Case Title: Querubin v. Thronas. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

Citation: 107 Haw. 48

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAWLBRARE
*#* FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

=== 000

 

BENJAMIN QUERUBIN; CAROLYN TAKETA, as Special Administrator of
the Estate of JUANITA QUERUBIN, deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 3
eS =
OLAF THRONES, i
Defendant~Appellee, 2 c

 

AND

 

CHARLES K. LEE; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS
1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; ROE CORPORATIONS 1-10; ROE “NON-
PROFIT CORPORATIONS 1-10; and ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10;

 

Defendants;

OLAF THRONAS,
Defendant /Cross-Plaintiff,

CHARLES K. LEE,
Defendant /Cross-Defendant,

OLAF THRONAS,
Defendant /Counter-Plaintiff,

BENJAMIN QUERUBIN,
Plaintiff /Counter-Defendant.

CAROLYN TAKETA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of JUANITA
QUERUBIN, deceased,
Plaintiff /Cross-claim Plaintifs, ~
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

BENJAMIN QUERUBIN,
Plaintiff/Cross-claim Defendant.

OLAF THRONAS,
‘Third-Party Plaintifs,

THE COUNTY OF KAUA'I, a political subdivision of the State of
Hawai'i, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10,
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, AND DOE ENTITIES 1-10,
‘Third-party Defendants

No. 24086

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
(CIVIL No. 98-0127)

MARCH 31, 2008

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.,
‘AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

The plaintiffs-appellants Benjamin Querubin
(hereinafter, “Benjanin”) and Carolyn Taketa, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Juanita Querubin [hereinafter,
‘suanita”} [collectively hereinafter, “the Appellants”), appeal
from the February 7, 2001 final judgment of the circuit court of
the fifth circuit, the Honorable George M. Masuoka presiding,
alleging that the circuit court erroneously entered the February
25, 2000 order granting the defendant-appellee Olaf Thronas’s
motion for summary judgment (¥SJ) via joinder in the MSJ of the

third-party defendant County of Kaua'i (hereinafter, “the

“the oxder granting Thronas’s

 

County”] [collectively hereinafter,
‘** FOR PUBLICATION *##

MsJ via joinder”).

on appeal, the Appellants argue: (1) that they “were
deprived of their constitutional right to due process of lav”
because (a) the circuit court “erred in sua sponte granting
‘summary judgment” and (b) they “were deprived of their right to
present evidence when the [circuit] court granted summary
Judgment against them”; (2) that “the third-party complaint
pleads an action distinct and separate from that originating in
the original complaint”; (3) that the Appellants’ “right to
present evidence is not defeated by Thronas’s collusion with the
County”; and (4) that “the evidence does not support summary
judgment against the” Appellants, insofar as “only admissible
evidence can be considered on a motion for sunmary judgment,”
such that the circuit court should not have considered (a)
“counsel’s statements in legal briefs,” (b) “the ‘drivers’
statements,’” which are “inadmissable double hearsay,” and (c)
“police reports,” which are “not authenticated.”

‘Thronas responds: (1) that the Appellants “raise
issues in this appeal which they failed to raise in the trial
court, their failure does not meet the criteria for addressing
new issues on appeal, and hence this court must ignore these new

issues”; (2) that, “by filing a statement of no position to [the]

 

County's motion for summary judgment on the issue which formed
the basis for their claim against Thronas, [the Appellants]
waived their right to challenge the effect of a decision in favor

(3) that, “given [the Appellants’

   

of [the] County”, taking no

position on [the] County's motion, and the moving papers
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION *#*

Providing a sufficient basis, Judge Masuoka properly granted
summary judgment in favor of [the] County and Thronas”; (4) that
“the still-viable judgment on the order granting summary judgment
in favor of (the] County is the ‘law of the case,’ eliminated the
basis for [the Appellants’) claim against Thronas, and cannot be
vacated without causing harm to [the} County"; and (5) that
“there was no clerical error involved in Judge Masuoka’s granting
summary judgment to Thronas; thus Judge Masucka did not abuse his
discretion when he denied [the Appellants’] (Hawai'i Rules of
Civil Procedure (HRCP)] Rule 60(a) [(2000)"} motion for
reconsideration.” (Emphasis in original.)

The Appellants reply: (1) that “thronas grossly
misstates the procedural facts”? (2) that “an affidavit
consisting of inadmissible hearsay cannot serve as a basis for
awarding summary judgment”; (3) that the Appellants “did not
waive their claims”; (4) that “this court could consider all
issues raised in the appeal”; (5) that “the law of the case
doctrine does not apply"? and (6) that the Appellants “were
deprived of due process of law.”

For the reasons discussed infra in section 112, ve
hold: (1) that the circuit court erred in sua sponte entering

1 WREE Rute 60a) provide

Reliet from judgeent or order.

{a} Clerical Méstores. Clerical mistakes in Judgments, orders ot
Gelsasln say be corvectea by the court at any fine at‘ iss Soar taat ire
eure srders, biting tne’ gendency ef'an sppesis sven ausetber ate be 0
corrected before the appeal sn docketed inthe supreme asures and

thereafter while the appeal iz pending may be so corrected with leave of

 

  

 

 

 
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION *#4

the order granting Thronas’s MSI via joinder in Thronas’s favor
and against the Appellants without providing the Appellants
notice that the entry of sunmary judgment against the Appellants
was under consideration and an oral hearing expressly with
respect thereto; and (2) that, notwithstanding the foregoing, (a)
the order granting the County's MSJ against Thronas and (b) the
Judgment in favor of the County and against Thronas remain the
“law of the case.” Accordingly, we (1) vacate (a) the February
25, 2000 order granting Thronas's MSJ via joinder in Thronas’s
favor and against the Appellants and (b) the circuit court's
February 7, 2001 final judgment and (2) remand this matter to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

1. BACKGROUND
‘The procedural history of the present matter includes
several events that are immaterial to the appeal before this
court. Accordingly, we set out only the relevant background
below. On April 22, 1998, the Appellants filed a complaint in
the circuit court, alleging in relevant part:
2 (Benjamin)... and. . . [Juanita
deceased, . | | Geel! materiai tines herein, were residents
ef the County of Kavai, state of Hawaii.
2. befendant CHARLES K. LEE af atl material

tines herein, was a resident of the County of Kaval, state
of Hawai

 

 

 

= (Thronas), . . . at all material tines
herein, wes a Fesident of the County of Kauei, State of
Haweil

 

6." * on or about August 1, he intersection
of Lavkona Street and Kunio Highway near the Mile Marker #2,
in the town of Hananaulu, County of Kauai, state of Hawa!

(lee) negligentiy operated his actor vehicle co as
ron the red 1ight and collide with (the Appellants’ J

  

     

 

    
‘+## FOR PUBLICATION *##

ventele,
3... . (throngs) is the registered landowner of

tthe property igeated at 4485 Laukona Street, adjacent to the

intersection of Laukona Street and Kuhio Highway.

1 (Thronas) negligently maintained a hedge
at the Corner Gidsest to said intersection{,) which far
exceeded the three feet height lineation imposed by law and
thereby obstructed the visien of motorists and caused a
eestfic hazard

 

 

9. The conbined negligence of {Lee and Thronas}
directly caused the collision described above.
10." As a result of said collision, « . . (Benjamin)

suftered severe bedily injuries Including, but not limited
tol,] multiple fractured ribs and a) punctured long

Tie RS a result of the said accigents
[suanita} suffered multiple neart attacks and died

12, “as a further result of the aforesaid conduct of
uee and’thronas),. + (Benjamin) hos suffered mental
Aistress, limitation of activities, loss of enjoyment. of
Life, loss of consortiun and other damages as shall be
proven at trial

13. "as a further result of the negligence aforesais,
(the xppeliante) have sustained medical, rehabilitative and
miscellaneous expenses in excess of the minimum thresheld
Establishes in HeR-S. Chapter 431:10C-308, and {eheyl, seek
Gamages therefor an an anount to be shown’ at trial

WHEREFORE, [the Appellants) denand jodgnent
(Lee and Thronas, jointly and severally, a8, follows:

Re General damages in an amount’ to be shown at the
time of trials

B.| "Special damages in an amount to be shown at the
time of trials

C. “Frejudgment interest from the date of the
accident, costs, ana reasonable attorneys fees, and such
Cther and further relief se may be deened just’ and
equitable:

On May 18, 1998, Thronas filed, inter alia, an answer

 

 

 

 

    

 

to the Appellants’ complaint. On March 5, 1999, Thronas filed a
third-party complaint against the County, alleging in relevant

 

Part as follow:

4. (The Appellante) alleged in their Complaint)
«_«_. afiong ether things, that (Dhronae] "ie the registered
landowner of the property... adjacent to the intersection
of Laukons Street! and Kuhio Highway (hereinafter designates
Mintersection’),” {Thronas] was negligent in maintaining “a

 

 

 

 

  

hedge at the cofner clorest to (INTERSECTION) ss and
thereby obstructed the vision of ncterists and caused «

traffic hazard,” and the negligence ef [Thronas] “directly
caused” @ traffic accident et INTERSECTION fron which [the

Sppeilante) ineurred damages}
‘Thronas!s

‘++ FOR PUBLICATION *#*

5. Based on information and belsef, (hronas)
alleges that the portion of the subject hedge that is,
Closest to INTERSECTION 1s in property that is onned and
Under the control of [the County?

bo) “Tine county]. «hed a duty to maintain that
portion of the hedge that io closest to INTERSECTION, and Sf
ny part of the hedge contributed to the damages incurred by
[the Appellants}, or any of thes, it was the portion of the

 

 

hedge located in’ (the county's). . . property that did 2%
an {the county} Breached its{j Sety £0 maintain that
Portion of the hedger

3." “IE [the Appellants), or any of them, incurred

Ganages ar alleged in their Conzlaint, each of their damages
were the result of the negligence or fault of (the County)
Sand [Thrones] was not at fault in any way? and

G0" Any negligence or fault on the part of (Thronas]
was passive and quaternary, whereas the negligence or fault
SE [the County) was active and primary, and thus
(Thronas) is entitied to indennitication, contribution
and/or subrogation from (the County].

(WHEREFORE THRONAS PRAYS AS FOLLOWS:

i. Tf judgment is enterea in favor of [the
Appellants), or any of then, against any party to this
action, that (the circuit court} enter Judgment against (the

 

 

 

Couney$ ts ‘and not ins
2.) “1b judgment is entered in favor of (the

Appellants], or any of them, against hin, that (the circuit

court] enter judgnent against (the County) . . . in favor of

him on the basis of indemnification, contribution, and/or

 

3. If he and any other party to this action are
Getermined co be joint tortfessors, that [the cireust court)

 

Sstablish the relative degree of fault of each tortfeasor,
fang enter judgnent against [the County]... for any excess
Uihich he pays over and above his pro-rata share of the total
Judgment, if any, in favor ef [the Appellante], or any of

4. Grant him such cther relief as [the circuit
court) deens to be Just and equitable:

on March 23, 1999, the County filed its anewer to

 

 

third-party complaint.
On December 7, 1999, the County filed a motion for

summary judgment against Thronas (hereinafter, “the County's

Mss") and

a memorandum in support thereof. The County’s MSo

recited in relevant part as follows:

 

COMES NOK, . .. [the County], by and through ite
attorney, 1 (ajeputy [eleunty attorney, and hereby
Rover for sunmary judgment against... (Thronas]
‘+** FOR PUBLICATION ###

This Motion 1s made pursuant to (HRCE) Rule 56
111999),°) -. and Ze supported by the pleadings,
attigavite, exnibite, supporting memorandum, and shy
evidence to be adduced at che hearing on said motion.

In the memorandum in support of its MSJ, the County argued as
follows with respect to Exhibit A, which was attached to the
motion:

The police report, which includes witness statenents,
drivers’ statements, and the traffic investigation, all make
fone point clear: she “i ‘$

Not ony dees the police fepert state ther
Grivers at the intersection have clear line of sights the
Feport reveals that the most likely cause of the accident
was [Lee"s] running a red traffic Light and colliding with
[the Appellants’ ] vehicle

 

 

+ RCP Rule $6 provides in relevent part:

 

A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
‘counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgnene: may
nove with or without supporting affidavits for e summary jusgaent 1h the
party"s favor upon allo any part thereof. A party secking recovery,

F this rule may seek rellef at any tine after the expiration of 20
Gays fron the comencenent of the action of after the service cfs
notion for summary judgment by the edverse party, provides, however,
that's motion seeking relief under this rule shell te served end filed
no less than 50 days before the date of the trial unless geanted
Permission by the court and for good cause show

(©) For defending party. A party against whom @ claim,
counterclaim, of cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
Sought nay move with or wiehost supporting affidavits for a sumsaty
judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part therect, provided,
however, that & notion seeking relief under this rule shell be filed ond
served no less than 50 days before the date of the trial unless grented
Permiscion by the court and fer geod cause shown.

(©) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be filed and
served not less than 16 days before the date set for the hearing. The
aeverse party may file and serve opposing nenorandun and/or affidavies
hot less than € daye before the date set fer the nearing. The moving
perty may file and serve a reply or affidavit not less than 3 days
Before the date set for the hearing. 2h

i atv, chow that there is ne agnuine tear ae seo ee
a cma
Sunmary judgment, interlocutory in character, may De rendered on the

issue of liability alone although there is 4 gendine issue as to the
snount of danages:

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis added
‘**4 FOR PUBLICATION *##

‘The hedge was not a contributing factor in the
sccident. “There is no genuine issue of material fect and
Sunmary judgment is proper.

(Bmphasis in original.)
On December 10, 1999, Thronas filed the following
joinder in the County's MsJ:
COMES Now... thronas{,} . .. by and through his

Tegal counsel in this action,
a } Beses his

at etbceeeer oie
ee eee eee

 

(Emphases added.)
On January 7, 2000, the Appellants filed a statement of

Flo position regarding the County's MSJ, stating as follows:

Cones now... (the App by and through their
attorneys, ... land) hereby state that they have ne
Position as to (the County's) Motion for Summary Judgment,
hich was filed December 7, 1993, and is scheduled for
hearing before the Honorable George NM. Hasuoka at 130 an,
fon January 11, 2000.

On January 11, 2000, the circuit court conducted a

 

 

hearing on the County's Msg:

HE CLERK: Civil number 96-0127, Benjamin Quervbin,
gt st.y versus Charles Lee, st ali, Third-party Defendant
County of Kauai" notion for suamaty jodgmene.

 

iciaini+s comes): Your senor, 1 have nothing to add
co our'govten
(Finoths comss.|: Your tenor, nor ay Jeinder.
Unereants® coon Warne Saket ne Podie Tees Your

 

TE COURT: Fine. Under the circumstances{,) the
circuit court will grant the eeticn
On January 28, 2000, the circuit court entered an order
granting the County's MSJ, which provides in relevant part:

led a statenent of no

 

[the Bppellante), having £4
position te the County's motions Thronas, havi
fled 6 soinder in the County's motion, ‘and the feireait
clourt having reviewed the nencranda subaitted, arguments of
counsel, and being apprised in the premises,

     

 

°
**# POR PUBLICATION *#*

IT 15 HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUOGED AND DECREED that (the
County's HSJ] is nereby granted

On February 25, 2000, the circuit court entered an order granting
Thronas’s MSJ via joinder:
THE HEARING on (the County's) Motion for Summary

   

 

Judgment on the
A ‘nd the
Joinger in said Notion by Thronas{] cane on £0 be
heard on {(Jenvary 11, 2000] | | \'. Present st said hearing
were. . legal counsel forthe ‘Countyiel = + legal
Counsed toe Thronas, and... legal Counsel for (the
Appellante].” Based cn the records of this scticny and the

written and oral submissions of said parties, te dnclude
[the Agpelionte’) taking of no position on seid Motion,

‘HIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS Summary Jodgment be granted
in favor of... Thronae et

Acpedlantsl
(Emphases added.)
on March 6, 2000, pursuant to HRCP Rules 7 (2000) and

 

 

 

60(a), the Appellants
granting Thronas’s MSJ via joinder (hereinafter, “the motion to

 

led a motion to set aside the order

set aside”) and a memorandum in support of the motion, In the
memorandum, the Appellants asserted in relevant part:

‘This Notion is brought pursuant to HCP Rule 60(a) to
correct an oversight that occurred uhen the (circuit elourt
entered [the order granting Thronas's HS sia jeinder],
filed herein on February 25, 2000...

This order must be set aside fer & very simple reason:

 

 

 

hs" shoicated above, at no tine dic ‘Thronas ever
file a Motion for summary Judgment ageinst [the Appellents],
and thos the [the orger granting Threnas's HS vis joinder)
is clearty a nollity whieh is completely develd of any basis
Sn the record. Accerdingly, it should be set acide 20 there
is no confusion in the record in later proceedings

ielappears that the genesis of this error wa
‘hronae" (2) counsel’ 13°" the
County's notion againet hs own client, the County's motion
against hic client was somehow transformed into his client's
notion against the [Appellants]. This, of course, is not

 

 

   

10
‘FOR PUBLICATION ***

true. Whatever the reason for this mistake, it ta

Fespectfully subaitted that the reccrd in this cage must be

Glarified and the [order granting Thronas’s Had via Joinder)
(Emphasis in original.)

On March 16, 2000, the circuit court entered judgment
“in favor of the County . . . and against all parties as to all
claims asserted in the . . . action against the County . ”

on March 16, 2000, Benjamin, through his separate
defense counsel and as counterclaim defendant, filed a joinder in
the Appellants’ motion to set aside

on May 22, 2000, Thronas filed a memorandum in
opposition to the Appellants’ motion to set aside.

on May 30, 2000, the circuit court conducted a hearing
on the Appellants’ motion to set aside. During the hearing, the
circuit court engaged the Appellants’ counsel in the following
colloquy:

THE COURT: Let me a9k you sone questions. Are you
saying that there must be a motion before this (clout...
can grant a motion for susmary Jucgnent?
TAFPELLANTS" COUNSEL] + Under the procedural
circumstances of this case, your Honor, Yee, that would be

Correct, in that there was no adversarial positioning
Between’ the (Appellants) and the (County)

THE COURT: Don't you think it would be inconsistent
‘ Sront 2 nerien fer are tedaaane scene

 

TAPPELLANTS" COUNSEL}: Well, Judge, I think what
been created is this, your Honcr. ‘With no standing on the
port of the [appellante) in that thiro-party complaint = we
had not amended over against the (County). With no standing
fo respond, to answer in any fashion, the defense counsel

 

 

 

 

 

then turns around and lays over end says? Well, we Join Sn
the potion against ourselves. In ether words, they'Fe s+.
joining camps with the County.

‘Onder these circunstances, sy
they've attempted te circumvent any such
snare 4 * ‘that they’ ve

done is =~ if the (eiveuit ejourt would allow an aneiogy te
be nace, in essence, we have Plaintiff/Defendant, one

 

aa
*** FOR PUBLICATION *#+

lawsuit, the Defendant/Third-Farty Defendant in a separate
claim.

think what the defense is attempting to do is roll
over on the second claim and then say: Uh-huh, we can take
this summary judgnent here and apply it in the first case,
when, in all actuality, Judge, we had two seperate claias

Now, the fact cf the matter is, we believe that there
fare very good reasons why they did not want to file a direct
notion for summary judanent against the [Appellants]. se
as felly auare, because ve had submitted the very lengthy
settlement booklet to [Thronas’s counsel] and te Ne. Thrones
indicating whet our claims were, what cur causes of action
we Well as the fact that we have a highway engineer
along with a hunan factors expert who are ready and willing
to testify with regard to. - a causal connection between
the violation of the ordinance by Mr. Thkonas of that heage
height and what role that played in the accident.

‘The fact that he concedes on his action with the
County should in no way [affect the. . + the separare
claim that we have against (Thronas], your fionor. Your
Honor, we believe that there's no proper authority. He hes
not cited any ceses which (are) on point because there is no
Taw on thie points

‘The cases that he cites have to do with parties te

zs :,an ection, parties that are in an dverseriel
position. There is not a single case indicated where they
are allowing. - . an order for summary =

‘THE CouRT: ‘se you didn’t .- « file a claim against
then then?

IAPPELLANTS' COUNSEL]: He... never filed @ claim
against the County. There was never & third-party complarnt

 

 

 

   

 

 

‘THE couRT: So ~

(APPELLANTS" CouNSEL): -- we never anended it over

THE COURT: -= but upon a motion of any... partys
this [court can consider all motions of sunery Judgment
fend consider the “= even the opposing party whe sutaice no
Rotion, as far as the [eireuit cloure fs concerned, and can
grant unmary:judgnent as to whatever issuer it fesles «+

VAPPELLANTS" COUNSEL]: In an edversarial situation,
your Honor, that's absolutely correct, and that’s what the
Gace law basically says.

But when you have two separste claims, your Honor,
where, Sf you were te take case che, seperate st from case
two, ihe sumary judgment in case tuo cannet apply in case
cone’ because the parties have not had an cpportenity
first, they . ss Jack standing to's. . come inte’ case two,
and they have not had the opportunity to answer end te
Fespond and to have their position filed with the [oircuit

 

 

 

 

clowrt. “And that’s exactly the situation that ss. has
been created here, your loner”

‘THE. CouRr: m e

(APPELLANTS" COUNSEL] Te eSrrect, your Honor

But there are seperate claine

22
(Emphases

 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

added.) After entertaining argument by Thronas’s

counsel, the Appellants’ counsel responded as follows:

IAPPELLANTS’ COUNSEL): Judge, just in response to the
argunent that was posed here, your Honor. when (Thronas" =
Counsel} speaks in terms of hotice, when he speaks in terms
of Joinder, and when he speaks in terns of no response, “your
Honor, what he doesn't indicate and what he has impliedly

conceded in is own memorandum is the fact that we
Gould not respond, we weren't party to the third-party
action, and we had no standings We... were not in'@
position te respond,

Defense counsel seems to be of the opinion that by
taking back the oor route he can spply it, when the only
way in which to have a summary judgment would be to go by
Way of the front door, wich ig to file against ue because
‘Our ony complaint is’against [Thronas]. We have no clais
against the County, and the County never filed a motion for
Sommary judgment against the (Appellant).

Yne County's motion fer summary Judgment was only as
to (Threnas], because [Thronas] was the only party that had

 

 

 

THE COURT: You're repeating the sane axgunents agsin.
(APELIANTS" COUNSEL]: That's correct, your Honor.
THE COURT! Okay. (The circuit clourt will Look at it
fone more tine, will take it under advisement, and inform
Sounsel of s2 decision.

on August 14, 2000, the circuit court entered an order

denying the Appellants’ motion to set aside.

judgment,

on February 7, 2001, the circuit court entered final
which provided in relevant part as follows:
Judgnent is entered in favor of [Thronas} against (the

Appellants) pursuant to the (order granting Thronsa’ s MSI
vie joinder)

 

Sadgnent is entered in favor of (the County) against

Thronas with respect to Thronas’ [e) third-party claims
pursvant to the [olrder [g}ranting (tne County's #59]
@ntered nerein on January 26, 2000 and the Judgrent entered
herein on Nazch 16, 2000

on February 14, 2001, the Appellants timely filed a notice of

appeal.

TT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

ie review the circuit court's grant er dental of

sunmory Sudgnent de novo. Hawai'i Comunity Federal Credit.
a3

 
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION #++

M4 Hawas"s 213, 221, 11 P.34 1, 9 (2000)

‘The standard for granting e notion fer summary judgment 48

settled

[Slumary judguent is appropriate it the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogavories,
and adnissions on file, together with the stfidavice,
Sf any, show that there ie no genuine issue aa to any
materis1 fact and that the moving party i= entitied to
Judgment asa matter of law. Atact is material tf
Proof cf that fact would have the effect of
establishing or refuting one of the essential elenents
of @ cause of action or defense asserted by the
Parties. The evidence mist be viewed in the light
ost favorable to the non-noving party. fn other
words, we must View a1! of the evidence and the
infertnces drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.

Ad, (citations and internal quotation marke omitted) .

Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recveling, Inc., 105 Hawai'i 490, 501,

100 P.3d 60, 71 (2004) (quoting Simmons v, Puy, 105 Hawai'i 112,
117-18, 94 P.3d 667, 672-73 (2004) (quoting Kahale v. City and
County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 341, 344, 90 P.34 233, 236 (2004)

 

 

(quoting SCI Management Corp, vs Sims, 101 Hawai'i 438, 445, 71
P.3d 389, 396 (2003) (quoting Coon v. City and County of
Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348, 359-60 (2002))))).

 

A
On appeal, the Appellants, inter alia, “vigorously
dispute . . . the granting of sunmary judgment in favor of one
-mov: Ct mov ty, without notice

and an opportunity to be heard,” insofar as “RCP [Rule] $6(c) [,

see supra note 2,) and due process protections do not permit

 

mmary judgment in such circumstances.” (Emphasis in original.)

a4
*** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

We agree with the Appellants.
In Clarke v, Civil Service Commission, 50 Haw. 169, 434
P.2d 312 (1967), the circuit court addressed an appeal from
several administrative hearings before the State of Hawai'i Civil
Service Commission (hereinafter, “the Commission”) upholding the
decision of the State of Hawai'i Director of Institutions to
terminate the appellant's employment with “a State institution
for the treatment and care of the mentally retarded.” Id. at
169-70, 434 P.2d at 312-13, “The trial court, at a pre-trial
conference, instructed the parties to file memoranda on points of

law. After a review of the memoranda filed by the parties, the

 

court decided to treat the [Commission’

 

} supplemental memorandum
as a motion for summary judgment and thereupon dismissed the
appeal.” Id. On secondary appeal to this court, we reasoned and
held as follows:

Aa a generat proposition, summary judgment should be

granted where there is no genuine issue as to any materia
FS Sloe’ party ie eneitied te 6 Suggnent a matter of

 

 

Jaw. “HRCP Rule 56(b) (e) a8 Haw. 32,
35, 396 Pe2d 43, S67, Browne ge aUGRE PARSE Ee, “te haw, 365,
3b, 355 Pid Ibs, 161; Zemritery v Arneson, G4 Haw, 343,

 

SS], 354 Piza $81, 986.

‘The fecord on anced] shows that the court entestained

 

aise felted to allege that there was no genuine iaeve
@ material fact and that the appellee was entitied £0 &
Sudguent as a matter of low.

The quection whether @ sumery disposition of # cause
pay properly follow s pre-trial conference though neither
party has neved for summary jeagnent har been answered both
in the affirmative and the negative by federal courts which
operate under a provision of the Fedefal Roles of Civsl
Procedure identical to Rule Se of the Hawaii Rules of Civil
Procedure
ower and aithoriry to grant suneary sudanens cua snonee,

 

 

 

 

as
‘** FOR PUBLICATION ##4

Be _aive fore pearing betixess hat the
fearing to fact be held on she-aateer
fetes ettred aceeaeltiat sn cedera, course

 

(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

‘Seant summary iudanent.
(ERGPT Radel Se; Hash ws Sisson, 30) F.2d 126 Sth cir.
1962)

Bu, 313 Fad 493 (Sth City 1967

 

 

Id, at 170-71, 434 P.2d at 313 (emphases added) (some citations
onitted).

In Jensen v. Pratt, $3 Haw. 201, 491 P.2d 547 (1971),
we elaborated on the principle set forth in Clarke. Jensen
concerned an appeal alleging that the circuit court erred in
entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiffs only upon written memoranda submitted by both
parties (i.e, without an oral hearing before the circuit court).
Ady at 201-202, 491 P.2d at 548. More specifically, the
plaintiffs maintained on appeal “that the failure of the trial
court to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of HRCP
Rule S6(c) is reversible error.” Id. at 202, 491 P.2d at 548.
Jensen reasoned and held as follows:

 

fen aes te

Se lasalian tects Induetsiee Innes St Wow Dies wee Pie
282, rehearing denied, st How. 352 11963). ‘ihe requizenent
of tngwing tha the error Judicial ctene tron HECE

 

foie el: "The

 

art at every stage of the proceeding must

ae
‘+ FOR PUBLICATION *#*

disregard any extor which does not affect the substantial

Fights of the parties.”

 

a, So Paw. 168, 434 F-20312 (196717 Enoche w Siaaen,
Sor F-24128 (Sth Cir. 1962). This reeult 12 further
dictated by the following specific language of HRCP Rule 78
which, we think, sets forth the exclusive procedure for
Giepetsing with’ oral hearings se required under our Roles of
Civil Procedure:

To expedite its business, the court may make provision
by rule or order for the subeission and determination
Of notions without oral hearing open beief written
Statenents Of reasons in support and opposition,

 

Ide at 202-03, 491 P.2d at 548 (emphases added).

It is noteworthy that the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(Ica) has held that “violation of the notice requirement does not
automatically result in a reversal,” insofar as “Clarke's progeny
holds that ‘absent a showing of harm, the failure of the trial
court to comply with the requirement of ten days’ notice of
hearing set forth in HRCP Rule $6(c) is not reversible error.”
Kav, City and County of Honolulu, 6 Haw. App. 370, 372-73, 722
P.2d 1043, 1045 (1986) (some emphasis added and some in original)
(affirming summary judgment against the appellants because the
appellants “failed to demonstrate prejudice or harm as a result
of the [circuit] court’s . . . fail{ure] to give [them] the
required (HRCP) Rule $6(c) 10-day notice of hearing,” inasmuch as
the appellee's written MSJ provided the appellants proper notice

and the appellants “did file a memorandum and other papers in

a7
‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION ***

opposition to the (MSJ] and had an opportunity to be heard”); see
alse Shelton Engineerina Contractors, Limited v, Hawaiian bac.
Industries, Inc., 51 Haw. 242, 246, 456 P.2d 222, 225 (1963)
(affirming summary judgment against the appellant because,
although the appellee “did not comply with the literal
requirement of [HRCP Rule 56(c)]” by filing the MSJ “only five
days before the date set for the hearing,” the appellee “complied
substantially with the notice requirement of the rule as
expressed in Clarke,” such that the appellant “had notice of a
hearing and had the opportunity to be heard” and could “not
demonstrate[] [that] he [was] harmed by not having @ full ten
days of notice”).

Moreover, based on an amendment of the Rules of the
Circuit Courts of the State of Hawai'i (RCH) Rule 8 (2000),? the
ICA has established an exception to the bright line rule set
forth in Jensen, 53 Haw. at 202-03, 491 P.2d at 548, that a
circuit court’s failure to comply with the oral hearing
requirement of HRCP Rule 56(c) is “harmful error per ge.” In
Wilder v. Tanouve, 7 Haw. App. 247, 753 P.2d 816 (1986), the ICA
addressed an appeal alleging that the circuit court had erred in
granting sunmary judgment against the appellant without providing
him an oral hearing on the appellees’ MSJ. Id, at 251, 491 P.2d
at €18, The circuit court had filed an ex parte order stating
that it would “rule on appellees’ MSJ) without oral hearing and

based solely upon the records, files and written arguments of the

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION *#

parties,” but allowed the parties to “submit additional memoranda
or evidence in the form of affidavit or other writing within
Ad. at 249, 491 P.2d at

819 (internal citations and quotation signals omitted). The ICA

 

thirty (30) days of the . . . order.

reasoned and held as follows:

ie start our analysis by examining the [HRCP). RCE
RCP Rule 7¢ provides in
Bereinent part:

‘To expedite its business, the court may make provision

by Tule or order for the’ submission and determination

Of motions without oral hearing upon brief writees

Statenents of reasons in support and opposition.
in Jengen vy. Pratt, supra, our suprene court stated that
Rule 78 "sete forth the exclusive procedure for dispensing
With oral hearings” on summary judgment motions. Za, at
202, $91 P.od at 348.” Because there was “neither # Tule nor
fan order generally dispensing with the requirement of oral
earings on motions for summary Judgment ,)” [Jensen] held
that the failure to hold an oral hearing wae reversible
error. 2d. at 202-03, 481 F.2d at 548. Four years earlier,
Sn oil 8 ‘supra, the [supreme] court
had hela that the trial court reversibly erred when it
Granted sunnacy jodgnent on its own notion without notice
Snd without a hearing on the matter. (*]

« RCC{H) Rule 8 reads in relevant part: “the
court n'its own motion may order any matter submitted on
the briefs and/or affidavits, without oral argument.” this
sentence was incorporated into RCC[#] Rule & by sn amendment
Adopted by the supreme court on June 22, 1963 to be
effective duly 1, 1983. Thus, Role € fille the void noted
in Jensen ond specifically allows the circuit court to
Consider motions, including those for summary judgnent,
without oral argument.

‘The Order Adopting New Procedures is an order issued
by the administrative judge of the First Circuit Court. it
Sees not and cannot sbyogate ACC(H) Rule £ which hes been
adopted end anended by the suprene court. The Order
Adopting New Procedures serves ss guideline for the Firat
cizeaie court

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+ the 1A neted that

 

tlhe federat cour’
necessary on 2 nc
Gecised cn weiteen

generally hold that an oral hearing se not

in for summary Judgment and that the notion can be

WUoniscions. ee 10k C. Wright, A, Hiller & M. Kane,
272001 (2963). See, aa,

Esderal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d
piled Then core us ackay, e55 F.2d tse (stn cir. 1983)
Wilder, 7 Haw. App. at 252 n.2, 753 P.2d at 620 n.2.

  

 

 

as
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION

 

Here, porsuant to RCC(H) Rule & the lover court
entered its <. . ex parte order that it would rele on the
Rotion for simnazy’ judgment without oral hearing, The
order, moreover, expresely provided for the submiseton of
Rencrande, affidavits, and other evidence by the parties
within a stated period

Aecorgingly, having discretionary authority which it
exercised, the lower court did not err in deciaing the
wotion for summary judgnent witheut an oral hese ng,

Id, at 251-52, 753 P.2d at 819-20.
In the present matter, the circuit court sua sponte

entered summary judgment in favor of Thronas and against the

 

Appellants, despite the fact that neither Thronas nor the
Appellants had moved for summary judgment against the other,
without substantially complying with the notice and hearing
requirements of HRCP Rule 56(c). As recited supra in section I,
the County responded to Thronas’s third-party complaint by filing
an MSJ only against Thronas; the County’s MSJ does not name the

Appellants. Thronas filed a joinder in the County's Msg, but did
not expressly move for summary judgment against the Appellants.
Thus, in contrast to Kay and Shelton, the Appellants had no
notice that Thrones was seeking sunmary judgment against then
Precisely because he had not, in fact, moved for summary judgment
against them. More importantly, the circuit court gave the
Appellants no notice that it was treating Thronas’s joinder as an
MSJ against then. Being unaware that Thronas’s joinder could
result directly in the entry of sunmary judgment against them on
their complaint, the Appellants were obviously and actually
preiudiced by the lack of notice.

With regard to the hearing requirement of HRCP Rule
86(c), although the circuit court did conduct @ hearing on

January 11, 2000, the transcript of the hearing was entitled,

20
*** POR PUBLICATION #44
“Third-Party Defendant County of Keuai’s motion for summary
judgment,” which accurately reflects the subject matter of the
Proceedings. The circuit court neither conducted a separate
hearing on Thronas's joinder nor addressed Thronas’s joinder as a
motion for summary judgment against the Appellants at all. By
contrast to Wilder, therefore, the circuit court did not exercise
its discretionary RCCH Rule 8 authority to forego an oral hearing
on Thronas’s joinder in the County’s MSJ, which did not target
the Appellants’ complaint in any event, and the circuit court's
failure to afford the Appellants an oral hearing on a motion for
summary judgment directed against them “constitute(d] harmful
error per se.” Jensen, 53 Haw. at 202, 491 P.2d at 548.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court
erred in sua sponte entering the February 25, 2000 order granting
‘Thronas's MSJ via joinder, which treated the joinder as a
distinct motion for summary judgment against the Appellants,
without providing the Appellants notice and an oral hearing. See
Slarke, $0 Haw. at 170-71, 434 P.2d at 313; Jensen, 53 Haw. at
202-03, 491 P.2d at 548.

B. o 3 nt

In their points of error on appeal, the Appellants
allege only that the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment against them and in favor of Thronas. The Appellants do
not challenge any of the following: (1) the January 28, 2000
order granting sunmary judgment in favor of the County and

against Thronas; (2) the March 16, 2000 judgment “in favor of the

2
444 FOR PUBLICATION *#+
county . . . and against all parties as to all claims asserted
against the County,”; and (3) the August 14, 2000 order
denying the Appellants’ motion to set aside. Thus, as Thronas
argues, “(t]he judgment entered on the order granting (the
County} summary judgment has not been appealed, is not subject to

appeal, and thus constitutes the law of the case.”

66 Haw, 388, 396, 668 P.20 157; 162 (1383)
Law of the case does not, however, nave the:
inexorable effect of nea iudicata and does not
Preclude the court fron reconsidering an earlier
Foling if the court feels that the ruling wae probably
Grroneous and ore harm would be done by adhering te
the earlier rule than from the delay incident toa
Peconsideration and the possible change in the rule of
law to be applied.” 2 Moore,
(612.14) pe 2266, tt
Sables 2. Siuches, 48 Haw. 370, 382, 405 P.24 772, 779
(iSee}7 “Tn fact, st has been noted that, Zo1ona\ag a trial
Sourt fetains durtsdiction, it “alvave has the power to
Eequamine, nodiiv. vacate, correct and reverse ite oricr

 

 

‘ulnar ang ordere-” In te Solonat fartners, Lp, 221 8.R.
143, 156 (e.A.F-2a Cir. 1999) (rejecting an argunent thet
Judge was bound by Yaw of the case cateblished by his own
peice, cron crdes) (citing, datee alla

, Fereara &-lantna oe
Bluares, 121 F.2d Sei, $83 (ae Cir 1997); Gniteg Stater ys
Eoeabite, 677 F.20 274, 178. (2a Cir. 1989).

92 Hawai'i 432, 441, 992 P.2d 127, 136 (2000) (emphases added) .

   

In the present matter, notwithstanding that Thronas did
not oppose the County's MSJ, the sole basis for the County's
motion was that “the hedge was not 4 contributing factor in
Live. 2 legal cause of] the accident.” (Emphasis in original.)
The circuit court’s January 28, 2000 erder granting the County's
MSJ therefore ruled, of necessity, that “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
#8 FOR PUBLICATION *#*
together with the affidavits, if any, showfed) that there [was]
no genuine issue as to” whether the hedge was 2 legal cause of
the accident, such that the County was “entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” HRCP Rule S6(c), see supra note 2; see also
Durette, 105 Hawai'i at 501, 100 F.3d at 71 ("{S]ummary judgment
is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Internal citations and quotation signals
omitted.)).

Further to the foregoing, although the Appellants
assert in their opening brief that “[t]he motion by the County
against Thronas should have had no effect on the [Appellants]
because [they] were not [parties] in the third-party action,”
they had an overwhelming interest in contesting the County’s MSJ.
As recited supra in section I, the Appellants’ complaint alleged,
Anter alia, (1) that “[Thronas} negligently maintained a hedge at
the corner closest to said intersection which far exceeded the
three feet height limitation imposed by law and thereby
obstructed the vision of motorists and caused a traffic hazard”
and (2) that “(t]he combined negligence of [Lee and Thronas)
directly caused the [subject] collision.” By filing their
January 7, 2000 statement of no position regarding the County's
MsJ and by failing to oppose the MSJ at the January 11, 2000
hearing, the Appellants effectively conceded that the hedge was

23
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION *#4

not a legal cause of the accident.’ Me therefore hold, pursuant

 

* ,he Appellants have failed to preserve any objection to the
bility of the attachments to the County’: MSJ against Thronas. This
Gourt recently abserves in u y es.
24896 and 24871, slip. op. (haw- Mazch 29, 2005), as followes

   

“(T)he role in this jurisdiction... prohibite an appellant from
complaining tor the first time on appeal of error to which he has,
acquiesced or to which he failed to object.” Skuhara w, froida, $1 Haw.
253, 255. «6 P.zd 228, 230 (1969) (citations omitted)? Beg alae MRS

§ 41-2 (2004) (The appellate court. . « need not consiaer a point
that was not presented in the trial court’ invan appropriate menkere"){
Grate y. Eeebles, 76 Hawai's 207, 294, 093 P.24 136, 145 (1958) 7 hewas'd
Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b) (4) (144) (2004), (noting
That an appellant's opening brief shall state “where in the record the
alleged error was cbjected to or the manner in which the eileged error
was brought to the attention of the court oF agency.)

 

 

 

There are sound reasons for the rele. It is unfair to the
trial court to reverse on a ground that ne one even
suggested might be error. ‘It is unfair to the opposing
Party, who aight have met the argument not made below.
Finally, it does not comport with the concept of an orderly
and efficient method of adninistration of justice.

 

ovamate Fame, inc. v. United Agri Prads,, €6 Hawas"i 214, 248, 948
Pidg'd0ss, 1089 (1997) Tettation omitted) =

Ide, slip. op. at 10-12 (brackets in original). In the present matter, ae in
Exlce, the Appellants dia not object in the cizcuit court to the adeisaibility
Of the police report and witness stetenents that they now challenge on appeal
See Etice, slip op. at 11-12.

Exiée further noted as follows

[TIhis court has previcusly declined to address evidentiary challenges
to affidavits relsting to sumary sudgnent motions without proper
objection before the cirevit court. See, ged,

} 92 Hawai'i 398, 408-09, 422-25 n.13, 992 Pad 83, 10S
O¢,"127=16-n.18 (2000) (noting ‘thet, because the appellant failed te
raise on evidentiary objection to an affidavit supporting @ menorandum
in opposition to a action for summary sodgment, [the appellant), waived

wt iezue.” (Citation onitted)); Aceba v, Gen, Tire, inca, ait

1, 986 P.2d 268, 299 (1999) (atating that, because the appellant did
not object t6 the appellee's aftidavite in support of ite notion for
Summary judgnent, “[the appellant) i= precloded from challenging tne
adission of {the appellee)"s pleadings and affidavits on appeas.”
(citation omitted)... . + (T)he masority of federal courts that have
interpreted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule S6le). (1961)
which is identical to the Hawai'i role governing effigavits end exhibits
in support of summary judgnent motione, have held that # party whe fails
fo object to inadnissible affidavite and exnibies waives the Fight to de

 
 

 

 

 

soon appeal. "Seg, gaGa, - . - Inge Zeltronics Servs, inca, Jee F024
386, 180 (2d cir, i988). |. | “Ap the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
{eont inued.. +)

 

24
‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION *#*
to the “law of the case” doctrine, that the circuit court may
choose on remand, in the face of @ motion for sunmary judgment
against the Appellants filed in compliance with HRCP Rule 56, to
enter summary judgment in favor of Thronas and against the
Appellants, because to rule otherwise would “disturb” (1) the
unchallenged January 28, 2000 order granting the County's MSJ and
(2) the unchallenged March 16, 2000 judgment in favor of the
County. See Chun, 92 Hawai'i at 441, 992 P.2d at 136.

On the other hand, the circuit court “always has the

power to reexamine, modify, vacate, correct and reverse its prior

 

S(.. cont ined)
statea:

(Tle set aside a summary judgment under these circumstances
would pernit a party to make no response, oF only a limited
Fesponse, to a movant's allegedly cefective affidavite, with
the result that the notion would either be defested oF later
Set aside, In the absence of a gross miscarriage of
justice, ot present here, such g result ie inpermiseible
Parties nay not sandbag the court in this fashion,
selectively opposing the peints they choose, and on appeal
Glaining that the unopposed points were defect ively
Presented and required no response

Ince Teltronice Serve inc, 762 F.2d at 192.

and some in original) (elipsis

 

 

 

 

Exice, slip op. at 12-14 (sone brackets addes

Points added). rice therefore held “that challenges to’. . + papers
[relating to sunmary judgment metions,] raised for the fist time on appeal.)
ste waive dosent pladn fever, 7” ag ae 34.

in ent matter, because the Appellants had every incentive, not

  

 

to mention’s full opportunity, to object te the sdnsesibility of the police
Eeports and witness ctatenents in the circuit courts coneiderstion of the
County" e Ss, we do not review the orders granting sumeary Judgment for plats
error, Thus, the Appellants’ “challenges to [the police Fepores,] raised for
the first tine on appeal(,] are waived 1

Nevertheless, in their opening brief Gn’ appeal, the Appellants assert
that “the evidence, even if considered, did got establish the hedge was not 4
factor.” (Esphests in original.) the Appellants have waived this argumest.
however, because (1) they nave conceded in their opening brief that. “Sudse
Masuoks’was correct in granting the County's notion against Thronge” and (2)
they have not raised as pointe of error either (a) the Jansary 26, 2000 order
Granting summary judanent in favor of the County and against Thrones or (tb)
the March 1€,, 2000 sudgrent in favor of the county

  

 

    

 

25
*** FOR PUBLICATION

 

rulings and orders.” Id. at 441, 992 P.2d at 136 (internal
citations and quotation signals omitted). But on remand, absent
a finding “that the ruling was probably erroneous and more harm
would be done by adhering to the earlier rule than from the delay
incident to @ reconsideration and the possible change in the rule
of law to be applied,” id, at 441, 992 P.2d at 136 (internal
citations and quotation signals omitted), the “law of the case”
doctrine would militate in the direction of the circuit court
granting sunmary judgment in Thronas’s favor. In any case, we

leave this determination to the discretion of the circuit court.

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we (1) vacate (a)
the February 25, 2000 order granting Thronas’s MSJ via joinder in
Thronas’s favor and against the Appellants and (b) the circuit
court's February 7, 2001 final judgment and (2) remand this
matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
on the briefs:
Rick J. Eichor, of Price, or
Okamoto, Himeno & Lum
Ryan E. Jimenez

for plaintiffs-appellants SecGen

Benjamin Querubins
Carolyn Taketa, as

Special Administrator Pease Cnty anen
of the Estate of
Suanite Querubin

Kone suai by

Warren C.R. Perry
for defendant-appellee
Olaf Thronas

26