Case Title: JUDITH KUZNAR V RAKSHA CORP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 132203

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 11, 2008 
JUDITH KUZNAR and JOSEPH KUZNAR, 
her husband, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 132203 
RAKSHA CORPORATION, doing business 
as CROWN PHARMACY, and VALERIE 
RANDALL, jointly and severally, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
KELLY, J. 
Plaintiffs Judith and Joseph Kuznar sued Raksha Corporation, doing 
business as Crown Pharmacy (hereafter Crown Pharmacy), and its nonpharmacist 
employee Valerie Randall for negligence in refilling a prescription that resulted in 
injury to Judith. The issue is whether the two-year statutory period of limitations 
 
 
 
 
                                              
for medical malpractice1 or the three-year period for ordinary negligence2 applies 
to plaintiffs’ claims. 
We affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that a pharmacy is not a 
licensed health facility or agency.  In addition, we conclude that a pharmacy is not 
a licensed health-care professional. We hold, therefore, that a pharmacy cannot be 
directly liable for medical malpractice. But it can be directly liable for ordinary 
negligence for operating without having a licensed pharmacist on site and for 
allowing a nonpharmacist to dispense medications.  Hence, plaintiffs’ claims of 
direct negligence on the part of the pharmacy are timely under the three-year 
period of limitations for ordinary negligence.   
Because the pharmacy is not a licensed health facility or agency, the 
defendant nonpharmacist employee was not an employee of such a facility or 
agency. Neither was she a licensed health-care professional.  As a consequence, 
plaintiffs’ claims alleging negligence by the nonpharmacist employee and 
vicarious liability for that negligence by the pharmacy may also proceed under the 
three-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence.  
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.    
1 MCL 600.5805(6).  
2 MCL 600.5805(10).  
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
On November 11, 2000, Joseph Kuznar took a prescription for Mirapex, 
0.125 mg, to be refilled at Crown Pharmacy.  His wife, Judith, was taking the 
medication on her physician’s orders to control the symptoms of restless leg 
syndrome. Defendant Valerie Randall refilled the prescription with 1 mg tablets 
of Mirapex, each tablet thus containing eight times the prescribed dosage.  Randall 
was a Crown Pharmacy employee who was not a licensed pharmacist and was not 
acting under the supervision of a pharmacist.3 
Judith Kuznar took one of the 1 mg Mirapex tablets in the afternoon and 
two in the early evening of November 13, 2000.  She became dizzy, agitated, and 
nauseated in the evening and lost consciousness during the night. At the Botsford 
General Hospital emergency room, her symptoms were determined to be an 
adverse reaction to the excessive dosage of Mirapex. 
On October 7, 2003, the Kuznars filed a negligence lawsuit against both 
Crown Pharmacy and Randall.4  In count 17 of the complaint, plaintiffs alleged 
that Crown Pharmacy owed a duty to exercise reasonable care through its agents 
and employees when dispensing medications.  In count 18, plaintiffs alleged that 
Crown Pharmacy owed a duty to avoid foreseeable injury when dispensing 
3 These are plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint.  We accept them as true 
for purposes of defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(7) and (8). Defendants characterize Randall as a pharmacy technician.    
4 Joseph Kuznar’s claims are derivative. 
3  
 
 
 
medications. In count 19, plaintiffs alleged that the pharmacy breached these 
duties by: 
a. Failing to dispense the appropriate medication dosage and 
refilling a prescription instead with eight times the prescribed 
dosage. 
b. Failing to timely recognize the error made in dispensing 
medications. 
c. Allowing persons other than a licensed pharmacist to refill 
prescriptions. 
d. Failing to have a licensed pharmacist available on site to 
oversee, supervise and control the actions of persons not pharmacists 
who refilled prescription[s]. 
In counts 22 to 24, plaintiffs alleged that Randall had a duty not to dispense 
medication if she was not a licensed pharmacist.  Alternatively, plaintiffs alleged, 
she had a duty “to adhere to a standard of care to which she is held to avoid 
foreseeable injury in dispensing medications.”  In count 25, plaintiffs alleged that 
Randall breached these duties by: 
a. Dispensing medication which she was not qualified to 
dispense as she was not a licensed pharmacist. 
b. Failing to dispense the appropriate medication dosage and 
refilling a prescription instead with eight times the prescribed 
dosage. 
c. Failing to timely recognize the error made in dispensing 
medications. 
d. Failing to consult with a licensed pharmacist before 
dispensing medications. 
On August 9, 2004, defendants moved for summary disposition under 
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). They contended that, because Randall was employed 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
at a licensed health facility or agency, the complaint sounded in medical 
malpractice rather than in ordinary negligence.  Defendants argued that the 
complaint failed to state a claim for ordinary negligence and was barred by the 
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice.  The circuit court denied 
the motion without explanation.   
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of defendants’ 
motion for summary disposition.5  It pointed out that, under MCL 600.5838a(1), a 
medical malpractice claim can be brought against a “licensed health facility or 
agency” as defined in article 17 of the Public Health Code.6  Because the licensure 
requirement applicable to pharmacies appears in article 15 of the code,7 and not in 
article 17, the Court of Appeals concluded that a pharmacy is not a “licensed 
health facility or agency” subject to medical malpractice claims.  
The Court of Appeals noted that pharmacists are licensed health-care 
professionals subject to medical malpractice claims under MCL 600.5838a(1)(b). 
However, Randall was not a licensed pharmacist, and neither was Crown 
Pharmacy.  The Court noted that MCL 600.5838a(1) contemplates that the 
negligent acts of unlicensed agents or employees of licensed health facilities or 
agencies may be subject to medical malpractice claims.  But because a pharmacy 
5 Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 272 Mich App 130; 724 NW2d 493 (2006). 
6 MCL 333.20101 et seq. 
7 MCL 333.16101 et seq. 
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is not a “licensed health facility or agency,” the Court opined, no medical 
malpractice had occurred in this case. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
plaintiffs’ complaint was timely under the three-year limitations period for 
ordinary negligence.8 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendants sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We review decisions on 
motions for summary disposition de novo.9  Such motions are properly granted 
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when a statute of limitations bars a claim.  In reviewing 
whether a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) was properly decided, we consider all 
documentary evidence and accept the complaint as factually accurate unless 
affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict it.10 
Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the nonmoving 
party “has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”  Such claims 
must be “‘so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development 
could possibly justify recovery.’”11  In reviewing the outcome of a motion under 
8 MCL 600.5805(10). 
9 See Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 419; 684 
NW2d 864 (2004). 
10 Id. We note that defendants based their motion for summary disposition 
exclusively on plaintiffs’ complaint. 
11 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) (citation 
omitted). 
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MCR 2.116(C)(8), we consider the pleadings alone.12  We accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.13 
We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.14  Our main 
goal in doing so is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  When a statute 
specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls.15  The meaning 
accorded to undefined terms is determined in part by their placement in the statute 
and their purpose in the statutory scheme.16 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE BRYANT REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
In Bryant, this Court held that, to be subject to the requirements for 
asserting medical malpractice, a claim must allege an action that (1) occurred 
within the course of a professional relationship and (2) poses questions of medical 
judgment outside the realm of common knowledge and experience.17 
A professional relationship exists if a person or an entity capable of 
committing medical malpractice was subject to a contractual duty to render 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29, 34; 729 NW2d 488 (2007).  
15 Id. at 35.  
16 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119  
(1999). 
17 Bryant, 471 Mich at 422. 
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professional health-care services to the plaintiff.18 Under the common law, only 
physicians and surgeons were potentially liable for medical malpractice.  But in 
MCL 600.5838a(1), the Legislature expanded the scope of those who could be 
liable for medical malpractice.19  It provided for medical malpractice claims to be 
brought against “a person or entity who is or who holds himself or herself out to 
be a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an 
employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency . . . .”20 
The primary issue in this case is whether the pharmacy technician and the 
pharmacy are covered by MCL 600.5838a(1). We conclude that they are not. 
Because the professional relationship test is not satisfied, we need not consider 
whether the complaint poses questions of medical judgment that would require 
expert testimony.21 
B. A LICENSED HEALTH FACILITY OR AGENCY 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the relevant statutes in determining 
that licensed health facilities and agencies are those licensed under article 17 of 
the Public Health Code.22  Article 17, entitled “Facilities and Agencies,” provides 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 420 n 8. 
20 MCL 600.5838a(1). 
21 Bryant, 471 Mich at 423. 
22 MCL 600.5838a(1)(a). 
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its own definition of what is a health facility or agency in the form of a list.  The 
list does not include pharmacies.23  All the entities listed do more than just 
dispense medication.  They provide in- or out-patient or residential or emergency 
medical care or treatment. MCL 333.20115(1) allows the promulgation of 
administrative rules to “further define” this list. Neither party has identified any 
administrative expansion of the list.  
Under the statutory definition, a pharmacy is not a licensed health facility 
or agency and cannot be directly liable for medical malpractice in that capacity. 
23 MCL 333.20106(1) provides that “health facility or agency” means 
(a) An ambulance operation, aircraft transport operation, 
nontransport prehospital life support operation, or medical first 
response service. 
(b) A clinical laboratory. 
(c) A county medical care facility. 
(d) A freestanding surgical outpatient facility. 
(e) A health maintenance organization. 
(f) A home for the aged. 
(g) A hospital. 
(h) A nursing home.  
(i) A hospice. 
(j) A hospice residence. 
(k) A facility or agency listed in subdivisions (a) to (h) 
located in a university, college, or other educational institution. 
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Nor can its agents and employees be liable for medical malpractice as agents or 
employees of a licensed health facility or agency.  The Court of Appeals correctly 
held that Randall and Crown Pharmacy cannot be liable for medial malpractice 
under this rationale. 
C. A LICENSED HEALTH-CARE PROFESSIONAL 
Defendants and the Michigan Pharmacists Association urge us to hold that 
a pharmacy is a licensed health-care professional.  We decline to do so. 
A licensed health-care professional is “an individual licensed or registered 
under article 15 of the public health code . . . and engaged in the practice of his or 
her health profession in a . . . business entity.”24  The flaw in defendants’ 
proposition is that the Public Health Code defines “individual” to mean “a natural 
person.”25  Article 15 defines a “pharmacist” as “an individual licensed under this 
article to engage in the practice of pharmacy.”26  However, it does not define a 
pharmacy as an individual or a natural person. 
Instead, “pharmacy” is defined as “a building or a part of a building in 
which the practice of pharmacy is conducted.”27  MCL 333.17711(1) provides that 
“a person shall not engage in the practice of pharmacy unless licensed or 
otherwise authorized by this article.” The Public Health Code defines “person” in 
24 MCL 600.5838a(1)(b).  
25 MCL 333.1105(1).  
26 MCL 333.17707(2).  
27 MCL 333.17707(4).  
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relevant part as “an individual, partnership, cooperative, association, private 
corporation, personal representative, receiver, trustee, assignee, or other legal 
entity.”28  Although a business entity can operate a licensed pharmacy, there is no 
requirement that a business entity operating as a pharmacy must consist solely of 
licensed health-care professionals. 
Rather, the standards for the operation of a pharmacy provide: 
(1) A pharmacy shall not be operated unless licensed by this 
part. 
(2) A pharmacy open for business shall be under the personal 
charge of a pharmacist.[29]  A pharmacist shall not simultaneously 
have personal charge of more than 1 pharmacy.  The person to 
whom a pharmacy license is issued and the pharmacists on duty are 
responsible for compliance with federal and state laws regulating the 
distribution of drugs and the practice of pharmacy.  Pharmacy 
services shall be conducted under the control and personal charge of 
a pharmacist. 
(3) A penalty for violation of this part does not affect the 
pharmacy license of other than the place of business where the 
violation occurred.[30] 
These standards make clear that a license to operate a pharmacy can be issued to a 
nonpharmacist.  But the holder of the pharmacy license cannot open a pharmacy 
for business unless a licensed pharmacist is physically present on site.  Because a 
pharmacy may be operated by a nonpharmacist, a pharmacy and a pharmacist are 
28 MCL 333.1106(2). 
29 “Personal charge” means the immediate physical presence of a 
pharmacist. MCL 333.17707(1). 
30 MCL 333.17741. 
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not the same thing. Whereas a pharmacist is a licensed health care professional, a 
pharmacy is not.31 
Since Crown Pharmacy was not a licensed health-care professional, it could 
not have had a professional relationship with plaintiffs.  Because plaintiffs’ direct 
claim against the pharmacy fails the first prong of Bryant’s two-pronged test, it 
cannot sound in medical malpractice. 
In count 19(c) and (d) of the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Crown 
Pharmacy allowed nonpharmacists to refill prescriptions.  They asserted that 
Crown did not have a licensed pharmacist on site to oversee, supervise, and 
control the activities of nonpharmacists. Plaintiffs essentially alleged that the 
holder of the pharmacy license in this case operated the pharmacy in violation of 
MCL 333.17741.32  These are allegations of direct liability on the part of Crown 
31 Defendants rely on two Court of Appeals cases for their claim that a 
pharmacy is a licensed health-care professional. See Becker v Meyer Rexall Drug 
Co, 141 Mich App 481; 367 NW2d 424 (1985); Simmons v Apex Drug Stores, Inc, 
201 Mich App 250; 506 NW2d 562 (1993). In each case, a pharmacy was sued 
when a pharmacist incorrectly filled a prescription.  Neither Becker nor Simmons 
specifically analyzed the distinction between a claim against a pharmacy and a 
claim against a pharmacist. 
32 “The fact that a person has violated a safety statute may be admitted as 
evidence bearing on the question of negligence.”  Klanseck v Anderson Sales & 
Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78, 86; 393 NW2d 356 (1986); cf. Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 
449 Mich 550; 537 NW2d 208 (1995) (holding that a drug addict was not entitled 
to a recovery on the basis of the pharmacists’ alleged violation of the controlled­
substance provisions of the Public Health Code because these provisions are not 
meant to protect persons who fraudulently obtain drugs). 
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Pharmacy.33  Because the pharmacy itself is not a licensed health-care 
professional, its direct liability for violations of the statute lies in ordinary 
negligence. The claims in count 19(c) and (d) of the complaint are subject to the 
three-year statutory period of limitations for ordinary negligence and are not 
barred by the expiration of it. 
The remaining allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint concern Randall’s direct 
liability for her own negligence in refilling the prescription and Crown 
Pharmacy’s vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee.34  Plaintiffs 
alleged that Randall was not a licensed pharmacist, and defendants have presented 
no documentary evidence to disprove this allegation.35 
On the basis of the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint, Randall cannot be 
liable in medical malpractice. Rather, she is directly liable for her own ordinary 
33 Plaintiffs have not identified any officers or agents of Raksha 
Corporation responsible for the alleged violation of its statutory duty to operate 
the pharmacy only under the supervision of a pharmacist.  However, because a 
corporation is a legal person, it is sufficient for the purposes of the complaint to 
allege its actions or failures as a legal person.  See Theophelis v Lansing Gen 
Hosp, 430 Mich 473, 478; 424 NW2d 478 (1988), citing Jones v Martz & Meek 
Constr Co, Inc, 362 Mich 451, 455; 107 NW2d 802 (1961). 
34 See Al-Shimmari v Detroit Med Ctr, 477 Mich 280, 294-295; 731 NW2d 
29 (2007) (“Vicarious liability . . . rests on the imputation of the negligence of an 
agent to a principal. . . . [T]o succeed on a vicarious liability claim, a plaintiff need 
only prove that an agent has acted negligently.”).  
35 For the first time in this Court, defendants argued that, by virtue of 
refilling the prescription, Randall held herself out as a licensed health-care 
professional, as defined in MCL 600.5838a(1).  We decline to consider this 
argument because defendants did not make it in the lower courts.  
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negligence, and Crown Pharmacy is vicariously liable for the ordinary negligence 
of its employee.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
A pharmacy is neither a licensed health facility or agency nor a licensed 
health-care professional and cannot be directly liable for medical malpractice. 
Hence, under the law, Crown Pharmacy was incapable of committing medical 
malpractice. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the prescription was refilled by a nonpharmacist 
employee of Crown Pharmacy without the supervision of a pharmacist. 
Defendants have presented no evidence to the contrary.  A nonpharmacist 
employee of a licensed pharmacy is neither a licensed health-care professional nor 
an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency.  
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims of direct liability against Randall and Crown 
Pharmacy and their claims for vicarious liability against Crown Pharmacy sound 
in ordinary negligence. Because plaintiffs have stated valid claims of ordinary 
negligence, the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary 
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The claims are not barred by the applicable 
three-year statute of limitations, and so the court also properly denied defendants’ 
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings.  
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
15