Case Title: Tharp v. PSRB

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51046

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  April 14, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
RODERICK DOLAN THARP,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,
Respondent on Review.
(PSRB 99-1640; CA A115750; SC S51046)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 5, 2005.
Harris S. Matarazzo, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the brief for petitioner on review. 
Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is vacated, and the case
is remanded to the board for further proceedings.
*Judicial Review from the Psychiatric Security Review Board. 188 Or App 763, 72 P3d 1011 (2003).
BALMER, J.
This case requires us to determine whether, for
purposes of ORS 161.295, substance dependency is a "mental
disease or defect," or, instead, is a "personality disorder." 
Petitioner, who had been placed under the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board (board) and committed to the
state hospital, requested discharge on the ground that he no
longer was affected by a mental disease or defect.  The board
denied his request, concluding that petitioner was affected by a
mental disease or defect that, when active, rendered him a
substantial danger to others.  Based on that conclusion, the
board ordered that petitioner remain under the board's
jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Tharp v.
PSRB, 188 Or App 763, 72 P3d 1011
(2003).  We allowed review and now reverse.
We review the background of this case and the
proceedings below in some detail because that discussion helps
frame the specific legal question we decide.  Petitioner's
confinement stems from his indictment for a 1999 robbery.  Two
mental health experts diagnosed petitioner as suffering from
paranoid thought disorder and schizophrenia at the time that he
had engaged in the criminal conduct.  Pursuant to a stipulated
judgment, the trial court found petitioner guilty except for
insanity, based on mental disease or defect.  See ORS 161.295(1)
("A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of a
mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal
conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the
conduct to the requirements of law.")  The trial court also
determined that, but for the judgment of guilty except for
insanity, petitioner would have been convicted of robbery and
that petitioner presented a substantial danger to others
requiring commitment to a state mental hospital.  See ORS 161.325
and 161.327 (describing procedures and standards for trial court
to determine whether person judged guilty except for insanity
should be committed to state hospital and placed under board's
jurisdiction).  The trial court ordered petitioner placed under
the board's jurisdiction for a maximum of 20 years.  ORS
161.327(1).
ORS 161.341(4) authorizes a person placed under the
board's jurisdiction and committed to a state hospital, as
petitioner was, to apply to the board for discharge on the ground
that "the person is no longer affected by mental disease or
defect." (1)  ORS 161.346 establishes the procedures for a
hearing on an application for discharge, and ORS 161.351
provides, in part, that, if the board finds that the person is no
longer affected by mental disease or defect, then the person
shall be discharged.  
In 2001, petitioner requested discharge pursuant to ORS
161.341(4), arguing that he no longer was affected by a mental
disease or defect.  At petitioner's release hearing, the parties
introduced exhibits from petitioner's 1999 criminal case,
including evaluations from that case by Dr. Cooley (on behalf of
petitioner) and Dr. Colistro (on behalf of the state).  Those
evaluations described petitioner, at the time that he engaged in
the criminal conduct and at the time of the hearing in his
criminal case, as suffering from paranoid thought disorder,
schizophrenia, and substance dependency.  
The parties also introduced evidence regarding
petitioner's conduct at the state hospital following his
commitment and his mental condition at the time of the release
hearing, including hospital tests and evaluations, information
regarding petitioner's participation in drug and alcohol programs
at the hospital, and the testimony of two experts, Dr. Ruiz-Martinez and Dr. Schwartz, petitioner's treating psychiatrist and
treating psychologist, respectively, at the state hospital.  Dr.
Ruiz-Martinez testified that petitioner "definitely doesn't have
[a] mental illness," that he displayed no signs or symptoms of
paranoid thought disorder or schizophrenia, and that he was not
being prescribed any medication for any mental disease or defect. 
Based on petitioner's medical history, she agreed with a
diagnosis contained in petitioner's state hospital file that
petitioner had a "marijuana dependency" and also suffered from
alcohol abuse and methamphetamine abuse.  She also agreed that
"this kid belongs [in] prison, he doesn't have [a] mental
illness, and * * * he [is] doing nothing here."  Dr. Schwartz
testified that petitioner was not suffering from a mental
illness.  Dr. Schwartz's written psychological evaluation found
that petitioner had a substance dependency, but that it was in
remission due to petitioner's inability to obtain alcohol or
illegal drugs at the state hospital. 
At the hearing, petitioner argued that he no longer was
affected by a mental disease or defect because his only current
diagnosis was marijuana dependency, which is a personality
disorder that is excluded from the definition of mental disease
or defect by ORS 161.295(2).  The state argued that petitioner
should not be discharged because he had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he no longer was affected by a
mental disease or defect.
Following the hearing, the board issued an order
denying petitioner's request for discharge and continuing his
commitment.  The board's findings of fact included the following:
"[Petitioner] is affected by a mental disease or
defect as demonstrated by the underlying facts shown by
the evidence, including the expert testimony of Luvy
Ruiz-Martinez, M.D., at the hearing, as well as the
information contained in Exhibits 20, 18, 15, 14, 10,
and 9.
* * * * *
"[Petitioner] did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence his fitness for discharge as required by
the standards of ORS 161.351."
The board's conclusions of law included the following:
"[Petitioner], being affected by a mental disease
or defect which, when active, renders him a substantial
danger to others, is under the jurisdiction of the
[board.]"
The board also found that petitioner was an appropriate subject
for conditional release but that, because adequate treatment
resources were not available in the community, he could not be
released at that time.  As a result, the board continued
petitioner's commitment to the state hospital until such time as
those resources might become available.
On judicial review in the Court of Appeals, petitioner
argued that the board erred in finding that he had a "mental
disease or defect" because the only expert testimony regarding
petitioner's mental condition at the time of the release hearing
-- the testimony of Dr. Ruiz-Martinez and Dr. Schwartz -- was to
the effect that petitioner had no mental disease or defect, but
that he suffered from substance dependency.  Petitioner asserted
that substance dependency is not a mental disease or defect but,
rather, is a "personality disorder" that the legislature, in ORS
161.295(2), expressly excluded from the definition of mental
disease or defect.  
The board's response was twofold.  First, the board
argued that, regardless of whether substance dependency is a
personality disorder or a mental disease or defect, petitioner
had the burden of proving that he no longer was affected by a
mental disease or defect.  Accordingly, the board asserted that,
as this court held in Einstein v. PSRB, 330 Or 121, 128, 998 P2d
1051 (2000), the only issue on review was whether a reasonable
person, based on the evidence before the board, could infer that
the petitioner presently suffers from a mental disease or defect. 
The board then argued that the record at the release hearing,
including the 1999 evaluations by Dr. Cooley and Dr. Colistro
that petitioner was affected by a mental disease or defect,
provided substantial evidence to support the board's findings and
conclusions.  Second, the board disagreed with petitioner's legal
argument regarding substance dependency.  It argued that
petitioner's diagnosis of substance dependency constituted a
mental disease or defect and not a "personality disorder," as
those terms are used in ORS 161.295.  For that reason, the board
claimed, it properly could base its determination that petitioner
continued to be affected by a mental disease or defect on the
testimony regarding his substance dependency.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the board's order, citing
two cases, Rios v. PSRB, 176 Or App 252, 30 P3d 1227 (2001), rev
dismissed, 335 Or 505 (2003); and Hanson v. PSRB, 156 Or App 198,
965 P2d 1051 (1998), rev'd and rem'd on other grounds, 331 Or
626, 19 P3d 350 (2001), in which that court had concluded that
substance dependency constitutes a mental disease or
defect. (2)   
On review, the parties reiterate their arguments in the
Court of Appeals.  We first consider the board's argument that,
regardless of whether substance dependency is a "mental disease
or defect" or, instead, is a "personality disorder," substantial
evidence in the record supported its order and we therefore
should affirm.  The board is correct that the record contains the
1999 evaluations that diagnosed petitioner as being affected by
paranoid thought disorder and schizophrenia, as well as expert
testimony at the hearing that he no longer was affected by those
mental illnesses (if he ever was) or by any other mental disease
or defect.  Ordinarily, that record might, if accepted by the
board, provide substantial evidence to support an inferential
determination by the board that petitioner continued to be
affected by the mental illnesses that had been diagnosed as
recently as two years earlier.  
Here, however, we are unable to determine whether the
board's finding that petitioner is affected by a mental disease
or defect was based on its inference, from petitioner's 1999
diagnoses, that petitioner continues to suffer from paranoid
thought disorder and schizophrenia or, instead, on evidence that,
although he no longer is affected by those mental illnesses, he
is affected by the mental disease or defect of substance
dependency.  The board's order states that its finding that
petitioner is affected by a mental disease or defect was based on
the expert testimony of Dr. Ruiz-Martinez and several mental
health evaluations that are part of the hearing record.  Most of
those evaluations, like Dr. Ruiz-Martinez's testimony, concluded
that petitioner was affected by only substance dependency. 
However, the board's order also states that the board relied on
Dr. Colistro's 1999 evaluation, which concluded that petitioner
suffered from "schizophrenia, paranoid type," as well as
"polysubstance dependency/abuse."  Because, as we explain below,
we conclude that substance dependency is a "personality disorder"
and thus is not a "mental disease or defect" within the meaning
of ORS 161.295(1), and because the board's order may have been
based on a contrary and erroneous interpretation of that statute,
we cannot affirm the board's order on the first ground it
asserts.  We would require further proceedings before the board,
consistent with this opinion, and a new board order before we
would have a record and order adequate to permit the substantial
evidence review that the board urges.
We now turn to the parties' dispute as to whether
petitioner's admitted substance dependency is a "personality
disorder" that the legislature has excluded from the definition
of "mental disease or defect."  Petitioner argues that it is. 
The board disagrees and asserts that substance dependency
qualifies as a mental disease or defect under ORS
161.295(1). (3)  We therefore must interpret and apply the
pertinent statutes, which we do according to the principles set
out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12,
859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We begin with a review of the relevant
statutes.
We first observe that, as noted previously, this case
arises out of a board hearing under ORS 161.341(4) in which
petitioner sought to prove that he was "no longer affected by
mental disease or defect."  We therefore must interpret the 
phrase "mental disease or defect" as it is used in that statute. 
When the trial court in 1999 found petitioner guilty except for
insanity by reason of "mental disease or defect" and placed him
under the jurisdiction of the board, however, it did so under ORS
161.295, ORS 161.319, and ORS 161.325.  An initial interpretive
question then is whether the phrase "mental disease or defect"
has the same meaning under both sets of statutes -- those that
relate to trial court orders regarding judgments of "guilty
except for insanity" and those that relate to board proceedings
by persons seeking discharge.  The parties appear to assume that
the phrase "mental disease or defect" has the same meaning in
both sets of statutes.  An examination of the statutes supports
that conclusion.  
The procedures for determining when a person may be
found not responsible for criminal conduct because of mental
disease or defect and those for obtaining release from a state
hospital by proving the absence of a mental disease or defect
were part of the legislature's 1971 revision of the criminal
code.  Although those statutes have been amended a number of
times, the structure of the 1971 revision continues in the
present statutes.  See generally Or Laws 1971, ch 743, §§ 36-53
(setting out standards for lack of responsibility for criminal
conduct resulting from "mental disease or defect" and procedures
for asserting defense, commitment to state hospital, and
discharge from hospital).  The 1971 law expressed, in a coherent
sequence of specific provisions, the policy that a person is "not
responsible" for criminal conduct if the person engages in
criminal conduct but, because of a mental disease or defect,
lacks the capacity to appreciate the criminality of the conduct
or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.  Id. at §
36.  The law then described the required notice of a defendant's
intent to use that defense, the burden of proof, and other
matters related to proceedings in a criminal trial in which the
defendant raises that defense.  Id. at §§ 38-42.  The law next
set out the findings that the trial court, following a
determination that a person was not responsible for criminal
conduct, was required to make respecting commitment to the state
hospital, release under supervision, or discharge.  Id. at §§ 43-47.  Finally, the law established the procedures and standards
under which a person who had been committed to the state hospital
could seek to be discharged by proving that he or she no longer
was affected by a mental disease or defect.  Id. at §§ 47(3), 49. 
The legislature has amended the statutes relating to
responsibility for criminal conduct several times, most notably
in 1983, when it adopted the phrase "guilty except for insanity"
in place of the 1971 law's statement that such a person was "not
responsible" for otherwise criminal conduct.  See Or Laws 1983,
ch 800, § 1 (amending ORS 161.295 to substitute "guilty except
for insanity" for "not responsible for criminal conduct at the
time of such conduct"). (4)  As relevant here, however, neither
the 1983 changes or any other amendments to the law initially
enacted in 1971 altered the basic structure of the provisions
regarding "mental disease or defect" outlined above.  The phrase
"mental disease or defect" continues to denote a defense, under
some circumstances, in a criminal proceeding, and the absence of
a "mental disease or defect" continues to be a means by which a
person who has been committed involuntarily to the state hospital
may seek discharge.  Although many other aspects of those
statutes have changed since 1971, the parallel use of the phrase
"mental disease or defect" has remained the same.
When the legislature uses the identical phrase in
related statutory provisions that were enacted as the part of the
same law, we interpret the phrase to have the same meaning in
both sections.  PGE, 317 Or at 611 (stating principle).  Neither
party has offered any argument that the phrase "mental disease or
defect" has any different meaning in ORS 161.341(4), the specific
statute at issue here, than it does in ORS 161.295, the statute
recognizing the guilty except for insanity defense, and we are
aware of none.  For those reasons, we conclude that the phrase
"mental disease or defect" in ORS 161.341(4) has the same meaning
as it does in ORS 161.295, and we proceed to consider that
meaning by looking at the more detailed context offered by ORS
161.295, including the legislature's decision to specifically
exclude "personality disorders" from that definition.  
ORS 161.295 provides, in part:
"(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as
a result of mental disease or defect at the time of
engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to
the requirements of law.
"(2) * * * [T]he terms 'mental disease or defect'
do not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor
do they include any abnormality constituting solely a
personality disorder."
As this court has observed, the legislature has not
provided a definition of the term "mental disease or defect,"
other than to state that it does not include a "personality
disorder."  See Hanson v. PSRB, 331 Or 626, 630, 19 P3d 350
(2001) (so stating).  Moreover, the terms "mental disease or
defect" and "personality disorder," although they consist of
common individual words, are not terms "of common usage" that we
must interpret according to their "plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning" at the initial level of our PGE analysis, and it would
be futile to treat them as such.  Rather, those phrases are terms
of art that are used in the context of professional disciplines
such as psychiatry and psychology, although here, of course,
their application has specific legal consequences.  See Mueller
v. PSRB, 325 Or 332, 339, 937 P2d 1028 (1997) ("personality
disorder" is term of art). 
The board asserts that this court resolved the meaning
and application of ORS 161.295 in Mueller.  According to the
board, this court in Mueller ascertained that the legislature
intended the phrase "personality disorder," for all purposes, to
have the meaning set out in the third edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), published
in 1980. (5)  The board, however, exaggerates the significance
of Mueller.  Mueller answered the narrow question whether an
"organic personality syndrome" -- more properly labeled, as this
court noted in Mueller, an "organic personality disorder" -- was
(1) a mental disease or defect; or (2) a personality disorder as
described in ORS 161.295(2) and OAR 859-10-0005(4).  Relying on
the DSM-III, the court concluded that organic personality
syndrome was a mental disease or defect rather than a personality
disorder.  325 Or at 340-42.  
The analysis in Mueller does not answer the question of
what the legislature intended to include within the term
"personality disorder" when it enacted ORS 161.295(2).  As noted,
this court in Mueller observed that the DSM-III offered guidance
in evaluating the meaning of "personality disorder," which it
described as a term of art.  Id. at 339.  The court, however, did
not conclude that the legislature intended the DSM-III to control
the meaning of "personality disorder" in ORS 161.295 and did not
investigate the legislative history of ORS 161.295.  Instead, the
court shifted its focus to former OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (now
OAR 859-010-0005(4) and (5)), which defined "mental disease" and
"mental defect" by referencing the DSM-III.  The court accepted
that rule's specific incorporation of the DSM-III definitions as
dispositive of the legal question before the court.  The court
concluded, "OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987) incorporated the
DSM-III by reference to define mental disease and mental defect. 
The board's rules thus contemplate that the DSM-III is the
appropriate reference.  We turn, then, to that document."  325 Or
at 340 (citation omitted).  In sum, Mueller never inquired into
the legislature's intent in adopting ORS 161.295, and it relied
on a rule that specifically referenced the DSM-III rather than
relying on the statute.  Thus, although Mueller properly
identified the DSM-III as an important source for interpreting
statutory terms related to mental illness, nothing in that case
suggests that the term "personality disorder" is to be defined as
it is in the DSM-III.  Nor does the case suggest which part of
DSM-III controls when different interpretations of that source
are plausible.
As noted, the legislature has not defined the terms
"mental disease" and "mental defect."  The legislature has,
however, provided some guidance as to the meaning of those terms. 
The 1971 criminal code revision excluded from those terms "an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct," 1971 Or Laws, ch 743, § 36(2), and the 1983
amendment excluded "any abnormality constituting solely a
personality disorder."  1983 Or Laws, ch 800, § 1.  This much is
clear:  whatever "mental disease or defect" means, it does not
include an abnormality that constitutes solely a "personality
disorder."  
Although our precedents do not require us to rely on
the DSM, the parties both begin their arguments concerning the
meaning of "personality disorder" with the definition of that
term in the DSM-III.  According to that definition, "personality
disorder" refers to a condition that typically manifests itself
no later than adolescence, continues throughout most of a
person's adult life, and involves "enduring patterns of
perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and
onself" that "are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either
significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or
subjective distress."  DSM-III at 305.  Petitioner argues that
the legislature intended the term "personality disorder" to
include substance dependency and, therefore, that substance
dependency is excluded from the definition of "mental disease or
defect."  The board responds that, in the DSM-III, substance
disorders, including drug and alcohol dependence, are not
included in the section on personality disorders, but are
separately coded in Axis I, which deals with clinical disorders.
Both petitioner's and the board's interpretations of
"personality disorder" are plausible interpretations of that term
as used in ORS 161.295(2).  Looking only to the statutory text,
it is possible to conclude, as does petitioner, that the
legislature deemed substance dependency to be the kind of
"enduring pattern" of relating to one's environment that is
"inflexible and maladaptive" and causes impairment in
functioning, and, therefore, is a "personality disorder" and not
a "mental disease or defect."  Alternatively, the board's view
that "personality disorder" does not include substance dependence
because the DSM-III deals with clinical disorders, such as
alcohol and drug dependency, in a different section than its
discussion of personality disorders, also is plausible.  Because
both of those proposed interpretations of the statutory text are
plausible, we conclude that the term "personality disorder," as
used in ORS 161.295(2), is ambiguous, and we turn to legislative
history to determine which among the competing interpretations
the legislature intended.  See Owens v. MVD, 319 Or 259, 268, 875
P2d 463 (1994).
In a case that the Court of Appeals decided after its
decision in this case, that court, in an opinion by Judge Landau,
engaged in a detailed review of the legislative history leading
to the legislature's decision to exclude personality disorders
from the definition of mental disease or defect in ORS 161.295. 
