Case Title: State v. New Mexico State Authority

Citation: 411 P.2d 984, 76 N.M. 1

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1966-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
411 P.2d 984 (1966) 76 N.M. 1 STATE of New Mexico ex rel. State Park and Recreation Commission and Floyd Cross, Superintendent, and John A. Elliott, John L. Gray, William H. Carr, Grady Coan, Clarence L. Forsling, Jacob D. Martinez and T.B. White, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO STATE AUTHORITY and M.M. Hardin, James E. Sperling, James M. Murray, J.W. Eaves and George Stanley, Defendants-Appellees. No. 7650. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 28, 1966. Rehearing Denied February 28, 1966. PER CURIAM. The motion for rehearing is denied; however, upon consideration of the motion, the original opinion heretofore filed is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor. CHAVEZ, Justice. This case involves an appeal from a decision of the district court which held that the State Revenue Bond Act, Ch. 271, Laws 1963, § 11-10-1 et seq., N.M.S.A., 1963 Pocket Supp., is unconstitutional. The State Revenue Bond Act will hereinafter be referred to as the "Bond Act," and the New Mexico State Authority will be referred to as the "Authority." Plaintiffs-appellants, State of New Mexico, ex rel. State Park and Recreation Commission *989 and its superintendent and members, filed suit for a declaratory judgment against defendants-appellees, the Authority and its members, seeking an adjudication of the validity of the Bond Act and an adjudication that the refusal of appellees to approve a proposal of appellants for the issuance of revenue bonds constituted an arbitrary and illegal refusal under said Bond Act. Appellees filed an answer admitting that appellants and appellees are both duly constituted governmental agencies of the state of New Mexico; that appellants and appellees are proper members and officers of such state agencies; that appellants adopted a resolution calling for the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to said Bond Act, to construct a boat dock facility at Bluewater Lake State Park; that appellants sought to gain approval from appellees either to issue such bonds themselves or, in the alternative, that appellees issue revenue bonds itself and lease the facility to appellants, utilizing the proceeds from the dock facility to pay the revenue bonds; and that appellees refused to authorize or approve such bonds and rejected appellants' proposals, based on nine main grounds stated in a resolution adopted by appellees. Following a hearing, the trial court entered its decision adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to appellees, holding that the Bond Act is unconstitutional upon twenty-one grounds, and entered judgment dismissing appellants' complaint. The parties stipulated the following material facts: That appellants adopted a resolution calling for the issuance of revenue bonds in the amount of $12,000 for the financing of a proposed boat dock facility at Bluewater Lake State Park, and adopted another resolution proposing, in the alternative, that revenue bonds be issued by appellees for the same purpose and that such facilities be leased to appellants; that under the proposals the income from the operation of such facilities be used to repay the bonds; that accompanying the proposals was a resolution indicating the financial feasibility of such project, the amount of the bonds to be issued, a detailed schedule of retirement of such bonds, and studies indicating projected proposed income from the use of such facility; that thereafter appellees adopted a resolution refusing the authorization of the revenue bonds and refusing the alternative proposal; that the proposed facilities are intended for use of the general public for recreational and park facilities; that appellants have proposed additionally to expend public funds acquired by appellants from park and lake use fees for the payment of certain operation and maintenance expenses of such facilities, and for maintenance of a reserve for such revenue bonds; that the sole basis for appellees' refusal to authorize the issuance of the bonds, or issue the bonds itself, is predicated upon the grounds set out in Exhibit "A" attached to appellants' complaint. Appellants contend under their first point that conclusion of law No. 4 is erroneous and that the Bond Act does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The challenge to the Bond Act's validity by appellees is that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power, contrary to Art. III, § 1, of our constitution. The trial court held the Bond Act unconstitutional because it vests in the parties here involved and other state agencies legislative power involving the exercise of broad discretion for determining the location and character of projects to be constructed, the manner of operating such projects, the financing and cost thereof, or details respecting the bonds issuable thereunder and the security therefor, and other legislative powers constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative powers to executive agencies, in contravention of Art. III, § 1, of our constitution, which provides: In approaching the problem submitted under this point we examine the rules laid down by other courts, as well as the rule followed by this court, upon the question of unlawful delegation of legislative powers. One of the earliest decisions on this question, which is still being cited, is found in the case of Cincinnati W. & Z. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County (Ohio Sup.Ct. 1852), 1 Ohio St. 77, wherein the court stated: See also, Crain v. First National Bank of Oregon, Portland (D.C.D.Or. 1962), 206 F. Supp. 783. In State ex rel. Young v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692, it is said: In 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138 (17), p. 615, we find this statement: The Connecticut supreme court, in St. John's Roman Catholic Church v. Town of Darien, 149 Conn. 712, 184 A.2d 42, quoted Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d 535, and stated: *991 In People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission, 14 Ill. 2d 74, 150 N.E.2d 792, the court stated: In Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okl. 335, 221 P.2d 795, the Oklahoma supreme court ruled that the Oklahoma act creating a state authority and granting said authority the power to issue turnpike revenue bonds was not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, saying: In Hatfield v. New Mexico State Board of Registration, 60 N.M. 242, 290 P.2d 1077, we considered the question of unlawful delegation of legislative authority and quoted with approval from 11 Am.Jur., § 214, p. 923, wherein it is stated: See also, 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 242, pp. 493-494. In State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 367 P.2d 918, we said: Again, in State ex rel. Holmes v. State Board of Finance, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925, we said that, where the legislature purports to delegate powers, reasonable standards must be provided as a guide in the exercise of the discretionary power conferred. In State v. Armstrong, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333, this court was presented with the question of whether a subsequent enactment could extend the provisions of a prior law (National Prohibition Act), solely by *992 reference to the title of the earlier law, and said: We stated in State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240: We are, therefore, called upon to rule whether the statute involved supplies the required standards. In enacting the statute in question, all that the legislature could do was to prescribe reasonably definite standards, leaving to the respective state agencies and the Authority the planning of each project according to the specifications set forth in the Bond Act. Appellants contend that the Bond Act imposes sufficient definite legislative standards to guide the action of the state agencies to carry out the "projects" as defined in the Bond Act. The Bond Act created the Authority and defined its powers and duties; it authorized the Authority and agencies of the state to construct, finance, operate and lease "projects," and to issue revenue bonds therefor without a pledge of property taxes or the faith and credit of the state. In § 11-10-2, N.M.S.A., 1963 Pocket Supp., the purpose of the Bond Act is stated to be: Section 11-10-7(E), of the Bond Act limits the length of such projects. Section 11-10-10(A), of the Bond Act limits the maximum interest rates on such revenue bonds and the maturity date thereof. Section 11-10-3(C), of the Bond Act defines the term "project" as "any of the following public works," and thereafter five specific facilities are set out which are within the meaning of the term "project." The facilities listed in § 11-10-3(C) (1) are sufficient to provide legislative standards for the Authority to follow. Under § 11-10-7(A) and (B) of the Bond Act a state agency undertaking the construction of any project is authorized, subject to the requirements of the Bond Act: *993 The legislature has declared the policy and established primary standards to which the agencies must conform. The Authority and other state agencies are delegated only that power necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of the statute. Beyond that, it does not delegate legislative power or confer executive or judicial authority. The legislature has not delegated its authority to make a law but has delegated power to determine facts upon which the law makes its own action depend. We hold that the statute does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Appellants' third point is that the trial court was in error in concluding that the Bond Act contravenes Art. IV, § 16, of our constitution in failing to clearly set forth in its title the subject of the legislation. The title of the Bond Act provides: The first case in New Mexico to announce the reason for the constitutional provisions in question is State v. Ingalls, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177, where we said: We followed the above rule in State v. Gomez, 34 N.M. 250, 280 P. 251; Crosthwait v. White, 55 N.M. 71, 226 P.2d 477; and in Fischer v. Rakagis, 59 N.M. 463, 286 P.2d 312, where it is stated: See also, City of Albuquerque v. Campbell, 68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698. We hold that the title of the Bond Act gives reasonable notice of the subject matter of the statute and that it does not violate Art. IV, § 16 of our constitution. We next consider appellants' points IV and VI, which relate to conclusions of law Nos. 7, 8 and 9, to the effect that the Bond Act constitutes the incurrence of indebtedness, contrary to Art. IV, § 29, and Art. IX, §§ 7 and 8, of our constitution. Article IV, § 29, states: Article IX, §§ 7 and 8 provide: The title of the Bond Act states in part: Section 11-10-4, of the Bond Act provides: Appellees cite two cases in support of the trial court's decision, that the Bond Act violates Art. IV, § 29, and Art. IX, §§ 7 and 8, of our constitution. The first is City of Santa Fe v. First Nat. Bank in Raton, 41 N.M. 130, 65 P.2d 857, in which the City issued sewer certificates payable from money received from special assessment. In addition, the City promised that, if any deficiency should develop in the fund, the certificates would be paid from general revenues of the City. This court held invalid that portion of the certificates whereby the City promised to pay the deficiency from the general funds of the City and quoted Brash v. State Tuberculosis Board, 124 Fla. 652, 169 So. 218. In Brash we find the following: The City of Santa Fe case is clearly distinguishable from the case before us, and the point of departure is the attempt in that case to make the general funds of the City liable for any deficiency. In the case at bar, the legislature has specifically stated that "Revenue bonds * * * shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. * * *" Appellees also cite State Office Bldg. Commission v. Trujillo, 46 N.M. 29, 120 P.2d 434, which is distinguishable. The act in question there created the state office building commission. This court held that it was invalid because the act failed to specify that moneys raised for payment of *995 rentals should come out of any fund other than general taxation. We said: In Wiggs v. City of Albuquerque, 56 N.M. 214, 242 P.2d 865, this court held that, under the act there in question, payments on the bonds issued were secured only by a lien against the auditorium to be built and the realty thereunder already owned by the municipality, and that such lien created a "debt" violating constitutional provisions against municipal indebtedness. This court stated: See also, Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Company, 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920. In State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm. v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097, 100 A.L.R. 878, we said: Section 11-10-12 of the Bond Act specifies and sets out the sources for payment of the principal and interest of the revenue bonds and discloses that no part of such payment is to be obtained from general taxation. We therefore hold that the Bond Act does not violate Art. IV, § 29, nor Art. IX, §§ 7 and 8, of our constitution and the trial court erred in so concluding. We note under the above points that § 11-10-3 (C) (3) (4) and (5), of the Bond Act sets out other state institutions, office buildings and highway facilities which may or could be termed "projects" under the Bond Act. This action concerns only a recreational project. None of the projects mentioned in subsections (C) (3), (4) or (5) are involved and we express no opinion as to the constitutionality of those subsections or any project provided therein. Appellants contend in their point V that the trial court's conclusion of law No. 8 is erroneous, and that the Bond Act is not unconstitutional because the payment of certain state moneys, other than revenues derived from the dock facilities, for certain expenses for operation and maintenance in *996 connection with the dock facilities, and the deposit of state funds in the reserve fund for the bonds, as proposed, is in accordance with state law. Appellees' objection is based on the parties' stipulation of fact No. 12: Based on the above stipulation of the parties, the trial court concluded that the expenditure of park use and lake use fees to create a reserve for retirement of bonds renders the Bond Act unconstitutional because such expenditures are not authorized by law. Specifically, it is argued that § 4-9-18, N.M.S.A., 1963 Pocket Supp., limits the use of park and recreation funds to the purposes expressed in that provision, thus prohibiting their use for bond retirement. The pertinent portion of § 4-9-18 reads: Under familiar rules of construction, statutes which relate to the same class of things are considered to be in pari materia, 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d Ed., § 5202, and, if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be so construed that effect is to be given to every provision of each. City of Tacoma v. Cavanaugh, 45 Wash. 2d 500, 275 P.2d 933; Maiatico v. United States, (D.C. Cir.1962), 112 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 302 F.2d 880; State v. Drake, 79 N.J. Super. 458, 191 A.2d 802. So construing § 4-9-18, supra, with the Bond Act, we find no conflict. The Bond Act authorizes the use of revenues from park and lake use fees for retirement of principal and interest of bonds issued to acquire or develop the facilities of a state agency. Clearly using such funds to retire bonds issued to acquire or develop recreation facilities is not inconsistent with the purposes authorized by § 4-9-18, supra, because those purposes include acquiring and developing recreational facilities. We find nothing repugnant between the two statutes. Furthermore, § 11-10-26 of the Bond Act expressly provides that: If a conflict should in fact develop, the provisions of the Bond Act would control. Appellants' point II attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 5: Article IV, § 18 of our constitution provides: *997 Section 11-10-24 of the Bond Act states: Section 11-10-26 of the Bond Act reads: We are of the opinion that conclusion of law No. 5 cannot be sustained. The Bond Act in question does not contravene Art. IV, § 18, of our constitution. In Alvarez v. Board of Trustees of La Union Townsite, 62 N.M. 319, 309 P.2d 989, we stated: We find no provisions or sections of preceding statutes that are so repugnant or inconsistent with the Bond Act in question that they are repealed by this later Act. We believe the Bond Act in question is just what it provides that it "shall be regarded as supplemental and additional to powers conferred by other laws." Appellants' point VII attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 10: Article IX, § 14, of our constitution, provides in part as follows: We were confronted with the precise question in Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Company, supra, wherein we upheld the statute which authorized the municipality to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of acquiring or constructing industrial buildings for sale or lease to industries wishing to locate in the municipality. We there stated (62 N.M. 18, 28, 303 P.2d 920, 926): We therefore hold that the trial court erred in conclusion of law No. 10. Appellants' point VIII attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 11: It is pointed out in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 151(5), p. 768: In accord with the above authority, our decision in Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Company, supra, and the cases cited therein, is conclusive on the question presented. We cannot say that the declared public policy of the legislature in the Bond Act has no reasonable relation to the public interest or welfare. The trial court's conclusion of law No. 11 is erroneous. Appellants' point IX attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 12: Article V, § 14, provides: Section 11-10-3(C) (5), of the Bond Act, cannot be held to contravene the constitutional powers given to the state highway commission. The wording in the statute is self-explanatory: It is not possible for this court to question the legislative intent in the above section. The underlying fact in the entire section is that the state highway commission is the ultimate authority in any project undertaken in that section, and it does not divest the state highway commission of any of its constitutional power. Section 11-10-9(A), of the Bond Act, which was also declared unconstitutional by the trial court, provides: Appellees contend that this section is unconstitutional because there is no requirement for the state highway commission's prior approval as in § 11-10-3(C) (5), supra. We cannot agree. This section does not give the Authority unbridled power to relocate highways. The power given in this section is limited "in the manner now provided by the Constitution," and this includes Art. V, § 14, which created the state highway commission and sets forth its duties. It is, therefore, compatible with our constitution and the trial court erred in its conclusion of law No. 12. Appellants' point X attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 13: We have previously noted that the Bond Act expressly provides that the bonds issued thereunder shall not become a debt or liability of the state. We find it difficult to perceive why the original special fund set up for the payment of the bonds should be changed into a debt of the state by the degree of completion of the project. Once any project is completed, it is almost certain to need at least minor alterations, and the legislature provided a method under which certain changes or alterations could be made from project revenues for a period of two years after completion of the project. The provision in question is within the limits of our constitution and the trial court erred in its conclusion of law No. 13. Appellants' point XI attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 14: The trial court's conclusion is not correct. We are unable to find any provisions in the Bond Act which could give rise to the *1000 conclusion of law in question. Section 11-10-9(C) of the Bond Act does no more than allow the Authority, with prior approval, to utilize state lands for the construction of projects. Section 11-10-11(A) of the Bond Act authorizes the creation of trust agreements insuring payments of the bonds, but it then expressly states: It is apparent under the Bond Act that the bond holders are limited to a pledge of revenues for satisfaction of their obligation, and in no manner do they hold any encumbrance upon the projects themselves. Appellants' point XII challenges the trial court's conclusion of law No. 15: Article VIII, § 3, provides in part as follows: Appellees argue that the term "bond," as used in the constitution, means "debt," and that since the revenue bonds authorized by the Bond Act do not constitute an indebtedness, they are not exempt from taxation. We cannot agree. We find nothing in the language of § 3, Article VIII, of the constitution requiring an interpretation that only such bonds as evidence a debt of the state or its political subdivisions are exempt from taxation. A similar issue was discussed in Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Company, supra, wherein revenue bonds were authorized to be issued by municipalities and this court concluded (62 N.M. 18, 35, 303 P.2d 920, 931): Appellants' point XIII attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 16: Again, we are unable to agree with the trial court's conclusion regarding § 11-10-20(E) of the Bond Act, which provides: Nowhere in this section is there any contradictory language used from which the opposite result could be reached. There being no doubt that the funds of the state will not be used except as provided in this section, we hold that the trial court erred in its conclusion of law No. 16. Appellants' point XIV attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 17: We have previously discussed this point and, in line with our decision in Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Company, supra, and the wording of the Bond Act itself, we hold that the Bond Act does not in any way pledge the general funds of the state. The rentals will be paid only from the revenues of the projects and from no other source. The trial court erred in its conclusion of law No. 17. Section 11-10-12 of the Bond Act not only authorizes the state agency issuing revenue bonds to charge and collect fees, rents and charges for the use of facilities and services furnished by any project, but specifically requires that such tolls, fees, rents and charges from the project or projects in connection with which bonds are issued, provide funds sufficient with other revenues, if any, to pay (1) the cost of maintaining, repairing and operating such projects; (2) the principal and interest on such bonds as they mature; and (3) to create and maintain reserves for such purposes. Section 11-10-20 of the Bond Act authorizes the Authority to lease its projects to the appropriate state agency under an agreement by which such state agency agrees to pay a rental in an amount not less than the amount required to pay the principal and interest of such revenue bonds, and to meet any other obligations imposed upon the Authority in connection with such bond issue, which under § 11-10-12 of the Bond Act would include the cost of maintaining and operating such project and reserves for such maintenance and operations, as well as for the payment of principal and interest of such bonds as they mature. Section 11-10-20(E) of the Bond Act, however, expressly restricts funds from which such rental payments may be made to funds and revenues lawfully available for such purpose. Under well recognized rules of statutory construction, when the context and objects sought to be attained are considered from the Bond Act as a whole, it appears that the words "other revenues" as used in § 11-10-12 were intended by the legislature not to be given a broader meaning than the terms preceding them, and to be limited to those sources of revenue similar to the sources enumerated by the preceding specific words. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d Ed., § 4909, and cases cited. In our view, an examination of the entire Bond Act makes it apparent that all of the cost of maintenance, operation, and repair of any project for which revenue bonds are issued, as well as the retirement of the principal and interest of *1002 such bonds and reserves for such purposes, by any state agency, or the Authority, is limited solely to the rents, tolls, fees, charges or other revenues of a like nature derived from such project. A proper construction of the Bond Act makes it abundantly clear that, during the time any such revenue bonds are outstanding, neither the cost of repairs, maintenance, or operation, including salaries and travel expenses of employees, nor the retirement of principal and interest of its revenue bonds, may be paid from any money appropriated by the legislature. Hence no indebtedness can result against the state from the issuance of these revenue bonds. Under point XV the validity of § 11-10-20 of the Bond Act is challenged, because it is said that the permission given the Authority to lease projects to the appropriate state agency makes the state both lessee and lessor, contrary to established principles. It is argued that it is contrary to public policy to permit the same party to dictate the policies of both parties to a contract. Conceding that this is a reason underlying the rule, nevertheless it does not exist here. The Park and Recreation Commission is a state agency with power to acquire and operate recreational facilities. It has authority under the Bond Act to issue revenue bonds against any of its projects to finance construction of facilities. The Authority, as created by the Bond Act, consists of five members appointed by the governor, with authority to approve or reject all bond issues by state agencies. Section 11-10-7 of the Bond Act. Even though, in connection with any project, the Authority is expressly deemed to be performing an essential governmental function, we think it is an independent public corporation specially created by the legislature to carry out legitimate and important functions of government. Its functions are both corporate and politic, and it is analogous in many respects to a municipal corporation. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 69 A.2d 875; City of Newark v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 7 N.J. 377, 81 A.2d 705. As Chief Justice Vanderbilt said in City of Newark, supra: In addition, in this instance, the terms under which the lease may be made are statutory. We look behind the mere identities of the agencies. The basic purpose of the lease provision is to place control of the project in an agency having authority to operate it, and to obviate the necessity of having two agencies with identical duties. Consequently, the established principle that the state cannot be both lessor and lessee has no application here. State Office Bldg. Commission v. Trujillo, supra, is distinguishable. Appellants' point XVI questions the correctness of the trial court's conclusion of law No. 19: We stated in Wiggs v. City of Albuquerque, supra, that true revenue bonds repayable from a special fund created for their retirement, and payable solely and wholly from moneys derived from sources other than general taxation, are not a general obligation *1003 of the municipality, and hence create no public "debt" in the constitutional sense prohibited by Art. 9, § 12 of our constitution. In our discussion under appellants' point IV we held that the revenue bonds in question and the provisions for their retirement do not contravene the applicable constitutional provisions. However, an additional question is presented under this point. The trial court held that the Bond Act, in pledging revenues of the projects to pay for the bonds, overstepped its constitutional bounds in providing for the pledging of revenues of facilities other than projects under this Bond Act. Nowhere in the Bond Act, or in the parties' briefs, do we find the provision which gives the agencies or the Authority the power to pledge revenues of facilities which are not projects under this Act. The most applicable provision is found in § 11-10-12 of the Bond Act, as follows: From the above provision of the Bond Act it is apparent that revenues may only be pledged from a project under this Act, or from "any portion thereof." There is no provision for a pledge of revenues from facilities totally unconnected with the project. It may be argued that, in some instance, a project might be built as an addition to the facilities which were already in place; and the pledge of revenues in toto from the old facilities and the project would divert revenues from the old facilities, necessitating taking funds from the state's taxing powers to replace the diverted revenues. In response to this argument, we are of the opinion that the revenues from the old facilities would be special funds themselves and could quite properly be diverted without contravening the constitutional provision against the creation of an indebtedness. The older facility created a fund in being at the time of the Bond Act, and the diversion of the revenues from such facility would not necessitate the levy of an additional tax to make up for the diversion. Further, the older facility would have such a close relationship to the project that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine what were revenues of the old facility and what were revenues of the project-addition. This segregation of revenues would be further hampered by an increase in revenues of the old facility, brought about by the project-addition, which would obviously improve the facility. The trial court erred in its conclusion of law No. 19. Appellants' point XVII challenges the trial court's conclusion of law No. 20: After a careful reading of § 4-9-18, supra, together with §§ 11-10-11(A) and 11-10-12(B), of the Bond Act, we find nothing incompatible between the two statutes. Even if there were some conflict in the two acts, this would not make the latter unconstitutional because the two acts may be easily reconciled to preserve the legislative intent. See also, § 11-10-24 of the Bond Act. This court has frequently held that repeals by implication are not favored and that where two statutes can be construed together and thus preserve the objects to be obtained by each, they should be so construed, where no contradiction or unreasonableness would result. In re Martinez' Will, 47 N.M. 6, 132 P.2d 422; Levers v. Houston, 49 N.M. 169, 159 P.2d 761. The trial court's conclusion of law No. 20 is erroneous. Appellants' point XVIII attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 21: Section 11-10-3(C) (3), of the Bond Act, specified that office buildings providing space for state departments and agencies may constitute a "project" within the meaning of the Act. It is true that in State Office Bldg. Commission v. Trujillo, supra, we held that such office buildings could not be constructed with special funds unless the sources for payment are specified and disclose that no part of the payment is to be obtained from general taxation. However, even if subsection (C) (3) should be held to violate § 8, Art. 9, of the constitution, such determination would not invalidate the entire Act because of the severability clause. The issuance of bonds for erection of the facilities named in subsection (C) (3) is not involved in this action and we express no opinion as to its validity. Appellants' point XIX attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 22: We cannot agree with appellants' contention that § 11-10-9(B) of the Bond Act, impliedly, is subject to the consent and permission of the state corporation commission. There is no express language to this effect, and we are unable to so interpret it in the light of § 11-10-24 of the Bond Act, which states in part: We are of the opinion, however, that Ch. 271, § 26, Laws 1963, Severability Clause, is applicable: We hold that § 11-10-9(B), supra, insofar as it purports to act without the constitutional permission or supervision of the state corporation commission, is unconstitutional and is hereby declared null and void and stricken from the Bond Act. Appellants' point XX attacks the trial court's conclusion of law No. 23: This conclusion adopted by the trial court from appellees' submitted conclusions of law is erroneous because Art. V, § 14, of our constitution concerns the state highway commission. Appellants treat the erroneous citation as if Art. IV, § 18, the applicable section, were cited. Appellees refer to a typographical error, or mere inadvertence, as the reason for the error. In either event, appellees are bound by the conclusion of law which they submitted and as adopted by the trial court, and they cannot now be heard to raise the correct section in the constitution. It is further noted that, even were this court to consider the correct section as given by appellees, the result would be the same. Section 11-10-3(C) of the Bond Act does not contravene Art. IV, § 18, of our constitution. See §§ 11-10-24, 11-10-25, 11-10-26, of the Bond Act; and State v. Montiel, 56 N.M. 181, 241 P.2d 844. Appellants' point XXI challenges the trial court's conclusion of law No. 24: Section 11-10-1 of the Bond Act states in part: Section 11-10-4 of the Bond Act provides in part: Within these two sections of the Bond Act the legislature has specifically provided that "[a]ll expenses incurred * * * shall be payable solely from funds provided under the authority thereof * * *." This statement is further qualified by the provision that no obligation is to be incurred other than those obligations which can be discharged *1006 from funds under the Bond Act. The trial court erred in concluding that the Authority, as lessor, would be required to expend general state funds for the operation of the project. The contrary is evident from the provisions of the Bond Act, in that the Authority can never use any funds for the payment of any expenses, except funds provided by the Bond Act. The trial court's conclusion of law No. 24 is erroneous. The cause is reversed and remanded to the district court with direction that the judgment heretofore entered be set aside, and to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with the views herein expressed. It is so ordered. NOBLE and COMPTON, JJ., concur. MOISE, J., not participating. CARMODY, C.J., dissenting. CARMODY, Chief Justice (dissenting). Reluctantly, I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court. My basic disagreement is upon two separate, although in some ways related, points discussed in the opinion. My first objection relates to the majority's disposition of the claim that there are sufficient definite legislative standards to guide the state agencies in carrying out the "projects," as defined in the Act. I cannot agree. Section 11-10-2, N.M.S.A. 1953, 1963 Pocket Supp., which is quoted by the majority, provides, in part, "to authorize the financing of certain public facilities used or useful in the performance of state functions"; then § 11-10-5(A) provides, in substance, that the construction, maintenance, repair and operation of any "project or projects" are essential governmental functions. We then must refer to § 11-10-3(C), which defines "projects," and, for the purpose of this case, § 11-10-3 (C) (1) enumerates a multitude of things which the State Park and Recreation Commission is authorized to undertake. The wide grant of authority under this subsection is so general and broadly encompassing that I feel it bears repeating here. The entire subsection reads as follows: Thus the State Park and Recreation Commission is authorized to do any of the things specifically enumerated, and apparently all others which they, in their unbridled judgment, determine is a recreational or cultural activity for the welfare of the general public. Once this Commission makes the decision (assuming, of course, it is approved by the Authority itself), it thereby becomes, under the Act, an "essential governmental function." In this connection, Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., Unabridged, defines *1007 "recreational" as an adjective of "recreation," which is defined as: and defines "cultural" as an adjective of "culture," which is in turn partially defined as: It seems that the legislature has delegated to the State Park and Recreation Commission and the State Authority not just the authority to make findings of fact but to actually make law in the determination that a particular project is an essential governmental function. Fully recognizing that the legislature must, of necessity, delegate to other agencies the power necessary to accomplish the purpose of legislation, nevertheless, the present Act goes further than this and cannot be sustained. In my judgment, the Act here involved is contrary to art. III, § 1, of the Constitution of New Mexico, and I believe the court's opinion is at variance with our decisions in State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 1937, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240; and State ex rel. Holmes v. State Board of Finance, 1961, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925. Although this court has many times discussed the question of "standards," I fully recognize that the term "standards" is not always given the same construction in decisions not only in New Mexico but in other state jurisdictions. I would prefer that the questions to be answered by the court in a case of this type, relating to the claimed unconstitutionality of a statute, would be by the more practical method as suggested by Professor Davis. See 1 Administrative Law, Treatise, Davis, § 2.15. See also Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Ky., Inc. (Ky. 1961), 352 S.W.2d 203. In any event, whether called "standards" or something else, the Act is sadly deficient in that there is no provision for any control over the State Park Recreation Commission or the Authority other than the broad generalizations contained in the definition of "projects." I would also point out that there is no provision anywhere in the Act for a hearing, for any procedural safeguards, or legislative supervision; there is nothing in the statute which would afford protection against unfairness, arbitrariness or favoritism. My second objection to the decision today announced is the court's determination that the title of the Act gives reasonable notice of its subject matter. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the only matter before us in this case and all that is determined by the court's opinion is the constitutionality of the Act insofar as it concerns the State Park and Recreation Commission. The other subsections of § 11-10-3(C), viz., 3, 4 and 5, are, in no sense, at issue in this case. With this in mind, the entire title of the Act is here set out: My brethren say that this title gives reasonable notice of the subject matter, yet the State Park and Recreation Commission is not named except as included in "agencies of the state," even though this same commission is specifically granted, as I previously have attempted to point out, the authority to determine that recreational or cultural activities almost without number are essential governmental functions. So also the title refers to "projects," without any intimation of the broad sweep of authority granted to the State Park and Recreation Commission and the Authority as to their determination as to what are "projects." I fully recognize that we have consistently held that no law will be held unconstitutional unless its invalidity is so apparent as to leave no reasonable doubt; also that the title cannot be expected to be a complete index to the provisions of the statute. However, the very purpose of art. IV, § 18, is to prevent fraud or surprise upon the legislature of hidden or concealed provisions of which the title gives no intimation. See State v. Ingalls, 1913, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177; Fowler v. Corlett, 1952, 56 N.M. 430, 244 P.2d 1122; First Thrift and Loan Association v. State, 1956, 62 N.M. 61, 304 P.2d 582; and Ballew v. Denson, 1958, 63 N.M. 370, 320 P.2d 382. I also realize and am in full sympathy with our holdings that the term "subject" as used in the Constitution is to be given a broad and extended meaning and to be liberally construed, so that all matters having a logical or natural connection may be embraced in the act. See Johnson v. Greiner, 1940, 44 N.M. 230, 101 P.2d 183; State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 1928, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928, 62 A.L.R. 296; and State v. Miller, 1928, 33 N.M. 200, 263 P. 510. It is so apparent to me, nevertheless, that the particular portion of the Act with which we are concerned contains such a broad comprehensive grant of authority to the State Park and Recreation Commission and the Authority that it seems obvious that there was a lack of sufficient notice to the legislature, or to anyone reading the title, that the Act itself contained the sweeping authority which it purports to grant. I believe this is exactly the type of statute which was intended to be prohibited by art. IV, § 16, of our Constitution. I quite understand that in our regular biennial sessions of the legislature, one of which is in session at the present time, it is almost impossible for the members of that honored body to familiarize themselves with the contents of all the bills that come before them. I find it hard to believe that the members of the legislature in 1963, who voted to approve the Act here involved, could have realized the far-reaching consequences made possible by the passage of this legislation, and most certainly unless each individual studied the Act in full, he had no notice of the enormous powers granted to the State Park and Recreation Commission and the Authority certainly it could not have been determined from a mere reading of the title. One further deficiency in the title (and I do not mean to say that there may not be others) is the complete lack of any notice of the content of the provisions of § 11-10-26 relating to the inapplicability of all laws inconsistent with the Bond Act. Certainly, such a broad provision, which is not an implied repealer but is apparently something else, should have been noted in the title. In no sense do I wish to be understood as objecting to the beneficial purpose apparently intended by the Act, my quarrel merely being on a legal basis and designed not only to voice my personal alarm but to perhaps alert the members of the legislative branch of our state government to *1009 the dangers involved in the enactment of a statute such as this. My disagreement with the majority, going as it does to the very foundation of the constitutionality of the Act, makes unnecessary any discussion of the remaining points set out in the opinion, but should not be considered as an expression of approval of the disposition made as to the other issues. I dissent.