Case Title: Estate of Long v. Fowler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 303A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-81 
No. 303A20 
Filed 13 August 2021 
ESTATE OF MELVIN JOSEPH LONG, by and through MARLA HUDSON LONG, 
Administratrix 
 
 
v. 
JAMES D. FOWLER, Individually, DAVID A. MATTHEWS, Individually, DENNIS 
F. KINSLER, Individually, ROBERT J. BURNS, Individually, MICHAEL T. 
VANCOUR, Individually, and MICHAEL S. SCARBOROUGH, Individually 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 270 N.C. App. 241 (2020), reversing an order entered on 3 May 
2019 by Judge Josephine K. Davis in Superior Court, Person County, and remanding 
to the trial court. Heard in the Supreme Court on 18 May 2021.  
 
Hardison & Cochran, PLLC, by John Paul Godwin; and Sanford Thompson, 
PLLC, by Sanford Thompson IV, for plaintiff-appellee. 
 
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Jonathan E. Hall and Patrick M. 
Meacham; and Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Melissa K. Walker, 
Assistant Attorney General, Shannon Cassell, Civil Bureau Chief, and Sarah 
G. Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, for defendant-appellants. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
This case raises the question of whether the estate of an individual killed by 
the allegedly negligent acts of State employees can proceed in state court to assert 
wrongful death claims against those employees in their individual capacities or 
whether such a suit is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Following our 
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precedent, sovereign immunity does not apply to suits against state employees in 
their individual capacities. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in dismissing 
the complaint on those grounds.   
¶ 2 
 
The tragic event giving rise to plaintiff’s claims occurred on the morning of 20 
January 2017, when Melvin Joseph Long was working to reconnect a trailer-mounted 
chiller on the campus of North Carolina State University (NCSU). To do so, he needed 
to remove metal flanges that capped two water pipes on the chiller. However, 
unbeknownst to Mr. Long, the pipes had become filled with pressurized gas after 
water in the pipes froze and the pipes cracked. As he began to loosen one of the metal 
flanges, it shot off the water pipe and hit him in the face with great force. Mr. Long 
died from his injuries five days later, on 25 January 2017.  
¶ 3 
 
Following his death, Mr. Long’s estate brought the present action against 
James D. Fowler, David A. Matthews, Dennis F. Kinsler, Robert J. Burns, Michael T. 
Vancour, and Michael S. Scarborough (defendants), NCSU employees who had 
worked on the chiller during the months before Mr. Long’s injury and, according to 
plaintiff’s allegations, caused his injury. In addition to arguing that the complaint 
failed to allege substantive elements of Mr. Long’s claims, defendants have asked us 
to hold that Mr. Long’s claims are brought against defendants in their official 
capacities or, in the alternative, that claims such as those brought by Mr. Long are 
necessarily claims against the State that cannot be brought against defendants in 
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their individual capacities. Doing so would require us to overturn several decades of 
this Court’s precedent establishing that claims brought against State employees in 
their individual capacities are not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
However, we are constrained to promote the “stability in the law and uniformity in 
its application” which may only be achieved through “respect for the opinions of our 
predecessors.” Wiles v. Welparnel Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 85 (1978).  
¶ 4 
 
The tie between injury and remedy is so fundamental to our law that it is 
enshrined in the first article of our state constitution—“every person for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course 
of law.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 18. Hewing close to our precedent in this case maintains 
the general principle that the law provides remedies to injured persons. Cf. Wirth v. 
Bracey, 258 N.C. 505, 508 (1963) (“The obvious intention of the General Assembly in 
enacting the Tort Claims Act was to enlarge the rights and remedies of a person 
injured by the actionable negligence of an employee of a State agency while acting in 
the course of his employment.”). By preserving remedies in tort, we “deter certain 
kinds of conduct by imposing liability when that conduct causes harm.” Haarhuis v. 
Cheek, 255 N.C. App. 471, 480 (2017) (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen 
M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 14 (2d ed. 2011)). As we have previously stated, 
“[t]here can be little doubt that immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, 
while liability promotes care and caution.” Rabon v. Rowan Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 269 
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N.C. 1, 13 (1967). Defendants in this case were sued in their individual capacities, 
and the complaint adequately stated claims for the tort relief sought by Mr. Long’s 
estate. As a result, the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, 
and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that order. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 5 
 
Since this case comes to us on the trial court’s order granting a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules 
of Civil Procedure, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Corwin v. 
British Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 611 (2018) (Rule 12(b)(1)); Parker v. Town of 
Erwin, 243 N.C. App. 84, 96 (2015) (Rule 12(b)(2)); Bridges v. Parrish, 366 N.C. 539, 
541 (2013) (Rule 12(b)(6)).  
¶ 6 
 
The Complaint alleges that in December 2016, NCSU owned, operated, and 
used a large, trailer-mounted chiller. Around 21 December 2016, one or more of 
defendants, pursuant to a work order completed during the course of their 
employment, shut the chiller down, disconnecting its power and water sources. At 
that time, they drained water from the chiller. However, two signs on the chiller 
contained a warning indicating that it was “not possible to drain all water” from the 
chiller and that the chiller “must be drained and refilled with” antifreeze solution 
“[f]or freeze protection during shut-down.” Similarly, the chiller’s operating manual 
instructed that the chiller should be filled with antifreeze to “prevent freeze-up 
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damage to the cooler tubes.” Defendants did not put antifreeze into the chiller.  
¶ 7 
 
Almost two weeks later, on 3 January 2017, one or more defendants tightly 
secured heavy metal flanges, weighing approximately 13.1 pounds, to the ends of the 
chiller’s water pipes to cap the pipes. A few days after that, the area experienced a 
hard freeze, with temperatures falling as low as nine degrees Fahrenheit. Water 
remaining in the pipes froze and ruptured the pipes, which caused the pipes to fill 
with a pressurized refrigerant gas. The gas built up in the pipes behind the metal 
flanges, and the pipes became pressurized.  
¶ 8 
 
On 20 January 2017, Mr. Long attempted to loosen the flanges on the chiller 
pipes so that the chiller could be reconnected. As he began doing so, one of the flanges 
flew off the end of the pipe, propelled by the pressurized refrigerant gas, and struck 
him in the face. The flange knocked off part of Mr. Long’s skull, and he died five days 
later.  
¶ 9 
 
Marla Hudson Long, Mr. Long’s wife and the personal representative of Mr. 
Long’s estate, filed the instant action in Superior Court, Person County, on 13 
November 2018. On 19 February 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 
arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the 
person of defendants and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. On 21 February 2019, defendants filed their answer and defenses. 
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Following a hearing on 8 April 2019, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to 
dismiss in an order filed 3 May 2019.  
¶ 10 
 
Following the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, the 
estate appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s order in a divided decision, holding that defendants, employees of NCSU, had 
been sued in their individual capacities and were therefore not entitled to the defense 
of sovereign immunity and that the complaint had adequately stated claims for 
negligence and gross negligence. Estate of Long v. Fowler, 270 N.C. App. 241, 250, 
252–53 (2020). The dissent, on the other hand, would have held that the complaint 
failed to adequately plead negligence or gross negligence and that defendants were 
entitled to sovereign immunity because the allegedly negligent actions occurred 
within the scope of their employment as public employees. Id. at 254–55, 257 (Tyson, 
J., dissenting).  
¶ 11 
 
Before this Court, defendants assert that they are being sued in their official 
capacities and that the suit is actually one against NCSU, which is entitled to 
sovereign immunity. They also argue that the complaint fails to state claims for 
negligence and gross negligence because it does not allege facts establishing 
proximate cause, and that the complaint fails to adequately allege claims for punitive 
damages. We reject these arguments and affirm the Court of Appeals. A suit against 
State employees is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity when brought 
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against the employees in their individual capacities. The complaint in this case 
indicates that it is brought against defendants in their individual capacities. 
Moreover, the complaint adequately alleges that Mr. Long’s injury was proximately 
caused by defendants’ conduct and adequately alleges that defendants acted with the 
requisite willful or wanton conduct to support a claim for punitive damages. 
II. 
Analysis 
A. Sovereign immunity 
¶ 12 
 
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1), “we apply de novo review, accepting the allegations in the complaint as 
true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Corwin, 
371 N.C. at 611.1 We review de novo “[q]uestions of law regarding the applicability of 
sovereign or governmental immunity.” Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 
(2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
368 N.C. 609, 611 (2016)).  
¶ 13 
 
Defendants are not entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity merely 
because they are State employees, even when the tortious conduct is alleged to have 
                                            
1 As was the case in Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., we need not decide whether a motion 
to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity is properly designated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
or a Rule 12(b)(2) motion. See Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 328 (1982) (stating 
that “the distinction becomes crucial in North Carolina because” a denial of a Rule 12(b)(2) 
motion is immediately appealable by statute while a denial of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is not). 
Here, the motion to dismiss was granted, and neither Ms. Long’s appeal to the Court of 
Appeals nor defendants’ appeal to this Court was an interlocutory appeal.  
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occurred during the scope of their employment. Miller v. Jones, 224 N.C. 783, 787 
(1945) (“The mere fact that a person charged with negligence is an employee of others 
to whom immunity from liability is extended on grounds of public policy does not 
thereby excuse him from liability for negligence in the manner in which his duties 
are performed, or for performing a lawful act in an unlawful manner.”); see also 
Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 609 (1999) (stating that it is irrelevant whether 
allegations of tortious conduct relate to a public employee defendant’s official duties 
“[b]ecause public employees are individually liable for negligence in the performance 
of their duties”); Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 108 (1997) (“Therefore, the fact that 
defendants may have been acting as agents of the State does not preclude a claim 
against defendants.”).2 However, as defendants correctly note, a suit against a State 
employee in that employee’s official capacity is a suit against the State and therefore 
subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Isenhour, 350 N.C. at 608 (“A suit 
against a defendant in his individual capacity means that the plaintiff seeks recovery 
from the defendant directly; a suit against a defendant in his official capacity means 
                                            
2 It is inconsistent with a fair reading of any of our precedents establishing that 
sovereign immunity is unavailable to a State employee sued in his or her individual capacity 
to suggest that the law is “less than clear,” on this point. See, e.g., Mullis, v. Sechrest, 347 
N.C. 548, 551 (1998) (“[T]he threshold issue to be determined” when evaluating what 
immunity defense are available “is whether [the] defendant [ ] is being sued in his official 
capacity, individual capacity, or both”); see also Trey Allen, Local Government Immunity to 
Lawsuits in North Carolina, (Inst. of Gov’t, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Oct. 2018, at 5–6)  
(“Under current case law, governmental immunity is not a defense to tort claims alleged 
against officers or employees in their individual capacities.”). 
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that the plaintiff seeks recovery from the entity of which the public servant defendant 
is an agent.” (quoting Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110)). As a result, as defendants 
acknowledge, the threshold question in this case is whether defendants are being 
sued in their individual or in their official capacities. 3 
B. Individual or official capacity 
¶ 14 
 
It is abundantly clear from the complaint that defendants are being sued in 
their individual capacities. “It is a simple matter for attorneys to clarify the capacity 
in which a defendant is being sued. Pleadings should indicate in the caption the 
                                            
3 The dissent wrongly posits that “the distinction between official and individual 
capacity conflicts with the concept of waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.”  In fact, the 
distinction between an “official” and “individual capacity” suit has been recognized as 
determinative when examining assertions of sovereign immunity by both the State of North 
Carolina under State law, as detailed above, and in claims arising under federal law. As we 
explained in Corum, 
 
[S]tate governmental officials can be sued in their individual capacities for 
damages under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983. . . . [U]nlike a suit against a state official in 
his official capacity, which is basically a suit against the official office and 
therefore against the State itself, a suit against an individual who happens to 
be a governmental official but is not acting in his official capacity is not 
imputed to the State. Such individuals are sued as individuals, not as 
governmental employees. Presumably, they are personally liable for payment 
of any damages awarded. 
 
Corum v. Univ. of N. Carolina Through Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 772 (1992); cf. Lewis 
v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017) (“The identity of the real party in interest dictates 
what immunities may be available. Defendants in an official-capacity action may assert 
sovereign immunity. . . . But sovereign immunity does not erect a barrier against suits to 
impose individual and personal liability.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing 
the distinction between official and individual capacity claims in no way “conflicts with the 
concept of waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity” because there is no sovereign immunity 
to assert when the defendant is sued in his or her individual capacity. 
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capacity in which a plaintiff intends to hold a defendant liable.” Mullis v. Sechrest, 
347 N.C. 548, 554 (1998). Here, the caption of the complaint lists each named 
defendant followed by “Individually” after each name. Moreover, the first line of the 
complaint indicates that the plaintiff is “complaining of the defendants in their 
individual capacities, jointly and severally.” The prayer for relief seeks relief against 
defendants “jointly and/or severally” after “having stated claims against the 
defendants, individually and jointly.” This is further indication that the complaint 
states claims against defendants in their individual capacities. See id. (“Finally, in 
the prayer for relief, plaintiffs should indicate whether they seek to recover damages 
from the defendant individually or as an agent of the governmental entity.”).  
¶ 15 
 
Importantly, the prayer for relief does not seek injunctive relief implicating the 
exercise of governmental power—it instead seeks only compensatory and punitive 
damages against the individual defendants. See id. at 552 (discussing the distinction 
between official and individual capacity claims and noting that “seek[ing] an 
injunction requiring the defendant to take an action involving the exercise of a 
governmental power” is indicative of an official capacity suit (quoting Meyer, 347 N.C. 
at 110)). When, as in the instant case, the complaint seeks monetary damages, the 
claim “is an individual-capacity claim” if “the complaint indicates that the damages 
are sought . . . from the pocket of the individual defendant.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110 
(quoting Anita R. Brown-Graham & Jeffrey S. Koeze, Immunity from Personal 
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Liability under State Law for Public Officials and Employees: An Update, Loc. Gov’t 
L. Bull. 67 (Inst. of Gov’t, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill), Apr. 1995, at 7).  
¶ 16 
 
Defendants have argued that they are being sued in their official capacities, 
and not in their individual capacities, because their allegedly tortious conduct was 
performed in the scope and course of their employment. However,  
[w]hether the allegations relate to actions outside the scope 
of defendant’s official duties is not relevant in determining 
whether the defendant is being sued in his or her official or 
individual capacity. To hold otherwise would contradict 
North Carolina Supreme Court cases that have held or 
stated that public employees may be held individually 
liable for mere negligence in the performance of their 
duties.  
Meyer, 347 N.C. at 111.  
¶ 17 
 
Defendants have also argued that “the course of proceedings” indicates that 
the suit is brought against defendants in their official capacities, not in their 
individual capacities. However, we need not look to “the course of proceedings” when 
“the complaint . . . clearly specif[ies] whether the defendants are being sued in their 
individual or official capacities.” Mullis, 347 N.C. at 552 (quoting Kentucky v. 
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)). As indicated above, the complaint in this 
case clearly indicates that defendants are being sued in their individual capacities. 
There is no ambiguity in the complaint which would require us to look to the course 
of proceedings to determine in what capacity defendants are being sued. 
¶ 18 
 
Essentially, defendants assert that this suit is one against the State because 
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Ms. Long has also sued NCSU in the Industrial Commission. However, “the fact that 
the Tort Claims Act provides for subject matter jurisdiction in the Industrial 
Commission over a negligence claim against the State does not preclude a claim 
against defendants in Superior Court.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 108. “A plaintiff may 
maintain both a suit against a state agency in the Industrial Commission under the 
Tort Claims Act and a suit against the negligent agent or employee in the General 
Court of Justice for common-law negligence.” Id. (citing Wirth, 258 N.C. at 507–08).  
¶ 19 
 
Finally, defendants asserted at oral argument that regardless of whether the 
complaint attempts to state claims against defendants in their individual capacities, 
the General Assembly has “taken off the table” suits against individual employees for 
conduct within the scope of their employment. Defendants assert that the suit is 
actually brought against them in their official capacities because the General 
Assembly has passed a law of general applicability which causes the State to pay 
judgments in actions brought against State employees. In defendants’ view, any other 
conclusion would “subvert the General Assembly’s efforts to route these kinds of tort 
claims to the Industrial Commission.” We can divine no such intent from the statutes 
that defendants cite. 
¶ 20 
 
By statute, the General Assembly has provided that “upon request of an 
employee or former employee, the State may provide for the defense of any civil or 
criminal action or proceeding brought against him in his official or individual 
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capacity, or both, on account of an act done or omission made in the scope and course 
of his employment as a State employee.” N.C.G.S. § 143-300.3 (2019). In such a case, 
the State has set out its intention to “pay (i) a final judgment awarded in a court of 
competent jurisdiction against a State employee or (ii) the amount due under a 
settlement of the action under this section.” N.C.G.S. § 143-300.6(a) (2019). 
Defendants argue that these two statutes indicate that an action against a State 
employee which the State chooses to defend is in actuality an action against the State 
entitled to sovereign immunity and required to be brought in the Industrial 
Commission pursuant to the State Tort Claims Act. See N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (2019) 
(“The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the 
purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of 
Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and 
agencies of the State.”).  
¶ 21 
 
The interpretation urged by defendants is belied by the text of the statutes 
themselves. The provision permitting the payment of judgments and settlements 
against State employees expressly provides that “[t]his section does not waive the 
sovereign immunity of the State with respect to any claim.” N.C.G.S. § 143-300.6(a). 
If, as defendants claim, actions against State employees which the State has elected 
to defend are entitled to sovereign immunity protections and may only proceed in the 
Industrial Commission, there would have been no need for the General Assembly to 
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specify that judgments or settlements paid in that context are not a waiver of the 
State’s sovereign immunity. If defendants were correct, there would be no danger that 
the payment of a judgment or settlement in such an action could constitute a waiver 
of the State’s sovereign immunity—the payment would have been made in an 
Industrial Commission action pursuant to the State’s limited waiver of immunity in 
the State Tort Claims Act. The General Assembly would have had no reason to specify 
that the payment of a judgment or settlement on behalf of a State employee “does not 
waive the sovereign immunity of the State with respect to any claim.” See N.C.G.S. 
§ 143-300.6(a). Adopting defendants’ argument would necessitate the conclusion that 
section 143-300.6 contains superfluous language—this conclusion is fatal to their 
claim. See State v. Morgan, 372 N.C. 609, 614 (2019) (“[A] statute may not be 
interpreted ‘in a manner which would render any of its words superfluous.’ ” (quoting 
State v. Coffey, 336 N.C. 412, 417 (1994))). 
¶ 22 
 
More broadly, the statutory scheme referenced by defendants would not exist 
if actions against State employees in their individual capacities were subject to the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. “[T]he Tort Claims Act applies only to actions against 
state departments, institutions, and agencies and does not apply to claims against 
officers, employees, involuntary servants, and agents of the State.” Meyer, 347 N.C. 
at 107. As a result, no action could be maintained in the Industrial Commission 
against the individual defendants being sued in the instant action. However, section 
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143-300.6 of our General Statutes contemplates the payment by the State of “a final 
judgment awarded in a court of competent jurisdiction against a State employee.” 
N.C.G.S. § 143-300.6(a). If these actions could only be brought in the Industrial 
Commission, which has no jurisdiction over the individual defendants, there would 
have been no need for the General Assembly to provide for the payment of judgments 
against State employees in any “court of competent jurisdiction”—no such judgments 
would exist. Id. If the General Assembly had intended that tort claims against State 
employees be decided in the Industrial Commission, it would not have written a 
statute that specifically allowed for the State to pay “a final judgment awarded in a 
court of competent jurisdiction against a State employee.” Id. 
¶ 23 
 
Two more considerations guide our decision on this point. First, adopting 
defendants’ argument would require overruling our prior decisions holding that 
actions against public employees are not subject to the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity—decisions issued both before and after the enactment of statutory 
provisions providing for defense by the State of actions against State employees and 
the payment by the State of judgments against State employees. See Wirth, 258 N.C. 
at 508 (stating in 1963 that the Tort Claims Act permits a suit against a state agency 
in the Industrial Commission without abrogating a plaintiff’s right to bring an action 
against the employee of such an agency, who remains “personally liable for his own 
actionable negligence”); Meyer, 347 N.C. at 108 (“Furthermore, the fact that the Tort 
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Claims Act provides for subject matter jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission over 
a negligence claim against the State does not preclude a claim against defendants in 
Superior Court.”).  
¶ 24 
 
Second, we note that the State’s decision to defend a State employee for actions 
in the scope and course of employment is discretionary. See N.C.G.S. § 143-300.3. We 
decline to adopt an interpretation of our statutes which would create serious notice 
problems for plaintiffs who cannot know whether the State will choose to defend an 
action against a particular employee, which defendants assert would trigger 
sovereign immunity and preclude a remedy in superior court. Even assuming that 
defendants’ interpretation was reasonable, we would avoid it. See In re Arthur, 291 
N.C. 640, 642 (1977) (“Where one of two reasonable constructions will raise a serious 
constitutional question, the construction which avoids this question should be 
adopted.”). For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting 
defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) on the basis of 
defendants’ arguments pertaining to sovereign immunity. 
C. Failure to state a claim 
¶ 25 
 
“Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is de novo.” Bridges, 366 N.C. at 541. Our task is 
to determine “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are 
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.” 
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Id. (quoting Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493, 494–95 (2006)). Defendants argue that Mr. 
Long failed to allege that his injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of their 
conduct and that the complaint therefore did not sufficiently establish the element of 
proximate cause. Defendants also argue that the complaint did not adequately allege 
the willful or wanton conduct needed to support a claim for punitive damages. We 
reject both arguments and hold that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
1. Proximate cause 
¶ 26 
 
Defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege that Mr. Long’s injury was 
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendants’ actions. At oral argument, 
defendants asserted that there is nothing in the complaint suggesting that they 
should have known that their conduct could possibly result in the chiller freezing up 
and pressurizing, thereby causing injury. We conclude that the complaint sufficiently 
alleges that defendants’ actions proximately caused Mr. Long’s injury. 
¶ 27 
 
In a common law negligence claim, “[i]t is sufficient if by the exercise of 
reasonable care the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result 
from his conduct or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have 
been expected. Usually the question of foreseeability is one for the jury.” Fussell v. 
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 226 (2010) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 735 (1965)). 
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¶ 28 
 
Defendants argue that the complaint “failed to include requisite allegations of 
fact that a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendants’ alleged failure to 
properly drain water from the chiller unit’s pipes would be a chemical reaction that 
could lead to a pressurized explosion of sufficient force to propel a 13-pound metal 
flange at a person’s head.” However, there is nothing surprising about the fact that 
water left in pipes that are subjected to freezing temperatures may freeze and cause 
the pipes to burst. Defendants’ description of this phenomenon as “a chemical 
reaction” does not make the result any less foreseeable. This unsurprising fact is 
underscored by two signs on the outside of the chiller that read 
FREEZE 
WARNING! 
It is not possible to drain 
all water from this heat 
exchanger! 
For 
freeze 
protection during shut- 
down, exchanger must 
be drained and refilled 
with 5 gals Glycol min. 
80GX504736- 
TRAPPED WATER!  
¶ 29 
 
By comparison, the work order attached to the complaint indicates that 
defendants were instructed to “drain and secure carrier chiller for relocation.” Given 
that the work order instructed defendants to “drain” the chiller, and that the notice 
on the chiller specified that it could not be completely drained and it “must be drained 
and refilled” with antifreeze, defendants were on notice that a necessary part of the 
task they were instructed to complete was ensuring that antifreeze was added to the 
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chiller. As a result, it is irrelevant that the work order did not specifically instruct 
defendants to “winterize” the chiller—the complaint alleges sufficient facts that, if 
true, indicate defendants were on notice that they must refill the chiller with 
antifreeze after draining it. The work order did not need to set out every step required 
to execute the task properly and safely. 
¶ 30 
 
The complaint alleges that each defendant improperly drained water from the 
chiller, leaving water inside. It alleges that notices on the chiller warned that it was 
not possible to drain all water from the chiller and that the chiller must be filled with 
antifreeze to prevent freezing. The complaint alleges that defendants failed to fill the 
chiller with antifreeze. The complaint alleges that as a result of this failure, the pipes 
froze and ruptured. The complaint further alleges that each defendant knew or 
should have known that this could happen and that the pipes would become 
pressurized as a result. Finally, the complaint alleges that the pressure in the pipes 
caused one of the 13-pound metal flanges that defendants allegedly placed on the 
ends of the pipes to fly off, resulting in injuries that caused Mr. Long’s death.  
¶ 31 
 
The complaint adequately alleged that defendants either knew or should have 
known that their conduct would cause damage to the chiller that might leave it in a 
dangerous state, that defendants in fact caused the damage through their actions, 
and that injury in fact resulted. This was sufficient, under principles of notice 
pleading, to “give the substantive elements of a legally recognized claim.” Estate of 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Savino v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 375 N.C. 288, 297 (2020) (quoting 
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 205 (1988)). 
“[P]roximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be solved by the 
exercise of good common sense in the consideration of the evidence of each particular 
case.” McAllister v. Khie Sem Ha, 347 N.C. 638, 645 (1998) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 403 (1979)). At this 
stage of the trial, dismissal is not warranted and plaintiff is entitled to proceed in the 
litigation which will determine whether the evidence bears out the allegations of 
proximate cause contained in the complaint. 
2. Punitive damages 
¶ 32 
 
As an initial matter, we need to be clear about the statutory standards for 
recovery of punitive damages applicable here. See N.C.G.S. § 1D-15 (2019). There is 
some suggestion in the briefs that for purposes of punitive damages, gross negligence 
is equivalent to willful or wanton conduct. However, our law now provides that 
“[p]unitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves” that either fraud, 
malice, or “[w]illful or wanton conduct” occurred and related to the injury. N.C.G.S. 
§ 1D-15(a). As used here, “ ‘[w]illful or wanton conduct’ means more than gross 
negligence” and is defined as “the conscious and intentional disregard of and 
indifference to the rights and safety of others, which the defendant knows or should 
know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or other harm.” N.C.G.S. § 1D-
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-21- 
5 (2019). The complaint alleges that each defendant is liable in negligence and gross 
negligence for compensatory damages and separately that punitive damages should 
be awarded. As to the punitive damages claims, we consider whether the complaint 
“gives sufficient notice of events or transactions to allow the adverse party to 
understand the nature and basis for the claim[s] [of punitive damages for willful or 
wanton conduct], to allow him to prepare for trial, and to allow for the application of 
res judicata.” Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 85 (1984). We conclude that it does. Because 
willful or wanton conduct is a higher standard than gross negligence, this inquiry 
obviates any need to separately determine whether the complaint adequately states 
a claim for gross negligence. See Estate of Savino, 375 N.C. at 300 (“[W]illful and 
wanton and reckless conduct is still a higher degree of negligence or a greater degree 
of negligence than the negligence of gross negligence . . . .” (quoting Crow v. Ballard, 
263 N.C. 475, 477 (1965)). 
¶ 33 
 
In their brief, defendants argue that the allegations in the complaint do not 
rise to the level of “willful or wanton conduct” necessary to sustain a claim for punitive 
damages in the absence of fraud or malice. See N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a). They argue that 
the complaint contains no allegations creating a factual basis for the “inference that 
NCSU’s employees knew or should have known about the risk of pressurized gas 
build-up in the chiller’s water pipes.” In defendants’ view, the allegations of the 
complaint fail to state a claim for punitive damages because they do not establish 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
that defendants were on notice that their actions might cause injury.  
¶ 34 
 
Defendants went further at oral argument, contending that because the 
allegations in the complaint “at most” support the inference that defendants should 
have known that their conduct could cause injury, the complaint is insufficient to 
state a claim for punitive damages. Defendants argued that the “willful or wanton 
conduct” necessary to establish gross negligence requires actual knowledge of the 
possibility of injury.  
¶ 35 
 
As noted above, a claim for punitive damages may be based on allegations of 
fraud, malice, or “[w]illful or wanton conduct.” N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a). Here, where there 
are no allegations of fraud or malice, the punitive damages claims are based on the 
aggravating factor of willful or wanton conduct. Notice pleading principles are 
applicable to claims for punitive damages. Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 337–38 
(1981). Under those principles, there must be “sufficient information in the complaint 
from which defendant [can] take notice and be apprised of ‘the events and 
transactions which produce the claim to enable [him] to understand the nature of it 
and the basis for it.’ ” Id. at 338 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sutton v. 
Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 104 (1970)). The complaint need not lay out the “detailed and 
specific facts giving rise to punitive damages.” Henry, 310 N.C. at 85 (citing Sutton, 
277 N.C. at 102).  
¶ 36 
 
As to each of the six defendants, the complaint alleges that the defendant’s 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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“acts and/or omissions . . . demonstrated a conscious or intentional disregard or 
indifference to the rights and safety of others, including Joe Long, which [that 
defendant] knew, or should have known, would be reasonably likely to result in injury 
or death and as such constituted willful or wanton conduct.” The “acts and/or 
omissions” of each defendant are described as follows: 
a. He improperly drained water from the Carrier 
chiller; 
b. He did not fill the Carrier chiller with glycol, 
ethylene glycol or some other anti-freeze after 
draining water from it; 
c. He left the Carrier chiller outside when he knew or 
should have known there was still water in the 
cooler tubes; 
d. He left the Carrier chiller outside when there was 
water in the cooler tubes when the temperature 
dropped below freezing; 
e. He capped the inlet water pipe and the outlet water 
pipe of the Carrier chiller with metal flanges when 
he knew or should have known the cooler tubes could 
be damaged and the water tubes and pipes could 
become pressurized; 
f. He allowed the inlet water pipe and the outlet water 
pipe of the Carrier chiller to remain capped when he 
knew, or should have known, pressure could build 
up inside the chiller; 
g. He did not consult the labels on the Carrier 
chiller . . . when 
he 
shut-down, 
disconnected, 
drained, or capped the Carrier chiller; 
h. He did not follow the labels . . . when he shut-down, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-24- 
disconnected, drained, or capped the Carrier chiller; 
i. He 
did 
not 
consult 
the 
Winter 
Shutdown 
instructions of the Operating Manual of the Carrier 
chiller . . . when he shut-down, disconnected, 
drained, or capped the Carrier chiller; 
j. He did not follow the Winter Shutdown instructions 
of the Operating Manual . . . when he shut-down, 
disconnected, drained, or capped the Carrier chiller; 
k. He ordered shut-down, disconnection, draining, and 
capping of the Carrier chiller in the wintertime 
without following the instructions on the labels, the 
Operating 
Instruction 
Manual, 
or 
otherwise 
exercising reasonable care;  
l. He directed shut-down, disconnection, draining, and 
capping of the Carrier chiller in the wintertime 
without following the instructions on the labels, the 
Operating 
Instruction 
Manual, 
or 
otherwise 
exercising reasonable care; 
m. He supervised one or more of the other defendants 
in the shut-down, disconnection, draining, or 
capping of the Carrier chiller in the wintertime 
without following the instructions on the labels, the 
Operating 
Instruction 
Manual, 
or 
otherwise 
exercising reasonable care; 
n. He did not warn Joe Long that the Carrier chiller 
had been shut down in the winter contrary to 
reasonable safe procedures and that there was high 
pressure gas behind the metal flanges; 
o. He did not warn anyone with Joe Long’s employer, 
Quate Industrial Service, Inc., that the Carrier 
chiller had been shut down in the winter contrary to 
reasonable safe procedures and that there was high 
pressure gas behind the metal flanges; 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-25- 
p. He failed to exercise reasonable care during winter 
shut-down of the Carrier chiller in such a way that 
the chill water tubes were damaged by freezing and 
allowed to become pressurized and then capped the 
inlet water pipe and the outlet water pipe so that the 
Carrier chiller became ultra-hazardous; 
q. He did not exercise reasonable care to prevent the 
metal flange from becoming exposed to pressure 
from the inside of the chiller; 
r. He was otherwise negligent as will be shown 
through discovery and proven at the trial of this 
action. 
¶ 37 
 
As to each defendant, the complaint alleges that the defendant, either 
knowingly or with reckless disregard of the consequences of his actions, left the chiller 
in such a condition that it was likely to seriously injure the next person who came 
along to work on it. The complaint specifically alleges that each defendant knew or 
should have known that the chiller’s tubes would become damaged in cold weather 
(knowledge underscored by notices attached to the chiller), and thereby become 
pressurized. The complaint further alleges that each defendant capped the pipes 
when each defendant knew or should have known that the pipes would become 
pressurized. Moreover, the complaint alleges that each defendant’s actions 
“demonstrated a conscious or intentional disregard or indifference to the rights and 
safety of others, including Joe Long, which [that defendant] knew, or should have 
known, would be reasonably likely to result in injury or death and as such constituted 
willful or wanton conduct.” These allegations were sufficient to put defendants on 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-26- 
notice of the events that the complaint asserts give rise to the claims for punitive 
damages and are sufficient to allow defendants “to understand the nature and basis 
for the claim.” See Henry, 310 N.C. at 85 (citing Sutton, 277 N.C. at 102). As a result, 
the complaint states claims for punitive damages sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 38 
 
The complaint in this case makes clear that it is a suit brought against State 
employees in their individual capacities. Under our prior decisions, it is not subject 
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The State’s voluntary election to defend State 
employees for conduct performed in the course of their employment does not change 
this analysis, nor does the State’s payment of judgments entered against such 
employees. The complaint adequately alleges facts from which, if true, a jury could 
find that Mr. Long’s injury was proximately caused by defendants’ conduct and 
further alleges facts sufficient to state claims for punitive damages against 
defendants. As a result, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
Justice BERGER dissenting. 
 
¶ 39 
 
The State can only act through its officers and employees.  The question 
presented is whether defendants were acting in their official capacity or individually. 
The statute waiving sovereign immunity grants the Industrial Commission exclusive 
jurisdiction to make this determination.  The majority’s holding removes this 
responsibility from the Industrial Commission and places it in the hands of a plaintiff, 
which could lead to double recovery by allowing plaintiff to pursue the same claim, 
for the same conduct, and the same injury, in both the Industrial Commission and 
superior court.  Because the complaint in this case, when fully considered, indicates 
that plaintiff is suing defendants in their official capacities – the only capacity in 
which they performed their task – the Industrial Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction over this case.  Furthermore, the majority’s holding constitutes a drastic 
departure from our requirements to plead facts sufficient to establish both proximate 
cause and willful or wanton conduct.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
¶ 40 
 
“Sovereign immunity is a legal principle which states in its broadest terms that 
the sovereign will not be subject to any form of judicial action without its express 
consent.”  Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 535, 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 
(1983) (quoting 12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1082, 1083 (1976)).  “It has long been 
established that an action cannot be maintained against the State of North Carolina 
or an agency thereof unless it consents to be sued or upon its waiver of immunity, and 
that this immunity is absolute and unqualified.”  Guthrie, 307 N.C. at 534, 299 S.E.2d 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-2- 
at 625 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (“The State has absolute immunity 
in tort actions . . . except insofar as it has consented to be sued or otherwise expressly 
waived its immunity.”).  Since the State can only act through individuals, its officers 
and employees enjoy the protection of the State’s sovereign immunity as they perform 
their official duties. 
¶ 41 
 
In N.C.G.S. § 143-291, the General Assembly enacted the State Tort Claims 
Act (STCA) which partially waived the State’s sovereign immunity in tort actions “to 
enlarge the rights and remedies of a person injured by the actionable negligence of 
an employee of a State agency while acting in the course of his employment.”  Meyer 
v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 109, 489 S.E.2d 880, 887 (1997) (quoting Wirth v. Bracey, 258 
N.C. 505, 507–08, 128 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1963)).  Subsection 143-291(a) states in 
relevant part: 
The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby 
constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing 
upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the 
Board of Transportation, and all other departments, 
institutions and agencies of the State. The Industrial 
Commission shall determine whether or not each individual 
claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, 
employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while 
acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, 
agency or authority, under circumstances where the State 
of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.  
N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (2019) (emphases added).   
¶ 42 
 
A plain reading of N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) makes it clear that the Industrial 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-3- 
Commission maintains exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against “the State 
Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, 
institutions and agencies of the State.”  Id.; see Meyer, 347 N.C. at 105, 489 S.E.2d at 
884 (“The only claim authorized by the Tort Claims Act is a claim against the State 
agency.  True, recovery, if any, must be based upon the actionable negligence of an 
employee of such agency while acting within the scope of his employment.” (quoting 
Wirth, 258 N.C. at 507–08, 128 S.E.2d at 813)).  
¶ 43 
 
Here, plaintiff sued defendants as employees of North Carolina State 
University (NCSU).  According to the majority, a plaintiff may sue a defendant in 
their individual capacity in superior court for ordinary negligence that arose during 
the course and scope of their employment.  However, the distinction between official 
capacity and individual capacity conflicts with both the concept of waiver of sovereign 
immunity and the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a).1  
¶ 44 
 
First, N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) states that the Industrial Commission “shall 
determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of 
any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within 
                                            
1 We readily acknowledge that our precedent in this area is less than clear and that 
there has been little discussion on the purpose of the STCA, the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 
143-291(a), or the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission to make course and 
scope determinations.  The approach taken by the majority, however, is inconsistent with the 
jurisdiction vested in the Industrial Commission, the limited waiver of the State’s sovereign 
immunity, and the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a).  
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-4- 
the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority[.]”  N.C.G.S. § 143-
291(a).  The plain language of N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) makes it clear that the Industrial 
Commission is vested with the power to determine whether the negligence of 
employees of the State occurred during the course and scope of their employment.  
However, under the majority’s reasoning, a plaintiff is allowed to make this 
determination simply by including the words “in their individual capacity” in the 
complaint.  In effect, this allows a plaintiff to take away the Industrial Commission’s 
jurisdiction, while at the same time creating jurisdiction in superior court.2  
¶ 45 
 
Second, because the State can only act through officers and employees, the 
distinction between official capacity and individual capacity conflicts with the concept 
of waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.  The STCA narrowly waived the State’s 
sovereign immunity for ordinary negligence of a State employee that occurred within 
                                            
2 Allowing plaintiffs to create jurisdiction in superior court by simply using the words 
“in their individual capacity” in the complaint implicates N.C.G.S. § 143-300.3.  N.C.G.S. § 
143-300.3 states in relevant part, “upon request of an employee or former employee, the State 
may provide for the defense of any civil or criminal action or proceeding brought against him 
in his official or individual capacity, or both, on account of an act done or omission made in 
the scope and course of his employment as a State employee.”  N.C.G.S. § 143-300.3 (2019).  
While the majority is correct that the State’s decision to pay is discretionary, this 
discretionary determination has far reaching consequences.  If the State chooses not to 
provide for the defense of a State employee acting within the course and scope of their 
employment, State employees could potentially lose their homes and other assets simply 
because a plaintiff included the words “in their individual capacity” in the complaint.  On the 
other hand, if the State chooses to defend an employee, a plaintiff who uses the words “in 
their individual capacity” has, in essence, circumvented the Industrial Commission’s 
jurisdiction, and is now bringing a suit against the State in superior court, creating the 
potential of a double recovery for the same injury. 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-5- 
the course and scope of their employment.  In this limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity, the STCA gave the Industrial Commission exclusive jurisdiction over 
these types of cases.  See N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (“The North Carolina Industrial 
Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon 
tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and 
all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State.”).  To allow a plaintiff 
to bring suit in superior court against an employee of the State for ordinary 
negligence that arose during the course and scope of their employment contravenes 
the purpose of the STCA.   
¶ 46 
 
This situation is similar to cases arising in the workers’ compensation context.  
This Court has stated that 
[t]he North Carolina Industrial Commission has a special 
or limited jurisdiction created by statute, and confined to 
its terms. Viewed as a court, it is one of limited jurisdiction, 
and it is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by 
consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction over subject 
matter of which it would otherwise not have jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction in this sense cannot be obtained by consent of 
the parties, waiver, or estoppel. 
Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 88, 92 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1956) (citations 
omitted).  “The Workmen’s Compensation Act, in [N.C.]G.S. [§] 97-9, provides that 
the sole remedy for a covered employee against his employer or those conducting the 
employer’s business is to seek compensation under the Act.  Thus, an employee 
subject to the Act whose injuries arise out of and in the course of his employment may 
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2021-NCSC-81 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-6- 
not maintain” an action for negligence.  Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 733, 239 
S.E.2d 243, 244 (1977) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  However, in Pleasant v. 
Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), we held that “the Workers’ 
Compensation Act does not shield a co-employee from common law liability for willful, 
wanton and reckless negligence.”  Id. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249.  
¶ 47 
 
Thus, in the realm of workers’ compensation, a plaintiff cannot create 
jurisdiction and bring a common law negligence action in superior court unless they 
can show that a defendant’s actions rose to the level of willful and wanton conduct.  
Turning to this case, because N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) gives the Industrial Commission 
exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the State and vests the power to determine 
whether alleged negligence occurred during the course and scope of a defendant’s 
employment, a plaintiff should not be allowed to create jurisdiction in superior court 
merely by claiming they are suing a defendant “in their individual capacity.” 
¶ 48 
 
Nevertheless, even assuming that plaintiff can bring this action in superior 
court, plaintiff’s complaint shows that she is suing defendants in their official 
capacities.  
In ruling on the individual defendants’ motions to 
dismiss, the first step is to determine whether the 
complaint seeks recovery from the individuals in their 
official or individual capacities, or both. . . . A suit against 
a defendant in his individual capacity means that the 
plaintiff seeks recovery from the defendant directly; a suit 
against a defendant in his official capacity means that the 
plaintiff seeks recovery from the entity of which the public 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-7- 
servant defendant is an agent. 
Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489 S.E.2d at 887; see also White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360, 363, 
736 S.E.2d 166, 168 (2013) (“A suit against a public official in his official capacity ‘is 
a suit against the State.’ ” (quoting Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 238, 388 
S.E.2d 439, 443 (1990))).  
¶ 49 
 
When determining whether a defendant is being sued in their official or 
individual capacity 
[t]he crucial question . . . is the nature of the relief sought, 
not the nature of the act or omission alleged. If the plaintiff 
seeks an injunction requiring the defendant to take an 
action involving the exercise of a governmental power, the 
defendant is named in an official capacity. If money 
damages are sought, the court must ascertain whether the 
complaint indicates that the damages are sought from the 
government or from the pocket of the individual defendant. 
If the former, it is an official-capacity claim; if the latter, it 
is an individual-capacity claim; and if it is both, then the 
claims proceed in both capacities. 
Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 552, 495 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1998) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489 S.E.2d at 887).  
¶ 50 
 
The majority contends that it is “abundantly clear from the complaint that 
defendants are being sued in their individual capacities” because the caption and 
prayer for relief state that plaintiff is suing defendants in their individual capacities.  
While it is true that “including the words . . . ‘in his individual capacity’ after a 
defendant’s name obviously clarifies the defendant’s status[,]” Mullis makes clear 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-8- 
that “the allegations as to the extent of liability claimed should provide further 
evidence of capacity.”  Mullis, 347 N.C. at 554, 495 S.E.2d at 724–25.  Therefore, the 
allegations in the complaint itself must provide further evidence that plaintiff is 
suing defendants in their individual capacities.   
¶ 51 
 
By the majority’s reasoning, plaintiffs who simply assert that they are suing 
defendants in their individual capacity can always bring suit in superior court.  As 
illustrated above, this reasoning would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the Industrial 
Commission’s jurisdiction to “determine whether or not each individual claim arose 
as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of 
the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or 
authority[.]”  N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a).  If the majority is correct, any plaintiff may strip 
the Industrial Commission of its jurisdiction and create jurisdiction in superior court 
by simply adding “in their individual capacity” to their complaint.  This reasoning 
discards the “ ‘crucial question’ ” outlined in Mullis: whether monetary damages are 
being “ ‘sought from the government or from the pocket of the individual defendant.’ ”  
Mullis, 347 N.C. at 552, 495 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489 S.E.2d 
at 887).  Simply put, the capacity listed by a plaintiff in their complaint is not 
dispositive.  
¶ 52 
 
Further, the majority relies on Mullis for the proposition that this Court can 
only examine the course of proceedings when “the complaint does not clearly specify 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-9- 
whether the defendants are being sued in their individual or official capacities.”  
However, nowhere in Mullis did this Court claim that when a complaint clearly states 
the capacity in which the defendant is being sued, we are barred from looking to the 
“course of proceedings.” 
¶ 53 
 
Rather, this Court stated “[t]he ‘course of proceedings’ . . . typically will indicate 
the nature of the liability sought to be imposed.”  Mullis, 347 N.C. at 552, 495 S.E.2d 
at 723 (alterations in original) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 
(1985)).  If this Court is barred from looking to the course of proceedings, any plaintiff 
can circumvent the Industrial Commission by merely listing the defendants as being 
sued in their individual capacities in the complaint.  Thus, the course of proceedings 
is helpful in determining the capacity in which a defendant is being sued, regardless 
of the capacity alleged in a complaint by an interested party.    
¶ 54 
 
Lastly, Mullis makes it clear that,  
it is often not clear in which capacity the plaintiff seeks to 
sue the defendant.  In such cases it is appropriate for the 
court to either look to the allegations contained in the 
complaint to determine plaintiff’s intentions or assume 
that the plaintiff meant to bring the action against the 
defendant in his or her official capacity.  
Mullis, 347 N.C. at 552, 495 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Anita R. Brown-Graham & Jeffrey 
S. Koeze, Immunity from Personal Liability under State Law for Public Officials and 
Employees: An Update, Loc. Gov’t L. Bull. 67, at 7 (Inst. Of Gov’t, Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill), Apr. 1995).  Because the capacity listed in a complaint is not dispositive, 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-10- 
this Court should consider the allegations in the complaint when making a capacity 
determination.  
¶ 55 
 
Therefore, “our analysis begins with answering the ‘crucial question’ of what 
type of relief is sought.”  Mullis, 347 N.C. at 552, 495 S.E.2d at 723.  Here, plaintiff 
is seeking to recover monetary damages.  As illustrated above, “[i]f money damages 
are sought, the court must ascertain whether the complaint indicates that the 
damages are sought from the government or from the pocket of the individual 
defendant.”  Id. (quoting Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489 S.E.2d at 887).  To make this 
determination, it is appropriate for us to consider the allegations contained in the 
complaint and the course of proceedings to determine whether defendants are being 
sued in their official or individual capacities. 
¶ 56 
 
Here, the allegations in the complaint and the course of the proceedings 
indicate that plaintiff is suing defendants in their official capacities.   
¶ 57 
 
First, plaintiff alleges that “[a]t all times pertinent to this action, each 
defendant was employed by NCSU.”  This establishes that defendants are agents of 
NCSU.  See Mullis, 347 N.C. at 553, 495 S.E.2d at 724 (finding that because the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was an employee of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education “[t]his allegation establishes that defendant . . . is an agent of 
defendant Board”).  Next, plaintiff alleges that the tasks to drain and maintenance 
the water pipes on the chiller “were done pursuant to NCSU Facilities Operations 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
-11- 
Work Order # 17-037848.”  Specifically, the work order states, “Please Drain and 
Secure Carrier Chiller For Relocation.”  Nowhere in the work order is it stated that 
defendants were required to refill the chiller with antifreeze upon completion of their 
maintenance.  Therefore, the substance of plaintiff’s allegations show that the alleged 
negligence arose from defendants carrying out a work order directed by NCSU.   
¶ 58 
 
This situation is similar to this Court’s analysis in Mullis.  In Mullis this Court 
stated  
plaintiffs set forth only one claim for relief in their 
complaint. In the beginning of their claim for relief, 
plaintiffs 
allege 
that 
“the 
Defendant 
Charlotte[–
]Mecklenburg School System provided, permitted and 
directed the operation of a Rockwell tilting arbor saw, 
model # 34–399 in its industrial arts class.” Later in the 
complaint, plaintiffs specifically allege that defendant 
Sechrest negligently failed to give reasonable or adequate 
instructions or warnings concerning the dangers inherent 
in the use of the saw and provided a machine that was 
unsafe. However, we note that it was necessary to allege 
defendant Sechrest’s negligence in the complaint because 
he was acting as an agent of defendant Board in performing 
his duties. The fact that there is only one claim for relief is 
also indicative of plaintiffs’ intention to sue defendant 
Sechrest in his official capacity, as an agent of defendant 
Board. 
Mullis, 347 N.C. at 553, 495 S.E.2d at 724 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
Here, plaintiff’s only real claim for relief is that defendants were negligent in carrying 
out a work order issued by NCSU.  While plaintiff alleged defendants’ negligence in 
failing to properly refill the chiller and warn Mr. Long, this was necessary to allege 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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defendants’ negligence in the complaint because these employees were acting as 
agents of NCSU.  See id. (“[I]t [is] necessary to allege defendant[’s] . . . negligence in 
the complaint because he was acting as an agent of defendant Board in performing 
his duties.”).  In essence, there is only one claim for relief because it is readily 
apparent that plaintiff was suing defendants in their official capacities for the work 
performed pursuant to the work order. 
¶ 59 
 
Further, the fact that plaintiff’s complaints in the Industrial Commission and 
superior court are largely duplicative is indicative that plaintiff is suing defendants 
in their official capacities.  In both complaints, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed 
to properly follow protocols when performing maintenance on the chiller before 
moving it outside, that they negligently put metal flanges on the ends of the water 
lines, and that they failed to warn Mr. Long of their failure to follow protocol.  The 
only major difference between the complaints is that the Industrial Commission 
complaint listed NCSU and “John Doe” as defendants and the superior court 
complaint listed defendants as individuals.  As illustrated above, a plaintiff should 
not be able to circumvent the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction and create 
jurisdiction in superior court by simply alleging they are suing defendants in their 
individual capacities.  Accordingly, the duplicative nature of plaintiff’s complaints 
further illustrates that this suit is against defendants in their official capacities.  
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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¶ 60 
 
Thus, “the [allegations in the] complaint, along with the course of proceedings 
in the present case,” indicate that this case is really an official-capacity claim couched 
under the heading of an individual capacity suit.  Mullis, 347 N.C. at 554, 495 S.E.2d 
at 725.  As such, this suit is effectively one against the State.  See White, 366 N.C. at 
363, 736 S.E.2d at 168 (“A suit against a public official in his official capacity ‘is a suit 
against the State.’ ” (quoting Harwood, 326 N.C. at 238, 388 S.E.2d at 443)).  Thus, 
the Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve this dispute, and 
plaintiff should be precluded from bringing this action in superior court.  
¶ 61 
 
Nevertheless, even assuming plaintiff’s suit was against defendants in their 
individual capacity and the superior court had jurisdiction to hear it, plaintiff has 
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ actions were the proximate 
cause of Mr. Long’s injuries.  Plaintiff also failed to allege facts sufficient to state a 
claim for punitive damages. 
This Court reviews a trial court’s order on a motion to 
dismiss de novo and considers “whether the allegations of 
the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal 
theory[.]” 
Cheryl Lloyd Humphrey Land Inv. Co., LLC v. Resco Prods., Inc., 2021-NCSC-56, ¶ 8 
(citation omitted) (quoting Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493, 494–95, 631 S.E.2d 121, 123 
(2006)). 
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when one of the 
following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; 
(2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts 
sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint 
discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s 
claim. 
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
An allegation of negligence must be sufficiently specific to 
give information of the particular acts complained of; a 
general allegation without such particularity does not set 
out the nature of plaintiff’s demand sufficiently to enable 
the defendant to prepare his defense.   
The complaint must show that the particular facts 
charged as negligence were the efficient and proximate 
cause, or one of such causes, of the injury of which the 
plaintiff complains.  
Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.C. 640, 645, 101 S.E.2d 814, 
818 (1958) (cleaned up). 
¶ 62 
 
This Court has stated 
[t]he fact that the defendant has been guilty of negligence, 
followed by an injury, does not make him liable for that 
injury, which is sought to be referred to the negligence, 
unless the connection of cause and effect is established; and 
the negligent act of the defendant must not only be the 
cause, but the proximate cause, of the injury. The burden 
was therefore upon the plaintiff to show that defendant’s 
alleged negligence proximately caused his intestate’s 
death, and the proof should have been of such a character 
as reasonably to warrant the inference of the fact required 
to be established, and not merely sufficient to raise a 
surmise or conjecture as to the existence of the essential fact. 
Byrd v. S. Express Co., 139 N.C. 273, 275, 51 S.E. 851, 851–52 (1905) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  In defining proximate cause, we have said    
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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[p]roximate cause is a cause which in natural and 
continuous 
sequence, 
unbroken 
by 
any 
new 
and 
independent cause, produced the plaintiff’s injuries, and 
without which the injuries would not have occurred, and 
one from which a person of ordinary prudence could have 
reasonably foreseen that such a result, or consequences of 
a generally injurious nature, was probable under all the 
facts as they existed. Foreseeability is thus a requisite of 
proximate cause, which is, in turn, a requisite for 
actionable negligence.  
Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227, 233, 311 S.E.2d 559, 565 
(1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
To establish foreseeability, the plaintiff must prove that 
defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, might have 
foreseen that its actions would cause some injury.  The 
defendant must exercise reasonable prevision in order to 
avoid liability.  The law does not require a defendant to 
anticipate events which are merely possible but only those 
which are reasonably foreseeable. 
Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 321 N.C. 706, 710, 365 S.E.2d 898, 901 (1988) (cleaned 
up) (emphasis added).  Further, “[p]roximate cause is an inference of fact to be drawn 
from other facts and circumstances.”  Hairston, 310 N.C. at 234, 311 S.E.2d at 566.   
¶ 63 
 
As an initial matter, the majority diminishes the pleading requirements to 
sufficiently allege proximate cause.  In her complaint, plaintiff asserted that 
“[defendants] capped the inlet water pipe and the outlet water pipe of the Carrier 
chiller with metal flanges when [they] knew or should have known the cooler tubes 
could be damaged and the water tubes and pipes could become pressurized[.]”  
Additionally, plaintiff alleged that “[defendants] allowed the inlet water pipe and the 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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outlet water pipe of the Carrier chiller to remain capped when [they] knew, or should 
have known, pressure could build up inside the chiller[.]”  However, outside of a 
cursory allegation that defendants’ negligence was a “direct and proximate result” of 
Mr. Long’s injuries, plaintiff failed to adequately allege that the foreseeable 
consequence of this negligence was that the chiller would pressurize, explode, and 
blow the metal flange into Mr. Long causing injury.  
¶ 64 
 
As the majority notes, a sign on the chiller contained a warning indicating that 
it was “not possible to drain all water” from the chiller and that the chiller “must be 
drained and refilled with” antifreeze solution “[f]or freeze protection during shut-
down.”  Similarly, the chiller’s operating manual instructed that the chiller should be 
filled with antifreeze to “prevent freeze-up damage to the cooler tubes[.]”  It appears 
that the majority is correct that defendants did not put antifreeze into the chiller.  
However, nothing in the work order or on the labels contained on the outside of the 
chiller mentioned that failing to refill the chiller with antifreeze would create a 
possibility of a pressurized buildup that could cause injury.  In fact, the only warning 
mentioned on the labels was that failure to fill the chiller with antifreeze could cause 
“damage to the cooler tubes.”  Thus, the foreseeable consequence of failing to follow 
the chiller’s warning labels is damage to the machinery itself.  
¶ 65 
 
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed allege facts sufficient to establish that 
defendants “in the exercise of reasonable care, might have foreseen that [their] 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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actions” in failing to refill the chiller with antifreeze would cause some injury.  
Bolkhir, 321 N.C. at 710, 365 S.E.2d at 901.  Simply put, it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that, in the face of the instructions on the work order and the labels on 
the chiller, defendants’ actions would cause injury to Mr. Long.  Because “[t]he law 
does not require a defendant to anticipate events which are merely possible but only 
those which are reasonably foreseeable[,]” id., plaintiff has failed allege facts 
sufficient to establish that defendants’ actions were the proximate cause of Mr. Long’s 
injuries.   
¶ 66 
 
Lastly, the majority’s holding that plaintiff adequately alleged willful or 
wanton conduct to bring a claim for punitive damages constitutes a dangerous 
reduction of the pleading requirements necessary for punitive damages in this State.  
Section 1D-15(a) of our General Statutes states that 
[p]unitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant 
proves that the defendant is liable for compensatory 
damages and that one of the following aggravating factors 
was present and was related to the injury for which 
compensatory damages were awarded: 
(1) Fraud. 
(2) Malice. 
(3) Willful or wanton conduct. 
N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a) (2019).  Section 1D-5 defines “[w]illful or wanton conduct” as 
the conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference 
to the rights and safety of others, which the defendant 
knows or should know is reasonably likely to result in 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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injury, damage, or other harm. “Willful or wanton conduct” 
means more than gross negligence. 
N.C.G.S. § 1D-5(7) (2019).  “[T]his Court held that it was not sufficient to state a cause 
of action for punitive damages to allege that the defendant’s conduct was ‘willful, 
wanton and gross’ . . . . ”  Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 336, 283 S.E.2d 507, 509 
(1981) (quoting Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 274 N.C. 416, 424, 163 S.E.2d 761, 
767 (1968)).  Rather, a “plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts or elements showing 
the aggravating circumstances which would justify the award of punitive damages.”  
Shugar, 304 N.C. at 336, 283 S.E.2d at 510 (citation omitted).  
¶ 67 
 
Here, plaintiff alleged “[s]ome or all of the acts and/or omissions of defendant[s] 
. . . constituted gross negligence” and that “[s]ome or all of the acts and/or omissions 
of defendant[s] . . . demonstrated a conscious or intentional disregard or indifference 
to the rights and safety of others, including Joe Long, which defendant[s] . . . knew, 
or should have known, would be reasonably likely to result in injury or death and as 
such constituted willful or wanton conduct.”  Outside of these allegations, plaintiff 
failed to set out the facts and circumstances to illustrate that defendants’ actions 
constituted a “conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights 
and safety of others.”  Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1956).  
Plaintiff’s complaint, at most, alleges that defendants negligently failed to follow the 
warning signs on the chiller which ultimately lead to Mr. Long’s injuries.  Nothing in 
the complaint points to any conscious disregard for the safety of others to rise to the 
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Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
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level of willful or wanton conduct.  As such, plaintiff failed to adequately allege willful 
or wanton conduct.   
¶ 68 
 
The allegations in the complaint, coupled with the course of proceedings, make 
it clear that plaintiff is suing defendants in their official capacities, and the Industrial 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over this case.  Even assuming the superior 
court had jurisdiction to hear this case, plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to 
show that defendants’ conduct proximately caused Mr. Long’s injuries.  Plaintiff has 
also failed to state a claim for punitive damages.  Therefore, the decision of the Court 
of Appeals should be reversed, and I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.  
Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BARRINGER join in this dissenting 
opinion.