Case Title: Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Young

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Young1986 WY 15713 P.2d 198Case Number: 85-120Decided: 01/22/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OFWYOMING, APPELLANT 
(APPELLEE/RESPONDENT),

 
 
v. 

 
 

MURRAY A. YOUNG, APPELLEE 
(APPELLANT/PETITIONER).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Karen A. Byrne, Sp. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Casper.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Allen Gardzelewski, 
Laramie.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

 
 

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

ROONEY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming (Commission), appellant, appeals from an order of remand 
by which the district court reversed an administrative decision of the 
Commission with direction to reinstitute the internal appeals process at the 
administrative level. The Commission had refused to review the decision of an 
examiner of the Commission on the basis that the appeal therefrom was not 
timely. In its opinion letter, the district court stated that 
it

 
 
"* * * will resolve the 
factual dispute in this case [timeliness of the appeal to the Commission] in 
favor of the Appellant [worker] because of the importance of affording the 
Appellant a decision by the highest level of the Employment Security Commission 
on the merits. * * *" (Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     On September 4, 1984, 
an examiner of the Commission conducted a hearing on appellee's contention that 
his resignation from employment by Centennial Valley Trading Post was for cause, 
whereby he was entitled to employment benefits. A decision letter was dated 
September 14, 1984. Appellee called the Commission on October 5, 1984, and said 
he did not receive a copy of the decision letter. Another copy was mailed to him 
on that date. Appellee appealed the decision to the Commission on October 11, 
1984. The Commission's refusal to accept a review of the examiner's decision was 
predicated on the fact that appellee had not filed his appeal within ten days of 
September 14, 1984. Appellee contends the appeal to have been timely filed 
within ten days of October 5, 1984.1 The factual dispute referred to by 
the district court is whether the notice was mailed on September 14, 
1984.

 
 

[¶4.]     The standard under 
which we review the trial court's finding relative to agency action was set 
forth in Board of Trustees of School 
District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427 (1980). We 
there noted that § 9-4-114(c), W.S. 1977 (now in § 16-3-114, W.S. 1977 (October 
1982 Replacement)), was changed in 1979 to provide a review of administrative 
action on the basis of the "whole record." Section 16-3-114(c) 
reads:

 
 
"To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

 
 
"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

 
 
"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

 
 
"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

 
 

[¶5.]     And we said in Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
  Big  Horn  County v. Colwell, 611 P.2d at 429: 

 
 
"* * * Under this 
standard, we do not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial 
evidence to support the Board's decision, but we must also examine the 
conflicting evidence to determine if the Board could reasonably have made its 
findings and order upon all of the evidence before it. After reviewing the 
history and rationale in changing the `substantial evidence' rule in the Wagner 
Act to the `whole record' provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
(similar to present provisions of § 9-4-114(c)), the consideration is stated in 
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 465, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951), 
and quoted in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S. Ct. 853, 854, 
7 L. Ed. 2d 829 (1962):

 
 
"`* * * the "reviewing 
court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot 
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, 
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including 
the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view," it may not "displace the 
Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would 
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." * * *'"

 
 

[¶6.]     Accordingly, contrary 
to that done in usual appeals where we consider only the evidence favorable to 
the prevailing party, we here review all of the evidence to determine if the 
evidence was sufficient to support the finding, and we review it to determine if 
it is sufficient to support the findings of the agency.

 
 

[¶7.]     The evidence on the 
question of mailing of the notice on September 14, 1984, consisted of a document 
from the Commission's records titled "Transmittal of Decision." It reflected 
that it was mailed to appellee at Post Office 
Box 
234, Centennial, 
WY82055
 on September 14, 1984. It recited 
that a copy of the decision was enclosed, that it would become final unless a 
written appeal was filed within ten days, and that the local JobServiceCenter would assist in preparing the 
appeal, if desired. It contained a distribution code which reflected that it was 
sent to "Claimant." All of this was in accordance with the office or business 
custom or usage of the Commission. It is more than a mere assertion that the 
notice was mailed.

 
 

[¶8.]     The Commission's record 
also contained a handwritten notation that appellee telephoned on October 5, 
1984, and contended that he did not receive the notice, that he acknowledged his 
correct address to be "P.O. Box 234, Centennial, WY 82055," and that additional 
copies of the first mailing were again mailed. There was nothing to indicate 
that the first mailing was returned to the sender, and appellee acknowledged 
receipt of the second mailing. The records of the Commission, and its routine, 
custom and usage, evidenced the fact of the mailing of the notice on September 
14, 1984. The only evidence to support the contrary contention that it was not mailed was appellee's statement that he 
did not receive it. 
In

 
 
"* * * matters such as 
the mailing of routine letters in an office where a very large number of such 
letters are customarily mailed in the due course of its business, and that proof 
of the custom and the fact that a carbon copy was found without the original in 
the place and under the circumstances where it would have been found, if the 
original had been mailed, is sufficient, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, to support a finding that the original had been properly mailed. * * 
*" Consolidated Motors v. Skousen, 56 
Ariz. 481, 109 P.2d 41, 43, 132 A.L.R. 1040, cert. denied 314 U.S. 631, 62 S. Ct. 64, 86 L. Ed. 507 (1941).

 
 
"Because of the 
well-established presumption of the regularity of acts of public administrative 
officials, [Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review v.] Hart, [22 Pa.Cmwlth. 225, 348 A.2d 497 (1975)], we 
cannot hold that the findings of the board are unsupported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Although petitioner made some attempts to controvert 
that presumption, the board is empowered to reject even uncontradicted testimony 
as not credible or as insufficient to meet the burden required. * *" Domanico v. Commonwealth, Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa.Cmwlth. 511, 409 A.2d 1201, 1202 
(1980).

 
 
The business custom and 
usage of the Commission which would result in the mailing of the notice are 
sufficient to establish the fact of such mailing absent evidence to the contrary 
other than a bald statement that it was not received. Good v.    Detroit  Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 67 
Mich. App. 
270, 241 N.W.2d 71 (1976).

 
 

[¶9.]     However, appellee 
argues further. He contends that he did not receive the notice, even if mailed, 
and that failure to do so with the resulting loss of a right to a hearing 
deprived him of due process of law. Again, the validity of this contention is 
dependent upon the factual question of whether or not the notice was received. 
Appellee's statement that it was not is the only evidence to support the fact of 
nonreceipt. The fact that it was mailed (see supra) is the only evidence to 
support the fact of receipt.

 
 

[¶10.]  A rebuttable presumption exists that 
delivery of mail matter occurs when it is properly addressed, stamped and 
mailed. Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 
178 U.S.App. D.C. 78 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hagner v. United 
States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S. Ct. 417, 76 L. Ed. 861 (1932). The presumption is based upon the probability 
that the postal service performs its duty in transmitting and delivering the 
mail. Roshek Realty Company v. Roshek 
Brothers Company, 249 Iowa 349, 87 N.W.2d 8 
(1957); Landover Associates Limited 
Partnership v. Fabricated Steel Products, Inc., 35 Md. App. 673, 371 A.2d 1140 (1977).

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellee's unsupported and uncorroborated 
statement of nonreceipt is some evidence toward establishing a finding contrary 
to the presumption, but the necessity for a factual determination of the 
question still exists.

 
 
"* * * For example, in 
the case of the presumption of receipt of a letter, referred to above, the 
defendant may destroy the presumption by denying receipt. Nevertheless, a jury 
question is presented, not because of the presumption, but because of the 
natural inference flowing from the plaintiff's showing that he had mailed a 
properly addressed letter that was not returned." McCormick on Evidence § 345, 
p. 821 (2nd Ed. 1972).

 
 

[¶12.]  In this case, the fact of delivery was 
found by the agency. The inference and appellee's statement represent two fairly 
conflicting views. Thus, we may not "`"displace the Board's choice,"'" (see 
quotation from Board of Trustees of 
School District No. 4,   Big  Horn  County v. Colwell, 
supra).

 
 

[¶13.]  The Commission's authority is set by 
statute. Section 27-3-404(a), supra note 1, authorizes the review requested here 
to be "within ten (10) days after notice is mailed or delivered." Such 
authorization is just as mandatory and jurisdictional as is a timely filing of a 
petition for review of an administrative action by a district court, Stagner v. Wyoming State Tax Commission, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 1296 (1982), or as is a timely filing of a notice of appeal to 
this Court, Bosler v. Morad, Wyo., 
555 P.2d 567 (1976). See Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 
(1979).

 
 

[¶14.]  Reversed.

 
 

1 Section 27-3-404(a), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) The commission may 
within ten (10) days after notice is mailed or delivered:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) Review a 
determination of a special examiner; * * *"

 
 
Section 27-3-403(c), W.S. 
1977 (June 1983 Replacement), provides:

 
 
"Notice of the tribunal's 
decision shall be given promptly to the interested party by delivery or by mail 
to his last known address of record. The notice shall include a copy of the 
decision and the findings and conclusions in support of the decision. The 
decision is final unless further review is initiated pursuant to W.S. 
27-3-404."

 
 

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶15.]  I would affirm the trial court by 
adopting the same reasoning employed by the trial judge when he said in his 
opinion letter:

 
 
"The case presents a 
clear factual dispute: A decision of the appeals examiner for the Employment 
Security Commission was reached adversely to the Appellant. `The Transmittal of 
Decision' notice was dated September 14, 1984. The notice contained a recital 
that the `Date Notice Mailed' was September 14, 1984. The appeals examiner 
attested that the date of mailing was, in fact, September 14, 1984. Appellant 
claims he did not receive `notice' until October 10, 1984. He produces an 
envelope containing a notice which bears a postmark of October 5, 1984. He 
claims that this mailing constituted his first notice of the adverse decision. 
He filed his Notice of Appeal on October 11, 1984, which was within the 10 day 
period from his notice of the adverse decision, thus Appellant claims he is 
timely.

 
 
"The Court will resolve 
the factual dispute in this case in favor of the Appellant because of the 
importance of affording the Appellant a decision by the highest level of the 
Employment Security Commission on the merits. The law clearly favors resolution 
of disputes on the merits. * * *"

 
 

[¶16.]  I would have remanded to the Employment 
Security Commission for reinstitution of the internal-appeals process at the 
administrative level.