Case Title: Kupec v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kupec v. State1992 WY 92835 P.2d 359Case Number: 91-194Decided: 07/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gloria Mae KUPEC, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director of the Defender Aid 
Program, and Stephany A. Meyer, Student Intern for the Defender Aid Program, 
for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael K. Kelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and 
GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Gloria 
Mae Kupec appeals from the lower court's order revoking her probation and 
reinstating her original sentence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant states 
the issues as follows:

     I. Whether the 
district court erred by allowing hearsay testimony at Appellant's probation 
revocation hearing on the issue of whether a condition of probation was 
violated?

     II. Whether the 
district court erred by allowing evidence of the urinalysis without an 
established chain of custody?

     III. Whether the 
district court judge erred in finding a violation when he relied solely on the 
breathalyzer result without finding that Appellant willfully and intentionally 
consumed alcohol?

     IV. Whether the 
district court erred in failing to credit Appellant's minimum and maximum 
sentence for the two hundred fifty days served in the S.T.O.P. 
program?

[¶4]      On November 13, 
1989, the district court sentenced Appellant to not less than two years nor more 
than twelve years in the Women's Correctional Facility. The district court 
imposed the sentence after Appellant entered a plea of guilty to delivery of a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 
35-7-1016(b)(iv) (1988). On May 3, 1990, Appellant filed a motion to reduce her 
sentence, which the court granted on November 26, 1990. The court suspended 
Appellant's sentence and placed her on probation for four years, with the first 
year to be spent in the Surveillance and Treatment of Offender Program 
(S.T.O.P.). Appellant's probation, among other things, prohibited her from 
consuming alcohol or using illegal drugs. In addition to her regular probation, 
the S.T.O.P. required Appellant to remain at her residence except during those 
times approved by her probation agent; to wear an electronic monitoring device 
to ensure compliance with her residential confinement restrictions; to travel 
only by approved routes; to remain employed full time; to attend treatment and 
counseling programs; and to allow only guests into her residence who had 
received the probation officer's prior approval.1 

[¶5]      On May 28, 1991, 
the district attorney filed a petition to revoke Appellant's probation after a 
urine test administered by her probation officer revealed the presence of 
cocaine metabolites. The district attorney subsequently filed a second petition 
to revoke Appellant's probation after a breathalyzer examination conducted by 
the Laramie County sheriff's office on June 19, 1991, indicated that she had a 
blood alcohol content of .151%. On July 2, 1991, the district court conducted a 
hearing to determine whether Appellant violated her probation by ingesting 
alcohol and cocaine. After hearing all the evidence, the court found that 
Appellant had violated her probation conditions. The court held a second hearing 
on July 10, 1991, to hear any mitigating circumstances, whereupon it reimposed 
Appellant's original sentence.

[¶6]      At the initial 
probation revocation hearing, Kelly Mann, the probation officer who collected 
Appellant's urine sample, did not testify. Rather than calling Ms. Mann, who had 
moved to Nebraska, the State called Chris Danni, another S.T.O.P. probation 
officer. Ms. Danni identified the initials of the sample taker on a urine test 
kit which purportedly contained Appellant's contaminated urine sample as 
belonging to Ms. Mann. Two chemists from the Wyoming Department of Health 
testified that the urine sample purportedly belonging to Appellant tested 
positive for cocaine metabolites.

[¶7]      To support its 
allegation of alcohol consumption, the State called John Roncalio, Appellant's 
probation officer following Ms. Mann's departure. Mr. Roncalio testified that he 
visited Appellant in her home during the evening of June 19, 1991, because she 
had missed a mandatory S.T.O.P. group meeting. While at Appellant's home, Mr. 
Roncalio used a portable breathalyzer machine to determine whether she had 
consumed any alcohol. Mr. Roncalio conducted three separate breathalyzer 
examinations on Appellant, with each test indicating the presence of alcohol. To 
verify the results of the breathalyzer tests, Mr. Roncalio transported Appellant 
to the Laramie County sheriff's office where, in a fourth breathalyzer test, 
Appellant's blood alcohol content registered .151%. Mr. Roncalio testified that, 
when he confronted Appellant with her positive breathalyzer test results, she 
denied drinking any alcohol but admitted maybe unknowingly consuming some spiked 
lemonade.

[¶8]      The trial court 
found that, by ingesting cocaine and alcohol, Appellant had violated her 
probation conditions. The court revoked Appellant's probation and reinstated her 
original sentence of not less than two years nor more than twelve years in the 
Women's Correctional Facility. Appellant was granted credit against the minimum 
and maximum terms of her sentence for the time she had already served in the 
correctional facility.

[¶9]      Appellant claims 
that the district court improperly concluded that she ingested cocaine because 
she was denied her right to confront the probation officer who monitored the 
urine collection; because the district court improperly relied upon hearsay 
testimony; and because the court admitted her urinalysis results into evidence 
without establishing a chain of custody. Appellant also argues that the court 
erred by relying upon her breathalyzer test results without finding that she 
willfully and intentionally consumed alcohol. We are satisfied that the district 
court had sufficient evidence to revoke Appellant's probation for consuming 
alcohol, and, consequently, we decline to address Appellant's claims concerning 
her rights of confrontation, hearsay, and chain of custody.

[¶10]   Appellant contends that the 
district court erred by failing to consider evidence which demonstrated that she 
did not willfully consume alcohol. Our statutes and rules concerning probation 
do not specify whether a probationer must willfully violate a probation 
condition before a court may revoke probation. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-401(a)(x) (Supp. 1991). Similarly, our prior probation revocation cases 
have not specifically required that a probationer willfully violate a probation 
condition before a court may revoke probation. See Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1195 (Wyo. 1991). 

[¶11]   The United States Supreme Court has 
considered the issue of whether a probationer must willfully violate a probation 
condition in the context of his ability to pay a fine or make restitution. 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983). In 
Bearden, the Supreme Court found that a state is perfectly justified in 
imprisoning a probationer who willfully fails to pay a fine which was required 
as a probation condition. However, when a probationer is unable to pay the fine 
or make the restitution through no fault of his own, automatically revoking his 
probation without first considering an alternative means of punishment would be 
fundamentally unfair. 461 U.S.  at 668-69, 103 S. Ct.  at 2070-71. In a footnote, 
the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a defendant who violates a 
probation condition not mandating the payment of money must act willfully. The 
Supreme Court reasoned that a probationer's lack of fault in violating a 
probation condition not involving the payment of money should not necessarily 
prevent a court from revoking probation. For example, a court should not allow a 
chronic drunken driver to remain on probation when that person has no control 
over his consumption of alcohol and constitutes a threat to society. 461 U.S.  at 
668 n. 9, 103 S. Ct.  at 2070 n. 9.

[¶12]   The Utah Court of Appeals recently 
followed the approach suggested by Bearden to determine whether a defendant 
charged with violating a probation condition not involving the payment of money 
must act willfully. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), cert. 
denied, (Dec. 26, 1990). The Utah Court of Appeals held: "[I]n order to revoke 
probation for the violation of a condition of probation not involving the 
payment of money, the violation must be willful, or, if not willful, must 
presently threaten the safety of society." Id. at 277. We agree with the rule as 
stated by the Utah Court of Appeals. Revoking the probation of a defendant whose 
failure to comply with his probation conditions was not willful but instead 
resulted from factors beyond his control would be fundamentally unfair. At the 
same time, a court cannot be prevented from revoking probation in situations 
where the probationer's conduct is beyond his control and such conduct creates a 
threat to society.

[¶13]   Applying the foregoing test to the 
present case, we must determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support a 
finding that Appellant willfully consumed alcohol. In a probation revocation 
proceeding, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a 
probationer violated his probation conditions, and that determination will not 
be reversed unless the discretion was abused. Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219, 224 (Wyo. 1991); Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Wyo. 1980). This 
Court has frequently explained:

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did.'" Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 680-81 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd on 
collateral issue 770 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1989), [quot]ing Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

Swackhammer, 808 P.2d  at 224. All that is necessary for a probation to be revoked is the court's 
conscientious conclusion, after the court hears the facts, that the violation 
occurred. Longwell v. State, 705 P.2d 336, 338 (Wyo. 1985); Ketcham, 618 P.2d  at 
1359.

[¶14]   Appellant claims that the court 
failed to consider her testimony demonstrating that she did not willfully 
consume alcohol. In the initial probation revocation hearing, Appellant did not 
introduce any evidence indicating that she had not willfully consumed alcohol. 
The only evidence concerning her lack of willfulness was the probation officer's 
testimony relating his conversation with Appellant whereby she denied consuming 
any alcohol but admitted maybe drinking some spiked lemonade. Only at her 
subsequent mitigation hearing did Appellant testify that she had not knowingly 
consumed any alcohol. 

[¶15]   Arguably, Appellant cannot complain 
that the district court failed to consider her lack of willfulness when she did 
not introduce any evidence on the subject at her initial probation revocation 
hearing. However, we do not need to decide this question because, even if we 
assume that Appellant's testimony at the subsequent mitigation hearing 
adequately raised the issue of her lack of knowledge, the State introduced 
sufficient evidence to support a determination that she willfully consumed 
alcohol. Four separate breathalyzer examinations revealed that Appellant had 
consumed a considerable amount of alcohol. Both Mr. Roncalio and the sheriff's 
deputy testified that Appellant's breath smelled of alcohol. Appellant claimed 
that she had consumed a single sixteen-ounce glass of possibly spiked lemonade, 
yet her blood alcohol content was .151%. Mr. Roncalio testified that, in his 
opinion, someone whose blood alcohol was over the legal limit would be aware 
that he had consumed alcohol and that Appellant may have tasted the alcohol in 
the lemonade. Mr. Roncalio further testified: "Based on my experience, it's very 
improbable that she would have consumed that much alcohol and not known." The 
court could have reasonably inferred from the evidence presented that Appellant 
willfully consumed alcohol in violation of her probation.2 We discern nothing in the record to 
indicate that the district court's judgment was less than conscientious, nor is 
there any indication that the court abused its discretion by revoking 
Appellant's probation.

[¶16]   Appellant next contends that the 
district court erred by failing to credit both the minimum and maximum terms of 
her sentence for the 250 days she spent in the S.T.O.P. When imposing a sentence 
following a probation revocation, the district court is not required to take 
into account the time a defendant served on probation. McFarlane v. State, 781 P.2d 931, 932 (Wyo. 1989) (per curiam). Despite the rule in McFarlane, we have 
recognized in prior cases that, when a defendant, as a probation condition, is 
placed in an environment from which a charge of escape would lie, he would be 
entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he spent in that 
environment if his probation were subsequently revoked. Craig v. State, 804 P.2d 686, 688 (Wyo. 1991); Prejean v. State, 794 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶17]   In Prejean, the defendant was 
required to spend his first year of probation in a community correctional 
facility. After completing nearly six months at the community correctional 
facility, the defendant violated his probation conditions by escaping. The trial 
court revoked his probation but refused to grant credit against his sentence for 
the time he served in the community correctional facility. On appeal, we held: 
"[U]pon being sentenced to the penitentiary for violation of probation, one who 
has served time as a resident in a community correctional facility . . . is 
entitled to credit for that time served." Prejean, 794 P.2d  at 878. We 
determined that time spent in a community correctional facility should count as 
time served if a charge of escape would lie, and, since a resident of a 
community correctional facility could be charged with escape from detention 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 7-18-112 (1987), we held that the defendant was 
entitled to receive credit.

[¶18]   In the present case, Appellant 
argues that she should be granted credit against her sentence pursuant to 
Prejean because the S.T.O.P. is essentially the same as a community correctional 
facility. As previously noted, Prejean requires a charge of escape to lie before 
a probationer is entitled to receive credit. Appellant cites no authority under 
which she could have been charged with escape. Unlike in Prejean, Appellant 
could not be charged with escape pursuant to § 7-18-112 because the S.T.O.P. is 
not a community correctional facility. Wyo. Stat. § 7-18-102(a)(i) (1987) 
defines a community correctional facility or program as being "a community based 
or community-oriented facility or program which is operated either by a unit of 
local government or by a nongovernmental agency." The S.T.O.P. is administered 
by the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole, which is neither a local 
government nor a nongovernmental agency.

[¶19]   Appellant could also not be charged 
with escape from the S.T.O.P. pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-206(a) (1988): "A 
person commits a crime if he escapes from official detention." Official 
detention is defined in Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-201(a)(ii) (1988) as being 
an

arrest, detention in a 
facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of crime or alleged 
or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or 
detention in any manner and in any place for law enforcement purposes. 
"Official detention" does not include supervision on probation or parole or 
constraint incidental to release on bail."

(Emphasis 
added.) The statutory definition of official detention expressly omits probation 
supervision. The S.T.O.P.'s home electronic monitoring system, while admittedly 
being more intense than typical probation, still constitutes probation 
supervision, thus foreclosing a charge of escape pursuant to § 6-5-206. Cf. 
Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶20]   Appellant maintains that the 
S.T.O.P. conditions are just as stringent as those in a community correctional 
facility and warrant the same credit for time served. We find it difficult to 
compare the S.T.O.P. to a hypothetical community correctional facility. The 
record contains practically no information concerning how Appellant's actual 
electronic monitoring was accomplished or how confining it was. An additional 
difficulty in comparing the two is that community correctional facilities, drug 
rehabilitation facilities, and "halfway houses" vary in their levels of 
restrictiveness. While certain similarities may exist between home detention and 
a particular community correctional facility, Wyoming grants credit for the time 
spent in those environments from which a charge of escape would lie, and a 
charge of escape would not lie in this case. Craig, 804 P.2d  at 688; Prejean, 
794 P.2d  at 879.

[¶21]   Appellant also argues that our 
decision in Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1990), entitles her to receive 
credit for the time she spent in the S.T.O.P. 785 P.2d  at 498. She bases her 
argument upon the following comment from Renfro:

     We adopt the goal of 
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice for "the purpose . . 
. to end . . . technical distinctions by granting a comprehensive credit that 
treats all periods of confinement attributable to the underlying criminal 
transaction as equivalent, no matter what label is attached to such 
incarceration. To this end, [we would] require[] the credit to be offset against 
both the minimum and maximum terms imposed. . . ." III ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice 18.310 (2d ed. 1980).

Id. See also 
Standard 18-4.7, III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1980), adopted 
in Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 498 n. 10, and in Ramirez v. State, 800 P.2d 503, 504 
(Wyo. 1990). Appellant claims that her time spent in the S.T.O.P. constituted a 
period of confinement which directly related to her original 
conviction.

[¶22]   Appellant's argument is similar to 
the analysis used by other courts. In many jurisdictions, a probationer's 
entitlement to receive credit for the time he spent in a restrictive environment 
hinges upon whether the particular environment was sufficiently restrictive to 
constitute "custody" or "confinement." See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, 
Defendant's Right to Credit for Time Spent in Halfway House, Rehabilitation 
Center, or Other Restrictive Environment as Condition of Probation, 24 A.L.R.4th 
789 (1983). Wyoming's rule is similar to that of these other jurisdictions, but, 
rather than engaging in case-by-case comparisons, we have adopted a rule which, 
in essence, defines custody as an environment from which a charge of escape 
would lie.

[¶23]   Since we have adopted a rule which 
defines custody as an environment from which a charge of escape would lie, we do 
not need to consider whether the conditions of the S.T.O.P. were sufficiently 
restrictive to constitute custody. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that 
other jurisdictions have found that home detention is not sufficiently 
restrictive to constitute custody or incarceration. State v. Muratella, 240 Neb. 
567, 483 N.W.2d 128 (1992); Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90, 588 A.2d 898 
(1991); People v. Denning, 204 Ill. App.3d 720, 149 Ill.Dec. 890, 562 N.E.2d 354 
(1990); People v. Reinertson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 320, 223 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1986). Cf. 
State v. Speaks, 119 Wn.2d 204, 829 P.2d 1096 (1992) (en banc).

[¶24]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 We take judicial notice 
of these conditions. The S.T.O.P. conditions were not included in the record but 
were attached as an appendix to Appellant's brief. See Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074 (Wyo. 1992).

2 As support for her 
argument that the court failed to consider testimony indicating a lack of 
willfulness, Appellant cites to the judge's comment that "as long as there is 
some alcohol in the system there is a violation of probation." Read in context, 
the judge's comment did not imply that willfulness was not a factor but referred 
to the fact that any level of alcohol may be sufficient to revoke probation; the 
blood alcohol level did not need to be over a certain limit.