Case Title: State v. John W. Kelley

Citation: 2001 WI 84

Docket Number: 1999AP001066

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1066 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John W. Kelley and Peter M. Kelley,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Arnott Trucking, Inc.,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 151, 610 N.W.2d 512 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 3, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 12, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Kinney 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and WILCOX, J.J., join concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating: BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Richard J. Weber and Kelley, Weber, Pietz & 
Slater, S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by Richard J. Weber 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Steven E. Tinker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2 
 
2001 WI 84 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1066 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John W. Kelley and Peter M. Kelley,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Arnott Trucking, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 
affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court for Oneida County, 
Robert E. Kinney, Circuit Court Judge.  The circuit court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding that 
defendants John W. Kelley and Peter M. Kelley had violated Wis. 
                     
1 State v. Kelley, No. 99-1066, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000). 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
2 
Stat. §§ 30.12(1)(a), 30.15(1)(a), and 30.15(1)(d) (1997-98)2 by 
depositing fill on a 200-foot section of land submerged at times 
by Lake Killarney, a navigable water, without a permit.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.   
¶2 
We consider three arguments raised by the Kelleys for 
reversing the judgment of the circuit court. 
¶3 
First, the Kelleys argue that they were not required 
to obtain a permit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a) before 
depositing fill on a 200-foot section of their land because the 
land was not the bed of navigable water.  The Kelleys assert 
that the 200-foot section was not the bed of navigable water 
because in 1988 when the fill was deposited, the 200-foot strip 
was above the ordinary high water mark.  The State, however, 
argues that so long as the land is submerged below navigable 
water, a permit is required and the location of the ordinary 
high water mark is irrelevant.  
¶4 
Second, the Kelleys raise constitutional challenges, 
involving uncompensated taking, excessive fines, and a five-year 
delay in enforcement.  
¶5 
Third, the Kelleys argue that they were entitled to 
summary judgment because the water levels in the lake were 
higher than the permit for the dam allowed.  
¶6 
We address these three arguments in turn.  As to the 
first issue, neither the Kelleys nor the State offers authority 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
3 
for their positions, cites legislative history to aid us in 
determining the intent of the legislature in interpreting Wis. 
Stat. § 30.12(1)(a), or discusses the consequences to the public 
and the administration of chapter 30 should the Court adopt 
either of their interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a).   
¶7 
The first issue is whether a property owner is 
required to obtain a permit before depositing fill on land 
submerged below navigable water regardless of whether the land 
is above or below the ordinary high water mark.  This issue 
presents a complex question that affects not only the parties to 
the present lawsuit but the people of the State of Wisconsin.  
Because this issue has not been sufficiently explored in the 
briefs or at oral argument to enable us to decide it, this case 
provides an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the issue the 
case presents.  Nevertheless, because the issue seems to be of 
statewide importance, we take the unusual step of remanding the 
matter to the circuit court where the parties can develop the 
facts and legal analysis to enable the circuit court to address 
the legal issue presented. 
¶8 
As 
to 
the 
second 
issue, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
constitutional arguments are not fully developed and, as 
presented, are unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below. 
¶9 
As to the third issue, we conclude, as did the circuit 
court, that the dam permit did not set forth mandatory water 
levels and that therefore the water levels about which the 
Kelleys complain do not violate the dam permit.  
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
4 
¶10 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court to determine 
whether the Kelleys were required in 1988 to obtain a permit 
from the Department of Natural Resources before depositing fill 
on their 200-foot section of land. 
 
I 
 
¶11 At the center of this case are a town dam and property 
belonging to the Kelley family.  The Town of Little Rice 
completed the construction of a town dam on the Little Rice 
River in 1961, creating Lake Killarney.  The Kelleys own 
property bordering the lake. 
¶12 The western edge of the Kelleys' property includes a 
parcel of land known as Pete's Point.  During certain periods of 
high water, the old logging roads leading to Pete's Point are 
submerged, turning Pete's Point from a peninsula into an island. 
¶13 In the fall of 1988, the Kelleys hired a trucking 
company to deposit fill on a section of land, 200 feet long by 
20 feet wide, that was at times submerged.  No Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) permit has been applied for or issued to 
deposit the fill. 
¶14 In October 1988, the DNR received a letter from Allan 
Konkol, a regular user of Lake Killarney.  Konkol informed the 
DNR that he and his wife had, in prior years, frequently canoed 
over the submerged 200-foot section of land and in October 1988 
were unable to do so because of the fill.  Konkol asked whether 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
5 
the DNR had granted a permit for this fill.  As part of the 
DNR's investigation into this complaint, a DNR representative 
located the filled area in May 1989.   
¶15 On June 25, 1990, the DNR took measurements to 
determine whether the fill was below the ordinary high water 
mark of Lake Killarney.  The ordinary high water mark is the 
point on the bank or shore up to which the presence and action 
of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either 
by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other 
easily recognized characteristic.3  
¶16 The State filed a civil proceeding against the Kelleys 
on November 22, 1993, alleging violations of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 30.12(1)(a), 30.15(1)(a), and 30.15(1)(d) and seeking an 
injunction ordering the Kelleys to remove the fill and pay a 
forfeiture and penalties.   
¶17 The trial began in January 1995.  After the first 
witness testified, the circuit court suggested that although 
there were disputed facts, the legal issues might be resolved on 
summary judgment and stipulated facts.  The parties agreed, and 
the Kelleys moved for summary judgment based on a stipulated 
statement of facts, the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, 
and supporting affidavits submitted by the parties.4  
                     
3 State v. McDonald Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 173, 176, 118 
N.W.2d 152 (1962) (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 
Wis. 261, 272, 145 N.W. 816 (1914)).  
4 The parties entered into a stipulation that set forth five 
legal issues and nine stipulated facts.   
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
6 
¶18 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the State, and thereafter the Kelleys moved to dismiss the 
State's action, raising various constitutional challenges to the 
summary judgment.  In particular, the Kelleys contended that the 
State's five-year delay in filing this civil action was 
unconstitutional, because daily forfeitures for the entire 
period of violation were coercively high and because potential 
defense witnesses had died prior to trial.  
¶19 The circuit court prudently commented that the motion 
to dismiss should have been brought before trial and expressed 
surprise that the defendants brought the motion after the 
circuit court had granted summary judgment.  The circuit court 
nevertheless proceeded to hear the constitutional objections and 
then denied the motion to dismiss.  
¶20 The circuit court granted the State injunctive relief, 
ordering the Kelleys to remove the offending portions of the 
fill and to pay a forfeiture.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
decision of the circuit court.  The Kelleys have removed the 
fill. 
 
II 
 
¶21 The first issue in this case is whether the circuit 
court erred in holding that the Kelleys violated Wis. Stat. 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
7 
§ 30.12(1)(a) by failing to obtain a permit from the DNR to 
deposit fill on the 200-foot section of land in question.5 
¶22 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the State.6  The Kelleys now assert that summary judgment should 
not have been granted because a dispute of material facts 
exists.7  But a motion for summary judgment carries with it the 
explicit assertion that the movant, here the Kelleys, is 
satisfied that the material facts are undisputed and that on 
                     
