Case Title: Murillo-Rodriguez v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 090510

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MILTON MURILLO-RODRIGUEZ 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090510 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
January 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Milton Murillo-Rodriguez appeals from a judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia refusing his petition seeking an 
appeal of his conviction for abduction with intent to defile 
in violation of Code § 18.2-48.  The Court of Appeals held 
Murillo-Rodriguez’s failure to make either a motion to strike 
at the conclusion of all the evidence or a motion to set aside 
the jury’s verdict convicting him of that offense constituted 
a waiver of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal.1  Murillo-Rodriguez contends that Code § 8.01-
384(A), as amended in 1992, and this Court’s decision in King 
v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 570 S.E.2d 863 (2002), applying 
that statute to criminal cases, abrogates or limits the waiver 
rule applied by the Court of Appeals in this case.  
Accordingly, he contends that his motion to strike at the 
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence preserved for appeal 
                     
1 In the same trial, the jury also convicted Murillo-
Rodriguez of rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61.  Murillo-
Rodriguez did not challenge this conviction in his petition to 
the Court of Appeals and, accordingly, that conviction is not 
before us in this appeal. 
 
the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.  Although we 
have previously recognized the Court of Appeals’ long-standing 
application of this concept of waiver in its jurisprudence, 
see, e.g., Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 723-24, 667 
S.E.2d 751, 762 (2008) (holding that failure to assign error 
to Court of Appeals finding of waiver barred consideration of 
that issue), we have not heretofore expressly addressed this 
concept of waiver on its merits. 
BACKGROUND 
 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence on appeal, the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.  Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 
171, 182, 670 S.E.2d 727, 734 (2009).  When so viewed, the 
evidence presented at trial in this case established that on 
the evening of September 8, 2007, Murillo-Rodriguez first 
encountered C.U., the victim, as she was walking along Glade 
Drive in Reston on her way to a friend’s home.  Murillo-
Rodriguez, a passenger in a vehicle driven by Elvis Gladamez, 
rolled down the window and offered to give C.U. a ride.  When 
she declined the offer, Murillo-Rodriguez made an obscene 
remark, and C.U. crossed to the opposite side of the road to 
avoid having further contact with the two men. 
 
Murillo-Rodriguez and Gladamez drove to Gladamez’s home 
nearby and then “decided to abuse [the victim].”  Walking back 
 
2
along Glade Road, the two men again encountered C.U. on the 
sidewalk.  As Gladamez blocked C.U.’s way, Murillo-Rodriguez 
grabbed her from behind and covered her mouth with his hand.  
The two men pulled C.U. down an embankment adjoining the 
sidewalk and into a wooded area where both men raped her. 
 
After the two men released her, C.U. immediately went to 
her friend’s home and reported the crimes to the police.  
Guided by C.U., police went to the location where the crime 
had occurred and recovered physical evidence supporting her 
description of the rape.  The following day, C.U. saw her two 
assailants at a grocery store parking lot and contacted 
police, who detained and arrested Murillo-Rodriguez and 
Gladamez.  During a police interview, Murillo-Rodriguez 
admitted to having had sexual contact with C.U., stating that 
he understood that he had committed a serious crime.2 
 
On January 22, 2008, a grand jury in the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County indicted Murillo-Rodriguez for both rape and 
abduction with intent to defile.  A two-day, bifurcated jury 
trial was held in the circuit court beginning on April 22, 
2008.  During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, evidence in 
                     
2 The police interviewed Murillo-Rodriguez, who is not 
fluent in English, with the assistance of a Spanish-speaking 
officer.  Murillo-Rodriguez stated that his actions were “un 
delito grave” (a serious crime) and when asked what crime he 
committed, he replied “[a]buso sexual” (sexual abuse). 
 
 
3
accord with the above-recited facts was presented to the jury.  
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Murillo-
Rodriguez’s counsel moved to strike the evidence as to the 
abduction charge, contending that the Commonwealth failed to 
prove that the restraint of the victim was not merely 
“incidental to the rape.”  The Commonwealth responded that the 
removal of the victim of a rape to a place of seclusion 
increased the danger to the victim and was not merely 
incidental to the commission of the rape because it involved 
restraint greater than was necessary to accomplish that crime.  
Thus, the Commonwealth contended that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding by the jury that there was an 
independent abduction of the victim.  Agreeing with the 
Commonwealth, the court overruled Murillo-Rodriguez’s motion 
to strike the evidence as to the abduction charge. 
 
Murillo-Rodriguez elected to introduce evidence in his 
defense and testified with the assistance of a Spanish 
language translator.  Murillo-Rodriguez recanted his prior 
statement to the police, contending that he had been 
intoxicated at the time of the interview.  Murillo-Rodriguez 
testified that he was acquainted with C.U. and her family and 
that he had engaged in consensual sexual activity with her 
prior to the date of the alleged rape.  He further testified 
that C.U. was intoxicated when they met on September 8, 2007 
 
4
and had voluntarily agreed to go to a nearby park, located 
some distance from the location where C.U. had indicated the 
rape had occurred, to have sexual intercourse with him.  He 
further testified that although she initially declined to have 
sexual intercourse with Galdamez, she did so after they had 
consumed some beer. 
 
After cross-examination and redirect examination of 
Murillo-Rodriguez, defense counsel stated, “That’s my case, 
your Honor.  The defense rests.”  Defense counsel did not 
renew his prior motion to strike the evidence as to the 
abduction charge. 
 
The Commonwealth introduced rebuttal evidence from the 
police officer who had acted as translator during the 
interview of Murillo-Rodriguez following his arrest.  The 
officer testified that Murillo-Rodriguez did not appear 
intoxicated at the time of the interview.  Through this 
officer’s testimony and without objection by the defense, the 
tape of Murillo-Rodriguez’s interview was played for the jury.  
After defense counsel briefly cross-examined the officer, the 
Commonwealth rested its case, and the trial was adjourned for 
the day. 
 
When the trial resumed the following morning, the jury 
was instructed by the circuit court, heard argument from the 
Commonwealth and defense counsel, and retired to consider its 
 
5
verdict.  The record does not reflect that Murillo-Rodriguez’s 
counsel made a new motion to strike the evidence as to the 
charge of abduction with intent to defile at any point prior 
to the case being given to the jury.  The jury unanimously 
found Murillo-Rodriguez guilty of rape and abduction with 
intent to defile.  Although Murillo-Rodriguez’s counsel 
requested a poll of the jury, he did not make a motion to set 
aside the jury’s verdict. 
 
Following additional testimony from the victim and 
Murillo-Rodriguez and additional argument by the parties in 
the penalty phase of the trial, the jury again retired to 
consider sentencing.  The jury recommended sentences of 20 
years imprisonment on each charge.  The jury was again polled, 
but Murillo-Rodriguez’s counsel did not make a motion to set 
aside the verdict. 
 
Following preparation of a pre-sentence report, the 
circuit court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 26, 2008. 
No transcript of the sentencing hearing was included in the 
record made available to the Court of Appeals and to this 
Court.  However, the sentencing order does not reflect, and 
Murillo-Rodriguez does not contend, that his counsel made a 
motion to set aside the verdict during or at the conclusion of 
the sentencing hearing.  The court sentenced Murillo-Rodriguez 
 
6
in accordance with the jury’s verdict, directing that the 
sentences be served consecutively. 
 
Murillo-Rodriguez noted an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals.  In his petition for appeal, Murillo-Rodriguez 
contended that the circuit court erred in failing to strike 
the Commonwealth’s evidence as to the charge of abduction with 
intent to defile because the evidence failed to show that the 
restraint of the victim “was separate and distinct from the 
restraint inherent in the crime of rape.” 
 
In an order dated February 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals 
refused the petition for appeal, first noting that, contrary 
to the requirements of Rule 5A:20(c), the petition failed to 
include “a clear and exact reference to the page(s) of the 
transcript, written statement, record, or appendix where each 
question was preserved in the trial court.”  Murillo-Rodriguez 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1763-08-4, slip op. at 1 (Feb. 11, 
2009).  The Court went on to state that in its review of the 
record it found that although Murillo-Rodriguez “made a motion 
to strike on the abduction charge after the Commonwealth 
rested its case-in-chief . . . the record fail[ed] to show 
that [Murillo-Rodriguez] renewed his motion to strike any time 
thereafter or timely moved to set aside the verdict.”  Id. 
 
Citing McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 753, 757, 460 
S.E.2d 624, 626 (1995) (en banc) (per curiam) (hereinafter, 
 
7
“McQuinn II”) and McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 321, 
357 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1987), the Court stated that “[i]n a 
jury trial, the defendant must make a motion to strike at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, or make a motion to set aside 
the verdict, in order to preserve the question of sufficiency 
of the evidence.”  Murillo-Rodriguez, Record No. 1763-08-4, 
slip op. at 2.  The Court concluded that Murillo-Rodriguez had 
not preserved for appeal his challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the conviction for abduction with 
intent to defile.  Accordingly, the Court held that Murillo-
Rodriguez’s appeal was barred by Rule 5A:18, and further held 
that it would not apply the ends of justice exception of that 
rule as the record did not demonstrate that the failure to do 
so would permit a miscarriage of justice to occur.  Id. 
 
Murillo-Rodriguez noted an appeal from the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals to this Court.  In his petition for 
appeal, Murillo-Rodriguez first assigned error to the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals that he had not adequately preserved 
for appeal the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the conviction for abduction with intent to defile by 
his motion to strike the evidence at the conclusion of the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.  He further assigned error to 
the failure of the Court of Appeals to overturn his conviction 
 
8
for abduction.  By an order dated June 19, 2009, we awarded 
Murillo-Rodriguez this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The resolution of Murillo-Rodriguez’s first assignment of 
error is dispositive to this appeal and involves the interplay 
between two closely related, but distinct concepts of waiver, 
and the application of a statutory provision limiting the 
circumstances in which an appellate court may find that an 
appellant has waived an issue for appeal after having “ma[de] 
known to the [trial] court the action which he desires the 
court to take or his objections to the action of the court and 
his grounds therefor.”  Code § 8.01-384(A).  The first concept 
of waiver is principally a rule of trial procedure, applied by 
this Court in criminal cases for over sixty years, requiring a 
court to consider all the evidence before it when a defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence after electing to 
introduce evidence in his defense at the conclusion of the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.  The second concept of waiver is 
a more recent rule of appellate procedure, first applied by 
the Court of Appeals in 1986, which bars the review by an 
appellate court of a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence where a defendant who has elected to introduce 
evidence in his defense does not make either a motion to 
 
9
strike at the conclusion of all the evidence or a motion to 
set aside the verdict. 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the relevant statute.  
As first enacted in 1970, former Code § 8-225.1 provided that: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court shall be unnecessary; but for all purposes for 
which an exception has heretofore been necessary, it 
shall be sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, 
makes known to the court the action which he desires 
the court to take or his objections to the action of 
the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at 
the time it is made, the absence of an objection 
shall not thereafter prejudice him on motion for a 
new trial or on appeal. 
In 1977, Code § 8-225.1 was recodified without amendment as 
Code § 8.01-384(A).  1977 Acts ch. 617.  In 1992, subsection 
(A) of the statute was amended by the addition of the 
following text: 
No party, after having made an objection or motion 
known to the court, shall be required to make such 
objection or motion again in order to preserve his 
right to appeal, challenge, or move for 
reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or action of 
the court.  No party shall be deemed to have agreed 
to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial 
court so as to forfeit his right to contest such 
order on appeal except by express written agreement 
in his endorsement of the order.  Arguments made at 
trial via written pleading, memorandum, recital of 
objections in a final order, oral argument reduced 
to transcript, or agreed written statements of facts 
shall, unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be 
deemed preserved therein for assertion on appeal. 
 
10
1992 Acts ch. 564 (emphasis added).  The legislation adding 
this language to the statute further stated “[t]hat the 
provisions of this act are declaratory of existing law.”  Id. 
 
In order to determine whether Code § 8.01-384(A) is 
applicable to the circumstances of this case, we first examine 
the origin of the two concepts of waiver that are implicated 
here.  Though the concept that presentation of evidence by a 
defendant is a waiver of a prior challenge to an opponent’s 
evidence is undoubtedly older and was regularly applied by 
this Court in civil cases, see, e.g., Rawle v. McIlhenny, 163 
Va. 735, 741, 177 S.E. 214, 216 (1934), the application of 
this concept of waiver in a criminal case in Virginia derives 
from the case of Spangler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 436, 50 
S.E.2d 265 (1948).  In Spangler, citing Rawle and other civil 
cases, we said: 
 
When a defendant in a civil or criminal case 
proceeds to introduce evidence in his own behalf, 
after the trial court has overruled his motion to 
strike, made at the conclusion of the introduction 
of plaintiff’s evidence in chief, he waives his 
right to stand upon such motion.  Plaintiff’s case 
may be strengthened by defendant’s evidence.  If 
thereafter a motion is made to strike the evidence 
or to set aside the verdict, the court must consider 
the entire record in reaching its conclusion. 
Id. at 438, 50 S.E.2d at 266.  Though we did not expressly 
indicate that Spangler made a motion to strike after 
introducing his evidence, a subsequent examination of the 
 
11
record by a judge of the Court of Appeals in a later case 
confirmed that the trial court had taken Spangler’s motion to 
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence under advisement and that 
Spangler made a further motion to strike at the conclusion of 
all the evidence, which the trial court denied.  See McQuinn 
v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 418, 431, 451 S.E.2d 704, 710-11 
(1994) (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(hereinafter, “McQuinn I”). 
 
Applying the rule from Rawle, we held in Spangler that 
after proceeding to introduce evidence in his own behalf, 
Spangler could not thereafter limit his challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to that presented solely by the 
Commonwealth, but, rather, the only question to be considered 
by the trial court, and subsequently by this Court on appeal, 
was “whether considering all the evidence, the guilt of the 
accused is established beyond a reasonable doubt.”  188 Va. at 
438, 50 S.E.2d at 266.  The issue in Spangler, therefore, was 
not whether the defendant had preserved for appeal his 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather what 
quantum of evidence from which guilt will be determined should 
be considered by the trial court, and in turn by an appellate 
court, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence after introducing evidence in his own behalf.   
 
12
 
While Spangler was a bench trial, we subsequently applied 
the same concept of waiver to jury trials where the defendant 
elected to introduce evidence in his defense.  See, e.g., 
Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 428, 61 S.E.2d 267, 269 
(1950).  In subsequent criminal cases in which we have applied 
Spangler or one of its progeny, the expression of the waiver 
concept has consistently been that when a defendant elects to 
introduce evidence in his own behalf after the denial of a 
motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, any further 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial or on 
appeal is to be determined from the entire record, because by 
putting on additional evidence, the defendant waives his 
ability to challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s 
evidence in isolation.3 
 
In contrast, the concept of waiver applied by the Court 
of Appeals in the present case does not involve the quantum of 
evidence to be considered when reviewing the sufficiency of 
                     
3 See, e.g., Canady v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 331, 332-33, 
200 S.E.2d 575, 576-77 (1973) (per curiam); Tolley v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 341, 347, 218 S.E.2d 550, 554 (1975); 
Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 
(1976); Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 604, 605, 248 
S.E.2d 814, 815 (1978); Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 
531, 290 S.E.2d 865, 866-67 (1982); Starks v. Commonwealth, 
225 Va. 48, 55, 301 S.E.2d 152, 156 (1983); Bunch v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 439, 304 S.E.2d 271, 280 (1983); 
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 270 n.8, 337 S.E.2d 255, 
259 n.8 (1985); Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 387, 
464 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1995). 
 
13
the evidence.  Rather, the focus is upon the concept of waiver 
in the context of appellate procedure for determining whether 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence has been 
preserved for appeal.  The Court of Appeals first addressed 
this concept of waiver in White v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 
231, 348 S.E.2d 866 (1986), involving a jury trial where the 
defendant moved to strike the evidence at the conclusion of 
the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, but did not make a motion to 
strike at the conclusion of all the evidence and did not make 
a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.  While recognizing 
the established rule that if a defendant makes a motion to 
strike the evidence at the conclusion of all the evidence or 
makes a motion to set aside the verdict a “ ‘court must 
consider the entire record in reaching its conclusion,’ ” id. 
at 233, 348 S.E.2d at 867 (quoting Spangler, 188 Va. at 438, 
50 S.E.2d at 266), the Court concluded that no Virginia 
authority directly addressed the issue of what consequence 
would ensue from the failure of the defendant to make these 
motions.  The Court observed that because White “never 
objected to the sufficiency of the evidence” after presenting 
his own case, “the trial court was never asked to rule on this 
issue based on the entire record.”  White, 3 Va. App. at 233, 
348 S.E.2d at 867.  Thus, citing Rule 5A:18, the Court held 
that by failing to make a motion to strike after he introduced 
 
14
his evidence White waived his challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence just as if he “failed to object to any other 
matter at trial.”4  Id.   
 
The Court of Appeals revisited the issue of preservation 
for appeal of sufficiency issues in a jury trial in Day v. 
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1078, 407 S.E.2d 52 (1991).  In Day, 
the majority applied White, holding that a defendant’s 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to show proper 
venue in a motion to strike at the conclusion of the 
Commonwealth’s case was waived where he failed to renew that 
motion after introducing evidence in his defense and made no 
express argument on that point in asking the court to set 
                     
4 Though not directly relevant to the issue raised in this 
appeal, which is essentially indistinguishable from the 
circumstances in White, we note that the Court of Appeals has 
refined and limited its application of this waiver rule in 
subsequent cases.  See, e.g., McGee, 4 Va. App. at 321, 357 
S.E.2d at 739-40 (holding that “[a] prior motion to strike the 
evidence . . . is not a prerequisite to a motion to set aside 
the verdict”); Sylvestre v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 253, 
255, 391 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1990) (rejecting the Commonwealth’s 
contention that White should be extended to bar a defendant 
from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in 
any case where the defendant elects to put on evidence); 
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 479-81, 405 S.E.2d 
1, 2-3 (1991) (en banc) (declining to extend White to a bench 
trial where no express motion to strike had been made at the 
conclusion of the case, but where sufficiency of the evidence 
had been fully addressed in the defense’s closing argument); 
Cotter v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 453, 454, 464 S.E.2d 566, 
567 (1995) (en banc) (order) (holding that although trial 
court ruled on motion to set aide the verdict, failure of 
defendant to provide a record of the basis for the motion 
 
15
aside the jury’s verdict.  12 Va. App. at 1079-80, 407 S.E.2d 
at 53-54.  The majority of the panel in Day did not address 
Code § 8.01-384(A).  Recognizing that the panel was bound by 
the existing precedent of White, a member of the panel in a 
concurring opinion nevertheless expressed the view that the 
“one objection limit” of Code § 8.01-384(A), as then in effect 
since 1970, “eliminat[ed] the need for formal exceptions and 
declar[ed] that stating one’s objection and the ground for it 
at the time a court rules is sufficient to preserve an issue 
for appeal.”  Id. at 1081, 407 S.E.2d at 54-55 (Barrow, J., 
concurring).   
 
Following the amendment of Code § 8.01-384(A) in 1992, 
the Court of Appeals in McQuinn I considered a challenge to 
the waiver concept established in White.  There, the 
Commonwealth asserted the procedural waiver established in 
White, as confirmed by Day, barred McQuinn, who had introduced 
evidence in his defense following the denial of his motion to 
strike at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief 
and had not thereafter renewed the motion to strike or moved 
to set aside the verdict, from challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence on appeal.  McQuinn I, 19 Va. App. at 420, 451 
S.E.2d at 705.  Addressing the issue of preservation of the 
                                                                
barred consideration of challenge to sufficiency of the 
evidence). 
 
16
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the majority of 
the panel concluded that “the defendant’s motion at the 
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to 
preserve the question for review on appeal.”  Id.  The 
majority reasoned, in part, that where a defendant elects to 
introduce evidence following the denial of a motion to strike 
at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Code 
§ 8.01-384(A) preserved the challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence on appeal “if the defendant’s evidence does no 
more than conflict with the prosecution’s evidence and does 
not render it insufficient as a matter of law, [because] the 
question of sufficiency does not change following presentation 
of the defendant’s evidence.  In such an instance, 
reconsideration of a motion to strike the evidence, once 
denied, is unnecessary.”  Id. at 422, 451 S.E.2d at 706.  Both 
McQuinn and the Commonwealth petitioned the Court of Appeals 
for a rehearing en banc and both petitions were granted.   
 
Sitting en banc, a majority of the Court found that White 
barred McQuinn’s sufficiency challenge because he had 
introduced evidence in his defense and had not thereafter made 
a motion to strike or a motion to set aside the verdict 
challenging the evidence as a whole.  McQuinn II, 20 Va. App. 
at 755-56, 460 S.E.2d at 625-26.  The majority rejected 
McQuinn’s contention that the 1992 amendment of Code § 8.01-
 
17
384(A) had abrogated or limited the application of White and 
its progeny.  The majority reasoned that “[t]he legislature is 
presumed to know the decisions of the appellate courts of the 
Commonwealth and to acquiesce therein unless it countermands 
them explicitly.”  Id. at 757, 460 S.E.2d at 626.  Applying 
this rule of construction, the majority noted that “[t]he 
doctrine[s] of Spangler, White, and Day, based on . . . 
concept[s] of waiver, w[ere] firmly in place prior to the 1992 
amendment to Code § 8.01-384(A)” and, thus, “[t]he 1992 
statutory amendment did not address waiver and did not 
explicitly overrule the holdings of Spangler, White, and Day.”  
Id.  This Court refused McQuinn’s petition for appeal from the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals.  McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 951752 (December 27, 1995). 
 
Following McQuinn II, the Court of Appeals has 
consistently applied the White/McQuinn II concept of waiver to 
require a defendant who elects to introduce evidence in his 
defense after the denial of a motion to strike the 
Commonwealth’s evidence to reassert in some fashion a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole after 
the record is complete, and if he fails to do so, he waives 
his ability to raise that issue on appeal.  This concept of 
waiver is so well established in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Appeals that its application has primarily been 
 
18
confined to unpublished memoranda opinions and, as in this 
case, orders refusing petitions for appeal. 
 
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ decisions in White 
and McQuinn II, Murillo-Rodriguez asserts that the concept of 
waiver established in those cases is not applicable to the 
circumstances of his case.  He contends that in King this 
Court recognized that the amendment of Code § 8.01-384(A) in 
1992 superseded the requirement for making a motion to strike 
all the evidence once a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s 
evidence is made, and that any waiver of a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal must be affirmatively 
shown on the record and will not be implied from the failure 
to make a subsequent motion to strike the evidence or from the 
absence of a motion to set aside the verdict after the 
defendant has elected to introduce evidence in his defense.  
Murillo-Rodriguez further contends that nothing in the 
evidence he presented in this case, or by the Commonwealth in 
rebuttal, added to or enhanced the evidence regarding the 
length of time or level of force used to restrain the victim 
prior to the rape.  Accordingly, he maintains that under Code 
§ 8.01-384(A) there was no waiver of his challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the independent offense 
of abduction for which he was indicted. 
 
19
 
The Commonwealth correctly responds that Murillo-
Rodriguez’s reliance on King is misplaced.  In that case the 
defendant made a motion to strike at the conclusion of the 
introduction of the evidence, but then failed to object to a 
jury instruction that addressed the same issue as the argument 
made in support of the motion to strike.  264 Va. at 579, 570 
S.E.2d at 864.  Our holding in King does not stand for the 
proposition that Code § 8.01-384(A) as amended in 1992 has 
altered or superseded the requirement that a defendant make a 
motion to strike all the evidence or thereafter a motion to 
set aside an unfavorable verdict in order to challenge on 
appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction.  In King, in the context of the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-384(A), we held that the issue was made known to the 
trial court in the defendant’s motion to strike the evidence 
and that the defendant’s failure to subsequently object to a 
jury instruction that varied from the language of the 
indictment did not constitute a waiver of the issue denied by 
the trial court following the motion to strike the evidence.  
264 Va. at 580-82, 570 S.E.2d at 865-66. 
 
While we agree with the Commonwealth that King is 
distinguishable from, and thus not directly applicable to, the 
facts of the present case, this does not resolve Murillo-
Rodriguez’s contention that our application of Code § 8.01-
 
20
384(A) in that case should be extended to provide for a more 
relaxed rule with regard to the necessity for formal 
objections to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal 
cases.  To the contrary, this case presents us with the 
opportunity, not available in Ortiz, specifically to consider 
the concept of waiver established by the Court of Appeals in 
White and McQuinn II and whether in McQuinn II the Court of 
Appeals correctly interpreted the interplay between that 
concept of waiver and Code § 8.01-384(A). 
 
Conceding that this Court has not directly applied the 
decisions in White and McQuinn II with regard to the concept 
of waiver in a direct appeal, the Commonwealth contends that 
implicitly we have recognized the application of that concept 
in Jerman v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 267 Va. 432, 593 
S.E.2d 255 (2004).  However, Jerman involved a petition for 
post-conviction relief through habeas corpus.  Our conclusion 
that appellate counsel’s decision not to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal was not 
ineffective “because that argument was procedurally defaulted 
when trial counsel failed to renew the motion to strike at the 
close of all the evidence,” id. at 441, 593 S.E.2d at 260, 
merely reflects our recognition of the state of the law 
applicable to the underlying direct appeal, rather than a 
 
21
considered approval of the Court of Appeals’ decisions in 
White and McQuinn II. 
 
Accordingly, we will first consider whether the 
application of the concept of waiver originally established 
and applied by the Court of Appeals in White was correct, and 
second, we will consider whether the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined in McQuinn II that the 1992 amendment to 
Code § 8.01-384(A) did not abrogate or limit the application 
of the concept of waiver established in White. 
 
The concept of waiver first set forth in White is in 
reality nothing more than a straightforward application of the 
contemporaneous objection rule.  “The primary purpose of 
requiring timely and specific objections is to allow the trial 
court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues 
presented, thereby avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.  
A specific, contemporaneous objection also provides the 
opposing party an opportunity to address an issue at a time 
when the course of the proceedings may be altered in response 
to the problem presented.  If a party fails to make a timely 
objection, the objection is waived for purposes of appeal.”  
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 126, 645 S.E.2d 914, 916  
(2007) (citations omitted). 
 
When a defendant has elected to introduce evidence on his 
own behalf after a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s 
 
22
evidence has been denied, he necessarily changes the quantum 
of evidence from which his guilt will be determined.  This is 
especially true where, as in this case, the defendant 
testifies on his own behalf and recants a prior confession, 
thereby putting his credibility at issue before the trier of 
fact. 
 
As the Court of Appeals observed in White, the failure to 
object to the sufficiency of all the evidence is a waiver of 
that issue just as if the defendant “failed to object to any 
other matter at trial.”  3 Va. App. at 233, 348 S.E.2d at 867.  
This is so because, by not reasserting a sufficiency challenge 
after he has introduced his own evidence, the defendant has 
deprived the trial court of the opportunity to consider and 
rule on the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law 
under the proper standard required by Spangler.5  Accordingly, 
we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded in White 
that in such cases the defendant must afford the trial court 
the opportunity upon proper motion to decide the question of 
the sufficiency of all the evidence, and that if he fails to 
                     
5 Although we frequently refer to a defendant “renewing” 
his motion to strike at the conclusion of the introduction of 
all the evidence, properly understood a “renewed” motion to 
strike is a new motion asking the trial court to apply a prior 
challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s case to all 
the evidence. 
 
23
do so, he has waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence on appeal. 
 
With regard to the application of Code § 8.01-384(A), in 
McQuinn II the en banc Court of Appeals addressed the question 
whether the 1992 amendment of that statute had abrogated or 
limited the concept of waiver established in White requiring a 
challenge to the sufficiency of all the evidence and concluded 
that it had not.  However, subsequent to the Court of Appeals 
decision in McQuinn II, we have applied Code § 8.01-384(A) in 
both civil and criminal cases to conclude that a party was not 
barred from asserting an issue on appeal that was the subject 
of a pre-trial or interlocutory motion or objection overruled 
by the trial court and not thereafter renewed when the issue 
arose again later in the trial.  For example, as noted above, 
in King, we held that the defendant was not required to object 
to a jury instruction that was contrary to his argument made 
during a motion to strike at the conclusion of all the 
evidence that the Commonwealth’s evidence did not conform to 
the indictment.  264 Va. at 579, 570 S.E.2d at 864.  We 
explained the application of Code § 8.01-384(A) and its 
recognition that a prior objection or argument from a motion 
might be waived as follows: 
Like the waiver of any legal right, the waiver 
referenced in Code § 8.01-384(A) “will be implied 
only upon clear and unmistakable proof of the 
 
24
intention to waive such right for the essence of 
waiver is voluntary choice.”  Chawla v. 
BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 
829, 833 (1998).  In Chawla, the appellee also 
argued that the failure to object to a jury 
instruction was a waiver of a prior objection on the 
same issue.  Applying Code § 8.01-384(A), we 
rejected this argument, finding no support in the 
record for the conclusion that the appellant 
“abandoned or evidenced an intent to abandon the 
[prior] objection.”  Id. 
 
The same rationale applies to the circumstances 
of this case with equal, if not greater, force 
considering the gravity of applying an implied 
waiver in a criminal trial.  The undeniable purpose 
of Code § 8.01-384(A) is to relieve counsel of the 
burden of making repeated further objections to each 
subsequent action of the trial court that applies or 
implements a prior ruling to which an objection has 
already been noted.  In this regard, the statute and 
the contemporaneous objection rule contained in Rule 
5A:18, applicable in the Court of Appeals, and in 
Rule 5:25, applicable in this Court, are entirely 
consistent. 
 
Id. at 581, 570 S.E.2d at 865-66. 
 
We have subsequently applied Code § 8.01-384(A) in a 
criminal law context to reject the Commonwealth’s assertion of 
a defense waiver of an issue in Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 
290, 305-06, 645 S.E.2d 448, 458 (2007), where we concluded 
that an argument raised in a memorandum in support of a pre-
trial motion to declare the capital murder statute 
unconstitutional was adequately presented to the trial court 
even though not addressed in a subsequent hearing on the 
motion.  Similarly, in Shelton, we applied the statute in an 
appeal of a Sexually Violent Predator Act commitment 
 
25
proceeding to hold that a pre-trial motion and qualified 
endorsement of the final order were sufficient to preserve 
issues raised on appeal although no objections were raised on 
those issues during the commitment hearing.  274 Va. at 127, 
645 S.E.2d at 916. 
 
Murillo-Rodriguez contends that the application of Code 
§ 8.01-384(A) by this Court in these cases essentially 
supports his contention that the proper application of the 
concept of waiver at issue would allow an appeal challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence based solely on a motion to 
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence so long as the evidence 
offered by the defendant does not “change[] the context in 
which the court had judged the sufficiency of the evidence as 
it related to his earlier motion to strike.”  He contends that 
such would be the case here because his motion to strike at 
the end of the Commonwealth’s evidence “fully [apprised] the 
trial court of his contention that the evidence was legally 
insufficient to support a charge of abduction separate and 
distinct from that of rape,” and thereafter the evidence he 
introduced “gave a completely different account of what 
transpired . . . there was no abduction, no asportation, and 
no rape.”  Accordingly, Murillo-Rodriguez contends that under 
Code § 8.01-384(A) he was not required to raise a further 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
 
26
separate crime of abduction with intent to defile because the 
evidence of that crime was limited to the evidence presented 
by the Commonwealth in its case-in-chief. 
 
We do not agree with Murillo-Rodriguez that Code § 8.01-
384(A) should be applied in this case, or in any similar case, 
to permit appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
based solely on a motion to strike denied after the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.  To the contrary, we hold that 
the statute does not apply to the circumstances of such cases 
for the self-evident reason, clearly set out in Spangler and 
in the subsequent line of cases which followed its rationale, 
that a motion to strike the evidence presented after the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief is a separate and distinct motion 
from a motion to strike all the evidence, or a motion to set 
aside an unfavorable verdict, made after the defendant has 
elected to introduce evidence on his own behalf. 
 
In each of the cases in which we have applied Code 
§ 8.01-384(A) to find that the statute did not permit an 
appellee to assert waiver of an issue by the appellant, we 
have been consistent in holding that in order for a waiver to 
be found the statute requires that “the record must 
affirmatively show that the party who has asserted an 
objection has abandoned the objection [or argument of an 
overruled motion] or has demonstrated by his conduct the 
 
27
intent to abandon” that argument.  Shelton, 274 Va. at 127-28, 
645 S.E.2d at 917; see also Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 6, 
671 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2009); King, 264 Va. at 581, 570 S.E.2d 
at 865-66; Chawla, 255 Va. at 623, 499 S.E.2d at 833.  
However, the concept of waiver established in Spangler, which 
is the underpinning of White and its progeny including McQuinn 
II, is that by electing to introduce evidence in his defense 
after a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence is 
denied, a defendant has affirmatively “waive[d] his right to 
stand upon such motion.”  188 Va. at 438, 50 S.E.2d at 266.  
In short, by electing to introduce evidence in his defense, 
the defendant demonstrates “by his conduct the intent to 
abandon” the argument that the Commonwealth failed to meet its 
burden through the evidence presented in its case-in-chief.  
Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 248, 682 S.E.2d 535, 543 (2009) 
(citing Helms, 277 Va. at 6, 671 S.E.2d at 129).  Thus, any 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence after such waiver 
will necessarily raise a new and distinct issue from the one 
presented by the denied motion to strike. 
 
Furthermore, even if we were to agree with Murillo-
Rodriguez that his self-serving testimony, especially his 
recantation of his statement to police, did not implicate the 
question of whether he abducted the victim, we would 
nonetheless reject his contention that the concept of waiver 
 
28
established in Spangler should apply only where the evidence 
presented by a defendant after a motion to strike is denied is 
directly relevant to the issue which he subsequently seeks to 
challenge on sufficiency grounds.  To the contrary, while we 
indicated that the basis for the waiver was that the 
“[prosecution’s] case may be strengthened by defendant’s 
evidence,” 188 Va. at 438, 50 S.E.2d at 266 (emphasis added), 
the waiver arises as soon as the defendant elects to introduce 
any evidence without regard to its quality, focus or import.  
In the absence of this bright line rule, appellate courts 
would be forever reviewing the evidence presented by 
defendants to determine whether, directly or by inference, it 
related to a particular question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence being asserted on appeal. 
 
In sum, the waiver rule established in Spangler bars the 
defendant from challenging only the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence, both in the trial court and on 
appeal, if he elects to introduce evidence of his own.  By 
contrast, the waiver rule established in White and confirmed 
in McQuinn II is addressed only to whether the defendant will 
be allowed to challenge the sufficiency of all the evidence on 
appeal.  The Court of Appeals’ waiver rule, which we now 
expressly approve, is not subject to the application of Code 
§ 8.01-384(A) because the failure of the defendant to 
 
29
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the conclusion of 
the introduction of all the evidence, whether by a motion to 
strike or a motion to set aside the verdict, does not present 
the same issue as was asserted in a previously denied motion 
to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence.  While Code § 8.01-
384(A), by its express language, supports the application of 
the waiver in Spangler because the defendant, by electing to 
introduce evidence in his defense, has affirmatively waived 
his objection limited to the Commonwealth’s evidence, the 
statute simply does not apply to the application of the waiver 
rule established in White and McQuinn II because that waiver 
applies when the defendant, after introducing evidence in his 
defense, has failed to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence as a whole in the trial court.  Simply put, a 
defendant may not rely upon Code § 8.01-384(A) to preserve for 
appeal an issue that he never allowed the trial court to rule 
upon. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly 
determined that Murillo-Rodriguez had waived his challenge to 
the sufficiency of all the evidence to support his conviction 
for abduction with intent to defile.  We further agree with 
the Court of Appeals that the ends of justice do not require 
that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence be 
reviewed despite this waiver, as the record from the circuit 
 
30
court amply demonstrates that no miscarriage of justice has 
occurred.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals did 
not err in refusing Murillo-Rodriguez’s petition for appeal.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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