Case Title: FML V. TW

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-06-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
FML V. TW2007 WY 73157 P.3d 455Case Number: C-06-7Decided: 05/03/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
FML,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
TW,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofWashakieCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

DaNece 
Day of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, PC, Gillette, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Thomas 
W. Harrington of Davis & Harrington, P.C., Worland, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a dissenting 
opinion, with which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, FML 
(hereafter Mother), seeks review of an order of the district court which granted 
TW's (Father's) Motion to Modify Custody.  
Father based his motion principally upon an assertion that Mother had 
actively and persistently interfered with his right of visitation with SMW (the 
parties' child, born January 1, 2005).  
The district court granted Father's motion.  Mother contends that the district court 
erred in placing more weight on Mother's violations of the initial 
custody/visitation order than it did on other factors affecting the best 
interests of the child as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 
2005).1  Mother also contends that the district 
court erred by failing to establish visitation  that includes details necessary to 
promote understanding and compliance as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-202(a) (LexisNexis 2005).2  We will affirm the trial court's order 
to the extent it modified custody, but remand for the purposes of clarifying the 
details on visitation as required by the governing statute and for a 
determination of child support to be paid by Mother, unless the district court 
has already done so.  As a prefatory 
matter we will, on our own motion, address whether or not the order from which 
the appeal was taken is an appealable order as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 
1.05.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mother raises 
these issues:

 
 
A.  Did 
the trial court commit reversible error by failing to establish visitation that 
includes details necessary to promote understanding and compliance as required 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-202?

 
 
B.  Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by placing more weight on the Mother's 
violation of the existing order than other factor's affecting the best interests 
of the child as set forth by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-101(a)?

 
 
Father 
raises this issue:

 
 
1.  Is 
there sufficient evidence to affirm the district court's decision to award 
primary custody to Father?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Based upon the 
record on appeal that was received by this Court, we are only able to provide a 
sketchy history of this case.  This 
matter appears to have been initiated when the State of Wyoming, Department of 
Family Services, ex rel. SML, filed a Petition to Establish Support on February 
28, 2005.  As an adjunct of the 
proceeding, Father sought to establish a visitation schedule.  An order entered on June 16, 2005, 
established the child's paternity in Father and established a detailed 
visitation schedule.  The record on 
appeal indicates that both parents are fit parents.

 
 
[¶4]      On July 15, 2005, 
Father filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause asserting that Mother refused to 
comply with the visitation schedule established by the district court.  The district court entered such an order 
on July 25, 2005, and set it for hearing on August 11, 2005.  After that hearing, Mother was ordered 
to allow Father additional compensatory visitation.  On January 27, 2006, Father filed a 
Motion to Modify Custody and Motion for Order to Show Cause.  Father again asserted that Mother had 
denied or interfered with his right of visitation and that Mother had moved to 
Kansas without 
notice to Father.  This matter was 
set for hearing on April 20, 2006, and the hearing was held on that date.  In a decision letter entered in the 
record on June 29, 2006, the district court made these general findings which 
were iterated in the appealable order:3 

 
 
1.  That 
[Father], the father of [Child], and [Mother] were never married but that 
[Child] was born of that union.

2.  That 
the Stateattempted to establish child support and filed a Petition in District 
Court on February 28, 2005 and as a result of an Order signed by this Court on 
16 June, 2005, [Father] was established as the natural father of 
[Child].

3.  That 
on the 15th day of July 2005, the father filed 
his Motion for Order to Show Cause to hold [Mother] in contempt for her failure 
to follow the necessary order concerning visitation.

4.  That 
this Court, after hearing, determined that  [Mother] had frustrated the 
visitation schedule and ordered that [Father] was to have an additional 28 hours 
of visitation.

5.  That 
on January 27, 2006, [Father] filed his Motion to Modify Custody on the basis 
that [Mother] has repeatedly denied or interfered with his visitation to such a 
degree that it constituted a material change of 
circumstances.

6.  That 
 [Mother] moved to Lawrence, Kansas, without notification to  [Father] and only 
contacted [him] after she had been in Kansas for several 
months.

7.  That 
 [Mother] failed to provide any type of telephone or cell phone numbers or 
street address to Father so visitation could be arranged.

8.  That 
 [Mother] by failing to comply with and allow visitation as ordered by the 
Court has frustrated the visitation by  [Father] in this matter which rises to 
the level of a material change of circumstances.

Therefore, 
this Court CONCLUDES:

1.  That 
there has been a material change of circumstances sufficient to justify a change 
of custody of [Child] from [Mother] to [Father] and that this change of custody 
should take place within thirty (30) days of the order of this 
Court.

2.  That 
Mother should have liberal visitation and that each party should submit their 
necessary financial affidavits to the Big Horn Basin Child support Authority for 
determination of payment of child support for the Mother to the 
Father.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Appealable 
Order

 
 
[¶5]      Whether the order 
from which this appeal was taken was an appealable order became an issue which 
this Court determined was necessary to consider on its own motion.  W.R.A.P. 1.05(a) 
provides:

 
 
1.05.  Appealable order 
defined.

An 
appealable order is:

(a)  An 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or

(b)  An 
order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; 
or

(c)  An 
order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
or

(d)  An 
order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated 
in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.;  
if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final 
and in effect for the purposes of appeal by another party;  or

(e)  Interlocutory 
orders and decrees of the district courts which:

(1)  Grant, 
continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve 
or modify injunctions; or

(2)  Appoint 
receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.

(See 
Rule 13 for additional guidance on review of interlocutory orders.) [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
This 
rule was amended by order adopted on April 23, 1992, and at that time we 
commented that:  "The number of this 
rule did not change, but the language was adjusted significantly to refine and clarify 
what an appealable order is, whether 
it be a final or interlocutory order [Emphasis added]."  See comment to Rule 1.05 at 823-32 P.2d, 
Wyo. Rptr. LII (1992).  We conclude 
that what was intended by the amendment of that rule was that we would no longer 
look at just whether an order was "final."  
Rather the limitation on our review would be directed to whether an order 
was "appealable" as defined by Rule 1.05.  
In this particular case we conclude that the instant order was made in a 
"special proceeding."  See In re WJH, 2001 WY 54, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Wyo. 2001), where we held:

 
 
In 
general terms, special proceedings are those which were not actions in law or 
suits in equity under common law and which may be commenced by motion or 
petition upon notice for the purpose of obtaining relief of a special or 
distinct type.  State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 
168 (Wyo.1981).  They result from a 
right conferred by law together with authorization of a special application to 
the courts to enforce the right.  
Id. This court 
has recognized that, even in cases involving delinquency, proceedings under the 
Juvenile Court Act could be in lieu of proceedings under the general criminal 
procedure.  Id.

 
 
[¶6]      Although some 
authorities set out the expanded meaning of "special proceeding" in great 
detail, perhaps the Supreme Court of Oklahoma put it most clearly and succinctly 
in these terms:  " Special 
proceedings' is a term used to distinguish litigation that is not governed by 
the general regime of pleadings.' They are distinguished from other civil 
actions by the manner of pleading, practice and procedure prescribed by 
law."  Barber v. Barber, 2003 OK 52, ¶ 6, 
77 P.3d 576, 579 (Okla. 2003); also see 39B Words and Phrases, "Special 
Proceeding" 416-447 (2006); 1A C.J.S. Actions § 115 (2005).  We are satisfied that the instant case 
involves a special proceeding as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.05.  The more rigorous limitation of Rule 
1.05 is probably the requirement that the order affect a "substantial 
right."  Here we need not tarry long 
because we have repeatedly held that, " [t]he right to associate with one's 
immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state and federal 
constitutions.'   Resolution of 
which parent shall have custody necessarily implicates the fundamental right of 
family association."  Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 
(Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶7]      We conclude that 
the order from which this appeal was taken is an appealable 
order.

 
 
Abuse of 
District Court's Discretion

 
 
[¶8]      Modification of 
custody is governed by Wyo. Stat.  
Ann. § 20-2-204 (LexisNexis 2005), which provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
§ 
20-2-204.  Enforcement and 
modification.  

      . . . 
.

      (c)  A 
court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the 
modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding in 
which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, 
proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow 
visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered as 
evidence of a material change of circumstances.

 
 
In 
reviewing such a matter, our standard of review is well 
established:

 
 
      "The party 
seeking a modification of the custody provisions of a divorce decree has the 
burden of showing that a material and substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred, after the entry of the initial decree, and that modification is in the 
best interests of the children."  
Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 
(Wyo.1998).  This court will not 
interfere with the trial court's decision regarding modification of custody 
absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. Id. We recently 
clarified the definition of an abuse of discretion when we stated the core of 
our inquiry must reach "the question of reasonableness of the choice made by the 
trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo.1998);  see also Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43,¶ 9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶ 9 Wyo.2001).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Id.

 
 

TW v. 
BM, 2006 
WY 68, ¶ 9, 134 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, 
¶ 9, 45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo.2002)).

 
 
[¶9]      Here, this Court 
does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, and that 
circumstance restricts our review to those assertions of error not requiring 
inspection of the transcript.  
Because we have  no 
transcript, or a substitute for a transcript, the regularity of the trial 
court's judgment is presumed.  TW, ¶ 15, 134 P.3d  at 
1267.

 
 
[¶10]   Mother filed her notice of appeal 
pro se on August 1, 2006.  She was represented by counsel for 
briefing.  This case was assigned to 
the expedited docket, so there was no argument to the Court.  For the reasons set out above, we affirm 
the district court's decision to modify custody because, on the face of things, 
its findings are adequate and we perceive no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
Visitation 
Detail and Child Support

 
 
[¶11]   The district court has not yet 
established a detailed visitation plan and, clearly, that is needed in this 
case.  The trial court may well have 
had timely expansion of the visitation plan, as well as establishment of 
support, on its agenda when this appeal was perfected.  Because these matters are yet to be 
completed, we remand this case to the district court to address those tasks to 
the extent it has not already done so.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   We affirm the district court's 
order modifying custody.  This case 
is otherwise remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 20-2-201. Disposition 
and maintenance of children in decree or order; access to 
records.

            
(a)  In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a 
marriage or upon the establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-401 
through 14-2-907, the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the 
children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the 
children.  In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:

                        
(i)  The quality of the 
relationship each child has with each parent;

            
(ii)  The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for 
each child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for 
each child's care by others as needed;

                        
(iii)  The relative competency and fitness of each 
parent;

            
(iv)  Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities 
of parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified 
times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times;

(v)  How the parents and each child can best maintain and 
strengthen a relationship with each other;

(vi)  How the parents and each child interact and communicate 
with each other and how such interaction and communication may be 
improved;

(vii)  The ability and willingness of each parent to allow the 
other to provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and 
responsibilities, including the right to 
privacy;

                        
(viii)  Geographic distance between the parents' 
residences;

            
(ix)  The current physical and mental ability of each parent to 
care for each child;

(x)  Any other 
factors the court deems necessary and relevant.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

2§ 20-2-202. 
Visitation.

            
(a)  The court may order visitation it deems in the best 
interests of each child and the court shall:

(i)  Order visitation in enough detail to promote understanding 
and compliance;

(ii)  Provide for the allocation of the costs of transporting 
each child for purposes of visitation;

(iii)  Require 
either parent who plans to change their home city or state of residence, to give 
written notice thirty (30) days prior to the move, both to the other parent and 
to the clerk of district court stating the date and destination of the 
move.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

3Neither 
party asked for special findings as provided for by W.R.C.P. 
52.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, dissents, in which Golden, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶13]   I respectfully dissent.  Even if we assume that the process of 
petitioning the district court for modification of the custody, support, or 
visitation provisions of a prior decree or order is a "special proceeding" for 
purposes of the rule, I believe it takes W.R.A.P. 1.05 to unreasonable limits to 
declare that, in one modification proceeding, the losing party may 
appeal each decision, one at a time, if that is the way the court issues its 
orders (if child support and visitation also are fundamental rights).  Beyond that, the court's order in the 
present case is, on its face, an interlocutory order that is not appealable 
because it specifically provides for further consideration of child support.  
This appeal should be dismissed because it is not an appeal from 
a final appealable order under the common sense meaning of W.R.A.P. 
1.05.