Case Title: Royer v. Wendland

Citation: 492 P.2d 280

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1971-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
492 P.2d 280 (1971)
Walter F. ROYER, Respondent,
v.
George C. WENDLAND, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted October 12, 1971.
Decided December 30, 1971.
Fred A. Anderson, Tigard, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Anderson & Dittman, Tigard.
*281 Francis F. Yunker, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was J. Robert Jordan, Portland.
BRYSON, Justice.
Plaintiff brought an action at law for damages against defendant, demanding general and punitive damages. Defendant filed a general denial, affirmatively pleaded self-defense, and counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiff committed assault and battery upon the defendant. Plaintiff's reply is a general denial. The jury returned a verdict against defendant and in favor of plaintiff for $1,500 general damages and $5,000 punitive damages. Defendant appeals.
The following, from the evidence, explains the incident. Plaintiff lives on a tract of land located three-tenths of a mile off Highway 219, between Hillsboro and Newberg, Oregon. In order to enter his property from Highway 219, it is necessary that he travel on an access road across defendant's property. The parties to this action have a long history of differences. They have previously been involved in disputes over the joint use of spring waters, a common fence line, and use of the access road. See Royer v. Gailey, 252 Or. 369, 449 P.2d 853 (1969).
On the morning of April 23, 1970, the defendant and an employee were working alongside the access road to plaintiff's property. Plaintiff drove his Ford van past this area on his way to Highway 219, but in response to his wife's signal on a portable electronic device he turned back towards his home. As he again reached the point where defendant was working, the defendant, according to the evidence, stepped out in the middle of the road, causing plaintiff to stop his vehicle, and began hurling epithets at the plaintiff and threatened to kill him. Defendant moved to the left side of the vehicle, and plaintiff backed up several feet. The defendant was again in front of the Ford van, and the plaintiff attempted to move his vehicle around the defendant. This time the defendant moved to the right of the vehicle and struck his hammer through the windshield three times, splintering the windshield, and some of the glass particles struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff picked up a tire iron, but at no time did he get out of the vehicle or stop the motor. When he saw the defendant was moving away from his vehicle, he drove to his home. The defendant's counterclaim alleges that plaintiff operated his vehicle "into the person of defendant with the intent and purpose of running down and crushing defendant * * *."
Defendant first assigns as error:
The defendant contends that battery is not pleaded on the face of the complaint. It is true that the complaint does not use the word "battery," but neither does it use the word "assault." The complaint alleges the ultimate facts that would constitute battery and this is all that is essential. McGill v. Huling Buick Company, 92 Or. Adv.Sh. 1745, 1747, 1748, 487 P.2d 656 (1971).
The defendant did not raise the question of adequacy of plaintiff's pleading or demur thereto other than in requested instructions, which are discussed in subsequent assignments of error. It is well settled in this state that a pleading first challenged on appeal must be construed favorably to the pleader.
The court did instruct the jury on assault and battery. The defendant's objections to the trial court's instructions relating *282 to assault and battery were not raised until after the instructions had been given. At this time the defendant had also requested instructions relating to both assault and battery. The defendant stated to the trial court:
After an extended statement by plaintiff's counsel, he again stated:
This leaves the defendant in the position of objecting to the court's inclusion of battery in his instruction to the jury and at the same time objecting to the court's failure to instruct on damages accruing from battery. This is an inconsistent position, and we find that the trial court did not err in this respect.
Defendant's next assignment of error is:
One of the defendant's other assignments of error is:
The first above-mentioned requested instruction questions the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial. We have closely reviewed the evidence and in taking the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that the jury could have properly returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. In the second above-mentioned requested instruction we are of the opinion that the court properly instructed the jury on the law pertaining to self-defense. Both of these requested instructions were also objectionable in the form in which they were submitted. They conclude with the language, "you must bring in a verdict for the defendant," and "you must find then for the defendant." In Ginter v. Handy, 244 Or. 449, 451, 419 P.2d 21, 22 (1966), this court stated:
The defendant further assigns as error that:
The court did instruct the jury as follows:
Without passing on the merits of defendant's requested instruction, we are satisfied that the jury was properly instructed on the law pertaining to self-defense.
The defendant next assigns as error that:
Defendant argues that trespass was material to the issues involved in this case, and on this basis cites Eldred v. Burns et al., 182 Or. 394, 182 P.2d 397, 188 P.2d 154 (1947), and Scheufele v. Newman, 187 Or. 263, 210 P.2d 573 (1949). From the reading of the entire transcript of evidence, we do not believe that trespass was an integral part of the factual scheme or theory of plaintiff's case. The question of ownership was not in issue and the court so instructed the jury. For this reason, we do not believe the court erred in this respect.
The defendant's final assignment of error is that:
The court instructed the jury as follows:
Whether or not the court's instruction, as given, is a correct statement of the law is not before us, but we are of the opinion that the instructions as a whole adequately cover the instruction requested by defendant in this assignment of error. See Hiddleson v. Ross, 231 Or. 21, 23, 371 P.2d 671 (1962).
Affirmed.
McALLISTER, J., concurs in the result.