Case Title: JOHNSON v. CREAGER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-204

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHNSON v. CREAGER2003 WY 11076 P.3d 799Case Number: 02-204Decided: 09/08/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

DWAYNE 
LEE JOHNSON and

ARLENE 
RAE JOHNSON, husband and wife,

 

Appellants(Defendants) 
,

 

v.

 

DAVID 
C. CREAGER,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Stacey 
E. Casper of Clapp and Associates, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jerry 
A. Yaap of Bishop, Bishop & Yaap, Casper, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellants, 
Dwayne and Arlene Johnson (Johnsons), seek review of the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, David Creager (Creager).  The Johnsons bought a mobile home from 
Creager and, after they failed to make the required payments in a timely manner, 
Creager filed a complaint for replevin.  
Creager then filed a motion for summary judgment with a supporting 
affidavit.  The Johnsons filed an 
untimely response to Creager's evidentiary materials, and the district court 
struck the response because it was filed late.  The district court then found that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact, because there was no evidence to 
contradict Creager's affidavit, and that Creager was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  We will 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      The Johnsons pose 
these issues:

 

I.  Whether 
the district court erred in granting [Creager's] motion for summary 
judgment.

            
A.  Whether the transaction in question is governed by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, Secured Transactions.

            
B.  Whether equitable doctrines preclude [Creager] from 
entitlement to repossession.

 

Creager's 
summary of the issues is tersely stated as:  "Whether the [district] court erred in 
granting [Creager's] motion for summary judgment."

 

 

[¶3]      On August 7, 
2000, the Johnsons bought a used mobile home from Creager.  The transaction was recorded on what was 
entitled, "A Plain Language Purchase Agreement."  The base price was $10,000.00, with the 
Johnsons making a $2,000.00 down payment.  
The agreement contained a notation that a "new water heater to be taken 
out of 1st payment  receipt $$ to equal 500.00."  Continuing, the agreement 
provided:

 

            
Terms are $2,000.00 down and 500.00 every other Friday starting 9-1-00 
until the amount of $10,000 is fulfilled (if all payments are on time  
[through] 3-29-01).  No interest 
providing all payments are made on time.  
Payments are considered late as of  
Sunday following the due date at close of

business 
for Oak Creek Village (5:00 p.m.).  
[If] 1st time payment is late interest goes to 21% on full 
original amount of loan (602.66 in interest). 2nd late payment home 
will be repossessed.  Neither Dave 
Creager or Oak Creek Village implies or will stand behind any warranties for 
this home.  Sale of home is as is 
where is  deposit is non-refundable at time of signing contract.  Full $2,000.00 down in order to move 
home off our lot.

            
Title will remain in name of Dave Creager until full amount is paid 
off.  Home shall remain at Blair Ln. 
 if it is to be moved notice in writing must be given to Dave Creager 30 days 
in advance for his approval or denial.  
$10,000 is as is where is.  
Customer is responsible for move and setting of 
home.

 

[¶4]      On January 17, 
2002, Creager filed a "Complaint for Replevin" in the district court alleging 
that the Johnsons had not made timely payments on the mobile home and seeking 
its return, as well as other damages and costs.  On February 8, 2002, the Johnsons filed 
an answer and counterclaims.  Their 
answer, as well as Creager's pleadings, established that, in addition to the 
$2,000.00 down payment, the Johnsons made various payments under the contract 
totaling $5,000.00, albeit not always within the time lines articulated in the 
contract.  The Johnsons' affidavits 
asserted that all payments were made in accordance with Creager's directions, or 
that Creager acquiesced in the late payments, but that is not a part of the 
record on appeal.  In addition, the 
Johnsons contended that Creager had breached an oral warranty to the effect that 
the trailer was "in working order."  
On May 8, 2002, Creager filed a motion for summary judgment with the 
affidavit of Creager attached.  The 
affidavit recited the contract set out above, as well as the facts pertaining to 
the Johnsons' failure to make timely payments and that Creager was, therefore, 
entitled to a writ of replevin to regain possession of the mobile home.  The motion for summary judgment was set 
for a hearing, to be held on July 10, 2002.  On July 8, 2002, the Johnsons filed 
their brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, to which was 
attached the affidavits of the Johnsons contending that they had not breached 
the contract but that Creager had.

 

[¶5]      The Wyoming Rules 
of Civil procedure provide:

 

Rule 
56. Summary Judgment.

            
(a)  For claimant.  
-- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part 
thereof.

            
(b)  For defending party.  -- A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought 
may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part 
thereof.

            
(c)  Motion and proceedings thereon.  -- Unless the court otherwise orders, 
the motion and any response and other papers relating thereto shall be served 
pursuant to Rule 6(c).  The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

            
(d)  Case not fully adjudicated on motion.  -- If on motion under this rule judgment 
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.  It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.  Upon the trial of the action the facts 
so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted 
accordingly.

            
(e)  Form of affidavits; further testimony;  Defense required.  -- Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith.  The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits.

When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse 
party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.  
If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

            
(f)  When affidavits are unavailable.  -- Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present 
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just.

            
(g)  Affidavits made in bad faith.  -- Should it appear to the satisfaction 
of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this 
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other 
party to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

 

Rule 
6.  
Time.

. 
. . .

(c)  Motions 
and Motion Practice. --

            
(1)  Unless these rules or an order of the court establish time 
limitations other than those contained herein, all motions, except (A) motions 
for enlargement of time, (B) motions made during hearing or trial, (C) motions 
which may be heard ex parte, and (D) motions described in subdivisions (3) and 
(4) below, together with supporting affidavits, if any, shall be served at least 
10 days before the hearing on the motion.  
Except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), or unless the court by 
order permits service at some other time, a party affected by the motion shall 
serve a response, if any, together with affidavits, if any, at least three days 
prior to the hearing on the motion or within 20 days after service of the  motion, whichever is earlier.   Unless  the court by order 

permits 
service at some other time, the moving party shall serve a reply, if any, at 
least one day prior to the hearing on the motion or within 15 days after service 
of the response, whichever is earlier.  
Unless the court otherwise orders, any party may serve supplemental 
memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at least one day prior to the hearing on the 
motion.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶6]      The Johnsons' 
papers resisting the motion for summary judgment were not filed in a timely 
manner under the above-quoted rules.  
As a result, Creager filed a motion to strike that pleading, and the 
district granted the motion.  The 
district court then proceeded to hear argument on the motion for summary 
judgment, leaving out of consideration the Johnsons' evidentiary materials and 
only considering Creager's evidentiary materials.  A district court does not abuse its 
discretion when it refuses to accept out-of-time affidavits.  10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 
2719, at 321-22, n.22 (1998).

 

[¶7]      As the initial 
part of his argument below, Creager challenged the Johnsons' claim that Creager 
had given an express warranty as to the condition of the trailer by telling them 
it was "in working order".  
Creager's position in this regard relied on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34.1-2-316(c) (LexisNexis 2003).1  Creager contended that the written 
contract was clear that the mobile home was sold "as is, where is."  The cited statute 
provides:

 

§ 
34.1-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties.

            
(a)  Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be 
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other;  but subject to the provisions of this 
article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 34.1-2-202) negation or 
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is 
unreasonable.

            
(b)  Subject to subsection (c), to exclude or modify the 
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention 
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or 
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and 
conspicuous.  Language to exclude 
all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face 
hereof."

            
(c)  Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this 
section:

(i)  Unless 
the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by 
expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and 
makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and

(ii)  When 
the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample 
or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no 
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the 
circumstances to have revealed to him; 
and

(iii)  An 
implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course 
of performance or usage of trade; and

(iv)  The 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a 
contract for the sale of human blood, blood plasma or other human tissue or 
organs from an individual or a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or 
organs.  Such blood, blood plasma or 
tissue or organs shall not for the purpose of this article be considered 
commodities subject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical 
services.

(v)  With 
respect to the sale of cattle, hogs, sheep and horses, there shall be no implied 
warranty that the cattle, hogs, sheep and horses are free from 
disease.

            
(d)  Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in 
accordance with the provisions of this article on liquidation or limitation of 
damages and on contractual modification of remedy (sections 34.1-2-718 and 
34.1-2-719).

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  With respect to all other 
matters at issue, Creager simply maintained that the only evidentiary material 
before the district court was entirely favorable to Creager's complaint, that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that he was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.

 

[¶8]      Countering this 
approach, the Johnsons contended that, even in the absence of their evidentiary 
materials, Creager was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  It was their view that Creager could 
not, or had not, properly proceeded under the statutes governing replevin (Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15-301 through -306 (LexisNexis 2003)) and, further, that this 
matter was one governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Secured 
Transactions (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34.1-9-101 through -709 (LEXIS 1999)).  Continuing, the Johnsons contended that 
even accepting Creager's entire affidavit as true, he was not entitled to 
repossess the trailer, keep all of their $7,000.00 in payments, and collect 
other damages.

 

[¶9]      Looking only to 
the contract itself and Creager's affidavit, the district court determined that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact.  It also determined that replevin was an 
appropriate remedy in these circumstances and, although there had been some 
delay in Creager filing his action for replevin, neither laches nor waiver 
applied in these circumstances.  
Thus, the district court returned the mobile home to Creager's 
possession, but did not award any further damages.

 

 

[¶10]   When we review a summary judgment, 
we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow 
the same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Company, 2001 WY 16, ¶9, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of 
action or defense.  We, of course, 
examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to that party who opposed 
the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that 
fairly may be drawn from the record.  
Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 
23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001); Central Wyoming Medical Laboratory, 
LLC v. Medical Testing Lab, Inc., 2002 WY 47, ¶15, 43 P.3d 121, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

 

[¶11]   The Johnsons take the position that 
replevin was not an available remedy under the circumstances of this case and 
that the only correct source of law to resolve this case is found in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC).  We note at 
the outset that that view was not articulated to the district court during the 
proceedings below.  Moreover, we are 
unable to agree with that foundational proposition.  The UCC is not intended to supplant 
remedies such as replevin.  Rather 
it serves to supplement them.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34.1-1-103 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

§ 34.1-1-103.  Supplementary 
general principles of law applicable.

            
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act [§§ 34.1-1-101 
through 34.1-10-104], the principles of law and equity, including the law 
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, 
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or 
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its 
provisions.

 

In 
the annotation to that statute, one of the purposes of the enactment is stated 
to be:  "The listing given in this 
section is merely illustrative; no listing could be exhaustive.  Nor is the fact that in some sections 
particular circumstances have led to express reference to other fields of law 
intended at any time to suggest the negation of the general application of the 
principles of this section."  We 
have specifically held that the law of replevin has not been displaced by the 
UCC.  Brown v. Green, 618 P.2d 140, 144 (Wyo. 1980); and see Comer v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 
858 P.2d 560, 562-64 (Wyo. 1993); and James J. White and Robert S. Summers, 
Uniform Commercial Code, § 25-8, at 898-99 (5th ed. 2000) ("A 
secured party, wishing to repossess by judicial action, has several means 
available.  For instance, it can 
bring an action in replevin, originally a common-law action, now largely 
codified.").  However, that does not 
necessarily mean that the UCC does not apply to some facets of a case such as 
this.

 

[¶12]   The Johnsons call our attention to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-9-102 (LEXIS 1999) which provided:

 

            
(a)  Except as otherwise provided in section 34.1-9-104 on 
excluded transactions, this article applies:

(i)  To 
any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, 
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and 
also

                        
(ii)  To any sale of accounts or chattel 
paper.

            
(b)  This article applies to security interests created by 
contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust 
deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other 
lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as 
security.  This article does not 
apply to statutory liens except as provided in section 
34.1-9-310.

            
(c)  The application of this article to a security interest in 
a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself 
secured by a transaction or interest to which this article does not 
apply.

 

The 
Johnsons further assert that the sale at issue here is governed by the UCC's 
provisions with respect to secured transactions and, because the Johnsons had 
paid more than 60% of the cash price, Creager was required to sell the mobile 
home and repay to them any surplus generated by that sale.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34.1-9-504 and 505 
(LEXIS 1999).  4 James J. White and 
Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 34-9, at 425-29, n.9 (4th ed. 1995).

 

[¶13]   A careful review of the record on 
appeal reveals that this argument was not presented in the district court and so 
is of no force here with respect to our review of the district court's order 
granting the writ of replevin.  
Thus, we are compelled to conclude that the district court correctly 
determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact because, in 
effect, the Johnsons had no facts available to them that disputed any of the 
evidentiary material brought forward by Creager with respect to the replevin 
action. However, in resolving this appeal, we only affirm the trial court's 
order granting the writ of replevin.  
The district court did not purport to resolve issues with respect to 
disposition of the collateral after repossession had been accomplished.  At the time this appeal was initiated, 
the 90-day period in which Creager would have been required to dispose of the 
trailer had not yet expired.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34.1-9-505(a) (LEXIS 1999).  
Therefore, our disposition of the instant appeal has no effect with 
respect to Creager's obligations in that regard.

 

[¶14]   We will make only brief mention of 
the Johnsons' claims that laches and waiver should have been applied by the 
district court to invalidate Creager's right to repossess the mobile home.  These arguments are not supported by 
facts of record, nor are they supported by cogent argument or pertinent 
authority and we decline to address them further.  Walton v. State ex rel. Wood, 
2002 WY 108, ¶11, 50 P.3d 693, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).

 

 

[¶15]   The district court's order on 
summary judgment is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1Although this 
case was considered under the version of the Uniform Commercial Code in effect 
at the time this matter arose, our citations will be to the current version if 
both are identical.