Case Title: State v. Blackmer

Citation: 160 Vt. 451, 631 A.2d 1134

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_BLACKMER.93-149; 160 Vt. 451; 631 A.2d 1134

[Filed 23-Jul-1993]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-149


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Charles Blackmer                             May Term, 1993


Paul F. Hudson, J.

Christopher C. Moll, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro,
 for plaintiff-appellee

Robert J. Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
 Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.





 DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals a decision that he be held without bail,
 arguing that (1) the State did not establish that the evidence of guilt was
 great as is required by the Vermont constitution in a denial of bail; (2) even
 if the constitutional right is inapplicable, the trial court abused its
 discretion in denying bail; and (3) the denial of bail deprived defendant of
 both substantive and procedural due process of law.  We affirm.

 On January 6, 1993, defendant was served with a temporary restraining order
 for relief from abuse prohibiting him from approaching his former girlfriend.
 On January 9, 1993, he was arrested for violating the restraining order and
 then released on conditions that he abide by it.  One day later, on January
 10, 1993, he was again arrested for violating the order.  Because he had been
 released on condition he abide by the order, he was also charged with
 violating the condition of release.  On January 12, 1993, he was released on
 conditions, including that he not consume alcohol or have probable cause found
 that he had committed a felony.

 On February 23, 1993, defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault on
 a nine-year-old girl, a crime for which the maximum punishment is life
 imprisonment.  See 13 V.S.A. { 3253(b).  The alleged crime occurred on
 February 22, while defendant was free on conditions of release from the
 earlier charges.  At the time of arrest, his blood-alcohol level was tested at
 .09%.  After a bail review hearing, the court ordered defendant to be held
 without bail, for the following reasons:

 His argument that he has "seen the light," while attractive, is less than
 convincing.  In fact, it is not believed by this court.  Were it a single
 order that had a single violation, it would be one thing.  These are multiple
 orders and have multiple violations and the court concludes that the defendant
 is simply not motivated to abide by orders of the court.

 The court referred to defendant as "seeing the light" because that was
 defendant's position as to why he should be released on conditions.

 Defendant first argues that he may not be held without bail under Vermont
 Constitution Chapter II, { 40 and 13 V.S.A. { 7553 because, although he is
 charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment, the court could not
 find that "evidence of guilt is great."  Chapter II, { 40 of the Vermont
 Constitution for offenses not punishable by life imprisonment states that
 there is a constitutional right to bail, but there is no constitutional right
 to bail for offenses punishable by life imprisonment where the evidence of
 guilt is great.  Thus, defendant argues that the right to bail exists where a
 defendant faces a punishment of life imprisonment if the State fails to show
 that evidence of guilt is great.  Defendant argues that this is such a case.

 This Court has determined that evidence meets the constitutional threshold if
 it meets the standards of V.R.Cr.P. 12(d) for establishment of a prima facie
 case.  See State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 440, 563 A.2d 258, 263 (1989).  Under
 that standard, the State must establish "by affidavits, depositions, sworn
 oral testimony, or other admissible evidence 'that it has substantial,
 admissible evidence as to the elements of the offense . . . sufficient to
 prevent the grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal at the trial.'"  Id.
 at 439, 563 A.2d  at 263 (quoting V.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2)).  The Court emphasized
 that this standard adds two elements beyond that necessary for establishing
 probable cause:  "(1) that substantial, admissible evidence of guilt exists,
 and (2) the evidence can fairly and reasonably convince a fact-finder beyond a
 reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty."  Id. at 440, 563 A.2d  at 263
 (emphasis in original).  In a later case, this Court emphasized that this
 standard "cannot be met by inadmissible evidence." State v. Passino, 154 Vt.
 377, 381, 577 A.2d 281, 284 (1990).

 The admissibility requirement imposed in Passino and Duff refers to
 admissibility of the evidence at trial.  For purposes of analysis, we can view
 the process created by those decisions as involving two steps:  (1) whether
 the State has shown evidence that can fairly and reasonably convince a
 fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty, and (2)
 whether the State has shown this evidence will be admissible at trial.

 Defendant asserts that the court ignored the second step and used
 inadmissible evidence in concluding that the evidence against him was great.
 This evidence included a medical record that had not been authenticated,
 V.R.E. 803; hearsay statements of the family and police that were inadmissible
 because the child victim was not available to testify, V.R.E. 804a(a)(2) and
 (3); and a statement of the child victim that did not name the perpetrator and
 was not analyzed for trustworthiness, V.R.E. 804a(b). Although the basis for
 the court's ruling is somewhat confusing, especially in separating out
 admissibility in the bail hearing from admission at trial, we agree that the
 court failed to go through the second step of the process.  Thus, the bail
 hearing record does not show that at least part of the evidence considered by
 the court will be admissible at trial.  For example, without a foundation,
 there is no showing that the medical record will be admissible, a defect
 admitted by the State at the bail hearing.

 The State argues correctly that it may proceed by affidavits. V.R.Cr.P.
 12(d)(2).  The child victim's affidavit, although it does not name the
 perpetrator, provides admissible evidence that a crime was committed, the
 details of the crime, and the availability of the victim to testify.  It in
 turn supports the admissibility of the evidence offered in the affidavits of
 her mother and another family member by stating the age and availability of
 the minor.  See V.R.E. 804a(a)(1), (3).  These affidavits recount the victim
 telling them what transpired and naming defendant as the perpetrator. The
 victim's statement occurred shortly after the alleged assault such that "the
 time, content and circumstances of the statements provide substantial indicia
 of trustworthiness."  V.R.E. 804a(a)(4); see State v. Duffy, ___ Vt. ___, ___,
 605 A.2d 533, 535 (1992).  Thus, the record establishes that the evidence of
 the family members will be admissible under the hearsay exception for
 statements from minor victims of sexual assault crimes.  See V.R.E. 804a. Once
 this evidence is considered, the State has shown that evidence of guilt is
 great.

 We caution that although the record clearly shows the evidence will be
 admissible in this case, that will not always be so.  Trial courts have
 discretion in the admission of evidence, and normally that discretion must be
 exercised to determine whether evidence proffered by the State at the bail
 hearing will be admissible at trial.  Failure to do so will often mean that
 defendant retains the constitutional right to bail.

 Defendant makes three arguments why the denial of bail is erroneous even
 though there is no constitutional right to bail.  Before addressing them
 specifically, we emphasize the narrowness of the question before us. We had
 occasion recently to explore the constitutional right to bail and the limits
 it places on the Legislature or the courts to deny bail in specific cases. See
 State v. Sauve, ___ Vt. ___, 621 A.2d 1296 (1993).  Except in very limited and
 special circumstances where the State's interest is legitimate and compelling,
 a court may not deny bail in the face of the constitutional right. ___ Vt. at
 ___, 621 A.2d  at 1301.  The Sauve requirements, to the extent they are based
 on the Vermont constitutional right to bail, do not apply in this case.
 Instead, the issue we address is whether in the absence of the constitutional
 right the court may deny bail because of a substantial and very recent record
 of violations of important conditions of release.

 We also emphasize that we are not conducting a de novo proceeding on whether
 to grant bail in this case.  Our standard of review is set forth in the
 applicable statute.  We must affirm the trial court's decision if it is
 supported by the proceedings below.  13 V.S.A. { 7556(b).

 Defendant's first argument is that the trial court decision is an abuse of
 discretion.  We have held that even where there is no constitutional right to
 bail the trial court has the discretion to grant bail.  See Duff, 151 Vt. at
 441, 563 A.2d  at 264.  We have never comprehensively defined the breadth of a
 trial court's discretion.  Our recent precedents recognize the existence of
 discretion without setting specific standards for its exercise. See Passino,
 154 Vt. at 379, 577 A.2d  at 283; Duff, 151 Vt. at 441, 563 A.2d  at 264.
 Although the Legislature has specifically defined the right to bail where the
 Vermont constitutional provision applies, it has provided only that a
 defendant charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment "shall not be
 bailable as a matter of right" when the evidence of guilt is great. 13 V.S.A.
 { 7553.

 We have, however, defined the court's discretion sufficiently to address this
 case.  The decision that forms the basis of our current law is In re Dexter,
 93 Vt. 304, 314-15, 107 A. 134, 138 (1919), which first enunciated the
 discretion of the trial court to grant bail where the constitutional right is
 inapplicable.  The Court noted that the discretion involved is "sound,
 judicial discretion, controlled by certain and well defined and established
 rules," but failed to describe those rules.  Id. at 315, 107 A.  at 138.  It
 did state:

 Ordinarily, in practice, bail is refused after indictment found, in capital
 cases, where the proof of guilt is evident or presumption great; but we are
 not called upon to define more particularly the practice or controlling
 features in such cases generally . . . . Had the county court exercised its
 discretion in determining the question, very likely we should leave the matter
 as there determined, let it be either way, without further consideration.  But
 the court . . . decided against the relator as a matter of law.  This it could
 not lawfully do.  The relator was entitled to the benefit of the court's
 judicial discretion, and it not being accorded her, she was deprived of her
 right in that behalf.

 Id.  The defendant in Dexter had been acquitted, but the State obtained a new
 trial and the issue involved her right to bail at the second trial.  The Court
 concluded that the circumstances ordinarily were sufficient to allow the
 defendant to have bail, but left the question entirely to the trial court.

 Duff follows up on the language of Dexter, suggesting the considerations are
 similar to those in determining the right to bail post- conviction.  See 151
 Vt. at 441, 563 A.2d  at 263-64.  We required a hearing on whether the court
 should allow bail, but added that "the trial court is under no obligation to
 set any conditions of release as a result of that hearing."  Id. at 441, 563 A.2d  at 264.

 The holdings in Duff and Dexter are similar to those in other states that
 have explored the issue.  For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
 Court explained the standard as follows:

 [B]ail in such a case is not a matter of right but is discretionary with the
 judge, who is to give due weight to the nature and circumstances of the case.
 On the subject of discretionary bail in capital cases, Blackstone's
 observations are no less pertinent today than they were two hundred years ago.
 "And herein," he said, "the wisdom of the law is very manifest.  To allow bail
 to be taken commonly for such enormous crimes, would greatly tend to elude the
 public justice: and yet there are cases, though they rarely happen, in which
 it would be hard and unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of
 the greatest offense."  4 Blackstone, Commentaries (8th ed.) 299.

 Commonwealth v. Baker,