Case Title: GARY HINKLE V WAYNE CO CLERK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119566

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 10, 2002  
GARY HINKLE, Executor of the Estate 
of MARILYN J. HINKLE-CALCUTT,  
Plaintiff,  
v 
No. 119566  
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF WAYNE, 
and WAYNE COUNTY COMMISSION,  
Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs/Appellees,  
v  
BILLY CALCUTT,  
Third-Party Defendant,  
and  
RANDALL WOKAS,  
Third-Party Defendant- 
Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
This appeal arises from postjudgment proceedings in a  
dispute over a partial refund owed by a hospital that was  
 
overpaid for the care of plaintiff’s decedent, Marilyn J.  
Hinkle-Calcutt.  
We hold that MCR 2.614(A)(1), commonly described as the  
automatic stay provision, does 
not 
apply 
to 
voluntary payments  
in satisfaction of a judgment.  Therefore, we reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it holds  
to the contrary.  
I  
While the plaintiff’s decedent was a patient at Harper- 
Grace Hospital, two insurance companies made duplicate  
payments for her care. Harper-Grace was prepared to issue a  
refund, but her surviving spouse, Billy J. Calcutt, and the  
executor of her estate, Gary Hinkle, could not agree on which  
of them should receive the money.1  Rather than choose between  
Calcutt and Hinkle, the hospital deposited the disputed funds  
with the Wayne County Clerk. 
Calcutt sued, and Hinkle  
intervened.  In 1989, the trial court granted summary  
disposition against Hinkle and awarded the funds to Calcutt.2  
Hinkle appealed to the Court of Appeals.  However, he did  
not attempt to obtain a stay of execution from the trial  
1 The coverages were not coordinated, so the refund would 
not be to the insurers.  
2 The full procedural history of this decade-old dispute 
is quite complex.  For present purposes, we are describing 
only those portions that are pertinent to today’s issue. 
Neither do we address the merits of the underlying controversy 
regarding whether the refund should go to Hinkle or Wokas.  
2  
 
court.  
After entry of the order of summary disposition, the  
county clerk asked Calcutt’s attorney, Randall Wokas, when he  
would withdraw the funds.  
Thereafter, Wokas removed the  
funds, before the expiration of the twenty-one-day automatic  
stay under MCR 2.614(A)(1).3  
The Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed 
the trial court’s judgment,  
and ordered that the funds be divided between Hinkle and  
Calcutt. Hinkle, however, was unable to obtain the estate’s  
share of the funds because the county clerk had previously  
disbursed them to Wokas.  
At that point, Hinkle filed the instant suit against the  
Wayne County Clerk, Wayne County, and the Wayne County  
Commission, alleging that the county had improperly disbursed  
the money.4
 The county defendants filed a third-party  
complaint against Calcutt and 
Wokas, 
contending, 
in 
part, that  
they acquired the funds in violation of MCR 2.614(A)(1).  
Wokas moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),  
arguing that the county defendants’ active fault precluded  
their recovery.  The trial court, on reconsideration of an  
earlier 
ruling, 
granted 
Wokas’ 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition.  
The county defendants appealed and Wokas cross-appealed.  
3 
 
Wokas’ 
removal 
of 
the 
funds 
spawned 
contempt  
proceedings detailed in In re Contempt of Calcutt, 184 Mich 
App 749; 458 NW2d 919 (1990).  
4 Hinkle ultimately entered into a settlement agreement 
with the county defendants.  
3  
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision that  
granted summary disposition to Wokas.5  
Wokas has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.  
II  
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for  
summary disposition is a question of law that we review de  
novo. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159;  
645 NW2d 643 (2002).  The interpretation of a court rule is  
likewise a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  CAM  
Construction v Lake Edgewood Condominium Ass’n, 465 Mich 549,  
553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002).  
III  
This 
Court 
applies 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation  
to the interpretation of court rules.  When the language is  
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning plainly expressed,  
and judicial construction is not permitted. 
Grievance  
Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116  
(2000).  
IV  
The issue presented is whether the county defendants  
violated MCR 2.614(A)(1) by voluntarily disbursing the funds  
during 
the 
twenty-one-day 
automatic 
stay 
of 
execution 
provided  
by the court rule.  The trial court agreed with Wokas that the  
county did not wrongfully distribute the funds, but the Court  
5 245 Mich App 405; 631 NW2d 27 (2001).  
4  
of Appeals held to the contrary. That Court determined that  
Wokas’ knowledge that a claim of appeal had been filed, and  
that an informal request had been made to maintain the funds  
in the clerk’s office, rendered Wokas responsible for the  
unavailability of funds to satisfy the judgment after the  
appellate decision in Hinkle’s favor.  The Court of Appeals  
charged Wokas with notice of MCR 2.614(A)(1), the provision  
for an automatic stay of execution pending appeal.  Thus, the  
Court found that Wokas was responsible for the funds having  
been mistakenly paid to Calcutt and Wokas.6  
The Court of Appeals erred in finding a violation of the  
automatic twenty-one-day stay provided by MCR 2.614(A)(1).  
That paragraph precludes execution on a judgment, not  
voluntary payment by a party willing to satisfy a judgment.  
Nothing in the plain language of the rule restrains a party  
liable for a judgment and the party entitled to satisfaction  
of the judgment from expediting the resolution of the  
litigation by effecting payment without resorting to formal  
methods of execution. MCR 2.614(A)(1) states:  
Except as provided in this rule, execution may 
not issue on a judgment and proceedings may not be 
taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 
21 days after its entry.  If a motion for new  
trial, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or 
a motion to amend or for additional findings of the 
court is filed and served within 21 days after 
entry of the judgment, execution may not issue on  
6 
 The trial court had limited Wokas’ liability to 
$23,500, the amount that he collected as attorney fees.  
5  
 
 
the judgment and proceedings may not be taken for 
its enforcement until the expiration of 21 days 
after the entry of the order on the motion, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court on motion for good 
cause.  Nothing in this rule prohibits the court  
from enjoining the transfer or disposition of 
property during the 21-day period.  
The language of the rule expressly limits execution on a  
judgment, not voluntary payments.  Because this case involved  
a voluntary payment, the rules governing execution were not  
applicable.7  
The Court of Appeals reliance on the proceedings in In re  
Calcutt was misplaced. 
In that case, the Court of Appeals  
expressly stated that the purported violation of MCR  
2.614(A)(1) was not dispositive of the claim that Wokas and  
Calcutt violated an order of the Court of Appeals. 
Id. at  
755.
 The comments of the Court in Calcutt regarding the  
effect of MCR 2.614(A)(1) were dicta.  Neither MCR 2.614(A)(1)  
nor MCL 600.6001 et seq. prohibited voluntary compliance with  
the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor  
of Calcutt.  Hinkle failed to obtain an order to preserve the  
status quo and cannot now complain that the status quo was not  
maintained.  
7 
 Execution refers to the coercive process for the 
collection of judgments. Regulations on coercive collection 
are imposed because direct attachment of a debtor’s property 
is disfavored. 
George v Sandor M Gelman, PC, 201 Mich App 
474, 477; 506 NW2d 583 (1993).  Chapter 60 of the Revised 
Judicature Act, MCL 600.6001 et seq., regulates the  
involuntary payment of judgments.  
6  
V  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar  
as it reversed the order of summary disposition in favor of  
Wokas. The county clerk’s voluntary payment of the judgment  
was not contrary to MCR 2.614(A)(1). We therefore reinstate  
the trial court order granting summary disposition for Wokas.  
In light of our resolution of this issue, we find it  
unnecessary to reach the remaining claims.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
7  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
GARY HINKLE, executor of the estate
of MARILYN J. HINKLE-CALCUTT, 
Plaintiff, 
v 
No. 119566 
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF WAYNE,
and WAYNE COUNTY COMMISSION, 
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v 
BILLY CALCUTT, 
Third-Party Defendant, 
and 
RANDALL WOKAS, 
Third-Party Defendant-
Appellant. 
___________________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I believe that this case is not appropriate for 
disposition by per curiam opinion.  Whether the Court of 
Appeals correctly construed MCR 2.614 is a question of some  
significance, not only to the parties, but to the bench and  
the bar in general.  Full briefing and oral argument would aid  
the Court greatly in analyzing and resolving the complex  
issues presented.  Therefore, I would not resolve this matter  
by per curiam opinion, but would grant leave to appeal.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh  
2