Case Title: Woolaver v. State

Citation: 175 Vt. 397, 2003 VT 71, 833 A.2d 849

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Woolaver v. State (2002-012); 175 Vt. 397; 833 A.2d 849

2003 VT 71

[Filed 01-Aug-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 71

                                No. 2002-012

  Kimberly Woolaver	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Washington Superior Court

       State of Vermont	                         November Term, 2002

  Matthew I. Katz, J.
      
  Cassandra S. Edson and David Putter of Putter & Edson, L.L.P.,
    Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David K. Herlihy, Special
    Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.  

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1) , Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.    Plaintiff Kimberly Woolaver appeals from the
  Washington Superior Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the
  State on plaintiff's claim that she was fired from her state job while on
  parental leave in violation of Vermont's Parental and Family Leave Act
  (PFLA), 21 V.S.A. §§ 470-474.  Plaintiff contends that (1) the trial court
  erred in finding that she was ineligible for PFLA leave; (2) the PFLA
  prohibits the discharge of an employee while on PFLA leave, or, if the PFLA
  allows termination of an employee for performance reasons during parental
  leave, the facts alleged by plaintiff suggest  her firing was improperly
  related to her pregnancy; and (3) the State made promises to plaintiff
  concerning her PFLA leave eligibility and reinstatement  rights upon which
  she justifiably relied.  We find the record contains disputed issues of
  material fact that preclude summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims,
  except for the claim based on promissory estoppel.  We therefore reverse
  the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the State, affirm the
  court's order denying summary judgment to plaintiff, and remand for further
  proceedings.

       ¶  2.  We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. 
  Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.,173 Vt. 302, 305,