Case Title: State v. Fernald

Citation: 168 Vt. 620, 723 A.2d 1145

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Fernald  (98-028); 168 Vt. 620; 723 A.2d 1145

[Filed 23-Oct-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-028

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1998

State of Vermont                }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     District Court of Vermont,
                                }     Unit No. 2, Rutland Circuit
Michael J. Fernald              }
                                }     DOCKET NO. 1078-8-97Rdcr

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Shelley Palmer appeals from the Rutland District Court's  denial of
  his request for a bail warrant and discharge as surety for Michael Fernald,
  pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7562, upon Palmer's surrender  of Fernald to the
  court.  We conclude that the case is moot and dismiss the appeal.

       The parties do not dispute the relevant facts.  On November 1, 1997,
  Shelley Palmer, a professional bail bondsman, entered into an Appearance
  Bond agreement ("agreement") with the district court and Michael Fernald,
  against whom were pending several criminal charges. According to the
  agreement, Fernald was required to reside at the apartment of John DeFeo,
  an indemnitor to Fernald's bail.  Fernald was  also prohibited from moving
  out of DeFeo's residence without first  providing written notice to Palmer.

       Approximately three weeks later, Palmer was informed by DeFeo and Geri
  Ackly, the other indemnitor to Fernald's bail, that  Fernald had moved from
  DeFeo's residence and his whereabouts were  unknown.  Palmer did not
  receive written notice of Palmer's intent to  move prior to his relocation. 
  On December 1, 1997, after unsuccessful attempts to locate Fernald, Palmer
  filed a Request for Arrest of Principal in Relief of Bail in the district
  court pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7562.  The court did not issue the requested
  bail warrant or discharge Palmer as Fernald's surety, but scheduled the
  matter for a  hearing on December 18, 1997.  When Palmer appeared at court
  on December 18, he learned that the hearing had been rescheduled for
  January, 15, 1998.  Later that day, Palmer located, arrested and
  surrendered Fernald to the court.

       Upon Palmer's surrender of Fernald, the court held a hearing  and
  declined to issue a bail warrant and relieve Palmer of his responsibilities
  as surety.  The court ordered Fernald to continue to reside at his new
  address and rescheduled the hearing on Palmer's §  7562 request for
  February 10, 1998.  On December 23, 1998, Palmer filed a notice of appeal
  from that order. The February 10 hearing was postponed until February 20,
  1998, when it was finally held and Palmer's requests were granted.  This
  appeal followed.

       On appeal, Palmer and the State (FN1) concede that the relief originally
  sought by Palmer from the district court has been granted. Both argue,
  however, that the situation in which a trial court declines to timely issue
  a bail warrant or accept a surety's surrender of his  principal is

 

  capable of repetition, yet evasive of review.  Thus, they claim that this
  case is an exception to the mootness doctrine which warrants review by this
  Court.

       In general, a case becomes moot "when the issues presented  are no
  longer `live[]'" or the parties lack a legally cognizable  interest in the
  outcome.  State v. Gundlah, 160 Vt. 193, 196,