Case Title: Sussex County Dept. of Elections, et al v. The Democratic Party, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 581, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
SUSSEX COUNTY DEPARTMENT ) 
OF ELECTIONS, KENNETH L. 
)  No. 581, 2012 
MCDOWELL, ELAINE MANLOVE, 
) 
and DELAWARE DEPARTMENT 
)  Court Below:  Court of Chancery 
OF ELECTIONS,  
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
)  C.A. No. 7982 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF 
) 
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Intervenor Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
SUSSEX COUNTY REPUBLICAN ) 
COMMITTEE, THE REPUBLICAN ) 
STATE COMMITTEE OF 
 
) 
DELAWARE and   
 
 
) 
BRIAN PETTYJOHN,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiffs Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  October 30, 2012 
Decided:  January 16, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Ian R. McConnel, State Solicitor; Ann Woolfolk and Ilona Kirshon, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellants. 
2 
 
 
Lisa B. Goodman, James M. Yoch, and Paul L. Loughman, Young Conaway 
Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware; Elizabeth Daniello Maron, Maron 
Marvel Bradley & Anderson, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware for Intervenor appellant. 
 
 
William E. Manning and Richard A. Forsten, Saul Ewing LLP, Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellees. 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
3 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Chancellor correctly interpreted 15 
Del. C. § 3306, which allows political parties to replace candidates who become 
incapacitated.  We hold that, under the statute, the term incapacity includes 
situations where a candidate would be practically incapable of fulfilling the duties 
of the office in a minimally adequate way.  In determining whether the standard 
was met, the Chancellor could consider events that occurred after the candidate 
withdrew.  We conclude that the withdrawing candidate was incapacitated and 
therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Chancery. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 11, 2012, Eric Bodenweiser won the Republican Party’s 
primary for Delaware’s 19th State Senatorial District and became the party’s 
general election candidate.  Soon after his victory, Bodenweiser became the target 
of a Delaware State Police investigation into alleged sexual abuse of a minor.  As 
the investigation progressed, Bodenweiser made fewer public appearances and 
eventually suspended his campaign on October 12.  After he ceased campaigning, 
Bodenweiser stopped communicating with the Republican Party.  On October 17, 
Bodenweiser unilaterally withdrew from the race.  The Department of Elections 
then began printing absentee ballots without a Republican candidate for the 19th 
State Senatorial District. 
4 
 
Plaintiff–Appellee the Sussex County Republican Committee sought to 
replace Bodenweiser on the ballot with Plaintiff–Appellee Brian Pettyjohn through 
a supplemental certificate of nomination, a procedure that allows a political party 
to replace incapacitated candidates.1  The Department of Elections responded to the 
supplemental certificate on October 18 and inquired into what “physical, mental, or 
other incapacity” prevented Bodenweiser from serving.  Bodenweiser did not 
respond to his party’s attempts to obtain an affidavit to facilitate the investigation. 
On October 22, a grand jury indicted Bodenweiser on 113 felony counts 
relating to sexual abuse of a minor.  Bodenweiser turned himself in to authorities 
and was released on bail the next day, subject to the conditions that he be 
monitored via a global positioning system bracelet2 and abstain from any contact 
with persons under 18 years old.  On October 24, the Department of Elections 
issued a final rejection of the Republicans’ supplemental certificate and indicated 
that it would conduct the election for the 19th State Senatorial District without a 
Republican candidate. 
The Sussex County Republican Committee, Republican State Committee of 
Delaware, and Pettyjohn (collectively “the Republicans”) filed suit in the Court of 
Chancery against the Commissioner of Elections, the Delaware Department of 
                                          
 
1 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
2 It is unclear from the record whether the bracelet limited Bodenweiser’s freedom of movement. 
5 
 
Elections, the Sussex County Department of Elections, and its Director3 
(collectively “the Commissioner”).  The Republicans sought an injunction 
directing the Commissioner to add Pettyjohn to the ballot and moved for a 
temporary restraining order to prevent the Commissioner from printing ballots 
without a Republican candidate.  After a hearing, the Chancellor granted the 
Republicans’ requested relief, holding that Bodenweiser was incapacitated for the 
purposes of 15 Del. C. § 3306.  The Chancellor held that the combination of 
Bodenweiser’s bail conditions, safety and security concerns, and Bodenweiser’s 
need to attend to his defense rendered him incapable of serving in the General 
Assembly.  The Commissioner has appealed, arguing that the Chancellor 
committed two errors in his analysis.  First, she argues that Section 3306 allows a 
party to submit a replacement candidate only in the case of actual, rather than 
practical, incapacity.  Second, incapacity must be determined at the moment of 
withdrawal, and the Chancellor improperly considered events (such as the 
indictment and the imposition of bail terms) that occurred after Bodenweiser 
withdrew. 
                                          
 
3 The Chancellor allowed the Democratic Party of the State of Delaware to intervene in this 
action.  See Ct. Ch. R. 24. 
6 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Chancellor’s interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we 
review de novo.4 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The meaning of incapacity as used in 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
1. Section 3306 
In Delaware, “major political parties” must hold a direct primary election to 
choose their general election candidate.5  The winner of a major political party’s 
primary becomes that party’s nominee for the general election.6  After a candidate 
is nominated, his party may replace him only in a few circumstances.  Once the 
deadline for filing certificates of nomination has passed,7 the party may only 
replace the candidate via a supplemental certificate of nomination.  The procedure 
for filing a supplemental certification of nomination is described in 15 Del. C. § 
3306, which provides, in relevant part: 
                                          
 
4 Freeman v. X-Ray Assocs., P.A., 3 A.3d 224, 227 (Del. 2010) (citing Dambro v. Meyer, 974 
A.2d 121, 129 (Del. 2009)). 
5 15 Del. C. § 3101A.  The statute defines “major political party” as “any political party which, 
as of December 31 of the year immediately preceding any general election year, has registered in 
the name of that party voters equal to at least 5 percent of the total number of voters registered in 
the State.” 15 Del. C. § 101(15)(a). 
6 15 Del. C. § 3107. 
7 15 Del. C. § 3303. 
7 
 
(a) Whenever it shall be determined, subsequent to [the filing 
deadlines established in 15 Del. C. § 3303], that a duly nominated 
candidate will be unable to serve if elected because of death, physical, 
mental or other incapacity, the county . . . committee shall convene 
within 24 hours of said determination to authorize the filing of a 
supplemental certificate of nomination for a substitute candidate . . . .  
However, in the case of the death of a candidate, said committee may 
convene within a reasonable period of time sufficient to have the new 
candidate’s name placed on the ballot, but in no case later than 5 days 
from the date of death.8 
 
The parties agree that Bodenweiser was the duly nominated Republican 
candidate for the 19th State Senatorial District and that he was neither physically 
nor mentally incapacitated.  They dispute whether Bodenweiser’s situation 
amounted to “other incapacity” as used in Section 3306.9  That frames the issue 
before us. 
2. General principles of statutory interpretation  
The meaning of incapacity as it is used in Section 3306 is a question of 
statutory construction.  When construing a statute, we attempt to ascertain and give 
effect to the General Assembly’s intent.10  First, we must determine whether the 
relevant statute is ambiguous.11  A statute is ambiguous when it can reasonably be 
                                          
 
8 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
9 The Commissioner acknowledged that the Department of Elections could replace 
Bodenweiser’s name with Pettyjohn’s before Election Day.  This is not a case where replacing a 
candidate’s name would make it infeasible to hold the election on the scheduled date. 
10 Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985). 
11 Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz & Bhaya v. Nanticoke Mem. Hosp., Inc., 36 A.3d 336, 342 (Del. 
2012). 
8 
 
interpreted in two or more different ways “or if a literal reading of its terms ‘would 
lead to an unreasonable or absurd result not contemplated by the legislature.’”12  If 
we determine that a statute is unambiguous, we give the statutory language its 
plain meaning.13  If we determine that a statute is ambiguous, “we consider the 
statute as a whole, rather than in parts, and we read each section in light of all 
others to produce a harmonious whole.”14  We presume that the General Assembly 
purposefully chose particular language and therefore construe statutes to avoid 
surplusage if reasonably possible.15 
3. The meaning of “other incapacity” 
Section 3306 allows political parties to replace a candidate if a “duly 
nominated candidate will be unable to serve if elected because of death, physical, 
mental or other incapacity.”16  Black’s Law Dictionary defines incapacity as a 
“lack of physical or mental capabilities.”17  The General Assembly explicitly used 
the word other in addition to the words physical and mental, however.  Construing 
                                          
 
12 CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Del. 2011) (quoting LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 
A.2d 929, 933 (Del. 2007)). 
13 Doroshow, 36 A.3d at 343 (citing Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1999)). 
14 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 538 (Del. 2011)). 
15 CML V, 28 A.3d at 1041 (citing Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 538 (Del. 
2011)). 
16 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
17 Black’s Law Dictionary 828 (9th ed. 2009). 
9 
 
the statute against surplusage18 requires us to hold that a lack of certain 
nonphysical, nonmental capabilities can render a candidate incapable of serving if 
elected. 
The crux of this dispute is the breadth of the term incapacity. The 
Commissioner argues for what she describes as a “true and actual” incapacity 
standard.19  This narrow definition would limit incapacity to situations such as 
death or being in a comatose state, where there is no conceivable set of 
circumstances in which the candidate could fulfill any official duty.20  The 
Republicans argue that we should affirm the Chancellor’s broader “practical” 
incapacity standard, which considers whether the candidate is unable as a practical 
matter to serve his constituents.21  Both interpretations are reasonable constructions 
of the word incapacity, and therefore the statutory language is ambiguous.   
Applying her “true and actual” standard, the Commissioner argues that 
“other incapacity” is essentially limited to situations where the candidate is 
                                          
 
18 CML V, 28 A.3d at 1041; see also Freeman v. X-Ray Assocs., P.A., 3 A.3d 224, 229 (Del. 
2010) (noting that courts should interpret statutes to give “each distinctive term an independent 
meaning”). 
19 Opening Br. 4. 
20 Id. 
21 Answering Br. 5.  See Smith v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 238 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1963) (defining “incapacity” as a “practical inability”). 
10 
 
ineligible for the office sought.22  Under the Commissioner’s reading, a person 
younger than 27 who seeks to serve in the Delaware Senate23 or a convicted 
perjurer24 would meet the standard for “other incapacity.”  Because we have 
previously interpreted the Delaware Constitution’s prohibition against legislators 
who have been convicted of “infamous crimes”25 to apply only after a court has 
found the person guilty and imposed a sentence,26 the Commissioner submits that 
only this standard can suffice to establish “other incapacity.”  While ineligibility 
for office would certainly render a candidate “unable to serve if elected,”27 the 
General Assembly used the term other incapacity, not ineligibility.  The word 
other mandates a fact-specific inquiry into the candidate’s capacity that cannot be 
limited to a discrete category such as legal ineligibility. 
                                          
 
22 Opening Br. 5. 
23 Del. Const. art. II, § 3 (“No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the age of 
twenty-seven years . . . .”). 
24 Del. Const. art. II, § 21 (“No person who shall be convicted of embezzlement of the public 
money, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the 
General Assembly . . . .”). 
25 Id. 
26 See Fonville v. McLaughlin, 270 A.2d 529, 530 (Del. 1970) (construing the Delaware 
Constitution’s prohibition on officeholders who have been convicted of infamous crimes 
narrowly because it creates a disability of citizenship). 
27 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
11 
 
4. Section 3306 encompasses practical incapacity. 
The General Assembly has announced the purposes underlying our election 
laws.  Our election statutes are intended to “assure the people’s right to free and 
equal elections” and to establish a system “[f]or the orderly and fair selection of 
party nominees . . . and for the filling of vacancies among such nominees.”28   
When construing a statute, it is often helpful to examine the statute’s 
history.29  Section 3306’s current language dates to the 1976 amendments to 
Delaware’s election statute.30  Before the amendments, Section 3306 provided that 
“[i]n case of death, resignation or removal of any candidate subsequent to 
nomination . . . a supplemental certificate may be filed by the proper officers 
. . . .”31  The legislative history surrounding Section 3306’s amendment indicates 
that the General Assembly was concerned that existing law had made it too easy to 
add, remove, or replace candidates on the ballot. 32  The ease with which candidates 
                                          
 
28 15 Del. C. § 101A (explaining the purpose of Delaware’s election laws); Bartley v. Davis, 
1986 WL 8810, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 1986) (interpreting election statute to further the 
purposes expressed in 15 Del. C. § 101A) aff’d, 519 A.2d 662 (Del. 1986). 
29 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 495 (Del. 2000) (citing 2A Norman F. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Constr. § 48.03 (5th ed. 1992)). 
30 60 Del. Laws ch. 412, § 2 (1976). 
31 15 Del. C. § 3306 (1949). 
32 Debate on S.B. 328, 128th Gen. Assem., at 1:00–6:03 (Jun. 19, 1975) (statement of Betty 
Ponds, Director, New Castle County Department of Elections) (voicing the Department of 
Elections’ concern that the statute allowed candidates to be replaced “practically the day before 
the election”). 
12 
 
could be replaced on or removed from the ballot created the potential for arbitrary 
or tactical withdrawals which in turn burdened the Department of Elections.  
The amendment to Section 3306 made it more difficult for political parties 
to replace candidates.  After the amendment, a candidate’s mere resignation or 
removal does not entitle his party to automatically substitute another candidate’s 
name on the ballot.  A candidate’s subjective desire to withdraw from the 
campaign, which might be motivated by poor poll performance or the appearance 
of a more electable individual, is insufficient reason to replace the candidate.   
The statute is equally clear, however, that in proper circumstances political 
parties may replace candidates after the filing deadlines have passed.  Recognizing 
that unforeseeable exigencies might deprive voters of a true choice between 
candidates, the statute allows supplemental certificates of nomination to be filed in 
certain situations.  If the candidate dies, or is physically, mentally, or otherwise 
incapacitated, he may be replaced. 
Though the Commissioner cites no authority for her definition of incapacity, 
her argument appears to rely on the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which provides 
that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.33  Because the statute 
                                          
 
33 Del. Bd. of Nursing v. Gillespie, 41 A.3d 423, 427 (Del. 2012) (citing Dole v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)). 
13 
 
provides that “death, physical, mental or other incapacity”34 may render a 
candidate unable to serve if elected, only situations akin to the absolute incapacity 
created by death, or as constitutional ineligibility, would qualify.   
Although statutory construction canons are “aids in the quest to ascertain the 
legislative intent,” the application of a single standard may not resolve 
uncertainty.35  Another statutory construction canon—that the statute he construed 
as a whole36—weighs against the Commissioner’s interpretation.  The statutory 
structure separates death from incapacity.  Unlike the words physical, mental, and 
other, the word death does not modify incapacity, but is an independent term.  
Though the statute requires party committees to file a supplemental certificate 
within 24 hours of determining that a candidate is unable to serve, it permits the 
party up to five days to file in the case of death.37  The General Assembly’s 
decision to make the maximum filing period five times longer in the case of death 
rather than incapacity strongly indicates that it considered death to be more serious 
than incapacity.  It would not make sense to provide for such a different procedure 
in the case of death if incapacity were limited to analogous circumstances.  Finally, 
                                          
 
34 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
35 Keeler v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Del. 1996). 
36 CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Del. 2011) (citing Taylor v. Diamond State Port 
Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 538 (Del. 2011)). 
37 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
14 
 
unlike incapacity, death is necessarily permanent and does not occur in differing 
degrees.  The fundamental differences between the two terms weigh against 
interpreting them identically.   
Section 3306 only requires a level of incapacity that renders the candidate 
unable to serve his constituents if elected.  A legislator’s ability to serve 
encompasses far more than merely being able to vote “aye” or “nay” on legislation; 
it includes the full scope of a legislator’s duties.38  At the hearing, the Chancellor 
asked the parties whether a serious heart attack would create a physical incapacity 
under Section 3306 if a physician advised a candidate that serving as an elected 
official would put his health in danger.39  The hypothetical candidate could cast the 
occasional vote at Legislative Hall with accommodation, but he would be too 
feeble to attend committee hearings, respond to petitions from constituents, or 
otherwise strain himself.40  No party attempted to dispute that this scenario could 
create an inability to serve for the purposes of Section 3306—though the candidate 
could not meet the Commissioner’s “true and actual” incapacity standard.41 
                                          
 
38 See, e.g., Karl T. Kurtz et al., Full-Time, Part-Time, and Real Time: Explaining State 
Legislators’ Perceptions of Time on the Job, 6 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 322, 324–25 (2006) (noting 
that a legislator’s duties are not limited to legislative sessions, but include constituent casework, 
speechmaking, and many other functions). 
39 Sussex Cnty. Republican Comm. v. Sussex Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, C.A. No. 7982, at 63, 65 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2012) (TRANSCRIPT). 
40 Id. at 38–39. 
41 Id. at 39, 62. 
15 
 
The Chancellor’s hypothetical is apt.  In some circumstances, a candidate 
could theoretically perform a few official duties with significant accommodation, 
but could not practically serve his constituents in a minimally adequate way.  The 
Commissioner’s interpretation precludes any consideration of a candidate’s 
practical ability to serve his constituents so long as it is possible to conceive of a 
way that he could perform any official duty, however inadequately.  The General 
Assembly’s intent to limit a political party’s ability to replace candidates does not 
compel the conclusion that the General Assembly sought to bar the replacement of 
practically incapacitated individuals when there is no colorable argument that the 
replacement was pretextual.  The Commissioner’s interpretation is not mandated 
by the statute’s language, and may frustrate the election statute’s stated purpose to 
provide for “free and equal”42 elections by depriving voters of a choice between 
opposing candidates who are practically able to serve their constituents. 
We view a person as incapacitated for the purposes of 15 Del. C. § 3306 if 
that person is practically incapable of fulfilling the duties of the office in a 
minimally adequate way.  Only a very serious physical, mental, or other incapacity 
will meet this standard.  Interpreting incapacity to include situations where the 
candidate is practically unable to fulfill his official duties if elected is consistent 
with the drafters’ intent to limit a candidate’s ability to withdraw, but without 
                                          
 
42 15 Del. C. § 101A. 
16 
 
creating a nearly insurmountable standard that denies voters a true choice.  This 
interpretation prevents candidates from withdrawing because of poor polling, the 
appearance of a more formidable candidate, or other inconvenient circumstances, 
yet provides the voters a choice between candidates who are practically capable of 
serving them. 
5. Bodenweiser was practically incapacitated. 
Applying this standard to Bodenweiser, it follow that he suffers from a 
nonphysical, nonmental condition that renders him practically incapable of 
fulfilling the duties of a State Senator in a minimally adequate way.  Bodenweiser 
is under indictment for 113 felony counts relating to the sexual abuse of a minor.  
He is subject to monitoring via a global positioning system bracelet and is 
forbidden to have contact with anyone under the age of 18.   
Bodenweiser’s bail conditions would make it impossible for him to meet 
with his constituents, give speeches, or visit large portions of his district.  It is hard 
to conceive of how Bodenweiser could make public appearances without violating 
his bail conditions.  Attending sessions at Legislative Hall would probably involve 
contact with minors.43  Even if it were possible for him to perform his duties 
                                          
 
43 At trial, counsel for the Democratic Party argued that the Delaware Constitution might protect 
Bodenweiser from arrest during his travel to and from, and attendance during, legislative 
sessions.  Del. Const. art. II, § 13.  Without addressing the merits of this interpretation, 
Bodenweiser’s need to rely on a constitutional provision to even attend a legislative session 
hardly weighs in favor of a finding that he is capable of serving. 
17 
 
without contacting minors, the inflammatory nature of the accusations against him 
would create a substantial security risk to Bodenweiser and to those around him.  
Sexual abuse allegations are emotionally charged, especially when the victim is a 
child.  The risk of violence is not insignificant.  As the Commissioner conceded, 
the General Assembly would need additional security if Bodenweiser were 
elected.44   
Bodenweiser’s need to attend to his defense also provides support for a 
finding of incapacity.  He has been charged with 113 felony counts relating to 
sexual abuse of a minor, and he faces many years in prison if ultimately convicted.  
Under these circumstances, he will understandably spend a considerable amount of 
his time preparing a defense.  State Senators and other public officials are subject 
to constant public scrutiny, so Bodenweiser could hardly ignore inquires from the 
press and the public regarding the allegations.  Under these circumstances, 
Bodenweiser would need to avoid the public sphere to lessen the risk of saying 
something that could be damaging to his case. 
Under these circumstances, Bodenweiser’s situation is no less incapacitating 
than that of a person who suffers from a serious physical or mental health 
condition.  We cannot conceive how Bodenweiser could practically fulfill the 
duties of his office in a minimally adequate way when he is barred from contacting 
                                          
 
44 Sussex Cnty., C.A. No. 7982, at 43. 
18 
 
many of his constituents, cannot visit large portions of his district, creates a 
significant security risk to himself and others, must spend a large portion of his 
time preparing a defense to 113 serious felony charges, and cannot make public 
comments without potentially undermining his defense. 
The argument that this interpretation will lead to pretextual, tactical 
withdrawals cannot withstand scrutiny.  Very few pending criminal charges will 
establish incapacity under Section 3306.  We are confident that even the most 
devoted partisans would not place themselves in Bodenweiser’s position for the 
sake of their parties’ success at the polls. 
The Commissioner’s final argument is that even the most serious 
indictments cannot incapacitate an individual.  She supports that position by 
pointing to a rogues’ gallery of disgraced federal and state politicians who 
remained in office despite indictments.  These examples are not persuasive.  This 
argument conflates an officeholder’s refusal to resign from a position with his 
ability to serve.  An indicted person’s continued hold on an office does not mean 
that the person is practically capable of serving his constituents.  While it is 
possible to capably serve despite criminal allegations, the Commissioner’s 
examples do not involve comparably serious and numerous allegations or bail 
conditions that are present in this case.  We do not regard the “other incapacity” to 
exclude Bodenweiser’s situation. 
19 
 
B. The Chancellor properly considered all the facts that were available to 
the Commissioner when she rejected the Republicans’ supplemental 
certificate of nomination. 
 
Having determined that Bodenweiser was otherwise incapacitated for the 
purposes of Section 3306, we turn to the Commissioner’s alternative contention 
that the Chancellor erroneously considered facts that came into existence only after 
Bodenweiser submitted a withdrawal form posted on the Department of Elections’ 
website.45  The Commissioner argues that Section 3306’s plain meaning requires 
that incapacity be determined at the moment of withdrawal (October 17, 2012).  
Here, the indictment was not issued until October 22, and the bail conditions were 
not set until the day thereafter.   
Section 3306 allows for the filing of a supplemental certificate of 
nomination “[w]henever it shall be determined . . . that a duly nominated candidate 
will be unable to serve if elected.”46  No statutory language limits the analysis of a 
candidate’s incapacity to the facts as they existed at the moment of withdrawal.  
The Commissioner did not provide any statutory provision establishing a 
procedure for a “duly nominated” candidate’s withdrawal.47 
                                          
 
45 Opening Br. 8. 
46 15 Del. C. § 3306. 
47 The statute contemplates a candidate’s withdrawal in other circumstances, such as a primary 
election, but does not describe a procedure for the withdrawal of a duly nominated candidate in 
the general election.  See 15 Del. C. § 3101 (allowing a candidate in the primary election to 
20 
 
Section 3306 does not contemplate or attach significance to the Department 
of Elections’ nonstatutory withdrawal form.  As previously discussed, the General 
Assembly deleted the words resignation and removal from Section 3306 when it 
amended the statute.  The statutory intent for a candidate’s objective incapacity 
determination to be the focus of Section 3306 (rather than the candidate’s personal 
desire to remove himself from the race) weighs against giving dispositive 
significance to the date of a candidate’s withdrawal.  By attaching statutory 
consequences to a procedure not contemplated by the statute, we would be 
judicially amending Section 3306. 
The Commissioner argues this interpretation violates the statutory 
construction canon that prohibits interpretations that yield an “unreasonable or 
absurd result.” 48  She notes that a candidate could withdraw from a race for 
personal reasons.  At this point, the candidate could not be replaced on the ballot.  
If the candidate later died or became incapacitated, however, Section 3306 would 
allow a replacement.   
This perceived absurdity vanishes once it is acknowledged that a candidate’s 
withdrawal has no statutory significance.  Under Section 3306, it does not matter 
                                                                                                                                        
withdraw his “notification of candidacy” until “the first Friday after the second Tuesday in July” 
or the next business day if that day is a holiday). 
48 CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Del. 2011) (citing LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 
A.2d 929, 933 (Del. 2007)). 
21 
 
whether a duly nominated candidate is actively campaigning, has stopped 
campaigning, or has withdrawn from the race.  Section 3306 applies to a “duly 
nominated candidate,” a status Bodenweiser acquired when he won the Republican 
Party’s primary.  Bodenweiser’s withdrawal from the race did not undo his primary 
election victory or somehow take away his nomination.  The statute’s plain 
meaning allows a party to replace a candidate only where the candidate has died or 
become incapacitated, regardless of whether the candidate is still actively seeking 
office.  If a duly nominated candidate ceases campaigning for a reason that is not 
contemplated by the statute, Section 3306’s purpose to eliminate pretextual 
withdrawals is served by not permitting a replacement.  If the candidate later dies 
or becomes incapacitated, however, the statute allows substitution, which gives the 
public a meaningful choice between candidates. 
The Commissioner’s interpretation would incentivize delay, which in turn 
would increase the burden on the Department of Elections to make the necessary 
adjustments to absentee ballots and voting machines.  That construction is 
unreasonable and is not compelled by the statute.  Bodenweiser’s decision to 
withdraw before the grand jury issued the indictment gave his party, opponents, 
and the Department of Elections additional notice that he might be incapable of 
serving if elected.  
22 
 
In this case, the Republican Party acted as promptly as possible based on the 
limited information available to it.  At the time the Commissioner rejected the 
Republican Party’s supplemental certificate of nomination on October 24, all of the 
facts the Chancellor relied upon were available to the Department of Elections.  
During the period between the Republicans’ filing of the certificate and the 
Commissioner’s rejection, the grand jury issued the indictment, Bodenweiser 
turned himself in to the authorities, and bail conditions were imposed.  We are not 
confronted with a case in which the facts supporting an incapacity determination 
were wholly unknown to the Commissioner, or where the events supporting an 
incapacity determination occurred after the Commissioner had rejected the 
supplemental certificate of nomination.49 
The procedures for filing a supplemental certificate of nomination are less 
than clear, and the statute would benefit from legislative revision.  Here, we 
conclude that the Chancellor properly reviewed all the facts that were available to 
the Commissioner at the time she rejected the Republicans’ supplemental 
certificate. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court of Chancery’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 
                                          
 
49 The Commissioner’s rejection of a supplemental certificate of nomination under those 
circumstances would raise the additional questions of whether the Commissioner must wait a 
reasonable period of time before rejecting a certificate, revisit her earlier rejection, or require the 
filer to submit a new certificate.