Case Title: Oregon v. McDowell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S060295

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  May 24, 2012 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
STATE OF OREGON, 
 
Plaintiff-Adverse Party, 
 
v. 
 
 
DYLAN CHARLES MCDOWELL, 
Defendant-Relator. 
 
(CC C120639CR; SC S060295) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
 
Original proceeding in mandamus.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted May 9, 2012. 
 
 
Eric M. Buchér, Buchér and Greenspan P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed 
the petition for defendant-relator. 
 
 
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the memorandum in opposition for the plaintiff-adverse party.  With her on the 
memorandum were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor 
General. 
 
 
LANDAU, J. 
 
 
The petition for a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus is allowed.  A 
peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue. 
 
 
 
*On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of Washington County Circuit 
Court, Kirsten Thompson, Judge. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
LANDAU, J. 
1 
 
 
Relator, defendant Dylan Charles McDowell, petitioned for a peremptory 
2 
or alternative writ of mandamus compelling his release pending trial.  He contends that 
3 
he is entitled to release under ORS 136.290, which provides, in part, that a criminal 
4 
defendant "shall not remain in custody pending commencement of the trial of the 
5 
defendant more than 60 days after the time of arrest."  According to relator, he was 
6 
indicted, arrested, and then held more than 60 days, when the state dismissed the charges 
7 
and released him.  Several days later, however, the state reindicted him on the same 
8 
charges and arrested him again.  He contends that the 60-day statutory deadline has run 
9 
and that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to be released under ORS 136.290.  
10 
The state contends that the court did not err in denying relator's motion, because the 
11 
statutory 60-day deadline recommenced upon his rearrest.  We agree with relator and 
12 
issue a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to release relator 
13 
immediately, subject to such terms and conditions as the court deems appropriate. 
14 
 
 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On July 24, 2011, relator was arrested 
15 
for first-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon arising out of an incident that 
16 
occurred earlier that day.  The following day, he was charged by information in 
17 
Washington County Circuit Court Case No. C111574CR, and, on August 1, 2011, he was 
18 
indicted by a grand jury.  Trial originally was set for September 21, 2011, but was reset 
19 
three times, once at the behest of the relator and twice at the behest of the state.  The state 
20 
sought a third reset, but the trial court denied that motion.  On March 16, 2012, at the 
21 
docket call before the scheduled trial date, the state reported that it was not ready to 
22 
 
2 
proceed.  The trial court dismissed the charges under ORS 136.120,1 and relator was 
1 
released from custody. 
2 
 
 
Four days later, on March 20, 2012, a grand jury indicted relator on the 
3 
same charges in Washington County Circuit Court Case No. C120639CR, and, on March 
4 
24, 2012, relator was arrested on the new indictment.  That new indictment charges 
5 
relator with precisely the same offenses as did the original, based on the same incidents 
6 
and the same victim.    
7 
 
 
On April 9, 2012, defendant moved for release under ORS 136.290.    
8 
Relator argued that he already had been held in custody more than 230 days following his 
9 
initial arrest, plus an additional 16 days following the second arrest on the same charges.  
10 
The total, he argued, far exceeds the 60-day limit prescribed by the statute, and "[t]he 60-
11 
day rule does not start over by simply recharging a defendant with the same offenses 
12 
under a new case number."  The trial court denied the motion, concluding that relator's 
13 
most recent arrest triggered a new 60-day period under the statute. 
14 
 
 
Relator then filed his petition in this court for a peremptory or alternative 
15 
writ of mandamus, asserting that ORS 136.290 requires his release and reprising his 
16 
argument that he has been held in custody well beyond the 60-day limit that the statute 
17 
imposes.  The state responds that, although it is true that the statute provides that a 
18 
                                              
 
1  
ORS 136.120 provides, in part: "If, when the case is called for trial, the 
defendant appears for trial and the district attorney is not ready and does not show any 
sufficient cause for postponing the trial, the court shall order the accusatory instrument to 
be dismissed[.]" 
 
3 
defendant may not be held more than 60 days following "arrest," the relevant arrest is the 
1 
most recent one, concerning the indictment on which defendant will actually be tried.  
2 
Because relator cannot be tried on the earlier indictment, the state argues, the arrest on 
3 
that indictment is irrelevant, and the more recent arrest triggers a new 60-day period 
4 
under the statute. 
5 
 
 
Thus, the question before us is whether the 60-day time limit for pretrial 
6 
custody provided in ORS 136.290 begins anew when a defendant is released from 
7 
custody after dismissal of an accusatory instrument, but is charged again with the same 
8 
crimes in a new accusatory instrument, rearrested, and returned to custody.  Our task is to 
9 
discern what the legislature contemplated in enacting ORS 136.290, examining the text in 
10 
context and, where appropriate, legislative history and other aids to construction.  State v. 
11 
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).  Context may include other statutes 
12 
enacted simultaneously with the statute at issue, see Gaines, 346 at 177 n 16, as well as 
13 
prior versions of the same statute.  Harris and Harris, 349 Or 393, 402, 244 P3d 801 
14 
(2010).   
15 
 
 
ORS 136.290 provides: 
16 
 
"(1) Except as provided in ORS 136.295, a defendant shall not 
17 
remain in custody pending commencement of the trial of the defendant 
18 
more than 60 days after the time of arrest unless the trial is continued with 
19 
the express consent of the defendant.  Absent the consent of the defendant 
20 
or an extension under ORS 136.295, the court shall order that the trial of 
21 
the defendant commence within 60 days after arrest if the state is prepared 
22 
to proceed to trial. 
23 
 
24 
 
"(2) If a trial is not commenced within the period required by 
25 
subsection (1) of this section, the court shall release the defendant on the 
26 
own recognizance of the defendant, or in the custody of a third party, or 
27 
 
4 
upon whatever additional reasonable terms and conditions the court deems 
1 
just as provided in ORS 135.230 to 135.290." 
2 
 
3 
The statute refers to exceptions in ORS 136.295.  Among them is provision for some 
4 
postponement for good cause, "but in no event shall the defendant be held in custody 
5 
before trial for more than a total of 180 days."  ORS 136.295(4)(a).  That statute also 
6 
provides that "[a]ny period following defendant's arrest in which the defendant is not 
7 
actually in custody shall not be included in the 60-day computation."  ORS 136.295(5). 
8 
 
 
ORS 136.290 thus provides that the 60-day period begins at "the time of 
9 
arrest.  The obvious purpose of the statute is to limit the amount of time that a defendant 
10 
may be held in custody pending trial.  If the state were correct, then the prosecution could 
11 
frustrate that purpose simply by repeatedly dismissing charges, refiling them, and 
12 
rearresting a defendant.  Certainly in a case in which the prosecution releases a defendant 
13 
and then promptly rearrests him on precisely the same charges on which he already has 
14 
been held well past the 60-day period, we see no reason to read "the time of arrest" as 
15 
anything other than the time of the initial arrest.   
16 
  
 
That reading of the statute is confirmed by its context, in particular ORS 
17 
136.295(5), which was enacted with ORS 136.290 in 1971 as part of the same bill but 
18 
codified separately.  See Or Law 1971, ch 323.  As we have noted, ORS 136.295(5) 
19 
provides that "[a]ny period following defendant's arrest in which the defendant is not 
20 
actually in custody shall not be included in the 60-day computation."  Thus, the statute 
21 
anticipates that some unspecified occurrence could interrupt a defendant's pretrial 
22 
custody.  And, when that happens, the statute provides that the period of time during 
23 
 
5 
which the defendant is not actually in custody must be excluded from the calculation of 
1 
the 60-day limit.  That implies that the time during which the defendant was in custody 
2 
before the interruption does count.     
3 
 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, relator was in custody for 236 days in Case 
4 
No. C111574CR and for an additional 16 days in Case No. C120639CR.  Combined, 
5 
defendant was in custody for 252 days on the same charges at the time of his motion.  
6 
That greatly exceeds the upper limit set by ORS 136.290(1). 
7 
 
 
We conclude that the trial court erred in denying relator's motion for release 
8 
under ORS 136.290 and that relator should be released immediately, subject to such 
9 
conditions as the trial court deems appropriate.   
10 
 
 
The petition for a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus is allowed.  
11 
A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue. 
12