Case Title: State v. Sims

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-436


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

Lee Sims                                     March Term, 1991



Joseph J. Wolchik, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Susan R. Harritt, Assistant Attorney
  General, and Elizabeth Zirkle, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, and
  Phillips B. Keller, III, Washington County Deputy State's Attorney, Barre,
  for plaintiff-appellee

E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant was charged with committing two lewd and
lascivious acts upon a child under the age of sixteen on or about the summer
or fall of 1988, in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 2602.  He was found guilty
after trial by jury and appeals.  We affirm.
     On the basis of a single affidavit of probable cause, the state issued
two informations accusing defendant of lewd and lascivious conduct with a
child.  The two incidents of abuse occurred at the victim's grandmother's
house.  The first took place in the bedroom, after which the victim wrote a
letter to her parents reporting being raped and asking for help.  The second
occurred in the living room while defendant and the victim sat on the couch
watching television.
     Defendant requested assignment of counsel at his arraignment in
January, 1989.  The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant at
a bail review hearing, but shortly thereafter defendant advised the court he
wished to represent himself.  After being informed of the complexity and
gravity of the charges against him, defendant agreed to utilize court-
appointed counsel on a consulting basis and signed a waiver-of-counsel form.
     The court granted the state's motion to videotape the testimony of the
victim and ordered appointed counsel to appear to assist in the cross-
examination of the victim.  With the court's permission, defendant left the
videotaping prior to the victim's testimony, instructing his counsel to
forego cross-examination.  At the next hearing, defendant reiterated his
decision to represent himself and signed a second waiver-of-counsel form.
Appointed counsel appeared for defendant during trial in a standby
capacity, occasionally arguing motions and questioning witnesses.
     At trial, the state called the investigating officer, a Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) caseworker, and a counselor on
contract with SRS.  All three testified to having substantial training and
experience in the area of child sexual abuse.  The counselor offered
testimony, which implied that the alleged abuse had in fact occurred, to
explain the victim's difficulty in talking about the incidents.  The officer
and the caseworker offered their opinions of the complainant's character
for truthfulness.  Defendant took the stand and consistently maintained his
innocence.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.
     Both a presentence investigation report (PSI) and a psychosexual
evaluation of defendant endorsed the maximum sentence of ten years based on
defendant's extreme denial respecting his offenses. The judge sentenced
defendant to consecutive terms of eighteen months to five years.
                                    I.
     Defendant's first assignment of error is that Linda Cope, who was
offered and accepted as an expert on child sexual abuse, impermissibly
commented on complainant's credibility.  We agree.
     Ms. Cope is a certified mental health counselor who worked under
contract with SRS to provide treatment for victims of sexual abuse and
their families.  In this capacity she first met with complainant in April
1989.  She has provided individual and group counselling to complainant
since that time.  The following testimony was elicited on direct examin-
ation:
         Q:  Miss Cope, what kind of psychological effect has the
         alleged abuse had on [complainant]?

         A:  Well, [complainant] was about eleven at the time the
         abuse occurred.  Now she's twelve and she's coming into
         puberty.  One of the things that happens to children of
         that age when they're sexually abused is that it creates
         a great deal of shame and embarrassment because it indu-
         ces trauma on the level of your developing body . . . .

         Q:  Would it be fair to say that in your opinion, the
         abuse is interfering with [complainant's] development?

At this point defendant objected on the ground that the abuse was still only
alleged, not proven, and should be referred to as such.  The court agreed,
and the questioning continued as follows:
         Q:  Would it be fair to say that the alleged abuse is
         interfering with [complainant's] development?

         A:  Yes. . . .

         . . . .

         Q:  You mentioned [complainant] has some negative
         feelings about herself as a result of the alleged abuse.
         Could you describe those feelings to the jury?

         A:  Well, I would call them -- it's shame.  It's
         basically shame.  She calls it embarrassment.  It
         precludes her ability to really, really talk about it in
         a way that will kind of help her see the issues clearly.
         She has a real hesitancy to talk about it.  When she
         began -- when she made her statement originally, the
         social workers all had to leave the room so that she
         could talk into the tape-recorder to tell the incident
         because she was so humiliated and felt so bad about it.
         And even while she was in the room all by herself, with
         the tape-recorder she still needed to whisper into the
         tape-recorder.  It was that kind of shameful experience.

         Q:  So it's difficult for [complainant] to talk about
         the alleged abuse?

         A: Yes.

     Defendant also claims error in two additional colloquies between the
prosecutor and Ms. Cope.  Having stated that complainant was able to dis-
tinguish between a "good" touch and a touch of an overtly sexual nature, Ms.
Cope was asked, "Does her recognition of the distinction have an impact on
the degree of her traumatization?," to which Ms. Cope responded affirmative-
ly.  When asked to give her opinion as to why complainant continued to go to
her grandmother's home "after the first incident of abuse," even though
defendant was still there, she responded:
         I mean, she was caught between a rock and a hard place.
         She needed to get to grandmother's, but there was also
         something else that was very difficult for her going on
         at grandmother's.

         . . . .

         . . . [Complainant] told what happened to her about the
         sexual abuse because she needed to stop it to make
         Gram's a safe place again for her.
                                    A.
     Expert testimony in a criminal child sexual abuse case is admissible to
help jurors understand "the emotional antecedents of the victim's conduct"
so that they "may be better able to assess the credibility" of the victim.
State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 369,