Case Title: Rodriguez v. State

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 14

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev, Advance Opinion |4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

pela, Fi L E D

1E STATE OF NEVADA,

sspondent.

    
 
  
  
   
   
  
   
  
  
    
    
  
   

iets
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
srdiet, of conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping,

nspiracy to commit sexual as

 

ult, burglary while in possession of a
jeadly weapon, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, first-degree
‘idnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, sexual assault with the use
ff a deadly weapon, coercion with the use of a deadly weapon, possession
f a credit or debit card without the cardholder's consent, and obtaining or
ising personal identifying information of another. Eighth Judicial
istrict Court, Clark County; Stefany Miley, Judge.
Affirmed,

susan D. Burke, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

latherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City: David J. Roger.
strict Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
muel G. Bateman, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

FORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, WJ.

 

1210705
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this opinion, we focus on two issues. First, we consider
authentication and other evidentiary challenges to the admissibility of
text messages. In particular, we conclude that text messages are subject
to the same authentication requirements under NRS 52.015(1) as other
documents, including proof of authorship. Here, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting 10 of the 12 text messages
that the State claimed were sent by the appellant, a codefendant, or both
using the victim’s cell phone because the State failed to present sufficient
evidence corroborating the appellant's identity as the person who sent the
10 text messages. However, we conclude that the error was harmless.

Second, we examine whether testimony that a defendant could
not be excluded as the source of a discovered DNA sample is admissible in
the absence of supporting statistical data reflecting the percentage of the
population that could be excluded as the source of the discovered DNA
sample. We hold that, so long as it is relevant, DNA nonexclusion
evidence is admissible because any danger of unfair prejudice or of
misleading the jury is substantially outweighed by the defendant's ability
to cross-examine or offer expert witness evidence as to probative value.
Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the relevant DNA nonexelusion evidence. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court's judgment of conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the night of May 12, 2008, a woman was attacked in her

apartment by two men. One of the men warned the victim that they
would “blow [her] head off” if she moved. The men then blindfolded the

 

 
victim, and she heard them pulling the shoelaces out of her shoes. ‘The
men used the shoelaces to bind her arms and legs while she was lying on
the floor on her stomach. The men questioned her about where she kept
her money, and when the vietim claimed not to have any, they again
threatened to blow her head off.

While one of the men held her down, the victim could hear the
other man rummaging through her kitchen, The victim then felt what she

thought was one of the men poking her in the ribcage with a knife, and she

 

also thought there was an object on the floor that felt like a gun. The

victim finally confessed to the men that she kept her debit card in her car,

and said she would give them the personal identification number (PIN).
‘The men carried the victim from the living room to the

bedroom and threw her onto the bed, As one of the men began to sexually

 

sult her, the second man obtained the debit card from the victim's car.
‘The man who was assaulting the victim kept threatening to kill her if she
resisted too much. After the sexual assault, the men threw the victim in
the closet in her bedroom and threatened to come back and kill her if she
gave them the incorrect PIN. Later, the victim escaped to a neighbor's
apartment where she called the police. She was later taken to a hospital.
‘The victim's boyfriend came to the hospital and showed some
text messages he had received earlier that night to the detective who
accompanied the victim to the hospital. The victim's boyfriend had been
texting with the victim earlier in the evening, and when she stopped

responding he assumed she had fallen asleep. In the early morning hours

 

 
oe

of May 13, 2008, the victim's boyfriend started receiving the following text

messages from the vietim’s phone:

The

“Willy boy, you better [%00]."! (1:29 a.m.)..
“Willy, do you love me.” (1:30 a.m.)

“You better go check on your b--.” (1:38 a.m.).

 

“Not playing, not going to answer the phone. You better go check on

that... be--, she is, you know.” (1:42 a.m.)..

 

“You dumb ass idiot, you're not talking to her, You better go to her
house now. I have to keep my promise and I'm not going back over
there, I think you should.” (1:47 a.m).

“You're an a

suffocate, idiot.” (1:50 a.m.).

 

Come over...there or your girl is going to

“Yeah, you better go over there now. She is in the closet tied up.”
(1:53 a.m).

“L hope you is going over there.” (2:00 a.m.).

“We just f .” (2:02 a.m),

“I'm not going to tell me or you no more. She even told me she got
herps.” (2:05 a.m),

 

your b:

“How is your girl? Is she okay?” (3:08 a.m.),
“You're lucky I didn’t kill that b---- and I told you." (4:21 a.m.)
victim’s phone was recovered from the codefendant’s cousin, who

testified at trial that the codefendant asked him to take the phone when

he and Rodriguez were arrested. The phone contained photos of

Rodriguez, the codefendant, and the codefendant’s girlfriend.

‘The victim's boyfriend described it as saying “Willy boy, you better

percentage zero, zero,” but he did not know what that meant.

 
Other evidence linked Rodriguez and the codefendant to ATM
withdrawals from the victim's bank account. ‘The victim’s debit card was
used at an ATM on Las Vegas Boulevard at 12:43 a.m. on May 18, about
five minutes before the victim called the police. ‘The ATM was close in
proximity to the victim’s apartment. Less than ten minutes later, the card
was used to withdraw about $500 in multiple transactions at another
ATM, The card was also used at a third ATM. After viewing surveillance
videos from the ATMs, a detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (LVMPD) identified Rodriguez and codefendant Timothy
Sanders as the men in the videos using the victim's debit card

Rodriguez was further linked to the ATM transactions
through DNA evidence. LVMPD forensic scientist Julie Marschner

 

testified regarding various DNA samples obtained from items seized
during the investigation. Among those items was a pair of sneakers
identical to sneakers that Rodriguez was depicted wearing in the ATM
surveillance videos. Marschner testified that she compared the DNA
sample taken from the sneakers with DNA samples obtained from
Rodriguez, the victim, Sanders, Sanders’s cousin, and the victim's
boyfriend. Marschner could not exclude Rodriguez as a contributor to the
DNA sample taken from the sneakers. On cross-examination, defense
counsel questioned Marschner about the DNA results related to the
sneakers. When defense counsel asked Marschner if she was able to
exclude any percentage of the population as the source of the DNA sample
she tested, Marschner admitted that she did not calculate that statistical
information for the sneakers. Defense counsel then objected to
Marschner’s testimony on the basis that it was “meaningless.” The

district court overruled the objection, finding that the evidence “goes to the

 

 
weight of the admissibility. Also, ... counsel indicated the records were
timely turned over to defense counsel. Defense could have hired their own
‘expert or ask{ed] that additional tests be run.”

After a seven-day jury trial, Rodriguez was found guilty of
multiple counts, Rodriguez now appeals his conviction.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in
overruling his objection to the admission of 12 text messages because the
State failed to authenticate the messages and the messages constituted
inadmissible hearsay. He further argues that the district court erred in
overruling his objection to the admission of DNA nonexclusion evidence
because the evidence was irrelevant without supporting statistical data.
Relying on NRS 48.035(1), Rodriguez. argues that the probative value of
the DNA evidence ‘was greatly outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and misleading the jury.” He contends that Marschner’s
testimony on direct examination implied that Rodriguez was a contributor
when, in reality, anyone could have been a contributor. We examine each
issue in turn,
Admissibility of a proffered text message?

Text messages offer new analytical challenges when courts
consider their admissibility. However, those challenges do not require a
deviation from basic evidentiary rules applied when determining

“The term "text message” as used in this opinion refers to any short
written message sent over a cellular network from one cell phone to
another.

 

 
authentication and hearsay. We take this opportunity to address several
of those rules as they apply to text messages.

Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in admitting the
12 text messages because the State failed to authenticate the messages
and they therefore are not relevant, and the messages are hearsay. We
review the district court’s decision on each challenge for an abuse of
discretion. Ramet v. State, 125 Nev. 195, 198, 209 P.8d 268, 269 (2009).

Authentication and identificatior
Rodriguez first complains that the State did not sufficiently

 

authenticate the text messages. In particular, he argues that the State

 

did not establish that he sent the messages and therefore they were not

admissible against him,

Only relevant evidence is admissible. NRS 48.025(2). NRS
48.015 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
“Authentication ‘represent[s] a special aspect of relevancy,’...in that

evidence cannot have a tendency to make the existence of a disputed fact

"The State also argues that this court should deem the issue waived
bocause Rodriguez. did not object to the State’s extensive discussion of the
text messages during its opening argument. We conclude that this
argument is without merit because Rodriguez did timely object when the
toxt messages were being introduced as evidence. Cf, Carter v, State, 121
‘Nev. 759, 769, 121 P.3d 592, 599 (2005) (indicating that an objection to the
admission of evidence is timely if made when the evidence is introduced
for admission); Layton v, State, 87 Nev, 598, 600, 491 P.2d 45, 47 (1971).
Furthermore, “[opening statements of counsel . . . are not evidence of any
character or of anything, and cannot be s0 considered by the jury.” State
xv. Olivieri, 49 Nev. 75, 77-78, 236 P. 1100, 1101 (1925).

 

 

 
more or less likely if the evidence is not that which its proponent claims.”
US. v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir. 1992) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Evid, 901(a) advisory committee's note).
“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence or other showing
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” NRS 52.015(1).4 Because the authentication inquiry is
whether “the matter in question is what its proponent claims,” the
proponent of the evidence “can control what will be required to satisfy the
authentication requirement” by “deciding what he offers it to prove.” 31
Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 7104, at 31 (Ist ed. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
‘The question then is what is necessary to authenticate a text message.

 

Although this presents a question of first impression for this

 

court, other courts have addressed the authentication of text messages

 

and we turn to their decisions for guidance. For example, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania considered the authentication of text messages
where a detective testified to how he transcribed the text messages and
that the transcription was an accurate reproduction of the text messages
on the defendant's phone, but the prosecution conceded that the defendant
did not author all of the text messages on her phone. Commonwealth v.
Koch, __ A.3d __, __, No. CP-21-CR-0002876-2009, 2011 WL 4336634,

‘Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) is similarly worded to Nevada's
authentication rule, NRS 52.015(1), and this court often views “federal
decisions involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [as] persuasive
authority when this court examines its rules.” Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev.
832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005).

 

 
at “6 (Pa, Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2011). The court observed that, as with
nonelectronic documents generally, the identity of the sender is critical to
authenticating text messages, see id, at *5-6, and that “the difficulty that
frequently arises in... text message cases is establishing authorship,” id.
at *6. The court reasoned that a person cannot be identified as the author
of a text message based solely on evidence that the message was sent from
a cellular phone bearing the telephone number assigned to that person
because “cellular telephones are not always exclusively used by the person

to whom the phone number is

 

jigned.” Id. at *6. Thus, some additional
evidence, “which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender, i

required.” Id, at *6, Circumstantial evidence corroborating the sender's

 

identity may include the context or content of the messages themselves, id,
at *B

 

, such as where the messages “contain[] factual information or
references unique to the parties involved,” id, at *5. Other jurisdictions
similarly have focused on the sender's identity and looked to the context
and content of the text messages for sufficient circumstantial evidence
identifying the sender. Seo, e.g., Dickens v, State, 927 A.2d 32, 36-37 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (identifying details in text messages that could have
been known by only a small number of persons, including defendant,
defendant’s conduct after the messages were sent, and nickname used in
one message as circumstantial evidence sufficient to link defendant to the
messages); State v. Taylor, 632 S.E.2d 218, 230-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
(pointing to information in the message and that sender identified himself
twice using the victim’s first name as sufficient circumstantial evidence
that the victim sent the messages).

As the reasoning of these jurisdictions illustrates, establishing

the identity of the author of a text message through the use of

 

 
corroborating evidence is critical to satisfying the authentication
requirement for admissibility. We thus conclude that, when there has
been an objection to admissibility of a text message, see NRS 47.040(1)(a),
the proponent of the evidence must explain the purpose for which the text
message is being offered and provide sufficient direct or circumstantial
corroborating evidence of authorship in order to authenticate the text
message as a condition precedent to its admission, see NRS 52.015(1); see
also NRS 47.060; NRS 47.070.

Here, the State offered the text messages to prove that
Rodriguez was one of the men who assaulted the victim, As such, the
messages were only relevant to the extent that the State could
authenticate them as being authored by Rodriguez. The State established
that the victim’s cell phone was stolen during the attack, The victim’s
boyfriend testified that he received the 12 text messages on his cell phone

from the telephone number assigned to the victim's cell phone, and the

 

State showed that the victim’s boyfriend began receiving those messages

We note that once a text message is admitted into evidence, the
opponent may rebut its authentication, and it is for the jury to decide
whether the proponent sufficiently proved his or her claims regarding the
text message, See NRS 52.015(3) ("Every authentication or identification
is rebuttable by evidence or other showing sufficient to support a contrary
finding’); U.S. v, Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Before
admitting evidence for consideration by the jury, the distriet court must
determine whether its proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation
from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is
authentic, ... Although the district court is charged with making this
preliminary determination, because authentication is essentially a
question of conditional relevancy, the jury ultimately resolves whether
evidence admitted for its consideration is that which the proponent
claims.” (citations omitted),

 

 
shortly after the assault. ‘The State also presented evidence indicating
that Rodriguez and Sanders were in possession of the victim’s cell phone
prior to their arrests, When the victim’s phone was recovered by the
police, it contained the 12 text messages, as well as photographs of
Rodriguez that were taken after the phone was stolen. Although the State

provided sufficient evidence that the text messages offered into evidence

 

‘were sent from the victim's cell phone to her boyfriend's cell phone during
a time when Rodriguez and Sanders had access to the vietim’s cell phone,
the State only provided sufficient evidence to show that Rodriguez
participated in authoring 2 of the 12 proffered text messages—the toxt
message sent at 1:29 a.m. stating, “Willy boy, you better [%00]" and the
text m

 

jage sent at 1:30 a.m. stating, “Willy, do you love me.” Those two
text messages were sent while Rodriguez and Sanders were on a bus
wult. ‘The bus's surveillance video demonstrates

 

together following the a:
that, with Rodriguez seated next to him and watching, Sanders held and
operated the victim’s cell phone. While it does not appear that Rodriguez
typed the two text messages, he had firsthand knowledge of the messages
and appeared to be participating in composing the messages. Based on
this, we conclude that the State provided sufficient direct and
circumstantial evidence that tends to corroborate that the two text
messages sent at 1:29 a.m. and at 1:30 a.m. were what the State claimed
them to be—messages sent or endorsed by Rodriguez that connect him to
the assault. However, the record is devoid of any evidence that Rodriguez
authored or participated in authoring the ten text messages that were
sent after he and Sanders exited the bus around 1:36 a.m. In fact, the

evidence suggests that it was Sanders, not Rodriguez, who had possession

of the cell phone before they were arrested. Because those ton text

 

 
1 nn

 

messages were not sufficiently authenticated, we conclude that the district,
court abused its discretion in admitting them.

Notwithstanding the district court's improper admission of the
ten remaining text messages against Rodriguez, we conclude that the
error was harmless. See Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d
1128, 1132 (2001) ("The test ... is whether the error ‘had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” (quoting
828 U.S, 750, 776 (1946))). There was other

 

overwhelming evidence to support the jury's verdict: the victim's

testimony that the men who assaulted and robbed her took her debit card

 

and her cell phone; the ATM surveillance videos depicting Rodriguez and
Sanders using the victim's debit card at three separate locations, all in
close proximity to the victim's apartment shortly after she was attacked;
the bus surveillance video showing Rodriguez and Sanders using the
stolen cell phone; and pictures of Rodriguez on the victim's phone taken
after it was stolen from her apartment.
Hearsay

We next address Rodriguez's hearsay objection to the text
messages. As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible. NRS 51.065,
Nevada generally defines “{hlearsay” in NRS 51.035 as “a statement
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” NRS 51.035
also excludes certain statements from that definition, such asa statement
offered against a party “of which [that] party has manifested adoption or
belief in its truth,” NRS 51.035(3)(b). We conclude that the two text

12

 
messages that were authenticated are not hearsay pursuant to NRS
51.035(8)(b)."
Admissibility of DNA nonexclusion evidence

Relying on NRS 48.015 and NRS 48.036(1), Rodriguez argues
that the district court committed error by admitting testimony that he
could not be excluded as the source of the DNA obtained from the sneakers
absent testimony explaining the statistical relevance of the nonexclusion
result, such as the percentage of the population that could be excluded.

According to Rodriguez, the DNA nonexclusion evidence is either

 

irrelevant or had limited probative value but a significant risk of unt

 

a
prejudice or misleading the jury without the additional statistical analysis
to provide context. We disagree,

DNA nonexclusion results are derived from a comparison of a
discovered DNA sample and a known DNA sample. See Sholler v. Com.,
969 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Ky. 1998). The results of DNA analysis may
demonstrate that the source of the known sample, while not conclusively
determined to be the source of the discovered DNA sample, cannot be
eliminated as the source of that sample. Id,

As noted above, this court “review[s] a district court's decision
to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Mclellan v, State,
124 Nev, 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). In resolving whether
nonexclusion DNA results are admissible in the absence of supporting

“In a conclusory sentence, Rodriguez suggests that the admission of
the text messages raises a confrontation issue. We disagree. The text
messages were neither hearsay nor testimonial. See Crawford_v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).

 

 
statistical data reflecting the percentage of the population that could be

excluded, we examine

 

instructive authority the approach other
jurisdictions have taken on this issue.

For example, in State v. Harding, the defendant challenged
the trial court's decision to admit testimony regarding DNA evidence. 323,
$8.W.3d 810, 816 (Mo, Ct. App. 2010), The defendant argued that the DNA
evidence, which indicated that he was a possible source of the tested DNA
ible because the DNA analyst
failed to support her conclusion by conducting certain calculations “for the
random match probabilities” on some of the DNA samples. Id, at 816-17.
The DNA analyst simply testified that the defendant “could not be
eliminated as the source of the DNA found.” Id, at 817. The court
concluded that “DNA evidence, even without a showing of statistical
and that it is the fact-finder's duty to weigh

samples, was irrelevant and thus inadmi

 

 

significance, is admissibl
this evidence together with all other evidence presented when determining
guilt. Id, ‘The court went on to note the fallacy of the defendant's
argument—if the DNA evidence eliminated the defendant as the source,
“auch evidence would certainly be relevant and admissible even without
statistics regarding the percentage of the population.” Id. at 817 n.8.
Similarly, in Sholler, 969 S.W.2d at 709, the appellant
challenged the admission of DNA evidence because it was unsupported by
statistical analysis. The witness testified that her testing of the DNA

 

 

samples “matched” DNA samples taken from the appellant; however, a
match simply meant that the witness could not exclude the appellant as a

possible source, not that he was the source, of the tested DNA samples.
Id. The court held that the DNA evidence was admissible because it was
“both relevant and assisted the jury in determining whether [a]ppellant

 

 
could have been the perpetrator of the{] crimes.” Id. at 710.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that questions as to the accuracy of the
DNA test results are matters of weight for the jury. Id, It noted that “{iJf
[alppellant desired additional evidence of statistical probabilities based on
[the DNA] test results, he could have hired his own population geneticist
to analyze the results and testify to those probabilities.” Id.

Finally, in People v, Schouenborg, $40 N.Y.8.2d 807, 808 (App.
Div. 2007), the court held that statistical analysis was not required in
order to admit DNA evidence because the DNA expert testified that she
could not exclude the defendant as a contributor to the DNA sample she
tested, not that the defendant matched the tested DNA sample.

In keeping with the holdings from these other jurisdictions, we
conclude that DNA nonexclusion evidence is admissible in the absence of
supporting statistical data reflecting the percentage of the population that
could be excluded as long as the nonexclusion evidence is relevant,
because any danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury is
substantially outweighed by the defendant's ability to cross-examine or
offer expert witness evidence as to probative value. See NRS 48.015; NRS
48.035(1),

Here, Marschner testified that Rodriguez could not be
excluded as a contributor to the DNA sample from the sneakers, not that
he was the source of the DNA sample. Additionally, defense counsel
competently cross-examined Marschner regarding the tests she conducted
on the DNA evidence. We determine that the DNA evidence was relevant
and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury. It was for the jury to decide the

amount of weight to be given to this evidence. Furthermore, as the

 

 
district court correctly found, Rodriguez had ample opportunity to rebut
this evidence through his own DNA expert testimony or by conducting his
own testing of the DNA samples. Thus, we conclude that the district court,

 

did not abuse its discretion by admitting the DNA nonexclusion evidenc

“Rodriguez also appears to challenge the admissibility of
Marschner's testimony regarding the DNA nonexclusion evidence related
to the victim's cell phone. However, Rodriguez admits in his opening brief
that he only objected during trial to the DNA nonexclusion evidence
concerning the sneakers. “When an error has not been preserved, this
court employs plain-error review. Under that standard, an error that is
plain from a review of the record does not require reversal unless the
defendant demonstrates that the error affected his or her substantial
rights, by causing ‘actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.” Valdez v.
State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 47 (2008) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Green v, State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003)); see also
Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 795, 138 P.3d 477, 485 (2006). Because
Rodriguez, has failed to demonstrate how his substantial rights were
affected, and because we conclude that the district court did not err in
admitting the DNA nonexclusion evidence related to the sneakers, we also
conclude that the district court did not commit plain error by admitting
the DNA nonexclusion evidence related to the vietim’s cell phone.

 

 

 

 
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of convietion.*

Nt,

Hardesty

We concur:

 

Parraguirre

"Rodriguez also argues that cumulative error warrants reversal,
that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by making an improper
statement to the jury, and that the district court erred by giving certain
jury instructions and failing to give others. We conclude that these
arguments are without merit and require no further discussion.