Case Title: People v. Weatherton

Citation: 

Docket Number: S106489

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/7/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S106489 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
FRED LEWIS WEATHERTON, 
) 
 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. INF030802 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Fred Lewis Weatherton of robbery, attempted 
murder, and two counts of first degree murder with special circumstances, then 
returned a verdict of death.1  Because juror misconduct during the guilt phase 
raises a substantial likelihood of actual bias, we reverse the judgment.   
I.  FACTS 
In light of our conclusion, we summarize the relevant facts. 
On the afternoon of Halloween 1998, defendant, Ernest Hunt, Nelva Bell, 
her roommate Connie Olivolo, Samuel Ortiz, Latonya Roberson, and her one-
                                            
1  
Penal Code sections 211 (robbery), 187/664 (attempted murder), 187, 
subdivision (a) (first degree murder), and 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) (multiple 
murder) and (17) (robbery murder).  (Further unlabeled statutory references are to 
the Penal Code.)  The jury further found that defendant personally discharged a 
firearm during the crimes (former § 12022.53, subd. (d); § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), 
and that he had suffered seven prior “Three Strikes” convictions (§§ 667, subds. 
(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).   
2 
year-old son convened at Hunt‟s home in Indio.  The adults shared crack cocaine 
brought by Bell and Olivolo.  Defendant was known by the nickname “Boo-Boo.”  
Defendant had no money, but was intent on obtaining more drugs.  During 
the evening, he suggested Olivolo have paid sex with one of his friends.  He and 
Bell twice acquired crack on credit from a drug dealer.  Later that evening, Bell, 
Roberson, and her son left Hunt‟s and went to Ortiz‟s house to spend the night.  
Defendant returned to the drug dealer‟s home, where he obtained more crack on 
credit and displayed what appeared to be a firearm.   
Early in the morning of November 1, Bell awoke to hear defendant‟s voice 
outside Ortiz‟s house.  Defendant said, “Tonya, Tonya, I just found Ernest [Hunt] 
dead.”  Ortiz opened the door, then tried to close it at Bell‟s urging.  Defendant, 
carrying a long black gun, kicked the door open, entered, and asked, “Where the 
money at?”  Roberson swore she had none.  Defendant replied, “Bitch, I ain‟t 
playing with you,” and shot her in the forehead.  Ortiz said, “Boo-Boo, you can 
have my money,” saying his wallet was under the bed.  Defendant retrieved the 
cash then shot Ortiz in the head.  Roberson was moaning; defendant shot her in the 
throat.  Bell, holding the boy, pleaded, “Boo-Boo, don‟t shoot me.  I won‟t tell 
nobody.”  At defendant‟s direction, she put the child down, whereupon defendant 
shot her in the back.  He then stood over her and shot her in the face.  Bell had 
been covering her face with her hand.  The bullet passed through her wrist and into 
her mouth.  She “played dead.”  Defendant kicked her leg several times and left.   
Vernon Neal, who lived close by, arrived at Ortiz‟s house early that 
morning.  He saw Roberson sitting on the floor, the child sitting on a bed, and 
Ortiz lying face down on the floor.  Bell told Neal that Boo-Boo shot them.  She 
told a responding police officer the same thing, adding that defendant acted alone, 
used a “big gun,” and committed the crimes “to rob us.”  The police located and 
arrested defendant at Hunt‟s house. 
3 
A police officer, who was an experienced tracker, found shoe prints at the 
scene similar in size, wear, and sole design to the shoes defendant was wearing 
when arrested.  Prints led from Hunt‟s house to an area near Ortiz‟s home.  Others 
led north away from the Ortiz residence.  The prints leading toward Ortiz‟s house 
were close together, suggesting defendant was walking.  The prints leading away 
from the house were further apart, with deeper toe impressions, suggesting 
defendant was running.  
Ortiz died at the scene; Roberson was pronounced dead at the hospital.  
Bell was alert and talking at the hospital.  She had been shot in the back.  A second 
bullet shattered her wrist, entered her mouth, split her tongue, and struck her teeth.  
Bullet fragments recovered from Roberson‟s hospital gurney and fragments found 
in the Ortiz house were determined to have been fired from the same gun. 
Bell was initially intubated and unable to talk.  She did, however, select 
defendant as her shooter from a photographic lineup.  Asked if she was “100 
percent positive,” she nodded yes.  Bell later told Olivolo that Boo-Boo shot her.  
Bell, who had known defendant for more than a year, testified she remained “100 
percent sure” defendant had shot her and the others.  
The jury convicted defendant and returned a verdict of death.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends Juror No. 1‟s misconduct during the guilt phase 
requires reversal of his conviction and sentence.   
The jury returned a guilty verdict on February 20, 2002, and the verdict was 
recorded.  Three days later, the trial court received an anonymous phone message 
that it played for the prosecutor and the defense.  The caller said he overheard a 
young man wearing a juror‟s badge say, “this guy should be getting the death 
penalty, because that‟s what he wants.”  The caller did not indicate when the 
incident occurred.  The court noted there were only three men on the jury:  Juror 
4 
No. 1 (P.P.), Juror No. 5 (M.K.), and Alternate Juror No. 5 (G.S.).2  Everyone 
agreed the court should question the three jurors.   
On February 25, the trial court granted defendant‟s request to represent 
himself, appointing defense counsel as standby counsel.   
At a February 27 hearing, the prosecutor reported that Juror No. 3 (D.A.) 
approached an attorney, not otherwise involved in the case.  When D.A. said she 
wanted to discuss the matter, the attorney refused and reported the incident.  The 
court questioned D.A., who expressed “concern[] that [defendant] is not getting a 
fair trial with the jurors.”  When D.A. began to discuss deliberations, she was 
interrupted and excused from the courtroom.  The parties discussed how best to 
proceed.  D.A. returned and testified that other jurors had engaged in misconduct.  
Specifically, she alleged P.P. and M.K. discussed the penalty toward the end of 
guilt phase deliberations.  P.P. said defendant “should get the death penalty,” and 
M.K. agreed.  The court questioned the other jurors on the panel, including P.P. 
and M.K.  All denied discussing or making up their minds about punishment.   
The trial court also questioned the alternate jurors.  Alternate Juror No. 1 
(K.G.) testified that, on several occasions, she heard jurors discuss punishment, 
saying defendant should receive the death penalty.  K.G. identified P.P. as the 
person most involved in these discussions.  She also testified that P.P. called her at 
home during deliberations, saying “he had interesting news.”  K.G. said P.P. also 
called former Alternate Juror No. 6 (T.M.) (who replaced Juror No. 8 (M.R.)) and 
another alternate juror, described as having red hair.  Alternate Juror No. 4 (L.B.) 
                                            
2  
In reciting the relevant facts, the designation of jurors becomes somewhat 
complicated, particularly because some numbered alternates later replaced 
numbered jurors.  For convenience of the reader, we refer to most jurors using 
their initials. 
5 
testified that, before deliberations, P.P. repeatedly expressed his opinion that 
defendant was guilty.  The other alternate jurors testified they did not recall 
anyone discussing punishment.  P.P. and T.M. were reexamined; both denied 
discussing the case outside deliberations.  
At a February 28 hearing, the trial court discussed the allegations with the 
parties.  The parties agreed that P.P., K.G., and L.B. should be excused.  The 
prosecutor argued D.A. should be excused as well for talking to the attorney, but 
defendant contended she could be rehabilitated and, in any event, the court should 
inquire further regarding her allegation that defendant had been denied a fair trial.  
The court indicated its decision to excuse D.A., K.G., L.B., and P.P.  It did not 
immediately inform the jurors of that decision and said it would ask the four jurors 
additional questions.  The prosecution expressed concern that the jurors‟ answers 
might expose them to potential civil or criminal liability and wondered whether 
the court should advise the jurors of their rights and provide attorneys.   
The trial court reexamined L.B. who recounted numerous conversations 
with P.P. before deliberations began.  P.P. told her he believed defendant was 
guilty and because of Bell‟s testimony, “there should be nothing else.”  P.P. also 
said that, “when he got into the deliberation room he was going to vote guilty . . . 
he wanted to see where everything was going.  But his first vote was going to be 
guilty.”  P.P. anticipated “a lot of argument against him in [deliberations].”  In 
particular, he “felt he would have a battle and especially a battle with [D.A.], that 
they would probably argue.”  The court asked L.B. whether she thought P.P. “was 
going to listen to what other people had to say.”  L.B. said, “No.  His mind was 
made up.  That‟s what I thought.”  L.B. also testified that P.P. called her during 
deliberations and reported arguing with D.A.   
The trial court reexamined P.P., telling him at the outset, “it is pretty clear 
to me that you were basically talking to everybody about the case during the whole 
6 
time prior to deliberations . . . .  So that‟s no longer a question in my mind 
anymore.”  P.P. denied prejudging the case, denied saying he thought defendant 
was guilty, and denied saying before deliberations that he would vote for guilt.  To 
the contrary, he testified he kept an open mind and fully participated in 
deliberations.  Finally, the court reexamined D.A.  She testified she overheard P.P. 
tell M.R. days after the trial began that “he felt that [defendant] was guilty.”   
At the conclusion of the hearing, defendant moved for a mistrial based on 
jury misconduct.  The trial court explained it could not declare a mistrial because 
it had already recorded the guilty verdict.  The court told defendant he could file a 
motion for a new trial, but the prosecutor would be given time to respond.  In the 
interim, the penalty phase would begin.  The jury was summoned, and the court 
excused P.P., D.A., K.G., and L.B.  Alternate Juror No. 2 (A.G.) replaced P.P., 
and G.S. replaced D.A.  After admonition not to discuss the case with anyone, the 
panel was excused.  
On March 4, the next court day, defendant filed a written motion for a new 
trial and mistrial, attaching the declarations of D.A., M.R., K.G., and L.B.  The 
motion alleged P.P. prejudged the case and discussed the case with other jurors 
outside of deliberations.  Regarding what effect the allegations would have on the 
penalty phase, the trial court asked the prosecutor, “if we assume then that there is 
a presumption of prejudice here, how are you going to rebut or overcome that 
prejudice?”  The prosecutor asked, “as to what issue?”  The court responded, “The 
fact that a juror has pre-decided a case and participated in deliberation and 
affected the other jurors that are still sitting.”  When the prosecutor said that there 
was no evidence that happened, the court said, “Sure we do.  [P.P.] prejudged the 
case, period.”  The court later remarked, “[P.P.] prejudged.  He committed 
misconduct, and then he carried it into the jury room.”  When the prosecutor 
argued there was no evidence P.P.‟s misconduct tainted the other jurors, the court 
7 
noted “defendant is entitled to 12, unbiased jurors.”  The court also said, “the 
reason we know [P.P.] was prejudging the case is because he talked to other jurors 
and was trying to lobby them to vote guilty before the deliberations even started.”  
After a recess, the court softened its view.  It said that, at this point, whether P.P. 
prejudged defendant‟s guilt was based on the testimony of other jurors who had 
themselves admitted misconduct.3  At the prosecution‟s request, the court 
ultimately took the motion under submission until after the penalty phase to permit 
the prosecution to interview the jurors.4  
With the issue still in flux, the penalty phase began on March 4; a death 
verdict was returned on March 7.  On March 15, a hearing on defendant‟s motion 
for a new trial began.  At the outset, the trial court and the parties addressed the 
authenticity and admissibility of declarations submitted.5   
                                            
3  
At the conclusion of the March 4 hearing, defendant said, “[it] seem[s] to 
me the Court already had made a factual finding regarding [P.P.]. . . . This 
morning I thought I heard you say that . . . [P.P.] had prejudged.”  The trial court 
said, “Well, sometimes I play the devil‟s advocate to help you out . . . .”  
4  
When asked for his views on how to proceed, defendant cited California 
Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 6th ed. 2002) section 55.33, 
page 1634:  “[A] motion for new trial between the guilt and penalty phases may 
forestall or render unnecessary the penalty phase.  The court and prosecutor may 
prefer to litigate a motion for new trial before resources have been spent on a 
penalty phase.  If reversible error has already been committed, a penalty phase 
would be futile.”  Given significant evidence of serious misconduct, it would be 
more prudent to rule on a motion before proceeding to the penalty phase.   
5  
Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), provides, “Upon an inquiry as 
to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as 
to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or 
without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the 
verdict improperly.  No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such 
statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to 
assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which 
it was determined.”  Where to draw the admissibility line may prove difficult.  
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
8 
A hearing was held on March 20.  At the trial court‟s direction, conflict 
attorneys were in attendance.  K.G. was called to the stand.  The court first advised 
her that some of her testimony might subject her to criminal prosecution or 
contempt of court.  It advised K.G. of her right against self-incrimination and told 
her that attorneys were present to assist her if she chose to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment.  Defendant asked K.G. if she “ever ha[d] an occasion to discuss this 
case with anybody?”  The court interjected, “Ma‟am, that‟s one of the questions 
that . . . may incriminate you if your answer would show that you violated your 
oath as a juror” and asked whether she wanted to speak with an attorney.  When 
K.G. began to cry, the court excused her from the courtroom and appointed one of 
the conflict attorneys to “tell [her] what [her] options are.”  The appointed attorney 
first noted that a grant of immunity by the prosecution or the court might be an 
appropriate solution.  The prosecution indicated it would not offer immunity to 
any juror, but allowed that the court might decide to grant use immunity.  When 
recalled to the stand, K.G. asserted her Fifth Amendment rights, and the court 
granted her use immunity.6   
                                                                                                                                  
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Admissibility of evidence under this statute was litigated in the trial court, and 
neither party raises the issue here.  We express no opinion on the court‟s rulings or 
on the admissibility of evidence relied upon by the court.     
6  
The trial court similarly advised M.R., D.A., L.B., and P.P.  After L.B. and 
P.P. invoked their Fifth Amendment rights, the court granted them use immunity.  
The court also told the remaining jurors that some jurors had admitted committing 
misconduct and attorneys had been appointed to advise them of their rights.  The 
court informed the remaining jurors of their rights and told them lawyers could 
assist them as well, although it noted “this may not involve you.”  We have been 
unable to find another instance in which a court investigating possible jury 
misconduct similarly advised jurors of their Fifth Amendment rights and offered 
to appoint an attorney.  Given the speculative nature of the nascent Fifth 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
9 
K.G. testified that jurors discussed the case from the beginning of trial.  On 
the first day, P.P. told K.G., D.A., and T.M. that he would vote guilty because 
“there was no denying Nelva Bell‟s testimony.”  Two to five other times, P.P. told 
K.G. that defendant was guilty.  K.G. testified that other jurors also said defendant 
was guilty before deliberations had begun.  After K.G., P.P., D.A., and L.B. had 
been excused from the jury, P.P. told them he had lied to the court about not 
discussing the case with others because “he was covering for everybody else, as he 
would assume that everyone else was covering for him.”  On cross-examination, 
K.G. admitted engaging in misconduct, having a “pretty poor memory,” and 
“having trouble recalling all these facts.”   
D.A. testified that, before deliberations began, P.P. told her, L.B., and T.M. 
that “he was going to vote guilty no matter what.”  On another occasion, P.P. 
explained to T.M. why he thought defendant was guilty.  On cross-examination, 
D.A. admitted committing misconduct.  The prosecutor also asked about 
discrepancies in her testimony and placed into evidence an audio recording of 
D.A. telling a defense investigator that P.P. said, “no matter what happens, I‟m 
going in there and vote guilty the first . . . time I vote because just in case.”  The 
                                                                                                                                  
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Amendment issue in these circumstances (see Juror Number One v. Superior 
Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 854, 865 [rejecting the Fifth Amendment claim as 
speculative]) and lacking some articulation of a crime the jurors may have 
committed, the court‟s decision to proceed in this fashion threatened to undermine 
its ability to acquire complete and accurate information, untainted by jurors‟ now-
heightened concerns about their own interests.  (See People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 
Cal.App.4th 339, 380 [“When a defendant makes a prima facie showing of juror 
misconduct, the trial court must conduct a hearing . . . „to determine the truth of 
the allegations.‟ ”].)  Because we reverse the judgment for prejudicial juror 
misconduct, however, we have no occasion to pass on the propriety of the court‟s 
decision to proceed in this manner. 
10 
investigator asked D.A. what was meant by “just in case,” and D.A. said she 
“assum[ed] just in case we all said not. . . . You know because he wanted to 
discuss it . . . I don‟t know if he was dead set on guilty . . . .” 
L.B. testified that she drove P.P. home from court almost every day 
beginning in the second week of the trial.  During their commute, P.P. 
“consistently said that the defendant was guilty.”  On one occasion, L.B. went to 
lunch with P.P. and D.A.  P.P. said “he was probably going to be arguing with 
[D.A.] during the [eventual] deliberations because they were at opposite sides.”  
P.P. later called L.B., an alternate juror, during deliberations.  He reported that 
“things weren‟t going well,” he relayed the vote count, he said that D.A. was 
upset, and expressed his belief that he should have been the foreman.  Before 
deliberations, P.P. frequently said he was going to vote guilty.  Although he said 
“he would listen to what the others said,” “he felt it was guilty, because he had to 
believe what Nelva Bell said.”  On cross-examination, L.B. admitted committing 
misconduct.   
T.M. testified other jurors, including P.P., discussed the case before 
deliberations.  In her opinion, P.P. prejudged defendant‟s guilt before the case was 
submitted to the jury.  After deliberations began, P.P. said he thought D.A. was 
“mad at me because I think — I think [defendant‟s] guilty.” 
A.G., G.S., M.K., former Alternate Juror No. 3 (J.A.) (who replaced Juror 
No. 2 (C.S.)), along with Juror Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 9-12 testified they did not hear 
other jurors discuss the case outside the jury room.     
P.P. first testified he did not hear jurors discuss the case outside of the jury 
room or before deliberations.  He subsequently admitted discussing the case on 
numerous occasions with other jurors, including D.A. and L.B.  He admitted 
telephoning L.B. during deliberations.  In explaining his lies, he said he thought 
his conversations were “unimportant,” and he did not want to get anyone in 
11 
trouble.  He initially denied making statements about defendant‟s punishment or 
prejudging his guilt.  He later admitted that, although he did not remember saying 
defendant was guilty, he might have done so.  He also admitted telling others 
before deliberations that he believed Bell‟s testimony.  When asked if he ever told 
L.B. and D.A. that he was going to vote guilty once deliberations began, P.P. 
testified that it was possible, but he did not remember.  P.P. testified he 
consistently voted for guilt.  On cross-examination by the prosecutor, P.P. testified 
he only formed an opinion on guilt after watching Bell‟s recorded hospital 
interview at the conclusion of the prosecutor‟s rebuttal.  Only then did he express 
an opinion to D.A. and L.B.  P.P. also testified he participated in deliberations and 
listened to the readback of testimony.   
At a March 28 hearing, the trial court found P.P. committed “serious 
misconduct,” but concluded it did “not rise to the level that there is a substantial 
likelihood [of bias].”7  The court acknowledged its initial view was to the 
contrary, but noted that evidence had been presented that P.P. engaged in 
deliberations, was not “dead set” on guilt, and only voted initially for guilt to see 
what others had to say.  The court determined neither P.P. nor D.A. “ha[d] a lot of 
credibility.”  It found that, before deliberations began, P.P. decided that his first 
vote would be guilty, but he would thereafter listen to the other jurors and engage 
in deliberations.  The court found D.A.‟s tape-recorded statement and L.B.‟s 
testimony to be the most compelling evidence concerning P.P.‟s intentions.  The 
court noted P.P. did not arrive at the court with a formed opinion and based his 
                                            
7  
As we explain below (see post, at pp. 12, 15), the court misinterpreted the 
manner in which the analysis is to proceed.   
12 
opinion only on the evidence presented at trial.8  It also noted that the jury asked 
for a readback of testimony, which it considered evidence that the jury was 
deliberating.  The court denied the motion for a new trial.9  
Defendant contends overwhelming evidence establishes P.P. committed 
prejudicial misconduct, and reversal is required.  We agree.   
A criminal defendant “has a constitutional right to a trial by unbiased, 
impartial jurors.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578 
(Nesler).)  That means “12, not 11, impartial and unprejudiced jurors.  „. . . [A] 
conviction cannot stand if even a single juror has been improperly influenced.‟ ”  
(People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1112.)  Jurors must be admonished 
not to “form or express any opinion about the case until the cause is finally 
submitted to them.”  (§ 1122, subd. (b).)  Prejudgment “constitute[s] serious 
misconduct” (People v. Brown (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 476, 480), raising a 
presumption of prejudice.  The presumption is rebutted “if the entire record . . . 
indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial 
likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.”  (In 
re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296.)  “On appeal, . . . whether jury 
misconduct was prejudicial presents a mixed question of law and fact „ “subject to 
an appellate court‟s independent determination.” ‟  [Citation.]  We accept the trial 
                                            
8  
These two conclusions appear to be a makeweight by the trial court.  The 
fact that P.P. did not engage in other kinds of misconduct is of little help in 
resolving whether the misconduct actually committed was prejudicial. 
9  
The trial court also cited (1) P.P.‟s testimony that his premature opinion 
about guilt was “reinforced” by Bell‟s videotaped hospital interview, which was 
played at the end of the trial, and (2) D.A.‟s failure to “articulate any evidence or 
opinion” that P.P.‟s misconduct “influenced her [vote] one way or the other.”  
Because the parties do not address whether such evidence was inadmissible under 
Evidence Code section 1150, we express no opinion on that issue.  
13 
court‟s factual findings and credibility determinations if supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 192 (Tafoya).)       
The trial court heard testimony concerning P.P.‟s premature decision to 
vote guilty.  Some jurors testified P.P. intended to vote guilty on the first ballot; 
others testified he intended “to vote guilty no matter what,” indicating an intent to 
vote guilty on all ballots, regardless of the views of others.  Although these two 
accounts are not necessarily inconsistent, the court ultimately found that P.P. 
decided to vote guilty initially in order to ensure defendant would not be acquitted 
at the outset, but that he thereafter participated in deliberations.  The court cited 
D.A.‟s tape-recorded statement and L.B.‟s testimony as the most persuasive 
evidence of P.P.‟s intent.  We defer to this factual finding.  Nevertheless, in light 
of the uncontroverted evidence of multiple other forms of recurring and serious 
misconduct, and applying the proper prejudice analysis, we conclude that the 
entire record does not eliminate a reasonable probability of prejudice.   
It is undisputed that P.P. repeatedly talked about the case outside 
deliberations.  He did so in direct defiance of the trial court‟s repeated 
admonitions.10  He discussed the case during his daily commute, at lunch, during 
cigarette breaks, in court hallways, and in elevators.11  He telephoned non-
deliberating jurors during deliberations, reporting what was occurring in the jury 
room.  Multiple jurors testified that, long before the prosecution rested its case, 
                                            
10  
At oral argument, defense counsel noted that the trial court fully 
admonished the jury for the first several days of trial.  It thereafter reminded the 
jury daily to “remember the admonitions.”  Given the length of the trial, the jurors 
were admonished scores of times. 
11  
The trial court never made a finding concerning which juror the anonymous 
caller had referred to.  It did note, however, that P.P. most closely fit the caller‟s 
description. 
14 
P.P. conveyed a belief in defendant‟s guilt.  (See People v. Brown, supra, 61 
Cal.App.3d at p. 480.)  He also told jurors, both before and during deliberations, 
that defendant deserved the death penalty, indicating that his mind was made up 
regarding guilt.  Jurors testified that, on the first day of trial, P.P. stated that Bell‟s 
testimony was dispositive on guilt.  These statements “require[] neither 
interpretation nor the drawing of inferences.  [They are] flat, unadorned 
statement[s] that [P.P.] prejudged the case long before deliberations began and 
while a great deal more evidence had yet to be admitted.”  (Grobeson v. City of 
Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 778, 794.) 
There is also no dispute that P.P. prematurely reached a firm conclusion 
concerning the veracity of Bell‟s testimony.  Indeed, P.P. admitted telling other 
jurors before deliberations that he believed Bell.  Several jurors testified that, after 
hearing Bell‟s testimony on the first day of trial, P.P. said “there should be nothing 
else,” “there was no denying Nelva Bell‟s testimony,” and that “he had to believe 
what Nelva Bell said.”  He expressed these opinions long before the prosecution 
finished its case and before the defense was able to present any evidence in 
rebuttal.12 
The evidence also establishes that P.P. abandoned the role of an impartial 
juror, adopting the mantle of an advocate.13  He repeatedly told the other jurors 
that defendant was guilty, that he deserved the death penalty, and that Bell‟s 
                                            
12 
During the guilt phase, the defense focused a substantial part of its own 
case on undermining Bell‟s testimony.  It noted the lack of physical evidence 
implicating defendant, offered evidence that Bell was under the influence of 
cocaine during the crimes, and presented expert testimony concerning the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification and the effect of crack cocaine on a 
user‟s perception.  
13  
The jurors were instructed to “[r]emember that you are not partisans or 
advocates in this matter.  You are impartial judges of the facts.” 
15 
testimony was dispositive.  Before deliberations, he explained to T.M. why 
defendant was guilty.  P.P. said he expected to “battle” D.A. during deliberations 
“because they were at opposite sides.”  P.P. telephoned L.B. during deliberations, 
reporting that “things weren‟t going well” and D.A. was upset.  He also told T.M. 
that D.A. was angry with him because he thought defendant was guilty.  
Consistent with this evidence, the trial court noted that P.P. “was trying to lobby 
[the other jurors] to vote guilty before the deliberations even started.”  P.P.‟s 
conduct was not only improper in itself, it also was inconsistent with his asserted 
intent to maintain an open mind during deliberations.  Even deferring to the 
court‟s conclusion that P.P. only intended to vote guilty on the first ballot to 
ensure ongoing deliberations, P.P.‟s transformation from impartial fact finder to 
combative advocate before deliberations began is separate and serious 
misconduct.14  The court‟s rejection of defendant‟s new trial motion fails to 
address this independent source of presumed bias.   
The trial court found that P.P. engaged in serious misconduct.  It thereafter 
concluded, however, that “[t]here [was] no evidence of actual bias on the part of 
[P.P.]” and that his misconduct “[did] not rise to the level that there is a substantial 
likelihood [of bias].”  This formulation has it backward.  Once a court determines 
a juror has engaged in misconduct, a defendant is presumed to have suffered 
prejudice.  (In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 295.)  It is for the prosecutor to 
rebut the presumption by establishing there is “no substantial likelihood that one 
or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.”  (Id. at p. 296.) 
Whether P.P.‟s  “misconduct was prejudicial presents a mixed question of 
law and fact „ “subject to an appellate court‟s independent determination.” ‟ ”  
                                            
14  
We do not imply that jurors who argue forcefully for an outcome once 
deliberations begin act improperly. 
16 
(Tafoya, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 192.)  Given the nature, scope, and frequency of 
P.P.‟s misconduct, along with his repeated and admitted untruthfulness on a 
variety of topics, the People have not discharged their burden.  Accordingly, “we 
must set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased 
jury would have reached the same verdict, because a biased adjudicator is one of 
the few structural trial defects that compel reversal without application of a 
harmless error standard.  [Citation.]”  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 579.) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
In light of the prejudicial juror misconduct, we reverse the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
RUVOLO, J.   * 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 
Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.   
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Weatherton 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S106489 
Date Filed: July 7, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: James S. Hawkins 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lisa Short and Michael R. Snedeker, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, 
Assistant Attorney General, Adrianne S. Denault, Robin Urbanksi and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael R. Snedeker 
Snedeker, Smith & Short 
PMB 422 
4110 SE Hawthorne Boulevard 
Portland, OR  97214-5246 
(503) 234-3584 
 
Daniel Rogers 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2283