Case Title: DH v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-02-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
DH v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2003 WY 15579 P.3d 997Case Number: C-02-7Decided: 11/25/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

IN 
THE INTEREST OF THE "H"

CHILDREN, 
Minors:

 

DH,

 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY

SERVICES,

 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Sue Davidson of Aspen Ridge Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Sue Chatfield, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, 
Justice, filed a dissenting opinion with which HILL, 
Chief Justice, joined.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a juvenile court adjudication of neglect and a subsequent placement 
order.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      On July 11, 2002, 
the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in which she stated that the appeal was 
being taken from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated June 11, 2002, 
and an Order for Transfer of Physical Placement Upon Motion Hearing dated July 
3, 2002.  In her appellate brief, 
the appellant identified several specific issues, which we restate as 
follows:

 

1.         
Must the Department of Family Services (DFS) follow state statutes, court 
orders, and its own regulations in a child protection 
case?

 

2.         
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion by appointing the attorney 
for one or more of the children to act as guardian ad litem (GAL) for the 
children?

 

3.         
Was the appellant denied procedural due process in the juvenile court 
proceedings in any of the following particulars?

 

a.         
Meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard.

 

b.         
Failure to meet the requirements of W.R.C.P. 58.

 

c.         
Arbitrary denial of motions for continuance.

 

4.         
Did the juvenile court err in finding neglect under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-402(a)(xii)(A) (LexisNexis 2003)?

 

[¶3]      The fourth 
section of the appellant's brief contains some argument pertaining to issue 
number four above, but the bulk of the argument in that section is directed to a 
separate issue, which we will identify as follows:

 

5.         
Did the juvenile court err in allowing the children to have visitation 
with their grandparents and aunt?

 

[¶4]      In its appellate 
brief, DFS identifies only two issues:

 

1.         
There was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to determine by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the appellant neglected her 
children.

 

2.         
The juvenile court's Order for Transfer of Physical Placement Upon Motion 
Hearing is not an appealable order.

 

[¶5]      Throughout this 
opinion, we will repeatedly note the appellant's failure to support her 
contentions with cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority.  We also need to note at the outset that 
both of the State's identified issues have to do with the appellant's issues 
number four and five, and that the State's appellate brief is completely devoid 
of any response to any of the appellant's other issues.  The briefing deficiencies in this case 
have made it almost impossible to reach the merits of the 
controversy.

 

FACTS

 

[¶6]      The appellant has 
three minor children (DDH, BKH and BMH).  
At the time of the incidents underlying this case, DDH was thirteen years 
old, BKH was ten years old, and BMH was eight years old.  The appellant and her children lived 
with the appellant's boyfriend.  
Frequently, the children spent weekends with the appellant's mother and 
adoptive father (grandparents).

 

[¶7]      On December 1, 
2001, the children spent the night with their grandparents.  DDH's friend, TS, also spent the 
night.  The appellant had instructed 
DDH to contact her by noon the next day to go on a family outing.  DDH telephoned home at noon and again 
between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., but there was no answer either time.  DDH then called the VFW bar, where the 
appellant and her boyfriend went nearly every night.1

 

[¶8]      DDH reached the 
appellant at the VFW.  The 
appellant's speech was slurred and she was angry with DDH for not calling her 
earlier.  After the call, the 
grandparents went to take the children and TS home.  At TS's home, DDH went inside with her 
friend, whereupon DDH became hysterical.  
TS's mother asked the grandfather to come inside.  DDH then described problems arising in 
her home, including the appellant's drinking, DDH's suicide threats, the 
appellant's various boyfriends, the present boyfriend's name-calling and threats 
of violence, arguing and fighting, and DDH having to raise her siblings.  DDH told her grandfather that she did 
not want to go home, that her mother was drunk, that her mother drinks every 
night, that she was "tired of it," and that there would be an argument about it 
if she went home.

 

[¶9]      At about that 
time, the appellant called TS's residence and spoke with her father.  Her father sensed that the appellant was 
drunk because she was slurring her words.  
The appellant's boyfriend came on the telephone and threatened the 
appellant's father with physical violence.  
TS's mother then called the Sheriff's Department.  She and the appellant's father spoke 
with the sheriff and with the psychiatrist who had dealt with DDH after her 
recent suicide threat.  The 
appellant's father was advised to take the children to the police department, 
which he did.  At the police 
department, an officer separately interviewed the appellant's father and all 
three children.  Each child told him 
about the appellant's drinking and problems that drinking created at home.  The officer also spoke with the 
appellant when she repeatedly called during the interviews.  Based upon all he had learned, the 
officer placed the children in protective custody.

 

[¶10]   After the children were taken to 
the police department, two officers went to the appellant's home.  They found both the appellant and her 
boyfriend to be agitated, excited, loud, and interruptive, and they described 
both the appellant and her boyfriend as having slurred speech and a short 
attention span, and smelling of alcohol.  
Both officers testified that they believed the appellant and her 
boyfriend to be intoxicated.

 

 

[¶11]   On December 4, 2001, a Laramie 
County Assistant District Attorney filed a petition in the juvenile court 
alleging that the three children were neglected under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-402(a)(xii)(A) because their "custodian has failed or refused to provide 
adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education, medical, surgical or any 
other care necessary for the children's well being."  The detailed factual basis for that 
allegation read as follows:

 

            
On December 2, 2001, Officers were called to [address] for a possible 
suicidal subject.  Upon arrival, 
officers made contact with [the appellant] who immediately denied any suicidal 
ideation and seemed confused, insisting there had been miscommunication between 
her and the dispatcher.  Also 
present was [the appellant's] boyfriend[.]  
Both [the appellant] and [her boyfriend] smelled heavily of al[c]oholic 
beverages and were uncooperative and agitated during questioning.  Essentially, [the appellant] tried to 
tell Officer Dafoe that her father . . . was refusing to return her children to 
her.  [The appellant's father] was 
contacted and agreed that he had refused to allow [the appellant] to take her 
children because she was drunk and hostile.  [The appellant's father] reported that 
[the appellant's boyfriend] was also drunk and threatened bodily harm to 
[him].

 

            
The children, [DDH, BKH, and BMH] were interviewed individually.  Each reported that their mother has a 
severe alcohol and drug problem and that they were scared to go home with 
her.  In addition, [DDH] told [her 
grandfather] that she would kill herself if she had to return to her mother's 
home, and had just been seen at the emergency room over Thanksgiving, having 
attempted suicide.  [DDH] confirmed 
to [the officers] these suicidal threats and feelings and stated that she is 
extremely despondent about the situation and fearful of her mother's 
actions.

 

[¶12]   On the same day that the petition 
was filed, the juvenile court held an informal shelter care hearing pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  After determining that further shelter 
care was required, the juvenile court temporarily placed the children in the 
custody of DFS for foster care placement, and ordered DFS to prepare a social 
summary and convene a multi-disciplinary team meeting.

 

[¶13]   The initial hearing on the petition 
was held on January 3, 2002.  
Appearing with counsel, the appellant denied the allegations of the 
petition.  Also at the initial 
hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion of the children's GAL that the 
children be allowed to have visitation with their grandparents and with an aunt, 
CW.  The juvenile court also 
continued the children's temporary placement with DFS.

 

[¶14]   On January 15, 2002, the appellant 
filed a Motion to Return Children to Mother's Physical Custody or, 
Alternatively, Move the Children to Another Foster Care Home; and Motion to 
Reconsider Visitation Order.  The 
allegations of this motion were of three general types:  (1) allegations of deficient care and 
supervision in the foster home; (2) allegations that the grandparents and CW 
continued to undermine the appellant's relationship with her children by 
intrusive and oppressive misconduct; and (3) allegations of procedural 
irregularities, including lack of notice to the appellant that the visitation 
issue would arise at the initial hearing, and the failure of counsel for the 
State to present the proposed Order for Shelter Care to the appellant's counsel 
for approval as to form as required by W.R.C.P. 58.

 

[¶15]   The appellant's motion was heard on 
February 21, 2002, and was denied by an order entered on March 6, 2002.  The order also maintained DFS's 
temporary legal custody of the children, ordered certain monies be paid over to 
DFS for support of the children, and ordered that an order be submitted 
appointing the children's GAL.2

 

[¶16]   On April 5, 2002, the GAL filed a 
motion requesting that DDH, over her mother's objections, be allowed to 
participate in certain school sporting activities.  An order entered April 9, 2002, set the 
matter for hearing two days later.  
On April 10, 2002, the appellant filed a motion to continue the hearing 
on the ground that neither she nor her counsel would be available.  The motion for continuance was denied 
and the hearing was held as scheduled, with substitute counsel appearing for the 
appellant, and with neither the appellant nor her regular counsel being 
present.  The motion was 
granted.

 

[¶17]   The non-jury adjudicatory hearing 
on the petition was held on May 9 and 16, 2002.  Subsequently, the appellant, the State, 
and the GAL each filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
written closing arguments.  On June 
11, 2002, the juvenile court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law.  Succinctly stated, the 
juvenile court concluded therein that the appellant had neglected her children 
as alleged in the petition.  The 
children were ordered to remain in the custody of DFS, and DFS was ordered to 
prepare a case plan with family reunification as the goal.  In a decision letter explaining why it 
had "adopted substantially the state's proposed findings and conclusions," the 
juvenile court focused on the particular incident of December 2, 2001, but 
examined that incident in the context of the appellant's relationships with male 
partners whom she brought into the home, and her "alcohol-centered lifestyle . . 
.."

 

[¶18]   On June 4, 2002, the GAL filed a 
motion on behalf of the children seeking a change from their present foster home 
placement to the home of their aunt, CW.  
The motion alleged that: (1) the current foster parents were going on 
vacation; (2) CW and her husband were certified foster parents through DFS; (3) 
the children already had a long-standing relationship with CW and her family; 
and (4) the children preferred placement with CW's family rather than placement 
in some unknown foster home or respite placement.  The appellant filed an objection to the 
GAL's motion in which she alleged primarily that she had been informed by DFS 
that the current foster parents had canceled their vacation 
plans.

 

[¶19]   The matter was heard on June 13, 
2002.  After considerable testimony 
was presented, the GAL and the State argued the benefits of such a family 
placement, while the appellant argued that, especially given the apparently 
canceled vacation plans, the children should not be moved into the home of her 
sister, given the disruptive family dynamics.  The juvenile court granted the motion by 
an order entered July 3, 2002.

 

[¶20]   The appellant filed her Notice of 
Appeal on July 11, 2002, specifically referencing the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered on June 11, 2002, and the Order for Transfer of 
Physical Placement Upon Motion Hearing entered July 3, 
2002.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Must 
the Department of Family Services (DFS) follow state statutes, court orders, and 
its own regulations in a child protection case?

 

[¶21]   In her appellate brief, the 
appellant details three primary areas in which she alleges that DFS has violated 
state statutes, administrative agency rules, and court ordersmaking 
assessments, preparing a social summary, and convening a meeting of the 
multi-disciplinary team (MDT).  In 
addition, she contends that DFS did not appropriately initiate an investigation 
of the alleged neglect, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-204(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2003), that it has never made formal reports to the juvenile court, 
as required by a court order, and that no written case plan has ever been 
completed, as required by Chapter 2, Section 7 of DFS's Rules and Regulations 
Governing Child Protective Services (the DFS Rules).

 

[¶22]   Although the appellant's appellate 
argument on these issues is, in large part, a generalized diatribe against DFS 
and the particular juvenile court involved in this case,3 we can glean the following 
allegations of specific failures by DFS, the State, or the juvenile 
court:

 

1.         
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-427(a) (LexisNexis 2003) requires the juvenile 
court, after a neglect petition is filed, to order DFS to make a pre-disposition 
study and report.  The juvenile 
court entered such an order on December 5, 2001.  At the hearing on February 21, 2002, the 
appellant's counsel informed the juvenile court that she had not received a copy 
of the report.  The subsequent 
colloquy between the juvenile court and counsel revealed that DFS had sent the 
report to the District Attorney, who had provided a copy to the GAL, but not to 
the appellant's counsel.  After the 
hearing, the GAL gave counsel a copy of the report, but that copy was not 
identical to one received a week later from DFS.

 

            
2.         
Chapter 2, Sections 3(a)(e) and 4(a)(i) of the DFS Rules require 
institution of a safety assessment and a safety plan for each child within 
twenty-four hours and completion within seven days.  The juvenile court ordered such 
assessment on December 5, 2001, but none was ever done.

 

            
3.         
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-427(b) provides that "[a]fter a petition is filed 
alleging a child is neglected, the court shall appoint [an MDT]."  The juvenile court order entered on 
December 5, 2001, included a provision "that [an MDT] shall convene in the 
interest of the minor for the purpose of providing recommendations to the 
Court."  When the appellant's 
counsel informed the juvenile court at the hearing on February 21, 2002, that an 
MDT had not met, the juvenile court agreed with the GAL that an MDT would not be 
appropriate until there was an adjudication of neglect.

 

            
4.         
As part of her complaint that no MDT meeting had occurred, the appellant 
argues that the MDT should meet no later than sixty days after the initial 
hearing, because that is the time limit for holding an adjudicatory hearing 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426(b) (LexisNexis 2003).  Having noted that deadline, the 
appellant then argues that the juvenile court's practice of ignoring the 
sixty-day requirement and setting adjudicatory hearings only upon motion ignored 
"a clear statement of procedure . . .."

 

[¶23]   We decline to address the merits of 
these inter-related issues and we affirm the adjudication of the juvenile court 
to that extent.  The portion of the 
appellant's appellate brief that concerns these matters is 
eight-and-one-half-pages in length.  
In those pages, the appellant cites to only one case in support of her 
position.  That case, MB v. 
Laramie County Dept. of Family Services in Interest of LB, 933 P.2d 1126, 
1127 (Wyo. 1997), 
involved an action for termination of parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a) (1981), rather than a neglect petition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-402(a).  Beyond a cursory 
comparison of the two situations with the contention that "parental rights may 
be terminated as a result of a neglect petition," the appellant makes no effort 
to provide cogent legal analysis.  
The mere showing that a statute or court rule has been breached, without 
more, does not establish cause for this Court to overturn the findings and 
conclusions of a trial court after a bench trial.

 

[¶24]   Not only does the appellant fail to 
support her grievances with citations to relevant precedent, she also fails to 
show how the alleged deficiencies in the juvenile court prejudiced her.  In MB, 933 P.2d  at 
1130, 
we reversed an order terminating parental rights because DFS's failure to follow 
its own regulations prevented MB from receiving adequate notice that DFS 
intended to seek termination of her parental rights if she did not succeed in 
her case plan.  In the present case, 
however, even if we accept the appellant's allegations as true, she has not 
shown how her rights were adversely affected by her delayed receipt of the 
pre-disposition report, by the lack of a safety assessment and report, or by the 
juvenile court's decision to delay the convening of an MDT meeting until neglect 
was actually found at an adjudicatory hearing.4  Neither has she shown the need for a 
separate DFS investigation and substantiation of neglect where there has been an 
investigation by law enforcement officers, a petition filed by the district 
attorney, and an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court.5  And finally, the appellant has not shown 
that any harm resulted from the alleged lack of formal written reports and a 
written case plan6 or how she was damaged by the delay 
in setting the adjudicatory hearing.7

 

[¶25]   We do not retreat from our 
conviction that the judicial system must be diligent in protecting parental 
rights.  Nor do we imply with this 
decision that DFS, or any other administrative agency, is free to ignore state 
statutes, agency rules, or court orders.  
However, appellants must come to this Court with particularized facts 
showing the alleged harm caused by the alleged breaches of statutory, 
administrative, or court-imposed duties.  
The appellate process exists to review litigated cases, not to 
superintend administrative agencies.

 

Did 
the juvenile court abuse its discretion by appointing the attorney for one or 
more of the children to act as guardian ad litem (GAL) for the 
children?

 

[¶26]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-211(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003) provides as follows:

 

The 
court shall appoint counsel to represent any child in a court proceeding in 
which the child is alleged to be abused or neglected.  Any attorney representing a child under 
this section shall also serve as the child's guardian ad litem unless a guardian 
ad litem has been appointed by the court.  
The attorney or guardian ad litem shall be charged with representation of 
the child's best interest.

 

In 
turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-416 (LexisNexis 2003) provides as 
follows:

 

            
The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to 
proceedings under this act if the child has no parent, guardian or custodian 
appearing in his behalf or if the interests of the parents, guardian or 
custodian are adverse to the best interest of the child.  A party to the proceedings or employee 
or representative thereof shall not be appointed guardian ad litem for the 
child.[8]

 

[¶27]   These seemingly straightforward 
statutory directives have led to considerable litigation in recent years, a 
review of which will help to put this issue in perspective.  The problem is that the role of the GAL 
and the role of counsel are not identical, yet the same person has frequently 
been called upon to fill both pairs of shoes.  In Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
648 P.2d 512, 517-18 (Wyo. 1982), overruled by Clark v. Alexander, 
953 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 1998), 
a case involving a petition to terminate parental rights, we dealt with the 
problem as follows:

 

The 
guardian ad litem was an attorney at law.  
She was afforded an opportunity to make an opening statement and to 
cross-examine all witnesses.  She 
did cross-examine most of them.  
After closing arguments by appellee and CP, the court called upon the 
guardian ad litem.  She began by 
saying that she was making a report to the court.  CP objected to a report-type 
presentation as distinguished from a closing argument.  The court advised that it 
would:

 

"* 
* *  consider it in the nature of a 
report from the guardian ad litem and similar to a social 
report."

 

CP 
contends that it was error to do so.  
The guardian ad litem reported that she had reviewed appellee's records 
and school records; that she talked to those who had testified, to CP's friends, 
to one of her landladies, to the foster parents into whose custody PP had been 
temporarily placed, to PP and to others; and that she had observed CP and PP's 
interaction on several occasions.  
She recommended termination of CP's parental rights in 
PP.

 

            
In representing the ward's interests, the guardian ad litem should 
express to the court that which he considers will further such interest.  This is often done during a hearing by 
accepting the presentation and argument of the guardian ad litem favorable to 
one side or the other as the guardian ad litem believes is in the best interest 
of the child.  Otherwise, the 
purpose in an appointment of a guardian ad litem would be thwarted.  If the guardian ad litem were other than 
an attorney at law, his position on behalf of the child could be obtained only 
through his testimony or in some fashion other than actual participation as an 
attorney in the hearing.  The 
position of a guardian ad litem who is also an attorney at law can be obtained 
through such actual participation, i.e., during legal argument, 
cross-examination of witnesses, etc.  
But it need not be so restricted.  
The position of the guardian ad litem was here presented in the form of a 
report "similar to a social report" in which the guardian ad litem made her 
recommendation.

 

            
. . .

 

            
Although it would have been more appropriate to have limited the guardian 
ad litem, who had participated in the trial as an attorney at law, to a 
conventional closing argument with opportunity during trial to present any 
proper factual matters by means of admissible evidence, whatever error may have 
resulted from receipt of the report without opportunity for cross-examination is 
harmless in this instance.  That 
reported by the guardian ad litem was only a restatement of some of that already 
said and otherwise evidenced during the hearing.

 

[¶28]   The specific problem identified in 
Matter of Parental Rights of PPparticipation in the proceedings as an 
attorney by a GAL who has also presented first-person factual evidencewas found 
to be error, but was considered harmless because it was merely cumulative.  Id.  Several years later, in a divorce action 
involving an attorney/GAL, we discussed the ethical considerations that may 
arise from such a dual role.  
Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 263-65 (Wyo. 1991).  Prior to announcing his child custody 
decision, the district judge informed counsel that he had discussed the matter 
with the GAL.  Neither party 
objected at the time, but in this Court, the appellant sought reversal on the 
basis of this ex parte contact.  
We held that both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law forbade such 
contact:

 

            
We are satisfied that those rules were applicable in this instance.  A guardian ad litem is the 
attorney for the minor whom he is appointed to serve.  . . .  He participates in the proceedings as an 
advocate.  . . .  In Wyoming, that rule is consistent with 
policy articulated by the legislature in two specific statutes requiring, or 
permitting, the appointment of a guardian ad litem since, in each 
statute, the guardian is charged with representing the child.  . . .  In accordance with the foregoing 
authority, we perceive it to be unequivocal that the guardian ad litem 
has the same ethical responsibilities in the proceeding as any other 
attorney.  The specific subject 
matter of this case is succinctly summarized in this way:

 

"* 
* *  Guardians ad litem may 
not have ex parte communications with the judge."  Podell, The Role of the Guardian Ad 
Litem, 25 Trial 31, 34 (April 1989).

 

Moore, 
809 P.2d  at 264.  We concluded, however, that, inasmuch as 
judgment was entered in favor of a party who was not responsible for and did not 
participate in the ethical impropriety, and inasmuch as the appellant had not 
objected below, we could find no manifest injustice and we affirmed the district 
court.  Id. at 
264-65.

 

[¶29]   Two years after Moore was 
published, we again considered the role of the GAL, this time in the context of 
a neglect proceeding brought pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-201  14-6-252 
(1986 & Cum.Supp. 1993).  
Without distinguishing between GAL's who are attorneys and GAL's who are 
not attorneys, we stated in In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1152 (Wyo. 
1993), 
that GAL's "must act with reasonable diligence in the role of an advocate," and 
must "participate as necessary in all phases of the process, including 
subsequent appeals," and we concluded that GAL's are subject to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.  
Slightly over two years later, however, in an opinion once again making 
no distinction between attorney/GAL's and non-attorney/GAL's, we made no mention 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, but stated, instead, 
that the GAL may file a written report with the court rather than make an 
in-court presentation.  Basolo v. 
Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 356 (Wyo. 1995).  Further, we observed that "[e]ven those 
who criticize the best interests of the child standard as indeterminate 
recognize the value of the guardian ad litem's subjective 
impressions to a court's decisions concerning custody and visitation."  Id. (emphasis in original).  The recitation of his or her subjective 
impressions is not, of course, an appropriate role for an 
attorney.

 

[¶30]   We continued to blur the line 
between GAL and attorney in In re Paternity of IC, 941 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 
1997).  As suggested by its caption, IC 
was neither a neglect case nor a parental rights termination case.  Rather, it was a paternity action 
brought by a presumed father under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (Michie 
1994).  In re Paternity of 
IC, 941 P.2d  at 49.  In the context of child custody, 
support, and visitation, we described the role of the appointed GAL as 
follows:

 

            
As the appointed attorney for the minor, a guardian ad litem is obligated 
to participate as an advocate for the child.  "[T]he guardian ad litem has the same 
ethical responsibilities in the proceeding as any other attorney," Moore v. 
Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo.1991), and has a responsibility to ensure that 
the record contains information relative to the child's best interest and 
welfare, factors essential to the court's final determination.  . . .  The guardian ad litem here, however, 
produced no evidence on behalf of the Child at the visitation and support 
hearing.

 

In 
re Paternity of IC, 
941 P.2d  at 52.  As before, we did not recognize separate 
roles for the GAL and the attorney.

 

[¶31]   Finally, in Clark v. Alexander, 
953 P.2d 145, 151-55 (Wyo. 1998), 
we squarely addressed the difficulties inherent in asking one person to act both 
as an agent of the court, identifying and pursuing the child's best interests, 
and as an attorney for the child, identifying and pursuing the child's 
preferences.  Despite those 
difficulties, and because of the prohibitive cost of appointing both a GAL and 
an attorney for the child, we adopted a "hybrid" role for the attorney/GAL.  Id. at 153.  The effect of such hybrid status is to 
excuse the attorney/GAL from application of some of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys at Law.9  At the same time, however, we made clear 
in Clark that an attorney/GAL may not be a fact witness.  Id. at 154.10

 

[¶32]   Perhaps understandably, problems 
continue to arise as the trial courts work out the mechanics of the 
attorney/GAL's hybrid representation of children.  In Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶¶ 
22-26, 22 P.3d 861, 868-70 (Wyo. 2001), 
we clarified our holdings in Moore and Clark, and we repeated 
their two central admonitions:  the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, as modified in Clark, 
apply to attorney/GAL's, and the attorney/GAL may not appear as a fact 
witness.  Finally, we summarized 
what attorney/GAL's are expected to do in representing the best interests of 
children:

 

A 
guardian ad litem, counsel, and the court should work together at the beginning 
of a case to develop and articulate clearly the scope and nature of the guardian 
ad litem's responsibilities.  Full 
investigations of the facts relevant to [the issues before the court] should be 
completed by the guardian ad litem, including interviewing witnesses deemed 
appropriate by the guardian ad litem, custody evaluators, if any, counselors, 
teachers, relatives, and friends.  
Based on the evidence, input from any experts, and their own best 
judgment, the guardians ad litem will develop their recommendations concerning 
[the issues].  They should 
communicate with the parents' counsel, preferably in writing, regarding the 
proposed recommendations sufficiently in advance of trial to allow them to 
prepare evidence in response to the recommendations.  If the parties agree, those 
recommendations should be provided to the court prior to trial.  To fulfill their obligations to the 
children they represent, guardians ad litem must take the necessary steps to 
assure sufficient evidence is presented at trial either by introducing the 
evidence themselves or assuring counsel for one or both parents are prepared to 
do so.  Finally, guardians ad litem 
should present their recommendations to the court in the form of closing 
argument and not through personal testimony.

 

Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶ 26, 22 P.3d  at 870.

 

[¶33]   Our most recent experience with 
this issue was in Robbins v. Robbins, 2002 WY 80, 46 P.3d 880 (Wyo. 
2002).  The parties in a divorce action had 
agreed to the appointment of an attorney to act as GAL for their child, and they 
had further stipulated both that the GAL could testify at trial and that her 
report could be introduced into evidence.  
Id., 2002 WY 80, ¶ 1, 46 P.3d  at 881.  After trial, the district court denied 
the mother's motion for a new trial, in which motion the mother alleged error in 
the court allowing the GAL to testify.  
Id., 2002 WY 80, ¶ 6, 46 P.3d  at 882.  We affirmed on two grounds:  first, that the mother could not 
identify how the GAL's testimony created any injustice; and second, that, to the 
extent error occurred, it was invited error.  Id., 2002 WY 80, ¶¶ 9-10, 46 P.3d  
at 883.

 

[¶34]   It is within this legal framework 
that we must consider the appellant's arguments in the present case.  Unfortunately, as with her other 
contentions, much of the appellant's claim in this regard consists of innuendo 
and rhetoric rather than cogent factual presentation and legal argument.11  As best as we can determine, her 
specific complaints are:  (1) the 
GAL appointment order was not entered for nearly three months after the petition 
was filed, during which period the person appointed as GAL had been acting as 
attorney for the children; (2) the GAL was aware of the intrusiveness of the 
grandparents and CW into the appellant's relationship with her children, yet the 
GAL actively supported visitation between the grandparents, CW and the children; 
(3) the GAL did not adequately distinguish the individual children's 
preferences; (4) the GAL did not adequately distinguish his role as an attorney 
from his role as GAL; (5) there never was an order appointing the GAL as the 
children's attorney; (6) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-416 does not recognize hybrid 
representation and does not allow for appointment of an attorney/GAL; and (7) 
the record sometimes refers to the children's GAL and sometimes to their 
attorney.

 

[¶35]   The appellant is certainly correct 
that the record is less than clear as to how John Frentheway (Frentheway) first 
became involved in this case.  His 
first appearance was at the initial hearing on January 3, 2002, where he was 
addressed by the court as the GAL, even though his order of appointment as GAL 
was not entered until February 28, 2002.  
There is also some confusion in the record as to his status as attorney 
for the children.  While he is 
referred to on the title page of each hearing or trial transcript as GAL, he is 
referred to in the juvenile court orders that followed as the children's 
attorney.12

 

[¶36]   We cannot help but conclude that 
there is no substance to this argument.  
To begin with, it is based on the appellant's mistaken belief that the 
same person cannot serve as both GAL and attorney.  Since one person can fulfill both roles 
under the hybrid concept of Clark, it is not necessary that the person be 
specifically identified as one or the other.  In addition, there does not seem to have 
been any actual confusion at the time; everyone knew that Frentheway was an 
attorney who had been appointed GAL.  
There was only one order of appointment, and that was as GAL.  Even the appellant's counsel referred to 
Frentheway as the GAL.  And the 
juvenile court judge made a specific finding that Frentheway was the 
GAL.

 

[¶37]   The appellant's complaint that 
Frentheway, an attorney, was appointed as GAL must fail for two other 
reasons.  First, the record is clear 
that Frentheway's participation in motion hearings and at trial was within the 
boundaries we set forth in Moore, Clark, and Pace.  He questioned witnesses and 
presented argument, but he did not, himself, appear as a witness.  And second, the appellant can point to 
no prejudice that resulted from Frentheway's appointment or the hybrid role he 
played.  A close reading of the 
record and of the appellant's appellate brief indicates that the appellant's 
objections to Frentheway are actually based on Frentheway's siding with the 
State on the neglect issue and Frentheway's support for the idea of visitation 
between the children and their grandparents.

 

Was 
the appellant denied procedural due process in the juvenile court proceedings 
due to the absence of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be 
heard?

 

[¶38]   Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, provides 
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law."  The similar 
provision found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  "Notice and the opportunity to be heard 
are touch stones of this due process of law."  Pecha v. Smith, Keller & 
Associates, 942 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1997).  The notice and hearing opportunity must 
be "appropriate to the nature of the case," and the opportunity to be heard must 
be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"  Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Moore v. Board of Educ. of 
Fulton Public School No. 58, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. 1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 916 (1993)).  The party claiming an infringement of 
his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both that he has a 
protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible 
way.  Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 1989).  The question is whether there has been a 
denial of fundamental fairness.  
Id.

 

[¶39]   Actions infringing upon the 
parent-child relationship may affect fundamental rights, thereby entitling 
parents to due process.  Matter 
of SAJ, 942 P.2d 407, 409 (Wyo. 1997) (custody and visitation); MB, 933 
P.2d at 1129 (parental rights termination).   Not all such infringements, 
however, are of the same magnitude.  
See A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982) (under equal protection challenge, strict 
scrutiny not required of legislative classification disallowing non-family 
member from attacking a presumption of paternity).  Termination of parental rights, for 
instance, requires clear and convincing evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309 (LexisNexis 
2003); MB, 933 P.2d  at 1129.  Child neglect, on the other hand, need 
only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-425(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  In the realm of 
due process, this is consonant with the requirement that notice and the 
opportunity to be heard must be appropriate to the nature of the 
case.

 

[¶40]   The chronology of events is 
important in understanding the appellant's due process argument.  The underlying incident occurred on 
December 2, 2001.  The petition was 
filed and a temporary shelter care hearing was held two days later.  The juvenile court judge left the 
children in DFS custody for continued shelter care.  On December 21, 2001, an Order Setting 
Arraignment was entered.  That order 
provided simply that "the above entitled matter be, and the same is hereby set 
for ARRAIGNMENT" on January 3, 2002.  
The arraignment, sometimes also called an initial appearance or initial 
hearing, took place as scheduled.  
Statutory guidance as to the purpose of the initial hearing is found in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426(a):

 

At 
their initial hearing, which may be held after a shelter care hearing or a 
transfer hearing, the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be 
advised by the court of their rights under law and as provided in this act.  They shall also be advised of the 
specific allegations in the petition and given an opportunity to admit or deny 
them.  They shall also be advised of 
the possible liability for costs of treatment or services pursuant to this 
act.  It is not necessary at the 
initial appearance for the district attorney to establish probable cause to 
believe the allegations in the petition are true.

 

[¶41]   During the initial hearing, the 
appellant denied the allegations of the petition.  The juvenile court noted the denial and 
ordered that the matter be set for trial on motion of a party.  The GAL then orally moved the juvenile 
court for an order allowing the children to have visitation with the 
grandparents and CW.  Counsel for 
the appellant objected to the juvenile court's consideration of the motion 
because the appellant had not received notice that the issue would be raised at 
the initial hearing.  Counsel also 
advised the juvenile court that there was significant controversy among family 
members and that testimony would be required for a proper decision.  The GAL responded that the children had 
always had close relationships with these relatives and that a sudden disruption 
of those relationships would be detrimental to the children.  The juvenile court granted the 
motion.

 

[¶42]   In this appeal, the appellant 
contends both that she was given no notice that the visitation issue would arise 
at the initial hearing and that she was not given an opportunity to present 
evidence on the matter.  For several 
reasons, we conclude that the facts of this case, when viewed in their totality, 
do not establish that the appellant's right to due process was violated.  To begin with, while Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-426(a) says nothing about other matters being raised at the initial 
hearing, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426(f) provides that "[a]t any time prior to 
disposition under W.S. 14-3-429, the court, on motion of any party or on its own 
motion, may reconsider its order regarding shelter care or conditions of release 
made under W.S. 14-3-409 or 14-3-414."  
Certainly, that is some notice to the parent that issues involving the 
conditions of shelter care may arise at any time.  Furthermore, the very nature of shelter 
care requires near-emergency responses to unexpected issues that arise in the 
days and weeks following the filing of a neglect petition.  It must be remembered that, under due 
process analysis, the notice and opportunity to be heard are to be appropriate 
to the nature of the case.

 

[¶43]   There is a further and even more 
substantive reason that the appellant's due process argument must fail.  On January 15, 2002, the appellant filed 
a motion seeking in part the juvenile court's reconsideration of the visitation 
order.  That motion was heard on 
February 21, 2002.  At the hearing, 
the appellant's counsel introduced exhibits, produced witnesses, cross-examined 
the witnesses produced by the State and the GAL, and argued the motion.  Clearly, this was meaningful notice and 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

 

Was 
the appellant denied procedural due process in the juvenile court proceedings by 
the failure to meet the requirements of W.R.C.P. 58?

 

[¶44]   In Wyoming, written judgments and 
orders generally are prepared by the successful party.  In criminal cases and in juvenile court, 
the State frequently drafts most orders.  
This practice of allowing one side to prepare court orders requires a 
process whereby the other side can review them before they are signed by the 
judge.  Read together, W.R.Cr.P. 1 
and W.R.C.P. 58 provide that process, which is the same for civil, criminal, and 
juvenile matters.  The substantive 
provisions are found in W.R.C.P. 58(a):

 

Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 55(b) and unless otherwise ordered by the court, 
written judgments or orders shall be presented to the court within 20 days after 
its decision is made known.  Before 
submitting the judgment or order, the party drafting it shall seek to secure the 
written approval as to form of the other parties.  If, within 10 days, approval as to form 
is not obtained, the party drafting the form of judgment or order may forward 
the original to the court and serve a copy on the other parties with a notice 
advising objections must be made within 10 days.  If no written objection is timely filed, 
the court may sign the judgment or order.  
If objection is filed, the court will resolve the matter with or without 
a hearing.  A party objecting shall 
submit an alternative form of judgment or order with the 
objection.

 

[¶45]   The appellant first raised this 
issue at the February 21, 2002, motion hearing when she informed the juvenile 
court that the orders being entered in the case were not being circulated for 
approval as to form.  In its 
response, the State made no pretense of any attempt to follow W.R.C.P. 
58:

 

[ASSISTANT 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, as 
the Court is well aware both from our work in juvenile cases and our work in 
adult cases, the district attorney's office has a huge number of orders that it 
prepares.  It would be absolutely 
unwielding [sic] for us to contact each and every defense attorney and 
hold those orders both from your signature and from [filing] with the court 
until each attorney made it into our office.

 

It 
is the standard practice of our office to have the orders prepared within 48 to 
72 hours.  We do, generally, hold 
them for approximately five business days after.  If the attorneys have not presented 
themselves to review and sign the orders, they are submitted to the Court 
unsigned.

 

[¶46]   In resolving this dispute, the 
juvenile court also made no effort to see that W.R.C.P. 58 was 
followed:

 

            
THE COURT:  
Okay.

 

            
Well, you're on notice that if you want to review orders before they're 
submitted, you have five days after the district attorney's office prepares 
them, at which time you will go to the office and look at them and register 
objections, or sign off on the order.  
It seems to me a reasonable period of time, is a pretty standard 
practice, and we'll just have to proceed on that basis in this 
case.

 

            
Could you have someone call [the appellant's counsel] and advise her when 
an order's ready?

 

[¶47]   The related questions that this 
issue should raise are (1) whether W.R.C.P. 58(a) is mandatory, 
and (2) if so, what is the effect of a failure to abide by the rule?  It would be helpful to consider whether 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, generally, are mandatory,13 whether use of the word "shall" 
makes the specific provisions of W.R.C.P. 58(a) mandatory,14 and why W.R.C.P. 58 differs from 
its federal counterpart.15  Likewise, does the excepting phrase, 
"unless otherwise ordered by the court," apply to all the requirements of 
subsection (a), or just to the twenty-day presentment deadline contained in the 
first sentence?

 

[¶48]   These are pertinent questions, but 
the appellant has not raised them nor has she made any effort to answer 
them.  In fact, the appellant does 
not cite to a single case or other authority in support of her W.R.C.P. 58(a) 
argument.16  Where a party fails to present cogent 
argument supported by pertinent authority, we will not consider the matter.   In re KD, 2001 WY 61, ¶ 8, 
26 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Wyo. 2001); 
Small v. Convenience Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Wyo. 
2000).  The appellant hints in her appellate 
brief that she was prejudiced because the first order in the case did not 
coincide with the record from that hearing, but she fails even to suggest what 
that prejudice was.  Similarly, she 
complains that her attorney was not contacted to approve later orders as to 
form, but she makes no effort to ascribe to this failure any particular errors 
in fact in such orders.  Nothing has 
been provided to this Court that would justify reversing the juvenile court on 
this issue.

 

Was 
the appellant denied procedural due process in the juvenile court proceedings by 
the arbitrary denial of motions for continuance when rule requirements have been 
met?

 

[¶49]   On April 5, 2002, the GAL filed a 
document entitled Motion for Consideration to Allow the Minors to Participate in 
Athletic Activities and Request for Hearing.  Despite the breadth of its title, it is 
clear from the body of the motion and from the hearing transcript that the sole 
purpose of the motion was to obtain the juvenile court's approval of the oldest 
child's participation in a school swimming program.  An order setting the motion for hearing 
on April 11, 2002, was hand delivered to the appellant's counsel on April 9, 
2002.  The next day, the appellant's 
counsel filed a motion seeking continuance of the hearing because counsel would 
be unavailable due to a previously scheduled deposition.

 

[¶50]   The hearing was held as 
scheduled.  Substitute counsel again 
sought a continuance, citing regular counsel's absence due to the deposition and 
the appellant's absence due to her work schedule.17  The oral motion for continuance was 
denied, substitute counsel called no witnesses and made no arguments, and the 
GAL's motion was granted.

 

[¶51]   The appellant presents three 
arguments to this Court in support of her contention that it was error for the 
juvenile court to deny the continuance:  
(1) W.R.C.P. 6(c) and (d) require that motions shall be served at least 
thirteen days before the hearing;18 (2) Rule 201 of the Uniform Rules 
of the District Courts (URDC) provides that "[c]ontinuances will be granted only 
for good cause shown"; and (3) the GAL misrepresented to the juvenile court the 
facts as to the appellant's objections to her daughter's participation in 
swimming.  Finally, the appellant 
contends that it was arbitrary and capricious for the juvenile court to rely on 
the statements and recommendations of the GAL at the 
hearing.

 

[¶52]   "The granting of a continuance is a 
matter for the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion."  In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d  at 
1149; 
see also Jones, 903 P.2d  at 547.

 

            
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 
(1985).'"

 

In 
re Board of County Com'rs, Sublette County, 2001 
WY 91, ¶ 11, 33 P.3d 107, 112 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)).  "An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
trial court could not reasonably conclude as it did."  In re Board of County Com'rs, 
Sublette County, 2001 WY 91, ¶ 11, 33 P.3d  at 112.  "There is a heavy burden placed upon an 
appellant to show such abuse."  
Id.

