Case Title: State v. Quebrado

Citation: 

Docket Number: S070057

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 16	
May 16, 2024	
301
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CARLOS ALBERTO QUEBRADO,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 19CR34736) (CA A174385) (SC S070057)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 19, 2023.
Morgen E. Daniels, Deputy Public Defender, Office of 
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was 
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate 
Section.
Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
JAMES, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part 
and affirmed in part. The case is remanded to the Court of 
Appeals for further consideration.
Flynn, C.J. concurred and filed an opinion.
______________
	
*  Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Ricardo J. Menchaca, 
Judge. 323 Or App 308 (2022) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion).
302	
State v. Quebrado
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
303
	
JAMES, J.
	
This is a case about preservation. The state charged 
defendant as an accomplice to second-degree assault and 
unlawful use of a weapon. The charges arose from defen-
dant’s codefendant firing a shotgun from the passenger win-
dow of the car that defendant was driving, into another car’s 
window, hitting that car’s passenger. Prior to trial, the code-
fendant entered a plea deal with the state in return for her 
testimony against defendant. Everything about the state’s 
conduct of the case, from the pretrial hearings to its witness 
list and voir dire discussions, indicated that it intended to 
call her as a witness. However, when the state rested its case 
on a Thursday afternoon, it had not called her. The state 
had, however, already introduced several of her statements 
through other witnesses during its case-in-chief. When the 
state rested, the trial court immediately concluded the day’s 
proceedings with instructions to counsel that court would 
resume the following Tuesday.
	
In the interim, defense counsel filed a written 
motion for a mistrial, or, alternatively, a motion to strike 
testimony, arguing that the state’s failure to call the code-
fendant as a witness meant that its reliance on her hearsay 
statements violated defendant’s confrontation rights under 
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. The court 
took up that mistrial motion immediately upon resuming 
the proceedings on Tuesday. The state did not argue at that 
time that defendant’s motion was untimely, and the trial 
court engaged with the merits of defendant’s motion, rul-
ing that no confrontation violation had occurred. Defendant 
thereafter was convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed, in a nonprecedential opinion, briefly reasoning 
that defendant’s motion had been untimely and therefore 
not preserved as error on appeal. State v. Quebrado, 323 
Or App 308, 310 (2022) (nonprecedential memorandum opin-
ion). Defendant petitioned for review, which we allowed.
	
The issue before us on review therefore con-
cerns preservation. And while this case involves only one 
motion—a mistrial motion—the preservation analysis of 
mistrial motions requires we address two distinct, but 
interrelated questions of timeliness—the timeliness of the 
304	
State v. Quebrado
objection to the act that allegedly created the basis for the 
mistrial, and the timeliness of the mistrial motion itself. 
First, we consider when a defendant must object to timely 
raise a confrontation challenge under Article I, section 11, 
of the Oregon Constitution—either at the point when state-
ments that a potential witness had made are admitted, or, 
instead, when the state fails to call the potential witness to 
testify. Second, we consider whether defendant’s motion for 
a mistrial, which was not orally raised immediately upon 
the state resting, but instead was filed in written form sev-
eral days later, yet before the next scheduled day of trial, 
was untimely, and therefore unpreserved.
	
As we explain, confrontation under Article I, sec-
tion 11, is more than solely a question of evidence. A poten-
tial Article I, section 11, confrontation violation occurs, not 
simply when hearsay evidence is admitted at trial, but when 
hearsay evidence is admitted and the hearsay declarant 
does not testify at trial and the state fails to show that it was 
unable to produce the declarant after exhausting all reason-
able means of doing so. Because not one, but two events need 
to occur for an Article I, section 11, confrontation violation, 
and because those two events may occur at different points 
in a trial, the appropriate time to challenge the admission 
of hearsay evidence on confrontation grounds may likewise 
vary. Thus, in determining whether a defendant has pre-
served a confrontation objection under Article I, section 11, 
courts must recognize that preservation “is a doctrine rooted 
in practicality, not technicality.” State v. Skotland, ___ Or 
___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (May 16, 2024) (slip op at 7:14-15).
	
Here, in the circumstances of defendant’s trial, it 
was understandable for defendant to forego objecting to the 
hearsay testimony when it was offered, because, in light of 
how the case had been tried, it was reasonable to expect 
that the declarant would testify herself later. The practical 
purposes of preservation were served by an objection occur-
ring at the close of the state’s case-in-chief. Here, defendant 
did not make that objection immediately when the state 
rested, which could well have presented a problem for him. 
However, because no significant event occurred in the trial 
between the time the state rested and the trial resumed on 
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
305
the following Tuesday, and, even more importantly, because 
neither the state nor the trial court expressed any concerns 
about timeliness or prejudice, we conclude that defendant’s 
mistrial motion based on confrontation grounds was timely, 
and properly preserved the issue. Accordingly, the decision 
of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in 
part, and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for 
further consideration.1
BACKGROUND
	
The relevant facts are undisputed. Defendant and 
his girlfriend, Sisco, were at a bar and began arguing with 
another couple, the Dixons. The argument escalated, and bar 
staff directed all of them to leave the bar, with their alterca-
tion continuing outside in the parking lot. Eventually, defen-
dant and Sisco drove away; the Dixons left shortly there-
after. Defendant and Sisco then followed the Dixons, with 
Sisco shouting at the Dixons and firing a shotgun at them 
from the passenger window while defendant drove. Shotgun 
pellets hit Ms. Dixon in the forehead and the hand.
	
A police officer who happened to be in the area saw 
defendant’s car and also saw Sisco in the passenger seat 
holding a shotgun. The officer began to pursue defendant’s 
car, and a short chase ensued. Defendant and Sisco even-
tually abandoned their car and fled on foot; they were later 
apprehended. Police searched defendant’s car and found a 
12-gauge shotgun and a spent shell in the passenger-door 
pocket. A citizen found an unfired shell some distance away. 
The shells contained size-eight shot, the same type of pellets 
that struck the Dixons’ car. The state charged defendant and 
Sisco with attempted murder, second-degree assault, unlaw-
ful use of a weapon, and attempting to elude a police officer.
	
1  We allowed review on a second question presented in defendant’s petition 
for review—whether, when a jury “asks a question during deliberations that indi-
cates that the jury may be proceeding under a legal theory that is not cogniza-
ble under Oregon law, does a defendant’s request that the trial court inform the 
jury that the legal theory is not correct constitute a ‘negative instruction’ that 
the court is not required to give?” Because we conclude that this case must be 
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of the merits of defen-
dant’s confrontation objection, we exercise our discretion under ORAP 9.20(2) to 
decline to reach the jury question issue identified in defendant’s second question 
at this time. Our decision here does not foreclose continued litigation on that 
matter, should it continue to be at issue following our remand.
306	
State v. Quebrado
	
Sisco entered a plea deal contingent on her agreeing 
to testify against defendant, and the trial court later granted 
a pretrial continuance so that defendant could conduct discov-
ery in preparation to impeach her. At a later pretrial hearing, 
the parties discussed limits on Sisco’s anticipated trial testi-
mony, and, at another hearing, the state represented that it 
expected her to testify. At trial, the state included Sisco on its 
witness list, subpoenaed her as a trial witness, and read her 
name to the jury pool as a potential witness.
	
During the state’s direct examination of Mr. Dixon, 
the state elicited a statement that Sisco allegedly had made 
to Mr. Dixon at the bar, to the effect of “I’m going to kill 
you.” Defense counsel did not object at that time.2 The state 
also elicited testimony from Mr. Dixon that Sisco allegedly 
had said to defendant in the parking lot, when he had been 
looking for something in his car, “Not right here; not right 
here.” Defendant objected to that statement as hearsay, 
and the trial court permitted its admission as a cocon-
spirator statement made in furtherance of the conspiracy 
under OEC 801(4)(b)(E). Defense counsel made no further 
objection at that time. Ms. Dixon, similarly, testified that 
she had observed defendant getting into the back of his 
car during the altercation and that Sisco had said “No, not 
here.” Defendant did not object to that testimony. Finally, a 
detective testified that both Mr. and Ms. Dixon had told him 
that Sisco had said, “Not here. Not here.” Defendant did not 
object to that testimony.
	
