Case Title: Laumbach v. Board of County Commissioners

Citation: 290 P.2d 1067, 60 N.M. 226

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1955-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
290 P.2d 1067 (1955) 60 N.M. 226 Joyce LAUMBACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY, New Mexico, and Vernon E. Lyster, Tobias G. Flores and Felipe Flores, as members thereof, Respondents-Appellees. No. 5924. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 3, 1955. *1068 Howard F. Houk, Santa Fe, for appellant. Noble, Spiess & Noble, Las Vegas, Jose E. Armijo, Las Vegas, for appellees. SADLER, Justice. The plaintiff as an appellant before this Court complains of a judgment entered against him in an action pending in the district court of San Miguel County, reading as follows: It will be noted that the cause was heard upon the pleadings consisting of an order to show cause entered upon the allegations of a verified complaint filed by the plaintiff in which it was charged that an election had been held in a certain area of San Miguel County on March 16, 1954, pursuant to L. 1947, c. 196, for purpose of determining whether a portion of San Miguel County should be annexed to Harding County; that certain illegal votes had been cast in Precinct 22 in the area proposed to be annexed by 20 or more persons who were not qualified electors therein which votes were wrongfully and fraudulently counted and tallied by the judges of election and that 4 or more persons who were duly qualified electors therein were denied the right to vote. Like allegations with respect to the rejection of the ballots of certain qualified electors, 26 or more in number in Precinct 65, were made, the refusal to permit them to vote being predicated on alleged defective registration certificates. It was further alleged that if the ballots of duly qualified voters in Precinct 65 so rejected had been or were, counted, tallied and canvassed as required by law, the result of the election, as upon the face of the return as it appeared to be, would be changed and the proposal to annex a portion of San Miguel to Harding County would have carried by a majority of the qualified electors of the affected area. Having so alleged in his complaint, the plaintiff prayed: Upon presentation of the complaint to the court, the trial judge entered an order to show cause, reading, as follows: In regular course, the defendants, the Board of County Commissioners of San Miguel County and Vernon E. Lyster, Tobias G. Flores and Felipe Flores, as individual members thereof, duly appeared in response to said order to show cause and filed a pleading entitled "Response to Alternative Writ of Mandamus" consisting of ten separate paragraphs of legal exceptions to the sufficiency of the order to show cause, designated and treated by defendants as an "Alternative Writ of Mandamus," closing their response to the "Order" or "Alternative Writ of Mandamus," whichever we finally shall determine it to be, with this language, immediately preceding the prayer, to wit: The plaintiff, having perfected his appeal, filed a pro forma brief in chief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 15, subd. 5, 1953 Comp. § 21-2-1 (15, subd. 5), calling *1070 on appellees (defendants) "to specify and maintain the insufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings in the District Court." In the pro forma brief so filed, the plaintiff assigns two errors, as follows: The defendants having filed their answer brief responding to the "Pro Forma Brief in Chief" of plaintiff (appellant), the latter's counsel filed their brief entitled "Appellant's Answer Brief." It became, in reality, the brief in chief of appellant (plaintiff) containing, as it does, principal discussion by plaintiff's counsel of the appeal on its merits. In this principal brief filed by plaintiff, he presents and relies upon one point for reversal, reading: Thus it is that we have for determination a single question, to wit: Is this an action in mandamus, or is it not? If so, determined, the judgment reviewed must stand affirmed. We may as well announce at the outset that we entertain no doubt about the nature of this action. It is one in mandamus and nothing else. True enough, it is not so designated in the pleadings filed. Nor is the order to show cause designated on its face an "Alternative Writ of Mandamus." This fact has encouraged an earnest effort by counsel for plaintiff to give it other color and character. He presents it as a simple suit in equity to prevent fraud said to have prevailed in a special election. They cite as a supporting authority Patterson v. People, 23 Colo. App. 479, 130 P. 618, a case which provides questionable grounds for equitable intervention. Compare, Orchard v. Board of Com'rs of Sierra County, 42 N.M. 172, 76 P.2d 41, and State ex rel. Denton v. Vinyard, 55 N.M. 205, 230 P.2d 238. It cannot be seriously doubted but that when the defendants, as members of the Board of County Commissioners, sit as a canvassing board to canvass the result of an election under statutory authority, they act as public officers whose acts, being purely ministerial, may be controlled by mandamus. In re Sloan, 5 N.M. 590, 600, 25 P. 930; Chavez v. Hockenhull, 39 N.M. 79, 39 P.2d 1027. Compare, Eldodt v. Territory ex rel. Vaughn, 10 N.M. 141, 61 P. 105. The writ lies only to enforce a clear legal right and against one whose clear legal duty it is to perform the act necessary to the enjoyment of such right. Regents of Agricultural College of New Mexico v. Vaughn, 12 N.M. 333, 78 P. 51; State ex rel. McElroy v. Vesely, 40 N.M. 19, 52 P.2d 1090. It lies only to compel a party to do that which it is his duty to do without it. It confers no new authority. Regents of Agricultural College of New Mexico v. Vaughn, supra. When we compare the allegations of the order in the case at bar, with those customarily found in an alternative writ of mandamus, we find every element present one would expect to find in an ordinary action of mandamus. Each mandate contained in the order commands the defendants to do some official act as a public officer, or show cause at a time and place named, why they have not done so. Counsel for the plaintiff would make of the complaint, or the order, a proceeding in equity, pointing out the paragraph of the complaint praying an injunction against *1071 adjournment until they show cause why they have not performed as directed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the prayer and a direction in the order in conformity therewith. This injunctive phase of the order was merely in aid of the action of mandamus and in no manner transformed the proceeding into one in equity. In re Sloan, supra. Nor does the fact that the order to show cause was not designated an alternative writ of mandamus change its character. The author of the text on mandamus states in 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 312, p. 550, in introducing his discussion on the alternative writ, that it is in effect an order to show cause. The text states: It matters not what the pleading initiating the proceeding may be denominated. If in truth it discloses by its allegations and the relief sought that it is an action in mandamus, it will be so treated. This much is made clear by our language in Heron v. Garcia, 48 N.M. 507, 153 P.2d 514, 515. We said: Once the proceeding is accepted as one in mandamus, then certain well-recognized rules emerge to control the consideration of the case. A most important one is that the case must be tried on the writ and answer. The complaint itself drops out of the picture and the writ must contain allegations of all facts necessary to authorize the relief sought. State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242. Furthermore, allegations in the writ should be made as in ordinary actions. Hence, the usual rules applicable in testing the sufficiency of a complaint in an ordinary civil action apply. The facts should be pleaded with the same certainty, neither more nor less. State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, supra. When we come to a consideration of this phase of the case there are absent so many material allegations essential to entitle plaintiff to the relief sought that it would be a work of supererogation to catalogue them. For instance, it is not alleged that plaintiff is, himself, a citizen of the United States, or a qualified elector anywhere. It was absolutely essential that he show himself to be a qualified elector in a precinct within the area sought to be annexed. Nor is there an allegation present in the writ disclosing any special interest entitling him to bring the action. See Tadlock v. Smith, 38 N.M. 288, 31 P.2d 708, and Tomlin v. Town of Las Cruces, 38 N.M. 247, 31 P.2d 258, 97 A.L.R. 185. But why go on? Counsel for plaintiff has frankly admitted that if this proceeding be held to be one in mandamus, sufficiency of the pleadings to be determined on the writ and answer, that the writ does not suffice. The trial judge's construction of the pleadings was that the action was one in mandamus. We cannot say this construction was unreasonable. Accordingly under well-settled rules of decision, we must uphold the construction he gave them. Cadwell v. Higginbotham, 20 N.M. 482, 151 P. 315. It follows from what we have said that the judgment appealed from must stand affirmed. It will be so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN and McGHEE, JJ., concur. KIKER, J., not participating.