Case Title: Corbin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 75S03-1401-CR-13

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Nicholas T. Otis 
LaPorte, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Justin F. Roebel 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
 
No. 75S03-1401-CR-13 
 
 
ROBERT CORBIN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Starke Circuit Court 
No. 75C01-1204-FD-72 
The Honorable Kim Hall, Judge  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 75A03-1209-CR-402 
_________________________________ 
 
 
September 30, 2014 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
This interlocutory appeal challenges the trial court’s refusal to dismiss charges of 
attempted child seduction. We affirm the trial court.   
 
Sep 30 2014, 3:42 pm
 
2 
 
 
The allegations are that Robert Corbin, a teacher and coach, communicated via an 
internet site (Facebook.com) with a sixteen-year-old student; on one day, he asked the student to 
“take care of” his sexual arousal and sneak out of the house after the adults were asleep so 
Corbin could drive over and pick up the student, and the next day, Corbin inquired about the size 
of the student’s breasts and again asked the student to sneak out so he could see them. Corbin 
was charged with two counts of attempted child seduction.  A teacher who engages in touching 
or fondling a student age sixteen to eighteen years of age with the intent to arouse or satisfy the 
sexual desires of the teacher or the student commits “child seduction,” a class D felony, though 
“solicitation” of a student of that age, without more, is not a crime under the child solicitation 
statute. See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-6 (child solicitation) & 7 (child seduction). As relevant here, a 
person “attempts” to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission 
of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a “substantial step” toward commission of 
the crime. See I.C. § 35-41-5-1 (2008).  
 
 
Relying primarily on Ward v. State, 528 N.E.2d 52 (Ind. 1988), Corbin moved to dismiss 
the charges on grounds the online solicitation was not aimed at the “immediate commission of a 
crime.” (Appendix, p. 18.)  See I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(5) (specifying that a trial court may dismiss 
charges when “the facts stated do not constitute an offense”). 
  
 
The trial court denied Corbin’s motion to dismiss but certified the issue for an Appellate 
Rule 14(B) interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals accepted. 
 
 
Reviewing for an abuse of discretion and taking the facts alleged in the charging 
document as true, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. See Corbin v. State, 999 N.E.2d 
70, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), vacated. The Court of Appeals concluded that as a matter of law, the 
internet solicitations did not constitute a substantial step toward the crime of child seduction 
because Corbin’s requests were simply an invitation to the student, not the required “urging” or 
“persuasion” discussed in Ward, and in any event because the requests were not made in the 
student’s presence, the student was never in a position to submit to the solicitation so the 
requests related to future conduct, not the immediate commission of a crime. We granted transfer 
of jurisdiction, Corbin v. State, 1 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2014) (table), and heard oral argument. 
 
 
3 
 
 
In Ward, this Court addressed the question whether solicitation of a child may suffice for 
conviction of attempted child molesting. 528 N.E.2d at 52. We noted, as stated in the Court of 
Appeals opinion, that what constitutes an attempt offense in the area of sex offenses against 
children can, on occasion, be determined as a matter of law, but often, the question involves 
subtle distinctions in behavior and the nuance of the context in which the behavior occurs. One 
difference between Corbin’s case and most of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals, including 
Ward, is those cases involved review of a conviction after all of the evidence had been presented. 
Corbin’s case, by contrast, is in the charging stage, when other evidence, if there is any, is not 
yet known. And for the most part, the charges against him reflect the language of the seduction 
statute. At this point, we simply cannot say that dismissal is required and we conclude there are 
enough unanswered questions to affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. In short, 
the charges match the statutory elements and are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss at this 
time.  
 
 
Having previously granted transfer, we affirm the trial court and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
  
All Justices concur.