Case Title: State of Florida v. Penna

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2022-0458

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0458 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ZACHARY JOSEPH PENNA, 
Respondent. 
 
May 2, 2024 
 
GROSSHANS, J. 
 
We accepted for review a decision of the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal that ordered suppression of certain statements made by 
Zachary Penna, concluding that police obtained those statements in 
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  See Penna v. 
State, 344 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).  At the request of the 
State, the district court certified a question to us involving the 
requirements of Miranda as interpreted by Shelly v. State, 262 So. 
3d 1 (Fla. 2018).  In particular, the district court asked if Miranda is 
“automatically violated” when an officer does not “re-read a Miranda 
 
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warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact” 
with law enforcement.  Penna, 344 So. 3d at 442 (on motion for 
certification).  We answer that question in the negative and recede 
from our decision in Shelly, which announced a per se rule that is 
inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.1 
I 
 
In 2015, Penna unlawfully entered a home in Palm Beach 
County and brutally stabbed two men to death when they refused 
his demand for their vehicle.  The force and number of stabbings 
caused significant bloodshed throughout the home.  Penna, covered 
in the victims’ blood, scooped up some blood and drank it. 
 
After stabbing the two men, Penna took their SUV, drove to a 
nearby neighborhood, and robbed an elderly woman.  Moments 
later, Penna kidnapped a coworker from his home, but he was able 
to escape when Penna stopped at a restaurant. 
 
Undaunted, Penna drove north to Brevard County where he 
abandoned the SUV.  After locating another vehicle, he approached 
the owner and demanded the keys.  When the owner did not fully 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
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comply with his directives, Penna slashed the man’s throat with a 
knife.2  Then, Penna fled into the woods. 
 
Responding to the attack, law enforcement deployed a canine 
that successfully located Penna.  Penna stabbed the canine and 
then ran out of the woods with a knife in hand.  Officers ordered 
Penna to drop the knife, but he refused.  Only after being shot four 
times did Penna stop charging at the officers. 
 
Following his apprehension, Penna was transported to a 
nearby hospital where he received medical treatment.  The next day, 
Detective Jonathan D’Angelo went to the hospital to speak with 
Penna.  At that time, Penna was shackled to his bed and on several 
medications.  Despite his physical condition, Penna was able to 
communicate with the detective. 
At the outset of their conversation, Detective D’Angelo asked 
Penna if he had been advised of his Miranda rights.  In response, 
Penna began listing those rights, noting the right to silence and an 
attorney.  Despite this, the detective read Penna the Miranda 
warnings as listed on his department-issued card. 
 
2.  This victim survived Penna’s attack. 
 
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Detective D’Angelo then began asking questions related to the 
murders.  Penna answered the first few questions, generally 
denying that he recognized the murder victims or their home.  But 
when Detective D’Angelo asked Penna how he came to have 
possession of the stolen SUV, Penna invoked his right to counsel.  
At that point, Detective D’Angelo stopped questioning Penna and 
left the room.  When another detective entered Penna’s room later 
that day, Penna again invoked his right to counsel. 
 
Following these interactions with law enforcement, Penna 
remained in a hospital for roughly a month and a half, always 
restrained to his bed.  During this time, at least one officer was 
assigned to constantly monitor him. 
One of the assigned officers was Deputy Michael Nettles, who 
started monitoring Penna roughly four weeks after the murders.  
One day, Penna asked Deputy Nettles why he (Penna) was in the 
hospital.  Deputy Nettles responded by saying, “[Y]ou don’t know 
why you’re here?”  A short time later, Penna volunteered to Deputy 
Nettles that he had “stabbed a couple of people.”  In response to a 
clarifying question, Penna confessed to stabbing a police dog and 
confirmed that he had stabbed two men. 
 
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Two days later, Deputy Nettles was again assigned to monitor 
Penna.  Without prompting, Penna stated that he was in a poor 
mood and that his life was messed up.  Deputy Nettles followed up 
by asking why Penna had this dim outlook.  Penna responded that 
he had ruined his own life, adding: “I know what I did.  I’m going to 
prison for my whole . . . life.” 
 
The very next day, Deputy Nettles was again assigned to watch 
Penna.  While talking with Deputy Nettles, Penna asked, “What do 
you think I will get?”  Penna clarified that he meant for “killing th[e] 
two [men].”  Redirecting that question, Deputy Nettles asked Penna 
what he thought his punishment would be for the crimes.  At that 
point, Penna told Deputy Nettles that he would share what 
happened.  Deputy Nettles reminded Penna that he was an officer 
and would write down his statements.  In addition, Deputy Nettles 
also cautioned Penna against talking unless he wanted to.  Deputy 
Nettles, though, stopped short of giving Miranda warnings to Penna.  
Penna proceeded to offer additional details about his crime spree. 
 
Roughly a week later, Penna again struck up a conversation 
with Deputy Nettles.  During that conversation, Penna once more 
 
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spoke of his crimes and said that he thought the murders would 
result in life sentences. 
The final relevant conversation with Deputy Nettles occurred 
roughly two weeks later.  In addition to mentioning expected 
criminal sanctions, Penna spoke of being reborn and his belief in 
the Egyptian god Ra.  Alluding to his anticipated prosecution, 
Penna said that he would testify that Ra told him to do things. 
 
Ultimately, the State charged Penna with several crimes, 
including two counts of first-degree murder.  Before trial, Penna 
moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing 
that such statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.  The 
trial court held a hearing on the motion at which Detective D’Angelo 
and Deputy Nettles testified.  Among other things, Deputy Nettles 
testified about his conversations with Penna and the circumstances 
surrounding those conversations.  Following the evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety, stressing 
that Penna initiated all the conversations with Deputy Nettles.  
Thus, in the court’s view, Penna had failed to establish a Miranda 
violation. 
 
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At the ensuing trial, the State presented substantial physical 
evidence and witness testimony to establish Penna’s guilt.  One of 
its witnesses was Deputy Nettles.  Through his testimony, the State 
presented many of Penna’s incriminating statements.  After the 
State rested, Penna introduced evidence to support his insanity 
defense.  Rejecting that defense, the jury found Penna guilty as 
charged on all counts.  The court entered judgment consistent with 
the verdicts and sentenced Penna to life in prison. 
 
Penna appealed to the Fourth District.  At the outset of the 
majority opinion, the district court rejected what it characterized as 
the parties’ “all or none” approach.  Penna, 344 So. 3d at 431-32.  It 
found that the statements during the first two conversations were 
not obtained in violation of Miranda.  According to the majority, 
such statements were not the products of police interrogation, i.e., 
they were either spontaneous or made in response to clarifying 
questions.  Id. at 434-36.  However, partially agreeing with Penna, 
the majority found that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing 
to “specifically” give Penna “his Miranda rights again” prior to 
custodial interrogation during the final three conversations.  Id. at 
436-38.  In support of that conclusion, the majority relied on its 
 
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own precedent, see Quarles v. State, 290 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2020), which had interpreted our decision in Shelly to require a full 
rereading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this 
case.  Penna, 344 So. 3d at 434 (discussing Quarles).  The majority 
went on to find that the error was not harmless, despite 
acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt.  Id. at 
438-39. 
Judge Artau agreed that Quarles compelled a finding that 
Miranda was violated.  Id. at 440-41 (Artau, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  But in his view, any error was harmless in 
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  Id. at 441-42.  He also 
questioned whether Shelly was correctly decided, though his doubts 
about that case were not the basis of his partial dissent.  Id.  
 
Following issuance of the district court’s decision, the State 
asked the court to certify a question of law to us.  Granting that 
request, the district court certified the following question as being of 
great public importance, asking: 
WHETHER A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT 
MIRANDA RIGHTS ARE AUTOMATICALLY VIOLATED 
WHEN AN OFFICER FAILS TO RE-READ A MIRANDA 
WARNING FOLLOWING A DEFENDANT’S VOLUNTARY 
RE-INITIATION OF CONTACT. 
 
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Based on that certified question, we granted the State’s 
request for review. 
II 
 
The certified question presents us with a pure legal issue.  As 
such, our standard of review is de novo.  See City of Tallahassee v. 
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., 375 So. 3d 178, 183 (Fla. 2023).  
In undertaking this review, we first discuss background legal 
principles and then analyze our decision in Shelly against that 
backdrop. 
 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467-69, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that, in order to safeguard the Fifth Amendment’s right 
against compelled self-incrimination, police must advise suspects of 
certain rights—including the right to silence and counsel—before 
subjecting them to custodial interrogation.  See Andrew v. White, 62 
F.4th 1299, 1333 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting Miranda’s recognition of 
such rights); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439-40 
(2000) (characterizing Miranda as being founded on Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination).  
When a suspect unequivocally invokes the Miranda right to counsel, 
 
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the officers must immediately stop questioning the suspect.  
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).  However, 
that invocation does not mean that law enforcement may never 
again question the suspect in a custodial setting.  Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
 
Viewed collectively, Edwards and Bradshaw establish a two-
part test for assessing whether post-invocation statements violate 
Miranda.  First, the defendant must reinitiate contact with police.  
See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.  
And second, there must be a valid waiver of the Miranda rights 
already invoked.  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9; Bradshaw, 462 
U.S. at 1046.  This waiver prong depends “upon the particular facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”  Bradshaw, 
462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 
374-75 (1979)). 
 
We relied on these principles in Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206 
(Fla. 2008).  Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test, we found 
no Miranda violation, specifically noting the factors relevant to our 
analysis.  Id. at 214-15 (“[I]f the accused initiates further 
 
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conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and 
voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made 
during this conversation may be properly admitted.” (citing 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46)). 
Ten years later, we again considered a situation where the 
suspect invoked his Miranda rights but made subsequent 
statements.  Shelly, 262 So. 3d at 16.  We held that the suspect’s 
post-invocation statements were inadmissible under Miranda.  In 
finding that Miranda violation, we noted that the suspect did not 
reinitiate contact with police.  Id. at 17.  Under the Bradshaw-
Edwards analysis, that conclusion would have been enough for a 
Miranda violation. 
But we did not confine our analysis to the re-initiation issue.  
Instead, we discussed Bradshaw and Welch at length.  Id. at 11-13.  
Expanding upon those opinions, we established a categorical rule 
that an accused must either be “reminded” of his Miranda rights or 
“given” them again—we said both.  Id. at 13 (“[I]f an accused 
invokes his or her Miranda rights but later reinitiates 
communication, an accused must be reminded of his or her Miranda 
rights pursuant to this Court’s holding in Welch.”); id. (“Welch 
 
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expands the requirements . . . by specifically including a 
requirement that the accused be specifically given his or her 
Miranda rights after an alleged reinitiation.”). 
 
The State argues that Shelly’s remind-or-readvise requirement 
is incompatible with U.S. Supreme Court precedent and urges us to 
recede from Shelly to the extent it adopted that requirement.  We 
think the State’s argument has merit. 
As our discussion above demonstrates, and as recognized in 
Shelly itself,3 Bradshaw does not state a legal rule that a suspect 
must always be reminded of or re-given Miranda rights following re-
initiation of contact with police.  See Shelly, 262 So. 3d at 22 
(Lawson, J., dissenting) (noting that Bradshaw did not add “third 
inquiry” of reminding the suspect of his or her Miranda rights).  
Instead, Bradshaw laid out a two-part test that asked whether the 
defendant reinitiated contact with police and waived his rights as 
determined by the totality of the evidence.  Id.  Thus, at a 
 
3.  Specifically, we acknowledged that “the standard is not 
explicitly stated in Bradshaw.”  Shelly, 262 So. 3d at 11.  Instead, 
we looked to “the facts of [Bradshaw]” as supporting our 
conclusion.  Id. 
 
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minimum, Shelly improperly expanded Bradshaw by adding a new 
requirement.4 
 
The federal courts of appeal are in line with this observation.  
Circuit courts have consistently interpreted Bradshaw and 
Edwards as simply requiring re-initiation by the defendant and a 
voluntary waiver based on the totality of the circumstances.  
See United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1087 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Bush v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 573 Fed. App’x 503, 511 (6th 
Cir. 2014); United States v. Robinson, 586 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 
2009); Lamp v. Farrier, 763 F.2d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Gonzalez, 202 Fed. App’x 284, 285 (9th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Willis, 826 F.3d 1265, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2016).  We note 
that Penna has not cited a single federal circuit opinion recognizing 
Shelly’s categorical remind-or-readvise requirement. 
 
Having concluded that Shelly improperly interpreted Fifth 
Amendment precedent, we now consider whether stare decisis 
 
4.  We also note that the Shelly court improperly expanded 
Welch, which did not hold that Miranda warnings must always be 
re-given after a suspect invokes his rights.  Rather, despite some 
questionable dicta, Welch properly applied a totality-of-the-
circumstances test, treating the re-giving of Miranda warnings as a 
significant factor in that analysis. 
 
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nevertheless demands our adherence to it.  In carrying out this 
inquiry, we must first consider whether Shelly was clearly 
erroneous.  See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 506 (Fla. 2020).  
Based on the analysis above, we conclude that our error in Shelly 
was clear.  Put simply, the Bradshaw-Edwards framework does not 
include a categorical remind-or-readvise requirement following 
invocation of Miranda rights.  Moreover, there is no support in the 
text of the Constitution or in any U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
that this one factor is determinative of a Fifth Amendment violation. 
Our conclusion that Shelly is clearly erroneous does not end 
the analysis.  Pursuant to Poole, we also evaluate whether there are 
any valid reasons for retaining Shelly’s remind-or-readvise 
requirement in our jurisprudence.  The critical consideration is 
reliance.  See State v. Maisonet-Maldonado, 308 So. 3d 63, 69 (Fla. 
2020).  “In evaluating reliance interests, courts consider ‘legitimate 
expectations of those who have reasonably relied on the 
precedent.’ ”  Id. (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 
1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)).  Unlike cases 
“involving property and contract rights,” “reliance interests are 
lowest in cases . . . ‘involving procedural and evidentiary rules.’ ”  
 
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Id. (quoting Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507).  Falling into this latter 
category, Shelly announced a rule of criminal procedure that 
governed police conduct.  In our view, detained suspects like Penna 
are not likely to have substantially altered their dealings with police 
based on the existence of this one requirement.  Penna does not 
claim otherwise.  Accordingly, we conclude that Penna has not 
identified any significant reliance interests at stake.  Nor has he 
argued any other factor that would justify our adherence to Shelly. 
For these reasons, we now recede from Shelly’s categorical 
remind-or-readvise requirement.  In doing so, we reiterate that 
Bradshaw provides the proper standard which should be applied in 
this case.5  That standard asks two things: (1) did the suspect 
reinitiate contact with police and, if so, (2) did he knowingly and 
voluntarily waive his earlier-invoked Miranda rights.  The latter 
inquiry turns on the totality of the circumstances.  We add a final 
observation.  Although we hold that there is no per se requirement 
 
5.  As best as we can tell, Shelly based its categorical rule on 
the federal constitution.  For his part, Penna has not asked us to 
consider whether a higher standard should be adopted as a matter 
of Florida constitutional law.  See art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (“No person 
shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness 
against oneself.”). 
 
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that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights, 
evidence of such would certainly be relevant to an overall analysis 
of whether the defendant voluntarily waived those rights. 
III 
 
Based on the reasoning above, we answer the certified 
question in the negative and quash the Fourth District’s decision 
below, which relied on Shelly and its own precedent interpreting 
Shelly.6  We remand for reconsideration under the proper standard 
as stated in this opinion.7 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., 
concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
6.  Because Quarles is inconsistent with this opinion, we 
disapprove it as well. 
 
7.  Since we leave for the district court to apply the Bradshaw 
standard on remand, we have no reason to assess the district 
majority’s harmlessness analysis. 
 
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LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
In receding from Shelly,8 the majority holds that when a 
defendant voluntarily reinitiates contact with law enforcement, 
“there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise 
[an accused] of his Miranda[9] rights.”  Majority op. at 15-16.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
Our state constitution provides protection against self-
incrimination and states that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in 
any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.”  Art. I, § 9, Fla. 
Const.  Notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion that this Court’s 
interpretation in Shelly constitutes an “improper[] expan[sion]” of 
decisions from the United States Supreme Court and this Court, 
majority op. at 13, “state courts are absolutely free to interpret state 
constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual 
rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution,” 
Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 888 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Arizona v. 
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)). 
 
 
8.  Shelly v. State, 262 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2018). 
 
9.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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Because the majority has not chosen to do so, I respectfully 
dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Great Public Importance 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D2020-0345 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, 
Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Allen L. 
Huang, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, 
Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
for Respondent