Case Title: Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise

Citation: 2006-Ohio-550

Docket Number: 20050803

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550.] 
 
 
 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. WISE. 
[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise,  
108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension with six months stayed on 
condition — Implying ability to improperly influence a public official — 
Threatening to bring criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a 
civil matter. 
(No. 2005-0803 — Submitted August 23, 2005 — Decided February 22, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-115. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, David M. Wise of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0037837, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1987.  
On December 22, 2003, relator, Cuyahoga County Bar Association, charged 
respondent in a two-count complaint with having violated the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and made findings of misconduct and 
recommended a sanction, all of which the board adopted. 
Findings of Misconduct 
 
{¶ 2} The 
allegations 
of 
misconduct 
arose 
from 
respondent’s 
representation of a mother in a custody dispute over her minor child.  The child 
had been cared for since birth by the father’s sister (“aunt”) with help from the 
father’s parents, and the aunt had asked the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court to 
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2 
award her permanent custody.  Respondent’s client and her fiancé, the child’s 
father, also wanted custody. 
{¶ 3} The juvenile court judge gave temporary custody of the child to the 
aunt for the duration of the permanent-custody case.  Later, at a hearing on 
January 29, 2003, the judge determined that the allegations in the complaint 
invoked a 90-day processing period that had already been exceeded in the case, a 
defect that the father raised in a motion to dismiss.  The judge granted the father’s 
motion to dismiss, a ruling that respondent believed operated to immediately 
return custody of the child to his client, the natural mother.  At the conclusion of 
the proceeding, the judge stated from the bench that she was concerned for the 
child’s well-being and safety and announced that she was going to immediately 
ask the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services to 
investigate whether being in the custody of her parents would put the child at risk.  
A case worker began an investigation that afternoon.  The next day, January 30, 
2003, the agency took the child into protective custody and formally placed the 
child in the aunt’s care. 
{¶ 4} After the January 29 hearing, the events underlying relator’s 
complaint occurred.  Almost immediately after the judge stated her intent to 
report the child’s case to children services, respondent and the father’s attorney 
advised their clients that they were free to take custody of the child.  
Respondent’s client and the father left the courtroom and drove to two different 
daycare centers at which the child had been enrolled.  They could not find the 
child, however, because the child was ill that day and in the care of another 
relative. 
{¶ 5} Either on the afternoon of January 29 or January 30, respondent 
learned that his client had been unable to find her child.  The client was so 
distraught that she talked about pursuing kidnapping charges against the aunt.  
Respondent called the aunt’s employer, the Cleveland Police Department.  
January Term, 2006 
3 
According to his testimony before the hearing panel, respondent called the police 
department to see if the aunt was working that day, surmising that she could not 
have run off with the child if she was on duty. 
{¶ 6} Respondent called the police department at around 3:30 p.m. on 
January 30.  He spoke to a police sergeant, one of the aunt’s supervisors, and told 
him that he was representing a client in a custody dispute with the aunt and that 
his client had been awarded custody but that the child could not be located.  He 
asked the sergeant to call the aunt and ask her to turn over the child.  He said that 
if she did not turn the child over, kidnapping charges might be filed.  The sergeant 
advised respondent that the aunt had not reported for duty that day or the day 
before, absences that the sergeant understood to be for family medical leave.  
Respondent replied that the aunt had been in court on January 29, a disclosure that 
caused the sergeant to question the aunt’s explanation for her absences.  
Respondent further told the sergeant that he knew “Bill Mason,” referring to the 
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and would personally go see him in 
order to get kidnapping charges filed. 
{¶ 7} After speaking with respondent, the sergeant was able to reach the 
aunt and discuss respondent’s concerns.  At respondent’s request, the sergeant 
called him back and relayed that the aunt had the child.  The sergeant also relayed 
the aunt’s request that respondent communicate with her only through her lawyer.  
Respondent asked the sergeant whether he knew where the child was.  When the 
sergeant said that he did not, respondent said that he understood that there was a 
code of silence among police officers. 
{¶ 8} At the panel hearing, respondent disputed the sergeant’s 
recollection of their conversation.  Respondent testified that he had mentioned the 
county prosecutor’s name not as a threat, but as a word to the wise that Mason 
would “eat his own” if he found out that an officer had acted criminally.  
Respondent claimed that the sergeant had mistaken his remarks for an attempt to 
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4 
apply pressure, when he was merely trying to get information to prevent his client 
from filing criminal charges against the aunt. 
{¶ 9} After calling the police department on January 30, respondent 
called Douglas Blackburn, the aunt’s attorney.  Blackburn testified that when he 
was told of the possible kidnapping charges, he had explained to respondent that 
custody remained with the aunt until the juvenile court journalized its entry, 
which it had not yet done.  Blackburn assured respondent of the child’s 
whereabouts and promised that the aunt had no intention of running away with the 
child. 
{¶ 10} According to Blackburn, despite being given these assurances, 
respondent referred during their conversation to his “good friend Bill Mason” in 
connection with pressing kidnapping charges.  Blackburn also recalled that 
respondent had threatened to report the aunt’s “misconduct” to another “friend,” 
the city of Cleveland Safety Director. 
{¶ 11} Respondent denied having made any threatening remarks to 
Blackburn and specifically denied having mentioned Mason or the safety director.  
He suggested that Blackburn was “confused” about the substance of their 
conversation because Blackburn had consulted with Ross Paul, the child’s 
guardian ad litem, and the police sergeant in the course of the disciplinary 
investigation.  Respondent explained that he and Paul had been on unfriendly 
terms even before Blackburn and Paul filed grievances against him.  Respondent 
believed that Paul still held a grudge, especially since respondent had criticized 
his performance as guardian ad litem. 
{¶ 12} Respondent acknowledged, however, that he had been “stern” with 
Blackburn during their telephone conversation.  He recalled having warned 
Blackburn about the consequences if Blackburn was lying to him in assuring him 
that his client had not absconded with the child.  Respondent testified that he had 
said, “[I]f I find out later on that that’s not true, that you deceived me and [in] 
January Term, 2006 
5 
reliance upon your word I passed this information on to my client, I want you to 
understand something very clearly, you and I will have a serious problem man to 
man, not you and me and the courts, but you and I personally will have a serious 
problem on this issue.  * * * [D]o you understand me?” 
{¶ 13} When asked why he had told his client she could get her child 
immediately after dismissal of the custody complaint, even though the judge said 
she was going to call children services, respondent testified that he had been 
uncertain whether the judge would actually follow through.  He said that he did 
not trust the judge’s resolve because during the January 29 hearing, the judge 
“was highly agitated,” “was asking [the parties] what she thought [they] ought to 
do,” and was “flipflopping back and forth.”  According to respondent, the judge 
also “couldn’t articulate from the bench what law she was proceeding under,” and 
she “went on for 20 minutes about just being overturned in the Court of appeals 
and how this wasn’t going to happen to her again.” 
{¶ 14} The panel and board found that respondent had resorted to 
intimidation tactics and suggestions that he would improperly influence public 
officials and had thereby violated DR 9-101(C) (“A lawyer shall not state or 
imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any 
tribunal, legislative body, or public official”), 7-102(A)(l) (in representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not “[f]ile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a 
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is 
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another”), and 7-105(A) (“A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or 
threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil 
matter”). 
 
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6 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 15} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel and 
board weighed specified mitigating and aggravating factors and other relevant 
considerations in respondent’s case.  See Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Adopting 
the panel’s report, the board found in mitigation that respondent had no prior 
record of professional discipline and that neither dishonesty nor self-interest lay 
beneath his violations of the cited Disciplinary Rules.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(a) and (b). 
{¶ 16} Against these factors, the board weighed a series of aggravating 
circumstances.  Apparently because the board did not believe respondent’s 
testimony regarding his telephone conversations with Blackburn and the police 
sergeant and because respondent had failed to notify the panel that affidavits he 
had submitted contained incorrect dates, the board found that respondent had 
submitted false evidence at the hearing.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(f).  Second, 
respondent refused to accept any responsibility for his wrongdoing, insisting that 
the witnesses were either in a conspiracy against him or were confused.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g).  Third, respondent had an improper motive for calling the 
aunt’s employer, and his call caused her problems with her employer. 
{¶ 17} Fourth, the board found that respondent had attempted to impede 
and obstruct the disciplinary process.  The board believed that respondent’s 
motions to disqualify relator’s counsel were “an obvious effort to interfere with 
the orderly commencement of the hearing.”  In his written motion to disqualify all 
three attorneys for relator, respondent argued that one attorney should be 
disqualified because she and respondent had represented opposing parties in a 
contentious domestic-relations case.  Respondent argued that the other two 
January Term, 2006 
7 
attorneys should be disqualified because he had included them on his witness list 
for the hearing before the panel.  He claimed that he should be able to cross-
examine those attorneys regarding affidavits that they had submitted to the 
probable-cause panel in response to his reply to the draft complaint.  
Respondent’s motion was overruled, and, in his motion to reconsider, respondent 
added a claim that one of the attorneys had attempted to intimidate one of his 
witnesses. 
{¶ 18} The board also noted that respondent had notified the panel on 
December 7, 2004, the day before the two-day hearing was to begin, that he was 
ill and might not attend the hearing.  Respondent did appear at the hearing on 
December 8, but advised the panel that he would not be available for the second 
day of the hearing because he was under doctor’s orders to undergo a medical test 
the next morning.  The parties agreed to try to finish the hearing that day.  Then, 
around 9:00 p.m. that night, respondent announced that one of his subpoenaed 
witnesses had failed to appear and he wanted to call him to appear the next day.  
When the chairman of the panel reminded respondent that he had said he could 
not be at the hearing the next day and that that was why they had all stayed late to 
finish the hearing, respondent said, “Actually, I will be here, I was ordered [by my 
doctor] not to be here today.  I disregarded that order.  I’ll disregard tomorrow’s 
order as well.” 
{¶ 19} The board was also displeased with respondent’s refusal to 
stipulate to matters at the panel hearing, a strategy that placed even the 
customarily stipulated authenticity of official records in issue.  Respondent 
subpoenaed the custodians of police, court, and other records for his defense; 
however, he never called the custodians as witnesses, because he was able to rely 
on copies of official records submitted by relator as exhibits.  Moreover, when 
faced with a motion to quash his subpoena for the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, 
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8 
respondent canceled the subpoena, accepting in substitute an affidavit by the 
prosecutor stating that the prosecutor did not know respondent. 
{¶ 20} Respondent argued that relator had failed to prove any misconduct 
and urged dismissal of the complaint.  He alternatively insisted that if the panel 
found any Disciplinary Rule violations, the sanction at most should be a public 
reprimand.  Arguing that respondent had committed serious misconduct and was 
overly contentious in his defense strategy, relator argued for a one-year 
suspension of respondent’s license and monitored supervision of his practice upon 
reinstatement. 
{¶ 21} The board and panel agreed that the aggravating circumstances of 
respondent’s case warranted a more exacting sanction than his misconduct alone 
would have justified.  Adopting the panel’s report, the board recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year with six months of 
the suspension stayed on the condition that respondent commit no further 
professional misconduct during the period of his suspension. 
Review 
{¶ 22} Respondent filed objections, arguing that the violations of DR 9-
101(C), 7-102(A)(l), and 7-105(A) were not proved with clear and convincing 
evidence.  In the alternative, respondent asserts that a public reprimand is the 
appropriate sanction if we do find misconduct.  Relator also filed objections, 
arguing that respondent’s misconduct and refusal to duly cooperate in the 
disciplinary proceedings warrant a one-year actual suspension with a provision for 
monitoring his practice upon reinstatement.  We overrule all the objections. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 23} Respondent insists that he did not intend to harass the aunt in the 
underlying custody dispute, that he did not threaten criminal charges against the 
aunt to gain an advantage in the custody matter, and that he did not mean to imply 
January Term, 2006 
9 
that he could improperly influence public officials to take action adverse to the 
aunt.  Respondent claims that his intentions were to try to prevent the aunt from 
being prosecuted for kidnapping and at the same time ensure that no one 
absconded with the child, whom he believed his client had immediate legal 
custody of as a result of the juvenile judge’s dismissal.  The panel, and later the 
board, found respondent’s explanation for his actions implausible, and so do we. 
{¶ 24} Unless the record weighs heavily against a hearing panel’s 
findings, we defer to the panel’s credibility determinations, inasmuch as the panel 
members saw and heard the witnesses firsthand.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 
101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  Here, we have no 
trouble seeing why the panel credited relator’s witnesses over respondent’s 
testimony. 
{¶ 25} The panel found credible the testimony of the police sergeant, who 
had no involvement in the custody proceedings, and of Blackburn, who 
demonstrated an even-tempered professionalism when faced with respondent’s 
attacks against him.  These witnesses’ similar recollections of their conversations 
with respondent corroborated the fact that respondent had resorted to the same 
improper tactics with each of them.  Moreover, respondent conceded that he had 
never really suspected the aunt of kidnapping or believed that criminal charges 
were warranted.  Thus, we agree with the board that respondent’s mentioning that 
the county prosecutor was his friend in connection with threatening to bring 
kidnapping charges was intended to intimidate and suggest that he could 
improperly influence the prosecutor in order to gain cooperation in locating his 
client’s child.  We therefore find that he violated DR 7-105 and 9-101(C). 
{¶ 26} We further reject respondent’s claim that he did not telephone the 
aunt’s employer to harass or maliciously injure the aunt.  Respondent recognized 
that he could not ethically communicate directly with the aunt without her 
counsel’s permission, see DR 7-104(A)(1), and insists that all he intended to do 
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10 
when he called the aunt’s employer on January 30 was to find out whether she 
was at work.  But respondent did not simply ask whether the aunt was on duty; he 
held on through several transfers to reach the aunt’s supervisor and proceeded to 
report the aunt’s personal troubles.  Respondent then exacerbated the situation by 
suggesting that the aunt was involved in a kidnapping.  Thus, we defer to the 
panel’s determination that respondent’s communications with the aunt’s employer 
violated DR 7-102(A)(1). 
{¶ 27} In finding this misconduct, we also reject as completely unfounded 
respondent’s remaining arguments.  He claims that he could not have violated DR 
7-105 because the juvenile court judge had dismissed the aunt’s complaint for 
permanent custody.  His argument ignores that DR 7-105 precludes threats of 
criminal prosecution to gain advantage in a civil matter.  This prohibition 
obviously extends to all civil claims, whether or not they are currently pending in 
court, and the custody dispute underlying these proceedings had clearly not been 
resolved.  Respondent also argues that he could not have violated DR 9-101(C), 
because he was not in reality acquainted with the county prosecutor or city safety 
director.  DR 9-101(C), however, prohibits a lawyer from implying that he is able 
to improperly influence a public official. 
Sanction 
{¶ 28} When imposing a sanction for attorney misconduct, we consider 
the duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney's mental 
state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818. 
{¶ 29} We find that in violating DR 9-101(C), 7-102(A)(1), and 7-105, 
respondent compromised his duty to promote confidence in the legal system and 
the legal profession.  Second, his misconduct hurt one of the legal system’s most 
vulnerable victims, a litigant in family court.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Arkow, 104 
January Term, 2006 
11 
Ohio St.3d 265, 2004-Ohio-6512, 819 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 23.  Third, respondent 
committed the misconduct, realizing that the aunt was emotionally fragile after 
having had her complaint for permanent custody dismissed. 
{¶ 30} Fourth, we agree with the board’s findings of aggravating and 
mitigating factors, including that respondent failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary proceedings.  Lawyers are entitled to zealously defend themselves 
against charges of misconduct; however, they are no less bound by the standards 
of professionalism in these proceedings than any other.  Respondent’s refusal to 
observe usual customs and courtesies justified the recommendation to enhance 
the sanction for his misconduct. 
{¶ 31} On the other hand, respondent’s attempts to have counsel 
disqualified were not totally specious, nor was respondent responsible for every 
delay.  Thus, contrary to relator’s argument, this case is not in the same category 
as Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Watterson, 103 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004-Ohio-4776, 815 
N.E.2d 386, a case in which the lawyer (1) requested four extensions to file an 
answer so that he could obtain counsel and then filed an answer pro se, (2) 
doggedly asserted a nonexistent conflict to prevent the Stark County Bar 
Association from prosecuting the case against him, and (3) moved this court for 
removal of the panel chairperson because she had overruled his motion to 
disqualify.  We dismissed Watterson’s motion sua sponte and later cited him for 
contempt for repeatedly failing to appear for his deposition.  See id. at ¶ 13.  
Responding to these and many additional efforts to hinder the disciplinary 
process, we said: 
{¶ 32} “Respondent 
persistently 
missed 
deadlines 
and 
otherwise 
obstructed the process in order to defend against the disciplinary charges.  He 
unjustifiably and repeatedly accused various participants in the process of some 
impropriety.  Relator’s counsel aptly described respondent’s behavior as 
‘exasperating.’ ” Id. at ¶ 42. 
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{¶ 33} Finally, none of the cases cited by the parties involves misconduct 
that precisely resembles respondent’s offenses.  The cases involving the most 
similar misconduct are Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 2002-
Ohio-2222, 768 N.E.2d 617, and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Cohen (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 712 N.E.2d 118, in which lawyers threatened their clients with criminal 
charges because the clients had written them bad checks, and Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Cicero (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 351, 678 N.E.2d 517, in which a defense 
lawyer boasted of his having a romantic relationship with a judge and suggested 
that the judge would rule in his clients’ favor for that reason.  Watson was 
suspended from practicing law for one year because he had also committed a 
variety of other misconduct and refused to accept responsibility for his actions.  
Cohen was publicly reprimanded after he conceded his single instance of 
wrongdoing.  Cicero was suspended for one year for engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5), and 
failing to act with respect toward the courts, a violation of Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶ 34} Respondent did not commit as many Disciplinary Rule violations 
as Watson did or impugn the integrity of a court, as Cicero did.  He did, however, 
fail to acknowledge his serious misconduct and unnecessarily complicate these 
proceedings.  We therefore find the board’s recommendation appropriate. 
{¶ 35} Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for one year.  The last six months of this suspension are stayed on the 
condition that respondent commit no further Disciplinary Rule violations.  If 
respondent violates the condition of the stay, the stay shall be lifted, and 
respondent shall serve the entire one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, 
JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissents and would suspend respondent for one year. 
__________________ 
 
Ellen S. Mandell, Bar Counsel, Jon F. Deegan, and Lenore Kleinman, for 
relator. 
 
David M. Wise, pro se, and Stephen McGowan. 
________________________