Case Title: Brickhouse v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 080130

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
LAKEITHA D. BRICKHOUSE 
 
v.       Record No. 080130                   OPINION BY 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA                  October 31, 2008 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the conviction of Lakeitha D. Brickhouse 
(“Brickhouse”) for possession with the intent to distribute 
cocaine as a principal in the second degree. 
 
Brickhouse was charged, in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Portsmouth, with possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute.  Code § 18.2-248.  After a bench trial, Brickhouse 
was found guilty and sentenced to serve a term of five years 
in prison, with three years and six months suspended.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished 
opinion.  Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3128-06-1 
(Dec. 18, 2007).  Brickhouse appeals. 
FACTS 
 
At approximately 2:30 p.m. on May 10, 2006, Portsmouth 
police officers executed a search warrant for a residence at 
103 Lexington Drive in Portsmouth.  The targets of the 
warrant, Garnet Brown and Tywon Wilkins (“Wilkins”) were not 
present; however, police found Brickhouse just outside of the 
 
residence.  Officer G.B. Smith (“Smith”) explained to 
Brickhouse why the police were there and took her inside the 
residence.  Officer Smith testified that Brickhouse told him 
that she knew why the police were there, whom they were there 
for, and that “she wasn’t the one doing it.”  Officer Smith 
also testified that Brickhouse told him that she had, at some 
point in time, seen Wilkins with bags of cocaine at the 
residence. 
While searching the residence, the officers discovered 
thirteen bags of crack cocaine weighing approximately 45 grams 
behind an air-conditioning vent in an upstairs bedroom closet.  
The officers found personal papers belonging to both 
Brickhouse and Wilkins and drug-packaging materials in that 
bedroom. 
Police also discovered a digital scale with cocaine 
residue in the living room, a razor blade on top of a 
microwave oven in the kitchen, and suspected heroin in another 
bedroom.  Additionally, drug-packaging material was found 
throughout the residence.  At trial, an expert witness 
testified that the amount of cocaine, considered along with 
the other items found at the residence, was inconsistent with 
the personal use of the cocaine. 
The only person in the residence at the time of the 
search was a man, identified as a “user,” who was found in the 
 
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upstairs bathroom, approximately fifteen feet from the closet 
where the cocaine was found.  Brickhouse testified that the 
man in the bathroom was the eldest brother of Wilkins and 
Brown and that he had entered the residence to use the 
bathroom.  Brickhouse further testified that he had been in 
the bathroom for about an hour when the police arrived. 
Brickhouse testified that she resided in the home along 
with her aunt and uncle.  Brickhouse stated that Wilkins, her 
boyfriend, had a key to the residence and had been in the 
residence at times without her.  Brickhouse further testified 
that she did not have any knowledge of drugs stored in or sold 
from the residence.  There was no evidence presented 
concerning who owned, rented, or had legal possession of the 
residence. 
The officers did not find anything illegal on 
Brickhouse’s person.  Also, upon testing, her fingerprints 
were not identified on the drugs or the drug paraphernalia. 
The circuit court found the evidence sufficient to find 
Brickhouse guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute as a principal in the second degree.  Focusing on 
the evidence found in plain view, such as the digital scale, 
the razor blade, and the drug packaging material, the court 
found that “[Brickhouse] knew these folks were using her house 
essentially as a drug house, either to stash or to sell.”  The 
 
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Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction stating that “she 
actually provided her home as a venue for the operation of a 
drug distribution scheme.”  Brickhouse, slip op. at 3. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Brickhouse alleges that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to find her guilty of possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine.  When a defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524, 659 
S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 
425-26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998).  However, we will not 
sustain a trial court’s judgment that is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  McMorris v. Commonwealth, 276 
Va. 500, 504, 666 S.E.2d 348, 350 (2008); Jay, 275 Va. at 524, 
659 S.E.2d at 319. 
The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the charged 
crime.  McMorris, 276 Va. at 504, 666 S.E.2d at 350.  
“ ‘Suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a probability 
of guilt, is insufficient to support a conviction.’ ”  Rogers 
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991) 
(quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 
599, 608 (1990)). 
 
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Brickhouse was found guilty of possession with the intent 
to distribute cocaine as a principal in the second degree.  To 
prove that a defendant is guilty as a principal in the second 
degree, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant 
procured, encouraged, countenanced or approved the criminal 
act.  Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 S.E.2d 
886, 888-89 (1983); Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523, 
526-27, 79 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1954).  Evidence of a defendant’s 
mere presence at a crime scene is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction as a principal in the second degree.  Hall v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 536, 303 S.E.2d 903, 904 (1983); 
Augustine, 226 Va. at 124, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Underwood v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978).  
“The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant consented to 
the felonious purpose and the defendant contributed to its 
execution.”  McMorris, 276 Va. at 505, 666 S.E.2d at 350.  
There must be evidence that Brickhouse committed an overt act 
knowingly in furtherance of the commission of the crime, 
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, or that she 
shared in the criminal intent of the principal committing the 
crime.  See id. at 505, 666 S.E.2d at 351. 
 
The Commonwealth does not contend that Brickhouse shared 
in the criminal intent of the principal in the first degree, 
the unknown person who placed the cocaine in the vent.  
 
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Rather, Brickhouse’s conviction is based upon the finding that 
she committed an overt act in furtherance of the crime by 
permitting the residence to be used as a haven for the 
distribution of cocaine or the storage of cocaine intended for 
distribution. 
 
The status of the accused as a principal in the second 
degree may be established by any combination of circumstantial 
evidence or direct evidence.  Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 
96, 100, 18 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1942).  Here, there is no direct 
evidence that Brickhouse gave permission for the drugs to be 
stored in the air conditioning vent in the bedroom.  The 
circuit court’s holding, therefore, is based upon evidence 
that is wholly circumstantial.  Consequently, “ ‘all necessary 
circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and 
inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence.’ ”  Rogers, 242 Va. at 317, 410 
S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 
228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)). 
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the evidence shows that the home in which Brickhouse resided 
contained drug paraphernalia in plain view, such as a digital 
scale with cocaine residue in the living room, a razor blade 
on the microwave oven in the kitchen, and drug-packaging 
materials throughout the residence.  The evidence demonstrates 
 
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that Brickhouse knew why the police came to the residence, who 
they were looking for and why.  Such evidence indicates that 
Brickhouse was aware of the drug activity; however, the 
Commonwealth must prove more than Brickhouse’s knowledge of 
the crime.  See Hall, 225 Va. at 536, 303 S.E.2d at 904; 
Augustine, 226 Va. at 124, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Underwood, 218 
Va. at 1048, 243 S.E.2d at 233. 
 
Brickhouse stated that she lived at the residence with 
her aunt and uncle.  The Commonwealth admits that no evidence 
was presented concerning who had legal possession of the 
residence in which the drugs were found.  Given that the 
principal in the first degree is unknown, and it was not 
proven that Brickhouse had exclusive control and authority 
over the residence where the drugs were found, the 
circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth failed 
to exclude all reasonable inferences inconsistent with 
Brickhouse’s guilt as a principal in the second degree.  Even 
if Brickhouse knew the drugs were being stored at the 
residence, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that she 
is the person who permitted it, as opposed to another 
resident.  Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction of Brickhouse of possession with the intent to 
distribute cocaine as a principal in the second degree. 
 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming Brickhouse’s conviction of possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute, vacate Brickhouse’s 
conviction, and dismiss the indictment against her. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed.