Case Title: Rahim v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District

Citation: 

Docket Number: information

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12884 
 
RAHIMAH RAHIM  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE SUFFOLK DISTRICT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 11, 2020. - December 31, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Public Records.  District Attorney.  Statute, Construction.  
Words, "Receive." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 24, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Joseph F. Leighton, Jr., J., on 
motions for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kate R. Cook for the plaintiff. 
 
Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the defendant. 
 
Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant United States Attorney General, 
Hashim M. Mooppan, Deputy Assistant United States Attorney 
General, H. Thomas Byron, III, & Joshua K. Handell, of the 
District of Columbia, Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, 
& Brian M. LaMacchia, Assistant United States Attorney, for the 
United States, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  During the course of investigating a fatal 
shooting by Federal and State law enforcement officials, the 
office of the district attorney for the Suffolk district 
(district attorney) requested and received assorted materials 
related to the incident from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).  We now decide whether these materials qualify as public 
records under G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a), of the Massachusetts public 
records law (public records law) and, if so, whether they are 
exempt from disclosure under either G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth (a) (exemption [a]), or G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f) 
(exemption [f]).2 
 
Background.  In June 2015, the FBI and the Boston police 
department jointly investigated Usaamah Rahim for suspected ties 
to the terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL).  Among its various terrorist activities, ISIL had 
encouraged followers to target and kill members of law 
enforcement in the United States.  In response to evidence that 
Rahim was planning imminent acts of violence against members of 
law enforcement, surveilling officers from the joint 
investigation approached him in a Boston parking lot.  Rahim, 
carrying a large knife, walked toward the officers.  After he 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the United 
States. 
3 
 
 
failed to comply with orders to drop the knife, the officers 
fired their service weapons at Rahim, killing him. 
 
The district attorney then opened an investigation into 
Rahim's death.  To aid in this effort, the FBI provided various 
materials (FBI materials) to the district attorney.  The FBI 
delivered the materials accompanied by a letter asserting that 
the materials remained FBI property, were being loaned 
temporarily to the district attorney, and were not to be 
disclosed upon a Massachusetts public records law request.  The 
district attorney concluded its investigation, determining that 
the officers had acted lawfully. 
 
In 2017, Rahimah Rahim, Rahim's mother,3 filed a public 
records request seeking documents relating to Rahim's death.  
The district attorney provided Rahimah with 783 pages of 
documents, 373 photographs, and unedited surveillance footage 
from the investigation, but denied her access to all the FBI 
materials.  Rahimah then sued the district attorney in the 
Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the FBI records were 
public records that must be produced under G. L. c. 66, § 10.4  
                     
 
3 Because she shares with her son the same last name, 
Rahimah is referred to throughout by her first name, whereas 
Usaamah Rahim is referred to by his last name. 
 
 
4 Rahimah also sought injunctive relief to ensure that the 
district attorney maintained possession of the FBI materials 
during the pendency of the litigation.  The parties eventually 
4 
 
 
After the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, the 
district attorney provided an index listing brief descriptions 
of each item of the FBI materials, along with brief explanations 
of why each was being withheld.  Additionally, the United States 
Attorney for the District of Massachusetts filed a statement of 
interest on behalf of the FBI, arguing that the FBI materials 
should not be disclosed under the Massachusetts public records 
law. 
 
The judge granted the district attorney's motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the FBI materials were not public 
records because they were not "made or received by" the district 
attorney as that phrase is used in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth, the statute that defines "public records" in the 
Massachusetts public records law.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10.  
Additionally, the judge concluded that even if the FBI materials 
were public records, they were exempt from disclosure as 
"investigatory materials" under exemption (f).5  Rahimah 
appealed.  We granted her application for direct appellate 
review. 
                     
stipulated that the district attorney would continue to hold the 
FBI materials until the dispute was resolved. 
 
 
5 The Superior Court judge also concluded that Federal law 
preempted the Massachusetts public records law.  Because we 
affirm in part and vacate in part and remand on exemption (f), 
we do not reach this issue. 
5 
 
 
 
We now hold that the FBI materials qualify as "public 
records" under the public records law; that the materials do not 
qualify for exemption (a); and that some of the materials 
qualify for exemption (f), but the rest must be remanded to 
determine whether exemption (f) applies. 
 
Discussion.  "Where the parties have cross-moved for 
summary judgment, we review a grant of summary judgment de novo 
to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the unsuccessful opposing party and drawing all 
permissible inferences and resolving any evidentiary conflicts 
in that party's favor, the successful opposing party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law."  Dzung Duy Nguyen v. 
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 479 Mass. 436, 448 (2018). 
 
1. Public records.  Two statutes primarily govern public 
records requests.  General Laws c. 66, § 10 (a), of the public 
records law requires State governmental entities to provide 
access to "public records" upon request.6  The definition of 
                     
 
6 General Laws c. 66, § 10 (a), provides: 
 
"A records access officer appointed pursuant to [G. L. 
c. 66, § 6A], or a designee, shall at reasonable times and 
without unreasonable delay permit inspection or furnish a 
copy of any public record as defined in clause [G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7 Twenty-sixth], or any segregable portion of a public 
record, not later than [ten] business days following the 
receipt of the request, provided that: 
 
"(i) the request reasonably describes the public record 
sought; 
6 
 
 
"public records" is provided in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, 
and includes all "documentary materials or data, regardless of 
physical form or characteristics, made or received by any 
officer or employee" of any Massachusetts governmental entity 
(emphasis added).  The district attorney maintains, and the 
Superior Court held, that "received" implies ownership and, 
therefore, the FBI materials are not public records under G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, because the materials belong to the 
FBI, not the district attorney.7  We disagree. 
 
"A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that 
statutory language should be given effect consistent with its 
plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless 
to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Sullivan v. 
Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  See also Plymouth 
Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd. 483 Mass. 
600, 604 (2019), quoting Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 
(2018) ("When conducting statutory interpretation, this court 
                     
 
"(ii) the public record is within the possession, custody 
or control of the agency or municipality that the records 
access officer serves; and 
 
"(iii) the records access officer receives payment of a 
reasonable fee as set forth in subsection (d)." 
 
 
7 Neither party disputes that the FBI materials were not 
"made" by the district attorney. 
7 
 
 
strives 'to effectuate' the Legislature's intent by looking 
first to the statute's plain language"). 
 
"Receive" means "to take possession or delivery of"; it 
does not mean own.8  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
1894 (1993).  See also Black's Law Dictionary 1522 (11th ed. 
2019) (defining "receive" as "To take [something offered, given, 
sent, etc.]; to come into possession of or get from some outside 
source").  Not only would construing "received" to be synonymous 
with "owned" contravene the plain meaning of the word, it would 
be inconsistent with the purpose of the public records law:  to 
provide "the public broad access to governmental records."  
Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 
436 Mass. 378, 382-383 (2002) (Worcester Tel.).  If every public 
records request also required the requestor to conduct something 
akin to a title search, then the public would necessarily be 
stymied in its quest for greater government transparency.  By 
using the word "received" in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, it 
                     
 
8 Contrary to the district attorney's argument, Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 439 
Mass. 374 (2003), does not undermine this reading.  In that 
case, we held that certain docket number information constituted 
"court records" under the criminal offender record information 
statute, G. L. c. 6, §§ 167 et seq. (CORI statute), and thus was 
not exempt from disclosure under G. L. c. 66, § 10.  Globe 
Newspaper Co., supra at 383-384.  Our analysis there, in other 
words, turned first and foremost on an interpretation of the 
CORI statute.  Here, our focus is solely on the public records 
law. 
8 
 
 
is clear that the Legislature did not intend a result so starkly 
at odds with the purpose of the law. 
 
Consequently, because the district attorney received the 
FBI materials, the materials are "public records" under G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  Cf. Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President 
& Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 755 (2006) (reports 
created by private university would qualify as public records 
"[o]nce in the custody of the department of State police"). 
 
The FBI's assertion that the materials are Federal property 
and outside the purview of the public records law does not alter 
this conclusion.  The public records law does not vest agencies 
with the authority to determine the statute's scope by making 
interagency agreements.  See Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 
Mass. 86, 98 (2015), quoting Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339 
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("It will obviously not be enough for the 
agency to assert simply that it received the file under a pledge 
of confidentiality to the one who supplied it").  That duty is 
the province of the supervisor of public records, the Superior 
Court, and, ultimately, this court.  See Hull Mun. Lighting 
Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 Mass. 609, 
615 (1993).  See also Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
447 Mass. 478, 481 (2006), citing Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 
347 Mass. 337, 343-344 (1964) ("the duty of statutory 
interpretation rests in the courts"). 
9 
 
 
 
2. Exemptions.  Although the definition of "public records" 
under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, is intentionally broad,9 the 
statute exempts twenty-one categories of information from 
disclosure.  See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a)-(v), as 
amended through St. 2019, c. 41, § 4.  Because the statute 
presumes disclosure, these exemptions "must be strictly and 
narrowly construed."  Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 432 (2019), quoting 
Globe Newspaper Co., 439 Mass. at 380.  "Despite this general 
presumption, the decision whether an exemption to disclosure 
applies requires careful case-by-case consideration."  WBZ-TV4 
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 408 Mass. 595, 603 
(1990).  Here, the district attorney claims that both exemption 
(a) and exemption (f) apply to the FBI materials. 
 
a. Exemption (a).  A public record custodian may invoke 
exemption (a) to prevent disclosure in two scenarios.  First, 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, defines "public 
records" as " all books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded 
tapes, financial statements, statistical tabulations, or other 
documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of 
any agency, executive office, department, board, commission, 
bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of any 
political subdivision thereof, or of any authority established 
by the general court to serve a public purpose, or any person, 
corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity 
which receives or expends public funds for the payment or 
administration of pensions for any current or former employees 
of the commonwealth or any political subdivision as defined in 
[G. L. c. 32, § 1]." 
10 
 
 
exemption (a) exempts a custodian from disclosing public records 
"where another statute -- the 'exempting statute' -- expressly 
prohibits disclosure."  Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. 
Department of Criminal Justice Info. Servs., 484 Mass. 279, 282 
(2020).  Second, exemption (a) applies "where the exempting 
statute protects the record from disclosure by 'necessary 
implication,' such as where the exempting statute prohibits 
disclosure as a practical matter."  Id.  The district attorney 
argues that both the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a 
qualify as exempting statutes under exemption (a).  Neither 
does. 
 
Much like the Massachusetts public records law, FOIA 
creates a framework for public access to various materials in 
the possession of Federal agencies.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552.  
Because FOIA does not even apply to State agencies, the statute 
cannot serve as the basis for an exemption (a) claim.10  See 5 
                     
 
10 Even if FOIA did apply to State agencies, the statute 
still could not serve as the basis for an exemption (a) claim.  
Although FOIA exempts from disclosure certain materials 
"compiled for law enforcement purposes," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), 
the statute's exemptions do not "foreclose disclosure," Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).  Instead, FOIA permits 
an agency to exercise its discretion and disclose exempted 
materials so long as the disclosure is not otherwise prohibited 
by applicable law.  Id. at 294 ("We therefore conclude that 
Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to disclose 
information when it enacted the FOIA").  Thus, FOIA itself would 
neither expressly nor by "necessary implication" prohibit the 
11 
 
 
U.S.C. § 552(f) (defining agencies within scope of FOIA).  See 
also Sykes v. United States, 507 Fed. Appx. 455, 463 (6th Cir. 
2012) ("FOIA does not apply to state entities"); Grand Cent. 
Partnership v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 484 (2d Cir. 1999) ("it is 
beyond question that FOIA applies only to federal and not to 
state agencies"); Phillip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 
58, 83 (1st Cir. 1997) (FOIA "applies only to federal executive 
branch agencies"); St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. 
California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981) (FOIA's 
definition of agency "does not encompass state agencies or 
bodies"). 
 
Unlike FOIA, the Privacy Act bars Federal agencies from 
disclosing certain records "maintained on individuals" unless an 
exemption applies.11  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).  Yet this 
                     
district attorney's disclosure of the FBI materials as is needed 
for exemption (a) to apply.  Cf. Boston Globe Media Partners, 
LLC, 484 Mass. at 282 (collecting examples of statutes that 
qualify as exempting statutes under exemption [a]). 
 
 
11 The act defines such records to include "any item, 
collection, or grouping of information about an individual that 
is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his 
education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal 
or employment history and that contains his name, or the 
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular 
assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a 
photograph."  5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4).  Although the descriptions 
of the FBI materials contained in the district attorney's index 
indicate that at least some of the materials involve 
individuals, we need not reach the issue whether the information 
is sufficient for the materials to fall within the Privacy Act, 
because the statute only governs Federal agencies. 
12 
 
 
prohibition applies only to Federal agencies like the FBI, not 
State agencies like the district attorney's office.12  See 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (defining agencies within scope of Privacy 
Act).  See also Spurlock v. Ashley County, 281 Fed. Appx. 628, 
629 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that Privacy Act applies to Federal 
agencies only); Schmitt v. Detroit, 395 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006) ("The fact that the 
Privacy Act contains a section that defines the term 'agency' as 
including only those agencies that fall under control [of] the 
federal government, coupled with a legislative history that 
supports such a reading of its scope, forces us to conclude that 
. . . the Privacy Act applies exclusively to federal agencies"); 
Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 1983) (Privacy 
Act "applies only to agencies of the United States Government"); 
St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp., 643 F.2d at 1373 (Privacy 
Act's definition of agency "does not encompass state agencies or 
bodies"); Gamble v. Department of the Army, 567 F. Supp. 2d 150, 
                     
 
12 The United States, in its amicus brief, cites Champa, 473 
Mass. at 92-93, for the proposition that Federal statutes may 
qualify as exempting statutes under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth (a).  This is true of Federal statutes that either 
expressly or necessarily prohibit States from disclosing 
particular materials.  For example, the decision in Champa 
involved "[t]he statute known as the Family Education Rights and 
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. II 2014), [which] 
does not expressly prohibit disclosure of 'education records,' 
but . . . does condition receipt of Federal funds on the 
nondisclosure of educational records."  Champa, supra at 91 n.8. 
13 
 
 
154 (D.D.C. 2008) (both Privacy Act and FOIA "are limited to 
entities deriving their authority from the federal government").  
Consequently, neither the Privacy Act nor FOIA can be read as an 
exempting statute as contemplated by exemption (a), and the 
district attorney has not cited any other authority that so 
qualifies.  The district attorney thus cannot claim exemption 
(a). 
 
b. Exemption (f).  Exemption (f) exempts from disclosure 
"investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public 
view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials[,] the 
disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the 
possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure 
would not be in the public interest."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth (f).  Among the reasons for exemption (f) are "the 
prevention of the disclosure of confidential investigative 
techniques, procedures, or sources of information, the 
encouragement of individual citizens to come forward and speak 
freely with police concerning matters under investigation, and 
the creation of initiative that police officers might be 
completely candid in recording their observations, hypotheses 
and interim conclusions."  Bougas v. Chief of Police of 
Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62 (1976). 
 
Depending on the contents of a particular record, 
exemption (f) may cover only certain aspects of the record, see 
14 
 
 
Reinstein v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290 (1979), 
or encompass "a certain carefully defined class of documents" in 
its entirety, Bougas, 371 Mass. at 65.  Furthermore, because the 
nature of certain records' contents may require continuing 
secrecy, the end of an investigation does not automatically 
terminate the applicability of exemption (f).  Id. at 63. 
 
i.  Burden of proof.  As a general matter, one might assume 
that disclosing materials concerning an investigation into an 
individual's ties to an international terrorist organization 
known for targeting law enforcement officials would "be so 
prejudicial to effective law enforcement that it is in the 
public interest to maintain secrecy."13  Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 859 (1995).  The 
requisite legal inquiry as to whether exemption (f) applies, 
however, does not resolve at this level of generality; the 
public records law "does not provide a blanket exemption for 
investigatory materials assembled by police departments."  WBZ-
TV4, 408 Mass. at 603.  Instead, the burden is on the district 
attorney "to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
such record or portion of the record may be withheld in 
                     
 
13 We recognize that preserving comity between State and 
Federal law enforcement agencies may qualify as an interest 
protected by exemption (f) when the record custodian can 
demonstrate that disclosure of particular materials would so 
prejudice law enforcement efforts arising from State-Federal 
cooperation that secrecy is in the public interest. 
15 
 
 
accordance with state or federal law" before a court may 
conclude that exemption (f) applies.  G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10A (d) (1) (iv).  As the record stands, it remains unclear 
whether the district attorney has satisfied that standard with 
respect to all the FBI materials. 
 
There remains understandable confusion concerning the 
burden of proof that a record custodian bears when claiming an 
exemption from the public records law.  In concluding that the 
FBI materials fell within exemption (f), the motion judge 
reasoned that the district attorney's index offered "specific 
proof" of the prejudicial effect that the materials' release 
would have on law enforcement.  "Specific proof" is not 
mentioned in G. L. c. 66, § 10A.  Rather, that language comes 
from the statute's predecessor, G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c), as 
amended through St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 58-59 ("the burden shall be 
upon the custodian to prove with specificity the exemption which 
applies" [emphasis added]).  Part of a broader revision of the 
public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv), replaced 
"with specificity" with "by a preponderance of the evidence" as 
the standard the custodian must prove to claim an exemption.  We 
now compare these two standards to elucidate the meaning of 
G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv). 
 
In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 
Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 281 n.3 (2017), 
16 
 
 
we noted that it appeared that the revisions to the public 
records law "would not significantly alter our analysis as to 
the exemptions and their application."  After reviewing the 
legislative history, we stand by this conclusion.14  Our cases 
that were decided prior to this revision thus remain instructive 
on the level of detail that a record custodian must provide to 
claim exemption (f). 
 
ii. Sufficiency of the index descriptions.  In order for a 
record custodian to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a record is exempt under exemption (f), the custodian must 
provide "insight as to the confidential nature of the contents."  
Matter of a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 445 Mass. 685, 690 (2006).  
See Worcester Tel., 436 Mass. at 386 ("What is critical is the 
nature or character of the documents, not their label").  
Recognizing that exempt materials will necessarily contain 
sensitive information, the record custodian need only provide 
enough evidence about the nature and scope of the materials' 
                     
 
14 The shift from "with specificity" to "by a preponderance 
of the evidence" first appeared in a draft bill proposed by the 
Senate.  See 2016 Senate Doc. No. 2120.  As the lead negotiator 
for the Senate noted, a main concern behind the draft was to 
guarantee that the public records law was "easy to understand."  
Committee will debate public-records law changes in public, The 
Lowell Sun (Mar. 3, 2016), quoting Sen. Joan Lovely.  See State 
House News Service (Senate Sess.), May 25, 2016 (statement of 
Sen. Jason M. Lewis) ("The focus has been to improve and 
strengthen and modernize the law, not to change the scope of the 
law"). 
17 
 
 
contents for a court to infer that disclosure would more likely 
than not prejudice effective law enforcement.  See Bougas, 371 
Mass. at 62.  Evidence about the materials' nature and scope can 
be provided "through the use of an itemized and indexed document 
log in which the custodian sets forth detailed justifications 
for its claims of exemption."  Worcester Tel., 436 Mass. at 384.  
"Where the applicability of an exemption is questionable, in 
camera inspection by a judge may be appropriate."15  Id. 
 
To illustrate the required level of detail, we examine 
several entries from the district attorney's index.16  Entry two 
                     
 
15 Because in camera review occurs in the "absence of an 
advocate's eye," judges "are all too often unable to recognize 
the significance, or insignificance, of a particular document."  
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 144 (2006).  We thus 
reiterate that the technique should be used "only in the last 
resort."  Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 295. 
 
 
16 Although not raised in the district attorney's brief, the 
district attorney previously claimed in the motion for summary 
judgment that entry thirty-four was covered by G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (c) (exemption [c]), in addition to exemption (f).  
Exemption (c) exempts from disclosure "personnel and medical 
files or information [and] any other materials or data relating 
to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."  G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c).  Entry thirty-four states in 
relevant part:  "Report from a Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Assistant Inspector-in-Place regarding medical records, dated 
June 4, 2015 -- 1 page.  The report includes eight pages of 
medical records."  Unlike the analysis under exemption (f), the 
analysis under exemption (c) "requires a balancing test:  where 
the public interest in obtaining the requested information 
substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of 
privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must 
yield."  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 477 
Mass. at 291-292.  Yet despite the different framework, entry 
18 
 
 
states in relevant part:  "Signed/Sworn statement of a Special 
Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning actions 
taken and observations made regarding the shooting that occurred 
on June 2, 2015, dated June 4, 2015 -- 5 pages.  The statement 
includes a one page annotated aerial photograph."  Although 
succinct, this description demonstrates that the identified 
materials contain the identity of at least one law enforcement 
official by name via the signature, descriptions of the 
official's "observations, hypotheses, and interim conclusions" 
about the shooting, and an aerial photograph presumably related 
to these observations.  Bougas, 371 Mass. at 62. 
 
Likewise, entry seventeen describes a "Report from a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistant Inspector-in-Place 
concerning a memorandum of understanding, deputation, and cost 
sharing agreements, dated June 5, 2015, and labeled 
'Deliberative Process Privileged Document' -- 1 page."  From the 
references to deputation17 and cost sharing agreements, a court 
                     
thirty-four suffers from the same problem as some of the entries 
claiming exemption (f) do:  it is unclear whether and how the 
privacy interests of a "specifically named individual" are 
implicated when the description of the records merely as 
"medical" remains abstract and general. 
 
 
17 The entry does not define "deputation."  However, given 
the context of the joint investigation conducted by the FBI and 
the Boston police department, it is reasonable to infer that the 
term refers to the deputation of State law enforcement officials 
in aid of that investigation. 
19 
 
 
may reasonably infer that the materials detail the joint 
investigation's internal organization, facts about which reveal 
highly sensitive investigative techniques or procedures.  In 
short, entries two, seventeen, and other analogous entries18 
provide a court with sufficient detail to conclude that 
disclosure of these materials would more likely than not 
prejudice effective law enforcement, and thus qualify for 
exemption (f). 
 
In contrast, entry thirty-six is described as "Report from 
a Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistant Inspector-in-Place 
concerning copies of reports received, dated June 5, 2015 and 
labeled 'Deliberative Process Privilege Document' -- 3 pages."  
The entry provides a court with little insight into why it 
should qualify for exemption (f).  The label "Deliberative 
Process Privilege Document," without more, gives no guidance as 
to how disclosure would prejudice effective law enforcement; 
mere repetition of the word "report" ("Report . . . concerning 
copies of reports") fails to add anything about the nature and 
scope of the materials' contents.19  Finally, at the far extreme 
                     
 
18 Additional entries that provide sufficient detail about 
the nature and scope of the underlying material are entries one, 
three through sixteen, nineteen through twenty-one, and twenty-
four. 
 
 
19 The hollowness of entry thirty-six's invocation of 
"report" is particularly evident when juxtaposed to entry 
20 
 
 
of examples is entry twenty-two:  "Hand-drawn diagram, dated 
June 2, 2015 -- 1 page."  From this description, a court is able 
to discern little. 
 
Conclusion.  Entries one, two, three, four, five, six, 
seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, 
fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, and 
twenty-four of the district attorney's index fall within 
exemption (f) and need not be turned over.  We remand the case 
to the Superior Court for determination of whether exemption (f) 
applies to the following entries in the district attorney's 
index:  eighteen, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-five, twenty-
six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight, twenty-nine, thirty, thirty-
one, thirty-two, thirty-three, thirty-four, thirty-five, thirty-
six, thirty-seven, thirty-eight.  On remand, the district 
attorney must provide a revised index that catalogues these 
entries in a manner inclusive of enough details about the nature 
and scope of the materials to determine whether each entry falls 
within exemption (f) by a preponderance of evidence.  See G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f).  Should the district attorney 
determine that it is not possible to provide fuller descriptions 
of any specified entry without disclosing information as would 
                     
seventeen, which, though also discussing a "report," actually 
provides details about the report's substantive contents. 
21 
 
 
defeat the purpose of claiming exemption, then the district 
attorney may seek in camera review of the relevant materials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.