Case Title: McCrone v. Bank One Corp.

Citation: 2005-Ohio-6505

Docket Number: 20041063 and 20041065

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505.] 
 
 
 
MCCRONE, APPELLEE, v. BANK ONE CORPORATION; 
KIELMEYER, ADMR., APPELLANT. 
[Cite as McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505.] 
Workers’ compensation — R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) — Definition of “injury” — 
Statutory exclusion of mental injuries from compensability under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act does not violate equal protection. 
(Nos. 2004-1063 and 2004-1065 — Submitted April 27, 2005 — Decided 
December 28, 2005.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Stark County, 
No. 2003CA00092, 2004-Ohio-2538. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise from a 
compensable physical injury or occupational disease are excluded from the 
definition of “injury” under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) and from workers’ 
compensation coverage. 
2. 
R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions by excluding from the definition of 
“injury” psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise from a 
compensable physical injury or occupational disease. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} The question presented is whether R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) violates 
equal protection by excluding psychological or psychiatric injuries from workers’ 
compensation coverage.  We hold that it does not. 
Facts and Procedure 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Kimberly McCrone, was an employee of Bank One 
Corporation from 1998 to 2001.  During her employment, the branch in which she 
worked was robbed twice.  At the first robbery on December 20, 2000, McCrone 
was present but was not the teller involved; however, she was the teller robbed on 
August 4, 2001.  Although McCrone returned to work without claiming adverse 
effects after the first robbery, after the second she was diagnosed with 
posttraumatic stress disorder and has not worked for the bank since.  She filed for 
workers’ compensation benefits for her psychological condition stemming from 
the second robbery, but benefits were denied because she had not suffered a 
physical injury.1  McCrone exhausted her administrative appeals and then filed 
suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County.  She challenged R.C. 
4123.01(C)(1), the statute that excludes psychological or psychiatric conditions 
from the definition of “injury” for workers’ compensation purposes, on 
constitutional grounds, alleging that it violated the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, as well as Section 
35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.2 
{¶ 3} The bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied, 
and R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) was ruled unconstitutional as applied to McCrone.  The 
trial court found that the exclusion of psychological injuries from workers’ 
compensation coverage was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest and thus found an equal protection violation.  The Court of Appeals for 
Stark County affirmed. McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 2nd Dist. No. 
2003CA00092, 2004-Ohio-2538, 2004 WL 1111021. 
                                          
 
1.  Fortunately, it does not appear that anyone was harmed on that occasion. 
 
2.  As the arguments concerning due process and the violation of Section 35, Article II were not 
raised in a proposition of law or in the certified conflict, we limit the constitutional analysis to the 
equal protection claim. 
January Term, 2005 
3 
{¶ 4} These cases come before us upon acceptance of a discretionary 
appeal of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”), as well as upon 
the certification of a conflict from the Court of Appeals for Stark County.  We 
found that a conflict exists. 103 Ohio St.3d 1459, 2004-Ohio-5056, 815 N.E.2d 
676. 
{¶ 5} The certified question asks “[w]hether R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) violates 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, where it 
excludes from Workers’ Compensation coverage psychological or psychiatric 
conditions occurring in the course of and arising out of the claimant’s 
employment, but [which] do not arise from or occur contemporaneously with a 
compensable physical injury.” 
The Equal Protection Clauses 
{¶ 6} Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  In like 
manner, Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution, provides that “[a]ll political 
power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the 
same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or 
immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by 
the General Assembly.”  Simply stated, the Equal Protection Clauses require that 
individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like circumstances. 
{¶ 7} The limitations placed upon governmental action by the federal 
and state Equal Protection Clauses are essentially the same. See Am. Assn. of 
Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (confirming that Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
tracks its federal counterpart), reversed on other grounds (1999), 526 U.S. 124, 
119 S.Ct. 1162, 143 L.Ed.2d 227; Porter v. Oberlin (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 143, 
151-152, 30 O.O.2d 491, 205 N.E.2d 363; State ex rel. Struble v. Davis (1937), 
132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 8 O.O. 552, 9 N.E.2d 684. 
{¶ 8} “A statutory classification which involves neither a suspect class 
nor a fundamental right does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio 
or United States Constitutions [sic] if it bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest.” Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio 
St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181.  Since no one argues that fundamental rights or 
suspect classes are implicated in this case, the correct standard to be applied is the 
rational-basis test.  Under this test, “ ‘a State does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.  If the 
classification has some “reasonable basis,” it does not offend the Constitution 
simply because the classification “is not made with mathematical nicety or 
because in practice it results in some inequality.” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co. [1911], 220 U.S. 61, 78 [31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369].’ ” State ex rel. 
Nyitray v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 179, 2 OBR 715, 443 N.E.2d 
962 (Krupansky, J., dissenting), quoting Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 
471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491.   
{¶ 9} The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis.  We must first 
identify a valid state interest.  Second, we must determine whether the method or 
means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational. See 
Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
260, 267, 652 N.E.2d 952.  A statute will not be held to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, and this court will not invalidate a plan of classification 
adopted by the General Assembly, unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. 
State ex rel. Lourin v. Indus. Comm. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 618, 620, 21 O.O. 490, 
37 N.E.2d 595, overruled on other grounds, Caruso v. Alum. Co. of Am. (1984), 
January Term, 2005 
5 
15 Ohio St.3d 306, 15 OBR 436, 473 N.E.2d 818.  Thus, provided that the statute 
is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it will be upheld. 
{¶ 10} Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution vests in the General 
Assembly the right to establish a workers’ compensation system.  It provides: 
“For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their dependents, for 
death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such 
workmen’s employment, laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be 
created by compulsory contribution thereto by employers, and administered by 
the state, determining the terms and conditions upon which payment shall be 
made therefrom.  Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to 
compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, or occupational disease, and 
any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law, passed in 
accordance herewith, shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or 
by statute for such death, injuries or occupational disease.” 
{¶ 11} McCrone claims that her equal protection rights have been violated 
because she is unable to benefit from workers’ compensation coverage, since she 
has suffered no physical injury.  First we must examine the statutory definition at 
issue. 
Definitions and Classifications of Injury 
{¶ 12} The General Assembly first defined the word “injury” for workers’ 
compensation purposes as “any injury received in the course of, and arising out 
of, the injured employee’s employment.” G.C. 1465-68, 117 Ohio Laws 109, 
effective July 10, 1937.  In 1959, the following italicized language was added to 
the term “injury” in R.C. 4123.01(C): “ ‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether 
caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, 
received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 470, 128 Ohio Laws 743, 745, effective November 2, 1959. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 13} In 1986, R.C. 4123.01(C) was amended to define what constitutes 
a workers’ compensation injury and what does not. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 718.  R.C. 4123.01(C) provides: 
{¶ 14} “ ‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether caused by external 
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, 
and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.  ‘Injury’ does not include: 
{¶ 15} “(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen 
from an injury or occupational disease.” 
{¶ 16} Both before and after these amendments, courts have held that 
compensable injuries under the workers’ compensation system require a physical 
component suffered by the claimant.3  In Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 
Ohio St. 292, 23 O.O. 496, 43 N.E.2d 266, overruled on other grounds, Village v. 
Gen. Motors Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 129, 15 OBR 279, 472 N.E.2d 1079, 
this court held that the term “comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or 
harm.” (Emphasis added.)  Malone at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Conditions 
suffered by the claimant could be mental disorders, provided that they arose from 
a physical injury. See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm. (2001), 92 Ohio 
St.3d 455, 459, 751 N.E.2d 967. 
{¶ 17} The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation itself has required a 
physical injury to the claimant before granting compensation for a psychiatric 
condition, both before and after the 1986 amendments. See, e.g., Andolsek v. 
Kirtland (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 333, 335, 650 N.E.2d 911; Connors v. Sterling 
Milk Co. (1993), 98 Ohio App.3d 711, 649 N.E.2d 856; Fields v. Youngstown 
(May 30, 1989), Mahoning App. No. 88 C.A. 89, 1989 WL 59014. 
                                          
 
3.  See Kerans v. Porter Paint Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 486, 489, 575 N.E.2d 428; Rambaldo v. 
Accurate Die Casting (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 281, 287, 603 N.E.2d 975; Bunger v. Lawson Co. 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.2d 463, 466, 696 N.E.2d 1029. 
January Term, 2005 
7 
{¶ 18} In Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 281, 
287, 603 N.E.2d 975, we discussed whether nonphysical injuries could be claimed 
as occupational diseases under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).  We held that “[i]n the 
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to recognize mental conditions 
caused solely by work-related stress as occupational diseases within the purview 
of the Workers’ Compensation Act, such mental conditions are not compensable 
as occupational diseases.” Id. at syllabus.  Similarly, we now hold that 
psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise from a compensable 
physical injury or occupational disease are excluded from the definition of 
“injury” under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) and from workers’ compensation coverage. 
{¶ 19} Because the General Assembly has classified mental conditions as 
compensable under workers’ compensation laws only when they are accompanied 
by physical injury, the question becomes whether that classification violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of either the United States or Ohio Constitution. 
Equal Protection Analysis 
{¶ 20} Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. State ex 
rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 
59, paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection requires that laws operate equally upon persons who are identified in 
the same class. State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 201, 
204, 672 N.E.2d 1008. 
{¶ 21} With the exception of the Court of Appeals for Stark County in this 
case, all appellate decisions hold that the exclusion of mental injuries from the 
workers’ compensation definition of “injury” does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of either the United States or Ohio Constitution.4 
                                          
 
4.  Wood v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 156 Ohio App.3d 725, 2004-Ohio-1765, 808 N.E.2d 887; 
Crutcher v. Butler Twp. (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 582, 735 N.E.2d 25; Chrisulis v. U.S.X. Corp. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 22} In this matter, the Court of Appeals for Stark County cited a case 
in which we held that a claimant could obtain workers’ compensation benefits for 
a mental condition when a co-worker, rather than the claimant, had suffered a 
compensable physical injury: Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc. (2001), 
91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121. McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 2nd Dist. 
No. 2003CA00092, 2004-Ohio-2538, 2004 WL 1111021, at ¶ 17.  In Bailey, the 
claimant, a forklift operator, had accidentally killed his co-worker and claimed 
severe depression as a resulting work-related injury.  In an atypical holding, the 
Bailey court held that “[a] psychiatric condition of an employee arising from a 
compensable injury or an occupational disease suffered by a third party is 
compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).” Id. at the syllabus.  We now question 
that holding. 
{¶ 23} When the entire definition of “injury” in R.C. 4123.01(C) is 
examined, it is clear that workers’ compensation covers physical injuries and 
psychiatric injuries that arise directly out of physical injuries or occupational 
disease to the claimant.  R.C. 4123.01(C) states: 
{¶ 24} “ ‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether caused by external 
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, 
and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.  ‘Injury’ does not include: 
{¶ 25} “(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen 
from an injury or occupational disease.” 
{¶ 26} Only three years before Bailey, this court recognized that the 
limited scope of the workers’ compensation system requires limiting 
                                                                                                                   
(June 29, 1994), Lorain App. Nos. 93CA005599 and 93CA005618; Andolsek v. Kirtland (1994), 
99 Ohio App.3d 333, 650 N.E.2d 911; Connors v. Sterling Milk Co. (1993), 98 Ohio App.3d 711, 
649 N.E.2d 856; Fields v.  Youngstown (May 30, 1989), Mahoning App. No. 88 C.A. 89; Neil v. 
Mayfield (July 22, 1988), Montgomery App. No. CA 10881; Zaricki v. Laco Die Casting Co. (July 
8, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 44254. 
January Term, 2005 
9 
compensability to claims involving physical injury to the claimant. Bunger v. 
Lawson Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 463, 465-466, 696 N.E.2d 1029.  Bunger was 
unacknowledged by the Bailey majority.  In Bunger, we stated: “The workers’ 
compensation system was not designed to resolve every dispute that arises 
between employers and employees.  It was designed to manage the compensation 
of individuals who suffer physical injuries or contract occupational diseases on 
the job.” Id. at 465, 696 N.E.2d 1029. 
{¶ 27} The facts in Bunger are similar to those now before us, for the 
claimant was seeking benefits for mental stress suffered as a result of a robbery at 
the workplace. We explained that certain cases were not covered by the workers’ 
compensation system and observed, “A majority of states allow compensation to 
workers for some purely psychological injuries suffered in the workplace. * * * 
Ohio’s General Assembly has yet to make such injuries compensable under 
workers’ compensation statutes. * * * [P]sychological injuries are removed from 
the coverage of the Act * * *.” Id. at 466, 696 N.E.2d 1029.  As we also noted in 
Rambaldo: “No workers’ compensation claim for a psychological condition, 
whether the condition was denominated as a disease or an injury, has been 
recognized by this court when the mental disease or injury was based solely on 
job-related stress.” Id., 65 Ohio St.3d at 284, 603 N.E.2d 975. 
{¶ 28} Thus, in allowing workers’ compensation for a mental condition 
arising from a third party’s injury, Bailey created an aberration.  Nonetheless, 
even if we were to apply Bailey, physical injury is still required (albeit to a third 
party) before a claimant’s mental condition becomes compensable.  In McCrone’s 
case, there was no physical injury whatsoever. Any reliance by the appellate court 
on Bailey was misplaced. 
{¶ 29} The General Assembly has defined the types of injuries and 
diseases that are compensable through workers’ compensation.  Psychological or 
psychiatric conditions, without an accompanying physical injury or occupational 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
disease, are not compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). We must determine 
whether this exclusion has a rational basis to support it. 
Rational-Basis Standard 
{¶ 30} The guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires the 
existence of rational grounds for making a distinction between those within and 
those outside a designated class. State v. Buckley (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 45 
O.O.2d 469, 243 N.E.2d 66, paragraph three of the syllabus; Porter v. Oberlin, 1 
Ohio St.2d 143, 30 O.O.2d 491, 205 N.E.2d 363, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
The General Assembly has determined that those who have mental conditions 
along with a compensable physical injury or occupational disease are covered 
within the workers’ compensation system, while those claimants with purely 
psychiatric or psychological conditions are excluded from coverage.  Legislative 
enactments that do not involve a suspect classification are “presumptively 
rationally related to legitimate social and economic goals, unless the ‘varying 
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any 
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the 
legislature’s actions were irrational.’ ” State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm. 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 201, 203, 533 N.E.2d 321, quoting Vance v. Bradley 
(1979), 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171. 
{¶ 31} Here, the court of appeals rejected cost-based reasons to justify the 
statute, citing State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 201, 
672 N.E.2d 1008, and State ex rel. Nyitray v. Indus. Comm., 2 Ohio St.3d at 177, 
2 OBR 715, 443 N.E.2d 962. McCrone, Stark App. No. 2003CA00092, 2004-
Ohio-2538, 2004 WL 1111021, at ¶ 24.  As the dissenting judge in McCrone 
noted, however, in Patterson and Nyitray, the injuries suffered were already 
covered by workers’ compensation, and the issues related to the amount of 
benefits to which the claimants were entitled. Id. at ¶32 (Edwards, J., dissenting).  
The Patterson constitutional challenge arose from an award to the dependent of a 
January Term, 2005 
11 
work-relief employee that was much smaller than the amount awarded to a 
dependent of a non-work-relief employee for the same injury. Patterson, supra, at 
the syllabus.  The Nyitray challenge was based upon the disparity between paying 
accrued temporary total disability benefits when an employee died of non-work-
related causes yet withholding those benefits when death was due to work-related 
causes. Id. at the syllabus.  We stated that “conserving funds is not a viable basis 
for denying compensation to those entitled to it.” Id., 2 Ohio St.3d at 177, 2 OBR 
715, 443 N.E.2d 962.  Here, the question is not whether Kimberly McCrone is 
entitled to payment of a specific amount of accrued compensation, but whether 
she is entitled to coverage at all. 
{¶ 32} “The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if 
they do not require, rough accommodations, — illogical, it may be, and 
unscientific.” Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago (1913), 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 
S.Ct. 441, 57 L.Ed. 730.  “A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” McGowan v. Maryland 
(1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393; Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. at 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491.  Our focus of inquiry, therefore, 
is whether there exist any reasonable bases for the disputed legislative 
classification. 
Reasons for Classification of Injuries 
{¶ 33} In support of R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), the BWC argues that it is 
reasonable to classify psychological and psychiatric conditions differently from 
those accompanied by physical injury because it is often difficult to prove the 
existence of, as well as the cause of, mental injuries.  McCrone relies on Ryan v. 
Connor (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 406, 28 OBR 462, 503 N.E.2d 1379, paragraph one 
of the syllabus (workplace injury resulting solely from stress is compensable 
under R.C. 4123.01(C)), seeming to suggest that we have rejected all problems of 
proof associated with psychological and psychiatric claims.  However, she ignores 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
that it was a stress-related physical injury in Ryan that was held compensable.  In 
mental injury claims, the problem arises of establishing the existence of that 
injury itself.  Although a physical injury may or may not cause a psychological or 
psychiatric condition, it may furnish some proof of a legitimate mental claim.  
McCrone also cites Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 4 
OBR 376, 447 N.E.2d 109, for the proposition that we have rejected problems of 
proof.  But Schultz is a tort case, where fear of fraudulent claims was not 
considered to be a valid reason to disallow a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress when a physical injury was not present.  Id. at 133-134, 4 OBR 
376, 447 N.E.2d 109.  As Schultz was not a workers’ compensation case, its 
reasoning is not applicable here.5 
{¶ 34} The BWC also emphasizes the government’s interest in making the 
most efficient use of a finite fund.  Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution 
gives the General Assembly the sole authority to determine coverage and to 
define which occupational injuries will be covered.  Rambaldo, 65 Ohio St.3d at 
288, 603 N.E.2d 975.  Applying the rational-basis test to this justification for the 
exclusion of psychological or psychiatric conditions, we conclude that the state 
has a legitimate interest.  It is reasonable to expect government to protect the self-
supporting nature of the Workers’ Compensation Fund, to distribute available 
resources so that benefit payments are kept at an adequate level for covered 
injuries rather than at an inadequate level for all potential disabilities, and to 
maintain a contribution rate not unduly burdensome to participating employers.6 
                                          
 
5.  The workers’ compensation system, nonetheless, is not the exclusive potential remedy for 
mental injuries.  This court determined in Bunger v. Lawson Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 463, 465-
466, 696 N.E.2d 1029, that, because these claims are excluded from workers’ compensation, an 
employee can bring a private claim in tort for which the employer does not have immunity. 
 
6.  This is the general rationale that has been accepted in the following cases: Wood v. Ohio State 
Hwy. Patrol, 156 Ohio App.3d 725, 2004-Ohio-1765, 808 N.E.2d 887;  Chrisulis v. U.S.X. Corp. 
January Term, 2005 
13 
{¶ 35} The BWC thus offers legitimate reasons that relate to the 
constitutional purpose underlying the workers’ compensation statute.  It cannot be 
said that denying workers’ compensation benefits to claimants who simply allege 
mental disorders or emotional stress due to their jobs is irrational, particularly 
when the requirement of a physical injury enables the state to distribute the 
limited resources of the fund to disabilities determined by the state to be covered.  
McCrone has not shown that the reasons advanced to support the distinctions 
drawn by the General Assembly are invalid. 
{¶ 36} We accept the appellant Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s 
position and hold that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions by excluding from the 
definition of “injury” psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise 
from a compensable physical injury or occupational disease. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Undoubtedly, psychological and psychiatric injuries may arise 
from an individual’s employment, and we do not discount their impact on those 
who suffer them.  The General Assembly, however, is the branch of state 
government charged by the Ohio Constitution to make public policy choices for 
the Workers’ Compensation Fund.  The legislatively created scheme sets forth a 
framework to determine which disabilities will be covered by the compensation 
system and which disabilities will not.  Requiring that a mental disorder be 
incident to a physical injury or the contraction of an occupational disease is 
                                                                                                                   
(June 29, 1994), Lorain App. Nos. 93CA005599 and 93CA005618; Andolsek v. Kirtland (1994), 
99 Ohio App.3d 333, 650 N.E.2d 911; Connors v. Sterling Milk Co. (1993), 98 Ohio App.3d 711, 
649 N.E.2d 856; Fields v. Youngstown (May 30, 1989), Mahoning App. No. 88 C.A. 89; Neil v. 
Mayfield (July 22, 1988), Montgomery App. No. CA 10881; Zaricki v. Laco Die Casting Co. (July 
8, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 44254. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.  As we noted in Bunger, 
“[t]he workers’ compensation system was not designed to resolve every dispute 
that arises between employers and employees.  It was designed to manage the 
compensation of individuals who suffer physical injuries or contract occupational 
diseases on the job.” Id., 82 Ohio St.3d at 465, 696 N.E.2d 1029.  At some point, 
the General Assembly may determine that psychological or psychiatric conditions 
arising in the workplace are compensable without regard to attendant physical 
injury or occupational disease.  Until then, however, claims for such conditions 
are limited to the extent that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) provides. 
{¶ 38} Appellee Kimberly McCrone has not met her burden to show that 
the state’s reasons for the statutory exclusion are invalid.  We therefore reverse 
the appellate court’s finding of unconstitutionality, because R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) 
rationally advances legitimate governmental interests. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 39} I 
agree 
with 
Justice 
Resnick’s 
dissenting 
opinion 
that 
psychological injuries can be as real as physical injuries.  However, I do not agree 
that a court has the authority to conclude that a psychological or psychiatric 
condition alone is a compensable workplace injury when the General Assembly’s 
definition of “injury” expressly requires a physical component. 
{¶ 40} First, there is no constitutional history to suggest that 
psychological injuries were contemplated by the drafters of Section 35, Article II 
of the Ohio Constitution at the time that section was written.  Therefore, I believe 
January Term, 2005 
15 
that it is the role of the General Assembly to determine whether a psychological 
or psychiatric condition resulting from workplace trauma should be a 
compensable injury or occupational disease for purposes of workers’ 
compensation.  In making that determination, I believe several issues should be 
subject to public debate:  criteria for diagnosis, the types of conditions to be 
included, and how to distinguish the effects of a personal trauma from workplace 
trauma. 
{¶ 41} The General Assembly should examine competing views on the 
topic, including expert testimony, and set goals, priorities, and standards before a 
purely psychological or psychiatric condition is defined as an “injury” for 
purposes of workers’ compensation.  Unlike conditions originating from an 
organic or chemical cause, trauma-related psychological and psychiatric 
conditions are very subjective and require balancing of evidence.  Even modern 
medicine differs widely over diagnoses as well as treatment. 
{¶ 42} Perhaps a purely psychological or psychiatric condition should be 
a compensable injury for purposes of workers’ compensation; however, it is not 
mandated under Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution or subject to 
coverage under the current workers’ compensation laws.  It is a matter for our 
General Assembly, and I urge our legislators to consider extending workers’ 
compensation to these injuries .  However, I would not mandate coverage by 
judicial fiat.  Therefore, I reluctantly concur in the majority’s decision. 
 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 43} Semantics aside, appellee, Kimberly McCrone, was injured in the 
course of her employment for Bank One Corporation, and her injury arose out of 
that employment.  She was injured as a result of a bank robbery that occurred at 
her place of employment while she was the teller on duty.  Her injury is real and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
disabling, and its existence is supported by competent medical evidence.  It is 
work-related in every sense of the word, it was accidental in character and result, 
and it has prevented appellee from returning to her former position of 
employment.  It is not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 
however, because it is psychological or mental in cause and effect, meaning that it 
has no “physical component” and was unaccompanied by physical trauma or 
damage.  And yet this same injury—posttraumatic stress disorder—would be fully 
covered under the statute if only the bank robber had been considerate enough of 
appellee’s compensation position to have shoved her during the robbery so that 
she could stub her toe and acquire the physical element that is deemed so essential 
to her right of recovery. 
{¶ 44} Now what kind of rational explanation or legitimate state interest 
could possibly justify distinguishing the compensability of one posttraumatic 
stress disorder from another under equivalent life-threatening circumstances based 
on the fortuity of a stubbed toe?  Or consider the situation in which the bank 
robber fires a gun at the teller but narrowly misses.  Can it really be concluded 
with any measure of rationality that there are reasonable grounds for making 
compensability of the teller’s posttraumatic stress disorder turn on whether she 
had the “good fortune” from a coverage standpoint to have twisted her back or 
sprained a finger upon recoiling at the prospect of being shot to death?  Does the 
injured back or finger under these circumstances, or the stubbed toe in the 
previous scenario, really provide such independent verification of the 
posttraumatic stress disorder as to be rationally determinative of its 
compensability? 
{¶ 45} The answers to these questions are as obvious as the physical-
injury prerequisite to coverage is absurd.  Indeed, it is unsatisfactory, to say the 
least, that the majority is constrained to fall back on the difficulty-of-
proof/conservation-of-resources rationale in order to justify the denial of coverage 
January Term, 2005 
17 
to an entire class of work-related injuries.  Not only are workers’ compensation 
claims routinely amended to include psychological injuries resulting from 
previously allowed physical injuries, but the time has long since passed when 
denying recoveries for “purely psychological” injuries can be excused on grounds 
of evidentiary difficulties or illusory claims.  We are no longer living in the 19th 
century when it was considered impossible to accurately diagnose psychological 
injuries. 
{¶ 46} As Professor Larson explains: 
{¶ 47} “[T]here is no really valid distinction between physical and 
‘nervous’ injury.  Certainly modern medical opinion would support this view, and 
insist that it is no longer realistic to draw a line between what is ‘nervous’ and 
what is ‘physical.’  It is an old story, in the history of law, to observe legal theory 
constantly adapting itself to accommodate new advances and knowledge in 
medical theory.  Perhaps, in earlier years, when much less was known about 
mental and nervous injuries and their relation to ‘physical’ symptoms and 
behavior, there was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for ruling 
out recoveries based on such injuries, both in tort and in workmen’s 
compensation.  But the excuse no longer exists.  And therefore a state which 
would withhold the benefits of workers’ compensation from a worker who, before 
an obvious industrial mishap, was a competent, respected iron-worker [or bank 
teller], and after the mishap was totally incapacitated to do the only job he or she 
was trained for, would nowadays be doing unjustifiable violence to the intent of 
the workers’ compensation act, for reasons that are without support in either 
legal or medical theory.”  (Emphasis added.)  3 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation 
Law (1999) 56-17 to 56-18, Section 56.04[1]. 
{¶ 48} In Bunger v. Lawson Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 463, 696 N.E.2d 
1029, Justice Lundberg Stratton explained: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶ 49} “A psychological injury is as real and may be as devastating as a 
physical injury.  Mental trauma that results from a robbery where one believes 
that one may be injured or killed can be serious and genuinely debilitating.  Yet 
psychological injuries without accompanying physical injury are specifically 
excluded from compensable injuries under the workers’ compensation statutes.”  
Id. at 467, 696 N.E.2d 1029 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring). 
{¶ 50} But if “[a] psychological injury may exist without a concurrent 
physical injury,” as Justice Lundberg Stratton suggested in Bunger, id., the 
majority’s current justification for the exclusion, i.e., that “[i]n mental injury 
claims, the problem arises of establishing the existence of the injury itself” 
(emphasis sic), is implausible.  Moreover, the majority’s cost-cutting justification 
rings hollow.  Since when is reducing governmental costs sufficient to nullify the 
basic protections afforded by the Ohio Constitution?  Is there a specific dollar 
amount of savings that must be realized before ignoring the Equal Protection 
Clause is justified? 
{¶ 51} I dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 52} This case demonstrates the failure of Bunger v. Lawson Co. 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 463, 696 N.E.2d 1029, to allow a meaningful chance for 
recovery for workers psychologically harmed by violent workplace attacks.  In 
Bunger, a case factually similar to this one, Rachel Bunger had been the victim of 
a holdup while working at a Dairy Mart.  She sued her employer in common pleas 
court for negligence and also sought workers’ compensation benefits for her 
psychological injuries.  This court held that while Ohio’s workers’ compensation 
statutes did not allow recovery for purely psychological injuries, Bunger could 
pursue a negligence claim against her employer.  We found that R.C. 4123.74’s 
January Term, 2005 
19 
grant of immunity from civil suits could not apply to a type of workplace injury 
that is not included in the statutory definition of compensable injuries.  Simply, an 
employer could not be immune from a civil suit for an injury that was not eligible 
for workers’ compensation benefits. 
{¶ 53} Because the case was before us on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal and 
the plaintiff had pleaded two different causes of action, the Bunger court was able 
to resolve the case without having to pass on the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
workers compensation law.  Although Bunger recognized that a cause of action 
for negligence in such situations is available, from a practical standpoint such a 
cause of action is not often useful.  The real-world truth is that employers can do 
only so much to protect their employees from the evil that men do; the fault for 
the trauma done to an employee in a robbery case usually lies entirely with the 
thug committing the felonious act.  Therefore, a cause of action against an 
employer for negligence is usually unwinnable, and accordingly, an employee is 
left with no compensation for her very real workplace injury. 
{¶ 54} That result is all the more unacceptable because workers’ 
compensation benefits are in fact available for psychological injuries.  Those 
injuries are compensable through workers’ compensation as long as they are 
accompanied by a physical injury. R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).  The majority writes, 
“Although a physical injury may or may not cause a psychological or psychiatric 
condition, it may furnish some proof of a legitimate mental claim,” that is, a 
physical injury may be proof of a work-related, cognizable triggering event 
causing the psychological trauma.  The injury tells us that something happened.  
A physical injury is merely evidence of the event — it is the triggering event that 
is significant.  But injuries are not the only possible evidence of traumatic events. 
{¶ 55} If the criminal in this case had given a paper cut to the teller when 
handing over his holdup note, would that have made her claims of mental distress 
easier to prove?  Certainly not.  There is no rational basis to treat injured 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
employees differently when both the physically injured and the nonphysically 
injured employees each can identify the genesis of their psychological condition.  
A cognizable triggering event, whether resulting in physical injury or not, is the 
proper determinant for proof of psychological injury.  A professional can evaluate 
the injury and the event to determine whether compensation is appropriate. 
{¶ 56} Finding the workers’ compensation statutes unconstitutional as 
they relate to workers psychologically harmed by a cognizable triggering event 
would not open the floodgates for compensation for all forms of mental distress.  
The court’s analysis and holding in this case should focus on the certain type of 
psychological injuries alleged here, in Bunger, and in Bailey v. Republic 
Engineered Steels, Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 741 N.E.2d 121 (worker 
suffered severe depression as a result of accidentally killing coworker).  We are 
not dealing in these cases with a person claiming depression because she is bored 
with her job and really wants to be an actress.  This case, Bunger, and Bailey all 
present instances in which the psychological injuries were demonstrably tied to a 
specific traumatic, accidental event in the workplace.  They do not present the 
same issues of proof as “I hate my job”-type depression masquerading as a 
workers’ compensation claim.  Allowing benefits in this case does not mean 
across-the-board compensation for all claims of mental illness.  Allowing benefits 
in this case allows for equal treatment of people with the same, equally provable 
injuries. 
{¶ 57} Accordingly, I would find that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) violates the 
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions in this case. 
__________________ 
 
Brian Law Offices, Richard F. Brian, and Steven J. Brian, for appellee. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. 
Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Diane Richards Brey and Franklin E. Crawford, 
January Term, 2005 
21 
Deputy Solicitors, and J. Quinn Dorgan, Assistant Solicitor, for appellant, 
Administrator, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Robert C. Meyer, and Brett 
L. Miller, for Bank One Corporation. 
 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and William A. Thorman III, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
______________________