Case Title: Zelinda Antoinette Dinardo v. City of New York

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 158  
Zelinda Antoinette Dinardo,
            Respondent,
        v.
City of New York,
            Defendant,
The Board of Education of the 
City of New York,
            Appellant.
Marta Ross, for appellant.
Henry G. Miller, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed,
with costs, and the complaint dismissed.
Plaintiff Zelinda DiNardo, a special education teacher
at a New York City public school, was injured when she tried to
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No. 158
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restrain one student from attacking another.  The student had
been verbally and physically aggressive for several months, and
plaintiff had repeatedly expressed concerns to her supervisors
about her safety in the classroom.  The school's supervisor of
special education and the principal had both told her that
"things were being worked on, things were happening" and urged
her to "hang in there because something was being done" to have
the student removed.  Following her injury, plaintiff commenced
this action alleging, among other things, that by these
assurances the Board of Education of the City of New York had
assumed an affirmative duty to take action with respect to the
removal of the student and that she justifiably relied upon those
assurances.  When the student was not removed in a timely
fashion, plaintiff alleges, the altercation which led to her
injury resulted. 
At trial, at the close of plaintiff's proof, the Board
of Education moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
CPLR 4401.  Following a jury verdict in DiNardo's favor, the
Board of Education moved to set aside the verdict under CPLR 4404
(a).  Supreme Court denied both motions.  The Appellate Division
affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding DiNardo damages. 
Two Justices dissented on a question of law, and the Board of
Education appeals as of right under CPLR 5601 (a).  
The Board of Education now argues that the conduct
alleged to have constituted a promise to act on her behalf was
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discretionary government action, which cannot be a basis for
liability (see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 202-203
[2009]; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40-41 [1983]).  We have no
occasion to decide that question because, even assuming the
school officials' actions in this case were ministerial, there is
no rational process by which a jury could have found liability.
In negligence cases premised on a special relationship
between municipality and plaintiff, "the injured party's reliance
is as critical . . . as is the municipality's voluntary
affirmative undertaking of a duty to act. . . .  Indeed, at the
heart of most of these 'special duty' cases is the unfairness
that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a
municipality's voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party
into a false sense of security and has thereby induced [her]
either to relax [her] own vigilance or to forego other available
avenues of protection" (Cuffy v New York, 69 NY2d 255, 261
[1987]).  The assurance by the municipal defendant must be
definite enough to generate justifiable reliance by the
plaintiff.  
Affording DiNardo every inference that may properly be
drawn from the evidence presented and considering the evidence in
a light most favorable to her (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d
553, 556 [1997]), we conclude that there is no rational process
by which the jury could have reached a finding that plaintiff
justifiably relied on assurances by the Board of Education.  The
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vaguely worded statements by DiNardo's supervisor and principal
that "something" was being done to have the student removed,
without any indication of when, or if, such relief would come, do
not, as a matter of law, constitute an action that would lull a
plaintiff into a false sense of security or otherwise generate
justifiable reliance.  Indeed, plaintiff was aware that the
administrative process for determining whether a student should
transfer to a different program or school could take up to 60
days and was still ongoing when the incident occurred.  There was
therefore no "special relationship" between the Board of
Education and plaintiff (see Cuffy, 69 NY2d at 259), upon which a
cause of action for negligence could be based, and the Board of
Education is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Zelinda Antoinette DiNardo v The City of New York and the Board
of Education of the City of New York
No. 158 
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (concurring):
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a
rational jury could not have found that a special relationship
existed between plaintiff and defendant Board.  For several
months prior to the incident giving rise to this action, the
student exhibited increasing behavioral problems, including
bringing a knife to school, which resulted in a week's
suspension.  Concerned about the student's behavior and the
classroom safety risks it presented, plaintiff and her supervisor
submitted to the Board's Committee on Special Education a written
recommendation to remove the student from plaintiff's classroom
and place him in a learning environment better equipped to his
highly problematic conduct.  The recommendation was supported by
notes that plaintiff had kept regarding the student's behavior. 
These notes disclose that the subject student frequently punched,
kicked and threw various items at his classmates.  He also
threatened to kill plaintiff, another teacher, and his fellow
classmates on numerous occasions. 
While the transfer request was pending, plaintiff
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repeatedly told her supervisors that she was concerned about the
safety of her classroom and "didn't know how much longer [she
could] hang in there."  She testified, "it was getting more and
more impossible to conduct the class . . . I wanted to quit.  I
couldn't go on anymore . . . It was getting unsafe, and I was
concerned about safety in the classroom, and . . . I did not want
to return."  In response, her supervisors told her to "hang in
there" because "something was being done" and "things were
happening."   
Viewing the evidence, as we must at this juncture, in
the light most favorable to plaintiff (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90
NY2d 553, 556 [1997]), I think the jury could have rationally
concluded that a special relationship existed between the
plaintiff and defendant Board.  Although the transfer request was
still outstanding when plaintiff was injured, the supervisors'
repeated assurances that "things were happening" and "something
was being done" suggested an impending solution to the dangerous
situation.  It would not be unreasonable for the jury to infer
that plaintiff, in justifiable reliance on these assurances,
chose to remain in the classroom and continue teaching rather
than quitting as she had threatened.  It should be stressed that
the stark choice facing plaintiff was whether she should resign
and abandon her class or continue to teach in a situation which
was by any reasonable measure dangerous.  In electing to follow
the latter, socially desirable course, plaintiff relied upon the
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municipality's assurances that the situation would soon be
rectified.  Indeed, the evidence, properly viewed, practically
compels the conclusion that the assurances made to plaintiff
induced her to "relax [her] own vigilance or . . . forego other
available avenues of protection" (Cuffy v City of New York, 69
NY2d 255, 261 [1987]), and thus sufficed to establish the special
relationship upon which recovery is conditioned.
  Nevertheless, I concur in the majority's result on
constraint of McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]).  In
McLean, this Court held that government action, if discretionary,
may never form the basis for tort liability, even if a special
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the municipality. 
According to McLean, the special relationship exception only
applies where the challenged municipal action is ministerial
(see id. at 203).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied
on Tango v Tulevech (61 NY2d 34, 40 [1983]) and Lauer v City of
New York (95 NY2d 95, 99-100 [2000]).  But, in those cases, the
Court never expressly considered whether the special relationship
exception applied to discretionary governmental acts.  Even if
Tango and Lauer can arguably be read to imply that the special
relationship exception does not apply to discretionary acts, that
interpretation was flatly rejected in Pelaez v Seide (2 NY3d 186
[2004]), decided after Tango and Lauer, but prior to McLean.  In
Pelaez, this Court explicitly held that a "narrow exception" to
the general discretionary immunity rule exists when a plaintiff
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establishes a special relationship with the municipality (2 NY3d
at 193).  One year later, in Kovit v Estate of Hallums, we
recognized that the police officer was exercising his discretion
and that in order "[t]o hold the City liable for the negligent
performance of a discretionary act, a plaintiff must establish a
special relationship with the municipality" (4 NY3d 499, 506
[2005]).  I can discern no convincing rationale for the Court's
disregard of this relevant binding precedent, which so
unreasonably narrows -- indeed effectively eliminates -- the
special relationship exception. 
Although I agree that liability should not generally
attach when a municipal employee is exercising his or her
reasoned judgment, the broad immunity recognized for
discretionary acts should not extend to situations where a
special relationship is present.  The touchstone of the special
duty rule is that the government, by its undertaking to the
specific plaintiff, has gone above and beyond the general duty it
owes to the public and created a unique relationship with that
plaintiff, upon which he or she is entitled to rely.  This is
entirely consistent with the general tort principle that a
defendant should be held liable for the breach of a duty it
voluntarily assumed (see Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY
160, 167 [1928]).  
Whether the municipality's act is characterized as
ministerial or discretionary should not be, and never has been,
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determinative in special duty cases.  Indeed, in Cuffy, a seminal
case in the special duty context, the plaintiffs alleged that the
police had a special duty to protect them based on a police
officer's promise that an arrest would be made or some other
protective action would be taken regarding an ongoing dispute
between plaintiffs and their neighbors (69 NY2d at 259). 
Although noting that the provision of police protection is within
the reasoned judgment of officials and therefore necessarily
discretionary in nature, we recognized that an exception to the
discretionary immunity rule exists when a special relationship
exists between the municipality and plaintiff (see id. at 260;
see also Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 NY2d 251, 255-256
[1989]; De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 305 [1983]). 
Unfortunately, under the rule announced in McLean, a plaintiff
will never be able to recover for the failure to provide adequate
police protection, even when the police voluntarily and
affirmatively promised to act on that specific plaintiff's behalf
and he or she justifiably relied on that promise to his or her
detriment.  This is particularly disturbing given our recognition
that the "police cases . . . all but occupy the special
relationship field" (Pelaez, 2 NY3d at 205).  
The rule in McLean, which clearly extends beyond police
protection and applies to all discretionary governmental actions,
allows public officials to unjustifiably hide behind the shield
of discretionary immunity even when their actions have induced a
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plaintiff to change his or her behavior in the face of a known
threat.  Because almost any governmental act may be characterized
as discretionary (see Tango, 61 NY2d at 41, citing Prosser, Torts
§ 132, at 990 [4th ed]), McLean too broadly insulates government
agencies from being held accountable to injured parties. 
The determination here as to whether and when to
transfer a potentially dangerous student is undoubtedly within
the discretion of the Board and thus may not subject the Board to
liability given the recent holding in McLean.  Accordingly, I
reluctantly concur with the majority that the order of the
Appellate Division should be reversed and the complaint
dismissed.  
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *  *
Order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed, in a
memorandum.  Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones
concur.  Chief Judge Lippman concurs in result in an opinion. 
Judge Ciparick concurs in result, stating: The majority does not
decide whether this is ministerial or discretionary.  I think it
was discretionary and therefore, under our recent decision in
McLean, must concur, but if I were to go to the issue of special
relationship, as the majority does, I would disagree for the
reasons stated in the concurrence of the Chief Judge.
Decided December 1, 2009