Case Title: State v. Prue

Citation: 414 Md. 531

Docket Number: 21/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 21
September Term, 2009
_________________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
ANDRE LYNN PRUE
__________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
         Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
        Harrell, Murphy and Adkins, JJ., 
  Concur and Dissent.
________________________________________
Filed:   June 8, 2010
The controversy before the Court in this criminal case arises because the trial
judge, as the trier of facts, failed to announce verdicts on six counts of the nine-count
indictment against the respondent, Andre Lynn Prue.  The Court of Special Appeals
held that the trial judge’s silence amounted to acquittals on the six counts.  This Court
granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari which challenged that holding by the
Court of Special Appeals.
I.
The facts pertinent to the issue before us are as follows.  The respondent Andre
Lynn Prue and his girlfriend, Barbara Kidd, were riding on a motorcycle on Smallwood
Drive in Waldorf, Maryland.  The trial judge, at the conclusion of Prue’s nonjury trial,
found as a fact that Prue and Kidd were jointly operating the motorcycle when it
careened into the guardrail and curb of a bridge on Smallwood Drive.  Kidd was killed
and Prue was severely injured.  
Prue was charged, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, with the following
nine offenses:  vehicular manslaughter (count 1), vehicular homicide while under the
influence of alcohol per se (count 2), vehicular homicide while under the influence of
alcohol (count 3), vehicular homicide while impaired by alcohol (count 4), driving
while under the influence of alcohol per se (count 5), driving while under the influence
of alcohol (count 6), driving while impaired by alcohol (count 7), reckless driving
(count 8), and possession of marijuana (count 9).  Prue waived his right to a jury trial,
and his nonjury trial in the Circuit Court for Charles County took place over several
days in March 2007.  
On the last day of the trial, prior to closing arguments, the prosecuting attorney
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raised with the trial judge an issue concerning the possible merger of certain charges,
stating:
“Your Honor, I think when all is said and done, out of the nine
counts you have on the indictment, there are only two counts the
court needs...to decide. That would be count one, the manslaughter
count, and count nine, the possession of marijuana []count.”
The prosecuting attorney then proceeded to review the evidence relating to the
marijuana charge.  While the attorney for the State was concluding his review of this
evidence, the court interrupted him and asked whether count 2, vehicular homicide
while under the influence of alcohol per se, would merge into count 1, the manslaughter
charge. The record reflects the following exchange:
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: [A]ll this has demonstrated
beyond a reasonable doubt, [that] Mr. Prue was, in fact, in
possession of that marijuana, that was found by Officer St.
Germain.  Of the other eight counts, counts two through eight,
we’re going – are going to merge into count one, manslaughter.
“Everything else is (unintelligible) defense. So let’s talk about
– let’s talk about that.  Lastly before – 
“THE COURT: Does two merge?
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Yes.
“THE COURT: Are you sure?
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Yes, because it is going to be – all
count two is, is a homicide under the influence.  A lesser included
of manslaughter.  Manslaughter requires gross negligence.  Well,
okay, I guess we could take – we could say – 
“THE COURT: There’s a different element.
-3-
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: – count two – count two requires
the BAC, plus negligence, plus death.  Where manslaughter
requires gross negligence plus death.
* * *
“THE COURT: Yeah, so, I would agree with you on the other ones
though. I think the other ones pretty well merge into two.
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Yes.
“THE COURT: Yeah.
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: So absolutely. Absolutely.
“THE COURT: Yeah.
“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: But I think in terms of sentencing,
should the court find him guilty in both counts one and two, I think
the court (unintelligible) sentences. So all right, we’re fine.
“Really the issue though comes down to – to gross negligence.”
The attorney for the State then continued his review of the evidence, pointing out that
the defendant had admitted to drinking alcohol on the night of the accident.  Defense
counsel made no comment regarding the possible merger of  charges.
Following closing arguments by both the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel, the trial judge rendered findings of fact on the contested factual issues.   The
judge ultimately concluded that Prue’s “conduct evidence[d] a wanton or reckless
disregard for human life.”  
The trial judge then announced the verdicts as follows:
“So we will enter verdicts of guilty on count one [vehicular
manslaughter], two [vehicular homicide while under the influence
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of alcohol per se] and nine [possession of marijuana]. Sufficient to
say the evidence is uncontradicted as to count nine, possession of
marijuana. Okay. When do you want sentencing?”
There were no verdicts announced with respect to counts 3 through 8.  Although the
transcript does not reflect any mention of counts 3 through 8 by the trial judge during
his rendition of the verdicts or thereafter during the final day of the trial, the docket
entry for that day of the trial reads (corrected for typographical errors):
“Opinion given by Court.
Court finds Deft guilty of:
Count 1 - Negligent Manslaughter - Auto/Boat/Other Vehicle
Count 2 - Negligent Homicide - Other Vehicle Under Influence
Count 9 - Possession - Marijuana
Count 3 thru 8 to merge with Count 2.” 
On May 11, 2007, Prue was sentenced on count 1 to ten years in prison with all
but four years suspended. On count 2, charging vehicular homicide while under the
influence of alcohol per se, Prue was sentenced to serve two years incarceration,
concurrent with the sentence on count 1.  Finally, he received a suspended sentence on
count 9, the possession of marijuana charge.  Prue was also ordered to serve four years
of supervised probation upon his release from prison. 
Prue noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that, because the
trial court did not render verdicts on counts 3 through 8, the docket entries should be
corrected to reflect an acquittal on those charges.  Prue also argued that the trial court
erred by imposing separate sentences for vehicular manslaughter (count 1), and
vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol per se (count 2).  He further
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contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Prue’s claim that
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, but agreed with Prue’s two
other allegations of error.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial judge’s
silence on counts 3 through 8 amounted to acquittals on those counts and ordered that
the docket entries be corrected to reflect this.  The intermediate appellate court also
held that the two-year sentence on count 2 should have merged into the ten-year
sentence for vehicular manslaughter.  Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals
vacated the sentence on count 2.
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, challenging the Court of
Special Appeals’ holding that the trial court’s silence on counts 3 through 8 constituted
an acquittal on each of those counts.  The State did not challenge the Court of Special
Appeals’ decision with regard to count 2, and Prue did not file a cross-petition for a
writ of certiorari.  This Court granted the State’s petition.   State v. Andre Lynn Prue,
407 Md. 529, 967 A.2d 182 (2009).
II.
The Court of Special Appeals and both parties in this Court correctly viewed this
case as one where the trier of facts failed to render verdicts on counts 3 through 8.
Where the trier of facts in a criminal case fails to render verdicts on certain counts,
Maryland law is firmly settled.  Unless one of a few well-established exceptions apply,
when rendering verdicts in a multicount charging document, silence by a trial judge or
jury on one count is equivalent to an acquittal on that count.  
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Initially under Maryland law, when the trier of facts rendered a guilty verdict on
one or more counts of a multicount indictment but failed to render a verdict on one or
more other counts in the same indictment, the action by the trier of facts was treated as
a complete nullity as to all of the counts, and the defendant could be tried again on all
of the counts in the indictment.  Thus, in The State v. Sutton, 4 Gill. 494 (1846),
involving a two-count indictment, the jury found the defendant guilty on one count but
omitted to render a verdict on the other count.  This Court, in deciding that the action
of the jury was a nullity but that the defendant could be retried on both counts, held as
follows ( 4 Gill. at 497-498):
“The law seems to be well settled upon authority, that if a jury
find but a part of the matters put in issue, and say nothing as to the
rest, it is ill.  King vs. Hayes, 2 Ld. Raymond [1518,] 1521 [(1727)]
. . . .
* * *
“If the law requires all the matters involved in a single issue, to
be found by the jury, unquestionably, it requires, where there are
two or more issues submitted to the finding of the jury, that they
should find upon each, and all, of the issues.
“This verdict, therefore, in the language of the books, was ill,
and should have been set aside by the [trial] Court.”
See also State v. Flannigan, 6 Md. 167, 171-172 (1854).
The holding in The State v. Sutton, supra, remained the law of Maryland for
more than 50 years.  In Hechter v. State, 94 Md. 429, 442, 50 A. 1041, 1043 (1902),
however, this Court overruled Sutton and held that silence by the trier of facts on some
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1
In Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262, 269-270, 18 S.Ct. 580, 582-583, 42 L.Ed. 1029,
1032 (1898), the case on which Hechter chiefly relied, the Supreme Court discussed at length the
difference between the “silence” of the trier of facts on a particular count, which is “‘equivalent to
acquittal,’” and the situation “where a jury have not been silent as to a particular count, but where,
on the contrary, a disagreement is formally entered on the record.”  The Court pointed out that, in
the latter situation, “a subsequent prosecution for the offense as to which the jury has disagreed . . .
would not constitute second jeopardy” (170 U.S. at 269, 18 S.Ct. at 583, 42 L.Ed. at 1032).  The
Supreme Court in Selvester indicated, however, that further prosecution on a count where there was
(continued...)
counts, when the formal verdicts are rendered, ordinarily constitutes an acquittal as to
those counts.  Judge Fowler for the Court in Hechter, 94 Md. at 440, 50 A. at 1042,
initially observed that the English decision upon which the Sutton case relied, King v.
Hayes, supra, “has been discredited even in England.”  Judge Fowler went on to discuss
or cite numerous cases in other states, a leading English opinion, and the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262, 18 S.Ct. 580, 42
L.Ed. 1029 (1898), all of which were inconsistent with the rule applied in the Sutton
case.  The Court in Hechter then stated (94 Md. at 442, 50 A. at 1043):
“We conclude, therefore, that the weight of modern
authority is opposed to the rule laid down in State v. Sutton,
supra, and that we ought not any longer be bound by it . . .”
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s Selvester opinion and the other cases discussed
or cited, this Court in Hechter held as follows (94 Md. at 443, 50 A. at 1043, emphasis
added):
“[A]s we have held, the . . . verdict, although it found only
on the first and second counts and was silent as to the third
and fourth, must be regarded, as a matter of law, as a verdict
of not guilty on them . . . .”1
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1
(...continued)
silence would violate the double jeopardy prohibition.  See also Dealy v. United States, 152 U.S.
539, 542, 14 S.Ct. 680, 681, 38 L.Ed. 545, 546 (1894), relied on by the Supreme Court in Selvester
and by this Court in Hecter.
This Court has consistently adhered to the holding in Hechter.  Thus, in
Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516, 523, 60 A.2d 216, 219 (1948), the Court reiterated
(emphasis added):
“Since the decision of this Court in the case of
Hechter v. State, 94 Md. 429, 50 A. 1041, 56 L. R. A. 457,
there has been no question that a verdict, finding a traverser
guilty under one count of an indictment containing several
counts and being silent as to the remaining counts, is a valid
verdict and is equivalent to a verdict of not guilty as to the
remaining counts.  This case expressly overruled the case of
State v. Sutton, 4 Gill. 494, which held to the contrary.”
Furthermore, the legal principle set forth in Hechter is fully applicable in a
nonjury criminal case.  In Felkner v. State, 218 Md. 300, 306, 146 A.2d 424, 428
(1958), Judge Hammond for the Court stated:
“The trial judge explicitly and specifically found Bafford and
Felkner guilty on the first count and not guilty on the fifth count,
but made no mention whatever of the second, third and fourth
counts.  This amounted to a finding of not guilty on the second,
third and fourth counts.  Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516, 523.”
Similarly, Reed v. State, 225 Md. 566, 171 A.2d 464 (1961), was a nonjury case in
which Chief Judge Brune for the Court held as follows (225 Md. at 570, 171 A.2d at
466):
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2
Since Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is fully applicable to state criminal proceedings.  The
double jeopardy prohibition is also part of Maryland common law, guaranteed to the inhabitants of
Maryland by Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  See, e.g., State v. Long, 405 Md. 527,
535-536, 954 A.2d 1083, 1089 (2008); State v. Taylor, 371 Md. 617, 629-630, 810 A.2d 964, 971
(2002); Farrell v. State, 364 Md. 499, 504, 774 A.2d 387, 390 (2001), and cases there cited.
“The absence of any docket entry recording the court’s finding
on count 14 has no effect upon the findings of guilt on counts 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 or 13 nor upon the validity of the sentence
imposed under those counts; but the absence of any finding on that
count is equivalent to a finding of not guilty thereunder.  Cf.
Hechter v. State, 94 Md. 429, 50 A. 1041; Glickman v. State, 190
Md. 516, 60 A.2d 216; Felkner v. State, 218 Md. 300, 306, 146
A.2d 424.”
See Jackson v. State, 231 Md. 591, 595-596, 191 A.2d 432, 434 (1963) (“The trial court
made no finding as to the fourth count, and we have held that this is equivalent to an
acquittal thereunder”).  See also, e.g., Huffington v. State, 302 Md. 184, 190, 486 A.2d
200, 203 (1985); Sweetwine v. State, 288 Md. 199, 208-210, 421 A.2d 60, 65-67, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1017, 101 S.Ct. 579, 66 L.Ed.2d 477 (1980); Harrington v. State, 17
Md. App. 157, 159, 300 A.2d 405, 407 (1973); Williams v. State, 9 Md. App. 447, 448-
449 n.1, 265 A.2d 266, 267 n.1 (1970); Gibson v. State, 8 Md. App. 1, 4, 256 A.2d 890,
892 (1969), cert. denied, 257 Md. 733 (1970); Jenkins v. State, 3 Md. App. 243, 245,
238 A.2d 922, 924, cert. denied, 250 Md. 732 (1968); Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. 278,
280 n.1, 234 A.2d 284, 285 n.1 (1967). 
The principle that a verdict’s silence on a count constitutes an acquittal is
frequently dealt with in the context of the double jeopardy prohibition.2  The two
principles are often intertwined and considered together.  See, e.g., Selvester v. United
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States, supra, 170 U.S. at 270, 18 S.Ct. at 583, 42 L.Ed. at 1032.
In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-191, 78 S.Ct. 221, 225, 2 L.Ed. 2d
199, 206 (1957), where the defendant was convicted on a count charging second degree
murder but the jury failed to return a verdict on a count charging first degree murder,
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held that the absence of a verdict
on the count was “an implicit acquittal on the charge of first degree murder” and that,
“under established principles of former jeopardy,” the defendant “could not be retried
for that offense.”  Later in the opinion, 355 U.S. at 194 n. 14, 78 S.Ct. at 227 n. 14, 2
L.Ed. 2d at 208 n. 14, Justice Black noted that the bar “of former jeopardy does not rest
on [the defendant’s] conviction for second degree murder but instead on” the jury’s
failure to render a verdict on the first degree murder count. 
This Court in several cases has discussed the principle that, under Green, a
verdict’s silence with regard to a count is ordinarily an implicit acquittal and bars
further prosecution on that count.  See, e.g., Huffington v. State, supra, 302 Md. at 190-
191, 486 A.2d at 203-204 (“The Supreme Court . . . treat[ed] the jury’s silence as an
implicit acquittal of first degree murder and [held] that the retrial of the charge of first
degree murder violated Green’s Fifth Amendment right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy”); State v. Moulden, 292 Md. 666, 678, 441 A.2d 699, 705 (1982); Sweetwine
v. State, supra, 288 Md. at 208-209, 421 A.2d at 65-66.  See also Price v. Georgia, 398
U.S. 323, 328-329, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 1761, 26 L.Ed. 2d 300, 305 (1970) (reaffirming the
“‘implicit acquittal’” holding of the Green case); Brazzel v. State of Washington, 491
F.3d 976, 978-979, 981-982 (9th Cir. 2007) (Discussing and applying the rule that the
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3
In Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 705, 319 A.2d 542, 544 (1974), with regard to the finality which
the law accords to an acquittal, this Court stated:
“From the earliest days, it has been clear that once a verdict of not
guilty has been rendered at . . . a criminal trial, that verdict is final
and cannot be set aside.  Any attempt to do so by the prosecutor is
barred by what at common law was the plea of autrefois acquit.
Thus, in State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878), our predecessors
declined to construe a statute as permitting the State to appeal a
verdict of acquittal, saying:
‘It has always been a settled rule of the
common law that after an acquittal of a party upon a
regular trial on an indictment for either a felony or a
misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never
afterward, on the application of the prosecutor . . . be
set aside . . . .’
(continued...)
verdict’s silence on a charge is an implied acquittal which bars further prosecution on
the charge).
Under double jeopardy principles, when action taken on a particular charge is,
or legally amounts to, an acquittal, not only is a subsequent separate prosecution
prohibited on that charge, but further prosecution on that charge in the same case is
prohibited.  Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 160 L.Ed. 2d 914
(2005), and cases there cited; In re Kevin E., 402 Md. 624, 632-636, 938 A.2d 826,
830-833 (2008); Giddins v. State, 393 Md. 1, 18-30, 899 A.2d 139, 149-154 (2006);
State v. Taylor, 371 Md. 617, 810 A.2d 964 (2002); Farrell v. State, 364 Md. 499, 506-
507, 774 A.2d 387, 391-392 (2001); Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 561-573, 515 A.2d
1157, 1161-1170 (1986); Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146, 472 A.2d 981 (1984); Block v.
State, 286 Md. 266, 407 A.2d 320 (1979); Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 319 A.2d 542
(1974).3  Thus, any action taken after the acquittal, which is inconsistent with the
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3
(...continued)
The Court in Shields went on to point out that it made no difference
whether the acquittal was based on a mistake of law or a mistake of
fact.”
The language from Shields has been reiterated time after time by this Court.  
4
As discussed later, one of the exceptions may well be applicable in this case, at least in part.
acquittal, is inconsistent with the double jeopardy prohibition.  Such post verdict
action, e.g., making entries on the docket or directing that they be made, certainly can
not change what in law is a “not guilty” verdict into a “guilty” verdict.
There are certain well-established exceptions to the principle that the absence of
a verdict on a count amounts to an acquittal, and we shall discuss those exceptions later
in this opinion.4  Nevertheless, if  none of the exceptions were applicable to the present
case, when the trial judge as the trier of facts rendered the verdicts in this case without
rendering any verdicts on counts 3 through 8, the defendant at that time would have
been acquitted on counts 3 through 8.  Such acquittals must be accorded finality.
III.
In the view of Judge Harrell’s concurring and dissenting opinion, the absence of
verdicts on counts 3 through 8 is an “ambiguous” or “uncertain[]” factual matter to be
clarified by “surrounding circumstances,” namely (1) remarks made prior to closing
arguments relating to post-verdict sentencing, and (2) the later clerical event of making
entries on the docket.  The absence of verdicts on certain counts in a criminal case is
not, however, a factual matter to be clarified by earlier remarks of the trial judge or
later acts by the clerk.  Instead, as held in the leading Maryland case, Hechter v. State,
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supra, 94 Md. at 443, 50 A. at 1043, “silen[ce] as to the third and fourth [counts], must
be regarded, as a matter of law, as a verdict of not guilty on them . . . .”  (Emphasis
added).
The concurring and dissenting opinion also treats this case as one where the trial
judge intended to deliver guilty verdicts on counts 3 through 8 and merge them for
sentencing, but the judge simply overlooked those counts when rendering the verdicts.
The Supreme Court in Dealy v. United States, 152 U.S. 539, 542, 14 S.Ct. 680, 681, 38
L.Ed. 545, 546 (1894), also with regard to a count which was not referred to when the
verdicts were rendered, pointed out that “[i]t may have been simply overlooked by the
[trier of facts].”  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Dealy went on to hold that the
absence of a verdict on that count “was doubtless equivalent to a verdict of not guilty
as to that count.”  Ibid.  In Dealy, the legal principle that silence on a count constitutes
an acquittal was fully applicable even if the reason for the silence was that the matter
was “overlooked.”  It is noteworthy that Dealy was relied upon by both the Supreme
Court in Selvester v. United States, supra, and by this Court in Hechter v. State, supra.
The theory set forth in the concurring and dissenting opinion, that “a reviewing
court may look to the relevant surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the
trier of fact[s]” when the trier of facts fails to render verdicts on some counts of the
charging document, is not supported by any opinion of this Court.  The only opinion
of this Court cited in support of this theory is Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 A.
60 (1933).  Judge Harrell’s concurring and dissenting opinion relies upon the first part
of the following sentence from Simmons, 165 Md. at 169, 167 A. at 66 (emphasis
-14-
added):
“Where the meaning of the verdict is so unmistakable, mere
inartificiality in its form will not be sufficient to defeat justice by
a nullification of a verdict which plainly declared the intent of the
jury to convict on all the counts charging the crime of false
pretenses and to acquit on all the counts charging the crime of
larceny.”
The above sentence relates to the form of a verdict and not the absence of a verdict on
a particular count. Also, it is stated in the above-quoted sentence that the source of the
plain “intent” is the verdict itself; there is no reference to “surrounding circumstances.”
Moreover, when the language of Simmons is viewed in context, it is clear that
Simmons furnishes no support for Judge Harrell’s theory.  The indictment in Simmons
contained eighteen counts which “charged alternately the crimes of larceny and false
pretenses.”  165 Md. at 169, 167 A. at 66.  Instead of separate verdicts on each of the
eighteen counts, the jury’s verdicts were embodied in a single sentence stating:  “Not
guilty of larceny, but guilty of false pretenses on all counts of the indictment, with
recommendation of mercy by the court.”  165 Md. at 169, 167 A. at 66.  The issue
raised by the defendant Simmons in this Court was that “the form of the verdict” was
erroneous.  (Ibid., emphasis added).  No argument was made that the verdict was
ambiguous.  The Court’s statement, that the jury’s intent to convict on certain counts
and acquit on certain counts was plain, simply pointed out that the jury’s intent was
clearly set forth in the verdict despite the challenged form of the verdict.  Nothing was
said in the Simmons opinion suggesting that “surrounding circumstances” could be
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5
 To the contrary, the Court in Simmons examined only the language of the verdict itself.  After
stating that the jury’s finding “was responsive, certain and complete, within the comprehension of
laymen, and, so, of the court,” 165 Md. at 170, 167 A. at 66, this Court continued (ibid.):
“As said in Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, sec. 1005 a (1): ‘The
language of the verdict, being that of “lay people,” need not follow
the strict rules of pleading, or be otherwise technical.  Whatever
conveys the idea to the common understanding will suffice.  And all
fair intendment will be made to support it.’  Therefore, if the counts
are numbered, the verdict may be guilty on specified numbers, and
not guilty on others; or the acquittal or conviction may be by naming
the offense, as if there are counts for larceny and for embezzlement
the verdict of ‘guilty of embezzlement and not guilty of larceny’ will
be as good as giving the number of the embezzlement count.”
The Court of Special Appeals in Pettiford and Berry v. State, 8 Md. App. 560, 569, 261 A.2d
216, 221 (1970), also cited in Judge Harrell’s concurring and dissenting opinion, similarly
misinterpreted the Simmons case.  In addition, the intermediate appellate court in Pettiford
erroneously called the Simmons verdict “indefinite.”  This Court in Simmons, however, characterized
the verdict as “unmistakable” and one “which plainly declared the intent of the jury.”  165 Md. at
169, 167 A.2d at 66.
6
 Instead, Brauer concerned an argument that a conviction was ambiguous because the word “or”
was used in connection with two related crimes involving alcohol and driving.  The Nebraska Court
of Appeals held that Brauer’s argument lacked merit and that it was clear that the defendant was
convicted of both offenses.  The Nebraska Court of Appeals, in its review of the applicable law,
stated (16 Neb. App. at 261, 743 N.W.2d at 658-659, internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis
added):
“Resolution of this issue requires us to ascertain the meaning of the county court’s
judgment.  In other contexts, it has been recognized that the meaning of a judgment
is determined, as a matter of law, by its contents. . . .  Unless the language used in
a judgment is ambiguous, the effect of the decree must be declared in the light of the
literal meaning of the language used.”
(continued...)
examined to determine the intent of the trier of facts.5 
Furthermore, neither of the two cases from other jurisdictions, relied on by Judge
Harrell, supports his view.  State v. Brauer, 16 Neb. App. 257, 743 N.W.2d 655 (2007),
did not involve the absence of a verdict on a count or anything remotely similar to such
absence.6  The other out-of-state case cited by Judge Harrell, State of Missouri ex rel.
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6
(...continued)
In the present case, there is no verdict “language” with respect to counts 3 through 8, and, with
respect to the total verdicts, there are no words which are even arguably ambiguous.  Moreover, the
concurring and dissenting opinion’s reliance upon so-called “surrounding circumstances” is
inconsistent with the Nebraska court’s statement that the meaning of a judgment is determined, as
a matter of law, by its contents.
7
 Del Muro was an original certiorari action in an intermediate appellate court, authorized under
Missouri law, to review the order in a habeas corpus case granting a writ of habeas corpus.  The
basis for the writ was that the petitioner’s right of due process was violated in an earlier and separate
revocation of probation case.  In its opinion upholding the issuance of the writ, the Missouri Court
of Appeals indicated that the language of the judgment in the probation revocation case was
ambiguous with regard to the grounds for revocation.  Accordingly, the court in the certiorari case
stated that it was required to review the record in the probation revocation case, and specifically
review the probation revocation “court[’s] . . . separate findings of fact and conclusions of law
[entered] simultaneously with its judgment.”  Del Muro, 98 S.W.3d at 909.  While this statement in
the Missouri court’s opinion is obviously sound, it has no relevance to the case at bar.  To repeat,
there is no ambiguous language in the verdicts rendered in the present case.  The verdicts were, and
the applicable law is, clear. 
Beaird, Prosecuting Attorney v. Del Muro, 98 S.W.3d 902 (Mo. App. 2003), likewise
did not involve the absence of a verdict on a count or counts in a criminal case.  In fact,
there were no verdicts or counts, and Del Muro was not a criminal case.7
In addition to being unsupported by any case law, the approach suggested by
Judge Harrell’s concurring and dissenting opinion is flawed and carries with it the
danger of serious miscarriages of justice in criminal cases.  The “surrounding
circumstance” upon which Judge Harrell primarily relies is the colloquy between the
trial judge and the prosecuting attorney, prior to closing arguments, concerning possible
mergers for purposes of sentencing if guilty verdicts were later rendered.  The
reasoning seems to be that the trial judge disclosed his intent to merge counts 3 through
8 into count 2 if there was a guilty verdict on count 2, and this in turn, according to
-17-
8
 In addition, court clerks are not infallible, and erroneous docket entries do occur.  See Waller
v. Maryland National Bank, 332 Md. 375, 379, 631 A.2d 447, 449 (In a case involving incorrect
docket entries, this Court pointed out “that when there is a conflict between the transcript of a trial
and the docket entries, the transcript, unless shown to be in error, will prevail”); Shade v. State, 18
Md.App. 407, 411, 306 A.2d 560, 562 (1973) (“The transcript of the trial, unless shown to be in
error, takes precedence over the docket entries”).  See also, e. g., Carey v. Chessie Computer, 369
Md. 741, 749 n.4, 802 A.2d 1060, 1064-1065 n.4 (2002); Osborn v. Bunge, 338 Md. 396, 401, 658
A.2d 1102, 1104 (1995); Savoy v. State, 336 Md. 355, 360 n.6, 648 A.2d 683, 685 n.6 (1994);
Roberts v. State, 219 Md. 485, 488, 150 A.2d 448, 450 (1959).  
Judge Harrell’s opinion, revealed “that the trial judge’s crystal clear intent was to . . .
render guilty verdicts also on Counts 3 through 8.” 
Assuming arguendo that this was the judge’s intent at the time, a trial judge’s
intent prior to closing arguments may be entirely different from his or her intent at the
time verdicts are rendered.  The apparent reasoning in the concurring and dissenting
opinion makes closing argument entirely superfluous.  Moreover, trial judges often
change their minds during trial proceedings.  A detailed discussion of a judge’s ability
in this regard is contained in Doering v. Fader, 316 Md. 351, 558 A.2d 733 (1989).
The concurring and dissenting opinion also relies on the clerk’s docket entries
stating that counts 3 through 8 are to merge.  This is a “bootstrap” argument, as the
whole point of the present appellate proceeding is to correct the erroneous docket
entries.8  The record in the present case shows that, when the verdicts were rendered,
there was a failure to render verdicts on counts 3 through 8.  The record prevails over
the erroneous docket entries.
The importance of certain and accurate criminal verdicts, in order to insure
fairness and justice in criminal cases, has been emphasized by this Court on numerous
occasions.  More than 100 years ago, our predecessors recognized that the legal
-18-
requirements applicable to the rendition of verdicts in criminal cases “are supported by
reasons of justice and propriety” and are “to secure certainty and accuracy . . . .”
Givens v. State, 76 Md. 485, 486-488, 25 A. 689, 689 (1893).  Consequently, our
opinions have consistently held that the legal requirements applicable to the rendition
of verdicts be strictly complied with.  See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 412 Md. 28, 985 A.2d
556 (2009); Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669, 866 A.2d 151 (2005); Smith v. State, 299 Md.
158, 165, 472 A.2d 988, 990 (1984); Pugh v. State, supra, 271 Md. 701, 319 A.2d 542;
Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 128 (1945).
Although most of the above-cited cases involve requirements applicable to jury
verdicts, it is just as important that there be certainty, accuracy, and fairness in the
rendition of nonjury verdicts.  The rule that absence of a verdict on a particular count
is, as a matter of law, a verdict of not guilty fulfills these objectives.  The concurring
and dissenting opinion’s speculation concerning the trial judge’s intent when he failed
to render verdicts on certain counts, based on the judge’s comments at other times
during the trial, does not.
IV.
We now turn to the exceptions to the rule that the absence of a verdict on a count
constitutes an acquittal.  It was earlier noted, supra n. 1, that a “hung jury” on a count
is an exception.  See  Selvester v. United States, supra, 170 U.S. at 269-270, 18 S.Ct.
at 582-583, 42 L.Ed. at 1032 (“[I]f, on the other hand, after the case had been submitted
to the jury, they reported their inability to agree, and the court . . . discharged them,
such discharge would not be equivalent to an acquittal”).  
-19-
9
 The test is sometimes referred to as the elements test, or the same evidence test, or the
Blockburger test. This last name of the test comes from a leading Supreme Court case, Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
Another exception is where the absence of a verdict on a count is pursuant to the
court’s instructions or the directions on a verdict sheet.  See Chichos v. Indiana, 385
U.S. 76, 79-80, 87 S.Ct. 271, 273, 17 L.Ed.2d 175, 178 (1966)(The defendant was
charged with two offenses, and the trial court, in accordance with state practice with
regard to the particular charges, told “‘the jury to return a verdict on only one of the
charges’”); State v. Moulden, supra, 292 Md. at 678-679, 441 A.2d at 705-706
(“Because of the court’s instruction to the jury that it need not consider” one count if
it found the defendant guilty on another count, and since it did find the defendant guilty
on the latter count, “in a real sense the [former] count was not submitted to the jury for
its consideration. * * * Consequently, in the present case we believe that the jury’s
silence regarding the [former] count did not amount to an acquittal under the principles
set forth in Green v. United States”).  Cf. State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 723-724, 393
A.2d 1372, 1379-1380 (1978)(This Court referred to the “normal” practice with regard
to certain charges of instructing the jurors that, if the verdict on one count is guilty,
they should not consider the other count).
A third exception to the rule may be applicable to some of the counts in the
present case.  The exception is where there is a guilty verdict on a count charging a
greater offense, and silence on a count charging an offense which is lesser included
under the so-called required evidence test.9  This exception was recognized in Maryland
when State v. Sutton, supra, 4 Gill. 494, was the prevailing precedent, and it has
-20-
10
Sometimes, both the exception when the jury’s silence is pursuant to an instruction and the
exception for a lesser included offense are applicable in the same case.  State v. Moulden, as well
as some of the other cases previously cited, are examples of this.
continued to be recognized after Hechter v. State, supra,  94 Md. 429, 50 A. 1041.  As
our cases have pointed out, the exception is based on simple logic.  If the greater
offense contains all of the elements of the lesser included offense, a guilty verdict on
the count charging the greater offense necessarily means that the defendant was also
guilty of the lesser included offense.  See, e.g., Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135, 150-151
(1854) (“So on an indictment containing counts for robbery, and an assault with intent
to rob, . . . [and if] the accused be convicted of the actual robbery, how could the jury
with any consistency say that he was not guilty of the intent to rob? *** The higher
crime necessarily merges the inferior offence”); Stevens v. State, 66 Md. 202, 204, 7
A. 254, 255 (1886)(The defendant was charged in the first count with rape and in the
second count with assault with intent to rape, and the jury found him guilty of rape but
delivered no verdict on the second count.  The Court, saying that “[i]t is manifest that
the first count includes the offence set forth in the second,” held that “when there is a
verdict of guilty on the first count there is a merger of the minor offense”); Murphy v.
State,  184 Md. 70, 81-82, 40 A.2d 239, 244 (1944).  See also  State v. Moulden, supra,
292 Md. at 678-679, 441 A.2d at 705-706.10
V.
In the case at bar, the Court of Special Appeals erroneously held that the rule
treating silence on a count as an acquittal “applies even where the court renders a
verdict on greater inclusive counts and is silent as to the lesser included counts.”
-21-
11
The colloquy between the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney prior to closing arguments,
discussing possible merger, did not involve any discussion of the elements of the offenses charged
in counts 3 through 8.  In addition, the discussion did not mention the required evidence  test.  There
are, under Maryland law, grounds for merger other than the required evidence test, such as the rule
of lenity, the fact that historically certain offenses merged into others, or considerations of fairness
in a particular case.  See, e.g., Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 321-332, 593 A.2d 671, 676 (1991);
Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222-224, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990); White v. State, 318 Md. 740,
744-748, 569 A.2d 1271, 1273-1275 (1990).
In this Court, the State in a footnote in its brief (p. 16) asserts that “two of the lesser counts
merged upon conviction of the greater counts pursuant to the required evidence test.”  These were
counts 5 and 8.  The State does not, however, discuss the elements of the offenses charged in counts
5 and 8, and it does not mention whether counts 3, 4, 6, or 7 charged lesser included offenses under
the required evidence test.
Consequently, the Court of Special Appeals did not analyze the elements of the
offenses charged in counts 3 through 8 to determine whether they, or some of them,
were lesser included offenses under the required evidence test.  Furthermore, neither
the trial court nor the parties have done so.11
 Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment
which directs the Circuit Court to correct the docket entries regarding counts 3 through
8.  We remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals for that court to determine
whether the offenses charged in counts 3 through 8, or any of them, are lesser included
offenses under the required evidence test.  The docket entries should be corrected only
with respect to those offenses which are not included within the crimes charged in
counts 1 or 2.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED IN PART.  CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
AS
DIRECTED IN THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN
-22-
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO ABIDE THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 21
September Term, 2009
                                                                             
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
ANDRE LYNN PRUE
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
by Harrell, J., which Murphy and
 Adkins, JJ., Join.
                                                                             
Filed:   June 8, 2010
Although I have no huge quarrel with the opportunity presented by the  judgment
reached by the Majority Opinion allowing the Court of Special Appeals the opportunity to
engage in an analysis of whether lesser included offenses existed here, I submit that the
record is adequate to conclude that the Circuit Court for Charles County actually convicted
Prue under Counts 3 through 8.  The Majority Opinion opines that further proceedings in the
Court of Special Appeals are required in order to determine whether any or all of the offenses
charged in Counts 3 through 8 constitute lesser included offenses of the flagship charges, and
that, to the extent Counts 3 through 8 are not lesser included offenses, the docket entries
should be changed to reflect acquittals on those counts.  In my view, such a remand is
unnecessary because the record, including the trial judge’s comments immediately prior to
closing arguments regarding the potential merger of Counts 3 through 8 with Count 2 if a
guilty verdict on Count 2 were to be rendered, and the consistent docket entries reflecting
that result, demonstrate clearly the trial judge’s unambiguous intent to convict Respondent
on Counts 3 through 8.  As such, I would hold that the trial judge, in fact, was not silent as
to verdicts on Counts 3 through 8 when the record as a whole is considered, and that the
docket entries should not be amended.
In reaching its conclusion that the trial judge was silent as to Counts 3 through 8, the
Majority Opinion asserts that, because the rendition of a formal verdict in a bench trial is
confined ordinarily to a specific portion of the trial, recourse to relevant comments made by
the trial judge immediately prior to closing arguments or relevant matters occurring
immediately following formal announcement of the verdict is not permitted in resolving what
was the intended disposition of the charges.  In this regard, I disagree with the Majority
-2-
Opinion.  
Where there is uncertainty regarding a verdict, a reviewing court may look to the
relevant surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the trier of fact.  See Pettiford
v. State, 8 Md. App. 560, 569, 261 A.2d 216, 221 (1970) (citing Simmons v. State, 165 Md.
155, 167 A. 60 (1933), for the proposition that, in a bench trial context, “[w]hen the trial
judge has caused some uncertainty by not making a specific finding of guilt, . . . the
reviewing court may look to the surrounding circumstances to determine the trial judge’s
intent”); see also Simmons, 165 Md. at 169, 167 A. at 66 (“Where the meaning of the verdict
is so unmistakable, mere inartificiality in its form will not be sufficient to defeat justice by
a nullification of a verdict which plainly declared the intent of the jury . . . .”); State v.
Brauer, 743 N.W.2d 655,658-60 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that “resort may be had to the
entire record” to determine the intent of an assertedly ambiguous bench verdict, where the
trial court’s recitation of guilt stated that he found defendant guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol “or” driving while having an impermissible concentration of alcohol in
his blood, two alternate theories of guilt presented by the State); State ex rel. Beaird v. Del
Muro, 98 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, where the trial court’s
judgment of conviction assertedly was ambiguous because it stated that defendant violated
the terms of his probation in “one or more” of four ways, the reviewing court was
empowered to “ascertain the court’s intent from the record”).  As part of the “surrounding
circumstances,” a reviewing court may consider relevant statements and exchanges appearing
in the record outside the formal recitation of the verdict, as well as the docket entries
1Although the colloquy does not make clear, merger, as discussed in this context, was
alluded to as a sentencing principle.  See Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 321, 951 A.2d 832,
840-41 (2008); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-59, 893 A.2d 1018, 1055-58 (2006);
(continued...)
-3-
purporting to reflect the verdict.  Barber v. State, 16 Md. App. 235, 242, 295 A.2d 814, 818
(1972) (“[W]hen the language used unmistakably expresses a conclusion, technicalities in
the form of the verdict cannot be used to invalidate that verdict. The docket entry as recorded
correctly reflects the jury's verdict . . . .”); Pettiford, 8 Md. App. at 569, 261 A.2d at 221-22
(“Further, we note that the clerk of the court reached a similar interpretation of the judge’s
words as evidenced by the docket entry ‘guilty addendum.’”).
As is known by most persons who have been engaged to be married and by many
professional athletes and rock-and-roll  stars with pierced ears, diamonds are graded, among
other things, for clarity; that is, the relative absence or appearance of internal “inclusions”
and external “blemishes.”  Under the rating system of the Gemological Institute of America
(GIA), a “flawless” category diamond (no flaws visible under 10X magnification) receives
the grade of “FL.”  The next highest category, “internally flawless” (meaning no inclusions
and only small blemishes visible under the same magnification), receives the grade of “IF.”
If the record of the present case were a diamond, it would be one of “IF” clarity regarding
the intention of the trial judge in rendering his verdict.
On 9 March 2007, after the parties rested their cases, but before closing arguments,
the State announced, in open court, that it would be focusing on Counts 1 and 9, because the
remaining Counts would merge into Count 1 for sentencing purposes.1  Considering the trial
1(...continued)
Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 236-37, 772 A.2d 283, 299 (2001).
2Immediately prior to reciting his verdicts on Counts 1, 2, and 9, the trial judge stated
on the record extensive findings of fact supporting his decision:
Now, as to the actions of the defendant at the time in
question.
First, we have him with a blood alcohol concentration,
almost double of what the legal, per se definition is in Maryland.
He was aware of that, because he tried to avoid the police
officers on the sidewalk at Legends [a bar].
He allowed the decedent jointly with himself to operate
the motorcycle, with the knowledge, a, that she had been
drinking.  And as I note she was over the per se limit of under
the influence.
He knew she had only driven in this strange tandem way
on five occasions, and she was not licensed for a motorcycle.
He facilitated the motorcycle to exceed twice the posted
speed limit, by telling the decedent when he wanted to shift to
a higher gear.  In other words if they had left it in first gear,
obviously they couldn’t have gotten up to 75 miles per hour.  I
think that’s common sense.
The defendant and the decedent engaged in this
bifurcated operation, where the decedent operated the hand-bars
and the accelerator.  And obviously that’s an impediment to both
of them, and to their safety, if an emergency situation arouse
(sic), and that’s what basically happened here.  She was a total
intoxicated, inexperienced driver, on a motorcycle, doing 75
(continued...)
-4-
judge’s recitation of the verdict, his extensive findings of fact in support of the guilty
verdicts,2 his comments prior to closing argument regarding merger of Counts 3 through 8
2(...continued)
miles an hour, at night, and she lost control.  She failed to keep
her vehicle under control.
So I am convinced that such conduct evidence is a
wanton or reckless disregard for human life.
3The record reflects the following colloquy between the State and the trial judge
immediately prior to closing argument:
STATE: Your Honor, I think when all is said and done, out of
the nine counts you have on the indictment, there are only two
counts the court needs – needs to decide.  That would be count
one, the manslaughter count, and count nine, the possession of
marijuana account (sic).
                         *                    *                    *
STATE: Of the other eight counts, counts two through eight,
we’re going – are going to merge into count one, manslaughter.
Everything else is (unintelligible) defense.  So let’s talk about –
let’s talk about that.  Lastly before –
THE COURT: Does two merge?
STATE: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you sure?
STATE: Yes, because it is going to be – all count two is, is a
homicide under the influence.  A lesser included of
manslaughter.  Manslaughter requires gross negligence.  Well
okay, I guess we could take – we could say –
THE COURT: There’s a different element.
STATE:  – count two – count two requires the BAC, plus
(continued...)
-5-
with Count 2 if a conviction on Count 2 were to be rendered,3 and the consistent docket
3(...continued)
negligence, plus death.  Where manslaughter requires gross
negligence plus death.
THE COURT: That’s right.
STATE: So the court gets the sentencing – I don’t know if the
court can be candid to both separate sentences for those two
counts.
THE COURT: Yeah, so, I would agree with you on the other
ones though.  I think the other ones pretty well merge into
[Count] two.
                         *                    *                    *
STATE: But I think in terms of sentencing, should the court find
him guilty in both counts one and two, I think the court
(unintelligible) sentences.
4Specifically, the docket entry for 9 March 2007 reflects:
“Opinion given by Court.
Court finds Deft guilty of:
Count 1-Negligent Manslaughter-Auto/Boat/Other Vehicle
Count 2-Negligent Homiside (sic) Other Vehicle Under
Influence
Count 9-Possession-Marijuana
Count 3 thur (sic) 8 to merge with Count 2."
-6-
entries reflecting that result made shortly after the trial judge’s announcement of the verdict,4
it is pellucid that the trial judge’s crystal clear intent was to (and in fact did) render guilty
verdicts also on Counts 3 through 8.  The record of the discussion between the trial judge and
the State prior to closing argument demonstrates that the trial judge agreed (and the defense
apparently did not disagree) that any convictions on Counts 3 through 8 would merge with
-7-
Count 2 upon a finding of guilt on Count 2, due to the former being lesser included offenses
of the flagship Count 2.  In addition, the clerk’s docket entry regarding the trial judge’s
verdict, stating that Counts 3 through 8 merged with Count 2, provides a clear indication and
understanding of that intent on the part of the trial judge with regards to those counts.
Despite his omission in the formal oral rendition of the verdict of specific guilty verdicts for
each count of the indictment, the trial judge intended to find Respondent guilty of Counts 3
through 8 by virtue of finding him guilty of Count 2.  Thus, I would hold that the trial judge
in fact did render verdicts as to Counts 3 through 8 and that, therefore, the docket entries
should not be amended.  As such, remand to the Court of Special Appeals for further
consideration regarding whether Counts 3 through 8 constitute lesser included offenses is
unnecessary, although I am confident that court will conclude that they are lesser included
offenses, whereupon this case will be in the same posture as I propose to leave it now,
affirmance of the trial court’s judgments.  On this record, Prue is not entitled to the potential
windfall delivered by the Majority opinion.
Judges Murphy and Adkins authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed
in this concurring and dissenting opinion.