Case Title: Noakes v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091911

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, and Millette, 
JJ., and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
ELIZABETH POLLARD NOAKES 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091911 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
September 16, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support her conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter, specifically contesting the findings that she was 
criminally negligent and that her acts were a proximate cause of 
a toddler's death.  Because there is sufficient evidence to 
support both findings, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  The defendant, 
Elizabeth Pollard Noakes, provided child care services in her 
home, and on the day in question, October 18, 2006, had in her 
care Noah Alexander Colassaco, a fifteen-month-old child, and 
two other children.1  Noakes had been caring for Noah for 
approximately three weeks and, throughout that time, had 
                     
1 Code § 63.2-100 defines the term "[f]amily day home" as a 
"child day program offered in the residence of the provider 
. . . in care for one through 12 children under the age of 13 
. . . when at least one child receives care for compensation" 
and requires licensure or voluntarily registration for such 
homes caring "for more than four children under the age of two." 
experienced difficulty in getting Noah to lie down and sleep 
during "nap time."  Instead, he usually would stand in the crib 
and cry.  Noakes had tried "traditional means" to help Noah 
sleep, which included "rocking him to sleep" and "patting his 
back," without success. 
Around noon on the day in question, Noakes put Noah and 
another toddler she was caring for in their cribs for an 
afternoon nap.2  The cribs were located in an upstairs, "loft" 
bedroom that was partially visible from Noakes' bedroom.  Only a 
half wall divided the two rooms, which were connected by a 
stairway.  The cribs, however, were not visible from Noakes' 
bedroom.  Noah's crib, as viewed from the loft's entrance, was 
positioned lengthwise against the back wall of the room, in the 
far right corner.  The rectangular crib was abutted on the right 
by one wall, on the rear with another, and on the left by 
another crib, with only the front, lengthwise portion 
unobstructed.  A third crib, in which Noakes placed the other 
toddler that day, was positioned a few feet from Noah's crib, 
nearer the entrance of the loft and also on the right wall.  
                     
2 Noah's crib was of the "pack-n-play" style, made of nylon 
and mesh, with plastic on the four corners and its bottom only a 
short distance off the floor.  Noakes described it as a 
"portacrib."  Its design makes the crib flexible, portable, and 
suitable for use as a playpen and crib. 
 
2
When Noakes left the loft, Noah was standing "facing the front 
of the crib" and crying. 
At approximately 12:30 p.m., Noakes returned to the loft to 
"check on" Noah, who was still standing in the crib and crying.  
Knowing that when Noah stood in his crib, his chin was above the 
crib's sides, and also that Noah would fall asleep if he were 
lying or sitting in the crib instead of standing, Noakes decided 
to place a make-shift covering over the crib to prevent Noah 
from standing.  After removing Noah from his crib, Noakes placed 
a thirty-three and one-quarter pound, collapsed "dog crate," 
which ran the length of the crib but was substantially narrower, 
on top of the crib.  Noakes reasoned that the crate's weight 
would prevent Noah from standing up in the crib. 
Noakes tested the stability of her contraption by shaking 
the crib with the crate on top to determine if the crate could 
fall into the crib and injure Noah.  Satisfied that the crate 
could not fall into the crib, Noakes removed the crate, put Noah 
back into the crib, and placed a fabric-covered piece of 
approximately one-inch thick cardboard on top of the crib.  The 
cardboard was added, in part, to cushion the force of any impact 
between Noah's head and the crate if Noah attempted to stand.  
Although the cardboard would cover the entirety of the crib's 
top, Noakes positioned it so the cardboard extended out over the 
front of the crib, where Noah often stood, thus leaving a small 
 
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"gap" in the rear between the crib's side and the cardboard.  
Noakes then placed the dog crate on top of the cardboard, 
towards the front side of the crib, where it covered a little 
more than one-half of the crib's width.  Noakes examined the 
covering to ensure that Noah would not be able to reach into the 
dog crate and injure his fingers. 
With Noah in his now-covered crib, Noakes remained in the 
loft for a short while to determine if the enclosure was causing 
any distress to Noah and if he was attempting to stand up in the 
crib despite the covering.  Observing no problems, Noakes left 
the loft.  Sometime before 1:00 p.m., Noakes, however, heard a 
noise from the loft and returned to find Noah sitting in his 
crib but not sleeping, with his face pressed against crib's 
front, mesh side.  Concluding that Noah would not fall asleep if 
he were able to look for her, Noakes placed a toy in front of 
the crib to obstruct Noah's view "so that he would not be 
looking for [Noakes] but . . . would just get bored and go . . . 
to sleep." 
Noakes again left the loft at about 1:00 p.m. and did not 
return until 3:15 p.m., when she came to wake the other toddler 
from his nap.  Noakes testified, however, that she monitored the 
toddlers audibly from her bedroom during that time and heard no 
noise from either of them.  Noakes testified that when she 
returned to wake the other child, she did not look at Noah's 
 
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crib, which was several feet to the left of the other crib, but 
"within [her] peripheral vision of the room."  She believed, 
however, that Noah was asleep since she did not hear any sounds 
from him when she awakened the other toddler. 
Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Noakes returned to the loft to 
wake Noah and found him unconscious.  He was standing with his 
chin resting on the side of the crib, one or both of his hands 
gripping the crib's side, and his head and neck wedged between 
the cardboard and the crib.  His lips were blue and his skin was 
cold to Noakes' touch.  Noakes surmised that Noah had attempted 
to stand, had pushed up against the cardboard causing the dog 
crate to slide a few inches thereby creating a space between the 
covering on top of the crib and the crib's wall.  Noah then had 
moved his head toward the crib's center, where he normally 
stood, trapping himself in a space between the side of the crib 
and the cardboard, which was held in place by the weight of the 
dog crate.  Despite Noakes' efforts to revive Noah and the 
intervention of emergency medical personnel, Noah was pronounced 
dead at Noakes' home. 
An autopsy of Noah's body revealed that the cause of death 
was "[a]sphyxia due to mechanical compression of neck."  The 
medical examiner who performed the autopsy found "a pressure 
mark at the neck [and] little broken blood vessels on the face," 
with "reddish coloring above and below the pressure mark."  
 
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According to the medical examiner, her findings were consistent 
with Noakes' explanation regarding the events leading to Noah's 
death.3  The examiner also testified that a restriction of the 
oxygen supply to the brain, such as would be caused by the 
circumstances Noakes described, would cause unconsciousness 
"within a minute" and death within "minutes and not hours." 
Noakes was subsequently convicted in a bench trial in the 
Circuit Court of the County of Chesterfield of involuntary 
manslaughter, in violation of Code § 18.2-36.  The trial court 
found Noakes' conduct to be "arrogantly reckless, merciless and 
inhumane," and concluded that she had "recklessly disregard[ed] 
Noah's safety [and the] consequences of her actions, being 
indifferent as to whether the harm would result."  The trial 
court sentenced Noakes to five years of incarceration, with four 
years suspended on the condition that she "be of good behavior 
upon [her] release from confinement" for a period of twenty 
years. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, a divided 
panel affirmed the trial court's judgment.  Noakes v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0295-08-2 (Jan. 13, 2009) 
(unpublished).  Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals 
                     
3 Noakes cooperated with the police during all phases of 
their investigation, providing a written statement, answering 
questions for an audio recording, and demonstrating in a video 
recording her acts on October 18, 2006. 
 
6
found that the "trial court could reasonably have concluded that 
[Noakes] recklessly disregarded Noah's safety by proceeding with 
her plan to prevent Noah from standing up by placing the dog 
crate on his crib."  Noakes v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 577, 
589-90, 681 S.E.2d 48, 54 (2009).  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that Noakes "could have foreseen the harm that could 
and did befall Noah from putting a thirty-three-pound collapsed 
dog crate on top of his crib."  Id. at 590, 681 S.E.2d at 54.  
Accordingly, having found "sufficient[,] credible evidence to 
support a rational factfinder's decision that [Noakes] was 
criminally negligent and, therefore, was guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt," the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction.  Id. at 593-94, 681 S.E.2d at 56. 
Noakes now appeals to this Court.  In a single assignment 
of error, she asserts the evidence was insufficient as a matter 
of law to sustain her conviction, claiming that "her acts did 
not rise to the level of criminal negligence nor could she have 
anticipated the unforeseeable acts that would be performed by 
the child while inside the crib." 
ANALYSIS 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal, we review "the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the [trial] court" and 
"accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable 
 
7
inferences deducible from the evidence."  Brown v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 523, 527, 685 S.E.2d 43, 45 (2009); accord Jay v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524, 659 S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); 
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 
(2003).  We give the trial court's judgment sitting as the 
factfinder "the same weight as a jury verdict," Brown, 278 Va. 
at 527, 685 S.E.2d at 45, and we will affirm that judgment 
unless it "is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."  
Code § 8.01-680; accord Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 
467, 536 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2000). 
We have defined the common law crime of involuntary 
manslaughter as "the killing of one accidentally, contrary to 
the intention of the parties, in the prosecution of some 
unlawful, but not felonious, act; or in the improper performance 
of a lawful act."  Mundy v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 609, 615, 131 
S.E. 242, 244 (1926); accord Brown, 278 Va. at 528, 685 S.E.2d 
at 45-46; Dowden, 260 Va. at 470, 536 S.E.2d at 443.  To convict 
a person for involuntary manslaughter caused by the improper 
performance of a lawful act, the Commonwealth must show that the 
improper performance of the lawful act "amount[ed] to an 
unlawful performance of such lawful act, not merely a negligent 
performance; that is, the lawful act must have been done in a 
way so grossly negligent and culpable as to indicate an 
indifference to consequences or an absence of decent regard for 
 
8
human life."  Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 847, 44 S.E.2d 
409, 413 (1947); accord Brown, 278 Va. at 528, 685 S.E.2d at 45-
46; West v. Director, Dep't of Corrs., 273 Va. 56, 64, 639 
S.E.2d 190, 195 (2007); Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 
415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992).  "The accidental killing must be the 
proximate result of a lawful act performed in a manner 'so 
gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of 
human life,'" Gooden v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 565, 571, 311 
S.E.2d 780, 784 (1984) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 
601, 607, 231 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1977)); the conduct must 
"manifest[] criminal negligence."  West, 273 Va. at 64, 639 
S.E.2d at 195; accord Cable, 243 Va. at 240, 415 S.E.2d at 220. 
"In this context, the term[s] 'gross, wanton, and culpable' 
describe[] conduct.  The word 'gross' means 'aggravated or 
increased negligence' while the word 'culpable' means 'deserving 
of blame or censure.'"  Cable, 243 Va. at 240, 415 S.E.2d at 220 
(quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 611, 195 S.E. 675, 
681 (1938)).  Gross negligence amounts to criminal negligence 
"when acts of a wanton or willful character, committed or 
omitted, show 'a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights 
of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce 
injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be 
occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the 
knowledge of, the probable result of his [or her] acts.'"  
 
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Brown, 278 Va. at 528-29, 685 S.E.2d at 46 (quoting Riley v. 
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 467, 484, 675 S.E.2d 168, 177 (2009)); 
accord Morris v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 732, 739, 636 S.E.2d 436, 
440 (2006); Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 445-46, 436 
S.E.2d 421, 424 (1993); Cable, 243 Va. at 240, 415 S.E.2d at 
220.  While the improper performance of a lawful act must be 
"'so gross and culpable as to indicate a callous disregard of 
human life,'" it need "'not be so gross as to raise the 
presumption of malice.'"  Beck v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 1, 4, 
216 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1975) (quoting Goodman v. Commonwealth, 153 
Va. 943, 946, 952, 151 S.E. 168, 169, 171 (1930)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Commonwealth must also prove that 
the criminally negligent act proximately caused the accidental 
death.  Brown, 278 Va. at 529, 685 S.E.2d at 46; Gallimore, 246 
Va. at 446, 436 S.E.2d at 424. 
In determining whether conduct rises to the level of 
criminal negligence, an "objective standard" applies, and 
criminal negligence may be found to exist when the defendant 
"either knew or should have known the probable results of 
his[/her] acts."  Riley, 277 Va. at 483-84, 675 S.E.2d at 177 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Brown, 278 Va. at 528, 685 
S.E.2d at 46; Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692, 701, 636 
S.E.2d 403, 408 (2006).  Thus, the Commonwealth did not need to 
prove that Noakes actually knew or intended that her conduct 
 
10
would cause, or would likely cause, Noah's death, but rather 
that Noakes should have known her acts created a substantial 
risk of harm to Noah.  See Jones, 272 Va. at 701-02, 636 S.E.2d 
at 408 (approving a trial court's finding of criminal negligence 
"[u]nder an objective standard" because the defendant-mother 
"knew or should have known that placing fourteen capsules of 
heroin and a plate with cocaine residue in the same room as her 
unattended eight-year-old son created a substantial risk of 
serious injury" as did "her continuous and illegal drug activity 
at the apartment when her young child was present" in view of 
the "dangers inherent in the illicit drug trade"). 
Citing Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 288, 296, 422 
S.E.2d 613, 618 (1992), aff'd, 246 Va. 441, 448, 436 S.E.2d 421, 
426 (1993), Noakes concedes on brief "that it is not necessary 
for a defendant to foresee the specific ma[nn]er in which injury 
occurred."  Noakes, nevertheless, argues that in evaluating the 
foreseeability of death or serious injury to Noah, attention 
must be given to the measures she "took to insure that death or 
serious injury would not occur."  Noakes points to her purpose 
for covering the crib — "to assist the child in sleeping" — and 
the "painstaking lengths [taken by her] to anticipate possible 
dangers and prevent them," as well her "regular[]" returns "to 
the adjoining bedroom so that she could monitor the child as she 
did housework."  Noakes claims, "[e]ach of these measures 
 
11
reduced the probability of harm to the child to the point that 
no reasonably intelligent person, using an objective standard, 
could be charged with the knowledge . . . that the child 
probably would be harmed by the object."  In summary, Noakes 
claims that "[i]t was her inability to predict any and all 
possible dangers that failed her." 
Upon review of the evidence, we conclude that Noakes' 
conduct in placing cardboard and a thirty-three and one-quarter 
pound, collapsed dog crate atop Noah's crib and failing to 
visually check on him for about three hours was wanton and 
willful, "showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of [Noah's 
rights], under circumstances [that made] it not improbable that 
injury [would] be occasioned, and [Noakes] is charged with the 
knowledge of[] the probable result of [her] acts."  Cable, 243 
Va. at 240, 415 S.E.2d at 220.  Noakes knew that Noah would 
attempt to stand in his crib and also that when doing so, Noah's 
head and chin rose above the height of the crib's sides.  While 
she obviously took steps to prevent the crate's falling upon 
Noah and his reaching into the crate, Noakes should have known 
that a toddler, used to standing but constrained against his 
will, might attempt to free himself, thereby dislodging the 
makeshift covering and sustaining serious injury.  The measures 
that Noakes undertook to prevent the crate from falling upon 
Noah demonstrate her actual knowledge of the inherent danger of 
 
12
the contraption she placed atop the crib.  And, because Noakes 
knew that she had placed Noah in an inherently dangerous 
situation that could cause serious injury, she certainly should 
not have left Noah unattended for approximately three hours.4 
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion: 
 
[T]he act of attempting to limit Noah's ability 
to stand in his crib was not inherently unlawful; 
however, a rational factfinder could indeed 
determine that the placing of a thirty-three-
pound dog crate on Noah's crib, combined with 
[Noakes'] inattentiveness in the face of this 
experimental and dangerous set-up and with Noah's 
conceded determination to stand up in his crib, 
constituted reckless and unlawful conduct in 
utter disregard of Noah's safety.  
 
Noakes, 54 Va. App. at 593, 681 S.E.2d at 56. 
Noakes, however, further contends that Noah's lifting "an 
object that weighed 30% greater than his own body weight and, 
without displacing [the object,] maneuver[ing] his head 
underneath it and asphyxiat[ing] himself" was not foreseeable 
and, thus, any knowledge of that danger cannot be "fairly 
imputed to her."  Noakes maintains that if Noah had "not 
performed this improbable feat," her actions would not have 
caused injury to Noah.  According to Noakes, Noah's actions were 
                     
4 We also do not find Noakes' reliance on Forbes v. 
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 304, 498 S.E.2d 457 (1998) availing.  
The defendant in Forbes had "followed the medical directions he 
had been given" to address the risk that materialized, causing 
the accidental death; here, Noakes did not have the benefit of 
professional advice nor did her precautionary measures address 
the relevant risk.  Id. at 312, 498 S.E.2d at 460.  
 
13
therefore an intervening cause that rendered Noakes' conduct a 
remote, rather than a proximate, cause of Noah's death.  We do 
not agree. 
"A proximate cause is 'an act or omission that, in natural 
and continuous sequence unbroken by a superseding cause, 
produces a particular event and without which that event would 
not have occurred.' "  Brown, 278 Va. at 529, 685 S.E.2d at 46 
(quoting Williams v. Joynes, 278 Va. 57, 62, 677 S.E.2d 261, 264 
(2009)).  An intervening act, to "'break[] the chain of causal 
connection between an original act of negligence and subsequent 
injury,' " cannot have been "'reasonably foreseeable.' "  
Gallimore, 246 Va. at 447, 436 S.E.2d at 425 (quoting Delawder 
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 55, 58, 196 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1973)); 
accord Brown, 278 Va. at 529, 685 S.E.2d at 46.  "Furthermore, 
an intervening event, even if a cause of the harm, does not 
operate to exempt a defendant from liability if the intervening 
event was put into operation by the defendant's negligent acts."  
Gallimore, 246 Va. at 447, 436 S.E.2d at 425 (citing Baxley v. 
Fischer, 204 Va. 792, 798, 134 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1964)). 
Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude that whatever Noah 
did to maneuver his head and neck between the cardboard and the 
side of the crib was "put into operation" by Noakes' placing the 
covering atop the crib.  Gallimore, 246 Va. at 447, 436 S.E.2d 
at 425.  There is no evidence in this record to show an 
 
14
unforeseeable, intervening act that broke the causal chain of 
connection between Noakes' original act of criminal negligence 
and Noah's subsequent death.  See id.  In other words, Noah 
would not have suffocated on the day in question if Noakes 
either had not placed the cardboard and dog crate atop Noah's 
crib while he was in the crib or, having erected the covering, 
had continuously monitored Noah during his nap. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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