Case Title: Carello v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 104, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MICHAEL CARELLO,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 104, 2004 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  C.A. No. IN03041095 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 22, 2004 
Decided:  November 1, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 1st day of November, 2004, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
1. 
Michael Carello appeals his conviction of felony theft in the Superior 
Court, claiming there was insufficient evidence for the trial judge to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the market value of the stolen property equaled or exceeded 
$1000.  The State of Delaware responds, contending that because Carello’s present 
claim was not fairly presented to the trial judge, Carello waived his right to present 
the issue on appeal.  Because we find the record evidence supports the trial judge’s 
findings concerning value, we affirm. 
2. 
In March 2003, a postal carrier witnessed Carello and another exit a 
home in Swanwyck Estates near New Castle.  The two had just burglarized the 
 
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house, carrying away a flat-screen television, an X-Box video game console, 
approximately seventy-five DVDs, a class ring, and several pillowcases.  Later that 
spring, police arrested Carello and a grand jury indicted him on charges of felony 
theft, among others. 
 
3. 
At a bench trial in February 2004, the owner of the home, Joy 
Campbell, testified about what she paid for the stolen items.  According to her, the 
three-week-old television cost her $480; the DVDs, $10 each; and the game 
console, $299.  She estimated the value of the class ring at $200.  The State 
proffered no other evidence of value.   
4. 
In reaching his decision, the trial judge found: 
The items taken from the homes [sic] included a TV, an X-box and 
game, seventy-five CDs [DVDs], and jewelry.  And the prices given 
for all of them, but the jewelry, which was a high school graduation 
ring, were purchase prices; not what those items may have been worth 
necessarily on March 31st.  I have no idea what they’re worth, and I 
think common sense tells me that . . . they would not be worth, once 
bought and taken home and used, the same amount as they would 
have been at the moment of purchase.  However, combined I’m 
satisfied that the value of those items – the TV, the X-box, the CDs, 
and the jewelry – exceed $1000.1 
 
Accordingly, the trial judge found Carello guilty of felony theft.2  Carello did not 
contest the sufficiency of the value evidence during or after trial.  Carello now 
appeals, claiming for the first time that Campbell’s testimony did not provide a 
                                                 
1 Trial Tr. at 68-69 (punctuation altered). 
 
2 State v. Carello, Del. Super., ID No. 0304001480, (Feb. 6, 2004). 
 
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sufficient basis for the trial judge to conclude that the stolen items’ aggregate value 
at the time of the crime exceeded $1000. 
5. 
We review both the law and facts on an appeal from a nonjury trial in 
Superior Court.3  This Court will accept the trial judge's findings of fact if they are 
“sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly, logical, and 
deductive process.”4  We are free to make contradictory findings of fact only when 
the original findings are “clearly wrong and justice requires their overturn.”5  We 
must affirm the trial judge’s findings if there is sufficient evidence to support 
them.6  
6. 
In criminal prosecutions, the General Assembly has, by statute, 
provided the methodology for determining the value of personal property.  
Specifically, value is defined as: 
[T]he market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, 
or if that cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacing the 
property within a reasonable time after the crime.7   
 
                                                 
3 DuPont v. DuPont, 216 A.2d 674, 680 (Del. 1966).   
 
4 Ingram v. Heiman, Aber & Goldlust, 748 A.2d 913 (Del. 2000) (TABLE). 
 
5 Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972), citing Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 
213 A.2d 203, 207 (Del. 1965).   
 
6 Brittingham v. American Dredging Co., 262 A.2d 255, 257 (Del. 1970). 
 
7 11 Del. C. § 224(1). 
 
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Where value cannot be determined “satisfactorily” by these methods, the value of 
property “shall be deemed to be an amount less than $100.”8  The issue in this case 
is whether any rational trier of fact, could, on this record, make a determination of 
value that a reasonable person would deem satisfactory.  In other words, could the 
trier of fact here ascertain from the evidence presented that the replacement cost of 
the stolen items within a reasonable time after the crime exceeded $1,000. 
 
7. 
Campbell testified about the purchase price of the television, game 
console, and DVDs, as well as the estimated value of the ring.  Specifically, she 
stated: 
[DVDs] I think we paid about $10 apiece.  So probably around $750-
$850. 
 
[Television] I think we recently purchased it.  It was around $480. 
 
[Game Console] We had just paid $299 for it. 
[Ring]  I don’t know because it was a gift, but I would think it would 
be around $200 to replace it.9  
 
With the arguable exception of the ring, Campbell offered no basis other than the 
“recent” price paid to acquire the items to support her estimate of value at the time 
of the robbery.  She evidently had not sought to replace the items in the 
marketplace. 
8. 
To warrant a felony conviction, the State has the affirmative burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the merchandise Carello stole 
                                                 
8 Id. 
 
9 Trial Tr. at 21-24. 
 
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totaled at least $1000.10  The statute, moreover, requires evidence of either market 
value at the time of the crime or replacement cost.  Although it is well-settled that 
owners may testify to the value of their property,11 the owner here, except for the 
ring, testified to what she paid, not about current market value at the time of the 
crime or replacement value at a reasonable time after the crime. 
9. 
In Davis v. State,12 the theft victim testified to the stolen property’s 
description, how well it worked, when it had been purchased, and her estimate of 
its current value at the time of the crime.  On appeal from his felony theft, 
burglary, and conspiracy convictions, Davis claimed the State failed to prove the 
property’s market value at the time of the crime.  We disagreed, noting that on 
“this record,” the evidence was properly admitted.13 
10.  We similarly held in Lukas v. State that testimony concerning the 
“worth” of parts stolen from a truck manufacturer was properly admitted.14  The 
Court quoted the theft statute then in effect: “. . . the value shall be the market 
                                                 
10 11 Del. C. § 841(c)(1). 
 
