Case Title: Dunbar v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 643, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL R. DUNBAR, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 643, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0703007316 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: February 28, 2014 
Decided: 
April 15, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 15th day of April 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On October 8, 2008, the appellant, Michael R. Dunbar, pled guilty but 
mentally ill to Manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of Murder in the First 
Degree.  On December 12, 2008, the Superior Court sentenced Dunbar to fifteen 
years at Level V suspended after five years for decreasing levels of supervision. 
(2) 
On June 28, 2012, Dunbar was convicted of violating probation 
(VOP) and was resentenced to ten years at Level V suspended for five years at 
Level III.  On August 31, 2012, Dunbar was again found guilty of VOP and was 
resentenced to nine years and six months at Level V suspended for nine years and 
2 
 
six months at Level IV Crest suspended after successful completion for four years 
at Level III.  On May 30, 2013, the Superior Court modified the August 31, 2012 
VOP sentence by removing the Level IV Crest component and placing Dunbar on 
Level III probation. 
(3) 
On October 31, 2013, the Superior Court found Dunbar guilty of his 
third VOP and resentenced him to nine and six months at Level V suspended upon 
successful completion of Level V Key for four years at Level IV Crest suspended 
upon successful completion for four years at Level III aftercare.  This appeal 
followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Dunbar asserts that the “technical” 
nature of his third VOP did not warrant a prison sentence.  Dunbar also suggests 
that he has not been given adequate credit for time previously served. 
(5) 
The Court’s appellate review of a sentence generally is limited to 
whether the sentence exceeds the statutory limits.1  “[O]nce a defendant violates 
the terms of his probation, the Superior Court has the authority to require a 
defendant to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence.”2  A subsequent 
VOP sentence cannot exceed the term that a prior VOP sentence left suspended.3 
                                          
 
1 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
2 State v. Sloman, 886 A.2d 1257, 1260 (Del. 2005) (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4334(c)). 
3 Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Del. 2005). 
3 
 
In this case, because the sentence imposed on August 31, 2012 and modified on 
May 30, 2013 for Dunbar’s second VOP imposed nine years and six months at 
Level V suspended entirely for four years at Level III probation, the Superior 
Court was authorized to impose nine years and six months at Level V when 
sentencing Dunbar on October 31, 2013 for his third VOP. 
(6) 
Dunbar suggests that he has not been given credit for time served.  
Dunbar has not, however, identified what dates he served for which he has not 
received credit.  Nor has he shown that he presented the time-served credit claim to 
the Superior Court in the first instance.  Under the circumstances, Dunbar’s claim 
for time-served credit is not appropriate for appellate review and has not been 
considered by the Court. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice