Case Title: JOSEPH P. MAULER v. KEITH TITUS, BILL NATION, AND MIKE GREGORIO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSEPH P. MAULER v. KEITH TITUS, BILL NATION, AND MIKE GREGORIO1985 WY 45697 P.2d 303Case Number: 84-91Decided: 03/20/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH P. MAULER, 
PLAINTIFF,

v.

KEITH TITUS, BILL NATION, 
AND MIKE GREGORIO, DEFENDANTS.

 
 
Harold Frederick 
Buck of Kline & Buck, Cheyenne, for plaintiff.

William D. 
Bagley and Mary L. Scheible of Bagley, Hickey, Evans & Statkus, Cheyenne, for defendants.

Blair Trautwein, 
Amicus Curiae Committee, The Wyoming Trial Lawyers Association, Cheyenne, filed an amicus 
curiae brief.

Before THOMAS*, ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at the 
time of oral arguments.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming certified to this court1 the following question pertaining 
to the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804, W.S. 
1977:

"If an employee is 
injured in the month immediately subsequent to the month of hire and prior to 
the reporting date for the month of hire, how does W.S. § 27-12-103(c) operate 
regarding the potential loss of employer immunity?"

We have agreed 
to answer this question which requires an interpretation of the statutory 
provisions relating to an employer's exposure to suit for failure to pay the 
premiums on an injured employee's earnings.

FACTS

[¶2.]     In late July of 1982, 
defendant Keith Titus hired plaintiff Joseph Mauler to perform plumbing and 
other work in the renovation of the Plains Hotel in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On August 4, 1982, plaintiff 
sustained work-related injuries when a portion of the hotel's ceiling collapsed 
on him. Plaintiff applied for and has received benefits for his injuries from 
the worker's compensation fund.

[¶3.]     Plaintiff brought this 
action in federal district court, alleging that his employer, Titus, a 
co-employee, Bill Nation, and a contractor, Mike Gregorio, caused his injuries 
through their willful and wanton or negligent conduct. Defendants Titus and 
Nation moved the court to dismiss the claims against them or, in the 
alternative, to grant summary judgment, based on their immunity to suit under 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶4.]     In resistance to the 
defendants' motion, plaintiff asserted that Titus had lost his immunity to suit 
by his failure to make timely payments to the worker's compensation fund, as 
required by § 27-12-201(a), W.S. 1977,2 for the months of May, June, July 
and August, 1982. Affidavits of R. Peter Simpson, principal compliance officer 
for the Worker's Compensation Division of the State of Wyoming, establish that 
Titus submitted the disputed payments and payroll reports, together with 
statutory penalties for late payment,3 as follows: 



 
 
 
 
MONTH

 
 
REPORT AND4 PAYMENT 
      DUE

REPORT AND PAYMENT 
      ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM DEFENDANt/EMPLOYER

May, 
      1982

June 15. 
      1982

June 30, 
      1982

June, 
      1982

July 15, 
      1982

August 3, 
      1982

July, 1982 
      

(Plaintiff hired in 
      late July)

 
 
August 15, 
      1982

 
 
October 7, 
      1982

August, 1982 
      

(Plaintiff injured 
      August 4)

 
 
September 15, 
      1982

 
 
October 7, 
      1982

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Federal District 
Court asks this court to determine whether an 
employer, who has contributed to the worker's compensation fund according to the 
above schedule, retains his immunity to suit under Wyoming 
law.

IMMUNITY PROVISIONS OF 
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT

[¶5.]     The Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act represents a compromise between the employer and the employee: 
in exchange for contributing to the compensation fund for the benefit of the 
injured or the heirs of a deceased employee, the employer receives absolute 
immunity from all common-law rights of action in tort for the employee's 
work-related injury or death. Parker v. 
Energy Development Co., Wyo., 691 P.2d 981 
(1984); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 
Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984); Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 
641 P.2d 1235 (1982). Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, as amended in 
1914, authorizes the Worker's Compensation Act and confers immunity upon 
employers contributing on behalf of their employees "as required by 
law":

"* * * As to all extra 
hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation 
and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as 
may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured 
in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as the result of 
such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence 
of the injured employee. * * * The right of each employee to compensation from 
such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of 
action against any employer contributing 
as required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason 
of any such injuries or death." (Emphasis added.)

Section 
27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, restates the Constitution's exclusive-remedy 
provisions:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, 
or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the 
employees are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies 
available to an employee and his dependents against any other 
person."

Section 
27-12-103(c), W.S. 1977, describes the conditions which must occur before an 
employer can be considered out of compliance with the law and subject to 
suit:

"This act does not limit 
or affect any right or action by any employee and his dependents against an 
employer for injuries received while employed by the employer when the employer 
at the time of the injuries has not qualified under this act for the coverage of 
his eligible employees, or having qualified, is either delinquent in the payment 
of premium on an injured employee's earnings for three (3) months immediately 
prior to the date of injury, or one (1) quarterly payroll reporting period when 
privileged to report quarterly. When an employee's employment starts within the 
month or yearly quarter of the date of injury, the status of delinquency or not 
contributing shall not apply until after the regular payroll reporting 
date."

Under the 
express provisions of this statute, an injured employee may sue his employer in 
tort if the employer is delinquent in making contributions on that injured 
employee's earnings for three months (or one quarter) immediately prior to the 
injury. In the event an employee incurs an injury in the month or quarter of his 
hire, "the status of delinquency" applies after the regular payroll reporting 
date rather than immediately prior to the date of injury. In answering the 
question certified to this court, we must determine the statute's application to 
an employee injured in the month following the month of his employment, a 
situation not explicitly covered by § 27-12-103(c).

Plaintiff's 
Position

[¶6.]     Plaintiff focuses on 
the language in Art. 10, § 4 of the Constitution and similar language in § 
27-12-103(a) which says that the Worker's Compensation Act provides an injured 
employee's exclusive remedy against an employer contributing to the compensation 
fund "as required by law." Plaintiff contends that his employer failed to 
contribute as required by law since payments for the months of May, June, July 
and August, 1982, were submitted late, in violation of § 27-12-201(a), supra n. 
2. Therefore, plaintiff urges, his employer was delinquent and cannot claim the 
immunity available to lawfully contributing employers under our worker's 
compensation enactments. Plaintiff rounds out this position by characterizing 
the specific provisions of § 27-12-103(c) as exceptions to the general rule of 
no immunity for noncomplying employers, mandated by the Constitution and § 
27-12-103(a). Since the present employment situation does not fit within the 
circumstances described by § 27-12-103(c), the rule of common-law liability 
controls, according to plaintiff.

[¶7.]     Alternatively, 
plaintiff suggests that the last sentence of § 27-12-103(c) applies to all 
situations where an employee has worked less than three months at the time of 
his injury.5 In such cases, the employer's 
payment record on the injured employee's earnings as of the next regular 
reporting date after the injury would control the employer's immunity to suit. 
Under this theory, an employee who had worked only one month at the time of his 
injury could, in addition to claiming worker's compensation benefits, sue his 
employer in tort if the employer were one day late in paying the premium on that 
month's earnings.

Legislative 
Intent

[¶8.]     A basic tenet of our 
judicial system holds that a statute must be read in light of its purpose. People v. Platte Pipe Line Company, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 208, 212 (1982). We do not think plaintiff's reading of our worker's 
compensation laws comports with the legislative intent in establishing an 
industrial insurance program to provide relief to injured workers. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 
supra; Zancanelli v. Central Coal 
& Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918). 

[¶9.]     Under our rules of 
statutory interpretation, we have a duty to make sense out of a statute and give 
full force and effect to the legislative product. McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1285 (1980). We presume legislative 
enactments to be reasonable and logical, Department of Revenue and 
Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1979), and will 
ascertain intent from the language of the statute whenever possible. McGuire v. McGuire, supra; Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, supra. In addition, we must interpret together statutes relating to 
the same subject to avoid conflicting and confusing results. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, 
supra.

[¶10.]  Section 27-12-103(c), as we have said, 
provides that an employer loses his immunity to suit if he 
is

"* * * delinquent in the 
payment of premiums on an injured employee's earnings for three (3) months 
immediately prior to the date of injury."

For an employee 
injured in the month of hire,

"* * * the status of 
delinquency or not contributing shall not apply until after the regular payroll 
reporting date."

To ascertain the 
legislative intent with respect to an employer's loss of immunity when an 
employee is injured in the month following his hire, we must determine the 
meaning of the term "delinquent" as used in the statute and then decide whether 
the employment conditions expressly addressed by the statute provide a mechanism 
for analyzing varying situations.

Delinquent in Payment of 
Premiums

[¶11.]  Under § 27-12-201(a), supra n. 2, an 
employer who reports monthly must submit payments on or before the 15th day of 
the month following the month for which the earnings are computed and paid. 
Accordingly, an employer who fails to contribute the amount owed by the 15th of 
the month is considered delinquent in the payment of that month's premiums. 
However, § 27-12-207(c), W.S. 1977, affords the employer a means to cure his 
delinquency:

"If any employer fails to 
make any of the payments within fifteen (15) days of the times required by this 
act, ten percent (10%) of the amounts due shall, in the absence of extenuating 
circumstances, immediately be added to the payment due. The penalty is part of 
the payment due for all purposes if suit is instituted as provided in this 
act."

Thus, an 
employer who has missed a regular reporting date may, under this statute, pay 
the full amount due plus statutory penalties and bring himself into compliance 
with the Worker's Compensation Act. By curing his delinquency prior to the date 
of an injury, he can protect himself from liability in tort for that 
injury.

[¶12.]  An analogy may be drawn between the 
contribution requirements of the Worker's Compensation Act and the collection 
provisions of our property-tax statutes, §§ 39-3-101 through 39-3-203, W.S. 
1977. Taxes not paid by the specified due date are considered "delinquent," § 
39-3-101(b), and may be collected through the sale of the owner's property, § 
39-3-102(d). A taxpayer may remove the delinquency, however, by payment of the 
past-due taxes plus interest and prevent the forced sale of his property. 
Section 39-3-102(c) and (d). Indeed, a property owner may cure a delinquency and 
redeem his property within four years after its sale by paying the sale price 
plus specified charges. Sections 39-3-108 and 39-4-102. These provisions reflect 
the purpose of our property-tax laws to secure proper payment to the public 
treasury rather than to punish a taxpayer who misses the statutory due 
date.

[¶13.]  In similar fashion, the payment schedule, 
penalty assessment and loss of immunity provisions in our worker's compensation 
laws are designed to promote prompt, complete payment to the compensation fund. 
We cannot agree with plaintiff that an employer who pays past-due premiums in 
full, together with statutory penalties, remains delinquent for purposes of 
assessing his immunity to suit under § 27-12-103(a) and (c). To so conclude 
would contravene the fundamental policy of the Worker's Compensation Act to free 
employers from liability in tort in exchange for their maintaining a relief fund 
for injured employees. An employer would have no incentive to make a particular 
payment after he had missed the due date by as little as one day, if he would 
still be considered delinquent and potentially liable to 
suit.

[¶14.]  We cannot apply the overly narrow reading 
of § 27-12-103(a) and (c) urged by plaintiff in disregard of an obvious 
legislative intent for a broader reading. People v. Platte Pipe Line Company, 
supra, 649 P.2d  at 213. We hold, therefore, that for purposes of assessing an 
employer's immunity to suit under § 27-12-103(a) and (c), an employer who has 
paid his premiums in full for a given month, plus statutory penalties for late 
payment, is contributing to the worker's compensation fund as required by law 
and cannot be considered delinquent for that month.

[¶15.]  This ruling has the practical effect of 
treating the three-month or one-quarter provision in § 27-12-103(c) as a grace 
period. An employer who has contributed to the benefits fund, even though late, 
for any of the three months immediately prior to the date of injury retains his 
immunity to suit. Stated conversely, when an employer, on the date of injury, 
has failed to make any of the required payments for the three months immediately 
prior to injury, the law presumes a breach of statutory duty to the injured 
employee and withdraws the employer's protection against tortious liability. In 
this way, the employer who contributes monthly loses his immunity to suit under 
the same conditions as does the employer who contributes quarterly.6

Employment for Fewer Than 
Three Months

[¶16.]  Keeping in mind the legislative policy 
that an employer's exposure to suit depends upon his payment record over a span 
of three specified months, we consider the statutory directive to apply the 
"status of delinquency or not contributing" after the payroll reporting date, 
when an employee sustains an injury within the month of his hire. Since no 
reporting date for that employee's earnings has elapsed at the time of injury, 
the statute requires that calculation of the three-month grace period begin with 
the next regular reporting date after the injury. If the employer fails to pay 
the premium due on that employee's earnings for three consecutive months after 
the first relevant reporting date, the employer loses his immunity to suit.7

[¶17.]  Other possible employment situations fall 
within the two extremes expressly addressed by § 27-12-103(c). For example, an 
employee might have worked one or two months on the date of his injury so that 
at least one reporting date covering his earnings would have elapsed at the time 
of injury. In such cases, the status of delinquency must be determined by the 
employer's payment record before and after the injury. That is, measurement of 
the grace period for payment on that employee's earnings would begin with the 
earliest reporting date prior to the date of injury and extend a sufficient 
amount of time beyond the injury to permit assessment of the employer's record 
of contributions for three months.

[¶18.]  By using the foregoing formula, all 
employees and employers receive equal treatment under the statute, regardless of 
the length of time a particular employee has worked on the date of his injury. 
We avoid the unreasonable conclusion that the legislature, in enacting § 
27-12-103(c), intended to afford new employees more generous rights than 
long-term employees to sue their employers in tort for work-related injuries. 
Likewise, we cannot reasonably attribute to the legislature an intention to hold 
a noncomplying employer subject to suit only when the employee incurs an injury 
in the month of hire or after working at least three months. Legislative 
enactments enjoy the presumption of logic and reasonableness. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, 
supra.

[¶19.]  We conclude that the legislature, in 
enacting § 27-12-103(c), established a policy of affording an employer a 
three-month grace period in which to pay the premiums for each employee before 
losing immunity to suit. We conclude further that § 27-12-103(c) furnishes the 
means for calculating the grace period when an employee has worked for fewer 
than three months on the date of injury.

[¶20.]  In the instant case, the employee 
suffered injury on August 4, after beginning work in late July. Since no regular 
reporting date for his earnings exists prior to the date of injury, the status 
of delinquency must be determined after the next regular reporting date after 
the injury. Therefore, measurement of the three-month grace period begins with 
August 15, the reporting date for wages plaintiff earned in July. The employer 
paid these premiums on October 7, well within the three-month period allotted by 
statute. Therefore, the employee's exclusive remedy in this case lies within the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

1 The Federal Court State 
Law Certificate Procedure Act, §§ 1-13-104 through 1-13-107, W.S. 1977, as 
implemented by Rules 11.01 through 11.07, W.R.A.P., authorizes review by this 
court of certified questions of law which may be determinative of a cause 
pending in federal court.

2 Section 27-12-201(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides in part:

"Payroll reports and 
monthly payments required by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] shall be 
submitted on or before the fifteenth day of the month following the month for 
which the earnings are computed and paid."

3 Section 27-12-207(c), 
infra.

4 See n. 2, 
supra.

5 The Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of this 
position.

6 The history of § 
27-12-103(c) evidences the current legislative intent to treat monthly and 
quarterly contributing employers equally for purposes of determining loss of 
immunity to suit. Section 27-53, W.S. 1957, the predecessor to § 27-12-103(c), 
provided that an employer could lose his immunity to suit if he 
were

"* * * either delinquent 
in the payment of premium on an injured worker's earnings for two months 
immediately prior to the date of injury of any employee, or two quarterly 
payroll reporting periods when privileged to report 
quarterly."

In 1975, the 
legislature amended this statute to permit an injured employee's suit if his 
employer were either three months or one quarter delinquent in contributing to 
the compensation fund. Chapter 149, Section 1, S.L. of Wyoming 
1975.

7 An employee may have 
earned wages for only a few days at the time of his injury and may be unable to 
work following his injury. Nevertheless, § 27-12-103(c) entitles the employer to 
three months in which to pay the premium on those earnings before losing his 
immunity to suit.