Case Title: State v. Scheuerman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122253

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 122,253 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT CASH SCHEUERMAN, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 
Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. This assessment begins with the 
plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning. When a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the 
legislative intent behind that clear language. If a statute's language is ambiguous, a court 
will consult the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. 
 
2. 
An otherwise clearly written statute may still manifest ambiguity when applied to 
the facts of a case.  
 
3. 
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case are reviewed in 
a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have 
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When a trial proceeds on 
stipulated facts, appellate courts conduct a de novo review for sufficiency of the 
evidence, again viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State. 
2 
 
 
4. 
The test for the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is distinct 
from—although related to—the "factual appropriateness" test for the giving of lesser 
included offense instructions. 
 
5. 
When the elements of a lesser included offense are wholly contained within the 
elements of a greater offense, evidence that would be sufficient to support a conviction 
for the greater offense also supports a conviction for the lesser.  
 
6. 
The plain language of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(a)(1) and (d) reflects the 
legislative intent to criminalize the possession of "any" amount of methamphetamine. 
The only difference between the four possible felony classifications for this crime lies in 
the amount of methamphetamine possessed. Consequently, the quantitative ranges of 
lesser included offenses under this statute are wholly contained within the quantitative 
ranges of greater offenses. 
 
7. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 15 of 
the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, an individual must have a sufficient interest in an 
area searched—often called "standing"—before they can challenge the validity of a law 
enforcement search of that area. 
 
8. 
An individual's status as a passenger in a car, without more, does not provide 
Fourth Amendment "standing" to challenge a search of that car by law enforcement. 
 
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Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 60 Kan. App. 2d 48, 486 P.3d 676 (2021). 
Appeal from Barton District Court; CAREY L. HIPP, judge. Opinion filed January 14, 2022. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming in part, reversing in part, and vacating in part the judgment of the district 
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.  
 
Michael J. Duenes, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and J. Colin Reynolds, assistant 
county attorney, M. Levi Morris, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on 
the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WILSON, J.:  After a panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed Robert Cash 
Scheuerman's conviction for possession of methamphetamine under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 
21-5705(a)(1) and (d)(3)(B) for insufficient evidence based upon the parties' stipulation 
of facts, the State petitioned this court for review. Scheuerman also conditionally cross-
petitioned this court for review of the panel's conclusion that he lacked Fourth 
Amendment "standing" to challenge the search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. 
We granted both the petition and the conditional cross-petition.  
 
Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, we reverse the Court of Appeals 
panel on the sufficiency of the evidence and affirm its determination that Scheuerman 
cannot challenge the search of the vehicle. We thus affirm Scheuerman's conviction. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
The facts of the case are well summarized by the panel below. In brief, Barton 
County Sheriff's Office Detective Sergeant David Paden stopped a vehicle on a rural road 
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outside of Great Bend, Kansas, on August 8, 2016. Officers were on the lookout for 
Scheuerman, who was a passenger in the vehicle driven by his girlfriend, Gwen Finnigan. 
After Paden signaled for her to pull over, Finnigan brought the vehicle to a stop in the 
traffic lane because there was a "very deep ditch" and "very little shoulder" on which to 
pull over.  
 
Officers then ordered Finnigan to get out. She complied, walking over to the 
officers. But as Paden and another officer, Sergeant Lloyd Lewis, approached the car, 
they discovered that Scheuerman was holding a gun to his own head. One officer then 
removed Finnigan from the scene for her safety, ultimately transporting her to the Barton 
County Jail; the remaining officers talked to Scheuerman. After a period of impasse, 
Scheuerman was eventually convinced to put down the gun and leave the car. After he 
had done so, officers took him into custody. According to Paden, Scheuerman stated that 
any "dope" in the car was his, not Finnigan's.  
 
Because Finnigan was still at the jail when Scheuerman was taken into custody, 
there was no lawful driver on scene to whom the officers could release the car. And 
because the car was parked in a traffic lane, officers could not leave it unattended without 
turning it over to a lawful driver—so they impounded it. Lewis retrieved the gun—which 
Scheuerman had left in the car—and performed an "inventory" search of the car prior to 
impound. During the search, Lewis found a backpack which contained "numerous items 
of drug paraphernalia and drugs." 
 
The State charged Scheuerman with six counts relating to his possession of illicit 
substances and a firearm. Scheuerman filed a motion to suppress, challenging both the 
stop itself and the lawfulness of the search of the car. After hearing testimony from 
officers and from Scheuerman himself, the district court denied Scheuerman's motion. 
The district court reasoned that Scheuerman's disclosure that the vehicle held "dope" 
5 
 
prevented law enforcement from releasing the car to Finnigan without "search[ing] that 
car for anything that might be hazardous and certainly anything that might be illegal." 
 
Eager for a resolution of the suppression issue on appeal, the parties submitted 
a joint factual stipulation for the district court's consideration on March 18, 2019. 
Specifically, the parties made this submission "for the Court to determine the defendant's 
guilt or innocence by an uncontested bench trial on the following stipulated facts" with 
the intent to "frame legal issues associated with this matter" for an appeal, should the 
court find Scheuerman guilty. The parties' stipulation provided: 
 
"1. 
That on August 8, 2016, Detective Paden, Detective Sargent [sic] of the Barton 
County Sheriff's Office, made a traffic stop of a passenger vehicle which the 
defendant was a passenger. 
"2. 
That on August 8, 2016 the defendant was taken into custody during the traffic 
stop. 
"3 
That on August 8, 2016, after being taken into custody, the defendant was found 
to be in possession of at least 3.5 grams but less than 100 grams of 
methamphetamine as confirmed by KBI lab testing. 
"4. 
That the above-mentioned events occurred in rural Barton County, Kansas on the 
8th day of August, 2016."  
 
 
Shortly before the bench trial, the State moved to dismiss five counts against 
Scheuerman and to reduce Count I "to a severity level 3 drug felony." These modified 
charges were "part of the agreement" pertaining to the stipulated facts; indeed, 
Scheuerman's counsel represented that "there's a pretrial issue that we're intending on 
appealing, and that was how we came to this agreement for the severity level of the 
crime."  
 
 
In a Memorandum of Decision issued after trial, the district court found 
Scheuerman guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under 
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K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5705(a)(1) and (d)(3)(B). The district court ultimately sentenced 
Scheuerman to 73 months in prison, with 36 months' postrelease supervision. 
Scheuerman then appealed.  
 
On appeal, the panel bypassed the district court's basis for denying Scheuerman's 
motion to suppress by concluding that, as a passenger, he lacked "standing" to challenge 
the search in the first place. Scheuerman, 60 Kan. App. 2d at 51-53. But then the panel 
reversed Scheuerman's conviction for insufficient evidence, concluding that the parties' 
stipulation—that Scheuerman possessed "at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine"—
could not support a conviction for possession of less than 3.5 grams of 
methamphetamine, the gravamen of the amended Count I. 60 Kan. App. 2d at 58-59. 
 
The State filed a petition for review, and Scheuerman filed a conditional cross-
petition for review. The court granted both. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The panel incorrectly concluded that Scheuerman's conviction was not supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
 
We first address the State's sole issue, which challenges the panel's determination 
that the parties' stipulation to a range quantity of methamphetamine, greater than that 
required for the charged crime, constituted insufficient evidence to support Scheuerman's 
conviction.  
 
 
 
 
 
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Standard of review 
 
The State's argument implicates both the standard of review as to sufficiency of 
the evidence and as to statutory construction. The latter raises a question of law, which is 
reviewed de novo. E.g., State v. Thurber, 313 Kan. 1002, 1005, 492 P.3d 1185 (2021).  
 
"The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 
Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, we begin 
with the plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning. 
When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about 
the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading 
something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. But if a statute's language 
is ambiguous, we will consult our canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. 
[Citations omitted.]" Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 312 Kan. 597, 600-01, 478 P.3d 776 
(2021). 
 
An apparently clear statute may nevertheless manifest ambiguity when applied to 
the particular facts of a case. Cf. State v. Walker, 280 Kan. 513, 523, 124 P.3d 39 (2005).  
 
