Case Title: In re T.K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 60/21

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re: T.K., No. 60, September Term, 2021.  
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE – 
REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER COURTS AND 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 3-819(E).   
 
A juvenile court has discretion to award custody under § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article if the juvenile court, by a preponderance of the evidence:  (a) sustains 
allegations in a CINA petition that are sufficient to support a CINA disposition against one, 
but only one, parent; and (b) finds that the other parent is able and willing to care for the 
child.  
 
 
CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE – BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
STANDARD.   
 
If a juvenile court finds that the prerequisites required to exercise its discretion under 
§ 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article have been met, the best interest 
of the child is the standard that applies to the court’s decision whether and, if so, how to 
exercise that discretion. 
 
 
CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE – EVIDENTIARY BEST INTEREST 
HEARING.   
 
A juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application 
of Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence if, after 
consideration of the evidence already presented or stipulated at an adjudicatory hearing, 
there are factual disputes as to any consideration that is material to (a) whether the parent 
to whom the court is considering awarding custody is able and willing to provide proper 
care for the child, or (b) the juvenile court’s determination of whether it is in the child’s 
best interest to leave the current custody arrangement in place or to award custody (legal, 
physical, or both) to the parent against whom allegations were not sustained. 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Howard County 
Case No. C-13-JV-20-000175 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Argued:  June 2, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 60 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
            ______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
IN RE: T.K. 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________   
  
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Fader, C.J. 
Hotten, J., dissents. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Filed: July 28, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2022-07-28 12:04-04:00
 
Parents have a fundamental right to rear their children without unwarranted 
interference by the State.  That right “occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given 
the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility.”  In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 (1994) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  That interest, however, is 
not absolute, and must be balanced against society’s obligation to protect the welfare of 
children.  See In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 568-69 (2003).   
The General Assembly has adopted a statutory scheme to balance the fundamental 
right of parents to raise their children with the State’s obligation and prerogative to protect 
a child who requires court intervention for protection.  Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
§§ 3-801 – 3-830 (2020 Repl.; 2022 Supp.).  Under that statutory scheme, a child is in need 
of assistance if the child requires court intervention because, as relevant here, (1) the child 
has been abused or neglected and (2) the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable 
or unwilling to properly care for the child.  Id. § 3-801(f)(1), (2).  Unless both of those 
prongs are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, id. § 3-817(c), court intervention is 
unavailable and a court ordinarily must dismiss the child in need of assistance (“CINA”) 
case without further involvement.   
The General Assembly, however, has authorized a limited but important exception 
to that general rule when (1) the allegations of a CINA petition are proven against only one 
of the child’s parents, and (2) another parent is able and willing to provide care for the 
child’s needs.  Id. § 3-819(e).  In that circumstance, ongoing court intervention is still 
unavailable, but the juvenile court, before dismissing the case, is authorized to “award 
2 
 
custody to the other parent.”  Id.  Section 3-819(e) thus permits a juvenile court that is not 
otherwise able to intervene in a family’s affairs to determine the most appropriate custody 
arrangement for the child as between the child’s parents. 
We have not previously had the opportunity to provide guidance concerning the 
mechanics of the application of § 3-819(e) to situations in which a local department of 
social services has limited knowledge about one of a child’s parents until after a CINA 
adjudicatory hearing has concluded.  We now take the opportunity to provide that guidance.  
Specifically, we are called upon to clarify:  (1) when a juvenile court has the discretion to 
make an award of custody under § 3-819(e); (2) what standard applies to the exercise of 
that discretion; and (3) when a juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose 
custody as a result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence 
relevant to the court’s exercise of authority under that provision.  We hold that: 
1. 
A juvenile court has discretion to award custody under § 3-819(e) only 
if the court, by a preponderance of the evidence:  (a) sustains allegations in a 
CINA petition that are sufficient to support a CINA disposition against one, 
but only one, parent; and (b) finds that the other parent is able and willing to 
care for the child;  
2. 
If those prerequisites are established, the best interest of the child is 
the standard that applies to the court’s decision whether and, if so, how to 
exercise that discretion; and 
3. 
A juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a 
result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence if, 
after consideration of the evidence already presented or stipulated at an 
adjudicatory hearing, there are factual disputes as to any consideration that 
is material to (a) whether the parent to whom the court is considering 
awarding custody is able and willing to provide proper care for the child, or 
(b) the juvenile court’s determination of whether it is in the child’s best 
interest to leave the current custody arrangement in place or to award custody 
3 
 
(legal, physical, or both) to the parent against whom allegations were not 
sustained. 
Here, the Circuit Court for Howard County, sitting as a juvenile court, made an 
award of custody under § 3-819(e) to a previously non-custodial father, and the Court of 
Special Appeals affirmed.  However, the record before the juvenile court did not contain 
evidence that the father was able and willing to care for the child, nor was there a stipulation 
to that effect, and the mother was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence to inform 
the court’s best interest analysis.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals and remand to that court with instructions to vacate the juvenile court’s 
order and remand for further proceedings described below. 
BACKGROUND 
The CINA Statutory Scheme 
A child in need of assistance is a child who requires court intervention because: 
(1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental 
disability, or has a mental disorder;[1] and  
(2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give 
proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs.   
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f)(1), (2).  Notably, the definition contains two prongs separated 
by the conjunctive “and,” requiring that both prongs be met before a child can be 
determined to be in need of assistance.  See In re Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 316 n.13 (2005) 
 
1 In certain respects, the statutory scheme applies differently to a child who may be 
determined to be in need of assistance due to a developmental disability or a mental 
disorder than it does when abuse or neglect is at issue.  See, e.g., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
§§ 3-815(f)(2); 3-816.1(b)(3); 3-819(b)(1)(ii), (c)(3), (h), (i), (j), (m); 3-823(h)(2)(vii).  For 
purposes of this appeal, we are concerned with children who may be in need of assistance 
based on prior abuse or neglect and will limit our further discussion to those circumstances. 
4 
 
(explaining that for a test conjunctive in nature, each element must be met for the test to be 
satisfied).  Thus, although a finding of abuse or neglect can inform a court’s decision 
concerning a parent’s ability or willingness to give proper care, the two prongs are distinct, 
and both must be satisfied before a court can determine that a child is in need of assistance. 
Upon receipt of a complaint of possible abuse or neglect, an investigating local 
department of social services may file a CINA petition if it determines that the court has 
jurisdiction2 and that doing so is in the child’s best interest.  Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-809(a).  
A CINA petition must “allege that [the] child is in need of assistance and shall set forth in 
clear and simple language the facts supporting that allegation.”  Id. § 3-811(a)(1). 
A CINA case proceeds in two phases.3  First, the juvenile court holds an 
adjudicatory hearing “to determine whether the allegations in the [CINA] petition, other 
than the allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.”  Id. § 3-801(c).  
The rules of evidence apply at an adjudicatory hearing, and the local department must prove 
its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. § 3-817(b), (c).   
 
2 Section 3-803(a)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides 
juvenile courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over “[p]roceedings arising from a 
petition alleging that a child is [in need of assistance.]”   
3 A CINA proceeding may also involve a request for shelter care, which is “a 
temporary placement of a child outside of the home at any time before disposition.”  Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. § 3-801(bb); see also id. § 3-815 (addressing shelter care proceedings).  
However, “[s]helter care is not a component of every CINA case.  Rather, it involves a 
separate proceeding in which the juvenile court decides whether to authorize interim 
protection for a child who may be at risk in the home while the CINA petition is pending.”  
In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 237 (2020).  There was no request for shelter care in this case. 
5 
 
Second, unless the CINA petition is dismissed, the court must “hold a separate 
disposition hearing . . . to determine whether the child is [in need of assistance].”  Id. 
§ 3-819(a)(1).  At a disposition hearing, the juvenile court has the discretion to decline to 
require the strict application of the rules of evidence.  In re M.H., 252 Md. App. 29, 43 
(2021) (citing Md. Rule 11-115(b)); see also Md. Rule 5-101(c)(5).   
If at a disposition hearing the juvenile court determines that the child is in need of 
assistance, it may take either of two actions:  (1) “Not change the child’s custody status;” 
or (2) “Commit the child on terms the court considers appropriate to the custody of” a 
parent, a relative or other individual, a local department of social services, or the Maryland 
Department of Health.  Id. § 3-819(b)(1)(iii).  On the other hand, if the juvenile court 
determines that the child is not in need of assistance, it must, “except as provided in 
subsection (e) of this section, dismiss the case.”  Id. § 3-819(b)(1)(i).   
Subsection (e) of § 3-819, which is at the center of the present dispute, provides: 
If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a 
child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for 
the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of assistance, 
but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other 
parent.   
That subsection thus provides a juvenile court with express authority to make an award of 
custody as between the child’s parents, if the statutory prerequisites are met, 
notwithstanding that the child (1) cannot be determined to be in need of assistance and 
(2) therefore cannot be subject to ongoing court intervention.  If a juvenile court decides to 
exercise that authority, its custody order “[r]emains in effect” even “[a]fter the court 
terminates jurisdiction[.]”  Id. § 3-804(c)(1).   
6 
 
With that statutory background in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. 
The Department’s Involvement with the K. Family 
This case concerns the custody of T.K., born in late 2015 or 2016.4  The other 
primary parties involved are T.K.’s mother, N.K. (“Mother”); father, T.R. (“Father”); and 
older sister, Ta.K.  Ta.K. is not a party to this appeal, and her custody is not in dispute.5 
The Howard County Department of Social Services (the “Department”) became 
involved with the K. family in May 2020 to assist Mother, T.K., and Ta.K. in obtaining 
stable housing.  At the time, Father was living in Georgia and was not involved in T.K.’s 
care.  In October 2020, the Department filed petitions seeking to have both children 
declared in need of assistance, which the Department later amended.  The Department did 
not seek to place T.K. in shelter care.  As a result, T.K. resided with Mother throughout the 
CINA proceedings. 
 
4 T.K.’s year of birth is stated in documents in the record as 2020, 2015, and 2016.  
The first appears to be an obvious error.  As between the other two, the record does not 
resolve which is correct, nor do the parties’ briefs filed in this Court, as Mother’s brief 
states that T.K. was born in 2015 and the Department’s brief, the statement of facts from 
which is adopted in T.K.’s brief, states that he was born in 2016.  Which year is correct is 
immaterial to our analysis.   
5 During T.K. and Ta.K.’s combined adjudicatory hearing, Mother and the 
Department agreed to stipulated facts with respect to Ta.K., who, unlike T.K., has 
developmental and physical disabilities.  Mother and the Department further agreed that at 
disposition, Ta.K. should be determined to be in need of assistance and placed in the 
custody of her maternal grandmother.  
7 
 
Adjudication 
An adjudicatory hearing was held in January 2021 before a magistrate.6  Father, 
whose paternity had not yet been established, attended the hearing but did not participate.  
During the hearing, Mother and the Department agreed to stipulate to some, but not all, of 
the allegations of the amended CINA petition.  As amended through negotiation between 
Mother and the Department,7 the stipulated facts included: 
• T.K. lived with Mother and Ta.K. in Mother’s apartment in 
Elkridge.   
• Mother has Type I diabetes and was hospitalized three times 
since the case opened.  When hospitalized, she relies on her 
mother and brother to care for the children.  Mother has a 
medical marijuana card for diabetes-related nausea.  
• Late on June 25, 2020, Mother, who had been drinking, left the 
children at an apartment in the care of an individual who 
Mother knew had also been drinking.  Upon returning to the 
apartment, Mother learned that the individual had hit Ta.K. 
with a belt and a spatula, causing bruises, and had also pulled 
 
6 Section 3-807 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article authorizes the 
appointment of magistrates to conduct both adjudicatory and disposition hearings and to 
“make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations as to an appropriate 
order” in a CINA case.  Id. § 3-807(b)(1), (2).  A magistrate’s proposals and 
recommendations are not final orders but may be adopted by the juvenile court without 
further proceedings unless a party files written exceptions and requests either a de novo or 
an on-the-record hearing by the juvenile court.  Id. § 3-807(c), (d).   
7 The written CINA adjudication order contains some allegations of the amended 
petition that were not included in the stipulation.  However, the order specifies that the 
allegations were “proven by a preponderance of the evidence” only “as amended on the 
record.”  As a result, we consider the allegations contained in that order and in the 
subsequent disposition order to be sustained only to the extent that they were adopted on 
the record in the transcript of the adjudicatory hearing.    
8 
 
out some of Ta.K.’s hair.  Based on that incident, Mother was 
indicated for neglect of both children.8  
• As part of a safety plan, the children were not permitted to be 
at the apartment at which Ta.K. had been hit.  Nonetheless, 
Mother once called the Department to ask if she could go see 
an individual who lived there.  The individual Mother wanted 
to see was not the individual who had previously hit Ta.K.  
• Mother previously had housing until October or November of 
2017, and since November 2020 had rented a three-bedroom 
apartment. 
• A family involvement meeting occurred in September 2020 at 
which other family members decided to work together to create 
a plan to assist Mother.  
• In October 2020, Mother informed the Department that T.K. 
got hold of a stair railing pole and hit Ta.K., cutting her eye. 
Mother iced Ta.K.’s injury but did not take her to a physician.  
 
• The Department referred Mother to therapy, which Mother 
attended at first and then discontinued.  Mother had been 
enrolled in once-a-week individual therapy through Families 
First since November 2020.  
 
The only fact concerning Father addressed in the stipulation—or, indeed, alleged in 
the amended petition—was that he was then living in Stone Mountain, Georgia.  
Following the stipulation, counsel for the Department noted that if the court were to 
find T.K. to be in need of assistance at disposition, Mother and the Department agreed to 
the Department’s dispositional recommendation, which was that custody remain with 
 
8 Neglect is defined as “the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give 
proper care and attention to a child . . . under circumstances that indicate:  (1) That the 
child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or (2) That the 
child has suffered mental injury or been placed at substantial risk of mental injury.”  Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. § 3-801(s).   
9 
 
Mother under an order of protective supervision.  However, counsel also observed that 
Father, if confirmed as T.K.’s biological father, was expected to argue that there should be 
no CINA determination because he was “a fit and proper parent.”  
Following the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court entered an order finding the 
facts as stipulated to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Disposition 
In February 2021, the parties appeared before the magistrate for a scheduled 
disposition hearing.  At the outset, the Department informed the magistrate that it intended 
to dismiss the petition because Father had been confirmed as T.K.’s biological father and 
was “present[ing] himself as a fit and proper parent.”9  Mother objected and sought to 
present evidence that Father was not a fit and proper parent and that it was not in T.K.’s 
best interest to change custody.  Relying primarily on an unreported opinion from the Court 
of Special Appeals,10 Mother argued that the juvenile court was required to conduct a best 
interest analysis before changing custody.  She also proffered that, if permitted to present 
evidence, she would offer testimony to the effect that Father had abandoned T.K. and had 
been abusive to T.K., Mother, and another former partner with whom he shared a child.  
 
9 Mother, who had been hospitalized on an emergency basis, did not appear but was 
represented by counsel.  Mother’s counsel requested a postponement, to which other parties 
objected.  The magistrate denied the postponement on the ground that if Father was willing 
and able to care for T.K., as the Department asserted, there was no need to proceed to 
disposition at all.  
10 Pursuant to Rule 1-104, unreported appellate opinions are neither precedent nor 
persuasive authority and may not be cited in any court of the State except for limited 
reasons, none of which are applicable here.  Md. Rule 1-104(a), (b). 
10 
 
Father, in turn, asserted that he had not abandoned T.K. and stated that he had four 
witnesses who could offer testimony on his behalf.  
The magistrate ultimately decided that the Department had the right to dismiss its 
case and so recommended dismissal on the Department’s motion.  The magistrate also 
recommended an award of full legal and physical custody to Father pursuant to the 
authority granted by § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  Mother 
filed exceptions and requested a de novo hearing before the juvenile court.11  
At the de novo hearing, the Department again stated that it was “seeking to withdraw 
or dismiss” the case.  The Department explained that it believed that result was compelled 
by In re Russell G., 108 Md. App. 366 (1996), in which the Court of Special Appeals held 
that a child cannot be adjudicated in need of assistance if either of the child’s parents is 
able and willing to provide proper care and attention to the child.  Because the Department 
had done its “due diligence,” found Father to be “willing and able to provide proper care 
and attention to [T.K.],” and believed him to be “in fact a fit and proper parent,” the 
Department concluded that T.K. could not be adjudicated in need of assistance and that 
 
11 Mother’s Notice of Exceptions states only that she “files this exception to this 
Honorable Court’s findings as identified in its Report and Recommendations,” without 
identifying any specific challenge.  Section 3-807(c)(1) of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article states that a party who files “exceptions to any or all of the magistrate’s 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations [ ] shall specify those items to which the party 
objects.”  Because no party raised before the juvenile court or in their appellate briefs the 
issue of whether Mother’s exceptions satisfied § 3-807(c), we will not address it.  See Md. 
Rule 8-131(a).   
11 
 
dismissal was therefore required.12  The Department did not request “any specific Court 
disposition as to custody” upon dismissal of its petition.  It did, however, confirm that it 
had intended to request that T.K. be placed with Mother under an order of protective 
supervision if the matter had proceeded to disposition.  
Mother did not object to dismissal of the CINA case but argued that the juvenile 
court should do so without making an award of custody.  If the court would not do that, 
Mother argued that it was required to conduct a best interest analysis, and take evidence to 
inform that analysis, before making an award of custody.  Mother emphasized that 
awarding custody to Father would remove T.K. from the only parent he had ever really 
known, uproot him from his family, and move him to another state.  
Father argued that the petition should be dismissed and that the court should award 
him custody.  He contended that it would not make sense and would not be in T.K.’s best 
interest to leave custody with a parent who had neglected T.K. when there was “another 
biological parent -- who also has a Constitutional right to raise that child -- [and who] is 
ready, willing, and available.”  
Although the juvenile court did not formally invite proffers of evidence from the 
parties, counsel for Father, Mother, and the Department each made partial, informal 
proffers during the hearing.  Father’s counsel proffered that Father was present during the 
first years of T.K.’s life, before Mother prevented his further involvement with the child, 
 
12 The Department, citing In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 43 (2009), recognized that 
it would not be permitted to unilaterally dismiss its petition over T.K.’s objection, but 
observed that T.K. did not object to dismissal.  
12 
 
and that Father would ensure that Mother would have access to T.K. if the child were to be 
placed in his custody.  Father also had concerns about Mother’s ability to care for T.K. due 
to her hospitalizations and medical history.  
Mother’s counsel proffered that she was prepared to present a witness who shared a 
child with Father and who would testify:  (1) to Father’s “abusive manner towards her and 
towards the child”; and (2) that Father “plays no role in that child’s life.”13  Counsel also 
proffered that Mother would testify that Father had been abusive toward herself and toward 
T.K., including an incident in which Father had “attempt[ed] to teach [T.K.] about fire by 
lighting a flame to his arm,” which Father justified by saying “how else do you teach a 
child about fire?”14  
The Department’s counsel proffered that it had cleared Father and all adult members 
of his household, verified Father’s employment, conducted a video tour of his home, and 
that Father had acted appropriately in his interactions with the Department.  
After wrestling with whether to take testimony or remand to the magistrate for that 
purpose, the juvenile court decided to close the CINA case and award custody to Father 
without taking testimony.  Acknowledging that its award of custody to Father was 
 
13 The Department suggests that the proffers that the witness would testify both that 
Father had been abusive and that he was uninvolved are “internally contradictory.”  
Although there is a possible interpretation of the proffers that is inconsistent, another 
interpretation is that the witness would have testified that Father was abusive when he was 
involved with her and her son and that he subsequently abandoned them. 
14 Mother interprets this proffer as suggesting that Father lit a flame to T.K.’s arm.  
T.K.’s attorney interprets it as indicating that Father lit a flame to Father’s own arm.  In 
context, the former seems much more likely, but the record does not provide a definitive 
answer because the testimony was not permitted.  
13 
 
discretionary, the court stated that, based on the arguments and its review of the petition, it 
would “find that – even without hearing any other proffer or any other testimony – that it 
is in the child’s best interest to be placed with the parent that is willing and able[.]”  The 
court subsequently issued a written order granting Father “sole legal and physical custody 
of [T.K.], with reasonable and liberal visitation with the mother . . . at times, and as can be 
arranged by the parties.”  
Mother noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed.  In 
re T.K., No. 292, Sept. Term, 2021, 2021 WL 5200223 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 9, 2021).  
Although the intermediate appellate court agreed with Mother that a juvenile court’s 
transfer of custody under § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is 
discretionary and “that a child’s best interest is always paramount,” id. at *5, the court held 
that Mother was not entitled to a separate evidentiary hearing to present evidence of 
Father’s ability to provide care for T.K., id. at *5-6.  The court considered Mother’s proffers 
insufficient to create a dispute of material fact and concluded that the juvenile court had 
“ample evidence” to find that Father was able and willing to care for T.K. and that an award 
of custody to Father was in T.K.’s best interest.  Id. at *6.   
Mother filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.  In re T.K., 477 
Md. 381 (2022). 
DISCUSSION 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews CINA determinations utilizing three interrelated standards of 
review.  In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 
14 
 
124-26 (1977)).  Factual findings by the juvenile court are reviewed for clear error.  In re 
Yve S., 373 Md. at 586.  Matters of law are reviewed without deference to the juvenile 
court.  Id.  Ultimate conclusions of law and fact, when based upon “sound legal principles” 
and “factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,” are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Id.   
We granted Mother’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider (1) what standard 
applies to a juvenile court’s discretion to make an award of custody under § 3-819(e), and 
(2) when a juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an 
application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence.15  We address those issues, 
respectively, in Parts II and III below.  As a predicate to addressing those issues, we must 
first clarify when a juvenile court has discretion to make an award of custody under 
§ 3-819(e), which is the question to which we turn in Part I.   
 
15 In her brief, Mother raises two additional, related questions.  First, she asks 
whether our recent opinion in In re R.S., 470 Md. 380 (2020), compels a juvenile court to 
award full custody to a non-custodial parent if the court sustains petition allegations against 
only one parent.  Mother argues that it does not, and neither the Department nor T.K. take 
a contrary position.  Instead, they acknowledge that the decision whether to award custody 
pursuant to § 3-819(e) is discretionary.  Father, on the other hand, argues that the “non-
offending [parent] is entitled to custody of the child” in the absence of a finding that the 
other parent is unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care.  For reasons explained at 
length below in addressing the other issues Mother raises, § 3-819(e) does not compel a 
juvenile court to award custody merely because the statutory prerequisites are satisfied.  To 
the contrary, § 3-819(e) provides a juvenile court with discretion to award custody, which 
must be exercised in accord with the best interest of the child.  R.S. is not to the contrary. 
Second, Mother asks whether the evidence before the juvenile court was sufficient 
to sustain the court’s award of custody.  Because we conclude that the juvenile court erred 
in declining to hear additional evidence, we will not separately address that question. 
15 
 
I. 
Parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their children as they choose, 
free from excessive intrusion by the State, a liberty interest long recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 
(1981); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  “Maryland has consistently 
echoed the Supreme Court, declaring a parent’s liberty interest in raising a child a 
fundamental one that cannot be taken away unless clearly justified.”  In re Yve S., 373 Md. 
at 566.  A CINA proceeding provides a mechanism to determine whether government 
intrusion in a parent’s relationship with a child is clearly justified.  “[A]dhering to statutory 
requirements, both procedural and substantive, is critical when the safety of the child and 
the fundamental rights of parents are at issue.”  In re M.H., 252 Md. App. 29, 44 (2021).   
By its express terms, § 3-819(e) includes two prerequisites to a juvenile court’s 
discretionary authority to “award custody to the other parent.”  First, “the allegations in the 
petition [must be] sustained against only one parent of a child[.]”  Id.  Second, there must 
be “another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child.”  Id.  If both 
prerequisites are met, the juvenile court:  (1) may not adjudicate the child in need of 
assistance; and (2) must dismiss the case; but (3) before doing so, “may award custody to 
the other parent.”  Id.  In this Part, we will explore the two prerequisites to the juvenile 
court’s authority to exercise discretion under § 3-819(e). 
16 
 
A. 
The first prerequisite to a court’s authority to award custody pursuant to § 3-819(e) 
is that the court must have sustained the allegations in the petition against only one parent.  
That, however, begs the questions of which “allegations in the petition” must be sustained 
and what it means to sustain them “against” a parent.  Answering those questions requires 
resort to our standard rules of statutory interpretation.  “As in any question of statutory 
interpretation, the goal is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature.”  In re 
O.P., 470 Md. 225, 255 (2020).  In doing so, we begin “with the text of the particular 
provision within the context of the statutory scheme of which it is part.”  Id.  Review of the 
legislative history, as well as prior caselaw concerning the provision or similar provisions, 
may provide guidance and “help confirm conclusions drawn from the text or resolve its 
ambiguities.”  Id.  “Finally, consideration of the consequences of alternative interpretations 
of the statute grounds the analysis.”  Id.  
The plain text of § 3-819(e) does not identify which “allegations in the petition” 
must be sustained or what it means to say they are sustained “against” just one parent.  
Here, the single allegation made in the amended petition as to Father—that he lived in 
Stone Mountain, Georgia—was sustained.  By contrast, only some of the allegations in the 
amended petition against Mother were sustained, as a result of the parties’ negotiated 
stipulation.  How are we to measure whether enough of “the allegations in the petition” 
were sustained “against” either parent for purposes of invoking § 3-819(e)? 
To obtain a more fulsome understanding of the legislative intent, we consider the 
role of the CINA petition in the broader statutory scheme.  See State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 
17 
 
266 (2017) (“We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine 
strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.”).  
Pursuant to § 3-811(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a CINA petition 
must “allege that a child is in need of assistance and shall set forth in clear and simple 
language the facts supporting that allegation.”  Rule 11-205(e) includes a substantially 
similar requirement and further requires that a CINA petition include specified information 
about the petitioner (here, the Department), the child, and the child’s parents, guardians, or 
custodians; the basis for the court’s jurisdiction; the names and addresses of known 
witnesses; and whether the child is in shelter care. 
A CINA petition is thus required to include basic factual allegations to support a 
petitioner’s claim that the child is in need of assistance.  Because a child can be adjudicated 
in need of assistance only if (1) the child has been abused or neglected,16 and (2) “[t]he 
child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care” to the 
child, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f), it necessarily follows that a CINA petition must support 
both prongs of the definition, see In re M.H., 252 Md. App. at 42 (observing that “[t]he 
facts in the petition must support an allegation that the child” meets both prongs of the 
CINA definition).  Although the same factual allegations may support both prongs, see In 
re Adriana T., 208 Md. App. 545, 570 (2012) (“It has long been established that a parent’s 
past conduct is relevant to a consideration of the parent’s future conduct.”), the prongs are 
 
16 As reflected in footnote 1, the first requirement can also be satisfied if the child 
has a developmental disability or a mental disorder.  Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f).  Because 
provisions related to those bases for a CINA adjudication are not at issue in this case, we 
do not discuss them here. 
18 
 
analytically distinct and must both be addressed.  A CINA petition, therefore, must allege 
facts that, if sustained, would be sufficient to support a determination that both prongs of 
the CINA definition—past abuse or neglect and a present inability or unwillingness to 
provide proper care—are satisfied.17   
The allegations in a CINA petition are then tested at the adjudicatory hearing, the 
purpose of which is “to determine whether the allegations in the petition, other than the 
allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.”  Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
§ 3-801(c).  Thus, the first prerequisite to the exercise of discretion under § 3-819(e) 
requires that, following the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court will have sustained 
allegations in the petition that are sufficient to support determinations that:  (1) the child 
has been abused or neglected; and (2) one of the child’s parents is unable or unwilling to 
provide proper care for the child.   
Our interpretation is consistent with the broad purpose of the CINA statute, which 
“is to ensure that juvenile courts (and local departments of social services) exercise 
authority to protect and advance a child’s best interests when court intervention is 
required,” In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 33 (2009), as well as with the State’s “parens 
patriae ‘interest in caring for those, such as minors, who cannot care for themselves,’” id. 
(quoting In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705-06 (2001)), because it provides an avenue for 
 
17 For reasons generally set forth in the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in In re 
E.R., 239 Md. App. 334, 341 (2018), it will often not be possible for a local department to 
set forth specific factual allegations as to the willingness or ability to provide care of a 
parent whose existence the department may not even be aware of, or as to whom the 
department may have only very limited information, at a time when it is necessary to file a 
petition.   
19 
 
court action to protect a child who is at risk in the care of one parent, even though the child 
does not fully meet the definition of being in need of assistance. 
Our interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history of § 3-819(e), which 
was enacted in response to the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in In re Russell G., 
108 Md. App. 366 (1996).  There, the juvenile court had determined that a child was in 
need of assistance based on sustained allegations that (1) the custodial mother had 
repeatedly neglected the child and was unable or unwilling to provide care for the child 
due to her alcoholism, and (2) the non-custodial father was unable or unwilling to provide 
care for the child due to willful ignorance of the mother’s alcoholism and a lack of legal 
custody of the child.  Id. at 370-72.  The intermediate appellate court took no issue with 
the juvenile court’s findings with respect to the mother but concluded that there was no 
evidence to support the sustained allegations with respect to the father.  Id. at 379-80.  As 
a result, the court held that the child could not be adjudicated in need of assistance and 
there was no basis for the court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the child.  Id. at 
380.  Russell G. thus identified a loophole in the CINA statute because the juvenile court, 
lacking any basis to exercise jurisdiction over the child or order a transfer of custody, was 
powerless to protect him even though the child remained at risk in the mother’s care.   
In response to Russell G., the General Assembly enacted what is currently 
§ 3-819(e).18  See 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 415 (S.B. 660).  The provision was thus intended to 
 
18 The provision, which was initially codified as § 3-819(d), was originally proposed 
by the Maryland Judicial Conference.  See Maryland Judicial Conference, The Foster Care 
Court Improvement Project (FCCIP) Implementation Committee, Summary of Senate Bill 
20 
 
respond to a situation in which petition allegations sufficient to support both prongs of a 
CINA disposition are sustained against only one custodial parent. 
B. 
The second prerequisite to a juvenile court’s authority to award custody under 
§ 3-819(e) is that “there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for the 
child.”  Notably, and critically here, there is an important distinction between the absence 
of a finding that both parents are unable or unwilling to provide proper care for purposes 
of the CINA determination—which would be enough to preclude a determination that a 
child is in need of assistance—and the finding required by § 3-819(e).  The distinction 
arises from the differing allocations of the burdens of proof for those determinations. 
With respect to a CINA determination, a local department may fail to carry its 
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one of a child’s parents is unable 
or unwilling to provide proper care for the child in multiple ways, including:  (i) the court 
may not be convinced by the department’s evidence that the parent is unable or unwilling; 
(ii) the court may be convinced that the parent is able and willing by more persuasive 
evidence presented by another party; or (iii) as here, the department may opt not to present 
any evidence on the subject.  In any of those scenarios, the court could not determine the 
child to be in need of assistance, but only in scenario (ii) would there be an affirmative 
finding that one parent is able and willing to provide proper care.   
 
660 and House Bill 754 (Feb. 14, 2001); see also Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, 
Bill Analysis: Senate Bill 660 at 4 (2001). 
21 
 
By contrast, the second prerequisite for the exercise of discretion under § 3-819(e) 
requires a finding that the parent to whom the court is considering awarding custody—the 
“other parent,” in the language of the statute—is available, willing, and able to provide 
proper care.  A finding that the local department failed to carry its burden to prove 
otherwise is, for that purpose, insufficient, because it is the proponent of the transfer of 
custody who bears the burden of proving that the prerequisites are satisfied.  It is, after all, 
the proponent of an award of custody who is seeking not just dismissal of the petition, but 
the juvenile court’s affirmative adjustment of a private custody arrangement.   
In summary, for a juvenile court to be authorized to award custody to a parent 
pursuant to § 3-819(e), the juvenile court must:  (1) have sustained allegations in the CINA 
petition sufficient to find both that the child has been abused or neglected and that one 
parent is unable or unwilling to provide care; and (2) find that the “other parent” is able 
and willing to provide care for the child. 
II. 
If the two prerequisites to the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion under § 3-819(e) 
are satisfied, the court then must decide whether to exercise that discretion.  Although 
Mother identifies the standard applicable to that exercise of discretion as a matter of first 
impression, all parties to this appeal, the juvenile court, and the Court of Special Appeals 
agree that the applicable standard is the best interest of the child.  We agree as well.  
“[T]he child’s best interest has always been the transcendent standard in adoption, 
third-party custody cases, and T[ermination of Parental Rights] proceedings.”  In re 
Adoption of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 112 (2010).  “[O]ur case law has been clear and 
22 
 
consistent, that, even in contested adoption and TPR cases . . ., the best interest of the child 
remains the ultimate governing standard.”  In re Adoption of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 67-68 
(2013) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 496 (2007)); 
In re Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. at 94 (“[T]he paramount consideration identified in the [TPR] 
statute . . . is the ‘best interests of the child[.]’”).  Similarly, “[t]he broad purpose of the 
CINA statute is to ensure that ‘juvenile courts (and local departments of social services) 
exercise authority to protect and advance a child’s best interests when court intervention is 
required.’”  In re M.H., 252 Md. App. at 41-42 (citing In re Najasha B., 409 Md. at 33); 
see In re Ashley S., 431 Md. 678, 715 (2013) (“[T]he overarching consideration in 
approving a permanency plan is the best interests of the child[.]”).  “The courts have said 
time and again that the best interest standard is dispositive in custody awards.”  In re Yve 
S., 373 Md. at 570; see also In re Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 494 (“In [the custody] setting, 
the governing standard, here and throughout the country, is and long has been the child’s 
best interest.”).   
So too here, the best interest of the child standard is applicable to the juvenile court’s 
exercise of discretion under § 3-819(e).  Thus, a juvenile court should exercise its discretion 
to award custody of a child to the parent who it finds available, willing, and able to provide 
care only if it determines that doing so is in the best interest of the child.  
III. 
The final legal question raised by Mother’s appeal is when is a parent, whose 
custody is in jeopardy due to a request that a juvenile court award custody to the “other 
parent” pursuant to § 3-819(e), entitled to a hearing at which that parent can present 
23 
 
evidence.  Before the juvenile court, the Department took the position that because it (the 
Department) sought to dismiss its CINA petition based on its conclusion that Father was 
able and willing to provide proper care for T.K., the court had no choice but to dismiss the 
case promptly.  As a result, the Department reasoned, any custody determination had to be 
made without any further evidentiary proceedings.  That position was based on the 
Department’s interpretation of the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Russell G.  
However, in direct response to Russell G., the General Assembly adopted § 3-819(e), which 
gives courts the authority in certain cases to make an award of custody to the “other parent” 
before giving up jurisdiction over the case.  We see nothing in the statute that would 
preclude a juvenile court from holding a hearing to determine whether and, if so, how to 
exercise that authority.  To the contrary, inherent in the grant of authority under § 3-819(e) 
is the ability to conduct appropriate proceedings to properly exercise that authority. 
On appeal, the Department now agrees that in most cases a juvenile court should 
conduct an evidentiary hearing before making a custody determination pursuant to 
§ 3-819(e).  As a general matter, we agree.  Depending on the case, such a hearing may 
address whether the court has authority to award custody pursuant to § 3-819(e)—in other 
words, whether the statutory prerequisites are satisfied—and, if so, whether and how it 
should exercise that authority.19  Although such a hearing may be unnecessary in some 
 
19 It is of course possible that in a § 3-819(e) hearing, the parent against whom the 
allegations of the petition were sustained might succeed where the local department had 
not, and prove that the “other parent” is, in fact, unable or unwilling to provide care for the 
child, based on evidence that was not presented or that could not have been presented at 
the adjudicatory hearing.  If that is the case, the court may not award custody to the “other 
24 
 
(perhaps many) cases in light of evidence already presented at the adjudicatory hearing or 
by stipulation of the parties, in other cases additional evidence not yet presented may be 
relevant.  That is especially true when, as here, little or no evidence was presented at the 
adjudicatory hearing about a non-custodial parent who subsequently seeks an award of 
custody pursuant to § 3-819(e).   
The Department, Father, and T.K. all take the position that a juvenile court may rely 
on proffers from counsel, if not contradicted, both to establish that the “other parent” is 
able and willing to care for the child and to serve as the basis for a court’s best interest 
determination.  They further contend that proffers made in this case by the Department and 
Father were sufficient for both purposes.  There are two problems with that argument as 
applied to this case.  The first is that proffers are not evidence and, where the matter is 
contested, cannot provide the basis for necessary factual findings.  The second problem, 
which we discuss in Part IV, is that the proffers at issue here were contradicted.   
A proffer, as used here, refers to an offer of the evidence a witness could provide if 
permitted to testify.  Proffer, Black’s Law Dictionary 1463 (11th ed. 2019); see also In re 
M.H., 252 Md. App. at 54.  Proffers are not evidence and “are not a substitute for the 
witnesses’ testimony.”  Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511, 532 (2006).  In a CINA case, absent a 
stipulation as to the relevant facts, a court may not resolve a contested issue of fact in favor 
of a party bearing the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence based solely on 
the proffers of counsel.  See In re M.H., 252 Md. App. at 29, 49, 51-54 (holding that 
 
