Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V EDMUND MCGEHEE BARBEE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123491

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 23, 2004  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 123491 
EDMUND McGEHEE BARBEE, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J.  
We 
granted 
leave 
to 
appeal 
to 
determine 
if 
a 
defendant’s conduct that occurs before criminal charges are 
filed can form the basis for an assessment of points under 
offense variable 19 (OV 19) for interference with the 
administration of justice.1
 Because we find that conduct 
occurring before criminal charges are filed can form the 
1 MCL 777.49 details the conduct that warrants points
under OV 19. 
Points assessed are used in conjunction with
other factors to produce a sentencing guidelines range
within which a defendant’s minimum sentence must fall 
unless the sentencing court identifies substantial and 
compelling reasons for deviating from the range. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
basis for interference, or attempted interference, with the 
administration of justice, we affirm the trial court’s 
scoring of ten points for OV 19. 
I. FACTS 
Defendant was stopped when a law enforcement officer 
observed the car defendant was operating cross the fog line 
twice. 
The officer also observed that it was dark and the 
car did not have its headlights on. 
Defendant told the 
officer his name was Christopher Noble Barbee. Defendant’s 
name is actually Edmund McGehee Barbee, Jr. 
Defendant’s 
fianceé gave the officer defendant’s correct name. 
A 
Breathalyzer 
test 
determined 
defendant’s 
blood 
alcohol content was 0.29 grams per 210 liters of breath. 
Defendant pleaded guilty of operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625, in exchange for 
the dismissal of two charges related to driving while his 
license was suspended, MCL 257.904. Because defendant gave 
the law enforcement officer a false name, the trial court 
scored OV 19 at ten points and imposed a prison sentence of 
twenty-nine to sixty months. 
Defendant objected to the 
assessment of ten points under OV 19, arguing that giving 
the law enforcement officer his brother’s name was not 
interference with the administration of justice because the 
officer would have learned his true identity in due course. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant’s motion for resentencing, which challenged the 
scoring of OV 19, was denied. 
The Court of Appeals denied 
defendant’s application for leave to appeal for lack of 
merit in the grounds presented. 
This Court granted 
defendant’s application for leave to appeal. 
469 Mich 966 
(2003). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. 
People v Krueger, 466 Mich 50, 53; 643 NW2d 223 (2002). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
one 
of 
statutory 
interpretation. 
The statute at issue, MCL 777.49, states, 
in pertinent part, the following: 
Offense variable 19 is a threat to the 
security of a penal institution or court or 
interference with the administration of justice
or the rendering of emergency services. 
Score 
offense variable 19 by determining which of the
following apply and by assigning the number of 
points attributable to the one that has the 
highest number of points: 
(a) The offender by his or her conduct 
threatened the security of a penal institution or
court ..................................25 points 
(b) The offender used force or the threat of 
force against another person or the property of
another person to interfere with, attempt to 
interfere 
with, 
or 
that 
results 
in 
the 
interference with the administration of justice
or 
the 
rendering 
of 
emergency 
services 
................................15 points 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
(c) The offender otherwise interfered with 
or attempted to interfere with the administration
of justice .............................10 points 
(d) The offender did not threaten the 
security of a penal institution or court or 
interfere with or attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice or the rendering of
emergency services by force or threat of force
................0 points[2] 
Because 
the 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
plain 
and 
unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written and follow 
its plain meaning, giving effect to the words used by the 
Legislature. 
See In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 
164 (1999). 
While “interfered with or attempted to interfere with 
the administration of justice” is a broad phrase that can 
include acts that constitute “obstruction of justice,” it 
is 
not 
limited 
to 
only 
those 
acts 
that 
constitute 
“obstruction of justice.”3
 The Legislature specifically 
chose to use the phrase “interfered with or attempted to 
interfere with the administration of justice.” 
If the 
2 The statute has been amended twice since the date of 
defendant’s offense. 
The amendments, however, do not 
affect the issue or the outcome in this case. 
3 In People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 458; 475 NW2d 288
(1991), this Court determined that the defendant’s conduct
—making a false statement in a police report—was a 
“substantial impediment to the administration of justice,”
but was not an obstruction of justice. 
4  
 
 
  
                                                 
Legislature had meant for OV 19 to apply only in cases 
dealing with the obstruction of justice, it could have 
easily used that phrase. 
“Obstruction of justice” is a 
well-known term of art. 
In People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 
457-458; 475 NW2d 288 (1991), this Court stated that 
common-law obstruction of justice is comprised of various 
offenses. 
To the contrary, conduct that “interfered with 
or attempted to interfere with the administration of 
justice” does not have to necessarily rise to the level of 
a chargeable offense because it is merely being used as one 
of various factors to determine a defendant’s sentencing 
guidelines range. 
The Court of Appeals in People v Deline, 254 Mich App 
595, 597; 658 NW2d 164 (2002), ignored the significance of 
the words used by the Legislature in MCL 777.49 and equated 
“interfered with or attempted to interfere with the 
administration of justice” with “obstruction of justice.”4 
Because the Legislature chose not to use the phrase 
“obstruction of justice,” this Court cannot interpret the 
4 Notably, in an opinion issued one week after Deline,
the Court of Appeals essentially reached the opposite
conclusion. 
In People v Cook, 254 Mich App 635; 658 NW2d
184 (2003), the Court of Appeals held that it was proper
for the trial court to score ten points under OV 19 for 
defendant’s conduct in attempting to flee from the police. 
5  
 
 
 
statute as if it had. 
In reaching this decision, we are 
merely applying basic rules of statutory interpretation and 
giving effect to the words used by the Legislature. 
See 
Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). 
While the Deline panel held that OV 19 could only be 
scored when the conduct interfered with the judicial 
process, we find that the phrase “interfered with or 
attempted to interfere with the administration of justice” 
encompasses more than just the actual judicial process. 
Law enforcement officers are an integral component in the 
administration of justice, regardless of whether they are 
operating directly pursuant to a court order. 
In Hewitt v 
White, 78 Mich 117, 119; 43 NW 1043 (1889), this Court 
referred to the sheriff’s duties as relating to “the 
administration of civil and criminal justice.” 
Similarly, 
in White v East Saginaw, 43 Mich 567, 570; 6 NW 86 (1880), 
this Court referred to the sheriff’s duties as “'more or 
less 
directly 
connected 
with 
the 
administration 
of 
justice,’” quoting People v Edwards, 9 Cal 286 (1858). 
It 
is certainly interference with the administration of 
justice to provide law enforcement officers with a false 
name. 
The 
investigation 
of 
crime 
is 
critical 
to 
the 
administration of justice. 
Providing a false name to the 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
police constitutes interference with the administration of 
justice, and OV 19 may be scored, when applicable, for this 
conduct. 
Therefore, to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with this opinion, an order will be issued disapproving the 
reasoning of Deline. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Conduct that occurs before criminal charges are filed 
can 
form 
the 
basis 
for 
interference, 
or 
attempted 
interference, with the administration of justice, and OV 19 
may 
be 
scored 
for 
this 
conduct 
where 
applicable. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s assessment of ten 
points for OV 19 because defendant’s conduct constituted 
interference with the administration of justice. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
7