Case Title: Commonwealth v. Fernandes

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11732

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11732 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ASHLEY FERNANDES. 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 14, 2020. - July 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable 
cause, Assistance of counsel.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Vienna Convention.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, 
Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury.  Attorney at 
Law, Conflict of interest. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court on May 
23, 2008. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Timothy 
Q. Feeley, J., the cases were tried before him, and motions for 
a new trial, filed on August 13, 2015, and December 15, 2017, 
were heard by him. 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Ashley 
Fernandes, of murder in the first degree in connection with the 
strangulation death of his girlfriend, Jessica Herrera.  At 
2 
trial, the Commonwealth successfully pursued theories of both 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The 
defendant was also convicted of assault and battery, but 
acquitted of attempted murder by strangling, in connection with 
a separate domestic violence incident involving the victim three 
and one-half months before the murder. 
Information about the murder first came to light on the 
night of April 5, 2008, just hours after the victim's death, 
when during a casual conversation with another patron at a bar 
the defendant twice "blurted out" that his girlfriend was dead 
in his apartment.  The next morning, the concerned bar patron 
reported the conversation to the police.  Further investigation 
led to a motor vehicle stop of the defendant's car that 
afternoon.  During the stop, the defendant spontaneously invited 
police to search his nearby apartment.  In a back room of the 
Peabody apartment, police found the victim's naked body rolled 
in a blanket.  Police took the defendant into custody, and later 
that evening he confessed to strangling the victim inside the 
apartment.  Police immediately sought and executed a search 
warrant of the apartment, where they found graphic images of the 
victim, taken at or near the time of her death, stored in a 
digital camera tucked inside a kitchen drawer. 
In this consolidated appeal from his convictions and from 
several related orders denying postconviction relief, the 
3 
defendant asserts reversible error arising from the denial of 
his pretrial motion to suppress the digital camera images.  He 
contends that the relevant warrant applications lacked 
sufficient information to connect either the camera or its 
contents to the homicide, such that the warrants issued without 
probable cause. 
The defendant, who is from India and is not a citizen of 
the United States, also claims that violations of his consular 
notification and access rights under art. 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations resulted in constitutional 
errors of structural magnitude, namely deprivation of his 
constitutional rights to (a) representation by counsel of his 
choice, and (b) court-appointed conflict-free counsel.  We also 
address additional claims that trial counsel's decision not to 
introduce certain evidence amounted to ineffective assistance, 
and that the trial judge's failure to give a requested 
intoxication instruction was error.  The defendant also seeks 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Whereas 
each of the above claims lacks merit, and we discern no basis to 
grant extraordinary relief after plenary review of the record on 
appeal, we affirm the defendant's convictions and the orders 
denying each of his motions for postconviction relief. 
 
Factual background.  1.  The domestic homicide.  The 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
4 
Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Anderson, 396 Mass. 306, 311, 
(1985), permitted the jury to find the following facts.  The 
defendant came to the United States in 2005, when he was twenty-
five.  In April or May of 2007, the defendant met the victim at 
a local bar.  The victim, who was in her mid-twenties, was then 
working as a dental hygienist and living in Peabody with her 
husband and her two sons, both under two years old.  The 
Department of Social Services (department) was involved with the 
family, and the victim's husband moved out shortly after she met 
the defendant.  Although the defendant and the victim were not 
then involved in a romantic relationship, he moved in with her 
to help pay rent and expenses, and assisted with child care.  By 
early September, the victim and the defendant had established an 
exclusive intimate relationship. 
The severity of the victim's drinking problem soon 
contributed to growing turbulence in her relationship with the 
defendant.  According to the defendant, one day in October 2007, 
he returned home from work early to find the victim's children 
in the living room crying and the victim "having sex" with a man 
he did not know in a different room.  At the defendant's 
request, the man left.  Unprompted by the defendant, the victim 
went with him.  Finding himself alone with two distraught 
children, the defendant called the department.  Representatives 
of the department arrived promptly and removed the children; the 
5 
victim lost custody of both boys.  By working with the 
department, she managed to regain custody, however briefly, just 
before Christmas. 
On Christmas Eve, the children went for an overnight visit 
with their father's family.  Since the defendant's birthday is 
the same day as Christmas, the defendant and the victim met up 
with another couple to celebrate.  The festivities were cut 
short, however, because of the victim's excessive alcohol 
consumption.  After their company left, the victim and the 
defendant went to sleep. 
According to the victim's later statements to police, she 
awoke suddenly to find herself on the floor with the defendant 
straddled over her, punching her, slamming her head against the 
floor, and calling her a "whore" and a "bitch."  He told her 
that he would kill her, and that she would die and no one would 
hear her scream.  The beating went on for more than two hours, 
as she struggled in and out of consciousness, trying to get up 
off the floor.  He choked her until she could not breathe.  She 
blacked out.  When she regained consciousness, her ears were 
ringing, and she begged and pleaded with him to stop, "trying to 
say anything for him not to kill [her]."  Finally, he relented.  
The area around the victim's left eye was black and blue, and 
6 
the white of the eyeball was completely blood red.1  She did not 
call police, fearing the department would take her boys away.2 
A few days after Christmas, the victim's stepfather drove 
to Peabody to bring the victim back with him to Cape Cod, where 
she stayed with her parents for a time.  On January 4, 2008, the 
victim visited the Peabody police station, seeking help to 
"remove" the defendant from the apartment.  She spoke with the 
head of the domestic violence unit, who asked what had happened.  
The victim described the attack, made a written statement, and 
permitted the officer to photograph her injuries.3  Later the 
                     
1 At trial, the Commonwealth's medical expert testified that 
strangulation may cause "minute hemorrhages," apparent in the 
whites of the eyes when blood flowing out from the brain is 
trapped and builds enough pressure to burst small blood vessels.  
This phenomenon was visible in the autopsy photographs, but it 
also served to corroborate the victim's report that she had been 
strangled on Christmas Eve, given the state of her left eyeball. 
 
2 Although the children returned from their visit with their 
paternal family on Christmas morning and opened presents, the 
victim's fears were shortly realized.  When representatives from 
the department came for an unannounced visit the next day, they 
removed the children immediately upon seeing the victim's 
injuries. 
 
3 At trial, the judge admitted both the officer's testimony 
about her meeting with the victim, including the victim's 
statements describing the Christmas Eve incident, and the 
victim's own written statement regarding the same, under the 
theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  The judge applied that 
theory on the ground that precluding the victim's adverse 
testimony at the impending April 11 trial of the assault and 
battery charges arising from these events was a factor, perhaps 
among others, that motivated the defendant to kill the victim. 
7 
same day, police arrested the defendant and a complaint issued 
in the Peabody Division of the District Court Department 
charging him with assault and battery.  Following a weekend in 
jail, and a Monday court hearing,4 the defendant was released.  
The victim obtained a restraining order and "moved out" for a 
time. 
On Valentine's Day, the defendant accompanied the victim to 
court, where she successfully moved to vacate the restraining 
order.  Reconciliation was short lived, however, and during a 
telephone argument soon thereafter, the defendant told the 
victim's stepfather that he (the defendant) "would be sending 
[the victim] home in a box."  Before February ended, the victim 
left Peabody again.  Her stepfather convinced her to try a 
rehabilitation program, but she stayed only one day before 
leaving to reunite with the defendant.  In early March, the 
victim again returned to her parents' home on Cape Cod, where 
she stayed with her stepfather for about three weeks.  During 
this time, the victim met and began spending time with a man in 
                     
 
4 The victim arrived at the hearing drunk.  When the hearing 
was over, her stepfather asked the court to have her civilly 
committed, so that she could get help.  The defendant's work 
supervisor testified at trial that the defendant had told her 
about his arrest for choking his girlfriend to the point of 
unconsciousness, but she had not believed him.  The supervisor 
also testified that the defendant had laughed with other workers 
during a cigarette break after joking that, in India, he could 
kill his girlfriend and nothing would happen to him. 
8 
his early twenties named Brett.  She also interviewed for jobs 
in the area and started looking for an apartment nearby.  The 
defendant's pending assault and battery case was scheduled for 
trial on April 11, and the department would not allow the 
children to visit the victim while she lived with him.  Still, 
the victim allowed the defendant to visit her on Cape Cod and 
had moved back in with him by March 23.  They then spent several 
days together at a hotel on Cape Cod, returning to Peabody on or 
about April 1. 
On Thursday, April 3, the defendant visited Salem Hospital 
with symptoms including numbness and chest pain.  Doctors 
admitted him overnight for testing and advised rest.  On April 
4, he returned home to find the apartment a mess and the victim 
drunk; she continued drinking and playing loud music, disturbing 
his efforts to rest.  At 12:06 A.M. on April 5, the victim spoke 
to Brett by telephone and asked him to come to Peabody and drive 
her back to Cape Cod.  Around 12:45 A.M., she called back to say 
that circumstances had "changed" and she would "be fine until 
the morning." 
On the morning of Saturday, April 5, the defendant answered 
the victim's cell phone to a male voice saying, "hello 
sweetheart."  Upset, the defendant asked the victim who was on 
the telephone.  She ignored him, and then took the call in 
another room.  That afternoon, around 2:30 P.M., the victim 
9 
telephoned Brett to say that she had a ride to Harwich later.  
The defendant took the victim to buy a twelve-pack of beer, and 
then both returned to the apartment, where she invited him to 
have a drink with her.  The defendant had two or three beers, 
and the victim drank the remaining nine or ten.  At about 5 
P.M., the victim called Brett again, sounding distressed.  She 
asked him to drive from Plymouth to pick her up in Peabody, and 
Brett agreed to come.5 
Not long after the victim ended the telephone call, she and 
the defendant argued, and the verbal altercation escalated into 
a physical struggle on the living room floor.  As the defendant 
himself described during the video-recorded confession to police 
the night of his arrest, he put his hands on the victim's neck 
and pushed hard, choking her until she urinated.  The victim 
struggled, "trying kicks" to escape out from under the 
defendant; he knew she was not strong enough to succeed, told 
her "you can't fight me," and continued to press down "hard" on 
her neck.  The victim soon died of asphyxia by strangulation.  
Between 5:29 P.M. and 5:36 P.M., the defendant used a camera to 
capture five digital images of the victim's body, two of them 
showing one of his hands wrapped around her neck. 
                     
 
5 When Brett later telephoned the victim for more specific 
directions, as planned, he could not reach her, despite calling 
repeatedly for almost an hour. 
10 
After strangling the victim, the defendant then went out to 
a bar.  He ordered a beer and appeared to be in a good mood.  
Later in the evening, the defendant was still nursing the same 
beer when he struck up a conversation with another patron.  The 
bar patron testified that amidst pleasant small talk, the 
defendant eventually "blurted out" that his girlfriend was dead 
in his apartment, and later stated that the bar patron would be 
reading about him in the newspaper.  After the bar closed and 
the defendant returned home, the victim was still lying on the 
floor.  He stripped off her clothing and cut off her bra and a 
chunk of her hair.  After wrapping the victim's naked body in a 
comforter and securing it with several pieces of rope, he moved 
it into the back bedroom. 
2.  Arguments at trial.  The Commonwealth proceeded on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, emphasizing the defendant's callous disregard of the 
victim, both during her life and after her death, and relying 
heavily on the five graphic images of the victim's body.  During 
the Commonwealth's opening statement, the jury heard an explicit 
description of the strangling's physical effects on the victim's 
body, and then listened to the prosecutor recount how the 
defendant had seized his camera and taken "five photographs of 
the horrifying last moments of [the victim]'s life," before he 
headed out for a beer. 
11 
Other critical evidence suggesting premeditation was a 
calendar that police seized from the defendant's kitchen wall, 
opened to the month of April.  The April 5 box was entirely 
colored over with red marker, but words written in red marker 
remained barely visible underneath:  "END OF STORY -- NO MORE 
LOVE -- 5:00 P.M. -- FINISH."  The calendar boxes representing 
April 6, 7, 8, and 9 were empty.  In the April 10 box, the words 
"Jess Birthday" appeared in blue pen.  The April 11 box was 
completely colored over in red marker, just like the April 5 
box,6 and peeking through from beneath were the words:  "Bench 
Trial -- Court Peabody -- I am Ready!"  All remaining boxes on 
the calendar page were empty. 
The Commonwealth argued that the calendar evidence 
"inextricably linked" the defendant's upcoming trial date with 
the murder of the only percipient witness to the incident 
resulting in the charge.  That the April 5 and April 11 calendar 
boxes were colored over in the same manner, with the same 
marker, many days before April 11, suggested they were struck 
out simultaneously.  According to the Commonwealth, this 
demonstrated the defendant's manifest purpose of solving the 
"problem" posed by the April 11 trial, by killing the victim on 
                     
 
6 The calendar boxes for each of April 1, 2, 3, and 4 were 
filled with a large "X" written in red marker, as were all of 
the boxes on calendar pages for prior months. 
12 
April 5.  The defendant strangled the victim, because he could 
not risk permitting her to leave the apartment, apparently into 
the arms of a younger man and back to her family who would 
encourage her to testify against him. 
The defense theory was heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation in support of a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, 
rather than murder.  The defendant testified on his own behalf 
as the sole defense witness, citing the detrimental effects of 
the victim's alcoholism, infidelity, and disrespectful behavior 
on his mental health.  The defense also focused on oddities in 
the defendant's behavior after the murder to demonstrate lack of 
premeditation, particularly his confession to a stranger at a 
bar, and his spontaneous invitation to the police to search his 
apartment, find the victim's body, and arrest him -- all when he 
easily could have boarded an airplane back to India.  The 
defense countered the prosecution's theory about the calendar by 
asking why the defendant would risk life in prison to prevent 
conviction on charges carrying a maximum sentence of two and 
one-half years.  Based on the defendant's lack of any prior 
record, the defense argued that any sentence would likely have 
been less. 
Discussion.  1.  The digital camera warrants.  The 
defendant's principal claim on appeal is that his motion to 
suppress the digital camera images should have been granted, 
13 
because the relevant warrant applications lacked sufficient 
information to show that the camera or its contents were related 
to the homicide under investigation.  Accordingly, he argues 
that the warrants permitting police to (a) seize the camera from 
his apartment, and then (b) search the camera's contents, 
violated his right to be "secure" from "unreasonable searches 
and seizures" of his home and possessions, as guaranteed under 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  After 
reviewing the two search warrant applications and their 
attendant supporting affidavits here at issue, we conclude that 
the nature of the crime -- domestic homicide -- combined with 
the particular facts and circumstances here, including the 
defendant's pending charge of assault and battery of the same 
victim just months earlier, provide a substantial basis to 
conclude that a search of the digital camera would provide 
evidence relevant to the crime and, consequently, probable cause 
for the warrants to issue. 
 
a.  Predicate facts.  After discovery of the victim's body 
during the consent search of the defendant's apartment led to 
his arrest and subsequent confession, Peabody police sought a 
warrant to perform a further search of the apartment, and 
authority to seize the victim's body and, among other things, 
"[digital video disc and videocassette recorder (DVD/VCR)] 
14 
tapes, recording devices, cameras and cellular phones (with 
chargers)."  Upon Detective Sergeant Scott Richards's 
application and supporting affidavit, the warrant (first 
warrant) issued on the night of April 6, 2008.  Police executed 
it that same night, at approximately 11 P.M., and seized items 
including the victim's body and an "HP Photo smart digital 
camera" (camera).  The next day, State police Trooper Brian 
O'Neill applied for and obtained an additional warrant (second 
warrant) authorizing police to search the defendant's apartment 
for, and seize "computers, digital cameras, cell phones, digital 
storage devices and media (disks, tapes, thumb drives) and any 
and all software and hardware related to computers and other 
digital devices."  The second warrant also authorized forensic 
examination of "two cellular phones, a digital camera, and a 
computer," each already in police custody, for "graphic evidence 
of the crime under investigation" and "any information linking 
the defendant to the victim, either through digital photography, 
digital documentation, e-mail, Internet and chat activity, 
cellular phone history and . . . text messaging." 
i.  First warrant affidavit.  In the affidavit he submitted 
with the application for the first warrant (first warrant 
affidavit), Richards averred as follows.  On the morning of 
April 6, Peabody police received specific information about an 
identified informant's tip to Beverly police.  The night before, 
15 
the informant had conversed with a man seated next to him at a 
bar, who identified himself as Ashley Fernandes and later stated 
that (i) his girlfriend was dead in his apartment and (ii) the 
informant would read about him in the newspaper in the next 
fifteen days.  That afternoon, Richards corroborated this 
account at an in-person meeting with the informant, who provided 
further information, including the defendant's age and the 
corporate name and location of his employer. 
A police search of internal records showed that identifying 
information matched with the resident of a Peabody address, whom 
police had arrested for "domestic assault and battery" on 
January 4, 2008.  Arrest records listed the victim as Jessica 
Herrera, the same woman whose body police later found dead 
inside that same apartment.  Police also matched the defendant's 
name, date of birth, and address with registry of motor vehicles 
records showing no license status, and a registration listing 
him as the owner of a vehicle registered to that address.  
Richards located a booking photograph of the defendant, and the 
informant confirmed that the person in the photograph was the 
man he spoke with at the bar.  The informant also told Richards 
that the defendant was jotting things down on a piece of paper 
throughout their conversation, including "Fuck the world" and 
his parents' address in India; before leaving, the defendant 
16 
voiced that he had "too much freedom in this country" and was 
"ready to die." 
Richards further attested that an officer he previously 
dispatched to surveil the defendant's address had made a motor 
vehicle stop of the defendant's car based on his license status.  
When stopped, the defendant had spontaneously (i) asked police 
if the stop was "about [his] girlfriend" and (ii) offered police 
consent to search his apartment.  Richards quickly reported to 
the scene and obtained the defendant's verbal consent to search 
the apartment.  The defendant unlocked the door to the 
apartment, and police then followed him inside, where Richards 
explained the written consent to search form and the defendant 
signed it.  In the back room, police located the victim's body 
wrapped in a blanket secured with lengths of rope. 
Richards cleared the building of police and had it secured 
as a crime scene.  The defendant was transported to the station, 
where he was read Miranda warnings and consented to a Miranda-
waived interview with Richards and O'Neill.  During the 
interview, the defendant confessed to killing his girlfriend, 
Jessica Herrera, inside the apartment on April 5, and then 
wrapping her body in a blanket, tying rope around it, and 
placing it in the back room.  At that time, he also told police 
that after he killed the victim, he called her cell phone from 
his cell phone and left her a message. 
17 
ii.  Execution of first warrant.  During police execution 
of the first warrant, a detective located the camera inside a 
kitchen drawer and handed it to Trooper James Crump, another 
member of the crime scene investigation team, assigned to take 
photographs documenting the search.  When Crump first received 
the camera, it was powered off.  He pressed the "ON/OFF" button 
to power it on, and then pressed the "back" button.  A digital 
image of the victim lying dead on the floor of the defendant's 
living room appeared on the camera's rear image display screen.  
Crump continued to press the "back" button and discovered four 
additional graphic images of the victim's body, two of them 
close-up shots of the victim's head, showing the defendant's 
hands around her neck.  Each of the images was stamped with a 
date and time in the bottom right corner.  To enable better 
viewing of the images on a larger screen, Crump removed the 
memory card from the camera, inserted it into a laptop computer, 
and accessed its contents so that others on the crime scene team 
could also view the images.  None of the information regarding 
opening the camera and viewing the images contained therein 
appeared in either warrant affidavit.  Nor was this information 
presented at the hearings on the motions to suppress or 
otherwise provided to the judge. 
iii.  Second warrant affidavit.  The affidavit O'Neill 
submitted with the second warrant application (second warrant 
18 
affidavit) contained all of the same facts Richards included in 
the first warrant affidavit, recited supra, but substituted his 
own credentials, training, and experience, which included eight 
years with the State police, in which capacity he had 
investigated over 200 deaths. 
O'Neill further averred that "[d]uring the initial search 
and the subsequent search of [the defendant's apartment], the 
search warrant executing officers observed a digital camera and 
a home computer."  He then added a series of generalized 
statements based on officer training and experience, including 
the following: 
"Based upon my own training and experience [and that of 
four other, more experienced State troopers], I know that 
it is not unusual for individuals involved in homicides to 
memorialize their victims' deaths through audio and or 
video media for later viewing, for guilt relief or for 
enjoyment as trophies. . . .  [A twenty-nine year veteran 
of the State police assigned to the computer facilitated 
crime unit] advises [me] that the convenience afforded by 
the use of a digital camera, in addition to the anonymity 
provided to the user of a digital camera, creates a greater 
likelihood that perpetrators will record such information -
- particularly given the ease with which they believe such 
images can be destroyed or deleted" (footnote omitted). 
The affidavit did not mention that officers had already viewed 
images stored on the camera, or what those images depicted. 
 
iv.  The suppression hearing.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant sought to suppress his statements to police and all 
physical and digital evidence recovered from searches of (1) his 
apartment, and (2) the seized electronic devices, including the 
19 
camera.  Among other arguments,7 the defendant contended that the 
warrants were deficient due to lack of probable cause, in that 
neither of the supporting affidavits included sufficient 
information for the issuing magistrate to conclude that evidence 
relating to the homicide would be stored on the devices seized. 
Following a two-day evidentiary hearing,8 the motion judge, 
who was later the trial judge, issued a written decision 
rejecting all of the defendant's arguments and denying relief.  
In finding probable cause for the warrants to issue, the judge 
observed that the warrant affidavits established that the murder 
had occurred inside the apartment where the electronic devices 
were located and seized.  The judge continued: 
"In today's age, computers, cameras, and cell phones often 
contain reflections and memorializations of one's 
relationships with other persons.  That is especially true 
with respect to family members and romantic partners.  
O'Neill also stated in his affidavit, based on the training 
and experience of long-term members of the State Police, 
that 'it is not unusual for individuals involved in 
homicides to memorialize their victims' deaths through 
audio and or video means.'" 
                     
 
7 The defendant also challenged the legality of the 
"pretextual" motor vehicle stop of his car, the voluntariness of 
his consent for police to search the apartment, the validity of 
his Miranda waiver, and the voluntariness of his confession.  In 
addition to contending that there was no probable cause for the 
warrant to issue, the defendant asserted that the warrants were 
defective because the examining magistrate had not signed them. 
 
 
8 Where the judge's assessment of the warrant applications 
for probable cause was necessarily confined to the "four 
corners" of the affidavit, the hearing testimony on December 10, 
2010, and January 3, 2011, largely addressed facts bearing upon 
the defendant's other suppression theories. 
20 
Finally, the judge found it "all the more likely" that 
electronic devices maintained in the apartment where the death 
occurred "could contain images or other reflections of the 
killing." 
 
b.  Probable cause.  "[W]hether there was probable cause to 
issue the search warrant is a question of law that we review de 
novo in a commonsense and realistic manner" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017).  "[O]ur 
inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application 
always begins and ends with the four corners of the affidavit" 
(quotation and citation omitted), Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 
Mass. 296, 297 (2003), such that "we consider only the facts 
recited in the affidavit and any reasonable inferences 
therefrom," Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 107 (2009).  
See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 387 (2018) 
("Inferences drawn from the affidavit must be reasonable and 
possible, but no showing that the inferences are correct or more 
likely true than not true is required"). 
To support a finding of probable cause, "the search warrant 
affidavit must establish a 'substantial basis for concluding 
that evidence connected to the crime will be found on the 
specified premises.'"  Perkins, 478 Mass. at 104, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 726 (2012).  The "nexus 
between the items to be seized and the place to be searched need 
21 
not be based on direct observation," Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 
389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983), and may 
be grounded in "the type of crime, the nature of the . . . items 
[sought], the extent of the suspect's opportunity for 
concealment, and normal inferences as to where a criminal would 
be likely to [keep the items sought]."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Matias, 440 Mass. 787, 794 (2004) ("to find this nexus we look 
at all the allegations in the affidavit as a whole in a 
commonsense fashion, not at individual fragments"). 
Here, the "type of crime" was the homicide of a domestic 
partner inside the home.  The defendant had also already 
confessed to killing the victim.  In addition, the police knew 
that the defendant had a recent prior charge of domestic assault 
and battery against the same victim.  In crimes of domestic 
violence, our cases have repeatedly recognized that evidence 
explaining the nature of the relationship between the defendant 
and the victim is relevant and admissible to prove state of mind 
and intent.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 
550 (2017) (citing cases); Commonwealth v. Sarourt Nom, 426 
Mass. 152, 160 (1997); Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 
281 (1992); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 408 Mass. 747, 751 
(1990); Commonwealth v. Jordan (No. 1), 397 Mass. 489, 492 
(1986). 
22 
The nature of the evidence sought here was images from a 
digital camera police found in the home one day after the 
killing.  That evidence would obviously provide insights into 
the nature of the relationship, including the victim's 
appearance at identifiable time periods up to and possibly 
including the date of the crime. 
All of this is apparent from facts either expressly stated 
in the warrant affidavits or reasonably inferred from that 
information.  Accordingly, the affidavits contain a substantial 
basis to support a finding of probable cause that the digital 
camera found in the Peabody apartment -- where the defendant 
admittedly killed the victim, where police found her body, and 
where the defendant was living at the time police arrested 
him -- would contain evidence relevant to the nature of their 
relationship, the defendant's motive for the killing, and 
possibly the killing itself.9 
The defendant's argument to the contrary relies heavily on 
our reasoning in Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 591 
(2016), where we held: 
"In essence, the Commonwealth is suggesting that there 
exists a nexus between a suspect's criminal acts and his or 
                     
 
9 We need not, and do not, rely on O'Neill's statements 
regarding the "not unusual" proclivity of defendants charged 
with homicide to memorialize the deaths of their victims by 
capturing images or recordings, and the advantages that digital 
cameras uniquely afford such perpetrators, to find probable 
cause here. 
23 
her cellular telephone whenever there is probable cause 
that the suspect was involved in an offense, accompanied by 
an officer's averment that, given the type of crime under 
investigation, the device likely would contain evidence.  
If this were sufficient, however, it would be a rare case 
where probable cause to charge someone with a crime would 
not open the person's cellular telephone to seizure and 
subsequent search." 
The instant case of domestic violence could not be more 
different for the reasons explained supra.  These facts are 
readily distinguishable from the armed robbery in White, where 
the only connection between the suspect's cell phone and the 
crime was generalized police experience locating useful cell 
phone evidence in other multiple-defendant criminal 
investigations.  Here, the nexus between the crime of domestic 
violence and the camera was specific, not speculative; there was 
a substantial basis to believe it would provide a clear window 
into the nature of the relationship. 
 
