Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner

Citation: 1997-Ohio-251

Docket Number: 19961995

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Disciplinary Counsel v. Eunice A. Clavner. 
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[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner (1997), ______Ohio 
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St.3d_______.] 
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Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- Public reprimand -- Attempting to  
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exonerate oneself from or limit one’s liability to client for personal 
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malpractice. 
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(No. 96-1995 -- Submitted October 16, 1996 -- Decided February 19, 1997.) 
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On Certified Report by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
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and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-92. 
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On November 24, 1995, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, relator, 
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charged Eunice A. Clavner of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
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0036747, respondent, with violations of DR 6-102(A) (attempting to 
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exonerate herself from or limit her liability to her client for her personal 
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malpractice), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
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administration of justice), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that 
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adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law).  The matter was heard 
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before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
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of the Supreme Court (“board”), on May 10, 1996. 
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According to the testimony adduced at the hearing, a default 
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judgment was entered against respondent’s clients, Peter Quinn and Connie 
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Rudolph (“clients”), after respondent failed to appear for a trial date on 
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November 1, 1994. [Exhibit 14, R. 82]  A scheduling error in her office led 
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respondent to believe the trial date to be November 3, 1994.  When the 
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clients arrived in respondent’s office on November 2, 1994 to discuss the 
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following day’s trial, respondent informed them of the default judgment.  
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Respondent said that the judgment might be set aside, but if it was not, 
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respondent would pay for damages, including court costs.  On that day 
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respondent and the clients entered into a “release” which provided that 
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respondent would pay “[t]he judgment amount in its entirety including court 
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costs * * * [and] replacement cost of $440.00 for lumber,” and the clients 
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would “refrain from taking legal action against” the respondent.  
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Respondent explained the release line by line, but she did not inform the 
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clients that they should seek counsel from another attorney before signing it.  
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Respondent told the clients that they should consult another lawyer with 
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respect to available remedies, and renegotiated certain terms of the release 
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with new counsel employed by the clients.  With the agreement of the 
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clients and their new counsel, respondent filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in the 
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trial court on November 28, 1994. The motion to vacate the judgment was 
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granted on January 27, 1995 and a new trial was set. 
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The panel found that respondent should not have obtained a release 
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from the clients without first informing them that they were in an 
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adversarial relationship with her and advising them that they had a right to 
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consult independent counsel before agreeing to the release.  The panel 
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found that in negotiating the release and dealing directly with her clients, 
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who on this issue were adverse to her, respondent violated DR 6-102.  The 
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board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
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recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded. 
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____________________________________ 
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Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, and Alvin E.Mathews, Assistant 
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Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
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Mary L Cibella for respondent. 
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____________________________________ 
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Per Curiam.  DR 6-102(A) provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not 
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attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his 
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personal malpractice.”  We do not read this rule so as to prohibit an attorney 
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from ever raising a defense against or attempting to settle a malpractice 
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action.  However, this rule places an attorney on notice that when a client 
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has a potential cause of action for malpractice, the attorney and the client 
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are adversaries.  Because the attorney-client relationship places the attorney 
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in a position of dominance, courts and professional ethics committees have 
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said that a potential malpractice claim may be settled only if  the client 
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consents after full disclosure, the settlement is not unconscionable, 
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inequitable, or unfair, and, most important, the client is advised to seek 
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independent counsel before signing the agreement.  The Florida Bar v. 
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Nemec (Fla. 1980), 390 S.2d. 1190; Committee on Legal Ethics of the West 
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Virginia State Bar v. Cometti (1993), 189 W.Va.262, 430 S.E.2d 320 
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(interpreting Rule 1.8[h] of the Rules of Professional Conduct);  Opinion of 
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Standing Committee on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State Bar No. 1550 
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(Oct. 20, 1993); ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct, 
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Ethics Opinions 1991-1995, at 1001:8723; Professional Ethics Commission 
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of the Board of Overseers of the State Bar of Maine, Opinion No.68 (March 
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14, 1986), 1 Maine Bar Journal, No. 3 (May 1986), 154. 
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Whatever may have been the intentions of respondent, however little, 
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if any, damage resulted to her clients, and regardless of whether her clients 
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had a cause of action for malpractice, respondent should have been aware 
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that when she began negotiations with her clients for a release of any 
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potential claims against her, she was in an adversarial relationship with 
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them.  She should have informed her clients of this adversarial relationship 
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and their right to independent counsel before they signed the release.  No 
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good intentions on the part of respondent to spare her clients harm and no 
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careful explanation of the terms of the release can excuse the violation of 
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DR-6-102(A). 
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We adopt the board’s findings and recommendation and hereby 
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reprimand the respondent publicly.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK 
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and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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