Case Title: Morris v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile

Citation: 359 So. 2d 371

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1978-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
359 So. 2d 371 (1978)
Leon MORRIS et al.
v.
MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE, etc., et al.
SC 2824.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 26, 1978.
W. Kenneth Gibson of Taylor, Benton & Irby, Fairhope, for appellants.
Norborne C. Stone, Jr., Charles C. Partin, III of Stone & Partin, Bay Minette, Johnstone, Adams, May, Howard & Hill, Mobile, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal by the Morrises from a summary judgment rendered against them and from an order denying their post-trial motion to set aside that summary judgment.
The present action is an outgrowth of earlier litigation, commenced in 1946, in which the Fullers sought injunctive relief against the Morrises. An injunction was issued on March 20, 1946. On October 29, 1966, more than twenty years later, this injunction was dissolved. Thereafter the Morrises brought this present action to recover damages, alleging a wrongful interruption of their business and trespass to their property, all arising out of the wrongful procurement and issuance of the injunction in the earlier action.
In view of the reasons on which we have based our decision to dismiss the appeal, it will be relevant to set out the course of the pleadings which were filed in the instant case.
The summons and complaint were filed on July 18, 1967. That complaint was demurred to on August 17, 1967. Then the *372 plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 22, 1968. This was followed on March 23, 1971 by the filing of a motion to strike one of the defendants, and later, on July 12, 1974, by the filing of a motion to dismiss by the defendants. On December 15, 1975 the defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with extensive documentary and other evidence. Then, on April 12, 1976 the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, to which the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 13, 1976. This was followed by the filing by the defendants on December 28, 1976 of another motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs then filed on January 4, 1977 their answer to the defendants second motion for summary judgment. In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on May 12, 1977, the trial court's order included the following findings:
After the trial court had granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed on May 27, 1977 an amended complaint, the preamble to which recited:
The defendants followed this by filing on June 9, 1977 a motion to strike the amended complaint, and alleged two grounds: (1) that it was a nullity because the court had theretofore granted summary judgment; and (2) that it was filed without leave of court contrary to the requirements contained in Rule 15, ARCP.
The plaintiffs on June 10, 1977 filed their "MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT," and asserted as their grounds: "That they want to amend their Complaint and equity requires that this should be done."
On August 9, 1977 the trial court entered the following order (filed on August 16, 1977):
Then on September 15, 1977 the plaintiffs filed a "MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION." As a ground for this motion the plaintiffs stated:
That same day the plaintiffs filed their "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" of (1) the order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and (2) the order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside so that another amended complaint could be filed. The grounds in support of this final motion were:
This motion was denied on September 20, 1977. Notice of appeal was filed on September 22, 1977.
The principal issue raised by this sequence of pleading is whether the plaintiffs' appeal was perfected within forty-two days of an appealable judgment in accord with Rule 4(a), ARAP. In a motion to dismiss the appeal, the defendants contend that the motions filed by the plaintiffs following the summary judgment did not suspend the running of the time for filing notice of appeal. On the other hand, the plaintiffs contend that their Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was a proper Rule 59(e) motion, and that their notice of appeal, filed on September 22, 1977, was filed within forty-two days of the trial court's order denying that motion (September 20, 1977).
Of course, the plaintiffs are correct in their contention that a proper motion for reconsideration filed under the authority of Rule 59(e) will extend the time for filing notice of appeal, even though the motion for reconsideration follows the grant of a summary judgment. Papastefan v. B. & L. Construction Co., Inc., Ala., 356 So. 2d 158 (1978). Their argument, however, misconceives the applicability of that principle to these pleadings. Examination of the post-trial pleadings reveals that in manner and form their purpose was either *374 to file another amended complaint or to obtain the trial court's consent to file another amended complaint. They were not designed to have the trial court reconsider the evidence on which the summary judgment was based.
Although not directly in point, Clardy v. Duke University, 299 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1962) discloses the reason why a motion to amend which follows summary judgment should not be treated as a motion for reconsideration which would extend the time for appeal. Following summary judgment rendered against him in that case a party moved for reconsideration, asking the trial court for leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court's denial of the motion was upheld on appeal, citing Rule 15(a), FRCP, of. Rule 5(a), ARCP. At pages 369-370 of the report this significant language appears:
See also Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 469-470 (5th Cir. 1967).
Because the post-trial motions of plaintiffs did not have the effect of extending the time for filing notice of appeal, that time began to run from the date of the summary judgment, or May 12, 1977. Forty-two days from that date would have been June 23, 1977. Thus the plaintiffs' notice of appeal filed on September 22, 1977 was too late. Timely filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Rule 3, ARAP.
The appeal must be dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
MADDOX, JONES, ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.