Case Title: Lombardo v. Warner

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51989

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 23, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JAMES LOMBARDO,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE A. WARNER,
in his official capacity as
Director of the Department of Transportation,
Defendant.
(CV 98-03001-MRH; US Ninth Circuit No. 02-35269; SC S51989)
On certified questions from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Order dated December 3, 2004;
certification accepted January 25, 2005.
Honorable Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, and Honorable
Warren J. Ferguson, Honorable Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Honorable A.
Wallace Tashima, Honorable Sidney R. Thomas, Honorable M.
Margaret McKeown, Honorable Kim McClane Wardlaw, Honorable
Raymond C. Fisher, Honorable Marsha S. Berzon, Honorable Richard
R. Clifton, and Honorable Jay S. Bybee, United States Ninth
Circuit Court Judges.
Argued and submitted June 22, 2005.
Alan R. Herson, Jacksonville, filed the brief and argued the
cause for plaintiff. 
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the brief and argued the cause for defendant.  With her on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,* and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
BALMER, J.
Certified questions answered.
* Chief Justice when case was argued.
** Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
BALMER, J.
This case is before the court on certified questions of
Oregon law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit under ORS 28.200 to 28.255 and ORAP 12.20.  See generally
Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 811
P2d 627 (1991) (discussing factors that court considers in
exercising discretion to accept certified questions).  The
certified questions ask us to interpret the provisions for
obtaining a variance under the Oregon Motorist Information Act
(OMIA), ORS 377.700 to 377.840, from otherwise applicable
restrictions on the display of temporary signs visible from
public highways. (1)
As we describe in Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v.
DMV, __ Or __, __ P2d __ (2005) (decided this day), the OMIA
regulates signs that are visible from public highways by, among
other things, requiring permits for certain signs.  The OMIA
makes several exceptions to that permit requirement, including
the exception for "on-premises" signs that is at issue in Outdoor
Media.  At issue in this case is a different exception to the
permit requirement, one that allows "temporary signs on private
property," which the OMIA defines as signs that "do[] not exceed
12 square feet," that are "not on a permanent base," that are not
displayed for compensation, and, for signs not erected by a
resident on his or her own property, that do not remain in place
for more than 60 days in a calendar year.  ORS 377.735(1)(b). 
ORS 377.735(2) permits the Department of Transportation
(department) to grant a variance "for good cause shown" to allow
a person to display, without a permit, a temporary sign that does
not meet the statutory requirements.  The certified questions
concern that variance provision.
We take the facts from the Ninth Circuit certification
order.  Plaintiff, who lives on property adjacent to a public
highway, wishes to display a 32-square-foot sign reading "For
Peace in the Gulf" on his property.  He challenged the variance
provision of ORS 377.735(2), arguing that it violates the First
Amendment because it allows state officials "unbridled
discretion" to grant or deny a variance and because, in
plaintiff's view, it does not limit the time within which state
officials must respond to a variance application.
The federal district court dismissed plaintiff's
claims, holding, in part, that plaintiff had no standing to bring
his as-applied challenge because he never had applied for a
variance.  Plaintiff appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's claims on the
merits.  Lombardo v. Warner, 353 F3d 774 (9th Cir 2003). 
Plaintiff then requested rehearing en banc, which the court
granted, withdrawing the panel opinion.  Lombardo v. Warner, 371
F3d 538 (9th Cir 2004).  On rehearing, the court certified two
questions of law to this court and "vacated and deferred"
submission of its case for decision pending our response to the
certified questions and our decision in Outdoor Media, which was
then under advisement.  Lombardo v. Warner, 391 F3d 1008, 1010-11
(2004).  The Ninth Circuit Court certified the following two
questions of law: (2)
"1.  What is the meaning of the phrase 'for good
cause shown,' as it appears in [ORS] 377.735(2) [of
the] OMIA?  Is the interpretation and application of
that phrase entirely within the discretion of the
Department?  Does the Department's regulation, [OAR]
734-060-0175(2), limit the Department's discretion in
applying the 'for good cause shown' provision?  Does
Oregon law otherwise limit the Department's discretion
in interpreting and applying the phrase?
"2.  The OMIA does not contain any explicit time
limitation on the Department's acting on an application
for a variance under [ORS] 377.735(2).  When a statute,
such as [ORS] 377.735(2), contains no explicit time
limitation within which an agency must act, does Oregon
law otherwise supply any time limitation on such
action?"
Id. at 1010.  We accepted certification of those questions.  
We first emphasize that our limited task in this case
is to answer the certified questions, which relate only to the
provision in ORS 377.735(2) that allows the department to grant
variances for good cause shown from the otherwise applicable
requirements regarding temporary highway signs.  Thus, our
answers in this case do not implicate exceptions to the OMIA's
permit requirement other than the exception for temporary signs,
and we express no opinion as to whether plaintiff's sign may come
within any other exception.  See Outdoor Media, ___ Or ___, ___
(slip op at 23-24) (noting argument that "Pray for Peace" sign on
residential lot may come within "on-premises" exception to permit
requirement, ORS 377.735(1)(c), but declining to decide that
issue because petitioner's case did not present it).  Moreover,
we hold today in Outdoor Media that the OMIA violates Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution because it requires permits
for certain signs, but not for other signs, based solely on the
content of the message on the sign.  Accordingly, in Outdoor
Media, we have stricken the OMIA's permit requirement for outdoor
advertising signs.  Id. at __ (slip op at 37).  However, here we
are not asked to, nor do we, express any opinion as to the
applicability of that holding to plaintiff's sign in this case. 
FIRST CERTIFIED QUESTION
The first certified question consists of four subparts
that ask us to describe the breadth of the department's
discretion in granting a variance.  As noted previously, ORS
377.735(2) describes the standard for granting a variance.  It
provides:
"The Department of Transportation may adopt rules
that, for good cause shown, allow a person displaying a
temporary sign to obtain a variance from the
restrictions in subsection (1)(b) of this section.  The
department shall not consider the content of the sign
in deciding whether to allow a variance."
A department rule interprets ORS 377.735(2) as that statute
relates to variances for temporary signs that exceed the 12-square-foot limit.  It provides:
"Overall size shall not exceed 12 square feet. 
However, a person wishing to erect a temporary sign
that exceeds 12 square feet may apply to the
Department's Outdoor Advertising Control Office for a
variance from the 12 square foot restriction.  The
Department may grant the variance for good cause shown. 
Good cause may include a showing that the content of
the sign will not be visible to the public if the sign
is 12 square feet or less, or a showing of hardship
caused by the inability to use a previously-manufactured sign that complies with former size
restrictions for temporary signs.  A variance will not
allow a sign that exceeds 32 square feet."
OAR 734-060-0175(2).
As far as we can tell from the record, the only aspect
of plaintiff's temporary sign that would require him to seek a
variance is the size:  His sign is 32 square feet, and ORS
377.735(1)(b)(A) limits the size of temporary signs to 12 square
feet unless the owner obtains a variance.
The four parts of the first certified question ask us
to explain the meaning of the phrase "for good cause shown" as
used in ORS 377.735(2).  This court has held that the phrase
"good cause" is a "delegative" term that "'calls for [the agency
to] complet[e] a value judgment that the legislature itself has
only indicated.'"  Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist.,
290 Or 217, 228, 621 P2d 547 (1980) (quoting McPherson v.
Employment Division, 285 Or 541, 550, 591 P2d 1381 (1979)). 
Oregon courts review an agency's application of a delegative term
to determine whether the agency's action was within the scope of
the authority conferred by the statute.  Springfield, 290 Or at
229; see also ORS 183.482(8)(b) (providing for remand when agency
action is outside its delegated discretion; inconsistent with
agency rule, position, or practice; or otherwise in violation of
constitutional or statutory provision).
Here, ORS 377.735 provides context for determining the
scope of the legislative delegation to the department to decide
when "good cause" has been shown to grant a particular variance
request.  First, ORS 377.735(1) contains the standards that
govern temporary signs for which no variance is required.  As we
described earlier, those standards require that temporary signs
be no larger than 12 square feet, that they not have a permanent
base, that they not be displayed for compensation, and that --
except for signs erected by a resident on residential property --
they be displayed for no more than 60 days a year.  Taken
together, those standards indicate the legislature's intent to
allow signs that are truly temporary and that are limited in
size, presumably for safety and aesthetic reasons.  See ORS
377.705 (policy of OMIA includes promoting public safety and
preserving natural beauty of state highways).  Because the
department must consider and advance that legislative policy in
determining what constitutes "good cause," that policy limits the
department's discretion in granting a variance.  For example, it
is unlikely that, considering the stated legislative policy, the
department reasonably could grant a variance to display a 300-square-foot sign.  Such a variance would be so at odds with the
legislative policy allowing temporary signs that, absent
extraordinary justification, it likely would not be within the
scope of the department's authority. (3)  
Second, ORS 377.735(2) expressly provides that "[t]he
department shall not consider the content of the sign in deciding
whether to allow a variance."  That restriction considerably
narrows the scope of the department's authority in granting a
variance, eliminating the possibility of censorship by the
department.  That provision, standing alone, refutes plaintiff's
argument that the department has "unbridled discretion" in
granting or denying variance requests.
Third, ORS 377.735(2) requires that the good cause be
"shown."  The word "shown" indicates that the department must
make its determination of good cause on the basis of what the
applicant demonstrates.  That requirement ensures that the
applicant will be able to present information in support of its
variance request and that the department will base its
determination on that information.  With that background in mind,
we turn to the four parts of the first certified question.
1. "What is the meaning of the phrase 'for good
cause shown,' as it appears in [ORS] 377.735(2)[?]"
"Good cause" is a "[l]egally sufficient ground or
reason" that "depends upon [the] circumstances of [the]
individual case."  Black's Law Dictionary 692 (6th ed 1990).  In
the context of the variance provision for temporary signs, ORS
377.735(2), as discussed above, "good cause shown" means that the
party seeking a variance must demonstrate sufficient reason for
the department to permit it to display a temporary sign, even
though that sign does not meet the requirements of ORS
377.735(1)(b).
2. "Is the interpretation and application of
that phrase entirely within the discretion of the
Department?"
No.  "For good cause shown" is a delegative term that
the agency must apply consistently with the policy choices that
the legislature made in enacting the OMIA, some of which we have
discussed above.  In addition, of course, the agency's discretion
is constrained by federal and state constitutional requirements.
3. "Does the Department's regulation, [OAR] 734-060-0175(2), limit the Department's discretion in
applying the 'for good cause shown' provision?"
Yes.  The department's discretion in granting a
variance is limited, inter alia, by the department's own rule. 
See ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) (remand required on judicial review if
agency's exercise of discretion is inconsistent with agency
rule).  As noted earlier, OAR 734-060-0175(2) provides in part
that the department will not grant a variance allowing a sign
that exceeds 32 square feet.  OAR 734-060-0175(4) also provides
that temporary signs are "subject to the provisions of ORS
377.720 and to applicable federal requirements."  ORS 377.720
describes signs that the OMIA generally prohibits, including
signs that interfere with traffic control, distracting signs, and
signs that are not well maintained and in good repair.  Because
the department has limited its own discretion by enacting that
rule, it may not disregard the rule while it is in effect.
4."Does Oregon law otherwise limit the
Department's discretion in interpreting and applying
the phrase?" 
Yes.  The department's discretion in granting variances
under ORS 377.735(2) also is limited by the state and federal
constitutions.  See ORS 183.482(8)(b)(C) (remand required on
judicial review if agency's exercise of discretion violates
constitutional provision); Schatzer v. Dept. of Rev., 325 Or 211,
220, 934 P2d 1119 (1997)(where otherwise ambiguous statute may
be interpreted in two ways, one constitutional and another
unconstitutional, this court applies constitutional
interpretation). 
SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION
The second certified question states that ORS 377.735
contains no explicit time limitation within which an agency must
act on a request for a variance, and it then asks us to determine
whether Oregon law otherwise supplies such a time limitation.  
The legislature did not supply an explicit time
limitation within which the department must act when granting or
denying a variance.  However, the Oregon Administrative
Procedures Act contains a specific provision that authorizes a
party to petition a court for an order "compel[ling] an agency to
act where it has * * * unreasonably delayed taking action or
making a decision."  ORS 183.490 (emphasis added).  We therefore
conclude that the legislature intended that the department act on
a request for a variance within a reasonable time. (4)
We note that what is reasonable may not be the same in
every instance.  A variance for a sign advertising an event to
take place on the upcoming weekend may require a quicker response
from the department than a sign advertising an event several
months in the future.  In each instance, the department and any
court reviewing the department's action (or inaction) must
determine what is reasonable by considering whether the
department's action was timely enough to allow the person seeking
a variance to obtain a determination in time to make the display
of the sign meaningful, consistently with the orderly processing
of variance requests.  
In answer to the second certified question, we conclude
that Oregon law requires the department to respond to a variance
request under ORS 377.735(2) within a reasonable time and that an
applicant for a variance may seek judicial review if the
department fails to act on a variance request within that time.
Certified questions answered.
1. The certified questions do not indicate which version of the OMIA is at issue in the
federal case.  We refer to the 2003 version, which appears consistent with the allegations in
plaintiff's complaint, the passages quoted in the Ninth Circuit's certification order, and the parties'
briefs.
2. Judge Ferguson dissented from the certification order, noting that plaintiff had not
applied for a variance and that variances, in any event, "are granted or denied on the basis of
specific fact situations."  For that reason, he concluded that the certified questions were
"academic" and based on "mere speculation."  Lombardo, 391 F3d at 1011.
3. Our view of the inherent limits on the discretion that the statute grants is mirrored in the
examples that the department's rules provide.  OAR 734-060-175(2) provides several examples
of what the department may determine to be good cause:  "a showing that the content of the sign
will not be visible to the public if the sign is 12 square feet or less" and "a showing of hardship
caused by the inability to use a previously-manufactured sign that complies with former size
restrictions for temporary signs."
4. In holding that ORS 183.490 provides a "reasonable" time requirement, we note that the
department may adopt a rule that would supply a more specific time limitation, as long as that
limitation is a reasonable one.  See ORS 377.735(2) (allowing department to make rules
regarding variance requests).