Case Title: Sodergren v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-71

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sodergren v. State1986 WY 49715 P.2d 170Case Number: 85-71Decided: 02/26/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
BARRY SODERGREN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Susan K. Overeem and 
Patricia Nagel, Casper.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Michael A. Blonigen, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Attys. Gen., Cheyenne and J. Scott 
Evans, Natrona County Dist. Atty., Casper.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, ROONEY (Retired), and GUTHRIE (Retired), 
JJ.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
by a NatronaCounty jury of two counts 
of manslaughter and sentenced to the penitentiary. In appealing the judgment and 
sentence appellant raises as issues:

 
 
"I

 
 
"Is State v. Thomas still controlling and 
thus the District Court erred in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction?

 
 
"II

 
 
"Is § 6-4-107 W.S. 1977 
unconstitutional, therefore Appellant could not be charged under that 
statute?

 
 
"III

 
 
"Does Appellant's trial 
and conviction of manslaughter violate the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution and Wyoming 
Constitution?

 
 
"IV

 
 
"Was Appellant's right to 
a speedy trial as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Wyoming 
Constitution violated?

 
 
"V

 
 
"Did the District Court 
err in refusing to give Appellant's requested instructions on the lesser 
included offense of vehicular homicide?

 
 
"VI

 
 
"Did the District Court 
err in refusing to give Appellant's requested instructions P, K, and 
J?

 
 
"VII

 
 
"Should Appellant have 
been sentenced under the penalty provision of § 31-5-1117 W.S. 1979 or § 6-2-106 
W.S. 1983?"

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     In a collision August 
23, 1982, between a truck driven by appellant Barry Sodergren and a Pinto 
automobile driven by Mia Olsen, Miss Olsen and a passenger, her mother, were 
killed. The collision took place west of Casper at the intersection of Highway 
20-26 and Ten Mile 
Road. Appellant testified that he never saw the Olsen 
vehicle and that he failed to stop at the stop sign on Ten Mile Road before 
entering the highway. He also testified that he slowed down to 20-25 miles per 
hour before entering the intersection; however, other witnesses testified that 
he was traveling 60 to 75 miles per hour and that he never slowed down before 
entering the intersection. Appellant's own witness, a traffic accident analyst, 
testified that appellant's minimum speed upon entering the intersection was 32.5 
miles per hour, and that it was "reasonably possible" that he could have been 
driving as fast as 70 miles per hour.

 
 

[¶4.]     On September 10, 1982, 
a criminal complaint was signed, charging appellant with two counts of 
involuntary manslaughter. After a preliminary hearing on September 19, 1982, 
appellant was bound over to Natrona County District Court; and on October 1, 
1982, an information was filed in district court. At the arraignment on November 
9, 1982, appellant pled not guilty. On the same day, the district court wrote a 
letter to counsel expressing doubts regarding the court's jurisdiction over the 
case. A motion to dismiss was filed by appellant November 12, 1982, questioning 
the jurisdiction of the district court. The district court issued a decision 
letter, November 16, 1982, ruling that the court had no jurisdiction over the 
matter. A bill of exceptions in response to the district court decision letter 
was entered by the state on November 24, 1982. An order of dismissal was signed 
and entered December 15, 1982.

 
 

[¶5.]     On June 8, 1983, this 
court entered an order denying the state's application to file a bill of 
exceptions; and on June 10, 1983, the attorney general filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari requesting this court to review the district court's order 
dismissing the manslaughter charges. On June 28, 1983, this court entered an 
order granting certiorari for the purpose of reviewing the district court's 
ruling that appellant could not be prosecuted under § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1979). On June 26, 1984, this court rendered its decision in which a 
majority held that Barry Sodergren could be charged under § 6-4-107, reversed 
the district court's order, and remanded the case to the district court for 
trial. State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 
686 P.2d 521 (1984).

 
 

[¶6.]     For clarification the 
following dates after remand are set out: The trial date had been set for August 
27, 1984; on August 23, 1984, the district attorney filed a motion for 
continuance of the trial date to October 1, 1984. Over the objection of 
appellant, the trial date was continued to September 24, 1984. On September 4, 
1984, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial; and on 
September 13, 1984, the district court denied appellant's motion to dismiss. On 
September 18, 1984, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
by the district court and a motion to compel discovery. Appellant also filed an 
application for a stay of proceedings in district court to enable him to apply 
for a writ of certiorari to the Wyoming Supreme Court for review of the district 
court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy 
trial.

 
 

[¶7.]     The trial commenced on 
September 24, 1984; on September 25, 1984, an order was entered denying 
appellant's pending motions. On October 2, 1984, this court entered a nunc pro 
tunc order denying appellant's petition for writ of certiorari and application 
for stay of proceedings. On September 27, 1984, a verdict was returned finding 
Barry Sodergren guilty of two counts of manslaughter. On February 15, 1985, 
appellant was sentenced to a term in the penitentiary. On February 25, 1985, 
notice of appeal was filed by appellant.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶8.]     In his first assignment 
of error appellant invites us to reconsider State v. Sodergren, supra, (hereinafter 
Sodergren I). In that case a divided 
court held that manslaughter, under § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1979), was 
the appropriate charge rather than vehicular homicide, under § 31-5-1117(a), 
(b), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982). Because the majority expressed two different 
reasons for the holding, counsel has characterized Sodergren I as a plurality 
opinion.

 
 

[¶9.]     Two justices in the 
majority determined that there was an infirmity in a portion of the vehicular 
homicide statute which rendered that portion inoperative. Because of this 
infirmity appellant could not be prosecuted under the vehicular homicide 
statute, and therefore it was proper to prosecute him under the manslaughter 
statute. One justice in the majority determined that the vehicular homicide 
statute could be read together with the manslaughter statute to the end that 
both could stand. This case is the latest chapter in the torturous history of 
the relationship of the vehicular homicide statute to the manslaughter statute. 
We are not optimistic that this case will be the final 
chapter.

 
 

[¶10.]  In Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 
(1977), we held that the vehicular homicide statute and the "culpable neglect" 
or "criminal carelessness" portion of the manslaughter statute proscribed the 
same conduct, provided different penalties for the same conduct, and were 
therefore repugnant. In Bartlett v. 
State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1235 (1977), we held that the 
vehicular homicide statute had impliedly repealed the "unlawful act" portion of 
the manslaughter statute, at least to the extent that an act "malum prohibita" 
was involved.

 
 

[¶11.]  In Lopez v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 157, 160 
(1978), in an effort to resolve the recurring conflict between the vehicular 
homicide and the manslaughter statutes, this court held:

 
 
"In order to level out 
and bring order to a chaotic state of the law, we hold that all vehicular 
homicides, short of murder and voluntary manslaughter, are prosecutable 
exclusively as a violation of § 31-5-1115, W.S. 1977. We overrule all decisions 
of this court to the contrary. * * *"

 
 

[¶12.]  Perhaps the Lopez case would have finally 
settled the vehicular homicide statute-manslaughter statute problem except the 
statutes were amended. For a more detailed history of the problem reconciling 
vehicular homicide and manslaughter, see Sodergren I.

 
 

[¶13.]  It is significant that in Thomas, Bartlett and Lopez, supra, this court determined that 
a manslaughter charge was improper because an existing viable vehicular homicide 
statute proscribed the same conduct, but provided different penalties, and was 
therefore repugnant. In those cases it is succinctly stated that an existing 
viable vehicular homicide statute barred a manslaughter charge and conviction 
for vehicular death. In the absence of a vehicular homicide statute, a 
prosecution for manslaughter would have been proper. In Sodergren I we held that a vehicular 
homicide statute did not bar a conviction for manslaughter. Two different 
reasons were expressed by the majority as to why the vehicular homicide statute 
was not a bar to prosecution for manslaughter.

 
 

[¶14.]  We have reviewed our holding in Sodergren I and are not persuaded that 
we should reverse our determination. Under the circumstances, manslaughter was 
the proper charge.1

 
 
II

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant contends in his second 
assignment of error that the manslaughter statute under which he was prosecuted, 
§ 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), is unconstitutional.2 This issue was raised for the first 
time on appeal. In Jahnke v. State, 
Wyo., 692 P.2d 911, 928 (1984), we stated:

 
 
"* * * Our rule is that 
in the absence of fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the 
appellant or involving the jurisdiction of the court, we do not consider 
questions sought to be raised for the first time on appeal. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43 (1983), 
cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983); Nickelson v. People, Wyo., 607 P.2d 904 (1980); and Nisonger v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1094 
(1978). Furthermore, unless plain error is present, questions concerning the 
constitutionality of a statute are not considered on appeal if the party 
presenting them failed to present or argue the contentions in the trial court. * 
* *"

 
 

[¶16.]  There is no jurisdictional problem here. 
Furthermore, appellant has not argued that point, nor do we see a fundamental 
error in trying appellant under the manslaughter statute given the circumstances 
of this case. It does not appear that the plain error doctrine, as we explained 
it in Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 
(1977), is applicable here. It is significant that appellant does not argue 
plain error.

 
 

[¶17.]  Discussing the constitutionality of the 
manslaughter statute applicable here, § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), 
would have little, if any, precedential value in that the manslaughter statute 
has been amended several times, and is now § 6-2-105, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1985).3 In urging that § 6-4-107 is 
unconstitutional, appellant, in effect, again invites us to reexamine our 
determination in Sodergren I. Again, 
we are not persuaded we should do that; and for the reasons stated, decline to 
discuss the constitutionality of § 6-4-107.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶18.]  In appellant's third issue he contends 
that Sodergren I effected an 
unforeseeable expansion of narrow and precise statutory language by judicial 
interpretation, and departed from the position taken by this court in the Thomas, Bartlett and Lopez cases. He complains that by 
allowing the manslaughter charge to stand in Sodergren I, we expanded the criminal 
liability to which he was exposed, and by applying the decision retroactively we 
created an ex post facto law.4 Appellant's argument is based on Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1964). An examination of Bouie 
and later cases, however, indicates that the Bouie doctrine does not preclude 
appellant from being tried for manslaughter.

 
 

[¶19.]  In Bouie v. Columbia, supra, two black 
college students entered a segregated lunch counter in Columbia, South 
Carolina. When asked to leave they refused to do so; 
they were subsequently arrested, and charged with violating a South Carolina criminal 
trespass statute. After their arrest, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled 
that remaining on the premise after a request to leave constituted criminal 
trespass. Before that time, South 
Carolina decisions had indicated a trespassory entry was 
necessary to conviction. Merely remaining on the premises after a request to 
leave had not previously been deemed sufficient to constitute a crime. Although 
the students' entry to the lunch counter had been made before the court's 
decision and had not been trespassory, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
sustained the conviction by retroactive application of its new decision. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judicial decision could not 
be applied retroactively if the decision interpreted a narrow and precise 
statute in an expansive manner which could not be foreseen. Specifically, the 
Court found that the South 
Carolina decision had rendered the students' conduct 
criminal when it had been noncriminal at the time of the incident. The Court 
said the defendants were deprived of fair warning that their actions were 
criminal since it was unforeseeable that the scope of the statute might be 
expanded in such a manner.

 
 

[¶20.]  Despite this holding, the Bouie case cannot be read to prohibit 
all retroactive application of judicial decisions. For example, this doctrine 
clearly does not apply if a state court is merely interpreting a statute for the 
first time. Furthermore, where there is no expansive decision in derogation of 
existing law there can be no foreseeability problem, or more succinctly, a fair 
warning problem. Retroactive application of a judicial decision is not improper 
if the statute itself has already provided fair warning to the defendant. Thompson v. Gaffney, 540 F.2d 251 (6th 
Cir. 1976).

 
 

[¶21.]  We now turn to an application of the 
principles in Bouie to the present 
case. Because the decision in Sodergren 
I, that appellant could be charged with manslaughter, was based on two 
separate theories, we will discuss both the plurality and the specially 
concurring opinion in light of the principles enunciated in Bouie. In the plurality opinion, 
authored by Chief Justice Rooney, it was held that the vehicular homicide 
statute in effect at the time of appellant's conduct was unconstitutional. This 
statute provided:

 
 
"(b) Whoever, except when the violation of law involves 
culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, unlawfully and unintentionally, but 
with a conscious disregard of the safety of others, causes the death of 
another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or ordinance 
applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, 
except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set forth in subsection (a) 
of this section, is guilty of homicide by vehicle when the violation is the 
proximate cause of death and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more 
than two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars or imprisoned in the county jail for not 
more than one (1) year, or both." (Emphasis added). § 31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1982).

 
 

[¶22.]  The plurality found the two emphasized 
clauses to be contradictory, and on that basis found the statute to be vague and 
ambiguous. For these reasons, the plurality held that the statute was 
"unconstitutional and inoperative." Having found the vehicular homicide statute 
to be unconstitutional, the plurality then determined that: "The only statute 
under which prosecution could be had was the manslaughter statute under which 
respondent was charged." Sodergren I, 
supra, at 527.

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant contends that this holding was 
an unforeseeable reversal of Lopez v. 
State, supra. We cannot agree. The reason for the Lopez ruling was because 
the two statutes proscribed the same conduct. It was unfair to subject some 
defendants to misdemeanors and others to a felony. This principle was recognized 
in Sodergren I.

 
 

[¶24.]  Sodergren I did not overrule Lopez. In fact, we recognized in Lopez that conduct such as appellant's 
did fall within the manslaughter statute. However, in Lopez we found that the manslaughter 
statute had been impliedly repealed by adoption of the vehicular homicide 
statute governing the same conduct. The vehicular homicide statute at issue in 
Lopez was later repealed, and was 
replaced by the statute deemed inoperative in Sodergren I. Thus, after declaring the 
vehicular homicide statute unconstitutional, only one valid statute remained to 
proscribe appellant's conduct, the manslaughter statute.

 
 

[¶25.]  The plurality opinion in Sodergren I was not inconsistent with 
prior case law. This court was interpreting the vehicular homicide statute for 
the first time, so there was no prior interpretation upon which to rely. Foster v. Barbour, 613 F.2d 59 (4th 
Cir. 1980); and Crosby v. Ellsworth, 431 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 
1970). Furthermore, there was no judicial expansion of criminal liability under 
the manslaughter statute. Conduct such as appellant's has long been recognized 
as falling within the ambit of the manslaughter statute. In part I we indicated 
that the only bar to prosecution for manslaughter in the Thomas, Bartlett and Lopez cases was an existing, viable 
vehicular homicide statute. Here, there was no existing, viable vehicular 
homicide statute. Finally, there is no statutory conflict here since the 
vehicular homicide statute was deemed inoperative. For this reason, the Bouie doctrine is not fulfilled. There 
is no judicial decision which interprets narrow and precise language in an 
expansive manner. Rather, there is an initial interpretation in Sodergren I of a statute containing 
vague and imprecise language.

 
 

[¶26.]  Nor is Bouie violated by the rationale of the 
specially concurring opinion in Sodergren 
I. There, although one justice agreed that appellant could be charged with 
manslaughter, his theory was different from that of the plurality. He argued 
that the two statutes could be read together to proscribe different conduct. Sodergren I, supra, (Thomas, J., 
specially concurring). Much of what we have said regarding the plurality opinion 
is applicable to the specially concurring opinion. This was an initial 
interpretation of a new statute. The interpretation was consistent with the 
prior decisions of this court.

 
 

[¶27.]  Finally, there was no fair warning 
problem under either the plurality or specially concurring opinion. Appellant 
had fair warning that his conduct was criminal. The opinion in Sodergren I did not constitute a 
"radical and unforeseeable departure from existing law." United 
States v. Wilder, 680 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 
1982). Certainly any claim that this was a settled area of the law in Wyoming is untenable in 
light of our opinions and the activity of the legislature in recent 
years.

 
 

[¶28.]  Furthermore, this court's opinion in Sodergren I did not render legal conduct 
illegal, nor does appellant so argue. He does, however, complain that his 
conduct now falls under a different statute. The observations of the Eighth 
Circuit seems particularly appropriate in this case.

 
 
"* * * His position, 
reduced to its simplest terms, is that he would be convicted for kidnapping 
only, rather than for kidnapping for ransom. This kind of reliance interest is 
not, in our view, entitled to a great deal of weight. When a person does an act 
that he well knows to be a violation of some law, and when a statute is later 
interpreted to cover his conduct in a way that does not do violence to the 
ordinary understanding of the English language, the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
offended." Knutson v. Brewer, 619 F.2d 747, 750-751 (8th Cir. 1980). See also, Welton v. Nix, 719 F.2d 969, 970 (8th 
Cir. 1983).

 
 

[¶29.]  For all of the reasons stated above, we 
are not persuaded by appellant's claim.

 
 
IV

 
 

[¶30.]  Appellant's fourth assignment of error 
raises a speedy trial problem. The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that, "[B]y virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial is enforceable against the states as `one of the most basic rights 
preserved by our Constitution.' * * *" Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969).

 
 

[¶31.]  Appellant was charged with manslaughter 
on September 10, 1982; he was ultimately tried on this charge September 24, 
1984. On the surface, a period of about twenty-five months between a complaint 
and trial would seem unusually long. However, most of this twenty-five months 
involved proceedings in the Wyoming Supreme Court. In the forepart of this 
opinion we detailed the circuitous history of this case, which reveals that from 
December, 1982 until June, 1984, or about eighteen months, the criminal charge 
against appellant was before this court. Considering the complex legal problems 
in Sodergren I, together with a 
specially concurring opinion and two dissenting opinions, it is not unreasonable 
that this case was in the Wyoming Supreme Court for eighteen 
months.

 
 

[¶32.]  In the absence of bad faith, neglect, or 
purposeful delay, an appeal by the state does not of itself weigh against the 
state in a speedy trial problem. United 
States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 
1984). In this case, rather than a traditional appeal, the delay was occasioned 
by petitions for a bill of exceptions, and a petition for a writ of certiorari, 
in effect, an interlocutory appeal. We held in Grable v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 663 
(1982), that the filing of the mandate of reversal in the district court was the 
date on which appellant's right to a speedy trial commenced. No mandate was 
issued in Sodergren I, but the 
opinion and journal order were issued on June 26, 1984, and the record returned 
to the district court July 18, 1984. A period of less than two months transpired 
between filing the original information and commencement of the appellate 
process with the filing of a bill of exceptions, that is, October 1, 1982, to 
November 24, 1982. It is not contended that this delay was unreasonable. This 
matter was originally before the district court for two months, and before this 
court eighteen months. While we will not ignore the time the case was originally 
before the district court and the time before this court on appeal, we will 
consider principally the time after the record was returned to the district 
court following the opinion in Sodergren 
I and the date of the actual trial, a period of sixty-eight 
days.

 
 

[¶33.]  In determining whether appellant's right 
to a speedy trial was violated we are guided by a four-part test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). This test involves, 1) length of the delay; 2) 
reason for the delay; 3) a defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial; 
and 4) whether prejudice resulted to the defendant from the 
delay.

 
 

[¶34.]  As indicated earlier, the delay of 
twenty-five months between the criminal complaint and actual trial was beyond 
the state's control, mainly because of this court's disposition of a complex 
case and a proliferation of opinions. The state controlled only sixty-eight days 
of that period of time, having asked for a four-week continuance in order to 
find all of its witnesses. A reason for delay, such as a missing witness, is a 
valid reason and will justify a delay. Barker v. Wingo, 
supra.

 
 

[¶35.]  About three weeks before trial, appellant 
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. This motion was denied. We 
have held that appellant has an affirmative duty to make certain a speedy trial 
violation does not occur. Cook v. 
State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 5 (1981). Failure to fulfill 
that duty within a reasonable time operates as a waiver. In this case 
appellant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until the "eleventh 
hour" weighs heavily against him.

 
 

[¶36.]  We cannot see any prejudice to appellant 
because of the delay in trial. In Barker 
v. Wingo, supra, three possible objectives in obtaining speedy trials were 
indicated: "(i) [T]o prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize 
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the 
defense will be impaired. * * *"

 
 

[¶37.]  The first two concerns have no 
application here. Appellant was not incarcerated before trial, and there is no 
indication that his concern and anxiety was more severe than usually experienced 
by an accused. Grable v. State, 
supra.

 
 

[¶38.]  As to the third concern, appellant 
contends that the delay prejudiced his defense because two years after the 
accident many of the physical marks left at the scene by the collision had 
disappeared, thus hindering his ability to have an accident reconstruction 
expert testify on his behalf. The need for a reconstruction expert existed from 
the beginning, regardless of the charge filed against him. The physical evidence 
any expert would need to reconstruct the accident would vanish in a matter of 
days, not months. Any prejudice to appellant resulting from the lack of physical 
evidence at the scene is due to his failure to preserve this evidence. 
Prejudice, if any, can be linked directly to factors other than delay by the 
prosecution. Appellant demonstrates no prejudice in support of his speedy trial 
claim, nor do we see any.

 
 

[¶39.]  As to the four-part test in Barker, no 
single factor is determinative. The four factors must be balanced and a 
determination made as to whether a speedy trial right has been violated. Here, 
appellant's argument fails for several reasons. First, he has counted time the 
case was in this court, which is not chargeable to the state. Second, appellant 
failed to assert his right to a speedy trial until three weeks before trial. 
Finally, the alleged prejudice has not been linked to the 
delay.

 
 

[¶40.]  In addition to the constitutional right 
to a speedy trial, appellant claims a statutory right. Rule 45(b), Wyoming Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, provides:

 
 
"By the Court - If there 
is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an 
information against the defendant who has been held to answer to the district 
court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the 
court may dismiss the indictment, information or 
complaint."

 
 
Rule 204, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, provides in 
part:

 
 
"(a) It is the 
responsibility of court and counsel to insure to each person charged with crime 
a speedy trial.

 
 
"(b) A criminal charge 
shall be brought to trial within 120 days following the filing of information or 
indictment."

 
 

[¶41.]  These rules cited by appellant are 
applicable only after the record in Sodergren I was returned to the district 
court, and as mentioned before, trial in the district court began sixty-eight 
days after this time. We indicated in our constitutional discussion of the 
speedy trial problem that sixty-eight days from the return of the record to 
trial was not unreasonable, and this period of time did not violate any rule 
regarding a speedy trial.

 
 
V

 
 

[¶42.]  Appellant next contends that the district 
court erred in refusing to give his requested instructions B, E and Q. Appellant 
says in his brief that "these three instructions pertain to the lesser-included 
offense of vehicular homicide." Appellant's proposed instruction B, while 
characterized as a lesser-included offense, is not a lesser-included offense 
instruction; it sets out the elements of involuntary manslaughter and 
more.

 
 

[¶43.]  The court instructed the jury, following 
Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal, § 7.503, p. 125 (1978), 
thusly:

 
 
"Instruction No. 
6

 
 
"The necessary elements 
of involuntary manslaughter are:

 
 
"1. The crime occurred 
within the County 
of Natrona on or about the 
date of August 23, 1982; and

 
 
"2. The Defendant killed 
a human being; and

 
 
"3. The Defendant acted 
involuntarily; but

 
 
"4. With culpable neglect 
or criminal carelessness.

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant not 
guilty.

 
 
"If, on the other hand, 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty."

 
 

[¶44.]  Appellant's proposed instruction B 
contained the first four elements that were contained in the court's instruction 
No. 6; additionally, such proposed instruction added two elements as 
follows:

 
 
"5. That the culpable 
negligence or criminal carelessness was the proximate cause of the accident; 
and

 
 
"6. The defendant's 
conduct does not come within the exception provided in W.S. 
31-5-1117."

 
 

[¶45.]  The statute under which appellant was 
charged, § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), reads:

 
 
"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, except as provided in W.S. 
31-5-1117, or by any culpable neglect 
or criminal carelessness, is guilty 
of manslaughter * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶46.]  It is obvious from reading the 
manslaughter statute that proximate cause is not an element of the crime as 
proposed by appellant in element 5 of his proposed instruction B. In view of our 
holding in Sodergren I, reference to § 31-5-1117, is improper. The effect of our 
ruling in that case was the elimination of the § 31-5-1117 exception. 
Appellant's proposed instruction B was not a lesser-included offense 
instruction, and was an incorrect involuntary manslaughter 
instruction.

 
 

[¶47.]  In his proposed instructions E and Q, 
appellant requested the court to instruct the jury that vehicular homicide is a 
lesser-included offense in the charge of manslaughter. Offered instruction E 
makes reference to a vehicular homicide statute, § 31-5-1117(a), (b), W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1979), that was superseded by the statute we considered in Sodergren I, § 31-5-1117(a), (b), W.S. 
1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982). We know of no authority for the suggestion that a statute 
no longer in force can serve as the basis for an instruction. Furthermore, in Sodergren I we did not reinstate the 
1979 statute (§ 31-5-1117(a), (b), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1979)). In Sodergren I, because of the infirmities 
of the vehicular homicide statute, we determined that statute could not be the 
basis of a criminal charge. That being the case, appellant could not be 
convicted of vehicular homicide; therefore, it could not be a lesser-included 
offense. See generally, Amin v. 
State, Wyo., 694 P.2d 119 
(1985).

 
 
VI

 
 

[¶48.]  Appellant argues that the court's refusal 
to give his proposed instructions J, K and P was reversible error. They read as 
follows:

 
 
"Instruction No. 
J

 
 
"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT 
to make an act carelessly performed 
resulting in death a criminal one, the carelessness must have been gross, 
implying an indifference to consequences; and the term culpable neglect means something more 
than mere negligence. It means wantonness and a disregard of the 
consequences which may ensue and indifference to the rights of others that is 
equivalent to a criminal intent.

 
 
"And carelessness by 
reason of driving at a speed that is unreasonable or is such as is likely to 
endanger life or limb is not necessarily criminal carelessness within the 
meaning of our statute providing for punishment for manslaughter." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
"Instruction No. 
K

 
 
"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT 
whether the misconduct of the defendant amounted to `culpable neglect' or 
`criminal carelessness' is to be determined from the nature of the act and not 
from its consequences.

 
 
"Not only must the 
misconduct be of grave character, but under the statute, it must also be willful. By willful misconduct is meant 
either intentional misconduct - that is, such as is done purposely, with 
knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince a wantonness and 
disregard of the consequences which may ensue, and indifference to the rights of 
others that is equivalent to a criminal intent. (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
"Ordinary negligence 
could never be even serious misconduct, much less willful misconduct. No 
misconduct which is thoughtless, heedless, inadvertent, of the moment, and none 
which arise from an error of judgment can be willful, culpable, or criminal 
carelessness.

 
 
"Nor will every violation 
of a statute or a public regulation, or a rule, regulation, order or instruction 
of an employer, constitute willful conduct or criminal 
carelessness."

 
 
"Instruction No. 
P

 
 
"You are instructed that 
the defendant is not charged with the violation of any traffic statute or 
ordinance, and any violation of a traffic ordinance will not, of itself, 
constitute criminal or culpable negligence."

 
 

[¶49.]  We are not convinced that appellant's 
objection to the court's refusal to give these proposed instructions was 
sufficiently specific to comply with Rule 31, W.R. Cr.P. and Rule 51, Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The spirit and policy of these rules is to "apprise 
and inform the trial court of the purpose of the offered instructions and of 
objections to proposed instructions so that he may have an opportunity to 
correct and amplify them before submission to the jury." Alberts v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 447, 453 
(1982). Rather than analyze appellant's objections, however, we will address the 
issue of the propriety of appellant's proposed 
instructions.

 
 

[¶50.]  The jury was instructed as to the 
necessary elements of involuntary manslaughter, and the definitions of 
"involuntarily," "culpable neglect" and "criminal carelessness." These 
instructions are found in W.P.J.I.C., §§ 7.503, 7.508, 7.510 (1978), and were 
based on the cases cited therein. Having instructed the jury on the general 
principles of law applicable in this case, the trial court discharged its duty. 
Benson v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 595 
(1977). An instruction does not have to be worded exactly as requested by a 
party as long as the correct statement of law was given to the jury. Alberts v. State, supra; and Scheikofksy v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981).

 
 

[¶51.]  A trial court properly refuses 
instructions which unduly emphasize one aspect of the evidence. Ellifritz v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1300 (1985); and Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 
(1982). "The weight to be given any particular portion of evidence is a matter 
for counsel to argue and for the jury to decide." State v. Humbolt, 1 Kan. App. 2d 137, 562 P.2d 123, 127 (1977). An instruction should not tell the jury how to weigh a 
particular piece of evidence, State v. 
Lee, 221 Kan. 109, 558 P.2d 1096 (1976), nor how to 
decide an ultimate factual issue in a case. Britton v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935 
(1982). Appellant's proposed instructions, in essence, told the jury how to view 
the evidence indicating appellant had been speeding and that he had run the stop 
sign. These proposed instructions unduly emphasized one aspect of the evidence 
and were otherwise improper. The cases cited by appellant only minimally support 
his position, and therefore will not be considered.

 
 

[¶52.]  The court properly refused to give 
appellant's proposed instructions J, K and P. The portions of these 
instructions, which were correct statements of the law, were embodied in other 
instructions given by the court.

 
 
VII

 
 

[¶53.]  In appellant's final assignment of error 
he contends that he should have been sentenced under "§ 31-5-1117, W.S. 1979 or 
§ 6-2-106, W.S. 1983." Section 31-5-1117 was the vehicular homicide statute in 
effect when appellant was first charged in 1982. Section 6-2-106 was the statute 
in effect at the time appellant was sentenced, February 15, 1985. Appellant has 
contended throughout his trial and appeal that he should have been charged with 
vehicular homicide. Before we could logically rule that appellant should have 
been sentenced under § 31-5-1117, Sodergren I should be overruled. We 
again say no compelling reason has been shown why we should do 
this.

 
 

[¶54.]  Appellant's argument that he should have 
been sentenced under § 6-2-106 is based on § 6-1-101(c), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), which provides:

 
 
"In a case pending on or 
after the effective date, involving a crime committed prior to the effective 
date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different from the penalty 
under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser 
sentence."

 
 

[¶55.]  In Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812, 815 
(1984), this court said:

 
 
"* * * We conclude that 
the legislative intent is to have the law in effect prior to July 1, 1983 
control all aspects of the prosecution for a crime in which any of its elements 
occurred prior to that date, with a single exception - any original sentence imposed after July 1, 
1983 must be the lesser of that provided for the crime where the new code and 
the old code diverge."

 
 

[¶56.]  Section 6-1-101(c) does not apply in this 
case. Appellant was charged with, and convicted of, involuntary manslaughter. 
Both the previous and the current statutes proscribing manslaughter provide for 
a sentence of up to twenty years in the state penitentiary. Section 6-4-107, 
W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1979) and § 6-2-105(b), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). 
Thus, the new code and the old code do not diverge, making § 6-1-101(c) entirely 
inapplicable. Appellant's interpretation and application of § 6-1-101(c) is 
inappropriate; he was never charged with or convicted of vehicular homicide. 
Appellant was properly sentenced under the manslaughter 
statute.

 
 

[¶57.]  Appellant has presented seven ingenious, 
well-reasoned arguments, none of which are irrational. The principal thrust of 
the arguments in issues I, II, III, V and VII is that we should overrule Sodergren I. We are not persuaded that 
we should.

 
 

[¶58.]  We have carefully examined appellant's 
seven issues raised on appeal, and find no reversible 
error.

 
 

[¶59.]  Affirmed.

 
 

THOMAS, C.J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

 
 

GUTHRIE, J. (Retired), files a 
specially concurring opinion.

 
 

CARDINE, J., 
dissents.

1 Appellant suggests that 
because Sodergren I was a plurality 
opinion the vehicular homicide statute in effect at that time was not 
effectively declared unconstitutional, although the plurality opinion said it 
was. We are not disposed to discuss that suggestion, which is now academic. The 
current vehicular homicide statute is § 6-2-106, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985). 
This statute replaced § 31-5-1117(a), (b), W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1982), the 
latter statute having been declared unconstitutional in Sodergren I.

2 In State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (1984), 
(Sodergren I), this court 
specifically determined that § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1979), was the 
proper statute under which to prosecute appellant. Appellant has not persuaded 
us that we should now reverse ourselves and declare this statute 
unconstitutional.

 
 
In State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056 
(1956), the constitutionality of the manslaughter statute, § 9-205, W.C.S. 1945, 
was attacked. There, appellant contended that the statute was unconstitutional 
as a denial of due process in that the terms "unlawful act," "culpable neglect" 
and "criminal carelessness" were so vague and ambiguous as to provide no 
ascertainable standard of guilt. In Wilson the court reaffirmed its prior 
determination and declined to declare the manslaughter statute unconstitutional. 
Here, the manslaughter statute under which appellant was charged, § 6-4-107, 
W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), also contains the terms "unlawful act," "culpable 
neglect" and "criminal carelessness." However, State v. Wilson, supra, is of only 
slight precedential value because the manslaughter statute has been amended 
since the Wilson case.

3 In 1982 the manslaughter 
statute was amended and renumbered by an act of the legislature (Wyoming 
Criminal Code of 1982), Ch. 75, S.L. of Wyoming, 1982 (§ 6-2-105), effective 
July 1, 1983. However, before the effective date of this amended statute the 
manslaughter statute was again amended, Ch. 171, S.L. of Wyoming, 1983 (§ 
6-2-106), with an effective date of July 1, 1983; thus, the 1982 amendment never 
became the state law. The statute was again amended, Ch. 215, S.L. of Wyoming, 
1985 (§ 6-2-106), and became effective May 23, 1985.

4 We note initially that 
appellant phrases the issue in terms of ex post facto laws. Technically, ex post 
facto prohibitions in the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions apply to actions by the legislative branch of government and do 
not apply to judicial decisions. Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S. Ct. 990, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977); and Frank v. 
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 
(1915). However, as will be illustrated by Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1964), similar considerations do apply to judicial decisions through the 
due process clause.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶60.]  I concur in the result in this case. 
Because of the position that I articulated in my separate opinion in State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 686 P.2d 521 
(1984), I believe that it would have been appropriate to give the requested 
instructions on the lesser included offense of vehicular homicide. I have not 
receded from that position.

 
 

[¶61.]  I am satisfied, however, that the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of guilt with respect to 
the charge of manslaughter, and under those circumstances I do not discern 
prejudicial error in the failure to give these instructions in light of the 
prior decision of the court in State v. 
Sodergren, supra.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶62.]  I dissent for the reasons stated in my 
dissenting opinion found in State v. 
Sodergren, Wyo., 686 P.2d 521 at 539 (1984).

 
 

GUTHRIE, Justice (Retired), 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶63.]  I reluctantly 
concur.

 
 

[¶64.]  I have a strong disagreement with the 
opinion and disposal of the preceding case of State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 
686 P.2d 521 (1984), and had I been a participant in its disposal, would have 
joined the dissents of Justices Rose and Cardine. It is my view that I must 
accept that disposition as the law insofar as it is applicable to this 
case.

 
 

[¶65.]  I do this because a fair and proper 
judicial system must recognize the force and application of the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Thus it would be improper to indulge myself in an explanation of 
my personal views as contrasted to that case.