Case Title: Thornton v. Glazer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 051612

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 
 
SAMUEL H. THORNTON, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 051612 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 21, 2006 
LIMOR GLAZER, D.P.M., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Michael C. Allen, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in its refusal to admit certain deposition testimony pursuant 
to Rule 4:7 and whether the trial court erred in its refusal 
of a jury instruction regarding adverse witness testimony. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Samuel H. Thornton, Jr. (“Thornton”) sought treatment 
from Dr. Limor Glazer, D.P.M. (“Glazer”), a podiatrist, for 
severe foot pain and deformity.  Glazer diagnosed several 
problems afflicting both of Thornton’s feet, and ultimately 
performed two surgeries on Thornton.  First, she operated on 
the lesser toes of his left foot to correct the condition 
commonly referred to as “hammertoes.”  During a follow up 
visit after the first surgery, Thornton complained that he 
could not put weight on his foot because “it felt like [he] 
was walking on bone.”  Nearly two years after the surgery, 
Thornton sought treatment with Dr. Mark Jones, who concluded 
                     
∗ Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
 
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that the surgery performed by Dr. Glazer on the lesser toes of 
Thornton’s left foot had caused a “valgus deformity” in his 
second, third, and fourth toes including severe hyperextension 
of the second toe that caused Thornton a great deal of pain.  
After attempting more conservative treatments, Thornton’s 
second toe had to be amputated. 
 
Thornton filed a medical malpractice suit against Glazer 
and her practice group, alleging they were negligent in 
failing to appropriately diagnose and treat Thornton’s 
condition, and failing to obtain informed consent for the 
surgeries performed by Glazer.  The jury returned a verdict 
for the defendants and Thornton noted his appeal.  In his 
first assignment of error, Thornton argues that the trial 
court erred by refusing to admit deposition testimony from Dr. 
Jones as rebuttal testimony on causation.  In his second 
assignment of error, Thornton argues that the trial court 
erred in refusing his proffered jury instructions pertaining 
to adverse witness testimony.  In his third assignment of 
error, he alleges error in the trial court’s refusal to grant 
an instruction concerning lack of consent to surgery.  
Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, Thornton maintains 
that the trial court erred in “not setting aside the jury 
verdict as being improper and against the great weight of the 
law and the evidence.” 
 
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II.  Analysis 
A.  Refusal to Admit Deposition Testimony 
 
The facts pertinent to this assignment of error concern 
the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Jones, 
who was Thornton’s treating physician at the time of trial.  
Dr. Jones testified ore tenus that the prior surgeries 
performed by Dr. Glazer caused the deformities in the lesser 
toes of Thornton’s left foot.  Upon completion of Dr. Jones’ 
testimony, he was released from his subpoena and permitted to 
leave.  During the defendant’s case-in-chief Dr. Charles M. 
Zelen testified that the deformity on the lesser toes of the 
left foot was caused by “walking on the heel and the side of 
[the] foot” for a period of eleven months after the surgery 
performed by Dr. Glazer.  For rebuttal, Thornton sought to 
introduce a portion of Dr. Jones’ deposition wherein he 
testified that the deformity could not have been self-imposed 
by use of the foot.  Although Dr. Jones testified earlier in 
the trial, he had been released and was no longer subject to a 
subpoena. 
 
The trial court denied Thornton’s motion on the basis 
that Rule 4:7 did not permit introduction of the deposition 
testimony.  The trial court stated from the bench that Rule 
 
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4:7 applies only “to circumstances in which the witness is 
unavailable at all.  Does not attend trial.  Once they have 
attended the trial and been released, I am not sure any of 
these apply . . .” 
Rule 4:7(a)(4) in pertinent part provides: 
(4) The deposition of a witness, whether 
or not a party, may be used by any party 
for any purpose in any action upon a claim 
arising at law . . . if the court finds: 
. . . (E) that the witness is a judge, or 
is a superintendent of a hospital for the 
insane more than 30 miles from the place 
of trial, or is a physician, surgeon, 
dentist, chiropractor, or registered nurse 
who, in the regular course of his 
profession, treated or examined any party 
to the proceeding, or is in any public 
office or service the duties of which 
prevent his attending court provided, 
however, that if the deponent is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the court, the 
court may, upon a showing of good cause or 
sua sponte, order him to attend and to 
testify ore tenus . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.)  When applying our rules, we adhere to the 
plain language used in the rule.  Lifestar Response of Md., 
Inc. v. Vegosen, 267 Va. 720, 724, 594 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2004); 
Mechtensimer v. Wilson, 246 Va. 121, 122, 431 S.E.2d 301, 302 
(1993).  Rule 4:7(a)(4)(E) applies to deposition testimony by 
a physician who either treated or examined any party to the 
proceeding.  Contrary to other subsections in Rule 4:7(a)(4) 
that specifically require unavailability of the witness, the 
application of subsection (E) is based entirely upon the 
 
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witness falling within one of the listed categories.  
Consequently, a party is entitled to offer into evidence the 
deposition testimony of a treating physician even if the 
physician is available, unless the trial court finds “good 
cause” under subsection (E) to order attendance to testify ore 
tenus. 
This conclusion is directly supported by our prior 
holding in Henning v. Thomas, 235 Va. 181, 191, 366 S.E.2d 
109, 115 (1988), where we said:  “First, Rule 4:7(a)(4)(E) 
does not make lack of availability a prerequisite for the use 
of a deposition of a treating or examining physician.  Second, 
the last phrase of the rule . . . provides a mechanism for 
determining when in-person testimony will be required.”  In 
Henning, the treating physician (whose deposition was 
admitted) was deemed available in the jurisdiction where the 
trial was held, but we held that admission of the deposition 
testimony was not error under the plain terms of this rule, 
and while the option for the opponent to show good cause for 
requiring testimony ore tenus exists under the rule, “[t]he 
defendants never sought to avail themselves of this 
mechanism.”  Id. 
When announcing its interpretation of Rule 4:7, the trial 
court cited King v. International Harvester Co., 212 Va. 78, 
181 S.E.2d 656, as supporting its view of Rule 4:7.  However, 
 
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our holding in King is inapposite to the facts presented in 
this case.  There, we analyzed Rule 4:1(d)(3)(2), a 
predecessor to the current Rule 4:7(a)(4)(B), and the sole 
question we addressed was whether a party deponent had 
“procured” his own absence from the trial within the meaning 
of the Rule.  212 Va. at 80, 181 S.E.2d at 658.  We held that 
“ ‘the absence’ of the witness as used in the second condition 
of the rule means absence from the trial.”  Id. at 84, 181 
S.E.2d at 660 (emphasis added).  The “second condition” 
referred to is the current Rule 4:7(a)(4)(B), which requires 
that a deponent be located farther than 100 miles from the 
place of the trial or hearing in order for deposition 
testimony to be used.  Clearly, that is not the issue in this 
case because here the deponent is a treating physician, not a 
party, and it was never argued that he was located outside 100 
miles from the trial.  As a result, our prior interpretation 
of what is now subsection (B) is not relevant to these facts, 
but subsection (E), which pertains to treating physicians, is 
dispositive. 
Pursuant to Rule 4:7(a)(4)(E), Thornton was entitled to 
use the deposition testimony of his treating physician “for 
any purpose,” so long as it met the conditions for 
admissibility, without regard to availability or prior 
attendance for testimony ore tenus at trial.  The trial court 
 
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erred by denying Thornton’s motion to use the deposition 
testimony in rebuttal. 
B.  Refusal of Instruction No. 22 
 
Thornton offered Instruction No. 22 which was refused by 
the trial court.  The instruction read: 
The plaintiff called the defendant as an 
adverse witness.  The plaintiff is bound by as 
much of the defendant’s testimony given as an 
adverse witness as is clear, logical, 
reasonable and uncontradicted. 
The plaintiff is not bound by any of the 
defendant’s testimony given as an adverse 
witness that conflicts with any of the other 
evidence in the case. 
 
Thornton sought this instruction to provide guidance to the 
jury in its consideration of the defendant’s deposition 
testimony that was introduced during Thornton’s case in chief. 
The trial court’s refusal was based solely upon the fact 
that “reading part of deposition testimony under Rule 4:7 is 
not the same as calling a party as a witness.”  We have 
previously held that “[t]he deposition of an adverse party 
that is received in evidence as substantive proof is oral 
testimony.”  Horne v. Milgrim, 226 Va. 133, 138, 306 S.E.2d 
893, 895 (1983).  Deposition testimony that is admitted into 
evidence should be treated in the same manner as live 
testimony.  For the purpose of an instruction regarding the 
jury’s consideration of testimony of an adverse witness, there 
 
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is no distinction to be made between ore tenus testimony and 
deposition testimony pursuant to Rule 4:7. 
It is well settled that when a defendant testifies as an 
adverse witness, the plaintiff is bound by that testimony to 
the extent that such testimony is reasonable and 
uncontradicted by the plaintiff’s evidence.  E.g., 
Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 259 Va. 806, 812, 528 S.E.2d 714, 
718 (2000); Miller v. White, 222 Va. 311, 315, 281 S.E.2d 802, 
804 (1981); S & W Motor Lines, Inc. v. Bayliss, 212 Va. 124, 
125, 183 S.E.2d 169 (1971); Weddle v. Draper, 204 Va. 319, 
322, 130 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1963).  However, the plaintiff does 
not make the adverse party his own witness. 
Rule 4:7(c) provides that “introduction in evidence of 
the deposition or any part thereof for any purpose other than 
that of contradicting or impeaching the deponent makes the 
deponent the witness of the party introducing the deposition, 
but this shall not apply to the use by an adverse party of a 
deposition under [Rule 4:7(a)(3)].”  (Emphasis added.)  Rule 
4:7(a)(3) provides that “[t]he deposition of a party . . . may 
be used by an adverse party for any purpose.”  Reading these 
sections together, Rule 4:7 clearly establishes that a party 
seeking to introduce deposition testimony of an adverse party 
will not suffer the consequences of making the deponent his 
own witness.  This is the conclusion we reached in Horne v. 
 
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Milgrim, 226 Va. at 138, 306 S.E.2d at 895, where the Court 
held that “Horne was entitled to rely on [the adverse party’s] 
deposition without incurring the dangers inherent in making 
her his witness.” 
We have previously held that it is error for a trial 
court to refuse an adverse witness instruction, nearly 
identical to that offered by Thornton, when the plaintiff 
called the defendant as an adverse witness at trial.  See Cook 
v. Basnight, 207 Va. 491, 497, 151 S.E.2d 408, 412 (1966).  
The fact that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, 
offered the instruction makes no difference.  Instruction No. 
22 was a proper statement of law and it was error to refuse 
it. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
We hold that the trial court erred in its refusal to 
admit deposition testimony of a treating physician as 
rebuttal, and erred in its refusal of an adverse witness jury 
instruction.  It is unnecessary to address any remaining 
assignments of error.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
Reversed and remanded.