Case Title: State v. Maduro

Citation: 174 Vt. 302, 816 A.2d 432

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Maduro (2001-232); 174 Vt. 302; 816 A.2d 432

[Filed 25-Oct-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2001-232


  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court


                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit 

  Samuel Maduro	                                 March Term, 2002


  Nancy Corsones, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       MORSE, J.   Defendant Samuel Maduro, also known as Samuel Penney,
  appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction following a jury
  trial on charges of delivery of cocaine in violation of 18 V.S.A. §
  4231(b)(3) and conspiracy to sell cocaine in violation of 13 V.S.A. §
  1404(a).  He argues on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted
  evidence of prior uncharged bad acts as direct evidence of the conspiracy,
  as well as evidence of intent on the delivery charge, and that the court
  erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of
  delivery.  Because we agree that the evidence was erroneously admitted, we
  reverse and remand for a new trial.

 
          
       The charges at issue stem from events occurring in the spring of 1999. 
  The affidavit submitted in support of the charges alleged that, between
  February 1999 and May 1999, defendant engaged in a conspiracy to sell
  cocaine.  As laid out in the affidavit, the conspiracy consisted of the
  defendant providing materials such as crack cocaine, cash and scales to a
  juvenile, K.M., to hold for him when police searched his apartment pursuant
  to conditions of his furlough status, and included, on one occasion, asking
  K.M. to give crack cocaine to an individual in exchange for cash at
  defendant's apartment while he was not there.  The affidavit also alleged
  that on May 1, 1999, defendant delivered to K.M. roughly seventy-seven
  grams of crack cocaine to hold for him, which K.M. provided to the police
  when they contacted her in the course of investigating defendant's
  activities.  	

       Defendant was charged with the above crimes in June 1999.  A little
  less than a month before the case was set to go to trial in September 2000,
  the State disclosed an additional witness it intended to call who would
  provide "prior bad act" evidence.  Specifically, the State intended to call
  Keith Merrow to testify that defendant provided him with powder and crack
  cocaine at their common workplace to sell between January and May 1999. 
  Defendant moved in limine to exclude the evidence.  In response, the State
  argued that the evidence was not only admissible to show intent with regard
  to the conspiracy charge, but was also direct evidence of the conspiracy
  itself because Merrow also formed part of that conspiracy.  The court heard
  argument on the motion the first day of trial and denied defendant's
  motion.  The court decided to let the evidence in, both as direct evidence
  of the conspiracy itself and for the purpose of showing plan and intent on
  the conspiracy offense. 

 

       The trial resulted in a hung jury on both charges.  Prior to
  defendant's new trial, he again moved to exclude Merrow's testimony.  In
  response, the State simply renewed its previous arguments in opposition to
  defendant's motion.  At no time, however, between the first and second
  trial did the State attempt to amend its information charging defendant
  with conspiracy in any way, nor did it bring any additional charges against
  defendant.  The trial court issued an order indicating the motion would be
  taken up at the beginning of trial.  Following a short discussion
  revisiting its original ruling, the court indicated that it would not
  change the ruling and thus would make the same ruling on defendant's new
  motion.

       Accordingly, Merrow testified at trial that he had met defendant in
  jail and then later worked with him for the same employer.  He stated that
  defendant approached him at work and asked if he would sell cocaine for
  him.  Merrow agreed to do so and worked out an arrangement in which he
  found customers, found out how much of the drug they wanted, and then
  procured it from defendant.  He would then receive a percentage of the
  sale.  Merrow stated that defendant did not know who his customers were and
  that he never brought the customers to defendant's apartment.  He then
  testified that he remembered seeing a young girl at defendant's apartment
  on some of the occasions when he would visit to pick up drugs.  He also
  testified, however, that K.M. - presumably the young girl, although never
  directly identified by Merrow - did not participate in any of his
  transactions, did not provide him with drugs or money, and was never a
  witness to the transfers from defendant. 
   
       Following Merrow's testimony, the trial court determined that the
  whole of his testimony went to the charged conspiracy and thus there was no
  need for any limiting instructions to the jury at that point in the trial. 
  Defendant objected, and the court overruled his objection.  At the close of
  trial, during the jury charge, the court affirmatively instructed the jury
  that it could consider 

 

  Merrow's testimony as direct evidence of the conspiracy charge involving
  K.M.  It also added, however, that, if the jury determined that Merrow's
  testimony was related to a separate uncharged conspiracy, it could still
  consider the evidence

    as proof of the opportunity to commit the crimes of which the
    defendant is charged; the defendant's intent to commit the crimes
    of which he is charged; the defendant's preparation for and plan
    to commit the crimes of which he is charged; the defendant's
    knowledge and absence of mistake in committing the crimes he is
    accused of.

       After the charge to the jury, defendant objected to the above-quoted
  portion, requesting that the court limit the instruction to the conspiracy
  charge and direct the jury not to consider it as evidence of opportunity,
  etc., with regard to the delivery charge.  Defendant argued that the
  testimony did not demonstrate those things with respect to the charged
  delivery, and that it also was unfairly prejudicial with respect to the
  delivery charge.  The court declined to do so.  Defendant now appeals to
  this Court.

       Defendant argues that the trial court's decision that the evidence was
  admissible as direct evidence of the charged conspiracy, as well as its
  ultimate admission of the evidence for somewhat more limited purposes under
  V.R.E. 404(b) on the delivery charge, was reversible error.  More
  specifically, defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously
  determined that V.R.E. 404(b) did not apply to the evidence with regard to
  the conspiracy charge.  He contends that the testimony was not direct
  evidence of the charged conspiracy, but was instead evidence of a separate
  uncharged conspiracy.  In other words, defendant argues that the trial
  court erroneously determined that the Merrow testimony was directly
  relevant as res gestae evidence with respect to the charged conspiracy.

 

       We have previously noted that "[c]rimes which form a body of evidence
  relating to the events surrounding the crime of which a defendant is
  charged are part of the res gestae."  State v. Norton, 147 Vt. 223, 235,