Case Title: Ex parte Jeff Green. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Jeff Green v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070388

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 07-18-08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
_________________________
1070388
_________________________
Ex parte Jeff Green
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Jeff Green
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-03-479 and CC-03-1073;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1597)
WOODALL, Justice.
Jeff Green sought certiorari review of a judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed a judgment of the
Houston 
Circuit 
Court 
denying 
Green's 
petition 
for
1070388
2
postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.
Green's Rule 32 petition sought relief from convictions for
the unlawful manufacturing and possession of a controlled
substance 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel 
was
ineffective.  We reverse and remand.
I. Factual Background
Green's arrest and convictions arose out of a warrant
executed for the search of a residence occupied by Green and
three other individuals.  The warrant was issued by a Houston
County district judge upon the affidavit of Officer Thomas
Flathman; Officer Flathman's affidavit stated, in pertinent
part:
"I have probable cause and do believe that
located at ---- Hubbard Rd. Wicksburg Houston County
Alabama, there is now being concealed certain
property 
namely 
Methamphetamine 
and 
that 
the
following facts tend to establish the facts thereof:
I am Off. Thomas Flathman of the Dothan Police
Department and I have received information from a
confidential 
informant 
that 
Jeff 
Green 
is
manufacturing and selling methamphetamine inside of
the residence and in the shed beside of the
residence.  The confidential informant also stated
that Paula Anderson resides at the residence.  ----
Hubbard Road is the address Anderson used on
September 21st 2002 when Off. Elkins arrested her
for a felony narcotics violation.  Both Green and
Anderson 
have 
prior 
arrests 
for 
narcotics
violations.  Dothan Swat team snipers have observed
continuous foot traffic between the residence and
1070388
3
the shed.  They have also smelled a strong acidic
chemical odor coming from the property that is
consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
"Affiant shows that, based on the above and
foregoing 
facts 
and 
information, 
affiant 
has
probable cause to believe that the above described
property is concealed upon the aforesaid premises
and is subject to seizure and makes this affidavit
so that a warrant may issue to search the said
premises."
The judge signed the warrant at his residence at 12:08 a.m.
Hours after the warrant was issued, Officer Flathman and
at least three other police officers searched the shed, where
they discovered and seized what has been described as a
"methamphetamine lab."  A search of the residence yielded
various smoking devices and a plastic container that tested
positive for methamphetamine residue.  Green was indicted for
first-degree manufacturing of methamphetamine in violation of
Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-12-218 ("the manufacturing charge"), and
possession of methamphetamine in violation of Ala. Code 1975,
§ 13A-12-212 ("the possession charge").
At Green's trial, his counsel did not challenge the
sufficiency of the search warrant or its supporting affidavit,
nor did counsel move to suppress the evidence discovered as a
result of the search.  Green was convicted on both charges and
1070388
4
was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment and 5 years'
imprisonment for the manufacturing charge and the possession
charge, respectively, with the sentences to run consecutively.
He appealed.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
convictions and sentences, and this Court denied Green's
petition for certiorari review.
On September 23, 2005, Green filed in the circuit court
a petition for postconviction relief under Rule 32, Ala. R.
Crim. P.   He sought to set aside his convictions on the
ground that, among other things, he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution
and the United States Constitution by his counsel's failure to
challenge the validity of the search warrant and the
admissibility of the evidence seized during its execution.  
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing at which
Officer Flathman testified.  At that hearing, the following
colloquy occurred:
"Q.
[By Green's counsel:] Other than what was on
the 
four 
corners 
of 
[the 
search-warrant
affidavit], did you present to the judge any
other 
information? 
 
After 
you 
obviously
apologized for the lateness of the hour, did
you present any other material facts to him?
"A.
[By Officer Flathman:] I don't recall."
1070388
5
(Emphasis added.)
The circuit court denied Green's Rule 32 petition, and he
appealed.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial
in an unpublished memorandum, Green v. State (No. CR-05-1597,
September 21, 2007), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2007)(table), and Green filed this petition for certiorari
review in this Court.  We granted his petition to consider
whether the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
conflicts with its prior decisions in Lewis v. State, 589 So.
2d 758 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384
(Ala. Crim. App. 1990), and Thomas v. State, 353 So. 2d 54
(Ala. Crim. App. 1977), regarding the sufficiency of an
affidavit supporting a search warrant.  We hold that it does.
II. Discussion
To obtain postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove "(1) that
counsel did not provide reasonably effective assistance and
(2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
petitioner."  Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d 847, 850 (Ala. 2000)
(applying the rule set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984)).  Counsel's "performance [is] measured
1070388
The second prong is not at issue in this case; the State
1
does not dispute that, if counsel did not provide reasonably
effective assistance, Green was prejudiced.
6
against an 'objective standard of reasonableness.'"  Rompilla
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005)(quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688).  "[A] determination of the reasonableness of
counsel's actions must be determined on a 'case-by-case'
basis."  Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 167 (4th Cir. 2007).
To 
prevail 
on 
an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim, 
both
prongs of the Strickland test must be met.  Altherr v. State,
911 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).  
1
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation."  Thus, "[a] search
warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause
that evidence or instrumentalities of a crime or contraband
will be found in the place to be searched."  United States v.
Gettel, 474 F.3d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 2007).  Moreover,
"'[s]ufficient evidence must be stated in the affidavit to
1070388
7
support a finding of probable cause for issuing the search
warrant,' and '[t]he affidavit must state specific facts or
circumstances which support a finding of probable cause[;]
otherwise the affidavit is faulty and the warrant may not
issue.'"  Ex parte Parker, 858 So. 2d 941, 945 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Alford v. State, 381 So. 2d 203, 205 (Ala. Crim. App.
1979)). 
"A probable cause determination is made after considering
the totality of the circumstances."  Gettel, 474 F.3d at 1086.
To pass constitutional muster, "the facts must be sufficient
to justify a conclusion that the property which is the object
of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at
the time the warrant is issued."   United States v. Greany,
929 F.2d 523, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).  Thus,
"[t]he police will ... encounter problems of 'staleness' of
their information if they delay too long in seeking a search
warrant."  United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 450 n.14
(1976).
Green contends that the warrant authorizing the
search of his residence was not based on probable cause,
because, he argues, Officer Flathman's affidavit, which
provided the basis for the warrant, "failed to establish that
1070388
8
the information being provided [by the affiant] was current
rather than stale or remote."  Green's brief, at 10.
According to Green, Flathman's affidavit differs in no
material respect from the supporting affidavits deemed to be
fatally deficient in Nelms, Lewis, and Thomas, supra.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals found the affidavit
sufficient, we agree with Green.
All three cases cited by Green involved motions to
suppress evidence of controlled substances discovered in the
execution of search warrants supported by affidavits lacking
information sufficient to determine whether the information
provided to, and by, the affiant was current.  In Thomas,
heroin was found pursuant to a search warrant executed on
March 14, 1973.  Thomas, 353 So. 2d at 55.  One of the police
officers who executed the warrant was the affiant, who had
stated, in pertinent part:
"'On February 23rd, 1973, a search warrant was
served at 2624 Tempest Drive, Apartment H, residence
of Marie Haley.  A quantity of heroin was seized on
this date.  On the afternoon of March 6th, 1973, an
undercover police officer purchased a quantity of
heroin from Eric Rogers at 2624 Tempest Drive,
Apartment H.  On March 13th, 1973, I received
information from a reliable informant who has given
me information over a period of the last 30 days
which has led to narcotic cases being made with
1070388
9
trials pending.  This informant gave me information
that he had observed heroin being used and sold at
2624 
Tempest 
Drive, 
Apartment 
H, 
Birmingham,
Alabama.'"
353 So. 2d at 56 (emphasis added).  In holding that the
defendant's motion to suppress the heroin found during the
search should have been granted, the Court of Criminal Appeals
stated:
"The affidavit is deficient because it fails to
show 
that 
the 
information 
received 
from 
the
informant was fresh as opposed to being remote. ...
The affidavit stated that the informant 'had
observed' heroin being used and sold from the
premises described.  The affidavit does not state
the date or the time the informant allegedly
observed the heroin on the premises. ...
"....
"The fact that heroin was previously seized on
February 23, 1973, at 2624 Tempest Drive, Apartment
H, did not establish probable cause to believe that
heroin was on the premises three weeks later.
"Also, the fact that on March 6, 1973, an
undercover police officer purchased a quantity of
heroin from Eric Rogers on the premises did not
establish probable cause to believe that a week
later such narcotic would be still found thereon.
Seven days is a considerable length of time in which
to remove heroin from the premises or dispose of it
in another fashion.  Such makes for a stale
warrant."
353 So. 2d at 56 (emphasis added). 
1070388
10
The search warrant challenged in Lewis was based on an
affidavit that stated, in pertinent part: "'[W]ithin the last
seventy-two hours, a reliable, confidential informant advised
this affiant that said informant had been at the above
described residence and observed a quantity of powder
cocaine.'"  Lewis, 589 So. 2d at 759 (emphasis added).  In
reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion
to suppress evidence of a controlled substance found during
the search, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the
affidavit 
was 
constitutionally 
"deficient, 
because 
it 
fail[ed]
to refer to the date when the informant allegedly observed
cocaine at the [defendant's] residence."  589 So. 2d at 759
(emphasis added).  
Similarly, in Nelms, a controlled substance was found in
executing a search warrant obtained on the basis of an
affidavit that stated, in pertinent part:
"'And that the facts tending to establish the
foregoing grounds for issuance of a search warrant
are as follows: That within the last seventy-two
hours a confidential police informant, who has
provided information to the affiant in the past that
led to an arrest, stated to the affiant that they
[sic] have seen Crack-Cocaine in the residence of
Tommie Lee Nelms, alias, located at 625 Westview
Drive, Auburn, Lee County, Alabama.'"
1070388
11
Nelms, 568 So. 2d at 385 (emphasis added in Nelms).  In
reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion
to suppress evidence of the controlled substance, the Court of
Criminal Appeals stated:
"The 
affidavit 
in 
this 
case 
is
[constitutionally] deficient because it does not
state when the drugs were seen by the informant at
the [defendant's] residence.  The words 'within the
last seventy-two hours' refer to when the informant
told this information to the affiant, not to when
the 
informant 
observed 
the 
narcotics 
in 
the
[defendant's] residence.  There is absolutely no
reference to the date or time when the narcotics
were observed by the informant.  Thus, the affidavit
was defective and was insufficient to support the
issuance of the search warrant in this case."
568 So. 2d at 386 (emphasis added).
The dispute in this case centers on the following three
statements in Flathman's affidavit: (1) "I have received
information from a confidential informant that Jeff Green is
manufacturing and selling methamphetamine inside of the
residence and in the shed beside of the residence"; (2)
"Dothan Swat team snipers have observed continuous foot
traffic between the residence and the shed"; and (3) "[t]hey
have also smelled a strong acidic chemical odor coming from
the property that is consistent with the manufacture of
methamphetamine."  To be sure, the first statement contains a
1070388
12
verb tense that is ostensibly the present tense, i.e., "is
manufacturing and selling."  (Emphasis added.)  However, any
present-tense aspect of this phrase is qualified by, and
subject to, the introductory clause, "I have received
information" (emphasis added), which indicates an action in
the past.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained in regard to
the phrase "had observed" that such statements in affidavits
evidencing past actions are ineffective.  This is so, because
the allegedly illegal activity "'could have been any time in
the past.'"  Thomas, 353 So. 2d at 56 (quoting Walker v.
State, 49 Ala. App. 741, 743, 275 So. 2d 724, 725-26 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1973)).  When "'[t]he informer [does] not tell the
officer-affiant the date or time he allegedly observed the
[activity] on the premises,'" then "'[t]here is nothing in the
affidavit which hints of time except the use of the past tense
in connection with the informant's ... report to the
affiant.'" 353 So. 2d at 56 (quoting Walker, 49 Ala. App. at
743, 275 So. 2d at 726)(emphasis added).
Similarly, nothing in Officer Flathman's affidavit
reveals when the tip from the informant was received or when
1070388
13
the alleged activity was observed.  The most that can be
gained from that portion of the affidavit is that -- at some
indefinite time in the past -- an anonymous individual
allegedly learned of a methamphetamine operation involving
Green at the address indicated on the search warrant.  Because
Officer Flathman's affidavit contained no chronological
reference 
in 
which 
to 
place 
the 
informant's 
alleged
observation of the methamphetamine operation, it afforded no
basis on which to determine whether "the object of the search
[was] probably on the premises to be searched at the time the
warrant [was] issued."   Greany, 929 F.2d at 525.
The information supplied to Officer Flathman by the
"Dothan SWAT team snipers" is defective for the same reasons.
The affidavit provides no information as to when the SWAT-team
snipers were deployed.  It relates only what the snipers
allegedly "have ... observed" and "have ... smelled" at some
indefinite time in the past.  Lacking a relevant time frame,
the statements of the snipers provided no basis on which to
determine whether a methamphetamine operation was ongoing at
the residence at the time the warrant was issued.  For these
reasons, the affidavit fails to state facts or circumstances
1070388
14
that would support a finding of probable cause within the
framework of Thomas, Nelms, and Lewis.
Even if an affidavit is facially defective for the
reasons just discussed, its deficiency may be cured by
information an affiant supplied to the issuing authority in
addition to the assertions in the affidavit.  However, no such
circumstance is presented in this case, because Officer
Flathman testified at the hearing on Green's Rule 32 petition
that he "[did]n't recall" telling the district judge who
issued the warrant anything "[o]ther than what was on the four
corners of the [search-warrant affidavit]."  In that respect,
also, this case is on point with Nelms and Lewis.  
Both of those cases involved, as does this case,
allegations 
that 
the 
supporting 
affidavits 
lacked 
a
chronological context by which to assess the timeliness of the
search warrant.  Nelms, 568 So. 2d at 386; Lewis, 589 So. 2d
at 759.  In both cases, the State attempted to cure the
deficiency of the affidavits with testimony of the affiants
regarding facts they had orally communicated to the judges who
issued the warrants.  Nelms, 568 So. 2d at 386-87, Lewis, 589
So. 2d at 759.  In both cases, as in this case, the affiants
1070388
15
testified that they could not recall what they had told the
issuing judge as to when the informant had observed the
illegal activity.  In both cases, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held, contrary to the holding in its unpublished
memorandum in this case, that such oral testimony is
insufficient to cure the deficiency of a supporting affidavit.
Finally, the State argues that "[e]ven if the affidavit
was [insufficient to establish probable cause], the evidence
was admissible under the 'good-faith exception' to the
exclusionary rule."  The State's brief, at 22.  Similar
arguments based on materially indistinguishable facts were
made by the State and rejected in Nelms and Lewis.
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Nelms, in particular,
stated:
"[T]he only possible way to justify the admission of
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant
in this case would be as a 'good faith' exception to
the exclusionary rule as enunciated in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d
677 (1984).  In Leon, 'the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained pursuant to a facially-valid
search warrant, later found to be invalid, is
admissible if the executing officers acted in good
faith and in objectively reasonable reliance on the
warrant.'  United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139
(9th 
Cir. 
1988). 
 
However, 
the 
Leon 
Court
specifically noted four circumstances when it cannot
be asserted that the officer is acting in 'good
1070388
16
faith' because 'the officer will have no reasonable
grounds for believing that the warrant was properly
issued.'  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3420.
One of these circumstances is when an officer relies
'on a warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."'  In
its discussion of this circumstance, the Supreme
Court stated that '"Sufficient information must be
presented to the magistrate to allow that official
to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare conclusion of
others."'  Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S. Ct. at 3416
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)).
"In Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228, 697
S.W.2d 899 (1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court was
faced with a situation similar to the one at bar.
In that case, the court held that the affidavit,
which was the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant, did not contain sufficient information to
support a probable cause determination because it
contained no reference to when the informant had
seen marijuana growing in the defendant's home.
Thus, the court held that the search in that case
could not be justified under the 'good faith'
exception enunciated in Leon.
"....
"The affidavit in this case was 'so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,'
since there was no reference at all in the affidavit
as to when the informant saw the narcotics at the
appellant's residence.  An argument could be made
that the 'good faith' exception should be applicable
in this instance because the affiant knew the time
the informant saw the narcotics in the appellant's
residence at the time he prepared the affidavit and
at the time he executed the search warrant.
1070388
17
"'Leon does not extend, however, to allow
the consideration of facts known only to an
officer and not presented to a magistrate.
The Leon test for good faith reliance is
clearly an objective one and it is based
solely 
on 
facts 
presented 
to 
the
magistrate.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.
Ct. at 3421.  An obviously deficient
affidavit cannot be cured by an officer's
later 
testimony 
on 
his 
subjective
intentions 
or 
knowledge. 
 
"Reviewing 
courts
will not defer to a warrant based on an
affidavit that does not 'provide the
magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable
cause.'"  Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S. Ct.
at 3416 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 527 (1983)).
"'Leon creates an exception to the
exclusionary rule when officers have acted
in reasonable reliance on the ruling of a
judge or magistrate.  The point is that
officers 
who present a colorable showing of
probable cause to a judicial officer ought
to be able to rely on that officer's ruling
in executing the warrant.  [Citation
omitted.]  When the officers have not
presented a colorable showing, and the
warrant and affidavit on their face
preclude 
reasonable 
reliance, 
the 
reasoning
of Leon does not apply.  To permit the
total deficiency of the warrant and
affidavit to be remedied by subsequent
testimony 
concerning 
the 
subjective
knowledge of the officer who sought the
warrant would, we 
believe, 
unduly erode the
protections of the fourth amendment.'
"Hove, 848 F.2d at 140.
1070388
18
"Here, the affidavit was deficient on its face
and, although the affiant testified that he and the
judge who issued the warrant talked about the time
when the informant had observed the drugs at the
[defendant's] house, he stated that he could not
remember what he told the judge with regard to this
matter. Thus, we cannot say that the affiant made a
colorable showing of probable cause to the judge.
Therefore, Leon does not apply here and the
[defendant's] motion to suppress should have been
granted."
Nelms, 568 So. 2d at 387-89 (emphasis added).  
The application of and rationale for the good-faith
exception are particularly inappropriate where, as here, the
officer is executing a search warrant that depends on his own
affidavit.  It is "'disingenuous, after having gone to [a
district judge] with the paltry showing seen here, to suggest,
as the [State] suggests, that at bottom it was the [district
judge] who made the error and the search and seizure are
insulated because the officer's reliance on that error was
objectively reasonable.'"  Ball v. State, 868 So. 2d 474, 475
(Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (Cobb, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir. 2002)).
The State does not discuss -- or even acknowledge --
Thomas, Nelms, or Lewis.  Instead, it relies on Harrelson v.
State, 897 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).  The State's
1070388
19
reliance on Harrelson, however, is misplaced.  In Harrelson,
the search-warrant affidavit stated, in pertinent part, that
"'[o]n August 9, 2002, information was received from a
confidential informant indicating that Mr. Harrelson was
responsible for [certain described] tire thefts,'" and that
Harrelson "'had "tens of thousands of dollars worth" of [said
stolen] property at his residence,'"  897 So. 2d at 1238
(emphasis added).  The warrant was issued that same day. 897
So. 2d at 1239.  
The Harrelson affidavit is distinguishable in that,
unlike the affidavit in this case, the date of the informant's
information was manifest.  In other words, it was fairly
inferable from the face of the affidavit that the stolen
property was at Harrelson's residence on August 9, 2002 -- the
benchmark date of the informant's tip.  Indeed, the Court of
Criminal Appeals so concluded: 
"In this case, the affidavit provides that the
informant said that Harrelson, at the time of the
execution of the affidavit, had stolen goods stored
in a building on his property, that is, the presence
of the stolen goods was ongoing at the time of the
execution of the affidavit."
1070388
20
Harrelson, 897 So. 2d at 1239-40.  Officer Flathman's
affidavit, on the other hand, contains no comparable
benchmark.  
In short, the affidavit is facially defective within the
framework of Thomas, Nelms, and Lewis, and, moreover, is "so
lacking indicia of probable cause" that it does not satisfy
the good-faith exception discussed in Nelms and Lewis.  The
affiant's testimony reveals nothing about when any of the
relevant activities took place, thus "render[ing] official
belief in [the existence of probable cause] entirely
unreasonable."  Nelms, 568 So. 2d at 388. 
III. Conclusion
Given the glaringly defective affidavit,  reasonably
effective counsel would have challenged the search warrant and
the admission of evidence obtained as a result of its
execution.  In failing to do so, Green's trial counsel did not
provide reasonably effective assistance.  For these reasons,
the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and
the cause is remanded to that court for the entry of an
appropriate order.
1070388
21
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
See, Lyons, Stuart, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Smith, J., concurs specially.
Bolin and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1070388
22
SMITH, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the main opinion.  I write only to note
that at the time a search warrant is challenged, the affiant,
or additional witnesses produced by the affiant, may not
recall the details of critical supplemental testimony that was
provided to the judge or magistrate when the warrant was
issued.  Thus, in order to preserve this supplemental
testimony, Rule 3.9(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that
"[s]uch additional sworn examination shall be recorded
verbatim by a court reporter, by recording equipment, or by
other means ...."
1070388
See Lewis, 589 So. 2d at 759 (finding deficient an
2
affidavit that stated merely that the informant advised the
affiant that "'said informant had been at the above-described
residence and observed a quantity of powder cocaine'"
(emphasis added)); Nelms, 568 So. 2d  at 385 (rejecting an
affidavit that stated merely that the informant "'stated to
the affiant that they [sic] have seen Crack-Cocaine in the
residence of'" the defendant (some emphasis omitted)); Thomas,
353 So. 2d  at 56 (finding that the affidavit "fail[ed] to
show that the information received from the informant was
fresh as opposed to being remote" where the affidavit stated
merely that the informant "'had observed heroin being used and
sold'" at the defendant's address (emphasis added)).
23
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
For the reasons discussed below, I respectfully dissent.
I find the cases of Lewis v. State, 589 So. 2d 758 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991), Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1990), and Thomas v. State, 353 So. 2d 54 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1977), to be distinguishable from the present case.  The
problematic, past-tense verb usage in each of these cases was
part of the informant's statement and was in reference to the
occurrence at some unknown time in the past of the illegal
activity itself or the informant's observation of that
activity.   In contrast, in the present case the "past tense"
2
reference is found only in the affiant's statement that "I
have received" certain information from the informant.  If
this makes the affidavit deficient, then very few affidavits
1070388
24
will be able to pass constitutional muster.  Obviously, any
time an affidavit describes information from an informant, it
is of necessity information the affiant has received before
signing the affidavit.
The real question is what is the information the affiant
has received from the informant.  According to the affidavit
in this case, it is that, at the time the affidavit is signed,
the defendant "is manufacturing and selling methamphetamine."
The main opinion disagrees with this understanding of the
affidavit.  It asserts that the present tense of the phrase
"is manufacturing and selling" is qualified by the reference
to prior activity in the clause "I have received information."
I believe the converse is true.  Moreover, the issuing court
reasonably could have understood the converse to be true.  By
stating that "I have received information from a confidential
informant that Jeff Green is manufacturing and selling
methamphetamines inside of the residence and in the [adjacent]
shed," the affidavit impliedly and necessarily states that the
affiant has received information from the informant that
speaks to the current state of affairs.  Compare Harrelson v.
State, 897 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (finding
1070388
The Harrelson court further explained:
3
"In this case, the affidavit provides that the
informant said that Harrelson, at the time of the
execution of the affidavit, had stolen goods stored
in a building on his property, that is, the presence
of the stolen goods was ongoing at the time of the
execution 
of 
the 
affidavit. 
 
As 
opposed 
to
absolutely no reference to the date or time, as was
the problem in Nelms and Lewis, the affidavit in
this case contained not only a general time frame,
but also it provided that at the moment of the
execution 
of 
the 
affidavit 
Harrelson 
was 
in
possession of the stolen goods."
897 So. 2d at 1239-40.  The Harrelson court also stated:
"Finally, the plain meaning of the statement in the
affidavit that reads, 'The informant stated that Mr.
Harrelson 
had 
air-conditioning 
units, 
ladders,
tools, and other property at his residence that were
thought to be stolen from Auburn University,'
indicates that, as of the date of the affidavit, the
stolen goods were at that point in time on
Harrelson's property."
897 So. 2d at 1242 (emphasis added).
25
that affiant's statement that "[i]nformation was also received
from the informant indicating that the suspect stored some of
the stolen property in an open-faced barn structure located
approximately 1/4 mile east of the suspect's residence,"
speaks to the current state of affairs at the time of the
execution of the affidavit).3
1070388
26
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court stated:
"'[T]he term "probable cause,"  according to its
usual acceptation, means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation....  It imports a seizure
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.'
[Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348 (1813)].
...  
"We also have recognized that affidavits 'are
normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and
haste of a criminal investigation. ...' [United
States v.] Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 [(1965)].
...  The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli [v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),] prongs and the
complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical
rules that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli
decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that
many warrants are -- quite properly ... -- issued on
the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of
laymen applying a standard less demanding than those
used in more formal legal proceedings.  ...
"Similarly, 
we 
have 
repeatedly 
said 
that
after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency
of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo
review.  A magistrate's 'determination of probable
cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts.'  Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 419."  
462 U.S. at 235-36. 
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.  And the duty of a reviewing
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27
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
'substantial 
basis for ... conclud[ing]' that
probable cause existed."
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (emphasis added).  As I read it, and
considering it in its entirety, the affidavit at issue here
gave the issuing court "substantial basis for ... concluding
that probable cause existed."  As an appellate court, this
Court should defer to an issuing court's "common-sense"
understanding of the wording of the affidavit presented to it.
Alternatively, even if the affidavit in this case did not
provide a reasonable basis for the issuing court to conclude
that it had probable cause to believe that the manufacture and
sale of methamphetamine was ongoing at the time the affidavit
was executed, I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that
the evidence obtained pursuant to the resulting warrant should
have been admissible under the "good-faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule.  Specifically, I cannot conclude that the
affidavit is "so lacking [in] indicia of probable cause as to
render 
official 
belief 
in 
its 
existence 
entirely
unreasonable."  Straughn v. State, 876 So. 2d 492, 500 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2003)(citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
921 (1984)).
1070388
28
Finally, I note that Lewis v. State, Nelms v. State, and
Thomas v. State all were appeals of convictions in which the
question of the adequacy of the affidavit and resulting
warrant was directly at issue.  In the present case, we are
not confronted with the direct question whether the affidavit
and warrant pass constitutional muster; rather, the question
is whether counsel's representation of the defendant was
reasonable.  Effective representation does not entitle a
defendant to error-free representation.  Saffold v. State, 570
So. 2d 727, 731 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).  "In any case
presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry
must 
be 
whether 
counsel's 
assistance 
was 
reasonable
considering all the circumstances."  Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added).  At a bare minimum,
I cannot conclude, in light of what are at least substantial
questions as discussed above, that counsel's representation of
Green fell below constitutional standards because counsel
failed to object to the validity of the warrant in the present
case.  See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("Judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.
...  A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
1070388
For the reasons discussed above, I also am not persuaded
4
that counsel's conduct necessarily resulted in any prejudice
to the defendant so as to meet the second prong of the
Strickland test.
29
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perspective at the time.").4
Bolin, J., concurs.