Case Title: DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC

Citation: 2007 WI 15

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP544 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
DaimlerChrysler c/o ESIS, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Glenn 
May, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 2, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 13, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren, III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Thomas 
M. Rohe and Otjen, Van Ert & Weir, SC, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Thomas M. Rohe. 
 
For the defendant-respondent Labor and Industry Review 
Commission there was a brief and oral argument by Jeffrey J. 
Shampo, Madison. 
 
For the defendant-respondent Glenn May there was a brief by 
Richard A. Fortune and Fortune & McGillis, S.C., Racine, and 
oral argument by Richard A. Fortune. 
 
 
2007 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP544  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV722) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DaimlerChrysler c/o ESIS, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Glenn 
May, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 2, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Honorable Wilbur W. Warren, Circuit Court Judge.  
Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before this court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-04).1  DaimlerChrysler appeals an 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 provides in relevant part: 
"The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or other 
proceeding in the court of appeals upon certification by the 
court of appeals or upon the supreme court's own motion." 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 
version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
2 
 
order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, Honorable Wilbur 
W. Warren, Judge, affirming a worker's compensation decision of 
the Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission (the LIRC). 
The LIRC determined that the defendant-respondent, Glenn May 
(May), was entitled to a minimum of 10 percent disability for 
each of two anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) repairs pursuant to 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) (Sept., 2005)2, resulting in a 20 
percent permanent partial disability (PPD) award. 
¶2 
We conclude that the LIRC's interpretations of Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) and Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) are 
entitled to controlling deference and great weight deference, 
respectively, and that the LIRC's award of 20 percent permanent 
partial disability to May should be upheld.   
¶3 
The certified question before this court is whether 
the LIRC may interpret Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) to award 
a 
cumulative 
minimum 
PPD 
for 
multiple 
ligament 
repair 
procedures, where the resulting award is higher than the highest 
medical estimate of PPD in evidence.  We answer this question in 
the affirmative.  We hold that § DWD 80.32(4) may be interpreted 
to award a cumulative minimum PPD for multiple ligament repair 
procedures, even though the award by the LIRC is higher than the 
highest medical estimate in the record.  We further hold that 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) does not prohibit determinations in 
excess of the highest medical assessment in evidence, but rather 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Administrative Code are to 
the September 2005 register date unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
3 
 
creates a presumption of reasonableness for PPD awards that fall 
within the prescribed range.  We therefore affirm the decision 
of the circuit court which affirmed the LIRC's award of 20 
percent PPD to May. 
I 
¶4 
On 
April 
19, 
1999, 
May, 
an 
employee 
of 
DaimlerChrysler, was injured at work when an engine that he was 
carrying hit his left knee.  The next day, May went to see Dr. 
Aftab Ansari, an orthopedic surgeon.   May underwent ACL 
reconstruction surgery by Dr. Ansari on May 5, 1999.   May 
continued to experience swelling, pain, and stiffness after the 
surgery.  On April 24, 2001, Dr. Ansari examined May and noted 
atrophy to his left quadriceps.  At that time, Dr. Ansari 
assessed 15 percent PPD of May’s left knee. 
¶5 
On July 27, 2001, Dr. Ansari performed a second ACL 
reconstruction surgery.  The second surgery improved May’s knee 
substantially, and he returned to work in October 2001 without 
further problems.  In April 2002 Dr. Ansari was given a copy of 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) and assessed the minimum 10 
percent PPD of May’s left knee.  Doctor Ansari reported that May 
had reached a healing plateau, and further indicated that May’s 
PPD had not changed due to the second ACL reconstruction.  
DaimlerChrysler paid May 10 percent PPD, which amounted to 
$7,820.  May then filed a claim for additional compensation with 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development 
(the 
DWD).  
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Sherman Mitchell awarded May 25 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
4 
 
percent  PPD, the amount determined by adding together Dr. 
Ansari’s assessments from each of the two surgeries. 
¶6 
In 
reaching 
his 
conclusion, 
the 
ALJ 
applied 
Hellendrung v. Wal Mart, Claim No. 1999039147 (LIRC Feb. 23, 
2001).  In Hellendrung, the LIRC ruled that the note to Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(1) indicates that the same principles 
that are applied to surgical procedures to the back, also apply 
to surgical procedures to the knee, and that additional ratings 
and permanent disability will be given for cumulative surgeries.  
Id. 
¶7 
The worker's compensation applicant in Hellendrung had 
a long-standing history of knee problems prior to being injured 
at work.  Following his work injury, the applicant sought 
treatment and underwent partial meniscectomy surgery.  Id.  The 
applicant's treating physician concluded that there was a causal 
relationship between the applicant's need for surgery and the 
work incident.  Id.  The ALJ awarded the applicant an additional 
5 percent PPD of the knee.  The employer argued in its petition 
to the LIRC for commission review that the language of Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
80.32(1) 
assumes 
that 
the 
member 
was 
previously without disability, and that appropriate reduction 
should have been made for any preexisting disability.  However, 
the LIRC affirmed the ALJ and concluded in Hellendrung that a 
footnote to § DWD 80.32(1) indicates that the same principle 
that is applied to an award for surgical procedures to the back 
is also applied in the case of procedures to the knee.  Id.  The 
LIRC concluded that § DWD 80.32(11) clearly contemplates that 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
5 
 
additional ratings and permanent disability will be given for 
cumulative surgeries to the back, and likewise to the knee, and 
that a reduction for any preexisting disability is most 
appropriately applied to previous losses of range of motion and 
amputations, but not to the surgical procedures listed in § DWD 
80.32.  Id. 
¶8 
In the present case, DaimlerChrysler petitioned the 
LIRC for review, alleging error by the ALJ.  The LIRC affirmed 
in part and reversed in part, reaffirming its decision in 
Hellendrung, and concluding that the evidence did not establish 
that May was entitled to 25 percent PPD because Dr. Ansari 
stated, after the second ACL surgery, that May had regained full 
strength in his knee and had 10 percent PPD.  The LIRC assessed 
20 percent PPD to the knee, concluding that Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 
80.32 
provides 
a 
10 
percent 
minimum 
for 
an 
ACL 
reconstruction 
and 
that, 
because 
May 
underwent 
two 
ACL 
surgeries, he was entitled to a minimum 10 percent recovery for 
each knee surgery.  
¶9 
DaimlerChrysler then brought an action for judicial 
review under Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  The Kenosha County Circuit 
Court, Judge Wilbur W. Warren, affirmed the LIRC's decision.  
DaimlerChrysler appealed, the court of appeals certified the 
matter to this court, and we accepted the certification. 
II 
¶10 Our analysis in this case focuses on the standard of 
review.  In order to answer the certified question in this case, 
it 
is 
necessary 
for 
this 
court 
to 
interpret 
both 
an 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
6 
 
administrative rule, Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32, especially 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4), and a statute, Wis. Stat.  
§ 102.18(1)(d).  The application of an administrative rule and 
the application of a statute to undisputed facts are questions 
of law that we review de novo.3   Garcia v. Mazda Motor of Am., 
Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶7, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365; Winters 
v. Winters, 2005 WI App 94, ¶7, 281 Wis. 2d 798, 699 N.W.2d 229.  
Further, when interpreting administrative regulations, we use 
the same rules of interpretation as we apply to statutes. State 
v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998)(citations 
omitted).  When an administrative agency promulgates regulations 
pursuant to a power delegated by the legislature, we construe 
those regulations "together with the statute to make, if 
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with 
common sense and sound reason."  Id.   
¶11 Here, we review the decision of the LIRC.  Brauneis v. 
LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶14, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635.  An 
administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules or 
regulations 
is 
controlling 
unless 
"plainly 
erroneous 
or 
inconsistent with the regulations."   Busch, 217 Wis. 2d at 441 
(citations omitted); see also RTE Corp. v. DILHR, 88 Wis. 2d 
283, 290, 276 N.W.2d 290 (1979).  Here, the LIRC reviewed a rule 
promulgated by the DWD, not the LIRC's own rule.  The LIRC is an 
adjudicative body charged only with resolving certain disputes.  
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State of Wis. Div. of Hearings 
                                                 
3 The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
7 
 
and Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶35, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  
The LIRC is an independent agency of the State of Wisconsin and, 
although it is not an organizational subdivision of the DWD, it 
is "'attached'" to the DWD for administrative purposes only.4  
The LIRC does not make rules, except for rules governing its own 
procedures.  Wis. Stat. § 103.04(2).   
¶12 The LIRC was created for the purpose of reviewing 
claims 
issued 
by 
ALJs 
in 
three 
divisions 
of 
the 
DWD: 
Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compensation, and Equal Rights.5  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.18(2)6, the DWD maintains on its 
staff ALJs to hear and decide disputed claims.  When decisions 
of ALJs are appealed in each of the three DWD divisions, the 
LIRC reviews the evidence submitted at the hearing, considers 
the parties' arguments, consults with the ALJs if necessary, and 
then issues a written decision.7  The LIRC was charged by the 
legislature with the duty of reviewing the evidence and 
affirming, reversing, setting aside, or modifying those findings 
or orders, in whole or in part.  Wis. Stat. § 102.18(3).   
                                                 
4 A 
Brief 
History 
of 
LIRC, 
http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/lrc_about.htm (2006) 
5 Id.  
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.18(2) provides in relevant part, 
"The department shall have and maintain on its staff such 
examiners as are necessary to hear and decide disputed claims 
and to assist in the effective administration of this chapter.  
These examiners shall be attorneys and may be designated as 
administrative law judges." 
7 A 
Brief 
History 
of 
LIRC, 
http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/lrc_about.htm (2006) 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
8 
 
¶13 We conclude that the LIRC's interpretation of Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) is entitled to controlling weight 
deference, because the LIRC reasonably interpreted a rule 
adopted 
by 
the 
DWD, 
the 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
was 
not 
inconsistent with the language of the rule or clearly erroneous, 
and the LIRC was charged by the legislature with the duty of 
reviewing decisions issued by ALJs in the Worker's Compensation 
Division 
of 
the 
DWD, 
and 
does 
so 
frequently.  
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(3).  See also RTE Corp., 88 Wis. 2d at 290. 
¶14 Case law supports our decision to grant controlling 
deference to the LIRC in this case.  In City of Elroy v. LIRC, 
152 Wis. 2d 320, 324, 448 N.W.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989), the court 
of appeals gave controlling weight deference to the LIRC's 
interpretation of a worker's compensation rule promulgated by 
the Industrial Commission8 under section Ind. 80.30 of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code, since the interpretation was not 
inconsistent with the language of the rule or clearly erroneous.  
The court of appeals determined that the LIRC's conclusion was 
reasonable, and affirmed the LIRC's decision.  Id.  Similarly, 
in Hutchinson v. Custom Drywall, Inc., the court of appeals 
concluded that the LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 80.24 was entitled to controlling weight deference, 
                                                 
8 The Industrial Commission was a predecessor agency to the 
DWD.  In 1967, The Department of Industry, Labor, & Human 
Relations (the DILHR) was created from the former Industrial 
Commission.  In 1996, the DWD replaced the DILHR as part of a 
major 
departmental 
reorganization. 
 
See 
DWD 
History, 
http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/dwd/DWDHistory/default.htm (2006). 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
9 
 
because it was not inconsistent with the rule or clearly 
erroneous.  Hutchinson v. Custom Drywall, Inc., No. 1997AP1675, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. September 3, 1998)9.   
¶15 Although the interpretation of a regulation and the 
interpretation of a statute are both questions of law, we 
determine 
the 
level 
of 
deference 
for 
agency 
statutory 
interpretations in a different manner.  Hillhaven, 2000 WI App 
20, ¶12 n.6, 232 Wis. 2d 400, 606 N.W.2d 572.  An agency's 
statutory interpretations are generally accorded one of three 
levels of deference: great weight, due weight, or no deference.  
Id.  However, for an agency's interpretation of its own rules or 
regulations, if the interpretation is reasonable and consistent 
with 
the 
intended 
purpose, 
we 
generally 
apply 
either 
"controlling weight" or "great weight" deference.  Marder v. Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2004 WI App 177, ¶27 n.3, 
276 Wis. 2d 186, 687 N.W.2d 832 (citing Hillhaven, 232 Wis. 2d 
400, ¶12 n.6).   However, "[d]espite the difference in 
terminology, the deference we give to an agency interpretation 
of its own rules is similar to the great weight standard applied 
to statutory interpretations."  Marder, 276 Wis. 2d 186, ¶27 
n.3.  Both great weight deference and controlling weight 
deference "turn on whether the agency's interpretation is 
reasonable and consistent with the meaning or purpose of the 
regulation or statute."  Id. 
                                                 
9 We include an unpublished decision merely to show that 
controlling weight deference is regularly given to the LIRC's 
interpretation of the DWD's administrative rules.  
No. 
2005AP544   
 
10 
 
¶16 In order for an agency's interpretation of a statute 
to be accorded great weight deference, four requirements must be 
met: (1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty 
of administering the statute; (2) the interpretation of the 
agency is one of long-standing; (3) the agency employed its 
expertise 
or 
specialized 
knowledge 
in 
forming 
the 
interpretation; and (4) the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity in the application of the statute.  Lisney v. LIRC, 
171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992); UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 
201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  Under the standard 
of 
great 
weight 
deference, 
a 
court 
will 
refrain 
from 
substituting its view of the law for that of an agency charged 
with administration of the law, and will sustain the agency's 
conclusions of law if they are reasonable.  Brown v. LIRC, 2003 
WI 142, ¶19, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 N.W.2d 279.  We will sustain an 
agency's conclusions of law even if an alternative view of the 
law is just as reasonable or even more reasonable.  Id. 
¶17 Due weight deference is appropriate when an agency has 
some experience in an area, but has not yet developed the 
expertise that would place it in a better position than a court 
to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute.  
UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 286.  When applying due weight 
deference, 
we 
will 
not 
overturn 
a 
reasonable 
agency 
interpretation that is consistent with the purpose of the 
statute, unless there is a more reasonable interpretation.  
Hillhaven, 232 Wis. 2d 400, ¶12 n.6. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
11 
 
¶18  De novo review or no deference is appropriate where 
the issue is one of first impression, where the agency has no 
special expertise, or where the agency's position has been so 
inconsistent that it provides no real guidance.  Am. Mfrs. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 2002 WI App 76, ¶14, 252 Wis. 2d 155, 642 
N.W.2d 584. 
¶19 The circuit court gave the LIRC's interpretation of 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 due deference, and noted that the 
court found no guidance in Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d).  For the 
following reasons, we conclude that the LIRC's interpretation of 
§ 102.18(1)(d) is entitled to great weight deference, and that 
the LIRC's interpretation of § DWD 80.32(4) is entitled to 
controlling weight deference.  As noted previously, controlling 
weight deference is similar to great weight deference, despite 
the difference in terminology, because both standards turn on 
whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable and consistent 
with the meaning or purpose of the regulation or statute.  
Marder, 276 Wis. 2d 186, ¶27 n.3.  Controlling weight describes 
a level of deference given to an agency's interpretation and 
application of administrative rules and regulations, while great 
weight deference describes a level of deference given to an 
agency's interpretation and application of a statute. 
¶20 The legislature empowered the DWD and the LIRC to 
administer the worker's compensation statutes.  Beecher v. LIRC, 
2004 WI 88, ¶25, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29. The LIRC 
employed its expertise and specialized knowledge in interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d).  The statute has been in effect for 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
12 
 
26 years, and the LIRC has issued approximately 130 decisions on 
§ 102.18(1)(d).  See, e.g., Laughlin v. Tommy Bartlett, Inc., 
Claim 
Nos. 
1999043589, 
2002042491 
(LIRC 
Aug. 
31, 
2004); 
Greenwood v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., Claim No. 1999046119 (LIRC 
Sept. 10, 2002).  Finally, the LIRC has been consistent in its 
application of § 102.18(1)(d), such that its interpretation will 
provide uniformity in the application of the statute.  Beecher, 
273 Wis. 2d 136, ¶23. The LIRC has consistently declined to read 
§ 102.18(1)(d) to mandate a range within which a PPD award must 
fall.  Sconzert v. Bay Engineered Castings, Inc., Claim No. 
2000011312 (LIRC June 28, 2001); Schouten v. Wis. Farmers Mut. 
Ins., Claim No. 89067604 (LIRC Mar. 10, 1994).  Therefore, we 
accord the LIRC's interpretation of § 102.18(1)(d) great weight 
deference here, and we will sustain that interpretation, even if 
an alternative view of the law is just as reasonable or even 
more reasonable.  Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶19. 
III 
¶21 In its brief, the LIRC argues that this court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction or competency, because the Joint 
Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) was never 
served with a copy of the petition for review.  The LIRC argues 
that 
service 
upon 
the 
JCRAR 
is 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(5)10.  This issue is better characterized as 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.40(5) provides in relevant part: 
"The joint committee for review of administrative rules shall be 
served with a copy of the petition in any action under this 
section and, with the approval of the joint committee on 
legislative organization, shall be made a party and be entitled 
to be heard." 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
13 
 
one of competency, not one of subject matter jurisdiction.  See 
Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 175-76, 313 N.W.2d 790 
(1982);11 Currier v. DOR, 2006 WI App 12, ¶6 n.2, 288 Wis. 2d 
693, 709 N.W.2d 520.  Under the Wisconsin Constitution, circuit 
courts in Wisconsin have general original subject matter 
jurisdiction over "all matters civil and criminal."  Wis. Const. 
art. VII, § 8; In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 307 N.W.2d 
881 (1981)(citations omitted).    Here, the issue of competency 
to proceed was not raised before the circuit court, and we 
decline 
to 
disregard 
the 
resulting 
waiver. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, we need not address the issue of competency.  
Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶27, 273 Wis. 2d 
76, 681 N.W.2d 190; see also Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of 
Milwaukee v. Sav. & Loan Review Bd. of Wis., 46 Wis. 2d 110, 
116, 174 N.W.2d 554 (1970), which involves the general rule that 
an issue not raised before the circuit court need not be 
addressed by an appellate court. 
                                                 
11 Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), 
was clarified in Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 
¶29, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, which held that a challenge 
to a circuit court's competency should be raised before the 
circuit court in order to be preserved for appellate review.  In 
Village of Trempealeau, we stated, 
[T]he common-law waiver rule applies to challenges to 
the circuit court's competency, such that a challenge 
to the court's competency will be deemed waived if not 
raised in the circuit court, subject to the inherent 
authority of the reviewing court to disregard the 
wavier and address the merits of the unpreserved 
argument. . . .   
Id., ¶27. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
14 
 
IV 
¶22 We have concluded that the LIRC's interpretation of 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4)12 is entitled to controlling 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 provides in 
relevant part: 
     (1) The disabilities set forth in this section 
are 
the 
minimums 
for 
the 
described 
conditions. 
However, findings of additional disabling elements 
shall result in an estimate higher than the minimum. 
The minimum also assumes that the member, the back, 
etc., was previously without disability. Appropriate 
reduction 
shall 
be 
made 
for 
any 
pre-existing 
disability. 
     Note: An example would be where in addition to a 
described 
loss 
of 
motion, 
pain 
and 
circulatory 
disturbance further limits the use of an arm or a leg. 
A meniscectomy in a knee with less than a good result 
would call for an estimate higher than 5% loss of use 
of the leg at the knee. The same principle would apply 
to surgical procedures on the back. The schedule of 
minimum disabilities contained in this section was 
adopted upon the advice of a worker's compensation 
advisory 
council subcommittee after a survey of 
doctors experienced in treating industrial injuries. 
. . . . 
     (4) Knee 
. . . . 
Anterior cruciate ligament repair  10% 
. . . . 
 
(11) Back 
. . . . 
    Note: It is the subcommittee's intention that a 
separate minimum 5% allowance be given for every 
surgical 
procedure 
(open 
or 
closed, 
radical 
or 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
15 
 
weight deference.  We will therefore uphold the agency's 
interpretation, unless such interpretation is "'inconsistent 
with the language of the regulation or clearly erroneous.'"  
Plevin v. DOT, 2003 WI App 211, ¶13, 267 Wis. 2d 281, 671 N.W.2d 
355 (citation omitted).  An administrative agency that regularly 
works with the rules and regulations of another agency, whose 
actions it is authorized by the legislature to review, is in the 
best position to interpret such rules and regulations because 
the agency knows the specific purposes of the rules and 
regulations that have been promulgated, and has expertise in the 
area the agency is called upon to review.  Id.   
¶23 As discussed earlier, the LIRC was established for the 
purpose of reviewing claims issued by ALJs in three divisions of 
the DWD: Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compensation, and 
Equal Rights. The LIRC was "created to have final review 
authority of Department interpretations."  DILHR v. LIRC, 161 
Wis. 2d 231, 245, 467 N.W.2d 545 (1991).  The LIRC corrects 
errors and "helps to assure consistent statutory application."  
Id. 
                                                                                                                                                             
partial) that is done to relieve from the effects of a 
disc lesion or spinal cord pressure. Each disc treated 
or surgical procedure performed will qualify for a 5% 
rating.  Due to the fact a fusion involves 2 
procedures a 1) laminectomy (dissectomy) and a 2) 
fusion procedure, 10% permanent total disability will 
apply when the 2 surgical procedures are done at the 
same time or separately. 
 
 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
16 
 
¶24  DaimlerChrysler argues that the LIRC's interpretation 
of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) has been inconsistent, and 
therefore should be given no deference.  To illustrate, 
DaimlerChrysler notes that in Hellendrung, Claim No. 1999039147, 
and in the present case, the LIRC concluded that reductions for 
preexisting 
disabilities 
did 
not 
apply 
to 
the 
surgical 
procedures 
listed 
in 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ 
DWD 
80.32.  
DaimlerChrysler asserts that, in King v. DOT, Claim Nos. 
2001007515 and 2003012619 (LIRC Apr. 27, 2005), the LIRC counted 
previous surgeries listed in § DWD 80.32 as preexisting 
disabilities that should be subtracted from the final PPD 
assessment. 
¶25 We disagree with DaimlerChrysler's assertion that the 
LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 has been 
inconsistent.  King is distinguishable from the present case 
because, in King, a second knee surgery was necessary because 
the applicant suffered from a second injury. The LIRC therefore 
reduced 
the 
disability 
determination 
for 
a 
preexisting 
condition.  Id.  In the present case, May did not suffer a 
second knee injury, but rather had an unsuccessful first 
surgery. The LIRC therefore made no reduction for a preexisting 
condition, since May did not have such a condition.  The LIRC's 
decision in this case is consistent with its decision in Hall v. 
Consol. Thermoplastics, Claim No. 1995022808 (LIRC Sept. 29, 
1999).  In Hall, the LIRC made it clear that, where a surgery is 
performed "to cure and relieve the effects of the same work 
injury[,]" the LIRC will not make a reduction in the amount 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
17 
 
awarded for post-injury surgeries by subtracting the minimum 
assessment for one surgery from a later surgery.  Id.  The 
LIRC's decision in this case is also supported by its conclusion 
in Hellendrung, Claim No. 1999039147, that a reduction under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(1) is appropriate for previous 
losses of range of motion and amputations, but not for the 
surgical procedures listed in § DWD 80.32.   
¶26   The language of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 does 
not specify how repeat ligament repair procedures should be 
treated.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(1) states that the 
minimum disability percentages are "[t]he minimums for the 
described conditions," and that additional disabling elements 
may result in an award higher than the listed minimum.  The 
minimum specified in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) for an ACL 
repair to the knee is 10 percent. 
¶27 The LIRC notes that Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) 
uses substantially identical language and format to set forth 
the minimum percentage for loss of use following an ACL 
procedure in the knee as Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(11) uses 
to set forth the minimum percentages following a procedure for 
removal of disc material or fusion in the spine.  Both 
subsections describe the surgical procedure and then indicate 
the minimum loss of use rating.     
¶28 Relying on Wilson v. Waukesha County, 157 Wis. 2d 790, 
796, 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990), the LIRC asserts that when 
substantially identical language is used in two subsections of 
the 
same 
administrative 
rule, 
the 
LIRC 
may 
consider 
an 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
18 
 
explanatory note discussing the meaning of language as used in 
one subsection, in order to interpret the language in the other 
subsection.  In Wilson, the court of appeals used bill drafting 
records that discussed the meaning of a word in one subsection, 
in order to determine the meaning of the same word in another 
subsection of the same statute.  Id. The LIRC asserts that it 
was reasonable to consider the note appended to Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 80.32(11) as being supportive of its interpretation of 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4).  DaimlerChrysler asserts that 
the note to § DWD 80.32(11) applies only to that subsection, and 
that the DWD intended to give special effect to back procedures, 
and to exclude knee procedures. 
¶29  To adopt DaimlerChrysler's argument would be to give 
different 
meanings 
to 
the 
same 
words 
within 
the 
same 
administrative rule.    See Gen. Castings Corp. v. Winstead, 156 
Wis. 2d 752, 759, 457 N.W.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1990)("We reject an 
interpretation which ascribes different meanings to the same 
word as it variously appears in a statute unless the context 
clearly requires such an approach.").  It is a basic rule of 
construction that we attribute the same definition to a word 
both times it is used in the same statute or administrative 
rule.  Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 663, 539 
N.W.2d 98 (1995). 
¶30 The text of Wis. Admin. Code §§ DWD 80.32(4) and (11) 
contains substantially similar wording.  Absent any direction 
clearly requiring the LIRC to give different meanings to the 
same words, the LIRC did not err in concluding that the text of 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
19 
 
§§ DWD 80.32(4) and (11) should be interpreted in the same way.  
See Gen. Castings Corp., 156 Wis. 2d at 759.  Nor was it error, 
in light of Wilson, 157 Wis. 2d at 796, for the LIRC to conclude 
that, just as additional minimum PPD percentages are allowable 
for repeat surgical spinal procedures, additional minimum PPD 
percentages are allowable for repeat surgical procedures to the 
knee.13 
¶31  DaimlerChrysler goes on to assert that there cannot 
be an award for both of May's ACL surgeries because Wis. Admin. 
Code 
§ 
DWD 
80.32(1) 
requires 
reduction 
for 
preexisting 
disabilities.  As we noted previously, Hellendrung, Claim No. 
1999039147, is instructive on this point.  In Hellendrung, the 
                                                 
13 The dissent, in ¶¶61-62, claims that the LIRC's decision 
is inconsistent with the intent of the Worker's Compensation 
Advisory Council Subcommittee (subcommittee).  Notes to Wis. 
Admin. Code §§ DWD 80.32(1) and (11), resulting from the work of 
the subcommittee, show that the subcommittee intended to allow 
at least additional minimum PPD percentages to be applied for 
repeat or multiple surgical procedures.  With respect to 
surgical procedures to the back, the note to § DWD 80.32(11) 
states in relevant part: "It is the subcommittee's intention 
that a separate minimum 5% allowance be given for every surgical 
procedure . . . that is done to relieve from the effects of a 
disc lesion or spinal cord pressure."  As the LIRC points out in 
its brief, a note to § DWD 80.32(1) states in relevant part: "A  
meniscectomy in a knee with less than a good result would call 
for an estimate higher than [the minimum in the code for a 
meniscectomy with excellent to good results].  The same 
principle would apply to surgical procedures on the back."  
These two notes, reflecting the intention of the subcommittee, 
strongly support the conclusion that the administrative rule was 
intended to be applied uniformly, regardless of whether the 
surgical procedure was to the knee, the back, or another part of 
the body, and that the subcommittee intended that at least 
additional minimum PPD percentages be allowed for repeat or 
multiple surgical procedures for the same work injury. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
20 
 
LIRC determined that a reduction under § 80.32(1) is appropriate 
for previous losses of range of motion and amputations, but not 
for the surgical procedures listed in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
80.32.  Anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction is one of the 
procedures listed in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) and the 
LIRC's decision not to make a reduction for preexisting 
disability was, therefore, reasonable and consistent with the 
intended purpose.  There was no preexisting disability or 
condition that predated May's original injury at work in April 
1999. 
¶32   Moreover, the preamble of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
80.32 provides for "[m]inimum percentages of loss of use for 
amputation levels, losses of motion, sensory losses and surgical 
procedures."  Statutes should be interpreted so that every word 
is given effect.  Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 
N.W.2d 817 (1980).   We construe administrative rules in the 
same manner as statutes.  Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶21, 
245 Wis. 2d 632, 629 N.W.2d 277.  The plural usage of "surgical 
procedures" in the preamble of § DWD 80.32 supports a conclusion 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
21 
 
that multiple or repeat surgical procedures are contemplated by 
the administrative rule.14 
¶33 It is not necessary for this court to address 
DaimlerChrysler's 
hypothetical 
assertion 
that 
the 
LIRC's 
interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) may lead to 
awards greater than 100 percent PPD.  Worker's compensation 
cases are fact-intensive and, for this reason, we need not deal 
"with 
any 
of 
the 
hypothetical 
situations 
posed 
by 
the 
appellants."  Town of Russell Volunteer Fire Dept. v. LIRC, 223 
Wis. 2d 723, 738, 589 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1998).  However, we 
are cognizant of the case of Blau v. Pecks Feed & Grain, Inc., 
Claim No. 1988015510 (LIRC July 19, 2001), in which the LIRC 
applied Wis. Stat. § 102.44(4),15 and, based on that statute, 
                                                 
14 Contrary to the position taken in ¶45 of the dissent, the 
LIRC's conclusion that additional minimum PPD percentages are 
allowable for repeat surgical procedures to the knee is an 
entirely reasonable one.  The LIRC's decision contains a 
reasoned analysis that is consistent with the language of Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.32, the notes resulting from the work of 
the subcommittee, and the policy concerns underlying Wisconsin's 
Worker's Compensation Act.  The LIRC's decision recognizes that 
repeat or multiple surgeries have a cumulative, negative effect 
on function of the body part upon which they are performed.  The 
LIRC's decision is also consistent with the well-established 
principle "that the Worker's Compensation Act, ch. 102, Stats., 
is to be liberally construed to effectuate its goal of 
compensating and making injured workers whole. . . ."  ITW 
Deltar v. LIRC, 226 Wis. 2d 11, 18, 593 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 
1999).      
15 Wisconsin Stat. §  102.44(4) provides in relevant part: 
"Where 
the 
permanent 
partial 
disability 
is 
covered 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 102.52, 102.53 and 102.55, such sections shall 
govern; provided, that in no case shall the percentage of 
permanent total disability be taken as more than 100 percent."   
No. 
2005AP544   
 
22 
 
determined that an employee may not be awarded PPD in excess of 
100 percent.   
V 
¶34 As noted previously, where great weight deference is 
given to the LIRC's interpretation and application of a statute 
such 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d),16 
this 
court 
will 
not 
substitute its view of the law for that of the LIRC, and will 
sustain the agency's conclusions of law if they are reasonable.  
Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶19. 
¶35 DaimlerChrysler 
asserts 
that 
the 
LIRC 
erred 
in 
awarding May 20 percent PPD because Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) 
prohibits determinations in excess of the highest medical 
assessment in the record.  DaimlerChrysler further asserts that 
the LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) 
contravenes the language of § 102.18(1)(d).  DaimlerChrysler 
asserts that § 102.18(1)(d) refers to an estimate of PPD that is 
"made by a practitioner which is in evidence" and that the 
statute specifically prohibits the LIRC from awarding PPD higher 
                                                                                                                                                             
The assessment of disability to the extremities, such as 
the knee, is regulated by Wis. Stat. § 102.52, which determines 
percentages of disability based upon the maximum number of weeks 
allocated by the legislature for the injured body part. 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) provides in relevant 
part: 
Any award which falls within a range of 5% of the 
highest or lowest estimate of permanent partial 
disability made by a practitioner which is in evidence 
is presumed to be a reasonable award, provided it is 
not higher than the highest or lower than the lowest 
estimate in evidence. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
23 
 
than the highest or lower than the lowest estimate in evidence.  
We disagree with DaimlerChrysler's argument that the LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
§ DWD 
80.32(4) 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
§ 102.18(1)(d). 
¶36 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.18(1)(d) 
does 
not 
prohibit 
deviation from the range specified.  Rather, § 102.18(1)(d) 
states clearly that any award within the range prescribed by the 
statute is "presumed to be a reasonable award. . . ."  The 
statute does not state that an award outside of the prescribed 
range is unreasonable.  Furthermore, § 102.18(1)(d) does not 
prohibit the DWD from setting minimum loss of use percentages by 
administrative rule.  Administrative rules must be construed to 
be harmonious with statutory law dealing with the same subject 
matter, if it is feasible.  Sommerfield v. Sommerfield, 154 Wis. 
2d 840, 847, 454 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1990). 
¶37 As 
noted 
previously, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
102.18(1)(d) 
provides in relevant part:  
Any award which falls within a range of 5% of the 
highest or lowest estimate of permanent partial 
disability made by a practitioner which is in evidence 
is presumed to be a reasonable award, provided it is 
not higher than the highest or lower than the lowest 
estimate in evidence. 
The first step of statutory interpretation is to look at the 
language of the statute; if the plain meaning is clear, a court 
need not look to the rules of statutory construction or to 
extrinsic sources of interpretation.  UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 
281.  We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in 
the statutory language.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
24 
 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110. 
¶38 DaimlerChrysler, the LIRC, and May all took the 
position, in their respective briefs and at oral argument, that 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) is clear and 
unambiguous.  We agree, and therefore we need not resort to 
extrinsic sources such as legislative history; we simply apply 
the language of an unambiguous statute to the facts before us.  
Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶24, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157 
(citing Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 
663, 660 N.W.2d 656).  A statute is not ambiguous merely because 
the parties disagree as to its meaning, as they do here.  Id., 
¶7. 
¶39 Wisconsin Stat., ch. 102, expressly recognizes PPD 
awards based on percentages set forth by the DWD.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 102.32(6)(b) states that "permanent disability can be 
determined based on a minimum permanent disability rating 
promulgated by the department by rule. . . ."  For the reasons 
stated herein, we conclude that the LIRC's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) is reasonable.  As noted previously, 
in order for the LIRC's interpretation of § 102.18(1)(d) to be 
accorded great weight deference, four requirements must be met: 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of 
administering the statute; (2) the interpretation of the agency 
is one of long-standing; (3) the agency employed its expertise 
or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) 
the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity in the 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
25 
 
application of the statute.  UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 284.  
Since all four requirements have been met here, we will sustain 
the 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 
102.18(1)(d) 
even 
if 
an 
alternative view is just as reasonable or more reasonable.  
Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶19.  
¶40 Relying on Pfister & Vogel Tanning Co. v. DILHR, 86 
Wis. 2d 522, 273 N.W.2d 293 (1979), DaimlerChrysler further 
argues that there is no credible evidence in the record to 
support a 20 percent PPD award to May.  In Pfister, physicians 
estimated that the plaintiff suffered either a 5 percent or a 15 
percent disability, and DILHR made a 20 percent disability 
award.  Id.  This court reversed the circuit court's affirmance 
of the award, holding that the award was not based upon credible 
evidence, and that there was error since the impairment of 
earning capacity had not been considered.  Id. at 524, 530-31.  
The percentages listed in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 set the 
minimum loss of use percentage that may be awarded for each 
listed procedure, regardless of whether there is a doctor's 
estimated PPD in evidence.  The minimum percentages are the 
product of a survey of practitioners with expertise in treating 
persons who have undergone the listed procedures, and of 
practitioners with expertise in assessing permanent partial 
disability.   
¶41  However, Pfister was decided in 1978, while Wis. 
Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) was not enacted until 1980.  Pfister was 
not decided based upon the current statute, and it never 
discussed the issue of the minimum PPDs set forth in Wis. Admin. 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
26 
 
Code § DWD 80.32.   Pfister, therefore, is neither helpful nor 
instructive in regard to the circumstances presented here.   
¶42 The LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) 
is reasonable.  Since we accord great weight deference here, we 
affirm 
the 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
§ 102.18(1)(d) in this case. 
VI 
¶43 In 
summary, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
LIRC's 
interpretations of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) and Wis. 
Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) are entitled to——controlling deference and 
great weight deference, respectively, and that the LIRC's award 
of 20 percent permanent partial disability to May should be 
upheld. 
¶44 The certified question before this court is whether 
the LIRC may interpret Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4) to award 
a 
cumulative 
minimum 
PPD 
for 
multiple 
ligament 
repair 
procedures, where the resulting award is higher than the highest 
medical estimate of PPD in evidence.  We answer this question in 
the affirmative.  We hold that § DWD 80.32(4) may be interpreted 
to award a cumulative minimum PPD for multiple ligament repair 
procedures, even though the award by the LIRC is higher than the 
highest medical estimate in the record.  We further hold that 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) does not prohibit determinations in 
excess of the highest medical assessment in evidence, but rather 
creates a presumption of reasonableness for PPD awards that fall 
within the prescribed range.  We therefore affirm the decision 
No. 
2005AP544   
 
27 
 
of the circuit court, which affirmed the LIRC's award of 20 
percent PPD to May. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
  
    
 
 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   The LIRC 
concluded that two surgical procedures necessary to repair one 
anterior cruciate ligament injury result in a 20 percent 
permanent partial disability of Glenn R. May's left leg at the 
knee.  The majority opinion concludes this is reasonable, even 
though 
the 
only 
medical 
evidence 
admitted 
places 
May's 
disability at 10 percent.  Majority op., ¶2.  It does so largely 
because of the deference it accords the LIRC's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4).  
Id.  The standards of review the majority opinion employs 
prevent a reasoned analysis of the legal issue presented, which 
when undertaken, demonstrates that May incurred one scheduled 
permanent 
disability, 
the 
extent 
of 
which 
is 
a 
factual 
determination that turns on the functional condition of his knee 
after he reached his final healing plateau.  Because proof of 
the existence and the extent of a functional disability are 
factual issues to be determined when a scheduled permanent 
disability is under consideration and because the LIRC's 
determination is contrary to uncontradicted, credible medical 
evidence that the extent of May's scheduled permanent disability 
is 10 percent, the LIRC's decision is not supported by credible 
and 
substantial 
evidence 
and 
therefore 
is 
erroneous.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶46 The dispositive facts are not disputed.  In 1999, May 
suffered a workplace injury to his left knee.  As a result of 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
2 
 
that injury, he had two surgical procedures performed on May 5, 
1999:  a meniscectomy and an anterior cruciate ligament 
autograft.1  DaimlerChrysler paid May temporary total disability 
during his recuperative period.  When May returned to work and 
had reached a healing plateau, the orthopedic surgeon who 
performed the knee surgery, Dr. Ansari, opined that the injury 
caused May a 15 percent permanent partial disability of his left 
leg at the knee, due to a 5 percent disability caused by the 
torn meniscus and a 10 percent disability caused by the torn 
anterior cruciate ligament. 
¶47 After several months at work, May's knee began to 
interfere with his work, in that it swelled, was painful and was 
stiff.  He again consulted Dr. Ansari, who opined that the first 
anterior cruciate repair had not held up well.  He recommended a 
second surgery.  
The second surgery did not involve a 
meniscectomy, but involved a repair of only the anterior 
cruciate ligament, this time with an allograft.2  Following the 
second surgery, May again was paid temporary total disability 
until he returned to work.  Once he had reached a healing 
plateau, Dr. Ansari opined that the second surgery had been 
successful in repairing May's torn anterior cruciate ligament 
and that May's permanent partial disability had not increased 
beyond the 10 percent level he had prior to the second surgery.  
                                                 
1 In an autograft, tissue from another part of the patient's 
body is removed and employed to repair the patient's injury.  
2 An allograft involves use of tissue that is taken from a 
source other than the patient's body, often from a cadaver. 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
3 
 
Dr. Ansari explained, "He has 10 percent PPD to the left knee 
due to ACL reconstruction.  In my opinion his PPD has not 
changed due to redo of his anterior cruciate ligament."  
(emphasis added). 
¶48 The LIRC rejected Dr. Ansari's medical opinion that 
the permanent condition of May's knee had not changed subsequent 
to the second surgery, and instead it adopted the opinion of an 
administrative law judge who stacked two minimum disability 
percentages for anterior cruciate ligament repair found in Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4).  The majority opinion affirms the 
LIRC's determination that stacking minimum disability values 
from § DWD 80.32(4) is reasonable even though the benefits 
awarded are more than 5 percent higher than the uncontradicted, 
credible medical evidence in the record.  Majority op., ¶3.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶49 We review the LIRC's decision, not that of the circuit 
court.  Stafford Trucking, Inc. v. DILHR, 102 Wis. 2d 256, 260, 
306 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1981).  The cause and the extent of a 
disability under worker's compensation law are questions of fact 
for which the LIRC's determination is conclusive if supported by 
credible and substantial evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6);3 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.23(6) states in relevant part:   
If the commission's order or award depends on any 
fact found by the commission, the court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the commission as 
to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any 
finding of fact.  The court may, however, set aside 
the commission's order or award and remand the case to 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
4 
 
Vande Zande v. DILHR, 70 Wis. 2d 1086, 1095, 236 N.W.2d 255 
(1975) (citing Transamerica Ins. Co. v. DILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 
276, 195 N.W.2d 656 (1972)).  When "facts are undisputed and 
only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts and 
that inference is contrary to the conclusion drawn by LIRC, we 
must overrule LIRC."  Leist v. LIRC, 183 Wis. 2d 450, 458, 515 
N.W.2d 
268 
(1994). 
 
The 
application 
of 
statutes 
or 
administrative rules are questions of law.  Beecher v. LIRC, 
2004 WI 88, ¶22, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29.  Although the 
majority opinion correctly sets out the standards of review that 
are often employed when we review an agency's application of 
statutes or administrative rules, majority op., ¶2, this case 
turns on whether the LIRC can ignore uncontradicted, credible 
medical evidence and substitute its own judgment about the 
existence and the extent of a medical condition.   
B. 
Permanent Partial Disability 
1. 
General principles 
¶50 A worker who has suffered a work-related injury may 
recover for a permanent disability at the end of his healing 
period.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2)-(4).  There are two categories 
of permanent disability:  permanent total disability and 
permanent partial disability.  See § 102.44(2) and (4).  Each 
type of permanent disability resulting from a work-related 
injury is further separated into two types of disabilities:  
                                                                                                                                                             
the commission if the commission's order or award 
depends on any material and controverted finding of 
fact that is not supported by credible and substantial 
evidence. 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
5 
 
scheduled disabilities and unscheduled disabilities.  Langhus v. 
LIRC, 206 Wis. 2d 494, 498-99, 557 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1996).   
¶51 The scheduled disabilities are addressed in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.52, 102.53 and 102.55.  Id. at 498.  The total benefits 
for an injury that results in a scheduled permanent disability 
to a body part are established by the benefit weeks set out in 
§ 102.52(1)-(18).  Id. at 498-99.  If the type of permanent 
disability listed in the statute results in less than a total 
permanent disability of the body, the benefit weeks are 
calculated as a percentage of loss of function for that part of 
the body that is listed in the schedule.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.55(3).  With a scheduled disability, the benefits are 
limited, as directed by Wis. Stat. § 102.44(4).4  Hagen v. LIRC, 
210 Wis. 2d 12, 23, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997); Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d 
at 498.   
¶52 If the work-related permanent disability is not a 
disability that is scheduled under Wis. Stat. §§ 102.52, 102.53 
or 102.55, it is characterized as an "unscheduled" permanent 
disability.  Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 18.  When the permanent 
disability is unscheduled, a loss of earning capacity is not 
presumed to follow a loss of function.  Kurschner v. DILHR, 40 
Wis. 2d 10, 18, 161 N.W.2d 213 (1968).  Rather, a loss of 
earning capacity in the same or other suitable employments is a 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(4) states:  "Where the permanent 
disability is covered by ss. 102.52, 102.53 or 102.55, such 
sections shall govern; provided, that in no case shall the 
percentage of permanent total disability be taken as more than 
100 per cent."   
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
6 
 
crucial element that the injured employee must prove before an 
unscheduled permanent disability can be found to exist.  N. 
States Power Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 252 Wis. 70, 73-74, 30 N.W.2d 
217 (1947).   
¶53 If 
the 
injury 
causes 
an 
unscheduled 
permanent 
disability that is partial, the benefits are calculated by 
determining the percentage of disability as "compared medically 
with injuries that would render a person permanently totally 
disabled for industrial purposes as provided in sec. 102.44(2) 
. . . ."5  Kurschner, 40 Wis. 2d at 18.  The calculation of 
benefits due to an unscheduled disability is accomplished by 
applying the percentage of loss of earning capacity to 1,000 
benefit weeks.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(3).  A back injury is an 
unscheduled injury.  Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 23; Pfister & Vogel 
Tanning Co. v. DILHR, 86 Wis. 2d 522, 523, 273 N.W.2d 293 
(1979); Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d at 501. 
¶54 An accurate analysis of the proof that is sufficient 
to support a worker's compensation award for a permanent 
disability requires an initial classification of whether the 
disability is scheduled or unscheduled.  See Pfister, 86 Wis. 2d 
at 527-28.  This is so because an unscheduled permanent 
disability benefit cannot be based solely on an impairment of 
bodily function, but also requires proof of an impairment of 
earning capacity.  Id.  However, proof of a scheduled disability 
will be sufficient if that proof establishes a functional 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(2) states in relevant part:  "In 
case of permanent total disability aggregate indemnity shall be 
weekly indemnity for the period that the employee may live." 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
7 
 
medical impairment to a body part.  Id.; Mednicoff v. DILHR, 54 
Wis. 2d 7, 12, 194 N.W.2d 670 (1972).  In explaining the 
different analyses to be applied to an unscheduled disability as 
compared with a scheduled disability, we noted that,  
[I]t appears that the injuries of an applicant (non-
schedule but permanent total or partial) are to be 
compared medically with injuries that would render a 
person permanently totally disabled for industrial 
purposes as provided in sec. 102.44(2), Stats., and 
not to injuries that would totally disable a person 
functionally 
without 
regard 
to 
loss 
of 
earning 
capacity. 
Id. at 11 (citing Kurschner, 40 Wis. 2d at 18). 
¶55 Most of the disabilities listed in Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 80.32 are scheduled disabilities.  However, a permanent 
disability of the back, § DWD 80.32(11), is an unscheduled 
disability.  Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 23; Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d at 
501; see also Pfister, 86 Wis. 2d at 523.  We have held that the 
LIRC errs when it determines the extent of an unscheduled 
permanent disability by comparing the "employee's injuries to 
those of a hypothetical person totally disabled functionally and 
not to one totally disabled as to loss of earning capacity."  
Pfister, 86 Wis. 2d at 529.  And as explained above, proof of 
loss of earning capacity is not required of a scheduled 
permanent disability because unscheduled and scheduled permanent 
disabilities have different foundations.  Kurschner, 40 Wis. 2d 
at 18.  The proof of a scheduled permanent disability is 
complete once the functional level of the disability has been 
proven, regardless of its actual impact on the employee's 
earning capacity.  Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d at 12.  Stated 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
8 
 
otherwise, the legislature has presumed a loss of earning 
capacity as a part of the number of benefit weeks it chose for 
each category of scheduled permanent disability.  Id.  The LIRC 
cannot change the permanency schedules established in the 
statutes or the proof required to accord benefits under those 
schedules.  Leist, 183 Wis. 2d at 457; Wis. Stat. § 102.55(3); 
Wis. Stat. § 102.44(4).  
2. 
May's permanent disability  
¶56 May's work-related injury to his knee caused a 
scheduled permanent disability.6  Wis. Stat. § 102.52(11); 
Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d at 13; Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d at 501.  
Accordingly, May's 
compensation for the permanent partial 
disability to his leg at the knee is limited by statute.  Hagen, 
210 Wis. 2d at 23. 
¶57 The LIRC cannot base its judgment about the existence 
and the extent of May's disability on speculation.  Leist, 183 
Wis. 2d at 457.  To do so would permit the LIRC to exercise its 
judgment arbitrarily.  Id.  The statutory provisions are May's 
exclusive remedy.  Id.  In order to qualify as a permanent 
disability, a knee injury requires medical proof of the 
                                                 
6 The LIRC did not overtly state that May's disability was 
scheduled; however, the calculation made in the LIRC's decision 
that is now under consideration demonstrates that the LIRC 
concluded that May incurred a scheduled permanent disability.  
To explain, the LIRC awarded 20 percent permanent partial 
disability, which it said equaled 85 weeks of benefits.  The 
benefit weeks for a total scheduled disability of the leg at the 
knee is 425 weeks.  Wis. Stat. § 102.52(11).  Twenty percent of 
425 weeks equals 85 weeks.  By contrast, an unscheduled injury 
at 20 percent would equal 200 weeks, as 20 percent of 1000 weeks 
equals 200 weeks.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(3). 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
9 
 
existence and functional extent of the change in condition of 
the knee.  Wis. Stat. §§ 102.13(1)7 and 102.52(11).   
¶58 Here, the report of Dr. Ansari was received into 
evidence without objection.  Therefore, it is prima facie 
evidence of the existence and the extent of May's permanent 
partial disability.  Leist, 183 Wis. 2d at 459.  Dr. Ansari gave 
the only contemporaneous opinion of the actual condition of 
May's knee.  He was May's treating physician for many years.  He 
had repeatedly seen May and evaluated his medical condition and 
May's resulting permanent disability.  The minimum percentage of 
disability set out in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4), i.e., 10 
percent permanent partial disability for an anterior cruciate 
ligament repair, is only an average value based on a state-wide 
survey 
of 
physicians. 
 
It 
is 
not 
patient-specific, 
and 
therefore, it is not competent evidence of the actual condition 
of May's knee.  Absent some reason to reject Dr. Ansari's 
opinion, the percentages of permanency set out in § DWD 80.32(4) 
cannot contradict Dr. Ansari's particularized medical evaluation 
of May's actual disability.  Let me explain. 
¶59 The Worker's Compensation Advisory Council (Advisory 
Council) assisted in establising Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 as 
guidelines that physicians were to consult in determining the 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.13(1) requires an employee who seeks 
compensation 
for 
a 
work-related 
injury 
to 
submit 
to 
an 
employer's request for a reasonable medical examination by a 
physician of the employer's choosing.  Refusal to submit to such 
an exam will result in the suspension of the employee's right to 
commence or continue an action for benefits under ch. 102.  
§ 102.13(1)(c).  
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
10 
 
levels of permanent disability for individual claimants. The 
guidelines were constructed after consultation with physicians 
throughout the state, who responded to the survey based on their 
experiences with many patients.  A large revision to these 
guidelines was made in 1973-74 and again in 1993-94 to form the 
current version of § DWD 80.32.   
¶60 The physician surveys used for these updates asked 
physicians to comment about the effect on the condition of 
various parts of the body for a variety of injuries and repairs.  
The results from the 1993 survey were tabulated by four 
administrative law judges and a worker's compensation assistant, 
Margaret O'Connell.  They chose the values for some subsections 
of § DWD 80.32 due to the "substantial agreement among the 
doctors" and in other areas where there was "such substantial 
disagreement" they made no recommendation.  Margaret O'Connell 
March 16, 1993 Memorandum to Worker's Compensation Advisory 
Council 
Sub-Committee 
Members 
(hereinafter 
"O'Connell 
Memorandum").  In regard to permanent disability of the leg at 
the knee, O'Connell related: 
B1 & 2.  We believe 102.32(4) should be amended 
to show that the 5 percent minimum for removal of 
semi-lunar cartilage applies to all procedures open or 
closed, total or partial since there has been an 
interference with the anatomical structure of the 
knee.  The Department has attempted to interpret the 
current rule in this manner but with disputes from 
carriers and increases in litigation which would be 
avoided with amendment. 
B3.  We would give anterior cruciate ligament 
repairs a 10 percent minimum to be graded upward with 
symptoms.   
Id., p. 2. 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶61 The "Analysis of Proposed Rules" that was used for the 
creation of current Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32 explains: 
1. 
The conditions described in the rule cause 
permanent disability.  By creating standards for 
evaluation the rule assures uniform payments for the 
same disabling conditions.  . . . 
. . .  
3. 
A minimum 5% permanent disability rating for 
removal of semi-lunar cartilage in the knee shall 
apply to all procedures.  Physicians responding to the 
survey indicated that regardless of the type of 
surgical procedure performed there is a change in the 
anatomical structure of the knee justifying a 5% 
permanent disability rating for any procedure used.  
. . .  
4. 
The rule pertaining to the knee is amended 
to include a minimum permanent disability rating for 
surgical repair to the anterior cruciate ligament.  
The physicians responding to the survey felt that a 
10% disability rating is appropriate because there has 
been an interference with the anatomical structure of 
the knee following the surgical repair. 
Analysis of Proposed Rules, Rule No. Ind 80.32, Hearing Draft of 
Proposed Rules, DILHR, ii-iii (hereinafter "Analysis of Proposed 
Rules").  The "all procedures" addressed in paragraph 3 of the 
Analysis of Proposed Rules refers to whether the surgical 
procedure performed to repair a knee injury was a closed 
procedure8 or an open procedure.  See O'Connell Memorandum, p. 2.  
Nothing in the Analysis of Proposed Rules implies that each time 
a repair is attempted for a single knee injury, the evaluating 
physician is to increase the percentage of disability. 
¶62 In contrast, the Analysis of Proposed Rules could be 
read to suggest that when a back injury leads to a permanent 
                                                 
8 Closed surgery of the knee is done by arthroscopy. 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
12 
 
disability each surgical procedure is to be awarded additional 
percentages of disability. 
8. 
The rule pertaining to minimal permanent 
disability for the back is amended to clarify the 
permanent disability due for surgical procedures.  A 
minimum 5% allowance will be given for every surgical 
procedure which is performed to relieve an individual 
from the effects of a disc lesion or spinal cord 
pressure. 
Analysis of Proposed Rules, iii (emphasis added).  A disability 
of the back, an unscheduled disability, was the only disability 
amendment made in the 1993-94 amendments that suggested a 
minimum disability allocation for "every surgical procedure 
which is performed," without regard to the disability that 
actually resulted.  This difference is consistent with the 
comment 
of 
the 
Advisory 
Council 
that 
is 
shown 
at 
the 
subcommittee note for § DWD 80.32(11).  
¶63 I could not find any explanation from the Advisory 
Council for the difference in treatment of a back disability as 
compared with the scheduled permanent disabilities that are also 
listed in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32.  However, because a back 
disability is an unscheduled permanent disability, and as such 
it is not eligible for benefits absent proof of its effect on a 
claimant's earning capacity, Pfister, 86 Wis. 2d at 528, it is 
probable that the Advisory Council wanted to give physicians 
some assistance in tying the unscheduled permanent disability to 
loss of earning capacity.   
¶64 However, whatever the Advisory Council's motivation, 
§ DWD 80.32 was created to be, and remains, only a guideline 
that physicians who evaluate worker's compensation injuries are 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
13 
 
to consult.  In addition, as we have explained, "LIRC cannot 
reject a medical opinion unless there is something in the record 
to support its rejection."  Leist, 183 Wis. 2d at 460 (citing 
Erickson v. DILHR, 49 Wis. 2d 114, 181 N.W.2d 495 (1970)).  
Therefore, absent a concession by the employer, the values in 
§ DWD 80.32 cannot override a physician's credible opinion based 
on 
his 
individualized 
evaluation 
of 
the 
worker's 
actual 
disability that resulted from a workplace injury.  Id. at 459.  
Here, Dr. Ansari, May's treating physician, gave his medical 
opinion that May's permanent partial disability had not changed 
as a result of the second surgery.  He said that May continued 
to have a 10 percent permanent partial disability due to the 
injury to his torn anterior cruciate ligament.9  
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) 
¶65 The parties take differing views of the impact of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.18(1)(d) 
on 
the 
outcome 
of 
this 
case.  
DaimlerChrysler contends that the LIRC erred by stacking two 
minimum percentages from the administrative guidelines contained 
in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.32, to accord May a 20 percent 
permanent partial disability.  DaimlerChrysler contends that 
because the sole expert opinion in evidence opines that May has 
                                                 
9 Dr. Ansari opined that May initially had a 15 percent 
disability of his left leg, due to two distinct injuries to 
which Dr. Ansari attributed differing percentages of permanent 
partial disability.  Dr. Ansari opined that May had a 5 percent 
disability caused by a torn meniscus and a 10 percent disability 
caused by a torn anterior cruciate ligament.  May was paid for 
both permanent partial disabilities before the second surgery 
was performed on his anterior cruciate ligament.  The 5 percent 
permanent partial disability from the torn meniscus was not a 
subject of this appeal.   
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
14 
 
only a 10 percent permanent partial disability of his left leg 
at the knee, the LIRC's award contradicts § 102.18(1)(d).  The 
LIRC and May contend that § 102.18(1)(d) does not preclude the 
LIRC's decision that May sustained a 20 percent permanent 
partial disability. 
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.18(1)(d) states in relevant 
part: 
Any award which falls within a range of 5% of the 
highest or lowest estimate of permanent partial 
disability made by a practitioner which is in evidence 
is presumed to be a reasonable award, provided it is 
not higher than the highest or lower than the lowest 
estimate in evidence.  
I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.18(1)(d) sets a range within which an award will be 
presumed to be a reasonable award.  Majority op., ¶3.  However, 
that conclusion determines only that there is no presumption of 
reasonableness for the 20 percent award the LIRC made because it 
is more than 5 percent higher than the highest physician's 
opinion in evidence. 
¶67 The majority opinion does not answer the question 
presented here:  Whether the LIRC erred in awarding benefits 
that are more than 5 percent higher than the highest medical 
opinion in evidence based on nothing except its interpretation 
of the guidelines for physician evaluations contained in Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
80.32(4), 
in 
the 
face 
of 
contrary, 
uncontradicted, credible medical testimony.  I conclude that the 
LIRC erred because Dr. Ansari's opinion is uncontradicted, and 
it does not lack credibility.  Leist, 183 Wis. 2d at 459.  As I 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
15 
 
explained above, May has been Dr. Ansari's patient for many 
years.  May repeatedly has been seen and evaluated by Dr. 
Ansari.  Furthermore, the LIRC gave no reason why Dr. Ansari's 
opinion was insufficient to establish the existence and the 
extent of May's permanent partial disability.    
¶68 By way of analogy, if May had incurred a second 
disability, for example from an injury to his back, he would 
have been required to provide proof of the existence and 
permanency of each injury, in order to receive a second 
permanent partial disability award.  Wis. Stat. § 102.175; see 
Vande Zande, 70 Wis. 2d at 1093.  In a like manner, because May 
had only one injury that resulted in a permanent disability, in 
order to receive a second payment for the functional disability 
of his left leg at the knee, he must provide proof that his knee 
has deteriorated further than the 10 percent disability for 
which he has already been paid. 
¶69 The majority opinion never acknowledges that the cause 
and the extent of a disability under worker's compensation law 
are questions of fact that require substantial and credible 
evidence to support them.  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).  Instead, it 
repeatedly discusses the standard of review for statutory 
interpretation, a question of law that has limited application 
here.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶10–20.  It also attempts to 
skirt the problem posed by uncontradicted, credible medical 
testimony that is contrary to the LIRC's factual finding by 
focusing on generalized policy statements about making an 
injured worker whole.  Majority op., ¶32 n.14.  The majority 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
16 
 
opinion reasons that it should sustain the LIRC's findings 
because, "The LIRC's decision recognizes that repeat or multiple 
surgeries have a cumulative, negative effect on function of the 
body part upon which they are performed."  Id.  While I do not 
contest that repeating medical procedures could increase the 
disability that those procedures were undertaken to remedy, in 
this case, there is uncontradicted, credible, medical testimony 
that May's disability did not increase subsequent to the second 
surgery.  In my view, when the LIRC ignores that testimony, it 
makes a finding about the extent of May's injury that is not 
supported by credible and substantial evidence as Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(6) requires; accordingly, the LIRC's factual finding 
should be set aside.  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).   
¶70 And finally, the LIRC has been inconsistent in its 
evaluation of knee injuries.  In King v. DOT, WC Claim Nos. 
2001-007515 and 2003-012619 (April 27, 2005), the LIRC reduced 
the extent of King's permanent partial disability attributed to 
a second workplace injury due to an earlier permanent partial 
disability finding for the same knee.  This demonstrates that 
permanent partial disability of the knee has not been expanded 
procedure 
by 
procedure 
in 
other 
decisions 
by 
the 
LIRC.  
Similarly, in Hall v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., WC Claim No. 2001-
037678 (April 15, 2004), the claimant had two knee surgeries 
after she injured her knee on January 6, 2000.  She had a total 
knee replacement on March 6, 2001 and a repeat surgery done on 
April 18, 2001.  The minimum for knee replacement is 50 percent 
permanent partial disability, but her surgeon opined that a 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
17 
 
greater level of disability was present because of a loss of 
range of motion.  He assigned 60 percent permanent partial 
disability.  The employer argued that the extent of the 
disability should be reduced because the claimant had undergone 
arthroscopic surgery in 1997.  In refusing that request, the 
LIRC said that there had been no work restrictions following the 
1997 surgery and no permanent disability rating was assessed in 
1997.  However, the LIRC also did not make any allocation of 
permanent partial disability due to the April 18, 2001 repeat 
surgery.  Instead, it relied on the opinion of her surgeon when 
setting the extent of her disability.  Hall is consistent with 
the position of this dissent:  it is the physician's opinion 
about the condition of the knee that drives the extent of the 
permanent partial disability rating that is assigned, unless the 
employer simply concedes to accept the minimum set in Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.32(4). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶71 Because proof of the existence and the extent of a 
functional disability are factual issues to be determined when a 
scheduled 
permanent 
disability is under consideration and 
because 
the 
LIRC's 
factual 
determination 
is 
contrary 
to 
uncontradicted, credible medical evidence that the extent of 
May's scheduled permanent disability is 10 percent, the LIRC's 
decision is not supported by credible and substantial evidence 
and therefore is erroneous.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
18 
 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this opinion. 
 
No.  2005AP544.pdr 
 
 
 
1