Case Title: Kathleen Jensen v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund

Citation: 2001 WI 9

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2774 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Kathleen Jensen, Bradley Jensen and Erik Jensen 
(a minor),  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
State of Wisconsin, Department of Health and 
Family Services,  
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, David 
McPherson, M.D., and Lakeland Medical Center,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 13, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 29, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs 
by Matthew W. O’Neill, Shannon A. Allen and Friebert, Finerty & 
St. John, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Matthew W. 
O’Neill. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Curtis C. Swanson, Edith F. Merila, Timothy J. Cesar and Axley 
 
2 
Brynelson, LLP, Madison, James R. Gutglass, Sharon R. Long and 
Gutglass, Erickson & Bonville, S.C., Milwaukee, and Paul J. 
Pytlik and Otjen, Van Ert, Leib & Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Curtis Swanson and James R. Gutglass. 
 
2001 WI 9 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2774 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kathleen Jensen, Bradley Jensen and Erik  
Jensen (a minor),  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
State of Wisconsin, Department of Health  
and Family Services,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
David McPherson, M.D., and Lakeland  
Medical Center,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County, Michael S. Gibbs, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
an  attorney admitted pro hac vice1 has the right to notice and 
                     
1 Pro hac vice is defined as: "For this turn; for this one 
particular occasion.  For example, an out-of-state lawyer may be 
admitted to practice in a local jurisdiction for a particular 
case only." Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (7th ed. 1999). 
FILED 
 
FEB 13, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
2 
an opportunity to be heard before his or her pro hac vice 
admission can be revoked.  The issue arose in this medical 
malpractice action when the circuit court granted a mistrial 
based upon "reprehensible" pretrial and trial conduct by the 
plaintiffs' attorney, who was licensed in Illinois but admitted 
in Wisconsin for purposes of this case.  Five days after the 
mistrial, without notice or hearing, the circuit court sua 
sponte issued an order withdrawing the attorney's pro hac vice  
admission. 
¶2 
The plaintiffs and their attorney obtained leave to 
appeal the circuit court’s nonfinal order, and the court of 
appeals certified the question of the attorney's right to notice 
and hearing to this court.  Wis. Stat. (Rule) §  809.61 (1997-
98).2  We conclude that as a matter of judicial policy, and in 
accordance with the proper administration of the justice system, 
notice and an opportunity to respond are necessary prerequisites 
to the revocation of an attorney's pro hac vice status.  
Accordingly, 
we 
reverse 
the 
order 
of 
the 
circuit 
court 
rescinding the pro hac vice admission of the plaintiffs' 
attorney in this case, and remand for further proceedings. 
I 
 
 ¶3 Kathleen Jensen, her husband Bradley Jensen, and their 
minor son Erik Jensen filed this medical malpractice action in 
Walworth 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
against 
Wisconsin 
Patients 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.    
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
3 
Compensation Fund, Dr. David McPherson, and Lakeland Medical 
Center.  They alleged negligence in connection with Erik's 
delivery that damaged his spinal cord and rendered him a 
paraplegic. Pursuant to SCR 10.03(4) (1998),3 the Jensens 
petitioned the circuit court for pro hac vice admission of Lee 
Phillip Forman, an attorney from Chicago, Illinois.  According 
to an affidavit submitted by a Wisconsin attorney in support of 
Forman's admission, Forman had been asked to participate in this 
case because it was a complicated medical malpractice action and 
Forman had more than 30 years of experience handling such 
matters.   
¶4 
The circuit court granted the petition by written 
order, citing SCR 10.03(4) and specifically stating that 
permission to appear pro hac vice may be withdrawn "if [Forman] 
manifests incompetency to represent a client in a Wisconsin 
court 
or . . . unwillingness 
to 
abide 
by 
the 
code 
of 
professional responsibility and the rules of decorum of the 
Court."   
¶5 
A jury trial commenced on October 4, 1999, before the 
Honorable Michael S. Gibbs.  On October 6, 1999, during the 
testimony of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Richard D. Jacobson, 
defense counsel objected that the doctor's trial testimony 
differed from his earlier deposition testimony.  The jury was 
                     
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Rules are to the 1998 version.    
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
4 
excused, and the court heard argument from counsel and allowed a 
voir dire of the witness. 
¶6 
Defense counsel noted that at the time of his 
deposition, Dr. Jacobson had offered only a rather tentative 
opinion 
that 
some 
event 
during 
Erik’s 
birth, 
perhaps 
a 
manipulation to correct the baby's breech position, had possibly 
caused the spinal cord damage.  The doctor had testified that in 
order to form an opinion to a reasonable medical probability he 
would need to review all of the medical records and relevant 
depositions, as well as search the literature, and that he had 
not done so at the time of his deposition.  Defense counsel had 
asked Forman at the deposition to advise them if Dr. Jacobson 
was provided with the additional information so that they could 
conduct a follow-up deposition to determine whether he would be 
changing his opinion. 
¶7 
Dr. Jacobson admitted during the voir dire that Forman 
had in fact given him additional materials after the deposition, 
and that his review of those materials had "solidified" or 
"firmed up" his opinion.  Forman argued that the doctor’s trial 
opinion was basically consistent with his deposition opinion.  
The circuit court disagreed, however, and found that the trial 
testimony "was a significant and substantial change in Dr. 
Jacobson's 
testimony 
when 
compared 
with 
his 
deposition 
testimony." 
 
¶8 
Based upon Forman's failure to notify defense counsel 
of the changed circumstances surrounding Dr. Jacobson's opinion, 
the circuit court granted the defendants' motion for a mistrial: 
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
5 
 
This is a very straightforward process and procedure, 
and I don't know why you can't just do it that way.  
This sneaking around with this new opinion when you 
knew it at least a week and a half ago, it is 
repulsive. . . .  
 
But I'm telling you, this makes me sick for your 
clients, Mr. Forman, because you've left them hanging 
out there like this, but that's not my problem.  
That's your problem. 
 
. . .  
 
I'm going to grant the mistrial because I think 
you've made such a mess out of this, Mr. Forman, that 
this case can't even go forward.  Your behavior here 
is unbelievable.  It's reprehensible.  And your lack 
of preparation for this trial and your inability to 
play within the rules has – it's created every one of 
these problems. 
 
¶9 
Five days later, without notice or an opportunity to 
be heard, the circuit court sua sponte entered an order 
rescinding Forman's permission to appear pro hac vice as counsel 
for the Jensens.  The order cited SCR 10.03(4) and stated that 
Forman "has by his conduct manifested incompetency to represent 
a client in a Wisconsin court and has not abided by the code of 
professional responsibility and the rules of decorum of the 
Court." 
¶10 Forman filed a motion for reconsideration, reasserting 
that Dr. Jacobson's trial testimony was consistent with his 
deposition testimony.  He argued that the circuit court's order 
deprived him of the right to practice his profession and 
deprived the Jensens of their right to counsel of their choice. 
 He also argued that the order had been entered without notice 
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
6 
or an opportunity to respond.  The circuit court entered its 
written findings of fact and order granting the mistrial, but 
did not specifically address Forman's motion for reconsideration 
of the revocation of his pro hac vice status.   
¶11 The court of appeals granted leave to appeal the 
narrow question of whether there is a right to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before a circuit court withdraws an 
attorney's pro hac vice admission.  The court of appeals then 
certified the question to this court, and we accepted the 
certification. 
II 
 
¶12 Resolution of the certified question begins with the 
Supreme Court Rule governing admission of attorneys pro hac 
vice: 
 
A judge in this state may allow a nonresident counsel 
to appear in his or her court and participate in a 
particular action or proceeding in association with an 
active member of the state bar of Wisconsin who 
appears and participates in the action or proceeding. 
 Permission to the nonresident lawyer may be withdrawn 
by the judge granting it if the lawyer by his or her 
conduct manifests incompetency to represent a client 
in a Wisconsin court or by his or her unwillingness to 
abide by the rules of professional conduct for 
attorneys and the rules of decorum of the court.   
 
Supreme Court Rule 10.03(4).  The Rule commits the decision to 
grant or withdraw pro hac vice admission to the discretion of 
the trial court.  Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 2001 WI 8, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
7 
¶13 Pro hac vice admission has always been considered a 
privilege rather than a right: 
 
As a matter of comity, the courts of this state have 
practically 
always . . . 
except 
in 
criminal 
proceedings on behalf of the state . . . cheerfully 
conceded the privilege to attorneys of sister states 
to engage in the conduct of trials in this state.  But 
such has always been recognized as a privilege 
extended to such outside counsel and not as a right to 
be claimed on their part . . . . There can be no 
question but that many lawyers of prominence have 
carried on substantial business in more than one state 
at the same time and without question or criticism.  
The extent to which such privilege may be extended is 
a matter for the courts of each state to determine 
when a question in that regard is presented in any 
particular situation. 
In re Pierce, 189 Wis. 441, 450, 207 N.W. 966 (1926) (citations 
omitted).  The United States Supreme Court has held that an 
attorney does not have a constitutional right to be admitted pro 
hac vice.  Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1979).  
¶14 The Jensens and Forman contend, however, that once an 
attorney has been admitted pro hac vice in a particular case, 
the attorney acquires a limited property interest that requires 
the due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before that status may be revoked.  This is an issue of 
first impression in this state. 
¶15 Some jurisdictions have concluded that attorneys have a 
limited property interest in pro hac vice admission, entitling 
them to notice and an opportunity to be heard as a matter of 
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
8 
constitutional due process before that status can be revoked.4  
Other jurisdictions have sidestepped the constitutional argument 
and found that notice and an opportunity to respond are required 
for policy reasons.5 
¶16 We conclude that, for reasons of policy and sound 
judicial administration, attorneys should receive notice and 
some opportunity to respond before pro hac vice admission is 
revoked.  Accordingly, we do not reach the constitutional 
question.  Labor and Farm Party v. Election Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 
351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) (courts generally do not 
consider constitutional questions when the case is resolvable on 
other grounds); see also Zander v. County of Eau Claire, 87 Wis. 
2d 503, 519, 275 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1979).   
                     
4 See Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 984 P.2d 1198, 1214 (Haw. 
1999) (holding that once a nonresident attorney has been granted 
pro hac vice status in a case by a judge, the nonresident 
attorney gains a "limited property interest" that is held 
pursuant to Hawaii Supreme Court Rules and that the deprivation 
of this property interest previously held under state law must 
be in accord with requisite constitutional safeguards); see also 
Kirkland v. National Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 
1371-72 (11th Cir. 1989)(holding that it was clear that 
admission of an attorney pro hac vice constitutes a property 
interest entitled to due process protection because an attorney 
admitted pro hac vice enjoys the same basic procedural rights as 
regular counsel). 
5 See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619 (10th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Summet, 862 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 
1988); Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Johnson 
v. Trueblood, 692 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980); Hallman v. Sturm 
Ruger & Co., Inc., 639 P.2d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).     
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
9 
¶17 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit adopted this approach in Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 
302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), and we find its treatment of 
the issue persuasive.  In Johnson, the Third Circuit held that 
some type of notice and an opportunity to respond were necessary 
when a court sought to revoke an attorney's pro hac vice status. 
 The court reached its decision not on constitutional due 
process grounds but as a matter of judicial policy.  In Johnson, 
the trial court, sua sponte and without notice, had revoked an 
attorney's pro hac vice status as a result of his disruptive and 
unprofessional conduct. Id. at 302.  The court of appeals 
reversed the trial court and said that some form of notice and 
an opportunity to respond were required, for these reasons:   
 
[S]ome sort of procedural requirement serves a number 
of salutary purposes.  It ensures that the attorney's 
reputation 
and 
livelihood 
are 
not 
unnecessarily 
damaged, protects the client's interest, and promotes 
more of an appearance of regularity in the court's 
processes. 
Id. at 303. 
¶18 The court in Johnson allowed for some flexibility of 
procedure, recognizing that the decision is discretionary in the 
trial court and some circumstances may not require formal notice 
and full hearing.  Id. at 303-04.  Accordingly, the court left 
the form of the notice to the discretion of the trial court, 
specifying only that it identify two things: "the conduct of the 
attorney that is the subject of the inquiry, and the specific 
reason this conduct may justify revocation."  Id. at 304.   
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
10
¶19 As for the opportunity to respond, the court in 
Johnson held that a full-scale hearing is not required in every 
case. Id. at 304.  "All that we will mandate is that the 
attorney be given a meaningful opportunity to respond to 
identified charges." Id.  Again, the court left the nature and 
scope of the opportunity to respond to the discretion of the 
trial court. Id.   
¶20 We agree with the flexible approach of the Third 
Circuit in Johnson.  We therefore conclude that, for reasons of 
judicial policy, attorneys admitted pro hac vice must be 
provided some form of notice and an opportunity to respond 
before pro hac vice status may be withdrawn under SCR Rule 
10.03(4).  The form of the notice and opportunity to respond is 
left to the sound discretion of the circuit court, provided, 
however, that the attorney is notified of the conduct which is 
alleged to violate SCR 10.03(4) and the specific reason this 
conduct may justify revocation under the rule. 
¶21 The defendants contend that Forman was effectively put 
on notice that his pro hac vice status was in jeopardy when the 
circuit court ruled on the mistrial motion.  They also contend 
that Forman had ample opportunity to respond during the course 
of the argument on the motion.   
¶22 While it is true that the circuit court explicitly and 
forcefully placed the blame for the mistrial squarely on Forman, 
revocation of the attorney’s pro hac vice admission was never 
mentioned as a possible sanction for his conduct.  Mistrial, 
attorneys' fees, and costs were the only remedies under 
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
11
consideration.  The circuit court's sua sponte order rescinding 
Forman's pro hac vice status came five days later, without any 
form of notice or an opportunity to respond, formal or 
otherwise.  We find it noteworthy that the circuit court 
acknowledged as much in an amicus curiae brief and suggested 
that "if this court should decide that notice and an opportunity 
to be heard are required, the case . . . should be remanded to 
the Circuit Court for notice and hearing." 
¶23 We agree and therefore reverse the circuit court's 
order revoking Forman's pro hac vice admission and remand the 
cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
By the Court.—The order of the Walworth County Circuit 
Court is reversed and the cause remanded.  
 
 
No. 
99-2774 
 
 
1