Case Title: Manirakiza v. Department of Health & Human Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 10

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 10 
Docket: 
Ken-17-119 
Argued: 
November 16, 2017 
Decided: 
January 23, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
EUPHREM MANIRAKIZA et al. 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 
 
JABAR, J.  
[¶1]  Euphrem Manirakiza appeals from the judgment entered by the 
Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) upholding the final agency 
decision of the Department of Health and Human Services denying 
Manirakiza’s application for food supplement benefits.1  Because we conclude 
that the temporal and fiscal limitations contained in P.L. 2013, ch. 368, 
§ OO-14 apply only to the fiscal years ending June 30, 2013, June 30, 2014, and 
June 30, 2015, and not beyond June 30, 2015, we vacate the Superior Court’s 
judgment.   
                                         
1  The Department also denied Fatima Nkembi’s application for food supplement benefits for 
eligible members of her household.  Manirakiza’s and Nkembi’s cases were consolidated on appeal 
to the Superior Court and to us, and both cases require us to address the same legal question.  
Accordingly, this opinion refers to appellants jointly as “Manirakiza.”  
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following undisputed facts are taken from the hearing officer’s 
recommended decision, see Brown v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
2006 ME 63, ¶ 2, 898 A.2d 387, and the procedural facts are drawn from the 
trial court record.     
[¶3]  Manirakiza and his family arrived in the United States in 2014.  In 
August of 2015, after Manirakiza and his wife received Employment 
Authorization Documents, Manirakiza applied for food assistance for his 
household pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(1)(D) (2017) (Paragraph D).  Title 
22 M.R.S. § 3104-A limits the categories of legal noncitizens who are eligible to 
receive food assistance, and Paragraph D establishes that noncitizens who are 
unemployed but who have “obtained proper work documentation” are eligible 
to receive the benefit.  See 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(1)(D).  Although certain 
members of Manirakiza’s family were eligible for benefits pursuant to 
Paragraph D, the Department denied Manirakiza’s application.  After an 
administrative hearing, the hearing officer found that the Department was 
correct when it denied Manirakiza’s application based on language in the 
public law that is not present within the statutory text, which contained a 
fiscal limitation—$261,384—as well as a temporal limitation—June 30, 
 
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2015—on the availability of funding for benefits for persons otherwise 
eligible under Paragraph D.  See P.L. 2013, ch. 368, § OO-14 (Section OO-14).  
The Commissioner accepted the findings of fact and recommendation of the 
hearing officer that the Department correctly denied the application for food 
assistance pursuant to Paragraph D and Section OO-14.    
[¶4]  To resolve the statutory interpretation issue, namely how the 
limitations within Section OO-14 affected the plain language of Paragraph D, 
Manirakiza appealed to the Superior Court.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80C; see also 
5 M.R.S. § 11001 (2017).  That petition and complaint included four counts: 
Count I alleged that the Department erred when it found that Manirakiza was 
not entitled to food assistance under Paragraph D; Count II requested that the 
court certify the action as a class action and, pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 8058 
(2017), requested judicial review of the Department rule interpreting 
Paragraph D, 17 C.M.R. 10 144 301-14 § FS-111-2 (2013); Count III sought a 
declaratory judgment; and Count IV sought injunctive relief.  The Department 
filed oppositions to all counts and a motion to dismiss the independent claims, 
Counts II and III, as duplicative.   
[¶5]  On June 28, 2016, the court denied Manirakiza’s motion to certify 
the class and granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the independent 
 
4 
claims as duplicative.  In order to determine whether Manirakiza was likely to 
succeed on the merits, the court also requested memoranda of law concerning 
the interpretation of Paragraph D.  After receiving further argument on that 
issue, in an order dated January 15, 2017, the court denied Manirakiza’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that Manirakiza had failed to 
demonstrate he was more likely than not to succeed on the merits.  After the 
denial of the preliminary injunction, the parties agreed that the record was 
complete, that it was unnecessary to conduct further discovery, and that it 
was unnecessary to provide additional briefing or argument.  On February 28, 
2017, upon those agreements by the parties, the court entered final judgment 
in favor of the Department, upholding the Department’s statutory 
interpretation of Paragraph D and the resulting denial of Manirakiza’s 
application for food assistance.  Manirakiza timely appealed to us.  See 
14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2 (Tower 2016).2   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  On appeal, Manirakiza contends that the court erred by 
(1) entering final judgment in favor of the Department on the statutory 
interpretation issue, effectively determining that Paragraph D also contained 
                                         
2  Because this appeal was filed before September 1, 2017, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate 
Procedure do not apply.  See M.R. App. P. 1.  
 
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the temporal and fiscal limitations of Section OO-14, and that those limitations 
were effective beyond the fiscal years ending June 30, 2013, June 30, 2014, 
and June 30, 2015; (2) denying his motion for class certification; and 
(3) dismissing the independent claims contained in Counts II and III of his 
complaint as duplicative.3  
A. 
Statutory Interpretation of 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(1)(D) 
 
[¶7]  “When the Superior Court acts in an intermediate appellate 
capacity pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, we review the administrative agency’s 
decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Somerset Cty. v. Dep’t of 
Corr., 2016 ME 33, ¶ 14, 133 A.3d 1006 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks 
omitted).  We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.  See Wong v. 
Hawk, 2012 ME 125, ¶ 8, 55 A.3d 425.   
 
[¶8]  The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent.  See Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 19, 
107 A.3d 621.  “Only if the plain language of the statute is ambiguous will we 
look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such 
as legislative history.”  Scamman v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41, 
                                         
3  Although the Complaint contains four counts, Count IV seeks injunctive relief based on the 
arguments set forth in Count I, and it is therefore not an independent claim. 
 
6 
¶ 14, 157 A.3d 223.  “Statutory language is considered ambiguous if it is 
reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  “When a statute administered by an agency is ambiguous, we 
review whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and 
uphold its interpretation unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
[¶9]  In 2013, the Legislature amended 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A to add 
Paragraph D, which created a fourth category of food assistance eligibility in 
addition to the three categories that already existed under the statute.  See P.L. 
2013, ch. 368, § OO-2.  The Legislature enacted this amendment in an 
appropriations bill entitled “An Act Making Unified Appropriations and 
Allocations for the Expenditures of State Government, General Fund and Other 
Funds and Changing Certain Provisions of the Law Necessary to the Proper 
Operations of State Government for the Fiscal Years Ending June 30, 2013, 
June 30, 2014 and June 30, 2015.”  P.L. 2013, ch. 368 (the appropriations bill).  
With the 2013 amendment, 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(1) now reads, in relevant part,  
1. Food assistance.  The department shall provide food 
assistance to households that would be eligible for assistance 
under the federal Food Stamp Act of 1977 . . . .  A noncitizen legally 
admitted to the United States . . . is not eligible for food assistance 
through a state-funded program unless that noncitizen is: 
A.  
Elderly or disabled . . . ; 
 
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B.  
A victim of domestic violence;  
C.  
Experiencing other hardship, such as time necessary 
to obtain proper work documentation . . . ; or   
D.  
Unemployed 
but 
has 
obtained 
proper 
work 
documentation, as defined by the department by rule.  Rules 
adopted by the department under this paragraph are routine 
technical rules as defined by Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 
2-A.  
 
(emphasis added).  Neither party argues that the language of Paragraph D is 
ambiguous on its face.  However, in the same part of this appropriations bill, 
P.L. 2013, ch. 368, part OO (Part OO), the Legislature also included the 
following unallocated language,4  
Sec. OO-14. Funding limit for legal noncitizens with 
work documentation but not yet employed.  Funding for 
noncitizens legally admitted to the United States who are eligible 
for a hardship exception under the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 
22, section 3104-A, subsection 1, paragraph D or Title 22, section 
3762, subsection 3, paragraph B, subparagraph (2), division (d) is 
limited to $261,384 until June 30, 2015.  If the funding limit is met 
prior to June 30, 2015, legal noncitizens with work documentation 
are no longer eligible for the hardship exception under Title 22, 
section 3104-A, subsection 1, paragraph D or Title 22, section 
3762, subsection 3, paragraph B, subparagraph (2), division (d). 
 
P.L. 2013, ch. 368, § OO-14 (emphasis added).  It is this italicized language—
“no longer eligible”—that gives rise to the ambiguity in this case because it 
                                         
4  The Maine Legislative Drafting Manual provides that “[a]n unallocated provision is law that is 
published in Laws of the State of Maine but is not included in the Maine Revised Statutes.”  Office of 
the Revisor of Statutes, Maine Legislative Drafting Manual, pt. II, ch. 1, § 1(A) at 15 (1st ed. 
Oct. 1990, rev. Oct. 2016).  In contrast, allocated provisions of law are those that appear in the 
Maine Revised Statutes.  Id.  
 
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conflicts with Paragraph D, the plain language of which contains no limitation.  
Because the unallocated language in Section OO-14 makes the statutory text of 
Paragraph D susceptible to different interpretations, Paragraph D is 
ambiguous.  Scamman, 2017 ME 41, ¶ 14, 157 A.3d 223.  Specifically, the 
phrase “no longer eligible” demonstrates a legislative intent to either (a) limit 
the total amount of the benefits paid pursuant to Paragraph D only during the 
fiscal years that the bill appropriates funds for; or (b) permanently cut off 
Paragraph D eligibility once the funding limit of $261,384 has been met or 
after June 30, 2015, despite the absence of any limiting language within the 
allocated language of the Paragraph D statutory provision itself.  To resolve 
the ambiguity, we must look to external indicia of legislative intent.  Id.  
[¶10]  The Maine Legislative Drafting Manual is particularly informative 
in this case because it expresses what the Legislature generally intends when 
it allocates language to an existing statutory framework or chooses not to 
allocate the language to any statute,  
A. Public Law.  Public law bills propose laws that affect all 
of the people of the State or all persons or things of a particular 
class.  Since these bills affect the general law, the sections of a 
public law bill that are of general or long-lasting application are 
almost always allocated to the Maine Revised Statutes; that is, they 
are placed somewhere in the existing statutory framework.  
Temporary provisions of a public law bill or housekeeping 
provisions are usually not allocated to the statutes but are drafted 
 
9 
as unallocated law and placed at the end of the bill (e.g., transition 
provisions, retroactivity clauses, appropriation and allocation 
clauses, effective date clauses and emergency clauses . . . ).  An 
unallocated provision is law that is published in Laws of the State 
of Maine but is not included in the Maine Revised Statutes.  
 
Office of the Revisor of Statutes, Maine Legislative Drafting Manual, pt. II, ch. 1, 
§ 1(A) at 15 (1st ed. Oct. 1990, rev. Oct. 2016). 
[¶11]  Section OO-14 was not placed “somewhere in the existing 
statutory framework.”  Indeed, it was placed at the end of Part OO, and it was 
not included in the Maine Revised Statutes.  Moreover, there are fourteen 
sections within Part OO of the appropriations bill, and every section other 
than Section OO-14 amends an existing statutory provision.  See P.L. 2013, 
ch. 368, §§ OO-1 to OO-13.  Section OO-14, at the very end of Part OO, is the 
only section that does not amend an existing statutory provision.  Language 
that the Legislature intends to be “of general or long-lasting application [is] 
almost always . . . placed somewhere in the existing statutory framework,” and 
“temporary . . . or housekeeping provisions . . . are drafted as unallocated law 
and placed at the end of the bill.”  According to the drafting manual’s general 
statement of intent regarding allocated versus unallocated language, 
Section OO-14 fits squarely within the parameters of a “temporary,” 
“housekeeping,” or “appropriation” provision placed at the end of a bill.  
 
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Conversely, the fact that the Legislature allocated the language of Paragraph D 
to an “existing statutory framework” indicates the Legislature’s intent for that 
language to be of “general” or “long-lasting application.”  It is also structurally 
relevant that Part OO of the appropriations bill both enacted Paragraph D and 
included the language found in Section OO-14; if the Legislature had intended 
for Section OO-14 to permanently limit Paragraph D, it could have done so by 
means of a limiting provision within the statutory language itself. 
[¶12]  The Department argues that although the “language of § OO-14 
could have appeared in the codified portion, its absence does not render it a 
nullity. . . . Whatever the wisdom of this choice, it remains true that the 
unallocated language must be given equal consideration as the allocated.”  The 
Department is correct that the language in Section OO-14 is not a nullity.  See 
Bowler v. State, 2014 ME 157, ¶ 12, 108 A.3d 1257 (“[A]n unallocated 
provision of law is a law nonetheless . . . .”).  The Legislature’s decision not to 
allocate the language to an existing statutory framework, however, indicates 
an intentional distinction between the nature of the two provisions.  The 
Department’s contention that the provisions should “be given equal 
consideration” does not comport with the meaningful distinction between 
allocated and unallocated law.   
 
11 
 
[¶13]  Further, in the summary portion of the Committee Amendment, 
the Legislature explained that Part OO of the appropriations bill “amends the 
food supplement and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families programs for 
legal aliens to limit eligibility to those noncitizens who are unemployed but 
who have obtained proper work documentation.”  Comm. Amend. A to H.P. 
1079, L.D. 1509, No. H-468 (126th Legis. 2013).  Although this is “language of 
limitations,” its limitation applies only to the category of noncitizen who is 
eligible for the benefit; there is no indication that the Legislature also 
intended for those eligible to be eligible only for a limited time or only until 
the predetermined funding limit was met.  The opposite appears to be true: 
the broad nature of the summary indicates an intent for Paragraph D to be 
permanent. 
 
[¶14]  We also endeavor to construe statutes to avoid an illogical or 
absurd result.  Wong, 2012 ME 125, ¶ 8, 55 A.3d 425.  If not absurd, the result 
of interpreting Section OO-14 to create a permanent limitation on 
Paragraph D is at least illogical.  It would be illogical to expect that a seemingly 
straightforward statutory provision could be limited, in perpetuity, by a 
portion of unallocated law in an appropriations bill affecting only specific 
years.  Those who look to the Maine Revised Statutes—which are readily 
 
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accessible and set forth as the law of our State—should not be required to 
look to the appropriations bills for each legislative session in which a statute 
was adopted or amended in order to determine whether a statutory provision, 
that is unambiguous on its face, may somehow contain a limitation buried in 
one of those appropriations bills, which only appropriate funds for limited 
time periods.   
[¶15]  We conclude that the Legislature intended for Paragraph D to be 
a permanent exception to the general ineligibility of noncitizens for food 
assistance under 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(1), that the language of limitation 
contained in Section OO-14 was language of limitation only for the fiscal years 
ending June 30, 2013, June 30, 2014, and June 30, 2015, and that once that 
budget period ended on June 30, 2015, absent other legislative action, the 
Department was required to provide food assistance to applicants eligible 
under Paragraph D in the same way that it must provide food assistance to 
those persons eligible under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of the same 
statutory provision.  See 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(1)(A)-(C).   
B. 
Class Certification and Dismissal of Independent Claims 
 
[¶16]  Manirakiza argues that the court applied the incorrect legal 
standard when it denied his motion for class certification, and that it was 
 
13 
improper for the court to dismiss the independent claims, Counts II and III, as 
duplicative.  Finding no error in these decisions, we affirm the actions of the 
court.   
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Melissa A. Hewey, Esq., David M. Kallin, Esq. and Amy K. Olfene, Esq. (orally), 
Drummond Woodsum, Portland, and Robyn Merrill, Esq., Maine Equal Justice 
Partners, Augusta, for appellants Euphrem Manirakiza and Fatima Nkembi 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Quinn, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-16-07 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY