Case Title: Anderson v. Attorney General

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13257

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13257 
 
CHRISTOPHER R. ANDERSON & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL 
& others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 4, 2022. - June 22, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Amendment of the Constitution, Taxation, 
Income tax.  Attorney General.  Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.  Taxation, Income tax. 
 
 
 
 
1 Nick Boldyga, David DeCoste, Colleen Garry, Marc Lombardo, 
Cece Calabrese, Irina Aguirre, Pascal Aguirre, Robert Ash, Jr., 
Gordon Bennett, Judith Anne Bevis, Robert H. Bradley, Ronald 
Brooks, Tony Burr, Gary Campbell, Christopher Carlozzi, John C. 
Childs, William Clafin, Fourth, Frederic M. Clifford, Paul 
Craney, Michael M. Davis, Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Michael 
D'Onofrio, Walter Downey, Denise A. Doyle, Zhanna Drogobetsky, 
Peter Goedecke, Jeffrey Gordon, Rick Green, Timothy Francis 
Hegarty, Charles C. Hewitt, Third, Lucile Hicks, James S. 
Hughes, Harvey Hurvitz, Matthew P. Jordan, Michael Kane, Robert 
S. Kaplan, Joshua Katzen, Gary Kearney, Mark Latina, Jake 
Layton, Pamela Layton, William J. Lundregan, Third, Eileen 
McAnneny, Joel P. Murray, Tom Palmer, Adam Portnoy, Elizabeth 
Powell, Robert Reynolds, Grant Schaumburg, Roger Servison, James 
Stergios, Lawrence Stifler, Frank Wezniak, and Pendleton P. 
White, Jr. 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth; Jose Encarnacion, Deborah 
Frontierro, Nazia Ashraful, Meg Wheeler, John M. Kyriakis, Ziba 
Cranmer, Keith Bernard, and Zayda Ortiz, interveners. 
2 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 27, 2022. 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
Kevin P. Martin (Jordan Bock & Jenna Welsh also present) 
for the plaintiffs. 
Robert E. Toone, Assistant Attorney General (Anne Sterman & 
Adam Hornstine, Assistant Attorneys General, also present) for 
the defendants. 
Thomas O. Bean, for the interveners, submitted a brief. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Michael Williams for Beacon Hill Institute for Public 
Policy Research. 
John Pagliaro & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Patrick Strawbridge & James P. McGlone for Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Daniel P. Ryan, Caroline A. Kupiec, & Jillian Friedmann for 
PioneerLegal, LLC. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution provides for two processes by which an amendment to 
our Constitution may be proposed, submitted to the people, and 
ultimately voted upon.  One of these processes begins with a 
proposal from voters of the Commonwealth, see art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74 of the Amendments, 
and the other begins with a proposal from a State legislator, 
see art. 48, The Initiative, III, § 2.  "A proposal for 
amendment to the constitution introduced into the general court 
by initiative petition [i.e., by voters] shall be designated an 
initiative amendment, and an amendment introduced by a member of 
3 
 
either house shall be designated a legislative substitute or a 
legislative amendment."  Art. 48, The Initiative, IV, § 1. 
 
This case involves the latter:  a legislative amendment 
that would impose a tax on that portion of annual incomes over 
$1 million, to be used, subject to appropriation by the 
Legislature, for education and transportation purposes.  In 
preparation for the submission of this amendment to voters, the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
(Secretary) have prepared informational materials, which will be 
distributed across the Commonwealth.  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74; G. L. c. 54, § 53.  
The plaintiffs here argue that some of these materials -- 
specifically, a concise summary of the legislative amendment and 
one-sentence statements describing the effects of a "yes" vote 
and a "no" vote -- are unfair and misleading and therefore 
constitutionally and statutorily defective.  We disagree.3 
 
Background.  Article 44 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution currently authorizes the Legislature 
to impose a tax "at different rates upon income derived from 
different classes of property" but requires that such a tax "be 
levied at a uniform rate throughout the [C]ommonwealth upon 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Beacon 
Hill Institute for Public Policy Research, the New England Legal 
Foundation, the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, and 
PioneerLegal, LLC. 
4 
 
incomes derived from the same class of property."  That is, the 
State Constitution prohibits the imposition of a graduated 
income tax on Massachusetts taxpayers. 
 
Since art. 44 was ratified in 1915, there have been six 
unsuccessful attempts to amend the Constitution to allow for a 
graduated income tax.  See Anderson v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 
780, 782-783 (2018) (Anderson I).  In the first five of these 
attempts, a proposed amendment was submitted to and rejected by 
voters.  In 2015, the Attorney General certified an initiative 
petition, which constituted the sixth attempt to amend art. 44 
and authorize a graduated income tax.  See id. at 783-784.  
Voters, including the lead plaintiff here, challenged that 
certification, arguing that the initiative petition failed the 
"related subjects requirement" of art. 48, The Initiative, III, 
§ 3, as amended by art. 74, which requires that "initiative 
petitions contain only subjects that are 'related' or 'mutually 
dependent.'"  Id. at 787.  We agreed and excluded the question 
from the November 2018 ballot.  Id. at 802. 
 
In 2019, Representative James J. O'Day introduced in the 
Legislature a "[p]roposal for a legislative amendment to the 
Constitution to provide resources for education and 
transportation through an additional tax on incomes in excess of 
one million dollars."  As required by art. 48, a majority of 
legislators at two successive joint sessions -- the first in 
5 
 
2019 and the second in 2021 -- voted to approve the proposed 
amendment.4  Consequently, the Secretary intends to place this 
legislative amendment on the ballot for the upcoming Statewide 
election in November 2022. 
 
The text of this legislative amendment almost is identical 
to the text of the initiative amendment proposed in 2015.  See 
Anderson I, 479 Mass. at 784.  However, unlike the 2015 
amendment, the instant amendment was proposed through the 
legislative process.  The related subjects requirement of art. 
48 applies only to initiative petitions, not to legislative 
amendments.5  See art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by 
 
 
4 A joint session refers to the meeting of both branches -- 
the Senate and the House of Representatives -- of the 
Legislature.  General Court of the Commonwealth, Glossary, 
https://malegislature.gov/StateHouse/Glossary#J [https://perma 
.cc/E7S4-Y32G].  Because State senators and representatives are 
elected biennially, see art. 82 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution; G. L. c. 54, § 62, a new joint 
session convenes every two years. 
 
 
5 This distinction between initiative amendments and 
legislative amendments both reflects the different processes by 
which they are submitted to the voters and accords with the 
purpose behind the relatedness requirement. 
 
 
First, in the same way that voters may propose new laws, 
initiative amendments are proposed through initiative petitions, 
which the Attorney General must certify before presenting to the 
Legislature and, ultimately, to the public.  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  As part of this 
certification process, the Attorney General must conclude that 
an initiative petition meets the relatedness requirement of art. 
48.  Id.  As discussed supra, legislative amendments instead are 
proposed through the legislative process, and the Attorney 
 
6 
 
art. 74.  Accordingly, our holding in Anderson I, which was 
grounded solely on the relatedness requirement, does not control 
the instant case. 
 
The legislative amendment would add the following paragraph 
to the end of art. 44, which currently prohibits the imposition 
of a graduated income tax on Massachusetts taxpayers: 
"To provide the resources for quality public education and 
affordable public colleges and universities, and for the 
repair and maintenance of roads, bridges, and public 
transportation, all revenues received in accordance with 
this paragraph shall be expended, subject to appropriation, 
only for these purposes.  In addition to the taxes on 
income otherwise authorized under this [a]rticle, there 
shall be an additional tax of [four] percent on that 
portion of annual taxable income in excess of $1,000,000 
(one million dollars) reported on any return related to 
those taxes.  To ensure that this additional tax continues 
to apply only to the [C]ommonwealth's highest income 
taxpayers, this $1,000,000 (one million dollars) income 
level shall be adjusted annually to reflect any increases 
in the cost of living by the same method used for [F]ederal 
income tax brackets.  This paragraph shall apply to all tax 
years beginning on or after January 1, 2023." 
 
General is not required to provide certification at any stage of 
that process.  Id. 
 
 
Second, the relatedness requirement came about because "the 
drafters of art. 48 were concerned that initiatives could 
confuse voters, or could be used for 'logrolling.'"  Oberlies v. 
Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 823, 830 (2018).  "'Logrolling' refers 
to the bundling of multiple provision such that they all gain 
approval, even if one or more of them would, standing alone, be 
rejected."  Id.  Where voters themselves are crafting initiative 
petitions, and they then engage in logrolling, there is no 
mechanism for accountability to their peers or continued 
dialogue among parties.  However, where legislators are those 
involved in drafting a measure, and they engage in logrolling, 
that fact is a matter for the political process. 
7 
 
The Attorney General proposes the following summary: 
"This proposed constitutional amendment would establish an 
additional 4% [S]tate income tax on that portion of annual 
taxable income in excess of $1 million.  This income level 
would be adjusted annually, by the same method used for 
[F]ederal income-tax brackets, to reflect increases in the 
cost of living.  Revenues from this tax would be used, 
subject to appropriation by the [S]tate Legislature, for 
public education, public colleges and universities; and for 
the repair and maintenance of roads, bridges, and public 
transportation.  The proposed amendment would apply to tax 
years beginning on or after January 1, 2023."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
And the Attorney General and the Secretary propose the following 
"yes" and "no" statements: 
"A YES VOTE would amend the [S]tate Constitution to impose 
an additional 4% tax on that portion of incomes over one 
million dollars to be used, subject to appropriation by the 
[S]tate Legislature, on education and transportation" 
(emphasis added). 
 
"A NO VOTE would make no change in the [S]tate Constitution 
relative to income tax." 
The plaintiffs take issue specifically with the portions of the 
summary and "yes" and "no" statements that refer to the use of 
the proposed additional tax revenue for education and 
transportation purposes, "subject to appropriation by the 
[S]tate Legislature."  The plaintiffs note that State spending 
on education and transportation has, for decades, exceeded the 
additional tax revenue expected to be generated by the proposed 
amendment.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim that, if the 
amendment were approved, "the Legislature [could] move funding 
around -- shift current spending on education and transportation 
8 
 
to some different purpose, while swapping in the new tax dollars 
-- and thereby use the additional revenues raised by the new tax 
to increase spending on whatever it wants."  The plaintiffs 
contend that as written, the summary and "yes" and "no" 
statements mislead voters by suggesting otherwise.  We disagree. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Attorney General's summary.  "Article 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, requires the 
Attorney General to prepare a 'fair, concise summary' of each" 
ballot measure.  Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 659 
(2016).  "The summary is one of the key pieces of information 
available to voters," appearing both in the Information for 
Voters guide prepared and distributed by the Secretary prior to 
the election and on the ballot itself.  Id. at 659-660.  See 
art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  "To be 
'fair,' a summary 'must not be partisan, colored, argumentative, 
or in any way one sided, and it must be complete enough to . . . 
giv[e] the voter . . . a fair and intelligent conception of the 
main outlines of the measure.'"  Hensley, supra at 660, quoting 
Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 505 (2014).  However, 
"[t]he Attorney General is not required to conduct a 
comprehensive legal analysis of the measure, including possible 
flaws."  Hensley, supra, quoting Abdow, supra.  Indeed, the 
Attorney General must weigh the need for sufficient completeness 
against the requirement of conciseness.  Hensley, supra at 661.  
9 
 
See id., quoting Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 
Mass. 230, 243 (1946) ("Before its amendment by art. 74 in 1944, 
the original art. 48 required the Attorney General to provide a 
'description' of the proposed act . . . .  When art. 48 was 
amended and the word 'description' was replaced with the phrase 
'fair, concise summary,' 'the intention was to relax the 
requirements which have been found implicit in the word 
description.  Conciseness is emphasized in art. 48 as amended, 
and conciseness and completeness are often incompatible'" 
[alteration omitted]).  Given the balancing act required, as 
well as the fact that the Attorney General is a "constitutional 
officer with an assigned constitutional duty," we give deference 
to the Attorney General's exercise of discretion in crafting a 
summary, Hensley, supra, quoting Abdow, supra at 506, and "will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the Attorney General's 
over a 'matter of degree,'" Associated Indus. of Mass. v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 1, 11 (1992) (AIM), 
quoting Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 229-230 (1981). 
 
Here, the plaintiffs raise a single issue with respect to 
the Attorney General's summary, namely that the summary 
impermissibly misleads voters by suggesting that, to the extent 
additional revenue were appropriated under the proposed 
legislative amendment, such an appropriation would lead to an 
10 
 
increase in education and transportation spending.  Plaintiffs 
contend that such an increase in education and transportation 
spending is not, in fact, guaranteed, as the Legislature could 
use the monies newly appropriated under the amendment to replace 
prior sources of education and transportation spending, thereby 
keeping that spending constant, and then redirect those prior 
sources of spending elsewhere, thereby increasing State 
expenditures in a wholly different area.6 
 
 
6 The plaintiffs' reliance on Opinion of the Justices, 271 
Mass. 582, 589-592 (1930), and Sears v. Treasurer & Receiver 
Gen., 327 Mass. 310, 325-326 (1951), is misplaced.  First, the 
plaintiffs misapply Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. at 589-
592, by stating that "th[is] [c]ourt wrote that the initiative 
petition itself was . . . 'easily susceptible of being 
misunderstood.'"  While we did use that phrase in that decision, 
we applied it not to the measure as a whole but rather to the 
"title of the act," which was included in the Attorney General's 
summary.  Id. at 589.  Moreover, we concluded that the ambiguity 
of the title, "standing alone," would not render the proposed 
summary "defective."  Id. at 590.  Rather, it was the presence 
of other deficiencies -- such as the Attorney General's failure 
to mention several substantive provisions of the measure -- that 
proved fatal.  Id. at 590-592 (summary "contain[ed] no reference 
to the highly responsible duties imposed by the proposed bill 
upon State officers" and also inaccurately described which 
statutes measure would repeal). 
 
 
Likewise, our decision in Sears, 327 Mass. at 325-326, 
rested on the Attorney General's failure to include in the 
summary key provisions of the measure.  There, the Attorney 
General had attempted to summarize "eight pages of rather fine 
print" in a single sentence, leading us to conclude that "the so 
called 'summary' is no more than would fairly serve as a title 
for the measure."  Id. 
 
 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs do not allege that 
there are similar deficiencies in the summary.  Their argument 
 
11 
 
Our decisions in AIM, 413 Mass. at 10, and Gilligan v. 
Attorney Gen., 413 Mass. 14, 19-20 (1992), are instructive on 
this issue.  Each concerned an initiative petition proposing 
statutes that would raise revenue through an excise and channel 
that revenue into a specific fund, to be spent on certain 
enumerated purposes subject to appropriation by the Legislature.7  
See Gilligan, supra at 15-16; AIM, supra at 2-4.  In both cases, 
the plaintiffs argued that the Attorney General's summaries 
could mislead voters because they failed to explain adequately 
that, according to the plaintiffs' interpretation of the 
proposed statutes, the Legislature might not be obligated to 
spend the money as designated.  See Gilligan, supra at 19-20; 
AIM, supra at 12. 
We held that the summaries in both cases satisfied art. 
48's requirements.  See Gilligan, 413 Mass. at 19-20; AIM, 413 
 
is that the Attorney General failed to explain more 
comprehensively the implications of the measure, not that the 
Attorney General omitted a key provision.  Accordingly, our 
decisions in Opinion of the Justices and Sears are not 
dispositive or applicable here. 
 
7 We acknowledge that Associated Indus. of Mass. v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 1, 2 (1992) (AIM), and 
Gilligan v. Attorney Gen., 413 Mass. 14, 14-15 (1992), involved 
proposed statutes and not, as in the instant case, a proposed 
constitutional amendment.  This distinction was quite relevant 
to our analysis whether the proposed statute in AIM was, in 
contravention to art. 48, a "specific appropriation," AIM, supra 
at 5-9, but that portion of the opinion has no bearing on the 
question facing us today regarding the adequacy of the Attorney 
General's summaries, see id. at 11-12. 
12 
 
Mass. at 12.  Each "track[ed] the basic language of the measure" 
by accurately describing that the revenues were subject to 
appropriation, and, far from being misleading, each summary 
"apprise[d] the voters both that the expenditure of monies for 
the stated purposes would be contingent on ('subject to') an 
action of the Legislature, and exactly what that action is 
('appropriation')."  AIM, supra.  See Gilligan, supra.  So too 
here:  the summary closely tracks the language of the proposed 
amendment and thus "fairly informs voters" of its operation.  
Gilligan, supra at 20. 
Moreover, in both cases we held that the summaries need not 
address the plaintiffs' assertions that the raised revenues 
could, in theory, be spent by the Legislature for nondesignated 
purposes.  See Gilligan, 413 Mass. at 19-20; AIM, 413 Mass. at 
12.  We reasoned that, where the text of the proposed statutes 
did not expressly address that possibility, "[n]othing in art. 
48 requires the summar[ies] to include legal analysis or an 
interpretation."8  AIM, supra.  See Gilligan, supra. 
That reasoning is equally applicable to the case at bar.  
The proposed amendment does not address how the Legislature may 
 
8 That, in a brief as a party to Anderson I, the Attorney 
General offered legal analysis regarding art. 48's prohibition 
against specific appropriations is therefore of no moment here, 
where we are concerned solely with her duty to prepare an 
adequate summary. 
13 
 
spend monies other than those raised by the amendment.  
Consequently, the Attorney General's summary need not opine on 
whether, as plaintiffs contend, monies that historically have 
been spent on education and transportation could, at some future 
point, be spent elsewhere.  The summary need only describe the 
amendment itself; we hold that it does so fairly, in compliance 
with art. 48.9 
 
2.  "Yes" and "no" statements.  General Laws c. 54, § 53, 
provides, in relevant part, that the Secretary "shall cause to 
be printed and sent to all residential addresses and to each 
voter . . . fair and neutral [one]-sentence statements 
describing the effect of a yes or no vote prepared jointly by 
the attorney general and the state secretary."  It further 
provides that after the statements are published in the 
Massachusetts Register, and upon the timely petition of fifty or 
more voters, this court may require the Attorney General and the 
Secretary to amend these "yes" or "no" statements if they are 
"false" or "misleading."  Id.  We have recognized "that the one-
sentence statements cannot, and should not, attempt to describe 
all the elements of a proposed measure" because "[t]hat would 
 
9 Further, as we noted in Gilligan, "the full text of the 
measure will be made available to voters, together with partisan 
arguments for and against the measure."  Gilligan, 413 Mass. at 
20, citing art. 48, General Provisions, IV, as amended by art. 
74; G. L. c. 54, §§ 53-54. 
14 
 
undermine their usefulness as a shorthand reference for voters."  
Dunn v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 688 n.12 (2016).  We may 
order an amendment to the one-sentence statement "'only if it is 
clear' that the statement 'in question is false, misleading, or 
inconsistent with' the statute's requirements."  Id., quoting 
G. L. c. 54, § 53.  Moreover, as with the Attorney General's 
summaries, we afford deference to "the Attorney General's and 
the Secretary['s] reasonable judgments in deciding what to 
include in the one-sentence statements."  Dunn, supra. 
 
The plaintiffs claim that the instant "yes" and "no" 
statements are misleading for the same reasons that they claim 
the instant summary is unfair.  They seek to add language 
purportedly clarifying that, at the discretion of the 
Legislature, the potential revenue from the proposed tax might 
or might not actually increase State education and 
transportation spending.  For the reasons discussed supra, we 
likewise disagree with the plaintiffs' contention that the "yes" 
and "no" statements are false or misleading.  Consequently, we 
decline to exercise our power to rewrite the statements. 
 
3.  Timing of publication.  Finally, the single justice 
asked the parties to also brief the issue of when the Attorney 
15 
 
General and the Secretary should release the summary and "yes" 
and "no" statements for legislative amendments.10 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the timeline for legislative 
amendments should be that which we suggested for initiative 
petitions in Hensley, 474 Mass. at 671-672, and Dunn, 474 Mass. 
at 685-687.  In Hensley, supra at 671, "we ask[ed] the Attorney 
General and the Secretary  to consider preparing and publishing 
the title and one-sentence statements under [G. L. c. 54, § 53,] 
no later than twenty days in advance of February 1 of the 
election year," and in Dunn, supra at 687, we suggested a 
similar timeline as to the Attorney General's summaries drafted 
pursuant to art. 48, The Initiative, III, § 3, as amended by 
art. 74.  Both cases involved initiative petitions, as opposed 
to legislative amendments. 
 
The defendants, instead, advocate the following: 
"[I]f a legislative amendment receives a second vote of 
approval by a joint session of the Legislature by March of 
an election year, the [materials] for the measure should be 
prepared in accordance with the deadline for all titles and 
 
 
10 The plaintiffs commenced the present action in the county 
court before the materials at issue had been released, 
preemptively challenging them.  At that time, the single justice 
took no action and instead urged the defendants to release the 
materials in a timely fashion.  After the release of the 
materials, the plaintiffs amended their initial complaint, and 
eight voters who supported the legislative amendment intervened.  
The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full 
court and asked the parties to brief additionally the issue of 
when the Attorney General and the Secretary should be required 
to publish the informational materials for legislative 
amendments. 
16 
 
one-sentence statements set forth in G. L. c. 54, § 53.  If 
a legislative amendment is finally approved later in an 
election year, [the Attorney General and the Secretary] 
should prepare those materials as soon as possible, with 
any litigation to follow in the county court." 
 
They also note that the Legislature has not chosen to amend the 
deadline in G. L. c. 54, § 53, despite our explicit invitation 
in Hensley, 474 Mass. at 672. 
 
We endorse the defendants' proposed timeline.  A 
legislative amendment requires an affirmative vote at two 
successive joint sessions of the Legislature, and, despite our 
invitation, the Legislature has opted not to impose statutorily 
a more abbreviated timeline on this process.  While we can 
request that parties strive for a different schedule, where 
legislative amendments are at issue, it is not appropriate for 
us to impose a schedule that could be at odds with the pace of a 
fulsome legislative process, however the Legislature chooses to 
engage in that process. 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General's 
summary is in compliance with the requirements of art. 48, as 
amended by art. 74, and that the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth's one-sentence statements 
describing the effects of a "yes" vote and a "no" vote are in 
compliance with the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.