Case Title: In the Matter of Raymond Gupta

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19S-DI-71

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-DI-71 
In the Matter of 
Raymond Gupta, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: March 10, 2020 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice David dissent. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 10 2020, 9:24 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-71 | March 10, 2020 
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Per curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Raymond Gupta, committed attorney 
misconduct by, among other things, mismanaging his attorney trust 
accounts, charging and collecting unreasonable amounts for fees and 
expenses, neglecting numerous client matters, making false statements to 
the Commission, and evading the payment of income taxes. For this 
misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be suspended from the 
practice of law for at least three years without automatic reinstatement. 
Pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23(12.1)(b), the 
Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission and Respondent have 
submitted for approval a conditional agreement for discipline stipulating 
agreed facts, costs, and proposed discipline. Respondent’s 1995 admission 
to this state’s bar subjects him to this Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction. See 
IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. The Court approves the agreement and proposed 
discipline. 
Stipulated Facts 
Respondent admits to twenty-two separate counts of widespread 
misconduct spanning several years and consisting generally of criminal 
activity, dishonesty, gross financial mismanagement, and severe neglect of 
client matters. Respondent has been under an order of emergency interim 
suspension since June 2019. Matter of Gupta, 123 N.E.3d 696 (Ind. 2019). 
We briefly summarize below some of the more egregious counts of 
admitted misconduct, distilled from a conditional agreement comprising 
72 pages and nearly 700 paragraphs. 
Respondent has willfully failed to file federal income tax returns from 
approximately 2010 through the present, despite having earned 
substantial income during that time through his representation of clients 
in personal injury and medical malpractice cases. Respondent has been 
indicted in federal court on charges of tax evasion, and that prosecution 
remains pending as of this writing. 
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Respondent mismanaged his two Indiana trust accounts from 2010 
through 2018. Among other things, Respondent failed to keep adequate 
records, commingled personal and client funds, used trust account funds 
to pay personal or business expenses, and failed to timely disburse 
settlement funds owed to clients or third parties. 
Respondent’s contingent fee agreements required clients to pay for any 
expenses Respondent deemed necessary. Respondent routinely billed 
clients unreasonable amounts for travel and other expenses. Respondent 
also referred clients to several consultants with whom Respondent had 
professional relationships, and Respondent allowed those consultants to 
submit requests for payment without providing invoices for work 
performed. Respondent paid these amounts without question and without 
advance consultation with his clients. In one particularly galling instance, 
Respondent charged his client $13,000 for payments to a consulting 
medical clinic. Not only had the client not approved this payment, but in 
fact Respondent had paid only $4,000 to the clinic on the client’s behalf. 
Respondent, the sole owner and manager of his firm, was frequently 
absent from his law office. He delegated broad accounting authority to a 
paralegal, Danica Blecic, who had minimal or no accounting training or 
knowledge. Blecic and other nonlawyer assistants also conducted initial 
client intakes despite having no training or knowledge regarding conflict 
screening. Beginning in 2016, Respondent’s firm began accepting client 
referrals from a California for-profit corporation that does not qualify as a 
service provider authorized to make such referrals. 
Respondent neglected numerous client matters, often resulting in 
substantial prejudice to his clients. Count 16, involving a medical 
malpractice matter, is one illustrative example among many. Respondent 
did not timely respond to discovery requests or to subsequent outreach 
efforts by opposing counsel, and he failed to attend a conference to 
finalize composition of the medical review panel. As a result, the 
defendants filed motions to dismiss the case, which the court granted. 
Soon thereafter successor counsel appeared on behalf of “Client 16” and 
filed a motion to reconsider the order of dismissal. The defendants then 
filed a response in which their counsel detailed numerous unsolicited 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-71 | March 10, 2020 
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communications they had received from Client 16 regarding Client 16’s 
inability to contact Respondent, defense counsel’s forwarding of these 
communications to Respondent, and Respondent’s lack of response to 
these forwarded communications. The court denied the motion to 
reconsider. 
Respondent’s representation of clients often suffered from other 
shortcomings as well. For example, “Client 4” hired Respondent to pursue 
a personal injury claim arising from a car accident. The other driver died 
in 2011 and a supervised estate was opened for him. The estate was 
represented by counsel and the decedent’s daughter served as personal 
representative, and the estate was closed as insolvent in March 2013. 
Initially unaware that the other driver was dead, Respondent filed a 
complaint against him on Client 4’s behalf in May 2013. Later, Respondent 
petitioned to reopen the decedent’s estate and to have a special 
administrator appointed for purposes of defending against Client 4’s 
complaint. The court granted that motion and, at Respondent’s request, 
appointed Blecic as special administrator. Respondent never contacted the 
decedent’s daughter or the estate’s counsel before requesting that his own 
paralegal be appointed special administrator, and he later falsely claimed 
to the Commission that he used Blecic as special administrator because he 
did not know anyone related to the decedent.  
In recent years, Respondent has stated to the Commission and various 
courts that physical and mental health issues were compromising his 
ability to manage his firm’s caseload. Nonetheless, during this time 
Respondent failed to withdraw from existing client representations and 
continued to accept new clients. 
The parties agree that Respondent violated these Indiana Professional 
Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct: 
1.3: Failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness. 
1.4(a)(2): Failing to reasonably consult with a client about the means 
by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished. 
1.4(a)(3): Failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter. 
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1.4(a)(4): Failing to comply promptly with a client’s reasonable 
requests for information. 
1.4(b): Failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary 
to permit a client to make informed decisions. 
1.5(a): Charging or collecting an unreasonable amount for fees and 
expenses. 
1.5(c): Failing to disclose to a client the method by which a contingent 
legal fee will be determined. 
1.7(a)(2): Representing a client when the representation may be 
materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to another client, 
a former client, or a third person. 
1.15(a): Commingling client and attorney funds, and failing to 
maintain a trust account in a state (Illinois) in which the attorney 
maintains a separate office. 
1.15(b): Maintaining more than a nominal amount of attorney funds 
in a trust account. 
1.15(c): Failing to disburse earned fees and reimbursed expenses 
from a trust account. 
1.15(d): Failing to deliver promptly to a client funds the client is 
entitled to receive, and to third parties funds they are entitled to 
receive. 
1.16(a)(2): Failing to withdraw from representation of a client when 
the lawyer’s physical or mental ability to represent the client is 
impaired. 
1.16(a)(3): Failing to withdraw from representation after being 
discharged.1 
 
1 The conditional agreement cites Rule 1.16(d), but this appears to be a typographical error in 
that the disciplinary complaint alleges a violation of Rule 1.16(a)(3) and the admitted 
misconduct falls squarely within Rule 1.16(a)(3). This discrepancy does not affect our analysis. 
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5.3(b): Failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct 
of a nonlawyer employee over whom the lawyer has direct 
supervisory authority is compatible with the professional obligations 
of the lawyer. 
7.3(d): Improperly accepting referrals from a lawyer referral service. 
8.1(a): Knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the 
Disciplinary Commission in connection with a disciplinary matter. 
8.4(b): Committing criminal acts (willful failure to file income tax 
returns) that reflect adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. 
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation. 
8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
The parties also agree Respondent violated the following Indiana 
Admission and Discipline Rules:2 
23(29)(a)(2) (2010-2016): Failing to create, maintain, or retain 
appropriate trust account records. 
23(29)(a)(3) (2010-2016): Failing to create, maintain, or retain client 
ledgers for trust accounts. 
23(29)(a)(4) (2010-2016): Commingling client funds with other funds 
of the attorney or firm. 
23(29)(a)(5) (2010-2016): Making withdrawals from a trust account 
without written withdrawal authorization stating the amount and 
purpose of the withdrawal and the payee, and disbursing payments 
 
2 The time period at issue in this case spans several amendments to Rule 23 that became 
effective on January 1, 2017, including a substantial revision and reorganization of section 29. 
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from a trust account using an electronic or telephonic payment 
system. 
23(29)(a)(7) (2010-2016): Inability to produce financial records by 
electronic, photographic, computer, or other media capable of being 
reduced to printed format. 
23(29)(a)(1) (2017-2018): Failing to keep a deposit and disbursement 
journal containing a record of deposits to and withdrawals from an 
attorney trust account. 
23(29)(a)(2) (2017-2018): Failing to keep sufficiently detailed client 
ledgers. 
23(29)(a)(6) (2017-2018): Failing to keep records of electronic 
disbursements or transfers from a trust account. 
23(29)(a)(7) (2017-2018): Failing to keep reconciliation reports for a 
trust account. 
23(29)(b) (2017-2018): Inability to produce financial records by 
electronic, photographic, computer, or other media capable of being 
reduced to printed format. 
23(29)(c)(2) (2017-2018): Paying personal or business expenses 
directly from a trust account, and failing to withdraw fully earned 
fees and reimbursed expenses from a trust account. 
23(29)(c)(3)(i) (2017-2018): Failing to have periodic trust account bank 
statements delivered unopened to attorney or to another person who 
does not have authority to disburse funds, and failure to review 
periodic trust account statements. 
23(29)(c)(3)(ii) (2017-2018): Delegating responsibility of conducting 
periodic reconciliations between internal trust account records and 
bank statements to a person who has authority to disburse funds 
from the trust account. 
23(29)(c)(5) (2017-2018): Making cash disbursements from a trust 
account. 
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23(29)(c)(6) (2017-2018): Failing to keep records of electronic 
disbursements or transfers from a trust account. 
23(29)(c)(7) (2017-2018): Failing to reconcile internal trust account 
records with periodic bank account statements. 
Discussion and Discipline 
Respondent and the Commission propose that Respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for a period of at least three years 
without automatic reinstatement.  
Respondent’s pattern of misconduct was wide-ranging, severe, and 
long-lasting. Many of Respondent’s actions were intended to unjustly 
enrich himself and affiliated consultants at the expense of his clients and 
the public fisc. Several of Respondent’s clients have suffered significant 
prejudice as a result of Respondent’s neglect of their cases and financial 
mismanagement. Respondent continued to accept clients long after it had 
become apparent that he could not capably represent them, and he ceased 
practicing only when forced to do so by an emergency interim suspension. 
The parties acknowledge in their conditional agreement that 
“Respondent’s actions may warrant a different sanction” (Agreement at 
68), and indeed we have disbarred attorneys who have engaged in 
similarly egregious patterns of misconduct. See, e.g., Matter of Johnson, 53 
N.E.3d 1177 (Ind. 2016); Matter of Brown, 766 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. 2002). 
That said, our Admission and Discipline Rules “encourage appropriate 
agreed dispositions of disciplinary matters,” see Admis. Disc. R. 
23(12.1)(b)(5), and accordingly we have approved in some similar cases 
agreements for lengthy suspensions without automatic reinstatement 
rather than disbarment. See, e.g., Matter of Emmons, 68 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. 
2017) (approving a three-year suspension without automatic 
reinstatement where attorney converted guardianship funds and failed to 
comply with court orders or the disciplinary process); Matter of Philpot, 31 
N.E.3d 468 (Ind. 2015) (approving a four-year suspension without 
automatic reinstatement following attorney’s federal convictions for mail 
fraud and theft stemming from his misuse of public funds).  
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Where the severity and scope of the attorney’s misconduct are as 
extreme as Respondent’s pattern of misconduct was here, an attorney who 
seeks reinstatement will face a particularly steep burden to gain reentry. 
See Matter of Gutman, 599 N.E.2d 604, 608 (Ind. 1992) (“The present fitness 
to practice law of an attorney seeking reinstatement must be considered in 
light of the offenses for which the petitioner was disciplined. . . . The more 
serious the misconduct, the greater its negative impact on future 
rehabilitation and eventual reinstatement, the greater [the] burden of 
proof to overcome the implication of unfitness which is conjured by the 
misconduct”). It will be the rare case in which such a heightened burden 
will be met, and there is little in the record before us that would suggest 
Respondent will be capable of doing so.  
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the parties’ 
proposed discipline affords sufficient protection to the public and that the 
conditional agreement should be accepted in the interest of judicial 
economy.   
Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated the Indiana Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Admission and Discipline Rules as set forth 
above. Respondent already is under an order of interim suspension. For 
Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent 
from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less than three 
years, without automatic reinstatement, effective immediately. 
Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under 
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of the minimum 
period of suspension, Respondent may petition this Court for 
reinstatement to the practice of law in this state, provided Respondent 
pays the costs of this proceeding, fulfills the duties of a suspended 
attorney, and satisfies the requirements for reinstatement of Admission 
and Discipline Rule 23(18). 
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. Pursuant 
to the parties’ stipulation, the Court hereby orders Respondent to pay the 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-71 | March 10, 2020 
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following expenses in separate checks to be transmitted to the 
Commission: (1) $10,540.26, payable to the Commission for investigative 
expenses; and (2) $250.00, payable to the Clerk for court costs. The 
expenses of the hearing officer will be submitted separately. 
With our acceptance of the parties’ agreement, the hearing officer 
appointed in this case is discharged.  
Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Rush, C.J., and David, J., dissent and would reject the conditional 
agreement, believing Respondent should be disbarred. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  RESP O N D E NT  
Michael Brown 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T  
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Larry D. Newman, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana