Case Title: James v. Crosby, Jr. v. Johnny Bolden

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-137

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
_____________
No. SC03-137
_____________
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHNNY BOLDEN,
Respondent.
[February 12, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Bolden v. Moore, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly D187 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 8, 2003), a decision of a district court of appeal
certifying a question to be of great public importance.  Upon reflection and further
consideration, we exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction.  Accordingly,
this review proceeding is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
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ANSTEAD, C.J., LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the discharge of jurisdiction because the issue raised was
correctly certified as a question of great public importance and should be
addressed as such.  Furthermore, by discharging jurisdiction, the majority allows a
decision to stand that reaches inconsistent holdings and I conclude should be
quashed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Johnny Bolden was convicted of felonious possession of firearms,
possession of a short-barreled shotgun, third-degree-felony aggravated assault, and
second-degree-felony aggravated battery, in connection with an incident occurring
on December 21, 1992.  On April 27, 1993, he was sentenced to four concurrent
ten-year terms, less 127 days of jail credit.  Pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (1991), Bolden could not begin earning gain time on his assault and
battery sentences until he first served a minimum of three years.  However, no such
limit applied to his shotgun sentence.  As a result, he eventually accrued 1334 days
of gain time on his shotgun sentence and only 997 days of gain time on his assault
1.  Section 944.275(2)-(3), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that the DOC
must calculate for each prisoner a “‘maximum sentence expiration date’ which shall
be the date when the sentence or combined sentences imposed on a prisoner will
expire,” and a “‘tentative release date’ which shall be the date projected for the
prisoner’s release from custody by virtue of gain-time granted or forfeited.”
2.  Bolden’s TRD for his fourth sentence occurred prior to this date and is
irrelevant to this dispute as that sentence was not subject to conditional release.
3.  Evans v. Singletary, 737 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1999).
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and battery sentences.
Pursuant to section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1991), the Department of
Corrections (DOC) calculated Bolden’s “tentative release dates” (TRDs) for each
of his sentences.1  His shotgun sentence was calculated as follows:  start date of
April 27, 1993, plus 3650 days (ten-year sentence), minus 127 days of jail credit,
minus 1334 days of gain time, equals a TRD of April 25, 1999.  However, due to
the difference in gain time accrued on each sentence, his TRDs for the assault and
battery sentences fell 337 days later, on March 27, 2000.2
Bolden was physically released from incarceration on March 27, 2000. 
Because he was sentenced as a habitual offender for the shotgun, assault, and
battery convictions and was released prior to the expiration of those sentences due
to accrued gain time, Bolden then was subject to “an extra post-prison
probation-type program”3 called “conditional release supervision,” as provided
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under section 947.1405, Florida Statutes (1991).  The length of such supervision is
established by the Florida Parole Commission (FPC) and “must not exceed the
maximum penalty imposed by the court.”  § 947.1405(6), Fla. Stat. (1991).  In
Bolden’s case, the FPC treated his conditional release supervision arising from the
shotgun sentence as tolled during the 337 days he remained incarcerated on the
other sentences and imposed two concurrent periods of conditional release
supervision, one ending after 997 days and a second ending after 1334 days.
Unfortunately, Bolden violated the terms of his conditional release.  On
November 18, 2000, 236 days after his physical release, Bolden was returned to
prison pursuant to section 947.141, Florida Statutes (1991), which provides that the
FPC may revoke conditional release upon violation of its terms and “return the
releasee to prison to serve the sentence imposed upon him.”  Pursuant to the same
section, the DOC deemed forfeited all gain time Bolden earned prior to his
conditional release.  The DOC then recalculated his TRDs for each sentence, taking
into consideration one day of time awarded to Bolden by the FPC and 124 days of
gain time earned after his return to prison.  The DOC’s recalculations for the
shotgun sentence were as follows:  start date of April 27, 1993, plus 3650 days
(ten-year sentence), minus 127 days of jail credit, minus 1334 days of gain time
(equals initial TRD), plus 337 days (time between release dates for shotgun
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sentence and longer sentences), plus 236 days (time between physical release and
reincarceration), plus 1334 days (gain time forfeited), minus one day (FPC credit),
minus 124 days (gain time awarded since reincarceration), equals recalculated TRD
of March 11, 2004.  This time his recalculated TRD for the assault and battery
charges fell 337 days earlier, on April 9, 2003.
Bolden filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court, claiming
the DOC erroneously increased his total time of incarceration by adding, in the
recalculation of his shotgun sentence, the 337 days between his initial TRD for the
shotgun sentence and the date of his physical release on March 27, 2000.  In
response, the DOC argued that Bolden was neither serving the incarcerative portion
of his shotgun sentence nor on conditional release during those 337 days; therefore,
in order to ensure he serves the full ten years of the shotgun sentence,  his release
date for the shotgun sentence must be extended by the total number of days (337
plus 236) on which he was not serving the incarcerative portion of that sentence. 
To do otherwise, the DOC urged, would grant Bolden prison credit toward his
shotgun sentence for time served solely on other charges.  The circuit court agreed
with the DOC and denied Bolden’s petition, citing Evans v. Singletary, 737 So. 2d
505 (Fla. 1999).
Bolden next petitioned the First District Court of Appeal for a writ of
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certiorari.  The First District granted the petition and concluded the circuit court
had departed from the essential requirements of the law.  See Bolden v. Moore, 28
Fla. L. Weekly D187, D189 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 8, 2003).  The First District
distinguished Bolden’s case from this Court’s decision in Evans v. Singletary, 737
So. 2d 505, 508-09 (Fla. 1999), in which we held that the DOC “may use an
unexpired Conditional Release-eligible sentence to determine the length of the
supervision and then toll the running of that supervision period until the inmate has
been released from prison,” as well as other similar decisions, by noting they “all
involve[d] concurrent sentences for unrelated crimes . . . [whereas] . . . Bolden was
serving concurrent ten-year sentences for related crimes arising from the same
incident.”  Bolden, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D188.  Turning to relevant statutes, the
First District concluded that no statutory support existed for the DOC’s method of
recalculating Bolden’s TRD.  Having reviewed case law and statutes, the court
held:
We conclude that Evans, [State v. Savage, 589 So. 2d 1016
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991), Bradley v. State, 721 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 5th DCA
1998), Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)], and
the 1991 version of section 947.1405(2) do not support tolling of
Bolden's conditional-release supervision on the shotgun charge while
he continued serving the incarcerative sentences for the aggravated
assault and aggravated battery offenses, nor do they mandate that the
337 days he remained in prison on the shotgun charge while pending
release on the assault and battery offenses be added to the calculation
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of a new release date.
Id. at D189.
ANALYSIS
Bolden contests neither the forfeiture of his gain time earned up to the date of
his conditional release nor the extension of his recalculated TRD by the 236 days
during which he was physically out of prison and on conditional release
supervision.  The only issue raised is whether the DOC properly extended his
recalculated TRD for the shotgun sentence by the 337 days he remained
incarcerated while serving the assault and battery sentences.  Secretary Crosby, on
behalf of the DOC, urges this Court to find that Bolden was neither serving prison
time creditable toward his shotgun sentence nor on conditional release during the
contested 337 days.  Such a finding, he argues, would then require the extension of
Bolden’s TRD for his shotgun sentence not only by the 236 days he was actually
out of prison but also by the 337 days he was constructively released from the
incarcerative portion of that sentence, in order to avoid effectively granting Bolden
prison time credit toward the shotgun sentence for a period when he was solely
serving the assault and battery sentences.  Bolden, on the other hand, argues that
when the DOC recalculated his TRDs and retroactively reclassified his gain time as
forfeited, it should also have retroactively reclassified the contested 337 days as
4.  For example, this principle underlies section 944.275(c), Florida Statutes
(1991), which provides that, when an escaped prisoner or parole violator is
returned to custody, the DOC must recalculate and extend the inmate’s maximum
sentence expiration date by the amount of time the inmate was “not in custody.”
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prison time served on the shotgun sentence so that the total number of days he
serves in prison on all concurrent sentences will not exceed ten years minus other
lawful credits.
Although the decision below focuses primarily on whether Bolden’s period
of conditional release supervision was properly tolled during the 337 days, the
parties’ arguments indicate that the primary question to be answered in this dispute
is whether those 337 days should be treated as time served and thus credited
toward the incarcerative portion of his shotgun sentence upon release revocation. 
When an offender violates conditional release supervision, has his gain time
forfeited, and is returned by FPC to prison “to serve the sentence imposed upon
him,” it must naturally follow that the DOC is to extend his TRD from his original
sentencing date by the number of days on which he was not serving the
incarcerative portion of the sentence to be completed.4  Clearly, at the time, Bolden
was not serving the incarcerative portion of his shotgun sentence during the
contested 337 days because if not for his other sentences, he would have been
conditionally released from the shotgun sentence on April 25, 1999.  Therefore, if
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the 337 days are to be treated as prison time served and credited toward the
shotgun sentence, that must be a retroactive construction.
Inexorably, the decision below appears to reach two inconsistent holdings. 
The decision focuses almost entirely on determining whether Bolden’s conditional
release supervision was properly tolled.  After lengthy discussion on that point, the
court concluded that no authority supported the tolling of conditional release
supervision during the 337 days.  However, without additional analysis, the court
further concluded that no authority “mandate[s] that the 337 days he remained in
prison on the shotgun charge while pending release on the assault and battery
offense be added to the calculation of a new release date.”  Bolden, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly at D189.  The reference to the contested period as “the 337 days he
remained in prison on the shotgun charge” does not appear to be consistent with
both parties’ agreement on the fact that Bolden would have been released on April
25, 1999, rather than March 27, 2000, if not for the lengthier incarceration periods
of the assault and battery sentences.  The first holding—that the DOC and FPC
lacked authority to toll Bolden's conditional release supervision while he continued
serving the incarcerative portions of his assault and battery sentences—dictates that
Bolden’s conditional release supervision arising from the shotgun sentence began
on April 25, 1999.  But the latter—that the 337 days could not be added to the
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recalculation of his TRD after release revocation—effectively grants Bolden prison
time credit toward his shotgun sentence for the same period.  I do not believe that it
can be correct to find that Bolden was simultaneously on supervised release from
and serving the incarcerative portion of the same sentence.
If Bolden’s conditional release supervision was not properly tolled but rather
began on April 25, 1999, it was error for the First District to also hold the contested
337 days could not be added in the recalculation.  On the other hand, if his
conditional release supervision was properly tolled, the question that would follow
is whether those 337 days should be treated as prison time creditable toward the
shotgun sentence or as a period when both the incarcerative portion of his shotgun
sentence and his conditional release supervision were tolled.
I conclude that Bolden’s conditional release supervision was properly tolled. 
Section 947.1405 does not directly address the issue, but its language plainly
provides that supervision begins upon release and ends no later than when the
offender’s maximum sentence would have ended had conditional release not been
granted.  As this Court has noted, “Conditional Release (as opposed to Control
Release, Provisional Credits, and Administrative Gain Time) is not an early release
program.  Conditional Release is an extra post-prison probation-type program.” 
Evans, 737 So. 2d at 507.  Its purpose is to ensure continued supervision after
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incarceration of those offenders the Legislature has found to provide the greatest
threat to the public safety.  See § 947.1405(8), Fla. Stat. (2003).  In Evans, this
Court relied on those principles for support of tolling:
[T]here is legitimate authority for the proposition that the supervision
period should be tolled until release from prison.  In State v. Savage,
589 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), for example, the defendant was
sentenced to three years to be followed by one year on probation. 
While serving the sentence, the defendant was convicted of an
additional crime and a new, completely separate sentence was
imposed.  This Court rejected the contention that the one-year
probation began at the end of the three-year sentence while the
defendant was still in prison, finding that the probation was tolled until
release from prison.  This Court stated:
Simple logic would seem to dictate that, where a
defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction, a
probationary period from an unrelated sentence would be
tolled since a probationary term should not be allowed to
expire simply because a defendant has decided to incur
new prison time as a result of a separate and distinct
offense.
Id. at 1018.  While in Savage the two sentences were from different
states, we believe that the same principle should apply here.  It would
be contrary to common sense to have Evans serve his Conditional
Release supervision in prison because he is already under a significant
restraint there. . . .
In this case, we conclude that if the legislature determined that
there was a need for additional post-prison supervision for these more
at-risk releasees, requiring that they serve their Conditional Release
supervision in prison would not make any sense.  Therefore, tolling the
supervision until the inmate has been released from prison would be
the most logical choice.
5.  Porter v. State, 585 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
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Evans, 737 So. 2d at 508 (emphasis added).  Because this “common sense”
approach holds true in the present case, the holding of Evans, that the State may
use an unexpired conditional release-eligible sentence to determine the length of the
supervision and toll the beginning of the supervision period until physical release
also appears applicable to the present case.
Because conditional release is a probation-type program, “the rehabilitative
concept of probation which presupposes that the probationer is not in prison
confinement”5 should likewise apply.  However, the general rule applying to
probation that the supervisory portion of a split sentence should immediately follow
the incarcerative portion of that sentence, upon which the First District inherently
relied below to distinguish the present case from Evans, is inapplicable to
conditional release.  Conditional release supervision is not a component of a split
sentence and indeed is not a sentence at all.
[The conditional release program] simply requires that certain inmates
will complete their sentences outside of prison, but still under a degree
of supervision.  As we recognized in Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d
708, 710 (Fla. 2000), conditional release is not an increased
punishment program at all, but rather an assistance program designed
to “help these former inmates in bridging the gap between prison and
the outside world.”
Further, conditional release is not a form of sentence, and it is
not imposed by a court.  Although the statute may impose an
6.  While the FPC’s tolling of Bolden’s conditional release supervision was
proper, its imposition of two terms of supervision, one for 997 days and a second
for 1336 days, appears erroneous.  Section 947.1405(6) states “The length of
supervision must not exceed the maximum penalty imposed by the court.”  Reading
this in conjunction with section 944.275(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), which
provides the DOC “shall establish for each prisoner sentenced to a term of years a
‘maximum sentence expiration date,’ which shall be the date when the sentence or
combined sentences imposed on a prisoner will expire,” I conclude that any
conditional release supervision imposed upon Bolden could not run past his
maximum sentence expiration date.  At the time of Bolden’s conditional release,
that date fell 997 days later.
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undesirable condition upon the release of those subject to the statutory
requirements by converting gain time that might be awarded into
postrelease supervision, neither gain time nor conditional release is a
true part of a criminal sentence.  An inmate's eligibility for conditional
release is established by statute.  Inmates who are subject to
conditional release are identified and their placement on conditional
release is required, not by the sentencing court, but by the Parole
Commission. 
Mayes v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 967, 971 (Fla. 2002).  Thus, it makes no difference
that Bolden’s concurrent sentences were for related crimes.  His conditional release
supervision arising from the shotgun sentence was properly tolled until his physical
release from incarceration so that the purpose and post-prison nature of the
program would be preserved.6 
Having determined Bolden’s conditional release supervision was properly
tolled during the contested 337 days, I turn to the question of whether those days
should be treated as prison time creditable toward the shotgun sentence or as a
7.  The DOC and FPC argue this conclusion could lead to undesirable
results in cases in which the time served between a shorter, conditional-release-
eligible sentence and a longer, concurrent sentence is greater than the amount of
gain time forfeited and to be served upon revocation.  Indeed, in such cases, the
offender’s return to prison “to serve the sentence imposed upon him” would be an
ineffective deterrent to violations of conditional release as the sentence would be
entirely fulfilled by the prison credit deriving from the time served on the longer,
concurrent sentence.  However, I note that the FPC’s authority is not limited to the
return of the releasee to prison “to serve the sentence imposed.”  Section
947.141(3) also provides the FPC may “enter such other order as it considers
proper.”  Because the extent of this additional grant of authority is not clear and
because the effectiveness of the conditional release program in certain
circumstances is at stake, I would urge the Legislature to take up this issue in
legislation addressing the interaction of concurrent sentences of varying lengths and
the conditional release program.
8.  “Concurrent sentences” is defined as “[t]wo or more sentences of jail
time to be served simultaneously.  For example, if a defendant receives concurrent
sentences of 5 years and 15 years, the total amount of jail time is 15 years.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1367 (7th ed. 1999).
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period when the incarcerative portion of his shotgun sentence was likewise tolled. 
Because Bolden’s sentences were concurrent, I conclude the 337 days he remained
incarcerated on the assault and battery charges should be treated, upon release
revocation, as prison time creditable toward the shotgun sentence as well. 7 
Although nothing in the Florida Statutes directly addresses this issue, I find implicit
in the nature of “concurrent” sentences8 that time previously served on a concurrent
sentence should be credited toward all other concurrent sentences.
CONCLUSION
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Because I find Bolden should have benefitted from the 337 days of his
incarceration on the assault and battery charges through the crediting of prison time
toward his shotgun sentence, I would conclude the DOC erred in extending his
recalculated TRD for that sentence by those 337 days.  Although this is the ultimate
conclusion reached in the decision below, I would nonetheless quash that decision
to the extent its analysis contradicts the above analysis.
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
First District - Case No. 1D01-3205
Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant General Counsel, and Judy Bone, Assistant General
Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Deborah Marks of Deborah Marks, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission,
Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Florida Parole Commission, Amicus Curiae