Case Title: PAUL BEFUMO v. CRAIG A. JOHNSON; BEVERLY TOURVILLE; ROBERT WILKOSKE TRUST; NONA WILKOSKE TRUST, MITCHELL E. OSBORN, Trustee; CLAMP HOLDINGS, INC. v. CRAIG JOHNSON; BEVERLY TOURVILLE; ROBERT WILKOSKE TRUST; NONA WILKOSKE TRUST, MITCHELL E. OSBORN, Trustee and DAVID TREFREN TRUST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
PAUL BEFUMO v. CRAIG A. JOHNSON; BEVERLY TOURVILLE; ROBERT WILKOSKE TRUST; NONA WILKOSKE TRUST, MITCHELL E. OSBORN, Trustee; CLAMP HOLDINGS, INC. v. CRAIG JOHNSON; BEVERLY TOURVILLE; ROBERT WILKOSKE TRUST; NONA WILKOSKE TRUST, MITCHELL E. OSBORN, Trustee and DAVID TREFREN TRUST 2005 WY 114119 P.3d 936Case Number: No. 04-202, 04-203Decided: 09/13/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
PAUL 
BEFUMO,       

Appellant 
(Defendant)          

 
 
v.         

 
 
CRAIG A. 
JOHNSON; BEVERLY TOURVILLE;   

ROBERT 
WILKOSKE TRUST; NONA

WILKOSKE 
TRUST, MITCHELL E. OSBORN, Trustee 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).           

 
 
 
 
CLAMP 
HOLDINGS, INC.   

Appellant 
(Defendant)

 
 
v.         

 
 
CRAIG 
JOHNSON; BEVERLY TOURVILLE;        

ROBERT 
WILKOSKE TRUST; NONA WILKOSKE         

TRUST, 
MITCHELL E. OSBORN, Trustee

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs)

 
 
And

 
 
DAVID 
TREFREN TRUST   

Appellee 
(Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff) .            

 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant Befumo:

            
 Pro se.

            

Representing 
Appellees: Johnson, Tourville, Wilkoske Trusts and Mitchell E. 
Osborn:

Mitchell E. 
Osborn of Grant & Osborn, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellant Clamp Holdings, Inc.:

            
C.M. Aron 
of Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee David Trefren Trust:

            
Don W. 
Riske of Riske & Arnold, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.    

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
DJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Craig Johnson and 
Beverly Tourville were beneficiaries under the Robert Wilkoske and Nona Wilkoske 
trusts (the original trusts).  First 
Estate Management Corp. (FEMCO) was the trustee.  FEMCO's vice-president, Paul Befumo, 
created the RW & NW Trust (new trust), named himself trustee, and 
transferred the trust property to the new trust.  The new trust then sold the trust 
assets, two parcels of real estate, to Clamp Holdings, Inc., (Clamp).  Clamp in turn sold one of the parcels to 
the David Trefren Trust (Trefren). 

 
 

[¶2]      Mr. Johnson, Ms. 
Tourville and the original trusts sought to have the sale of the trust property 
to Clamp set aside. 1  Following a bench trial, the trial court 
entered an order quieting title in Trefren's name to the parcel of trust 
property it purchased from Clamp and awarding Trefren damages for property 
removed from the parcel.  The trial 
court quieted title in the name of the original trusts to the second parcel of 
trust property still held by Clamp.  
The trial court also granted judgment in favor of the original trusts and 
against Mr. Befumo in the amount of $35,000 (the amount he collected in 
attorney's fees from the trusts although he was not a licensed attorney) and 
Clamp for $170,420.32 (the amount it received in payment for the parcel of trust 
property it sold to Trefren). 

 
 
[¶3]      Clamp appealed, 
claiming the trial court abused its discretion in reopening the evidence after 
the original trusts failed to carry their burden, erred in finding Clamp was not 
a bona fide purchaser of one of the parcels and erred in rescinding the sale 
without also ordering restitution of the amount Clamp paid for the 
property.  Mr. Befumo, appearing 
pro se , also appealed claiming the trial court deprived him of his right 
to a fair trial and erred in allowing the claims against him to go forward and 
awarding damages against him.  We 
affirm.    

 
 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Befumo 
presents the following issues for our consideration:

 
 

ISSUE 
1:  Did the district court err in failing to 
dismiss Plaintiff 's claim against Defendant Befumo based on principles of 
res judicata, or, alternatively, collateral 
estoppel?

 
 

ISSUE 
2:  Did the district court deprive Defendant 
Befumo of his right to a fair trial by:

 
 
            
a)  Conducting trial without 
allowing Mr. Befumo time to answer the complaint, in violation of Rule 12; 
and

 
 
            
b)  Denying Mr. Befumo the 
opportunity to conduct any discovery whatsoever, in violation of Rules 26 
through 33?

 
 

ISSUE 
3:  Did the district court err in awarding 
damages that were not requested in the complaint, and which were not supported 
by any evidence?

 
 
Clamp 
presents the following issues:

 
 
1.         
Was it an abuse of discretion to reopen the evidence, sua sponte, 
after finding a failure by plaintiffs to sustain the burden of 
proof?

 
 
2.         
Was it error to conclude that Clamp was not a bona fide purchaser 
on one of two parcels in the same transaction?

 
 
3.         
Was it error to order rescission of a real estate sale without return of 
the consideration paid for the purchase?

 
 
Mr. 
Johnson, et al. restate the issues as follows:

 
 
1.         
Did Appellants comply with the requirements of Rule 3.02 when they failed 
to make provisions for the entire transcript of the proceedings to be included 
in the record on review and not presenting a statement of the issues they 
intended to present in their respective notices of appeal?

 
 
2.         
Is Appellant Befumo barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel 
and res judicata from asserting his claim that the District Court erred 
in denying him "his right to a fair trial"[?]

 
 
3.         
Did the district court err in awarding Plaintiff a judgment for damages 
against Defendant Befumo[?]

 
 
4.         
Did the court close the evidence prior to May 28, 2004 and, if so, was it 
an abuse of discretion to reopen the evidence, sua sponte, pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. Rule 59[?]

 
 
5.         
Was it error for the district court to conclude that Appellant Clamp was 
not a bona fide purchaser[?]

 
 
6.         
Was it error for the district court to order rescission of the real 
estate sale to appellant Clamp[?]

 
 
Trefren 
states the following issues:

 
 
1.         
Whether appellant seeks review by this Court of that judgment on 
crossclaim of defendant Trefren Trust.

 
 
2.         
Whether appellant seeks review by this court of the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order regarding Trefren Trust's bona fide purchaser 
defense and third party complaint.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      This appeal 
involves some of the same parties and facts as Johnson v. Sikorski,  2004 WY 137, 100 P.3d 420 (Wyo. 
2004).  Mr. Johnson and Ms. 
Tourville were beneficiaries of the original trusts .  The trust property consisted of two 
parcels of real estate, referred to as the missile site and the salvage 
yard.  Mr. Befumo, as vice president 
of FEMCO, created a new trust, named himself trustee and  sold both parcels to Clamp.  Clamp then sold the salvage yard to 
Trefren.  After both parcels were 
sold, Mr. Johnson mortgaged the property purchased by Trefren. 

 
 

[¶6]      As reflected in 
Johnson, ¶10, in an order entered by the trial court and affirmed by this 
Court, all conveyances from the original trusts to the new trust were declared 
null and void and Mr. Befumo was relieved of his duties as trustee.  The original trusts, their 
beneficiaries, and Mr. Osborn, the newly appointed trustee of the Robert 
Wilkoske Trust, then filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against FEMCO, 
Mr. Befumo, Trefren, Clamp and Jack Sikorski (Clamp's operations manager and 
vice president 2) seeking 
to set aside the conveyances to Clamp, to quiet title to the trust property in 
the name of the original trusts and money damages.  The original trusts and their 
beneficiaries also filed a motion for temporary restraining order seeking to 
prohibit the removal of assets from the trust property.

 
 

[¶7]      Clamp, Mr. 
Sikorski and Trefren filed answers to the complaint.  Trefren raised the affirmative defense 
that it was a bona fide purchaser for value of the parcel it purchased from 
Clamp.  Trefren also filed a third 
party complaint 3 and a 
counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the property in its name alone.  Additionally, Trefren filed a 
cross-claim against Clamp and Mr. Sikorski for breach of warranty and breach of 
contract.  Clamp then filed a 
counterclaim against Mr. Johnson alleging that he interfered with Clamp's 
negotiations, contract and prospective economic advantage and seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages.  
Clamp also filed a cross-claim against Trefren alleging conversion of 
property and seeking monetary damages.

 
 
[¶8]      After a hearing 
on the original trusts' motion for temporary restraining order, the trial court 
entered an order on March 26, 2004, restraining the parties from removing or 
selling any property from the missile site pending a bench trial scheduled for 
May 10, 2004.   Prior to trial, 
Mr. Befumo, who for reasons that do not appear in the record, was not served 
with the complaint until several months after it was filed, filed a pro 
se motion to dismiss the claims against him, claiming they were barred by 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. 

 
 
[¶9]      Following a 
hearing held prior to trial on May 10, 2004, the trial court denied Mr. Befumo's 
motion to dismiss.  The case 
proceeded to trial and, the following day, the trial court entered findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and an order.  
The trial court found Trefren was a bona fide purchaser for value of the 
salvage yard and the original trust did not own the property at the time Mr. 
Johnson executed the mortgage.  The 
trial court declared the mortgage void  ab initio, quieted title to the 
salvage yard in Trefren and declined to set aside the conveyance from Clamp to 
Trefren.  By separate order, the 
trial court dismissed the cross-claim against Mr. Sikorski, dismissed Trefren's 
breach of warranty claim against Clamp, and awarded Trefren judgment against 
Clamp in the amount of $12,868.25 for breach of contract.  The trial court also entered an order 
setting the remaining matters for further evidentiary hearing on May 28, 
2004.

 
 
[¶10]   Prior to continuation of the 
hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing all claims against Mr. 
Sikorski.  Additional evidence on 
the remaining claims was presented on May 28, 2004.  On June 15, 2004, the trial court 
entered judgment quieting title to the missile site in the name of the original 
trusts and awarding the original trusts $35,000 in attorney's fees from Mr. 
Befumo and $170,420.32 plus costs from Clamp.

 
 
  

DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

Clamp's 
Claims

 
 
 
 
a.         
Reopening the Evidence

 
 
[¶11]   Clamp claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in reopening the evidence sua sponte after finding the 
original trusts had not met their burden of proof at the May 10, 2004, 
trial.  The limited portions of the 
record Clamp designated for our consideration on appeal suggest that, following 
the trial on May 10, 2004, the trial court made some rulings from the 
bench.  The incomplete record 
submitted does not include the portions of the transcript containing the trial 
court's ruling.  Apparently, 
however, the trial court stated it would take judicial notice of its ruling in 
Johnson declaring null and void all conveyances from the original trusts 
to the new trust .  Upon reconvening 
the following day, the trial court had reconsidered its rulings. 

 
 
[¶12]   On May 11, 2004, the trial court 
stated that for the original trusts to be entitled to an order setting aside the 
conveyance from the new trust to Clamp, they had to present evidence that they 
owned the parcels at the time of the conveyance.  Absent evidence in the record showing 
that the conveyance from the original trusts to the new trust was set aside in 
Johnson, the trial court concluded, there was no proof that the original 
trusts owned the parcels and were entitled to the relief they sought.  Additionally, the trial court stated 
there was no evidence that Mr. Osborn, appointed by the court to act as trustee 
for the Robert Wilkoske Trust after Mr. Befumo' s removal, had any authority to 
act for the Nona Wilkoske Trust.  
Without such evidence, the trial court concluded, the original trusts 
failed to meet their burden of proof. 

 
 
[¶13]   The trial court 
stated:

 
 
I have two 
options. I can keep the record open and give you an opportunity to prove all of 
these things, or I can declare a mistrial, have you come back and try it all 
over again. My inclination is to keep the record open until you can prove all of 
these things.

* * 
*

We will, 
therefore, adjourn for the day. I will allow you to have a hearing to try to 
prove [that the conveyance from the Nona Wilkoske Trust was void.] 

 
 
Prior to 
adjourning, the trial court appointed Mr. Osborn as trustee of the Nona Wilkoske 
Trust. 

 
 

[¶14]   On May 25, 2004, the original 
trusts filed a request for the trial court to take judicial notice of its ruling 
in Johnson v. FEMCO. 4  The trial reconvened on May 28, 
2004.  From the limited record 
before us, we know only that the parties presented the transcript of Mr. 
Befumo's testimony from Johnson and additional live testimony from Mr. 
Sikorski.  The trial court 
apparently was persuaded from the additional evidence presented that the 
original trusts met their burden of proving that the conveyance from the 
original trusts to the new trust had been set aside, meaning the original trusts 
owned the trust property at the time the new trust conveyed it to Clamp.  

 
 
[¶15]   In claiming error with regard to 
the trial court's reconsideration of its May 10, 2004, rulings, Clamp asserts 
that the trial court closed the evidence and issued its ruling from the bench 
May 10, 2004, and then re-opened the evidence the following day.  The difficulty with Clamp's assertion is 
that the limited record provided for our review includes only a partial 
transcript of the May 10, 2004, proceedings (the testimony of Mr. Sikorski) and 
does not include the trial court's rulings.  It is not clear from the partial record 
provided that in fact the evidence was closed May 10, 2004, and re-opened May 
11, 2004.  In fact, portions of the 
May 11, 2004, transcript suggest the proceedings were simply left open for 
presentation of further evidence.    

 
 
[¶16]   It is the appellant's burden to 
bring a complete record to this Court.  
Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶10, 109 P.3d 548, 551-52.  Where a proper record is not provided, 
an appeal may be dismissed or review may be limited to those issues not 
requiring inspection of the record.  Id.  Without 
a sufficient record, we must accept the trial court's findings as being the only 
basis for deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence.   Id. In the absence of anything to refute them, we will 
sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the evidence presented 
was sufficient to support those findings.  
Id. 

 
 
[¶17]   The record before us is not 
complete and we would be warranted in sustaining the trial court's rulings on 
that basis alone.  However, it is 
clear from the limited record that the trial court based its decision to allow 
the presentation of additional evidence on W.R.C.P. 59.   Rule 59 is directed at new trials 
and amendments of judgments after entry of judgment.  Although we question the applicability 
of Rule 59 given that no judgment or final order, signed by the trial judge, had 
been entered in the clerk of court's office, we will assume for purposes of 
deciding Clamp's first issue that in fact the evidence was closed on May 10, 
2004, judgment was rendered from the bench and the evidence was re-opened on May 
11, 2004.  By way of analogy, we 
consider the factors relevant to the granting of a new trial after entry of 
judgment.

 
 
[¶18]   W.R.C.P. 59 provides in relevant 
part:

 
 
Rule 59. 
New trials; amendments of judgments.

 
 
(a) 
Grounds.  A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties, and 
on all or part of the issues. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open 
the judgment, if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings 
of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(d) On 
court's initiative; notice; specifying grounds.  No later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court, on its own, may order a new trial for any 
reason that would justify granting one on a party's motion. * * * When granting 
a new trial on its own initiative or for a reason not stated in a motion, the 
court shall specify the grounds in its order.

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)  One of the grounds for 
granting a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) is that the decision is not sustained 
by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law.  A trial court is vested with broad 
discretion when ruling on a motion for new trial, and we will not overturn the 
court's decision except for an abuse of that discretion.  John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 
954 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Wyo. 1998).  The trial court should grant a new tr 
ial whenever in the exercise of sound discretion the judge thinks a new trial is 
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.  Id.  A court does not abuse its discretion 
unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  Goglio v. Star 
Valley Ranch Ass'n, 2002 WY 94, ¶38, 48 P.3d 1072, 1084 (Wyo. 2002).  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  
Id.  An abuse of discretion has been said to 
mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.  Id.  

 
 
[¶19]   Considering these standards 
applicable to granting a new trial after judgment is entered, we conclude from 
the limited record before us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it allowed the parties to present additional evidence on May 28, 2004. The 
trial court apparently had informed the parties on May 10, 2004, that it would 
take judicial notice of its earlier ruling in Johnson, making the 
presentation of evidence of the ruling unnecessary.  Upon further reflection, the trial court 
concluded evidence of the prior ruling properly must appear in the record for it 
to conclude the original trusts met their burden of proof and were entitled to 
judgment.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
decision to reopen the evidence and allow the presentation of additional 
evidence.   

 
 
 
 

Finding 
that Clamp Was Not a 
Bona Fide Purchaser on One of Two Parcels in the Same 
Transaction

 
 
[¶20]   Clamp contends the trial court 
erred in concluding it was not a bona fide purchaser of the missile site.  Rather than claiming insufficient 
evidence was presented to show it was not a bona fide purchaser, Clamp's 
assertion seems to be that the trial court did not make factual findings to 
support the conclusion, such as a finding that Clamp was on notice that the new 
trust from which it purchased the property was invalid and without legal 
authority to convey the property. 

 
 
[¶21]   W.R.C.P. 52 provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
Upon the 
trial of questions of fact by the court . . . it shall not be necessary for the 
court to state its findings, except generally for the plaintiff or the 
defendant, unless one of the parties requests it before the introduction of any 
evidence . . . in which case the court shall state in writing its special 
findings of fact separately from its conclusions of law; provided, that without 
such request the court may make such special findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as it deems proper. . . .

 
 
[¶22]   No contention is made and the 
limited record does not reflect that any of the parties requested the trial 
court to make specific findings of fact.  
Even if such a request was made, in the absence of an adequate record we 
will sustain the trial court's findings, and assume the evidence presented was 
sufficient to support them.  The 
trial court concluded based on the evidence presented that Clamp was not a bona 
fide purchaser. Evidence was presented that Clamp's vice president, Mr. 
Sikorski, had a prior employment relationship with Mr. Befumo, who sold the 
property to Clamp.  Evidence was 
also presented that Mr. Sikorski was also aware of the potential problems that 
existed with the title to the property Clamp was purchasing.  We sustain the trial court's finding and 
assume the evidence presented was sufficient to support 
it.

 
 
[¶23]   Clamp also contends the trial court 
improperly treated as res judicata against Clamp the decision in 
Johnson.  The limited record 
before us shows only that the trial court allowed the original trusts to present 
evidence of the decision in Johnson to show that they owned the trust 
property and the conveyance from the new trust to Clamp was invalid.  The trial court apparently found that 
evidence persuasive in concluding the original trusts owned the trust 
property.  Nothing in the record 
suggests the trial court treated the decision as res judicata against 
Clamp. 

 
 
 
 

Rescission 
of Real 
Estate  Sale Without Return of 
Consideration

 
 
[¶24]   Clamp's final claim is that the 
trial court erred in rescinding the sale without ordering restitution of the 
amount Clamp paid for the property.  
The original trusts and beneficiaries respond that Clamp is not entitled 
to restitution because Clamp had notice that the new trust's title to the 
property was questionable and, even if the new trust held title to the property, 
Clamp was in default on the purchase. 

 
 
"It is the 
general rule that a party seeking to rescind a contract must return the opposite 
party to the position in which he was prior to entering into the contract. 
However, this is not a technical rule, but rather it is equitable and requires 
practicality in readjusting the rights of the parties. The standard used is 
substantial restoration of the status quo.' How this is to be accomplished, or 
indeed whether it can, is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial 
court, under the facts as found to exist by the trier of 
fact."

 
 
This court 
has settled on the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of reasonableness of the choice made by the district 
court.

