Case Title: Edwards v. Corbin

Citation: 379 Md. 278

Docket Number: 102/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 102
September Term, 2002
_________________________________________
EDWARDS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, et al.
v.
CYNT HIA CORB IN
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
       * Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                                
         JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   February 10, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1
While referred to as the “Washington, D.C. branch,” according to the complaint the office where
Corbin worked, and where the events giving rise to this action occurred, was located in Beltsville,
Prince George’s County, Maryland.  The defendants have not disputed this allegation.
In this case, the petitioners contend that the combined operation of Prince
George’s County anti-discrimination ordinances and a state statute violates Article XI-
A of the Maryland Constitution.  The state statute, Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 49B, § 42, authorizes, in three Maryland counties, the enforcement of local
anti-discrimination ordinances by causes of action in the circuit courts. 
I.
The facts of this case, which are not in dispute, were set forth in the unreported
opinion of the Court of Special Appeals as follows:
“Appellant, Cynthia Corbin, is a black female.  On March 11,
1996, she was hired by EST [Edwards Systems Technology, Inc.]
as a Service Agreement Sales Specialist.  On December 30, 1996,
Corbin was promoted to the position of Operations Manager for
EST’s Services Division’s Washington, D.C. branch.[1]
“While Corbin held the position of Operations Manager,
appellee Anderson, a white male, was employed as EST’s District
Manager.  Corbin lodged numerous complaints to Anderson and his
superiors about alleged discriminatory practices and about
Anderson’s billing and contract-letting practices.
“In August 1997, Anderson informed Corbin that EST would
demote her to the position of Service Agreement Sales Specialist.
Anderson further noted that he would take the position that she
would be forced to vacate.  Consequently, Corbin contacted the
Regional Manager, who confirmed that the company was demoting
Anderson because he was unable to perform the duties of District
Manager in a satisfactory manner.  The demotions became effective
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in late February 1998.  Corbin assumed the position of Customer
Service Specialist and Anderson became the Operations Manager
for the Services Division’s Washington, D.C. branch.
“Corbin alleges that from February 1998 to March 1999,
Anderson consistently assigned his duties as Operations Manager
to her.  As a result, tensions continued to rise between the two
parties and Corbin informed the Branch Manager and his
supervisors that she was doing the brunt of Anderson’s work and
should be reassigned to the position.
“Corbin further alleges that on February 19, 1999, she
approached Anderson to inquire as to what employees would be
attending an upcoming trade show.  Despite the fact that, as a
member of the sponsor organization, she requested to attend,
Anderson did not respond.
“Subsequently, on February 25, 1999, the day of the trade show,
at approxim ately 8:20 a.m., Anderson entered Corbin’s office to
ask her for a trade show video.  As Anderson was exiting the
office, he stopped to ask if Corbin was planning on attending the
trade show that day.  Corbin informed Anderson that she did not
plan on attending because he had not responded to her request to
attend and as a result she did not obtain a ticket.  Anderson insisted
that she did not need a ticket to enter, but Corbin insisted
otherwise.  Anderson then threw a ticket in Corbin’s direction,
voiced his displeasure with Corbin, and left.
“Corbin subsequently walked to Anderson’s office to return the
ticket and inform him that she would not be attending.  Corbin
claims that as she left the office Anderson followed her and began
shouting at her.  Anderson continued to follow Corbin into her
office and continued to yell.  Corbin further alleged . . . that
Anderson slammed his fist on her desk and attempted to prevent
her from leaving the office.  Despite his presence, Corbin did leave
the office.  Anderson followed so Corbin returned to her office and
locked the door.  She then telephoned Corporate Headquarters to
report the incident.”
Corbin filed a six-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
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2
Division 12 of the Prince George’s County Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Sec. 2-186.  Definitions.
(a) As used in this Division:
* * *
(3) Discrimination shall mean acting, or failing to act, or unduly delaying any
action regarding any person because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age
(except as required by State or federal law), occupation, familial status, marital
status, political opinion, personal appearance, sexual orientation, or physical or
mental handicap, in such a way that such person is adversely affected in the areas of
housing and residential real estate, employment, law enforcement, education,
financial lending, public accommodations, or commercial real estate.”
* * *
“Sec. 2-222.  Discrimination in employment prohibited.
“No employer in the County shall discharge or refuse to hire any person, or act
against any person with respect to compensation or other terms and conditions of
employment, or limit, segregate, classify or assign employees because of
discrimination.”
County, asserting claims against Edwards Systems and Anderson, and seeking money
damages.  In the first three counts, Corbin alleged that Edwards Systems violated
Division 12, § 2-185, et seq. of the Prince George’s County Code (1999), and
specifically §§ 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 which define and prohibit discrimination in
employment.2  Count one claimed that Edwards Systems demoted Corbin because of
her race and sex, and count two alleged harassment and discrimination based on race
and marital status.  Count three stated that the employer failed to provide reasonable
accommodation for a disability. Corbin’s asserted causes of action against Edwards
Systems, encompassed by the first three counts, were based upon the state statute,
Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, § 42, coupled with §§ 2-186(a)(3)
-4-
3
Article 49 B, § 42, provides as follows:
“§ 42.  Civil actions for discriminatory acts – Montgomery County, Prince      
                     George’s County, and Howard County.
“(a) Authorized. – In Montgomery County, Prince George's County, and Howard
County, in accordance with this subtitle, a person who is subjected to an act of
discrimination prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action
against the person who committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages,
injunctive relief, or other civil relief. 
“(b) Limitations periods. – (1) An action under subsection (a) of this section shall
be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discrimination
took place not later than 2 years after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act.
“(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, an action under
subsection (a) of this section alleging employment or public accommodation
discrimination may not be commenced sooner than 45 days after the aggrieved
person files a complaint with the county agency responsible for handling violations
of the county discrimination laws. 
“(3) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, an action under
subsection (a) of this section alleging real estate discrimination may be commenced
at any time. 
“(c) Fees and costs. – In a civil action under this section, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness
fees, and costs.”
and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code.3  The remaining three counts initially
alleged “common law” causes of action against Anderson.  Count four was based upon
an alleged civil assault; count five asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and count six charged “racial harassm ent.”
On April 10, 2000, both defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.  They argued that
counts one, two, and three should be dismissed because they were predicated on the
combined operation of Art. 49B, § 42, and the local anti-discrimination law, and that
-5-
this combined operation violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution as applied
in McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 570 A.2d 834 (1990).  In addition, the
defendants maintained that count two failed to state a claim against Edwards Systems
for harassment and discrimination based on marital status.  Finally, they asserted that
counts three through six failed to state a claim.  
After the filing of Corbin’s opposition to the motion to dismiss and the
submission of several memoranda, the Circuit Court held a hearing on October 6, 2000.
During the hearing, Corbin “withdrew” count three.  Corbin also stated that count six,
setting forth an alleged cause of action for “racial harassm ent,” was against both
Edwards Systems and Anderson and was based on the same statutory provisions as
counts one and two.  The Circuit Court at the hearing decided that counts four, five,
and six would be dismissed for failure to state a claim, although the dismissal of count
six would be with leave to amend.  Corbin requested that the dismissal of count four
be with leave to amend, but the court denied this request.  The Circuit Court also
dismissed counts one, two, and six on the ground that Art. 49B, § 42, coupled with the
local anti-discrimination ordinances, violated Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution.  The dismissal of counts one and two was also with leave to amend, in
order for the plaintiff to allege discrimination claims under federal law if she chose to
do so.
The determinations made at the October 6th hearing were recorded on a separate
document that day and were thereafter duly entered on the docket.  Nevertheless, there
-6-
was no appealable final judgment at that time because of the leave to amend counts
one, two, and six.  Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 311 Md. 278, 281-282, 533 A.2d
1303, 1305 (1987), and cases there cited.
Within ten days of the October 6, 2000, determinations, Corbin filed in the
Circuit Court a motion to reconsider the dismissals of counts one, two, and six, and to
reconsider the denial of leave to amend with regard to count four.  At about the same
time, the defendants removed the case from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.  The case was
docketed in the United States District Court on October 16, 2000.  The defendants also
filed an opposition to Corbin’s motion for reconsideration.  Next, on December 26,
2000, the United States District Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County for further proceedings in the latter court, holding that “the case was
wrongly removed from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.”
The plaintiff Corbin decided not to amend her complaint, and on April 16, 2001,
the circuit judge signed an “Order” denying Corbin’s motion to reconsider and
effectively terminating the action in the Circuit Court.  The order was filed and entered
on the docket on April 17, 2001.  Thereafter, Corbin took a timely appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals, challenging the dismissal on state constitutional grounds of counts
one, two, and six, and challenging the trial judge’s denial of leave to amend with
respect to count 4.  The Court of Special Appeals, agreeing with Corbin’s arguments,
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  The
-7-
4
The Court of Special Appeals also addressed the appealability of the Circuit Court’s April 16,
2001, order.  While not viewing the order as a final judgment, the Court of Special Appeals took the
position that it could enter a final judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C).  Although
we do not believe that Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C) is applicable to the present situation, we do believe that
the April 16, 2001, order effectively terminated the case in the Circuit Court and was, therefore, a
final appealable judgment.  See Houghton v. County Comm’rs of Kent Co., 305 Md. 407, 412-413,
504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986) (“The order . . . had the effect of putting the plaintiff out of court.
Nothing remained to be done. * * * Nothing in [the rules] . . . requires that the word ‘judgment’
always be used as a prerequisite to finality”).
intermediate appellate court held that Art. 49B, §42, coupled with the Prince George’s
County anti-discrimination ordinances, did not violate Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution, and that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing counts one, two, and six on
the ground that the above-mentioned statutes violated the Constitution.  In addition, the
Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by refusing
leave to amend count four of the complaint.4  
The defendants filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting
the single issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the cause
of action authorized by Art. 49B, § 42, combined with the Prince George’s County anti-
discrimination ordinances, did not violate Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.
The certiorari petition did not present any other constitutional or non-constitutional
issues, and did not challenge the Court of Special Appeals’ decision regarding leave
to amend count four of the complaint.  The plaintiff Corbin did not file a cross-petition
for a writ of certiorari presenting any additional issues.  We granted the petition,
Edwards Systems v. Corbin, 372 Md. 429, 813 A.2d 257 (2002), and shall affirm the
-8-
5
The defendants-petitioners in their brief in this Court, for the first time, argue that Art. 49B,
§ 42, “by selectively extending a right of action to residents of some, but not all, of Maryland’s
counties, violates the equal protection guarantees embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.”  (Petitioners’ brief at 18).  As this issue was not presented in the certiorari
petition, a cross-petition, or added by order of this Court, it is not properly before us, and we intimate
no opinion on the issue.  See, e.g., Maryland Rule 8-131(b); Baltimore Teachers Union v. Maryland
State Board of Education, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2004); Brooks v. Lewin Realty; 378 Md. 70,
75, 835 A.2d 616, 619 (2003); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 174, 825 A.2d 452, 455 (2003);
Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 439-441, 788 A.2d 636, 641-642 (2002); Lovelace v. Anderson,
366 Md. 690, 712, 785 A.2d 726, 739 (2001); Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 319-325, 718 A.2d 588,
594-597 (1998); Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 501-503, 403 A.2d 1221, 1222-1224 (1979).
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.5
II.
Before addressing the petitioners’ argument based on Article XI-A of the
Maryland Constitution, it would be useful to review the constitutional background and
the case on which the petitioners chiefly rely, McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, 319
Md. 12, 570 A.2d 834.
Prince George’s County is a chartered home rule county under Article XI-A of
the Maryland Constitution.  In McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, involving a Montgom ery
County ordinance, we set forth the history and purpose of Article XI-A as follows (319
Md. at 16-17, 570 A.2d at 835-836):
“Article X1-A was proposed by Ch. 416 of the Laws of Maryland
of 1914 and ratified by the voters on November 2, 1915. The
Article, known as the Home Rule Amendment, enabled counties,
which chose to adopt a home rule charter, to achieve a significant
degree of political self-determination.   Its purpose was to transfer
the General Assemb ly*s power to enact many types of county
public local laws to the Art. XI-A home rule counties.  See
generally, e.g., Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md.
332, 344, 558 A.2d 724 (1989); Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381,
384, 470 A.2d 345 (1984); Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291
-9-
Md. 331, 342, 435 A.2d 425 (1981); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287
Md. 595, 597-598, 415 A.2d 255 (1980).  As the Court explained
in State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 422, 137 A. 39, 41 (1927)
(emphasis supplied):
‘The wisdom of incorporating in the organic law of the state
such provisions as are contained in this article had been
urged for a number of years prior to its adoption, the reasons
assigned by its proponents being that a larger measure of
home rule be secured to the people of the respective political
subdivisions of the state in matters of purely local concern,
in order that there should be the fullest measure of local
self-government, and that these local questions should thus
be withdrawn from consideration by the General Assembly,
leaving that body more time to consider and pass upon
general legislation, and to prevent the passage of such
legislation from being influenced by what is popularly
known as “log-rolling”; that is, by influencing the attitude
and vote of members of the General Assemb ly upon
proposed general laws by threatening the defeat or
promising the support of local legislation in which a
particular member might be peculiarly interested.’
“Sections 1 and 1A of Article XI-A empower Baltimore City
and the counties of Maryland to adopt a charter form of local
governm ent. Section 2 directs the General Assemb ly to provide a
grant of express powers for charter home rule counties.  The
General Assemb ly followed that directive and enacted the Express
Powers Act by Ch. 456 of  the Laws of Maryland of 1918, codified
as Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.), Art. 25A.  Section 3 of Article
XI-A provides (emphasis supplied):
‘From and after the adoption of a charter by the City of
Baltimore, or any County of this State, as hereinbefore
provided, the Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the
City of Baltimore or the County Council of said County,
subject to the Constitution and Public General Laws of  this
State, shall have full power to enact local laws of  said city
or county . . . upon all matters covered by the express
powers granted as above provided . . . .’
“Article XI-A ‘does not constitute a grant of absolute autonomy
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to local govern ments.’  Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md.
48, 56, 388 A.2d 523, 529 (1978).  This Court*s decisions and the
above-quoted passage make it clear that the Home Rule
Amendment limits the . . . County Council to enacting ‘local laws’
on matters covered by the Express Powers Act.”
* * *
“In prohibiting the General Assemb ly from enacting public local
laws for Baltimore City and charter home rule counties on subjects
covered by the Express Powers Act, Section 4 of Article XI-A
states that ‘[a]ny law so drawn as to apply to two or more of the
geographical subdivisions of this State shall not be deemed a Local
Law, within the meaning of this Act.’  As this Court has pointed
out, ‘[a]part from that limitation, [Article XI-A] attempts no
definition of the distinction between a local law and a general law,
but leaves that question to be determined by the application of
settled legal principles to the facts of particular cases in which the
distinction may be involved.’  Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 260,
183 A. 534, 537-538 (1936).”
For more recent discussions concerning Article XI-A, see Piscatelli v. Board of Liquor
Licence Commissioners, ___ Md. ___, ___, 837 A.2d 931, 937-938 (2003); Holiday v.
Montgomery County, 377 Md. 305, 313-319, 833 A.2d 518 (2003); H. P. White v.
Blackburn, 372 Md. 160, 167-171, 812 A.2d 305 (2002); Tyma v. Montgomery County,
369 Md. 497, 504-514, 801 A.2d 148 (2002); Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 363
Md. 565, 579, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001).
McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, concerned the validity of a Montgom ery
County ordinance which created a new circuit court cause of action by one who had
been discriminated against in violation of the Montgomery County Code.  Robert
Fowler, a manager of a McCrory Corporation store in Montgom ery County, alleged that
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McCrory harassed and thereafter constructively discharged him in retaliation for his
refusal to implement McCrory’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices.  Fowler filed,
in the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County, an action against McCrory under, inter
alia, § 27-20(a) of the Montgom ery County Code, which created a new circuit court
cause of action to remedy the violation of the local anti-discrimination ordinances.
Section 27-20(a) of the Montgom ery County Code, which had been enacted by the
Montgom ery County Council, authorized the recovery of money damages without any
statutory limitations, or an injunction, or “other civil relief, including reasonable
attorney’s fees.”  Fowler sought to recover over $1.8 million in compensatory and
punitive damages.
The McCrory case was removed from the Circuit Court to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.  The federal court subsequently certified to
this Court questions concerning the validity, under both state public general law and
under the Maryland Constitution, of § 27-20(a) of the Montgom ery County Code which
created the cause of action.
After emphasizing in McCrory that Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution
authorized chartered county councils to enact only “local laws,” we turned to the issue
of whether § 27-20(a) of the Montgom ery County Code was a “local law” within the
meaning of Article XI-A.  We initially pointed out that “[s]everal decisions by this
Court illustrate that laws, which may appear to be local in form, might not constitute
‘local laws’ under Article XI-A.”  McCrory, 319 Md. at 18, 570 A.2d at 837.  The
-12-
McCrory opinion continued: “‘[A] law is not necessarily a local law merely because its
operation is confined . . . to a single county, if it affects the interests of the people of
the whole State.’”  Ibid., quoting Gaither v. Jackson, 147 Md. 655, 667, 128 A. 769,
773 (1925).  See also Holiday v. Montgomery County, supra, 377 Md. at 319, 833 A.2d
at 526-527, where the Court recently stated that, if a chartered county ordinance
“substantially affects persons and entities outside of [the] County,” then “it is not a
local law and is facially unconstitutional under Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution.”  
The McCrory opinion then pointed out, 319 Md. at 20, 570 A.2d at 838, that
chartered counties could enact anti-discrimination ordinances, could authorize
adjudicatory administrative proceedings to enforce such ordinances, and could provide
for traditional judicial review actions to review the administrative decisions.
Nevertheless, the McCrory Court held that the creation of “new” judicial causes of
action “encroaches upon an area which heretofore had been the province of state
agencies.  In Maryland, the creation of new causes of action in the courts has
traditionally been done either by the General Assemb ly or by this Court under its
authority to modify the common law of this State.” Ibid.  The Court stated that (319
Md. at 20-21, 570 A.2d at 838)
“§ 27-20(a) of the Montgomery County Code affects ‘matters of
significant interest to the entire state’ and cannot qualify as a ‘local
law’ under Article XI-A.
“A contrary holding would open the door for counties to enact
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a variety of laws in areas which have heretofore been viewed as the
exclusive province of the General Assemb ly and the Court of
Appeals.  For example, could a county ordinance authorize in the
circuit court and the District Court negligence actions in which
contributory negligence would not be a bar?  Could a county
ordinance provide for breach of contract suits upon ‘contracts’ not
supported by consideration, or where the parol evidence rule is
inapplicable?  We believe that the answer is ‘no.’  These, and many
other legal doctrines, are matters of significant interest to the entire
State, calling for uniform application in state courts.  They are not
proper subject matters for ‘local laws.’”
Shortly after the McCrory decision, this Court in Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 319 Md. 440, 444, 573 A.2d 32, 33 (1990), held that an ordinance enacted by
the Howard County Council, similar to the ordinance involved in McCrory, and
“authorizing an independent action in law or equity in the Circuit Court for Howard
County,” was not a “local law” and thus violated Article XI-A of the Constitution.  See
also H. P. White v. Blackburn, supra, 372 Md. at 167-171, 812 A.2d at 309-311,
holding that a Harford County ordinance, authorizing a circuit court action to recover
damages, by a plaintiff who has been discriminated against in violation of the Harford
County Code, was not a “local law” and therefore was invalid under Article XI-A of
the Maryland Constitution.
In response to the decisions in the McCrory and Sweeney cases, the General
Assemb ly enacted Art. 49B, § 42.  As previously quoted, supra, n.3, § 42 provides that,
in Montgomery, Prince George’s, and Howard Counties, “a person who is subjected to
an act of discrimination prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil
action against the person who committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages,
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6
Section 2-200 of the Prince George’s County Code, like the ordinances involved in McCrory
Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 570 A.2d 834 (1990), Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 319 Md. 440,
573 A.2d 32 (1990), and H. P. White v. Blackburn, 372 Md. 160, 812 A.2d 305 (2002), also purports
to create an “action in law or equity in the Circuit Court to seek damages, redress of injury, or
injunctive relief arising out of” a discriminatory act in violation of Division 12 of the Prince
George’s County Code.
Under the holdings in the above-cited cases, this provision of the Prince George’s County Code
violates Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution and is, therefore, void.  Nevertheless, the
plaintiff’s action in the case at bar is not dependent on § 2-200 of the Prince George’s County Code.
Instead, it is based on Art. 49B, § 42, and §§ 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County
Code.
injunctive relief, or other civil relief.”  Subsection (b)(1) of § 42 states that the action
“shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged
discrimination took place” and “not later than 2 years after the occurrence of the
alleged discriminatory act.” 6
Sections 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, quoted
earlier, supra, n.2, prohibit discrimination in employment in Prince George’s County.
“Discrimination” is broadly defined as acting, failing to act, or delaying any action,
“because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age (except as required by State
or federal law), occupation, familial status, marital status,” etc.  
Section 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code begins by stating that “[n]o
employer in the County shall discharge or refuse to hire any person, or act against any
person with respect to compensation or other terms and conditions of employment . . .
because of discrimination.”  The language “[n]o employer in the County” may be
ambiguous with regard to discriminatory acts outside of Prince George’s County by
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7
The petitioners at one place in their brief suggest that, under Art. 49B, § 42, and § 2-222 of the
Prince George’s County Code, a discriminatory act outside of Prince George’s County, by a Prince
George’s County employer, could be the basis for the § 42 action and that the suit would be brought
in the circuit court for the county where the discriminatory act occurred.  (Petitioners’ brief at 16).
At another place in their brief, however, the petitioners take the position that Art. 49B, § 42, covers
only discriminatory acts taking place in Prince George’s, Montgomery, and Howard counties.
(Petitioners’ brief at 19).
employers with a presence in the County. 7  If § 2-222 were construed to have a
significant territorial effect beyond Prince George’s County, it would not be a “local”
law and thus would be unconstitutional under Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution.  See Holiday v. Montgomery County, , supra, 377 Md. 305, 833 A.2d 518,
and cases there cited.
This Court has consistently adhered to the principle that “an interpretation which
raises doubts as to a legislative enactment’s constitutionality should be avoided if the
language of the act permits.”  Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492, 509, 754 A.2d 1018,
1028 (2000).  See, e.g., Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 352, 653
A.2d 468, 475 (1995) (“[I]t is the policy of this Court to favor an interpretation that
upholds the validity of an ordinance”); Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 172, 638 A.2d
93, 104-105 (1994) (“If a statute is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one
of which would involve a decision as to its constitutionality, the preferred construction
is that which avoids the determination of constitutionality”); Schochet v. State, 320 Md.
714, 725-726, 580 A.2d 176, 181 (1990), and cases there cited.  In light of this
principle, we construe § 2-222 as covering only discrimination occurring in Prince
George’s County by an employer with a significant presence in Prince George’s
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County.
As construed, the alleged discrimination in the case at bar is encompassed by §§
2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, and a cause of action based
on such discrimination has been created by Art. 49B, § 42, of the Maryland Code.
III.
The petitioners’ argument that Art. 49B, § 42, coupled with §§ 2-186(a)(3) and
2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, violates Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution, is somewhat elusive.  Nonetheless, we shall attempt to set forth and
answer the petitioners’ contentions.
The petitioners argue that Art. 49B, § 42, “does nothing to define the elements
of liability or damages” and therefore “completely fails to address the constitutional
infirmities identified by this Court in McCrory.”  (Petitioners brief at 9).  The
petitioners assert that the General Assembly’s enactment of § 42 “failed to cure the
defects addressed in McCrory, because it still effectively left it to the county to create
the cause of action . . . .”  (Id. at 12).  They state that the General Assemb ly cannot
rectify the Article XI-A constitutional limitation on chartered counties’ authority
“through a thinly veiled delegation of its own legislative authority to county councils.”
(Id. at 12-13)  The petitioners contend that,
“in every real sense, it is the County Council – not the General
Assemb ly – that made the tough legislative choices and created the
cause of action.  Section 42 merely purports to authorize the
creation of the cause of action, while expressly leaving it to the
County Council to decide what will constitute actionable
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discrimination.
“Most fundamentally, under section 42, no cause of action
exists until the relevant county decides to create it.  Only where
there is a local discrimination ordinance, and that ordinance
prohibits the type of discrimination at issue, does a cause of action
exist.  Under these circumstances, section 42 is no more than an ill-
conceived, and ultimately impermissible, license issued by the
General Assemb ly to a handful of localities to do that which the
Constitution forbids: legislate on non-local matters. * * *
Notwithstanding section 42, the county council is still the entity
truly creating the purported cause of action.”  (Id. at 13).
The petitioners also rely upon language in the McCrory opinion that “the
creation of new judicial remedies has traditionally been done on a statewide basis” and
that “[a]busive employment practices constitute a statewide problem . . . .”  McCrory,
319 Md. at 20, 570 A.2d at 838.  Based on this language, the petitioners contend “that
any judicial cause of action for discrimination should be created by the General
Assemb ly and be available statewide.”  (Petitioners’ brief at 11).  They assert that,
“despite this Court’s holding [in McCrory] that employment discrimination is a matter
of statewide concern calling for uniform application, the General Assemb ly attempted,
by the enactment of . . . Art. 49B, § 42, to give the county councils of Prince George’s,
Montgomery, and Howard counties the very power that the McCrory Court held that
they did not have.”  (Id. at 12).  The petitioners maintain that “the defect in section 42
is . . . that it allows each of the three named counties to legislate on a matter that is
reserved to the state.”  (Id. at 21).  They conclude “that section 42 . . . represent[s] an
unconstitutional delegation of authority to the counties.”  (Id. at 23).
-18-
The petitioners’ argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Article
XI-A and of this Court’s decisions in McCrory and numerous other cases.
Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution sets forth only one limitation upon
the General Assembly’s authority to enact statutes.  Article XI-A, § 4, provides as
follows:
“Section 4. General Assembly not to enact local laws on          
                      subjects covered by express powers.
“From and after the adoption of a charter under the provisions
of this Article by the City of Baltimore or any County of this State,
no public local law shall be enacted by the General Assemb ly for
said City or County on any subject covered by the express powers
granted as above provided. Any law so drawn as to apply to two or
more of the geographical sub-divisions of this State shall not be
deemed a Local Law, within the meaning of this Act. The term
‘geographical sub-division’ herein used shall be taken to mean the
City of Baltimore or any of the Counties of this State.”
Article 49B, § 42, of the Code does not violate this provision.  It is not a prohibited
“local law” on two alternative grounds.  First, it applies to three counties and,
therefore, is not a “local law” under the express language of Article XI-A, § 4.  Second,
it creates a new cause of action in the circuit courts, and, under the McCrory case, it
is not a local law for this reason.
The limitations upon ordinances enacted by chartered county councils, set forth
in Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, include the following.  The ordinances
must be “local laws” (Article XI-A, § 3), and they must be within the “express powers”
granted by the General Assemb ly to chartered counties (Article XI-A, §§ 2 and 3).  An
-19-
ordinance enacted by a chartered county must be authorized by the county’s charter and
must not be inconsistent with the “Public General Laws of this State” (Article XI-A,
§ 1).  A locally-enacted ordinance may be inconsistent with state public general laws
in one of three ways: 1. it could be in direct conflict with a public general law; 2. it
could be the type of ordinance which is expressly preempted by a public general law;
3. it could be impliedly preempted by public general laws because the General
Assembly has intended to occupy the entire field within which the ordinance falls.
Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487-493, 620 A.2d 880; 883-886 (1993), and
cases there cited.  See also, e.g., Tyma v. Montgomery County, supra, 369 Md. at 506,
801 A.2d at 153; Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, supra, 363 Md. at 579-581, 770
A.2d at 119-120; Holiday v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 190, 209-214, 707 A.2d
829, 840-841 (1998); Coalition v. Annapolis Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 378-383, 635 A.2d
412, 421-423 (1994).
Sections 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code do not
violate the above-described Article XI-A limits upon a chartered county’s legislative
authority.  This Court has consistently held that a chartered county ordinance limited
to prohibiting discrimination in the county is a “local law,” is authorized by the express
powers granted by the General Assembly to chartered counties, and generally is not
preempted by or otherwise inconsistent with public general laws.  See, e.g., Montrose
Christian School v. Walsh, supra, 363 Md. at 579-581, 770 A.2d at 119-120 (A
Montgom ery County ordinance prohibiting discrimination in employment neither
-20-
8
Even if an ordinance by a chartered county failed to provide for judicial review of the
adjudicatory administrative decision, such review, by a mandamus, certiorari, or declaratory
judgment action, would ordinarily be guaranteed under Articles 8 and 19 of the Maryland
(continued...)
conflicts with nor is otherwise preempted by public general laws); Molesworth v.
Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 634-636, 672 A.2d 608, 614-615 (1996) (The General
Assemb ly has not “preempted the field of employment discrimination”); McCrory
Corp. v. Fowler, supra, 319 Md. at 20, 570 A.2d at 838 (pointing out that laws aimed
at discriminatory employment practices fall within a “field [which] has not been
preempted by the State, and . . . home rule counties have concurrent authority” to enact
such laws); National Asphalt v. Prince George’s County, 292 Md. 75, 437 A.2d 651
(1981) (State legislation aimed at employment discrimination has not preempted the
field, and Prince George’s County is entitled to enact local ordinances prohibiting
employment discrimination); Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md.
151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969) (Under Article XI-A of the Constitution and the Express
Powers Act, Code (1957), Art. 25A, a chartered county has the authority to enact laws
for the prevention of discrimination).
As the above-cited cases clearly hold, a chartered county generally has the
authority to prohibit discrimination occurring in the county, to define the elements of
a claim by one injured by such discrimination, to provide for an adjudicatory
administrative proceeding by which the injured party may obtain relief, and to provide
for a traditional judicial review action in the circuit court for a party aggrieved by the
final administrative decision.8  Consequently, there is no merit in the petitioners’
-21-
8
(...continued)
Declaration of Rights and Article IV of the Maryland Constitution.  See, e.g., Piselli v. 75th Street
Medical, 371 Md. 188, 206, 808 A.2d 508, 518-519 (2002); Board of License Commissioners v.
Corridor, 361 Md. 403, 415, 761 A.2d 916, 922 (2000); State v. Board of Education, 346 Md. 633,
641-647, 697 A.2d 1334, 1338-1341 (1997), and cases there cited; Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372,
378-381, 45 A.2d 73, 76-77 (1945); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-281, 40 A.2d 673, 677
(1945).
complaints that the chartered counties’ ordinances, rather than Art. 49B, § 42, “define
the elements of liability” or “decide what will constitute actionable discrimination.”
(Petitioners’ brief at 9, 13).  Under our cases, chartered counties have authority to do
this.
The constitutional defect in the Montgom ery County ordinances at issue in
McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, was not that the local ordinances prohibited
discrimination in the county, or defined the elements of liability, or decided what would
constitute actionable discrimination.  Instead, the constitutional problem was in one of
the alternative remedies created by the Montgomery County law.  In addition to
administrative remedies, the Montgom ery County ordinances created a new cause of
action in the courts, and it was this provision which the Court in McCrory held was not
a “local law” and thus was not authorized by Article XI-A of the Constitution.  That
defect has now been remedied by Art. 49B, § 42.
The petitioners’ reliance upon language in McCrory, 319 Md. at 20, 570 A.2d
at 838, that “[a]busive employment practices constitute a statewide problem,” is
entirely misplaced.  That phrase was simply the introductory language in a sentence
pointing out that the General Assemb ly had enacted statewide anti-discrimination laws
-22-
in Art. 49B of the Code.  The very next sentence in the same paragraph stated (ibid.)
“that the field has not been preempted by the State, and that home
rule counties have concurrent authority to provide administrative
remedies not in conflict with state law.”
Furthermore, the statement in McCrory that “the creation of new judicial
remedies has traditionally been done on a statewide basis,” ibid., does not help the
petitioners’ position.  That was simply a statement of historical fact, underscoring the
holding that the creation of new judicial causes of action was a matter for the state
legislature and not for a single county council.  Nothing in the McCrory opinion
suggested that Article XI-A precludes the General Assemb ly from creating a new
judicial cause of action effective in less than all of the State’s counties.
The petitioners also criticize Art. 49B, § 42, on the ground that the judicial cause
of action created by the General Assemb ly incorporates the substantive elements or
standards from the county ordinances.  Nevertheless, it is ordinarily not a
constitutionally impermissible delegation of legislative authority for a legislative body
to adopt a standard promulgated by a different governmental entity.  In Board of
Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 96 n.24, 562 A.2d 720, 731 n.24, cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1167, 107 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1989), this Court stated:
“In our complex system of government, state and local as well as
state and federal authority unavoidably intermesh.  See, e.g.,
Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 82-83, 532
A.2d 1056 (1987) (to maintain eligibility for federal funds, General
Assembly conformed state law to requirements of federal Clean Air
-23-
Act); Price v. Clawns, 180 Md. 532, 538, 25 A.2d 672 (1942)
(statute making it a crime to ride railroad except in compliance
with railroad’s regulations dovetailed with federal statutes
dictating substance of a railroad’s regulations).  As a result, a
legislature may ordinarily adopt a standard promulgated by another
governmental entity, even if that standard is subject to modification
by the other governmental entity.”
See also, e.g., Comptroller v. SYL, 375 Md. 78, 100-102, 825 A.2d 399, 412-413, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 478, 157 L.Ed.2d 375 (2003), and cases there cited
(state tax statute incorporates federal constitutional standards and reaches corporate
income to the extent constitutionally permissible); Mangum v. Maryland State Board
of Censors, 273 Md. 176, 187-193, 328 A.2d 283, 289-293 (1974) (state obscenity
statute may constitutionally incorporate federal law definition of obscenity);
Katzenberg v. Comptroller, 263 Md. 189, 200, 282 A.2d 465, 470 (1971) (“The State’s
adoption of the federal definition of income does not constitute a delegation of
legislative authority”).
The Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the operation of Art. 49B, § 42,
combined with §§ 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, did not
violate Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  PETITIONERS TO
PAY COSTS.