Case Title: Lessard v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lessard v. State1986 WY 119719 P.2d 227Case Number: 85-75Decided: 05/21/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lonnie LESSARD, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

Wyo. Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Darold W. Killmer, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY,* BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., 
Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The first issue 
presented in this appeal is whether a verdict finding Lonnie Lessard guilty of 
one count of sexual assault and one count of aggravated burglary must be set 
aside in view of the findings in the same verdict of not guilty with respect to 
two other counts of sexual assault which were alleged to be based upon the same 
transaction. A second issue is raised which asserts error in the admission of 
expert testimony concerning the reactions of victims of sexual assault. We hold 
that there is no error in the admission of the expert testimony and that the 
divergent findings in the jury's verdict are not a basis for any claim of error 
on appeal. The judgment and sentence entered by the trial court is 
affirmed.

[¶2.]     Lessard was charged 
with three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 
6-2-302(a)(i) and (ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.),1 and one count of aggravated 
burglary in violation of § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.).2

[¶3.]     The case was tried to a 
jury which found Lessard guilty of the first count of first degree sexual 
assault and the count of aggravated burglary. By its verdict the jury found him 
not guilty of the second and third counts of first degree sexual assault. 
Lessard then was sentenced to 10 to 25 years on each of the counts of which he 
was convicted, with the sentences to run concurrently, and with credit given for 
time in custody awaiting trial. This appeal is taken from the judgment and 
sentence imposing the two concurrent terms of 
imprisonment.

[¶4.]     In the Brief of the 
Appellant Lessard states the issues to be:

"1. Whether in light of 
Appellant's acquittal on two counts of first degree sexual assault, there exists 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of one count of first degree 
sexual assault and one count of aggravated burglary.

"2. The Court erroneously 
permitted the introduction of an expert's testimony that [the victim's] behavior 
during the course of the alleged sexual assault as [the victim] related it to 
the expert was consistent with [the victim] having been sexually 
assaulted."

In its Brief of 
the Appellee the State of Wyoming sets forth the issues to be resolved 
in this way:

"I. There exists 
sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction of one count of first 
degree sexual assault and one count of aggravated 
burglary.

"II. Admission of expert 
testimony was within the discretion of the trial judge and does not constitute 
grounds for reversal."

[¶5.]     Lessard first met the 
victim when he and a friend of the victim and her husband stopped at the 
victim's residence for the purpose of borrowing money to buy alcoholic 
beverages. The victim loaned them the money, taking the friend's impact set and 
Lessard's tool box as collateral, and they left. The friend and Lessard, 
accompanied by Lessard's father, then returned to the victim's home with beer 
and whiskey. The victim's husband was out of town in connection with his 
employment, and she and her young child had other visitors, a married female 
friend and the friend's two children. The victim, her female friend and the 
three men played some parlor games and consumed alcoholic beverages until the 
three men manifested some unacceptable conduct. The women asked them to leave 
and they did so.

[¶6.]     Two days later Lessard 
went back to the victim's home to repay the loan and retrieve the collateral 
which had been left with her. Lessard testified that the victim was apprised of 
the fact that he had no place to stay and that he had been sleeping in his car. 
He said that the victim invited him to stay at her house any time he needed a 
place to stay. In her testimony at the trial the victim controverted this 
claimed invitation.

[¶7.]     The next day the victim 
and her infant child visited at the home of her husband's aunt and uncle. She 
returned to her residence that evening, put her infant child to bed, and made 
some phone calls, including a telephone call to her husband. She testified that 
she then locked the doors and the windows and went to bed at about 11:00 P.M. On 
that day Lessard traveled to Hardin, Montana, with his father, and on the trip back to 
Buffalo they 
were partying and drinking most of the way. They arrived in Buffalo late in the 
evening, and Lessard went to a friend's house where he drank some beer. Lessard 
then went on to the Buffalo Bar for a drink, and after that he went to JR's for 
drinking and dancing until some time after midnight. He then went back to the 
Buffalo Bar where he met a friend, and the two of them went to another woman's 
home where they were told to go away.

[¶8.]     Following this Lessard 
went to the victim's home. Lessard's story, as related in his trial testimony, 
was that he drove to the victim's house, knocked on the door and rang the 
doorbell, but received no response to his efforts to summon someone to the door. 
He then tried the front door, and, having discovered that it was unlocked, he 
entered and hollered to announce his presence. He testified that ultimately he 
found the victim asleep in the bedroom, woke her up and asked permission to 
"crash" there. According to Lessard the victim granted permission; they spent 
some time visiting; one thing led to another; and they engaged in consensual 
intercourse but only one time. After that Lessard went into the kitchen for a 
drink of water, and he noticed that the kitchen window was broken. He offered to 
return later in the day and fix the window. Lessard testified that about 5:00 or 
5:30 A.M. the victim asked him to leave so that the neighbors would not see his 
car and infer that he had spent the night. He said that they agreed that he 
would return later to repair the window, and the victim told him how to enter 
the house using a credit card to force the lock if he found the door to be 
locked. Lessard stated that he then left, but he did pause outside the house to 
inspect the window so that he would know what repair materials he would need and 
in the process he did touch the broken glass with his 
fingers.

[¶9.]     The victim's account 
was entirely different. She said that she was first awakened by the cries of her 
infant child who was in bed beside her and that she discovered Lessard 
straddling her waist with one knee on each side of her. Lessard demanded that 
she remove her clothing, but she declined. Lessard then began to remove his 
clothing and she kicked him in the face. This caused him to lose his balance and 
fall away from the bed, but he recovered before she could get away. The victim 
testified that Lessard then told her that if she ever wanted to hold her infant 
son again she would do what he wanted. She testified that he initially attempted 
to force her to perform fellatio, but she gagged when his penis came in contact 
with her lips, and that he then forced her to submit to sexual intercourse which 
was painful for her because of recent cervical surgery. She testified that some 
20 minutes later Lessard repeated the act of intercourse with her and that after 
approximately another 45 minutes he had sexual intercourse with her a third 
time. According to her testimony it was after this last assault that they went 
into the kitchen and discovered the broken window. She said that Lessard stayed 
in her home until about 5:45 A.M. and that he then told her he would return 
later. She admitted that she did ask him not to tell anyone that they had had 
sex.

[¶10.]  Immediately after Lessard left the victim 
telephoned her husband's aunt and uncle who summoned the police. The police 
officers took the victim to the hospital for an examination which revealed that 
the victim indeed had experienced recent sexual intercourse. Upon investigation 
the police officers found Lessard's fingerprints on broken fragments of glass 
which were outside the victim's home. When Lessard returned to the house later 
in the morning the police were present pursuing their investigation, and Lessard 
told them that his fingerprints would be all over the window. Lessard was not 
arrested at that time although he did make a statement to the police officers. 
Still later in the day Lessard went to the police station as he had been 
instructed to do, and at that time he was arrested for the offenses which were 
charged in the information.

[¶11.]  Lessard's argument in support of his 
first claim of error is complex and sophisticated. He acknowledges that in Clegg 
v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1240 (1982), this court dealt with a very similar 
situation in which there were findings of guilty of three counts of first degree 
sexual assault and findings of not guilty with respect to another three counts 
of first degree sexual assault. To avoid the result dictated by Clegg v. State, 
supra, the appellant turns to Amin v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1021 (1985), a case involving 
the propriety of instructions on lesser included offenses. In that case this 
court held that a lesser included offense instruction need not be given in a 
case in which the evidence discloses that the defendant is guilty either of the 
greater offense charged or is not guilty at all. The justification for a refusal 
to give the lesser included offense instructions in such an instance is that it 
invites the jury to speculate or compromise. Lessard contends that in his case, 
as in Amin v. State, supra, the evidence discloses that he either was guilty of 
three counts of first degree sexual assault and the aggravated burglary or that 
he really did nothing wrong. He then argues that the inconsistent verdicts 
demonstrate that the jury either speculated on his guilt or made an improper 
compromise. Lessard reasons that if it is improper, as held in Amin v. State, 
supra, to instruct the jury in such a way that it may speculate or compromise, 
obviously, it is improper to permit a verdict to stand which manifests 
speculation or compromise.

[¶12.]  Lessard's case is quite different form 
the authority upon which he relies. In Amin v. State, supra, this court, 
following earlier precedents on the subject, held that a lesser included offense 
instruction was not required in an instance in which the only evidence 
demonstrated that the accused either was guilty of the charged offense or was 
not guilty of any crime. The court pointed out that if a rational trier of fact 
could convict of a lesser offense but acquit of the greater then the lesser 
included offense instruction should be given; but to justify the giving of a 
lesser included offense instruction there must be a conflict in the evidence as 
to the existence of some element which distinguishes the charged offense from 
the lesser included offense. Amin v. State, supra, 695 P.2d  at 1028, quoting 
State v. Yarbrough, 131 Ariz. 70, 638 P.2d 737, 740 (1981). If there 
is no conflict in the evidence with respect to the distinguishing element then 
no instruction with respect to the lesser included offense should be given 
because in that situation it is not necessary for the jury to make a 
determination as to which evidence, including the different aspects of any 
witness' testimony, it should believe in resolving any factual issue as to the 
existence of the disputed element. Clegg v. State, supra; Brown v. State, 
Wyo., 581 P.2d 189 (1978); Montez v. State, 
Wyo., 527 P.2d 1330 (1974). In this case there indeed was a conflict in the evidence which 
justified the submission of all the charged offenses to the jury, but in 
resolving that conflict in the evidence, the jury, as in Clegg v. State, supra, 
was permitted to find as it did.

[¶13.]  The fatal flaw with respect to Lessard's 
argument is that it does not take into account the fact that error in failing to 
offer a lesser included offense instruction which is disadvantageous to a 
defendant is subject to review on appeal whereas an inconsistency in verdicts 
does not present an issue that is subject to review on appeal. In essence the 
difference is that our system of jurisprudence does not hold a judge or jury 
accountable for those errors which may be favorable to an accused, but it does 
require accountability for mistakes that are not favorable to the accused. Even 
though the ruling in favor of the accused is erroneous and results in an 
acquittal the constitutional protection against double jeopardy inhibits any 
demand that the judge or the jury be held accountable for that error. Contrary 
to Lessard's claim that the inconsistency in these verdicts demonstrates jury 
conjecture or compromise which requires reversal the correct resolution is that 
such verdicts do not present any issue for review.

[¶14.]  In State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119, 127 (1947), this court quoted with approval from the opinion of 
Justice Holmes in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932). In that case Justice Holmes, quoting in part from Judge Learned 
Hand, explained that:

"Consistency in the 
verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a 
separate indictment. Latham v. Reg. 5 Best & S. 635, 642, 643; Selvester v. 
United States, 170 U.S. 262, 18 S. Ct. 580, 42 L. Ed. 1029 
[1898]. If separate indictments had been presented against the defendant for 
possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been separately tried, the 
same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not be 
pleaded as res judicata of the other. Where the offenses are separately charged 
in the counts of a single indictment the same rule must hold. As was said in 
Steckler v. United 
States (C.C.A.2d 7 F.2d 59, 60 
[1925]:

`The most that can be 
said in such cases is that the verdict shows either in the acquittal or the 
conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show 
that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the 
acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to 
exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.'

"Compare Horning v. 
District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 53, 65 L. Ed. 185 [1920].

"That the verdict may 
have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is 
possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such 
matters."

[¶15.]  This concept, which may be characterized 
as recognition of jury nullification, appears to be the rule followed in the 
courts of the United 
States. E.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 476, 
83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984); United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279, 
64 S. Ct. 134, 135, 88 L. Ed. 49, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 815, 64 S. Ct. 367, 88 L. Ed. 492 (1943); Young v. United States, 168 F.2d 242, 246 (10th 
Cir. 1948); Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1949); Coil v. 
United States, 343 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Magnus, 365 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2nd Cir. 
1966); Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 1967); United States 
v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Livengood, 427 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bevins, 430 F.2d 601, 603 (6th 
Cir. 1970); United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 479 (2nd Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Littlewind, 551 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1096 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jacobs, 632 F.2d 695, 697 (7th 
Cir. 1980); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 581, modified, 671 F.2d 858 (5th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 181, 74 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1982); 
United States v. Cargo Service Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676, 685, reh'g denied, 
664 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389, 1393 (11th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Upshaw, 685 F.2d 1202, 1203 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Stewart v. Blackburn, 746 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 105 S. Ct. 1401, 84 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1985); United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1536 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 81, 88 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1985). 

