Case Title: Hamilton National Bank v. Touriansky

Citation: 271 S.W.2d 1

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1954-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
271 S.W.2d 1 (1954) HAMILTON NATIONAL BANK, Adm'r, etc., v. Leib TOURIANSKY et al. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 6, 1954. *2 Warren W. Kennerly, of Knoxville, for appellant guardian ad litem. Ambrose & Wilson, of Knoxville, for Intervening Petitioners. H.H. McCampbell, Jr., and Creekmore & Buhl, all of Knoxville, for appellees. NEIL, Chief Justice. The Hamilton National Bank as administrator, etc., has petitioned the Court for the writ of certiorari to review and reverse the decree of the Court of Appeals. The case presents many interesting points of view. Since we are persuaded to overrule the assignments of error and affirm the decree of the Court of Appeals we adopt the unusual course of setting out in full the opinion, and then will respond to the appropriate assignments of error. Opinion by McAmis, P. J. Before giving consideration to the assignments of error it should be said that the issues involved are extremely controversial. It was the well-considered opinion of the Chancellor that in view of the strained relationship between the governments of Russia and the United States, that the primary beneficiaries of the testator could not be contacted by the Administrator and, if it were possible to do so, any effort to do so might jeopardize their safety. His decree directed that the Administrator make no further effort to locate them. There are facts and circumstances appearing in the record which tend to support the Chancellor's view. But we feel that the Court of Appeals was correct in expressing a contrary opinion, holding that the Administrator should not make distribution to the several charitable institutions mentioned in the will until the expiration of five years from the date of the testator's death. We deem it unnecessary to reply to persuasive arguments of the respective counsel in support of, and in refutation of, the several assignments of error. We will respond to those assignments which we consider as determinative of the issues. The first two assignments complain that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was not impossible to communicate with citizens of Russia and that there should be delay in closing the administration of the estate. The third assignment is as follows: Assignments 4, 5, and 6 are as follows: It cannot be doubted that the court was correct in holding that the intention of the testator is of paramount importance and should be followed, "and given effect if it can be done without contravening some rule of property or some fixed rule of law or public policy." *6 Responding to the contention that the court erred in failing to give specific instructions to petitioner on the remand as to what further action should be taken in searching for the beneficiaries named, we think it not unwise to await further developments because of the manifest difficulties in locating beneficiaries living behind the so-called "iron curtain". Moreover there appears from the record that at least one sister of the testator has made an effort to intervene since this cause was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Whether or not she is an impostor or otherwise, and the pro confesso taken against her should be set aside is wisely left to the decision of the Chancellor. The Court of Appeals properly refused to rule on the right of intervention by this individual claiming to be a beneficiary. We find no error in the court's holding that there is no prohibition on the transfer of private funds from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of Russia. No statute, or any ruling of the Department of Justice is cited in support of this assignment. There is a letter in the record dated April 18, 1951, from the Department of Justice of the United States to the petitioner stating that there are no such restrictions. The Administrator, however, would not be justified in paying anything to anyone, claiming to be a beneficiary, or to an agent or representative of such beneficiary, i.e., an individual or an official of the Soviet Union, unless expressly authorized by the Chancellor. The opinion of the Surrogate's Court of New York, Alexandroff's Estate, 61 N.Y.S.2d 866, and other cases based upon the "Surrogate's Court Act" are not persuasive that the Court of Appeals erred in its opinion. Counsel for the petitioner has ably argued the questions at issue. But we feel, as did the Court of Appeals, that a delay in making disbursement of the funds is in strict conformity to the testator's intention and does not embarrass the administration of the estate in any way, nor have the beneficiaries any legal right to complain at such reasonable delay. We think the holding of the Court of Appeals is correct. The assignments of error are overruled, and the writ is accordingly denied.