Case Title: Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-75

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc.1997 WY 127947 P.2d 1297Case Number: 97-75Decided: 11/13/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

HUBERT TOWNSEND, 

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

LIVING CENTERS ROCKY MOUNTAIN, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, d/b/a Living Centers of America, DONNA SCHULZ and MARGE 
INGALLS,  

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County 

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley

 

 

James P. Castberg, Sheridan for 
Appellant.

 Dennis M. 
Kirvin of Kirven and Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, for Appellees Living Centers 
of America and Donna Schulz .

Barry D. 
Epstein of Miles & Epstein, P.C., Denver Colorado, for Appellee 
Living Centers Rocky Mountain Inc.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1]      The employment of 
appellant Hubert Townsend was terminated following allegations of sexual 
harassment. Conceding that he was an at-will employee, Townsend nevertheless 
brought suit for wrongful termination under the theories of civil conspiracy, 
tort, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against his 
employer, appellee Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc. (Living Centers). The 
court ruled that these causes of action are not recognized in Wyoming and 
granted summary judgment to appellees.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Townsend presents 
these issues:

 

There are genuine issues as to material facts which 
preclude the granting of the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 
56(c) W.R.C.P. on the Appellant's cause of action for Civil Conspiracy and 
Wrongful Termination.

 

There are genuine issues of material facts which 
preclude the granting of the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 
56(c) W.R.C.P. on the Appellant's cause of action for Prima Facie 
Tort.

 

Living Centers presents these 
issues:

A. Did the district court properly grant appellee's 
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., on appellant's claims of 
civil conspiracy and prima facie tort in a wrongful termination 
case?

B. Is there no reasonable cause for appeal and should 
appellees be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs under Rule 10.05 
W.R.A.P.?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Living Centers 
owns and operates the Sheridan Manor which is a nursing care facility located in 
Sheridan, Wyoming. Donna Schulz is the administrator of the Sheridan Manor, and 
Marge Ingalls was the director of nursing during Townsend's employment. Townsend 
was hired as a registered nurse on October 27, 1993, and, as set out by an 
employee handbook, began a probationary period for the first ninety days. As a 
probationary employee, Townsend was an at-will employee. On December 16, 1993, 
four female employees reported a number of incidents they claimed constituted 
sexual harassment and which involved Townsend. Ingalls suspended Townsend, and 
on December 20, Townsend was notified that his employment would be terminated. 
He responded in writing specifically referencing the incidents. He also 
requested that he be allowed to face his accusers and to know the names of his 
accusers. Ingalls refused to divulge that information, and Schulz approved 
Townsend's termination, which was effective on December 23, 
1993.

 

[¶5]      Townsend filed 
suit, alleging in his complaint civil conspiracy to cause wrongful termination, 
wrongful termination, punitive damages for willful and wanton civil conspiracy 
and wrongful termination, and prima facie tort for wrongful termination of 
Townsend's employment in a tortious manner. In granting summary judgment, the 
district court ruled that wrongful termination and these torts were not 
recognized in Wyoming, and the facts of this case did not constitute those 
torts. This appeal followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]      As can be seen 
from the precise wording in Townsend's complaint, the dispositive issue in this 
case is whether or not Wyoming will recognize the claims of civil conspiracy or 
prima facie tort as theories of recovery for an employment termination. Our 
standard of review for these questions of law is de novo. 

 

[¶7]      Generally in 
Wyoming, only contract remedies are available to provide relief for wrongful 
terminations, and tort remedies are rarely available in the employment context. 
For an at-will employee, a breach of contract action is not available, and the 
only tort remedies available to date are breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing which was recognized in Wilder v. Cody Country Ch. of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 221 (Wyo. 1994), the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress recognized in Leithead v. American Colloid, 721 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Wyo. 1986), and, as recognized in Griess v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 754 (Wyo. 1989), and Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985), a cause of action for retaliatory discharge which violates 
the State's public policy when no other remedy is 
available.

 

[¶8]      The at-will 
employment rule is derived from the common law. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 217. We have 
recognized that the common law is based upon experience, and a court can and 
should modify it to meet changing conditions. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wyo. 1990). This Court has modified or abandoned the common law 
on issues of interspousal tort immunity, parental tort immunity, recovery for 
loss of spousal and parental consortium, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, off-premises liability of a lessee, and classifications of tort 
plaintiffs in landowner liability cases.1 In determining whether or not to 
recognize a new cause of action, our decisions usually evaluate whether 
developments in the law agree with the policies which have guided us and upon 
which our precedent is based. See 
Ortega, 902 P.2d  at 204; Nulle, 
797 P.2d  at 1173; Gates, 719 P.2d  at 
196.

 

[¶9]      Our jurisprudence 
in the employment context has developed from the premise that the stability of 
the business community is our primary consideration and that stability is best 
served by applying contract principles in the employment context. Based on that 
fundamental precept we have produced the rule that, unless an express or implied 
contract states or establishes otherwise, all employment is a contract for 
at-will employment. Brodie v. General 
Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997). An at-will employee can be 
terminated for any or no reason at all. Id. The at-will employment rule offers 
no remedy to an employee who has been arbitrarily or improperly discharged and 
has suffered adverse effects on his or her economic and social status regardless 
of how devastating those effects actually were. Stability in the business 
community is preserved because, at least at the state level, employers' and 
employees' decisions remain subject only to the express or implied contracts 
into which they have voluntarily entered or subject to statute. The tort actions 
available to an at-will employee rarely apply as they serve only to protect 
extraordinary benefits or public policy as set by the 
State.

 

[¶10]   Recognizing the torts of civil 
conspiracy or prima facie tort as actionable for employment terminations would 
not further the policies just described, but would, in fact, destabilize our 
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to appellees 
on the basis that Wyoming does not recognize these causes of 
action.

 

[¶11]   Living Centers contends this appeal 
was presented without cogent argument and was frivolous and meritless. It refers 
to Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730 
(Wyo. 1985), for the rule that there was no reasonable cause for a frivolous 
appeal and requests attorney fees and costs as permitted by WYO. R.APP. P. 
10.05. We generally decline to grant sanctions under this rule. See Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997). Heretofore, we had not expressly rejected these theories of 
recovery and decline to certify that there was no reasonable cause for appeal 
pursuant to Rule 10.05.

 

Footnotes

1 Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 
1995) (refusal to abrogate common law rule of landlord immunity); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 
1987) (abrogating common law rule of interspousal tort immunity); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 
(Wyo. 1992) (abrogating common law rule of parental tort immunity); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 
1986) (rejecting common law rule denying recovery for loss of spousal 
consortium); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell 
Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990) (rejecting common law rule denying 
recovery for claim for loss of parental consortium); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 
1986) (rejecting common law rule denying a family member recovery of damages for 
the negligent infliction of emotional distress); Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987) (rejecting common law rule that a landowner has no duty to warn 
an invitee of risks off the landowner's premises); and Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 
1993) (rejecting the common law classifications of invitee and licensee and 
ruling that landowners owed a duty of reasonable 
care).