Case Title: In re Children of Jeremy A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 82

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 82 
Docket: 
And-17-515 
Argued: 
May 16, 2018 
Decided: 
June 26, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF JEREMY A.  
 
 
HJELM, J. 
[¶1]  On the third appeal in this child protection matter, see In re E.A., 
2015 ME 37, 114 A.3d 207 (Evelyn I); In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, 169 A.3d 
914 (Evelyn II), the parents of two children challenge the judgment entered by 
the District Court (Lewiston, Dow, J.) terminating their parental rights and 
denying their motions to reopen the record and for relief from judgment.  We 
affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Much of the procedural history—which has been anything other 
than linear—and the description of the facts in this case are set out in the 
opinions we issued in the first two appeals.  See Evelyn I, 2015 ME 37, ¶¶ 2-6, 
114 A.3d 207; Evelyn II, 2017 ME 182, ¶¶ 1-13, 169 A.3d 914.  Here, to provide 
context to the issues presented, we briefly review some of that material, and we 
describe developments since the most recent appeal.     
 
2 
[¶3]  In 2003, the parents’ 21-month-old son, Nathaniel, died.  The 
mother was convicted of manslaughter for Nathaniel’s death, see State v. Allen, 
2006 ME 20, 892 A.2d 447, and the father was convicted of assaulting him the 
night before he died, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, 892 A.2d 456.  Ten years 
after they were convicted, the mother and father became parents to the twins 
who are the subject of this proceeding.  Less than a week after the children were 
born prematurely and while they were still hospitalized, the Department of 
Health and Human Services sought a preliminary protection order on the basis 
of the parents’ convictions for the crimes they had committed against 
Nathaniel.  The court (Oram, J.) issued the order and gave custody of the 
children to the Department.  Directly following the children’s release from the 
hospital, they were placed in the foster home where they have lived ever since.   
[¶4]  The court held a lengthy jeopardy hearing in the late winter and 
spring of 2014, where the parents offered evidence challenging the cause of 
Nathaniel’s death, “did not accept responsibility for Nathaniel's death, and 
. . . expressed their belief that his death was caused by some other undiagnosed 
medical problem, possibly due to his immunizations or a seizure or metabolic 
disorder.”  Evelyn II, 2017 ME 182, ¶ 6, 169 A.3d 914.  In early June of 2014, the 
court (Beliveau, J.) entered an order finding the children to be in circumstances 
 
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of jeopardy.  Because the court also found aggravating factors based on the 
parents’ convictions for their crimes against Nathaniel, the court ordered the 
Department to cease reunification efforts.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-B)(A), 
(B)(3), (5) and 4041(2)(A-2)(1) (2017).  On the parents’ appeal, we affirmed 
the jeopardy order in March of 2015.  See Evelyn I, 2015 ME 37, ¶¶ 1, 14, 
114 A.3d 207. 
[¶5]  The Department had petitioned for termination of parental rights in 
July of 2014.  After a two-day hearing held in October of 2015, the court (Dow, J.) 
entered a judgment in early 2016 terminating the rights of both parents to the 
children.  The parents filed timely notices of appeal, but the father moved to 
stay the appellate proceedings because he anticipated filing a motion for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  We granted 
the motion to stay, and eventually, in June of 2016, both parents filed a joint 
Rule 60(b) motion, which, as amended five months later,1 alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel for each parent at both the jeopardy and termination 
hearings.   
                                         
1  In an appeal that followed, we held that the court abused its discretion by allowing the 
Rule 60(b) motion to be amended so belatedly because of the importance of “finding permanency for 
the child within a reasonable time.”  In re Evelyn. A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 18, 169 A.3d 914.  As we note 
later in the text, see infra ¶ 9, these delays in the proceedings caused by the parents factored into our 
remand instructions for the court to act with considerable caution if—as they did—the parents 
sought to reopen the record. 
 
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[¶6]  In December of 2016, the court held a hearing on the motion.  During 
the hearing, the parents presented testimony from a forensic pathologist whom 
the court had not allowed to testify at the termination hearing because even 
approximately two months after the expiration of the deadline to exchange 
expert reports, counsel for the mother had not yet produced a report, and the 
court then denied the mother’s late motion for enlargement of time to exchange 
reports.  During the motion hearing, the forensic pathologist questioned the 
determination reached by the physician whose practice focuses on child abuse 
and who had testified at both the manslaughter trial and the jeopardy hearing 
that Nathaniel’s fatal injuries were “inflicted.”  That child abuse specialist also 
testified at the motion hearing and stated that, despite the opinions of the 
parents’ expert, his original opinion remained unchanged and that, in his view, 
the opinion of the parents’ expert was unsupported by the medical evidence 
and the medical community’s understanding of head trauma in children.  
During the hearing, the parents also testified, both still maintaining that the 
mother was not responsible for Nathaniel’s death.   
[¶7]  In February of 2017, the court issued an order granting the 
Rule 60(b) motion based on a conclusion that the parents had been deprived of 
effective representation at the jeopardy hearing because, in the court’s view, 
 
5 
counsel improperly failed to advise the parents to accept an offer that would 
have allowed reunification services to continue.  For that reason, the court 
vacated the termination order, reinstated the jeopardy order, and ordered the 
Department to offer the parents a proposed jeopardy order that would allow 
for reunification services.   
[¶8]  On an appeal taken by the Department, we issued an opinion in 
August of 2017 concluding that the court erred by addressing the claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel at the jeopardy hearing.  See Evelyn II, 2017 ME 182, 
¶¶ 3, 34, 169 A.3d 914.  We therefore vacated the court’s order and remanded 
for the court to reconsider the evidence presented during the termination 
hearing because the court erroneously imposed a burden of proof on the 
parents.  Id.  We also ordered that, if the court again determined that parental 
rights should be terminated, the court would then be required to consider the 
parents’ Rule 60(b) motion but only to the extent that it alleged ineffectiveness 
of counsel at the termination hearing.  Id.  
[¶9]  The parents moved for us to reconsider the scope of the remand 
proceedings.  By order dated September 15, 2017, we denied the motion, 
making clear that when the court readdressed the issue of termination on 
remand, the record would include “any evidence that was appropriately 
 
6 
considered” during the termination hearing but that the parents also would be 
entitled to move to reopen the record if there had been changes in 
circumstances after the original termination hearing.  Importantly for this case, 
we stated that the court “would grant such a motion only if it determines that 
reopening the record is appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account 
that the passage of time resulted largely from the parents’ own motions for 
enlargement of time and their subsequent filing of a late motion to amend their 
Rule 60(b) motion.”  We also stated that the record to be considered by the 
court in adjudicating the termination petition “does not include evidence 
offered in the Rule 60(b) proceeding.”  (Emphasis added.)  This had the direct 
effect of foreclosing the court from considering the testimony of the parents’ 
expert regarding the cause of Nathaniel’s death as part of the termination 
hearing record, leaving it germane only to the claim of ineffectiveness. 
[¶10]  Within several weeks after the case was remanded, the parents 
filed two sequential motions to reopen the record of the termination hearing.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 43(j).  Both motions sought to allow the development of two 
additional areas of evidence: the testimony of their expert witness presented at 
the Rule 60(b) motion hearing and updated evidence about the children’s 
circumstances since the termination hearing held in October 2015.  In the first 
 
7 
motion, the parents recited that they had attached affidavits describing 
updated information relating to the children.  In fact, no such affidavits 
accompanied the motion.  The second motion, which the parents referred to as 
their amended motion, requested that the court accept affidavits in lieu of 
testimony, but the parents again did not submit any affidavits and did not 
suggest what evidence they wanted to present about the children for the court 
to consider.   
[¶11]  A month later, the court issued a consolidated order adjudicating 
all matters pending before it.  First, using the standard prescribed in our 
September 2017 order denying the parents’ motion to reconsider and 
concluding that it was not appropriate to reopen the record, the court denied 
the parents’ motion to reopen the evidence.  
[¶12]  Second, the court terminated the parental rights of the parents.  
The court pointed to, among other things, the convictions for acts of violence 
committed by each parent against Nathaniel—with the mother having been 
convicted for causing his death; each parent’s denial of responsibility for, and 
lack of insight into, the cause of Nathaniel’s death and their deflection of blame 
to an “unfair judicial system”; the absence of any protections that could be 
 
8 
imposed to protect the children; and the best interests of the children, which 
would be promoted by termination.   
[¶13]  Finally, the court denied the parents’ Rule 60(b) motion as it 
related to the termination hearing.  The court found that representation of the 
mother was deficient because her attorney had failed to timely designate the 
forensic pathologist as a witness and provide a report to the Department.  The 
court concluded, however, that although it had now heard “the medical 
testimony the parents had wanted for so long to present,” that testimony was 
not of sufficient merit to demonstrate even that the parents could reasonably 
believe that, as the pathologist opined, there were causes for Nathaniel’s 
injuries and death other than the mother’s criminal agency.  Based on this, the 
court concluded that the ineffectiveness of the counsel’s representation of the 
mother did not result in prejudice.  As to the father, the court found no 
ineffectiveness because his counsel made a reasonable choice to focus on a 
post-jeopardy-hearing assessment of the risk posed by the father to the 
children rather than to relitigate the assault against Nathaniel for which the 
father had been convicted.  Concluding that the termination hearing “produced 
a just result” as to each parent, the court denied their motion for relief from 
judgment.   
 
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[¶14]  The parents timely appealed to us.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶15]  The parents assert that the court erred by denying their motion to 
reopen the record and by denying their Rule 60(b) motion.2  We address these 
challenges in turn.  
A. 
Motion to Reopen the Evidence 
 
[¶16]  “A party who has rested cannot thereafter introduce further 
evidence except in rebuttal unless by leave of court.”  M.R. Civ. P. 43(j).  In the 
context of a proceeding on a petition for termination of parental rights, we have 
held that a court should, but is not required to, reopen the evidence “when there 
is evidence relevant to the issues in the case.”  In re Danielle S., 2004 ME 19, ¶ 2, 
844 A.2d 1148.      
 
[¶17]  Here, the parents moved to reopen the termination record on two 
issues.  First, the parents sought to include the testimony of their expert 
witness, developed during the Rule 60(b) motion hearing, on medical issues 
relating to Nathaniel’s death.  In our September 2017 order denying the 
                                         
2  The parents also challenge the court’s determination that termination of their parental rights is 
in the children’s best interests.  There is competent evidence in the record supporting that conclusion 
by a clear and convincing standard of proof, see In re Children of Amber L., 2018 ME 55, ¶ 4, --- A.3d ---; 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2017), and we do not discuss it further. 
 
10 
parents’ motion for us to reconsider the remand order in Evelyn II, however, we 
explicitly circumscribed the record the court was to reconsider in adjudicating 
the termination petition so as to exclude evidence developed at the motion 
hearing.  This is because the purpose of that portion of the remand was to allow 
the court to reconsider the evidence on termination pursuant to a correct 
evidentiary framework.  See Evelyn II, 2017 ME 182, ¶ 33, 169 A.3d 914.  
Although we ordinarily review a court’s decision on a motion to reopen the 
evidence for an abuse of discretion, see In re Danielle S., 2004 ME 19, ¶ 2, 
844 A.2d 1148, here the court had no discretion and acted properly by denying 
that part of the parents’ motion.3    
 
[¶18]  Second, the parents sought to reopen the record to present 
evidence about developments in the children’s lives after the termination 
hearing, which is evidence that the parents claim is relevant to the issues of 
parental unfitness and the children’s best interests.  During the two years 
following the original termination hearing, the children remained with the 
foster parents who, as the court described them, are “extraordinarily 
                                         
3  In any event, because the court ultimately rejected the opinions of the parents’ expert, it is 
apparent that even if the testimony of the parents’ expert had been included in the termination 
record, that evidence would not have affected the court’s ultimate determination to terminate the 
parents’ parental rights.   
 
11 
experienced” and provide the children with “excellent care,” and to whom the 
children are “very attached.”  The parents had regular contact with the children 
even after the termination order issued in 2015, and therefore were in a 
position to make an offer of proof regarding the prospective evidence about the 
children’s present circumstances.  Nonetheless, they did not make any such 
proffer.4   
 
[¶19]  We recognize that in child protection proceedings, the court is in a 
position to consider ongoing changes in the circumstances of both children and 
parents.  See In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50, ¶ 19, 182 A.3d 1252; In re Paige 
L., 2017 ME 97, ¶ 31, 162 A.3d 217; In re Marcus S., 2007 ME 24, ¶ 10, 916 A.2d 
225; In re Heather G., 2002 ME 151, ¶ 14, 805 A.2d 249; In re Scott S., 2001 ME 
114, ¶ 15, 775 A.2d 1144.  Nonetheless, given the fundamental goal of providing 
children with permanence in their lives, see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4003(4), 4050 (2017); 
see also Evelyn II, 2017 ME 182, ¶ 18, 169 A.3d 914, and the caution that we 
directed the court to exercise if the parents were to move to reopen the 
evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion or violate the parents’ 
constitutional right that protects their relationship with the children when it 
                                         
4  Instead, the parents simply assert in their brief, “an awful lot can change in approximately two 
years.  The [D]istrict [C]ourt erred by not bothering to check if that was the case here.” 
 
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reconsidered the termination petition based on the then-existing record, see In 
re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 30-32, 126 A.3d 718 (explaining, in a child protection 
case, that due process is determined by balancing the parent’s rights with the 
State’s right to provide “stability and permanency” in a child’s life); Pitts v. 
Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶¶ 12, 14, 90 A.3d 1169 (“[T]he State has a compelling 
interest in limiting, restricting, or even terminating a parent's rights when harm 
to the child will result from the absence of such governmental interference.”).    
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  
 
[¶20]  We next turn to the parents’ contentions that the court erred by 
determining that, at the 2015 termination hearing, the mother was not 
prejudiced by her attorney’s ineffective representation and that the father’s 
counsel’s performance was not deficient in the first place.    
 
[¶21]  A parent alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a child 
protection case has the burden to show that “(1) counsel’s performance was 
deficient, i.e., that there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or 
inattention of counsel amounting to performance . . . below what might be 
expected from an ordinary fallible attorney; and (2) the deficient performance 
prejudiced the parent’s interests at stake in the termination proceeding to the 
extent that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”  In re 
 
13 
Alexandria C., 2016 ME 182, ¶ 18, 152 A.3d 617 (quotation marks omitted).  
When considering the issue of prejudice, the court must “determine if there is 
a ‘reasonable probability’ that the ineffectiveness resulted in a different 
outcome—meaning, whether ineffective assistance of counsel rose to the level 
of compromising the reliability of the [judgment] and undermining confidence 
in it.”  Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 25, 125 A.3d 1163.  Because the parents 
had the burden of proof at the motion hearing to prove ineffectiveness, they 
must demonstrate here that the evidence compelled a contrary outcome.  In re 
Alexandria C., 2016 ME 182, ¶ 19, 152 A.3d 617.  While “[w]e review the factual 
findings underlying ineffectiveness claims for clear error,” we review for an 
abuse of discretion the “trial court’s ultimate denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.”  Id.   
 
[¶22]  The mother stridently asserts that the court erred by rejecting the 
testimony of the forensic pathologist who stated that Nathaniel’s death could 
have resulted from several accidental falls, which the mother reported.  This 
assertion, however, fails to account for two aspects of the record.  First, the 
mother was prosecuted for Nathaniel’s death and was convicted of 
manslaughter, see Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶¶ 6-10, 892 A.2d 447, meaning that it is 
established that she caused Nathaniel’s death recklessly or with criminal 
negligence, see 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2017).  That conviction was affirmed 
 
14 
on appeal, see Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 27, 892 A.2d 447, and conclusively 
establishes her personal and criminal responsibility for the child’s death, see In 
re Shulikov, 2000 ME 70, ¶ 12, 749 A.2d 1270 (explaining, in a termination of 
parental rights case, that “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . bar[s] 
relitigation of the facts resolved by the criminal convictions); cf. Evelyn II, 
2017 ME 182, ¶ 34, 169 A.3d 914 (referring to the “undisturbed criminal 
convictions” entered against the parents for the crimes of violence they 
committed against Nathaniel).   
 
[¶23]  Second, at the Rule 60(b) motion hearing, the parents thoroughly 
developed the testimony of their expert in an attempt to demonstrate, at the 
very least, the reasonableness of the parents’ firmly held notion that the mother 
did not bear responsibility for Nathaniel’s death.  In response, the Department 
also presented the testimony of a qualified physician who roundly and 
vigorously disagreed with the parents’ expert both on the particular aspects of 
Nathaniel’s fatal injuries and on her description of the state of medical 
understanding of abusive head trauma cases.  Given this record, basic principles 
of appellate review make it evident that the mother’s contention on appeal is 
without merit.5  See In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 19, 144 A.3d 50; Gordon v. 
                                         
5  Contrary to the parents’ argument, the record does not demonstrate that the court applied an 
incorrect standard in its examination of prejudice.  Although the court made one statement that the 
 
15 
Cheskin, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 12, 82 A.3d 1221 (explaining that factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error and deference is given to the court’s determinations of 
witness credibility).   
 
[¶24]  For his part, the father contends that the court erred by failing to 
find ineffectiveness in two ways.  Neither is persuasive.  First, as the court 
found, the father’s intransigent minimization of his assaultive conduct toward 
Nathaniel made it reasonable for his attorney, at the termination hearing, not 
to relitigate the medical issues but instead to develop evidence demonstrating 
that the father could now safely care for the children.  See, e.g., Pineo v. State, 
2006 ME 119, ¶ 13, 908 A.2d 632 (explaining the deference afforded to 
“strategic and tactical decisions by defense counsel[, which] must be manifestly 
unreasonable” to establish ineffectiveness).  And second, in the context of the 
mother’s ineffectiveness claim, the court rejected the parents’ expert’s analysis.  
From this, it is apparent that, even if the father’s attorney was obligated to 
present the expert’s testimony at the termination hearing in order to argue that 
the father had not failed in his responsibility to protect Nathaniel from the 
                                         
parent’s expert’s testimony would not have “changed the result” of the termination hearing, the court 
correctly described the prejudice standard, which required the parents to prove that any 
ineffectiveness did not produce a just result, and the court ultimately concluded that the termination 
hearing did in fact produce a “just result.”  See In re Alexandria C., 2016 ME 182, ¶ 18, 152 A.3d 617; 
Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 25, 125 A.3d 1163.   
 
16 
mother, that omission was not prejudicial because, as the court concluded, that 
evidence would not have called into question the reliability and justness of the 
judgment terminating parental rights.   
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant father 
 
Heidi M. Pushard, Esq. (orally), Law Office of Heidi M. Pushard, Lewiston, for 
appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2013-73 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY