Case Title: Plaches v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 126, 2020

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
JAMES L. PLACHES, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 126, 2020 
 
Defendant Below, Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
 C.A. Nos. 00912004522 & 1402007837 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, Appellee.  
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: 
April 20, 2022 
Decided: 
June 6, 2022 
 
 
 
Before 
SEITZ, 
Chief 
Justice; 
VALIHURA, 
VAUGHN, 
TRAYNOR, 
and 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.   
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Collins & Associates, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant.   
 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALIHURA, Justice, for the Majority: 
 
 
 
2 
 
Before this Court is an appeal from a February 24, 2020 Superior Court Violation 
of Probation (“VOP”) hearing where the court held that James L. Plaches (“Plaches”) 
violated his probation after he admitted to police contact.  The court sentenced Plaches to 
seven years of unsuspended prison time, followed by community supervision with 
conditions.1   
On appeal, Plaches argues that the Superior Court’s decision should be reversed 
because he could not have violated his probation by complying with a condition of his 
probation, namely, reporting police contact.  Plaches argues that the court specifically 
found one fact, police contact, and based on that finding, the Superior Court erroneously 
held that “‘obviously’ the [c]ourt must find that [Plaches] violated the terms and conditions 
of his probation.”2  Plaches asserts this was an abuse of discretion.  
The State’s burden to prove a violation of probation requires the State to “prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the ‘conduct of the probationer has not been as good 
as required by the conditions of probation.’”3  We are unable to determine on this record 
what evidence the Superior Court relied on when it found Plaches in violation of his 
probation.  For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the Superior Court’s finding 
that Plaches violated his probation and REMAND this case to the trial court for 
 
1 A64–84 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g). 
2 Opening Br. at 17; see A82 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g). 
3 Rossi v. State, 140 A.3d 1115, 1117 (Del. 2016) (quoting Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 
(Del. 2006)). 
 
 
 
3 
 
proceedings consistent with this opinion, which would include conducting an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether a violation of probation occurred. 
I. 
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. 
Plaches’ Initial Guilty Plea, Incarceration, and Terms of Probation 
Plaches was arrested on December 9, 2009, and pleaded guilty to the following three 
charges on July 7, 2010:  Rape Third Degree, Breach of Conditions, and Tampering with 
a Witness.4  He was sentenced to thirty-two years of Level V imprisonment, suspended 
after two years followed by additional periods of probation.  As a result, Plaches was 
classified as a Tier 3 sex offender.5   
After completion of Plaches’ Level V incarceration time, Plaches served 
approximately 21 terms of probation — none of which was completed successfully.6  Prior 
to the events leading to this appeal, Plaches’ most recent violation of probation occurred 
on May 22, 2018.  During that time, the Superior Court resentenced Plaches to the Level 
V Key Program.7  Plaches successfully completed the Key Program and the balance of his 
Level V time was suspended for four concurrent terms of Level III GPS supervision.8  
Plaches’ Level III supervision had certain conditions, such as successful completion of an 
 
4 A1–2, A4 (Superior Ct. Docket).  The remaining charges were dismissed.  A4 (Superior Ct. 
Docket).   
5 A corrected sentence order did not alter the two-year term of imprisonment.     
6 A31 (Violation Report).  According to the Docket, Plaches violated his probation on September 
13, 2013, March 18, 2014, June 12, 2014, March 3, 2017, and May 22, 2018.  A1 (Superior Ct. 
Docket). 
7 A31 (Violation Report). 
8 Id.  The term GPS stands for Global Positioning System, which uses satellites to determine where 
someone is located.  
 
 
 
4 
 
Intensive Outpatient Treatment Program, maintaining his GPS equipment, and no contact 
with any minors.9  Plaches was also immediately referred to treatment at the Treatment 
Access Center (“TASC”).   
In May of 2019, Plaches was enrolled in the Kent County Mental Health Court.  
Shortly after enrollment, Plaches was sanctioned for a positive urine screen, which 
prompted an increase in his treatment.  He was referred to two programs that provide 
clinical mental health services, namely, ARGO and IOP.10   
Two months later, Plaches was committed to Sussex Violation of Probation Center 
(“SVOP”) because he began missing IOP appointments.  After he was released from 
SVOP, Plaches admitted himself to Dover Behavioral Health in an attempt to “get his meds 
straight.”11  Plaches was released from Dover Behavioral Health in August of 2019 and 
started receiving mental health treatment from Mind and Body.12   
As of October 2019, Plaches’ reports showed he was doing well with his TASC and 
Mind and Body treatment and that he had obtained employment with Easter Seals as a 
caregiver for his elderly mother.   
 
 
 
9 Id.  Plaches was released from his Level V time on April 5, 2019.   
10 ARGO, which stands for Aquila Behavioral Health Georgetown Argo Institute and IOP, the 
Intensive Outpatient Program at SUN Behavioral in Georgetown, are programs that help patients 
who may be transitioning from inpatient care by providing clinical mental health services. 
11 Id. 
12 The Mind and Body Consortium offers counseling and mental health services.   
 
 
 
5 
 
B. 
The Alleged VOP at Issue 
On Friday, January 3, 2020, police were called to Plaches’ residence located in 
Felton, Delaware (the “Residence”) to check on the well-being of Christina Hays (“Hays”), 
Plaches’ significant other at the time.13  The report identifies Samantha Clendaniel as the 
“reporting person” who stated that Hays had been “drinking and was acting weird and she 
wanted the police to check and make sure Hays was ok.”14  During the welfare check, Hays 
stated to police that “she had been drinking and did not want to be around her roommate 
James Plaches.”15  Hays asked if the police could take her to a hotel because she did not 
want to stay at her residence.  The police officer transported Hays to a local hotel.   
Later that night, Plaches called the 24-hour probation and parole monitoring center 
(the “Monitoring Center”) to inform them that family members were going to be visiting 
and were planning to bring children.16  In order to avoid a violation of his probation, 
Plaches requested to stay at a local hotel for the night.  The Monitoring Center granted his 
request.17   
 
13 The police reports refer to Plaches’ significant other as “Christina L Hays,” but certain 
transcripts refer to her as “Hayes.”  We will use the spelling provided in the police reports.   
14 A48 (Jan. 3, 2020 Police Report). 
15 Id.   
16 A38 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g); A31 (Violation Report).   
17 A73–74 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g) (Plaches: “I contacted Probation and informed them that my sister 
was coming with the grandchildren and was due to be there anytime, okay.  I would like to stay at 
a local hotel for the weekend and was given permission from Probation.”); A78 (Feb. 24, 2020 
Hr’g) (Probation Officer Vorous: “Permission was given for him to leave the house by the 
monitoring center and the on-call officer that Friday night.  It was not given by me.  But because 
he called and said there were children in the house, I’m trying to do the right thing, they permitted 
him to go.”). 
 
 
 
6 
 
A few days later on January 5, 2020, Plaches again contacted the Monitoring Center.   
According to the violation report submitted by his Probation Officer, Jessica Vorous 
(“Vorous”), Plaches advised the Monitoring Center that he could not return to his 
Residence because his relatives were still there with children.18  Plaches stated that he 
needed to relocate to a different local hotel.  The Monitoring Center again granted his 
request.19 
On January 6, 2020, Plaches had a scheduled meeting with Vorous.20  At this 
meeting, Plaches reported to Vorous that he had police contact on January 3 and 
experienced a temporary residence relocation over the weekend.  When describing the 
police contact, Plaches allegedly told Vorous that an unannounced family visit caused 
tension, and the Felton Police Department was contacted “due to a domestic call involving 
[Plaches’] fiancé and her sister, and that he was not involved.”21  According to Vorous, she 
questioned Plaches’ weekend arrangements, and Plaches was adamant that his relocation 
was due to children at his Residence.22  He maintained that he did not know when the 
 
18 A31 (Violation Report); A38 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g) (stating that Plaches called the 
Monitoring Center on January 3,, 2020 (a Friday), and called “[a]gain, on Sunday” (January 5th)). 
19 A38 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g) (Probation Officer Vorous: “Again, on Sunday, he called in to 
the monitoring center to say, the children are still there, I need to say at another hotel.  He was 
allowed to stay at that hotel.”). 
20 A31 (Violation Report) (“On January 6, 2020, Mr. Plaches reported to the Probation and Parole 
office for his scheduled reporting.”). 
21 A28, A31 (Violation Report). 
22 A38–39 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g) (reflecting statements by Probation Officer Vorous). 
 
 
 
7 
 
relatives were leaving, and he had no choice but to relocate until the children left so that 
he would be compliant with his probation terms and conditions.23   
Plaches returned to the probation office the next day, on January 7, 2020, and 
advised Vorous that he could return to the Residence because the children had left.24   
Later that day, Felton police were dispatched to the Residence “in reference to a 
physical domestic in progress.”25  Upon arrival, Hays advised the police officers that she 
and Plaches had an argument in Rodney Village where Plaches punched her in the face.  
Then, Hays changed her story and stated that the incident happened in Camden.  Due to 
the alleged location of the incident, it was determined that the police department in Camden 
would be handling the report.  In the meantime, Hays was transported to Bayhealth Kent 
General Hospital by ambulance.  Once finished at the hospital, Hays was transported by 
the same police officer to the Residence to retrieve some belongings.   
On January 8, 2020, the Camden Police Department issued their report regarding 
the alleged domestic violence dispute that occurred between Hays and Plaches the previous 
day.26  According to the police report, Hays and Plaches were involved in a verbal dispute 
in a store in Camden.  After leaving the store, Hays “lightly smacked Plaches on the arm” 
and in return, Plaches “used [] his fist to backhand her in the face.”27  “No visible injuries 
 
23 Id.; A31 (Violation Report). 
24A31 (Violation Report); A39 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g) (“Tuesday [January 7, 2020], [Plaches] 
came in to see me.  He said, talked to my girlfriend, the children are leaving.”). 
25 A49 (Jan. 7, 2020 Police Report).   
26 A50–51 (Jan. 8, 2020 Police Report). 
27 A51 (Jan. 8, 2020 Police Report). 
 
 
 
8 
 
were observed” on Hays by the officer.28  Although the officer interviewed Hays about the 
incident, the case was closed because of her lack of cooperation. 
That same day, Vorous received a call from “family members in New Hampshire”29 
who stated there were no children at Plaches’ Residence over the weekend.30  The family 
members also stated that they were concerned for Hays, who was allegedly attempting to 
leave Plaches over the weekend.31  Vorous stated that according to the family members, 
“[Hays] was going from hotel to hotel, he was following her, and they were engaged in a 
domestic dispute over the weekend.”32   
 
Vorous followed up with Hays that same day (January 8, 2020) and later reported 
— contrary to what the investigating police officers reported — that Hays had visible 
bruises33 and was extremely frightened of Plaches.  After Vorous’ conversations with Hays 
and the family members, Vorous concluded that Plaches had lied to the Monitoring Center 
 
28 Id.   
29 It is unclear as to whose family members these are.  Vorous refers to these individuals as “family 
members and residents of his reported residence,” suggesting in one section of the Violation 
Report, that she spoke to Plaches’ family members, but Vorous also refers to these individuals as 
“Mr. Plaches’ fiancé’s concerned family members in New Hampshire” in another section of the 
Violation Report.  See A27, A31 (Violation Report). 
30 A39 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g) (“Wednesday [January 8, 2020], I get a call from family members 
in New Hampshire.  There were no children there at all all weekend.”); A31 (Violation Report).   
31 A31–32 (Violation Report); A39 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g). 
32 A39 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g). 
33 We note that Vorous’s statement about Hays’s visible bruises was unsworn and not subject to 
cross-examination.  Vorous also wrote in her violation report that the police officers who contacted 
Hays on January 8 “observed evidence of abuse,” (A31) (Violation Report), but the relevant police 
report states that the officers — a Camden Police Department patrolman and a Delaware State 
Trooper — on the date of the alleged assault “did not see any physical injury to [Hays].”  A51 
(Jan. 8, 2020 Police Report). 
 
 
 
9 
 
in order to stay with Hays.  However, according to Vorous’ report, no charges were filed, 
and Plaches was not arrested.34   
C. 
Vorous’ Administrative Warrant 
On January 10, 2020, Vorous filed an Administrative Warrant alleging that Plaches 
violated the terms of his probation.35  Specifically, Vorous alleged that Plaches had violated 
three conditions, namely, Conditions Two, Five, and Thirteen of his Level III probation.   
First, the Administrative Warrant stated that Plaches violated Condition Two of his 
probation which required that Plaches report “any new arrest, conviction, or police contact 
within 72 hours to [his] supervising officer.”36  According to the Administrative Warrant, 
Plaches violated this condition because “[o]n January 6, 2020, Mr. Plaches reported [to 
Vorous that] police contact [occurred on January 3] due to a family dispute between [Hays] 
and her sister,” and “[f]urther investigation revealed this police contact never occurred.”37      
Second, Condition Five required him to “report any changes of residence . . . within 
72 hours to [his] supervising officer.”38  Plaches allegedly violated this condition on 
January 3, 2020, and January 5, 2020 when he contacted the probation and parole office 
Monitoring Center and advised them that he needed to move from his residence due to an 
 
34 A31–32 (Violation Report). 
35 A26 (Administrative Warrant). 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  The Administrative Warrant (filed January 10, 2020) states that an investigation revealed 
“police contact never occurred.”  Id.  However, at the January 24, 2020 VOP Hearing, Vorous 
clarified that Plaches reported police contact, police contact did occur, but that “[t]he reason for 
the police contact was false,” (i.e., that a dispute between Hays and her sister did not occur).  A41–
42 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g). 
38 A26 (Administrative Warrant). 
 
 
 
10 
 
unexpected family visit involving children.  The warrant also states that “[o]n January 8, 
2020, it was learned that there were no children present to [sic] his report residence.”39  
According to the Administrative Warrant, Plaches “lied to probation and parole in order to 
stay outside of [his] reported residence with [Hays],” and that permission would not have 
been given since no children were present at the Residence.40  Therefore, Plaches allegedly 
relocated without proper probation and parole permission.   
Third, Condition Thirteen of his probation required Plaches to “abide by a curfew 
established by [his] supervising officer.”41  Plaches allegedly violated this condition 
because according to Vorous, he would not have been given permission to leave the 
Residence, and he was not at the Residence during his 10 p.m.–6 a.m. curfew from January 
3 until January 7. 
D. 
Plaches’ VOP Hearings and Subsequent Arrest 
The allegations set forth in the Administrative Warrant resulted in Vorous’ 
Violation Report charging Plaches with his sixth VOP in connection with his 2010 
convictions.42  The court held a VOP hearing on January 24, 2020.     
 
39 Id.   
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 A31 (Violation Report).  The Violation Report also charges Plaches with his third VOP of his 
2014 conviction.   
 
 
 
11 
 
At that hearing, the court heard from Officer Vorous who stated that although 
Plaches was adamant that children were at the Residence, she believed that was a lie.43  
Even though Vorous agreed that Plaches had reported the police contact, Vorous stated that 
the dispute he reported was a domestic dispute between his girlfriend Hays and her sister.  
According to Vorous, the police contact that actually occurred was Hays calling the Felton 
police and saying “come get me out of this house because I don’t want to have to defend 
myself [against him].”44  Thus, Vorous asserted that although Plaches had reported police 
contact, he had lied about the nature of it.   
The court asked Plaches whether he was disputing Officer Vorous’s statement that 
the police contact that he reported was not the police contact that occurred.  Plaches denied 
having a domestic dispute with Hays, and instead, recited his version of the events.  
According to Plaches, he and Hays argued over Hays’s sister’s plans to visit at the residence 
with her nieces and nephews and over Plaches’ concern that he could not leave his mother 
who was under his care at the Residence.  Plaches maintained that this argument resulted 
in police contact, which Plaches reported to Vorous and admitted to on the record.  Thus, 
Plaches confirmed that he was disputing Officer Vorous’s account of the events.   
The court concluded that because “[Plaches] is disputing the allegations . . . [the 
court is] going to have to set this thing down for a contested hearing.”45  The court was 
 
43 A41 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g) (Probation Officer Vorous: “The allegation is not that--yes, he 
reported where he was going.  He lied.  He was given permission to go because there was [sic] 
children in the house.  There were no children in that house.”). 
44 Id. 
45  A43 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g). 
 
 
 
12 
 
adamant that a contested hearing had to be scheduled even though Vorous included the 
police reports.46  While trying to schedule the contested VOP hearing, the court stated that 
the parties will “have to bring witnesses [] here” and that the court will have to “make a 
finding” because “someone is not telling the truth here.”47  The contested VOP hearing was 
scheduled for a month later. 
 
THE COURT: Are you disputing those events? 
[PLACHES]: Well, I’m disputing the police contact of events, yes, sir, Your Honor, 
. . . . 
THE COURT: Okay.  But he is disputing the allegations here, so it sounds to me 
like I’m going to have to set this thing down for a contested hearing. 
A42–43 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g). 
46 A43 (Jan. 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g). 
PROBATION OFFICER VOROUS: Your Honor, I have included the police 
reports. 
THE COURT: I have to schedule a contested hearing. 
[PLACHES]: Your Honor, I did not get arrested.  I mean I would have been arrested 
if I did something wrong. 
THE COURT: It would be clearer for the court if he was arrested.  He was not 
arrested apparently. 
PROBATION OFFICER VOROUS: Understood, understood. 
Id. 
47 A43–44 (Jan 24, 2020 VOP Hr’g).  The following colloquy occurred: 
THE COURT: So this is a matter in dispute.  So I can make no finding today, but I 
can set--if the State wants to continue with this hearing, then I must set it down for 
a contested hearing which you’ll have to have witnesses. 
THE COURT: All right.  We’ll set it down for a contested hearing, Madam Clerk.  
What day can we give it? 
[PLACHES]: I can’t ask for bail?  I didn’t get no [sic] bail or nothing, not even 
from the judge. 
THE COURT: You know what that means, sir.  That means we’ll have to bring 
witnesses in here. 
[PLACHES]: Yes, sir. 
 
 
 
13 
 
Between hearings, the police arrested Plaches and charged him with falsely 
reporting an incident.48  This arrest related to Vorous’ conclusion in the Violation Report 
that Plaches had falsely reported that children were in his Residence.  The State entered a 
nolle prosequi on this charge on March 16, 2020, but the charge was pending during what 
was to be the contested VOP hearing on February 24, 2020.49  Because the matter was 
pending prior to that hearing, Vorous filed a supplemental report which added a violation 
of probation based on Plaches’ arrest.50   
On February 24, 2020, the court began the VOP hearing, where both sides appeared 
prepared to present evidence.51  But at the beginning of the hearing, Plaches’ attorney, who 
was new to the case, stated that Plaches “is in agreement to admit police contact,” and that 
Plaches “would like to be heard regarding sentencing.”  The court then converted the matter 
“from a contested VOP to a standard VOP with an admission as to police contact by the 
defendant.”52  The court heard from the State as to its initial recommendation of nine years 
at Level V incarceration.  While explaining the nine-year recommendation, the State 
 
THE COURT: I have to make a finding.  
[PLACHES]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That someone is not telling the truth here. 
Id. 
48 A54–55 (Jan. 30, 2020 Warrant).    
49 A88 (Disposition Record). 
50 A58–63 (Suppl. Violation Report).   
51 A65 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).  For example, Plaches appeared ready to present an affidavit from a 
family member, and the State appeared ready to provide Hays’ testimony as she was present in the 
courtroom.  See A70–71 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).  
52 A81 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
 
 
 
14 
 
mentioned that Plaches “told the police that some people were coming to his house that 
had children so he could get out of the house and follow Ms. Hay[s].”53  Although the State 
said that it “would have witnesses today that would say that there were not children at the 
house,” there was no testimony at this hearing.54   
In response, the defense attorney noted that these allegations were odd stating that 
“[u]nlike other probationers where they are not reporting contacts [with police], Mr. 
Plaches took it upon himself [to advise] Probation that there was police contact and no new 
charges resulted out of those contacts.”55  Therefore, the alleged violation was not due to 
Plaches failing to report police contact, but instead, “[t]he allegation is based on the 
probation officer not believing what [Plaches] is saying.”56  Indeed, at the January 24 
hearing, Vorous acknowledged that Plaches “did report [the] police contact,”57 but she 
believed that Plaches had mischaracterized the call that caused the police to respond.  
Plaches’ counsel also pointed out that the officer who responded to conduct the January 3 
welfare check reported that Hays had a history of alcohol abuse and mental health issues.  
His counsel also presented a letter from Plaches’ sister explaining that she and her mother’s 
 
53 A66 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
54 Id.  The record indicates that Hays was in the courtroom at the time of the scheduled contested 
VOP hearing.  A70–71 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).  No witnesses were sworn and no cross-examinations 
occurred. 
55 A69 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
56 A68 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
57 A41 (Jan. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
 
 
 
15 
 
great grandchildren were planning a surprise visit to her mother at the Residence that 
weekend but that she cancelled due to an “unexpected death on January 2nd.”58   
Plaches then addressed the court.  Plaches admitted to police contact but stated that 
the police contact did not result in an arrest or new charges.59  The court, however, focused 
on Plaches’ statement that he admitted to police contact.60  Then, the court afforded the 
State an opportunity to respond and heard Vorous’ view on the matter.  Vorous’ statements 
echoed her statements at the first hearing.  She agreed that Plaches had reported the police 
contact, but she stated that “the police contact he reported was not the police contact that 
happened.”61  Further, Vorous reiterated that although permission was given to him by the 
 
58 A86 (Letter from Plaches’ Sister); see A70 (Feb. 24 2020 Hr’g) (“We do have a notarized 
statement from his sister saying that she was coming from Pittsburgh that weekend, and I can hand 
that up to the [c]ourt.”). 
59 A72–73 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
60 See A72 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).  The court questioned Plaches during the hearing as follows: 
THE COURT:   But you’re admitting to police contact, are you not? 
[PLACHES]:  I’m sorry? 
THE COURT:  But you’re admitting to police contact? 
[PLACHES]:  I admit to police contact, but it was, like, I consider the contact, like, 
it was a positive not a negative where I was questioned and put against the car and 
had my ID out.  It was just he come [sic] to the house, and, you know, just asked 
me what was going on.  I said we had an argument.  He talked to her on the stair 
and she was like, you know -- like, I just reported she was drinking.  She was 
uncredible because she kind of blacks out when she’s drinking. . . .  Well, what 
more or less I was trying to get to, my current order is no contact with children 
under 18, so if my mother was there and my sister showed up and I’m there at the 
house and they come knocking on the door and they show up, I’m in major violation 
right now because I’m there with kids in the house.  So what I was trying to do was 
remove myself form the situation before they showed up.   
A72–73 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
61 A78 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g). 
 
 
 
16 
 
monitoring center for him to leave, it was not given by her, and permission would not have 
been given had it been known that there were no children in the house.   
Without stating the reason for its decision, the court stated that it had heard from all 
parties in the matter which had “been converted from a contested VOP to a standard VOP 
with an admission as to police contact by the defendant.”62  And without setting forth any 
findings or addressing the probation officer’s admission that Plaches had reported the only 
police contact that he had experienced on the day in question, the court then held that 
“[o]bviously, the [c]ourt must find Mr. Plaches in violation of the terms and conditions of 
his probation.”63  Thereafter, the court sentenced Plaches to seven years of unsuspended 
prison time followed by community supervision with conditions.64   
On May 14, 2020, the court denied Plaches’ motion for a sentence reduction.65   
On March 27, 2020, Plaches filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal, and filed his 
Opening Brief on May 7, 2021.66  The State filed its Motion to Affirm on May 13, 2021.  
This Court concluded that it was not manifest on the face of Plaches’ opening brief that his 
appeal was without merit.  In the interest of justice, we sua sponte determined that counsel 
should be appointed to represent Plaches on appeal. 
 
 
62 A81 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
63 A82 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
64 A82–83 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
65 A89 (May 14, 2020 Superior Ct. VOP Order). 
66 A90–127 (Plaches’ Pro Se Opening Br.).   
 
 
 
17 
 
II. 
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL 
 
Plaches contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it found him in 
violation for complying with a condition of his probation.  Specifically, he argues that the 
Superior Court erroneously held that he violated his probation based on only one fact: 
police contact.  Plaches asserts that he was required to report police contact, and that the 
police contact, which did not result in an arrest, is not a violation of his probation.  Further, 
he argues that the court erred when it turned the February 24, 2020 contested VOP hearing 
into a sentencing hearing because the court should have resolved the contested issues.  
Although Plaches admitted to police contact during that hearing, he contends that he did 
not intend to admit a violation of probation.  Therefore, Plaches asserts that the Superior 
Court’s decision should be reversed and that the order revoking Plaches’ probation and the 
prison sentence should be vacated.    
 
The State argues that the court did not abuse its discretion because Plaches violated 
his probation for two reasons: (1) he misrepresented the reason for the police contact, and 
(2) he reported a change of residence based on a false claim that there were minor children 
present in his Residence.  Therefore, the State argues that there was sufficient competent 
evidence for the Superior Court to determine that Plaches violated his probation.   
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s revocation of probation for abuse of 
discretion.67 
 
67 Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 271–72 (Del. 1968).   
 
 
 
18 
 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
We address Plaches’ contention that this Court should reverse the trial court’s 
revocation of his probation because there is no competent evidence that an actual violation 
of probation occurred.  After reviewing the record, we conclude that the basis upon which 
the Superior Court found Plaches to be in violation of his probation is not set forth on the 
record and is, therefore, unclear.  Accordingly, we remand this matter with instructions to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a violation of probation occurred. 
Although “a defendant’s admission of the alleged crime is considered sufficient 
competent evidence to revoke probation,” when the “defendant has not admitted violating 
his probation, some competent evidence linking the defendant to the crime is necessary.”68  
Further, “when the State claims that a defendant violated probation by committing a crime, 
the State must produce competent evidence that shows not only that a crime occurred, but 
also that the defendant is linked to the crime.”69   
In Collins v. State, for example, the State asserted that the defendant violated his 
probation when he broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home and caused extensive damage inside.  
The only evidence that the State presented at Collins’ VOP hearing was testimony from 
the investigating police officer.  Although the officer had personally observed the damage 
at the home, he had no personal knowledge of who or what caused that damage.  The 
Superior Court found that the defendant violated probation based on the officer’s personal 
 
68 Collins, 897 A.2d at 161 (footnote omitted).  
69 Rossi, 140 A.3d at 1123. 
 
 
 
19 
 
observation of the damage and his recitations of inadmissible hearsay.  On appeal, this 
Court reversed, noting that “[a]lthough physical evidence of the damage to the apartment 
may have indicated that criminal conduct had occurred, it did not connect Collins to that 
crime,” and, therefore, the revocation of his probation was an abuse of discretion.70 
In this case, Plaches’ admission to having police contact is competent evidence 
connecting him to the scene of an alleged domestic dispute where police were dispatched 
on January 3.  However, the only information the State presented at Plaches’ VOP hearing 
consisted of Vorous’ unsworn statements.71  Similar to the investigating police officer in 
Collins, Vorous had no personal knowledge of what prompted the police contact on 
January 3.  Rather, Vorous provided information about that incident based on inadmissible 
hearsay, from what Hays and Hays’ family allegedly told her.   
Plaches contends that Vorous made several untrue statements.  He claims that her 
statement that Hays called the police on January 3 to “come get me out of this house 
because I don’t want to have to defend myself” was untrue.  Rather, the police report states 
that Hays’ sister, Samantha Clendaniel, called the police.  Vorous also claimed to have 
seen evidence of the bruising on Hays on January 8, 2020 due to the alleged incident that 
 
70 Collins, 897 A.2d at 162.  Our Court stated that, “[a]lthough the rules of evidence applicable to 
criminal trials are relaxed in violation of probation proceedings and hearsay evidence is 
admissible, Delaware law requires ‘some competent evidence to prove the violation asserted.’”  
Id. at 160.   
71 See id. at 160–61 (“Although the probationer’s guilt need not be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, probation cannot be revoked solely upon the basis of testimony of a witness with ‘no first-
hand knowledge of the events constituting the violations.’”) (footnote omitted); Brown, 249 A.2d 
at 271 (reversing a revocation of probation where there was no competent evidence beyond a police 
officer’s testimony relaying information from a police report and newspaper article, that the 
probationer had violated her probation by committing a crime).   
 
 
 
20 
 
occurred on January 7, but the officers from each of three departments (Felton, Camden, 
and State Police) stated in their reports that they saw no evidence of injury to Hays on 
January 7, 2020.72  Plaches also complains that neither Vorous nor the court considered the 
notarized letter from Plaches’ sister who, during the weekend in question, was planning to 
bring her grandchildren to the Residence for a visit, but instead, relied on a call from Hays’ 
family who were not planning to visit. 
Vorous did relate that Plaches had told her directly that there were children in the 
house.73  The facts surrounding whose children would be visiting are unclear.  At one point, 
Plaches states that it was Hays’ family.  But, as mentioned, he also submitted a notarized 
letter from his sister indicating that her grandchildren would be visiting.74  Whether Plaches 
was mistaken about whether and whose children would be visiting or whether he lied so 
that he could leave the Residence was not addressed or resolved by the Superior Court.  
More critically, the Superior Court never made a finding as to what its basis was for finding 
a violation of Condition Two which concerned the alleged incident on January 3.   
Despite Hays’ presence in the court room, the State did not present Hays’ testimony.  
Based upon the statement by Plaches’ counsel, the State apparently acquiesced in forgoing 
the evidentiary hearing.  We are not faulting the State for doing so, particularly since 
 
72 See A51 (Jan. 8, 2020 Police Report). 
73 Vorous’ statements regarding what Plaches allegedly told her during his scheduled probation 
meeting was not hearsay.  See D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).  “A statement that meets the following 
conditions is not hearsay: . . . (2) An Opposing Party’s Statement.  The Statement is offered against 
an opposing party and: (A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity.”  Id. 
74 A70 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g).   
 
 
 
21 
 
Plaches’ counsel advised the court that Plaches would admit to police contact and wished 
to be heard regarding sentencing.  Nevertheless, we are left with a record that provides 
neither an adequate basis for the revocation of probation, nor a basis to find that Plaches 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a contested evidentiary hearing.   
As stated in Rossi, “[a]lthough the State’s burden in proving a violation of probation 
is not an onerous one, that burden has long required that the State at least present some 
competent evidence that shows the defendant did not comply with the terms of his 
probation.”75  No doubt, absent an admission by Plaches that he violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation, that burden will require the State in this case to put on some 
evidence aside from Plaches admitting to a police contact, which, by all accounts, Plaches 
reported to his probation officer.  “But given the serious consequences that can result from 
a violation of probation” — as exemplified here by the sentence of seven-years of 
unsuspended prison time, followed by community supervision with conditions — the 
requirement of competent evidence “is a reasonable one that provides the responding 
probationer with an important procedural protection, while still leaving the State well-
positioned to prosecute probation violations much more inexpensively and efficiently than 
crimes.”76  The Superior Court’s reliance on Plaches’ admission to police contact (a term 
and condition of his probation) without more, does not provide a basis for finding that a 
 
75 Rossi, 140 A.3d at 1124.  “Competent evidence” is “evidence that would be admissible in a 
criminal trial and is proof that the defendant violated the terms of his probation.”  Id. at 1119.  As 
we reiterated in Rossi, inadmissible hearsay, without some corroborating admissible evidence, is 
a basis too untrustworthy to terminate a person’s freedom.  Id. at 1120.   
76 Id. at 1124. 
 
 
 
22 
 
crime occurred, and that Plaches was linked to that crime.  Without competent evidence 
establishing both requirements, the revocation of Plaches’ probation was an abuse of 
discretion.77   
And as to whether Plaches, through counsel, waived his right to a contested VOP 
hearing by admitting to police contact and proceeding to sentencing, we hold that he did 
not.  As we recently stated in Purnell v. State, “[w]aiver is the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.”78  “In the criminal context, it is ‘incumbent upon the 
State to prove’ waiver, and ‘the courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against 
waiver.’”79  “Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate 
personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether 
the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right 
at stake.”80   
 
77 See Brown, 249 A.2d at 272 (concluding that “there being no competent evidence upon which 
to base the exercise of sound judicial discretion, the revocation of the probation and the imposition 
of the prison sentence constituted an abuse of discretion”).   
78 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1101 (Del. 2021) (quoting Daskin v. Knowles, 193 A.3d 717, 
725 (Del. 2018)). 
79 Id. (quoting Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 113 (Del. 1983)).  “The distinction between waiver 
and forfeiture is most visible in so-called ‘plain error’ analysis, where a forfeited allegation that a 
defendant’s rights were violated can nevertheless be the basis for later reversal, but a waived right 
cannot.”  Id. at 1101 (footnotes omitted).  At most, one might argue that Plaches forfeited his right 
to a contested VOP hearing.  But even under plain error standard of review, we can and do 
conclude, given the potential loss of liberty at stake, that finding that he is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing under these unique circumstances would be plain error.  As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court, “most States have recognized that there is no interest on the part of 
the State in revoking parole without any procedural guarantees at all.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 484 (1972).  Therefore, ”[w]hat is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that 
the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion 
will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.”  Id. 
80 Purnell, 254 A3d at 1101 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).   
 
 
 
23 
 
Revocation of probation results in a loss of liberty and entitles the probationer to a 
hearing with certain “minimum requirements of due process.”81  The “minimum 
requirements of due process” regarding the revocation of probation have been summarized 
as follows: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) 
disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) 
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied 
on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.82 
 
Similar safeguards are reflected in Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1.83 
In this case, the record below does not provide a clear indication that Plaches 
voluntarily and intentionally waived his right to a contested hearing.  Although defense 
counsel stated on the record, and in front of Plaches, that “[Plaches] is in agreement to 
admit police contact,” as explained above, police contact, in and of itself, was not a 
violation of Plaches’ probation.   
Rather, the record suggests that Plaches did not understand that admitting to police 
contact was considered by the court to be the equivalent to admitting to a violation of 
probation because he repeatedly stated that the police contact did not result in new 
 
81 See Perry v. State, 741 A.2d 359, 363 (Del. 1999).     
82 Id. at 363. 
83 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32.1 (setting forth the process a person should be afforded when 
there is a revocation of partial confinement or probation).  
 
 
 
24 
 
charges.84  Plaches did ask that he be sentenced to time served with no probation.85  
Although we could assume that Plaches, having violated probation several times before, 
should have understood that defense counsel’s admission on the record, coupled with the 
request to be heard regarding sentencing, could be considered a waiver of his contested 
hearing, affirming the court below based on this assumption would require us to speculate 
as to what Plaches may or may not have understood during the February 24, 2020 hearing.  
We decline to do so.  Instead, we remand for an evidentiary hearing so that the Superior 
Court can address these matters and state its findings on the record.   
Finally, the State asks us to find, alternatively, that Plaches violated the other 
conditions (Five and Thirteen) of his probation.  However, the Superior Court made no 
findings of violations of these conditions, and they are not properly the subject of this 
appeal.   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED and 
REMANDED for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
84 A71 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g) (Plaches: “What I would like to bring out to Your Honor, I was 
violated for police contact that did not result in new charges whatsoever.”).  A72 (Feb. 24, 2020 
Hr’g) (Plaches: “But what I’d like to get to, [Y]our Honor, is the police contact I did have, I did 
report like I was supposed to as of --you know, the police report . . ..  It does say I had police 
contact.”).  A72–73 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g) (Plaches: “I admit to police contact, but it was, like, I 
consider the contact, like, it was a positive not a negative where I was questioned and put against 
the car and had my ID out.”).  A76 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g) (Plaches: “Yes, I had police contact.  Did 
I get in trouble for it?  No, sir.  I did report it within my 72-hour allotted time.  And, [Y]our Honor, 
I’m asking for -- you know, nine years, it don’t count for nine years.”). 
85 A75 (Feb. 24, 2020 Hr’g) (Plaches: “With all of this information I presented to you, [Y]our 
Honor, I’m asking just to have time served with no probation to follow so I can leave the state and 
go back to my family in upstate New York.”).   
 
 
 
25 
 
VAUGHN, Justice, dissenting: 
 
I would find that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion, or otherwise 
err, by finding that the defendant violated condition two of his probation, which 
required him to report police contact.  I believe the record supports a conclusion that 
the Superior Court found that the defendant admitted a violation of that condition.86 
 
Every Level III probationer receives 13 standard conditions of supervision.87  
There are additional conditions for sex offenders.  In many cases, special conditions 
specific to the individual probationer are added.   At least a general awareness that 
standard conditions of supervision exist becomes a part of the working, common 
knowledge of any experienced judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney.  The 
probationer, of course, is expected to be aware of each condition of supervision to 
which he is subject.  Condition two of the standard conditions, the police contact 
provision, requires the probationer to “report any new arrest, conviction, or police 
contact within 72 hours to your Supervising Officer.”88  A violation is the failure to 
report the police contact, not the mere fact of police contact.  There are many reasons 
a probationer may have police contact.  The probationer may be a victim of a crime 
that is reported to the police.  The probationer may be a witness to a crime committed 
 
86 When an issue is first raised on appeal, this Court normally reviews for plain error.  Since I 
don’t believe the trial judge committed any error, the standard of review is not an issue for me. 
87 See SENTAC Benchbook 2021-22 at 134. 
88 Id. 
 
 
 
26 
 
by another, and the police may interview the probationer in connection with that 
crime.  No probation officer would contend that police contact, by itself, without 
more, is a violation of probation.  But even innocent police contact must be reported, 
and failure to report that contact violates condition two. 
 
The condition two, five, and 13 allegations against the defendant were stated 
in the Administrative Warrant as follows: 
Condition # : 2 You must report any new arrest, 
conviction, or police contact within 72 hours to your 
supervising officer. 
 
On January 6, 2020, Mr. Plaches reported police contact 
due to a family dispute between his fiance and her sister.  
Further investigation revealed this police contact never 
occurred. 
 
Condition # : 5  You must report any changes of 
residence and/or employment within 72 hours to your 
supervising officer. 
 
On January 3, 2020, Mr. Plaches contacted the probation 
and parole office and advised that he needed to move from 
his residence due to children being present.  He advised 
that he would be staying in a local hotel.  On January 5, 
2020, Mr. Plaches again contacted the probation and 
parole office and advised that he still could not return to 
his reported residence due to children being present in his 
home.  He relocated to another local hotel.  On January 8, 
2020, it was learned that there were no children present to 
his report residence.  Mr. Plaches lied to probation and 
parole in order to stay outside of reported residence with 
his fiance.  Given that there were not children present at 
his reported residence, Mr. Plaches would not have had 
permission to leave his residence.  Therefore, Mr. Plaches 
relocated without proper probation and parole permission. 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
Condition # : 13 You must abide by a curfew 
established by your supervising officer.   
 
On January 3, 2020, Mr. Plaches contacted the probation 
and parole office and advised that he needed to move from 
his residence due to children being present.  He advised he 
would be staying at a local hotel.  On January 5, 2020, Mr. 
Plaches again contacted the probation and parole office 
and advised that he still could not return to his reported 
residence due to children being present in his home.  He 
relocated to another local hotel.  On January 8, 2020, it 
was learned that there were no children present to his 
report residence.  Mr. Plaches lied to probation and parole 
in order to stay outside of reported residence with his 
fiance.  Given that there were not children present at his 
reported residence, Mr. Plaches would not have had 
permission to leave his residence.  Therefore, he was not 
at his reported residence during his 10pm-6am curfew 
from January 3 until January 7.89  
 
In the Violation Report, the condition two allegation was stated more fully as 
follows: 
You must report any new arrest, conviction, or police 
contact within 72 hours to your supervising officer. 
 
On January 6, 2020, during an office visit, Mr. Plaches 
reported having police contact.  He reported that Felton 
Police Department responded to his reported residence on 
January 3, 2020 due to a domestic call involving his fiance 
and her sister and that he was not involved.  Felton Police 
Department complaint explains the call was in fact Mr. 
Plaches’ fiance requesting police escort/assistance in 
leaving the residence due to Mr. Plaches.90 
 
89 App. to Opening Br. at A26.  The defendant was not permitted to have contact with children 
because he was a sex offender. 
90 Id. at A28. 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
Officer Vorous never argued that the defendant violated his probation simply 
by having police contact.  Her theory was that the obligation to report police contact 
carried with it an obligation to report police contact truthfully, that is, to report the 
police contact that actually occurred.  The defendant reported his January 3 police 
contact, but reported that it involved a dispute between his girlfriend and her sister 
to which he was, in essence, an innocent bystander.  Officer Vorous received 
information through the Felton Police Department report that led her to believe the 
defendant was the target of the January 3 contact and the contact involved a potential 
domestic violence situation between the defendant and his girlfriend.  Her argument 
was that he failed to report the specific police contact that actually occurred.   
 
At the January 24 violation of probation hearing, Officer Vorous explained 
her theory of the alleged condition two violation to the Superior Court in the 
defendant’s presence: 
He did report police contact.  However, that is not the 
police contact that occurred.  The police contact that 
occurred was the girlfriend was calling Felton police, 
come get me out of this house because I don’t want to have 
to defend myself.  That is not what was related to 
probation.91 
 
 
The judge asked the defendant whether he disputed the alleged condition two 
violation, and he responded, “Well, I’m disputing the police contact of events, yes 
 
91 Id. at A41. 
 
 
 
29 
 
sir.”92  Most of the back and forth at the January 24 hearing involved conditions five 
and 13.  To his credit, the judge scheduled the matter for a hearing away from the 
distractions of a VOP calendar to a hearing date of its own, at which he could give 
the defendant’s case his full time and attention.  This resulted in the second hearing 
on February 24.   
 
That brings us to defense counsel’s statement at the very beginning of the 
February 24 hearing that “he is in agreement to admit police contact, and we would 
like to be heard regarding sentencing after the State makes its recommendation.”93   
I draw two inferences from defense counsel’s statement.  The first is that the 
defendant and his attorney had decided they did not want to litigate the merits of the 
alleged violations.  The second is that they settled on condition two as the alleged 
violation they wanted to admit.   
 
The Superior Court then asked the prosecutor for her sentencing 
recommendation.  She proceeded to make her sentencing comments.  She reported 
that she had witnesses present who would testify concerning the alleged violations 
of conditions five and 13.  The State did not do anything to impede the defendant 
from having a hearing on the merits of the alleged violations if the defendant had 
wanted to have one. 
 
92 Id. at A42. 
93 Id. at A65. 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
Defense counsel then proceeded with her sentencing comments.  It appears 
from those comments that defense counsel seems to have understood the condition 
two allegation well enough.  She said, “when I first reviewed this violation, I actually 
received it from another attorney in the office.”94  From this, an inference can be 
drawn that she reviewed and was aware of the alleged condition two violation.  She 
also stated, “At that time, my review of the allegations is that unlike a lot of 
probationers, Mr. Plaches was contacting his probation officer.  He’s not absconding 
from probation.  The allegation is based on the probation officer not believing what 
he is saying.”95  From this, it appears that defense counsel understood that the alleged 
violation of condition two was not merely that the defendant had police contact, but 
that he falsely represented the nature of the police contact and had not reported the 
police contact that actually occurred.  This was the theory that Officer Vorous 
consistently explained.  The defense attorney also commented with respect to 
conditions five and 13 that “if we were to have a hearing today, a lot of this violation 
comes down to whether or not Mr. Plaches was truthful in his information to 
Probation that there were grandkids visiting the residence he was staying at.”96  
 
94 Id. at A68. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at A70. 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
When the defendant made his sentencing comments, he began with police 
contact: 
THE DEFENDANT:  Good morning, your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Good morning. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  James Plaches.  Your Honor, yes, 
there was police contact.  There was a domestic dispute, 
no hands-on or nothing like that, between my fiance and I 
at the time.  We are just friends now as we resituated our 
situation and said we want to be friends. 
 
What I would like to bring out to your Honor, I was 
violated for police contact that did not result in new 
charges whatsoever.  The officer just told me to leave her 
be and just stay away, and he made me pour the bottle of 
99 percent alcohol out in the driveway the night he was 
disputed here.  That’s why we were arguing, because she 
was drinking and we were arguing about my family 
coming to see my mother. 97 
 
After additional comments, the Superior Court interrupted: 
 
THE COURT:  But you’re admitting to police contact? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I admit to police contact, but it was, 
like, I consider the contact, like, it was positive, not a 
negative where I was questioned and put against the car 
and had my ID out.98 
 
 
When the defendant reported the January 3 police contact on January 6, he 
reported that it occurred due to a dispute between his girlfriend and her sister and he 
 
97 Id. at A71. 
98 Id. at A72-A73. 
 
 
 
32 
 
was uninvolved.  In his first sentencing comments, the defendant admitted that the 
January 3 police contact did not occur the way he reported it.  He admitted that it 
was not the result of a dispute between his girlfriend and her sister to which he was 
an innocent bystander.  He acknowledged that it was the result of a domestic dispute 
between his girlfriend and him, as Officer Vorous had alleged.  I would find that the 
initial sentencing comments from the defendant are an admission that he violated the 
police contact condition as alleged by Officer Vorous.  The fact that he had not been 
arrested on that occasion and he considered the contact “positive”99 were offered as 
mitigation.   
 
After defense counsel and the defendant made their comments, the judge 
asked the prosecutor whether she wished to respond to anything the defendant had 
said.  She asked the court to hear from Officer Vorous, who repeated that “yes, he 
did report police contact to me.  That is true.  However, the police contact he reported 
was not the police contact that happened.”100   
 
The prosecutor then readdressed the court, stating that “I think the main issue 
here is that he did report the police contact, but the police contact that he reported to 
his probation officer was not what really happened; that he lied about the police 
 
99 Id. at A72. 
100 Id. at A78. 
 
 
 
33 
 
contact.”101  These additional comments by Officer Vorous and the prosecutor drew 
no request from the defendant or his attorney to readdress the Court.   
 
I think the defendant’s theory of this case, first asserted on appeal, that he and 
his attorney intended to admit only that he had police contact and he was wrongly 
found to have violated his probation for merely having police contact, is not credible.  
The alleged violation—that he gave his probation officer a false account of police 
contact—was clearly stated in the Violation Report.  The allegation was stated in 
open court in the defendant’s presence by Officer Vorous at both the January 24 and 
February 24 hearings.  The defense attorney’s sentencing comments at the February 
24 hearing make it clear that she understood the allegation.   
I also think the implication in the defendant’s theory that the defense attorney 
and the Court both thought that merely having police contact alone is a violation of 
probation is not credible.  I think the choice of words used by the defense attorney 
and the Court, that the defendant “admit[ted] police contact,”102 was just a short-
hand method of referring to the violation as alleged.  It would make no sense for 
defense counsel to couple the statement that “he is in agreement to admit police 
contact”103 with the statement that they would like to be heard regarding sentencing 
 
101 Id. at A79. 
102 Id. at A65, A72. 
103 Id.  
 
 
 
34 
 
if she did not mean that the defendant admitted a violation of condition two, failure 
to report police contact as alleged by Officer Vorous.  It seems to me that statements 
made by the defendant when he addressed the court, discussed above, bear this out.  
I think the record is clear enough that the judge relied on admissions by defense 
counsel and the defendant that he violated condition two as alleged by Officer 
Vorous.  I do not think a remand is necessary.  I would affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court.