Case Title: Minnesota Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Paper Recycling of La Crosse

Citation: 2001 WI 64

Docket Number: 1999AP000327

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Minnesota Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, a 
Minnesota corporation, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Paper Recycling of La Crosse, a Wisconsin 
corporation, and General Casualty Company, a 
Wisconsin corporation, 
 
Defendants-Appellant-Petitioners. 
________________________________________________ 
 
Joyce A. Devenport, Individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Daniel Raymond 
Devenport, Deceased,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Paper Recycling Company, and Regent Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 150, 610 N.W.2d 512 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 14, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 4, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGES: 
Dennis G. Montabon and Michael J. Mulroy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinions filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
2 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For defendants-appellants-petitioners, Paper 
Recycling of La Crosse and General Casualty Company, and for 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, Paper Recycling Company and 
Regent Insurance Company, there were briefs by James G. Curtis 
and Hale, Skemp, Hanson, Skemp & Sleik, La Crosse, and oral 
argument by James G. Curtis. 
 
 
For plaintiff-appellant, Joyce A. Davenport, 
there was a brief by Dean R. Rohde and Bye, Goff & Rohde, Ltd., 
River Falls, and oral argument by Dean R. Rohde. 
 
 
For plaintiff-respondent, Minnesota Fire & 
Casualty Insurance Company, there was a brief by Tony R. Krall, 
John F. Cook and Hanson, Lulic & Krall, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
and oral argument by John F. Cook. 
 
2001 WI 64 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Minnesota Fire & Casualty 
Insurance Company, a Minnesota 
corporation, 
 
         Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Paper Recycling of La Crosse, a 
Wisconsin corporation and General Casualty 
Company, a Wisconsin corporation, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
Joyce A. Devenport, Individually and as  
Personal Representative of the Estate of  
Daniel Raymond Devenport, Deceased,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Paper Recycling Company, and Regent  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
2 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Paper 
Recycling of La Crosse, Inc. (Paper Recycling), seeks review of 
an unpublished court of appeals decision.  Two La Crosse County 
Circuit Court cases were consolidated for appeal purposes 
because the cases resulted from the same fact situation and 
presented the same issue.  In the first case, the circuit court, 
Judge Dennis G. Montabon presiding, held that Paper Recycling 
was not entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2) in a lawsuit stemming from a 1997 fire at Paper 
Recycling's property that resulted in the death of a young boy. 
 In denying the motion for summary judgment, the circuit court 
concluded that Paper Recycling was not entitled to recreational 
immunity because Daniel Devenport and the boys he was with were 
not engaged in a recreational activity as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(g).   
¶2 
In the second case, the circuit court, Judge Michael 
J. Mulroy presiding, held that Paper Recycling was entitled to 
recreational immunity because Devenport and his friends were 
engaged in a recreational activity.  The circuit court, 
therefore, 
granted 
Paper 
Recycling's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment.  The court of appeals affirmed Judge Montabon's 
decision and reversed Judge Mulroy's decision, holding that 
Paper Recycling was not entitled to recreational immunity 
because the boys were not engaged in a recreational activity. 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
3 
¶3 
We hold that the boys, who were crawling through 
stacks of baled paper, lighting matches and starting fires, were 
not engaged in a recreational activity as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(g), and therefore, Paper Recycling was not entitled 
to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).  We, 
thus, affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
On May 28, 1997, eleven-year-old Daniel Devenport 
(Devenport) was killed in a fire on commercial property leased 
to Paper Recycling.  Paper Recycling, while operating a 
recycling facility on this property, stored stacks of baled 
paper in the outdoor yard of the property.  The property, which 
was protected by a fence, was not open to the public.  Devenport 
and two of his friends, who were also eleven-year-olds, entered 
Paper Recycling's property through an opening in the fence.  
Once inside the outdoor yard of Paper Recycling's property, 
Devenport and his friends began crawling around through spaces 
inside the stacks of baled paper that they imagined were 
tunnels.  Within the interior of the stacks were large spaces 
that the boys imagined were rooms or forts to play in.  One of 
the boys brought a box of matches that all three boys used to 
start fires inside the stacks.  While inside one of the interior 
spaces, the boys noticed a fire in the space they had used to 
enter the stacks.  Devenport's friends escaped the fire through 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
4 
a small opening in the stacks.  Devenport was unable to escape 
and was killed in the fire.    
¶5 
Two lawsuits followed the fire and Devenport's death. 
 In case number 99-0327, Minnesota Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company sued Paper Recycling in a subrogation action to recover 
damages it paid to its insured, Royal Properties, who leased the 
property to Paper Recycling.  Paper Recycling moved for summary 
judgment 
claiming 
recreational 
immunity 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(2) because the boys were engaged in a recreational 
activity.  The circuit court denied Paper Recycling's motion, 
holding that Devenport and his friends were not engaged in a 
recreational activity as defined by Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  
The circuit court determined that the activity that the boys 
were 
engaged 
in 
was 
neither 
specifically 
listed 
in 
the 
recreational immunity statute, nor substantially similar to the 
activities 
listed 
in 
the 
statute, 
nor 
undertaken 
in 
circumstances substantially similar to the circumstances of a 
recreational activity.  
¶6 
In case number 99-0858, Devenport's mother, Joyce 
Devenport, sued Paper Recycling in a wrongful death action.  
Paper Recycling moved for summary judgment, again claiming 
recreational immunity because Devenport and his friends were 
engaged in a recreational activity.  The circuit court granted 
Paper Recycling's motion, holding that the boys were engaged in 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
5 
a recreational activity as defined by Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g). 
 The circuit court held that they were engaged in a recreational 
activity because one of them stated in an affidavit that the 
boys' purpose in entering Paper Recycling's property was to play 
in the stacks of baled paper. 
¶7 
The 
Wisconsin 
Court 
of 
Appeals, 
District 
IV, 
consolidated the two cases for appeal.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court in case number 99-0327 and reversed 
the circuit court in case number 99-0858, holding that Paper 
Recycling was not entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2), because Devenport and his friends were not 
engaged in a recreational activity as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(g).  The court of appeals determined that the 
activity that the boys were engaged in was not substantially 
similar to any of the activities listed in the recreational 
immunity statute. 
II 
¶8 
The consolidated case requires us to determine whether 
Paper Recycling is entitled to summary judgment.  We review a 
circuit court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary 
judgment "by applying the standards set forth in sec. 802.08(2), 
Stats., in the same manner as the circuit court."  Shannon v. 
Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 441, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989).  A court 
shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
6 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) (1995-1996).1 
¶9 
The issue presented by the instant case is whether 
Paper Recycling is entitled to recreational immunity in both 
lawsuits under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).2  To resolve this issue, 
we must apply the recreational immunity statute to the specific 
facts of the present case.  The application of the recreational 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.  
2 The recreational immunity statute provides in pertinent 
part: 
(2) No duty;  immunity from liability.  . . . no owner and 
no officer, employe or agent of an owner owes to any person who 
enters the owner's property to engage in a recreational 
activity: 
1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational 
activities. 
2. A duty to inspect the property . . . 
3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or 
activity on the property. 
(b) . . . no owner and no officer, employe or agent of an 
owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any 
death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a 
recreational activity on the owner's property or for any 
death or injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
7 
immunity statute to specific facts presents a question of law 
that we review de novo, while benefiting from the analyses of 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Sievert v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 628, 528 N.W.2d 413 
(1995).   
¶10 To determine whether Paper Recycling is entitled to 
recreational immunity in the two lawsuits, we must first 
determine 
whether 
the 
boys 
involved 
were 
engaged 
in 
a 
recreational activity.  Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 628.  The 
recreational immunity statute provides the following definition 
of recreational activity: 
"Recreational activity" means any outdoor activity 
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or 
pleasure, including practice or instruction in any 
such activity.  "Recreational activity" includes, but 
is 
not 
limited 
to, 
hunting, 
fishing, 
trapping, 
camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, 
bicycling, 
horseback 
riding, 
bird-watching, 
motorcycling, 
operating 
an 
all-terrain 
vehicle, 
ballooning, 
hang 
gliding, 
hiking, 
tobogganing, 
sledding, 
sleigh 
riding, 
snowmobiling, 
skiing, 
skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, 
cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, 
animal training, harvesting the products of nature, 
and any other outdoor sport, game or educational 
activity, but does not include any organized team 
sport activity sponsored by the owner of the property 
on which the activity takes place. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  In Sievert, we determined that this 
definition of recreational activity is divided into three parts: 
(1) a broad definition stating that a recreational 
activity is 'any outdoor activity undertaken for the 
purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure,' (2) a 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
8 
list 
of 
28 
specific 
activities 
denominated 
as 
recreational, and (3) a second broad definition, 
directing that a recreational activity can be 'any 
other outdoor sport, game or educational activity." 
 
190 Wis. 2d at 629.  The first part's broad definition, 
providing that a recreational activity is "any outdoor activity 
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure," 
could be interpreted to include almost any outdoor activity.  
Id.  Because every outdoor activity is not a recreational 
activity, we must construe the first part's broad definition in 
light of the second part's list of 28 specific recreational 
activities, and the third part's broad definition providing that 
a recreational activity is "any other outdoor sport, game or 
educational activity."  Id.  We must therefore determine if the 
activity that Devenport and the other two boys were engaged in 
satisfies the statutory definition of recreational activity. 
 
¶11 Joyce 
Devenport 
and 
Minnesota 
Fire 
& 
Casualty 
Insurance Company (Minnesota Fire) contend that the boys were 
not engaged in a recreational activity.  Both argue that the 
activity that the boys were engaged in does not satisfy the 
statutory definition of recreational immunity.  In addition, 
both 
argue that the boys' 
activity 
fails 
the 
test for 
recreational 
activity 
set 
forth 
in 
Linville 
v. 
City 
of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  Both claim 
that the boys' activity fails the Linville test because the 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
9 
activity is neither substantially similar to the activities 
listed 
in 
the 
statute 
nor 
undertaken 
in 
circumstances 
substantially similar to the circumstances of a recreational 
activity.     
¶12 Joyce Devenport and Minnesota Fire also suggest that 
the boys' activity was not a recreational activity because it 
was not a traditional form of child's play.  They compare the 
boys' activity to the random wanderings of a three-year-old 
child near a lakeshore, an activity held not to be a 
recreational activity in Shannon.  150 Wis. 2d at 448.  Both 
claim that the boys' activity is like the activity in Shannon 
because both are activities in which children fail to understand 
the danger involved.  Lastly, both argue that concluding that 
the boys were not engaged in a recreational activity is 
consistent with the purpose of the recreational immunity 
statute.  According to both, the purpose of the recreational 
immunity statute is to encourage property owners to open their 
property for recreational activities, not to reward property 
owners for failing to prevent children from being drawn onto the 
dangerous conditions of commercial property. 
¶13 Paper 
Recycling 
contends 
that the 
activity 
that 
Devenport and his friends were engaged in was a recreational 
activity.  Paper Recycling argues that this activity satisfies 
the first part of the statutory definition for recreational 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
10
immunity as "any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of 
exercise, relaxation or pleasure."  Paper Recycling also argues 
that this activity satisfies the third part of the statutory 
definition for recreational activity as "any other outdoor sport 
or game."  In the alternative, Paper Recycling argues that this 
activity satisfies the Linville test as substantially similar to 
the activities listed in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g). 
¶14 Paper Recycling argues that the activity that the boys 
were engaged in was an "outdoor activity undertaken for the 
purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure."  To support this 
argument, Paper Recycling relies on Kruschke v. City of New 
Richmond, 157 Wis. 2d 167, 458 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1990).  In 
Kruschke, the court of appeals held that playing on a swing in a 
city park is a recreational activity.  157 Wis. 2d at 168.  The 
court of appeals stated that its decision was consistent with 
the broad definition that had been given to the phrase 
recreational activity in previous Wisconsin cases.  Id. at 172. 
¶15 Paper Recycling also argues that the boys were playing 
a game that can be classified as "any other outdoor sport or 
game" under the third part of the statutory definition.  To 
support this argument, Paper Recycling relies on Taylor v. City 
of Appleton, 147 Wis. 2d 644, 433 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1988).  
In Taylor, the court of appeals held that Taylor's activity of 
"playing catch with a football in a city park" was an "outdoor 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
11
sport or game" that satisfies the third part's broad definition 
of recreational activity.  147 Wis. 2d at 646.  Even though the 
court of appeals recognized that playing catch with a football 
"is of a different character from many of the activities listed 
in sec. 895.52(1)(g)," the court concluded that it is still a 
recreational activity.  Id. at 647.  Following the legislative 
intent for liberal construction of the statute, the court of 
appeals concluded that playing catch with a football in a city 
park was an "outdoor sport or game."  Paper Recycling argues 
that Devenport and his friends, like Taylor, were engaged in an 
"outdoor sport or game." 
  
¶16 Paper Recycling further contends that the activity 
that the boys were engaged in satisfies the Linville test as 
substantially similar to the specific activities listed in the 
recreational immunity statute.  For example, Paper Recycling 
suggests that Devenport and his friends imagined that they were 
playing in tunnels and forts, an activity substantially similar 
to the specific activity listed in the statute of exploring 
caves.  In addition, Paper Recycling argues that Devenport and 
his friends had the intent to recreate by playing outdoor games 
after school and that this intent, combined with the objective 
nature of the activity, establishes that the boys were engaged 
in a recreational activity. 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
12
 
¶17 Lastly, Paper Recycling argues that the recreational 
immunity 
statute 
provides 
blanket 
immunity 
and 
that 
any 
limitation of that immunity would hinder the purpose of the 
statute.  To support this argument, Paper Recycling relies on 
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 547 N.W.2d 
602 (1996).  In Verdoljak, we held that the recreational 
immunity statute protected Mosinee Paper Corporation (Mosinee) 
from a lawsuit filed by a motorcyclist who was injured on its 
property, despite the fact that Mosinee opened its property for 
hunting and fishing, but not for motorcycling.  200 Wis. 2d at 
631. 
 
In 
that 
case, 
we 
recognized 
that 
limiting 
the 
applicability of the recreational immunity statute to property 
owners who open their property for all recreational activities 
would defeat the statute's purpose of encouraging property 
owners to open their lands for recreational activities, even if 
the owner only opens the land for one activity.  Id. at 635. 
¶18 The activity that the boys were engaged in, crawling 
through stacks of baled paper, while lighting matches and 
starting fires, is not included in the second part of the 
immunity 
statute's 
definition 
which 
lists 
28 
specific 
recreational activities.  Nor is the activity of the boys 
included, specifically, in the third part's broad definition 
providing that a recreational activity is "outdoor sport, game 
or educational activity."  
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
13
¶19 It is argued that we should construe the first part of 
the statutory definition providing that a recreational activity 
is "any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, 
relaxation or pleasure" to include the boys' activity.  This 
activity was an outdoor activity and one of the boys stated that 
the purpose of the activity was to play.  However, every outdoor 
activity for the stated purpose of exercise, relaxation or 
pleasure could be included within this definition.  Sievert, 190 
Wis. 2d at 629.  Because every outdoor activity is not a 
recreational activity, we must construe the first broad part of 
the definition in light of the second part's 28 specific 
activities and the third part's broad definition.  Id.   
¶20 As noted, our analysis does not end because the 
activity the boys were engaged in is not specifically listed in 
Wis. Stat.  § 895.52(1)(g).  Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 629-30.  
The legislature has stated that § 895.52(1)(g) only provides 
examples of recreational activities.  Id. at 630.  Consequently, 
the legislature has provided guidance for construing the 
statute.  In 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1, the legislature stated its 
intent behind the recreational immunity statute: 
The legislature intends by this act to limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use 
their 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities 
under 
circumstances in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit.  While it is not 
possible to specify in a statute every activity which 
might constitute a recreational activity, this act 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
14
provides examples of the kinds of activities that are 
meant to be included, and the legislature intends 
that, where substantially similar circumstances or 
activities exist, this legislation should be liberally 
construed in favor of property owners to protect them 
from liability.  The act is intended to overrule any 
previous 
Wisconsin 
supreme 
court 
decisions 
interpreting section 29.683 of the statutes if the 
decision is more restrictive than or inconsistent with 
the provisions of this act. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
will 
liberally 
construe 
the 
recreational 
immunity statute in favor of property owners when the activity 
in question is not specifically listed but "is substantially 
similar to the activities listed in the statute or whe[n] [the] 
activity is undertaken in circumstances substantially similar to 
the circumstances of a recreational activity."  Sievert, 190 
Wis. 2d at 631.  
¶21 We must therefore determine whether the activity that 
the boys were engaged in was "substantially similar to the 
activities listed in the statute or whether [the activity was] 
undertaken 
in 
circumstances 
substantially 
similar 
to 
the 
circumstances of a recreational activity."  Id. at 631.  In 
Linville, the court of appeals applied the following test that 
this court has adopted in making that determination: 
The test requires examination of all aspects of the 
activity. 
 
The 
intrinsic 
nature, 
purpose 
and 
consequence of the activity are relevant.  While the 
                     
3 The 
legislature 
repealed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 29.68, 
the 
predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 895.52, by 1983 Wis. Act 418 § 2 
effective May 15, 1984.    
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
15
injured person's subjective assessment of the activity 
is relevant, it is not controlling.  Thus, whether the 
injured 
person 
intended 
to 
recreate 
is 
not 
dispositive, but why he was on the property is 
pertinent.  
184 Wis. 2d 705, 716, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994)(citing Linville v. 
City of Janesville, 174 Wis. 2d 571, 579-80, 497 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. 
App. 1993)).  The Linville test is an objective test.  184 Wis. 
2d at 713.  This test requires a court to apply a reasonable 
person standard to determine whether a property user's activity 
is recreational based on the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the activity.   
¶22 We begin the analysis, in regard to the application of 
the Linville test, with the intrinsic nature of the activity.  
Nature is defined as "[t]he essential characteristics and 
qualities of a person or thing."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary 1204 (3d ed. 1992).  The essential characteristic of 
the boys' activity was involvement in mischievous conduct.  The 
boys were inside the stacks of baled paper, lighting matches and 
starting fires.  According to a statement taken in an interview 
with one of the surviving boys, Devenport, at the time that a 
fire was discovered, was "sitting in the corner in one of the 
rooms" within the baled paper.4    The determination that the 
boys were engaged in mischievous conduct is further evidenced by 
                     
4 It 
should 
be 
noted 
that 
the 
boys' 
activity 
was 
characterized as "play" in their affidavits. However, the 
interview with one of the surviving boys, the only evidence in 
the record in the boys' own words, did not state that they were 
playing.  Nonetheless, a subjective assessment, while relevant, 
is not determinative of the result in the present case.   
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
16
the fact that the boys stated in their affidavits that they 
waited to begin their activity until no one was around.  This 
fact suggests that the boys wished to conceal their activity, a 
fact not usually associated with a recreational activity.  
¶23 Before we analyze the purpose and consequence of the 
activity, the examination of the intrinsic nature of the 
activity also requires consideration of the nature of the 
property upon which the activity takes place.  Linville, 184 
Wis. 2d at 717.  The nature of the property can be an important 
part 
of 
the 
determination 
of 
whether 
the 
activity 
is 
recreational.5  For example, in Linville the nature of the 
property was a significant factor in the determination that the 
activity in question was recreational.  Id.  Kelly Linville and 
her son David were taken to a pond in a van driven by Walter 
Hadden to look at potential fishing spots.  Id. at 711-12.  The 
City 
of 
Janesville 
owned 
the pond, 
which 
was 
used for 
recreational purposes.  Id. at 712.  When the van became stuck 
in the mud, Kelly Linville got out and tried to push it out.  
                     
5 The dissent suggests that the legislature has removed the 
nature of the property from the analysis of whether an activity 
is recreational, citing Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 
Wis. 2d 624, 631, 633-34, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996).  Dissent at 
¶61.  The legislature, in enacting Wis. Stat. § 895.52, removed 
references to a property owner opening his or her land for 
recreational 
activities 
in 
order 
to 
receive 
recreational 
immunity.  Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 631.  However, there is 
nothing that could be found in the legislative history of  
§ 895.52 indicating that the nature of the property on which the 
activity takes place should be excluded from the determination 
of whether an activity falls within the ambit of recreational 
immunity.    
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
17
Id.  She was unable to move the van and it sank in the mud, 
drowning David Linville and Walter Hadden.  Id.  We concluded 
that the Linvilles were engaged in a recreational activity.  Id. 
at 717.  To reach this conclusion we relied on the fact that 
fishing is an activity listed in the statutory definition of 
recreational activity and that the intrinsic nature of fishing 
is recreational.  Id.  In addition, we relied on the nature of 
the property upon which the activity took place.  Id.  We stated 
that "[t]he facts crucial to our determination are that [Kelly 
Linville] was at a recreational facility which is open for 
public use, looking at potential fishing areas in the Pond."  
Id.  The fact that the Linvilles were at a recreational facility 
open for public use was inextricable from the fact that they 
were looking at potential fishing spots. 
¶24 While the nature of the property can be a significant 
factor 
in 
the 
determination 
of 
whether 
an 
activity 
is 
recreational, it is not dispositive.  Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 
623.  In Sievert, we determined that the activity of walking 
onto a boat dock to greet a neighbor was not a recreational 
activity.  Id. at 633.  We made this determination based on the 
intrinsic nature and purpose of the activity.  Id.  The fact 
that the activity took place on property used for recreational 
purposes, a boat dock, did not change the non-recreational 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
18
activity of greeting a neighbor into a recreational activity.6  
Id. at 632. 
¶25 In the present case, there is nothing in the intrinsic 
nature of the boys' activity that was substantially similar to a 
recreational activity.  As stated above, the nature of the boys' 
activity was that they were engaged in mischievous conduct while 
no one was around.  As was the case in Linville, the nature of 
Paper Recycling's property is crucial to our examination of the 
nature of the boys' activity.  184 Wis. 2d at 717.7  The nature 
of the property was a commercial site used for a business 
purpose.  In addition, the property was not open to the public 
for recreational use.  While we recognize that intent is not 
dispositive (see Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 717), there is nothing 
                     
6 The dissent contends that the determination of whether an 
activity is recreational focuses on the nature of the activity, 
not the nature of the property, citing Sievert v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 632, 528 N.W.2d 413 
(1995).  Dissent at ¶61.  We also stated in Sievert that "[t]he 
Linville test does not rely exclusively on the characteristics 
of the property on which the activity is undertaken to determine 
whether an activity is recreational under the statute."  190 
Wis. 2d at 632.  The fact that we do not focus on or rely 
exclusively on the nature of the property does not mean that we 
exclude the nature of the property from the analysis.   
7 The dissent also states that we have relied on one line in 
Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 717, 516 N.W.2d 
427 (1994) to conclude that the nature of the property can be a 
significant factor in determining whether an activity is 
recreational.  Dissent at ¶62.  In Linville, we stated that 
"[t]he facts crucial to our determination are that [the person] 
was at a recreational facility . . .."  184 Wis. 2d at 717.  The 
use of the word "crucial" clearly indicates that the nature of 
the property is a significant factor in the determination of 
whether an activity is recreational.   
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
19
in the record to indicate that Paper Recycling intended that its 
property would be a recreational property or would be used for 
recreational activities.  In fact, the record indicates that 
Paper Recycling intended that its property would be used only 
for 
commercial 
activities, 
evidenced 
by 
the 
fence 
Paper 
Recycling erected around its property to keep people away from 
the commercial materials, such as the paper bales, stored in the 
outside yard.  
¶26 Paper Recycling leased the property to operate its 
recycling business.  There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the property was used for any other purpose than the 
recycling business.  There is nothing in the nature of this 
activity, 
engaging 
in 
mischievous 
conduct 
on 
commercial 
property, 
that 
is 
substantially 
similar 
to 
any 
of 
the 
recreational activities listed in the statute. For example, 
there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of fishing, bicycling 
or skiing that involves mischievous conduct.              
¶27 The next step in the analysis is to examine the 
purpose of the boys' activity.  This part of the Linville test 
must also be judged by an objective standard.  Purpose is 
defined as "[t]he object toward which one strives or for which 
something exists; an aim or a goal."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary 1471 (3d ed. 1992).  The goal of the boys' activity 
was to light matches and to start fires.  There is nothing in 
the purpose of this activity, lighting matches in order to start 
fires, that is substantially similar to any of the recreational 
activities listed in the statute. 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
20
¶28 Next in the analysis we look at the consequence of the 
boys' activity.  As was the case with the nature and purpose of 
the activity, the consequence of the activity must be judged by 
an objective standard.  Consequence is defined as "[s]omething 
that 
logically 
or 
naturally 
follows 
from 
an 
action 
or 
condition."  The American Heritage Dictionary 401 (3d ed. 1992). 
 What naturally followed from the boys' activity was that a fire 
started, destroying Paper Recycling's property and tragically 
killing Devenport. 
 In 
fact, it 
was 
an 
almost certain 
consequence that a fire would start when the boys were lighting 
matches in stacks of baled paper.  There is nothing in this 
terrible consequence that is substantially similar to any of the 
recreational activities listed in the statute.  While some of 
the 
activities 
listed 
in 
the 
statute 
may 
have 
tragic 
consequences when someone is killed or injured, none of these 
activities, such as hang-gliding, skiing or rock-climbing, have 
unavoidable or almost certain tragic consequences.  Thus, the 
intrinsic nature, purpose and consequence of the boys' activity, 
judged by an objective standard, all indicate that this activity 
was not a recreational activity. 
 
¶29 The Linville test also requires us to consider the 
boys' subjective assessment of the activity.  Devenport and his 
friends did have the intent to play in the stacks of baled 
paper.  While this subjective intent is relevant to the analysis 
of whether the activity was recreational, it is not controlling. 
 Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 716.  Intent does not change the 
intrinsic nature, purpose and consequence of the activity.  Id. 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
21
at 717.  The fact that Devenport and his friends intended to 
play does not change their non-recreational activity into a 
recreational one.  Consequently, the activity that the boys were 
engaged in does not satisfy the Linville test for a recreational 
activity. 
 
¶30 While we recognize the legislative intent to give a 
broad definition to the phrase recreational activity, we also 
recognize that there are limits to this definition.  As stated 
above, not every outdoor activity is a recreational activity.  
Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 629.  Likewise, not every form of 
child's play is a recreational activity.  Previous Wisconsin 
cases have concluded that some forms of child's play, like 
playing on a swing in Kruschke or playing catch with a football 
in Taylor, are recreational activities.  Because a child's 
subjective assessment of recreational activity could include 
every form of child's play, we must use an objective, reasonable 
adult standard to determine whether a form of child's play is a 
recreational activity.   
¶31 By applying an objective, reasonable adult standard, 
we conclude that the conduct that Devenport and his friends were 
engaged in, crawling through stacks of baled paper, while 
lighting matches and starting fires, is not a recreational 
activity.  A reasonable adult would not consider crawling around 
lighting fires to be a recreational activity.  Crawling around 
lighting fires is not a game, nor is it based on competition, 
rules or strategy.  It is just an inherently dangerous activity 
that is not objectively a recreational activity.      
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
22
 
¶32 We are not persuaded that the boys' activity is 
substantially similar to exploring caves, or any other of the 
specific activities listed in the recreational immunity statute. 
 The labeling of the activity that the boys were engaged in as 
exploring caves or playing in tunnels and forts depends solely 
on the boys' subjective characterization.  When we consider the 
intrinsic nature, purpose and consequence of the activity, as 
the Linville test instructs, we do not find the activity that 
Devenport and his friends were engaged in to be substantially 
similar to exploring caves.  Stacks of baled paper are not 
substantially similar to caves.  Crawling around while lighting 
matches and starting fires is not substantially similar to 
exploring.  There is nothing about the intrinsic nature, purpose 
and consequence of the activity that is substantially similar to 
any of the activities listed in the statute.  While the boys' 
characterization of the activity is relevant under the Linville 
test, it does not control the result. 
 
¶33 We therefore conclude that the activity that Devenport 
and his friends were engaged in was not a recreational activity. 
 This activity does not satisfy the definition of recreational 
activity set forth in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  In addition, 
this 
activity 
was 
neither 
substantially 
similar 
to 
the 
activities listed in the statute nor undertaken in circumstances 
substantially similar to the circumstances of a recreational 
activity.  Because we conclude that the boys were not engaged in 
a recreational activity, Paper Recycling is not entitled to 
recreational immunity. 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
23
 
¶34 We also consider the effect of our decision in the 
present case on the common law doctrine of attractive nuisance. 
 The doctrine of attractive nuisance is a phase of the law of 
negligence that describes a property owner's liability to a 
trespassing child.  Christians v. Homestake Enters., Ltd., 101 
Wis. 2d 25, 28 n.1, 303 N.W.2d 608 (1981).  In short, the 
doctrine of attractive nuisance imposes a duty upon possessors 
of property "to keep those parts of their land on which they 
know, or ought to know, children are likely to be present, free 
from artificial conditions which involve an unreasonable risk of 
bodily injury or death to children."  Id. at 30 n.2 (citations 
omitted).8  Our decision in the present case affects the doctrine 
                     
8 A plaintiff claiming a cause of action for attractive 
nuisance must establish the following elements: 
(1) . . . that the former [possessor of real estate] 
maintained, or allowed to exist, upon his land, an artificial 
condition which was inherently dangerous to children being upon 
his premises . . . .  
(2) . . . that he knew or should have known that children 
trespassed or were likely to trespass upon his premises . . . . 
(3) . . . that he realized or should have realized that the 
structure erected or the artificial condition maintained by him 
was 
inherently 
dangerous 
to 
children 
and 
involved 
an 
unreasonable risk of serious bodily injury or death to them     
. . . .  
(4) . . . that the injured child, because of his youth or 
tender age, did not discover the condition or realize the risk 
involved in going within the area, or playing in close proximity 
to the inherently dangerous condition . . . .  
(5) . . . that safeguards could reasonably have been 
provided which would have obviated the inherent danger without 
materially interfering with the purpose for which the artificial 
condition was maintained . . .. 
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
24
of attractive nuisance because the recreational immunity statute 
provides that a possessor of property has no liability under 
attractive nuisance to a child using the property for a 
recreational activity.  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(7).    
¶35 By concluding that Devenport and his friends were not 
engaged in a recreational activity, we do not eliminate 
consideration of the doctrine of attractive nuisance under such 
circumstances.  All children would likely characterize the 
activity of trespassing onto commercial property to play around 
dangerous, artificial conditions as a recreational activity.  If 
we were to agree, that the subjective play of children on 
commercial property is a recreational activity, then possessors 
of 
commercial 
property 
would 
have 
no 
liability 
towards 
trespassing children.  The inevitable result of that conclusion 
would be that possessors of commercial property would have no 
incentive to keep children from being drawn onto their property 
by dangerous artificial conditions.  Consequently, possessors of 
commercial property would have less reason to monitor their 
property and prevent children from trespassing. 
III 
 
¶36 In summary, we hold that Paper Recycling is not 
entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) 
in the lawsuits filed by Joyce Devenport and Minnesota Fire and 
Casualty Insurance Company, because the activity that the boys 
                                                                  
Christians v. Homestake Enters., Ltd., 101 Wis. 2d 25, 44, 
303 N.W.2d 608 (1981)(citations omitted).    
No. 
99-0327 & 99-0858 
 
 
25
were engaged in, crawling through stacks of baled paper, while 
lighting matches and starting fires, was not a recreational 
activity as defined in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
99-0327 & 99-0858.awb 
 
1 
¶37 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). When interpreting 
a statute we must discern the intent of the legislature.  This 
rule of statutory construction sounds simple.  Yet, the gulf 
between the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 and a 
reasonable conception of the statute's purpose obfuscates a 
determination of that intent.  
¶38 When enacting the recreational immunity statute, did 
the legislature intend that it apply to an industrial yard?  Did 
the legislature intend that it provide immunity from liability 
in virtually all cases involving the outdoor activities of 
children?  Because I agree with the majority's answers to these 
questions, I join the opinion.  I write separately to emphasize 
the lack of a coherent statutory purpose and scheme that 
frustrates our application of the statute.   
 
¶39 The statute as written is difficult to apply.  Its 
laundry list of specific "recreational activities" couched 
between two sweeping generalizations of what that term means is 
at the same time all-encompassing and overly specific.  While it 
is well suited to handle a run-of-the-mill case, such as a 
softball injury or a camping accident, at the edges of the 
spectrum are activities that test the definition provided by the 
statute.  In such cases we are required to create new 
formulations, all the while in the context of a shifting and 
evasive legislative purpose.   
¶40 We 
have 
maintained 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
recreational immunity statute is to serve the public policy of 
encouraging landowners to open their property to recreational 
99-0327 & 99-0858.awb 
 
2 
use.  However, as the dissent correctly notes, the legislature's 
change in its perception of the statute has effectively divorced 
this public policy from the application of the statute.  As a 
result of the legislative sea change, the statute serves simply 
to further the goal of relieving landowners from liability, bar 
none.   
¶41 With relief from liability as the only purpose of the 
statute, what is our guiding light in construing the statute?  
Where do we draw the lines?   
¶42 The answer supposedly lies in the amorphous definition 
of 
"recreational 
activity." 
 
This 
case 
illustrates 
the 
deficiencies of such an approach.  As we strain to identify the 
controlling principles, the parties engage in fruitless debate 
over whether playing in bales of paper is sufficiently analogous 
to "exploring caves" so as to entitle the defendant to immunity. 
 We could avoid such artificial distinctions if we were able to 
address the policy of encouraging landowners to open their 
property to recreational activities.  How can that policy be 
served by providing immunity to the owner of an industrial yard 
who allegedly has failed to take adequate precautions against 
the potential for intruding children?  
¶43 One of the most vexing difficulties the current 
statute creates is the seemingly universal application of 
"recreational activity" to the lives of children.  With limited 
exception, all outdoor activities that children engage in during 
their idle hours might constitute a recreational activity under 
§ 895.52(1)(g).  The majority opinion correctly acknowledges 
99-0327 & 99-0858.awb 
 
3 
this and avoids this harsh result.  I do not believe that the 
legislature intended blanket immunity in cases involving young 
children.  However, absent the majority's construction, the 
statute would seemingly relieve landowners of any duty to 
children engaged in an outdoor activity.   
¶44 Given the difficulties inherent in the statute as 
currently drafted, I believe it is time that the legislature 
revisit it.  A coherent purpose and scheme are needed to provide 
guidance, consistency, and reason to our application of the 
statute.  I urge the law revision committee and the revisor of 
statutes to exercise their statutory duties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.83(1) and § 13.93(2)(d) and examine the statute, as it is 
in need of revision.   
¶45 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
1 
¶46 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent.  I would conclude that the boys' activity constituted a 
"recreational activity" under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (1995-96)9 and, 
for this reason, § 895.52 immunizes Paper Recycling from 
liability.  Therefore, I believe that this court should have 
ruled that summary judgment in favor of Paper Recycling is 
appropriate.   
I 
¶47 The legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 895.52 to "be 
liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them 
from liability."  Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 
705, 715, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994) (quoting 1983 Wis. Act 418, the 
act creating § 895.52); see also Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 638, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996) (noting 
legislative intent); Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 
476-77, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) ("The clear legislative intent was 
to construe sec. 895.52, Stats., in favor of landowners to 
protect them from liability.").  Accordingly, it worded the 
statute in broad language:  "[N]o owner and no officer, employe 
or agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, 
or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a 
recreational activity on the owner's property . . . ."10  Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).  Nonetheless, the majority of this court 
                     
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.  
10 Section 895.52(1)(d) defines "owner" in part as an owner, 
lessee, or occupant of property. 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
2 
in the present case takes two unprecedented strides around the 
legislative directive and plain language of § 895.52 and, in 
doing so, unduly narrows the scope of the statutory term 
"recreational activity."   
A 
¶48 First, rather than examining the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the boys' activity, the majority 
focuses its analysis almost entirely upon a single momentary 
diversion from that activity.  This marks a sharp break from 
precedent. 
¶49 In Linville, this court first set forth its analytical 
framework for examining whether an activity is a "recreational 
activity," as defined by § 895.52.  In that case, three persons 
drove a van to a city-owned pond in order to prepare to go 
fishing at the pond the next day.  184 Wis. 2d at 711-12.  While 
at the pond, the van became stuck in mud.  Id. at 712.  The 
persons thus attempted to dislodge the van from the mud.  Id.  
However, the van jumped forward into the pond, drowning two of 
the persons.  Id.  
¶50 On review of the subsequent lawsuit against the city, 
this court explained that the test to determine whether a 
property user is engaged in a recreational activity "is one 
which considers the purpose and nature of the activity in 
addition 
to 
the 
user's 
intent. . . .  
The 
test 
requires 
examination of all aspects of the activity."  Id. at 716 
(emphasis added).  In light of this test, while examining the 
facts of the case, we did not focus our analysis on the fact 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
3 
that at the time immediately surrounding the accident, the 
persons were pushing their van out of mudan activity probably 
not within the scope of § 895.52.  Rather, we looked to the 
persons' primary activity:  "to look at fishing areas and to 
prepare for fishing the next day."  Id. at 717.  Because the 
persons' primary activityfishingis a recreational activity 
under § 895.52, we concluded that § 895.52 conferred immunity 
upon the city.  Id.  
 
¶51 Linville illustrates that recreational activities are 
defined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
property user's primary activity.  Temporary diversions from the 
primary activity do not alter the purpose and nature of the 
activity for purposes of § 895.52 analysis.  Accord Schultz v. 
Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 229 Wis. 2d 513, 519-20, 600 
N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the momentary diversion 
of chasing a runaway steer did not change the recreational 
activity of attending a fair into "something different"). 
¶52 In the present case the majority abandons the Linville 
analysis.  The majority predicates its holding on the fact that 
at the time immediately surrounding the accident at issue, the 
boys had lit fires.  However, the record indicates that this was 
not the boys' primary activity. 
¶53 The only two documents in the record that provide 
insight regarding the boys' activity on May 28, 1997, are 
affidavits by Ronald Murray and Andy Barney, the boys who 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
4 
accompanied Daniel Devenport onto Paper Recycling's premises.11  
Ronald Murray's affidavit provides in pertinent part: 
 
After school on May 28, 1997 I got together with 
Danny Devenport and Andy Barney and we decided to 
enter the business premises of Paper Recycling through 
a hole in the fence around the business.  There were 
large bales of paper stacked in the yard and we liked 
to play among the bales of paper.  We had found that 
there were tunnels among the paper bales and we could 
crawl through the tunnels and reach forts or rooms 
within the stacks of paper bales where we could play 
games.  Our purpose in entering the premises that day 
was to play among the bales of paper. 
 
On May 28, 1997 the three of us entered through 
the hole in the fence.  There was no one around and we 
began playing among the bales of paper.  I had with me 
that day a box of stick matches and all three of us 
played with the matches among the bales of paper.  We 
all lit matches and lit small fires in the paper. 
 
                     
11 In footnote 4 of the majority opinion, the majority 
references the transcript of a recorded statement by Andy 
Barney, which it characterizes as evidence regarding the purpose 
and nature of the boys' activity.  That document states in 
pertinent part: 
[Q]  What was Danny Devenport doing before you noticed 
the fire in the paper bails [sic]? 
 
[A] He was sitting in a corner in one of the rooms. 
 
[Q] How long had he been sitting in one of the rooms 
before you noticed the fire? 
 
[A] Five minutes. 
 
 
The majority is correct insofar as it explains that this 
transcript does not demonstrate that the boys were engaged in a 
recreational activity.  However, this transcript also fails to 
indicate what the boys had been doing more than five minutes 
before the fire.  That is, it contains no evidence of what the 
boys' primary activity was. 
 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
5 
After a time we proceeded down one of the tunnels 
in the paper bales and spent some time in a fort or 
room among the bales.  We then noticed that there was 
fire at the far end of the tunnel in the area where we 
had previously been lighting the matches. 
Andy Barney's affidavit provides substantially the same account: 
 
Prior to May 28, 1997, Danny Devenport, Ron 
Murray and I would occasionally play at the business 
premises of Paper Recycling.  There were large bales 
of paper stacked in the yard at Paper Recycling, and 
we liked to play among the bales of paper.  The bales 
of paper were stacked so that there were tunnels 
through which we would crawl to reach forts or rooms 
within the stacks of paper bales where we played 
games. 
 
On May 28, 1997, Danny Devenport, Ron Murray and 
I went to the business premises of Paper Recycling 
after school to play amongst the bales of paper.  On 
that day, the three of us entered through an opening 
in the fence.  There was no one around and we began to 
play among the bales of paper. 
 
Ron Murray had brought a box of stick matches 
that day, and all three of us played with the matches 
among the bales of paper.  After a time, we proceeded 
down one of the tunnels in the paper bales and spent 
some time in a fort or room among the bales.  It was 
then that we noticed that there was a fire at the far 
end of the tunnel in the area where we had been 
previously playing. 
¶54 These documents indicate that the primary purpose and 
nature of the boys' activity was climbing and playing among the 
paper bales.  To be sure, the boys lit fires on Paper 
Recycling's premises.  However, the evidence shows that they did 
so only as a temporary diversion before crawling into another 
"room" and continuing their primary activity.   
¶55 I recognize that, as the majority notes, the boys' 
affidavits are subjective.  And I agree with the majority that 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
6 
in general, although a property user's subjective intent is 
relevant, it is not controlling as to whether he or she is 
engaged in a recreational activity.  However, in the present 
case, the boys' affidavits are the only relevant evidence before 
this court.  Consequently, the court necessarily should have 
based its ruling on the evidence in the affidavits. 
¶56 Nevertheless, the majority ignores the affidavits and 
concludes that "[t]he goal of the boys' activity was to light 
matches and start fires."  Majority op. at ¶27.  Not only is 
there no evidence in the record to support such a proposition, 
but the boys' affidavits directly contradict this conclusion.   
¶57 The affidavits, the sole evidence on point, show that 
the boys' primary activity was climbing and playing among the 
paper bales.  Thus, had the majority properly applied Linville 
to the evidence in the record and focused on the boys' primary 
activityclimbing and playing among the bales of paperrather 
than upon a single, temporary diversion during the activity, it 
would have determined that the boys were engaged in an "outdoor 
activity," substantially similar to "exploring caves" and "rock-
climbing."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g) (listing "exploring caves" 
and "rock-climbing" as recreational activities).  For this 
reason, § 895.52 should apply.  See majority op. at ¶20 
(explaining that § 895.52(2)(b) immunity applies to outdoor 
activities that are "substantially similar" to the recreational 
activities listed in § 895.52(1)(g)).  
B 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
7 
 
¶58 The majority opinion also is problematic because it 
gives great weight to the nature of Paper Recycling's property. 
 This ignores the plain text of § 895.52, legislative intent, 
and this court's precedent. 
 
¶59 Section 895.52 does not premise liability on the 
nature of the property on which a person engages in a 
recreational activity.  Section 895.52(2)(b) immunizes property 
owners against liability for injury or death caused by or to "a 
person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's 
property."  Section 895.52(1)(f) defines "property" in pertinent 
part 
as 
"real 
property 
and 
buildings, 
structures 
and 
improvements thereon, and the waters of the state."  Both of 
these provisions are clear and unambiguous.  Verdoljak, 200 
Wis. 2d at 634.  And neither of these provisions contains any 
limiting language regarding the "nature" of property to which 
the statute applies.  Hence, the plain text of the statute 
indicates that immunity attaches to any "recreational activity," 
regardless of the nature of the property on which the activity 
occurs.12 
                     
12 The majority seems to suggest that because § 895.52 does 
not specifically prohibit courts from considering the nature of 
property when determining whether the statute applies to a given 
case, this court may graft such a consideration onto the 
statutory test.  However, as explained above, the legislature 
intended § 895.52 to be broadly construed.  Further, the 
legislature wrote § 895.52 in broad terms and unequivocally 
defined the "property" to which the statute applies.  In light 
of these facts, I do not find it reasonable to conclude based on 
an absence of language in § 895.52 to the contrary, that the 
legislature intended this court to introduce limitations to the 
statute, thus narrowing the scope and rewriting the definition 
of the statutory term "property."  
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
8 
 
¶60 That § 895.52 is blind to the nature of an owner's 
property is further evidenced by the statute's legislative 
history.13  Prior to May 1984 when § 895.52 became law, 
recreational immunity was governed by Wis. Stat. § 29.68 (1981-
82).14  The prefatory language to 1962 Wis. Act 89, the act that 
created § 29.68, explained the statute as "relating to the 
limitations on liability of landowners who open private lands 
for recreational purposes." 
 The 
legislature 
subsequently 
altered this language several times, thus redefining the 
intended scope of the statute:  1965 Wis. Act 190 applied to "a 
landowner who gives another permission to use his land for a 
recreational purpose"; 1977 Wis. Act 75 applied to "landowners 
who permit people to cut or remove wood from their land"; and 
1977 Wis. Act 123 applied to "landowners who allow their land to 
be 
used 
for 
certain 
outdoor 
recreational 
activities."  
                     
13 Although this court may not tap legislative history to 
show that a statute is ambiguous, we may use legislative history 
to support a conclusion that a statute is clear on its face.  
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶51-52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659.   
14 Section 
29.68 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
(1981-82) 
provided in pertinent part: 
Liability of landowners.  (1) Safe for entry; no 
warning.  An owner, lessee or occupant of premises 
owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or 
use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, 
hiking, snowmobiling, berry picking, water sports, 
sight-seeing, cutting or removing wood, climbing of 
observation towers or recreational purposes, or to 
give warning of any unsafe condition or use of or 
structure or activity on the premises to persons 
entering for such purpose . . . .   
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
9 
Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 633.  But although the legislature 
altered this prefatory language, it consistently indicated that 
§ 29.68 applied only to specific types of "opened" property.   
 
¶61 In May 1984 the legislature repealed § 29.68 and 
enacted § 895.52.  1983 Wis. Act 418.  In doing so, the 
legislature made clear that § 895.52 "is intended to overrule 
any previous Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
§ 29.68 of the statutes if the decision is more restrictive than 
or inconsistent with the provisions of this act."15  1983 Wis. 
Act 418.  As this court later observed: 
 
[T]he newly created statute [§ 895.52] is essentially 
a complete rewrite, containing none of the previous 
references to 'open[ing] land' . . . .   
 
The 
unambiguous 
language 
of 
the 
[new] 
recreational 
use 
statute 
sets 
the 
following 
precondition for immunitythat the injury be to or 
caused by "a person engaging in a recreational 
activity on the owner's property."   
                     
15 It appears that the legislature included this language in 
part to show its dissatisfaction with this court's decision in 
LePoidevin v. Wilson, which, while narrowing the scope of 
§ 29.68, noted that "[t]he language of the statute leaves 
uncertain the types of lands, persons, and events intended to be 
included within its purview."  111 Wis. 2d 116, 128-29, 330 
N.W.2d 555 (1983), superceded by statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  
As an associate of a sponsor of 1983 Wis. Act 418 explained: 
[T]his bill is to do away with some of the great 
uncertainty of our present landowner liability law.  
This is particularly important because of the Supreme 
Court's 1983 decision in LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 
Wis. 2d 116.  
 
Letter from John R. Zillmer to Jim S. Christenson, Bureau of 
Legal Services, Dept. of Natural Res. 2 (June 2, 1983).     
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Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 633-34 (quoting § 895.52(2)(b)).  
Based on this observation and the language in § 895.52, we thus 
concluded that the legislature consciously decided to remove the 
nature of property from consideration when assessing statutory 
recreational immunity.  Id. at 631, 633-34.  Accordingly, to 
date, this court consistently has held that "the test to 
determine whether an activity is recreational focuses on the 
'nature of the activity,' not the nature of the property."  
Sievert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 632, 
528 N.W.2d 413 (1995); see also Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 631.   
¶62 Despite this overwhelming authority to the contrary, 
the majority asserts that the nature of property can be a 
"significant factor" to § 895.52 analysis.  Majority op. at ¶24. 
 To support this assertion, the majority cites a single line in 
Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 717, where this court considered the 
fact that a person was "at a recreational facility which is open 
for public use, looking at potential fishing areas," in 
concluding that the person was engaged in a recreational 
activity.  But had the majority examined this line in the 
context of the Linville opinion rather than citing it in an 
analytical vacuum, it would have recognized that Linville does 
not lend any support to its "nature of the property" analysis. 
¶63 As explained above, the evidence in Linville showed 
that several persons who allegedly were examining property in 
preparation to fish there the following day drowned while 
pushing a van out of mud.  Id. at 712, 717.  But because the 
persons drowned while dislodging the van and not while fishing, 
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this court examined the nature of the property to determine 
whether it supported the allegations that the person intended to 
fish there the next day.  Id.  That is, this court examined the 
nature of the property only insofar as it evidenced the 
credibility of the witnesses' account of the events leading to 
the accident.  We did not consider the nature of the property as 
defining the activity.      
¶64 In the present case, the nature of Paper Recycling's 
premises supports the boys' accounts that they were climbing and 
playing prior to the fire.  It is undisputed that the property 
contained large bales of paper.  It further is undisputed that 
between these bales of paper, there were spaces in which the 
boys could climb and play.  Thus, to the extent that Linville 
suggests that this court should consider the nature of Paper 
Recycling's premises, the nature of the property lends credence 
to the boys' descriptions of the events at issue. 
¶65 Nevertheless, the majority looks beyond the nature of 
the property as evidence of the credibility of the boys' 
affidavits and considers the nature of the property as defining 
the boys' activity.  The majority explains that the closed, 
industrial "nature of Paper Recycling's property is crucial to 
our examination of the nature of the boys' activity."16  Majority 
                     
16  The majority even goes so far as to suggest that the 
subjective intent of a landowner to open his or her property to 
recreational use should be a factor for courts to consider under 
§ 895.52 analysis.  Majority op. at ¶25.  This proposition is 
without legal support.  
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
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op. at ¶25.  Hence, it reasons that the nature of Paper 
Recycling's property transmogrifies the boys' climbing and 
playing from a recreational activity into something else.  
¶66 The majority's reasoning is counterintuitive for at 
least four reasons.  First, the majority's reasoning contravenes 
the general canons of statutory construction.  "It is a well-
recognized rule of statutory construction that nontechnical 
words and phrases are to be construed according to their common 
and ordinary usage."  Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 483-84 (citation 
omitted).  Pursuant to this rule, the enumerated "recreational 
activities" in Wis. Stat. § 895.52 should be construed in light 
of their common and ordinary usage.   
¶67 However, under the majority's "nature of the property" 
analysis, the enumerated activities in § 895.52 cannot be 
construed in light of their common meanings.  For example, 
                                                                  
In Linville, this court held that the subjective intent of 
the property user is relevant to whether a particular activity 
falls within the scope of § 895.52.  Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 716, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  
Linville did not, however, mention the subjective intent of the 
property owner. 
Indeed, in Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 
624, 628, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996), this court specifically 
rejected the proposition that § 895.52 conditions immunity upon 
the property owner's subjective intent to open his or her land 
to recreational activity.  As we explained:  "[T]he concept of 
'openness' . . . has 
never 
been 
and 
is 
not 
now . . . an 
'element' of the statute that a landowner needs to satisfy in 
order to be afforded immunity."  Id. at 634 n.6.  "The focus is 
on the activity of the person who enters and uses the land, not 
upon any obligation on the part of the owner to affirmatively 
demonstrate that the land is open."  Id. at 631. 
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13
§ 895.52 lists "bicycling" among its enumerated recreational 
activities.  The ordinary and common meaning of "bicycling" is 
"[t]o ride or travel on a bicycle."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 183 (3d ed. 1992).17  Thus, 
pursuant to the rule of statutory construction set forth above, 
a reasonable person reading § 895.52 would expect that the act 
of riding or traveling on a bicycle for purposes of exercise, 
relaxation, or pleasure always is a "recreational activity" to 
which the statute applies.  But under the majority's "nature of 
the property" analysis, while § 895.52 may apply to riding or 
traveling on a bicycle for such purposes in a park, it may not 
apply to riding or traveling on a bicycle for the same purposes 
in an industrial lot.  Under this reasoning, the statutory term 
"bicycling" does not necessarily mean "to ride or travel on a 
bicycle" for recreational purposes.  Rather, the term means "to 
ride or travel on a bicycle" for recreational purposes in areas 
where a court determines such an activity is appropriate.  
Consequently, 
pursuant 
to 
the 
majority's 
reasoning, 
the 
definition of "bicycling," as used in § 895.52, is more limited 
in scope than the statute or the term's ordinary and common 
meaning would suggest.  
¶68 Second, the majority's reasoning creates artificial 
distinctions between activities to which § 895.52 potentially 
                     
17 "The ordinary and common meaning of a word may be 
established by definition of a recognized dictionary."  Ervin v. 
City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 483-84, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) 
(citation omitted).  
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
14
may apply.  Many modern sports and activities such as BMX 
bicycling, skateboarding, and in-line skating are best suited 
for an urban environment.  And many of these sports and 
activities arguably are or are exceedingly similar to enumerated 
"recreational activities" such as "skating" or "bicycling."  But 
pursuant to the majority's reasoning, while § 895.52 applies to 
"skating" on a pond in a public park (i.e., a "recreational 
area"), for example, it may not apply to in-line skating in the 
parking lot of a commercial business.  
¶69 Third, the majority's analysis could lead to absurd 
and unreasonable results.  In accordance with the majority's 
analysis, if a person is injured in an area intended for 
recreatingsuch as a parkhe or she may not pursue a claim for 
the injuries.  On the other hand, if a person is injured during 
the same activity in an area where the activity is dangerous, 
prohibited, or even illegalsuch as an industrial lothe or she 
may sue the property owner.  Thus, the majority's analysis 
affords greater rights to persons who engage in their activities 
in dangerous, "non-recreational" areas than it does to persons 
who exercise caution, discretion, and common sense.  Contra 
Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 636 ("We reject the notion that the 
recreational use statute could confer greater protection to a 
trespasser 
than 
to 
one 
who 
was 
lawfully 
using 
the 
premises . . . .").  
¶70 And fourth, the majority's analysis may suggest to 
property owners such as Paper Recycling to remove fences, 
barricades, and other protective devices in order to give their 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
15
lands the appearance of a "recreational area."  Owners who 
maintain such protections run the risk of owning what the 
majority may deem "non-recreational property" and, thus, being 
held liable for users' injuries.  But if the owners give their 
propertiesregardless 
of 
dangerthe 
appearance 
of 
a 
"recreational area," they less likely will be subjected to 
lawsuits.  Cf. Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 477 ("If liability were 
imposed on landowners for negligence in failing to provide 
adequate safety measures, it would encourage landowners to 
provide no safety measures.").   
¶71 I 
cannot 
believe 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
§ 895.52 to promote any of these policies or lead to such absurd 
results.  Accordingly, I cannot join the majority in abandoning 
Linville, Sievert, Verdoljak, and our other precedent on point, 
and adopting this unworkable reasoning. 
II 
¶72 I recognize that proper application of § 895.52 may 
lead to harsh results, and I agree with Justice Bradley's 
observation that the legislature should consider revisiting this 
statute.  But I further recognize that while there may be reason 
to dislike § 895.52, there are limits to courts' authority:  
"[W]hen a legislative mandate is 'clearly expressed and there is 
no warrant for alternative construction, a court may not impose 
its view of what the law should be.'"  Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 478 
(citation omitted).  Policy considerations weighing in favor of 
creating exceptions to statutory mandates are best left to the 
No. 99-0327.jpw 
 
16
established province of the legislature.  Seider v. O'Connell, 
2000 WI 76, ¶40, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.    
¶73 In sum, I believe that had the majority properly 
applied § 895.52 in light of the legislative intent and plain 
text of the statute and in accord with this court's precedent, 
it would have concluded that the statute applies in this case.  
Accordingly, the court should have concluded that summary 
judgment in favor of Paper Recycling is appropriate. 
¶74 In refusing to grant summary judgment for Paper 
Recycling, the majority has contravened the purpose and text of 
§ 895.52, and has ignored our precedent on point.  Unlike the 
majority, I believe that if § 895.52 is to be limited or 
amended, the legislaturenot this courtis the proper body to 
make the changes.  For this reason, I dissent.    
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent.  
 
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