Case Title: State v. Ciancanelli

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49707

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  September 29, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CHARLES ROBERT CIANCANELLI,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 98CR2685FE; CA A108122; SC S49707)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 3, 2003.
Robin A. Jones, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With
her on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Oregon Public Defense Services.
Charles Robert Ciancanelli, petitioner on review, filed the
briefs for himself.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Charles F. Hinkle, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. and for amici curiae
Oregonian Publishing Company and other media entities.  With him
on the brief for Oregonian Publishing Company and other media
entities was Stoel Rives LLP.
Chin See Ming, of Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, filed the
brief for amici curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. and White
Bird.  With him on the brief were Julia E. Markley and Les
Swanson.
Bradley J. Woodworth and Lake James H. Perriguey, of Bradley
J. Woodworth & Associates, PC, Portland, filed the briefs for
amicus curiae Portland Area Privacy Alliance.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The case is remanded to the circuit court.
De Muniz, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court, Joan S. Seitz, Judge. 181 Or App 1, 45 P3d 451 (2002). 
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal proceeding, we are asked to decide
whether ORS 167.062, which makes it a crime to, among other
things, "direct, manage, finance or present" a "live public show"
in which the participants engage in "sexual conduct" violates the
free expression rights guaranteed by Article I, section 8, of the
Oregon Constitution. (1)  Drawing on the "Robertson
framework," (2) which this court uses to address free
expression issues that arise under Article I, section 8,
defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it
is directed, by its terms, at a form of expression and does not
fall within a well-established "historical exception" to the
constitutional prohibition on enactment of such laws.  
The state disagrees that ORS 167.062 is directed at
expression and, for that reason, argues that the statute is 
constitutionally sound under State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649
P2d 569 (1983).  However, the state also contends, on a more
fundamental level, that the analytical underpinnings of the
Robertson framework are unsound.  It follows, the state asserts,
that this court should re-examine that framework and disavow it
in favor of a form of "balancing" test that (in the view of the
state) more correctly captures the true meaning and scope of
Article I, section 8. 
For reasons that we set out post, we disagree with the
state's assertion that the statute is not, by its terms, aimed at
expression.  We therefore conclude that this case is one to which
the Robertson framework applies.  Respecting that methodology, we
accept the state's request that we consider its criticisms of
Robertson.  Having done so, we conclude that the state has failed
to show that Robertson is incorrect.  We therefore adhere to it. 
Furthermore, we reject categorically the state's proffered
alternative, balancing test.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
The following facts are supported by the record. 
Defendant operated an "adult-oriented" business, Angels, in
Roseburg.  Angels offered a menu of "shows," to be performed for
individual customers or small groups upon payment of a fee.  The
shows were presented in a small room on the premises.
Undercover policemen visited Angels on two occasions. 
During the first visit, the officers requested and paid for a
"toy show."  A female employee of Angels led them into a room and
proceeded to "perform" for them by, among other things, removing
her clothing and inserting a dildo and her finger into her
vagina.  During the second visit, the officers paid for a "two
girl show."  During that show, two women performed a striptease,
rubbed their breasts against the officers chests, and engaged in
oral sex with one another.
After the second visit, the officers arrested defendant
and the performers.  Defendant later was charged by indictment
with two counts of promoting a live sex show, ORS 167.062, one
count of promoting prostitution, ORS 167.012, two counts of
compelling prostitution, ORS 167.017, and two counts of using a
child in a display of sexual conduct, ORS 163.670 (the latter two
counts are based on the fact that one of defendant's performers
was under 18 years of age).  Before trial, defendant demurred to
the indictment, arguing, among other things, that ORS 167.062, on
its face, and ORS 167.012, as applied to the conduct at issue,
violate the free expression guarantee of Article I, section 8, of
the Oregon Constitution and the free speech guarantee in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The trial
court overruled the demurrers, and the case proceeded to trial. 
Defendant was convicted of all charges.
On his direct appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant
assigned error, inter alia, to the trial court's ruling on his
demurrer, again arguing that ORS 167.062 is facially
unconstitutional and that ORS 167.012 is unconstitutional as
applied to his case.  A majority of the Court of Appeals rejected
both arguments.  The Court of Appeals majority began by
accepting, for the sake of argument, the proposition that a live
sex show has content that qualifies as "expression" under Article
I, section 8.  State v. Ciancanelli, 181 Or App 1, 7, 45 P3d 451
(2002).  Utilizing the analytical framework for challenges under
Article I, section 8, that this court set out in Robertson, the
Court of Appeals majority nonetheless concluded that ORS 167.062
falls within a "well-established" historical exception to the
general prohibition in Article I, section 8, against laws that,
by their terms, restrain expression.  Id. at 19.  The majority
found support for that conclusion in a line of statutes and cases
dating back to the seventeenth century which, taken as a whole,
suggest that public nudity and sexual conduct long have been a
subject of governmental regulation and punishment in the United
States.  The majority also relied on the fact that, in the early
days of Oregon, it was a crime to expose one's private parts or
otherwise to exhibit oneself in a way that is "offensive to
decency, or is adapted to excite vicious or lewd thoughts or
acts."  Id. at 12 (quoting General Laws of Oregon, ch 48, § 632,
p 559 (Deady 1845-1864)). 
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals majority held
that the conduct that is the subject of ORS 167.012 (promoting
prostitution) also falls wholly within a longstanding historical
exception to Article I, section 8.  And, because it does fall
within such an exception, the majority concluded that, even if
defendant were correct in suggesting that some of the conduct
prohibited by ORS 167.012 is or can be "expression," that fact
would not raise a constitutional issue.  Ciancanelli, 181 Or App
at 28-31.
II.  METHODOLOGY
On review, defendant argues that the Court of Appeals
majority's analysis is contrary to this court's holding in State
v. Henry, 302 Or 510, 520-23, 732 P2d 9 (1987), that such early
restrictions on sexually explicit or obscene expressions between
adults as may have existed were not "well established" at the
time that early freedoms of expression were adopted or at the
time of the adoption of Article I, section 8.  Defendant also
argues that the Court of Appeals relied almost entirely on cases
and statutes pertaining to "lewd" conduct before a nonconsenting
public, but pointed to no real evidence of the historical
treatment of private, sexually explicit performances staged for
consenting adults. (3)   
For its part, the state does not dwell on whether
criminal prosecution for promoting a live sex show or
prostitution falls within a "historical exception" for purposes
of the Robertson framework.  Instead, it focuses its argument on
two points: (1) that the statutes at issue are directed at
conduct, not expression; and (2) that, in any event, the entire
Robertson framework should be abandoned because it is
"inconsistent with what language and history teach about the
intentions of the [Oregon] constitution's authors."  Respecting
the latter point, the state notes that, in recent years, this
court has utilized a consistent methodology to construe
provisions of the Oregon Constitution and has stated repeatedly
that its ultimate purpose is to ascertain the intent of the
provision's framers and of the people who voted to adopt it. 
See, e.g., Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 54, 11 P3d
228 (2000) (describing methodology and purpose).  The state
further asserts that this court did not construe Article I,
section 8, in Robertson by means of that methodology.  The state
suggests that, under those circumstances, Robertson should be set
aside and Article I, section 8, should be interpreted by means of
this court's present methodological paradigm.
In Stranahan, this court summarized the circumstances
under which, in spite of the salutary doctrine of stare decisis,
it will reconsider rules arising out of earlier decisions
respecting the Oregon Constitution:
"[W]e remain willing to reconsider a previous
ruling under the Oregon Constitution whenever a
party presents to us a principled argument
suggesting that, in an earlier decision, this
court wrongly considered or wrongly decided the
issue in question.  We will give particular
attention to arguments that either present new
information as to the meaning of the
constitutional provision at issue or that
demonstrate some failure on the part of this court
at the time of the earlier decisions to follow its
usual paradigm for considering and construing the
meaning of the provision in question." 
Stranahan, 331 Or at 54.  As noted, the state has argued that, in
Robertson, this court failed to follow its "usual paradigm" for
construing a provision of the Oregon Constitution.  
The "usual paradigm" referred to in Stranahan for
analyzing an original provision of the Oregon Constitution (such
as Article I, section 8) is the one that this court first
specifically identified and described in Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or
411, 840 P2d 65 (1992).  There, we indicated that our search for
the intent of those who drafted and adopted an original
constitutional provision would address three separate topics: the
wording of the constitutional provision, the case law surrounding
it, and the historical circumstances leading to its adoption. 
Id. at 415-16.  The purpose of our inquiry under the Priest
methodology is "to understand the wording [of the constitutional
provision] in the light of the way that the wording would have
been understood and used by those who created the provision * * *
and to apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon
Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances
arise."  Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 90-91, 23
P3d 333 (2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In the decade since the court decided Priest, this
court consistently has applied that methodology to construe  a
number of provisions of the Oregon Constitution.  See, e.g.,
Neher v. Chartier, 319 Or 417, 422-28, 879 P2d 156 (1994)
(utilizing methodology to construe Article I, section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution); Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281, 296-97, 906
P2d 789 (1995)(same respecting Article VII (Amended), section 3,
of the Oregon Constitution); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514,
529-36, 931 P2d 770 (1997) (same respecting Article II, section
8, of the Oregon Constitution); State v. Vasquez, 336 Or 598,
604-13, 88 P3d 271 (2004) (same respecting Article I, section 10,
and Article VII (Amended), section 5, of the Oregon
Constitution).
Relying on this court's expressed willingness in
Stranahan to reconsider allegedly erroneous constitutional
decisions, the state proffers an alternative rule to Robertson,
supported by an extensive exposition of the wording of, the
history respecting, and the case law decided under Article I,
section 8.  Defendant weighs in with an equally able brief
supporting the Robertson framework, and various amici offer
further help.  Before addressing those arguments, however, we
wish to add a note respecting requests that this court reconsider
constitutional doctrine.
A decent respect for the principle of stare decisis
dictates that this court should assume that its fully considered
prior cases are correctly decided.  Put another way, the
principle of stare decisis means that the party seeking to change
a precedent must assume responsibility for affirmatively
persuading us that we should abandon that precedent.  
Various considerations may add to that responsibility. 
The most common such consideration is time.  Many decisions of
this court serve as precedent in later decisions.  Thus,
disavowing one case may undermine the precedential significance
of several others. 
The contrast between Stranahan and this case
illustrates the foregoing principle.  In Stranahan, the allegedly
erroneous decision had been rendered less than 10 years earlier,
and few intervening precedents had relied on the earlier case,
Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 315 Or 500, 849 P2d 446 (1993). 
The Stranahan majority simply acted at the earliest possible
moment to correct what it perceived to be an analytical mistake
made in the immediately preceding case, Lloyd Corporation.  The
present case, by contrast, involves a challenge not only to
Robertson, but also to the many cases that this court has decided
since 1983 that have utilized its methodology.
It follows from the foregoing that the state, in order
to prevail in this case, must persuade us, first, that the
constitutional rule that it attacks was not formulated either by
means of the appropriate paradigm or by some suitable substitute. 
If the state accomplishes that task, then it still has before it
the more difficult task of persuading this court that application
of the appropriate paradigm establishes that the challenged
constitutional rule is incorrect.  Finally, and assuming that it
is able to convince us of the incorrectness of the challenged
rule, the state must persuade us that, when the passage of time
and the precedential use of the challenged rule is factored in,
overturning the rule will not unduly cloud or complicate the law.
With respect to the first task described above, we
acknowledge that Robertson does not discuss at length the
wording, history or case law surrounding the particular clause
that has captured the state's attention -- that is, the "abuse"
clause of Article I, section 8.  That is so, most likely, because
the parties in that case did not emphasize it.  As such, we
properly may consider the state's request that we conduct a more
complete application of the appropriate paradigm to that aspect
of Article I, section 8, than the Robertson court was called upon
to do.  In doing so, however, we once again emphasize that our
consideration of such arguments in this or any other similar case
does not suggest that we automatically doubt the validity of the
holding in the earlier decision.  As we have explained respecting
that question, the principle of stare decisis dictates that our
assumption going into the inquiry is just the other way around. 
And, as our subsequent analysis will demonstrate in detail, our
reexamination of Robertson in response to the state's argument
leads us to conclude that the state has not established, in
accordance with its burden discussed above, that Robertson
incorrectly considered or decided the constitutional issues that
the court there addressed under Article I, section 8.   
As discussed, the Priest paradigm requires us to search
for the intent of the persons who adopted Article I, section 8 in
three separate sources: (1) the text of the constitutional
provision; (2) the case law surrounding it; and (3) the
historical circumstances leading to its adoption.  We turn to
that paradigmatic process.    
III.  ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 
A.  Wording
As noted, Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution provides:  
"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever; but every person shall be responsible
for the abuse of this right."
The first half of the provision is directed at the legislature
and other lawmaking bodies ("No law shall be passed * * *."). 
The provision prohibits enactment of two categories of laws: (1)
those that "restrain[] the free expression of opinion," and (2)
those that "restrict[] the right to speak, write or print freely
on any subject whatever."  The latter category of laws appears to
deal only with various modes of communication that use words
(i.e., speech, printing, or writing), while the first category
seemingly includes laws directed at any mode of
"expression." (4)  The broad category of "expression" is
narrowed somewhat by the specification that the expression be an
expression of "opinion."  That phrase, "expression of opinion,"
thus appears to refer to expression that, in some way, appraises
or judges an object, person, action, or idea. (5)  But the
concept is not in terms limited to opinion that is communicated
by means of words, i.e., expression that is spoken, written, or
printed.  The phrase could, for example, include nonverbal
"artistic" forms of expression like painting, photography, and
dance, which often are designed to convey something about the
communicator's world view.
The two categories of laws that are prohibited by the
first part of Article I, section 8, may be distinguished in
another way -- by the choice of the terms "restrain" and
"restrict."  Respecting those terms, it is sufficient here to say
that we read the first phrase as referring to laws that restrain
or punish expression of opinion (6) and the second phrase as
referring to laws that limit speaking, writing, or printing on
any subject.  Needless to say, that is a very broad prohibition. 
It precludes any restraint on most forms of expression as well as
laws directed at limiting or restricting any conceivable kind of
communication.    
The second half of Article I, section 8 ("but every
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right"),
describes an exception or modification to the broad guarantee
(i.e., "this right") set out in the first half.  The import of
that "abuse clause" depends on the intended meaning of two words
-- "responsible" and "abuse."
One may be "responsible" for abuse in a number of ways. 
Although Article I, section 8, logically could be read as
referring only to moral responsibility, we think it unlikely that
either the framers of the Oregon Constitution or those who voted
to adopt it would have viewed a moral admonition as an
appropriate subject for a substantive provision of their
constitution.  Instead, we think it inescapable that the term
must be read as referring to legal accountability for any "abuse"
of the expansive right described in the first clause of Article
I, section 8.  However, the word alone does not make clear
whether, for example, such legal accountability is limited to
civil damages, or also may be extended to criminal
punishment. (7)
When used as a noun, the term "abuse" meant, at or
around the time that it was adopted in Article I, section 8: 
"1. Ill use; improper treatment or
employment; application to a wrong purpose; as an
abuse of our natural powers; an abuse of civil
rights; or of religious privileges; abuse of
advantages, etc.
"* * * * *
"5. Perversion of meaning; improper use or
application; as an abuse of words." 
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (emphasis
in original).  "Abuse," in the context of Article I, section 8,
thus appears to mean improper use -- that is, use of the right
provided by the first clause in a way or for a purpose that,
under some unidentified standard, is improper or wrongful. 
Beyond that, however, the provision offers no further hint as to
how abuse of the right granted in the first clause of Article I,
section 8, may be distinguished from a proper use of that right.
B.  Case Law
Following our paradigm, we turn to a review of cases
that were decided under Article I, section 8, before the
Robertson decision.  We think that it is fair to summarize those
cases by saying that they tended to rely, expressly or
implicitly, on federal First Amendment jurisprudence.  When
Article I, section 8, explicitly was at issue, this court tended
to view the abuse clause of Article I, section 8, as permitting
laws aimed at punishing (as opposed to imposing prior restraints
on) expression itself. (8)  See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 224 Or
337, 349-52, 356 P2d 495 (1960) (sustaining indictment for
selling, distributing, and possessing obscene book; observing
that Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution appears to
adopt Blackstonian view that freedom of speech means only freedom
from prior restraint); City of Portland v. Welch, 229 Or 308,
322, 367 P2d 403 (1961) (although city movie licensing ordinance
violated Article I, section 8, because it amounted to prior
restraint, that constitutional provision "does not prohibit
sending convicted obscenity dealers to jail"); State v. Laundy,
103 Or 443, 204 P 958 (1922) (criminal syndicalism laws aimed at
punishing speech that advocates revolution did not violate
Article I, section 8).
Although no pre-Robertson case contains a systematic
analysis of the meaning of Article I, section 8, standing alone,
the Jackson court made some effort in that direction.  The court
there quoted Blackstone on the issue of liberty of the press and
noted that Blackstone's analysis -- that liberty of the press
meant only freedom from prior restraint -- had been criticized by
at least one notable constitutional scholar as unworkable and
inconsistent with eighteenth-century history.  Jackson, 224 Or at
346-47.  Having identified the issue, however, the Jackson court
concluded, without further explanation or analysis, that Article
I, section 8 "adopt[s] the formula of [Blackstone's]
Commentaries."  Id. at 348.       
That brings us to Robertson -- the case that, as we
have noted, has become the source of our present framework for
analyzing issues that arise under Article I, section 8.  We
discuss the case in some detail.  Before doing so, we note in
passing that, in a way, it is curious that Robertson should have
become the lightning rod for disputes under Article I, section 8. 
On its face, the case was (and is) a straightforward effort at
comparing a statute with the Oregon Constitution and determining
whether the two could co-exist.  Nothing in the opinion
announces, at last explicitly, that it intends to state a new and
different standard for interpreting the scope of Article I,
section 8.
Robertson involved challenges under the First Amendment
and Article I, section 8, to the then-current version of the
statute defining the crime of coercion.  The court declined to
consider the First Amendment argument, preferring to map out and
utilize an analysis that focused particularly on Oregon's free
expression provision, Article I, section 8.   
Drawing on comments in an earlier case, State v.
Spencer, 289 Or 225, 611 P2d 1147 (1980), the Robertson court
opined that Article I, section 8, is a restriction on lawmakers,
prohibiting them from enacting restrictions that are directed by
their terms at expression:
"As stated above, Article I, section 8, prohibits
lawmakers from enacting restrictions that focus on
the content of speech or writing, either because
that content itself is deemed socially undesirable
or offensive, or because it is thought to have
adverse consequences.  This is the principle
applied in State v. Spencer, supra.  It means that
laws must focus on proscribing the pursuit or
accomplishment of forbidden results rather than on
the suppression of speech or writing either as an
end in itself or as a means to some other
legislative end."
Robertson, 293 Or at 416-17.  The court then went on to say,
however, that there is an exception to that rule –- specifically,
that laws that are directed at restraining expression are
permissible when the "scope of the restraint is wholly confined
within some historical exception that was well established when
the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were
adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were
not intended to reach."  Id. at 412.  The court specifically
identified, as examples, the crimes of "perjury, solicitation or
verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and
fraud and their contemporary variants."  Id.       
The Robertson court next held that, even when a statute
is written to focus on some forbidden result, it is subject to
closer scrutiny if it proscribes one or more modes of expression
as a means to that end:
"When the proscribed means include speech or
writing, however, even a law written to focus on a
forbidden effect * * * must be scrutinized to
determine whether it appears to reach privileged
communication or whether it can be interpreted to
avoid such 'overbreadth.'"
Id. at 417-18.  The court noted that, on the other hand, when a
law is directed only against causing a forbidden effect, a person
accused of causing that effect by means of expression "would be
left to assert * * * that the statute could not constitutionally
be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that
it was drawn and enacted contrary to [A]rticle I, section 8." 
Id. at 417.  That is to say, the person would have to object to
the statute on a narrow, "as applied" basis.
The Robertson court did not inquire directly into the
intent of the people who drafted and adopted Article I, section
8, or mention any other methodology as a basis for its analysis. 
However, the central points in Robertson -- the propositions that
Article I, section 8, is directed at lawmakers and laws, and that
it precludes the adoption of laws that are directed at
restraining expression -- derive directly from certain words of
the provision.
As noted, the Robertson framework has become the
consistent basis for examining any challenge under Article I,
section 8.  Among the many cases that have been decided according
to that framework are a number that are particularly relevant
here, because they involve attempts to ban or regulate expression
that has sexual content.  In State v. Henry, 302 Or 510, 732 P2d
9 (1987), for example, this court used the Robertson framework in
holding that a statute prohibiting the possession of obscene
material violated the free expression guarantee of Article I,
section 8, because it was directed, by its terms, at a type of
expression.  Notably, the court rejected the state's contention
that prohibitions on obscenity fall within a historical exception
to the guarantee:  While the state was able to show that various
legal prohibitions on "lewd" conduct and publications existed
during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the Henry court
concluded that there was no "well-established" exception
equivalent to the acknowledged exceptions for libel, perjury, and
forgery.  Id. at 520-22.
In the later case of City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306
Or 174, 759 P2d 242 (1988), the City of Portland attempted to
regulate, rather than prohibit outright, obscene expression by
enacting certain zoning restrictions on "adult" bookstores and
businesses.  The city prefaced the zoning restrictions with
"findings" to the effect that "adult" businesses caused certain
harmful effects and argued to this court that those findings
established that the restrictions were directed at harmful
effects, rather than at expression.  After noting that the
ordinance did not make the adverse effects described in the
findings an element of the regulatory standard, the Tidyman court
concluded that the zoning ordinance was directed at expression
and, thus, violated Article I, section 8.  Tidyman, 306 Or at
185-86.
More recently, in State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 920
P2d 535 (1996), this court applied the Robertson framework to a
criminal statute directed at the producers and purchasers of
visual reproductions of children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct.  This court examined the statute in its context and
found that it was directed at a harmful effect -- unlawful sexual
exploitation of children -- in that it made such exploitation a
necessary element of any violation.  The court concluded that the
statute therefore passed muster under Article I, section 8.  Id.
at 550.
Our discussion of the foregoing cases illustrates how
this court in recent years has applied the Robertson framework to
Article I, section 8, challenges.  In none of those cases,
however, did this court attempt to evaluate systematically the
text and other relevant material surrounding Article I, section
8, to determine what the people who drafted and adopted that
provision intended by it.  
A fair summary of all the cases that this court has
decided under Article I, section 8, would be that, while earlier
cases (such as Jackson) point one way, and later cases (such as
Robertson and Henry) point another, the later cases do not
expressly overrule the earlier ones.  We turn to the historical
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the provision.
C.  Historical Circumstances
In its brief to this court, the state argues that, when
viewed in the light both of earlier and contemporary thinking
about the concept of free speech and expression, it is clear that
Article I, section 8, as it was drafted in 1857, was intended
only as a prohibition on prior restraints.  According to the
state, it also is clear that the "abuse clause" of Article I,
section 8, was inserted in recognition of the power of the state
to punish, after the fact, any speech that, because of its anti-social tendencies, the legislature deemed to be an "abuse."
The state's argument has some historical support. 
Certainly, there is evidence that, during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, most American courts and legal
treatises tended to treat the right of free speech as a very
limited one, guaranteeing to the individual only a freedom from
prior restraint.  In fact, it now is widely accepted that, in
adopting a prohibition on laws "abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press," as the First Amendment phrased it, many, if not
most, of the framers of the First Amendment were thinking in
terms of the English common-law notion of freedom of speech,
which prohibited prior restraints on the press but did not
preclude civil or criminal prosecution, after the fact, for
obscene, blasphemous, libelous, or seditious speech.  See
generally Leonard W. Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press 220-81
(1985) (setting out that view). (9)  
It is clear, moreover, that, throughout the nineteenth
century, the most popular legal treatises equated the First
Amendment and state constitutional guarantees of free speech
primarily with freedom from prior restraint.  See, e.g., William
Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America
(1829) (reprint ed. 1970) ("A previous superintendency of the
press, an arbitrary power to direct or prohibit its publications
are withheld, but the punishment of dangerous or offensive
publications * * * is necessary for the peace and order of
government and religion."); Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations 421 (1868) ("[I]t is well understood
and received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of
the press [i.e., the First Amendment], that it was intended to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments") (emphasis in original);
Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 667-68 (1858) reprinted in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph
Lerner, eds., 5 The Founders' Constitution 181 (1987)  ("It is
plain, then, that the language of this amendment imports no more,
than that every man shall have a right to speak, write and print
his opinions on any subject whatever, without any prior
restraint"). 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, most of the
mainstream American discussions of the constitutional right to
free speech drew heavily (sometimes without attribution) on
Blackstone's explication of the common law pertaining to freedom
of the press:
"[W]here blasphemous, immoral, treasonable,
schismatical, seditious or scandalous libels are
punished by the English law * * * the liberty of
the press, properly understood, is by no means
infringed or violated.  The liberty of the press
is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published.  Every freeman
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public: * * * but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or
illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity. * * * * *.  Thus the will of individuals
is still left free; the abuse only of that free-will is the object of legal punishment. * * * * *
"So true will it be found, that to censure the
licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty of the
press."
William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 151-52
(1783 ed.) (reprint ed. 1978).  Following Blackstone, American
legal treatises described the government's power to punish the
"licentiousness" of the press, or the "abuse" of the right of
free speech.  See Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations at 420 (the right guarantees "the liberty of the
press, not its licentiousness"); Story, 2 Commentaries on the
Constitution at 670 (prohibiting prior restraint but permitting
punishment of "dangerous or offensive" expression is proper
because "the will of individuals is still left free [and] the
abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment"). 
But what constituted "abuse" under that formulation? 
On that point, the mainstream legal treatises again tended to
treat Blackstone as the oracle:  His pronouncements -- that
liberty of speech does not extend to publications that are
"improper, mischievous, or illegal" or that are "on a fair and
impartial trial * * * adjudged of a pernicious tendency" -- often
were repeated and endorsed.  See, e.g., Story, 2 Commentaries on
the Constitution at 670-71 (repeating the foregoing phrases from
Blackstone).  Thus, many respected early and mid-nineteenth
century jurists and legal writers appear to have believed that
"abuse" covered at least some speech that the governing authority
deemed to have anti-social tendencies or to threaten the public
peace.  That Blackstonian formulation, purporting to be a
restatement of the English common law, (10) extended to broad
categories of speech including, apparently, libel, seditious
libel, blasphemy, and obscenity. (11)
On the whole, the nineteenth century American judiciary
appeared to have shared that limited view of the right to free
speech.  See, e.g., Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 518, 2 Am Dec
402, 405-06 (Pa 1805) ("Publish as you please in the first
instance without control; but you are answerable both to the
community and to the individual, if you proceed to unwarrantable
lengths"); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass (3 Pick) 304, 313-14
(Mass 1825) (stating that the free speech provision in the
Massachusetts Constitution was intended to prevent previous
restraints on publication and does not abrogate the common law,
including the then-prevalent common law understanding that, in
libel prosecution, truth may not be asserted as defense);
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass (20 Pick) 206, 219 (Mass 1838)
(the obvious intent behind the free speech provision in
Massachusetts Constitution was to prevent the enactment of
licence laws or other direct restraints upon publication).   
At most, the judiciary would concede to a slightly more
liberal version of the Blackstonian view -- that, in addition to
prohibiting prior restraint, freedom of speech and of the press
incorporated a "right to publish, with impunity, truth, with good
motives, and for justifiable ends, whether it respects
government, magistracy, or individuals."  People v. Croswell, 3
Johns Cas 335, 392-93 (NY 1804) (reciting that definition in the
context of a prosecution under the Alien and Sedition Act); Pugh
v. Starbuck, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 143, 149 (Ohio Sup 1845)
(quoting Croswell).  See also James Kent, II Commentaries on
American Law 17-25 (3d ed. 1836) (accepting view that individuals
may be criminally punished for challenging individuals or the
government in print, but stating that, contrary to Blackstone,
the truth of the publication should be available as a defense). 
That variation on Blackstone's formulation did not challenge the
legislature's power to punish undesirable speech, but did extend
to defendants threatened with criminal punishment for libel an
opportunity to demonstrate their own good motives and the truth
of the matter in question.    
Interestingly, the foregoing view of the right of free
speech was contrary, in many respects, to the philosophy that had
animated the American Revolution.  Many of the leading lights of
the American revolutionary period were greatly influenced by the
"natural rights" philosophy that was advanced in the works of
John Locke and that later was popularized, and fused with the
republican political tradition, by John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon under the nom de plume "Cato."  See generally Levy, The
Emergence of a Free Press at 109-14 (describing Cato's Letters
and noting that the letters were revered, quoted, and recommended
by the likes of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin,
Josiah Quincy, and John Dickinson).  On the issue of freedom of
speech, Cato wrote: 
"Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such
Thing as Wisdom; and no such Thing as publick
Liberty, without Freedom of Speech; Which is the
Right of every Man, as far as by it does not hurt
and controul the Right of another; and this is the
only Check which it ought to suffer, the only
Bounds which it ought to know."
"Of Freedom of Speech", No 15, Feb 4, 1720, in John Trenchard and
Thomas Gordon, I Cato's Letters: Essays on Liberty, Civil and
Religious 96 (reprint ed. 1971)
To the more libertarian adherents of the natural rights
philosophy, freedom of speech was an "inalienable" natural right
-- that is, it was not part of the package of natural rights that
individuals ceded to the community in order to obtain the
protections and benefits of civil society.  Rather, it was a
right that the individual always retained, as he or she would in
a state of nature.  Even for natural rights adherents, however,
the right was not absolute.  According to the natural rights
theory, inalienable rights, such as freedom of conscience and
speech, were bounded, as they were in the state of nature, by the
equally fundamental rights of other individuals.  If the state
had any authority at all to act in these protected areas, it was
to enforce the fundamental rights of other individuals, not to
protect society as a whole from undesirable "tendencies" or to
promote the majority's idea of the greater good.  That is
decidedly different from the Blackstonian notion of
"abuse", (12) which extended to everything that Parliament had
identified as contrary to the public good (a notion that included
purely social values like order, morality, and religion).
Thus, and particularly in reaction to the ill-advised
Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, some early American political
thinkers would speak in terms of an "absolute" right of freedom
of speech and press, bounded only by the necessity of avoiding
injury to the equal rights of another individual.  Madison, for
example, argued that the First Amendment denied to Congress any
power to regulate speech or the press, prospectively or
retrospectively, but still expressed concern that individuals
have a remedy for injury to their reputations and suggested that
that was available under state laws.  See generally James
Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in
Kurland and Lerner, 5 The Founders' Constitution at 141-46
(criticizing the Alien and Sedition Act as contrary to the First
Amendment and rejecting the idea that First Amendment merely
adopted common law with respect to freedom of speech).  St.
George Tucker posited an absolute liberty of speech without
restraint, "except as to the injury of any other individual in
his person, property, or good name."  St. George Tucker,
Blackstone's Commentaries:  With Notes and References to the
Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United
States (1803), reprinted in Kurland and Lerner, 5 The Founders'
Constitution at 152-58.  George Hay, a member of the Virginia
House of Delegates, insisted that freedom of the press consisted
of absolute freedom to publish what one pleases, "provided he
does no injury to any other individual."  Hortensius [George
Hay], "An Essay on the Liberty of the Press" (1799), in George
Hay, Two Essays on the Liberty of the Press, 21, 23 (reprint ed.
1970). (13)  Other notable early speech "libertarians" included
Tunis Wortman, who wrote A Treatise Concerning Political Enquiry
and the Liberty of the Press (1800), and John Thomson, who wrote
An Enquiry Concerning the Liberty and Licentiousness of the Press
(1801).
Although we tend to associate the notion of natural,
inalienable rights with the founding of our nation, it is
important to note that that idea continued as an important legal
and political philosophy until the latter part of the nineteenth
century. (14)  The theory held particular appeal for the
Americans participating in the great westward movement, who often
had moved west to avoid the constraints of settled society and
tended to place an especially high value on individual liberty. 
Records of the constitutional conventions of pioneer states are
replete with affirmations of the natural rights theory, (15)
and many of those states adopted constitutional provisions or
preambles expressly declaring the "inalienable natural rights" of
man.  See, e.g., Ill Const (1848), Art XIII, § 1 (declaring man's
natural and inalienable rights); Ind Const (1851), Art I, § 1
(same); Iowa Const (1857), Art I, § 1 (same); Kan Const (1861), §
1 (same); Nev Const (1864), Art I, § 1 (same); Wis Const (1848),
Art I, § 1 (same).  Some western courts utilized natural-rights
thinking in their opinions, rejecting the "general welfare" or
"police powers" doctrine that was increasingly being used by
state courts to support the idea that private rights always must
give way to the social interest in public welfare, safety, and
good morals, (16) or holding that such power is limited to or
must be based on actual injuries to others. (17)      
The struggle over the efficacy of natural rights played
a significant role in the defining political issue of the
nineteenth century, slavery.  Natural rights ideas were taken up
wholeheartedly by anti-slavery Republicans, who used them to
challenge the legality of slavery.  Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, A History of the American Constitution 258-71 (1990). 
But abolitionists and anti-slavery Republicans also had a special
interest in the free speech implications of the natural rights
theory.  The abolitionist message was highly unpopular in most of
the United States, and the proponents of the message were acutely
aware of the threat to free speech presented by majority
rule. (18) 
Abolitionists therefore argued that legislatures -- the
instruments of the majority -- had no constitutional power to
suppress or punish speech because of its supposed "bad
tendencies" vis-à-vis the public peace.  See, generally, Michael
K. Curtis, Free Speech:  "The People's Darling Privilege" 10-13,
194-215 (2000) (describing prevailing "bad tendency" rationale
for suppressing unpopular speech and rejection of that rationale
by abolitionists and Republicans).  However, consistent with
traditional natural rights theory, they acknowledged that the
God-given right to free expression was limited by the equal
rights of others.  See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance, An
Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression,
78 B U L Rev 1275, 1297 n 124 (1998) (quoting speeches and
writings of abolitionists, including James G. Birney and the Rev.
Elijah Lovejoy).   
In general, then, we can see that Article I, section 8,
was adopted at a time in American history when much of the legal
community was content with a narrow, Blackstonian view of freedom
of speech, but when a more libertarian approach, which was
associated with the natural right theory that initially had
animated the American Revolution -- still enjoyed significant
popular adherence. (19)  That background suggests the question: 
Which one (if either) of those theories did the framers of
Article I, section 8, intend to adopt when they included the
"abuse" clause in Article I, section 8?  The first place to look
for the answer to that question is the direct history of Article
I, section 8.  We turn to that history now.
We know that Article I, section 8, was part of the
original Oregon Constitution and was derived from the free speech
guarantee in Indiana's 1851 constitution. (20)  Charles Henry
Carey, ed., The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates
of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 468 (1926).  As this
court acknowledged in Jackson, the wording is not peculiar to
Oregon and Indiana, and was widely used in other state
constitutions, beginning with the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790.  Jackson, 224 Or at 348-49.  
There is no record of any specific discussion of
Article I, section 8, at Oregon's Constitutional Convention in
1857.  However, we do have a record of comments made during the
Constitutional Convention about a proposed amendment to another
provision of the draft constitution that shows that a range of
points of view was present there.  Specifically, Carey reports
that, on September 9, 1857, delegate Perry B. Marple moved to
amend proposed Article I, section 10, of the draft constitution
to provide that, in "prosecutions" for libel, the truth may be
given in mitigation of damages, rather than in "justification." 
Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention of 1857 at 309.  The omnipresent
Matthew Deady moved to make the provision even less
protective (21) and suggested, by way of illustration, that the
editor of the San Francisco Bulletin was guilty of a "malicious
use of power" with regard to certain stories that had appeared in
that newspaper.  Id. at 309-10.  Thomas Dryer, then editor of the
Oregonian, a Whig newspaper, complained bitterly about the
suggested amendments as attempts to muzzle the press and
suggested that "the previous section [which was to become Article
I, section 8] covered all the ground."  Id. at 310.  Delegate
George Williams (22) apparently agreed with Dryer that Article
I, section 8, "embraced all that was required" and moved to
strike the provision pertaining to libel altogether.  Id.  A
rather lengthy "debate" between Dryer and Deady ensued, with
Deady decrying the "irresponsible public press" and Dryer stating
that it would be strange if the press were to be debarred from
denouncing corruption and villainy.  Dryer also said, in apparent
reference to Article I, section 8, that 
"it was also strange that the whole judiciary
should lock hands together on this subject.  When
the newspapers spoke of any prominent official --
and told the truth -- it was invariably
characterized as 'abuse.'"
Id.
The dispute between Deady and Dryer suggests that there
was no clear agreement among the delegates as to the meaning of
the term "abuse" in the context of Article I, section 8.  In
fact, Dryer seemed to have feared a different kind of "abuse,"
one in which a conservative judiciary would abuse its authority
to interpret the Oregon Constitution to undermine the very
freedom that, in Dryer's view, Article I, section 8, sought to
guarantee.  Neither does it appear that there was any clear
winner in the dispute:  the delegates may have concluded that
Article I, section 8, "covered all the ground," but they did not
feel compelled to further clarify the abuse clause.           
As to the question whether the original Oregon
Constitution reflects a Blackstonian view of individual rights
or, instead, has a natural rights focus, the evidence also is
mixed.  This court previously has noted that the original
constitution, as a whole, reflects a basic distrust of
legislative power.  See Smothers, 332 Or at 113 (so stating). 
Such distrust would be more consistent with a natural rights-based world view.  Certain comments made by delegates to the
constitutional convention support that theory.  One delegate
argued for inclusion of a bill of rights in the constitution on
the ground that it would limit the "fractious" spirit of the
majority if it tried to "infringe on the rights of the individual
citizen."  See Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 at 102 (comments
of delegate Delazon Smith).  Another delegate suggested that a
bill of rights was necessary only to control a despotic ruler and
was irrelevant when the people are sovereign.  Id. at 102-103
(comments of delegate George Williams).  The fact that the
framers ultimately opted to include a bill of rights suggests
acceptance of the view that at least some individual rights
should not be subject to the whims of the majority. 
On the other hand, unlike their counterparts in many
western states, the framers of the Oregon Constitution did not
include any express announcement of the "inalienable" natural
rights of man in their constitution.  They were content to
announce that "all men, when they form a social compact, are
equal in right" and that "all power is inherent in the people." 
Or Const, Art I, § 1.  The absence of any declaration of
"inalienable" natural rights was noted and decried by some
Oregonians at the time, (23) but probably did not affect the
ultimate decision to adopt the constitution.  As one contemporary
commentator put it, "This objection is not sufficient to deter a
man really favorable to State government from voting for the
Constitution."  Claudia Burton and Andrew Grade, A Legislative
History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857 -- Part I (Articles I
and II), 37 Willamette L Rev 469, 491-92 (2001) (quoting letters
to the editor printed in Oregon Argus on October 17, 1857).
D.  The Framers' Intent     
It is against the foregoing textual, historical, and
jurisprudential background that we must assess the state's
assertion that the Robertson framework is contrary to the intent
of the people who drafted and adopted Article I, section 8.  That
assessment necessarily involves an attempt to ascertain, from the
information that we have gathered, the framers' intent with
respect to the scope and meaning of Article I, section 8. 
Turning our focus to the first clause of Article I,
section 8, one is struck by its sweeping terms, both with respect
to the legislative power ("[n]o" law shall be passed restraining * * * or restricting) (emphasis added) and the kinds of
expression protected ("* * * the free expression of opinion, or * * * the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever") (emphasis added).  In fact, the words are so clear and
sweeping that we think that we would not be keeping faith with
the framers who wrote them if we were to qualify or water them
down, unless the historical record demonstrated clearly that the
framers meant something other than what they said.  As our
recitation of the historical circumstances shows, we have found
no such demonstration.  Thus, it appears to us to be beyond
reasonable dispute that the protection extends to the kinds of
expression that a majority of citizens in many communities would
dislike -- profanity, blasphemy, pornography -- and even to
physical acts, such as nude dancing or other explicit sexual
conduct, that have an expressive component.  Thus, we have little
trouble in concluding that the people who framed and adopted
Article I, section 8, as part of the original Oregon Constitution
intended to prohibit broadly any laws directed at restraining
verbal or nonverbal expression of ideas of any kind. (24)
We also conclude that those same people intended to
provide an exception to that broad prohibition -- the legislature
could provide legal and even criminal remedies for "abuse" of the
right to free speech.  That is evident from the fact that,
however people might have disagreed as to what constituted
"abuse" of the right of free expression, no one in the United
States (with the possible exception of George Hay) was arguing,
at that time, that the government never could impose criminal
penalties, even as a remedy for an undeniable abuse of the right
of free expression. 
The foregoing leaves us to sort out the pivotal
conundrum inherent in Article I, section 8:  What is the scope of
the term, "the abuse of this right"? (25)  As we have seen,
based on the philosophical currents swirling through the mid-nineteenth century United States, two opposing answers suggest
themselves.  On the one hand, the framers of the Oregon
Constitution may have intended that the section receive a
classically Blackstonian construction, i.e., they may have been
satisfied that the only limitation that need be placed on
legislative interference with free expression was a denial of the
ability to impose prior restraints.  If that were the case, then
"abuse" of the right of free expression included anything that
was deemed to be such by the majority.  On the other hand, the
framers of the Oregon Constitution may have intended that the
section receive a classically natural rights construction,
allowing no punishment of expression qua expression, even after
the fact.  In that case, an individual's responsibility for
"abuse" of the fundamental right of free expression would be
limited to expression that caused some injury to the equally
fundamental rights of other individuals.  
The difficulty, of course, is that there is no sound
basis for placing "the framers," as a whole, into one or the
other of those categories.  Both views were represented at the
Constitutional Convention (the exchange between Dreyer and Deady,
described above, demonstrates as much) and, presumably, among the
population that voted in 1857 to adopt the Oregon Constitution. 
There is scant evidence of any overt collision between the two
philosophies (only the exchange between Dreyer and Deady,
described above, might qualify).  Certainly, there is no clear
evidence that one or the other theory prevailed.          
In short, no unassailably correct answer, based
entirely on the provision's wording, case law, history, or any
other objective evidence, is possible.  The question then
presents itself:  In the face of the foregoing impasse about the
framers' intent, can the state meet its burden of showing that
the Robertson framework is contrary to the framers' intent with
respect to Article I, section 8?  Clearly, it can do so only if
it demonstrates that Robertson is incompatible with both of the
possible meanings of that provision that we have identified.  
Doubtless, the state could demonstrate that Robertson
is incompatible with the Blackstonian approach:  The central
tenet of that approach -- that any speech that the government
deems to be improper or socially undesirable may be punished as
"abuse" -- could not be farther from the Robertson rule.  On the
other hand, the Robertson approach appears to be largely, if not
entirely, compatible with the pure "natural rights" approach that
we have described.  As discussed, that natural rights theory
holds that only speech that directly interferes with or harms the
fundamental rights of other individuals is punishable (either
civilly or criminally) as "abuse."  That notion is fully
consonant with the idea expressed in Robertson that, although
speech qua speech cannot be punished, acts causing "forbidden
results" (which, presumably, would include acts causing harm to
other individuals) can be punished, even if that result is
reached by means of speech. (26)  
We recognize, of course, that some aspects of the
Robertson framework have no obvious connection to the "natural
right" theory of free speech as we have described it.  In
particular, Robertson states that there are "historical
exceptions" to the prohibition on laws restraining free
expression and describes those exceptions as restrictions on
speech that were "well established when the first American
guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the
guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to
reach."  Robertson, 293 Or at 412.  However, assuming that the
drafters of Article I, section 8, intended to convey something
akin to the "natural right" theory we have described, Robertson's
"historical exception" idea does not clash with that intent. 
Instead, it merely recognizes that there are certain well-recognized traditional crimes that fall under the literal terms
of the constitutional prohibition, but that the drafters
"demonstrably" did not intend to abolish.  The Robertson court
may have realized that it was necessary to acknowledge such
historical exceptions in order to carry out the drafters'
intent. (27)  In the end, then, Robertson's description of
"historical exceptions" is not inconsistent with the framers'
intent. 
We have stated that, in light of this court's
longstanding reliance on the Robertson framework to resolve
issues that arise under Article I, section 8, the burden of
demonstrating that that framework is inconsistent with the intent
of the people who drafted and adopted Article I, section 8, lies
with the party challenging that framework –- in this case, the
state.  It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the
state has failed to meet its burden:  To the contrary, after
applying the methodology set out in Priest to Article I, section
8, we are satisfied that the Robertson framework is justified. 
That framework is generally compatible with the "natural rights"
approach that we have described as a possible source of Article
I, section 8.  Moreover, it is more consistent with that approach
than the malleable and indistinct "balancing" test proposed by
the state.  We therefore will continue to analyze challenges
brought under Article I, section 8, using the Robertson framework
(including Robertson's notion of a historical exception).
Before we turn to the task of applying the Robertson
framework to the case at hand, we believe that it is appropriate
to address the "historical exception" aspect of the Robertson
analysis with more particularity.  It has become clear to this
court, from the opinion below, the state's arguments in this and
other recent cases, and certain commentary in the academic and
professional literature, (28) that some students of this
court's jurisprudence are intent on reading the historical
exception idea of Robertson more broadly than the Robertson court
intended.  Those critics of Robertson focus exclusively on the
words of the oft-quoted test from Robertson (29) and, from that
standpoint, assume that a "historical exception" is made out by
showing that laws prohibiting the expression at issue were more
or less widespread at or before the adoption of the federal Bill
of Rights and continued to exist in this state after 1859, when
the Oregon Constitution was adopted.  They do so in spite of the
admonition against such thinking in Henry.  In that case, this
court emphasized that 
"the constitutional guarantee of free speech and press
will not be overcome by the mere showing of some legal
restraints on one or another form of speech or writing. 
The party opposing a claim of constitutional privilege
must demonstrate that the guarantees of freedom of
expression were not intended to replace the earlier
restrictions." 
Henry, 302 Or at 521 (emphasis added.)  We note also that Henry warned that  
"'contemporaneous legislative actions should not
necessarily be given much weight when construing
constitutional principles.  Constitutional draftsmen
are concerned with broad principles of longstanding
significance.'"
Id. at 521-22 (quoting State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz,
289 Or 277, 284, 613 P2d 23 (1980)).
To be sure, this court has not elaborated on those
passages from Henry to explain what a party must show in order to
demonstrate that the drafters of Article I, section 8, did not
intend to abolish a well-established pre-existing restriction on
expression. (30)  However, Robertson contains some comments
that, in our view, are relevant to the problem.    
Section V of the Robertson opinion contains a lengthy
examination of how courts have dealt with laws pertaining to
extortion, intimidation, and solicitation -- laws that are
conceptually related to the prohibition on "coercion" that was at
issue in Robertson and that fall, in whole or in part, within the
historical exception notion.  213 Or at 421-31.  The court
suggested, in that part of the opinion, that such laws have been
upheld in the face of free speech challenges, but generally only
to the extent that the threatened action would be independently
unlawful if executed.  The court suggested that, with respect to
those statutes, courts did not appear to be much concerned with
the coercive effect that threats would have on the hearer.  The
Robertson court summarized the results of its examination as
follows:    



"To recapitulate, we believe that the constitutional
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever guaranteed in Article I, section 8, was not
meant to immunize the use of words in some respects
relevant to [the coercion statute].  As we have said,
one of these is the use of words in the course of what
indisputably would have been a conventional crime when
Oregon's Bill of Rights was adopted in 1859, or in the
course of similar kinds of conventional crimes that
lawmakers may from time to time enact.[FN 28]  This
includes the use of words in the course of soliciting,
attempting, carrying out, or concealing other crimes. 
Therefore Article I, section 8 would not foreclose a
statute, otherwise in valid form, that made it criminal
to compel another to commit an offense by threats or
other verbal means under circumstances in which the
demand is meant to be followed and the compulsion is
realistically plausible.  In such a statute, the focus
is on the actual or probable commission of the
compelled offense, not on protecting the addressee from
hearing the speaker's threats.  ORS 163.275, however,
is not such a statute. * * * It is not concerned with
the performance of the compelled act, which the statute
does not require to be unlawful."
"[FN 28] We refer to 'conventional' crimes so as not to
imply that constitutional freedom of expression today
does not extend to crimes known before the Bill of
Rights, such as seditious or criminal libel, that
restrained freedom of public disclosure and debate."
Robertson, 293 Or at 433 and n 28.
Thus, the Robertson court drew a distinction between
longstanding verbal crimes like solicitation, which (it posited)
the drafters of Article I, section 8, did not intend to affect,
and other verbal crimes like seditious and criminal libel of
similar long standing which, in its view, the drafters of Article
I, section 8, intended to abolish.  But how to tell the
difference?  The fact that Robertson dubbed crimes in the first
category as "conventional" crimes is unhelpful:  The term
"conventional" has no obvious meaning in this context that can
distinguish one historical verbal crime from another.  However,
the passage overall (and the material that precedes it) does seem
to explain the distinction.  Specifically, it seems to suggest
that, among the various historical crimes that are "written in
terms" directed at speech, those whose real focus is on some
underlying harm or offense may survive the adoption of Article I,
section 8, while those that focus on protecting the hearer from
the message do not.
Notably, the examples that Robertson provides of valid
historical exceptions -- "perjury, solicitation or verbal
assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud and
their contemporary variants," 293 Or at 412 -- all fall into the
former category:  Although the laws making those acts criminal
may be "written in terms" directed at speech, all those crimes
have at their core the accomplishment or present danger of some
underlying actual harm to an individual or group, above and
beyond any supposed harm that the message itself might be
presumed to cause to the hearer or to society.  Also notably, the
distinction between "conventional" and other historical speech
crimes fits remarkably well with Robertson's overall point --
that Article I, section 8, is concerned with prohibitions that
are directed at the content of speech, not with prohibitions that
focus on causing palpable harm to individuals or groups. 
But how does that distinction made in Robertson connect
to the oft-quoted "test" for a historical exception that also
appears in that opinion -- that the scope of the restraint must
be "wholly confined within some historical exception that was
well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of
expression were adopted and the guarantees then or in 1859
demonstrably were not intended to reach"?  Id.  We think that it
means that, however well-established a restraint directed in
terms against speech or expression might have been at some time
in the past, the mere fact that it continued to exist in one form
or another after the adoption of Article I, section 8, does not
sufficiently demonstrate that the framers of that provision did
not intend to reach it, unless the restraint itself is of a sort
that is consistent with the spirit of Article I, section 8.  In
other words, for those historical crimes that ultimately focus on
some underlying nonspeech harm but, nevertheless, are directed
"in terms" at speech, the conflict between their existence and
the fundamental principle expressed in Article I, section 8, is
not very great, and it may be possible to infer an intention to
immunize them from a literal application of Article I, section 8,
from the mere fact of their continued existence after the
provision's adoption.  However, the same cannot be said for
historical crimes that are directed at expression, both "in
terms" and in their real focus.  For such crimes, we would
require a more direct expression of the framers' intent.
IV. APPLICATION TO ORS 167.062
We turn now to the question whether ORS 167.062, the
live sex show statute, violates Article I, section 8, of the
Oregon Constitution.  The statute provides, in part:
"(3) It is unlawful for any person to
knowingly direct, manage, finance, or present a
live public show in which the participants engage
in sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct.
"(4) Violation of subsection (3) of this
section is a Class C felony.
"(5) As used in * * * this section unless the
context requires otherwise:
"(a) 'Live public show' means a public show
in which human beings, animals, or both appear
bodily before spectators or customers.
"(b) 'Public show' means any entertainment or
exhibition advertised or in some other fashion
held out to be accessible to the public or member
of a club, whether or not an admission or other
charge is levied or collected and whether or not
minors are admitted or excluded."    
For purposes of the statute, "sexual conduct" is defined as
"human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any
touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks
of the human male or female, or the breasts of the
female, whether alone or between members of the
same or opposite sex or between humans and animals
in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or
gratification."
ORS 167.060(10). 
We first must determine whether the statute is directed
by its terms at restraining or restricting speech or expression. 
The state contends that it is not directed at expression but,
instead, at conduct that the legislature is entitled to punish. 
However, the state's briefing on that particular point is
somewhat unclear:  At some points, it appears to suggest that ORS
167.062(3) is directed at public masturbation and sexual
intercourse while, at other points, the briefing suggests that
the statute is directed at "masturbation and sexual intercourse
for profit."
The latter suggestion is easily dismissed.  There is
nothing in ORS 167.062 that suggests that application of that
statute is limited to sexual displays for profit or for which the
performers (or any other persons) are paid.  In fact, the statute
states explicitly that it is irrelevant whether the observers of
a live sex show pay an admission fee or other charge.  See ORS
167.062(5)(b) (defining "public show," for purposes of ORS
167.062, as an exhibition or entertainment held out to be
accessible to the public "whether or not an admission or other
charge is levied or collected").
Neither can we agree with the state that ORS 167.062 is
directed, essentially, at public masturbation and sexual
intercourse -- conduct that, according to the state, the
legislature can and does criminalize.  The legislature has drawn
a clear distinction between sexual conduct that occurs in or in
view of a "place to which the general public has access," see ORS
163.465 (defining public indecency to include sexual intercourse
and deviate sexual intercourse in, or in view of, a "public
place" as defined by ORS 161.015(10)), and sexual conduct that
occurs in a place to which adult members of the public are
invited, but where "patrons are forewarned and viewing is limited
to those patrons," State v. Brooks, 275 Or 171, 178, 550 P2d 440
(1976).  That distinction would be blurred beyond recognition
were we to accept the state's contention that ORS 167.062 is
directed at "public" sexual conduct.  The statute is not so
directed.
In arguing against the suggestion that ORS 167.062 is
directed at expression, the state also relies on this court's
recognition, in Huffman and Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 317 Or
445, 857 P2d 101 (1993), that conduct is not protected expression
under Article I, section 8, merely because the actor intends the
conduct to convey a message.  But, in so arguing, the state loses
sight of the fact that the issue here is the overall
constitutionality of a statute, not whether defendant can claim
that his particular conduct is expressive and therefore immunized
from any and all criminal liability.  It may or may not be true
that the sexual acts that defendant directed were conduct in the
most basic sense and, as such, could be punished under some other
statute.  But the fact remains that the statute at issue here --
ORS 167.062 -- prohibits and criminalizes those acts only when
they occur in an expressive context, i.e., in a "live public
show."  Under those circumstances, we cannot avoid the conclusion
that the statute is directed primarily, if not solely, toward the
expressive aspect of the conduct that it describes.  That is, the
statute is one restraining free expression.
We must consider, then, whether the statute is "wholly
confined within some historical exception that was well
established when the first American guarantees of freedom of
expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859
demonstrably were not intended to reach."  Robertson, 293 Or at
412.  In the Court of Appeals, the majority reformulated that
question into a two part test: "(1) whether there was a
restriction on expression that was 'well-established' during the
relevant historical period, and, if so, (2) whether the
challenged statute falls 'wholly within' that historical
exception."  Ciancanelli, 181 Or App at 8.  The majority
ultimately concluded that the statute did fall within a well-established historical exception, based almost exclusively on its
presentation of numerous examples of eighteenth and nineteen
century laws prohibiting public nudity and sexuality.  The Court
of Appeals majority did not at any time address itself to the
question that is raised by the last clauses of the Robertson
framework, viz., whether "the guarantees [of free expression]
then [i.e., at the adoption of the Bill of Rights] or in 1859
demonstrably were not intended to reach."  Robertson, 293 Or at
412.  As should be clear from the material that we have quoted
from Henry and our earlier discussion in this case, that question
is not one that can be ignored.  
We will assume, for the sake of argument, that the
information set out in the Court of Appeals majority opinion is
sufficient to support a conclusion that a criminal prohibition on
live shows involving displays of nudity and sexuality was well-established in the United States at the time that Article I,
section 8, was adopted.  The question remains, however, whether
the material in that opinion or in any other submission to this
court is sufficient to demonstrate that the people who adopted
Article I, section 8, did not intend that the provision affect
that prohibition.  We have suggested that it may be sufficient to
show the continued existence, after the adoption of Article I,
section 8, of a historically well-established crime that is
directed in terms at speech, but only when it is clear that the
crime's real focus is on some underlying harm to individuals or
groups, and that speech is merely a way of accomplishing that
harm.  But here, where the criminal prohibitions at issue are and
always have been directed at protecting the hearer (or, in this
case, viewer) from the message, (31) only a more direct
expression of an intent to immunize the historical prohibition
would suffice.  We see nothing in the state's arguments or
elsewhere in the record that even approaches the required
showing.
To conclude:  ORS 167.062 is directed by its terms at
expression and does not fall under a well-established historical
exception that the framers of Article I, section 8, demonstrably
did not intend to reach.  It is unconstitutional on its face.  It
follows that defendant's convictions under ORS 167.062 must be
reversed.         
V. PETITIONER'S OTHER CONVICTIONS
Although petitioner makes no separate argument to this
court that his convictions under ORS 167.012 for promoting
prostitution also violate Article I, section 8, we briefly
address that issue.  Defendant argued in the Court of Appeals
that 
"[t]he same conduct that resulted in defendant's
conviction under ORS 167.062 also resulted in his
conviction under ORS 167.012.  Therefore, even if
the described conduct meets the technical
definition of prostitution, defendant is still
entitled to judgment of acquittal because the
dancers were engaged in protected expression."
The Court of Appeals majority rejected that contention, primarily
on the ground that prostitution and conduct relating to
prostitution fall within a "historical exception" to the broad
prohibition in Article I, section 8, on laws restraining
expression.  Ciancanelli, 181 Or App at 27-31.  
We too reject the contention that ORS 167.012
implicates Article I, section 8, but on the more basic ground
that the statute is not directed at expression.  ORS 167.012
prohibits promoting prostitution -- owning, controlling,
managing, or supervising a prostitution enterprise -- regardless
of the presence or absence of any circumstances that might add an
expressive element to the conduct. (32)  It is not targeted
either at expression itself or at the expressive aspects of
certain conduct.  It therefore does not, in and of itself, raise
an issue of facial unconstitutionality under Article I, section
8.  Defendant's contrary argument is not well taken.
Defendant argues, however, that ORS 167.012 is
unconstitutional as applied in his case, because his conduct
occurred in conjunction with a "live show" and, thus, was
protected expression.  That is essentially the same argument that
the defendants made, and that we rejected, in Huffman and Wright
Logging.  In that case, as previously noted, environmental
protesters who were engaged in an effort to stop a logging
operation in the Siskiyou National Forest chained themselves,
without permission, to logging equipment that belonged to a
logging company, while displaying and shouting anti-logging
slogans.  The logging company brought an action for trespass, and
the protesters attempted to defend their actions on the ground
that their conduct was protected expression.  We acknowledged the
expressive aspect of the conduct, but ultimately concluded that
"[t]he message that defendants sought to convey by their conduct,
the reason for their conduct, and the spoken and written words
accompanying their conduct did not transform defendants' conduct
into [protected] speech."  Huffman and Wright Logging, 317 Or at
458.  
In the present case, we have concluded that Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution precludes defendant's
prosecution under ORS 167.062 for directing a live public show in
which performers engage in certain sexual conduct.  We have
concluded that, to the extent that ORS 167.062 applies only to
sexual conduct in live public shows, it is directed at expression
or, at least, the expressive aspect of certain conduct.  
However, neither that holding, nor the fact that defendant's
conduct (directing acts of prostitution) occurred in association
with live public shows, transforms his conduct into protected
expression for all purposes.  Defendant's involvement in
directing and profiting from a prostitution enterprise is subject
to regulation and punishment, and that is what occurred
here. (33)  Defendant's convictions for promoting prostitution
are affirmed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The case is remanded to the circuit
court. 
DE MUNIZ, J., dissenting
I agree that Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution protects a wide variety of expression and
communication.  See State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 541, 920 P2d
535 (1996) (Article I, section 8, "extends protection to written
and spoken communication, but also to verbal and non-verbal
expressions in film, photographs and the like").  However, unlike
the majority, I cannot conclude that masturbation and sexual
intercourse in a "live public show" prohibited by ORS 167.062 is
a form of speech that the drafters of the Oregon Constitution
sought to protect in Article I, section 8.  For the reasons
described below, I  respectfully dissent.
I commend the majority's attempt to carefully examine
the antecedent legal philosophies and debates that foreshadowed
the drafting of Article I, section 8, and the abuse clause in
particular.  Nevertheless, the majority's historical research and
analysis fails to demonstrate convincingly that the nineteenth-century legal scholars and commentators on which it relies
believed that free speech protections, such as Article I, section
8, extended to the conduct prohibited in ORS 167.062.  
The majority correctly recognizes that the text of
Article I, section 8, consists of two parts, one part "setting
out an expansive right" and another part "apparently qualifying
that right."  Regarding the first part of the text, the majority
seizes upon the term "expression of opinion," trims away the
qualification "of opinion," and emphasizes throughout the rest of
its opinion that the subject matter of article I, section 8 is
"expression."  The majority, however, reads the constitutional
text more expansively than I do.  The text commands the
legislature to respect the free expression of ideas — not conduct
— when it forbids laws "restraining the free expression of
opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print
freely on any subject whatever."  The separate clauses emphasize
that the constitution protects the "expression of opinion" as
well as the "right to speak, write, or print."  The text of
Article I, section 8 thus protects ideas and thoughts expressed
as opinion in speech and print, but contains nothing in the text
that explicitly would protect public masturbation and sexual
intercourse.
The second part of Article I, section 8 qualifying the
free-speech right is the abuse clause: "every person shall be
responsible for the abuse of this right."  The majority locates a
source for the abuse clause in the writings of William
Blackstone, who wrote that individuals are free from prior
restraints on publishing, but are responsible for abuse of that
right in publishing "blasphemous, immoral, treasonable,
schismatic, seditious or scandalous libels."  Blackstone suggests
that the scope of the abuse clause is potentially quite wide. 
Not only that, but the majority concedes that many scholars and
jurists in the nineteenth century adhered to Blackstone's
understanding of the abuse clause.  The majority insists,
however, that Blackstone's followers encountered resistance from
"libertarians" who grounded their beliefs in eighteenth-century
natural rights philosophy.  The majority then claims that it is
faced with a "conundrum":  some scholars and commentators
followed the restrictive Blackstonian approach to free speech,
while others believed that the law protected profanity,
blasphemy, pornography, and other forms of both speech and
conduct.  The libertarians, in other words, adopted a
"classically natural rights construction, allowing no punishment
of expression qua expression."  State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or ___,
___, ___ P3d ___ (2005) (slip op at 44).  The conundrum, the
majority claims, is that it cannot figure out which view is
reflected in Article I, section 8.  I submit, however, that the
alleged conundrum is one of the majority's own making.
First, Blackstone is considered by many to be a
natural-rights thinker of the first rank.  See generally Albert
W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U Pa L Rev 1 (1996). 
Thus, the majority's claim that Blackstone's allegedly narrow-minded views were inconsistent with those of natural-rights
advocates is problematic. (34)
Second, the very existence of the text in the abuse
clause of Article I, section 8 indicates that Blackstone won the
debate, in effect, because the idea of regulating abusive speech
came from Blackstone and followers such as Joseph Story and
Thomas Cooley, as the majority acknowledges, rather than from the
alleged libertarians the majority claims to have located. 
Third, the majority describes the alleged libertarians
as discussing the right of free speech in favorable terms, but
the majority fails to show that those commentators believed, or
would have believed that the protections of free speech, such as
Article I, section 8, would extend to conduct such as public
masturbation and sexual intercourse.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the idea that
the Victorian-era drafters and ratifiers of the Oregon
Constitution sought to bring public masturbation and sexual
intercourse within the purview of constitutional free-speech
protection is difficult to comprehend.  In my view, the Court of
Appeals' majority opinion in this case amply demonstrated that,
at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted, pornography,
nudity, lewd behavior, and "bawdy-houses" were accepted targets
of regulation that enjoyed no constitutional protection based on
expressive content.  State v. Ciancanelli, 181 Or App 1, 9-21, 45
P3d 451 (2002). 
Most importantly, it is unnecessary to embark, as the
majority does, on a search for the historical truth underlying
the framers' intent, or invoke the free-speech framework
announced in Robertson.  Article I, section 8 addresses speech,
whereas ORS 167.062 addresses conduct, which is a well-accepted
dichotomy in constitutional free-speech law.  See United States
v. O'Brien, 391 US 367, 88 S Ct 1673, 20 L Ed 2d 672 (1968)
(draft-card burning not protected speech but subject to
regulation as conduct).  ORS 167.062 does not on its face,
violate Article I, section 8 because the statute is directed at
conduct, not at the substance of any opinion or any subject of
communication or expression.
It should be beyond dispute that public acts of
masturbation and sexual intercourse for profit are not
intrinsically expressive or communicative acts.  See Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 US 697, 705, 106 S Ct 3172, 92 L Ed 2d 568
(1986) (upholding closure of adult bookstore where patrons were
engaged in masturbation, oral sex, and prostitution, court
observed that "the sexual activity carried on in this case
manifests absolutely no element of protected expression"). 
Unfortunately, the majority accepts defendant's argument that the
statute restrains expression protected by Article I, section 8,
because it prohibits sexual conduct in a public show.  In
essence, according to the majority, masturbation and sexual
intercourse before an audience are forms of protected expression. 
In my view, the question is not resolved so simply.  I cannot
accept the majority's premise that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled speech simply because it occurs
beneath a proscenium arch or is performed before an audience. 
Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 US 49, 67, 93 S Ct 2628,
37 L Ed 2d 446 (1973) ("a 'live' performance of a man and a woman
locked in a sexual embrace at high noon in Times Square is [not]
protected by the Constitution," even if "they simultaneously
engage in a valid political dialogue.").
Sexual conduct on the street, in the park, or the
village square has historically been the subject of criminal
regulation.  ORS 163.465, (35) the public indecency statute, is
directed at the same conduct prohibited by ORS 167.062.  The only
difference is the particular venue in which the conduct occurs. 
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that legislative
regulation of public sex acts must stop at the supposed theater
door.  Simply because the acts are part of a supposed "live
public show" does not necessarily save the conduct from
regulation.
I would hold that ORS 167.062 is not directed to the
substance of any opinion or any subject of communication. 
Rather, the statute is directed at conduct that may under some
circumstances be expressive.  That the conduct may in some
circumstances be expressive does not mean the statute is facially
overbroad in violation of Article I, section 8.  Instead, under
specific circumstances where masturbation or sexual intercourse
are claimed to have some expressive content, an accused's right
to "direct, manage, finance or present" such expression can be
protected through an applied constitutional challenge or by a
jury instruction indicating that an accused may be held
accountable only for the non-expressive aspects of his or her
conduct.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
1. 
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:
"No law shall be passed restraining the free expression
of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write,
or print freely on any subject whatever; but every
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this
right." 
2. 
So named for State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402,
649 P2d 569 (1982), the case that first described and
applied the framework.   We include an extended
discussion of Robertson and its rationale, ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 18-20).
3. 
Before this court, defendant focuses on
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution as it
applies to ORS 167.062.  However, he also argues,
either directly in his briefs to this court or by
reference to his arguments in the Court of appeals,
that:  (1) ORS 167.062 violates the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution; (2) ORS 167.012, both
on its face and as applied to his conduct, violates
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution; (3)
certain evidence obtained in searches of his business
should have been suppressed because the searches were
unlawful; (4) he was entitled to acquittals on the
charges of compelling prostitution, ORS 167.017, and
using a child in a display of sexual conduct, ORS
163.670, because the evidence in the record was
insufficient to support a finding that defendant knew
that the child in question was, in fact, a minor; (5)
the state was required, and failed, to prove that
touching of intimate parts during the performances was
for the purpose of and actually was sexually gratifying
to the performers; (6) a conversation that the police
taped pursuant to a phone tap order should have been
suppressed because the police failed to tape the
conversation in its entirety; and (7) defendant's
rights were violated because businesses like "Angels,"
operating in other counties, have not been subjects of
criminal investigation and prosecution.
Because we agree with defendant that his ORS
167.062 convictions must be overturned under Article I,
section 8, we need not consider the first of those
arguments, pertaining to the application of the First
Amendment to ORS 167.062.  We do address the second
argument, pertaining to the constitutionality of ORS
167.012, because that argument was discussed in the
majority and dissenting opinions in the Court of
Appeals.  We conclude that the remaining arguments do
not merit further discussion.
4. 
Noah Webster's An American Dictionary of the
English Language (1828) included the following in its
definition of "expression":
"2.  The act of uttering, declaring or
representing:  utterance; declaration;
representation; as an expression of the
public will.
"* * * * *
"5.  In painting, a natural and lively
representation of the subject; as the
expression of the eye, of the countenance, or
of the particular action or passion.
"6.  In music, the tone, grace, or
modulation of the voice or sound suited to
any particular subject; that manner which
gives life and reality to ideas and
sentiments."
(Emphasis in original).  Also relevant is Webster's
definitions of the word "express," including:
"2.  To utter; to declare in words, to
speak.
"* * * * *
"5.  To represent or show by imitation
or the imitative arts; to form a likeness; as
in painting or sculpture * * *
"6.  To show or make known; to
indicate."
Id.
5. 
Webster's An American Dictionary of the
English Language defined "opinion" as: 
"1. The judgment which the mind forms of
any proposition, statement, theory or event,
the truth or falsehood of which is supported
by a degree of evidence that renders it
probable but does not produce absolute
knowledge or certainty; * * * 
"* * * * *
"3. settled judgment or persuasion; as
religious opinion; political opinion."
6. 
Although, as we shall describe, the common
legal import of the word "restrain" in the context of
discussion of restraints on speech was limited to the
idea of prior licensing schemes, we find little support
for the idea that the term was intended by the drafters
to have such a limited connotation.  Then or now, the
threat of punishment could (and can) be as much a
restraint on speech as any prior licensing scheme.   
7. 
According to Webster, "responsible" meant:
"1.  Liable to account; accountable;
answerable; as for a trust reposed or for a
debt."
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language.
8. 
We put to one side this court's cases holding
that defamatory statements "have throughout the history
of this state been recognized as an abuse of the right
of free expression for which a person is to be held
responsible under the provisions of Article I, section
8."  Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99, 118, 593 P2d 777
(1979).  The parties here properly focus on
governmental restrictions on speech, and we do so as
well.
9. 
Professor Levy examined popular writings,
case law, and other material from the pre-revolutionary
period and found that the American notions of liberty
of speech and press at that time were remarkably
consistent with the English common law as described by
Blackstone.  Levy also examined the immediate history
of the drafting and adoption of the Bill of Rights and
found that, although proponents of the bill often
raised concerns about freedom of the press, their
rhetoric generally was devoid of any explanation of
that phrase that would distinguish it from the
prevailing view.  Levy, Emergence of a Free Press at
144-219.  Levy also suggests that there actually was
very little interest among the framers of the United
States Constitution in announcing fundamental personal
rights in a Bill of Rights, and that the entire project
would have died in Congress if it had not been for
James Madison's persistence.  Id. at 220-266.    
Levy acknowledges that, shortly after the
adoption of the Bill of Rights (and, more particularly,
after the enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798), there
were attempts to explain the First Amendment as a
repudiation of the common law.  However, Levy suggests
that, in the context of the times, those after-the-fact
explanations are suspect, at least as evidence of the
framers' views at the time of the First Amendment's
adoption.  Id. at 309-349. 
10. 
Thus, in 1868, Cooley wrote:
    "[W]e understand liberty of speech and of
the press to imply not only liberty to
publish, but complete immunity for the
publication, so long as it is not harmful in
its character, when tested by such standards
as the law affords.  For these standards we
must look to the common-law rules which were
in force when the constitutional guaranties
were established." 
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations at 422. 

11. 
Notably, Blackstone believed that it was
consistent with the common law notion of freedom of the
press to punish even  an entirely truthful attack on a
public figure, because the sovereign could determine that
such a publication would have an undesirable "tendency" to
disturb the public peace.  See  Blackstone, 4 Commentaries
on the Laws of England at 151-52. 
12. 
We acknowledge that it is somewhat simplistic to
describe the Blackstonian approach as being contrary to the
natural rights philosophy that was popular at the end of the
eighteenth century.  Blackstone, in fact, styled himself as
an advocate for the natural law philosophy, writing in his
Commentaries that the "law of nature, being co-eval with
mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior
in obligation to any other."  Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on
the Laws of England at 41.  However, in the end, Blackstone
believed that Parliament was -- indeed, it had to be --
supreme.  No matter how he is categorized, Blackstone's
ideas contrast sharply with the idea of reserved or
inalienable rights that the state may not abridge except to
the extent that exercise of those rights invades the rights
of another individual.  See Thomas C. Grey, "The Original
Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution," in Neil L.
York, ed., Toward a More Perfect Union, Six Essays on the
Constitution 145, 152 (1988) (so asserting).    
13. 
In his essay, Hay drew a sharp distinction between
the natural right theory of freedom of the press and the
Blackstonian theory with respect to that freedom.  He wrote: 

"Now freedom is of two kinds, and of two kinds
only: one is, that absolute freedom which belongs to
man, previous to any social institution; and the other,
that qualified or abridged freedom, which he is content
to enjoy, for the sake of government and society.  I
believe there is no other sort of freedom in which man
is concerned.
"The absolute freedom, or what is the same thing,
the freedom, belonging to man before any social
compact, is the power uncontrouled by law, of doing
what he pleases, provided he does no injury to any
other individual.  If this definition of freedom be
applied to the press, as surely it ought to be, the
press, if I may personify it, may do whatever it
pleases to do, uncontrouled by any law, taking care,
however, to do no injury to any individual.  This
injury can only be by slander or defamation, and
reparation should be made for it in a state of nature
as well as in society.
"But freedom in society, or what is called civil
liberty, is defined to be, natural liberty, so far,
restrained by law as the public good requires, and no
farther. * * * Now let freedom, under this definition,
be applied to the press, and what will the freedom of
the press amount to?  It will amount precisely to the
privilege of publishing, as far as the legislative
power shall say, the public good requires: that is to
say, the freedom of the press will be regulated by law. 
If the word freedom was used in this sense, by the
framers of the [First A]mendment, they meant to say,
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the
press, which freedom, however, is to be regulated by
law.  Folly itself does not speak such language."       

Hay, Two Essays on the Liberty of the Press at 23-24
(emphasis added).
14. 
Natural rights-based theories were not replaced by
the legal positivism that dominated the twentieth century
until well after the Civil War.  See Steven J. Heyman,
Righting the Balance:  An Inquiry into the Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B U L Rev 1275, 1299
(1998) (so noting).   
15. 
See, e.g., the description of Iowa's
constitutional conventions in Bruce Kempkes, The Natural
Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution, 42 Drake L Rev 593,
622-30 (1993) (describing natural rights thinking expressed
during Iowa's Constitutional Convention).
16. 
See e.g., Beebe v. State of Indiana, 6 Ind 501, 63
Am Dec 391 (Ind 1855) (legislature could not prohibit
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors on theory that
doing so was for the public good); Herman v. State, 8 Ind
545 (Ind 1855) (same).
17. 
See, e.g., State ex rel Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114
Wis 530, 90 NW 1098 (Wis 1902) (so holding).
18. 
By the 1830s, the Southern states all had passed
laws criminalizing the publication or distribution of anti-slavery sentiments and were pushing for similar legislation
in Congress and in the Northern States, on the theory that
anti-slavery speech was incendiary and threatened the public
peace.  Although unsuccessful in their efforts to
criminalize anti-slavery speech outside of the South,
southern leaders did succeed in silencing debate about
slavery in the United States Congress and obtaining the
cooperation of at least one federal agency, the United
States Postal Service, in checking the spread of anti-slavery ideas.  See, generally, Michael K. Curtis, Free
Speech:  "The People's Darling Privilege" 117-81 (2000)
(discussing history). 
19. 
Perhaps most notably, there is no evidence of any
body of thought in nineteenth century America to the effect
that the values involved in the concept of freedom of
expression involved a balancing of the interests of the
government against the individual's interest.  Nineteenth
century legal thought, one scholar writes, "was
overwhelmingly dominated by categorical thinking."  Morton
J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 17
(1992).  The modern legal notion of balancing, including the
idea of balancing in the area of free speech, did not appear
until around 1910.  Id. at 18.       
20. 
Indiana's Article I, section 9, provided:
"No law shall be passed restraining the free
interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the
right to speak, write or print freely on any subject
whatever; but for the abuse of that right every person
shall be responsible."
21. 
Under Deady's formulation, truth would serve
as a basis for mitigating damages only when the
publication related to the public character of the
complainant.
22. 
George Williams, a prominent Portland lawyer,
later served as Attorney General under President Grant. 
Grant appointed Williams to be Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, but the appointment
was not confirmed by the Senate.
23. 
See Claudia Burton and Andrew Grade, A
Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857
-- Part I (Articles I and II), 37 Willamette L Rev 469,
488-92 (2001) (quoting editorials and letters printed
in the Oregon Argus in October 1857). 
24. 
We say "any kind" because, whatever else may
be said about Article I, section 8, we would turn it
into an historical footnote if we were to declare that
it referred only to forms of expression commonly used
in 1857.  Radio and television (not to mention film)
thus would go wholly unprotected.  Instead, we take the
view that "expression," as a concept used in Article I,
section 8, must have a scope consonant with society's
expanding methods of expressing itself.  The same
appreciation of the wording of Article I, section 8,
leads us to state that many (if not all) art forms --
dance, painting, sculpture, music, photography -- have,
and are generally accepted as having, expressive
components.
25. 
We note that one permissible construction of
the second clause of Article I, section 8, would be to
read the phrase "this right" in that clause as
referring only to the "right to speak, write, or print
freely on any subject whatever," and not to extend to
the "free expression of opinion," as those phrases are
used in the first clause.  That is, the use of the word
"right" in the second clause could be read to cross-reference only the "right" specifically denominated as
such in the first clause.  However, we do not so read
the reference to "this right" in the second clause, for
two reasons.
First, it is difficult to imagine how "the
right to speak, write, or print on any subject
whatever" could be carried out without from time to
time constituting the "free expression of opinion." 
Thus, the former phrase in the first clause would
appear, as a practical matter, to be subsumed by the
latter.  Second, given the orotund nature of mid-nineteenth century prose, it seems likely that the
people who drafted and adopted Article I, section 8,
intended and understood the two phrases in the first
clause ("restraining * * * free expression" and
"restricting the right to speak, write or print") to
describe a unitary concept.  
26. 
As the Robertson opinion has it, Article I,
section 8,
"prohibits lawmakers from enacting restrictions that
focus on the content of speech or writing either
because that content itself is deemed socially
undesirable or offensive, or because it is thought to
have adverse consequences. * * * It means that laws
must focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment
of forbidden results rather than on the suppression of
speech or writing either as an end in itself or as a
means to some other legislative end."  
Robertson, 293 Or at 416-17.
27. 
We also recognize that Robertson contains certain
statements suggesting that the "abuse clause" pertains to
civil responsibility for harm done to individuals by means
of expression.  Robertson, 293 Or at 412; 433 n 29.  We
further recognize that In re Lasswell, 296 Or 121, 673 P2d
855 (1983) and State v. Henry, 302 Or 510, 732 P2d 9 (1987)
amplified that suggestion.  However, we do not consider
those statements about the scope of the abuse clause to
foreclose the possibility of criminal punishment when
expression is used to cause actual harm to the fundamental
rights of other individuals.  In fact, we think that that
sort of criminal responsibility can be fully explained in
terms of the Robertson distinction between prohibitions that
are directed in terms at speech or expression and those that
are directed at harmful effects.  In other words, there does
not appear to be any serious conflict between the natural
rights theory that we have described and this court's
comments about the abuse clause in Robertson, Lasswell, and
Henry.  
28. 
See, e.g., Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for the
Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 Or L Rev 793, 848-50 (2000).
29. 
We refer to Robertson's statement excepting from
the general rule restraints that are "wholly confined within
some historical exception that was well established when the
first American guarantees of freedom of expression were
adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably
were not intended to reach."  Robertson, 293 Or at 412.    
30. 
In Henry, for example, this court examined the
evidence that the state offered -- a territorial statute
aimed at "obscene" materials "manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth" -- and concluded that it
was insufficient.   Henry, 302 Or at 521-22. 
31. 
The state suggests that, because of a supposed
connection between live sex shows and prostitution, sexually
transmitted diseases, and the exploitation of women, such
shows may threaten the health and welfare of the community
and that ORS 167.062 ultimately is directed at those harms. 
However, this court repeatedly has rejected such attempts to
find expression harmful by association.  See, e.g., Tidyman,
306 Or at 185 (city cannot rely on supposed adverse effects
of speech to justify prohibition on speech when the adverse
effects are not part of the operative text of the statute).
We do not mean to say that the legislature cannot
enact laws that are designed to prohibit or punish conduct
that amounts to prostitution, the transmission of sexual
diseases, or the exploitation of classes of persons. 
However, we agree with the point in Robertson that lawmakers
are precluded from enacting restrictions on speech solely on
the theory that the speech is connected with some adverse
consequences and that, absent the speech, the consequences
are, to some indefinable degree, less likely.  Robertson,
293 Or at 416. 
32. 
ORS 167.012 provides, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of promoting
prostitution if, with intent to promote
prostitution, the person knowingly:
"(a) Owns, controls, manages, supervises or
otherwise maintains a place of prostitution or a
prostitution enterprise."
"Place of prostitution" is defined as "any place where
prostitution is practiced."  ORS 167.002(1).  A
"prostitution enterprise" is "an arrangement whereby two or
more prostitutes are organized to conduct prostitution
activities."  ORS 167.002(3).
33. 
Defendant argues that the evidence in the record
does not support the findings in the trial court that
performers in the two-girl show committed acts of
prostitution within the definition of ORS 167.007(1) and
that defendant promoted those acts in violation of ORS
167.012(1), but we do not find those issues to merit
discussion.  Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence respecting the age of one of the women who
participated in the show, but we conclude that that issue
likewise does not merit discussion.  
34. 
See, e.g., William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 121 (1765):
"The absolute rights of man, considered as a
free agent, endowed with discernment to know good
from evil, and with power of choosing those
measures which appear to him to be most desirable,
are usually summed up in one general appellation,
and denominated the natural liberty of mankind.
This natural liberty consists properly in a power
of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint
or control, unless by the law of nature: being a
right inherent in us by birth, and one of the
gifts of God to man at his creation, when he
endued him with the faculty of free-will. But
every man, when he enters into society, gives up a
part of his natural liberty, as the price of so
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of
receiving the advantages of mutual commerce,
obliges himself to conform to those laws, which
the community has thought proper to establish."  
(Emphasis added.)
35. 
ORS 163.465 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of public
indecency if while in, or in view of, a public
place the person performs:
"(a) An act of sexual intercourse;
"(b) An act of deviate sexual intercourse; or
"(c) An act of exposing the genitals of the
person with the intent of arousing the sexual
desire of the person or another person.
"(2)(a) Public indecency is a Class A
misdemeanor.
"(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this
subsection, public indecency is a Class C felony
if the person has a prior conviction for public
indecency or a crime described in ORS 163.355 to
163.445."