 
 

Millheiser 
v. Wallace, 2001 WY 
40, ¶¶8-9, 21 P.3d 752, 755 (Wyo. 2001) (citations omitted).  Where a mistake occurs concerning the 
nature of the property intended to be conveyed, we have approved rescission of 
the contract and the return of any monies paid pursuant to said contract in the 
interest of fairness.  Id., 
¶11.

 
 
[¶25]   In this instance, Mr. Befumo agreed 
to transfer title to the missile site to Clamp in exchange for an agreed 
purchase price.  Clamp made payments 
toward the purchase price but Mr. Befumo was unable to transfer the title.  Clamp failed to obtain that which it 
expected to obtain.  The question is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it set aside the sale to 
Clamp and quieted title to the property in the original trusts without ordering 
the return of the monies Clamp paid for the property. 

 
 
[¶26]   This was a complicated case 
involving numerous parties and claims, cross-claims and counterclaims.  Notably absent was any claim by Clamp 
against FEMCO or Mr. Befumo for repayment of the amounts paid toward purchase of 
the missile site.  Although it may 
be that in equity no express claim for restitution is required as between the 
parties to the contract rescinded, it is difficult for us in complex proceedings 
such as these to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
order restitution for Clamp sua sponte after quieting title to the 
property in the original trusts free from any claims of the new trust, FEMCO or 
Mr. Befumo.  Under these 
circumstances, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that for restitution to 
occur, the party claiming a right to it should request it.  So far as this Court is aware from the 
limited record presented, there is nothing preventing Clamp even now from 
seeking reimbursement of the amounts paid for property it did not receive.    

 
 
[¶27]   As we have stated throughout this 
opinion, it is difficult for this Court to conclude an abuse of discretion 
occurred from the limited record before us.  Where the parties fail to submit an 
adequate record, we will sustain the trial court's findings and assume the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support them.  Beeman, ¶10.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's failure to award restitution to Clamp.  

 
 
 
 

Mr. 
Befumo's pro se 
Claims

 
 
 
 

Res 
Judicata or Collateral 
Estoppel

 
 
[¶28]   Mr. Befumo claims that the district 
court erred in failing to dismiss Clamp's claims against him based alternatively 
upon principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel.  Under either principle, Mr. Befumo 
asserts, the claims against him in this case are barred because they were 
litigated previously in Johnson. 

 
 
[¶29]   Four factors must be satisfied in 
order for the doctrine of res judicata to bar consideration of an 
issue:  (1) identity in parties; (2) 
identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the 
subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference 
to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  Dolence v. State, 2005 WY 27, ¶6, 
107 P.3d 176, 178 (Wyo. 2005).  Four 
factors also must be satisfied in determining whether a claim is barred by 
collateral estoppel:  (1) 
whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action;  
(2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the 
merits;  (3) whether the party 
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication;  
and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.  Williams Production 
RMT Co. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 2005 WY 28, ¶141, 107 P.3d 179, 212 (Wyo. 
2005).  Collateral estoppel 
bars relitigation of previously litigated issues.  Id.  Res judicata bars relitigation of 
previously litigated claims or causes of action.  Id.

 
 

[¶30]   In Johnson, the 
beneficiaries and the original trusts filed 
suit 
against FEMCO and Mr. Befumo alleging breach of fiduciary duty.  The trial court found against FEMCO and 
Mr. Befumo, removed them as trustees and declared the transfer of trust assets 
from the original trusts to the new trust null and void.  In the present case, the beneficiaries 
and the original trusts filed suit against FEMCO, Mr. Befumo and other parties 
seeking an order setting aside the conveyance of trust assets by Mr. Befumo to 
Clamp and fees and costs incurred in bringing the action.  The trial court set aside the 
conveyances and ordered Mr. Befumo to pay to the original trusts the $35,000 in 
attorney fees he collected from them.  
Clearly, the two actions involved different parties, causes of action and 
issues.  The trial court correctly 
concluded the claims and issues in the present case were not barred by the 
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 

 
 
 
 
b.         
Denial of Right to Fair Trial          

 
 
[¶31]   Mr. Befumo also claims he was 
denied the right to a fair trial when the district court conducted the trial 
without allowing him time to answer, in violation of W.R.C.P. 12, or conduct 
discovery, in violation of W.R.C.P. 26 through 33.  Other than citing the rules and article 
1, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution and arguing generally that he was the last to 
be served and was required to proceed to trial with no time to prepare, Mr. 
Befumo provides no argument or authority for his 
assertion.

 
 
[¶32]   The record reveals that the 
original trusts and beneficiaries filed their complaint in this matter on 
October 17, 2003.  On February 23, 
2004, they filed a precipe for summons requesting the trial court to issue a 
summons for Mr. Befumo in Montana.  
No affidavit or certificate appears in the record showing when Mr. Befumo 
was served.  However, on March 3, 
2004, Mr. Befumo filed an opposition to the motion for temporary restraining 
order in which he asserted he was served with the complaint on February 27, 
2004, and was not given ten days notice of the March 4, 2004, hearing on the 
motion for temporary restraining order as required by W.R.C.P 6(c)(1).  It is not apparent from the record 
whether Mr. Befumo appeared at the March 4, 2004, hearing.  It is clear, however, that the March 4, 
2004, hearing resulted in the entry of an order temporarily restraining the 
parties from removing items from the trust property until final adjudication of 
the claims. Mr. Befumo did not and does not now allege how entry of the 
temporary order harmed or prejudiced him.  
In its temporary restraining order, the trial court set the case for 
trial on May 10, 2004.

 
 
[¶33]   Thereafter, on March 30, 2004, Mr. 
Befumo served his motion to dismiss, contending as he does on appeal that the 
claims against him were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel.  With 
his motion, he filed a request for hearing by telephone or, in the alternative, 
a ruling from the trial court based upon the parties' written memoranda.  The trial court entered an order setting 
a hearing for May 10, 2004, prior to commencement of trial, and allowing Mr. 
Befumo to appear by telephone. Mr. Befumo does not contend he did not have a 
full opportunity to present argument on his motion at the hearing.  When the trial court denied his motion, 
Mr. Befumo terminated his participation in the proceedings and did not appear at 
the trial even by telephone.  
Because no transcript of the hearing is presented, we do not know why Mr. 
Befumo terminated his participation nor do we know whether he requested a 
continuance of the trial date or took any action to obtain an extension.  No written request for continuance or 
extension of time appears in the record. 

 
 
[¶34]   As discussed previously in this 
decision, the evidence remained open after the May 10 and 11, 2004, trial 
dates.  Although the trial court 
served Mr. Befumo with notice that the trial had not concluded and another day 
of trial was scheduled for May 28, 2004, Mr. Befumo apparently did nothing.  When the original trusts and 
beneficiaries sought to take his trial deposition on May 24, 2004, for purposes 
of the May 28, 2004, trial pursuant to an order of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Missoula County, 
Montana, Mr. Befumo did not show 
up.  He also did not appear at the 
continuation of the trial on May 28, 2004.  
Mr. Befumo did file an answer to the complaint on June 1, 2004, 22 days 
after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss.  His answer reveals nothing about what 
defenses he might have presented at trial other than his claims of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.  Mr. Befumo did not appear for oral 
argument before this Court.  

 
 
[¶35]   W.R.C.P. 12(a)(1) requires the 
defendant to serve an answer within ten days after the denial of a motion to 
dismiss.  Mr. Befumo, therefore, was 
required to serve his answer on May 20, 2004.  Although he failed to do so until May 
27, 2004, the late filing is not the issue before us.  The question we must decide is whether 
by proceeding with the trial on May 10, 2004, before Mr. Befumo filed his answer 
the trial court denied him the right to a fair trial. 

 
 
[¶36]   There is no question that under 
ordinary circumstances it is preferable for litigation to proceed in an orderly 
fashion, from filing of the complaint, to filing of W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions, 
if any, to filing of an answer upon the denial of any such motions, to 
discovery, to trial, to judgment.  
However, the circumstances in this case were far from ordinary.  This was the second of two district 
court proceedings involving some of the same parties and similar issues arising 
out of some of the same facts. Mr. Befumo, who chose to appear pro se 
throughout, was intimately involved in the first proceeding and the evidence and 
issues in that proceeding were substantially related to those in this second 
proceeding.  By the time Mr. Befumo 
was served with the complaint in this case, the parties to the first proceeding, 
including Mr. Befumo, had made their way through the litigation process, 
including discovery, trial and the entry of final judgment, and the case was on 
appeal to this Court.  The issues 
presented in this case were not new or unknown to Mr. Befumo.  Had he chosen to do so, Mr. Befumo 
reasonably could have requested a continuance or remained on the telephone after 
the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the May 10, 2004, 
trial.  Mr. Befumo also could have 
made himself available as he was ordered to do and defended himself at the 
deposition scheduled for May 24, 2004.  
He likewise could have appeared and presented a defense at the 
continuation of trial on May 28, 2004.  

 
 
[¶37]   Instead, except for serving an 
answer on May 27, 2004, and filing an appeal after the trial court entered its 
final judgment, Mr. Befumo chose to terminate his involvement after the denial 
of his motion on May 10, 2004.  In 
presenting his argument to this court, Mr. Befumo does not allege that he 
objected to, sought a continuance of or took any other action to obtain a delay 
of the May 10, 2004, trial date.  
There is no indication he made any efforts to undertake discovery in the 
two and a half months that passed between service of the complaint and the trial 
date nor does the record suggest he sought an extension of time to pursue 
discovery.  He chose not to 
participate in the trial on May 10, 2004, the court ordered deposition on May 
24, 2004, or the trial on May 28, 2004.  
There is no indication Mr. Befumo sought relief from the judgment after 
the trial was concluded and the trial court entered final judgment.  Mr. Befumo also does not indicate what 
evidence he would have presented had he participated in the trial or how the 
result might have been different if he had answered prior to trial.  Under these particular circumstances, we 
conclude the fact that the trial went forth before Mr. Befumo filed his answer 
did not deprive him of a fair trial. 

 
 
 
 
c.         
Award of Damages            
    

 
 
[¶38]   Mr. Befumo claims the district 
court erred in awarding damages that were not requested in the complaint or 
supported by the evidence.  Among 
other relief requested in their complaint, the original trusts requested 
damages, costs and fees associated with bringing the action and such other 
relief as the trial court deemed proper.  
At trial, they presented evidence by way of Mr. Befumo's testimony from 
Johnson that Mr. Befumo collected $35,000 in attorney's fees from the 
original trusts, although he was not licensed to practice law.  We find no error in the trial court's 
award. 

 
 
[¶39]   Affirmed. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 
.In the meantime, the original trust and 
its beneficiaries also filed suit against FEMCO and Mr. Befumo alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty.  The trial court 
found against Mr. Befumo, removed FEMCO and Mr. Befumo as trustees and declared 
the transfer of trust assets from the original trusts to the new trust null and 
void. We affirmed in Johnson v. Sikorski, 2004 WY 137, 100 P.3d 420 (Wyo. 
2004).  

 
 

2 
tMr. Sikorski previously was hired by Mr. 
Befumo as an employee of FEMCO to operate the salvage 
yard.

 
 

 t3 
The third party complaint named Kenneth and Vicki Rhodes as third party 
defendants and alleged that after the sale of the salvage yard to Trefren, Mr. 
Johnson mortgaged the property with the Rhodes 
as mortgagees. In the third party complaint, Trefren sought judgment declaring 
Mr. Johnson had no interest in the property at the time of the mortgage and 
quieting title in Trefren.

 
 

4 
.The trial court ruled from the bench 
in Johnson on September 23, 2003.   The original trust filed its 
complaint for declaratory judgment in the present action on October 17, 2003, 
and the trial court issued its order and judgment on June 15, 2004.  This Court issued its decision affirming 
the trial court's ruling in Johnson on November 10, 2004.