Case Title: CARROLL ELEC. CO-OP. CORP. v. Benson

Citation: 312 Ark. 183, 848 S.W.2d 413

Docket Number: 92-1122

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
848 S.W.2d 413 (1993) 312 Ark. 183 CARROLL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Joe BENSON and Amelia Benson, Appellees. No. 92-1122. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 1, 1993. *414 John C. Everett, Fayetteville, for appellant. James N. McCord, Fayetteville, for appellees. HOLT, Chief Justice. The issue presented is whether the appellant, Carroll Electric Cooperative Corporation (hereafter "Carroll Electric"), had a right pursuant to a 1962 easement to extend certain existing power lines across the western portion of appellees', Joe and Amelia Benson (hereafter "the Bensons"), property or was required to acquire a new easement. We hold that the trial court erred in determining that Carroll Electric could not extend this power line under a 1962 easement but remand to the trial court for its determination of the reasonableness of the route chosen for the line. On May 12, 1962, the appellees' predecessor in title, Arrow Land Company, Inc., granted Carroll Electric the following described right-of-way easement: (Emphasis added.) Three years later, in 1965, this property, Pointe Clear Heights Subdivision, was platted. In 1967, in accordance with this right-of-way *415 easement, Carroll Electric constructed an overhead electric line into the center of the Bensons' property to serve the residence now owned by the Bensons. The Bensons filed this lawsuit on June 29, 1992 after Carroll Electric entered their land and cut down numerous large trees to clearcut a path for the construction of an overhead electric transmission line on the west side of their property to provide electric power to a residence on property in Pointe Clear Heights Subdivision owned by Mr. Larry Cox. Carroll Electric placed several tall poles within the clearcut path in preparation for stringing the overhead transmission line across the Bensons' property. Carroll Electric did not confer with the Bensons prior to cutting the path or placing poles nor did it give the Bensons an opportunity to "delimit" (lay out the boundary of) the easement. The Bensons approached the electric company and offered to permit underground wiring but the company refused. The Bensons filed a complaint in Benton County Chancery Court requesting a preliminary as well as a permanent injunction enjoining Carroll Electric from further constructing overhead transmission lines across their property. The chancery court granted the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the Bensons amended their complaint to ask for a mandatory injunction ordering Carroll Electric to remove all new poles and new overhead electric lines placed on the clearcut path across their property. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, and the matter was submitted to the court. After considering the stipulated exhibits and facts, the chancellor granted the Bensons' countermotion for summary judgment. In reaching this decision, the chancellor made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: ... Undesignated grants of rights-of-way may be termed "floating rights-of-way" until located and utilized but thereafter such easements become fixed. *416... After the location is designated and used it cannot thereafter be redesignated at a different location without another grant. The chancellor's reliance upon Bradley is misplaced. In Bradley the issue before this court was whether Arkla had the right under a 1960 easement to relocate a pipeline across the property owners' land without obtaining a new right-of-way. The new pipeline location was about one hundred feet south of the existing right-of-way. The language of the easement agreement gave the grantor the "right to lay, maintain alter, repair, operate and remove pipe lines for the transportation of oil and gas." Bradley, 280 Ark. at 495, 659 S.W.2d 180. There, as here, the right-of-way was undesignated. Yet, in holding that a new rightof-way was required, this court held that when the grantee selects a right-of-way not specifically described in the grant, the right-of-way becomes fixed and the "grantee has no right to go upon other parts of the grantor's land without a new grant. Bradley, 280 Ark. at 496, 659 S.W.2d 180. However, Bradley is not comparable to the facts at hand. In Bradley the utility was relocating the right-of-way while here, Carroll Electric is extending a powerline under the authority of the existing easement. This line extension is clearly permitted by the 1962 easement agreement which states that Carroll Electric may "extend lines for other service upon the above lands and to extend lines from services on this land to and for service to other property." (Emphasis added.) While it is true that a right-of-way grant is to be construed against the party preparing it, the language in the 1962 easement plainly provides that Carroll Electric may extend the lines as needed to provide service to other property, and that is just what they have done here. While the right-ofway of the lines to the Bensons' residence may have become fixed, the 1962 easement is still "floating" as to the extension of a line situated near the west side of their property. In sum, Carroll Electric was within its rights to extend this electric line across the west side of the Bensons' property to service the Cox property. Although Carroll Electric is entitled to extend its power lines pursuant to the existing 1962 easement, this right-ofway easement entitles both the grantee and the grantor to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way. Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Ark. 261, 261 S.W. 645 (1924). The location of the undefined right-of-way must be reasonable to both the dominant and servient estates, considering the condition of the place, the purposes for which it was intended, and the acts of the grantee. Id. Further, the owner of the servient estate has the right to delimit the easement. Id. We have consistently applied the law as stated in Fulcher. See Bradley v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 280 Ark. 492, 659 S.W.2d 180 (1983); Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Brinks, 240 Ark. 381, 400 S.W.2d 278 (1966); Drainage Dist. No. 16 v. Holly, 213 Ark. 889, 214 S.W.2d 224 (1948). *417 A review of the abstract reveals that the parties attempted to stipulate as to the reasonableness of the exact route but ultimately agreed with each other and with the court that this issue should be reserved depending upon the trial court's decision regarding the status of the easement. As the trial court made no further findings in this regard, we remand this issue to the trial court as well as for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.