11 State v. 0.15 Acres of Land, 169 A.2d 256, 258 (Del. 1961) (holding that owner is presumed 
cognizant of market value); see also Ligon v. Brooks, 196 A. 200 (Del. 1937). 
 
12 453 A.2d 802 (Del. 1982). 
 
13 Id. 
 
14 303 A.2d 664 (Del. 1973). 
 
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value or the replacement cost.”15  As parts used in the victim’s assembly business, 
their market value could be readily ascertained. 
 
11. 
Here, the value of each individual item stolen is unclear.  The record 
is not as developed as the one in Davis, nor is the property akin to regularly-
ordered parts in an assembly line, as in Lukas.  Although one could argue that 
much of the stolen property here was relatively new, resulting in a de minimis 
reduction from the purchase price, the value evidence reflects neither market value 
at the time of the crime nor replacement cost within a reasonable time after the 
crime.  The question then becomes whether the factfinder can infer market or 
replacement value from the record evidence. 
 
12. 
Other jurisdictions that have considered owner testimony in criminal 
cases have deferred to the factfinder in determining value.16  The Court of Appeals 
of Georgia, for example, has held: 
Testimony of the owner of the value of stolen items based upon his 
experience in buying them, coupled with the jury's awareness of the 
value of “everyday objects,” is sufficient to allow the jury to consider 
such opinion evidence and make reasonable deductions exercising 
their own knowledge and ideas.17   
                                                 
15 Id. at 665, quoting 11 Del. C. § 633 (1973). 
 
16 See, e.g., Haynes v. Glenn, 91 S.E.2d 433, 438 (Va. 1956) (“[E]vidence of value a reasonable 
time prior and subsequent to the conversion is admissible, its weight being for the trier of fact.”); 
People v. Supino, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12550, at *2 (holding that where used car was 
stolen a few months after purchase, “[c]ost is some proof of the value and, in this case, it is 
enough.”). 
 
17 Moore v. State, 321 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
 
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The victim in Moore, however, stated on the record his estimate of replacement 
cost and the purchase price.  Although the Georgia court found the inferences to be 
proper, that court nonetheless had in the record an explicit estimate of replacement 
cost. 
 
13. 
The evidentiary deficiencies here, however, are not fatal.  The 
overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the sufficiency of lay 
testimony concerning value, including this Court, have concluded that owners are 
in the best position to estimate the worth of their personalty.18  Assessing the 
credibility of their estimates, essential to a felony theft prosecution, ultimately 
devolves on the factfinder.19   
 
14. 
In declaring that he had “no idea what they are worth,” we believe the 
trial judge was implicitly referring to the item’s market value at the time of the 
crime.  Without the benefit of explicit, time-sensitive testimony concerning market 
value, the trial judge instead, as he put it, relied on his common sense to determine 
replacement cost.  In the absence of a record establishing market value at the time 
                                                 
18 See generally M. C. Dransfield, Annotation, Admissibility Of Opinion Of Nonexpert Owner As 
To Value Of Chattel, 37 A.L.R.2D 967 § 25 (collecting cases).   
 
19 See Davis, 453 A.2d at 803 (“Defendant's contention that Jones'[s] estimates were inflated 
goes to the weight of her testimony, not whether the figures were properly admitted.”). 
 
 
 
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of the crime, we believe it was reasonable for the trial judge, sitting as the trier of 
fact, to do so.    
 
15. 
Although Campbell stated only what she paid, this testimony provides 
a sufficient basis for the factfinder to conclude the State had met the $1000 
threshold it needed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt.  The stolen items are 
common household goods, easily with the realm of everyday experience.  
Furthermore, the television and game console were recently purchased; Campbell 
testified she had “just paid” for them.  Where the stolen property comprises 
common household items, recently purchased, the factfinder can reasonably infer 
the items’ value at the time they were stolen or their replacement cost from the 
owner’s recollection of purchase price.  From the trial judge’s perspective here, it 
is logical to assume that Campbell could replace these items at a price similar to 
what she had paid.  Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find the 
value of the property Carello stole equaled or exceeded $1000. 
 
16. 
Although we find the evidence presented in this case sufficient to 
support Carello’s felony theft conviction, we caution that our reasoning is based on 
the unique circumstances of the record before us.  Ideally, counsel would both 
frame a line of questioning designed to elicit testimony that squarely addresses the 
statutory distinction between market value at the time of the crime and replacement 
 
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cost within a reasonable time, and present the evidentiary route relied upon to the 
factfinder. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice