Case Title: State v. Filiaggi

Citation: 1999-Ohio-99

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. FILIAGGI, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when — Verdicts on 
noncapital offenses reversed and cause remanded to three-judge trial panel 
when only presiding judge entered the verdicts. 
(No. 98-287 — Submitted April 13, 1999 — Decided July 29, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 95CA006240. 
 
This appeal involves charges from two separate incidents concerning the 
defendant-appellant, James J. Filiaggi, and his ex-wife, Lisa Huff Filiaggi.  The 
first incident resulted in charges of felonious assault and domestic violence; the 
second incident resulted in charges of aggravated murder, attempted aggravated 
murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping.  A three-judge panel convicted 
defendant and sentenced him to death for the aggravated murder of Lisa Huff 
Filiaggi (“Ms. Filiaggi”). 
 
Defendant and Ms. Filiaggi married in December 1991.  There were two 
children born during the marriage.  Ms. Filiaggi filed for divorce in August 1992, 
and the divorce was granted in February 1993.  Ms. Filiaggi received custody of 
the children, although defendant had visitation rights.  Defendant was required to 
pay child support.  Relations between defendant and Ms. Filiaggi were strained. 
 
In the spring of 1993, Ms. Filiaggi and the two children moved into the 
home of Eric Beiswenger.  In the fall of 1993, Ms. Filiaggi and Beiswenger 
became engaged, and shortly thereafter, became the victims of telephone 
harassment and vandalism.  Beiswenger and Ms. Filiaggi suspected that defendant 
was responsible for the acts, and set up video cameras hoping to capture him on 
tape.  Ms. Filiaggi also carried a tape recorder with her. 
 
In the fall of 1993, Ms. Filiaggi and Beiswenger recorded a phone 
conversation in which defendant told Ms. Filiaggi that there are going to be “more 
2 
headaches and heartaches if she tries to get more money out of him.” 
 
On December 19, 1993, Ms. Filiaggi and Beiswenger went to the home of 
defendant’s parents to pick up the children after a visit.  Ms. Filiaggi carried a tape 
recorder in her pocket, which recorded the incident.  Defendant and Ms. Filiaggi 
were arguing while defendant put one child in a car seat in the back seat of the 
vehicle.  After putting the child in the seat, defendant grabbed Ms. Filiaggi around 
the neck and she began screaming.  Beiswenger, who was outside the vehicle, 
grabbed defendant by the waist and pulled him off her.  Defendant turned around 
and struck Beiswenger in the face numerous times.  Beiswenger suffered multiple 
broken bones in his face.  The assault ended when defendant’s mother came out, 
grabbed defendant, and yelled at him to stop.  The recording of the incident was 
admitted into evidence. 
 
Beiswenger and Ms. Filiaggi pressed charges against defendant, and he was 
arrested and indicted for felonious assault and domestic violence.  He was released 
on bond awaiting trial. 
 
The picture window of Beiswenger’s house was also broken on numerous 
occasions.  On January 20, 1994, the last time there was an attempt to break the 
window, the video camera recorded the incident and clearly showed defendant as 
the person throwing a bottle at the window.  Charges were filed against defendant 
for attempted vandalism, criminal trespassing, and intimidation of a witness. 
 
Two days later, defendant purchased a 9 mm Luger pistol, which had two 
clips for ammunition.  He also purchased ammunition for the weapon, despite the 
fact that he already possessed another gun.  According to the defense theory, he 
intended to go to Ms. Filiaggi’s house and kill himself in front of her. 
 
On January 24, 1994, defendant took a $1,000 cash advance on his Visa 
card.  He left $600 to $700 with his girlfriend, Tracey Jones.  At approximately 
10:45 p.m., the Lorain Police Department dispatcher received a call from Ms. 
3 
Filiaggi.  The call was tape-recorded.  Ms. Filiaggi told the dispatcher that her ex-
husband, defendant, was at her back door and was breaking into her house.  
Defendant broke down the door and entered the house.  Still carrying the 
telephone, Ms. Filiaggi fled out the front door.  A neighbor, Robert Mutnansky, 
who lived two doors away, saw Ms. Filiaggi standing in the yard of the intervening 
neighbor and frantically looking around.  Another neighbor was awakened by 
someone screaming, “God help me, someone, please, help me, he’s going to kill 
me.”  Ms. Filiaggi saw Mutnansky looking out the window and ran towards his 
front door.  He let her in, and Ms. Filiaggi told him that her ex-husband was after 
her with a gun.  She looked petrified and ran past him while Mutnansky locked the 
door behind her. 
 
Moments later, Mutnansky heard a couple of bangs on the door and the door 
came crashing in.  Defendant had a gun in his hand and asked Mutnansky where 
she went.  Mutnansky said he did not know, and defendant told Mutnansky to help 
find her.  They both started down the hallway.  When they came to a linen closet, 
with the door partially open, defendant opened the door and found Ms. Filiaggi.  
Defendant was very angry and pulled Ms. Filiaggi from the closet by the arm and 
swung her into the bathroom, which was across the hall from the closet.  There was 
a struggle.  Mutnansky heard defendant tell Ms. Filiaggi, “This will teach you to 
fuck with me,” and then heard two shots fired. 
 
Although shot in the shoulder, Ms. Filiaggi was able to get away and run 
across the hallway into one of the bedrooms.  Mutnansky, standing partially in one 
of the bedrooms, was pleading with defendant not to shoot her.  Mutnansky was in 
another bedroom and defendant told Mutnansky to close the bedroom door and 
stay out.  Mutnansky again heard defendant tell Ms. Filiaggi, “This will teach you 
not to fuck with me” and heard two more shots.  Mutnansky then heard footsteps 
down the hallway.  Mutnansky came out of the bedroom and saw Ms. Filiaggi 
4 
slumped against the wall.  She had been shot in the head.  Mutnansky attempted to 
call 911, but noticed a policeman coming through his front door. 
 
About twenty minutes away, in Amherst Township, Delbert Yepko, Ms. 
Filiaggi’s stepfather, was watching the news.  At 11:15 p.m., he heard pounding at 
the front door.  While he had a motion detector light on the side of the trailer, it 
was not on and the area outside the door was dark.  He was home alone, and his 
house had previously been vandalized, so he picked up a can of red pepper spray 
and went to the door.  He opened the door about three inches and saw defendant.  
Defendant then bashed the door in. 
 
Defendant came in the house and said, “Are you ready to die?”  Yepko saw 
a gun in defendant’s right hand.  Defendant brought the gun up to shoot Yepko and 
said, “I’m going to kill you.”  Yepko sprayed  defendant in the face with the 
pepper spray, and defendant shot at him, but did not hit him.  Yepko managed to 
get out of the trailer, without a coat or shoes.  He ran to four separate trailers, 
knocking on doors, finally gaining admittance to the fourth one, where he was able 
to call 911.  He tried to call Ms. Filiaggi, but was shaking too badly. 
 
On the morning of January 25, 1994, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m., defendant 
arrived at the home of Howard R. Matlack, a college friend.  Defendant asked 
Matlack if he could “crash,” and he lay down on the couch.  Matlack took his 
girlfriend to work later that morning.  His girlfriend later called Matlack and told 
him that defendant had killed Ms. Filiaggi.  Matlack confronted defendant about it.  
Defendant got up off the couch and a gun fell to the floor.  Defendant then left 
Matlack’s house. 
 
On January 27, 1994, defendant took another $1,000 cash advance.  
Defendant fled the state, but returned to Lorain, when he discovered that his 
parents might lose their house, which had been put up for his bond on the previous 
charges.  Defendant had rented a car at the Pittsburgh Airport that was later 
5 
recovered in an area near defendant’s parents’ home.  The car contained the rental 
agreement as well as several rounds of 9 mm ammunition.  The murder weapon 
was never found. 
 
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  He also waived 
his right to be tried by a jury.  A three-judge panel heard the evidence presented on 
all charges.  The three-judge panel entered its verdict on the aggravated murder 
charge, but only the presiding judge entered a verdict on the remaining charges. 
 
The three-judge panel found defendant guilty of aggravated murder and the 
three capital specifications: the offense was committed for the purpose of escaping 
detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by 
defendant (R.C. 2929.04[A][3]); the offense was part of a course of conduct 
involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by 
defendant (R.C. 2929.04[A][5]); and the victim of the offense was a witness to 
prior offenses by defendant and was purposely killed to prevent her testimony in a 
criminal proceeding concerning those prior offenses (R.C. 2929.04[A][8]).  The 
case proceeded to the penalty phase and the panel sentenced defendant to death.  
The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and death sentence. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jonathan E. 
Rosenbaum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Jack W. Bradley and Renee W. Green, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  In this appeal, defendant raises twelve 
propositions of law.  We sustain defendant’s fourth proposition of law and remand 
the cause to the trial court.  We affirm defendant’s aggravated-murder conviction, 
and after independently reviewing the record, weighing the aggravating 
6 
circumstances against the mitigating factors, and examining the proportionality of 
the death sentence in this case to the penalty imposed in similar cases, we affirm 
defendant’s sentence of death. 
Competency to Stand Trial 
 
The trial proceedings were set to begin on July 11, 1995.  Defendant had 
entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity; however, the question of 
competency had not been raised.  On the way to the courthouse for the start of the 
trial, officers shackled defendant and placed a stun belt on him for security 
purposes.  En route, defendant was accidentally shocked by the stun belt.  As a 
result, he was shaken up, and evidence indicated that he might have been placed on 
Valium.  The court recessed until that afternoon.  When court resumed, defendant, 
with his three attorneys present, waived his right to trial by jury.  After opening 
arguments, eight state’s witnesses testified.  Court then recessed for the day. 
 
The next morning, July 12, 1995, defense counsel told the trial court that in 
the opinion of all three defense counsel, defendant was not competent to stand trial, 
i.e., to understand the nature of the charges against him or to assist in his defense.  
The court contacted the local forensics center and requested that the defendant be 
examined to determine if he was competent.  The forensics center immediately 
accommodated the court’s request, and court recessed for the day. 
 
On July 13, 1995, the court held a competency hearing.  Defendant gave 
counsel permission to proceed without him.  Dr. Thomas Haglund, who had 
examined defendant on July 12, testified that he had interviewed defendant for 
about forty-five minutes.  He related that defendant believed that he was still 
receiving shocks from the stun belt.  Dr. Haglund indicated that defendant was 
quite tense and agitated during the interview.  At one point during the interview, 
defendant began to lose control, breathed more rapidly, and his legs and feet began 
to shake. 
7 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Haglund testified that he did not think that 
defendant was malingering.  It was his opinion that given the state that defendant 
was in as a result of the stun belt incident, he was concerned about defendant’s 
mental condition and did not think defendant was able to continue with the trial.  
Although Dr. Haglund had not talked with defendant on the day of the competency 
hearing, he testified that he believed the defendant’s emotional state could be 
turned around quickly and was on a day-to-day status. 
 
Dr. Haglund also testified that during the interview, defendant was mentally 
alert, oriented, and able to answer questions.  When questioned, defendant was 
able to tell Dr. Haglund what he had been charged with and who his attorneys 
were, as well as give a brief description of the testimony from the day before.  
Defendant understood that he was under a doctor’s care, and identified his doctor 
and the medications he was currently receiving.  Defendant also knew why he was 
on the medications. 
 
In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Dr. Haglund stated that defendant 
understood the proceedings against him, and was able to consult with his attorneys 
and to assist in preparing his defense.  Again, on cross-examination, Dr. Haglund 
testified that he believed defendant to be able to assist in his own defense and to 
consult with counsel and understand the court proceedings.  Defense counsel 
declined to call any witnesses, nor did counsel offer any testimony to contradict 
Dr. Haglund’s findings or his report that the defendant had slept well and was in 
acceptable physical condition at the time of the examination. 
 
The court determined that defendant was competent to stand trial, and that 
the trial would proceed.  Defense counsel requested that Dr. Haglund be given the 
opportunity to examine defendant again, and also requested that defendant’s own 
treating psychiatrist be given the opportunity to examine him.  The court 
determined that other evidence concerning defendant’s medical condition was not 
8 
relevant on this point.  Defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial was overruled. 
 
After one state’s witness testified, defense counsel put the following matters 
on the record: that defendant was brought into court in a wheelchair with 
handcuffs, leg irons and a body belt; that in defense counsel’s opinion, defendant 
was incoherent; that he was not following the proceedings and could not 
communicate or assist defense counsel; that defense counsel did not believe that 
defendant was malingering; and that his pulse rate was one hundred twenty.  
Defense counsel again requested a mistrial.  The prosecutor responded that defense 
counsel had several opportunities to speak with defendant throughout the day and 
never mentioned to the court that defendant was incoherent before the deputies 
transported defendant to court.  The prosecutor stated that, in his opinion, 
defendant was malingering.  The motion for mistrial was denied. 
 
When the trial resumed on July 14, defense counsel again indicated that he 
did not think that defendant was competent to proceed.  However, defense counsel 
did not file any additional information to support these allegations.  Further, a 
deputy who guarded the defendant during the noon recess testified that defendant 
was doing stretching exercises, seemed to be fine, was not shaking, was in control 
of himself, and was conversing in a normal tone with his lawyers.  The court 
overruled the motion, as well as defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial. 
 
Defense counsel made similar motions concerning defendant’s competence 
and requested a mistrial throughout the course of the trial.  Again, these motions 
were unsupported and, consequently were denied. 
 
After defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, defense counsel filed 
a motion for new trial on the grounds that defendant was not competent to stand 
trial.  Attached to the motion were affidavits by his counsel and a physician, and a 
report by the psychiatrist who had been treating defendant before and during trial.  
The defendant also attached a report of a radiology examination that was 
9 
performed on July 21, 1995 (after the date of conviction but before the sentencing 
phase), which indicated that there had been some change in defendant’s brain since 
a prior examination on March 25, 1995.  The affidavits and report described some 
physiological observations of defendant during the course of trial, which included 
increased respiration, elevated pulse, sweating, shaking, and stammering.  The trial 
court denied the motion for new trial. 
 
Former R.C. 2945.37, in effect at the time of defendant’s trial, provided: 
 
“(A) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas or municipal court, the 
court, prosecutor, or defense may raise the issue of the defendant’s competence to 
stand trial.  * * * If the issue is raised after trial has begun, the court shall hold a 
hearing on the issue only for good cause shown. 
 
“A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial, unless it is proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence in a hearing under this section that because of his 
present mental condition he is incapable of understanding the nature and objective 
of the proceedings against him or of presently assisting in his defense. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The prosecutor and defense counsel may submit evidence on the issue of the 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.” 
 
When the question of competency arose, the court, having determined that 
there was good cause, ordered that defendant be examined.  A hearing was held the 
day after the evaluation.  Pursuant to R.C. 2945.37, the defense had the burden of 
proving that defendant was incompetent.  The only witness called during the 
hearing was Dr. Haglund. 
 
As stated, Dr. Haglund testified that defendant was competent to stand trial.  
Dr. Haglund wavered only on the issue of whether defendant was capable of going 
forward with the trial due to his mental/emotional state.  However, this had more to 
do with the stun belt incident and some follow-up incidents where correction 
10 
officers attempted to restrain him before transport.  These events served as the 
basis for Dr. Haglund’s desire to reexamine defendant, not that defendant had 
somehow become incompetent from the previous day. 
 
At the time the trial court was called upon to decide defendant’s 
competence, the information indicated that although shaken from the stun belt 
incident, defendant had come to trial that afternoon, July 11, waived his right to a 
jury trial, and sat through a half a day of testimony.  The court based its 
determination of competence on those factors, in combination with Dr. Haglund’s 
opinion and the court’s own observations of the defendant’s behavior.  Defendant 
did not carry his burden of proving incompetence. 
 
After the trial court found defendant competent, defense counsel persisted in 
their efforts to obtain an additional evaluation of competence.  Their requests were 
based on their own observations of defendant during the trial proceedings.  Even 
though defendant was being treated by a psychiatrist who examined him four days 
after the stun belt incident, an affidavit by the doctor was not presented until the 
new trial motion was filed.  Based on the evidence presented at the time of the 
hearing, the trial court’s decision was proper. 
 
The record indicates that defense counsel raised concerns about defendant’s 
mental state during the course of the trial.  Given that defense counsel are officers 
of the court, their assertions cannot be dismissed.  However, in State v. Chapin 
(1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 437, 21 O.O.3d 273, 424 N.E.2d 317, we held: “An 
unqualified suggestion of defendant’s incompetency to stand trial by defense 
counsel during trial without additional objective indications such as, but not 
limited to, supplemental medical reports, defendant’s conduct at trial or specific 
reference to defendant’s irrational behavior or the like does not meet the ‘good 
cause shown’ standard of R.C. 2945.37.” Id., paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
During the course of the trial, defense counsel filed no additional 
11 
information to support their allegations of incompetency.  Further, defense 
counsel’s statements must be balanced against the court’s own observations, as 
well as the statements of the deputy sheriffs who also observed defendant 
(although such statements were not under oath).  Considering the totality of the 
evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for 
additional evaluation and mistrial. 
 
While defendant did file additional information with his motion for new 
trial, the standard of review remains whether the trial court abused its discretion.  
State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 564 N.E.2d 54, paragraph one of the 
syllabus; State v. Williams (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 88, 72 O.O.2d 49, 330 N.E.2d 
891.  In the entry denying the new trial motion, the presiding judge considered the 
additional medical evidence, and still determined that defendant was competent to 
stand trial.  That determination was based on the court’s own observations, as well 
as unrefuted representations of correctional officers who observed defendant 
showering, eating meals, and conversing with other inmates, correctional officers 
and, upon request, with his attorneys.  The detailed entry of the trial court fails to 
support defendant’s claim that the court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable.  Thus, we find no abuse of discretion.  State v. Adams (1980), 62 
Ohio St.2d 151, 158, 16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149.  Accordingly, we 
overrule defendant’s first and second propositions of law. 
Jury Waiver Colloquy 
 
In his third proposition of law, defendant makes two specific arguments 
concerning his jury waiver on July 11.  First, he argues that a jury waiver in a 
capital case is not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily unless the 
defendant is aware of all the implications of the waiver.  Second, he argues that 
because he was accidentally shocked with the stun belt on the morning of trial, and 
was on Valium as a result, his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
12 
 
Defendant first asserts that this court’s decision in State v. Post (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754, is inconsistent with State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We held in Post, “[T]his 
court indulges ‘ * * * in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal 
case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in 
arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ”  Id., 32 
Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d at 759, quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 
146, 151, 44 O.O.2d 132, 136, 239 N.E.2d 65, 70.  In Jells, we held that there is no 
requirement for a trial court to interrogate a defendant in order to determine 
whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a jury trial.  Defendant now 
argues that after this court’s decision in Post, the defendant must be advised of the 
presumption of correctness that will attach to the findings of the three-judge panel. 
 
Since Jells holds that no inquiry is required, the trial court’s failure to make 
specific inquiries of the defendant cannot be error.  “While it may be better 
practice for the trial judge to enumerate all the possible implications of a waiver of 
a jury, there is no error in failing to do so.”  Id., 53 Ohio St.3d at 26, 559 N.E.2d at 
468.  Here, the trial judge read the waiver aloud, and asked defendant if “this [was] 
your desire?”  Defendant answered in the affirmative.  Pursuant to Jells, no more 
was required. 
 
Defendant also argues that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary because “the waivers were signed at a time shortly after appellant had 
been administered the shock of 50,000 volts of electricity from a stun belt he was 
wearing * * * [and] had just been placed under the influence of Valium.”  The 
record supports defendant’s claim that he was shocked by the stun belt; however, 
the record does not indicate the voltage level.  The record also indicates that the 
trial judge stated:  “The defendant is shaken, and he may be on Valium.”  The 
court took a recess directly after this incident for the remainder of the morning, and 
13 
the court then reconvened at 1:30 p.m.  Immediately upon reconvening, the parties 
addressed the subject of the waivers and made opening statements.  Nothing 
indicates that defendant was unable to make a decision concerning the jury waiver.  
Defendant was represented by three attorneys, one of whom was a physician, and 
they never indicated that defendant would not be able to waive his right to a jury.  
Further, while defense counsel requested a mistrial and additional evaluations of 
defendant during the course of the trial alleging incompetence, they never asked 
the court to revisit the jury waiver issue.  The record does not support defendant’s 
claim that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Therefore, we 
overrule this proposition of law. 
Determination of the Charges by One versus Three Judges 
 
The presiding judge consolidated defendant’s cases.  The first case (No. 
93CR044726) included charges of felonious assault and domestic violence after an 
altercation by defendant with Ms. Filiaggi and Beiswenger in December 1993.  
The second case (No. 94CR044866) involved charges of aggravated murder, 
attempted aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping on January 24, 
1994.  Defendant filed a motion to consolidate the cases for trial, which was 
granted.  Defendant waived his right to be tried by a jury in both cases.  However, 
in the second case, the three-judge panel decided only the aggravated murder count 
and the accompanying specifications.  The presiding judge alone determined all the 
remaining charges (attempted aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and 
kidnapping) connected to the death penalty case.  In his fourth proposition of law, 
defendant challenges that procedure.  Defendant does not challenge the convictions 
for felonious assault and domestic violence (No. 93CR044726), the consolidated 
case. 
 
It is clear from the jury waiver colloquy that the presiding judge thought that 
14 
defendant was entitled to a three-judge panel only on the aggravated murder 
charge, and that he alone should determine guilt on the remaining counts.  
Defendant signed the waivers.  The three trial judges sat and collectively listened 
to all the testimony as to all the charges, but the panel entered its verdicts only on 
the aggravated murder charge and specifications.  The presiding judge decided the 
remaining charges.1 
 
The state contends that defendant consented to the procedure and therefore 
waived any error.  However, we conclude that this jurisdictional matter cannot be 
waived. 
 
R.C. 2945.06 provides: 
 
“If the accused is charged with an offense punishable with death, he shall be 
tried by a court to be composed of three judges, consisting of the judge presiding at 
the time in the trial of criminal cases and two other judges to be designated by the 
presiding judge or chief justice of that court, and in case there is neither a presiding 
judge nor a chief justice, by the chief justice of the supreme court.  The judges or a 
majority of them may decide all questions of fact and law arising upon the trial; 
however, the accused shall not be found guilty or not guilty of any offense unless 
the judges unanimously find the accused guilty or not guilty.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 104, 684 N.E.2d 668, 684-685, 
the defendant argued that even though all charges were present in the same 
indictment, his noncapital offenses were separate from the capital offenses, and 
thus he should be allowed to appeal the noncapital offenses to the court of appeals.  
We held, however, that we had jurisdiction over the entire case, and not just certain 
counts, charges, or sentences.  Here, the statute makes no provision for trying the 
noncapital counts by a single judge when a three-judge panel tries the capital 
offenses.  In the thirty-eight previous three-judge panel cases reviewed by this 
court, no previous trial court has interpreted R.C. 2945.06 as did the presiding 
15 
judge (and the court of appeals) in this case. 
 
We find persuasive the cogent reasoning of another state court that faced a 
similar situation: 
 
“[W]here it is apparent from the allegations that the matter alleged is within 
the class of cases in which a particular court has been empowered to act, 
jurisdiction is present.  Any subsequent error in the proceedings is only error in the 
‘exercise of jurisdiction,’ as distinguished from the want of jurisdiction in the first 
instance.  * * * 
 
“ ‘[I]n cases where the court has undoubted jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, and of the parties, the action of the trial court, though involving an 
erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, which might be taken advantage of by direct 
appeal, or by direct attack, yet the judgment or decree is not void though it might 
be set aside for the irregular or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction if appealed from.  
It may not be called into question collaterally.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  In re Waite 
(1991), 188 Mich.App. 189, 200, 468 N.W.2d 912, 917, quoting Jackson City Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Fredrick (1935), 271 Mich. 538, 544-546, 260 N.W. 908, 909. 
 
We have consistently required strict compliance with Ohio statutes when 
reviewing the procedures in capital cases.  See State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
333, 658 N.E.2d 766, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Since R.C. 2945.06 mandates that “the accused shall not be found guilty or 
not guilty of any offense unless the judges unanimously find the accused guilty or 
not guilty,” the presiding judge did not have sole authority to enter a verdict on the 
noncapital charges.  Thus, the trial is still incomplete because outstanding charges 
remain to be decided by the three-judge panel. See State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556, syllabus. 
 
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial panel the verdicts on the non-
capital offenses, attempted aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and 
16 
kidnapping.  Upon remand, the trial panel is required to proceed from the point at 
which the error occurred.  Montgomery Cty. Commrs. v. Carey (1853), 1 Ohio St. 
463, paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Stevenson v. Murray (1982), 69 
Ohio St.2d 112, 113, 23 O.O.3d 160, 431 N.E.2d 324, 325.  Thus, the three-judge 
panel, having already heard all of the evidence, should reconstitute itself and 
deliberate anew on the charges of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated 
burglary, and kidnapping.  The three-judge panel, as a whole, considered the 
aggravated murder charge, specifications, and penalty, as required by the statute; 
therefore, the verdicts on that charge are not affected. 
Inquiry on Waiver of Right to Testify 
 
In his fifth proposition of law, defendant argues that he was deprived of due 
process rights because the trial court did not, sua sponte, inquire as to whether his 
“failure to testify was a result of his own thinking.” 
 
We recently addressed this issue for the first time in State v. Bey (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 487, 499, 709 N.E.2d 484, 497, and held that “a trial court is not 
required to conduct an inquiry with the defendant concerning the decision whether 
to testify in his defense.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In this case, nothing in the record suggests that defendant was unaware of 
his right to testify or that defendant’s counsel failed to advise him of his right.  
Nothing suggests that defendant wanted to testify or was denied the opportunity to 
do so.  Accordingly, we overrule defendant’s fifth proposition of law. 
Failure to Admit Psychological Reports 
 
Defendant presented a clinical psychologist and three psychiatrists as experts 
during the defense case.  The state called one forensic psychiatrist to testify in 
rebuttal.  At the close of the rebuttal case, the state moved for the admission of the 
report that its expert had prepared.  Defense counsel objected, arguing that the 
court heard the testimony, but the court admitted the report.  At that point, defense 
17 
counsel asked the court to admit his experts’ reports.  The prosecutor objected, 
arguing, “[T]hey had their chance, it’s not their case.”  The trial court denied the 
defense’s request.  In his sixth proposition of law, defendant argues that the trial 
court erred in refusing to permit the admission of the defense experts’ reports. 
 
R.C. 2945.10(C) specifies the order of proceedings at trial:  “The state must 
first produce its evidence and the defendant shall then produce his evidence.”  
“The state will then be confined to rebutting evidence, but the court, for good 
reason, in furtherance of justice, may permit evidence to be offered by either side 
out of its order.”  R.C. 2945.10(D).  Moreover, this court has held that “[t]he 
admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court.”  State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 
343, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
The appropriate time for defense counsel to have requested admission of the 
reports of the defense experts was during the defense’s case.  While it certainly 
was within the court’s discretion to have admitted the reports at the close of the 
rebuttal case, the court’s refusal to admit the reports does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion, which would be “more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies 
that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  State v. 
Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149.  
Defendant has not met that burden here. 
 
Further, even if the trial court erred in excluding the reports, the error was 
harmless.  The court had the opportunity to hear all the witnesses testify in person 
and, therefore, the information given by the experts was conveyed to the trial court 
and the reports were merely cumulative.  Accordingly, we overrule this proposition 
of law. 
Failure to Find Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
18 
 
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  A plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity is an affirmative defense that must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Brown (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 133, 5 OBR 
266, 449 N.E.2d 449.  A person is not guilty by reason of insanity only if he or she 
proves that “at the time of the commission of the offense, he did not know, as a 
result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of his acts.”  Former 
R.C. 2901.01(N); 2901.05. 
 
Four experts testified for the defense, and one for the state.  In his seventh 
proposition of law, defendant argues that the panel “simply lost its way in the 
thicket of expertise.”  Defendant appears to be arguing that he met his burden of 
proving the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity by a preponderance of the 
evidence and that the trial court’s finding to the contrary was against the weight of 
the evidence. 
 
Defendant offered the testimony of a clinical psychologist (Dr. Marc Robert 
Pagano) and three psychiatrists (Drs. J. Alexander Bodkin, Paul Jay Markovitz, 
and Emil F. Coccaro).  None of the defense experts was qualified in the field of 
forensics.  The rebuttal expert called by the state was a forensic psychiatrist (Dr. 
Phillip Resnick). 
 
Dr. Pagano examined defendant and diagnosed him as suffering from 
intermittent explosive disorder and bipolar disorder at the time the offenses were 
committed.  Dr. Pagano relied on accounts by defendant, his family, and defense 
counsel, and did nothing to verify the accuracy of the information.  He specifically 
stated that he was not giving an opinion on the question of legal insanity. 
 
Dr. Bodkin also examined defendant and determined that he suffered from 
bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive disorder.  He opined that defendant, 
because of these diseases, did not know the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time 
of the murder and attempted murder.  Dr. Bodkin also received all of his 
19 
information used to evaluate defendant from the defendant himself, the defendant’s 
family, and the defense team.  He did not believe that defendant was being 
untruthful or malingering. 
 
Dr. Markovitz also diagnosed defendant as having bipolar disorder, 
intermittent explosive disorder, and attention deficit disorder.  He testified that, 
based on defendant’s conduct, if he had been treating defendant in the two weeks 
preceding the murder, he would have hospitalized him as suicidal.  He further 
opined that on the day of the incident with Beiswenger, and on the day of the 
murder, defendant did not know right from wrong.  He based his analysis on the 
facts of the case, his interview with defendant, defendant’s lifelong behavior 
patterns, biochemical studies, and overview of his life.  He also did nothing to 
verify the information provided by the defense. 
 
Dr. Coccaro did not examine defendant, but examined his medical and 
chemical test results.  He concluded that defendant suffered from bipolar disorder 
and intermittent explosive disorder.  His testimony echoed the other doctors’ 
testimony concerning defendant’s chemical imbalance.  However, Dr. Cocarro 
conceded that it was possible for a person with a history of impulsive aggressive 
behavior to plan a premeditated, intentional crime that the person knows is wrong. 
 
Dr. Resnick was the forensic psychiatrist who testified on behalf of the 
prosecution.  Dr. Resnick explained that a forensic psychiatrist evaluates people 
who are in some form of litigation, either civil or criminal, and the person being 
evaluated is in the human sense trying to manage the impression he creates, 
whether it is to look disabled, more insane, etc.  Therefore, the forensic 
psychiatrist, unlike the clinical psychiatrist, does not take at face value what the 
evaluee reports, but relies more heavily on objective evidence, such as police 
reports, witnesses’ reports, employer reports, and school reports, and does not 
assume that everything being said is truthful. 
20 
 
In preparing for his testimony, Dr. Resnick spent five and a half hours with 
defendant and another two and three-quarter hours with him another day.  Dr. 
Resnick interviewed defendant’s mother, father, and girlfriend.  He reviewed 
detailed police reports, witnesses’ reports, police records regarding earlier charges, 
and deputies’ accounts of assaults made by defendant.  He reviewed a response to a 
motion to compel the production of records, the indictment, reports of Drs. Bodkin, 
Markovitz, Pagano, and Coccaro, reports of the hospital dietician, and various 
other medical reports. 
 
Dr. Resnick diagnosed defendant as having antisocial personality disorder, 
alcohol abuse, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder of childhood.  He further 
stated that defendant did not suffer from any mental diseases on the day of the 
killing that would meet the Ohio legal test (for insanity) and that defendant knew 
the wrongfulness of his conduct.  His opinion was that defendant committed the 
crimes out of vengeance.  Defendant expected to go to prison, he expected to lose 
his job, and the court had already told him that he was not allowed to see his 
children.  Dr. Resnick stated that while defendant was contemplating suicide, he 
decided, in Dr. Resnick’s opinion, to kill Ms. Filiaggi. 
 
“The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses 
concerning the establishment of the defense of insanity in a criminal proceeding 
are primarily for the trier of the facts.”  State v. Thomas (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 
24 O.O.3d 150, 434 N.E.2d 1356, syllabus.  The trial panel clearly expressed what 
its responsibilities were regarding the findings it needed to make.  The court found 
that “the defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence his claim of 
insanity at the time of the acts involved.  This Court specifically finds that the 
defendant knew of the wrongfulness of his acts in this case.” 
 
Even if the defense experts’ diagnoses are taken as true, Dr. Resnick’s 
testimony (as well as that of lay witnesses) concerning the defendant’s state of 
21 
mind at the time of the crime, as well as steps defendant took to evade capture by 
the police, indicates that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct. 
 
Dr. Resnick testified that there was no evidence that defendant was confused 
at the time of the killing.  He parked around the corner from his ex-wife’s house to 
keep from being seen.  He went to the back door because he knew there was a light 
by the front door.  He pursued Ms. Filiaggi into the home of a neighbor, 
Mutnansky.  When in Mutnansky’s  home, defendant told Mutnansky to stay in the 
other bedroom and close the door.  Dr. Resnick noted that this showed that 
defendant did not want anyone to witness the killing.  This was also evidence that 
defendant’s actions were not an uncontrolled rage, but a plan aimed at Ms. 
Filiaggi. 
 
Dr. Resnick indicated that information contributed by the family could be 
used to help the clinical experts to determine whether defendant was suffering 
from a severe mental disease, but the issue of whether defendant knew the 
wrongfulness of his act would depend in part on his answers regarding his conduct 
and other objective police data.  From the police reports, Dr. Resnick obtained 
additional information not available to the other experts, indicating the charges 
against defendant, his checking into a hotel under a false name, and his changing 
license plates, etc.  This evidence demonstrates that defendant knew the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.  In addition, through a telephone call, defendant 
learned that the police were tracing his whereabouts by his use of a money 
machine card, so he stopped using that card.  Dr. Resnick pointed to this as an 
example of clear, logical thinking. 
 
Defendant reported no delusions, hallucinations, or false beliefs that caused 
him to think that killing Ms. Filiaggi was the right thing to do.  In fact, Dr. Resnick 
testified that defendant volunteered to him the statement, “I know right from 
wrong.”  Defendant expressed no remorse and Dr. Resnick opined that defendant 
22 
had revenge for a motive, and not a psychotic motive. 
 
All the defense experts conceded that a person with the mental conditions 
that they identified in defendant could commit a premeditated murder with the 
knowledge that it was wrong.  We conclude that the evidence clearly showed that 
defendant did not suffer from any mental diseases that would qualify for the 
insanity defense under Ohio law and that the defendant knew the wrongfulness of 
his conduct.  Accordingly, we overrule defendant’s seventh proposition of law. 
Trial Panel’s Opinion 
 
When a sentence of death is imposed, R.C. 2929.03(F) requires that the 
court or the three-judge panel issue a separate opinion weighing the mitigating 
factors and aggravating circumstances in the case, and stating why the aggravating 
circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.  In his eighth 
proposition of law, defendant makes generalized complaints concerning the panel’s 
opinion.  But none of defendant’s complaints has merit. 
 
First, defendant argues that the panel, although making a “generic 
statement” that the death penalty specifications charged in the indictment were 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, made the more specific finding that they were 
supported by “substantial, credible evidence.”  In the trial phase of the case, the 
panel found defendant guilty of the three aggravating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The panel’s opinion specifically states:  “The panel finds that 
the Defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing the 
following aggravating circumstances:  * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  The panel then 
lists each circumstance and sets forth that there was “substantial and credible 
evidence” presented to prove each one.  Defendant argues that this constitutes error 
because substantial, credible evidence is not equivalent to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We do not agree that the panel’s use of the term “substantial, 
23 
credible evidence” undermines its specific finding that appellant was guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.2 
 
Second, defendant argues that the panel failed to indicate with sufficient 
specificity how it determined the weight to be given each mitigating factor and 
how it balanced those factors against the aggravating circumstances.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.03(F), the trial court was required to state its specific findings as to the 
existence of any of the statutory mitigating factors as well as any other mitigating 
factors.  This is exactly what the panel did.  The panel examined the statutory 
factors listed in R.C. 2929.04(B), and defendant’s history, character, and 
background.  The panel assigned weight to the factors it found present in 
defendant’s case. 
 
Defendant’s complaint is that the panel did not explain how it determined 
the weight given to the factors considered.  However, there is no requirement that 
the panel explain how it decides how much weight to give to any one factor.  The 
weight, if any, given to a mitigating factor is a matter for the discretion of the 
individual decisionmaker.  State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 193-194, 631 
N.E.2d 124, 132; State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 376, 582 N.E.2d 972, 
988. 
 
Finally, defendant argues that the panel incorrectly treated its conclusion that 
the offense was planned and calculated as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  
Defendant reaches this conclusion by citing the portion of the opinion in which the 
panel sets forth the reasons why the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors:  “The evidence showed that the Defendant’s actions were 
planned and calculated.”  The panel’s conclusion came at the end of a lengthy 
recitation of the facts of the case.  Indeed, the evidence did show that defendant’s 
actions were planned and calculated.  But, given the context of the sentence in the 
whole of the opinion, nothing leads us to believe that the panel weighed this as an 
24 
additional aggravating circumstance. 
 
In Fox, 69 Ohio St.3d at 192, 631 N.E.2d at 131, this court specifically 
admonished trial courts to “carefully comply with every specific statutory 
requirement of R.C. 2929.03(F).”  Here, the panel did.  Based on all the foregoing, 
we overrule this proposition of law. 
Scope of Proportionality Review 
 
In his ninth, tenth, and eleventh propositions, defendant asks the court to 
revisit State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, concerning the universe of cases to be considered by 
an appellate court when conducting the proportionality review required by R.C. 
2929.05(A).  Defendant presents no new arguments concerning this issue and, 
therefore, based upon Steffen, these propositions are overruled.  State v. Poindexter 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
 
Defendant argues that Ohio’s capital sentencing scheme violates various 
provisions of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  This court has examined 
and disposed of these same issues in numerous cases.  See State v. Jenkins (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 322, 336, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1309; State v. Steffen, supra; State v. Grant 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 483, 620 N.E.2d 50, 69; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 
Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph six of the syllabus; State 
v. Lewis (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 200, 206, 616 N.E.2d 921, 926; State v. Buell 
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; State v. Phillips (1995), 
74 Ohio St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 
308, 544 N.E.2d 622, 633; State v. Smith, supra.  Thus, we overrule defendant’s 
twelfth proposition of law. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE REVIEW 
25 
 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder committed with prior 
calculation and design.  He was also convicted of three separate aggravating 
circumstances: (1) that the offense was committed for the purpose of escaping 
detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by 
defendant (R.C. 2929.04[A][3]); (2) that the offense was part of a course of 
conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons 
by defendant (R.C. 2929.04[A][5]); and (3) that the victim of the offense was a 
witness to prior offenses by defendant and was purposely killed to prevent her 
testimony in a criminal proceeding concerning those prior offenses (R.C. 
2929.04[A][8]).  The court of appeals merged the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(8) 
factors, leaving the 2929.04(A)(5) and (A)(8) factors. 
 
This court, as part of the independent review mandated by R.C. 2929.05(A), 
must determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of the 
aggravating circumstances of which the defendant was found guilty.  We find that 
the state clearly met its burden on both aggravating circumstances. 
 
Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit conviction of any person 
except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  In examining claims based 
upon insufficient evidence, a reviewing court will ask whether after viewing the 
probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Jenks (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492; State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 10 
O.O.3d 340, 383 N.E.2d 132.  The test is whether there is “substantial evidence 
upon which a [fact-finder] could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an 
offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Eley at syllabus. 
 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) specifically provides that the “victim of the aggravated 
murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent the 
26 
victim’s testimony in any criminal proceeding * * * [or] was purposely killed in 
retaliation for the victim’s testimony in any criminal proceeding.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
While there had been ongoing hostility between defendant and Ms. Filiaggi, 
defendant did not kill Ms. Filiaggi until she and her fiancé, Eric Beiswenger, filed 
charges against defendant.  Defendant assaulted both of them on December 19, 
1993, and Ms. Filiaggi and Beiswenger had audio-recorded the assault.  Ms. 
Filiaggi brought a complaint for domestic violence and Beiswenger brought a 
complaint for felonious assault.  Ms. Filiaggi had witnessed the felonious assault 
against her fiancé and the domestic violence against her by defendant.  A grand 
jury indicted defendant for both crimes on December 28, 1993.  Further, Ms. 
Filiaggi and Beiswenger brought a complaint against defendant for attempted 
vandalism, criminal trespassing, and intimidation after an incident on January 20, 
1994, when defendant threw a bottle at their living room window.  Ms. Filiaggi had 
also videotaped the defendant throwing the bottle at her house.  Similarly, the state 
could have called Ms. Filiaggi as a witness at defendant’s trial on these charges.  
Two days after the bottle-throwing incident, defendant purchased a semiautomatic 
pistol.  Two days after that, defendant murdered Ms. Filiaggi on January 24, 1994. 
 
Defense counsel attempted to portray defendant as suicidal, claiming that he 
did not intend to kill Ms. Filiaggi, but only to take his own life in front of her.  We 
find that defendant’s actions belie that theory.  On January 24, 1994, defendant 
took out a $1,000 cash advance on his Visa card.  Defendant left $600 or $700 with 
his girlfriend, Tracey Jones.  The record does not show what the defendant did 
with the balance of the cash advance.  After he murdered his ex-wife, defendant 
attempted to kill his ex-father-in-law and then fled.  Defendant took another $1,000 
cash advance on his Visa, switched license plates with a stolen car, rented a car at 
an airport, and registered at a hotel under a false name.  We conclude that this 
27 
evidenced defendant’s plan to flee the jurisdiction after murdering the key witness, 
Ms. Filiaggi. 
 
We find that the state presented sufficient evidence to prove that the filing of 
these complaints was one of the reasons that defendant killed Ms. Filiaggi.  The 
law does not require it to be the sole reason.  Despite the long history of hostilities, 
there was never any physical attempt on Ms. Filiaggi’s life until after she brought 
the charges.  In addition, defendant stated twice to Ms. Filiaggi at the time of the 
shootings that “[t]his will teach you * * * to fuck with me.”  This evidence, along 
with the closeness in time to the filing of the complaints, creates a strong inference 
that supports the state’s theory of an attempt to avoid criminal responsibility by 
killing a witness.  In addition, the evidence also supports the theory that defendant 
killed Ms. Filiaggi in retaliation for her testimony in a criminal proceeding, i.e., 
the bringing of the complaint.  Before he murdered Ms. Filiaggi, he told her twice, 
“This will teach you * * * to fuck with me.”  Consequently, we find that the state 
proved this aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
We now examine the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance that 
Ms. Filiaggi’s murder was part of a course of conduct.  The evidence clearly shows 
that defendant purposely killed Ms. Filiaggi and then proceeded to the home of Ms. 
Filiaggi’s parents.  Ms. Filiaggi’s stepfather, Delbert Yepko, answered the door.  
Defendant asked him if he was ready to die, said, “I’m going to kill you,” and then 
aimed the gun at him.  Had Yepko not used the pepper spray against defendant, 
Yepko would most likely have also been killed.  This aggravating circumstance is 
also supported by sufficient evidence to make defendant death-eligible. 
 
Nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense is mitigating. 
Defendant was angry at Ms. Filiaggi for the trouble she was allegedly causing him.  
He perceived that she was antagonizing him, using his children to punish him, and 
always trying to get more money out of him.  Moreover, Ms. Filiaggi had just 
28 
pressed charges against defendant twice and would likely have been a witness at 
his trials on these charges.  However, Ms. Filiaggi did nothing to provoke 
defendant at the time of the murder. 
 
Some mitigating factors are present in defendant’s history, character, and 
background under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  His mother and sister testified that when 
his sister was ill as a child, defendant stayed by her side and helped to take care of 
her.  Defendant spent four years in the Army and achieved the rank of sergeant.  
He saved money while in the Army, went to college on the GI Bill, and graduated 
cum laude.  Defendant married Ms. Filiaggi while still in college, and after the 
children were born, he was described as a loving father to them.  Throughout 
college, defendant supported his family.  Defendant maintained fairly steady 
employment and paid his child support at the time the crime occurred.  These 
factors are entitled to some weight.  See, generally, State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 
Ohio St.3d 670, 686-687, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1374; State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 180, 207, 702 N.E.2d 866, 891; State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 
236, 690 N.E.2d 522, 533. 
 
We must now determine under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), whether at the time of 
committing the offense, defendant, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.  The defense experts during the trial phase 
claimed that defendant suffered from bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive 
disorder.  This diagnosis was based on testimony of family members who related 
incidents in defendant’s past concerning his allegedly uncontrollable temper and 
his propensity for violence.  From the age of five, defendant would act 
aggressively with very little provocation.  When defendant was in the second 
grade, he hit his teacher.  He then began counseling, which continued for a three-
year period, with very little improvement.  The court heard about other incidents 
29 
concerning altercations he was involved in throughout the course of his life. 
 
Defendant’s parents testified that he would always express remorse and take 
responsibility for these rages after they had occurred, but he did not seem able to 
control himself at the time.  His brother indicated that defendant would not incite 
fights, but it would not take much to get him fighting. 
 
While the defense witnesses portrayed the defendant’s anger problems as 
uncontrollable, Dr. Phillip Resnick testified that defendant has the ability to control 
his aggression if it benefits him, or use violence to achieve a purpose.  Dr. Resnick 
explained that defendant engaged in two types of aggression:  impulsive aggression 
and controlled aggression.  The impulsive aggression was evidenced by defendant 
going into a rage and losing control.  However, there were numerous examples of 
defendant’s ability to control his aggression.  For example, defendant’s mother 
relayed to Dr. Resnick that when defendant was a child, if he wanted the remote 
control for the TV and one of his sisters would not give it to him, he would punch 
her and take it.  Dr. Resnick explained that this behavior is not rage, but using 
aggression to accomplish a purpose.  Another example of defendant’s ability to 
control his aggression is his history in the military.  Dr. Resnick indicated that the 
defendant told him that because of the consequences, he would walk away from 
many fights because the military is a more controlled society with regard to 
consequences.  Dr. Resnick testified that defendant behaved similarly while on the 
job, i.e., did not get into fights, because he knew that there would be serious 
consequences.  Therefore, when defendant was more likely to “get away with it,” 
he was more likely to act on impulse.  However, if he was fearful of facing the 
consequences, he was able to control his temper. 
 
As mentioned previously, four experts testified for the defense regarding 
defendant’s mental condition at the time of the crimes.  Dr. Pagano diagnosed 
defendant with bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive disorder.  First, Dr. 
30 
Pagano testified that in the manic phase of bipolar disorder, defendant would be 
more impulsive and more easily provoked.  Again, as mentioned above, Dr. 
Pagano also testified that he did not read any police reports, and that he relied on 
the accounts by the defendant, his family, and defense counsel.  In addition, he did 
nothing to verify the accuracy of this information. 
 
Second, Dr. Bodkin also testified that he believed that defendant suffered 
from bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive disorder.  In addition, Dr. Bodkin 
believed that defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder.  Again, Dr. Bodkin 
received all of his information used to evaluate defendant from the defendant 
himself, the defendant’s family, and the defense team. 
 
Third, Dr. Markovitz testified that at the time of the offenses, defendant 
suffered from bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, and intermittent explosive 
disorder.  Dr. Markovitz testified that he did not believe that defendant was aware 
of or had the ability to reflect on what he was doing at the time he murdered Ms. 
Filiaggi. 
 
Finally, Dr. Coccaro also concluded that defendant suffered from 
intermittent explosive disorder and bipolar disorder.  Again, as noted above, Dr. 
Coccaro testified that he also had done nothing to independently verify the 
information he reviewed.  Instead, he relied on the reports of Drs. Markovitz and 
Bodkin.  Significantly, Dr. Coccaro conceded that it was possible for a person with 
a history of impulsive aggressive behavior to plan a premeditated, intentional 
crime that the person knows is wrong. 
 
Dr. Resnick, the only forensic psychiatrist to testify at the trial, testified on 
behalf of the prosecution.  Based on his interviews, reviews of police records, 
witness reports, deputy accounts, and other documents mentioned above, Dr. 
Resnick made three diagnoses: antisocial personality disorder, alcohol abuse, and 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder of childhood. 
31 
 
Dr. Resnick disagreed with the conclusion that defendant suffered from 
intermittent explosive disorder.  Instead, Dr. Resnick believed that defendant 
suffered from antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Resnick explained that there is a 
specific statement under the criteria for intermittent explosive disorder in the DSM 
IV manual that says that if the violence can be explained by another disease, such 
as antisocial personality, then the diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder may 
not be made.  “It’s [intermittent explosive disorder] a weaker diagnosis.  It’s only 
if someone does not have others, or antisocial personality.” 
 
Dr. Resnick explained to the court that with intermittent explosive disorder, 
the outbursts are out of proportion to the stimulation.  Continual physical fights are 
much more characteristic of antisocial personality disorder, and not characteristic 
of intermittent explosive disorder.  Because defendant had numerous examples of 
controlled aggression, he met the category of antisocial personality disorder, rather 
than intermittent explosive disorder. 
 
Dr. Resnick arrived at his diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder by 
evaluating defendant against the criteria in the DSM IV.  Dr. Resnick testified that 
the evidence went beyond that recommended by the manual necessary to make the 
diagnosis.  For example, Dr. Resnick related specific evidence of defendant’s 
antisocial personality.  This included defendant’s conduct disorder as a child, 
which was evidenced by his “initiation of physical fights, being physically cruel to 
people, vandalism, shoplifting, running away from home, truancy, bullying, use of  
a weapon (knife), and deliberate destruction of property.”  Further evidence of 
antisocial personality included defendant’s adult unlawful behavior, impulsivity, 
aggressiveness, indicated by his approximately one hundred physical fights, 
reckless driving, and lack of remorse, as indicated by rationalizing his behavior 
and by his mother saying that he had no remorse after getting into physical fights. 
 
In addition, Dr. Resnick testified that the defendant’s mother told him that 
32 
several times she heard defendant on the phone with his ex-wife, Ms. Filiaggi, and, 
one time, after concluding the call, he said, “I’m going to kill her one of these 
days.”  Dr. Resnick noted the vengeance of defendant when he said to Ms. Filiaggi 
before he shot her, “This will teach you * * * to fuck with me.”  Dr. Resnick stated 
that it was his belief that this showed that defendant had a rational motive rather 
than a psychotic motive. 
 
Dr. Resnick noted that defendant had admitted to Dr. Pagano that while he 
was feeling suicidal before the act, he thought about taking out others with whom 
he had grievances and “had done him wrong.” That included judges, in an earlier 
case, and police officers with whom he had trouble in the past.  Dr. Resnick noted 
that on the day of the murder, although defendant had one gun available to him, 
before leaving for Ms. Filiaggi’s home he insisted on taking a second gun with 
him.  Dr. Resnick opined that this did not mesh with the suicide theory. 
 
Dr. Resnick testified that there was no evidence that defendant was confused 
or suffering from delusions or hallucinations that suggested to him that killing Ms. 
Filiaggi was the right thing to do.  At the time of the killing, his activities were 
goal-directed and effective.  He parked his car not in front of Ms. Filiaggi’s house, 
but around the corner to keep from being seen.  He went to the back door because 
there was a light by the front door.  He chased Ms. Filiaggi into the neighbor’s 
house, suggesting that he was pursuing her, which is goal-directed rather than 
impulsive behavior.  As mentioned above, defendant told the neighbor to stay in 
the other bedroom and close the door.  Again, this demonstrates defendant’s ability 
to control the situation and to control anger. 
 
Dr. Resnick noted that when defendant drove to his father-in-law’s home 
after shooting Ms. Filiaggi, it showed premeditation, rather than impulsivity, 
because he actually drove a distance for that purpose.  Further, his steps taken after 
the murders also suggested that defendant knew he was committing illegal and 
33 
wrongful acts.  Dr. Resnick pointed to the acts of avoiding police, switching 
license plates with stolen ones, renting a car at an airport, registering in a hotel 
under a false name, and keeping his calls to his parents’ home short because he 
believed their phone was tapped. 
 
Dr. Resnick found the defendant to be an above average, intelligent man.  
He testified that defendant had already spent time in jail for past crimes, knew he 
was violating a restraining order, lied to obtain a 9 mm gun, and volunteered to Dr. 
Resnick that he knew right from wrong. 
 
Defense counsel pressed Dr. Resnick again about the antisocial personality 
disorder issue.  Defense counsel noted that defendant had set and met goals such as 
graduating from college with honors, marrying, and supporting his family.  
Defense counsel challenged that these behavior traits are inconsistent with a 
sociopathic personality.  Dr. Resnick disagreed and noted that the fact that a person 
succeeds does not imply that he or she is not sociopathic.  Dr. Resnick continued to 
disagree with the prior diagnoses of bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive 
disorder.  Dr. Resnick completely disagreed with the defense proposition that if a 
person suffers from intermittent explosive disorder and bipolar disorder, he or she 
may not know right from wrong.  In fact, Dr. Resnick interviewed defendant, and 
then after reviewing the medical reports of the defense experts, he went back and 
systematically asked specific, detailed questions of defendant, his parents, and his 
girlfriend regarding issues like bipolar disorder, depression, attention deficit 
disorder, and explored the criteria for those conditions.  Dr. Resnick also testified 
that the diagnostic criteria for attention deficit disorder do not include aggressive 
violence. 
 
There was testimony by the defense experts that defendant had a chemical 
imbalance in his brain.  Specifically, some of the defense experts testified that 
defendant possessed low seratonin levels.  Seratonin is a neurotransmitter in the 
34 
brain that functions as a behavioral inhibitor.  One defense expert testified that if 
seratonin is low and people have impulsive aggressive problems, it would stand to 
reason, that if you enhance their seratonin activity, it should make them less 
impulsive and aggressive.  However, Dr. Resnick testified that whether it was 
impulsive or premeditated, defendant could still know the wrongfulness of his 
conduct, whatever the diagnosis (bipolar, intermittent explosive, or antisocial 
personality disorder).  In fact, as the court of appeals noted, all of the defense 
experts conceded that a person with the mental conditions that they identified in 
defendant could commit a premeditated murder with the knowledge that it was 
wrong. 
 
Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), defendant was required to prove that “at the time 
of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, 
lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” 
 
All of the defense experts conceded, as the court of appeals noted, that a 
person with the mental conditions that they identified in defendant could commit a 
premeditated murder with the knowledge that it was wrong.  In addition, we agree 
with the court of appeals that the claims that defendant had successfully completed 
college, served in the military, maintained employment, and cared for his children 
contradict the claim that he had a mental disease or defect so severe that it rendered 
him unable to control himself or unable to conform his conduct to the law.  
Accordingly, we give this factor slight weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3). 
 
Considering the mitigating factors set forth above, we find that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh, beyond a reasonable doubt, the factors in 
mitigation of the death sentence. 
 
As a part of the appropriateness determination, we must compare this case to 
other cases reviewed by this court containing the course-of-conduct specification 
35 
to determine if the death sentence in this case is disproportionate. 
 
In State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 501-502, 663 N.E.2d 1277, 
1293-1294, the defendant was convicted of killing his ex-wife and one of his 
children.  Allard presented evidence that he was raised in foster homes and was 
sexually abused as a child.  Allard was remorseful and there was evidence he 
would adapt well in prison.  Like defendant, he also presented evidence that he 
suffered from bipolar disorder.  The court affirmed the death sentence. 
 
In State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 338-339, 667 N.E.2d 960, 972-
973, the defendant killed his wife and brother-in-law.  There was mitigating 
evidence that Awkal was raised in a poor background and did not finish school.  
Awkal’s father was physically abusive.  Awkal was gainfully employed, had no 
prior criminal history, and expressed remorse for the killing.  Further, Awkal was 
suffering from psychological disorders.  The court affirmed the death sentence. 
 
In State v. Sowell, 39 Ohio St.3d at 336-337, 530 N.E.2d at 1309-1310, the 
defendant killed one person and attempted to kill a second.  Sowell presented 
mitigating evidence that the killing was the result of provocation and that he was 
intoxicated when it occurred.  The court affirmed the death sentence. 
 
State v. Claytor (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 234, 245-246, 574 N.E.2d 472, 481-
482, involved the killing of two hospital guards.  Claytor had no criminal 
convictions.  The compelling factor in that case was the existence of the R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) factor, that Claytor, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked 
the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law.  The court reversed Claytor’s death 
sentence. 
 
This case is more similar in facts to Allard, Awkal, and Sowell.  The mental 
disorders present in this case are not the severe mental defects found in Claytor.  
As such, we find that the death sentence in this case is not disproportionate when 
36 
compared to similar cases. 
 
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm defendant’s conviction for 
aggravated murder and his sentence of death.  We also affirm his convictions and 
sentences for felonious assault and domestic violence in Lorain Common Pleas 
case No. 93CR044726.  However, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in 
case No. 94CR044866 and the verdicts and/or the sentences imposed for attempted 
aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping, and remand the cause to 
the three-judge panel for final resolution consistent with our opinion, supra, in 
defendant’s fourth proposition of law. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
 and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The presiding judge found defendant not guilty of the kidnapping charges. 
2. 
The trial court erred in not merging two of the aggravating circumstances 
(R.C. 2929.04[A][3] and [A][8]); however, the court of appeals merged them in 
conducting its independent review. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur with the 
majority opinion, except I would find that any error resulting from a single judge 
deciding the noncapital offenses in this case was waived by the defendant’s failure 
to object. 
 
The defendant in a noncapital criminal case where a jury is waived is tried 
and his guilt determined by a single judge.  R.C. 2945.06, in reference to capital 
37 
offenses, provides that where a jury is waived, the case should be tried and 
determined by a panel of three judges.  The statute may allow the three-judge panel 
to determine noncapital offenses along with capital offenses, but does not require 
it. 
 
The majority finds, without explanation, that the three-judge panel cannot be 
waived as to noncapital offenses.  I have found no reason why the failure to object 
should not waive this issue.  In fact, our decision in Swiger v. Seidner (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 685, 686, 660 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (where defendant waived three-judge 
panel and a single judge determined both capital and noncapital offenses, single 
judge had jurisdiction to determine noncapital offense) supports the waiver 
argument. 
 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on this 
issue. 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law One[:]  It is prejudicial error for a trial court to find a 
defendant competent to stand trial where the evidence shows that additional 
evaluations may have shown otherwise. 
 
“Proposition of Law Two[:]  It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to 
fail to grant a new trial when that court failed to make a meaningful determination 
regarding defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
 
“Proposition of Law Three[:]  A defendant’s decision to waive a jury and 
be tried by a three judge panel is not voluntary, knowing and intelligent when the 
court does not engage in any meaningful colloquy with him regarding the meaning 
of a jury trial. 
 
“Proposition of Law Four[:]  It is a violation of a defendant’s due process 
rights when a trial court fails to have the entire three judge panel decide all the 
charges contained in the indictment. 
38 
 
“Proposition of Law Five[:]  It is a violation of a defendant’s due process 
rights when the trial court fails to specifically inquire whether defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify at trial. 
 
“Proposition of Law Six[:]  It is an abuse of discretion and highly 
prejudicial to a defendant when a trial court refuses to permit a defendant to enter 
the reports of his experts into evidence. 
 
“Proposition of Law Seven[:]  It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to refuse to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity when the experts deem 
otherwise. 
 
“Proposition of Law Eight[:]  When the R.C. 2929.03(F) opinion of the 
three judge panel is defective a new trial must be ordered. 
 
“Proposition of Law Nine[:]  It is error for a trial court to impose a death 
sentence when the death penalty law as currently applied in Ohio violates R.C. 
2929.05(A) by requiring appellate courts and the Supreme Court, in conducting 
their R.C. 2929.04(A) review of ‘similar cases’ for proportionality, to examine 
only those cases in which a death sentence was imposed and ignore those in which 
a sentence of life with parole eligibility after twenty full years or life with a parole 
eligibility after thirty full years was imposed.  The current method also violates the 
rights to a fair trial and due process, results in cruel and unusual punishment, and 
implicates others of appellant’s protected rights as well, all as set forth in the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and in Sections 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16 and 20, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Ten[:]  It is prejudicial error to sentence defendant to 
the death penalty, when, based upon the law and the record of this case, the 
sentence of death herein is inappropriate and is disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, in violation of defendant’s rights as guaranteed to him by 
the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
39 
Sections 5, 9, 10 and 16 of Article One of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Eleven[:]  The proportionality review that this court 
must conduct in the present capital case pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 
2929.05 is fatally flawed and therefore the present death sentence must be vacated 
pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, Sections 5 and 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and Ohio 
Revised Code 2929.05, in violation of defendant’s rights as guaranteed to him by 
the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
Sections 5, 9, 10 and 16 of Article One of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law Twelve[:]  R.C. 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.021, 
2929.022, 2929.023, 2929.03, 2929.04 and 2929.05 as read together and as applied 
in this case violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Sections 2, 9, 10, and 16 of Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.”