Case Title: Bailey v. Eagle Mountain Telephone Co.

Citation: 303 S.W.2d 726

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1957-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
303 S.W.2d 726 (1957) Robert H. BAILEY, Appellant, v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN TELEPHONE CO., Inc., Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. June 7, 1957. *727 Maupin, Berry & Curtis, Greeneville, for appellant. Fraker, Silvers & Coleman, and F.H. Parvin, Greeneville, for appellee. SWEPSTON, Justice. This is a suit for a specific performance in which the appellant filed his bill to require the respondent Telephone Company to specifically perform its contract of purchase of a tract of real estate which it had bargained to purchase from said Bailey. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer of the defendant and dismissed the bill, hence this appeal. The principal question is whether or not the following language, without more, created a fee simple determinable subject to a possibility of reverter in the heirs of the grantor. The following language which appears in the chain of title of the said Bailey: It is the insistence of the appellant that the words "so long as" are not sufficient to create a fee simple determinable subject to a possibility of reverter in the grantor or his heirs. The appellee insists that they are sufficient. Both parties have full briefs citing cases from various States of the Union but we do not find it necessary to respond by a discussion of each one of these cases. We think that the rule is correctly stated in our own case of Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36, in an opinion by Green, Chief Justice. We do not mean to say that case is exactly analogous on the facts because the language was not only "so long as" but in addition there was express provision for a reversion. Nevertheless 151 Tenn. on page 228, 269 S.W. on page 37, of the opinion Judge Green in quoting from Brewster, On Conveyancing, Sec. 173, et seq., says in part as follows: Likewise, in Tiffany on Real Property, 2nd. Vol. 1, p. 334, sec. 93, the author says in part: In 18 Corpus Juris, page 301, section 281, it is said: In 26 C.J.S. Deeds, § 110, p. 921, after referring to the expressions, "so long as" "while" "until", "during", etc., it is stated that it is not necessary to use these words, or words of this type, provided that the grantor's intention is otherwise expressed, which is in accordance with the rule in this State to be referred to hereinafter briefly. Then the text states: Templeton v. Strong, 182 Tenn. 591, 188 S.W.2d 560, is cited, which case did not contain the technical words and in fact did not contain any words sufficient to show an intention on the part of the grantor to create a determinable fee; the Court simply held that a determinable fee is not favored by the law and will in no particular be implied but must be clearly expressed. Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church v. Wagner, 193 Tenn. 625, 249 S.W.2d 875, is a case where no technical words, supra, were used, but there was an express provision for a reversion in case the property should cease to be used for church purposes. The Court found from an examination of the entire instrument that the intention was to create a determinable fee. That opinion by no means undertakes to lay down any rule that there must be an express provision for a reverter, where apt technical words are used that are sufficient alone to create a determinable fee, absent any contrary intention appearing in the whole instrument. The clearest case that we have found on the question is Lynch v. Bunting, 3 Terry 171, 29 A.2d 155. The author of that opinion, after pointing out the distinction between a fee simple determinable and a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, all of which is referred to, supra, has this to say (29 A.2d page 157): The author then states that those words alone would do no more than simply express the purpose of the grant and would not be sufficient to create a determinable fee. Then quoting further, it is said: That opinion cites seven supporting cases from other States. (Emphasis ours.) Appellant cites Walker v. Shelby County School Board, 150 Tenn. 202, 263 S.W. 792, where the language was "for public school purposes," but did not have any such expression as "so long as", etc.; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S.W.2d 1026, 1028, which contains the language "for railroad purposes only" in the habendum clause; and Boyd v. Ducktown Chemical & Iron Company, 19 Tenn. App. 392, 396, 89 S.W.2d 360. These cases are not in point because they simply contain merely an expression of the purpose for which the grant was made, which under all authorities is not sufficient to create a determinable fee. We are therefore constrained to hold that the estate in this case was a determinable fee. The only other question raised by the assignment of error is that appellant seeks to rely upon the first section of the Act of 1819, T.C.A. sec. 28-201, that is the seven year statute to create a title in fee. Since there is absolutely no evidence of any grant from this State or the State of North Carolina, this assignment be overruled. The decree below is affirmed.