Case Title: John Blackwelder v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-2058

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-2058
____________
JOHN BLACKWELDER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 3, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, John Blackwelder, appeals a circuit court judgment sentencing him
to death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
I. FACTS
Appellant pleaded guilty to the first-degree, premeditated murder of
Raymond D. Wigley.  At the time of the murder, Appellant and Wigley were
inmates at the Columbia Correctional Institution.  In May 2000, they engaged in a
consensual sexual encounter.  Although Blackwelder did not want a sexual
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relationship with Wigley, he knew that Wigley would badger him for sex, so
Blackwelder decided to murder him.  In preparation, Blackwelder positioned three
pieces of cord in accessible locations around the bunk beds in his cell.  Then he
waited for an opportune moment.  
That time came on May 6, 2000.  On that day, Wigley went to Blackwelder's
cell asking for sex.  Blackwelder feigned agreement so that Wigley would consent
to being tied to the bed.  Wigley disrobed and permitted Blackwelder to tie his
hands and feet to the bed and tie a hand towel over his mouth.  Blackwelder then
knelt on Wigley's mid-back, reached for one of the hidden cords, and strangled
him.  Wigley pleaded with Blackwelder "not to do this" and stated, "I'll do
anything."  It took ten minutes for Wigley to die.  After killing Wigley, Blackwelder
turned himself in to prison authorities.
Blackwelder pleaded guilty to first-degree murder.  A jury was impaneled for
the penalty phase, and it unanimously recommended a sentence of death.  The trial
court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while
under a sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (2) Blackwelder has been
previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to some person (great weight); (3) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); and (4) the murder was committed in a
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cold and calculated and premeditated manner (great weight).  The trial court also
found two statutory mitigating factors (the crime was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and
he lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or his ability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired) and
two nonstatutory mitigating factors (Blackwelder's relationship with his family and
his history of sexual abuse as a child).  The court gave slight weight to each
mitigating circumstance and found that any aggravator, standing alone, would
outweigh all the mitigation.  
The court imposed a sentence of death.  Blackwelder appeals.  He raises
four claims, which we address below.
II. EQUIVOCATING JURORS
Blackwelder first argues that the jury's recommendation of death was not the
product of adversarial testing because he actively sought jurors with pro-death
penalty views.  During voir dire, two prospective jurors initially equivocated about
the possibility of recommending a life sentence.  Both ultimately concluded,
however, that they could recommend a life sentence if the mitigating circumstances
outweighed the aggravating ones.  Both jurors were on the panel that recommended
a sentence of death.
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Blackwelder concedes that he failed to object to any potential jurors.   
Blackwelder had seven peremptory challenges remaining at the end of jury
selection.  He did not attempt to challenge either juror for cause.  In fact,
Blackwelder expressed that he was "happy" with the jury panel.  We have held that
defendants are required to challenge jurors they find questionable.  Pentecost v.
State, 545 So. 2d 861, 863 n.1 (Fla. 1989) ("To show reversible error, a defendant
must show that all peremptories had been exhausted and that an objectionable juror
had to be accepted.").  Because Blackwelder chose not to challenge either juror, he
cannot now complain about their presence on the jury. To permit relief under this
claim would allow a defendant to intentionally inject error into the penalty phase to
hedge against a sentence of death.  Cf. Armstrong v. State, 579 So. 2d 734, 735
(Fla. 1991) (affirming where the defendant claimed that the trial court committed
fundamental error by charging the jury with an erroneous instruction the defendant
had requested). 
Even if Blackwelder had preserved this claim, we would deny it on the
merits.  As we have held, "[i]n a death penalty case, a juror is only unqualified
based on his or her views of capital punishment, if he or she expresses an
unyielding conviction and rigidity toward the death penalty."  Barnhill v. State, 834
So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2002).  Here, Blackwelder complains that two jurors initially
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equivocated about the possibility of recommending a life sentence.  Neither juror,
however, held an unyielding conviction toward the death penalty.  Both ultimately
agreed they could recommend life if the mitigators outweighed the aggravators.
III. SENTENCING ORDER
Blackwelder next argues that the trial court abdicated its responsibility
because the sentencing order copied almost verbatim the State's sentencing
memorandum.  At the end of the penalty phase, the trial court requested that each
side prepare a proposed sentencing order.  The State suggested that preparing a
proposed order was a "bad idea" and recommended that each side prepare a
sentencing memorandum.  Both sides prepared memoranda and the trial court
copied substantial portions of the State's memorandum in its sentencing order. 
This issue, too, is procedurally barred because Blackwelder failed to object.  
See Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 611 (Fla. 2000) (holding that although the trial
court may have erred in relying on a sentencing order the State prepared, the
defendant failed to preserve the issue).
This argument also fails on the merits.  It is true that "this Court has held that
the trial court may not request that parties submit proposed orders and adopt one
of the proposals verbatim without a showing that the trial court independently
weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances."  Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d
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960, 965 (Fla. 2001) (citing Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993)). 
In this case, however, the differences between the State’s memorandum and the
sentencing order demonstrate that the trial judge independently weighed the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The sentencing order found three
mitigating circumstances, while the State’s memorandum argued that no mitigation
applied.  The judge also found that the prior violent felony aggravator was
supported by a prior capital felony and seven other felonies involving violence or
the threat of violence – not ten, as the State argued.  These differences indicate that
the trial court did not simply rubber-stamp the State's sentencing memorandum, but
independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and personally
evaluated the case.  Cf. Morton v. Florida, 789 So. 2d 324, 334 (Fla. 2001) (if a
resentencing judge copies verbatim the prior sentencing order or substantial
portions thereof, reversal is not necessary if it is evident from the record that the
resentencing judge performed an independent weighing and personal evaluation of
the case).
However, we remind judges of their duty to independently weigh aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.  A sentencing order should reflect the trial judge’s
independent judgment about the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors and
the weight each should receive.  When a judge simply copies verbatim the State’s
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submission, whether it is designated a “sentencing order” or a "sentencing
memorandum," the judge abdicates that responsibility.  Moreover, such verbatim
copying renders more difficult, if not impossible, our own duty to determine
whether the trial court fulfilled its sentencing responsibility.  Therefore, we warn trial
judges that they should avoid copying verbatim a State’s sentencing memorandum. 
While we recognize the efficiency modern computer technology affords in drafting
orders, efficiency cannot substitute for independent consideration of the evidence.
IV. PRIOR VIOLENT FELONY AGGRAVATOR
Blackwelder next claims that the prior violent felony aggravator should be
stricken because it was based, in part, on six felony convictions that are not per se
crimes of violence.  Even if he is correct, however (which we do not address),
Blackwelder also had been convicted of capital sexual battery, which is per se a
crime of violence.  In addition, Blackwelder had been convicted of attempted
capital sexual battery.  Therefore, the prior violent felony aggravator is supported
by competent, substantial evidence. 
V. RING ISSUES
Finally, Blackwelder argues that Florida's capital sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court,
considering the effect of Ring, denied relief in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693
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(Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct 662 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143
(Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 657 (2002), which, like Blackwelder's case, involved
a prior-felony-conviction aggravator.  Ring rests on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), which held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. at 490.  We have previously rejected claims under Apprendi and Ring in cases
involving the prior-felony-conviction aggravator.  See Lugo v. State, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly S160, S173 n.79 (Fla. Feb. 20, 2003) (noting rejection of Apprendi/Ring
claims in postconviction appeals, unanimous guilty verdict on other felonies, and
"existence of prior violent felonies"); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 966 (Fla.
2003) (stating that prior violent felony aggravator based on contemporaneous
crimes charged by indictment and on which defendant was found guilty by
unanimous jury "clearly satisfies the mandates of the United States and Florida
Constitutions"). 
Blackwelder argues specifically that aggravating circumstances must be
alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and individually found by a
unanimous jury verdict.  We recently rejected this same argument.  Porter v.
Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2003).
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VI. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Although Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence for his
conviction of first-degree murder, we must nevertheless independently determine
whether the evidence is sufficient.  See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla.
1998); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(h).  Based on our review, we find that there is
competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict.  We have outlined that
evidence in detail above.
VII. PROPORTIONALITY
Although Blackwelder has not contested the proportionality of his sentence,
we have an independent duty to determine whether the sentence of death was
proportional – that is, that such a sentence was appropriate in light of the sentences
imposed under similar circumstances.  See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064
(Fla. 1990).  We find that Blackwelder's sentence is proportional to other cases
where a death sentence has been imposed.  See Lawrence v. State, 698 So.2d 1219
(Fla. 1997) (death sentence proportional where aggravators of especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel (HAC), cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), and under
sentence of imprisonment weighed against five nonstatutory mitigators – a learning
disability, a low IQ, a deprived childhood, the influence of alcohol, and a lack of a
violent history). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we approve the trial court's sentencing order and
affirm Blackwelder's sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons I expressed in my opinion in Duest v. State, No. SC00-2366
(Fla. June 26, 2003), I cannot agree with the majority's discussion of Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  I do not view the mere existence of a prior violent
felony aggravating circumstance as a valid means of rejecting a Ring claim,
especially where the trial judge found three other aggravating circumstances and
assigned them each "great weight" in the decision to impose the death sentence. 
Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the essential holding of Ring that a
death sentence cannot be predicated upon findings made by the trial judge alone,
was violated.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Columbia County, 
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E. Vernon Douglas, Judge - Case No. 00-513-CF
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and W. C. McLain, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee