Case Title: Lobianco v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 349, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
HELEN M. LUBRANO LOBIANCO,§
§
No. 349, 2005
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court 
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of the State of Delaware in and 
v.
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for Sussex County
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STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
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Plaintiff Below,
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Def. ID No. 0501011432
Appellee.
§
Submitted: January 18, 2006
Decided:
March 3, 2006
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 3  day of March 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief
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filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”), her attorney’s
motion to withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court
that:
(1)
In June 2005, a Superior Court jury convicted the appellant, Helen
M. Lubrano Lobianco (“Wife”), of Assault in the Second Degree for having
assaulted her husband, Salvatore Lubrano Lobianco (“Husband”), age sixty-
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 612(a)(5) (2001) (providing in pertinent part that a
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person is guilty of assault in the second degree when the person recklessly or intentionally
causes physical injury to another person who is 62 years of age or older).
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,
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486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Id.  
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two, during a domestic dispute at their home in Georgetown, Delaware.   The
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Superior Court sentenced Wife to two years at Level V suspended for six
months at Level II probation.  This appeal followed.
(2)
Wife’s trial counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a careful
and complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable
issues. 
(3)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the Court’s
consideration of a brief and a motion under Rule 26(c) is twofold.  First, the
Court must be satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious examination of
the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal.2
Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues
that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.3
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(4)
 It appears that Counsel informed Wife of the provisions of Rule
26(c) and provided Wife with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the Rule 26(c)
brief and the trial transcript.  It further appears that Wife supplemented
Counsel’s presentation with two issues for the Court’s consideration.  The State
has responded to the position taken by Counsel as well as to the issues raised
by Wife and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(5)
The transcript of Wife’s jury trial reflects the following facts.  At
approximately 8:00 p.m. on January 4, 2005, Georgetown Police Detective
Daniel Davis (“Detective Davis”) responded to an emergency call reporting a
domestic disturbance in progress between Wife and Husband.  Upon arriving
at the couple’s residence, both Husband and Wife told Detective Davis that they
had been arguing.  Husband told Detective Davis that during the argument Wife
struck him in the face with a stainless steel salad bowl.  Wife told Detective
Davis that she accidentally struck Husband with the salad bowl when she
tripped over a footstool.  
(6)
After determining that Husband was not intoxicated and that his
only visible injury was a small amount of dried blood in the corner of his
mouth, Detective Davis directed that Husband leave the residence for the
remainder of the night.  In a police report prepared later on January 4, 2005,
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Detective Davis characterized the incident as a “verbal dispute” and indicated
that there was “no injury.” 
(7)
Husband testified that he spent the night in his vehicle somewhere
in the Lewes Beach area and awoke the following morning, January 5, 2005,
to find that his face was bruised and swollen.  Husband went to the Georgetown
Police Station later that morning.  The police took pictures of Husband’s
injuries and advised that he go to the hospital.  
(8)
On January 12, 2005, Husband returned to the Georgetown Police
Station and spoke to Detective Davis.  Husband gave Detective Davis several
more photographs of his injuries and a notarized written statement describing
the events of January 4, 2005.  Husband told Detective Davis that the
photographs had been taken the day before, i.e., on January 11, 2005, in a
police station in Pennsylvania.  Based on all of the photographs and Husband’s
written statement, Detective Davis prepared a second police report that
eventually led to Wife’s arrest, charge and  conviction.
(9)
In her first issue on appeal, Wife claims that the Superior Court
abused its discretion when admitting into evidence the photographs of Husband
that were taken on January 11, 2005.  Wife claims that the photographs were
not taken at a police station in Pennsylvania, as Husband had testified, but by
See 
Del. Unif. R. Evid. 901(a) (providing that “[t]he requirement of authentication
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or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”); see also
Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1208 n.43 (Del. 1999) (“A photograph’s contents,
buttressed by indirect or circumstantial evidence, can form a sufficient basis for
authentication, even without the testimony of the photographer[.]” (quoting United States
v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 169 (1  Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1084 (1995))).
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Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980).
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Husband’s “friends in the police [department]” or at Husband’s brother’s car
dealership.
(10)
We find no merit in Wife’s argument that the Superior Court erred
when admitting the photographs in question.  Husband’s testimony that the
photographs in question were an accurate depiction of his injuries on January
11, 2005, served to sufficiently authenticate the photographs before they were
admitted into evidence.   Once the photographs were admitted into evidence,
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the ultimate question of the weight to be given the photographs as well as
matters of credibility were properly submitted to the jury.5
(11)
In her second issue on appeal, Wife further calls into question
Husband’s and Detective Davis’ credibility as well as the consistency of their
respective trial testimony.  Wife’s claim is without merit.  
Id.
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Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982).
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(12)
It is the jury’s responsibility, as the sole trier of fact, to determine
witness credibility and to resolve conflicts in the testimony.   It is entirely
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within the discretion of the jury to accept part of one witness’ testimony and
reject any conflicting testimony offered by the same witness or any other
witnesses.  
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(13)
Here, the record is clear that the Superior Court properly instructed
the jury on its responsibility to decide questions of fact.  The jury then
evaluated the testimony of all of the witnesses, including Husband and
Detective Davis, both of whom were subject to cross-examination, and ruled
against Wife.  In the absence of any indication to the contrary in the record, we
conclude that any factual inconsistencies in the trial testimony were properly
resolved by the jury prior to rendering the verdict.
(14)
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded
that Wife’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We are satisfied that Counsel made a conscientious effort to
examine the record and properly determined that Wife could not raise a
meritorious claim in this appeal.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The
motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice