Case Title: State v. Newman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118608

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 118,608 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
COTY RYLAN NEWMAN, 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When reviewing a district court's consideration of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea before sentencing, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence or reassess witness 
credibility, but will reverse the lower court only for an abuse of discretion. 
 
2. 
 
A sentencing court has no authority to impose lifetime postrelease supervision on 
an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; EVELYN Z. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed February 14, 
2020. Affirmed in part and vacated in part.  
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Coty Newman pleaded guilty to first-degree felony murder and 
attempted second-degree intentional murder. Before sentencing, Newman moved to 
withdraw those pleas. The district court denied his motions and imposed a life sentence 
for the first-degree murder conviction and a consecutive 59 months' imprisonment for the 
second-degree murder conviction. The district court also ordered lifetime postrelease 
supervision for the first-degree murder conviction and 36 months of postrelease 
supervision for the second-degree murder conviction. Newman appeals the denials of his 
motions to withdraw his pleas and the imposition of lifetime supervision. We affirm the 
denials of his motions but vacate the lifetime postrelease supervision. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On October 27, 2010, the State charged Coty Newman with first-degree felony 
murder; alternative counts of attempted second-degree intentional murder or aggravated 
battery; attempt to distribute marijuana; and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The State 
later amended the complaint to add first-degree intentional murder as an alternative to 
first-degree felony murder.  
 
Newman agreed to plead guilty to first-degree felony murder and attempted 
second-degree intentional murder and, in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 
alternative and remaining counts. The parties agreed to recommend a life sentence for the 
first-degree murder charge and a consecutive 59 months' imprisonment for the second-
degree murder charge. They further agreed that Newman would not be eligible for parole 
until he served 20 years and 59 months in prison and that neither party would request a 
departure sentence. 
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On March 22, 2013, the district court held a plea hearing. Newman pleaded guilty 
to first-degree felony murder and attempted second-degree intentional murder. The 
district court found that Newman voluntarily entered into the agreement and accepted his 
pleas. 
 
On July 18, 2013, Newman filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. He argued that 
the court should allow the withdrawal for two reasons:  his mother had been hospitalized 
during the plea hearing, which caused him to experience extreme physical and emotional 
distress; and he had newly discovered evidence that would exonerate him. The State 
responded to this motion, arguing that Newman had not indicated he was distressed 
during the hearing and that the newly discovered evidence was not credible.  
 
At a hearing on Newman's motion, Newman's mother testified that she had been 
hospitalized on March 21, 2013, due to complications related to diabetes and had spent a 
day and a half in the intensive care unit. She also testified that she and Newman 
discussed over the phone ways to withdraw his plea. The district court admitted State 
exhibits that both parties stipulated represented recorded jail calls between Newman and 
his mother. 
 
James Martin also testified at the hearing. He stated that he met Newman while 
incarcerated at the Ellsworth Correctional Facility while Newman was there as a result of 
the charges in this case. Martin stated that he had been present at the time of the alleged 
killing and that Newman, while present, had not shot anyone.  
 
After this hearing, the State filed a supplemental response and motion to strike 
Martin's testimony. In this motion, the State alleged that Martin had been incarcerated at 
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the time of the alleged crimes and, consequently, could not have been a witness to those 
crimes. At a second hearing, a records clerk with the Ellsworth Correctional Facility 
testified that a man named James Martin with the same date of birth, social security 
number, and DOC number as the James Martin who testified had been in custody at the 
time of the alleged crimes.  
 
On October 17, 2013, the district court denied Newman's motion to withdraw his 
pleas. 
 
On October 25, 2013, Newman filed a pro se "Motion to Vacate Plea Bargain Due 
to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel."  
 
At a hearing on this motion, Newman testified that Jon Whitton had been his 
counsel at the time he was considering a plea and that he had told Whitton on the day of 
the plea hearing that he did not want to plead guilty. Newman stated that Whitton had 
informed him he could plead guilty and then "pull it back" if he "g[o]t cold feet" and 
wanted to go to trial. Newman said that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had 
known he could not withdraw the plea for any reason. Newman also testified that, before 
pleading, he told Whitton about some possible exculpatory witnesses and Whitton told 
him he would look into them after he entered his plea. During the State's cross-
examination of Newman, Newman testified that he remembered telling his mother on a 
phone call that, if his original motion to withdraw his plea did not work, he was going to 
have to claim his counsel had been ineffective.  
 
Newman's wife also testified at the hearing. She stated that she had not wanted 
Newman to plead guilty but Whitton had informed her and Newman on the day of the 
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plea hearing that Newman only had an hour to decide whether to accept the plea and 
could later withdraw it.   
 
Whitton also testified at the hearing. He stated that he never told Newman he 
could withdraw his plea based on "cold feet." He informed Newman that it is possible to 
withdraw a plea but it very rarely happens and that Newman should not enter a plea based 
upon an understanding that he could withdraw it at a later time. Newman asked for an 
example of when a defendant can withdraw a plea, and Whitton told him a court will 
permit the withdrawal based on ineffective assistance of counsel or newly discovered 
evidence. Whitton also stated that he told Newman it is much more difficult to withdraw 
a plea after sentencing. Whitton testified that he did not believe Newman mentioned any 
exculpatory witnesses during this conversation with whom Whitton had not already 
spoken.  
 
On June 10, 2014, the district court denied Newman's second motion to withdraw 
his pleas.  
 
On July 23, 2014, the district court sentenced Newman to life in prison with no 
chance of parole for 20 years for the first-degree murder conviction and 59 months in 
prison for the attempted second-degree murder conviction, to be served consecutively. 
The court also imposed lifetime postrelease supervision for the first-degree murder 
conviction and 36 months of postrelease supervision for the second-degree murder 
conviction.  
 
Newman appealed the denials of his motions to withdraw his pleas and the district 
court's imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision to this court. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Withdraw of pleas 
 
Newman argues that the district court erred when it denied his motions to 
withdraw his pleas.  
 
A district court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for good cause 
any time before sentencing. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1). In determining whether 
the defendant has shown good cause, the court generally considers the following three 
"benchmark" factors:  "(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; 
(2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage 
of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made." State v. Edwards, 309 
Kan. 830, 836, 440 P.3d 557 (2019). 
 
When reviewing the district court's consideration of such a motion, we will reverse 
the lower court only for an abuse of discretion. We will not reweigh evidence or reassess 
witness credibility. Edwards, 309 Kan. at 836. 
 
First, Newman argues that the district court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that he had not shown good cause to withdraw his plea based on his claims of 
emotional distress. Newman insists that the stress and pressure caused by his mother's 
health condition and pressure from his attorney to plead guilty "combined to overwhelm 
him" and rendered his plea involuntary. 
 
In its ruling, the district court found that Newman had probably been under "some 
significant pressure at the time of the plea hearing because trial was fast approaching," 
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but that this pressure was "inevitable." The court also found that Newman had assured the 
court several times that "he was able to think clearly, was able to understand the 
proceedings, and had taken enough time to consider whether he wanted to enter a plea of 
guilt." The court also found that "[a]t no time did [Newman] mention any tension caused 
by his mother's medical condition" and that nothing in the recorded calls suggested that 
Newman was "nervous, tense, or in any way upset at the time of the plea because of his 
mother's condition or hospitalization." Based on these findings, the district court 
concluded that Newman had failed to show that he was misled, coerced, mistreated, or 
unfairly taken advantage of.  
 
The district court also found that Newman had an extensive plea hearing, his 
mental health had not been questioned, and he had not raised any new issues. 
Consequently, the court concluded that Newman's plea was fairly and understandingly 
made.  
 
Newman has offered no authority suggesting that the district court abused its 
discretion when it concluded that neither his mother's hospitalization nor the pressures of 
impending trial led to a coerced, misunderstood, or otherwise unfair plea. He simply 
disagrees with the district court's assessment of the evidence. We will not reweigh that 
evidence. We affirm the district court's decision.  
 
Next, Newman argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion 
because his counsel was ineffective. Newman avers that his counsel told him he could 
withdraw his plea if he decided he wanted to go to trial and that the evidence does not 
support Whitton's testimony that he did not make this statement.  
 
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In regard to this claim, the district court found that Whitton's testimony was more 
credible than Newman's, and, consequently, that Whitton had not informed Newman he 
could withdraw his plea if he had second thoughts. Accordingly, the court concluded that 
Newman had failed to show good cause to withdraw his plea based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
 
Newman acknowledges that we defer to the district court's credibility 
determinations but insists we cannot do so here because the evidence is more supportive 
of his version of events.  
 
As we noted above, we will not reassess the credibility of evidence. The district 
court concluded that Whitton was more credible than Newman and we defer to that 
finding.  
 
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Newman's motions to withdraw his pleas.  
 
Lifetime Postrelease Supervision 
 
The parties agree that the district court erred when it sentenced Newman to 
lifetime postrelease supervision on the first-degree murder conviction. They are correct. 
"'[A] sentencing court has no authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in 
conjunction with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence.'" State v. Summers, 293 Kan. 
819, 832, 272 P.3d 1 (2012). Newman received an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence 
for his first-degree murder conviction. See K.S.A. 21-4706(c). Consequently, he becomes 
eligible for parole after serving 20 years of that sentence. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-
3717(b)(2); K.S.A. 21-4706; K.S.A. 21-3401; see also State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 
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997-98, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019). The district court had no authority to impose lifetime 
postrelease supervision. Accordingly, we vacate the order for lifetime postrelease 
supervision. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The district court's decision denying the motions to withdraw Newman's pleas is 
affirmed. The portion of the district court's sentencing order imposing lifetime 
postrelease supervision is vacated.  
 
HENRY W. GREEN, JR., J., assigned.1 
STEVE LEBEN, J., assigned.2 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Judge Green, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was 
appointed to hear case No. 118,608 under the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the 
retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.  
 
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  Judge Leben, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was 
appointed to hear case No. 118,608 under the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the 
retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.