Case Title: THOMAS E. FINCH V. FARMERS CO-OP OIL COMPANY OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-143

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS E. FINCH V. FARMERS CO-OP OIL COMPANY OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING2005 WY 41109 P.3d 537Case Number: 04-143Decided: 04/11/2005
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
THOMAS 
E. FINCH,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 

SHERIDAN, 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Barbara A. Baker, Sheridan, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Anthony T. Wendtland and Clint A. Langer of Davis & Cannon, 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Wendtland. 

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, DJ., 
Retired.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
 
 
[¶1]      Thomas Finch sued 
his employer Farmers Co-op Oil Company of Sheridan, Wyoming, (Farmers Co-op) alleging several 
causes of action stemming from the termination of his employment.  The district court ruled that Farmers 
Co-op was entitled to summary judgment on all of Mr. Finch's claims.  We affirm.  

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Finch states 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Did 
Employee, Thomas E. Finch, have a contract for employment with Employer, Farmers 
Co-op[,] or was Farmers an "at-will" employer at the time [Mr.] Finch[] began 
his employment with Employer?

 
 

2.                  
Did 
the District Court abuse its discretion by granting a summary judgment motion 
"on all claims" when Employer erroneously set out that Employee did not allege a 
breach of contract claim, when he did in fact allege such a 
claim?

 
 
Farmers 
Co-op phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
1.         Did 
the trial court properly grant summary judgment in favor of Farmers Co-op on Mr. 
Finch's express employment contract claim?  
Would the statute of frauds have precluded such a contract under any 
circumstances anyway?

 
 
2. 
        
Was summary judgment proper concerning Mr. Finch's implied in fact 
contract claim?

 
 
3. 
        
Was summary judgment proper concerning Mr. Finch's promissory estoppel 
claim?

 
 
4. 
        
Is Mr. Finch precluded from arguing that the "at-will" disclaimer in his 
employment application was inconspicuous because he failed to raise that issue 
below?

 
 

5.                  
Was 
summary judgment proper concerning Mr. Finch's bad faith 
claim?

 
 
6. 
        
Was summary judgment proper concerning Mr. Finch's punitive damages 
claim?

 
 
 
 
FACTS 

 
 
[¶3]      In accordance 
with our standard of review, we state the facts in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Finch, as he was the non-moving party.  
See e.g., Honorable v. 
American Wyott Corporation, 11 P.3d 928, 929 (Wyo. 2000); Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Company, Inc., 
1 P.3d 615, 619 (Wyo. 2000).  On 
January 28, 2001, Mr. Finch submitted an application to Farmers Co-op requesting 
a job as a propane truck driver.  
The application contained a paragraph expressly stating that any future 
employment with Farmers Co-op would be "at will."  Farmers Co-op hired Mr. Finch as a 
propane truck driver and he received a copy of the company's 1996 employment 
manual.    

 
 
[¶4]      During the first 
week of February 2002, Mr. Finch's supervisor, Dennis Nelson, offered him a 
promotion to manager of the propane delivery shop.  Mr. Nelson told Mr. Finch that "if 
things didn't work out" with that position, he could return to his truck driving 
position.  Later in February, Mr. 
Finch received a copy of a modified employment manual.  The employment manual included two 
at-will disclaimers.  In addition, 
Mr. Finch signed a separate form entitled "Disclaimer and Acknowledgement of 
Receipt" which reiterated that Farmers Co-op employees had "at will" employment 
status.  Mr. Finch was paid $50 in 
consideration "for the acceptance of [the] handbook and the terms set forth 
therein."    

 
 
[¶5]      On November 14, 
2002, Mr. Nelson informed Mr. Finch that "the shop had [gone] from bad to worse" 
and laid him off from his position as manager of the propane shop.  Mr. Finch requested that he be allowed 
to return to his position as a propane truck driver, but Mr. Nelson informed him 
there was no position available for him.    

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Finch filed a 
complaint naming Farmers Co-op and Mr. Nelson as defendants.   He alleged claims for breach of 
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
promissory estoppel, and punitive damages.  
Mr. Nelson was dismissed without prejudice from the action pursuant to a 
stipulation of the parties, and Farmers Co-op moved for summary judgment on all 
of Mr. Finch's claims.  The district 
court held a hearing and granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers 
Co-op.  Mr. Finch filed a timely 
notice of appeal of the district court's decision.  

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      Wyo. R. Civ. P. 
56 governs summary judgments.  A 
summary judgment is appropriate when there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  See also, Owsley v. Robinson, 2003 WY 33, ¶7, 65 P.3d 374, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003); McLean v. 
Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶14, 34 P.3d 1262, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2001).   When reviewing a 
summary judgment, we consider the record in the perspective most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record.  Hasvold v. Park County School District No. 
6, 2002 WY 65, ¶11, 45 P.3d 635, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002); Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, 
Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 238 (Wyo. 
2000).  We review questions 
of law de novo without giving any 
deference to the district court's determinations.  Hasvold, ¶11; McLean, ¶14.  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
            
A.        
Procedural Issue

 
 

[¶8]      As an 
initial matter, we consider Mr. Finch's assertion that the district court abused 
its discretion by granting summary judgment in favor of Farmers Co-op on all 
claims, including his breach of contract claim.  Mr. Finch argues that in dismissing his 
breach of contract claim, the district court relied on Farmers Co-op's 
misstatement that he did not present a breach of contract 
claim.

 

[¶9]      The summary 
judgment hearing was not recorded in this case.  Consequently, we have no transcript to 
review on appeal and our review is limited to the matters appearing in the 
appellate record.  See e.g., 
Dewey v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶9, 38 P.3d 402, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002); Waggoner v. 
General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1989).  The summary judgment order includes 
numerous references to Mr. Finch's breach of contract claim, showing that, 
despite Farmers Co-op's misstatement, the district court recognized Mr. Finch's 
contractual claims.  We do not find 
any procedural error in the district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
on all issues.

 
 
  

            
B.        Employment 
Contract

 
 
[¶10]   In Wyoming, employment is presumed to be at 
will.  Trabing v. Kinkos, Inc., 2002 WY 171, 
¶10, 57 P.3d 1248, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002); Worley, 1 P.3d  at 620.  "In an at-will employment relationship, 
either the employer or the employee may terminate the relationship at any time, 
for any reason or for no reason at all."  
Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 
987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo. 1999).  See also, McLean, ¶21.  The presumption that the employment 
relationship is at-will may be rebutted by a showing that the parties entered 
into an express or implied-in-fact agreement that the employee would be 
discharged only with just cause.   
Boone, 987 P.2d  at 685; Brodie v. General Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997).  

 
 
[¶11]   An express contract for employment 
may be made either orally or in writing.  
The necessary elements of a contract are "offer, acceptance and 
consideration."  McLean, ¶42.   In order to create an employment 
contract promising job security, the employee must show that the employer's 
offer included terms above and beyond the typical at-will employment 
situation.   Id.  
See also, Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218-19 (Wyo. 1994); 
Loya v. Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole, 
Inc., 2001 WY 124, ¶¶9-10, 35 P.2d 1246, ¶¶9-10 (Wyo. 2001).  Employment for a definite duration is 
one example of a term that may be inconsistent with typical at-will 
employment.  See Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 217.   However, employment contracts that 
cannot be performed within one year fall within the purview of the statute of 
frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2003), and must be reduced to 
writing to be enforceable.  Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 218.  Another example of an employment 
contract term that negates at-will employment is one containing the requirement 
that just cause exist before an employee may be terminated.  Id. 

 
 

[¶12]   Whether 
an oral contract existed, the terms and conditions of the contract, and the 
intentions of the parties to the contract are generally questions of fact.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 622; Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 216.  A court may, however, answer those 
questions as a matter of law when there is no conflict in the evidence.  Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶10, 75 P.3d 640, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003); Worley, 1 P.3d  at 622.  

 
 
[¶13]   
In this case, Mr. Finch argues that he and Farmers Co-op entered into an 
express oral agreement that he could return to his job as a propane truck driver 
if the position as shop manager "did not work out."  Even viewed in the light most favorable 
to Mr. Finch, Mr. Nelson's promise did not provide him with job security because 
the truck driving position was an at-will position.  Mr. Finch acknowledged that he could 
have been terminated from his position as a propane truck driver at any time, 
for any reason, or for no reason at all.  
Furthermore, he did not make any claims that he and Mr. Nelson had ever 
discussed the circumstances that could lead to his discharge.  One example of Mr. Finch's understanding 
of the at-will nature of his position can be found in the following excerpt from 
his deposition testimony: 

 
 
Q.        Do you 
claim  I'm trying to understand how going back to the propane truck driver job 
worked out.  Do you claim you had a 
right to work as a propane truck driver at Farmers Co-op until you retired?  Is that what you are claiming 
here?

 
 

A.                 
I don't 
know if I'm claiming that.  I'm just 
claiming that if I was not to be in the shop that I was supposed to be given a 
job back as a propane driver.

 
 

Q.                
For how 
long, do you know, or was it just indeterminate if you got the truck driver job 
back?

 
 

A.                 
If I got 
the driver's job back and done a good job, I don't see why I should have any 
problems.

 
 

Q.                
So you 
don't know for how long that would have lasted had you been transferred back to 
propane truck driver?

 
 

A.                 
No, I 
don't.

 
 

Q.                
There is 
really no writing of any kind to indicate there was any set time that you would 
ever work at Co-op in any job, was there?

 
 

A.                 
Not that 
I know of.

 
 

Q.                
And that 
was true when you were hired, right?

 
 

A.                 
I 
guess.

 
 
Mr. 
Nelson's promise to Mr. Finch that he could return to the truck driving position 
if the management job did not "work out" did not provide him with any job 
security.  Consequently, Mr. Finch 
did not establish that he was entitled to relief pursuant to an express 
employment contract.   

 
 
[¶14]   Farmers Co-op also argues that any 
oral employment contract between Mr. Finch and Farmers Co-op that could not be 
fully performed within one year was barred by the statute of frauds.  As we recently acknowledged in WERCS 
v. Capshaw, 2004 WY 86, ¶21, 94 P.3d 421, ¶21 (Wyo. 2004), the statute of frauds, which is codified at § 
1-23-105, may be asserted as a defense to a contention that a long-term oral 
employment contract existed.  See 
also, Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 
218.  We are not, however, compelled 
to address the statute of frauds argument in this case because our other rulings 
are dispositive.

 
 
[¶15]   Although his argument is not 
completely clear, Mr. Finch also seems to contend that  he had an implied-in-fact contract for 
continued employment with Farmers Co-op based upon its employment manuals and/or 
Mr. Nelson's oral statements.  "[A]n 
employment handbook or personnel policies, letters of employments, performance 
evaluations and an employer's course of dealing may supply terms for an 
implied-in-fact employment contract which requires termination for cause only 
unless it contains a sufficient disclaimer."  Bear v. Volunteers of America, Wyoming, 
Inc., 964 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1998).  See also, Worley, 1 P.3d  at 621; Ormsby v. Dana Kepner Co., 997 P.2d 465, 
471 (Wyo. 2000).  "To determine the 
contents of any particular implied contract of employment, we examine under an 
objective test whether the employer has intended, either by words or conduct, to 
include job security as part of the implied employment contract."  Brodie, 934 P.2d  at 1265-66.    As we opined in Boone, without an objective showing of a 
promise of job security, there is no basis for an employee to argue that cause 
is required before he can be discharged.  
An employee's "subjective belief that he could not be discharged unless 
just cause existed was insufficient to create a contract for continued 
employment."  Boone, 987 P.2d  at 686.  See also, Allen v. Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 282 (Wyo. 
1985).  

 
 
 [¶16]  Mr. Finch does not direct us to any 
language in either the 1996 or the 2002 employment manual that would create an 
implied-in-fact contract for continued employment.  He does not allege the existence of a 
progressive disciplinary policy or any other provision implying that he could 
only be terminated for cause.  Thus, 
there was no basis to find that Mr. Finch had an implied-in-fact contract for 
continued employment with Farmers Co-op.  

 
 
[¶17]   As a further impediment to Mr. 
Finch's implied-in-fact contract claim, there are  several at-will employment disclaimers 
at play in this case.  The 
application Mr. Finch signed included an express provision emphasizing that all 
Farmers Co-op employees were at-will employees and prohibiting oral 
modifications of an employee's at-will status.  That provision was emphasized in bold 
font and stated as follows:

 
 
I 
understand and agree that nothing contained in this application, or conveyed 
during any interview, is intended to create an employment contract.  I further understand and agree that if I 
am hired, my employment will be "at-will" and without any fixed term, and may be 
terminated at any time, with or without cause and without prior notice, at the 
option of either myself or the Company.  
No promises regarding employment have been made to me, and I understand 
that no such promise or guarantee is binding upon the Company unless made in 
writing.

 
 
[¶18]   We recognized in Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 
710 (Wyo. 1996), abrogated on other 
grounds by Scherer Const., LLC v. Hedquist Const., Inc., 2001 WY 23 ¶23, 18 P.3d 645 ¶23 (Wyo. 2001), that an employment application with an at-will 
disclaimer forms "a written, at-will employment contract."  The application form Mr. Finch signed 
expressly negated the authority of any Farmers Co-op employee to make a promise 
or guarantee of job security binding upon the company unless it was made in 
writing.  Mr. Finch testified in his 
deposition that he never received any written promise from Farmers Co-op.    

 
 
[¶19]   In his appellate brief, Mr. Finch 
attempts to argue that the disclaimer was insufficiently conspicuous.  We decline, however, to consider this 
argument as it was not addressed to the district court.  See e.g., Rock Springs Land & Timber, Inc. v. 
Lore, 2003 WY 100 ¶35, 75 P.3d 614 ¶35 (Wyo. 2003); Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶25, 95 P.3d 802, ¶25 (Wyo. 2004).  Under 
the circumstances presented here, the disclaimer effectively prevented Mr. Finch 
from relying on Mr. Nelson's promise that he would have a position as a propane 
truck driver in the event the shop manager position did not work out.  

 
 
[¶20]   Moreover, shortly after Mr. 
Nelson's discussion with Mr. Finch about the management position, Farmers Co-op 
presented its employees, including Mr. Finch, with a new employment manual and a 
form entitled "DISCLAIMER AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT," which restated the 
company's at-will employment policy.  
Mr. Finch signed the disclaimer and acknowledgement of receipt and 
received $50 in consideration for his acceptance of the handbook and the terms 
set forth therein.  In Brodie, we held that even after 
promising job security to an employee, an employer can restore at-will status if 
the employee agrees to give up that contractual right and the employer provides 
additional consideration to the employee.  
Brodie, 934 P.2d  at 1268-69.  
Thus, even if Farmers Co-op's course of conduct or the employment manuals 
had evinced an intention to provide job security, the disclaimer and additional 
consideration would have sufficed to reinstate Mr. Finch's at-will employment 
status.  

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Finch did not present a prima 
facie case to establish either an express or an implied-in-fact contract for 
continued employment.  The district 
court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Co-op on Mr. 
Finch's breach of contract claims.  

 
 
 
 
            
C.        Promissory 
Estoppel

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Finch also argues that Mr. 
Nelson's promise that he could return to his job as a propane truck driver if 
the shop management position did not work out should be enforced against Farmers 
Co-op under the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel.  "In the employment context, promissory 
estoppel works to prevent injustice to employees who in good faith detrimentally 
rely upon an employer's actions, in turn binding the employer to fulfill a 
promise to an employee despite the lack of an employment contract."  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 623. "The required 
elements of a promissory estoppel claim are:  the existence of a clear and definite 
agreement; proof that the party urging the doctrine acted in reasonable reliance 
on the agreement; and the equities support the enforcement of the 
agreement."  Id.  
  

 
 
[¶23]   A valid at-will employment 
disclaimer, however, defeats an employee's promissory estoppel claim.  Trabing, ¶22.  The existence of a disclaimer "makes it 
unreasonable for an employee to rely on any subsequent understanding that [his] 
employment would be anything other than at will."  Id.  
In other words, a valid disclaimer prevents the employee from 
satisfying the second element of a promissory estoppel claim.  Id.  
See also, Honorable, 11 P.3d  at 931. In Honorable, we recognized that a valid 
at-will disclaimer prevents the employee from relying on oral representations 
made by the employer in making a promissory estoppel claim.  Id.  

 
 
[¶24]   As we have discussed at length 
above, there were disclaimers in the application and acknowledgement forms Mr. 
Finch signed, and in the body of the 2002 employment manual.  The existence of these disclaimers 
prevented Mr. Finch from establishing that he reasonably relied on Mr. Nelson's 
statement and was, therefore, fatal to Mr. Finch's promissory estoppel argument. 

 
 
 
 

 
 

[¶25]   Mr. 
Finch 
also claims that Farmers Co-op breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing when it laid him off.  
Recovery of damages for tortious conduct arising out of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a showing of a legal 
duty and a breach of that duty. See also, 
Wilder, 878 P.2d at 220-22; Loya, 
¶16.  All employment contracts 
include an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Wilder, 878 P.2d  at 221; Bear, 964 P.2d 1245 at 1253.  However, "it is only in rare and 
exceptional cases that the duty is of such a nature as to give rise to tort 
liability."  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 624.  

 
 
[¶26]   "A duty arises only where a special 
relationship of trust and reliance exists between the employer and the employee 
seeking recovery."  Loya, ¶17.   The mere existence of an 
employment relationship is not sufficient to establish the special relationship 
necessary to state a tort claim.  Boone, 987 P.2d  at 689.  Examples of the special relationship 
required in order to recover for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing include: separate consideration; rights created by common law 
or statute; or the existence of rights which accrue with longevity of 
service.  Loya, ¶17.  
See also, Boone, 987 P.2d  at 689.  Mr. Finch did not present any evidence 
to suggest that he and Farmers Co-op had a special relationship of trust and 
reliance that would support a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.  He cannot, 
therefore, maintain a claim on that theory.

 
 
[¶27]   The district court correctly 
granted a summary judgment in favor of Farmers Co-op on all of Mr. Finch's 
claims and its order is, therefore, affirmed.