Case Title: MacIoch v. Wagner

Citation: 134 N.W.2d 591

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1965-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
134 N.W.2d 591 (1965) Joseph MACIOCH, Respondent, v. Theodore WAGNER, by his guardian ad litem Bernard Wagner, and Bernard Wagner, Appellants, and Freed Chevrolet Company, Respondent. No. 39418. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 9, 1965. *592 Ralph T. Lilly, St. Paul, for appellants. Hvass, Weisman & King, Minneapolis, Gegen & Schoen, Hastings, and Frederick Allen, Minneapolis, for plaintiff-respondent. Carroll, Cronan, Roth & Austin, Minneapolis, for defendant-respondent. NELSON, Justice. This action, commenced in the Dakota County District Court January 11, 1963, arose out of an accident which occurred May 1, 1961, when a 1958 Chevrolet driven by defendant Theodore Wagner and registered in the name of defendant Bernard Wagner collided with plaintiff's automobile. Bernard Wagner had ordered a new car in April 1961 from defendant Freed Chevrolet Company (hereinafter called Freed), part of the consideration for which was to be a trade-in of the 1958 Chevrolet, so plaintiff joined Freed as a party. Separate answers were filed by all defendants, defendants Wagner later serving amended answers and cross-claims against Freed. In its answer Freed specifically denied that it owned the Chevrolet involved in the accident. On March 30, 1963, a discovery deposition was taken of Bernard Wagner in behalf of Freed and another was taken of Clarence E. Freed, owner of Freed, in behalf of defendants Wagner. Thereafter Freed moved for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that Freed was in no way liable or responsible for the automobile involved in the accident and was entitled to summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law. The late Judge R. C. Nelsen prepared an order and memorandum granting this motion in September 1963 but died prior to its execution. Judge William C. Christianson granted a similar motion December 12, 1963, but later vacated it to permit certain amendments by defendants Wagner. Freed's third motion for summary judgment was granted by Judge John B. Friedrich February 13, 1964, who held that the ownership of the 1958 Chevrolet remained in Bernard Wagner on May 1, 1961, when the collision which injured plaintiff occurred. Defendants Wagner appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to Judge Friedrich's order. The facts are simple, and in the main undisputed, concerning defendant Bernard Wagner's negotiations with Freed, through its salesman, A1 Hoffman, for the purchase of a new 1961 Chevrolet automobile. Hoffman's efforts brought about a sale to Wagner, which involved the signing of a purchase order at Wagner's home April 22, 1961. The consideration was fixed at $3,380, to be paid in part by the buyer by turning in the 1958 Chevrolet for a credit of $1,560 when the 1961 Chevrolet became available for delivery, but subject to a reappraisal *593 of the 1958 Chevrolet at that time. Among the terms and conditions attached to the order which Wagner signed were the following: At the taking of the discovery depositions, the transaction of April 22, 1961, was fully explored. Al Hoffman, the salesman, was not asked to give a deposition. Bernard Wagner, upon being questioned by plaintiff's attorney, testified as follows regarding the title transfer card to his 1958 Chevrolet: Clarence E. Freed gave the following testimony: Due to the extent of the damage to the 1958 Chevrolet in the collision, Freed refused *595 to accept it as any part of the consideration for the new car. Mr. Freed testified on that point as follows: 1. The rule is well established that registration of an automobile under the state motor vehicle law is prima facie evidence of ownership but not conclusive evidence of title in the party in whose name the car is registered. It may be rebutted by evidence of the true intention of the parties. Flaugh v. Egan Chevrolet, Inc., 202 Minn. 615, 279 N.W. 582; Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N.W. 855; Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., Inc., 201 Minn. 44, 275 N.W. 416; Carey v. Broadway Motors, Inc., 253 Minn. 333, 91 N.W.2d 753; Haugen v. Dick Thayer Motor Co., 253 Minn. 199, 91 N.W.2d 585; Stroesser v. Hopper, 269 Minn. 96, 129 N.W.2d 913. 2. The question presented on this appeal is governed, however, by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, Minn.St. c. 512, pertinent sections of which are as follows: As we view the record, which includes the purchase agreement and the depositions, we think that it conclusively establishes that Freed was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The additional terms and conditions of the purchase agreement quoted above clearly establish that before accepting the 1958 Chevrolet to apply on the purchase price of the new 1961 Chevrolet Freed required a reappraisal to determine the then value of the 1958 Chevrolet and also that if the reappraised value was less than the original allowance Wagner had the right to cancel the order prior to delivery of the new car. Wagner also agreed to furnish satisfactory evidence of title to the 1958 Chevrolet at the time of delivery of that car to Freed. These provisions are entirely inconsistent with a transfer of title to Freed by Wagner before the 1961 automobile became available for delivery. The depositions conclusively establish that the parties understood that title and possession of the 1958 Chevrolet should remain in Wagner until Freed's delivery to him of the new automobile. Under all facts and circumstances presented by the record we cannot escape finding, as a matter of law, that the true intention of the parties was not to consummate the contract until Freed delivered the new car and exercised its right of reappraisal of the 1958 *596 Chevrolet.[1] It also follows that the title to the 1958 Chevrolet was, as a matter of law, in Bernard Wagner at the time of the collision with plaintiff's automobile on May 1, 1961. Appellants rely on Haugen v. Dick Thayer Motor Co., supra, and Carey v. Broadway Motors, Inc., supra, but the facts in those cases are not closely analogous to the facts in the case at bar. We reach the conclusion, upon all the facts before us and the applicable law, that the trial court properly awarded summary judgment to defendant Freed against plaintiff and defendants Wagner. Affirmed. [1] The question of the intention of the parties to a contract to sell as to when the property in its subject matter is to pass to the buyer is for the jury in doubtful cases, evidence being admitted which might be calculated to show the intention of both parties as indicated to each other. However, the whole of the contract of the parties here having been reduced to writing, this question could properly be determined by the court, as is true also if the facts are so clear as to justify but one conclusion and generally also if the facts are undisputed. 2 Williston, Sales (Rev. ed.) § 262; Rail v. Little Falls Lbr. Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50 N.W. 471. For other cases dealing with "intention," see Schnirring v. Stubbe, 177 Minn. 441, 225 N.W. 389; Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 130 Minn. 121, 153 N.W. 115; E. L. Welch Co. v. Lahart Elev. Co., 122 Minn. 432, 142 N.W. 828; Haugen v. Dick Thayer Motor Co., 253 Minn. 199, 91 N.W.2d 585.