Case Title: Thomas v. State

Citation: 542 S.W.2d 284

Docket Number: CR76-111

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
542 S.W.2d 284 (1976) William H. THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR76-111. Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 25, 1976. *285 Richard L. Mays, of Walker, Kaplan & Mays, P. A., Little Rock, for appellant. Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by Jackson Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. BYRD, Justice. Involved in this case is the bail bond procedure conducted in the Little Rock Municipal Court. The record shows that petitioner William H. Thomas was arrested on Saturday May 8, 1976, at approximately 11:45 p. m. for allegedly possessing marijuana for sale. Bail at that time by prearrangement of the municipal court for all such offenses was set at 20,000. On Monday May 10, 1976, at petitioner's first appearance before the municipal court, and when it was determined that he was a resident of the State, the bail was reduced to $5,000 to be made only by a professional bail bondsman. It appears that no hearing was had at that time and on motion of the State the matter of petitioner's detention was passed to May 26, 1976. On May 11, 1976, petitioner through his present counsel filed a motion to reduce the $5,000 bail bond. In refusing to hold a pretrial release inquiry pursuant to Ark.Rules of Crim.Pro., Rule 8.5 the municipal judge stated: Following the hearing in municipal court, petitioner went to the circuit court upon a "Petition for Supervisory Writ of Mandamus and Certiorari and for Writ of Habeas Corpus." The circuit court held two hearingsone on May 14, 1976, and the other on May 17, 1976. The first hearing was conducted pursuant to Ark.Rules of Crim.Pro., Rule 8.3(c), wherein it was determined that petitioner, while driving an automobile occupied by two or three other men, had been stopped by the police and that a search of the car by the police turned up two pounds of marijuana. The court at that time fixed bail at $5,000 to "be bail by a surety, money bail by a surety or property bond" pending the May 17th hearing. In dismissing the mandamus petition, on May 17th, the circuit court stated: Following the ruling of the trial court, a temporary writ of certiorari was granted by this court releasing petitioner upon "$5,000 bail with surety or by depositing 10% of that bail with the clerk of the Municipal Court." Petitioner's contentions in this court are as follows: The Constitution of the State of Arkansas in so far as here pertinent provides: The Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by this Court on January 6, 1976, in so far as here applicable provide: An arrested person who is not released by citation or by other lawful manner shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. (a) Upon the first appearance of the defendant the judicial officer shall inform him of the charge. The judicial officer shall also inform the defendant that: (b) No further steps in the proceedings other than pretrial release inquiry may be taken until the defendant and his counsel have had an adequate opportunity to confer, unless the defendant has intelligently waived his right to counsel or has refused the assistance of counsel. (c) The judicial officer, if unable to dispose of the case at the first appearance, shall proceed to decide the question of the pretrial release of the defendant. In so doing, the judicial officer shall first determine by an informal, non-adversary hearing whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. The standard for determining probable cause at such hearing shall be the same as that which governs arrests with or without a warrant. (a) An inquiry by the judicial officer into the relevant facts which might affect the pretrial release decision shall be made: (b) In all other cases, the judicial officer may release the defendant on his own recognizance or on order to appear without conducting a pretrial release inquiry. (a) A pretrial release inquiry shall be conducted by the judicial officer prior to or at the first appearance of the defendant. (b) The inquiry should take the form of an assessment of factors relevant to the pretrial release decision, such as: (c) The prosecuting attorney should make recommendations to the judicial officer concerning: (a) At the first appearance the judicial officer may release the defendant on his personal recognizance or upon an order to appear. (b) Where conditions of release are found necessary, the judicial officer should impose one (1) or more of the following conditions: (a) The judicial officer shall set money bail only after he determines that no other conditions will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant in court. (b) If it is determined that money bail should be set, the judicial officer shall require one (1) of the following: (c) In setting the amount of bail the judicial officer should take into account all facts relevant to the risk of wilful nonappearance including: The drafting committee's comment to Rule 9.2 states: "Money bail in any form ought to be a last resort and should be used only to assure the defendant's appearance." In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 1, 96 L. Ed. 3 (1951), the twelve petitioners had been indicted in the District Court upon a charge of conspiring to violate the Smith Act. The trial court set bail at $50,000 for each petitioner. The only evidence offered by the Government on a motion for reduction of bond was a certified record showing that four persons previously convicted under the Smith Act had forfeited bail. In holding that the District Court in leaving the bail at $50,000 had violated both statutory and constitutional standards for admission to bail, a majority of the court, in speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, stated: In a separate opinion Justice Jackson elaborated: Obviously Rule 8.5, supra, mandates that the judicial officer hold a pretrial release inquiry upon the first appearance of an arrested person. Likewise, Rule 9.2 mandates a determination that no other condition would ensure the appearance of the arrested person before setting a money bail. When we consider the record before us with reference to the applicable law and the purpose of pretrial bail, we must agree with petitioner that the circuit court erred in refusing to direct the municipal court to conduct a pretrial release inquiry before setting money bail. The municipal court's adamantive bail requirements in drug arrests of $20,000 money bail at time of arrest with a reduction to $5,000 money bail for state residents can hardly be classified as a pretrial release inquiry. It would be putting form above substance to classify an inquiry limited to an arbitrary determination of whether the bail would be $20,000 or $5,000 money bail as a pretrial release inquiry within the meaning of Rule 8.5, supra. Consequently, we need not determine the nature and extent of a hearing necessary to satisfy the requirements of a pretrial release inquiry. In this connection we must note that The Honorable Municipal Judge was fearful that such inquiries would seriously impede the business of the municipal court. However, we must point out that the Constitution of this State and the foregoing Rules place much stress on the individual rights of persons and were drafted *290 with the view that the authorities would discharge their responsibilities by providing sufficient courts and courtroom facilities for the protection of those individual rights. Since the Ark.Rules of Criminal Procedure were drawn from the standpoint that money bail in any form should be used only as a last resort to ensure the appearance of an accused in court, we must agree with petitioner that the circuit court erred in refusing to require the municipal court to make determination that no other condition would ensure petitioner's appearance in court before setting money bail only. Finally, we must agree with petitioner that Rule 9.2 contemplates that in fixing money bail, the judicial officer will use the least restrictive type of money bail arrangement set out in Rule 9.2(b) for securing the appearance of an arrested person. The State to sustain the action of the circuit court contends that if there were any deficiencies in the municipal court then they were cured by the proceedings in the circuit court. This contention is not sustained by the record which shows bail fixed by the circuit court solely upon the offense charged and without regard to the individual responsibility of appellant. The tenor of the record before us is that a person arrested on a drug charge must either remain in jail or forfeit a considerable sum[1] to a professional bail bondsman. Thus in either case the arrested person is substantially penalized before trial. The spirit of the fixing of bail by the trial court contravened the drafting committee's view that "money bail in any form ought to be a last resort and should be used only to assure the defendant's appearance." The State also suggests that certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the proceedings in the circuit court. However, we pointed out in State v. Nelson, Berry Petroleum Co., 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969), that certiorari is available in the exercise of this court's superintending control over a tribunal which is proceeding illegally and where there is no other adequate mode of review. Writ granted. HOLT, J., not participating. FOGLEMAN, J., concurs. FOGLEMAN, Justice (concurring). In concurring, I disagree with only one particular of the majority opinion. I cannot agree that the circuit court did not conduct an adequate pretrial release inquiry. The circuit judge specifically found, and held, that only money bail would insure appellant's appearance, set the bail at $5,000 and declined to allow the payment of ten percent of the face amount of the bail into court, prescribing that bail be in the form of either a surety or property bond. The trial judge specifically stated that he did not feel that this was the proper case for a cash deposit of ten percent of the bail. It appears that the circuit judge did take into consideration relevant factors and made certain findings in that regard. He also found, as a basis for requiring money bail, that there was a probability of conviction and a substantial sentence of imprisonment, remarking that juries deal harshly with the offense with which appellant was charged. I do not believe that this requirement made by the circuit court mandated jail or forfeiture of a bail bondsman's fee. One as reliable as appellant is represented to be would likely be able to make a "property bond" without risking the fee. [1] The charge of a professional bail bondsman is regulated by the trial court, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-732 (Repl.1964), and ordinarily amounts to 10% of the face amount of the bond.