Case Title: KARA WALTERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0037

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
KARA WALTERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 159197 P.3d 1273Case Number: S-08-0037Decided: 12/31/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KARA 
WALTERS,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Respondent.

 
 
Original 
Proceeding

Petition 
for Writ of Review

District 
CourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:

R. Michael Vang, Brown 
& Hiser, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Respondent:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; Robin Sessions 
Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. Sessions 
Cooley.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Petitioner Kara 
Walters entered a conditional guilty plea to a second offense of driving while 
under the influence of alcohol.  She 
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Judgment and Sentence.  Ms. Walters petitioned this Court for a 
Writ of Review, which we granted.  
We find that Ms. Walters did not enter a valid conditional guilty plea 
pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of 
conviction and reverse for further proceedings.

ISSUEs

[¶2]           
Ms. Walters presents 
the following issues:

1.   Was it proper for the trial court 
to admit Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST) evidence in a jury trial 
without first holding an evidentiary hearing to establish the arresting 
officer's competence and reliability to testify regarding this 
evidence?

2.   Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-105(a), was it proper for the trial court to admit into evidence an 
Alco-Sensor portable breath test (PBT) result?

3.   Was Ms. Walters improperly detained 
and arrested under Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution?

The State rephrases 
the issues:

1.   Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting the field sobriety evidence.

2.   Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting the Alco-Sensor test results.

3.   Whether Petitioner was 
appropriately detained and arrested.

We, however, find that 
the following issue resolves this case:

Did Ms. Walters enter 
a proper conditional guilty plea pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2)?

FACTS

[¶3]           
On July 23, 2005, a 
Wyoming 
highway patrolman observed a vehicle that did not display a front license plate. 
 After observing that the rear 
license plate was issued by South Dakota, and 
being aware that South 
Dakota requires two license plates to be displayed, the 
patrolman pursued and stopped the vehicle.  Ms. Walters was the driver of the 
vehicle.

[¶4]           
During the course of 
the stop, the patrolman noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from both the 
vehicle in general and Ms. Walters in particular.  When questioned, Ms. Walters first 
denied drinking anything, then admitted to the patrolman that she had consumed 
one beer.  The patrolman 
administered several field sobriety tests, including a horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test, which Ms. Walters performed poorly.  
The patrolman next administered a portable breath test that indicated a 
blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.125%.  
Ms. Walters then admitted to drinking three beers and told the officer 
that she should not have been driving.  
The patrolman arrested Ms. Walters.  
At the jail, the patrolman administered another breath test using the 
machine at that facility.  That test 
indicated that Ms. Walters had a BAC of 0.14%.

[¶5]           
Ms. Walters filed a 
number of pretrial motions:

1.      Motion for Access to Law Enforcement 
Investigation Policies;

2.      Motion for Access to Expert Witness 
Information;

3.      Demand that State Provide Notice of 
Intention to Use 404(b) Evidence and Motion to Suppress use of Such 
Evidence;

4.      Motion for Discovery and for Leave to File 
Further Motions if Discovery Establishes Unknown 
Issues;

5.      Motion to Give Notice of Intent to Use as 
Evidence the DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student 
Manual Published by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration;

6.      Request for Daubert Hearing and Motion to 
Suppress use of Field Sobriety Maneuvers;

7.      Request of Notice from the State of 
Wyoming of Its 
Intent to use Statements of the Defendant and Motion to Suppress such 
Statements;

8.      Motion to Suppress use of Chemical 
Tests;

9.      Motion to Suppress Alco-Censor [sic] Result;

10.    Motion for Disclosure of Prosecutors' 
Information about Prospective Jurors, Plea Deals with Witnesses and Witnesses' 
Criminal Histories;

11.    Motion to Sequester 
Witnesses;

12.    Motion for Discovery of EC/IR Software 
Information;

13.    Motion to Suppress Evidence and Dismiss Case 
. . . . 

[¶6]           
The circuit court held 
a motion hearing on January 3, 2006.  
At the beginning of the hearing, the court denied the Motion for Discovery of EC/IR Software 
Information and denied the juror information portion of the Motion for Disclosure of Prosecutors' 
Information about Prospective Jurors, Plea Deals with Witnesses and Witnesses' 
Criminal Histories.  Ms. Walters 
withdrew the Motion for Access to Law 
Enforcement Investigation Policies.  
In addition, the court established that the State intended to use the 
portable breath test only to show that Ms. Walters had alcohol in her system, 
not the precise BAC.  The court then 
addressed the defense motions to suppress evidence.  The State presented the testimony of the 
arresting officer.  He testified 
that he stopped the vehicle because of the lack of a front license plate and 
described his investigation from the initial stop through Ms. Walters being 
booked at the jail.  Ms. Walters 
called two witnesses who testified that, contrary to the patrolman's testimony, 
the vehicle displayed a front license plate.  One witness was the owner of the vehicle 
and a passenger in the vehicle on the night Ms. Walters was arrested.  The other witness testified that he 
arrived on the scene after the patrolman left to take Ms. Walters to jail and 
photographed the front of the vehicle.  
The photographs showed the front of the vehicle with a license plate 
properly displayed.

[¶7]           
Subsequent to the 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an Order Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence 
and Dismiss Case and Order Denying Motion to Suppress Statements of the 
Defendant.  Specifically, the 
court determined that the testimony of the car owner was not as reliable as that 
of the patrolman.  The court also 
discounted the second witness's testimony because "he did not check for a 
license in the back of the vehicle and the photo was taken after the Trooper 
left the scene."

[¶8]           
Trial was scheduled 
for February 28, 2006.  On that day, 
but before the trial was to begin, the circuit court held a hearing to consider 
the defense request for a Daubert 
hearing regarding the field sobriety tests, specifically the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test.1  The court determined that the tests 
would be admissible at trial without a Daubert hearing.  The court also commented upon its 
earlier ruling regarding the portable breath test results, stating: "They can be 
introduced.  I'm not suppressing 
them or keeping them out at this time."

[¶9]           
After the court denied 
the request for a Daubert hearing, 
Ms. Walters indicated her desire to change her plea.  After confirming that Ms. Walters was 
changing her plea voluntarily and understood that she was giving up certain 
constitutional rights, the court accepted her plea of guilty.  The court then ordered that a substance 
abuse evaluation be performed and allowed Ms. Walters to be released on bond 
pending sentencing.  At the end of 
the hearing, the following exchange occurred:

The Court: . . . Do 
you have any questions, Ms. Walters?

The Defendant: No, 
ma'am.

The Court: All 
right.  Thank 
you.

[Defense Counsel]: And 
Mr. [Prosecutor] just wanted to note for the record that we're doing this as a 
conditional plea.  So I'm just 
bringing that up, so we understand this is conditional.

The Court: All 
right.  Thank 
you.

[Defense Counsel]: 
Thank you, Your Honor.

The Court: Court will 
be in recess.

[¶10]       
Ms. Walters was 
subsequently sentenced to 127 days imprisonment with 120 days suspended in favor 
of two years probation, and credit for two days of pretrial confinement.  In the Judgment and Sentence, the court 
stated:

There was [a] plea 
agreement entered between the parties whereby the District Attorney would 
consent to Ms. Walter[s] entering a conditional guilty plea under Rule 
11(a)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was fully disclosed 
and accepted by the Court as required by Rule 11(e)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 

[¶11]       
Ms. Walters timely 
appealed to the district court.  She 
argued on appeal the same issues she now raises before this Court.  On January 30, 2008, the district court 
affirmed the Judgment and Sentence of the circuit court.  Ms. Walters next petitioned this Court 
for a writ of review, which we granted.

Standard 
of Review

[¶12]       
This case involves the 
proper interpretation of W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), a question of law that we review de novo.  Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2008 
WY 46, ¶ 7, 181 P.3d 94, 98 (Wyo. 2008).

Discussion

[¶13]       
The Judgment and 
Sentence entered in the circuit court characterizes the guilty plea of Ms. 
Walters as a "conditional guilty plea."  
Conditional guilty pleas are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) which 
states:

Conditional Pleas.  
With the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving 
in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea.

This rule is nearly 
identical to its federal counterpart.  
See F.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  When this Court construes court rules 
that are virtually identical to their federal counterparts, relevant federal 
authority is persuasive.  Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial 
Dist., 647 P.2d 1368, 1374 n.4 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶14]       
Rule 11(a)(2) imposes 
several requirements.  The parties 
must make a reservation of the right to appeal a specific issue in writing.  This ensures "careful attention to any 
conditional plea."  F.R.Cr.P. 11, 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 Amendment.  It makes clear "that a particular plea 
was in fact conditional, and . . . identif[ies] precisely what pretrial issues 
have been preserved for appellate review."  
Id.  While strict conformance with the 
writing requirement is the best practice, some federal courts have determined 
that it is not mandatory.  E.g., United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 1000 
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 916-17 (5th 
Cir. 1992).  Without a writing, 
those courts require that the record sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant 
intended to preserve the right to appeal a specific issue or issues.  See, e.g., United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535, 542-44 (6th Cir. 2008); Yasak, 884 F.2d  at 1000.  It is undisputed that in this case the 
parties did not make a reservation of the right to appeal a specific issue in 
writing.  Additionally, the record 
does not sufficiently demonstrate that Ms. Walters intended to preserve the 
right to appeal the specific issues she raises on appeal.

[¶15]       
The other requirements 
of the ruleconsent of the State and approval of the courtare mandatory.  See United 
States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 645 
(4th Cir. 2004).  The 
requirement that the trial court approve a conditional plea "ensures . . . that 
the defendant is not allowed to take an appeal on a matter which can only be 
fully developed by proceeding to trial."  
F.R.Cr.P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 Amendment.  The requirement that the State consent 
"ensure[s] that conditional pleas will be allowed only when the decision of the 
[appellate] court . . . will dispose of the case either by allowing the plea to 
stand or by such action as compelling dismissal of the [charges] or suppressing 
essential evidence."  Id.  The required consent must be explicit in 
the record.  For example the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that "for Rule 11 purposes, silence 
or inaction by the government is not consent."  United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1156 
(11th Cir. 1997).

[¶16]       
This Court has 
recognized that the requirements of court approval and prosecution consent exist 
for the purpose of ensuring "that conditional pleas will be allowed only when 
the decision of the [appellate] court . . . will dispose of the case.'"  Bouch v. State, 2006 WY 122, ¶ 28, 143 P.3d 643, 652 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting F.R.Cr.P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Rules, 1983 Amendment).  In Knox v. State, an early case involving a 
conditional guilty plea, counsel explicitly noted on the record that the issue 
appealed was dispositive.  848 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Wyo. 1993).  We implicitly agreed when we concluded 
that the defendant's guilty plea was conditional and addressed the issue 
presented on appeal.  Id. at 
1357.

[¶17]       
Years later, in Bouch, we emphasized the dispositive 
issue requirement.  143 P.3d 643.  In that case, the defendant 
raised the issue of whether the search warrant was deficient.  Id., ¶ 2, 143 P.3d  at 645.  We noted that "a trial 
court should only approve a conditional plea if assured that the decision of the 
appellate court will dispose of the case."  
Id., ¶ 28, 143 P.3d  at 652.  While we determined 
that the warrant issue was not case dispositive, we chose to consider the issue 
"in light of the unique circumstances of this case and because we have not 
previously addressed our concerns regarding the proper application of W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2)."  Id., ¶ 29, 143 P.3d  at 652.

[¶18]       
Most recently, we 
again emphasized the dispositive issue requirement in Johnson v. City of Laramie, 2008 WY 73, 
187 P.3d 355 (Wyo. 2008).  In that 
case, the defendant was charged with driving while under the influence of 
alcohol and moved to suppress a breath test.  Id., ¶ 1, 187 P.3d  at 356.  The trial court denied 
the motion to suppress, and the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea 
reserving the right to appeal that decision.  Id.  We challenged the propriety of the 
conditional guilty plea under the circumstances because "[e]ven if Johnson had 
ultimately prevailed on his challenge to the evidence from the breath test, the 
breath test was not the only evidence supporting a conviction for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol."  
Id., ¶ 5, 187 P.3d  at 356.  Despite this 
deficiency, we chose to address the defendant's appellate issue.  Id., ¶ 6, 187 P.3d  at 357.  Though we exercised 
our discretion and addressed the substantive issue in both Bouch and Johnson, we decline to do so here.  In this case, all issues presented in 
this appeal are not dispositive, and there is no indication in the trial court 
record regarding the specific issue or issues that were reserved for 
appeal.

[¶19]       
The essential problem 
created by use of the conditional guilty plea when the issues reserved are not 
dispositive is that further judicial proceedings will be required if the 
defendant prevails on appeal.  In 
that situation, upon remand, the defendant will be entitled to withdraw the 
plea.  At that point, the defendant 
may then enter another guilty plea or proceed to trial.  In either case, the proceeding may 
result in another appeal and further delay.  If the defendant opts for trial, the 
ability of both parties to present their case may be compromised.  The delay may be more significant to the 
government because it bears the burden of proof.  Use of the conditional guilty plea, when 
the issues reserved are not dispositive, "only serve[s] to postpone the trial 
and require the government to try the case after substantial delay, during which 
time witnesses may be lost, memories dimmed, and the offense grown so stale as 
to lose jury appeal.'"  Bouch, ¶ 28, 143 P.3d  at 652 (quoting 
F.R.Cr.P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 Amendment).  

[¶20]       
Use of the conditional 
guilty plea when the reserved issues are not dispositive may also negatively 
impact appellate review.  Proper 
appellate review requires an adequate factual record.  It is important that the issues 
presented to this Court be "capable of disposition on a pretrial record."  Bundy, 392 F.3d  at 646.  The factual record is particularly 
important when we attempt a harmless error analysis.  If an appellate court finds error in a 
pretrial ruling, it may not be able to determine whether the error is 
harmful.  "Permitting conditional 
guilty pleas to preserve non-case-dispositive pretrial issues for appeal would 
undermine harmless-error analysis."  
Id. at 
647.

[¶21]       
These concerns compel 
us to enforce compliance with W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) in this case.  The dispositive issue rule minimizes the 
risks of unnecessary trial and appellate litigation and avoids the possibility 
of appellate courts deciding appeals without an adequate record.  Moreover, we agree with the following 
statement by the Bundy 
court:

[W]e believe it is the 
duty of the [trial] court in the first instance "to ensure that the defendant 
reserves only issues that can adequately be reviewed without a full trial 
record, resolution of which by this court would dispose of the case."  . . . A [trial] court should reject any 
conditional guilty plea that purports to preserve for appellate review pretrial 
issues that, in the [trial] court's own judgment, are not fully 
case-dispositive.

392 F.3d  at 647.  An issue is dispositive if (1) an 
appellate ruling in the defendant's favor would require dismissal of the charges 
or suppression of evidence necessary for conviction, or (2) where an appellate 
ruling in the State's favor would require affirming the conviction.  Id. 
at 648.  The State's assessment of 
the case has considerable weight, but the ultimate decision belongs to the trial 
court.  The question for the court 
is whether the appeal will end the case.  
Id.

[¶22]       
Turning our attention 
to the current case, the first question we must answer is whether Ms. Walters 
entered a valid conditional guilty plea, including conformance with the 
dispositive issue requirement.  We 
conclude that she did not.  First, 
there is neither a written reservation of the particular appellate issue, nor 
does the record demonstrate that Ms. Walters intended to preserve any specific 
issue or issues for appeal.  There 
was no mention during the change of plea hearing of what issue or issues Ms. 
Walters intended to appeal.  The 
Judgment and Sentence specifies no particular issue to be appealed.  The first mention of the issues raised 
on appeal appears in the first brief filed in the district court on appeal from 
the circuit court.  Second, there is 
a significant question regarding whether the court approval and State consent 
requirements were met.  The first 
mention of the conditional nature of the plea occurred after Ms. Walters had 
entered a plea of guilty and the circuit court had accepted it.  Rather than consenting to a conditional 
plea, the court was merely informed that the plea it had just accepted was 
conditional.  Additionally, the 
State did not mention or consent to the conditional nature of the guilty plea 
prior to entry of the plea.

[¶23]       
The main basis for our 
decision to reject the plea for noncompliance with W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), however, 
is that two of the three issues raised on appeal are not dispositive.  Namely, Ms. Walters contends that the 
circuit court inappropriately ruled that evidence of her performance on field 
sobriety tests and the portable breath test was admissible.  Even if she were to prevail on those 
issues, the case would not be fully resolved because the State could still 
introduce the statements of Ms. Walters and the results of the alcohol sensor 
test administered at the jail, which indicated a BAC of 0.14%.  Both Ms. Walters and the State conceded 
as much during oral argument before this Court.  In addition, the State contends that 
admission of the field tests, even if improper, is harmless error.  It is impossible, however, to evaluate 
the prejudicial effect of this evidence.  
Because no trial occurred, there is no record of how this evidence would 
be introduced, how it would be addressed by counsel in argument, or whether any 
other evidence of guilt would be introduced.  Put simply, it would be pure speculation 
for this Court to reach any conclusion regarding harmless error given the lack 
of a trial record in this case.

[¶24]       
The third issue 
presented by Ms. Walters, however, is dispositive.  She contends that the initial stop 
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 
of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  If Ms. Walters were 
to prevail on this issue, suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of 
the illegal traffic stop would have to be suppressed.  Because there is no evidence of guilt 
other than that obtained as a result of the traffic stop, a finding in favor of 
Ms. Walters on this issue would require dismissal of the charges against 
her.

[¶25]       
We are now faced with 
a situation similar to that presented in Bundy, 392 F.3d  at 649.  The question is whether the two 
non-dispositive issues taint the entire conditional plea, or whether we may 
separate the single dispositive issue and resolve it.  Like the Bundy court, we conclude that the entire 
plea is invalid.

[¶26]       
"The alternatives to 
a conditional plea being entered are either that an unconditional plea has been 
entered or that no [valid] plea has been entered.'"  Bundy, 392 F.3d  at 649 (quoting United States v. Carrasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1454 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)).  In order for a plea to be valid, it must 
be knowingly and voluntarily made.  
E.g., Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d 468, 472 (Wyo. 2004); Maes v. State, 
2005 WY 70, ¶¶ 8-9, 114 P.3d 708, 710 (Wyo. 2005).  A plea of guilty is a waiver of 
non-jurisdictional defenses.  E.g., Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 394, 400-01 (Wyo. 2004); Guy v. 
State, 2008 WY 56, ¶¶ 41-43, 184 P.3d 687, 700 (Wyo. 2008).  In this case, Ms. Walters did not 
voluntarily waive the right to appeal.  
Indeed, defense counsel's discussion with the court at the conclusion of 
the plea hearing indicated that Ms. Walters explicitly believed that she would 
be able to undertake an appeal.  We 
cannot therefore treat the plea of Ms. Walters as a voluntary unconditional 
plea.  "Because there is no valid 
pleaconditional or unconditionalto support the judgment of conviction, that 
judgment must be vacated."  Bundy, 392 F.3d  at 649.  On remand, Ms. Walters may choose 
to enter another conditional guilty pleawith the consent of the State and the 
approval of the courtreserving only dispositive issues.  Alternatively, she may enter an 
unconditional guilty plea or proceed to trial.

[¶27]       
We reverse the order 
of the district court affirming the conviction of Ms. Walters and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1This is a reference to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), a seminal case involving the proper foundation for admission of 
expert testimony.