[¶16.]  In State v. Hickenbottom, supra, this 
court held that in any instance in which any given element of any charged 
offense is different from the elements of another charged offense, then 
divergent verdicts with respect to those charged offenses are not inconsistent. 
This is so even though the same evidence will establish the rest of the elements 
of both charges. Such verdicts do not present a basis for a claim of error 
because they do not afford any ground for relief from the judgment and sentence 
of the court. This rule is in harmony with that of the federal courts and a 
majority of the courts of other states. See cases cited in Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 
259 (1968); Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 514 (1982). 
The rule establishes the proposition that inconsistent verdicts in criminal 
cases have no legal significance save in the instance of double jeopardy. Even 
though the same evidence may be relied upon to prove the elements of crimes 
separately charged in different counts of an indictment or information, if the 
crimes involve different elements, a conviction on any of the counts could not 
be invoked to demonstrate a claim of double jeopardy with respect to any of the 
other counts. In such a situation verdicts of guilty as to one count and not 
guilty as to any other as a matter of law are not inconsistent. There cannot be 
error under Lessard's theory if the verdicts are 
consistent.

[¶17.]  This rule is sound and can be applied to 
justify the result of other cases in our jurisdiction in which this issue has 
been touched upon. See Mainville v. State, Wyo., 607 P.2d 339 (1980); Padilla v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 189 (1979); and Hahn v. State, 78 
Wyo. 258, 322 P.2d 896 (1958). The essence of the rule has been invoked by other courts which 
have dealt with such issues in cases involving charges of multiple sexual 
assaults. State v. Flynn, 109 Ariz. 545, 514 P.2d 466 (1973); State v. Fairfax, 42 Wn.2d 777, 258 P.2d 1212 
(1953).

[¶18.]  The rule represented by State v. 
Hickenbottom, supra, is valid for yet another reason. It prevents any 
speculation concerning the deliberations of a jury in a criminal case. Lessard's 
contention requires speculation concerning the deliberations of the jury. We are 
compelled to eschew any invitation extended by Lessard's claim of jury 
conjecture or compromise to make our own speculations with respect to the 
product of a jury verdict and the deliberations which led to it. Rule 606, 
W.R.E., addresses this subject as follows:

"(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or 
indictment. - Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the 
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from 
the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection 
therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning 
a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received, * * 
*."

Wisdom dictates 
that, having articulated a policy which forecloses proof of the process of jury 
deliberation, we do not then arrive at appellate decisions based upon our 
assumptions with respect to matters which our policy clearly says are not 
susceptible to proof.

[¶19.]  The second complaint that Lessard makes 
is that the trial court erred in permitting an expert witness, a rape crisis 
counselor, to testify that the victim's behavior was consistent with a sexual 
assault. This witness first testified about her training and experience, and 
defense counsel then requested a bench conference to discuss the proposed 
testimony. The trial judge made it clear that he was not going to permit any 
testimony about a profile of rapists. He did rule, in effect, that the witness 
could testify with respect to her interview of the victim and her explanation of 
why the victim made certain statements such as "Don't tell anybody." Following 
the bench conference defense counsel objected on the ground that the expert's 
testimony was not relevant and any probative value would be outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect. This objection was overruled by the trial court. The 
essential testimony then continued as follows:

"PROSECUTOR: 
Hypothetically, given a sexual assault, is it common or uncommon for the victim 
to ask the assailant not to say anything about what has 
happened?

"EXPERT: It's very common 
on a threat of death because the person can be identified. The victim can 
identify the person who has assaulted her and she must protect herself, and in 
this case, her child and she would say anything, and it's very, very 
common.

"PROSECUTOR: Has that 
commonality been shown through instances in other cases?

"EXPERT: I would say the 
majority. * * *"

In this court 
Lessard argues that in effect this witness vouched for the truthfulness of the 
victim which is an invasion of the province of the jury. The State of Wyoming contends that 
this issue should not be addressed because it was not presented on that basis to 
the trial court.

[¶20.]  If this witness testified to the 
truthfulness of the victim, contrary to this court's holding in Smith v. State, 
Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194 (1977), this court could address the question under the 
doctrine of plain error. Wunder v. State, Wyo., 
705 P.2d 333 (1985); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 692 P.2d 911 (1984). Lessard correctly 
points out that in Smith v. State, supra, this court held that an expert may not 
testify with respect to the truthfulness of the defendant because that testimony 
does invade the province of the jury. It is based upon the well-established 
principle that the question of credibility is for the trier of fact a question 
for the jury. The principle is applicable in this instance because the 
credibility of a victim of a claimed sexual assault is an issue for the jury. 
Brown v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 189 
(1978).

[¶21.]  Expert testimony now is addressed in Rule 
702, W.R.E., which provides in pertinent part:

"If * * * specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert * * * may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

Rule 704, 
W.R.E., says:

"Testimony in the form of 
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact."

This court, in 
harmony with the language of Rule 702, W.R.E., has said that expert testimony is 
admissible if it is helpful to the trier of fact. Buhrle v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374 (1981); McCabe v. R.A. Manning 
Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699 
(1983); Reed v. Hunter, Wyo., 663 P.2d 513 
(1983).

[¶22.]  The rule articulated in Smith v. State, 
supra, is based upon a principle that credibility is for the trier of fact. 
Testimony as to truthfulness would have to be otherwise admissible to make it 
subject to the implications of Rule 704, W.R.E. The assumption of the rule found 
in Smith v. State, however, is that the members of the jury are themselves 
expert with respect to the issue of credibility. Consequently, such testimony 
would not be of assistance to the jury in understanding the evidence or in 
determining a fact in issue in accordance with Rule 702, W.R.E. We conclude that 
the rule of Smith v. State, supra, survives the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence, and is still the law in Wyoming. See, e.g., McArtor v. State, 
Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 (1985); Simmons v. State, 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 255 (1984) (credibility is for the trier of fact).

[¶23.]  Acceptance of this prong of Lessard's 
argument, however, does not change the result in this case. The expert in this 
instance testified that most rape victims at some point ask their assailant not 
to tell. The witness then gave her opinion of why victims usually do this. In 
the process the expert did not say that she believed or held any opinion with 
respect to the victim's version of the events surrounding the assault. She did 
not vouch for the truth of the victim's testimony, and we will not so construe 
the opinion which she furnished. The trial court is afforded sound discretion in 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and our principle of jurisprudence is 
that the exercise of that discretion will not be set aside except upon a clear 
showing of abuse. Amin v. State, supra; Munden v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 621 (1985); Towner v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 45 (1984). 
In this instance the trial court did exclude a portion of the evidence which the 
expert was prepared to offer. In the exercise of his discretion, however, the 
trial judge permitted the expert witness to testify on the basis of her 
specialized knowledge in order to assist the jury to understand one aspect of 
the evidence. That was a matter which had troubled both the prosecutor and the 
defense counsel, i.e., why would a victim ask the assailant not to tell about 
the sexual encounter. The explanation given by the expert does not constitute 
testimony with respect to the veracity of the victim, and the appellant has made 
no other showing of an abuse of discretion in the admission of his 
testimony.

[¶24.]  The judgment and sentence of the trial 
court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-2-302(a)(i) 
and (ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.), provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first 
degree if:

"(i) The actor causes 
submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated 
to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement;

"(ii) The actor causes 
submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme 
physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably 
believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats; * * 
*."

2 Section 6-3-301(a) and 
(c)(ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.), provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

* * * * * 
*

"(c) Aggravated burglary 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more 
than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000.00), or both, if, in the course of committing the crime of burglary, 
the person:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Knowingly or 
recklessly inflicts bodily injury on anyone; or"

* * * * * 
*