Case Title: Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp.

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1926

Docket Number: 20091070

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1926.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1926 
RIEDEL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1926.] 
Torts — Asbestos claims — Non-asbestos claims brought in same suit as asbestos 
claims subject to 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292 — When claimant fails to 
make necessary prima facie showing required by R.C. 2307.91(A)(1) on 
asbestos claims and court grants motion for administrative dismissal, 
court may sever non-asbestos claims for trial. 
(No. 2009-1070 — Submitted February 16, 2010 — Decided May 6, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Nos. 91237, 91238, and 91239, 2009-Ohio-1242. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The proposition of law presented by the appellants is as follows:  
"An asbestos claim subject to H.B. 292 may not be severed from non-asbestos 
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claims arising from the same lawsuit and involving the same indivisible jury." 1 
We conclude that the General Assembly did not intend the statutory scheme 
addressing asbestos claims to apply to non-asbestos claims and, therefore, that 
non-asbestos claims can be severed from asbestos claims. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Appellees Jack E. Riedel, Danny R. Six, and Josephine Weldy 
(collectively "Riedel") separately brought suit against appellants Consolidated 
Rail Corporation, American Premier Underwriters, Inc., and Norfolk Southern 
Railway 
Company 
(collectively 
"Consolidated 
Rail"), 
alleging 
various 
occupational-disease claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Section 
51 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code  ("FELA") and the Locomotive Inspection Act, 
Section 20701 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code.  Because the complaints included 
claims for asbestosis based on occupational exposure to asbestos, they were 
assigned to the court’s separate asbestos docket, a special docket in the Cuyahoga 
County Common Pleas Court designed to manage the court’s heavy caseload of 
asbestos claims. 
{¶ 3} Consolidated Rail moved for an administrative dismissal, alleging 
that Riedel had failed to make the preliminary prima facie showing required by 
R.C. 2307.93(A)(1).  When the court ordered Riedel to make the required 
showing, Riedel offered evidence intended to comply with R.C. 2307.92(B) (any 
person bringing an asbestos claim must make a prima facie showing “that the 
exposed person has a physical impairment, that the physical impairment is a result 
of a medical condition, and that the person's exposure to asbestos is a substantial 
contributing factor to the medical condition”).  Finding Riedel’s evidence 
insufficient to establish a prima facie case, the court granted Consolidated Rail's 
                                                 
1.  “H.B. 292” refers to 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970, which enacted 
R.C. 2307.91 et seq., Ohio’s asbestos-claims legislation. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
motion for administrative dismissal as to the asbestos-related claims, but severed 
the remaining claims and ordered them to be scheduled for trial. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, Consolidated Rail argued that the trial court erred in (1) 
ruling that the administrative-dismissal provisions of R.C. 2307.93 do not apply to 
the non-asbestos claims and (2) severing the non-asbestos claims for trial. 
Consolidated Rail asserted that the court should have administratively dismissed 
all the claims pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(C). 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 
stating, "The administrative dismissal provision is limited to the asbestos-related 
claims that are specified in R.C. 2307.92."  Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 8th Dist. 
Nos. 91237, 91238, and 91239, 2009-Ohio-1242, ¶ 13.  The court reasoned that 
the General Assembly "could have allowed the court to administratively dismiss 
the entire tort action, but chose to limit R.C. 2307.93(C) to asbestos-related 
nonmalignancy claims, lung cancer claims in a smoker, and wrongful death 
claims."  Id.  We accepted jurisdiction.  Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 122 Ohio 
St.3d 1521, 2009-Ohio-4776, 913 N.E.2d 457. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} Because this case "requires the interpretation of statutory authority, 
which is a question of law, our review is de novo."  State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶ 8, citing Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio 
St.3d 460, 466, 639 N.E.2d 425. 
{¶ 7} R. C. 2307.93(A)(1) provides that a "plaintiff in any tort action 
who alleges an asbestos claim shall file * * * prima-facie evidence of the exposed 
person's physical impairment that meets the minimum requirements specified in 
[R.C. 2307.92(B), (C), or (D)].  R.C. 2307.92(B), (C), and (D) set forth the 
minimum requirements of a prima facie showing in claims alleging injury related 
to exposure to asbestos.  This provision plainly indicates that the General 
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Assembly intended to require all asbestos-claim plaintiffs, irrespective of the 
action in which the claims are filed, to provide prima-facie evidence of physical 
impairment related to asbestos in order to avoid dismissal.  This provision clearly 
cannot apply to claims of injury due to exposure to other toxic substances, such as 
the claims by Riedel of injury due to diesel exhaust. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 2307.93(C) provides that a "court shall administratively 
dismiss the plaintiff's claim without prejudice" when the plaintiff fails to make the 
prima-facie showing required by R.C. 2307.93(A)(1).  Consolidated Rail argues 
that the General Assembly's use of "claim" in R.C. 2307.93(C) is broad enough to 
refer to the more comprehensive "tort action," as used in R.C. 2907.93(A)(1).  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 9} The statutory scheme that addresses asbestos claims, R.C. 2307.91 
through 2307.98, is replete with the terms "tort action,” "asbestos claim,” and 
"claim."  As far as we can determine, there are no instances in which the General 
Assembly, in referring to a “claim,” clearly intended to encompass the entire tort 
action.  We agree with the court of appeals, that if the General Assembly had 
intended R.C. 2307.93(C) to administratively dismiss an entire tort action, it 
would have used the term "tort action" instead of the more limited "claim."  2009-
Ohio-1242, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 10} A claim that has been administratively dismissed may be reinstated 
only when the plaintiff is able to make a prima-facie showing as to the asbestos 
claim.  R.C. 2907.93(C).  Based on Consolidated Rail's interpretation of "claim" 
as encompassing the entire "tort action," non-asbestos claims paired with an 
asbestos claim would remain unresolved, possibly forever, unless the plaintiff 
could make a prima-facie showing as to the asbestos claim.  We consider that 
result unreasonable or absurd.  Accordingly, it is our duty to construe the statute to 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
avoid this result.  R.C.  1.47(C); State ex rel. Cooper v. Sacord (1950), 153 Ohio 
St. 367, 41 O.O. 396, 92 N.E.2d 390, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 11} We conclude that the administrative-dismissal provision of R.C. 
2307.93(C) applies only to asbestos claims, even when the tort action in which the 
claim is brought includes non-asbestos claims.  We also conclude that when a tort 
action includes an asbestos claim that is administratively dismissed, non-asbestos 
claims can be severed from the asbestos claim and proceed to trial.  Furthermore, 
we conclude that the trial court in this case properly severed the non-asbestos 
claims from the asbestos claims.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 12} I concur.  However, I write separately to address the argument of 
appellants and amicus curiae that severing non-asbestos claims would overburden 
the asbestos docket and undermine judicial economy.  They contend that litigating 
non-asbestos claims on the already overloaded asbestos docket would thwart the 
purpose of H.B. 292, which was intended to expedite asbestos cases. 
{¶ 13} The adjudication of the non-asbestos claims is a matter best 
decided at the local level.  Once the non-asbestos claims have been severed from 
the asbestos claims, the local court should determine whether the non-asbestos 
claims may be adjudicated on the asbestos docket or should be transferred to the 
court’s general docket.  I believe that this is a matter of docket control that is best 
left to court administration at the local level. 
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O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
__________________ 
Doran & Murphy, L.L.P., Christopher M. Murphy, and Michael L. 
Torcello; and Mary Brigid Sweeney Co., L.L.P., and Mary Brigid Sweeney, for 
appellees. 
Burns, White & Hickton, L.L.C., David A. Damico, Ira L. Podheiser, and 
Megan L. Zerega, for appellants. 
Gallagher Sharp, Kevin C. Alexandersen, Colleen A. Mountcastle, and 
Holly M. Olarczuk-Smith, for amicus curiae, Grand Trunk Western Railroad, Inc. 
______________________