 

[¶53]   In another context, that being 
review of administrative agency action, we have said that the determination of 
whether that action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion 
requires this Court to look to whether the agency's decision is based on a 
consideration of relevant factors and whether it is rational.  Taylor v. Wyoming Bd. of Medicine, 
930 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1997).  Were we to apply that standard in the 
instant case, we would be inclined to conclude that the juvenile court did not 
consider relevant factors in denying the appellant's motion for a continuance.19  However, at the risk of redundancy, we 
will point out that, as with other issues, the appellant has not identified the 
appropriate standard of review for this issue, and she has cited no authority, 
other than W.R.C.P. 6 and U.R.D.C. 202, themselves, in support of her 
position.  Furthermore, she has not 
even claimed, no less identified, any harm or prejudice that resulted from 
denial of the continuance.  As a 
result of the hearing, the children were allowed to participate in their 
schools' swimming programs.  There 
is no evidence in the record, nor does the appellant argue, that this caused her 
any hardship, financial or otherwise, or created any risk or harm to the 
children.  We do not even know if 
the children actually took up swimming.  
As with other issues, the appellant has failed to support her contentions 
with cogent legal argument based on pertinent authority, and she has shown no 
prejudice.

 

Did 
the juvenile court err in finding neglect under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-402(a)(xii)(A) (LexisNexis 2003)?

 

[¶54]   Contrary to the dictates of 
W.R.A.P. 7.01(f)(2), the appellant's appellate brief does not contain "a concise 
statement of the applicable standard of review" as to this issue.  As part of the "Conclusion" section of 
her appellate brief, the appellant does define the term "abuse of 
discretion."  It appears that she 
may have intended to argue that this standard governs all the issues of the 
case.  We perceive, as did 
DFS in its appellate brief, that this issue actually presents a question as to 
the sufficiency of the evidence.

 

In 
reviewing a record for sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of neglect, 
we:

 

"1.        Give 
considerable deference to the trial court's determination because it has the 
advantage to judge the demeanor and intelligence of the 
witnesses;

 

2.         
Examine the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee and resolve 
all conflicts in evidence for appellee;

 

3.         
Assume as true the evidence in appellee's favor, disregard entirely 
appellant's evidence in conflict with appellee's evidence, and give to 
appellee's evidence every favorable inference that may fairly be 
drawn."

 

MP 
v. State in Interest of CP, 965 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d 564, 
565 (Wyo. 1990) and Matter of RJP, 761 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Wyo. 
1988)).  The State had to prove neglect by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which means that it had to prove it was more 
likely than not that neglect occurred.  
Id.

 

[¶55]   The neglect petition in the instant 
case was based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(xii)(A), which defines 
"neglected child" as a child "[w]hose custodian has failed or refused to provide 
adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical or any 
other care necessary for the child's well being[.]"  The petition alleged not only the events 
of December 2, 2001, but also that the appellant had a severe alcohol and drug 
problem, that the children were afraid to go home, and that DDH was extremely 
despondent and had recently threatened suicide.

 

[¶56]   Nine witnesses testified during the 
two-day adjudicatory hearing:  three 
called by the State, five called by the appellant, and one called by the 
GAL.  The juvenile court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 11, 2002.  The juvenile court's findings covered 
both the events of December 2, 2001, and the inter-family relationships and 
problems.  Based on those findings, 
the juvenile court concluded that the children were neglected under the 
statutory definition.

 

[¶57]   In her appellate brief, the 
appellant contends that the family's difficulties had been caused by the 
intrusive meddling of her parents and CW, that the children are well-behaved and 
well-mannered, that neither the appellant nor the children have been in trouble 
with the law, and that the juvenile court's comments during the hearing suggest 
that it believed the appellant was charged with psychological and emotional 
abuse of the children.  She also 
complains that her proposed expert witness was not allowed to testify as to the 
effect of her father's interference.20

 

[¶58]   The appellant's approach to this 
issue is contrary to our standard of review.  We do not review the record to determine 
whether there is evidence to support the appellant's position.  Rather, as outlined above, we disregard 
the appellant's evidence and assume the appellee's evidence is true.  Consequently, the appellant's recitation 
of the evidence she believes establishes the "manipulation and subversiveness" 
of her father is of no avail.  The 
question is whether the evidence, examined in the light most favorable to the 
State, and with conflicts therein resolved in favor of the State, leads to the 
conclusion that, more likely than not, the children were 
neglected.

 

[¶59]   When we apply the proper standard, 
we find sufficient evidence of neglect.  
The transcript is replete with testimony that could have been relied upon 
by the juvenile court in reaching its conclusion.  DDH could not locate the appellant at 
home, so she called the VFW bar, having memorized the telephone number from 
frequent calls there.  The appellant 
and her boyfriend went to the VFW bar and consumed alcohol nearly every 
night.  DDH, her grandfather, and 
two police officers were of the opinion that the appellant was drunk when 
contacted at the VFW and later at her home.  The appellant admitted she had consumed 
five beers and a shot of tequila.  
The appellant's boyfriend threatened her father with physical 
violence.  The appellant's boyfriend 
had threatened the children with physical violence and called them inappropriate 
things, such as "slut, whore, bitch, retard, stupid, dumb, moron."  Although the children were usually 
locked in the basement at such times, DDH had witnessed the appellant and a 
previous boyfriend using controlled substancesa white powder that they 
"sniffed"on more than one occasion.  
The appellant and her boyfriend would "grope each other" in front of the 
children.  The appellant's conduct 
led to family arguments and fighting.  
DDH recently had attempted, or at least threatened, 
suicide.

 

[¶60]   It simply cannot be that this 
testimony, if believed by the juvenile court, was insufficient to establish that 
neglect had occurred.  Almost by 
definition, these circumstances constitute the failure or refusal to provide the 
adequate care, maintenance, and supervision necessary for the children's well 
being.

 

Is 
the juvenile court's Order for Transfer of Physical Placement Upon Motion 
Hearing an appealable order?

 

[¶61]   This Court reviews judgments and 
"appealable orders" of the district courts.  W.R.A.P. 1.04(a).  For purposes of this case, an order 
affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding is an appealable 
order.  W.R.A.P. 1.05(b).  Proceedings in juvenile court are 
special proceedings and both adjudication and disposition affect substantial 
rights.  In Interest of MFB, 
860 P.2d  at 1147; 
State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 168-70 (Wyo. 1981).

 

[¶62]   The State's contention in the 
instant case is that the July 3, 2002, order was simply an interlocutory 
placement order pending disposition, and it is therefore not appealable.  The State points to an Order Setting 
Further Disposition filed October 1, 2002, as proof that disposition had not yet 
occurred when the July 3, 2002, order was entered.  We do not agree with the State's 
interpretation of the documents in the record.  While the October 1, 2002, setting order 
may be the first record use of the word "disposition," it is noteworthy that the 
order actually refers to "further disposition," an obvious implication that 
initial disposition has occurred.  
Furthermore, the October 1, 2002, setting order was filed after the 
appeal was taken, which raises the question of whether it should be 
considered.  Beyond that, however, 
is the fact that the July 3, 2002, order goes far beyond temporary placement 
pending disposition.  For instance, 
it includes the following language:

 

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
the Laramie County Field Office of the Wyoming Department of Family Services 
shall monitor the provisions of services in accordance with a continuing case 
plan of working towards family reunification.

 

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the Laramie County Field Office of the Wyoming Department of Family 
Services shall provide the Court with reports of the parent's progress and 
behavior not less than every three (3) months and shall make such recommendation 
for further disposition as indicated.

 

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
no later than six (6) months from entry of this Order that the Laramie County 
Field Office of the Wyoming Department of Family Services shall advise this 
Court if the plan for working toward family reunification has not been achieved, 
at which time this Court shall set a hearing in this 
matter.

 

[¶63]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-402(a)(i) defines "adjudication" as "a finding by the court or the jury, 
incorporated in a decree, as to the truth of the facts alleged in the 
petition[.]"  The document entitled 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed June 11, 2002, specifically 
referred to this definition and included a specific finding that "[t]he Court 
finds that the facts alleged in the petition are true."  The juvenile court's intent seems to 
have been that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law would act as a decree 
of adjudication.  Clearly, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(i) contemplates a separate decree.  In addition, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-426(c) requires entry of a decree:

 

If 
after an adjudicatory hearing or a valid admission or confession the court or 
jury finds that a child is neglected, it shall enter a decree to that effect 
stating the jurisdictional facts upon which the decree is based.  It may then proceed immediately or at a 
postponed hearing within sixty (60) days to make proper disposition of the 
child.

 

[¶64]   The absence of a decree in this 
case is troublesome, but it has not directly been raised as an issue.  Similarly, the July 3, 2002, order does 
not appear to meet the statutory qualifications for a disposition order, but 
that also has not been addressed.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429 (LexisNexis 2003).  We have treated both the June 11, 2002, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the July 3, 2002, Order for Transfer 
of Physical Placement Upon Motion Hearing as appealable orders because they had 
the effect of an adjudicatory decree and a dispositional order, and they 
affected the appellant's substantial rights.

 

Did 
the juvenile court err in allowing the children to have visitation with their 
grandparents and aunt?

 

[¶65]   Some of the procedural history of 
this case requires repeating in order to place this issue in context.  The children were placed in shelter care 
on December 2, 2001.  A neglect 
petition was filed two days later.  
At the initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court granted the 
GAL's oral motion to allow the children to visit with their grandparents and 
aunt.  Soon thereafter, the 
appellant filed a motion, one part of which requested reconsideration of the 
visitation order.  That motion was 
denied after a hearing.  Several 
months later, after the adjudicatory hearing, the GAL filed a motion to change 
the children's foster placement to the home of the aunt, CW.  That motion was granted over the 
appellant's objection, by an order dated July 3, 2002.

 

[¶66]   The appellant's Notice of Appeal 
stated that appeal was being taken from the order finding neglect and from the 
July 3, 2002, order mentioned above.  
The challenged visitation was authorized first when the juvenile court 
granted the GAL's oral motion at the initial hearing, it was authorized again 
when the juvenile court denied reconsideration of that decision, and it was 
authorized a third time as part of the July 3, 2002, order changing 
placement.  The appellant's 
appellate brief relies heavily on testimony from the May 2002 adjudicatory 
hearing in arguing against visitation.  
In its appellate brief, the State does not discuss this 
issue.

 

[¶67]   As is consistent with the rest of 
the appellant's brief, the section dealing with this issue contains neither a 
statement as to the standard of review nor citation to pertinent legal 
authority.  We assume, because of 
the general reference to "abuse of discretion" in the conclusion section of the 
appellant's appellate brief, that it is her position that such is the standard 
of review for all the issues of the case.  
Without cogent argument provided by counsel, we are not inclined to 
venture on our own into determining whether that is the appropriate standard of 
review for this issue or whether review should be for sufficiency of the 
evidence.21  The best that can be said for the 
appellant's argument in this appeal is that, despite the juvenile court's 
repeated rulings, the appellant continues to believe that visitation between the 
children and their grandparents is a bad idea.  Even if we agreed, we cannot substitute 
our judgment for that of the juvenile court.

 

[¶68]   More than once, the juvenile court 
heard testimony and argument about the inter-family relationships, and it made 
specific findings as to the grandparents' historic role in the children's 
lives.  Although the appellant 
certainly produced evidence that the grandparents and aunt did, indeed, meddle 
in the appellant's family affairs, it cannot be said that the great weight of 
the evidence was to that effect.  
There was considerable evidence supporting the juvenile court's 
conclusion that the children benefited from their association with their 
grandparents.  Whether measured 
under an abuse of discretion standard, or as a question of sufficiency of the 
evidence, the appellant has not shown that the decision of the juvenile court 
was in error.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶69]   On all issues raised in this 
appeal, the appellant has either failed to show that the juvenile court erred in 
the particular manner alleged, or has failed to show that she was prejudiced by 
any such error, or both.  The record 
contains sufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that the 
children were neglected under the statutory definition.  Further, the record reveals that the 
juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting visitation 
between the children and their grandparents and aunt.  To the contrary, the juvenile court 
heard the matter thoroughly and repeatedly, and there was sufficient evidence in 
the record to sustain its visitation decisions.

 

[¶70]   We affirm.
  

GOLDEN, 
Justice, dissenting, in which HILL, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 

[¶71]   I respectfully dissent.  I do not believe that leaving one's 
children with their grandparents, being intoxicated to an unknown degree on one 
occasion, or being uncooperative with law enforcement legally constitutes 
neglect.  I also believe many 
serious mistakes were made during the course of the proceedings below that 
deserve comment and that such comment is a proper use of this Court's 
supervisory authority over juvenile courts.  Wyo. Const. Art. 5, § 2 ("The supreme 
court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in 
both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control 
over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed 
by law.").

 

[¶72]   I preface my remarks by stating 
that I am approaching this case from both broad and narrow perspectives.  The narrow perspective involves 
analyzing the facts of this particular case.  There is no doubt this family has 
serious problems, and the children should not be returned to Mother without 
careful, individualized review.  
After all, the overriding goal of a proceeding under the Child Protection 
Act is to protect children.  A 
finding that the allegations in the petition do not constitute legally 
cognizable neglect in no way prevents the state from either amending its 
petition in this case or filing a new petition, as may be appropriate.  

 

[¶73]   The broad perspective involves 
analyzing this case within the context of the Child Protection Act.  The Child Protection Act requires 
balance between protecting children and timely establishing a permanent living 
arrangement for the children.  With 
exceptions, the general goal in a child protection proceeding is either family 
reunification or termination of parental rights, freeing the children for 
adoption.  This balance serves the 
best interest of all children.  
Unfortunately, this balance has not been achieved in this 
proceeding.

 

[¶74]   I agree that neither brief provides 
much guidance to this Court.  
Mother's brief is a general diatribe upon the juvenile court 
process.  While this does not help 
this Court resolve the current situation, it does reveal a seriously 
dysfunctional juvenile court system.  
Certainly the safety of the children is the primary concern, but the 
ultimate goal of the juvenile system is to maintain the family unit whenever 
safely and reasonably possible.  In 
this case, the record discloses that no efforts were made to reunify this mother 
with her three children before adjudication.

 

[¶75]   Physical custody and adjudication 
of neglect are two distinct aspects of a juvenile court action.  With regard to physical custody, the 
Child Protection Act very clearly requires reasonable efforts to maintain 
children in their home and reasonable efforts to reunify the family if the 
children must be removed from the home.  
At the informal shelter care hearing, the juvenile court made a finding 
in its order that the state was complying with these reasonable efforts 
requirements.  A review of the 
transcript from that hearing, however, reveals that the issue of reasonable 
efforts was never discussed.  The 
findings, therefore, are completely unsupported by the evidence.  Indeed, a review of the entire record 
reveals that no reasonable efforts to reunify this family were ever implemented 
before adjudication.

 

[¶76]   The statutory reasonable efforts 
requirement begins immediately upon the removal of a child from the home.  The heart of reasonable efforts to 
reunify a family is a case plan, created with the cooperation and consultation 
of family members, DFS and an MDT.  
Although the juvenile court timely ordered an MDT to convene, no MDT was 
ever appointed or convened.  More 
disturbingly, there is no indication that a case plan was ever created and 
adopted.  Child specific case plans 
provide the juvenile court with a means to determine the appropriate goals for 
the family and gauge the progress of the family in achieving these goals, with 
reunification being the required result when safely and reasonably 
possible.  Without a case plan and 
constant evaluation thereof, there are no concrete criteria by which a parent's 
behavior and progress can be measured.  
Ultimately, the lack of a case plan results in there being no means by 
which a parent can regain custody of his or her children.  This result flies in the face of the 
constitutional dimension of the right to familial association and the language 
of the Child Protection Act.

 

[¶77]   The state justified the absence of 
an MDT by stating that the convening of an MDT is not appropriate before 
adjudication.  The essence of the 
argument presented by the state is that convening an MDT (and thereby 
effectuating case planning) is potentially a wasted effort if the parent is 
denying all allegations.  As 
mentioned above, adjudication and custody are two distinct aspects of a juvenile 
court proceeding.  The Child 
Protection Act clearly contemplates that attempts to reunify the family must 
begin immediately.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-427 (LexisNexis 2003) contemplates an MDT being appointed as soon as 
possible after a petition is filed.  
The MDT is specifically required to review each child's individual 
situation for the purpose of making case planning recommendations. 
§ 14-3-427(e). The parent's denial of the allegations is simply a factor to 
be weighed in determining appropriate case plan options.  The statute specifically provides that 
the recommendations of the MDT are not to be considered by the juvenile court 
before adjudication without the consent of the child and the parent.  § 14-3-427(h).  This section clearly anticipates that 
the MDT will be functioning before adjudication.  

 

[¶78]   The Act also contains other 
provisions that require case planning to begin immediately upon the filing of 
the petition if a child is removed from the home.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429(a)(iv) 
(LexisNexis 2003) requires the juvenile court at adjudication 
to:

 

ensure 
that reasonable efforts were made by the department of family services to 
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child's home or 
to make it possible for the child to return to the child's home.  Before placing a child outside of the 
home, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that to return the 
child to the child's home would not be in the best interest of the child despite 
efforts that have been made[.]

 

Further, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(c) (LexisNexis 2003) mandates that the juvenile 
court:

 

shall 
conduct a review hearing six (6) months from the date of the child's removal 
from the home, twelve (12) months from the date of the child's removal from the 
home, and not less than once every twelve (12) months thereafter.  At each of these review hearings the 
court shall review the case plan to determine:

                                    
(i) The health and safety of the child;

                                    
(ii) The continuing necessity for the placement;

                                    
(iii) The appropriateness of the current placement;

(iv) 
The reasonableness of efforts made to reunify the family and the consistency of 
those efforts with the case plan;

(v) 
The appropriateness of the case plan and the extent of compliance with the case 
plan including the permanent placement of the child;

(vi) 
If progress has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes 
necessitating placement outside the home and the extent of that progress; 
and

(vii) 
The date the child is expected to be returned to the home or placed for adoption 
or legal guardianship.

 

The 
time requirements for these case plan reviews by the juvenile court run from the 
date the child is removed from the home.  
It is important that these time frames are followed because § 14-3-431(d) 
mandates:

 

When 
a child has been placed in foster care under the responsibility of the state for 
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months the state shall file a 
petition to terminate parental rights or seek to be joined as a party to the 
petition if a petition has been filed by another party, 
unless:

                                    
(i) The child is in the care of a relative;

(ii) 
The state agency has documented in the case plan a compelling reason for 
determining that filing the petition is not in the best interest of the child; 
or

(iii) 
The state agency has not provided services to the child's family deemed to be 
necessary for the safe return of the child to the home, if reasonable efforts 
described in W.S. 14-3-440 are required to be made.[1]

 

[¶79]   The statutory framework reveals 
that the critical action invoking the beginning of reasonable efforts to reunify 
the family is the removal of a child from her home.  Because the process potentially leads to 
the termination of parental rights, due process concerns permeate the entire 
proceedings.  Even if termination of 
parental rights is not statutorily required, it is always in the best interests 
of the child to effect permanency and, if circumstances allow, family 
reunification as quickly as possible.  

 

[¶80]   In the instant proceeding, no case 
plan was ever developed.  There was 
never any specific finding by clear and convincing evidence in the order of 
adjudication that the return of the children to their home would not be in their 
best interests.  There is no 
indication that the situation of each child was evaluated individually to 
determine what was best for each, individual child.  There are no case plan reviews as 
required under § 14-3-431(c) (obviously a futile activity given the absence of 
case plans).  The juvenile court 
refused to even consider Mother's motion for the return of her children filed 
January 15, 2002.2  Even if the juvenile court had 
entertained the motion, because there was no case plan and no MDT, there would 
have been little if any information available to the juvenile court upon which 
it could make an informed decision based upon the objectively determined best 
interests of each, individual child.  

 

[¶81]   Further, not only was this mother 
separated from her children, the juvenile court seemingly even refused to 
acknowledge that Mother retained certain residual parental rights.3  At the hearing on Mother's motion for 
return of her children, the juvenile court commented that Mother maintained no 
supervisory authority over the children.  
The juvenile court repeatedly deferred to the recommendations of the GAL 
over the express objections of Mother, without taking evidence.  Mother's wishes were given seemingly 
little to no weight.  This is not to 
say that a parent can micromanage the lives of her children when her children 
have been placed in the legal custody of the state.  The right to make certain major 
decisions, however, remains with the parent.

 

[¶82]   The lack of an MDT and a case plan 
takes on even more significance in this case because Mother and the GAL 
disagreed on what was best for the children on several occasions.4  This case presents disturbing family 
dynamics.  There are strong 
indications that actions of the grandfather and possibly the aunt (Mother's 
sister) are negatively affecting the relationship between Mother and the 
children. The juvenile court, however, granted visitation to these family 
members, over Mother's objection, solely upon the recommendation of the GAL.5  The juvenile court also has ordered 
placement of the children with the aunt, again solely upon the recommendation of 
the GAL.  Whether such visitation 
and placement are in the best interests of the children is undetermined.  No evidence has been presented.  An MDT would have independently 
evaluated the family dynamics and objectively decided what was in the best 
interests of these children, thus putting more confidence in any decision 
reached by the juvenile court.  

 

[¶83]   In short, a review of the record in 
this case reveals an utter disregard for the provisions of the Child Protection 
Act dealing with child custody, family reunification and permanency.  Having said this, however, I also must 
emphasize that Mother shares the burden of ensuring the system functions 
appropriately.  The defects noted 
above do not affect the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  The remedy for alleged violations of 
statutory directives or due process violations is first to request appropriate 
action from the juvenile court.  If 
the juvenile court does not act, the remedy then is to seek review from this 
Court.  See generally, In 
Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140 (Wyo. 1993); In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1989).  Further, if 
Mother were truly interested in improving family life for her children, she 
could have voluntarily undertaken to resolve some of the obvious issues even 
without a case plan and then present the juvenile court with evidence of her 
efforts.  The record reveals that 
every party to these proceedings has failed these 
children.

 

[¶84]   Mother also complains about the 
appointment of John Frentheway as the GAL in this action.  While her argument is poorly presented, 
I perceive the issue Mother to be raising as a very focused issue.  The issue is not, as the majority 
opinion suggests, whether an attorney can be both a GAL and an attorney for a 
child.  The issue Mother raises is 
actually one of statutory interpretation.  
Mother argues that if Frentheway was the attorney for the children, his 
appointment as GAL violates Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-416, which prohibits the 
juvenile court from appointing a representative of any party to a Child 
Protection proceeding as GAL.  The 
majority opinion also recognizes the potential implication of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-211.  Section 14-3-211 requires 
a court appointed attorney for a child to also represent the child's best 
interests.  Under the facts of this 
case, however, § 14-3-211 does not apply because Frentheway was never appointed 
by the court to act as the attorney for the children.6  Thus, § 14-3-416 controls.  If Frentheway was acting as attorney for 
the children before his court appointment as GAL, he would have been a 
representative of a party (the children) and should not have been appointed 
GAL.

 

[¶85]   It thus becomes important to 
determine exactly what role Frentheway is playing in the juvenile court 
proceeding.  The problem is that his 
initial role in this action is uncertain.  
The record is replete with implications of Frentheway's acting as the 
attorney for the children.  However, 
his authority to represent the children as their attorney is never 
disclosed.  Mother did not hire him 
to represent the children.  He was 
not appointed by the juvenile court, either as a private attorney or as a public 
defender.7  It is even unclear if he was claiming to 
represent all three children or only the oldest child.8  Thus, the representation of the children 
is very unclear.  Even after the 
juvenile court finally appointed Frentheway to be the GAL for the children on 
February 28, 2002, Frentheway continued to be referred to as both the attorney 
for the children as well as the children's GAL.9   

 

[¶86]   Because the record is unclear as to 
Frentheway's role, Mother has failed to meet her burden of proving that the 
statute was violated.  It is not 
appropriate to make any assumptions as to Frentheway's role before his 
appointment by the juvenile court.  
I strongly suggest, however, that the juvenile court resolve this 
issue.  Every party to these 
proceedings has a right to know Frentheway's role.  The juvenile court should immediately 
clarify Frentheway's status.  If 
Frentheway is acting as attorney for the children, his authority should be made 
explicit and he should be removed as GAL if his attorney role began before his 
appointment as GAL.  If Frentheway 
has always been acting as the GAL for the children, the juvenile court must 
ensure Frentheway is properly appointed as GAL at the beginning of 
proceedings.  This is not a minor 
technicality.  Legal representation 
of children is critically important in juvenile proceedings.  These children had no court appointed 
legal representation until almost three months after the petition was 
filed.  Further, although one person 
can fulfill both roles, the roles are distinct, with distinct obligations.  Everyone involved in the proceeding, 
most especially the children, must know exactly who is representing the children 
and in what capacity.10

 

[¶87]   Returning now to the narrow 
perspective, the heart of Mother's appeal is her challenge to the adjudication 
of neglect.  The petition alleges 
one incident.11  While one, isolated incident certainly 
can constitute legal neglect, the single incident as alleged in this case does 
not present an issue of legal abuse or neglect.  At best the allegations in the petition 
suggest that Mother and her boyfriend were intoxicated to an unknown degree and, 
upon being informed that her children would not be returned to her, she became 
agitated and uncooperative with law enforcement.  The children, however, were with their 
grandparents, where Mother had delivered them.  For their part, the children did not 
want to return home because they believed Mother was drunk.  The oldest child was particularly 
adamant about refusing to return home, threatening suicide if she was returned 
to her mother.12  While certainly this allegation 
indicates a dysfunctional family with serious problems, the allegation includes 
no indication of legally cognizable neglect.  The children were safely provided for by 
the grandparents, at least initially at mother's request.  

 

[¶88]   I do not question the propriety of 
taking the children into protective custody.  Under the circumstances, taking 
protective custody of the children was a prudent action.  I do not even question whether neglect 
or emotional abuse due to substance abuse or other problems exist in this 
family.  That question is not before 
this Court.  Such allegations were 
not charged in the petition, and, therefore, this Court should not review the 
evidence or offer any opinion on such potential allegations.  Should the State choose to allege 
continuing behaviors that constitute abuse or neglect, it may do so.  

 

[¶89]   The fact, however, is that Mother 
had no prior notice that her entire lifestyle and prior history would be 
available to support a nebulous adjudication of neglect.13  Mother was defending against the single 
incident alleged in the petition.  I 
do not perceive the allegation that Mother was intoxicated to an unknown extent 
on this one occasion to open the door to a generalized allegation of neglect 
through continued substance abuse.  
I do not perceive the mention of Mother's boyfriend in the petition as 
opening the door to an allegation of neglect through Mother's failure to protect 
the children from boyfriend's emotional abuse.  While further allegations may be 
supported by evidence adduced during the course of these proceedings, the 
petition has never been amended to include such allegations.  Due process considerations require that 
a parent have adequate notice of the specific allegations against him or 
her.

 

[¶90]   I would reverse the adjudication of 
neglect under the specific facts of this case.  A parent does not neglect her child by 
placing the child with a caregiver.  
Further, it is not the function of the juvenile court or this Court to 
moralize on a person's lifestyle.  
Whether or not this, or any, court agrees with how this single mother is 
raising her children is irrelevant.  
The only issue is whether Mother is neglecting or abusing her children as 
defined in the Child Protection Act.  
Certainly this family has problems.  
The Child Protection Act requires the State to take a focused approach to 
helping the family resolve its problems, not just separate antagonistic parties 
and then disappear until formal adjudication.  

 

[¶91]   That said above brings me back to 
the physical custody of the children.  
This family has been kept apart for almost two years, with no hope for 
reunification because there has been no case plan.  The right to familial association is a 
fundamental right.  CH v. 
Campbell County D-Pass, 699 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1985) (appellant has a 
"fundamental right to have care and custody of her own child").  The right belongs not only to parents, 
but also to children.  By failing to 
create circumstances under which reunification could be achieved, the juvenile 
court system and every participant therein have failed these children.14  

 

[¶92]   Unfortunately, there is no remedy 
except to remand the case to the juvenile court for proceedings in compliance 
with the Child Protection Act.  
Assuming the petition is amended or a new petition is filed, an MDT 
immediately should evaluate the situation of each child individually to 
determine the best interests of that child.  Case plans for each child must be 
developed and reasonable efforts must be made by the State to reunify this 
family or at least individual children with the mother if safely possible.  The questions of visitation and physical 
placement of the children must be reviewed.  Ultimately, it is the responsibility of 
all the parties to cooperate and timely determine the actions necessary in the 
best interests of the children.  

 

[¶93]   The juvenile court must guide the 
process.  This includes conducting 
the statutorily required case plan reviews and, when appropriate, the juvenile 
court must make a finding, by clear and convincing evidence for each individual 
child, that return to the child's home would not be in the best interest of that 
child (§ 14-3-429(a)(iv)).  Time is 
of the essence.  Do 
it.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1DDH testified that she had memorized 
that number from calling it so frequently.

 

  2Although the GAL began representing 
the children as early as the initial hearing on January 3, 2002, no order of 
appointment had been entered at that time.  
This deficiency was pointed out to the juvenile court at the motion 
hearing on February 21, 2002, and was remedied by an order entered February 28, 
2002.

 

  3For instance, the appellant's 
appellate brief makes the following non-record-based 
accusations:

 

(Mother's 
attorney has been told, by other attorneys not involved in this case, the trial 
judge does not like Mother's attorney using expert witnesses.  The implication is that it confines the 
trial judge's ability to use his discretion in crafting 
decisions.)

 

            
. . .

 

            
So, if the court will not follow what seems to be a clear statement of 
procedure, i.e., to set a trial within sixty (60) days, how can the Department 
of Family Services be expected to follow its rules and regulations or the 
law?  One is not an excuse for the 
other, although the trial court can and did excuse the other, the Department of 
Family Services, from compliance.

 

  4In cases of alleged neglect, it is 
not unusual for counsel to advise parents not to participate in or cooperate 
with an MDT, for fear of jeopardizing the defense of the case.  Furthermore, where a court utilizes the 
MDT primarily for disposition recommendations, there is the potential for wasted 
effort if no adjudication of neglect is made.  That appears to have been the concern of 
the juvenile court in the instant case.  
In agreeing to delay the convening of an MDT meeting, the juvenile court 
judge commented, "Well, I guess I don't know how we can have an MDT for a 
recommendation as to disposition when we don't have an adjudication as to abuse 
or neglect."

 

  5Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-411 
(LexisNexis 2003), DFS is to provide assistance to the district attorney in 
making an investigation.  It seems 
likely that the intent of the legislature is that DFS make its own investigation 
and findings where the matter has not been submitted to law enforcement and the 
district attorney.  Or, a separate 
administrative investigation may be required for DFS's own administrative 
purposes.  These concerns, and their 
impact on the judicial adjudicative process, have not been 
raised.

 

  6Once again, in MB, we found 
that the absence of a written case plan under the facts of that case adversely 
affected the parent's ability to comply with the plan and did not provide her 
with sufficient knowledge that termination of her parental rights could follow 
failure of the plan.  MB, 933 P.2d  at 1130.  There are no facts 
presented in the instant case from which we can make a similar 
determination.

 

  7We held in In Interest of MFB, 
860 P.2d 1140, 1148 (Wyo. 1993), 
that the purpose of the requirement of an adjudicatory hearing within sixty days 
was to prevent prolonged pre-hearing detention of the child.  The children in the instant case were in 
foster care, rather than detention, but the appellant did not cite In 
Interest of MFB and did not directly argue that the purpose of the time 
requirement should be equally applicable to the latter 
situation.

 

  8As used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-416, "this act" refers to the Child Protection Act, under which neglect 
petitions are brought.  See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(xviii).  
This, of course, is only one of many circumstances under which a GAL may 
be appointed.  Others include 
divorce, paternity, and parental rights termination.  The principles enunciated in this case 
would seem to apply to GAL's in all of those situations.

 

  9For instance, as perceived by 
Clark, the attorney/GAL is bound by the child's best interests, not by 
the child's expressed preferences, and attorney-client confidentiality is 
modified so that relevant information may be provided to the court in the 
child's best interests.  
Clark, 953 P.2d  at 153-54.

 

  10For a critical review of the 
Clark decision, see Jennifer Paige Hanft, Attorney for Child 
Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, But Is It a Formula for 
Malpractice?, XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

 

  11The "flavor" or "tenor" of the 
appellant's argument is reflected in this passage from her appellate 
brief:

 

After 
John Frentheway was appointed as guardian ad litem, during which of his court 
appearances did he appear as the children's guardian ad litem?  As the children's attorney?  As their legal representative?  During the course of a hearing or trial, 
did he change roles?  On which of 
the children's behalf did he appear?  
All of them?  One of 
them?  Two of them?  If so, which two?  Sometimes was he representing one child 
and at other times, was he representing other of the children?  How did the court, or the District 
Attorney, or Mother know when he was changing roles or which of the children he 
was representing?

 

Mother 
cries foul.  How can she know how to 
defend herself when John Frentheway is a moving, invisible target?  How can any party, even his own clients 
or the court, comprehend his posture in the case at any given moment?  They cannot.

 

  12A surmise strongly supported by the 
record is that the orders were basically form orders emanating from the district 
attorney's office, and that those form orders simply mistakenly referred to 
attorney rather than GAL.

 

  13See, for example, Loghry v. 
Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 668 (Wyo. 1996); 
Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994); 
Matter of the Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 275 (Wyo. 1988); 
and Larsen v. Roberts, 676 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1984).

 

  14See, for example, In re LePage, 
2001 WY 26, ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001); 
State By and Through Dept. of Family Services v. Jennings, 818 P.2d 1149, 
1150 (Wyo. 1991); 
and Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977).  It is possible for "shall" to be 
directory, rather than mandatory.  
Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, 551 P.2d 687, 699 (Wyo. 
1976).  For instance, "shall" may be directory 
where there is no stated "penalty" for a violation.  In re Lambert, 53 Wyo. 241, 80 P.2d 425, 428 (1938).

 

  15See, Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 
2781 and 2786 (2d ed. 1995).

 

  16The appellant's argument on this 
issue is simply a continuation of her diatribe against the juvenile 
court:

 

            
Mother's counsel remembers ten or more years ago when opposing counsel 
were routinely called when Orders were completed by the District 
Attorney's office so that review and signature could be made.  When the practice of the District 
Attorney's office changed is unknown, but it should not have been 
changed.

 

            
How is anyone; i.e., local counsel, pro se litigants, out of town 
counsel, new counsel or the public apprised of the District Attorney's local 
"rule of practice" which supercedes the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?  Wyoming Court Rules Annotated are 
circulated to all practicing Wyoming attorneys, are found in law libraries all 
over the state and readily accessible to the public.  Is it any wonder out-of-county attorneys 
express their incredulousness about the way justice is administered in Laramie 
County, Wyoming District Court and their distain therefore?  There are too many nuances and pitfalls 
which deprive parties of their rights.  
It allows "those-in-the-know" who know the "unwritten" rules of practice 
to run roughshod over the unsuspecting, the na¯ve and the 
not-so-na¯ve.

 

  17In her appellate brief, the 
appellant states that she filed an amended motion for continuance on the day of 
the hearing, alleging these and additional grounds.  However, no such amended motion is 
contained in the record on appeal.

 

  18The appellant argues for thirteen 
days, rather than ten, because she claims the GAL's motion was served upon her 
court mailbox, not upon her personally.

 

  19Both the appellant and her attorney 
appeared to have good reasons for requesting the continuance, and two days' 
notice is so short as to call into question the due process concept of 
meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard.

 

  20The appellant has not raised as a 
separate issue the juvenile court's W.R.E. 702 ruling, and she has not presented 
argument or authority on that ruling.

 

  21The thought arises that the 
standard could be different, even as to the issue of visitation, depending upon 
the circumstances of the decision.  
Do we review a pretrial visitation decision that is part of temporary 
shelter care in the same manner that we review a visitation decision that is 
part of an adjudicatory order?  Is 
the former decision even reviewable; that is, is it an appealable order?  Questions such as this are neither asked 
nor answered in the parties' appellate briefs.

 

Footnotes 
for the Dissent

 

1I 
do not perceive this subsection as being intended to excuse the total absence of 
reasonable efforts at reunification.  
A child's best interests could never be served by including a catch-all 
subsection that effectively writes out all other provisions regarding reasonable 
efforts in the Child Protection Act.

 

2The 
majority opinion suggests this motion was considered and denied.  The transcript from the hearing reveals 
otherwise.

 

3Residual 
parental rights are defined in part at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(xvi) 
(LexisNexis 2003). 

 

4For 
instance, Mother refused to give her oldest daughter permission to participate 
in a school swimming program because of perceived health concerns (Mother is a 
certified nurse).  The GAL filed a 
motion to allow the daughter to swim.  
At a hearing that neither Mother nor her regular counsel could appear 
because of short notice, the juvenile court granted the motion of the GAL 
without taking evidence.

 

5Mother 
objects that her due process rights were violated when the GAL made an oral 
motion for family visitation at the initial hearing.  Mother's objection is well-taken. 
"Parents are entitled to due process in custody and visitation matters, which 
includes adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard."  Matter of SAJ, 942 P.2d 407, 409 
(Wyo. 1997) ("The district court abused its discretion in modifying Mother's 
visitation . . . without affording a meaningful opportunity to be heard or 
otherwise providing for development of the evidentiary record." Id. at 
410.).  Especially with the negative 
family dynamics alleged in this case, more care should have been taken.  There is no indication that the issue of 
visitation was an "emergency" that required an immediate 
decision.

 

6We 
are not faced with the question whether the juvenile court is statutorily 
required to appoint an attorney for the child in every proceeding in which a 
child is alleged to be abused or neglected.

 

7If 
the public defender's office is representing children in alleged neglect cases, 
hopefully it is doing so consistently and uniformly throughout the 
state.

 

8Representing 
all three children in any capacity raises serious concerns about conflict of 
interest.

 

9The 
order appointing Frentheway as the children's GAL is ambiguous in itself.  Its title refers only to the appointment 
of a GAL, but its language states that Frentheway is appointed to "represent the 
minor child/children in the above entitled matter, and shall act as Guardian Ad 
Litem to advocate for the best interest of said minor child/children."  The language, and especially the use of 
the conjunctive "and" could be interpreted as the juvenile court making a dual 
appointment.

 

10There 
are also payment issues and ethical issues raised by an attorney appearing in a 
juvenile court proceeding without express authorization.

 

11The 
majority opinion states that the petition alleges Mother had a severe drug and 
alcohol problem.  In fact, the 
petition states that the children "reported that their mother has a severe 
alcohol and drug problem and that they were scared to go home with her."  This is not an allegation by the state 
against Mother.  It is a statement 
from the children, presumably included in the petition to justify emergency 
shelter care.  (The eldest daughter, 
at the adjudicatory hearing, stated that she had only seen her mother ingesting 
illegal drugs "maybe once or twice" and that she had not seen her mother use 
drugs for at least 3 years.)

 

12Both 
the allegation and the majority opinion state that the oldest daughter had 
previously attempted suicide.  The 
daughter, however, testified at the adjudicatory hearing that she had only 
threatened suicide to get attention.  
On that occasion, Mother immediately took her to the emergency room of 
the hospital.  After admitting to 
the psychiatrist from the behavioral health unit that she was only bluffing, she 
was counseled and then released to her mother. 

 

13As 
stated in the majority opinion, the juvenile court used "DH's relationships with 
male partners whom she brought into the home, and her alcohol-centered 
lifestyle'" as a basis for his decision.

 

14This 
is particularly disturbing because there are indications that, initially, only 
the oldest child was adamant about not returning to Mother, and at least one of 
the children has always wanted to return to Mother.