5 The circuit court also determined that the Kelleys had 
violated Wis. Stat. § 30.15(1)(a) and (d).  These sections 
provide 
that 
any 
person 
who 
"[u]nlawfully 
obstructs 
any 
navigable water and thereby impairs the free navigation thereof" 
or "[c]onstructs or places any structure or deposits any 
material in navigable waters in violation of s. 30.12 or 30.13" 
forfeits not less than $10 or not more than $500 for each 
offense. 
The circuit court, court of appeals, and the parties 
addressed Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a).  Neither the courts nor the 
parties explicitly addressed § 30.15(1)(a) and (d).  We do not 
address § 30.15(1)(a) and (d). 
6 "If it shall appear to the court that the party against 
whom a motion for summary judgment is asserted is entitled to a 
summary judgment, the summary judgment may be awarded to such 
party even though the party has not moved therefor."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(6). 
7 Summary judgment is properly granted when there are no 
disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Lambrecht v. Estate of 
Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶24, 241 Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751. 
An appellate court reviews a circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment independently of the circuit court or court of 
appeals, benefiting from those courts' analyses.  Lambrecht, 
2001 WI 25, ¶21. 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
8 
those facts summary judgment is justified as a matter of law.8  
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the Kelleys 
waived their right to allege that disputed material facts 
entitle them to a hearing.  We disagree with the court of 
appeals. 
¶23 We agree with the Kelleys that the legal issue 
presented in their summary judgment motion was essentially 
whether they had the right to deposit fill on the flooded roads 
without a permit if the DNR was not properly maintaining a water 
level of 112 feet in accordance with the dam permit.  The 
Kelleys did not succeed on this theory because the circuit court 
determined that the dam permit did not require a water level of 
112 feet. 
¶24 
As the case proceeded through the courts, however, 
another legal issue was introduced, namely, whether the Kelleys 
had to obtain a permit before depositing fill on the 200-foot 
section of land depends on whether the land was above or below 
the ordinary high water mark.  The parties' stipulation of facts 
stated that the DNR first established an ordinary high water 
mark on June 25, 1990.  The stipulation further stated that fill 
material had been placed in some spots below the ordinary high 
water mark, as calculated by the State on June 25, 1990.  The 
parties did not stipulate about the location of the ordinary 
high water mark in 1988.   
                     
8 Powalka v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 53 Wis. 2d 513, 
518, 351 N.W.2d 852 (1972). 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
9 
¶25 
The parties now dispute whether the 200-foot section 
of land was above or below the ordinary high water mark in 1988 
when the fill was deposited.  The circuit court's decision to 
grant summary judgment to the State was based in part on the 
parties' stipulation regarding the ordinary high water mark 
identified by the DNR in 1990.  No evidence was presented, 
however, to identify the ordinary high water mark in 1988 when 
the fill was deposited.  Indeed, in deposition testimony, 
various DNR officials conceded that the ordinary high water mark 
measured in June 1990 does not necessarily reflect the ordinary 
high water mark that existed in 1988.  Thus, the Kelleys are 
correct in their assertion that the factual issue of whether the 
fill was deposited below the ordinary high water mark in 1988 is 
disputed.   
¶26 No disputed issue of material fact existed with 
respect to the legal issue on which the parties in the present 
case originally sought summary judgment, namely, whether the 
DNR's alleged failure to maintain the dam properly entitled the 
Kelleys to deposit fill without a permit.  This case involves an 
additional legal issue whose resolution may depend on a disputed 
issue of material fact, namely, the location of the ordinary 
high water mark in 1988 to determine whether the 200-foot 
section of land is the bed of navigable water.  Because the 
legal issue upon which summary judgment was granted is different 
from the legal issue on which the Kelleys' motion for summary 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
10
judgment was based,9 we conclude that the Kelleys have not waived 
their right to allege that disputed material facts exist barring 
a summary judgment. 
¶27 We 
turn 
to 
the 
relevant 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a), which makes it unlawful to deposit any material 
upon the bed of any navigable water where no bulkhead line has 
been established.  Section 30.12(1) reads as follows: 
 
[U]nless a permit has been granted by the department 
pursuant to statute or the legislature has otherwise 
authorized structures or deposits in navigable waters, 
it is unlawful: 
 
(a) To deposit any material or to place any structure 
upon the bed of any navigable water where no bulkhead 
line has been established . . . .10 
 
¶28 
A permit is therefore required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a) if the State establishes these four elements: (1) 
the Kelleys deposited material (2) upon the bed (3) of any 
navigable water (4) where no bulkhead line has been established. 
  
                     
9 The court has recognized that different legal issues raise 
different issues of material facts for purposes of summary 
judgment in the context of reciprocal motions for summary 
judgment and that an issue of fact that was not material under 
one legal theory might be material to another legal theory.  
Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 595 n.1, 407 
N.W.2d 873 (1987). 
10 "Bulkhead line" is the statutory term for a legislatively 
established shoreline.  See State v. McFarren, 62 Wis. 2d 492, 
497-98 (1974); see also Wis. Stat. § 30.11 (governing the 
establishment of a bulkhead line). 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
11
¶29 
The first and fourth elements are not disputed: The 
Kelleys 
deposited 
fill 
and 
no 
bulkhead 
line 
has 
been 
established.  
¶30 
Regarding the third element, the test for navigability 
is whether a body of water is "capable of floating any boat, 
skiff, or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for recreational 
purposes."11  Moreover, a determination that a body of water is 
navigable does not depend on whether it is always navigable, or 
whether its navigability is due to natural conditions.  As this 
court held in DeGayner & Co. v. DNR, 70 Wis. 2d 936, 946, 236 
N.W. 2d 217 (1975), the test is whether the navigability is 
regularly recurring or of a sufficient duration to make it 
conducive to recreational uses.  Thus, the court in DeGayner 
upheld the DNR's finding that a stream was navigable when 
periodic high water conditions enhanced by beaver dams led to 
levels at which a craft could be floated along the stream.  
¶31 
Based on the stipulated facts and the affidavits 
submitted, the circuit court determined that the water above the 
submerged 200-foot section of land was navigable.  The circuit 
court determined that the area around Pete's Point was navigable 
on a regularly recurring basis for a sufficient duration.  In 
making its determination, the circuit court found relevant the 
testimony of Mrs. Konkol and another property owner on Lake 
Killarney, as well as members of the Kelley family, regarding 
                     
11 Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 
N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W. 2d 40 (1952). 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
12
boat travel around Pete's Point.  Thus, there appear to be 
undisputed facts to support the finding that the area in 
question was navigable.12 
¶32 
That leaves the second element, namely, whether the 
200-foot section of land is the bed of navigable water subject 
to state regulation under Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a).  The Kelleys 
contend that if the sole test for a permit is navigability, the 
State could require an owner to obtain a permit to fill a 
backyard if the backyard was periodically flooded.  Indeed, they 
contend that this scenario is precisely what occurred in their 
case: The Kelleys' access roads were regularly flooded, the 
State assumed jurisdiction, and the State sought to prevent the 
Kelleys' efforts to repair the roads.  
¶33 
The 
Kelleys contend 
that 
the submerged 200-foot 
section of land is not a bed of navigable water under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a), reasoning as follows.  According to the Kelleys, 
just because the water over the 200-foot section of land is 
navigable does not mean that when submerged their section of 
                     
