Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY DUANE TAYLOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C 
hief Just ice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 12, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 112341  
JOEY DUANE OLIVER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v
 No. 115064  
ANTHONY DUANE TAYLOR,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
These 
consolidated cases arise from the same bank robbery  
and ensuing police stop of a car in the city of Jackson. In  
each case, the defendant argues that incriminating evidence  
resulting from the stop of the car should have been suppressed  
on the basis of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.  We  
conclude that the stop of the car was supported by reasonable  
suspicion and, thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
Accordingly, we agree with the refusal of the lower courts to  
suppress the evidence at issue.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Shortly before noon on December 1, 1994, an armed robbery  
was committed at a Republic Bank branch in Jackson.  It was  
reported that two black males were the perpetrators and that  
they left the bank on foot. Pivotal to the issue at hand is  
the conduct of Jackson County Deputy Sheriff Roger Elder that  
led to his stopping of the motor vehicle containing both the  
defendants and two other passengers.  Deputy Elder had been a  
sheriff’s deputy for over sixteen years at the time of the  
suppression hearing in Oliver. 
Notably, the great bulk of  
Deputy Elder’s service with the sheriff’s department was with  
the road patrol division.  Before that, he was a township  
police officer for about 2½ to three years.  In the course of  
his career as a police officer, Deputy Elder was directly  
involved in investigating about twenty bank robberies.  
Deputy Elder testified that while he was in his patrol  
car shortly before noon on the date of the robbery he (along  
2  
 
with other police officers in the area) heard a general  
dispatch that an armed robbery had just occurred at the  
Republic Bank at the corner of North and Wisner Streets in  
Jackson.  This dispatch advised that the suspects were two  
black males last seen heading northbound on foot from the  
bank.  When he heard the dispatch, Deputy Elder, who was north  
of the bank, headed south to the general area of the bank to  
look for suspects. Deputy Elder explained at the suppression  
hearing in Oliver that he was not looking for just two  
suspects,  
[b]ecause it’s my experience in the years I’ve been 
a police officer, that there is almost always a 
getaway car in a bank robbery, and if there’s a 
getaway car, there’s at least one more person with 
it.[1]  
In the course of driving toward the area of the armed  
robbery, Deputy Elder stopped at a New York Carpet World store  
where he encountered two store employees standing outside  
smoking cigarettes.  This store was located north of the  
Republic Bank. Deputy Elder asked them if they had seen any  
black males running in the area, and they replied that they  
1 
 Deputy Elder likewise testified at the suppression 
hearing in Taylor that he was looking for at least three 
suspects:  
Well, it’s been my experience in the past that 
there is usually someone nearby, in a robbery 
attempt, with a getaway vehicle, so I would look 
for at least three people.  
3 
 
had been outside for about ten minutes and had not seen anyone  
except children across the street at a school.  
He next went to the Westbay Apartments complex because he  
thought that the apartment complex would have been an  
excellent place for someone on foot to run and a good place to  
hide a getaway vehicle. The Westbay Apartments were located  
on the corner of North and Brown Streets, which was the first  
major intersection along North Street to the west of the  
Republic Bank, and this area was secluded.  
The Westbay  
Apartments complex was within a quarter mile of the Republic  
Bank.  
When Deputy Elder was turning into an entrance to the  
Westbay Apartments complex, he saw a green Mercedes with four  
black male occupants heading out of the driveway.  Deputy  
Elder testified at the suppression hearing in Oliver that  
“[a]s I was passing by them [the occupants of the Mercedes],  
I turned and looked over at them, and all four subjects looked  
directly ahead.  They would not, any of them, look over at  
me.”  Deputy Elder said that he found this “very unusual”  
because, on the basis of his nineteen years of experience as  
a police officer, “[w]ell basically, because people always  
look at the cops.  When you drive by, they always look over  
4  
 
and see who’s in the car or—they just always look at you.”2  
Deputy Elder testified that he saw the Mercedes within ten or  
fifteen minutes of the dispatch regarding the bank robbery and  
that he passed within six to eight feet of the Mercedes when  
they passed by each other at the entrance to the apartment  
complex.  
After this, apparently concluding that these individuals  
were possibly implicated in the robbery, Deputy Elder  
requested backup over his police radio because he had spotted  
a “possible suspect vehicle.”  Deputy Elder, driving his  
patrol car, then followed the Mercedes as it proceeded west on  
North Street, then south on Brown Street, then east on Ganson  
Street, and finally south on Wisner Street. In driving this  
route, the Mercedes went through the intersection of Wisner  
and Ganson Streets.  It would have been a more direct route to  
that 
intersection 
from the Westbay Apartments for the Mercedes  
to have simply gone east on North Street and then turned south  
on Wisner Street.  Notably, this more direct route would have  
2  Deputy Elder similarly testified at the suppression 
hearing in Taylor that no occupant of the Mercedes looked over 
at his patrol car.  Deputy Elder explained that he found this 
significant because in his experience:  
Inevitably, when a patrol car drives by 
somebody, they [sic] always look over at you. 
Somebody in the vehicle will look at the patrol 
car.  
5 
taken the Mercedes by the location of the Republic Bank that  
was robbed in this case.  When backup patrol cars arrived,  
Deputy Elder stopped the Mercedes on Wisner Street.  
Eventually, when another sheriff’s deputy patted down  
Casual Banks, one of the passengers in the Mercedes, he found  
a large amount of money, including a bundle of money with a  
bank wrapper on it, and a Michigan identification for  
defendant Oliver.  Later at the police station, a wad of money  
was found on defendant Oliver, who was a passenger in the  
Mercedes.  Defendant Taylor was the driver and owner of the  
Mercedes.  A search of the trunk of the Mercedes at the police  
station located a bag containing money and a .32 caliber  
automatic pistol.  Also, defendant Taylor eventually made  
statements to the police that were later used against him.  
Notably, at each suppression hearing, the trial court  
credited Deputy Elder’s testimony about the basic facts  
surrounding the traffic stop.  Defendants do not challenge  
that determination, but rather accept the basic facts related  
by Deputy Elder, while arguing that he nevertheless did not  
have legal justification consistent with the Fourth Amendment  
to effect the traffic stop.  
In each of these consolidated cases, the circuit court  
denied the respective defendant’s motions to suppress the  
6  
 
 
 
incriminating evidence discussed above.  The circuit court  
held, contrary to the defense position, that the traffic stop  
was supported by reasonable suspicion.  
Thereafter, 
defendant 
Oliver 
entered 
a 
conditional 
guilty  
plea to conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a,  
armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during  
the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The condition was  
that defendant Oliver be able to appeal the trial court’s  
ruling at the suppression hearing in his case.  At a jury  
trial, defendant Taylor was found guilty of the same crimes to  
which defendant Oliver conditionally pleaded guilty.  
In Oliver, the Court of Appeals declined to address  
whether there was reasonable suspicion to effect the traffic  
stop on the basis of its conclusion that defendant Oliver, as  
a passenger in the car, did not have “standing to challenge”  
admission of the evidence at issue under the Fourth Amendment  
exclusionary rule.3  In Taylor, a different panel of the Court  
3 In short, the panel in Oliver concluded that defendant  
Oliver could not challenge the search of Banks in which 
incriminating evidence was first found and that, accordingly, 
he could not challenge the location of other incriminating 
evidence as a result of the ensuing events.  The parties in 
each case have argued the issue of the scope of the respective 
defendants’ “standing to challenge,” or in other words the 
extent to which they may avail themselves of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule if there were a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  However, in light of our conclusion that 
the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion (and, 
(continued...)  
7  
  
of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the  
stop of the car was a valid traffic stop supported by  
reasonable suspicion.  
II. ANALYSIS  
A 
trial 
court’s 
factual findings at a suppression hearing  
will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.  
However, as in the present case, the application of  
constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to  
essentially uncontested facts is not entitled to this level of  
deference. People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496,  
500-501; 556 NW2d 498 (1996).  
In LoCicero, supra at 501-502, this Court summarized the  
requirements for the police to make a valid investigatory stop  
based 
on 
reasonable 
suspicion 
consistently 
with 
constitutional  
protections:  
The brief detention of a person following an 
investigatory stop is considered a reasonable  
seizure 
if 
the 
officer 
has 
a 
“reasonably 
articulable suspicion” that the person is engaging 
in criminal activity.  The reasonableness of an  
officer’s suspicion is determined case by case on 
the basis of the totality of all the facts and 
circumstances.  “[I]n determining whether the  
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due 
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled  
3(...continued) 
thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment), we need not 
address these “standing to challenge” issues.  
8  
to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”  
Although this Court has indicated that fewer 
facts are needed to establish reasonable suspicion 
when a person is in a moving vehicle than in a 
house, 
some 
minimum 
threshold 
of 
reasonable  
suspicion must be established to justify an  
investigatory stop whether a person is in a vehicle 
or on the street. [Citations omitted.]  
Further, in determining whether the totality of the  
circumstances provide reasonable suspicion to support an  
investigatory stop, those circumstances must be viewed “as  
understood and interpreted by law enforcement officers, not  
legal scholars . . . .” People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 632;  
505 NW2d 266 (1993).  Also, “[c]ommon sense and everyday life  
experiences predominate over uncompromising standards.” Id.  
at 635-636.  
In Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30-31; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed  
2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that in  
certain circumstances a police officer may “stop” and briefly  
detain a person consistently with the Fourth Amendment  on the  
basis of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be  
afoot.  Notably, “[t]he type of intrusion authorized by  
[Terry] has been extended to permit investigative stops under  
various circumstances . . . .” Nelson, at 631.  
The facts of Terry are instructive. In that case, plain  
clothes police detective Martin McFadden was assigned to  
9  
 
  
 
downtown Cleveland.  He observed two men walking a street,  
each of them repeatedly stopping to look in the same store  
window.  Then, they were joined by a third man who talked with  
them briefly. 
Officer McFadden “testified that after  
observing [the two men’s] elaborately casual and oft-repeated  
reconnaissance of the store window on Huron Road, he suspected  
the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up,’ and that he  
considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate  
further.” Terry, supra at 6. Officer McFadden also explained  
that he feared the men might have a gun.  Officer McFadden  
stopped the three men and asked their names.  When the men  
merely “mumbled something” in response, Officer McFadden  
grabbed one of them and patted down the outside of his  
clothing, finding a gun. Eventually, he conducted a similar  
search of another of the men and found a gun on him as well.  
The 
following 
discussion 
in 
Terry 
illustrates 
how 
factors  
that 
in 
isolation 
appear innocent may, in combination, provide  
a police officer with reasonable suspicion to justify an  
investigative stop:  
“[Officer 
McFadden] 
had 
observed 
Terry, 
Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts, each 
of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken 
together warranted further investigation.  There is  
nothing unusual in two men standing together on a 
street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is  
there anything suspicious about people in such 
circumstances strolling up and down the street,  
10  
 
singly or in pairs.  Store windows, moreover, are 
made to be looked in.  But the story is quite 
different where, as here, two men hover about a 
street corner for an extended period of time, at 
the end of which it becomes apparent that they are 
not waiting for anyone or anything; where these men 
pace alternately along an identical route, pausing 
to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; 
where each completion of this route is followed 
immediately by a conference between the two men on 
the corner; where they are joined in one of these 
conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and 
where the two men finally follow the third and 
rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It would have  
been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 
years’ experience in the detection of thievery from 
stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to 
investigate this behavior further.”  [Id. at 22­
23.]  
Similarly, in itself, there is certainly nothing  
suspicious about four men occupying a car that is leaving an  
apartment complex.  However, there were other factors in this  
case that provided Deputy Elder with reasonable suspicion to  
stop the car.  First, as Deputy Elder explained in his  
testimony at both suppression hearings, he deduced that the  
two direct perpetrators of the bank robbery would most likely  
have the assistance of a getaway driver.  Also, it was  
reported that the bank was robbed by two black males. Thus,  
the fact that the car had at least three occupants and at  
least two black males4 indicated that its occupants were  
4  The car was occupied by four black males, but the 
important point is that it had at least three occupants and at 
least two of those were black males.  If, for example, the car 
(continued...)  
11  
 
consistent 
with 
the 
description 
of 
the 
suspected  
perpetrators.5  Of course, that in itself would not provide  
the 
particularized 
suspicion 
necessary 
for 
a 
valid  
investigatory stop. See LoCicero, supra at 505.6  
However, there were other factors that provided a  
particularized basis for Deputy Elder to reasonably suspect  
that occupants of the Mercedes in which defendants were  
present had been involved in the bank robbery.  The car was  
spotted by Deputy Elder in the Westbay Apartments complex  
4(...continued) 
would have had two black male and two white male occupants, we 
do not see any way that would alter the reasonable suspicion 
analysis.  
5 We note that there are certainly many ways in which it 
would be inappropriate for the police to use race as a factor 
in performing their duties.  However, no reasonable person 
would contend that the police should disregard race where it 
has been reported by eyewitnesses that a crime has been 
committed by a person of a particular race or skin color. 
Simply put, it would have made no sense in the case at hand 
for the police to have pursued non-black individuals as having 
been the individuals who actually robbed the bank.  As the  
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed 
in United States v Waldron, 206 F3d 597, 604 (CA 6, 2000), 
“[c]ommon sense dictates that, when determining whom to 
approach as a suspect of criminal wrongdoing, a police officer 
may legitimately consider race as a factor if descriptions of 
the perpetrator known to the officer include race.”  
6 
 Thus, we certainly agree with the dissent that Deputy 
Elder would not have been “justified in stopping every 
grouping of black males in the vicinity . . . .”  Slip op,  
p 11.  However, as we set forth in this opinion, there were a  
number 
of 
factors 
that, 
in 
combination, 
provided 
particularized suspicion for the traffic stop at issue.  
12  
 
within fifteen minutes of the report of the bank robbery. The  
complex was located to the west of the bank along North Street  
and within a quarter mile of the bank.  Deputy Elder had first  
essentially eliminated the direction north of the bank on the  
basis of two men outside the carpet store (which was north of  
the bank) telling him that they had not seen anyone go by in  
that direction.  He testified that he went to the Westbay  
Apartments complex because that would have been an excellent  
place to hide a getaway vehicle as the apartment complex  
provided a secluded area to hide a car in contrast to the  
parking lots of businesses near the bank.7  In this regard,  
the fact that the car was leaving the apartment complex was  
consistent with it being a getaway vehicle that was attempting  
to leave the general vicinity of the crime.  Thus, the  
suspicion of Deputy Elder reasonably focused on the Westbay  
Apartments.  
These 
deductions by Deputy Elder are particularly  
entitled to deference because  
[i]n analyzing the totality of the circumstances, 
the law enforcement officers are permitted, if not  
7  At the suppression hearing in Oliver, Deputy Elder 
explained that a getaway vehicle was more often “in a hidden 
area somewhere close by” the site of a robbery than in front 
of the building.  In Taylor, Deputy Elder testified at the 
suppression hearing that his “experience tells me that they 
wouldn’t have put” the getaway car in the parking lot of a 
Wendy’s restaurant or laundromat (which were apparently among 
the businesses near the bank) as opposed to a more secluded 
place.  
13  
 
 
required, to consider “the modes or patterns of 
operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.  From  
[this] data, a trained officer draws inferences and 
makes deductions–inferences and deductions that  
might well elude an untrained person.”  [Nelson,  
supra at 636, quoting United States v Cortez, 449  
US 411, 418; 101 S Ct 690; 66 L Ed 2d 621 (1981).]  
On top of this, the occupants of the Mercedes drew  
further suspicion on themselves by their atypical conduct in  
each declining to look in the direction of Deputy Elder’s  
passing marked patrol car.  As the deputy explained, in his  
experience as a police officer, this was highly unusual.  
There is no basis to conclude that this observation was  
inaccurate, and, accordingly, we defer to his substantial  
experience as a law enforcement officer. LoCicero, supra at  
501-502.  
For conduct to support a finding of a reasonable  
suspicion, it need be, as we are instructed by the United  
States Supreme Court, merely evasive.  Indeed, the United  
States Supreme Court has quite recently stated that “nervous,  
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining  
reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124;  
120 S Ct 673; 145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000).
 In Wardlow, the  
defendant was standing next to a building holding an opaque  
bag in an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics  
14  
 
 
trafficking.  When a four-car caravan of police cars8 entered  
the area, the defendant looked in the direction of the  
officers and fled, eventually running through a gangway and an  
alley.  Ultimately, police officers stopped the defendant and  
conducted a patdown search for weapons, discovering a gun in  
the bag.  The United States Supreme Court held that there was  
reasonable suspicion to support this investigatory stop in  
light of the defendant’s presence in an area of heavy  
narcotics 
trafficking, 
coupled 
with 
his 
unprovoked 
flight 
when  
he noticed the police.  In making this determination, the  
Wardlow Court stated:  
In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s 
conduct, courts do not have available empirical 
studies 
dealing 
with 
inferences 
drawn 
from  
suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably 
demand scientific certainty from judges or law 
enforcement officers where none exists. Thus, the 
determination of reasonable suspicion must be based 
on commonsense judgments and inferences about human 
behavior. [Id. at 124-125.]  
Further, in United States v Orozco, 191 F3d 578, 582 (CA 5,  
1999), the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals  
approved 
consideration of the “overall behavior of the vehicle  
driver,” including “the avoidance of eye contact” as one  
factor that might be considered in determining whether there  
was reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop. Likewise,  
8  The police cars were involved in an effort to 
investigate drug transactions in the area.  
15  
 
we see no reason that the overall behavior of all occupants of  
a car in seeming to avoid looking in the direction of a marked  
police car cannot be considered as one factor in support of a  
finding 
of 
reasonable suspicion.  Accordingly, we believe that  
Deputy Elder was entitled to rely on his perception that it  
was unusual that the occupants of the Mercedes seemed to avoid  
looking in his direction.  As in Wardlow, we do not have, nor  
have we been offered, the benefit of any empirical studies  
rebutting 
Deputy 
Elder’s 
experience-based 
conclusion 
regarding  
how people ordinarily react to marked police cars.  Deputy  
Elder’s observation that it was suspicious for all four  
occupants of a car not to look at his passing police car does  
not strike us as unreasonable.  Indeed, it may well comport  
with “commonsense.” Accordingly, we consider Deputy Elder’s  
suspicion aroused by the occupants of the car not looking at  
his patrol car to be one factor that is properly considered,  
together with other factors such as the secluded nature of the  
apartment complex and that the apartments were located within  
a quarter mile of the bank, as supporting a finding of  
reasonable suspicion in this case.9  
9 
 We note that defendants have cited some pre-Wardlow  
decisions by panels of the United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeals indicating that avoidance of eye contact is not 
properly considered as a factor in support of a finding of 
reasonable suspicion.  However, we regard these pre-Wardlow  
(continued...)  
16  
 
In addition to the foregoing, the route followed by the  
Mercedes before the traffic stop provides another factor in  
support of the existence of reasonable suspicion.  The  
Mercedes took a circuitous route to the intersection of Ganson  
and Wisner Streets before the traffic stop was actually  
effected.10  This is particularly suspicious because it  
involved avoiding driving by the bank that had been robbed.  
The most direct route to that intersection from the Westbay  
9(...continued) 
decisions to be of little value in light of the recognition in 
Wardlow that evasive conduct can be a factor supporting (or 
even providing the primary basis for) an investigatory stop. 
Moreover, we note that there are federal appellate decisions 
that consider an apparent avoidance of eye contact as one 
factor in support of a finding of reasonable suspicion.  See,  
e.g., United States v Brown, 188 F3d 860, 864-865 (CA 7, 1999) 
(considering the defendant’s “unusually nervous demeanor, 
including his failure to make eye contact” as one of “several 
distinct articulable bases” for reasonable suspicion); United  
States v Robinson, 119 F3d 663, 667 (CA 8, 1997) (concluding 
that “the fact that [the defendant] appeared nervous and the 
fact that he would not make eye contact” provided “[f]urther 
justification” for a finding of reasonable suspicion).  Of  
course, none of this is to suggest that the mere fact that a 
car passes by a patrol car without any of its occupants 
looking at the patrol car would justify a traffic stop, but 
merely that such apparent avoidance of eye contact can be one 
factor that, together with others, may support a stop.  
10 
 The dissent states that “it is impossible to say that 
the ‘route’ they [the occupants of the car] chose was  
‘circuitous when they had not yet traveled to a specified 
destination when stopped.  At most, we can conclude that they 
chose to drive a longer distance than necessary between two 
points.” Slip op, p 21. We do not perceive the distinction 
that the dissent would draw in this regard.  It seems plain to 
us that a route would be “circuitous” precisely because it 
involved driving longer than necessary.  
17  
Apartments would have been east on North Street and then south  
on Wisner Street to the intersection. This would have taken  
the car past the bank at the intersection of North and Wisner  
Streets. Instead, the car took a longer route by proceeding  
west on North Street, then south on Brown Street, and finally  
east on Ganson Street before reaching the intersection of  
Ganson and Wisner Streets.  
We recognize that the route followed by the Mercedes was  
not mentioned in Deputy Elder’s testimony and evidently was  
not subjectively relied on by the police in effecting the  
traffic stop.  Nevertheless, the location of the bank robbery  
and the route followed by the Mercedes were obviously facts  
known to the police before the traffic stop occurred. Thus,  
these facts are appropriately considered in determining  
whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the traffic  
stop because, as this Court unanimously recognized in People  
v Arterberry, 431 Mich 381, 384; 429 NW2d 574 (1988):  
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the 
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons 
which provide the legal justification for the 
officer’s action does not invalidate the action  
taken 
as 
long 
as 
the 
circumstances, 
viewed  
objectively, justify that action. [Quoting Scott v  
United States, 436 US 128, 138; 98 S Ct 1717; 56 L 
Ed 2d 168 (1978).]  
Accordingly, objective facts known to the police officers who  
effected the traffic stop should be considered in determining  
18  
whether the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion  
regardless of whether the officers subjectively relied on  
those facts.  
We 
conclude 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the  
circumstances, 
Deputy Elder’s investigatory stop of the car at  
issue was supported by reasonable suspicion that occupants of  
that car may have been involved in the robbery of the Republic  
Bank.  The reasons for that conclusion include: (1) the deputy  
encountered the car near the crime scene, given that the  
apartment complex was within a quarter mile of the bank; (2)  
the time was short, with at most fifteen minutes elapsing from  
the time of the report of the robbery to the traffic stop;  
(3) the car was occupied by individuals who comported with the  
limited description that the officer had at his disposal; (4)  
Deputy 
Elder 
had 
tentatively eliminated the direction north of  
the bank as an escape route on the basis of the information he  
received from the carpet store employees; (5) on the basis of  
his familiarity with the area and experience with crimes of  
this nature, Deputy Elder formed the reasonable and well­
articulated hypothesis that the robbers had fled to the  
secluded Westbay Apartments; (6) the deputy also reasonably  
hypothesized on the basis of his experience that the robbers  
would use a getaway car to try to escape from the area; (7)  
Deputy Elder also reasonably inferred on the basis of his  
19  
 
experience that a driver would probably be at the getaway car  
waiting for the actual robbers; (8) the behavior of each of  
the car’s four occupants in seeming to avoid looking in the  
direction of the deputy’s marked police car was atypical; (9)  
the car was leaving the apartment complex, which is consistent  
with it being a getaway car whose occupants were attempting to  
leave the area; (10) the car followed a circuitous route that  
avoided driving by the site of the bank robbery.11  
The viewpoint of the dissent may best be summed up in its  
statement that “in this case, the sum of zero suspicion and  
zero suspicion is zero suspicion.” Slip op, p 19. Whatever  
the obvious merits of this proposition, we respectfully  
disagree that it bears any relevance to this case.  The  
factors that we have discussed above as supporting a finding  
of reasonable suspicion were not each of “zero suspicion” in  
themselves.  Rather, as we have acknowledged, while the degree  
11 
 As the dissent indicates, there was testimony from 
Deputy Elder that the car that was stopped was being driven in 
a manner that seemed overly cautious because of the driver’s 
strict compliance with traffic laws.  Slip op, p 6.  However, 
we place no reliance whatsoever on this strict compliance with 
the traffic laws in concluding that there was reasonable 
suspicion to support the present traffic stop.  Indeed, we 
agree with the dissent that it would seem anomalous to 
consider the mere fact of strict compliance with the traffic 
laws as being a factor in support of a finding of reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  Of course, we do not mean to 
suggest that an act in compliance with the law cannot be a  
factor in support of reasonable suspicion.  
20  
of suspicion from each of the factors in isolation may have  
fallen short of providing reasonable particularized suspicion  
to support the present traffic stop, that does not mean that  
these factors properly considered in the aggregate would not  
provide reasonable suspicion to support the stop under the  
totality of the circumstances.  The validity of such a  
cumulative 
analysis, 
as we have discussed, is well established  
in our law.  
It is always possible, as the dissent does, to  
hypothesize innocent explanations for the circumstances  
preceding the traffic stop.  That possibility alone cannot  
thwart the proper efforts of law enforcement to protect our  
communities. “Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop  
innocent people.”  Wardlow, supra at 126.12
 Indeed, the  
possibility that innocent people will more than infrequently  
be briefly detained during valid investigatory stops is  
foreshadowed 
by 
guiding 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedent,  
given that the reasonable suspicion needed for such stops  
“requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of  
the evidence.” Id. at 123. As this Court explained in 1993  
12 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court pointed out in 
Wardlow that “the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in 
connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested 
and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed 
a crime may turn out to be innocent.” Id. at 126.  
21  
 
 
 
  
in Nelson, supra at 632:  
[T]he absence of apparent innocent behavior 
has never been a requirement for the suspicion 
required to make an investigatory stop. 
United  
States v Sokolow, 490 US 1, 9; 109 S Ct 1581; 104 L 
Ed 2d 1 (1989).  The question is not whether the 
conduct is innocent or guilty.  Very often what 
appears to be innocence is in fact guilt, and what 
is 
indeed 
entirely 
innocent 
may 
in 
some  
circumstances provide the basis for the suspicion 
required to make an investigatory stop. Thus, the 
focus is on the “‘degree of suspicion that attaches 
to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” Id.  
at 10.  
Indeed, the facts of Nelson are instructive because they  
also involve defendants of whom the police were reasonably  
suspicious because of the location of occupants in a car near  
a location where criminal activity was known to have occurred.  
In Nelson, a police informant bought a quantity of cocaine  
from a house that was under police surveillance. After about  
thirty minutes, a vehicle with three occupants (unconnected  
with the police informant) arrived at the house and remained  
for only four minutes.  A detective with twenty-three years of  
experience 
testified 
that 
this 
behavior 
“was 
characteristic 
of  
a ‘crack-house’ buy.” Id. at 629. Shortly after leaving the  
house, the car in Nelson was stopped to investigate the  
possible drug transaction. This Court, showing deference to  
the experience of the police detective, held that the stop was  
supported 
by 
reasonable suspicion, noting that the behavior in  
22  
 
that case “was indicative of drug trafficking.” Id. at 637­
638.  This Court in Nelson noted—and rejected—the argument of  
one of the defendant’s counsel in the trial court that there  
was no reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop  
because there were innocent explanations for the conduct such  
as dropping off a birthday card or stopping to say hello.  
This Court pointedly stated that “[t]he question is not the  
number of scenarios that the imagination can conjure, but the  
degree 
of 
suspicion 
conferred on the seemingly legal conduct.”  
Id. at 635. 
Accordingly, the existence of reasonable  
suspicion in the present case is not negated by the ability to  
imagine 
possible 
innocent explanations for the presence of the  
Mercedes at the apartment complex and the actions of the car’s  
occupants.  
In sum, the police in the present case stopped a car that  
contained at least three people in a situation where the  
police were looking for two bank robbers and expecting to find  
a getaway driver as well.  Because the car had at least two  
black male occupants, its occupants were consistent with the  
description of the bank robbers. 
After Deputy Elder  
eliminated the direction north of the bank, the car was found  
leaving a secluded area close to the bank (indeed, within a  
23  
 
quarter mile) that was a logical hiding place.13  The occupants  
of the car drew further suspicion on themselves by appearing  
to a trained law enforcement officer to be evasive by  
declining to look in the direction of his marked police car as  
it passed close by the car.  Finally, the car followed a  
circuitous route that avoided the site of the bank robbery  
before the traffic stop. While one or more of these factors  
in isolation may not have constituted reasonable suspicion to  
stop the car, under the totality of the circumstances, there  
was reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop in this  
case.  
13  While not expressly stated, the dissent seems to 
suggest that one of the reasons provided by Deputy Elder for 
investigating 
the 
Westbay Apartment complex may have been that 
“he knew blacks lived there.”  See post at 10-12. However, 
Deputy Elder never indicated that he went to the Westbay 
complex because “he knew from personal experience that black 
individuals lived there.”  Post at 11. Instead, his comments 
in this regard were isolated responses to specific questions 
concerning what he had observed while he had been at the 
complex on a previous occasion looking for an apartment with 
his wife.  Accordingly, Deputy Elder’s testimony does not 
reflect that he decided to go to the Westbay Apartments 
because of the number of African-Americans that may have lived 
there, but merely that he happened to know from an unrelated 
event that African-Americans lived there.  
In any event, we, of course, agree with the dissent that 
there would be nothing reasonably suspicious about African- 
Americans merely being at the apartment complex. Rather, as  
we have addressed, it is the particular circumstances  
surrounding the occupants of the car that was stopped in this 
case that provided reasonable suspicion for the present 
traffic stop.  
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION  
We 
conclude 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the  
circumstances, the police had the necessary reasonable  
suspicion to justify the traffic stop underlying these  
consolidated cases.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals in each case.14  
CORRIGAN, 
C.J., 
and WEAVER, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred  
with TAYLOR, J.  
14 
 We note that defendant Taylor makes arguments in his 
brief on appeal regarding issues other than the validity of 
the stop of the Mercedes and the scope of his standing to 
challenge the evidence obtained as a result of that stop. 
These issues are beyond the scope of defendant Taylor’s 
application for leave to appeal that was previously granted by 
this Court. Accordingly, we decline to review those issues.  
25  
 
_______________________________________ 
_______________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 112341  
JOEY DUANE OLIVER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 115064  
ANTHONY DUANE TAYLOR,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
The primary issue in this case is whether reasonable  
suspicion existed to stop and search a vehicle and its four  
black occupants. 
I would hold that (1) the officer  
effectuating the stop failed to articulate a particularized  
and objective basis that would lead a reasonable person to  
 
 
suspect the occupants of the vehicle of criminal activity, and  
(2) evidence derived from the illegal stop is subject to  
analysis under the exclusionary rule.  
I  
The issue in this case implicates the Search and Seizure  
Clause of the Fourth Amendment of the United States  
Constitution,1 
which 
protects 
individuals 
against 
unreasonable  
searches 
and 
seizures conducted by governmental actors.  Whren  
v United States, 517 US 806, 809-810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed  
2d 89 (1996). 
When a police officer detains, even  
temporarily, the occupants of a vehicle, they have been  
“seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Delaware  
v Prouse, 440 US 648, 683; 99 S Ct 1391; 59 L Ed 2d 660  
(1979).  Thus, the question becomes whether the seizure of the  
defendants was constitutionally reasonable.  
Our United States Supreme Court has spoken on the  
requisite test to be applied in cases involving an  
investigatory stop of criminal defendants.  The Court has held  
that 
“[a]n 
automobile 
stop 
is 
thus 
subject 
to 
the  
constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under  
the circumstances.”  Whren at 810.  In United States v Cortez,  
1  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be  
violated . . . .  
2  
 
449 US 411, 418; 101 S Ct 690; 66 L Ed 2d 621 (1981), the  
United States Supreme Court stated that the totality of the  
circumstances inquiry, in the event of a Terry stop, should  
take into account the whole picture.  On the basis of that  
whole 
picture, 
the 
detaining 
officers 
must 
have 
a  
particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal  
activity by the particular person stopped.  In other words, to  
justify the seizure, the officer must act on more than an  
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Terry v  
Ohio, 392 US 1, 27; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).  
Instead, the officer must have at least “a particularized  
suspicion, based on an objective observation, that the person  
stopped has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal  
wrongdoing.” People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 59; 378 NW2d 451  
(1985).  
When the seizure of a defendant is unreasonable because  
it does not comport with Terry, evidence flowing from that  
seizure may be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Wong  
Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441  
(1963); Shabaz, supra. Pursuant to Wong Sun, “the fruits of  
the officers' illegal action are not to be admitted as  
evidence unless an intervening independent act of free will  
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.”  Shabaz at  
66.  
3  
II  
In order to determine whether the stop in this case  
passes constitutional muster, we are required to consider the  
underlying facts as well as the deductions predicated upon the  
facts and to make a determination of whether the detaining  
officer had a reasonable, articulable, and particularized  
basis for detaining the defendants.  The majority does a fair  
job of detailing the objective facts underlying this case and  
recapping Deputy Elder’s testimony.  However, the majority  
occasionally commingles the facts with Deputy Elder’s  
deductions and with its own deductions, and omits a few facts  
that I find key to the case.  This opinion offers a  
disentangled version of the underlying events in order to  
separate the circumstances giving rise to Deputy Elder’s  
suspicions from the conclusions he drew on the basis of those  
factors.  I find the distinction to be crucial, especially in  
light of the majority’s conclusions that an officer’s  
subjective deductions must be given special deference, and  
that factors not articulated by the officer may factor into a  
determination of whether a stop was objectively reasonable.  
Given the tests offered by the majority, I believe that the  
Court 
must 
distinguish which parts of Deputy Elder’s testimony  
amount to facts and which parts compose the officer’s  
articulated 
particularized 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
In 
addition,  
4  
the Court should recognize which factors were extrinsic to the  
officer’s articulated basis for effectuating the stop.  
Deputy Elder’s testimony in this case revealed the  
following facts common to both Oliver and Taylor: (1) Deputy  
Elder overheard a dispatch2 that an armed robbery had just  
occurred at the Republic Bank and that two black male suspects  
had been last seen heading north on foot; (2) Deputy Elder  
spoke to two men outside a New York Carpet World, which was  
located north of the bank, who indicated that they had seen no  
one but some children across the street during the preceding  
ten minutes; (3) Deputy Elder then decided to go to the  
Westbay Apartments, which were located approximately one  
quarter mile west of the bank; (4) Deputy Elder came upon four  
black men in a car as they were exiting the Westbay Apartment  
complex, approximately ten to fifteen minutes after hearing  
the dispatch; (5) Deputy Elder had previously observed that  
blacks lived at the Westbay Apartment complex; (6) according  
to Deputy Elder, the car’s occupants did not look in the  
direction of his patrol car when he passed within six to eight  
feet of them; (7)  Deputy Elder doubled back, began following  
2  In Oliver, Deputy Elder testified that he received a 
dispatch that was broadcast to all police agencies.  In  
Taylor, he testified that he did not receive the dispatch 
directly, but heard some radio traffic.  
5  
 
 
 
the car, and radioed for back-up3; (8) while being followed by  
Deputy Elder, the driver of the car drove cautiously and  
obeyed all traffic laws; (9) while being followed by Deputy  
Elder, the car drove west on one street, then turned south,  
then turned east, and then turned south again before being  
stopped.4  
From these objective facts, Deputy Elder testified that  
his experience as a police officer led him to deduce the  
following: (1) that the Westbay Apartment complex would be an  
excellent place for someone to run on foot or to hide a  
getaway vehicle because it was close and secluded, (2) that if  
there were a getaway vehicle, it would likely have at least  
three occupants because an additional person usually drives  
the getaway vehicle, (3) that it was very unusual for people  
not to look at an officer or patrol car driving by, and (4)  
that by driving the speed limit, using turn signals, and  
making complete stops, the driver of the car seemed to be  
overcautious.  
The 
majority 
adds 
one 
additional 
deduction–that  
the defendants were acting suspiciously by driving a  
3 
 It is unclear at what point the officer radioed for 
back up.  In Taylor, he testified it was at the point he 
turned around and began to follow the defendants.  In Oliver, 
he indicated it was while he was already following them.  
4 
 In Oliver, Deputy Elder additionally testified about 
the fact that he had seen no black males either in vehicles or  
on foot before encountering the defendants.  
6  
“circuitous” route while being tailed by Deputy Elder.  
III  
According to the majority, reasonable suspicion is the  
sum total of all the circumstances presented by this case.  I  
disagree.  An analysis of the underlying facts and deductions  
reveals that Deputy Elder’s suspicions were generalized,  
rather than particularized, articulable, and reasonable.  
Deputy Elder failed to demonstrate that these particular  
defendants were acting in a fashion that would support a  
suspicion that they had been or were about to be engaged in  
criminal wrongdoing.  As such, the stop lacked reasonableness  
and was unjustified. See Shabaz at 59.  
This case boils down to a situation in which our  
defendants fell within the universe of possible suspects  
because they were of the race, gender, and minimal number  
described in the dispatch and because they were in the  
vicinity of the robbery shortly after the time that it had  
occurred.  It is important to remember that the original  
description Deputy Elder heard was that two black men (not  
four), fled north (not west), on foot (not in a car). While  
Deputy Elder’s testimony provided reasons to justify his  
belief that he should look for a broader class of suspects  
than the dispatch described, it is crucial to recognize that  
many of the factors cited by Deputy Elder and relied upon by  
7  
the majority would justify a stop of any grouping of two or  
more black males who happened to be traveling within the  
vicinity of the robbery at the time of Deputy Elder’s search. 
 The law does not permit random stops of automobiles.  Rather,  
officers may make a stop only when particularized facts lead  
them 
to 
reasonably 
believe 
that 
the 
occupants 
have  
transgressed or will transgress some law.5  
As a preliminary matter, it should also be recognized  
that the majority had to deduce that the Westbay Apartment  
complex was a reasonable place for Deputy Elder to look for  
5 As we stated in Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 
744, 747; 506 NW2d 209 (1993), “there is no support in the 
constitutional history of Michigan for the proposition that 
the police may engage in warrantless and suspicionless 
seizures of automobiles for the purpose of enforcing criminal 
law . . . .”  
Similarly, as we warned in People v Roache, 237 Mich 215, 
224-225; 211 NW 742 (1927):  
While we may take judicial notice of the fact 
that rum runners and bandits ride in automobiles, 
and use them to commit crimes and effect their  
escape, may we not also take judicial notice of the 
fact that where there is one bandit or rum runner  
passing over a public highway, there are thousands 
of respectable, law-abiding citizens who are doing 
likewise?
 
The 
protection 
afforded 
by 
the  
constitution to such persons must be regarded as 
paramount to any right to be given a police officer 
to enable him to verify his ungrounded suspicion 
that a law is being violated.  
The granting, if such were possible, to over­
zealous officers, of powers, the performance of 
which would invade constitutional rights of the 
citizen, would do more to retard the enforcement of 
the law than to promote it.  
8  
 
suspects as a precursor to the conclusion that he had the  
requisite 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
Though 
Deputy 
Elder 
testified  
that he had headed to the Westbay Apartment complex after  
ruling out the area north of the bank, and also stated that a  
getaway car would probably be located in a secluded area, his  
search nonetheless began north of the bank and he made  
inquiries of individuals standing in a public parking lot.  
Thus, it is not entirely clear that the Westbay Apartment  
complex was an area any more suspicious than anywhere else  
near the robbery, or that Deputy Elder would have been any  
less suspicious of black males in a crowded parking lot.  
Further, Jackson is a mid-sized city with a population over  
37,000; it seems reasonable to infer that there could be  
scores of places to hide a getaway vehicle.  Additionally, ten  
to fifteen minutes had passed before Deputy Elder arrived at  
the Westbay Apartments.  Given that the apartment complex was  
located only a block away from the bank, the amount of time  
that passed between when Deputy Elder received the dispatch  
and the time he encountered the defendants was well beyond the  
necessary time to escape. Thus, the passage of time made it  
less likely that there was a connection between the robbery  
and the presence of four black men.  
Even assuming that it is appropriate to rely on the  
deduction that the Westbay Apartment complex was a reasonable  
9  
 
place to hide a getaway car, almost all the factors noted in  
Deputy Elder’s testimony reveal only that he believed that he  
was in a location where the suspects might reasonably be when  
he stopped the defendants: he had ruled out the area near the  
New York Carpet World, he was within a quarter mile of the  
bank, he thought a getaway car might be hidden there, he  
thought it was within walking distance of the bank, and he  
knew blacks lived there.  None of these factors were tied to  
our defendants.  Similarly, Deputy Elder also offered a few  
factors that tend to show that the defendants were not  
precluded from the list of suspects: they were black, they  
were male, and there were at least two of them.  At most,  
these collective observations by Deputy Elder narrowed the  
list of possible suspects.  None of these factors would tie  
our specific defendants to the crime.  While Deputy Elder may  
have been justified in stopping only black males in the  
vicinity, nothing in his testimony indicates that he was  
justified in stopping every grouping of black males in the  
vicinity, or these black males in particular.  
Even if special weight is given to the fact that Deputy  
Elder believed the apartment complex would be a good place to  
hide a getaway vehicle and that at least three people would  
have been involved in the crime, the prosecution was still  
required to show that Deputy Elder believed that these  
10  
 
 
particular defendants had been or were about to be engaged in  
criminal activity. Instead, a review of the factors leading  
to Deputy Elder’s suspicions of these particular defendants,  
as opposed to his suspicion of groups of black men in general,  
amount to nothing more than a hunch that they in fact may have  
been the robbers. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a hunch is  
an insufficient basis for initiating a stop.  See Terry at 27.  
In Oliver, Deputy Elder testified that he was familiar  
with the Westbay Apartments, that he knew from personal  
experience that black individuals lived there, and that it  
would not be unusual for black individuals to be coming out of  
the Westbay Apartment complex. 
These factors undercut the  
reasonableness 
of Deputy 
Elder’s 
suspicions 
that 
any  
particular black men or group of black men at the apartment  
complex were the bank robbers.6  This is especially true in  
6As a matter of logic, searching for a black person in an 
area where there is a concentration of black people makes it 
less likely that any particular black individual is the one 
unknown individual you are searching for than if you were to 
see a black individual in an area where the black population 
is less concentrated.  
With regard to the fact that Deputy Elder knew blacks lived at 
the Westbay Apartments, the majority writes,  
Deputy Elder never indicated that he went to 
the Westbay complex because “he knew from personal 
experience that black individuals lived there.” 
Post at 11. 
Instead, Deputy Elder’s comments in 
this regard were isolated responses to specific 
questions concerning what he had observed while he 
had been at the complex on a previous occasion 
(continued...)  
11  
 
light of the fact that the officer had absolutely no  
description of the suspects’ size, age, or clothing.  
Beyond the fact that the defendants were a group of black  
men traveling together in a car near the location of the  
robbery, Deputy Elder offered only two reasons for stopping  
these defendants: they over-cautiously followed all traffic  
laws, and they did not look at him when he drove by them.  The  
majority wisely has chosen not to place emphasis on the fact  
that the defendants were obeying all traffic laws while being  
followed by a police officer. 
On cross-examination, Deputy  
Elder conceded that it is not unusual for persons followed by  
a marked police car to drive cautiously.  The trial judge also  
found that the way the car was driven was not unusual, as an  
average citizen would drive similarly.  
6(...continued) 
looking for an apartment with his wife. [Slip op at 
24-25.]  
I note that this opinion nowhere states that Deputy Elder went 
to the Westbay Apartments because he believed that he would  
find blacks there.  The opinion simply points out that Deputy 
Elder himself testified that he knew that he was in an area  
where it was not unusual to see blacks leaving the apartment 
complex. Thus, his testimony is indicative of the fact that 
there was nothing inherently suspicious about the fact that 
our defendants were leaving the Westbay Apartments, and that 
Deputy Elder knew there was nothing suspicious about black 
individuals exiting the Westbay Apartments.  
It is entirely irrelevant whether Deputy Elder’s  
testimony came to light in response to questions posed by 
defense counsel or whether he offered the information  
voluntarily.  The fact remains that his testimony sheds light 
on whether his suspicions were reasonable and particularized.  
12  
The final factor, that the defendants did not look at the  
patrol car when leaving the apartment complex, is the only  
other 
factor 
enunciated by Deputy Elder that potentially tends  
to separate these particular defendants from the general  
populace of black men. With regard to this observation, the  
majority defers to Deputy Elder’s experience as a law  
enforcement officer, and concludes that courts may consider  
“evasive” behavior as a factor in determining whether  
reasonable suspicion exists.  I believe that the majority  
places too much weight on this solitary factor, and I disagree  
with the majority’s analysis in several regards.  
First, I disagree that the law somehow decisively  
supports the proposition that failure to look at a police  
officer constitutes a specific factor.  The primary case  
relied upon by the majority is distinguishable.  The majority  
cites Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124; 120 S Ct 673; 145  
L Ed 2d 570 (2000), for the proposition that, “nervous,  
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining  
reasonable suspicion.”  Slip op at 14.  However, Wardlow  
involved a defendant who fled at the sight of police officers.  
Failure to react to police officers and reacting by fleeing  
are very different, even opposite, behaviors. Wardlow is in  
no way controlling.  Thus, unlike the majority, see slip op at  
16, n 8, I believe that pre-Wardlow decisions are of great  
13  
 
value, and are more persuasive than the limited authority  
offered by the majority.7  
Second, while I agree that courts may consider an  
officer’s years of experience when determining whether his  
actions 
were 
reasonable, the majority overstates the degree of  
deference that must be given to an experienced police  
officer’s deductions.  The majority relies in large part on  
People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626; 505 NW2d 266 (1993). Though  
Nelson did recognize that a certain degree of deference should  
be given to officers who draw inferences based on experiences  
with 
crimes 
occurring 
under 
similar 
circumstances 
or 
committed  
by similarly situated defendants, see id. at 636, an officer’s  
7 See United States v Dela Cruz-Tapia, 162 F3d 1275, 1280 
(CA 10, 1998)(the lack of eye contact is so innocent or 
susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous and 
does not afford a reasonable suspicion for a stop); United  
States v Garcia-Camacho, 53 F3d 244, 246-247 (CA 9, 1995)(the 
fact that occupants of a vehicle stared straight ahead when 
passing a marked police car cannot weigh in the balance of 
whether there existed a reasonable suspicion for a stop); 
United States v Halls, 40 F3d 275, 276 (CA 8, 1994)(merely 
avoiding eye contact with state troopers while driving a 
vehicle fails to give rise to a reasonable inference of 
illegal activity); United States v Pavelski, 789 F2d 485, 489 
(CA 7, 1986)(the fact that four men in a car failed to make 
eye contact with an officer cannot justify an investigatory 
stop); United States v Pacheco, 617 F2d 84, 87 (CA 5, 1980)(in 
assessing reasonable suspicion for stopping a vehicle, “the 
avoidance of eye contact can have no weight whatsoever”); 
United States v Lamas, 608 F2d 547, 549-550 (CA 5, 
1979)(“testimony that the occupants of a car avoided eye 
contact with [the officer] as they passed” cannot weigh in the 
balance whatsoever “because of the precarious position 
travelers on our nation’s highways would be placed in if 
avoiding eye contact with an officer could be considered a 
suspicious reaction”).  
14  
 
 
bald assertion that a particular situation looks like a  
criminal transaction to the officer is not enough to justify  
a Fourth Amendment intrusion.  People v LoCicero (After  
Remand), 453 Mich 496, 506; 556 NW2d 498 (1996). 
Where an  
officer institutes an investigatory stop that is based on a  
mere 
hunch 
rather 
than 
reasonably 
articulated 
and  
particularized facts, deference must be given to the  
constitution in lieu of the officer’s years of experience.8  
8 The majority places great reliance on Nelson, stating 
that “the facts of Nelson are instructive because they also 
involve defendants of whom the police were reasonably 
suspicious because of the location of occupants in a car near 
a location where criminal activity was known to have  
occurred.”  Slip op at 22.  Nelson involved factors that were  
more particularized than the factors at issue in the present 
case.
 In Nelson, the police were on surveillance at a 
particular location where criminal activity had previously 
occurred and was suspected to occur again.  The exact type of 
activity the police were watching for in fact occurred before 
the time that the police stopped the defendants.  In LoCicero  
at 503, this Court noted Nelson’s observation that  
the detective watching the house testified “that on 
the basis of his twenty-three years experience, the 
defendant’s behavior was characteristic of a  
‘crack-house’ buy: ‘a short visit, in/out back in 
the car and down the road.’ It was described as a  
‘carbon copy’ of what had occurred two weeks  
earlier.”  The Court concluded that this knowledge, 
coupled with the other information the police had 
regarding 
the 
house, 
formed 
the 
basis 
for  
reasonable suspicion justifying further inquiry.  
Contrast these factors with what occurred in our case: the  
police knew that a crime occurred somewhere in the area, but 
they were not watching for the crime to be repeated; the 
police knew that suspects would likely be in the general area, 
but they did not know where; and the police did not observe 
behavior that amounted to a carbon copy of behavior they had 
previously seen while observing robbers.  
15  
 
 
Even if Deputy Elder’s conclusion that it is unusual for  
people to avoid looking at police is given a great deal of  
weight as the majority suggests, his observation is  
insufficient in and of itself to create reasonable suspicion  
in this case.  The majority correctly points out that it does  
not suggest that “the mere fact that a car passes by a patrol  
car without any of its occupants looking at the patrol car  
would justify a traffic stop, but merely that such apparent  
avoidance of eye contact can be one factor that, together with  
others, may support a stop.” Slip op at 17, n 8.  
In sum, the factors cited by Deputy Elder in support of  
his decision to stop the defendants do not amount to  
reasonable suspicion.  In this regard, I agree with the  
majority that the fact that four men are leaving an apartment  
complex is not suspicious.9  Similarly, the majority correctly  
concludes that the fact that the defendants fit within the  
description 
of 
possible 
suspects 
did 
not 
create 
particularized  
reasonable suspicion.10
 Additionally, I find nothing  
9  
[I]n itself, there is certainly nothing 
suspicious about four men occupying a car that is 
leaving an apartment complex. [Slip op at 11.]  
10 The majority states:  
[T]he fact that the car had at least three 
occupants and at least two black males indicated 
that its occupants were consistent with the  
description of the suspected perpetrators.  Of  
(continued...)  
16  
 
particularly suspicious about the fact that the defendants  
were leaving Westbay Apartments at the time Deputy Elder was  
patrolling the area, especially in light of Deputy Elder’s own  
testimony that it was not unusual for black men to be leaving  
the complex.11  Similarly, I find nothing suspicious about the  
10(...continued) 
course, that in itself would not provide the 
particularized suspicion necessary for a valid 
investigatory stop. [Slip op at 11-12.]  
11 During oral argument before this Court, even the 
attorney for the people recognized that a Fourth Amendment 
problem could arise when an officer simply goes to an area 
near a crime scene where a high concentration of people 
fitting the description might be found, and then relies on 
something as minimal as the avoidance of eye contact to 
support a stop. The following discourse occurred:  
Court: So let’s say the robbery were reported 
to have been committed by a senior citizen with 
gray hair.  I presume if Elder drove to a nearby 
retirement center and waited for the first person 
coming out that had gray hair in the car and looked 
straight ahead, he could stop him.  
Attorney: Boy, I’d have trouble with that one 
because in the first place, senior citizens with 
gray hair, statistically there are a lot more of 
them than . . . .  
Court: Than black males?  
Attorney: In the Jackson area, oh yes.  If the  
facts of this had occurred in East Detroit, I’d be 
in really big trouble.  I personally would not find 
reasonable suspicion in your case . . . .  
The people’s attorney then went on to explain that the inquiry 
entails looking at the totality of the circumstances, and that 
a limiting description that cuts out over half the population 
would add support for a finding of reasonable suspicion.  What  
the attorney failed to recognize is that Deputy Elder himself 
admitted that he was not in an area where the description was 
(continued...)  
17  
 
fact that the defendants were obeying all traffic laws.  
Again, I would point out that even Deputy Elder’s testimony  
indicated that it is not unusual for people to follow traffic  
laws when followed by a marked police car.  Once these clearly  
nonsuspicious 
singular factors are subtracted from the list of  
factors offered by Deputy Elder, all we are left with is the  
fact that the defendants did not look at Deputy Elder’s patrol  
car.  I agree with the majority that taken alone, the failure  
to look at a passing patrol car would not justify a traffic  
stop.12  For these reasons, I would hold that Deputy Elder’s  
decision to stop the defendants was not predicated upon  
reasonable, articulable, and particularized suspicion.  
IV  
None of the factors cited by Deputy Elder as suspicious  
would justify the stop in this case in and of itself. Thus,  
the only way that particularized suspicion can be found on the  
facts offered by Deputy Elder is to conclude that the  
collection of unsuspicious behaviors offered by Deputy Elder  
somehow acted in tandem to create particularized reasonable  
11(...continued) 
limited.  Instead, he was in an area where it was not unusual 
to see black males.  
12  
[N]one of this is to suggest that the mere 
fact that a car passes by a patrol car without any 
of its occupants looking at the patrol car would 
justify a traffic stop . . . . [Slip op at 17, n 
8.]  
18  
 
suspicion.  I would conclude that, in this case, the sum of  
zero suspicion and zero suspicion is zero suspicion.13  In  
reaching an opposite conclusion, the majority turns to the  
facts of Terry, the original “stop and frisk” case. According  
to the majority, “Terry illustrates how factors that in  
isolation appear innocent may, in combination, provide a  
police officer with reasonable suspicion to justify an  
investigative stop . . . .” Slip op at 10. However, what the  
majority fails to recognize is that in Terry, the police  
officer observed particular individuals engaging in a series  
of behaviors that the officer believed to be characteristic of  
defendants preparing to commit a robbery.  In the present  
case, Deputy Elder’s first glance of the defendants was at the  
moment he observed them pulling out of the parking lot at the  
Westbay Apartments.  While he may have had a reason for  
heading toward the apartment complex, any deductions the  
officer made before encountering our defendants pertained to  
suspects in general and added nothing to the determination of  
whether these particular defendants had been or were about to  
be engaged in criminal wrongdoing as required by the Fourth  
Amendment. Thus, I believe the majority makes a fundamental  
13 Though the majority attempts to assert otherwise, the 
simple fact remains that nothing in the majority opinion shows 
that our particular defendants were any more suspicious than 
any other black men who would have been leaving the Westbay 
Apartments together.  
19  
 
 
error.  
V 
 It is clear that reasonable suspicion has not been  
proven on the basis of the factors relied upon by Deputy  
Elder. The factors were not suspicious, either individually  
or collectively.  However, the majority asserts that this  
Court should consider all the factors available to the police  
in determining whether the stop was justified, regardless of  
whether the officers subjectively relied upon those facts.  
Citing People v Arterberry, 431 Mich 381, 384; 429 NW2d 574  
(1988).  In particular, the majority finds significance in the  
fact that the defendants drove a “circuitous” route while  
being followed.  I disagree with the majority that a  
significant level of suspicion is objectively raised by the  
fact that a car full of persons being tailed by a police  
officer who doubled back to follow them choose not to drive  
the most direct route between two points along the path to an  
unknown destination. First of all, the officer’s suspicions  
were apparently aroused before he decided to follow the  
defendants, as indicated by his decision to double back and  
follow them.  Moreover, it is impossible to say that the  
“route” they chose was “circuitous,” when they had not yet  
traveled to a specified destination when stopped.  At most, we  
can conclude that they chose to drive a longer distance than  
20  
 
necessary between two points.  Moreover, it is entirely  
plausible that an innocent defendant would change course,  
hoping that the police officer would continue in another  
direction. Further, it is possible that a driver with a car  
full of passengers might be distracted in conversation, and  
travel in a direction he might not otherwise.  If we are to  
look at the objective circumstances of this case, without  
regard to the officer’s subjective state of mind, then we must  
consider not only factors indicative of guilt, but also other  
possible innocent explanations for the defendants’ behavior.  
Objectively viewed, I would not consider the defendant’s  
behavior to be particularly suspicious.  Nothing indicates  
that these particular defendants had or were about to be  
engaged in criminal wrongdoing, as is required for a Fourth  
Amendment stop to be valid.  Shabaz at 59. 
Rather, the  
officer acted upon an inchoate or unparticularized hunch. I  
would, therefore, hold that Deputy Elder’s actions were  
unreasonable under the circumstances, and that the stop was  
constitutionally invalid. 
See Whren at 810; Terry at 27.  
As such, the fruits of the illegal stop are subject to an  
exclusionary rule analysis.  
The unlawful invasion in this case was an illegal stop of  
a vehicle occupied by four men. The subsequent searches and  
seizures of the occupants produced the “fruits” sought to be  
21  
  
suppressed. Wong Sun explained that, in determining whether  
evidence should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree,  
the question is “whether, granting establishment of the  
primary 
illegality, 
the evidence to which instant objection is  
made has come by exploitation of that illegality or instead by  
means 
sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary  
taint.” 
Id. at 488. 
In this case, the evidence obtained  
appears to have come about directly by exploitation of the  
illegal stop.  
The trial court’s decision to admit the evidence flowing  
from the stop was made without consideration for the  
exclusionary rule because the decision was based on an  
erroneous conclusion that the stop was reasonable.  The Court  
of 
Appeals 
affirmance similarly found the exclusionary rule to  
be inapplicable.14   Given the illegality of the stop, the  
exclusionary rule would be directly implicated.  I would,  
therefore, reverse and remand for a determination of whether  
the “fruit” of the illegal stop came about by any legitimate,  
distinguishable means that would purge the taint of this  
unlawful seizure.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
14 
The 
Court 
of Appeals affirmed on grounds different than 
that offered by the trial court.  However, the Court of 
Appeals conclusion that the defendant was lawfully arrested 
ignored the illegality of the initial stop.  Thus, like the 
trial court, the Court of Appeals erred at the outset.  
22