Case Title: Ex Parte Mt. Zion Water Authority

Citation: 599 So. 2d 1113

Docket Number: 2910392

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1992-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
599 So. 2d 1113 (1992)
Ex parte MT. ZION WATER AUTHORITY, et al.
(Re Ex parte STATE of Alabama ex rel. Jimmy EVANS, Attorney General of Alabama, and the Department of Environmental Management.
(Re STATE of Alabama, et al. v. MT. ZION WATER AUTHORITY)).
1911240.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 27, 1992.
*1114 William D. Scruggs and J. David Dodd of Scruggs, Jordan & Dodd, P.A., Fort Payne, for petitioners.
Thomas L. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
MADDOX, Justice.
The Mt. Zion Water Authority petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Court of Civil Appeals ordering that court to set aside a writ of mandamus it has entered directed to Circuit Judge Randall Cole of the Cherokee Circuit Court.
The primary issue presented by this expedited petition is whether a circuit court can permit a public water authority to continue to operate, even though the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") has determined, and proved to the court, that the water it supplies fails to comply with environmental laws and regulations.
Stated differently, the issue is whether the circuit court, after having found that ADEM had sustained its burden of proof showing that it was entitled to an injunction against a local water authority, could suspend the effect of that injunction for a period of 60 days to 6 months.
In addition to addressing the central issue, we also address other contentions that the petitioner raises, viz.: 1) that the Court of Civil Appeals had no appellate jurisdiction in this case, 2) that ADEM was not entitled to a writ of mandamus from the Court of Civil Appeals because it failed to show that it was clearly entitled to the relief it sought, and 3) that the Court of Civil Appeals granted the writ of mandamus without providing the Water Authority notice and the opportunity to be heard required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically Rule 21, Ala.R.App.P.
In issuing its writ of mandamus, the Court of Civil Appeals did not issue an opinion. There is currently pending in the Court of Civil Appeals an appeal (docket number 2910392) arising out of the same proceeding in the circuit court.
The Mount Zion Water Authority ("the Water Authority") was formed some 10 to 12 years ago by the residents of the Mount Zion community in Cherokee County, Alabama, to build a water system to supply drinking water to community homes and *1115 businesses. The Water Authority installed water lines and pumps, erected a storage tank, and tapped into the Mount Zion spring, the only local, natural aquifer. The Authority now supplies drinking water to approximately 89 families in the community.
In the fall of 1991, water samples taken from the system operated by the Water Authority showed violations of the State's Primary Water Standards for turbidity and microbiological maximum contaminant level ("MCL").[1] Specifically, fecal coliform bacteria and regular coliform bacteria (E. coli) were detected in the samples taken. Rather than immediately suspending or revoking the Water Authority's permit, ADEM issued water supply permit number 91-649 on September 30, 1991. That permit contained the following special conditions:
The Water Authority's monthly turbidity reports for January through March 1992 showed continuing violations of ADEM's turbidity requirements, as those requirements were set forth in ADEM Admin.Code R. 335-7-2-.05(1)(a) (1990). Laboratory bacteriological testing of water samples taken for the months of September 1991 through March 1992 revealed the continued presence of regular and fecal coliform in violation of ADEM's microbiological MCL.
On February 14, 1992, ADEM issued administrative order number 92-46-DW, which suspended the Water Authority's water supply permit and prohibited the Authority from supplying water for public consumption until its permit was reinstated. The Water Authority timely filed an appeal of ADEM's administrative order with the Environmental Management Commission ("the EMC"), and requested a stay of ADEM's order pending that appeal.[2]
On April 2, 1992, ADEM, by and through Attorney General Jimmy Evans, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cherokee County and applied for an injunction to restrain the Water Authority from further operation. Judge Cole held a hearing on the application for the injunction and afterwards made written findings of fact; he granted ADEM's request for an injunction, but stayed the effect of the injunction for 60 days to 6 months. Judge Cole's order reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
ADEM challenged Judge Cole's order staying the effect of the injunction by filing in the Court of Civil Appeals a petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Cole to vacate his stay of the injunction and to make the injunction effective immediately. The Court of Civil Appeals issued the writ, without giving the Water Authority an opportunity to respond, or to file briefs. On May 8, 1992, Judge Cole vacated *1117 his stay of the injunction as ordered by the Court of Civil Appeals.
On that same day, the Water Authority filed in this Court its petition for a writ of mandamus and a request for a stay of the Court of Civil Appeals' writ. This Court issued an order staying the Court of Civil Appeals' writ of mandamus and expedited the briefing schedule in regard to the petition filed here.
The Water Authority makes three arguments as to why the writ of mandamus should issue to the Court of Civil Appeals directing it to vacate its writ of mandamus and ordering it to reinstate the trial court's original order. Initially, the Water Authority argues that the trial court had the power to grant ADEM's requested injunction and then to stay the effect of that injunction. ADEM, on the other hand, argues that the trial court, having found that it was entitled to an injunction, was without power to apply equitable principles and stay the effect of that injunction. ADEM claims that "[Judge Cole's] substitution of [his] judgment for that of [ADEM] is contrary to established principles of administrative law and practice."
ADEM strongly urges this Court to adopt, in regard to injunctions sought by a government agency seeking to enforce public health legislation, a legal standard different from that applied in cases between private litigants. ADEM argues that in cases involving the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, especially those affecting the public health, if it sustains its burden of proving a violation of the laws and regulations it administers, as the trial court found it did in this case, then a trial court is without authority to stay or modify ADEM's administrative order. In support of its legal position, ADEM urges us to adopt an approach similar to that followed in other jurisdictions, as set out in United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-Op, 833 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.1987). In its brief, ADEM argues as follows:
We cannot agree with ADEM that a trial court, when presented with a request by ADEM for a restraining order or injunction under the provisions of Ala.Code 1976, § 22-23-36,[3] is without authority to apply equitable principles in granting the relief requested. Although we recognize the principle of law that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of an administrative agency empowered to protect the public's health and welfare, we are also of the opinion that courts, in fashioning a remedy in such cases, are authorized to apply traditional equitable principles.
This Court has stated:
Alabama Power Co. v. Drummond, 559 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala.1990) (citations omitted).
Because we determine that Judge Cole was authorized to issue a stay of the injunction and that he has not abused the discretion vested in him, we hold that ADEM was not entitled to the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Civil Appeals.
This Court has often stated that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring a showing that there is: "(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent *1119 to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889 (Ala.1991). Based on the briefs and the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court "violate[d] a principle of equity or misapprehend[ed] a controlling principle of law." Drummond, 559 So. 2d  at 161. Thus, ADEM failed to show a clear legal right to the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Civil Appeals.
We also find that the Court of Civil Appeals failed to follow the provisions of Rule 21, Ala.R.App.P.,[4] in that it issued the writ of mandamus without affording the Water Authority an opportunity to respond and file briefs in support of its position. Although there could be situations when the urgency of the matter would justify an appellate court's not setting a briefing schedule or allowing a response (and ADEM argues that this is such a situation), we cannot accept ADEM's argument that the Water Authority's opportunity to be heard at the trial court level is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 21, Ala. R.App.P. On the other hand, we agree with the Water Authority's argument that the Court of Civil Appeals should have allowed the Water Authority to respond to ADEM's petition for the writ of mandamus. An appellate court, when setting the time for a response, could, of course, in the exercise of its discretion, set such a time as may be required by the gravity of the occasion or the necessities of the moment, and it could, taking into account the same factors, prescribe the method for hearing the response. We find no necessity here, however for dispensing with the ordinary procedure of Rule 21. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Water Authority was entitled to an opportunity to respond to ADEM's petition and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in failing to allow a response.
The Water Authority also argues that the Court of Civil Appeals was without jurisdiction to even consider this matter. We disagree, based on our reading of the apposite statutes and case law.
Ala.Code 1975, § 12-3-10, states:
(Emphasis added.)
Also, § 12-3-11 states, "Each of the courts of appeals shall have and exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance and determination of writs of quo warranto and mandamus in relation to matters in which said court has appellate jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied.) Further, this Court has held that § 12-3-10 "was intended to grant to the Court of Civil Appeals exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals involving the enforcement of, or challenging, the rules, regulations, orders, actions, or decisions of administrative agencies," even when the appeal is, in form, an appeal from a circuit court. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Eagerton, 433 So. 2d 452, 454 (Ala.1983).
Based on the provisions of § 12-3-10 and the holding in Kimberly-Clark, the Court of Civil Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from administrative rulings, other than those of the public service commission, regardless of the form of the appeal, and § 12-3-11 gives the Court of Civil Appeals *1120 jurisdiction over mandamus petitions in relation to cases over which it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, we cannot agree with the Water Authority's contention that, because the action at trial was for an injunction, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals.
In sum, then, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in issuing the writ of mandamus directing Judge Cole to vacate the stay of his injunction against the Water Authority, because we find that Judge Cole did not abuse his discretion in staying the effect of the injunction. In reaching this conclusion, we specifically reject ADEM's argument that injunctions sought by government agencies pursuant to public health statutes should be granted summarily by the circuit courts of this state and that courts are without authority, in fashioning the relief to be granted, to apply equitable principles. Of course, the application of those principles cannot constitute a complete substitution of the court's judgment for that of the administrative agency.
On the procedural issues, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals should have allowed the Water Authority to respond to ADEM's petition, pursuant to Rule 21(b), Ala.R.App.P., but we reject the Water Authority's argument that the Court of Civil Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain ADEM's petition for the writ of mandamus.
Based on the foregoing, we grant the writ of mandamus requested by the Water Authority and hereby order the Court of Civil Appeals to vacate its order directed to the Circuit Court of Cherokee County. The Court of Civil Appeals is further directed to order the circuit court to reinstate its original judgment.
WRIT GRANTED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
[1]  See, ADEM Admin.Code R. 335-7-1-.01(r) (1990) (defining "MCL" as "the maximum permissible level of a contaminant in drinking water"); see also, ADEM Admin.Code R. 335-7-2.05 (stating the turbidity requirement), and ADEM Admin.Code R. 335-7-2-.06 (stating the microbiological MCL requirement).
[2]  From the record before us, it appears that, on April 13, 1992, a hearing officer with the EMC held an administrative hearing on the Water Authority's administrative appeal, and that the EMC issued an order adopting the hearing officer's findings of fact and recommendation to approve ADEM's administrative order 92-46-DW on April 22, 1992.
[3]  Section 22-23-36, Ala.Code 1975, states:

"The board, upon receipt of information that a contaminant which is present in or is likely to enter a public water system may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health, may take the following or other appropriate administrative actions:
"(1) Issue such orders as may be necessary to protect the health of persons who are or may be users of such system, including travelers; and
"(2) Commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a restraining order or permanent injunction as provided in sections 22-23-52 and 22-23-53."
[4]  Rule 21(b) states, "If the court is of the opinion that the writ [of mandamus] should not be granted, it shall deny the petition. Otherwise, it shall order that an answer to the petition be filed by the respondents within the time fixed by the order." (Emphasis supplied.) The clear import of Rule 21(b) is that if a petition for the writ of mandamus is not denied summarily, the court must allow the respondent an opportunity to answer.