Case Title: Maumee v. Weisner

Citation: 1999-Ohio-68

Docket Number: 19982016

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
CITY OF MAUMEE, APPELLANT, v. WEISNER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Maumee v. Weisner (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 295.] 
Criminal law — Police officer makes an investigative stop of an automobile, 
relying solely upon a dispatch — State must demonstrate at suppression 
hearing that facts precipitating the dispatch justified a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity — Telephone tip can, by itself, create 
reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop, when. 
1. 
Where an officer making an investigative stop relies solely upon a dispatch, 
the state must demonstrate at a suppression hearing that the facts 
precipitating the dispatch justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. 
2. 
A telephone tip can, by itself, create reasonable suspicion justifying an 
investigatory stop where the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability. 
(No. 98-2016 — Submitted September 21, 1999 — Decided December 22, 
1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-97-1409. 
 
On August 20, 1997, Patrolman Timothy Roberts of the city of Maumee 
Police Department received a police dispatch concerning a suspected crime of 
drunk driving in progress. The dispatch was based upon a call from an eyewitness 
motorist who was following the car at that time. The caller reported the make, 
 
2
color, and license plate number of the car and described it as “weaving all over the 
road.” The caller also identified himself to the police dispatcher, providing his 
name and cellular and home phone numbers.  The caller continued to follow the 
car, describing its activities while Patrolman Roberts attempted to locate it.  When 
the caller alerted the dispatcher that the car had stopped at a railroad crossing, 
Roberts pulled into a parking lot opposite the railroad crossing to wait. After the 
train passed, Roberts spotted the car and radioed for verification. Approximately 
thirty to forty seconds elapsed, during which Roberts did not witness the car either 
driving erratically or weaving.  After receiving confirmation from the dispatcher, 
Roberts stopped the car, questioned the driver, Glenn Weisner, and arrested him 
for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Maumee Codified 
Ordinances 333.01(a)(1).  Weisner later submitted to breath analysis and was 
charged with operating a motor vehicle while having a prohibited concentration of 
alcohol in violation of Maumee Codified Ordinances 331.01(a)(3). 
 
Weisner moved to suppress the evidence obtained from Roberts’s stop of his 
car.  At the hearing, the city called only Roberts to testify as to the events of that 
night.  The trial court considered his testimony sufficient to show that he had 
reasonable suspicion that Weisner was driving under the influence and denied 
Weisner’s motion to suppress. Weisner then pleaded no contest to violating 
 
3
Maumee Codified Ordinances 333.01(a)(3) and was sentenced to serve three days 
in a drunk-driving intervention program. 
 
Weisner appealed the constitutionality of the stop to the court of appeals.  
That court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the city had failed to 
meet its burden of proving that the dispatcher had reasonable suspicion to issue the 
dispatch.  Maumee v. Weisner (Aug. 21, 1998), Lucas App. No. L-97-1409, 
unreported, 1998 WL 526772.  The cause is now before the court upon the 
allowance of a discretionary appeal to decide the constitutionality of a stop based 
upon a citizen informant’s telephone tip. 
__________________ 
 
John B. Arnsby, Maumee Municipal Prosecutor, for appellant. 
 
Bischoff, Kenney & Niehaus and Stephen M. Sadowski, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, 
and Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Attorney General. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, David Hanson and Siobhan 
O’Keeffe, Assistant State Public Defenders, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Public Defender. 
__________________ 
 
4
 
COOK, J.  This case involves a Fourth Amendment challenge to an officer’s 
stop of a suspected drunk driver.  Specifically, we have been asked to determine 
whether a citizen informant’s telephone tip may provide the sole basis for an 
officer’s stop of a  motorist suspected of driving under the influence.  We resolve 
this issue in favor of the city of Maumee and hold that a telephone tip can, by 
itself, create reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop where the tip has 
sufficient indicia of reliability. 
I. 
Burden of Proof at Suppression Hearing 
A 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must resolve a debate among Ohio appellate 
courts concerning the state’s burden of proof at a suppression hearing.  Despite the 
focus of the parties’ briefs, it was upon this issue that the appellate court’s decision 
turned.  Specifically in conflict is whether he state must prove, when an 
investigative stop is made in sole reliance upon a police dispatch, that the 
information known to the officer issuing the dispatch was sufficient to justify the 
stop, or whether the stopping officer’s testimony that he relied upon the dispatch is, 
by itself, sufficient.  Following State v. Hill (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 10, 3 OBR 10, 
443 N.E.2d 198, the court below held that the state is required to prove that the 
information known to the dispatcher was sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion 
 
5
of criminal activity.  Concluding that the city failed to meet this burden of proof, 
the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision. 
 
Generally, at a suppression hearing, the state bears the burden of proving 
that a warrantless search or seizure meets Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness. 5 LaFave, Search and  Seizure (3 Ed.1996), Section 11.2(b).  In the 
case of an investigative stop, this typically requires evidence that the officer 
making the stop was aware of sufficient facts to justify it.  Terry v. Ohio (1968), 
392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906.  But when an 
investigative stop is made in sole reliance upon a police dispatch, different 
considerations apply. 
 
A police officer need not always have knowledge of the specific facts 
justifying a stop and may rely, therefore, upon a police dispatch or flyer.  United 
States  v. Hensley (1985), 469 U.S. 221, 231, 105 S.Ct. 675, 681, 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 
613. This principle is rooted in the notion that “effective law enforcement cannot 
be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information 
transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, 
cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for 
the transmitted information.”  Id. at 231, 105 S.Ct. at 682, 83 L.Ed.2d at 614, 
quoting United States v. Robinson (C.A.9, 1976),  536 F.2d 1298, 1299.  When a 
 
6
dispatch is involved, therefore, the stopping officer will typically have very little 
knowledge of the facts that prompted his fellow officer to issue the dispatch. The 
United States Supreme Court has reasoned, then, that the admissibility of the 
evidence uncovered during such a stop does not rest upon whether the officers 
relying upon a dispatch or flyer “were themselves aware of the specific facts which 
led their colleagues to seek their assistance.”  It turns instead upon “whether the 
officers who issued the flyer” or dispatch possessed reasonable suspicion to make 
the stop. (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 231, 105 S.Ct. at 681, 83 L.Ed.2d at 613 
(discussing and applying Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary [1971], 
401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306, to reasonable suspicion in the 
context of a police flyer).  Thus, “[i]f the flyer has been issued in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance upon it violates the 
Fourth Amendment.”  Hensley, 469 U.S.  at 232, 105 S.Ct. at 682, 83 L.Ed.2d at 
614. 
 
Many courts in Ohio and other jurisdictions have interpreted Hensley and 
Whiteley to require proof at the suppression hearing that the officers issuing the 
dispatch possessed sufficient knowledge of facts or information to justify the stop, 
where the stopping officer himself did not.  See State v. Hill, supra; State v. 
Ramsey (Sept. 20, 1990), Franklin App. Nos. 89AP-1298 and 89AP-1299, 
 
7
unreported, 1990 WL 135867.  Other Ohio courts have held instead that an 
officer’s statement that he relied upon a dispatch is, by itself, sufficient to justify 
the stop, regardless of the knowledge of the officer issuing the dispatch.  See, e.g., 
State v. Good (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 174, 525 N.E.2d 527; State v. Janda (Apr. 
14, 1993), Lorain App. No. 92CA005416, unreported, 1993 WL 120549.  See, 
also, State v. Penn (Aug. 2, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93AP-953, unreported, 1994 
WL 409758. 
 
We believe the latter approach is inconsistent with United States Supreme 
Court precedent and fails to adequately protect the citizen’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Accordingly, we clarify here that where an officer making an investigative 
stop relies solely upon a dispatch, the state must demonstrate at a suppression 
hearing that the facts precipitating the dispatch justified a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
B 
 
Given that the state must present evidence of the facts known to the 
dispatcher in these situations, the next question concerns the type of evidence that 
may be used for this purpose.  The appellate court below concluded that the city’s 
failure to offer the testimony of either the dispatcher or the citizen informant 
rendered its evidence insufficient.  In this assessment of the sufficiency of the 
 
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evidence, however, the court, without explanation, ignored Roberts’s testimony 
about the facts relayed from the caller to the dispatcher.  While a stopping officer 
in a dispatch situation will typically be unaware of the facts known to the 
dispatcher, this case is different.  Here, Roberts testified that the dispatcher relayed 
to him the facts precipitating the dispatch.1 
 
We believe that the appellate court should have considered Roberts’s 
testimony in assessing whether the facts known to the dispatcher were sufficient to 
justify the stop.  First, we note that the hearsay rule does not preclude courts’ 
consideration of this evidence, because “[a]t a suppression hearing, the court may 
rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be 
admissible at trial.” United States v. Raddatz (1980), 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S.Ct. 
2406, 2414, 65 L.Ed.2d 424, 425.  We further note that no one argued at any point 
in the proceedings that the officer’s testimony was unreliable.  Roberts’s testimony 
regarding the information that the dispatcher knew, therefore, should have been 
analyzed to determine whether the burden was met. 
 
Given that this evidence should have been considered, we turn now to our 
analysis of the facts known to the dispatcher.  Specifically, we must determine 
whether those facts, which came solely from a citizen informant’s tip, were 
sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. 
 
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II. 
Reasonable Suspicion 
 
The proscriptions of  the Fourth Amendment impose a standard of 
reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials.  Delaware 
v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653-654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 
667.  “Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged 
by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against 
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  Id. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396, 
59 L.Ed.2d at 667-668.  To justify a particular intrusion, the officer must 
demonstrate “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts,  reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to 
permit police stops of motorists in order to investigate a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.  Id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906-907.  The 
reasonable suspicion necessary for such a stop, however, eludes precise definition. 
Rather than involving a strict, inflexible standard, its determination involves a 
consideration of  “the totality of the circumstances.”  United States v. Cortez 
(1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-629.  Under 
this analysis,  “both the content of information possessed by police and its degree 
 
10
of reliability” are relevant to the court’s determination.  Alabama v. White (1990), 
496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309. 
 
Where, as here, the information possessed by the police before the stop 
stems solely from an informant’s tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion 
will be limited to an examination of the weight and reliability due that tip.  See  id.  
The appropriate analysis, then, is whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify the investigative stop.  Factors considered “ ‘highly relevant in 
determining the value of [the informant’s] report’ ” are the informant’s veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge. Id. at 328, 110 S.Ct. at 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d at 
308, quoting Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527, 543. 
 
To assess the existence of these factors, it is useful to categorize informants 
based upon their typical characteristics.  Although the distinctions between these 
categories are somewhat blurred, courts have generally identified three classes of 
informants:  the anonymous informant, the known informant (someone from the 
criminal world who has provided previous reliable tips), and the identified citizen 
informant. While the United States Supreme Court discourages conclusory analysis 
based solely upon these categories, insisting instead upon a totality of the 
circumstances review, it has acknowledged their relevance to an informant’s 
 
11
reliability.  The court has observed, for example, that an anonymous informant is 
comparatively unreliable and his tip, therefore, will generally require independent 
police corroboration.  Alabama v. White,  496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2415, 110 
L.Ed.2d at 308.  The court has further suggested that an identified citizen 
informant may be highly reliable and, therefore, a strong showing as to the other 
indicia of reliability may be unnecessary: “[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen 
comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would 
subject him to criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of 
his knowledge unnecessary.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-234, 103 S.Ct. at 
2329-2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545. 
 
In light of these principles, federal courts have routinely credited the 
identified citizen informant with greater reliability.  In United States v. Pasquarille 
(C.A.6, 1994), 20 F.3d 682, 689, for instance, the Sixth Circuit presumed the report 
of a citizen informant to be reliable because it was based on firsthand observations 
as opposed to “ ‘idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture,’ ” quoting United States v. 
Phillips (C.A.5, 1984), 727 F.2d 392, 397. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held 
that the statement of an ordinary citizen witness is entitled to more credence than 
that of a known informant.  “ ‘Courts are much more concerned with veracity when 
the source of the information is an informant from the criminal milieu rather than 
 
12
an average citizen * * * in the position of a crime * * * witness.’ ”  Easton v. 
Boulder (C.A.10, 1985), 776 F.2d 1441, 1449, quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure 
(1978) 586-587. See, also, Edwards v. Cabrera (C.A.7, 1995), 58 F.3d 290, 294. 
 
Many Ohio appellate courts have also accorded the identified citizen witness 
higher credibility.  In fact, several have used this principle to uphold a telephone 
tip made in fact situations nearly mirroring this one.  In State v. Loop (Mar. 14, 
1994), Scioto App. No. 93CA2153, unreported, 1994 WL 88041, for instance, the 
court held that a telephone call from a citizen stating that a motorist might be 
having a seizure was sufficient to justify an investigative stop that produced 
evidence of drunken driving.  The court reasoned that “ ‘[i]nformation from an 
ordinary citizen who has personally observed what appears to be criminal conduct 
carries with it indicia of reliability and is presumed to be reliable.’ ”  Id. at 5, 
quoting State v. Carstensen (Dec. 18, 1991), Miami App. No. 91-CA-13, 
unreported, at *4, 1991 WL 270665.  The Carstensen court found a stop based 
upon a 911 call describing a drunk driver sufficiently justified, although the 
informant there was unidentified.  See, also, Fairborn v. Adamson (Nov. 17, 1987), 
Greene App. No. 87-CA-13, unreported, at 4-5, 1987 WL 20264; State v. Jackson 
(Mar. 4, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 17226, unreported, at *5, 1999 WL 115010, 
observing generally that “ ‘a tip from an identified citizen informant who is a 
 
13
victim or witnesses a crime is presumed reliable, particularly if the citizen relates 
his or her basis of knowledge,’ ” quoting Centerville v. Gress (June 19, 1998), 
Montgomery App. No. 16899, unreported, at *4-5, 1998 WL 321014. 
 
Given the greater degree of reliability typically accorded the identified 
informant, the central issue disputed between the parties is whether the informant 
here should be considered identified or anonymous.  Because Weisner 
characterizes the motorist as an anonymous informant, he contends that additional 
corroborating facts from the officer would have been necessary to create a 
reasonable suspicion.  Although the motorist identified himself, Weisner argues 
that the identification easily could have been fabricated and therefore adds nothing 
to his reliability.  The city of Maumee and amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General 
urge that the information provided by the citizen informant was sufficient to 
identify him and therefore to accord him greater reliability.  Identified citizen 
witnesses, they insist, are presumptively reliable because of their motivation, their 
basis of knowledge, and their identification.  Thus, the issue becomes whether the 
information provided by the informant was adequate to consider him identified. 
 
Courts have been lenient in their assessment of the type and amount of 
information needed to identify a particular informant.  Many courts have found, for 
instance, that identification of the informant’s occupation alone is sufficient.  In 
 
14
United States v. Pasquarille, supra, the court concluded that, although the 
informant’s name was unknown, information that he was a transporter of prisoners 
was enough to remove him from the anonymous informant category.  Likewise, in 
Edwards v. Cabrera, supra, the court was satisfied with the knowledge that the 
informant was a bus driver whose identity was ascertainable.  See, also, State v. 
Loop, supra.  Furthermore, at least one court has considered simple face-to-face 
contact to be enough.  In State v. Ramey (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 409, 717 N.E.2d 
1153,  the court held that an unnamed informant who flagged down an officer to 
provide information concerning a suspected drunk driver was in no way 
“anonymous”:  “There is nothing even remotely anonymous, clandestine, or 
surreptitious about a citizen stopping a police officer on the street to report 
criminal activity.”  Id. at 416, 717 N.E.2d at 1158. 
 
Viewing the information here in this context, we are convinced that it was 
sufficient to identify the informant and remove him from the anonymous informant 
category.  It is undisputed that the informant provided identifying information 
including his name, his cellular phone number, and his home phone number.  We 
are unpersuaded by Weisner’s argument that the identification is worthless because 
it could have been fabricated.  The caller’s continued contact with the police 
dispatcher throughout the incident sharply reduces that possibility.  In fact, we 
 
15
infer from his willingness to continue assisting Patrolman Roberts that he may 
have considered face-to-face police contact a possibility.  With that in mind, he 
would have been unlikely to offer a false report because of the potential 
consequences.  We believe that greater credibility may be due an informant such as 
this who initiates and permits extended police contact rather than one who phones 
in a tip and retreats from any further police interaction.  Accordingly, we consider 
the citizen informant to have identified himself sufficiently to accord him greater 
reliability than an anonymous informant. 
 
Having resolved this issue, we emphasize that our categorization of the 
informant as an identified citizen informant does not itself determine the outcome 
of this case.  Instead it is one element of our totality of the circumstances review of 
this informant’s tip, weighing in favor of the informant’s reliability and veracity.  
Continuing our review, we believe that the informant’s basis of knowledge also 
furthers his credibility.  Typically, a personal observation by an informant is due 
greater reliability than a secondhand description.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-234, 103 
S.Ct. at 2329-2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545.  Here, the citizen’s tip constituted an 
eyewitness account of the crime.  His version of that night was not mere rumor or 
speculation—it was a firsthand report of the events as they happened.  Also 
significant is the fact that the tip was an exact relay of the circumstances as they 
 
16
were occurring.  Immediately upon witnessing the events, the citizen described 
them to the dispatcher.  This immediacy lends further credibility to the accuracy of 
the facts being relayed, as it avoids reliance upon the informant’s memory. 
 
We also believe that the informant’s motivation supports the reliability of his 
tip.  According to the evidence, the informant reported that Weisner was weaving 
all over the road.  He made this report from the perspective of a  motorist sharing 
the road with an another motorist driving erratically.  We can reasonably infer 
from these circumstances that he considered Weisner a threat to him personally as 
well as to other motorists and that he was motivated, therefore, not by dishonest 
and questionable goals, but by his desire to eliminate a risk to the public’s safety. 
 
Taken together, these factors persuade us that the informant’s tip is 
trustworthy and due significant weight. The informant was an identified citizen 
who based his knowledge of the facts he described upon his own observations as 
the events occurred.  As a result, his tip merits a high degree of  credibility and 
value, rendering it sufficient to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge 
without independent police corroboration.  Accordingly, the dispatch based upon 
this tip was issued on sufficient facts to justify Patrolman Roberts’s investigative 
stop. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
 
17
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., BOWMAN and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
 
DONNA BOWMAN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Roberts’s testimony suggests that he may have learned of some of the facts 
after the stop was completed.  Were it clear that he possessed all the information 
known to the dispatcher about the caller at the time he made the stop, we could 
have analyzed Roberts’s own reasonable suspicion, without considering the 
dispatcher.  We require evidence of the dispatcher’s knowledge not as an 
additional burden upon the state, but only to allow the stopping officer to rely upon 
the dispatch without his having to cross-examine the dispatcher as to his basis of 
knowledge.  See United States v. Hensley and United States v. Robinson, supra. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., J., dissenting.  Respectfully, I dissent. In my 
opinion, a telephone caller’s unverified report of erratic driving does not, standing 
alone, provide reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigative traffic stop.  It is 
imperative that law enforcement officers possess a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to warrant an investigative stop of a vehicle.  While deterrence of drunk 
 
18
driving remains of utmost importance, this policy needs to be carefully balanced 
against an individual’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  An individual’s Fourth Amendment right should not be forfeited 
simply to promote this public policy. 
 
The cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment is the right of the people to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.  In the context of an investigatory stop of an 
automobile, the stopping of the car and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure.  
Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 
660, 667.  However, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the officer has 
reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the person stopped has 
engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in criminal activity.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
653-655, 99 S.Ct. at 1396-1397, 59 L.Ed.2d at 667-668. 
 
In forming reasonable suspicion, a police officer may rely on outside 
information provided directly to him, such as tips from informants, or on 
information relayed to him via a flyer or radio dispatch.  Adams v. Williams (1972), 
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612; United States v. Hensley (1985), 469 
U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604. However, where an informant’s tip is 
 
19
relied upon, the informant’s veracity and reliability and his basis for knowledge 
must be assessed under the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
tip establishes reasonable suspicion.  Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 103 
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.  Where the tip is from an anonymous caller, the tip, 
standing alone, will rarely provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for an 
investigative stop.  Alabama v. White (1990), 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 
L.Ed.2d 301.  However, if corroborated by independent police work, that tip may 
be a sufficient basis for the stop.  Id.  In contrast, where a tip is received from a 
known informant and the details of the tip are easily verifiable, that tip has greater 
indicia of reliability.  Adams, supra.  Regardless of whether the informant is 
known or anonymous, each case must be evaluated under the totality of the 
circumstances. 
 
In this case, the arresting officer relied solely on information relayed to him 
from the radio dispatch, which, in turn, was based on information from an 
unverified cellular telephone caller.  The majority justifies the stop by holding that 
the tip was reliable because it was made by a citizen-informant who identified 
himself sufficiently to police, personally observed erratic driving, and then relayed 
the information to police as it was happening.  The majority further concludes that 
the tip was reliable because it can be inferred that the informant had a strong 
 
20
motivation to report the erratic driving, i.e., to promote the safety of the roadway.  
From these facts, the majority concludes that the informant’s tip was highly 
credible and can withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The fact that the informant provided the dispatching officer with his name 
and phone number and a brief description of the vehicle and its location does not, 
in and of itself, make him a reliable source of information.  See State v. Ramsey 
(Sept. 20, 1990), Franklin App. Nos. 89AP-1298 and 89AP-1299, unreported, 1990 
WL 135867.  In fact, since the caller’s identity was never verified, the informant is 
more akin to an anonymous caller.  As aptly noted by the Washington Supreme 
Court, “[t]he reliability of an anonymous telephone informant is not significantly 
different from the reliability of a named but unknown telephone informant.  Such 
an informant could easily fabricate an alias, and thereby remain, like an 
anonymous informant, unidentifiable.”  State v. Sieler (1980), 95 Wash.2d 43, 48, 
621 P.2d 1272, 1275.  It is therefore illogical to presume that an unverified 
citizen’s report of erratic driving is inherently reliable.  Cf. United States v. 
Pasquarille (C.A.6, 1994), 20 F.3d 682, 689.  Nor should the supposed motivation 
behind an informant’s tip be used to test the reliability of the tip, particularly where 
the informant was never contacted by the arresting officer or called to the witness 
stand to explain his reasons for providing police with this information. 
 
21
 
Had the veracity and reliability of the informant’s tip been corroborated, or 
had the officer followed appellee for a longer time and himself witnessed erratic 
driving, then there would indeed have been sufficient indicia of reliability to make 
the stop.  However, that was not done.  Instead, the officer who made the stop 
relied solely on the dispatch report and then followed appellee’s car for 
approximately thirty to forty seconds.  In that short time, the officer admits, he did 
not observe any weaving or any other erratic driving to lead him to believe that 
appellee was committing a crime.  Nevertheless, he stopped appellee’s vehicle. 
 
Under the totality of the circumstances, I believe that the arresting officer 
lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop appellee’s vehicle, and 
consequently violated appellee’s constitutional rights.  Since I believe that the 
police lacked justification to stop appellee’s vehicle, in my opinion appellee’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.