Case Title: Advisory Opinion to Gov. Request of July 12, 1976

Citation: 336 So. 2d 97

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
336 So. 2d 97 (1976)
In re ADVISORY OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR REQUEST OF JULY 12, 1976.
No. 49811.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 30, 1976.
Donald M. Middlebrooks, Gen. Counsel, Orlando, and Algia R. Cooper, Asst. General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor.
William L. Durden and Lacy Mahon, Jr., Jacksonville, for Hans G. Tanzler, Jr.
Dawson A. McQuaig, Gen. Counsel, and William Lee Allen, Asst. Counsel, Jacksonville, for City of Jacksonville.
Edward P. Vieira, in pro. per.
Dear Governor Askew:
We have the honor to acknowledge your communication of July 12, 1976, requesting our advice pursuant to Section 1(c), Article IV, Florida Constitution, 1968 Revision, and Rule 2.1(h), Florida Appellate Rules, relating to certain executive powers and duties.
Your letter reads in part as follows:
Upon receipt of your communication, an Interlocutory Order was entered, announcing that the questions propounded were answerable and setting dates for filing of briefs and oral argument.
We will respond to your questions in order of their submission.
It is our opinion that you as Governor have authority to suspend the mayor of the consolidated government of the City of Jacksonville under the provisions of Article IV, Section 7(a), of the Florida Constitution, 1968 Revision, provided you find the existence of a ground for removal as set forth in Section 7(a), which are limited to:
By virtue of this conclusion we are of the opinion that you are without authority to suspend the mayor of Jacksonville as a municipal official under the provisions of Article IV, Section 7(c).
Some officers of the consolidated government carry out both county and municipal functions. Article IV, Section 7(a), relates to the suspension of county officers and provides:
Article IV, Section 7(c), relates to the suspension of municipal officials and provides:
This provision grants to the Legislature the authority to vest elsewhere by legislative act the suspension power over municipal officials. The Legislature recognized the unique nature of consolidated governments and the fact that some officials of such governments function as both county and municipal officials by enacting Section 112.49, Florida Statutes, which provides:
Inasmuch as the Legislature has power to create, alter, and abolish both counties and municipalities, we believe it was well within the legislative power to enact Section 112.49, defining what a municipality is and what a county is, for suspension purposes. An examination of Jacksonville's charter leads us to conclude that the mayor of the consolidated City of Jacksonville has "the powers and duties of a county officer," Section 112.49, supra, and should be treated as a county officer, if he is to be suspended. The grounds for suspension of county officers are set forth in Article IV, Section 7(a), of the Florida Constitution. Section 7(c), pertaining to municipal officers, is not applicable.
We need not answer this question in view of our answer to question one.
To answer this question would require this Court to pass on the legal sufficiency of the individual charges contained in the indictments in this cause. It is our opinion that such a determination should not be made an advisory opinion but should be resolved in regular trial and appellate proceedings where appropriate factual issues can be developed.
We, therefore, decline to answer question three.
In our opinion, you may appoint an interim replacement in the same manner as you would any other county official in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, Section 7(a).
*100 ENGLAND, J., took no part in the consideration of this case.
BOYD, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with, and have signed, the Advisory Opinion to Your Excellency. Justice B.K. Roberts has stated that almost without exception public officials have not been subjected to disciplinary action for conduct occurring in prior terms of office. The one known exception to that rule is cited in your pleadings to this Court and is referred to as In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13. The holding in that case conflicted with the majority opinion stated in State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, and other prior cases decided by the regular members of the Supreme Court of Florida. The Boyd case was decided by a special panel of judges who were on temporary assignment to this Court, and the holding conflicted with precedents previously established by this and other Courts. It should be further noted that a Select Committee of the Florida House of Representatives held extensive hearings and found no basis for disciplinary action by the Legislature against Boyd.
I respectfully submit this information to you as Governor only to assist you in considering the question of law raised by Justice Roberts.
ROBERTS and ADKINS, Justices (dissenting).
In response to your preliminary inquiry as to the status of Mayor Tanzler as a municipal officer or a county officer, upon examination of the pertinent constitutional authority and decisions of the courts, we must conclude that insofar as the instant cause is concerned, Mayor Tanzler is a municipal officer. Article VIII, Section 9, Florida Constitution (1885), carried forward in full force and effect by Article VIII, Section 6(e), provides:
This constitutional provision authorized the Legislature to establish a municipal corporation to be known as the City of Jacksonville. Pursuant to such authority, Ch. 67-1320, Laws of Florida, was promulgated by the Legislature creating the consolidated City of Jacksonville and such act was ratified by the Duval County voters. In Jackson v. Consolidated Gov. of City of Jacksonville, 225 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1969), this Court approving the opinion of the Circuit Court authored by Judge Larkin, explained:
Being fully mindful of Section 112.49, Florida Statutes, which provides:
it should be noted that sub judice no contention has been made that any county duties or responsibilities are involved. In conclusion as to this question, therefore, the Governor's power of suspension relative to Mayor Tanzler under the existing circumstances arises from Article IV, Section 7(c).
Article IV, Section 7(c), provides:
The proviso language specifically vests the Legislature with the power to abrogate the authority to suspend which is vested in the Governor. It necessarily follows that the Legislature having the full authority to derogate the responsibility of the Governor in this area also has the power to circumscribe said authority which it has done through enactment of Section 112.51(1), Florida Statutes, which provides:
This statutory provision is not inconsistent with or in conflict with the aforementioned constitutional provision. The questioned indictments and charges contained therein do not relate to official actions arising directly or indirectly out of or pertaining to official conduct or duties as Mayor.
Counsel for Mayor Tanzler accurately points out that had Tanzler been the challenger rather than the incumbent, the cited acts could not have even been attempted to be attributed to his duties as Mayor.
In your request, the questions are anchored to indictments referred to therein. Since the questions thus pose a problem of both law and fact, we must limit this opinion to the factual situation involved in the indictments. It is our opinion and we advise you that the management of campaign financing and matters relating thereto are neither county nor municipal functions, and we must therefore advise you that you are without authority on the present state of the record to suspend Mayor Tanzler.
We are not unmindful that other facts and circumstances set forth by a subsequent proclamation of the Governor in this or some other matter may henceforth establish grounds for removal of Mayor Tanzler, but such facts and circumstances must be dealt with subsequent to this time upon appropriate presentation to this Court.
Insofar as the validity vel non of Section 112.42 is concerned, we refer to this Court's decision in State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974), wherein this Court quoted with approval the long established rule of this Court stated by the revered late Justice Terrell in 1945 (Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 156 Fla. 682, 24 So.2d 108) writing for a unanimous court and the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions, that "No rule is better settled under our democratic theory than this; When one is re-elected or re-appointed to an office or position he is not subject to removal for offenses previously committed."
Furthermore, the Court said:
The following relevant facts are pertinent:
As the City of Jacksonville points out, none of the events set forth in the indictments occurred during the existing term of Mayor and the only indictment covering events occurring in the next preceding four years is failure to report gifts received for the period of January 1 through June 30, 1973, by August 15, 1973, which is a misdemeanor not connected with his duties and responsibilities as Mayor.
Since it would therefore appear that removal at this time is inappropriate as a matter of law, it is unnecessary to give consideration to the fulfilling of a prospective vacancy.
ROBERTS, Justice, further dissenting.
An exhaustive study of the National Reporter System and all other available treatises demonstrate a near unanimous rule throughout this nation, both State and Federal, that a public official cannot be removed from office under a current commission for misconduct in a prior one. See numerous precedents cited in the main dissenting opinion. Therefore, I advise you that in my opinion to do so would violate almost unanimous precedent for more than a century. In view of this rule, the other questions presented are moot. I am authorized to say that Justice Adkins joins me in this view.
(s)B.K. ROBERTS