Case Title: In re Children of Mary J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 2

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 2 
Docket: 
Was-18-232 
Argued: 
November 7, 2018 
Decided: 
January 3, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
ALEXANDER, J., and SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF MARY J. 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  The Passamaquoddy Tribe (Tribe) appeals from an order of the 
District Court (Calais, D. Mitchell, J.) denying the Tribe’s motion to intervene in 
a child protective action involving nonmember children, following the removal 
of the children from the custody of their mother, who resided within the Tribe’s 
territory.  The Tribe contends that the court erred in determining that the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ removal of the children from its 
territory was not impermissible state regulation of an internal tribal matter.  
See 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (2017).  Because we find no error in the court’s 
determination, we affirm the court’s denial of the Tribe’s motion for 
intervention of right, filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), and the denial of 
the Tribe’s motion for permissive intervention, filed pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 24(b). 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following is derived from the court’s factual findings, all of 
which are supported by competent evidence in the record.  See Grondin v. 
Hanscom, 2014 ME 148, ¶ 8, 106 A.3d 1150 (“A factual finding is clearly 
erroneous only if no competent evidence supports it.”).   
[¶3]  In September 2017, the Department filed a child protection petition 
alleging neglect by both the mother and the father of several children.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017).  Although the mother is a member of the 
Passamaquoddy Tribe, neither the father nor the children are members, or 
eligible to become members.1  At the time the petition was filed, the children 
were living with the mother on the Passamaquoddy reservation at Indian 
Township.   
[¶4]  In February 2018, the Department requested a preliminary 
protection order, seeking custody of the children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4034 (2017).  
The mother waived her right to a summary preliminary hearing except as to the 
issue of placement.  She requested that the children be placed with their 
maternal grandmother, who is also a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, and 
who lives on the reservation.  After a hearing, the court denied the mother’s 
                                         
1  Because the children are not members, or eligible to become members, of the Tribe, the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 1901-1963 (LEXIS through Pub. L.  115-281), does not apply. 
 
3 
request and allowed the Department to seek foster placement.2  The 
Department placed the children in foster care outside of Indian Township.   
[¶5]  Following the Department’s removal of the children from their 
mother’s care, the Tribe filed a motion to intervene, alleging that Maine Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provided for intervention of right, because the 
Department’s removal of the children from the Tribe’s territory constituted 
impermissible state regulation of an “internal tribal matter[].”  See 30 M.R.S. 
§ 6206(1).  Alternatively, the Tribe sought permissive intervention, pursuant to 
Rule 24(b), asserting that the underlying child protective action and its claim of 
tribal sovereignty have a question of law in common.  The court denied the 
Tribe’s motion to intervene, and the Tribe timely appealed.  See M.R. 
App. P. 2B(c)(1).3   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶6]  Rule 24(a)(2) permits a nonparty to intervene, as a matter of right, 
if three criteria are met: “(1) [the nonparty] must claim an interest in the 
                                         
2  Although the court declined to place the children with the grandmother, she was granted 
intervenor status without objection by the Department.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4005-(D)(5) (2017).   
 
3  Because the Tribe is appealing from the denial of a motion to intervene, there is no final 
judgment at issue.  However, we have “recognized an exception to the final judgment rule for appeals 
challenging the denial of a motion to intervene.  The exception applies whether the party sought 
intervention of right or permissive intervention.”  State v. MaineHealth, 2011 ME 115, ¶ 7, 31 A.3d 
911 (citations omitted). 
 
4 
property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) it must be so 
situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to 
protect its interests; and (3) its interests must not be adequately represented 
by the existing parties to the action.”  Bangor Publ’g Co. v. Town of Bucksport, 
682 A.2d 227, 231 (Me. 1996).  Alternatively, permissive intervention is 
available when a “[nonparty’s] claim or defense and the main action have a 
question of law or fact in common” and intervention will not “unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”  M.R. 
Civ. P. 24(b). 
[¶7]  Under either path for the Tribe’s intervention, the pivotal issue 
before us is whether the court’s order, issued pursuant to Title 22, granting the 
Department custody of children in jeopardy constitutes an impermissible state 
intervention into “internal tribal matters.”  See 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1). 
[¶8]  We review the denial of a motion to intervene for error of law or 
abuse of discretion.  State v. MaineHealth, 2011 ME 115, ¶ 7, 31 A.3d 911.  
Where the court’s decision turns on a question of law, we review the issue de 
novo.  See Passamaquoddy Water Dist. v. City of Eastport, 1998 ME 94, ¶ 5, 
710 A.2d 897. 
 
5 
A. 
Internal Tribal Matters and Intervention of Right 
 
[¶9]  The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (Settlement Act), 25 U.S.C.S. 
§§ 1721-1735 (LEXIS, 2015 U.S.C.S. Archive), and the Maine Indian Claims 
Settlement Implementing Act (Implementing Act), 30 M.R.S. §§ 6201-6214 
(2017), were the result of a comprehensive settlement between the Penobscot 
Nation, Passamaquoddy Tribe, and the State of Maine, resolving the Tribe’s and 
Nation’s claims to vast swaths of Maine land.  See Francis v. Pleasant Point 
Passamaquoddy Hous. Auth., 1999 ME 164, ¶ 6, 740 A.2d 575.  As a result of 
these acts, Maine exerts greater jurisdiction over these Tribes than other 
states.4  See id.; Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 12, 770 
A.2d 574 (“The relationship between the State of Maine and the Tribes is not 
governed by the general federal laws,” but rather “occurs in a framework that 
is unique to Maine.”). 
 
[¶10]  The Implementing Act lays out the specific contours and 
limitations of this unique relationship between the State of Maine and the 
Tribes, and describes the powers and duties of the Tribes within their 
respective territories as follows: 
                                         
4  The Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians were later added to the Implementing Act, although the 
Band does not retain the same jurisdiction as the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe do.  
See P.L. 1981, c. 675 (codified at 30 M.R.S. §§ 6203(2-A), 6205-A, 6206-A, 6208-A (2017)). 
 
6 
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy Tribe 
and the Penobscot Nation, within their respective Indian 
territories, shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, 
powers and immunities, including, but without limitation, the 
power to enact ordinances and collect taxes, and shall be subject to 
all the duties, obligations, liabilities and limitations of a 
municipality of and subject to the laws of the State, provided, 
however, that internal tribal matters, including membership in the 
respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the respective 
Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government, tribal 
elections and the use or disposition of settlement fund income shall 
not be subject to regulation by the State. 
 
30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (emphasis added).  Thus, pursuant to the Implementing 
Act, the Tribes are treated like municipalities except with regard to “internal 
tribal matters.”  See Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 488 (Me. 1983).   
[¶11]  In arguing that the Department’s actions interfered with internal 
tribal matters, the Tribe specifically points to the “right to reside within the 
respective Indian territories,” and asserts that, by placing the children in a 
foster home that is not on Passamaquoddy territory, the Department has 
interfered with an internal tribal matter.  Based on this assertion, the Tribe 
claims a right to intervene in this child protective matter.  As discussed below, 
the plain meaning of “right to reside within the respective Indian territories” 
does not support the Tribe’s position. 
[¶12]  To interpret the term “right to reside,” we first look to the plain 
meaning of the statutory language in the context of the whole statutory scheme.  
 
