Case Title: Patrick v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC16-801, SC17-246

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-801 
____________ 
 
ERIC KURT PATRICK, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-246 
____________ 
 
ERIC KURT PATRICK, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[June 14, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Eric Kurt Patrick, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order 
denying his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  Patrick also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
 
 
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have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the postconviction court’s denial of 
Patrick’s postconviction motion and remand for an evidentiary hearing on one 
claim.  We grant Patrick’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, which raises a valid 
claim under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State (Hurst), 
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In 2009, Patrick was convicted of the kidnapping, robbery, and first-degree 
murder of Steven Schumacher.  Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1054 (Fla. 
2012).  On direct appeal, we affirmed his convictions and sentences, including a 
sentence of death for the murder, and summarized the guilt-phase evidence as 
follows: 
Eric Kurt Patrick was recently released from prison and 
homeless when he met Steven Schumacher at Holiday Park during a 
rain shower when both men took shelter under a pavilion.  
Schumacher invited Patrick to lunch, then to stay with him at his 
home until Patrick was back on his feet.  On the night of Sunday, 
September 25, 2005, Patrick beat Schumacher to death.  Patrick left 
Schumacher’s apartment and took Schumacher’s truck and parked it 
at the Tri–Rail station.  Patrick withdrew approximately $900 from 
Schumacher’s bank account using his ATM card in three separate 
transactions.  Patrick was arrested after a separate, unrelated 
encounter with Deputy Kurt Bukata.  Patrick [later] confessed to 
beating Schumacher, stated that he was afraid Schumacher was dead, 
and that he didn’t mean to kill him. 
. . . . 
On the night of the murder, Patrick and Schumacher drank 
beers and went to bed.  Patrick gave Schumacher a massage, then they 
 
 
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both lay naked in bed.  According to Patrick, Schumacher attempted 
anal sex, which Patrick refused.  Patrick stated that Schumacher was 
“riding up on [him] squeezing [him].”  After Patrick told him to stop, 
Schumacher stopped but tried again later.  Patrick then explained that 
he “cut loose on [Schumacher].” 
Patrick admitted and the evidence verified that Patrick beat 
Schumacher in the bedroom, beginning in the bed.  He began hitting 
Schumacher with his fists but also beat him with a wooden box 
because his hands hurt so badly.  Schumacher’s nose was broken and 
his face was cut.  He was hit so hard that his teeth were broken.  
Patrick then tied up Schumacher using a telephone cord at the base of 
the bed, then taped his mouth when Schumacher yelled for help.  
Patrick did not want Schumacher “to go to the law” on him.  Patrick 
put Schumacher in the bathtub on his side where Schumacher was 
later found dead. 
Jenny Scott and Robert Lyon, Schumacher’s friends, usually 
saw him daily.  They last saw Schumacher on [Sunday,] September 
25, 2005 . . . .  Scott did not hear from Schumacher [after that time,] 
and she also noticed his truck was missing.  When Scott went to check 
on Schumacher on Tuesday, he did not answer so she called the 
Sheriff’s Department. 
Deputy James Snell responded to Scott’s call.  They both went 
into the apartment and saw that the bedroom was dark and disarrayed.  
Both Deputy Snell and Scott saw blood stains throughout the room.  
At that point, Scott ran out of the apartment.  Deputy Snell found 
Schumacher’s body in the bathtub.  The body was very bloody and the 
hands and ankles were bound in the back; the head and face were 
taped, with the face resting on the drain.  The pants were pulled down 
although still on the body.  The body was cold and stiff and the blood 
had pooled.  The ankles were bound with torn sheets and a knotted 
lamp cord.  The wrists were bound by a telephone cord and tape.  
There was bruising on an elbow, the chin, and the top of the head.  
The tape on the head went both horizontally and vertically and there 
was a pillow case folded over the mouth under the tape.  The tape 
seemed to be one continuous piece.  Deputy Snell informed Scott that 
Schumacher was dead.  Scott then provided the police with a 
description of Patrick. 
The deputies found no evidence of forced entry into the 
apartment.  Additionally, they discovered that the air conditioning was 
set at sixty degrees so all the windows had condensation on them.  In 
 
 
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the kitchen trash, the deputies found tape matching that used on 
Schumacher’s face.  Schumacher’s wallet was in the living room.  
There were bloody footprints on the tile, a large blood stain on the 
bedroom carpet, and blood spatter on the dresser and wall.  The 
bedroom lamp was cracked and missing its cord.  A cord was in the 
bed under the sheets.  There was blood spatter on the sheets and 
headboard.  Teeth were found in the bedclothes.  A broken box with 
blood on it was under the dresser. 
Deputy Kurt Bukata ran into Patrick at a gas station and 
arrested him on an outstanding warrant.  Patrick had injuries on his 
knuckles and was carrying a duffel bag.  Patrick also had some 
abrasions on his upper body.  Bukata inventoried the duffel bag and 
found blood-stained boots, jeans, briefs, and socks. . . . DNA tests 
identified Schumacher’s blood on Patrick’s jeans. 
 
Id. at 1053-54. 
 
Patrick’s jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of seven to five.  The 
trial court followed the jury’s recommendation, finding seven aggravators1 and 
sixteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.2  On appeal, this Court struck one 
                                          
 
 
1.  The aggravators the trial court found were the following: (1) Patrick was 
under a sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (2) Patrick had a prior violent 
felony (great weight); (3) the murder occurred in the course of a felony, 
specifically robbery or kidnapping (great weight); (4) pecuniary gain (merged with 
the in the course of a felony aggravator); (5) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (great weight); (6) the murder was cold, calculated, and 
premeditated (great weight); and (7) the victim was particularly vulnerable due to 
advanced age (seventy-two) or disability (great weight). 
 
2.  The mitigating circumstances found were the following: (1) Patrick’s 
father was physically and mentally abusive (little weight); (2) Patrick had a tragic 
youth (little weight); (3) his childhood was unstable (little weight); (4) there was 
family abuse (some weight); (5) substance abuse from an early age (little weight); 
(6) Patrick suffered from severe drug abuse at the time of the crime (some weight); 
(7) Patrick sought absolution and forgiveness (little weight); (8) Patrick had 
remorse (some weight); (9) he loves his family (little weight); (10) Patrick is close 
 
 
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aggravator (cold, calculated, and premeditated) but affirmed the death sentence, 
finding the consideration of this aggravator harmless error.  Id. at 1055, 1068.  
Patrick’s death sentence became final in 2013.  Patrick v. Florida, 571 U.S. 839 
(2013). 
 
Thereafter, Patrick timely filed his initial motion for postconviction relief 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, followed by a corrected motion, 
raising seven claims with subparts.3  Patrick later sought leave to amend his rule 
                                          
 
to his mother (some weight); (11) his brother attended the trial (little weight); (12) 
Patrick confessed (little weight); (13) he had good conduct throughout the trial 
(little weight); (14) he suffered from emotional stress combined with a history of 
family dysfunction (little weight); (15) he had experienced childhood sexual abuse 
and exploitation (some weight); and (16) he had some mental health history as 
discussed in number 14 (little weight).  Patrick, 104 So. 3d at 1055 n.2. 
 
3.  Patrick raised the following claims in his corrected rule 3.851 motion: (1) 
application of the one-year time limit of rule 3.851 to Patrick’s case violates his 
rights to due process and equal protection; (2) section 27.7081, Florida Statutes 
(2014), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional both 
facially and as applied because public records in the possession of state agencies 
have been withheld; (3) Patrick is being denied various constitutional rights 
because of the rules prohibiting his attorneys from interviewing jurors to determine 
the extent to which constitutional error is present; (4.1) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly challenge Patrick’s waiver of his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the voluntariness of his confession; 
(4.2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a challenge to the shoeprint 
evidence under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); (4.3) the State 
failed to disclose that much of the testimony of Martin Diez was false and coerced; 
(4.4) the cumulative effect of counsel’s ineffective assistance, prosecutorial 
misconduct, and the other errors in this case entitles Patrick to a new trial; (5) trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present available mitigation 
evidence; (6) section 922.105, Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida’s existing 
procedure for lethal injection violate article II, section 3 and article I, sections 9 
 
 
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3.851 motion to add a Hurst v. Florida claim.  The postconviction court accepted 
the amendment and, after an evidentiary hearing on certain claims, denied the 
motion in its entirety.  As to the Hurst v. Florida claim, the postconviction court 
noted that this Court had not yet determined whether the holding in that case would 
have retroactive effect and denied the claim without prejudice to Patrick’s filing a 
future motion on the same grounds once this Court resolved the retroactivity issue 
in then-pending cases. 
 
Patrick appealed the denial of his rule 3.851 motion and filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus with this Court, requesting relief under Hurst v. Florida and 
Hurst.  In his appeal, Patrick argues that the postconviction court erred with respect 
to the following claims: (1) that he is entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. 
Florida; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contest Patrick’s 
Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of his confession; (3) that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise a Frye challenge to shoeprint evidence or otherwise 
contest its credibility; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
and present certain mitigation evidence at Patrick’s penalty phase; and (5) that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately question or challenge two jurors 
                                          
 
and 17 of the Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, both as applied and facially; and (7) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to adequately question or challenge two jurors.  
 
 
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during voir dire.  We find no reversible error in the postconviction court’s 
procedural ruling that Patrick’s Hurst v. Florida claim was premature, as it was 
presented to the postconviction court before this Court decided the retroactivity of 
that decision and Hurst in Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1276 (Fla. 2016).  
However, as explained below, we grant Patrick a new penalty phase under Hurst v. 
Florida and Hurst in accordance with his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
Because Patrick is entitled to a new penalty phase as argued in his petition for writ 
of habeas corpus, the other penalty-phase claim raised before the postconviction 
court is moot and need not be addressed.  We address each of the remaining claims 
in turn. 
II. POSTCONVICTION APPEAL 
Each of the non-Hurst claims at issue on appeal alleges ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  Some of these claims were denied after an evidentiary 
hearing and some summarily.  We review the summarily denied claims de novo, 
accepting their allegations as true to the extent they are not conclusively refuted by 
the record and reversing for an evidentiary hearing if they are facially sufficient to 
show entitlement to relief and raise an issue of fact.  Ault v. State, 213 So. 3d 670, 
677-78 (Fla. 2017).  As to the claims denied after an evidentiary hearing, we “defer 
to the postconviction court’s factual findings as long as they are supported by 
 
 
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competent, substantial evidence in the record” and review the postconviction 
court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Seibert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 78 (Fla. 2010).  
Substantively, each ineffective assistance of counsel claim required Patrick 
to show the following, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984):  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
Abdool v. State, 220 So. 3d 1106, 1111 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Bolin v. State, 41 So. 
3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010)).  These two prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
test present mixed questions of law and fact, Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 
(Fla. 2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698)), but the ultimate conclusions on 
both prongs are matters of law, Peterson v. State, 221 So. 3d 571, 584 (Fla. 2017) 
(quoting Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010)). 
A. Confession 
Patrick argues that the postconviction court erred in denying the claim that 
his attorneys were ineffective for failing to consult a psychopharmacologist or 
addictionologist for the purpose of challenging the validity of his Miranda waiver 
and the voluntariness of his confession that followed.  The motion would have 
been based on the premise that Patrick was experiencing cocaine withdrawal, 
 
 
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which combined with his preexisting conditions of depression and post-traumatic 
stress disorder to render him unable to comprehend his rights sufficiently to waive 
them or have the mental capacity to withstand police coercion and speak 
voluntarily thereafter.  Because counsel cannot be deficient for failing to file a 
meritless motion, see Merck v. State, 124 So. 3d 785, 800 (Fla. 2013), we affirm 
the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.   
The confession at issue was given during a video-recorded custodial 
interrogation after Patrick was read his Miranda rights, said he understood them, 
agreed to waive them, and signed a waiver form.  To establish that the proposed 
motion would have been successful, Patrick presented the postconviction court 
with the video of the interrogation and the testimony of Dr. William Morton, a 
psychopharmacologist.  After considering the video and Dr. Morton’s testimony, 
the postconviction court made the following significant finding:  
While, arguably, an expert could point out the subtleties that would 
show withdrawal, that is exactly what they would have been in this 
case.  In other words, there was no glaring behavior that would have 
led a reasonable judge or jury to believe that [Patrick] was under the 
influence of any drugs or alcohol or manifesting any drug withdrawal 
symptoms. 
 
The court also stated that it noted no signs of impairment and that Patrick’s 
answers to the detective’s questions were relevant and responsive.  Patrick argues 
that the lack of “glaring behavior” does not invalidate his claim but proves the 
need for expert testimony.  Consistent with this position, Dr. Morton testified that 
 
 
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he was able to detect nuances that would not be observed by the average lay 
person.  Even so, the essential point of the postconviction court’s finding—that the 
video belies Patrick’s claim, even after consideration of his expert’s testimony—
remains valid.   
Indeed, while tired and distressed concerning his crimes, Patrick seemed 
intelligent, reflective, and engaged during the interview, even drawing a map for 
the interviewing officer to show where he left the victim’s keys, while providing 
detailed instructions.  Moreover, although Dr. Morton indicated that Patrick would 
have been experiencing a significant level of physical and emotional discomfort 
from drug withdrawal, he did not testify that Patrick was incapable of 
understanding the Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them, and he 
found that Patrick’s withdrawal symptoms were only “mild to moderate.”  Also, 
although Dr. Morton opined that Patrick showed “confusion” and “some episodes 
of slow thinking,” Patrick made direct comments during the interview indicating 
that he understood the likely consequences of his statements.  This evidence 
supports the postconviction court’s findings and leads us to conclude that Patrick 
gave his statements with “full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,” such that his 
Miranda waiver was valid.  Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 575 (Fla. 1999) 
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).  Accordingly, a motion to 
 
 
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suppress challenging the validity of Patrick’s Miranda waiver would have been 
unsuccessful.  Cf. Buzia v. State, 82 So. 3d 784, 793 (Fla. 2011); Orme v. State, 
677 So. 2d 258, 262-63 (Fla. 1996).  
Likewise, Patrick could not have succeeded on a motion to suppress his 
confession due to his experience of withdrawal symptoms during the questioning 
itself, as this component of the motion would have relied on his subjective mental 
state, not any specific examples of external pressure from the police beyond the 
inherent pressure of a custodial interrogation.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 165 (1986) (“[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s 
susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s state of 
mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.”); Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 
454, 458 (Fla. 1984); see also Rigterink v. State, 193 So. 3d 846, 865 (Fla. 2016). 
For these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.  
B. Shoeprint Evidence 
Patrick also argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Frye hearing 
concerning expert testimony that the boots found in his duffel bag matched bloody 
shoeprints at the scene, or to challenge the credibility of that evidence.  This claim 
was based on articles indicating that the FBI has questioned the validity of 
shoeprint identifications.  At trial, Patrick’s counsel advised the court that he did 
 
 
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not raise a Frye challenge to this evidence because, “candidly, there [was] so much 
other evidence” and the defense was not contesting that Patrick was at the murder 
scene.  He also noted that he probably would not cross-examine the State’s expert 
about the new studies because he did not find them “anywhere near important 
enough.”   
At the time of Patrick’s trial, “new or novel scientific evidence” was 
admissible in Florida trials only when it passed the test set forth in Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).4  We have previously rejected a claim 
that shoeprint evidence is “new or novel.”  Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467-68 
(Fla. 2006).  Thus, the postconviction court properly ruled that if a Frye hearing 
had been requested, it would have been denied.  
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the State’s 
expert concerning the validity of shoeprint identification is a separate question.  
This Court has explained that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and 
counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”  
Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 382 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Howell v. State, 877 So. 
                                          
 
 
4.  The Florida Legislature has since amended the Evidence Code to replace 
the Frye test with the test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993).  We have declined to adopt that test to the extent it is procedural.  
In re Amends to the Fla. Evid. Code, 210 So. 3d 1231, 1238-39 (Fla. 2017). 
 
 
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2d 697, 703 (Fla. 2004)).  A decision that lodging a particular challenge to the 
validity of evidence would be a waste of resources in light of counsel’s knowledge 
of corroborating facts can be a reasonable strategic decision.  Id.  Here, the record 
establishes that counsel made a decision not to explore defects in shoeprint 
identification in part because he had chosen as a matter of strategy, and 
consistently with Patrick’s confession and other evidence, to admit Patrick’s 
presence at the scene.  Accordingly, the record establishes that counsel’s decision 
was a reasonable strategic one and, therefore, not deficient.  See id.  Moreover, 
given the concession both in defense argument and in Patrick’s confession that 
Patrick was at the scene, there is no reasonable probability that a successful 
challenge to the validity of shoeprint comparison as a field would have affected the 
outcome of Patrick’s trial.  In other words, our confidence in the outcome is not 
undermined.  Thus, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
C. Jurors 
 
In the last of the appellate issues that we address, Patrick argues that the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying the claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge or adequately question two jurors concerning 
alleged biases.  We address this claim as to only one of the jurors, as the claim 
concerning the other juror relates to the penalty phase, and we have determined 
 
 
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that the penalty-phase claims are moot.5  In pertinent part, Patrick claims that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a juror who was biased against 
him based on his drug use and participation in sexual acts with the male victim.  
We affirm the denial of this claim except as it relates to statements this juror made 
regarding the effect evidence of homosexuality would have on his deliberations.  
For the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing 
on that aspect of the claim.   
 
A valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge a 
juror must demonstrate that “one who was actually biased against the defendant sat 
as a juror,” meaning that the juror had a “bias-in-fact that would prevent service as 
an impartial juror.”  Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 323-24 (Fla. 2007).  The 
evidence of the juror’s actual bias must amount to “something more than mere 
doubt about that juror’s impartiality.”  Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1265.  Otherwise, the 
defendant cannot show prejudice.  Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 324.  Our cases 
                                          
 
 
5.  Assuming arguendo that Patrick’s claim that he was denied a fair trial 
because of the other juror’s views concerning the death penalty extends to how the 
juror’s views would have affected his guilt-phase deliberations, we note that the 
denial of the claim was proper.  Patrick argues that this juror indicated a strong 
predisposition for recommending the death penalty by declaring that he leaned 
toward the death penalty at a level of “eight or nine” on a scale of one to ten.  
However, this juror later said that he was “[r]ight in the middle” concerning the 
death penalty, would “go by the law,” and would have to “hear everything.”  His 
comments do not show actual bias.  Cf. Guardado v. State, 176 So. 3d 886, 899 
(Fla. 2015). 
 
 
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addressing such claims tend to focus on this prong of the Strickland test, as it is 
necessary to establish that the juror was actually biased before proving that counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to challenge that juror due to bias.  See, e.g., Hall 
v. State, 212 So. 3d 1001, 1016 (Fla. 2017); State v. Bright, 200 So. 3d 710, 742 
(Fla. 2016).  Accordingly, our analysis of this issue begins with the prejudice 
prong.   
The juror at issue said that he would give a witness’s testimony less weight 
or credence if the witness was on drugs at the time that he observed the things 
about which he testified.  These comments do not show bias, but rather reflect the 
reality of the effect that drug use can have on a person’s ability to see, understand, 
and remember events.  See Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting Edwards v. State, 548 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1989) (describing the 
circumstances under which evidence of a witness’s drug use is relevant for 
impeachment purposes)).  Therefore, this aspect of the claim was properly denied.   
In contrast, the juror showed actual bias stemming from Patrick’s sexual 
activity.  He said that he “would have a bias if [he] knew the perpetrator was 
homosexual.”  When asked if he would still hold the prosecutor to the proper 
burden of proof, he answered, “Put it this way, if I felt the person was a 
homosexual, I personally believe that person is morally depraved enough that he 
 
 
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might lie, might steal, might kill.”  The juror said “yes” when asked if this bias 
might affect his deliberations.   
The State contends that this juror’s bias was not against the defense, as there 
was no evidence that Patrick was homosexual, and instead suggested more bias 
against the victim.  However, the evidence and arguments at trial indicated that, 
while Patrick denied being homosexual, he willingly participated in sexual and 
intimate acts with the male victim before the encounter in question and that he had 
engaged in similar activity in the past with other men.6  Applying this evidence to 
the juror’s voir dire answers establishes that, by the juror’s own acknowledgement 
on the record, he was predisposed to believe that Patrick is morally depraved 
enough to have committed the charged offenses.  Although Patrick does not 
identify as homosexual and indicated in his confession that his sexual activity with 
men was for material support rather than personal fulfillment, these points do not 
eliminate the bias that this juror said he would feel based on the evidence that trial 
counsel and the trial court knew the jury would hear during trial.  Also, the fact 
that the juror’s bias would have extended to the victim does not refute the bias he 
acknowledged or render him impartial. 
                                          
 
 
6.  Patrick’s counsel was aware that this evidence would be presented at 
trial, as it was part of his confession, and Patrick’s counsel acknowledged at a 
sidebar before the voir dire questioning at issue that there would be evidence of 
“[h]omosexual acts.” 
 
 
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Because the juror’s voir dire answers concerning homosexuality meet the 
Carratelli test for prejudice, the validity of the summary denial of this claim 
depends on the performance prong.  Failure to raise a meritorious issue is not 
deficient performance when it results from the exercise of professional judgment 
after considering alternative courses.  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 
(Fla. 2000).  As the State argues, the record in this case suggests possible strategic 
grounds, relating to both phases of the trial, for not striking this juror.  We need not 
detail these grounds but note that when applying Strickland, “[g]enerally, an 
evidentiary hearing is required to conclude that action or inaction was a strategic 
decision.”  Pineda v. State, 805 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).  On this 
record, we can neither ignore the possibility that counsel’s failure to challenge this 
juror was strategic nor conclude that it was.  Therefore, we reverse the 
postconviction court’s denial of this claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
While Patrick’s postconviction motion was pending before the circuit court, 
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, in which it 
held that Florida’s former capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth 
Amendment because it “required the judge to hold a separate hearing and 
determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing 
the death penalty” even though “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a 
 
 
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judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.”  Hurst v. Florida, 
136 S. Ct. at 619.  On remand from this decision, we reached the following 
holding: 
[B]efore the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, 
the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the 
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death.  
 
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 57. 
 
We have held that Hurst applies retroactively to “defendants whose 
sentences became final after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Ring[ v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)].”  Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1276.  Because 
Patrick’s death sentence became final in 2013, Hurst applies retroactively to him.  
See id.  And because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to 
five, Patrick’s death sentence violates Hurst.  See Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 3d 568, 
570 (Fla. 2017).   
Accordingly, we must consider whether the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction.   
 
 
- 19 - 
 
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 
1986)).  While at least three of the aggravators in this case are such that no 
reasonable juror would have failed to find their existence,7 based on the jury’s 
seven-to-five recommendation for a sentence of death, we cannot determine that 
the jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to impose a 
sentence of death.  Nor can we “determine that the jury unanimously found that the 
aggravators outweighed the mitigation.”  Kopsho, 209 So. 3d at 570.  “We can 
only determine that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.”  
Id.  Therefore, because we cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that 
the error contributed to the sentence, the Hurst error in Patrick’s sentencing was 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cf. id.   
 
Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted.  We 
vacate the death sentence and remand to the circuit court for a new penalty phase.  
See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 69. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief 
except as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning juror bias on the 
                                          
 
 
7.  Specifically, no reasonable juror would have failed to find that Patrick 
was under a sentence of imprisonment, that he had a prior violent felony, or, in 
light of the guilt-phase verdict, that the murder occurred in the course of a felony. 
 
 
- 20 - 
basis of homosexuality, and we grant Patrick’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the postconviction claim concerning juror 
bias and remand for an evidentiary hearing.  We also vacate Patrick’s death 
sentence and instruct the circuit court to hold a new penalty phase in the event that 
Patrick’s conviction for first-degree murder is confirmed after the rule 3.851 
motion at issue in this appeal is finally resolved at both the circuit court level and 
this level. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
          I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm in part and reverse in part the 
postconviction court’s denial of Patrick’s postconviction motion and to remand for 
an evidentiary hearing on one claim.  I dissent as to its grant of Patrick’s petition 
for writ of habeas corpus and vacating of the death sentence pursuant to Hurst.  See 
Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1285 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., dissenting on 
retroactivity of Hurst).  I would also affirm the denial of Patrick’s other penalty 
phase claims. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Ilona M. Holmes, Judge - Case No. 062005CF016477A88810 
And An Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Suzanne Myers Keffer, 
Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Lisa-Marie Lerner and 
Ilana Mitzner, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent