Case Title: State v. Jeskey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 134

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 134 
Docket: 
Pen-15-315 
Argued: 
May 4, 2016 
Decided: 
August 16, 2016 
Corrected:  
December 13, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
ROXANNE JESKEY 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Roxanne Jeskey appeals from a judgment of conviction for the 
intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder of her 
husband, Richard Jeskey, entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, 
Hunter, J.) after a bench trial.  Roxanne argues that (A) there was insufficient 
evidence to support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she 
was guilty of knowing or intentional murder or depraved indifference murder; 
(B) the court erred by not finding her not guilty by reason of insanity; (C) the 
court erred by not considering the lesser included offense of manslaughter; 
 
 
2 
and (D) the court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial.1  
We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the 
trial record supports the following facts, which were found by the Superior 
Court in a comprehensive decision following a seven-day bench trial.  See 
State v. Weaver, 2016 ME 12, ¶ 2, 130 A.3d 972.   
[¶3]  Roxanne and Richard “Rick” Jeskey were married and living 
together in an apartment in Bangor in June 2011.  Rick was employed full time 
as a freight delivery truck driver, and Roxanne regularly provided care for her 
young grandchildren at their apartment.  In 2003, Roxanne underwent a 
resection of the anterior right temporal lobe of her brain to mitigate 
intractable seizures.  The surgery left Roxanne with some cognitive 
limitations, such as disorganized thinking and impaired processing, as well as 
personality, emotional, and behavioral changes, such as being quick to anger 
and experiencing stronger and more frequent impulsive reactions.  Roxanne 
                                         
1  Roxanne also asserts that the court abused its discretion by limiting the use of information that 
she related to a doctor during her forensic evaluation.  We do not find this argument persuasive and 
do not discuss it further. 
 
 
3 
also suffers from heart disease and may suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder associated with childhood abuse. 
[¶4]  A husband and wife lived in the apartment next door to, and were 
friends with, the Jeskeys.  They reported that the Jeskeys frequently argued 
and that Roxanne often described and displayed bruising on her arms, legs, 
and torso, but Roxanne provided no explanation for them other than that she 
was on blood thinners for her heart condition and had a history of bruising 
easily.   
[¶5]  Both the Jeskeys and the couple next door were home in the late 
afternoon and evening on Sunday, June 12, 2011.  Roxanne called the wife 
around 6:00 p.m., when the couple was having dinner, and the wife spoke with 
her briefly.  The wife fell asleep watching television and was awoken about an 
hour later by loud banging or slamming sounds coming from the Jeskeys’ 
apartment.  The wife called Roxanne to see if everything was all right.  
Roxanne told her that everything was fine and that they did not need any help.  
At ten or twenty minute intervals throughout the course of the evening until 
midnight, the couple heard loud banging, slamming sounds, bumps, and thuds 
coming from the Jeskeys’ apartment. 
 
 
4 
[¶6]  The wife and Roxanne exchanged several more phone calls that 
evening, and, at some point, Roxanne told the wife that she and Rick were 
fighting because she had discovered that he had been speaking with a former 
girlfriend on the phone, and she was mad.2  The wife testified that she never 
heard any voices that night despite Roxanne’s assertion that she and Rick 
were fighting.  Roxanne also told the wife that Rick slapped her across the face 
and asked what she “planned to do about it” when Roxanne confronted him 
about the former girlfriend.  Roxanne explained that, in response, she used a 
pickaxe to damage Rick’s motorcycle3 that was parked near the apartment and 
had then gone back inside to hit him in the face with a plastic bat. 
[¶7]  When the wife asked if Rick was okay, Roxanne told her that she 
had given him a bloody nose and had loosened a tooth but that he was fine, 
and if he really needed an ambulance, Roxanne said, she would let the wife 
know.  During one call, in response to the wife’s repeated offers of assistance, 
Roxanne specifically asked her not to call an ambulance.  Roxanne stated that 
she was “pissed off” and that she could “be your best friend or your worst 
fucking enemy, and that’s what [Rick] picked.”  Roxanne told the wife that Rick 
                                         
2  Roxanne also made several calls to the former girlfriend from Rick’s cell phone, and Rick had 
called the woman once in the early evening and once again at around 9:30 p.m.   
3  Roxanne had cut the brake lines and spark plug wire, pulled out wires, and loosened the air 
filter and wire harness box. 
 
 
5 
was getting cleaned up and taking a bath.  She ended the phone call by telling 
the wife that Rick was calling her from the bathroom, though the wife testified 
that she did not hear him.   
[¶8]  Shortly after 11:30 p.m., the husband heard a very loud thud 
coming from the Jeskeys’ apartment, and he was so concerned that he went 
next door, in the pouring rain, to find out for himself if everything was all 
right.  Roxanne came to the door but only opened it a crack to speak with him.  
She did not invite him in.  He stayed at the door less than a minute, but he did 
not see anything out of the ordinary regarding Roxanne’s appearance, and she 
assured him that all was well.  Roxanne called the couple once more and 
thanked the husband for coming over; that was the last contact they had with 
her until the following day.  Both husband and wife stated that on each 
occasion they spoke with Roxanne, she appeared to be appropriately 
responsive, outwardly calm, and coherent.   
[¶9]  Later that night, at approximately 2:30 a.m. on June 13, 2011, 
Roxanne called Rick’s place of employment and spoke with the night 
supervisor.  She told him that Rick was very ill and that the two of them were 
driving home from the hospital where they had just spent the entire evening, 
and therefore Rick would not be going to work that morning.  Roxanne also 
 
 
6 
asked for the supervisor’s name so that she could write it down, which the 
supervisor considered odd because he and Rick had worked together for 
years, and Roxanne claimed that Rick was sitting next to her in the car.  
[¶10]  That morning, around 8:30 a.m., Roxanne called 9-1-1 and 
reported that Rick was unconscious and not breathing.  Emergency services 
and law enforcement arrived within minutes, found Rick lying in the bathtub, 
and quickly determined that he was dead.  An officer with the Bangor police 
department arrived on the scene, and, as he began to interact with Roxanne, 
he noted that she appeared weak and was breathing rapidly.  She volunteered 
that she had gotten in a huge fight with her husband the night before and that 
she had hit him with her grandchild’s plastic bat—part of which the officer 
subsequently found in the garbage can.  She admitted to the officer that she 
lied to Rick’s supervisor about having been at the hospital.  She also told him 
that she found Rick in the tub when she went to take a shower that morning. 
[¶11]  As she was speaking with the officer, she made repeated requests 
for medical personnel to “get a pulse” from Rick, and, when informed that he 
was deceased, she began to strike the officer’s chest repeatedly.  He took hold 
of her arms and held them away from him.  Following her outburst, Roxanne’s 
breathing became more labored, and she began to clutch her chest.  As EMTs 
 
 
7 
walked her to the door, she stated that Rick had pushed her down, and she 
displayed what to the officer’s observation seemed like aged bruises on her 
arms and legs.  Roxanne was taken to the hospital for evaluation.  She spent 
approximately four hours in the emergency department and, during that time, 
interacted with one particular nurse for about twenty minutes.   
[¶12]  That nurse described Roxanne’s demeanor at the hospital as calm 
and matter-of-fact, and testified that Roxanne was consistently oriented to 
person, place, time, and situation.  The nurse noted that Roxanne had no 
difficulties communicating and that Roxanne volunteered to the nurse that 
she had “hit [Rick] again and again and again,” that she had cut him, and that 
“he had made quite a mess and that she had to clean it up.”  At no time did 
Roxanne complain to the nurse of any specific injuries nor did she claim that 
Rick had hit her.  The nurse observed bruises on Roxanne’s body and the back 
of her hands, consistent with the use of blood thinners. 
[¶13]  When the wife went to the hospital to visit, Roxanne gave her a 
rambling explanation of what happened, reporting that Rick had been quite 
drunk, and that he had repeatedly fallen down and kept banging his face to the 
point that his eye came out.  Roxanne also told the wife that Rick took the 
 
 
8 
towel rack off the wall and attempted to strike her with it.  She repeatedly told 
the wife that “she didn’t do it,” and she only wanted to “hurt [him] a little bit.”   
[¶14]  Upon investigation of the Jeskeys’ apartment, law enforcement 
found Rick’s unclothed body in the bathtub with a cellphone, broken in two, 
on his chest, a ripped shower curtain, a broken wooden towel rack and a 
brown leather belt lying on the bathroom floor; a pair of needle-nose pliers 
and a razor without the blade on the bathroom counter; and a broken piece of 
a metal broom handle, a cigarette lighter, and a bent metal towel rod also lying 
on the floor.  In addition, there were impact, cast-off, and transfer blood 
patterns4 in the shower; on the bathroom door, floor, walls and counter; on 
the hallway carpet; and on the toolbox in the bedroom closet.  The washing 
machine and a laundry basket were full of wet laundry with red-brown stains 
on several of the articles.  The bathroom appeared as though it had been 
cleaned up.   
[¶15]  The medical examiner testified that Rick sustained multiple 
injuries to the front, both sides, and back of his head; a deep laceration across 
the bridge of his nose and a broken nose; a subarachnoid hemorrhage near 
                                         
4  An officer with the Bangor Police Department’s Criminal Investigation Division testified that 
“cast-off is basically blood that is flung from or released from a moving object.”  “Impact” is “the 
striking of blood with an object.  Liquid blood, wet blood.”  “Transfer” is a “bloodied surface coming 
in contact with another surface.”   
 
 
9 
the surface of his brain; multiple cuts and tear wounds to his forehead and 
scalp; injuries all around his eyes and a cutting injury to his left eyelid, the 
globe of his left eye sliced open in a manner that allowed the vitreous fluid to 
escape; puncture wounds to his arms5; significant bruising around his entire 
neck; a fractured hyoid bone; pinpoint hemorrhages inside his lips suggesting 
that he was strangled or choked; multiple torso injuries on his front and left 
side, including three rib fractures; a burn to his left nipple; punctures, bruises, 
and cuts to the exterior of his penis; injuries to his scrotum that were caused 
when something6 was thrust through the scrotal sac far enough to reach the 
pelvic floor and grab onto and damage the mesentery and tear a hole in the 
small bowel; cuts and lineal abrasions to the anus; and bruising, cuts, tears, 
and abrasions to the forearms, hands, thighs, and calves.  Rick also had alcohol 
and sleeping pills in his system, which may have impaired or incapacitated 
him, but the court specifically found that he was “conscious throughout his 
ordeal.”   
[¶16]  On June 22, 2011, Roxanne was charged with intentional or 
knowing murder or, in the alternative, depraved indifference murder in 
                                         
5  The court found that these wounds were caused by blows from the wooden towel rack, which 
had protruding screws. 
6  The court found that Roxanne caused the injuries to Rick’s genitals using needle-nose pliers 
and the injuries to his anus using the metal broom handle.  
 
 
10 
violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)-(B) (2015).  On June 24, 2011, the State 
filed a motion for a forensic evaluation, stating, “The circumstances of the case 
strongly suggest that the defendant may have mental illness issues, including 
neuropsychological issues.”  On July 27, 2011, the grand jury returned an 
indictment charging Roxanne with one consolidated count of intentional or 
knowing and/or depraved indifference murder.  
[¶17]  Roxanne pleaded not guilty at her arraignment in 
September 2011 and, after holding a hearing on October 31, 2011, the court 
(A. Murray, J.) granted the State’s motion for a forensic evaluation, ordering a 
mental examination to determine Roxanne’s competency, whether she 
suffered from insanity or an abnormal condition of the mind, and whether 
there existed other mental conditions relevant to issues that might arise at 
trial, such as battered woman syndrome.  In May 2012, at the State’s request, 
the court also ordered a neuropsychological examination to be conducted by 
the State Forensic Service.  Shortly thereafter, Roxanne was ordered admitted 
to Riverview Psychiatric Center for sixty days. 
[¶18]  On April 10, 11, 12, and 16, 2013, the court held the first of two 
competency hearings.  Four expert witnesses testified.  Dr. Riley, a clinical 
neuropsychologist, opined that Roxanne had all the skills necessary to 
 
 
11 
demonstrate competency if she chose to exercise those skills.  Drs. Doiron, a 
board-certified clinical neuropsychologist, and Lorenz, a clinical psychologist, 
opined that she did not.  And Dr. O’Grady, a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
opined that Roxanne’s “skills related to competency fell somewhere between 
her functioning prior to arrest”—which included being entrusted with the 
care of young children, volunteering at school, driving, functioning in the 
community—“and not being competent.”  In its May 2013 order, the court 
noted that Roxanne’s presentation to the four experts was “markedly different 
than her presentation to others.”  The court stated that, although it was 
convinced that Roxanne “has some impairments, and is further convinced that 
stress may exacerbate those impairments,” it concluded, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that she was competent to stand trial because she was able to 
cooperate with counsel to conduct a defense in a reasonable manner. 
[¶19]  On May 24, 2013, Roxanne entered a plea of not criminally 
responsible by reason of insanity, 17-A M.R.S. § 39 (2015), and waived her 
right to a jury trial.7  On November 8 and 12, 2013, Roxanne and the State 
each moved for a second competency evaluation alleging a change in 
                                         
7  Also on that day, Roxanne moved for the recusal of Justice Murray on the ground that the court 
found that Roxanne was “malingering,” i.e. intentionally presenting symptoms to avoid 
consequences, which Roxanne claimed raised a question as to whether the court was prejudicing 
Roxanne’s credibility.  The motion to recuse was granted, without comment. 
 
 
12 
circumstances based on a new report by Dr. Lorenz, and the court (Hunter, J.) 
granted the motion.   
[¶20]  On December 10 and 11, 2013, the court held a second 
competency hearing and took testimony from the same panel of four doctors.  
This time, Drs. O’Grady’s and Riley’s testimony supported the conclusion that 
Roxanne did have the ability to cooperate and assist in her defense, but Drs. 
Doiron and Lorenz testified that she did not have the ability to assist.  In an 
order dated December 13, 2013, the court noted that the experts shared a 
view that Roxanne suffered from low cognition, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and “other significant mental health issues that adversely affect[ed] 
her level of functioning.”  The court appropriately took into account its 
observations of Roxanne during the course of the proceedings and other 
evidence presented of her behavior in jail for five months and concluded, 
again, that she was competent to stand trial. 
[¶21]  A seven-day bench trial commenced on December 16, 2013.  On 
December 20th, following the State’s case-in-chief, the court granted an 
extended recess to give Roxanne time to decide whether she wanted to testify.  
On January 2, 2014, during the break, the court held a video conference with 
Roxanne, her counsel, and the State’s attorneys.  Roxanne’s counsel alleged 
 
 
13 
that she was suffering from an active psychotic disorder that was “seriously 
interfering with her ability to assist counsel in anything close to a normal 
relationship” and requested that she be evaluated by a psychiatrist to address 
her significant medication and treatment issues that affected, counsel claimed, 
her ability to make the decision whether or not to testify.   
[¶22]  The State contended that Roxanne had been given several 
opportunities to review trial materials and availed herself of many of those 
opportunities, and the prison staff reported that she adamantly denied 
suicidal or homicidal ideations, plan, or intent, and that she did not endorse 
perceptual disturbances.  The court stated that there was “nothing to suggest 
that Ms. Jeskey does not enjoy the competence – the level of competence that 
the Court had found in its most recent order, and, therefore, [it was] not 
inclined to order any further evaluations or any testing such [as] has been 
suggested by the defense here.”   
[¶23]  When trial re-commenced on January 6, Roxanne presented one 
witness in her defense, Dr. Doiron, who testified that Roxanne suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder and schizoaffective disorder, which, when 
coupled with her cognitive and mood changes following her brain resection, 
resulted in her inability to properly perceive the situation the night of the 
 
 
14 
murder.  He testified that Roxanne had been experiencing a dissociative state 
that prevented her from being able to form the requisite culpable state of 
mind for knowing and intentional murder.  In contrast, the State’s rebuttal 
witness, Dr. O’Grady, testified that she did not observe anything during the 
course of her interaction with Roxanne that would support Dr. Doiron’s 
conclusion that Roxanne was experiencing a dissociative state. 
[¶24]  In an order dated May 30, 2014, as to the charge of knowing or 
intentional murder the court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
(1) Roxanne inflicted injuries upon Rick Jeskey that ultimately lead to his 
death; (2) what Roxanne did to Rick was for the purpose of hurting him, and 
therefore her conduct was the product of her own free choice; and (3) she 
intentionally caused Rick’s death.  As to the charge of murder based on 
depraved indifference, the court found that “[a]ny one of [the injuries Rick 
sustained] standing alone manifests a depraved indifference to the value of 
human life.  Taken together they reflect a monstrous savagery and cruelty that 
defies comprehension.”  The court also found that this was “not a case of 
criminally negligent manslaughter,” despite that being a lesser included 
charge.  
 
 
15 
 
[¶25]  As to evidence bearing on Roxanne’s defenses of self-defense and 
justified use of deadly force based on her allegations of mutual aggression 
between her and her husband, the court stated that, even under Roxanne’s 
view of the evidence, the State had proved the absence of self-defense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Specifically, the court stated, “The evidence is clear to this 
court that [Roxanne’s] use of force greatly exceeded the bounds of objective 
reasonableness and simply cannot be viewed as a ‘reasonable degree’ of 
force.”  The court also found “that [Roxanne] did not actually believe that what 
she did to Mr. Jeskey was necessary because it is clear to this court that [she] 
continued to use force against [him] long after he had become unresponsive 
and therefore long after any threat of imminent use of force against her had 
ended.”  Further, the court found that there was “no credible evidence that 
would have, at any time, justified [Roxanne’s] use of deadly force against” 
Rick.   
 
[¶26]  As to Roxanne’s contention that she should be held not criminally 
responsible for her conduct by reason of insanity, the court found that she 
failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that at the time of her 
actions, she lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her 
conduct because of a severe abnormal condition of the mind that grossly and 
 
 
16 
demonstrably impaired her perception or understanding of reality,” despite 
the fact that she suffered from “a variety of mental health issues.”  The court 
found that, because Roxanne was coherent in her communications with the 
neighbors, Rick’s supervisor, a police officer, and the nurse, and because she 
made several phone calls throughout the course of the evening, she was 
coherent and “capable of reality[-]based, goal[-]directed behavior.”  
[¶27]  The court also concluded that Roxanne had demonstrated 
appreciation for the wrongfulness of her conduct by her request that the wife 
not call an ambulance; by her “opening the door a crack” and subsequent 
failure to invite the husband in when he came over to check on her; by her 
deceptive call to Rick’s supervisor; and by her efforts to clean the bathroom 
and launder the clothing.  The court concluded that, “at the time she was 
causing fatal injuries to Mr. Jeskey, [Roxanne] did not suffer from the kind of 
severe abnormal condition of the mind that would be sufficient to shield her 
from criminal responsibility under Maine law.”  The court entered a finding of 
guilty on May 30, 2014.  
[¶28]  On June 9, 2014, Roxanne filed a motion for a new trial on the 
ground that “it was manifestly unjust for [her] to be tried while she was 
actively psychotic” because it was impossible for her to be adequately 
 
 
17 
counseled and make a “truly voluntary and informed decision about . . . 
whether to testify in her own defense.”  She implied that she was entitled to a 
new trial because her new anti-psychotic medication had markedly improved 
her overall mental health by the time she made the motion.  On June 12, 2014, 
the court denied the motion, noting that, other than Roxanne’s counsel, no 
one, including the court, had observed any evidence of active psychosis prior 
to or during the trial.  The court stated that it was “aware of no recognized 
right for a criminal defendant to be at some specified state of optimum 
physical or mental health before being required to stand trial.  That they 
might be made better able to participate in trial proceedings through medical 
intervention does not appear to be a recognized basis for granting a new trial.”  
[¶29]  On June 27, 2014, the court held a sentencing hearing and 
sentenced Roxanne to fifty years in prison.  Roxanne timely appealed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Murder Convictions 
 
1. 
Knowing or Intentional Murder Conviction 
[¶30]  Roxanne first argues that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed 
intentional or knowing murder.  We review the evidence, and all reasonable 
 
 
18 
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to 
the court’s judgment to determine whether the trial court rationally could 
have found each element of the charged offense proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See State v. Jones, 2012 ME 88, ¶ 7, 46 A.3d 1125. 
[¶31]  A person is guilty of murder if the person intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another human being or engages in conduct 
that manifests a depraved indifference to the value of human life that in fact 
causes the death of another human being.  17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)-(B).  “In 
order to prove the defendant guilty of murder, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt” that (1) the victim is dead; (2) the defendant caused his 
death; (3) the defendant’s conduct was voluntary;8 and (4) the defendant 
acted knowingly or intentionally.9  Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, 
§ 6-62 at 6-123 (2016 ed.).   
                                         
8  Voluntary conduct means “that the defendant’s actions that caused the death were the result of 
the defendant’s conscious choice and not the result of reflex, convulsion or some other 
nonvoluntary act. . . .”  Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 6-62 at 6-123 (2016 ed.). 
9  “A person causes death intentionally if it is that person’s conscious object to cause death.  A 
person causes death knowingly if that person is aware that it is practically certain that his/her 
conduct will cause death.”  Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 6-62 at 6-123. 
 
 
19 
[¶32]  Relying on the law of abnormal condition of the mind10 and 
self-defense based on mutual physical combat, Roxanne asserts that the court 
erred because it failed to consider fully those distinguishing factors that raised 
a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the required culpable state of mind.  
See 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2015).  The flaw in her reasoning is that “merely because 
there is evidence sufficient to generate an issue does not mean that the [court] 
is compelled to believe that evidence.”  State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 542 
(Me. 1980). 
[¶33]  Our standard of review requires us to view evidence in the light 
most favorable to the court’s judgment.  See Jones, 2012 ME 88, ¶ 7, 46 A.3d 
1125.  Here, the court could rationally have found every element of knowing 
or intentional murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt despite evidence 
presented that could negate Roxanne’s mental state.  First, evidence 
established that Rick was dead and that Roxanne was responsible for his 
death.  
[¶34]  Second, regarding Roxanne’s state of mind, the court found, and 
the record supports, that because Rick sustained so many injuries over what 
                                         
10  “Evidence of an abnormal condition of the mind may raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of the required culpable state of mind.”  17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2015); See State v. Graham, 
2015 ME 35, ¶ 17, 113 A.3d 1102. 
 
 
20 
must have been an extended period of time, “[t]he very nature of those 
injuries reflect a willfulness and a sense of purpose to inflict serious harm.”  
The court also found that because Roxanne was emotionally hurt due to Rick’s 
perceived infidelity, she “became enraged and formed an intention to hurt” 
him—an intention that she communicated to a neighbor.  Finally, the record 
supports the court’s finding that Roxanne’s actions were taken knowingly.  
Rick was alive but incapacitated most of the time that the injuries were 
inflicted as demonstrated by the fact that the neighbors heard no voices or 
screams; that Rick was still bleeding and hemorrhaging from his injuries and 
was laying prone; and that Roxanne, an LPN, had sufficient medical knowledge 
to attend to his medical needs, and even a layperson would be aware that, if 
unattended, Rick would bleed to death from the injuries that she had inflicted.   
[¶35]  Roxanne’s contentions that, because she did not have a plan to 
kill Rick, because there was evidence of a mutual physical altercation,11 and 
because she had several mental health diagnoses, she could not, and did not, 
have the requisite culpable state of mind to commit knowing or intentional 
murder are unavailing.  We conclude that sufficient evidence existed to permit 
                                         
11  The court considered but ultimately rejected Roxanne’s affirmative defense of self-defense, 
stating that there was no properly submitted evidence that generated the issue, and that her use of 
force, even if she was not the original aggressor, “exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.”  
 
 
21 
a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Roxanne 
was guilty of knowing or intentional murder.  
2. Depraved Indifference Murder Conviction 
 
[¶36]  Roxanne also contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that she committed depraved indifference murder.  We 
apply the same standard of review and examine the facts in the light most 
favorable to the court’s judgment to determine whether a rational trier of fact 
could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State proved all of the 
elements of the charged offense.  See id. ¶ 7.   
[¶37]  A defendant may be convicted of depraved indifference murder if 
the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the conduct was 
voluntary, representing the defendant’s conscious decision; (2) the conduct 
caused the victim’s death; and (3) when looking objectively, the fact-finder is 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was, as the court here 
stated, so bad, brutal, savage, revolting or shocking, that, although the 
defendant may not have acted with the actual subjective intent to kill the 
victim, the fact-finder can nonetheless impute the highest degree of 
blameworthiness.  See State v. Thongsavanh, 2007 ME 20, ¶ 39, 915 A.2d 421; 
see also State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 63 (Me. 1981) (“[D]eath-producing 
 
 
22 
conduct will justify a verdict of guilty of depraved indifference murder if a jury 
could find that [the] conduct was so heinous in the eyes of the law as to 
constitute murder.” (quotation marks omitted)).   
[¶38]  Citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), Roxanne 
contends that, as a predicate to all criminal liability, the person must have fair 
notice that her conduct is forbidden, and, because she suffered from multiple 
mental health and medical diagnoses, she could not know that her behavior 
was proscribed.  She argues that it is inherent in this predicate that a person’s 
individual capacities are always a factor when they so significantly and 
severely deviate from the norm.  Contrary to Roxanne’s contention, Harriss 
establishes an objective standard and requires only that a statute give “a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by the statute.”  Id.; see also State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 174 
(Me. 1981).  No special dispensation for individuals diagnosed with mental 
health conditions exists in our case law to alter the objective standard we 
have enunciated, and Roxanne cites none in her brief.  Roxanne also argues 
that the existence of several mental health diagnoses raises more than a 
reasonable doubt as to her ability to form the requisite intent; however “[t]he 
 
 
23 
offense does not require evidence of a defendant’s subjective state of mind.” 
Thongsavanh, 2007 ME 20, ¶ 38, 915 A.2d 421. 
[¶39]  Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the record supports the 
court’s finding that Roxanne acted with depraved indifference to human life.  
Her violence against her husband lasted for several hours, and the litany of 
the injuries he sustained as recited by the medical examiner, including a 
fractured hyoid bone, a sliced-open eyeball, and punctured scrotal sac, would 
lead a rational fact-finder to conclude that Roxanne’s conduct was so 
outrageous and revolting as to constitute depraved indifference murder.  See 
id. ¶ 39 (stating that “[c]onduct manifests a depraved indifference to the value 
of human life when it is highly charged with death-inducing potential and 
demonstrates a total lack of concern that a person may die or suffer as a result 
of the conduct”).  
B. 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
[¶40]  Roxanne contends next that the court erred by concluding that 
she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she is not guilty 
by reason of insanity.  See 17-A M.R.S. § 39.  “We review the evidence, and any 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, most favorably to the result 
reached by the trial court.”  State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 44, 36 A.3d 893.   
 
 
24 
[¶41]  “A defendant is not criminally responsible by reason of insanity if, 
at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the 
defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
criminal conduct.  Mental disease or defect means only those severely 
abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person’s 
perception or understanding of reality.”  Id. ¶ 45 (alterations omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see 17-A M.R.S. § 39.  The 
defendant must prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and we will overturn a trial court’s finding adverse to the defendant 
“only if the record compels a contrary conclusion.”  Gurney, 2012 ME 14, 
¶¶ 45-46, 36 A.3d 893 (quotation marks omitted).  
[¶42]  Roxanne contends that she has a severely abnormal mental 
condition due to her several documented diagnoses.  The defense expert, Dr. 
Doiron, testified that he diagnosed Roxanne with “cognitive disorder, not 
otherwise specified” resulting from her brain surgery, schizoaffective 
disorder, and severe post-traumatic stress disorder.  He stated that Roxanne 
would have been “overwhelmed” and “unable to properly understand what is 
taking place” in an altercation with her husband.  She also may have 
developed a “fractionated sense of self” from abuse she suffered early in her 
 
 
25 
life and may have been in and out of a dissociative state.  Dr. Doiron stated 
that he did not believe that Roxanne was able to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of her actions.  
[¶43]  The State’s rebuttal witness, Dr. O’Grady, testified that she had 
diagnosed Roxanne with post-traumatic stress disorder, “cognitive disorder, 
not otherwise specified,” and personality change due to general medical 
condition, but she disagreed with Dr. Doiron’s diagnosis of a psychotic 
disorder.  Dr. O’Grady did not believe that Roxanne was in the severe 
dissociative state required to negate criminal responsibility because Roxanne 
could not have made phone calls, engaged in coherent conversation, or quickly 
adjusted her behavior from one moment to the next if she had been in that 
state.  Dr. O’Grady agreed that Roxanne had a “thought dysfunction” and a lack 
of impulse control but noted evidence of malingering in another doctor’s 
reports.  
[¶44]  Although the court heard differing diagnoses and opinions 
concerning Roxanne’s ability to perceive the situation the night of Rick’s 
death,12 on appellate review “[a]ny conflicts in evidence are resolved in favor 
of the State.”  State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 26, 892 A.2d 447.  The evidence in 
                                         
12  Roxanne at all times denied having hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia to Dr. Doiron.   
 
 
26 
the record supports the court’s finding that “[a]lthough it is clear that 
[Roxanne] suffers from a variety of mental health issues, she has failed to 
prove that at the time of her actions, she lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.”  For example, the court noted 
that during the night of June 12, 2011, Roxanne was coherent in her several 
conversations with the neighbors, and neither neighbor suggested that she 
seemed out of touch.  She was also able to fabricate a story when she called 
Rick’s supervisor to tell him that Rick would not be coming in to work.  She 
could communicate coherently with a dispatcher, the Bangor police officer, 
the nurse, and her neighbor on the morning of June 13, 2011.  Roxanne was 
also able to damage Rick’s motorcycle and make several phone calls, 
indicating that she was capable of reality-based, goal-directed behavior.  
Evidence that she appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct included her 
refusal to allow her neighbor to call an ambulance, opening the door “a crack” 
when her other neighbor came over in response to a particularly loud noise, 
her lies to Rick’s supervisor, and her efforts to clean the bathroom and do the 
laundry.  The court found that these actions were intended to hide and 
deceive, which reflected an appreciation of wrongful behavior and a 
consciousness of guilt.   
 
 
27 
[¶45]  Roxanne’s actions and statements amply support the court’s 
findings and conclusion that she failed to prove that she was not guilty by 
reason of insanity.  See Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 43 & n.7, 36 A.3d 893.  On this 
record, we discern no error in the court’s determination that Roxanne did not 
meet her burden of proof on her affirmative defenses. 
C. 
Manslaughter 
[¶46]  Roxanne argues that the court erred by not considering the 
“lesser included” charge of manslaughter because her mental health diagnoses 
raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the culpable state of mind 
required for a murder conviction.  We review the court’s application of a 
statute de novo.  See Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 57, 956 A.2d 
110.  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1-A) (2015) provides that “when the crime of 
depraved indifference murder is charged, the crime of criminally negligent 
manslaughter is deemed to be charged.”  “A person is guilty of manslaughter if 
that person . . . with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human 
being[.]”  State v. Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 15, 736 A.2d 1047 (alterations in 
original) (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶47]  The court here acknowledged that a depraved indifference 
charge included the lesser charge of manslaughter and explicitly rejected it, 
 
 
28 
stating “[t]his is not a case of criminally negligent manslaughter.  The evidence 
in this case is so compelling that it permits no other conclusion and proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Roxanne] is guilty of depraved indifference 
murder.”  See 17-A M.R.S. § 13-A(1) (2015) (providing that the court, as fact-
finder, need not consider a lesser included offense “unless on the basis of the 
evidence there is a rational basis for finding the defendant guilty of that lesser 
included 
offense”). 
Roxanne 
has 
no 
constitutional 
entitlement 
to 
consideration of the lesser included offense once the court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that her conduct was sufficiently dangerous as to reflect a 
depraved indifference to the value of human life.  See Boyce v. Comm’r Me. 
Dep’t. of Corr., 217 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D. Me. 2002); see also Thongsavanh, 
2007 ME 20, ¶¶ 32-33, 915 A.2d 421.  
 
[¶48]  Because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the court’s conclusion that the State had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Roxanne committed depraved indifference murder, the court did not err 
in finding there was no rational basis for finding Roxanne guilty of the lesser 
offense of manslaughter.  
 
 
29 
D. 
Motion for New Trial 
[¶49]  Roxanne contends that the court abused its discretion by denying 
her motion for a new trial.  “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial 
for clear error or an abuse of discretion.”13  State v. Robinson, 2016 ME 24, 
¶ 24, 134 A.3d 828.  Former Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,14 in effect 
at the time, permitted a court to grant a new trial if required in the interest of 
justice.  Roxanne moved for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the court erred 
in denying her request for a third competency hearing because she was 
demonstrating an active psychotic disorder, which constituted a bona fide 
doubt regarding her competency, and (2) because her mental health status 
has improved following the administration of antipsychotic medication, 
allowing her to proceed untreated during trial was substantially unfair and 
deprived her of due process of law.  
[¶50]  “Competence to stand trial sufficient to meet the requirements of 
due process means that the accused is capable of understanding the nature 
and object of the charges and proceedings against him . . . and of conducting in 
                                         
13  “Review for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions: (1) are factual 
findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) did the court 
understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying 
the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds 
of reasonableness.”  Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074.   
14  Maine R. Crim. P. 33 (amended 2015, current version at M.R.U. Crim. P. 33). 
 
 
30 
cooperation with his counsel his defense in a rational and reasonable 
manner.”  Thursby v. State, 223 A.2d 61, 66 (Me. 1966).  A defendant may be 
mentally competent to stand trial even though he or she may require 
psychiatric treatment.  Id. at 68; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
180 (1975) (stating that “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his 
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial 
are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required . . . .”).   
[¶51]  Dr. O’Grady with the State Forensic Service first evaluated 
Roxanne in November 2011 over the course of two sessions, totaling five and 
a half hours.  Dr. O’Grady wrote an addendum to her report in June 2012 
following receipt of Dr. Riley’s evaluation, and she conducted follow-up 
evaluations in May 2012 and April and December 2013.  Dr. Lorenz 
interviewed Roxanne in October and November 2011, in March 2012, and in 
December 2013.  Dr. Doiron evaluated Roxanne in five separate sessions in 
February and March 2012 and November 2013.  Finally, Dr. Riley conducted 
evaluations of Roxanne in June 2012 and March and December 2013.  
Additionally, prison staff and counselors regularly made inquiries and 
notations as to Roxanne’s affect and state of mind during her confinement.  
The court held two separate, multiple-day, testimonial competency hearings 
 
 
31 
in March and December 2013, the second hearing being held just days before 
her trial was scheduled to begin.  The record demonstrates that Roxanne’s 
mental health was well monitored and regularly assessed over the course of 
the several years her case was pending and during the trial itself.   
[¶52]  In denying Roxanne’s motion for a new trial, filed in June 2014, 
the court noted that three of the four experts examining her never observed 
any evidence of active psychosis and that “none of the transport officers, 
general jail staff members making progress notations15 and in particular jail 
mental health workers ever observed any evidence of psychosis.”  Roxanne 
also indicated concern during the trial regarding the media’s video recording 
of the proceeding, demonstrating her awareness of courtroom activity and 
ability to advocate for her needs.  Additionally, following the extended recess 
during trial to give Roxanne time to decide whether she wanted to testify, the 
court engaged in a careful colloquy with her regarding her wishes, and at no 
time did she demonstrate psychosis; rather, she answered the court’s 
questions in an appropriate and rational manner.   
                                         
15  A corrections officer stated in an interview in June 2014 that Roxanne’s behavior was “much 
different when her defense attorneys came to visit her. . . . She would become more withdrawn, 
child-like and frail in demeanor . . . [but] after the attorneys left . . . she’d be back to the old Roxanne, 
with an age-appropriate voice and demeanor.”   
 
 
32 
[¶53]  As to the improvement in her mental health status resulting from 
being prescribed anti-psychotic medication, in its order denying her motion 
for a new trial, the court observed that it was “aware of no recognized right 
for a criminal defendant to be at some specified state of optimum physical or 
mental health before being required to stand trial.”  “Requiring that a criminal 
defendant be competent has a modest aim:  It seeks to ensure that he has the 
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.  While 
psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify various kinds and 
degrees of competence . . . the Due Process Clause does not impose [that] 
additional requirement[].”  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).   
[¶54]  Given the discrepancies in Roxanne’s presentation of symptoms 
among experts and jail staff, the consistent monitoring of her mental health 
status, and two judicial determinations of competency for trial, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying Roxanne’s motion for a new trial.  She 
was not deprived of her due process right because there was sufficient 
evidence to support the court’s findings that she was, and continued to be, 
competent to stand trial; and the court’s weighing of the facts and choices was 
within the bounds of reasonableness.  See Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 
930 A.2d 1074.   
 
 
33 
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶55]  In summary, we conclude that the court did not err in 
determining that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element 
of both knowing or intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.  
We also conclude that the court did not err in determining that her defense of 
not guilty by reason of insanity was not supported by the evidence.   We also 
conclude that the court properly declined to consider whether Roxanne was 
guilty, instead, of the lesser offense of manslaughter because there was no 
rational basis for finding she was guilty of that offense.  Finally, the court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Roxanne’s motion for a new trial despite 
her allegedly improved psychological state. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., Law Office of Joseph M. Baldacci, 
Bangor, and David Bate, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Roxanne 
Jeskey 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General and Donald W. Macomber, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
34 
At oral argument: 
 
Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., for appellant Roxanne Jeskey 
 
Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant State of 
Maine 
 
 
 
Penobscot Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2011-2195 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY