Case Title: Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc.1996 WY 152927 P.2d 1168Case Number: 95-299Decided: 11/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Karen WOODARD,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

COOK FORD SALES, INC., 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, J.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Bruce P. Badley 
of Badley & Rasmussen, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      Suit was filed by 
Karen Woodard against Cook Ford Sales, Inc. alleging negligence and breach of 
contract for damage to her truck which resulted when Cook Ford Sales repaired 
her truck by "boiling out" the fuel tanks. The district court, without reference 
to either cause of action, granted Cook Ford Sales' motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds that the suit was time barred by Wyoming's four-year statute of 
limitations, W.S. 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) and (C) (1988).

[¶2]      We affirm the 
order granting summary judgment, holding that Woodard's negligence claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse the order of summary judgment 
on the contract claim.

[¶3]      Woodard presents 
two issues for review:

1.         Is a 
breach of contract claim barred by the expiration of the statute of 
limitation[s] set forth in W.S. § 1-3-105(a)(iv) which is applicable to an ". . 
. injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract . . .?" 

2.         Was 
Summary Judgment proper when there was a genuine issue of material fact in 
dispute regarding when the cause of action accrued?

Appellee Cook 
Ford Sales responds:

I.          
There is no basis for Appellant's breach of contract claim.

II.          
Based upon the documents submitted by the Appellant, there is no question 
of fact in regard to the expiration of the statute of limitations in this 
action.

[¶4]      Woodard's Ford 
truck was vandalized by placing mothballs in the fuel tanks. On October 12, 
1988, Woodard took her truck to Cook Ford Sales to have it repaired "to run." 
Cook Ford Sales agreed to repair the pickup by, among other things, "boiling 
out" the fuel tanks for $5,001.41. The repair order expressly disclaimed all 
warranties. On November 30, 1988, Cook Ford Sales completed the repair, and 
Woodard accepted delivery of the truck.

[¶5]      Complaining that 
it would not "run right" using gasoline as fuel, Woodard returned her truck to 
Cook Ford Sales three times: on June 23, June 27 and September 28, 1989. On 
March 8, 1990, Woodard sought the advise of another dealership which, after 
performing numerous tests, recommended that the carburetor, fuel tanks and fuel 
lines be replaced. In the summer of 1992, Woodard took her truck to yet another 
mechanic. Eventually, Woodard had the fuel tanks removed at Riley Motors on 
March 2, 1993.

[¶6]      On May 6, 1994, 
Woodard filed a complaint in district court alleging negligence and breach of 
contract. Woodard argued that not only had Cook Ford Sales negligently repaired 
her truck by "boiling out" the fuel tanks, but also that it breached its 
contract by failing to repair the truck "to run." The district court held that 
Woodard's action was timed barred by Wyoming's four-year statute of 
limitations.

[¶7]      With respect to 
the negligence claim, Woodard contends that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when the cause of action 
accrued. Our standard of review in cases such as this is well delineated. 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fowler 
v. Westair Enterprises, Inc., 906 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wyo. 1995); Kahrs v. Board of 
Trustees for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995); see 
also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We review the grant of summary judgment according no 
deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Duncan v. Town of 
Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 
(Wyo. 1995). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the 
party who opposed the motion, and we give to that party the benefits of all 
favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Adkins v. 
Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995); Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 342 (Wyo. 1989)). We do not 
favor summary judgment in a negligence action; therefore, the summary judgment 
is subject to more exacting scrutiny. Duncan, 903 P.2d  at 551.

[¶8]      We are in full 
accord with the determination by the trial court that the statute of limitations 
had run with respect to Woodard's tort claim. Negligence actions are governed by 
a four-year limitation specified in W.S. 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) and (C). Because 
Wyoming is a "discovery state," the statute of limitations is not triggered 
until such time as the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of 
the cause of action. Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 
1996); Barlage v. Key Bank, 892 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1995). That rule with 
respect to tort cases was articulated in Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, reh'g 
denied 590 P.2d 1340 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979), and applies even though the damage is slight, continues to 
occur, or additional damage caused by the same wrongful act may result in the 
future. Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶9]      Woodard argues 
that genuine issues of material fact existed which should have precluded a 
summary judgment from being entered. Specifically, Woodard argues that the 
second mechanic, Jason Clemens, did not run tests on the truck until March 1994. 
Thus, she claims not to have known prior to May 6, 1990 that there was damage to 
her vehicle. Woodard maintains that this factual dispute should prevent the 
entry of a summary judgment because she neither knew nor could have known of the 
accrual of a cause of action.

[¶10]   We conclude that, even assuming 
such a factual dispute existed, the statute of limitations issue is still a 
question of law within the province of the court. Hiltz, 910 P.2d  at 570. It is 
clear that Woodard was aware of damage to her truck prior to May 6, 1990. 
Woodard had taken her truck back to Cook Ford Sales complaining that the truck 
would not "run right" on gasoline at least three times. And, in contrast to 
Woodard's affidavit claiming that Clemens did not perform any tests until 1994, 
the record clearly establishes the tests were performed on March 8, 1990, by the 
date notation on the computerized test readouts. The uncontroverted facts of 
this case support the district court's conclusion that a reasonable person would 
have realized he/she had a cause of action prior to May 6, 1990.

[¶11]   This leaves only the contention of 
breach of contract. In the trial court's opinion letter and order, the dismissal 
of plaintiff's claims was based solely upon the four-year statute of 
limitations. There was no reference to the contract. Wyoming Statute 1-3-105(i) 
indicates a ten-year limitation for claims based upon a contract in writing. We, 
therefore, reverse the order granting summary judgment as it pertains to the 
breach of contract claim.

[¶12]   Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.