Case Title: ANDREW J. JOHNSON, A/K/A A.J. JOHNSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANDREW J. JOHNSON, A/K/A A.J. JOHNSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 26695 P.2d 638Case Number: 84-192Decided: 02/19/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ANDREW J. JOHNSON, A/K/A 
A.J. JOHNSON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 
v. 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Rehearing Denied February 
27, 1985.

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Andrew J. 
Johnson, appellant, pro 
se.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
for delivering controlled substances. The jury misread the court's instructions 
and also found appellant guilty of lesser included offenses. After determining 
the jury's intent the trial court sentenced appellant on the two principal 
charges of delivery of a controlled substance and nullified the jury's verdict 
on the lesser offenses.

[¶2.]     The issue on appeal is 
whether the court should have found the appellant guilty of the lesser included 
offenses rather than the principal offenses.

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     On January 23, 1984, an 
information was filed charging appellant with two counts of delivering a 
controlled substance defined in § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 
1977:

"(a) Except as authorized 
by this act [§§ 35-7-1001 to 35-7-1055], it is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 
controlled substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

* * * * * 
*

(ii) Any other controlled 
substances classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime * * 
*."

[¶5.]     In addition to 
instructions on the two delivery charges the court also instructed the jury that 
possession of a controlled substance as defined in § 35-7-1031(c), W.S. 1977, 
was a lesser included offense to the crime of delivery. The court's instructions 
seem reasonably clear that the jury was to consider the lesser included offenses 
only if they failed to find appellant guilty of delivery. Nevertheless, the jury 
found him guilty of two counts of delivery and two counts of possession. The 
trial judge recognized that the verdicts returned by the jury were inconsistent. 
He therefore carefully polled the panel and determined from each individual 
juror that it was his or her intent that appellant be found guilty of two counts 
of delivery of a controlled substance. The court thereafter treated the 
lesser-included offenses as having merged with the greater, and found appellant 
guilty of only the greater offenses, delivery of a controlled substance. The 
sentence imposed was for the greater offense and no reference was made to the 
lesser offenses. We find no error in the manner in which the trial court caused 
the jury's verdict to be corrected to reflect their intent. See 4 Wharton's 
Criminal Procedure, § 578, p. 139 (12th ed. 1976).

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
because the jury found him guilty on two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance he should have been sentenced on those two counts, and the two 
findings of guilt for delivery of a controlled substance should have been 
nullified or disregarded. We disagree. The only authority cited by appellant in 
support of his argument is § 6-1-101(c), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement):

"(c) In a case pending on 
or after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to 
the effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different 
from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser 
sentence."

[¶7.]     Section 6-1-101(c), 
W.S. 1977, has no application to this case. The crime charged in Count I of the 
information occurred December 16, 1983, and the crime charged in Count II 
occurred January 4, 1984. The effective date of the statute here was July 1, 
1983.

[¶8.]     Section 6-1-101(c), 
W.S. 1977, applies to a crime that provides for a greater penalty under the 
criminal law prior to July 1, 1983, than the penalty provided for under the law 
after July 1, 1983. That is not the situation here. The offenses occurred after 
July 1, 1983, and the trial and sentencing was after July 1, 1983. All 
proceedings were under the new criminal code which was effective July 1, 
1983.

[¶9.]     
Affirmed.