Case Title: 75-80 Properties v. RALE, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 59/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
75-80 Properties, L.L.C., et al. v. RALE, Inc., et al., No. 59, September Term, 2019, 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
– 
FREDERICK 
COUNTY 
ETHICS 
ORDINANCE 
APPLICABLE 
TO 
ETHICS 
VIOLATIONS 
DURING 
DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL PROCESS.  Under the plain language of the Frederick 
County Ethics Statute, Maryland Code, General Provisions Article (“GP”) § 5-862, the 
circuit court was not required to undertake a procedural due process analysis and determine 
whether the violation of the ethics statute denied an aggrieved party procedural due process 
within the underlying zoning proceeding.  Under the plain language of the statute, the 
circuit court is required to determine, within the context of a judicial review proceeding, 
whether a violation of the Ethics Statute occurred.  If the circuit court makes a factual 
determination that a violation occurred, its work is done, and the court “shall” remand the 
matter to the Frederick County governing body for “reconsideration.”   
 
The Ethics Statute does not provide any parameters or limitations on Frederick County’s 
reconsideration proceedings on remand.  Accordingly, the Frederick County Council has 
the authority to determine the scope of the proceeding.  After the circuit court determined 
that a violation of the Ethics Statute occurred, and after the Frederick County Council 
determined that it would conduct a de novo hearing on the Developers’ application, the 
circuit court did not err in vacating the development approvals in connection with its 
remand order, given the Developers’ refusal to participate in the reconsideration 
proceeding.   
 
DOCTRINE OF ZONING ESTOPPEL.  The Court of Appeals declined to recognize or 
apply equitable estoppel under the facts of this case.  Assuming (without deciding) that the 
Court recognizes the doctrine, the Developers did not demonstrate the elements of good 
faith and substantial reliance on the development approvals where the actions alleged to 
have been made in reliance on the development approvals consisted of either: prospective 
concessions or agreements negotiated in anticipation of receiving discretionary final 
development approval; or actions undertaken at their own risk after receiving final 
development approval during the pendency of a judicial review proceeding.  The Court 
also held that there was no ambiguity in the definition of ex parte communication that 
would warrant the application of principles of equitable estoppel.   
Circuit Court for Frederick County 
Case No.:  10-C-14-001899 
Argued: May 13, 2020 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 59 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75-80 PROPERTIES, L.L.C., et al. 
v. 
RALE, INC., et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 24, 2020 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-08-24 14:51-04:00
This case requires that we examine a special provision of the Maryland Public Ethics 
Law, codified in the General Provisions Article (“GP”) of the Maryland Code at §§ 5-857 
– 5-862, that applies when the Frederick County governing body is undertaking review of 
a zoning or development application.  Under the statute, a member of the governing body 
must disclose ex parte communications with any individual concerning a pending zoning 
or development application during the pendency of the application.  If a violation of the 
statute occurs, the Frederick County Ethics Commission or any aggrieved party of record 
has standing to raise the violation within a petition for judicial review by the circuit court.  
If the circuit court determines that a violation has occurred, the language of the statute 
mandates that the circuit court remand the proceeding to the Frederick County governing 
body for “reconsideration.”   
In this case, upon consideration of petitions for judicial review filed by a local 
citizens group that opposed the Developers’ application, the Circuit Court for Frederick 
County found that a former member of the Frederick County Board of Commissioners had 
violated the ethics statute by engaging in an ex parte communication, during the pendency 
of a proceeding to apply a floating zone to an approximately 400-acre property.  The circuit 
court remanded the case to the Frederick County Council for reconsideration.  The Frederick 
County Council decided to reconsider the Developers’ rezoning and development 
application in a de novo proceeding.  Upset with the Council’s decision that the application 
be considered anew, the Developers refused to participate.  Having reached an impasse, 
the Frederick County Council requested that the circuit court enter an appropriate order 
2 
which would allow the Council to proceed with a de novo reconsideration proceeding.  As 
part of its remand, the circuit court vacated the original development approvals.  
The Developers appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  In a reported opinion, 
the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.  75-80 Props., LLC 
v. RALE, Inc., 242 Md. App. 377, 416–17 (2019).  For the reasons set forth in this opinion, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  
I.  
Background 
A. The Developers’ Development Applications  
In November 2012, Petitioners Payne Investments, LLC and 75-80 Properties, LLC 
(collectively “the Developers”) filed an application to rezone approximately 450 acres of 
land in southeastern Frederick County from its current agricultural designation1 to allow 
for a planned unit development (“PUD”), 2  to be called the “Monrovia Town Center.”  The 
                                              
1 The Developers’ property is zoned in the Agricultural District (A) under the 
Frederick County Zoning Ordinance.  The Zoning Ordinance describes the purpose of the 
Agricultural District (A) as preserving “productive agricultural land and the character and 
quality of the rural environment and to prevent urbanization where roads and other public 
facilities are scaled to meet only rural needs.”  Frederick County Code, § 1-19-5.220.  
 
2 The PUD District is a floating zone under the Frederick County Zoning Ordinance. 
For a discussion of floating zones generally, see County Council of Prince George’s 
County v. Zimmer Development Co., 444 Md. 490, 514–17 (2015).  Floating zones are 
often used to allow the development of specialized or mixed uses.  Id. at 515 (citations 
omitted).  As part of the approval process for a floating zone, the local zoning authority 
“must find generally that the legislative prerequisites for the zone are met and the rezoning 
is compatible with the surrounding neighborhood[.]”  Id. (citations omitted).  According to 
the Frederick County Zoning Ordinance, the purpose and intent of the floating zones is to 
“provide new development and redevelopment within identified growth areas that result in 
an integrated mixture of commercial, employment, residential, recreational, civil and/or 
3 
application sought approval for the construction of 1,510 residential units.  Along with the 
PUD rezoning application, the Developers filed an application for a development rights 
and responsibilities agreement (“DRRA”), to contractually secure the zoning and 
development approvals for a term of years, pursuant to Maryland Code, Land Use Article 
(“LU”) § 7-304(a).  Additionally, the Developers requested an Adequate Public Facility 
Ordinance Letter of Understanding (“APFO LOU”) which would define the public facilities 
(such as road improvements and sewer facilities) that would be required to be constructed to 
satisfy the County’s Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance (the PUD, DRRA, and APFO 
LOU are sometimes collectively referred to as the “Development Approvals”).   
In November 2013, the Frederick County Planning Commission (“the Planning 
Commission”) voted to recommend that the Board of County Commissioners approve the 
PUD and found that the draft DRRA was consistent with the County’s Comprehensive Plan.   
After holding three public hearings in January 2014, the Board of County 
Commissioners approved the PUD, subject to a number of conditions.  The Developers 
accepted the conditions.  In March 2014, the Planning Commission recommended approval 
of a revised plan.   
In April 2014, the Board of County Commissioners held a total of four public hearings 
concerning the Development Approvals for the Monrovia Town Center.  The public hearings 
were well-attended, and there was considerable public opposition to the proposed 
development.  Much of the public opposition focused on traffic safety and adequacy of public 
                                              
cultural land uses as provided within the appropriate Frederick County Comprehensive, 
Community, or Corridor Plan.”  Frederick County Code, § 1-19-10.500.1. 
4 
roads.  Throughout the approval process, a local citizens opposition group, Residents Against 
Landsdale Expansion (“RALE”), actively participated in the public hearings.  
B. The Ex Parte Communications:  Commissioner Smith, the FACT Meeting, and 
FACT Letter  
On April 14, 2014, before the Board’s final public meeting, Commissioner C. Paul 
Smith attended a public meeting of the Frederick Area Committee for Transportation 
(“FACT”).  FACT is composed of representatives of the business community and the local 
government who have training or expertise in transportation issues.  FACT’s mission is to 
analyze the efficacy of and promote the development of transportation improvements in 
the County.  Commissioner Smith was the Board of County Commissioners’ representative 
on the FACT advisory board.  FACT’s advisory board also included Michael Smariga, a 
retired principal in the engineering firm engaged by the Developers to process the rezoning 
application.  Michael Smariga’s son, Christopher Smariga, was the lead engineer in 
creating and processing the application.   
At the FACT meeting on April 14, 2014, Commissioner Smith spoke in favor of the 
proposed development, and argued that the improvements the Developers proposed to 
make to the nearby highways (MD Routes 75 and 80) would substantially upgrade the 
regional transportation network and benefit all the residents in that area of the County.  The 
arguments that Commissioner Smith articulated in favor of the Developers’ application 
ultimately were included in a letter purportedly from FACT to the Board of County 
Commissioners in support of the Developers’ application.  The FACT letter was sent to the 
Board of County Commissioners via electronic mail at 2:41 p.m. on April 23, 2014—a 
5 
little more than three hours prior to the beginning of the final public hearing on the 
Developers’ application.  Although Commissioner Smith’s arguments were included in the 
letter, the arguments were not attributed to Commissioner Smith.   
C. Final Board of County Commissioners’ Hearing on the Developers’ Application 
At the public hearing on April 23, the Board of County Commissioners considered 
public comment from numerous witnesses, including the county staff, the Developers, 
RALE representatives, and the public.  Like the other public hearings concerning the 
Developers’ application, testimony from the public again focused overwhelmingly on 
traffic safety and road adequacy concerns.  One of the witnesses was RALE’s traffic 
consulting engineer, who testified that the Developers’ traffic study was flawed.   
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the Board of County Commissioners 
President, Blaine Young, introduced and read the entire FACT letter into the record, stating 
that the development of the Monrovia Town Center would provide “significant funding for 
improvements” in the Monrovia area, and that this “public-private partnership is the only 
likely scenario for any significant improvement at this point.”  After reading the FACT 
letter into the record and naming its signatory (FACT’s secretary, Michael Proffitt), President 
Young then read the names of each of the FACT directors (though not the names of the 
advisory board members, which included Commissioner Smith).  When Commissioner 
David Gray asked whether each of FACT’s directors had signed the letter, President Young 
responded that they had not, but that they had given their authority for the letter to be signed.   
Counsel for RALE asked for an opportunity to cross-examine a representative of 
FACT on the letter.  President Young responded that FACT was submitting a letter, not 
6 
testifying, and accepted the letter into evidence over RALE’s objection.  President Young 
then called upon the Developers to rebut RALE’s case.  Counsel for the Developers 
emphasized the importance of the FACT letter and its contents, stating that “FACT might 
be the most apolitical organization in Frederick County,” that “FACT doesn’t care where 
or when land gets developed,” and that “FACT cares strictly and solely about funding for 
transportation.”   
At the end of the meeting, the Board voted to approve the PUD, the DRRA, and 
the APFO LOU by a vote of 4-1.  The Commissioners signed the operative documents 
on May 29, 2014.  
Even though the effect of the proposed Monrovia Town Center on regional 
transportation facilities, and in particular MD Route 75, was a hotly contested issue, 
Commissioner Smith did not disclose prior to the Board of County Commissioners’ vote 
on April 23, 2014 that he attended the FACT meeting on April 14 and that he provided 
detailed arguments to FACT in support of the Developers’ application, which were then 
included in the FACT letter.  
On June 3, 2014, a few days after the PUD, the DRRA, and the APFO LOU took 
effect, a local newspaper reported that most of the FACT members, including its president, 
had not seen the letter before it was sent, nor had the members voted on the correspondence 
or discussed its contents as a group.  The newspaper reported that two FACT directors, 
Michael Proffitt and Michael Smariga, collaborated to draft the letter at Commissioner 
Smith’s request, and that Commissioner Smith had stayed after the FACT meeting to 
discuss his arguments with Mr. Smariga.  Around the same time as the publication of the 
7 
newspaper article, FACT submitted a second letter, characterizing its first letter’s contents 
as “public comment” and stating that it was “not to be considered evidence.”   
II.  
Proceedings Below 
A. Petition for Judicial Review 
RALE and certain neighboring landowners filed timely petitions in the Circuit Court 
for Frederick County, seeking judicial review of the approval of the PUD rezoning, the 
DRRA, and the APFO LOU.  The circuit court scheduled a hearing on the petitions for 
January 26, 2015.  Prior to the hearing, RALE learned of Commissioner Smith’s 
discussions with FACT representatives about the Developers’ application.  On January 15, 
2015, RALE issued trial subpoenas for Commissioner Smith, FACT’s secretary, Michael 
Proffitt, and Ronald Burns (FACT member and County traffic engineer) to appear at the 
hearing.  The County and the Developers filed motions to quash the subpoenas.   
During the January 26, 2015 hearing, the circuit court heard arguments on the 
motions to quash the subpoenas.  RALE argued that, under Public Service Commission v. 
Patuxent Valley Conservation League, 300 Md. 200, 214 (1984), it may take testimony 
about an administrative decisionmaker’s mental process if it can make a strong showing of 
fraud or extreme circumstances that occurred outside the scope of the administrative record.  
RALE also argued, among other things, that Commissioner Smith had “orchestrated” the 
creation of the FACT letter, i.e., that he had participated in the creation of evidence in an 
administrative proceeding in which he was one of the quasi-judicial decisionmakers.   
8 
The circuit court issued an order dated January 27, 2015, quashing the subpoenas 
issued to the two FACT representatives.  The court denied the motion to quash the 
subpoena issued to Commissioner Smith and ruled that Commissioner Smith could be 
examined regarding fraud, arbitrariness, capriciousness, and exceptional circumstances in 
connection with the FACT letter.   
The County, the Developers, and former Commissioner Smith all filed motions to 
reconsider the January 27 order.  In addition, on February 23, 2015, RALE filed a motion 
to remand the Developers’ PUD rezoning application to the newly constituted County 
Council.3  In support of its motion to remand, RALE relied upon the Frederick County 
Ethics Statute, GP §§ 5-857 – 5-862.  Specifically, RALE argued that Commissioner Smith 
had engaged in undisclosed ex parte communications concerning the Developers’ 
application, in violation of GP § 5-859(b).  Consequently, RALE argued that the circuit 
court was required to “remand the case to the governing body for reconsideration” in 
accordance with the requirements set forth in GP § 5-862(a)(2).   
1. Circuit Court’s March 10, 2015 Remand Order 
On March 10, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on the pending motions and 
issued an opinion and order remanding the PUD application, and related approvals, to the 
County Council.  The court based its order on the following findings of fact:  
(1) That Commissioner Smith attended the April 14, 2014 FACT 
Committee meeting; 
 
                                              
3 On December 1, 2014, Frederick County became a charter county, with a County 
Executive and a County Council, rather than a Board of County Commissioners.  
9 
(2) That Commissioner Smith commented on [the Developers’] pending 
zoning application, as reflected in the April 14, 2014 FACT Committee 
Meeting Minutes; 
 
(3) That [GP § 5-859(b)] states: “A member of the governing body who 
communicates ex parte with an individual concerning a pending 
application during the pendency of the application shall file with the 
Chief Administrative Officer a separate disclosure for each 
communication within the later of 7 days after the communication was 
made or received,” and therefore requires disclosure of such 
communications;  
 
(4) That pursuant to the Public Ethics 2014 Annual Report to the Frederick 
County Ethics Commission, wherein the [Board of County 
Commissioners] discloses ex parte communications, Commissioner 
Smith’s comments were not disclosed;  
 
(5) That the FACT Committee incorporated the information from 
Commissioner Smith into its April 23, 2014 letter to the [Board of 
County Commissioners];  
 
(6) That the FACT letter was presented to the Commissioners with the 
intent to influence the pending vote;  
 
(7) That the FACT letter was read into the record at the end of testimony 
by [the Board of County Commissioners] President, Blaine Young, 
which is highly suggestive that the [Board] relied upon it.   
The court further stated that it could not make a judgment about whether the record 
supported the decision to approve the PUD because the FACT letter, its timing, and the 
potential that the Board members had relied on it “form[ed] an integral part of the record.”  
Additionally, the circuit court “found the facts and circumstances to be extreme and [] 
therefore Petitioners have met their burden of making a strong showing as to an extreme 
circumstance.”  Based on these findings, the court ordered a remand “to the County for 
further proceedings, including testimony, to resolve the issues raised in [its] Opinion.”  At 
the same time, the circuit court quashed the subpoena served on Commissioner Smith, 
10 
presumably because of the remand for further proceedings, including testimony.  The court 
did not dismiss the case.   
2. Remand Proceedings Before the Frederick County Council 
 
In conformance with the circuit court’s opinion and order, the County Council held 
public hearings on June 9 and 16, and September 1, 2015.  The County Council requested 
affidavits from former Commissioners Smith, Young, and Gray regarding “their position 
on the significance of the FACT correspondence on the case.”  Commissioner Gray, the 
sole vote against the application, stated that the letter had no effect on his vote and that 
“[i]ts source was suspect and its validity in question.”  Commissioner Young, who had 
voted in favor of the application, stated that he would have voted to approve even if the 
FACT letter had not been introduced.  Similarly, two councilmembers who had been 
County Commissioners in 2014 told their new colleagues that the FACT letter did not 
affect their decision.   
Commissioner Smith declined to submit an affidavit.  Citing the threat of criminal 
prosecution,4 Commissioner Smith submitted a five-page letter in which he did not deny 
that the discussion with FACT representatives had occurred or that he had participated in 
drafting the FACT letter.  Instead, he argued, among other things, that the prohibition on 
undisclosed ex parte communications by a quasi-judicial decisionmaker would violate his 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  
                                              
4 Under GP § 5-862(b)(1), a knowing and willful violation of the restriction on ex 
parte communications is a misdemeanor.   
11 
In connection with the hearing, the Council received lengthy written submissions 
from RALE and from attorneys for the Developers.  Additionally, the Council heard from 
members of the public, some of whom repeated what they had read in the newspaper that 
former Commissioner Smith had asked one or more of the FACT board members to submit 
a letter on FACT’s behalf and that the directors of FACT had not authorized the letter.  
Perhaps because of the limitations on the Council’s subpoena power,5 it did not compel 
testimony from former Commissioner Smith, Mr. Smariga, Mr. Proffitt, FACT’s president, 
or other persons who may have had personal knowledge concerning the FACT letter.  No 
one testified concerning how Commissioner Smith’s arguments made at the April 14 FACT 
meeting ended up in the FACT letter as FACT’s opinion or provided an explanation as to 
why FACT appeared to distance itself from the first letter after the PUD was approved by 
sending a second letter in which FACT attempted to qualify its first letter as “public 
comment” and not as “evidence.”   
 
At the conclusion of the September 1 hearing, the County Council approved a 
motion, which found that as a result of the undisclosed ex parte communications, 
reconsideration by the County Council should be de novo, starting with a new hearing 
                                              
5 Section 211 of the Frederick County Charter states that, in investigating “the affairs 
of the County and the conduct and performance of any Agency,” the Council may issue a 
subpoena to “any current County employee, County agency or department, or contractor 
doing business with the County upon the affirmative vote of at least six council members.” 
Assuming a remand would be considered an investigation “of the affairs of the County,” 
the Council still could not issue a subpoena without the approval of a supermajority of its 
members.  Even then, it appears that the Council’s subpoena powers only extended to 
current employees, agencies, departments, or contractors doing business with the County.   
12 
before the Planning Commission on the Developers’ PUD rezoning application.  The 
motion approved by the Council was as follows:  
Council Member Keegan-Ayer moved to send the entire matter 
back to the Frederick County Planning Commission (FcPc) to 
begin again, because at this time it is not possible to reconcile 
the affidavits and statements made and submitted to the 
Council with respect to this letter and its alleged influence on 
the previous Board of County Commissioners[’] decision with 
the actions, statements, and behavior surrounding the letter; its 
inception; its creation; its phraseology; its timing and its 
introduction and handling once it was introduced[.] 
 
The motion also contemplated that the Planning Commission would report back in six 
months or less, and that if possible, the Developers’ fees would be waived.  The motion 
passed by a vote of 4-3. 
 
Following the Council’s directive, Frederick County proceeded to send the matter 
to the Frederick County Planning Commission.  However, the Developers informed the 
County that they would not return to the Planning Commission, contending that they had 
vested rights in the prior approvals.  Without the applicant present for consideration of the 
application, the Planning Commission and the Council were unable to proceed.   
 
The County Council subsequently adopted formal findings of fact in connection 
with the remand proceeding in Resolution 17-04, titled “County Council Post Remand 
Conclusions,” effective on February 7, 2017 (“Remand Conclusions”).  Based upon the 
testimony and other evidence presented at the remand hearings, the Council concurred with 
the circuit court’s findings of fact that Commissioner Smith had engaged in undisclosed ex 
parte communications by consulting with FACT about the Developers’ PUD rezoning 
13 
application and providing input culminating in the creation of the FACT letter.  The 
Council found:  
Other than the statements submitted by the former County 
Commissioners, the testimony and exhibits presented to the 
County Council during the hearings were consistent with [the 
circuit court’s] findings regarding former Commissioner 
Smith’s ex parte activities: attending the April 14, 2014, 
Frederick Area Committee for Transportation (FACT) 
Committee meeting; commenting during that meeting about 
the [Monrovia Town Center] pending applications; [and] 
failing to disclose those ex parte communications as required 
by law; which led to the preparation of the FACT letter dated 
April 23, 2014, and its presentation to the Board of County 
Commissioners (BOCC) near the conclusion of its hearing 
with the intent to influence the upcoming vote; [and] the 
reading into the record of the letter by the then Board President 
at the end of the testimony. 
 
In the Remand Conclusions, the Council determined that “[t]he aggregate of the 
information reveals extreme irregularity surrounding the FACT letter, including the timing 
of its presentation, handling by the [Board] President during the hearing, and the emphasis 
placed on this ‘last minute’ document during the applicant’s rebuttal were extremely 
irregular.”  The Council commented on what it viewed as inconsistencies between 
comments by the Board President at the hearing, and the information that it later 
discovered.  Specifically, the Council pointed out that the Board President represented that 
the entire FACT board had approved the letter, when in fact, testimony and documentation 
later revealed that only two FACT members generated the letter.  Additionally, one of the 
FACT members generating the letter was a retired principal of the engineering firm 
representing the Developers and the father of an individual who had been a lead engineer 
for the Developers before and during the approval process.  The Council also observed that 
14 
Commissioner Smith “did not testify during the Council hearings nor did he submit sworn 
testimony,” as he had been requested to do.   
Because the Developers declined to return to the Planning Commission and said 
they would oppose any effort to reconsider the PUD, DRRA, and the APFO LOU, the 
Council recognized that they were at an impasse, concluding that it had “done what it can 
to fully comply with the Remand Order.”  In its Remand Conclusions, the County Council 
requested “that the Court take such action as it deems necessary and appropriate so that the 
County Council may rehear the [Monrovia Town Center] application.”   
3. Circuit Court’s September 29, 2017 Opinion and Order 
After hearing legal arguments, the circuit court issued an opinion and order on 
September 29, 2017, in which it vacated the approval of the PUD, DRRA, and APFO 
LOU (the latter two documents being dependent upon the Developers successfully 
obtaining PUD zoning approval).6  In its opinion, the circuit court found, again, that 
Commissioner Smith had engaged in an undisclosed ex parte communication, in violation 
of GP § 5-859(b).  The court also found that “because of its timing,” the ex parte 
communication was “deceitful to the Government as well as the public.”  The court stated 
under these circumstances, Commissioner Smith’s “breach of ethics” could “not be 
overlooked.”   
                                              
6 The DRRA gave the Developer contractual rights to develop the property consistent 
with the PUD zoning at a maximum density of 1,250 residential dwelling units for a term of 
18 years.  Without PUD zoning approval, the property cannot be developed at the same scale 
and density under the current agricultural zoning designation.  Accordingly, the DRRA and 
APFO LOU are contingent upon the Developer receiving PUD approval.  
15 
The court also determined that the FACT letter, which was generated as a result of 
Commissioner Smith’s ex parte communications, was a “substantial factor” in the Board 
of Commissioners’ approval of the Developers’ PUD rezoning application:  
In analyzing the FACT letter’s significance, it is necessary to 
discuss the mission of FACT as well as the contents and timing 
of the letter.  FACT is devoted to advocating for major 
transportation issues in Frederick County.  FACT’s opinion is 
relied upon by various governing bodies in Frederick County, 
including the Board of Commissioners as a neutral, unbiased 
entity.  Commissioner Smith inserted his opinion into FACT’s 
decision[-]making process and subsequently failed to disclose 
his involvement.  FACT’s use of Commissioner Smith’s 
opinion 
without 
attribution 
tainted 
its 
assessment.  
Furthermore, transportation concerns remained a major issue 
during various meetings pending approval of the [PUD].  The 
FACT letter, as read into the Board of Commissioners’ hearing 
record, addresses the potential traffic issues.  The letter also 
argues [for] the “large benefits from the approval of the 
[PUD].”  By citing only positive outcomes of approval of the 
project, the FACT letter was introduced to sway the 
Commissioners’ votes toward approval of the project and to 
dissuade the community’s fears of the pending project.”   
 
The court also concluded that the timing of the letter “increase[d] its propensity to influence 
a Commissioner’s vote.”  The court stated that “the lack of attribution in the FACT letter 
was intended to deceive not only members of the Board, but the public at large.”  
 
Because the court concluded that it was unable to determine whether the 
Commissioners acted properly in approving the PUD, the court relied upon People’s 
Counsel for Baltimore County v. Country Ridge Shopping Center, 144 Md. App. 580, 
593 (2002), for the proposition that it “should remand to the agency for further 
proceedings.”   
16 
 
The court rejected the Developers’ argument that they had vested rights in the 
DRRA which prevented a remand, reasoning that the governing body’s violation of the 
ethics provisions set forth in GP § 5-859 “prevents the enforcement of the DRRA.”   
In a separate order, the circuit court remanded the case to the County Council and 
vacated the PUD, the DRRA, and the APFO LOU.  The Developers and Commissioner 
Smith appealed.7   
B. 
The Court of Special Appeals 
In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  75-80 Props., LLC, v. RALE, Inc., 242 Md. App. 377, 416–17 (2019).  The 
Developers and Commissioner Smith argued that Commissioner Smith’s communications 
were not ex parte communications under GP § 5-859.  Id. at 397.  The Court of Special 
                                              
7 In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals stated that “[i]t is unclear how 
Commissioner Smith has a right to be heard in this appeal.”  75-80 Props., LLC v. RALE, 
Inc., 242 Md. App. 377, 396 n.9 (2019).  The intermediate appellate court pointed out 
that Commissioner Smith was never a party to the circuit court proceeding, and that he 
did not file a notice of appeal until 34 days after the entry of final judgment.  Id.  Under 
these circumstances, the Court of Special Appeals considered Commissioner Smith’s 
arguments “as if they were those of an amicus.”  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals 
rejected Commissioner Smith’s argument that the statute violates his First Amendment 
rights.  The court explained that Commissioner Smith was a quasi-judicial decisionmaker 
and restrictions on ex parte communications with judges and quasi-judicial 
decisionmakers are common.  Id. at 403–05.  The Court of Special Appeals also explained 
that the statute does not “prohibit the Commissioner from speaking about anything; it 
merely required him to disclose ex parte communications concerning certain land-use 
disputes that were pending before him as a quasi-judicial decisionmaker.”  Id. at 404.  
The intermediate appellate court also rejected Commissioner Smith’s argument that the 
Ethics Statute was unconstitutionally vague, stating that “[i]n our judgment, persons of 
ordinary intelligence could discern that [GP] § 5-859(b) required them to disclose that 
they had engaged in such communications.”  Id. at 406.  Commissioner Smith filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court denied. 
17 
Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that by its plain terms, the statute requires the 
disclosure of ex parte communications “with an individual concerning a pending 
application.”  Id. at 400 (emphasis in original).  The intermediate appellate court reasoned 
that if the General Assembly “intended to confine the statute’s scope to communications 
with an ‘applicant’ or a ‘party’” (the interpretation taken by the Developers and 
Commissioner Smith), “it could have done so . . . .”  Id.  Accordingly, the Court of Special 
Appeals held that the circuit court correctly found that the Ethics Statute applied to 
Commissioner Smith’s communications with FACT.  Id. at 403. 
Additionally, the Developers argued that the record did not support the circuit 
court’s findings and subsequent vacatur.  Id. at 408.  The intermediate appellate court 
disagreed, finding that there was adequate factual basis for the circuit court to conclude 
“that Commissioner Smith had procured evidence in a proceeding that was pending before 
him as a quasi-judicial decisionmaker.”  Id. at 407.  Because there was support in the record 
for this finding, it was not unreasonable for the court to find a violation of the ethics law.  
Id.  The Court of Special Appeals held that under the plain and mandatory terms of GP § 5-
862(a)(2), the circuit court was required to remand the case after concluding that the ethics 
law was violated.  Id. at 409.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court.  Id. at 416–17.   
The Developers petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider the 
following questions, which we have rephrased:8   
                                              
8 The questions presented in the writ of certiorari were:   
18 
1. When a circuit court considers whether a member of the Frederick 
County governing body violated the Frederick County Ethics 
Statute during the pendency of a zoning approval, does the Ethics 
Statute, GP § 5-862, require that the court determine that the 
petitioner suffered a procedural due process violation prior to 
remanding the matter to the Frederick County governing body for 
reconsideration? 
  
2. Did the circuit court err in entering an order vacating the 
development approvals obtained by the Developers after making a 
factual determination that a member of the Frederick County 
governing body violated the Ethics Statute, and after the County 
Council determined on remand that it would conduct a de novo 
review of the development application, but the Developers refused 
to participate in the reconsideration proceeding?  
 
3. Whether zoning estoppel should be applied under the facts of this 
case?  
 
For the reasons set forth below, we answer each of these questions in the negative 
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.   
                                              
1. On a petition for judicial review of land use approvals, must 
the reviewing court evaluate an ex parte violation through the 
narrow lens of “procedural error,” as expressly prescribed by 
Md. Code (2014) §§ 5-859 and 5-862 of the General Provisions 
(“GP”) Article? 
2. On a petition for judicial review, may a court vacate county 
approvals, including an executed [DRRA], based solely on the 
County’s violation of GP §5-862, when the statute expressly 
provides that the only remedy in the land use context is 
remand? 
3. Does zoning estoppel apply where developers, acting in 
good faith, substantially relied on, and partially performed 
under, fully-vetted county approvals and an executed DRRA, 
and the misconduct stems solely from the government’s 
actions? 
 
19 
III.  
Discussion 
  
In this case, we are being asked to determine whether the circuit court correctly 
interpreted and applied the Ethics Statute. This Court reviews issues of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Washington Cty. v. Perennial Solar, LLC, 
464 Md. 610, 617 (2019) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25 (2013) (“When 
an issue involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory, or 
case law, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally 
correct under a de novo standard of review.”)) (internal citations omitted).  To the extent 
that the circuit court made findings of fact in connection with the application of the Ethics 
Statute, we review those findings under a clearly erroneous standard.  See Md. Rule 8-
131(c).  “If there is any competent material evidence to support the factual findings of the 
[circuit] court, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.”  YIVO Inst. for Jewish 
Research v. Zaleski, 386 Md. 654, 663 (2005) (citations omitted).  In determining whether 
the findings are supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Schmitz, 362 Md. 229, 233–34 
(2001) (citations omitted).  
The Developers argue that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted and misapplied 
the Ethics Statute, GP § 5-862.  They contend that the statute requires that the circuit court 
undertake a procedural due process analysis when considering an ethics violation arising 
under the statute.  Specifically, the Developers posit that the circuit court was required to 
determine whether RALE had notice and an opportunity to cross-examine or rebut the 
20 
FACT letter.  The Developers argue that under the facts of this case, RALE suffered no 
procedural due process violation and therefore, the circuit court erred in remanding the 
matter to the Frederick County Council for reconsideration.  The Developers also assert 
that the circuit court exceeded its authority to vacate the Development Approvals.  The 
Developers contend that under the language of GP § 5-862, the circuit court’s only remedy 
upon finding a violation of the Ethics Statute was to remand the matter to the Frederick 
County Council.  Finally, the Developers argue that the Court should recognize and apply 
the doctrine of zoning estoppel under the facts of this case.   
In response, RALE and Frederick County (“Respondents”) contend that the 
Developers misconstrue the plain language of GP § 5-862, which is devoid of any 
requirement that the circuit court undertake a procedural due process analysis.  
Respondents argue that under the plain language of the statute, the court is simply required 
to determine whether an ethics violation occurred.  If the court makes that factual 
determination, Respondents assert that under the plain language of the statute, the court is 
required to remand the matter back to the Frederick County governing body for 
reconsideration.  Respondents argue that the circuit court did not err in vacating the 
approvals in the context of its order remanding the case to Frederick County, given the 
Developers’ refusal to participate in the reconsideration proceeding established by the 
Frederick County Council.  With respect to zoning estoppel, Respondents assert that, 
assuming that this Court recognizes the doctrine, its application is not warranted under the 
facts of this case.   
21 
A. The Developers’ Contentions Concerning the Interpretation and Application of the 
Frederick County Ethics Statute 
 
1. Principles of Statutory Construction 
 
Despite the somewhat unusual and complex procedure recited above, the legal 
issues presented in this case require that the Court undertake a straightforward analysis of 
the language of a statute.  In matters involving statutory construction, the canons applied 
by this Court are well-settled and have been oft repeated.  The predominant goal of 
statutory construction is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”  Md.-
Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 182 (2006) (citations 
and quotations omitted).  As we have explained, “to determine that purpose or policy, we 
look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.”  Id.  
(citations and quotations omitted); see also Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 (2006) (stating 
that “[s]tatutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and the ordinary, 
popular understanding of the English language dictates the interpretation of its 
terminology”) (citations omitted).  “We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly 
is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.”  Lillian C. Blentlinger, 
LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 294 (2017) (“Blentlinger”) (citations 
omitted).  “When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory 
language to determine the Legislature’s intent.”  Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 
(2006) (citations and quotations omitted).  “If the words of the statute, construed according 
to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain 
meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.”  Blentlinger, 456 Md. at 294 
22 
(citations omitted).  Additionally, we “neither add nor delete words to a clear and 
unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected in the words the Legislature used or 
engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s 
meaning.”  Walzer, 395 Md. at 572 (citations and quotations omitted).  “If there is no 
ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or 
circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends.”  Blentlinger, 456 Md. at 294 
(citation omitted); Walzer, 395 Md. at 572 (citations and quotations omitted).   
 
If the language of the statute is ambiguous, “then courts consider not only the literal 
or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the 
objectives and the purpose of the enactment under consideration.”  Anderson, 395 Md. at 
182 (citations and quotations omitted).  “[A]mbiguity exists within a statute when there are 
two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.”  Melton v. State, 379 Md. 
471, 477 (2004) (citations and quotations omitted).  “When a statute can be interpreted in 
more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the 
legislative intent, using all of the resources and tools of statutory construction at our 
disposal.”  Blentlinger, 456 Md. at 295 (citations omitted).   
In construing a statute, “we avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, 
illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.”  Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 482 (2017) 
(citations omitted).  Additionally, the “meaning of the plainest language is controlled by 
the context in which it appears.”  Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 
465 Md. 169, 203 (2019) (citations and quotations omitted).  As this Court has stated,  
23 
[b]ecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory 
scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative 
purpose or goal must also be considered.  Thus, not only are 
we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if 
appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of 
which it is a part.   
 
Id. (citations omitted).  We apply these principles of statutory construction to the Ethics 
Statute.   
2. The Frederick County Ethics Statute – General Legislative Framework 
 
 
The Frederick County Ethics Statute is codified at GP § 5-857, et seq.  It was 
adopted by the General Assembly in 2007.  2007 Md. Laws, Chap. 474.9  The purpose of 
the legislation was to establish “certain ethics requirements that relate to planning and 
zoning proceedings and apply to members” of the County’s governing body, then the 
Frederick County Board of Commissioners.  Id.   
 
The Frederick County Ethics Statute generally describes three types of prohibited 
conduct: (1) certain campaign contributions by persons pursuing zoning applications 
before the Frederick County Board of County Commissioners (see GP § 5-858(a)); (2) a 
member of the governing body participating in zoning proceedings if the member 
                                              
9 As originally enacted in 2007, the statute was codified at Md. Code (1984, 2009 
Repl. Vol.), § 15-855(b) of the State Government Article, which provided that “[a] Board 
member who communicates ex parte with an individual concerning a pending application 
during the pendency of the application shall file with the County Manager a separate 
disclosure for each communication within the later of 7 days after the communication was 
made or received.”  As of December 1, 2014, the prohibition on certain undisclosed ex 
parte communications, and other related measures pertaining to Frederick County, were 
transferred without substantive change to the General Provisions Article.  2014 Md. Laws, 
Chap. 645.  Because the Frederick County Council has now replaced the Board of County 
Commissioners, GP § 5-859(b) currently requires “[a] member of the governing body” to 
disclose certain ex parte communications.  
24 
received a campaign contribution from the applicant during the pendency of the 
application (see GP § 5-858(b)); and (3) undisclosed ex parte communications between 
a County Commissioner and any individual about a pending zoning application (see GP 
§ 5-859(b)).   
 
This case involves the third category of prohibited conduct—undisclosed ex parte 
communications.  GP § 5-859(b) provides: “A member of the governing body who 
communicates ex parte with an individual concerning a pending application during the 
pendency of the application shall file with the Chief Administrative Officer a separate 
disclosure for each communication within the later of 7 days after the communication 
was made or received.”  As the Court of Special Appeals correctly observed, under the 
plain language of GP § 5-859, a member of the governing body is prohibited from 
engaging in an ex parte communication with “an individual” regarding a pending 
rezoning application, not merely an applicant or a party to the proceeding.  RALE, 242 
Md. App. at 400.  
 
The language at the center of this dispute is set forth in GP § 5-862(a), which 
provides a right to judicial review where a violation is alleged to have occurred during the 
pendency of a zoning approval process.  Under that subsection,  
(1) The Frederick County Ethics Commission or another 
aggrieved party of record may assert as procedural error a 
violation of this part in an action for judicial review of the 
application. 
 
(2) If the court finds that a violation of this part occurred, the 
court shall remand the case to the governing body for 
reconsideration.  
 
25 
This section gives both the Frederick County Ethics Commission and aggrieved parties 
standing to raise a violation of the Frederick County Ethics in an action for judicial review 
of the zoning proceeding, even if the violations are unrelated to the substantive issues and 
the evidence presented in the underlying zoning proceeding.  
 
Where a violation of the Frederick County Ethics Statute is asserted in an action for 
judicial review, GP § 5-862(a)(2) requires that the court consider and make a factual 
determination whether a violation has occurred.  If the circuit court finds that a violation 
occurred, the mandatory language in the statute states that the court “shall remand the case 
to the governing body for reconsideration.”  GP § 5-862(a)(2) (emphasis added).  
3. Under the Plain Language of GP § 5-862, the Circuit Court’s Fact-Finding Does 
Not Include a Procedural Due Process Analysis 
 
 
The Developers argue that the circuit court erred in remanding this case to the 
County Council for reconsideration.  The Developers contend that under GP § 5-862(a)(1), 
the term “procedural error” is synonymous with “procedural due process.”  The Developers 
assert that the circuit court was required to make a factual determination as to whether the 
ex parte communication that culminated in the creation and the introduction of the FACT 
letter, denied RALE procedural due process—i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard.  
The Developers posit that the circuit court was only permitted to remand the matter to the 
County Council for reconsideration if the circuit court determined that RALE, as the 
aggrieved party, was denied notice and the opportunity to rebut the evidence presented in 
the FACT letter and was prejudiced.  
26 
We find the Developers’ argument to be unavailing, and inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute.  “Procedural error” as used in the context of the Ethics Statute is 
different from “procedural due process.”  The Ethics Statute contains no language that 
would require a circuit court to make a factual determination concerning whether a 
violation of the Ethics Statute denied a party to the underlying proceeding procedural due 
process.  Rather, “procedural error” describes the asserted violation which gives the 
aggrieved party of record or the Ethics Commission standing and a forum in which to assert 
a violation of the Ethics Statute.  In the absence of statutory language authorizing the Ethics 
Commission or an aggrieved party to assert a violation of the Ethics Statute as “procedural 
error,” they would have no standing to raise the violation in the judicial review proceeding 
because ordinarily, the circuit court’s review is limited to whether the administrative 
agency, on the basis of the record before the agency, made an error of law, or whether the 
decision is based upon substantial evidence.  See, e.g., Cty. Council of Prince George’s 
Cty. v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 573–74 (2015) (citations omitted).   
 
The Developers’ argument is not only inconsistent with the plain language of the 
statute, it ignores the structure of GP § 5-862(a).  Subsection one describes persons who 
have standing to participate in a judicial review proceeding where a “procedural error” 
involving the Frederick County Ethics Commission is alleged to have occurred.  GP § 5-
862(a)(1).  Once the alleged ethics violation is asserted as part of a petition for judicial 
review, subsection two sets forth the circuit court’s scope of review—the court is simply 
required to determine whether “a violation of [the statute] has occurred . . . .”  GP § 5-
862(a)(2).  If the circuit court determines that a violation has occurred, its work is 
27 
concluded—the statute mandates that the court “shall remand the case to the governing 
body for reconsideration.”  Id.  Nothing in the statute requires that a circuit court make a 
factual determination that the person or entity asserting a violation of the Ethics Statute has 
been denied procedural due process.  The Developers’ interpretation would require us to 
rewrite the statute by adding additional terms, which of course, is the role of the 
Legislature, not the Court. 
 
The Developers’ interpretation is also illogical.  GP § 5-862(a)(1) confers standing 
to assert an ethics violation as a “procedural error” not only on aggrieved parties of record, 
but also upon the Frederick County Ethics Commission.  The Ethics Commission would 
not be a party to the underlying zoning or development proceeding and accordingly, would 
not have procedural due process rights for the circuit court to consider as part of its judicial 
review. 
Furthermore, a violation of the Ethics Statute does not necessarily result in evidence 
or testimony that would be part of the underlying zoning hearing.  Although in this instance, 
the undisclosed ex parte communication resulted in the culmination of a letter that was 
submitted into the record of the proceeding, a violation of the Ethics Statute is not limited 
to evidentiary matters that may give rise to procedural due process concerns.  For example, 
a “procedural error” under the Ethics Statute could include a violation of the campaign 
contributions provisions.  See GP § 5-858(a)–(b).  A campaign finance violation would be 
unrelated to the presentation of evidence submitted in a zoning or development proceeding 
before the local governing body.  To interpret “procedural error” as being synonymous 
28 
with a denial of the procedural due process rights of an interested party or aggrieved person 
to the underlying proceeding leads to an illogical reading of the statute. 
The Developers’ reliance upon cases involving an analysis of procedural due 
process rights in the context of administrative agency proceedings have no application here, 
as those cases do not involve the application of a statute that outlines the specific remedy 
when a court finds that a violation of the Ethics Statute has occurred.  See, e.g., Md. State 
Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 557 (1993); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 66–67 (1966).  The Frederick County Ethics Statute addresses the 
scope of circuit court review and the remedies mandated by the statute where a violation is 
found to have occurred.  Any procedural due process arguments raised by the Developers—
such as whether RALE had notice and an opportunity to cross-examine an individual 
concerning the FACT letter or rebut the FACT letter, whether RALE was prejudiced by 
the introduction of the FACT letter, or whether the letter was cumulative of other evidence 
in the record—are not part of the circuit court’s factual determination under the plain 
language of GP § 5-862.  The statute simply requires the circuit court to make a factual 
determination of whether a violation of the Ethics Statute occurred.10   
                                              
10 Instead of applying a plain language analysis of GP § 5-862, the Developers argue 
that we should look to case law from other jurisdictions to create a holding concerning the 
treatment of ex parte letters in the context of a quasi-judicial proceeding.  The Developers 
urge us to look to Mauna Kea Power Co. v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, 874 
P.2d 1084, 1087–88 (Haw. 1994), Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 950 P.2d. 1262, 1267 
(Idaho 1998); and Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d. 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), for guidance.  
We disagree.  Here, under GP § 5-862, the statute specifies the remedy where the circuit 
court makes a factual determination that a violation of the Ethics Statute has occurred—
that remedy is a remand to the Frederick County governing body for reconsideration, plain 
29 
In short, the Developers’ interpretation of the statute—permitting remand only 
where the circuit court determines that the ethics violation affected an aggrieved party’s 
procedural due process rights—is inconsistent with the plain language of the Ethics Statute, 
as well as its scope and structure, and is illogical.  We will not construe a statute in a manner 
to create such a result.  See Della Ratta v. Dyas, 414 Md. 556, 567 (2010) (explaining that 
the Court “must always be cognizant of the fundamental principle that statutory 
construction is approached from a ‘commonsensical’ perspective.  Thus, we seek to avoid 
constructions that are illogical, unreasonable or inconsistent with common sense.”) 
(citations and quotations omitted).   
4. The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Vacating the Development Approvals as Part of a 
Remand Proceeding Where the Developers Refused to Participate in the Council’s 
Reconsideration Proceeding  
 
Next, the Developers argue that the circuit court’s order vacating the Development 
Approvals “impermissibly expands a court’s role on review of a zoning decision.”  The 
Developers focus on the language in the circuit court’s opinion that concludes that the 
FACT letter was a “substantial factor” in the Board’s decision to enact the PUD.  Based 
upon this language, the Developers contend that the circuit court created a “new test” that 
permits the court to disregard the substantial evidence test and the deference owed to the 
agency/decisionmaker in favor of the court’s own judgment with respect to the impact of 
the ex parte communication on the proceeding.  We disagree.  
                                              
and simple.  To the extent that the Developers believe that this remedy is inappropriate, 
any revision must be made by the General Assembly, not this Court.  
30 
This case does not involve the application of the substantial evidence test that is 
ordinarily applied by a court when undertaking judicial review of an administrative 
agency’s approval of a zoning decision.  Here, the Ethics Statute provides a separate and 
distinct statutory review process that the circuit court must undertake where an aggrieved 
party has asserted a violation of the Frederick County Ethics Statute.  As previously noted, 
the statute mandates that the circuit court remand a development or rezoning approval to 
the Frederick County governing body if the court finds a violation of the Frederick County 
Ethics Statute. 
 
Within the context of the petition for judicial review, RALE asserted that 
Commissioner Smith violated the Frederick County Ethics Statute.  When that occurred, 
under the process outlined in GP § 5-862(a)(2), the circuit court was required to make a 
factual determination whether a violation occurred.  Here, the court determined that 
Commissioner Smith made an undisclosed ex parte communication in violation of the 
Ethics Statute.  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the court’s findings of fact 
were not clearly erroneous.11   
Once the circuit court found that a violation of the Ethics Statute occurred, under 
the plain language of GP § 5-862(a)(2), the circuit court was required to remand the matter 
                                              
11 In their appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the Developers argued that 
Commissioner Smith’s communications with FACT representatives did not constitute ex 
parte communications prohibited by GP § 5-859.  The Developers do not make that 
argument here, other than to argue that the statute is ambiguous and therefore, we should 
apply principles of equitable estoppel, which is discussed in part III.B.4. herein.  We agree 
with the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusions concerning Commissioner Smith’s ex parte 
communications and its determination that the circuit court’s findings of fact on that issue 
were not clearly erroneous.  RALE, 242 Md. App. at 397–403.   
31 
to the Frederick County Council for reconsideration.  The term “shall” connotes that an 
action is mandatory, not subject to discretion or satisfaction of further conditions.  
Harrison-Solomon v. State, 442 Md. 254, 269 (2015).  We agree with the Court of Special 
Appeals that “[t]he circuit court did what the statute required it to do.”  RALE, 242 Md. 
App. at 409.  
On remand, the statute requires that the governing body “reconsider” the decision.  
“In seeking to apply the plain[ ]meaning rule, it is proper to consult a dictionary or 
dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.”  Hoang v. Lowery, 469 Md. 95, 
120 (2020) (quoting Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 416 Md. 249, 262 (2010)).  To 
“reconsider” means “to consider again especially with a view to changing or reversing.” 
Reconsider, Merriam-Webster (2020), https://perma.cc/C8VK-FK59; see also Tracey v. 
Solsesky ex rel Solsesky, 427 Md. 627, 667 (2012) (overruled on other grounds by Md. 
Code, Courts and Judicial Procedure Article (“CJ”) § 3-1901) (Judge Wilner explaining 
that “[a] motion for reconsideration gives each judge of the Court an opportunity to take 
another look at the issue and to rethink the position formerly asserted.”).   
In Peoples Counsel for Baltimore County v. Country Ridge Shopping Center, Inc., 
144 Md. App. 580 (2002), the Court of Special Appeals was asked to determine the 
parameters of a remand to a board of appeals of a special exception where the case was 
reversed based upon a matter of statutory interpretation.  After initially denying the special 
exception, on remand, the board of appeals was required to reconsider whether the 
applicant was entitled to a special exception.  Id. at 586–88.  By the time the case was 
remanded, the composition of the board of appeals had changed.  Id. at 589.  On remand, 
32 
the board did not consider additional evidence, but rather, reviewed the existing evidence 
in light of the Court of Special Appeals’ holding as to the correct legal standard.  Id. at 
589–90.  By a vote of 2-1, the board voted again to deny the special exception.  Id. at 590.   
On appeal, the applicant asserted that because the board had two new members, it 
was required on remand to conduct a de novo hearing on the special exception.  Id. at 593.  
The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument, holding that the language of its initial 
remand ‘“for further proceedings’ was deliberately open-ended.”  Id.  The intermediate 
appellate court explained that the board had discretion to determine the nature and scope 
of the further proceedings it would conduct to reconsider its decision denying the special 
exception:  
We reject the appellees’ argument that “further proceedings” 
necessarily implies a de novo hearing, with witnesses being 
called and arguments being made as if for the first time.  
“Further proceedings” could, of course, embrace such a 
procedure but could also embrace other less radical procedures.  
It was not for us to anticipate what “further proceedings” might 
be required.   
 
Id.  The Court of Special Appeals explained that the board had the discretion to adopt a 
number of procedures for considering the special exception on remand, ranging from 
conducting a de novo hearing to clarifying its original rationale.  Id. at 593–94. 
Similarly, in the context of the Ethics Statute, where the circuit court finds that a 
violation has occurred, the plain language of GP § 5-862(a) expressly contemplates that 
the governing body shall reconsider or revisit its prior decision.  Moreover, the statute does 
not establish any parameters or limitations on the governing body’s reconsideration of the 
prior zoning or development approval.  Given the lack of any limitation by the General 
33 
Assembly on the governing body’s authority to “reconsider” its decision under the Ethics 
Statute, we conclude that the local legislative body has broad discretion to determine how 
to conduct its reconsideration proceedings, including starting the zoning review and 
approval process anew.   
In this case, on remand, after undertaking an inquiry into the ex parte 
communication, including its creation and the potential effect that it had on the proceeding, 
the Frederick County Council determined that it would undertake a de novo review of the 
zoning application as part of its reconsideration proceeding.  The Developers refused to 
participate in that process.   
Had the Developers accepted the Frederick County Council’s decision with respect 
to the reconsideration proceedings, the circuit court case would have concluded, and there 
would have been no reason for the circuit court to enter an order vacating the approval.  
Instead, the Developers disagreed and refused to participate in a de novo proceeding.  As a 
result of this impasse, the Frederick County Council enlisted the assistance of the circuit 
court, through the case that was still open and pending, requesting “that the Court take such 
action as it deems necessary so that the County Council may rehear the [Monrovia Town 
Center] application.”  In other words, the Frederick County Council sought relief from the 
circuit court, within the context of the ongoing petition for judicial review, to enable it to 
carry out its responsibilities of “reconsideration” under GP § 5-862(a)(2).  Given the 
Developers’ refusal to consent to the Frederick County Council’s decision to conduct a de 
novo hearing, which was within the Council’s discretion to undertake, the circuit court did 
34 
not err in entering an order vacating the approvals to enable the Council to proceed with 
the format that they were entitled to implement under the statute.  
Finally, the Developers urge us to rely upon out-of-state case law and fashion a 
holding that requires a factual determination of prejudice where an ex parte communication 
is the basis for a vacatur of a development approval.  See, e.g., Everett v. Paul Davis 
Restoration, Inc., 771 F.3d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 2014); Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Profit 
Counselors, Inc., 748 F.2d 354, 359 (6th Cir. 1984); In re the Petition of the City of 
Overland Park, 736 P.2d 923, 928 (Kan. 1987).  The Developers also argue that the vacatur 
of the approvals is punitive by “[i]gnoring the substantial evidence supporting the 
Approvals and focusing solely on the ethics violation.”  As previously noted, it is not the 
role of the Court to rewrite the plain language of the statute out of concerns of perceived 
fairness.  Where a statute is lawfully enacted under the police powers of the state and does 
not violate or infringe upon a constitutional right, we do not question its wisdom or 
expediency or undertake a judicial revision to achieve what some may argue is a more 
equitable outcome.  
B. The Doctrine of Zoning Estoppel 
 
The Developers also argue that we should recognize and apply the doctrine of 
zoning estoppel and hold that the circuit court was prohibited from vacating the PUD 
approval and related Development Approvals under that doctrine, and that similarly, the 
County Council was estopped from deciding to reconsider the Developers’ rezoning 
application de novo.  The Developers contend that we should recognize and apply the 
doctrine of zoning estoppel because: (1) they relied in good faith that the County would 
35 
follow its own ethics law, and approvals were passed in conformity with all applicable 
zoning/land use laws; (2) Developers incurred extensive obligations and expenses that it 
would be highly inequitable to destroy their rights based on the wrongdoing of the County; 
and (3) other jurisdictions apply zoning estoppel where, as here, there is good faith and 
substantial reliance to the Developers’ detriment.   
1. An Overview of the Discussion of the Doctrine in Our Previous Cases 
 
Although this Court has discussed the doctrine of zoning estoppel in several cases 
and has perhaps shown a receptivity toward the doctrine when we last discussed the 
concept, see Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1, 52–63 (2010) 
(“MRA”), we have thus far refused to recognize or apply it in Maryland.  
Over the years, we have repeatedly cited a 1971 article by David G. Heeter, which 
we have “found to be the most helpful in explicating the doctrine of zoning estoppel and 
how it differs from vested rights.”  MRA, 414 Md. at 55 (citing David G. Heeter, Zoning 
Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning 
Disputes, 1971 Urb. L. Ann. 63, 66 (1971) (hereinafter “Heeter”)).  The traditional, “black-
letter” definition of zoning estoppel is:  
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be 
estopped when a property owner, 
 
(1) relying in good faith,  
 
(2) upon some act or omission of the government,  
 
(3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurred 
such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be 
highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which he 
ostensibly had acquired. 
36 
 
Heeter, supra, at 66.  As we explained in Sycamore Realty Co. v. People’s Counsel of 
Baltimore County,  
A typical zoning estoppel scenario arises when the 
government issues a permit to a citizen that allows him or her 
to develop property in some way.  Commonly, after the 
citizen has incurred some expense or has changed his or her 
position in reliance upon the permit, the property for which 
the permit was granted is rezoned so that the citizen’s 
intended use is illegal.  In such a situation, many courts allow 
the citizen to assert zoning estoppel as a defense to the 
government’s attempt to enjoin the property use that violates 
the new zoning scheme.   
344 Md. 57, 64 (1996); see also Walter F. Witt, Jr., Vested Rights in Land Uses—A View 
from the Practitioner’s Perspective, 21 Real. Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 317, 319 (1986) (“The 
doctrine of equitable estoppel provides that the right to use or develop land cannot be 
infringed by legislative action when the owner or developer of such land has in good faith 
relied upon some act or failure to act by a governmental body and made a substantial 
change in position.”). 
 
Heeter identifies four categories of cases in which a zoning estoppel claim may 
arise, consisting of a landowner or developer’s reliance upon: “(1) a validly issued permit; 
(2) the probability of issuance of a permit; (3) an erroneously issued permit; or (4) the non-
enforcement of a zoning violation.”  Heeter, supra, at 67.  As Heeter explains, although 
some courts blend the doctrines of zoning estoppel and vested rights together, “the origins 
of the two defenses are quite different.  The defense of estoppel is derived from equity, but 
the defense of vested rights reflects principles of common and constitutional law.”  Heeter, 
37 
supra, at 64–65; see also Sycamore, 344 Md. at 67 (quoting Heeter’s distinction between 
vested rights and zoning estoppel).   
 
In Sycamore, we declined to adopt zoning estoppel under the facts of that case and 
signaled that if we were to adopt the doctrine in the future, we would only apply it where 
the property owner had acquired a vested right in the proposed use.  344 Md. at 66–67 
(“We have never adopted zoning estoppel in Maryland.  Instead, we, like all of the other 
courts that have declined to adopt zoning estoppel, ‘recognize a legal defense cast in terms 
of whether the property owner acquired ‘vested rights’ to use his land without 
governmental interference.’”) (quoting Heeter, supra, at 64).   
 
In MRA, we again declined to adopt the doctrine, although we recognized that there 
may be instances in which the doctrine might be applied:  
We have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of zoning estoppel, 
but we recognize that as zoning and permitting processes 
become more complex, the need for such a doctrine grows.  
Today, land use is much more highly regulated than it was fifty 
years ago—environmental concerns abound, and vehicular 
traffic demands seem to mushroom every year.  Thus, a 
property owner who seeks to build or develop may well incur 
sizable expenses for experts in engineering, various 
environmental fields, traffic flow, archeology, etc., before 
putting a spade into the ground.  With increasing public 
appreciation for open space and environmental protection 
causing apprehension about new construction, the likelihood a 
developing landowner will face serious opposition is high.  
Indeed, a developer faces quite a tortured process. . . .  
 
