Case Title: Schuchard v. Schuchard

Citation: 293 N.W.2d 428

Docket Number: 9734

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1980-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
293 N.W.2d 428 (1980) Irene SCHUCHARD, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. John Leo SCHUCHARD, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. No. 9734. Supreme Court of North Dakota. May 15, 1980. *429 Scott R. Thompson, of Foughty, Christianson & Thompson, Devils Lake, for plaintiff and appellee. Arne F. Boyum, Jr., Rolla, for defendant and appellant. VANDE WALLE, Justice. John Leo Schuchard appeals from a judgment and decree of divorce entered by the Rolette County district court on September 17, 1979. We affirm. John Leo Schuchard and Irene Schuchard were married in Canada on May 30, 1959. Mrs. Schuchard was a widow at the time and had children by a previous marriage. The parties, along with two of Mrs. Schuchard's sons, moved to North Dakota where they lived with Mr. Schuchard's mother on a farm owned by her. Soon after the marriage the two boys were adopted by Mr. Schuchard. In 1963, a parcel of land consisting of 160 acres ("Parcel A") was transferred from Mr. Schuchard's mother to the parties in joint tenancy in order that Farmers Home Administration financing could be obtained for a new house. Upon the mother's death in 1969, Mr. Schuchard alone received title to the remaining 160 acres of the farm ("Parcel B"). No consideration was paid Mr. Schuchard's mother for either transfer other than allowing her to reside in the house with the parties. In 1978, Mrs. Schuchard commenced an action for divorce, which was granted by the district court. The court awarded Mr. Schuchard Parcel A along with certain personal property. Mrs. Schuchard was awarded Parcel B and certain personal property. Mr. Schuchard now appeals from the judgment. Our only issue for consideration is whether or not the district court's failure to award Mr. Schuchard all of the real estate was clearly erroneous and inequitable. A trial court's determinations on matters of property division are treated as findings of fact. Bosma v. Bosma, 287 N.W.2d 447 (N.D.1980); Haugeberg v. Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657 (N.D.1977). Thus our scope of review of these findings on appeal is limited by Rule 52(a), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and we will not set aside those findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is deemed "clearly erroneous" when, although there is *430 some evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576 (N.D.1979); Haberstroh v. Haberstroh, 258 N.W.2d 669 (N.D.1977). In dividing the marital estate, the trial court is governed by Section 14-05-24, N.D.C.C., which provides: This court has also provided the district courts with some guidelines to be used in dividing the marital property, although we have not specifically said that the trial court must make an express finding as to each of these factors. Nastrom v. Nastrom, supra. These guidelines, known as the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, were first enumerated in Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952), and Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.1966). See Fries v. Fries, 288 N.W.2d 77 (N.D.1980). As is stated in Nastrom v. Nastrom, supra: In light of the evidence adduced at trial, the district court concluded, in part, in its findings of fact: Thereafter, in its conclusions of law, the district court stated: The findings of fact, which are sustained by the record, clearly show that the district court applied the proper guidelines in making the property awards. The district court considered the ages of the parties, their earning abilities, the duration of the marriage, the parties' conduct, their health, property owned by them, its value, and whether it was acquired before or during the marriage. We are aware of Mr. Schuchard's great attachment to the property upon which he has lived and farmed since 1937. But we are also aware that Mrs. Schuchard has lived and worked on the property for the last 20 years and helped care for Mr. Schuchard's mother until her death. It is true the property in question was acquired from Mr. Schuchard's mother and that Parcel B was held in Mr. Schuchard's name alone, but these are only two of many factors which may be considered in making an equitable property distribution. This court has held that district courts have jurisdiction to award the separately owned property of one spouse to the other, if equity should require it. Hultberg v. Hultberg, supra; Fine v. Fine, 248 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 1976); Bellon v. Bellon, 237 N.W.2d 163 (N.D.1976). The findings of fact indicate that the parties have approximately the same income needs. To meet these needs, Mrs. Schuchard receives $6,000 in wages annually, which, except for a small pension, will cease when she retires at 65. Mr. Schuchard receives farm income, which was $3,500 in 1978, and Social Security benefits of $214 per month. During oral argument, counsel for Mr. Schuchard contended that giving each party one-half of the real property would drastically reduce Mr. Schuchard's earnings. However, the record reflects only the farm income Mr. Schuchard received *432 from the property during 1978. This amount may increase or decrease, depending upon the success of a particular year and when grain is sold. The amount of farm income will also depend upon the manner in which rent is determined. Because of these contingencies, we do not believe the amount of farm income for a single year can indicate that Mr. Schuchard's future earnings on one half of the property will be only one-half of the 1978 income, or $1,750. After considering the factors discussed above, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court erred when it awarded Mrs. Schuchard Parcel B, and we therefore hold that the district court made an equitable distribution of the marriage property. Judgment affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.