Case Title: State v. Phillips

Citation: 232 Kan. 625, 656 P.2d 770

Docket Number: 54,577

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1983-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
232 Kan. 625 (1983)
656 P.2d 770
STATE OF KANSAS, Petitioner,
v.
JAMES S. PHILLIPS, SR., Respondent.
No. 54,577

Supreme Court of Kansas.
January 14, 1983.
Per Curiam:
This is an original action filed by the Disciplinary Administrator against James S. Phillips, Sr., an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the State of Kansas. The complaint arose when a decision of the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial after finding that David Richard was denied a fair trial due to the conflict of interest of the respondent. See In re Estate of Richard, 4 Kan. App.2d 26, 602 P.2d 122 (1979), rev. denied 227 Kan. 927 (1980). A panel of the Board for Discipline of Attorneys found in part that the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (DR 5-105 and DR 5-101, [230 Kan. cxx-cxxi]) by representing a client in a cause where the client's interests were in conflict with those of David Richard whom respondent had previously represented. The panel recommended public censure by this court. Exceptions to the report of the panel were filed by the respondent.
Summarized, the evidence on the complaint resulting in the panel's recommendation was that David Richard and his family moved from Wichita to live and work on the farms of his uncle, Alphonse Richard, which were located near Brewster, Kansas. Respondent had represented David on many matters, some before and some after the move. After Alphonse's death, with David's consent, respondent represented the estate of Alphonse Richard. David claimed that "Uncle Alf" had promised him the farm and implements if David and his wife would farm the land and look after Alphonse. When this claim was tried in In re Estate of Richard, David objected to respondent representing the estate but the objection was successfully resisted. Respondent continued to represent the estate in the trial on David's claim. Respondent's representation of the estate and statements suggested to the trial court negative inferences about David's claim. David thought prior knowledge gained from him by respondent as his lawyer could be used to cross-examine David and his wife at the trial of David's claim.
A majority of the court agrees with the panel's conclusions and recommendation of public censure.
We find that the respondent has violated the Code of Professional *626 Responsibility as determined by the panel and that its recommendation of public censure should be accepted and approved by this court.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that James S. Phillips, Sr., be and he is hereby disciplined by this court by public censure and he is hereby ordered to pay forthwith the costs of this proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order of Public Censure be published in the official Kansas Reports.
By order of this court this 14th day of January, 1983.
HOLMES, J., not participating.
HERD, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority holding that James S. Phillips, Sr., violated DR 5-101 and DR 5-105(b) (230 Kan. cxx, cxxi).
D.R. 5-101 provides:
D.R. 5-105(B) and (C) provide:
....
For a complete understanding of the issues it is necessary to again recite the facts. The respondent, James S. Phillips, Sr., a Wichita attorney, represented David Richard during the late 1960's and early 1970's. In 1974 Alphonse Richard, the uncle of David Richard, contacted David and requested him to move to Brewster and assist Alphonse in his extensive farming operation. Alphonse, elderly and in failing health, could not properly operate his 2400 acres. David accepted the invitation and moved his family to Brewster in August 1974. Alphonse needed legal assistance; David recommended his own attorney, James S. Phillips, Sr. Mr. Phillips' contact with Alphonse was primarily by telephone at first. Phillips drafted a power of attorney in David for Alphonse which was executed November 14, 1975, and later assisted in the eviction of some farm tenants.
David Richard leased Alphonse's land on a standard one-third/two-thirds share crop basis. Phillips drafted a written lease in 1975 and later an extension of the lease. David was quite active under the power of attorney, so active in fact it made other relatives nervous. Alphonse Richard was unmarried and as far as anyone knew had no will. On October 8, 1976, Loretta Gross, a niece, petitioned the district court to appoint herself guardian of Alphonse Richard and conservator of his estate. David, on behalf of his uncle, called Phillips to defend against the action. Phillips discussed his employment with Alphonse and filed appropriate pleadings. J. Ronald Vignery was attorney for Loretta Gross and the court appointed Perry Warren guardian ad litem for Alphonse. Before the case could be resolved, Alphonse Richard died on March 6, 1977, leaving an estate valued in excess of $1,000,000.
Both family factions vied for administration of the estate. Two petitions for appointment of an administrator were filed simultaneously on March 7, 1977. Respondent, representing David Richard, asked that David Richard or in the alternative Lawrence Bruggeman, be appointed and Mr. Vignery, representing Germaine Jacobs, a sister of the deceased, asked that Mrs. Jacobs and her son John be appointed. At the hearing on the petitions before Judge Birney, it became obvious to the court a family squabble was brewing. This colloquy ensued:
"MR. VIGNERY: Yes sir, Your Honor.
"MR. VIGNERY: No, I'm not.
"MR. VIGNERY: I see no reason why there isn't.
"MR. PHILLIPS: There is no reason, Your Honor.
"MR. PHILLIPS: No cattle, no livestock.
"MR. VIGNERY: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Mr. Phillips?
"MR. PHILLIPS: That is correct, Your Honor.
Both family factions including David Richard approved the court's action in appointing the co-administrators and Phillips and Vignery as attorneys for them. Phillips immediately informed David Richard he would have to retain other counsel on matters adverse to the estate. Mr. Richard did not object to this arrangement. He stated he felt it was to his advantage to have his former attorney represent the administrators and look out for his interests in the estate.
*630 Sometime prior to August 1, 1977, David Richard employed Thomas R. Oglevie of Goodland as his attorney. Phillips delivered all of David's files to David.
In the meantime David Richard had been appointed special administrator of the estate for a brief period. Phillips assisted Richard in closing the special administration on April 22, 1977. He also helped Richard prepare a claim for services and expenses in the amount of $1,841.05. The administrators denied the claim and put David on strict proof. The dual role Phillips engaged in was criticized by complainant but the panel called it mere housekeeping chores in the administration of the estate. I agree.
On September 2, 1977, David Richard filed a petition for specific performance of an oral contract he claims he had with Alphonse Richard wherein David was to receive the entire estate in consideration for his taking over the farming operation and caring for the decedent. Thomas Oglevie was his attorney.
On October 7, 1977, the administrators filed their answer denying David's claim and counterclaimed for $17,774.64 for wrongful expenditures under the power of attorney. $9,474.54 of the amount claimed had been paid to respondent for representation of decedent in the guardianship proceedings.
Mr. Oglevie discussed the possibility of disqualifying respondent for a conflict of interest with David Richard prior to filing the action for specific performance. Mr. Richard declined to permit such action.
On June 26, 1978, the trial of David Richard's claim began. All went tranquilly until Mr. Phillips commenced objecting to questions propounded to David. It then came home to David Richard that Phillips could possibly possess information damaging to his case. He had Mr. Oglevie move to disqualify Phillips from assisting in cross-examination of his wife; Oglevie then broadened the motion to oust respondent from the case. The court took the motion under advisement while he read the transcript, then denied the motion. The district court opinion denying David Richard's claim and granting in part the counterclaim in the amount of $10,502.40 was rendered September 14, 1978. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and granted David Richard a new trial, stating:
From that opinion the disciplinary administrator felt impelled to file this complaint.
This is not an easy case. The hearing panel struggled with it and failed to agree on many issues. The case has now been winnowed down to one issue: Did David Richard knowingly and willingly waive his right to confidential communications with respondent? It is clear he willingly waived this right. The question is how knowing was his waiver. David claims it was totally unknowing because he was promised by respondent he would get "insider" treatment by having his own attorney representing the administrators. Instead, David Richard's attorney, Tom Oglevie, testified on cross-examination as follows:
By Mr. Hensley:
"A. With 100 grains of salt.
....
....
Mr. Olgevie testified that, "on the specific directions of David Richard," he did not formally move to disqualify respondent until the trial.
He went on to state in that regard on cross-examination:
"A. I most certainly did.
....
"A. Yes.
"A. Yes.
....
....
"A. Very definitely."
In cross-examination of Mr. Vignery the following occurred:
By Mr. Hensley:
"A. No.
"A. No."
David Richard was called back for further testimony. Chairman Patterson questioned David. He stated that Mr. Phillips had told him since he was an heir to the estate Phillips would be representing him as well as others in the probate proceeding. This question followed:
"A. Yes."
Mr. Hensley elicited this information in cross-examination of Mr. Richard:
"A. No, I think that would be pretty close."
Laurence Bruggeman's testimony on cross-examination was also revealing:
"A. No."
It is axiomatic that an attorney cannot represent two clients on *633 opposite sides of a controversy unless he has the consent of both. DR 5-105(C). That is exactly what happened here. David Richard and his sisters were involved in a heated controversy with Germaine Jacobs and her family over administration of Alphonse Richard's estate. It was a classic family quarrel. The two factions, with their lawyers, at the urging of the judge arrived at the compromise agreement where both sides could participate in the administration of the estate. Everyone was pleased. The judge explained how controversies between the administration would be resolved. Phillips told David Richard he would have to obtain outside counsel if he pursued a claim against the estate. David Richard clearly understood that. He hired other counsel who apprised him of the consequences of having Phillips represent the estate against David's claim. David continued to insist Phillips should not be challenged. It was not until the trial was in progress, some sixteen and one-half months later, that David objected. Phillips did not voluntarily step aside because David's claim was for the entire estate. Phillips had pledged, by accepting employment, to protect the estate. To keep his commitment he had to do his best to protect the corpus of the estate which was under attack. Phillips had been released from his duty to David except as an heir, and had taken on a new obligation which he was diligently discharging.
Complainant has the duty of proving by clear and convincing evidence James Phillips, Sr., accepted employment by the Alphonse Richard Estate without the consent of David Richard. State v. Freeman, 229 Kan. 639, 644, 629 P.2d 716 (1981). I find the opposite true. Phillips accepted the employment, not only with the consent of David, but with the actual urging of David. By such acts David clearly waived the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.
James S. Phillips, Sr., should be exonerated from the charge of ethical violations.
PRAGER, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.