Case Title: AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12224

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12224 
 
AIDS SUPPORT GROUP OF CAPE COD, INC.  vs.  TOWN OF BARNSTABLE 
& others.1 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     February 14, 2017. - June 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Hypodermic Needle. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 10, 2015. 
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Raymond 
P. Veary, Jr., J., and the case was reported to the Appeals 
Court by Robert C. Rufo, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Bennett H. Klein (Andrew Musgrave also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Charles S. McLaughlin, Jr., Assistant Town Attorney (Ruth 
J. Weil, Town Attorney, also present) for the defendants. 
 
Andrew H. DeVoogd, Kate F. Stewart, & Tiffany M. Knapp, for 
Massachusetts Infectious Diseases Society & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Board of health of Barnstable and director of public 
health of Barnstable. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  Prior to 2006, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, provided 
criminal penalties for the possession, delivery, sale, or 
exchange of hypodermic needles without a prescription.  In 2006, 
the Legislature amended the statute to regulate only the sale of 
such needles, thereby decriminalizing, inter alia, the 
possession of hypodermic needles.  See St. 2006, c. 172, §§ 2, 3 
(2006 act). 
 
Since 2009, AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. (ASGCC), 
has been operating a free hypodermic needle "access" program in 
Hyannis, a village in Barnstable.  It provides clean syringes 
without charge to those who use intravenous drugs, in order to 
prevent the spread of diseases such as human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) and hepatitis C.  Claiming that ASGCC, which did not 
first seek local approval of its program, is in violation of two 
State statutes, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215, the 
town of Barnstable2 (town) ordered the cessation of the program. 
 
General Laws c. 94C, § 27, in essence prohibits the sale of 
hypodermic needles to those under eighteen, while G. L. c. 111, 
§ 215, authorizes the Department of Public Health (DPH) to 
operate nonsale needle exchange programs with local approval.  
The town maintains that the statutes provide the only two legal 
                                                          
 
 
2 For convenience, we refer to the defendants the town of 
Barnstable, its board of health, and its director of public 
health collectively as the "town." 
3 
 
 
methods for the sale and distribution of hypodermic needles in 
Massachusetts:  sale by pharmacists and distribution by a 
locally approved DPH program.  ASGCC contends that neither 
statute regulates the private nonsale distribution of hypodermic 
needles. 
 
In response to the town's cease and desist order, ASGCC 
brought an action in the Superior Court, seeking injunctive 
relief as well as a declaration that its nonsale needle "access" 
program is not prohibited by either statute.  After enjoining 
the town preliminarily from enforcing its cease and desist 
order, the judge reported the question without decision to the 
Appeals Court, and we allowed ASGCC's application for direct 
appellate review.  We conclude that neither statute prohibits 
the subject program and, accordingly, that the town's cease and 
desist order cannot stand.3 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts 
Infectious Diseases Society; Massachusetts Public Health 
Association; Association of Behavioral Health; Harvard Pilgrim 
Health Care; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts; 
Baystate Health, Inc.; National Alliance of State and 
Territorial AIDS Directors; Partners HealthCare System, Inc.; 
UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc.; Greater Lawrence Family Health 
Center; Lynn Community Health Center; Outer Cape Health 
Services, Inc.; Duffy Health Center; Fenway Health; Manet 
Community Health Center, Inc.; Massachusetts Association of 
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors; Massachusetts Association 
of Community Health Workers; Tapestry Health Systems, Inc.; 
Victory Programs; Multicultural AIDS Coalition; AIDS Project 
Worcester, Inc.; MassEquality.org, the Campaign For Equality; 
New England AIDS Education and Training Center; Massachusetts 
 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Background and prior proceedings.4  ASGCC is a nonprofit 
organization that operates programs in Hyannis, Provincetown, 
and Falmouth for those suffering from drug addiction and its 
attendant illnesses.  At its site in Hyannis, ASGCC distributes 
free hypodermic needles and syringes as part of a comprehensive 
program of services for people who use intravenous drugs.  
Because sharing needles is a leading cause of the spread of 
blood-borne diseases, notably HIV and hepatitis C, ASGCC seeks 
to ensure that its clients use a clean needle every time they 
inject opiates or other drugs.  ASGCC therefore conducts an 
initial assessment of each person who requests needles or other 
services and provides only as many needles as staff believe will 
be necessary so that the client will be able to use a clean 
needle for each injection.5  ASGCC provides a collection 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Chapter of The National Association of Social Workers; The 
Dimock Center; Justice Resource Institute; John Snow, Inc.; 
North Shore Health Project; Community Research Initiative of New 
England; and Center For Human Development, Inc. 
 
 
4 The facts are taken from the agreed-upon statement of 
facts within the parties' joint motion to report the case the 
Appeals Court, and we reference additional, uncontroverted facts 
where necessary to supplement the discussion. 
 
 
5 In his decision allowing the motion for a preliminary 
injunction filed by AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 
(ASGCC), the Superior Court judge noted ASGCC's report that, in 
its then most recent fiscal year, it had issued 112,604 syringes 
and received back 115,209 syringes, "for a rate of return of 102 
[per cent]."  He noted also: 
 
 
5 
 
 
receptacle for the return of used needles at its facility, 
encourages clients to return needles, and gives each client an 
individual "sharps container" for storing used needles before 
they are returned, but does not require a return of the same 
number of needles distributed in order to provide additional 
needles.6  It also offers additional services for users of 
intravenous drugs, such as medical case management, peer 
support, housing, nutritional programs, testing for diseases 
such as HIV, and risk reduction strategies.  ASGCC does not sell 
hypodermic needles, is not operating a program implemented by 
DPH, and has not sought approval from the town to operate its 
programs. 
 
In 2015, the town discovered improperly discarded 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
"Both sides have responded to [the risk of improperly 
discarded needles].  The [t]own has installed sharps 
receptacles at four of its five fire stations. . . .  
ASGCC, in addition to distributing individual sharps 
containers and maintaining its own disposal kiosk, has also 
conducted sweeps of its own neighborhood to locate and 
secure discarded materials.  Both sides have also shown a 
willingness to expand these efforts and to coordinate their 
resources in doing so (e.g.[,] installing secure sharps 
receptacles in public comfort facilities, increasing public 
awareness and education).  This willingness, to the court's 
view, shows the most promise, in both focus and scope, to 
address the [t]own's foremost concern." 
 
 
6 Consistent with ASGCC's own "harm reduction" goal of 
clients using a clean needle every time they inject, the 
Department of Public Health (DPH) also does not require programs 
contracted under its auspices, pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 215, 
to insist on a one-to-one exchange of needles in order for a 
client to participate in the program. 
6 
 
 
hypodermic needles in public places and traced the origin of at 
least some of these needles to ASGCC.  Soon thereafter, the town 
ordered7 ASGCC to cease distributing hypodermic needles at its 
Hyannis site, citing violations of G. L. c. 94, § 27, and G. L. 
c. 111, § 215.  The order indicated in this regard that, in 
failing to obtain approval of its program from the town council, 
ASGCC had violated G. L. c. 111, § 215, and that its program 
also was not in compliance with G. L. c. 94, § 27, which permits 
only licensed pharmacists or wholesale druggists to sell 
hypodermic needles. 
 
As noted, on November 10, 2015, ASGCC commenced an action 
in the Superior Court seeking a declaration that the town's 
order was in contravention of Massachusetts law because nothing 
in the language of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, or G. L. c. 111, § 215, 
prohibits private individuals or organizations from distributing 
free hypodermic needles.  ASGCC also sought equitable relief to 
preliminarily and permanently enjoin enforcement of the order. 
  
After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge 
preliminarily enjoined the town from enforcing the cease and 
desist order against ASGCC or otherwise interfering with ASGCC's 
                                                          
 
 
7 The town of Barnstable (town) issued two orders, 
described, collectively, as the "order."  The Barnstable police 
department hand-delivered the first order on September 22, 2015, 
which stated that it was a "warning."  The Barnstable director 
of public health mailed ASGCC a letter and a second order on 
September 23, 2015. 
7 
 
 
distribution of hypodermic needles.  The parties thereafter 
jointly requested that the case be reported for determination by 
the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as 
amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996).  The judge allowed that motion, 
and we allowed ASGCC's application for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The question before us is whether G. L. 
c. 94C, § 27, or G. L. c. 111, § 215, prohibits private 
individuals or organizations from distributing free hypodermic 
needles.  ASGCC maintains that we need look no further than the 
plain language of the statutes, given that neither contains 
language relevant to ASGCC's program or services.  The town 
argues that, notwithstanding the plain statutory language, the 
legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended 
G. L. c. 111, § 215, to provide the sole means by which an 
organization may operate free needle distribution programs 
outside the requirements of G. L. c. 94C, § 27.  According to 
the town, were we to conclude otherwise, only DPH-implemented 
exchange programs would require local approval, while similar 
private programs would be unregulated, a result the town 
considers absurd.  We disagree.  The statutory language is clear 
that programs such as ASGCC's are not prohibited, the 
legislative history does not evidence an intent to the contrary, 
and interpreting the two statutes to allow private entities to 
operate nonsale needle exchange programs does not give rise to 
8 
 
 
an absurd result. 
 
a.  Statutory language.  Our primary goal in interpreting a 
statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and "the 
statutory language is the principal source of insight into 
legislative purpose."  Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 390 
Mass. 701, 704 (1984).  Therefore, "[w]here the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent."  Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 
Mass. 134, 138 (2013), quoting Martha's Vineyard Land Bank 
Comm'n v. Assessors of W. Tisbury, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 27–28 
(2004).  Accordingly, turning first to the plain language of the 
statutes, it is clear that, by their words alone, neither G. L. 
c. 94C, § 27, nor G. L. c. 111, § 215, proscribes ASGCC's 
activities. 
 
General Laws c. 94C, § 27, regulates only the sale of 
hypodermic needles and syringes.  It provides: 
 
"Hypodermic syringes or hypodermic needles for the 
administration of controlled substances by injection may be 
sold in the commonwealth, but only to persons who have 
attained the age of [eighteen] years and only by a 
pharmacist or wholesale druggist licensed under the 
provisions of [G. L. c. 112], a manufacturer of or dealer 
in surgical supplies or a manufacturer of or dealer in 
embalming supplies.  When selling hypodermic syringes or 
hypodermic needles without a prescription, a pharmacist or 
wholesale druggist must require proof of identification 
that validates the individual's age." 
 
At the time of the cease and desist orders in 2015, G. L. 
c. 111, § 215, stated, in relevant part: 
9 
 
 
 
"The department of public health is hereby authorized 
to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation 
of not more than ten pilot programs for the exchange of 
needles in cities and towns within the commonwealth upon 
nomination by the department.  Local approval shall be 
obtained prior to implementation of each pilot program in 
any city or town."8 
 
In sum, the plain language of the statutes simply does not 
proscribe free distribution of hypodermic needles by a private 
individual or organization, such as ASGCC, that does not operate 
a program implemented by DPH.  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 363 (1978). 
 
b.  Legislative history.  The town asserts, however, that 
the plain language does not, in this case, accurately reflect 
the intent of the Legislature, and that other canons of 
statutory construction must be used in order to avoid an absurd 
result.  See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001) ("A 
fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory 
language should be given effect consistent with its plain 
meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do 
so would achieve an illogical result").  The legislative history 
                                                          
 
 
8 General Laws c. 111, § 215, was amended in 2016, but those 
amendments, while removing any restriction on the number of DPH 
programs, did not expand the provision to reference anything 
other than DPH programs.  The statute currently provides: 
 
 
"The department of public health may implement needle 
exchange programs for the exchange of needles in cities and 
towns.  Prior to implementation of a needle exchange 
program, approval shall be obtained from the board of 
health in the hosting city or town." 
10 
 
 
of G. L. 94C, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215, the town maintains, 
indicates a legislative intent to restrict access to hypodermic 
needles to one of two methods:  sale by pharmacists or 
distribution by a DPH-sponsored needle exchange program.  Where 
"the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, . . . 
legislative history is not ordinarily a proper source of 
construction."  Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 
(1977).  Nonetheless, as the town argues, we also must "construe 
statutes that relate to the same subject matter as a harmonious 
whole and avoid absurd results."  Canton v. Commissioner of the 
Mass. Highway Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 791 (2010).  Therefore, we 
consider the town's assertion that the successive legislative 
decisions to regulate the sale of hypodermic needles, and also 
to regulate free distribution through DPH programs, indicate a 
clear intent to proscribe other types of free distribution, and 
that allowing a private program like ASGCC's to exist, outside 
the ambit of DPH-implemented programs, would be absurd. 
 
The town asserts that, by amending G. L. c. 94C, § 27, 
in 2006, the Legislature "anointed" pharmacists as the 
"gatekeepers" of "sale and distribution" of hypodermic needles.  
The town contends further that, by enacting these amendments to 
G. L. c. 94C, § 27, while retaining G. L. c. 111, § 215, the 
Legislature intended the provisions of G. L. c. 111, § 215, to 
regulate any organization that wished to distribute free 
11 
 
 
hypodermic needles, outside the regulations on sales set forth 
in G. L. c. 94C, § 27.  In addition, the town points to prior, 
unsuccessful efforts to amend G. L. c. 94C, § 27, before 
implementation of the 2006 act, subsequent unsuccessful efforts 
to amend G. L. c. 111, § 215, and the 2016 expansion of G. L. 
c. 111, § 215, as evidence of legislative intent to restrict 
nonsale possession of hypodermic needles in enacting the 2006 
act.  In particular, in the town's view, the expansion of G. L. 
c. 111, § 215, in 2016, confirms that, in 2006, the Legislature 
did not authorize the establishment of private programs that 
distribute free hypodermic needles but, rather, limited needle 
exchange programs to those implemented by DPH.9 
 
The legislative history of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, does not 
support the town's contention that that statute, read in 
                                                          
 
 
9 In support of this argument, the town relies extensively 
on a Superior Court judge's interpretation of G. L. c. 111, 
§ 215, in Holyoke City Council vs. Holyoke, Mass. Super. Ct., 
No. 12-0837 (Hampden County Mar. 14, 2016), which the town 
argues represents the proper analysis of the interplay between 
the two statutes that regulate hypodermic needles.  The issue 
before the Superior Court in that case, however, was whether a 
town council or town board of health was the proper "local 
authority" to approve DPH-sponsored needle exchange programs, a 
question quite distinct from the one before us.  The judge 
himself indicated as much in a decision on a motion for 
reconsideration, stating that he was not confronted with the 
question whether G. L. c. 111, § 215, is applicable to private 
entities.  Since the decision in that case, the Legislature has 
amended G. L. c. 111, § 215, to clarify that a local board of 
health is now the approving authority for DPH programs.  See 
St. 2016, c. 133, § 65. 
12 
 
 
conjunction with the decision not to repeal G. L. c. 111, § 215, 
regulates nonsale distribution.  Prior to 2006, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 27, provided criminal penalties for the possession, delivery, 
sale, or exchange of hypodermic needles without a prescription.  
See G. L. c. 94C, § 27 (a), as amended through St. 1993, c. 224, 
§ 2 ("No person, not being a [licensed professional] shall have 
in his possession a hypodermic syringe [or] hypodermic 
needle. . ." [emphasis added]); G. L. c. 94C, § 27 (b), as 
amended through St. 1993, c. 224, § 2 ("No such syringe, needle 
or instrument shall be delivered or sold to, or exchanged with, 
any person except a [licensed professional]" [emphases added]).  
In enacting "An Act relative to HIV and Hepatitis C prevention," 
St. 2006, c. 172, §§ 2, 3, the Legislature removed from G. L. 
c. 94C, § 27, all references to possession, delivery, and 
exchange, choosing to retain only the word "sold."  See G. L. 
c. 94C, § 27, as appearing in St. 2006, c. 172, § 3.  Given the 
elimination of all references to possession, delivery, and 
exchange, we cannot infer, as the town suggests, that the 
Legislature intended the current version of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, 
to continue to regulate possession, delivery, and exchange.  
“Where the Legislature has deleted . . . language, apparently 
purposefully, the current version of the statute cannot be 
interpreted to include the rejected requirement.  Reading in 
language that the Legislature chose to remove . . . violates 
13 
 
 
basic principles of statutory construction and impermissibly 
interferes with the legislative function."  Commonwealth v. 
Porges, 460 Mass. 525, 530 (2011), quoting Kenniston v. 
Department of Youth Servs., 453 Mass. 179, 185 (2009).10 
 
The conclusion that G. L. c. 94C, § 27, applies only to the 
sale of hypodermic needles is required also by the statutory and 
common-law definitions of "sale" and "distribution."  General 
Laws c. 94C, § 1, defines the word "[d]istribute" as "to deliver 
other than by administering or dispensing a controlled 
substance."  While "sale" has no statutory definition, it is 
commonly understood as meaning "[t]he transfer of property or 
title for a price."  Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 513 
n.3 (2012), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1454 (9th ed. 2009).  
"Sell" is defined as "[t]o transfer (property) by sale."  
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Sale thus is legally 
                                                          
 
 
10 The town points to language in three prior proposed 
amendments to G. L. c. 94C, § 27, over the course of ten years, 
that would have exempted from criminal penalties the 
distribution of hypodermic needles by any program, whether 
private or public.  The town maintains that these efforts 
demonstrate the Legislature's consideration and rejection of the 
concept of allowing private organizations to distribute 
hypodermic needles.  See 1995 Senate Doc. No. 554; 1997 Senate 
Doc. No. 517; 1999 Senate Doc. No. 537.  We do not consider 
proposed legislation that was never enacted as being indicative 
of legislative intent; rather, we look to the statutory language 
that the Legislature in fact adopted.  See, e.g., Duracraft 
Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 162-164 (1998).  In 
any event, certain of the proposed exemptions were included in 
G. L. c. 94C, § 27 (f) (now repealed). 
14 
 
 
distinct from distribution.  See Keefner, supra ("[T]he term 
'sell' or 'sale' is narrower than the term 'distribution' and we 
agree with the judge that they are not synonymous").  The town's 
contention that G. L. c. 94C, § 27, codified the role of 
pharmacists as gatekeepers for both "sale and distribution" of 
hypodermic needles is accordingly unavailing. 
 
The town also claims that cross references contained within 
prior versions of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 27 and 27A, and G. L. c. 111, 
§ 215, provide evidence of legislative intent that G. L. c. 111, 
§ 215, continues to apply to nonsale programs, such as the ASGCC 
program.  This contention is unpersuasive, for the reason, if no 
other, than that the 2006 act eliminated the very cross 
references upon which the town relies. 
 
In previous versions of the statutes, portions of the 
language of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215, did 
reference each other.  Prior to 2006, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, 
included subsection (f), which explicitly exempted from criminal 
liability the possession of needles without a prescription "as 
part of a pilot program approved by [DPH] in accordance with 
[G. L. c. 111, § 215]."  The 2006 act repealed G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 27 (f).  See St. 2006, c. 172, § 15.  With respect to 
currently effective legislation, the 2006 act added a new 
section, G. L. c. 94C, § 27A, which requires DPH, along with the 
Department of Environmental Protection, to design and implement 
15 
 
 
programs for the collection of used hypodermic needles; the 
section does not reference programs implemented by DPH.11 
 
In short, following the extensive amendments of the 2006 
act, decriminalizing the possession of hypodermic needles 
without a prescription, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, no longer contains 
any reference to programs implemented by DPH under the authority 
granted to it in G. L. c. 111, § 215.  Although, as the town 
argues, the statutes "relate to the same subject matter," 
Canton, 455 Mass. at 791, we do not read words into a statute 
that the Legislature saw fit to remove.  See Porges, 460 Mass. 
at 530.  The removal from G. L. c. 94C, § 27, of all statutory 
references to G. L. c. 111, § 215, is consistent with the 
legislative purpose of decriminalization; once criminal 
penalties had been eliminated, the exception to criminal 
liability for possession of needles acquired through a DPH 
program was no longer needed.  Nothing in these cohesive changes 
reveals a legislative intent that G. L. c. 111, § 215, would 
restrict possession of needles acquired by any means other than 
sales pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 27.  Indeed, the proponents of 
the 2006 act stated, in no uncertain terms, that "[w]ithout 
                                                          
 
 
11 The 2006 act also contained a single reference to 
programs established under G. L. c. 111, § 215, in a section 
that was not codified, which required DPH to "perform a 
comprehensive study and review of the existing needle exchange 
programs established pursuant to [G. L. c. 111, § 215]."  St. 
2006, c. 172, § 15. 
16 
 
 
providing the opportunity for a clean needle it's like spreading 
disease and condoning it."  State House News Service (Senate 
Sess.), June 1, 2006 (statement by Sen. Steven Tolman).  See 
State House News Service (Senate Sess.), June 1, 2006 (statement 
by Sen. Robert O'Leary) (any policy based on restricting access 
to needles is "fundamentally flawed"). 
 
In an effort to buttress its contention that the 
Legislature intended to retain nonsale restrictions, the town 
calls attention to two unsuccessful efforts to amend G. L. 
c. 111, § 215, subsequent to enactment of the 2006 act,12 and 
also to the later expansion of G. L. c. 111, § 215, in 2016.  
None of these efforts sheds any light on the Legislature's 
intent in 2006, when it enacted the now controlling G. L. 
c. 94C, § 27, "An Act relative to HIV and Hepatitis C 
prevention."  See Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 
660-662 (2016), quoting Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 194 
(1976) ("the views of a subsequent [Legislature] form a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one"); 
Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 555 n.14 (2013) ("We do 
not draw conclusions concerning the intent of the Legislature 
based on the failure to enact a subsequent amendment").  Nor 
                                                          
 
 
12 See Proposed Amendment No. 77 to 2016 House Doc. No. 
3944; 2016 Senate Doc. No. 2305, § 87. 
17 
 
 
does the 2016 legislation amending G. L. c. 111, § 215, advance 
the town's argument in this regard.  That legislation removed 
restrictions on the number of programs that DPH may implement, 
changed the status of such programs from "pilot" to permanent, 
and clarified that the local approval needed for such programs 
was to come from boards of health.  The amendment is silent, as 
before, as to any restrictions on private providers of the same 
service.  To the extent that this 2016 legislation in any way 
illuminates the Legislature's intent ten years before, it 
suggests an ongoing legislative effort to expand, rather than 
limit, nonsale access to hypodermic needles. 
 
Finally, we do well to note that the town's position stands 
in tension with the basic and fundamental legal principle that 
an activity not prohibited or restricted by law is lawful.  See 
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *45.  "To punish a person because 
he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due 
process violation of the most basic sort . . . ."  
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.  Concluding that ASGCC's 
services are unlawful under either G. L. c. 94C, § 27, or 
G. L. c. 111, § 215, would be tantamount to doing just that. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court for entry of a declaration that G. L. c. 94C, § 27, and 
G L. c. 111, § 215, do not prohibit ASGCC from engaging in free 
distribution of hypodermic needles, and an injunction 
18 
 
 
permanently enjoining enforcement of the town's order to cease 
and desist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.