Case Title: Commonwealth v. McGee

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11209 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEFFREY McGEE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 7, 2014.  -  July 1, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Demonstration, Present recollection 
refreshed, Intent, State of mind.  Intent.  Witness, 
Refreshment of recollection.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, State of mind. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments 
found 
and 
returned 
in 
the 
Superior 
Court 
Department 
on January 3, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
 
Eric S. Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the 
defendant. 
 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney (Katherine 
B. Folger, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder 
in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation.1  On 
1 The defendant was also convicted of several charges arising 
out of a motor vehicle accident the day after the victim's death.  
See part 2 and note 7, infra.  He appeals only from his conviction 
                                                 
 
 
2 
November 
20, 
2007, 
the 
defendant 
choked 
and 
stabbed 
his 
wife 
to 
death 
in their apartment; the killing was witnessed by the couple's three 
and one-half year old son.  The defendant did not dispute that he 
had killed his wife, asserting only that he had done so in the heat 
of passion and had not premeditated the act.  On appeal, the 
defendant 
raises 
two 
issues.  First, 
he 
contends 
that 
the 
trial 
judge 
erred in allowing the defendant's son to demonstrate, on a couch in 
the court room, the position in which his mother was lying as the 
defendant was choking her.  Second, he objects to a ruling 
prohibiting him from using a police report to refresh the 
recollection of a witness regarding a sexual overture made by the 
victim. 
For 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth 
below, 
we 
discern 
no 
error 
and 
affirm 
the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree.  After a 
review of the entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we 
decline to exercise our power to reduce the defendant's conviction 
to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts as the jury 
could have found them, reserving some details for later discussion. 
i.  Defendant's relationship with the victim.  The defendant 
of murder in the first degree. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
3 
and 
the 
victim, 
Christine 
McGee,2 met 
while 
the 
defendant 
was 
a 
singer 
in 
a 
rock 
and 
roll 
band 
dedicated 
to 
performing 
music 
from 
the 
1980s, 
which Christine enjoyed.3  At that time, the defendant looked like 
what 
Margaret 
Barone, 
a 
longtime 
friend 
of 
the 
defendant 
and 
a 
close 
friend of Christine, described as an "eighties rocker"; he had long 
hair and wore ripped jeans.  The defendant and Christine began 
dating, and eventually moved together into an apartment in Lowell.  
In early 2003, the defendant and Christine separated for several 
weeks, during which time Christine dated another man.  Upon their 
reconciliation, 
Christine 
discovered that she was pregnant, but did 
not 
know 
which 
man 
was 
the 
father.  The 
defendant 
told 
Christine 
that 
he wanted to raise the child as his own even if he was not the 
biological father. 
While Christine was pregnant, the defendant continued to play 
in his band and stay out late; this schedule upset Christine.  
However, 
after 
the 
couple's 
son, 
Gavin, 
was 
born 
on 
December 
1, 
2003, 
the defendant stopped playing in his band, cut his previously long 
2 Because the victim, Christine McGee, shares a last name with 
the defendant, her husband, we refer to her by her first name. 
3 It is unclear from the record exactly when the defendant met 
Christine.  The record suggests that they met sometime in 2002.  
Margaret Barone had known the defendant through mutual friends as 
a teenager.  She testified that she "met up" with him again in the 
spring of 2002, and began to see him every other weekend.  Barone 
also 
met 
Christine 
during 
this 
period, 
and 
Christine 
thereafter 
began 
to date the defendant. 
                                                 
 
 
4 
hair, and wore professional clothing instead of ripped jeans.  
Hoping to better support his family, the defendant began working at 
a store that sold heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 
equipment.  During this time, Christine worked as a bartender 
several nights a week while the defendant took care of Gavin.  The 
resulting improvement in the couple's finances and in their 
relationship led them to marry in May, 2005. 
Beginning 
in 
late 
2006, 
the 
defendant 
and 
Christine 
experienced 
tension 
in 
their 
relationship.  The 
defendant's 
responsibilities 
at 
work 
changed, 
requiring 
longer 
hours, 
and 
Christine 
was 
unhappy 
that 
he was too tired to socialize when he arrived home in the evenings.  
On two occasions, the defendant was violent towards Christine.  In 
March, 2007, he put a pillow over Christine's face while they were 
lying 
in 
bed 
with 
Gavin 
because 
a 
man 
sent 
her 
a 
text 
message.4  That 
summer, the couple moved to Tyngsboro hoping to facilitate a fresh 
start; in July, however, the defendant punched Christine and gave 
her a black eye. 
The defendant and Christine separated again in early October, 
2007, and the defendant moved out of their shared apartment.  
Christine began to date a local rock musician, Gary Hoey, and she 
spent 
one 
night 
at 
the 
house 
of 
another 
rock 
musician, 
Salvatore 
Erna.  
4 The defendant told Barone that he had "lost his mind because 
of [the man] who had texted [Christine] at some ungodly hour." 
                                                 
 
 
5 
Later that month, Christine went to California for four days in an 
effort to appear on a reality television show called "Rock of Love 
with Bret Michaels."5  The defendant was upset that Christine was 
seeing other men and embarrassed that she planned to appear on the 
television 
show.  He 
told 
Barone 
that 
he 
would 
not 
"make 
it 
easy 
for 
[Christine] to go out anymore," and told a coworker he planned to 
contact the television show to inform the producers that Christine 
was married.  The defendant also sent Christine a text message that 
read, "I don't care about my son.  I just want to kill myself and 
I'm going to take you with me." 
Early on November 10, 2007, the defendant banged on the door 
of Christine's Tyngsboro apartment and pushed his way inside once 
Christine came to the door.  Christine told the defendant to leave, 
but he wanted to lie in bed and talk.  Christine's brother, who was 
living 
with 
his 
girl 
friend 
in 
the 
apartment, 
telephoned 
police; 
when 
they arrived, they ordered the defendant to leave.  Later that 
afternoon, the defendant returned to Christine's apartment, 
accompanied by his father and a police officer, to retrieve his 
furniture and belongings.  While the defendant was retrieving his 
belongings, 
Barone 
arrived, 
and 
she 
and 
Christine 
left 
the 
apartment 
and went to a restaurant with Gavin.  As they were sitting in the 
5 Contestants on "Rock of Love with Bret Michaels" compete to 
date the lead singer of Poison, a heavy metal band. 
                                                 
 
 
6 
restaurant, the defendant sent Christine numerous text messages, 
saying first that he did not want to live without her, next that she 
was a "fucking whore" and a "slut," and finally that he loved her 
and wanted to reconcile.  Despite this incident, over the course of 
the 
next 
week 
the 
defendant 
told 
several 
coworkers 
that 
he 
was 
excited 
to 
get 
back 
together 
with 
Christine 
and 
that 
he 
was 
optimistic 
about 
their 
relationship.  On 
November 
17, 
2007, 
Christine 
and 
Gavin 
spent 
the 
night 
at 
the 
defendant's 
apartment, 
and 
Christine 
told 
Gavin 
that 
the apartment "may be your home." 
ii.  Day of the victim's death.  On the afternoon of November 
19, 2007, the defendant went to see his friend Mark Vigeant at 
Vigeant's workplace.  He told Vigeant that, even though Christine 
had been seeing Hoey, he was willing to forgive her and wanted to 
get 
back 
together.  That 
evening, 
Christine, 
Vigeant, 
the 
defendant, 
and a friend of Vigeant's met at a local bar.  Christine played the 
jukebox while the defendant stood behind her and rubbed her back.  
The 
group 
returned 
to 
Vigeant's 
workplace; 
from 
there, 
Christine 
and 
the 
defendant 
left 
separately 
to 
return 
to 
the 
defendant's 
apartment.  
Although Vigeant, Christine, and the defendant had planned to meet 
at the defendant's apartment, Vigeant changed his mind.  He 
telephoned the defendant's cellular telephone at 8:01 P.M. to let 
them know; the defendant answered, and Vigeant heard Gavin and 
Christine in the background.  Between 7:30 P.M. and 8 P.M. that 
 
 
7 
evening, Christine telephoned both Hoey and Erna. 
Later that evening, at the defendant's apartment, Gavin, then 
three and one-half years old,6 saw the defendant and Christine 
fighting 
and 
looking 
for 
their 
cellular 
telephones.  Afterward, 
the 
defendant, Christine, and Gavin all went to sleep in the same room, 
with his parents in the bed and Gavin on a mattress on the floor.  
Sometime 
thereafter, 
when 
it 
was 
dark 
outside, 
Gavin 
woke 
up 
and 
heard 
Christine crying.  He walked into the living room and saw Christine 
on 
the 
couch 
with 
her 
head 
"like stuck between the cushions" and the 
defendant "[k]illing her" by choking her with his hands.  The 
defendant then got two knives from the kitchen, one of which was 
"sharp" and "round," and stuck that knife into Christine's body.  
Gavin 
testified 
that 
he 
and the defendant then went to bed, and that 
Christine "was dead when I walked out of the room." 
iii.  Motor vehicle accident and the homicide investigation.  
The 
following 
morning, 
the 
defendant 
put 
Gavin 
in 
his 
automobile 
and 
drove to Route 110 in Methuen.  At approximately 10:30 A.M., the 
defendant's vehicle collided with a large dump truck that had been 
approaching 
from 
the 
opposite 
direction.  When 
emergency 
responders 
arrived at the scene, they found Gavin in the front seat, secured 
by only the lap portion of his seat belt.  Gavin wore a T-shirt and 
6 Gavin McGee was six years old at the time of trial. 
                                                 
 
 
8 
sweatpants, 
with 
no 
coat, 
shoes, 
or 
socks, 
despite 
the 
snowy 
weather.  
The 
defendant 
was 
conscious 
and 
alert 
but 
unresponsive 
to 
questions.  
Medical personnel observed horizontal cuts on the inside of the 
defendant's left wrist and several puncture wounds to the left side 
of his chest.  The defendant said that his injuries were 
self-inflicted, 
that 
he 
wanted 
to 
die, 
and 
that 
he 
had 
been 
"trying" 
to cause the accident. 
While being treated by medical personnel, Gavin said 
repeatedly, "You better take me to my mommy."  He also said that 
"daddy killed mommy" and that "there was blood, blood everywhere."  
When 
asked 
where 
Gavin's 
mother 
was, 
the 
defendant 
said 
that 
she 
was 
in Tyngsboro.  Gavin confirmed that his mother was at his father's 
apartment and described its location. 
Chelmsford police officers were dispatched to the defendant's 
apartment, where they discovered the victim's body on the floor 
leaning against the sofa, covered by a black comforter.  There was 
blood on the couch and on a "dagger-style" knife lying nearby.  
Officers also recovered a cellular telephone and a razor blade with 
reddish-brown stains.  The autopsy revealed six stab wounds to the 
victim's neck, jaw, and upper abdomen, as well as signs of 
strangulation.  The 
stab 
wounds, 
inflicted 
after 
the 
strangulation, 
caused the victim's death. 
2.  Trial 
proceedings.  On 
January 
3, 
2008, 
a 
Middlesex 
County 
 
 
9 
grand jury indicted the defendant for the murder of his wife.  
Subsequently, an Essex County grand jury indicted the defendant for 
four different offenses arising out of the motor vehicle accident 
in 
Methuen 
on 
the 
morning 
after 
the 
victim's 
death.7  A 
Superior 
Court 
judge granted the defendant's motion to transfer the Essex County 
case to Middlesex County and consolidate the charges for trial. 
During 
his 
twelve-day 
trial, 
the 
defendant 
did 
not 
dispute 
that 
he had killed his wife.8  The only question before the jury was 
whether the defendant had deliberately premeditated the act or 
whether he had acted in the heat of passion, having just discovered 
that 
the 
victim 
remained 
in 
contact 
with 
other 
lovers.  The 
defendant 
was 
convicted 
of 
murder 
in 
the 
first 
degree 
on 
a 
theory 
of 
deliberate 
premeditation.   He was acquitted of armed assault with intent to 
murder 
Gavin, 
and 
was 
convicted 
of 
all 
other 
charges.  The 
defendant 
timely appealed from the murder conviction. 
a.  Motion 
to 
permit 
trial 
demonstration.  Prior 
to 
trial, 
the 
Commonwealth had filed a motion in limine seeking permission for 
Gavin, 
then 
six 
years 
old, 
to 
use 
a 
couch 
to 
demonstrate 
how 
the 
victim 
7 The defendant was indicted for armed assault with intent to 
murder his son, Gavin McGee, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); 
and reckless endangerment of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13L. 
8 The defendant offered to stipulate to having caused the 
victim's death. 
                                                 
 
 
10 
was positioned as the defendant killed her.  The defendant opposed 
the 
motion, 
arguing 
that 
Gavin 
was 
not 
competent 
to 
testify, 
and 
that, 
in any event, the demonstration would be more prejudicial than 
probative.  On the third day of trial, the judge held a hearing on 
the issue and conducted a voir dire of Gavin.9  After ruling that 
Gavin 
was 
competent 
to 
testify, 
the 
judge 
allowed 
the 
Commonwealth's 
motion because she concluded that the demonstration could clarify 
Gavin's oral testimony and was not unduly prejudicial.  The judge 
informed counsel that she would offer a cautionary instruction to 
mitigate any emotional effect the demonstration might have on the 
jury. 
Immediately prior to Gavin's testimony, the judge instructed 
the jury that they were to rely only on the informational value of 
the evidence and to disregard their emotional response.  She also 
reminded them that they must not base their decision on sympathy or 
pity.  After 
Gavin 
testified 
about 
the 
circumstances 
of 
his 
mother's 
death, the prosecutor asked him to step down from the witness stand 
and approach a couch, which had been brought into the court room.  
She 
requested 
that 
he 
show 
the 
jury 
how 
his 
mother 
had 
been 
positioned 
9 Defense counsel requested that the judge conduct a voir dire 
of 
the 
demonstration 
itself.  The 
prosecutor 
stated 
that 
such 
a 
voir 
dire was not necessary, and made a detailed offer of proof as to the 
contents 
of 
the 
proposed 
demonstration.  She assured the judge that 
Gavin would not become emotional during the demonstration, and the 
judge did not require the voir dire. 
                                                 
 
 
11 
while the defendant was choking her, and asked him, specifically, 
where his mother's body had been located on the couch.  Gavin lay 
down on the couch briefly,10 then returned to the witness stand. 
b.  Limitation on cross-examination of Mark Vigeant.  During 
the 
cross-examination 
of 
Vigeant, 
the 
defendant 
sought 
to 
elicit 
that 
the 
victim 
had 
suggested 
a 
sexual 
"threesome" 
to 
Vigeant 
on 
the 
night 
of her death.11  The judge sustained the prosecutor's objection, 
noting that evidence of the victim's overture was admissible only 
if there were evidence to suggest that the defendant knew about it.  
She prohibited defense counsel from inquiring as to statements the 
victim 
had 
made 
to 
Vigeant, 
but 
permitted 
counsel 
to 
question 
Vigeant 
as to whether he had relayed information about the overture to the 
defendant. 
The 
judge 
then 
conducted 
a 
voir 
dire 
of 
Vigeant, 
out 
of 
the 
jury=s 
10 The 
prosecutor 
described 
Gavin's 
demonstration 
for 
the 
record 
as 
follows:  "The 
witness 
got on his back, laid his back on the seat 
of the couch with his hands raised to either side of his head in a 
touchdown 
fashion 
perpendicular 
out 
at 
ninety-degree 
angles 
with 
his 
legs hanging over the seat of the couch onto the floor.  And he was 
perpendicular 
to 
the 
couch 
with 
his 
head 
into 
the 
back 
cushion 
where 
the 
cushion 
and 
the 
seat 
meet and he was on his back."  Although the 
record does not indicate precisely how long the demonstration took, 
it appears to have been quite brief; Gavin left the witness stand, 
positioned his body on the couch, and immediately returned to the 
stand. 
11 This 
evidence 
was 
in 
service 
of 
the 
defendant's 
ultimate 
claim 
that 
Vigeant 
had 
recounted 
the 
victim's 
overture 
to 
him 
during 
their 
8:01 P.M. telephone call.  See part 1.a.ii, supra, and part 3.b, 
infra. 
                                                 
 
 
12 
presence.  She asked him whether he had informed the defendant of 
any statements the victim made about a "threesome."  Vigeant said 
he did not recall doing so, and the judge asked defense counsel 
whether she had any basis to refresh Vigeant's recollection on this 
point.  Counsel referenced a police report12 written during an 
interview Vigeant had with police.  The judge commented that the 
police report recounted only "what Christine said [to Vigeant], not 
what [Vigeant] related to [the defendant]," and counsel confirmed 
that the report did not indicate whether Vigeant had spoken to the 
defendant 
about 
any 
sexual 
overture.  The 
judge 
then 
reiterated 
that 
counsel could inquire only as to any statements Vigeant had made to 
the defendant on the night of the killing. 
Vigeant returned to the stand and defense counsel inquired 
whether he recalled the topic of his conversation with the victim 
on 
the 
night 
of 
her 
death.  Vigeant 
stated 
that 
he 
did 
not 
remember, 
and defense counsel once more sought to refresh Vigeant's 
recollection by means of the police report.  The judge prohibited 
counsel from using the police report to refresh Vigeant's 
recollection as to the substance of his inadmissible conversation 
with the victim, but reiterated that counsel could inquire about 
statements Vigeant might have made to the defendant on the night of 
12 The report was not marked for identification. 
                                                 
 
 
13 
the victim's death concerning that conversation.  Defense counsel 
then 
inquired 
whether 
Vigeant 
had 
told 
the 
defendant 
that 
the 
victim 
had made a sexual overture.  Vigeant answered, "No," and the judge 
allowed his answer to stand over the Commonwealth's objection.  
Defense counsel then asked Vigeant again whether he had told the 
defendant anything about the victim's request.  Vigeant again 
answered, "No."  Defense counsel then asked, "You don't remember?"  
Vigeant replied, "I don't remember."  Defense counsel did not 
attempt to refresh Vigeant's recollection with the police report or 
otherwise as to statements he might have made to the defendant. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Trial demonstration.  The defendant 
contends 
that 
Gavin=s 
demonstration 
violated 
his 
constitutional 
right 
to 
a 
fair 
trial 
because 
the 
demonstration 
had 
limited 
probative 
value 
but a substantially prejudicial effect.  In allowing the 
demonstration, 
the 
judge 
determined 
that 
it 
was 
within 
her 
discretion 
to 
permit 
the 
demonstration 
where 
it 
could 
enhance 
and 
contextualize 
Gavin's 
oral 
testimony, 
and 
where 
the 
initial 
voir 
dire 
of 
the 
venire 
and 
subsequent 
cautionary 
instructions 
would 
effectively 
counteract 
its potential emotional effects. 
"The 
permission 
to 
perform 
or 
make 
experiments 
or 
illustrations 
in 
the 
presence 
of 
the 
jury 
rest[s] 
in 
the 
sound 
judicial 
discretion 
of the . . . judge."  Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 541-542 
(1946), 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Chin 
Kee, 
283 
Mass. 
248, 
260 
(1933).  
 
 
14 
A demonstration is appropriate if it is relevant, Commonwealth v. 
Darby, 
37 
Mass. 
App. 
Ct. 
650, 653 (1994), if it is not substantially 
more prejudicial than probative, see Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 
Mass. 550, 557 (2005); Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2013), and if it 
"sufficiently resembles the actual event so as to be fair and 
informative," Commonwealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 
193-194 (2002), quoting Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 
173 
(1983).  See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Butynski, 
339 
Mass. 
151, 
153 
(1959).  
We 
review 
a 
trial 
judge's 
decision 
to 
allow 
a 
demonstration 
for 
abuse 
of 
discretion, 
and 
"will 
not 
interfere 
with 
the 
judge's 
determination 
unless 
it 
is 
plainly 
wrong."  Commonwealth 
v. 
Hartnett, 
72 
Mass. 
App. 
Ct. 467, 474 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Perryman, supra at 194.  
See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bys, 370 Mass. 350, 360-361 (1976) (party claiming 
abuse of discretion in evidentiary ruling on motion in limine 
"assumes a heavy burden"). 
In these circumstances, "we cannot say that . . . the judge 
exceeded the limits of [her] discretion" in permitting Gavin to 
demonstrate, on a couch, the position in which his mother was lying 
as the defendant was choking her.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 
Mass. 236, 243 (1996) (affirming trial judge's allowance of 
demonstration). 
As an initial matter, and contrary to the defendant's 
 
 
15 
contention, the position of the victim's body was probative of the 
central issue at trial:  whether the defendant had acted with 
deliberate premeditation or while in the heat of passion.  As the 
judge 
correctly 
noted, 
Gavin's 
demonstration 
established 
that, 
while 
the victim was being choked, her body was in the same position on 
the couch as it was depicted in the crime scene photographs, which 
were 
taken 
after 
the 
victim 
had 
been 
stabbed.13  This 
similarity, 
in 
turn, 
tended 
to 
show 
that 
the 
victim 
did 
not 
move 
after 
she 
was 
choked, 
and therefore that she did nothing to provoke the defendant during 
the period of time when he went into the kitchen, retrieved two 
knives, and returned to stab her.  See Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 
Mass. 724, 728 (1980) (manslaughter instruction appropriate only 
where there was evidence "that something happened which would have 
been likely to produce in an ordinary person" requisite heat of 
passion). 
Absent evidence of provocation between the choking and the 
stabbing, the jury could conclude that the defendant premeditated 
the 
stabbing 
as 
he 
walked 
into 
the 
kitchen 
and 
retrieved 
the 
knives.  
See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 373 Mass. 849, 850-852 (1977) 
(deliberate 
premeditation 
where 
defendant 
left 
room 
where 
victim 
was 
located, retrieved knife from kitchen, then returned and stabbed 
13 As stated, see part 1.a.iii, supra, the cause of death was 
the stab wounds, not the choking. 
                                                 
 
 
16 
victim).  See also Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 733 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 165, 168 (2001) 
("no particular period of reflection is required [for deliberate 
premeditation], and . . . a plan to murder may be formed in 
seconds"). 
Furthermore, the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
concluding 
that 
the 
demonstration could clarify and enhance Gavin's 
oral testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Butynski, 339 Mass. at 153 
(where 
defendant 
accused 
of 
setting 
up 
lottery 
based 
on 
use 
of 
pinball 
machine, witness could demonstrate to jury how machine was played); 
Everson 
v. 
Casualty 
Co. 
of 
Am., 
208 
Mass. 
214, 
218, 
220 
(1911) 
(where 
defendant 
alleged 
injury 
from 
catching 
his 
hand 
beneath 
door, 
defense 
counsel 
could 
use 
model 
of that door where "the jury would be helped 
by 
an 
observation 
of 
it").  When 
asked 
about 
the 
position 
and 
location 
of 
his 
mother's 
body 
while 
the 
defendant 
was 
choking 
her, 
Gavin 
stated 
that his mother had been "[o]n the couch with her head between the 
couch," and that her head and the rest of her body had been "like 
stuck 
between 
the 
cushions."  These 
responses 
suggest, 
and 
the 
judge 
found,14 that Gavin, just six at the time of trial, lacked the 
14 The judge stated, after voir dire, "[W]e are dealing with a 
six-year-old 
child 
who 
may 
be 
able 
to 
better 
express 
his 
observations 
through a physical reenactment than he might do verbally.  Or, 
alternatively, 
it 
might 
enhance 
and 
add 
context 
and 
dimension 
to 
his 
verbal presentation." 
                                                 
 
 
17 
vocabulary to describe certain spatial relationships.  When Gavin 
lay down "perpendicular to the couch with his head into the back 
cushion where the cushion and the seat meet," and raised his hands 
"to 
either 
side 
of 
his 
head 
in 
a 
touchdown 
fashion 
perpendicular 
out 
at ninety-degree angles with his legs hanging over the seat," his 
physical actions helped the jury better understand his verbal 
statements. 
The demonstration also assisted the jury in assessing Gavin's 
credibility and determining the relative weight of his testimony.  
Since Gavin was the only witness to the victim's death, his 
recollections were essential to the jury's deliberations.  When 
asked to show the jury how his mother's body was positioned as the 
defendant was choking her, Gavin lay on the couch in a manner that 
matched the crime scene photographs of the victim.  That the 
photographs corroborated Gavin's physical display was relevant to 
the accuracy of his testimony as a whole.  See Commonwealth v. 
Qualls, 440 Mass. 576, 585-586 (2003) (autopsy photographs that 
corroborated witness account of murder admissible to aid jury in 
assessing witness credibility). 
Finally, any prejudice arising from the demonstration did not 
outweigh its substantial probative value.15  See Commonwealth v. 
15 The judge was alert to the possibility of prejudice from the 
beginning of the defendant's trial.  After individual voir dire of 
                                                 
 
 
18 
Jaime, 
433 
Mass. 
575, 
579 
(2001) 
(fact 
that 
evidence 
bears 
on 
central 
issue "tips the balance in favor of admission" when weighing 
probative value against prejudice).  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
LaSota, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 28 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Yelle, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 465, 471 (1985) (admission of sex pamphlet 
where defendant charged with rape of his young daughter required 
reversal where probative value of pamphlet was "nugatory or nearly 
so" and prejudicial effect was considerable).  The demonstration 
was, the record indicates, quite brief, and was not so "gruesome" 
or "inflammatory" as to be "rendered inadmissible," given its 
"evidential 
value 
on 
a 
material 
matter."  See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Berry, 
420 Mass. 95, 108 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 406 Mass. 
397, 407 (1990). 
Importantly, 
there 
is 
no 
evidence 
to 
suggest 
that 
the 
jury 
were 
upset by the demonstration in particular, as opposed to Gavin's 
testimony 
as 
a 
whole.  Although 
defense 
counsel 
noted 
that 
two 
jurors 
were crying,16 she did so immediately prior to the demonstration.  
each member of the venire, the judge excused thirty-four potential 
jurors 
who 
she 
determined 
would 
have 
been 
unable 
to 
remain 
impartial 
or 
to 
disregard 
the 
emotional 
effects 
of 
the 
evidence.  After 
Gavin's 
voir dire, the judge stated, "each juror who has been seated has 
satisfied the Court that he or she can separate any sympathy that 
may 
be 
engendered 
by 
the 
evidence from their duty to decide the case 
based only on the evidence and the law that's presented in the 
courtroom during the trial." 
16 The judge, however, "hadn't noticed that" any jurors were 
upset. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
19 
The record does not reveal, and the defendant does not allege, that 
the jury grew more emotional either during or after Gavin lay down 
on the couch.  The judge was entitled to determine, after viewing 
the 
demonstration 
and 
its 
effect 
on 
the 
jury, 
that 
the 
demonstration 
had not so distressed the jurors that it would cloud their ability 
to deliberate. 
Moreover, the judge twice offered clear and detailed curative 
instructions, which we presume the jury to have followed.  
Commonwealth v. Auclair, 444 Mass. 348, 358 (2005).  Immediately 
before 
Gavin's 
testimony, 
the 
judge 
reminded 
the 
jury 
that 
they 
"must 
separate any emotional reaction . . . from the informational value 
and 
weight 
of 
the 
evidence,"17 and 
reiterated 
in 
her 
final 
charge 
that 
the jury must not be "swayed by prejudice, or by sympathy," but 
instead must "consider the evidence in a calm, dispassionate, and 
analytical 
manner."  The 
judge 
was 
within 
her 
discretion 
to 
conclude 
that these cautionary instructions sufficed to cure any emotional 
effect the demonstration might have had on the jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 196-197 (2002) 
(judge's thorough instruction as to demonstration that jury must 
decide case "solely on a fair consideration of the evidence" cured 
any possible prejudice). 
17 The 
judge 
also 
repeated 
this 
instruction 
in 
her 
final 
charge. 
                                                 
 
 
20 
b.  Limited cross-examination of Mark Vigeant.  The defendant 
contends also that the judge erred in prohibiting defense counsel 
from 
using 
a 
police 
report, 
created 
during 
the 
course 
of 
the 
homicide 
investigation, to refresh Vigeant's recollection as to statements 
the victim made to him about a sexual "threesome."  As stated, the 
defense was that the killing was committed in the heat of passion, 
based 
on 
the 
defendant's 
sudden 
realization 
of 
the 
victim's 
continued 
infidelities.  Although the defendant knew about the victim's past 
contact with Hoey and Erna, he had forgiven the victim, and he 
believed that, in the weeks prior to her death, she wanted to get 
back 
together 
with 
him.  Defense 
counsel 
sought 
to 
argue 
that 
during 
their 8:01 P.M. telephone conversation on the night of the victim's 
death, Vigeant told the defendant that the victim had proposed a 
"threesome" to Vigeant.18  Particularly where the victim also made 
telephone calls to both Hoey and Erna that night, counsel reasoned, 
the jury could infer that learning the victim had made yet another 
extramarital overture caused the defendant to lose control. 
Accordingly, the defendant argues, his inability to refresh 
18 Despite the defendant's theory of the case, there was no 
indication that the police report recounted a conversation between 
Vigeant and the defendant as to the victim's statements.  The judge 
noted, and defense counsel conceded, that the report only detailed 
the remarks the victim made to Vigeant on the night of her death, 
and did not address whether Vigeant relayed those remarks to the 
defendant. 
                                                 
 
 
21 
Vigeant's recollection with the police report led to the wrongful 
exclusion of evidence that was central to his theory of the case.  
Therefore, the defendant contends, the judge's ruling violated his 
right 
to 
present 
a 
defense 
as 
guaranteed 
by 
the 
Sixth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 
14, 
19 
(1967); 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Conkey, 
443 
Mass. 
60, 
66 
(2004).  
We conclude that the judge acted well within her discretion in 
excluding 
the 
victim's 
statements 
to 
Vigeant 
and 
prohibiting 
defense 
counsel from refreshing with the police report Vigeant's 
recollection as to such inadmissible statements. 
"[R]elevant 
evidence 
of 
the 
victim's 
state 
of 
mind 
of 
which 
the 
defendant was aware," Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 408 Mass. 278, 
282-283 (1990), is admissible when offered to show its effect upon 
the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 907 
(2013); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249, at 191-193 (K.S. Broun ed., 
7th ed. 2013).  See generally H.J. Alperin, Summary of Basic Law 
§ 10.111 
(4th 
ed. 
2006) 
(out-of-court 
statements 
that 
are 
admissible 
as nonhearsay).  A defendant must make a "credible showing" that he 
knew of the victim's state of mind, Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 401 
Mass. 
749, 
759 
(1988), 
since 
"[o]bviously, 
the 
victim's 
state 
of 
mind 
can be relevant to the defendant's motive only if there is reason 
to believe that the defendant knew of that state of mind."  
 
 
22 
Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 8 (1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1049 (1977).  See Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 167 
(1997) (state of mind exception "calls for admission of evidence of 
a murder victim's state of mind as proof of the defendant's motive 
to kill the victim when and only when there also is evidence that 
the 
defendant 
was 
aware 
of 
that 
state 
of 
mind 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
crime 
and would be likely to respond to it"). 
To the extent that the defendant contests his inability to use 
the 
police 
report 
to 
refresh 
Vigeant's 
recollection 
as 
to 
statements 
the victim made to Vigeant, his argument is unavailing.  The judge 
was 
well 
within 
her 
discretion 
in 
excluding 
evidence 
of 
the 
victim's 
sexual overture to Vigeant where the defendant could not show that 
he was aware of that overture.  Vigeant stated, twice, that he did 
not speak to the defendant about any request by the victim for a 
"threesome."  Given this unequivocal testimony, the jury could not 
permissibly infer that the defendant was aware of the victim's 
conversation with Vigeant.19  Contrast Commonwealth v. Todd, 394 
Mass. 791, 797 (1985) (evidence of victim's statements to witness 
indicating intent to terminate relationship with defendant 
admissible where victim likely had made similar statements to 
19 The defendant did not testify.  Accordingly, the only means 
by 
which 
the 
jury 
could 
have 
learned 
of 
any 
conversation 
that 
Vigeant 
may have had with the defendant about the victim's offer of a 
"threesome" would have been through Vigeant's testimony. 
                                                 
 
 
23 
defendant); 
Borodine, 
supra 
at 
8-9 
(same).  Absent 
the 
"fundamental 
prerequisite" of the defendant's awareness of the victim's 
statements, Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 470 (2000), any 
request the victim may have made to Vigeant was irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible.  The judge did not err in prohibiting 
defense counsel from using the police report to elicit such 
inadmissible testimony. 
To the extent, however, that the defendant also alleges that 
he was wrongly prohibited from using the police report to refresh 
Vigeant's recollection as to his alleged conversation with the 
defendant, his argument has no basis in the trial transcript.  
Although defense counsel repeatedly sought to refresh Vigeant's 
recollection 
as 
to 
the 
victim's inadmissible statements to Vigeant, 
she did not make any such effort as to Vigeant's conversation with 
the 
defendant, 
and 
the 
judge 
did 
not 
bar 
her 
from 
doing 
so.  Indeed, 
while 
the 
judge 
correctly 
prohibited defense counsel from eliciting 
testimony about the victim's statements to Vigeant, she repeatedly 
reminded counsel that counsel could inquire whether Vigeant had 
recounted any such statements to the defendant.  The defendant 
cannot now contest the consequences of defense counsel's strategy 
where there was no unfavorable ruling on the issue at trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Simcock, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 196 (1991) ("The 
consequences of trial tactics may not be converted after conviction 
 
 
24 
into alleged errors by the judge"). 
This is particularly the case where there was no foundation to 
refresh Vigeant's recollection as to his conversation with the 
defendant.  Counsel may refresh a witness's recollection only if 
that 
witness's 
memory 
clearly 
is 
exhausted.  See, 
e.g., 
Commonwealth 
v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 731 (2012).  Here, Vigeant twice stated 
that he did not discuss the victim's overture with the defendant.  
See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Jenkins, 
458 
Mass. 
791, 
796 
n.4 
(2011) 
("negative 
responses are not the equivalent of a failure of memory").  While 
Vigeant subsequently went along with defense counsel's suggestion 
that he did not remember, that alone is an insufficient showing of 
exhaustion where the question had been asked, and answered, twice.  
Indeed, defense counsel then put further questions to Vigeant 
regarding his 8:01 P.M. telephone conversation with the defendant.  
When 
asked, 
"You're 
not 
sure 
if 
you 
discussed 
what 
you 
and 
Christine 
discussed?" 
Vigeant 
replied, "I'm pretty confident I didn't discuss 
anything about what I had stated."  We discern no error in the 
aforesaid limits on testimony. 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed 
the 
entire 
record 
consistent 
with 
our 
duty 
pursuant 
to 
G. L. 
c. 278, 
§ 33E, we discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the 
degree of guilt. 
Judgment affirmed.