Case Title: LEE ANN KILLIAN and DONNA OAKLEY, as co-personal representatives of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased, and the Estate of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased V. CAZA DRILLING, INC., a Colorado corporation; and ORVILLE LONG

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEE ANN KILLIAN and DONNA OAKLEY,as co-personal representatives of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased, and the Estate of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, deceased V. CAZA DRILLING, INC., a Colorado corporation; and ORVILLE LONG2006 WY 42131 P.3d 975Case Number: 05-37Decided: 04/07/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
LEE ANN 
KILLIAN and DONNA OAKLEY, as co-personal representatives of Jeffrey Christopher 
Pool, deceased, and the Estate of Jeffrey Christopher Pool, 
deceased,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
CAZA 
DRILLING, INC., a Colorado corporation; and ORVILLE 
LONG,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Robert 
N. Williams  of Meyer and Williams, 
Jackson, Wyoming, and James K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by 
Mr. Williams.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
George 
Santini of Ross, Ross & Santini, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, For Appellee Caza Drilling, Inc.  Gary R. Scott and Robert C. Jarosh of 
Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee Orvil Long.  Argument by Messrs. Santini and 
Jarosh.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

HILL, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.  GOLDEN, J. files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Lee Ann Killian 
and Donna Oakley (collectively Appellants) are co-personal representatives of 
the estate of Jeff Pool, who was killed when he was struck by a vehicle driven 
by an employee of Caza Drilling, Inc. (Caza).  On behalf of the estate, Appellants filed 
an action against Caza and Orvil Long, the supervisor of the employees involved 
in the accident, alleging that they negligently allowed the employees to drink 
alcohol on company premises in violation of Caza policy.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants concluding that Caza and Long did not owe a duty to 
Pool, and that their actions were not the proximate cause of his death.  We agree that there was no duty and 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Appellants set 
forth the following issues:

 
 

A.     
Does a 
duty to the motoring public arise where an employee became intoxicated on 
company premises with the corroboration and knowledge of his supervisor and in 
violation of a company policy expressly adopted to protect the 
public?

 
 

B.     
Is the 
Wyoming Dram Shop Act applicable to the facts of this 
case?

 
 

C.    
Is 
court-ordered counseling one of the express exceptions to a privilege under W.S. 
§ 33-38-103?

 
 
Caza 
sets out the following issues:

 
 

1.      
Should 
this Court create a duty on the part of employers which have adopted policies 
prohibiting worksite possession or consumption of alcohol greater than those 
recognized under the Wyoming Dramshop Act?

 
 

2.      
Can an 
employer be held vicariously liable for off duty, off premises torts committed 
by employees or ex-employees?

 
 

3.      
Was 
there a legally recognizable duty owed by Caza Drilling to the 
Appellant?

 
 

4.      
Assuming 
such a duty exists, was the death of Jeffrey Pool so far attenuated and 
disconnected from the breach of the duty to the extent that any such breach as a 
matter of law could not be a proximate cause?

 
 
Long 
responds with the following:

 
 

1.      
Does 
Wyoming Statute Annotated § 12-8-301 immunize Orvil Long from liability for 
damages resulting from the accident that caused Jeffrey Christopher Pool's 
death?

 
 

2.      
If 
Wyoming Statute Annotated § 12-8-301 does not immunize Orvil Long from liability 
for damages resulting from the accident that caused Jeffrey Christopher Pool's 
death, does Wyoming law impose a duty upon Long, under the circumstances of this 
case, to protect against the harm caused to Pool?

 
 

3.      
Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that information regarding Orvil 
Long's alcohol counseling, which was court-ordered in an unrelated case, was 
confidential pursuant to Wyoming Statute Annotated § 
33-38-113?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On April 15, 
2001, Clint Hammers (Hammers) and Wyatt Ditterline (Ditterline) were employed by 
Caza on a drilling crew working on Rig 73, near Marbleton, Wyoming.  
Long was the driller and supervisor of the crew.  At 6:30 that morning, the crew finished 
a twelve-hour shift and retired to Caza's mancamp, which was located about five 
miles from the rig site.  The 
mancamp consisted of a trailer provided without cost by Caza to its employees 
while they worked at the rig site.  
Although employees were not required to stay at the mancamp, Hammers, 
Ditterline, and Long elected to do so.

 
 
[¶4]      Caza prohibited 
the possession or consumption of alcohol at its mancamp.  The policy was posted on the trailer 
door at the mancamp.  Hammers and 
Ditterline were aware of the policy.  
Nevertheless, the policy was not enforced.  After returning to the mancamp on April 
15, members of the crew, including Hammers, Ditterline, and Long, began 
drinking.  After a couple of hours, 
Hammers and Ditterline left the mancamp in Ditterline's truck with Hammers 
driving.  Initially, Hammers and 
Ditterline went to the rig site, where they allegedly smoked marijuana with 
another Caza employee.1  They then decided to go see Hammers' new 
cabin in Dubois.  After a brief stop 
in Jackson, they 
headed north on U.S. Highway 191.  At approximately 1:30 p.m. Hammers was 
driving about sixty-five miles per hour near the Jackson HoleAirport when he struck Jeff Pool, who was 
riding his bicycle.  Pool was killed 
instantly.  Hammers and Ditterline 
were arrested a short time later after fleeing the scene.  Subsequently, Hammers pleaded guilty to 
aggravated homicide by vehicle and hit and run while Ditterline pleaded guilty 
to aiding and abetting hit and run.

 
 
[¶5]      On April 14, 
2003, Appellants filed a wrongful death action against numerous individual and 
corporate defendants alleging that their negligent misconduct resulted in the 
death of the decedent.2  Caza and Long filed motions for summary 
judgment.  After a hearing, the 
district court granted the motions concluding that Caza and Long were "entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law because there is no duty of care owed by these 
Defendants to the Plaintiff's [sic] or Plaintiffs' decedent."  Alternatively, the court found that 
"even if defendants owed some duty of care to Jeffrey Pool[,] Summary Judgment 
is still appropriate for defendants because there is no proximate cause as a 
matter of law."  Appellants 
appeal.3

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]                  
     Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.   
 A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an 
essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have 
asserted.    The movant bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment.  If the movant carries his burden, the 
party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.    This court evaluates the propriety of a 
summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials 
as the district court employed and used.  We examine the record in the light most 
favorable to the party who opposed the motion for summary judgment, and we give 
that party all the favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  We accord no deference to 
the district court's decisions on issues of law.

 
 

Christensen 
v. Carbon County, 2004 
WY 135, ¶8, 100 P.3d 411, 413-14 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Company v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶9, 39 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Through 
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is only liable 
for the negligence of an employee who is acting within the scope of his 
employment.  Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 964 
(Wyo. 1999); Austin v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561, 563 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
The 
conduct of an employee is within the scope of his employment "only if it is of 
the kind he is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within the 
authorized time and space limits; and it is actuated, at least in part, by a 
purpose to serve the master."  [Hamilton v. NatronaCounty Education Association, 901 P.2d 381, 385 
(Wyo. 1995)] 
(citing Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Co., 
598 P.2d 20, 22 (Wyo. 1979)); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
§ 228 (1958).

 
 

Austin, at 
Id. There is no contention that Hammers and 
Ditterline were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the 
accident.  Rather, Appellants ask us 
to expand the recognized circumstances in which an employer is liable for the 
negligence of its employees by imposing a duty directly upon the employer when 
it has adopted a safety policy with the intent to benefit the public.  Appellants cite the following language 
from Caza's employee safety manual:

 
 
SECTION 
1  SAFETY POLICY AND PROGRAM 

 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION

 
 
The 
management of CAZA Drilling Inc. is sincerely committed to providing a safe and 
healthful workplace. Safety is an integral part of our Company's work.  It is part of our daily operations and is 
there to protect our employees, customers, contractors, property, the 
environment, and the public.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Everyone 
employed by CAZA is responsible for maintaining the safety program.  Managers and supervisors are responsible 
for identifying safety needsand informing supervisors of any unsafe 
conditions

 
 
As a 
CAZA Drilling Inc. employee, you are expected to comply with all applicable CAZA 
safety rules, to perform all duties in a safe and workmanlike manner, and 
promote safety awareness among fellow employees

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
1.3  GENERAL 
POLICY STATEMENT  DRUGS, ALCOHOL, FIREARMS, & OTHER 
HAZARDS.

 
 
CAZA 
Drilling Inc. subscribes to the following policy regarding illegal drugs, 
alcoholic beverages, firearms, explosives, or other hazardous 
conditions:

 
 
1.  The 
possession, use, sale or distribution of any illegal controlled substance(s) or 
being under the influence of same, by any employee while in the workplace, on 
company premises, or in the conduct of company-related work off-site, is 
prohibited.  The presence of any 
detectable amount of any illegal drug (or any metabolities) in any employee in 
the company workplace, on its premises, or in the conduct of company-related 
work off-site is prohibited.  Company vehicles, as well as private 
vehicles parked on company premises or worksites are locations included within 
this prohibition.  In addition, no 
employee may use, possess, transport, promote, or sell alcohol, any drug or drug 
paraphernalia while performing work for the company or while on company 
property.

 
 
Appellants 
argue that Caza voluntarily adopted a "zero tolerance" policy regarding alcohol 
and drug use on company property, including the mancamps, and that the policy 
was specifically adopted to protect the general public.  Appellants note that one who voluntarily 
adopts a duty must perform such in a reasonable manner.  They contend that Caza knew its policy 
was being violated and that Long, who as supervisor was supposed to enforce the 
policy, actually participated in the violation.  Appellants conclude it was foreseeable 
that a violation of the policy could lead to injury or death to members of the 
public.  Accordingly, they insist 
that Caza owed a duty to the decedent and since there were material facts in 
dispute as to whether the duty was breached, the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment.

 
 
[¶8]      "Whether a legal 
duty exists is a question of a law, and absent a duty, there is no liability." 
 Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, ¶46, 42 P.3d 1013, 1027 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Bowen v. 
Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 198 (Wyo. 1992) (Brown, J., 
concurring)).

 
 
"  
"Duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total 
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff 
is entitled to protection.' " [Anderson v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, 
¶44, 49 P.3d 1011, 1024 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 
(Wyo. 1986))]. 
* * * A duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, "or when the 
relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the 
defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff."  Hamilton v. NatronaCountyEduc. 
Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995).  The legal question to be answered by the 
court is

 
 
"  
"[w]hether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the 
parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the 
benefit of the other  or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff 
which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the 
defendant.  This is entirely a 
question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, 
principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only 
by the court." ' "

 
 

Thomas 
By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, § 37 at 
206 (4th ed. 1971) and Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo. 1983).

 
 
In 
deciding whether to adopt a particular tort duty, a court's focus must be much 
broader than just the case at hand:

 
 
"[T]he 
courts have merely reacted to the situation in the way in which the great mass 
of mankind customarily react,' and that as our ideas of human relations change 
the law as to duties changes with them.  Various factors undoubtedly have been 
given conscious or unconscious weight, including convenience of administration, 
capacity of the parties to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future 
injuries, the moral blame attached to the wrongdoer, and many others.  Changing social conditions lead 
constantly to the recognition of new duties.  No better general statement can be made 
than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons 
would recognize it and agree that it exists."  Prosser & Keaton on Torts, § 53, pp. 
357-359 (5th ed. 1984).

 
 
"* * * 
The judge's function in a duty determination involves complex considerations of 
legal and social policies which will directly affect the essential determination 
of the limits to government protection. Consequently, * * * the imposition and 
scope of a legal duty is dependent not only on the factor of foreseeability. 
([Cunis v. Brennan] 56 Ill. 2d 372, 
375, 308 N.E.2d 617) but involves other considerations, including the magnitude 
of the risk involved in defendant's conduct, the burden of requiring defendant 
to guard against that risk, and the consequences of placing that burden upon the 
defendant.  [Citations.]" Nelson by Tatum v. Commonwealth Edison 
Company, 124 Ill.App.3d 655, 662, 80 Ill.Dec. 401, 465 N.E.2d 513, 519 
(1984).

 
 

Mostert 
v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1987). In Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196, we further 
detailed the factors to be considered:

 
 
Some of 
the key policy factors to be considered are: (1) the foreseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) 
the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the 
defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) 
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 (1976).

 
 

Borns ex 
rel. Gannon v. Voss, 2003 
WY 74, ¶¶30-31, 70 P.3d 262, 273-74 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶9]      In support of 
their position, Appellants rely on a case from the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals:  Peal by Peal v. Smith, 444 S.E.2d 673 
(N.C. App. 1994).  The defendant 
Smith worked for Cianbro Corporation.  In Cianbro's Employee Information 
Handbook was the following policy statement:  "No person under the influence of 
alcohol, marijuana, or non-prescription drugs shall be allowed on the project 
work site."  444 S.E.2d  at 675; 677. 
 After work, ten or twelve Cianbro 
employees, including Smith, met in the company's parking lot to drink beer. 
 Id. 
at 675.  Supervisory personnel were 
aware of the activity.  After Smith 
consumed some beers, he left the premises in his vehicle.  As he was proceeding across a bridge 
approximately two miles from the company property, he drove his car across the 
centerline and collided head on with another vehicle killing one occupant of 
that vehicle and causing permanent and debilitating brain damage to another, the 
plaintiff.  Id. Testimony from witnesses of the accident 
scene indicated that Smith was obviously alcohol-impaired. 

 
 
[¶10]   The plaintiff joined Cianbro to her 
suit against Smith alleging that the company "failed to enforce or carry out 
their own regulations, which, on information and belief, would have prevented 
the defendant Smith from becoming intoxicated on their business premises and 
then departing to operate an automobile on the highway in that condition[.] 
 Peal, 444 S.E.2d  at 676.  A jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff.  Among the issues raised 
on appeal by Cianbro was whether it owed a duty to the plaintiff.  The Court of Appeals concluded that it 
did.  First, noting the presence of 
the drug and alcohol policy in the employee handbook, the court observed that in 
North 
Carolina, "the breach of a voluntarily adopted safety 
rule is some evidence of [a] defendant's negligence."  Id. 
at 677.  From that, the court 
concluded "that on the facts of this case the safety rule adopted in the 
employee handbook by the corporate defendants was some evidence of a standard of 
care."  Id. at 678. 
 Later, the court noted that 
Cianbro's supervisory personnel were aware of the policy and that it was being 
regularly violated.  Id. at 679. 
 The court stressed that there was 
testimony from supervisors that the policy was adopted "not only to protect the 
employees on site, but also to prevent 
accidents involving Cianbro employees and the public." Id. (Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 
[¶11]   The court then turned to § 317 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts for support in determining whether a duty was 
owed to the plaintiff:

 
 
            
Section 317 states that:

 
 
A master 
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to control his servant while 
acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally 
harming others or from conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm to them, if

 
 
(a) the 
servant

 
 
(i) is 
upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is 
privileged to enter only as his servant, or

 
 
(ii) is 
using a chattel of the master and

 
 
                                    
(b) the master

 
 
(i) 
knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, 
and

 
 
(ii) 
knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such 
control.

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
Clearly, 
the use of the master's chattel is inapplicable under the facts of this case, 
nor is the cause of action grounded in negligent supervision.  In our situation, we have an employer who 
could control the employee so as to prevent harm to third persons; the employee 
was on premises in possession of the employer; the employer knew or had reason 
to know that he could control the employee, and knew or should have known that 
there was the necessity and the opportunity to exercise that control over the 
employee. Thus, the elements of a common law duty in a master/servant 
relationship as described by the above section of the Restatement have been 
met.

 
 

Peal, 
444 S.E.2d  at 678-79.  The court then 
reached its conclusion:

 
 
We agree 
that the corporate defendants' establishment and memorialization of a [sic] 
alcohol policy standing alone did not subject them to liability.  However, the common law duty of a master 
to control his servant under certain circumstances as outlined in Restatement § 
317, taken together with the defendants' own written policies established a 
standard of conduct that if breached could result in actionable negligence. 

 
 

Peal, 
444 S.E.2d  at 679.  Having found a duty, 
the court upheld the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  Id. 
at 681.

 
 
[¶12]   For several reasons, we do not find 
the Peal case to be particularly 
persuasive authority.  First, the 
court takes the unremarkable proposition that the violation of a safety rule may 
be evidence of a standard of care, and concludes that it supports finding a duty 
on behalf of the defendant corporation for the actions of an employee acting 
outside the scope of his employment.  Standard of care and duty are not 
synonymous concepts.  Of the cases 
cited by the court in support of its conclusion, two were situations wherein the 
defendant's employee was acting within the scope of his employment, Klassette v. Mecklenburg County Area Mental 
Health, 364 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1988) (plaintiff patient sued clinic for 
negligent medical treatment), Robinson v. 
Seaboard System R.R., Inc., 361 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. 1987) (plaintiff driver 
sued engineer of train and his employer for damages arising out of train-car 
collision), one was a case of negligent hiring, Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 
Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. 1987) (plaintiff patient sued Hospital for 
granting clinical privileges to doctor without ascertaining whether the doctor 
was qualified), and the other was a product liability case, Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, 
Inc., 131 S.E.2d 501 (N.C. 1963) (plaintiff alleged that ladder sold by 
defendant was not constructed in compliance with the American Standard Safety 
Code for Portable Wooden Ladders).  In all of these cases, a duty was owed by 
the defendant to the respective plaintiffs independently of any consideration of 
whether or not a safety rule was violated.  That principle was relevant only to the 
extent that it was considered evidence that the defendants breached their duty. 
 The holdings of these cases do not 
support the conclusion of the Peal 
court.

 
 
[¶13]   In addition, the decision 
misapplies the Restatement.  As 
noted above, Section 317 states that an employer is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the activities of his employees when they are acting 
outside the scope of their employment so as to prevent intentional harm to 
others if: (1) the employee is upon the employer's premises or is using the 
chattel of the employer; and (2) the employer knows or has reason to know that 
it has the ability to control the employee and that it knows or should know of 
the necessity and opportunity for exercising control.  Restatement (Second) Torts § 317 (1965). 
 The Peal court predicated its finding of a 
duty partially on the fact that the defendant's "employee was on premises in 
possession of the employer."  The 
problem with the court's reasoning is that the defendant's employee in Peal was not on the employer's premises 
when the accident occurred.  The 
Restatement only imposes a duty on the employer to prevent harm to others when 
the employee is on the employer's premises:

 
 

A master 
is required to police his own premises, and 
those upon which, though in the possession of another, he has a privilege of 
entry for himself and his servants, to 
the extent of using reasonable care to exercise his authority as a master in 
order to prevent his servant from doing harm to others.  So too, he is required to exercise his 
authority as master to prevent them from misusing chattels which he entrusts to 
them for use as his servants.  This 
is true although the acts of the servant while upon the premises or in the use 
of the master's chattels are done wholly for the servant's own purposes and are, 
therefore, outside the course of the servant's employment and thus do not 
subject the master to liability under the rules of the law of Agency.  On 
the other hand, the master as such is under no peculiar duty to control the 
conduct of his servant while his is outside of the master's premises, unless 
the servant is at the time using a chattel entrusted to him as servant.  Thus, a factory owner is required to 
exercise his authority as master to prevent his servants, while in the factory 
yard during the lunch hour, from indulging in games involving an unreasonable 
risk of harm to persons outside the factory premises.  He 
is not required, however, to exercise any control over the actions of his 
employees while on the public streets or in a neighboring restaurant during 
the lunch interval, even though the fact that they are his servants may give him 
the power to control their actions by threatening to dismiss them from his 
employment if they persist. 

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 317, comment b (emphasis added).  See also Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 
633 N.W.2d 707, 714-15 (Wisc. App. 2001); Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc., 
755 A.2d 36, 41-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Riddle 
v. Arizona Oncology Services, Inc., 924 P.2d 468, 472-73 (Ariz. App. 1996); D'Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896, 
901-02 (N.Y. 1987); and Pursley for the 
Benefit of Clark v. Ford Motor Company, 462 N.E.2d 247, 250-51 (Ind. App. 1984).  Section 317 was not applicable to the 
situation before the Peal 
court.

 
 
[¶14]   The appellate court decision in Peal was appealed to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, which affirmed per curiam after one justice recused and those 
remaining split their vote.  Peal by Peal v. Smith, 457 S.E.2d 599 
(N.C. 1995).  The Peal case came out in 1994 and has been 
cited in only three subsequent cases, all from North Carolina.  See Estate of Mullis by Dixon v. Monroe Oil 
Company, 505 S.E.2d 131, 136 (N.C. 1998); Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 547 S.E.2d 48, 51 (N.C. App. 2000); and Norris v. Zambito, 288, 520 S.E.2d 113, 
118 (N.C. App. 1999).  None of those 
cases discuss the substantive holding of Peal.  For these reasons, we do not find the 
case to be persuasive authority.

 
 
[¶15]   The Peal case is the only authority 
Appellants offer in support of their position.  There is authority to the contrary.  In Estate of Catlin v. General Motors 
Corporation, 936 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.App.--Houston 1996) employees of Fluor 
Daniel held a "fish fry" on company property following a company softball game. 
 Id. 
at 448-49.  The company had adopted 
a safety policy forbidding consumption of alcohol on company property except at 
company sponsored events.  Id. at 449-50.  A violation of the policy was grounds for 
immediate discharge.  Id. The safety policy required a detailed 
written plan regarding the consumption of alcohol, designation of a person "in 
charge," and special security procedures.  Id. 
at 450.  The organizers of the fish 
fry failed to comply with these procedures.  Id. One of the employees attending the 
fish fry got intoxicated and, after stopping for more drinks at a bar, caused an 
automobile accident resulting in the death of the plaintiff's decedent.  Id. 
at 449.

 
 
[¶16]   The plaintiff argued that "because 
Fluor Daniel adopted a policy regarding the consumption of alcohol on its 
premises, and thereafter failed to follow the policy, a legal duty to third 
parties was created."  Estate of Catlin, 936 S.W.2d  at 451. 
 The court stated that, as a general 
rule, "a person does not have a duty to control the conduct of another even when 
the person has the practical ability to do so."  Id. 
at 450.  It then noted that in 
Texas, an 
employer may be liable for the torts of off-duty employees which are committed 
on the employer's premises or with the employer's chattels.  Id. 
at 450-51 (citing § 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).  That duty, the court observed, 
encompassed situations where because of an employee's incapacity, an employer 
exercised control over the employee.  In those situations, the court noted that 
Texas law 
required the employer to "take such action as a reasonably prudent employer 
under the same or similar circumstances would take to prevent the employee from 
causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others."  Id. at 450 (citing Otis Engineering Corporation v. Clark, 
668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983)).  The court found that the "narrow duty" 
imposed on employers to third persons by Otis did not apply in this case because 
there was no evidence indicating that Fluor Daniel or its employees knew that 
the employee was intoxicated and that they exerted any control over him.  Id. 
at 451.  The court then 
held:

 
 
We 
conclude that the mere creation of an internal policy regarding consumption of 
alcohol on the premises, whether or not the fish fry was a "company function," 
does not create a duty as set forth in Otis. More is required. In Otis, the employer had actual knowledge of the intoxication 
and then performed an affirmative act of 
control.  These elements are not 
present in this case.  To accept the 
Estate's argument would impermissibly extend the test set forth in Otis * * *. Fluor Daniel did not assume 
a duty to third parties by its limited activities in this 
case.

 
 

Estate 
of Catlin, 936 S.W.2d  at 451.  (Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 
[¶17]   A similar argument was advanced by 
the plaintiff in Premo v. General Motors 
Corporation, 533 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. App. 1995).  A GM employee left work intoxicated and 
caused an accident, injuring the plaintiff.  Id. 
at 332.  In his complaint, the 
plaintiff alleged that GM had a policy or practice of not allowing employees to 
leave the workplace in their automobiles if intoxicated; instead the company 
would detain them and arrange alternative transportation.  Id. The plaintiff claimed that the 
"practice was for the protection of both the employee and the motoring public, 
and that, therefore, General Motors owed [the plaintiff], as a member of the 
motoring public, a duty not to allow [their employee] to leave the plant in his 
automobile in an intoxicated state."  Id. 
at 332-33.  The court found that 
GM's "internal policy of preventing intoxicated employees from driving did not, 
as a matter of public policy, amount to General Motors' assumption of a duty to 
protect the public at large."  Id. 
at 333.  The court then described 
the public policy reasons against imposing a duty under the facts of the 
case:

 
 
Significant 
and compelling public policy reasons support a conclusion of an insufficient 
"undertaking" in this case.  Alcohol 
and substance abuse is a serious societal problem causing significant human 
suffering and economic loss.  In the 
work setting alcohol use and related problems undoubtedly cost employers and the 
national economy hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars each year in 
lost work time, efficiency, product quality, health and medical costs, workers' 
compensation, etc.  To impose 
liability upon an employer who, by means of work rules, policies, etc. 
undertakes to address the problem of alcohol use and/or abuse is clearly against 
public policy and would encourage employers to abandon all efforts which could 
benefit such employees in order to avoid future liability.

 
 

Premo, 533 N.W.2d  at 333.  The court concluded 
that in "this case, the relationship between [GM] and [the plaintiff] was too 
remote to obligate [GM] to protect her."  Id.; see also Meyers v. Grubaugh, 750 P.2d 1031, 1037 
(Kan. 1988) (State not liable for injuries caused by employee who got 
intoxicated on the jobsite in violation of employer's rules and regulations 
because absent "special circumstances, a private employer owes no duty to a 
third party for tortious acts of an employee who, after consuming alcohol on the 
employer's premises, leaves the employer's premises and while off duty injures 
the third party.")

 
 
[¶18]   These cases form the background as 
we consider the factors set out in Gates to determine whether Caza and Long 
owed a duty of care to Appellants' decedent. 

 
 
[¶19]   The 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.  The question posed by the first 
factor is a determination of whether the harm to the plaintiff was a foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant's actions (or inaction, as the case may be).  Here, the allegation is that the 
defendant assumed a duty to the general public when it adopted a safety policy 
prohibiting the consumption of alcohol by its employees on company property. 
 Thus, the specific question is 
whether or not the harm to the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of Caza's 
knowing failure to enforce its policy.

 
 
[¶20]   The essence of this factor is, for 
all practical purposes, a consideration of proximate cause:4

 
 
Proximate 
cause is explained as "the accident or injury must be the natural and probable 
consequence of the act of negligence."  Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 
735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 1987); followed 
in, Natural Gas Processing Co. v. 
Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1886 (Wyo. 1994); Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993).  The 
ultimate test of proximate cause is foreseeability of injury.  Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 
779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 
414 (Wyo. 
1983).  In order to qualify as a 
legal cause, the conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff's injuries.  Natural Gas Processing Co., 886 P.2d  at 1186; Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 
1178.

 
 

Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1997) (emphasis added).  In considering the concept of proximate 
cause, we have noted not only what constitutes proximate cause but what does 
not:

 
 
In Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 793 
(1921), this court first defined proximate cause as "[t]hat which, in a natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces 
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."  This same definition has been relied upon 
in recent years.  Robertson v. TWP, Inc., Wyo., 656 P.2d 547 (1983); Kopriva v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
Wyo., 592 P.2d 711 (1979).  In Lemos v. Madden, supra, 200 P.  at 794, 
the court also rejected a "but for" rule of causation, 
stating:

 
 
"* * * 
But if the original wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it is 
the remote and not the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there 
would have been no loss or injury but for such condition or occasion. * * 
*"

 
 
In later 
cases our court has identified legal causation as that conduct which is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint. 
 McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983); Chrysler Corporation v. 
Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978); Phelps v. Woodward Construction Co., 
Wyo. 66 Wyo. 33, 33, 204 P.2d 179 (1949).  The obvious rationalization of that 
approach with the two propositions found in Lemos v. Madden. supra, is that if the 
conduct is "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a 
sufficient intervening cause produces the injury, without which the result would 
not have occurred," it must be identified as a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm.  If, however, it 
created only a condition or occasion for the harm to occur then it would be 
regarded as a remote, not a proximate, cause, and would not be a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm.

 
 
An 
alternative method for explaining these concepts is found in the discussions of 
intervening cause in our cases.  McClellan v. Tottenhoff, supra; Koprina v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra; 
Gilliland v. Rhoads, Wyo., 539 P.2d 1221 (1975); Fagan v. Summers, Wyo., 
498 P.2d 1227 (1972); and Tyler v. 
Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (1956).  An intervening cause is one that comes 
into being after a defendant's negligent act has occurred, and if it is not a 
foreseeable event it will insulate the defendant from liability.  It is reasonably foreseeable if it is a 
probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to 
the stimulus of the situation created thereby.

 
 

Buckley 
v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1091-92 (Wyo. 1985). 

