Case Title: Wiggins v. Edwards

Citation: 442 S.E.2d 169

Docket Number: 24021

State: south-carolina

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1994-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
442 S.E.2d 169 (1994) MYRTLE WIGGINS, Appellant, v. Terry Lee EDWARDS, d/b/a Island Tree Service, Respondent. No. 24021. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard January 18, 1994. Decided March 7, 1994. Eric J. Davidson, of Drose, Davidson & Bennett, Charleston, for appellant. Jon L. Austen, of Wise & Cole, P.A., Charleston, for respondent. CHANDLER, Acting Chief Justice: Myrtle Wiggins (Wiggins) appeals an Order granting summary judgment to Respondent (Edwards) on a statute of limitations defense. We affirm. On November 11, 1988, Wiggins was in a three car accident involving automobiles driven by Edwards and another defendant. She sustained back injury for which she was hospitalized four days. On November 15, 1992, 3 years and 4 days from the date of the accident, Wiggins served Edwards with a summons and complaint. Edwards moved for summary judgment, contending the claim was barred by S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Supp.1992), which provides a three (3) year statute of limitations in personal injury actions. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. Wiggins appeals. Wiggins contends that the trial court erred in holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the accident. Wiggins argues that the statute here began to run at the time she was actually able to investigate her case, discover a cause of action existed, and determine who or what caused her injury. We disagree. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Supp.1992) requires that an action for personal injury "must be commenced within three years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action." Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 303, 278 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1981). This is an objective determination. Wilson v. Shannon, 299 S.C. 512, 386 S.E.2d 257 (Ct.App.1989). Moreover, the focus is upon the date of discovery of the injury, not the date of discovery of the wrongdoer: Tollison v. B & J Machinery Co., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 618, 620 (D.S.C.1993). Wiggins erroneously applies a subjective test to establish the time of discovery of her injury. This does not accord with well settled law. We hold that Wiggins should have been aware of a potential claim on the date of the accident; therefore, the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Wiggins claims that the injuries sustained in the accident rendered her "insane" until November 21, 1988; therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled until this time. We disagree. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (Supp.1992) (the tolling statute) provides in part that the statute of limitations is tolled if the plaintiff is: (1) within the age of eighteen years; (2) insane; or (3) imprisoned on a criminal or civil charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a less term than his natural life.... The general rule as to the standard for insanity under tolling statutes is that: 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 117 at 159-169 (internal footnotes omitted). Here, the confusion or disorientation suffered by Wiggins does not constitute "insanity". She did not lose consciousness nor did she sustain any type of head injury in the accident. See Annotation, Proof of unadjudged *171 incompetency which prevent running of statute of limitations, 9 ALR2d 964. Wiggins contends that her physical disability should toll the statute of limitations. We disagree. Any amendment to the disabilities provided in the tolling statute is a matter for the legislature. This Court is without authority to alter the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139, 417 S.E.2d 541 (1992). Wiggins contends that Edwards is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitation as a defense since he was the cause of the accident and was aware of the impending litigation. We disagree. A defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense if "the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been induced by the defendant's conduct." Dillon Co. Sch. Dist. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal, 286 S.C. 207, 218, 332 S.E.2d 555, 561 (Ct.App.1985), cert. granted 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d 697 (1985), cert. dismissed 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986). This may consist of an express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary. Id.; Rink v. Richland Memorial Hospital, ___ S.C. ___, 422 S.E.2d 747 (1992). Nothing in this record supports equitable estoppel. No showing whatsoever was made by Wiggins that Edwards induced her failure to comply with the statute of limitations. Wiggins argues the enforcement of the statute of limitations to bar her action violates public policy. To the contrary, statute of limitations rest on public policy. See Harrison v. Holsenbeck, 208 Ga. 410, 67 S.E.2d 311 (1951). Wiggins contends that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to her, creates a jury question as to whether the claim is time barred. We disagree. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Rule 56, SCRCP. Here, there is no question that the accident occurred on November 11, 1989. It is on that date that Wiggins should have known that a cause of action accrued. Moreover, the record shows no conduct on the part of the defendant establishing estoppel. Therefore, summary judgment was proper. Gadsden v. Southern Railway, 262 S.C. 590, 206 S.E.2d 882 (1974). AFFIRMED. FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., and WILLIAM T. HOWELL, Acting Associate Justice, concur.