Case Title: State v. LaPointe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112019

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,019 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JACK R. LAPOINTE, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
The right to appeal is entirely statutory, and the limits of appellate jurisdiction are 
imposed by the legislature.  
 
2. 
The determination of whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over an appeal 
rests on the interpretation of statutes and involves a question of law over which the 
Kansas Supreme Court, upon review of a Court of Appeals decision, exercises unlimited 
review. 
 
3. 
 
The district court must have entered a final judgment before the prosecution may 
bring a question-reserved appeal under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3).  
 
 
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4. 
 
Question-reserved appeals under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3) may proceed 
only where they seek a ruling on questions of statewide interest that are important to the 
correct and uniform administration of the criminal law and the interpretation of statutes. 
 
5. 
 
An order granting postconviction DNA testing under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512 
occurs at the midpoint in the proceedings required by the statute and is not a final 
judgment from which the State may appeal on a question reserved under K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 22-3602(b)(3). 
 
6. 
 
A State's question-reserved appeal from an interim order allowing postconviction 
DNA testing may not be treated as a premature appeal that may lie dormant until a final 
judgment is entered.  
 
7. 
 
An order allowing postconviction DNA testing cannot be considered final for 
purposes of a question-reserved appeal simply because a judgment of conviction and 
sentence has been entered in the underlying criminal case. 
 
8. 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, the State, having invoked the appellate 
courts' jurisdiction over a question reserved in a criminal case, as provided for in K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3), cannot expand its elected, and repeatedly asserted, statutory 
basis for jurisdiction. 
 
 
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Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 51 Kan. App. 2d 742, 355 P.3d 694 (2015). 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; KEVIN P. MORIARTY, judge. Opinion filed March 3, 2017. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed. Appeal dismissed.   
 
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellant. 
 
Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  In this appeal, we are presented with a novel question:  May the 
State use K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3), which allows the prosecution to take a 
criminal appeal "upon a question reserved," after a district court grants postconviction 
DNA testing under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512 but before the testing is conducted and 
thus before any posttesting court proceedings have been completed? The Court of 
Appeals concluded the State could not bring such a "question reserved" appeal because 
there had been no final order in the case. Specifically, at the time the State tried to bring 
its appeal the district court had only entered an order granting DNA testing—which, 
under the testing statute, was merely a midpoint in the statutory proceedings. The Court 
of Appeals further concluded the State's inability to meet the requirements for a question-
reserved appeal meant the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction. See State v. LaPointe, 
51 Kan. App. 2d 742, 355 P.3d 694 (2015). 
 
On petition for review, the State asks us to reverse the Court of Appeals and 
determine that it may take an appeal from an order granting postconviction DNA testing. 
But the State fails to persuade us that a final order had been entered, and we hold that the 
 
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Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the State's appeal in this case and that the 
appeal was properly dismissed. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
The question before us rests on the procedural history of the case, not the 
underlying facts of the crime. For our purposes, it is enough to know that a jury convicted 
LaPointe of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. LaPointe's criminal history 
scored as a category A on the Kansas sentencing guidelines grid, and the district court 
sentenced him to a total of 245 months' imprisonment to run consecutive to sentences 
imposed in other state and federal cases. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
LaPointe's convictions and sentences. State v. LaPointe, No. 93,709, 2006 WL 2936496 
(Kan. App. 2006) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 283 Kan. 932 (2007).  
 
Approximately 7 years later, LaPointe filed, in his underlying criminal case, a 
request for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512(a). 
LaPointe acknowledged that the statute was written to apply only to criminal defendants 
convicted of first-degree murder or rape and that he had not been convicted of those 
crimes. He argued, however, that the statute should be extended to cover him because his 
controlling term of 245 months' imprisonment (more than 20 years) equaled or exceeded 
the terms for first-degree murder or rape and therefore caused him to be similarly situated 
to someone who had been convicted of those crimes. Citing State v. Cheeks, 298 Kan. 1, 
6-14, 310 P.3d 346 (2013), LaPointe argued there was no rational basis to treat his 
offenses and resulting sentences differently from first-degree murder or rape and, as a 
result, the postconviction DNA testing statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
 
 
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The district court agreed, over the State's objections. The State then appealed from 
the district court's order, and in its notice of appeal stated:  "This appeal is taken to the 
Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas upon a question reserved pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
3602(b)(3), K.S.A. 60-2101(a) and K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(2)." Through the question-
reserved appeal, the State argued the district court erred in extending the postconviction 
DNA testing statute to a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment equal to or 
longer than the mandatory or presumptive sentences for first-degree murder or rape. 
 
The Court of Appeals did not reach that question, however. Instead, the Court of 
Appeals focused on LaPointe's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed, noting that a question-reserved appeal may only be 
taken from a final judgment and there had been no final judgment when the State 
appealed. LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 743.  
 
 
The State then filed a petition seeking our review of the Court of Appeals' 
determination that it lacked jurisdiction. We granted the State's petition and obtained 
jurisdiction through K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (jurisdiction to review judgments of the Court of 
Appeals) and K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (petition for review procedures). This does not mean, 
however, that we have jurisdiction over the question reserved—i.e., the merits of the 
State's arguments on appeal; when this court grants a petition for review in a criminal 
case it limits the issues considered to those that (1) were properly before the Court of 
Appeals and (2) were specifically raised in the petition for review or the cross-petition as 
having been decided erroneously by the Court of Appeals. See Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(h)(1) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 53). Thus, we will not resolve the equal protection 
question at the heart of LaPointe's request for DNA testing. If we agree that the Court of 
Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the State's appeal, then the equal protection question was 
not properly before the Court of Appeals and is similarly not properly before us. And 
 
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even if we were to conclude the Court of Appeals erred by declining to decide the equal 
protection question, that court still did not reach the issue and thus our recourse would be 
to remand for further consideration. Either way, we decline to decide whether petitioners 
like LaPointe should receive the benefits of the postconviction DNA testing statute. We 
will instead focus on the issue of jurisdiction. 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Beginning in the Court of Appeals, LaPointe has argued and continues to argue 
there is no statutory authority for the State of Kansas to take an interlocutory appeal from 
a district court order granting postconviction DNA testing under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
2512(a). As LaPointe correctly observes, "the right to appeal is entirely statutory," and 
"the limits of appellate jurisdiction are imposed by the legislature." State v. Berreth, 
294 Kan. 98, 110, 273 P.3d 752 (2012); see Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 287, 200 
P.3d 467 (2009) ("Kansas appellate courts may exercise jurisdiction only under 
circumstances allowed by statute . . . ."). As such, the determination of whether the Court 
of Appeals had jurisdiction over an appeal rests on the interpretation of statutes and 
involves a question of law "over which we exercise unlimited review." Berreth, 294 Kan. 
at 109. 
 
 
K.S.A. 60-2101 provides the starting point for defining the jurisdiction of Kansas 
appellate courts in both civil and criminal cases. Because LaPointe filed his request for 
postconviction DNA testing within his criminal case, the Court of Appeals focused on 
jurisdiction over criminal appeals. LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 744, 746-77. As to 
criminal appeals, K.S.A. 60-2101(a) provides:  "Appeals from the district court to the 
court of appeals in criminal cases shall be subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3601 
and 22-3602."  
 
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The State's notice of appeal cited the second of these statutes—22-3602—and 
more specifically, subsection (b)(3) of that statute. Subsection (b) lists four categories of 
cases in which the prosecution may take an appeal "as a matter of right" and indicates the 
right is limited to the listed types "and no others." The third category, the one specifically 
referenced by the State in its notice of appeal and in its briefs, allows the State to appeal 
"a question reserved by the prosecution."  
 
 
The State's notice of appeal also cited to 2015 Supp. K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(2), which 
allows a party to bring an appeal in the Court of Appeals "as a matter of right" when the 
party appeals "[a]n order that grants, continues, modifies, refuses or dissolves an 
injunction, or an order that grants or refuses relief in the form of mandamus, quo 
warranto or habeas corpus." The Court of Appeals noted, however, that this citation 
followed the State's explicit reference to an appeal on a question reserved and that the 
State's brief limited the discussion to a question reserved; it, therefore, considered the 
appeal in that context only. See LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 749-50. Before us, 
although the State argues for application of some principles borrowed from civil 
procedure, it phrases its objection to the Court of Appeals ruling as being that the "Court 
of Appeals erred in declining to answer the question reserved." Thus, it continues to rely 
on the third circumstance listed in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3602(b)—an appeal on a 
question reserved—as the jurisdictional basis for this appeal. 
   
Focusing on that jurisdictional basis, the State's arguments require us to interpret 
the statutory provision allowing question-reserved appeals, which has a long history in 
Kansas. See, e.g., The State of Kansas v. Carmichael, 3 Kan. 102 (1865). Despite the 
statute's longevity, it tends to be used sparingly and so the trappings of these appeals have 
 
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been rather slowly developed. See State v. Glaze, 200 Kan. 324, 325, 436 P.2d 377 
(1968). But we nonetheless have the benefit of at least two clear standards.  
 
First, "[i]nherent in appeals as a matter of right by the prosecution," including in 
question-reserved appeals, "is the element that the trial court has entered a final judgment 
in the case." State v. Puckett, 227 Kan. 911, 912, 610 P.2d 637 (1980); see State v. 
Grimes, 229 Kan. 143, 147, 622 P.2d 143 (1981) ("[Q]uestions reserved . . . may be 
appealed only when the case has been terminated."); see also State v. Ramirez, 175 Kan. 
301, 304, 263 P.2d 239 (1953) (expressing skepticism about the State's argument that the 
phrase "question reserved by the state" should be "construed as comprehending and 
including all orders made in the trial of a criminal case, regardless whether they be 
intermediate or final").  
 
Requiring a final judgment fits with the purpose of a question-reserved appeal, 
which is to resolve important questions going forward even though resolution will not 
impact the defendant in the present case. Puckett, 227 Kan. at 912 ("Questions reserved 
presuppose that the case at hand has concluded, but that an answer is necessary for proper 
disposition of future cases which may arise."); see State v. Barlow, 303 Kan. 804, 811, 
368 P.3d 331 (2016) (explaining that question-reserved appeals "allow[] the State to 
obtain an appellate ruling on a particular point of law . . . without attacking or affecting 
the defendant's acquittal"); Berreth, 294 Kan. at 123-24 (noting that "an appellate court's 
answer to a State's question reserved has no effect on the criminal defendant in the 
underlying case" and analogizing a question reserved to "a purely academic question in 
the case in which it arrives on appeal").   
 
 
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Second, this court has more recently focused on a different aspect of question-
reserved appeals:  They may proceed only where they seek a ruling on "questions of 
statewide interest important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law 
and the interpretation of statutes. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Leonard, 248 Kan. 427, 
432, 807 P.2d 81 (1991); see Berreth, 294 Kan. at 102-03, 110-11; see also Barlow, 303 
Kan. at 811. For example, legal questions that "relate peculiarly to the particular facts 
shown in the evidence" would be of limited precedential value and probably not 
appropriate for a question-reserved appeal. See Glaze, 200 Kan. at 325-26; see also State 
v. Mountjoy, 257 Kan. 163, 168, 891 P.2d 376 (1995); State v. Kopf, 211 Kan. 848, 848-
49, 508 P.2d 847 (1973). "Reserved questions will not be entertained merely to 
demonstrate whether or not error has been committed by the trial court in its rulings 
adverse to the state." Glaze, 200 Kan. at 325; see also State v. Chittenden, 212 Kan. 178, 
179, 510 P.2d 152 (1973) ("The purpose of allowing appeal on questions reserved by the 
state is not to point out error in criminal trials, but to give the bench, bar, and public the 
benefit of this court's opinion on questions of statewide interest, usually the interpretation 
of statutes."). 
 
Here, the State explains that it does not seek to impact LaPointe's case and instead 
only seeks "clarification concerning other criminal defendants who are neither convicted 
of murder nor rape but who are serving lengthy sentences based on their extensive 
criminal history." It contends it may appeal the district court's order granting testing upon 
a question reserved and acknowledges that the primary stumbling block for its attempted 
appeal is not whether there is an issue of statewide interest, but, rather, whether there has 
been a final judgment. See, e.g., Puckett, 227 Kan. at 912.  
 
 
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The State offers four explanations as to why there was a final judgment in 
LaPointe's case or why the Court of Appeals could have found an alternative basis for 
jurisdiction:  (1) The district court's order allowing testing constituted a final judgment; 
(2) proceedings in district court that occurred subsequent to the State filing its appeal but 
before the Court of Appeals decision made the judgment final; (3) final judgment had 
been entered upon conviction and sentence, which sufficed for the purposes of its present 
appeal; and (4) certain civil jurisdiction principles should be applied in question-reserved 
appeals and under those principles the appellate courts have jurisdiction. We reject each 
of these arguments.  
 
       1.  The district court's order granting DNA testing is not a final judgment because it is 
only a midpoint in the postconviction DNA testing proceedings.  
 
The State first contends that the district court's order granting testing was, itself, a 
final judgment in the case which permitted the State to appeal upon a question reserved. 
We disagree, as K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512 indicates that an order granting testing is a 
mere midpoint in the proceedings.  
 
Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512, "after the test results are obtained" the district 
court "has to determine whether the test results are unfavorable to the petitioner, 
favorable to the petitioner, or inconclusive," and must then take additional appropriate 
action. State v. Hernandez, 303 Kan. 609, 620, 366 P.3d 200 (2016); see generally State 
v. Rodriguez, 302 Kan. 85, 94, 350 P.3d 1083 (2015) ("[21-2512(f)] sets out 'specific and 
distinct' procedures a trial court must follow . . . ."); Haddock v. State, 295 Kan. 738, 755-
56, 286 P.3d 837 (2012) (describing what the district court "must" and "is required" to do 
depending on the test results); Goldsmith v. State, 292 Kan. 398, 402, 255 P.3d 14 (2011) 
(same); Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475, 495-99, 146 P.3d 187 (2006) (describing the 
statute as providing for "certain mandatory dispositions" and also, in the case of 
 
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inconclusive results, court discretion). This finding about the test results constitutes the 
first step a district court must take after entering the order allowing testing. 
 
The district court must then take some additional action, the nature of which 
largely depends on whether the court found the DNA test results to be unfavorable to the 
petitioner, favorable, or inconclusive. If unfavorable, the court "shall" dismiss the 
petition. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512(f)(1)(A). If the DNA test results are favorable and 
the results "are of such materiality that a reasonable probability exists that the new 
evidence would result in a different outcome at a trial or sentencing," the court "shall" 
order a hearing and "enter any order that serves the interests of justice." K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 21-2512(f)(2)(A)-(B). Such orders include, but are not limited to, vacating and 
setting aside the judgment, releasing the petitioner from custody, resentencing, or even 
granting a new trial. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512(f)(2)(B)(i)-(iv). Finally, if the DNA test 
results are inconclusive, the statute calls for some amount of discretion; the district court 
"may" order a hearing "to determine whether there is a substantial question of 
innocence." If the petitioner proves such a question exists, the court shall then follow the 
procedure for favorable test results. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512(f)(3). Even when the 
statute allows for discretion—that is, when the statute indicates the district court "may" 
order a hearing if the tests are inconclusive—it still requires the court to make that 
determination and to take specific actions after making the necessary discretionary call. 
See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512(f)(3) (directing, e.g., that if the petitioner proves the 
inconclusive results present a substantial question of innocence, the court "shall proceed" 
as if the results were favorable).  
 
Thus, regardless of the outcome of the test, the statute requires the district court to 
take some action thereafter—and an order granting testing does not terminate the 
proceedings. See State v. Denney, 283 Kan. 781, 789, 156 P.3d 1275 (2007) (describing 
 
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"clear" statutory procedure); Haddock, 282 Kan. at 495 (referring to the statute's 
"mandatory dispositions"). Given these requirements, the order allowing testing can more 
appropriately be labeled an interim or interlocutory order than a final order. Although 
there are a few permissible interlocutory appeals that may be brought by the prosecution 
(e.g., an order suppressing evidence), an order granting postconviction DNA testing is not 
among them. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3603. Plus, the State did not attempt to use the 
interlocutory appeal statute as the basis for jurisdiction. See Berreth, 294 Kan. at 114 
("[T]here must be some point in the appellate process with the Court of Appeals by which 
the appellant is required to expressly declare its elected basis for jurisdiction. This is 
particularly true when the appellant is the State because its mere election can determine 
whether the defendant will be affected by the court's decision."). 
 
We therefore approve of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that an order granting 
postconviction DNA testing must be followed by additional proceedings and is therefore 
not a final judgment from which the State may appeal on a question reserved. LaPointe, 
51 Kan. App. 2d at 747-49.  
 
       2.  The eventual finality of the postconviction DNA testing proceedings does not serve 
to make the order from which the State actually appealed a final judgment. 
 
The State also argues that even if there was no final judgment when it filed its 
June 2014 notice of appeal, the matter is now final—and, indeed, was final before the 
Court of Appeals issued its ruling—and thus the Court of Appeals could have exercised 
jurisdiction over the merits. See LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 748 ("We know now that 
the district court did not order a new trial [even though the DNA testing was favorable to 
LaPointe].").  
 
 
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Some additional facts and procedural history explain the basis for this argument. 
After the State filed its appeal, the testing ordered by the district court occurred, the test 
results were received, and the district court conducted additional proceedings. Although 
the DNA test results had basically excluded LaPointe as the source of two hairs found on 
a piece of clothing that was recovered by the police in their investigation of the crime, the 
State argued this new evidence would not result in a different trial outcome. At trial, the 
State had called an expert who testified that "the probability" or "most likely outcome" 
was that the hairs found by police were not LaPointe's. The State suggested to the Court 
of Appeals that it had always acknowledged there was no scientific evidence tying 
LaPointe to the crimes and that the main evidence against him came from a 
coconspirator, who testified that he and LaPointe planned and executed the robbery. 
Thus, the results of the DNA testing would make no difference to the trial. The district 
court essentially agreed with the State's arguments and denied LaPointe's motion for a 
new trial in April 2015, which was about 10 months after the State filed this appeal. 
 
In light of these additional proceedings, the State now argues its notice of appeal 
"could be treated as a premature notice" of appeal that should be allowed to lie dormant 
until the district court finally resolved LaPointe's motion for new trial, at which point the 
case as a whole would move forward on appeal. Since there is now a final judgment, the 
State urges, the Court of Appeals could exert jurisdiction over the appeal. We reject this 
argument because the circumstances of this case differ from the dormancy cases on 
which the State constructs its argument, which derive from the seminal case of State v. 
Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 319 P.3d 506 (2014). 
 
In Hall, the appellant's premature notice of appeal sought review of the final 
judgment—the judgment of conviction and sentence, including restitution—after a prison 
term had been imposed and restitution had been ordered but before the amount of 
 
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restitution had been settled. Then in a subsequent notice of appeal, the appellant again 
sought review of the final judgment; by this point, restitution had been settled and all 
aspects of the judgment were final. Under those circumstances, this court held:   
 
"[I]n a criminal matter, where judgment is effective once pronounced from the bench, a 
premature notice of appeal that seeks review of a conviction and sentencing yet to be 
completed lies dormant until final judgment including the entire sentence is pronounced 
from the bench. At that point, the notice of appeal becomes effective." Hall, 298 Kan. at 
988. 
 
See Hess v. St. Francis Regional Med. Center, 254 Kan. 715, 718, 869 P.2d 598 (1994) 
("It is a fundamental proposition of Kansas appellate procedure that an appellate court 
only obtains jurisdiction over the rulings identified in the notice of appeal."). 
Significantly, in Hall and similar cases, the subsequent notice duplicates the premature 
notice and, in essence, consolidates appeals that sought review of a final judgment and 
prevents piecemeal proceedings.  
 
Here, in contrast to Hall and similar cases, piecemeal appeals can arise—and, in 
fact, have arisen—through the procedure the State asks us to endorse. This results, in 
part, because the State, as the appellant, never sought an appeal from the final judgment. 
Rather, the State only appeals the order granting testing—which, as we have held above, 
represents a midpoint in the K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-2512 proceedings. The State does not 
want review of the final order, which was favorable to the State's position. But LaPointe, 
who was not aggrieved by the midpoint order, has appealed the final order denying him a 
new trial; a separate appeal has been docketed (No. 113,580) and remained pending 
before the Court of Appeals while the State pursued this appeal before us. In that separate 
appeal, the State cross-appealed and argued, among other things, that any error by the 
district court in deciding the DNA results did not justify a new trial and had to be 
 
15 
 
 
 
considered harmless because LaPointe was not even qualified to pursue DNA testing. In 
other words, in two separate appeals, the State has raised the legal issue of whether 
LaPointe and offenders like him are entitled to postconviction DNA testing under K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 21-2512. And in one (No. 113,580), the State attempts to affect the outcome 
of the case. Piecemeal appeals have resulted. We now know the separate appeal before 
the Court of Appeals has concluded, see State v. LaPointe, No. 113,580, 2016 WL 
6910200 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), which if anything underscores the 
dangers and procedural pitfalls of piecemeal appeals. 
 
Yet Kansas follows "the ancient federal policy against piecemeal appeals." 
Fredricks v. Foltz, 221 Kan. 28, 31, 557 P.2d 1252 (1976); see State v. Sales, 290 Kan. 
130, 139, 224 P.3d 546 (2010) (discussing interlocutory appeals under K.S.A. 22-3603). 
Requiring all claims of error to be raised in a single appeal serves a number of important 
purposes:  
 
"It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual 
initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course 
of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district 
judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, 
the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of 'avoid[ing] the obstruction to just 
claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of 
separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its 
initiation to entry of judgment.' [Citations omitted.] The rule also serves the important 
purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981). 
 
To allow the State's notice of appeal to lie dormant would be inconsistent with this 
policy and its purpose. If the Court of Appeals panel in this case had addressed the merits 
in this appeal before the district court entered its final order, that ruling would 
 
16 
 
 
 
undoubtedly have influenced the district court. This is true even if the panel specified that 
its decision should not affect LaPointe himself in light of the rule that a question reserved 
does not affect the defendant in the case. Thus, the appeal would have been contrary to 
the first purpose noted in Risjord—i.e., "[p]ermitting piecemeal appeals would undermine 
the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in 
our judicial system." 449 U.S. at 374. Further, even if the district court had already 
reached its decision before the Court of Appeals panel in this case had decided the merits 
of the equal protection issue, the first panel's decision could have been cited to the second 
panel—the one hearing LaPointe's appeal from the district court's final order. This 
duplication of process would be contrary to the other policy reasons noted in Risjord 
because it would increase costs and promote judicial inefficiency rather than efficiency. 
449 U.S. at 374. In addition, because one Court of Appeals panel has the right to disagree 
with a previous panel of the same court, State v. Urban, 291 Kan. 214, 223, 239 P.3d 837 
(2010), inconsistent rulings could result. While that potential is inherent in the Court of 
Appeals process of hearing cases in separate panels rather than en banc, such 
inconsistency within the same case is not—in fact, the rules are designed to avoid that 
possibility. 
 
For all these reasons, we will not treat a State's question-reserved appeal from an 
interim order allowing postconviction DNA testing as a premature appeal that may lie 
dormant until a final judgment is entered. Accordingly, we conclude that the eventual 
finality of the district court's process did not impact the finality of the district court's 
order granting DNA testing in LaPointe's case. 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
       3.  The finality of LaPointe's underlying criminal judgment does not constitute a final 
judgment for purposes of a question-reserved appeal in this case. 
 
The State presents an alternative argument urging us to assess finality by focusing 
on LaPointe's underlying criminal conviction. It contends the judgment of conviction and 
sentence supplies the necessary finality for a question-reserved appeal of the district 
court's order granting postconviction DNA testing. 
 
The State is nominally correct in that LaPointe's underlying criminal judgment is 
unquestionably final:  He was convicted and sentenced over 10 years ago, and all of his 
direct criminal appeals have been concluded. See State v. LaPointe, No. 93,709, 2006 
WL 2936496, at *3 (Kan. App. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (affirming LaPointe's 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal), rev. denied 283 Kan. 932 (2007); see also 
State v. Tafoya, 304 Kan. 663, 666-67, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016) ("The final judgment in a 
criminal case is the sentence."). These facts certainly separate LaPointe's situation from 
question-reserved appeals involving defendants who had not yet been convicted and 
sentenced and were still in the middle of pending criminal prosecutions—cases cited and 
relied upon by the Court of Appeals. See LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 748 (citing and 
discussing Grimes, 229 Kan. at 146 [State's attempt to appeal from district court's order 
granting a new trial]; Puckett, 227 Kan. at 911 [State's attempt to appeal from district 
court's order granting defendant's motion to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas]). 
LaPointe's situation is also distinct from the dozens of cases discussing question-reserved 
appeals when a judgment of acquittal has been entered and any court order could no 
longer affect the defendant; those cases, too, are final. See, e.g., State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 
108, 108-09, 112, 642 P.2d 972 (1982); State v. Jones, 229 Kan. 528, 625 P.2d 503 
(1981); State v. Rodgers, 225 Kan. 242, 589 P.2d 981 (1979); State v. Crozier, 225 Kan. 
120, 587 P.2d 331 (1978); State v. V.F.W. Post No. 3722, 215 Kan. 693, 694-95, 527 P.2d 
1020 (1974); Chittenden, 212 Kan. 178. 
 
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Nevertheless, the State has not convinced us that the finality of LaPointe's 
conviction is the finality that matters here. In essence, it has failed to persuade us that 
every order following LaPointe's sentence is "final" for purposes of question-reserved 
appeals. While the final judgment the State relies on—the underlying criminal 
conviction—was already appealed, the present issue is a new matter filed within 
LaPointe's old criminal case. See LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 748 ("But we are not 
dealing with the original criminal judgment here; we are dealing with an order for DNA 
testing."); see also Denney, 283 Kan. at 793-94 (suggesting that K.S.A. 21-2512 
proceedings are not a continuation of a criminal trial but are instead legislatively created 
procedures). And that new matter needs to reach finality before any appeal is taken.  
 
The reasons we have just explained for not holding the State's notice of appeal 
dormant apply equally to this argument. We are understandably reluctant to hold that 
every order following a conviction and sentence, no matter the context in which the order 
arose, is "final" for purposes of question-reserved appeals—to do so would likely 
encourage a plethora of appeals that are interlocutory in nature, piecemeal appeals, and 
potentially conflicting outcomes. We hold, therefore, that an order allowing 
postconviction DNA testing cannot be considered final for purposes of a question-
reserved appeal simply because a judgment of conviction and sentence has been entered 
in a case.  
 
        4.  The State's references to civil jurisdiction principles are not persuasive in 
LaPointe's case.  
 
For its fourth argument, the State reminds us that its notice of appeal from the 
district court's order granting testing did not only refer to its right to appeal in a criminal 
case upon a question reserved—it also mentioned a civil appeal provision, K.S.A. 2015 
 
19 
 
 
 
Supp. 60-2102(a)(2), which relates to appeals in actions seeking an injunction or 
mandamus, quo warranto, or habeas corpus relief. Before the Court of Appeals, the State 
argued the district court's order allowing DNA testing "granted an injunction or granted 
relief in the form of mandamus, both of which are appealable under K.S.A. 60-
2102(a)(2)." In the State's petition for review, it notes that injunctions can be a 
provisional remedy—that is, a temporary remedy designed to preserve the status quo 
pending final judgment. In addition, the State argues in its supplemental brief that "a 
question reserved appeal is akin to appeal under the Collateral Order Doctrine in civil 
cases." See Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, 612, 244 P.3d 642 
(2010) (collateral order doctrine is to be sparingly applied and only when a court order 
"'[1] conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [is] effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.'").  
 
The State's arguments touch on the reality that postconviction DNA testing issues 
have reached the appellate courts as both civil and criminal appeals. Indeed, the State's 
instant appeal was labeled "Criminal," but its later cross-appeal from the April 2015 
district court's order denying LaPointe's motion for a new trial was labeled "Civil." This 
reality is arguably inevitable given the ambiguity of the postconviction DNA testing 
statute, which does not clearly classify the process as either criminal or civil. The statute 
merely directs that petitions for postconviction DNA testing are to be filed with "the 
court that entered the judgment," and no statutory language prohibits a petitioner from 
filing the petition in the underlying criminal docket as LaPointe did in this case. K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 21-2512(a). Yet 21-2512 petitions are not purely criminal, either, as such 
proceedings are necessarily postconviction, and the ultimate remedies contemplated by 
the statute—including an offender's release—have the hallmarks of civil, habeas actions. 
See Denney, 283 Kan. at 793 (referencing "our holding that the [K.S.A. 21-2512] 
 
20 
 
 
 
proceeding, whether characterized as a continuation of the original trial or new litigation, 
is not a criminal prosecution," which in context referred to whether an offender was 
entitled to all the rights a criminal defendant enjoys during trial). In fact, sometimes 21-
2512 petitions will be filed alongside a habeas motion, or a habeas motion might be 
construed as including a 21-2512 petition. See Haddock, 282 Kan. at 492-93; Bruner v. 
State, 277 Kan. 603, 605, 88 P.3d 214 (2004). These cases have been treated as civil 
actions in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 183(a)(1)-(2) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 222), 
which states that a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion "is an independent civil action that must be 
docketed separately," and "the procedure on a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 is governed 
by the rules of civil procedure, K.S.A. 60-201 et seq., to the extent the rules are 
applicable." See State v. Berreth, 294 Kan. 98, 109, 111, 273 P.3d 752 (2012).  
 
The State's arguments about civil jurisdictional principles and the ambiguities that 
arise from the diverse treatment of 21-2512 petitions deserve attention at some point. But 
this is not the case for doing so because the State's arguments confront insurmountable 
procedural barriers. First, following the State's reasoning would require us to recast 
LaPointe's arguments and his chosen procedural vehicle; the State has never argued 
LaPointe could not have sought relief via a criminal action. As the Court of Appeals aptly 
noted:   
 
"To now consider this appeal on the ground that it is 'analogous to a civil case,' 
we would have to ignore the State's stated basis for jurisdiction in its notice of appeal and 
opening brief and recharacterize LaPointe's 'motion for post-conviction DNA testing,' 
which was filed by counsel in his criminal case, as a civil petition for mandamus or 
injunction." LaPointe, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 750.  
 
Second, the State's notice of appeal specifically identified this appeal as a question-
reserved appeal and its brief to the Court of Appeals "based its claim of appellate 
 
21 
 
 
 
jurisdiction solely on the existence of a question reserved." 51 Kan. App. 2d at 749-50. 
At most, before the Court of Appeals the State argued this appeal was "analogous to a 
civil case." And while the State added to its arguments in proceedings before this court, it 
still only argues that the appeal is "akin" to a civil appeal—it still frames its issue and its 
arguments in the context of a question reserved. Under analogous circumstances in 
Berreth, this court looked to the State's docketing statement, which referenced criminal 
question-reserved jurisdiction and bore the district court's criminal case number and 
concluded "the State was unable to expand its elected, and repeatedly asserted, statutory 
basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals." 294 Kan. at 115-16. The State's petition 
for review and supplemental brief do not counter the panel's conclusion that principles of 
criminal jurisdiction afford the determinative analysis in this appeal.   
 
Thus, we reject the State's attempts to recast the procedural vehicle chosen by 
LaPointe and to use principles of civil jurisdiction to control appellate jurisdiction in its 
present appeal, which it brought as a criminal appeal. The State clearly sought to invoke 
the courts' criminal jurisdiction powers over a question reserved. As we have discussed, a 
final judgment is required in order for a question-reserved appeal to be filed, and that 
requirement is not met in this case. Because allowing an appeal to proceed on the 
nonfinal judgment in this case has resulted in piecemeal appeals, we decline to wade 
through the legal questions of whether the statutory language allows combining question-
reserved appeals and appeals under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2102(a)(2). We also decline 
the State's invitation to consider whether the collateral order doctrine might apply 
because under the facts of this case, at least, we are not persuaded the State could meet 
that doctrine's third requirement of showing that the issue is effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment. 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the district court's May 2014 order granting testing—the order from 
which the State appealed in this case—was not a final order and could not be appealed by 
the State upon a question reserved. Because this was the only appellate avenue open to 
the State in this particular criminal appeal, we conclude the State had no statutory right to 
appeal the order and the Court of Appeals correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the merits of the case.  
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed; the State's appeal is dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
Dismissed.