Case Title: Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones

Citation: 1998-Ohio-186

Docket Number: 19970714

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE LONG BEACH ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLEE, v. JONES ET AL., APPELLANTS; 
PRYKA ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Real property — Construction of 1927 plat agreement. 
(No. 97-714 — Submitted April 22, 1998 at the Seneca County Session — 
Decided August 12, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ottawa County, No. OT-96-032. 
 
Long Beach is a community located on the southern shore of Lake Erie in 
Ottawa County.  It consists of three subdivision blocks designated A, B, and C, 
divided into residential lots.  Block B includes a constructed lagoon with a private 
lane around its perimeter providing boating access to Lake Erie. 
 
In 1923, a plat for the subdivision of Long Beach was submitted by the 
Long Beach Company and was recorded with the Ottawa County Recorder.  This 
plat included blocks A, B, and C; however, only A and C were subdivided into 
lots, including one hundred ninety-three lots in Block A and one hundred five lots 
in Block C.  The 1923 plat contained no indication of or reference to the lagoon or 
private road.  Block B, situated between Blocks A and C, was not divided into lots 
until a separate plat was submitted to the county recorder in 1927. 
 
The 1927 plat, entitled “Long Beach Subdivision of Block B,” included one 
hundred one single-family residential lots.  It included a statement that Lot E, 
which includes the lagoon, and the private lane “are for the use of lot owners 
within the subdivision.”  The platters in the 1927 plat were different from those of 
the 1923 plat, but both sets included officers of the Long Beach Company. 
 
The Long Beach Company discontinued business at an unidentified date, 
and the Long Beach Association was organized in 1939.  The association is open 
to membership for residents of Blocks A, B, and C.  The association is and has 
 
2
been involved in the maintenance and regulation of the lagoon area, including 
control of the dockings and the leasing of docks to residents of Blocks A and C.  
Over the years, the association has made various improvements to the docks and 
dock area. 
 
Appellants Stanley K. and Joan Jones purchased Lot 87 in Block B in 1978, 
and appellants Ralph and Delores Schade purchased Lot 88 in Block B in 1954.  
Appellants were members of the association until the association filed suit to quiet 
title to the lagoon and private lane and for trespass against the Joneses for using 
more than one docking space for a period of years in contravention of association 
regulations. 
 
The Joneses counterclaimed and the Schades made a third-party claim 
against the association, claiming trespass, conversion, unjust enrichment, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Appellants contend that they installed 
steel piling along the shoreline, within their lot lines, for their own personal use, 
but the association is leasing docks to persons from Blocks A and C.  The 
association responded by offering evidence that its improvements were made for 
the benefit of all members. 
 
The trial court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, dismissed the 
counterclaim and third-party claim.  It determined that there was no evidence 
supporting the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court 
dismissed the trespass claim because it determined that the association’s interest 
was of a sufficient extent that appellants could not exclude the association from 
use of the private lane and lagoon.  Finally, the court dismissed the remaining 
claims, finding that the 1927 plat agreement was unambiguous and that no 
evidence in the plat dedication, attached affidavits, or recorded restrictions 
 
3
supported the appellants’ contention that the lagoon was for the exclusive use of 
the residents of Block B. 
 
Upon appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in 
dismissing the counterclaims of trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment, and 
affirmed summary judgment on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  Additionally, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the 1927 plat and found the language in the two plats sufficiently 
ambiguous on the question of whether the members of Blocks A and C were 
intended to have access to the docks to preclude summary judgment. 
 
Despite the ruling of the court of appeals in their favor, the appellants 
appealed to this court on the issue of whether the 1927 plat clearly and 
unambiguously dedicated use of the lagoon and private lane to residents of Block 
B only. 
 
The cause is before the court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Pheils & Wisniewski and David R. Pheils, Jr., for appellants. 
 
McKean & McKean and Alan R. McKean; Fuller & Henry, P.L.L., Martin 
D. Carrigan and Lisa A. Lay, for appellee Long Beach Association, Inc. 
 
Meister, Ayers & Meister and Mark Metusalem, for appellees Ray Pryka et 
al. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  The question presented for resolution is whether the wording 
in the 1927 plat of Block B is ambiguous or clear, and if clear, whether the plat 
limits use of the lagoon to residents of Block B or allows use to residents of 
Blocks A, B, and C of the Long Beach subdivision. 
 
4
 
Our analysis causes us to conclude that the wording in the plat is clear in 
stating that all residents of the Long Beach subdivision have use of the lagoon, 
which includes the residents of Blocks A, B, and C.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
 
The construction of written contracts and instruments, including deeds, is a 
matter of law.  Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, 
Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 322, 15 OBR 448, 449, 474 N.E.2d 271, 272.  
Questions of law are reviewed de novo.  Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147, 593 N.E.2d 286, 287. 
 
The plat that is the subject of this dispute reads: 
 
“Long Beach Subdivision of Block B of which this is a correct plat is laid 
out on and consists of Block B in Long Beach in Carroll Township, Ottawa 
County, Ohio recorded in Vol. ____ Page ____ of Plats of Ottawa County Record 
of Plats.  Said Block B being located between Blocks A and C, Long Beach whose 
south line is 6613 North of centerline of Long Beach Road (as called) and whose 
north line is shore of Lake Erie.  Stakes are set at all lot corners.  Iron pipe set at 
points marked thus -o- Stone monuments at points marked thus -x.  Lots are 
numbered from 1-103 both inclusive and Lots A-B-C-D-E and F, G, and H.  * * * 
 
“We the undersigned owners of the above described premises adopt this 
subdivision into lots and dedicate to public use the way hereon delineated.  Lot G 
is hereby dedicated to public use as soon as land adjoining on the South dedicated 
20 ft. adjoining Robinwood Drive for street purposes.  No part of private lane is 
dedicated to public.  Said private lane Lots C-D and E are for the use of lot owners 
within the sub-division.” 
 
“Where terms in an existing contract are clear and unambiguous, this court 
cannot in effect create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in the 
 
5
clear language employed by the parties.” Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. 
(1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 246, 7 O.O.3d 403, 406, 374 N.E.2d 146, 150; Blosser 
v. Enderlin (1925), 113 Ohio St. 121, 148 N.E. 393, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Applying those well-established principles here, if the intent of the drafters 
was to delineate an entirely new subdivision, they easily could have done so by 
eliminating any reference to its being a part of the general subdivision.  The plat 
language clearly states that Block B is located “between Blocks A and C, Long 
Beach.”  The common meaning of this language can only suggest that Block B is a 
part of the general subdivision established in 1923.  Nothing supports the 
contention of the appellants that Block B is somehow a separate subdivision from 
the Long Beach subdivision established in 1923, and that therefore the use of the 
lagoon is exclusive to the residents of Block B.  We find no words in the plat that 
indicate an intent to remove Block B from the subdivision of Long Beach and 
designate an entirely separate subdivision. Thus, the proper conclusion is that 
Block B is included in the Long Beach subdivision. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the court of appeals erred in determining that the 
trial court made a factual determination concerning the plat language, since the 
interpretation of the unambiguous language was correctly a matter of law subject 
to determination by the trial court. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the 
trial court is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.