Case Title: Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-340


Town of Sandgate, et al                      Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Bennington Superior Court

Raymond Colehamer                            June Term, 1989



Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

Witten, Saltonstall & Woolmington, P.C., Bennington, for plaintiffs-
  appellees

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Raymond Colehamer, appeals an injunction, dated
June 3, 1988, granted pursuant to 24 V.S.A. {{ 2241-2283, by the Bennington
Superior Court in favor of plaintiffs, the Town of Sandgate and its
selectmen and the Sandgate Zoning Board of Adjustment.  The injunction was
issued in a suit in which plaintiffs sought the removal of junk cars and a
boat from the property occupied by defendant and owned by Sonia Siwik, who
is also joined as a defendant.  We reverse and remand.
     Plaintiffs appeal the court's February 25, 1986 decision denying them
an injunction for failure to set forth sufficient facts supporting the
Town's decision to amend its zoning ordinance.  We reverse and remand that
order also.  The effect of our action is to authorize an injunction similar
to that issued by the trial court but based on the Sandgate Zoning Ordinance
and not on the state junkyard statute.
     Defendant resides in the mountainous region of Sandgate, Vermont,
where, according to the Town Plan, "there is virtually no commercial use of
land . . . other than a few home occupations."  The log cabin in which he
resides and the surrounding land is actually owned by defendant's former
girlfriend, Sonia Siwik,(FN1) but she moved out some time ago to live elsewhere.
Defendant currently makes the mortgage payments on the cabin.
     Since 1968, when defendant moved onto the property, he has accumulated
"a collection of kitchen appliances, lawn mowers, automobiles, used wood,
old tires, gas cans, steel drums, cable reels and a small yacht," which are
left outside around the land.   Among the items strewn about the land are
twenty-one unregistered vehicles and a boat.  The trial court found that the
property was not used as a junkyard, since there is no commercial activity.
A neighbor testified that defendant's residence is an eyesore which devalues
the property of its neighbors in the area.
     Apparently, in response to the situation on the property on which
defendant resided, the Town amended its zoning ordinance in 1985 to prohibit
the storage of junk cars on property within the Town.  An amendment was
adopted that made it illegal to have "more than one inoperable motor
vehicle . . . stored on any lot for a period in excess of thirty days unless
within a building or totally screened from view from off the premises."  The
amendment required existing uses to be brought into compliance within ninety
days of the effective date of the amendment.  On July 16, 1985 the Town
zoning administrator issued citations to Sonia Siwik and Raymond Colehamer
for violation of the newly amended ordinance, giving them thirty days in
which to bring the property into compliance with the amendment.  On August
2, 1985, defendant appealed to the zoning board of adjustment.  Sonia Siwik
did not appeal.  Although the Board found the appeal to be untimely, it held
a hearing on September 30, 1985, and defendant failed to appear.  The Board
found defendant in violation of the ordinance and ordered him to remove the
junk vehicles and the boat, within thirty days of receipt of the decision.
     At this point, the action shifted to Bennington Superior Court to
which defendant appealed the decision of the Sandgate Zoning Board.  Again
Sonia Siwik did not join in the appeal.  Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs
brought an action against defendant and Sonia Siwik seeking an injunction to
require defendant to remove the junk vehicles, along with civil fines. The
actions were combined and heard in early 1986.  Sonia Siwik never answered
plaintiffs' complaint and testified at the hearing that she wanted the court
to order the removal of the cars.  The court denied plaintiffs' requests for
relief and reversed the decision of the zoning board, concluding that the
junk car amendment to the zoning ordinance was invalid because it was not
supported by the Town plan.
     An attempted appeal to this Court failed because we found that there
was no final judgment since the court had not resolved plaintiffs' claim
that they were entitled to relief under the state junkyard statute, 24
V.S.A. {{ 2241-2283, and the common law of nuisance.  The trial court then
decided that plaintiffs were entitled to relief under the statute.  It found
that defendant had maintained junk motor vehicles within view of the main-
traveled public highway in violation of 24 V.S.A. {{ 2242(2) and 2271.
Accordingly, the court issued an injunction requiring defendants to remove
the boat and all unregistered motor vehicles within the view of the traveled
way of any public highway by 5 p.m. on July 5, 1988.  Further, defendants
were prohibited from placing any other junk motor vehicles on the property
within view of the main traveled way of any public highway.  If defendants
failed to comply with the order, plaintiffs were authorized to remove the
junk motor vehicles and dispose of them to pay for their removal costs.
Since the court granted plaintiffs relief under the state junkyard statute,
it did not reach plaintiffs' common-law nuisance claim.  Both defendant (FN2)
and plaintiffs (FN3) appeal the trial court's decision.
                                    I.
     We consider first plaintiffs' appeal from the 1986 decision that the
provisions of the ordinance with respect to junk vehicles are invalid.
Plaintiffs assert that the court's decision is erroneous because: (1)
defendant's appeal should have been dismissed because he is not the owner of
the land and does not have standing to contest the action of the zoning
board; and (2) the ordinance amendments are valid, and plaintiffs were
entitled to an injunction under them.
     There are actually two standing issues in this case, one in each of the
combined cases.  The first issue is whether defendant has standing to pursue
an appeal from the zoning board to the superior court.  Under 24 V.S.A. {
4471, an appeal may be taken only by an "interested person."  This term is
defined in 24 V.S.A. { 4464(b)(1) to include:
           A person owning title to property affected by a by-
         law who alleges that such regulation imposes on such
         property unreasonable or inappropriate restrictions of
         present or potential use under the particular
         circumstances of the case.

There is no other part of the definition that could apply to defendant's
situation; if defendant does not fit within { 4464(b)(1), he lacks standing.
     This Court construed { 4464(b)(1) in Mad River Valley Enterprises, Inc.
v. Town of Warren Board of Adjustment, 146 Vt. 126,