Case Title: Rheaume v. Pallito

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2010-355

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 72













Rheaume
v. Pallito (2010-355)
 
2011 VT 72
 
[Filed 1-Jul-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 
 
 
2011 VT 72 
 
No. 2010-355
 
Allen Rheaume
  
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, Windsor Unit,
 
Civil Division
 
 
Andrew A. Pallito
 
March Term, 2011
 
 
 
 
Harold
  E. Eaton, Jr., J.
 
Allen W. Rheaume,
Pro Se, Beattyville, Kentucky, Petitioner-Appellant.
 
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and David
McLean, Assistant Attorney
  General, Waterbury, for
Respondent-Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J.,
Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
REIBER, C.J.   Petitioner Allen Rheaume
is an inmate in the custody of the Vermont Commissioner of Corrections
currently serving a life sentence.  He challenges his classification by
the Department of Corrections as a "high risk" sex offender and that
designation's concomitant programming requirements.  The trial court
granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim  and
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that review under Vermont Rule of
Civil Procedure 75 was unavailable for classification and programming decisions
made by the Department of Corrections pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 5411b(b). 
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
¶ 2.            
Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Civil Rule
12(b)(1), is reviewed de novo, with all uncontroverted factual allegations of
the complaint accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.  Jordan v. State Agency of Transp.,
166 Vt. 509, 511, 702 A.2d 58, 60 (1997).  In reviewing a court's
grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 (b)(6),
this Court accepts all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and
all reasonable inferences from those facts.  Richards
v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 48-49, 726 A.2d 81, 85 (1999). 
¶ 3.            
Petitioner is currently serving a life sentence as a habitual
offender.  He has forty-eight convictions, five of which either involve
sex crimes or have a sexual element.   He also has had
sixty-three disciplinary report convictions while incarcerated.   The
Vermont Department of Corrections' Sex Offender Review Committee designated
petitioner a high-risk sex offender pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 5411b(b)
in 2007.  Respondent claims the Committee sent petitioner a letter on July
24, 2007, notifying him of his designation and his right to appeal to the
Committee within thirty days.  Petitioner claims he never received this
notice and did not become aware of his designation until December of
2009.  In March 2009, the DOC reviewed petitioner's case file and
determined that in order to be released before the expiration of his maximum
sentence, he must participate in Cognitive Self Change, a program directed at
violent offenders, and the Vermont Treatment Program
for Sex Abusers.  Petitioner appealed pursuant to Rule 75 on November 13,
2009.  The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction concluding that
petitioner could not seek review of either his designation as "high risk" or
his programming requirements under Rule 75.  Petitioner appeals these
determinations.
¶ 4.            
Respondent concedes that the trial court's determination that petitioner
could not seek review of his designation was erroneous but argues that
petitioner's claim should nevertheless be dismissed as untimely.  Under 13
V.S.A. § 5411b(b) a "sex offender who is designated as high risk shall have the
right to appeal [his designation] de novo to the superior court in accordance
with Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure."  Rule 75 requires
that review be sought "within 30 days after notice of any action."  V.R.C.P. 75(c).  Respondent claims that petitioner
received notification of his designation on August 3, 2007, as evidenced by
petitioner's dated signature on the notification letter.  Petitioner
did not file his complaint until November 13, 2009, and thus, respondent argues
his claim is time barred.  Petitioner, however, contends that he did not
receive notice of the designation until "mid December of 2009."  While
this is somewhat difficult to harmonize with the fact that petitioner filed his
initial grievance contesting his designation on July 24, 2009, exactly when petitioner
was given notice of his designation remains a question of fact and was improper
for disposal on the pleadings.  We thus reverse and remand to the trial
court the question of whether petitioner received notice of the Committee's
designation decision such that the limitations period began to run.
¶ 5.            
The question of whether an inmate designated as "high risk" can appeal
his programming requirements through Rule 75 is one of first impression. 
Rule 75 states in pertinent part, "[a]ny action or
failure or refusal to act by an agency of the state or a political subdivision
thereof, including any department, board, commission, or officer, that is not
reviewable or appealable under Rule 74 of these rules . . . may be reviewed in
accordance with this rule if such review is otherwise available by law." 
V.R.C.P. 75(a); see V.R.C.P. 74 (providing for appeals from decisions of
governmental agencies when party is entitled to seek review by statute). 
According to the Reporter's notes, Rule 75(a) "does not purport to say what
determinations are reviewable, but provides a procedure applicable whenever
county court review is provided by the particular statute establishing an
agency or is available as a matter of general law by proceedings in the nature of
certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition."  Reporter's notes, V.R.C.P.
75.  No statute provides for review of DOC programming decisions and so
the question becomes whether these fall within the class of decisions
appealable at common law under one of the extraordinary writs.  We
consider each in turn.
¶ 6.            
"The function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
assumption of jurisdiction by a tribunal contrary to common law or statutory
provisions."  In re Mattison,
120 Vt. 459, 463, 144 A.2d 778, 780 (1958).  There is no question
that the structuring of programming requirements is within the agency purview
of the DOC, thus Rule 75 review cannot be derived from this writ.  See
Administrative Rule on Determination of High Risk and Failure to Comply with
Treatment for Purposes of Sex Offender Internet Registry, 4, Code of Vt. Rules
13 130 025
¶ 7.            
"A writ of mandamus can enforce the performance of only existing
duties.  It can neither create new duties nor require of a public officer
more than the law has made it his duty to do."  Grout
v. Gates, 97 Vt. 434, 453, 124 A. 76, 82 (1924) (quotation omitted). 
Petitioner has no pre-existing right to a change in his programming
requirements, and thus, a writ of mandamus would not be a proper avenue for a
Rule 75 appeal.
¶ 8.            
The common law writ of certiorari thus seems the most likely avenue from
which petitioner could derive the right of Rule 75 appeal with regard to his
programming requirements.  This writ applied to review of judicial actions
by inferior courts and tribunals.  "In determining the availability of
review under Rule 75 this Court looks to the applicable law in the substantive
area governing the case."  Mason v. Thetford Sch. Bd., 142 Vt. 495,
497, 457 A.2d 647, 648 (1983).  
¶ 9.            
The Commissioner of Corrections "is charged with the following power[]: . . . "[t]o exercise supervisory power over and to establish and
administer programs and policies . . . for the correctional treatment of persons
committed to the custody of the commissioner."  28 V.S.A. § 102(b)(2) (emphasis added).  He is also charged with the "responsibilit[y] . . . [t]o make rules and regulations for
the governing and treatment of persons committed to the custody of the commissioner,"
id. § 102(c)(1), and "[t]o establish in any appropriate correctional
facility a system of classification of inmates, to establish a program for each
inmate upon his . . . commitment to the facility and to review the program of
each inmate at regular intervals and to effect necessary and desirable changes
in the inmate's program of treatment," id.  § 102(c)(8).
¶ 10.         The
establishment of programming requirements falls within the Commissioner's
explicit power to establish inmate treatment programs under
28 V.S.A. § 102(b)(2).  The DOC is
not an inferior court or tribunal of the Superior Court; nor is it performing
the functions of a quasi-judicial body when it establishes programming
requirements.  Rather, the Commissioner is fulfilling his statutorily-created
responsibilities under 28 V.S.A. § 102(c)(8) to establish classification and
commitment programs for each inmate in a correctional facility and to
periodically review such programming decisions.  
¶ 11.         While
the decision to designate an offender as highly dangerous could be termed a
quasi-judicial actlikely the reason why the Legislature explicitly provided
for Rule 75 review of designation decisionswe believe the promulgation of
programming requirements falls within the broad discretion of the DOC to
determine what mode of treatment best serves individual inmates.  See Nash
v. Coxon, 155 Vt. 336, 338, 583 A.2d 96, 97
(1990) ("[B]road discretion must be granted to correctional authorities to
determine what mode of treatment will best serve the individual inmate." (quotation omitted)).  Nothing in the statutes limits
that discretion.  We conclude that while an inmate may have review of his
designation under Rule 75, the particular programming requirements promulgated
after that designation becomes final are a matter of DOC discretion and as such
are non reviewable under Rule 75.  We thus affirm the trial court's
determination that the programming requirements are not reviewable under Rule
75.
Affirmed
as to the determination that programming requirements are not reviewable under
Rule 75.  Reversed as to the determination
that designations are not reviewable under Rule 75.  Remanded for
determination on whether petitioner's designation appeal was timely filed.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief
  Justice