Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael W. Tobin

Citation: 2007 WI 50

Docket Number: 2005AP001281-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1281-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael W. Tobin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant-Cross-
Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael W. Tobin, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TOBIN 
OPINION FILED: 
        
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
 
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs and oral argument by William J. Weigel, litigation 
counsel. 
 
For the respondent-respondent-cross-appellant there were 
briefs by Christopher T. Kolb and Halling & Cayo, S.C. 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Christopher T. Kolb. 
 
 
2007 WI 50
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1281-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael W. Tobin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant- 
          Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael W. Tobin, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 9, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals and Attorney Michael W. Tobin cross-appeals the report 
of Richard C. Ninneman, referee, recommending discipline of 120 
days license suspension and the imposition of costs.  The 
referee found that Attorney Tobin committed nine of ten charged 
counts of misconduct that include trust account violations, 
conversion and false statements to the OLR.  The only issue on 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
2 
 
appeal and cross-appeal is whether the recommended discipline is 
appropriate.   
¶2 
We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law.  We conclude that the referee's reasoning 
with respect to discipline is persuasive.  Accordingly, this 
court concludes that a four month suspension of Attorney Tobin's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction 
for his violations.  We further agree with the referee that 
Attorney Tobin shall bear the costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding.1   
¶3 
Attorney Tobin was licensed to practice law in 1980 
and practices in Milwaukee.  He has not been previously 
disciplined.   
¶4 
In 1999 the OLR began an investigation into Attorney 
Tobin's trust account recordkeeping procedures after receiving 
notice 
of 
a 
trust 
account 
overdraft. 
 
No 
disciplinary 
proceedings arose from the overdraft notice; however, subsequent 
trust account violations gave rise to these proceedings.      
¶5 
Attorney Tobin's practice concentrates on providing 
high volume real estate closing services to lenders.2  To handle 
                                                 
1 The OLR has filed a statement of costs amounting to 
$15,020.10.  No objection to the statement has been received. 
2 The referee found that "[i]n 2002/2003 Tobin estimated 
that 
his 
office 
closed 
approximately 
2,000 
real 
estate 
transactions per year involving approximately five hundred 
million dollars."  The number of trust account checks issued in 
connection with these closings was estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 
per year.  
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
3 
 
funds related to real estate closings, Attorney Tobin maintained 
five separate trust accounts.  He also maintained a general 
business account and a payroll account at the Associated Bank. 
¶6 
In January 2005 Attorney Tobin requested his real 
estate closing trust account at Wells Fargo Bank to be closed.  
Attorney Tobin explained to the OLR that he had discontinued 
using this account in part due to an earlier OLR request related 
to upgrading his software program.  When the Wells Fargo trust 
account was closed, 18 uncashed checks amounting to $3545.67 
were outstanding, none of which were payable to Attorney Tobin.  
The trust account balance of $2834.96 was $710.71 less than the 
amount attributable to the 18 outstanding checks.   
¶7 
On January 4, 2005, in connection with closing the 
account, by check payable to "Michael Tobin," Attorney Tobin 
disbursed the entire trust account balance of $2834.96 to his 
business 
account at Associated Bank.  The same day he 
transferred $3000 from his business account to his payroll 
account and disbursed $1797 from his payroll account to himself.  
¶8 
The 
next 
day, 
January 
5, 
2005, 
Attorney 
Tobin 
transferred an additional $1500 from his Associated Bank 
business account to his Associated Bank payroll account and 
disbursed $870.37 to himself from the payroll account.  His 
business account balance for January 5, 2005, was $2145.87.   
¶9 
In a March 2005 letter to the OLR, Attorney Tobin 
listed the dates and numbers of the 18 checks outstanding at the 
time the Wells Fargo trust account was closed, as well as the 
various payees and amounts.  Attorney Tobin wrote the OLR that 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
4 
 
the original payees were probably not entitled to the funds, and 
in "most cases, I have been unable to determine who is.  The 
time I have spent attempting to resolve these items is well in 
excess of the amount involved."   Attorney Tobin explained, for 
example, that with respect to a $1155 check made out for an 
insurance premium, he had contacted the borrower and learned 
that the premium had already been paid.  Attorney Tobin had 
disbursed these funds to himself on January 4, 2005.   
¶10 The OLR requested documentation of his attempts to 
contact the persons entitled to any portion of the $3545.67.  In 
April 2005 correspondence, Attorney Tobin indicated to the OLR 
that he spent over three hours attempting to investigate one 
outstanding check.  In a May 2005 letter, he stated that he had 
begun to review the 18 uncashed checks, but his previous 
representations as to his investigations related only to unpaid 
checks in general, not any one check specifically.  In a follow 
up letter in May 2005, Attorney Tobin stated that he made "no 
systematic effort to identify the rightful owner of uncashed 
checks prior to March 2, 2005."  He indicated that stop payment 
requests were impractical due to their cost and the short 
duration of time the request is honored.  Attorney Tobin also 
stated that he had not segregated the funds after he closed the 
Wells Fargo trust account, but treated the checks as abandoned 
property and transferred the funds to his office account. 
¶11 Attorney Tobin's conduct with the Wells Fargo account 
gave rise to four counts charged in the OLR's amended complaint:  
In Counts One and Two, Attorney Tobin was charged with failure 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
5 
 
to 
hold 
third-party 
funds 
in 
trust, 
contrary 
to 
SCR 
20:1.15(b)(1),3 due to his overdraft of $710.71 and disbursing 
$2834.94 when he closed the account.  Count Three charged 
Attorney Tobin with converting the $2834.94 by depositing the 
funds in his business account and transferring them to his 
payroll account, thus engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).4  Count Four 
charged that by misrepresenting to the OLR his attempts to 
locate the rightful owners of the Wells Fargo trust account 
funds, Attorney Tobin knowingly made false statements to the 
OLR, contrary to SCR 22.03(6).5     
¶12 In addition to the Wells Fargo trust account, Attorney 
Tobin also closed two other trust accounts.  These accounts were 
held at the Park Bank.  The first was closed in September 2004 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) states:  Segregation of trust property. 
(1) Separate account.  A lawyer shall hold in 
trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, that 
property of clients and 3rd parties that is in the 
lawyer's 
possession 
in 
connection 
with 
a 
representation.  All funds of clients and 3rd parties 
paid to a lawyer or law firm in connection with a 
representation shall be deposited in one or more 
identifiable trust accounts. 
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
5 SCR 22.03(6) states that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
6 
 
and the second was closed in January 2005.  Attorney Tobin 
stated he deposited the funds from these two trust accounts into 
his general account at Associated Bank.  One trust account had 
contained 31 uncashed checks totaling $3484.27; the other 
contained 12 uncashed checks totaling $2964.57.  Attorney Tobin 
stipulated that the information he provided the OLR did not 
indicate the date that he transferred the funds to his general 
account, but instead indicated a future August 6, 2005, transfer 
to a M&I Bank trust account.     
¶13 Attorney Tobin stipulated that as of January 19, 2005, 
the three trust accounts had been closed, and the balance in his 
business account and payroll account totaled less than the sum 
of the outstanding checks from the three trust accounts.  The 
stipulation stated that as of August 1, 2005, Attorney Tobin had 
not maintained the trust account funds on deposit in his payroll 
or general business accounts and had not placed them in another 
trust account.   
¶14 The 
OLR 
complaint alleged that Attorney Tobin's 
conduct with respect to the two Park Bank accounts gave rise to 
Counts Five through Eight.  Counts Five and Seven charged that 
by closing the two accounts and disbursing the funds to himself, 
he failed to hold client and third-party funds in trust, 
violating SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).  Counts Six and Eight charged that 
by depositing the proceeds of each account into his business 
account, he converted trust account funds, thereby engaging in 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
7 
 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 
20:8.4(c).6 
¶15 In Count Ten, the OLR charged that by filing an 
inaccurate annual bar dues certification and alternatively, if 
failure to check the certification box on the dues statements 
constitutes failure to certify, Attorney Tobin violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(g)7 for years 1999, 2000 and 2001.  
                                                 
6 Count Nine involved recordkeeping issues.  Because the 
dismissal of Count Nine is unchallenged, we do not address it.  
7 Former SCR 20:1.15 applies to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former SCR 20:1.15(g) stated: 
 
(g) A member of the State Bar of Wisconsin shall 
file with the State Bar annually, with payment of the 
member's State Bar dues or upon such other date as 
approved by the Supreme Court, a certificate stating 
whether the member is engaged in the private practice 
of law in Wisconsin and, if so, the name of each bank, 
trust company, credit union or savings and loan 
association in which the member maintains a trust 
account, safe deposit box, or both, as required by 
this section.  Each member shall explicitly certify 
therein that he or she has complied with each of the 
record-keeping requirements set forth in paragraph (e) 
hereof. 
 
A 
partnership 
or 
professional 
legal 
corporation may file one certificate on behalf of its 
partners, associates, or officers who are required to 
file under this section.  The failure of a member to 
file the certificate required by this section is 
grounds for automatic suspension of the member's 
membership in the State Bar in the same manner as 
provided in SCR 10.03(6) for nonpayment of dues.  The 
filing of 
a 
false certificate is unprofessional 
conduct and is grounds for disciplinary action.  The 
State Bar shall supply to each member, with the annual 
dues statement or at such other time as directed by 
the Supreme Court, a form on which the certification 
must be made and a copy of this rule. 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
8 
 
¶16 Following a hearing on the complaint, the referee 
determined that the parties' partial stipulation of facts 
supported Counts One through Eight of the OLR's amended 
complaint.  The referee found: "Tobin closed three trust 
accounts with 61 uncashed and outstanding checks on such 
accounts 
totaling 
$9,994.51 
and 
in 
so 
doing 
transferred 
$9,283.80 to his business/payroll accounts and ultimately used 
the proceeds to pay employees."  The referee concluded that in 
so doing, Attorney Tobin violated former SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) by 
failing to hold client and third-party funds in trust, as well 
as violating SCR 20:8.4(c) by converting trust account funds to 
his own use, thereby engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.  
¶17 The referee found that Attorney Tobin's explanations 
for his actions were unacceptable.  For example, Attorney Tobin 
blamed his actions on faulty advice he claimed to have received 
from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) 
in 1987.  The referee said: "[T]o rely on some unidentified 
clerical person to pursue an inquiry of this importance without 
any documentation whatsoever as to the individual to whom the 
inquiry was made is also unreasonable."   
¶18 Nonetheless, the referee noted that Attorney Tobin's 
initial receipt of funds from lenders in connection with 
closings involved no rule violations.  Also, the referee noted 
Attorney Tobin's testimony to the effect that a stop payment 
request could be impractical, and that reissuing a check could 
expose Attorney Tobin and the trust account to presentation of 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
9 
 
both the original and reissued check, potentially resulting in 
double payment.   
¶19 However, the referee observed that by late 2004 or 
early 2005 it would be difficult to trace a particular payee and 
resolve issues dating back to 1997 or 2000, a problem caused by 
Attorney Tobin's failure to address the issue earlier.  The 
referee found, "It is clear to this Referee that no serious 
effort was made by Tobin to locate the proper payee and resolve 
these matters prior to the closing of the three trust accounts."   
¶20 Additionally, the referee concluded that illustrating 
Attorney Tobin's lack of candor was his representation to the 
OLR that he attempted to correct the trust conversion problem by 
depositing proceeds into a trust account on August 6, 2005.  The 
OLR had received correspondence to this effect on August 8 but 
bank statements revealed the deposits were not made until August 
15, 2005. The referee concluded that clear and convincing 
evidence 
demonstrated Attorney Tobin knowingly made false 
statements of material fact to the OLR, contrary to SCR 22.03(6) 
and SCR 20:8.4(f),8 charged in Count Four.9    
                                                 
8 SCR 20:8.4(f) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
9 Although 
Attorney 
Tobin 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
determination that this evidence demonstrates a lack of candor, 
he does not challenge the referee's finding of a rules violation 
charged in Count Four. 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
10 
 
¶21 With respect to Count Ten, the referee said the 
evidence was undisputed that Attorney Tobin failed to check the 
certification box on his annual state bar dues statements for 
years 1999, 2000 and 2001, thus violating former SCR 20:1.15(g). 
The referee rejected Attorney Tobin's claim that his failure was 
inadvertent, because it occurred during an OLR investigation of 
his trust account recordkeeping procedures and while Attorney 
Tobin was experiencing overdrafts.  In any event, the referee 
said, "knowing" is not a required element of the charged rule 
violation. 
¶22 The 
referee 
viewed 
Attorney 
Tobin's 
lack 
of 
disciplinary history and his appropriate initial treatment of 
the third-party funds as mitigating factors.  He also noted the 
several character witnesses who testified on Attorney Tobin's 
behalf.  The referee determined, nonetheless, that Attorney 
Tobin's cavalier attitude towards others' funds, his prompt 
conversion of the funds and his lack of candor, as charged in 
Counts One through Eight, supported a 90-day license suspension.  
The referee added an additional 30-day suspension for Count Ten, 
the annual certification issue.  The referee said that while 
generally this rule violation would not justify a suspension, 
the entire circumstances and Attorney Tobin's somewhat defiant 
attitude to the OLR with reference to his trust account issues 
in 
general 
called 
for 
an 
additional 
consecutive 
30-day 
suspension, for a total of 120 days.  The referee also 
recommended that Attorney Tobin should be assessed the entire 
costs of the disciplinary proceeding.   
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
11 
 
¶23 The OLR appeals.  The only issue is whether the 
recommended 120-day discipline for Attorney Tobin's misconduct 
is appropriate.  The OLR argues that the serious nature of the 
misconduct, which includes conversion of approximately $10,000 
of trust account funds, supports a two year license suspension.  
While the OLR acknowledges every disciplinary case is different, 
it relies on several cases, including In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Edgar, 230 Wis. 2d 205, 601 N.W.2d 284 
(1999) and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bult, 142 
Wis. 2d 885, 419 N.W.2d 245 (1988), as cases which imposed a two 
year license suspension.  
¶24 The OLR argues that Attorney Tobin's lack of prior 
discipline, his compliance with trust account rules when 
depositing the funds initially and his numerous character 
witnesses are inadequate mitigation.  The OLR argues that the 
number and nature of the violations, together with Attorney 
Tobin's lengthy legal experience and the victims' lack of 
knowledge that they were owed money, are aggravating factors.  
The OLR points to the referee's findings regarding Attorney 
Tobin's attitude and lack of candor with the OLR.    
¶25 Attorney Tobin responds and cross-appeals, contending 
the recommended discipline is excessive.  He argues that the 
violations arose from uncashed checks, a common problem in a 
practice involving real estate closings, particularly his, which 
involved some 70,000 checks and more than $3 billion over the 
past ten years.  He claims he made regular efforts over the 
years to locate the proper recipients for uncashed checks.  He 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
12 
 
admits that he was mistaken in assuming that when unsuccessful 
at locating the recipients, the property had been abandoned and 
therefore was no longer trust property.  However, he argues 
there is no evidence or claim that he was in any way responsible 
for the payees' failures to cash their checks.  He submits this 
mistake is the only blemish in an otherwise honorable career, 
and therefore the recommended sanction is too harsh.  
¶26 Attorney Tobin emphasizes his clients have never 
complained about him and there is no suggestion he ever failed 
to deliver the checks to where they were supposed to go.  He 
also points out no payee has ever complained about not receiving 
funds.  He argues it is inevitable that checks may go uncashed 
for various reasons.  He claims that there is no evidence the 
existence of uncashed checks was due in any way to any failure 
on his part.  He notes the impracticalities of stop payment 
orders and reissuing duplicative checks.  He claims that while a 
closing may take just two hours, it may take an additional three 
hours to determine where unclaimed funds should go.  He rejects 
any implication that he needed funds to meet payroll.   
¶27 Attorney Tobin does not specifically challenge the 
referee's findings of fact or conclusions of law.  However, in 
the context of his challenge to the recommended discipline, he 
argues the referee misunderstood his statements to the OLR.  He 
acknowledges they were not a model of clarity, but contends they 
were not intended to be misleading.  He also points to the 
testimony of numerous character witnesses who testified on his 
behalf.  Attorney Tobin further contends he listed his trust 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
13 
 
accounts on his annual bar dues statements, which were complete 
except for checking the certification box.   
¶28 Attorney Tobin points out that he admitted the vast 
majority of the complaint's allegations and agreed to a partial 
fact stipulation.  Attorney Tobin states that where he did 
resist the allegations with respect to recordkeeping as charged 
in Count Nine, the referee agreed and dismissed the count.    
¶29 Attorney Tobin asserts that the cases the OLR cites 
are not analogous and claims cases involving a two year 
suspension involve misconduct far more egregious than his.  
Tobin contends that his case is similar to In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Trowbridge, 177 Wis. 2d 485, 501 N.W.2d 452 
(1993)(A 60-day suspension for a previously disciplined lawyer 
whose violations included trust account records, defective 
certification, and inappropriate removal of estate funds.) and 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raymonds, 2000 WI 116, 
238 Wis. 2d 846, 618 N.W.2d 521 (A 90-day suspension for trust 
account 
violations; 
a 
$100,000 
unexplained 
shortfall; 
misrepresentations to the BAPR and recordkeeping violations.).  
Attorney Tobin also refers to a number of private and public 
reprimands that involved trust account violations and failures 
to hold property in trust.  Attorney Tobin submits that there is 
a lack of direction as to what to do with unclaimed funds, 
citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kalal, 2005 WI 
138, ¶30, 286 Wis. 2d 10, 704 N.W.2d 575 (the court directed 
Kalal to seek direction from the OLR to resolve the issue of 
unidentified client funds). 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
14 
 
¶30 This court concludes there is no claim that the 
referee's findings are clearly erroneous.  The findings are 
supported by the record and are adopted.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  This court independently reviews the referee's 
legal conclusions.  Id.  Here, the referee's legal conclusions 
are reasonable and consistent with existing law.  This court 
adopts the referee's conclusions of law. 
¶31 The level of discipline is the only dispute.  As both 
parties point out, there are numerous cases supporting a wide 
range 
of 
sanctions. 
 
Ultimately, 
it 
is 
this 
court's 
responsibility 
and 
not 
the 
referee's 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriate discipline.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39, ¶74, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894.  
This court considers the seriousness of the conduct as well as 
the need to protect the public, courts, and legal system from 
repetition of misconduct, to impress upon the attorney the 
seriousness of the misconduct and to deter other attorneys from 
engaging in similar misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, ¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 
694 N.W.2d 910.
¶32 We agree with the OLR to the extent that the 
misconduct involved is serious and demonstrates the need to 
protect the public and deter attorneys from similar misconduct.  
See id.  The seriousness of the misconduct, which includes 
conversion of funds and false statements to the OLR, calls for 
more than a reprimand or minimal license suspension.   
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
15 
 
¶33 We 
disagree, 
however, 
that 
a 
two 
year 
license 
suspension is called for under the particular facts of this 
matter.  The record discloses a number of mitigating factors.  
Attorney Tobin has no previous disciplinary history.  He 
admitted the majority of the allegations.  He entered into a 
partial fact stipulation.  He has made restitution to his trust 
account.  He concedes that his transfer of funds due to uncashed 
checks from his trust accounts to his general and ultimately 
payroll account reflects significant misjudgment.  We are 
persuaded 
that 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
Attorney 
Tobin 
understands the seriousness of his misconduct and it will likely 
not recur.  The disciplinary proceedings have undoubtedly been 
significantly costly to Attorney Tobin.  In view of the 
particular circumstances presented, we are persuaded that the 
referee's reasoning is sound.  We conclude that a four month 
license suspension is sufficient to advance the objectives of 
lawyer discipline.   
¶34 We further conclude that full costs are to be imposed 
on Attorney Tobin.  Neither the OLR nor Attorney Tobin disputes 
assessing Attorney Tobin with the full costs in the present 
case.  Only the concurring and dissenting justice objects to the 
assessment of the costs. 
¶35 The assessment of full costs on the disciplined lawyer 
in the present case is in keeping with our practice under the 
rules in existence when this discipline action was commenced, 
namely that the general policy is that upon a finding of 
misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, including the 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
16 
 
expenses of counsel for the OLR upon the disciplined lawyer.  
See OLR v. Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ¶¶37-92, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 
N.W.2d 376 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶36 The court amended the rules relating to the assessment 
of costs in lawyer disciplinary proceedings on May 1, 2006.  See 
S.Ct. 
Order 
05-01, 
2006 
WI 
34, 
287 
Wis. 2d xiii, 
714 
N.W.2d Ct.R-21 (May 1, 2006).  The new rules do not apply to the 
present 
case; 
they 
apply 
"prospectively 
to 
disciplinary 
proceedings, medical incapacity proceedings, or reinstatement 
proceedings filed on or after July 1, 2006."10  Id. at xv.  This 
                                                 
10 Effective July 1, 2006, SCR 22.24 provides:  Assessment 
of costs. 
(1)  The supreme court may assess against the 
respondent all or a portion of the costs of a 
disciplinary proceeding in which misconduct is found, 
a medical incapacity proceeding in which it finds a 
medical incapacity, or a reinstatement proceeding and 
may enter a judgment for costs.  The director may 
assess 
all 
or 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
an 
investigation when discipline is imposed under SCR 
22.09.  Costs are payable to the office of lawyer 
regulation. 
(1m)  The court's general policy is that upon a 
finding of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all 
costs, including the expenses of counsel for the 
office of lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In 
cases involving extraordinary circumstances the court 
may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the 
amount of costs imposed upon a respondent.  In 
exercising its discretion regarding the assessment of 
costs, the court will consider the submissions of the 
parties and all of the following factors: 
 
(a) The number of counts charged, contested, 
and proven. 
 
(b) The nature of the misconduct. 
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
17 
 
disciplinary action was commenced on May 16, 2005.  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(c) The level of discipline sought by the 
parties and recommended by the referee. 
 
(d) The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
 
(e) Prior discipline, if any. 
 
(f) Other relevant circumstances. 
(2)  In seeking the assessment of costs by the 
supreme court, the director shall file in the court a 
statement of costs within 20 days after the filing of 
the referee's report or a SCR 22.12 or 22.34(10) 
stipulation, together with a recommendation to the 
court regarding the costs to be assessed against the 
respondent.  If an appeal of the referee's report is 
filed or the supreme court orders briefs to be filed 
in response to the referee's report, a supplemental 
statement of costs and recommendation regarding the 
assessment of costs shall be filed within 14 days 
after the appeal is assigned for submission to the 
court or the briefs ordered by the court are filed.  
The recommendation should explain why the particular 
amount of costs is being sought.  Objection to a 
statement 
of 
costs 
[which 
may 
include 
relevant 
supporting documentation] shall be filed by motion 
within 21 days after service of the statement of 
costs.  A respondent who objects to a statement of 
costs must explain, with specificity, the reasons for 
the objection and must state what he or she considers 
to be a reasonable amount of costs.  The office of 
lawyer 
regulation 
may 
reply 
within 
11 
days 
of 
receiving the objection. 
(3)  Upon the assessment of costs by the supreme 
court, the clerk of the supreme court shall issue a 
judgment for costs and furnish a transcript of the 
judgment to the director.  The transcript of the 
judgment may be filed and docketed in the office of 
the clerk of court in any county and shall have the 
same force and effect as judgments docketed pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 809.25 and 806.16 (1997-98).  
No. 
2005AP1281-D   
 
18 
 
in the absence of any objection to assessing full costs on the 
disciplined 
lawyer 
and 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
extraordinary 
circumstances, we adhere to our practice of assessing full costs 
on the disciplined lawyer in the present case. 
¶37 IT IS ORDERED the license of Attorney Michael W. Tobin 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for four months 
effective June 12, 2007, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct. 
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney Michael W. Tobin pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Michael W. Tobin shall remain suspended until 
further order of this court.  
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent unidentified 
or unclaimed trust funds remain, Michael W. Tobin is to seek 
direction 
from 
and 
cooperate 
with 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation to resolve the issue. 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael W. Tobin comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.   
 
No.  2005AP1281-D.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶41 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  This appeal implicates an issue familiar to the 
court: the imposition of full costs against an attorney who is 
disciplined by the Lawyer Regulation System. 
¶42 Last term, the court denied a petition to revise 
Supreme Court Rule 22.001(3) but instead created Supreme Court 
Rule 
22.24(1m) 
and 
amended 
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
22.24(2) 
pertaining to this subject.1 
¶43 New Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) provides: 
The court's general policy is that upon a finding 
of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, 
including the expenses of counsel for the office of 
lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In cases 
involving extraordinary circumstances the court may, 
in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount 
of costs imposed upon a respondent.  In exercising its 
discretion regarding the assessment of costs, the 
court will consider the submissions of the parties and 
all of the following factors: 
 
(a) The number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven. 
 
(b) The nature of the misconduct. 
 
(c) The 
level of discipline sought by the 
parties and recommended by the referee. 
 
(d) The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
 
(e) Prior discipline, if any. 
 
(f) Other relevant circumstances. 
¶44 Supreme Court Rule 22.24(2) then adds in part: 
                                                 
1 See S.Ct. Order 05-01, 2006 WI 34, 287 Wis. 2d xiii, 714 
N.W.2d Ct.R-21 (May 1, 2006). 
No.  2005AP1281-D.dtp 
 
2 
 
. . .  If an appeal of the referee's report is 
filed or the supreme court orders briefs to be filed 
in response to the referee's report, a supplemental 
statement of costs and recommendation regarding the 
assessment of costs shall be filed within 14 days 
after the appeal is assigned for submission to the 
court or the briefs ordered by the court are filed.  
The recommendation should explain why the particular 
amount of costs is being sought.  Objection to a 
statement 
of 
costs 
[which 
may 
include 
relevant 
supporting documentation] shall be filed by motion 
within 21 days after service of the statement of 
costs.  A respondent who objects to a statement of 
costs must explain, with specificity, the reasons for 
the objection and must state what he or she considers 
to be a reasonable amount of costs.  The office of 
lawyer regulation may reply with 11 days of receiving 
the objection. 
¶45 I dissented from the new rules because I thought they 
amounted to a "rationing of fairness."  S.Ct. Order 05-01, 2006 
WI 34, 287 Wis. 2d at xv-xvi, 714 N.W.2d Ct.R-21 (May 1, 2006) 
(Prosser, J., dissenting).  Nonetheless, I expressed hope that 
time would prove me wrong.  Id. 
¶46 This is the first case since the revision of the cost 
rules that has required comment.  The majority opinion correctly 
notes that this case was commenced before the effective date of 
the new rules; hence, "[t]he new rules do not apply . . . ."  
Majority op., ¶36.  Nevertheless, the new rules provide relevant 
standards for an appeal briefed and decided after the new rules 
took effect, if the court had any inclination to exercise its 
discretion on costs.  The former rules, which still apply, gave 
the court broad discretion on costs, without standards, which 
helps to explain why the court consistently declined to exercise 
its discretion. 
No.  2005AP1281-D.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶47 The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) charged Attorney 
Michael W. Tobin with ten counts of misconduct and asked that 
his license be suspended for two years.  Attorney Tobin fought 
the charges, but he especially fought the level of discipline.  
Referee Richard C. Ninneman found that Attorney Tobin had 
committed nine of the ten charged counts but recommended that 
Tobin's license be suspended for four months.  A four-month 
suspension is one-sixth of what OLR originally advocated. 
¶48 OLR must have believed it was acting reasonably in 
seeking a two-year suspension.  Nonetheless, any attorney facing 
such a lengthy loss of license is nearly certain to oppose the 
level of discipline if the attorney believes the discipline is 
excessive.  A two-year suspension will wipe out an attorney's 
normal livelihood, and a two-year suspension may stretch into 
three years during the reinstatement process.  The reinstatement 
process (when a suspension equals six months or more) may also 
entail significant additional costs. 
¶49 In this case, Attorney Tobin substantially prevailed 
on the level of discipline before the referee, but OLR assessed 
him $12,061.91 for its full expenses in the prosecution.  These 
costs for OLR come on top of the fees Tobin incurred for hiring 
an attorney for his defense.  I am not here questioning the 
$12,061.91 in initial costs. 
¶50 But then OLR appealed, disagreeing with the referee's 
recommended level of discipline.  Again OLR asked for a two-year 
suspension.  Again, Attorney Tobin was required to defend 
himself.  OLR loses in this appeal, but the court assesses 
No.  2005AP1281-D.dtp 
 
4 
 
Attorney Tobin an additional $2958.19 to pay for OLR's failed 
effort. 
¶51 I acknowledge that Attorney Tobin has not objected to 
any of these costs.  I suspect he knows the meter is running and 
has simply given up, believing that this court will rebuff any 
appeal for leniency on costs.  But I object in principle.  The 
new costs of $2958.19 are not appropriate or reasonable because 
Tobin won the appeal. 
¶52 To sum up, I concur in the discipline but do not 
approve the final $2958.19 of costs for this appeal.  In this 
regard, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2005AP1281-D.dtp 
 
1