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case are reviewed in 
a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have 
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When a trial proceeds on 
stipulated facts, appellate courts conduct a de novo review for sufficiency of the 
evidence, again viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Darrow, 
304 Kan. 710, 715, 374 P.3d 673 (2016). 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The parties stipulated "[t]hat on August 8, 2016, after being taken into custody, the 
defendant was found to be in possession of at least 3.5 grams but less than 100 grams of 
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methamphetamine as confirmed by KBI lab testing." But "[a]s part of the agreement" of 
the parties, the State reduced the charge against Scheuerman from a severity level 2 drug 
felony to a severity level 3 drug felony, as set forth in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(a)(1) 
and (d)(3)(B).  
 
The panel acknowledged that "[a]s it relates to lesser included offenses whose 
elements are wholly contained within the originally charged crime, . . . if the facts are 
sufficient to convict of the charged crime, the facts are also sufficient to convict of a 
lesser included crime." Scheuerman, 60 Kan. App. 2d at 56. But, while the panel 
reasoned that the amended charge here was "clearly a lesser included offense of the 
originally charged crime," it concluded that the amended charge's elements "are not all 
contained within the originally charged crime" under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5109(b)(2). 
60 Kan. App. 2d at 56-57. Critically, the panel focused on what it perceived to be a strict 
elemental separation between the four subsections of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(d)(3) 
based on quantity, reasoning that "[t]he amended charge's quantity element requires 
possessing at least 1 gram but less than 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, while the 
originally charged crime requires possessing at least 3.5 grams but less than 100 grams." 
60 Kan. App. 2d at 57. 
 
We begin by examining the relevant portion of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705: 
 
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to distribute or possess with the intent to 
distribute any of the following controlled substances or controlled substance analogs 
thereof: 
(1) Opiates, opium or narcotic drugs, or any stimulant designated in subsection 
(d)(1), (d)(3) [i.e., methamphetamine] or (f)(1) of K.S.A. 65-4107, and 
amendments thereto; 
 
. . . . 
 
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"(d) . . . .  
 
. . . .  
(3) Violation of subsection (a) with respect to material containing any quantity of 
. . . methamphetamine, as defined by subsection (d)(3) or (f)(1) of K.S.A. 65-4107, and 
amendments thereto, or an analog thereof, is a: 
(A) Drug severity level 4 felony if the quantity of the material was less than 1 
gram; 
(B) drug severity level 3 felony if the quantity of the material was at least 1 gram 
but less than 3.5 grams; 
(C) drug severity level 2 felony if the quantity of the material was at least 3.5 
grams but less than 100 grams; and 
(D) drug severity level 1 felony if the quantity of the material was 100 grams or 
more." 
 
The statute appears clear. By its plain language, the amount of methamphetamine 
possessed—expressed as a range of grams—points specifically to the applicable crime. 
Possession with intent to distribute more than 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, but less 
than 100 grams of methamphetamine, is a drug severity level 2 felony. Scheuerman 
stipulated he possessed that amount, which establishes that he was guilty of the level 2 
felony. 
 
But Scheuerman was not charged with a level 2 felony. Because he consented to a 
court trial on stipulated facts, the prosecutor agreed to charge Scheuerman with the less 
serious level 3 felony, which required a lesser amount of methamphetamine for 
conviction. Thus, if the plain language of the statute means Scheuerman must be guilty of 
the crime within the matching quantitative parameters, and no other, then Scheuerman 
must be found not guilty of the crime charged and go free. This is what Scheuerman 
argues, and this is what the panel held.  
 
The amounts of methamphetamine are specifically ascribed to a crime level, but if 
a person possesses a great amount of methamphetamine, it seems obvious that he also 
10 
 
possesses a small amount of methamphetamine. How, then, could someone be guilty of 
possessing a large amount but not guilty of possessing a smaller amount? Logically, he 
cannot. Thus, the facts of this case, when applied to the statute, reveal an ambiguity in 
what at first seems clear from the statute's plain language—an ambiguity that lies not in 
the amounts, but in how the amounts are to be considered in relation to each other. See 
State v. Walker, 280 Kan. 513, 522-23, 124 P.3d 39 (2005) (despite apparently clear and 
unambiguous statutory language, application to the facts of the case revealed ambiguity 
necessitating further interpretation). In other words, are the amounts set forth in the 
different levels to be considered as mutually exclusive or cumulative? The panel's 
holding necessarily concludes that the amounts are mutually exclusive. Under this 
reasoning, since Scheuerman had more methamphetamine than the range specified by the 
lesser crime, he cannot be convicted of the lesser crime. 
 
Because the statute is ambiguous in its application, we turn to the canons of 
construction to resolve whether the Legislature intended the amounts set forth to be 
considered as cumulative or mutually exclusive. To do that, we need go no further than to 
consider which option leads to an absurd result. State v. Toliver, 306 Kan. 146, 154, 392 
P.3d 119 (2017) (interpreting an ambiguous term to avoid an "unreasonable or absurd 
result"). Cf. Kelly v. Legislative Coordinating Council, 311 Kan. 339, 354, 460 P.3d 832 
(2020) (Stegall, J., concurring) ("We have said before that we may depart from our strict 
adherence to the plain text of a law if that plain reading produces obviously absurd 
results."). Here, we conclude that an absurdity results if one cannot be guilty of 
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine because he has too much 
methamphetamine. If someone possesses at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, that 
person also necessarily possesses at least 1 gram of methamphetamine. Logically, if the 
amounts are to be considered as cumulative, the charges must likewise be considered to 
be cumulative, rather than mutually exclusive. Thus, someone who has 3.5 grams of 
methamphetamine may be found guilty of a level 2 felony, a level 3 felony, or even a 
level 4 felony (which only requires some measurable amount of methamphetamine).  
11 
 
 
The legislative intent that the amounts are to be treated as cumulative, and not 
mutually exclusive, is further evinced by K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5705(a), which indicates 
plainly that possession of "any" methamphetamine with intent to distribute is a felony at 
some level. See State v. Gensler, 308 Kan. 674, 680, 423 P.3d 488 (2018) (even where a 
criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not require the court to give effect to 
an absurd interpretation of a statute). Our holding means that a prosecutor has the 
discretion to charge a crime less than the maximum allowed by the quantity of 
methamphetamine possessed, if that prosecutor believes the circumstances justify it.  
 
We note the cases relied on by the panel to the contrary but find them 
distinguishable. For instance, in State v. Winn, No. 111,474, 2016 WL 1169422, at *8 
(Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), the court concluded that, where the State proved 
that the defendant possessed 622 grams of marijuana, there was no evidence that the 
defendant possessed an amount less than 450 grams for purposes of establishing factual 
appropriateness. But Winn did not challenge the amount of the marijuana found—he 
merely argued that he planned to consume it, rather than distribute it, and thus if the jury 
"found he would have smoked more than 172 grams and distributed the rest, it could have 
found him guilty of [the lesser] offense." Winn, 2016 WL 1169422, at *8.  
 
Likewise, in State v. Palmer, No. 110,624, 2015 WL 802733, at *1 (Kan. App. 
2015) (unpublished opinion), the defendant possessed 10.26 grams of methamphetamine 
in his shoe. The defendant argued that a lesser included offense instruction on possession 
of less than 3.5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute would have been 
appropriate based on "some evidence that at least a portion of the methamphetamine 
found in his possession was for his personal use rather than for distribution[.]" Palmer, 
2015 WL 802733, at *7. The panel rejected the defendant's argument that lesser included 
instructions should have been given because "K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5705 only requires 
12 
 
proof of the quantity of a controlled substance found in a defendant's possession, not the 
quantity that the defendant may have intended to distribute." 2015 WL 802733, at *7. 
 
Neither case supports the strict separation of quantitative elements that the panel 
extrapolated for purposes of evaluating evidentiary sufficiency, nor involved an 
evidentiary challenge to the amount of contraband possessed. Scheuerman, 60 Kan. App. 
2d at 58. Instead, both cases involved challenges to a defendant's intentions concerning 
certain parts of the contraband. Winn, 2016 WL 1169422, at *8 (evidence was presented 
that defendant possessed 622 grams of marijuana, and defendant "did not challenge that 
evidence as to weight"); Palmer, 2015 WL 802733, at *7 ("There is no dispute here that 
law enforcement discovered 10.26 grams of methamphetamine in Palmer's shoe."). In 
other words, Winn and Palmer were both claiming that "I may have a lot of drugs, but 
you can only count the part that I intended to distribute and not also that part that I 
intended to consume myself." Such a claim has no application here.  
 
Neither Winn nor Palmer were reviewed by this court. Thus, their holdings 
would not constrain us in any case. But we note that the test for the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction is distinct from—although related to—the "factual 
appropriateness" test for the giving of lesser included offense instructions. See, e.g., State 
v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 115, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993) ("A question of the sufficiency 
of evidence on the greater offense does not affect the inquiry into the need to instruct on 
the lesser included offense."). As the Kansas Supreme Court has said of the factual 
appropriateness analysis for jury instructions: 
 
"Such an inquiry is closely akin to the sufficiency of the evidence review frequently 
performed by appellate courts in criminal cases where 'the standard of review is whether, 
after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the 
appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' Of course, where the defendant has requested the 
lesser included offense instruction, the evidence should be viewed in the light most 
13 
 
favorable to the defendant. But deference is given to the factual findings made below, in 
the sense that the appellate court generally will not reweigh the evidence or the credibility 
of witnesses. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 162, 283 P.3d 202 
(2012). 
 
Because these questions of factual sufficiency and factual appropriateness are 
distinct, we leave for another day the matter of whether a specifically defined quantity of 
substance, alone, may constitute "some evidence" that would reasonably justify a lesser 
included offense instruction under K.S.A. 22-3414(3). Cf. State v. Louis, 305 Kan. 453, 
459, 384 P.3d 1 (2016) (evaluating failure to give arguably factually appropriate lesser 
included offense instruction under harmlessness paradigm based on "overwhelming 
evidence" of the greater offense that would eliminate any "reasonable probability" of a 
conviction on the lesser offense). Instead, we conclude only that, where the undisputed 
evidence establishes the possession of a greater quantity of contraband than a charged 
crime encompasses, that evidence is sufficient to establish the possession of the amount 
contemplated by the charged crime.  
 
Consequently, we reverse the Court of Appeals panel with respect to its 
conclusion that Scheuerman's conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. We 
affirm the district court on this point. 
 
The panel correctly concluded that Scheuerman's status as a passenger did not confer 
"standing," for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, to challenge the search of the car. 
 
 
We next turn to Scheuerman's sole issue:  whether his status as a passenger was 
sufficient to enable him to challenge the search of the vehicle driven by Finnigan. 
 
 
 
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Standard of review 
 
As the court has previously written, 
 
"Reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress requires the 
application of a bifurcated standard. The appellate court reviews the district court's 
factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent 
evidence, and then the ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed using a de novo standard. In 
reviewing the factual findings, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or assess 
the credibility of witnesses. 'Substantial competent evidence is such legal and relevant 
evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion.' 
[Citations omitted.]" State v. Doelz, 309 Kan. 133, 138, 432 P.3d 669 (2019). 
 
 
A district court's refusal to suppress evidence is subject to review for harmless 
error. E.g., State v. Thornton, 312 Kan. 829, 831, 481 P.3d 1212 (2021). Additionally, 
issues regarding a party's standing to challenge a search constitute questions of law and 
are thus subject to de novo review. E.g., State v. Gilbert, 292 Kan. 428, 431, 254 P.3d 
1271 (2011). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 15 of 
the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, an individual must have a sufficient interest in an 
area searched—often called "standing"—before they can challenge the validity of a law 
enforcement search of that area. E.g., State v. Dannebohm, 308 Kan. 528, 532-33, 421 
P.3d 751 (2018). These rights "are personal, and defendants may not vicariously assert 
them." Dannebohm, 308 Kan. at 533. To claim these protections, "defendants must 
establish that they have a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and this 
expectation must be objectively reasonable." 308 Kan. at 533. Put another way, "To 
establish a sufficient interest to have standing to challenge the legality of a search, the 
15 
 
challenger must claim either to have a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises 
searched or to have owned or possessed the seized property." State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 
715, Syl. ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 179 (2014). A passenger's Fourth Amendment rights "are 
implicated when the vehicle he or she is occupying is stopped, and this enables the 
passenger to challenge the constitutionality of that stop," but such rights "are not 
implicated during the search of an automobile he or she neither owns nor claims a 
possessory interest in, even if the evidence obtained during the search is used against the 
defendant later." Gilbert, 292 Kan. at 435.  
 
Scheuerman argues that recent caselaw has clarified the nature of a passenger's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle as akin to a "social guest." Scheuerman 
points to Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1528, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 
(2018), and Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 
(1998), which he reads in the aggregate to support a claim that vehicular passengers have 
standing to contest a search of a vehicle on the broad theory that they are social guests. In 
Scheuerman's formulation, if social guests have enough of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to enable them to challenge the search of a home, and vehicular passengers are 
essentially social guests, then passengers should have enough of a privacy expectation to 
challenge a search of the car in which they ride. 
 
The recognition that social guests may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
another's home—and, thus, standing to contest a search there—is not new. See, e.g., State 
v. Talkington, 301 Kan. 453, 473-83, 345 P.3d 258 (2015) (discussing the development of 
the "social guest" standing theory). But, as Byrd noted and as Scheuerman admits, more 
weight is given to an individual's expectation of privacy in their home than in their car. 
Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1526 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. Ct. 
1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 [1991]).  
 
16 
 
This disparity forms the core problem with Scheuerman's argument. Byrd clarified 
that there is no bright line holding "that passengers cannot have an expectation of privacy 
in automobiles," but it focused on "the expectation of privacy that comes from lawful 
possession and control and the attendant right to exclude" as the source of standing to 
challenge a search. 138 S. Ct. at 1528. See also United States v. Young, 289 F. Supp. 3d 
299, 301-02 (D. Mass. 2018) (where defendant "did not own or have a possessory right 
over the vehicle . . . [and] was not the driver of the vehicle on the day it was searched," 
she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle even though she 
"had been a passenger for a number of hours, had travelled in the car previously, and had 
left her cell phone locked in the vehicle"); United States v. Lewis, No. 19-20014-CM, 
2019 WL 3430603, at *4 (D. Kan. July 30, 2019) (focusing on control of a vehicle and 
possessory interest in a vehicle as sufficient to confer standing to challenge a search). Cf. 
United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (In challenging a vehicle stop, 
"[a] taxi fare—who by definition has contracted to pay for both the right to exclude 
others from the cab and the right to control its destination in certain respects—has a 
reasonable expectation that he will not gratuitously be seized while en route."). In one 
case, for instance, the following factors were deemed "relevant to a privacy expectation:  
legitimate presence in the area searched, possession or ownership of the area searched or 
the property seized, prior use of the area searched or the property seized, ability to control 
or exclude others' use of the property, and a subjective expectation of privacy." United 
States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 
Scheuerman's arguments demonstrate neither a right of lawful possession nor 
control of the vehicle. While the evidence showed he paid for the car, the car nevertheless 
belonged to his girlfriend, Finnigan. Finnigan, not Scheuerman, was driving the car at the 
time of the stop, and Scheuerman presented no evidence that he had any right to control 
the car or to exclude others from it at any time. And while some of Paden's testimony 
could support an inference that Scheuerman had used the vehicle in the past—at least 
enough to be associated with it by law enforcement—that alone does not support a 
17 
 
finding that Scheuerman had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. 
Consequently, we affirm the panel's conclusion that Scheuerman lacked Fourth 
Amendment "standing" to challenge the search. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We reverse the Court of Appeals panel with respect to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting Scheuerman's conviction and affirm the panel as to its conclusion 
that Scheuerman cannot challenge the underlying search of the vehicle. We thus affirm 
Scheuerman's conviction and sentence.