Case Title: BOZEMAN PARKING COMMISSION v FIRST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-135

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-135 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 BOZEMAN PARKING COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Respondent, FIRST TRUST CO. OF MONTANA, as Trustee for JEAN M. STIMSON, Trust, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial ~istrict, In and for the County of Gallatin. Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. counsel of Record: For Appellant: Bolinger, Higgins and Andes, Bozeman, Montana Far Respondent: Berg, Morgan, Coil and Stokes, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on briefs: August 13, 1980 Decided: SEP 9 - 1 9 8 4 SEP 9 - 1 9 8 0 Filed: - M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s a n appeal by F i r s t T r u s t Company of Montana, ( F i r s t T r u s t ) , a s t r u s t e e f o r Jean M. Stimson T r u s t from a judgment of condemnation granted t o Bozeman Parking Commission, (Bozeman) , by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Eighteenth J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , G a l l a t i n County, and from a n o r d e r of t h a t c o u r t denying necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n . W e hold t h a t F i r s t T r u s t i s e n t i t l e d t o recover i t s necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n and t h a t t h e judgment of condemnation should stand. Plair~tj ff is a municipal e n t i t y c r e a t e d by t h e C i t y of Bozeman, Montana, and endowed by s t a t u t e w i t h t h e power of eminent domain. S e c t i o n 7-14-462(.2), MCA. F i r s t T r u s t , a s t r u s t e e , i s t h e owner of c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y i n the o r i g i n a l town site which Bozeman seeks t o condemn f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h - ment of a p u b l i c o f f - s t r e e t parking f a c i l i t y . W e w i l l f i r s t t r e a t t h e i s s u e r a i s e d by F i r s t T r u s t t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court should have granted its motion t o d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n e n t i r e l y . A f t e r t h e preliminary condemnation o r d e r was e n t e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, commissioners w e r e appointed t o determine t h e v a l u e of t h e taking. They r e t u r n e d t h e i r r e p o r t on August 21, 1979, determining t h a t F i r s t T r u s t should be p a i d $155,000. The c l e r k of t h e District Court mailed t o t h e a t t o r n e y s of record f o r t h e p a r t i e s a copy of her minutes f o r August 21, 1979, which s t a t e d with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r f i n d i n g s : "The v e r d i c t was given t o t h e Clerk w i t h Orders t o f i l e same, t h e Commissioners w e r e excused by t h e Court and s t a t e d t h a t they would be mailed a check f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e s . " N o n o t i c e of t h e f i l i n g of t h e award, t o g e t h e r w i t h a t r u e copy of t h e commissioners' r e p o r t , was served by t h e c l e r k upon t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e same manner a s a summons a s required by s e c t i o n 70-30-303(1), MCA. Section 70-30-304 (1) , MCA, provides t h a t the time f o r e i t h e r p a r t y t o appeal i s within t h i r t y days a f t e r the s e r v i c e upon the appealing p a r t y of t h e n o t i c e of t h e f i l i n g of t h e award. Since t h e s e r v i c e required by s t a t u t e w a s n o t made i n t h i s case, t h e t r i g g e r i n g i n c i d e n t f o r s t a r t i n g the t i m e running f o r appeal from the commissioners' award never occurred. N o judgment based upon t h e commissioners' r e p o r t had been entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court when, on October 23, 1979, F i r s t T r u s t f i l e d i t s motion t o dismiss t h e a c t i o n i n i t s e n t i r e t y upon t h e contention t h a t F i r s t T r u s t had n o t been paid t h e amount of t h e commissioners' award, and an execution could not be made upon t h e munici- p a l i t y . The D i s t r i c t Court held a hearing on t h e motion t o dismiss and on December 7, 1979, entered i t s findings and conclusions, i n essence deciding t h a t no f i n a l judgment had occurred i n the c a s e because of the f a i l u r e of the D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k t o send a n o t i c e of t h e commissioners' award, together with a t r u e copy of the r e p o r t , upon t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e manner required by s e c t i o n 70-30-303(1), MCA. A s a r e s u l t of t h e hearing, however, t h e n o t i c e of f i l i n g of t h e r e p o r t of t h e commissioners was duly served by t h e D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k on December 11, 1979. Thereafter, no appeal w a s taken within t h i r t y days by e i t h e r party. I t i s t h e contention of F i r s t T r u s t t h a t t h e t h i r t y - day period t o appeal t h e commissioners' v e r d i c t began t o run upon t h e e n t r y of t h e r e p o r t and the a c t u a l n o t i c e thereof t o t h e p a r t i e s on August 2 1 , 1979. The applicable s t a t u t e s , however, are n o t open t o t h a t construction. I t i s t h e duty of t h e D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k , a s w e have s a i d , t o n o t i f y a l l i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s t h a t t h e r e p o r t has been f i l e d by a n o t i c e accompanied by a t r u e copy of the r e p o r t , which must be served upon t h e i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n t h e same manner as a summons. Section 70-30-303(1), MCA. Immediately follow- i n g t h a t s e c t i o n , with r e s p e c t t o an appeal t o the D i s t r i c t Court from t h e commissioners1 assessment, s e c t i o n 70-30-304 (1) , MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ". . . Such appeal must be taken within the period of 30 days a f t e r t h e s e r v i c e upon a ~ ~ e l l a n t of t h e n o t i c e of t h e f i l i n a of -- -- - the award by t h e s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of such appeal upon t h e opposing p a r t y o r h i s a t t o r n e y . . . I 1 (Emphasis added.) The only s t a t u t o r y provision f o r s e r v i c e of t h e com- missioners' award i s t h a t found i n s e c t i o n 70-30-303(1), MCA. Section 70-30-304, MCA, can have no reference t o any nonstatutory method of s e r v i c e , nor even t o a c t u a l know- ledge of t h e p a r t i e s , t h a t t h e comissionersl award has been f i l e d . The s t a t u t o r y purpose of r e q u i r i n g t h e c l e r k t o serve t h e n o t i c e of t h e commissioners1 award i s t o provide a d e f i n i t e l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e t i m e contained i n t h e records of t h e D i s t r i c t Court which marks t h e s t a r t of t h e time f o r appeal. When t h e s t a t u t o r y procedure is properly followed, nothing i s l e f t t o chance a s t o t h e s t a r t of t h e running of t h e t i m e f o r appeal. I f a c t u a l n o t i c e o r nonstatutory s e r v i c e of such n o t i c e i s t o be regarded a s t r i g g e r i n g t h e t i m e f o r appeal, too much is l e f t t o chance and t o the s u b j e c t i v e impressions of t h e p a r t i e s o r t h e i r a t t o r n e y s . I n t h i s case, t h e r e f o r e , t h e time f o r appeal from t h e commissioners1 award d i d n o t begin t o run u n t i l t h e n o t i c e served by t h e c l e r k was proper- l y completed on December 11, 1979. O n t h e d a t e t h a t F i r s t T r u s t moved t o dismiss t h e appeal, October 23, 1979, t h e commissioners' award w a s merely f i l e d and nothing s t a t u t o r - i l y had occurred t o t r i g g e r the running of t h e t i m e f o r appeal. The District Court properly determined t h a t no f i n a l judgment was then pending. There was no l e g a l duty upon Bozeman a t t h a t t i m e t o make payment t o F i r s t Trust. It i s only when a condemnor has f a i l e d t o make payment of a f i n a l judgment t h a t t h e condemnee i s e n t i t l e d t o an order of dismissal of t h e a c t i o n under s e c t i o n 70-30-308(2), MCA. The second i s s u e i s whether F i r s t T r u s t is e n t i t l e d t o t h e necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n which it incurred i n t h i s condemnation case. There i s no d i s p u t e between t h e p a r t i e s t h a t Bozeman made a f i n a l o f f e r t o F i r s t Trust of $110,000 and a condi- t i o n a l short-term o f f e r of $140,000. The eventual award a s w e have s t a t e d was $155,000. O n December 18, 1979, F i r s t T r u s t f i l e d and served i t s motion f o r t a x a t i o n of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e con- demnation l i t i g a t i o n . When t h i s motion was f i l e d , t h e t h i r t y - day time f o r appeal was s t i l l running s i n c e t h e n o t i c e by t h e D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k of t h e r e p o r t of t h e commissioners was served on December 11, 1979. Moreover, no f i n a l judgment o r order of condemnation had been entered. The District Court on January 23, 1980, denied t h e motion f o r t a x a t i o n of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . O n January 2 4 , 1980, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court entered i t s f i n a l order of condemnation i n t h e case. The f i n a l order noted t h a t Bozeman had paid and deposited with the c o u r t c l e r k a l l sums due by reason of the commis- s i o n e r s ' award and t h a t no appeal from t h e assessment of t h e commissioners' had been taken within t h i r t y days. ~ o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment w a s served on the same day by t h e c l e r k . O n January 25, 1980, F i r s t Trust, without renewing i t s motion t o t a x c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s a f t e r t h e e n t r y of f i n a l judgment, f i l e d a w r i t t e n o f f e r of proof of t h e c o s t s which were incurred i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court held a hearing on t h e w r i t t e n o f f e r , and on February 7 , 1980, accepted i n f u l l a s reasonable and necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n t h e items set f o r t h t h e r e i n . The condemnee i s e n t i t l e d t o h i s necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n " i n t h e event of l i t i g a t i o n and when t h e p r i v a t e property owner p r e v a i l s by receiving an award i n excess of t h e f i n a l o f f e r of t h e condemnor." Section 70-30-305(2), MCA. When F i r s t T r u s t f i l e d its motion on October 23, 1979, t o t a x c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s , it was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a judgment on t h e award of t h e commissioners because t h e time f o r appeal had not began t o run on t h e day t h a t t h e motion was f i l e d . The D i s t r i c t Court, t h e r e f o r e , properly denied t h e motion. However, it i s t h e contention of Rozeman t h a t F i r s t T r u s t i s n o t e n t i t l e d i n any event t o a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s . Bozeman reads s e c t i o n 70-30-305, MCA, t o mean t h a t an appeal from t h e commissioners' award must be per- f e c t e d by one of t h e p a r t i e s , and t h e r e a f t e r , within t h i r t y days t h e condemnor must submit t o condemnee a w r i t t e n f i n a l o f f e r of judgment. I f t h e s e events do n o t occur, Bozeman contends t h a t then t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o a t t o r n e y f e e s and expenses of l i t i g a t i o n under s e c t i o n 70-30-305, MCA. I f t h i s contention were accepted, any condemnor could avoid the payment of necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n t o t h e condemnee simply by n o t appealing from a commissioners' award. This cannot be t h e r e s u l t i n l i g h t of t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l provision i n 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, S29, which provides with r e s p e c t t o eminent domain, i n p a r t : ". . . I n t h e event of l i t i g a t i o n , j u s t compensation s h a l l include necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n t o be awarded by t h e c o u r t when the p r i v a t e property owner p r e v a i l s . " The l e g i s l a t u r e , i n adopting s e c t i o n 70-30-305(2), MCA, used nearly the same language a s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provi- sion, providing: " I n t h e event of l i t i g a t i o n and when t h e p r i v a t e property owner p r e v a i l s by receiving an award i n excess of t h e f i n a l o f f e r of t h e condemnor, t h e c o u r t s h a l l award necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n t o t h e condemnee." Under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l clause, t h e r e a r e only two conditions necessary t o e n t i t l e the condemnee t o l i t i g a t i o n expenses. They a r e (1) l i t i g a t i o n , and ( 2 ) t h e p r i v a t e property owner p r e v a i l i n g . The l e g i s l a t u r e simply explained t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i n s e c t i o n 70-30-305(2), MCA, when it provided t h a t t h e p r i v a t e property owner prevailed when he received an award i n excess of t h e f i n a l o f f e r of t h e condemnor. Whether we look a t the s t a t u t e o r t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l provision, no simpler statement of t h e condemnee's r i g h t t o l i t i g a t i o n expenses can be made than: i f he pre- v a i l s i n l i t i g a t i o n , he i s e n t i t l e d t o recover h i s expenses. Those conditions a r e f u l l y m e t here, and i f on remand t h e condemnee moves t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r such necessary l i t i g a t i o n expenses, it w i l l be e n t i t l e d t o those expense amounts already accepted by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e o f f e r of proof. Thus, t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e n t w i l l be served and t h e e v i d e n t l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t a l s o . F i r s t Trust r a i s e s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e claiming t h a t s e c t i o n 70-30-305, MCA, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i f t h e con- demnee's r i g h t t o l i t i g a t i o n expenses was l i m i t e d t o those s i t u a t i o n s where an appeal had been taken from t h e commis- s i o n e r s ' award. I n view of our holding foregoing, t h e r e i s no need t o reach t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e . I n any event, t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e i s n o t r a i s e d properly under Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P. One f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d by F i r s t T r u s t r e q u i r e s d i s - cussion. O n November 1, 1979, Bozeman deposited with t h e c l e r k of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i t s warrant i n t h e amount of $156,860, representing t h e commissioners' award p l u s i n t e r e s t . The warrant was made payable t o F i r s t Trust. F i r s t T r u s t ' s contention i s t h a t t h e warrant was n o t a d e p o s i t of money 17 0 under s e c t i o n 79.-30-308, MCA. A t t h e t i m e Bozeman deposited t h e warrant with t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h e r e w a s no l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n upon it a s a condemnor t o do so. N o f i n a l judgment had been entered, as w e have previously noted, and the only purpose of a d e p o s i t i n t h i s case a t t h a t time would be t o make a v a i l a b l e t o F i r s t T r u s t monies which could be used t o s a t i s f y a f i n a l judgment under s e c t i o n 70-30-308, MCA. F i r s t Trust i s c o r r e c t t h a t s e c t i o n 70-30-308, MCA, r e q u i r e s t h a t money be deposited i n s t e a d of a warrant, b u t here t h a t p o i n t is unimportant, A t t h e time of the d e p o s i t of t h e warrant with t h e D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k , F i r s t T r u s t was n o t e n t i t l e d t o payment because a f i n a l judgment had n o t been entered. There i s no requirement f o r a d e p o s i t of money with t h e D i s t r i c t Court under our s t a t u t e s dealing with eminent domain u n t i l it i s necessary t h a t t h e condemnor make pay- ment of a f i n a l judgment, with one exception. The exception i s when t h e condemnor seeks an i n t e r l o c u t o r y order p u t t i n g t h e condemnor i n possession of t h e condemned lands. When t h a t occurs, t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 70-30-311, MCA, come i n t o play and t h e condemnor must d e p o s i t with the D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e condemnee t h e amount of compensation claimed by him i n h i s answer, o r t h e amount assessed by t h e commis- s i o n e r s o r by t h e jury, as t h e case may be. Here Bozeman had n o t sought an i n t e r l o c u t o r y order p u t t i n g it i n possession of the lands claimed. Therefore, t h e d e p o s i t of a warrant i n s t e a d of money with the c l e r k of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s case d i d n o t cause any prejudice t o F i r s t Trust. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court granting condemnation of t h i s case i s affirmed. The order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court denying necessary l i t i g a t i o n expenses t o t h e condemnee i s a l s o affirmed, b u t t h e cause i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court so t h a t F i r s t Trust may have an opportunity t o move again f o r t a x a t i o n of i t s necessary l i t i g a t i o n expenses before t h e D i s t r i c t Court. See S t a t e v. Helehan, cause no. 80-60, decided August 27, 1979, i n t h i s Court. Costs of appeal s h a l l be borne by each party. This case i s a good example of t h e l e g a l confusion which r e s u l t s when a t t o r n e y s involved i n s p e c i a l proceedings, such a s eminent domain, do n o t c a r e f u l l y follow t h e s t a t u t e s provided. A t every s t a g e of d i f f i c u l t y before the D i s t r i c t Court, the answer l a y i n t h e provisions of t h e s t a t u t e s . Had they been followed, t h e r e had been no need for t h i s appeal. W e concur: J u s t i c e