Case Title: Ginter v. Auglaize County Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2571

Docket Number: 2013-1710

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ginter v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2571.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2571 
GINTER ET AL., APPELLEES, v. AUGLAIZE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ginter v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-2571.] 
Taxation—Boards of revision do not have authority to dismiss a valuation 
complaint for failure to prosecute based on the complainant’s failure to 
attend the scheduled hearing of the board—A board of revision must make 
a determination of value whenever a complaint properly invokes its 
jurisdiction. 
(No. 2013-1710—Submitted January 13, 2015—Decided July 2, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2013-Y-1782. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This case concerns the discretionary authority of boards of revision 
to dismiss a valuation complaint for failure to prosecute based on the 
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complainant’s failure to attend the scheduled hearing of the board.  We conclude 
that boards of revision do not have that authority, and we hold that a board of 
revision must make a determination of value whenever a complaint properly 
invokes its jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we vacate the Board of Tax Appeals’ 
(“BTA’s”) decision and remand the cause to the Auglaize County Board of 
Revision for further proceedings. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellees Charles and Christina Ginter filed a complaint with the 
Auglaize County Board of Revision (“BOR”) challenging the auditor’s valuation 
of their property for 2012 at $113,511.  The Ginters proposed a value of $99,900.  
The complaint alleged that “[c]omparable home sales and comparable market data 
of existing and recently sold homes reflect [the] requested change in value.”  In 
correspondence to the BOR dated April 15, 2013, the Ginters’ attorney indicated 
that an arm’s-length sale provided the basis for a reduced valuation.  He submitted 
various documents supporting this argument, including a printout from the county 
auditor’s website showing a transfer of the property on October 8, 2010, with a 
sale price of $99,900; a printout of the property-record card for the parcel, which 
notes the 2010 $99,900 sale price; a United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development settlement statement relating to the sale that lists $99,900 as 
the “contract sale price”; a printout from the website Zillow referring to the 2010 
sale; and a copy of a BTA decision that granted a decrease in value to an owner 
based on evidence of an arm’s-length sale. 
{¶ 3} The BOR notified the Ginters that a hearing would be held on May 
30, 2013.  Neither the Ginters nor anyone on their behalf appeared at the hearing.  
The absence of the complainants led to the dismissal of the complaint, which was 
embodied in an order and letter dated June 3, 2013. 
{¶ 4} The Ginters appealed.  At the BTA, the BOR and the auditor moved 
for an order affirming the dismissal of the complaint. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 5} The BTA stated in its decision that “a board of revision has the 
discretion to dismiss a complaint when a complainant fails to appear at a duly 
scheduled hearing,” but that such discretionary authority “is not without limits.”  
BTA No. 2013-Y-1782, 2013 WL 6833846, *1.  The BTA held that the BOR had 
exceeded those limits because the evidence presented raised the presumption that 
the sale furnished the criterion of value.  The BTA concluded that the BOR had 
improperly dismissed the complaint.  The BTA therefore reversed and directed 
the BOR “to value the subject property in accordance with the sale amount.”  Id. 
at *2.  Appellants, the BOR and the county auditor, appealed to this court. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Boards of revision have the statutory duty to determine property value, 
but lack authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute 
{¶ 6} We have long recognized that boards of revision are creatures of 
statute imbued only with the powers granted by their enabling laws.  Steward v. 
Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 547, 56 N.E.2d 159 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus; 
Kohl’s Illinois, Inc. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 522, 2014-
Ohio-4353, 20 N.E.3d 711, ¶ 23.  The statutes do not specifically confer a power 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.  Logic dictates, therefore, that boards of 
revision lack authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute. 
{¶ 7} Twenty years ago, we departed from these basic legal precepts.  In 
LCL Income Properties v. Rhodes, 71 Ohio St.3d 652, 646 N.E.2d 1108 (1995), 
the property owner filed a complaint and failed to appear at the hearing, and the 
board of revision dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute.  The BTA held 
that “the [board of revision] cannot avoid its statutory duty to render a decision on 
the value of the subject property by dismissing the action,” and “[i]f the available 
evidence supports the auditor’s valuation, then the proper course would be to find 
value at the level determined by the auditor.”  BTA No. 92-J-1225, 1994 WL 
93138, *1-2 (Mar. 18, 1994).  On appeal, we reversed, stating that “[t]he BTA’s 
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decision requiring the board of revision to revalue every property complained of, 
even if the complainant does not appear at a hearing to contest the valuation, and 
even if the complainant presents no evidence, is unreasonable.”  71 Ohio St.3d at 
653, 646 N.E.2d 1108.  Such a requirement “ignores the primary obligation of a 
property owner who challenges a real property valuation:  to sustain the burden of 
proving that the property has been overvalued.”  Id. 
{¶ 8} Today we acknowledge that LCL Properties was wrongly decided 
and that the BTA was right.  In doing so, we are setting aside the extrastatutory 
dismissal power and enforcing the statutory duty of boards of revision to hear and 
decide complaints by determining value. 
{¶ 9} In LCL Properties, we relied on Swetland Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 
6, 37 N.E.2d 601 (1941).  That reliance was misplaced because Swetland was 
inapposite to LCL Properties.  In Swetland, the property owners had contested the 
valuations by the county but made payment based on the assessed value without 
properly protesting the payment of the portion sought to be recovered.  Id. at 21-
22.  Under the law, the property owners thereby forfeited their right to relief from 
the overvaluation of their properties.  Id. at 22 (“We conclude that the Board of 
Tax Appeals was right in holding that the payment of the 1937 taxes in full was 
voluntary and that the question before the county board of revision was moot”).  
See also id. at paragraphs three and four of the syllabus.  The board of revision, 
after giving the property owners multiple opportunities to submit evidence, issued 
a dispositive order retaining the auditor’s valuation on the grounds that the 
property owners had not presented evidence of different values.  See id. at 15, 22-
23. 
{¶ 10} On appeal, this court approved the action of the board of revision 
and the action of the BTA.  As to the board of revision’s disposition, we stated:   
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Even after one dismissal of the complaints by the county board of 
revision, [the property owners] failed to appear or offer evidence 
before such board.  Under such circumstances, the county board of 
revision was justified in determining and fixing the taxable 
valuation of the property both as to the land and improvements at 
the same figure indicated in the assessment made by the county 
auditor. 
 
Id. at 22-23.  We affirmed the BTA, which had dismissed the appeals on the 
grounds of mootness. 
{¶ 11} It is apparent that Swetland does not provide support for our 
holding in LCL Properties for the simple reason that Swetland did not involve a 
dismissal by the board of revision for failure to prosecute.  Instead, Swetland 
involved the board of revision’s decision to retain the auditor’s valuation because 
of the lack of evidence presented by the property owners. 
{¶ 12} We stated in LCL Properties that “the practical result of the 
dismissal” by the board of revision is that “it fixes ‘the valuation complained of in 
the amount assessed by the county auditor.’ ”  71 Ohio St.3d at 653, 646 N.E.2d 
1108, quoting Swetland, paragraph nine of the syllabus.  The result of permitting 
dismissal by the board of revision was a new layer of litigation concerning the 
propriety of the board of revision’s dismissal, which distracts from the proper 
focus: the valuation of the property.  See Snavely v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 78 
Ohio St.3d 500, 678 N.E.2d 1373 (1997); Kalmbach Wagner Swine Research 
Farm v. Wyandot Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 319, 691 N.E.2d 270 
(1998); Leach v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 94 Ohio St.3d 170, 761 N.E.2d 36 
(2002). 
{¶ 13} LCL Properties also states that there are “many situations in which 
dismissal is the proper solution.”  Id. at 653.  We pointed to two such instances:  
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failing to timely file a notice of appeal and filing a second complaint during the 
three-year interim period in violation of the triennial rule of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).  
Id.  But those situations are inapposite because they involve jurisdictional defects, 
and boards of revision have the same inherent authority that all tribunals must 
have to determine whether they can properly take jurisdiction of the matter 
presented to them.  See Kohl’s Illinois, Inc., 140 Ohio St.3d 522, 2014-Ohio-
4353, 20 N.E.3d 711, ¶ 26 (acknowledging that a board of revision is “justified in 
dismissing a complaint when a violation of statutory requirements deprives the 
board of jurisdiction”), citing Kalmbach Wagner Swine Research Farm.  In LCL 
Properties, as in the present appeal, the issue is whether a complaint can be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute under circumstances in which the board of 
revision clearly possesses jurisdiction to determine the property’s value.  We 
erred in LCL Properties by relying on cases involving jurisdictional defects to 
justify a nonjurisdictional dismissal. 
{¶ 14} In the instant case, the BOR clearly had jurisdiction and the Ginters 
submitted some evidence beyond the complaint.  Despite this, the BOR concluded 
that the Ginters’ failure to appear at the hearing justified dismissal for failure to 
prosecute.  The unfairness of that result has led us to review LCL Properties, 
which, as noted, was wrongly reasoned and decided and began a practice of 
sanctioning dismissals of cases by boards of revision for reasons other than 
jurisdictional defects.  We remedy our error today by overruling LCL Properties.  
In doing so, we return to the statutorily prescribed path of requiring a 
determination of value whenever a complaint properly invokes a board of 
revision’s jurisdiction. 
{¶ 15} This change is procedural in character.  Taxpayers will benefit 
because they will be assured of obtaining a determination of value, even if that 
determination retains the auditor’s valuation.  The result is that the issue of value 
January Term, 2015 
 
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will be front and center, as it should be, both before the board of revision and at 
the BTA. 
{¶ 16} The foregoing discussion establishes that the BTA’s decision is 
correct in determining that dismissal was improper, though for a different reason 
than that articulated by the BTA. 
The cause must be remanded to the BOR so that it may evaluate the evidence 
{¶ 17} The BTA regarded the sale-price evidence as raising an unrebutted 
presumption in favor of using the sale price to value the property.  Appellants 
argue that the burden on the owner to make a prima facie case for relying on the 
sale price has not been met and that the evidence is not sufficient to raise the 
presumption, either at the BOR or at the BTA.  Appellants assert that if the 
BOR’s dismissal was improper, the BTA should have remanded the cause to the 
BOR for valuation.  We agree. 
{¶ 18} Because it dismissed the complaint, the BOR expressed no opinion 
concerning the sale price.  Given that the October 2010 sale for $99,900 is noted 
on the property record card as an “unvalidated” sale, the auditor is presumed to 
have considered and rejected the sale as an indication of value.  See Akron City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 92, 2014-
Ohio-1588, 9 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 23-26.  But the BOR has yet to determine the value 
of the property.  As a result, it is premature for either the BTA or this court to 
address the issue of value.  We agree with appellants that the cause must be 
remanded to the BOR for a determination of value. 
{¶ 19} When the BOR deliberates on the property value in this case, 
further documentation might become part of the record, and that in turn might 
affect the review by the BTA.  See Mason City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warren 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 138 Ohio St.3d 153, 2014-Ohio-104, 4 N.E.3d 1027, ¶ 47-48 
(the BTA is obliged to consider the specific findings by the board of revision), 
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citing Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 
Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 20} Because the BOR has not yet determined a value and because such 
a determination by the BOR might affect the manner in which the BTA decides 
the case on appeal, we decline to review the BTA’s determination of value. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the BTA’s decision and 
remand the cause to the BOR for a determination of value.  Because we have 
reached our decision based on the fourth proposition of law and remanded based 
on the fifth proposition of law, it is unnecessary for us to consider the first, 
second, and third propositions of law. 
Decision vacated, 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________________ 
 
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Kelley A. Gorry, and James A. Gorry, 
for appellants. 
__________________