In sum, it was far from "mere speculation" for the 
magistrate to conclude that a camera found in the apartment 
likely would contain evidence of this crime of domestic 
violence.  Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521 (2017).  
There was probable cause for the warrants to issue. 
 
c.  Taint of illegality cured by independent source and 
inevitable discovery.  At oral argument, the defense, for the 
first time, argued that the digital images stored on the 
defendant's camera should have been suppressed because a police 
24 
officer turned on the camera and viewed its contents while 
executing the first warrant to search the apartment, which 
granted police the authority to search for, and seize, any 
"DVD/VCR tapes, recording devices, cameras and cellular phones 
(with chargers)," but did not contain a separate grant of 
authority to perform a further search of the contents of those 
devices.  We disagree. 
Even if a separate grant of authority was required to 
search the camera after it was properly seized, the officers did 
not reference any information about the evidence they discovered 
on the camera in the affidavit they submitted in support of the 
second search warrant, which authorized the search for digital 
images.  "Evidence obtained during a search pursuant to a 
warrant that was issued after an earlier illegal . . . search is 
admissible as long as the affidavit in support of the 
application for a [subsequent] search warrant contains 
information sufficient to establish probable cause to search the 
premises 'apart from' observations made during the initial 
illegal . . . search."  Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 
692 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 625 
(2003) (discussing "independent source" exception to our 
exclusionary rule). 
There is also no doubt that the police agenda here included 
obtaining a search warrant for any "DVD/VCR tapes, recording 
25 
devices, cameras and cellular phones" actually seized during 
execution of the first warrant:  the only value these items 
could possibly add to the investigation relied upon a legal 
further search of their contents.  It is clear that the decision 
to seek a warrant was not prompted by any prior illegal search.  
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 & n.3 (1988).  Under 
these circumstances, legal discovery of the images was 
inevitable, and the "inevitable discovery" exception to our 
exclusionary rule applies to "cleanse" the images of any 
"illegal taint" imputed to them by the police preview.  See 
Martino, 412 Mass. at 277 (where valid warrant to search for, 
seize, and view videotape was en route, defendant precluded from 
arguing "that, but for the [unauthorized] warrantless viewing of 
the videotape, the police would never have acquired and viewed 
it"). 
2.  Consular notification and counsel of choice.  The 
defendant contends that the Commonwealth violated the rights 
conferred upon foreign nationals by art. 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (art. 36 or Convention) when (i) arresting 
authorities neglected to apprise him of his consular 
notification rights at any time, and (ii) other competent 
authorities failed to formally notify the consulate of his 
arrest and detention pending trial on homicide charges when the 
26 
defendant later sought their assistance.  The defendant further 
contends that these alleged art. 36 violations are 
constitutional error of structural magnitude, as they deprived 
him of a choice of counsel and forced him to proceed to trial 
with counsel who had a conflict of interest, and therefore 
entitle him to a new trial without any showing of prejudice. 
We agree with the ruling of the judge who denied the 
defendant's first motion for a new trial, who was also the trial 
judge.  Although the Commonwealth violated its art. 36 
obligation to apprise the defendant of his art. 36 rights, that 
error was neither constitutional nor structural.  The indigent 
defendant was promptly provided qualified appointed counsel, 
fulfilling the fundamental purpose of art. 36.  See Commonwealth 
v. Gautreaux, 458 Mass. 741, 752-753 (2011).  Neither the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution nor art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights entitles indigent defendants 
to choose the particular attorney appointed to represent them.  
Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 97 (2020), citing United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006).  Finally, 
for reasons discussed infra, defense counsel's representation 
here was never burdened by any "actual" conflict of interest.  
27 
Declining to grant the defendant a new trial on these grounds 
was not an abuse of discretion.10 
 
a.  Relevant background.  At all relevant times, the 
defendant, who was indigent, was represented by appointed 
counsel.  About one month before the trial, the defendant wrote 
a letter to the Board of Bar Overseers (board), seeking guidance 
regarding the "proper way" to obtain copies of "discoveries" and 
items docketed in his case, as "years" of repeated requests to 
his appointed counsel had gone unheeded.  He also stated his 
desire "to contact the diplomatic representative of [his] 
country as soon as possible," given that it was "very difficult 
[for him] to understand the law."  Finally, he wrote that (i) at 
the time of his arrest, "they did not even call the [Indian] 
embassy to tell [him his] rights based on [art.] 36;" and 
(ii) he had not received any response to the "numerous letters" 
he sent to the embassy himself. 
                     
 
10 "Generally, we consider whether a motion judge committed 
a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion in 
[ruling on] a defendant's motion for a new trial."  Commonwealth 
v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 817 (1998).  We will find abuse of 
discretion where we determine that a decision resulted from "a 
clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision, such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. 
v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Where, as 
here, the motion judge was also the trial judge, we give 
"special deference" to the judge's findings of fact and ultimate 
decision on the motion.  Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591, 
597 (2012). 
28 
Approximately two weeks after the date of the letter to the 
board, with less than thirty days until trial, defense counsel 
moved to withdraw.  In her motion, she asserted a "complete 
breakdown in communication" with her client, who had "lost 
confidence" in her.  At the motion hearing, after a judge 
(motion judge), who was not the trial judge, conducted a sworn 
colloquy with the defendant, defense counsel alleged that the 
defendant's written "complaint" to the board gave rise to "an 
actual conflict [of interest]."  She expressed doubt in her 
ability "to represent [the defendant] with zealousness" based on 
anticipated inability to divorce the representation from the 
stigma she associated with being the subject of such complaint. 
The motion judge then told the defendant that it appeared 
that the defendant had "filed a complaint with Bar Counsel about 
[his] attorney, in an attempt to have her removed."  The "next 
time" this happened, the motion judge warned, the defendant 
might be forced to decide between proceeding to trial with his 
next lawyer or representing himself.  When the motion judge 
asked whether the defendant wanted defense counsel to withdraw, 
however, the defendant replied that counsel could withdraw if 
she wanted to.  In response to a follow-up inquiry, he stated:  
"I didn't file a complaint, I just told her that I'm asking for 
-- I wrote a letter." 
29 
After reviewing a copy of the letter to the board,11 the 
motion judge recessed to "carefully consider what is in the 
interest of justice" and "weigh[] all of the factor[s]."  On 
reconvening the hearing, the motion judge summarized his written 
findings from the bench.  He first concluded that the defendant 
was "satisfied with counsel," but sought "assistance with what 
the court [would] broadly categorize as discovery issues."  The 
motion judge then promised to "ensure that [the defendant] has 
the discovery materials he desires and a meaning[ful] 
opportunity to study them." 
Respecting defense counsel's request to withdraw, the 
motion judge determined that counsel had filed her motion "in an 
abundance of caution" on learning of the letter to the board, 
which the motion judge considered "more an expression of concern 
[about the defendant's discovery issues] than a complaint."  
Based on "personal knowledge and [defense counsel's] 
reputation," the motion judge then characterized defense counsel 
as a "strong advocate" who would be well prepared and organized 
at trial and whose "zealous advocacy [would] not be limited in 
any way by these circumstances."  Finally, the motion judge held 
                     
 
11 The defendant provided the motion judge with a copy of 
his letter to the board, which defense counsel had not yet seen.  
Counsel explained that she had only learned about the 
defendant's "complaint" from a telephone conversation with Bar 
Counsel. 
30 
that the considerations set forth in Commonwealth v. Carsetti, 
53 Mass. App. Ct. 558 (2002),12 "overwhelmingly compel[led]" that 
he deny the motion:  conflict of interest and breakdown in 
communication were both absent from the representation, and 
there was "no threat to [the defendant]'s right to a fair 
trial."  At the time of this decision, the case was more than 
four years old.13 
As the hearing was coming to an end, the defendant 
addressed the court directly, to ask whether he might "request 
somebody from the Country of India, like a Diplomatic 
Representative so [he could] speak to anybody from [his] 
country."  Rather than entertain the request, the motion judge 
instead resolved to "leave that to [the defendant] and [his] 
lawyer."14  Just before trial, the defendant filed a pro se 
                     
 
12 In Commonwealth v. Carsetti, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 561 
(2002), the Appeals Court suggested factors for a judge's 
consideration in the exercise of discretion to grant or deny a 
request for new counsel, and generally advised:  "While there is 
no mechanical test for determining [whether to grant a request 
for new counsel on the eve of trial] . . . , the judge should 
make findings showing a balancing between the defendant's rights 
and the interests of the Commonwealth and demonstrating that 
discretion was in fact exercised." 
 
 
13 Following extensive pretrial suppression efforts, trial 
was initially set for early April 2012, but was twice continued 
at defense counsel's request. 
 
 
14 In an affidavit appended to the first part of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, defense counsel admitted 
that the defendant had asked for her assistance in contacting 
31 
pleading purporting to "preserve [his] rights," and stating that 
the he had "tried to get hold of his Indian Consulate to get in 
touch with the Diplomatic Representative" but had neither "heard 
from his Indian Consulate" nor received their "help . . . based 
on [art. 36]."  The pleading did not contain any complaint about 
defense counsel's representation, or any indication of a desire 
to replace her with different counsel. 
Following his convictions, new postconviction defense 
counsel contacted the Indian consulate in New York,15 and 
ultimately obtained a written letter therefrom (consular letter) 
in support of the arguments advanced in the defendant's motion 
for a new trial.  The consular letter did not acknowledge or 
address whether the consulate had received any communications 
from the defendant.  It nonetheless expressed concern that the 
consulate had not received formal notification from the 
                     
the Indian Consulate, but that she advised him to write to the 
consulate himself instead of providing that assistance. 
 
 
15 In an affidavit filed with the sealed copy of the 
consulate's letter to the court, postconviction counsel 
explained:  " I asked the Consulate to confirm and document that, 
pursuant to India's policy of legal assistance under Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention, India would have provided [the 
defendant] with his choice of counsel had the Consulate been 
contacted as [the defendant] had consistently requested."  She 
further reported:  "I am informed by the Consulate that due to 
consular immunity the Consulate is immune from process and 
unavailable to testify." 
32 
Commonwealth of the charges against the defendant,16 stated 
regret that the defendant "appear[ed] to have been unfortunately 
denied of his request to contact the Consulate since the time of 
his arrest several years ago," and then contended: 
"Had the consulate known [the defendant's] attorney had 
delayed the trial due to other matters and told the court 
that she was unable to represent [him] due to conflict of 
interest and breakdown in communications, the Consulate 
would have assisted and furnished counsel of [the 
defendant]'s choice." 
In closing, the consular letter added that "the Consulate [had] 
no financial or legal or liability obligation in this matter." 
 
b.  Art. 36.  The United States is party to the 
multinational Convention, which it ratified in 1969.  Article 36 
of the Convention,17 which is binding upon both Federal and State 
                     
 
16 The consular letter stated:  "[A]s a Consulate, we are 
always concerned about Indian citizens within our jurisdiction 
and will render help to the maximum possible within the 
permissible rules and regulations of the Government of India.  
It is also essential on the part of the local authorities to 
report every case of Indians to the closest Consulate." 
 
 
17 In relevant part, art. 36 states: 
 
"1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular 
functions relating to nationals of the sending State: 
 
". . . 
 
"(b) if [a national of the sending State] so requests, the 
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without 
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, 
within its consular district, a national of that State is 
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial 
or is detained in any other manner.  Any communication 
33 
authorities, "sets out the procedure to be followed when a 
foreign national is arrested or detained."  Gautreaux, 458 Mass. 
at 746.  In its 2006 opinion in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 
U.S. 331, 347 (2006), the United States Supreme Court left it to 
each of the several States to determine whether art. 36 grants 
individually enforceable rights and, if so, to establish an 
appropriate remedy in the event of breach.  See id. at 343, 347, 
360 ("assum[ing], without deciding," that art. 36 vests foreign 
nationals with such individual rights, but declining to dictate 
particular remedy for State authorities' breach of such rights 
where Convention failed to prescribe one). 
In 2011, this court first confronted alleged violations by 
the Commonwealth of art. 36 obligations in Gautreaux.  The 
defendant in Gautreaux was born in the Dominican Republic; he 
moved to the United States at age fourteen, but never became a 
naturalized citizen or achieved English fluency.  Gautreaux, 458 
Mass. at 742.  In 2003, he pleaded guilty to criminal charges 
                     
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in 
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the 
said authorities without delay.  The said authorities shall 
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights 
under this sub-paragraph; 
 
"(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a 
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or 
detention, to converse and correspond with him and to 
arrange for his legal representation." 
34 
arising from three separate arrests.  Id.  Like the defendant in 
the instant case, Gautreaux was never apprised of his art. 36 
right as a foreign national to have the consulate of the 
Dominican Republic informed of his arrests, and there was no 
indication that the consulate was so informed of any of his 
arrests or the accompanying charges by the appropriate 
authorities.18  Id. at 744.  Like the defendant in the instant 
case, he was also indigent and the court appointed counsel to 
represent him.  Id. at 744, 752-753.  Years later, notice of 
Federal deportation proceedings prompted Gautreaux to file a 
motion to vacate his plea and for a new trial.  Id. at 742. 
 
In our decision in Gautreaux, we recognized that art. 36 
confers enforceable individual rights on foreign nationals to 
receive "the notifications required by art. 36" upon arrest.  
                     
 
18 Our conclusion in Gatreaux that "the notifications 
required by art. 36 must be provided to foreign nationals on 
their arrest" does not signify that the Commonwealth's art. 36 
obligations evaporate once the opportunity for "prompt" 
performance upon arrest has passed (emphasis added).  
Commonwealth v. Gautreaux, 458 Mass. 741, 744 (2011).  To the 
contrary, the Commonwealth's art. 36 obligations to provide such 
notice continue.  "Consular notification is always 'better late 
than never.'"  United States Department of State, Consular 
Notification and Access:  Instructions for Federal, State, and 
Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign 
Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular 
Officials to Assist Them, at 29 (5th ed. Sept. 2018).  Thus, the 
Commonwealth's art. 36 obligations are not the exclusive 
province of the police or prison officials interacting with a 
foreign national at the time of arrest or detention. 
35 
Id. at 743-744.  We held that to warrant a new trial upon clear 
violation of that right, a defendant must "[a]t a minimum . . . 
establish"19 that "his consulate would have assisted him in a way 
that likely would have favorably affected the outcome of his 
[criminal] case."20  Id. at 752.  We concluded that the 
Commonwealth's failure to apprise Gautreaux of his art. 36 right 
to consular notification was not reversible error entitling him 
to a new trial, because 
"[the defendant] produced no evidence of the practices and 
protocols of the [consulate of the Dominican Republic], or 
of the advice and assistance it would have provided on 
notification of the detention of one of its citizens.  An 
assumption with respect to such matters is not evidence, 
and is woefully insufficient to demonstrate that the 
                     
 
19 The Convention does not prescribe a set remedy for 
violation of art. 36 in individual cases where the detainee is 
subsequently convicted of a crime, but in Gautreaux, we 
"acknowledge[d] and accept[ed]" that the Commonwealth has an 
obligation, respecting cases where "clear violations of 
[art. 36] notice protocols have been established," to designate 
"some process by which the soundness of a subsequent conviction 
can be reviewed in light of the violation."  Gautreaux, 458 
Mass. at 751.  To fulfill that obligation, we designated the 
motion process pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), as the applicable procedure, 
and a "substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice" the 
applicable standard of review.  Gautreaux, supra. 
 
 
20 Article 36 certainly does not obligate the consulate of a 
"sending State" to provide any assistance at all, although 
art. 36(1)(c) provides the consulate with that right.  "The 
provision secures only a right of foreign nationals to have 
their consulate informed of their arrest or detention -- not to 
have their consulate intervene, or to have law enforcement 
authorities cease their investigation pending any such notice or 
intervention."  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349 
(2006). 
36 
outcome of the defendant's case -- his pleading guilty to a 
significantly reduced set of charges with no sentence of 
incarceration -- likely would have been different, had he 
been informed of his right to have his consulate so 
notified." 
Id.  We also concluded that Gautreaux had received "the 
principal type of assistance envisioned by [art. 36]," that is, 
"assist[ance] . . . in retaining counsel," by virtue of the 
court's prompt appointment of counsel to represent him 
throughout the proceedings, in accordance with the 
constitutional right accorded any indigent defendant.  Id. 
Similarly, here, the defendant was never apprised of his 
right to have authorities inform his consulate of his arrest 
upon his request, and authorities never thus apprised his 
consulate.21  Nonetheless, the defendant, who was indigent, was 
promptly appointed competent counsel to represent him.  Apart 
from his argument that consular notification would have provided 
him with a choice of counsel, which we separately address infra, 
the record here is silent as to what, if anything, proper notice 
would have provided that the defendant had not received already.  
We therefore conclude, as we did in Gautreaux, that the 
                     
 
21 We do not subscribe to the Commonwealth's rationale that 
the defendant's own efforts to contact the consulate achieved 
the purpose of, and thereby released the Commonwealth from, its 
art. 36 obligation to inform the consulate of the defendant's 
arrest or detention upon the defendant's request.  The 
Commonwealth's notification obligations are not contingent upon 
the success or failure of the defendant independently to contact 
the consulate. 
37 
defendant did not make the minimum showing that "his consulate 
would have assisted him in a way that likely would have 
favorably affected the outcome of his case."  Gautreaux, 458 
Mass. at 752. 
 
c.  Right to counsel of choice.  We also agree with the 
judge that none of the asserted failures by the Commonwealth to 
observe art. 36 obligations resulted in any violation of the 
Sixth Amendment or art. 12 right to representation by "counsel 
of choice."  The defendant here remained indigent throughout the 
relevant period, and it is axiomatic that defendants who require 
counsel to be appointed for them are not entitled to choose the 
attorney appointed and have no "unbridled right to . . . replace 
one competent [and prepared] attorney with another" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dunne, 394 Mass. 10, 15 
(1985).  See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151 (Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice "does not extend to defendants who 
require counsel to be appointed for them").  See also Francis, 
485 Mass. at 96-97, citing Commonwealth v. Pena, 462 Mass. 183, 
191 (2012) ("[w]ith regard to an indigent defendant, the right 
to an attorney does not guarantee the right to any particular 
court-appointed counsel"). 
In a confusing and cryptic letter written in response to a 
letter from the defendant's first appointed appellate counsel, 
the Consulate General of India advised the Superior Court: 
38 
"Had the consulate known his attorney had delayed the trial 
due to other matters and told the court that she was unable 
to represent [the defendant] due to conflict of interest 
and breakdown in communications, the Consulate would have 
assisted and furnished counsel of [the defendant]'s choice.  
The Consulate has no objection if [the defendant's first 
appointed appellate counsel] represents [the defendant] and 
[the defendant] has no reservation about the same.  It may 
however be noted that the Consulate has no financial or 
legal or liability obligation in this matter." 
We interpret the meaning of the consular letter de novo, as this 
court is in as good a position as the judge to evaluate 
posttrial documentary evidence.  Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 
Mass. 155, 158 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007).  As was its 
right, the consulate declined to testify or otherwise appear in 
court.  We read the letter as carefully avoiding any commitment 
to provide the indigent defendant with counsel at the 
consulate's expense.  As such, the indigent defendant had no 
choice of counsel. 
Furthermore, even if we were to adopt the more generous 
interpretation of the letter posited by the judge, we still 
would conclude, for the same reasons he did, that no deprivation 
of a right to choice of private counsel resulted.  As the judge 
found: 
"Despite his contentions in this motion for new trial, and 
until this motion, [the defendant] never tied his desire 
for communication with his consulate to a desire or 
intention to replace [defense counsel] with an attorney of 
his choice.  See Commonwealth v. Francil, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 
35, 41 (1982) (defendant's 'complaint that he was deprived 
of his counsel of his choice smacks of afterthought')." 
39 
Without such record support, and without a financial commitment 
from the consulate, the choice of counsel argument amounted to 
nothing more than "speculation on top of speculation."  The 
judge succinctly identified and then dismissed each assumption 
in turn. 
To begin, the judge rejected the assumption that, upon 
making Commonwealth-facilitated contact with the consulate in 
August 2012, the defendant would have sought assistance to 
obtain successor counsel.  The only dissatisfaction the 
defendant ever expressed with his counsel was limited to her 
asserted failure to provide him with copies of discovery and 
court filings; he neither criticized her ability, preparation, 
or performance in court, nor asked for her to be replaced.  The 
judge found that "within thirty-days of a twice continued, four-
year old first degree murder case," the defendant would not have 
sought successor counsel but instead would have continued with 
the representation of experienced appointed counsel familiar 
with the case. 
Next, the judge dismissed the "pure speculation" that he 
would have permitted new counsel to appear in the defendant's 
case, given its age, serial continuances, and inevitable 
Commonwealth objection, especially where the "competency and 
effectiveness" of existing counsel were unquestioned.  Rather, 
the judge found that he would not have further continued the 
40 
trial to allow counsel to be replaced and prepare anew.  We 
discern no error in that analysis.  Even where the defendant has 
a choice of counsel, which this defendant did not have, such 
choice is not absolute.  As we explained in Francis, "[t]he 
court need not unduly delay trial to provide the defendant with 
counsel of his choice."  Francis, 485 Mass. at 96, citing Burton 
v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764, 771 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 
U.S. 821 (2005). 
d.  "Actual" conflict of interest in representation.  On 
appeal here, the defendant for the first time claims that 
defense counsel's representation at trial was impaired by an 
actual conflict of interest.  Article 12 entitles the criminally 
accused to "the untrammeled and unimpaired assistance of counsel 
free of any conflict of interest and unrestrained by commitments 
to others."  Commonwealth v. Davis, 376 Mass. 777, 780-781 
(1978).  An "actual" or "genuine" conflict of interest exists 
only where an attorney's own interests or the interests of 
another client impair the attorney's independent exercise of 
professional judgment, see Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 Mass. 
16, 20 (1986), such that "prejudice is 'inherent in the 
situation,'" Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 819 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Epsom, 399 Mass. 254, 262 (1987).  The 
defendant must marshal "sufficient, concrete evidence" of an 
attorney's divided loyalty to carry "the burden of proving both 
41 
the existence and precise character of the alleged conflict of 
interest."  Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 617-618 
(2018).  Once a defendant establishes that an actual conflict 
exists, a new trial typically is required without any need to 
demonstrate resulting prejudice.  See Shraiar, 397 Mass. at 20. 
Defense counsel's continued representation of the defendant 
was not burdened by an actual conflict of interest at any time 
for the reasons found by the judge who ruled on defense 
counsel's pretrial motion to withdraw.  He found that counsel 
filed her motion to withdraw in an abundance of caution 
following the defendant's "complaint" to the board, which the 
judge expressly found was "not a true complaint in the sense 
that is often understood within the Bar."  Based upon defense 
counsel's reputation and the judge's personal knowledge, he 
further concluded that no threat to "zealous advocacy" was 
present, and that defense counsel would be "well prepared and 
organized for trial."  Even when defense counsel objected to the 
judge's decision denying her motion to withdraw, and moved to 
reconsider, the judge made further findings, emphasizing the 
time he took to review the applicable case law, even though the 
defendant had not in fact expressed a desire for replacement 
counsel.  Counsel's continued representation following denial of 
42 
the motion to withdraw was therefore not burdened by any actual 
conflict.22 
 
3.  Ineffective assistance claims.  On appeal from his 
second motion for a new trial, the defendant maintains that he 
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney failed to apprise the court of certain additional 
evidence refuting the prosecution theory that the murder of the 
victim was premeditated to preclude her adverse testimony at his 
impending domestic assault trial.  This additional evidence was 
supposedly to the effect that the victim was unwilling to 
testify against the defendant.  The evidence at issue was a one-
page document memorializing the record of a telephone call from 
the defendant to an intake coordinator of the employee 
assistance program available through his employer on April 2, 
2008 (call summary) -- three days before the murder.  According 
to the call summary, the defendant "related he is prone to rages 
and violence against his [girlfriend] . . . when they drink 
together," and then reported that "last night he repeatedly 
                     
 
22 To the extent that the defendant now complains about 
defense counsel's requests to continue his trial date to attend 
to other client matters, the practical reality that public 
counsel carry heavy caseloads, often necessitating triage, is 
not the type of "sufficient, concrete evidence" of counsel's 
divided loyalty due to other clients' adverse interests that 
will establish existence of an "actual" conflict.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 617-618 (2018), citing 
Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 820 (2010). 
43 
tried to choke her 'maybe 10 times' after arguing about her 
playing her music too loud."  The call summary further reflects 
that the victim was also on the telephone call with the intake 
coordinator the entire time, "telling [the defendant] how to 
answer questions," and "making statements such as 'you have 
control issues, you act like the devil.'"  She dismissed 
questions about her own medical and future safety needs, 
stating, "I'm not getting into all that with the police again."  
It is this last statement that the defendant apparently 
considers of significant value to his defense. 
 
According to the defendant, counsel ineffectively 
squandered this available evidence where its absence 
(i) impaired his ability to contest the Commonwealth's 
interpretation of the calendar evidence by substantiating his 
asserted lack of concern that the victim would offer cooperating 
testimony; and (ii) ultimately led to the judge ruling the 
victim's statements to police describing the December 24, 2007 
assault admissible under the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
Because we conclude that the evidence at issue was far more 
likely to be prejudicial than beneficial, and there is no reason 
to doubt the determination by the motion judge, who was also the 
trial judge, that it would not have altered his pretrial ruling 
applying the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim must fail.  
44 
Accordingly, the judge's order denying the defendant's second 
motion for a new trial is affirmed. 
 
4.  Intoxication instruction.  Finally, the defendant 
contends that the judge committed reversible error by declining 
to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication, as his counsel 
requested.  As we have previously explained:  "[a] jury 
instruction on voluntary intoxication is required only where 
there is evidence of 'debilitating intoxication' that could 
support a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's ability to form 
the requisite criminal intent."  Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 
Mass. 512, 524 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Lennon, 463 Mass. 
520, 523 (2012).  There is no such evidence here. 
The defendant could at best show that he consumed "two to 
three beers" over several hours on the day of the murder, which 
was insufficient to require an intoxication instruction.  See 
Carter, 475 Mass. at 524 (no evidence that defendant's condition 
at time of murder approached "debilitating intoxication").  
Evidence that the defendant consumed alcohol in proximity to the 
crime does not itself establish a resulting state of 
"debilitating intoxication" such as could support reasonable 
45 
doubt about the defendant's capability to form the requisite 
criminal intent.  Lennon, 463 Mass. at 523.23 
Conclusion.  Having carefully observed our G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, duty to review the entire record, we discern no reason to 
reduce or set aside the verdicts.  The defendant's convictions 
and the orders denying his first and second motions for a new 
trial are affirmed. 
So ordered. 
                     
 
23 We decline the defendant's invitation to revisit our 
holding in Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 524 (2016), 
that a defendant's "self-serving statements are insufficient to 
warrant an intoxication instruction."