Case Title: State v. Frank P. Howard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP000770

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 95-0770 
 
 
1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-0770 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Frank P. Howard, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  199 Wis. 2d 454, 544 N.W.2d 626 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 26, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
LEE S. DREYFUS, JR. 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Sharon Ruhly, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Daniel R. Clausz and Williams Law Offices, Delavan and oral 
argument by Daniel R. Clausz. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak 
and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
2 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Frank P. Howard, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   The State seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals
1 reversing an order of 
the Waukesha County Circuit Court, Lee S. Dreyfus, Jr., Judge.  
The circuit court refused to grant the defendant, Frank P. 
Howard, a new trial on the issue of whether he was guilty of 
delivery of a controlled substance while possessing a dangerous 
weapon. 
¶2 
Howard contends that because the jury was not required 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a dangerous 
weapon to facilitate the commission of the drug offense, due 
                     
1  State of Wisconsin v. Frank Howard, 199 Wis. 2d 454, 544 
N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1996).  
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
2 
process and our decision in State v. Peete
2 require that he 
receive a new trial on the issue of the dangerous weapon 
enhancer.  We conclude that the holding of Peete applies to 
cases of actual as well as constructive possession, and must be 
applied retroactively to this case.  We further hold that 
because Howard could not have foreseen the effect of the Peete 
decision at the time of his original appeal, his motion for a 
new trial is not barred by our decision in State v. Escalona-
Naranjo, 185  Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W. 2d 157 (1994).  We therefore 
affirm the court of appeals.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
In 1989, the State charged Howard with, inter alia, 
aiding and abetting the unlawful delivery of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) while possessing a dangerous weapon, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.41(1)(c)2, 939.05, 939.63(1)(a)3 
and 2 (1987-88).  At trial, the police testified that when they 
searched Howard at the scene, they found a handgun in his coat 
pocket.  At that point, Howard told them that he had another gun 
in his jacket.  Howard, however, testified that he told the 
police he had two guns on his person before the police initiated 
their search of him.  When Howard was arrested, he had 
approximately $2,200 in cash on his person, as well as the two 
handguns.  According to his testimony, Howard had the money at 
his garage, because he saved it to buy, fix up and sell cars.  
                     
2  185 Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994). 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
3 
He had the guns at the garage for protection.  According to 
Howard, his garage was in a high crime area of Milwaukee.   
¶4 
In February of 1990, Howard was tried by jury.  At the 
conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court instructed the 
jury on the elements of the first charged offense.  The court 
also instructed the jury on the penalty enhancer of possessing a 
dangerous weapon.
3  Wis JICriminal 990.  "Possession" was not 
defined in that jury instruction.  The court also instructed the 
jury on the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, using 
Wis JICriminal 1343.  That instruction defined "possession" as 
"the defendant knowingly had a firearm under his actual physical 
control."  Howard did not object to these jury instructions. 
¶5 
In closing argument, the prosecutor described to the 
jury the elements necessary to prove the charges against Howard. 
 With regard to the penalty enhancer, the prosecutor stated, 
"[A]nd further as to the January 20th incident, out at 
the Marriott, an additional factor you must consider 
in that count alone is did he commit that crime; that 
is, the delivery of cocaine over 10 and under 30 grams 
                     
3  The court gave the following instruction: 
If you find the Defendant guilty of party to the crime 
of delivery of cocaine, you must answer the following 
question: Did the Defendant commit the crime of party 
to the crime of delivery of cocaine while posssssing 
[sic] a dangerous weapon? 
A "dangerous weapon" is any firearm, whether loaded or 
not. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from 
the evidence presented that the Defendant committed 
the crime of party to the crime of delivery of cocaine 
while possessing a dangerous weapon  . . . then you 
should answer the question "yes". 
If you are not so satisfied, then you must answer the 
question "no". 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
4 
while possessing a firearm.  In this case, it's clear 
the Defendant admitted that he had the two firearms 
with him on that date, so if you find the Defendant 
guilty of that offense and I ask you to do so, finding 
that he possessed those firearms is also a given 
fact."  
 
Wrapping up his argument, the prosecutor stated: 
"I ask you to reach a quick verdict as well as a 
guilty verdict finding that, . . . on January 20th, 
1989, he knowingly and unlawfully helped, assisted, 
and, in fact, was a supplier for delivery of cocaine 
from Jay Clemins to Officer Adlam unwittingly and that 
he had a couple guns with him at the time, and also on 
that day, that he was a convicted felon and had those 
guns with him also."  
 
¶6 
The jury found Howard guilty of party to a crime of 
delivery 
of 
controlled 
substance 
(cocaine) 
while 
in 
the 
possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and 
delivery 
of 
controlled 
substance 
(cocaine). 
 
Howard 
was 
sentenced on all three counts.  On March 23, 1990, the circuit 
court sentenced him to nine years in prison, the maximum for the 
crime of delivery of a controlled substance, party to a crime 
while possessing a dangerous weapon.  At that time, the maximum 
penalty for the underlying crime was 5 years.  The maximum 
penalty for the enhancer charge was 4 years. 
¶7 
Howard filed a number of post-conviction motions and a 
direct appeal.  After exhausting his direct appeals, Howard 
filed 
a 
pro 
se
4 
motion 
on 
October 
3, 
1994, 
requesting 
                     
4  Howard originally filed this motion pro se.  On December 
13, 1994, a Notice of Amended Motion and Amended Motion for a 
New Trial or Sentence Modification pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 was filed by Howard's current attorney, Daniel R. 
Clausz.  
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
5 
postconviction relief and/or modification of sentence pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 974.06,
5 and based on this court's holding in 
Peete.  In Peete, we held that when a defendant is charged with 
the penalty enhancer of committing a crime while in possession 
of a dangerous weapon, Wis. Stat. § 939.63 requires the State to 
                     
5 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06 
(1991-92) 
Postconviction 
procedure. 
(1) 
After 
the 
time 
for 
appeal 
or 
postconviction 
remedy 
provided in 
s. 
974.02 has 
expired, a prisoner in custody under sentence of a 
court or a person convicted and placed with a 
volunteers 
in 
probation 
program 
under 
s. 
973.11 
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. 
constitution or the constitution or laws of this 
state, that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside 
or correct the sentence. . . . 
 
(3) . . . 
 
(d) Determine the issues and make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  If the court finds that the 
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that 
the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is 
otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has 
been 
such 
a 
denial 
or 
infringement 
of 
the 
constitutional rights of the person as to render the 
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court 
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall 
discharge the person or resentence him or her or grant 
a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear 
appropriate. 
 
(4) All grounds for relief available to a person under 
this section must be raised in his or her original, 
supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground finally 
adjudicated 
or 
not 
so 
raised, 
or 
knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in 
the original, 
supplemental 
or 
amended 
motion. 
 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
6 
prove a nexus between the underlying crime and possession of the 
weapon.   Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 18-19.  Howard thus sought a new 
trial, because in his first trial the jury received no 
instruction on the nexus element.  The circuit court denied 
Howard's motion.  The court of appeals reversed.
6  The State 
sought review by this court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
Whether our construction of Wis. Stat. § 939.63 (1987-
88) 
in 
Peete 
applies 
to 
cases 
of 
actual, 
as 
well 
as 
constructive, possession and if so, whether Peete must be 
applied retroactively to this case are questions of law that we 
review independently, benefiting from the analyses of the lower 
courts.  See State v. Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870, 885, 891, 532 
N.W.2d 423 (1995).  If Peete is applicable to this case, we then 
consider, as a question of law, whether Howard's claim is barred 
under Escalona-Naranjo.  Whether the jury instructions given by 
the circuit court violated the defendant’s right to due process 
is a question of law that we review independently of the lower 
                     
6  In reversing the circuit court, the court of appeals 
remanded for entry of the judgment of conviction solely on the 
delivery of cocaine charge and resentencing on that underlying 
conviction.  The court of appeals also remanded for vacation of 
Howard's sentence for delivery of cocaine while armed, and 
ordered that Howard was entitled to a new trial on the issue of 
whether he committed the underlying drug offense while in 
possession of a weapon.  In the event of a new trial, the court 
of appeals ordered the circuit court to vacate the sentence and 
resentence Howard after the new trial.  State v. Howard, 199 
Wis. 2d at 463-64. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
7 
courts.  State v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 43, 387 N.W.2d 55 
(1986). 
THE PEETE DECISION 
¶9 
A review of our decision in Peete illustrates the 
basis for Howard's claim.  Jerry Peete was arrested at his 
girlfriend's residence, following a search of the premises.  
Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 10.  That search revealed plastic bags 
containing cocaine stuffed in socks in a dresser drawer in the 
girlfriend's bedroom.  Also in the bedroom were over $2,000 in 
cash and a number of personal items belonging to Peete.  Between 
the mattresses was a loaded handgun.  Id. at 11.  In the 
kitchen, police found three loaded handguns in a cereal box.  
Id.   Peete was arrested and convicted of possession of cocaine 
with intent to deliver while armed.  Id. at 9. 
¶10 At Peete's trial, the court did not give a separate 
instruction on what constituted "possession" of a dangerous 
weapon for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 939.63, the penalty 
enhancer.  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 12-13.  On appeal, and on 
review by this court, Peete raised the question of what the jury 
was required to find under the instruction as given.  Id. at 14. 
¶11 On review, we engaged in statutory interpretation and 
construction.  We held that § 939.63
7 created a possessory 
                     
7 Wis. Stat. § 939.63 (1987-88) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
8 
offense linked to a predicate offense.  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 
14.  Section 939.63 provides that if a defendant commits a crime 
while in possession of a dangerous weapon, his or her sentence 
may be increased by varying amounts of time, depending on the 
maximum sentence for the underlying offense.  Id.  Both Peete 
and the State agreed that the legislature intended the enhancer 
to apply only when there is a relationship between the 
underlying crime and the weapon.  Id. at 16-17.  We unanimously 
held that Wis. Stat. § 939.63 requires the State to prove a 
nexus between the crime and the weapon the defendant possessed, 
because that nexus is an element of the penalty enhancer.  Id. 
at 18-19.  We later clarified that the weapons penalty enhancer 
is an element of the enhanced offense, but is not an element of 
the underlying offense.  Avila, 192 Wis. 2d at 893b. The jury 
must find the nexus element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Peete, 
185 Wis. 2d at 21. 
¶12 In Peete, we also interpreted the penalty enhancer 
provision to apply to actual, as well as constructive possession 
of a weapon.  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 16; see also, Avila, 192 
Wis. 2d at 891.  Our interpretation was consistent with the 
interpretation of other criminal statutes governing possessory 
offenses.  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 14 (citations omitted).  
                                                                  
(1)(a) If a person commits a crime while possessing, using 
or threatening to use a dangerous weapon, the maximum term of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
9 
¶13 We then considered the proper definition of an 
adequate nexus.  We ultimately adopted the definition proposed 
by the State and agreed to by Peete:  "[W]hen a defendant is 
charged with committing a crime while possessing a dangerous 
weapon, under sec. 939.63, the state should be required to prove 
that the defendant possessed the weapon to facilitate commission 
of the predicate offense."  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 18 (emphasis 
added).  We recognized that the use of, or a threat to use, a 
weapon facilitated commission of the predicate offense because 
such use or threat instills fear in the victim, protects the 
defendant, and/or protects the contraband.  Id.  Under our 
construction of the statute, imposing the nexus requirement made 
the phrase "while possessing" parallel to the other statutory 
phrases, "while . . . using" and "while  . . . threatening to 
use."  Id. 
¶14 We then established the proper instructions to be 
given the jury when a defendant is charged with the weapons 
penalty enhancer: "A circuit court must instruct the jury on the 
definition of possession; on the nexus requirement, that the 
defendant possessed the weapon to facilitate the predicate 
crime; and on the definition of dangerous weapon."  Peete, 185 
Wis. 2d at 21. 
                                                                  
as follows: [statute then sets increased penalties that vary 
according to the penalty for the predicate offense]. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
10
¶15 At the time Peete was arrested, he did not use, or 
threaten to use, a dangerous weapon.  The lower court concluded 
that Peete constructively possessed (at least one) dangerous 
weapon.  We reversed Peete's conviction because, in light of 
that possession, the circuit court failed to instruct the jury 
on the nexus requirement.  Without a nexus instruction, the jury 
was not asked to decide whether the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of § 939.63.  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 
at 19.  
¶16 In Peete, as in Howard's case, the State argued that 
the evidence supported a conclusion that the nexus requirement 
was satisfied.  Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 19.   What we said in 
Peete applies equally here: "a court may not direct a verdict of 
guilt against a defendant in a criminal case.  Where the finder 
of fact is a jury, proof of all essential elements must be 
tendered to the jury." (Citations omitted.)  The jury must make 
the factual finding of whether Howard possessed a handgun to 
facilitate the commission of the predicate crime.  Id.  
ACTUAL VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
¶17 The State first argues that Howard is not entitled to 
relief because the case against him proceeded under the theory 
of actual possession, and the State proved actual possession.  
The State thus contends that the Peete instruction would not 
have enhanced the fact finding in Howard's case.  
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
11
¶18 The State has borrowed from Jerry Peete's brief to 
assert that physical control of a weapon at the time of the 
offense would permit a reasonable inference of a direct 
connection between the weapon and the substantive offense.  
Peete's brief contended that the inference applied at the time 
of the offense, even applying to offenses committed in private, 
like tax fraud.  The State's position in Peete was that it would 
be absurd to apply the penalty enhancer to situations where 
there is no relationship between the offense and the possession, 
such as when a person fills out and files a fraudulent tax 
return while carrying a pistol.  See 185 Wis. 2d at 17. 
¶19 We agree with the State's position in Peete.  There 
can be situations when a defendant is in actual possession of a 
dangerous weapon during commission of a crime, but where the 
actual possession has no relationship to the predicate crime.  
Where the possession has no relationship to the predicate crime, 
it does not facilitate the commission of the predicate crime.  
Peete directs the jury to determine whether such a relationship 
exists. 
¶20 Thus we do not accept the State's contention that "by 
proving actual possession, the State has proved the nexus and 
despite the absence of an instruction, has satisfied the rule of 
Peete."  Peete is not limited to constructive possession of a 
dangerous weapon while committing a crime. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
12
¶21 The 
State 
may 
have 
based 
its 
actual 
versus 
constructive possession distinction on our statement in Peete 
that the addition of the nexus requirement makes "possessing" 
parallel to the "use of" or "threatened use of" language from 
Wis. Stat. § 939.63.  Jerry Peete had only constructive 
possession in that case.  Our statement there, however, does not 
eliminate the nexus requirement in cases of actual possession. 
¶22 Based on the jury instructions given in Howard's case, 
we cannot know whether the State proved existence of a nexus 
beyond a reasonable doubt, merely by proving actual possession. 
 The only possession instruction given concerned the third 
count, possession of a firearm by a felon.  That offense 
contains no nexus element.  Thus, the jury was never instructed, 
nor specifically asked to find beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Howard 
possessed 
a 
dangerous 
weapon 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
facilitating 
commission 
of 
the 
drug 
offense. 
 
Such 
an 
instruction, and such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, are 
required for the State to meet its burden on the enhancer 
provision.  As such, if the rule announced in Peete applies to 
Howard, the circuit court erred by failing to instruct on the 
nexus element.  In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 
¶23 Next we determine whether the rule we announced in 
Peete applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.  The 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
13
judgment in Howard's case was final
8 before we decided Peete in 
June, 1994. 
¶24 The United States Supreme Court set the parameters for 
the federal doctrine of non-retroactivity in Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (1989).
9  First, the court said that retroactivity only 
applies to certain new rules.  "[A] case announces a new rule 
when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the 
States or Federal Government."  Id. at 301.  New rules merit 
retroactive application on collateral review only in two 
instances.  In the first instance, a "new rule should be applied 
retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private 
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe."  State v. Denny, 163 Wis. 2d 352, 357, 
471 N.W.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 307). 
 "Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it 
requires observance of those procedures that are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty."  Denny, 163 Wis. 2d at 357 (citing 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307).  The court of appeals concluded that 
the first exception applied to Howard.  Howard, 199 Wis. 2d at 
                     
8  A case is final if the prosecution is no longer pending, 
a judgment of conviction has been entered, the right to a state 
court appeal from the final judgment has been exhausted, and the 
time for certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court 
has expired.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321, n.6 
(1987). 
9  Only a plurality of the Court adopted the doctrine of 
retroactivity set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  
Later, a majority of the Court endorsed the doctrine. Graham v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 471 (1993). 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
14
460.   The court of appeals held that the nexus requirement of 
Peete places the conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe.  Id. 
¶25 It is not absolutely clear from the Supreme Court's 
discussion in Teague if the Court meant to apply the non-
retroactivity doctrine to questions of substantive law, as well 
as to questions of procedure.  See Teague, 489 U.S. at 299, 304. 
 In that case, the petitioner sought retroactive application of 
a new rule announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10 
 The 
confusion 
arises 
from 
Teague's 
delineation 
of 
the 
exceptions to non-retroactivity.  The first exception, that "a 
new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of 
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," 489 U.S. at 311 
(internal quotations omitted), would seem to cover conduct that 
is classically substantive.  The second Teague exception, that 
"a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the 
observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty," id. (internal quotations omitted), clearly 
applies to rules of procedure.  After discussing the costs of 
                     
10  The Court held in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 
(1986), that a defendant can establish a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination by showing that he or she is a member of a 
cognizable racial group, that the State exercised peremptory 
challenges to remove from the jury members of the defendant's 
race, and that those facts and any other relevant circumstances 
create an inference that the State used that practice to exclude 
jurors because of race.   
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
15
broad retroactivity, the Teague plurality adopted the exceptions 
as originally proposed by Justice Harlan.  The Court stated that 
unless cases on collateral review fall within one of the 
exceptions, "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure" 
would not apply to cases which became final before the new rules 
were announced.  489 U.S. at 310. 
¶26 Based on the Teague Court's own summary, we agree with 
the State that the Teague retroactivity analysis is limited to 
procedural rules.  See also State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 
499 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 880 (1993)(comparing 
criteria 
from 
earlier 
cases, 
and 
substituting 
the 
Griffith/Teague rule as the law in Wisconsin for determining 
whether 
to 
apply 
a 
new 
rule 
of 
criminal 
procedure 
retroactively); Denny, 163 Wis. 2d at 356-57 (holding that new 
rule requiring a trial court to consider defendant's own 
confession to assess whether a codefendant's statements are 
supported by sufficient indicia of reliability, fits second 
Teague exception as a procedure implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty). 
¶27 The State concedes that Peete may have effected a 
substantive change in the law and that the doctrine of non-
retroactivity found in Teague does not apply to substantive 
interpretations.  Neither would the doctrine as endorsed by this 
court in Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 548 N.W.2d 
45 (1996), bar us from applying the rule of Peete to Howard. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
16
¶28 Schmelzer claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We held that there is a statutory right to counsel in the 
preparation of a petition for review to this court, and that 
Schmelzer's appellate counsel had performed deficiently for 
failing to timely file a petition for review.  Schmelzer, 201 
Wis. 2d at 249.  We also concluded, however, that Schmelzer was 
not prejudiced by his appellate counsel's deficient performance. 
 Our holding, that one in Schmelzer's situation may petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus and should the writ be granted, the 
court can allow the late filing of such a petition for review, 
announced a new procedural rule.  Id. at 256. 
¶29 We then considered the question of retroactivity.  
Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 256-57.  We endorsed the rule of 
Teague, recognizing its two exceptions to non-retroactivity.  We 
concluded, however, that a strict application of Teague would 
prevent retroactive application of any new rule of law relating 
to habeas corpus claims based on a statutory right.  Schmelzer, 
201 Wis. 2d at 257-58.  Because ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims can only be brought through a writ of habeas 
corpus, we articulated a third exception, to include claims that 
can only be raised on collateral review.  Id. at 258. 
¶30  Schmelzer then went on to specifically state that the 
new rule it adopted would apply to the defendant in that case, 
but would not apply retroactively to cases finalized before that 
opinion.  Id.  We announced no such limitation in Peete. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
17
¶31 However, the State attempts to cleave the Peete 
decision into two parts: first, a substantive change in 
statutory interpretation; and second, a procedural change in the 
required jury instructions.  The State contends that the Peete 
requirement for a jury instruction on nexus is only a procedural 
change and therefore does not require a retroactive application. 
 We disagree. 
¶32 Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.63 worked a 
substantive change in the law.  Prior to our interpretation, 
neither the courts nor the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions 
Committee 
responsible for 
drafting 
jury instructions, had 
interpreted the statute to require the nexus element, "that the 
defendant possessed the weapon to facilitate the commission of 
the predicate offense."  Before our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.63 in Peete, there was no nexus element and no specific 
charge to the jury to prove that element.  The State would have 
us ignore the intimate and essential relationship between the 
substantive element identified by Peete, and its practical 
effectuation, the instruction required by Peete.  We hold that 
in this case, where a substantive right is recently identified 
on collateral review, and that right can only be effectuated by 
instructing 
the 
jury 
to 
make 
a 
specific 
finding, 
jury 
instruction is a necessary part of the substantive right.  The 
defendant's substantive right to have the nexus element proven 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
18
can only be met after the jury has received the necessary 
instruction on that element. 
BAR OR WAIVER 
¶33 The State's next contention is that Howard's motion is 
barred by Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168.  In that case, we 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) to require that if a ground 
for relief was not raised in an original, supplemental or 
amended motion, the defendant had to show a sufficient reason 
why he or she had not asserted that ground for relief earlier; 
otherwise, the defendant's claim was barred.  Escalona-Naranjo, 
185 Wis. 2d at 181-82.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
requirements of Escalona were met in Howard's case.  Howard, 199 
Wis. 2d at 461-62.  "The fact that Howard could not have 
foreseen the affect [sic] of the Peete decision at the time of 
his appeal constitutes a sufficient reason for not raising the 
issue at an earlier date."  Id. 
¶34 In 
Escalona-Naranjo, 
the 
defendant 
asserted 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in two § 974.02 
postconviction motions.  At the time of those earlier motions, 
he was also aware of the basis for a claim he later raised in a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) motion.  We ruled that the defendant was 
precluded from raising a third allegation of ineffective 
assistance in a later § 974.06(4) motion, when he had known the 
basis for that allegation at the time of his earlier motions.  
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 184.  We read Wis. Stat. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
19
§ 974.06 to limit even constitutional bases for a postconviction 
motion unless the court determines that a "sufficient reason" 
exists for the failure to allege, or to adequately raise, the 
issue in the original, supplemental or amended motion.  185 Wis. 
2d at 181-82. 
¶35 The 
State 
argues 
here 
that 
Howard 
should 
have 
preserved his objection to the lack of a nexus instruction 
despite the fact that Howard's case predated the Peete decision. 
 Specifically, the State argues that Howard had available to him 
all of the statutes, legislative history, and the rules of 
statutory construction as Peete himself had.  The State also 
asserts that even without Peete, Howard could have challenged 
the sufficiency of the evidence for the penalty enhancer. 
¶36 The 
court 
of 
appeals, 
however, 
considered 
it 
impractical to expect a defendant to argue an unknown statutory 
interpretation.  Despite the prescription that a statute cannot 
mean one thing prior to an interpretation, and mean something 
else afterward, the court of appeals concluded that a legal 
argument like Howard's cannot be made until a higher authority 
determines the correct application.  Howard, 199 Wis. 2d at 462. 
¶37 We agree with the court of appeals.  Our construction 
of Wis. Stat. § 939.63 in Peete constituted a new rule of 
substantive law.  Peete's success in arguing that the enhancer 
provision requires proof of the nexus beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not automatically preclude others, sentenced before Peete, 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
20
from raising that same argument in a postconviction motion.  
Unlike the defendant in Escalona-Naranjo, Howard was not aware 
of the legal basis for his present motion at the time of his 
trial and sentencing.  Nor was Howard aware of the nexus 
requirement at the time of his earlier postconviction motions 
and appeal. 
¶38 To hold otherwise would require criminal defendants 
and their counsel to raise every conceivable issue on appeal in 
order to preserve objections to rulings that may be affected by 
some subsequent holding in an unrelated case.  We do not believe 
that Wis. Stat. § 974.06 requires so much.  Howard's case is 
just such an example of the "sufficient cause" exception to the 
finality of appellate issues under Wis. Stat. § 974.06. 
¶39 The State also contends that Howard waived his claim 
of error because he did not object to the penalty enhancer jury 
instruction as given.  The court of appeals concluded that 
Howard did not object to the instructions as given because he 
did not foresee the new rule of Peete.  Howard, 199 Wis. 2d at 
463. 
¶40 The State's waiver analysis is also based on the 
premise that because the State proved actual possession, any 
defect in the jury instructions did not create a substantial 
probability that a different result would be likely on retrial. 
 State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 741, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
21
493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  We have already concluded, however, 
that the possession proved in this case was established without 
any proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the necessary nexus 
element. 
¶41 The State relies on State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 
388, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) to establish waiver.  Schumacher in 
part relied on Wis. Stat. § 805.13,
11 to determine the breadth of 
the court of appeals' discretion to review error based on 
instructions to which no objection had been made at trial.  
Schumacher did not involve a "new rule" basis for the claimed 
instructional error. 
¶42 The Schumacher court concluded that the court of 
appeals does not have a broad discretionary power of review to 
reach waived jury instructions.  As a caveat, however, the court 
stated that the intermediate court may still reach issues which 
are unwaivable.  144 Wis. 2d at 408 n.14.  Unwaivable issues, 
                     
11  Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3)(1985-86) 
At the close of the evidence and before arguments to 
the jury, the court shall conduct a conference with 
counsel outside the presence of the jury.  At the 
conference, or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, counsel may file written motions 
that the court instruct the jury on the law, and 
submit verdict questions, as set forth in the motions. 
 The court shall inform counsel on the record of its 
proposed action on the motions and of the instructions 
and verdict it proposes to submit.  Counsel may object 
to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds 
of incompleteness or other error, stating the grounds 
for 
objection 
with 
particularity 
on the 
record.  
Failure to object at the conference constitutes a 
waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or 
verdict. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
22
such as ineffective assistance of counsel claims, ordinarily 
would not be brought up by the defendant at trial.  Therefore, 
the court of appeals' discretionary power to review must extend 
to such unwaivable matters. 
¶43 Here, Howard and his counsel in 1990 had no way to 
know how this court would construe Wis. Stat. § 939.63 by the 
time it decided Peete in 1994.  We agree that Howard's counsel 
had an obligation to object at the instructions conference based 
on incompleteness or other error about which he knew or should 
have known.  We cannot agree that Howard's counsel could have 
stated grounds for an objection "with particularity," based on 
the absence of a nexus element and corresponding instruction.  
See Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3).  Howard has not waived this issue. 
¶44 Had Howard made this objection at the time of the 
instructions conference in 1990, it is unlikely that the circuit 
court would have "easily remedied the deficiency."  144 Wis. 2d 
at 409.  Howard did not waive the issue of the nexus element, 
and the court of appeals did not exceed its authority by its 
discretionary review of this question. 
INAPPLICABILITY OF HARMLESSS ERROR ANALYSIS 
¶45 The Due Process Clause protects a defendant against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is 
charged.  Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.  The burden of proving all 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
23
State.  Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 473, 289 N.W.2d 570 
(1980).  
¶46 Proper jury instruction is a crucial component of the 
fact-finding process.  State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 426, 
307 N.W.2d 151 (1981).  The jury must determine guilt or 
guiltlessness in light of the jury charge, and the validity of 
that determination is dependent upon the correctness, and 
completeness, of the instructions given.  See id., at 426-27. 
Elements of a crime are its requisite conduct, either an act or 
omission, and mental fault.  Elements may include particular 
attendant circumstances, and sometimes, a specified result of 
the conduct.  W. LaFave and A. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal 
Law at 45 n.3 (1972). 
¶47 We review jury instructions as a whole to determine 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
jury 
understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof 
insufficient to meet the Winship standard.  Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 889, (quotations omitted) citing Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. 
Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994).  An inadequate jury instruction can 
provide a ground for reversal because it deprives the accused of 
a jury determination that he or she engaged in constitutionally 
prohibitable conduct made unlawful by statute.  See, e.g., 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 123-26 (1990).  The court cannot 
direct a verdict of guilty, no matter how overwhelming the 
evidence.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
24
¶48 In this case, the State contends that the harmless 
error analysis applies.  The State specifically relies on 
Illinois v. Pope, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), to contend that any 
instructional error in Howard's case is harmless.  In Pope, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the harmless error analysis is 
appropriate in the absence of error that renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair.  481 U.S. at 502.  The Pope Court cited 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), as an example where the 
harmless error analysis was appropriate because the jury 
instruction 
did 
not 
"entirely 
preclude" 
the 
jury 
from 
considering the element of malice, even though it shifted the 
burden of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510 (1979).  Pope, 481 U.S. at 502-03.  Similarly, in Pope, the 
jurors were "not precluded" from considering the question of 
value to determine whether a reasonable person would find value 
in the allegedly obscene work, even when the court erroneously 
instructed by giving a constitutionally infirm standard for 
"value".  Id. at 503.  Even if Pope focused on the effect, 
rather than on the character, of the error, see United States v. 
Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988), we perceive a 
difference.  
¶49 In Howard's case, the jury was "entirely precluded" 
from considering whether Howard possessed a dangerous weapon "to 
facilitate commission of the predicate crime."  The absence of 
the nexus instruction thus renders Howard's conviction on the 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
25
penalty enhance "fundamentally unfair."  Unlike the facts in 
Pope and Rose, here there was no instruction on the nexus 
element.  The Howard jurors were never asked to find whether 
Howard possessed a dangerous weapon to facilitate the predicate 
crime, nor were they instructed to presume that, if they found 
possession, they could find that Howard possessed the weapon to 
facilitate the underlying crime. 
¶50 In other cases, reviewing courts have found the error 
harmless, because the instruction given on the element was 
somehow flawed.  In none of those cases, however, was the 
required instruction totally absent.  Carella v. California, 491 
U.S. 263 (1989)(instructions containing conclusive presumption); 
State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991) 
(jury instruction creating mandatory conclusive presumption 
regarding an element of the offense, presented an exceedingly 
rare case in which a conclusive presumption is harmless error). 
 But see  State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 478, 147 N.W.2d 550 
(1967)(trial court refused to give instruction on mens rea 
element, error prejudicial and new trial required); State v. 
Moriarty, 107 Wis. 2d 622, 631, 321 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 
1982)(instructing 
that 
defendant 
was 
armed, 
instead 
of 
instructing that defendant used or threatened to use a weapon 
during robbery, relieved the State of its burden to prove every 
fact essential to the crime, and thus was not harmless); State 
v. Hurd, 135 Wis. 2d at 275-76, (where trial court failed to 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
26
instruct on element of "wilfully," failure not harmless, new 
trial ordered). 
¶51 In Avila, we distinguished the effect of flawed jury 
instructions 
from 
the 
complete 
absence 
of 
an 
essential 
instruction.  We held that if the circuit court fails to 
instruct a jury about an essential element of the crime  and the 
jury must find that element beyond a reasonable doubt, there is 
an automatic reversal of the verdict.  If, however, there is 
some instruction on that element, albeit erroneous, and the jury 
is told that the element must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then the analysis is one of harmless error.  Avila, 192 
Wis. 2d at 893a. 
¶52 The State disagrees that Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275 (1993), cited by the Avila court, actually supports the 
Avila holding.  The Sullivan Court recognized that most 
constitutional errors are amenable to the harmless error 
analysis.  508 U.S. at 279.  Harmless error analysis looks to 
the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict.  Id. at 
279 (citations omitted).  In Sullivan, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder, after receiving an 
unconstitutional instruction defining "reasonable doubt."  Id. 
at 277.  The Court distinguished this infirmity from one where 
the instructions create a presumption for an element of the 
crime, but where the jury finds the predicate facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Under the latter scenario, the court can 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
27
conclude that the presumption "played no significant role in the 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 281. 
¶53 But Howard's case is not one of an erroneous or a 
deficient instruction.  This is a case where the required 
instruction on an element of the State's case was not given at 
all.  It is a case where the failure to prove nexus "affect[ed] 
the composition of the record."  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 283 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
¶54 In its brief, that State contends that our rejection of 
the harmless error analysis in Avila, because the instructional 
error related to an element of the offense, conflicts with our 
summary affirmance of the decision in State v. Nye, 100 Wis. 2d 
398, 302 N.W.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1981).  According to the State, the 
Nye court "found harmless an erroneous jury instruction on one 
element of the crime of second degree sexual assault."  State's 
Brief at 40.  
¶55 The State both overstates our ruling in Avila, and 
reads too broadly the conclusion in Nye.  Our holding in Avila 
only concerned the total absence of an instruction on an 
element, and did not foreclose the harmless analysis for any 
error "related to an element."  In Nye, the defendant was 
charged with having sexual intercourse with his 14-year old 
stepdaughter.  One of the instructions to the jury lowered the 
burden of proof below the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  
The instruction read "if that intentional touching can be 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
28
reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal 
or gratification . . ."  Nye, 100 Wis. 2d at 400. 
¶56 The court of appeals held that the jury instruction 
lowered the burden of proof, and thus was unconstitutional.  The 
court then proceeded to consider whether the instruction as 
given constituted harmless error.  Nye, 100 Wis. 2d at 403.  
According to the evidence, the defendant and his stepdaughter 
had intercourse for approximately ten minutes, resulting in 
orgasm.  The court concluded that it was effectively impossible 
for the jury to conclude that the act was not committed for the 
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.  Id. at 404.  The 
court of appeals then surmised that if the harmless error 
analysis applies when a court gives a jury instruction that 
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof, it clearly 
applies where the jury instruction merely lowers the burden of 
proof.  Id. at 405. 
¶57 Significantly, the Nye court did not answer the 
question of whether a failure to instruct on an element 
(nonconsent) unconstitutionally resulted in a directed verdict 
for the State on that element, and thus could not be harmless.  
The Nye court did not reach that question because a plain 
reading of the statute and instruction indicated that nonconsent 
of the victim was not an element of that crime when committed 
against a person less than 15 years of age.  Id. at 407-08.  We 
do not read Nye to conflict with our holding in Avila. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
29
¶58 Howard may well be guilty of the offense charged 
against him, but he is entitled to a fair trial according to the 
established rules of procedures and principles of law, with a 
jury finding on each and every element of the crime charged.  
See  Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 395, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977) 
(citing Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 17, 38 N.W. 177 (1888)). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 95-0770 
 
 
1