Case Title: MGM GRAND DETROIT LLC V COMMUNITY COALITION FOR EMPOWERMENT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119274

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 30, 2001  
MGM GRAND DETROIT, LLC,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119309  
COMMUNITY COALITION FOR EMPOWERMENT  
INC., and ERNEST JOHNSON,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
v  
JACKIE L. CURRIE, in her capacity as 
CITY CLERK FOR THE CITY OF DETROIT and  
DETROIT CITY COUNCIL,  
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
The issue is whether Detroit Ordinance 35-98 is exempt  
from the power of referendum found in the Detroit Charter.  
On its own motion, this Court voted to grant leave to appeal1  
before a decision by the Court of Appeals.  Having heard oral  
argument, we now find as follows:  
(1) The power of referendum in the Detroit Charter does  
“not extend to the budget or any ordinance for the  
1464 Mich 855 (2001).  
appropriation of money . . . .” Detroit Charter § 12-101.  
(2) Detroit Ordinance 35-98 provides in pertinent part:  
The Three Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand Three 
Hundred 
Thirty-Three 
and 
34/100 
Dollars  
($333,333.34) early advance heretofore paid by the 
developer to the City pursuant to the development 
agreement is hereby appropriated to the temporary 
casino site support and infrastructure improvement 
. . . .  
(3) An appropriation of $333,333.34 is an “appropriation  
of money” and Ordinance 35-98 is “any ordinance.”  
(4) Therefore, the power of referendum in the Detroit  
Charter does not extend to ordinance 35-98.  
Accordingly, consistent with MUCC v Secretary of State,  
464 Mich 359; ___ NW2d ___ (2001), the circuit court’s  
judgment granting MGM’s motion for summary disposition is  
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for  
resolution of the remaining issues.  
Response to Justice Weaver’s dissent  
Justice Weaver dissents, asserting that we improvidently  
granted leave in the case at bar to be heard with the MUCC  
case because it has now become apparent the cases are too  
dissimilar to be considered together.  She further asserts  
that the cases are no longer being considered together, in  
that the MUCC decision was issued just over three weeks ago.  
We cannot agree.  The fact that the MUCC opinion was issued  
less than a month ago does not mean the case at bar and the  
MUCC case were not considered together. The MUCC decision was  
issued on an expedited basis in order to meet a statutory  
deadline.  No such deadline exists in this case.  Hence the  
Court has taken the prudent course of allowing additional time  
2  
 
before issuing its decision in this case before the end of our  
term on July 31, 2001.  Further, the MUCC case and the case at  
bar are similar.2
 While the language in the Michigan  
Constitution and the Detroit Charter are not identical, they  
are closely related and warrant application of the same  
analysis.3  That is why we are affirming on the basis of our  
holding in the MUCC case.  
Response to Justice Cavanagh’s dissent  
Justice Cavanagh dissents, asserting this appeal should  
be dismissed on the basis of mootness. He contends the case  
is moot because MGM renovated the building and that such  
renovation precludes the Court from being able to grant  
defendants the relief they request.  Justice Cavanagh also  
posits that MGM would have a legal right to stay in the casino  
even if the ordinance went to a referendum and lost because  
the renovated casino would constitute a prior nonconforming  
use that could remain despite any zoning change.  
The claim of mootness does not withstand serious  
2In the MUCC case the issue was whether a statute that  
included a million dollar appropriation was exempt from a 
referendum 
because 
it 
was 
an 
“act[] 
making 
[an] 
appropriation[] for [a] state institution[],” whereas the 
issue in the case at bar is whether an ordinance that included  
a one-third of a million dollar appropriation is exempt from 
a referendum because it constitutes “any ordinance for the 
appropriation of money.”  
33Although the issues in each case warrant application of 
the same analysis, when we granted leave we were faced with a 
split of authority between the Court of Appeals decision in 
MUCC, 
supra 
(which 
applied the amorphous “core function” test) 
and Judge Sapala’s decision in this case (which relied on the 
plain and unambiguous language of the Detroit City Charter). 
By considering this case along with the MUCC case we have  
provided an efficient resolution to a single problem.  
3  
  
 
scrutiny.
 Preliminarily, we note that the burden of  
demonstrating mootness is a “heavy one.”  Los Angeles v Davis,  
440 US 625, 631; 99 S Ct 1379; 59 L Ed 2d 642 (1979).  This  
means to get an appeal dismissed as moot, thus depriving a  
party seeking redress of a day in court, the party urging  
mootness on the court must make a very convincing showing that  
the opportunity for an appellate court to review the matter  
should be denied.  Not surprisingly, it is rare for a court to  
grant such a motion.  Furthermore, neither MGM nor the city  
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis of mootness.  
Indeed, the mootness argument is only presented in a manner  
that conveys its infirmity.4  
While it is true that defendants did not seek a stay  
after the trial court ruled against them (nor did they have  
to), they did file a timely appeal in the Court of Appeals.  
They also sought, albeit unsuccessfully, an expedited hearing  
from the Court of Appeals.  It is also the case that the city  
and MGM were on notice that they proceeded at their peril if  
they built before the appeal was resolved because defendants  
sent a letter to the city council and MGM advising them  
exactly of that.  Under such circumstances, one cannot  
reasonably conclude that defendants’ claim is moot.  In fact,  
the obviousness of this is probably why the city and MGM did  
not bring such a motion.  
It not only is common sense, but also a well-established  
4The supplemental brief filed on behalf of the city clerk 
and the city council merely mentions mootness in a footnote 
found on page 19 of its twenty-page brief.  
4  
 
 
legal principle, that a party can not obliterate an opponent’s  
appeal, on the basis of mootness, by so changing the status  
quo during the appeal (remarkably enough in this case by  
building the very casino that was at issue in the appeal while  
the appeal was pending) that they can then argue it is  
impossible to return to the situation that existed when the  
appeal was filed. The United States Supreme Court, no less,  
has said as much.  In Jones v Securities and Exchange Comm,  
298 US 1, 15-18; 56 S Ct 654; 80 L Ed 1015 (1936), our  
nation’s highest Court said:  
The rule is well settled, both by the courts 
of England and of this country, that where a suit 
is brought to enjoin certain acts or activities, 
for example, the erection of a building or other 
structure, of which suit defendant has notice, the 
hands of the defendant are effectively tied pending 
a hearing and determination, even though no  
restraining order or preliminary injunction be 
issued.  
* * *  
The conclusion to be drawn from all the cases is  
that after a defendant has been notified of the  
pendency of a suit seeking an injunction against 
him, even though a temporary injunction be not 
granted, he acts at his peril and subject to the 
power of the court to restore the status, wholly 
irrespective of the merits as they may be  
ultimately decided.  
We concur with the United States Supreme Court,  
reinforced in this conclusion by the fact that there is no  
contrary authority in our jurisprudence.5  
5Also instructive is West v Secretary of the Dep’t of 
Transportation, 206 F3d 920 (CA 9, 2000).  In this case, there 
was a dispute regarding the building of a highway.  A builder  
argued the case was moot because the construction for stage 1 
of the highway was already complete.  The Court rejected this 
argument, noting that if completion of construction was the 
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
We also note that it is premature for Justice Cavanagh to  
conclude on the basis of Heath Twp v Sall, 442 Mich 434; 502  
NW2d 627 (1993), that MGM would have a legal right to stay in  
the building if the ordinance went to a referendum and lost.  
If this were to occur, MGM could then make whatever arguments  
it had at that time.  
Justice Cavanagh asserts that leave was granted in this  
case by the Court in order to “demonstrate that the Court  
would apply the same logic” to this case as we did in the MUCC  
case.  
To the charge that the majority attempts to apply the  
same logic to all cases coming before it, we plead guilty.  
Justice Cavanagh’s discontent with our approach merely  
reflects our differing views on the proper role of the  
judiciary in our representative democracy.  
We, the majority, apply the text of the constitution, a  
statute, or an ordinance according to its ordinary meaning.  
We are prepared to live with the result of the plain  
application 
of 
such 
texts, regardless of whether we personally  
agree or disagree with the outcome.  We subscribe to the  
notion that judges are not the lawgivers in our society;  
5(...continued) 
test, parties could merely ignore the requirements of the law, 
build its structures before a case gets to court, and then 
hide behind the mootness doctrine. The Court concluded that  
“[s]uch a result is not acceptable.”  See also Gamlen Chemical  
v Gamlen, 79 F Supp 622 (WD Pa, 1948):  
Equity will not permit a wrongdoer to shelter 
himself behind a suddenly or secretly changed 
status though he succeeded in making the change 
before the chancellor's hand actually reached him.  
6 
 
 
 
rather, they are the interpreters of the law.  
Justice Cavanagh’s judicial philosophy is perhaps more  
“complex” than ours insofar as he is willing to depart from  
giving texts a plain reading for a more “complicated”  
construction, 
one 
less respectful of the words themselves used  
by the lawgiver, in this case the people of the city of  
Detroit in enacting their charter.  See, for example, his MUCC  
dissent, where he introduces a “core function” test as a means  
of avoiding the conclusion that a one million dollar  
appropriation is, in fact, an appropriation under art 2, § 9.  
We decline to read in such complexities where none are  
apparent in the language of the law.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with  
TAYLOR, J.  
7  
________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MGM GRAND DETROIT, L.L.C.,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119309  
COMMUNITY COALITION FOR EMPOWERMENT, 
INC., and ERNEST JOHNSON,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
v  
JACKIE L. CURRIE, in her capacity as 
CITY CLERK FOR THE CITY OF DETROIT and  
DETROIT CITY COUNTIL,  
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
This case arrived here at this Court’s request. Another  
vehicle was desired, along with Michigan United Conservation  
Clubs v Secretary of State, 464 Mich 359; ___ NW2d ____  
(2001), to demonstrate that the Court would apply the same  
logic to deny residents of the city of Detroit the right to a  
referendum vote on a rezoning ordinance for casino gambling  
that was applied in MUCC to deny this state’s residents the  
right to a referendum on new gun legislation. The majority,  
having decided in MUCC that the insertion of a dollar amount,  
however ill-intended, renders a new law referendum-proof, now  
 
is determined to opine on the merits of this issue again  
rather than following the normal course, or option, of  
remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration  
in light of this Court’s decision in MUCC.  For the reasons  
that follow, I would do neither.  
Rather than affirm the trial court’s decision in this  
case, I would dismiss because this case has become moot.  When  
intervening changes in a case’s factual circumstances make it  
impossible for a court to fashion a remedy, the case has  
become moot and should be dismissed.  See UAW v Governor, 388  
Mich 578, 582; 202 NW2d 290 (1972); see also Crawford Co v  
Secretary of State, 160 Mich App 88, 93; 408 NW2d 112 (1987).  
The changes in the factual circumstances of this case prevent  
this Court from being able to grant defendants Community  
Coalition for Empowerment and Ernest Johnson the relief they  
seek, so this case should be dismissed. 
Therefore, I  
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm  
the trial court.  
I  
This case arises from the implementation of casino  
gambling in the city of Detroit.  A detailed understanding of  
the facts illustrates that this case has become moot.  
By adopting Proposal E in 1996, voters decided to allow  
licensed casino gambling in Detroit.  Plaintiff MGM Grand was  
subsequently chosen as one of the developers to conduct casino  
gambling, and plaintiff then selected a site in an existing  
building to establish a temporary casino facility. Next, the  
Detroit City Council adopted ordinance 24-98, which changed  
2  
the zoning at the site from commercial to planned development,  
which would allow plaintiff to use the site for its temporary  
casino.  
Defendants sought to refer ordinance 24-98.  In accord  
with the referendum power reserved in the Detroit City  
Charter, art 12, § 101, defendants conducted a petition drive  
and submitted a sufficient number of valid signatures to the  
third-party defendant Detroit City Clerk, who certified the  
referendum petition in September 1998.  Instead of subjecting  
ordinance 24-98 to popular adoption or rejection through a  
referendum election, however, the Detroit City Council  
repealed the ordinance, a power provided to the council by  
Detroit City Charter, art 12, § 107.  
At the same session when the Council repealed ordinance  
24-98, it adopted ordinance 35-98.  Like ordinance 24-98, the  
new ordinance rezoned plaintiff’s site to allow plaintiff to  
use the site for a temporary casino, but the new ordinance  
additionally “appropriated [$333,333.34] to the temporary  
casino 
site 
support 
and 
infrastructure 
improvement  
appropriation . . . .”  
Defendants conducted another petition drive, seeking to  
refer ordinance 35-98.  They again submitted a sufficient  
number of valid signatures to the Detroit City Clerk, but she  
informed them that the petition did not meet the legal  
requirements for certification because ordinance 35-98 was an  
appropriations measure, exempt from referendum.  The city  
3  
 
clerk, therefore, did not certify the referendum petition.1  
On the same day that the city clerk denied certification,  
this litigation began.  Plaintiff MGM Grand filed a complaint  
seeking a declaration that defendants’ petition was without  
legal effect. Several days later, defendants filed a third­
party complaint against the Detroit City Clerk and the Detroit  
City Council, as well as a counterclaim against plaintiff.  
The counterclaim sought a temporary injunction against  
plaintiff,2 and the third-party complaint sought declaratory  
relief and mandamus ordering the city clerk to certify the  
petition.  After briefing and argument on cross-motions for  
summary disposition, the trial court issued a written opinion  
in January 1999, “finding that ordinance 35-98 is not subject  
to referendum under the City Charter of Detroit” because it  
was an ordinance for the appropriation of money, exempt from  
referendum under Detroit City Charter, art 12, § 101.  The  
trial court granted plaintiff’s motion, granted the third­
party defendants’ motion against defendant, and denied  
defendant’s motion. Later that month, defendants claimed an  
appeal with the Court of Appeals.  They did not assert any  
claim for a temporary injunction and did not move to stay the  
trial court’s decision. Before the Court of Appeals reached  
1 
 The city clerk cited a problem with the petition’s 
description of ordinance 35-98, required by Detroit City 
Charter, art 12, § 102, as an additional reason for denying 
certification.  The validity of the description, and the city 
clerk’s decision, however, are not before this Court.  
2 
 Plaintiff points out that the defendant mentioned the 
temporary injunction in the counterclaim, but did not pursue 
it before the trial court.  
4  
 
a decision, this Court took jurisdiction over the case. 464  
Mich 855 (2001).  
With its trial court victory, plaintiff pressed on with  
its plans for a temporary casino.  Plaintiff renovated its  
chosen building and opened the temporary casino in July 1999.  
The temporary casino is approximately 75,000 square feet,  
contains various games including approximately 2,500 slot  
machines, and takes in over $1 million a day.  Also, plaintiff  
constructed a nine-deck parking structure, which opened in  
December 1999, adjacent to the temporary casino.  
II  
Defendants request this Court to reverse the trial  
court’s decision and compel the city of Detroit to schedule a  
referendum election on ordinance 35-98 so the voters of  
Detroit can reject the ordinance.  However, such a remedy  
would be impossible.  With plaintiff having completed its  
temporary casino, even if there were a referendum on ordinance  
35-98, and even if the voters of Detroit were to reject the  
ordinance, plaintiff’s temporary casino would be a prior  
nonconforming 
use 
that could remain despite any zoning change.  
Because a referendum could not change the zoning at  
plaintiff’s 
temporary 
casino, 
the 
remedy 
defendants 
request 
is  
moot, and this case should be dismissed.  
In Heath Twp v Sall, 442 Mich 434; 502 NW2d 627 (1993),  
this Court discussed prior nonconforming uses when zoning  
changes were effected by referendum.  There, the defendants  
purchased land intending to build a mobile home park.  The  
township rezoned the land to accommodate the defendants’  
5  
 
intent, but township residents brought a referendum and voted  
to return the land to its original zoning, under which the  
mobile home park was not allowed.  Before the referendum  
returned the land to its original zoning classification,  
though, 
the 
defendants had taken steps toward constructing the  
mobile home park.  This Court had to decide whether the steps  
the defendants had taken were sufficient to establish a prior  
nonconforming 
use, 
which requires that the property owner must  
have, at the least, engaged in work of a substantial character  
done in preparation for an actual use of the premises.  See  
id. at 436-439. Elaborating, we quoted from our decision in  
Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 427 Mich 562, 574­
575; 398 NW2d 393 (1986):  
The actual use which is nonconforming must be 
apparent and manifested by a tangible change in the 
land, as opposed to intended or contemplated by the 
property owner. 
In this regard, preliminary 
operation such as ordering plans, surveying the 
land, and the removal of old buildings are  
insufficient to establish a nonconforming use.  The  
test in each case is not whether a little or a lot  
has been spent in reliance upon the past zoning 
classifications, but, rather, whether there has 
been any tangible change in the land itself by 
excavation and construction. [Heath Twp, supra at  
440 (citations and internal quotations omitted).]  
If plaintiff MGM Grand’s activities at the temporary casino  
site pass this test, even if there were a referendum and  
zoning change, the zoning at plaintiff’s temporary casino  
could not be changed.  
Plaintiff’s 
temporary 
casino 
would 
be 
a 
prior  
nonconforming use because its operations go well beyond the  
preliminary requirements identified in our case law.  Here,  
plaintiff has completely refurbished its building to serve as  
6  
 
a casino, and has constructed a large new parking deck next to  
the refurbished building.  This certainly amounts to a  
tangible change in the land.  In addition, though, the  
analysis from Heath Twp was directed at an incomplete  
development that was alleged to be sufficient to comprise a  
nonconforming 
use, 
and 
considered 
only 
construction 
toward 
the  
development that occurred before the zoning was restricted.  
In this case, we have a completed business that has been  
operating for nearly two years. Thus, plaintiff’s temporary  
casino would certainly be a lawful and existing use, see MCL  
125.216(1), insulated from any subsequent zoning changes.  
Defendant’s failure to move to stay the trial court’s  
decision, or to pursue a temporary injunction, and the  
resulting establishment of plaintiff’s temporary casino are  
intervening changes in the facts of this case that make  
defendant’s requested relief moot. As mentioned above, even  
if there were a referendum election on ordinance 35-98, and  
even if the voters of Detroit rejected the zoning of  
plaintiff’s temporary casino site adopted by that ordinance,  
the zoning at the temporary casino site would remain because  
plaintiff would have established a nonconforming use that  
cannot be altered by a subsequent zoning change.  See UAW v  
Governor at 582; Crawford Co at 93. Hence, there is nothing  
for us to grant for defendants.  Absent a possible remedy,  
this case has become moot. When a case is moot, rather than  
affirm the substance of the lower court’s decision, the proper  
resolution is dismissal.  I, therefore, disagree with the  
majority decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment in  
7  
favor of plaintiff.  Additionally, I point out that, in  
addressing 
mootness, 
the 
majority 
relies 
on 
federal 
decisions,  
which, with a justiciability question like mootness, do not  
necessarily apply.  See ASARCO, Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605, 617;  
109 S Ct 2037; 104 L Ed 2d 696 (1989).  
III  
For the reasons stated, this case is moot and should be  
dismissed.  I respectfully dissent from the majority decision  
to affirm the lower court.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
8  
 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MGM GRAND DETROIT, L.L.C.,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119309  
COMMUNITY COALITION FOR EMPOWERMENT  
INC., and ERNEST JOHNSON,  
Defendant-Appellants,  
v  
JACKIE L. CURRIE, in her capacity as 
CITY CLERK FOR THE CITY OF DETROIT and  
DETROIT CITY COUNCIL,  
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision  
affirming the  circuit court’s judgment granting MGM’s motion  
for summary disposition because I believe that leave was  
precipitately granted in this matter.  I would dismiss our  
jurisdiction over this case and remand to the Court of Appeals  
for continuation of the proceedings there.  
On May 24, 2001 this Court, on its own motion, took  
jurisdiction as on leave granted before decision by the Court  
of Appeals.3  It did so saying “[i]t appears that the issues  
raised 
regarding 
whether an ordinance is subject to referendum  
3The Court of Appeals had already had oral argument on 
this case, but had not yet issued an opinion.  
 
are sufficiently related to the issues raised in Michigan  
United Conservation Clubs v Secretary of State, Supreme Court  
Docket No. 119274, that the cases should be considered  
together.”
 (Docket No. 119309.) 
The Court released its  
opinion in  Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Secretary of  
State, 464 Mich 359; ___ NW2d ___ (2001). Obviously they are  
no longer being considered together.  
The Court believed that consideration of the two cases  
would afford a better perspective on the issues that they  
appeared to have in common.  However, after oral arguments, it  
became apparent that leave was improvidently granted in this  
case.  The issues in this case were too dissimilar to be  
considered with Michigan United Conservation Clubs. 
While  
art 2, § 9 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution  states that  
“[t]he power of referendum does not extend to acts making  
appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies  
in state funds,” § 12-101 of the Detroit City Charter provides  
in pertinent part:  
The voters of the city reserve the power to 
enact city ordinances, called the “initiative,” and 
the power to nullify ordinances, enacted by the 
city, called the “referendum.”  However, these 
powers do not extend to the budget or any ordinance 
for the appropriation of money; the referendum 
power does not extend to any emergency ordinance. 
[Emphasis added.]  
Additionally, in this case there is also the underlying issue  
whether the ordinance in fact contains an appropriation.  
Appellants assert that the ordinance does not incur any  
obligation as required by the definition of appropriation  
under the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act, that the funds  
2  
paid to the city by MGM are not “public funds,” and that the  
ordinance merely authorizes an appropriation, but is not  
itself an appropriation.  
I believe that we should remand this case to the Court  
of Appeals for a decision on all the issues in light of our  
recent opinion in  Michigan United Conservation Clubs, rather  
than issue an opinion on certain issues4 and remand the  
remainder of the case.  
4In the grant order, this Court limited the appeal “to 
the issues concerning whether City of Detroit ordinance 35-98 
is exempt from the referendum provision of the City Charter 
because it is an ordinance for the appropriation of money.”  
3