 
 
[¶21]   So the question before us now is 
should Caza have foreseen the harm caused to the decedent by its employees? 
 Appellants, of course, argue that 
the harm to the decedent was a foreseeable consequence of the drinking by Caza's 
employees:

 
 
[by 
adopting a no alcohol policy] it is essentially admitted that if drinking were 
allowed at either the mancamp or the rig location, Caza knew that a risk of harm 
to the general public would exist.  The risk of harm to third persons was 
increased in this case by the fact that Hammers, Ditterline, and the other 
workers were working twelve-hour shifts, which ended at 6:30 in the morning, 
when no bars are open.  It was or at 
least should have been even more foreseeable that allowing exhausted young men 
to drink before they had to drive home would create a risk of harm to those on 
the roads the men had to travel.

 
 
The 
argument, however, is not persuasive.  First, there is no evidence that Hammers 
and Ditterline "had to drive home."  Hammers and Ditterline were part of a 
crew assigned to work twelve-hour on/off shifts at a rig site for a one-week 
period.  Although not required to, 
both Hammers and Ditterline were staying at the company provided mancamp.  The mancamp served as the employees' 
place of residence during their stint at the rig and included sleeping quarters 
and provisions of food.  After 
completing the shift on April 15, 2001, the crew retired to the mancamp to eat 
and rest before their next shift began in twelve hours.  While Hammers and Ditterline proceeded to 
consume alcohol upon arrival at the mancamp, there was no "risk of harm to those 
on the roads the men had to travel" because there were no roads they had 
to travel, the expectation being that the crew would use the facilities at the 
mancamp to rest up for the next shift.  Indeed, with the exception of Hammers and 
Ditterline, the crew members proceeded to go to bed after consuming alcohol and 
eating a meal.  The record shows 
that Hammers and Ditterline made a spur-of-the-moment decision to drive away 
from the mancamp.  Hammers and 
Ditterline were under no compulsion to remain at the camp and could do whatever 
they wanted until their next shift began.  They informed no one at the camp of their 
decision.  There is no evidence in 
the record that any other employee of Caza knew or even should have known that 
Hammers and Ditterline were or were not going to be driving anywhere.  There was no evidence that Caza or its 
agents allowed "exhausted young men to drink before they had to drive 
home."

 
 
[¶22]   Under the principles enunciated 
above, the injuries to the decedent were not a foreseeable consequence of Caza's 
actions.  Presuming that Caza was 
negligent for allowing Hammers and Ditterline to consume alcohol on company 
premises, the accident and the consequent injury suffered by the decedent was 
not the "natural and probable consequence of [that] act of negligence" nor a 
"substantial factor in bringing about" the injury.  The decedent's injury was the natural and 
probable consequence of the voluntary decision by Hammers and Ditterline to 
operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated on their own time off company 
premises.  At most, Caza's conduct 
created "only a condition or occasion for the harm to occur" and was only a 
remote, not a proximate or foreseeable, cause.

 
 
[¶23]   The 
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury 
suffered.  As noted above, Caza's actions were 
remote from the injury suffered.

 
 
[¶24]   Degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury.  There is 
no dispute that the decedent suffered injury.

 
 
[¶25]   The 
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct.  "Serious misconduct may increase the 
scope of persons who are entitled to protection afforded by the imposition of 
duty."  Erpelding v. Lisek, 2003 WY 80, ¶25, 71 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 
This 
factor is used to determine whether the defendant is morally culpable before 
imposing liability.  Moral blame 
generally results from situations in which the defendant had direct control over 
establishing and ensuring proper procedures to avoid the harm caused or where 
the defendant is the party best in the position to prevent the 
injury.

 
 

Larsen 
v. Banner Health System, 2003 
WY 167, ¶30, 81 P.3d 196, 205 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 
[¶26]   Whatever the degree of moral blame 
for the accident, the lion's share must rest on Hammers, who elected to operate 
a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and Ditterline, who allowed Hammers to drive 
his vehicle.  Indisputably, Caza 
violated its own safety policy when its agents allowed Hammers and Ditterline to 
consume alcohol on company premises.  That activity, however, was not illegal. 
 When they left the mancamp, Hammers 
and Ditterline were on their own time in a private vehicle.  They did not inform anyone of their 
plans, and there is no evidence that anyone at Caza was aware that they were 
going to be driving.  The degree of 
moral culpability that can be attached to Caza's conduct, if any, is 
slight.

 
 
[¶27]   The 
policy of preventing future harm; the 
extent of the burden on the defendant; and the consequences to the community and 
the court system.  We will 
consider these three factors together, which at their essence are simply an 
examination of the policy reasons for and against adoption of a duty. 

 
 
[¶28]   The law generally recognizes only 
two situations in which an employer is held liable for the negligent acts of his 
employees: when the employee is acting within the scope of his employment 
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 
WY 55, ¶12, 25 P.3d 511, 515 (Wyo. 2001), and when the employee is acting 
outside the scope of his employment but is on the employer's premises or is 
using the chattel of the employer and the employer knows or has reason to know 
that it has the ability and opportunity to control the employee pursuant to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317.5  Appellants seek to expand an employer's 
liability for the negligence of their employees to encompass situations in which 
an employee is acting outside the scope of employment and the coverage of 
Restatement § 317 if the employee has violated a safety policy adopted by the 
employer with the stated purpose of protecting the general public.  Appellants assert that imposing a duty 
would require employers to enforce the policies that they implement and that the 
public would benefit through increased safety.  Appellants contend that no additional 
burden would be placed on the employer to require "reasonable" enforcement of 
its safety policies or on the court system as a 
consequence.

 
 
[¶29]   We, however, think it more likely 
that an imposition of a duty under these circumstances would merely result in an 
employer forgoing adoption of any safety rules to avoid the risk of liability. 
 Premo, 533 N.W.2d  at 333.  If it were even possible, let alone 
practicable, for an employer to monitor and control the conduct of their 
employees when they are off duty and off premises, the costs incurred to do so 
would be significant.  An employer 
would be exposed to liability from an undefined, limitless class of potential 
plaintiffs.  The community would 
suffer because employers would either abandon efforts to create a safer 
workplace to avoid liability or they would have to absorb the costs to protect 
themselves by cutting other expenses.  Imposition of a duty in these 
circumstances would have significant effects on litigation as plaintiffs seek a 
"deep pockets" defendant.  The 
dockets of the trial courts would face an increase in the amount and complexity 
of negligence cases.  Any safety 
benefits derived from enforcing the policy would be lost if the risk of 
liability is greater than the cost of enforcement and employers simply rescind 
or refuse to implement safety policies.  The burden on the employer does not arise 
from requiring it to enforce its safety policies but from requiring it do so for 
the benefit of a limitless class of potential plaintiffs.  Compared to the negative consequences of 
imposing a duty under these circumstances, the benefits of doing so are 
slight.

 
 
[¶30]   The 
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
 There is no evidence in the record 
regarding the availability or cost of insurance but expanding the scope of an 
employer's liability for the negligence of their employees can reasonably be 
presumed to increase the cost of insurance, if available, to 
employers.

 
 
[¶31]   Under the circumstances of this 
case, the Gates factors do not favor 
imposing a duty on the defendant.  We decline to expand the scope of an 
employer's liability for the negligent acts of their employees beyond that 
already established under the law.

 
 
[¶32]   Appellants also urge imposition of 
a duty under § 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  As we have already noted, however, that 
section imposes a duty on an employer for the negligent acts of its employees 
when they are acting outside the scope of their employment only if the employee 
is on the employer's premises or using the chattel of the employee.  Neither situation is applicable to the 
facts of this case, so there was no duty owed under the 
section.

 
 
[¶33]   Finally, Appellants argue that a 
duty was created by the contract Caza had with its employees Long, Hammers, and 
Ditterline.  Appellants' third party 
beneficiary theory is not supported by a cogent analysis with citation to 
appropriate legal authority.  We 
decline to consider it.  Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶20, 88 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   There was no duty owed under the 
circumstances by the defendant employer to the plaintiff's decedent.  The district court's order granting the 
defendant summary judgment is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Hammers and 
Ditterline claimed in their deposition testimony that they had smoked the 
marijuana.  Blood samples drawn 
after the accident, however, did not disclose any evidence of marijuana 
consumption.

 
 

2All 
defendants except Caza and Long have been dismissed from this action by 
stipulation.

 
 

3On appeal, 
Appellants challenge the district court's summary judgment rulings on duty and 
proximate cause.  They also 
challenge a district court discovery ruling that prohibited access to records 
from court-ordered alcohol counseling imposed on Long in another judicial 
proceeding.  Because of our 
determination that there was no duty, we do not need to address the discovery 
issue.

 
 

4Unless the 
evidence is such that reasonable minds could not disagree, proximate cause is 
normally a question for the trier of fact.  Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 52 
(Wyo. 1997). 
 However, the question of duty is 
one of law and for purposes of making that determination only we will consider 
the question.

 
 

5We have not 
adopted § 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Since, as we will note later in this 
opinion, that section is not applicable to the factual situation before us, we 
do not do so in this case.  We 
simply note that imposition of employer liability for employee negligence has 
been recognized under the section.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
J., specially concurring.  

 
 
[¶35]   I write separately simply to 
clarify that this Court has taken into account the appellants' second issue 
regarding whether the Dram Shop Act is applicable to the facts of the instant 
case.  The appellants' argument on 
this issue comes in two parts.  
First, the Dram Shop Act was raised below by the appellees as a defense, 
and the appellants attempt to rebut this possible defense.  Because this Court finds no duty, there 
is no need for a defense, making this part of the appellants' argument 
moot.  Second, the appellants 
attempt to argue that the Dram Shop Act creates a statutory duty.  This argument, however, was never raised 
below.  This Court will not address 
issues raised for the first time on appeal.  Since the arguments presented by the 
appellants regarding the Dram Shop Act lead nowhere, there was no need to 
address the issue in the majority opinion.