parent” and, because the petition will not yet have been dismissed, should proceed to 
disposition to determine whether the child is in need of assistance. 
25 
 
findings of fact based solely on proffers of counsel and an unadmitted shelter care report 
were necessarily clearly erroneous because neither of those sources constitutes “evidence 
to substantiate the allegations in the Petition”).  Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals has 
held that even in a shelter care hearing, at which the rules of evidence do not apply, see 
Md. Rule 11-101(b)(3)(A), where there is a factual dispute, “unless the disputed allegation 
is probatively inconsequential to a determination of whether . . . removal from the home is 
necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the child, the court must receive 
testimony as to the material, disputed allegations[.]”  In re Damien F., 182 Md. App. 546, 
584 (2008).   
We hold that when a party asks a juvenile court to make an award of custody under 
§ 3-819(e), if requested by the parent who stands to lose custody, a juvenile court must 
hold an evidentiary hearing if, after consideration of the evidence already presented or 
stipulated at an adjudicatory hearing, there are factual disputes as to any consideration that 
is material to (a) whether the parent to whom the court is considering awarding custody is 
able and willing to provide proper care for the child, or (b) the juvenile court’s 
determination of whether it is in the child’s best interest to leave the current custody 
arrangement in place or to award custody (legal, physical, or both) to the parent against 
whom allegations were not sustained.  However, such a hearing need not look identical to 
a best interest custody hearing of the type that would ordinarily occur in a family law case, 
nor must an overburdened juvenile court hold an evidentiary hearing when all the evidence 
that is relevant and material is already in the record.  The sustained findings that the 
juvenile court must necessarily already have made in a CINA adjudicatory proceeding to 
26 
 
satisfy the first prerequisite to the exercise of discretion under § 3-819(e) will, in many 
cases, likely obviate the need to consider evidence relating to many of the factors that 
would otherwise be relevant to a custody determination.  As a result, although 
consideration of the factors listed in Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. 
Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1977), and Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986), will often be 
helpful to a juvenile court conducting a § 3-819(e) best interest analysis, the juvenile court 
should exercise its discretion in determining which factors and what evidence may be 
relevant to the best interest determination it must make in each individual case. 
IV. 
We now turn to an application of the principles we have set forth to the dispute 
before us.  We discern no error with respect to the standard the juvenile court applied, 
which was the best interest of the child.  However, based on the principles set forth above, 
the juvenile court erred in concluding that a hearing was not required in two respects.  First, 
the record before the juvenile court at the time it awarded custody to Father did not contain 
any evidence to support the court’s finding on the contested issue of Father’s willingness 
and ability to care for T.K.  Although the Department proffered that its “due diligence” 
caused it to conclude that Father was able and willing to provide care for T.K. and that 
Father was a fit and proper parent, neither the Department nor Father sought the admission 
of evidence to that effect.  The juvenile court thus lacked a factual basis for its finding that 
Father was able and willing to provide care for T.K. 
The Department contends that the juvenile court nonetheless did not err in declining 
to hold a hearing because Mother had previously stipulated that Father was able and willing 
27 
 
to provide care.  At the disposition hearing, however, Mother argued repeatedly that the 
court should not award custody to Father without affording her the opportunity to present 
evidence that, among other things, Father was not able and willing to provide care for T.K. 
and that he was not a fit and proper parent.20  The Department’s current argument that 
Mother nonetheless stipulated that Father was able and willing to provide care relies on a 
single passage in the transcript of the argument in which, after being asked Mother’s 
position on whether the Department was permitted to dismiss its petition, Mother’s counsel 
stated:   
I understand that the Department has done their investigation and they 
believe that [Father] is a fit and proper parent in accordance with Russell G. 
That primarily [unintelligible] the basis to support the plea finding against 
Mother and they have a parent who is ready, willing, and able.  That’s 
basically what Russell G. says.  And so those two components were met.   
 
Read in isolation, that passage is at best ambiguous.  In the context of Mother’s other 
arguments during that hearing, however, it is plain that she was not stipulating that Father 
 
20 At oral argument, Mother for the first time argued that she was denied the 
opportunity to present evidence that she was able and willing to provide care for T.K.  
Although she did not make that argument before the juvenile court, Mother insists that her 
intent to present that evidence was implicit based on the witness list she provided before 
the disposition hearing.  However, Mother argued that she should be permitted to present 
evidence of Father’s fitness, not her own.  By failing to present that argument to the juvenile 
court, Mother waived it.  See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not 
decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or 
decided by the trial court[.]”).  We nevertheless observe that unless the nature of the abuse 
or neglect proven by the sustained allegations makes it clear that there are no circumstances 
in which it would be in the best interest of the child to continue in the custody of the parent 
against whom allegations of a CINA petition have been sustained, that parent should 
ordinarily be permitted to present new evidence at a § 3-819(e) hearing that is relevant to 
the court’s best interest analysis, including evidence concerning that parent’s own fitness 
to retain custody. 
28 
 
was able and willing to provide care to T.K.  It is thus notable that at oral argument, the 
Department conceded that if Mother had not stipulated to that finding, the juvenile court 
should have held an evidentiary hearing on the issue.  
Second, even if the juvenile court had properly found that Father was able and 
willing to provide care for T.K., in this case, a hearing was still required to inform the 
court’s best interest analysis in this case.  See Sewell v. State, 239 Md. App. 571, 619 (2018) 
(“Relevance is a question of law, which [the Court] review[s] de novo.”).  When a court 
makes a custody determination, it is called upon to make a prediction about the custody 
arrangement that is in the child’s best interest.  See Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 
499 (1991) (explaining that in rendering a custody determination “[t]he fact finder is called 
upon to evaluate the child’s life chances in each of the homes competing for custody and 
then to predict with whom the child will be better off in the future.” (quoting Sanders, 38 
Md. App. at 419)).  Section 3-819(e) provides the juvenile court with a binary choice:  
(1) close the CINA case without altering the existing custody arrangement; or (2) award 
custody to the parent against whom allegations in the CINA petition that are sufficient to 
support a CINA determination were not sustained.21  Here, as in many CINA cases, the 
 
21 The second option encompasses multiple sub-options, as “custody” is not an all-
or-nothing proposition, with one parent receiving all of it and the other receiving none of 
it.  Custody is comprised of legal custody, which “‘carries with it the right and obligation 
to make long range decisions’ that significantly affect a child’s life,” and physical custody, 
which “‘means the right and obligation to provide a home for the child and to make’ daily 
decisions as necessary while the child is under that parent’s care and control” and includes 
parenting time or visitation.  Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 627 (2016) (quoting Taylor, 306 
Md. at 296).  A juvenile court’s decision to award custody to the “other parent” thus 
necessarily involves determinations with respect to both legal custody (whether sole or 
29 
 
existing custody arrangement was not formalized by an order from any court, so both 
parents had equal legal custodial rights, but Mother had de facto sole legal and physical 
custody of T.K.  In deciding whether to exercise its discretion under § 3-819(e), it was thus 
incumbent on the court to determine whether T.K.’s best interest lay in maintaining the 
current custody arrangement, with either party free to then seek a change to it by filing a 
family law action, or in providing additional custodial rights to Father.   
Here, the juvenile court determined that it did not need to consider any additional 
evidence to reach a determination as to T.K.’s best interest.  In doing so, the court relied 
primarily on its findings that Mother had neglected T.K. and that Father was able and 
willing to provide care.  Although we recognize that there will be cases in which a juvenile 
court’s adjudicatory findings might establish that custody with one parent rather than 
another is in a child’s best interest without the need to consider any additional evidence, 
multiple considerations demonstrate that that is not the case here. 
First, as discussed, the court’s finding that Father was able and willing to provide 
proper care for T.K. was not supported by any stipulation or by any evidence in the record.  
It could not, therefore, provide an evidentiary basis for determining that T.K. would be 
better off in Father’s care than in Mother’s. 
Second, even if Father or the Department had introduced some evidence to support 
their conclusion that Father was a fit parent who was able and willing to provide proper 
care for T.K., Mother proffered that she was prepared to present evidence to the contrary.  
 
joint, with or without tie-breaking provisions) and physical custody (how divided, 
including visitation). 
30 
 
Specifically, Mother proffered that she had witnesses available who would testify that 
Father was abusive to another child of his and to that child’s mother, that he subsequently 
abandoned that other child, and that he had held a flame to T.K.’s arm—at a time when 
T.K. could have been no older than three years old—to teach T.K. about fire.  Although 
T.K.’s counsel interprets Mother’s statements about the last of these allegations differently, 
see footnote 14 above, Mother’s proffered evidence collectively raised at least a material 
dispute concerning Father’s fitness as a parent and whether T.K. would be better off in 
Father’s care than in Mother’s.   
Third, the bare fact that a parent has been indicated for an instance of neglect does 
not, by itself, automatically disqualify that parent from maintaining custody.22  Indeed, 
even after a child has been determined to be in need of assistance, a juvenile court has the 
discretion to “[n]ot change the child’s custody status[.]”  Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
§ 3-819(b)(1)(iii).  We do not discount the possibility that the facts surrounding even a 
single incident of abuse or neglect could, by themselves, be dispositive of a parent’s ability 
to care for a child or fitness for custody.  However, it is apparent that the circumstances 
 
22 Mother contends that the stipulated facts adopted by the juvenile court identify 
only a single incident of neglect, in which she left the children with an individual who had 
been drinking alcohol and who subsequently injured Ta.K.  Father and the Department 
contend that the stipulated facts identify a second instance of neglect, when Mother failed 
to obtain professional medical attention for Ta.K. after T.K. hit her with a stair railing pole 
and “cut her eye.”  However, the stipulation, as negotiated and accepted, does not establish 
either that Ta.K.’s cut required professional medical attention or that the failure to seek 
such attention put Ta.K. at risk.  The stipulation thus does not itself establish neglect 
concerning that incident.  Regardless, our decision that the juvenile court erred in declining 
to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider additional evidence related to the custody 
arrangement that would be in T.K.’s best interest would not change if we considered both 
incidents to demonstrate neglect. 
31 
 
here did not rise to that level.  Indeed, there was no request to place T.K. in shelter care, 
and Mother maintained custody of him throughout the CINA proceedings, apparently 
without incident.  Moreover, the Department planned to recommend that T.K. be placed in 
Mother’s custody under an order of protective supervision if he had been determined to be 
in need of assistance.  In these circumstances, in light of the limited stipulations as to 
Mother’s conduct, the absence of evidence in the record concerning Father, and Mother’s 
proffers regarding evidence she would present, the juvenile court should have held a 
hearing to receive additional evidence to inform its analysis concerning the custody 
arrangement that was in T.K.’s best interest. 
The Department raises two additional arguments why a best interest hearing was not 
required here, even though it now agrees that such a hearing would ordinarily be required 
as part of a court’s exercise of its authority pursuant to § 3-819(e).  First, the Department 
argues that § 9-101(b) of the Family Law Article (2019 Repl.) precluded the juvenile court 
from leaving T.K. in Mother’s custody because “there has been no assertion by Mother that 
despite [her prior] neglect, there is . . . no likelihood of further abuse and neglect.”  Section 
9-101 provides that where a court “has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been 
abused or neglected by a party,” “the court shall deny custody or visitation rights to that 
party” unless it “specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or 
neglect by the party.”  However, although the juvenile court did not explicitly make such 
a finding, it both permitted T.K. to remain in Mother’s custody throughout the CINA 
proceedings and awarded Mother “reasonable and liberal visitation” with T.K. in its 
custody order.  Assuming that § 9-101(b) is applicable to this CINA proceeding, which all 
32 
 
the parties do, neither of those decisions would have been consistent with that provision 
unless the court had at least implicitly found that there was no likelihood of further neglect 
by Mother.23 
Second, the Department argues that the court was not required to hold an evidentiary 
hearing because, in light of the sustained findings with respect to Mother’s neglect of T.K., 
she and Father were not on “equal footing [ ] in terms of safety[.]”  That, however, does 
not differentiate this case from any other in which a juvenile court would be considering 
an award of custody pursuant to § 3-819(e), after finding the prerequisites to the exercise 
of authority under that provision satisfied.  The statute nonetheless provides the court with 
discretion whether to make an award of custody, which must be exercised in the best 
interest of the child after consideration of evidence that is relevant and material to that 
analysis. 
For those reasons, the juvenile court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing 
before awarding Father sole legal and physical custody of T.K.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand to that court with 
instructions to vacate the juvenile court’s order and remand for further proceedings.  
Because it is now impossible to recreate the situation that existed at the time the court made 
its award of custody to Father without risking substantial additional and potentially 
unnecessary upheaval for T.K., pending further proceedings custody should remain with 
Father, with reasonable and liberal visitation for Mother.  In those further proceedings, the 
 
23 We do not suggest that an implicit finding of no likelihood of further neglect is 
sufficient to satisfy § 9-101(b).   
33 
 
court should hold a hearing to receive evidence concerning the custody arrangement that 
is in T.K.’s best interest and then enter an appropriate custody order.24   
CONCLUSION 
We hold:  
• Section 3-819(e) grants the juvenile court discretion to award custody 
only if the court, by a preponderance of the evidence:  (a) sustains 
allegations in a CINA petition that are sufficient to support a CINA 
disposition against one, but only one, parent; and (b) finds that the 
other parent is able and willing to care for the child; 
• If those prerequisites are established, the best interest of the child 
standard applies to the court’s decision whether to exercise its 
discretion to award custody, and if so, how; and  
• A juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody if the 
court’s discretion under § 3-819(e) is exercised an opportunity to 
present evidence if, after consideration of the evidence already 
presented or stipulated at the adjudicatory hearing, there are factual 
disputes as to any consideration that is material to (a) whether the 
“other parent” is able and willing to provide proper care or (b) the 
juvenile court’s determination of whether it is in the child’s best 
interest to leave the current custody arrangement in place or to award 
custody (legal, physical, or both) to the parent against whom 
allegations were not sustained.   
Because the juvenile court did not hold a hearing to allow the parties to present 
evidence concerning whether Father was able and willing to provide proper care for T.K. 
 
24 As discussed above, if the court had held an evidentiary hearing when the issue 
was first raised, it should have first determined whether Father was willing and able to 
provide proper care for T.K.  Only if it had determined that he was should the court have 
proceeded to examine whether it was in T.K.’s best interest to award custody to Father.  
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-819(e).  However, because Father has presumably had custody of 
T.K. for the duration of the proceedings on appeal, Mother’s own circumstances might 
have changed from those on which the court based its adjudicatory findings, and T.K.’s 
best interest is paramount, on remand the juvenile court’s focus should be exclusively on 
identifying T.K.’s best interest based on present circumstances. 
34 
 
and the custody arrangement that was in T.K.’s best interest before awarding sole legal and 
physical custody to Father, the case must be remanded to that court for further proceedings 
as described above.   
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; 
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT 
COURT TO VACATE THE ORDER 
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
HOWARD COUNTY SITTING AS A 
JUVENILE COURT AND REMAND 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS 
OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY 
RESPONDENT HOWARD COUNTY 
DEPARTMENT 
OF 
SOCIAL 
SERVICES. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Howard County 
Case No. C-13-JV-20-000175 
Argued: June 2, 2022 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 60 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
__________________________________ 
 
IN RE: T.K. 
__________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 28, 2022 
 
Respectfully, I dissent.  The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration 
in juvenile proceedings.  We entrust juvenile courts with making this determination 
because they are “in the unique position to marshal the applicable facts, assess the 
situation, and determine the correct means of fulfilling a child’s best interests.”  In re Mark 
M., 365 Md. 687, 707, 782 A.2d 332, 343–44 (2001) (emphasis added).  Juvenile courts 
possess wide discretion in determining the welfare of children and are not bound to any 
particular list of exhaustive factors.  Accordingly, the juvenile court is “not required to 
recite the magic words of a legal test[] . . . as an adherence to form over substance, [which 
would] not cause the Genie to appear[,]” and particular words are “neither required nor 
desired if actual consideration of the necessary legal considerations are apparent in the 
record.”  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Darjal C., 191 Md. App. 505, 532, 992 A.2d 503, 
519 (2010) (quoting S. Easton Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468, 
495, 876 A.2d 58, 74–75 (2005)). 
 
In the case at bar, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court considered the best 
interests of T.K. by awarding custody to the father.  The mother stipulated to allegations 
of neglect, and the Howard County Department of Social Services (“the Department) 
established that the father was willing and able to assume custody of T.K.  Given the unique 
position of the juvenile court to marshal the applicable facts, assess the situation, and 
determine the best interests of T.K., it would be detrimental to the welfare of T.K. to require 
subsequent proceedings to further establish what is already manifest in the record.  I would 
hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody of T.K. to the 
father, and I would affirm the Court of Special Appeals.  
 
2 
 
The best interest of the child was served by awarding custody to the father. 
The purpose of a CINA proceeding is to secure the best interests of the child.  In re 
Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 33, 972 A.2d 845, 852 (2009) (“The broad policy of the CINA 
Subtitle is to ensure that juvenile courts (and local departments of social services) exercise 
authority to protect and advance a child’s best interests when court intervention is 
required.”).  “[T]he child’s welfare is a consideration that is of transcendent importance 
when the child might . . . be in jeopardy.”  Id., 972 A.2d at 852 (citation omitted).   
The CINA statute also obligates the juvenile court to consider the preservation of 
the family unit and the fundamental right of parents to have custody and care of their child 
when conducting a best-interest-of-the-child analysis.  Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) § 3-802(a)(3); In re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 683–84, 874 
A.2d 423, 428 (2005).  In the CINA context, there is a strong presumption that the best 
interest of the child is served by placing the child with a parent.  In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 
572, 819 A.2d 1030, 1043 (2003); In re Billy W., 386 Md. at 685, 874 A.2d at 429 (“[T]he 
General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to ascertain whether a 
child is in need of assistance due to his or her parents’ inability or unwillingness to care for 
him or her.  Pursuant to the statute, when the local department of social services receives 
reports of abuse or neglect, it is required to . . . render appropriate services in the best 
interests of the child, including reunifying the child with a parent . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
The CINA statute at issue, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-819(e), incorporates the strong 
presumption that the best interest of a child is served by placing a child with a parent.  The 
 
3 
 
provision affords juvenile courts the discretion to award custody to one parent when 
allegations of abuse or neglect are sustained against another: 
If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a 
child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care 
for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of 
assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to 
the other parent. 
 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-819(e).  (Emphasis added). 
 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-819(e) permits the juvenile court to promote the best interests 
of the child by transferring custody to another available parent as long as two necessary 
conditions are satisfied.  First, an allegation of abuse or neglect has been sustained against 
one parent.  Second, there must be another parent who has demonstrated the willingness 
and ability to care for the child.   
 
When these two conditions are satisfied, the statute does not obligate the juvenile 
court to award custody.  There may be circumstances in which the juvenile court is not 
satisfied with the apparent fitness of the other parent and concludes that a more in-depth 
best-interest-of-the-child hearing is required.  This was not one of those cases. 
 
The Department investigated and was satisfied by the fitness of the father and his 
capacity to care for T.K.  In light of the challenges posed by the COVID pandemic, the 
Department performed child-protective services clearances of the Father, verified the 
employment of the Father, searched Georgia court databases, and conducted a video tour 
of the Father’s home and T.K.’s room.  The Department presented these findings to the 
juvenile court.  The juvenile court determined, based on the facts presented, that the father 
was able and willing to care for the child.  It would have been unnecessary to conduct a 
 
4 
 
further best-interest-of-the-child analysis when (1) there is a strong presumption that it 
would be in the best interest of T.K. for the father to have custody, (2) there was nothing 
presented to the juvenile court that rebutted this strong presumption or the willingness or 
ability of the father to care for T.K, (3) the fundamental interest of a parent in raising a 
child would be preserved, (4) and T.K. would be transferred from a home where he suffered 
neglect to the home of his father.1   See Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-802(a) (“The purposes of this 
subtitle are . . . [t]o conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child 
from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare[.]”).   
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody to the father. 
 
This Court must review the custody decision of a juvenile court under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review.  In re R.S., 470 Md. 380, 398, 235 A.3d 914, 924 (2020).  
“[W]e recognize that [these q]uestions . . . are much better decided by the [juvenile courts] 
than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such [courts] should only be disturbed where 
it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has 
occurred.”  Id., 235 A.3d at 924 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “A 
reviewing court will not disturb findings that fit squarely within the discretion of the 
[juvenile] court, unless the decision under review is ‘well removed from any center mark 
imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally 
acceptable.’”  Id., 235 A.3d at 924–25 (citations omitted).   
 
1 The juvenile court also found that there was a preexisting relationship between 
T.K. and the father: “I do recognize . . . that the father is not a stranger to this child . . . 
because the father was there for the first couple years of this child’s life.  And this child is 
. . . four years old at this point.  So he’s not a stranger[.]”   
 
5 
 
  
The decision of the juvenile court to award custody did not constitute a serious error 
that warranted intervention from this Court.  By requiring further proceedings, we 
potentially uproot and unsettle T.K. who is already living with the father.  Another 
proceeding will not likely affect the ultimate outcome—the award of custody to the 
father—but cause unnecessary strain to T.K. and expense to all parties involved.  The 
burden of further proceedings undoubtedly factored into the calculus of the juvenile court 
when it awarded custody to the father pursuant to Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-819(e).  The General 
Assembly also undoubtedly weighed these same costs and benefits by enacting a provision 
that gives the juvenile court the discretion to award custody to a willing and able parent 
following a sustained allegation of abuse or neglect against another parent.  
 
I am unpersuaded that the interests of justice would be better served by another 
hearing to permit the mother another opportunity to submit evidence of the father’s alleged 
lack of fitness.  The mother was already given such an opportunity during the adjudicatory 
hearing.  The mother submitted no evidence that would impugn the willingness and ability 
of the father to care for T.K, rather the mother only stipulated to her own record of neglect.   
This Court employs the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review to avoid second-
guessing the juvenile court.  There is nothing in the record that demonstrates the juvenile 
court erred in rendering its decision or suggests the result will be different on remand. 
I would affirm the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the juvenile court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding custody of T.K. to the father.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent.