Case Title: T Investments, LLC v. City of Montgomery Planning Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0017, SC-2023-0262, SC-2023-0337, SC-2023-0351, SC-2023-0790, SC-2023-0822

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: December 8, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0017 
_________________________ 
 
T Investments, LLC, and FHM Company, LLLP  
 
v.  
 
City of Montgomery Planning Commission and City of 
Montgomery 
 
 
 
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-21-901370) 
 
COOK, Justice. 
 
SC-2023-0017 
2 
 
T Investments, LLC, and FHM Company, LLLP,1 challenge the 
Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment denying their petition for a writ of 
mandamus directing the City of Montgomery Planning Commission ("the 
Commission") to conditionally approve their preliminary plat for a 
proposed development within the geographical limits of the City of 
Montgomery ("the City"). Because we conclude that the Commission 
failed to record a legally sufficient reason for denying conditional 
approval of the preliminary plat, we reverse the judgment and remand 
the case with instructions for the circuit court to grant the petition for 
the writ of mandamus. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
FHM owns approximately 85 acres of undeveloped land in the City's 
County Downs neighborhood ("the subject property"). County Downs was 
originally developed in 1974. From the beginning, the neighborhood has 
continuously been zoned as "R-75-S," a designation that restricts 
 
1Although the pleadings and other filings identify this entity as 
FHM Company, LLP, materials in the record, including the affidavit of 
James B. Marshall, Jr., a partner in this entity, reflect that the entity's 
actual name is FHM Company, LLLP, which is also how this entity is 
listed in the Alabama Secretary of State's online business-records 
database. 
SC-2023-0017 
3 
development to single-family residential dwellings on lots with at least 
75 feet of road frontage. Since 1974, different portions of County Downs 
have been systematically developed at different times. Notably, although 
County Downs is zoned "R-75-S," the developed lots adjacent to the 
subject property generally have between 85 and 100 feet of road frontage.  
As County Downs has expanded, proposed plats contemplating the 
development of unimproved land within the neighborhood have been 
submitted to the Commission for approval. In January 2002, FHM 
submitted a preliminary plat for the subject property ("the 2002 
preliminary plat") to the Commission. The 2002 preliminary plat 
proposed the development of 327 single-family, residential homes on lots 
that were approximately 100 feet wide. Although the Commission 
conditionally approved the 2002 preliminary plat, that plat was never 
submitted to the Commission for final approval, and the subject property 
remained undeveloped.  
In 2021, FHM entered into an agreement with T Investments to 
develop the subject property. As part of the agreement, FHM authorized 
T Investments to act as its agent in, among other things, seeking the 
Commission's approval of a proposed development on the subject 
SC-2023-0017 
4 
property. The City's subdivision regulations require developers to comply 
with a two-stage process for plat approval. First, a subdivider, which is 
defined in § IX.C of the City's subdivision regulations as "[a]ny person or 
corporation or duly authorized agent who undertakes the subdivision of 
[the] lands" at issue, must seek the Commission's conditional approval of 
a preliminary plat. See § II.A-C of the City's Subdivision Regulations.  To 
do so, the subdivider must submit the "preliminary plat together with 
other supplementary material as deemed necessary by the … 
Commission and specified in Section III" of the subdivision regulations.  
Id., § II.B.1. 
Conditional approval of a preliminary plat by the Commission does 
"not constitute approval of the final plat," but, rather, is  
"deemed an expression of approval of the layout submitted on 
the preliminary plat as a guide to the preparation of the final 
plat, which will be submitted for the approval of the … 
Commission, and for recording upon the fulfillment of the 
requirements of [the subdivision] regulations and the 
conditions of the conditional approval, if any."  
 
Id., § II.B.5.  If the Commission grants conditional approval, and after 
the subdivider satisfies the requirements set forth in the subdivision 
regulations and any conditions imposed by the Commission, the 
SC-2023-0017 
5 
subdivider then submits a final plat for approval and recording. See id., 
§ II.D. 
T Investments hired Flowers & White Engineering to create a 
preliminary plat for the subject property that conformed with the 
requirements for "R-75-S" zoning districts. The preliminary plat 
proposed subdividing the subject property into 244 lots for single-family, 
residential use, with typical lot sizes that were 75 feet wide and 135 feet 
deep.  
In October 2021, the preliminary plat was submitted to the 
Commission for conditional approval. City staff noted that the 
preliminary plat complied with the City's zoning ordinance and 
subdivision regulations. Moreover, the City's engineering, traffic, fire, 
water, and sewer departments, along with the Montgomery County 
Health Department, expressed no objections to the preliminary plat.  
 
Consideration of the preliminary plat was initially set for a hearing 
at the Commission's October 28, 2021, meeting. At that meeting, 
however, the Commission urged representatives of T Investments to 
meet with certain residents of County Downs ("the residents") to discuss 
their concerns regarding the preliminary plat. As a result, T Investments 
SC-2023-0017 
6 
voluntarily delayed its request for conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat until the Commission's next meeting on November 18, 
2021, and it arranged for its representatives to meet with the residents 
on November 9, 2021. 
Representatives from both T Investments and Flowers & White met 
with the residents on November 9, 2021. The primary concern expressed 
by the residents at the meeting was the proposed width of the lots in the 
preliminary plat. Some of the residents were concerned that the proposed 
smaller lot sizes in the preliminary plat would cripple the value of 
existing homes in County Downs. Although the residents acknowledged 
that the "R-75-S" zoning designation required that each lot have only 75 
feet of road frontage, they nevertheless asked that the preliminary plat 
be amended to propose lots with at least 100 feet of road frontage. T 
Investments, however, would not agree to the residents' request, and no 
resolution of this disagreement was reached at the meeting. 
Consideration of the preliminary plat was reset for a hearing at the 
Commission's November 18, 2021, meeting. All nine commissioners, 
along with several members of the City's land-use staff, were present at 
the meeting. During the meeting, the Commission and City officials 
SC-2023-0017 
7 
discussed, among other things, the connectivity of the street system in 
County Downs, the neighborhood's sewage infrastructure, whether a 
traffic study was required at the conditional-approval stage, and whether 
the preliminary plat submitted by T Investments could supersede the 
2002 preliminary plat previously conditionally approved by the 
Commission. Kenneth White, the Flowers & White engineer who had 
prepared the preliminary plat, asserted that he had met with the City's 
traffic engineer before submitting the preliminary plat to the 
Commission and that the traffic engineer had not indicated that a traffic 
study was required. According to White, the City's zoning ordinance -- 
rather than the 2002 preliminary plat -- controlled the width of the 
proposed lots in the preliminary plat. White further explained that, as 
development of the subject property pursuant to preliminary plat 
proceeded, there would be greater street connectivity within County 
Downs, which would help improve the quality of emergency and other 
municipal services to the neighborhood. 
Several of the residents also appeared at the meeting to object to 
the proposed development of the subject property. The Commission heard 
from some of the residents, who voiced concerns about increased traffic, 
SC-2023-0017 
8 
exacerbation of existing drainage issues, and the fact that the 2002 
preliminary plat called for lots with 100 feet of road frontage, rather than 
the 75-feet-per-lot of road frontage proposed by the preliminary plat. One 
of the residents, attorney Richard Dean, submitted a letter to the 
Commission on the day of the meeting, specifically asking it to deny 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat for eight enumerated 
reasons.2  
At the meeting, Dean explained that, in his view, the City's 
subdivision regulations required subdividers "to have a traffic study 
ahead of time before [the Commission] approve[d] a plat that has a 
subdivision of 50 houses or more." Dean argued that some neighborhood 
residents had relied on the 2002 preliminary plat when purchasing 
homes in County Downs. Dean also provided the Commission with his 
overview of the legal and regulatory framework governing the 
Commission's review of the preliminary plat: 
 
2The Commission took Dean's letter under advisement during the 
meeting. Dean's letter noted that the Commission's bylaws and the 
relevant statute required that it state in its records a valid reason for 
denying conditional approval of a preliminary plat. See § 11-52-32(a), 
Ala. Code 1975, and Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 305, 308 (Ala. 
1979). 
SC-2023-0017 
9 
"MR. DEAN: I'll hurry. I just want to explain, very 
briefly, the law …. You are supposed to vote on this. You can 
vote it up or down. The statute says, the ground of disapproval 
shall be stated on the record if you vote it down.  
 
"You have to state a reason for it to be valid. Secondly, 
the case law says, valid reason. There's no definition of valid 
reason. But what the cases all come down on is health, morals, 
public safety, welfare of the community, stuff like that. 
 
"I have given you a memo with eight good, valid reasons, 
including the fact the plat's already out there that says 
something different. But if you do vote it down -- here's where 
most … planning commissions get messed up. 
 
"You either vote and it's a tie and you do nothing, well, 
it's automatically approved in 30 days. If you vote it down, but 
you don't give your reasons on the record tonight, it's going to 
be approved in 30 days. But it -- you're just like a jury. You 
decide. You vote. 
 
"If five of you vote this plat down, and you state your 
reasons tonight, that's the final decision. I don't want you to 
assume it's going to be an appeal. I looked. I didn't see but 
about three cases that have ever been appealed. And when it 
does get appealed, it's not somebody suing the [C]ity. They 
just asking a circuit judge to review what you did. They can 
ask the appellate courts to review what you did. You can vote 
it down and give a reason -- and by the way, the law says you 
can give as many reasons as you want. 
 
"Only one of them has got to be valid. So I've typed up 
eight of them for you …. 
 
"…. 
 
"I'm asking … you make an affirmative motion to vote it 
down, second it, and then vote. And please state your reasons 
SC-2023-0017 
10 
on the record if you do so. And you will not be overturned. 
That's my opinion. I've researched it. 
 
"…. 
 
"If you vote to approve it, it's approved. No reason has 
to be given. If you vote it down, you have to state your reason 
on the record here at the meeting tonight. One person's of the 
opinion it's got to be in writing. I'm of the opinion you can 
orally state it because we're being filmed. There's a nice little 
video of this. But you have to give a reason why you're denying 
it. 
 
"I had one attorney tell me you -- to be safe, you need to 
make a motion to deny it or disapprove or vote down the plat, 
whatever you call it, a second, a discussion, if you want. Then, 
you vote. And if you vote to deny it, somebody has to say, okay, 
the reason is this. 
 
"And I suggest you give a lot of reasons because if there's 
an appeal, if just one of those reasons is valid, it's going to be 
upheld. That's what I'm asking to do. If you want to vote it 
down, I'd like you to give every one of them eight reasons I 
gave you. And that's your discretion. I'm not trying to tell you 
what to do. But that would help down the road." 
 
 
A commissioner moved to deny conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat, and that motion was seconded. Ann Clemons, the 
Chairperson of the Commission, then asked that those commissioners in 
favor of denying conditional approval of the preliminary plat raise their 
right hand. All nine commissioners raised their right hand, and 
Chairperson Clemons announced that the motion to deny conditional 
SC-2023-0017 
11 
approval of the preliminary plat carried by a 9-0 vote. After the vote, 
Chairperson Clemons polled some of the Commission's members as to the 
reasons they had voted to deny conditional approval of the preliminary 
plat. Commissioner Buddy Hardwich asserted that conditional approval 
of the preliminary plat should be denied for safety reasons. 
Commissioner Crews Reaves stated that he had voted to deny conditional 
approval of the preliminary plat for reasons relating to safety, drainage, 
and the applicability of the 2002 preliminary plat. Commissioner James 
Reid stated that he had voted to deny conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat because it did not conform with the 2002 preliminary 
plat. Commissioner Frank Cook cited the lack of a traffic study and the 
preliminary plat's deviations from the 2002 preliminary plat. The 
remaining five commissioners did not vocalize their reasons for 
disapproving of the preliminary plat. 
 
On the following day, November 19, 2021, Thomas M. Tyson, Jr., 
the land-use-control administrator for the City and the Commission's 
executive secretary, sent Flowers & White a letter stating that the 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat had been denied for "safety 
reasons, drainage, and … [failure to] conform to the preliminary plat that 
SC-2023-0017 
12 
was approved in 2002." The minutes of the Commission's November 18, 
2021, meeting were also considered and approved at its next meeting on 
December 9, 2021. Those minutes contain the following entry:  
 
"Presented 
by 
Flowers 
& 
White 
Engineering 
representing T Investments, LLC requesting preliminary 
approval of County Downs Addition Preliminary Plat located 
on the east end of Paddock Lane in an R-75-[S] (Single-Family 
Residential) Zoning Districts. 
 
 
"ACTION: After thorough study and consideration and 
based on the facts as presented, a motion was made by Mr. 
Reaves, seconded by Mr. Dunn, and carried to deny this 
request for safety reasons, drainage, and this plat does not 
conform to the preliminary plat that was approved in 2002, by 
the following vote: 
 
 
"AYES 
 
: 
UNANIMOUS  
 
9 
 
"NAYS 
 
: 
NONE 
 
 
 
0 
 
"RECUSED 
: 
NONE 
 
 
 
0 
 
"ABSTAINED 
: 
NONE 
 
 
 
0 
 
"ABSENT  
: 
NONE 
 
 
 
0" 
(Emphasis added.) 
On December 30, 2021, T Investments and FHM petitioned the 
circuit court for a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to 
conditionally approve the preliminary plat submitted on November 18, 
2021. The Homeowners Association of County Downs ("the HOA") 
petitioned to intervene. The circuit court denied the HOA's petition, and 
the HOA appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the circuit court's 
SC-2023-0017 
13 
order denying the HOA's petition to intervene. County Downs 
Homeowners Ass'n v. T Invs., LLC, [Ms. CL-2022-0572, Sept. 30, 2022] 
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (table). The HOA, however, was 
allowed to file an amicus curiae brief in the circuit court.  
On October 26, 2022, the circuit court heard oral arguments. At oral 
arguments, the Commission and the City conceded that T Investments 
had not been required to provide a traffic study, stating that, "[w]ith a 
planned unit development, you do have to have what they call a traffic 
study. However, with a preliminary plat, you do not have to have a traffic 
study." The Commission and the City additionally clarified that the lack 
of a traffic study is "just one thing. It's not safety. It's not drainage." The 
Commission and the City argued that the denial "wasn't based solely on 
what the residents [were] saying. It wasn't based solely on the traffic 
study. It wasn't based solely on the fact that the residents [were] 
concerned about the 75-feet homes and the 100-feet homes. They were, 
but it was also safety issues that [were] addressed." In addition, the 
Commission and the City raised no arguments pertaining to T 
Investments and FHM's failure to provide a traffic study in their answer 
to the mandamus petition. Attached to the Commission and the City's 
SC-2023-0017 
14 
answer, moreover, was the affidavit of Tyson, who stated that "T 
Investments presented a preliminary plat, whereas, a preliminary plat is 
a map of the property which can be used in any zoned district. For a 
preliminary plat, a traffic impact study is not required."  
 
On December 2, 2022, the circuit court entered a judgment 
upholding the Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat and denying T Investment and FHM's petition for a writ 
of mandamus. Specifically, the circuit court found that, although the 
stated reasons of "drainage" and "failure to conform to the [2002 
preliminary plat]" were legally insufficient grounds for denying 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat, the Commission's decision 
to deny approval based on "safety reasons" was valid. According to the 
circuit court, it was upholding the Commission's decision to deny 
approval based on "safety reasons" because (1) § III.A.3(j) of the City's 
subdivision regulations "suggests a traffic analysis approved by the … 
Commission may be necessary for approval of the preliminary plat (based 
on the subdivision consisting of more than 50 dwelling units and/or where 
deemed appropriate by the planning commission)," (2) there was no 
traffic study provided at the time the preliminary plat was presented, 
SC-2023-0017 
15 
and (3) the transcript of the November 18, 2021, meeting reflects that 
Commissioner Cook stated that one of his reasons for denying the 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat was the lack of a traffic 
study. As the circuit court explained: 
 
"The final reason cited by the … Commission for denying 
the preliminary plat was based upon 'safety.' The record 
reflects that at least one [c]ommissioner cited lack of a traffic 
study and potential danger to neighborhood residents caused 
by increased traffic in the area. While there was no objection 
to the preliminary plat from the traffic engineering 
department of the City of Montgomery, Sec. III(A)(3)(j) of [the 
City's subdivision regulations] governing requirements for 
preliminary approval of plats states: 
 
"'Data required as a basis for the preliminary plat 
in A(1) above shall include the following 
information: 
 
 
"'[(j)] For all planned unit developments, 
subdivisions consisting of more than 50 dwelling 
units, and for any subdivision when deemed 
appropriate by the planning commission, a 
comprehensive traffic analysis, which must be 
approved by the planning commission, indicating 
the probable effect of the proposed subdivision on 
traffic patterns and capacities of adjacent streets 
in the immediate area.' 
 
 
"Because the foregoing City [subdivision regulation] 
suggests a traffic analysis approved by the … Commission 
may be necessary for approval of the preliminary plat (based 
on the subdivision consisting of more than 50 dwelling units 
and/or 
where 
deemed 
appropriate 
by 
the 
planning 
commission), this Court cannot find that the decision to deny 
SC-2023-0017 
16 
the plat due to safety concerns was arbitrary and capricious. 
While this Court may have reached a different decision than 
the … Commission, the standard of review requires that the 
Court uphold the Commission's decision unless it is arbitrary 
and capricious. While a close call, based upon the foregoing, 
the above-styled Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED."  
 
(Some emphasis added; some emphasis in original.) T Investments and 
FHM subsequently appealed the circuit court's judgment denying their 
petition for a writ of mandamus to this Court.  
Standard of Review 
"There is no dispute that the proper standard of review in 
cases based on an administrative agency's decision is whether 
that decision was arbitrary or capricious or was not made in 
compliance with applicable law. 
 
"'Our 
standard 
of 
review 
regarding 
administrative actions is very limited in scope. We 
review the circuit court's judgment without any 
presumption of correctness since that court was in 
no better position than this court to review the 
agency decision …. The special competence of the 
agency lends great weight to its decision. That 
decision must be affirmed unless arbitrary, 
capricious, or not made in compliance with 
applicable law …. Neither the circuit court nor this 
court may substitute its judgment for that of the 
administrative agency.'" 
 
Ex parte City of Fairhope, 739 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1999) (quoting State 
Dep't of Revenue v. Acker, 636 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)).  
Discussion 
SC-2023-0017 
17 
At issue in this appeal is whether T Investments and FHM are 
entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to grant 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat. T Investments and FHM 
argue that the Commission failed to adequately state in writing its 
reasons for denying conditional approval of the preliminary plat within 
30 days of the plat's submission and that such failure should have 
resulted in the automatic approval of the preliminary plat pursuant to  
§ 11-52-32(a), Ala. Code 1975. We begin our analysis by reviewing the 
law governing a planning commission's decision to disapprove a 
subdivision plat. 
I. 
A planning commission's authority to regulate the subdivision of 
land is derived from legislative act. Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 
305, 307 (Ala. 1979). " 'In exercising its function approving or 
disapproving any particular subdivision plat, [a planning commission] 
acts in an administrative capacity, and is bound by any limitations on its 
authority contained in the legislation authorizing it to act, as well as any 
restrictions contained in its own regulations.'" Id. (quoting Boulder Corp. 
v. Vann, 345 So. 2d 272, 274 (Ala. 1977)).  
SC-2023-0017 
18 
Alabama's subdivision-control statutes, § 11-52-30 et seq., Ala. 
Code 1975, impose certain limitations on a planning commission's review 
of subdivision applications. As relevant here, § 11-52-32(a) provides that 
a planning commission "shall approve or disapprove a plat within 30 days 
after the submission thereof to it; otherwise, the plat shall be deemed to 
have been approved, and a certificate to that effect shall be issued by the 
municipal planning commission on demand." Section 11-52-32(a) further 
mandates that "[t]he ground of disapproval of any plat shall be stated 
upon the records of the municipal planning commission."  
Appellate decisions interpreting § 11-52-32(a) make clear that the 
reasons assigned for the denial of a subdivision application must be both 
(1) valid and (2) "sufficiently clear … to inform a developer 'wherein the 
plan failed to meet the requirements of the regulations.'" Ex parte Pine 
Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Ala. 1992) (quoting E.C. Yokely, 
The Law of Subdivisions § 54 (2d ed. 1981); see Smith, 374 So. 2d at 308 
("'Where a subdivision plan is disapproved, valid reasons must be given 
for such action.'" (quoting Yokely, supra, § 54 (1963 and Supp. 1979))); 
Mobile City Plan. Comm'n v. Southern Region Devs., Inc., 628 So. 2d 739, 
740 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (affirming a trial court's decision to grant 
SC-2023-0017 
19 
mandamus relief to developer when planning commission cited existence 
of vague "concerns" and "questions" as reasons for denying developer's 
subdivision application).  
As this Court explained in Sigler v. City of Mobile, 387 So. 2d 813 
(Ala. 1980),  
"[i]n passing judgment on a landowner's proposed subdivision, 
[a planning commission] must assign its reasons for denial 
within thirty (30) days. If it does not do so, approval is 
automatic under the statute. An invalid reason is equivalent 
to no reason …." 
 
Id. at 814 (emphasis added). Importantly, in addition to being both valid 
and unambiguous, the reasons for a planning commission's disapproval 
of a proposed subdivision plat must also be sufficiently recorded to 
comply with § 11-52-32(a). See Sadie v. Tyson, 539 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1988) (concluding that § 11-52-32(a) "requires that the grounds 
for the disapproval of any plat shall be stated upon the records of the 
planning commission within thirty days of the submission of the plat ….")  
II. 
As noted above, the Commission cited three reasons for its denial 
of conditional approval of the preliminary plat: (1) "safety reasons," (2) 
"drainage," and (3) "this plat does not conform to the preliminary plat 
SC-2023-0017 
20 
that was approved in 2002." The circuit court found that all but one of 
those reasons were invalid. In particular, the circuit court concluded that, 
although some of the residents had expressed concern that the proposed 
development of the subject property would exacerbate existing drainage 
issues, "no data or other evidence was presented to bolster those 
concerns." The circuit court additionally concluded that "[t]he fact that a 
prior preliminary plat was approved calling for 100 ft. lots nearly two 
decades ago d[id] not serve as a valid legal basis for rejecting a 
preliminary plat that otherwise conform[ed] to the zoning requirements 
for the area."3  
The circuit court, however, upheld the Commission's decision to 
deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat for "safety reasons." 
The circuit court asserted that, because a provision of the City's 
subdivision regulations "suggests a traffic analysis approved by the … 
Commission may be necessary for approval of the preliminary plat, … [it 
could] not find that the decision to deny the plat due to safety concerns 
 
3In its judgment denying the mandamus petition, the circuit court 
also noted that the Commission and the City had raised the issue of 
standing, but it found that T Investments and FHM did have standing to 
seek mandamus relief. 
SC-2023-0017 
21 
was arbitrary and capricious." In reaching that conclusion, the circuit 
court acknowledged that the Commission had not mentioned the lack of 
a comprehensive traffic analysis as a ground for denial in the minutes for 
the November 18, 2021, meeting, but it stated that the submissions to 
the circuit court did reflect that at least one commissioner had cited the 
"lack of a traffic study and potential danger to neighborhood residents 
caused by increased traffic in the area" as a reason for his vote to deny 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat. 
III. 
T Investments and FHM argue that the circuit court erroneously 
concluded that the "safety reasons" articulated in the meeting minutes 
were legally sufficient grounds for denying conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat. In response, the Commission and the City contest T 
Investments', and by extension FHM's, standing to petition the circuit 
court for a writ of mandamus. Alternatively, the Commission and the 
City contend that, assuming that T Investments did have standing to 
seek mandamus relief, the circuit court correctly concluded that the 
Commission's denial of conditional approval of the preliminary plat for 
"safety reasons" was legally sufficient. We first address the Commission 
SC-2023-0017 
22 
and the City's challenge to T Investments' standing to seek mandamus 
relief. 
A. 
The Commission and the City argue that, because FHM, and not T 
Investments, is the owner of the subject property, "T Investments was 
not the proper party to present the preliminary plat to the … 
Commission, and therefore, had no standing and no legal right to petition 
the trial court for [a] writ of mandamus." The Commission and the City's 
brief at 17. The Commission and the City's argument is premised on § I.B 
of the City's subdivision regulations, which provides: 
"B. Limits of jurisdiction. From and after the effective 
date hereof, these regulations shall govern all subdivision of 
land within the corporate limits of the City of Montgomery 
and its police jurisdiction. Any owner of land within the area 
governed by these regulations wishing to subdivide land shall 
submit to the Planning Commission a plat of the subdivision 
which shall conform at least to the minimum requirements 
and procedures set forth in these regulations." 
 
The Commission and the City insist that, because the above provision 
states that the "owner of land … shall submit to the … Commission a plat 
of the subdivision," only FHM could have properly presented a 
preliminary plat to the Commission.  Thus, according to them, T 
SC-2023-0017 
23 
Investments had no "standing"4 to seek mandamus relief from the circuit 
court.  
Notably, the Commission and the City's argument overlooks other 
relevant language in the City's subdivision regulations -- namely, the 
provisions of the regulations that pertain to the procedures for approval 
of a preliminary plat. As relevant here, those provisions provide (1) that 
"the subdivider may … proceed to prepare the preliminary plat for 
 
4Although couched in terms of standing and jurisdiction, the 
Commission and the City's argument actually concerns whether T 
Investments and FHM have shown a clear legal right to a writ of 
mandamus. Importantly, the Commission and the City do not dispute 
that T Investments, as the intended developer of the subject property, 
has a legally cognizable interest that has been injuriously affected by the 
Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary 
plat. See Ingle v. Adkins, 256 So. 3d 62, 71 (Ala. 2017) (plurality opinion) 
("[T]o have standing to bring an action, the plaintiff must have an 
interest in the outcome of the action and show that he or she has suffered 
or imminently will suffer an injury."). Rather, they argue that, because T 
Investments was not the proper party to present the preliminary plat to 
the Commission, T Investments and FHM could not demonstrate that the 
Commission owed T Investments a clear duty to comply with § 11-52-
32(a). See Campbell v. City of Hueytown, 289 Ala.  388, 390, 268 So. 2d 
3, 4 (1972) ("An indispensable requirement for mandamus is the presence 
of a right in the applicant to the thing applied for."). Thus, the 
Commission and the City confuse T Investments and FHM's entitlement 
to a writ of mandamus with the circuit court's jurisdiction to consider the 
mandamus petition. In any event, and as discussed below, the 
Commission and the City's assertion that T Investments could not 
properly present the preliminary plat to the Commission is without 
merit. 
SC-2023-0017 
24 
submission," § II.A.2 of the City's subdivision regulations, and (2) that 
"the subdivider shall cause to be prepared a preliminary plat together 
with other supplementary material as deemed necessary by the Planning 
Commission and specified in section III." Id., § II.B.1. 
As previously noted, the City's subdivision regulations define a 
subdivider as "[a]ny person or corporation or duly authorized agent who 
undertakes the subdivision of lands defined herein." Id., § IX.C (emphasis 
added). Thus, the City's subdivision regulations allow an agent of the 
landowner to prepare and present a preliminary plat. Here, T 
Investments and FHM presented the circuit court with affidavit 
testimony indicating that T Investments was acting as FHM's agent 
when it filed the application for conditional approval of the preliminary 
plat.5 The City and the Commission do not acknowledge, much less 
dispute the accuracy of the facts alleged in, those affidavits. 
 
5Specifically, the T Investments and FHM submitted the affidavits 
of James B. Marshall, Jr., a partner in FHM, and Foy Tatum, the owner 
of T Investments, who both testified (1) that FHM had entered into an 
agreement with T Investments to develop the subject property and (2) 
that, as part of that agreement, FHM had authorized T Investments to 
serve as its legal agent in presenting "the City … and the … Commission 
[with] documents needed for approval of a preliminary plat, construction 
permitting, final platting, and any other items needed to gain approval 
to develop the [subject] property."  
SC-2023-0017 
25 
Furthermore, the Commission never indicated that T Investments was 
not permitted to present the preliminary plat, and it did not cite that as 
a basis for its disapproval of the plat. Because the City's subdivision 
regulations permit the duly authorized agents of property owners to 
present preliminary plats to the Commission, and because the affidavits 
confirm the existence of an agency relationship between T Investments 
and FHM, the Commission and the City's argument that T Investments 
could not properly request the Commission's approval of the preliminary 
plat is without merit.  
B. 
We now turn to the merits of the arguments raised in T Investments 
and FHM's brief. T Investments and FHM contend that the Commission's 
denial for "safety reasons" was impermissibly vague and speculative and 
that the circuit court improperly "endeavored on a fact-finding mission to 
resolve this vagueness by reasoning that … 'safety reasons' could be 
broadly interpreted to mean there was a lack of the traffic study." T 
Investments and FHM's brief at 29 (emphasis in original). According to 
them, the meeting minutes control whether, pursuant to § 11-52-32(a), 
the Commission sufficiently stated its grounds for denying conditional 
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26 
approval of the preliminary plat. T Investments and FHM additionally 
say that the Commission "did not and could not" base its disapproval on 
the lack of a traffic study because the City, as evidenced by Tyson's 
affidavit testimony, did not require a traffic study at the conditional-
approval stage.  Id. at 32. 
The Commission and the City dispute T Investments and FHM's 
contention that judicial review of the Commission's decision in this case 
should be limited to the reasons recorded in the meeting minutes. 
Instead, they urge this Court to consider, cumulatively, the minutes of 
the meeting, the transcript of the meeting, and all other evidence in the 
record in determining whether the Commission adequately stated its 
grounds for denying conditional approval of the preliminary plat. 
According to the Commission and the City, because that evidence reflects 
that a traffic study was discussed during the meeting, and that one 
commissioner cited the lack of a traffic study as a reason for his vote to 
deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat, the circuit court 
correctly concluded that the Commission's denial for "safety reasons" was 
not impermissibly vague. They further contend that the discussions that 
took place during the meeting provided the Commission with a 
SC-2023-0017 
27 
reasonable basis for its decision to deny conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat for "safety reasons." 
As a threshold matter, we agree with T Investments and FHM's 
contention that the meeting minutes, standing alone, fail to comply with 
the requirements of § 11-52-32(a). This Court has held that "[n]otification 
of disapproval must be accompanied by reasons sufficiently clear and 
definite to inform a developer 'wherein the plan failed to meet the 
requirements of the regulations.'" Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 
So. 2d at 1016 (quoting Yokely, supra, § 54). In Ex parte Pine Brook 
Lakes, Inc., we concluded that the "planned county roadway 
construction" cited by Jefferson County as the basis for its disapproval of 
a preliminary-plat application was insufficient under our statutes and 
caselaw. Id. As we explained, "the purported explanation utterly fail[ed] 
to apprise [the developer] of the nature of the deficiency, and, 
consequently, of the nature of such amendments as would render the 
plans acceptable." Id. Here, the "safety reasons" stated in the meeting 
minutes gave no indication as to how T Investments and FHM could have 
altered their application to address the Commission's concerns.  
SC-2023-0017 
28 
As noted, however, the Commission and the City dispute T 
Investments and FHM's contention that review of the Commission's 
decision should be limited to the reasons recorded in the minutes of the 
Commission's November 18, 2021, meeting. Although this Court has held 
that a planning commission's reasons for denying a subdivision 
application must be recorded, we have not interpreted § 11-52-32(a) as 
requiring that those reasons be recorded in any specific type of document. 
Thus, we reject T Investments and FHM's contention that planning 
commissions can rely only on meeting minutes to satisfy § 11-52-32(a)'s 
requirement that valid grounds for a planning commission's denial of 
approval of a plat be adequately "stated upon the records of the municipal 
planning commission."  
Nevertheless, even when we consider the Commission's meeting 
minutes, the transcript of the meeting, and other evidence in the record 
cumulatively, as the Commission and the City urge, that evidence does 
not reveal that the Commission recorded a sufficiently specific basis for 
its decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat within 
30 days -- or that the "safety reasons" cited in the meeting minutes 
pertained to the lack of a traffic study.     
SC-2023-0017 
29 
Crucially, although the transcript of the Commission's November 
18, 2021, meeting reflects that several potential reasons for denying 
conditional approval of the preliminary plat -- both valid and invalid -- 
were raised and debated throughout the course of that meeting, at the 
time the commissioners voted to deny conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat, only four of the nine commissioners in attendance 
articulated their reasons for doing so. Of those four commissioners, 
moreover, only one, Commissioner Cook, referenced the lack of a traffic 
study, but he did not otherwise mention any safety concerns arising from 
the lack of a traffic study.6 Furthermore, the two commissioners who 
expressly referenced safety as a reason for their votes to deny conditional 
 
6Although the circuit court's judgment states that "[t]he record 
reflects that at least one [c]ommissioner cited lack of a traffic study and 
potential danger to neighborhood residents caused by increased traffic in 
the area," the transcript does not reflect that Commissioner Cook, or any 
other commissioner, cited the danger posed by increased traffic as a 
reason for disapproving the preliminary plat. According to the transcript, 
when asked for his reasons for denying conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat, Commissioner Cook responded as follows: 
 
"Mr. Cook: My reason is that the interconnectivity of the 
roads, the traffic -- I don't think there's a question about 
[whether] the traffic study has to be done. And I've got a 
question about the, uh, the change with the plat -- with the 
preliminary plat that was done in 2002." 
SC-2023-0017 
30 
approval of the preliminary plat made no effort to identify with any 
particularity the bases for their stated safety concerns. Accordingly, 
although the transcript of the meeting may reflect that T Investments 
and FHM were made aware of various potential bases for the 
Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary 
plat, the transcript does not indicate that T Investments and FHM were 
provided with meaningful notice of the actual basis for the Commission's 
collective decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat.  
The evidence in the record, moreover, undermines the circuit 
court's conclusion and strongly suggests that the Commission's 
disapproval of the preliminary plat was not actually related to the lack 
of a traffic study. As previously discussed, neither the meeting minutes 
nor the denial letter mentioned a traffic-study requirement. The 
Commission and the City's answer to the mandamus petition also made 
no reference to T Investments and FHM's failure to provide a traffic 
study.  
Most importantly, attached to the Commission and the City's 
answer was the affidavit of Tyson, the City's land-use-control 
administrator, who stated that "T Investments presented a preliminary 
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31 
plat, whereas, a preliminary plat is a map of the property which can be 
used in any zoned district. For a preliminary plat, a traffic impact study 
is not required." (Emphasis added.) 
Likewise, at oral arguments before the circuit court, the 
Commission and the City expressly conceded that T Investments and 
FHM were not required to provide a traffic study for conditional approval 
of a preliminary plat, stating: "With a planned unit development, you do 
have to have what they call a traffic study. However, with a preliminary 
plat, you do not have to have a traffic study." (Emphasis added.) 
Crucially, at no point in the proceedings before the circuit court did 
the Commission and the City argue (1) that § III.A.3(j) of the City's 
subdivision regulations required T Investments and FHM to submit a 
traffic study or (2) that the lack of a traffic study was a valid or actual 
basis for the Commission's disapproval of the preliminary plat. Thus, the 
record of the proceedings before the circuit court indicate that the 
Commission deliberately declined to adopt the lack of a traffic study as a 
basis for its disapproval in the meeting minutes and denial letter and 
that the Commission did not intend for the stated ground of "safety 
SC-2023-0017 
32 
reasons" to encompass T Investments and FHM's purported failure to 
submit a comprehensive traffic analysis. 
The Commission and the City, for the first time in their briefing to 
this Court, now contend that the Commission's denial based on "safety 
reasons" was really because of the lack of a traffic study and therefore 
was not overly broad and vague. However, beyond approvingly 
reiterating the circuit court's findings and stating -- in conclusory fashion 
-- that Tyson's affidavit testimony "cannot override" the City's 
subdivision regulations,7 the Commission and the City do not explain 
how the circuit court could have reasonably concluded that the 
Commission's denial of conditional approval of the preliminary plat for 
"safety reasons" was actually based on the T Investments and FHM's 
purported failure to comply with § III.A.3(j) of the City's subdivision 
regulations when, in proceedings before the circuit court, they never 
alleged that the lack of a traffic study was a ground for the Commission's 
decision and when their own employee swore that providing a traffic 
 
7We note that the question whether the City's subdivision 
regulations requires the submission of a traffic study is distinct from 
whether the Commission (1) actually based its denial T Investments and 
FHM's purported failure to provide a traffic study or (2) adequately 
stated its reasons for the denial. 
SC-2023-0017 
33 
study was not a requirement for conditional approval. See Noojin v. 
Mobile City Plan. Comm'n, 480 So. 2d 587, 590 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) ("The 
commission would have this court judge the validity of the denial of 
approval, not just in terms of the reason given in the official denial letter 
…, but also in terms of the four purposes … set forth in the subsequent 
letter …. This we cannot do.").   
The Commission and the City, moreover, distinguished the issue of 
the traffic study from the safety concerns cited by the Commission, 
explaining that the Commission's denial of conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat "wasn't based solely on the traffic study … [or] the fact 
that the residents w[ere] concerned about the 75-feet homes and the 100-
feet homes. They were, but it was also safety issues that w[ere] 
addressed." (Emphasis added.) 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Commission failed to 
satisfy § 11-52-32(a)'s requirement that valid and sufficiently specific 
grounds for its denial of approval of a subdivision plat be "stated upon 
the records" of the Commission within 30 days of the submission of the 
plat. See Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., supra. Because that failure 
resulted in the automatic approval of the preliminary plat pursuant to  
SC-2023-0017 
34 
§ 11-52-32(a), T Investments and FHM are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus directing the Commission to conditionally approve the 
preliminary plat. See Sigler v. City of Mobile, supra. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and remand the case with instructions that the circuit court grant the 
petition for the writ of mandamus. 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.  
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise and Stewart, JJ., 
join. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SC-2023-0017 
35 
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. This Court has long held that municipal 
planning commissions operate in an administrative capacity when 
"exercising [their] function approving or disapproving any particular 
subdivision plat." Boulder Corp. v. Vann, 345 So. 2d 272, 275 (Ala. 1977). 
Although the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, § 41-22-1 et seq., 
Ala. Code 1975, does not apply to the City of Montgomery Planning 
Commission ("the Commission"), the majority correctly notes that, due to 
the administrative nature of municipal planning commissions as arms of 
municipal government, we must still accord the Commission's decision 
considerable deference and affirm it "'unless [it was] arbitrary, 
capricious, or not made in compliance with applicable law.'" Ex parte City 
of Fairhope, 739 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1999) (quoting State Dep't of Revenue 
v. Acker, 636 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)). But the majority's 
invocation of this standard of review appears to be nominal at best 
because it proceeds to do exactly that which the standard of review 
forbids: The majority "'substitute[s] its judgment for that of the 
[Commission].'" Id. Notably, in its de novo review of the trial court's 
judgment upholding the Commission's decision, the majority accepts 
SC-2023-0017 
36 
certain conclusions without any explanation, yet it ultimately reverses 
the trial court's judgment by parsing the judgment and reweighing the 
evidence before the Commission, deeming the Commission's recorded 
reasons legally insufficient to support the denial of conditional approval 
of the preliminary plat. 
Relying on a series of appellate decisions construing § 11-52-32(a), 
Ala. Code 1975, the majority contends that a municipal planning 
commission's reasons for disapproving a preliminary plat must be not 
only valid but also "sufficiently clear" to apprise a developer of its plan's 
deficiencies. Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Ala. 
1992); see Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 305, 308 (Ala. 1979). 
Applying this standard requiring fair notice to the developer, the 
majority concludes that the "safety reasons" espoused by the Commission 
did not relate to the lack of a traffic study and that the Commission failed 
to record a sufficiently specific basis for denying conditional approval of 
the preliminary plat. In so concluding, the majority, in my view, applies 
the "sufficiently clear" prong in too exacting a manner, requiring a level 
of specificity well beyond what our precedents mandate. Indeed, the two 
cases the majority cites that applied this standard involved reasons for 
SC-2023-0017 
37 
denial that were so vague that the developer in each case had no guidance 
regarding "the nature of [the] amendments [that] would render the plans 
acceptable." Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 So. 2d at 1016 (noting 
that the planning commission's citation to a "planned county roadway 
construction" would authorize indefinite suspension of real-estate 
development, which was at odds with the commission's own regulatory 
time constraints); see Mobile City Plan. Comm'n v. Southern Region 
Devs., Inc., 628 So. 2d 739, 740 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (affirming a trial 
court's granting mandamus relief to a developer when the planning 
commission based its denial merely on "concerns" and "questions").  
Such is not the case here. The trial court found that the 
Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary 
plat because of "safety reasons" was valid, noting that at least one 
commissioner had cited as the bases for his vote the lack of a traffic study 
and -- more importantly -- the "potential danger to neighborhood 
residents caused by increased traffic in the area." And unlike the 
majority, I believe that § 11-52-32(a) requires only that the "ground of 
disapproval of any plat shall be stated upon the records of the municipal 
planning commission." It is logical to conclude that, based on all the 
SC-2023-0017 
38 
evidence presented at the Commission's November 18, 2021, meeting 
(which the trial court had before it), the addition of 244 houses in a 
subdivision will result in increased traffic and an increase in other 
attendant dangers, about which the current residents expressed their 
concerns. Surely the developers knew of those concerns as a result of 
discussions they had with the residents before the Commission's 
November meeting and as a result of views expressed by residents at the 
meeting. I do not believe the "sufficiently clear" prong required the 
Commission to record each safety concern that can be readily inferred 
from the residents' expressions of concern and the circumstances at the 
level of specificity the majority demands in order to affirm the trial 
court's judgment and uphold the Commission's decision. 
One final note. The majority rests its decision on a series of cases 
interpreting § 11-52-32 as imposing rather specific and onerous time 
constraints and recording requirements. See Boulder Corp., 345 So. 2d at 
276 (requiring a planning commission that disapproves a plat to record 
its ground for doing so within 30 days of the submission date); Sigler v. 
City of Mobile, 387 So. 2d 813, 814 (Ala. 1980) (holding that a proposed 
plan should have been automatically approved because "[a]n invalid 
SC-2023-0017 
39 
reason is equivalent to no reason"); Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 
So. 2d at 1016 (requiring that the "[n]otification of disapproval ... be 
accompanied by reasons sufficiently clear and definite to inform a 
developer 'wherein the plan failed to meet the requirements of the 
regulations'"). But in so doing, I am concerned that the majority is 
impliedly reaffirming interpretations of § 11-52-32 that are inconsistent 
with the statute's plain meaning and that divest the Commission of its 
proper authority and the deference its decisions are due to be afforded, 
thereby rendering the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review a 
nullity. Seeing as no party has asked that we overrule any of the decisions 
in those cases, however, I will withhold judgment on this matter until a 
later date.  
Regardless of the questionable tenability of those aforementioned 
decisions, I believe the Commission recorded a valid and sufficiently clear 
reason for its denial; therefore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Wise and Stewart, JJ., concur.