Case Title: Samuel v. Zwerin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Samuel v. Zwerin1994 WY 16868 P.2d 265Case Number: 93-80Decided: 02/09/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert C. SAMUEL and William R. Chaney,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Mark 
ZWERIN,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellants,

Joseph 
F. Moore and Glenn W. Myers of Moore & Myers, Jackson.

Representing 
Appellee,

Paul 
Knight of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson,*

* 
Order Granting Motion of Counsel for Appellee to Withdraw entered December 13, 
1993. 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Robert 
C. Samuel and William R. Chaney commenced an action, praying for a judgment 
declaring that a restrictive covenant prohibited the on-site use of a trailer 
for habitation during construction and praying for injunctive relief prohibiting 
the trailer from being placed on the lot belonging to Appellee Mark Zwerin. The 
trial court found that the covenant did not prohibit such a use of the trailer, 
entered judgment denying the injunctive relief, and dismissed the 
complaint.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellants 
present four issues for our review:

Issue 
1. 
Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of fact and law in finding an 
ambiguity in Section 10 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions for the Solitude Subdivision - Unit 1, which ambiguity permitted 
habitation of trailers during construction.

Issue 
2. 
Whether the Trial Court's finding that there was a "custom" which permitted 
habitation of "construction trailers" was against the great weight of the 
evidence.

Issue 
3. 
Whether a 32-foot fifth-wheel recreational vehicle which is equipped and used 
for habitation is a "construction trailer[."]

Issue 
4. 
Whether the Trial Court erred in permitting Floyd King, Esquire to testify as an 
expert on behalf of Defendant/Appellee.

[¶4]      When the builder 
commenced construction of Appellee's home, he moved a trailer onto the lot. The 
builder's workers lived in, and stored supplies and equipment in, the trailer 
during construction of the home. Appellants objected and sought enforcement of 
the restrictive covenant which prohibited the use of a construction trailer in 
which one or more of the builder's employees live during 
construction.

[¶5]      The first two 
sentences of the covenant in question state:

10. 
PROHIBITED STRUCTURES.

No 
trailer home, mobile home, tent, camper, basement, garage, outbuilding or any 
other structures of a temporary or mobile nature, shall be used as a place of 
residence or habitation, either temporarily or permanently. No house trailer, 
camper trailer, tent, shack or other structure of a temporary or insubstantial 
nature shall be erected, placed or be permitted to remain on any lot except as 
the same may be customarily employed by contractors or owners for and during the 
construction of improvements thereon or unless shielded from view by adjacent 
property owners either by fence or placement in a permitted 
building.

Appellants 
contend that the trial court erred when it determined that, as a matter of law, 
the first two sentences of the covenant, when read together, were 
ambiguous.

[¶6]      Whether language 
is ambiguous is a question of law. Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J 
Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993). Language is ambiguous if it 
contains a double meaning. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 855 P.2d 1242, 
1244 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 
599 (Wyo. 1989)). When language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible 
to show its meaning. Rolfe v. Varley, 860 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Wyo. 1993). 
This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's conclusions of law. 
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶7]      The first 
sentence of the covenant strictly prohibited habitation of trailers. The second 
sentence permitted the customary use of trailers on lots during construction of 
improvements. The covenant's language was susceptible to two different meanings 
when a builder temporarily housed workers in an on-site trailer, rendering the 
language to be ambiguous. Either habitation was strictly prohibited or the 
trailer and its habitation were permitted if the practice was 
customary.

[¶8]      We hold that the 
trial court did not err when it determined that, as a matter of law, the 
covenant was ambiguous and by admitting extrinsic evidence to determine the 
covenant's meaning in order to resolve the ambiguity.

[¶9]      Appellants also 
contend that the trial court's finding that it was customary to permit 
habitation of construction trailers was against the great weight of the 
evidence. We will not disturb the trial court's findings unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 538. We have stated in various ways on many occasions that, when making 
this determination, we will examine the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the appellee and leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party in conflict therewith. E.R. v. L.T. (Adoption of G.A.R.), 810 P.2d 113, 118 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting TR v. Washakie County Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services, 736 P.2d 712, 715 (Wyo. 1987)). With this 
standard of review in mind, we note from the record that the subdivision 
developer testified that the covenant did not intend to prohibit construction 
trailers from being inhabited during construction. Several witnesses also 
testified that inhabiting construction trailers was customary in the 
subdivision. The record also includes photographs of three other construction 
trailers in use in the subdivision.

[¶10]   We hold that the trial court's 
findings were not erroneous and that sufficient evidence existed to establish 
that habitation of construction trailers was customary on lots in the 
subdivision during construction of buildings therein.

[¶11]   Appellants further contend that the 
trailer in question was a recreational vehicle and not a construction trailer. 
We fail to see what difference it makes whether the trailer was classified as 
being a recreational trailer or a construction trailer. The undisputed testimony 
readily reveals that, in addition to the trailer being used for temporary 
habitation, it was used to house blueprints, transits, files, records, and 
construction tools and that it was a customary practice to use trailers for such 
purposes in that particular subdivision.

[¶12]   Appellants also assert that 
allowing a partner in the law firm which was representing them in another case 
involving the subdivision's covenants to testify violated Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-101 
(Supp. 1993) and constituted prejudicial error. Section 1-12-101(a)(i) 
states:

(a) 
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:

(i) 
An attorney . . . concerning a communication made to him by his client . . . in 
that relation, or his advice to his client. . . . The attorney . . . may testify 
by express consent of the client . . . and if the client voluntarily testifies 
the attorney . . . may be compelled to testify on the same 
subject[.]

[¶13]   The attorney did not testify about 
communications from Appellants to his firm or advice from his firm to 
Appellants. Instead, he testified about his advice to Appellee concerning the 
covenant's meaning. Thus, § 1-12-101(a)(i) did not disqualify the attorney from 
being a witness for Appellee, and the trial court, therefore, did not abuse its 
discretion by permitting the attorney to testify. This Court does, however, 
direct the attorney's attention to Rules 1.7 and 1.10 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.

[¶14]   We hold that, as a matter of law, 
the covenant in question was ambiguous as to whether or not construction 
trailers could be inhabited on construction sites within the subdivision and 
that the record contained sufficient competent extrinsic evidence to resolve 
this ambiguity by showing that trailers had been customarily used for the 
purpose since the covenant's effective date.

[¶15]   Affirmed.