See Beiswenger v. PSRB, 192 Or App 38, 48-51, 84 P3d 180 (2004),
rev dismissed, 337 Or 669 (2004).  We find the court's discussion
of that legislative history pertinent here and therefore set it
out at length:
"ORS 161.295 originated as House Bill (HB) 2075
during the 1983 legislative session.  The bill was the
product of an interim legislative committee that
focused on public concerns with the so-called 'insanity
defense' in criminal cases.  At the first of the many
hearings on the bill, the witnesses who testified in
support urged that the determinative term -- 'mental
disease or defect' -- not be defined solely in
psychiatric terms, but rather in legal or
multidisciplinary terms.  The Executive Director of
[the board], for example, testified that the American
Psychiatric Association had released a report on the
'insanity defense' in which it recommended that the
'decision to release' a person under such a scheme 'not
be made solely by psychiatrists or solely on the basis
of psychiatric testimony regarding the person's mental
condition.'  Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary, HB
2075, Apr 6, 1983, 2 (statement of Felicia Gniewosz). 
Similarly, a professor of psychiatry at Oregon Health
Sciences University (OHSU) submitted written testimony
stating that he 'view[ed] the insanity defense as a
legal issue.  Psychiatrists and physicians did not
invent the insanity defense.  It came from the law and
serves legal ends.'  Minutes, House Committee on
Judiciary, HB 2075, Apr 27, 1983, Ex E (statement of
Professor Joseph D. Bloom, M.D.).
"The original version of the bill did not exclude
'personality disorders' from the 'mental disease[s] or
defect[s]' that would be subject to a defense of guilty
except for insanity.  At an early hearing on the bill,
the Executive Director of [the board] suggested that
the bill should address that issue:
'The legislature should take a position to either
include or exclude "personality disorders" from
the definition [of "mental disease or defect"]. 
It should be noted that personality disorders
include the following diagnoses:  antisocial,
inadequate, passive-aggressive, sexual conduct
disorders, drug dependent, alcohol dependent and
paranoid.'
"Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, Apr
27, 1983, Ex D (statement of Felicia Gniewosz).
"At the same hearing, the chair of [the board]
testified that the board supported the exclusion of
'personality disorders' from the definition of 'mental
disease or defect.'  She explained to the House
Judiciary Committee that 'personality disorders'
include child molestation, other sex offenses, and
persons 'suffering from a drug-induced syndrome.'  Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, Apr
27, 1983, Tape 270, Side A (statement of Judy Snyder). 
She added as a further example of a 'personality
disorder':
'[P]eople who have an alcohol problem and who
maybe stabbed someone while they were in an
alcoholic stupor and they're put under our
jurisdiction.  * * *  The problem the board
has is that kind of person can be very
dangerous if they drink alcohol but the
doctors will testify that's not a mental
illness, they don't have a mental illness[.]'
"Id. at Tape 269, Side B.
"The subject of defining the conditions that
constitute a 'personality disorder' arose again at a
later hearing.  During the course of further testimony
from the Executive Director of [the board],
Representative Hill asked whether the distinguishing
characteristic of a 'personality disorder' is the
individual's self control.  The Executive Director
replied that some individuals can control their
disorders, while others cannot.  She explained that
'the perfect example would be that one of the
personality disorders would be somebody that's alcohol
or drug dependent.'  Tape Recording, House Committee on
Judiciary, HB 2075, May 13, 1983, Tape 324, Side A
(statement of Felicia Gniewosz).
"It was at that point that the current wording of
the statute was first proposed.  Representative
Courtney asked Jeffrey Rogers, the chair of the
legislative interim task force that had drafted the
bill, to propose wording that would accomplish the
exclusion of 'personality disorders' from the statutory
definition of 'mental disease or defect.'  Rogers
responded with the wording that is, in substance, the
current law.  The wording was adopted by the House
Judiciary Committee without objection.  Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, May 13, 1983,
Tape 324, Side A.
"The House Judiciary Committee ultimately approved
the bill, including the exclusion for 'personality
disorders.'  Interestingly, in the staff measure
analysis prepared for the benefit of the committee
members, the effect of the bill was summarized in the
following terms:
'The bill as amended further limits the
scope of mental diseases or defects for which
a person may be found, under present law,
"not responsible."  Existing law excludes
abnormalities manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. 
The bill would exclude, in addition, any
abnormality which constitutes solely a
personality disorder, which includes such
diagnoses as sexual conduct disorders, drug
dependent and alcohol dependent.'
"Staff Measure Analysis, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2075 (1983).
"The bill moved to the floor of the House, where
the floor manager, Representative Courtney, explained
that it contained a 'personality exclusion' that
accomplished a narrowing of the definition of 'mental
disease or defect.'  Quoting from a letter from [the
board's] Executive Director to the House Judiciary
Committee, he explained:
'Right now if a person has what is
considered a personality disorder, by that I
mean what they call "anti-social, inadequate, 
passive-aggressive, sexual conduct disorders,
drug dependent, alcohol dependent, or
paranoid," if they fit into that personality
disorder category they're able to claim that
they have a mental disease or defect.  We now
no longer, with this piece of legislation,
will allow an individual to say that I have a
mental disease or defect because I have a
personality disorder.'
"House Floor Debate, HB 2075, June 16, 1983, Reel 19,
Track I (Rep Peter Courtney).
"After passage by the House, the bill [proceeded
to the Senate, where it] was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.  At the first hearing on the bill,
Representative Courtney introduced it to the committee
and explained that it 'would remove personality
disorders as a category that could be relied on for use
of the insanity plea.'  Tape Recording, Senate
Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, June 29, 1983, Tape
234, Side A (Rep Peter Courtney).  A 'personality
disorder,' he explained, included such conditions as
'anti-social, inadequate, passive-aggressive, sexual
conduct disorders, drug dependent, alcohol dependent,
paranoid, etc.'  Id.
"Rogers also testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.  He explained the findings of a recently
completed study that he and two professors from OHSU
had completed concerning the insanity defense in
Oregon.  The report explicitly categorized alcohol and
drug dependency as 'personality disorders.'  Senate
Judiciary Committee, HB 2075, June 29, 1983, Unmarked
Exhibit ('Oregon's New Insanity Defense System:  A
Review of the First Five Years--1978-1982').
"The Senate Judiciary Committee, concerned that
the concept of 'personality disorder' was too difficult
to define, deleted the exclusion from the bill, and the
Senate approved the bill as amended.
"The bill then moved to a conference committee. 
The first topic of discussion was the deletion of the
'personality disorder' exclusion.  Representative
Courtney explained that he was satisfied that the term
was practicable.  He referred to the Rogers insanity
defense study and its list of diagnoses--including,
among other things, drug and alcohol dependency--that
qualified as 'personality disorders.'  Tape Recording,
Conference Committee, HB 2075, July 13, 1983, Tape 550,
Side A. The committee ultimately agreed to restore the
'personality disorder' exclusion.  The staff measure
analysis of the final version of the bill explained
that, as amended, the bill 'would exclude * * * any
abnormality which constitutes solely a personality
disorder, which includes such diagnoses as sexual
conduct disorders, drug dependent and alcohol
dependent.'  Staff Measure Analysis, House Committee,
HB 2075, 1983.  As amended by the conference committee,
the bill was passed by both houses and signed into
law."  
192 Or App at 48-51 (alterations added; omissions and emphasis in
original).
Having considered the legislative history, we now are
satisfied that we can discern the legislature's intent.  The
legislative history shows that the legislature intended to
exclude personality disorders such as drug and alcohol dependency
from the terms "mental disease" and "mental defect" as it used
those terms in ORS 161.295.  
Despite the foregoing evidence of legislative intent,
the board insists that "[t]he legislative history does not
clearly express the legislative intent."  The board observes that
several witnesses testifying before the legislature proposed an
explicit adoption of the DSM and its standards in ORS 161.295. 
The legislature, however, chose not to do that, as ORS 161.295
itself demonstrates.  Cf. Mueller, 325 Or at 339-40 (board's
rules, but not ORS 161.295, incorporate DSM standards).  The
board concedes that its argument is a weak one, however, in light
of the specific references in the legislative record that drug or
alcohol dependency would not be considered a mental disease or
defect and thus a basis for an insanity defense, and we find the
argument unpersuasive for that reason.  The legislative history
satisfies us that the legislature did not intend to incorporate
substance dependency into the definition of "mental disease or
defect" in ORS 161.295.  That established, we need not explore
the question of legislative intent further.  See PGE, 317 Or at
612 (where legislative history clarifies legislative intent,
court does not inquire further).  We hold that substance
dependency is a "personality disorder" as that term is used in
ORS 161.295(2).
As we explained above, we cannot determine from the
board's order in this case whether it based its conclusion that
petitioner continues to suffer from a mental disease or defect on
a finding that petitioner was affected by substance dependency
only or, instead, on a finding that petitioner was affected,
either solely or in part, by a mental disease or defect.  A
decision based solely on the former ground would be legally
incorrect, for the reasons stated above, while a decision based
on the latter ground would be legally correct if it were
supported by substantial evidence in the record.  The board on
remand must clarify which ground it finds to be the correct one
here and, having done so, issue an order accordingly.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the board for further proceedings.
1. The statutes distinguish between "conditional release" from the state hospital and
"discharge," in which the person is released without conditions.  See ORS 161.341(4) (committed
person may apply to board "for an order of discharge or conditional release").  As discussed later
in this opinion, the board here determined that petitioner failed to prove his fitness for discharge
and that, although petitioner would qualify for conditional release, the supervision and treatment
necessary for conditional release were not available.  However, given the board's conclusion that
petitioner continued to be affected by a mental disease or defect and that he should not be
discharged or conditionally released, the distinction between discharge and conditional release
has no effect on the legal issue before us.  Additionally, the term "discharge" sometimes is used
in the statutes to mean discharge from commitment, see, e.g., ORS 161.346(1)(a), and sometimes
to mean discharge from the jurisdiction of the board, see, e.g., ORS 161.351(3).  That difference
may be important in other circumstances, but it does not affect the analysis of this case. 
2. We note that, in a case decided after its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals
overruled its decisions in Rios and Hanson and held that, under ORS 161.295, substance
dependency is a personality disorder and not a mental disease or defect.  Beiswenger v. PSRB,
192 Or App 38, 84 P3d 180, rev dismissed, 337 Or 669 (2004).    
3. The petitioner in Menzl v. PSRB, 325 Or 159, 934 P2d 431 (1997), also argued
that substance abuse is not a mental disease or defect because it is solely a personality disorder
under ORS 161.295(2).  However, in reviewing the board's order, this court held that the board
had erred for a different reason.  The court therefore reversed the board's order without reaching
the issue presented in this case.  Id. at 165; see also Hanson v. PSRB, 331 Or 626, 19 P3d 350
(2001) (similarly vacating a board order without reaching issue of whether alcohol abuse
constituted mental disease or defect).
4. As we discuss in detail below, the 1983 law also added the "personality disorder"
exclusion to the definition of "mental disease or defect."  See Or Laws 1983, ch 800, § 1
(amending ORS 161.295).
5. The DSM-III is a reference work compiled by the American Psychiatric
Association that categorizes mental disorders.  The DSM-III uses five axes for classifying
disorders.  The first two axes are for mental disorders, and the third is for physical disorders and
conditions.  The fourth and fifth axes provide information supplementing the official diagnoses
under the first three axes.  In 1987, the DSM was revised (DSM-III-R), and in 1994, it was
superseded by DSM-IV.