Case Title: Florida Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Etc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-2130

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-2130 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL 
REGULATION, etc., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-2131 
____________ 
 
 
HARTMAN-TYNER, INC., et al.,  
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Appellee. 
 
[September 6, 2007] 
 
ANSTEAD, J. 
 
We have on appeal a decision of a district court of appeal declaring invalid a 
state statute.  State Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 
Inc., 912 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  The issue before this Court is whether section 550.615(6), 
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), is unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the 
guise of a general law and without compliance with the specific requirements for 
the enactment of special laws.  We affirm and approve the holding of the district 
court that this statute is an unconstitutional special law because there was no 
reasonable possibility that the classification used in the statute would ever apply to 
another area of the state after the statute was amended in 1996.1   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In April 2002, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (“the 
Department”) filed an administrative complaint against Gulfstream Park Racing 
Association, Inc. (“Gulfstream”), alleging that it had engaged in an unauthorized 
exchange of intertrack wagering signals.  Gulfstream had been conducting horse 
races at its racetrack in Hallandale and selling the live broadcasts of the races to 
Pompano Park Racing, a harness racing track in Pompano Beach.  The Department 
                                          
 
1.  We decline to address the issue of whether Gulfstream was required to 
exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the constitutionality of 
section 550.615(6). 
 
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contended that Gulfstream was in violation of section 550.615(6), which prohibits 
Gulfstream from selling its broadcasts within its market area, because it holds a 
thoroughbred racing permit and is within twenty-five miles of at least two other 
horse race permitholders. 
Gulfstream filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court, 
challenging the provisions of section 550.615(6) on a number of constitutional 
grounds.  Among the grounds was a claim that the statute was a special law and 
that it was not enacted according to the state constitutional requirements that apply 
to special laws.  After taking evidence to determine the parties and areas of the 
state affected by the statute, the trial court concluded that section 550.615(6) was 
unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law: 
 
The plaintiff presented testimony sufficient to establish, and I 
now find, that there was at the time of enactment, during the entire 
time since enactment and is now precisely one “area of the state where 
there are three or more horserace permitholders within 25 miles of 
each other.”  The only area of the state where there are or were three 
horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other is the area of 
Dade and Broward Counties that includes Gulfstream, Calder, 
Pompano Park and Hialeah Park. 
 
Section 550.615(6) was enacted in 96-364, Laws of Florida.  
There is no suggestion within the enacting legislation of any purpose 
of the 25 mile intertrack border other than the obvious one––to carve 
out the Dade-Broward market area as it existed when the statute was 
enacted. 
 
Although certainly not dispositive, this conclusion is consistent 
with the parties’ description of the negotiated legislative process that 
preceded enactment of the statute.  Neither party offered any 
legislative history to explain some public purpose served by limiting 
the intertrack wager authorization within the 25 mile border.  The 
 
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most plausible explanation in the testimony was that there was no 
public policy that led to the 25 mile intertrack border.  The restrictions 
against intertrack wagering at Gulfstream were simply what 
Gulfstream was required to give up for various other benefits.  This 
sort of local interest horsetrading is specifically prohibited by Article 
III Section 10. 
 
. . . . 
 
The preponderance of the evidence and Florida’s legislative 
scheme supports the conclusion that the classification created by 
section 550.615(6) was constitutionally closed at the time of its 
enactment and remains so.  The legislature imposed the statutory 
geographic restrictions on permitholders.  Moreover, the legislature 
decreed that additional permits may only become “effectual” upon 
affirmative vote of the county electorate.  Thus, for the intertrack 
wagering restriction to expand the legislature must repeal the 
geographic permit limitations, an entity must apply for a permit and 
meet all of the rather daunting requirements, and the electorate of the 
county must approve the permit.  It is unsurprising under these 
circumstances that section 505.615(6) has since its enactment, applied 
to precisely one 25 mile area of the state. 
 
The classification was closed at the time of enactment and 
remains closed.  To conclude otherwise would be to reduce Article III 
Section 10 to mere semantics.  Section 550.615(6) applies only and 
can apply only to the Dade-Broward market area and so constitutes a 
special law in violation of Article III, Section 10 of the Florida 
Constitution. 
 
The Department and intervenors vigorously argue the high 
standard that must be satisfied by a party seeking to overturn a statute.  
The only doubt injected in this matter comes from the statute’s use of 
the word “any.”  It implies that there might be more than one.  But the 
pari-mutuel statutes themselves, together with conditions as they exist 
now and as they existed at the time of enactment leads to the 
conclusion that the classification, “three or more horserace 
permitholders within 25 miles of each other,” was and is closed in the 
constitutional sense. 
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
decision that section 550.615(6) violates article III, section 10 of the Florida 
 
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Constitution, which states, “No special law shall be passed unless notice of 
intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by 
general law . . . [unless the law] is conditioned to become effective on the vote of 
the electors of the area affected.”  Gulfstream, 912 So. 2d at 618.2    
In its opinion, the First District did its own constitutional analysis as to 
whether the classification created in section 550.615(6) was limited to one 
geographic area or remained open:   
When Gulfstream Park opened for business, the restrictions on 
the minimum distance between pari-mutuel wagering facilities were 
much more lenient, and that is why it was possible for Gulfstream to 
be one of three horse racing tracks within a twenty-five mile radius of 
each other.  However, these conditions do not exist at present, because 
the other sections of the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act now prohibit the 
issuance of permits for horse racing tracks this close together.  Section 
550.054(2) states in part, “[A]n application may not be considered, 
nor may a permit be issued by the division or be voted upon in any 
county, to conduct horse races, harness horse races, or dograces at a 
location within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility . 
. . .”  § 550.054(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). 
If a horse racing permit cannot be issued at a location within 
one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility, then it 
is safe to say that there will not be a new area in Florida that would 
have three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five 
miles of each other.  Because new horse racing tracks would have to 
be at least one hundred miles apart, the conditions that trigger the 
statutory prohibition against intertrack wagering in section 550.615(6) 
will not be replicated. 
Section 550.054 was enacted in 1992 and has been in effect 
continuously since then to prohibit the issuance of a permit to conduct 
                                          
 
2.  The Department and Intervenors concede that these procedures were not 
followed.  They contend that the Legislature was not required to give notice or 
allow for a local election because the statute was properly enacted as a general law.   
 
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horse races within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel 
wagering facility.  However, the prohibition in section 550.615(6) 
against intertrack wagering in areas where there are three or more 
horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other 
was enacted subsequently in 1996.  The timing of these two laws 
leads us to conclude that the purpose of the twenty-five-mile limit in 
section 550.615(6) was merely to describe the area where Gulfstream 
is located.  It was, even at that time, the only area that could fit the 
description. 
 
. . . . 
 
The evidence presented in this case plainly shows that there is 
no reasonable possibility that section 550.615(6) will be applied in 
another area of the state.  Someone would have to obtain a 
thoroughbred permit in Key West, which would then be subject to the 
prohibition against intertrack wagering in the statute only if two other 
stand-alone quarter horse permits were issued in Key West, and then 
only if all three horse racing tracks were located within twenty-five 
miles of each other.  Alternatively, the Department would have to 
issue a stand-alone quarter horse permit in a twenty-five mile area that 
includes an existing thoroughbred permit holder and at least one other 
horse racing permit holder. 
These hypotheticals do not show that section 550.615(6) has 
any real potential to apply to others.  They are highly contrived 
situations that demonstrate no more than a technical possibility.  The 
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that quarter 
horse racing is a thing of the past.  Apparently, quarter horse races are 
so unprofitable that they are no longer held anywhere in the state, not 
even by those who hold multiple horse racing permits and can afford 
to pay the fixed expenses of operating their race tracks with the 
revenues earned from other kinds of horse races. 
 
Gulfstream, 912 So. 2d at 621-23.  The Department and Hartman-Tyner, Inc, et. al. 
(“Intervenors”) now appeal the First District’s conclusion that section 550.615(6) 
is unconstitutional.    
ANALYSIS  
 
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The question of whether a law is a special or general law is a legal question 
subject to de novo review.  Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So. 2d 
1050, 1055 (Fla. 2003).  When a court has declared a state statute unconstitutional, 
the reviewing court must begin the process with a presumption that the statute is 
valid.  Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 
879, 881 (Fla. 1983).   
The Florida Constitution defines “special law” as “a special or local law.”  
Art. X, § 12(g), Fla. Const.  Furthermore, this Court has defined “special law” and 
“general law” as:  
[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, 
particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon 
classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or 
the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or 
designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, 
or one that purports to operate within classified territory when 
classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal.   
A general law operates universally throughout the state, or 
uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or 
uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties 
or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or instrumentality. 
 
State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934) (citations omitted).  We 
have applied these definitions to a wide variety of statutes that were enacted by the 
Legislature as general laws, but were challenged as special laws.  We discuss only 
a few to illustrate the application of the constitutional restrictions on the passage of 
special or local laws.   
 
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In City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002), this Court 
addressed a statute which authorized only certain municipalities—those with 
populations of more than 300,000 on April 1, 1999—to impose a parking tax.  Id. 
at 146.  We concluded that the statute was a special law because its express terms 
concerning population on a date certain limited its application and excluded any 
other municipalities from joining the class in the future.  Id. at 151.  This was a 
straightforward case because it could easily be determined, based upon available 
population statistics, that the class was closed and there was no possibility of the 
statute ever applying to another municipality.   
 
On the other hand, in City of Coral Gables v. Crandon, 25 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 
1946), this Court held that a statute relating to the creation of a water management 
district in any county having a population greater than 260,000 was not a special 
law.  Id. at 2-3.  This statute was a general law because there were other Florida 
counties that were rapidly approaching the limit set by the statute.  Id. at 2.  Thus, 
it was reasonably possible that the statute would apply in another area of the state. 
 
In Department of Business Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155 
(Fla. 1989), we addressed a statute that authorized the receipt and display of 
simulcast thoroughbred horse racing, and pari-mutuel wagering thereon, at licensed 
facilities.  Id. at 1157.  The statute provided criteria for establishing a class of 
counties in which a facility could be licensed, including requiring the existence of 
 
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two unused quarter horse racing permits before January 1, 1987.  Id.  All parties in 
that case agreed that Marion County was the sole county that would ever fall 
within the statutorily designated class of counties eligible for licensure of a facility.  
Id.  Therefore, we held that the statute was an unconstitutional special law, despite 
the Legislature’s treatment of the law as a general law, because it applied only to 
one county and there was no possibility that it would ever apply to any other 
county.  Id. at 1158.  We explained that “a statutory classification scheme 
incapable of generic application to members of a class, and fixed so as to preclude 
additional parties from satisfying the requirements for inclusion within the 
statutory classification at some future point in time, indicates an arbitrary 
classification scheme in the context of parimutuel legislation.”  Id. at 1158 n.4 
(citing Sanford-Orlando, 434 So. 2d at 882; Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Fla. 
State Racing Comm’n, 165 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1964)). 
In Sanford-Orlando, we confronted a statute that permitted harness racing 
tracks to be converted to dog racing tracks.  434 So. 2d at 880.  At the time the 
legislation was passed, it only applied to one track.  Id. at 882.  However, we stated 
that “[n]either does it matter that, once the law was passed, Seminole was the only 
track to benefit from it.  The controlling point is that even though this class did in 
fact apply to only one track, it is open and has the potential of applying to other 
tracks.”  Id.  We concluded that because the statute could be applied to future 
 
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tracks, it was a constitutional general law, and we emphasized that “[t]he fact that 
matters is that the classification is potentially open to other tracks.”  Id.   
Finally, in Biscayne Kennel Club, this Court addressed a statute that allowed 
a racing permitholder having daily revenues below a certain amount to conduct 
harness racing in any county that had previously approved pari-mutuel wagering.  
165 So. 2d at 763-64.  However, at the time of its enactment, the statute applied in 
only one county.  Id. at 764.  Nevertheless, this Court held that the class remained 
open because “a number of Florida counties may by future referendum acquire 
racing establishments, and some may reasonably be expected to come within the 
class covered.”  Id.    
THIS APPEAL 
Apparent from an analysis of our prior cases on special laws is that while we 
must give great deference to actions of the Legislature, we must also recognize that 
under the provisions of article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, the 
Legislature is constitutionally barred from passing general laws that impact only 
specific parties or areas of the state unless constitutional requirements are met.  
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a statute that appears to apply to one situation 
or area at the time of enactment may still be considered a general law if it could be 
applied to other situations or areas in the future.   
 
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The parties herein are in agreement that the statute when enacted and at the 
time of the trial court proceedings only applied to a limited area of the state and 
limited entities located therein.  They differ only as to whether the class of 
operations covered by the statute remains open, and the standard for determining 
the statute’s potential for future application.  Appellants assert that the district 
court applied an erroneous legal standard in considering whether the statute could 
apply to other entities or other areas of the state by adding a “reasonableness” 
condition to the evaluation of that possibility: 
The Department and the intervenors argue that it is still possible 
to have an area in Florida where there would be three horse race 
permit holders within a twenty-five mile radius of one another.  They 
point out that the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act contains a special 
provision exempting quarter horse permit holders from the one-
hundred mile limit that applies to other horse race permit holders.  See 
§ 550.334(4), Fla. Stat.  It is at least conceivable, they argue, that 
someone could obtain a permit to hold quarter horse races near 
enough to a thoroughbred permit holder and at least one other horse 
racing permit holder to trigger the prohibition against intertrack 
wagering. 
This brings us to the most difficult part of the case.  We 
acknowledge that the class is not closed for the purpose of this 
analysis merely because it is unlikely that it will include anyone else.  
However, we could not say that the class is open merely because there 
is a theoretical possibility that some day it might include someone 
else.  That approach would undermine the constitutional requirements 
for the adoption of special laws.  We conclude from the applicable 
precedents that the proper standard is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the class will include others. 
 
Gulfstream, 912 So. 2d at 622 (emphasis supplied).  We conclude that a review of 
our case law and the underlying purpose behind the constitutional restrictions 
 
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contained in article III, section 10, supports the reasonableness standard used by 
the First District and its application to this case. 
 
In essence, we must choose between a wholly speculative evaluation of the 
possibility of the future application of a statute as advanced by the appellants and 
the practical reasonableness standard articulated by the district court.  While our 
own case law has been largely silent on this issue, an examination of the analysis 
applied in each case implicitly suggests that we ourselves were applying a 
reasonableness and realistic possibility standard in assessing a statute’s potential 
future operation.  Nowhere in any of our decisions have we indicated that a wholly 
speculative or unreasonable potential would satisfy the constitutional mandate of 
article III, section 10.   
 
Moreover, in Biscayne Kennel Club, we ourselves utilized a reasonableness 
standard when we concluded that “a number of Florida counties may by future 
referendum acquire racing establishments, and some may reasonably be expected 
to come within the class covered.”  165 So. 2d at 764 (emphasis supplied).  We 
conclude now that we made explicit in that opinion what was implicit in our prior 
decisions, namely that any determination of possible future applications of a statute 
must be done by a realistic and reasonable assessment.  Otherwise, such an 
assessment would essentially be standardless, a situation we do not believe to be 
consistent with judicial review and enforcement of article III, section 10. 
 
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Further, we also agree with the observations of both the trial court and the 
district court on this issue.  The trial court explained its determination that the class 
upon which the statute operated was realistically closed and that “[t]o conclude 
otherwise would be to reduce article III section 10 to mere semantics.”  The district 
court further explained that “we could not say that the class is open merely because 
there is a theoretical possibility that some day it might include someone else.  That 
approach would undermine the constitutional requirements for the adoption of 
special laws.”  Gulfstream, 912 So. 2d at 622. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 550.615(6) prohibits thoroughbred permitholders from engaging in 
intertrack wagering in “any area of the state where there are three or more 
horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other.”  Both the trial court and 
the district court concluded that at the time the statute was amended in 1996, these 
conditions existed only in the area where Gulfstream was located, and there was no 
reasonable possibility that they would ever exist in another part of the state.  We 
concur in the findings of the trial court and the conclusion of the district court.  As 
a result, we conclude that section 550.615(6) is an unconstitutional special law 
enacted in the guise of a general law.  Accordingly, we affirm the First District’s 
decision below.   
It is so ordered.   
 
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LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
LEWIS, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, C.J., specially concurring. 
 
 
I agree with the majority analysis that section 550.615(6) of the Florida 
Statutes is an unconstitutional special law.  I write separately because the majority 
fails to mention, recognize or discuss the impact of the nonseverability clause 
found in section 550.71 of the Florida Statutes on the present dispute.  Section 
550.71, entitled “Operation of ch. 96-364,” was originally enacted as part of 
chapter 96-364, Laws of Florida, and provides: 
 
If the provisions of any section of this act are held to be invalid 
or inoperative for any reason, the remaining provisions of this act 
shall be deemed to be void and of no effect, it being the legislative 
intent that this act as a whole would not have been adopted had any 
provision of the act not been included. 
§ 550.71, Fla. Stat. (2006).  Section 550.71 is an example of a pure-form 
nonseverability clause.  Unlike severability clauses, which are commonly included 
in legislation and direct that the invalidation of any part of a statute does not affect 
the validity of the remaining statutory provisions, a nonseverability clause, such as 
the clause found in section 550.71, expresses legislative intent that if any provision 
 
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of a statutory enactment is declared invalid, the remaining provisions of the act 
will also be voided.   
Although the impact of a nonseverability clause has never been directly 
addressed by Florida courts, this Court has addressed the operation of severability 
clauses on several occasions.  See, e.g., Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620, 628 (Fla. 
2000); Moreau v. Lewis, 648 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 1995); St. Johns County v. 
Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla. 1991).  This Court 
has held that although severability clauses are highly persuasive, such clauses are 
not binding on courts.  See St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640.  The decision 
whether to sever an unconstitutional provision from the remainder of a statute is 
guided by four factors which consider whether: 
(1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the 
remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in 
the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those 
which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so 
inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would 
have passed the one without the other and, (4) an act complete in itself 
remains after the invalid provisions are stricken. 
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 137 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 
1962).   
However, these factors are poorly suited to any analysis of severability in 
instances where the statute contains an unambiguous statement of legislative intent 
of nonseverability—that the invalidity of one provision of a statute should void the 
 
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remaining provisions.  This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1981), in which the Court, 
although ultimately remanding the determination to the Alaska state courts, noted 
with regard to a nonseverability clause that it “need not speculate as to the intent of 
the Alaska Legislature; the legislation expressly provides that the invalidation of 
any portion of the statute renders the whole invalid.”  Id. at 65.  In those rare 
situations where the Legislature has chosen to include a clear directive that the 
invalidation of one provision of a statute shall result in the invalidation of the 
statute as a whole, there can be no doubt that the Legislature would not have 
passed any of the provisions without passing all of the provisions.  In my view, 
section 550.71 is an unambiguous statement of legislative intent, and, therefore, the 
invalidation of section 550.615(6) operates to void the remaining provisions of 
chapter law 96-364. 
While chapter law 96-364 is a lengthy and involved legislative act which 
effected substantial changes in the laws regulating the Florida pari-mutuel industry, 
the majority of the provisions contained in that act have been subsequently 
amended.  Those amended provisions are no longer provisions of the chapter law.  
Therefore, it appears that the only provisions which would now be impacted by the 
operation of section 550.71 are sections 550.6335 with regard to permissible 
surcharges on intertrack wagering and 550.70 with regard to jai alai facilities.  See 
 
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§§ 550.6335, 550.70, Fla. Stat. (2006).  Regardless of the impact of the operation 
of section 550.71, the majority should address this issue. 
Today, the Court ignores the proverbial elephant in the corner, even though 
this Court requested and received supplemental briefing specifically on the impact 
of the nonseverability clause after oral argument. 
BELL, J., concurs. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal - Statutory or Constitutional 
Invalidity 
 
 
First District - Case Nos. 1D04-3819 and 1D04-4094 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Major B. Harding and Stephen C. Emmanuel of Ausley and McMullen, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Joseph M. Helton, Jr. and S. Thomas Peavey Hoffer, 
Assistant General Counsels, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellants State of Florida Department of Business and Professional 
Regulation, Division of Par-Mutuel Wagering 
 
Harold F.X. Purnell and Gary R. Rutledge of Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell and 
Hoffman, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellants Hartman-Tyner, Inc., West Flagler Associates, Ltd., The 
Aragon Group, Inc., Summersport Enterprises, LLLP, and Florida Gaming 
Centers, Inc. 
 
Cynthia S. Tunnicliff and Peter M. Dunbar of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell 
and Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
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Bruce David Green, on behalf of Florida Horseman’s Benevolent and Protective 
Association, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae