Case Title: Hixson v. Plump

Citation: 167 Vt. 202, 704 A.2d 1159

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hixson v. Plump  (96-578); 167 Vt. 202; 704 A.2d 1159

[Filed 24-Oct-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-578

Evelyn P. Hixson                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                       Windsor Family Court

Ralph Eric Plump                             June Term, 1997

Alan W. Cook, J.

J. Eric Anderson, Manchester Center, for plaintiff-appellee

Philip M. Johnson, Taftsville, and Norman E. Watts, Woodstock, for 
  defendant-appellant

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Ralph Plump appeals a Windsor Family Court order that
  he pay $1,000 per month to Evelyn Hixson, his former spouse and the mother
  of their two children. Plump argues that (1) under applicable New York and
  Vermont statutes of limitations, the court lacked authority to enter such
  an order, and (2) the court erred by ordering monthly payments without
  entering judgment for the total amount owed by him to Hixson.  We affirm.

       Defendant Ralph Plump and plaintiff Evelyn Hixson married in New York
  State in 1959. The couple's two children were born in 1960 and 1961.  The
  parties divorced in 1973, and under the terms of the divorce order,
  defendant was to pay child support to plaintiff, who retained custody of
  the two minor children.

       In 1981 plaintiff sued defendant in New York's Supreme Court to
  collect past-due child support.  Defendant made a personal appearance, but
  later ceased participation in the litigation. In 1984, the New York Supreme
  Court rendered a default judgment ordering defendant to pay plaintiff a
  total of $63,371.81 for child support arrearages, accumulated interest, and
  costs. Defendant did not appeal the judgment.

 

       As of 1990, defendant had made no payments on the 1984 judgment and
  had also moved his residence to Vermont.  In April 1990, plaintiff came to
  Vermont and sued in Windsor Superior Court to domesticate the 1984 New York
  judgment.(FN1)  Defendant signed a stipulation for judgment "in the amount of
  $96,642.02 as of January 27, 1990, together with interest at the legal rate
  of twelve (12%) percent per annum accruing from that date forward."  The
  court entered judgment for plaintiff on those exact terms.

       Plaintiff thereafter made several unsuccessful attempts to collect
  money from defendant pursuant to the 1990 Vermont judgment.  In 1992 she
  filed a motion for trustee process in an attempt to secure defendant's
  goods and, in 1993, she moved the Windsor Family Court to compel discovery
  of defendant's financial records.  Twice in 1994 the court found defendant
  in contempt of court orders relating to this litigation.

       In November 1995, continuing her effort to collect on the 1990
  judgment, plaintiff filed motions in Windsor Family Court to hold defendant
  in contempt of court under 15 V.S.A. § 603 and to suspend defendant's
  automobile driver's license under 15 V.S.A. § 798.  In its initial inquiry
  on the motions, the family court found that defendant had the ability to
  satisfy his financial obligation to plaintiff, but had theretofore
  neglected to pay the debt.

       On the issue of contempt the court found that defendant's ability to
  pay the debt had not been previously determined by a tribunal, and that a
  contempt order was not appropriate in advance of such a finding.  For the
  same reason, the court declined to suspend his driver's license.  The court
  also interpreted the automobile license suspension statute as more
  appropriately applied in situations where defendant is required to make
  periodic payments, instead of a single payment as under the 1990 judgment. 
  See 15 V.S.A. § 798(b) (suspension of operator's license appropriate where
  obligor fails to make payment on "one quarter of the

 

  annual support obligation").  Accordingly, while the family court denied
  plaintiff's motions for contempt and license suspension, it nonetheless
  ordered defendant to pay plaintiff a minimum of $1,000 per month toward
  satisfaction of the 1990 Vermont judgment and accrued interest thereon.

       Defendant's first argument on appeal to this Court is essentially a
  two-pronged challenge to the family court's order on the theory that
  relevant New York and Vermont statutes of limitations render the order
  unenforceable.  We address these arguments in turn.

       Defendant attempts a collateral attack on the New York judgment based
  on expiration of the applicable statute of limitation.  "A collateral
  attack is `one questioning the validity of a judgment in a proceeding which
  is not brought for the purpose of modifying, setting aside, vacating or
  enjoining the judgment.'"  Bennett Estate v. Travelers Ins. Co., 140 Vt.
  339, 342,