Case Title: Jacobsen v. Wyoming

Citation: 2012 WY 105, 281 P.3d 356

Docket Number: 2012-wy-105

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
JULIE 
ANN JACOBSEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Robert 
W. Southard, Laramie, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey Pope, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Pope.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  A jury found Julie Ann Jacobsen guilty 
of ten felony counts involving forgery and larceny.  She appeals the convictions, claiming 
her trial counsel was ineffective.  
She also asks this Court to allow her to supplement the trial record in 
order to prove her ineffective assistance claim.  We decline Ms. Jacobsen’s request to 
supplement the record and affirm her convictions.  
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]  Ms. Jacobsen presents two issues for 
this Court’s consideration:
 
Issue 
One:  Did defense counsel fail to investigate 
this case, obtain documents and witnesses, including an expert, and therefore 
deny Ms. Jacobsen effective assistance of counsel?
 
Issue 
Two:  Will this court effectively deny Ms. 
Jacobsen the right to due process and a meaningful appeal by denying her the 
opportunity to supplement the trial record in her attempt to prove her appellate 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel?
 
Addressing 
Ms. Jacobsen’s first issue, the State asserts Ms. Jacobsen received effective 
assistance of counsel and, in any event, the evidence against her was so 
overwhelming that she was not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness.  Addressing her second issue, the State 
contends this Court properly denied Ms. Jacobsen’s previous motion requesting a 
partial remand to supplement the record and should not reconsider that 
ruling.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]  The Fox Park Homeowner’s Association and 
Fox Park Improvement District (Fox Park) were created by residents of a mobile 
home park in Gillette, Wyoming, to oversee and maintain common areas and provide 
for utilities and other services within the park, ensure compliance with the 
covenants and collect member dues.  
In 1989, Fox Park contracted with Better Bookkeeping and Accounting, a 
business Ms. Jacobsen operated, to perform bookkeeping and manage its day-to-day 
business operations.   Under 
the terms of the contract, Ms. Jacobsen was to be paid $1,500 a month for her 
services, plus expenses.   

 
[¶4]  In 2003, Fox Park began receiving 
telephone calls from vendors indicating they had not been paid for services they 
had provided.  Fox Park checked its 
bank accounts (an operating account and a money market account) and discovered 
that money had been transferred to a third account about which it knew 
nothing.  Further investigation 
revealed the account had been opened in 1996 and Ms. Jacobsen was a signatory on 
the account.  Review of the account 
statements showed that checks to Fox Park from homeowners had been deposited 
into that account rather than into the Fox Park operating account; money had 
been transferred into the account from Fox Park’s money market account; checks 
from the county treasurer and the State that should have been deposited into the 
money market account had been deposited into the third account; and Ms. Jacobsen 
had written and signed checks totaling over $69,000 on the account to various 
people and entities, including herself, Better Bookkeeping, her husband, her 
daughter and a jeweler.     

 
[¶5]  Fox Park contacted the Campbell County 
Sheriff’s Department which began an investigation.  The investigation revealed that, in 
addition to the creation of a third account in its name, loans for thousands of 
dollars had been obtained under Fox Park’s name with forged signatures and 
without its knowledge or authorization.  
Also, charge accounts had been opened in Fox Park’s name at an auto 
supply store, office supply store and pro shop.  Invoices for charges on the accounts had 
been signed by Ms. Jacobsen’s daughter and her boyfriend and by Ms. Jacobsen’s 
husband.     

 
[¶6]  The State charged Ms. Jacobsen with 
eleven felonies:  five counts of 
forgery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(ii) and (b) (LexisNexis 
2011), four counts of uttering forgery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-602(a)(iii) and (b), one count of larceny by bailee in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) and one count of conspiracy 
to commit larceny by bailee in violation of §§ 6-1-303(a) (LexisNexis 2011), 
6-1-304 (LexisNexis 2011) and 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i).  The State later amended the information 
to charge four rather than five counts of forgery.  The district court convened a jury trial 
and, on the fifth day of trial, the jury found Ms. Jacobsen guilty on each of 
the ten counts.  
 
[¶7]  The district court sentenced Ms. 
Jacobsen to serve six to ten years on each count of forgery, uttering forgery, 
larceny by bailee and conspiracy.  
The district court imposed consecutive sentences on the forgery, larceny 
by bailee and conspiracy convictions and ordered the sentences for uttering 
forgery to run concurrently with the corresponding forgery sentence.  Ms. Jacobsen timely appealed from the 
judgment and sentence.
 
[¶8]  Prior to submitting her brief in this 
Court, Ms. Jacobsen filed a motion pursuant to W.R.A.P. 21 and Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 
1993) requesting a partial remand to the district court for a hearing on her 
claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  In her motion, Ms. Jacobsen claimed 
trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to retain an expert witness, investigate, and seek 
out and prepare witnesses on her behalf.  
This 
Court denied the motion, concluding that Ms. Jacobsen had failed to show, 
“in 
a nonspeculative manner, how a more thorough investigation or the hiring of an 
expert would have helped her in the presentation of her trial defense.”    
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶9]  Ms. Jacobsen claims this Court’s denial 
of her motion for partial remand resulted in the denial of her constitutional 
right to due process. We review constitutional claims de novo.  Tucker v. State, 2009 WY 107, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d 236, 240 (Wyo. 2009).  She also 
claims her trial counsel was ineffective.  
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of 
law and fact; consequently, our review of Ms. Jacobsen’s second claim is also de novo.  Ken v. State, 2011 WY 167, ¶ 27, 267 P.3d 567, 574 (Wyo. 2011).              

 
DISCUSSION
 
1.    
Remand
 
[¶10]  We begin by addressing Ms. Jacobsen’s 
request to supplement the record.  She in essence asks us to reconsider our 
order denying her motion for remand to the district court for a hearing on her 
ineffectiveness claim.  She frames 
the issue as one involving a denial of her right to due process.  We hold as a matter of law that her due 
process right was not impinged and decline to reconsider our ruling on her 
motion for remand.
 
[¶11]  W.R.A.P. 21 provides for a remand to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance 
only if  
 
the 
motion is accompanied by affidavits containing nonspeculative allegations of 
facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel’s representation was deficient and 
prejudiced the appellant.     
 
An 
evidentiary hearing is only appropriate when serious and specific allegations of 
legal ineffectiveness are sufficiently stated and documented to show a real and 
substantial issue.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 27, 100 P.3d 394, 407 (Wyo. 2004), citing Calene, 846 P.2d  at 687, 693.  A substantial issue regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel exists only when serious and specific 
allegations are presented supporting both prongs of the Strickland test for 
ineffectiveness.  

 
[¶12]  In Calene, this Court applied these 
criteria to determine that the defendant’s allegations of ineffectiveness were 
sufficiently serious and specific to show a real issue requiring remand to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing.   Mr. Calene had been convicted of 
several offenses involving a stolen vehicle.  His defense was that he did not know the 
vehicle was stolen.  After his 
conviction, he asserted his trial counsel was ineffective because he had failed 
to investigate four witnesses who would have testified that he did not know the 
vehicle was stolen or provided testimony impeaching the State’s key 
witness.  Mr. Calene specifically 
identified the witnesses and what their testimony would have 
been.
 
[¶13]  In her motion for remand, Ms. Jacobsen 
asserted her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and 
discover documents and witnesses, including an expert, to support her defense 
that she was authorized to take the actions she took.  She further asserted her trial counsel’s 
consumption of alcohol impaired his ability to represent her.  Unlike Mr. Calene, however, Ms. Jacobsen 
did not identify any specific exonerating document or witness that counsel would 
have discovered had he performed a more thorough investigation, hired an expert 
or been unimpaired.  Instead she 
asserted only generally that he failed to adequately investigate and if he had 
investigated he would have discovered somewhere in the fifteen years of 
financial records some witness or document supporting her defense.  Absent the identification of a specific 
witness and the substance of his or her testimony or a document that would have 
shown she had the authority to take the actions she took, Ms. Jacobsen’s 
assertion that counsel’s failure to investigate constituted deficient 
performance and prejudiced her defense amounted to speculation.  She did not, therefore, satisfy the 
requirements of W.R.A.P. 21 and she was not entitled to a remand.  

            
2.         
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 
[¶14]  Ms. Jacobsen maintains her trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to investigate and discover witnesses and/or 
documents supporting her defense that she was authorized to take the actions she 
took.  Her ineffectiveness claim 
fails for the same reason she was not entitled to a remand.  Even assuming her counsel’s 
investigation was deficient, Ms. Jacobsen has not shown that evidence existed 
supporting her defense such that the deficient investigation prejudiced 
her.
 
[¶15]  To prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must first establish that trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  Ken, ¶ 27, 267 P.3d  at 574, citing Sanchez v. State, 2011 WY 77, ¶ 40, 253 P.3d 136, 147 (Wyo. 2011); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).  This requires a showing 
that counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney.  Id.  Assuming a successful showing that 
counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must also show the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  
Id.  That is, a defendant must show a 
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the 
outcome would have been different.  
Id.  In order to prevail on an 
ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must prove both deficient performance and 
prejudice.  The failure to make the 
required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice will result in a 
finding that counsel was not ineffective.  
Id.  
 
[¶16]  The law is well-settled that counsel has 
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that a 
particular investigation is unnecessary.  
Peterson v. State, 2012 WY 17, 
¶ 17, 270 P.3d 648, 654 (Wyo. 2012).  
In order to show that a failure to investigate amounted to ineffective 
assistance, an appellant must identify the favorable evidence or witnesses that 
additional investigation would have revealed. Brock v. State, 2012 WY 13, ¶ 17, 272 P.3d 933, 938 (Wyo. 2012), quoting Asch 
v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶ 40, 62 P.3d 945, 958-59 (Wyo. 
2003).
 
[¶17]   Ms. Jacobsen has failed to 
identify any witness undiscovered by her trial counsel who would have testified 
that Fox Park gave her the authority to take the actions she took.  She also has not identified any document 
that would have shown she had that authority. Although she asserts counsel 
failed to obtain the accounting records she kept for Fox Park, including a 
computer, accounting software and stored data, she does not point to any 
specific document among those records that would have shown she had the 
authority to take the actions she took.  
Instead, she asserts broadly that she had the authority and if trial 
counsel had investigated he would have found somewhere among the fifteen years 
of financial records some document evidencing that authority.  She also asserts that if counsel had 
investigated and discovered fifteen years of cancelled checks signed exclusively 
by her that would have shown her implied authority.  The latter assertion is pure 
speculation.  Absent identification 
of a specific witness or document supporting her defense, Ms. Jacobsen cannot 
show a reasonable probability that but for the inadequate investigation the 
outcome would have been different.        
 
[¶18]  In addition to her own affidavit, Ms. 
Jacobsen submitted the affidavit of a certified public accountant outlining the 
investigation an expert witness should or would have undertaken had defense 
counsel retained one.  Although the 
affidavit details what an expert would have done, it suffers from the same lack 
of specificity as Ms. Jacobsen’s affidavit in that it does not identify any 
witness or document showing that Fox Park authorized her to sign financial 
documents on its behalf or owed the money she paid to herself and others. To 
succeed on her ineffectiveness claim, it is not enough for Ms. Jacobsen to show 
that counsel should have investigated further or hired an expert to do so; she 
must show that but for counsel’s failure to do so a reasonable probability 
exists that the outcome would have been different.  She cannot make that showing without 
identifying evidence that had a reasonable probability of causing the jury to 
believe the actions she took were authorized.  She has identified no such 
evidence.  Ms. Jacobsen has failed 
to satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness test; consequently, we 
need not address the question of whether counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 43, 
275 P.3d 377, 395 (Wyo. 2012), quoting Floyd v. State, 2006 WY 135, ¶ 13, 144 P.3d 1233, 1238 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶19]  Affirmed.