Case Title: Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S266034

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LISA NIEDERMEIER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FCA US LLC, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S266034 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B293960 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC638010 
 
 
March 4, 2024 
 
Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, 
and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices 
Groban and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
NIEDERMEIER v. FCA US LLC 
S266034 
 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
California’s lemon law protects consumers who purchase 
defective vehicles or other goods.  The lemon law, officially 
known as the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, 
§ 1791 et seq.;1 hereafter the Act or the Song-Beverly Act), 
permits new vehicle buyers who have been damaged by a 
manufacturer’s failure to comply with the Act to sue under 
section 1794 for the recovery of damages and other relief.  
(§ 1794, subd. (a).)  The measure of a buyer’s damages in such 
an action includes “replacement or reimbursement as set forth 
in subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2 . . . .”  (Id., subd. (b).)  If a 
manufacturer is unable to repair a new vehicle after a 
reasonable number of attempts, section 1793.2, subdivision (d) 
requires the manufacturer to promptly replace the vehicle or 
promptly pay restitution “in an amount equal to the actual price 
paid or payable by the buyer,” as specified.  (Id., subd. (d)(2)(B).)  
The manufacturer is entitled to reduce the amount of restitution 
by the “amount directly attributable” to the buyer’s use of the 
vehicle prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle for 
repair.  (Id., subd. (d)(1); see also id., subd. (d)(2)(C).) 
The questions before us are whether, in an action under 
section 1794, the statutorily-defined measure of restitution set 
forth in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter sometimes 
 
1 
All further statutory references are to the Civil Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
2 
referred to as the statutory restitution remedy) must be reduced 
by proceeds a buyer has received when trading in or selling a 
defective vehicle and, if so, whether the reduction should be 
assessed before or after penalties are calculated.2  The Court of 
Appeal below held that the statutory restitution remedy did not 
include the amount a plaintiff recovered after trading in a 
defective vehicle, and thus reduced the plaintiff’s damages 
award by the trade-in amount (here, $19,000).  (Niedermeier v. 
FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060, 1061 
(Niedermeier).)   
We conclude that in an action pursuant to section 1794, 
neither a trade-in credit nor sale proceeds reduce the statutory 
restitution remedy set forth in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) 
at least where, as here, a consumer has been forced to trade in 
or sell a defective vehicle due to the manufacturer’s failure to 
comply with the Act.  Given this conclusion, we do not reach the 
issue of when such a reduction, if it were authorized, should be 
assessed.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In January 2011, Lisa Niedermeier purchased a new Jeep 
Wrangler (hereafter the vehicle) from FCA US LLC (hereafter 
FCA) for approximately $40,000.  Almost immediately, and 
 
2 
As Niedermeier had traded in her vehicle, the issue before 
the Court of Appeal was limited to whether the restitution 
remedy included the amount Niedermeier recovered by trading 
in the vehicle.  FCA US LLC, however, assumes the same 
analysis applies to proceeds from the sale of a defective vehicle, 
and we find that the outcome would remain the same regardless 
of whether a buyer trades in or sells a defective vehicle.  Our 
analysis therefore encompasses both circumstances throughout. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
3 
throughout the warranty period, Niedermeier experienced a 
variety of problems with the vehicle’s transmission, engine, and 
exhaust.  These problems caused the vehicle to jerk, make 
rattling and grinding noises, and emit noxious gases.  They 
caused the floorboard of the vehicle to heat up and impaired the 
vehicle’s braking, acceleration, and turning.  Niedermeier 
presented the vehicle to FCA’s authorized repair facilities a total 
of 16 times over four years, but the facilities were unable to 
remedy the defects.  Niedermeier’s vehicle was out of 
commission for 75 days during the failed repair attempts. 
In April 2015, Niedermeier asked FCA to buy back the 
vehicle, but FCA declined.  Niedermeier renewed her request in 
early June 2015, and made a third buyback demand in late June 
2015.  FCA, however, declined to repurchase the vehicle.  By the 
time Niedermeier made the third buyback request, she had 
presented the vehicle for repair 14 times.  In October 2015, after 
additional repair attempts failed, Niedermeier traded in the 
vehicle for a new GMC Yukon.  The purchase price of the Yukon 
was $80,000, and the dealership gave Niedermeier a $19,000 
trade-in credit towards that purchase. 
In October 2016, Niedermeier filed a lawsuit against FCA 
asserting causes of action for breach of express warranty under 
the Act, breach of implied warranty under the Act, fraudulent 
inducement and concealment, and negligent repair.  A jury 
found in Niedermeier’s favor on her claims for breach of express 
warranty and breach of implied warranty and awarded her 
$98,961.08.  The jury found against Niedermeier on her claim 
for fraudulent inducement/concealment.  The jury also found 
that FCA willfully violated the Act.  The damages award 
included:  the purchase price of the vehicle, including charges 
for transportation and manufacturer-installed options, finance 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
4 
charges, sales tax, license fees, and other official fees pursuant 
to section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B), a total of $39,799; 
incidental and consequential damages of $5,000; and a 
deduction of $5,214.57, reflecting the amount attributable to 
Niedermeier’s use of the vehicle before she first delivered it to 
FCA’s 
authorized 
facilities 
for 
repairs 
pursuant 
to 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(C).  The award also included a 
penalty of $59,376.65 pursuant to section 1794, subdivision (c) 
due to FCA’s willful failure to repurchase the vehicle. 
 
Following the verdict, FCA filed a postjudgment motion 
requesting a $19,000 offset from the awarded damages (the 
amount of the trade-in credit Niedermeier received on the 
Yukon’s purchase price), to be imposed before the civil penalty 
was assessed.  This would have resulted in a total award of 
$51,461.07.  The trial court denied FCA’s motion.  It reasoned 
that reducing the jury’s award by the trade-in amount would be 
inconsistent with the pro-consumer policy supporting the Act.  
The court concluded an offset for the trade-in “would reward 
defendant for its delay in replacing the car or refunding 
plaintiff’s money when defendant had complete control over the 
length of that delay, and an affirmative statutory duty to replace 
or refund promptly. . . . ‘No one can take advantage of his own 
wrong.’  (§ 3517.)  Nor can principles of equity be used to avoid 
a statutory mandate.” 
FCA appealed.  It made three arguments before the Court 
of Appeal:  (1) by obtaining a full refund under section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2) in addition to proceeds from the trade-in of the 
vehicle, Niedermeier received a windfall, which is inconsistent 
with the concept of restitution; (2) provisions of the California 
Uniform Commercial Code incorporated into section 1794 of the 
Act recognize that a buyer’s recovery is reduced by the amount 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
5 
the buyer obtains by reselling the vehicle; and (3) allowing 
Niedermeier a full refund on top of trade-in proceeds she 
received 
would 
undermine 
legislative 
protections 
for 
downstream consumers in the used car market by effectively 
nullifying the Act’s requirement that manufacturers notify 
subsequent purchasers of defects in reacquired vehicles. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with FCA’s first and third 
arguments and reversed.  It declined to consider FCA’s second 
argument.  The Court of Appeal held, as a matter of first 
impression, that the Act’s restitution remedy — “set at ‘an 
amount equal to the actual price paid or payable’ for the 
vehicle” — does not include any amount a plaintiff receives from 
trading in the defective vehicle.  (Niedermeier, supra, 56 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1061.)  The Court of Appeal reasoned that the 
Legislature’s use of the word “restitution” in section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2)(B) indicates an intent to restore the status 
quo ante as far as practicable and return buyers to the financial 
position they would have been in had they not purchased the 
vehicle.  (Niedermeier, at p. 1071.)  It concluded that allowing 
Niedermeier the full restitution remedy after she received a 
credit for trading in the vehicle would place her in a better 
position than if she had never purchased the vehicle, a result 
inimical to the concept of restitution.  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal also opined that allowing the full 
restitution refund under section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B) 
would thwart the lemon law’s labeling and notification 
requirements.  It noted that the labeling and notification 
provisions are only triggered when a manufacturer reacquires 
the defective vehicle.  It reasoned that allowing buyers to 
recover the full restitution remedy after receiving trade-in 
proceeds would incentivize buyers to reintroduce defective 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
6 
vehicles into the market without the statutorily required Lemon 
notifications, rendering the labeling and notification provisions 
“largely meaningless, a result contrary to the rules of statutory 
construction.”  (Niedermeier, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072.) 
We granted review.  Since that time, another division of 
the Second Appellate District has disagreed with Niedermeier 
and held that a manufacturer is not entitled to a reduction in 
restitution damages under section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) for 
the net cash a plaintiff receives after selling a defective vehicle 
to a third party.  (Figueroa v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 
84 Cal.App.5th 708, 713–714 (Figueroa).)  We granted review in 
Figueroa on February 1, 2023, and deferred further action in 
that matter until after this case is decided.  
More recently, the Third Appellate District also disagreed 
with Niedermeier.  It agreed with Figueroa that a buyer’s 
restitution under the Act does not exclude the credit a buyer 
receives when trading in a defective vehicle.  (Williams v. FCA 
US LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 765, 772 (Williams).)  The court 
concluded that the jury impermissibly deducted the buyer’s 
$29,500 trade-in credit when calculating the actual price paid or 
payable as provided in the statutory restitution remedy.  (Id. at 
p. 786.)  We granted review in Williams on May 3, 2023, and 
deferred further action in that matter until after this case is 
decided. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
We are first asked to determine whether a consumer’s 
restitution 
damages 
award, 
defined 
in 
section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2), must be reduced by the proceeds the 
consumer receives after trading in or selling a defective vehicle.  
This is a question of statutory construction, which we review de 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
7 
novo.  (Apple, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)  
As with all cases of statutory interpretation, “[w]e first examine 
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense 
meaning.  [Citation.]  We do not consider statutory language in 
isolation; instead, we examine the entire statute to construe the 
words in context.  [Citation.]  If the language is unambiguous, 
‘then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, 
and the plain meaning of the language governs.’ ”  (Kirzhner 
v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (2020) 9 Cal.5th 966, 972 
(Kirzhner).)  Further, “there is no need for construction, nor is it 
necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature” to 
interpret the statute.  (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
727, 735.) 
On the other hand, “ ‘[i]f the statutory language permits 
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and 
public policy.’ ”  (Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 972.)  When 
more than one statutory construction is arguably possible, our 
policy is “ ‘to favor the construction that leads to the more 
reasonable result.’  [Citation.]  This policy derives largely from 
the presumption that the Legislature intends reasonable results 
consistent with the apparent purpose of the legislation.  
[Citation.]  Thus, our task is to select the construction that 
comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, 
with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statutes’ 
general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to 
unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results.”  (Imperial 
Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 388.)  We 
also keep in mind that the Act is “ ‘manifestly a remedial 
measure, intended for the protection of the consumer; it should 
be given a construction calculated to bring its benefits into 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
8 
action.’ ”  (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 985, 990 (Murillo); see also People ex rel. Lungren v. 
Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 313 [“civil statutes for the 
protection of the public are, generally, broadly construed in 
favor of that protective purpose”]; see Pineda v. Williams-
Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 530 (Pineda) 
[liberally construing § 1747.08 of the Song-Beverly Credit Card 
Act].) 
A. The Plain Text of Section 1794 and the 
Statutory Restitution Remedy Do Not Support 
an Offset for a Trade-in Credit or Sale Proceeds 
Resolution of the first issue before us requires us to 
interpret several interrelated provisions of the Act.  First, 
section 1794, subdivision (a) permits a buyer who “is damaged 
by a failure to comply with any obligation” under the Act or 
under an implied or express warranty or service contract to 
“bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and 
equitable relief.”  (§ 1794, subd. (a).)  “The measure of the 
buyer’s damages in an action under this section shall include the 
rights of replacement or reimbursement as set forth in 
subdivision (d) 
of 
Section 1793.2, 
and 
the 
following:  
[¶] (1) Where the buyer has rightfully rejected or justifiably 
revoked acceptance of the goods or has exercised any right to 
cancel the sale, Sections 2711, 2712, and 2713 of the 
Commercial Code shall apply.  [¶] (2) Where the buyer has 
accepted the goods, Sections 2714 and 2715 of the Commercial 
Code shall apply, and the measure of damages shall include the 
cost of repairs necessary to make the goods conform.”  (Id., subd. 
(b).) 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
9 
In turn, section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) of the Act 
provides that if a manufacturer or its representative “is unable 
to service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the 
applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of 
attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the 
new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or 
promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with 
subparagraph (B).  However, the buyer shall be free to elect 
restitution in lieu of replacement, and in no event shall the 
buyer be required by the manufacturer to accept a replacement 
vehicle.”3 
The Act provides a specific formula for calculating the 
amount of restitution.  According to the Act, “the manufacturer 
shall make restitution in an amount equal to the actual price 
paid or payable by the buyer, including any charges for 
transportation 
and 
manufacturer-installed 
options, 
but 
 
3  
Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) has dual purposes.  
First, it (along with the other subdivisions of § 1793.2) instructs 
manufacturers about what they must do to comply with the Act 
when a vehicle proves defective.  (See generally Kirzhner, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 971 [§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2) “sets forth the 
manufacturer’s affirmative obligation to ‘promptly’ repurchase 
or replace a defective vehicle it is unable to repair” and describes 
how manufacturers must offer replacement or restitution in 
order to comply with the Act].)  Second, section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2) includes the right to reimbursement as a 
measure of damages in an action pursuant to section 1794.  (See 
Kirzhner, at pp. 971–972 [§ 1794 is “the Act’s general damages 
provision” and permits buyers to seek damages, “the measure of 
which includes the restitution and replacement remedies”].)  
The question before us today involves the latter purpose of 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), and our analysis is therefore 
limited to the issue of the calculation of damages in a lawsuit 
under section 1794. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
10 
excluding nonmanufacturer items installed by a dealer or the 
buyer, and including any collateral charges such as sales or use 
tax, license fees, registration fees, and other official fees, plus 
any incidental damages to which the buyer is entitled under 
Section 1794, including, but not limited to, reasonable repair, 
towing, and rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer.”  
(§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2)(B).)  The amount to be paid to the buyer 
may also “be reduced by the manufacturer by that amount 
directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the 
buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or 
distributor, or its authorized service and repair facility for 
correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.”  
(§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2)(C).)  Offsets for nonmanufacturer items 
installed by a dealer or buyer and the buyer’s predelivery use of 
the vehicle are the only reductions to the restitution remedy 
enumerated in section 1793.2, subdivision (d). 
1. The Statutory Restitution Remedy Does Not Allow 
a Restitution Award to Be Reduced by a Trade-in 
Credit or Sale Proceeds 
The parties disagree how the restitution remedy in 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) should be interpreted.  The 
parties specifically disagree whether the amount Niedermeier 
received when she traded in the defective vehicle should be 
excluded from the statutory restitution remedy.  Niedermeier 
argues the Act’s plain language lays out the precise measure and 
scope of restitution and does not permit any reduction in the 
restitution award by the amount of a trade-in credit.  
Notwithstanding 
the 
Act’s 
defined 
restitution 
formula, 
including its express reference to specific permissible offsets, 
FCA argues that restitution should be given the same meaning 
as provided in common law.  According to FCA, Niedermeier’s 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
11 
restitution award should be reduced by the amount she 
recovered when trading in the vehicle in order to avoid a double 
recovery. 
We agree with Niedermeier and conclude the plain 
language of the Act does not support FCA’s construction of 
section 1793.2.  As noted above, the Act’s plain language lays 
out a specific formula for calculating the amount of restitution 
to be paid by the manufacturer as damages in an action 
pursuant to section 1794.  The statutory restitution remedy has 
clearly enumerated exceptions, none of which includes the offset 
requested by FCA.  (Accord, Figueroa, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 712 [“[t]he statute is clear and unequivocal”]; Williams, 
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 [“[a]lthough the Legislature 
used the word ‘restitution’ in section 1793.2, subdivision (d), it 
clearly defined that term in the restitution provision by stating 
it is ‘an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the 
buyer,’ a calculus that includes and excludes specified costs” 
(original italics)].) 
 
Nowhere does section 1793.2 provide that a restitution 
award must be reduced by any amount a buyer receives when 
trading in or selling the defective vehicle to a third party.  In 
order to adopt FCA’s statutory construction, we would have to 
ignore the words following “restitution” in section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2)(B), including “paid or payable” and the 
enumerated exceptions.  “[O]ur office is simply to ascertain and 
declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by 
reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of 
it language it does.  We may not rewrite the statute to conform 
to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.”  
(Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253; see 
also Jiagbogu v. Mercedes–Benz USA (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
12 
1235, 1241 (Jiagbogu) [“We may not rewrite the section to 
conform to that unexpressed, supposed intent”]; see also 
Figueroa, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 712 [“We cannot add 
words to a clear and unequivocal statute”].) 
As noted above, the statute excludes nonmanufacturer-
installed options from the restitution calculation (§ 1793.2, 
subd. (d)(2)(B)) and permits the restitution award to be reduced 
by the amount of a buyer’s predelivery use of the vehicle (id., 
subd. (d)(2)(C)).  The choice to include these exceptions, and no 
others, indicates that the Legislature intended to specify how 
restitution awards for new motor vehicles must be calculated, 
including limiting the number and type of offsets to those 
explicitly enumerated.4  The Legislature recognized there were 
multiple sources of potential offsets to the restitution remedy 
yet did not include trade-in credits or sales proceeds in the 
statute.  The Legislature could have stated that trade-in or sale 
amounts were to be offset or reduced from the statutory 
restitution remedy.  It did not do so.  “We will not create an 
 
4  
Indeed, in section 1793.2, subdivision (d), the measure of 
restitution is defined differently for “goods” and “new motor 
vehicles.”  For “goods,” restitution is defined as, “the purchase 
price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly attributable 
to use by the buyer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.”  
(§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(1).)  We have thus held that section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d) “treats the special provisions applicable to new 
motor vehicles in subdivision (d)(2) as an exception to the 
general provision applicable to all consumer goods in 
subdivision (d)(1)[,]” as subdivision (d)(2) “provides additional 
specifications for both the refund and restitution remedies.”  
(Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 490–
491, italics added; see also id. at p. 491 [“If restitution is 
selected, the amount is to be calculated as specified by the 
statute”].) 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
13 
exception the Legislature did not enact.”  (Lopez v. Sony 
Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 636.) 
Moreover, trade-in or sale proceeds obtained years after 
the purchase of a defective vehicle are not part of “the actual 
price paid or payable” because they are separate and apart from 
the settled purchase price of the vehicle at the time of 
contracting.  In our recent opinion in Kirzhner, we explained 
that the “actual price paid or payable” is determined at the time 
of the vehicle’s purchase.  (Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
pp. 974–975.)  In Kirzhner, we were tasked with determining 
whether vehicle registration renewal and nonoperation fees 
plaintiff paid after initially leasing his vehicle were recoverable 
as collateral charges or as incidental damages under 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B).  We held that the charges 
were not recoverable as collateral charges because they “are not 
auxiliary to and do not supplement the price paid [for the 
vehicle] because they are not paid as part of the total cost of the 
vehicle and in exchange for the vehicle.”  (Kirzhner, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 975.) 
We rejected Kirzhner’s argument that the phrase “actual 
price paid or payable” indicated a legislative intent to ensure the 
manufacturer paid the consumer what the consumer actually 
paid as of the time of the repurchase rather than at the time of 
contracting.  We explained, “[t]he word ‘price’ means ‘[t]he cost 
at which something is obtained’ or ‘[t]he consideration given for 
the purchase of a thing.’ ”  (Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
pp. 972–973, citing Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1188, 
col. 2); see also Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) [price means 
“[t]he amount of money or other consideration asked for or given 
in exchange for something else; the cost at which something is 
bought or sold”].)  We noted the word “ ‘payable’ ” in 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
14 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B) modifies the word “ ‘price’ ” 
and simply acknowledges that some buyers do not pay the full 
cost of the vehicle at the time of the initial purchase or lease, but 
does not demonstrate that all later-incurred charges or expenses 
connected to ownership or use of vehicle are recoverable.  
(Kirzhner, at p. 974.)  We concluded, however, that the charges 
would be recoverable as incidental damages if they were 
incurred as a result of the manufacturer’s failure to promptly 
provide a replacement vehicle or restitution under section 
1793.2, subdivision (d)(2).  (Kirzhner, at p. 977.) 
The Court of Appeal here acknowledged section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2)(B) defines restitution as “the actual price paid 
or payable,” but declined to follow a plain language reading of 
the statute.  Relying on Mitchell v. Blue Bird Body Co. (2000) 
80 Cal.App.4th 32 (Mitchell), it found the Legislature’s choice of 
the word “restitution” significant in this case and reasoned that 
a literal interpretation of the statute would disregard the 
Legislature’s word choice, allow Niedermeier “to recover far 
more from [FCA] than her actual economic loss[,]” and result in 
an unjustified windfall to Niedermeier.  (Niedermeier, supra, 
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071.) 
We find the Court of Appeal’s reliance on Mitchell to be 
misplaced.  In Mitchell, the court considered whether the “actual 
price paid or payable” in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B) 
included interest payments paid after a vehicle was purchased.  
It held the payments were part of the actual price paid or 
payable, and properly recoverable as restitution under the Act, 
because consumers become legally obligated to pay the 
payments at the time the vehicle is purchased or leased.  
(Mitchell, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.)  It is true that the 
Mitchell court interpreted “restitution” as designating a remedy 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
15 
meant “to restore ‘the status quo ante as far as is 
practicable . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 36, italics omitted.)  But Mitchell 
did not consider whether it was appropriate to reduce the 
statutory restitution remedy by the amount of a trade-in credit 
or sale proceeds in order to restore the status quo.  Contrary to 
the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Mitchell’s analysis suggests 
that reducing the restitution remedy by an amount not 
enumerated in section 1793.2, subdivision (d) would be 
inappropriate.  The Mitchell court emphasized the remedial 
nature of the Act and explained that restoring the status quo 
was intended to afford “ ‘complete relief, including restitution of 
benefits . . . and any consequential damages to which [the 
purchaser] is entitled . . . .’ ”  (Mitchell, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 36.)  It thus concluded that “the Legislature intended to allow 
a buyer to recover the entire amount actually expended for a 
new motor vehicle, including paid finance charges, less any of 
the expenses expressly excluded by the statute.”  (Id. at p. 37, 
italics added.) 
In interpreting “restitution,” the Mitchell court relied on 
Alder v. Drudis (1947) 30 Cal.2d 372, 384, in which we observed, 
“The purpose of restitution as a remedy for breach is the 
restoration of the status quo ante as far as is practicable, and in 
the absence of qualifying circumstances, the plaintiff must 
return any consideration he has received in order to obtain 
specific restitution.”  (Italics omitted.)  Alder, however, predates 
the Act’s enactment by more than 20 years, did not concern 
breach of a product warranty, and considers only common law 
restitution and rules of equity.  The plain language of 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), by contrast, indicates that the 
Legislature intended “restitution” to be “a term of art separate 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
16 
from the evolving common law concept that shares the name.”5  
(Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094, 1111; 
see also Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 491, 500 [courts generally apply common law when a 
statute refers to a term without defining the term]; People v. 
Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1060 [“if a term known to the 
common law has not otherwise been defined by statute, it is 
assumed that the common law meaning was intended” (italics 
added)]; Williams, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 [same].)  
Moreover, “ ‘principles of equity [cannot] be used to avoid a 
statutory mandate.’ ”  (Martinez v. Kia Motors America, Inc. 
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 187, 199 (Martinez), citing Jiagbogu, 
 
