Case Title: State v. Tourville

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP001251-CR, 2014AP001250-CR, 2014AP001249-CR, 2014AP001248-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1248-CR, 2014AP1249-CR, 2014AP1250-CR, 
2014AP1251-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Patrick K. Tourville, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 363 Wis. 2d 656, 862 N.W.2d 903) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 15, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 15, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Polk 
 
JUDGE: 
Molly E. GaleWyrick 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by John A. Pray and the Frank J. Remington Center, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by John A. Pray.  
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
Nos.    2014AP1248-CR, 2014AP1249-CR, 2014AP1250-CR,  
        2014AP1251-CR 
(L.C. Nos. 2012CF27, 2011CF293, 2011CF376, 2013CF107) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Patrick K. Tourville,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
MAR 15, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. 
Petitioner, Patrick Tourville 
("Tourville"), seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision denying his motion for post-conviction relief.1  He 
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object after the State allegedly breached the plea agreement by 
recommending consecutive sentences.  Additionally, Tourville 
                                                 
1 State v. Tourville, Nos. 2014AP1248-CR, 2014AP1249-CR, 
2014AP1250-CR, 2014AP1251-CR, unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. 
App. March 31, 2015) (affirming judgment and order entered by 
the 
circuit 
for 
Polk 
County, 
Molly 
E. 
GaleWyrick, 
J., 
presiding). 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
2 
 
contends that there was an insufficient factual basis for the 
court to accept his guilty plea to the charge of party to the 
crime of felony theft.  
¶2 
Like the circuit court and court of appeals, we 
conclude that Tourville's trial counsel was not ineffective.  
Given that the State did not breach the plea agreement by 
arguing for consecutive sentences, Tourville fails to establish 
the 
deficient 
performance 
necessary 
for 
an 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.   
¶3 
We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination was not clearly erroneous.  There was a sufficient 
factual basis to accept Tourville's guilty plea to the charge of 
party to the crime of felony theft.  He willingly aided others 
who engaged in felony theft by taking them to his campsite, 
helping them open the safe, and disposing of the ill-gotten 
property.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.    
I. 
¶4 
The underlying facts in this case are taken from the 
amended criminal complaint in case no. 2012CF27.  The State 
charged Tourville with seventeen criminal counts in four 
separate, unrelated cases: 
 
Case No. 2011CF293:  Operating a motor vehicle 
without the owner's consent, misdemeanor theft, and 
obstructing an officer, with all counts charged as a 
repeater. 
Case No. 2011CF376:  Burglary while arming himself 
with a dangerous weapon, two counts of theft of a 
firearm, misdemeanor theft, felony bail jumping, and 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
3 
 
possession of a firearm by a felon, with all counts 
charged as a repeater. 
Case No. 2012CF27:  Party to the crime of felony 
theft, possession of a firearm by a felon, with both 
counts charged as a repeater. 
Case 
No. 
2013CF107: 
 
Possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia 
and 
five 
counts 
of 
felony 
bail 
jumping, with all counts charged as a repeater.     
¶5 
All charges from these four cases were incorporated 
into a single plea agreement.  Tourville agreed to plead guilty 
or no-contest to felony theft as a party to a crime, felony bail 
jumping, burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon and 
misdemeanor theft, all as a repeater.  The State agreed to 
dismiss and read in the remaining counts. 
¶6 
The circuit court received a plea questionnaire/waiver 
of rights form for each of the four cases.  In three cases, a 
signed addendum was attached to the form that set forth the 
terms of the plea agreement.2  Only Tourville signed the 
addendum.  Terms of the plea agreement stated in the signed 
addendum included:  "The joint sentencing recommendation is to 
                                                 
2 There was no addendum setting forth the terms of the plea 
agreement attached to Case No. 2013CF107.  However, all charges 
from the four criminal cases were incorporated into a single 
plea agreement and there is no argument advanced that the plea 
does not apply to Case No. 2013CF107.  The four cases were also 
consolidated for appeal. 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
4 
 
order a presentence investigation; the state will cap its 
recommendation at the high end of what the PSI orders."3 
¶7 
A Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") was filed 
with the court.  It suggested a range of initial confinement 
("IC") and extended supervision ("ES") for each charge, but made 
no recommendation regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences.  
The PSI recommended: 
Case No. 2011CF293:  16-18 months IC, 6 months 
ES 
Case No. 2011CF376:  4-6 years IC, 3-4 years ES 
Case No. 2012CF27:  16-18 months IC, 6 months ES 
Case No. 2013CF107:  1-2 years IC, 2 years ES 
The circuit court asked Tourville's trial counsel if there were 
any errors or omissions in the PSI's recommendations that needed 
to be clarified.  He responded that there were no errors or 
omissions in the PSI. 
¶8 
During sentencing, the prosecutor argued for the 
maximum in the PSI's ranges of sentencing recommendations.  He 
sought the following:   
Case No. 2011CF293:  18 months IC, 6 months ES 
Case No. 2011CF376:  6 years IC, 4 years ES 
                                                 
3 The State argues in the alternative that it did not agree 
to limit its sentencing recommendation to the "high end" of the 
PSI recommendation and requests the case be remanded for factual 
findings regarding the terms of the plea agreement if we 
determine the agreement was breached.  We need not address this 
argument because we determine that the State did not breach the 
terms of the plea agreement. 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
5 
 
Case No. 2012CF27:  18 months IC, 6 months ES 
Case No. 2013CF107:  2 years IC, 2 years ES 
The prosecutor also recommended that the circuit court impose 
consecutive sentences in all four cases, despite the fact that 
the PSI was silent on this issue.   
¶9 
Tourville's trial counsel did not object when the 
State recommended consecutive sentences.  At the post-conviction 
motion hearing, he testified that there was no strategic reason 
for 
failing 
to 
object 
to 
the 
State's 
recommendation 
of 
consecutive sentences.  Rather, he candidly stated that it 
"slipped my mind to object." 
¶10 One of the charges to which Tourville pled guilty was 
felony theft as a party to the crime pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.20(1)(a), (3)(d), and 939.05.4  Several men, not including 
Tourville, stole a gun safe containing firearms and other tools.  
The men called Tourville, advised him that they had a safe and 
needed both a place to take it and help to break it open.  They 
picked Tourville up at his residence and then went to 
Tourville's campsite at a resort.  After they all participated 
in opening the safe, Tourville advised the other men where to 
dispose of it.  Ultimately, they disposed of the safe in a 
swamp, along the side of the road.  The men drove Tourville 
home, dropped him off and later paid Tourville in cash for his 
assistance.    
                                                 
4 All subsequent reference to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 Although Tourville did not participate in the planning 
or initial execution of the theft, the criminal complaint 
alleged Tourville "took and carried away" property as a party to 
the crime.  The probable cause portion of the complaint sets 
forth the factual basis for the charge.   
¶12 At the plea hearing, the circuit court questioned 
Tourville regarding the factual basis for the charge of party to 
the crime of felony theft.  Tourville stated that he did not 
take part in the burglary, but gave the other men who did commit 
the burglary a place to go to open the safe: 
The Court:  On your plea you understand——by your plea 
you're acknowledging that on or about August 27, 2010 
in this county with others you took and carried away 
moveable property belonging to another, specifically 
firearms belonging to a Kevin Beyl without his consent 
and with intent to keep them? 
Mr. Miller:  Do you understand those elements? 
The Defendant:  Intent, I never did the burglary.  I 
gave him a place to—— 
Mr. Steffen:  Says party to the crime. 
The Court:  That's as a party to the crime. 
The Defendant:  Yeah.  Guilty.  I understand. 
¶13 In an effort to clarify the record, the circuit court 
again questioned Tourville regarding whether he understood the 
factual basis for the charge of party to the crime of felony 
theft.  He again responded that he gave the other men a place to 
open the safe:  
The Court:  All right.  Finally in 13CF107——let's go 
back to that so we make certain that the facts meet 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
7 
 
the elements of the crime.  Mr. Miller, why don't you 
articulate, you just both said it on the record and I 
think Mr. Tourville did as well, but the facts that 
meet the elements of the crime. 
Mr. Steffen:  Judge, let me just say quickly that Mr. 
Tourville's statement was I didn't do the burglary and 
he's charged with a theft as a party to the crime.  As 
part of the theft it would be our——the allegations 
that 
after 
the 
burglary 
took 
place 
and 
these 
individuals were looking for a way to store or stash 
the guns that were taken as a result of the burglary 
. . . .  It was listed out in the probable cause 
statement as well. 
The Defendant:  I didn't give them nothing. 
Mr. Miller:  You were around them, you watched them, 
you were aiding and abetting them. 
The Defendant:  I gave them a place to do it.  I 
didn't give them no materials or I didn't hide 
nothing. 
The Court:  You gave them a place—— 
The Defendant:  To cut open, yeah. 
The Court:  Material that was—— 
The Defendant:  I didn't give them no material. 
The 
Court: 
 
No. 
No. 
No. 
You 
gave 
them 
the 
surroundings, the place to hopefully gain access to 
the safe. 
The defendant:  Yeah. 
The Court:  Right. 
The defendant:  Yeah. 
The Court:  And everybody agrees that that meets the 
elements of the crime. 
Mr. Steffen:  Yes. 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
8 
 
¶14 The circuit court accepted Tourville's plea and 
sentenced him to consecutive prison sentences totaling 26 years.5  
Tourville filed a post-conviction motion raising the same issues 
that are now before this court.  The court denied Tourville's 
motion and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
judgment and order. 
II. 
¶15 In this case we are asked to address issues involving 
ineffective assistance of counsel, breach of a plea agreement, 
and if there is a factual basis to support a guilty plea. 
¶16 Whether 
counsel's 
actions 
constitute 
ineffective 
assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. 
Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786.  
Findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  The ultimate conclusion of whether counsel's 
conduct breached the defendant's right to effective assistance 
of counsel presents a question of law.  Id.   
¶17 The issue of whether the State breached the plea 
agreement by arguing for consecutive sentences also presents a 
question of law.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶4, 249 Wis. 2d 
492, 637 N.W.2d 733.  This court reviews questions of law 
independently from the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Id.   
                                                 
5 Tourville's sentence included 14.5 years of initial 
confinement plus 11.5 years of extended supervision. 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
9 
 
¶18 We review, under the clearly erroneous standard, the 
issue of whether a factual basis exists for a charge to which 
the defendant has entered a plea.  "Unless it was clearly 
erroneous, we will uphold the circuit court's determination that 
there existed a sufficient factual basis to accept the plea."  
State v. Sutton, 2006 WI App 118, ¶8, 294 Wis. 2d 330, 718 
N.W.2d 146.  
III. 
¶19 We address first Tourville's argument that his trial 
counsel was ineffective because he failed to object when the 
State recommended consecutive sentences.  Under Strickland v. 
Washington, Tourville must establish that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result 
of that deficient performance.  466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984).   
¶20 Therefore, 
the 
threshold 
inquiry 
for 
Tourville's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the State's 
actions constituted a breach of the plea agreement.  If the 
State did not breach the plea agreement, then the failure of 
Tourville's counsel to object did not constitute deficient 
performance.  See, e.g., State v. Naydihor, 2004 WI 43, ¶9, 270 
Wis. 2d 585, 678 N.W.2d 220.   
¶21 Tourville 
has 
a 
constitutional 
right 
to 
the 
enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement.  Williams, 249 Wis. 
2d 492, ¶37.  An agreement by the State to recommend a 
particular sentence may induce an accused to give up the 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  Id.  "[O]nce an accused 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
10 
 
agrees to plead guilty in reliance upon a prosecutor's promise 
to perform a future act, the accused's due process rights demand 
fulfillment of the bargain."  Id. 
¶22 As the court of appeals explained in State v. Bowers, 
the issue of concurrent and consecutive sentences is "extremely 
important" to a guilty plea.  2005 WI App 72, ¶16, 280 Wis. 2d 
534, 696 N.W.2d 255 (quoting State v. Howard, 2001 WI App 137, 
¶18, 246 Wis. 2d 475, 630 N.W.2d 244).  "The designation of 
concurrent or consecutive time can affect the actual amount of 
time served, the application of pre-sentence credit, parole 
eligibility dates, the date a defendant is allowed to access 
rehabilitative services, and other factors."  Howard, 246 Wis. 
2d at ¶18.  "A recommendation of concurrent sentences can also 
send a signal to the trial court that the agreement contemplates 
a lesser sentence than one where consecutive sentences are 
recommended."  Id.    
¶23 The court of appeals observed that a defendant is not 
entitled to relief when the breach is merely a technical one 
rather than a substantial and material breach of the agreement.  
Id., ¶15.  "A material and substantial breach is a violation of 
the terms of the agreement that defeats the benefit for which 
the accused bargained."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶38.   
¶24 When a plea agreement "undisputedly indicates that a 
recommendation is to be for concurrent sentences, an undisputed 
recommendation of consecutive sentences that is not corrected at 
the sentencing hearing constitutes a material and substantial 
breach of the plea agreement as a matter of law."  Howard, 246 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 457, ¶19.  The remedy for a breach that is material and 
substantial is either to vacate the plea agreement or resentence 
the defendant under the terms of the original plea agreement.6  
Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶38; see also State v. Smith, 207 
Wis. 2d 258, 268, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997). 
¶25 Interpretation of a plea agreement is rooted in 
contract law.  Bowers, 280 Wis. 2d 534, ¶16 (citing  State v. 
Deilke, 2004 WI 104, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945).  
"Contract law demands that each party should receive the benefit 
of its bargain; no party is obligated to provide more than is 
specified in the agreement itself."  Id. (citations omitted).  
"While the government must be held to the promises it made, it 
will not be bound to those it did not make.  To do otherwise is 
to strip the bargaining process itself of meaning and content."  
Id. (quoting United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464-65 
(4th Cir.1986)). 
¶26 In this case, the plea agreement was silent as to 
whether 
Tourville's 
sentences 
would 
be 
concurrent 
or 
consecutive.  The plea agreement stated:  "The joint sentencing 
recommendation is to order a presentence investigation; the 
state will cap its recommendation at the high end of what the 
PSI orders."  Tourville's signed plea questionnaire/waiver of 
rights form also stated:  "[n]o promises have been made to me 
other than those contained in the plea agreement." 
                                                 
6 Tourville requests resentencing, rather than withdrawal of 
the guilty plea. 
 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 The PSI recommended a range of initial confinement and 
extended supervision for each charge, but made no recommendation 
for either concurrent or consecutive sentences.  It recommended: 
Case No. 2011CF293:  16-18 months IC, 6 months 
ES 
Case No. 2011CF376:  4-6 years IC, 3-4 years ES 
Case No. 2012CF27:  16-18 months IC, 6 months ES 
Case No. 2013CF107:  1-2 years IC, 2 years ES 
During sentencing, the prosecutor argued for the PSI's maximum 
sentencing recommendations.  He also recommended that the 
circuit court impose consecutive sentences in all four cases, 
despite the fact that the PSI was silent on this issue.    
¶28 Tourville argues that by recommending consecutive 
sentences, the State breached the plea agreement.  He contends 
that because the PSI made no recommendation regarding whether 
the sentences were to be served consecutively or concurrently, 
the State's recommendation went beyond the "high end" of the 
PSI.  If this court finds that the State breached the plea 
agreement, Tourville asserts his trial counsel was ineffective 
by failing to object to the prosecutor's recommendation for 
consecutive sentences. 
¶29 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals relied 
on Bowers, 280 Wis. 3d 534, in denying Tourville's motion for 
post-conviction relief.  In Bowers, the defendant argued that 
because the plea agreement was silent on the question of whether 
his sentence should run concurrently or consecutively with the 
sentence he was already serving, the State breached the plea 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
13 
 
agreement by recommending a consecutive sentence.  280 Wis. 2d 
534, ¶14.  The Bowers court explained that "in the absence of 
any indication that the parties expected the State to either 
remain 
silent 
or 
recommend 
concurrent 
sentences, 
we 
are 
reluctant to engraft these conditions into a fully integrated 
plea agreement."  Id., ¶16.    
¶30 Tourville advances that Bowers should be distinguished 
because:  (1) the State's sentence recommendation involved four 
charges here, rather than only one in Bowers; and (2) the 
language 
of 
Tourville's 
plea 
agreement 
is 
significantly 
different from Bowers' plea agreement. In the alternative, 
Tourville argues that even if Bowers does apply, this court 
should overrule Bowers because it was wrongly decided.  We 
disagree. 
¶31 First, we do not agree that the facts of this case are 
distinguishable from Bowers.  Whether a sentence recommendation 
involves four charges or one charge in addition to a sentence 
already being served, a recommendation of consecutive sentences 
has the same effect on the defendant.  In both cases, the length 
of 
time 
the 
defendant 
will 
serve 
is 
increased 
by 
a 
recommendation that the sentences be served consecutively.  Both 
defendants could have, but did not, negotiate for an agreement 
that the State recommend the sentences be served concurrently.   
¶32 We are also not persuaded by Tourville's argument that 
the language of the plea agreement warrants a different outcome 
in this case than in Bowers.  Here, the signed addendum stated:  
"The joint sentencing recommendation is to order a presentence 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
14 
 
investigation; the state will cap its recommendation at the high 
end of what the PSI orders."  In Bowers, the terms of the plea 
agreement were:  "State to recommend 2 yrs. Initial confinement; 
3 years extended supervision."  280 Wis. 2d 534, ¶2. 
¶33 Regardless of any differences in the language of the 
plea agreements, the tenets of contract interpretation set forth 
in Bowers apply with equal force here.  The key issue is whether 
the plea agreement contains language regarding concurrent or 
consecutive sentences.  Both the plea agreement and the PSI in 
this case, as well as the plea agreement in Bowers, were silent 
as to whether the sentences would be concurrent or consecutive.  
If the recommendation for concurrent sentences was not bargained 
for and is not contained within the terms of the plea agreement, 
we will not engraft those terms into the agreement. 
¶34 We also do not agree that Bowers was wrongly decided 
and ought to be overruled.  The Bowers court analyzed and was 
guided by case law from both Wisconsin and other jurisdictions 
in reaching its determination.   
¶35 Central to its analysis was the premise that in the 
absence of a provision in a plea agreement regarding sentencing, 
courts will not find a breach of the plea agreement when the 
State recommends consecutive sentences.  See id., ¶19 (citing 
Fentress, 792 F.2d at 464-65 (holding that the prosecution did 
not breach a plea agreement by asking the court to order 
restitution and consecutive sentences, where the agreement did 
not mention either restitution or consecutive sentences and the 
government otherwise kept its promises on the proposed length of 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
15 
 
imprisonment); White v. United States, 308 F.3d 927, 929 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (concluding that the government did not breach a plea 
agreement by recommending that the defendant's new sentence 
should run consecutive to his probation revocation sentence 
because the plea agreement contained no provision for the 
sentences to be served concurrently); Doles v. State, 55 P.3d 
29, 34 (Wyo. 2002) (determining that because there was no 
agreement that the sentence was to be concurrent, and the terms 
of the agreement did not establish that the prosecutor was 
required to refrain from asking for a consecutive sentence, it 
was permissible for the prosecutor to argue for a consecutive 
sentence).     
¶36 We agree with the Bowers court that the reasoning in 
State v. Zanelli, 212 Wis. 2d 358, 367, 569 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 
1997), is applicable to a plea agreement that is silent as to 
the issue of concurrent or consecutive sentences.  In Zanelli, 
212 Wis. 2d at 367, the court of appeals explained that because 
the plea agreement was silent regarding a future ch. 980 
proceeding, the record did not reflect that the defendant had 
bargained for the State's promise to forego a ch. 980 
proceeding.  The Zanelli court concluded that there was no 
breach of the plea agreement.  Id. at 368.  Similarly, when a 
plea agreement is silent regarding concurrent or consecutive 
sentences, the defendant has not bargained for the State's 
promise to refrain from recommending the sentences be served 
consecutively.   
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
16 
 
¶37 In sum, we agree with both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals that Bowers controls the outcome of this case.  
We likewise conclude that because the State did not breach the 
plea 
agreement 
when 
it 
recommended 
that 
Tourville 
serve 
consecutive 
sentences, 
Tourville 
has 
failed 
to 
establish 
deficient performance by his trial counsel.  Accordingly, 
Tourville's trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to 
object to the State's sentencing recommendations. 
IV. 
¶38 We address next Tourville's argument that there was an 
insufficient factual basis for the circuit court to accept his 
guilty plea as a party to the crime of felony theft.  Although 
Tourville did not participate in the planning or initial 
execution of the theft, the complaint alleged Tourville "took 
and carried away" property as a party to the crime.  Tourville 
argues that there is an insufficient factual basis for the plea 
because he did not "take and carry away" property of another.   
¶39 "[A] post-sentencing motion for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea should only be granted when necessary to correct a manifest 
injustice."  State v. Johnson, 200 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 548 N.W.2d 
91 (Ct. App. 1996).  The circuit court's failure to establish a 
sufficient factual basis that the defendant committed the 
offense to which he pleads is manifest injustice.  State v. 
Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996) (citing White 
v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 488, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978).   
¶40 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b), a circuit court 
must "make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
17 
 
fact committed the crime charged" before accepting a defendant's 
guilty plea.  A sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea 
requires a showing that "the conduct which the defendant admits 
constitutes the offense charged."  State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 
74, ¶33, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (quoting White, 85 Wis. 
2d at 488).   
¶41 The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 are 
"designed to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary."  Id., ¶34 (quoting State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906).  "A 
defendant's failure to realize that the conduct to which she 
pleads guilty does not fall within the offense charged is 
incompatible with that plea being 'knowing' and 'intelligent.'"  
Id., ¶35. 
¶42 The elements of felony theft are stated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.20: 
(1) 
ACTS.  Whoever does any of the following may be 
penalized as provided in sub. (3): 
(a) 
Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, 
transfers, conceals, or retains possession 
of moveable property of another without the 
other's consent and with intent to deprive 
the owner permanently of possession of such 
property. 
¶43 The State must plead one of the elements of theft in 
the criminal complaint.  Jackson v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 284 
N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1979).  However, the State may not charge 
the 
defendant 
in 
the 
disjunctive 
by 
alleging 
multiple 
alternative elements of theft.  Id.  Here, the criminal 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
18 
 
complaint alleged the element that Tourville "took and carried 
away" the property of another. 
¶44 Tourville was charged as a party to the crime of 
felony theft.  Wis. Stat. § 939.05 sets forth the elements of 
the charge of party to a crime: 
(1) 
Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime 
is a principal and may be charged with and 
convicted of the commission of the crime although 
the person did not directly commit it and 
although the person who directly committed it has 
not been convicted or has been convicted of some 
other degree of the crime or of some other crime 
based on the same act. 
(2) 
A person is concerned in the commission of the 
crime if the person: 
(a) 
Directly commits the crime; or 
(b) 
Intentionally aids and abets the commission 
of it; or 
(c) 
Is a party to a conspiracy with another to 
commit it or advises, hires, counsels or 
otherwise procures another to commit it. 
¶45 In this case, three men, not including Tourville, 
stole a gun safe containing firearms and other tools.  The men 
called Tourville, advised him that they had a safe and needed 
both a place to take it and help to break it open.  They picked 
Tourville up at his residence and then went to Tourville's 
campsite at a resort.  After they all participated in opening 
the safe, Tourville advised the other men where to dispose of 
it.  Ultimately, they disposed of the safe in a swamp, along the 
side of the road.  The men drove Tourville home and dropped him 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
19 
 
off.  They subsequently paid Tourville in cash for his 
assistance.   
¶46 At the plea hearing, the circuit court questioned 
Tourville as to whether he understood the elements of the crime 
to which he was pleading guilty.  Tourville insisted that he did 
not commit the burglary, but only gave the thieves a place to 
go.   
¶47 In an effort to clarify the record, the circuit court 
again questioned Tourville regarding whether he understood the 
factual basis for the charge of party to the crime of felony 
theft.  He again responded that he gave the other men a place to 
open the safe:  
The Defendant:  I gave them a place to do it.  I 
didn't give them no materials or I didn't hide 
nothing. 
The Court:  You gave them a place—— 
The Defendant:  To cut open, yeah. 
The Court:  Material that was—— 
The Defendant:  I didn't give them no material. 
The 
court: 
 
No. 
No. 
No. 
You 
gave 
them 
the 
surroundings, the place to hopefully gain access to 
the safe. 
The defendant:  Yeah. 
The Court:  Right. 
The defendant:  Yeah. 
¶48 Tourville argues that at the plea hearing, no facts 
were presented that he took or carried away property.  His 
contention is that the only facts alleged at the hearing were 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
20 
 
that he helped open the safe and provided a means to hide the 
property.  Thus, Tourville contends that there was no factual 
basis for the plea because felony theft involves the "taking and 
carrying away" of property.  See Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a).  
¶49 In order to aid and abet a crime, the defendant need 
be only a willing participant.  State v. Marshall, 92 Wis. 2d 
101, 122, 284 N.W.2d 592 (1979).  "Such participation as would 
constitute aiding and abetting does not even require that the 
defendant be present during the [crime]."  Id.  "One need not 
perform an act which would constitute an essential element of 
the crime in order to aid and abet that crime.  It is only 
necessary that he undertake some conduct (either verbal or 
overt), which as a matter of objective fact aids another person 
in the execution of a crime, and that he consciously desire or 
intend that his conduct will in fact yield such assistance."  
Id. 
¶50 As the court of appeals explained, "asportation... is 
a transaction which continues beyond the point in time when the 
property of another is taken."  State v. Tourville, Nos. 
2014AP1248-CR, 
2014AP1251-CR, 
2014AP1249-CR, 
2014AP1250-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶8 (Wis. Ct. App. March 31, 2015) (citing 
State v. Grady, 93 Wis.2d 1, 6, 286 N.W.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1979)).  
“With regard to the crime of larceny in particular, it is 
generally held that one may be guilty of larceny as a principal 
where the crime was incomplete until he contributed his aid in 
the asportation or taking possession of and removal of stolen 
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
21 
 
property.” Grady, 93 Wis.2d at 6 (citing Hawpetoss v. State, 52 
Wis.2d 71, 78, 187 N.W.2d 823 (1971)). 
¶51 We recognize that Tourville was not charged directly 
with committing felony theft.  Rather, he was charged as a party 
to the crime of felony theft because he willingly aided the 
other thieves in their continued efforts to carry away the safe 
and the guns.  Tourville aided the other thieves when he took 
them to his campsite, helped open the safe, and assisted in the 
disposal of the safe along the side of the road in a swamp.  
Indeed, he was even subsequently paid for his services.  These 
facts provide a sufficient basis for Tourville's guilty plea to 
the charge of party to the crime of felony theft.  
¶52 In sum, we conclude that Tourville's trial counsel was 
not ineffective. Because the State did not breach the plea 
agreement by arguing for consecutive sentences, Tourville fails 
to 
establish 
the 
deficient 
performance 
necessary 
for 
an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.   
¶53 We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination was not clearly erroneous.  There was a sufficient 
factual basis to accept Tourville's guilty plea to the charge of 
party to the crime of felony theft.  He willingly aided others 
who engaged in felony theft by taking them to his campsite, 
helping them open the safe, and disposing of the property.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.    
By the Court. – The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR   
 
 
 
1