Case Title: State ex rel. Herdman v. Watson

Citation: 1998-Ohio-296

Docket Number: 19980595

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. HERDMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WATSON, JUDGE, ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Herdman v. Watson (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 537.] 
Prohibition — Writ prohibiting judge of common pleas court from enforcing 
pretrial discovery orders — Complaint dismissed, when. 
(No. 98-595 — Submitted September 15, 1998 — Decided November 10, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD12-1663. 
 
Appellant Angelia Herdman filed the action entitled Herdman v. BP 
America, Inc., in appellee Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant 
Riyad Altalla is a witness in the case.  According to appellants, in December 1997, 
appellee Judge Michael H. Watson issued entries in the case ordering appellants to 
produce tangible evidence and testify about matters covered by the privilege 
against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Appellants further claim that Judge Watson ordered them to testify 
concerning matters subject to the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges. 
 
Shortly after Judge Watson issued these orders, appellants filed a complaint 
in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
Judge Watson and the common pleas court from enforcing the orders.  The court 
of appeals granted appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and dismissed the complaint 
because the “trial court clearly ha[d] discretion to enter discovery orders in a civil 
action pending before it.” 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
David A. Sams, for appellants. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey L. 
Glasgow, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
 
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__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellants assert in their sole proposition of law that the court 
of appeals erred in dismissing their prohibition action.  This action, they claim, is 
appropriate to prevent the enforcement of judicial orders that erroneously violated 
their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as well as statutory 
attorney-client and physician-patient privileges.  For the following reasons, 
however, appellants’ proposition lacks merit. 
 
First, trial courts have the requisite jurisdiction to decide issues of privilege; 
thus, extraordinary relief in prohibition will not lie to correct any errors in 
decisions on these issues.  See State ex rel. Children’s Med. Ctr. v. Brown (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 194, 196, 571 N.E.2d 724, 726; Rath v. Williamson (1992), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 419, 583 N.E.2d 1308. 
 
Second, appellants did not allege in their complaint that the trial court 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter the pretrial discovery 
orders.  In general, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court 
having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a 
party challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by appeal.  
State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 676 N.E.2d 109, 113. 
 
Therefore, appeal following the entry of a final appealable order constitutes 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to resolve any alleged error by 
the trial court in its pretrial discovery orders.  See, e.g., State ex rel. White v. 
Junkin (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 686 N.E.2d 267, 270, and Manrow v. 
Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 37, 20 OBR 
285, 485 N.E.2d 713, holding that postjudgment appeal is an adequate legal 
remedy to raise a purported violation of a person’s privilege against self-
incrimination, thereby precluding issuance of a writ of prohibition.  In addition, 
 
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any further evidentiary rulings by the trial court concerning appellants’ assertions 
of privilege may be subject to immediate appeal under R.C. 2505.02, as amended 
effective July 22, 1998.1 
 
Third, while we have issued a writ of prohibition in extremely rare 
circumstances to prevent the disclosure of privileged materials, see State ex rel. 
Lambdin v. Brenton (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 21, 50 O.O.2d 44, 254 N.E.2d 681, 
appellants’ complaint does not reveal any similar usurpation of judicial authority 
here, i.e., the attachment of prejudicial conditions to the failure to submit 
evidence.  See Rath, 62 Ohio St.3d at 420-421, 583 N.E.2d at 1309, distinguishing 
Lambdin. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly granted appellees’ 
motion and dismissed appellants’ complaint.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
In Walters v. The Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 118, 676 N.E.2d 890, syllabus, we reaffirmed that discovery orders, 
including those concerning applicability of privileges, are interlocutory.  But we 
invited the appellees in that case to request the General Assembly to amend R.C. 
2505.02 to address their policy contentions.  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 123, 676 N.E.2d 
at 894, fn. 2.  The General Assembly subsequently enacted Sub.H.B. No. 394, 
which amends R.C. 2505.02, effective July 22, 1998, by permitting, inter alia, a 
right of immediate appeal from certain trial court decisions concerning discovery 
of privileged matter.