Case Title: Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Fremont County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Fremont County1987 WY 44735 P.2d 709Case Number: 86-129, 86-135, 86-163Decided: 04/15/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
BI-RITE 
PACKAGE, INC., Petitioner

 
 
v.

 
 
DISTRICT 
COURT OF the NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FREMONT COUNTY and Robert B. Ranck, 
Judge thereof, Respondents; John PHELPS, Katherine Phelps, Petitioners, v. 
DISTRICT COURT OF the NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FREMONT COUNTY and Robert B. 
Ranck, Judge thereof Respondents; BI-RITE PACKAGE, INC., a Wyoming corporation, 
Appellant (Defendant), Reno Long, d/b/a Star Lite Lanes & Lounge; Fremont 
County, Wyoming; Town of Riverton, Wyoming; and William G. Keith (Defendants), 
v. John PHELPS and Katherine Phelps, Appellees (Plaintiffs) Jack Little Whiteman 
(Plaintiff)

 
 
Richard 
R. Wilking and Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, 
for Petitioner in Case 86-129 and appellant in Case 86-163; argument by Mr. 
Wilking.

 
 
William 
F. Fix and Robert N. Williams, Jackson, for petitioners in Case 86-135; 
submitted on briefs.

 
 
Allen C. 
Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Respondents in Cases 86-129 and 
86-135 and Appellees in Case 86-163.  

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ.  Brown, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.  

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     This appeal is from an 
order requiring that plaintiffs, John and Katherine Phelps, and defendant, 
Bi-Rite Package, Inc., pay $5,000 (each side paying $2,500) to the Clerk of the 
District Court, Ninth Judicial District, Wyoming, as a sanction for late 
settlement of a personal injury civil action.

 
 
[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 
[¶3.]     The issues presented by 
appellants for our review are whether the court had power to impose sanctions 
for failure to timely settle, whether the pretrial conference order informing 
the parties that costs might be assessed for late settlement was sufficiently 
definite to support sanctions, whether the imposition of sanctions violated 
Art. I § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, and 
whether the court abused its discretion in imposing 
sanctions.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4.]     In this case for trial 
to a jury, Phelps sought to recover damages against Bi-Rite and other defendants 
for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident. At a pretrial 
conference, held November 15, 1985, the court ordered that a settlement 
conference be held March 10, 1986, and, after setting a trial date of April 14, 
1986, stated in its written order:

 
 
"Two 
weeks are set aside for the trial of this case. This means in the event 
settlement occurs at a late date, costs just for the use of the courtroom would 
be $10,000."

 
 
[¶5.]     On March 5, 1986, the 
court entered an order vacating the trial date of April 14 and continuing the 
case until further order of the court. On April 2, 1986, the court entered an 
order setting the case for trial on May 12, 1986, and on April 22, 1986, entered 
an additional order confirming the trial date of May 12, 1986, and setting aside 
four and one-half days for the trial of the case. On April 28, 1986, Phelps 
settled with defendants, Town of Riverton and 
FremontCounty, for the sum of 
$120,000. On May 6, 1986, Phelps settled with defendant Star Lite Lanes & 
Lounge for $13,250. Phelps offered to settle with Bi-Rite for the sum of 
$90,000. On May 7, 1986, Bi-Rite countered with an offer to settle its part of 
the case for the sum of $13,250. On May 8, 1986, Phelps offered to settle with 
Bi-Rite for $50,000, but indicated that they would accept $30,000 in settlement. 
That same day, May 8, 1986, Phelps and Bi-Rite settled the case between them for 
a payment of $29,000. The settlement was concluded four days before trial, and 
counsel immediately informed the court of the settlement. The clerk of court 
called all of the jurors and advised them the case had been settled and that 
they need not appear for jury duty. As a result, juror fees were not 
incurred.

 
 
[¶6.]     On the same date, May 
8, 1986, the court set a hearing on sanctions to be imposed for late settlement 
by sending the following Mailgram to Phelps and Bi-Rite:

 
 
"ReferenceFremontCounty # 23227. This case was set for jury 
trial for one week starting Monday May 12, 1986at 1:30 p.m. The court was 
advised at 3 p.m. Thursday May 8, 1986 that the case settled. Evidently counsel 
are of the opinion this court does not mean what it says when it sets a 
settlement date and affirmatively advises what will happen if the case is 
settled after that date. Therefore it is ordered that Richard Wilking and Rob 
Williams and any others they would like to have appear on their behalf shall 
personally appear in the courtroom of this court at Lander, Wyoming Monday May 
12, 1986 at 1:30 p.m. to show cause if any they have why the court should not 
impose sanctions, attorney fees, etcetera as set forth in the record of this 
case."

 
 
[¶7.]     The hearing commenced 
with the court stating:

 
 
"As I've 
stated and as you know, I moved the trial to May 12th and I set aside five days 
rather than ten days. So the record is clear that the date to settle was March 
10 [this was the date of the court-ordered settlement conference]. It doesn't 
take any thought at all to understand that the Thursday before the trial, which 
is to start Monday, is a late settlement date."

 
 
And the 
court then further stated:

 
 
"Now, I 
like to have some control over my docket, but it is abundantly apparent I have 
none. I have attorneys deciding when I'm going to try cases; I have babies 
deciding about my continuances. A great deal goes into just the scheduling with 
Judge Kail and Judge Denhardt to use these courtrooms."

 
 
And, 
finally, the court informed the parties:

 
 
"So the 
courtroom lies vacant. I'm aggravated because -- not mad, I'm not mad. 
Aggravated. And I want to tell you why I'm really aggravated. This might 
surprise you. Because now I've got some litigant who had the authority to settle 
this case who I don't even know controlling my docket."

 
 
Phelps 
and Bi-Rite then each informed the court concerning the course of settlement 
negotiations, reciting the offers, counteroffers, and discussions in some 
detail. The court was advised that Phelps had settled with the primary 
defendants on April 28 for the sum of $120,000, with Star Lite Lanes & 
Lounge on May 6 for $13,250, and that the last party-defendant, Bi-Rite, had 
settled with Phelps on May 8 for the sum of $29,000. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the court stated:

 
 
"Well, I 
appreciate that and I appreciate your candor and I'm sure that you're both full 
of veracity to the endth degree. * * * *

"It's 
the judgment of this Court that you each be assessed $2,500. Pay it to the Clerk 
of the Court. Both sides, Bi-Rite and the plaintiffs."

 
 
[¶8.]     To say that much was 
wrong with the imposition of sanctions here is a gross understatement. There was 
no finding of bad faith, fault or abuse of the process by the parties or their 
attorneys; the amount assessed was described as costs in the pretrial conference 
order; the $5,000 assessed was not an item of cost established by either statute 
or rule; the $5,000 assessed had no evidentiary basis; the $5,000 assessed was 
payable to the clerk of court rather than a party; the parties were never 
advised that the last date to settle was March 10, 1986, which was two months 
before trial; the court never advised the parties as to what constituted a "late 
settlement"; the order of the court, after hearing, described the penalty as a 
sanction rather than costs as stated in the pretrial order; the primary 
defendants settled April 28th and Star Lite Lanes & Lounge settled May 6th, 
which was long after the March 10th last date to settle, but were not sanctioned 
for late settlement.

 
 
ASSESSMENT 
OF COSTS

 
 
[¶9.]     Initially in its 
pretrial conference order, the court informed the parties that two weeks had 
been set aside for trial and that in the event of a "late settlement," 
costs would be assessed against them in the amount of $10,000 which was 
calculated at $1,000 a day for the use of the courtroom. It is abundantly clear 
that whatever the $5,000 assessment against the parties might be, it could not 
be costs.

 
 
[¶10.]  Costs were unknown at common law and, 
therefore, not awarded to either party. Costs are recoverable and may be awarded 
only if authorized by statute and then may be awarded only to parties to the 
litigation in amounts supported by evidence as having been incurred and 
reasonable.  Weaver v. Mitchell, Wyo., 715 P.2d 1361 (1986); Roberts Construction Company v. Vondriska, Wyo., 
547 P.2d 1171 (1976); 20 Am.Jur.2d 
Costs, §§ 4 and 5.

 
 
[¶11.]  The penalty assessed by the court here 
cannot be sustained as costs. There is no statute or rule providing for an 
assessment of costs of $1,000 a day for the use of the courtroom. The costs 
assessed were not awarded to a party but to the clerk of the district court. 
They are not supported by evidence of reasonableness or by any evidence at all. 
If the award were clearly of costs, as designated in the pretrial conference 
order, it could not stand and there would be no need for us to proceed further 
with this case.

 
 
SANCTIONS 
FOR LATE SETTLEMENT

 
 
[¶12.]  In the order entered after hearing, the 
court designated the $5,000 penalty assessed against the parties as a 
sanction for late settlement of the case rather than assessment of costs. 
The only question we need now determine is whether the court possessed the power 
or authority to order the parties to pay to the clerk of the district court the 
sum of $5,000 as a sanction for late settlement.

 
 
[¶13.]  Courts are vested with very great and 
far-reaching power to control their business and proceedings and to enforce 
their orders and process in conducting the business of a court. Courts must have 
these very great powers to ensure civility, orderly procedure, respect for the 
court as an institution and for its orders, and in the end an honest development 
of the facts of a controversy that will end in a just result. The court did not 
indicate the source of the power utilized in imposing sanctions in this case. 
We, therefore, begin our search for that power with a review of our rules which 
provide the penalties and sanctions that might be imposed against parties or 
their attorneys.

 
 
[¶14.]  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which contain provisions for sanctions or penalties, are as 
follows:

 

Rule 11, 
W.R.C.P., relating to signing and verification of pleadings, provides that a 
pleading signed with an intent to defeat the purpose of the rule may be stricken 
as sham and false, and for a willful violation of the rule or for the insertion 
of scandalous and indecent matter, an attorney may be subjected to appropriate 
disciplinary action.

Rule 37, 
W.R.C.P., provides that for a failure or refusal to make discovery in the 
answering of interrogatories, responding to requests for admissions, in giving 
depositions and in other discovery, the moving party may be awarded reasonable 
expenses and attorneys fees or the offending party held in contempt of 
court.

Rule 56, 
W.R.C.P., relating to summary judgments provides that the court may award 
reasonable expenses including attorneys fees against a party or attorney who 
files affidavits in bad faith or for the purpose of delay and may also adjudge 
the party or attorney guilty of contempt.

Rule 70, 
W.R.C.P., pertaining to judgment for specific acts, permits the issuance of a 
writ of attachment against the property of the disobedient party to compel 
obedience and also allows the court to adjudge the party in 
contempt.

Rule 41, 
W.R.Cr.P., provides for the disposition of criminal contempt summarily if 
committed in the presence of the court, otherwise upon notice and with bail if 
not in the presence of the court. There is no limit to the sentence for contempt 
that might be imposed except that if the sentence exceeds six months, a right of 
jury trial must be afforded.

Rule 
41(b), W.R.C.P., empowers a court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute 
or to comply with the rules of civil procedure or any order of the 
court.

 
 
There is 
nothing in either the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure or the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure that vest in the court a power to impose as a sanction a 
penalty of $5,000, calculated at $1,000 per day for use of the courtroom, for 
failure to timely settle a case.

 
 
[¶15.]  Rule 83, W.R.C.P., provides 
that:

 

"Each 
district court may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice 
not inconsistent with these rules or applicable statutes."

 
 
The 
district courts adopted the Uniform Rules for District Courts of the State of 
Wyoming, the pertinent rules being: Rule 203, U.R.D.C., providing for dismissal 
of cases in which there is no substantial or bona fide action of record for a 
period of 90 days; Rule 601 concerning pretrial practice which requires that the 
parties shall discuss settlement; and Rule 901, U.R.D.C., which 
provides:

 
 
"The 
following may be imposed for violation of these rules: reprimand, monetary 
sanctions, contempt, striking of briefs or pleadings, dismissal of proceedings, 
costs, attorneys fees, or other sanctions."

 
 
[¶16.]  It is agreed that the parties met and 
discussed settlement but did not settle at that time. In meeting and discussing 
settlement, the parties complied fully with District Court Rule 601. There is 
nothing in the Uniform Rules for District Courts that requires that the parties 
settle or that settlement occur at any specified time before trial. There was no 
violation of the Uniform Rules of the District Courts and, therefore, no 
authority under these rules for the imposition of sanctions for the failure to 
settle.

 
 
[¶17.]  We have repeatedly recognized that the 
power of a court to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of general 
jurisdiction, and we have said that such exists independently of any special or 
express grant of power.  Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial 
District, Wyo., 647 P.2d 1368 (1982); Townes v. State, 
Wyo., 502 P.2d 991 (1972); Matter of Estate of Mayne, Wyo., 345 P.2d 790 (1959); Application of Stone, 
77 Wyo. 1, 305 P.2d 777 (1957). Numerous statutes provide for contempt powers. The 
parties here, however, were not charged with contempt of court nor were the 
penalties assessed against them for contempt. The contempt power of the court, 
therefore, furnishes no support for the $5,000 penalty here assessed for late 
settlement.

 
 
INHERENT 
POWERS OF THE COURT

 
 
[¶18.]  If there is a power in the district court 
to require a payment of $5,000 to the clerk as a sanction for late settlement of 
the case, it does not exist in our statutes or rules and can only be supported 
as an exercise of an inherent power of the court. Cases which concern inherent 
powers of courts deal with the imposition of sanctions against both attorneys 
and parties.

 
 
[¶19.]  They are equally relevant to the issues 
posed in this case and are discussed without distinction.

 
 
[¶20.]  It is unquestioned that courts have 
inherent powers beyond those specified in rules and statutes that are absolutely 
necessary to the courts' ability to perform the functions for which they were 
created. The district court which presided in this case was established in Art. V, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution, which 
provides:

 
 
"The 
judicial power of the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of 
impeachment, in a supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as 
the legislature may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to 
time."

 
 

Article 
V, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution confers 
on the district courts original jurisdiction of all causes and appellate 
jurisdiction from the county and justice of the peace courts. Article V, § 2 of the Wyoming Constitution vests 
appellate jurisdiction and superintending control in the Wyoming Supreme Court 
and provides:

 
 
"The 
supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the 
state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general 
superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by law."

 
 
[¶21.]  First it is said that courts possess an 
inherent power described as

 
 
"an 
extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the 
essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of 
absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless 
the terms 'court' and 'judicial power.'" Eash v. 
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562, 
77 A.L.R.Fed. 751 (3rd Cir. 1985).

 
 
This 
power is essential to the separation of powers concept and allows a court to act 
notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. There is also an inherent power 
that is described as necessary to the efficient functioning and prompt and just 
disposition of litigation and business of the court. Thus, courts have an 
inherent power to summon witnesses and compel their attendance, to administer 
oaths, prevent abusive process, provide counsel for the indigent, correct 
records, relieve parties in default, discipline attorneys at law, and take other 
similar appropriate action. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 
79. Finally, there is an inherent power to take such action as is useful 
to the efficient functioning of the court. What is necessary and what is useful 
may be difficult to ascertain and subject to considerable disagreement. It has 
been said that "the notion of inherent power has been described as nebulous, and 
its bounds as 'shadowy,'" "not possible to locate with exactitude," and, 
therefore, should be exercised with great restraint and caution.  Eash v. 
Riggins Trucking, Inc., supra, 757 F.2d  at 
561-562.

 
 
[¶22.]  What is necessary in one jurisdiction or 
in certain circumstances might be only useful in others. Thus, where the time 
between filing a case and commencing a jury trial is five years, an inherent 
power utilized to expedite the court business might be termed necessary, whereas 
in a court such as those in Wyoming where the time between filing the complaint 
and commencing the trial to a jury is generally less than a year, an inherent 
power to push those cases faster might be termed only useful. A review of cases 
which discuss the inherent power of courts is instructive.

 
 
[¶23.]  In Link v. 
Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962), there was 
recognized an inherent power to dismiss an action with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute the action. The Court noted that this inherent power had been 
expressly recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 41(b), providing for involuntary dismissal. Where there 
was a failure to comply with orders relating to discovery and the filing of 
briefs, upon motion pursuant to Rule 37, 
F.R.C.P., the Court awarded costs "including attorneys fees," finding 
there was an inherent power to assess attorneys fees against a party who had 
litigated in bad faith.  Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1980). And in proceeding against 
an attorney under Rule 37, F.R.C.P., 
pertaining to discovery, J.M. Cleminshaw Company 
v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338 
(1981), the court, noting an era of rapidly expanding dockets and 
referring to a broad range of inherent powers available, imposed expenses and 
attorneys fees to the prevailing party and an additional sanction against the 
offending attorney, payable to the clerk of court from his personal funds. The 
court cited as authority Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, supra, wherein it is stated:

 

"If a 
court may tax counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith, it 
certainly may assess those expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial 
processes." 100 S. Ct.  at 2464.

 
 
[¶24.]  In Itel 
Containers International Corporation v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, 
Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96 (1985), 
defendant, knowing the court was without jurisdiction, concealed that fact, 
deceptively answered interrogatories to continue the concealment and litigated 
the matter for an extended period of time before dismissal. The court, relying 
upon violations of Rules 7, 11, and 26(g), 
F.R.C.P. and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, imposed 
a sanction against defendant and his counsel jointly and severally by entry of a 
judgment for attorneys fees payable to the plaintiff in the amount of 
$41,150.50. Then, relying upon Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking, Inc., supra, 757 F.2d  at 
568, the court identified an inherent power to impose a monetary penalty 
upon an attorney for abusive litigation practices and imposed a sanction in the 
amount of $5,000 to be paid to the government.

 
 
[¶25.]  Eash v. 
Riggins Trucking, Inc., supra, presents an enlightening and 
comprehensive discussion in both the majority and dissenting opinions of 
inherent power of courts to impose sanctions. In Eash, plaintiff's attorneys' 
repeated attempts to communicate with defendant's attorney concerning settlement 
during the week preceding trial were unsuccessful. On the date trial was to 
begin, the parties came to court, and defendant's counsel proposed a settlement 
figure which plaintiff accepted. The court believed defendant's counsel was 
scheduled for trial in state court and had settled to avoid a scheduling 
conflict. The court imposed a sanction of $390 on defendant's attorney which was 
the jury fee for 13 jurors who appeared and would have been selected for the 
case. Concerning the imposition of sanctions upon an attorney, it is 
stated:

 
 
"Courts 
must be able to impose reasonable sanctions for conduct by lawyers that falls 
short of contempt. A court's inherent power to manage its caseload, control its 
docket, and regulate the conduct of attorneys before it, provides authority to 
fashion tools that aid the court in getting on with the business of deciding 
cases." (Citations omitted.) 757 F.2d  at 
567.

 
 
Because 
the sanctioned attorney was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard, the 
cause was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Four 
judges dissented from the majority opinion and would have held that the 
assessment against the attorney was not a recoverable cost, could not be imposed 
under any rule or congressional legislation then existing, but was purely and 
simply a fine levied against the attorney and as such could only be imposed 
pursuant to the contempt powers of the court. The dissent further would have 
held that the late settlement did not rise to the level of contempt and that 
courts should not be permitted to fine attorneys on an ad hoc basis without 
clear authority therefor, stating:

 
 
"Because 
there are few effective checks on the judiciary in our democratic form of 
government, we must be particularly sensitive to the need to check ourselves. 
There is no more difficult task before judges than to voluntarily decline to 
expand their own powers. It may appear that the fine imposed in this case, a 
mere $390, is too trifling to presage an arrogant usurpation by the judiciary of 
the powers of the other branches. But the principle that underlies the 
majority's affirmation of the district court's power has no built-in limitation. 
If a district court chooses to rule that attorneys who tried a lengthy libel or 
antitrust case before settling it could and should have reached a settlement 
before trial, the majority's holding could authorize that court to impose on the 
trial attorneys the heavy expenses of jurors fees and presumably their food and 
other expenses as well. * * * * We cannot be blind to the lesson of history that 
unchecked power may lead to abuse." 757 F.2d  at 
580 (Sloviter, J., dissenting.)

 
 
The 
majority and dissenting opinions in the Eash case clearly define the problem 
which confronts us. But we can distinguish the Eash case from the case at hand 
in that it involved what the court viewed as specific misconduct of an attorney 
in settling the morning of trial because of a conflict with another setting in 
another court. The case before us involved no misconduct by the attorneys but 
was simply what the court viewed as a late settlement.

 
 
[¶26.]  The cases discussed to this point deal 
with special facts and circumstances peculiar to the particular case involved. 
They generally involve abusive practices or bad faith actions by parties or 
attorneys in the case. An inherent power to impose the sanctions has been 
recognized because of the special circumstances, although support for those 
sanctions may not be found in particular rules and legislative 
enactments.

 
 
[¶27.]  Usually litigation is subject to 
settlement in some manner. The imposition of a sanction for late settlement in 
this case involves no peculiar facts or circumstances, but is applicable to all 
cases pending before the court. Therefore, we are not concerned with bad faith 
or abusive activities of the kind described in the preceding 
cases.

 
 
[¶28.]  Two cases focus most clearly upon the 
problem which confronts us. In White v. Raymark 
Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 1175, 
(4th Cir. 1986), the district court assessed juror costs in the amount of $2,000 
against Raymark Industries pursuant to Local Rule 20(C) for the Eastern District 
of Virginia. Local Rule 20(C) states:

 
 
"Whenever 
any civil action scheduled for jury trial is settled or otherwise disposed of in 
advance of the actual trial, then, except for good cause shown, juror costs, 
including Marshal's fees, mileage and per diem, shall be assessed equally 
against the parties and their counsel or otherwise assessed as directed by the 
Court, unless the Clerk's Office is notified at least one full business day 
prior to the day on which the action is scheduled for trial * * * *." Id. at 1176.

 
 
In 
affirming the sanction imposed, it was held that the district court had power to 
promulgate Local Rule 20(C) emanating from congressional legislation and federal 
statutes, uniform federal rules, and the inherent power vested in federal courts 
to control their proceedings. The court further found that Raymark's insurer had 
not demonstrated good cause and that there was no abuse of discretion in the 
entry of the district court's order assessing juror costs against 
Raymark.

 
 
[¶29.]  In Ruiz 
Ruiz v. Nazario, 108 F.R.D. 399 
(1985), juror costs were assessed to the Justice Department pursuant to 
Local Rule 323 which provides in part:

 
 
"Whenever 
any civil action scheduled for jury trial is settled or otherwise disposed of in 
advance of the actual trial, then, except for good cause shown, jury costs, 
including Marshal fees, mileage, and per diem, may be assessed * * * * unless 
the Clerk is notified before twelve noon of the last business day preceding the 
time when the action is scheduled for trial * * * *."

 
 
The 
court noted that the rule is not a disciplinary sanction, is imposed only upon 
last minute settlements when the parties cannot show good cause for failure to 
give prior notification or timely settle, and is imposed pursuant to the broad 
discretionary power of the district courts to interpret and apply their local 
rules to promote efficiency in the courts. The court then affirmed the order 
requiring the Justice Department to deposit with the court the sum of $1455.74, 
the total amount assessed for jury costs.

 
 
[¶30.]  It is often said that a good settlement 
is better than a good lawsuit. To that we add, that a good settlement is better 
than a lengthy trial. Settlement of cases ought to be encouraged. Even a late 
settlement more often than not results in considerable judicial economy. It is 
suggested the courtroom will sit empty. That should not be so. But even if on 
occasion that does occur, we must recognize that here the jury panel did not 
appear for trial. Jury fees, costs and per diem, a lengthy trial, post-trial 
motions, hearings, orders, notice of appeal and appellate proceedings were all 
avoided with the consequent saving of judicial resources and time. We cannot 
help but wonder in this case what would have happened had the parties, knowing 
that a $5,000 sanction would be imposed for late settlement, called the judge 
and advised that they could settle the case except for the $5,000 penalty. Would 
the court prefer sitting through a five-day trial with attendant costs? We also 
wonder whether the $1,000 per day ad hoc rule would apply to all cases -- 
divorce, collections, contracts, parental rights, etc. Sometimes in divorce 
cases there is no money. Are parties without money exempt or do attorneys then 
pay?

 
 
[¶31.]  The court in Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., supra, 757 F.2d 557, after recognizing the authority of 
the court under its inherent powers to impose sanctions, 
stated:

 
 
"Certainly, 
however, the district court must exercise discretion and sound judgment in 
dealing with the myriad methods with which lawyers may abuse the judicial 
process. Nor is anything in this opinion meant to suggest that settlement on the 
eve of trial is in and of itself improper. Frequently a settlement may be in the 
best interest of not only clients and their attorneys, but of the judicial 
system and society as a whole." Id. at 568.

 
 
[¶32.]  There is no statute or rule under which 
the district court could have imposed the $5,000 sanction assessed against the 
parties in this case. Settlement is something that is involved in every case and 
is so common that if a failure to settle is to be the subject of sanctions, that 
at least ought to be provided in some rule governing procedure and practice 
before the court. We hold, therefore, that the court does not have inherent 
power on an ad hoc basis to impose sanctions against parties or attorneys for 
something so common, usual and general as case settlement.

 
 
[¶33.]  Here it seems that contrary to Glatter v. American National Bank of 
Powell, Wyo., 675 P.2d 642 (1984), 
the court, being "aggravated" -- "not mad," may have acted upon impulse in 
imposing sanctions, for there is nothing in the record that supports a finding 
that the cost of an empty courtroom is $1,000 per day. For this reason alone, we 
could not approve the sanction imposed.

 
 
[¶34.]  We do not by this opinion suggest or 
approve sanctions for late settlement of cases, but do recommend that, if 
imposed, they should be pursuant to some rule specifying reasons and 
circumstances allowing imposition and giving notice to all concerned. Before 
adoption of such rule, it would surely be advisable that there be considerable 
study and that the court have the benefit of input from all segments of the 
judicial system and the advice of the Rules Advisory 
Committee.

 
 
[¶35.]  For the reasons stated, the order of the 
district court imposing sanctions is reversed.  

 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶36.]  I generally agree with that said by the 
majority in its opinion and concur in the result. However, the opinion sets out 
basic rules regarding inherent powers of the court to impose sanctions, and then 
unnecessarily dilutes the application of those rules.

 
 
[¶37.]  The majority quotes with approval 
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 567 (3rd Cir. 1985), as 
follows:

 
 
"'Courts 
must be able to impose reasonable sanctions for conduct by lawyers that falls 
short of contempt of court. * * * * A court's inherent power to manage its 
caseload, control its docket, and regulate the conduct of attorneys before it, 
provides authority to fashion tools that aid the court in getting on with the 
business of deciding cases. * * * *'"

 
 
[¶38.]  The majority in its opinion also 
says:

 
 
"It is 
unquestioned that courts have inherent powers beyond those specified in rules 
and statutes that are absolutely necessary to the courts' ability to perform the 
functions for which they were created. * * * * 

* * 
*

"An 
inherent power to impose the sanctions has been recognized because of the 
special circumstances, although support for those sanctions may not be found in 
particular rules and legislative enactments."

 
 
The 
majority, however, concludes its well-written opinion by 
saying:

 
 
"* * * * 
We hold, therefore, that the court does not have inherent power on an ad hoc 
basis to impose sanctions against parties or attorneys for something so common, 
usual and general as case settlement. 

* * 
*

"We do 
not by this opinion suggest or approve sanctions for late settlement of cases, 
but do recommend that, if imposed, they should be pursuant to some rule 
specifying reasons and circumstances allowing imposition and giving notice to 
all concerned. * * * *"

 
 
[¶39.]  This later pronouncement by the majority 
seems to nullify or dilute what was said before in the opinion regarding 
inherent powers of the court.

 
 
[¶40.]  I believe that the trial court does have 
inherent power or should have inherent power to impose sanctions in the proper 
case, not for late settlement but for playing fast and loose with the court. It 
seems that modest sanctions would be preferable to the trial judge stacking 
cases.

 
 
[¶41.]  My experience suggests several situations 
that I believe would justify the imposition of sanctions. For example, the judge 
leaves Kemmerer at 6:00 a.m. for what he supposes to be a five day trial 
beginning at 10:00 a.m. in Jackson. At 9:30 a.m. he learns, for the first 
time, from a custodian in the Jackson courthouse that the lawyers settled the 
case four days earlier. I humbly submit that in the circumstances just 
described, modest sanctions against the lawyers might be in order -- not for 
late settlement but for their inexcusable neglect to inform the 
judge.

 
 
[¶42.]  Sometimes lawyers settle cases well in 
advance of the trial date, but do not tell the judge about the settlement, thus 
giving him an opportunity to adjust his docket.

 
 
[¶43.]  I think that a judge must have the tool 
of sanctions to be imposed in the proper case.