12 The parties do not discuss whether a determination of 
navigability is a finding of undisputed fact by the circuit 
court on summary judgment or a conclusion of law.  
The court has treated administrative agency determinations 
of navigability as findings of fact for purposes of judicial 
review.  See Omernick v. DNR, 100 Wis. 2d 234, 301 N.W.2d 437 
(1981); Klingeisen v. DNR, 163 Wis. 2d 921, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. 
App. 1991).  
Although counsel for the Kelleys stated at oral argument 
that they do not concede navigability, they do not appear to 
contest it either. 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
13
land is a bed of navigable water.  The Kelleys assert that 
submerged land cannot be a bed of navigable water if the land is 
above the ordinary high water mark.13  The 200-foot section of 
land upon which the Kelleys deposited the fill in 1988 was, 
according to the Kelleys, above the then-existing ordinary high 
water mark.  Thus, contend the Kelleys, the 200-foot section of 
land cannot be the bed of navigable water.  
¶34 The State appears to offer conflicting arguments 
regarding the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a). 
 At times the State argues that the 200-foot section of land in 
question was below the ordinary high water mark and was part of 
the bed of Lake Killarney.  Thus the State argued to the circuit 
court on the first day of trial that land that is below the 
ordinary high water mark is considered a bed of navigable water 
and that the State intended to prove that the land in question 
was below the ordinary high water mark.  
¶35 At other times the State appears to argue that the 
ordinary high water mark is irrelevant to determining the 
State's jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a) to require a 
permit for depositing fill on the 200-foot section of land.  The 
State seems to contend that it has jurisdiction to regulate the 
deposit of fill on the 200-foot section of the Kelleys' land, 
regardless of where the ordinary high water mark is located, 
                     
13 Uplands are lands bordering bodies of water but above the 
high water mark.  State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 102 n.5, 408 
N.W.2d 337 (1987).   
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
14
because the 200-foot section of land is submerged below 
navigable water. 
¶36 In sum, the State has not advanced a coherent legal 
argument to explain when land such as the 200-foot section at 
issue in the present case is a bed of navigable water subject to 
the permit requirements of § 30.12(1)(a).  
¶37 The 
dispute 
in 
the 
present 
case 
about 
the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a) seems to turn on 
whether a finding of navigability eliminates the need to 
determine whether land is a bed of navigable water, that is, 
whether the land is below the ordinary high water mark.  
¶38 The court of appeals in the present case appears to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a) to mean that navigability is 
the determinative factor and the determinations of the ordinary 
high water mark and the bed are irrelevant once navigability is 
established.  The court of appeals, citing State v. Trudeau, 139 
Wis. 2d 91, 103-04, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987), concluded that 
although the ordinary high water mark determines the bed, it 
does not necessarily determine navigability.  
¶39 However, the facts in the Trudeau case are different 
from those in the present case.  The issue in Trudeau was 
whether construction could go forward when half the project site 
was below Lake Superior's ordinary high water mark.  The Trudeau 
court concluded that any part of the site below the ordinary 
high water mark is a protected lakebed upon which building is 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
15
prohibited.14  The Trudeau court further stated that the water 
need not be navigable for the land to be lakebed and that 
lakebed that is below the ordinary high water mark is subject to 
state regulation under Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a).  Citing Houslet 
v. Natural Resources Department, 100 Wis. 2d 280, 287, 329 
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1982), the Trudeau court concluded that the 
public interest in navigable waters such as Lake Superior 
"extends to areas covered with aquatic vegetation within the 
ordinary high water mark of the body of water in question."  
¶40 The issue in Trudeau was what are the boundaries of 
the public trust associated with the lakebed of a natural, 
navigable lake.  The court held that the land below the ordinary 
high water mark, even though the water over that land was not 
navigable, is held in trust for the public.  The Trudeau court 
did not determine that land over which navigable water sometimes 
flows is a bed of navigable water for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a).  Thus, Trudeau does not resolve the question in 
the present case. 
¶41 The question in the present case is whether a property 
owner is required to obtain a permit from the DNR before 
depositing fill on land submerged below navigable water even 
though the land may be above the ordinary high water mark.  
Although 
case 
law 
seems 
to 
protect 
uplands 
from 
DNR 
jurisdiction, the case law does not establish a clear legal 
answer to the question presented in this case.  
                     
14 Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 109. 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
16
¶42 Neither the Kelleys nor the State offers authority for 
their positions.  Neither the Kelleys nor the State offers 
legislative history to aid us in determining the intent of the 
legislature in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a).  Neither 
the Kelleys nor the State discusses the consequences to the 
public and the administration of chapter 30 should the Court 
adopt 
either 
of 
their 
interpretations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a).   
¶43 The issue of whether a property owner is required to 
obtain a permit before depositing fill on land submerged below 
navigable water regardless of whether the land is above or below 
the ordinary high water mark is a complex question that affects 
not only the parties to the present lawsuit but the people of 
the State of Wisconsin.  The precise issue presented in this 
case has not been sufficiently explored in the briefs or at oral 
argument to enable us to decide it.  Under these circumstances, 
we are persuaded that, at this stage, this case provides an 
inappropriate 
vehicle 
for 
resolving 
the 
issue 
this 
case 
presents.  We therefore considered dismissing this review as 
improvidently granted.  But because the issue is of statewide 
importance, we take the unusual step of remanding the matter to 
the circuit court where the parties can develop the facts and 
legal analysis to enable the circuit court to address the legal 
issue presented. 
 
III 
 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
17
¶44 We turn to the Kelleys' constitutional challenges to 
the State's action.  Although their constitutional challenges 
are not fully developed, the Kelleys appear to focus on two 
aspects of the case.  First, the Kelleys contend that the DNR's 
failure to properly maintain the dam caused their property to 
flood and represents an unconstitutional taking.  Second, they 
allege that the five-year delay in bringing this action is 
unconstitutional.  
¶45 The Kelleys first raised these constitutional claims 
in a motion to dismiss that was filed after the circuit court 
granted summary judgment for the State.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the Kelleys had failed to raise these issues in a 
timely manner before the circuit court and had therefore waived 
these constitutional claims.  Nonetheless, the court of appeals 
addressed and rejected the Kelleys' constitutional claims.   
¶46 Although we agree with the court of appeals that the 
Kelleys did not raise these constitutional claims in a timely 
manner and could be deemed to have waived them, we consider 
these arguments to the extent that the circuit court and court 
of appeals have also considered them.15 
¶47 As to the Kelleys' first challenge, we agree with the 
court of appeals that the takings argument made in the Kelleys' 
briefs is not related to the legal issue that is before this 
court.  The Kelleys' takings argument focuses on the flooding of 
                     
15 See State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 940-41, 437 N.W.2d 
218 (1989). 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
18
their roads and timberlands.  The issue of whether the Kelleys 
are entitled to compensation for the flooding of their property 
has no bearing on the legal issue that is before this court, 
namely, whether the Kelleys were required to seek a permit 
before placing fill.   
¶48 The sole takings argument that could be relevant to 
the 
question 
before 
this 
court 
is 
whether 
chapter 
30's 
requirement that the Kelleys not place fill without a permit 
constitutes a regulatory taking.  The Kelleys' briefs to this 
court quote Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Commission, 66 
Wis. 2d 720, 726, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975), for the proposition 
that a regulatory taking occurs "where a restriction had been 
placed upon the use of land that practically or substantially 
renders the land useless for all reasonable purposes."  Despite 
reciting this standard, the Kelleys' briefs do not allege that 
the 
permit 
requirement 
of 
chapter 
30 
practically 
or 
substantially 
renders 
the 
Kelleys' 
land 
useless 
for 
all 
reasonable purposes.  We therefore reject the argument that this 
action represents an unconstitutional taking. 
¶49 The Kelleys' second argument that the five-year delay 
in enforcement is unconstitutional is likewise misplaced in the 
context of this case.  The Kelleys challenge the enforcement 
delay on two grounds.  First, they allege that the possibility 
of a per-day fine, coupled with a lengthy enforcement delay, 
could violate due process by leading to a fine that would be 
excessively high or that would coerce a property owner into 
forgoing legal rights and acceding to the State's demands.  
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
19
¶50 We 
need 
not 
consider 
the 
Kelleys' 
speculative 
arguments regarding the potential problems that might arise from 
an enforcement delay because these problems are not present 
under facts of this case.  The parties stipulated to a period of 
250 days as the basis for calculating the per-day forfeiture, 
and there is no allegation that the $3,000 forfeiture imposed by 
the circuit court violates the Kelleys' due process rights.  
Moreover, the record of this case shows that the Kelleys have 
decidedly not been coerced into forgoing their legal rights.   
¶51 The Kelleys' second basis for challenging the five-
year delay is that two potential witnesses for the Kelleys have 
died since this litigation began.  The Kelleys concede that the 
testimony of these witnesses could have been preserved for 
litigation.  They argue, however, that the possibility that the 
testimony of these witnesses could have been preserved is not 
relevant because these deaths were "not scheduled."  We cannot 
conclude that the unforeseen deaths of potential witnesses whose 
testimony could have been preserved by the parties is a basis 
for deeming the five-year delay in this case unconstitutional. 
 
IV 
 
¶52 
Finally, we address the Kelleys' assertion that they 
were entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that the water 
levels in the lake were higher than the dam permit allowed.   
¶53 
The circuit court rejected this argument, concluding 
that the dam permit does not set forth mandatory water levels 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
20
and that therefore the water levels about which the Kelleys 
complain do not violate the dam permit.16  
¶54 
The relevant language of the dam permit provides that 
"[t]he dam will be operated with normal head of 11.5 feet and 
will maintain a pond level at 112.0 feet."17  The Kelleys contend 
that this language sets forth a mandatory pond level, and that 
the flooding of their lands resulted from years of operation at 
a pond level that was higher than the mandatory 112 feet.  
¶55 
At summary judgment, the State submitted numerous 
affidavits from DNR officials stating that the permit in issue 
did not require a pond level of 112 feet.  The DNR officials 
stated that required water levels would appear in the "order" 
section of the permit rather than in the "findings of fact" 
section, and would be stated in terms of a maximum and minimum 
water level.  
¶56 
The Kelleys have offered no factual or legal basis for 
their reading of the permit language in question.  We agree with 
the circuit court that the dam permit did not require a maximum 
pond level of 112 feet.  
                     
16 Alternatively, the circuit court concluded that even if 
the dam permit required a lower water level, the public may have 
gained prescriptive rights to a higher water level over the 
period in which the dam was improperly operated.  Because we 
conclude that the dam permit did not require a lower water 
level, the parties' arguments regarding prescriptive rights when 
a permit requires a lower water level are irrelevant. 
17 Findings of Fact, Order, and Permit, Public Service 
Commission of Wisconsin, April 17, 1955. 
No. 
99-1066 
 
 
21
¶57 
In addition, the circuit court concluded that there 
were lawful avenues through which the Kelleys could address the 
issues of water level.  According to an affidavit submitted by 
Sonntag, an engineer with the DNR, if a dam permit does not set 
forth maximum and minimum water levels, the DNR may subsequently 
set water levels if it receives complaints regarding water 
levels.  The Kelleys apparently did not make any complaint 
regarding the water levels of Lake Killarney before depositing 
fill without a permit.  
¶58 
We therefore agree with the circuit court that neither 
the proper maintenance of the dam nor the cause of the water 
levels on the Kelleys' property are relevant to this action.   
¶59 
The question on remand to the circuit court is whether 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a) have been met so 
that the Kelleys should have obtained a permit in 1988 before 
they deposited fill on the 200-foot section of land.  More 
specifically, the question is how to define the "bed," the 
interplay of the statutory requirements of "bed" and navigable 
water, and the relevance and location of the ordinary high water 
mark in 1988.  We therefore remand the cause to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
¶60 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 99-1066.jpw 
 
1 
¶61 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I write separately to 
underscore the fact that on remand, the circuit court should 
examine the facts at hand in light of both Wis. Stat. § 30.12 
(1997-98) and Wis. Stat. § 30.15 (1997-98).  Contrary to the 
majority's proviso in footnote 5, the opinion of the court of 
appeals and both parties' briefs to this court explicitly 
addressed issues arising from the circuit court's application of 
§ 30.15.  See, e.g., State v. Kelley, No. 99-1066, unpublished 
slip op. at ¶¶1, 7, 12, 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000); 
Respondent's Brief at 9-11, 22-23, 28; Petitioners' Reply Brief 
at 1. 
 
No.  99-1066.npc 
 
1 
¶62 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority opinion that a remand is necessary in this case.  
However, I write separately because the majority opinion has, I 
believe, stated the primary issue of this case in a confusing 
manner.  In addition, the majority opinion seems to suggest that 
a dam permit, with minimum and maximum water levels, could not 
form the basis for a regulatory takings claim. 
¶63 With respect to the primary issue presented by this 
case, the majority opinion properly remands this case so that 
"the parties can develop the facts and legal analysis to enable 
the circuit court to address the legal issue presented."  
Majority op. at ¶7.  There is a lack of evidence in the record 
with respect to the ordinary high water mark (OHWM) of Lake 
Killarney in 1988, at the time the Kelleys deposited the fill.  
In order to address properly the interrelationship between 
navigability-in-fact and the OHWM, both the parties and the 
court need information regarding the OHWM. 
¶64 The preceding sentence leads me to the next point, 
that the majority opinion has not properly stated the primary 
issue of this case.  Rather than stating the issue in terms of 
"whether a property owner is required to obtain a permit before 
depositing 
fill 
on 
land 
submerged 
below 
navigable 
water 
regardless of whether the land is above or below the ordinary 
high water mark," (majority op. at ¶7), the issue is better 
stated as follows:  What is the interrelationship between 
navigability-in-fact and a body of water's OHWM as these terms 
pertain 
to 
liability 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 30.12(1)(a), 
No.  99-1066.npc 
 
2 
30.15(1)(a), and 30.15(1)(d)?  This is a more fitting statement 
of the issue because the majority's statement of the issue seems 
to assume that there was water covering a portion of the road at 
the time the fill was deposited, even though the parties dispute 
whether this was the case.  Roger Wojner Second Aff. at 1; Paul 
Kurth Aff. at 1.     
¶65 Finally, the majority, in holding that the flooding of 
the Kelleys' roads and timberlands, due to alleged failure of 
the DNR to maintain the water levels of Lake Killarney as set 
forth in the dam permit, cannot support a takings claim seems to 
foreclose a properly proved regulatory takings claim.  Majority 
op. at ¶47-48.18  Under well-established Wisconsin law, a taking 
of property can occur without physical occupation of land by the 
government.  Eberle v. Dane Co. Bd. of Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 
609, 621, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999) (citing Howell Plaza, Inc. v. 
State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 81, 87, 284 N.W.2d 887 
(1979)).  Such a taking is referred to as a regulatory taking.  
Eberle, 227 Wis. 2d at 622.  A regulatory taking occurs when a 
regulation or government action denies "'the landowner all or 
substantially all practical uses of a property.'"  Eberle, 227 
Wis. 2d at 622 (quoting Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 
365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996)).  Although I agree with the 
majority that the information presented in this case does not 
                     
18 It is noted, as set forth in the majority opinion 
(majority op. at ¶45), that the takings issue was first raised 
in ¶¶1 and 5 of the Kelleys' motion for dismissal that was filed 
after the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
State.  
No.  99-1066.npc 
 
3 
support a regulatory takings claim, I would not foreclose the 
possibility that, with proper proof, a party could maintain such 
a claim.  It is possible that the failure to maintain proper 
water levels, according to a dam permit and order which requires 
minimum and maximum water levels, could deprive a landowner of 
all or substantially all practical uses of a piece of property. 
 I write, therefore, to make it clear that we do not foreclose 
the possibility that the failure to maintain water levels 
pursuant to such a dam permit and order could form the basis of 
a valid regulatory takings claim. 
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this concurrence. 
 
No.  99-1066.npc 
 
1