Case Title: Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc.1995 WY 30891 P.2d 80Case Number: 94-133Decided: 03/07/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Kerry 
DRAKE and Kelly Flores, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INCORPORATED, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Rodger McDaniel of Law 
Offices of Rodger McDaniel, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Loyd E. Smith of Lathrop 
& Rutledge, Cheyenne, L. Michael Zinser and Michael E. Heston of Zinser and 
Domina, Nashville, TN, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Kerry Drake and 
Kelly Flores (appellants) filed this action alleging that Cheyenne Newspapers, 
Inc. (Newspaper) wrongfully terminated their employment. The district court 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and appeal is taken.

[¶2]      Appellants 
present the following issues:

1.         Does 
Wyoming recognize the protection of free speech as an important public policy in 
the context of the public policy exception to the "at will" employment 
doctrine.

2.         May 
an employer discharge an employee who refuses the employer's directive to state 
the employer's opinion as though it were his own.

3.         May 
an employer discharge his employees in retaliation for exercising legitimate 
free speech.

4.         Are 
the Plaintiffs unable to prove any set of facts under which they would be 
entitled to relief on Count II of their complaint alleging a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

5.         Are 
the Plaintiffs unable to prove any set of facts under which they would be 
entitled to relief on Count III of their complaint alleging a breach of 
contract.

The Newspaper presents a single 
issue:

Whether the allegations of all three counts of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted?

FACTS

[¶3]      Appellants were 
employed by the Newspaper's editorial division without the benefit of a written 
employment contract. In August of 1993, the Communications Workers of America 
sought to unionize the editorial division of the Newspaper. The NLRB ruled that 
appellants were employed in management positions; therefore, they were not 
included within the proposed bargaining unit.

[¶4]      The Newspaper 
actively opposed the unionization effort. As part of its campaign, the Newspaper 
required each member of its managerial staff to wear buttons urging a "no" vote 
on the union. After a brief period of time, appellants informed the Newspaper 
that they could not, in good conscience, wear the buttons. In response, the 
Newspaper suspended appellants indefinitely without pay. Ultimately appellants 
were fired.

[¶5]      Appellants filed 
an action in state district court, which the Newspaper removed to federal 
district court. That court later remanded the case back to state court. In their 
complaint, appellants filed claims for retaliatory discharge in violation of 
public policy, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach 
of the employment contract. The Newspaper filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. Appellants now 
appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      Wyoming is an 
at-will employment state, which means that when employment is for an indefinite 
period of time, either party may terminate the employment relationship at any 
time and for any reason, or for no reason at all. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber 
of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 (Wyo. 1994). We have previously recognized an 
exception to the general rule of at-will employment in the context of a tort 
action for retaliatory discharge if the action is premised on a violation of 
public policy. Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985); 
Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 753 (Wyo. 1989) (an 
action in tort for retaliatory discharge allowed if the employee is discharged 
for filing a claim for worker's compensation).

[¶7]      Count I of 
appellants' First Amended Complaint alleges that the right to free speech found 
in the Wyoming Constitution at Art. 1, § 20 represents an important public 
policy. Appellants claim that public policy was violated by the Newspaper when 
it terminated appellants' employment because they exercised their right of free 
speech by refusing to wear the anti-union buttons.

[¶8]      Appellants' claim 
is predicated upon their contention that the free speech clause of the Wyoming 
Constitution does not require state action. Article 1, § 20 of our constitution 
provides:

Freedom of 
speech and press; libel; truth a defense. - Every person may freely speak, write and publish 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and in all 
trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good 
intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense, the jury 
having the right to determine the facts and the law, under direction of the 
court.

Appellants' position is that 
since the Wyoming Constitution, unlike the federal, does not specifically 
require state action, they may maintain a cause of action against a private 
entity for a violation of their free speech rights.

[¶9]      In Allen, this 
court's opinion implied that, in certain situations, an employee might have a 
cause of action if he is discharged for exercising his free speech rights. 
Allen, 699 P.2d  at 282-84. However, we also noted that the right to free speech 
is not absolute. Id., at 283. One of the restrictions on the right to free 
speech is that the right does not, generally, extend to private property. Lloyd 
Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-70, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 2228-29, 33 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1972); cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2043-44, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980). Even in the context of a labor 
dispute, the right of free speech on private property, including picketing, is 
limited. Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 520-22, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1036-37, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1976).

[¶10]   Terminating an at-will employee for 
exercising his right to free speech by refusing to follow a legal directive of 
an employer on the employer's premises during working hours does not violate 
public policy.1 The fact that irony exists in this 
case because the employer purports to be an advocate of free speech does not 
create a public policy exception to at-will employment.

[¶11]   Count II of appellants' First 
Amended Complaint alleges that the Newspaper breached the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The district court dismissed Count II stating that pursuant to 
the criteria set forth by this court in Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.

[¶12]   We stated in 
Wilder:

"A tort, however, requires the presence of a duty 
created by law, not merely a duty created by contract; and, although a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is created by law in all cases, it is only in rare 
and exceptional cases that the duty is of such a nature as to give rise to tort 
liability. The kind of breach of duty that brings into play the bad faith tort 
arises only when there are special relationships between the tort-victim and the 
tort-feasor * * *." The special relationship necessary to permit recovery is not 
established merely by the employer-employee relationship.

Wilder, at 221 (quoting K 
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 
(1987)).

[¶13]   Appellants assert that a special 
relationship existed with the Newspaper because of longevity of employment; that 
the Newspaper was successful in removing them from the bargaining unit, thereby 
depriving them of the protections of federal law; and because the Newspaper is 
uniquely protected by free speech, they believed they would not be terminated 
for exercising their right of free speech. The problem with appellants' argument 
is that they allege their termination was solely because they refused to wear a 
campaign button - an act the Newspaper could legally ask them to do. No other 
allegations of unconscionable acts by the Newspaper were 
alleged.

[¶14]   The First Amended Complaint in fact 
states that appellants were informed by the Newspaper that if they refused to 
wear the button, it would result in their dismissal from employment. Appellants' 
reliance, therefore, on a special relationship after being informed of their 
imminent termination was misplaced. The district court correctly found that no 
cause of action existed upon which relief could be 
granted.

[¶15]   Finally, as to Count III alleging 
the existence of an oral contract, appellants' complaint does not allege an 
explicit promise by the Newspaper that they would be terminated only for cause, 
but rather that a practice existed of progressive discipline before termination. 
The mere allegation of an employment practice is nothing more than a subjective 
expectation. Subjective understandings and expectations do not establish an 
employment contract provision. Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277; Anglemyer 
v. Hamilton County Hosp., 1994 WL 409618 (Kan. 1994).

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   No claim was alleged upon which 
relief could be granted.

[¶17]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1 In an unpublished opinion, the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion. Rigsby v. Murray Ohio 
Mfg. Co., 1991 WL 95710 (Tenn. App. 1991).