5  
Notably, the statutory restitution remedy is consistently 
referenced throughout the Act by specific reference to 
section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2) 
and 
its 
directive 
for 
calculating restitution.  (See, e.g., §§ 1793.23, subd. (c) [labeling 
requirements 
include 
circumstances 
in 
which 
“the 
manufacturer knew or should have known that the vehicle is 
required by law to be replaced [or] accepted for restitution due 
to the failure of the manufacturer to conform the vehicle to 
applicable 
warranties 
pursuant 
to 
paragraph (2) 
of 
subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2”], 1793.25, subd. (a) [“State 
Board of Equalization shall reimburse the manufacturer of a 
new motor vehicle for an amount equal to the sales tax or use 
tax which the manufacturer . . . includes in making restitution 
to the buyer or lessee pursuant to subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2”], 1794, 
subd. (b) [“The measure of the buyer’s damages in an action 
under this section shall include the rights of replacement or 
reimbursement 
as 
set 
forth 
in 
subdivision (d) 
of 
Section 1793.2”].)  These repeated references  to subdivision 
(d)(2) further indicate a legislative intent to attribute a specific 
statutory restitution formula to the term “restitution” distinct 
from the common law definition.   
 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
17 
supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244.)  The plain language of 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) does not contemplate an 
unenumerated reduction to the statutory restitution remedy for 
a trade-in credit or sale proceeds received after the purchase of 
a defective vehicle. 
2. Section 1794’s Reference to the California Uniform 
Commercial Code Does Not Provide a Basis to 
Reduce Restitution Damages by a Trade-in Credit 
or Sale Proceeds 
FCA next contends that Niedermeier’s damages must be 
reduced by the amount she received when she traded in the 
defective vehicle since section 1794, subdivision (b) incorporates 
California Uniform Commercial Code sections 2711 through 
2715.  These provisions prohibit a double recovery and set forth 
a reduced measure of damages when a buyer resells goods.  FCA 
argues that because section 1794, subdivision (b) states that the 
measure of damages “shall include the rights of replacement or 
reimbursement . . . and” (italics added) the California Uniform 
Commercial Code remedies, the remedies identified in 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d) and the remedies identified in 
the California Uniform Commercial Code are not merely 
alternate measures of damages.  Rather, FCA urges, the 
measure of damages must consider both the statutory 
restitution remedy and the relevant provisions of the California 
Uniform Commercial Code.  Citing Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of 
North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174 (Kwan), Bishop 
v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750 (Bishop), 
and Kirzhner, FCA argues the Legislature has made it clear that 
damages — including the restitution remedy — are measured in 
the same manner as, and subject to the general rules applicable 
to, ordinary contracts.   
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
18 
We conclude that the Act’s restitution and replacement 
remedies are distinct from the available California Uniform 
Commercial Code remedies referenced in section 1794, and the 
California Uniform Commercial Code remedies do not reduce 
the Act’s statutory restitution remedy.  We also find that any 
attempt to reduce the statutory restitution remedy by the 
remedies set forth in the California Uniform Commercial Code 
would conflict with the Act, and the Act’s restitution remedy 
thus controls.  (See § 1790.3.) 
 
“[A]s the conjunctive language in Civil Code section 1794 
indicates, the statute itself provides an additional measure of 
damages beyond replacement or reimbursement (Civ. Code, 
§ 1793.2, subd. (d)) and permits, at the option of the buyer, the 
Commercial Code measure of damages which includes ‘the cost 
of repairs necessary to make the goods conform.’  (Civ. Code, 
§ 1794, subd. (b)(2).)”  (Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, 
Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 302 (Krotin), italics added.)  
Moreover, the plain language of section 1794 makes clear that 
“[t]he measure of the buyer’s damages in an action under this 
section 
shall 
include 
the 
rights 
of 
replacement 
or 
reimbursement as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2, 
and [the California Uniform Commercial Code remedies].”  
(§ 1794, subd. (b), italics added.)  The phrase “as set forth” 
indicates that the buyer is entitled to the statutory restitution 
remedy as distinctly and precisely described in section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d) in addition to any applicable remedies set forth 
in the California Uniform Commercial Code. 
 
FCA’s statutory interpretation not only disregards the 
plain language of section 1794, it also ignores the overall 
statutory context.  Section 1794 is intended to encompass all of 
the remedies available for failures to “comply with any 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
19 
obligation under this chapter [i.e., the Act,]” as well as non-Act 
failures to comply with any obligation “under an implied or 
express warranty or service contract . . . .”  (§ 1794, subd. (a); 
§ 1790; see also Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 180 
[“Section 1794 sets out the damages available to a buyer for a 
seller or manufacturer’s failure to comply with an obligation 
under the Act or under a consumer product warranty”].)  
Moreover, the Act provides that its remedies “are cumulative 
and shall not be construed as restricting any remedy that is 
otherwise available . . . .”  (§ 1790.4, italics added.)  We have 
similarly observed that the “pro-consumer remedies [of the Act] 
are in addition to those available to a consumer pursuant to the 
Commercial Code ( . . . § 1790.3) and the Unfair Practices Act 
( . . . § 1790.4).”  (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 990, italics 
added.) 
 
The language of the statutory restitution remedy itself 
further supports our conclusion that it is distinct from the 
California Uniform Commercial Code remedies identified in 
section 1794.  Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B) requires the 
manufacturer to “make restitution in an amount equal to the 
actual price paid or payable by the buyer . . . plus any incidental 
damages to which the buyer is entitled under Section 1794.”  
(Italics added.)  The inclusion of the word “plus” indicates that 
a buyer may receive damages available in the California 
Uniform Commercial Code in addition to the statutory 
restitution 
amount 
recoverable 
under 
section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2).  As the Court of Appeal explained in Krieger 
v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 213, 
the Act “supplements, rather than supersedes, the provisions of 
the California Uniform Commercial Code.”  (See also § 1790.3; 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
20 
§ 1794, subd. (b) [incorporating specific damages provisions of 
the Cal. U. Com. Code].)   
 
The California Uniform Commercial Code remedies 
referenced in section 1794 stand separate and apart from the 
remedies in section 1793.2, subdivision (d), and do not purport 
to limit the statutory restitution remedy in any way.  This 
makes sense because the Act provides more extensive consumer 
protections than the California Uniform Commercial Code.  
(Krotin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 301; see also Murillo, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 989 [the Act “ ‘regulates warranty terms, 
imposes service and repair obligations on manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers who make express warranties, 
requires disclosure of specified information in express 
warranties, and broadens a buyer’s remedies to include costs, 
attorney’s fees, and civil penalties.’ ”].)  FCA cites no authority 
in which the Act’s statutory restitution remedy has ever been 
reduced by the provisions of the California Uniform Commercial 
Code referenced in section 1794, and its proposed reading would 
elevate the California Uniform Commercial Code over the 
remedies provided in the Act and be contrary to the Act itself.  
“The provisions of [the Act] shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of parties determined by reference to the 
Commercial Code except that, where the provisions of the 
Commercial Code conflict with the rights guaranteed to buyers 
of consumer goods under the provisions of [the Act], the 
provisions of [the Act] shall prevail.”  (§ 1790.3.) 
 
FCA’s reliance on Kwan, Bishop, and Kirzhner is 
misplaced.  These cases address whether certain damages not 
explicitly enumerated in the Act were recoverable under it.  
(Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 192 [emotional distress 
damages not recoverable for violations of the Act]; Bishop, 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
21 
supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757–758 [emotional distress and 
loss of use damages for time period plaintiff had no replacement 
vehicle after defective vehicle was destroyed not recoverable 
under Act]; Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 981 [registration 
renewal and nonoperation fees incurred after purchase of 
vehicle not recoverable under the Act as collateral charges, but 
may be recoverable as incidental damages].)  For various 
reasons, these cases found it appropriate to turn to the 
California Uniform Commercial Code provisions referenced in 
section 1794 in order to determine whether such damages were 
recoverable.  But none of these cases holds the restitution 
remedy may be reduced by reference to those California Uniform 
Commercial Code provisions.  (See Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 187 [“Under section 1794, subdivision (b), the buyer’s 
remedies under the Act include, in addition to the refund-or-
replace remedy of section 1793.2, subdivision (d), [California 
Uniform 
Commercial 
Code] 
damages 
as” 
stated 
in 
subsections (1) and (2) (italics added)]; Bishop, supra, 
44 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 [in case of restitution, buyer is also 
entitled to, inter alia, incidental damages and civil penalty]; 
Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972 [measure of damages 
includes restitution and replacement remedies as well as 
remedies allowed by the Cal. U. Com. Code].) 
 
FCA argues a few out-of-state cases support a conclusion 
that the relevant provisions of the California Uniform 
Commercial Code should reduce the statutory restitution 
remedy.6  None of these cases, however, address the issue before 
 
6 
See Gast v. Rogers-Dingus Chevrolet (Miss. 1991) 
585 So.2d 725; Roneker v. Kentworth Truck Co. (W.D.N.Y. 1997) 
 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
22 
us:  whether alternate California Uniform Commercial Code 
remedies should reduce damages calculated pursuant to the 
express statutory restitution formula contained in California’s 
lemon law.  The cases cited by FCA merely found that damages 
for certain breaches of warranty were to be determined under 
the relevant state equivalents of the model Uniform Commercial 
Code.  In California, as discussed above, the Uniform 
Commercial Code provides additional damages affected 
consumers can elect to pursue under section 1794 if they wish 
but it does not displace the statutory restitution remedy.  (See 
Krotin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 302.) 
 
In sum, we hold that “restitution” has the meaning 
provided in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B) and reducing a 
damages award by the amount of a trade-in credit or sale is not 
permitted by that statute or by section 1794’s incorporation of 
California Uniform Commercial Code remedies.  FCA’s reading 
of sections 1794 and 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) would force us to 
“ignore the actual words of the statute in an attempt to vindicate 
our perception of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the 
law[,]” which is something we cannot do.  (Murillo, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 993.)   
B. Offsets for a Trade-in Credit or Sale Proceeds 
Are Not Consistent with the Legislative History 
of Sections 1794 and 1793.2, Subdivision (d) or 
the Purpose of the Act 
 
As discussed above, we conclude that the language of 
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) does not permit any reduction 
 
977 F.Supp. 237; Hibbs v. Jeep Corp. (Mo.Ct.App. 1984) 
666 S.W.2d 792; Sanborn v. Aranosian (1979) 119 N.H. 969. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
23 
in the restitution award by the amount of a trade-in credit or 
sale.  Nonetheless, FCA’s contention that restitution as detailed 
in section 1793.2 should have the same meaning as common law 
restitution is not unreasonable on its face.  By recovering the 
full statutory restitution remedy after receiving value for the 
vehicle in the form of a trade-in credit, it can be argued that 
Niedermeier was placed in a better financial position than if she 
had not purchased the vehicle.  To resolve any potential 
ambiguity, we consider the legislative history of sections 1793.2 
and 1794 and the Act’s purpose.  (Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 972.)  We conclude that even if the statute is amenable to 
more than one reasonable interpretation, additional indicia of 
legislative intent support our holding that at least where, as 
here, a consumer has been forced to trade in or sell their vehicle 
due to the manufacturer’s failure to promptly pay restitution 
when its obligation arose, trade-in or sale proceeds do not reduce 
the statutory restitution remedy. 
 
The Legislature adopted the Act in 1970 to address 
problems with enforcing consumer warranties for new products, 
including the problem of manufacturers reaping the advertising 
benefits of warranties without bearing the costs of promised 
repairs.  (Stats. 1970, ch. 1333, § 1, p. 2478 et seq.)  The original 
restitution remedy provided, “[s]hould the manufacturer be 
unable to make such return of merchantable goods, he shall 
either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an amount 
equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount 
directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to discovery of the 
defect.”  (Former § 1793.2, subd. (c), added by Stats. 1970, 
ch. 1333, § 1, p. 2481.) 
 
In 1982, the Legislature amended the Act in several ways.  
It amended section 1793.2 to apply the “repair and replace” 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
24 
provisions of the Act to “new motor vehicles” bought for personal 
use.7  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 
35 Cal.App.4th 112, 123; Stats. 1982, ch. 388, § 1, pp. 1720–
1723.)  The Legislature also added section 1794 to the Act to help 
consumers and courts understand the panoply of remedies 
available to buyers under different laws for breach of a 
consumer warranty by enumerating each of the remedies in one 
statute.  (Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
1246, 1261; see also Dept. Consumer Affairs, Explanation and 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3560 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 
1982, p. 2 [“[t]he bill’s purpose and function is to consolidate and 
restate in a single section of the . . . Act the remedies now 
available to buyers under the Song-Beverly Act and other 
California and federal laws”]; see also ibid. [“This bill is 
essentially a consumer law ‘housekeeping’ bill whose function is 
to make our consumer warranty law more coherent, rational, 
understandable and effective”].)  As originally enacted, section 
1794 provided in pertinent part that “[t]he measure of the 
buyer’s damages in an action under this section shall be as 
follows:  [¶] (1) Where the buyer has rightfully rejected or 
justifiably revoked acceptance of the goods or has exercised any 
right to cancel the sale, Sections 2711, 2712, and 2713 of the 
Commercial Code shall apply.  [¶] (2) Where the buyer has 
 
7  
As amended, section 1793.2, subdivision (d) provided, 
“Should the manufacturer or its representative in this state be 
unable to service or repair the goods to conform to the applicable 
express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the 
manufacturer shall either replace the goods or reimburse the 
buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the 
buyer, less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer 
prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.”  (Stats. 1982, 
ch. 388, § 1, p. 1721.)   
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
25 
accepted the goods, Sections 2714 and 2715 of the Commercial 
Code shall apply, and the measure of damages shall include the 
cost of repairs necessary to make the goods conform.”  (Former 
§ 1794, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1982, ch. 385, § 2, p. 1716.)  
Although restitution and replacement were available remedies 
since the enactment of the Song-Beverly Act, they were not 
mentioned in the 1982 version of section 1794. 
 
After these amendments to the lemon law, however, there 
were numerous complaints from new car buyers concerning its 
implementation, including that manufacturers were not paying 
full restitution or replacement awards and were seeking 
excessive offsets for rental cars.  (See Dept. Consumer Affairs, 
Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. 
Sess.) Sept. 25, 1987, pp. 2–3; see also Assembly 3d reading 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 11, 1987, at p. 4; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended August 17, 1987, p. 3.) 
 
As a result, the Legislature again amended the Act in 
order to protect consumers.  Among other things, the 
Legislature amended section 1794 to clarify that a buyer’s 
damages include the rights of replacement and reimbursement 
and the California Uniform Commercial Code’s additional 
remedies, and amended section 1793.2, subdivision (d) to 
comprehensively explain how to calculate restitution.  (See 
Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. 
Sess.) p. 2 [“This bill would revise the provisions relating to 
warranties on new motor vehicles to require the manufacturer 
or its representative to replace the vehicle or make restitution, 
as specified, if unable to conform the vehicle to the applicable 
express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts” 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
26 
(italics added)]; see also Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, §§ 1, 2, 4;  id., § 9, 
p. 4567 [amendment to section 1794 “does not constitute a 
change in, but is declaratory of, existing law”].) 
 
FCA argues the 1982 version of section 1794 demonstrates 
that the Legislature intended for damages under the Act to be 
reduced by ordinary damages principles laid out in the 
California Uniform Commercial Code.  But there is no indication 
in the legislative history that the reference to California 
Uniform Commercial Code remedies in section 1794 was 
intended to supplant or limit the statutory restitution remedy.  
To the contrary, the history is clear that the statute was 
intended to consolidate, not add to or subtract from, the existing 
remedies for the enforcement of a consumer warranty.  (Dept. 
Consumer Affairs, Explanation and Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 3560 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 1982, pp. 1, 4.)  Had the 
Legislature intended for the statutory restitution remedy to be 
limited by the California Uniform Commercial Code provisions 
referenced in section 1794, “it would not have chosen such an 
obscure mechanism to achieve its purpose.”  (Murillo, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 992.)   
 
FCA also relies on legislative history addressing the 1970 
version of section 1794 to argue that the Legislature intended to 
apply ordinary contract rules whenever a consumer cannot 
return a defective vehicle.  All three documents FCA relies 
upon — a letter from a legislative aide to Senator Song 
addressing the meaning of some language in the Act and two 
letters from the Legislative Counsel to Senators Cologne and 
Song, respectively, expressing various opinions in response to 
particular questions relating to the Act — are postenactment 
documents and are entitled to little weight because they do not 
reflect the legislative body enacting the statute.  (Quintano v. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
27 
Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062 [statements 
of an individual legislator, including bill author, are generally 
not considered in construing a statute; court’s task is to 
ascertain the intent of the Legislature as a whole]; Coker v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 690, citing 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC (2011) 562 U.S. 223, 242 [“ ‘[p]ost-
enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a 
legitimate tool of statutory interpretation’ because ‘by definition 
[it] “could have had no effect on the [Legislature’s] vote” ’ ”].)  
With respect to the letters from the Legislative Counsel, FCA 
focuses on two responses addressing distinguishable factual 
scenarios.  The first considers whether a manufacturer can 
refuse to replace, reimburse, or repair defective goods if (unlike 
here) the goods are not returned to be serviced at a service 
facility.  The second asks whether a privately-owned public 
utility has any liability under the Act if it sells consumer goods 
and contracts with an independent contractor for installation.  
The responses do not address, and therefore shed no light on, 
the specific issue that is before us in the present case. 
  
The legislative history reveals little legislative analysis 
addressing the language of the current statutory restitution 
remedy, including the meaning of “the actual price paid or 
payable.”  (See also Mitchell, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 
[“ ‘interpretive commentary’ on the statute’s replacement or 
refund remedy is practically nonexistent”].)  Nevertheless, we 
can draw insight from the history of the amendments to 
sections 1793.2 and 1794.  This history demonstrates that the 
Legislature intended to lay out a precise method for calculating 
restitution awards payable to buyers, including the amounts 
allowed to be reduced from awards. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
28 
 
The evolution of the Act also indicates a legislative intent 
to ensure buyers receive full compensation under the Act, to 
make it easier for buyers to access all the benefits to which they 
are entitled under applicable warranties, and to constrain 
manufacturers from evading their statutory obligations.  To this 
end, since its enactment, the Act “has been amended numerous 
times to broaden its consumer protection policy, expand the 
classes of vehicles to which the lemon law applies, lessen the 
types of defenses that can [be] asserted, and change the 
statutory text in response to appellate decisions.”  (Frank, 
Lemon Law (Nov. 2016) 39 L.A.Law. 27, 32.)  This counsels 
against reducing statutory restitution awards by trade-in 
credits or sales proceeds, when such reductions are not 
enumerated or authorized in section 1793.2, subdivision (d).  
Any such reduction would be inconsistent with the legislative 
history and the Act’s consumer protective purpose.  
C. The Act’s Labeling and Notification Provisions 
Do Not Support an Offset to the Statutory 
Restitution Remedy for a Trade-in Credit or 
Sale Proceeds 
 
FCA maintains that Niedermeier’s interpretation of the 
statutory restitution remedy would undercut the labeling and 
notification 
provisions 
in 
sections 1793.22 
and 
1793.23 
(hereafter sometimes referred to as the labeling and notification 
provisions).  It echoes the Court of Appeal’s concerns that 
Niedermeier’s interpretation “would incentivize buyers to 
reintroduce defective vehicles into the market without the 
warnings a manufacturer otherwise would have to provide” and 
“would render the labeling and notification provisions largely 
meaningless, a result contrary to the rules of statutory 
construction.”  (Niedermeier, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072.)  
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
29 
In FCA’s view, no rational owner would return their defective 
vehicle to the manufacturer if they could instead resell their 
vehicles to third parties.  The Court of Appeal similarly could 
not “conceive why a buyer would ever return a vehicle to the 
manufacturer rather than obtain the extra proceeds from a 
resale or trade.  Return of the vehicle to the manufacturer would 
be the rare exception rather than the rule.”  (Ibid.)  We disagree. 
As FCA concedes, sections 1793.22 and 1793.23 require 
manufacturers, not consumers, to label defective vehicles as 
lemons once they are reacquired.  (§ 1793.22, subd. (f)(1) 
[manufacturers must provide a one-year warranty for all 
defective vehicles transferred to it under the Act]; § 1793.23, 
subds. (c)–(e).)  Buyers have neither the obligation nor the 
ability to label their defective vehicles lemons.  Had FCA 
promptly refunded Niedermeier when its obligation to do so 
arose, the defective vehicle could have been reacquired and 
labeled a lemon by the manufacturer.  Buyers like Niedermeier 
are only confronted with the possibility of selling or trading in 
their defective vehicles after manufacturers have failed to 
comply with their obligation to promptly replace or repurchase 
the vehicle.  When this occurs, buyers may have no choice but to 
engage in self-help to relieve themselves of the burden of owning 
or possessing a lemon.  Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s focus, 
it is manufacturers, not buyers who are forced to trade in or sell 
their vehicles, who undercut the Act’s labeling and notification 
provisions by failing to timely comply with the Act’s 
requirements.  (Figueroa, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 713, 714; 
see also Williams, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 784–785.)  
Allowing buyers to recover full restitution, as defined in the 
statute, incentivizes manufacturers to comply with their 
obligations under the Act. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
30 
Neither FCA nor the Court of Appeal provide any basis for 
their opinion that no rational owner would return their defective 
vehicle or that returning a defective vehicle would become the 
rare exception rather than the rule, and we question these 
assumptions.  Niedermeier made three separate requests to 
return the vehicle after multiple attempts to repair it over four 
years failed.  It was not until FCA repeatedly declined to buy 
back the vehicle that Niedermeier gave up, purchased a new 
vehicle, and traded in the defective one.  Even if a buyer is 
entitled to recover the full statutory restitution remedy in an 
action under section 1794, it is reasonable to believe that, like 
Niedermeier, buyers will continue to attempt to return defective 
vehicles before filing suit in order to avoid the time and trouble 
of selling or trading them in to a third party and resorting to 
litigation.  The concurrence disagrees,  maintaining that “[i]f 
trade-in or resale always yielded the potential for double 
recovery, one would expect a good number of consumers to go 
that route.”  (Conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 15.)  But 
manufacturers can rather easily avoid a result in which buyers 
resell defective cars simply by promptly complying with their 
obligations under the Act.  (See Figueroa, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 713 [any windfall to the plaintiff was the direct result of 
FCA’s willful violation of the Act, and “[h]ad FCA fulfilled its 
duty under the [Act] to promptly replace or repurchase the 
truck, there would be no such windfall”]; see also Williams, 
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) 
 
FCA and the Court of Appeal also overlook the fact that a 
buyer’s decision to trade in or sell a vehicle is made in real time.  
It would be quite risky for a buyer to choose to trade in or sell a 
defective vehicle to a third party before a manufacturer is able 
to comply with its statutory obligation to promptly repurchase 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
31 
or replace the vehicle.  The Act requires a buyer to deliver the 
defective vehicle to the manufacturer’s service and repair 
facility for the purpose of allowing the manufacturer a 
reasonable number of repair attempts.  (§ 1793.2, subds. (c), (d); 
§ 1793.22, subd. (b); Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 969, 971, 
986; Krotin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 302–303 [“the Act does 
not require consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure 
relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or repair a 
vehicle to conform to applicable warranties — other than, of 
course, permitting the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity 
to repair the vehicle”]; Martinez, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 191, 193.)  Once the manufacturer is unable to repair the 
vehicle 
after 
a 
reasonable 
number 
of 
attempts, 
the 
manufacturer’s obligation to promptly provide restitution to the 
buyer arises.  (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2); see also § 1794, subd. (b); 
see also Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 986.)  Thus, it is only 
where the manufacturer fails to “promptly” provide restitution 
that a buyer would be able to trade in or sell a defective vehicle 
while also obtaining restitution from the manufacturer.  If a 
buyer were to trade in or sell the vehicle before affording the 
manufacturer a reasonable number of opportunities to repair 
the vehicle, the buyer would not be able to obtain restitution or 
replacement remedies under the Act.8  (Kirzhner, supra, at 
 
8 
We are not faced with circumstances in which a 
manufacturer has violated the Act but has a good faith and 
reasonable belief that a statutory obligation to pay restitution 
does not exist.  Neither are we faced with a situation in which a 
buyer sells or trades in a vehicle before a manufacturer has the 
opportunity to comply with its obligation to promptly pay 
restitution.  We do not decide today how such facts might affect 
the damages calculation; in this case, a jury found FCA not only 
 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
32 
pp. 969, 971, 986; Krotin, supra, at pp. 302–303.)  In this way, 
the Act itself curbs the concern that buyers will not return 
defective vehicles to the manufacturer for service and labeling. 
FCA also argues the labeling and notification provisions, 
“contemplate[] that, in exchange [for the full restitution 
remedy], the buyer will return the car to the manufacturer.  This 
is made clear by Section 1793.23, which states in four different 
places that a defective vehicle is ‘accepted for restitution’ by the 
manufacturer.”  FCA instructs us to assume, however, that 
consumers who cannot return a vehicle are still entitled to 
statutory restitution under section 1793.2.  Indeed, FCA does 
not challenge Martinez’s holding that a plaintiff does not need 
to “possess or own the vehicle at issue in order to obtain 
replacement or restitution pursuant to the Act.”  (Martinez, 
supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.)  Yet FCA reasons that in light 
of section 1793.23, in situations where a consumer cannot return 
the vehicle, any value the consumer received from a trade-in or 
sale of the vehicle must nonetheless reduce the consumer’s 
restitution award. 
The “accepted for restitution” language in the Act, 
however, is only present in the labeling and notification 
provisions.  (§ 1793.23, subds. (c)–(e).)  It is notably absent from 
both sections 1794 and 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2).  The labeling 
and notification provisions identify what a manufacturer must 
do to comply with the Act when it reacquires a vehicle.  The 
provisions impose no limits on the remedies identified, and 
concededly 
applicable, 
in 
sections 
1794 
and 
1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2).  Accordingly, this language does not require 
 
failed to promptly pay Niedermeier restitution, but FCA also 
willfully failed to comply with the Act.   
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
33 
a buyer’s restitution award to be reduced if the buyer does not 
return their defective vehicle to the manufacturer. 
 
Ultimately, the labeling and notification provisions “are 
inapplicable in the situation where, as here, the manufacturer 
elects not to reacquire the vehicle and the buyer is forced to seek 
legal intervention.”  (Williams, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 783.)  
These provisions do not require a buyer to return a defective 
vehicle in order to receive restitution under the Act; they merely 
place a duty on the manufacturer or dealer to notify subsequent 
transferees that the car was reacquired due to a nonconformity.9  
Once restitution is available to a plaintiff as a remedy, which 
FCA concedes is the case here, the measure of restitution is as 
described 
in 
section 1793.2, 
subdivision (d)(2), 
with 
no 
reductions other than those expressly stated in that subdivision. 
D. Additional Public Policy Considerations 
Support Not Reducing a Restitution Award by a 
Trade-in Credit or Sale Proceeds 
 
There are a number of additional public policy reasons to 
conclude the statutory restitution remedy does not permit a 
reduction for a trade-in credit or sale proceeds. 
 
9  
The concurring opinion observes that the statutory 
restitution remedy seems to be built on the premise that a buyer 
returns the defective vehicle, the manufacturer accepts it, and 
the manufacturer offers the buyer their choice of a refund or 
replacement vehicle.  (See conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 9.)  
But as FCA acknowledges, the question of whether Martinez 
was correctly decided is not before us, so we assume a buyer is 
not required to return the defective vehicle to a manufacturer to 
obtain restitution.   
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
34 
 
First, the Court of Appeal’s (and FCA’s) interpretation 
would incentivize manufacturers to drag out the process of 
offering restitution in hopes of paying reduced damages.  
Specifically, manufacturers would be encouraged to wait for 
consumers to become fed up with delays and give up and sell or 
trade in their defective (if not dangerous) vehicles, at which 
point the manufacturers could request that the consumers’ 
damages be reduced accordingly.  If the statutory restitution 
remedy can be reduced by a trade-in credit or sale proceeds, 
manufacturers will be relieved of the obligation to pay the full 
restitution amount required by statute.  Such a rule would 
encourage “the manufacturer’s unforthright approach and 
stonewalling of fundamental warranty problems.”  (Krotin, 
supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.)10   
 
Similarly, allowing a reduction to the statutory restitution 
remedy in actions pursuant to section 1794 would reward 
manufacturers for delaying refunds when the manufacturer 
“ha[s] complete control over the length of that delay, and an 
affirmative statutory duty to replace or refund promptly.”  
(Jiagbogu, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244; Williams, supra, 
 
10 
Niedermeier and amicus Consumers for Auto Reliability 
and Safety argue that trade-in credits tend to be artificially 
inflated and are not reflective of the actual value of the vehicle.  
The prospect that a buyer would trade in a defective vehicle for 
an artificially inflated value would provide an even greater 
incentive for manufacturers to delay in repurchasing defective 
vehicles.  However, Niedermeier’s counsel advised the court as 
to the Yukon’s purchase price; no evidence was introduced at 
trial as to the Yukon’s purchase price or whether the trade-in 
amount reflected the vehicle’s actual value.  Thus, the court does 
not credit the assertion that the trade-in amount Niedermeier 
received was artificially inflated. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
35 
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 785 [manufacturer’s interpretation “would, 
in essence, reward manufacturer for declining or not offering to 
reacquire the vehicle”].)  If a manufacturer fails to comply with 
the Act, a buyer may spend months or years pursuing futile 
repair attempts and years in litigation pursuing remedies.  Any 
delay in paying restitution increases the likelihood that a buyer 
will be forced to trade in or resell the defective vehicle or 
relinquish the vehicle to a lienholder, relieving manufacturers 
of the obligation to label the vehicles lemons. 
 
FCA contends that reducing the restitution remedy by the 
amount of a trade-in credit or sale will not encourage delay.  
According to FCA, there is no economic difference from the 
manufacturer’s perspective between a scenario in which a buyer 
returns the car to the manufacturer and the manufacturer is 
liable for the purchase price of the vehicle, and a scenario in 
which a buyer sells or trades in a car to a third party and the 
manufacturer pays the buyer reduced damages.  This argument 
is not well taken.  FCA ignores that manufacturers 
independently benefit from delays that cause buyers to trade in 
or sell defective vehicles because manufacturers are relieved of 
the burden of complying with the Act’s labeling and notification 
requirements.  Not only that, incidental damages cease accruing 
when buyers trade in or sell defective vehicles, further reducing 
the amount manufacturers have to pay in damages.  FCA’s 
interpretation would result in significant incentives for delay.  
Encouraging manufacturer delays would undermine the prompt 
restitution obligation imposed on manufacturers under the Act 
and 
contravene 
the 
Act’s 
pro-consumer 
purpose.  
“Interpretations 
that 
would 
significantly 
vitiate 
a 
manufacturer’s incentive to comply with the Act should be 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
36 
avoided.”  (Jiagbogu, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244; see also 
Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 184.) 
The Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by the argument 
that a buyer trading in a defective vehicle bears all or part of the 
cost of the manufacturer’s delay, and observed that Niedermeier 
“can recover the full purchase price through a combination of 
the trade-in and restitution from defendant.”  (Niedermeier, 
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073.)  The Court of Appeal fails to 
account for the fact that buyers are always forced to bear a 
burden when a manufacturer delays in promptly reimbursing or 
exchanging a vehicle.  These burdens may include considerable 
stress and time diverted from work, school, family, or leisure 
activities while attempting to repair or return a defective 
vehicle.  At a minimum, a manufacturer’s failure to promptly 
reimburse a buyer imposes a financial burden on the buyer, who 
must continue to shoulder payments for a defective vehicle 
and — if the buyer can afford it — pay out of pocket for a new 
vehicle.  This, by itself, is inconsistent with the pro-consumer 
purpose of the Act.  If buyers cannot afford to buy a replacement 
vehicle, they may have no choice but to continue driving a 
defective or dangerous vehicle.  Forcing consumers to engage in 
self-help in order to avoid the ongoing impact of a 
manufacturer’s delay is not what the Legislature intended. 
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “actual price paid 
or payable” as not including trade-in or sale amounts could also 
compel buyers to choose replacement over restitution.  Faced 
with the choice of a manufacturer delaying payment of 
restitution on the one hand, and a replacement option that 
requires a manufacturer to provide an alternate vehicle that is 
likely already available on the other hand, buyers may 
ultimately select replacement.  This, however, would be in direct 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
37 
contravention of the Act’s explicit directive that “the buyer shall 
be free to elect restitution in lieu of replacement, and in no event 
shall the buyer be required by the manufacturer to accept a 
replacement vehicle.”  (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) 
 
FCA argues that manufacturers have “ample incentive” to 
promptly comply with the Act because they are already subject 
to attorney fee awards and civil penalties for willful violations 
of the Act.  The facts of this case prove otherwise.  Niedermeier 
took the vehicle in for repair a total of 16 times over four years, 
rendering the vehicle out of commission for 75 days without it 
ever being repaired.  Niedermeier made three separate demands 
for restitution — which she was not required to do under the Act 
(see Krotin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 302–303) — but FCA 
declined to repurchase the vehicle.  Attorney fees and penalties 
were a real possibility in this case, and in fact were imposed on 
FCA for willfully violating the Act, but FCA still failed to 
promptly comply with the Act.  As Niedermeier points out, “the 
most defective vehicles . . . are the vehicles most likely to be 
traded-in for a safe vehicle, yet those are the ones by which a 
manufacturer would reap the best benefit for its delay.”  To the 
extent FCA contends that manufacturers already have 
sufficient incentives to comply with the Act or that buyers will 
receive windfalls if the statutory restitution remedy is not 
reduced by the trade-in credit or sale proceeds, these are 
competing policy concerns that are more appropriately directed 
to the Legislature.  (See Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 
13 Cal.5th 662, 696 [“The proper balancing of these competing 
priorities is ultimately and unquestionably ‘a policy issue that 
lies within the province of the legislative, rather than the 
judicial, branch’ ”].) 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
38 
For these reasons, we decline to adopt a rule that reduces 
a buyer’s statutory restitution award by a trade-in credit or sale 
proceeds at least where, as here, a consumer has been forced to 
trade in or sell the defective vehicle due to the manufacturer’s 
failure to comply with the Act.  Once restitution is available to 
a plaintiff as a remedy, the measure of restitution is as described 
in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), with no reductions other 
than those expressly stated in that subdivision.  Our 
interpretation is supported by the plain language of the Act, the 
legislative history, and the consumer-protective purpose of the 
Act.  It is also “more consistent with the rule that courts should 
liberally construe remedial statutes in favor of their protective 
purpose . . . .”  (Pineda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 532.)   
The concurrence maintains a rule that categorically 
entitles consumers to obtain the full statutory restitution 
remedy without a reduction for trade-in or sale proceeds “would 
raise significant questions of fairness.”  (Conc. opn. of Kruger, 
J., post, at p. 15.)11  To be sure, we do not mean to suggest that 
 
11  
The concurrence also argues that such a rule “would mean 
that plaintiffs who buy luxury vehicles could wind up turning a 
substantial profit if those vehicles later prove defective, while 
plaintiffs who buy economy cars probably could not — for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the extent of their actual 
losses or the extent of the manufacturer’s wrongdoing.”  (Conc. 
opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 15.)  Consumers who purchase 
more expensive vehicles pay more as a matter of course for their 
vehicles and thus are more likely to obtain more when they are 
traded in or resold.  The court does not assume, based on our 
holding, that consumers will start buying vehicles with the 
expectation that they will be defective and that manufacturers 
will refuse to comply with the Act, so that they can sell or trade 
 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
39 
a consumer has the right to sell or trade in a vehicle at any time.  
Our holding is narrower and applies to the measure of 
restitution described in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), in 
actions brought pursuant to section 1794.  A consumer still has 
the 
obligation 
to 
permit 
manufacturers 
a 
reasonable  
opportunity to repair the vehicle.  Manufacturers must also 
comply with their obligations under the Act, including the 
obligation to promptly repurchase or replace vehicles and the 
obligation to label vehicles lemons.  Prompt compliance with the 
Act will ensure manufacturers meet these obligations and that 
defective vehicles end up in their possession for labeling.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
As we conclude that neither a trade-in credit nor sale 
proceeds reduce the statutory restitution remedy, at least where 
a consumer has been forced to trade in or sell a defective vehicle 
due to the manufacturer’s failure to comply with the Act, we do 
not reach the issue of whether the amount a buyer recovers 
should be assessed before or after calculating penalties.  We 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVANS, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J.
 
in the vehicles and bring actions under the Act hoping to realize 
a profit.  
1 
NIEDERMEIER v. FCA US LLC 
S266034 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
Car manufacturer FCA US LLC willfully violated its 
duties under California’s lemon law when it repeatedly refused 
to accept the return of Lisa Niedermeier’s defective Jeep for 
replacement or a refund of the $40,000 she paid for it.  
Niedermeier eventually gave up on FCA and went to an 
unaffiliated dealership, where she traded in the defective Jeep 
for a working vehicle.  Niedermeier sued FCA for her damages, 
including a full $40,000 refund.  FCA now argues that because 
Niedermeier did not return the Jeep but instead traded it in for 
another car, FCA is entitled to subtract from her damages the 
likely inflated $19,000 trade-in credit she received for the Jeep.  
Never mind that the reason Niedermeier did not return the 
defective Jeep to FCA is that FCA had refused to accept it and 
promptly pay restitution, in willful violation of California’s 
lemon law. 
FCA’s argument is all but self-refuting, and the court 
rightly rejects it.  The majority opinion holds that under 
California’s lemon law, a car buyer is entitled to a full refund for 
a defective vehicle even if the buyer has in the meantime traded 
it in or sold it to a third party — with the qualification that this 
rule applies “at least” where, as in this case, the buyer “has been 
forced” to trade in or sell the defective vehicle because of “the 
manufacturer’s failure to comply with the [Song-Beverly 
Consumer Warranty] Act.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)  I write 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
2 
separately to explain how I understand this holding, including 
both the rule and the suggestion that the rule may have limits.  
I also write to explain why, in my view, such limits are 
important to a full understanding of the lemon law in light of its 
overarching consumer-protection purposes. 
As I read the law, if a car proves defective, the buyer 
ordinarily must return the car to the manufacturer in order to 
receive a replacement vehicle or refund.  The car manufacturer 
may then resell the returned car, but first must disclose to 
prospective buyers that the car has been designated a lemon.  
This usual order of operations ensures that original buyers are 
appropriately compensated when their cars cannot be made to 
conform to their warranties within a reasonable time, while also 
protecting prospective buyers from inadvertently purchasing 
vehicles that have a history of serious defects.  But all bets are 
necessarily off if the manufacturer willfully thwarts the buyer’s 
efforts to return the vehicle for a replacement or refund, which 
is what happened here.  If the car buyer then engages in 
reasonable self-help by selling the car or trading it in for another 
vehicle, the manufacturer is not entitled to pocket the proceeds 
and thereby profit from its willful misconduct. 
I. 
California’s lemon law, formally known as the Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act), Civil Code section 
1790 et seq., is a consumer protection law aimed specifically at 
new car buyers, who often depend on those cars to get to work, 
to take their children to school, and to handle myriad other daily 
necessities of life.  Among other things, the law places 
affirmative obligations on car manufacturers to back up the 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
3 
warranty promises made in connection with the sale of their 
products.   
The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of various 
provisions of the lemon law addressing what happens when a 
car manufacturer is unable to make a car conform to its 
warranty after a reasonable number of attempts.  One set of 
provisions concerns a buyer’s remedies.  The first of these 
provisions, Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) (section 
1793.2(d)(2)), provides that if the manufacturer has had a 
reasonable amount of time to repair the vehicle and still cannot 
get it done, the manufacturer has an obligation to “promptly” 
replace the defective vehicle or “make restitution” by refunding 
the buyer.  (See Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 966, 971.)  Appellate case law makes clear that this 
replace-or-refund obligation exists whether or not the buyer 
asks; it is the manufacturer’s “affirmative duty to replace a 
vehicle or make restitution to the buyer if the manufacturer is 
unable to repair the new vehicle after a reasonable number of 
repair attempts.”  (Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. 
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 303.) 
This process is meant to work without court involvement.  
But if a manufacturer does not comply with its obligation to 
promptly repurchase or replace the defective vehicle, the buyer 
may turn to a second provision of the law, Civil Code section 
1794 (section 1794), which creates “an action for the recovery of 
damages and other legal and equitable relief.”  (§ 1794, subd. 
(a).)  A successful claimant in a suit under section 1794 is 
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs (id., subds. (d), 
(e)(1)), as well as damages whose measure “shall include the 
rights of replacement or reimbursement as set forth in 
subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2, and” provisions of the 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
4 
California Uniform Commercial Code governing the damages 
ordinarily available to a buyer of nonconforming commercial 
goods.  (Id., subd. (b).)   
The law also provides for penalties to punish and deter 
willful violations.  Appellate case law treats the manufacturer’s 
violation as not willful “if [its] failure to replace or refund was 
the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts 
imposing the statutory obligation were not present.  This might 
be the case, for example, if the manufacturer reasonably 
believed the product did conform to the warranty, or a 
reasonable number of repair attempts had not been made, or the 
buyer desired further repair rather than replacement or 
refund.”  (Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 
23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185.)  If, however, a manufacturer violates 
the statute without such a good faith and reasonable belief, the 
judgment may include a civil penalty of up to two times the 
amount of actual damages.  (§ 1794, subd. (c).)   
That is the set of provisions governing the remedies 
available to the buyer of a defective car, and which forms the 
centerpiece of the dispute before us.  There is also, however, a 
second set of provisions relevant to our inquiry, which are the 
provisions governing what’s supposed to happen to the car after 
it is found to be defective.  A car that has once been labeled a 
lemon because it could not be made to conform to its warranty 
within a reasonable time is not necessarily worthless, and it 
may be resold.  But to prevent reselling defective or once-
defective vehicles “without notice to the subsequent purchaser” 
(Civ. Code, § 1793.23, subd. (a)(2)), the law imposes various 
labeling and notification requirements on the manufacturer 
that has “reacquired” a vehicle that is “required by law to be 
replaced” or “accepted for restitution” under section 1793.2(d)(2) 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
5 
or under comparable laws in other jurisdictions (Civ. Code, 
§ 1793.23, subd. (c); see also id., subds. (d)–(f)). 
Specifically, before the manufacturer resells, leases, or 
transfers the car, the manufacturer must instruct the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to “inscribe the ownership 
certificate with the notation ‘Lemon Law Buyback,’ ” and “affix 
a decal to the vehicle” indicating that it has been designated a 
“ ‘Lemon Law Buyback.’ ”  (Civ. Code, § 1793.23, subd. (c); Veh. 
Code, § 11713.12, subd. (a).)  The manufacturer must also 
provide written notice to the transferee of the nonconformities 
reported by the original buyer or lessee and of any repairs 
attempted to correct the nonconformity.  (Civ. Code, §§ 1793.23, 
subd. (d), 1793.24, subd. (a)(3)–(4).)  The Act likewise prohibits 
the sale, lease, or transfer of a vehicle “transferred by a buyer or 
lessee to a manufacturer pursuant to [section 1793.2(d)(2)] or a 
similar statute of any other state” absent disclosure of the 
vehicle’s nonconformities, correction of those nonconformities, 
and a one-year manufacturer warranty that the vehicle is free 
of the nonconformities.  (Id., § 1793.22, subd. (f)(1); see generally 
Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1065–
1066.) 
II. 
 
The threshold question in this case is whether the plain 
language of the statute forecloses FCA’s argument for 
calculating Niedermeier’s damages by subtracting the trade-in 
value of the Jeep from the original purchase price.  The plain-
language argument goes something like this:  Section 1794 says 
that a car manufacturer that violates its lemon law duties must 
pay damages including “replacement or reimbursement as set 
forth in subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2.”  (§ 1794, subd. (b).)  
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
6 
And the restitutionary remedies in section 1793.2(d)(2) specify 
precisely what this means.  A manufacturer required to 
reimburse the buyer for a defective car must pay the actual price 
of the vehicle but may make reductions for nonmanufacturer 
items installed by a dealer or the buyer, and the amount directly 
attributable to the vehicle’s use by the buyer before first 
delivering it for correction of the warranty nonconformity.  
(§ 1793.2(d)(2)(B), (C).)  But those provisions do not say 
anything about reducing the reimbursement amount by the 
trade-in or resale value a buyer receives for the defective vehicle.  
By negative implication, then, a manufacturer may not reduce 
the reimbursement amount by whatever proceeds the buyer 
may have received through selling or trading in the car to a third 
party.  
The majority walks through this argument (maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 10–23), but it also, in the end, acknowledges that a 
“potential ambiguity” in the statutory language makes it 
appropriate to consider legislative history and the purposes and 
policies underlying the lemon law in arriving at the conclusions 
the court reaches today (id. at p. 24).  I emphatically agree the 
statute is ambiguous. 
Looking at sections 1793.2(d)(2) and 1794 in isolation, the 
idea that the plain language of the provisions answers the 
question has some superficial appeal.  The difficulty with the 
plain-language argument, however, is that it would seem to 
prove too much.  The restitutionary remedy in section 
1793.2(d)(2) is not specific to cases like this one, in which a car 
manufacturer has willfully violated its duties to make a prompt 
offer of replacement or refund.  Indeed, section 1793.2(d)(2) does 
not address violations of those duties at all; it is what tells car 
manufacturers what they must do in the first instance to avoid 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
7 
violating their duties.  By suggesting that section 1793.2(d)(2) 
categorically entitles a car buyer to trade in or sell a defective 
vehicle to a third party, retain the proceeds, and still demand a 
full refund of the purchase price (or even a brand-new 
replacement vehicle from the manufacturer), the plain-language 
argument would seem to provide an avenue for double recovery 
in every lemon law case, regardless of whether the 
manufacturer has done anything wrong.  This is not the only 
way — or even a particularly likely way — to understand the 
text of the relevant remedial provisions.1 
One reason is the one the majority expressly identifies:  
Allowing across-the-board double recovery for lemon law 
plaintiffs arguably overshoots what the Legislature was aiming 
at when it provided for damages to include a right of 
“restitution,” even if that right is statutory rather than based in 
common law.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24; see Alder v. Drudis 
 
1  
The court in Martinez v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2011) 
193 Cal.App.4th 187, 194, did appear to adopt this reading of 
the language of the statute.  But the actual holding of the case 
did not depend on it.  In Martinez, the buyer abandoned her 
nonfunctioning car at the dealership after the dealer refused to 
provide warranty coverage to repair it.  The car was ultimately 
repossessed.  (Id. at p. 192.)  There was no trade-in or resale to 
contend with, no dispute about the proper amount of restitution, 
and no question about the calculation of damages.  The Court of 
Appeal determined that nothing in the lemon law required 
Martinez to possess the vehicle before pursuing damages for the 
violations she asserted.  (Id. at pp. 193–194.)  Whether and to 
what extent the Martinez opinion correctly reasoned through 
the issue before it is beyond the scope of our inquiry in this case.  
It suffices to observe that the actual holding of Martinez is not 
inconsistent with a more nuanced understanding of the statute 
that acknowledges its ambiguities. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
8 
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 372, 384 [“[t]he purpose of restitution as a 
remedy for [contract] breach is the restoration of the status quo 
ante as far as is practicable”].)   
But the more fundamental reason, as I see it, relates to 
the relationship between section 1793.2(d)(2) and related 
provisions governing what is supposed to happen to a car after 
it has proved defective.  If the statute does not specify that resale 
or trade-in values are to be excluded from the “restitution” for 
which section 1793.2(d)(2) provides, that may simply be because 
the statute does not anticipate the scenario in which a car buyer 
seeks a full refund or replacement vehicle despite having sold 
the defective car to a third party. 
Again, recall that section 1793.2(d)(2) is not written as a 
remedy for manufacturer wrongdoing; it is, rather, the provision 
that tells the manufacturer what it must do when a defective car 
doesn’t live up to the warranty.  The assumption running 
through the statute appears to be that, in the ordinary course, 
if it appears that a car cannot be made to conform to the 
warranty within a reasonable number of repair attempts, the 
manufacturer will offer replacement or restitution and will 
reacquire the car in exchange.   
This assumption is most clearly evident in the Act’s 
labeling and notification provisions governing “Lemon Law 
Buyback” 
(Civ. 
Code, 
§ 1793.23), 
which 
impose 
on 
manufacturers multiple requirements designed to disclose a 
defective vehicle’s past before the vehicle can be sold to another 
buyer.  These provisions expressly refer to cars “accepted for 
restitution” under section 1793.2(d)(2) — suggesting that the 
cars will, in fact, be returned to the manufacturer in exchange 
for the restitution described in that section.  (Civ. Code, 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
9 
§ 1793.23, subds. (c)–(e).)  And, perhaps more fundamentally, 
the labeling and notification provisions can serve their essential 
purpose of protecting downstream consumers in the used-car 
market only if the manufacturers have the chance to comply, 
which means the cars must somehow find their way back into 
the manufacturers’ hands.   
None of this is, or should be, especially controversial.  
Indeed, Niedermeier’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument 
that the idea that a car buyer will return the defective vehicle 
in exchange for replacement or full refund is “embedded” in the 
statutory framework that describes what is supposed to 
transpire when a manufacturer cannot conform a vehicle to its 
warranty, even if the lemon law may not say so in explicit terms.  
The restitutionary remedy in section 1793.2(d)(2) appears built 
on this premise:  The buyer returns the defective vehicle, the 
manufacturer accepts it and in return offers the buyer her choice 
of a refund or a replacement vehicle.2  
 
2  
Unsurprisingly, many other states’ lemon laws make the 
return of the car an explicit requirement.  (E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 56:12-32(a)(1) [“the manufacturer . . . shall accept return of the 
motor vehicle from the consumer” and “(1) . . . provide the 
consumer with a full refund of the purchase price of the original 
motor vehicle” (italics added)]; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 198-a(c)(1) 
[“the manufacturer, at the option of the consumer, shall replace 
the motor vehicle with a comparable motor vehicle, or accept 
return of the vehicle from the consumer and refund to the 
consumer the full purchase price” (italics added)]; R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 31-5.2-3(a)(1) [“the manufacturer shall accept return of 
the vehicle from the consumer or lessee and, at the consumer’s 
or lessee’s option, refund the full contract price or lease price of 
the vehicle including all credits and allowances for any trade-in 
vehicle” (italics added)]; Wn. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.118.041(1) 
 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
10 
The problem we confront here raises a set of issues as to 
which the statute provides no express instruction.  What 
happens if the buyer doesn’t return the vehicle — because, as 
occurred here, the manufacturer refuses to take the car back — 
and the buyer then trades it in or sells it to a third party?  Is the 
buyer entitled to a full refund or replacement?  The statute 
offers no clear answers.  
To navigate this hazy area of the lemon law, we can look, 
as the majority says, to the legislative history and, ultimately, 
to the law’s purposes as they relate to the issue before us.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 24.)  As I understand the majority opinion, the 
dispositive consideration is an essentially equitable one that 
focuses on the circumstances of this case and others like it.  If 
Niedermeier did not return the defective Jeep, it was not for lack 
of trying.  It was, rather, because FCA willfully refused to accept 
the return of the Jeep and promptly pay restitution, as it was 
statutorily required to do.  If the result was that Niedermeier 
ultimately sold the Jeep in a manner that undercut the labeling 
and notification requirements, the fault belongs with FCA, 
which effectively forced Niedermeier into that position.  FCA 
should not then be permitted to profit from its intransigence by 
subtracting the likely inflated trade-in credit Niedermeier 
received from the total amount it would otherwise owe 
Niedermeier in damages.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30–31, 35–38.)   
 
[“the manufacturer . . . shall, at the option of the consumer, 
replace or repurchase the new motor vehicle” (italics added)]; see 
also Martinez v. Kia Motors America, Inc., supra, 193 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 196–197 [discussing additional jurisdictions 
that require return of a defective vehicle for a lemon law 
refund].) 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
11 
This is not a particularly novel concept, nor one unique to 
the lemon law.  It is, rather, essentially a statute-specific 
application of the well-established equitable principle that “[n]o 
one can take advantage of his own wrong.”  (Civ. Code, § 3517.)  
The problem raised by the calculation of the “restitution” owed 
to Niedermeier in this case, in other words, evokes the familiar 
doctrine of unjust enrichment.  The doctrine is “based on the 
idea that ‘one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich 
himself at the expense of another, but should be required to 
make restitution of or for property or benefits received, retained, 
or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such 
restitution be made.’ ”  (County of San Bernardino v. Walsh 
(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 542.)  “Typically, the defendant’s 
benefit and the plaintiff’s loss are the same, and restitution 
requires the defendant to restore the plaintiff to his or her 
original position.  [Citations.]  The principle of unjust 
enrichment, however, is broader than mere ‘restoration’ of what 
the plaintiff lost.”  (Ibid.)  “The emphasis is on the wrongdoer’s 
enrichment, not the victim’s loss.  In particular, a person acting 
in conscious disregard of the rights of another should be 
required to disgorge all profit because disgorgement both 
benefits the injured parties and deters the perpetrator from 
committing the same unlawful actions again.”  (Ibid.; see Ward 
v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 741–742; Rest.3d Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment, § 1.) 
Consideration of unjust enrichment principles offers an 
explanation for the conclusion that a manufacturer obligated to 
pay lemon law damages may not withhold the amounts it would 
otherwise save through its willful violation of section 
1793.2(d)(2) — which is to say, its “conscious disregard” of the 
buyer’s statutory rights and of its own statutory duties.  (County 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
12 
of San Bernardino v. Walsh, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 542; 
see Rest.3d Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, supra, § 51, 
subd. (4) [“unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer . . . is the 
net profit attributable to the underlying wrong”]; American 
Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 
Cal.App.4th 1451, 1487 [same].)  Through its misconduct — 
unjustly refusing to accept Niedermeier’s Jeep for restitution 
even after multiple repair efforts had failed to make the Jeep 
safe to drive — FCA effectively “forced” Niedermeier to trade in 
her Jeep for a working vehicle (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3, 24, 39, 
40), and improperly retained the full restitution to which she 
was entitled under section 1793.2(d)(2).  Considered in light of 
unjust 
enrichment 
principles, 
the 
damages 
calculation 
prescribed by sections 1794 and 1793.2(d)(2) cannot be 
interpreted to reward FCA for this willful wrongdoing. 
The trial court in this case invoked these principles when 
it rejected FCA’s request for a reduction in damages, expressly 
citing the tenet that “ ‘[n]o one can take advantage of his own 
wrong.’ ”  And in other cases — also, as it happens, against 
FCA — courts have rejected similar requests for a reduction in 
damages with the observation that FCA should not “be 
compensated for its own willful violation of the law.”  (Figueroa 
v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 708, 713; see also 
Williams v. FCA US LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 765, 785 
[agreeing with Figueroa and declining to interpret the Act to 
“reward manufacturer” for its willful refusal to reacquire the 
vehicle].)  Regardless of whether Niedermeier would otherwise 
be entitled to trade in her Jeep and pocket the proceeds, any 
reasonable understanding of the lemon law refutes the idea that 
FCA is entitled to profit from the course of action that led 
Niedermeier to that point in this case. 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
13 
Niedermeier invoked the requirements of the Act by 
presenting her Jeep to FCA for repair; she also specifically asked 
FCA to accept the Jeep for restitution when many repairs over 
an extended period did not conform the Jeep to its warranty.  
Niedermeier, in other words, tried to return her vehicle to FCA, 
as the Act envisions, and would have been entitled to recover 
full restitution as described in section 1793.2(d)(2) if FCA had 
not willfully violated the Act and refused her return.  Under 
these circumstances, Niedermeier’s “rights of replacement or 
reimbursement as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2” 
(§ 1794, subd. (b)), for purposes of measuring her damages, 
include the full measure of restitution to which she would have 
been entitled absent FCA’s willful violation of its duties and 
conscious disregard of her rights.   
III. 
The majority opinion suggests — but does not outright 
hold — that the result might be different in a different case.  It 
says that the statute entitles a plaintiff car buyer to a full 
refund, without any deductions for trade-in or resale value, but 
adds this qualification:  “at least where, as here, a consumer has 
been forced to trade in or sell a defective vehicle due to the 
manufacturer’s failure to comply with the Act.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 3.)  The majority also makes clear that its holding is limited 
to circumstances like those presented in this case,  and is leaving 
open whether the same rule would apply in a case involving a 
good-faith, reasonable mistake about whether the Act’s replace-
or-refund provision applies to a particular vehicle.  (Id. at 
pp. 32–33, fn. 8.)   
In my view, the result the court reaches today makes sense 
precisely because of the circumstances we confront.  Although 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
14 
the majority opinion leaves the limits of its holding for 
exploration in a future case, those limits are, in my view, 
important to a full understanding of the law. 
There is no real question that a rule the majority applies 
today results in something of a windfall for the buyer, in that it 
leaves her better off than she was before she purchased the 
defective car.  (Accord, maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  In a case where 
she has been forced to sell the car because of the manufacturer’s 
willful failure to promptly refund or replace the car in 
accordance with the law, none of this matters.  The reason the 
buyer in Niedermeier’s position is entitled to a full refund is not 
because all the money is necessary to make her whole; it is, 
rather, because it is necessary for the manufacturer to 
relinquish any claim on the money, in order to avoid rewarding 
misbehavior and to avoid encouraging a repeat of the same 
statute-defying stunt in future cases.  (Cf., e.g., Center for 
Healthcare Education & Research, Inc. v. International 
Congress for Joint Reconstruction, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 
1108, 1129 [the “ ‘profit-based measure of unjust enrichment 
determines recoveries against conscious wrongdoers’ ” and 
“ ‘may potentially exceed any loss to the claimant’ ”].)3  
 
3  
I do not mean to overstate the degree to which our holding 
is likely to affect manufacturers’ existing incentives to do their 
best to comply with the law.  As the majority points out, the 
prospect of hundreds of thousands of dollars in civil penalties 
and attorney fees was not enough to deter FCA’s misbehavior in 
this case.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 38.)  It is unclear to me, at 
least, that the prospect of being denied a $19,000 trade-in credit 
would have made a dispositive difference.  But the point here is 
not how effective any individual component of the monetary 
remedy may be in deterring wrongdoing in any particular case.  
 
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
15 
But it is not hard to see why the Court of Appeal in this 
case was concerned about adopting a rule that would extend 
similar treatment across the board, to any buyer of a defective 
vehicle who might choose to trade in or sell the vehicle for profit 
rather than give it back to the manufacturer.  Certainly some 
buyers might choose continued repairs rather than getting rid 
of the vehicle and “resorting to litigation.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 31; see also Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 
supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 186 [the plaintiff “repeatedly agreed 
to allow continued repair efforts rather than insisting on 
replacement or refund”].)  But a rule that guaranteed full 
reimbursement on top of trade-in or resale profit would almost 
certainly alter some consumers’ calculations.  If trade-in or 
resale always yielded the potential for double recovery, one 
would expect a good number of consumers to go that route.  And 
as the Court of Appeal explained, the result would be to 
undermine the operation of the labeling and notification 
provisions, which depend on buyers returning their defective 
cars to manufacturers rather than selling their unlabeled 
lemons into the used-car market.  (Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC, 
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071–1072.)   
An across-the-board rule giving lemon law plaintiffs a 
categorical entitlement to full reimbursement (or else a new 
replacement car) plus the proceeds of resale or trade-in would 
also raise significant questions of fairness.  A rule permitting 
this sort of double recovery in every case would mean that 
plaintiffs who buy luxury vehicles could wind up turning a 
substantial profit if those vehicles later prove defective, while 
 
The point is that such wrongdoing should not be rewarded in 
any measure.  
NIEDERMEIER  v. FCA US LLC 
Kruger, J., concurring 
16 
plaintiffs who buy economy cars probably could not — for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the extent of their actual 
losses or the extent of the manufacturer’s wrongdoing.  It is 
unclear why the Legislature would have set up a remedial 
scheme that would authorize this additional recovery based 
solely on the price tag of the car, and thus, by extension, the 
financial means of the buyer. 
By applying its holding “at least” in a case involving 
circumstances like those before us — that is, a willful failure to 
accept the return of a defective vehicle and make restitution — 
the majority leaves open the possibility that the rule it 
announces may be limited to such cases, and does not 
necessarily apply across the board.  As I see it, such a limit is 
not only sound, but important to a complete understanding of 
the statutory scheme.  On that understanding, I concur in the 
majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 56 Cal.App.5th 1052 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S266034 
Date Filed:  March 4, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Daniel S. Murphy 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Matt Gregory, 
Shaun Mathur; Clark Hill and David L. Brandon for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Knight Law Group, Steve Mikhov, Roger Kirnos, Amy Morse; Hackler 
Daghighian Martino & Novak, Sepehr Daghighian, Erik K. Schmitt; 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman, Joseph V. 
Bui; Public Justice and Leslie A. Brueckner for Plaintiff and 
Respondent.  
 
Consumer Law Practice and Daniel T. LeBel for Consumers for Auto 
Reliability and Safety as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Thomas H. Dupree, Jr. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20036 
(202) 955-8547 
 
Cynthia E. Tobisman 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP 
6420 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1100 
Los Angeles, CA 90048 
(310) 859-7811