Case Title: Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 10/30/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SAVE TARA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S151402 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B185656 
CITY OF WEST HOLLYWOOD, 
) 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Respondent; 
)  
Los Angeles County 
 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. BS090402 
WASET, INC., et al., 
)  
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest and 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21000 et seq.),1 a public agency must prepare an environmental impact 
report (EIR) on any project the agency proposes to “carry out or approve” if that 
project may have significant environmental effects (§§ 21100, subd. (a), 21151, 
subd. (a)).  We address in this case the question whether and under what 
circumstances an agency’s agreement allowing private development, conditioned 
on future compliance with CEQA, constitutes approval of the project within the 
meaning of sections 21100 and 21151.  We conclude that under some 
                                              
1 
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Public Resources 
Code. 
 
 
2
circumstances such an agreement does amount to approval and must be preceded 
by preparation of an EIR.  Under the circumstances of this case, we further 
conclude the City of West Hollywood’s conditional agreement to sell land for 
private development, coupled with financial support, public statements, and other 
actions by its officials committing the city to the development, was, for CEQA 
purposes, an approval of the project that was required under sections 21100 and 
21151 to have been preceded by preparation of an EIR. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The property at 1343 North Laurel Avenue (1343 Laurel) in the City of 
West Hollywood (City) is occupied by a large colonial-revival-style house 
constructed in 1923, later converted to four apartments, and a chauffeur’s house 
and garage.  The buildings are set well back from the street and the property is 
heavily wooded and landscaped, in contrast to most other properties on the block.  
City designated the main house a local cultural resource in 1994.  In 1997, Mrs. 
Elsie Weisman, the longtime owner of 1343 Laurel, donated it to City on 
condition she be permitted to live there until her death and the other tenants be 
permitted to occupy the premises for six months after her death.  Mrs. Weisman 
died in 2000 at the age of 101.2 
Two nonprofit community housing developers, West Hollywood 
Community Housing Corporation and WASET, Inc., and a corporation they 
created for the purpose, Laurel Place West Hollywood, Inc. (collectively, Laurel 
Place), propose to develop approximately 35 housing units for low-income seniors 
on the 1343 Laurel site.  As outlined in a 2003 grant application to the United 
                                              
2 
Whether because of its estate-like appearance or because Gone With the 
Wind was Mrs. Weisman’s favorite film, 1343 Laurel has acquired the popular 
nickname “Tara.” 
 
 
3
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the project would 
preserve the main house but not the chauffeur’s house or garage.  The existing 
two-story house would be converted to hold the manager’s apartment, one 
resident’s apartment, and communal space, including a multipurpose room, arts 
and crafts room, television lounge and kitchen.  A new three-story building, 
wrapping around the existing house’s back and sides, would contain 33 one-
bedroom apartments and underground parking spaces for residents.  Between the 
back of the existing house and the new building would be a landscaped courtyard.  
A 2,800-square-foot portion of the existing front yard would remain in City’s 
hands and be used as a pocket park.  The HUD application included preliminary 
architectural drawings showing the proposed renovation, new building, site plan 
and landscaping. 
On June 9, 2003, to facilitate Laurel Place’s HUD grant application, City’s 
city council granted Laurel Place an option to purchase the 1343 Laurel property, 
allowing the developer to show HUD it had control of the project site.  In a 
June 10 letter to a HUD official, City’s city manager outlined City’s intended 
contribution to the proposed project:  “To make the project competitive, [City] has 
approved the sale of the property at negligible cost.”  More specifically, City 
planned to contribute $1.5 million in land value.  “In addition, [City] will commit 
additional funding, in an amount not to exceed $1 million,” toward development 
costs.  “In summary, [City] will be contributing land and funds totaling $2,500,000 
toward the development of the Laurel Place project.”  
HUD approved a $4.2 million grant to Laurel Place in late 2003.  City’s 
mayor announced the grant in a December 2003 e-mail to residents, explaining it 
“will be used to build 35 affordable senior residential units, rehabilitate an historic 
house, and provide a public pocket park on Laurel Avenue.”  He described the 
project as “a win-win-win for the City, balancing desperately needed affordable 
 
 
4
senior housing with historic preservation and open space.”  Similarly, a City 
newsletter announced that with the recent HUD grant, City and Laurel Place “will 
redevelop the property” to rehabilitate the main house, build 35 units of low-
income senior housing, and create a pocket park.  The mayor’s announcement 
referred residents with questions about the proposed development to Jeffrey 
Skornick, City’s housing manager. 
Shortly after the HUD grant was approved, in November 2003, Skornick 
wrote to a 1343 Laurel tenant, Allegra Allison, reassuring her that “nothing is 
going to happen for about a year” and that “[a]s the project proceeds and prior to 
construction” the tenants would receive professional relocation assistance.  While 
he knew she would prefer to stay at 1343 Laurel, the housing manager wrote, he 
pledged, on City’s behalf, to “do everything in our power to minimize the impact 
of this project on you.”  In December 2003, Allison responded that “your 
relocation people” had already contacted tenants and, according to one tenant, had 
said they would soon be served with “one year eviction notices.”   
In January 2004, Skornick, responding to a resident critical of the proposed 
development, explained that the project would retain the historic house and most 
of the property’s front yard, as the new building would be to the rear of the site.  
He continued:  “We are happy to consider variations on the approach.  However, 
inasmuch as the City and its development partners have been awarded a $4.2 
million federal grant to help develop this project for senior housing, we must 
continue on a path that fulfills this obligation.”  In another January 2004 e-mail to 
a resident, a city council member’s deputy used the same language, referring to the 
development of senior housing on the site as an “obligation” City “must” pursue.   
On April 23, 2004, City announced the city council would consider, at its 
May 3 meeting, an agreement to facilitate development of the 1343 Laurel project, 
“subject to environmental review” and other regulatory approvals.  Save Tara, an 
 
 
5
organization of City residents and neighbors opposed to the project, wrote City to 
urge that it conduct CEQA review, including an EIR, before approving any new 
agreement, making a loan, or renewing the purchase option.  Despite that and 
numerous other objections voiced at the meeting (many also expressed support), 
the city council on May 3, 2004, voted to (1) approve a “Conditional Agreement 
for Conveyance and Development of Property” between City and Laurel Place, 
including a $1 million City loan to the developer, in order to “facilitate 
development of the project and begin[] the process of working with tenants to 
explore relocation options”; (2) authorize the city manager to execute the 
agreement “substantially in the form attached”; and (3) have appropriate City 
commissions review “alternative configurations” for the planned new building and 
obtain more public input “on the design of project elements.”   
The “Conditional Agreement for Conveyance and Development of 
Property” the city council thus approved and authorized the city manager to 
execute (the May 3 draft agreement) had the stated purpose of “caus[ing] the reuse 
and redevelopment of [1343 Laurel] with affordable housing for seniors and a 
neighborhood pocket park, while retaining the historic integrity of the Site.”  The 
agreement provided that “upon satisfaction of the conditions of this Agreement,” 
City would convey the property to Laurel Place and provide the developer a loan, 
and Laurel Place would construct 35 units of housing, one for the resident 
manager and 34 restricted to occupancy by low-income seniors.  In the first phase 
of actions under the agreement, Laurel Place would obtain final HUD approval, 
“complete the relocation of tenants”3 and take actions necessary “to comply with 
                                              
3 
A staff report on the proposed agreement, presented to the city council, 
explained that relocation notices would be sent “shortly after” the agreement was 
executed, starting a one-year period for relocating the tenants. 
 
