Case Title: Peiffer v. Hoyt

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50315

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  December 30, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
SHARON L. PEIFFER,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
SONIA E. HOYT,
Superintendent,
Oregon Women's Correctional Center,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 99C-18990; CA A115146; S50315)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 9, 2004.
J. Sara Dean Cromwell, Salem, argued the case and filed the
briefs for petitioner.  With her on the brief was Melinda M.
Buel, Salem.
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent.  With her on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.  
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
DURHAM, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Richard D. Barber, Judge. 186 Or App 485, 63 P3d 1273 (2003).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DURHAM, J.
In this post-conviction relief proceeding, petitioner
alleged that she received inadequate assistance of trial counsel
in violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. (1)  The post-conviction court
determined that petitioner had not shown that her trial counsel
was constitutionally inadequate and denied relief.  In an en banc
decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Peiffer v. Hoyt, 186 Or
App 485, 63 P3d 1273 (2003).  We allowed petitioner's petition
for review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the post-conviction court.
On the morning of December 10, 1997, police officers
executed a search warrant at a Marion County residence.  The
warrant authorized the officers to search for amphetamine,
evidence of the sales and distribution of amphetamine, documents
tending to show the source, ownership or control of amphetamine,
and documents showing the identity of persons present or residing
at the residence.  Petitioner had stayed the previous night at
the residence and was present during the search.  An officer saw
petitioner drop a wallet on the floor.  He retrieved it and asked
petitioner for identification, which she indicated was in the
wallet.  The officer opened the wallet and found an Oregon driver
license that appeared altered but bore petitioner's photograph. 
The officer also found in the wallet three photographs of
petitioner standing in front of a background that resembled the
background used for driver license photographs.  When questioned,
petitioner admitted that the license and other items in her
wallet, including credit cards and other driver licenses, were
forged or stolen.
During their search of the residence, the police also
found miscellaneous folders and a tote bag on top of a desk.  The
officer supervising the search contacted a detective from the
property section of the criminal investigation unit and requested
that he come to the residence.  The supervising officer informed
the detective that the officers present should not disturb the
items on the desk.  However, the record does not reveal whether
the folders or tote bag were open or closed when the officers
discovered them or, if the folders or tote bag were closed, which
officer opened any of those items and for what purpose.
The detective found numerous items in the folders,
including the following:  an original check on which someone had
attempted to erase the payee; four checks from the same payor
made payable to Pyle, two checks in amounts exceeding $23,000;
additional photographs of petitioner similar to the ones that the
officer had found in her wallet; laminate material; a partially
made Oregon driver license with petitioner's photograph, but
issued to Pyle; and petitioner's correspondence.  The detective
also discovered, in the tote bag on the desk, several cans of
spray adhesive that, according to the detective, may be used in
creating false identification.  One of those cans had
petitioner's name on it.
The state indicted petitioner on two counts of
attempted aggravated theft and two counts of first-degree forgery
for the checks addressed to Pyle.  Petitioner's trial counsel did
not move to suppress the evidence that the officers had found
during the search, and the court admitted that evidence during
petitioner's bench trial.  The court convicted petitioner on all
four counts.  The court also convicted petitioner of three
misdemeanor charges resulting from the forged items found in her
wallet.
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.  Instead,
petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that her
trial counsel had provided inadequate assistance of counsel in
violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  Specifically, she asserted that her trial counsel
had been inadequate because he had "failed to file a motion to
suppress the evidence which was seized illegally from
[petitioner] and which, if such motion had been filed, would have
changed the outcome of [petitioner's] case."  The post-conviction
trial court denied relief, finding that "[p]etitioner failed to
prove counsel [had been] ineffective for not filing a motion to
suppress" because "[s]uch a motion would have been denied."
On appeal, petitioner argued that the warrant only
authorized a search for drug-related evidence and that the search
for and seizure of the forgery-related evidence was beyond the
scope of that warrant and did not fall within an exception to the
warrant requirement.  In short, petitioner contended that the
police were required to obtain a second warrant to seize the
forgery-related evidence and that, because the police had not
obtained a second warrant, a constitutionally adequate lawyer
would have filed a motion to suppress on those grounds. 
Defendant responded that the police had not been
required to obtain a separate search warrant because they
lawfully had been in the home, the forgery-related evidence had
been in plain view, and the incriminating nature of that evidence
had been immediately apparent.  See State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455,
463 n 5, 918 P2d 819 (1996) (noting that evidence is admissible
under the "plain view" doctrine when intrusion is valid and it is
immediately apparent that items are incriminating).  Defendant
further argued that, to the extent that the forgery-related
evidence had not been in plain view, the officers discovered that
evidence while searching for evidence within the scope of the
warrant -- i.e., documents related to the source or control of
amphetamine or documents establishing the identity of persons
present in the residence.  Defendant contended that, as a result,
the post-conviction court correctly determined that a trial court
would have denied a motion to suppress and that petitioner's
trial counsel either acted reasonably in failing to file such a
motion or that petitioner suffered no prejudice as a result.
Based on the issues that the parties presented on
appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that petitioner's claim
that the post-conviction court should have granted her relief
rested on the factual premise that the folders containing forgery
evidence "were closed when the officers first came upon them, and
[that] the officers did not open the folders to look for anything
for which the warrant authorized them to search; rather, they
opened them to look for evidence of forgery."  Peiffer, 186 Or
App at 490.  Because the post-conviction court had not found that
petitioner had proved that factual premise, the Court of Appeals
stated that,
"for us to hold on appeal that the post-conviction
court erred in not granting petitioner relief,
petitioner must convince us that the evidence before
the post-conviction court permitted only one reasonable
conclusion -- i.e., that the folders were closed when
the officers first found them and that the officers
opened the folders to look for evidence of forgery."
Id. (footnote omitted).
The court then determined sua sponte that, before
addressing the merits of petitioner's claim, it first must
address whether petitioner had preserved that claim of error
below.  The court noted that petitioner did not claim in her
trial memorandum to the post-conviction court that the evidence
permitted only one reasonable conclusion, did not make a motion
to withdraw the factual issue from the factfinder, and did not
object to the post-conviction court's findings of fact on the
ground that the evidence required the court to find the facts
differently.  The court concluded that, 
"[a]lthough petitioner urged the post-conviction court
to find the facts in her favor, she never told the
court that it was required to do so as a matter of law. 
The factual argument that petitioner made below failed
to preserve the legal issue that she seeks to raise on
review."
Id. at 491.
In so deciding, the Court of Appeals crafted a rule of
preservation that this court previously has not recognized or
applied.  The Court of Appeals determined that a party who bears
the burden of persuasion on an issue, such as petitioner in this
context, must preserve at trial, by motion or by an objection to
factual findings, a claim that the party, as a matter of law,
must prevail on that issue.  The court observed that, in a jury
trial, a party must move to withdraw a factual issue from the
jury in order to be entitled to raise on appeal the argument that
the party should have prevailed on that issue as a matter of law. 
Id. at 492 (citing Wood Int'l Corp. v. Rose, 271 Or 103, 105-06,
530 P2d 1245 (1975) (plaintiff did not preserve claim that trial
court erred by submitting defendant's counterclaim to jury
because plaintiff did not move to withdraw claim from jury or for
directed verdict)).  Likewise, in a trial to the court, the party
that does not bear the burden of persuasion must move for a judgment
of dismissal to raise on appeal the legal insufficiency of the
opposing party's evidence.  See Falk v. Amsberry, 290 Or 839,
843, 626 P2d 362 (1981) (holding that, in civil case tried to
court, moving party may not raise on appeal the sufficiency of
opposing party's evidence unless moving party first asserted
legal insufficiency of the evidence in trial court).  See also
ORCP 54 B(2) (authorizing motion for judgment of dismissal by
defendant in bench trial).  The Court of Appeals decided that it
would apply a similar preservation rule in the circumstances of
this case.  Peiffer, 186 Or App at 497.
The court also explained that it previously had applied
such a preservation rule.  Id. at 494.  However, because a
footnote in a prior Court of Appeals case had suggested a
contrary rule, the court recognized that petitioner could have
relied on that case and determined that it only should apply the
newly announced preservation rule prospectively.  See Millsap v.
Eugene Care Center, 68 Or App 223, 228 n 4, 682 P2d 795, rev den,
297 Or 547 (1984) (indicating that preservation rule in Falk did
not apply to party that bore burden of proof).  The court,
therefore, addressed the merits of petitioner's claim.  
Respecting the merits, the Court of Appeals concluded
that, on the basis of the record, it could not say that the post-conviction court had been required to find that the police had
exceeded the scope of the warrant when they seized the forgery
evidence in this case.  The court determined that petitioner had
not established that her counsel had been inadequate in failing
to file a motion to suppress.  It followed that petitioner had
failed to sustain her burden to show that her trial counsel had
been inadequate.  Based on that reasoning, the court affirmed the
judgment of the post-conviction court.  Peiffer, 186 Or App at
498.
Judge Wollheim concurred in the outcome of the case but
disagreed both with the creation of a new rule of preservation
sua sponte and with the substance of the rule itself.  Id. at 499
(Wollheim, J. concurring).  Judge Wollheim opined that such a
preservation rule should not apply when, in an appeal from a
bench trial, the party raising the claim concerning the effect of
the evidence is the party with the burden of persuasion on that claim. 
Id. at 500.  He emphasized that the purpose of the preservation
requirement is to give the trial court an opportunity to decide
the issue.  Id. at 502.  Judge Wollheim concluded that, because
trial courts always decide whether the party with the burden of
persuasion has presented sufficient evidence to support his or her
claim, the trial court had an opportunity to decide the issue and
"[t]here should be no requirement that the party make the
meaningless motion before the trial court evaluates the
sufficiency of the evidence."  Id.
We must decide whether the preservation rule adopted by
the Court of Appeals is consistent with this court's previously
stated principles regarding preservation of error.  We first
examine the reasons supporting judicially created preservation
requirements.  In general, this court has based its rules
regarding preservation of error on two concerns: (1) fairness to
the parties in making and responding to arguments asserted in a
case; and (2) efficient judicial administration.  See, e.g.,
Davis v. O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 737, 891 P2d 1307 (1995) ("[t]his
court has indicated that the rules pertaining to preservation of
error in trial courts are intended to advance goals such as
ensuring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly
to the initial tribunal and that parties are not taken by
surprise, misled, or denied opportunities to meet an argument");
Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77-78, 559 P2d 1275 (1977) (the
reason for requiring preservation "is not merely to promote form
over substance but to promote an efficient administration of
justice and the saving of judicial time."); Vancil v. Poulson,
236 Or 314, 320-21, 388 P2d 447 (1964) ("[a]ppellate courts
should not decide new issues upon which the trial court had no
opportunity to rule").
The preservation rules governing a claim on appeal that
a party should have prevailed as a matter of law are based on
those same concerns.  As the Court of Appeals discussed, this
court long has required parties to preserve for appellate review
the claim that there is insufficient evidence to support a
verdict, i.e., that the party should have prevailed on the
evidence as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Marks v. First Nat.
Bank, 84 Or 601, 602-03, 165 P 673 (1917) (holding that party's
challenge to sufficiency of evidence was not preserved because
party did not move for directed verdict); Shmit v. Day, 27 Or
110, 116-17, 39 P 870 (1895) (holding that, to preserve challenge
to sufficiency of evidence, party must move for nonsuit or for
instruction to jury that it must find for that party).  That rule
applies both to the party with the burden of persuasion and to the
party that does not bear the burden of persuasion on the challenged
claim.  See Marks, 84 at 602-03 (applying to plaintiff); Shmit,
27 Or at 116-17 (applying to defendant).  This court has
explained the purpose of that rule as follows:
"Our imposition of this requirement in jury-tried
cases was a specific application of the general rule of
appellate procedure that an appellate court will not
consider a question on appeal unless it has been first
presented to and ruled upon by the lower court.  The
rule reflects the function of appellate review to
correct errors of the trial court.  Under this general
rule no error has occurred where no ruling has been
made by the court or requested by the litigant."
Falk, 290 Or at 843; see also Vancil, 236 Or at 324-25 (stating
that purpose of rule is "to give the trial court the opportunity
to rule upon the particular issue and to apprise one's opponent
what particular deficiency of proof is asserted").
This court later extended that rule to challenges to
the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence in civil cases tried to
the court without a jury.  In Falk, this court held that a party
without the burden of persuasion on an issue cannot raise "the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence on appeal unless he has
asserted the legal insufficiency of the evidence in the trial
court."  290 Or at 843.  This court based its decision to adopt
that rule for cases tried to the court on the concerns that
underlie all our preservation requirements -- fairness and
efficiency.  The court stated:
"The reasons for requiring a motion testing the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence in a jury trial
as a condition for considering the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal apply with equal force in civil
actions tried to the court.  Lack of proof of a
necessary fact may be overlooked if not brought to the
attention of the trial court.  An appropriate motion
may allow the trial court to avoid entry of an
erroneous judgment if the necessary proof cannot be
supplied, thus preventing appeals and retrials on that
basis.  The trial court's ruling may specify whether
the ruling is on the weight of the evidence or due to a
failure of proof, thus enabling the appellate court to
identify and distinguish errors of law justifying a
reversal of the judgment from resolution of questions
of fact on which the trial court's judgment is
conclusive."
Id.
In this case, the Court of Appeals extended the rule
announced in Falk to a party who bears the burden of persuasion on an
issue in a case tried to a court and who contends on appeal that
it should have prevailed on its claim as a matter of law.  As
explained below, we do not agree that such a rule serves the
purposes that underlie this court's preservation requirements.
Requiring the party with the burden of persuasion on a claim
to make a motion for directed verdict (or another similar motion)
when the court serves as the finder of fact does not promote
judicial efficiency or fairness to the parties.  The trial court
in that circumstance bears the responsibility for weighing the
evidence and evaluating the sufficiency of that evidence to
support its judgment.  The party who bears the burden of persuasion on
a claim and who asserts that it must prevail on the evidence as a
matter of law is asserting no more than that, on the evidence, a
reasonable trier of fact cannot find for the opposing party.  The
absence of a special motion does not create the danger that the
trial court will overlook that possibility in its examination of
the weight and effect of the evidence.  Thus, imposition of a
preservation requirement in this context would not serve this
court's interest in efficient judicial administration.
In regard to this court's concern for fairness, it
seems undebatable that the party that does not bear the burden of
persuasion at trial ordinarily is well aware that the party that does
bear the burden of persuasion contends that it should prevail on the
evidence.  It therefore is unlikely that, on appeal, the party
that does not bear the burden of persuasion would be surprised by a
specific argument from the party that had the burden of persuasion
that that party should have prevailed as a matter of law.  That
is so, because that party's contention on appeal is that,
considering the evidence as a whole, the record required the
trial court to find for the party who bore the burden of persuasion. 
In most cases that we can conceive, the party that does not bear
the burden of persuasion already has resisted that general argument
below on the basis of whatever evidence is in the record.
Further, we find nothing in our prior case law or the
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure that requires a party to take
particular steps to preserve the kind of issues now under
consideration.  We acknowledge that, prior to 1965, Oregon civil
practice required either party in a trial to the court to object
to the trial court's findings of fact, or to ask for additional
or different findings, or to raise on appeal the argument that
that party should have prevailed as a matter of law.  See
Thompson, Georgeson, Inc. v. Ward, 240 Or 429, 431, 400 P2d 557
(1965) (stating that objections to findings serve function of
directed verdict at bench trial).  However, that preservation
requirement was based on former ORS 17.430 (1963), repealed by Or
Laws 1965, ch 177, § 1.  That statute was replaced by former ORS
17.431 (1965), which explicitly withdrew that preservation
requirement.  See Clarke's Trucking v. Land Management, 278 Or
153, 156, 562 P2d 976 (1977) (so stating); see also former ORS
17.431(6) ("Requests for findings or objections to findings are
not necessary for purposes of appellate review.").  The Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure later incorporated former ORS 17.431
into ORCP 62 E almost verbatim.
In view of the evolution of the pertinent rules
described above and our conclusion that the Court of Appeals'
preservation rule does not advance fairness or efficiency, we
decline to require a party that bears the burden of persuasion at a
court trial to raise, for preservation purposes, the claim that
it should prevail on the evidence as a matter of law.
We turn to the merits of petitioner's claim. 
Petitioner makes the same arguments that she asserted in the
Court of Appeals, namely, that the officers exceeded the scope of
the warrant when they searched for and seized forgery evidence
and, therefore, that her trial counsel was constitutionally
inadequate for failing to file a motion to suppress that
evidence.  This court reviews post-conviction proceedings for
errors of law.  Moen v. Peterson, 312 Or 503, 510 n 6, 824 P2d
404 (1991).  The post-conviction court's findings of historical
fact are binding on this court if sufficient evidence in the
record supports them.  Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d
621 (1968).  If the post-conviction court fails to make findings
of fact on all the issues, and there is evidence from which such
facts could be decided more than one way, we will presume that
the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the post-conviction court's conclusion of law.  Id.
Petitioner contends that she should have prevailed
below as a matter of law because the evidence demonstrated that
the officers conducted two separate searches of the residence and
that the warrant clearly did not authorize the second search for
forgery evidence.  Petitioner's premise -- that two searches
occurred -- may be incorrect.  See State v. Munro, 339 Or ___,
___ P3d ___ (2005) (officer's change of focus during later
examinations of property seized pursuant to warrant does not
create new invasions of privacy so long as later examinations
adhere to scope of search authorized by warrant).  But even
assuming the correctness of that premise, petitioner cannot
prevail on her claim.  Petitioner necessarily would have had to
show that the officers opened the folders or the tote bag, or
both, on the desk to search for forgery evidence.  The record,
however, does not disclose whether the folders or tote bag were
open or closed when the officers found them or, if they were
closed, whether the officers opened them to search for forgery
evidence as opposed to evidence covered by the warrant.  We
cannot say, on the basis of the record, that the evidence
required the post-conviction court to find that the officers had
exceeded the scope of the warrant when they discovered and seized
the forgery evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Article I, section 11, provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel[.]"
The Sixth Amendment provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defen[s]e."