Case Title: Garcia v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 220, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WANDA I. GARCIA, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 220, 2006 
 
Defendant Below-   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
ID #0504013989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 11, 2006 
   Decided:  October 31, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1)  
Appellant Wanda I. Garcia appeals her conviction in the Superior 
Court of Use of a Dwelling for Keeping a Controlled Substance.1  Garcia presents 
two arguments to this Court, both of which relate to the admission of evidence 
showing that Garcia was present during a prior police search of her home.  First, 
she contends that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  Second, she 
contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Getz analysis.  We find no 
merit in either of Garcia’s arguments and affirm.  
                                          
 
1 16 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5). 
 2
(2)  
Garcia lived at 1712 W. 4th Street with her boyfriend, Nago Ortiz, and 
her son.  Around April 7th or 8th, 2005, a confidential informant told the 
Wilmington police that a Mexican male was selling drugs at Garcia’s address.  
After receiving the tip, the police arranged for an informant to make a controlled 
purchase of drugs from Ortiz.   
(3)  
The police then executed a search warrant on April 18, 2005.  They 
found $52 on Ortiz and other cash in various parts of the house.  They also found 
3.3 grams of cocaine in the rafters of the basement, Ziploc bags of various sizes 
and color, and a black digital scale.  During the search, Ortiz, Garcia and her son 
waited outside on the porch with a detective.  The detective heard Garcia say to 
Ortiz, “Whatever they find put it on me, I’ll say it’s mine.” 
(4)  
Garcia was indicted for Possession with Intent to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, 
Conspiracy Second Degree, and Misdemeanor Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  
At trial, Garcia testified that she did not know that there were drugs present in her 
home.  “I don’t know what was happening in my house because sometimes -- most 
of the time I’m not at my house. . . . [b]ecause I work every day.”2  She also denied 
telling Ortiz to tell the police that whatever they found belonged to her.  
                                          
 
2 Garcia testified through an interpreter. 
 3
(5)  
Before cross-examining Garcia, the prosecutor requested a sidebar 
conference and the following conversation occurred: 
Mr. Martyniak: Before I engage in this line of questioning I don’t 
know -- speaking to the officer, the defendant’s last response was: She 
wasn’t home very often so she had no idea what’s going on in her 
house.  There have been four -- Well, several search warrants that 
have been issued on this residence and she was home for at least one 
of the other ones.  The question doesn’t go to her guilt, but rather that 
she does in fact know what’s going on in her house. 
 
Mr. Manning: Your Honor, I’d have to object: One, these other search 
warrants seem very collateral to this case; and two, bringing up the 
fact there may have been other search warrants indirectly implies that 
she’s involved in some ongoing activity and is guilty, and there’s this 
404(b) evidence issue and it’s very collateral to this case. 
 
The Court:  This witness has professed ignorance that anything 
unlawful is going on at this residence.  If she was present and subject 
to three previous search warrants that certainly goes to her credibility.  
The objection is overruled. 
 
The prosecutor then asked Garcia if she was present during any other prior police 
search.  Garcia answered that she was present at a 2003 search.  On re-direct, she 
stated that she was never charged with a crime resulting from that search.   
(6)  
Garcia was convicted of one count of Use of a Dwelling for Keeping 
Controlled Substances.  A mistrial was declared as to the other counts because the 
jury could not reach a unanimous verdict.  Garcia was sentenced to two years 
Level V imprisonment, suspended for one year of Level II supervision and a 
$1,000 fine. 
 4
(7)  
We review the admission of the statement for abuse of discretion.3  
“An abuse of discretion occurs when ‘a court has . . . exceeded the bounds of 
reason in view of the circumstances, [or] . . . so ignored recognized rules of law or 
practice so as to produce injustice.’”4  Evidence is relevant when it has a “tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”5  
Evidence that impeaches a witness’s credibility is relevant and admissible so long 
as it is not prohibited by another rule.6 
(8)  
Garcia argues that evidence establishing her presence at a prior search 
of her home was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial in violation of D.R.E. 402 and 
403 and therefore, should not have been admitted.  Garcia testified that, because 
she was not at home very often, she had no knowledge that there were drugs in her 
house.  She also denied telling Ortiz to blame her if the police found anything in 
the house.  Once she took the stand, Garcia’s credibility became an issue.  The 
evidence that she was present at a prior search of her home was relevant because it 
                                          
 
3 Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785, 790 (Del. 1983) (“A decision whether to admit testimony as 
relevant is within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge and will not be reversed absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion.”). 
4 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 
541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988)). 
5 D.R.E. 401. 
6 Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 680 (Del. 1983); Baumann v. State, 891 A.2d 146, 148-49 (Del. 
2005) 
 5
contradicted her testimony that she was clueless about the activities going on in her 
house.    
(9)  
Under D.R.E. 403, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . 
.”7  The evidence in this case was probative on the issue of Garcia’s credibility.  It 
directly undermined Garcia’s assertion that she did not know about possible 
unlawful activity being conducted in her home.  The prosecutor asked if she was 
home during any other execution of a search warrant there.  He did not ask about 
the reasons for the search nor did he inquire as to whether any contraband was 
found.  Garcia herself testified that she was not charged with any crime as a result 
of the search.  We find no abuse of discretion by the Superior Court in its decision 
to allow this contradiction evidence about her presence during a prior search.  
(10)  Garcia next argues that the Court improperly failed to apply Getz8 
before admitting the evidence.  We review the trial court’s decision to not apply 
Getz for abuse of discretion.9  D.R.E. 404(b) states that evidence of a defendant’s 
uncharged bad acts is not admissible to show conformity therewith.  However, 
Rule 404(b) “does not preclude a party opponent from presenting rebuttal evidence 
that a party has given false testimony to a jury about his own conduct which is at 
                                          
 
7 D.R.E. 403. 
8 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 
9 Baumann, 891 A.2d at 150-51. 
 6
issue in the case.10  In Baumann, the defendant was accused of stalking and 
harassment.  He testified on his own behalf and claimed that he “always tried to 
treat the ladies very nicely. . . .  I always try to be very nice.”11  Then, in an effort 
to impeach the defendant, the prosecutor asked if he had a prior conviction for 
violating a Protection of Abuse Order.  This Court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in not conducting a Getz analysis.12   
 (11)  Here, as in Baumann, Garcia opened the door by testifying that she 
was clueless as to what was occurring in her home when she was at work.  The 
prosecutor properly sought permission to question her about the prior search 
outside the presence of the jury.  The evidence of the prior search was admitted 
solely to rebut Garcia’s testimony and not to show that she had any predisposition 
for criminal activity.  While the court in Baumann read a limiting instruction to the 
jury, defense counsel in this case specifically requested that no jury instruction be 
given for strategic reasons.13  We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion by allowing the evidence to be admitted without first performing a Getz 
analysis.   
                                          
 
10 Id. at 149. 
11 Id. at 147. 
12 Id. at 150-51. 
13 Defense counsel stated before closing arguments: “I don’t want a limiting instruction.  I don’t 
want to draw the jury’s attention to this . . . .” 
 7
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice