Case Title: Green Bay Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021AP000102

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP102 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Green Bay Professional Police Association and 
Andrew Weiss, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Green Bay, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 504, 966 N.W.2d 107 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 73 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 27, 2023    
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Kendall M. Kelley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring 
opinion. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Jonathan Cermele and Cermele Law, S.C., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Jonathan Cermele. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
William E. Fischer, Kyle J. Gulya, and von Briesen & Roper, 
S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by William E. Fischer.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brendan P. Matthews and 
Cermele & Matthews, S.C., Milwaukee, for the Milwaukee Police 
Association.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Matthew J. Thome, and Attolles Law, S.C., Milwaukee, for the 
Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association.  
 
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 33 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP102 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV1248) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Green Bay Professional Police Association and 
Andrew Weiss, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Green Bay, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
APR 27, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring 
opinion. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   The Green Bay Police Department 
(the Department) disciplined Andrew Weiss for violating several 
Department policies and demoted him from his position as a 
detective to a patrol officer.  The demotion resulted in Weiss's 
loss of an $80 monthly stipend.  Weiss1 challenged this 
                                                 
1 The Green Bay Professional Police Association brought this 
action against the City of Green Bay along with Weiss.  As their 
arguments are identical and briefed together, we refer only to 
Weiss throughout the opinion.  
No. 
2021AP102   
 
2 
 
disciplinary 
action 
in 
an 
arbitration 
proceeding. 
 
The 
arbitrator concluded that the Department had cause to take its 
chosen disciplinary action.  Additionally, the arbitrator 
concluded that the Department's disciplinary procedures did not 
violate Weiss's constitutional due process rights.2  The circuit 
court3 confirmed the arbitration award, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.4  We afford a high level of deference to arbitration 
decisions because of the contractual nature of arbitration 
agreements.  Given this deference, the arbitrator did not exceed 
his powers, and so we likewise affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In the fall of 2017, Weiss, a detective for the 
Department, accessed sensitive information via the Green Bay 
Electronic Records Program (GERP) regarding two sexual assault 
cases that the Department was investigating.  Weiss was not 
involved in either investigation.  After obtaining the sensitive 
information, 
Weiss 
used 
a 
personal 
cellphone 
to 
provide 
information to a third party.  After launching an internal 
investigation, the Department issued a formal complaint alleging 
that Weiss violated the following four Department policies: 
Media 
Relations 
(§ 322.4); 
Media 
Requests 
(§ 322.6(a)); 
Unauthorized Disclosure (§ 320.5.6(a)); and Conduct Unbecoming 
                                                 
2 See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. 
3 The Honorable Kendall M. Kelley of the Brown County 
Circuit Court presided. 
4 Green Bay Pro. Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay, 2021 WI 
App 73, 399 Wis. 2d 504, 966 N.W.2d 107. 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
3 
 
an Officer (§ 320.5.9(n)).  The Department held an investigative 
interview with Weiss and gave Weiss the opportunity to address 
the allegations.  Weiss admitted both accessing information on 
GERP and then using a personal cell phone to relay information 
to a friend. 
¶3 
The following month, the Department conducted a second 
interview with Weiss and provided him with an amended formal 
complaint alleging two additional violations of the Department 
policy regarding the use of personal communication devices 
(§§ 701.2 & 701.5(e)).  At that interview, investigators asked 
Weiss to turn over his phone logs for the relevant time period.  
The investigators allowed Weiss time to discuss the request with 
his union and its attorney before meeting for a third time.  At 
the third meeting, Weiss refused to provide the requested phone 
records and the investigators gave him a copy of the Department 
policy 
regarding 
cooperation 
with 
personnel 
complaint 
investigations (§ 1008.2).  
¶4 
One month later, the Department issued Weiss a final 
notice5 informing him that the Department was "considering a 
serious level of discipline."  The notice listed four policy 
violations: 
Media 
Relations 
(§ 322.4); 
Media 
Requests 
                                                 
5 Both the Department and Weiss refer to this notice and 
accompanying hearing as the "Loudermill notice" and "Loudermill 
hearing" in reference to Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532 (1985), which held that oral or written notice and 
opportunity to respond was required prior to the termination of 
the subject public employee who could only be terminated for 
cause. 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
4 
 
(§ 322.6(a)); 
Unauthorized 
Disclosure 
(§ 320.5.6(a)); 
and 
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer (§ 320.5.9(n)).  The notice 
referenced Weiss's admission that he accessed case information 
on GERP and then provided information to a friend.  A final 
hearing was held that same day, and Weiss was allowed to address 
the allegations. 
¶5 
The 
following 
month 
the 
Department 
issued 
its 
disciplinary decision in which it determined that Weiss violated 
the following policies: Unauthorized Disclosure (§ 320.5.6(a)); 
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer (§ 320.5.9(n)); Use of Personal 
Communication Devices (§§ 701.2 & 701.5(e)); and Failure to 
Cooperate in an Investigation of Personnel Complaint (§ 1008.2).  
As a result of these violations, the Department demoted Weiss 
from his position as a detective to a position as a patrol 
officer, resulting in the loss of an $80 per month stipend 
associated with the detective assignment. 
¶6 
Weiss filed a grievance with the Green Bay Personnel 
Committee which was denied.  Weiss then sought arbitration, 
arguing that the Department did not have cause to discipline him 
and that his due process rights under Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), were violated because he was 
ultimately disciplined for three policy violations that were not 
included in the Department's final notice——Use of Personal 
Communication Devices (§§ 701.2 & 701.5(e)) and Failure to 
Cooperate in an Investigation of Personnel Complaint (§ 1008.2).  
The arbitrator determined that the Department had cause, as 
required by the collective bargaining agreement, to discipline 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
5 
 
Weiss by removing him from his detective assignment.  The 
arbitrator concluded that the discipline was warranted because 
Weiss had violated all referenced Department policies except for 
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer.6   
¶7 
The arbitrator also addressed Weiss's due process 
argument as follows: 
The reliance Weiss puts in Loudermill is misplaced.  
In Loudermill, the court balanced competing interests 
specific to the discharge of a public employee.  The 
weight accorded to Loudermill varies depending on the 
severity of the disciplinary action taken.  Subsequent 
cases have confirmed that a neutral pre-termination 
adjudicator is not required where there is also a 
post-termination administrative procedure.  Locurto v. 
Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2nd Cir. 2001); Schacht v. 
Wisconsin Dept. of Corr., 175 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 
1999).  In the present case, the arbitrator serves as 
the post-disciplinary administrative procedure and 
satisfies due process requirements under Loudermill, 
particularly given that the disciplinary action taken 
was short of discharge. 
¶8 
Weiss challenged the arbitration award in circuit 
court, arguing that the award manifestly disregarded the law 
with regards to the due process issue under Loudermill.  The 
circuit court denied Weiss's request to vacate the award and 
granted the City of Green Bay's request to confirm the 
arbitration award.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
                                                 
6 The arbitrator decided that Weiss's actions did not fit 
the behavior historically understood to be conduct unbecoming an 
officer, and that the violation of this section was duplicative 
of his other violations. 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
6 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶9 
In 
determining 
whether 
an 
arbitration 
award 
is 
confirmed or vacated, we independently interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 788.10(1) (2021-22).7  Racine Cnty. v. Int'l Ass'n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, AFL-CIO, 2008 WI 70, 
¶11, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312.  The choice to arbitrate, 
at its core, is a contract between the parties intended to keep 
a dispute out of the court system.  Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
2006 WI 70, ¶61, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42.  As such, the 
court's role in reviewing an arbitrator's award is generally 
limited to ensuring that the parties received the arbitration 
process for which they bargained.  Racine Cnty., 310 Wis. 2d 
508, ¶11.  In that light, Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1) sets out 
specific circumstances under which the court must vacate an 
arbitration award.  As relevant here, courts must vacate an 
arbitration award if the "arbitrators exceed[] their powers." 
§ 788.10(1)(d).  Arbitrators exceed their powers when: (1) they 
demonstrate "perverse misconstruction" or "positive misconduct," 
(2) they manifestly disregard the law, (3) the award is illegal, 
or (4) the award violates a strong public policy.  Racine Cnty., 
310 Wis. 2d 508, ¶11.   
¶10 We 
reverse 
an 
arbitration 
award 
as 
manifestly 
disregarding the law "when the arbitrator[] fail[s] to examine 
and apply the relevant law" because parties to arbitration have 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
7 
 
"a legitimate expectation that the governing law [will] be 
followed and applied properly."  Orlowski v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 21, ¶¶37-38, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 
775.  However, we will not reverse an arbitration award for 
"mere errors of judgment as to law or fact" on the part of the 
arbitrator.  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, City of Jefferson v. 
Jefferson Ed. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 117, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977).   
¶11 Weiss primarily argues that the arbitrator exceeded 
his powers because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law 
when he determined that the Department provided adequate notice 
to Weiss under Loudermill.8  Weiss bases this claim on the fact 
that the Department's final notice did not list three of the 
Department policies for which he was ultimately disciplined, 
depriving Weiss of his opportunity to respond.  Weiss contends 
that the failure to include those policies in the final notice 
violated the due process requirements set out in Loudermill.  
¶12 Importantly, we need not decide whether Weiss was 
afforded all the process due to him.  We need determine only 
whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers under Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.10(1)(d) by manifestly disregarding the law.  Although it 
may be difficult to define exactly what it means to "manifestly 
                                                 
8 Weiss also claims that the arbitrator exceeded his powers 
under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) because the arbitration award 
"violates 
strong 
public 
policy" 
and 
"conflicts 
with 
the 
governing law." However, these arguments are almost entirely 
duplicative of his argument that the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded Loudermill.  Because we conclude that the arbitrator 
did not 
manifestly disregard 
Loudermill, these additional 
arguments also fail. 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
8 
 
disregard the law," we know that this standard does not entitle 
arbitration 
participants 
to 
de 
novo 
court 
review 
of 
an 
arbitrator's interpretation of the law.  See City of Oshkosh v. 
Oshkosh Pub. Libr. Clerical and Maint. Emp.: Union Loc. 796-A, 
99 Wis. 2d 95, 104, 299 N.W.2d 210 (1980) ("Having agreed to be 
bound by the arbitrator's determination, the arbitrator has the 
'authority' to err and a mistake of judgment is plainly not 
grounds for vacating an award under sec. 298.10(1)(d)."9).  
Arbitrators are bound to follow precedent, Racine Cnty., 310 
Wis. 2d 508, ¶34, but they are not expected to anticipate how a 
court might apply or extend that precedent when faced with novel 
arguments or fact scenarios.  Parties do not have the same 
"legitimate expectation" regarding new applications of the law 
that they have in established applications.  See Orlowski, 339 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶38. 
¶13 Loudermill, the precedent that Weiss argues the 
arbitrator manifestly disregarded, provides guidance on what 
pre-termination process an employer must afford a public 
employee who can be discharged only for cause.  470 U.S. at 535.  
In Loudermill, the Cleveland Board of Education terminated a 
security 
guard 
after 
discovering 
he 
had 
previously 
been 
convicted of a felony but did not disclose that felony in the 
application process.  Id.  The employee was provided no pre-
termination process whatsoever where he could assert his defense 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 298.10(1)(d) 
is 
the 
identical 
predecessor statute to § 788.10(1)(d). 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
9 
 
to the allegations.10  Id.  In holding that some pre-termination 
process was due, the Court emphasized that "[a]n essential 
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, 
or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case[,]'" and "that an 
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 
deprived of any significant property interest."  Id. at 542 
(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313 (1950) & Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).   
¶14 The 
Court 
emphasized 
that 
the 
"formality 
and 
procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon 
the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the 
subsequent proceedings."  Id. at 545 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. 
at 378).  Recognizing the importance of a person's interest in 
retaining employment, the Court held that the following pre-
termination procedures were constitutionally required: (1) "oral 
or written notice of the charges" against the employee with "an 
explanation of the employer's evidence;" and (2) an opportunity 
for the employee to "present his side of the story" either in 
person or in writing before the termination decision is made.  
Id. at 546. 
                                                 
10 The employee explained in post-termination proceedings 
that he thought his conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than 
a felony. 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
10 
 
¶15 At the outset, we note that the specific process 
outlined in Loudermill may not govern in this case.11  Unlike the 
public employee in Loudermill, Weiss was not terminated——he was 
reassigned within the Department and lost an $80 per month 
stipend——which implicates a different property interest than the 
interest addressed in Loudermill.  Our focus on Loudermill stems 
from Weiss's argument, which is limited to the arbitrator's 
application of Loudermill.  Consequently, we address whether the 
arbitrator's application of Loudermill demonstrates a manifest 
disregard of the law. 
¶16 The arbitrator directly addressed Weiss's Loudermill 
arguments by explaining that "the weight accorded to Loudermill 
varies depending on the severity of the disciplinary action 
taken."  Weiss offers no argument for why this statement is 
inaccurate, let alone how this statement manifestly disregarded 
Loudermill.  At best, Weiss's position could be seen as a 
request 
to 
extend 
Loudermill's 
pre-termination 
process 
requirements to less serious forms of discipline.  However, the 
arbitrator is not bound to extend Loudermill in this way. 
¶17 The arbitrator then determined that, in light of his 
view of Loudermill, the process the Department afforded to 
Weiss——which included notice of all of Weiss's alleged policy 
violations, opportunities to be heard at four in-person hearings 
                                                 
11 See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)) ("Due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands." (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))). 
No. 
2021AP102   
 
11 
 
prior to the Department's disciplinary decision, and opportunity 
to bring post-disciplinary review through a Green Bay Personnel 
Committee 
grievance 
and 
arbitration——was 
constitutionally 
adequate. 
 
The 
arbitrator 
did 
not 
manifestly 
disregard 
Loudermill in doing so, and Weiss received the arbitration he 
bargained for.  Thus, he is contractually bound by the 
arbitrator's decision. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶18 The arbitrator did not exceed his powers by manifestly 
disregarding the law when he determined that Weiss was afforded 
the constitutional process he was due under Loudermill.  As 
such, Weiss received the arbitration he bargained for, and the 
arbitration award was appropriately confirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶19 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
agree with the majority that no grounds exist in this case for 
vacating the arbitrator's decision, and I therefore join the 
majority opinion.  I write separately to address the atextual 
nature of the "manifest disregard" standard and to request that, 
in future cases, parties include the arbitration agreement as a 
part of the circuit court record. 
¶20 Arbitration agreements are not special.  They are 
contracts just like any other.  As is true with all contracts, 
our task in cases concerning arbitration awards is to review the 
arbitration agreement and determine whether the parties received 
the arbitration they bargained for.  See Midwest Neurosciences 
Assocs., LLC v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical Assocs., LLC, 2018 WI 
112, ¶40, 384 Wis. 2d 669, 920 N.W.2d 767 (quoting Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 101, 253 
N.W.2d 536 (1997)) ("Arbitration agreements are 'a matter of 
contract.'"); Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 
610, 
527 
N.W.2d 681 
(1995) 
("Arbitration 
is 
essentially 
contractual . . . ."); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 
2005 WI App 86, ¶8, 280 Wis. 2d 823, 696 N.W.2d 214 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)) ("The Federal Arbitration Act's purpose 
is 
'to 
reverse 
the 
longstanding 
judicial 
hostility 
to 
arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts.'").  This task is 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
2 
 
exceedingly difficult when, as here, the agreement containing 
the terms for arbitration is absent from the record. 
¶21 The Wisconsin Arbitration Act ("WAA") helps define the 
circumstances where parties did not receive the arbitration they 
bargained for by establishing several grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award.  These grounds include where "the award was 
procured by corruption, fraud or undue means"; "there was 
evident 
partiality 
or 
corruption 
on 
the 
part 
of 
the 
arbitrators"; "the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct"; or, 
most relevant here, "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or 
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."  Wis. 
Stat. § 788.10(1).  The parties to this case agree that the 
arbitrator exceeded his powers if he "manifestly disregarded the 
law," and the majority correctly applies this standard for that 
reason. 
¶22 However, this "manifest disregard" language is wholly 
absent from the statutory text.  The "manifest disregard" 
standard instead originates from dicta in the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 
(1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  The Court in 
Wilko appears to have simply described how arbitrators might 
exceed their powers as defined by a choice-of-law provision in 
an arbitration agreement.  After Wilko, the "manifest disregard" 
standard 
became 
seemingly 
untethered 
from 
the 
text 
of 
arbitration agreements, taking on a life of its own as the 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
3 
 
standard for reviewing essentially all challenges to arbitral 
awards without regard to the language in the underlying 
contract.  Parties involved in requests to vacate arbitral 
awards must submit the arbitration agreement to the circuit 
court so the court may determine the scope of the arbitrator's 
powers and confirm whether applying the "manifest disregard" 
standard is appropriate.  Without the arbitration agreement, we 
may not be able to determine whether the parties received the 
arbitration they bargained for.    
I.  THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD" STANDARD IN WISCONSIN. 
¶23 In 1931, the Legislature enacted the WAA, "which 
attempted to invest the courts of this state with power to 
specifically enforce an agreement to arbitrate future disputes."  
Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wis. Empl. Rels. Bd., 267 Wis. 316, 325, 64 
N.W.2d 866 (1954).  Relevant to this case, the WAA also 
identified grounds for vacating an arbitral award, and the text 
remains identical to this day: 
(1) In either of the following cases the court in 
and for the county wherein the award was made must 
make an order vacating the award upon the application 
of any party to the arbitration: 
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, 
fraud or undue means; 
(b) Where 
there 
was 
evident 
partiality 
or 
corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or either 
of them; 
(c) Where 
the 
arbitrators 
were 
guilty 
of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or 
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
4 
 
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made.   
§ 2, ch. 274, Laws of 1931 (codified at Wis. Stat. § 788.10).  
¶24 Conspicuously absent from this text is the phrase, 
"manifest disregard."  Regardless, we have repeatedly described 
our review of arbitral awards using the "manifest disregard" 
standard without explaining where this standard came from.  See, 
e.g., McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 2018 WI 88, ¶29, 383 
Wis. 2d 358, 914 N.W.2d 708; Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 
2013 WI 29, 346 Wis. 2d 450, 828 N.W.2d 812; Orlowski v. State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 21, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775; 
Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶48, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 787 
N.W.2d 384; Baldwin-Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. Educ. 
Ass'n-Baldwin Woodville Unit, 2009 WI 51, ¶24, 317 Wis. 2d 691, 
766 N.W.2d 591; Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, AFL-CIO, 2008 WI 70, ¶11, 310 
Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312; Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶24 
n.8, 268 Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832; Lukowski v. Dankert, 184 
Wis. 2d 142, 149, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994); City of Madison v. 
Madison Pro. Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 586-87, 425 
N.W.2d 8 (1988); Nicolet High Sch. Dist. v. Nicolet Educ. Ass'n, 
118 Wis. 2d 707, 713 n.3, 348 N.W.2d 175 (1984); City of 
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n, 97 Wis. 2d 15, 25-26, 292 
N.W.2d 841 (1980); Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Milwaukee 
Tchrs' Educ. Ass'n, 93 Wis. 2d 415, 422, 287 N.W.2d 131 (1980); 
Glendale Pro. Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 
Wis. 2d 90, 99 n.2, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978); Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
5 
 
10, City of Jefferson v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 
117-18, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977).  
¶25 The first time we used the "manifest disregard" 
standard was in Scherrer Construction Co. v. Burlington Memorial 
Hospital, 64 Wis. 2d 720, 221 N.W.2d 855 (1974).  Scherrer 
Construction presented the issue, "What is the scope of judicial 
review of arbitration awards?"  Id. at 725.  Rather than 
examining the language of Wis. Stat. § 788.10 to answer this 
question, Scherrer Construction instead reviewed how this court 
described the standard for reviewing arbitral awards in previous 
cases.  Id. at 726–28.  We concluded, "[T]his court has 
consistently held[] the scope of review of such matters is 
extremely limited," id. at 726, and expressed a general standard 
for reviewing arbitral awards: 
These statements are consistent with the views 
expressed in Domke on Commercial Arbitration, the 
leading treatise in the field.  The author states that 
to vacate an arbitration award, the court must find 
not merely an error in judgment, but "perverse 
misconstruction or positive misconduct . . . plainly 
established'," "'manifest disregard of the law'," or 
that the award itself "violates public policy," "is 
illegal," or that "the penal laws of the state will be 
violated." 
Id. at 729 (footnotes omitted).  Without clearly explaining how 
or whether this standard was based in the language of the WAA, 
Scherrer Construction apparently adopted "manifest disregard of 
the law" from Domke on Commercial Arbitration as the standard 
for reviewing all arbitral awards.  According to that treatise, 
the standard's origin "lies in dicta from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Wilko v. Swan."  Martin Domke et al., 2 Domke on 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
6 
 
Commercial Arbitration § 39:16 (2022).  In continued search of 
how this standard came about, I turn next to federal law.   
 
II.  THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD" STANDARD'S ORIGIN  
IN FEDERAL LAW. 
¶26 In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA") in order to "abolish the common law rule that 
arbitration agreements were not judicially enforceable."  Cost 
Brothers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 760 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 
1985); accord Pub. L. No. 68.41, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified 
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16).  The FAA "was specifically aimed at the 
historical problems of courts' refusing to honor contractual 
arbitration agreements" and "was intended to make arbitration 
agreements specifically enforceable upon the terms established 
by the parties."  Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 
645 (7th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).  But the Act also 
identifies grounds for vacating an arbitrator's decision: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, 
fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where 
there 
was 
evident 
partiality 
or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where 
the 
arbitrators 
were 
guilty 
of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or 
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made. 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
7 
 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  Apart from its use of the Oxford comma, this 
is the exact same language as appears in the Wisconsin 
Arbitration Act.  See Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1).   
¶27 The United States Supreme Court first discussed the 
grounds for vacating an arbitral award under the FAA in Wilko v. 
Swan.  Wilko involved a customer's suit against a securities 
brokerage firm under the Securities Act of 1933, alleging 
fraudulent inducement.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428–29.  The 
securities 
brokerage 
firm, 
"[w]ithout 
answering 
the 
complaint, . . . moved to stay the trial of the action pursuant 
to § 3 of the [FAA] until an arbitration in accordance with the 
terms of identical margin agreements was had."  Id. at 429.   
¶28 Notably, Wilko did not address whether to vacate an 
arbitral award at all.  By the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court, no arbitration had yet taken place.  The issue was 
instead whether "an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy 
is a 'condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person 
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision' 
of the Securities Act which § 146 declares 'void.'"  Id. at 430.  
The Court concluded such an agreement is void, a holding later 
overturned by Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477.  While 
discussing how the effectiveness of buyer protections under the 
Securities Act "is lessened in arbitration as compared to 
judicial proceedings," the Court noted the high standard for 
vacating an arbitral award: 
Power to vacate an award is limited.  While it may be 
true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure 
of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the 
provisions of the Securities Act would 'constitute 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
8 
 
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 
of the Federal Arbitration Act,' that failure would 
need to be made clearly to appear.  In unrestricted 
submission, such as the present margin agreements 
envisage, the interpretations of the law by the 
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not 
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for 
error in interpretation. 
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435–37 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
This is where the "manifest disregard" language first appeared.  
¶29 After the Wilko decision, "manifest disregard" seemed 
to take on a life of its own.  As the Supreme Court has 
observed, Wilko's cryptic language caused much confusion and 
varying approaches to reviewing arbitral awards in the years 
since:  
Maybe the term "manifest disregard" was meant to name 
a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred 
to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding 
to them.  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Arbitration awards are 
only reviewable for manifest disregard of the law, 9 
U.S.C. §§ 10, 207"); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal 
Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 431 [(2d Cir. 1974)].  
Or, as some courts have thought, "manifest disregard" 
may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), 
the 
paragraphs 
authorizing 
vacatur 
when 
the 
arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded 
their 
powers." 
 
See, 
e.g., 
[Kyocera 
Corp. 
v. 
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 
(9th Circ. 2003)]. 
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 
(2008).  However, the Court has not attempted to clarify the 
meaning of "manifest disregard," how it fits into the FAA's 
language, or whether it is an extra-statutory ground for 
vacating arbitral awards.  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) ("We do not decide 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
9 
 
whether 'manifest disregard' survives our decision in [Hall 
Street Associates, 552 U.S. 576] as an independent ground for 
review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for 
vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.").  
 
III.  "MANIFEST DISREGARD" IS LIKELY NOT A UNIVERSAL 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
¶30 Several aspects of the Wilko opinion indicate that the 
United States Supreme Court might not have intended for 
"manifest disregard" to be a general standard of review for all 
arbitral awards. 
¶31 First, the Court used the phrase "manifest disregard" 
in passing as dicta.  The issue was whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate.  There was no arbitral award for the Court to 
review, and no need to determine the permissible scope of 
review.  Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 480 (4th 
Cir. 
2012) 
("The 
origins 
of 
modern 
manifest 
disregard . . . likely lie in dicta from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Wilko . . . .").   
¶32 Second, none of the authorities cited in Wilko appear 
to support the proposition that "manifest disregard" is the 
general standard for reviewing arbitral awards.  Wilko collected 
several sources cited in footnote 24 in support of the "manifest 
disregard" dicta.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437 n.24.  Rather than 
recognizing a general standard of review, these authorities 
instead seem to recognize a reviewing court's ability to vacate 
an arbitral award in part depends on the scope of submission to 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
10 
 
the arbitrator as stated in the arbitration agreement.1  One of 
the cited cases, Kleine v. Catra, most comprehensively explains 
how the standard of review stems from the contract language:  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 
(1854) (emphases added) ("If an award is within the submission, 
and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a 
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not 
set it aside for error, either in law or fact.  In this case, 
one of the parties sued the other for debt, who, in his turn, 
claimed damages for the manner in which he was sued.  The 
submission was broad enough to cover all these demands on either 
side."); United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406, 413-
14 (1874) (stating "the whole controversy was submitted to three 
arbitrators" 
and 
reviewing 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
arbitration 
agreement); Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 158 F.2d 
251, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1946) (discussing authority of the 
arbitrators 
under 
rules 
established 
by 
contract); 
The 
Hartbridge. N. of Eng. S.S. Co. v. Munson S.S. Line, 62 F.2d 72, 
73 (2d Cir. 1932) (emphasis added) (quoting Wilkins v. Allen, 62 
N.E. 575, 576 (N.Y. 1902)) ("Where the merits of a controversy 
are referred to an arbitrator selected by the parties, his 
determination, either as to the law or the facts, is final and 
conclusive; and a court will not open an award unless perverse 
misconstruction or positive misconduct upon the part of the 
arbitrator is plainly established, or there is some provision in 
the agreement of submission authorizing it."); Mut. Benefit 
Health & Accident Ass'n v. United Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 390, 393 
(1st Cir. 1944) ("It is the contention of the Association that 
the decision of the arbitrator is not binding on it, because he 
did not follow the terms of submission . . . ."); Wesley A. 
Sturges, A Treatise on Commercial Arbitrations and Awards § 218 
(1930) ("Judicial opinion, as it is expressed in the cases, is 
uniformly to the effect that under an unrestricted submission 
arbitrators are not required to decide 'according to law.'  They 
may disregard the 'strict letter of the law.'"); Note, Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 
681, 685 (1950) (emphasis added) ("[T]he general view, both at 
common law and by statute, is that the courts will not review 
for its wisdom or soundness the principle selected by the 
arbitrator, unless his discretion in making that selection is 
limited by the terms of the submission agreement."); Archibald 
Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, 34 Chi. Bar Rec. 
205, 207 (1953) (arguing arbitrators should apply the governing 
law as a judge would, but nonetheless recognizing "[t]he power 
of arbitrators differs with the breadth of the provision"). 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
11 
 
If the parties wish to reserve the law for the 
decision of the court, they may stipulate to that 
effect in the submission; they may restrain or enlarge 
its operation, as they please.  If no such reservation 
is made in the submission, the parties are presumed to 
agree, that every thing, both as to law and fact, 
which is necessary to the ultimate decision, is 
included in the authority of the referees. 
Under 
a 
general 
submission, 
therefore, 
the 
arbitrators have rightfully a power to decide on the 
law and the fact; and an error in either respect ought 
not to be the subject of complaint by either party, 
for it is their own choice to be concluded by the 
judgment of the arbitrators.  Besides, under such a 
general submission, the reasonable rule seems to be, 
that the referees are not bound to award upon the mere 
dry principles of law applicable to the case before 
them.      
14 F. Cas. 732, 735 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).  Wilko's cited 
authorities therefore may instead support the idea that the 
standard of review for arbitral awards depends on the contract, 
meaning there is no universal standard. 
¶33 Finally, Wilko itself apparently did not purport to 
establish "manifest disregard" as a universal standard.  The 
Court only said the standard for reviewing an arbitral decision 
for legal error is "manifest disregard" "[i]n unrestricted 
submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage."  
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.  Whether the applicable standard is 
"manifest disregard" seems instead to depend on the language in 
the arbitration agreement. 
¶34 Unlike the record in this case, Wilko helpfully 
includes the contract language defining the scope of submission 
to the arbitrator:  
Any controversy arising between us under this 
contract shall be determined by arbitration pursuant 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
12 
 
to the Arbitration Law of the State of New York, and 
under the rules of either the Arbitration Committee of 
the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, or 
of the American Arbitration Association, or of the 
Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Exchange 
or such other Exchange as may have jurisdiction over 
the matter in dispute, as I may elect. 
 Any 
arbitration hereunder shall be before at least three 
arbitrators. 
Id. at 432 n.15.  This is a choice-of-law provision, which 
defines which jurisdiction's law the arbitrator is required to 
apply.  Based on this reading of Wilko, so long as the 
arbitrator 
applied 
this 
law, 
the 
parties 
received 
the 
arbitration they bargained for.  However, if the arbitrator did 
not apply the law described in the choice-of-law provision——in 
other words, manifestly disregarded the law——then the parties 
did not receive the arbitration they bargained for.  See James 
M. Gaitis, Clearing the Air on "Manifest Disregard" and Choice 
of Law in Commercial Arbitration: A Reconciliation of Wilko, 
Hall Street, and Stolt-Nielsen, 22 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 21, 22 
(2011) ("[T]he advent of the phrase manifest disregard in 
American 
case 
law 
and 
commentary 
is 
an 
unfortunate 
and 
unnecessary adjunct to evaluating the enforceability of choice-
of-law provisions in agreements to arbitrate. . . . [M]anifest 
disregard of the law is nothing more than a loosely used 
catchall misnomer that should be forever abandoned in favor of a 
simple and clear pronouncement mandating the enforcement, to one 
degree 
or 
another, 
of 
choice-of-law 
provisions 
governing 
agreements to arbitrate."). 
¶35 This 
formulation 
seems 
to 
fit 
neatly 
with 
the 
statutory vacatur standard.  A reviewing court may vacate an 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
13 
 
arbitral award "[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers."  
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).  One must look 
to the arbitration agreement to discern the scope of the 
arbitrators' 
powers. 
 
6 
C.J.S. 
Arbitration 
§ 101 
(2023) 
(footnotes omitted) ("Except to the extent that an arbitrator's 
power may derive from a statute mandating arbitration, or a 
court 
order, 
the 
scope 
of 
an 
arbitrator's 
authority 
is 
determined by the arbitration agreement . . . .").  Where an 
arbitrator fails to abide by a choice-of-law provision, and 
therefore manifestly disregards the law, it may be that the 
arbitrator exceeded his powers, and a reviewing court may vacate 
the award.2  
 
IV.  PARTIES MUST INCLUDE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS  
IN THE RECORD. 
¶36 In certain cases, it may be that "manifest disregard" 
is the proper standard for reviewing challenges to arbitral 
awards.  But whether that is the case may depend on how the 
parties defined the arbitrator's powers in the arbitration 
agreement, and a reviewing court likely cannot know the scope of 
                                                 
2 This 
explanation 
of 
"manifest 
disregard" 
does 
not 
necessarily run contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Hall 
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  
In Hall Street, the Court concluded the grounds for vacatur 
under the FAA are exclusive and cannot "be supplemented by 
contract."  Id. at 578.  The arbitration agreement in that case 
permitted district court "review for legal error," which the 
Court concluded was a supplemental ground for vacatur in 
violation of the FAA.  Id. at 578–80.  Though parties cannot 
supplement the statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA, they 
may be free to define the arbitrator's powers as they wish.  
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
14 
 
the arbitrator's powers without first seeing the arbitration 
agreement. 
¶37 In the present case, the arbitration agreement appears 
absent from the record.  The closest we have in the record is a 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement stating, "The 
decision of the arbitrator shall be limited to the subject 
matter of the grievance.  The arbitrator shall not modify, add 
to or delete from the express terms of this Agreement.  The 
arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding."  This 
somewhat establishes the scope of the arbitrator's powers, but 
it contains no language stating how the arbitrator was to arrive 
at a decision.  Such a contract provision does not appear in the 
record, and we have no indication as to whether one even exists.  
Nonetheless, the parties agree that the arbitrator would have 
exceeded his powers if he were to manifestly disregard the law, 
and the majority correctly applies the "manifest disregard" 
standard for that reason. 
¶38 In future cases, however, parties must ensure the 
record contains the contract language establishing the scope of 
the 
arbitrator's 
powers. 
 
Arbitration 
agreements 
are 
no 
different from all other contracts.  Our duty is to read the 
contract 
language 
and 
ensure 
the 
parties 
received 
the 
arbitration they bargained for.  The arbitration agreement may 
very well call for us to apply a "manifest disregard" standard——
or it may not.  Either way, fulfilling our duty to enforce the 
arbitration agreement as written becomes nearly impossible when 
the parties omit it from the record. 
No.  2021AP102.akz 
 
15 
 
¶39 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
 
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶40 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Although 
the majority treats Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532 (1985) as the lodestar in cases involving the due 
process rights of public employees deprived of a property 
interest, in this case it isn't.  As the arbitrator noted, 
Andrew Weiss's reliance on Loudermill is "misplaced."  Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) governs the due process 
analysis but the majority doesn't even mention it.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully concur but do not join the majority opinion. 
¶41 In Loudermill, a school board terminated a security 
guard because he did not disclose in his employment application 
that he had been convicted of a felony.  470 U.S. at 535.  Under 
state law, a security guard could be terminated only for cause.  
Id. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
terminated 
security 
guard 
had 
a 
constitutionally-protected 
property 
interest 
in 
continued 
employment under binding precedent.  Id. at 535–41. 
 
¶42 The terminated security guard sued, alleging he was 
not given an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty 
prior to his termination.  Id. at 536.  He claimed he mistakenly 
thought he had been previously convicted of a misdemeanor, not a 
felony, and that this mistaken belief should have mitigated his 
discipline.  Id. at 535.  
¶43 The United States Supreme Court held the terminated 
security guard stated a due process claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, relying heavily on 
its previous decision in Mathews.  In that case, the Court set 
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
2 
 
forth a three-factor test to determine the amount of process 
due: 
(1) 
"the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action"; 
(2) 
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; 
and  
(3) 
"the Government's interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail." 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 263–71 (1970)).  In Loudermill, the Court merely 
applied the Mathews test to a specific set of facts, ultimately 
concluding both notice and a hearing were required before 
termination.  470 U.S. at 546.  The Court said little about 
these requirements, probably because the facts of the case 
warranted a narrow holding.  It did explain, however, that 
notice may be provided in writing or orally, and a hearing, 
while "necessary," "need not be elaborate."  Id. at 545–46. 
¶44 The Court's application of the Mathews test in 
Loudermill provides no guidance as to the test's proper 
application in this case.  Regarding the first factor, the 
"private interest," the Court repeatedly emphasized that the 
case involved termination; in this case, Weiss was merely 
demoted.  In fact, the words "terminated," "termination," 
"pretermination," and "post-termination" collectively appear 
twenty-nine times in the Loudermill majority opinion.  The first 
sentence of the opinion states, "we consider what pretermination 
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
3 
 
process must be accorded a public employee who can be discharged 
only for cause."  Id. at 535.  Similarly, the concluding 
paragraph begins, "[w]e conclude that all the process that is 
due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, 
coupled 
with 
post-termination 
administrative 
procedures 
as 
provided by . . . [state law]."  Id. at 547–48.  In applying the 
first factor, the Court emphasized the gravity of a job loss: 
[T]he 
significance 
of 
the 
private 
interest 
in 
retaining employment cannot be gainsaid.  We have 
frequently recognized the severity of depriving a 
person of the means of livelihood.  While a fired 
worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will 
take some time and is likely to be burdened by the 
questionable circumstances under which he left his 
previous job. 
Id. at 543 (citations omitted).  Throughout the opinion, the 
Court focused on the significance of losing employment. 
 
¶45 The private interest at stake in this case is 
obviously less than in Loudermill.  Weiss will lose $80 a month 
as a result of his demotion, a small fraction of his salary, 
whereas the security guard in Loudermill lost his entire salary.  
Additionally, Weiss will not face the less-tangible burdens 
associated with termination.  He will not have to look for 
employment elsewhere and accordingly will not have to explain to 
potential employers why he is no longer working for the Green 
Bay Police Department.  The stigma associated with demotion is 
substantially less than the stigma associated with termination.  
The 
decision 
to 
demote 
Weiss 
has 
a 
quantifiably 
and 
qualitatively smaller effect on his private interest than the 
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
4 
 
decision to fire in Loudermill had on the private interest of 
the terminated security guard. 
¶46 The Loudermill Court's application of the second 
factor——"the risk of an erroneous deprivation" and the "probable 
value" 
of 
additional 
"procedural 
safeguards"——is 
similarly 
inapplicable in this case.  The Court noted: 
[S]ome opportunity for the employee to present his 
side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in 
reaching an accurate decision.  Dismissals for cause 
will often involve factual disputes.  Even where the 
facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of 
discharge may not be; in such cases, the only 
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the 
decisionmaker is likely before the termination takes 
effect. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The Court stated that a hearing could 
be "informal"——the point of the hearing, it explained, is to 
"alert[]" the employer "to the existence of disputes about facts 
and arguments[.]"  Id. at 543 n.8 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 583–84 (1975)).  
 
¶47 With respect to the second factor, this case is 
distinguishable from Loudermill on multiple grounds.  Loudermill 
involved a classic dispute of fact:  Did the terminated security 
guard know he had been convicted of a felony?  Unlike 
Loudermill, this case involves no such dispute——Weiss admitted 
he gave confidential information to a friend.  See majority op., 
¶2.   
 
¶48 Additionally, Weiss received four in-person hearings 
prior to being demoted, while the terminated security guard in 
Loudermill alleged he did not receive a pretermination hearing.  
See id., ¶17.  Weiss does not dispute he received a hearing.  
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
5 
 
Instead, he argues the final notice did not cite some of the 
specific policies he was ultimately disciplined for violating.  
See id., ¶11.  The Court in Loudermill did not discuss that 
category of due process claim.  In the particular context of 
employment termination, the Court determined that a "tenured 
public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the 
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, 
and an opportunity to present his side of the story."  470 U.S. 
at 546 (citations omitted).   
 
¶49 Weiss's notice argument suffers from two further 
flaws:  he focuses on the final notice, but nothing in 
Loudermill suggests notice must be given in a single, formal 
document.  Weiss had either oral or written notice of each 
policy he was alleged to have violated, as the majority notes.  
Majority op., ¶17.  Whether a notice even has to cite a specific 
policy is questionable.  Cf. Kohlbeck v. Reliance Const. Co., 
2002 WI App 142, ¶12 n.3, 256 Wis. 2d 235, 647 N.W.2d 277 
("[L]egal theories need not be fully developed, or even 
expressly identified, at the pleading stage."  (citing Murray v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI App 62, ¶12 n.6, 252 Wis. 2d 613, 642 
N.W.2d 541)). 
 
¶50 Lastly, Loudermill's application of the third factor, 
"the Government's interest," is immaterial.  The Court reasoned: 
[A]ffording the employee an opportunity to respond 
prior 
to 
termination 
would 
impose 
neither 
a 
significant 
administrative 
burden 
nor 
intolerable 
delays. 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
employer 
shares 
the 
employee's 
interest 
in 
avoiding 
disruption 
and 
erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled, 
the employer would continue to receive the benefit of 
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
6 
 
the employee's labors.  It is preferable to keep a 
qualified employee on than to train a new one.  A 
governmental employer also has an interest in keeping 
citizens usefully employed rather than taking the 
possibly 
erroneous 
and 
counterproductive 
step 
of 
forcing 
its 
employees 
onto 
the 
welfare 
rolls.  
Finally, in those situations where the employer 
perceives a significant hazard in keeping the employee 
on the job, it can avoid the problem by suspending 
with pay. 
470 U.S. at 544–45.  The Court's analysis of the third factor 
places great weight on the purported benefit the government 
receives by retaining a qualified employee pending a hearing.  
In this case, the Department held four hearings; it did not lose 
the benefit of Weiss's labor; and Weiss remained gainfully 
employed in a different position.  Obviously, the government did 
not perceive any hazard in keeping Weiss on the job; the 
department only demoted him. 
 
¶51 In summary, Weiss has not explained how the arbitrator 
erred.  He was afforded a great deal of process, and Loudermill 
does not entitle him to more.  The Court in Mathews even noted, 
"[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands."  424 U.S. at 
334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).  
Despite the fact-intensive nature of the Mathews test, Weiss 
latches onto one particular application of that test and asks 
this court to take the rare step of setting aside an 
arbitrator's 
decision 
based 
on 
that 
application. 
 
The 
application he cites, Loudermill, does not fit the facts of this 
case and therefore provides no guidance; accordingly, Weiss's 
argument fails.   
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶52 "[I]t is this court's function to develop and clarify 
the law."  State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 
Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) (citations omitted).  
Although litigants often treat Loudermill as the benchmark by 
which to determine whether a disciplined government employee 
received due process, it set the standard only for cases 
involving a terminated government employee.  The majority should 
have taken the opportunity to clarify that Loudermill represents 
but one application of Mathews, which governs the analysis of 
whether the government satisfied due process in depriving an 
individual, including a public employee, of a property interest.  
Although the majority reaches the right result, it applies the 
wrong case.  I therefore respectfully concur.   
 
 
No.  2021AP102.rgb 
 
 
 
1