Case Title: DANIEL JUSTIN COLEMAN V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-45

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
DANIEL JUSTIN COLEMAN V. STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 69115 P.3d 411Case Number: No. 04-45Decided: 06/21/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                        

DANIEL 
JUSTIN COLEMAN,          

Appellant 
(Defendant),         

 
 
v.         

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,           

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).   

 
 
 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

Argument by 
Ms. Domonkos. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Director, PAP; Jenny 
L. Craig, Student Director; and Scott M. Dutcher, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. Dutcher. 

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Daniel Justin 
Coleman appeals his conviction of larceny claiming he was improperly denied an 
attorney at his preliminary hearing.  
In addition, Mr. Coleman objects to his sentence asserting the district 
court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution for items he did 
not admit to stealing and by wrongly banishing him from NatronaCounty.  We affirm Mr. Coleman' s conviction 
because he waived his right to raise defects in his preliminary hearing by not 
objecting prior to trial.  We 
reverse the district court's order of restitution to the extent it requires 
payment for items he was not charged with and did not admit to taking during the 
criminal proceeding.  Further, we 
reverse the district court's order banishing him from NatronaCounty.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Coleman 
presents three issues for review:

 
 
Issue 
I

 
 
Whether 
reversible error occurred when Mr. Coleman was forced to proceed at the 
preliminary hearing without an attorney.

 
 
Issue 
II

 
 
Whether the 
District Court erred when it ordered restitution for a crime M r. Coleman was 
not charged with nor did he admit to committing in court.

 
 
Issue 
III

 
 
Whether the 
trial court abused its sentencing discretion when it effectively "sundowned" Mr. 
Coleman from NatronaCounty.

 
 
The State 
phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
1.         
Whether any error relating to the absence of counsel during appellant 's 
preliminary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
2.         
Whether the trial court's order that appellant pay $280.00 in restitution 
was proper because appellant admitted the criminal acts to which it 
related.

 
 
3.         
Whether remand is necessary to determine whether appellant may be 
released into NatronaCounty.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On November 16, 
2002, Mr. Coleman, a Wal-Mart employee, pushed a cart filled with broken-down 
boxes toward the front of the store.  
While Mr. Coleman was pushing the cart, a store manager noticed the boxes 
looked suspicious.  When the store 
manager asked Mr. Coleman what he was doing with the boxes, he replied that he 
was taking them to help another manager with an upcoming move.  The store manager accepted Mr. Coleman's 
explanation and proceeded to the front of the store.  As Mr. Coleman pushed the cart out the 
front doors, the anti-theft alarms sounded.  The store manager approached Mr. Coleman 
and found a box in the middle of the cart that was not broken down which 
contained a digital camera and a video camera.  Mr. Coleman was immediately suspended 
from work and was asked to report back to Wal-Mart on November 18, 2002.  Wal-Mart personnel reviewed the security 
tapes, which showed a man identified as Mr. Coleman taking two items from a cart 
of electronic equipment and walking out of the camera's view.  The tape also showed Mr. Coleman 
placing the torn down boxes around two items in the bottom of a shopping cart, 
and pushing it out the door.  

 
 

[¶4]      When Mr. Coleman 
returned to Wal-Mart on November 18, 2002, the district manager of loss 
prevention for Wal-Mart interviewed him.  
Mr. Coleman continued to deny knowing anything about the merchandise in 
the cart, claiming he was only taking the boxes out to help an assistant manager 
move.  After being informed there 
were videotapes showing him taking the merchandise, Mr. Coleman "went into . . . 
submission," and confessed to taking the items.  The district manager asked Mr. Coleman 
to put his confession in writing, which he did.  In his written statement, Mr. Coleman 
indicated that some gentlemen had approached him to see what he could "get for 
them" from Wal-Mart in the way of CDs and DVDs, as well as other items.  He wrote that they were pressuring him, 
and on Saturday (November 16, 2002) "the opportunity came to try and get these 
items," and he was caught stealing them. 1  Mr. Coleman also admitted in the written 
statement to having previously taken DVDs and CDs. 2 As a 
result of Mr. Coleman's confession, Casper police were called and he was 
arrested at the Wal-Mart store. 

 
 
[¶5]      The officers 
escorted Mr. Coleman to the police station where he was read his Miranda 
rights and interviewed by Officer Ready and Detective Kirkendal.  Mr. Coleman admitted his involvement in 
the theft of a digital camera and a video camera from Wal-Mart.  Mr. Coleman was then charged with grand 
larceny in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402 (LexisNexis 2003).  At his preliminary hearing before a 
circuit court judge, Mr. Coleman stated he had filled out the necessary 
paperwork to receive a court-appointed attorney, but no attorney had been 
provided.  The court declared it had 
not received any paperwork, and asked Mr. Coleman if he wanted to proceed 
without an attorney, which he agreed to do.  

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Coleman was 
bound over to district court and, after a three-day trial, a jury found him 
guilty of felony larceny in violation of § 6-3-402 as charged in the 
information.  During the trial, the 
only evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the larceny involved the 
theft of the cameras.  The court 
sentenced Mr. Coleman to a term of not less than fifty-four months nor more than 
ninety months at the Wyoming State Penitentiary with 240 days credited for time 
served.  Mr. Coleman was also 
ordered to pay $280.00 in restitution and $100.00 to the crime victim's 
compensation fund.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
Preliminary 
Hearing

 
 

[¶7]      Mr. Coleman 
argues that he was improperly denied an attorney at his preliminary 
hearing.  In response, the State 
asserts Mr. Coleman failed to provide this Court with a proper record of the 
preliminary hearing, waived the right to challenge the procedures followed at 
the preliminary hearing because he failed to object to the alleged defect before 
trial, and that any error was harmless.

 
 
[¶8]      As we have 
recognized before, the preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the criminal 
proceedings at which a defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel.  Davila v. State, 
831 P.2d 204, 215-16 (Wyo. 1992).  However, in Trujillo v. State, 
880 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo. 1994), we also unequivocally adopted the rule set 
forth in Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1964), 
that the time to object to defects in the 
preliminary hearing is before arraignment and trial, and "unless some 
reason is shown why counsel could not have discovered and challenged the defect 
before trial, it will generally be assumed that any objections to the 
preliminary proceedings were considered and waived, and no post-conviction 
remedies will be available."  
Id. It is only appropriate that a 
defendant be required to object to alleged errors in the preliminary hearing 
procedures before trial when the district court has the opportunity to correct 
them.

 
 
[¶9]      Finding no 
objection in the record following Mr. Coleman's preliminary hearing, we are hard 
pressed to find in his favor on this issue.  A thorough review of the record shows it 
is devoid of any reference, let alone objection, to any defect in Mr. Coleman's 
preliminary hearing.  Though 
seemingly a harsh result, our prior case law demands this outcome.  Thus, we need not discuss the State's 
other arguments pertaining to the preliminary hearing.

 
 
 
 
Restitution

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Coleman claims the district 
court erred when it ordered restitution for a crime for which he was not charged 
and which he did not admit to in the course of the criminal proceedings.  The State argues the court's order 
requiring Mr. Coleman to pay $280.00 in restitution for the DVDs and CDs was 
proper because he admitted to stealing them in a written statement given to his 
employer.

 
 
[¶11]   Whether or not the district court 
had the authority to order the $280.00 restitution payment "is reviewed  . . . de novo." Penner v. State, 
2003 WY 143,  ¶7, 78 P.3d 1045, 
¶7 (Wyo. 2003).  In Penner, 
we clarified the distinction between the standard of review of 
factual challenges to the amount of restitution ordered and challenges to the 
authority of the court to make a restitution award:

 
 
"The 
distinction between whether a defendant is making a factual challenge to an 
order of restitution or whether he is challenging the authority of the trial 
court to make a particular award of restitution is an important one. Challenges 
to the factual basis of an award of restitution can be waived in 
certain circumstances by the defendant's voluntary actions, such as entering 
into a plea agreement, and then failing to make any objection at sentencing, as 
occurred in Meerscheidt [v. State, 931 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1997)]. Outside the 
context of a plea agreement, the failure to object to a factual determination in 
the awarding of restitution results in an appellate review for plain error. In 
contrast, a challenge by a defendant to the authority of a trial 
court to make a particular award of restitution is reviewed on appeal under a 
de novo statutory interpretation standard whether or not the defendant 
objected or entered into a plea agreement. While not explicit in our decision in 
Meerscheidt, the reason for conducting a de novo review under such 
circumstances is that a court has only that authority to act which is conferred 
by the subject statute."

 
 

Id. (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶12]   The Wyoming legislature has created a clear 
mandate and procedure for the collection of restitution in criminal 
cases.

 

As part of 
sentencing, "the prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim for 
restitution submitted by any victim." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(a) (LexisNexis 
2003). In turn, the court is to "order a defendant to pay restitution to each 
victim . . . unless the court specifically finds that the defendant has no 
ability to pay . . .." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 2003). A 
"victim" is defined as "a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result 
of a defendant's criminal activities." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2003). And finally, "criminal activity" means "any crime for 
which there is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or verdict of guilty upon which 
a judgment of conviction may be rendered and includes any other crime which is 
admitted by the defendant, whether or not prosecuted."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-101(a)(i).

 
 

Penner, 
¶8 
(emphasis added).  The 
crux of the problem at issue is whether Mr. Coleman's admission to his employer 
is adequate to establish "criminal activity" for purposes of 
restitution.

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Coleman was charged with, and 
convicted of, felony larceny in violation of § 6-3-402 for stealing a digital 
camera and a video camera from his employer.  No mention was made regarding the 
alleged theft of DVDs and CDs at any time during the course of the criminal 
proceedings.  In fact, the court 
granted Mr. Coleman's motion to redact all references to the DVDs and CDs from 
his written statement.  The 
prosecutor's comments during consideration of that motion indicated agreement 
that this evidence related to prior uncharged misconduct.  Furthermore, Mr. Coleman never admitted 
to law enforcement or the court that he stole any DVDs or CDs.  The only evidence that Mr. Coleman took 
DVDs and CDs appears in his written statement taken by Wal-Mart officials. 

 
 
[¶14]   The State urges us to consider the 
portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003), that states, 
criminal activity "includes any other crime which is admitted by the defendant, 
whether or not prosecuted."  While 
this Court has never held that admissions to crimes must be given in a 
court of law for purposes of restitution, we agree with Mr. Coleman that, in 
accordance with § 7-9-101(a)(i), restitution is only appropriate for crimes for 
which there is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a guilty verdict, or 
admissions given in the context of criminal proceedings.  We discussed this issue in Penner 
and Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646 (Wyo. 2000) .  

 
 
[¶15]   In Penner, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, the defendant entered a nolo plea to one count of burglary in 
exchange for dismissal of two other burglary counts.  The district court ordered restitution 
on the counts that were dismissed.  
On appeal, this Court held that, "[t]he record simply contains no 
admission of those crimes or express agreement to pay those amounts, and we are 
not at liberty . . . to draw from a blank record inferences that are contrary to 
the appellant's interest."  
Id., ¶11.  While the record in the instant case 
does contain an admission of sorts in Mr. Coleman's written statement to 
Wal-Mart authorities, that admission does not rise to the level intended by the 
statute, which presupposes a defendant and a crime in the context of a criminal 
proceeding.  Rather, Mr. Coleman's 
statement, made before he was ever charged with any crime, is not sufficient to 
trigger application of the restitution statute.

 
 
[¶16]   Similarly, in Van Riper we 
held that restitution could only be ordered for those crimes the defendant pled 
guilty to or admitted in the plea agreement.  Van Riper, 999 P.2d  at 648.   Mr. Van Riper was charged in one 
felony information with a single count of escape from official detention. A 
second felony information charged him with four counts of burglary, three counts 
of larceny, and one count of property destruction.  He later pled guilty to escape and one 
count of burglarizing an aviation hangar.  
All other charges were dismissed.   He was ordered to pay restitution 
not only for property taken from the aviation hangar, but also personal property 
taken from a stolen vehicle, and damage done to stolen vehicles, which were 
involved in the dismissed charges.  
Our holding was based in part on the fact that, after the preliminary 
hearing, the district court dismissed the count charging him with larceny of 
those items.     The facts 
in Van Riper differ slightly from those presented by Mr. Coleman's case 
in that Mr. Van Riper affirmatively denied taking property from the 
vehicles.   Mr. Coleman was 
never charged with any crime relating to the DVDs and CDs.  Additionally, Mr. Coleman's statement was 
made to Wal-Mart personnel prior to his arrest. 

 
 
[¶17]   We hold that the district court was 
without authority to order Mr. Coleman to pay restitution for stealing DVDs and 
CDs from Wal-Mart because he did not admit to the crimes in the context of a 
criminal proceeding.  We reverse 
that portion of Mr. Coleman's sentence.

 
 
 
 
Sundowning

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Coleman also contends the 
district court abused its discretion in "sundowning" him from NatronaCounty.  The court, in its judgment and sentence, 
stated, "IT IS FURTHER the recommendation of Court that if the Defendant is ever 
released on parole or into a less restrictive facility, that he not be granted 
release to NatronaCounty." 

 
 
[¶19]   In Strickland v. State, 2004 
WY 91, ¶37, 94 P.3d 1034, ¶37 (Wyo. 2004), we held a defendant may be banished 
from certain small areas of the state, but such a condition must relate to the 
rehabilitative purposes of the sentence.  
In Strickland, the district court articulated no rehabilitative 
purpose for the banishment  
condition and thus this Court remanded the case with instructions that 
the banishment condition either be deleted or the district court justify the 
condition through "clearly articulated findings."  Id., ¶38.

 
 
[¶20]   Subsequent to Strickland, 
Crabtree v. State, 2005 WY 62, ¶¶15-16, --___ P.3d ___, ¶¶15-16 (Wyo. 
2005), gave us the opportunity to further articulate our position on 
banishment. 

 
 
. . . There 
is case law to suggest that banishment has no rehabilitative role in modern 
penology and is instead contrary to public policy.  

 
 
The courts 
finding that banishment violates public policy often focus on the problems 
associated with banishing a defendant from an entire state.  These courts reason that  "[b]anishment would tend to incite 
dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental equality of 
political rights among the several states which is the basis of the Union itself. To permit one state to dump its convict 
criminals into another is not in the interests of safety and welfare; therefore, 
the punishment by banishment to another state is prohibited by public 
policy."  We find this reasoning 
equally applicable to banishment from entire counties.

 
 
We 
reiterate that we do not see how banishment from a county has any role in modern 
penology.  Thus, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, banishment of this sort is never appropriate.  Id., ¶16.  Therefore, this portion of Mr. Coleman's 
sentence is reversed.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   We hold that Mr. Coleman waived his 
right to appeal defects in his preliminary hearing by not objecting prior to 
trial and affirm his conviction.  We 
reverse the order of restitution because it relied only upon a statement to his 
employer not made in the context of a criminal proceeding.  We also reverse that portion of Mr. 
Coleman's sentence banishing him from NatronaCounty.

            

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 
.Mr. Coleman's statement does not 
specifically refer to the Panasonic video camera or Sony digital 
camera.

 
 

2 
.Mr. Coleman estimated in his 
statement that he had earlier taken about fifteen DVDs and five CDs, which is 
apparently how Wal-Mart arrived at the $280 of restitution they 
requested.