 
6
CEQA . . . .”  Once the property was conveyed, the second, construction phase 
would begin. 
Under the May 3 draft agreement, City’s obligation to convey the property 
and make the improvement portion of the loan (i.e., all of the $1 million loan other 
than the predevelopment portion and an earlier grant for $20,000) was subject to 
several conditions precedent, among them that “[a]ll applicable requirements of 
CEQA . . . have been satisfied, as reasonably determined by the City Manager” 
and that “[d]eveloper shall have obtained all Entitlements.”4  The city manager, 
however, could waive these conditions.  The predevelopment portion of the loan, 
which City estimated at $475,000, was to be used for, inter alia, “environmental 
reports” and “governmental permits and fees” and was not subject to the CEQA 
compliance or entitlement conditions.   
A “Scope of Development” discussion attached to the May 3 draft 
agreement explained that “[a] three- or four-story building over semi-subterranean 
parking will be erected at the west-rear portion of the lot, replacing what are 
currently the garage and outdoor parking area, and possibly the chauffeur’s 
quarters.”  The new building’s exterior and interior design were described in some 
detail.   
At the city council’s May 3, 2004, meeting, the project architect explained 
that the exact building design had not yet been determined and that historic 
preservation values would be fully considered in the final design.  For example, 
the chauffeur’s house could be preserved, while still adding 35 housing units, by 
                                              
4 
The May 3 draft agreement defined “Entitlements” to include zoning 
changes, general plan amendments, and CEQA compliance, as well as any other 
permit or license required by City.  
 
 
7
making the new building four stories rather than three, though the architect for 
aesthetic reasons preferred a three-story building.   
Skornick, City’s housing manager, similarly told the council that the further 
planning processes the project would undergo were “not a rubber stamp,” as there 
were “real options to consider” regarding the design of the new building and park.  
At the same time, Skornick noted that staff had already rejected the alternative 
uses of 1343 Laurel suggested in public comments, such as dedication of the entire 
property for a park or use of the historic home as a library or cultural center.  
These alternatives, Skornick explained, failed to contribute to City’s affordable 
housing goals and, in any event, “there were no funds available for those options.”  
Finally, Skornick stressed that “while the agreement is conditional, the council 
needs to know that the recommended actions will commit the city as long as the 
developer delivers.”  
On July 12, 2004, Save Tara filed the operative complaint and petition for 
writ of mandate alleging, inter alia, that City had violated CEQA by failing to 
prepare an EIR before the city council’s May 3 approval of the loan and draft 
agreement.  On August 9, 2004, City and Laurel Place executed a revised 
agreement (the August 9 executed agreement).5  This agreement followed the 
May 3 draft agreement in many respects, but contained some potentially 
                                              
5  
Save Tara argues the administrative record should not have been 
augmented with the August 9 executed agreement, as its execution took place after 
the decision Save Tara has challenged, i.e., the city council’s approval of the 
May 3 draft agreement.  We agree with the Court of Appeal, however, that 
“[w]hile the May 2004 agreement is relevant for certain purposes, review of City’s 
decision would be ineffective, if it were limited to the May 2004 Agreement, 
which is no longer operative.”  Like the lower court, we treat Save Tara’s petition 
for writ of mandate as amended to address the August 9 executed agreement as 
well as the May 3 draft agreement. 
 
 
8
significant changes.  The requirement that all applicable CEQA requirements be 
satisfied could no longer be waived by the city manager, and the parties expressly 
recognized City retained “complete discretion over . . . any actions necessary to 
comply with CEQA” and that the agreement “imposes no duty on City to approve 
. . . any documents prepared pursuant to CEQA.”  Finally, details on tenant 
relocation were stated, including that the developer was to begin the process by 
hiring a relocation consultant within 30 days.  
The superior court denied Save Tara’s mandate petition, finding that while 
the parties agreed the 1343 Laurel project did call for an EIR at some time, none 
was required before approving the May 3 draft agreement because “the Agreement 
is expressly conditioned on compliance with CEQA . . . [and] does not limit the 
project alternatives or possible mitigation measures.”  Thus, City “has not given its 
final approval to convey the property at issue to [Laurel Place], nor has it given its 
final approval of the housing project itself.”   
The Court of Appeal reversed.  Section 21100, the appellate court reasoned, 
requires an EIR be prepared whenever lead agencies “propose to approve or carry 
out” a project with potential significant effects; it is not, contrary to the trial 
court’s holding, “to be delayed until a ‘final’ decision has been made.”  Moreover, 
conditioning a development agreement on CEQA compliance is insufficient 
because the EIR review process “is intended to be part of the decisionmaking 
process itself, and not an examination, after the decision has been made, of the 
possible environmental consequences of the decision.”  Any question as to 
whether a particular point in the development process is too early for preparation 
of an EIR “is resolved by the pragmatic inquiry whether there is enough 
information about the project to permit a meaningful environmental assessment.  If 
the answer is yes, the EIR review process must be initiated.”  Before May 3, 2004, 
the Court of Appeal held, the project was well enough defined to permit 
 
 
9
meaningful environmental analysis, which City should have performed between 
the award of the HUD grant in November 2003 and the approval of the May 3 
draft agreement. 
As remedy for the CEQA violation, the Court of Appeal remanded with 
directions that City be ordered (1) to void its approval of the May 3 and August 9 
agreements, and (2) to “engage in the EIR review process (a) based on the project 
as described in the HUD application and (b) without reference to the May and 
August 2004 Agreements.”  One justice dissented, arguing the matter was moot 
because, according to the parties, City had certified a final EIR for the project in 
October 2006.   
We granted City’s and Laurel Place’s petitions for review, which presented 
the mootness issue as well as the substantive question of whether an EIR was 
required before City’s approval of the conditional development agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
I.  Mootness 
According to the Court of Appeal decision, City approved a final EIR for 
the 1343 Laurel project in October 2006, during pendency of the appeal.  All 
parties agree on this chronology and further agree that Save Tara has not 
challenged the adequacy of this EIR in court.   
The parties dispute whether these events rendered the present appeal moot.  
City and Laurel Place take the position that Save Tara has already received the 
relief it seeks in this action — preparation and certification of an EIR — and no 
further effective relief can be granted it.  They cite CEQA cases in which, during 
pendency of the litigation, the project site had undergone irreversible physical or 
legal changes.  (See, e.g., Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v. 
Local Agency Formation Com. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 164, 171-173 [challenge to 
 
 
10
EIR for annexation moot where annexation had already occurred and could not be 
ordered annulled because annexing city was not a party to the action]; Hixon v. 
County of Los Angeles (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 370, 378 [street improvement project 
involving tree replacement had already progressed to removal of original trees, 
which could not be restored].)  Save Tara, in turn, argues that effective relief, in 
the form of an order setting aside City’s approval of the May 3 draft agreement 
and August 9 executed agreement, can still be awarded, as it was by the Court of 
Appeal.  It cites CEQA cases that were held not to be moot despite some 
intervening progress on the project.  (See, e.g., Bakersfield Citizens for Local 
Control v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1202-1204 [partial 
construction of a project did not moot the appeal, as the project could still be 
modified, reduced, or mitigated]; Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, 
Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888 [already constructed project could be 
modified or removed].) 
We agree with Save Tara that the preparation and certification of an EIR 
does not render the appeal moot.  No irreversible physical or legal change has 
occurred during pendency of the action, and Save Tara can still be awarded the 
relief it seeks, an order that City set aside its approvals.  As will appear, we 
ultimately conclude the matter must be remanded with directions that the superior 
court order City to void its approval of the May 3 and August 9 agreements and 
reconsider those decisions, informed this time by an EIR of the full environmental 
consequences.  Neither City nor Laurel Place contends such reconsideration is 
impossible as a practical matter or that the superior court lacks the power to order 
it.  Such an order remedies the CEQA violation Save Tara alleges occurred, 
approval of the agreements without prior preparation and consideration of an EIR, 
and thus constitutes effective relief. 
 
 
11
II.  Timing of EIR Preparation 
We turn to the substantive CEQA issue presented:  Was City required to 
prepare and consider an EIR before approving the conveyance and development 
agreement on May 3 and executing the revised agreement on August 9, 2004?  To 
answer this question, we first outline, in this part of the opinion, the existing law 
on timing of EIR preparation and the legislative policies that shape this law.  We 
next address, in part III, the general question of whether an agency may delay EIR 
preparation by making its final approval of a project contingent on subsequent 
CEQA compliance, while otherwise agreeing to go forward with the project.  In 
part IV, we apply our conclusions to the facts of this case to determine that City’s 
May 3 and August 9 actions constituted project approval requiring prior 
preparation of an EIR.  
We begin with CEQA’s text.  Section 21100, subdivision (a) provides in 
pertinent part:  “All lead agencies shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by 
contract, and certify the completion of, an environmental impact report on any 
project which they propose to carry out or approve that may have a significant 
effect on the environment.”  (Italics added.)  To the same effect, section 21151 
provides that “local agencies shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by contract, 
and certify the completion of, an environmental impact report on any project that 
they intend to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect on the 
environment.”  (Italics added.)6 
                                              
6 
Both sections appear applicable to City.  Section 21151 applies to local 
governments by its terms.  Section 21100, although placed in a chapter of CEQA 
mainly addressing the duties of state agencies, itself applies to all “lead agencies,” 
a term that includes local public entities undertaking projects subject to CEQA.  
(See §§ 21067 [“ ‘Lead agency’ means the public agency which has the principal 
responsibility for carrying out or approving a project which may have a significant 
effect upon the environment”], 21063 [“ ‘Public agency’ includes any state 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
12
While the statutes do not specify criteria for determining when an agency 
“approve[s]” a project, the law’s implementing regulations, the CEQA Guidelines 
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.),7 do address the question.  Section 
15352 of the CEQA Guidelines provides as follows:   
“(a) ‘Approval’ means the decision by a public agency which commits the 
agency to a definite course of action in regard to a project intended to be carried 
out by any person.  The exact date of approval of any project is a matter 
determined by each public agency according to its rules, regulations, and 
ordinances.  Legislative action in regard to a project often constitutes approval. 
“(b) With private projects, approval occurs upon the earliest commitment to 
issue or the issuance by the public agency of a discretionary contract, grant, 
subsidy, loan, or other form of financial assistance, lease, permit, license, 
certificate, or other entitlement for use of the project.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 
§ 15352, subds. (a), (b).) 
CEQA Guidelines section 15004, subdivision (b) observes that “[c]hoosing 
the precise time for CEQA compliance involves a balancing of competing factors.  
EIRs and negative declarations should be prepared as early as feasible in the 
planning process to enable environmental considerations to influence project 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
agency, board, or commission, any county, city and county, city, regional agency, 
public district, redevelopment agency, or other political subdivision”].) 
7 
“The CEQA Guidelines, promulgated by the state’s Resources Agency, are 
authorized by Public Resources Code section 21083.  In interpreting CEQA, we 
accord the Guidelines great weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or 
erroneous.”  (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of 
Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 428, fn. 5.) 
 
 
13
program and design and yet late enough to provide meaningful information for 
environmental assessment.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004, subd. (b).)8   
This court has on several occasions addressed the timing of environmental 
review under CEQA, emphasizing in each case the same policy balance outlined 
in CEQA Guidelines section 15004, subdivision (b).  In No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68 (No Oil, Inc.), discussing whether the proper scope of 
an EIR included possible related future actions, we quoted this observation from a 
federal decision:  “ ‘Statements must be written late enough in the development 
process to contain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough 
so that whatever information is contained can practically serve as an input into the 
decision making process.’ ”  (Id. at p. 77, fn. 5.)  We again quoted this formulation 
of the general issue in Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of 
Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779 (Fullerton), which considered whether a 
particular action was a “project” for CEQA purposes, adding, with what has turned 
                                              
8 
The parties’ briefs frame the timing issue here in two ways:  (1) Did City, 
in May and August of 2004, approve the 1343 Laurel project? and (2) Was the 
contingent agreement to convey and develop 1343 Laurel itself a project?  While 
this opinion will discuss some relevant decisions on the definition of a project, it 
largely follows the first formulation, asking whether City approved the project.  As 
section 15378 of the CEQA Guidelines explains:  “(a) ‘Project’ means the whole 
of an action, which has the potential for resulting in [an environmental change.]  
[¶] . . .  [¶] (c) The term ‘project’ refers to the activity which is being approved and 
which may be subject to several discretionary approvals by government agencies.  
The term ‘project’ does not mean each separate government approval.”  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15378.)  The “project” in this case is the redevelopment of 
1343 Laurel, not any of the individual steps City took to approve it.  City and 
Laurel Place do not dispute the redevelopment of 1343 Laurel is a project 
requiring evaluation in an EIR; they disagree with Save Tara only on the required 
timing of that EIR process. 
 
 
14
out to be an understatement, that “[t]he timing of an environmental study can 
present a delicate problem.”  (Fullerton, at p. 797.) 
In Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California 
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 376 (commonly known as Laurel Heights I), again discussing the 
proper scope of an EIR regarding future actions, we summed up the issue and 
attempted to state a rule, as follows:  “We agree that environmental resources and 
the public fisc may be ill served if the environmental review is too early.  On the 
other hand, the later the environmental review process begins, the more 
bureaucratic and financial momentum there is behind a proposed project, thus 
providing a strong incentive to ignore environmental concerns that could be dealt 
with more easily at an early stage of the project. . . .  For that reason, ‘ “EIRs 
should be prepared as early in the planning process as possible to enable 
environmental considerations to influence project, program or design.” ’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 395.)9  We also observed that at a minimum an EIR must be performed before a 
project is approved, for “[i]f postapproval environmental review were allowed, 
EIR’s would likely become nothing more than post hoc rationalizations to support 
action already taken.”  (Laurel Heights I, at p. 394.) 
This court, like the CEQA Guidelines, has thus recognized two 
considerations of legislative policy important to the timing of mandated EIR 
preparation:  (1) that CEQA not be interpreted to require an EIR before the project 
is well enough defined to allow for meaningful environmental evaluation; and 
                                              
9 
In the recent decision of Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 
Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 441, discussing the 
extent to which a large housing project’s EIR was required to address water 
sources for the project’s later phases, we reiterated Laurel Heights I’s admonition 
that environmental analysis not be delayed to the point where “ ‘bureaucratic and 
financial momentum’ ” rendered it practically moot. 
 
 
15
(2) that CEQA not be interpreted as allowing an EIR to be delayed beyond the 
time when it can, as a practical matter, serve its intended function of informing 
and guiding decision makers.   
The CEQA Guidelines define “approval” as “the decision by a public 
agency which commits the agency to a definite course of action in regard to a 
project.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (a).)  The problem is to 
determine when an agency’s favoring of and assistance to a project ripens into a 
“commit[ment].”  To be consistent with CEQA’s purposes, the line must be drawn 
neither so early that the burden of environmental review impedes the exploration 
and formulation of potentially meritorious projects, nor so late that such review 
loses its power to influence key public decisions about those projects. 
Drawing this line raises predominantly a legal question, which we answer 
independently from the agency whose decision is under review.  While judicial 
review of CEQA decisions extends only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse 
of discretion, “an agency may abuse its discretion under CEQA either by failing to 
proceed in the manner CEQA provides or by reaching factual conclusions 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  (§ 21168.5.)  Judicial review of these two 
types of error differs significantly:  while we determine de novo whether the 
agency has employed the correct procedures, ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all 
legislatively mandated CEQA requirements’ (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of 
Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564), we accord greater deference to the 
agency’s substantive factual conclusions.”  (Vineyard Area Citizens for 
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.)   
A claim, like Save Tara’s here, that the lead agency approved a project with 
potentially significant environment effects before preparing and considering an 
EIR for the project “is predominantly one of improper procedure” (Vineyard Area 
Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, supra, 40 
 
 
16
Cal.4th at p. 435) to be decided by the courts independently.  The claim goes not 
to the validity of the agency’s factual conclusions but to the required timing of its 
actions.  Moreover, as noted above (fn. 8, ante), the timing question may also be 
framed by asking whether a particular agency action is in fact a “project” for 
CEQA purposes, and that question, we have held, is one of law.  (Muzzy Ranch 
Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 382; 
Fullerton, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 795.)10   
Considering the timing issue as one of legally proper procedure does not 
remove all logistical discretion from agencies; it merely sets an outer limit to how 
long EIR preparation may be delayed.  To accord overly deferential review of 
agencies’ timing decisions could allow agencies to evade CEQA’s central 
commands.  While an agency may certainly adjust its rules so as to set “[t]he exact 
date of approval” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (a)), an agency has no 
discretion to define approval so as to make its commitment to a project precede the 
required preparation of an EIR. 
III.  Development Agreements Contingent on CEQA Compliance 
The May 3 draft agreement and August 9 executed agreement conditioned 
City’s obligation to convey the property to Laurel Place for development on all 
                                              
10 
In Mount Sutro Defense Committee v. Regents of University of California 
(1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 20, 40, the Court of Appeal remarked that “the 
determination of the earliest feasible time [for environmental review] is to be 
made initially by the agency itself, which decision must be respected in the 
absence of manifest abuse.”  (Accord, Stand Tall on Principles v. Shasta Union 
High Sch. Dist. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 772, 780; see also City of Vernon v. Board 
of Harbor Comrs. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 677, 690 [“the timing of an EIR is 
committed to the discretion and judgment of the agency”].)  To the extent these 
opinions contradict our determination that postponement of an EIR until after 
project approval constitutes procedural error that is independently reviewable, we 
disapprove them. 
 
 
17
applicable requirements of CEQA having been satisfied.  City and Laurel Place 
contend such a CEQA compliance condition on an agreement to convey or 
develop property eliminates the need for preparation of an EIR (or any other 
CEQA document) before an agency approves the agreement.  In contrast, Save 
Tara, quoting the Court of Appeal, maintains that permitting a CEQA compliance 
condition to postpone environmental review until after an agreement on the project 
has been reached would render the EIR requirement a “dead letter.”  We adopt an 
intermediate position:  A CEQA compliance condition can be a legitimate 
ingredient in a preliminary public-private agreement for exploration of a proposed 
project, but if the agreement, viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances, 
commits the public agency as a practical matter to the project, the simple insertion 
of a CEQA compliance condition will not save the agreement from being 
considered an approval requiring prior environmental review. 
As previously noted, the CEQA Guideline defining “approval” states that 
“with private projects, approval occurs upon the earliest commitment to issue or 
the issuance by the public agency of a discretionary contract, grant, subsidy, loan, 
or other form of financial assistance, lease, permit, license, certificate, or other 
entitlement for use of the project.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (b).)11  
On its face, this regulatory definition suggests a public agency’s execution of a 
contract to convey a property for development would constitute approval of the 
development project.  City and Laurel Place rely on two decisions holding 
                                              
11 
The guideline derives in part from Public Resources Code section 21065, 
which defines “project” as including a private activity supported by public 
contracts, grants, or other assistance, or requiring issuance of a public permit, 
license, or other entitlement.  (Id., subds. (b), (c).) 
 
 
18
agreements not to be approvals for CEQA purposes when conditioned on later 
CEQA compliance. 
In Stand Tall on Principles v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., supra, 235 
Cal.App.3d 772 (Stand Tall), a school district board passed resolutions choosing 
the site for a new high school from a group of finalists and authorizing the district 
administration to purchase the property; any offer to purchase “was to be made 
contingent upon completion of the EIR process and final state approval.”  (Id. at 
p. 777.)  The appellate court rejected a claim the EIR should have been done 
before selecting the preferred school site, reasoning that “the Board’s resolutions 
regarding the site selection do not constitute an ‘approval’ under CEQA because 
they do not commit the District to a definite course of action since they are 
expressly made contingent on CEQA compliance.”  (Id. at p. 781.) 
In Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community Services Dist. 
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 181 (McCloud), a district executed an agreement with a 
commercial spring water bottler for exclusive rights to bottle and sell water from 
the district’s sources, contingent on, among other things, the district and the bottler 
“ ‘completing, during the Contingency Period, proceedings under CEQA in 
connection with the Project, and the expiration of the applicable period for any 
challenge to the adequacy of District’s and [the bottler’s] compliance with CEQA 
without any challenge being filed.’ ”  (Id. at p. 188.)  Relying in part on Stand 
Tall, the McCloud court held no EIR was required before the district executed the 
contingent bottling agreement.  The agreement was subject to several “ ‘ifs,’ ” the 
court reasoned, continuing:  “The biggest ‘if’ in the agreement however is if all 
discretionary permits, expressly defined as including CEQA documentation, 
review and approvals, along with the final adjudication of any legal challenges 
based on CEQA, are secured and all environmental, title, physical, water quality 
and economic aspects of the project are assessed.”  (McCloud, at p. 193.) 
 
 
19
Without questioning the correctness of Stand Tall and McCloud on their 
facts, we note that each case involved particular circumstances limiting the reach 
of its logic; neither convinces us a broad rule exists permitting EIR preparation to 
be postponed in all circumstances by use of a CEQA compliance condition.   
In McCloud, the court relied in part on the agreement’s lack of information 
as to the springs that would be exploited, the site of the bottling plant, how the 
water would be transported, and other details essential to environmental analysis 
of the project.  Without that information, the court concluded, “preparation of an 
EIR would be premature.  Any analysis of potential environmental impacts would 
be wholly speculative and essentially meaningless.”  (McCloud, supra, 147 
Cal.App.4th at p. 197.)  In the terms used by the CEQA Guidelines to define 
“approval” — “the decision by a public agency which commits the agency to a 
definite course of action” (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (a)) — McCloud 
thus speaks as much to definiteness as to commitment and does not establish that a 
conditional agreement for development never constitutes approval of the 
development.  
Stand Tall, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 772, involved an agreement to purchase 
property, an activity that, as a practical matter in a competitive real estate market, 
may sometimes need to be initiated before completing CEQA analysis.  The 
CEQA Guidelines accommodate this need by making an exception to the rule that 
agencies may not “make a decision to proceed with the use of a site for facilities 
which would require CEQA review” before conducting such review; the exception 
provides that “agencies may designate a preferred site for CEQA review and may 
enter into land acquisition agreements when the agency has conditioned the 
agency’s future use of the site on CEQA compliance.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 
§ 15004, subd. (b)(2)(A).)  The Guidelines’ exception for land purchases is a 
reasonable interpretation of CEQA, but it should not swallow the general rule 
 
 
20
(reflected in the same regulation) that a development decision having potentially 
significant environmental effects must be preceded, not followed, by CEQA 
review.  (See Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 394 [“A fundamental 
purpose of an EIR is to provide decision makers with information they can use in 
deciding whether to approve a proposed project, not to inform them of the 
environmental effects of projects that they have already approved”].) 
City and Laurel Place apparently would limit the “commit[ment]” that 
constitutes approval of a private project for CEQA purposes (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (a)) to unconditional agreements irrevocably vesting 
development rights.  In their view, “[t]he agency commits to a definite course of 
action . . . by agreeing to be legally bound to take that course of action.”  (City of 
Vernon v. Board of Harbor Comrs., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.)  On this 
theory, any development agreement, no matter how definite and detailed, even if 
accompanied by substantial financial assistance from the agency and other strong 
indications of agency commitment to the project, falls short of approval so long as 
it leaves final CEQA decisions to the agency’s future discretion.   
Such a rule would be inconsistent with the CEQA Guidelines’ definition of 
approval as the agency’s “earliest commitment” to the project.  (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (b), italics added.)  Just as CEQA itself requires 
environmental review before a project’s approval, not necessarily its final 
approval (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21100, 21151), so the guideline defines 
“approval” as occurring when the agency first exercises its discretion to execute a 
contract or grant financial assistance, not when the last such discretionary decision 
is made.   
Our own decisions are to the same effect:  we have held an agency 
approved a project even though further discretionary governmental decisions 
would be needed before any environmental change could occur.  (See Muzzy 
 
 
21
Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 383 
[adoption of airport land use plan held to be a project even though it directly 
authorized no new development]; Fullerton, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 795 [adoption 
of school district succession plan held to be a project even though “further 
decisions must be made before schools are actually constructed”]; Bozung v. Local 
Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 279, 282 [regional agency’s 
approval of annexation by city held to be a project even though further approvals, 
including zoning changes, would be needed for property development to occur].)  
Though these decisions framed the question as whether certain agency steps 
constituted projects, rather than whether the agency had approved a project, they 
stand for the principle that CEQA review may not always be postponed until the 
last governmental step is taken. 
Moreover, limiting approval to unconditional agreements that irrevocably 
vest development rights would ignore what we have previously recognized, that 
postponing environmental analysis can permit “bureaucratic and financial 
momentum” to build irresistibly behind a proposed project, “thus providing a 
strong incentive to ignore environmental concerns.”  (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 
Cal.3d at p. 395.)   
A public entity that, in theory, retains legal discretion to reject a proposed 
project may, by executing a detailed and definite agreement with the private 
developer and by lending its political and financial assistance to the project, have 
as a practical matter committed itself to the project.  When an agency has not only 
expressed its inclination to favor a project, but has increased the political stakes by 
publicly defending it over objections, putting its official weight behind it, devoting 
substantial public resources to it, and announcing a detailed agreement to go 
forward with the project, the agency will not be easily deterred from taking 
whatever steps remain toward the project’s final approval.   
 
 
22
For similar reasons, we have emphasized the practical over the formal in 
deciding whether CEQA review can be postponed, insisting it be done early 
enough to serve, realistically, as a meaningful contribution to public decisions.  
(See Fullerton, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 797 [“as a practical matter,” school district 
succession plan was a project requiring review]; No Oil, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.3d at 
p. 77, fn. 5 [“ ‘Statements must be written . . . early enough so that whatever 
information is contained can practically serve as an input into the decision making 
process’ ”]; see also Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Albany (1997) 
56 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1221 [CEQA review should not be delayed to the point 
where it would “call for a burdensome reconsideration of decisions already 
made”].)  The full consideration of environmental effects CEQA mandates must 
not be reduced “ ‘to a process whose result will be largely to generate paper, to 
produce an EIR that describes a journey whose destination is already 
predetermined.’ ”  (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 268, 271.) 
We note as well that postponing EIR preparation until after a binding 
agreement for development has been reached would tend to undermine CEQA’s 
goal of transparency in environmental decisionmaking.  Besides informing the 
agency decision makers themselves, the EIR is intended “to demonstrate to an 
apprehensive citizenry that the agency has in fact analyzed and considered the 
ecological implications of its actions.”  (No Oil, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 86; 
accord, Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.)  When an agency reaches a 
binding, detailed agreement with a private developer and publicly commits 
resources and governmental prestige to that project, the agency’s reservation of 
CEQA review until a later, final approval stage is unlikely to convince public 
observers that before committing itself to the project the agency fully considered 
the project’s environmental consequences.  Rather than a “document of 
 
 
23
accountability” (Laurel Heights I, at p. 392), the EIR may appear, under these 
circumstances, a document of post hoc rationalization. 
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the suggestion of the Court of 
Appeal, supported by Save Tara, that any agreement, conditional or unconditional, 
would be an “approval” requiring prior preparation of CEQA documentation if at 
the time it was made the project was sufficiently well defined to provide 
“ ‘meaningful information for environmental assessment.’ ”  (Citizens for 
Responsible Government v. City of Albany, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221, 
quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004, subd. (b).)  On this theory, once a 
private project had been described in sufficient detail, any public-private 
agreement related to the project would require CEQA review. 
This rule would be inconsistent with the CEQA Guidelines’ definition of 
approval as involving a “commit[ment]” by the agency.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 
§ 15352, subd. (a).)  Agencies sometimes provide preliminary assistance to 
persons proposing a development in order that the proposal may be further 
explored, developed or evaluated.  Not all such efforts require prior CEQA review.  
(See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15262 [conduct of feasibility or planning 
studies does not require CEQA review].)  Moreover, privately conducted projects 
often need some form of government consent or assistance to get off the ground, 
sometimes long before they come up for formal approval.  Approval, within the 
meaning of Public Resources Code sections 21100 and 21151, cannot be equated 
with the agency’s mere interest in, or inclination to support, a project, no matter 
how well defined.  “If having high esteem for a project before preparing an 
environmental impact statement (EIR) nullifies the process, few public projects 
would withstand judicial scrutiny, since it is inevitable that the agency proposing a 
project will be favorably disposed to it.”  (City of Vernon v. Board of Harbor 
Comrs., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.) 
 
 
24
As amicus curiae League of California Cities explains, cities often reach 
purchase option agreements, memoranda of understanding, exclusive negotiating 
agreements, or other arrangements with potential developers, especially for 
projects on public land, before deciding on the specifics of a project.  Such 
preliminary or tentative agreements may be needed in order for the project 
proponent to gather financial resources for environmental and technical studies, to 
seek needed grants or permits from other government agencies, or to test interest 
among prospective commercial tenants.  While we express no opinion on whether 
any particular form of agreement, other than those involved in this case, 
constitutes project approval, we take the League’s point that requiring agencies to 
engage in the often lengthy and expensive process of EIR preparation before 
reaching even preliminary agreements with developers could unnecessarily burden 
public and private planning.  CEQA review was not intended to be only an 
afterthought to project approval, but neither was it intended to place unneeded 
obstacles in the path of project formulation and development. 
In addition to the regulatory definition of “approval” quoted earlier (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15352, subd. (b)), Save Tara relies on Citizens for 
Responsible Government v. City of Albany, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1199 (Citizens 
for Responsible Government) for the principle that an EIR must be prepared before 
a public agency executes a detailed agreement for development.  In that case, the 
city council decided to place before the voters a proposal for development of a 
gaming facility at a racetrack; included in the proposal was an agreement with the 
private developer setting out details of the proposed facility and its operation.  (Id. 
at p. 1206.)  Although the agreement called for the developer to submit any studies 
needed “ ‘to address any potential adverse environmental impact of the Project’ ” 
and provided that “ ‘[a]ll reasonably feasible mitigation measures shall become 
conditions’ ” of the city’s implementation agreement (id. at pp. 1219-1220), the 
 
 
25
appellate court held the city council had approved the project, for CEQA purposes, 
by putting it on the ballot, and thus the agreed-to environmental analysis came too 
late:  “[T]he appropriate time to introduce environmental considerations into the 
decision making process was during the negotiation of the development 
agreement.  Decisions reflecting environmental considerations could most easily 
be made when other basic decisions were being made, that is, during the early 
stage of ‘project conceptualization, design and planning.’  Since the development 
site and the general dimensions of the project were known from the start, there 
was no problem in providing ‘meaningful information for environmental 
assessment.’  At this early stage, environmental review would be an integral part 
of the decisionmaking process.  Any later environmental review might call for a 
burdensome reconsideration of decisions already made and would risk becoming 
the sort of ‘post hoc rationalization[] to support action already taken,’ which our 
high court disapproved in [Laurel Heights I].”  (Citizens for Responsible 
Government, at p. 1221.) 
Again, without questioning the correctness of this decision on its facts, we 
find it falls short of demonstrating a general rule against use of conditional 
agreements to postpone CEQA review.  The development agreement in Citizens 
for Responsible Government, once approved by the voters, vested the developer 
with the right to build and operate a card room within particular parameters set out 
in the agreement.  The city had thus “contracted away its power to consider the 
full range of alternatives and mitigation measures required by CEQA” and had 
precluded consideration of a “no project” option.  (Citizens for Responsible 
Government, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1221-1222.)  “Indeed, the purpose of a 
development agreement is to provide developers with an assurance that they can 
complete the project.  After entering into the development agreement with [the 
 
 
26
developer], the City is not free to reconsider the wisdom of the project in light of 
environmental effects.”  (Id. at p. 1223.)12 
Desirable, then, as a bright-line rule defining when an approval occurs 
might be, neither of those proposed — the execution of an unconditional 
agreement irrevocably vesting development rights, or of any agreement for 
development concerning a well-defined project — is consistent with CEQA’s 
interpretation and policy foundation.  Instead, we apply the general principle that 
before conducting CEQA review, agencies must not “take any action” that 
significantly furthers a project “in a manner that forecloses alternatives or 
mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of CEQA review of that public 
project.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004, subd. (b)(2)(B); accord, McCloud, 
supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 196 [agreement not project approval because, inter 
alia, it “did not restrict the District’s discretion to consider any and all mitigation 
measures, including the ‘no project’ alternative”]; Citizens for Responsible 
Government, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221 [development agreement was 
project approval because it limited city’s power “to consider the full range of 
alternatives and mitigation measures required by CEQA”].)   
In applying this principle to conditional development agreements, courts 
should look not only to the terms of the agreement but to the surrounding 
                                              
12 
Citizens for Responsible Government’s references to a “development 
agreement” were to development agreements as described in Government Code 
section 65865.2, which allows for only such conditions as “shall not prevent 
development of the land for the uses and to the density or intensity of development 
set forth in the agreement.”  The purpose of such agreements is to give 
“[a]ssurance to the applicant for a development project that upon approval of the 
project, the applicant may proceed with the project in accordance with existing 
policies, rules and regulations . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 65864, subd. (b); see Citizens 
for Responsible Government, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213-1214.) 
 
 
27
circumstances to determine whether, as a practical matter, the agency has 
committed itself to the project as a whole or to any particular features, so as to 
effectively preclude any alternatives or mitigation measures that CEQA would 
otherwise require to be considered, including the alternative of not going forward 
with the project.  (See Cal. Code Regs, tit. 14, § 15126.6, subd. (e).)  In this 
analysis, the contract’s conditioning of final approval on CEQA compliance is 
relevant but not determinative.  
A frequently cited treatise on CEQA (Remy et al., Guide to the Cal. 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (11th ed. 2006)) summarizes this approach in 
a useful manner.  “First, the analysis should consider whether, in taking the 
challenged action, the agency indicated that it would perform environmental 
review before it makes any further commitment to the project, and if so, whether 
the agency has nevertheless effectively circumscribed or limited its discretion with 
respect to that environmental review.  Second, the analysis should consider the 
extent to which the record shows that the agency or its staff have committed 
significant resources to shaping the project.  If, as a practical matter, the agency 
has foreclosed any meaningful option to going forward with the project, then for 
purposes of CEQA the agency has ‘approved’ the project.”  (Id. at p. 71.)  As this 
passage suggests, we look both to the agreement itself and to the surrounding 
circumstances, as shown in the record of the decision, to determine whether an 
agency’s authorization or execution of an agreement for development constitutes a 
“decision . . . which commits the agency to a definite course of action in regard to 
a project.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15352.) 
Our analysis does not require CEQA analysis before a definite project has 
been formulated and proposed to the agency.  An agency cannot be deemed to 
have approved a project, within the meaning of Public Resources Code sections 
21100 and 21151, unless the proposal before it is well enough defined “to provide 
 
 
28
meaningful information for environmental assessment.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 
§ 15004, subd. (b).)  Moreover, when the prospect of agency commitment 
mandates environmental analysis of a large-scale project at a relatively early 
planning stage, before all the project parameters and alternatives are reasonably 
foreseeable, the agency may assess the project’s potential effects with 
corresponding generality.  With complex or phased projects, a staged EIR (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15167) or some other appropriate form of tiering (see In re 
Bay-Delta et al. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1170; Vineyard Area Citizens for 
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431) 
may be used to postpone to a later planning stage the evaluation of those project 
details that are not reasonably foreseeable when the agency first approves the 
project.   
IV.  Application to City’s Decisions 
We turn finally to whether the city council’s approval of the draft 
agreement on May 3, 2004, and the city manager’s execution of the revised 
agreement on August 9 of the same year constituted approval of the 1343 Laurel 
project for purposes of sections 21100 and 21151.  From the agreements and the 
surrounding circumstances, we conclude City did approve the 1343 Laurel project 
in substance, though it reserved some of the project’s design details for later 
environmental analysis and final decision. 
The contract between City and Laurel Place demonstrates City’s 
commitment to the project.  Both the May 3 draft and the August 9 executed 
agreements forthrightly stated their purpose was to “cause the reuse and 
redevelopment” of 1343 Laurel in accordance with the project as outlined in the 
agreements and in the earlier HUD grant application.  The city council’s May 3 
 
 
29
resolution, similarly, stated the intent to “facilitate development of the project” — 
while allowing further public input on “the design of project elements.”   
In both versions of the agreement, moreover, City agreed to initially lend 
the developer nearly half a million dollars, a promise not conditioned on CEQA 
compliance.  This predevelopment portion was to be advanced in the first phase of 
the agreement’s performance, before EIR approval and issuance of other final 
approvals, and was to be repaid from project receipts over a period of up to 
55 years.  If City did not give final approval to the project, therefore, it would not 
be repaid.  For a relatively small government like City’s, this was not a trivial 
outlay, and it would be wasted unless City gave final approval to the project in 
some form. 
While both versions of the agreement conditioned conveyance of the 
property and disbursement of the second half of the loan on CEQA compliance, 
among other conditions, the May 3 draft agreement significantly circumscribed 
City’s remaining authority in this regard.  Under the draft agreement, whether 
CEQA requirements had been met was to be “reasonably determined by the City 
Manager,” language that could have left City open to charges it acted 
unreasonably, had it ultimately declined to certify the EIR or make any needed 
CEQA findings.   
In addition, the May 3 draft agreement, in setting the condition that all 
“requirements of CEQA” be “satisfied,” arguably left open the question whether 
City remained free to find that the EIR was legally adequate and yet to reject the 
project on substantive environmental grounds.  An EIR that “satisfies” CEQA 
“requirements” may nonetheless demonstrate the project carries with it significant 
immitigable adverse effects.  The May 3 draft agreement’s condition does not 
clearly encompass the possibility that in such a situation City could decline to find, 
 
 
30
pursuant to section 21081, subdivision (b), that the project’s benefits outweigh 
such immitigable effects.   
Finally, the May 3 draft agreement had no provision for appealing to the 
city council the city manager’s decision on, or waiver of, CEQA compliance.  
Such a delegation of the council’s authority was itself an impermissible attempt to 
approve the project without prior CEQA review.  (See Sundstrom v. County of 
Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 307 [permit condition requiring applicant 
to submit environmental study to the planning commission and adopt any 
mitigation measures formulated by commission staff was an improper delegation 
of CEQA responsibility to staff and an impermissible postponement of 
environmental review].) 
After Save Tara sued, alleging some of these same flaws in the May 3 draft 
agreement, City staff revised the agreement to repair them.  Under the August 9 
executed agreement, the city manager no longer had authority to determine or 
waive CEQA compliance, and City’s “complete discretion” over CEQA matters 
was expressly acknowledged.  But the city council had already approved the 
May 3 draft agreement, by which it had shown a willingness to give up further 
authority over CEQA compliance in favor of dependence on the city manager’s 
determination.  Given that history, as well as the other circumstances discussed 
below, City’s “apprehensive citizenry” (No Oil, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 86) 
could be forgiven if they were skeptical as to whether the city council would give 
adverse impacts disclosed in the EIR full consideration before finally approving 
the project. 
Circumstances surrounding City’s approval of the agreements confirm 
City’s commitment to the 1343 Laurel project.  In aid of Laurel Place’s HUD 
grant application, the city manager told the federal agency City “has approved the 
sale of the property” and “will commit” up to $1 million in financial aid.  Once the 
 
 
31
grant was awarded, City’s mayor announced it “will be used” for Laurel Place’s 
project, and the City newsletter stated that, using the grant, City and Laurel Place 
“will redevelop the property.”  City officials told residents who opposed the 
project that while “variations” on the proposal would be entertained, City “must 
continue on a path that fulfills this obligation” to redevelop the property for senior 
housing.  Similarly, at the May 3, 2004, city council meeting, City’s housing 
manager stated that while there were “options to consider” regarding project 
design, options for other uses of the property (as a park, library, or cultural center) 
had already been ruled out.13 
Finally, City proceeded with tenant relocation on the assumption the 
property would be redeveloped as in the proposed project.  After HUD awarded 
the grant, City’s housing manager told a tenant that she would be relocated, 
though not for a year or so.  Around the same time, other tenants reported being 
contacted by relocation consultants, who told them they would soon be given one-
year notices.  As part of its May 3, 2004, resolution, the city council authorized the 
predevelopment loan in order to, among other things, “begin the process of 
working with tenants to explore relocation options.”  The May 3 draft and 
                                              
13  
At oral argument, counsel for City and Laurel Place urged strenuously that 
expressions of enthusiasm for a project by an agency’s staff members should not 
be confused with official approval of a project.  We agree.  In isolation, such 
statements could rarely, if ever, be deemed approvals for CEQA purposes.  Here, 
of course, we weigh statements by City officials not in isolation but as one 
circumstance shedding light on the degree of City’s commitment when it approved 
the May 3 and August 9 agreements.  It bears noting, as well, that one of the 
statements upon which we rely was a communication from City’s mayor, another 
appeared in an official City newsletter, and others were from City’s housing 
manager, who, having been named in the mayor’s announcement as the contact 
person for residents with questions about the proposed development, had apparent 
authority to speak for City on this topic. 
 
 
32
August 9 executed agreements provided that Laurel Place would “complete the 
relocation of tenants” in the agreement’s first performance phase, that is, before 
final project approval was given and the property conveyed to Laurel Place.  A 
staff report on the May 3 draft agreement stated that relocation notices, with a one-
year period, would be sent shortly after the agreement was executed.  The 
August 9 executed agreement further specified the process was to begin within 30 
days.   
Relocation of tenants is a significant step in a redevelopment project’s 
progress, and one that is likely to be irreversible.  City’s willingness to begin that 
process as soon as the conditional development agreement was executed, and to 
complete it before certifying an EIR and finally approving the project, tends 
strongly to show that City’s commitment to the 1343 Laurel project was not 
contingent on review of an EIR.   
In summary, City’s public announcements that it was determined to 
proceed with the development of low-income senior housing at 1343 Laurel, its 
actions in accordance with that determination by preparing to relocate tenants 
from the property, its substantial financial contribution to the project, and its 
willingness to bind itself, by the May 3 draft agreement, to convey the property if 
the developer “satisfied” CEQA’s “requirements, as reasonably determined by the 
City Manager,” all demonstrate that City committed itself to a definite course of 
action regarding the project before fully evaluating its environmental effects.  That 
is what sections 21110 and 21151 prohibit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, we agree with the Court of Appeal that City 
must be ordered to “declare void its approval of the May and August 2004 
Agreements” and to reconsider those decisions in light of a legally adequate EIR 
for the project.  (See § 21168.9, subd. (a)(1).)  If that reconsideration leads to 
 
 
33
approval of the project, City must make any appropriate findings under section 
21081.   
Unlike the Court of Appeal, however, we do not believe City necessarily 
must prepare a new EIR before reconsidering its approval of the project.  The 
parties agree City certified a final EIR for the project in 2006, during pendency of 
this appeal, and Save Tara did not judicially challenge that EIR’s legal adequacy.  
Under section 21167.2, the 2006 EIR is conclusively presumed to comply with 
CEQA’s standards unless a subsequent or supplemental environmental EIR is 
needed for any of the reasons set out in section 21166 (discussed below).   
The 2006 EIR was prepared after City approved the May 3 and August 9, 
2004, agreements, which approvals must be now vacated.  To the extent the 2006 
EIR’s discussion of project alternatives and mitigation measures was premised on 
City’s 2004 approvals, that discussion may need revision.  Moreover, by the time 
of our remand more than two years will have passed since the EIR was certified in 
October 2006.  Because of both these factors, it is possible that “[s]ubstantial 
changes [have] occur[red] with respect to the circumstances under which the 
project is being undertaken which will require major revisions in the 
environmental impact report” or that “[n]ew information, which was not known 
and could not have been known at the time the environmental impact report was 
certified as complete, [has] become[] available.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21166, 
subds. (b), (c); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15162, 15163 [subsequent and 
supplemental EIR’s].)  Whether this is so must be decided in the first instance by 
City and reviewed by the superior court on a substantial evidence standard.  (See 
Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 
689, 704.) 
 
 
34
This matter must therefore be returned to the superior court for that court 
(1) to order City to set aside its prior approval of the project; (2) if City decides no 
subsequent or supplemental EIR is required under section 21166, to review that 
decision; and (3) to make any other order necessary and proper under section 
21168.9. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings 
consistent with our opinion. 
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood 
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Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted  XXX 147 Cal.App.4th 1091 
Rehearing Granted 
 
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Opinion No. S151402 
Date Filed: October 30, 2008 
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Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Ernest M. Hiroshige 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Chatten-Brown & Carstens, Jan Chatten-Brown, Douglas P. Carstens, Katherine A. Trisolini and Amy C. 
Minteer for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Michael W. Stamp and Michael W. Stamp for Save Our Carmel River and The Open 
Monterey Project as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Frank G. Wells Environmental Law Clinic, Sean B. Hecht; Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles 
County, David Pallack and Joshua Stehlik for Lincoln Place Tenants Association, People for Parks, Sierra 
Club and Trudy Saposhnek as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Rachel B. Hooper, Amy J. Bricker, Michelle W. Anderson; Law Offices of 
Donald B. Mooney and Donald B. Mooney for Environmental Defense Center, California Preservation 
Foundation, Planning and Conservation League and Natural Resources Defense Council as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Jenkins & Hogin, Michael Jenkins, John C. Cotti and Christi Hogin for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Aleshire & Wynder, David Aleshire and Joseph W. Pannone for League of California Cities as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Truman & Elliott, Kathleen O’Prey Truman and Todd Elliott for Housing California and Southern 
California Association of Nonprofit Housing as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Latham & Watkins, James L. Arnone, Stephanie E. Ord, Ernest J. Hahn and Benjamin J. Hanelin for Real 
Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jan Chatten-Brown 
Chatten-Brown & Carstens 
2601 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suite 205 
Santa Monica, CA  90405-3219 
(310) 314-8040 
 
Michael Jenkins 
Jenkins & Hogin 
1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 110 
Manhattan Beach, CA  90266-2436 
(310) 643-8448 
 
James L. Arnone 
Latham & Watkins 
633 West Fifth street, Suite 4000 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-2007 
(213) 485-1234