Case Title: Cruz v. Testa

Citation: 2015-Ohio-3292

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cruz v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3292.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3292 
CRUZ, APPELLANT, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cruz v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3292.] 
R.C. 5739.33—Delinquent-sales-tax assessments—When an assessment made 
against a responsible person under R.C. 5739.33 is predicated on an 
earlier assessment against the corporation itself, the person may contest 
the assessment against her personally by challenging the service of the 
corporate assessment on the corporation. 
(No. 2014-0513—Submitted March 24, 2015—Decided August 19, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2013-1010. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant, Susan C. Cruz, contests 27 assessments of 
delinquent sales tax that, when added to preassessment interest, penalty, and 
additional charges, amounted to over $599,000.  Cruz’s liability derives from 
previous assessments issued against Cruz-Samsa Corporation, a pet-store business 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of which Cruz was co-owner and an officer.  We confront a jurisdictional issue 
and an issue on the merits. 
{¶ 2} With regard to the jurisdictional issue, appellee, the tax 
commissioner, argues that this appeal must be dismissed on the grounds that Cruz 
failed to set forth an error, as required by R.C. 5717.04, that would confer 
jurisdiction over the appeal.  We disagree, and we therefore deny the motion to 
dismiss. 
{¶ 3} On the merits, Cruz argues that she may contest the validity of the 
service of the assessments against the corporation as a defense against her 
derivative liability.  We agree with this contention, and our review of the record 
demonstrates completed service of seven of the 27 assessments against the 
corporation.  We therefore affirm the BTA’s decision to uphold the seven 
assessments as to which completed service has been shown. 
{¶ 4} As to the other 20 assessments, we conclude that additional fact-
finding is necessary.  We therefore vacate the BTA’s decision with regard to those 
20 assessments and remand the cause with instructions that the BTA take 
additional evidence and determine whether service of those 20 assessments was 
perfected on the corporation. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The assessments against the corporation and against Cruz personally 
{¶ 5} Before the court are 27 assessments against Susan C. Cruz, issued 
pursuant to R.C. 5739.33, as a person who is responsible for the sales-tax 
obligation of Cruz-Samsa Corporation, which did business as a Petland store in 
Cleveland Heights.  The periods at issue extend from late 2007 through the first 
half of 2010.  As a retail vendor, Cruz-Samsa Corporation applied in November 
2005 for a vendor’s license under the sales-tax law, with a view to making sales 
beginning January 20, 2006.  R.C. 5739.17. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 6} The application identified Susan Cruz as president and Mark Samsa 
as vice president and gave four addresses as follows: 
 A corporate headquarters address: 2504 Lee Road, Cleveland Heights 
(which is the same address listed as the residential address of Susan 
Cruz on her 2006 federal tax return); 
 A business location for making retail sales: 2255 Lee Road, Cleveland 
Heights; 
 An address for the corporation’s president, Susan Cruz: 2141 Lee 
Road, Cleveland Heights; and  
 An address for the corporation’s vice president, Mark Samsa: 228 
Paxton Road, Eastlake. 
Cruz was the majority shareholder of the corporation. 
{¶ 7} The record indicates that the tax commissioner issued 27 
assessments against the corporation.  It is clear from the record that seven of the 
assessments were successfully delivered by certified mail to the headquarters 
address.  Because the assessment notices are not in the record, the dates they were 
issued are not clearly established.  But the evidence relating to the seven notices 
that were successfully delivered by certified mail show mailing dates ranging 
from July 11, 2008, to October 9, 2009.  The evidence also shows the attempted 
service of all 27 assessments on Cruz-Samsa Corporation, using either the 
headquarters or the business-location address. 
{¶ 8} The 27 assessments are for the following periods:  one assessment 
for October 2007, one assessment for December 2007, one assessment for each of 
the 12 months of 2008, one assessment for each of the 12 months of 2009, and a 
single assessment covering the first six months of 2010. 
{¶ 9} Although the record does not contain the assessment notices against 
the corporation, the tax commissioner did certify as part of the statutory transcript 
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printouts from the tax department’s “Proof of Delivery” computerized system.  
Those printouts indicate successful certified-mail delivery of seven of the 27 
assessments, with the other 20 marked either “unclaimed,” “returned,” “refused,” 
or “NoFinlEvnt.”  Two addresses were used in mailing the assessment notices:  
the 2504 Lee Road address, which was listed on the vendor’s-license application 
as the corporate headquarters address; and the 2255 Lee Road address, which was 
listed on the vendor’s-license application as the place of retail business for the 
corporation.  Additionally, both Cruz’s appointment as statutory agent for Cruz-
Samsa Corporation and her joint federal income-tax return for 2006 give 2504 
Lee Road as her address. 
{¶ 10} During March 2012, the tax commissioner issued the 27 
assessments against Susan Cruz personally at the 2504 Lee Road address; 
according to the accompanying cover letters, the assessments against Cruz were 
originally sent by certified mail but in each case the tax commissioner followed 
up with ordinary mail when the certified mail was unsuccessful.  The cover letters 
sent by ordinary mail are dated May 2012. 
{¶ 11} On July 12, 2012, Cruz filed her petitions for reassessment, 
specifying two bases for contesting the assessments:  first, Cruz was “not a party 
responsible for filing returns for, or paying sales tax” for the corporation; second, 
“[t]here was no valid assessment against the corporation for failure of service.” 
{¶ 12} In an accompanying memorandum, Cruz explained that she was 
not a proper person to assess because she did not control or supervise the fiscal 
function relating to the filing of sales-tax returns; indeed, that function belonged 
to the corporation’s vice president and minority shareholder, Mark Samsa.  As for 
service, the memorandum explicitly argued that because the corporation was 
never served with an assessment, Cruz’s own liability was precluded. 
{¶ 13} Attached to the memorandum was Cruz’s affidavit, in which she 
testified that she is the “former president and majority shareholder of Cruz-Samsa 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Corporation dba Petland of the Heights from 2006 through 2009”; that she was 
not an employee and drew no wages; and that she had no responsibilities relating 
to the corporation’s tax compliance.  According to the affidavit, Mark Samsa, the 
vice president and minority shareholder “was originally responsible for 
maintaining the corporate accounts and filing and paying the taxes of the 
corporation.”  Subsequently, “on or before December 31, 2007,” according to the 
affidavit, Samsa resigned his corporate responsibilities.  The affidavit recites 
Samsa’s assertion that he had trained “another person” in keeping the accounts 
and submitting sales-tax returns, but the affidavit asserts that that other person 
was not Cruz. 
{¶ 14} Finally, the affidavit makes the following two averments 
concerning the service of the corporate assessments: 
Statement 1:  “As a statutory agent for Cruz-Samsa Corporation, Affiant 
never received either a certified mailing nor an ordinary post mailing of any 
assessment against Cruz-Samsa Corporation.” 
Statement 2:  “Affiant received over a score of regular post mailings 
addressed to Affiant personally from the Department subsequent to August, 
2011.” 
The tax commissioner’s determination and the BTA’s decision 
{¶ 15} The tax commissioner issued his final determination on the 
petitions for reassessment on December 28, 2012.  He found that as 66 percent 
owner of the company and as corporate president with the power to hire and fire, 
Cruz “had the authority to control fiscal responsibilities” of the corporation.  
Citing Spithogianis v. Limbach, 53 Ohio St.3d 55, 559 N.E.2d 449 (1990), the 
determination recites that “R.C. 5739.33 does not permit officers, otherwise 
responsible for fiscal responsibilities, to escape liability by delegating those duties 
to others.” 
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{¶ 16} Turning to the service issue, the tax commissioner held that a 
challenge to the service on the corporation was barred by Rowland v. Collins, 48 
Ohio St.2d 311, 358 N.E.2d 582 (1976). 
{¶ 17} Cruz appealed to the BTA, asserting both issues in her notice of 
appeal.  The BTA held a hearing on February 3, 2014, at which counsel 
representing Cruz and the tax commissioner appeared and presented arguments.  
The BTA issued its decision on March 7, 2014, affirming the commissioner’s 
determination upholding the assessments against Cruz.  As for the service issue 
(which is the only issue on appeal to this court) the BTA disposed of it in a 
footnote reading as follows: 
 
[Cruz] also asserted in her petitions that the underlying 
sales tax assessments against Cruz-Samsa Corp. were invalid due 
to lack of proper service on the corporation.  In her memorandum 
in support of her petitions, she argued that service on the minority 
shareholder of the corporation (Mark Samsa) was improper, 
because she was the statutory agent for the corporation.  The 
commissioner rejected the argument as not being properly raised; 
instead, he asserted that such argument should have been made in a 
proceeding challenging the underlying assessments themselves.  
We agree.  Moreover, we find that service on Mr. Samsa was 
sufficient, as it was “reasonably calculated to give notice of the 
assessment and allow the taxpayer to present his objections.” 
  
(Citation omitted.)  BTA No. 2013-1010, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1463, 3 (Mar. 7, 
2014), fn. 1. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
{¶ 18} The sixth paragraph of R.C. 5717.04 requires that a notice of 
appeal from a BTA decision to a court “set forth the decision of the board 
appealed from and the errors therein complained of.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
requirement that the errors be set forth in the notice of appeal is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to the court’s power to grant relief on a particular basis.  See Global 
Knowledge Training, L.L.C. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 34, 2010-Ohio-4411, 936 
N.E.2d 463, ¶ 22, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 19} The tax commissioner has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting two 
reasons why Cruz’s notice of appeal to the court is so deficient in specifying error 
that it fails to invoke the court’s jurisdiction at all.  We disagree. 
Cruz properly preserved her argument that a failure of service on the corporation 
invalidates the assessments against her personally 
{¶ 20} The tax commissioner first argues that the case should be dismissed 
because the sole error set forth in the notice of appeal to this court “fails to assert 
any error regarding the actual controversy that was at issue at the Board of Tax 
Appeals, i.e., the 27 personal responsibility assessments that the Commissioner 
issued to Ms. Cruz.”  (Emphasis sic.)  The commissioner highlights the language 
in the notice of appeal stating that the issue is whether Cruz “can challenge the 
assessment against the corporation.”  Because the notice of appeal does not say in 
so many words that Cruz’s issue ultimately relates to her challenge to the 
assessments against her personally, she supposedly “fail[ed] to assert any error 
regarding the actual controversy” over the personal assessments against her. 
{¶ 21} This argument reflects a cramped reading of the notice of appeal, 
which has given rise to the kind of hypertechnical jurisdictional objection that we 
have rejected in the past.  When we evaluate a notice of appeal either to the BTA 
or to this court, we do not “judge[ ] the sufficiency of assignments of error * * * 
merely by their form of words,” but instead, we insist that those words “be read in 
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the context of the particular case in which [they] are used.”  WCI Steel, Inc. v. 
Testa, 129 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-3280, 951 N.E.2d 421, ¶ 36.  In WCI Steel, 
we reasoned further that a notice of appeal to the BTA from a determination of 
the tax commissioner should therefore “be read in light of the objections and 
evidence that were presented to the commissioner.”  Id. 
{¶ 22} Applying WCI Steel here, we read Cruz’s notice of appeal to this 
court in light of the objections and evidence Cruz presented to the BTA (which 
had also previously been advanced before the tax commissioner).  At the BTA, 
Cruz argued in her notice of appeal as follows: 
 
In order for Cruz to be held personally responsible for an 
uncontested assessment by the corporation, there must have been 
statutorily sufficient service of an assessment upon the corporation. 
 
{¶ 23} Cruz then proceeded to argue before the BTA that the corporation 
had not been served as statutorily required and as required by due process.  The 
BTA explicitly acknowledged this argument (albeit in a manner less fully 
articulated than the manner in which Cruz had advanced it) in its footnote 1, 
which we have already quoted.  That footnote, in turn, referred to the portion of 
the tax commissioner’s final determination that reads as follows: 
 
[Cruz] also argues that assessment [sic] against the 
company is invalid due to lack of service against the company.  
This is an attacked [sic] on the validity of the underlying corporate 
assessments.  Under Rowland v. Collins (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 311 
[358 N.E.2d 582] the objection cannot be considered.  The 
petitioner may not challenge the merits of the assessment against 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
the corporation in a proceeding under R.C. 5739.33.  The objection 
is denied. 
 
{¶ 24} In sum, a review of the arguments raised below shows that Cruz 
raised her lack-of-service-on-the-corporation argument at each level,1 and both 
the tax commissioner and the BTA determined that the argument was barred by 
Rowland, 48 Ohio St.2d 311, 358 N.E.2d 582.  Moreover, when read in that 
context, the error set forth in Cruz’s notice of appeal to this court does suffice to 
put the court and the commissioner on notice of what error Cruz is asserting that 
the BTA made.  We therefore reject this argument as a basis for dismissing the 
appeal. 
Cruz did not need to challenge the BTA’s hypothetical regarding service on 
Samsa in order to pursue her appeal 
{¶ 25} The tax commissioner also argues for dismissal on account of 
Cruz’s failure to contest the BTA’s purported “determin[ation] that the 
Commissioner, in fact, had effectuated valid service of the corporate assessments 
issued to [Cruz-Samsa Corporation].”  Notably, the commissioner himself offers 
only an interpolated quotation of the BTA’s finding in this regard; a review of the 
full language of the BTA’s finding shows that the commissioner is mistaken: 
 
Moreover, we find that service on Mr. Samsa was sufficient, as it 
was “reasonably calculated to give notice of the assessment and 
allow the taxpayer to present his objections.”  Castellano v. 
Kosydar (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 [326 N.E.2d 686]. 
 
                                                 
1The tax commissioner also argues that Cruz’s failure to raise the service issue during the 
collection proceedings constitutes a waiver in this case.  But there are two rights at issue:  the 
corporation’s service defense, and Cruz’s corporate-service defense.  Waiver of the former does 
not entail waiver of the latter.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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BTA No. 2013-1010, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1463, at 1, fn. 1. 
{¶ 26} The tax commissioner understandably seeks to construe this as a 
finding that the corporation was properly served with the assessments against the 
corporation itself.  But this statement is not a finding of fact based on the record 
of the case; it is instead a legal ruling based on purely hypothetical facts. 
{¶ 27} That is so because, looking at the record before us, we conclude 
that the corporate assessments were never served, nor attempted to be served, on 
Mr. Samsa, either personally or as a representative of the corporation.  The record 
documents a total of four addresses on the vendor’s-license application:  (1) the 
address of the corporate headquarters, (2) the address of the corporate place of 
business, (3) a personal address for Cruz, and (4) a personal address for Samsa.  
The assessments against the corporation were sent to one of two addresses:  the 
headquarters address or the place-of-business address.  Neither of the two 
personal addresses was used.  Thus, the record supports a finding that the tax 
commissioner attempted service on the corporation at the two business addresses; 
on the other hand, absolutely nothing in the record supports the theory that there 
was service on Samsa. 
{¶ 28} The BTA apparently derived the idea that there was “service on 
Mr. Samsa” from Cruz’s memorandum submitted to the tax commissioner, which 
did mention service on Samsa.2  But the statement was in the nature of errant 
speculation by Cruz about what addresses the commissioner might have used for 
serving notice of the corporate assessments.  At the time she submitted her 
                                                 
2 Cruz referred in her memorandum to service of “a subsequent judgment lien arising out of a sales 
tax liability against Cruz-Samsa Corporation, for a month not here at issue, by an action in aid of 
execution.”  (Emphasis added.)  It was this lien filing that that was apparently served on Samsa, 
not the corporate assessments themselves.  In the memorandum, Cruz was apparently speculating 
that the tax commissioner might have attempted service on the corporation in the same manner 
and arguing that such service would be insufficient.  But since the record shows that the 
commissioner attempted service at the corporation’s business addresses (one of which is Cruz’s 
residential address) and not by serving Samsa, Cruz’s reference in her memorandum to service on 
Samsa is irrelevant. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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memorandum, Cruz apparently lacked access to the documentation that was later 
included in the record by the tax commissioner after Cruz appealed to the BTA—
documentation that showed the attempted service on the corporation at its 
business addresses. 
{¶ 29} As a result, Cruz’s statement in her memorandum to the tax 
commissioner was not a factual assertion, much less evidence, of how the service 
of the corporate assessments had in fact been attempted.  And as a further result, 
the BTA’s reference to “service on Mr. Samsa” cannot be construed as a finding 
of fact, but instead constitutes a hypothetical legal ruling based on facts not in the 
record—the BTA is in essence saying that, if the commissioner had attempted 
service on the corporation by serving Samsa (of which there is no evidence here), 
that service would be valid against the corporation. 
{¶ 30} When she appealed to this court, Cruz was entitled to ignore the 
statement because of its purely hypothetical character.  Because it is not necessary 
for the court to reverse this “ruling” that was based on hypothetical facts in order 
for Cruz to prevail on the appeal, the point is essentially moot. 
{¶ 31} For his contrary view, the tax commissioner relies on Lenart v. 
Lindley, 61 Ohio St.2d 110, 399 N.E.2d 1222 (1980), and Ellwood Engineered 
Castings Co. v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 424, 2003-Ohio-1812, 786 N.E.2d 458, for 
the proposition that “the failure to specify as error a finding * * * which was the 
basis of * * * [the] determination jurisdictionally precludes * * * consider[ation 
of] that finding [on appeal].”  (Emphasis deleted.)  This doctrine does not apply 
for two reasons.  First, as just discussed, the BTA’s statement regarding service 
on Samsa is not a finding, but a hypothetical legal ruling that Cruz was entitled to 
ignore.  Second, Ellwood Engineered Castings requires specifying a finding as 
error only when that finding was the “basis” for the “determination” below, id. at 
¶ 21; in the present case, the basis for the BTA’s rejection of the service argument 
was not the statement about “service on Mr. Samsa,” but the BTA’s agreement 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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with the tax commissioner’s determination that contesting service on the 
corporation was barred by Rowland. 
{¶ 32} For the above reasons, we also reject this argument for dismissing 
the appeal.  Thus, having rejected both of the tax commissioner’s arguments for 
dismissing the appeal, we deny his motion to dismiss. 
FAILURE OF SERVICE OF THE CORPORATE ASSESSMENT INVALIDATES A 
DERIVATIVE ASSESSMENT UNDER R.C. 5739.33 
{¶ 33} R.C. 5739.13 authorizes assessment of unpaid sales tax against 
vendors and consumers, and when the assessed entity is a corporation, R.C. 
5739.33 authorizes assessment against “any of its employees having control or 
supervision of or charged with the responsibility of filing returns and making 
payments, or any of its officers, members, managers, or trustees who are 
responsible for the execution of the corporation’s * * * fiscal responsibilities.”  
Cruz was assessed pursuant to R.C. 5739.33 for liabilities incurred by the Cruz-
Samsa Corporation. 
Rowland v. Collins makes a validly served corporate assessment substantively 
binding on a later-served responsible person 
{¶ 34} In Rowland, 48 Ohio St.2d 311, 358 N.E.2d 582, the tax 
commissioner issued personal-responsibility assessments under the authority of 
R.C. 5739.33 on officers of Allied Highway Equipment, Inc.  Allied was a vendor 
that collected sales tax and had allegedly failed to collect and remit tax on certain 
transactions.  The corporate assessments concerned transactions that Allied 
claimed to be exempt from sales tax, but it had failed to produce exemption 
certificates from its purchasers with respect to those transactions. 
{¶ 35} When they were later assessed, the officers defended by asserting 
that the transactions were in fact exempt; the tax commissioner rejected this 
argument by observing that the assessments were final as against the corporation.  
The BTA reversed the commissioner’s determination on two grounds.  The one 
January Term, 2015 
 
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relevant here is its holding that because R.C. 5739.13 (the sales-tax-assessment 
statute) afforded the assessee the opportunity to challenge the assessment in a 
hearing before the tax commissioner and because Albert Rowland had no control 
over the corporation at the time the tax commissioner’s assessment was made, 
Rowland had to be afforded the opportunity to argue that the assessment was 
substantively erroneous.  Rowland v. Collins, BTA No. D-121 (May 21, 1976), at 
14-15. 
{¶ 36} On appeal, we reversed the BTA on that point by observing that 
“appellee’s liability for the overdue sales tax is derivative in nature.”  Rowland at 
313.  Because the “separate identities of corporation and officer are thus irrelevant 
in this context,” we concluded that “[o]nce the assessment against the corporation 
becomes conclusive by the failure to present objections thereto the officer is 
bound by the oscitancy3 of his corporation.”  Id.  In other words, the officer 
cannot challenge the assessment on the grounds of substantive tax-law error when 
the corporation itself failed to do so; the only substantive argument the officer has 
against the assessment is to “assert that he is not one of the class of persons 
chargeable under R.C. 5739.33,” i.e., not a responsible person under the statute.  
Id. 
{¶ 37} In this case, however, the tax commissioner and the BTA have 
extended Rowland beyond the court’s holding in that case:  according to the tax 
authorities, Rowland also bars Cruz’s argument that the corporation was not 
properly served with the assessments against it.  It is that extension of Rowland 
that Cruz challenges in this appeal. 
 
 
                                                 
3 By “oscitancy,” the court refers to a party’s having slept on its rights. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Rowland’s “oscitancy” doctrine and due process both require that Cruz be able 
to challenge the service of the assessments on the corporation 
{¶ 38} The analysis in support of Cruz’s position is straightforward and 
simple.  Cruz correctly states in her brief that a “[f]ailure to perfect service is not 
an objection implicating oscitancy.  Failure to perfect service alleges one was 
never called upon to act.”  If the corporation was not properly served, then its 
omission to contest the assessments cannot be regarded as oscitant, i.e., the 
corporation did not sleep on its rights.  The service defect means that the 
corporation was justified in ignoring the assessments, with the result that the 
corporation’s failure to contest them cannot form the basis for imposing the 
obligation to pay on a person who is later assessed as a responsible person. 
{¶ 39} This reasoning receives reinforcement from the constitutional 
guarantee of due process.  Taxpayers cannot be subjected to monetary 
assessments unless they have notice and an opportunity to be heard.  See 
McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36, 110 S.Ct. 
2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990) (“Because exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation 
of property, the State must provide procedural safeguards against unlawful 
exactions in order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause”); Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 
{¶ 40} By barring a substantive challenge to the assessment by the officer, 
Rowland imposes liability for the corporation’s debts on the person who is 
assessed as a responsible person.  If that doctrine is extended to bar a challenge to 
the validity of service on the corporation, then that liability is being imposed 
without any taxpayer having had the opportunity to be heard on the substantive 
issue of whether the corporate assessment is valid.  That result would exceed the 
tolerances of due process. 
{¶ 41} Consistent with this view is the doctrine that the service of a tax 
assessment may be challenged in a later collection proceeding.  See Ohio Dept. of 
January Term, 2015 
 
15
Taxation v. Plickert, 128 Ohio App.3d 445, 450, 715 N.E.2d 239 (11th Dist.1998) 
(a trial court’s general jurisdiction to entertain an affirmative defense includes the 
defense of insufficient service of the assessment, and “if the defense is good, 
judgment will be entered for the taxpayer”), citing Hakim v. Kosydar, 49 Ohio 
St.2d 161, 165, 359 N.E.2d 1371 (1977).  Because the later assessment against the 
corporate officer is also derivative of the earlier assessment against the 
corporation, it stands to reason that insufficient service of the corporate 
assessment should be a defense against the personal-responsibility assessment. 
{¶ 42} In light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that when an 
assessment made against a responsible person under R.C. 5739.33 is predicated 
on an earlier assessment against the corporation itself, the person may contest the 
assessment against her personally by challenging the service of the corporate 
assessment on the corporation.  A successful challenge to the service on the 
corporation will invalidate the derivative-liability assessment against the 
responsible individual.4  We therefore reverse the BTA’s contrary ruling, and we 
now examine the extent to which the record establishes service on the 
corporation. 
THE RECORD SHOWS CERTIFIED-MAIL SERVICE OF SEVEN ASSESSMENTS BUT 
DOES NOT SHOW COMPLETED SERVICE OF THE OTHERS 
{¶ 43} R.C. 5739.13(A) expressly provides that notice of a sales-tax 
assessment shall be given in the manner prescribed by R.C. 5703.37.  As it 
currently reads, R.C. 5703.37 permits service of notices of assessment by personal 
service, certified mail, or authorized delivery service.  As for the address to be 
                                                 
4 Because the tax commissioner is the party in possession of the relevant information, he must bear 
the burden of producing evidence that service was perfected on the corporation when corporate 
service has been challenged by the assessee under R.C. 5739.33.  Accord FirstCal Indus. 2 
Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 125 Ohio St.3d 485, 2010-Ohio-1921, 929 
N.E.2d 426, ¶ 25; Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2014-Ohio-853, 9 N.E.2d 920, ¶ 27-29. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16
used, the current version of the statute authorizes the commissioner to use a “last 
known address.” 
{¶ 44} Here, the tax commissioner used corporate headquarters and 
business addresses set forth on the vendor’s-license application, and there is no 
reason to question the validity of those addresses.  At the time the earlier 
corporate assessments were issued, the statute merely provided the alternative 
between personal service and certified-mail service, with no provisions addressing 
the follow-up action if the certified-mail service was not clearly perfected after its 
initial mailing.  Former R.C. 5703.37, Sub.S.B. No. 200, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
1943, 1966, effective Sept. 6, 2002.  But in 2009, the General Assembly added the 
explicit requirement of follow-up service by ordinary mail to R.C. 5703.37.  2009 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, effective Oct. 16, 2009. 
{¶ 45} With respect to certified-mail service, the statute, since amended in 
2009, provides two courses of action when the certified mailing is “returned.”  If 
the mailing is returned “because of an undeliverable address,” the tax 
commissioner must attempt to locate a new address.  If the mailing is returned 
“for some cause other than an undeliverable address,” the tax commissioner must 
send the notice by ordinary mail to the same address, after which service is 
deemed complete, unless the ordinary mail is returned because of an 
undeliverable address. 
{¶ 46} The record in this case documents successful certified-mail service 
as to the following corporate assessments:   
(1) assessment No. 06200818377615, the corporate assessment for 
February 2008 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405368);  
(2) assessment No. 06200827626866, the corporate assessment for May 
2008 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405373);  
(3) assessment No. 06200909798435, the corporate assessment for 
November 2008 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405403);   
January Term, 2015 
 
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(4) assessment No. 06200912782801, the corporate assessment for 
December 2008 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405386);  
(5) assessment No. 06200918226874, the corporate assessment for 
February 2009 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405391);  
(6) assessment No. 06200923762494, the corporate assessment for March 
2009 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405393); and  
(7) assessment No. 06200927393628, the corporate assessment for April 
2009 (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405394). 
{¶ 47} In the tax-department records, the remaining assessments are 
marked as one of the following:  “returned,” “unclaimed,” “refused,” or 
“NoFinlEvnt.”  There is no indication that the addresses ever proved to be 
undeliverable.  There were only two addresses used, 2504 Lee Road and 2255 Lee 
Road.  Among the seven corporate assessments for which service has been shown 
to have been perfected, the record demonstrates successful instances of service at 
2504 Lee Road.  Moreover, the record demonstrates perfected service of tax 
assessments—albeit ones that are not at issue in this case—on Cruz-Samsa 
Corporation at the 2255 Lee Road address. 
{¶ 48} Thus, the remaining factual and legal issue is whether the tax 
commissioner can demonstrate perfected service of the other 20 corporate 
assessments at those addresses, given the language of R.C. 5703.37 that was in 
effect at the time the particular corporate assessment in question was issued and 
given the requirements of due process.5  See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 
126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006). 
                                                 
5 Those assessments are (1) No. 06200806095852 (October 2007) (corresponding to Cruz 
assessment No. 06201205305282), (2) No. 06200812765205 (December 2007) (corresponding to 
Cruz assessment No. 06201205405365), (3) No. 06200816533974, (January 2008) (corresponding 
to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405366), (4) No. 06200821499467 (March 2008) 
(corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405369), (5) No. 06200824113899 (April 2008) 
(corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405371), (6) No. 06200830575615 (June 2008) 
(corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405375), (7) 06200834334123 (July 2008) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18
{¶ 49} In tax proceedings, proof of the service of important notices is 
usually included as part of the administrative record that is certified to the next 
tribunal on appeal.  See, e.g., Gaston v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision, 133 Ohio 
St.3d 18, 2012-Ohio-3872, 975 N.E.2d 941, ¶ 12-16 (evaluating taxpayer’s claim 
of lack of service in light of the statutory transcript certified by the board of 
revision); Castellano v. Kosydar, 42 Ohio St.2d 107, 326 N.E.2d 686 (1975) 
(same).  In this case, the tax commissioner sensibly placed evidence of the 
certified-mail service of the corporate assessments into the record that it certified 
to the BTA pursuant to R.C. 5717.02.  But the tax commissioner also has the 
burden of producing evidence of the follow-up service, to the extent that further 
action by the commissioner was required by statute and due process to perfect 
service as to the remaining 20 assessments in this case.  The tax commissioner has 
offered assurances through counsel that ordinary-mail service was provided as a 
follow-up, but there is no evidence of that in the record. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 50} For the foregoing reasons, we deny the tax commissioner’s motion 
to dismiss, and we reverse the BTA’s ruling that Cruz’s service argument was 
barred by Rowland, 48 Ohio St.2d 311, 358 N.E.2d 582.  We also affirm the 
BTA’s decision to uphold seven of the assessments against Cruz as set forth 
                                                                                                                                     
(corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405378), (8) No. 06200900265437 (August 
2008) (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405379), (9) No. 06200902949231 
(September 2008) (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405381), (10) No. 
06200906276628 (October 2008) (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405383), (11) 
No. 
06201008515678 
(November 
2009) 
(corresponding 
to 
Cruz 
assessment 
No. 
06201205405385), (12) No. 06200915311247 (January 2009) (corresponding to Cruz assessment 
No. 06201205405388), (13) No. 06200928713356 (May 2009) (corresponding to Cruz assessment 
No. 06201205405395), (14) No. 06200932192665 (June 2009) (corresponding to Cruz assessment 
No. 06201205405397), (15) No. 06200933525157 (July 2009) (corresponding to Cruz assessment 
No. 06201205405399), (16) No. 06200936351375 (August 2009) (corresponding to Cruz 
assessment No. 06201205405400), (17) No. 06201002862874 (September 2009) (corresponding 
to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405401), (18) No. 06201006392882 (October 2009) 
(corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405402), (19) No. 06201013496132 (December 
2009) (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405406), (20) No. 06201030663171 
(January through June 2010) (corresponding to Cruz assessment No. 06201205405407). 
January Term, 2015 
 
19
above, and we vacate the decision and remand the cause as to the remaining 20 
assessments for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  Given the 
posture of this case, the only issue on remand is service of the corporate 
assessments, and the BTA may take additional evidence as it deems necessary in 
order to determine that issue.  See Woda Ivy Glen Ltd. Partnership v. Fayette Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 175, 2009-Ohio-762, 902 N.E.2d 984, ¶ 32 (when 
the Supreme Court clarifies the applicable law on appeal, the BTA is usually 
justified in taking additional evidence on remand).  If service is found to have 
been completed on the corporation, the corresponding assessments against Cruz 
should be upheld; if service is found not to have been perfected, then the 
corresponding assessments should be canceled. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
____________________________ 
 
John Wood, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and David D. Ebersole and Barton A. 
Hubbard, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
_______________________