Case Title: Afify v. Simmons

Citation: 

Docket Number: 961781

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
1 Lacy, Keenan, and  
  Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
MOHAMAD A. AFIFY 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v.  Record No. 961781               September 12, 1997 
 
LINDA J. SIMMONS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether prior to July 1, 1997, a 
plaintiff who initially filed a claim in the general district 
court was permitted to amend the ad damnum clause of his claim to 
seek damages in excess of the civil jurisdictional limits of that 
court, Code § 16.1-77,
2 where the defendant has elected to remove 
the case to circuit court under Code § 16.1-92. 
 
On September 30, 1993, Michael David Simmons and Linda J. 
Young Simmons filed three warrants in detinue in the City of 
Virginia Beach General District Court against Mohamad A. Afify.  
One warrant sought recovery of property or damages for property 
jointly owned by the Simmonses valued at $9,976, another sought 
to recover property or damages for property belonging to Mr. 
Simmons valued at $9,953, and the third, filed in her maiden 
name, sought recovery of property or damages for property 
belonging to Mrs. Simmons valued at $9,952.92.  These claims 
arose out of the Simmonses' employment by Afify as resident 
                     
     
1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
July 1, 1997.  
     
2At all times relevant to this appeal, the civil 
jurisdictional limit for claims filed in a general district court 
was $10,000.  As of July 1, 1997, that limit was increased to 
$15,000. 
managers of a residential motel and his retention of their 
property after their employment was terminated. 
 
On November 30, 1993, Afify filed an application, with the 
appropriate supporting affidavit, to remove the cases to the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach.  Following a stay in 
the proceedings pending conclusion of Afify's bankruptcy, the 
Simmonses filed a motion to amend the warrants in detinue in the 
form of a single motion for judgment.  In the motion for judgment 
which was filed on March 13, 1995, the Simmonses asserted new 
claims for wages and unreimbursed expenses under a theory of 
breach of contract.  The Simmonses further asserted a claim for 
conversion of the property previously itemized in their general 
district court claims, increasing the damages sought to $60,000. 
 In addition, the Simmonses sought punitive damages in the amount 
of $120,000 for the alleged conversion.  A subsequent amendment 
to the motion for judgment increased the claim for punitive 
damages to $330,000. 
 
In a jury trial, the Simmonses were awarded compensatory 
damages of $20,800 for loss of personal property and unreimbursed 
expenses and punitive damages of $300,000.  Afify filed a post-
trial motion seeking, inter alia, to have the verdict reduced to 
comport with the civil jurisdictional limits of the general 
district court, asserting that those limits applied to claims 
removed to the circuit court.  The circuit court denied this 
motion and entered judgment on the jury's verdict.  We awarded 
Afify this appeal. 
 
It is settled law in this Commonwealth that when a judgment 
is rendered in the general district court, the jurisdictional 
limits of that court carry over to the appeal of that judgment in 
the circuit court.  Stacy v. Mullins, 185 Va. 837, 844, 40 S.E.2d 
260, 265 (1946); see also Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va. 785, 794, 51 
S.E.2d 239, 244 (1949).  In Hoffman, we went on to explain that 
the removal of a case from the general district court to the 
circuit court permits a defendant to file a counterclaim in 
excess of the jurisdictional limits of the general district 
court.  Id. at 795, 51 S.E.2d at 244.  The rationale supporting 
the holding expressed in Hoffman was that the claims of a 
defendant who promptly removes a case should not be subject to 
the jurisdictional limits of a tribunal not of his choosing and 
that one of the functions of removal is to afford the defendant 
the opportunity to select a forum in which his claims can be 
fully adjudicated.  Id.  Accordingly, unless an express provision 
in Code § 16.1-92, the statute permitting removal by the 
defendant of a plaintiff's claims from the general district court 
to the circuit court, authorizes the circuit court to exercise 
broader jurisdiction with respect to such claims, the plaintiff 
will remain bound by the civil jurisdictional limits of the 
general district court. 
 
The Simmonses assert that our decision in Jackson v. 
Jackson, 236 Va. 199, 372 S.E.2d 155 (1988), implicitly found 
such authority within the statute.  In Jackson, the trial court 
permitted the plaintiff, after removal, to increase the amount of 
her claims in a motion for judgment beyond the civil 
jurisdictional limits of the general district court and entered a 
default judgment in her favor when the defendant failed to file a 
timely response.  Id. at 204, 372 S.E.2d at 158.  On appeal, the 
defendant did not assert that permitting the amendment was error, 
asserting instead that the removal affidavit was a responsive 
pleading barring the entry of a default judgment.  We limited our 
review to that issue.  Id. at 205, 372 S.E.2d at 159. 
 
Similarly, in Hetland v. Worcester Mutual Insurance Co., 231 
Va. 44, 340 S.E.2d 574 (1986), the trial court permitted a 
plaintiff to increase her ad damnum claim when filing her motion 
for judgment following removal, but refused as untimely a further 
amendment increasing the amount of her claims.  The initial 
increase did not exceed the jurisdictional limits of the general 
district court.  The issue presented to us in that case was 
whether the refusal to permit the further amendment was an abuse 
of discretion.  Holding that it was not, we did not reach the 
issue of whether the jurisdictional limits of the lower court 
would have otherwise prohibited the subsequent amendment.  Id. at 
47, 340 S.E.2d at 576. 
 
Accordingly, we have never before considered whether Code 
§ 16.1-92, as in effect at the time Afify removed the Simmonses' 
cases, permitted the plaintiffs to increase the amount of their 
claims beyond the civil jurisdictional limits of the general 
district court following removal of the claims by the defendant 
to the circuit court.  We hold that it did not. 
 
Prior to its amendment in 1997, the statute permitted the 
circuit court, following removal, to allow amendments, enter 
orders, and otherwise conduct proceedings "to correct any 
defects, irregularities and omissions in the pleadings."
3  Thus, 
there was an express limitation in the statute on the power of 
the circuit court to be liberal in granting leave to amend.  See 
Rule 1:8.  Nothing in the statute at the time under consideration 
expressly permitted the Simmonses to take advantage of the 
jurisdiction of the circuit court in order to increase the amount 
of the claims made in the general district court.   
 
Moreover, none of the additions made by the Simmonses in the 
original motion for judgment or the subsequent amended motion for 
judgment were necessary to correct a defect, irregularity, or 
omission in the warrants in detinue.  Accordingly, it was error 
to permit the Simmonses to amend their original claims to 
increase the damages sought to amounts in excess of the 
jurisdictional limits of the general district court.  Because the 
circuit court was without jurisdiction to consider the amended 
claims, the trial and verdict on that pleading are nullities. 
 
For these reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand the case for a new trial limited to the 
claims raised in the original warrants in detinue and, with 
respect to those claims, subject to the civil jurisdictional 
limits of the general district court.
4
                     
     
3Code § 16.1-92 was amended effective July 1, 1997 allowing 
the circuit court to "permit all necessary amendments, including 
amendments to increase the amount of the claim above the 
jurisdictional" limits of the general district court.  The 
addition of this new language by the legislature lends support to 
our conclusion that the prior form of the statute did not permit 
such amendments.  See Wisniewski v. Johnson, 223 Va. 141, 144, 
286 S.E.2d 223, 224-25 (1982); Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 
688, 693, 77 S.E. 470, 472 (1913). 
     
4Our resolution of the jurisdictional issue renders moot the 
 
Vacated and remanded. 
                                                                  
remaining issues raised by the appellant.  In addition, the 
appellant has not raised an issue concerning the validity of the 
appellees' amendments asserting new theories of breach of 
contract and conversion following removal of the original claims 
to the circuit court.  Accordingly, we express no opinion as to 
these issues.