Case Title: State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-6664

Docket Number: 20011793

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-6664.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MILLER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-
6664.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claimants injured before November 16, 1973, can 
receive scheduled loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) and 
permanent total disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58 on the same 
claim — State ex rel. Benton v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec Co., overruled. 
(No. 2001-1793 — Submitted September 17, 2002 — Decided December 13, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-1384. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Claimants injured before November 16, 1973, can receive scheduled loss 
compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) (formerly R.C. 4123.57[C]) and 
permanent total disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58 in the same 
claim.  (State ex rel. Benton v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co. [1968], 14 
Ohio St.2d 130, 43 O.O.2d 238, 237 N.E.2d 134, overruled.) 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Jimmie Miller became a paraplegic after a 1967 industrial injury.  
In 1968, he was granted permanent total disability compensation (“PTD”), which 
continued until his death from related causes in 2000. 
{¶2} 
After receiving death benefits, appellant widow-claimant, Ruth J. 
Miller, sought a scheduled loss award under R.C. 4123.57(B) for her decedent’s 
total loss of use of his legs.  That motion was brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.60, 
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which permits payment of an award to dependents that “decedent would have 
been lawfully entitled to have applied for * * * at the time of his death.” 
{¶3} 
Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the award, 
reasoning that the decedent had no lawful entitlement to R.C. 4123.57(B) 
compensation at the time of his death, since dual payment of PTD and scheduled 
loss benefits was prohibited to claimants injured before November 16, 1973. 
{¶4} 
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County denied claimant’s 
petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the compensation, prompting her appeal 
to this court as of right. 
{¶5} 
R.C. 4123.58(C) specifically permits payment of both PTD and 
scheduled loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) (formerly 4123.57[C]) for 
the same injury.  Before 1973, however, both statutes said nothing on the topic of 
concurrent payment.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 417, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1699-1706. 
{¶6} 
Pre-1973 claimants have been governed by State ex rel. Benton v. 
Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co. (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 130, 43 O.O.2d 238, 237 
N.E.2d 134, which held that the two benefits could not be paid in the same claim.  
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Having been denied scheduled loss 
compensation as a result of her decedent’s PTD awards, claimant insists that 
Benton has been significantly modified—if not completely overruled—by State ex 
rel. Martin v. Indus. Comm. (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 18, 9 O.O.3d 10, 377 N.E.2d 
1000, and State ex rel. Doughty v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 736, 576 
N.E.2d 801.  That is the issue now before us. 
{¶7} 
Two types of compensation in three guises are integral to our 
analysis.  First, R.C. 4123.57(B) (formerly [C]) provides a compensation schedule 
for the loss of enumerated body members, designating the number of weeks of 
compensation according to which body part is lost.  Originally interpreted as 
confined to loss by amputation—with the obvious exception of hearing and 
sight—scheduled loss benefits now cover loss of use as well.  State ex rel. Walker 
January Term, 2002 
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v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 402, 12 O.O.3d 347, 390 N.E.2d 1190, 
overruling State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 146 Ohio St. 618, 33 O.O. 
92, 67 N.E.2d 536. 
{¶8} 
The second type of compensation is PTD, contained in two forms 
in R.C. 4123.58.  There is vocational PTD, where the allowed conditions either 
alone or with nonmedical disability factors render the claimant unable to do 
sustained remunerative work.  State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 
31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946.  There is also statutory PTD, in 
which a claimant is deemed permanently and totally disabled—irrespective of the 
claimant’s actual ability to work—due to the loss of two enumerated body parts.  
R.C. 4123.58(C). 
{¶9} 
These types of compensation variously influence Benton, Martin, 
and Doughty.  Benton, which underlies the denial of compensation in the claim at 
issue, involved an employee who was statutorily deemed permanently and totally 
disabled after both hands were amputated.  He was then denied scheduled loss 
benefits administratively and at the court of appeals.  We affirmed on two bases, 
both of which we reexamine at this time. 
{¶10} First, the court in Benton stated that claimants “cannot receive 
concurrent compensation for twice the amount of compensation permitted under 
Section 4123.57(C), Revised Code, in addition to the benefits provided by Section 
4123.58, Revised Code.”  14 Ohio St.2d at 133, 43 O.O.2d 238, 237 N.E.2d 134.  
Two difficulties emerge from this reasoning.  First, if this statement meant that a 
claimant cannot receive compensation for both hands under R.C. 4123.57(C), that 
is clearly untrue.  Second, regardless of whether R.C. 4123.57(C) permitted an 
award for one or two hands, there is no reason why receipt of PTD would be 
inconsistent with that scheduled loss award. 
{¶11} Benton also held that the claimant was foreclosed from R.C. 
4123.57(C) benefits because he had never been partially disabled, and therefore 
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he “never came within the purview of” R.C. 4123.57.  Id. at 133, 43 O.O.2d 238, 
237 N.E.2d 134.  Instead, he had been totally disabled from the moment of injury.  
This reasoning might work if R.C. 4123.57(C) and statutory PTD are viewed as 
having the same compensatory purpose.  Both presume disability without 
requiring proof of it, with the distinction lying only in the perceived extent of 
disability—PTD is for total disability, while R.C. 4123.57(C) is not.  From this 
perspective, one could argue that receipt of both types of compensation 
constitutes double recovery for a single injury. 
{¶12} We have, however, always viewed PTD and partial disability 
compensation—including R.C. 4123.57(C)—as having different goals.  Total 
disability benefits, whether temporary or permanent, compensate for the loss of 
earnings or earning capacity.  State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. 
(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 282, 71 O.O.2d 255, 328  N.E.2d 387; State ex rel. 
Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 533.  In 
contrast, partial disability benefits have been compared to damages and are 
awarded irrespective of work capacity.  Gen. Motors Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d at 282, 
71 O.O.2d 255, 328 N.E.2d 387.  Using this rationale, the sequence of disability—
i.e., whether R.C. 4123.57(C) benefits are requested before or after PTD—is 
irrelevant. 
{¶13} While Benton’s logic may be unclear, the majority’s regret at the 
conclusion it felt compelled to reach is not: 
{¶14} “This obviously unjust result, whereby a claimant’s award is 
measured by the fortuity of the events contributing to his disability, is 
compelled by the unperceptiveness of the controlling legislation.”  14 Ohio 
St.2d at 133, 43 O.O.2d 238, 237 N.E.2d 134. 
{¶15} Perhaps in this spirit, the court next addressed the problem in 
Martin, ten years later.  A pre-1973 claimant like Benton, Martin received R.C. 
4123.57(C) benefits for an above-the-knee amputation.  He later received 
January Term, 2002 
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vocational PTD, from which his earlier R.C. 4123.57(C) compensation was 
deducted. 
{¶16} Claimant objected to the deduction, and this time both types of 
compensation were allowed.  Martin’s reasoning, unfortunately, however, was 
just as flawed as Benton’s.  Martin emphasized that claimant’s amputation was 
clearly compensable under the schedule of R.C. 4123.57(C), attempting to 
distinguish it from Benton on that basis.  That distinction, however, fails because, 
despite Martin’s language to the contrary, Benton’s loss was fully compensable 
under that statute as well.  Martin also states that “[n]owhere in the body of the 
Benton opinion is it specifically held that an employee cannot receive concurrent 
compensation for an injury under R.C. 4123.57(C) and 4123.58 where he 
otherwise qualifies.”  55 Ohio St.2d at 20, 9 O.O.3d 10, 377 N.E.2d 1000.  That is 
misleading.  While the body of the opinion indeed does not make that statement 
so explicitly, Benton’s syllabus paragraph two clearly states that these benefits 
cannot both be paid for the same injury.  Benton, 14 Ohio St.2d 130, 43 O.O.2d 
238, 237 N.E.2d 134.  In fact, Martin, four paragraphs later, acknowledged the 
syllabus: 
{¶17} “This court is aware of the broad language found in paragraph 
two of the syllabus of Benton which, when read alone, supports the proposition 
that a claimant cannot receive compensation under both R.C. 4123.57(C) and 
4123.58.  However, that paragraph must be read in conjunction with the entire 
syllabus and supporting facts of the case.  When read in this context, it is clear 
that the Benton holding does not prevent claimant in this cause from receiving 
his previously awarded benefits under R.C. 4123.57(C).”  55 Ohio St.2d at 21, 9 
O.O.3d 10, 377 N.E.2d 1000. 
{¶18} This reasoning is also vulnerable to attack.  Reading Benton “in 
conjunction with the entire syllabus and [its] supporting facts” neither 
distinguishes Benton nor frees Martin from Benton’s holding.  Benton is crystal 
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clear in its pronouncement, which is why the case continues to haunt claimants to 
this day. 
{¶19} This court’s most recent struggle with Benton occurred in Doughty, 
61 Ohio St.3d 736, 576 N.E.2d 801.  There, another pre-1973 claimant lost the 
use of his right leg and was granted vocational PTD.  Ten months later, a new 
claim was allowed for his left leg.  The left leg continued to deteriorate, resulting 
in its eventual amputation. 
{¶20} After that condition was allowed, claimant unsuccessfully sought 
R.C. 4123.57(C) compensation for the left leg.  The court of appeals denied a writ 
of mandamus to order the compensation, and claimant appealed here.  We ordered 
the commission to pay R.C. 4123.57(C) compensation.  This time, we properly 
distinguished Benton, stressing that—unlike Benton—the condition for which 
Doughty received R.C. 4123.57(C) compensation was not the same condition for 
which he was paid PTD.  To refuse R.C. 4123.57(C) compensation “would be to 
leave him uncompensated for his left leg amputation which arose and occurred 
after his PTD award.  Such a result defeats the goal of workers’ compensation to 
compensate claimants for their injuries.”  61 Ohio St.3d at 739, 576 N.E.2d 801. 
{¶21} The crux of the current controversy, however, stems from this 
statement in Doughty:  “[T]o the extent that Benton can be read as inconsistent 
with the present case and the fairly well-settled law from which our opinion today 
derives, Benton is overruled.”  Id. 
{¶22} The widow-claimant here contends that this declaration invalidates 
Benton and removes it as the sole impediment to receipt of both types of 
compensation.  This argument is tenuous.  Doughty overruled Benton only to the 
extent that it was inconsistent therewith.  Given, however, that Benton was wholly 
distinguishable from Doughty, and therefore not controlling in Doughty, the two 
cases had no common ground on which there could be any inconsistency. 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶23} Nevertheless, our analysis and further consideration of this issue, 
as explained above, persuade us that Benton is unsound.  Accordingly, Benton is 
hereby overruled, and we grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to 
grant the widow-claimant’s application for scheduled loss benefits. 
{¶24} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the writ is 
granted. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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Thompson, Meier & Dersom and Adam H. Leonatti, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
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