Case Title: Layton v. Howard County

Citation: 399 Md. 36

Docket Number: 116/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Colleen Layton, et al. v. Howard County Board of Appeals, et al.
No. 116, September Term, 2006
Headnote:   Reaffirming the Yorkdale Corporation v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269
(1964) rule that a change in statutory law that takes place during the course of the litigation
of a land use or zoning issue shall be retrospectively applied by appellate courts whether it
operates to deny, i.e., moot an application (provided that it does not affect the vested rights
of a party), or applies in an opposite context.
Circuit Court for How ard Cou nty
Case # 13-C-04-058937 & 13-C-04-058939
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 116
September Term, 2006
Colleen Layton, et al.
v.
Howard County Board of Appeals, et al.
Bell, C. J.
Raker
          Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M . 
(Retired specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Wilner, J., Dissents
Filed:   May 9, 2007
This case, in a land use or zoning context, addresses the question of the retrospective
applicability of a related statutory law which is amended during the course of litigation.  It
presents the issue of whether the rule in Yorkdale Corporation v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205
A.2d 269 (1964), may be applied to enlarge uses as well as to limit uses.
Colleen Layton and Scott Robbins, d/b/a Frisky’s Wildlife and Primate Sanctuary,
Inc., (collectively referred to as “Frisky’s”), the petitioners, attempted to obtain a special
exception to operate as a charitable and philanthropic institution in Howard County.  The
primary reason for the application was that Frisky’s had apparently been out of compliance
with Howard County’s zoning ordinances in its operation as an animal rehabilitation center
and primate sanctuary.  The Howard County Board of Appeals (the “Board”) granted
Frisky’s special exception in part, but denied it permission to operate as a primate sanctuary.
Thereafter, on June 17, 2004, petitioners filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit
Court for Howard County.  On June 25, 2004, Richard Wyckoff and Julianne Tuttle,
neighbors of Frisky’s, filed a separate petition for judicial review, which the Board joined
(collectively the respondents).  Both petitions, by order of the court, were later consolidated.
On September 27, 2004, a pertinent portion of the Howard County Code was amended,
changing the definition upon which the Board had relied in making its initial zoning
decision to deny Frisky’s permission to operate a primate sanctuary.  On April 8, 2005, the
Circuit Court held a hearing on the matter and, on July 13, 2005, issued a memorandum
opinion affirming the decision of the Board.
Petitioners filed a motion to alter or amend judgement, which was denied on August
1 This matter has been before administrative and judicial entities for approximately
seven years.
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30, 2005.  Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  In a reported opinion,
Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals, 171 Md. App. 137, 908 A.2d 724 (2006), the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court.  Petitioners then timely
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, which we granted on December 14, 2006.
Layton v. Howard County, 396 Md. 12, 912 A.2d 648 (2006).1  One question is presented
for our review:
“Whether one who challenges a decision of a zoning board may have,
as Petitioners here seek, (a) the benefit of a legislated change in the basis of
a decision of the zoning board and (b) demand application on judicial appeal
of the ‘new law’?”
We answer this question in the affirmative.  Under the Yorkdale Corporation v. Powell, 237
Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964), rule, legislated change of pertinent law, which occurs during
the ongoing litigation of a land use or zoning case, generally, shall be retrospectively
applied.
  I. Facts
Petitioners have operated Frisky’s, a wildlife refuge and sanctuary, in Howard County
since 1976.  Frisky’s has been at its current location, 10790 Old Frederick Road,
Woodstock, Maryland, since 1993.  That property is composed of 3.728 acres and is zoned
as a Rural Conservation-Density Exchange Option Overlay Zoning District (“RC-DEO”).
This controversy arose on December 14, 1999, when petitioners were issued a notice
2 HCZR § 131.N.13 at that time stated:
“Charitable and Philanthropic Institutions
A special exception may be granted in the RC, RR, R-ED, R-20 and R-12
Districts for a charitable or philanthropic institution, provided that:
a.
The minimum lot size shall be 40,000 square feet.
b.
The proposed activities on the site shall be specified, including the
institution’s goals, activities and hours of operation.
c.
The institution shall be a charitable or philanthropic institution as
defined in these regulations.  The fact that the organization is a tax-
exempt entity does not, of itself, constitute eligibility as a special
exception, but may be considered as one of the factors of eligibility,
provided the use complies in all other respects with the definition.
d.
The petitioner demonstrates that the use shall meet applicable Federal,
State or local laws and regulations.
(continued...)
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by the Howard County Department of Planning and Zoning (the “Department”) for violating
a zoning regulation by operating a charitable and philanthropic institution without an
approved special exception.  Frisky’s was incorporated in 1998, as a not-for-profit
corporation, but petitioners had never filed for a special exception to bring the operation of
the facility into compliance with Howard County’s zoning regulations.
On April 28, 2000, petitioners filed a petition “for a Special Exception for a
Charitable and Philanthropic Institution (Section 131.N.13) for an existing wildlife
rehabilitation center and primate sanctuary” with the Department.  The Department, on
August 9, 2000, issued a recommendation to the Howard County Board of Appeals, in
which it suggested that Frisky’s petition for a special exception be approved, subject to a
number of conditions.  The matter then went before the Board, for a special exception
petition for a charitable and philanthropic institution in a RC-DEO, pursuant to §§ 131.N.132
2(...continued)
e.
The use shall not have an adverse effect on the use or development of
surrounding properties due to noise, odor, traffic, lights or any other
reason.
f.
All parking areas and outdoor activity areas shall be screened from
surrounding properties and roads by landscaping or other appropriate
means.
g.
The design of any structures shall be compatible with that of other
structures in the vicinity.” 
3 HCZR § 130.B.2 pertained to variances and is not relevant to this appeal.
4 “A zoning violation notice was issued to Scott Allen Robbins and Colleen Lucille
Layton on December 14, 1999, for operating a charitable and philanthropic institution
without an approved Special Exception.”  Board’s opinion, n.1.
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and 130.B.23 of the Howard County Zoning Regulations (“HCZR”) in effect at that time.
Numerous hearings were held over the course of the next three years – these hearings
included testimony from witnesses on both sides.
On May 18, 2004, the Board issued its written decision, which, as relevant to this
proceeding, granted Frisky’s a special exception to operate as a charitable and philanthropic
institution, including permitting the operation of an animal rehabilitation center on the
property.  The Board, however, denied Frisky’s an exception to operate a primate or other
exotic wildlife sanctuary.  The Board’s factual findings stated, in pertinent part:
“2. The Petitioner currently operates a charitable institution that
functions as an animal rehabilitation center and primate sanctuary (the
‘Center’) on the Property.  Frisky’s is registered with the State of Maryland as
a Charitable Organization and with the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation as a non-stock, not for profit corporation for the purpose of a
charitable organization.  In order to operate such an organization in the RC
district, a Special Exception is required.[4] The Petitioner is trying to gain
approval as a Special Exception for a ‘Charitable and Philanthropic
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Institution’ for this purpose on the 3.728 acre Property.
“3. The Petitioner’s proposed activities include care and rehabilitation
for ‘wildlife that have been injured or orphaned; domestic animals such as
rabbits, and farm animals that are sick or who have become pets, but can’t be
kept by their owners; and primates that come from laboratories, sanctuaries or
private owners around the country before it became illegal to own primates
without a license.’  The Petitioner submitted documentation of a Wildlife
Permit for Wildlife Rehabilitation from the Maryland Department of Natural
Resources. . . .
“4. At the hearing held before the Board on November 1, 2001, the
Petitioner submitted documentation that Frisky’s had obtained a ‘Class C
Exhibitor’ license pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq.)
from the United States Department of Agriculture.
“5. Animals which are permitted to be rehabilitated are accepted from
multiple sources, provided care and shelter, and upon recovery, are released
back into the wild or made available for adoption.  Primates stay in the care
of Frisky’s for the remainder of their lives.
. . . 
“18. The Board finds based on the evidence presented that the
Petitioner operates the Center on the subject Property as a charitable
institution for the rehabilitation and sanctuary of animals.  Included in the
animals housed in the center are monkeys, other primates and wild animals.
Exotic animals are defined in Section 17.300(p) of the Howard County Code
(the ‘Code’) as ‘animals of a species that is not indigenous to Howard County
and is not a domesticated animal.’  A wild animal is defined in Section
17.300(y) of the Code as ‘an animal which is not a domesticated animal, is
incapable of being completely domesticated, or requires the exercise of art,
force, or skill to keep it in subjugation.  Wild animal includes any hybrid
animal which results from the breeding of a wild animal and a domesticated
animal.’
“19. The Board finds that the monkeys and other primates housed in
the Center are wild and exotic animals as defined in the Code.
“20.  Section 17.306(e) of  the Code  provides  that  wild  or exotic
animals are prohibited in Howard County as follows:
(1)
Wild or exotic animals prohibited: No person may keep, hold
for sale or sell wild or exotic animals even if well trained, de-
clawed, defanged, ostensibly domesticated and affectionate to
people.
(2)
Exemption for licensed veterinarian: a licensed veterinarian is
exempt from the provisions of paragraph (1) only for the
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purpose of professional medical treatment of such animals.
(3)
Exemption for research, study, exhibits: The holder of a
currently valid permit issued by a state or federal authority to
keep animals for scientific research, study, or exhibits is exempt
from the provisions of paragraph (1) only to the extent provided
in the permit.
“21. The Board finds that although the Petitioner may have a license
to exhibit animals at the Center, the Petitioner initially did not apply to be an
animal exhibitor and subsequently failed to provide sufficient evidence during
the course of the hearings held before the Board to determine that the
Petitioner is, in fact, an animal exhibitor. . . .
“22. 
Therefore, 
the 
exemption 
for 
‘exhibits’ 
in 
Section
17.306(e)(4)[(3)] is not applicable to this petition.”
The Board’s conclusions of law stated, in pertinent part:
“1. The Board concludes that the Petitioner operates the Center as a
charitable institution for the rehabilitation and sanctuary of animals on the
Property.
“2. The Board concludes that the rehabilitation center and sanctuary
does not operate as a center for displaying or exhibiting the animals to the
public. 
“3. The Board concludes that the monkeys and other primates at the
center are wild and exotic animals as defined by the Howard County Animal
Control Law, Section 17.300 et seq. of the Howard County Code.
“4. The Board concludes that it is unlawful under the Howard County
Code to operate a primate sanctuary or wildlife rehabilitation center in
Howard County.  Section 17.306(e)(1) of the Code provides that ‘No person
may keep, hold for sale or sell wild or exotic animals even if well trained, de-
clawed, defanged, ostensibly domesticated and affectionate to people.’
“5. The Board concludes that although the Petitioner may have an
exhibitor’s license, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence during
the course of the hearings for the Board to determine that the Petitioner is, in
fact, an animal exhibitor rather than a sanctuary and rehabilitation center for
animals.  The exemption for exhibits in Section 17.306(e)(4)[(3)] of the
Howard County Code does not apply because the Petitioner[] did not prove
to the Board that she was an exhibitor and the Petitioner[] cannot therefore
legally keep primates or other wild or exotic animals on the subject Property.
. . .
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“7. The Board further concludes that because wild or exotic animals are
prohibited by local law in Howard County (except under circumstances not
found to be present in this case) the Zoning Board could not have
contemplated a land use for a rehabilitation center and primate sanctuary for
wild and exotic animals as constituting a charitable institution in the context
of the zoning regulations.  The Board cannot grant a special exception for the
primate sanctuary use or that portion of the rehabilitation center involving
wildlife which is not permitted by the Howard County Code or the Howard
County Zoning Regulations.
“8. Thus this Board’s approval of the charitable and philanthropic
institution use for a animal sanctuary and rehabilitation center hereinafter
(referred to as ‘Approved Charitable Use’) excludes the primate sanctuary and
other wildlife not permitted under the Howard County Code.”
Pursuant to the provisions of the Howard County Code in effect at the time of the
Board’s decision, monkeys and other primates were considered exotic or wild animals. §§
17.300(p) and (y).  Furthermore, § 17.306(e) of the Howard County Code, at that time,
provided that no person (or corporation) could keep exotic or wild animals unless it met the
exemption of having a valid permit issued by a state or federal authority to keep such
animals for scientific research, study or exhibits. § 17.306(e)(3).  The Board found that
Frisky’s did not satisfactorily establish evidence to meet such an exemption and, therefore,
determined that it was not permitted to operate a primate sanctuary.
On June 17, 2004, Frisky’s filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for
Howard County; Richard Wyckoff and Julianne Tuttle, neighbors of Frisky’s, filed a
separate petition for judicial review on June 25, 2004.  Those petitions were consolidated
by order of the court.
On September 27, 2004, prior to any hearing before the Circuit Court, Howard
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County amended pertinent provisions of the Howard County Code.  The Code provided a
definition for “Animal Sanctuary,” which was not in existence at the time of the hearing
before the Board.  Specifically, § 17.300(g) stated:
“Animal Sanctuary. 
A facility that performs at least one of the following functions:
(1)
Rescues, rehabilitates and releases, when possible, native
wildlife; or
(2)
Provides permanent housing to the following categories of non-
releasable animals, as defined in this subtitle:
(i)       Wild animals; or
(ii)      Exotic animals.”
Exotic animals were defined in § 17.300(q) as:  “An animal of a species that is not
indigenous to Howard County and is not a domesticated animal. . . .”  Wild animals were
defined in § 17.300(aa) as:  “An animal that is not a domesticated animal, is incapable of
being completely domesticated, or requires the exercise of art, force, or skill to keep it in
subjugation. . . .”  Thus, monkeys and other primates still fell under the definition of a wild
or exotic animal.  
The provision upon which this case turns, however, (i.e., the section dealing with the
keeping of wild or exotic animals) was also amended.  Now set forth in § 17.307(d), it read:
“Wild or Exotic Animals Prohibited.  A person shall not keep, hold for
sale, offer for sale, or sell a wild or exotic animal, even if the animal is
well-trained, de-clawed, de-fanged, ostensibly domesticated, and
affectionate to people, except that:
 
(1)
A circus or animal show holding a valid permit from any public
authority for temporary operation is exempt from this
subsection for the term of the permit;
 
(2)
A licensed veterinarian may temporarily keep such an animal
only for the purpose of professional medical treatment of the
5 This, of course, assumes that Frisky’s does, in fact, meet all of the pertinent State
and Federal licensing and permitting requirements.
6 Arguably, Frisky’s could apply for a new special exception utilizing the current law.
There are, however, provisions in the Code that prohibit reapplication until a certain period
of time has passed.  Whether reapplication prohibitions apply when the law itself is changed
is an issue not directly presented in this case and the resolution must await a case in which
the issue is present.
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animal;
 
(3)
The holder of a valid permit issued by a state or federal
authority to keep a wild or exotic animal is exempt from this
subsection only to the extent provided in the permit;
 . . . 
(5)
An animal sanctuary is exempt from this subsection if the
sanctuary meets all state and federal licensing and permitting
requirements.” [Emphasis added.]
Subsection (5) now provided an exemption for animal sanctuaries.  Therefore, under the new
law, as described by §§ 17.300(g) and 17.307(d) of the Howard County Code, Frisky’s may
arguably meet the definition of an “Animal Sanctuary” and thus be exempt from the
prohibition5 against keeping wild or exotic animals under § 17.307(d)(5).6
Petitioners incorporated this change in law into the arguments presented before the
Circuit Court for Howard County.  On April 8, 2005, the Circuit Court held a hearing on the
consolidated petitions for judicial review and, on July 13, 2005, issued a memorandum
opinion affirming the decision of the Board.  The Circuit Court declined to accept
petitioners’ argument that the new provisions of the Howard County Code should be
7 The Circuit Court also addressed several other arguments which were not presented
to this Court.
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retrospectively applied to Frisky’s petition for the operation of a primate sanctuary.7
Petitioners filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, which was denied by the
Circuit Court.  The petitioners then timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  The
intermediate appellate court heard argument and issued its reported opinion on October 2,
2006.  Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals, 171 Md. App. 137, 908 A.2d 724
(2006).  
The Court of Special Appeals addressed the retrospective application of the new
provisions of the Howard County Code.  After conducting a review of Maryland law, the
court determined that the changes in the Code should not be applied to the case at bar.
Specifically, the court stated:
“Turning to the instant case, we see no reason to stray from the general
rule that statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and are construed
accordingly.  See Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Riverdale
Heights Volunteer Fire Co. Inc., 308 Md. 556, 560-61, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987).
We are unable to discern in the statute a clear expression of the legislative
intent that the statute should operate retrospectively, nor have appellants
directed us to any such intent in their brief or oral argument.  Notwithstanding
that there is no articulated legislative intent, no other exception to the general
rule applies to the change in the animal control law.
“The law is not procedural, but substantive.  The Court of Appeals
discussed the difference between substantive laws and procedural or remedial
laws in Langston, stating: ‘A law is substantive if it creates rights, duties, and
obligations, while a remedial or procedural law simply prescribes the methods
of enforcement of those rights.’  359 Md. at 419, 754 A.2d 389 [(2000)]
(citations omitted).  The animal control law at issue provides a right for a
sanctuary to have exotic and wild animals, not a new method or procedure to
8 The Court of Special Appeals failed to discern that the definitions in the Animal
Control Law were being applied in a land use context by reason of the description of uses
in the zoning code and that, moreover, the definitions were a determinative factor in the
agency’s land use decision. 
9 Mandel v. Board of County Comm’rs of Howard County, 238 Md. 208, 208 A.2d
710 (1965).  We note that Mandel is a decision of this Court, not the Court of Special
Appeals.
10 Holland v. Woodhaven Building and Development, Inc., 113 Md. App. 274, 687
A.2d 699 (1996). 
-11-
enforce their right to have the animals.  We discussed in Langston what
defines a remedial statute, stating:
Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy,
or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the
enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.  They also
include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes
and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of
the state.
359 Md. at 408-09, 754 A.2d 389.  The animal control law is not remedial, but
a new substantive right to possess wild and exotic animals for facilities that
are designated as animal sanctuaries.
“Finally, the animal control law is not a zoning law;[8] whether it should
be applied retrospectively is not properly based upon the rationale relied upon
in our decisions in Mandel[9] and Holland[10].  Thus, we hold that the circuit
court did not err by refusing to remand the case to the Board for consideration
under the current animal control law.”
Layton, 171 Md. App. at 172-73, 908 A.2d at 744.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Circuit Court.
II. Standard of Review
In Purich v. Draper Properties, Inc., 395 Md. 694, 912 A.2d 598 (2006), we quoted
Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 775 A.2d 1234 (2001), where we discussed the standard of
review of administrative agency decisions in the context of special exceptions:
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“A proceeding on a special exception is subject to a full
judicial review.  Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 329 Md.
494, 506, 620 A.2d 886, 892 (1993).  We examined the correct
standard of judicial review in White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 44,
736 A.2d 1072, 1079-80 (1999), when we stated that:
In judicial review of zoning matters,
including special exceptions and variances, ‘the
correct test to be applied is whether the issue
before the administrative body is “fairly
debatable,” that is, whether its determination is
based upon evidence from which reasonable
persons could come to different conclusions.’
Sembly v. County Bd. of Appeals, 269 Md. 177,
182, 304 A.2d 814, 818 (1973).  See also Board
of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210,
216-17, 550 A.2d 664, 668 (1988); Prince
George’s County v. Meininger, 264 Md. 148, 151,
285 A.2d 649, 651 (1972); Zengerle v. Board of
County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 1, 17, 276 A.2d 646,
654 (1971); Gerachis v. Montgomery County Bd.
of Appeals, 261 Md. 153, 156, 274 A.2d 379, 381
(1971).  For its conclusion to be fairly debatable,
the administrative agency overseeing the variance
decision must have ‘substantial evidence’ on the
record supporting its decision.  See Mayor of
Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md.
383, 395, 396 A.2d 1080, 1087 (1979);
Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop,
Inc., 280 Md. 686, 706, 376 A.2d 483, 495
(1977), cert. denied sub nom. Funger v.
Montgomery County, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S. Ct.
1245, 55 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1978); Agneslane, Inc. v.
Lucas, 247 Md. 612, 619, 233 A.2d 757, 761
(1967).
In Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md.
383, 398, 396 A.2d 1080, 1089 (1979), we defined the
substantial evidence test as ‘“whether a reasoning mind
reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency
reached,” Insurance Comm’r v. Nat’l Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 309,
236 A.2d 282 (1967), or as “‘such relevant evidence as a
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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,’” Bulluck v. Pelham Apts., 283 Md. 505, 390 A.2d
1119 (1978); Snowden v. Mayor & C.C. of Balto., supra, 224
Md. [443] at 448, 168 A.2d 390.’  In applying the substantial
evidence test:
The question for the reviewing court is . . .
whether the conclusions ‘reasonably may be
based upon the facts proven.’ The court may not
substitute its judgment on the question whether
the inference drawn is the right one or whether a
different inference would be better supported.
The test is reasonableness, not rightness.
Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. at 399, 396 A.2d at 1089,
quoting 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law, § 29.05, 137, 139
(1958). 
When we review an administrative agency’s order, we
make sure that it is not premised upon an error in the law.  Ad +
Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County,
307 Md. 307, 338, 513 A.2d 893, 909 (1986).  ‘Generally, a
decision of an administrative agency, including a local zoning
board, is owed no deference when its conclusions are based
upon an error of law.’  Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 267, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999),
citing Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560,
569, 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998).
Alviani, 365 Md. at 107-09, 775 A.2d at 1241-42; see also Department of
Natural Resources v. Heller, 391 Md. 148, 892 A.2d 497 (2006); Motor
Vehicle Administration v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 887 A.2d 1042 (2005).”
Purich, 395 Md. at 706-08, 912 A.2d at 606-07.
Furthermore, we stated in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981):
“When the legislative body determines that other uses are compatible
with the permitted uses in a use district, but that the beneficial purposes such
other uses serve do not outweigh their possible adverse effect, such uses are
designated as conditional or special exception uses.  See City of Takoma Park
v. County Bd. of Appeals for Montgomery County, 259 Md. 619, 621, 270 A.2d
772, 773 (1970); Creswell v. Baltimore Aviation Servs., Inc., 257 Md. 712,
719, 264 A.2d 838, 842 (1970); Art. 66B, § 1.00.  Such uses cannot be
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developed if at the particular location proposed they have an adverse effect
above and beyond that ordinarily associated with such uses.”
291 Md. at 21-22, 432 A.2d at 1330; see Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md. App.
1, 7-8, 666 A.2d 1253, 1257 (1995) (“[A] special exception/conditional use in a zoning
ordinance recognizes that the legislative body of a representative government has made a
policy decision for all of the inhabitants of the particular governmental jurisdiction, and that
the exception or use is desirable and necessary in its zoning planning provided certain
standards are met.”).  Judge Davidson, writing for the Court in Shultz, elucidated the proper
standard in relation to special exceptions as follows:
“[T]he appropriate standard to be used in determining whether a requested
special exception use would have an adverse effect and, therefore, should be
denied is whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the
particular use proposed at the particular location proposed would have any
adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such a
special exception use irrespective of its location within the zone.”
291 Md. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1331 (citations omitted); Harford County v. Earl E. Preston,
Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 499, 588 A.2d 772, 775 (1991).    
In this case, we are not concerned with the Board’s initial disposition of the case.  Its
determination as to whether Frisky’s was entitled to a special exception was made pursuant
to the Code in effect at that time.  The question presented is purely one of law – whether the
Circuit Court should have retrospectively applied (or remanded the case for the Board to
consider) the changed Code.  As such, we shall review that question of law de novo.  Nesbit
v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004). 
11 In the forty plus years since Yorkdale, governmental entities have generally
supported its applicability in land use cases.  In those cases, however, the application of the
Yorkdale rule restricted the rights of property owners.  As far as we have discerned, the
present case is the first instance where the Yorkdale rule might result in the expansion of a
property owner’s rights.  Now, in this changed context, the governmental entity wants the
Court to abandon Yorkdale. 
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III.  Discussion
We are presented in this case with the occasion to revisit Yorkdale Corporation v.
Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964),11 and those cases preceding and following it in
creating an exception in land use cases to the general rule that statutes are presumed to
operate prospectively.  We stated the general rule in Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm’n  v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 560, 520 A.2d 1319, 1321
(1987), “[a]s a general rule, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and are to be
construed accordingly.”  See State Ethics Comm’n v. Evans, 382 Md. 370, 381, 855 A.2d
364, 370 (2004); County Council of Prince George’s County v. Collington Corporate Ctr.
I Ltd. P’ship, 358 Md. 296, 305, 747 A.2d 1219, 1223 (2000); but cf. Spielman v. State, 298
Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730, 733 (1984) (“There is ‘no absolute prohibition against
retroactive application of a statute.’”) (quoting State Comm’n on Human Relations v.
Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976)).  Yorkdale, as an exception to the
general rule, provides for the retrospective application of changes to statutes that impact land
use issues made during the course of litigation in land use and zoning cases.  
In our Country’s early jurisprudence, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the United
12 The treaty entered into with France provided in pertinent part: “Property captured,
and not yet definitively condemned, or which may be captured before the exchange of
ratifications . . . shall be mutually restored.”  Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch at 107, 5 U.S. at
107.  The Court found that the ship was “not yet definitively condemned” because litigation
involving the possession of the schooner Peggy had not concluded.  Id. at 108, 5 U.S. at 108.
13 This holding was specifically adopted by our Court in Price v. Nesbitt, 29 Md. 263,
266 (1868), where, after referring to the above language, we stated:  “This doctrine has been
recognized and settled by this court in Atwell v. Grant, 11 Md. [101,] 104 [(1857)]; State v.
Norwood, 12 Md. [195,] 206 [(1858)]; Keller v. State, 12 Md. [322,] 326 [(1858)], and will
be applied to the decision of this case.”  Price, interestingly, was a case relating to real
property (i.e., ejectment), (generally zoning laws were not formulated until the early 20th
century) but, the issue in which Schooner Peggy was adopted involved a change in law
relating to removal questions. 
-16-
States Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 5 U.S. 103, 2 L.Ed. 49
(1801), laid the foundation for the retrospective application of changes in a statutory scheme
to ongoing litigation.  There, the Court was concerned with the disposition of spoils of war.
A French schooner (the Peggy) had been captured by an American ship.  The Court was
faced with the question, in the midst of litigation, of determining who was entitled to
possession of the Peggy.  For guidance, the Court turned to a treaty.  The provisions of the
treaty involving the validity of the capture and resultant possession of captured ships had
changed during the course of the litigation.12  Chief Justice Marshall explicated:
“It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only
to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not.  But if
subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a
law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must
be obeyed, or its obligation denied.”
1 Cranch at 110, 5 U.S. at 110.13  The Court continued:
“If the law be constitutional . . . .  I know of no court which can contest its
14 We recognize that the retrospective application in Schooner Peggy differs from the
situation extant in the case sub judice.  As Justice Stevens stated for the Supreme Court in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1501, 128 L.Ed.2d 229
(1994), “[o]ur application of ‘the law in effect’ at the time of our decision in Schooner
Peggy was simply a response to the language of the statute[,]” referring to the language “not
yet definitively condemned.”  Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch at 109, 5 U.S. at 109.  Nonetheless,
our Maryland cases, in the context of land use and zoning issues, both preceding and
following Yorkdale, have applied the “law in effect at the time” of the Court’s decision.
-17-
obligation.  It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court
will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a
retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national
concerns where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national
purposes, the contract, making the sacrifice, ought always to receive a
construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up
the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government,
to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation.  In such a case the
court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside
a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in
violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.”
Id.14  
In Yorkdale, the Court addressed a situation in which a property owner (the Yorkdale
Corporation) had negotiated the reclassification of the zoning of its property in order to build
an apartment building.  Yorkdale also applied for a special exception and variance.  The
zoning commissioner granted Yorkdale’s requests, with the exception of limiting the number
of units in the apartment building, i.e., the density of the zoning.  A neighboring property
owner appealed the Board’s decision to the Circuit Court.  There, the question was “whether
the zoning ordinances . . . gave the zoning officials power to grant a variance as to density.”
Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 123, 205 A.2d at 270.  The Circuit Court found that the then-current
15 It is clear that the Court realized the importance of what it was doing.  The Court
had already heard the case, then directed that it be reargued based upon the possible
retrospective applicability of a change in law.  The Yorkdale rule was not an unintended
holding relating to some larger issue.  It was specifically considered by the Court and it was
the major holding of the case.  It is a holding that has stood the test of time.  
16 See Tudor Arms Apartments v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342, 351, 62 A.2d 346, 350 (1948)
(In a landlord tenant case, the Court was “bound to decide [the] case according to existing
laws.”); Cockerham v. Children’s Aid Soc’y, 185 Md. 97, 43 A.2d 197 (1945) (In a habeas
corpus proceeding for child custody, the Court decided the case according to the law
existing at the time of argument.); Gordy v. Prince, 175 Md. 688, 7 A.2d 611 (1939) (per
curiam) (In an income tax case, the Court applied an intervening decision of the United
States Supreme Court.); Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530, 539 (1865) (In a land use case concerning
a patent to land, the Court followed the reasoning in Schooner Peggy, stating:  “It is proper,
however, to refer to another well settled rule, which clearly leads to the same results, and
that is, that we are bound to decide according to existing laws, even though a judgment,
(continued...)
-18-
law did not authorize a variance in density.  Id. at 124, 205 A.2d at 270.  Yorkdale appealed
to the Court of Appeals and, after argument, but before a decision was issued, a bill was
passed by the county council modifying the law in respect to the granting of variances as to
density.  Id.  Upon becoming aware of this event, the Court set the case for reargument.15 
In reaching its decision, the Yorkdale Court first stated that:
“Maryland consistently has followed the rule that ‘an appellate court
is bound to decide a case according to existing laws, even though a judgment
rightful when rendered by the court below should be reversed as a
consequence,’ as Judge Markell, for the Court, repeated in Woman’s Club v.
State Tax Comm., 195 Md. 16, 19 (or, it may be noted, even when a judgment
wrong when rendered is made right by the change in the law).  See also for
this proposition that a change in the law after a decision below and before
final decision by the appellate Court will be applied by that Court unless
vested or accrued substantive rights would be disturbed or unless the
legislature shows a contrary intent, Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322; Day v. Day,
22 Md. 530; Gordy v. Prince, 175 Md. 688; Cockerham v. Children’s Society,
185 Md. 97; and Tudor Arms Apts. v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342.”16
16(...continued)
rightful when rendered by the court below, should be reversed as a consequence.”); Keller
v. State, 12 Md. 322 (1858) (In a criminal case, the Court held that a party cannot be
convicted after the law under which he may be prosecuted has been repealed, though the
offence may have been committed before the repeal, and the same principle applies where
the law is repealed or expires pending an appeal or writ of error from the judgment of an
inferior court.).
17 See Grau v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 210 Md. 19, 122 A.2d
824 (1956) (Rezoning case, in which appeal was dismissed as moot because the property in
question was rezoned again during the course of litigation.); Lake Falls Ass’n v. Zoning
Appeals of Baltimore County, 209 Md. 561, 121 A.2d 809 (1956) (same); Banner v. Home
Sales Co. D., 201 Md. 425, 94 A.2d 264 (1953) (same). 
-19-
Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 124, 205 A.2d at 271.  In discussing several zoning cases in which this
rule had been applied, the Yorkdale Court stated:
“It would seem to follow from the decisions in Banner [v. Home Sales
Co. D., 201 Md. 425, 94 A.2d 264 (1953)], Lake Falls [Ass’n v. Board of
Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 209 Md. 561, 121 A.2d 809 (1956)] and
Grau [v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 210 Md. 19, 122
A.2d 824 (1956)][17] that an applicant for rezoning to a more intense use of his
property, who has been successful before the zoning authorities and the circuit
court does not acquire a vested or substantive right which may not be wiped
out by legislation which takes effect during the pendency in this Court of the
appeal from the actions below.”
Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 126, 205 A.2d at 272.
Applying this reasoning to the case, and after analyzing the legislative intent of the
county in its enactment of the new bill and determining that there was no evidence that the
bill was not to be subject to retrospective application, the Yorkdale Court held that the
change in the zoning law had made the case decided under the old law moot.  Because the
amended law had come into effect during the course of litigation (i.e., while the appeal was
-20-
pending and before a final judgment) the Court applied it retrospectively and dismissed
Yorkdale’s appeal.  Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 133, 205 A.2d at 276.
Following the Court’s decision in Yorkdale, we have affirmed those principles in
relation to land use and zoning cases several times.  In Mandel v. Board of County Comm’rs
of Howard County, 238 Md. 208, 214, 208 A.2d 710, 714 (1965), the property owners “had
applied to the Board to use their respective properties for high-rise apartments under the
zoning regulations then existing.”  During the course of litigation, the pertinent zoning
regulations were changed to disallow high-rise apartments.  Applying the Yorkdale rule, the
Court decided against the property owners and held that:
“[T]his case is to be determined under the law as it now exists, that the
appellants had not secured a final decree establishing their rights to use their
properties for the use permitted under the former classification, that they had
no vested rights, and that the change in the regulations is not invalid because
it eliminates the proposed use.”
Mandel, 238 Md. at 215, 208 A.2d at 714.  Additionally, the Court stated that:
“[I]t is clear that the Board, as a legislative body, if its action is otherwise in
accordance with law, can validly change a zoning regulation, even though the
effect of its action is to eliminate any inchoate rights, which property owners
may have asserted in pending appeals from adverse administrative
determinations under the pre-existing regulations.”
Id. at 216, 208 A.2d at 715.  Furthermore, “[u]nder the Yorkdale rule, the Board’s legislative
act, if otherwise valid, eliminated any rights which the appellants had to use their property
for high-rise apartments under the pre-existing zoning regulations.”  Mandel, 238 Md. at
217, 208 A.2d at 715-16.
-21-
In Marathon Builders, Inc. v. Montgomery County Planning Board, 246 Md. 187,
227 A.2d 755 (1967), we addressed the impact of a change to the overall zoning ordinance
during the course of litigation.  After referencing the holding in Mandel, we stated:
“Certainly if such a change in classification has the effect of
extinguishing existing rights during the pendency of an appeal involving the
exercise of rights under a former classification, a fortiori a change in
classification as a result of the passage of a comprehensive rezoning ordinance
would have at least the equal effect of terminating any rights unexercised as
of the effective date of the change in classification.  This Court has made
frequent declarations in zoning cases that courts are bound to decide cases
according to existing laws.  Yorkdale v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269
(1964).”
Marathon Builders, 246 Md. at 194, 227 A.2d at 758.
In Springloch Area Citizens Group v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 252
Md. 717, 723, 251 A.2d 357, 360 (1969), citing to Yorkdale and Mandel, we stated:  “[T]his
Court is bound to decide a zoning case according to the laws existing at the time the decision
is rendered unless vested rights have intervened . . . .”  And, in Dal Maso v. Board of County
Comm’rs for Prince George’s County, 264 Md. 691, 694, 288 A.2d 119, 121 (1972), we
stated that “we have held that a zoning case must be decided upon the law applicable at the
time the case is before us, in the absence of intervening vested rights . . . .” 
We had further occasion to address this issue in Anne Arundel County v. Maragousis,
268 Md. 131, 299 A.2d 797 (1973).  The Maragousises had purchased a piece of property
that was subject to a rezoning after their purchase.  They brought an action in the Circuit
Court and then appealed that verdict to this Court.  After the case had been appealed, but
18 “A different rule is applicable to procedural changes, Luxmanor Citizens Ass’n, Inc.
v. Burkart, 266 Md. 631, 644-45, 296 A.2d 403 (1972).”   Anne Arundel County v.
Maragousis, 268 Md. 131, 139 n.3, 299 A.2d 797, 802 n.3 (1973).  The present case
concerns changes in reference to the substance of the law.
19 Like the Rule in Shelley’s Case, which pre-existed Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. Rep.
93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (C.P. 1581), the so called Yorkdale rule had been applied prior to the
Court’s decision in Yorkdale.  See footnotes 16 and 17.
-22-
prior to any decision being issued, the County amended the zoning ordinance.  We stated:
“It has consistently been our policy to consider zoning cases on the
state of the substantive law as it exists when the case is argued before us, Dal
Maso v. Board of County Comm’rs, 264 Md. 691, 694, 288 A.2d 119 (1972);
Mandel v. Board of County Comm’rs, 238 Md. 208, 215, 208 A.2d 710
(1965); Yorkdale Corporation v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 124-28, 205 A.2d 269
(1964),[18] and compare Springloch Area Citizens Group v. Montgomery
County Board of Appeals, 252 Md. 717, 723, 251 A.2d 357 (1969).  The
amendment of [the statutes] marked the opening of an entirely new ball game,
because the uses permitted by [the new statutes] were obviously much wider
in scope.”
Maragousis, 268 Md. at 139, 299 A.2d at 802.  The County also conceded that some of the
uses allowed under the rezoning had changed.  We continued, stating that, “[s]ince neither
this concessum nor [the new Bill] was before the lower court, the whole picture has been
drastically altered.”  Id. at 140, 299 A.2d at 802.  As a result of this determination and the
Yorkdale rule, we remanded the case for reconsideration under the new law.
Yorkdale and its progeny have never been overruled.19  They are still good law and
are determinative in evaluating whether, in a land use or zoning case, a change in statutory
law taking place during the course of a litigated issue should have retrospective application.
As discussed supra, we shall consider zoning cases based upon the law as it exists at the
-23-
time the case is before us. 
The respondents argue that, after the Court’s decision in Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 520 A.2d 1319
(1987), Yorkdale is no longer viable.  We disagree.  Before we discuss Riverdale directly,
we look to Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964).  The Janda
opinion was issued by the Court of Appeals on the same day as Yorkdale and penned by the
same judge.  Thus, there can be little argument that the Court rendered the opinions without
a realization of their full effect.
In Janda, we addressed a change in the State’s unemployment law.  There, a number
of employees were denied unemployment insurance benefits for a week in January of 1963.
Those employees appealed the denial to the Board of Appeals, which, on August 21, 1963,
affirmed the initial denial.  The facts of the case show that there was a collective bargaining
agreement between the employees and General Motors in effect from September 20, 1961,
through August 31, 1964.  During the course of the litigation, a statute governing
unemployment insurance benefits in 1961, was repealed and reenacted in 1963.  The 1963
statute specifically provided that benefits to be paid under a contract in force prior to the
reenactment should be continued.  The Janda Court stated, in pertinent part:
“Many of the reasons that led us to conclude that the Legislature
intended in 1961 to make extra pay in lieu of vacation a bar to benefits lead
us to conclude the 1963 act operates to remove that bar where the allowance
in lieu of vacation is paid by the employer under and during the term of a
written contract in effect on December 6, 1962, and the ‘normal practice’ of
the employer was not to grant a vacation with pay.  December 6, 1962, was
20 The other rules extant in Janda are as follows:
“(1) ‘Ordinarily a change affecting procedure only, and not substantive rights,
made by statute . . . applies to all actions [and matters] whether accrued,
pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed.’  Richardson v.
Richardson, 217 Md. 316, 320, and cases cited.  (2) Ordinarily a statute
affecting matters or rights of substance will not be given a retrospective
operation as to transactions, matters and events not in litigation at the time the
statute takes effect:
‘* * * unless its words are so clear, strong and imperative in
their retrospective expression that no other meaning can be
attached to them, or unless the manifest intention of the
Legislature could not otherwise be gratified. * * * (citing cases).
An amendatory Act takes effect, like any other legislative
(continued...)
-24-
the day the 1961 act first took effect (it having been in suspended animation
since June 1, 1961, its stated effective date, because it had been put to
referendum).  Prior to that day extra pay in lieu of vacation had not been a bar
to benefits.  We think the 1963 Legislature, by expressly making December
6, 1962, the critical date, manifested a clear and unmistakable intent that extra
pay allowances in lieu of vacation, paid under a contract in force on that day,
should continue not to be a disqualification for unemployment benefits so
long as the contract then currently in force continued, whether or not the time
of separation from employment came before June 1, 1963, the effective date
of the 1963 act.”
237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d at 234.  Janda clearly did not involve a land use or zoning issue,
and the Court found that the changed statute specifically provided that the pre-existing
contract continue to be in force.  
In reaching its decision, however, the Janda Court described various rules
“formulated by the courts to aid in determining whether a statute is to be applied
retrospectively or prospectively.”  237 Md. at 168, 205 A.2d at 232.  Pertinent to our
discussion, the Court stated in its fourth rule20 that:
20(...continued)
enactment, only from the time of its passage, and has no
application to prior transactions, unless an intent to the contrary
is expressed in the Act or clearly implied from its provisions.’
Tax Comm. v. Power Company, 182 Md. 111, 117.
(3) A statute, even if the Legislature so intended, will not be applied
retrospectively to divest or adversely affect vested rights, to impair the
obligation of contracts, or so as to violate the due process clause, or to operate
as a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.  Aside from the disinclination of
legislative bodies and courts to make a law operate on past events or
transactions, the limitations on retroactive laws are only those which affect all
legislation and, if the Legislature intends a law affecting substantive matters
to operate retrospectively and the law does not offend constitutional
limitations or restrictions, it will be given the effect intended.  See 2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 2201 (3rd Ed. 1943), and Match Co.
v. State Tax Comm., 175 Md. 234.”
Janda, 237 Md. at 168-69, 205 A.2d at 232-33.   
21 Also citing Gordy v. Prince, 175 Md. 688, 7 A.2d 611 (1939) (per curiam) and Day
v. Day, 22 Md. 530 (1865).
-25-
“(4) A statute which affects or controls a matter still in litigation when it
became law will be applied by the court reviewing the case at the time the
statute takes effect although it was not yet law when the decision appealed
from was rendered, even if matters or claims of substance (not constitutionally
protected), as distinguished from matters procedural or those affecting the
remedy are involved, unless the Legislature intended the contrary.  See
Yorkdale Corp. v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, and cases cited . . . .”21
Janda, 237 Md. at 169, 205 A.2d at 233.
Respondents contend that Riverdale overruled this portion of Janda, thereby
overruling Yorkdale.  That is simply not the case.  
In Riverdale, an Act was passed, effective July 1, 1983, providing fire companies
with immunity for civil liability arising out of allegedly tortious conduct in the course of
performing their duties.  In 1980, a fire had occurred, damaging an apartment house in
-26-
Riverdale.  The fire insurer paid for the loss and then sued the Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission (WSSC), alleging that WSSC was negligent in failing to maintain the
fire hydrant closest to the fire.  In other words, when fire fighters arrived to combat the
blaze, they attempted to utilize that particular fire hydrant, but it proved to be dry, failing to
provide any water.  This allegedly caused a delay that resulted in an increase in damages and
the resultant loss due to the fire.  In September 1984, after the 1983 Act became effective,
WSSC filed a third-party complaint against the Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., Inc.
(“Fire Co.”), alleging that Fire Co. knew that the fire hydrant was inoperable and therefore,
any negligence on the part of WSSC was secondary.  Fire Co. moved to dismiss, asserting
immunity under the 1983 Act.
The Circuit Court granted Fire Co.’s motion to dismiss.  WSSC appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals, arguing that the Circuit Court was erroneous in its retrospective
application of the Act.  This Court issued a writ of certiorari prior to consideration by the
Court of Special Appeals.
First, it must be noted that Riverdale clearly did not concern a land use or zoning
issue.  The case involved a statute pertaining to fire companies’ immunity from civil liability
in tort actions.  In determining whether such a statute should be applied retrospectively, the
Court stated:
“As a general rule, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and
are to be construed accordingly.  See, e.g., Rigger v. Baltimore County, 269
Md. 306, 305 A.2d 128 (1973); Kastendike v. Baltimore Association for
Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 389, 297 A.2d 745 (1972); State Farm
-27-
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 219 A.2d 820
(1966); but cf. Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 471 A.2d 730 (1984) (there is
no absolute bar to retrospective application).  The presumption against
retrospectivity is rebutted only where there are clear expressions in the statute
to the contrary.  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hearn,
supra.  Moreover, even where permissible, retrospective application is not
found except upon the plainest mandate in the legislation.  Bell v. State, 236
Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54 (1964).  The rationale underlying the general rule
provides that retrospective application, which attempts to determine the legal
significance of acts that occurred prior to the statute’s effective date, increases
the potential for interference with persons’ substantive rights.  State
Commission on Human Relations v. Amecom Division of Litton Systems, 278
Md. 120, 360 A.2d 1 (1976).”
Riverdale, 308 Md. at 560-61, 520 A.2d at 1321-22.  The Court then addressed Janda,
which Fire Co. had raised in arguing for the retrospective application of the 1983 Act.
The Court, initially, correctly distinguished Janda, stating that, “[u]nlike the instant
case, Janda involved a statute the terms of which clearly reflected a retroactive intent.”
Riverdale, 308 Md. at 562, 520 A.2d at 1322.  The Court then observed that there was
writing, which it described as dicta, in Janda, referring to the four rules discussed supra, and
in particular to the fourth rule.  The Riverdale Court elaborated:  “Janda’s collection of rules
was not intended to restate the universe of then Maryland law on prospective or
retrospective application of statutes.”  Riverdale, 308 Md. at 563, 520 A.2d at 1323.  The
Court proceeded to state that “[t]his Court has never applied the fourth rule in Janda to
decide a case.”  Id. at 563, 520 A.2d at 1323.  
As Yorkdale, Mandel, Marathon Builders, Springloch, Dal Maso, Maragousis, and
the cases cited in Yorkdale indicate, that was only correct to the extent of actual statements
22 The fourth rule in Janda, as we have indicated, was based on Yorkdale.  Yorkdale’s
rule, even at the time of Riverdale, had been continuously and frequently cited.
Shepardizing Yorkdale and Janda indicate that Yorkdale is still good law. 
23 We reiterate that Yorkdale and its progeny apply to land use and zoning cases.
Thus, even if the statute in Janda did not clearly reflect a legislative intent as to retrospective
application (though it did), the fourth rule may have been distinguishable from the current
Yorkdale rule in allowing retrospective application of the statute in that instance, because
it was not a land use case like its companion, Yorkdale. 
-28-
in reference to Janda in the determination of subsequent cases.22  In the case sub judice,
respondents’ reliance on this statement – placed out of the context of the rule’s basis in
Yorkdale and other cases – is unavailing.  It is evident that the Janda Court cited to Yorkdale
in stating the fourth rule.  Janda, 237 Md. at 169, 205 A.2d at 233.  And, as we have said,
the two opinions were written by the same judge and filed on the same day.  Thus, it is clear
that the holdings are related to each other.  The Court obviously knew what it was doing in
Yorkdale and Janda.  Moreover, as discussed supra, there are a significant number of cases
which follow and affirm Yorkdale in the context of land use and zoning cases and cases
prior to Yorkdale supporting the concept.23   It is evident that this Court has applied the
fourth rule in Janda, but generally only in the context of land use and zoning cases.  After
discussing several non-land use and non-zoning cases, the Riverdale Court went on to state
that “[b]ecause it is inconsistent with the general body of Maryland law on the subject, the
fourth rule in Janda is disapproved.”  Riverdale, 308 Md. at 565, 520 A.2d at 1324.
The Riverdale Court ultimately declined to retrospectively apply the 1983 Act, and
therefore, held that Fire Co. was not immune from liability.  In doing so, the Court applied
24 See also Enviro-Gro Tech. v. Bockelmann, 88 Md. App. 323, 341 n.17, 594 A.2d
1190, 1199 n.17 (1991), where the Court of Special Appeals stated:
“Janda’s fourth holding was expressly ‘disapproved’ in Riverdale
Heights Fire Co., supra, 308 Md. 556, 520 A.2d 1319, a case involving the
application of an immunity statute.  Yorkdale and the zoning and other cases
we have cited were not overruled in Riverdale Heights, although the court’s
reasoning in rejecting 
Janda’s ‘fourth rule’ causes us some concern.  We note,
however, that it was somewhat limited to that factual situation, thus apparently
not applicable to dissimilar factual cases.  Due to the long and consistent body
of law from Schooner Peggy to Yorkdale and subsequent thereto, we perceive
that the Yorkdale rule still applies in zoning cases generally, and this case
specifically, until overruled or disapproved by higher authority, or by the
legislature.”
The Court of Special Appeals expressly recognized that Riverdale did not overrule the
Yorkdale rule.  But see Wharf at Handy’s Point, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 92 Md. App.
659, 674 n.8, 610 A.2d 314, 321 n.8 (1992) (“The proposition for which we cited Yorkdale
in Enviro-Gro was that in zoning cases involving changes in substantive law, not affecting
vested rights and absent a contrary legislative intent, a ‘change in the law after a decision
(continued...)
-29-
the general rule that the Act was presumed to operate prospectively and found that there was
no evidence of legislative intent that the statute be applied otherwise.  Id. at 568-69, 520
A.2d at 1326.  Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he foregoing review demonstrates that
under the law of Maryland statutes ordinarily are construed to operate prospectively, absent
a clear legislative intent to the contrary.”  Id. at 568, 520 A.2d at 1325.    
The Riverdale Court was correct in the above statement.  Ordinarily, we do construe
statutes to operate prospectively, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.  The
Riverdale Court, however, did not address Yorkdale, the exception to the general rule.  The
Riverdale Court’s “disapproval” of what it termed dicta from Janda (a non-land use and
non-zoning case) does not affect the Yorkdale rule.24  Any disapproval of Janda’s fourth rule
24(...continued)
below and before final decision by the appellate court will be applied by that Court.’”)
(citing Enviro-Gro, 88 Md. App. at 339, 594 A.2d at 1198 (quoting Yorkdale, 237 Md. at
124, 205 A.2d at 271.)).  
25 A current zoning treatise supports this position, albeit based in part on Maryland
cases:
“§ 27.38.  Effect of amendment during pendency of appeal
“In proceedings to review a decision of a board of adjustment, the
reviewing court, in most jurisdictions, will apply the law as it exists at the
moment of decision in the reviewing court. . . . 
“If a zoning ordinance has been amended between the moment of
administrative action or decision and the moment of review, the amendment
will apply.  Thus, where a restrictive amendment was adopted after the
application for a permit, the reviewing court will judge the administrative
decision on the basis of the amendment.  If the affect of the amendment is to
render the case moot, the reviewing court will dismiss the appeal.
“The amendment will be applied even though it was adopted after an
inferior court reviewed the decision in issue, [citing Yorkdale in footnote] and
in spite of the fact that the amendment is not part of the record. . . .”
4 Anderson’s Am. Law. Zoning § 27.38 (4th ed. 1997, 2006 supp.) (footnotes omitted).  See
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 115 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); West
Coast Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967); McCallum v. Inland Wetlands Comm’n, 196 Conn. 218, 223, 492 A.2d 508, 510
(1985) (“The majority rule, and the rule followed in Connecticut, is that the zoning law or
regulation in effect at the time of the decision of a court is controlling as opposed to that in
effect when the proceedings were instituted or when the administrative agency entered its
decision upon the application.”), superceded by statute, Connecticut General Statute §§ 8-2h
and 22a-42e (2006), as recognized in Protect Hamden/North Haven from Excessive Traffic
and Pollution, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Comm’n of Town of Hamden, 220 Conn. 527,
540, 600 A.2d 757, 765 (1991); Johnson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Conn. App. 24, 475
A.2d 339 (1984), superceded by statute, Connecticut General Statute §§ 8-2h and 22a-42e
(2006), as recognized in Protect Hamden/North Haven, 220 Conn. at 540, 600 A.2d at 765;
(continued...)
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by the Riverside Court was made in the context of the statute at issue in that case, which had
no relation to land use and zoning issues.  The exception to the general rule still stands.  In
land use and zoning cases, the law shall be applied as it is in effect at the time of argument.25
25(...continued)
Holladay v. City of Coral Gables, 382 So.2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1980); Outdoor Systems,
Inc. v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 606, 608, 555 S.E.2d 689, 691 (2001) (“An appellate court
must apply the law as it exists at the time of its judgment and may, therefore, even reverse
a judgment that was correct at the time it was rendered, where, as here, the law has changed
in the meantime and no vested rights are impaired.”); Nuuanu Neighborhood Assoc. v. Dep’t
of Land Utilization, 63 Haw. 444, 630 P.2d 107 (1981); City and County of Honolulu v.
Midkiff, 62 Haw. 411, 616 P.2d 213 (1980); O’Hare International Bank v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 37 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 347 N.E.2d 440 (1976); U.S. Cellular Corp. v. Bd. of
Adjustment of City of Des Moines, 589 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Iowa 1999) (“The rule in most
states is that ‘a reviewing or appellate court must decide a case based on the zoning  law as
it exists at the time of the court’s decision.’”) (quoting Edward H. Ziegler, Rathkopf’s The
Law of Zoning and Planning § 26.02[2][a], at 26-3 to 26-4 (4th ed. 1996)); State ex rel.
Jacobson v. New Orleans, Dept. of Safety & Permits, 166 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1964);
Thomas v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 381 A.2d 643 (Me. 1978); Caputo v. Board of Appeals,
330 Mass 107, 111 N.E.2d 674 (1953); Town Pump, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Red
Lodge, Montana, 971 P.2d 349 (Mont. 1998); Kruvant v. Cedar Grove, 82 N.J. 435, 414
A.2d 9 (1980), but see Pizzo Mantin Group v. Twp. of Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 235, 645
A.2d 89, 99 (1994) (Retroactive application is not automatic, “A court must balance the
municipality’s zoning interest against the developer’s degree of reliance on the old statute
and its entitlements of right[,]” appearing to recognize that “vesting” may negate the
retrospectivity of a new statute.);  Cathedral of the Incarnation v. Glimm, 61 N.Y.2d 826,
473 N.Y.S.2d 972, 462 N.E.2d 149 (1984); Mascony Transport & Ferry Service, Inc. v.
Richmond, 49 N.Y.2d 969, 428 N.Y.S.2d 948, 406 N.E.2d 803 (1980); Dyl & Dyl Dev.
Corp. v. Building Dept., 298 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969); Lunden v. Petito, 292
N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); Atlantic Beach Towers Constr. Co. v. Michaelis, 251
N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 180
N.Y.S.2d 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 281 N.C.
715, 190 S.E.2d 175 (1972); Szymanski v. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio App. 2d 11, 47 Ohio Op.
2d 12, 246 N.E.2d 368 (1969); Shender v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 388 Pa. 265, 131 A.2d
90 (1957); Linda Dev. Corp. v. Plymouth Twp., 281 A.2d 784 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971).
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Therefore, respondents’ reliance on Riverdale is misplaced.
Respondents urge that Holland v. Woodhaven Building and Development, Inc., 113
Md. App. 274, 687 A.2d 699 (1996), demonstrates that zoning cases are not to be
distinguished from the general rule of prospective application.  We disagree.  When
26 Arundel Corp. did not involve a change in substantive law, it concerned a change
to procedure, as did, arguably, Holland.
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language in a Court of Special Appeals opinion is in conflict with language in an opinion
of this Court, the language of this Court’s opinion is controlling.  The Court of Special
Appeals in Holland dealt with the issue of a party’s standing to challenge a ruling of a
zoning board.  Factually, the protesting party filed an appeal to the Board.  The Board
dismissed that appeal due to lack of standing.  The protesting party then appealed to the
Circuit Court, and while that appeal was pending, an ordinance was enacted specifically
providing for such standing.  Addressing the argument that the ordinance should be applied
retrospectively, the intermediate appellate court stated:
“Without discussing Janda or Riverdale Fire Co., appellants assert that ‘[i]n
zoning cases, Maryland law is absolutely clear [that “a]n appellate court must
apply the law in effect at the time a case is decided, provided that its
application does not affect intervening vested rights.”’ We see no reason to
distinguish zoning cases in this manner.  The Court of Appeals could have
limited its holding in Riverdale Fire Co. to exclude zoning cases, but it did not
so limit that case.  See, e.g., Arundel Corp. [v. County Comm’rs of Carroll
County], 323 Md. [504,] 509-10, 594 A.2d 95 (applying Riverdale Fire Co.
in a zoning case).[26]”
Holland, 113 Md. App. at 286, 687 A.2d at 705-06.  Obviously, the viability of the Yorkdale
rule was not “absolutely clear” at the time of the Holland decision.  We now, however, deem
to make it so.  Our discussion supra, serves to distinguish Yorkdale from Riverdale, thus,
in the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals’ ruling in Holland does not control.
Furthermore, in Powell v. Calvert County, 368 Md. 400, 795 A.2d 96 (2002), decided
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subsequent to both Riverdale and Holland, we reaffirmed the principles of Yorkdale.  There,
the granting of a special exception for the outdoor storage of excavating material was at
issue.  The landowner, respondent, in that case was granted a special exception by the
Calvert County Board of Appeals in February of 1997, over the protests of his neighbors.
The neighbors, petitioners, appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed the decision of the
Board.  The neighbors then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  In December of 1998,
while the appeal was pending, the Board amended the pertinent zoning ordinance to
disallow outdoor storage of excavating material, repealing the section under which the
landowner had initially obtained approval from the Board for his special exception.  In April
of 1999, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion (Powell I), reversing the
Circuit Court’s decision, vacating the Board’s decision, and remanding the case back to the
Board.  The intermediate appellate court’s decision was based upon a “lack of evidence
result[ing] in a deficient record from which the court was unable to determine if the Board’s
decision was based on substantial evidence.”  Powell, 368 Md. at 405, 795 A.2d at 99.  
In September of 1999, the Board again considered the landowner’s application for
a special exception.  His application was granted, with the Board applying the law as it
existed at the time of the original hearing (February 1997), not in accord with the new
ordinance enacted in December of 1998.  The neighbors appealed that decision to the Circuit
Court.  The Circuit Court upheld the Board’s decision based upon a finding that the
landowner had established a vested right.  The neighbors again appealed to the Court of
27 The litigation involving whether he would ultimately be entitled to a special
exception was ongoing through, and until the time of, our decision.  
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Special Appeals, which affirmed the relevant decision of the Board (Powell II). 
We first looked at the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Powell II, Powell v.
Calvert County, 137 Md. App. 425, 435-36, 768 A.2d 750, 756 (2001), where the court
found that, under Holland, the amendment to the zoning ordinance by its terms operated
retrospectively.  Powell, 368 Md. at 407-08, 765 A.2d at 100.  We then went into an in-
depth discussion of whether the landowner had obtained vested rights, ultimately holding
that:
“In instances where there is ongoing litigation, there is no different
‘rule of vested right’ for special exceptions and the like.  Until all necessary
approvals, including all final court approvals, are obtained, nothing can vest
or even begin to vest.  Additionally, even after final court approval is reached,
additional actions must sometimes be taken in order for rights to vest.”
Id. at 409, 795 A.2d at 101.  We found that the landowner in Powell had not obtained a
vested right because he had “never used his property for the storage of materials under a
valid special exception.”  Id. at 412, 795 A.2d at 103.27  We then, discussing Ross v.
Montgomery County, 252 Md. 497, 250 A.2d 635 (1969), cited Yorkdale and Mandel in
support of this “ongoing litigation” reasoning and for the rule that, in cases involving land
use and zoning, we apply the law as it “now exists,” absent a vested right.  Powell, 368 Md.
at 412-13, 795 A.2d at 103.  In Powell, we reiterated the language of Yorkdale, that one
“who has been successful before the zoning authorities and the circuit court does not acquire
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a vested or substantive right which may not be wiped out by legislation which takes effect
during the pendency in this Court of the appeal from the sections below.”  Powell, 368 Md.
at 413, 795 A.2d at 103 (quoting Ross, 252 Md. at 503, 250 A.2d at 639 (quoting Yorkdale,
237 Md. at 126, 205 A.2d at 272)) (quotation marks omitted).
Respondents, in the case sub judice, attempt to characterize Powell’s citations to
Yorkdale and Mandel as only affirming the “proposition that mere zoning approval does not
create vested rights.”  Respondents assert that, “[i]f Yorkdale was still good law, the Court
had the opportunity to so state.  It did not.”  The converse, however, is true.  We did not
have to state that Yorkdale is good law, because it was and still is.  Yorkdale has never been
overruled and our citation to it in Powell is evidence of that.  Had Yorkdale been overruled,
we would have had to distinguish it.  Thus, not only does it stand for the proposition
elucidated in Powell, that approval pending ongoing litigation does not create a vested right,
but also for the rule that we reiterate today, that in the case of land use and zoning issues,
appellate courts generally are bound to apply the law (whatever its source) relating to those
issues as it exists at the time of their decision.
Respondents cite to several additional non-land use and non-zoning cases in support
of their argument that we should not retrospectively apply a change in statutory law:  State
Ethic Comm’n v. Evans, 382 Md. 370, 855 A.2d 364 (2004); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376
Md. 276, 829 A.2d 611 (2003); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d 389 (2000);
Informed Physician Services, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 350 Md. 308,
28 Obviously, the Animal Control Law may apply in other contexts unrelated to land
use issues.  If so, Yorkdale may not apply.  When, however, an ancillary statute becomes a
part of the resolution of a land use issue, such as present here, Yorkdale may apply.
-36-
711 A.2d 1330 (1998); Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 523 A.2d 1003 (1987).  None of
these cases dealt with land use or zoning and, thus, they do not affect the viability of the
Yorkdale rule as applicable to land use and zoning cases.
Respondents also argue that the law in question, §§ 17.300(g) and 17.307(d) of the
Howard County Code, is not part of Howard County’s zoning ordinance or regulation, but
part of the Howard County Animal Control Law.  The zoning law, however, impliedly
incorporates those relevant provisions of the Animal Control Law.  The Animal Control Law
was applied by the Board in making its land use determination as to whether Frisky’s was
entitled to a special exception under the zoning ordinance.  It was applied in a land use
context.28  Therefore, it was a determinative provision in a zoning context, and we will apply
it retrospectively under Yorkdale.  On remand, the Board shall apply the current law.
IV. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we reaffirm the Yorkdale rule that a substantive
change in relevant statutory law that takes place during the course of the litigation of a land
use or zoning issue shall be retrospectively applied by appellate courts.  We reverse the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE
TO THE BOARD OF APPEALS FOR
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 116
September Term, 2006
Colleen Layton, et al.
v.
Howard County Board of Appeals, et al.
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired specially assigned),
   
 JJ.
_______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.
_______________________________________
Filed:   May 9, 2007
With respect, I dissent.  As Judge Cathell’s opinion points out, there is, indeed,
case law to support the conclusion that zoning cases have been treated somewhat
differently than other kinds of cases in determining the effect to be given to a change in
statutory law while a matter is pending in court.  I therefore cannot fault the Court’s
reliance on those cases in continuing to carve out a special exception – no pun intended –
for zoning, or even broader land use, cases.
My problem is that I can find no practical or jurisprudential basis for such a
distinction, and the Court offers none.  The issue is always presented when a legislature
changes a law whether that change, from and after its declared effective date, should
apply to matters already in litigation when the law takes effect.  On the one hand, as Chief
Justice Marshall observed in the Schooner Peggy case, there is a certain anomaly in a
court’s failure to apply the law that is in effect when it decides the case, for the effect of
that is to render a judicial decision that is not supported by existing law.  On the other
hand, there is a certain unfairness in applying laws retroactively, at least where, as part of
its legitimate declaration of public policy, the legislative body has not clearly indicated an
intent that they be so applied.  In both commerce and personal dealings, people and
entities necessarily rely on existing law to guide their conduct and their transactions, and
that necessary and permissible reliance – that certainty – is seriously jeopardized when the
rules are changed in the middle of the game.
The general rules that we have adopted attempt to balance those considerations. 
As an overarching principle, subject only to Constitutional imperatives, we have left it to
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the legislative body to determine whether statutory changes should be applied to matters
already in litigation.  If the legislature declares that a new law should be so applied and
there is no Constitutional impediment to such application, we respect the legislative
judgment and apply the new law as the legislature intended.  The problem arises when
there is no such expressed intent – when all that we have is an effective date of the law
and nothing more.  In those situations, we have generally applied the principle that, if the
change is one of procedure only, we will apply the new law even if doing so would
produce a different result than not doing so.  If the change affects substance, however, we
will not apply the new law, at least if doing so would produce a different result.  In that
circumstance, we do not permit the rules to be changed mid-stream.
Those distinctions are not perfect; they can, and sometimes do, result in what may
appear to be an injustice in a given case, and it is not always clear whether a change is
merely procedural or also affects substance.  But, on the whole, the distinctions are
reasonable, and they have a solid jurisprudential basis.  When we start carving out
categorical exceptions to them, however, both their rationality and their jurisprudential
basis are eroded.  Why just zoning or land use cases?  What is so special about them? 
They involve property, but only real property.  Is real property somehow more, or less,
sacred than other kinds of property, including contractual rights?  I would be more
inclined to bless the Court’s opinion in this case if it offered any legitimate reason for
drawing a distinction between zoning cases and other kinds of cases.  Unfortunately,
-3-
however, it does not.  I would therefore overrule the prior case law relied upon by the
Court and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.