Case Title: Commonwealth v. Larose

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12610

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12610 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ZACHARIAH J. LAROSE. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     January 10, 2019. - October 10, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operation.  Constitutional Law, Search and 
seizure, Reasonable suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Motor 
vehicle, Reasonable suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Motion 
to suppress.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Lane." 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Eastern Hampshire 
Division of the District Court Department on June 20, 2016. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
H. Estes, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michael A. DelSignore & Julie Gaudreau, for National 
College for DUI Defense, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case is before us on further appellate 
review from an unpublished memorandum and order of the Appeals 
Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, see Commonwealth v. Larose, 93 
Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2018), concerning whether a police 
officer's stop of the defendant's motor vehicle for failing to 
drive entirely within a marked traffic lane was reasonable, and 
therefore valid, under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  As a result of observations and further inquiry 
made by the officer during the stop, the defendant was charged 
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24, and a 
marked lanes violation in accordance with G. L. c. 89, § 4A 
(§ 4A), a civil motor vehicle infraction punishable by a fine of 
not more than one hundred dollars.1 
 
A Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's motion to 
suppress "all evidence related to the illegal seizure" on the 
ground that the defendant had not violated § 4A and, as a 
result, the stop of his motor vehicle was not reasonable.  A 
                     
 
1 With certain exceptions not relevant here, a civil motor 
vehicle infraction is a motor vehicle law violation "for which 
the maximum penalty does not provide for imprisonment."  G. L. 
c. 90C, § 1.  This includes marked lanes violations.  G. L. 
c. 89, § 5. 
3 
 
 
single justice of this court granted the Commonwealth leave to 
appeal from the allowance of the motion and reported the matter 
to the Appeals Court, which reversed. 
 
We granted the defendant's request for further appellate 
review to consider whether the defendant violated § 4A when he 
crossed the right-side fog line2 one time for two or three 
seconds.  We conclude that in this case, where the circumstances 
suggest that the defendant both failed to operate his motor 
vehicle entirely within his lane of travel and moved from his 
lane of travel without first ascertaining the safety of that 
movement, the defendant violated § 4A and the ensuing traffic 
stop was reasonable.  Accordingly, we vacate the judge's order. 3 
 
Background.  We recount the facts as found by the motion 
judge, supplemented by uncontroverted evidence from the 
suppression hearing.  Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 93 
(2018). 
 
A police officer stopped the defendant's motor vehicle in 
the early morning hours on Route 202, a two-lane highway with a 
                     
 
2 "The term 'fog line' generally refers to 'the white line 
on the right-hand side of [a road] that separates the driving 
lane from the shoulder.'"  United States v. Lawrence, 675 Fed. 
Appx. 1, 1 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017), quoting United States v. Diaz, 
802 F.3d 234, 238 n.8 (2d Cir. 2015).  See Commonwealth v. 
Bartlett, 465 Mass. 112, 114 (2013) (officer observed motor 
vehicle cross "fog line" on right side of road). 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the National 
College for DUI Defense, Inc. 
 
4 
 
 
single lane of travel in each direction, after observing the 
defendant, who was traveling in the northbound travel lane 
directly in front of the officer, cross the right-side fog line 
"one time for two to three seconds."  A video recording taken 
from the officer's dashboard camera and admitted in evidence 
showed the right-side tires of the defendant's motor vehicle 
cross over the right-side fog line, straddle the northbound 
travel lane and the narrow road shoulder for a few seconds, and 
return to entirely within the bounds of the northbound travel 
lane.4 
 
This stop led to the defendant's arrest for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.  
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress certain evidence 
gathered as a result of the stop, arguing that the stop was 
conducted "without probable cause" and "without there having 
been a traffic violation and without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity."5  Section 4A provides in pertinent part: 
                     
4 We have reviewed the recording.  See Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 714 (2019) ("we review any factual 
findings of the motion judge that were based entirely on the 
documentary evidence de novo" [quotation and citation omitted]).  
Nonetheless, in light of our and the dissent's divergent views 
of the recording, we confine our analysis to the judge's 
explicit finding that the defendant crossed the right-side fog 
line one time for two or three seconds. 
 
 
5 The defendant argued in his motion to suppress that there 
was no probable cause to stop the vehicle for a lane violation 
5 
 
 
"When any way has been divided into lanes, the driver of a 
vehicle shall so drive that the vehicle shall be entirely 
within a single lane, and he shall not move from the lane 
in which he is driving until he has first ascertained if 
such movement can be made with safety." 
 
The motion judge concluded that "crossing a fog line one time 
for a few seconds does not constitute a marked lane violation" 
and that, therefore, the initial stop of the defendant's motor 
vehicle was not lawful.  In reaching that conclusion, he 
reasoned that a "fog line does not serve to divide lanes" and, 
"even if the fog line is a marked lane for the purposes of the 
statute, there is no indication . . . that the defendant's 
crossing the fog line was unsafe." 
 
Discussion.  In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, 
"we adopt the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent 
clear error, but we independently determine the correctness of 
the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Buckley, 
478 Mass. 861, 864 (2018). 
 
A police stop of a moving automobile constitutes a seizure 
and, therefore, must be reasonable in order to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment and with art. 14.  See Buckley, 478 Mass. at 
865; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 773 (2015).  We 
consistently have held that a stop is reasonable, and therefore 
                     
and argued in the memorandum in support of the motion that there 
was also no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
6 
 
 
constitutional, where an officer has observed a traffic 
infraction and, as a result, has actual cause to believe that 
the driver violated an applicable motor vehicle law.6  See 
                     
 
6 Many of our traffic statutes create offenses in which 
whether a driver has committed a violation will be immediately 
apparent to an observing officer.  See J.F. Comerford, 
Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Stops Benchbook 17 (2016) ("In the 
typical case, the quantum of evidence necessary to stop a motor 
vehicle for a civil motor vehicle infraction is not at issue.  
Direct observation by a police officer of an equipment violation 
or moving violation provides actual cause for a stop and 
issuance of a citation").  See, e.g., G. L. c. 90, § 17 
(traveling in excess of posted speed limited); G. L. c. 89, § 9 
(failure to stop at stop sign); G. L. c. 90, § 14B (failure to 
signal before turning or stopping).  Others might require some 
degree of investigation before an officer has the quantum of 
proof necessary to issue a warning or citation.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 90, § 9D (prohibited degree of window tint); G. L. 
c. 90, § 8M (use of mobile telephone by driver under age 
eighteen); G. L. c. 90, § 7AA (failure to secure child under age 
eight who is fifty-seven inches tall or shorter in child 
passenger restraint, or failure to secure child between ages 
eight and twelve or over fifty-seven inches tall with seat 
belt).  In circumstances where a violation is not at once 
obvious, we have indicated that "an officer's reasonable 
suspicion of a possible, but unconfirmed, motor vehicle 
violation sufficiently justifies an investigatory traffic stop 
in order to verify or dispel that suspicion."  Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 39 n.14 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 774 (2015) ("in the civil traffic law 
violation context, appellate decisions in Massachusetts have 
deemed constitutionally permissible stops that factually 
appeared to satisfy either the probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion standard").  See also Commonwealth v. Brazeau, 64 
Mass. App. Ct. 65, 69 (2005) (officer's observation of certain 
items hanging from rearview mirror did not amount to reasonable 
suspicion and so did not justify stop for violation of statute 
prohibiting driving with anything that might interfere with or 
impede operation of vehicle); Commonwealth v. Baez, 47 Mass. 
App. Ct. 115, 118 (1999) (standard to be used in determining 
legality of stop based on suspected violation of statute 
governing tinting of car windows is whether officer reasonably 
suspected, based on his or her visual observations, that tinting 
7 
 
 
Buckley, supra at 868; Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 
208 (1995) (reasonable for police to stop driver who violated 
motor vehicle law); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 
(1980) (police warranted in stopping vehicle where police 
observed traffic violation). 
 
We have applied this test, often referred to as the 
authorization test, without regard for the gravity or magnitude 
of the perceived violation.7  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cordero, 
477 Mass. 237, 242 (2017) (impermissible degree of window tint, 
and broken tail and brake lights); Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 
Mass. 147, 151 (2016) (unlit registration plate); Commonwealth 
v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 75 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
1187 (2006) (inoperable headlight in daytime); Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 673 (2001) (failure to stop at stop 
sign); Commonwealth v. Damon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 168 (2012) 
(failure to signal turn).  And we have maintained this bright-
line test despite numerous challenges.  See Buckley, 478 Mass. 
at 866-868 (rejecting standard that would require extended 
examination of police's underlying motives for conducting stop 
                     
of windows exceeded permissible limits).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Whitehead, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (2000) (belief that 
commission of civil motor vehicle infraction is imminent does 
not justify investigatory stop). 
 
 
7 The dissent agrees that even a minor violation of a motor 
vehicle law may be the basis of a stop.  Post at    . 
8 
 
 
in favor of authorization test, which avoids "often-speculative 
probing of the police's 'true' motives, while at the same time 
providing an administrable rule" that clarifies exactly when 
police may conduct traffic stop); Santana, 420 Mass. at 208-209 
(rejecting "reasonable police officer" test and articulating 
authorization test). 
Permitting police to conduct these types of stops promotes 
compliance with our motor vehicle laws and "'serves the 
significant government interest' of ensuring public safety on 
our roadways."  Buckley, 478 Mass. at 869.  See Rodriguez, 472 
Mass. at 776–777.  As we more fully explained in Rodriguez: 
"[M]any of our traffic violation statutes regulate moving 
cars and relate directly to the promotion of public safety; 
even those laws that have to do with maintaining a 
vehicle's equipment in accordance with certain standards 
may also be safety-related. . . .  Permitting stops based 
on reasonable suspicion or probable cause that these laws 
may have been violated gives police the ability to 
immediately address potential safety hazards on the road.  
Thus, although a vehicle stop does represent a significant 
intrusion into an individual's privacy, the government 
interest in allowing such stops for the purpose of 
promoting compliance with our automobile laws is clear and 
compelling." 
 
Id.  The marked lanes statute is no exception.  The salient 
issue before us then is whether the defendant, in briefly 
crossing the right-side fog line, violated § 4A. 
 
1.  Violation of § 4A.  We never have addressed explicitly 
whether crossing a fog line is a marked lanes violation, 
although we once noted in dicta that a driver whose motor 
9 
 
 
vehicle had swerved over the fog line, back into the travel 
lane, over the double yellow lines separating the travel lanes, 
and back over the fog line had committed "three marked lanes 
violations."  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 625 (2015).  
See United States v. Lawrence, 675 Fed. Appx. 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2017) (noting lack of any definitive commentary on issue by 
Massachusetts courts); United States vs. Herrera, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 17-cr-10112-ADB (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2018) (recognizing 
uncertainty regarding application of § 4A). 
We begin with the language of the statute.8  Section 4A 
provides in pertinent part: 
"When any way has been divided into lanes, the driver of a 
vehicle shall so drive that the vehicle shall be entirely 
within a single lane, and he shall not move from the lane 
                     
 
8 We interpret a statute according to the intent of the 
Legislature, which we ascertain from all the statute's words, 
"construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language" 
and "considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object 
to be accomplished" (citation omitted).  Harvard Crimson, Inc. 
v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  See generally G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  "Ordinarily, 
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent"; however, "we will not 
adopt a literal construction of a statute if the consequences of 
doing so are absurd or unreasonable, such that it could not be 
what the Legislature intended" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  Our principal 
objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in a way that is consonant with sound reason and 
common sense.  Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 633-634 
(2018). 
 
10 
 
 
in which he is driving until he has first ascertained if 
such movement can be made with safety."9 
 
We presume, as we must, that the Legislature intended "what 
the words of the statute say" (citation omitted).  Sheehan v. 
Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  Accordingly, we read § 4A as 
commanding drivers to adhere to two distinct directives.  First, 
drivers must operate entirely within a single lane.  We take 
that to mean that drivers must maintain their lanes and avoid 
drifting or swerving into an adjoining lane or the shoulder.  
Second, drivers must not move from their respective travel lanes 
without first ascertaining whether it is safe to do so.  That 
the Legislature intended for these two directives to operate 
independently is demonstrated by the Legislature's inclusion of 
two legal predicates directing the actions of drivers and 
conscious separation of those predicates by a comma and the 
conjunction "and."10  See Commissioner of Correction v. Superior 
Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 
Mass. 123, 126 (2006) (sentence structure informs 
interpretation); Flemings v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
                     
 
9 See 720 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.06(1) (1996) (predecessor of 
§ 4A, directing motorists to drive entirely within marked 
lanes). 
10 The legal predicate directs that the legal subject act in 
the manner prescribed by the Legislature; it is the verb that 
directs or permits action or inaction.  1A N.J. Singer & J.D. 
Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 21:8 (7th 
ed. 2007). 
11 
 
 
431 Mass. 374, 378 (2000) (relying on word "and" to conclude 
statute set out two independent requirements); Taylor v. Burke, 
69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007) (comma regularly used to 
separate ideas or elements within sentence).  Accord Lawrence, 
675 Fed. Appx. at 4 (§ 4A "imposes one requirement when 
motorists travel or 'drive' on a particular 'way' that has been 
divided into 'lanes' and another when they try to depart or 
'move from' one of these lanes, such as when pulling off and 
stopping on the side of the road or turning onto another 
road").11  Consistent with this interpretation, a driver may 
violate the statute either by failing to maintain the driver's 
intended lane of travel or by failing to ascertain the safety of 
a movement from that lane before executing that movement. 
The defendant argues, consistent with the motion judge's 
reasoning and that of the dissent, that § 4A does not require 
adherence to two distinct directives.  Rather, they read the 
statute as essentially prohibiting unsafe movements only, the 
necessary implication being that drivers cannot violate the 
statute by either failing to drive entirely within their lane of 
                     
 
11 We recognize, as does the dissent, that § 4A has been 
applied inconsistently by courts across the Commonwealth.  Post 
at note 4.  We do not agree that the language of the statute is 
ambiguous, however.  To the extent that there is inconsistent 
application, it is a function of a lack of appellate law 
interpreting the statute and not a result of ambiguous language. 
 
12 
 
 
travel or moving from that lane unless, in either event, it is 
in fact unsafe to do so.12  We are not persuaded. 
First, the defendant's position has the undesirable effect 
of affording drivers unfettered discretion to ignore lane 
markings so long as they do not in fact make unsafe movements.  
Not only does this interpretation render the Legislature's 
command to drive entirely within a single lane meaningless, 
which we strive to avoid, see Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 
179 (2019), but it also is entirely inconsistent with the clear, 
obligatory language of the statute that requires drivers to 
maintain their lanes regardless of whether a failure to do so 
would be in fact unsafe.13  It also would have the practical 
                     
 
12 The dissent maintains that a driver violates § 4A "only 
if he or she moves from a marked lane in which one otherwise 
must drive, or straddles two lanes of travel, when in either 
event it is unsafe to do so."  Post at    . 
 
 
13 A comparison of § 4A to the marked lanes provision of the 
Uniform Vehicle Code (code), adopted by seemingly every other 
State, illustrates this point.  Although our marked lanes 
statute bears a strong resemblance to that embodied in the code, 
it differs in a key respect.  The code provides that vehicles 
must be driven "as nearly as practicable entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the 
driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with 
safety" (emphasis added).  Uniform Vehicle Code and Model 
Traffic Ordinance § 11-309, at 143 (rev. 1968).  Our version is 
not so forgiving.  The Legislature has considered whether and to 
what extent to bring our motor vehicle laws in conformity with 
the code, see Report of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles Relative 
to the Advisability of Revising the Laws of Massachusetts 
Relative to Motor Vehicles, 1952 House Doc. No. 1950 (including 
side-by-side comparison of each Massachusetts motor vehicle law 
and its code counterpart), and has declined to revise the 
13 
 
 
effect of requiring law enforcement officials to engage in a "no 
harm, no foul" type of analysis before initiating a stop and 
prohibit them from taking action until a driver's maneuvers are 
sufficiently "unsafe," which might risk the safety of the driver 
and others in the vicinity.  Common sense dictates that this 
cannot be what the Legislature intended.  See Rodriguez, 472 
Mass. at 776–777 (police need ability to address immediately 
potential safety hazards on road).  We do not require such an 
analysis for other traffic violations and see no reason to 
require one here.14  See G. L. c. 90, § 14B (failure to signal 
                     
language of § 4A.  See id. at 60; St. 1952, c. 461, § 1 (adding 
§ 4A to G. L. c. 89).  In addition, the Legislature has used 
"practicable" and similar language in other sections of c. 89. 
See, e.g., G. L. c. 89, §§ 4 ("Whenever on any way, public or 
private, there is not an unobstructed view of the road for at 
least four hundred feet, the driver of every vehicle shall keep 
his vehicle on the right of the middle of the traveled part of 
the way, whenever it is safe and practicable so to do"); G. L. 
c. 89, § 7C (b) ("Upon approaching a stationary emergency 
vehicle, highway maintenance vehicle or recovery vehicle with 
flashing lights an operator shall . . . proceed with due 
caution, reduce the speed of the vehicle to that of a reasonable 
and safe speed for road conditions, and, if practicable . . . 
yield the right-of-way by making a lane change into a lane not 
adjacent to that of the emergency response vehicle, highway 
maintenance vehicle or recovery vehicle").  This further 
bolsters our conclusion that the Legislature's omission of the 
word "practicable," or any other language affording drivers some 
degree of latitude in compliance, in § 4A was purposeful.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 865 (1999) (where 
Legislature has employed specific language in one section of 
act, but not in another, language should not be implied where it 
is not present). 
 
 
14 The dissent would find a marked lanes violation only 
where a driver "moves from a marked lane in which one otherwise 
14 
 
 
before stopping or turning); G. L. c. 90, § 17 (exceeding posted 
speed limit); G. L. c. 89, § 9 (failure to stop at stop sign). 
Second, and perhaps more saliently, the plain language of 
the statute does not prohibit unsafe movements; rather, the 
second directive requires that drivers assess the safety of any 
movement from their respective lanes of travel before making 
said movement.  Interpreting the statute as prohibiting unsafe 
movements only reads into the statute a requirement that is 
neither reflected in nor called for by the statute's plain 
language.  Accordingly, we maintain that a driver may run afoul 
of § 4A by either failing to maintain his or her lane or failing 
to assess the safety of a movement from his or her lane 
regardless of whether a particular movement created a safety 
issue.  We emphasize also that an officer has discretion as to 
when to stop drivers for such possible violations.  We do not 
mean to require or imply that a stop should be made in all such 
instances. 
                     
must drive, or straddles two lanes of travel, when in either 
event it is unsafe to do so," post at    , and claims that this 
construction "of an otherwise ambiguous traffic statute" best 
effectuates the Legislature's intent to promote public safety, 
id.  We disagree for essentially the same reasons we rejected 
the defendant's comparable interpretation.  The dissent's 
construction puts officers in the difficult position of waiting 
for sufficient danger before initiating a stop and ignores the 
clear, mandatory language of the statute. 
15 
 
 
In addition, and of particular relevance to this case, we 
note that it is not only purposeful lane departures that may 
endanger other drivers or pedestrians.  Nonpurposeful, i.e., 
unintentional or accidental, lane excursions, by necessary 
implication, are made without the driver first ascertaining 
their safety.  Such inadvertent maneuvers may cause as much 
danger or damage as those made deliberately.  Indeed, 
considering the obvious danger posed by inattentive or impaired 
drivers, it would make little sense for the Legislature to allow 
for unintended lane diversions so long as, by pure happenstance, 
the diversion did not cause actual harm to fellow drivers, 
bicyclists, pedestrians, or myriad others sharing the road. 
It is axiomatic that in order for traffic to flow safely, 
drivers and others sharing the road must be able to quickly and 
accurately anticipate one another's movements and respond 
accordingly.  When individual drivers, purposefully or 
otherwise, fail to operate in conformity with applicable traffic 
rules, particularly one as fundamental as the directive to drive 
entirely within one lane, they pose a serious danger to 
themselves and others.  To hold otherwise would be inconsistent 
with the Legislature's intent in enacting traffic laws 
generally, as well as G. L. c. 89 specifically, which was to 
promote the orderly and safe flow of traffic.  See Patrican v. 
Garvey, 287 Mass. 62, 64 (1934) (laws designed to regulate 
16 
 
 
conduct of travelers upon public ways were enacted to end that 
general welfare of community may be promoted); 1927 House Doc. 
No. 112, at 3-10 (traffic laws enacted with aim of improving 
traffic safety and reducing traffic deaths); St. 1951, c. 646, 
emergency preamble, amending G. L. c. 89, §§ 1, 4 (intent was to 
effectuate "immediate preservation of the public safety" on 
roads).  See generally Black's Law Dictionary 1802 (11th ed. 
2019) (defining "traffic regulation" as "[a] prescribed rule of 
conduct for traffic; a rule intended to promote the orderly and 
safe flow of traffic"). 
This is not to say that drivers may never move from their 
respective lanes of travel, either entirely in order to change 
lanes or exit the roadway, or partially to avoid an obstacle or 
other hazard in their lane, but only to say that drivers must 
operate entirely within the bounds of one lane until and unless 
they decide to move from that lane and, in the event they choose 
to so move, that movement must be preceded by an assessment of 
its safety.  We agree with the dissent that an overly narrow 
reading of § 4A could lead to absurd results.  Nonetheless, we 
think that our interpretation avoids the absurdity with which 
the dissent is concerned and is consistent with related traffic 
laws that make room for necessary and purposeful lane deviations 
that can be made safely.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 89, § 2 (when 
passing, "[i]f it is not possible to overtake a bicycle or other 
17 
 
 
vehicle at a safe distance in the same lane, the overtaking 
vehicle shall use all or part of an adjacent lane if it is safe 
to do so or wait for a safe opportunity to overtake"); G. L. 
c. 89, § 5 (§ 4A does not apply to drivers "acting in conformity 
with the direction of a police officer" or to instances where 
"construction or repair is being performed which prohibits 
passage in the ordinary travel lane or lanes"); G. L. c. 89, 
§ 7A ("Upon the approach of any fire apparatus, police vehicle, 
ambulance or disaster vehicle which is going to a fire or 
responding to call, alarm or emergency situation, every person 
driving a vehicle on a way shall immediately drive said vehicle 
as far as possible toward the right-hand curb or side of said 
way and shall keep the same at a standstill until such fire 
apparatus, police vehicle, ambulance or disaster vehicle has 
passed"). 
Nonetheless, in this case, the circumstances suggest that 
the defendant violated § 4A in two ways:  he failed to operate 
his motor vehicle entirely within a single lane of travel; and 
he moved inadvertently from his lane of travel onto the road 
shoulder, the necessary implication being that he did not first 
ascertain that his movement onto the shoulder could be made 
safely.  The defendant did not use his turn signal to indicate 
an intention to move out of the northbound travel lane; he did 
not reduce his speed in order to come to a complete stop on the 
18 
 
 
road shoulder; he returned entirely to within the confines of 
the northbound travel lane after only a few seconds; and there 
was no visible hazard or other obstacle in the road that might 
explain his brief digression onto the shoulder.  In these 
circumstances, the violation was clear and the ensuing stop was 
reasonable. 
 
2.  Marked lane defined.  We further conclude that the 
defendant's position that § 4A prohibits the crossing of 
pavement markings that separate only lanes of traffic finds no 
support in the plain language of the statute.  The Legislature's 
use of the phrase "entirely within" when describing a motor 
vehicle's position necessarily implies that a lane is bounded on 
either side and that it is impermissible to deviate from those 
boundaries.  G. L. c. 89, § 4A.  Moreover, the defendant's 
suggestion that the fog line does not demarcate the right edge 
of the travel lane is undermined by applicable highway 
regulations and, as the Appeals Court noted, strains the bounds 
of common sense.  The Department of Transportation (department) 
is responsible for constructing and maintaining State highways 
as well as installing and maintaining all signage and traffic 
markings necessary to protect the traveling public in accordance 
with the department's current manual on uniform traffic control 
devices.  G. L. c. 85, § 2.  See Twomey v. Commonwealth, 444 
Mass. 58, 61 (2005).  The department defines a "lane" as "a 
19 
 
 
longitudinal strip of roadway of sufficient width to accommodate 
the passage of a single line of vehicles, whether or not the 
bounds of the lane are indicated by pavement markings or 
longitudinal construction joints," and a road "shoulder" as 
"that part of the paved surface of a way lying outside solid 
traffic lines."  700 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.02 (2016).15  See 
United States Department of Transportation, Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices § 3B.06 (Dec. 2009) ("If used, edge line 
pavement markings shall delineate the right or left edges of a 
roadway. . . .  [R]ight edge line pavement markings shall 
consist of a normal solid white line to delineate the right-hand 
edge of the roadway"); id. at § 3B.07 ("Edge line markings may 
be used where edge delineation is desirable to minimize 
unnecessary driving on paved shoulders or on refuge areas that 
have lesser structural pavement strength than the adjacent 
roadway").  Therefore, a fog line does not merely alert drivers 
to the edge of the travel lane.  Rather, it marks the right-hand 
edge of the travel lane and serves to separate the travel lane 
from the road shoulder.  Accord Jewett, 471 Mass. at 625 (noting 
in dicta that crossing fog line is marked lanes violation).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 659–660 (1999) 
                     
 
15 See 720 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.01 (1996) (defining 
"roadway" as "[t]hat portion of a highway between regularly 
established curb lines or that part, exclusive of shoulders, 
improved and intended to be used for vehicular traffic"). 
20 
 
 
(officer observed motor vehicle travel "over the marked lane" 
into breakdown lane and cited driver for marked lanes 
violation). 
 
3.  Pretextual stops.  Finally, we are not persuaded by the 
defendant's argument that our holding today will give officers 
"carte blanche to stop almost every car on the road" and 
inevitably result in a deluge of pretextual stops for innocuous 
traffic violations.  Pretext is not an issue in this case, cf. 
Buckley, 478 Mass. at 870 ("This brings us to the more obvious 
deficiency in the defendant's appeal to the racial profiling 
context:  the fact that racial profiling is not an issue in this 
case"); and if the issue of pretext arises in another case, we 
have an established framework for assessing whether a traffic 
stop is impermissibly pretextual.  See id. at 870-871, citing 
Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 437, 439-440 (2008) (if 
defendant can establish that traffic stop is product of 
selective enforcement predicated on race and thus violative of 
constitutional right to equal protection of laws, evidence 
seized in course of stop should be suppressed under exclusionary 
rule).  As we noted in Buckley, supra at 871, to the extent that 
we must review the adequacy of our framework for assessing 
whether a stop is impermissibly pretextual, "we wait to do so in 
a case where a driver has actually alleged and laid a proper 
foundation" for such a claim. 
21 
 
 
 
Moreover, the argument advanced by the defendant and 
alluded to by the dissent that, because perfect compliance with 
all traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police 
officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given driver 
in a violation, creating an unacceptable risk of pretextual 
stops, has been rejected.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 810 (1996); Buckley, 478 Mass. at 866 n.10 (rejecting 
argument mirroring that of petitioners in Whren, supra).  The 
dissent worries that the consequences of this decision may 
result in selective enforcement and "mischief," but its 
redefinition of the marked lane statute does not alleviate the 
mischief with which it is concerned.  The dissent's concerns are 
not caused by our interpretation of the statute.  Rather, they 
are a function of the enforcement of all the traffic laws by 
police officers who are entitled to lawfully use their 
discretion in issuing traffic citations.  See G. L. c. 90C, 
§ 3 (A) (1) ("If a police officer observes or has brought to the 
officer's attention the occurrence of a civil motor vehicle 
infraction, the officer may issue a written warning or may cite 
the violator for a civil motor vehicle infraction . . .").  See 
also Buckley, supra at 879 (recognizing that law enforcement 
officers enjoy considerable discretion in exercising some 
selectivity for purposes consistent with public interest); Lora, 
451 Mass. at 437 (same).  Interpreting the statute to require 
22 
 
 
actual unsafety does not preclude the potential for pretextual 
stops, which is rooted ultimately in officer discretion.16 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons set forth supra, because the 
judge found that the defendant drove out of the marked travel 
lane when crossing over the fog line, the observing police 
officer had sufficient reason to stop the defendant for a marked 
lanes violation.  The order allowing the defendant's motion to 
suppress is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
16 We note that the court is tasked with construing the 
marked lane statute as written and is obliged to stay in its 
lane.  If the Legislature is concerned that too many drivers are 
being stopped for minor marked lane infractions, then it may 
amend § 4A or pass other corrective legislation. 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (dissenting, with whom Gants, C.J., and Budd, J., 
join).  I agree with the court that, unless a traffic stop is 
the product of selective enforcement predicated on race, a stop 
is legally justified where the police have observed a violation 
of a motor vehicle law, even a seemingly minor one.  I also 
agree that, if the defendant had violated G. L. c. 89, § 4A, 
when, as the motion judge found, he crossed over the fog line 
"one time for two to three seconds," under circumstances where 
"there is no indication . . . that the defendant's crossing the 
fog line was unsafe," the stop would have been lawful.  I 
dissent because I conclude that the conduct found by the motion 
judge1 does not amount to a violation of G. L. c. 89, § 4A, and 
the stop therefore was not lawful. 
                     
 
1 The judge heard testimony from the arresting officer and 
reviewed the dashboard video footage taken from the police 
cruiser.  The officer testified that the defendant was "drifting 
in and out of the lanes," "having a hard time maintaining [his] 
lanes" and crossed the fog line by "two feet."  The judge 
explicitly rejected this version of events in light of the 
"stark contrast" between the testimony and what the video 
footage shows.  He observed that the arresting officer either 
"[did] not have a clear recollection of the events or [was] 
confusing this incident with another."  The judge's findings, 
upon which I rely, were as follows: 
 
"The video shows the Defendant's vehicle cross over the fog 
line one time for two to three seconds.  It does not show 
the Defendant's vehicle touching or crossing over the 
double yellow lines at any time.  Otherwise, the Defendant 
appears to be operating his vehicle in a normal fashion 
(including during the stop)." 
2 
 
 
 
In my view, a driver violates G. L. c. 89, § 4A, only if he 
or she moves from a marked lane in which one otherwise must 
drive, or straddles two lanes of travel, when in either event it 
is unsafe to do so.  This construction of an otherwise ambiguous 
traffic statute best effectuates the Legislature's intent and 
comports with common sense by (1) avoiding the barrage of 
absurdities that follows; (2) harmonizing the statute's language 
with its core purpose of promoting public safety; and 
(3) minimizing the likelihood of selective enforcement of our 
traffic laws. 
 
General Laws c. 89, § 4A, provides, in relevant part: 
"When any way has been divided into lanes, the driver of a 
vehicle shall so drive that the vehicle shall be entirely 
within a single lane, and he shall not move from the lane 
in which he is driving until he has first ascertained if 
such movement can be made with safety." 
 
The court today concludes that this sentence sets forth two 
separate directives, and that, with one small movement, a driver 
may be pulled over and cited for a violation of both.  Ante 
at    .  More specifically, the court declares that the fog line 
demarcates the edge of a travel lane, and that, by once crossing 
the fog line, albeit safely and for no more than three seconds, 
the defendant has violated the law in two ways:  (1) by moving, 
he did not drive the vehicle "entirely within a single lane"; 
and (2) he may have made that movement without first 
ascertaining whether it was safe -- even though, objectively, it 
3 
 
 
was.  Id. at    .  As to the latter determination, the court 
concludes that "the circumstances suggest" that the movement was 
inadvertent2 and that the defendant did not determine whether it 
was safe to move before he crossed the fog line, leading to a 
violation of the second directive.  According to the judge's 
findings, however, "there [are] no . . . facts" in this record 
that might indicate that the driver's movement was, in any way, 
unsafe.3 
 
Unlike the court, I do not view the language of G. L. 
c. 89, § 4A, as being plain and unambiguous in its "command[] 
[to] drivers to adhere to two distinct directives," ante at    , 
nor do I necessarily stand alone in thinking so.  See United 
                     
2 The court today appears to conflate our well-established 
standards regarding a lawful traffic stop.  Ante at    .  An 
officer may not stop, seize, or search a vehicle based upon a 
mere suggestion or hunch that a driver has committed a traffic 
violation.  See Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 436 (2008), 
quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("the 
decision to stop an automobile is reasonable for [purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution] 'where 
the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic 
violation has occurred'").  Nor may an officer stop and seize a 
vehicle and its occupants based upon a subjective or good faith 
belief that a violation has occurred.  See Commonwealth v. 
Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 867 (2018) (courts evaluate "validity of 
police conduct on the basis of objective facts and 
circumstances, without consideration of the subjective 
motivations underlying that conduct"). 
 
 
3 Insofar as the court suggests that the defendant 
"straddle[d]" his travel lane and the shoulder of the road, ante 
at    , the motion judge found only that the driver "cross[ed] 
over the fog line one time for two to three seconds" and did not 
"cross[] over the double yellow lines at any time." 
4 
 
 
States vs. Herrera, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-10112-ADB (D. 
Mass. Feb. 22, 2018) (there is "ambiguity in the Massachusetts 
marked lane statute as to whether it applies only to unsafe lane 
crossings"); United States vs. Lawrence, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13-
cr-10245-MLW (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2016) (marked lanes statute is 
"doubtful in construction" and "ambiguous" regarding fog line 
crossings), aff'd, United States v. Lawrence, 675 Fed. Appx. 1, 
5 (1st Cir. 2017) (recognizing, but not resolving, ambiguity in 
marked lanes statute).4 
 
Under the court's literal interpretation of the statute, a 
driver commits a marked lanes violation every time he or she 
crosses a lane marker or fog line, even for a fraction of a 
                     
 
4 The statute is ambiguous not because of the lack of 
appellate cases interpreting it, see ante at note 11, but 
because of its language.  Underscoring this ambiguity is the 
fact that courts across the Commonwealth have interpreted G. L. 
c. 89, § 4A, as applying only to unsafe lane deviations.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth vs. Blanchard, Mass. Super. Ct., Nos. 17-0034 
& 17-0044 (Franklin County Dec. 29, 2017) (no lanes violation 
where there was no evidence that crossing double yellow line was 
unsafe); Commonwealth vs. Caballero, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 
BRCR200900991 (Bristol County Nov. 12, 2012) (no lanes violation 
for straddling lane markings briefly because it was not unsafe); 
Commonwealth vs. Santos, Mass. Super. Ct. No. 06-754 (Norfolk 
County May 18, 2007) (no lanes violation for crossing fog line 
twice); Commonwealth vs. Girardi, Mass. Dist. Ct., No. 0128-CR-
0267 (N. Berkshire Div. Dec. 3, 2001) (no lanes violation for 
crossing fog line once).  See also Zion v. Colonial Wholesale 
Beverages, Inc., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2002) (unpublished) (no 
lanes violation where car straddled yellow line to avoid another 
car).  But see Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1132 
(2017) (unpublished) (crossing over fog line repeatedly is 
marked lanes violation). 
5 
 
 
second, when it otherwise is safe to do so.  In the court's 
view, a driver violates G. L. c. 89, § 4A, if the driver moves 
over the fog line in an effort to dodge a pot hole or patch of 
ice, or to avoid another vehicle that drifts too close during 
perilous weather conditions.  A driver also would commit a 
violation if, ever so slightly, he or she crosses the fog line 
in order to give more room to a large vehicle, a bicyclist, or a 
pedestrian, or to steer clear of an animal that has darted out 
onto the road.  In fact, as best as I can tell, a driver would 
violate G. L. c. 89, § 4A, every time he or she crosses over a 
lane marker in order to exit a highway, to pull onto the 
shoulder of a highway to change drivers when tired, or to pull 
into a gasoline station, parking lot, or driveway. 
 
Indeed, if the language of the statute is read this 
literally, any lane change would, for just an instant, violate 
the statute because the driver would not then be driving the 
vehicle "entirely within a single lane."  Of course, this 
interpretation would be absurd, but its silliness only 
demonstrates that the language of the first clause cannot be 
construed in such a literal or narrow manner.  See, e.g., Ciani 
v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019) (courts "will not adopt a 
literal construction of a statute if the consequences of doing 
so are 'absurd or unreasonable'" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 660 (2016) 
6 
 
 
(interpretation cannot lead to "illogical result" [citation 
omitted]).  Cf. Lawrence, 675 Fed. Appx. at 5–6 ("Of course, it 
would be nonsensical to read [§] 4A in a way such that a 
violation arises when a driver causes his or her vehicle to 
cross a fog line even when it is unsafe to continue driving in a 
given travel lane").5 
 
Nor can the language of the first clause be read in 
isolation.  See Casseus v. Eastern Bus. Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 
                     
 
5 The court appears to acknowledge that there must be room 
for these deviations, but to do so, reads into the statute the 
element of intentionality (or purposeful movement) in order to 
avoid some of the absurdities that result.  Ante at    .  Rather 
than reading this new element into G. L. c. 89, § 4A, our duty 
is to interpret the statute, as written, so that it may 
constitute "a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative 
purpose" (citation omitted).  See Perez v. Bay State Ambulance & 
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 413 Mass. 670, 678 (1992).  The marked 
lanes provision, as I construe it, ensures that an officer need 
not hypothesize about a driver's subjective purpose in having 
made a lane movement before deciding whether there is actual 
cause to stop and cite the driver for a violation. 
 
 
Along the same lines, that the Legislature has codified 
certain situations that require a driver to pull over for a fire 
truck or ambulance, G. L. c. 89, § 7A, or to follow the 
direction of a police officer, G. L. c. 89, § 5, also does not 
exhaust the list of circumstances in which deviating from a lane 
is necessary.  Ante at    .  Rather than crafting an exemption 
for every possible situation in which a driver may need to move 
from his or her lane of travel, the Legislature instead drew the 
line at lane maneuvers that are not safe.  G. L. c. 89, § 4A.  
This solution was, and remains, the most sensible.  An officer 
need not guess at which swerves were motivated by a patch of 
black ice, a driver's need to sneeze, or a squirrel on the road; 
rather, police are tasked with a far simpler determination:  Was 
the maneuver objectively safe?  The Legislature burdens officers 
with no more complicated a determination, and neither should we. 
7 
 
 
(2018) (statutory provision must be construed in its entirety).  
The "stay in one lane" part of the sentence thus cannot be 
severed from the rest of the sentence, which recognizes that a 
driver nonetheless lawfully may "move" from that lane if "such 
movement can be made with safety."  See G. L. c. 89, § 4A.  
Indeed, the phrase "move from the lane in which he [or she] is 
driving" is far broader than "changing the lane" in which he or 
she is driving, in that it includes any movement that the driver 
ascertains to be safe.  It therefore includes a lane diversion 
made safely to give more room to a bicyclist or other vehicle. 
 
In contrast to the court's literal reading of the statute, 
the alternative interpretation I offer, i.e., that the statute 
is violated when a driver moves from a marked lane in which one 
otherwise must drive, or straddles two lanes, when in either 
event it is unsafe to do so, serves public safety without 
engendering absurd results.6  It harmonizes the statute's 
language with its "main object to be accomplished," see Harvard 
                     
 
6 As a result of further inquiry, police charged the 
defendant with operating a vehicle while under the influence, 
G. L. c. 90, § 24, and a marked lanes violation, G. L. c. 89, 
§ 4A.  While I certainly share the court's concern about drunk 
driving and the devastation that it occasions, it cannot affect 
our construction of the traffic statute at issue.  Nor may it 
affect our view of the legality of the stop predicated upon a 
violation of that traffic statute, a stop that itself has the 
potential to be lethal in consequence.  See Buckley, 478 Mass. 
at 877, n.3 (2018) (Budd, J., concurring) (documenting recent 
fatalities during routine traffic stops for African-Americans).  
See also discussion, infra. 
8 
 
 
Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 749 (2006), which is to effectuate "immediate 
preservation of the public safety" on the roads, see St. 1951, 
c. 646, emergency preamble, amending G. L. c. 89, §§ 1, 4.  In 
sum, the court's construction does not comport with what it 
correctly recognizes to be our "principal objective" in 
interpreting the meaning of a statute -- "to ascertain and 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in a way that is 
consonant with sound reason and common sense."  Ante at note 8.7 
                     
 
7 The court makes much of the Legislature's not having 
adopted any provisions of the long compendium that is the 
Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance (code).  It 
infers from this that the Legislature specifically declined to 
include the "as nearly as practicable" language when drafting 
G. L. c. 89, § 4A.  Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic 
Ordinance § 11-309, at 143 (rev. 1968).  The court bases this 
inference only upon the Legislature's having declined to adopt 
any section of the code.  Ante at note 13.  It is somewhat of a 
red herring to suggest that the omission was intentional, where 
nothing indicates that the Legislature focused on this 
particular language in any way.  In any event, the statute's 
purpose is not about practicability or about promoting strict 
lane integrity; it is about ensuring public safety on the roads. 
 
 
Further, in those few States that sever their statutes in 
the same way that the court does today, the absurdities we have 
discussed remain avoidable because the code requires drivers to 
stay within a single lane only "to the extent practicable."  See 
generally State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 & n.3 (2011) (citing 
this "crucial phrase" to justify reading statute as two distinct 
directives).  Thus, a driver would not violate that statute when 
dodging a bicyclist or swerving ever so slightly from his or her 
lane of travel, because the requirement that one drive entirely 
within one lane in those instances would no longer be 
"practicable."  Where G. L. c. 89, § 4A, does not include such 
language, the decision to sever the statute in this manner only 
serves to allow these absurdities to prevail; it requires 
9 
 
 
 
I also worry about the consequences of the court's decision 
and the mischief it may occasion.  Although this defendant does 
not complain of selective enforcement based on race, it is 
surely a concern where a statute is construed in such a way that 
many, if not most, licensed drivers will become serial 
scofflaws.  Where the court's interpretation of this statute 
also affords an officer "discretion as to when to stop drivers 
for such possible violations," ante at    , or to stop anyone 
who crosses a fog line in order to investigate whether that 
action was intentional, it increases the risk of pretextual 
stops.  We must take what we have learned about implicit bias, 
how "pretextual stops disproportionately affect people of 
color," and "explore what can be done to mitigate the harm 
caused by this practice."  See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 
Mass. 861, 876-877 (2018) (Budd, J., concurring).  This is so 
even when traffic stops do not result in any criminal charges; 
they still can be humiliating, terrifying, and, at times, lethal 
for African-American drivers, as well as for members of other 
marginalized groups.  Id. at 876-877, nn.1, 3.  Heeding the 
time-tested admonition that an ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure, this is yet another reason to reject the court's 
                     
strict, single-lane travel, without any exception for a driver's 
agency in moving from his or her lane when otherwise safe (and 
practicable) to deviate from that lane. 
10 
 
 
unnecessarily rigid reading of this otherwise ambiguous traffic 
statute, and the attendant problems that likely will arise in 
its wake. 
 
Because there is no evidence that the defendant in this 
case made any unsafe movements across the fog line, or that he 
was driving in more than one lane, I would conclude that his 
conduct did not amount to a violation of G. L. c. 89, § 4A.8  The 
motor vehicle stop predicated on a supposed violation therefore 
was unlawful, and the motion judge's suppression of the fruits 
of that stop should be affirmed.  Because the court would 
reverse, I respectfully dissent. 
                     
 
8 Moreover, where a statute with criminal consequences is 
genuinely capable of being construed in two or more fashions, 
the rule of lenity guides its interpreters toward resolving that 
ambiguity in favor of a criminal defendant.  See Crandon v. 
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 174, 178 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  See also Commonwealth v. Carrion, 
431 Mass. 44, 45-46 (2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 
F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (construing civil traffic law 
in defendant's favor because court "decline[d] to use the 
vagueness of a statute against a defendant"); Whitfield v. 
United States, 99 A.3d 650, 656 n.14 (D.C. 2014) ("it is within 
the spirit of the law to apply the rule of lenity to civil 
traffic regulations").  Indeed, here, because the defendant was 
charged with a marked lanes violation, he must be afforded the 
benefit of the ambiguity in our construction of the statute.