Case Title: Troila v. Department of Correction

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13264

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13264 
 
MATTHEW TROILA  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION. 
 
 
October 5, 2022. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Civil, Action in nature of mandamus, Moot case. 
 
 
 
Matthew Troila appeals from a judgment of the county court 
denying, without a hearing, his petition for extraordinary 
relief.  In his petition, Troila sought relief in the nature of 
mandamus compelling the Department of Correction (department) to 
prepare a medical parole plan, including an evaluation for 
placement in a particular long-term care facility, in connection 
with his application for medical parole.1  He also requested that 
the single justice report a question to the full court 
concerning the department's obligations in connection with 
medical parole planning.  After Troila filed his petition, the 
Commissioner of Correction denied his request for medical 
parole, and Troila's complaint for judicial review of that 
denial is currently pending in the Superior Court.  We dismiss 
the appeal as moot. 
 
 
"[L]itigation is considered moot when the party who claimed 
to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome."  
 
1 Although Troila was neither challenging any court ruling 
nor seeking an order that the trial court take any action, his 
petition stated that it was filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
That statute is inapplicable, as it "only empowers us to 
exercise superintendence over 'courts of inferior jurisdiction,' 
not executive agencies."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
76819 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 212, 221 n.3 
(2018).  We treat the petition as seeking relief in the nature 
of mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5.  
2 
 
Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 582 (2022), quoting Blake v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976).  "A party 
no longer has a personal stake in a case 'where a court can 
order "no further effective relief."'"  Lynn, supra, quoting 
Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 481 Mass. 810, 
817 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020).  Where Troila's 
petition for medical parole has been denied, the question of 
preparing a medical parole plan for him is moot, as is any legal 
question concerning the department's obligations with regard to 
medical parole planning.  
 
 
If we were to consider the merits, Troila would fare no 
better.  "When a single justice denies relief in the nature of 
mandamus, '[that] determination will rarely be overturned.'" 
Snell v. Office of the Chief Med. Examiner, 482 Mass. 1005, 1005 
(2019), quoting Watson v. McClerkin, 455 Mass. 1002, 1003 
(2009).  "It would be hard to find any principle more fully 
established in our practice than the principle that neither 
mandamus nor certiorari is to be used as a substitute for 
ordinary appellate procedure or used at any time when there is 
another adequate remedy."  D'Errico v. Board of Registration of 
Real Estate Brokers & Salespersons, 490 Mass. 1008, 1008 (2022), 
quoting Matter of Burnham, 484 Mass. 1036, 1036 (2020).  Troila 
has, and is pursuing, the opportunity to challenge the denial of 
medical parole in the ordinary course.  In addition, "mandamus 
relief 'is not appropriate where the acts in question are 
discretionary rather than ministerial.'"  Vinnie v. 
Commonwealth, 475 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2016), quoting Boxford v. 
Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass. 596, 606 (2010).  
Formulating a medical parole plan is not a ministerial task, but 
one requiring the exercise of significant discretion.  For both 
these reasons, the single justice did not err or abuse his 
discretion by denying relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Ruth Greenberg for the petitioner. 
 
Mary Eiro-Bartevyan for the respondent.