Case Title: Smith v. Stewart

Citation: 165 Vt 364, 684 A.2d 265

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Smith v. Stewart (94-693); 165 Vt 364; 684 A.2d 265

[Opinion Filed 02-Aug-1996]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 94-693


Judith Smith                                      Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Windham Family Court

Potter Stewart, Jr.                               April Term, 1996


Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

William M. McCarty and Mark T. Doherty of McCarty Law Offices, P.C.,
Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

William M. Dorsch of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch, Burlington, for
defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Norton, J.,
Specially Assigned



       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Potter Stewart, Jr., appeals the decision of
  the Windham Family Court awarding increased child support for 1993 and 1994
  to his former wife, plaintiff Judith Smith.  He argues that the court erred
  by awarding support beyond the guideline maximum, by extrapolating from the
  guidelines, by not basing the guideline calculation on shared custody, and
  by awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff.  We affirm the court's grant of
  attorney's fees and refusal to apply the shared custody guidelines, but
  reverse the child support award and remand for recalculation consistent
  with this opinion.

       The parties were married in 1971 and divorced in 1991.  They have two
  sons whose physical custody was awarded to plaintiff but who are frequently
  with defendant when not in school.  This case involves calculation of
  support for the children for 1993 and 1994 in accordance with the 1991
  divorce order.  The order, which was based on a stipulation of the parties,
  provides:

       The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff child support in



       accordance with the Vermont Child Support Guidelines.  Said
       support shall be recalculated annually on January 1 or as soon
       thereafter as possible.  Each party shall provide the other with
       income and tax information necessary to recalculate said support
       amount.  The amount recalculated shall be retroactive to January
       1 of the relevant year.  The support calculation shall include actual
       capital and operating losses and expenses and shall not be based on
       shared custody guidelines.  Provided, however, that the support
       shall be $1,283.00 per month through 31 December 1991, which
       is a compromise amount without reliance on the guidelines.

  The parties agreed to this arrangement to accommodate defendant's
  fluctuating salary.  In December 1991, the parties agreed to an amendment
  to the provision to provide, among other matters, that "income shall be as
  defined in 15 V.S.A. § 653(5)(A) with the exception of imputed income and
  gifts, which shall not be considered" and "[i]ncome computations shall also
  include the defendant's `out of pocket losses,' if any, from the
  condominium investments."  In connection with this amendment, defendant
  again agreed that the shared custody guidelines did not apply to the
  support calculation.

       The 1991 order also requires that defendant pay maintenance.  He is
  required to pay $1,600 per month through December 31, 1996, and $1,150 per
  month thereafter through December 31, 2008 when the maintenance obligation
  ceases.

       Defendant's income in 1991 was approximately $146,000.  In 1992, it
  rose to $299,951. In 1993, it fell to $180,523.  In February 1994,
  defendant left his law firm and started his own practice.  He estimated
  that he would earn approximately $75,000 in 1994 from this practice.
  Plaintiff's income in 1992 was $36,952, including the maintenance payments;
  in 1993, it dropped to $29,480.

       In 1992, defendant paid child support in the amount of $337 per week,
  based on his 1991 income.  Defendant filed his 1992 income tax return in
  April 1993, but did not give plaintiff a copy until July 1993.  He
  continued the preexisting child support amount until July 16, when he
  raised it to $434 per week.  During 1993, defendant paid $19,949 in child
  support.

       In 1994, defendant lowered his child support payment when he left his
  firm to start his

 

  own practice.  Since January he has been paying $128 per week.  He provided
  his 1993 income tax returns in May 1994.

       On January 12, 1994, defendant moved that the maintenance award be
  reduced because he no longer had the ability to comply with it since his
  income had declined with the start of his new practice.  He also requested
  that the court determine the proper amount of child support pursuant to the
  1991 order.  On January 26, 1994, plaintiff responded by moving to enforce
  the 1991 order with respect to child support for the years 1993 and 1994. 
  Plaintiff also sought a maintenance supplement and attorney's fees.

       Following a hearing, the family court ruled on these motions on
  December 1, 1994, denying defendant's motion to modify the maintenance
  award and plaintiff's motion for a maintenance supplement.  It granted
  plaintiff's motion to enforce the 1991 child support order and calculated
  the outstanding arrearage as $20,973.44 for 1993 and $9,180 for the 32
  weeks of 1994 which preceded the hearing.  It set the on-going child
  support amount for 1994 at $434 per week and awarded plaintiff $8,745.58 in
  attorney's fees.

                                A.

       Defendant first argues that the court erred by awarding child support
  in an amount greater than the guideline maximum.  He claims that the court
  may award support beyond the guideline maximum only if it finds that the
  needs of the children have not been met, and that no such finding was or
  could have been made here.  This argument requires us to revisit the
  purposes and policies of our child support system.

       In 1986, the Legislature adopted a new child support system which
  established guidelines for determining the financial support obligations of
  parents in most cases.  See 15 V.S.A. §§ 650, 653.  The guideline system
  has three main purposes: to ensure children receive the same proportion of
  parental income after separation or divorce as they would have received if
  the parents had never separated, to eliminate discrepancies in awards
  between children in similar circumstances and to improve the efficiency of
  child support adjudication.  See Grimes v.

 

  Grimes, 159 Vt. 399, 403, 621 A.2d 211, 213 (1992); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth,
  154 Vt. 103, 106, 574 A.2d 772, 774-75 (1990).  The central component of
  the system is a set of tables which reflect "the percent of combined
  available income which parents living in the same household in Vermont
  ordinarily spend on their children."  15 V.S.A. § 654.  The table amounts
  are expressed in dollars and are "presumed to be the total support
  obligation of parents."  Id. When the events in this case took place, the
  tables covered combined available incomes up to $11,575 per month.  See
  Office of Child Support Services, Child Support Guidelines § 1002, at 5
  (1990) [hereinafter Guidelines].(FN1)  When the combined available income of
  the parents exceeds the "uppermost levels of the support guideline," the
  "court may use its discretion in determining child support."  15 V.S.A. §
  656(d).

       Before addressing defendant's specific argument, it is important to
  understand how the family court approached this case.  Plaintiff argued
  consistently that she was seeking enforcement of the 1991 agreement and
  order, and not requesting a modification of the child support provisions of
  the order.  Defendant has not been consistent on this point, but a number
  of his arguments are premised on his claim that the family court modified
  the 1991 order by setting a support amount above the guideline maximum. 
  The family court clearly believed it was enforcing, and not modifying, the
  1991 order.

       We conclude that the family court acted reasonably and was correct in
  its approach.  See C.D. v. N.M., 160 Vt. 495, 501,