Case Title: William Lacey v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S04-0502-PC-57

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Liisi Brien 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Jason Kopp 
Deputy Public Defender  
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S04-0502-PC-57 
 
WILLIAM LACEY, 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court, No. 49G04-9710-CF-135067 
The Honorable Nancy Broyles, Master Commissioner 
The Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0406-PC-317 
_________________________________ 
 
June 23, 2005 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
Petitioner William Lacey was convicted in March, 1998, of the robbery of a Kroger gro-
cery store and carrying a handgun without a license.  The parties agree that the evidence at trial 
indicated that the man who robbed the store wore a baseball hat and that the police found the hat 
on the ground outside the store following the robbery.  In June, 1999, Lacey filed a pro se peti-
tion for post-conviction relief.  In August, now represented by counsel, Lacey asked the court for 
 
permission to perform a DNA test on the hat.  Following a hearing, the post-conviction court de-
nied the request.  Lacey then sought to take an interlocutory appeal of this determination, but that 
request was also denied.  At this point, Lacey (by counsel) amended his pro se petition for post-
conviction relief to add a claim that the post-conviction court had improperly denied his motion 
for DNA testing.  The post-conviction court subsequently denied the petition (including the DNA 
testing claim) and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Lacey v. State, No. 49A04-0406-PC-317, 819 
N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App.  2004) (mem.).  Lacey sought, and we granted, transfer. No. 49S04-
0502-PC-57, 2005 Ind. LEXIS 145 (Ind. Feb. 18, 2005). 
 
On the date this matter was set for oral argument in our Court, the State, for the first time, 
asserted that the post-conviction court had not had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
DNA testing request.  We deny the State’s motion for dismissal.  In brief, the State’s argument is 
that Lacey’s August, 1999, request for DNA testing itself constituted a petition for post-
conviction relief separate and apart from the petition that Lacey already had on file.1  As such, 
the State contends that the DNA testing request was a “successive” petition for post-conviction 
relief for which appellate court authorization was required for it to be considered by the post-
conviction court.2  It is clear that Lacey sought the DNA testing in order to prosecute his then-
pending petition for post-conviction relief, and he did so without implicating our rule on succes-
sive petitions.  It would be a different matter if he had already litigated one petition to conclu-
sion.  But here his request was simply part of discovery in a proceeding in fieri.  He was entitled 
to file it without appellate court authorization. 
 
For somewhat similar reasons, we conclude that the post-conviction court was wrong to 
deny Lacey’s request.  Lacey was entitled to employ reasonable means in order to obtain evi-
dence in support of his petition.  It is our understanding from the record that he simply sought to 
                                                 
1 Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(d) provides: 
A petition filed by a person who has been convicted or sentenced for a 
crime by a court of this state that seeks to require forensic DNA testing 
or analysis of any evidence, whether denominated as a petition filed pur-
suant to Ind. Code § 35-38-7-5 or not, is considered a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
2 Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) provides that a second, or successive, petition for post-conviction relief 
must first be authorized by the Court of Appeals or this Court before it can be filed. 
 
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obtain the hat so that his counsel could submit it to DNA testing at his (in this case, the State 
Public Defender’s) expense. 
 
The State argues that a special statute on forensic DNA testing, Indiana Code Sections 
35-38-7-1, et seq., controls.  We do not see that statute implicated here, but only normal rules of 
discovery. 
 
Indiana Code Sections 35-38-7-1, et seq., was enacted by the Legislature in 2001.  2001 
Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 49-2001, § 2 at 262.  It established detailed procedures by which persons 
convicted of murder or a Class A, B, or C felony can petition the sentencing court to require 
DNA testing in certain circumstances.  Joel M. Schumm, Survey: Criminal Law and Procedure: 
Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 1347, 1348 
(2002).  We read this legislation as providing certain “convicted felons greater access to DNA 
testing and analysis to exonerate themselves.”  Id. (emphasis added).  To read the legislation as 
the State suggests here would be to do the opposite, that is, it would provide persons convicted of 
a crime less access to DNA testing than they had prior to the enactment of Indiana Code Sections 
35-38-7-1, et seq. 
 
The decision of the post-conviction court is reversed.  We remand this matter to that court 
with directions that, upon certification of this decision by the Clerk, it instruct the State to deliver 
the hat to the State Public Defender and that it instruct her, upon receipt of the hat, to conduct the 
DNA testing she considers appropriate in the circumstances and then file the report on the test-
ing, all on a reasonable schedule that the post-conviction court establishes for this purpose. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
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