Case Title: In re Wenk

Citation: 165 Vt 562, 678 A.2d 898

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Wenk  (95-486); 165 Vt 562; 678 A.2d 898

[Opinion Filed 30-Apr-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-486

                              APRIL TERM, 1996


In re Craig R. Wenk                  }     APPEALED FROM:
				     }
				     }
                                     }     Professional Conduct Board
				     }
				     }
				     }     DOCKET NO. 95-10


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The Board found that Respondent's negligence caused no actual damage
  and that he paid for his misconduct through the settlement of the
  malpractice suit.   Respondent is remorseful and has cooperated with these
  disciplinary proceedings.  In light of these of mitigating factors, the
  Board's recommended sanction of a public reprimand is approved.



     BY THE COURT:


Dissenting:
				   _______________________________________
_______________________________    John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice
				   _______________________________________
______________________________     James L. Morse, Associate Justice
Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice
				   _______________________________________
				   Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice


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                                 Dissenting


       ALLEN, C.J. and GIBSON, J., dissenting.   The Professional Conduct
  Board found that Respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by not candidly
  answering a question regarding his client's status in litigation in which
  the Respondent was representing the client, and that he knowingly engaged
  in misrepresentation by omission by not informing his client that he had
  lost his interest in property in Vermont by default.  It also found that he
  violated DR 6-101(A)(3) by failing to file an answer to a Petition to
  Partition and by failing to communicate with his client.  It concluded that
  while his initial misconduct was due to negligence he later knowingly
  deceived his client for more than a year and knowingly failed to represent
  him diligently.

       A majority of the Board indicated that had there been evidence of
  actual injury in the case, it would have recommended suspension.  The ABA
  Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) state that suspension is
  generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services and
  causes injury or potential injury to a client, 4.42(a) (emphasis added),
  and when

 

  a lawyer knowingly deceives a client and causes injury or potential injury
  to the client, 4.62 (emphasis added).  The misconduct found certainly had
  the potential for injury to the client and warranted suspension under the
  ABA Standards.

       It is apparent from the Board's opinion that it believed that if it
  recommended suspension that the suspension had to be at least six months
  because of our opinion in re Rosenfeld, 157 Vt. 537, 601 A.2d 972 (1991). 
  The Board felt that a suspension of that duration would be too severe in
  this case.  We did indicate in Rosenfeld that the ABA Standards recommended
  that if a lawyer is to be suspended, the suspension should have a duration
  of at least six months, and imposed a six-month suspension in that case. 
  Id. at 547, 601 A.2d  at 978.  We noted that the rationale in the commentary
  to ABA Standard 2.3 is that a short-term suspension with automatic
  reinstatement is not an effective means of protecting the public and that a
  six-month suspension is needed to protect client interests.  Id.  That
  rationale does not appear to be applicable in this case as the Board found
  that the Respondent was experiencing personal problems and physical
  impairment during part of his representation, cooperated with the
  disciplinary proceedings, is remorseful, and has settled the malpractice
  action arising from his misdeeds.

       In our view, Rosenfeld does not foreclose suspensions for less than
  six months.  Indeed, we imposed a two-month suspension following the
  decision in Rosenfeld.  In re Doherty, 162 Vt. 632,