Case Title: Hawthorne v. VanMarter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091127

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
 
PAXTON HAWTHORNE, CO-ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF JOYCE HAWTHORNE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 091127 
 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                     April 15, 2010 
TIMOTHY VANMARTER 
 
 
KEVIN GUTHRIE 
 
v. 
Record No. 091156 
 
TIMOTHY VANMARTER 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 
Charles N. Dorsey, Judge 
 
In these appeals of a judgment for a defendant in a 
vehicular accident case alleging ordinary and gross negligence, 
we consider several issues, including the circuit court’s 
holding that the defendant, a police officer, was entitled to 
sovereign immunity.  We also consider the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss one of the appeals. 
I. Pre-Trial Rulings 
In June 2005, Joyce Hawthorne was killed and Kevin 
Guthrie was injured when a police vehicle driven by Senior 
Officer Timothy VanMarter of the Roanoke County Police 
                     
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
12, 2010. 
Department struck the vehicle Hawthorne was driving.  Guthrie 
and the co-administrators of Hawthorne’s Estate, Paxton 
Hawthorne and Joseph Anthony (the Administrators), filed 
separate motions for judgment2 in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Roanoke against VanMarter, alleging negligence.3  The 
circuit court granted VanMarter’s motion to transfer the cases 
to the Circuit Court of Roanoke County, and the cases were 
consolidated for trial. 
VanMarter filed a plea in bar asserting that he was 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  VanMarter argued that at the 
time of the accident, he was attempting to “overtake” a 
vehicle that was traveling at an excessive rate of speed.  
Contending that this conduct was discretionary in nature, 
VanMarter asserted that he was immune from liability for 
ordinary negligence.  VanMarter also argued that, as a matter 
of law, his conduct was not grossly negligent because he 
exercised some care by applying the police vehicle’s brakes 
and by swerving in an attempt to avoid the accident. 
                     
2 These motions for judgment were filed prior to the 
amendment of Part Three of the Rules of Court, effective 
January 1, 2006, to provide that a civil action is commenced 
by filing a “complaint.”  Rules 3:1 and 3:2; see also Ahari v. 
Morrison, 275 Va. 92, 96 n.2, 654 S.E.2d 891, 893 n.2 (2008). 
3 In their respective motions for judgment, Guthrie and 
the Administrators both named James R. Lavinder, Chief of 
Police of the Roanoke County Police Department, as a 
defendant.  However, their amended complaints named only 
VanMarter as a defendant. 
 
2
In response, the Administrators and Guthrie 
(collectively, the plaintiffs) asserted that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was inapplicable because VanMarter never 
activated his police vehicle’s emergency equipment, and 
because he was “overtaking” rather than pursuing a speeding 
vehicle.  The plaintiffs further argued that any determination 
of gross negligence required factual findings that could not 
be decided by the court as a matter of law. 
In a hearing conducted on the defendant’s plea in bar, 
the circuit court considered VanMarter’s testimony and the 
memoranda and arguments of counsel.  The plaintiffs did not 
present the testimony of any witnesses for the court’s 
consideration.  Based on VanMarter’s testimony, the circuit 
court found that VanMarter was pursuing a speeding vehicle at 
the time of the accident.  The circuit court held that 
VanMarter’s actions were discretionary in nature and that, 
therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims of ordinary negligence were 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Following the circuit court’s ruling on the plea in bar, 
the plaintiffs conducted depositions of two potential trial 
witnesses.  These witnesses stated that during a period of 
between 30 and 45 minutes before the collision, they stood 
about 250 feet from Chaparral Drive and were engaged in 
conversation.  The two witnesses related that they did not 
 
3
observe a speeding vehicle before hearing the collision.  
Arguing that these witness accounts were “[n]ewly 
[d]iscovered” evidence, the plaintiffs filed a motion “to 
[a]mend [p]rior [r]uling,” asserting that the deposition 
testimony created a factual dispute regarding the presence of 
a speeding vehicle.  The plaintiffs asked that the circuit 
court allow the two witnesses to testify at trial, and submit 
to the jury the factual issue whether VanMarter was pursuing a 
speeding vehicle.  The plaintiffs argued that if the jury 
determined that there was no such speeding vehicle, VanMarter 
would not be entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity 
and the jury should be instructed on both ordinary and gross 
negligence. 
VanMarter contended that this testimony was not “newly 
discovered” because the witnesses’ names were provided by the 
plaintiffs in discovery at least two weeks before the hearing 
on the plea in bar.  VanMarter also asserted that the 
witnesses’ proffered statements did not contradict VanMarter’s 
account of the events that night.  Thus, VanMarter asserted, 
the proffered testimony would not have changed the circuit 
court’s sovereign immunity determination. 
The circuit court agreed with VanMarter and denied the 
plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the sovereign immunity 
holding.  The circuit court concluded that the witnesses’ 
 
4
testimony did not qualify as “after-discovered evidence,” and 
further held that even if the court had considered the 
proffered testimony, the witnesses’ statements would not have 
affected the court’s sovereign immunity determination.  The 
plaintiffs did not request that they be allowed to present the 
testimony of the two witnesses to the jury for impeachment 
purposes or on the issue of gross negligence. 
II. Trial 
The evidence at trial showed that, at the time the 
accident occurred, Guthrie was riding as a passenger in a 
vehicle driven by Hawthorne.  Guthrie testified that 
immediately before the accident, Hawthorne looked in both 
directions before leaving a driveway and turning onto 
Chaparral Drive.  Guthrie testified that he did not observe 
any other vehicles, and did not see flashing emergency lights 
or hear an emergency siren before the collision.  Guthrie 
stated that the last thing he remembered after Hawthorne 
turned his vehicle onto Chaparral Drive was the “sudden 
impact” of something hitting the vehicle. 
Guthrie also presented the testimony of witnesses who 
qualified as experts on subjects including accident 
investigation and the operation of emergency vehicles.  From 
these witnesses, the jury heard evidence about, among other 
things, the conditions of the vehicles involved in the 
 
5
collision, the line of sight from the driveway “looking down” 
Chaparral Drive, and the amount of time it would take a 
vehicle to travel that distance.  The jury also was presented 
evidence regarding the “proper protocol” for activation of 
emergency equipment on a police vehicle during the pursuit of 
another vehicle. 
As part of his case, Guthrie also presented the 
deposition testimony of VanMarter.  VanMarter stated that on 
the night of the accident, he was driving his police vehicle 
northbound on Chaparral Drive and observed a car traveling in 
the opposite direction at 63 miles-per-hour, as measured by 
police radar equipment.  The posted speed limit at that 
location was 25 miles-per-hour.  VanMarter stated that he made 
a “U-turn” in order to pursue the car and accelerated his 
police vehicle by pressing its gas pedal to the floor.  
VanMarter conceded that he did not activate the vehicle’s 
emergency lights and siren at that time. 
In this deposition testimony, VanMarter also stated that 
as his speed increased, he looked down to locate and activate 
his vehicle’s emergency equipment.  At the same time, the 
vehicle driven by Hawthorne entered onto Chaparral Drive from 
a driveway.  VanMarter testified that when he saw Hawthorne’s 
car, he applied his vehicle’s brakes, and attempted to turn 
 
6
his vehicle so that it would strike the rear of Hawthorne’s 
car. 
In his defense, VanMarter presented the testimony of two 
witnesses who qualified as experts on the subject of emergency 
vehicle training instruction.  These witnesses testified 
regarding the accepted protocol for activation of emergency 
equipment of police vehicles.  They stated that when making a 
determination whether to “overtake” a speeding vehicle and 
whether to activate a police vehicle’s emergency lights and 
siren, police officers must take into account various factors 
including the time of day, road and vehicle conditions, the 
amount of traffic, and the safety of others. 
VanMarter also presented the testimony of an accident 
investigator and a mechanical engineer.  The accident 
investigator testified regarding the unobstructed line of 
sight that Hawthorne would have had before turning onto 
Chaparral Drive.  The mechanical engineer testified regarding 
the force of the impact and the vehicle damage caused by the 
collision. 
At the close of all the evidence, the parties submitted 
proposed jury instructions.  As relevant to this appeal, the 
plaintiffs objected to Instructions 3 and 11, which are 
described below.  The circuit court overruled these objections 
and instructed the jury accordingly. 
 
7
The jury returned a verdict in favor of VanMarter.  The 
circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the 
verdict and entered final judgment in accordance with the jury 
verdict.  The plaintiffs appeal from the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
III. Motion to Dismiss 
Before addressing the various rulings and holdings 
assigned as error, we will consider VanMarter’s motion to 
dismiss the Hawthorne Estate’s appeal.  VanMarter argues that 
the appeal filed on behalf of the Hawthorne Estate must be 
dismissed because the Administrators filed the appeal in a pro 
se capacity.  VanMarter asserts that our holding in Kone v. 
Wilson, 272 Va. 59, 630 S.E.2d 744 (2006), that an 
administrator of an estate may not file an action in a pro se 
capacity, unequivocally bars the Administrators’ appeal here. 
In response, the Administrators argue that the holding in 
Kone is not applicable to this appeal because that holding 
does not address whether an administrator may file an appeal 
in this Court, as opposed to a complaint in a circuit court, 
in a pro se capacity.  The Administrators alternatively 
contend that even if the holding in Kone is applicable to the 
filing of an appeal, the Administrators have a personal 
interest in the outcome of the present appeal to recover their 
fees and, therefore, were permitted to file their appeal in a 
 
8
pro se capacity.  Finally, the Administrators argue that even 
if they were prohibited from filing the appeal in a pro se 
capacity, the notice of appeal filed by Guthrie in this 
consolidated proceeding had the effect of perfecting the 
Administrators’ appeal.  We disagree with the Administrators’ 
arguments. 
We first observe that the notice of appeal filed by 
Guthrie did not perfect the Administrators’ appeal.  Although 
Rule 5:9(c) is permissive in nature, and allows one notice of 
appeal to be filed on behalf of all parties when two or more 
cases have been tried together, the plaintiffs in the present 
cases each filed separate notices of appeal, and Guthrie’s 
notice of appeal did not state that it was being filed on 
behalf of the Hawthorne Estate.  Thus, the record before us 
plainly shows that Guthrie’s attorney was not acting on behalf 
of the Hawthorne Estate when he filed Guthrie’s notice of 
appeal. 
We also disagree with the Administrators’ argument that 
our holding in Kone is distinguishable from the present case 
because that holding addressed a pro se filing in the circuit 
court, rather than in this Court.  Our holding in Kone was 
based on the representative role of an administrator, not on 
the type of court in which the administrator’s action was 
filed. 
 
9
In Kone, we explained that the Virginia Wrongful Death 
Act, Code §§ 8.01-50 through -56, vests a right of action for 
wrongful death in a decedent’s personal representative, but 
that the cause of action belongs to the decedent’s 
beneficiaries.  Id. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at 746.  We held that an 
administrator of an estate acts as a surrogate for the 
beneficiaries of the estate and cannot file a cause of action 
in a pro se capacity, because the administrator is merely 
acting in a representative capacity for the true parties in 
interest.  Id. at 62-63, 630 S.E.2d at 746. 
Although a licensed attorney properly filed the present 
action in the Administrators’ names in the circuit court, the 
notice of appeal filed in this Court by the Administrators 
stated that each was acting in a “pro se” capacity as a co-
administrator of the Hawthorne Estate.  Like the administrator 
in Kone, the Administrators in the present case can act only 
in a representative capacity for the beneficiaries of the 
Hawthorne Estate.  Thus, because the Administrators were not 
the true parties in interest, they were not entitled to file 
the present appeal in a pro se capacity.  See id. at 62-63, 
630 S.E.2d at 746. 
We find no merit in the Administrators’ argument that 
they nevertheless were entitled to file their appeal in a pro 
se capacity because they have a personal interest in the 
 
10
outcome of the appeal.  The Administrators did not become 
aggrieved parties in the case merely by virtue of their desire 
to recover the fees purportedly owed to them for serving as 
administrators of the Hawthorne Estate.4 
Because our holding in Kone is controlling, we conclude 
that the Administrators did not have a right to file the 
appeal in a pro se capacity for a cause of action belonging to 
the Hawthorne Estate’s beneficiaries.  See id. at 62-63, 630 
S.E.2d at 746.  Accordingly, we will grant VanMarter’s motion 
to dismiss the Administrators’ appeal. 
IV. Plea in Bar Asserting Sovereign Immunity 
Guthrie argues that the circuit court erred when it 
refused to submit to the jury the factual question whether 
VanMarter was engaged in overtaking a speeding vehicle at the 
time of the collision.  Guthrie asserts that the circuit court 
improperly made a factual determination when the court 
concluded that the proffered testimony of the two witnesses 
would not have changed the outcome of the circuit court’s 
sovereign immunity holding. 
                     
4 There also is no merit in the Administrators’ argument 
that Anthony was authorized to file this appeal as an attorney 
representing the Hawthorne Estate, because the record does not 
demonstrate that he filed the appeal in his capacity as a 
licensed attorney. 
 
 
11
Guthrie argues that he had no obligation to bring the two 
witnesses to the circuit court’s attention during the plea in 
bar hearing because VanMarter only asked the circuit court to 
determine whether an officer overtaking a speeding vehicle is 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  Guthrie asserts that he was 
not required to raise the separate factual question whether 
the speeding vehicle in fact existed, and argues that this 
factual dispute should have been submitted at trial to the 
jury.  Guthrie maintains that a jury presented with that 
testimony reasonably could have concluded that VanMarter was 
not apprehending a speeding vehicle and, thus, was liable for 
his acts of ordinary negligence.  We disagree with Guthrie’s 
arguments. 
We first observe that the circuit court’s ruling 
declining to reopen the record and reconsider its ruling on 
the plea in bar was a discretionary determination.  The 
essence of any discretionary determination is the exercise of 
judgment.  Only when the record does not fairly support the 
circuit court’s exercise of its judgment will we say that an 
abuse of discretion has occurred.  See Grattan v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009).  
Thus, we will not disturb the circuit court’s judgment absent 
a clear abuse of that discretion.  See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 
246 Va. 136, 148, 431 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1993); Hechler Chevrolet, 
 
12
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., Inc., 230 Va. 396, 403-04, 337 
S.E.2d 744, 748-49 (1985). 
A plea in bar asserts a single issue, which, if proved, 
creates a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.  Schmidt v. Household 
Fin. Corp., II, 276 Va. 108, 116, 661 S.E.2d 834, 838 (2008); 
Baker v. Poolservice Co., 272 Va. 677, 688, 636 S.E.2d 360, 
366 (2006); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 594, 
537 S.E.2d 580, 590 (2000).  The party asserting a plea in bar 
bears the burden of proof on the issue presented.  Baker, 272 
Va. at 688, 636 S.E.2d at 367; Cooper Indus., 260 Va. at 594, 
537 S.E.2d at 590; Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480, 468 
S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996). 
The issue raised by a plea in bar may be submitted to the 
circuit court for decision based on a discrete body of facts 
identified by the parties through their pleadings, or 
developed through the presentation of evidence supporting or 
opposing the plea.  Kroger Co. v. Appalachian Power Co., 244 
Va. 560, 562, 422 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1992); see Schmidt, 276 Va. 
at 112, 661 S.E.2d at 836; Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 
Va. 230, 233, 564 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2002).  If the parties 
present evidence on the plea ore tenus, the circuit court’s 
factual findings are accorded the weight of a jury finding and 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are plainly wrong 
or without evidentiary support.  Jennings v. Kay Jennings 
 
13
Family Ltd. P’ship, 275 Va. 594, 600, 659 S.E.2d 283, 287 
(2008); Cooper Indus., 260 Va. at 595, 537 S.E.2d at 590. 
If the facts underlying the plea in bar are contested, a 
party may demand that a jury decide the factual issues raised 
by the plea.  See Code § 8.01-336(B); Bethel Inv. Co. v. City 
of Hampton, 272 Va. 765, 770, 636 S.E.2d 466, 470 (2006); 
Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., Inc., 266 
Va. 582, 585-86, 587 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2003); Kroger, 244 Va. 
at 562, 422 S.E.2d at 758.  Conversely, if the facts are 
disputed and no demand for a jury is made, the “whole matter 
of law and fact” may be decided by the court.  See Code 
§ 8.01-336(B). 
In the present case, the parties proceeded on the plea in 
bar as if the facts were uncontested.  Guthrie neither 
informed the circuit court of the potential witnesses he had 
identified during discovery, nor did he request additional 
time to depose those witnesses.  Moreover, Guthrie failed to 
request that a jury decide the factual issues presented by the 
plea in bar, agreed that the circuit court should decide those 
issues, and did not object when the circuit court made the 
factual determination that VanMarter was in fact attempting to 
overtake a speeding vehicle. 
By submitting the entire decision on the plea in bar to 
the circuit court judge, Guthrie effectively agreed to have 
 
14
the judge decide all legal and factual questions underlying 
the single issue whether sovereign immunity shielded VanMarter 
from Guthrie’s allegations of ordinary negligence.  See 
Kroger, 244 Va. at 562, 422 S.E.2d at 758.  Thus, we hold that 
Guthrie waived his right to have the jury at trial decide the 
factual issues pertaining to the question of sovereign 
immunity. 
Additionally, we note that the circuit court’s decision 
declining to reopen the issues pertaining to its sovereign 
immunity holding fully reflected the function of the plea in 
bar, which is to narrow the litigation by resolving an issue 
that will determine whether a plaintiff may proceed to trial 
on a particular cause of action.  See Schmidt, 276 Va. at 116, 
661 S.E.2d at 838; Tomlin, 251 Va. at 480, 468 S.E.2d at 884.  
This function would have been undermined in the present case 
had the circuit court set aside its ruling and permitted 
Guthrie an opportunity to relitigate the issues already 
addressed without objection at the hearing on the plea in bar. 
We also hold that the circuit court did not err in 
concluding that the testimony of the two witnesses failed to 
qualify as “after-discovered” evidence.  This testimony was 
not “after-discovered,” because Guthrie disclosed the identity 
of these witnesses before submitting the sovereign immunity 
issue to the circuit court and, therefore, could have 
 
15
discovered the content of their testimony by exercising 
reasonable diligence.  See Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 
486, 502, 628 S.E.2d 344, 353 (2006); Odum v. Commonwealth, 
225 Va. 123, 130-31, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983); Fulcher v. 
Whitlow, 208 Va. 34, 39, 155 S.E.2d 362, 366 (1967).  
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to reopen its ruling on the plea in bar 
and allow the testimony of the two witnesses to be presented 
at trial, because Guthrie could have presented that testimony 
at the hearing on the plea in bar or have requested additional 
time to develop this evidence at that hearing. 
V. Venue 
We next consider Guthrie’s argument that the circuit 
court abused its discretion in granting VanMarter’s motion to 
transfer venue.  VanMarter argued that the City of Roanoke was 
an improper venue because he had relocated his residence from 
the City to Roanoke County before this action was filed.  In 
response, Guthrie asserted that the City of Roanoke was a 
permissible venue under Code § 8.01-262 because VanMarter 
retained a residence there and conducted “substantial business 
activity” in the City. 
At a hearing on the motion to transfer venue, VanMarter 
testified that he lived with his girlfriend, Melissa Alderman, 
on Springtree Drive in the City of Roanoke until July 2005, 
 
16
when VanMarter moved to the County.  Alderman testified that 
VanMarter moved from her home in the summer of 2005. 
During cross-examination, VanMarter conceded that after 
he relocated to the County, he retained a key to the 
Springtree Drive residence and stored certain furniture and 
personal items there.  VanMarter testified that he completed a 
change of address form with the United States Postal Service, 
but that some of his mail still was delivered to the 
Springtree Drive address after this litigation was initiated.  
VanMarter also stated that in October 2005, his Police 
Department paycheck and his voter registration continued to 
list the Springtree Drive house as his address. 
VanMarter further testified on cross-examination that he 
drives through certain portions of Roanoke City on his way to 
work, and that he travels into the City more than once a month 
to shop, to attend movies, and to dine at City restaurants.  
He also testified that at the time this action was filed, he 
was enrolled in classes at Virginia Western Community College 
in the City of Roanoke and had been taking classes for about 
six months. 
After considering this evidence and the arguments of 
counsel, the circuit court held that VanMarter had proved that 
he resided in Roanoke County at the time this action was 
filed.   The circuit court further held that VanMarter’s 
 
17
conduct in the City of Roanoke did not constitute “substantial 
business activity” as contemplated by Code § 8.01-262(3). 
On appeal, Guthrie asserts that VanMarter failed to 
present sufficient evidence to establish that the venue chosen 
by the plaintiffs was improper.  Guthrie argues that VanMarter 
failed to prove that he moved to Roanoke County before the 
date the action was initiated.  Guthrie further argues that 
VanMarter conducted substantial business activity in the City 
of Roanoke and, therefore, that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in transferring venue to Roanoke County.  We 
disagree with Guthrie’s arguments. 
We observe that Code § 8.01-262 provides in relevant part 
that an action may be filed “[w]herein the defendant resides” 
or “[w]herein the defendant regularly conducts substantial 
business activity.”  Code § 8.01-262(1), (3).  The party 
objecting to venue has the burden to establish that the venue 
chosen by the plaintiff was improper.  Barnett v. Kite, 271 
Va. 65, 69, 624 S.E.2d 52, 54 (2006); Meyer v. Brown, 256 Va. 
53, 57, 500 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1998).  The determination whether 
the selected venue is proper is committed to the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.  Barnett, 271 Va. at 69, 624 
S.E.2d at 54; Meyer, 256 Va. at 56-57, 500 S.E.2d at 809. 
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting VanMarter’s motion to change venue.  
 
18
The record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that 
VanMarter lived in Roanoke County at the time the suit was 
filed in the fall of 2005.  Alderman corroborated VanMarter’s 
testimony that in the summer of 2005, he moved out of her home 
located in the City of Roanoke.  VanMarter also completed a 
change of address form in order to receive mail at his home in 
Roanoke County.  The fact that VanMarter continued to receive 
some mail at Alderman’s home, retained a key to her home, and 
stored personal property there did not contradict his 
testimony that he resided in Roanoke County before Guthrie 
filed the present action. 
The record also supports the circuit court’s conclusion 
that VanMarter did not regularly conduct substantial business 
activity in the City of Roanoke.  Although VanMarter testified 
about his enrollment in classes at a community college in the 
City of Roanoke, the record does not provide any further 
details about these classes and does not indicate that they 
were related to his work as a police officer. 
The evidence also showed that VanMarter entered the City 
of Roanoke to pursue personal and recreational interests, 
including dining at restaurants, shopping, and attending 
movies.  VanMarter also drove on roads located in the City on 
his way to work as a police officer in Roanoke County.  
 
19
However, these transient activities, considered as a whole, do 
not constitute substantial business activity. 
Nevertheless, Guthrie asserts that he satisfied the test 
of conducting substantial business activity in the City 
because, under a certain Roanoke City ordinance, VanMarter was 
authorized to perform some law enforcement functions in the 
City.  We do not consider this argument, however, because 
Guthrie did not raise it before the circuit court.  Guthrie’s 
failure to do so prohibits us from considering this argument 
for the first time on appeal.  See Rule 5:25; Green v. Va. 
State Bar, 278 Va. 162, 178, 677 S.E.2d 227, 235 (2009); 
Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 248, 682 S.E.2d 535, 543 (2009).  
Therefore, we hold that the record before us supports the 
circuit court’s discretionary decision transferring venue to 
Roanoke County. 
VI. Jurors 
We next consider Guthrie’s arguments related to the 
circuit court’s seating of certain jurors.  At the beginning 
of the voir dire, the circuit court asked the potential jurors 
whether they knew of any reason that they could not give a 
fair and impartial trial to the parties based solely on the 
law and the evidence.  All the potential jurors responded, 
“No.”  The court also asked whether the veniremen were aware 
 
20
of any bias or prejudice for or against any of the parties, to 
which they all responded, “No.” 
When questioned by Guthrie’s counsel about whether any 
potential jurors had any involvement with the law firm 
representing VanMarter, Juror Tuckwiller stated that his 
sister worked for that firm.  Tuckwiller explained that he 
does not discuss his sister’s work with her and that his 
relationship with her would not make it “difficult” for him to 
“decide this case.” 
Regarding whether any of the potential jurors worked with 
or came into contact with police officers, Juror Harris stated 
that she attends church weekly with two police officers.  In 
response to a question by counsel, Juror Harris stated that 
she did not know whether it would “bother” her to serve as a 
juror in case against a police officer, and that “[m]aybe 
[she] shouldn’t [sit on the case].”  When questioned further, 
Juror Harris stated that “it might” be a “little difficult” 
for her to serve as a juror and that if a verdict were 
rendered against the police officer it would cause her “some 
concern.” 
Juror Draper stated that she “probably” agreed with Juror 
Harris, but also stated that she did not “like to do anything 
wrong.”  Earlier during voir dire, Juror Draper had stated 
that she “[didn’t] think” it would be difficult to be involved 
 
21
in the case and that she did not have any “bias [sic] opinion” 
about the case despite her familial relationships with police 
officers. 
In response to questions about whether potential jurors 
believed “it may be unfair to blame” VanMarter for the death 
of Hawthorne, Juror Blankenship stated that if VanMarter “was 
doing his job, I would have a problem with finding him 
personally liable.”  After Jurors Harris and Hodges stated 
that they agreed with Blankenship’s statement, Juror 
Blankenship stated that her position might change if it were 
proved that VanMarter was negligent in performing his job. 
Juror Harris responded to counsel’s question about 
whether the plaintiff’s burden of proof was fair and stated 
that she “wish[ed] it were more [than 51 percent], but if that 
is the law [sic].”  Juror Draper stated that if a person were 
going to be “proven guilty” it “[would have] to be 100 
percent, I would have to feel it in my mind,” but also stated 
that “if that is the law[,] that is the law.” 
Guthrie’s counsel asked whether any of the potential 
jurors believed that they would not bring a lawsuit against a 
police officer even if they felt they had a reason to do so.  
The potential jurors all responded, “No.” 
Guthrie moved to strike Jurors Draper, Harris, 
Blankenship, Tuckwiller and Hodges (the five jurors) for 
 
22
cause.  The circuit court denied the motion.  The circuit 
court stated that while counsel had questioned jurors 
regarding whether they would have a “hard time” serving as 
jurors, the court had observed the panel and determined that 
they would be fair and impartial. 
Guthrie requested permission to conduct individual voir 
dire outside the presence of the rest of the jury.  The 
circuit court refused this request and also refused to permit 
Guthrie to continue his voir dire.  The court noted that the 
voir dire had lasted longer than any felony case over which 
the judge had presided. 
On appeal, Guthrie argues that the “totality” of the 
comments made by the five jurors demonstrated that they were 
not impartial or free of bias and that, therefore, the circuit 
court should have granted Guthrie’s motion to strike them for 
cause.  In the alternative, Guthrie contends that the circuit 
court abused its discretion in denying his request to question 
the five jurors outside the presence of the other jurors and 
to continue voir dire in order to clarify whether the five 
jurors should have been disqualified.  We disagree with 
Guthrie’s arguments. 
Civil litigants are entitled to a fair and impartial 
trial by jury consisting of people who “stand indifferent in 
the cause.”  Code § 8.01-358.  A circuit court has wide 
 
23
latitude in seating jurors because the court has a superior 
ability to hear the responses and observe the body language of 
each member of the venire.  Roberts v. CSX Transp., Inc., 279 
Va. 111, 115, 688 S.E.2d 178, 180 (2010); Juniper v. 
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 400, 626 S.E.2d 383, 408 (2006); 
Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 115, 116, 546 S.E.2d 446, 451 
(2001).  Therefore, we have stated that a circuit court’s 
ruling on a motion to strike a juror for cause will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it constitutes manifest error.  
Roberts, 279 Va. at 116, 688 S.E.2d at 181; Juniper, 271 Va. 
at 401, 626 S.E.2d at 408; Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
823, 826, 553 S.E.2d 731, 732 (2001); Green v. Commonwealth, 
262 Va. at 116, 546 S.E.2d at 451; Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va. 
47, 50, 523 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2000). 
 
The circuit court is required to provide each party a 
full and fair opportunity to determine whether prospective 
jurors “stand indifferent in the cause.”  LeVasseur v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983); 
see Roberts, 279 Va. at 116, 688 S.E.2d at 181.  However, the 
circuit court retains the discretion to determine whether the 
parties have had sufficient opportunity to question the 
prospective jurors.  Juniper, 271 Va. at 396, 626 S.E.2d at 
405; LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653.  Also, the 
circuit court retains the discretion to determine whether the 
 
24
parties should be permitted to question prospective jurors 
outside the presence of the others.  Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 
228 Va. 493, 505, 323 S.E.2d 539, 546 (1984).  Finally, when 
this Court reviews a circuit court’s ruling on the seating of 
a juror, we consider the voir dire of that juror as a whole, 
and do not consider the juror’s isolated statements.  Juniper, 
271 Va. at 401, 626 S.E.2d at 408; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 
267 Va. 178, 191, 590 S.E. 2d 520, 527 (2004); Green v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. at 116, 546 S.E.2d at 451. 
We hold that when viewed in its entirety, the voir dire 
of each of the five jurors demonstrated that they were able to 
serve impartially in the case.  Juror Tuckwiller, whose sister 
worked for the law firm representing VanMarter, expressed 
unequivocally that this relationship would not interfere with 
his ability to serve as an impartial juror.  Juror Blankenship 
initially stated that she might have difficulty rendering a 
verdict against a police officer but quickly qualified her 
statement and reconsidered her position.  Juror Hodges simply 
stated that she agreed with Juror Blankenship’s initial 
response and did not state that she was unable to serve 
impartially. 
Jurors Harris and Draper, who had familial and personal 
relationships with police officers, provided responses that 
were equivocal and tentative.  Juror Harris stated that 
 
25
“[m]aybe” she should not serve as a juror, that it “might” be 
“a little difficult” to serve as a juror, and that she would 
have “some concern” in rendering a verdict against VanMarter.  
Similarly, Juror Draper stated that she “probably” felt 
similarly to Juror Harris, but earlier had stated clearly that 
she held no biased opinions in favor of police officers. 
With regard to the burden of proof, Jurors Harris and 
Draper indicated that they would follow the law even if they 
disagreed with it.  Notably, none of the statements by Jurors 
Harris or Draper indicated that they would be unwilling or 
unable to follow the instructions of the court. 
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to permit Guthrie to continue 
questioning the five jurors or to question them outside the 
presence of the other jurors.  As we have stated, it is within 
the court’s discretion to determine whether counsel has had 
adequate time to question jurors and whether to permit 
individual voir dire.  In this case, the circuit court noted 
that the questioning by counsel was extensive and exhaustive 
and that individual voir dire was not necessary to determine 
that the jurors could serve impartially.  From our review of 
the entire voir dire, we conclude that the record supports the 
circuit court’s determination.  Therefore, we hold that the 
circuit court did not commit manifest error in refusing to 
 
26
strike the five jurors for cause.  See Roberts, 279 Va. at 
116, 688 S.E.2d at 181; Juniper, 271 Va. at 401, 626 S.E.2d at 
408; Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va. 47, 50, 523 S.E.2d 502, 504 
(2000); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826, 553 S.E.2d 
731, 732 (2001). 
VII. Jury Instructions 
We next consider Guthrie’s contention that the circuit 
court erred in overruling his objections to Instructions 3 and 
11.  Instruction 3 stated: “The driver of an emergency vehicle 
may exceed the speed limit provided he is not grossly 
negligent.”  Guthrie objected to this instruction on the basis 
that it failed to inform the jury that police officers are 
required to activate the emergency lights of their vehicles 
when driving in excess of the speed limit. 
The circuit ruled that Instruction 3, when read together 
with Instruction 4, accurately reflected the law.  Instruction 
4 provided, in part: “The driver of a law enforcement vehicle 
may disregard speed limits, while having due regard for safety 
of persons and property, only when the operator of such 
vehicle displays a flashing emergency light or lights, and 
sounds a siren.” 
Instruction 11 provided: “Immediately before entering a 
highway from a private driveway, the driver of a vehicle has a 
duty to stop and use ordinary care to yield to any vehicle 
 
27
that is so near the driveway that the driver cannot safely 
enter the highway.”  Guthrie objected to this instruction on 
the ground that it did not inform the jury that a driver 
traveling in excess of the speed limit forfeits the right of 
way that he ordinarily enjoys when driving on a main roadway.  
Guthrie also offered proposed Instruction C, which the circuit 
court refused, that addressed circumstances under which a 
driver forfeits his right of way. 
The circuit court overruled Guthrie’s objection to 
Instruction 11, stating that this Instruction, when read in 
conjunction with Instruction 10, gave a “full and fair” 
statement of the law.  Instruction 10 stated, in relevant 
part: “Hawthorne had a right to assume that other drivers on 
Chaparral Drive, including [VanMarter], would use ordinary 
care until she realized, or in the exercise of ordinary care 
should have realized, that [VanMarter] was not doing so.” 
On appeal, Guthrie observes that under Code § 46.2-
920(B), drivers of emergency vehicles may exceed the speed 
limit only if their vehicles display emergency lights or sound 
a siren.  Guthrie contends that Instruction 3 misstated the 
law and permitted the jurors incorrectly to conclude that 
VanMarter lawfully could have exceeded the speed limit without 
activating his vehicle’s emergency lights and sirens. 
 
28
Guthrie further argues that based on the evidence at 
trial, the jury could have concluded that VanMarter was 
traveling in excess of the speed limit and, thus, had 
forfeited his right of way under Code § 46.2-823.  Guthrie 
asserts that Instruction 11 should have included an 
explanation of such forfeiture of the right of way, and that 
Instruction 10 did not remedy this error because it too was 
silent on that subject.  Guthrie argues that, at best, the two 
instructions were inconsistent.  We disagree with Guthrie’s 
arguments. 
The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury 
fully and fairly about the law applicable to the particular 
facts of a case.  Castle v. Lester, 272 Va. 591, 605, 636 
S.E.2d 342, 349 (2006); Honsinger v. Egan, 266 Va. 269, 274, 
585 S.E.2d 597, 600 (2003); H. W. Miller Trucking Co. v. 
Flood, 203 Va. 934, 936, 128 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1962).  In 
reviewing the content of jury instructions, this Court’s 
responsibility is to see that the law has been clearly and 
accurately stated, and that the instructions cover all issues 
fairly raised by the evidence.  Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 
277 Va. 127, 131, 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009); Molina v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 666, 671, 636 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2006); 
Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 
(1982). 
 
29
We read the granted jury instructions together and 
consider them as a whole.  Supervalu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 
356, 366, 666 S.E.2d 335, 341 (2008); Miller Trucking, 203 Va. 
at 937, 128 S.E.2d at 440.  The determination whether a jury 
instruction accurately states the relevant law is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 
131, 670 S.E.2d at 722. 
In the present case, Instruction 3 correctly informed the 
jury that VanMarter was permitted to disregard the speed limit 
to the extent that he was not grossly negligent in his 
actions.  While Instruction 3 did not include the 
qualification that emergency vehicles are required to display 
activated lights and sirens when being operated at speeds in 
excess of the posted speed limit, Instruction 3 did not 
misstate the law.  Furthermore, Instruction 4 unequivocally 
addressed Guthrie’s concern that the jury be instructed about 
the conditions under which police officers may disregard speed 
limits, including that they must activate their police 
vehicle’s emergency lights and siren. 
Instruction 11 also provided the jury with a correct 
statement of law and informed the jury that a driver always 
has a duty to use ordinary care.  Instruction 10 informed the 
jury that a driver initially may assume that other drivers 
also are acting with ordinary care.  The issue of forfeiture 
 
30
of right of way presented a legal issue distinct from the duty 
of a driver to exercise ordinary care and, thus, the circuit 
court did not err in refusing to add that principle to 
Instruction 11. 
In addition, we note that the circuit court’s decision to 
refuse proposed Instruction C, which addressed the forfeiture 
of right of way, has not been assigned as error in this case.  
Accordingly, we hold that when all the jury instructions are 
read together, the jury properly was instructed on the issues 
addressed in Instructions 3 and 11 and, thus, the circuit 
court did not err in granting those instructions. 
VIII. Conclusion 
For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal of the 
Hawthorne Estate, and will affirm the circuit court’s judgment 
in favor of VanMarter in Guthrie’s appeal. 
 
 
Record No. 091127 – Dismissed. 
Record No. 091156 — Affirmed. 
 
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