7 
See State v. Stevens, 2007 ME 5, ¶ 5, 912 A.2d 1229.  The United States Supreme 
Court has long recognized that Indian tribes have the right to determine who 
may and may not reside within their respective territories, subject only to the 
plenary control of the United States Congress.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515, 559, 561 (1832); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 
(1978).  This right is specifically memorialized in section 6206(1) of the 
Implementing Act, which the Tribe has recognized as giving it the 
“unquestioned right to determine if and when a person may reside within 
Indian Territory.”  Indian Twp. Passamaquoddy Reservation Hous. Auth. v. 
Socobasin, No. P93-C-03, 1994 Passamaquoddy App. LEXIS 2, at *7-8 
(July 4, 1994).   
[¶13]  The statutory language of section 6206(1) is plain on its face: the 
State is prohibited from regulating “the right to reside within the respective 
Indian territories.”  30 M.R.S. § 6206(1).  Here, neither the court nor the 
Department has, or is, attempting to regulate who may or may not reside within 
an Indian territory.  As the court correctly held, a child protective proceeding 
in no way “calls into question the right of the Tribe to determine who is able or 
not able to reside on its reservation or within its territory.”5   
                                         
5  In a child protective proceeding, it is the court’s obligation to determine whether to terminate 
or suspend an individual’s parental rights because that individual’s child is in circumstances of 
 
8 
 
[¶14]  In addition, the Implementing Act specifically acknowledged and 
retained the existing structure of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).  See 
S. Rep. No. 96-957, at 15 (1980) (stating that the Settlement Act “specifically 
continues the applicability of . . . the Indian Child Welfare Act, and all other 
federal Indian statutes to the extent they do not affect or preempt authority 
granted to the State of Maine under the terms of the settlement”); 30 M.R.S. 
§ 6209-A(1)(D) (granting exclusive jurisdiction over “Indian child custody 
proceedings to the extent authorized by applicable federal law . . . .”).  If the 
children who are the subject of this action were members of the Tribe, or 
eligible to become members, then the ICWA would apply and the 
Passamaquoddy court would be able to assert jurisdiction over these children, 
or at a minimum, the Tribe would have had the statutory right to intervene in 
this case.  See 25 U.S.C.S. § 1911 (LEXIS through Pub. L. 115-281); 30 M.R.S. 
§ 6209-A(1)(D).   
 
[¶15]  Finally, the Tribe’s urged construction is at odds with our broader 
interpretation of what constitutes an internal tribal matter.  In determining 
                                         
jeopardy.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4035, 4055 (2017).  If the court determines that the child is in jeopardy, it 
must then determine how best to protect the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4036 (2017).  In this case, the 
court determined that the mother’s children were in circumstances of jeopardy and that to best 
protect the children it had to remove them from her custody.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4034, 4035, 4036, 
4036-B (2017).  The mother does not contest that determination. 
 
9 
whether something constitutes an internal tribal matter, we have looked to the 
factors announced by the First Circuit in Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 
482, 486-87 (1st Cir. 1997).6  The Akins factors, which are nonexclusive and 
nondispositive, include: “(1) the effect on nontribal members, (2) & (3) the 
subject matter of the dispute, particularly when related to Indian lands or the 
harvesting of natural resources on Indian lands, (4) the interest of the State of 
Maine, and (5) prior legal understandings.”  Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot 
Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 49, 770 A.2d 574 (applying the Akins factors to 
determine that the Maine Freedom of Access Act does not apply to the 
Penobscot Nation when it is engaged in self-governance). 
 
[¶16]  When the Akins factors are applied here, the subject matter of this 
action—the children—are nonmembers, and stand to be the most affected by 
its outcome.  Moreover, the State has a well-established parens patriae interest 
in the safety and well-being of the children within its jurisdiction.  See In re 
Emma B., 2017 ME 187, ¶ 12, 169 A.3d 945 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 
                                         
6  Shortly after the enactment of the Implementing Act, we used the familiar canon of esjudem 
generis—“that a general term followed by a list of illustrations is ordinarily assumed to embrace only 
concepts similar to those illustrations”—to construe “internal tribal matters” as encompassing only 
the concepts similar to those explicitly listed after it.  Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 
489-90 (Me. 1983) (determining that an otherwise unlawful high stakes beano game was not similar 
to the listed matters because those matters did not directly bring the Penobscot Nation into conflict 
with state laws of general application).  However, in more recent cases, we have consistently applied 
the Akins factors, and continue to do so here.  See Great N. Paper, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 49, 770 A.2d 574; 
Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, ¶¶ 13-17, 962 A.2d 944. 
 
10 
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see also 22 M.R.S. § 4003 (2017), amended by P.L. 
2017, ch. 411, §§ 5-7 (effective Aug. 1, 2018) (codified at 22 M.R.S. § 4003(2), 
(3-A), (3-B)).  Finally, there is a prior legal understanding that the ICWA, which 
provides the protections and procedures that the Tribe argues for here, does 
not apply in this case.  See 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4).  All of these factors weigh 
against a determination that an “internal tribal matter” is at issue here. 
 
[¶17]  Accordingly, the court did not err by determining that the removal 
of nonmember children from the custody of their mother, pursuant to a 
properly issued child protection order, did not constitute impermissible state 
regulation of an internal tribal matter.  For that reason, the court properly 
denied the Tribe’s motion for intervention of right.  See M.R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
B. 
Permissive Intervention 
[¶18]  As an alternative to its claim for intervention of right, the Tribe 
asserts that it should be permitted to intervene pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(b), again relying upon the argument that its participation in the 
case is necessary to protect the Tribe’s sovereign power to decide who may or 
may not reside within Passamaquoddy territory.7  For the reasons already 
                                         
7  As part of its motion to intervene, the Tribe implies that by removing the children from Indian 
Township, the children would miss out on being exposed to the Tribe’s culture, language, and 
community.  The Tribe asserts that it is important that the children have such exposure, regardless 
 
11 
discussed, we do not find the Tribe’s underlying argument persuasive, and 
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Tribe’s 
motion for permissive intervention.  See M.R. Civ. P. 24(b); In re N.W., 2013 ME 
64, ¶¶ 12-13, 70 A.3d 1219 (stating that the interest of both the children and 
the Department is “the prompt adjudication of a permanent and safe living 
arrangement” for the children).8 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J., with whom SAUFLEY, C.J., joins, dissenting. 
 
 
[¶19]  This child protective action involves children who have been living 
with their mother, a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, on the 
                                         
of their nonmember status, because the children’s mother is a member, and the children were living 
within the Tribe’s territory.   
 
The court recognized this concern, and noted that the mother was free to bring her, and the 
children’s, cultural traditions to the court’s attention at the hearing.  In addition, the grandmother of 
the children, also a member of the Tribe, was permitted to intervene in this action pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4005-(D)(5).  See supra n.2.  Like the mother, the grandmother is also able to bring 
concerns regarding the children’s culture to the court’s attention. 
 
8  While the Tribe may not intervene in this action, the Department represented at oral argument 
that it would not object to the continued participation of the Tribe through interested-person or 
participant status.  Interested person status would allow the Tribe to remain informed regarding the 
proceedings and attend all hearings.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4005-D(2)-(3) (2017).  As a participant, the Tribe 
would be permitted to both attend all hearings and be heard in the proceedings about cultural and 
other matters. § 4005-D(4). 
 
12 
Passamaquoddy Reservation at Indian Township.  The children’s mother is 
urging a kinship placement9 with the children’s maternal grandmother, who is 
also a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe.  The grandmother has been 
granted intervenor status.  M.R. Civ. P. 24(b).   
[¶20] 
 
The 
children’s 
mother, 
their 
grandmother, 
and 
the 
Passamaquoddy Tribe itself each have a legitimate interest in preserving the 
children’s access to and participation in the tribal culture that would be 
fostered through a continuing relationship with the Tribe.  As the Court 
recognizes in its opinion In re Children of Shirley T., 2019 ME 1, ¶ 13, --- A.3d ---, 
also published today, preserving access to tribal culture is important for 
children with a parent or parents who are members of a tribe.  Shirley T. quotes 
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, enacted in 1978, which states “that an 
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, 
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private 
agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in 
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions,” and “that the States 
. . . have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people 
                                         
9  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4003(3-A), 4062(4) (2017) (instructing the Department to give preference to 
an adult relative over a nonrelated caregiver when determining placement for a child).  These 
subsections have since been amended to include a reference to the newly enacted 22 M.R.S. § 4005-G.  
See P.L. 2017, ch. 411, §§ 5, 11, 13 (effective Aug. 1, 2018).  
 
13 
and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and 
families.”  25 U.S.C.S. § 1901(4)-(5) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-281). 
 
[¶21]  In the matter before us, for the safety of the children, the District 
Court (Calais, D. Mitchell, J.) rejected the request to place the children in a 
kinship placement with their maternal grandmother.  Instead, it authorized the 
Department of Health and Human Services to seek a foster placement for the 
children off the reservation and with caregivers who are not related to the 
children and are not members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe.    
 
[¶22]  With the prospect of the children being removed from their 
Passamaquoddy relatives and the reservation community, the Passamaquoddy 
Tribe sought to intervene as a matter of right or, alternatively, with the court’s 
permission.  M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), (b).  The Tribe argued that, pursuant to 
30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (2017), the children’s right to reside with their relatives on 
the reservation constituted an “internal tribal matter” that “shall not be subject 
to regulation by the State.”  Accordingly, the Tribe argued that it had an 
independent interest and a right to at least be heard regarding proper 
placement of the children.   
 
[¶23]  The District Court denied the Tribe’s motion to intervene, and the 
Court today affirms.  From the Court’s affirmance of the denial of the 
 
14 
Passamaquoddy Tribe’s effort to be heard regarding placement of children of a 
member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe who have lived on the Passamaquoddy 
Reservation, we respectfully dissent. 
 
[¶24]  Although we concur with the Court’s determination that the 
Tribe’s concern about removal of the children from the reservation does not 
constitute an internal tribal matter that would allow the Tribe to intervene as a 
matter of right, that conclusion does not decide the issue.  As the Tribe asserts, 
their participation in decisions related to the placement and resources 
available to the children are matters of importance to the court in addressing 
the needs of the children, whose mother is a member of the Passamaquoddy 
Tribe.  The Tribe’s role, distinct from the role of family members, is important 
in informing the court of options regarding tribal resources and connections to 
tribal culture.  As the Tribe argues, “[g]iven the well-established, horrific 
history of forced acculturation and state agencies removing children from their 
tribal families and forcing them to live off the reservation,” the Tribe’s request 
to remain a resource for the children and the court is compelling.   
 
[¶25]  Although the Tribe’s argument that these factors and this history 
give it a right to participate pursuant to 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) is unpersuasive on 
the facts of this case, these factors and this history demonstrate that, in the 
 
15 
proper exercise of its discretion, the District Court should have found a method 
of involvement for the Tribe that would benefit the children.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4005-D(1)(C)-(E) (2017).10  With such involvement, the District Court could 
properly consider information from the Tribe regarding conditions and 
resources on the reservation and important cultural factors that may favor the 
children returning to reside on the reservation or having continued meaningful 
contact with members and the culture of the Tribe. 
 
[¶26]  In a footnote, the Court does suggest other ways the Tribe might 
be allowed to participate.  See supra note 8.  However, those alternatives do not 
appear to have been considered by the parties, and there is no certainty of any 
participation on remand.  We would vacate the trial court’s denial of the Tribe’s 
motion to intervene and remand for the court to consider which type of 
participation by the Tribe would best allow the Tribe to have meaningful input 
regarding the children’s connection to their Indian heritage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
10  22 M.R.S. § 4005-D has since been revised, but subsections (1)(C)-(E) are unchanged.  See P.L.  
2017, ch. 411, §§ 8-9 (effective Aug. 1, 2018).   
 
16 
Arnold S. Clark, Esq. (orally), Fletcher Mahar & Clark, Calais, for appellant 
Passamaquoddy Tribe 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen. 
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of 
Health and Human Services 
 
 
Calais District Court docket number PC-2017-06 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY