Case Title: P. v. Burgos

Citation: 

Docket Number: S274743

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FRANCISCO BURGOS et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S274743 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H045212 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
C1518795, C1756994 
 
 
June 3, 2024 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins 
concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice 
Corrigan concurred. 
 
Justice Evans filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu 
concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
S274743 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), known as the STEP 
Forward Act of 2021.  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.)  Assembly Bill 
333 amended Penal Code section 186.22 by imposing new 
substantive requirements relating to gang enhancements and 
the criminal offense of gang participation.1  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, 
§ 4.)  Assembly Bill 333 also added section 1109, which provides 
that, if requested by the defense, a trial court must try a gang 
enhancement charge separately from the underlying offense.  
(§ 1109, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.)  The statute likewise 
provides that gang-participation offenses must be tried 
separately from all other counts that do not require gang 
evidence as an element of the crime.  (§ 1109, subd. (b); Stats. 
2021, ch. 699, § 5.)   
We granted review to determine whether section 1109’s 
provisions governing bifurcation apply retroactively to cases in 
which the judgment is not yet final.  This question has divided 
the Courts of Appeal.  (Compare People v. Burgos (2022) 
77 Cal.App.5th 550, 565–568 (Burgos) [concluding that § 1109 
applies retroactively], People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 
82, 105–108 (Montano) [same], People v. Ramos (2022) 
77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1128–1131 (Ramos) [same] with People v. 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
Boukes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 946–949 [concluding § 1109 
does not apply retroactively], review granted Dec. 14, 2022, 
S277103 (Boukes), People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 
207 [same], review granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275090 (Perez), 
People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65 [same], review 
granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275341 (Ramirez).)   
Ordinarily, statutes are presumed to apply only 
prospectively, unless the Legislature expressly declares 
otherwise.  This well-settled principle is codified at section 3 of 
the Penal Code and appears in other codes as well.  (See, e.g., 
Code Civ. Proc., § 3; Civ. Code, § 3.)  In In re Estrada (1965) 
63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), however, we held that an amendment 
to a statute that lessened punishment for a crime gave rise to 
an inference of contrary legislative intent; that is, that the 
Legislature must have intended that the amendment mitigating 
punishment would apply retroactively to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.  (Id. at p. 745.) 
We conclude that the Estrada inference of retroactivity 
does not extend to section 1109.  Estrada’s principle of statutory 
interpretation infers retroactivity from statutory reductions in 
punishment, not from the type of prophylactic rules of criminal 
procedure embodied in section 1109’s bifurcation provisions.  
Accordingly, the general presumption of prospective-only 
application applies to section 1109.  The equal protection clauses 
of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) do not compel a different result.  
Because the Court of Appeal concluded that section 1109 applies 
retroactively, we reverse its judgment. 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Around midnight on August 29, 2015, Francisco Burgos, 
Damon Stevenson, Jr., James Richardson, Derrik Lozano, and 
Gregory Byrd approached Gabriel Cortez and Danny Rodriguez 
near a convenience store in San Jose.  A member of the group 
asked Cortez and Rodriguez where they were from, whether 
they “banged,” and if they were from “Meadowfair,” a criminal 
street gang.  After Cortez and Rodriguez responded that they 
were from “right here,” a member of the group responded, “Well, 
we’re Crip[s].”  The group proceeded to rob Cortez and Rodriguez 
at gunpoint and threatened to shoot them unless they left 
immediately.  Cortez and Rodriguez ran to Cortez’s home.   
The People filed an information charging Burgos, 
Stevenson, Richardson, Lozano, and Byrd with two counts of 
second degree robbery.  (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c).)  Each count 
also included gang enhancement and firearm enhancement 
allegations.  (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (b) & 
(e)(1).)  Burgos, Stevenson, and Richardson (collectively, 
defendants) 
moved 
to 
bifurcate 
trial 
on 
the 
gang 
enhancements.2  The trial court denied the requests.  At trial, 
the prosecution presented evidence that the robberies were 
committed in association with a criminal street gang.   
A jury found defendants guilty of two counts of second 
degree robbery and also found true the gang enhancement 
allegations.  The trial court found true prior conviction 
allegations as to Burgos and Stevenson, and Richardson 
 
2  
Lozano pleaded guilty prior to trial and Byrd was 
acquitted at trial.   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
admitted his prior conviction.  The court sentenced each 
defendant to 21 years of imprisonment.   
While defendants’ appeals were pending, the Legislature 
passed Assembly Bill 333, which became effective January 1, 
2022.  (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).)  
Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22 by narrowing the 
definitions of “ ‘criminal street gang,’ ” “common benefit,” and 
“ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity,’ ” and adding the 
requirement that gang members “collectively engage in” the 
“pattern of criminal gang activity.”  (§ 186.22, subds. (e)(1)–(2), 
(f) & (g).)  These changes “ha[d] the effect of ‘increas[ing] the 
threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the 
imposition of the enhancement.’ ”  (Tran, at p. 1207.)  Assembly 
Bill 333 also “added section 1109, which requires, if requested 
by the defendant, a gang enhancement charge to be tried 
separately from all other counts that do not otherwise require 
gang evidence as an element of the crime.”  (Tran, at p. 1206.)   
The Attorney General conceded that the amendments to 
section 186.22 apply retroactively, and that the true findings on 
defendants’ gang enhancement allegations must be vacated.  
(Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 563; cf. Tran, supra, 
13 Cal.5th at p. 1207 [Assembly Bill 333’s substantive changes 
apply retroactively to all nonfinal cases under Estrada].)  
However, the Attorney General maintained that section 1109’s 
bifurcation provisions apply only prospectively.  (Burgos, at 
p. 564.) 
A divided Court of Appeal held that section 1109 also 
applies retroactively.  (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 564–569.)  The majority concluded that the statute meets 
the criteria for retroactive application under the reasoning of 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, because it “reduces the possible 
punishment for a class of persons [and] provides a possible 
ameliorating benefit to a class of criminal defendants.”  (Burgos, 
at p. 565.)   
We granted review, limited to the issue of whether section 
1109’s bifurcation provisions apply retroactively to cases not yet 
final. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Defendants 
contend 
that 
section 
1109 
applies 
retroactively, not just prospectively.  Burgos also claims that 
applying section 1109 only prospectively would violate equal 
protection principles.  We find both arguments unconvincing. 
A. Section 1109’s Bifurcation Provisions Do Not 
Apply Retroactively 
1. Language and Legislative History of Section 1109 
Prior to the enactment of section 1109, trial courts were 
authorized, in their discretion, to bifurcate trials so that a gang 
enhancement allegation would be tried separately from a 
charged offense, when appropriate to avoid undue prejudice to 
the defense.  (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 
(Hernandez).)  This authority came from “ ‘section 1044, which 
vests the trial court with broad discretion to control the conduct 
of a criminal trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1048; see § 1044 [“It shall be the 
duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial”].)  
Section 1109 now requires the trial court to bifurcate such trials 
if the defense so requests.   
Section 1109 provides in relevant part:  “(a) If requested 
by the defense, a case in which a gang enhancement is 
charged . . . shall be tried in separate phases as follows:  [¶]  
(1) The question of the defendant’s guilt of the underlying 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
offense shall be first determined.  [¶]  (2) If the defendant is 
found guilty of the underlying offense and there is an allegation 
of a[] [gang] enhancement . . . , there shall be further 
proceedings to the trier of fact on the question of the truth of the 
enhancement. . . .  [¶]  (b) If a defendant is charged with a 
violation of subdivision (a) of Section 186.22, this count shall be 
tried separately from all other counts that do not otherwise 
require gang evidence as an element of the crime.  This charge 
may be tried in the same proceeding with an allegation of an 
enhancement under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22.”   
In enacting Assembly Bill 333, the Legislature made 
several findings and declarations related to section 1109’s 
bifurcation provisions.  The Legislature declared that “[g]ang 
enhancement evidence can be unreliable and prejudicial to a 
jury because it is lumped into evidence of the underlying charges 
which further perpetuates unfair prejudice in juries and 
convictions of innocent people.”  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. 
(d)(6).)  The Legislature further declared that “[s]tudies suggest 
that allowing a jury to hear the kind of evidence that supports a 
gang enhancement before it has decided whether the defendant 
is guilty or not may lead to wrongful convictions” and “[t]he mere 
specter of gang enhancements pressures defendants to accept 
unfavorable plea deals rather than risk a trial filled with 
prejudicial evidence and a substantially longer sentence.”  (Id., 
subd. (e).)  The Legislature resolved that “[b]ifurcation of trials 
where gang evidence is alleged can help reduce its harmful and 
prejudicial impact.”  (Id., subd. (f).)   
2. Section 3 and the Presumption of Prospective 
Application 
The question of whether a statute applies retroactively 
begins with section 3 of the Penal Code.  Enacted in 1872, this 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
provision specifies that no part of the Penal Code “is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared.”  (§ 3.)   
“ ‘[T]he language of section 3 erects a strong presumption 
of prospective operation, codifying the principle that, “in the 
absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not 
be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic 
sources that the [lawmakers] . . . must have intended a 
retroactive application.”  [Citations.]  Accordingly, “ ‘a statute 
that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is 
construed . . . to be unambiguously prospective.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. 
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 (Buycks); see People v. Brown 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 324 (Brown) [same]; People v. Floyd 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 184 (Floyd) [§ 3 “embodies the general 
rule of statutory construction that ‘when there is nothing to 
indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be presumed that 
the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively 
and not retroactively’ ”]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 282, 287 (Tapia) [“It is well settled that a new statute 
is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express 
declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the 
electorate, or the Legislature, intended otherwise”]; People v. 
Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 (Hayes) [same]; cf. 
Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207–1208 
(Evangelatos) [“Like similar provisions found in many other 
codes,” including Pen. Code, § 3, Civ. Code, § 3 “reflects the 
common 
understanding 
that 
legislative 
provisions 
are 
presumed to operate prospectively, and that they should be so 
interpreted ‘unless express language or clear and unavoidable 
implication negatives the presumption’ ”]; cf. Aetna Cas. & 
Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 393 (Aetna) 
[“It is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made 
to appear that such was the legislative intent”].)   
However, the presumption that a statute will apply only 
prospectively “is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than 
a constitutional mandate.  [Citation.]  Accordingly, ‘the 
Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, 
either explicitly or by implication.’ ”  (People v. Frahs (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 618, 627 (Frahs).)  “In applying this principle, we have 
been cautious not to infer retroactive intent from vague phrases 
and broad, general language in statutes.”  (Brown, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 319; see also Aetna, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 396 
[“it must be assumed that the Legislature was acquainted with 
the settled rules of statutory interpretation, and that it would 
have expressly provided for retrospective operation of the 
amendment if it had so intended”].)   
3. The Estrada Exception to Prospective Application 
of Statutes 
Although section 3’s presumption of prospectivity 
ordinarily applies if a statute does not contain an express 
statement of retroactivity or otherwise clearly and unavoidably 
indicate that the Legislature intended the statute to operate 
retroactively, this court has recognized an additional, related 
exception to this rule.   
In Estrada, we held that an amendment to a statute that 
reduces the punishment for a particular criminal offense gives 
rise to an inference that the statute applies retroactively to all 
judgments not yet final on appeal.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
p. 745.)  We explained our reasoning as follows:  “There is one 
consideration of paramount importance.  It leads inevitably to 
the conclusion that the Legislature must have intended, and by 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
necessary implication provided, that the amendatory statute 
should prevail.  When the Legislature amends a statute so as to 
lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined 
that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter 
punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the 
prohibited act.  It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature 
must have intended that the new statute imposing the new 
lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to 
every case to which it constitutionally could apply.  The 
amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied 
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided 
the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.  
This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be 
to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for 
vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern 
theories of penology.”  (Id. at pp. 744–745.)   
At the same time, we reiterated in Estrada that section 3’s 
general rule of prospectivity still applied to an amended statute 
unless there were “other factors that indicate the Legislature 
must have intended” that it would operate retroactively.  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.)  Accordingly, Estrada 
stands for the principle that, “ ‘where the amendatory statute 
mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, . . . the 
amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter 
punishment is imposed.’ ”  (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 
784, 792 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.) (Nasalga), quoting Estrada, 
at p. 748; cf. People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852 [under 
Estrada, 
“Newly 
enacted 
legislation 
lessening 
criminal 
punishment or reducing criminal liability presumptively applies 
to all cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the legislation’s 
effective date” unless it “sets out a specific mechanism as the 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
exclusive avenue for retroactive relief”], superseded by statute 
on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 
14 Cal.5th 839, 869; see also People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
594, 601–603 [holding that a statute reducing punishment did 
not apply retroactively under Estrada because its resentencing 
provisions sufficiently indicated a contrary intent]; People v. 
Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657–658 (Conley) [same].)   
We have applied Estrada’s inference of retroactivity to 
legislation that created an affirmative defense, contracted a 
criminal offense, or otherwise lessened punishment in some 
meaningful manner.  These laws have included statutes 
addressing penalty enhancements as well as statutes concerned 
with substantive offenses.  (E.g., People v. Prudholme (2023) 
14 Cal.5th 961, 968–969 [statute reducing maximum probation 
term for nonviolent offenses applies retroactively]; People v. 
Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 [newly enacted affirmative 
defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; 
Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 798 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.) 
[amendments that increase monetary amount of property loss to 
trigger sentencing enhancements apply retroactively]; Tapia, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301 [statute specifying that certain 
death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be 
intentional applies retroactively]; People v. Rossi (1976) 
18 Cal.3d 295, 302 [amendatory statute decriminalizing the 
commission of certain sexual acts applies retroactively].)  We 
have also applied the Estrada inference to statutes that give 
trial courts discretion to impose lesser punishment.  (People v. 
Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 [statute eliminating 
restriction on trial court’s ability to strike serious felony 
enhancement applies retroactively]; People v. Francis (1969) 
71 Cal.2d 66, 76 (Francis) [modified treatment of marijuana 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
possession from straight felony to either felony or misdemeanor 
applies retroactively].) 
More recently, we have applied the Estrada inference to 
statutes that, while not limited to reducing punishment for a 
particular crime, created a concrete avenue for certain 
individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more 
leniently or avoid punishment altogether.  (Frahs, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at pp. 624, 629 [statute creating pretrial diversion 
program in lieu of criminal prosecution for individuals suffering 
from qualifying mental health disorders applies retroactively]; 
People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 (Lara) 
[statute prohibiting prosecutors from directly filing criminal 
charges against minors in “adult” criminal court and giving 
juvenile courts sole discretion to decide whether to prosecute 
minors as adults applies retroactively].)  We explained in Lara 
that although Estrada was not directly on point, “its rationale 
does apply.  The possibility of being treated as a juvenile in 
juvenile court — where rehabilitation is the goal — rather than 
being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically 
different and more lenient treatment.  Therefore, Proposition 57 
reduces the possible punishment for a class of persons, namely 
juveniles.”  (Lara, at p. 303.)  “For this reason,” we concluded, 
“Estrada’s inference of retroactivity applies.”  (Ibid.)   
Notably, however, we have recognized “the limited role 
Estrada properly plays in our jurisprudence of prospective 
versus retrospective operation” and reiterated that Estrada does 
not “weaken[] or modify[]” section 3’s default rule that 
amendments to a statute apply prospectively.  (Brown, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 324; see Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 
pp. 1208–1209 [“California continues to adhere to the time-
honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
retroactivity 
provision, 
a 
statute 
will 
not 
be 
applied 
retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that 
the Legislature or the voters must have intended a retroactive 
application.  The language in Estrada . . . should not be 
interpreted as modifying this well-established, legislatively-
mandated principle”].)  Rather, Estrada informs the application 
of the default rule “in a specific context by articulating the 
reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the 
punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to 
apply to all nonfinal judgments.”  (Brown, at p. 324.) 
We have found Estrada inapplicable to statutes that, 
although arguably lessening punishment in some sense, did not 
implicate the central rationale behind the Estrada inference.  In 
Brown, we held that a statute that temporarily increased the 
rate at which local prisoners could earn conduct credits against 
their sentences for good behavior did not apply retroactively 
under Estrada (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 318, 320), even 
though it resulted in less time served.  We emphasized that 
Estrada 
“supports 
an 
important, 
contextually 
specific 
qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate 
prospectively:  When the Legislature has amended a statute to 
reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will 
assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature 
intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose 
judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.  
[Citation.]  We based this conclusion on the premise that ‘ “[a] 
legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime 
represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the 
different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of 
the criminal law.” ’ ”  (Brown, at p. 323, fn. omitted.)   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
We concluded in Brown that although the statute’s 
increased rate for earning conduct credits functioned in practice 
to reduce punishment, it did not fall within the scope of Estrada.  
We explained that “the rule and logic of Estrada is specifically 
directed to a statute that represents ‘ “a legislative mitigation of 
the penalty for a particular crime” ’ [citation] because such a law 
supports the inference that the Legislature would prefer to 
impose the new, shorter penalty rather than to ‘ “satisfy a desire 
for vengeance” ’ [citation].  The same logic does not inform our 
understanding of a law that rewards good behavior in prison.”  
(Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325.)  We rejected the argument 
that Estrada should be understood to apply more broadly to any 
statute that reduces punishment in any manner, explaining 
that this contention “would expand the Estrada rule’s scope of 
operation in precisely the manner we forbade” in our prior 
decisions, and “does not in any event represent a logical 
extension of Estrada’s reasoning.”  (Brown, at p. 325.)   
Consistent with our reasoning in Brown, both our case law 
and decisions by the Courts of Appeal have declined to apply the 
Estrada presumption to new legislation that modified aspects of 
how criminal cases are investigated or tried.3  (Accord, Tapia, 
 
3  
The dissenting opinion attempts to downplay the 
significance of our decision in Brown, asserting that we 
“reversed field and repudiated Brown’s narrow reading of 
Estrada” a few years later.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 6; 
see id. at pp. 8–9.)  Rather than renouncing it, this court has 
continued to cite Brown with approval in discussing principles 
of retroactivity.  (See, e.g., People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
671, 676 [including Brown in summary of this court’s relevant 
precedent evaluating whether specific legislation ameliorates 
punishment]; Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 880 [reaffirming 
 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 299 [we apply laws that “address the 
conduct of trials” that are in effect at the time of trial]; People v. 
Mortimer (1873) 46 Cal. 114, 118 [Pen. Code procedures govern 
trial of crimes defined and committed before the code’s 
enactment].)  In People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 51 
(Robertson), we held that a newly enacted death penalty law 
prohibiting the consideration of nonstatutory factors in 
aggravation, which the former death penalty law allowed, did 
not apply retroactively under Estrada.  We reasoned that the 
law “had no bearing on the criminality of defendant’s conduct or 
 
Brown’s holding]; People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
1144, 1195–1196 [same]; Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 312 
[agreeing that conduct credits at issue in Brown were “not 
‘analogous’ to the Estrada situation, and Estrada’s logic d[id] 
not apply” to them].)   
In contrast, the dissent relies on cases that have either 
been disapproved by our court as improperly expanding 
Estrada’s reach or do not involve the interpretation of statutes 
at all.  (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 1, citing In re 
Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587; dis. opn. of 
Evans, J., post, at p. 4, citing In re Johnson (1970) 3 Cal.3d 404, 
413.)  In Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 229–230, we explained that “at least in 
modern times, we have been cautious not to infer the voters’ or 
the Legislature’s intent on the subject of prospective versus 
retrospective operation from ‘vague phrases’ [citation] and 
‘broad, general language’ [citation] in statutes, initiative 
measures and ballot pamphlets.  We have also disapproved 
statements to the contrary in certain older cases,” including 
Marriage of Bouquet.  And Johnson addresses the standards for 
determining “[t]he retrospective effect of a law-making opinion” 
(Johnson, at p. 410, italics added), which are fundamentally 
different from determining the retroactive operation of a 
statute.  (See, e.g., Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, 
1057 [“ ‘ “The general rule that judicial decisions are given 
retroactive effect is basic in our legal tradition” ’ ”].)   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
the severity of punishment therefor; hence the statute in effect 
at the time of the offenses governs” the penalty phase retrial.  
(Ibid.) 
In People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 927 
(Cervantes), the Court of Appeal held that legislative 
amendments to section 859.5, which expanded the requirement 
of recorded custodial interrogations to all persons suspected of 
committing murder, did not come within Estrada’s limited 
exception to section 3’s general rule of prospective application 
because the amendments did not alter or reduce criminal 
punishment or treatment for past criminal conduct.  (Cervantes, 
at p. 940.)  The Cervantes court further held that the logic of 
Estrada did not apply because the legislative findings 
accompanying section 859.5’s amendments indicated the 
changes “were not designed to provide a clear and significant 
benefit to defendants; they were designed to reduce biased 
interpretation of, and ensure the accuracy of the evidence of, the 
communication that occurs in an interrogation.”  (Cervantes, at 
p. 941.)   
Similarly, in People v. Sandee (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 294 
(Sandee), the Court of Appeal rejected the claim that the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (§ 1546 et seq.), which 
limited a government entity’s access to electronic device 
information, applied retroactively under Estrada.  (Sandee, at 
p. 305, fn. 7.)  The court determined that “[t]he retroactivity 
principle discussed in Estrada is not applicable here because the 
[statute] does not have the effect of lessening the punishment 
for a crime.”  (Ibid.) 
In sum, we have adhered to section 3’s default rule of 
prospective operation in a variety of contexts and have applied 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
Estrada’s limited inference of retroactivity only to statutes that 
“are analogous to the Estrada situation” and by their nature 
implicate “Estrada’s logic” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 312, 
some italics omitted); that is, statutes that either reduce the 
punishment for a criminal offense or create discretion to reduce 
such punishment, or narrow the scope of criminal liability, 
because such enactments give rise to an “inevitable inference 
that the Legislature [or electorate] must have intended that the 
new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be 
sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally 
could apply” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745).   
4. Conflicting Court of Appeal Decisions 
As noted, the question of section 1109’s retroactivity has 
divided the Courts of Appeal.   
In this case, the Court of Appeal majority concluded that 
section 1109’s bifurcation provisions apply retroactively under 
Estrada and its progeny.  (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 564–569.)  The majority reasoned that section 1109 applies 
“to a distinct class of defendants — those charged with gang 
enhancements” (Burgos, at p. 565), and “the legislative findings 
in Assembly Bill 333 also show the Legislature intended to 
reduce punishment specifically for people of color — who 
overwhelmingly comprise the class of defendants charged with 
gang enhancements” (id. at p. 566).  Because the legislative 
findings “repeatedly cite the disparate levels of punishment 
suffered by people of color under the old law,” the majority 
reasoned, section 1109 cannot be considered only “as a 
‘prophylactic rule of criminal procedure’ designed to enhance the 
fairness of proceedings.”  (Burgos, at p. 566.)  The majority 
highlighted two ameliorative effects of the bifurcation 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
provisions:  the “increased possibility of acquittal — which 
necessarily reduces possible punishment,” and the reduction of 
“pressure to accept longer sentences” through unfavorable plea 
deals, which “will necessarily reduce the degree of punishment 
for many defendants.”  (Id. at p. 567.)   
The majority then rejected the argument that “different 
parts of Assembly Bill 333 should be treated differently under 
Estrada.”  (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.)  It reasoned 
that the “legislative findings setting forth the ameliorative 
purposes of the bill apply to the entire bill, and they specifically 
address the reasons for the new bifurcation rules.”  (Ibid.)  
Considering Assembly Bill 333’s substantive changes to section 
186.22, which apply retroactively under Estrada, “[i]t would be 
especially incongruous for the Legislature to make one isolated 
section of a bill prospective-only without stating so expressly, 
expecting instead that a court would somehow discern this 
anomaly.”  (Burgos, at pp. 567–568.)   
The dissenting justice below disagreed.  In his view, 
“section 1109 is not an ameliorative statute within the meaning 
of the Estrada rule, and therefore it is subject to the general rule 
that Penal Code provisions are presumed to be prospective-
only.”  (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 569 (dis. opn. of Elia, 
J.).)  The dissent reasoned that our prior applications of Estrada 
involved statutes that “were facially ‘ameliorative’ because they 
either reduced the punishment or created discretion to reduce 
the punishment for a criminal offense, or narrowed the scope of 
criminal liability.”  (Burgos, at p. 571 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.).)  
Section 1109, by contrast, is “a prophylactic rule of criminal 
procedure expressly intended to employ new procedures aimed 
at enhancing the fairness of future criminal proceedings.  It 
makes no change to any crime or defense and makes no change 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
to any punishment provision, and it does not create the 
possibility of lesser punishment or any other ‘ameliorative’ 
benefit from which it could be inferred that failing to extend that 
benefit retroactively must have been motivated by a ‘desire for 
vengeance.’ ”  (Burgos, at p. 572 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.).)  Because 
section 1109 “makes a ‘purely procedural’ change to a trial 
procedure that will not have any impact ‘directly’ or indirectly 
on punishment,” the dissent reasoned, the general presumption 
of prospectivity applies.  (Burgos, at p. 572 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.).)   
In Montano, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th 82 and Ramos, supra, 
77 Cal.App.5th 1116, the Courts of Appeal agreed with the 
Burgos majority.  In Montano, the appellate court relied on the 
uncodified preamble in Assembly Bill 333 in concluding that 
section 1109 is ameliorative within the meaning of Estrada.  
(Montano, at pp. 105–106.)  The Montano court also determined 
that section 1109 was sufficiently similar to the statutes in Lara 
and Frahs to bring it within the scope of Estrada’s inference of 
retroactivity.  (Montano, at pp. 106–108.)  The Ramos court 
likewise determined that Assembly Bill 333’s findings and 
declarations that the Legislature intended “to benefit a certain 
class of criminal defendants by reducing the potentially harmful 
and prejudicial impact of gang evidence through bifurcation of 
gang allegations” invoked “the logic of Estrada.”  (Ramos, at 
p. 1131.)   
Other Courts of Appeal, however, have found the dissent 
in Burgos persuasive.  (Boukes, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 
review granted; Perez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 192, review 
granted; Ramirez, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 48, review granted.)  In 
Ramirez, the appellate court concluded that “the Estrada 
presumption does not apply to section 1109 because section 1109 
‘is not an ameliorative statute within the meaning of the 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
Estrada rule.’ ”  (Ramirez, at p. 65, quoting Burgos, supra, 
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 569 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.).)  Likewise, in 
Perez, the Court of Appeal held that because section 1109 is a 
procedural statute that ensures a jury will not be prejudiced by 
gang-related evidence, and not one that reduces the punishment 
imposed or reduces the scope of application of the gang statute, 
it does not give rise to an inference of retroactivity under 
Estrada.  (Perez, at p. 207.)  The Perez court contrasted “the new 
law in Lara, which was a new procedural law that had the effect 
of potentially reducing the punishment for a class of 
defendants,” with bifurcation under section 1109, which 
“ensures a jury will not be prejudiced by the introduction of 
evidence to support gang enhancement allegations.”  (Perez, at 
p. 207.)  The Boukes court agreed, concluding that section 1109 
does not apply retroactively because it does not reduce 
punishment imposed on gang enhancements.  (Boukes, at 
p. 948.) 
With this background in mind, we turn to the question of 
whether 
section 
1109’s 
bifurcation 
provisions 
apply 
retroactively.   
5. Discussion 
Before we address whether section 1109’s provisions 
provide the sort of relief contemplated in Estrada such that an 
inference of retroactivity arises, we resolve the threshold 
question of whether the statute expressly or impliedly addresses 
retroactive application.  As noted, if the statute expressly states 
that it is retroactive or otherwise clearly and unavoidably 
indicates that the Legislature intended retroactive operation, 
that determination governs, regardless of whether section 1109 
lessens punishment within the meaning of Estrada. 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
The parties agree that section 1109 does not contain an 
express statement as to its retroactivity.  Defendants maintain, 
however, that the legislative findings and declaration of purpose 
accompanying 
Assembly 
Bill 
333 
clearly 
indicate 
the 
Legislature intended its provisions would apply retroactively.  
They contend that the Legislature’s stated objective to reduce 
the prejudicial impact of gang evidence, and the concerns it 
expressed regarding racial and socioeconomic disparities 
relating to prosecution under the gang enhancement statute, 
demonstrate that the Legislature intended the statute’s 
bifurcation provisions would apply retroactively.  
There is no question that the legislative findings 
accompanying Assembly Bill 333 reflect significant concerns 
about gang enhancements in general, including about their 
usefulness in stemming crime and their disproportionate impact 
on people of color in particular.4  However, we do not discern 
from these findings a “ ‘clear and unavoidable implication’ ” that 
the Legislature intended Assembly Bill 333’s bifurcation 
provisions to apply retroactively.  (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 319.)  Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history to 
suggest that the Legislature considered the issue of retroactivity 
 
4  
For example, the legislative findings accompanying 
Assembly Bill 333 state that “[c]urrent gang enhancement 
statutes criminalize entire neighborhoods historically impacted 
by poverty, racial inequality, and mass incarceration as they 
punish people based on their cultural identity, who they know, 
and where they live” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (a)), “[n]o 
empirical studies have produced evidence showing that gang 
enhancements meaningfully reduce crime or violence” (id., subd. 
(c)), and “[t]he gang enhancement statute is applied 
inconsistently against people of color, creating a racial 
disparity” (id., subd. (d)(1)). 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
at all.  (Cf. Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1211 
[enactment’s stated objective to remedy system of inequity and 
injustice in tort actions does not suggest that the retroactivity 
question was considered].)   
Indeed, our opinion in Tran, which concerned Assembly 
Bill 333’s amendments to the gang enhancement statute, also 
suggests that the bill’s legislative history does not shed much 
light on whether the Legislature intended for its provisions to 
have retroactive operation.  If it did, it would not have been 
necessary in Tran to resort to the secondary question of whether 
the amendments to section 186.22 apply retroactively under 
Estrada.  (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207.)   
Most of the legislative findings appear to relate most 
directly to the provisions of Assembly Bill 333 that substantively 
narrow the gang enhancement statute, not section 1109.  The 
legislative findings describe the function of section 1109 in more 
equivocal terms.  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (d)(6) [“Gang 
enhancement evidence can be unreliable and prejudicial to a 
jury” (italics added)]; id., subd. (e) [“Studies suggest that 
allowing a jury to hear the kind of evidence that supports a gang 
enhancement before it has decided whether the defendant is 
guilty or not may lead to wrongful convictions” (italics added)]; 
id., subd. (f) [“Bifurcation of trials where gang evidence is 
alleged can help reduce its harmful and prejudicial impact” 
(italics added)].)5  These limited assertions align with the 
 
5  
We disagree with the dissent’s characterization of the 
legislative findings pertaining to section 1109 as “clear and 
forceful” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 2) on the relevant 
issue before us — i.e., whether the limited bifurcation provisions 
 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
measured nature of change in subdivision (a) of section 1109, 
which gives defendants the election of a bifurcated or a unitary 
trial, rather than making bifurcation mandatory whenever gang 
evidence may be introduced.  In short, the legislative findings do 
not clearly indicate the Legislature intended section 1109 to 
have retroactive operation.  (See Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 
p. 880 [statute that is ambiguous regarding retroactive 
application applies prospectively].)   
With no “express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and 
compelling implication that the Legislature intended” to apply 
the statute retroactively (Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1274), we 
apply section 3’s presumption that section 1109 operates 
prospectively unless the statute “lessen[s] . . . punishment” 
 
apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments.  We of course are 
“aware that avoiding ‘the injustice that results from the 
conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our 
criminal justice system’ ” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4, 
citing Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 325), and we are 
cognizant that the Legislature identified racial disparities in the 
use of gang enhancements (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 3).  
But we also note that strongly worded legislative findings 
relating to racial bias and unfairness in the criminal justice 
system do not necessarily convey that the Legislature intended 
for section 1109 — which concerns the order of presentation of 
evidence at trial, not the substantive scope of the gang 
enhancements — to apply retroactively to cases that have 
already been tried.  (Compare Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subds. 
(a)–(j) with Pen. Code, former § 745, subd. (j) [“This section 
applies only prospectively in cases in which judgment has not 
been entered prior to January 1, 2021”].) 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
within the meaning of Estrada.6  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
p. 745.)  We conclude that it does not. 
As noted, section 1109 requires the trial court to try an 
underlying offense separately from a gang enhancement if 
requested by the defense, and it mandates that a substantive 
gang offense be tried separately from nongang-related offenses.  
By its terms, section 1109 does not directly or potentially reduce 
the punishment for an offense.  Nor does it change the elements 
of a substantive offense, defense, or penalty enhancement.  
Likewise, it does not create an alternative avenue for certain 
individuals to receive lesser or no punishment.  Instead, section 
1109 reflects a prophylactic procedural rule that modifies the 
sequence of trial proceedings.  In an effort to minimize the 
potentially prejudicial impact of gang evidence, it gives 
defendants the option to request bifurcation at trial of the gang 
enhancement allegations charged under section 186.22, 
subdivision (b) and the other charged offenses.   
Because the procedures established by section 1109 do not 
alter the criminality of defendant’s conduct or the severity of 
punishment, the logic of Estrada does not apply.  (See Robertson, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 51.)  The further any particular 
amendatory act is from a clear reduction of punishment, or 
 
6  
Stevenson incorrectly suggests that the Legislature’s 
failure to include an express provision regarding the prospective 
application of Assembly Bill 333 supports a finding that the 
Legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively.  As 
stated above, if a statute is silent as to retroactivity, it is 
generally presumed to apply prospectively.  (§ 3; Brown, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 320; Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1209 
[under “the general principle of prospectivity, the absence of any 
express provision directing retroactive application strongly 
supports prospective operation of the measure”].)   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
removal of a class of defendants from the criminal system 
altogether, the less “inevitable” and “obvious” (Estrada, supra, 
63 Cal.2d at p. 745) and more speculative the inference of 
retroactivity becomes.  (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325 [“a 
statute increasing the rate at which prisoners may earn credits 
for good behavior does not represent a judgment about the needs 
of the criminal law with respect to a particular criminal offense, 
and thus does not support an analogous inference of retroactive 
intent”].)  We decline to extend the reach of our holding in 
Estrada to a statute so untethered from its logic. 
The reasoning we applied in Estrada leads us to conclude 
that there are also practical reasons why it makes sense to 
distinguish between the retroactive effect of new legislation 
reducing the punishment prescribed by law and the retroactive 
effect of new legislation that makes the types of changes we see 
in section 1109.  The Legislature, as the lawmaking body of the 
state (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1), is accorded considerable 
deference in deciding how to set the penalties for particular 
offenses.  (E.g., People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 840–
841.)  When the Legislature determines that one of its 
enactments operates too harshly, we presume that it wants its 
reevaluation, as embodied in a new law, to apply as broadly as 
possible within the limits of finality.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 
at p. 745.)   
But it is more difficult to draw such an inference when a 
statute makes the types of changes reflected in section 1109.  
While the Legislature may determine that certain additional 
procedures are warranted to enhance the fairness of criminal 
proceedings, as it did in enacting section 1109, the Legislature 
might decide to adopt a rule of prospective application for such 
changes for reasons other than “a desire for vengeance.”  
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  Some changes adopted by 
the Legislature might enhance the fundamental fairness 
already guaranteed by the Constitution and by existing 
statutory protections.  But applying these changes retroactively 
to already-concluded proceedings will inevitably come with 
systemic costs (which may affect the resources available to 
ensure the timely and effective administration of justice in other 
cases).  Thus, even if the Legislature decides it makes good 
policy sense to provide a defendant with a right to bifurcation as 
specified in section 1109 on a going forward basis, it could also 
reasonably intend, for reasons other than “vengeance” (Estrada, 
at p. 745), that the change in the law should not apply to 
defendants who have already been tried.  (Cf. Jenkins v. 
Delaware (1969) 395 U.S. 213, 218 [potential incongruities 
“inherent in prospective decision making, i.e., some defendants 
benefit from the new rule while others do not,” “must be 
balanced against the impetus the technique provides for the 
implementation of long overdue reforms, which otherwise could 
not be practicably effected” (italics omitted)].)   
It makes practical sense for courts to look to the 
Legislature to weigh the costs and benefits of retroactive versus 
only prospective application, and not to infer retroactive intent 
from legislative silence in these circumstances.  That is because 
“we can[not] . . . say with confidence, as we did in Estrada, that 
the enacting body lacked any discernible reason to limit 
application of the law with respect to cases pending on direct 
review.”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 658–659; see id. at 
p. 658 [declining to apply Estrada where “the enacting body 
creates a special mechanism for application of the new lesser 
punishment to persons who have previously been sentenced, 
and . . . the body expressly makes retroactive application of the 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
lesser punishment contingent on a court’s evaluation of the 
defendant’s dangerousness”].)  Here, we cannot presume the 
Legislature’s silence on section 1109’s retroactivity equates with 
an intent to undo or jeopardize completed trials conducted under 
valid and constitutional laws (and where evidence supports guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt).   
Defendants contend that section 1109 is sufficiently 
similar to the statutes at issue in Lara and Frahs to bring it 
within the scope of Estrada.  We disagree.  It is true that the 
statutes we considered in Lara and Frahs had substantial 
procedural components.  But the core of the changes made by 
those statutes was to allow for the possibility of channeling 
cases involving certain classes of offenders the Legislature 
identified as having diminished culpability — juvenile offenders 
(in Lara) and offenders with mental health disorders (in 
Frahs) — away from ordinary criminal proceedings, thereby 
reducing those offenders’ exposure to the punishment otherwise 
prescribed under applicable criminal law.  (Lara, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 303; Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624.)  The crux 
of the statutes at issue in Lara and Frahs, and what mattered 
for purposes of our analysis, was the path to reduced 
punishment based on a legislative judgment that the 
punishments prescribed by law for certain offenses are 
frequently inappropriate for certain classes of persons who bear 
reduced culpability for their crimes.  (Frahs, at p. 624 [“The 
statute here is similar to the scheme we considered in Lara, in 
that section 1001.36 by design and function provides a possible 
ameliorating benefit for a class of persons . . . by offering an 
opportunity for diversion and ultimately the dismissal of 
charges”].)   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
Section 1109, in contrast, does not reflect an intent to 
benefit defendants in the same way.  It is by design and function 
a procedural change affecting the sequence of trial proceedings 
in situations where the defendant elects to invoke the statute.  
Unlike with the statutory changes at issue in Lara and Frahs, 
in enacting section 1109, the Legislature did not identify any 
class of defendants having a characteristic potentially 
demonstrating 
diminished 
culpability 
deserving 
of 
less 
punishment.  Instead, section 1109 is designed to provide fairer 
proceedings for defendants subject to the same potential 
punishment.  No “ ‘obvious’ and ‘inevitable’ inference” of 
retroactivity arises based on the statute’s operation.  (See dis. 
opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4.)   
Defendants who elect a bifurcated trial will still be tried 
in a criminal court.  They will face the same charges and the 
same potential sentences for those charges if convicted.  And in 
some instances, the same gang evidence introduced to establish 
the elements of a gang enhancement might be admissible at a 
bifurcated trial on the underlying charge.  (See Hernandez, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [“the criminal street gang 
enhancement is attached to the charged offense and is, by 
definition, inextricably intertwined with that offense”]; id. at 
pp. 1049–1050 [“To the extent the evidence supporting the gang 
enhancement would be admissible at a trial of guilt, any 
inference of prejudice would be dispelled”]; see also People v. 
Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31 [“The People are generally 
entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation 
and activity if it is relevant to the charged offense”]; Boukes, 
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 948, review granted [holding any 
error in lack of bifurcation was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt because evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation “would 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
have been admissible for reasons aside from any effort to prove 
the special circumstance and gang enhancement findings, for 
instance, defendant’s motivation for the killing”].)   
Under these circumstances, the rationale of Estrada does 
not apply; we cannot say it is “inevitable” that the Legislature 
would intend retroactive application of the bifurcation 
provisions without expressly so declaring.  (Estrada, supra, 
63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  Neither Frahs nor Lara goes so far as 
defendants here propose.  New bifurcation procedures that may, 
in some instances, be beneficial to a criminal defendant in that 
they conceivably could result in the exclusion of gang-related 
evidence during the trial of charged offenses are not the 
equivalent of a change in the legislated punishment that must 
be applied to all nonfinal cases on appeal.7  (Estrada, at p. 745; 
Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325, fn. 15 [legislative intent to 
equalize custody conduct credits, which served to reduce 
punishment by decreasing days in custody, “does not, by itself, 
provide a logical basis for inferring the Legislature wished to do 
so retroactively”].)  We decline to apply Estrada’s inference of 
retroactivity when, as here, there is no alteration to criminality 
or the legislated punishment. 
 
7  
In Assembly Bill 333’s findings and declarations, the 
Legislature cited a decision by this court in which we recognized 
that gang evidence may in some instances be prejudicial (Stats. 
2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (e), citing People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 153, 193).  But in that case we actually upheld the 
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to exclude gang 
evidence because the evidence was relevant to motive and 
identity and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect 
(Williams, at p. 193).   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
Defendants also contend that even if the Legislature’s 
stated objectives in passing Assembly Bill 333 do not provide a 
clear indication that the Legislature intended that the 
measure’s bifurcation provisions would apply retroactively, they 
nonetheless demonstrate that section 1109 is an ameliorative 
statute within the meaning of Estrada.  The Court of Appeal 
majority likewise relied on Assembly Bill 333’s legislative 
findings in concluding that Estrada’s inference of retroactivity 
applies.  (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 566–567.)   
This logic is unavailing.  Again, we decline to extend the 
reach of Estrada’s inference to statutes like section 1109 without 
a clearer indication of legislative intent to mitigate punishment.  
As noted, section 1109’s provisions do not directly or potentially 
reduce the punishment for an offense, change the elements of a 
substantive offense, defense, or penalty, or create an alternative 
avenue for certain individuals to receive lesser or no 
punishment.  The uncodified legislative findings concerned with 
bifurcation establish an intent to promote fairness and reduce 
the potential for prejudice in trial proceedings where a gang 
enhancement is alleged.  But they do not reflect an intent to 
lessen punishment within the meaning of Estrada and its 
progeny.  Thus, they are insufficient to rebut section 3’s “strong 
presumption of prospective operation.”  (Brown, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 324.)  “[T]he mere fact that the statute is 
remedial and subject to the rule of liberal construction” cannot, 
without more, give rise to the implication that the Legislature 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
intended it to have retroactive application.  (Aetna, supra, 
30 Cal.2d at p. 395.)8 
In this respect, we also find it notable that defendants and 
the Court of Appeal majority focus primarily on the legislative 
findings accompanying Assembly Bill 333 rather than the text 
of section 1109 itself.9  Likewise, the dissent makes a single 
passing reference to section 1109’s actual provisions, noting only 
 
8  
The dissent emphasizes that the Legislature intended to 
prevent the conviction of “innocent” defendants serving 
“wrongful convictions.”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 1–4, 
9–12, 14–16.)  We acknowledge the important remedial 
purposes of the changes enacted by the Legislature, but we 
decline to infer retroactivity based on such “broad, general 
language in statutes.”  (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319.)  The 
Legislature chose to adopt optional bifurcation procedures that 
operate in a limited manner; as noted, gang evidence may still 
be admissible where relevant to the underlying charges.  A 
voluntary procedure which may (or may not) alter when gang 
evidence is admitted at trial is not the type of ameliorative 
reduction in punishment that gives rise to Estrada’s inference 
of retroactivity. 
9  
In evaluating whether section 1109 applies retroactively 
under Estrada, the Court of Appeal addressed the statutory 
language only in passing, observing simply that it applies to a 
distinct class of defendants (those charged with gang 
enhancements or active participation in a street gang).  (Burgos, 
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 565.)  That section 1109 applies to a 
class of persons is of minimal significance in determining 
whether it applies retroactively under Estrada, since it is 
axiomatic that an amendatory act will affect a class of persons.  
Although we took note of the fact that the stated purposes of the 
enactments in Lara and Frahs were to address specific classes 
of individuals, we did so in the context of identifying the 
Legislature’s desire to reduce their reentry into the criminal 
system.  (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 309; Frahs, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 626.)   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
that it grants a criminal defendant charged with one or more 
gang enhancements “the right to have the question of guilt be 
tried in ‘separate phases.’ ”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., at p. 1.)  But 
this is the inverse of our usual Estrada inquiry.  Estrada and its 
progeny focused on the substantive statutory provisions in 
determining whether they gave rise to an inference of 
retroactivity.  Consistent with standard principles of statutory 
interpretation, our precedent instructs that we should focus on 
the statute itself before examining legislative findings or 
legislative history.  (See, e.g., Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 635; 
Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 303, 309.)  Indeed, in determining 
whether Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 
applied retroactively under Estrada, we relied on section 
186.22’s substantive changes to the elements of the gang 
enhancement rather than the accompanying legislative findings 
and statements of purpose, concluding that section 186.22 
applied retroactively because it increased the threshold for 
conviction of the gang offense and imposition of the gang 
enhancement.  (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207.)  
Although legislative findings may be a useful aid in confirming 
whether we should presume retroactive intent based on the 
ameliorative nature of a statute, we are disinclined to bypass 
section 1109’s substantive provisions, which do not actually 
operate to mitigate punishment, and rely on legislative findings 
relating to potential prejudice in determining whether Estrada’s 
inference of retroactivity applies.   
We do not dispute that the changes implemented through 
section 1109 are designed to serve the salutatory goals of 
enhancing the overall fairness of criminal proceedings and 
reducing the potential for prejudice.  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, 
subds. (d)(6), (e) & (f).)  Yet we have declined to infer retroactive 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
intent under the principles of Estrada based solely on the 
presence of similar remedial purposes.  In Brown, we rejected 
the argument that the Estrada inference extends “broadly to 
any statute that reduces punishment in any manner” (Brown, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325), explaining that such a position 
“would expand the Estrada rule’s scope of operation in precisely 
the manner we forbade in Evangelatos” (ibid.).  In the earlier 
Evangelatos decision, we rejected the argument that a tort 
reform proposition’s purpose, to rectify the “system of inequity 
and injustice” (Civ. Code, § 1431.1, subd. (a)), demonstrated that 
the 
electorate 
intended 
for 
it 
to 
apply 
retroactively.  
(Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1213.)  We explained:  
“Although the ‘findings and declaration of purpose’ included in 
the proposition clearly indicate that the measure was proposed 
to remedy the perceived inequities resulting under the 
preexisting joint and several liability doctrine and to create 
what the proponents considered a fairer system under which 
‘defendants in tort actions shall be held financially liable in 
closer proportion to their degree of fault’ [citation], such a 
remedial purpose does not necessarily indicate an intent to 
apply the statute retroactively.  Most statutory changes are, of 
course, intended to improve a preexisting situation and to bring 
about a fairer state of affairs, and if such an objective were itself 
sufficient to demonstrate a clear legislative intent to apply a 
statute retroactively, almost all statutory provisions and 
initiative measures would apply retroactively rather than 
prospectively.  In light of the general principles of statutory 
interpretation set out above, and particularly the provisions of 
Civil Code section 3 [articulating the general rule of prospective 
application], the contention is clearly flawed.”  (Ibid.)  These 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
same principles apply here and support the prospective 
application of section 1109’s bifurcation procedures.10 
Our Courts of Appeal have expressed a similar 
understanding of Estrada’s limited applicability in a variety of 
contexts.  In Cervantes, for example, the Court of Appeal held 
that statutory amendments that expanded the circumstances in 
which custodial interrogations must be recorded applied only 
prospectively (Cervantes, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 941), 
notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature had declared in 
the enactment that recording interrogations during police 
questioning of suspects “decreases wrongful convictions based 
on false confessions and enhances public confidence in the 
criminal justice process” (Stats. 2016, ch. 791, § 1, subd. (b)).  
(See id., subd. (a)(2) [citing national study finding that false 
confessions extracted during police questioning of suspects have 
been identified as a leading cause of wrongful convictions].)  And 
in Sandee, the Court of Appeal held that the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act did not apply retroactively under 
Estrada notwithstanding the likelihood that the act’s increased 
restrictions on law enforcement access to electronic devices 
would benefit defendants, because the law did not have the 
effect of lessening the punishment for a crime.  (Sandee, supra, 
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 305, fn. 7.)  The objective of the statutes at 
issue in these decisions, like section 1109, is to enhance the 
 
10  
The dissent points out that “the statutory scheme in 
Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 did not 
even implicate the criminal law.”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, 
at p. 13, fn. 5.)  But both Civil Code section 3 and Penal Code 
section 3 contain a default presumption in favor of prospective 
application.   
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
fairness of a criminal proceeding.  But they do not implicate the 
logic of Estrada.   
The dissent posits that “section 3’s presumption of 
prospective effect does not apply to ‘new provisions’ — like the 
one here — ‘which clearly benefit only defendants.’ ”  (Dis. opn. 
of Evans, J., post, at p. 5, citing Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 
p. 300.)  Neither the text of section 3 nor our cases support this 
proposition.  Our cases have instead made clear that the 
presumption 
applies 
except 
to 
changes 
that 
mitigate 
punishment.  The statutory provisions at issue in Tapia applied 
retroactively because they benefitted defendants in the specific 
manner contemplated by Estrada and its progeny.  (See Tran, 
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207, quoting Tapia, at p. 301 [“Estrada 
applies to statutory amendments ‘which redefine, to the benefit 
of defendants, conduct subject to criminal sanctions’ ” (italics 
added)].)  Specifically, the statutory provisions found to operate 
retroactively in Tapia “provide[] that the killing of a prosecutor 
or judge, to constitute a special circumstance, must be 
intentional” and “also provide[] that an accomplice, for a non-
felony-murder special circumstance to be found true, must have 
had the intent to kill.”  (Tapia, at p. 301.)  Section 1109, by 
contrast, does not create an affirmative defense, contract a 
criminal offense, or otherwise lessen punishment by redefining 
the law’s treatment of a defendant’s conduct.  There is no basis 
in our case law for inferring that the Legislature intended a rule 
about the conduct of trials to apply retroactively to cases that 
have already been tried, absent a clear indication to that effect. 
It is, of course, true that procedures designed to enhance 
the fairness and accuracy of particular proceedings might 
indirectly result in reduced punishment for individual offenders, 
insofar as the procedures might increase the chances of 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
acquittal.  But the question before us is whether section 1109 
constitutes a change within the meaning and logic of Estrada, 
and we have not previously applied the Estrada inference so 
broadly.  As the dissenting Court of Appeal justice aptly put it, 
“Although the Legislature expressly intended section 1109 to 
enhance the fairness of future proceedings, there is a manifest 
distinction between the Legislature’s creation of new criminal 
procedures designed to enhance fairness and its enactment of 
provisions that reduce the possibility of punishment.  The 
underlying rationale for the Estrada rule is to avoid the 
inference that the Legislature was bent on vengeance.  No such 
inference arises from the nonretroactivity of section 1109’s 
provisions.  Instead, the Legislature has clearly decided that 
these new procedures offer a better way to avoid the risk of 
undue prejudice than the previous procedures of discretionary 
bifurcation coupled with restrictive jury instructions.”  (Burgos, 
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 573–574 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.).)  To 
hold that any new procedures which could inure to a defendant’s 
benefit come within the Estrada exception to section 3’s default 
rule on that basis alone is not a “logical extension of Estrada’s 
reasoning” and would represent a significant expansion of 
Estrada’s scope of operation “in precisely the manner we 
[previously] forbade.”  (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325.)   
Defendants also assert that the retroactivity of Assembly 
Bill 333 should be considered as a whole.  Because the legislative 
findings pertain to the entirety of the bill and it is undisputed 
that the amendments to section 186.22 have retroactive 
application, defendants argue, section 1109’s provisions should 
also apply retroactively.  But most of the findings relate to the 
former gang enhancement provisions, not discretionary 
bifurcation.  Moreover, we do not examine retroactivity at the 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
level of the entire enactment.  We focus on the nature of each 
provision rather than its company.  (E.g., Tapia, supra, 
53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 
[rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to 
chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, 
“the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with 
respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, 
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many 
legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) 
statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject 
to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, 
not the mere fact that the amendment was enacted in the 
company of other amendments in a single legislative bill”].)  The 
mere placement of multiple provisions in a single bill does not 
provide a “clear and compelling implication” that the 
Legislature intended all would have retroactive application.  
(Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1274.)  Accordingly, in the face of 
the Legislature’s silence regarding Assembly Bill 333’s 
application, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Estrada’s 
inference 
of 
retroactivity applies to the punishment-mitigating changes to 
section 186.22, but not provisions governing the conduct of trial 
in section 1109.  (See Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 322 [when 
statutory language does not clearly support interpretation of 
retroactive application, courts must “resolve such ambiguities in 
favor of prospective operation,” which “is precisely the function 
of section 3 and the default rule it embodies”].)   
In sum, we see no justification in Estrada and its progeny 
for applying the Estrada inference of retroactivity to section 
1109.  We therefore turn to Burgos’s alternative claim that equal 
protection principles require the statute to be applied 
retroactively. 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
B. Prospective Application of Section 1109 Does 
Not Violate Equal Protection Principles 
In the alternative, Burgos argues that prospective-only 
application of section 1109 would violate the equal protection 
clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)).  He contends there is 
no rational basis to distinguish between two classes of 
individuals charged with gang enhancements, those convicted 
before the effective date of section 1109, whose judgments are 
not yet final, and those convicted after section 1109’s enactment.  
We disagree. 
“The 
equal 
protection 
clause 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no 
state may ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.’  [Citation.]  This provision is ‘essentially 
a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike.’  [Citation.]  ‘At core, the requirement of equal protection 
ensures that the government does not treat a group of people 
unequally without some justification.’ ”  (People v. Hardin (2024) 
15 Cal.5th 834, 847, fn. omitted (Hardin).)   
“The degree of justification required to satisfy equal 
protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue.”  
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847.)  “[W]hen a statute involves 
neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, the 
‘general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will 
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Burgos 
concedes that rational basis review applies. 
We recently clarified that “when plaintiffs challenge laws 
drawing distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are 
inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need to ask 
at the threshold whether the two groups are similarly situated 
for purposes of the law in question.  The only pertinent inquiry 
is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately 
justified under the applicable standard of review.  The burden 
is on the party challenging the law to show that it is not.”  
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.)   
We have repeatedly rejected an equal protection argument 
based on the timing of a statute lessening punishment for a 
particular offense.  (Floyd, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 188–190; 
Baker v. Superior Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 663, 668–669; accord, 
People v. Willis (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 952, 956; People v. 
Superior Court (Gonzales) (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 134, 142–143.)  
We have explained the basis for this holding as follows:  
“Estrada itself recognized that when the Legislature has 
amended a statute to lessen the punishment, its determination 
as to which statute should apply to all convictions not yet final, 
‘either way, would have been legal and constitutional.’  
[Citations.]  That the Legislature’s choice, either way, would be 
constitutional is the foundation for our oft-repeated statement 
that, in this type of circumstance, the problem ‘is one of trying 
to ascertain the legislative intent — did the Legislature intend 
the old or new statute to apply?’  [Citations.]  Defendant’s equal 
protection argument presumes that the Estrada rule is 
constitutionally compelled.  As we have stated repeatedly, it is 
not.”  (Floyd, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 188–189; see People v. 
Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 532 [“A refusal to apply a statute 
retroactively does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment”], 
superseded by statute as stated in People v. Capistrano (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 830, 868.)  Burgos offers no persuasive reason to 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
refrain from applying our prior precedent to an amended statute 
that is not ameliorative under Estrada.11   
Accordingly, we hold that equal protection principles do 
not require section 1109 to be applied retroactively. 
C. Burgos’s Additional Arguments Exceed the 
Scope of Review  
Burgos also contends that even if section 1109 applies 
prospectively only, the admission of gang evidence at his trial 
was unduly prejudicial and violated his due process rights.  The 
Court of Appeal did not reach this and other claims brought by 
the defense in light of its holding that Assembly Bill applies 
retroactively.  (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 564, fn. 4.)   
We decline to address Burgos’s claims of prejudice because 
they exceed the scope of our review.  Our briefing order was 
limited to the question of whether “the provision of Penal Code 
section 1109 governing the bifurcation at trial of gang 
enhancements from the substantive offense or offenses appl[ies] 
retroactively to cases that are not yet final.”  Having answered 
this question in the negative, we remand the matter to the Court 
of Appeal to resolve any remaining claims in the first instance.  
 
11  
In Hardin, we explained that our rejection of the two-step 
framework for determining equal protection challenges did not 
“call into question any of this court’s precedent that purported 
to dispose of an equal protection challenge upon deciding that 
the challenged disparate treatment did not involve groups that 
were similarly situated for purposes of the law in question.”  
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.)  Thus, Hardin does not 
call into question any of our prior precedent rejecting an equal 
protection argument based on the timing of a statute lessening 
punishment for a particular offense, even assuming such 
precedent might be said to have been premised on an application 
of the two-step framework. 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We 
conclude 
that 
section 
1109 
does 
not 
apply 
retroactively.  Because the Court of Appeal majority concluded 
otherwise, we reverse its judgment and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion.   
We 
also 
disapprove 
People 
v. 
Montano, 
supra, 
80 Cal.App.5th 82 and People v. Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 
1116, to the extent they are inconsistent with our opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
S274743 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
I agree with the majority opinion that the inference of 
retroactivity from In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 does not 
extend to Penal Code section 1109.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  
However, I write separately to emphasize a point we have made 
before: It would be preferable for “the Legislature, and the 
electorate with respect to ballot measures, to consider the 
retroactive application of new laws and to regularly express 
their intent regarding if and how they should be applied 
retroactively.”  (People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 
980.)  Instead, without an express statement from the 
Legislature, we are left to attempt to glean what we think the 
Legislature intended.  In the last 10 years alone, we have been 
compelled to make a retroactivity determination at least nine 
times, including the present case.  None of the new laws at issue 
in these cases contained an express statement regarding 
retroactivity.1 
 
1  
See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207 
(amendments to Pen. Code, § 186.22 apply retroactively to 
nonfinal cases); Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 963 
(Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 
1950) applies retroactively to nonfinal cases); People v. Stamps 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 (Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) applies retroactively to nonfinal cases); People v. Frahs 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624, 628–637 (Pen. Code, § 1001.36 applies 
 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
2 
Our Courts of Appeal have been compelled to make this 
determination with even greater regularity.  There have been 
well over a dozen published Court of Appeal cases in just the last 
two years that have addressed the retroactivity of new laws 
where no express statement regarding retroactivity was 
provided by the Legislature.2  
 
retroactively to nonfinal cases); People v. Superior Court 
(Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304 (Proposition 57  (approved Nov. 
8, 2016) applies retroactively to nonfinal cases); People v. 
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852 (Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) does not apply retroactively to nonfinal cases 
on direct appeal); People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 602–
603 (Proposition 47  (approved Nov. 4, 2014) does not apply 
retroactively to nonfinal cases on direct appeal); People v. Conley 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 (Proposition 36 (approved Nov. 6, 
2012) does not apply retroactively to nonfinal cases on direct 
appeal); see also People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675–
676 (collecting cases). 
2  
See, e.g., People v. Slaton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 363, 376, 
review granted November 15, 2023, S282047 (Evid. Code, § 
352.2 does not apply retroactively to nonfinal cases on direct 
appeal); People v. Ramos (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 578,  596 , 
review granted July 12, 2023, S280073 (same); People v. 
Venable (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 445, 456, review granted May 17, 
2023, S279081 (Evid. Code, § 352.2 applies retroactively to 
nonfinal cases); People v. Jackson (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 207, 
212, review granted September 13, 2023, S281267 (Assembly 
Bill 1950 modified the defendant’s probationary period); People 
v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 186 (Assembly Bill 1950 
applies retroactively to nonfinal cases); People v. Govan (2023) 
91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1020 (Assembly Bill No. 518’s (2021–2022 
Reg. Sess.) amendments to Pen. Code, § 654 apply retroactively 
to nonfinal cases); In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288 
(Assembly Bill No. 2361’s (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amendments 
to Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707 apply retroactively to nonfinal 
cases); People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1088–1090  
 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
3 
Without a clear statement from the Legislature, we scour 
uncodified legislative findings, declarations of purpose, 
statements on the floor, and committee reports in an effort to 
decipher the Legislature’s intent.  This process is admittedly 
less precise than simply looking to a clear statement in the 
statute itself.  Indeed, two of my distinguished colleagues here, 
analyzing exactly the same legislative materials relied on by the 
majority, have come to the opposite conclusion regarding 
retroactivity.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1.)   Going forward, the 
Legislature can remain silent regarding retroactivity and we 
will continue to use these less than perfect analytical tools to 
determine what we believe it meant.  Or, instead, the 
Legislature can take a more preferable course and plainly state 
whether or not the statute in question is retroactive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
I Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
[trial court erred in denying recall on the ground that Senate 
Bill No. 1393 did not apply retroactively to defendant’s case 
because it was final on appeal]; People v. Superior Court 
(Ortiz) (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 851, 860, footnote 2 (Pen. Code, § 
1001.95 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases); In re 
N.L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 463, 469 (Senate Bill No. 383 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to nonfinal cases); People 
v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109 (Pen. Code, § 1170’s 
amended statutory language applies retroactively to nonfinal 
cases); People v. Singh (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 147, 153 
(Assembly Bill No. 1259 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) applies 
retroactively to nonfinal cases).   
1 
 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
S274743 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Evans 
 
Whether ameliorative legislation, such as Penal Code 
section 1109,1 applies retroactively is a question of legislative 
intent.  (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada).)  One 
may readily discern the Legislature’s intent with respect to 
section 1109 by examining its text and context, the uncodified 
legislative findings accompanying its enactment, and its 
legislative history.  (See In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 
Cal.3d 583, 587 (Bouquet) [“Consistent with Estrada’s mandate, 
we must address ‘all pertinent factors’ when attempting to 
divine the legislative purpose”].)  That examination convinces 
me that the Legislature intended this statute, which was 
explicitly intended to prevent the conviction of innocent 
defendants, to have retroactive effect.  I therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
As relevant here, section 1109 grants a criminal defendant 
who is charged with one or more gang enhancements (§ 186.22, 
subds. (b), (d)) the right to have the question of guilt be tried in 
“separate phases” (§ 1109, subd. (a)):  trial on the underlying 
offense and then, if necessary, trial on the truth of the gang 
enhancement.  (Id., subd. (a)(1) & (2).)   
 
1  
All subsequent references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise specified. 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
2 
Placing the choice whether to bifurcate proceedings 
involving a gang enhancement in the defendant’s hands 
represented a sea change in how gang cases are tried.  
Previously, defendants had to rely entirely on the trial court’s 
discretion to bifurcate trial of a gang enhancement from 
nongang offenses.  (See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1040, 1049–1050.)  In practice, that discretion was exercised 
only “rarely.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 2021, 
p. 8.)  Because of what was then regarded as the efficiencies of 
joinder, courts denied bifurcation even when admission of the 
gang evidence would have been excluded as “unduly prejudicial” 
in the trial on the nongang offenses.  (Hernandez, at p. 1050; see 
Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 333, 
supra, as amended May 28, 2021, at p. 9.)   
The legislative history of section 1109 explained the 
magnitude of the potential prejudice:  evidence supporting a 
gang enhancement “ ‘may be so extraordinarily prejudicial, and 
of so little relevance to guilt, that it threatens to sway the jury 
to convict regardless of the defendant’s actual guilt.’ ”  (Sen. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 333, supra, 
as amended May 28, 2021, p. 8, italics added.)  The legislative 
history also noted the testimony of a San Joaquin County deputy 
district attorney and expert on gang prosecutions before the 
Committee on the Revision of the Penal Code, who “ ‘agreed that 
bifurcating evidence of gang involvement from evidence related 
to the underlying charges would reduce the risk of unfairly 
prejudicing juries and convicting innocent people.’ ”  (Id. at p. 10, 
italics added.)   
This unfairness was of profound concern to the 
Legislature.  In clear and forceful language, the Legislature 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
3 
found and declared that “[g]ang enhancement evidence can be 
unreliable and prejudicial to a jury because it is lumped into 
evidence of the underlying charges which further perpetuates 
unfair prejudice in juries and convictions of innocent people.”  
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (d)(6), italics added.)  It relied on 
studies showing that “allowing a jury to hear the kind of 
evidence that supports a gang enhancement before it has 
decided whether the defendant is guilty or not may lead to 
wrongful convictions” and noted, as a result, that “[t]he mere 
specter of gang enhancements pressures defendants to accept 
unfavorable plea deals rather than risk a trial filled with 
prejudicial evidence and a substantially longer sentence.”  (Id., 
§ 2, subd. (e).)  Citing the 2020 Annual Report of the Committee 
on Revision of the Penal Code, the Legislature found that this 
unfairness was borne disproportionately by “people of color, 
creating a racial disparity.”  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. 
(d)(1).)   
The disparity identified by the Legislature is substantial.  
Nearly 90 percent of individuals in the state’s gang database are 
Black or Latino (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (d)(10)), and over 
98 percent of people sentenced to prison for a gang enhancement 
in our state’s largest county are people of color.  (Id., subd. 
(d)(4).)  The Legislature further found that “gang enhancement 
statutes criminalize entire neighborhoods historically impacted 
by poverty, racial inequality, and mass incarceration as they 
punish people based on their cultural identity, who they know, 
and where they live.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  
Like the Court of Appeal below, I believe the Legislature’s 
concern about the conviction of innocent defendants indicates it 
wanted to extend the benefit of this ameliorative statute “to 
every case to which it constitutionally could apply.”  (Estrada, 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
4 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  Legislatures as well as courts are 
aware that avoiding “the injustice that results from the 
conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our 
criminal justice system.”  (Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 
325.)  A legal maxim, well known to lawyers and nonlawyers 
alike, states “ ‘that it is better that ninety-nine . . . offenders 
should escape, than that one innocent man should be 
condemned.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Against this shared background, the 
Legislature’s explicit concern about preventing “wrongful 
convictions” of “innocent people” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subds. 
(e), (d)(6)), which it supported with empirical studies (id., subd. 
(e)), cannot reasonably be read as “equivocal.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 21.)  
In short, section 1109 is an ameliorative statute that by 
design and function is aimed at preventing the conviction of 
innocent defendants.  It is an “obvious” and “inevitable” 
inference the Legislature would have been as concerned about 
wrongful convictions of innocent people that were then occurring 
or already had occurred as it was about wrongful convictions 
that could occur three months later, once the statute took effect.  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745; cf. In re Johnson (1970) 3 
Cal.3d 404, 413 [“the more directly the new rule in question 
serves to preclude the conviction of innocent persons, the more 
likely it is that the rule will be afforded retrospective 
application”].)  “[T]o hold otherwise would be to conclude that 
the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance,” as 
there can be no penological justification for denying the benefit 
of section 1109 to innocent defendants whose convictions are not 
yet final.  (Estrada, at p. 745.)   
Consequently, this is yet another instance where the 
“ ‘logic’ ” and “rationale” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–13) of 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
5 
Estrada require a statute to be applied retroactively.  As we 
have 
previously 
explained, 
section 
3’s 
presumption 
of 
prospective effect does not apply to “new provisions” — like the 
one here — “which clearly benefit only defendants.”  (Tapia v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 300; see People v. Conley 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 (Conley) [“The Estrada rule rests on 
an inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a 
legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to 
the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible”].)  Section 
1109 should therefore be given retroactive effect. 
I.  
The 
majority 
opinion 
evades 
this 
conclusion 
by 
disregarding the development of the Estrada doctrine over the 
past several decades and focusing instead only on the narrow 
question whether the statute here “mitigate[s] punishment.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34.)  While it is true that the particular 
statute in Estrada did act “to lessen the punishment” (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745), we have long since recognized that 
Estrada can apply to many other types of statutes, including 
those that “created an affirmative defense” (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 10), “contracted a criminal offense” (ibid.), or granted courts 
“discretion to impose lesser punishment” (ibid., italics added).  
Our precedent likewise holds that a statute may be retroactive 
even when it is not restricted to “a particular crime” (id. at p. 
11) and even though “Estrada was not directly on point,” so long 
as “ ‘its rationale’ ” or “ ‘logic’ ” applies (id., at pp. 11, 16).   
The foregoing amply demonstrates the folly of an unduly 
narrow focus on whether an ameliorative statute has a 
particular kind of effect on punishment.  Consider People v. 
Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 (Brown), which similarly 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
6 
attempted to cabin Estrada’s scope only to the specific 
circumstances which, to that point, our case law happened to 
have addressed.  In rejecting an attempt to make retroactive a 
temporary increase in the rate at which county jail inmates 
could earn conduct credits, Brown purported to limit Estrada to 
“ ‘ “[a] legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular 
crime” ’ ” and deemed it significant that the increase in credits 
for good behavior “does not represent a judgment about the 
needs of the criminal law with respect to a particular criminal 
offense.”  (Brown, at p. 325, second italics added.)   
A few years later, however, we reversed field and 
repudiated Brown’s narrow reading of Estrada.  We deemed it 
irrelevant that a new procedural provision prohibiting 
prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in 
adult court, and instead conditioning transfer to adult court on 
a fitness hearing in juvenile court, “did not ameliorate the 
punishment, or possible punishment, for a particular crime.”  
(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308, italics 
added (Lara).)  Although the “effect” of the new rule was 
“different from the statutory changes in Estrada,” we reasoned 
that “the same inference of retroactivity should apply” because 
“[t]he possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court 
. . . can result in dramatically different and more lenient 
treatment.”  (Lara, at pp. 308, 303.)  Shortly after that, we 
applied the Estrada retroactivity exception to a new legislative 
scheme that, for most charged felonies, offered defendants the 
possibility of mental health diversion.  (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 618 (Frahs).)  And in People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 
Cal.5th 961 (Prudholme), we applied the Estrada retroactivity 
exception to a statute reducing the maximum allowable 
probation term for a wide range of offenses, despite the fact that 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
7 
the new statute was not limited to “any particular offense” (id. 
at p. 976) and did not even involve “punishment” but instead 
modified the terms of “an act of leniency” (id. at p. 968) — and 
despite the fact that Estrada was “not directly on point” (ibid.).   
What mattered in Prudholme, as well as in these other 
cases, was not whether the particular statute made a 
“punishment-mitigating change[]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 36) nor 
whether the statute happened to mirror statutes we had 
previously deemed to be retroactive under Estrada, but whether 
the “rationale of Estrada” applied.  (Prudholme, supra, 14 
Cal.5th at p. 968.)  That rationale inquires whether the statute 
“by design and function provides a possible ameliorating 
benefit” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624) as to punishment (see 
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745) or as to the issue of guilt or 
innocence (see People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 [newly 
enacted affirmative defense]) for an identifiable “class of 
persons” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308; Frahs, at p. 624).  
Where, as here, the Legislature enacts an ameliorative statute 
aimed at benefiting defendants, it “represents a legislative 
judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is 
sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.”  
(Estrada, at p. 745, italics added.) 
Even if the test for retroactivity were limited to whether 
the statute reflected an intent to lessen punishment, section 
1109 certainly satisfies the test.  The Legislature explicitly 
contemplated that bifurcating trial on a gang enhancement from 
trial on the underlying felony — like a statute narrowing the 
definition of a crime or recognizing a new affirmative defense — 
would significantly increase the possibility of acquittal and 
thereby “ ‘reduce the possibility of punishment.’ ”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 35.)  It is true that section 1109 is procedural, but (as 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
8 
the majority concedes (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 26)) so too were 
the statutes we considered in Lara and Frahs.  (See also People 
v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 [statute “[e]liminating the 
prior restriction on the court’s ability to strike a serious felony 
enhancement”]; People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 76 
[statute “vest[ing] in the trial court discretion to impose either 
the same penalty as under the former law or a lesser penalty”].)  
Section 1109, like these other procedural statutes, is retroactive 
because it reflects an intent to “ma[k]e a reduced punishment 
possible.”  (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 629.)   
The majority opinion’s occasional effort to broaden its 
characterization of Estrada’s rationale — i.e., as applicable to 
“statutes that either reduce the punishment for a criminal 
offense or create discretion to reduce such punishment, or 
narrow the scope of criminal liability” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 
16) — falls short of the mark.  This characterization does not 
articulate an actual rationale; it merely describes the individual 
instances in which this court has previously found Estrada to 
apply.2  What’s worse, this mechanical approach replicates 
Brown’s improperly narrow reading of Estrada, which we 
 
2  
In fact, it’s not even an accurate description.  If the test 
under Estrada were solely whether “ ‘the Legislature has 
amended a statute to lessen the punishment’ ” (maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 38), then the amended statute at issue in Brown, supra, 54 
Cal.4th 314, which temporarily increased the rate at which 
county inmates could earn conduct credits (and thus “earlier 
release from custody” (id. at p. 322)), would have had retroactive 
effect.  But Brown correctly did not restrict its analysis to the 
statute’s effect on punishment.  We reasoned instead that the 
amended credits statute, enacted in the face of “a state fiscal 
emergency” (id. at p. 318), was not designed to confer a benefit 
on defendants; rather, it was designed to “offer[] incentives for 
future good behavior.”  (Id. at p. 324, italics added.)  
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
9 
shortly thereafter effectively repudiated in Lara, Frahs, and 
Prudholme.  I fear this zigzag approach to applying Estrada will 
sow confusion in the law and exacerbate the uncertainty that 
has already led the lower courts time and again to arrive at 
conflicting decisions as to whether a given statute is retroactive.  
(Compare, e.g., People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 565–
567 with People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 207.)  Yet 
we are not without the tools to solve the problem.  The question 
for courts, properly understood, is whether a statute, by design 
and function, provides a clear and significant benefit to 
defendants as to punishment or on the question of guilt and 
innocence.  Unlike the majority, I find it unimaginable the 
Legislature would have restricted its concern about convicting 
the innocent to only a subset of those it could constitutionally 
reach.   
II. 
The majority opinion seeks to downplay the Legislature’s 
focus on preventing wrongful convictions of innocent people in 
two ways.  First, it tries to divert attention away from the 
express legislative findings accompanying the enactment of 
section 1109.  Second, it insists the Legislature could not have 
meant what it said about the risk of convicting innocent people 
when irrelevant gang evidence is included in a trial on the 
underlying substantive offense.  Neither effort is persuasive.   
A.  
The majority opinion intimates there is something 
untoward about considering the explicit legislative findings 
included in the uncodified section of the bill that enacted section 
1109.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30–31.)  Not so.  As the 
majority opinion elsewhere concedes, the question of whether 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
10 
new legislation applies retroactively “ ‘ “is one of trying to 
ascertain the legislative intent.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 38.)  From the 
beginning we have instructed courts making that inquiry to 
consider “all pertinent factors” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 
746), and we have reaffirmed that broad review continuously 
(see, e.g., Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 587 [“Consistent with 
Estrada’s mandate, we must address ‘all pertinent factors’ ”]), 
including in our most recent retroactivity decisions (see, e.g., 
Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th 961, 967 (Prudholme) [quoting 
Estrada]).  The majority opinion’s contention that we have 
“disapproved” this practice (maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 3) is 
manifestly mistaken. 
It is also beyond dispute that the Legislature’s explicit 
findings are a valuable resource in ascertaining legislative 
intent.  We regularly consult uncodified provisions, which are 
“part of the statutory law” (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans 
Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 925), to ascertain “[t]he general 
intent” of legislation (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
661, 669) as well as its “express purpose and intended scope” 
(People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 362). (See generally 
People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 858, fn. 13 [uncodified 
sections “express the Legislature’s view on some aspect of the 
operation or effect of the bill”].)  Those findings, which are set 
forth above, evidence the Legislature’s special concern about the 
risk of convicting innocent people. 
B. 
In fact, it’s no exaggeration to say that convicting the 
innocent is what the law abhors most.  Such a scenario is the 
subject of some of our culture’s most enduring literature and 
film, from To Kill a Mockingbird to The Shawshank 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
11 
Redemption.  Instances of convicting the innocent haunt our 
nation’s history.  (See, e.g., Stevenson, Just Mercy:  A Story of 
Justice and Redemption (2014); The Central Park Five 
(Sundance Selects 2012).)  It is therefore perplexing that the 
majority opinion describes the Legislature’s findings on this 
fundamental point to be merely “ ‘ “vague phrases” ’ ” and 
“ ‘ “broad general language.” ’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 3.) 
I view the findings differently.  The Legislature stated 
clearly and specifically that lumping gang enhancement 
evidence with “evidence of the underlying charges . . . 
perpetuates unfair prejudice in juries and convictions of 
innocent people.”  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (d)(6).)  The 
Legislature supported this finding with empirical studies 
showing that the jury’s consideration of “the kind of evidence 
that supports a gang enhancement . . . may lead to wrongful 
convictions.”  (Id., § 2, subd. (e).)  Finally, the legislative history 
noted that the proposed remedy — section 1109 — would be 
effective.  As noted above, a prosecution gang expert opined that 
“ ‘bifurcating evidence of gang involvement from evidence 
related to the underlying charges would reduce the risk of 
unfairly prejudicing juries and convicting innocent people.’ ”  
(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 333, 
supra, as amended May 28, 2021, p. 10.)   
To characterize the Legislature’s conscious effort to 
remedy this type of injustice as merely a general desire “to 
promote fairness and reduce the potential for prejudice in trial 
proceedings” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 29) is not only a profound 
understatement but a category error.  Section 1109 is not merely 
a “new procedure[] which could inure to a defendant’s benefit.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 35.)  Rather, it enables juries, at the 
defendant’s option, to carefully and soberly assess the evidence 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
12 
regarding the charged offense without being distracted by the 
irrelevant and inflammatory suggestion the defendant is 
allegedly associated with a criminal street gang.  Never before 
have we denied retroactive effect to a statute that “by design and 
function provides a possible ameliorating benefit for a class of 
persons” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624) — and certainly not 
when the statute is aimed at preventing the conviction of an 
innocent defendant.  Not even once.   
C.  
The remaining cases on which the majority opinion 
relies — none of which was “designed to provide a clear and 
significant benefit to defendants” (People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 
Cal.App.5th 
927, 941) — 
are 
soundly 
distinguishable.  
Cervantes considered the retroactive effect of an amended 
statute requiring that custodial interrogations of murder 
suspects be recorded.  (§ 859.5, subds. (a), (b), (d); Stats. 2016, 
ch. 791, § 2.)  In enacting the amendments, the Legislature had 
made findings that recorded interrogations would generally 
promote fairness neutrally to both the prosecution and the 
defense and reduce the likelihood of prejudice arising from 
inaccurate reports of what transpired.  (Stats. 2016, ch. 791, § 1, 
subd. (a)(2), (3).)  In particular, the Legislature believed that 
recorded interrogations would not only “decrease[] wrongful 
convictions based on false confessions” (id., § 1, subd. (b)), but 
also “ ‘prevent disputes about how an officer conducted himself 
or herself or treated a suspect during the course of an 
interrogation, prevent a defendant from lying about the account 
of events he or she originally provided to law enforcement, and 
spare judges and jurors the time necessary and the need to 
assess which account of an interrogation to believe.’ ”  
(Cervantes, at p. 941, quoting Stats. 2016, ch. 791, § 1, subd. (b).)  
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
13 
Because the amendments were aimed at improving the justice 
system generally, they were not retroactive.  (Cervantes, at 
p. 941; see also People v. Sandee (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 294, 305 
& fn. 7 [statute limiting governmental searches of cell phones, 
designed to protect Californians’ privacy, was not retroactive].)3  
These examples of “new procedures which could inure to a 
defendant’s benefit” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 35) or general 
improvements in “how criminal cases are investigated or tried” 
(id. at p. 13) shed little light on section 1109 and the stakes 
highlighted by the Legislature.  
The 
majority 
opinion’s 
hypothesized 
legislative 
justification for refusing to apply section 1109 retroactively 
likewise does not withstand scrutiny.  The majority opinion 
suggests that the “systemic costs” of retroactive application 
could justify a decision not to apply the new bifurcation policy to 
defendants who have already been tried, noting these 
“completed 
trials” 
were 
“conducted 
under 
valid 
and 
constitutional laws (and where evidence supports guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt).”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 25–26.)  But this 
stated concern fails to distinguish the case before us from any of 
the other instances in which we have found Estrada to apply.  
Anytime the Legislature reduces punishment, expands the 
opportunities for diversion, limits the ability to try a minor as 
an adult, or increases the possibility of acquittal by, say, adding 
a new element to (or otherwise narrowing) an offense, 
 
3  
The statute at issue in People v. Robertson (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 18, 51, did not implicate a defendant’s guilt or innocence, 
and the statutory scheme in Evangelatos v. Superior Court 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 did not even implicate the criminal law at 
all.  (Id. at p. 1210, fn. 15 [“the Estrada decision provides no 
guidance for the resolution of this case”].) 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
14 
retroactive application of the new statute could equally “undo or 
jeopardize completed trials conducted under valid and 
constitutional laws (and where evidence supports guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt).”  (Id. at p. 26.)  In Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
618, for example, a defendant who had been convicted of second 
degree robbery, found to have suffered a prior serious felony 
conviction, and sentenced to nine years in prison was allowed to 
seek eligibility for mental health diversion under section 
1001.36 — despite the fact the defendant had been found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt under valid and constitutional laws 
as they then existed.   
In this case, the Court of Appeal found it “likely” the jury 
improperly relied on evidence of Francisco Burgos’s and his 
codefendants’ gang membership to establish their guilt of two 
counts of robbery, given that neither victim identified any of the 
defendants at trial.  (People v. Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 569.)  Denying Burgos, whose conviction is not yet final, the 
opportunity to demonstrate he would not have been convicted 
had the gang enhancement been bifurcated “can, by hypothesis, 
serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance.”  
(Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 628.)  While the Legislature may 
be free, as a constitutional matter, to apply such a statute either 
retroactively or prospectively (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 38–
39) — or even to provide for an alternate avenue of relief, and 
thereby rebut the inference of retroactive effect (see, e.g., 
Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 658–659) — the majority 
opinion cites no authority suggesting that “systemic costs” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 25) have ever led the Legislature to intend 
prospective-only application of an ameliorative statute that “by 
design and function” (Frahs, at p. 624) was aimed at preventing 
the wrongful conviction of innocent people.  Given its express 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
15 
findings, there is no indication the Legislature had “a fear of too 
much justice,” which in this circumstance “would be repugnant 
to deeply rooted conceptions” against punishing the innocent.  
(McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 339 (dis. opn. of 
Brennan, J.).)  
III. 
For all these reasons, I am unwilling to conclude the 
Legislature would have been so nonchalant about denying a 
remedy for innocent defendants who were convicted simply 
because the jury was allowed to consider evidence of their 
alleged association with gangs that was unrelated to the 
charged crimes a few days, weeks, or months before the effective 
date of section 1109.  By finding otherwise, the court today 
seems to have lost sight of the fact that the general statutory 
presumption in section 3 that statutes operate prospectively “is 
not a straitjacket.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.)  As we 
recently observed, this presumption “should not be followed 
blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to 
the legislative intent.”  (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 967.)  
Section 1109’s explicit focus on the risk of wrongful conviction of 
innocent people offers much more than a clue. 
Unlike the majority opinion, I believe that a statute which, 
by design and function, provides a clear benefit to defendants on 
the question of guilt or innocence should apply in every case to 
which it constitutionally could apply — regardless of whether 
the statute might be characterized as more procedural than 
substantive.  It seems rather unlikely the Legislature would 
have been more concerned about the elusive line between 
statutes that are procedural and those that are substantive than 
whether the previous statutory regime may have led to the 
PEOPLE v. BURGOS 
Evans, J., dissenting 
16 
conviction of innocent people whose judgments could still be 
corrected.   
I therefore respectfully dissent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVANS, J. 
I Concur: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Burgos 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 77 Cal.App.5th 550 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S274743 
Date Filed:  June 3, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara 
Judges:  Cynthia A. Sevely and Helen E. Williams 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Laurie Wilmore, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and 
Conrad Petermann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant Francisco Burgos. 
 
Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant Damon Stevenson, Jr. 
 
Solomon R. Wollack, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant James Richardson. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, 
Alice B. Lustre, Seth K. Schalit and J. Michael Chamberlain, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Solomon R. Wollack 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 23933 
Pleasant Hill, CA 94523 
(925) 671-2501 
 
Jeffrey M. Laurence 
Assistant Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3812