But we also cannot ignore a local government’s responsibility 
to its residents, and thus, Maryland courts should not apply the 
doctrine casually.  As open space disappears, and scientific 
knowledge about the adverse environmental impact from 
people’s use of land grows, local governments struggle to 
balance the legitimate interests and rights of land owners 
38 
wishing to develop against equally legitimate environmental 
and community concerns.  Due to the delicacy of this balancing 
act, and the overriding need to protect the public, local 
government cannot always chart a steady course through the 
Scylla and Charybdis of these disparate interests.  Land 
developers must understand that, to a limited extent, the local 
government will meander, and before they incur significant 
expense without final permitting, they must carefully assess the 
risk that the government will shift course.  On the other hand, 
there may be situations in which the developer’s good faith 
reliance on government action in the pre-construction stage is 
so extensive and expensive that zoning estoppel is an 
appropriate doctrine to apply.   
 
414 Md. at 56–57 (emphasis in original).   
 
 
Despite our recognition that there may be circumstances in which we would apply 
the doctrine, we stopped “short of adopting zoning estoppel in this case as the facts set 
forth in this record do not support its application.”  Id. at 57.  We noted that “[f]or decades 
Maryland has maintained a stricter stance than most states in protecting government’s right 
to downzone in the face of planned construction.”  Id. at 57–58 (citing 9-52D Patrick J. 
Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 52D.03 (2009)).  We 
explained that “[a]lthough we may sometimes adopt a new principle of law in a case in 
which the facts do not fit the doctrine, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is so fact-specific 
that it would be imprudent to depart from this history before we are faced with a case 
presenting circumstances for its application.”  Id. at 58.  We stated that “zoning estoppel 
must be applied, if at all, sparingly and with utmost caution . . . .  Squaring with this 
cautious approach, we conclude that the burden of establishing the facts to support that 
theory must fall on the person or entity claiming the benefit of the doctrine.”  Id. 
39 
 
We noted that “[u]nder the theory of zoning estoppel, if the developer ‘has good 
reason to believe, before or while acting to his detriment, that the official’s mind may soon 
change, estoppel may not be justified.’”  Id. (emphasis in original omitted) (quoting Robert 
M. Rhodes, et al, Vested Rights: Establishing Predictability in a Changing Regulatory 
System, 13 Stetson L. Rev. 1, 4 (1983)).  “At the heart of establishing ‘good faith’ is proof 
that the claimant lacked knowledge of those facts that would have put it on sufficient notice 
that it should not rely on the government action in question.”  Id. (citing Heeter, supra at 
77–82).   
In MRA, we declined to recognize or apply the doctrine under the facts of the case.  
Id. at 63.  We determined that the developer failed to satisfy the good faith element because 
there were sufficient facts available to them prior to the purchase of their land for a rubble 
landfill that “should have alerted them to the real possibility that its plans for a rubble 
landfill would not come to fruition” including strong public opposition.  Id. at 59.  We 
explained that “[g]enerally, purchase of land, by itself, is insufficient to constitute 
substantial reliance.”  Id. at 60–61 (internal citations omitted).  Nor did we find that the 
developer’s engineering costs and expenses incurred in connection with the development 
approval process were sufficient to meet the developer’s burden to prove the fact and the 
extent of their reliance on the county council’s action.  Id. at 63.  Based upon the facts in 
the record, we concluded that the developer “has not proven zoning estoppel against the 
County according to the criteria used in states that have adopted that doctrine.”  Id.  
40 
 
We undertake a similar analysis here.  Assuming that we would recognize zoning 
estoppel, we conclude that the Developers fail to satisfy the criteria utilized in jurisdictions 
that have recognized and applied the doctrine.  
2. The Developers Have Not Established that They Have Vested Rights or Contract 
Rights in the Development Approvals   
First, we note that the Developers have not acquired common law vested rights in 
the Development Approvals, nor have they acquired rights protected by contract.12  With 
respect to common law vested rights, this Court has explained that in order to vest rights 
in an existing zoning use that will be protected against a subsequent change in zoning use, 
the owner must obtain a valid permit and undertake a substantial beginning in construction 
before the change in zoning has occurred.  See Prince George’s Cty. v. Sunrise Dev., Ltd. 
P’ship, 330 Md. 297, 307–08 (1993).  Developers have no vested rights in the PUD floating 
zone arising from the application of the vested rights doctrine. 
                                              
12 We start our zoning estoppel analysis with a consideration of whether the 
Developers acquired vested rights, given our discussion in Sycamore indicating that, if we 
were to recognize the doctrine of zoning estoppel, we would limit its application to instances 
where the developer had acquired vested rights.  Sycamore Realty Co. v. People’s Counsel 
of Baltimore Cty., 344 Md. 57, 67 (1996).  However, we recognize the Court’s more 
favorable attitude expressed in MRA where we indicated that there “may be situations in 
which the developer’s good faith reliance on government action in the pre-construction stage 
is so extensive and expensive that zoning estoppel is an appropriate doctrine to apply.”  Md. 
Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1, 57 (2010).  In urging the Court to 
apply zoning estoppel under the facts of that case, the dissenting opinion, written by Judge 
Harrell and joined by Chief Judge Bell, argued that the two doctrines, vested rights and 
zoning estoppel “may exist in tandem and apply to different types of situations.”  Id. at 88 
(Harrell, J. dissenting).  We need not decide whether we would apply zoning estoppel 
irrespective of whether the Developers acquired vested rights, because once again, we are 
neither recognizing nor applying the doctrine under the facts of this case.   
41 
Similarly, the Developers did not acquire contractually protected development 
rights arising under the DRRA because it was immediately appealed.13  Under the terms of 
the DRRA, any person aggrieved by the agreement had a right to file an appeal to the 
Circuit Court for Frederick County within 30 days of the date on which the parties executed 
the agreement.  In this case, RALE and other interested persons timely filed a petition for 
judicial review to the circuit court.  The petition for judicial review resulted in the circuit 
court vacating the Development Approvals, including the DRRA.   
3. Developers Cannot Demonstrate a Good Faith Reliance on a Development 
Approval Leading to a Substantial Change in Position  
 
As was our practice in MRA, although Heeter and some courts treat “good faith” 
and “reliance” as separate elements, “we discuss them together, as they are so closely 
entwined.”  414 Md. at 58.  We explained that given our cautious approach to the doctrine, 
the “burden of establishing the facts to support that theory must fall on the person or entity 
claiming the benefit of the doctrine.”  Id. 
                                              
13 Under the Maryland DRRA statute, Md. Code., Land Use Article (“LU”), §§ 7-
301 to 7-306 (“the DRRA statute”), the General Assembly has given a local governing 
body with zoning powers the authority to enter into an agreement with a person having a 
legal or equitable interest in a development, “to establish conditions under which  
development may proceed for a specified time.”  LU § 7-301(b).  “The purpose of a DRRA 
is to allow developers and local governing bodies, such as a county, to negotiate terms and 
conditions under which development may occur.”  Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. 
Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 277 (2017) (“Blentlinger”).  A DRRA permits 
a developer to obtain contractual rights in the development approvals and laws in effect at 
the time of the approval.  Under the DRRA statute, in what we have described as a “freeze 
provision,” the statute authorizes the parties to “freeze certain laws, rules, regulations, and 
policies as of the time of the execution of the DRRA.”  Id. at 277; see LU § 7-304(a).  “The 
effect of the freeze provision is that developers are able to move forward, with certainty 
regarding the applicable laws, with development projects that may extend over a long 
period of time.”  Blentlinger, 456 Md. at 277.  
42 
To demonstrate their good faith reliance upon the Development Approvals, the 
Developers first note that “after receiving conditional approval, [they] reduced the size and 
number of units for the [Monrovia Town Center] project.”14  They also point out that in the 
DRRA and the APFO LOU, they “agreed to contribute to at least fourteen escrow accounts 
and to provide eight road improvements of full fee-in-lieu funding,” and “also agreed to 
pay impact fees” totaling over $1 million and “began to pay those fees.”   
We are not persuaded by the Developers’ attempt to characterize concessions or 
negotiations undertaken prior to receiving a discretionary development approval as 
evidence of good faith reliance on approvals that they had not yet received.  When 
considering the Developers’ concessions, it is important to keep in mind the type of 
development approvals being sought.  The Developers are seeking the application of a 
discretionary floating zone that is applied as part of a lengthy, quasi-judicial process.  The 
application, review, and approval procedures for a PUD are extensive, involving pre-
application conferences, a requirement for a neighborhood meeting, Planning Commission 
review and public hearings, and ultimately, public hearings and final approval by the 
County legislative body.  Frederick County Code, § 1-19-10.500.  The County legislative 
body has discretion whether to approve or disapprove a PUD.  See Frederick County Code, 
§ 1-19-10.500.3 (stating that the “County Council may approve or disapprove a request for 
                                              
14 As part of the approval process, the total acreage of the PUD was reduced to 
approximately 400 acres, and the number of overall residential units was reduced to 1,250 
units.  The Board’s granting of conditional approval was not a final approval of the project 
nor did the Developers secure any zoning or construction rights in the conditional approval 
under the Frederick County Zoning Ordinance.  
43 
rezoning of property to a Planned Unit Development District if persuaded that granting the 
request is appropriate and serves the public interest.”).15  It is logical and expected that 
when a developer is seeking a discretionary approval, that involves the rezoning of 
agriculturally zoned land to enable significant development of over 1,000 housing units, 
that there will be negotiations and concessions by the developer.  Simply put, the 
Developers’ negotiations and concessions that they made in an effort to secure 
discretionary zoning approvals do not constitute evidence of good faith reliance on 
development approvals that they had not yet received.   
In addition to the pre-approval concessions described above, the Developers also 
argue that “[p]erhaps the most detrimental reliance is that the Developers conveyed to the 
County four acres of land for a fire station free of charge after receiving the Approvals.”16  
                                              
15 The Frederick County Code establishes two sets of criteria that must be satisfied 
in order for an applicant to obtain PUD approval.  The first set of criteria apply within the 
context of the approval of a zoning amendment generally, and include:  
 
(1) Consistency with the comprehensive plan;  
(2) Availability of public facilities;  
(3) Adequacy of existing and future transportation systems;  
(4) Compatibility with existing and proposed development;  
(5) Population change; and  
(6) The timing of development and facilities.   
 
Frederick County Code, § 1-19-3.110.4.  In addition to the general criteria for rezoning 
approval, the Code sets forth ten additional criteria that must be evaluated for the approval 
of a PUD.  See id. § 1-19-10.500.3.   
 
16 As evidence of this conveyance, the Developers direct us to Section 3.5 of the 
DRRA, where the Developers agreed to “dedicate and convey to the County, a public use 
site which is not less than 4.0 acres . . . for future discretionary use by the County, at or 
prior to the first residential plat recordation for the Project, or by November 30, 2014, 
44 
As noted above, after the Board of Commissioners approved the Development Approvals, 
RALE filed a timely petition for judicial review.  As this Court has previously explained, 
a party that changes its position in reliance on a regulatory approval that is the subject of 
judicial review does so at its own risk.  O’Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 508 (1981) 
(noting that a landowner “who obtains a permit and begins construction before the 
expiration of an appeal period proceeds at his own risk”).  To the extent that the Developers 
elected to convey property to the County pursuant to a DRRA that was subject to a petition 
for judicial review, they proceeded at their own risk.  As we noted in MRA, in cases where 
zoning estoppel has been applied by other courts where the facts involved a validly issued 
building permit, the court looks to whether the property owner “accelerate[d] his 
development or increase[d] his investment or obligations in an effort to establish such an 
apparent degree or amount of reliance as to prevent the rezoning.”  MRA, 414 Md. at 56, 
(citing Heeter, supra, at 77–78).   
In summary, we decline to recognize or apply equitable estoppel under the facts of 
this case.  Assuming, without deciding, that we were to recognize the doctrine, Developers 
have not demonstrated the elements of good faith and substantial reliance on Development 
Approvals, where their asserted reliance actions consist of either: prospective concessions 
or agreements negotiated in anticipation of receiving discretionary final development 
                                              
whichever first occurs.”  The record does not contain any additional information 
concerning this conveyance.   
45 
approval; or actions undertaken at their own risk after receiving final development approval 
during the pendency of a judicial review proceeding.   
4. We Decline to Apply Equitable Estoppel Principles Based Upon the Developers’ 
Argument that the Frederick County Ethics Statute is Ambiguous 
 
 
Finally, the Developers argue that the Ethics Statute is ambiguous, and therefore, 
we should apply a doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent its application here.  To support 
their argument, the Developers rely on Permanent Financial Corp. v. Montgomery County, 
308 Md. 239 (1986).  In that case, the Court held that a county was estopped from claiming 
that the fourth floor of a building exceeded the height limitations under the zoning 
ordinance where the applicable height provisions were determined to be ambiguous.  Id. at 
251.  Applying general principles of equitable estoppel, we observed that the county shared 
the same interpretation of the height limit as the applicant’s interpretation at the time of the 
issuance of the building permit, which it had consistently applied for a significant period 
of time.  Id.  Under the facts of the case, we concluded that, after the property owner relied 
upon the building permit and constructed the fourth floor in reliance on the permit, “it 
would be inequitable now to permit the [c]ounty to require the removal of the fourth floor.”  
Id. at 252–53.   
 
The Developers argue that the phrase “ex parte communication” is ambiguous 
because it is not defined in the Ethics Statute, and therefore, it would be inequitable to 
apply the statute in this instance.  To support their ambiguity argument, the Developers 
assert that neither the Court of Special Appeals nor the Council could clearly define what 
the alleged ex parte communication actually involved, and also argue that Commissioner 
46 
Smith was unaware that his communications with FACT would constitute ex parte 
communications under the statute.  We disagree with the Developers’ contention that the 
statute is ambiguous.   
If a specific term is not defined in a statute, “we determine the intended scope of the 
term by applying the language’s natural and ordinary meaning, by considering the express 
and implied purpose of the statute, and by employing basic principles of common sense, 
the meaning these words intended to convey.”  Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 344 (2005) 
(citations omitted).  The statute requires disclosure of a communication by “[a] member of 
the governing body who communicates ex parte with an individual concerning a pending 
application during the pendency of the application . . . .”  GP § 5-859.  The Federal 
Administrative Procedures Act defines the term “ex parte communication” to mean “an 
oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable 
prior notice to all parties given . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 551(14).  Other rules and statutes similarly 
describe the concept of ex parte communications as applying to communications outside 
the presence of the parties to the proceeding.  See, e.g., Md. Rule 18-102.9 (a) (generally 
prohibiting a judge from initiating, permitting, or considering ex parte “communications 
made to the judge out of the presence of the parties or their attorneys, concerning a pending 
or impending matter”); Md. Code, State Gov’t Article § 10-219(a)(1) (generally prohibiting 
a presiding officer in a proceeding under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act from 
communicating ex parte regarding the merits of any issue in the case, while the case is 
pending, with a party, a party’s representative, or a party’s attorney, or any person who 
presided at a previous stage of the case).  
47 
When a governing body, such as the Frederick County Council is applying PUD 
standards to a particular property, it is undertaking adjudicative or administrative fact-
finding.  Bucktail, LLC v. Cty. Council of Talbot Cty., 352 Md. 530, 548 (1999).  When the 
legislative body undertakes the role of an adjudicatory or administrative nature, the 
governing body’s decision-making process occurs in public, and based upon the evidence 
presented in the record.  The public decision-making process accomplishes several 
objectives.  Foremost, it satisfies due process concerns.  Specifically, the applicant whose 
property is the subject of the proceeding has confidence that the decision-maker is making 
its decision based upon the evidence before it and is not influenced by outside 
communications.  Similarly, it enables others who have an interest in the outcome to have 
an opportunity to observe the proceedings, and to participate and conduct cross-
examination.  Second, it ensures that the members of the decision-making body are all 
privy to the same information and are making their decision on the same evidence.  Third, 
it promotes public confidence that the decision is made within the confines of a transparent 
and public process.  For these reasons, like other quasi-judicial or administrative 
proceedings in other contexts, the regulation of ex parte communications has been widely 
extended to planning and zoning decisions.  2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
§ 32.10 (4th ed. 2018); see, e.g., GP § 5-836 (generally requiring disclosure of certain ex 
parte communications with the Prince George’s County Executive or members of the 
Prince George’s County Council concerning a pending application for a change in rules 
governing the use of property).   
48 
We find no ambiguity in the provision of the Ethics Statute requiring disclosure of 
ex parte communications.  GP § 5-859(b).  It requires disclosure of ex parte 
communications with any individual17 concerning a pending planning and zoning 
application.  Id.  We supply the common and ordinary definition to the term ex parte 
communication, which is any communication outside of the record of the pending 
proceeding.  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “Commissioner Smith’s 
communications with FACT were ex parte because they concerned a pending quasi-judicial 
proceeding in which he was one of the decisionmakers but were not part of the record of 
that proceeding.”  RALE, 242 Md. App. at 398–99.  We will not consider an application of 
an estoppel doctrine based upon an asserted ambiguity in the statute.  
IV. 
Conclusion 
In summary, we hold that under the plain language of the Frederick County Ethics 
Statute, GP § 5-862, the circuit court was not required to undertake a procedural due 
                                              
17 To bolster their ambiguity argument, the Developers cite to the Department of 
Legislative Services Note to the 2007 legislation that became the 2007 Ethics Statute.  
According to the fiscal note, the legislation “require[s] disclosure of ex parte 
communications between a Frederick County Commissioner and an applicant while the 
application is pending.”  RALE, 242 Md. App. at 402 (emphasis added).  We agree with 
the Court of Special Appeals that the Department of Legislative Services “has no power to 
amend legislation to make it mean something other than what it literally says.”  Id.  
Moreover, we will not resort to legislative history “to seek contradiction of the plain 
meaning of the statute.”  Duffy v. CBS Corp., 458 Md. 206, 229 (2018).  As the intermediate 
appellate court succinctly stated, and we can state no better, “[t]he legislation in this case 
pertains to communications between a commissioner and an individual, and not merely an 
applicant.  To the extent that the Department of Legislative Services interpreted the statute 
otherwise, it was wrong.”  RALE, 242 Md. App. at 402.   
49 
process analysis and to determine whether the violation of the statute violated an aggrieved 
party’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Under the plain language of the 
statute, the circuit court is required to determine, within the context of a judicial review 
proceeding, whether a violation of the Ethics Statute occurred.  If the circuit court makes a 
factual determination that a violation occurred, its work is done, and the court “shall” 
remand the matter to the Frederick County governing body for “reconsideration.”  On 
remand, the statute does not provide any parameters or limitations on the type of 
reconsideration proceeding the County Council must undertake.  Accordingly, the 
Frederick County Council has the discretion to determine the scope of the reconsideration 
proceeding.  After the circuit court determined that a violation of the Ethics Statute 
occurred and remanded the matter to the Frederick County Council, the Council determined 
that it would conduct a de novo hearing on the Developers’ application.  The circuit court 
did not err in vacating the Development Approvals in connection with its remand order, 
after the Developers refused to participate in the de novo reconsideration proceeding.   
We decline to recognize or apply zoning estoppel under the facts of this case.  
Assuming (without deciding) that we recognize the doctrine, the Developers have not 
demonstrated the elements of good faith and substantial reliance on the Development 
Approvals where the asserted actions in reliance on the Development Approvals consist of 
either: prospective concessions or agreements negotiated in anticipation of receiving 
discretionary final development approval; or actions undertaken at their own risk after 
receiving final development approval during the pendency of a judicial review proceeding.  
Finally, we reject the Developers’ argument that the Ethics Statute is ambiguous, and that 
50 
it should therefore not apply under general equitable estoppel principles.  We find no 
ambiguity.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED; 
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONERS.