Case Title: Selland v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1

Citation: 285 N.W.2d 567

Docket Number: 9528-A

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1979-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
285 N.W.2d 567 (1979) Cynthia SELLAND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FARGO PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, a public corporation, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 9528-A. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 15, 1979. Rehearing Denied November 28, 1979. *568 Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant; appearances by Daniel J. Chapman and Charles L. Chapman, Bismarck, argued by Charles L. Chapman, Bismarck. Tenneson, Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson, Leclerc & Marcil, Fargo, for defendant and appellee; argued by Jack G. Marcil, Fargo. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment entered on January 31, 1979, in Cass County District Court, denying the plaintiff's writ of mandamus or damages in lieu thereof. We reverse and remand. The facts are not in dispute. Cynthia Selland has been a school teacher in the Fargo Public School System, in the City of Fargo, North Dakota, since 1952. She was employed by the Fargo Public School District No. 1 [hereinafter referred to as the Board] during the 1977-78 school year. For several years, the Board has had a mandatory retirement policy, Board Policy 5250, which reads as follows: *569 It is undisputed that Ms. Selland was well aware of this particular provision, and that it had been applied uniformly over the years. On or about February 25, 1978, Ms. Selland sent a letter to Dr. Les Pavek, then the president of the Fargo Board of Education, attempting to persuade Dr. Pavek, and ultimately the Board, to change the mandatory retirement policy or make an exception in her case. The reason being that Ms. Selland reached the age of 65 on March 16, 1978, and desired to continue teaching.[1] On March 7, 1978, Dr. Pavek sent a letter to Ms. Selland which read: Sometime between March 7, 1978, and May 10, 1978, Ms. Selland again wrote to Dr. Pavek, saying: On May 10, 1978, Dr. Pavek sent the following letter to Ms. Selland: A complaint was filed against the Board on May 30, 1978, seeking relief in the nature of a judgment requiring the Board to offer Ms. Selland a contract for the 1978-79 school year, pursuant to Section 15-47-27, N.D.C.C., and enjoining the Board from issuing a contract to any other person for Ms. Selland's teaching position. Accompanying the complaint was an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order pending appeal. A hearing on the order to show cause was held on June 8, 1978, after which Ms. Selland's application for a temporary restraining order was denied. On July 31, 1978, Ms. Selland appealed to this court from the order denying the temporary restraining order and applied for a temporary restraining order pending the hearing on the appeal from the order of the district court denying the request for a temporary restraining order. After a hearing on the application for a temporary restraining order pending the hearing on the appeal, this court denied the application, saying: By a written stipulation between the parties, it was agreed that an appeal on the merits to this court would be moot. Thereafter, the case was set for trial on January 2, 1979. An amended complaint was filed on January 2, 1979, seeking a judgment directing the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to employ Ms. Selland as a teacher, or pay her all back pay for the period of time she had been unemployed as a teacher, as well as other damages and costs. On January 25, 1979, the trial court made its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, denied the writ of mandamus, damages in lieu thereof, and dismissed the action. Judgment was entered on January 31, 1979, and Ms. Selland appeals to this court from that judgment. Ms. Selland raises two basic issues on appeal: Section 15-47-27, N.D.C.C., provides as follows: The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Section 15-47-27, *571 N.D.C.C., refers to "[a]ny teacher who has been employed by any school district . . .." No reference is made to an exception in said statute for teachers facing mandatory retirement. The statute further provides that failure on the part of the school board to give written notice to a teacher, on or before April 15, of a determination not to renew the teacher's contract for the ensuing school year, "shall constitute an offer to renew the contract for the ensuing school year under the same terms and conditions as the contract for the then current year." This statutory offer to renew automatically arises after April 15, if the teacher has not received a written notice of nonrenewal. Enstad v. North Central of Barnes Public School District No. 65, 268 N.W.2d 126 (N.D.1978). It is undisputed that Ms. Selland was employed by the Board during the 1977-78 school year. It is also undisputed that the notice required by Section 15-47-27, N.D. C.C., was not given by the Board in this case. Furthermore, it is not denied that the Board failed to comply with the provisions of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., granting teachers facing a nonrenewal of their contracts, the right to a hearing with the school board at an executive session prior to the issuance of a final decision to nonrenew a contract. This section requires that the school board give serious consideration to damage that can result to the professional stature and reputation of a teacher, as a consequence of a board's decision not to renew a teacher's contract. Further, the statute requires "that such action be taken with maximum consideration to basic fairness and decency." Baker v. Minot Public School District No. 1, 253 N.W.2d 444 (N.D. 1977). In addition, subsection 5 of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., reads: The narrow issue to be determined by this court is whether or not a school board must comply with the provisions of Sections 15-47-27 and 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., when a teacher's contract has been terminated pursuant to a mandatory retirement provision in school board policy. The trial court relied on the South Dakota decision of Monnier v. Todd County Independent School District, 245 N.W.2d 503 (S.D.1976), to support the contention that the statutory protections afforded teachers under North Dakota law were not applicable to teachers facing mandatory retirement. South Dakota has adopted a continuing contract law very similar to the continuing contract provisions existing in North Dakota in Sections 15-47-27 and 15-47-38, N.D. C.C. See SDCL 13-43-9.1 through 13-43-15. More important, South Dakota also has a specific statute pertaining to the enactment of mandatory retirement policies, which provides: The effect of the enactment of this statute is to limit the conceded right to establish a mandatory retirement policy to ages 65 or over. In balancing the concept of teacher's continuing contract rights against the school board's right to enact a policy of mandatory retirement, the Supreme Court of South Dakota said: As to the teacher's right to notice and a hearing, the court went on to say: The trial court in this case adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, as evidenced in paragraph 2 of the trial court's conclusions of law: We disagree. Monnier, supra is predicated upon the premise that a school board can enact a mandatory retirement policy under SDCL 13-8-39.1, and to require that notice be given under the continuing contract provisions would impose greater restrictions on school boards than those already imposed by the legislature. We believe that in the absence of a specific statute granting school boards the power to enact a mandatory retirement policy, the rule enunciated in Monnier, supra should not apply. In reviewing the Board's decision, we must recognize that the statutory procedures afforded teachers were enacted to protect them from arbitrary discharge. Mandatory retirement, in and of itself, because of its finality could be arbitrary, and age alone, has little, if anything, to do with teaching ability, competence, or qualifications. See Johnston v. Marion Independent School District, 275 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979). This view is somewhat bolstered by the Board's concession that Ms. Selland was a good and capable teacher, whose abilities were not at issue in this action. The trial court, however, in its conclusions of law, found that there was statutory authority giving school boards the power to establish mandatory retirement policies within their respective districts: In so concluding, the district court failed to recognize a very pertinent statutory rule of construction. Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C., provides: Section 15-29-08, N.D.C.C., merely sets forth the general powers and duties of school boards throughout the state, while *574 Section 15-51-17, N.D.C.C., applies solely to the Board of Education of the City of Fargo, and enumerates similar powers and duties. Neither section specifically mentions the power to establish mandatory retirement policies. Nor can it be forcefully asserted that Section 15-39.1-14, N.D.C.C., gives the Board the power to establish a mandatory retirement act. Section 15-39.1-14, N.D. C.C., reads: Here, the general provisions of Sections 15-29-08, 15-51-17, and 15-39.1-14, N.D. C.C., must give way to the very specific provisions of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., relating to nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, and the reasons to be given in accordance therewith as the provisions of the latter are irreconcilable with the provisions of the former. For these reasons, we conclude that the provisions of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., prevail over the sections of the Code asserted to apply in this case. A school board's decision not to renew a teacher's contract is no longer a discretionary act. Rather, it is an act subject to the requirements of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C. Baker v. Minot Public School District No. 1, supra. When the Board contemplates the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, the reasons for such nonrenewal The Legislature has not provided for an exception to the requirements articulated in Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., and in interpreting this statute, we are governed by the general principle that the letter of a clear and unambiguous statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Section 1-02-05, N.D.C.C.; Barnes County Education Ass'n v. Barnes County Special Education Board, 276 N.W.2d 247 (N.D.1979). Age is simply not an exception to Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., and the Board cannot transcend the statutory protections afforded teachers by the mere implementation of a mandatory retirement policy.[2] The letter of May 10, 1978, from Dr. Les Pavek, president of the Fargo School Board, to Ms. Selland expressing the Board's final decision not to renew her teaching contract for the 1978-79 school year because she had reached the age of mandatory retirement, does not meet the requirements of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C. The letter cannot be considered as notice of a contemplated course of action. See Pollock v. McKenzie County Public School District # 1, 221 N.W.2d 521 (N.D.1974); Henley v. Fingal Public School District # 54, 219 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1974). This court has said that the school board has the burden to articulate a reason for nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, and to relate that reason to teaching ability, competence, or qualifications, or to the needs of the district. Rolland v. Grand Forks Public *575 School District No. 1, 279 N.W.2d 889, 894, n. 7 (N.D.1979); Dathe v. Wildrose School District No. 91, 217 N.W.2d 781 (N.D.1974). The Board failed to meet this burden in the instant case. Having concluded that, pursuant to Section 15-47-27, N.D.C.C., Ms. Selland was not given proper notice of the Board's contemplated nonrenewal of her teaching contract for the 1978-79 school year; and further, that the Board failed to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of Section 15-47-38, N.D.C.C., we find that this constituted a statutory offer to renew her teaching contract for the ensuing school year under the terms and conditions of the then current year. Although it was unnecessary that she do so under the circumstances, this offer of reemployment was timely accepted by Ms. Selland prior to May 10, 1978. See Lefor Education Ass'n v. Lefor Public School District No. 27, 285 N.W.2d 524 (N.D.1979); Enstad v. North Central of Barnes Public School District No. 65, supra. Finally, we must examine the rights and obligations of the parties in light of the relief that could have been granted by the trial court. In accordance with her amended complaint of January 2, 1979, Ms. Selland sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to employ her as a teacher in the Fargo Public School System, or damages in lieu thereof. A writ of mandamus will lie However, where the remedial writ of mandamus can no longer be issued in time, and if granted will not be effectual, i. e., where the school year has already been completed, the action must be remanded to the trial court to determine the compensatory damages to which the teacher is entitled. Henley v. Fingal Public School District # 54, supra; See Fargo Education Ass'n v. Paulsen, 239 N.W.2d 842 (N.D.1976). Here, the factual circumstances make injunctive relief impossible. Therefore, the trial court must determine the compensatory damages to which Ms. Selland is entitled. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings conformable to law. SAND, PAULSON and PEDERSON, JJ., and NORBERT J. MUGGLI, District Judge, concur. MUGGLI, District Judge, sitting in place of VANDE WALLE, J., disqualified. [1] The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1975), previously prohibited age discrimination with respect to individuals between the ages of 40 and 65. The Act was amended in 1978 to extend the prohibitions of the Act to individuals less than 70 years of age. This amendment took effect on January 1, 1979, 29 U.S.C.A. § 631 (Supp.1979). This was subsequent to the time Ms. Selland was forced to retire from teaching, and therefore would not apply to her case. See also Section 34-01-17, N.D.C.C., prohibiting discrimination because of age. [2] See State Hospital v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau, 239 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1976), where this court said that continuing in an employment after learning that the employer has a compulsory retirement policy does not make mandatory retirement under that policy "voluntary" on the part of the employee.