Case Title: People v. Dworak

Citation: 

Docket Number: S135272

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DOUGLAS EDWARD DWORAK, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S135272 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2004016721 
 
 
July 15, 2021 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
S135272 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Douglas Edward Dworak was sentenced to 
death in 2005 for the rape and murder of Crystal Hamilton.  The 
jury found Dworak guilty of one count each of murder and rape 
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 261, subd. (a)(2); all undesignated 
statutory references are to the Penal Code) and found true the 
special circumstance that the murder was committed while 
Dworak was engaged in the commission of rape (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17)(C)).  Dworak waived his right to jury trial on two prior 
felony conviction allegations and admitted to prior convictions 
for rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and sexual penetration with a 
foreign object while using a weapon (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)).  This 
appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment 
in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
The prosecutor’s theory at trial was that Dworak, who had 
previously been convicted of rape and who admitted to a history 
of consensual sexual encounters with prostitutes during times 
of stress in his marriage, sought out nonconsensual sex the 
evening of April 20, 2001, after he and his wife had an argument, 
and while his wife was out of town.  The prosecutor speculated 
that the victim, Crystal Hamilton, may have mistaken Dworak’s 
white pickup truck for that of her father, who was on his way to 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
pick her up from a shopping plaza sometime around midnight.  
During the course of their encounter, the prosecutor argued, 
Dworak raped Hamilton and then murdered her in order to 
avoid a return to prison, leaving her body in the water at a 
deserted point of Mussel Shoals Beach in Ventura. 
The prosecutor opened her case with testimony from 
Cynthia W. concerning Dworak’s prior convictions.  In October 
1986, Cynthia was returning home from a shopping trip when 
Dworak approached her in her driveway.  Dworak grabbed her 
from behind and put a large hunting knife to her throat.  They 
struggled; Cynthia’s glasses fell off and she sustained a cut on 
her thumb.  Dworak took Cynthia to the back of her car, put his 
finger in her vagina, and raped her.  He then told her to “stay 
put” or else he would come back and hurt her.  After Dworak 
left, Cynthia ran inside her home and called her husband and 
then 911.  She provided a statement to the police and identified 
Dworak as the perpetrator.  Dworak was 20 years old at the 
time.  He was convicted of rape and sexual penetration with a 
foreign object while using a weapon and was sentenced to 18 
years in state prison.   
Dworak was paroled to Ventura County in 1996.  In 1999, 
he married Susannah Dworak.  They fought frequently, and 
Dworak described Susannah as a “raging bitch” who “got on [his] 
case about everything,” including his fishing trips with friends 
to Mussel Shoals, among other places.  Dworak told detectives 
that he was “sexually frustrated” and sought to have sex with 
prostitutes in Ventura because there “just wasn’t any sex 
happening.”   
Susannah worked for an oral surgery group.  On the 
weekend of April 21, 2001, Susannah was scheduled to attend a 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
certification course in Irvine to become an oral surgery 
assistant.  The day before the training, Susannah called the 
office to explain she would not come in that day.  Susannah was 
crying and upset but confirmed she would attend the weekend 
training.  Susannah attended the conference; a coworker who 
shared a room with Susannah described her as “very upset, very 
emotional” that weekend because she had “a rough day Friday.”   
Dworak was employed at a general contracting company.  
He was “on-call” the weekend of April 21 but did not work either 
day.  A neighbor testified that Dworak stopped by to talk that 
weekend; Dworak told the neighbor that his wife was away and 
that he was “out living it up and playing pool and — at the local 
bars and going down to Ventura and staying out late.”  The 
neighbor testified that Dworak seemed to be in good spirits and 
told her, “ ‘[W]hen the cat’s away, the mouse will play.’ ”   
Crystal Hamilton was 18 years old in April 2001.  She 
lived in Oxnard with her father, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel 
Michael Hamilton and two siblings.  She frequently wore small 
jewelry items; Hamilton’s sister recalled that she was wearing a 
bracelet when she left home the day before her death to attend 
a small gathering at the home of Matt Zeober, a friend and 
former classmate.  Zeober lived with his mother, Robyn Jones, 
in Ventura.  During that gathering, which took place on Friday, 
April 20, Zeober, Hamilton, and some friends smoked marijuana 
and used methamphetamines.  Hamilton spent the night at 
Zeober’s home.   
Hamilton remained at Zeober’s house the next day.  In the 
afternoon, Hamilton called her father asking for a ride home.  
Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton was in Corona and told Crystal he 
could pick her up that evening.  Hamilton made other calls 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
seeking a ride home but ultimately made plans to meet her 
father in the parking lot at a nearby Ralphs grocery store around 
midnight.  That evening, Zeober fell asleep but then woke up 
between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.  Hamilton was drawing a 
picture and told Zeober she would be leaving soon, and he fell 
back asleep.  It was the last time he saw Hamilton.  When 
Zeober next woke up, the evening news was on and Hamilton 
was gone.   
Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton arrived at the grocery store 
around midnight, driving a white pickup truck with no toolbox, 
but Hamilton was not there.  He drove around looking for her in 
the parking lot, then drove to Zeober’s home.  The lights were 
off, and he did not knock on the door.  Hamilton occasionally 
failed to appear when she made arrangements to meet her 
father, so he was not overly concerned at that point and did not 
call the police.   
Jorge Valdez was fishing at Mussel Shoals Beach around 
dawn on Sunday, April 22, when he saw what looked like a body.  
The beach was approximately an 18-minute drive from the 
Ralphs store where Hamilton had planned to meet her father.  
Valdez went to a nearby fire station to report what he saw.  
Firefighters found Hamilton’s body lying naked in the surf.   
The firefighters recovered Hamilton’s body and observed 
signs of lividity and rigor mortis, a cut over her left eye, and 
bruising around her hips.  There was no clothing or jewelry on 
the body.  Police searched the area but found no clothing, 
jewelry, or other evidence connected to Hamilton.   
The autopsy revealed numerous injuries on Hamilton’s 
body, including blunt-force trauma to the head; abrasions on her 
left breast, right shoulder, ribs, and hips; bruising on her left 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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upper bicep; abrasions and bruising to her left wrist and hand; 
and abrasions on her neck.  Examination of the body and 
biopsies of some of the injuries confirmed that some of 
Hamilton’s injuries, including the injuries to her right forehead 
area, breast, bicep, knee, and wrist, occurred before death.  The 
medical examiner, Dr. Ronald O’Halloran, testified that marks 
on her left wrist could have been a pressure mark caused when 
an object like a bracelet was pressed into her skin before or after 
death.  Dr. O’Halloran further testified that the injury just 
above the bridge of her nose was caused by an impact against a 
hard, blunt object that hit Hamilton in the head, such as a car 
or rock, but because no biopsy was performed of this injury, he 
could not testify as to whether it occurred before or after death.   
Dr. O’Halloran described abrasions on a “relatively 
protected” area of Hamilton’s neck that is not usually injured 
when a person falls down, explaining that “in manual 
strangulations, fingernails often leave” such marks.  Hamilton 
had petechial hemorrhages in her eyes, which Dr. O’Halloran 
described as “a very common finding in manual strangulations.”  
He acknowledged these can also occur as a result of CPR or 
violent vomiting but added there was no evidence that either 
had occurred here.  There was sand and water in Hamilton’s 
lungs. 
 
The 
toxicology 
report 
was 
positive 
for 
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana in amounts 
sufficient to affect Hamilton’s “brain function, that is, she 
probably got high on it,” but “not a level that generally is 
accepted to cause death.”   
Dr. O’Halloran determined that the cause of death was a 
homicide, and he opined that she likely died from drowning, 
though the evidence strongly indicated she was also manually 
strangled, perhaps while in the water.  Based on the paramedics’ 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
observations of lividity, rigor mortis, and body temperature, as 
well as contemporaneous measurements of the air and water 
temperatures in the area, Dr. O’Halloran estimated that 
Hamilton died between midnight and 3:30 a.m.   
Dr. O’Halloran did not observe any injuries in the vaginal 
area.  Seminal fluid, sand, and seaweed were present inside 
Hamilton’s vagina.  A forensic scientist at the Ventura County 
Sheriff’s Department who later examined the vaginal swabs 
described the amount of sperm as “off the charts,” indicating 
that it was deposited within one hour and 15 minutes of her 
death or much less, assuming she was ambulatory after 
intercourse.  If she was not ambulatory (i.e., had laid down 
before intercourse and never got back up), the sperm could have 
been deposited 11 to 12 hours before her death.  He 
acknowledged that this was the first examination he had 
conducted on sperm found in someone floating in cold water and 
that colder temperatures could have slowed degradation and 
prolonged sperm life.  He also acknowledged that he did not 
prepare his sample using the same method as the studies he 
relied on.   
An analysis of the vaginal swabs confirmed the presence 
of both sperm and nonsperm cellular material.  A DNA profile 
from the sperm portion was submitted to the California 
Department of Justice’s convicted offender DNA data bank .  In 
March 2002, the Department of Justice notified the Ventura 
County Sheriff that the DNA profile from the sperm portion of 
the vaginal swabs matched the DNA profile on file for Dworak.  
The detective assigned to the case determined that Dworak was 
a sex offender and asked to be notified when Dworak next 
reported for mandatory registration.   
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
When Dworak reported on May 12, 2003, he agreed to 
speak with detectives.  (The record does not explain the lapse of 
time between the DNA hit and this encounter.)  When asked, 
Dworak stated that he had been with three different prostitutes 
whom he picked up in Ventura over “a year and a half or so, 
maybe two” years earlier.  He explained that these encounters 
occurred during the afternoon when he got off work and that he 
used a condom each time.  He described one of the prostitutes as 
African American, one as “Mexican,” and one as White.  He 
described the White prostitute as approximately 5 feet 4 inches 
tall, no tattoos, wearing make-up, and having wavy, shoulder-
length hair that was “dirty brown, dirty blonde” in color.  She 
was “[m]iddle aged, . . .  maybe 20’s, hard 20’s” and looked “kind 
of hard — rode hard.”  He denied recognizing either a 
photograph of Hamilton or her name.  The interview was tape-
recorded and played for the jury.   
Detectives interviewed Dworak again on June 11; a 
videotape of this interview was played for the jury.  This time, 
Dworak described the White prostitute as “mid-twenty 
something” with short “bleach blonde” hair.  Again, he described 
her as looking “kind of ragged, kind of rough,” but this time he 
said she was not wearing makeup.  Dworak was again shown a 
picture of Hamilton, and he again denied recognizing her.   
On July 22, detectives executed a search warrant on 
Dworak’s home and place of business.  During the search, 
Dworak spoke with detectives; an audiotape of this interview 
was played for the jury.  Again, he was shown a photograph of 
Hamilton and said he did not recognize her.  Dworak was told 
that physical evidence implicated him in a sexual assault, to 
which he responded, “I don’t mess with little kids,” and again 
stated he did not recognize Hamilton.  He reiterated that outside 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
of his marriage he had only been with the three prostitutes he 
had already described and that he did not think Hamilton could 
be one of them.  Dworak was arrested at the conclusion of the 
interview.   
At the time of Hamilton’s death, Dworak drove a white 
pickup truck similar in style to that driven by Hamilton’s father.  
Following his arrest in 2003, Dworak’s truck was searched.  A 
stain on the driver’s seat reacted to a screening test, indicating 
it may have been human blood, but the sample was too small to 
confirm.  No DNA was found in the stain.   
The jury was taken to view four locations relevant to the 
prosecutor’s case:  the outside of Zeober’s home; the location of 
the Ralphs store; the south end of Mussel Shoals Beach, where 
Hamilton’s body was found; and the north end of the beach, 
where a patrol officer from the Ventura Port District opined that 
Hamilton might have drowned based on the tides and currents 
at the time of her death.  Dworak was known to fish and picnic 
at Mussel Shoals Beach, and he once told a friend of his that “if 
they went there early enough, nobody else would be there.”   
2.  Defense Case 
Scott Osler, one of Dworak’s best friends, was with 
Dworak from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on April 21, shooting pool 
at the Hilltop Bar in Oak View.  He testified that Dworak picked 
him up that day in his white pickup truck, which had a toolbox 
in the bed (in contrast to a similar truck driven at the time by 
Hamilton’s father).   
Dr. Robert Bux was an associate coroner and medical 
examiner for EI Paso County, Colorado.  Before testifying, Dr. 
Bux reviewed the autopsy photographs, the death investigation 
report, autopsy report, and Dr. O’Halloran’s trial testimony.  Dr. 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
Bux testified that he could not form an opinion to a medical 
certainty that Hamilton’s death was a homicide instead of an 
accident.  In his opinion, Hamilton was not manually strangled 
because she lacked “congestion” above the level of strangulation, 
bruising around her neck, fractures to her thyroid cartilage, or 
petechiae on her lungs.  In his opinion, the fact that the 
abrasions on her neck were horizontal rather than vertical was 
inconsistent with manual strangulation.  He also could not form 
an opinion to a medical or scientific certainty that Hamilton had 
been raped, in the absence of injury to the vaginal region or 
inner thighs.  Based on the toxicology report, Dr. Bux opined 
that Hamilton would not have been a “passive individual” 
during a sexual assault and would have defended herself.  
Finally, he opined that her postmortem injuries were consistent 
with being dragged on the ocean floor and against the rocks, and 
that her premortem injuries could have occurred during the act 
of drowning.  He agreed that the evidence showed that Dworak’s 
sperm had been deposited “recently” before death but said he 
was not aware of anything that could determine whether it had 
been deposited within minutes or a few hours.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
The prosecution’s case in aggravation primarily relied on 
evidence from the guilt phase trial concerning the circumstances 
of the charged crime and Dworak’s prior felony conviction for 
rape and sexual penetration with a foreign object (and related 
criminal activity involving force or violence).  The following 
additional evidence was presented at the penalty phase: 
Hamilton’s father and grandfather testified about how 
Hamilton’s death affected them and their families, including 
descriptions of her unique qualities as a person such as her 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
artistic and musical abilities.  The court also permitted the 
introduction of one photograph of Hamilton playing the piano 
and two pieces of her artwork.  Recalling his last phone call with 
Hamilton (about picking her up at the grocery store parking lot 
around midnight), her father blamed himself in part for what 
happened and said he felt he had let her down.   
Rather than recalling Cynthia W. to the stand, the 
prosecutor called Allen Brambrink, a Napa County Sheriff’s 
Department employee, to testify about the impact of the crime 
on Cynthia W.  Brambrink testified that he knew Cynthia W. as 
a fellow county employee.  When he saw her on the day of the 
crime, her hand was covered with a large bandage.  He put his 
arm around her and could feel her tremble as she hugged him.  
He explained that there was “[s]omething about her demeanor,” 
adding, “She needed something, and I — I just responded to my 
instincts.”   
Dworak called nine witnesses at the penalty phase:  eight 
members of his family and a corrections expert.  His niece 
testified to their close relationship; Dworak never acted 
inappropriately with her, and she did not believe he raped 
Cynthia W. or raped and killed Hamilton.  Dworak’s older 
brother and his sister-in-law described him as a good and 
helpful person; Dworak’s older sister and his brother-in-law 
offered similar testimony.  His sister testified that she did not 
believe Dworak raped Cynthia W. and acknowledged that she 
sent a card to Cynthia W. on the anniversary of the crime that 
read in part, “Happy Anniversary and many, many more.  Just 
a little something for you to remember your RAPE.  May you get 
AIDS, bitch.  Having your son lie to cover up your blindness of 
being able to see your true rapist!”   (Double underscoring 
omitted). 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
Dworak’s mother described him as “a loving, outgoing 
young man.”  She did not want to see him executed because he 
had “too much to offer.”  His mother-in-law described him as 
helpful.  She had never seen him act inappropriately with 
anyone.  She was not aware before the trial that he had been 
convicted of rape. 
Dworak’s wife, Susannah, testified that she loved him 
deeply and that he was very close with his family.  Dworak had 
told Susannah that he was wrongly convicted of raping Cynthia 
W.  She acknowledged that they would argue about money and 
went through marriage counseling at the end of 2001.  She said 
their marriage was getting better and they were thinking of 
starting a family before his arrest.   
James Esten, an expert on the California prison system, 
opined that Dworak would be an “above average” inmate with 
useful skills as a teacher’s aide based on his prior incarceration 
record.  He acknowledged that Dworak obtained early release 
on his prior conviction for good behavior and would not have the 
same incentives while serving a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole. 
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Exclusion of Defense Evidence  
Before trial, and over the opposition of defense counsel, 
the prosecution moved to exclude defense evidence relating to 
third party culpability and victim character.  Dworak contends 
the trial court erred in granting these motions.  We hold that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this 
evidence.  
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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1.  Third Party Culpability 
(a) Facts 
The day after Hamilton’s body was found, police searched 
Robyn Jones’s home, the last place Hamilton was seen before 
her murder, with Jones’s consent.  Among other items, 
detectives found a bucket in the carport that contained a pair of 
wet, sandy jeans.  Jones told the detectives she did not know 
where they had come from.  One year later, Jones told detectives 
that she remembered two of her friends, Jay Campbell and 
Cindy Kinnaird, had gone to the beach on a date “ ‘the night 
Crystal was killed.’ ”  Jones assumed they had come to her house 
to change clothes, an assumption confirmed by both Campbell 
and Kinnaird in separate statements to detectives.  DNA 
evidence obtained from the jeans was later matched to a sample 
provided by Campbell.  The prosecutor moved to exclude any 
testimony or evidence regarding the jeans, arguing “there was 
never anything connecting” the jeans to the crime. 
Around the same time Jones told officers about Campbell 
and Kinnaird, she also told friends and detectives that her 
friend Danny Carroll may have been involved in Hamilton’s 
rape and murder.  Moving to exclude any evidence regarding 
Carroll, the prosecutor described him as “a long time drug user, 
low-level dealer, and occasional boyfriend” of Jones, adding that 
Dworak’s “[m]arginal evidence” linking Carroll to the crime was 
insufficient to satisfy the admissibility standard set in People v. 
Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall).   
Opposing the prosecutor’s motion to exclude this evidence, 
Dworak pointed to statements from Jones that Carroll shaved 
his mustache and pubic hair shortly after the time of the crime; 
statements from Zeober that Carroll had stolen Jones’s car on 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
the night that Hamilton was last seen and that it had a broken 
window and was full of sand when recovered; and statements 
from Zeober that Carroll commented on his desire to have a 
relationship with Hamilton.  Zeober later admitted he did not 
actually hear this latter comment but was only speculating as to 
what “could have happened.”  Dworak also pointed to evidence 
that a computerized voice stress analysis conducted by 
detectives indicated that Carroll was deceptive, though the 
prosecutor countered that the test was administered poorly.  
Dworak also sought to introduce letters from Carroll to Jones 
offering his own speculations and musings as to what might 
have happened to Hamilton.  As the trial court observed, these 
letters did not contain any suggestion that Carroll was involved 
in the crime.  Collectively, Dworak argued, these facts “support 
an inference that Danny Carroll was involved, in some way, with 
the death of Crystal Hamilton.” 
The court granted both of the prosecutor’s motions.  As to 
Campbell’s jeans, the court found no evidence connecting either 
the jeans or Campbell himself to Hamilton.  Regarding Carroll, 
the court found there was no evidence “that actually puts 
[Carroll] in proximity” to Hamilton or linking any of the 
proffered evidence to the crime here.  The court described the 
evidence proffered by Dworak as “weak[]” and found it would 
“not meet[] the threshold requirement that would reasonably 
create a doubt” as to Dworak’s guilt. 
(b) Discussion  
We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 264, 292.)  We have rejected any special rule governing 
evidence of third party culpability, explaining that “courts 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any 
other evidence:  if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code, ]§ 350) 
unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion ([id., ]§ 352).”  (Hall, 
supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834.)  In making this assessment, courts 
should be mindful that third party evidence “need not show 
‘substantial proof of a probability’ that the third person 
committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a 
reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.”  (Hall, at p. 833.)  Hall 
explained that, in general, “evidence of mere motive or 
opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without 
more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a 
defendant’s guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial 
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of 
the crime.”  (Ibid.; see People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 
1242.) 
We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision 
to exclude evidence or testimony relating to Carroll or to the 
jeans linked to Campbell found in Jones’s carport.  As the trial 
court explained, there was no evidence placing Carroll in 
proximity to Hamilton at the time of her death, and any link 
between the jeans found in Jones’s garage and Hamilton’s death 
rested on speculation.  Although the jeans could be seen as 
circumstantial evidence that Campbell was involved in 
Hamilton’s death, such an inference requires speculation that 
the sand and water on the jeans were from the beach on which 
Hamilton’s body was found, combined with additional 
speculation that this was the result of Campbell’s presence at 
Hamilton’s murder and not, as Campbell stated, a separate visit 
to the beach that same weekend.  The trial court reasonably 
concluded that the probative value of this evidence related to 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
Carroll and Campbell, which produced only speculative 
inferences, was substantially outweighed by the risk that it 
would cause undue delay, prejudice, or confusion.  
For the same reasons, we reject Dworak’s further 
contentions that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence 
deprived him of his rights to present a defense, to compulsory 
process, and to confrontation, and thereby also violated his right 
to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.  (People v. Prince, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1243.) 
2.  Victim Character Evidence 
Rachel Daniels had been one of Hamilton’s closest friends.  
According to the prosecutor’s motion in limine, Daniels was “a 
regular drug-user, and frequently had relationships with men to 
exchange for dope and/or money.”  Through Daniels, Hamilton 
met John Figueroa.  A few months before Hamilton’s death, 
Figueroa rented a motel room where Daniels, Hamilton, Zeober, 
and others “smoked drugs and partied.”  Hamilton called 
Figueroa the night of her death while looking for a ride home, 
but no witness placed Hamilton with Daniels or Figueroa on the 
weekend of her death.  In a statement to police given two months 
after Hamilton’s death, while in custody for being under the 
influence, Daniels stated that Hamilton was not engaged in 
prostitution but had been sexually active.   
The prosecutor successfully moved to exclude any evidence 
regarding Hamilton’s use of drugs and activities in the week 
before her death, including any evidence relating to Daniels and 
Figueroa.  Dworak argued the evidence was relevant to explain 
“to the jury the possible actions taken by . . . Hamilton at the 
time this occurred,” actions “other than just going to Ralphs 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
supermarket and waiting there for her father.”  Specifically, 
Dworak suggests, Hamilton may have contacted another person, 
who “offered to give her a ride, or perhaps such things as going 
to a party at a hotel room became more — another possibility of 
an action for her to take.”   
We find no abuse of discretion.  The trial court reasonably 
found such evidence to be irrelevant, as it rested solely on 
speculation as to what might have occurred after Hamilton left 
Jones’s home.  (See People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 
711.)  Nor was Dworak precluded from presenting evidence that 
Hamilton may have gone somewhere other than Ralphs that 
evening, as the court permitted him to cross-examine Zeober 
about whether Hamilton was attempting to call older men whom 
she “associated with” for a ride home that night.   
B.  Exclusion of Victim Photograph 
Dworak next claims the trial court prejudicially erred by 
admitting three photographs of Hamilton proffered by the 
prosecutor while excluding a booking photograph of Hamilton 
proffered by Dworak.  Hamilton argues that the booking 
photograph would have provided a more accurate view of 
Hamilton at the time of her death and would therefore explain 
why he did not recognize her from the photographs shown to him 
by detectives.  We find no error. 
The prosecutor moved to admit three photographs of 
Hamilton while she was alive.  The first photograph, taken 
weeks or months before Hamilton’s death, was shown to Dworak 
during his first interview with detectives on May 12, 2003, and 
again during his third interview on July 22, 2003.  The second 
photograph, taken several months earlier, was shown to Dworak 
during his second interview on July 11, 2003.  Each time 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
detectives asked if he recognized the woman in the photograph, 
and each time he denied recognizing Hamilton.  Over Dworak’s 
objection, the trial court found these two photographs were 
“clearly admissible since they were photographs shown [to 
Dworak] during the course of this investigation, and he denied 
knowing the person depicted in those photographs.”   
The third photograph was taken approximately two years 
before Hamilton’s death.  It depicted Hamilton holding a cat 
while standing in front of a fireplace with family photographs 
behind her.  In the picture, Hamilton was wearing the type of 
jewelry she normally wore, including a bracelet the prosecutor 
argued would have created the type of bruising observed on her 
wrist during the autopsy.  Again over Dworak’s objection, the 
trial court found the photograph to be admissible but ordered 
that it be cropped and blurred to depict only the articles of 
jewelry and not the cat or family photographs.   
Dworak does not renew his objection to the three admitted 
photographs.  Instead, he limits his argument to the trial court’s 
purported error in denying his own motion to admit a booking 
photograph of Hamilton taken at the time of one of her juvenile 
arrests.  According to defense counsel, the prosecutor’s 
photographs would “presumably reflect what . . . [Hamilton] 
looked like when she was not using drugs” and so were 
irrelevant to show what she would have looked like “when she 
was using drugs and ‘on the street.’ ”  By contrast, defense 
counsel argued, the booking photograph would “more accurately 
reflect[] how she appeared when she was using drugs and how 
she may have appeared to [Dworak] when he came into contact 
with her.”     
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
The court denied Dworak’s motion to admit Hamilton’s 
booking photograph, explaining there was no showing that 
Hamilton was under the influence of drugs in the photograph, 
which was the sole basis proffered by Dworak to admit the 
photograph.  “[W]ithout that additional link,” the court 
explained, the photograph would not be admitted.   
As presented by Dworak in his motion to admit the 
photograph, the relevance and thus admissibility of the booking 
photograph depends on the existence of the foundational fact 
that it more accurately depicted Hamilton on the night at issue 
because it showed her under the influence of narcotics.  “The 
determination regarding the sufficiency of the foundational 
evidence is a matter left to the court’s discretion.”  (People v. 
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 47, citing People v. Lucas (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 415, 466.)  The trial court reasonably concluded that 
Dworak had not laid a sufficient foundation for this evidence, 
and we find no abuse of discretion in its decision to exclude the 
evidence. 
C.  Exclusion of Newspaper Articles 
During Dworak’s first interview with the detectives in this 
matter, Detective Debbie Rubright told Dworak that they were 
investigating a crime that occurred two years ago involving a 
vehicle that matched a description of his car.  She emphasized 
it was “still an ongoing investigation” so they would “only 
release a little bit of information as possible” during the 
interview.  One of the detectives then showed Dworak a picture 
of Hamilton and asked whether he recognized her or had seen 
her in April 2001.  Dworak asked, “How old is she?”  Detective 
Melissa Smith replied, “I think she’s 19.  She would have been.”  
Dworak then stated, “She would have been.”  Shortly thereafter, 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
Detective Rubright stated that they were going to continue 
investigating the crime, to which Dworak replied, “Well, yes it 
is if you have a deceased victim.  Yeah, it something you guys 
are gonna [sic] continue as long as it takes.”  The transcript of 
the interview does not include any prior statement by the 
detectives that they were investigating a homicide.  The 
prosecutor relied on this statement in her closing argument, 
referring to it as a “one of the absolutely best pieces of evidence 
in this case” and “an admission” of guilt because the detectives 
had not yet told Dworak that the victim was dead.   
After the close of evidence from both parties, Dworak 
moved to introduce into evidence three newspaper articles from 
April 2001 concerning Hamilton’s death.  Dworak argued the 
articles were relevant to explain his statement to the detectives 
that the victim was deceased because it was a “matter of 
common knowledge throughout the county of Ventura” that 
Hamilton had died, and that the coroner had concluded her 
death was a homicide.  The trial court denied the motion, 
agreeing with the prosecutor that Dworak had not laid a proper 
foundation for the evidence.   
We agree with the trial court that Dworak made no offer 
of proof that he had read the articles before he was interviewed 
by the detectives.  Without this foundation, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that had not been 
shown to have any probative value.  (Evid. Code, §§ 403, 352; cf. 
People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 360 [affirming exclusion of 
newspaper articles offered to show that a witness contrived his 
testimony based on news reports when there was no evidence 
the witness had seen the articles].)  As we have previously 
explained, application of the ordinary rules of evidence — here, 
the requirement to lay a proper foundation — does not 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
“impermissibly infringe on defendant’s right to present a 
defense.”  (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 725, citing 
People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1178.) 
D.  Evidence of Other Crimes 
As noted, the trial court admitted evidence of Dworak’s 
prior convictions for sexual offenses under Evidence Code 
section 1108, a ruling we review for abuse of discretion.  (People 
v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 824.)  Dworak 
challenged the admissibility of this evidence below, and he 
renews those arguments on appeal.  He also contends for the 
first time on appeal that the jury was improperly instructed on 
the relevance of this evidence.  We reject these claims. 
1.  Admissibility 
As a general rule, “propensity evidence is not admissible 
to prove a defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion.”  (People v. 
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299; see Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. 
(a).)  But Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) provides 
an exception to this rule:  “In a criminal action in which the 
defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is 
not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not 
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”  Evidence Code section 
352, in turn, provides that “[t]he court in its discretion may 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 
misleading the jury.”  “In short, if evidence satisfies section 
1108, and is not excluded under section 352, admission of that 
evidence to prove propensity is permitted.”  (People v. Molano 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 664, citing People v. Daveggio and 
Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 823.)  As a reviewing court, we 
accord deference to a trial court’s determination that the 
probative value of a particular piece of evidence outweighs any 
danger of prejudice.  (See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 
587, 587–588 [“ ‘[T]he court has broad discretion under Evidence 
Code section 352’ ” and reviewing courts “ ‘ “will not disturb a 
trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 
352 ‘ “except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion 
in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that 
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice” ’ ” ’ ”].)   
Dworak was accused of the sexual offense of rape and with 
the special circumstance of murder in the commission of rape.  
Under Evidence Code section 1108, evidence of his prior sexual 
offenses was not inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101 
to show Dworak’s propensity to commit the sexual offense of 
which he was charged and upon which the murder charge and 
the special circumstance allegations were based, so long as the 
evidence was not inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352.  
We have previously rejected the argument raised here by 
Dworak that admission of prior crimes under Evidence Code 
section 1108 violates the constitutional right to due process and 
a fair trial.  (See, e.g., People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 
415.) 
“By reason of [Evidence Code] section 1108, trial courts 
may no longer deem ‘propensity’ evidence unduly prejudicial per 
se,” but trial courts “must engage in a careful weighing process 
under [Evidence Code] section 352.”  (People v. Falsetta (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 903, 916, 917 (Falsetta).)  It is this discretion to 
exclude propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 352 
that “saves section 1108 from defendant’s due process 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
challenge.”  (Falsetta, at p. 917.)  The admissibility of such 
evidence “ ‘is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge 
who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence.’ ”  (Id. at 
pp. 917–918.)  We have instructed that the trial court’s 
determination should be guided by such factors as the “nature, 
relevance, and possible remoteness” of the evidence, “the degree 
of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, 
misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its 
similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on 
the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the 
uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial 
alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some 
but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or excluding 
irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the 
offense.”  (Id. at p. 917.) 
As Dworak acknowledges, the prior offenses at issue were 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, and the 
trial court’s inquiry appropriately emphasized that the degree 
of certainty that Dworak committed the prior crime was high, 
given that he was convicted of that crime.  Nor is there any 
serious contention that the evidence was not probative on the 
question of whether he committed a sexual offense in this 
instance.  The trial court accordingly concluded that the 
evidence was not likely to “mislead or in any way confuse this 
jury in terms of what it’s being admitted for.”  In fact, the trial 
court declined to admit evidence of a different prior sexual 
offense — an alleged attempted rape — due to lack of certainty 
that Dworak committed that crime, noting that such evidence 
would distract jurors from the main inquiry by turning the trial 
into a mini-trial on the alleged prior offense.   
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
Instead, Dworak contends the trial court erred in its 
assessment of other factors set forth in Falsetta, including the 
remoteness of the crimes, the degree of similarity, the 
prejudicial impact of the evidence on the jurors, and potential 
for confusing or misleading the jury, and thereby abused its 
discretion in allowing the evidence.   
In assessing the remoteness of the crimes, the trial court 
said Dworak “spent nine years in prison following his conviction 
for that rape offense and had been released on parole for just a 
matter of   is it three or four years in this particular case before 
the offense occurred?” to which the district attorney confirmed 
“not quite four.”  Dworak argues the trial court overlooked the 
two years he had been off probation before the charged offense 
was committed.  It is possible that the trial court misunderstood 
the timeline and failed to note that some time had passed during 
which Dworak was neither incarcerated nor on probation.  It is 
also possible that this level of nuance was lost in the court’s 
explanation of its tentative ruling.  In either case, we find no 
error on the basis of the court’s remoteness inquiry.  In People 
v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, the court found a gap of 23 
years to be “a long time” and therefore to weigh in favor of 
exclusion.  (Id. at p. 739.)  But Harris observed that the 
“ ‘staleness’ of an offense is generally relevant if and only if the 
defendant has led a blameless life in the interim.”  (Ibid.)  
Dworak was incarcerated or on parole for the prior offenses for 
the bulk of the time between the two incidents.  (See People v. 
Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 62 [crimes committed 15 and 21 years 
before the charged offense were not so remote as to require 
exclusion where defendant had been in prison for much of the 
intervening time]; People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 
900 [finding no error in admitting a 23-year-old rape conviction 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
where the defendant had been incarcerated for 12 of those 
years].) 
Dworak contends that the two incidents were similar only 
if the jury were to agree with the prosecutor that Hamilton was 
raped.  In addition, he notes a number of factual differences 
between the two acts:  Cynthia W. was older than Dworak, and 
the incident took place outside her home and involved the use of 
a knife.  By contrast, Hamilton was younger than Dworak, and 
there is no specific evidence as to where the crime took place or 
whether a knife or other weapon was used.  The proper focus of 
the trial court’s inquiry is on the type of sex offense at issue 
(here, forcible rape), and differences in the manner in which the 
acts were committed or in the characteristics of the victims, 
while potentially relevant, are not dispositive.  (See People v. 
Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 63 [“ ‘[T]he charged and uncharged 
crimes need not be sufficiently similar that evidence of the latter 
would be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, 
otherwise Evidence Code section 1108 would serve no purpose.  
It is enough the charged and uncharged offenses are sex offenses 
as defined in section 1108.’ ”]; People v. Earle (2009) 172 
Cal.App.4th 372, 397 [propensity evidence must tend to show 
“that the defendant is predisposed to engage in conduct of the 
type charged” (italics omitted)].)  The points raised by Dworak 
are relevant to the trial court’s exercise of discretion, but they 
are not enough to show that the trial court abused its discretion. 
As to the potential for undue prejudice and the likelihood 
of confusion, the trial court observed that “the evidence of the 
rape of Cynthia W. is certainly less inflammatory than the 
evidence that’s to be received in this case concerning the alleged 
rape and murder of Crystal Hamilton.”  Dworak contends that 
Cynthia W.’s testimony was itself prejudicial — more so than 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
the fact of the convictions — as it required the jury to “hear 
Cynthia W. relive her assault when she thought it was all over 
and done with and had put it in the back of her mind.”  But the 
trial court considered this argument and took care to limit the 
scope of her testimony.  Dworak makes the related contention 
that the trial court erred by failing to consider the availability 
of less prejudicial alternatives.  Defense counsel asked the court 
to use the fact of the prior convictions and prison sentence to 
prove the offenses rather than allow Cynthia W. to testify.  But 
the trial court addressed this consideration by excluding 
medical evidence about the extent of Cynthia W.’s injuries and 
by carefully managing the extent of the prosecution’s 
questioning.  The potential for undue prejudice was also likely 
diminished by the trial court’s provision of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 
to the jury both directly before and directly after the former 
victim’s testimony.  (See post, at pp. 26–28.)     
Finally, Dworak argues the jury may have been confused 
or distracted by a motivation to further punish him for his 
crimes against Cynthia W. because the jury knew he had served 
only nine years of his 18-year sentence for those crimes, a point 
emphasized by the prosecutor during her closing argument.  
Dworak did not raise this concern in the trial court; in fact, while 
arguing about the type of evidence that should be permitted 
regarding the crimes against Cynthia W., defense counsel 
acknowledged, “The fact that Mr. Dworak spent time in prison 
for that conviction is appropriate.”  In Falsetta, we explained 
that “the prejudicial impact of the evidence is reduced if the 
uncharged offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison 
term, ensuring that the jury would not be tempted to convict the 
defendant simply to punish him for the other offenses, and that 
the jury’s attention would not be diverted by having to make a 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
separate determination whether defendant committed the other 
offenses.”  (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917, italics omitted.)  
The fact of Dworak’s release on parole might have been relevant 
to the Evidence Code section 352 inquiry if Dworak had raised 
it at the time.  But it would not have precluded the trial court 
from finding the prior crimes evidence more probative than 
prejudicial.   
In sum, we cannot say that the trial court’s approach, even 
if not the only approach available, was an abuse of discretion. 
2.  Instructional Claim 
Dworak also contends that the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.01 before and after 
Cynthia W.’s testimony.  As given, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 provided 
in relevant part:  “If you find that the defendant committed a 
prior sexual offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that 
the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual offenses.  If 
you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but 
are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did 
commit the crimes of which he is accused.  [¶]  However, if you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
prior sexual offenses, that is not sufficient by itself to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged 
crimes.  If you determine an inference properly can be drawn 
from this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to 
consider, along with all other evidence ultimately received in 
this trial, in determining whether the defendant has been 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes.  
[¶]  Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider 
this evidence for any other purpose.”   
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
Dworak objects to the reference to “charged crimes,” in the 
plural, because the prosecutor offered two theories of first 
degree murder — felony-murder in the commission of rape and 
malice murder — and the evidence could not permissibly be 
considered for the latter offense.  As explained in People v. 
Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, “murder, standing alone 
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), is not one of the offenses 
enumerated in [Evidence Code] section 1108” for which prior 
sexual offenses may be admitted, and first degree murder under 
a malice murder theory does not “involve as one of its necessary 
adjudicated elements deriving sexual pleasure or gratification 
from inflicting death, bodily injury or physical pain on his 
victim.”  (Id. at pp. 798, 802.)  In other words, while propensity 
evidence of prior sexual offenses can be considered in 
determining whether a defendant has committed felony murder 
where the underlying felony was a sexual offense (People v. 
Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1294), such evidence cannot be 
used to infer that a defendant has committed a murder without 
an underlying sexual offense (Walker, at p. 798).  On this basis, 
Dworak argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
evidence of his prior sexual offenses may be used to find that he 
“was likely to commit and did commit the crimes of which he is 
accused [which includes malice murder].”  (CALJIC No. 
2.50.01.)   
Assuming Dworak did not forfeit this claim by failing to 
object at trial and thereby provide the trial court an opportunity 
to consider whether a modification to the instruction might be 
appropriate (see People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 309; 
People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012), he still 
cannot show prejudice.  The jury found Dworak guilty of rape 
and found the rape-murder special circumstance to be true.  
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
Thus, the jury necessarily found him guilty of felony-murder — 
an offense for which the proffered evidence could properly be 
considered.   
E.  Testimony Regarding Susannah Dworak 
Over Dworak’s objection, the court permitted two 
witnesses to testify to the demeanor of Dworak’s wife, 
Susannah, around the time of Hamilton’s death, from which the 
prosecutor argued it could be inferred that Dworak and his wife 
had fought and that Dworak was angry and sexually frustrated 
the weekend Hamilton died, leading him to seek nonconsensual 
sex. 
The office administrator for the oral surgery group where 
Susannah worked testified that Susannah did not work on 
Friday, April 20.  She further testified that Susannah called in 
that day to say she was taking a vacation day and would not be 
in to work, and that Susannah was “upset” and “crying” during 
that call.  A second coworker testified that she, Susannah, and 
two other employees attended a job certification conference that 
weekend in Irvine.  This coworker testified that Susannah was 
“quite upset,” adding that “[Susannah] had a rough day Friday, 
evidently, and she was, you know, very upset, very emotional, 
and she showed signs of that.”   
The testimony from Susannah’s coworkers linked the 
prosecutor’s theory that Dworak sought nonconsensual sex the 
night of Hamilton’s murder with his own statements to 
investigators that when he and Susannah were not getting 
along, he would become sexually frustrated and would seek out 
sexual encounters.  The prosecutor relied on this testimony 
during closing argument to characterize Dworak as “angry,” 
adding that “you know that he and his wife got in a huge fight 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
that weekend” and that Susannah “called in to work, crying and 
upset,” and was upset the whole weekend.  The prosecutor 
continued, “And suddenly, [Dworak’s] anger at his wife, his 
complaints about how he doesn’t get to do anything and his glee 
about his wife being out of town, talking . . .  about how when 
the cat’s away, the mouse can play, suddenly, that all makes 
much more sense.  He’s got the motive.  He’s got the desire.  And 
now he’s got the opportunity to do what he did to Crystal 
Hamilton.”  The prosecutor returned to the same point 
repeatedly in her argument.   
Dworak objected to this testimony on the grounds that it 
was 
irrelevant 
and 
more 
prejudicial 
than 
probative.  
Specifically, Dworak argues there was no evidence as to the 
reason why Susannah was upset.  But Dworak’s own statements 
to investigators that he and Susannah were having marital 
problems around the time of Hamilton’s death, that Susannah 
was “just a raging bitch basically,” and that they were fighting 
“all the time,” as well as his neighbor’s testimony that Dworak 
regularly complained that Susannah nagged him and was 
“riding his case,” provided a basis from which the jury could 
rationally infer that Susannah was upset because she and 
Dworak had been fighting and that Dworak therefore had a 
motive to seek nonconsensual sex on the weekend of Hamilton’s 
death.  In light of this other evidence and the prosecutor’s case 
as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding 
this testimony — consisting of five lines of testimony from two 
minor witnesses — more probative than prejudicial. 
F.  Testimony from Victim’s Father  
Dworak contends the trial court erred in permitting the 
prosecutor to elicit testimony from the victim’s father, 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, about her future plans in 
violation of state evidentiary rules and his confrontation right 
under the federal Constitution.  We conclude that the trial court 
properly admitted the evidence under the exception to the 
hearsay rule set forth in Evidence Code section 1250. 
During Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton’s testimony, the 
prosecutor asked whether Crystal had spoken to him about her 
future.  Dworak objected, and a hearing was held at sidebar.  
The prosecutor explained that based on Dworak’s opening 
statement that Hamilton was neither raped nor murdered, “it 
appears as though there will be an implication that this could 
have been either a suicide or an accidental death wherein 
Crystal wandered off out into the ocean or did something to — 
that amounts to taking her own life.”  The trial court overruled 
Dworak’s hearsay objection, explaining that such testimony 
“would certainly be probative if in fact she is discussing with her 
dad future plans to either continue her education or other 
career-related activities, things of that nature which would 
suggest that she would not be a person, as far as [Lieutenant] 
Colonel Hamilton might know, that might be inclined to do 
something to hurt herself.”  Defense counsel then clarified that 
it was “never the intent of the defense in this matter to raise any 
kind of issue that this young lady committed suicide, never.”  
The trial court responded that it expected any testimony 
regarding Crystal’s future plans to be very brief, and the 
prosecutor agreed.     
In front of the jury, Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton was 
again asked whether, in April 2001, Hamilton spoke of her 
intentions in the “near future.”  He answered, “There were a 
couple of things she was looking at.  One longer range was 
college.  A shorter range, something in the medical field, and she 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
thought perhaps the Air Force, air evacuation, flight nurse 
basically.”  Dworak never raised any suggestion Hamilton’s 
death may have been the result of suicide, but the prosecutor 
nevertheless returned to that point in her closing argument:  
“This girl had been talking about going to college.  She had been 
talking about joining the Air Force, maybe becoming a nurse in 
the Air Force, who spent all Saturday trying to call her dad to 
come get her and who does get in touch with her dad to come get 
her.  She tells Matt she’s going to be leaving soon.  She wants to 
go home.  Suddenly she decides to end it all?”   
There is some ambiguity in the record as to the basis upon 
which the trial court admitted this evidence.  After defendant 
objected on relevance and hearsay grounds, the prosecutor 
argued that Dworak was “going to attempt to prove this was no 
murder” and that the prosecution was “entitled to present 
evidence [in response] that this is not a girl who’s planning on 
taking her own life.  She made plans about going to college, 
getting a job, joining the military.  She was a normal, happy 
kid.”  Defense counsel responded, “It’s hearsay,” and the 
prosecutor replied, “Statement of intention.”  These comments 
indicate that the prosecutor sought admission of the statements 
under the Evidence Code section 1250 hearsay exception, which 
applies to “a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of 
mind . . . including a statement of intent,” (id., subd. (a)) in order 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., Hamilton “made 
plans about going to college, getting a job, joining the military.”  
The trial court overruled the objection, explaining that the 
evidence “would certainly be probative if in fact she is discussing 
with her dad future plans to either continue her education or 
other career-related activities, things of that nature which 
would suggest that she would not be a person, as far as 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
[Lieutenant] Colonel Hamilton might know, that might be 
inclined to do something to hurt herself.”  The prosecutor during 
closing argument relied twice on the truth of Hamilton’s 
statements, describing Hamilton as “[a] young girl with her 
whole life ahead of her who’s thinking about joining the Air 
Force, going off to college.” Other statements in her closing 
argument adhere more closely to the limited view of the 
evidence; for example, the prosecutor argued against any idea 
that Hamilton’s death was an accident or suicide, asserting 
“[t]his girl had been talking about going to college [and] about 
joining the Air Force, maybe becoming a nurse in the Air Force.”   
Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a) provides in 
relevant part that “evidence of a statement of the declarant’s 
then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation 
(including a statement of intent, plan . . . ) is not made 
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is 
offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or 
physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is 
itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to 
prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” “If offered to 
prove the declarant’s state of mind, the statement may be 
introduced without limitation, subject only to [Evidence Code] 
section 352.”  (People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377, citing 
People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 622.) 
Although the record is not as clear as it might be, it 
appears the trial court admitted the evidence under the hearsay 
exception set forth in Evidence Code section 1250.  There is no 
error here, as Hamilton’s state of mind was fairly at issue to the 
extent there may have been some question as to whether she 
committed suicide.  Her statements to her father regarding 
future plans, to the extent they were true, were probative of her 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
disinclination to commit suicide.  Under the hearsay exception 
set forth in Evidence Code section 1250, the statements were 
admissible as to their truth, and the prosecutor was entitled to 
rely on the truth of the statements in his closing argument. 
Evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1250 is 
subject to the limitation set forth in section 1252, which 
provides:  “Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this 
article if the statement was made under circumstances such as 
to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.”  “A statement is 
trustworthy within the meaning of section 1252 of the Evidence 
Code when it is ‘ “made in a natural manner, and not under 
circumstances of suspicion.” ’ ”  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 804, 844, quoting People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 
778–779.)  As in Harris, there is no indication that the 
statements at issue were made under coercion or “with an intent 
to deceive.”  (Harris, at p. 844.)  We find no abuse of the court’s 
discretion in allowing this brief testimony regarding Hamilton’s 
statements of her future plans. 
In addition to his state law evidentiary claim, Dworak 
contends that the trial court’s erroneous admission of this 
hearsay testimony violated his right to confrontation and due 
process under the federal Constitution.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 
14th Amends.)  Because the statements were admitted for their 
truth, the confrontation clause right as articulated in Crawford 
v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, is implicated.  As 
Crawford explained, “admission of testimonial statements of a 
witness who did not appear at trial” is not permitted unless the 
witness “was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  (Ibid.)  The issue 
was not litigated below; however, there is no evidence indicating 
that the statements were “testimonial” hearsay as the United 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
States Supreme Court has delineated that term.  Hamilton’s 
statements “were not made to law enforcement officers, nor were 
they otherwise made under circumstances suggesting a primary 
purpose of creating evidence for defendant’s prosecution.”  
(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1217.)  The statements 
were therefore not testimonial and do not implicate the 
confrontation right. 
Even if we were to assume error, it would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The testimony at issue comprised 
just 13 lines of testimony.  Dworak notes only two instances in 
which the prosecutor referred to this evidence during her closing 
argument; in each case, it was coupled with other evidence 
suggesting Hamilton did not intend to harm herself, including 
her repeated telephone calls to her father to secure a ride home.  
Moreover, the pathology evidence showing evidence of 
premortem wounds, coupled with expert testimony that 
Hamilton’s death followed shortly from intercourse with 
Dworak, belies any notion that her death was self-inflicted.  We 
see no reasonable possibility that the jury would have returned 
a verdict more favorable to Dworak without this brief testimony. 
G.  Alleged Instructional Error  
Dworak contends that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt evidenced by 
willfully false statements.  We reject the claim. 
The court instructed the jury with the language of CALJIC 
No. 2.03:  “If you find that before this trial the defendant made 
a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning 
the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider 
that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a 
consciousness of guilt.  However, that conduct is not sufficient 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, 
are for you to decide.”  Although Dworak lodged a blanket 
objection to all instructions as given, he made no specific 
objection to this instruction.   
Dworak contends that this instruction improperly 
duplicated more general circumstantial evidence instructions, 
was unfairly partisan and argumentative, permitted the jury to 
draw an irrational inference about his guilt, and intruded upon 
the jury’s factfinding function.  Dworak acknowledges that we 
have rejected substantially similar challenges.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 653 [collecting cases].)  
Even assuming the argument is not forfeited, Dworak offers no 
persuasive reason for us to reconsider these conclusions.   
H.  Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Dworak contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
denigrating defense counsel and witnesses.  We reject this claim. 
During her closing argument, the prosecutor addressed 
the opinion from the defense expert, Dr. Bux, that Hamilton was 
not raped.  She described Dr. Bux as a “hired mouthpiece, really, 
who would say what they pay him to say,” characterized his 
opinion as one “bought by the defense,” and added that “[f]or 
$3,600, defendant bought an outrageous, antiquated and 
preposterous opinion about rape.”  Further, in mentioning the 
fact that Dr. Bux agreed Hamilton suffered injuries premortem 
yet said he did not see evidence of a violent struggle, the 
prosecutor said:  “Well, I guess for $3,600, people will say 
contradictory things.”  Dworak’s counsel objected to the first and 
third of these statements, but the trial court overruled both 
objections on the ground that counsel has wide latitude in 
argument.   
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
In response to the prosecutor’s statements, Dworak’s 
counsel declared in his closing argument:  “I know that the 
prosecution did not mean to imply that Mr. Farley, Ms. Duffy, 
or I committed a grade one felony when we called Dr. Bux on the 
phone and said, ‘Dr. Bux, for $3,600, would you please come out 
from Colorado to Ventura to spoon-feed perjury to a jury?’  
Ladies and gentlemen, that’s a serious felony, suborning 
perjury.  And we don’t do that.”   
“ ‘ “To preserve a misconduct claim for review on appeal, a 
defendant must make a timely objection and ask the trial court 
to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper 
remarks or conduct, unless an admonition would not have cured 
the harm.” ’ ”  (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 480.)  
Although Dworak made timely objections to two of the 
statements at issue, he did not request an admonition of the 
jury.  Dworak argues that requesting an admonition would have 
been futile and therefore was unnecessary to preserve this issue 
for review.  The “general rule” requiring objection and request 
for admonition to preserve a misconduct claim does not “apply 
when the trial court promptly overrules an objection and the 
defendant has no opportunity to request an admonition.”  
(People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1001.)  This 
exception applies to both the “hired mouthpiece” and 
“outrageous, antiquated and preposterous opinion” statements 
made by the prosecutor about Dr. Brux set forth above.  Dworak 
did not object to the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “bought by 
the defense” or “contradictory statements,” both of which 
occurred close in time to the statements Dworak did object to.  
For that reason, we will assume for the sake of argument that 
the entirety of this claim is properly presented.  Even so, we 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
conclude that the statements at issue do not amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct.   
“ ‘ “Under the federal Constitution, a prosecutor commits 
reversible misconduct only if the conduct infects the trial with 
such ‘ “unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial 
of due process.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 480.)  Misconduct that falls short of a federal due process 
violation may nevertheless violate state law if it “involves the 
use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court 
or jury.”  (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1031.)  In 
evaluating such a claim, we are cognizant that “ ‘[a] prosecutor 
is given wide latitude to vigorously argue his or her case and to 
make fair comment upon the evidence, including reasonable 
inferences or deductions that may be drawn from the evidence.’ ”  
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 768.)  We review claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of discretion 
standard (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 213), asking 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the 
remarks in an objectionable fashion (People v. Edwards (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 658, 734). 
Dworak contends that the prosecutor’s statements 
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because “she suggested 
to the jury it should in effect disregard Dr. Bux’s testimony 
because defense counsel had paid him to say what counsel 
wanted him to say.”  We rejected a similar claim in  People v. 
Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 614.  In Cook, the prosecutor 
commented on the fees paid to a defense expert witness, stating 
“ ‘for 124 hours at $225 per hour, Dr. Wilkinson comes up with 
something that excuses this man’s responsibility.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 613.)  The defendant argued that this statement “impugn[ed] 
defense counsel’s integrity for having, in effect, bought the 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
expert’s testimony.”  (Id. at pp. 613–614.)  Although the claim 
was forfeited by the defendant’s failure to object at trial, we went 
on to explain that “although counsel may not denigrate the 
integrity of opposing counsel, an attorney is free to argue that 
the opinions of paid expert witnesses may be biased.”  (Id. at p. 
614; see also People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 360 [“a 
prosecutor ‘is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may 
accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the 
evidence, that a witness’s testimony is unbelievable, unsound, 
or even a patent “lie” ’ ”].)  Similarly here, it is not likely that the 
jury took the prosecutor’s statements regarding the expert 
witness’s payment to mean defense counsel lacks integrity 
because he paid an expert to say anything he wanted.   
Dworak relies on People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97 for 
the proposition that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to argue 
that defense counsel fabricated a defense and procured a 
witness’s perjury.  But the prosecutor’s actions here stopped 
short of the actions in McLain, where the prosecutor outright 
stated defense counsel shopped around and found somebody 
willing to come in and lie.  (McLain, at p. 112.)  The prosecutor 
did use hyperbolic language in calling the expert a “hired 
mouthpiece,” but we have said that using colorful or hyperbolic 
language generally will not by itself establish prosecutorial 
misconduct.  (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 793.)   
I.  Review of Sealed Material  
Before and during trial, the court denied Dworak access to 
a witness’s medical records following an in camera review.  
Dworak now asks this court to review those records to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying him 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
discovery of the records.  We find no error in the trial court’s 
ruling. 
1.  Background 
As discussed, Dworak’s neighbor testified about her 
interactions with Dworak in April 2001.  Before trial, the 
prosecutor moved to exclude evidence relating to the witness’s 
treatment for Vicodin addiction at a treatment hospital in 
November 2004.  Dworak subpoenaed all of the witness’s 
psychological and psychiatric records from the hospital in order 
to determine whether the severity of her addiction would have 
affected her ability to perceive and recollect events from that 
time period.  The court agreed that such evidence would be 
relevant and ordered the hospital to deliver the records under 
seal to the court.   
After reviewing the records, the trial court ruled that 
Dworak was not entitled to pretrial discovery of the records.  
Citing People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 (Hammon), the 
court balanced Dworak’s right to cross-examination against the 
privacy interest in those medical records and concluded that 
disclosure was not warranted at that time, saying that while 
“there may be a very slight bit of information that would be of 
assistance to [Dworak] in this matter[,] . . . I can’t 
overemphasize how slight that information is.”  The court added 
that it would revisit the issue depending on the scope of 
Dworak’s opening statement and his cross-examination of the 
witness. 
During the cross-examination of this witness, defense 
counsel asked, “With regard to the Vicodin that you were taking 
at the time that you had this conversation with Mr. Dworak in 
which he stated that he had been out in Ventura in 2001, with 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
regard to the strength of the Vicodin, do you recall what the 
strength was, the milligrams?”  She replied, “Five milligrams, 
between five and 7.5.” Based on this testimony, Dworak renewed 
his request for access to the records.  The court denied the 
request, explaining that “having heard the testimony of the 
witness now and also the opening statements of both sides, the 
Court’s view is that the material that is contained in the records 
themselves is of such slight value to the defense in terms of 
cross-examination of the witness that it is not — that in 
balancing the right of the defense to her right of privacy, it is 
not something that would be discoverable under the facts of this 
case since it is apparently the stipulation between the parties 
that there was, in fact, sexual intercourse between Mr. Dworak 
and the decedent in this matter.”  The trial court later held an 
in camera hearing outside the presence of the jury and counsel 
regarding these records, the transcript of which was ordered 
sealed.   
2.  Discussion 
Dworak does not contest the trial court’s decision to review 
the psychological and psychiatric records at issue in camera, 
acknowledging that Evidence Code section 1014 generally 
privileges confidential communication between a patient and 
his or her psychotherapist.  (Cf. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1127–1128 
[psychiatric 
material 
is 
not 
generally 
discoverable prior to trial]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
557, 592 [same].)  Instead, Dworak contends that this court 
should independently review the records to determine whether 
the trial court abused its discretion when it did not provide him 
with access to these records.  The Attorney General does not 
object to this request, although both parties request an 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
opportunity to provide supplemental briefing if the court finds 
any error.   
“Parties who challenge on appeal trial court orders 
withholding 
information 
as 
privileged 
or 
otherwise 
nondiscoverable ‘must do the best they can with the information 
they have, and the appellate court will fill the gap by objectively 
reviewing the whole record.’ ”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 
324, 493; see People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 74.)  We have 
reviewed the records and agree with the trial court’s assessment 
that they contain little of any plausible value to the defense.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting disclosure of 
the materials.   
J.  Guilt Phase Cumulative Error 
Dworak asserts that the combined errors during the guilt 
phase warrant reversal of his conviction.  With respect to the 
guilt phase, we have assumed for sake of argument that the trial 
court’s instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 erroneously 
permitted the jury to consider the evidence of Dworak’s prior 
sexual assault conviction as propensity evidence as to the 
nonsexual offense of malice murder.  Having found no prejudice 
from this assumed error, we reject Dworak’s cumulative error 
claim. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE CLAIMS 
A.  Evidence and Argument Regarding Lack of 
Remorse  
Dworak claims the trial court erred by allowing evidence 
and argument suggesting Dworak lacked remorse for the 
crimes.  The prosecutor arguably crossed the line by briefly 
arguing that evidence of lack of remorse constituted aggravating 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
evidence in this matter.  But we need not resolve the latter 
question because any error was harmless. 
Before the penalty phase, Dworak moved to exclude any 
evidence suggesting he lacked remorse.  The trial court 
tentatively denied the motion with respect to “acts or conduct at 
the immediate scene of the crime . . . versus post-crime evidence” 
but cautioned the prosecutor that “argument in this area can 
become a mine field.”   
During the prosecutor’s case in aggravation, she solicited 
testimony from Dworak’s mother-in-law (over Dworak’s 
objection on the ground of relevance) that she saw Dworak 
“laugh and joke and be happy between April of 2001 [when 
Hamilton was killed] and July 2003 [when Dworak was 
arrested].”  In a similar vein, the prosecutor asked Dworak’s 
wife, “Did you ever in between April 22nd of 2001 and July of 
2003 see any sign of what you would call remorse in your 
husband.”  The trial court sustained Dworak’s objection on the 
ground of speculation.  The prosecutor repeatedly referred to 
this evidence during her closing argument to suggest Dworak 
lacked remorse for the crimes.  
We have routinely held that evidence of lack of remorse is 
admissible so long as it does not amount to a direct or indirect 
comment on the defendant’s invocation of the right to silence.  
(People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674; People v. Bemore 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 855; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
1017, 1067–1068, revd. on another ground sub nom. Stansbury 
v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318.)  Dworak asks us to reconsider 
those decisions but provides no reasoned basis for us to do so.  
We adhere to our prior decisions and find no error in admitting 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
the testimony elicited by the prosecutor during cross 
examination of Dworak’s wife and mother-in-law. 
But Dworak also claims the prosecutor overstepped by 
relying on evidence during closing argument as an aggravating 
factor.  Lack of remorse is not a statutory aggravating factor.  (§ 
190.3; see People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 398, 449, overruled 
on another point in People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263, 
fn. 14.)  As a result, a prosecutor may not argue lack of remorse 
as an aggravating factor at the penalty phase.  (People v. Dalton 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 264.)  The prosecutor may, however, point 
to a defendant’s lack of remorse for the purpose of 
demonstrating the absence of a mitigating factor.  (See People v. 
Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771.) 
Some of the prosecutor’s comments suggesting a lack of 
remorse were offered in the appropriate context of negating the 
existence of certain mitigating factors.  For example, the 
prosecutor permissibly referred to the testimony of Dworak’s 
wife and mother-in-law on how “wonderful and happy-go-lucky 
the defendant was” to demonstrate a lack of mitigating section 
190.3,  factor (d) evidence, i.e., whether the defendant 
committed the crime while under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.   
Although prosecutors can argue lack of remorse and point 
to facts in the record that show the defendant was not 
remorseful, they must take care not to suggest that lack of 
remorse can be considered in aggravation.  Other comments 
from the prosecutor appeared to argue a lack of remorse as 
evidence in aggravation.  For example, after explaining to the 
jury that she was transitioning to evidence in aggravation, the 
prosecutor returned to the point that “while Crystal Hamilton’s 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
father is making that awful phone call to her grandparents 
telling them what had happened to her, the defendant is in Oak 
View playing checkers with his mother-in-law telling jokes.”   
More troubling, the prosecutor alluded to defendant’s lack 
of remorse during his interview with detectives two years after 
the crime as part of her argument regarding her case in 
aggravation:  “Two years later when the police talk to him about 
his crime, when they show him a picture of her, what does he 
do?  Does he break down sobbing and apologizing for what he’s 
done?  For what happened that night?  Does he admit everything 
that we know he did to her but explain it in some way, give some 
explanation that mitigates what he did to her?  No, no, no, no.  
He lies and lies.  Turns on the manipulation, turns on the charm, 
’cause that’s his character.”  Dworak did not raise any objections 
to the statements made by the prosecutor when discussing 
evidence in aggravation.   
In the absence of prejudice to the fairness of a trial, a 
prosecutor’s errant remarks do not require reversal.  (People v. 
Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214.)  “[B]efore a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able 
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  Here, 
we need not resolve whether the prosecutor’s statements rise to 
the level of prosecutorial misconduct because we find no 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury’s death 
verdict.  The bulk of the prosecutor’s case in aggravation 
concerned other evidence in support of a death verdict, including 
the circumstances of the crime and Dworak’s prior instances of 
violent criminal conduct including rape and forcible sexual 
penetration with use of a knife.  In the context of the prosecutor’s 
argument as a whole, the passing comments about the 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
defendant’s conduct and demeanor in the time period following 
the crime did not compromise the fairness of the trial.  (See 
People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 554 [harmless 
misconduct where prosecutor’s remarks “were brief and fleeting, 
asserting nothing the evidence did not already suggest”].)  We 
conclude that any error in this line of argument was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B.  Victim Impact Evidence  
As noted, the prosecutor presented victim impact 
testimony about the effect of Hamilton’s death on her family as 
evidence of the circumstances of the capital crime (§ 190.3, 
factor (a)) and about the effect of Dworak’s acts on Cynthia W. 
as evidence of use of force and violence and prior felony 
conviction (id., factors (b), (c)).  Dworak does not contend that 
the evidence offered here was especially inflammatory or beyond 
the bounds of what we have generally recognized is permissible 
penalty phase evidence.  Instead, he presents three general 
challenges to the admission of victim impact evidence at the 
penalty phase of the trial, asking us to reconsider our prior 
rejection of those claims in order to preserve the issues for later 
federal review.  (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 
303.)   
First, Dworak argues that victim impact testimony must 
be limited to witnesses who were present at the crime.  Second, 
he argues that victim impact testimony must be limited to 
characteristics of the victim known to the defendant at the time 
of the crime or those that reasonably should be known.  And 
third, he argues that victim impact testimony must be restricted 
to testimony relating to the victim of the capital crime.  We have 
repeatedly rejected each of these claims.  (See, e.g., People v. 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 73 [questioning whether evidence 
of the circumstances of a noncapital crime and its direct 
aftermath on the victim of that crime constitutes victim impact 
evidence as it is traditionally understood and, in any event, 
finding no error]; see also People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 
1031 [collecting cases].)  Dworak provides no persuasive reason 
to depart from these precedents, and we decline to do so.   
C.  Cumulative Error  
As noted, Dworak asserts that the combined errors during 
the guilt and penalty phase warrant reversal of his conviction, 
his death sentence, or both.  Reviewing both the guilt and 
penalty phase claims, we have assumed for sake of argument 
that the trial court’s guilt phase instruction pursuant to CALJIC 
No. 2.50.01 erroneously permitted the jury to consider the 
evidence of Dworak’s prior sexual assault conviction as 
propensity evidence as to the nonsexual offense of malice 
murder; and we have assumed that the prosecutor erred in her 
penalty phase argument by referring to evidence suggesting a 
lack of remorse as a factor in aggravation.  We conclude that 
their cumulative effect does not rise to the level of prejudice 
necessary to reverse Dworak’s conviction or his sentence. 
D.  Constitutional Challenges to the California 
Death Penalty  
Dworak raises myriad challenges to the constitutionality 
of California’s death penalty regime.  While he acknowledges we 
have consistently found similar claims to be meritless, he 
nevertheless asks us to reconsider our precedent.  We decline to 
do so. 
Dworak contends that California’s capital punishment 
scheme violates the Eighth Amendment because it “fails to 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
provide a meaningful and principled way to distinguish the few 
defendants who are sentenced to death from the vast majority 
who are not.”  We decline to revisit our precedent holding that 
section 190.2 as construed by this court “adequately performs 
the constitutionally mandated narrowing function” (People v. 
D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 308) and that our state death 
penalty statute is not unconstitutional for “failing to require 
intercase proportionality review or disparate sentence review” 
(People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 154).   
Both this court and the high court have held that the 
current application of section 190.3, factor (a), is constitutional.  
(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976; People v. 
Erskine (2019) 7 Cal.5th 279, 303–304; People v. Johnson (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 600, 655; People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 
860.)  “Nor is the death penalty statute unconstitutional for not 
requiring ‘findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
(b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.’ ”  (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 
190, quoting People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235.) 
Though he did not object below, Dworak now argues that 
CALJIC No. 8.85 was constitutionally deficient because it failed 
to delete inapplicable sentencing factors, failed to delineate 
between aggravating and mitigating factors, contained vague 
and ill-defined factors, and limited some mitigating factors with 
adjectives such as “extreme” and “substantial.”  We have 
previously rejected each of Dworak’s arguments regarding 
CALJIC No. 8.85, and he offers no reasoned basis to reconsider 
our prior decisions.  (See People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 
220.) 
PEOPLE v. DWORAK 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
Finally, we decline to reconsider our holding that 
“California’s use of the death penalty does not violate 
international law, the federal Constitution, or the Eighth 
Amendment’s 
prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment in light of ‘evolving standards of decency.’ ”  (People 
v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 590.) 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment.   
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Dworak 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)   
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S135272 
Date Filed:  July 15, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior     
County:  Ventura    
Judge:  Kevin J. McGee    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Diane Nichols, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. 
Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Viet H. 
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Diane Nichols 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2194 
Grass Valley, CA 95945  
(530) 477-7462 
 
Viet H. Nguyen 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., 5th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6125