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, 555.)  
This should not, however, sound the death knell for predispute jury waivers.  
“While the public policy favoring jury trials subjects jury waiver agreements to 
strict construction, the application of that policy will not void every such 
agreement.”  (Mall, Inc. v. Robbins (Ala. 1982) 412 So.2d 1197, 1199.)   
Indeed, we should join other jurisdictions in recognizing that “there is no 
abstract public policy against contractual waivers of the right to civil jury trial.”  
(Okura & Co. (America), Inc. v. Careau Group (C.D.Cal. 1991) 783 F. Supp. 482, 
488 (Okura) [citing Moore’s Federal Practice treatise]; Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton 
Credit Corp. (10th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2d 835, 837 [“Agreements waiving the right 
to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy”]; see also In re 
Prudential, supra, 148 S.W.3d at p. 131 [“Public policy that permits parties to 
waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of trial by jury”].)  As a 
practical matter, in a diversity action, a federal court will routinely enforce a 
knowing and voluntary predispute jury waiver as a matter of federal law.  (See, 
e.g., Okura, supra, 783 F. Supp. at p. 488.)  Our decision today would prohibit the 
same knowing and voluntary waiver if parties filed their action in state court.  
Finally, numerous amici curiae argue that barring predispute jury waivers 
will have far-reaching negative consequences.  I agree that the Legislature, and not 
this court, is the appropriate body to address and evaluate these concerns.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23-26.)  If amici curiae’s concerns are valid, however, the 
 
4 
Legislature has yet more reason to adopt the majority rule that predispute jury 
waivers are enforceable.  
CHIN, J. 
 
 
1
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Grafton Partners v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 115 Cal.App.4th 700 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S123344 
Date Filed: August 4, 2005 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Ronald M. Sabraw 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady, Falk & Rabkin, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven L. Mayer; Bartko, Zankel, 
Tarrant & Miller, John J. Bartko, Christopher J. Hunt and Allan N. Littman for Petitioners. 
 
McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, Cliff Palefsky and Keith Ehrman for California Employment Lawyers 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
The Arns Law Firm, Morgan C. Smith, Robert S. Arns; Bruce R. Pfaff & Associates and Bruce R. Pfaff for 
the American Board of Trial Advocates as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Law Offices of Public Advocates and Richard A. Marcantonio for Public Advocates, Inc., as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant and Monique Olivier for Consumer Attorneys of 
California, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Association of Trial Lawyers of America and National 
Association of Consumer Advocates as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest: 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Daniel M. Kolkey, Scott A. Fink, Daniel S. Floyd, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., 
Julian W. Poon and Dominic Lanza for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
Page 2 – S123344 – counsel continued 
 
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest: 
 
Buchalter, Nemer, Fields & Younger, James B. Wright, Bernard E. Lesage; Goldberg, Kohn, Bell, Black, 
Rosenbloom & Moritz, Richard M. Kohn, Kenneth S. Ulrich; Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston & Rosen, 
Bernard Beitel, Jonathan N. Helfat and Daniel Wallen for Commercial Finance Association as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Rebecca D. Eisen, Thomas M. Peterson, Brett M. Schuman and Amanda D. 
Smith for Employers Group as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Leland Chan for California Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
National Chamber Litigation Center, Robin S. Conrad, Stephanie A. Martz; Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, 
Donald M. Falk and Fatima Goss Graves for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, Nina F. Locker, Steven Guggenheim and Joni Ostler for New Focus, 
Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory, Bruce W. Hyman and Gregg J. Loubier for California Mortgage 
Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Erika C. Frank; Knox, Lemmon & Anapolsky, Thomas S. Knox and Glen C. Hansen for California 
Chamber of Commerce and California Retailers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora, Harry W. R. Chamberlain, Robert M. Dato and Brian P. Barrow 
for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney, Matthew W. Powell, Megan A. Lewis; Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 
Kelly M. Hnatt; and Richard I. Miller for American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for the Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jerome B. Falk, Jr. 
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin 
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111-4024 
(415) 434-1600 
 
Daniel M. Kolkey 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
One Montgomery Street 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 393-8200