Case Title: Denisyuk v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mark Denisyuk v. State of Maryland, No. 45, September Term 2010
SIXTH AMENDMENT – RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL – GUILTY PLEA –
NOTIFICATION OF IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES – In light of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), under
Maryland law a Defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to
inform him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.  This holding applies
retroactively to all pleas entered after the effective date of the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (effective April 1, 1997).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 45
September Term, 2010
MARK DENISYUK
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
*Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Battaglia, Murphy and Adkins, J.J., dissent.
Filed:   October 25, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
1 The Supreme Court, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010),
uses the term “noncitizen” and we adopt its use here.
2 The Supreme Court noted in Padilla that “changes to our immigration law have also
involved a change in nomenclature; the statutory text now uses the term ‘removal’ rather than
‘deportation.’” Padilla, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 n.6 (internal citation omitted).
Given that the Padilla Court used the term “deportation,” we have opted to use the same term
in this opinion.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants to criminal defendants,
among other rights, the right to the effective assistance of defense counsel.  McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).  We consider in this case whether Petitioner,
Mark Denisyuk, a noncitizen1 who in 2006 pleaded guilty to a deportable offense, is entitled
to postconviction relief based on the claim that his defense counsel was constitutionally
ineffective by failing to notify him of the deportation risks of his guilty plea.  The answer to
the issue posed is governed to a great extent by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010).  In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that it is ineffective assistance to misadvise,
or fail altogether to advise, a client that deportation2 is a likely consequence of the guilty
plea.  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.  The central question to be decided in this case is
whether Padilla applies to Petitioner’s collateral challenge to his conviction, and, if so,
whether he has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to provide proper
advice concerning immigration consequences.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that Padilla applies to postconviction claims
arising from guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (effective
April 1, 1997), and, applying Padilla to the plea at issue here, defense counsel’s failure to
2
advise Petitioner of the deportation consequence of his guilty plea was constitutionally
deficient.  We further hold, based on the record developed at the postconviction hearing and
the court’s express finding on the subject, that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
Petitioner.  He therefore is entitled to the requested relief of vacation of the plea and a new
trial.
I.
On November 2, 2006, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Petitioner pleaded
guilty pursuant to a binding plea agreement to the charge of second degree assault, in return
for a sentence of 10 years of incarceration, with all but two years suspended.  At that
proceeding, the court engaged Petitioner in a colloquy to ensure that the plea was knowing
and voluntary.  The State then recited the factual basis for the plea and the court accepted the
plea.  At a subsequent hearing on December 7, 2006, the court imposed the sentence agreed
upon, and included three years of supervised probation.  The record of the plea hearing
reflects that Petitioner was not advised by defense counsel, the court, or the State, of the
immigration consequences of the plea.  At the time of the conviction, Petitioner was a 31-
year-old Latvian citizen who immigrated to the United States at the age of fourteen.  As a
result of the conviction, Petitioner is facing deportation. 
Petitioner did not file an application for leave to appeal the guilty plea conviction.  On
October 15, 2007, he filed, through counsel, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, seeking
vacation of the conviction and a new trial.  Petitioner asserted two grounds in support of the
petition:  (1) the plea was rendered involuntary by the omission of advice concerning the
3 Counsel explained at the postconviction hearing that he tried, without success, to
obtain from the Harford County Circuit Court a writ to obtain custody of Petitioner, who is
currently incarcerated under a federal detainer.
3
potential immigration consequences of the plea; and (2) the failure of defense counsel to
advise him of those potential consequences of his conviction constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Petitioner was unable to be present at the hearing on the petition.3  He therefore
submitted an affidavit to the postconviction court in which he swore that he would have
rejected the plea offer and gone to trial had he been made aware of the immigration
consequences of the plea.  Petitioner wrote:
In light of the fact that neither my counsel, nor the prosecutor, nor the judge
advised me that I could be deported, I had no idea that the guilty plea would
not only result in my being incarcerated, but that a direct consequence of that
guilty plea would result in the filing of deportation proceedings against me.
***
Had I been aware of the aformentioned immigration consequences I now face,
including an order or [sic] deportation, I never would have proceeded in the
manner I did, rather, I would have exercised my right to a court or jury trial
and any other right or defense which would have prevented the entry of a
conviction for a deportable offense.       
The postconviction court granted Petitioner relief in the form of a new trial, based on
Petitioner’s ineffective-counsel claim.  The court, aware of the standard for identifying
ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilty-plea context, see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985), found that defense
counsel’s failure to advise Petitioner of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea fell
below the range of conduct expected of reasonable defense counsel, and Petitioner was
4 The postconviction court, though granting Petitioner relief on the basis of his
argument that defense counsel had been ineffective, ruled against Petitioner on his claim that
the guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary.  Petitioner did not seek appellate review of
that ruling.
4
prejudiced thereby.  With regard to the latter, the court relied on Petitioner’s uncontroverted
affidavit testimony that “but for trial counsel’s conduct he would not have pled guilty and
would have proceeded to trial.” 
The State filed an application for leave to appeal the grant of postconviction relief.4
The Court of Special Appeals granted the petition on February 9, 2009, set the case on its
regular appeal docket, and, in a reported decision, State v. Denisyuk, 191 Md. App. 408, 461,
991 A.2d 1275, 1306 (2010), reversed the grant of postconviction relief.  Citing caselaw from
Maryland and elsewhere, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that the “line that has
historically been drawn between advice as to the consequences of a guilty plea that is
constitutionally required and advice as to other consequences that is not constitutionally
required, no matter how valuable such advice might be, is the line that separates direct
consequences from collateral consequences.”  Id. at 437, 991 A.2d at 1292.  The Court
followed decisions of federal courts of appeal in concluding that deportation is a collateral
consequence of a criminal conviction and therefore does not fall within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 451-61, 991 A.2d at 1300-
05.  The Court of Special Appeals held:  “The Sixth Amendment does not impose on a
lawyer a duty to inform a client contemplating a guilty plea about collateral consequences
generally or the risk of deportation specifically.”  Id. at 460-61, 991 A.2d at 1305.
5
  
The decision of the Court of Special Appeals pre-dates by two days the Supreme
Court’s decision in Padilla.  The Padilla Court rejected as “ill-suited” the distinction
between consequences of a guilty plea that are “direct” and those that are “collateral” insofar
as immigration consequences are concerned, and the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel requires defense counsel to notify his or her client of
the deportation consequences of the guilty plea.  559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
We granted a writ of certiorari to address the following questions presented by
Petitioner:
1. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, [559] U.S.
___, [130 S. Ct. 1473] (filed March 31, 2010), did the Court of Special
Appeals err in holding that defense counsel can never be ineffective for failing
to advise his or her client of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea? 
2.  Is Petitioner, a Latvian immigrant, entitled to postconviction relief as a
result of his attorney’s failure to inform him of the immigration consequences
of his plea?
II.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.”  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is only realized, though,
if defense counsel provides “effective assistance of counsel.”  McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14
(emphasis added).
 In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test to determine whether
a criminal defendant is entitled to relief as a result of constitutionally deficient representation.
6
“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient . . . . Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  466 U.S. at
687.  To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, a defendant “must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing
professional norms.”  Id. at 688.  The Court explained:  “Prevailing norms of practice as
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like are guides to determining what
is reasonable, but they are only guides.”  Id.  (citation omitted).  To satisfy the second prong
of Strickland, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. at 694.
“[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.  In the guilty plea context,
the prejudice prong of Strickland is established if there  “is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, [Petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.” Id. at 59; accord Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 733, 744
(2011) (explaining that the prejudice inquiry “is whether [the defendant] established the
reasonable probability that he would not have entered his plea but for his counsel’s
deficiency”); Yoswick v. State, 347 Md. 228, 245, 700 A.2d 251, 259 (1997) (explaining that,
under Hill, the defendant who has pleaded guilty and claims ineffectiveness of counsel in
connection with the plea “must show that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
5 There is no doubt that Padilla applies not only to all future cases but also to those
cases that, on the date of the Padilla decision, were pending either in the trial court or on
direct appeal.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (“As a practical matter 
. . . we cannot hear each case pending on direct review and apply the new rule.  But we fulfill
our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively
to cases not yet final.”). See also State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 77 n. 26, 18 A.3d 60, 85 n.
26 (2011) (“Even when applying a holding prospectively only. . . [that] prospective
application of a holding applies also to all other pending cases where the relevant question
has been preserved for appellate review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”).  If a defendant satisfies both prongs of the
Strickland test, then “the Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be overturned
because of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.
Whether Petitioner is entitled to relief by application of the Strickland test to his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel ultimately depends, in part at least, on whether he is
entitled to the benefit of the Padilla decision.  The State, though recognizing the import of
Padilla on current and future cases,5 argues that Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of its
holding.  The State reasons that the Padilla Court announced a new rule of criminal
procedure concerning claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering it inapplicable
to cases, like Petitioner’s, that are on collateral review of a final judgment.  Petitioner
counters that he is entitled to have the holding of Padilla apply to his conviction, thereby
dictating the conclusion that his defense counsel, in failing to apprise him of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea, was constitutionally ineffective.
To resolve the debate and determine ultimately whether the postconviction court was
legally correct in deciding that Petitioner satisfied the performance prong of Strickland, we
8
must examine Padilla.
III.
Padilla, which, as we have noted, was decided two days after the Court of Special
Appeals issued its opinion in this case, goes to the core of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.  Padilla’s conviction of transporting a large amount of marijuana was
based on a guilty plea.  559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.  As a result of that conviction,
Padilla faced automatic deportation under federal immigration law.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).  He sought postconviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel
affirmatively misadvised him that “he did not have to worry about immigration status since
he had been in the country so long.”  559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court of Kentucky assumed the truth of the
allegations and denied relief, holding that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about
deportation because it is merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.”  Id. at ___, 130
S. Ct. at 1478 (citation omitted).  
The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari “to decide whether, as a matter of
federal law, Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he
was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
1478.  The Court answered “yes” to that question, stating:  “We agree with Padilla that
constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug
distribution made him subject to automatic deportation.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
9
The Court began its analysis with the recognition that
[t]he landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the
last 90 years.  While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses
and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation,
immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses
and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of
deportation.  The drastic measure of deportation or removal is now virtually
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.  
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
The Court traced the evolution of this country’s immigration law from its earliest
iteration in the 17th century through the 1996 amendments to the immigration statutes, see
generally The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (effective April 1, 1997) (amending various sections of
8 and 18 U.S.C.) (hereafter “IIRAIRA”).  559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1478-80.  The
Padilla Court found that, unlike in earlier times, when the law had a more limited class of
deportable offenses and greater authority for the exercise of discretion by courts not to order
deportation, 
[u]nder contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense
after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is practically
inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable
discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens
convicted of particular classes of offenses.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. 
***
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of
a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.  The importance of accurate legal advice
for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.  These
changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an
integral part–indeed, sometimes the most important part–of the penalty that
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes.
10
559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (footnotes omitted).  In that same vein, the Court added:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty” but
it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.  Although removal proceedings
are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal
process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of
deportation for nearly a century.  And, importantly, recent changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad
class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.  Moreover, we are quite
confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a
particular offense find it even more difficult.   
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citations omitted). 
For these reasons, the Padilla Court rejected the argument that criminal defense
attorneys need not warn their clients about deportation risks because deportation is a
“‘collateral consequence’” of a criminal conviction and is therefore “outside the scope of
representation required by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court pointed out that it has “never applied a
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally
‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
1481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  And though the Court declined to address
whether a distinction between collateral and direct consequences ever is appropriate in a
Strickland analysis, the Court made clear that such a distinction is “ill-suited” to determining
a claim relating to possible deportation consequences.  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.  The
Court explained:  “Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a
6 See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense
Function (3d ed. 1993), Standard 4-4.1(a) (“Defense counsel should conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.”); id. at Standard
11
collateral consequence.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.   The Court therefore concluded “that
advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.  Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct.
at 1482.
Turning then, to Strickland, the Court observed that “[t]he first prong–constitutional
deficiency–is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community:
‘The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.’”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.
S. at 688).  Such professional norms, the Padilla Court recognized, “as reflected in American
Bar Association standards and the like[,] . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable.”
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 688; other citations omitted).
The Court observed: “The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that
counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”    Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
1482.  (citations omitted).  The Court noted, in particular:  “[A]uthorities of every
stripe–including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender
organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications–universally require
defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients
. . . .”6   Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Court also
4-4.1(a), cmt. at 183 (stating that, “without adequate investigation the lawyer is not in a
position . . . to conduct plea discussions effectively,” and “[f]ailure to make adequate pretrial
investigation and preparation may also be grounds for finding ineffective assistance of
counsel”); id. at Standard 4-5.1(a) (“After informing himself or herself fully on the facts and
the law, defense counsel should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all
aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome.”); ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty (3d ed. 1993),  Standard 14-3.2(f), cmt. at 126-27
(“[D]efense counsel should be active, rather than passive, taking the initiative to learn about
rules in this area rather than waiting for questions from the defendant, who will frequently
have little appreciation of the full range of consequences that may follow from a guilty, nolo
or Alford plea. Further, counsel should interview the client . . . given the client’s particular
personal circumstance and the charges the client faces.”).  See also National Legal Aid and
Defender Ass’n, Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation (1995) § 2.2
(b)(2)(A) (stating that during the initial interview counsel should acquire information about
matters including the client’s immigration status).
12
noted its own previous statements on the subject.  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (“We too
have previously recognized that ‘[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States
may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.’” (quoting INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted))); Id. at ___,
130 S. Ct. at 1482 (“‘[P]reserving the possibility of’ discretionary relief from deportation .
. . ‘would have been one of the principle benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to
accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.’” (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 (citations
omitted))); Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (“We expected that counsel who were unaware of
the discretionary relief measures would ‘follo[w] the advice of numerous practice guides’ to
advise themselves of the importance of this particular form of discretionary relief.” (quoting
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50)).
From all of the above, the Court concluded that “[t]he consequences of Padilla’s plea
13
could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was
presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
1483.  The Court recognized, though, that “[i]mmigration law can be complex” and 
[t]here will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the
deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain.  The
duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited.  When the law is
not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry
a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  But when the deportation
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct
advice is equally clear.
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (footnote omitted).
The Court rejected the argument of the United States Solicitor General (who argued
as amicus in support of Respondent, the State of Kentucky), that Padilla’s trial counsel’s
performance was deficient only to the extent that he gave misadvice about the immigration
consequences of a plea.  The Court found “no relevant difference ‘between an act of
commission and an act of omission’ in this context[,]” because “[s]ilence under these
circumstances would be fundamentally at odds with the critical obligation of counsel to
advise the client of ‘the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.’”  Id. at ___, 130
S. Ct. at 1484 (citations omitted).  The Court added that limiting the focus of an
ineffectiveness claim to misadvice would give defense counsel incentive to remain silent
while also “deny[ing] a class of clients least able to represent themselves the most
rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available.”  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct.
at 1484.  The Padilla Court held: “It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her
14
client with available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so ‘clearly
satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.’” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 (quoting
Hill, 474 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring)).
The Padilla Court was unable to address the “prejudice” prong of Strickland because
the lower courts, having decided (wrongly, as it developed) that deportation is merely a
collateral consequence of a guilty plea and is not subject to Strickland, did not address
whether Petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s misadvice.  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
1487.  The Padilla Court therefore remanded the case for a finding on whether Padilla had
been prejudiced as the result of his counsel’s ineffective representation.  Id. at ___, 130 S.
Ct. at 1487.
IV.
Padilla issued on March 31, 2010, long after Petitioner’s conviction became final.
The question, then, is whether the holding in Padilla applies on collateral review of
Petitioner’s conviction. 
Under Maryland law, 
the question of whether a particular judicial decision should be applied
prospectively or retroactively, depends in the first instance on whether or not
the decision overrules prior law and declares a new principle of law. If a
decision does not, . . . no question of a “prospective only” application arises;
the decision applies retroactively in the same manner as most court decisions.
State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 78, 18 A.3d 60, 86 (2011) (quoting Houghton v. County
Comm’rs of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 220, 513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986)); see Walker v. State,
343 Md. 629, 637, 684 A.2d 429, 433 (1996).  Of particular relevance to this case, we have
7 Our research discloses several reported appellate court decisions holding that Padilla
does not have retroactive application.  E.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 18034 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), Chaidez v. United States, No. 10-3623,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17546 (7th Cir., Aug. 23, 2011), Barrios Cruz v. State, 63 So. 3d 868
15
explained that, “where a decision has applied settled precedent to new and different factual
situations, the decision always applies retroactively[,]” and it is only “where a new rule . .
. constitutes ‘a clear break with the past . . .’” that the question of prospective only
application arises.  Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 577, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982)); accord Warrick v. State, 108 Md. App.
108, 113, 671 A.2d 51, 53 (“The general rule of retroactivity vel non can be stated simply–if
the subject case merely applies settled precedents to new facts, the case is given retroactive
effect, for the case is viewed as not changing the law in any material way.”), cert. granted
but dismissed at request of party, 342 Md. 507, 677 A.2d 583 (1996).
We conclude, for the reasons that follow, that the holding of Padilla, i.e., that the
failure of defense counsel to advise his or her client of the potential immigration consequence
of a guilty plea is deficient performance under Strickland, applies retroactively to all cases
arising out of convictions based on guilty pleas that occurred after April 1, 1997, the
effective date of the enactment of the IIRAIRA.
Since Padilla was decided, a number of reported state and federal appellate decisions
have addressed whether Padilla should be applied retroactively.  Although the decisions are
not uniform in holding that Padilla applies retroactively, we are persuaded that those that so
hold represent the better reasoned view.7
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), Gomez v. State, No. E2010-01319-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 12, 2011), as well as a decision of our own Court
of Special Appeals, Miller v. State, 196 Md. App. 658, 11 A.3d 340 (2010), cert. granted,
___ Md. ___ (2011). 
16
In United States v. Orocio, the Third Circuit concluded, based on Strickland and Hill,
that “Padilla followed from the clearly established principles of the guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel.”  645 F.3d. 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011).  The court elaborated:  “[A]
court’s disposition of each individual factual scenario arising under the long-established
Strickland standard is not in each instance a ‘new rule,’ but rather a new application of an
‘old rule’ in a manner dictated by precedent.  Padilla is no different.”  Id.  Padilla, in other
words, merely followed existing precedent, rather than departed from it, and thereby did not
establish any new rule of prospective application only. 
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Clarke, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that Padilla did not announce a “new rule” and therefore the Padilla holding must be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.  949 N.E.2d 892, 904 (2011).  Citing the
excerpt from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09
(1992) (and quoted by the Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)), the Clarke
Court, like the Third Circuit, explained that “it may be harder to find a ‘new rule’ in a case
where the existing precedent established a general standard that can only be applied after
analysis of the facts of a given case[.]”  949 N.E.2d at 898.  The Clarke Court determined
that the two-part Strickland test provides such a “general standard” for ineffective assistance
8 All of these courts used the retroactivity analysis set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989).  See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011);
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 897 (Mass. 2011); People v. Gutierrez, No. 1-09-
3499, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 717, at *22-29 (Ill. App. Ct., June 30, 2011); Ex parte
Tanklevskaya, No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4034 at *15-19 (Tex. App.
Houston-1st Dist., May 26, 2011).  Maryland has not adopted Teague, nor must it.  See
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008) (stating that Teague “does not in any way
limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to
provide a remedy for a violation that is declared ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”).  Thus,
even if the Supreme Court ever were to hold that Padilla is not retroactive under Teague, that
17
of counsel claims and, therefore, “such claims present the sort of case-by-case application
of a general standard that will rarely create a ‘new rule.’”  Id. at 900.  Accord People v.
Gutierrez, No. 1-09-3499, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 717, at *26 (Ill. App. Ct., June 30, 2011)
(applying the Teague test and stating: “[T]he  Padilla Court simply expanded Strickland to
include counsel’s obligation to inform a defendant of possible deportation consequences.  A
decision that applies an established general rule (Strickland) to a new set of facts
(deportation) is not a new rule.”); see also Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No. 01-10-00627-CR,
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4034, at *16-18 (Tex. App. Houston-1st Dist., May 26, 2011)
(acknowledging that Padilla overturned a substantial amount of Federal Circuit authority,
but concluding nonetheless that Padilla was not a new rule because “the determination of
whether a new rule [is] created is ‘objective’ and the ‘mere existence of conflicting authority
does not necessarily mean a rule is new’” (citations omitted)).  One other court has noted that
Padilla was reasoned like “most” Strickland cases, stating: “[T]he Supreme Court merely
cited to professional standards and expectations and identified competent counsel’s duty in
accordance thereof.”  Tanklevskaya, 2011 Tex. App. 4034 at *18 (citations omitted).8
holding would have no adverse effect on our analysis here.  Indeed, we cite and discuss these
cases because we find persuasive, and subscribe to, the analysis these courts gave to the
Padilla decision.
18
We agree with our sister courts in the Third Circuit, Massachusetts, Illinois,
Minnesota, and Texas that Strickland set forth a general standard for application to a specific
set of facts; that decisions applying the Strickland standard do not establish a rule of
prospective application only; and that Padilla is an application of Strickland to a specific set
of facts.  Padilla, decided on March 31, 2010, instructs that, “[f]or at least the past 15 years,
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on
the deportation consequences of a client’s plea.”  559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.  That
15-year span approximately matches the time period following the 1996 amendments to
federal immigration law that made deportation “practically inevitable” for noncitizens
convicted of removable offenses.  Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing 8. U.S.C. § 1229b).
The Padilla Court explained that those changes to immigration law “dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction[,]” and, as a result, “[t]he importance of accurate
legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.”  Id. at ___,
130 S. Ct. at 1480.   Likewise, all but one of the sources cited by the Court in determining
the “weight of prevailing professional norms” were published in 1995 or later, i.e., within the
15 years preceding the Court’s decision in Padilla.
We therefore need look no further than Padilla itself to ascertain what has been
expected of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment, in connection with advice
19
concerning the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, at least since the 1996
amendments to federal immigration law.  Stated differently, the holding of  Padilla did not
“overrule[] prior law and declare[] a new principle of law.”  Daughtry, 419 Md. at 78, 18
A.3d at 86 (internal citations omitted).  Rather, Padilla applied “settled precedent [i.e.,
Strickland] to [a] new and different factual situation[],” and, therefore, that decision “applies
retroactively.”  Potts, 300 Md. at 577, 479 A.2d at 1341. 
 Consequently, under Maryland retroactivity jurisprudence, Padilla is retroactively
applicable to convictions, like Petitioner’s, that are based on guilty pleas that came after the
effective date of the 1996 changes to the immigration laws.  Because, under Padilla,
Petitioner’s trial counsel was obligated, but failed, to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of Petitioner’s plea, we hold that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient. 
Much of what we have said disposes of the remainder of the State’s arguments for
why Padilla does not apply to Petitioner’s case.  The State argues that Padilla does not apply
because Padilla received misadvice and Petitioner received no advice.  True, Petitioner’s
counsel did not advise him of the possible immigration consequences of the guilty plea.  But,
as we have detailed, the Padilla Court adamantly rejected the Solicitor General’s attempt to
draw the distinction, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, between no
advice and incorrect advice concerning immigration consequences.  See Padilla, 559 U.S.
at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
The State also argues that we should affirm the Court of Special Appeals’ reversal of
20
the postconviction court’s finding of deficient performance, because the Court of Special
Appeals’ analysis “is in accord with the controlling authority at the time of [Petitioner’s]
plea.”  The State points out in its brief that the Court of Special Appeals, in applying the
Strickland analysis, 
thoroughly addressed the long-recognized distinctions between collateral and
direct consequences of criminal convictions . . . [and] concluded, based on “the
dispositive distinction made by the caselaw,” that potential deportation is a
collateral consequence which, unlike a direct consequence, is not a matter as
to which a defendant must be advised before pleading guilty.        
The State, relying on language from Strickland concerning the performance prong of the
analysis, notes that “a reviewing court ‘must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s
conduct[,]’” and “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the
time.”  (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (emphasis added by the State).
This argument, like the others the State advances, fails under the Court’s reasoning
in Padilla.  The Padilla Court applied the same Strickland analysis to a set of facts materially
identical to Petitioner’s.  The Padilla Court recognized that many courts, prior to Padilla,
drew a distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea and, treating
deportation consequences as “collateral,” held that counsel’s failure to inform the client about
such consequences was beyond the scope of what is required under the Sixth Amendment.
Yet, notwithstanding prior caselaw, the Padilla Court had no apparent difficulty concluding
9  We have explained why counsel’s failure to advise Petitioner of the immigration
consequences of the plea was deficient performance, under Strickland and Padilla.  We also
note (though we do not ground our decision on this point) that Petitioner’s counsel should
also have known, when advising Petitioner about the plea, of the requirements of Maryland
Rule 4-242.  At the time of Petitioner’s plea, Rule 4-242 provided in pertinent part that,
[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court, the
State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof
shall advise the defendant (1) that by entering the plea, if the defendant is not
a United States citizen, the defendant may face additional consequences of
deportation, detention, or ineligibility for citizenship and (2) that the defendant
should consult with defense counsel if the defendant is represented and needs
additional information concerning the potential consequences of the plea.  The
omission of advice concerning the collateral consequences of a plea does not
itself mandate that the plea be declared invalid. 
21
that “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction is. . . ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim
concerning the specific risk of deportation[,]” and therefore, “advice regarding deportation
is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”  559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.  In essence, the
Padilla Court’s decision is a recognition and correction of an error on the part of many courts
that for many years had prevented them from applying the Strickland analysis to factual
situations like those presented in Padilla’s, and Petitioner’s, cases. 
Furthermore, Petitioner’s guilty plea, like Padilla’s, post-dated the enactment of the
IIRAIRA when, as the Padilla Court made plain, the prevailing professional norms dictated
that defense counsel advise their clients of the immigration consequences of the plea.  Id. at
___, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.  Petitioner’s counsel was charged, just as was counsel for Padilla,
with adherence to the same then-prevailing professional norms of which the Padilla Court
spoke.9
Md. Rule 4-242(e) (2006).
By its plain language, Rule 4-242(e) mandates that defense counsel, among others (the
court and State’s Attorney), ensure an on-the-record advisement of the immigration
consequences of the plea.  The Rule mandates the advice,  and it charges defense counsel
with the obligation, if not to advise the client himself directly on the record, then, at a
minimum, to ensure that the advice is given, on the record.
Furthermore, as Petitioner points out, the minutes of the April 24, 1998, meeting of
the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure reflect the
intention of the drafters of Rule 4-242(e) to permit collateral challenges, based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, to a plea that did not include on-the-record advice concerning
immigration consequences:
The Vice Chair expressed her disagreement with the fact that if a judge fails
to advise the defendant about the consequences of a guilty plea, no remedy
exists, even if that defendant suffers dire consequences.  Some other states
provide that if the advice is not given, the plea can be invalidated.  The Chair
pointed out that there are two aspects to this.  One is that the defendant can get
postconviction relief based on inadequate advice of counsel.  The Rule says
that the guilty plea cannot be attacked, but does not preclude postconviction
relief.  U.S. citizens may not ask for their pleas to be set aside because the
judge did not give the advice about immigration consequences.  If a particular
defendant is unfairly prejudiced, that defendant’s right to competent defense
counsel should cover this situation.
22
For all these reasons, we reject the State’s contentions and hold that Padilla governs
Petitioner’s case.
V.
We have determined so far that, by application of Padilla, Petitioner’s counsel’s
performance was deficient because it fell below the standard of prevailing professional
norms.  That, however, resolves only the first of the two prongs of the Strickland test.  It
remains for us to determine whether Petitioner has established that he was prejudiced, in the
Strickland sense, as the result of defense counsel’s deficient performance.   We turn now to
that inquiry.
23
To show prejudice, Strickland requires that a defendant demonstrate “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  The Supreme Court
instructed in Hill that, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  474 U.S. at 59.  See also Padilla,
559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (instructing that, “to obtain relief on [an ineffective
assistance of counsel] claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances”).  This Court has interpreted
the “reasonable probability” language of Strickland to mean a “substantial possibility”  that
the result of the trial would have been different.  See Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 375-76,
605 A.2d 103, 107 (1992).
In Hill, the defendant entered a guilty plea and later sought federal habeas relief on
the ground that his defense counsel provided erroneous information about his eligibility for
parole under the sentence agreed upon as part of the plea.  The Supreme Court found no
prejudice for purposes of Strickland, because the defendant “did not allege in his habeas
petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would
have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.”  Hill, 474 U.S. at 60.
Unlike in Hill, Petitioner expressly alleged that he would not have entered the guilty
plea had he been advised of the deportation risk of doing so.  In his affidavit to the
24
postconviction court, Petitioner wrote:  
Had I been aware of the . . . immigration consequences I now face, including
an order or [sic] deportation, I never would have proceeded in the manner I
did, rather, I would have exercised my right to a court or jury trial and any
other right or defense which would have prevented the entry of a conviction
for a deportable offense.     
The State did not challenge the affidavit, nor did it argue that the affidavit was insufficient,
even if credited fully, to establish the prejudice required by Strickland and Hill. 
We are bound to credit a postconviction court’s first-level findings, including findings
concerning the sworn testimony of a defendant concerning whether he or she would have
entered into a plea if defense counsel had performed competently in connection with the plea.
Yoswick, 347 Md. 228, 700 A.2d 251, provides an example.  In that case, Yoswick, after
pleading guilty to attempted first degree murder and kidnaping, sought postconviction relief
by asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel erroneously
advised him regarding the requirements for parole.  At a postconviction hearing, the
defendant testified that, had he been correctly advised regarding parole, he would not have
entered the guilty plea.  The postconviction court did not find the defendant credible:
“Simply stated, the Court does not believe Petitioner’s self-serving statement that he would
not have pled guilty had he known the actual date for parole eligibility.”  Id. at 237, 700 A.2d
at 255.  This Court affirmed the postconviction court, holding that the defendant had failed
to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement.  Deferring to the trial court’s finding, the
Yoswick Court stated:  “[T]he trial court simply did not believe him and we cannot say that
credibility determination was clearly erroneous.”  Id. at 246, 700 A.2d at 260.
10 The fact that the postconviction court made the express finding that Petitioner was
prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance provides one of two reasons why we
decline the State’s request that, if we hold that defense counsel’s performance satisfies the
first prong of Strickland (as we have done), then we should direct a remand to the
postconviction court for further proceedings at which the State is given an opportunity to
present evidence and argument concerning whether Petitioner was prejudiced.  The
additional reason why we decline to remand this case is that the State had the opportunity to
present its own evidence that might have shed light on the credibility of Petitioner’s sworn
statement; the State did not opt to do so.  The State could have argued the weight to be given
to Petitioner’s sworn statement; the State did not do that either.  The State left the
postconviction court with the decision whether to credit Petitioner’s sworn statement, on its
face, and the court exercised its right to do so.  The State is not entitled to the proverbial
“second bite of the apple.”
25
In the case at bar, the postconviction court expressly credited Petitioner’s
uncontroverted, sworn averment that, had defense counsel advised him of the plea
consequence of deportation, he would not have entered into the plea.  We must accept that
fact, as not clearly erroneous.  Our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals viewed the
postconviction court’s finding much the same way.  See Denisyuk, 191 Md. App. at 425-26,
991 A.2d at 1285 (“[W]e would probably have been highly skeptical about [the Petitioner’s]
pro forma representation, even if uncontroverted, were the matter before us.  That is not,
however, our prerogative.  We were not fact finders, and we have no choice but to accept the
facts as properly found by the fact-finding judge.”).10 
The State, seemingly ignoring that the postconviction court expressly credited
Petitioner’s averment, argues that “[t]he multiple charges that [Petitioner] was facing, the
overwhelming evidence against him, and the leniency afforded [Petitioner] as a result of his
negotiated plea arrangement refute his contention . . . that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
26
representation.”  By citing the “multiple charges” facing Petitioner and “leniency” offered
him, the State appears to assume that Petitioner must have considered conviction of fewer
charges and a relatively short period of incarceration to be his top priorities when he entered
the plea.  
The State’s assumption does not hold up in the face of what the Supreme Court
recognized in  Padilla, and we endorse here:  “[P]reserving the client’s right to remain in the
United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”  559 U.S.
at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322).  Petitioner swore that, had he
been given the choice, he would have gone to trial.  The postconviction court obviously took
Petitioner at his word.  From that we must conclude that, had Petitioner been advised of the
deportation risks of his plea, he would have run the risk of significant jail time, rather than
the near certainty of deportation. 
Our conclusion in this regard is far from fanciful.  We are not alone in understanding
that many noncitizens might reasonably choose the possibility of avoiding deportation
combined with the risk of a greater sentence over assured deportation combined with a lesser
sentence.  See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 645 (“For the alien defendant most concerned with
remaining in the United States, especially a legal permanent resident, it is not at all
unreasonable to go to trial and risk a ten-year sentence and guaranteed removal, but with the
chance of acquittal and the right to remain in the United States, instead of pleading guilty to
an offense that, while not an aggravated felony, carries ‘presumptively mandatory’ removal
consequences.”); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“deportation is an
27
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”) (footnote omitted).
Insofar as the State refers to the “overwhelming evidence” against Petitioner to
suggest that a conviction was inevitable and therefore no prejudice existed, the State
misunderstands the focus of the prejudice inquiry in cases involving plea agreements.  The
appropriate determination is not whether Petitioner ultimately would have been convicted
following a trial, but rather whether there “is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, [Petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added); see also Premo, 562 U.S. at  ___, 131 S. Ct. at 744
(explaining that the prejudice inquiry “is whether [the defendant] established the reasonable
probability that he would not have entered his plea but for his counsel’s deficiency. . . ”); see
also Orocio, 645 F.3d at 645 (noting that the threat of removal provides a “powerful
incentive to go to trial if the plea would result in removal anyway” and, given his relatively
young age at the time of the plea agreement, Orocio “rationally could have been more
concerned about a near-certainty of multiple decades of banishment from the United States
than the possibility of a single decade in prison”). 
For all of the reasons we have discussed, Petitioner’s sworn statement that he would
have opted to go to trial if he had known of the likelihood of deportation, which was credited
by the court, established a “substantial possibility” that, had he received the advice required
by Padilla, he would have opted to go to trial.  Cf. Williams, 326 Md. at 382, 605 A.2d at 110
(1992) (concluding that the petitioner’s after-the-fact-statement “that had he been told [by
28
defense counsel] of the possible mandatory sentence, he would have accepted the plea” was
enough to allow the inference that the petitioner “‘may well’ have opted to accept the plea
agreement, [thereby creating] at least a ‘substantial possibility’ that the outcome would have
been different”).  We hold, based on this factual record, that Petitioner satisfied his obligation
under Strickland and Hill to prove that he was prejudiced as the result of his counsel’s
deficient performance.
VI.
In conclusion, Petitioner has satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test for
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.  Consequently, the postconviction court
correctly granted Petitioner the relief of a new trial.  We must reverse the Court of Special
Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and remand the case to that Court with the direction to
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTION TO
AFFIRM THE ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
HARFORD 
COUNTY
GRANTING PETITIONER A NEW TRIAL;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY HARFORD COUNTY.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 45
September Term, 2010
MARK DENISYUK
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
          *Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J., which
Murphy, J., joins.
Filed: October 25, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
I agree with the majority on the application of Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S. __, 130
S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), to the instant case; I disagree with the majority’s
mandate vacating the guilty plea and ordering a new trial merely on a recitation by Denisyuk
that
[h]ad I been aware of the aforementioned immigration
consequences I now face, including an order or deportation, I
never would have proceeded in the manner I did, rather, I would
have exercised my right to a court or jury trial and any other
right or defense which would have prevented the entry of a
conviction for a deportable offense.
 
In essence, the result of the majority’s decision is that a self-serving declaration suffices to
vacate a guilty plea.  I would prefer that the trial court be instructed with this opinion, when
faced with post-conviction allegations pursuant to Padilla, as here, to conduct an evidentiary
hearing, beyond the admission of an affidavit, to determine whether an alien’s decision to
reject a plea offer and proceed to trial “would have been rational under the circumstances.”
__ U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 297.  
Other courts addressing post-Padilla claims have rejected similar self-serving
affidavits as sufficient per se to establish prejudice.  See United States v. Viera, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86290, at *8-9 (D. Kan. 2011) (explaining that Viera’s conclusory Padilla
claim, even if “supported by his sworn statement, is insufficient to show that ‘a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances’”); United States
v. Diaz-Palmerin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37151, at *15 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (concluding that
Diaz-Palmerin’s “self-serving statement that he would have rejected the plea agreement [did]
not suffice to establish that the result of the proceedings would have been different if [he]
2
were aware of the potential immigration consequences”).  
Rather, some of the factors about which a trial court should be concerned include an
individual’s prior criminal history – in the present case, there are allusions to pending
violations of probations for criminal offenses that have not been explored.  The presence of
other criminal offenses may have affected Denisyuk’s alien status with respect to
deportation.  See People v. Bevans, 30 Misc. 3d 1238A, 926 N.Y.S. 2d 345, 2011 NY Slip
Op 50395U, at *15-16 (N.Y. Kent County 2011) (concluding that there was “no reasonable
probability that Defendant would have insisted on a trial under a totality of the
circumstances” where he was already “at risk of deportation,” in part, because “he was
previously convicted of a more serious criminal charge in another criminal proceeding prior
to the time he pled guilty in the instant case”).  
Whether an individual is documented also may be a relevant consideration.  See
Zapata-Banda v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36739, at *39-40 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
(explaining that, because Zapata-Banda had “never been a lawful permanent resident of the
United States,” the “immigration consequence of Zapata’s guilty plea is not that he lost the
right to be in the United States, but instead, that he lost the right to apply to be in the United
States”).  There is nothing in the record to reflect Denisyuk’s status apart from his affidavit,
which states only that he “was not a United States citizen.”  
Other relevant factors may include the strength of the prosecution’s case.  See Santos-
Sanchez v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95442, at *39 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (expressing
doubt that Santos-Sanchez would have rejected the plea and gone to trial where “reality is
3
combined with the straight-forward facts of the case, it appears that a conviction at trial was
very probable,” and even if not convicted, Santos-Sanchez may still have been deported
under the immigration court’s less-exacting evidentiary burden).  Conversely, the trial court
may consider the presence of a viable defense as indicative of prejudice.  See Zapata-Banda,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36739, at *35-37 (after Zapata-Banda failed to articulate a believable
defense, the court remained “completely unconvinced” that his trial strategy “would have had
any impact on his proceedings”).  
Whether the benefit obtained from the guilty plea was substantial also has been a
frequent consideration among trial courts.  See Zapata-Banda, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36739,
at *39-40 (concluding, in part, that because Zapata-Banda did not lose his right to be in the
United States because of the guilty plea at issue, he was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
failure to advise him of deportation consequences).  Curative judicial admonishments also
may be relevant considerations, although admittedly, in the present case, none occurred.  See
Khanali v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45751, at *14 (S.D. Ga. 2011) (finding no
prejudice where trial judge explicitly advised Khanali at plea hearing that “the maximum
penalty could include deportation”); see also Ellington v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38943, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (concluding that Ellington failed to establish
prejudice where, after court asked whether he recognized that his “plea of guilty to the
offense outlined in the indictment” affected his “ability to remain within the United States,”
Ellington answered “[y]es, sir”).  Any other objective indicia that rejecting the plea and
proceeding to trial would have been rational also may be the subject of an evidentiary
4
hearing, such as the length of time Denisyuk has lived in the United States, whether
Denisyuk has family in the United States, the connections Denisyuk has to his home country,
and evidence that Denisyuk knew, or did not know, of the deportation consequences of a
conviction.  See United States v. Dass, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76506, at *16-17 (D. Minn.
2011) (concluding that Dass established prejudice where it was shown that (1) he had family
ties in Minnesota, lacked connections to his home country of Guyana, (2) he came to the
United States while still an infant and spent his entire life in Canada and the United States,
(3) he had at least four children of his own, and (4) his current partner had a five-year old
daughter of her own in Minnesota); see also People v. Williams, 72 A.D.3d 1347, 899
N.Y.2d 438, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 3187, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (crediting Williams’s
girlfriend’s testimony that “she was present on at least four occasions when defense counsel
stated that defendant would not be exposed to deportation proceedings due to his guilty
plea”). 
If a mere self-serving recitation of a non-citizen that he would have rejected the plea
had he known of the potential immigration consequences is sufficient to garner a new trial,
a Strickland prejudice inquiry is eviscerated.  Rather, in a post-conviction setting, the
prejudice prong deserves more inquiry than that given here.
I respectfully dissent.  Judge Murphy has authorized me to state that he joins this
dissenting opinion. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 45
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
MARK DENISYUK
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
*Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   October 25, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
1As the majority correctly observes, we are not bound by the federal standard, but it
is persuasive.  Maj. Slip Op. at 18, n. 8.
2The only federal circuit court to apply Padilla retroactively failed to address the
Supreme Court’s later interpretations of the Teague standard.  See U.S. v. Orocio, 645 F.3d
(continued...)
I respectfully dissent because I believe the better position under Maryland law, under
federal law, and in light of prudential considerations is that Padilla v. Kentucky created a new
rule, not applicable retroactively.  In my view, Padilla should not apply to Petitioner, and he
should not receive a new trial.
It is clear that Padilla created a new rule under the federal standard for retroactivity.1
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court set forth the federal standard, holding that a rule is
“new,” and thus not applicable retroactively, if “the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”  489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 1070 (1989).  In Beard v. Banks, the Court refined the Teague standard, holding that
a rule is new whenever “reasonable jurists could differ as to whether precedent compels [it].”
542 U.S. 406, 416 n. 5, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2000).  Thus, the Tenth Circuit recently held
that Padilla created a new rule because “a reasonable jurist . . . would not have considered
Supreme Court precedent to compel [its result].”  U.S. v. Chang Hong, ___ F.3d ___ (10th
Cir. 2011), available at 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18034, at *18–22.  The Seventh Circuit
reached the same result, holding that Padilla created a new rule because one could not say
that prior cases holding differently had been “unreasonable in their reading of existing
Supreme Court precedent.”  Chaidez v. U.S., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2011), available at 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 17546, at *19.2  Because Padilla created a new rule under the federal
(...continued)
630 (3rd Cir. 2011).  Indeed, the only Supreme Court case cited in Orocio with respect to the
Teague standard is Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 n.8, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2490 (1992),
which held that “a rule is ‘new’ for Teague purposes whenever its validity under existing
precedents is subject to debate among ‘reasonable minds’ or among ‘reasonable jurists’”
(citations omitted).
3
standard, the majority must rely on Maryland’s unique standard for retroactivity, set forth in
Daughtry v. State, 419 Md. 35, 77–81, 18 A.3d 60, 85–87 (2011), to hold that Padilla did not
create a new rule, and thus is applicable retroactively to Petitioner.
The better position, however, is that Padilla creates a new rule under Maryland’s
standard as well as the federal standard, because the rule it overturned was more reasonable
and more widely followed than the rule overturned in Daughtry.  In other words, Daughtry
is distinguishable because Padilla overturned stronger and better-established precedents.
Unlike the rule overturned in Daughtry, which was followed in “some trial courts” and
“seemingly . . . [mis]construed a prior case,” 419 Md. at 80, 18 A.3d at 79, the rule
overturned in Padilla was followed in “every Federal Court of Appeals,” and provided a
reasonable solution to a “uniquely difficult” question. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1482, 1491–92 (2010).
Daughtry affirmed a judgment from the Court of Special Appeals holding that the
defendant’s guilty plea was involuntary because “there was no other evidence (aside from
the fact of representation) tending to show that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered.”  419 Md. at 80, 18 A.3d at 87.  On appeal before this Court, the State argued that
the holding below, if affirmed, would create a new rule because it was “a significant
3State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 424 A.2d 349 (1981).
4Of course, this was the rule in Maryland as well.  Yoswick v. State, 347 Md. 228, 240,
(continued...)
4
departure from . . . Priet,” a case3 sometimes cited as having created a presumption that
guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary as long as the defendant is represented by counsel.
Id. at 78–79, 18 A.3d at 86.  We disagreed.  Acknowledging that it “may well be that
members of the bar and lower courts . . . relied upon and employed the . . . presumption in
accepting or upholding guilty pleas,” we held:
[T]hat ‘some trial courts and members of the bar seemingly have
[mis]construed’ a prior case does not mean that a later decision,
setting forth a proper interpretation, ‘comprise[s] a departure
from the law applicable to criminal causes in Maryland.’” . . . .
Because our decision today is consistent entirely with Rule
4-242(c), its predecessor, and attendant case law, we need not
address the parties’ contentions vis á vis [retroactivity], and we
declare that this opinion must be given full retrospective effect.
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 80–81, 18 A.3d at 87.  Thus, the rule overturned in Daughtry was not widely accepted
and was a mistaken interpretation of applicable precedent.
On the other hand, the rule overturned in Padilla was widely accepted and well
reasoned.  Padilla held that a criminal defense lawyer, to provide effective assistance under
Strickland, “must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.”  130 S. Ct.
at 1486.  This holding overturned the rule, widely followed in the lower courts, that a guilty
plea is not invalid under Strickland solely because the defense attorney failed to inform the
defendant of the risk of deportation.4  Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring).  As the Seventh
(...continued)
700 A.2d 251, 257 (1997) (holding that a guilty plea is not invalid merely because the lawyer
fails to advise the defendant of collateral consequences such as deportation).  Although Md.
Rule 4-242(e) required defense attorneys to advise their clients of “collateral consequences”
of a guilty plea, including deportation, it explicitly provided that “the omission of advice
concerning the collateral consequences of a plea does not itself mandate that the plea be
declared invalid.”  Maryland Rule 4-242(e).  The committee note also provided that Md. Rule
4-242(e) “does not overrule Yoswick . . . .”
5Maryland law, too, recognizes that a holding is more likely a new rule when the
precedent it overturns was widely accepted.  See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
(continued...)
5
Circuit explained in Chaidez, prior to Padilla “virtually all jurisdictions . . . had held that
defense lawyers . . . need not explain collateral consequences, such as . . . deportation.”
___ F.3d at ___, available at 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17546, at *14 (citation omitted).  Thus,
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Padilla characterized the majority’s holding as a
“dramatic departure from precedent” and a “major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,”
observing that “the Court’s view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have
considered the issue thus far.”  130 S. Ct. at 1488, 1491.  Because Padilla overturned such
a strong and widely followed precedent, the best position is that it created a new rule.
Daughtry, therefore, is distinguishable.
Two additional considerations counsel against the retroactive application of Padilla.
First, as the Supreme Court observed in Butler v. McKellar, “[T]he ‘new rule’ principle
therefore validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state
courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.”  494 U.S. 407, 414, 110
S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990).5  I find this consideration persuasive.  To avoid implying that
(...continued)
420, 471, 601 A.2d 633, 658 (1992) (holding that “two major considerations in determining
whether a new holding is to be applied only prospectively are the purpose of the holding and
the extent of reliance upon the overruled cases”).  
6Again, this consideration distinguishes Padilla from Daughtry, which overturned
lower-court precedent that had “[mis]construed a prior case.”  419 Md. at 80–81.
6
practically all judges and practitioners have been unreasonable in their interpretation of
Strickland, courts should recognize that Padilla created a new rule.6
Second, one of the reasons Teague created the dichotomy between new rules and old
rules is that states are unduly burdened when new constitutional rules are applied
retroactively.  As the Court observed,
In many ways the [retroactive] application of new rules . . . may
be more intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions,
for it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order
to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed
to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore . . . [s]tate
courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply
existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover
. . . new constitutional commands.  
(Citations omitted.)
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S. Ct. at 1075. 
I find this consideration persuasive as well.  Petitioner’s guilty plea complied with
then-existing constitutional standards under Strickland.  As Justice Alito noted in Padilla,
“every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the issue” agreed that deportation was
a collateral consequence, and that failing to advise a defendant of it did not invalidate a guilty
plea.  130 S. Ct. at 1488, 1491.  Thus, granting Petitioner a new trial when his plea
7
conformed with a well-established and reasonable constitutional rule imposes an undue
burden on the Circuit Court.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.