Case Title: Board of Zoning Appeals v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071395

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, Agee,∗ and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 
FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
v.  Record No. 071395 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         ELIZABETH B. LACY 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF  
 
    September 12, 2008 
FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the circuit 
court erred in dismissing a declaratory judgment action filed 
by the Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County (BZA) against 
the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County (Board of 
Supervisors) based on the court’s conclusion that the BZA does 
not have the authority to institute litigation on its own 
behalf. 
 
The BZA’s declaratory judgment action was prompted by 
certain positions taken by the County regarding the BZA.  In 
2004, the Fairfax County Executive sent a letter to the BZA 
stating that the Board of Supervisors “will no longer pay for 
private legal counsel to represent the BZA and will not permit 
the County Attorney or his staff to represent the BZA” except 
when the BZA is alleged to have violated the Virginia Freedom 
of Information Act, Code §§ 2.2-3700 through -3714, or when 
                                                 
∗ Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 30, 
2008. 
BZA members are sued individually in their official 
capacities.  In a subsequent letter, the County Executive 
informed the BZA that it was not “authorized to hire private 
legal counsel to act in a capacity that is adverse to the 
interests of the Board of Supervisors . . . or the Zoning 
Administrator of Fairfax County.”  Prior to this time, the 
County Attorney or private counsel defended the BZA in 
certorari proceedings filed pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314.  In 
2005, the Fairfax County Attorney separately asserted in a 
letter to the then Chief Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial 
Circuit that, pursuant to Code § 15.2-2308(A), the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County could not make appointments to the BZA 
without the concurrence of the Board of Supervisors. 
 
In 2006, the BZA filed this declaratory judgment 
proceeding, seeking a declaration that the BZA was entitled to 
have the Board of Supervisors “appropriate and pay” litigation 
expenses and reasonable sums for legal counsel chosen by the 
BZA in certiorari proceedings pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314 and 
in “any litigation arising from the BZA’s performance of its 
public functions.”  The BZA also sought a declaration that the 
Fairfax County Circuit Court could appoint members of the BZA 
without the concurrence of the Board of Supervisors.  The 
Board of Supervisors filed a demurrer arguing, inter alia, 
that the BZA was a “creature of statute” and no statute 
 
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conferred upon the BZA the authority to sue the Board of 
Supervisors “or anyone else.”  The circuit court agreed with 
the Board of Supervisors, granted the demurrer and dismissed 
the declaratory judgment action.  The BZA filed a timely 
appeal in this Court. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The sole issue on appeal - whether the BZA has the 
authority to file this declaratory judgment action - is an 
issue of law which we review de novo.  Glazebrook v. Board of 
Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003). 
 
We have consistently held that boards of zoning appeals 
are “creatures of statute possessing only those powers 
expressly conferred.”  Board of Zoning Appeals v. Cedar Knoll, 
Inc., 217 Va. 740, 743, 232 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1977); Lake 
George Corp. v. Standing, 211 Va. 733, 735, 180 S.E.2d 522, 
523 (1971).  The BZA concedes that no Virginia statute 
expressly grants the BZA the authority to institute litigation 
on its own behalf.  Nevertheless, the BZA argues that our 
decisions such as Cedar Knoll and Lake George are not 
dispositive of this issue.  The BZA argues that under Dillon’s 
Rule a public body derives its powers in three distinct ways - 
powers that are expressly authorized by statute, powers fairly 
or necessarily implied from the express powers, and powers 
that are essential and indispensable.  The BZA argues that 
 
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while our decisions in Lake George and Cedar Knoll precluded a 
board of zoning appeals from acquiring a power by virtue of 
the second component or “corollary” of Dillon’s Rule, that is, 
powers fairly or necessarily implied from expressed powers, 
neither case addressed the application of the third component 
or “corollary.”  The BZA identifies this third “corollary” as 
powers afforded a public body because such powers are 
essential and indispensable to the performance of the public 
body’s duties.  This “corollary” of Dillon’s Rule, the BZA 
continues, was acknowledged in City of Portsmouth v. Virginia 
Railway and Power Co., 141 Va. 54, 61, 126 S.E. 362, 364 
(1925), with regard to the powers of the State Corporation 
Commission, also a “creature of statute.”  That case, 
according to the BZA, provides the basis for concluding in 
this case that the BZA has the power to sue on its own behalf 
because such power is necessary and essential to enable the 
BZA to exercise the powers expressly granted it.  We reject 
the BZA’s position because it is based on a misperception of 
the “corollary” of Dillon’s Rule and misapplication of City of 
Portsmouth. 
 
City of Portsmouth did not involve a “corollary” to 
Dillon’s Rule.  In fact, Dillon’s Rule was not mentioned in 
that case.  The issue was whether the State Corporation 
Commission had the authority to abrogate an obligation imposed 
 
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under the terms of the franchise between the city and the 
Virginia Railway and Power Company, a public utility subject 
to the Commission’s jurisdiction.  City of Portsmouth, 141 Va. 
at 56-57, 126 S.E. at 362.  In resolving the issue, the Court 
recited that the Commission’s authority stemmed from 
constitutional and statutory grants but cautioned that those 
provisions should be liberally construed to give the 
Commission not only powers expressly granted, but also powers 
fairly implied from the language or necessary to allow 
exercise of expressly granted powers.  Id. at 61, 126 S.E. at 
364.  Although this description of the Commission’s powers is 
consistent with Dillon’s Rule, the Court never characterized 
the grant of authority as derived from Dillon’s Rule and 
ultimately held that the Commission did not have the express 
authority to abrogate the franchise obligation.  Id.  
Therefore, our decision in City of Portsmouth does not support 
the position advanced by the BZA in this case. 
More importantly, the BZA’s interpretation of Dillon’s 
Rule and its “corollary” is incorrect.  Dillon’s Rule provides 
that municipal corporations have only those powers that are 
expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from 
expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and 
indispensable.  City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enters., 253 Va. 
243, 246, 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1997); accord Ticonderoga Farms 
 
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v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va. 170, 173-74, 409 S.E.2d 446, 448 
(1991); City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 239 Va. 
77, 79, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990).  The corollary to Dillon’s 
Rule does not refer to sources from which a municipal 
corporation derives its power but to the application of the 
rule to other public bodies such as boards of supervisors and 
school boards in addition to municipal corporations.  See 
Board of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 
453, 455-56 (1975) (boards of supervisors); Kellam v. School 
Board, 202 Va. 252, 254, 117 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1960) (school 
boards).  Therefore, the holding in Cedar Knoll and Lake 
George is that neither Dillon’s Rule nor its corollary, that 
is the extension to other public bodies, are applied to boards 
of zoning appeals and such boards are limited to powers 
expressly granted. 
In summary, the principle established in Cedar Knoll and 
Lake George, that boards of zoning appeals have only those 
powers expressly granted, is dispositive in this case.  As the 
BZA concedes, the Virginia Code contains no express grant of 
authority allowing the BZA to institute litigation on its own 
behalf.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed.