Case Title: MARRIAGE OF MILLER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-087

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 89-87 IN THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1989 I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F GENE G. MILLER, (Deceased) P e t i t i o n e r and Appellant, and NANCY G. MILLER, Respondent and Respondent. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Missoula, The Honorable James Wheelis, Judge presiding. C O U N S E L O F RECORD: For Appellant: D. R. Matthews, Missoula, Montana H. L. Garnaas, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Michael Sol; Sol & Wolfe, Missoula, Montana I . . Submitted on Briefs: May 1 8 , 1989 r -. C ' :.- L Decided: J u l y 6 , 1989 ... , . i. 3 -A " Clerk Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. Gene Miller appeals from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, denying his motion to amend the order issued November 14, 1988, which had set aside a prior decree of dissolution. We reverse. The parties married June 14, 1985. The husband filed a petition for legal separation three months later, contending that the marriage was irretrievably broken. On October 4, 1985, the wife was personally served with a copy of this petition and with a summons requiring her to answer the petition. The wife failed to file an answer or make any other appearance. Consequently, the husband moved for a default judgment. Following a brief hearing on November 8, 1985, the court entered a default judgment granting the husband's petition for a decree of legal separation. On September 2, 1986, attorney for the wife, Larry Meyer, filed and served upon the husband's attorney a motion for entry of a decree of dissolution. The motion was based on the fact that more than six months had passed, without reconciliation, since the decree of legal separation. Hearing on this motion was indefinitely continued per the request of attorney Meyer, who did not take any further action in this matter. Meyer moved to California prior to issuance of notice of the petition for dissolution. The husband filed a similar motion for entry of decree of dissolution on May 6, 1988. This motion was served on attorney Meyer, who remained the attorney of record for the wife; Meyer did not notify the wife of this motion. A hearing on husband's motion was held on May 27, 1988. Neither the wife nor an attorney acting on her behalf were present at this hearing. The District Court entered a decree of d i s s o l u t i o n a t t h e conclusion of t h i s hearing. N o n o t i c e of e n t r y of t h i s decree was f i l e d o r served by e i t h e r p a r t y . The husband died i n t e s t a t e on June 19, 1988. Thereafter, on August 22, 1988, t h e wife f i l e d a motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n and t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e s t a t e of Gene Miller f o r t h e deceased i n t h i s matter. By a f f i d a v i t o f f e r e d i n support of t h i s motion, t h e wife alleged. t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n a s t h e marriage was not i r r e t r i e v a b l y broken. She contends t h i s a l l e g a t i o n is supported by t h e f a c t she and t h e deceased were t r a v e l i n g t o Missoula t o remarry when t h e husband suffered a h e a r t a t t a c k and died. O n September 2 , 1988, a t t o r n e y f o r t h e husband's e s t a t e f i l e d a motion t o dismiss t h e w i f e ' s August 2 2 , 1988 motion. A memorandum i n support of t h i s motion was f i l e d on September 13, 1988. The D i s t r i c t Court d i d not e n t e r judgment on e i t h e r motion u n t i l November 1 4 , 1988, a t which time t h e c o u r t granted t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n motion and ordered t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n s e t a s i d e f o r t h e following reasons: 1) t h e decree was void f o r lack of any testimony o r evidence t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had l i v e d a p a r t f o r more than 180 days o r t h a t t h e marriage was i r r e t r i e v a b l y broken; 2 ) t h e wife had not received proper n o t i c e of t h e motion f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e marriage; and 3) t h e c o u r t deemed t h e w i f e ' s a l l e g a t i o n s t o be well taken s i n c e t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e e s t a t e f a i l e d t o f i l e a b r i e f i n support of h i s motion t o dismiss within t h e time required by Rule 2 of t h e Uniform D i s t r i c t Court Rules. Notice of e n t r y of t h i s judgment was f i l e d t h e same day. The D i s t r i c t Court subsequently denied t h e e s t a t e ' s motion t o amend t h i s November 1 4 , 1988 judgment, and t h e p e t i t i o n e r t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d t h i s appeal. The following i s s u e s a r e submitted upon appeal: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court l o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n by f a i l i n g t o r u l e w i t h i n 45 days o f t h e d a t e t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n was f i l e d ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n holding t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s l a t e f i l i n g o f h i s b r i e f i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n warranted a summary r u l i n g i n favor o f t h e wife? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n holding t h a t no testimony e x i s t e d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e marriage was i r r e t r i e v a b l y broken? 4 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n determining t h a t t h e wife was n o t r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t t h e t i m e of d i s s o l u t i o n and t h a t s e r v i c e o f t h e motion f o r d i s s o l u t i o n upon a t t o r n e y Meyer f a i l e d t o give h e r proper n o t i c e ? The w i f e contends t h a t t h e husband's f a i l u r e t o f i l e a response b r i e f w i t h i n t h e mandatory t i m e l i m i t s a u t o m a t i c a l l y deemed t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e judgment admitted a s w e l l taken. The w i f e argues t h a t t h i s admission "cannot t h e n be undone by subsequent a p p l i c a t i o n o f Rule 60 ( b ) o r Rule 59 ( g ) , M.R.Civ.P." Rule 2 of t h e Uniform D i s t r i c t Court Rules d i d i n f a c t r e q u i r e t h e husband, a s t h e adverse p a r t y , t o f i l e a response b r i e f t o t h e w i f e ' s motion w i t h i n t e n days a f t e r t h e wife f i l e d h e r motion and supporting b r i e f . The husband f a i l e d t o f i l e h i s b r i e f w i t h i n t h i s period. This f a i l u r e i s deemed an admission by t h e husband t h a t t h e motion i s w e l l taken. See Rule 2 ( b ) , U.D.C.R. The D i s t r i c t Court then could, w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , g r a n t a summary r u l i n g i n favor o f t h e wife. The c o u r t , however, f a i l e d t o immediately g r a n t such a r u l i n g . I n s t e a d , t h e c o u r t waited approximately 7 4 days b e f o r e s o r u l i n g . The c o u r t ' s r u l i n g , p e r Rule 2 , U.D.C.R., t h u s was n o t a p r i o r r u l i n g , a s argued by t h e w i f e , which would automatically preempt any subsequent application of Rules 60 (b) and 59 (9) , M.R.Civ.P. The wife next contends that the 45 day limit specified in Rules 60(c) and 59(g)., M.R.Civ.P., during which a district court must rule on a motion properly before it or the motion will be deemed denied, had not expired prior to the November 14, 1988 ruling. She asserts that a notice of entry of judgment begins the running of all jurisdictional time limits. Because such a notice had not been filed after the May 8, 1988 dissolution decree, she contends that none of the post-trial motion time limits had even begun to run, let alone expire, when the court issued its November 14, 1988 order setting aside the decree. This argument, which goes beyond the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, finds no support in law. A court is required to rule on a post-judgment motion to set aside (Rule 60 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. ) or to amend (Rule 59 (9) , M.R.Civ.P.) a judgment within 45 days of the date the motion is filed. Rules 60 (c) and 59 ( g ) , M.R.Civ.P., expressly state - that this 45 day limit is the same as that respecting motions for a new trial as set forth in Rule 59(d), M.R.civ.P.: If the court shall fail to rule on a motion for new trial within 45 days from the time the motion is filed, the motion shall, at the expiration of said period, be deemed denied. (Emphasis added. ) The rules clearly state that the 45 day time limit for ruling on such post-trial motions begins on the actual date the motion is filed. No statutory provision exists, unlike that provision existing for a notice of appeal, which states that this 45 day period, in cases in which a post-judgment motion is filed prior to notice of entry of judgment, shall be treated as beginning on the day of the notice of entry of judgment. - Cf. Rule 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) , M . R . A ~ ~ . P . ( e x p r e s s l y s t a t i n g t h a t a p r i o r n o t i c e o f appeal w i l l b e t r e a t e d a s f i l e d on t h e subsequent d a t e t h a t n o t i c e o f e n t r y of judgment i s f i l e d ) . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t a n o t i c e o f e n t r y o f judgment, i n r e g a r d t o post-judgment motions, w i l l n o t a f f e c t t h e time w i t h i n which a c o u r t must r u l e on t h e motion. However, i f t h e n o t i c e i s never f i l e d , a moving p a r t y p o t e n t i a l l y would have an u n l i m i t e d t i m e w i t h i n which t o f i l e t h e r e s p e c t i v e motion. Once t h e motion i s made, however, t h e t i m e frame w i t h i n which t h e c o u r t must a c t begins. See, e . g . , Winn v . Winn (1982) , 200 Mont. 402, 408, 651 P.2d 51, 5 4 . When t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o r u l e on t h e w i f e ' s motion t o set a s i d e t h e judgment w i t h i n 45 days o f t h e d a t e t h e motion was f i l e d , t h e m a t t e r was deemed denied and t h e c o u r t l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e . Having s o r u l e d , we need n o t d i s c u s s t h e o t h e r c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e November 8 and December 16, 1988 o r d e r s i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e r e v e r s e and r e i n s t a t e t h e decree o f d i s s o l u t i o n e n t e r e d May 27, 1988. W e concur: