Case Title: STATE v JACK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12881 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 STATE O F M O N T A N A , Plaintiff and Appellant, -VS - DONALD JACK, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the F i f t h Judicial District, Honorable Frank E. Blair, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Chester Lloyd Jones, County Attorney, Virginia City, Montana Clayton Herron argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Larry D. Whitman argued, West Yellowstone, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Longan, Holmstrom and Vicki W. Dunaway, Billings, Montana Vicki W. Dunaway argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: May 6, 1975 Decided : - er M r . Chief Justice Harrision delivered the Opinion of the Court. The s t a t e of Montana appeals from an order of the d i s t r i c t court, Madison County, granting summary judgment t o defendant Donald Jack. Donald. Jack i s a resident of the s t a t e of California charged with violating section 26-909, R.C.M. 1947, ~ o n t a n a ' s Resident Guide Law, which provides: 11 Licensed o u t f i t t e r o r guide required f o r nonresident hunting-exception f o r landowner-waiver. (1) It s h a l l be unlawful f o r any nonresident t o hunt game animals on any land within any national f o r e s t wilderness area, national game refuge, o r s t a t e game range within the s t a t e of Montana unless accompanied by a licensed o u t f i t t e r , professional guide or resident guide and the nonresident hunting license must bear the signature and license number of the o u t f i t t e r o r resident guide who accompanies him except a s noted below. "(2) A landowner o r agent may guide nonresident o r resident hunters on land owned by, or land leased t o him without a guide license; o r he may authorize nonresi- dent o r resident hunters t o hunt without a guide on land owned by, o r land leased t o , such landowner, lessee o r agent. The nonresident hunter's hunting license must bear the signature of the resident landowner, lessee or agent on whose fenced property he is hunting as evidence t h a t permission has been obtained. "(3) The Montana f i s h and game commission s h a l l have authority t o waive guide requirements f o r holders of B-2, B-5 and B-6 licenses i n special deer and antelope areas during the period B-5 and B-6 license holders may hunt . I I Guide requirements may not be waived i n areas open t o a general hunting season on any game animal other than deer and antelope. 1 l Donald Jack was convicted on November 19, 1973, and fined f i f t y d o l l a r s by a j u s t i c e of the peace. His conviction was based on a s t i p u l a t i o n of f a c t s which can be summarized as: 1. Defendant Donald Jack was a nonresident of the s t a t e of Montana a t the time of the offense charged. 2. A t such time, i n Madision County, Montana, defendant was hunting big game within a national f o r e s t . 3 . That he was, a t the time and place, unaccompanied by any resident guide. 4. Except a s may be s t a t e d above, defendant was i n compliance with a l l f i s h and game laws of the s t a t e of Montana. Defendant's sole defense a t a l l levels of these proceedings has taken the form of a constitutional challenge t o the s t a t u t e he admittedly offended. In support of t h i s challenge he urges t h a t t h e s t a t u t e denies him equal protection of the laws i n contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 11, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution. H e a l s o contends the s t a t u t e t o be an undue burden on i n t e r s t a t e commerce, contrary t o the prohibition of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Consti- tution. The question of whether a s t a t u t e encroaches upon t h e protections offered by the equal protection clause depends d i r - e c t l y on the determination of three basic issues: 1) whether the s t a t u t e i s a legitimate and proper exercise of governmental authority; 2) the basis of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and an i d e n t i f i - cation of the persons covered thereunder; and 3) the proper stan- dard of review o r scope of j u d i c i a l inquiry regarding the r e l a - tionship between the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and the objectives of the law. There i s no question t h a t a s t a t e has the power t o pre- serve and regulate i t s w i l d l i f e . In the nineteenth centfry, it was commonly held t h a t t h i s power derived from the common law 1 1 concept of sovereign ownership". Under t h a t doctrine, the ownership of w i l d l i f e was held by the s t a t e i n t r u s t f o r i t s people. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 24 L.Ed 248; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct.600, 40 L. Ed. 793. Under more modern theory, the power has been held t o l i e within t h e purview of a s t a t e r s police powers. S i l z v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 29 S.Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75; Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Dept.of Natural Resources, 30 F.2d 111. Montana recognizes both the doctrine of sovereign owner- ship (Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 67 Mont. 558, 216 P. 776), and the police power theory (State ex r e l . Nepstad v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689). W e need not decide which of these doctrines should now prevail i n the s t a t e of Montana. I n t h e area of w i l d l i f e regulation, it i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e the l e g i s l a t u r e may impose such terms and conditions a s it sees f i t , a s long a s constitutional limitations a r e not infringed. S t a t e ex r e l . Visser v. Fish and Game Comm., 150 Mont. 525, 531, 437 P.2d 373. The next step i s t o determine the basis f o r the legis- l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and determine what persons o r groups of persons a r e affected by it. By drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between resident and nonresident sportsman, we find the s t a t u t e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s a t l e a s t four d i s t i n c t groups of persons. F i r s t , a r e of course the t r u e nonresidents who merely enter the s t a t e f o r the purpose of hunting. But the broad language of the law must a l s o be construed a s applying t o persons l i v i n g i n the s t a t e f o r a period of time i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y the l e g a l residency requirements (section 26-202.3, R.C.M. 1947); t o former residents of the s t a t e who s t i l l return t o hunt; and t o persons who own land within the s t a t e but maintain t h e i r l e g a l residences else- where. Defendant i s a member of t h i s l a t t e r c l a s s , a s he a c t u a l l y owns land i n Madison County. A hearing was held i n the d i s t r i c t court t o afford the s t a t e an opportunity t o present evidence regarding the purpose of t h e s t a t u t e . On the b a s i s of t h a t evidence, the s t a t e con- tends the l e g i s l a t u r e had these objectives i n mind when the s t a t u t e was enacted: 1. That the safety of nonresident hunters i s promoted by placing them i n the company of residents who a r e more l i k e l y t o be familiar with the l o c a l t e r r a i n and weather conditions. 2. That s t a t e regulations and t e r r a i n a r e more l i k e l y t o be obeyed and respected on the assumption t h a t residents a r e more familiar with the laws and more jealous as t o the maintenance of the l o c a l environment. 3. That landowners a r e b e t t e r protected against t h e improper use of t h e i r land. 4. That the law affords s t a t e o f f i c i a l s b e t t e r en- forcement control. Finally, we determine the proper standard of review o r scope of j u d i c i a l inquiry t o be applied. Over the years, the courts have developed two main approaches, conditioning t h e i r respective application on the nature of the constitutional challenge. Where the challenge extends only t o the more general l e g i s l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , the j u d i c i a l inquiry must be limited t o determining whether t h e d i s t i n c t i o n is j u s t i f i e d by a r a t i o n a l basis. Stated another way, we can determine only whether the law has a s u f f i c i e n t l y reasonable r e l a t i o n t o a proper l e g i s l a t i v e purpose so a s not t o be deemed a r b i - t r a r y . State v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 106 Mont. 182, 76 P.2d 81; Great F a l l s National Bank v. McCormick, 152 Mont. 319, 448 P.2d 991. In connection with t h i s standard, a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n having some reasonable b a s i s does n o t deny equal protection merely because it i s not made with precise mathematical nicety o r r e s u l t s i n some inequality, One who attacks the l e g i s l a t i o n has the burden of proving t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o be a r b i t r a r y . Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed.2d 393. But when t h e challenge extends t o c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s which 11 a f f e c t "fundamental r i g h t s " o r c e r t a i n suspect c r i t e r i a " t h e scope of j u d i c i a l inquiry i s correspondingly increased. The I1 purposes of the law must serve a compelling governmental interest1' and a heavy burden i s placed on the s t a t e t o j u s t i f y i t s c l a s s i - f i c a t i o n . Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175. Defendant alleges and argues t h a t the s t a t u t e i n question infringes upon h i s constitutional r i g h t t o t r a v e l i n an e f f o r t t o persuade us t o apply the stringent "compelling governmental i n t e r e s t " t e s t . And, it i s t r u e the record tends t o indicate the costs of h i r i n g a resident guide a r e quite high, and t h a t many more nonresident hunters enter the s t a t e each year than could be reasonably accommodated by the existing number of licensed professional guides. While we recognize a p o s s i b i l i t y the resident guide law a f f e c t s the r i g h t t o i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l , we do not base our decision on those grounds. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 note 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L ed.2d 600. The s t a t u t e does not appear t o be patently unconstitutional on i t s face, But i t s constitutional defects a r e revealed when reviewed i n l i g h t of i t s p r a c t i c a l application. The s t a t u t e was allegedly designed t o promote safety f o r hunters, y e t it i s an established f a c t t h a t the requirements of the law have been waived a s t o deer and antelope, inthose hunting d i s t r i c t s com- prising the eastern one t h i r d of t h i s s t a t e . While there may be a marked difference i n the t e r r a i n i n the two general areas, we find no reason t o assume t h a t one area i s l e s s dangerous than the other. Further, the dangers inherent t o hunting ante- lope o r deer would c e r t a i n l y not decrease a s t o those who might hunt e l k o r moose. The s t a t u t e purports t o promote adherence t o the game laws and respect f o r the environment, but no rea- sonable connection has been established between t h i s goal and the l e g i s l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Even assuming the existence of such a connection, its relationship t o t h i s particular purpose be- comes more remote when applied t o former Montana residents and nonresident landowners, as defendant. The s t a t e f u r t h e r contends the law f o s t e r s b e t t e r protec- t i o n f o r private landowners and more e f f e c t i v e law enforcement. Yet the evidence completely f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t more non- residents than residents a r e found t o be i n violation of the law, o r t h a t hunters a s a group a r e l e s s law abiding than fishermen o r other outdoor sportsmen. Even i f t h e s t a t u t e did operate t o promote these goals, c e r t a i n l y the people i n the eastern one t h i r d of the s t a t e a r e a s deserving of t h i s protection a s a r e our western c i t i z e n s . Certainly a l l nonresident hunters a r e * subject t o j u d i c i a l sanction and l i a b i l i t y f o r violations and t o r t s committed within the s t a t e . The relationship between the s t a t u t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i t s legitimate objectives i s tenuous and remote, and therefore i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y the inequities it has engendered. The judgment i s affirmed. I , 4 ' ' " ,$ ' ** 1 ad *' . % . - - - ; d d 2 - d z & ~ ~ + & - - k * - L - - - ~ ~ - - - * - - - k - x - - 2 % ~ Chief ~ u L t i c e W e Concur: Justices.