Case Title: WATKINS v SPRING CREEK COLONY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM L. No. 80-28 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 WATKINS , Plaintiff and Appellant, SPRING CREEK COLONY, a church, a Montana domestic non-profit corporation; ELI WALTER , DARIUS WALTER et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Fergus. Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: D. Frank Kampfe, Red Lodge, Montana For Respondents: Peter L. Rapkoch, Lewistown, Montana Parrish, Knopp & O'Hare, Lewistown, Montana B. Miles Larson, Stanford, Montana Submitted on briefs: March 7, 1980 Decided: July 14, 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n 1977 respondents i n t h i s a c t i o n f i l e d a criminal complaint with t h e Musselshell County Attorney, John P r a t t . The complaint a l l e g e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t h e r e i n had deprived them of some money. A s a r e s u l t of t h e f i l i n g of t h e criminal complaint, P r a t t f i l e d a motion requesting leave t o f i l e an information i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court charging a p p e l l a n t with felony t h e f t . The motion w a s granted a f t e r a f i n d i n g of probable cause t h a t a p p e l l a n t committed felony t h e f t by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Appellant was subsequently t r i e d on t h e felony t h e f t charge. The jury i n t h e c a s e was unable t o reach a v e r d i c t a t t h e conclusion of t r i a l . The charges w e r e u l t i m a t e l y dismissed with prejudice. I n May 1979 a p p e l l a n t f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of Fergus. Appellant's complaint a l l e g e d t h a t j u d i c i a l proceedings had been i n s t i g a t e d a g a i n s t him a t t h e i n s i s - tence of respondents, t h a t t h e proceedings had terminated i n h i s favor, t h a t respondents had maliciously i n s t i t u t e d t h e proceedings, t h a t t h e r e was no probable cause f o r t h e pro- ceedings, and t h a t he had suffered damages a s a r e s u l t of t h e j u d i c i a l proceedings i n s t i g a t e d by respondents. The complaint asked f o r damages i n excess of t h r e e m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . Respondents f i l e d motions t o dismiss t h e s u i t brought by a p p e l l a n t and b r i e f s i n support of t h e motions. ~ p p e n d e d t o s e v e r a l of t h e b r i e f s were copies of t h e motion f o r leave t o f i l e t h e criminal information f i l e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t and t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court granting leave t o f i l e t h e criminal information. The D i s t r i c t Court i n i t i a l l y denied respondents' motions t o dismiss. On f u r t h e r consideration, however, t h e c o u r t granted t h e motions t o dismiss based on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court had found probable cause t o allow t h e charges t o be f i l e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t and t o have the case submitted t o t h e jury. Because of t h i s j u d i c i a l finding of probable cause, t h e c o u r t found one of t h e e l e - ments of a claim f o r malicious prosecution, want of probable cause f o r t h e f i l i n g of t h e alleged maliciously prosecuted a c t i o n , w a s not present, and, therefore, a cause of a c t i o n f o r malicious prosecution d i d not e x i s t . After e n t r y of t h e order granting respondents' motions t o dismiss, appellant p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o g r a n t t h e p a r t i e s an opportunity t o present o r a l argument on the motions t o dismiss. The D i s t r i c t Court granted the o r a l argument. After t h e hearing t h e c o u r t issued an order leaving i t s p r i o r order granting t h e respondents' motions t o dismiss i n e f f e c t . This appeal followed. Appellant r a i s e s t h e following i s s u e s on appeal: 1. Did the D i s t r i c t Court err i n finding t h a t t h e determination of t h e existence of probable cause t o f i l e t h e criminal charges a g a i n s t appellant i n t h e criminal proceed- ings brought a g a i n s t him precludes a subsequent c i v i l a c t i o n f o r malicious prosecution? 2 . Did the D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n considering matters outside t h e pleadings i n granting respondents' motions t o dismiss without providing a hearing before granting t h e motions? I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a j u d i c i a l determination of probable cause t o hold a p a r t y answerable t o criminal charges does not preclude t h e p a r t y from subsequently bringing s u i t for malicious prosecution. While the fact the party was held to answer the criminal charge is considered prima facie or presumptive evidence of the existence of probable cause, it is not considered conclusive proof of probable cause to initiate the criminal action. De La Riva v. Owl Drug Co. (1967), 253 Cal.App.2d 593, 61 Cal.Rptr. 291, 293; Willis v. Gurry (1954), 331 Mass. 19, 116 N.E.2d 689, 690; Foster v. Banks (1931), 112 Cal.App. 622, 297 P. 106, 107; Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1168 (1959). The trial court here held that the prior determination of probable cause to bring the criminal charges against appellant was conclusive on the probable cause issue in the malicious prosecution case. It then dismissed appellant's suit because, with the conclusive determination of probable cause for the bringing of the criminal action, it would have been impossible as a matter of law for appellant to prove an essential element of a malicious prosecution cause of action. Under the above rule, this decision by the trial court was error. The decision by the judge in the criminal proceedings that probable cause existed to hold appellant on the crimi- nal charges and submit the case to the jury is not conclu- sive on the probable cause issue in the malicious prosecu- tion case. It is not, therefore, impossible as a matter of law for appellant to prove the lack of probable cause ele- ment of a cause of action for malicious prosecution, and his case should not have been dismissed on that basis. There- fore, the decision of the District Court is reversed and the case remanded for such further proceedings as are necessary to decide the merits of appellant's claim. Having reversed and remanded t h i s c a s e on t h e f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t , it i s unnecessary t o comment on t h e second i s s u e r a i s e d . W e do, however, f e e l it would be h e l p f u l i n u l t i m a t e l y deciding t h e c a s e t o make one addi- t i o n a l note. Although it i s u n i v e r s a l l y held t h a t a p r i o r determina- t i o n of probable cause c o n s t i t u t e s prima f a c i e evidence o r presumptive evidence of probable cause a t a subsequent malicious prosecution proceeding, t h e r e i s a s p l i t of au- t h o r i t y a s t o t h e quantum of proof necessary t o overcome t h e presumption. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d a t 1170. Some j u r i s d i c - t i o n s r e q u i r e t h e showing of f r a u d , p e r j u r y , o r o t h e r undue means i n o b t a i n i n g t h e o r i g i n a l determination t h a t probable cause e x i s t e d t o overcome t h e e f f e c t of t h e prima f a c i e o r presumptive evidence of probable cause e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e p r i o r j u d i c i a l determination of probable cause. See, f o r example, Lee v. C i t y of Mount Vernon (1979), 68 A .A.D.2d 902, 4 1 4 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217; Rodgers v. W. T. Grant Company + , & ' \ ( F l a . 1976), 326 So.2d 57, 64; Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d a t 1190. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s only r e q u i r e a showing of l a c k of probable cause by a preponderance of t h e evidence t o overcome t h e presumption of t h e e x i s t e n c e of probable cause r a i s e d by a determination of probable cause i n a p r i o r proceeding. See, f o r example, Zalewski v. Gallagher (1977), 150 N.J.Super. 360, 375 A.2d 1195, 1200; Lampos v. Bazar, Inc. (1974), 270 O r . 256, 527 P.2d 376, 383; Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d a t 1173. The l a t t e r r u l e has been adopted i n t h e numerical m a j o r i t y of j u r i s d i c t i o n s . W e a l s o f e e l t h a t it i s t h e b e t t e r reasoned p o s i t i o n as it i s c o n s i s t e n t with o u r s t a t u t e s s t a t i n g a presumption which i s n o t deemed conclusive can be controverted by o t h e r evidence and s e t t i n g t h e normal standard of proof i n c i v i l cases a s t h e preponderance of t h e evidence. See s e c t i o n 26-1-602, MCA; s e c t i o n 26-1-403(1), MCA. W e see no reason t o impose a higher burden of proof t o overcome t h e presumption here than i n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s . Therefore, w e adopt t h e majority p o s i t i o n . A p l a i n t i f f i n a malicious prosecution a c t i o n can overcome t h e presumption of probable cause r a i s e d by a determination of probable cause t o hold t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a criminal proceeding by showing by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t t h e r e was no probable cause f o r f i l i n g t h e o r i g i n a l criminal a c t i o n . Thus, should t h i s case proceed t o t r i a l , respondents may introduce evidence of t h e r u l i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t probable cause e x i s t e d t o hold a p p e l l a n t on t h e c r i m i - n a l charges brought a g a i n s t him. This w i l l be prima f a c i e o r presumptive evidence of t h e e x i s t e n c e of probable cause. Appellant can, however, overcome t h i s presumption by showing by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t probable cause t o f i l e t h e criminal a c t i o n d i d n o t e x i s t . Reversed and remanded. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e