The state then rested its case on a Thursday after-
noon without having called Sisco as a witness. The trial 
court adjourned for the day, with instructions to the par-
ties that the case would resume on Tuesday morning. At 
that point, it was clear that the state would not be calling 
Sisco as a witness. After court adjourned, defendant filed 
a written motion for mistrial or, alternatively, to strike 
the testimony of the Dixons and the detective relating to 
	
2  Defense counsel later stated that he did not object at the time on hearsay 
grounds because he believed a hearsay exception applied. Because we address 
only the issue of preservation and not merits of defendant’s confrontation-based 
arguments in this case, we express no view as to whether that statement or any of 
the other challenged statements constituted hearsay so as to raise confrontation 
concerns.
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
307
Sisco’s statements and give a curative instruction, on con-
frontation grounds under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon 
Constitution. When trial resumed on Tuesday, the court took 
up the filed mistrial motion. At that time, defense counsel 
additionally orally moved for a mistrial or else to strike that 
testimony, on the same confrontation grounds. Defendant 
conceded that all the disputed testimony fell within firmly 
rooted hearsay exceptions—his sole argument was that the 
state had failed to prove Sisco’s unavailability as required 
by Article I, section 11, which grants persons accused of a 
crime the right “to meet the witnesses [against them] face to 
face.” See, e.g., State v. Copeland, 353 Or 816, 818, 306 P3d 
610 (2013) (referring to a defendant’s confrontation right 
under Article I, section 11).
	
In response, the state did not argue that defen-
dant’s motion was untimely or that Sisco was unavailable. 
In addressing the merits, however, rather than responding 
to defendant’s argument under Article I, section 11, of the 
Oregon Constitution, the state advanced an argument under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
that the testimony had described nontestimonial statements 
of a coconspirator and, therefore, no Sixth Amendment con-
frontation violation had occurred. The trial court agreed 
with the state—including that no confrontation violation 
had occurred—and denied defendant’s motion on the merits:
“I’m respectfully going to deny the Motion for a Mistrial 
and respectfully decline to give a curative instruction. I 
don’t find it’s hearsay and I don’t find it’s testimonial, the 
two statements at issue.”3
	
3  The state also had maintained that the statements at issue were not tes-
timonial and, therefore, the Confrontation Clause did not apply. See Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 US 36, 124 S Ct 1354, 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004) (holding that 
the federal Confrontation Clause applies only to hearsay statements that are 
“testimonial” in nature). However, only the federal confrontation clause makes 
a distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements. See State v. 
Cook, 340 Or 530, 540, 135 P3d 260 (2006) (explaining that, even though the 
United State Supreme Court no longer adheres to the test abrogated by Crawford, 
Oregon’s constitutional confrontation rights are governed by the earlier rule, 
announced in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56, 100 S Ct 2531, 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), 
which required both witness unavailability and a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion). The trial court, in turn, referred only to the fact that the statements were 
not “testimonial,” without addressing defendant arguments under the Oregon 
Constitution’s confrontation provision.
308	
State v. Quebrado
The trial court added, “I do find you’ve preserved your record.”
	
In rebuttal closing argument, the state relied on 
Sisco’s statements as evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defendant 
was convicted of second-degree assault and unlawful use of 
a weapon as an accomplice, and he was convicted as a prin-
cipal for attempting to elude a police officer.
	
On appeal, among other assignments, defendant 
assigned error to the trial court’s ruling on his Article  I, 
section 11, confrontation objection, arguing that the court’s 
denial of his motion for mistrial or to strike had “flowed from 
a mistaken legal premise” that no confrontation violation 
had occurred. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument 
on preservation grounds, briefly stating:
“Defendant’s fourth and fifth assignments of error assert 
that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mis-
trial and motion to strike. Considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s motions were 
untimely. See State v. Sprow, 298 Or App 44, 49, 445 P3d 
351 (2019). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s arguments 
because they were not preserved.”
Quebrado, 323 Or App at 310.
ANALYSIS
	
The issue in this case is preservation, and the motion 
in question is a mistrial motion. We have stated that, to be 
preserved for appeal, a motion for mistrial must be timely. 
See State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 248, 809 P2d 81 (1991) (“To 
preserve error, a motion for a mistrial must be timely.”). We 
have further noted that, typically, a motion for mistrial is 
timely if it is made when the allegedly objectionable and mis-
trial worthy statements or acts are made. Id.; see also State 
v. Shafer, 222 Or 230, 235, 351 P2d 941 (1960) (“The time 
to move for a mistrial is when the allegedly prejudicial act 
occurs, not after the incident has been allowed to pass by, for 
then it is too late for the trial judge to caution the jury and 
mend the harm.”).4
	
4  The concurrence raises thoughtful questions about the extent to which our 
prior decisions may have overvalued timeliness, when considered against the 
general goals of preservation. In this case, no party has advanced that argument 
or asked us to revisit any prior decisions. We therefore leave that discussion for 
another day.
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
309
	
Accordingly, before we can consider the timeliness 
of defendant’s mistrial motion, based on his Article I, section 
11, confrontation rights, we must consider when a basis for 
a confrontation objection under Article I, section 11, arises. 
The state equates confrontation objections to evidentiary 
objections, and it advocates for a contemporaneous-objection 
rule. That is, the state argues that a confrontation objection 
can be timely raised only if made contemporaneously with 
the state’s introduction of the purported hearsay statement. 
Here, according to the state, defendant was required to object 
on confrontation grounds when the state elicited the state-
ments of Sisco through witnesses on direct examination.
	
There is some support for the state’s position. 
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the United States 
Supreme Court has implied that confrontation objections 
may be the equivalent to evidentiary objections, stating 
that “[t]he right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, 
including by failure to object to the offending evidence; and 
States may adopt procedural rules governing the exercise 
of such objections.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 US 
305, 313 n 3, 129 S Ct 2527, 174 L Ed 2d 314 (2009).
	
If a confrontation objection is the direct equivalent of 
an evidentiary objection, there is support for the state’s posi-
tion that a contemporaneous objection is required because, 
to challenge an evidentiary ruling on appeal, a litigant typi-
cally must object at the time when the challenged testimony 
is proffered. See State v. Clegg, 332 Or 432, 442, 31 P3d 408 
(2001) (“Generally, once evidence has been admitted without 
restriction, it can be used by the jury for any purpose.”).
	
However, we decline to create a strict contempora-
neous-objection requirement here, because we disagree with 
the state’s characterization of a confrontation challenge as 
the direct equivalent to an evidentiary challenge. For pur-
poses of Article I, section 11, a confrontation violation does 
not occur solely with the introduction of hearsay statements. 
As we explained in State v. Moore, 334 Or 328, 333-34, 49 
P3d 785 (2002),
“when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, [Article I, section 11,] normally 
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his 
310	
State v. Quebrado
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia 
of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, 
at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”
(Some internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, for 
purposes of Article I, section 11, confrontation is not solely 
a question of evidence. Rather, Article I, section 11, looks to 
the co-occurrence of two events at trial: (1) the state’s intro-
duction of hearsay statements, and (2) the state’s failure to 
call the declarant without a showing that the declarant is 
unavailable.
	
Because a confrontation challenge is not the direct 
equivalent to a challenge to the admission of evidence but 
considers two components—one apparent when the evidence 
is admitted (the introduction of hearsay), and one that may 
or may not be apparent when the evidence is admitted (the 
failure to produce a witness and the witness’s unavailabil-
ity)—and because those two components may not occur at 
the same time at trial, a strict contemporaneous-objection 
preservation rule is not workable. The complexity of the 
inquiry does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Instead, parties and courts must consider the practical pur-
poses of preservation—most fundamentally, to ensure pro-
cedural fairness. Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 220, 191 
P3d 637 (2008). At its core, preservation asks whether the 
parties, and the trial court, had a fair opportunity to meet 
the merits of the argument later advanced on appeal and 
thereby avoid the error at the outset or to correct the error 
upon its occurrence.
	
In some instances—particularly when the hearsay 
statement was made by a declarant whom the parties and 
the court are not expecting to testify at trial—preserving 
a confrontation objection may require a contemporaneous 
objection as the hearsay statement is admitted. A contem-
poraneous objection in that circumstance may place both 
the parties, and the trial court, in the best position to avoid 
or remedy the error. Any other requirement could allow for 
gamesmanship by the defense.
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
311
	
In contrast, however, when a trial is conducted in 
a manner such that it is reasonable to anticipate that the 
declarant of a hearsay statement will be called as a witness, 
preserving a confrontation objection may not always require 
a contemporaneous objection at the time of the hearsay 
statement’s admission. Preservation, as a doctrine of practi-
calities, does not require purely performative acts by coun-
sel. A requirement that a confrontation objection be made 
contemporaneously to the introduction of a hearsay state-
ment, even when it is reasonable to expect that the declarant 
will later be testifying, risks elevating form over substance, 
which is antithetical to the goals of preservation. Shields v. 
Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77-78, 559 P2d 1275 (1977) (explaining 
that preservation does not “promote form over substance but 
[promotes] an efficient administration of justice and the sav-
ing of judicial time”). In such a situation, based on the con-
text of how events unfolded at trial, an objection at the close 
of the state’s case, when the declarant has unexpectedly not 
testified, may sufficiently preserve an Article I, section 11, 
confrontation objection. Any other requirement could allow 
for gamesmanship by the state.
	
In this case, every indication in the record shows 
that the state intended to call Sisco as a witness. The state 
had secured a plea agreement for her testimony. The trial 
court had previously continued the trial date so that defen-
dant could conduct discovery in preparation to impeach 
Sisco after she had agreed to testify against defendant. 
The parties had discussed at a pretrial hearing limiting the 
scope of Sisco’s trial testimony. The state had included Sisco 
in its witness list, subpoenaed her as a trial witness, and 
read her name to the jury pool. In short, on this record there 
was no reasonable basis to believe that the state would not 
call Sisco as a witness. Considering all those circumstances, 
we conclude that the practical purposes of preservation were 
served by defendant’s objection at the close of the state’s 
case, rather than at the time when Sisco’s hearsay state-
ments were admitted.
	
As noted earlier, although this case involves one 
mistrial motion, analytically the issue involves two con-
stituent parts: (1) the timeliness of the objection to act that 
312	
State v. Quebrado
allegedly created the basis for the mistrial, and (2) the 
timeliness of the mistrial motion itself. Having discussed 
the first of those, we now address the second. As noted, the 
state rested its case without calling Sisco as a witness in the 
afternoon, on a Thursday. Apparently, the court had previ-
ously set a trial schedule with the parties that the trial pro-
ceedings would end for the week on Thursday, then resume 
the following Tuesday. Upon the close of the state’s case, the 
trial court said:
	
“[PROSECUTOR]:  At this time, Judge, the State rests.
	
“[THE COURT]:  All right. Okay it is roughly 3:40 
[p.m.]. The State has rested, ladies and gentleman. * 
* 
* 
Thank you all very much for being here this week. [Followed 
by instructions to return to the courthouse the following 
Tuesday at 9:00 a.m., together with other instructions, and 
excusal of the jury.]
	
“(Outside the presence of the jury at 3:41 p.m.:)
	
“[THE COURT]:  Okay. The jury is outside the court-
room. The State has rested. My thoughts are to take up any 
additional things on Tuesday * 
* 
*. It’s been a long day.”
At that point, the prosecutor responded, “That’s fine with 
me, Judge.” The trial court then adjourned.
	
During the intervening break in the trial proceed-
ings, defendant filed a written mistrial motion, or in the 
alternative a motion to strike, based on the state’s alleged 
confrontation violation. On Tuesday, the trial court called to 
order and immediately took up defendant’s motion.
	
In this court, the state contends that the delay 
between the Thursday afternoon when the state rested 
its case, and the Tuesday morning when the court consid-
ered defendant’s mistrial motion, renders the issue unpre-
served. The state more particularly argues that defendant 
was required to move for a mistrial on Thursday, and any 
delay was fatal to preservation. In the context of this case, 
we disagree.
	
Broadly speaking, mistrial motions are favored 
at the time when the objectionable act occurs. See State v. 
Montez, 309 Or 564, 601, 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (to preserve 
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
313
error, a motion for a mistrial must be raised in the trial 
court); Shafer, 222 Or at 235 (generally, a mistrial motion 
is timely if it is made when the allegedly objectionable error 
was made). However, we have cautioned that, when a motion 
for mistrial is not made immediately following the objec-
tionable act, such a motion may nevertheless be timely and 
preserved if “no significant lapse of time, no additional tes-
timony, no recess, and no discussion of another issue” took 
place. State v. Larson, 325 Or 15, 22, 933 P2d 958 (1997) 
(mistrial motion was timely when a discussion that took up 
only two pages of transcript had occurred before the defen-
dant moved for mistrial, following improper statement by 
prosecutor).
	
The flexibility in our approach to the timing of mis-
trial motions once again emphasizes the practical aspect of 
preservation. As we have explained, “[w]hat is required of a 
party to adequately present a contention to the trial court 
can vary depending on the nature of the claim or argument; 
the touchstone in that regard, ultimately, is procedural fair-
ness to the parties and to the trial court.” Peeples, 345 Or at 
220.
	
One pragmatic touchstone of preservation in the 
context of a motion for mistrial is whether the parties and 
the trial court would have been in a superior position to cure 
the deficiency if the motion had been raised earlier in the 
proceedings. Our decision in Shafer provides such an exam-
ple. In that case, the defense attorney had asked a prosecu-
tion witness who had sat inside the courtroom bar about his 
presence there, and the trial judge then stated, “ 
‘I am the 
one that had him sit on the inside of the rail.’ 
” 222 Or at 234. 
The defendant moved for a mistrial on a subsequent day of 
trial, arguing that the prosecution witness had received a 
“judicial blessing,” which had prejudiced the jury against 
the defendant. Id. We concluded, however, that any appear-
ance of undue recognition arising from allowing the witness 
to sit inside the bar could have been cured with a timely 
objection and, therefore, the issue had not been preserved. 
Id. at 235.
	
Two considerations lead us to conclude that the 
practical purposes of preservation were served here, even 
314	
State v. Quebrado
though defendant did not raise the issue immediately upon 
the state resting on Thursday. First, between when the 
trial court dismissed the parties on Thursday, and when it 
took up the mistrial motion on Tuesday morning, no trial 
actions had occurred. No other issue was discussed. And no 
other evidence was presented in the time between those two 
events. In other cases, we have cited the lack of further trial 
developments as an important factor in evaluating whether 
a mistrial motion was timely. Larson, 325 Or at 22.
	
Even with the absence of such trial developments, 
of course, it is possible that the state could have identified 
some prejudice from defendant’s delay, such as by objecting 
that Sisco was no longer available. Thus, the second consid-
eration significant to our analysis is that the state did not 
do so. Before us, the state maintains that, by the time that 
defendant moved for a mistrial, it was too late to call Sisco 
as a witness and mend the harm. The state, however, did 
not make that argument in the trial court or present any 
evidence to support it. To the extent the state is now advo-
cating we affirm the trial court on timeliness, under a “right 
for the wrong reasons” rationale, that argument is foreclosed 
because the record might have developed differently. See 
generally Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 
331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001) (considering whether 
record would have developed differently had the issue been 
raised in the trial court). For example, the state could have 
explained, during the Tuesday hearing on that motion, why 
Sisco had been unavailable to testify or how it had been prej-
udiced by defendant not moving for a mistrial on Thursday. 
It could have moved to reopen its case. It did not.
	
As we stated in a different preservation case issued 
today, “the winds of preservation can be gauged by looking 
to the weathervane of trial court surprise: Would the trial 
court be taken aback to find itself reversed on this issue, 
for this reason?” Skotland, __ Or at __ (emphasis in origi-
nal) (slip op at 11:1-3). That inquiry is applicable here, as 
well, though in this context the trial court was affirmed on 
appeal. Would the trial court be surprised to learn that the 
Court of Appeals affirmed its ruling—but on preservation 
and timeliness grounds—when no party, nor the court itself, 
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
315
had considered defendant’s mistrial motion to have been 
untimely and instead addressed the merits? The answer here 
is yes. Neither the parties, nor the trial court, expressed any 
concern about the timeliness of defendant’s mistrial motion. 
They were in the best position to evaluate whether taking 
up the issue on Tuesday morning, as opposed to Thursday 
afternoon, placed the court in a worse position to be able 
to address the error; no one so indicated. Instead, the trial 
court stated, on the record, that defendant had preserved 
the issue.
	
In short, all the policy objectives underlying the 
doctrine of preservation were satisfied here. Under the facts 
of this case, a defense objection on confrontation grounds 
under Article I, section 11, at the close of the state’s case 
was sufficient to preserve that objection. As explained, 
defendant raised that objection by moving for a mistrial (or, 
alternatively, to strike the disputed testimony) during the 
interim time between the end of the trial proceedings one 
week and the start of proceedings the following week, with 
no other trial event, let alone a significant trial event, occur-
ring. Neither the state at trial, nor the trial court, claimed 
surprise or asserted that the timing of defendant’s motion 
for a mistrial prevented a fair adjudication on the merits. 
The state fully grappled with and responded to the merits of 
defendant’s argument, and the trial court similarly consid-
ered the merits and issued a merits-based ruling.
	
We conclude that defendant’s motion for a mistrial 
on confrontation grounds under Article  I, section 11, was 
timely and therefore preserved the issue for appeal. The 
Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise and should 
have proceeded to address defendant’s assignments of error 
concerning his motion for mistrial (or, alternatively, his 
motion to strike the disputed testimony).
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed 
in part and affirmed in part. This case is remanded to the 
Court of Appeals for further consideration.
	
FLYNN, C.J., concurring.
	
I agree with the majority that defendant preserved 
his challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion for 
316	
State v. Quebrado
mistrial. I also agree with the majority that defendant’s 
motion for mistrial was timely under the circumstances of 
this case. But I write separately to question whether the 
two issues are as closely linked as some of our decisions may 
suggest.
	
As the majority explains, the preservation require-
ment serves “to ensure procedural fairness” to both the 
parties and the trial court. ___ Or at ___ (citing Peeples 
v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219-20, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (also 
recognizing that “preservation fosters full development 
of the record” for purposes of appeal)) (slip op at 10:19-21). 
“Preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and 
rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error alto-
gether or correcting one already made, which in turn may 
obviate the need for an appeal.” Peeples, 345 Or at 219; see 
also State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 356, 800 P2d 259 (1990) 
(emphasizing that the reasons for the rule requiring pres-
ervation in the trial court are to “allow the adversary to 
present its position and to permit the court to understand 
and correct any error”).
	
I agree with the majority that the purposes of pres-
ervation were fully served when defendant moved for a mis-
trial on the asserted basis that the state’s introduction of 
hearsay statements without calling the declarant as a wit-
ness violated defendant’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause. ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 16:13-14). The state had the 
opportunity to respond on the merits to defendant’s motions, 
the trial court had the opportunity to rule on the merits, 
and the record is fully developed. Thus, applying our long-
standing rules of preservation, there would be no question 
that defendant’s claim of error was preserved for appeal. See 
State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 189, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (conclud-
ing that the defendant preserved his claim of error because 
“[t]he state was not ambushed or misled or denied an oppor-
tunity to meet defendant’s argument in this case”).
	
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed exclu-
sively to the timing of defendant’s motion, concluded without 
elaboration that the motion was untimely, and from there 
concluded that any challenge to the court’s denial of a mis-
trial necessarily was unpreserved.  See State v. Quebrado, 
Cite as 372 Or 301 (2024)	
317
323 Or App 308, 310 (2022) (nonprecedential memorandum 
opinion) (concluding that defendant’s motion for mistrial 
was untimely and, “[a]ccordingly,” rejecting defendant’s 
challenge to the denial as “not preserved”).
	
The court’s equating of timeliness with preserva-
tion is understandable. A series of opinions from this court 
during the 1990s offered such cursory rejections of a defen-
dant’s challenge to the denial of a motion for mistrial that 
they arguably suggest that timeliness supplants our usual 
preservation analysis. See, e.g., State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 
90, 969 P2d 1013 (1998), cert den, 528 US 1135 (2000) (sum-
marily announcing that the defendant’s “mistrial request 
was untimely and, consequently, did not preserve the alleged 
underlying error for review”); State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 
409, 963 P2d 667 (1998) (summarily announcing that the 
defendant’s motion for mistrial “was not timely and hence 
was not preserved”); State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 631, 912 
P2d 364, cert den, 519 US 854 (1996) (summarily announc-
ing that the defendant’s motion for mistrial “was not timely 
and, thus, that claim of error was not preserved for review”); 
State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 248, 809 P2d 81 (1991) (sum-
marily announcing that, “[t]o preserve error, a motion for a 
mistrial must be timely”).
	
But I would caution against so readily substituting 
a timeliness test for the preservation analysis we typically 
employ—as the Court of Appeals did here—especially when 
“untimely” is, itself, used as a categorical label for any motion 
that has not been made immediately after the concerning 
incident. The timeliness of a motion for mistrial fits within 
our framework for analyzing whether the mistrial issue was 
preserved for purposes of appeal; if nothing else, delay in 
bringing the motion may have eliminated the court’s ability 
to correct the error with action short of a mistrial, which, 
in turn, could be a reason to conclude that any challenge 
to the denial of a mistrial was unpreserved. But not every 
error can be corrected short of a mistrial, and, conversely, 
not every delayed objection comes too late for the trial court 
to take lesser corrective action. As we long ago emphasized 
in explaining the rule of preservation, “[e]fficient procedures 
are instruments for, not obstacles to, deciding the merits, 
318	
State v. Quebrado
particularly when the alternative is a criminal conviction 
that lacks a basis in law or in fact.” Hitz, 307 Or at 188-89.
	
In prior cases, the Court of Appeals has taken a 
“more nuanced approach” to evaluating whether a motion 
for mistrial was preserved, including holding “that a mis-
trial motion was timely, even if not instantaneously made, 
when made under such circumstances that the underlying 
purpose of that preservation requirement is fulfilled.” State 
v. Sprow, 298 Or App 44, 49, 445 P3d 351 (2019) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). That reasoning 
appears to fold timeliness back into the preservation frame-
work, and I agree with that approach.
	
Indeed, to the extent that this court’s 1990s-era 
mistrial cases appear to compel a deviation from our estab-
lished approach to preservation, they may not survive close 
scrutiny. Not one case in the series explains why the timing 
of a motion for mistrial can present a categorical obstacle to 
concluding that an appellant satisfied the purposes of pres-
ervation, which this court already had announced in Hitz 
and Brown. And the categorical approach to preservation 
was questionable from the start. Walton—which announced 
that, “[t]o preserve error, a motion for a mistrial must be 
timely,” 311 Or at 248—is the earliest case in the series, and 
it attributes that categorical link to State v. Montez, 309 Or 
564, 789 P2d 1352 (1990). But Montez does not support the 
proposition that Walton attributes to it, because the mistrial 
issue in Montez was entirely unpreserved—the defendant 
had not moved for a mistrial and later sought “plain error” 
review on appeal. 309 Or at 601. And the other cases in the 
series merely followed Walton’s lead—with Williams citing 
Walton, 322 Or at 631; Hayward citing Williams, 327 Or at 
409; and Barone citing both Walton and Williams, 328 Or at 
90. But defendant has not asked us to disavow Walton and 
its progeny, and the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in 
Sprow may illustrate that the Walton line of cases can sim-
ply be limited. Both are questions for another day. Therefore, 
I concur.