Case Title: State v. Alexander

Citation: 2013 WI 70

Docket Number: 2011AP000394-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP394-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Demone Alexander, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 342 Wis. 2d 249, 816 N.W.2d 350 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Carl Ashley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
CROOKS, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY concur. 
(Opinion filed.) 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
by Hans P. Koesser and Koesser Law Office, S.C., Kenosha, with 
oral argument by Hans P. Koesser. 
   
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP394-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF3168) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Demone Alexander, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We are asked to determine 
whether a defendant must be physically present when a judge 
holds an in-chambers discussion with a juror during the middle 
of a trial.  We recognize that a defendant has a constitutional 
right to be present at his trial.  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 
730, 745 (1987).  Whether this right to be present at trial 
encompasses in-chambers meetings "admits of no categorical 'yes' 
or 'no' answer.  A conference in chambers might well constitute 
part of the trial depending upon what matters are discussed or 
passed upon.  Likewise, such a conference might not be a part of 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
2 
 
the trial in the sense of one's constitutional right to be 
present."  Ramer v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 79, 84, 161 N.W.2d 209 
(1968) (citation omitted).  The test for whether a defendant's 
presence is required at an in-chambers hearing, or at a 
conference in the courtroom after the judge has emptied it of 
spectators, is whether his absence would deny him a fair and 
just hearing.  Id. at 85.   
¶2 
The defendant, Demone Alexander, was charged with 
first-degree intentional homicide and his case was tried to a 
jury.1  During the trial, two jurors at separate times approached 
the bailiff to discuss a potential bias issue.  One juror stated 
that she knew a woman in the courtroom gallery, who turned out 
to be the mother of Alexander's child, and another said that he 
knew one of the defense's witnesses.  To resolve the matter, the 
judge held separate in-chambers discussions with both jurors to 
determine the extent of the bias.  Both of Alexander's attorneys 
and the prosecutor were present for these meetings, but 
Alexander was not.  The court ultimately struck the jurors, over 
defense counsel's objections.   
¶3 
Alexander was convicted and sought postconviction 
relief, arguing that he had a constitutional and statutory right 
to be present during the in-chambers discussions.  He argued the 
constitutional right is grounded in the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The statutory right, 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Carl Ashley presiding.   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
3 
 
he alleged, stemmed from Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c),2 which 
provides that "the defendant shall be present . . . [d]uring 
voir dire of the trial jury."  The circuit court denied the 
motion and the court of appeals affirmed.    
¶4 
We hold that the circuit court's decision to exclude 
Alexander from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not 
deprive Alexander of a fair and just hearing.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has outlined, the factors a trial court 
should consider in determining whether a defendant's presence is 
required to ensure a fair and just hearing include whether the 
defendant could meaningfully participate, whether he would gain 
anything by attending, and whether the presence of the defendant 
would be counterproductive.  United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 
522, 527 (1985) (per curiam).  Alexander would not have been 
able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of 
the jurors, and may in fact have intimidated them if he had been 
present.  Additionally, both of Alexander's attorneys were 
present at the in-chambers meetings.  Alexander's absence thus 
did not violate his constitutional right to be present at his 
trial.   
¶5 
We also hold that Alexander's statutory right under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) to be present during voir dire was not 
violated.  Voir dire is a preliminary examination of whether an 
individual can serve on a jury.  In this case, the trial had 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version. 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
4 
 
already commenced and the jurors had already been selected when 
the bias issue arose.  Section 971.04(1)(c) is thus inapplicable 
here.  The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
Demone 
Alexander 
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional homicide in the shooting death of Kelvin Griffin.  
The facts surrounding the shooting are not at issue in this 
case.  Instead, the questions presented center around the trial 
judge's separate in-chambers discussions with members of the 
jury, 
which 
took 
place 
outside 
Alexander's 
presence.  
Accordingly, we recite only the facts relating to those 
discussions.     
  
¶7 
 Near the end of Alexander's seven-day trial, Juror 10 
approached the bailiff and informed him that she knew a woman 
who was seated in the gallery.  The trial judge then held an on-
the-record meeting in his chambers with the juror.  The 
prosecutor and both of Alexander's attorneys were present as 
well.  At the outset of the gathering, the circuit court asked 
Alexander's counsel if she would be willing to "waive the 
appearance of Mr. Alexander for purposes of this?"  The attorney 
replied, "We do."3    
¶8 
The court proceeded to ask the juror how she knew the 
woman in the gallery.  Juror 10 identified the woman as 
"Monique," and said that "[s]he's an old friend of the family.  
                                                 
3 Alexander had two attorneys representing him at his trial.  
To avoid unnecessary confusion and for the sake of brevity, we 
will refer to them as "counsel" where appropriate.   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
5 
 
We grew up together."  As Juror 10 further elaborated, Monique 
"went to school with my sister . . . .  [S]he's really my 
sister's friend."  However, due to a falling out between Monique 
and Juror 10's sister, Juror 10 had not seen Monique in six 
months.  Finally, Juror 10 stated that she did not know what 
Monique's connection to the case was.   
¶9 
After Juror 10 left chambers, the court was informed 
that Monique had a child with Alexander.  Counsel for Alexander 
argued that this fact was not a problem, as Juror 10 "doesn't 
have any idea why Monique is even here.  So if she doesn't know 
anything about it, there's no relationship and no prejudice and 
no bias and no nothing."  The prosecutor, though, argued that it 
would be "dangerous to keep her on the jury" because she might 
discover the connection between Monique and Alexander.  The 
court then ordered Alexander's attorneys to talk to their client 
about his relationship with Monique and his knowledge of Juror 
10's 
connection 
with 
Monique. 
 
After 
an 
off-the-record 
discussion with their client, counsel for Alexander confirmed 
that Monique "is, in fact, his baby's momma.  But he has not 
seen her in sixteen months.  He's not close to her.  [And he] 
does not know the juror.  He's never seen her before."   
¶10 The court put off the decision on whether to remove 
Juror 10 and proceeded to address another potential juror bias 
issue that arose that day.  The defense had just called a 
witness named Jesse Sawyer to dispute the statement of one of 
the State's witnesses who testified that Alexander gave the 
murder weapon to Sawyer to hide.  After Sawyer finished his 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
6 
 
testimony that day, Juror 33 told the bailiff that he knew 
Sawyer.  The circuit court, repeating the process it used 
earlier, invited the attorneys and Juror 33 into chambers to 
inquire on the record as to the juror's relationship with the 
witness.  Upon inquiry from the court, Juror 33 described his 
relationship with Sawyer as one based on a mutual interest in 
Harley-Davidson motorcycles.  Sawyer does custom work on the 
motorcycles, Juror 33 continued, and Juror 33 would "go by his 
house because I'm interested in how he does the bikes because I 
want to purchase me a Harley-Davidson.  I wanted him to do some 
work on my bike."  Juror 33 further stated that he had known 
Sawyer for three years, and had seen him recently at a party and 
at a Harley-Davidson event.  Juror 33 did not, however, consider 
Sawyer a personal friend, but rather an acquaintance he would go 
to if he needed work done on his motorcycle.   
¶11 Following Juror 33's departure from chambers, the 
judge asked each side to state a position on whether he needed 
to be removed.  Defense counsel argued against removal, while 
the prosecutor equivocated: "I'm uncomfortable with any juror 
knowing a witness . . . .  [B]ut I'm not asking that he be 
struck at this time, and I reserve.  If we make it to the end 
with 14 [jurors], I don't know what I would do at that point."4  
The court then decided it would wait until the conclusion of 
                                                 
4 Fourteen jurors were selected so that two could be 
designated as alternates.  If at the end of the trial all 14 
jurors still remained, the circuit court planned to randomly 
pick two to be removed before deliberations.     
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
7 
 
Alexander's trial to determine whether it had to remove either 
juror.   
¶12 After a weekend break, the trial resumed for closing 
arguments.  That morning, however, Juror 10 called another juror 
to report that she would not be able to make it to court that 
day because her boyfriend had been in a car accident.  Juror 10 
subsequently arrived, and the judge decided to conduct another 
in-chambers discussion with her to ask her about the car 
accident and to further inquire into any potential bias 
resulting from her relationship with Monique.  Once again the 
lawyers——but not Alexander——were present.   
¶13 When asked by the court whether she could be impartial 
in light of her relationship with Monique, Juror 10 replied, "I 
definitely can . . . .  I don't talk to her at all.  It doesn't 
bother me.  I'll be able to go ahead and directly have my own 
decision."  The prosecutor asked her why she reported her 
relationship with Monique to the bailiff and Juror 10 replied, 
"I felt it was very important because I didn't know if she was 
going to try to retaliate and try to contact me and ask me about 
some things [about the case] or not."  And in response to 
further questions from the prosecutor, Juror 10 said she thought 
Monique was somehow connected to Alexander's murder trial.   
¶14 The circuit court, pointing to Juror 10's concern that 
Monique might "retaliate" against her, struck her from the jury.  
Defense counsel noted her objection on the record, and the 
discussion moved to Juror 33.  The State requested removal and 
Alexander's attorney objected, stating that "I don't think 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
8 
 
there's any basis on this record for him to be struck for 
cause."  The court sided with the prosecution and removed Juror 
33 for cause based on his relationship with the defense's 
witness.   
¶15 Alexander was found guilty of first-degree intentional 
homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon.  He 
subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing 
that he had a constitutional and statutory right to be present 
when the court questioned Jurors 10 and 33.5  According to the 
motion, the circuit court's in-chambers discussions with the 
jurors violated his due-process rights and his right to a fair 
and impartial jury.  See U.S. Const. amends. VI, and XIV, § 1; 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.  As for the statutory violation, 
Alexander pointed to Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c), which provides 
that "the defendant shall be present . . . [d]uring voir dire of 
the trial jury."  The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning 
that because the in-chambers conversations were not part of the 
jury-selection process, Alexander's constitutional and statutory 
rights were not violated.   
¶16 Alexander appealed and the court of appeals affirmed 
in an unpublished opinion.  State v. Alexander, No. 2011AP394-
CR, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 8, 2012).  The 
court of appeals concluded that because the in-chambers meetings 
with the jurors occurred after voir dire, they were permissible, 
                                                 
5 Alexander raised other issues which are not germane to 
this appeal.   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
9 
 
for Alexander's attorney "was entitled to make the strategic 
decision to waive Alexander's presence at the in-chambers 
meetings with the jurors."  Id., ¶17 (citation omitted).   
¶17 We granted Alexander's petition for review and now 
affirm his conviction, although on different grounds than the 
court of appeals.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 This case requires us to determine whether Alexander 
had a constitutional or statutory right to be present during the 
court's in-chambers discussions with the two jurors.  The 
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory 
provisions are questions of law that we review de novo.  State 
v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.     
III. DISCUSSION 
¶19 We conclude that on the facts of this case, Alexander 
was not denied a fair and just hearing by virtue of his absence 
from the circuit court's separate in-chambers discussions with 
two jurors.  Moreover, we hold that Alexander did not have a 
statutory right to attend the discussions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(c) because removal of the jurors did not occur 
during voir dire.         
A. 
Alexander's Absence From the In-Chambers Hearings Did 
Not Violate His Constitutional Right to be Present at Trial    
1. 
Applicable Constitutional Provisions 
¶20 Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
contain a right to due process.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution prevents a state from depriving "any 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
10 
 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law," while Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads:  "No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law . . . ."  Due process guarantees a 
defendant "the right to be present at any stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure."6  Stincer, 482 U.S. 
at 745.  
¶21 A criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury, on 
the other hand, flows from the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 847, 596 
N.W.2d 736 (1999).  The Sixth Amendment, in relevant part, 
states:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . ."  Similarly, Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense 
                                                 
6 A defendant's right to be present at his trial is also 
rooted in the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.  United 
States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam).  But in 
a situation (such as the one at issue in this case) where the 
defendant is not confronting witnesses or evidence against him, 
the right is located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987); 
United States v. McCoy, 8 F.3d 495, 496 (7th Cir. 1993).   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
11 
 
shall have been committed . . . ."  When "the language of [a] 
provision in the state constitution is virtually identical to 
that of the federal provision or where no difference in intent 
is discernible, Wisconsin courts have normally construed the 
state constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's construction of the federal constitution."  State v. 
Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. 
Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶62, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457 
(determining that the compulsory-process clauses in the Sixth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
are cognate provisions).  Wisconsin courts may also look for 
guidance from lower federal courts in interpreting cognate 
constitutional provisions.7  See Rao v. WMA Secs., Inc., 2008 WI 
73, ¶¶47-50, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220. 
2. 
Alexander's Right to be Present at Trial Was Not 
Violated 
¶22 An accused has a constitutional right "to be present 
during his trial, and his right to be present at the trial 
includes the right to be present at proceedings before trial at 
                                                 
7 "Cognate provision" refers to the parts of a state 
constitution that are modeled on the federal Bill of Rights.  
Stanley E. Adelman, Towards an Independent State Constitutional 
Jurisprudence or How to Disagree with the Supreme Court and How 
Not To, 2002 Ark. L. Notes 1, 1 ("State constitutions typically 
contain 'cognate' provisions which are based on and worded 
similarly, if not identically, to the various guarantees of 
liberty contained in the Bill of Rights of the United States 
Constitution.") (footnote omitted).     
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
12 
 
which important steps in a criminal prosecution are often 
taken."  Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 689, 207 N.W.2d 589 
(1973) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  As for conferences 
during the trial, we have "recommended" that these "rarely" be 
held without the defendant present.  Id. at 690 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  "However, the presence 
of [a] defendant is constitutionally required only to the extent 
a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. . . .  
The constitution does not assure 'the privilege of presence when 
presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'"  Id. 
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934)), 
overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964)).  Furthermore, "whether the defendant has a right to 
attend a conference in chambers . . . admits of no categorical 
'yes' or 'no' answer.  A conference in chambers might well 
constitute part of the trial depending upon what matters are 
discussed or passed upon.  Likewise, such a conference might not 
be part of the trial in the sense of one's constitutional right 
to be present."  Ramer, 40 Wis. 2d at 84.     
¶23 We acknowledge that some of the language in our case 
law has been in tension with the concept that a defendant does 
not have an absolute constitutional right to attend every in-
chambers conference.  For example, in State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 
2d 
560, 
563, 
334 
N.W.2d 263 (1983), the circuit court 
communicated twice with the jury——outside the presence of either 
the prosecutor or defense counsel——during deliberations.  Id.  
The discussions concerned the process for turning over the 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
13 
 
sealed verdict to the court as well as scheduling dinner and 
hotel arrangements in the event the jury could not reach a 
verdict by the end of the day.  Id. at 563-64.  We held that 
"communication between a judge and a jury, while the jury is 
deliberating, outside the courtroom and outside the presence of 
the defendant and defense counsel constitutes constitutional 
error, if the defendant has not waived the constitutional right 
to be present."  Id. at 570.   
¶24 This holding, however, was in direct contradiction to 
our decision just three years earlier in May v. State, 97 Wis. 
2d 175, 293 N.W.2d 478 (1980).  In that case, during 
deliberations the jury asked the circuit court the following 
question related to the charged offense of delivering a 
controlled substance as a party to a crime:  "'By withdrawing 
from a conspiracy has a person removed themselves (sic) from 
aiding and abetting the commission of a crime?'"  Id. at 180 
(quoting the jury note) ("sic" in original).  The court answered 
the question "no," without informing the defendant or his 
attorney.  Id.  Two issues related to this incident were raised 
on appeal: (1) did the circuit court err in answering the 
question in the absence of counsel?; and (2) did the circuit 
court err in answering the question in the absence of the 
defendant?  Id.  As to the first question, we held that because 
"there was no waiver in this case, counsel should have been 
given the opportunity to confer with the court about the 
appropriate response to be given to the jury's question.  It was 
error for the trial court to answer the question without 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
14 
 
notifying counsel."  Id. at 183-84.  On the second question, 
however, we held that, "[a] fair and just trial was not thwarted 
by the court's answering that question outside the defendant's 
presence.  The question posed by the jury dealt with a question 
of law and the trial court answered it correctly."  Id. at 186.  
Additionally, "[n]othing transpired which was prejudicial or 
harmful to the defendant's cause, especially in view of the fact 
that the trial court subsequently reread to the jury the 
instructions concerning party to a crime."  Id.  All that due 
process 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04 
required 
was 
that 
the 
defendant's attorney be present.  Id. at 185-88.   
¶25 As Burton and May are in conflict, we must overrule 
one of them.  We now hold that May is more soundly reasoned and 
more consistent with the precedent of this court and that of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  As we have stated, "the presence of [a] 
defendant is constitutionally required only to the extent a fair 
and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence . . . .  The 
constitution does not assure 'the privilege of presence when 
presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'"  
Leroux, 58 Wis. 2d at 690 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07).  
Adopting a requirement that a defendant must always be present 
whenever a court speaks with members of the jury would render 
the above-quoted language from Leroux meaningless.  More 
importantly, it would impose an unreasonable and unnecessary 
burden upon trial judges, who would be forced to ensure the 
presence of defendants at meetings where they had nothing to 
contribute to their own cause, and where their presence could in 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
15 
 
fact be highly counterproductive.  The Constitution does not 
require criminal proceedings to be undermined so significantly 
in this way, and for so little benefit to the defendant.  That 
is why our better-reasoned case law provides that whether a 
defendant must be present when a court meets with members of the 
jury "admits of no categorical 'yes' or 'no' answer."  Ramer, 40 
Wis. 2d at 84.  All that is required when the court communicates 
with members of the jury is that the defendant's attorney be 
present.  See May, 97 Wis. 2d at 183-84.   
¶26 Our carelessness in Burton also led this court astray 
in State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 
74, a case Alexander relies on heavily.  In that case, the issue 
once again was the propriety of "the circuit court's ex parte 
communications with the jury during deliberations outside the 
presence of the defendant and without notice to or consultation 
with the defendant."  Id., ¶23.  We began our analysis on this 
issue by quoting the U.S. Supreme Court edict that "[o]ne of the 
most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause 
is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every 
stage of his trial."  Id., ¶39 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 
U.S. 
337, 
338 
(1970) 
(alteration 
in 
original)). 
 
The 
Confrontation Clause, however, does not apply when the defendant 
is not confronting witnesses or evidence against him.  United 
States v. McCoy, 8 F.3d 495, 496 (7th Cir. 1993).  As Anderson 
centered on the defendant's right to be present when the trial 
court spoke with the jury during deliberations, its reliance 
upon a Confrontation Clause case was incorrect.   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
16 
 
¶27 We then moved to a discussion of Burton and Williams 
v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 154, 161 N.W.2d 218 (1968), and concluded 
that "an accused has a right to be present whenever any 
substantive step is taken in the case."  Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 
673, 
¶42 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
This 
court 
never 
defined 
"substantive step," but nonetheless concluded——ipse dixit——that 
"[a] substantive step in a trial for which an accused has a 
right to be present includes the circuit court's communications 
with the jury during deliberations."  Id., ¶43 (footnote 
omitted).  For support of this statement we cited to Burton and 
a slew of court of appeals cases relying on that decision.  
Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶43 n.20.  At the end of that string 
cite, though, we tacitly acknowledged but did not confront the 
fact that May and Burton conflicted.  Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 
¶43 n.20. 
¶28 What is more, Anderson never cited to Leroux, nor 
Ramer, which made clear that a defendant has a due-process right 
to be present at an in-chambers meeting only if his absence 
would deny him a "fair and just hearing."  See Leroux, 58 Wis. 
2d at 690; Ramer, 40 Wis. 2d at 85.  With a sleight of its hand, 
Anderson changed what should have been a fact-specific due-
process inquiry (did the communication between the judge and 
jury deny the defendant a fair and just hearing?) into an 
absolute Confrontation Clause right to be present whenever the 
trial court speaks with members of the jury.  We thus withdraw 
all language from Anderson intimating such a right.  See 291 
Wis. 2d 673, ¶¶35-44.       
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
17 
 
¶29 Federal case law also supports our conclusion that 
Burton and Anderson are outliers.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
said that the "mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation 
between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a 
deprivation of any constitutional right.  The defense has no 
constitutional right to be present at every interaction between 
a judge and juror, nor is there a constitutional right to have a 
court reporter transcribe every such communication."  Gagnon, 
470 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
And in a case where the defendants were excluded from a 
conference concerning whether to dismiss a group of jurors, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit put it 
persuasively and succinctly:  "It is clear that there is no 
constitutional right for a defendant to be present at a 
conference in chambers concerning dismissal of a juror."  United 
States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997-98 (3d Cir. 1980); see 
also McCoy, 8 F.3d at 497.  All that the Constitution requires 
at such a conference is the presence of defense counsel.  See 
Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1970).   
3. 
Alexander Received a Fair and Just Hearing 
¶30 While Alexander had no automatic constitutional right 
to be present during the circuit court's in-chambers discussions 
with Jurors 10 and 33, his presence was required "to the extent 
a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence."  
Leroux, 58 Wis. 2d at 690 (citation omitted).  Factors a trial 
court may consider in determining whether a defendant's presence 
is required at an in-chambers conference with a juror to ensure 
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
18 
 
a "fair and just hearing" include whether the defendant could 
meaningfully participate, whether he would gain anything by 
attending, and whether the presence of the defendant would be 
counterproductive.8  See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527.  In a situation 
such as the present case, where a judge is conducting an in-
chambers meeting to determine whether a juror is biased based on 
an account of the juror's connection to the case, the presence 
of the defendant would in no way help to resolve the issue and 
may actually hinder the proceeding.  There was presumably 
nothing Alexander could have contributed on either the subject 
of 
Juror 
10's 
relationship 
with 
Monique 
or 
Juror 
33's 
association with Sawyer, as Alexander has never alleged that he 
was aware of these connections.  In fact, both jurors may very 
well 
have 
been 
intimidated 
and 
deterred 
from 
speaking 
forthrightly about their potential bias with Alexander seated 
only a few feet away.  Cf. United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e doubt whether the jurors would 
have been as comfortable discussing their conduct [in chambers] 
had [the defendant] been present.") (footnote omitted).  This 
concern is particularly acute in Juror 10's case, as she was 
explicitly afraid of "retaliation" from a woman who turned out 
to 
be 
the 
mother 
of 
Alexander's 
child. 
 
Additionally, 
Alexander's attorneys were permitted to leave chambers to speak 
with him whenever they needed his input.  Alexander was thus not 
                                                 
8 This list is not exhaustive, as future cases will present 
circuit courts with facts that cannot be anticipated.   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
19 
 
denied a "fair and just hearing" by virtue of his absence from 
the judge's chambers.9       
B. Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) Does Not Apply  
¶31 Alexander also asserts that he had a right to be 
present at the in-chambers meetings based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(c), 
which 
mandates 
that 
a 
defendant 
"be 
present . . .  [d]uring voir dire of the trial jury."  "Voir 
dire" is not defined in the statute, but Black's Law Dictionary 
defines it as "[a] preliminary examination of a prospective 
juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is 
qualified and suitable to serve on a jury."  1710 (9th ed. 2009) 
(emphasis added).  Other sources define it similarly.  See James 
H. Gold, Voir Dire:  Questioning Prospective Jurors on Their 
Willingness to Follow the Law, 60 Ind. L.J. 163, 163 (1985) 
("During the pre-trial jury selection process known as voir 
dire, criminal defendants often seek to question prospective 
jurors as to their willingness and ability to follow specific 
rules of law.") (footnote omitted); Robert E. Larsen, Navigating 
the Federal Trial, § 4:1 (2012 ed.) ("Voir dire is a preliminary 
                                                 
9  Rather than grappling with any of the factors articulated 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 
527 (1985) (per curiam) to determine whether Alexander was 
denied a fair and just hearing, Justice Crooks nakedly asserts 
that "Alexander's presence at these conferences was critical to 
the fairness of the proceedings."  Justice Crooks's concurrence, 
¶71.  Justice Crooks does not answer what Alexander could have 
contributed to the in-chambers conferences, nor does he address 
the threat that would have been posed to the jurors' candor had 
they been forced to discuss their potential bias issues with an 
accused murderer seated a few feet away.  See Gagnon, 470 U.S. 
at 527.     
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
20 
 
examination of potential jurors by a judge or lawyer to 
determine whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to 
serve on a jury.").   Here, the examination of Jurors 10 and 33 
occurred during the trial and after both had been selected as 
jurors.  The in-chambers hearings were thus not part of voir 
dire.  The court of appeals cases relied on by Alexander 
supporting the proposition that a defendant has a right to be 
present during in-chambers voir dire are as a result inapposite.  
See State v. David J.K., 190 Wis. 2d 726, 735-36, 528 N.W.2d 434 
(Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the defendant had a constitutional 
and statutory right to be present when the circuit court 
privately questioned three jurors in chambers during the middle 
of voir dire); see also State v. Tulley, 2001 WI App 236, ¶¶6, 
10, 248 Wis. 2d 505, 635 N.W.2d 807 (reaffirming David J.K.).10 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(1)(b) protects a defendant's 
right to be present "[a]t trial."  Justice Crooks contends that 
Alexander had a right to attend the in-chambers discussions 
pursuant to that provision.  Justice Crooks's concurrence, ¶58.  
However, Alexander did not make that argument before this court.  
We therefore do not address the question.  See State v. Johnson, 
153 Wis. 2d 121, 124, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) ("This court will 
not consider the issues respondent wishes to have considered 
unless they are asserted in the brief and fully discussed in 
that brief to this court.").   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
21 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶32 We hold that the circuit court's decision to exclude 
Alexander from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not 
deprive Alexander of a fair and just hearing.  Alexander would 
not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's 
inquiry of the jurors, and may in fact have intimidated them if 
he had been present.  Additionally, both of Alexander's 
attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings.  Alexander's 
absence thus did not violate his constitutional right to be 
present at his trial.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Nonetheless, 
Justice 
Crooks 
considers 
the 
issue 
sufficiently pled because Alexander's brief here cites to State 
v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74, and 
"Anderson 
considers 
both 
a 
defendant's 
statutory 
and 
constitutional right to be present 'at trial.'"  Justice 
Crooks's concurrence, ¶47.  True enough.  But Anderson also 
considered "whether the circuit court committed error by failing 
to make a record of or preserve a record of its statements or 
comments to the jury relating to the case" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.13, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶¶77-78, and "whether the circuit 
court erred by refusing the jury's requests to have the 
defendant's and the victim's in-court testimony read to it while 
allowing the jury during deliberations to see and hear the 
victim's videotaped interview."  Id., ¶82.  Alexander cited 21 
other cases in the same brief, each of which presented separate 
issues.  It would be aberrant indeed to consider an issue raised 
because a case cited in a litigant's brief mentioned the 
particular issue.  Appellate courts have higher pleading 
standards than this.  See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 
17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention a 
possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to 
do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put 
flesh on its bones."); Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 
635 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Judges are not expected to be mindreaders.  
Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to spell out its 
arguments squarely and distinctly . . . , or else forever hold 
its peace.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
No. 
2011AP394-CR   
 
22 
 
¶33 We also hold that Alexander's statutory right under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) to be present during voir dire was not 
violated.  Voir dire is a preliminary examination of whether an 
individual can serve on a jury.  In this case, the trial had 
already commenced and the jurors had already been selected when 
the bias issue arose.  Section 971.04(1)(c) is thus inapplicable 
here.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2011AP394-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with and join Justice Crooks' concurrence.   
¶35 I write separately to address the majority opinion's 
misreading of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 971.04(1)(c), majority op., 
¶¶5, 19, 38, 40, and to explain that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
971.04(1)(c) has to be read to give a defendant the right to be 
present "when the jury is being selected."  Here is why. 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) was created by the 
legislature.1  When created, Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) read as 
follows: 
971.04 Defendant to be present. (1) Except as provided 
in subs. (2) and (3), the defendant shall be present: 
. . . . 
(c) At all proceedings when the jury is being selected 
(emphasis added). 
¶37 In 1997, in the exercise of its rule-making powers and 
at the request of the Judicial Council, the Supreme Court (by 
Supreme Court Order 96-08, eff. July 1, 1997) adopted numerous 
provisions relating to juror use and management and amended the 
legislatively created Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 971.04(1)(c) to read 
as follows: 
971.04 Defendant to be present. (1) Except as provided 
in subs. (2) and (3), the defendant shall be present: 
. . . . 
(c) During voir dire of the trial jury (emphasis 
added). 
                                                 
1 § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969 (eff. July 1, 1970). 
No.  2011AP394-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶38 As a result of the Supreme Court's amendment of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(1)(c), a defendant's right to be present is 
stated in terms of "voir dire" instead of "when the jury is 
being selected."  "Voir dire" ordinarily refers to the selection 
of jurors before trial.  If the term "voir dire" is given this 
limited meaning, the Court's change of the legislative language 
curtailed the defendant's legislatively granted right to be 
present at all proceedings when the jury is being selected.  
¶39 Such a curtailment of a defendant's legislatively 
granted right arguably exceeds the Court's powers.  The Supreme 
Court may not promulgate rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify 
the 
substantive 
rights 
of 
any 
litigant." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 751.12(1). 
¶40 Furthermore, it is obvious that the Court did not 
intend the rule to modify a defendant's substantive rights.2  In 
changing the language of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c), the court 
did not have in mind a proceeding in which a challenge is made 
to a juror mid-trial, as in the present case; such a challenge 
is not a usual occurrence.  
¶41 That the Supreme Court (and the Judicial Council, 
which petitioned for the change) did not mean to limit a 
defendant's rights is clearly evidenced in the Judicial Council 
Note appended to Supreme Court Order 96-08.   
                                                 
2 The court of appeals stated that it "perceive[d] no 
substantive change in the statute" as a result of the rule 
modification.  State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839 n.3, 601 
N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No.  2011AP394-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶42 The Judicial Council's proposed change in the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) explains that the change was meant 
to clarify that a defendant has a right to be present only when 
"the jurors themselves were present" and not during the initial 
selection of names from lists, which ordinarily occurs before 
the defendant is charged or the trial jury is selected. 3     
¶43 In light of the legislatively created right of a 
defendant to be present at all proceedings when the jury is 
being selected and the reason proffered by the Judicial Council 
for the change of language in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) proposed 
to the Court, I conclude that the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 971.04(1)(c) (incorporating the Supreme Court rule) has 
to be interpreted to have the same meaning as the legislatively 
created right of a defendant to be present at all proceedings 
when the jury is being selected.    
¶44 In-chambers 
proceedings 
with 
jurors 
present 
to 
determine which jurors will continue to serve on the jury, like 
the one in the instant case, are proceedings during which the 
jury is being selected; in my opinion, the defendant had a 
statutory right to be present.  
                                                 
3 Judicial Council Note, 1996, Wis. Stat. § 971.04:  
This statute [sub. (1)(c)] defines the proceedings at 
which a criminal defendant has the right to be 
present.  The prior statute's [sub. (1)(c)] reference 
to "all proceedings when the jury is being selected" 
was probably intended to include only those at which 
the jurors themselves were present, not the selection 
of names from lists which occurs at several stages 
before the defendant is charged or the trial jury 
picked. 
No.  2011AP394-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶45 With 
this 
explication 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
971.04(1)(c), I join Justice Crooks' concurring opinion.4   
 
                                                 
4 I concur in the mandate because here the defendant chose 
to waive his right (through counsel and his own actions) to be 
present when the jury was being selected during trial.  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(3).  The instant case does not present the 
situation in which a defendant voluntarily absents himself 
during jury selection before trial.  For a discussion of this 
issue that is not presented in the instant case, see State v. 
Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 678-79, 563 N.W.2d 528 (1997); State 
v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Dwyer, 181 Wis. 2d 826, 512 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶46 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  Alexander had 
both a statutory and a constitutional right to be present at 
each of the in-chambers conferences that occurred with sitting 
jurors during his trial for the purpose of determining the 
composition of the jury.  His rights were waived for him by his 
counsel and by his own actions in voluntarily absenting himself.  
The Wisconsin legislature gave him the statutory right to be 
present "at trial,"1 and the in-chambers conferences in question 
clearly occurred "at trial."  Additionally, Alexander had a 
constitutional right of due process to be present at the in-
chambers conferences because the circumstances of this case put 
it into the category of cases where "a fair and just hearing 
would be thwarted by his absence."2  
¶47 I write separately to address a statutory requirement 
that entitles a defendant to be present in a judge's chambers 
when the judge communicates with members of the jury where, as 
in this case, that communication is part of a determination of 
which jurors will continue to serve on the jury.  It would seem 
disingenuous 
for 
the 
court 
not 
to 
consider 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(b) when discussing whether Alexander has a statutory 
right to be present at the in-chambers conferences at issue 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(b).  All citations to the Wisconsin 
Statutes reference the 2011-2012 version.  
2 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934), 
overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
under Section 971.04.  Counsel for Alexander relied on State v. 
Anderson, 2006 WI 77, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74, in both 
his brief and at oral argument.  Anderson considers both a 
defendant's statutory and constitutional right to be present "at 
trial."  
¶48 The statute at issue today is not complicated; it 
simply provides a defendant with the right to be present at 
trial.  In fact, the State agreed that the in-chambers 
discussions in question happened "at trial."  The definition of 
what constitutes "at trial" is settled and uncontroversial, and 
it certainly encompasses the in-chambers conferences at issue in 
this case.   
¶49 The majority errs in concluding that Alexander had no 
constitutional 
right 
to 
be 
present 
at 
the 
in-chambers 
conferences at issue.  In doing so, it abandons principles 
articulated in State v. Anderson,3 which is a longstanding, well-
reasoned precedent from this court.  An in-chambers conference 
that deals with the ability of sworn jurors to continue to serve 
on the jury is an exceedingly important occurrence in a criminal 
trial, and a defendant's absence from it could frustrate his or 
her ability to have a fair and just hearing.  Therefore, I would 
hold that Alexander had a constitutional due process right to be 
present at the in-chambers conferences at issue. 
¶50 Even though Alexander had both a statutory and 
constitutional right to be present at all of the in-chambers 
                                                 
3 State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 
74. 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
discussions concerning an individual juror's ability to remain 
on the jury, he chose to waive those rights through counsel and 
through his own actions.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
correctly denied Alexander's motion for a new trial, and I 
respectfully concur. 
I. ALEXANDER'S STATUTORY RIGHT 
¶51 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04 provides a defendant the 
right to be present during certain enumerated proceedings, at 
trial, and at sentencing.4  This statutory right clearly includes 
a right to be present at trial and at voir dire.  
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 971.04 provides: 
 (1) Except as provided in subs. (2) and (3), the defendant 
shall be present:  
(a) At the arraignment; 
(b) At trial; 
(c) During voir dire of the trial jury; 
(d) At any evidentiary hearing; 
(e) At any view by the jury; 
(f) When the jury returns its verdict; 
(g) At the pronouncement of judgment and the imposition of 
 
sentence; 
(h) At any other proceeding when ordered by the court. 
 (2) A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may authorize 
his or her attorney in writing to act on his or her behalf in 
any manner, with leave of the court, and be excused from 
attendance at any or all proceedings. 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
¶52 We have interpreted the language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04 and explicitly held that the statute provides a 
defendant with enumerated statutory rights and further explains 
when a defendant may voluntarily absent himself or herself. 
State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 679, 563 N.W.2d 528 (1997).  
In Koopmans, the court concluded that the use of "shall" in the 
statutory language means "mandatory" unless one of the statutory 
exceptions found in Section 971.04(2)-(3) applies.5  In other 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) If the defendant is present at the beginning of the 
trial and thereafter, during the progress of the trial or before 
the 
verdict of the jury has been returned into court, 
voluntarily absents himself or herself from the presence of the 
court without leave of the court, the trial or return of verdict 
of the jury in the case shall not thereby be postponed or 
delayed, but the trial or submission of said case to the jury 
for verdict and the return of verdict thereon, if required, 
shall proceed in all respects as though the defendant were 
present in court at all times. A defendant need not be present 
at the pronouncement or entry of an order granting or denying 
relief under s. 974.02, 974.06, or 974.07. If the defendant is 
not present, the time for appeal from any order under ss. 
974.02, 974.06, and 974.07 shall commence after a copy has been 
served upon the attorney representing the defendant, or upon the 
defendant if he or she appeared without counsel. Service of such 
an order shall be complete upon mailing. A defendant appearing 
without counsel shall supply the court with his or her current 
mailing address. If the defendant fails to supply the court with 
a current and accurate mailing address, failure to receive a 
copy of the order granting or denying relief shall not be a 
ground for tolling the time in which an appeal must be taken. 
5  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(2) provides an exception for 
misdemeanor charges and is inapplicable to this case. 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
words, the use of "shall" in Section 971.04 conveys a right to a 
defendant to be present at his or her trial.6  
¶53  As the majority opinion outlines, the circuit judge 
met with two sitting jurors separately and in chambers toward 
the end of Alexander's trial.  All of these conferences took 
place in the presence of the Assistant District Attorney and 
defense counsel, but Alexander was not present for any of the 
conferences.  In the first in-chambers conference, the circuit 
judge questioned Juror 10 about her relationship with a woman 
that the juror had recognized in the courtroom's gallery.  The 
second 
in-chambers 
conference 
involved 
Juror 
33. 
 
After 
observing a particular witness's testimony, this juror indicated 
that he and the witness were acquainted.  In a third in-chambers 
conference, the court posed additional questions to juror 10 
regarding her relationship with the woman she knew who had been 
observing the trial.  All three of the conferences occurred 
after the jury had been sworn and, in fact, dealt with questions 
surrounding whether the two particular sitting jurors could 
continue their jury service.   
¶54 The separate in-chambers conferences with two sitting 
jurors at issue today certainly took place during Alexander's 
trial.  We have previously defined the meaning of trial for the 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(b).  State v. Anderson, 2006 
                                                 
6 Whether Alexander waived his right to be present at trial 
ultimately 
depends 
on 
whether 
he 
“voluntarily 
absent[ed] 
himself” from his trial as permitted by Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3). 
I am satisfied that Alexander did, in fact, voluntarily absent 
himself from the in-chambers conferences at issue here.  
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
WI 77, ¶42, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74.  In Anderson, the 
court defined trial as beginning with "the commencement of jury 
selection" and going "through the final discharge of the jury 
and at any time an action is taken affecting the accused." Id. 
(citing Williams v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 154, 160, 161 N.W.2d 218 
(1968)); see also State v. Miller, 197 Wis. 2d 518, 521-22, 541 
N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]n a jury trial, 'the beginning 
of the trial' occurs when jeopardy attaches; i.e., 'when the 
selection of the jury has been completed and the jury sworn.'") 
and Wis. Stat. § 972.07(2) (explaining that jeopardy attaches 
"when the selection of the jury has been completed and the jury 
sworn").  These definitions vary slightly, but both clearly 
comport with the common understanding of the meaning of a trial.  
In addition, both definitions squarely place the in-chambers 
conferences at issue, which occurred after the jury had been 
sworn in and before the jury had been discharged, as occurring 
during Alexander's trial.  Furthermore, the State's brief agreed 
that the in-chambers conferences at issue occurred "at trial" 
within the meaning of Section 971.04(1)(b). 
¶55 We have never held that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(b) does 
not or cannot encompass circumstances where a circuit court 
communicates with individual members of the jury for purposes of 
determining whether these individual jurors will remain on the 
jury.  In May v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 175, 293 N.W.2d 478 (1980), 
this 
court 
considered 
whether 
Section 
971.04 
requires 
a 
defendant's presence for the court to respond to questions posed 
by a deliberating jury.  The jury's question concerned the 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
"withdrawing from a conspiracy."  Id. at 180.  May held that 
"the communication between the judge and jury related to a 
question of law, and therefore the defendant's absence at the 
time of the communication did not result in a non-compliance 
with the provisions of sec. 971.04."  Id. at 188.  
¶56 The holding in May simply provides that a defendant's 
statutory right to be present during trial does not extend to 
communications between a judge and juror or jury when that 
communication relates to a pure question of law submitted to the 
court by a deliberating jury, and thus May is inapplicable to 
this case.  Here, the in-chambers conferences that occurred 
between the circuit judge and the individual jurors did not 
relate to a pure question of law.  While the in-chambers 
conferences at issue in this case could be viewed as presenting 
a mixed question of law and fact to the circuit judge, the 
conferences did not concern a pure question of law and did not 
originate from the deliberating jury.  Therefore, May is clearly 
not controlling in this case.  
¶57 The facts in May can be further distinguished from the 
circumstances of this case.  As noted, in May the court applied 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04 to communications between a court and a 
deliberating jury regarding a pure question of law.  In 
contrast, the case at hand deals with three in-chambers 
conferences each with an individual sitting juror to consider 
the appropriateness of each such juror continuing his or her 
jury service.  The communications between the judge and the 
deliberating jury in May regarding a pure question of law merely 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
required the judge to communicate a yes or no answer to the 
jury.  In contrast, the in-chambers conferences at issue today 
relate to the composition of the jury, an issue of great 
importance to any defendant.  Communications between a judge and 
juror(s) that could affect the jury's composition are distinct 
from communications between a judge and a deliberating jury 
relating to a pure question of law.  These factual distinctions 
further support the conclusion that the statutory limitation 
presented in May should not extend to this case.  
¶58 I 
agree 
with 
the 
State 
that 
the 
in-chambers 
discussions with jurors at issue occurred "at trial" for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 971.04.  I would therefore hold that a 
defendant has a clear statutory right under Section 971.04 to be 
present at in-chambers discussions with jurors that occur during 
the defendant's trial when those in-chambers conferences concern 
the appropriateness of sitting jurors continuing their jury 
service. 
¶59 While Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(b) provides a defendant 
with a statutory right to be present at trial, which encompasses 
all of the in-chambers conferences at issue here, there is a 
statutory exception to this right that is applicable to this 
case. Under Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3) a defendant may voluntarily 
absent himself or herself from trial, as long as he or she was 
present at the start of the trial.  Here, the record indicates 
that Alexander did, in fact, voluntarily absent himself from all 
three in-chambers conferences.   
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
¶60 The record indicates that Alexander knew about each of 
the in-chambers conferences that occurred with the two jurors.  
In addition, there is no indication that Alexander objected to 
being absent from any of the conferences.  Defense counsel 
represented Alexander in each of the conferences and during the 
first in-chambers conference waived the defendant's presence 
when asked by the circuit judge.  A similar colloquy between the 
circuit judge and Alexander's attorney does not appear on the 
record 
in 
reference 
to 
either 
of 
the 
other 
in-chambers 
conferences; however, there is no indication that Alexander 
asserted his right to be present in the second or third 
conference.   
¶61 The 
record 
indicates 
that 
Alexander's 
attorney 
conferred with him privately in reference to the in-chambers 
conference with Juror 10.  Additionally, the record reflects 
that Alexander's attorney informed him of the information 
discussed in the first and second in-chambers conferences.  
Although the record does not disclose Alexander's conversations 
about the third in-chambers conference with his attorney, there 
is no indication that Alexander did anything other than 
voluntarily 
absent 
himself 
from 
the 
third 
in-chambers 
conference, just as he had for the prior two conferences.  
Strong inferences to that effect can properly be drawn from the 
facts of record.   
¶62 Although I would hold that Alexander had a statutory 
right to be present at the in-chambers conferences that took 
place during his trial, I believe the record demonstrates that 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
Alexander waived his statutory right by voluntarily absenting 
himself knowing that his counsel would be present. 
II. ALEXANDER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
¶63 As the majority opinion indicates, the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution both provide a defendant with a right to be present 
at trial.  Majority op. ¶20.  The United States Supreme Court 
has characterized a defendant's due process right as a right to 
be present at trial where "a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by his absence."  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
108 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1 (1964).  I write separately to emphasize that an in-
chambers conference that deals with the ability of sworn jurors 
to continue to serve on the jury is an exceedingly important 
occurrence in a criminal trial, and a defendant's absence from 
it could frustrate his or her ability to have a fair and just 
hearing.  Therefore, I would hold that Alexander had a 
constitutional due process right to be present at the in-
chambers conferences at issue but that he ultimately waived that 
right. 
¶64    Wisconsin case law recognizes that a defendant may 
have a due process right to be present during an in-chambers 
conference depending on what is discussed during the conference. 
Ramer v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 79, 84-85, 161 N.W.2d 209 (1968). In 
Ramer, this court held that a defendant's due process right to 
be present at trial did not extend to proceedings that involved 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
questions of law because fairness would not be thwarted by a 
defendant's absence at proceedings that involved pure questions 
of law.  See id. at 85; see also May, 97 Wis. 2d at 186 
(providing that a fair and just trial occurred even though the 
court answered a question of law from the jury in the 
defendant's absence).  In doing so, however, this court has also 
stated "that conferences of the court and attorneys outside the 
presence of the accused should be rarely held during the trial." 
Ramer, 40 Wis. 2d at 85 (emphasis added). 
¶65 Here, the in-chambers conferences did not deal with 
any questions of law.  Instead these conferences pertained to 
the appropriateness of sitting jurors continuing to serve on the 
jury.  The conferences at issue are quite unlike the questions 
of law that the court answered outside of the defendant's 
presence in Ramer and May.  I would, consistent with Anderson, 
hold that a defendant has a constitutional due process right to 
be at in-chambers conferences dealing with the continuing 
service of sitting jury members that could ultimately affect the 
composition of the jury.  These types of conferences could 
result in an unjust or unfair trial if held without the 
defendant's presence, unless the defendant has waived his or her 
constitutional right to be present. 
¶66 In Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶37, this court also 
addressed a defendant's constitutional right to be present at 
his or her criminal trial.  Specifically, we confronted the 
issue of whether communication between the circuit court and a 
deliberating jury, outside the presence of the defendant, 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
violated the defendant's constitutional right to be present at 
his trial. Id. at ¶¶35-40.  The communication between the 
circuit judge and the deliberating jury involved numerous 
questions from the jury regarding exhibits and the possibility 
of having witness testimony read back to them.  Id. at ¶10-19.  
In Anderson, we held that both the defendant's constitutional 
and statutory rights to be present at trial were violated when 
the judge communicated with the deliberating jury outside of the 
defendant's presence.  Id. at ¶36.  In reaching our decision on 
the 
constitutional 
issue, 
this 
court 
relied 
on 
the 
constitutional rights granted to a defendant through both the 
Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause.  Id. at ¶38 
("An accused's constitutional right to be present derives from 
the right to be heard and confront witnesses and from the 
accused's right to due process.").7 
¶67 The 
majority 
unnecessarily 
abandons 
well-reasoned 
precedent set forth in Wisconsin case law to reach its 
                                                 
7 In doing so, we drew support from the United States 
Supreme Court.  State v. Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶38 n.13, 
¶39 (citing United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) 
(“The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large 
extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but 
we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due 
Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not 
actually 
confronting witnesses or evidence against him.”) 
(citations omitted); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 
(1970)(“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the 
courtroom at every stage of his trial.”). We also relied upon 
the United States Constitution, as well as the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Id. at ¶38 (“The constitutional right to be heard 
and confront witnesses appears in the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.” (footnotes omitted)).  
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
conclusion today.  Specifically, the majority casts aside 
longstanding precedent from Anderson and concludes that State v. 
Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 334 N.W.2d 263 (1983), a case that 
Anderson relied upon, must be overruled.8  Its conclusion that 
Burton and parts of Anderson must be overruled to decide the 
case at issue is misguided and unnecessary to the court's 
holding. 
¶68 Neither Anderson nor Burton need be overturned to 
reach a decision in this case.  Both cases, in fact, are 
factually distinct from the issue we have been asked to decide. 
Both Anderson and Burton dealt with questions surrounding a 
defendant's right to be present when a judge communicates with a 
deliberating jury.  In contrast, this case deals with a 
                                                 
8 The majority’s conclusion that State v. Burton must be 
overruled is based on a supposed conflict between Burton and 
May, that the majority cites, but does not explain.  Considering 
the factual differences between these two cases, no conflict 
actually exists.  In Burton, our holding that constitutional 
error occurred when the circuit judge communicated with a 
deliberating jury stems from our concern with the judge in that 
case repeatedly entering the jury room outside the presence of 
the defendant or defendant’s counsel.  A judge’s presence in the 
jury room outside the defendant’s presence could easily cause 
unfairness that would result in a violation of the defendant’s 
due process rights.  
In contrast, in May v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 175 (1980), while 
recognizing that an accused has the right under the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the United States Constitution to be present 
during her or her trial, we held that there was no reversible 
error when the judge communicated an answer to a question of law 
to a deliberating jury outside of the defendant’s presence.  In 
May, the judge simply communicated a yes or no answer to the 
jury by note and did not enter the jury room or communicate 
anything other than an answer to a question of law.  Considering 
these factual distinctions, it is easy to see how this court 
found a constitutional violation in Burton, but not one in May. 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
factually distinct situation involving communications between a 
court and sitting jury members concerning the appropriateness of 
allowing each one to continue to serve as a member of the jury.  
Due to this factual distinction, there is absolutely no need to 
overrule Burton, and certainty we do not have to overrule or 
withdraw portions of Anderson9 to decide the case at hand.  We 
should refrain from unnecessarily overturning well-established 
and well-reasoned precedent. 
¶69 Finally, the majority is persuaded by United States v. 
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997-98 (3d Cir. 1980), which found 
that "there is no constitutional right for a defendant to be 
present at a conference in chambers concerning dismissal of a 
juror." (emphasis omitted).  Such an approach has not been 
followed by other federal circuit courts.  
¶70 I emphasize that the approach taken by several other 
courts——one that allows for the possibility that a defendant's 
absence from communications between a judge and juror or jury 
could result in a constitutional violation if "a fair and just 
hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant's] absence"——is the 
better-reasoned case law. See Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 
1482 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f Mr. Verdin had a constitutional 
right to be present at the exchange [between the judge and the 
jury], it stemmed from his due process right to be present 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that Anderson and May also do not 
conflict 
with 
one 
another. 
 
While 
Anderson 
dealt 
with 
communication between a judge and a deliberating jury regarding 
trial 
exhibits 
and 
testimony, 
May 
addressed 
a 
judge’s 
communication with a deliberating jury when that communication 
related to a pure question of law.  
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
15 
 
' . . . to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by his absence.'"); Ross v. Dist. Attorney of the Cnty. 
of Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2012) (considering 
whether a defendant's absence from a conference between trial 
judge, counsel, and juror resulted in unfairness to the 
defendant);  United States v. Fernandez-Hernandez, 652 F.3d 56, 
66 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 353, (2011) 
(discussing factors relating to whether the defendant's absence 
from a bench conference with the judge, counsel, and jurors 
deprived him of his due process right to be present during 
trial); Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 940-44 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(evaluating various case-specific circumstances to determine 
whether the defendant's trial was fundamentally unfair due to 
communications between the court and jury that occurred outside 
of the defendant's presence); United States v. Peterson, 385 
F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (reviewing whether a judge's 
private in-chambers conference with a juror violated the 
defendant's due process right to be present by considering the 
effect of that conference on the defendant's opportunity for a 
fair trial); United States v. Santiago, 977 F.2d 517, 522 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (discussing the circumstances surrounding the trial 
judge's ex parte questioning of a juror and the effect that 
questioning 
would 
have 
on 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional 
rights);  United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 997 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (considering the brevity of communications between a 
juror and circuit judge, as well as other case-specific facts, 
to determine if the defendant's constitutional due process 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
16 
 
rights had been violated);  Nevels v. Parratt, 596 F.2d 344, 346 
(8th Cir. 1979) (holding that defendant's absence from a hearing 
with a juror about possible juror misconduct violated the 
defendant's constitutional right to be present at all stages of 
his trial).  This more nuanced approach allows for a due process 
analysis based on the individualized circumstances of each case 
and better conforms with our statement "that conferences of the 
court and attorneys outside the presence of the accused should 
be rarely held during the trial," Ramer, 40 Wis. 2d at 85, than 
does the majority's categorical approach. 
¶71 Applying this approach, I would hold that due process 
gave Alexander the right to be present at the in-chambers 
conferences dealing with whether the jurors should continue to 
serve on the jury.  Alexander's presence at these conferences 
was critical to the fairness of the proceedings.  The importance 
of a defendant's presence at proceedings involving the selection 
of jurors and the continued service of jurors, which ultimately 
may affect the composition of the jury cannot be overstated.  
See Boone v. United States, 483 A.2d 1135, 1137-38 (D.C. 1984) 
(discussing the importance of the defendant's presence at voir 
dire); Welch v. Holman, 246 F. Supp. 971, 973-74 (M.D. Ala. 
1965), aff'd 363 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing a 
defendant's right to be present during proceedings that involve 
juror qualifications).    
¶72 Although 
I 
would 
hold 
that 
Alexander 
had 
a 
constitutional due process right to be present at the in-
chambers conferences at issue, I have noted previously in this 
No.  2011AP394-CR.npc 
 
17 
 
opinion that a defendant may waive that right.  State v. Biller, 
262 Wis. 472, 479, 55 N.W.2d 414 (1952).  I am satisfied on this 
record that Alexander did in fact waive his due process right, 
along with his statutory right to be present during the in-
chambers conferences as evidenced by the record in this case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶73 Alexander had both a statutory and a constitutional 
right to be present at each of the in-chambers conferences that 
occurred with sitting jurors during his trial for the purpose of 
determining the composition of the jury.  His rights were waived 
for him by his counsel and by his own actions in voluntarily 
absenting himself.  The Wisconsin legislature gave him the 
statutory right to be present "at trial," and the in-chambers 
conferences 
in 
question 
clearly 
occurred 
"at 
trial."  
Additionally, Alexander had a constitutional right of due 
process to be present at the in-chambers conferences because the 
circumstances of this case put it into the category of cases 
where "a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his 
absence."10   
¶74 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion.
                                                 
10 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. at 108.  
No.  2011AP394-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion because, under the facts of this case, 
neither Alexander's constitutional right to due process nor his 
statutory right to be present at voir dire under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(c) were violated.1  I write separately to point out 
that even if we were to conclude that a constitutional or 
statutory protection was violated, the error in not having 
Alexander present, under these facts, is harmless.2  Alexander is 
entitled to a fair trial and impartial jury, which he received.    
¶77 "Judges face tough calls in the courtroom each day.  
Judges are charged with administering justice and have a 
concurrent 
goal 
of avoiding 
unnecessary 
appellate 
issues."  
State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶60, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 
(Ziegler, J., concurring).  Here, to the extent that any issue 
arose as to the two jurors who were dismissed as alternates, the 
judge was properly attempting to avoid unnecessary appellate 
issues.   
¶78 Alexander was involved in the selection of 14 jurors.  
He knew that any 12 of those 14 jurors would ultimately sit as 
the final jury in this case.  Alexander had no particular right 
to have these two jurors remain on his jury.  If anything, 
                                                 
1 Alexander did not argue that his right to be present at 
trial under Wis. Stat. § 971.04 was violated.   
2 I believe that judges around this state strive to include, 
not exclude, defendants and counsel when issues arise during the 
course of trial.  This case illustrates why it is a good 
practice to include defendants and counsel, if possible, when 
matters arise during trial.   
No.  2011AP394-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
leaving these two alternates on the jury and dispensing with two 
other jurors would likely have created more issues than it 
resolved.  Twelve jurors, not fourteen, reach a verdict based 
upon the evidence and the law.  The trial court judge was 
correct to select these two jurors as the alternates.  Alexander 
received the fair and impartial jury to which he was entitled.   
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2011AP394-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1