Case Title: JOYNER, v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-87

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOYNER, v. STATE2002 WY 17458 P.3d 331Case Number: 01-87Decided: 11/27/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

 

STEVEN 
JOYNER,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Public 
Defender.  Argument by Mr. Roden.

 
   

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Faculty 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Tari L. Elam, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. Elam.

 
   

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
     

LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Steven Joyner 
(Joyner) appeals from a conviction of felony stalking in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-506 (LexisNexis 2001).  
Joyner pled guilty, but utilized W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) to reserve his right 
to appeal the district court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss.  Joyner contends that the criminal case 
should have been dismissed because the order of protection he was accused of 
violating was entered without affording him an adequate opportunity to appear 
and be heard.  We reverse and 
remand.

 
   

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Joyner advances three 
issues on appeal:

 
  
   

I.  Did 
the trial court err in denying appellant's motion to 
dismiss?

II.  Was 
appellant denied his right to be present at a critical stage of the 
proceedings?

III.  Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial 
misconduct when he knowingly prosecuted appellant for violation of an invalid 
order?

 
 
         
      

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On March 30, 
2000, Joyner went to the United Medical Center (UMC) in Cheyenne seeking 
adjustment to his epilepsy medication.  
For reasons not explained in the record, UMC detained Joyner, and 
proceedings were commenced for his involuntary hospitalization under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 25-10-101 through 25-10-305 (LexisNexis 2001).  UMC detained Joyner for five days, 
during which time he was not allowed to leave and had no access to mail or a 
telephone.  UMC released Joyner on 
April 4, 2000, after a district court commissioner found that he was not 
mentally ill.  

 

[¶4]      Joyner is 
divorced from Vickie Hitt (Hitt).  
On March 31, 2000, Hitt obtained from the Circuit Court of the Eighth 
Judicial District, Goshen County, in Torrington an Ex Parte Order of 
Protection against Joyner.  This 
temporary order and a summons were served on Joyner, "personally and in person," 
at UMC on the same date.  At the 
time of service, Joyner was in a room with a nurse and a guard.  The deputy sheriff laid the papers on 
the table and told Joyner it was a summons for him to appear in court.  Joyner read the first paragraph of the 
summons, which indicated the date, time, and location of a court hearing.  The nurse then escorted Joyner from the 
room and told him not to worry, that the matter would be taken care of.  Joyner did not know the papers contained an order of protection, and he 
was never given an opportunity to read the papers, but he did observe that the 
court hearing was set in Torrington.

 
       
              
             

[¶5]      On April 3, 2000, 
while Joyner was still at UMC, the Goshen County Circuit Court held the hearing 
noticed in the summons.1  Joyner, of course, was unable to 
attend.2  That same evening, while still at UMC, 
Joyner was served "personally and in person" with a copy of the Order of 
Protection issued as a result of that hearing.  The nurse took the papers without giving 
Joyner a chance to read them.  

 

[¶6]      After he was 
released from UMC, Joyner made no attempt to contact the Goshen County Circuit 
Court about the papers with which he had been served.  Between May 1 and May 5, 2000, nearly a month 
after Joyner's release from UMC, Joyner engaged in a course of conduct that 
resulted in his being charged with stalking his ex-wife.

 
         
             
          

[¶7]      Joyner's claims 
of error in this case contain both issues of fact and of law.  As we have stated numerous times, the 
district court's factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard.  However, constitutional 
issues are questions of law that we review de novo.  Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 19 
(Wyo. 2000); see also Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶14, 38 P.3d 1069, ¶14 
(Wyo. 2002).  

DISCUSSION

 

Denial of the Motion to Dismiss

 
 
    

[¶8]      Joyner based his 
motion to dismiss on a challenge to the validity of the Order of Protection 
given his inability to attend and be heard on the matter.  Due process requires the State to "prove 
every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt."  Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222, 
1224 (Wyo. 1983)  (citing 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 2453, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 43 (1979)).  The criminal 
offense charged here is stalking under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (LexisNexis 
2001).  Generally, stalking is a 
misdemeanor.3  If, however, the offense is committed in 
violation of an order of protection, the offense becomes a felony punishable by 
up to ten years in prison.4  Implicit in this version of felony 
stalking is the requirement that the order of protection be 
valid at the time of the alleged stalking.  It is clear, following hearing, that the 
State cannot prove the order of protection was valid.  

 

[¶9]      Both the United 
States and Wyoming constitutions provide that no person may be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 6.  To be 
constitutionally valid, the court issuing the order must have acted in a manner 
consistent with due process.  Due 
process requires that the litigants be afforded both notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  Murray 
v. Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 608 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Sandstrom v. 
Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994)).  
  

[¶10]   As stated in the facts, Joyner was 
involuntarily detained in a psychiatric ward at UMC, apparently pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 25-10-109 (LexisNexis 2001).  
UMC placed Joyner in a "lock down" facility from which he could not 
leave.  UMC deprived Joyner access 
to a telephone and the mails.  
Importantly, at hearing, the prosecutor conceded that UMC acted as an arm 
of the State in detaining Joyner.  
While UMC detained Joyner, Joyner's ex-wife filed a petition in Goshen 
County Circuit Court requesting a Stalking Order of Protection, and the circuit 
court issued an Ex Parte Order of Protection.  That same day, a Laramie County 
sheriff's officer served Joyner at UMC with the petition, the Ex parte 
Order of Protection, and a summons to appear for a hearing.  Joyner was never given an opportunity to 
read the papers.  On April 3, 2000, 
while Joyner was still in "lock down," the order of protection was entered.  UMC discharged Joyner on April 4, 2000, 
pursuant to an order from a Laramie County District Court Commissioner.  

 

[¶11]   Although the circuit court, by 
virtue of service, had personal jurisdiction over Joyner at the time it entered 
the order of protection, that fact, by itself, does not resolve the question of 
whether Joyner was afforded due process of law.  The evidence recited above establishes 
that the order of protection was entered without affording Joyner a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard thus depriving Joyner due process of law.   

 

[¶12]   We find persuasive the four cases 
trial counsel for Joyner cited to support his contention that he was not 
afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  A review of those cases reveals, 
generally, that incarcerated parties are not afforded due process when they are 
not permitted to participate in hearings.  
RPM v. State, Dep't of Family Servs., Div. of Public Assistance & 
Social Servs., 917 P.2d 169, 170-71 (Wyo. 1996); Tageant v. Tageant, 
909 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 1996); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 47-48 (Wyo. 
1995); and Murray v. Murray, 894 P.2d  at 608.  In those cases, the incarcerated party 
at least had an opportunity to make a request to participate.  Here, Joyner did not have the 
opportunity to make such a request.  
The holdings in those cases apply with even greater force where it is 
clear that Joyner, as a result of state action, had no opportunity to even make 
a request to participate.  On these 
facts, we conclude Joyner was deprived of due process of law, and the protection 
order was thus not valid at the time of the alleged stalking.  

 

[¶13]   In an argument made for the first 
time on appeal, the State contends that Joyner's attack on the validity of the 
order of protection issued by the Goshen County Circuit Court is a collateral 
attack upon the order.  This court 
has consistently held that it "will not consider issues which are raised for the 
first time on appeal unless they are jurisdictional issues or issues of such a 
fundamental nature that they must be considered."  Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2000); WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998).  The 
collateral attack issue is not one concerning jurisdiction, and it cannot be 
considered by this court based on that exception to the general rule.  Whether the collateral attack issue is 
"fundamental" we do not decide today.  
However, it is appropriate for us to address issues that are bound to 
emerge again if left unresolved.  
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1167 
(Wyo. 1982); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980).   Because we believe the collateral 
attack principles are misplaced and misapplied in this instance, we will comment 
on them.  

 

[¶14]     Collateral attack principles apply where 
a party is seeking to attack or "undo" a prior court order.  Here, Joyner did not seek to undo the 
order of protection; he sought to preclude the order from being used in a later 
prosecution.  A similar collateral 
attack argument was swiftly rejected in the Washington case of State v. 
Marking, 997 P.2d 461, 463 (Wash.App. 2000) review denied 11 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2000), where the court wrote:

 
  
     

Because 
Marking did not challenge the no-contact order when the district court issued 
it, the State argues that his objection to it now is an improper collateral 
attack.  We 
disagree.

The 
validity of a protective order is an implicit element of the crime of violation 
of such order.  See City of 
Seattle v. Edwards, 87 Wash. App. 305, 308, 941 P.2d 697 (1997) (discussing 
protective order issued pursuant to RCW 26.50.060 (2)). Notwithstanding 
Marking's failure to challenge the order in district court, the State bore the 
burden at trial of proving the validity of the order beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Edwards, 87 Wash. App.  at 308, 941 P.2d 697.

 Thus, the determinative issue here is not 
the validity of the order per se, but rather whether the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the order was valid.  
Edwards, 87 Wash. App.  at 307-309, 941 P.2d 697.

 

See 
also 
State v. Schultz, 25 P.3d 436, 438 (Wash.App. 2001).  

 

[¶15]   In addition to the well-reasoned 
discussion above, we emphasize that Joyner did not seek to challenge or undo the 
protective order itself.  Instead, 
he simply sought to prevent the use of the protection order in support of the 
felony prosecution.  This he can 
do.  In different circumstances, 
several Wyoming cases exemplify that a defendant can challenge the use of a 
prior order or conviction in later proceedings.  See Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 1998) ("We hold that Brisson should have been provided 
counsel for his first conviction and that his uncounseled conviction cannot be 
used to enhance his current charge to a felony."); Gunderson v. State, 
925 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo. 1996) ("Appellant argues that, although the Nebraska 
and South Dakota convictions were classified as felonies in those states, they 
would have been punished as misdemeanors in Wyoming.  He contends, therefore, that the 
convictions should not have been used to enhance his punishment under the 
habitual criminal statute."); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1180 
(Wyo. 1992) ("Appellant attacks collaterally his prior convictions used for 
enhancement.  He does not deny 
having been convicted of the crimes.  
He asserts, however, that two of the prior convictions were defective and 
should not have been used against him in this enhancement proceeding.").  

 

[¶16]   Even if Joyner's attack on the 
order of protection can be considered a collateral attack, those principles are 
misapplied in this case.   As a 
general rule, collateral attacks on judgments are not allowed.  This general rule, and an exception to 
it, are well stated in 50 C.J.S. Judgment § 499 
(1997):

 
  

            
 Generally, a judgment 
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, 
unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not open to 
contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its validity, verity, or binding 
effect, by parties or privies, in any collateral action or proceeding.  Even if the judgment is voidable, that 
is, so irregular or defective that it would be set aside or annulled on a proper 
direct application for that purpose, it is well settled as a general rule that 
it is not subject to collateral impeachment as long as it stands unreversed and 
in force.

            
However, under an exception to the general rule, a judgment is subject to 
collateral attack if it is void.  
Thus, a judgment which is absolutely void is 
entitled to no authority or respect, and therefore may be impeached at any time, 
in any proceeding in which it is sought to be enforced or in which its validity 
is questioned, by anyone with whose rights or interests it conflicts.

 
             
              
               
      

(Footnotes 
omitted.)  A judgment obtained in 
violation of due process is void.  
Matter of Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Wyo. 1998); 
Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1989).  Thus, such a judgment may be 
collaterally attacked.

  

[¶17]   To avoid confusion, we seek to 
clarify the extent of this opinion.  
Respect for the law and the finality of judgments are valued principles 
of this court.  Nothing in this 
opinion should be construed as disregard for that principle.  The presumption of validity still 
attaches to prior orders.  
Accordingly, the State does not have the initial burden of proof related 
to the validity of the protection order.  
This initial burden of production is placed 
on the defendant.

 
         

[¶18]   Our previous discussions of the 
"burden of proof" have shown that the phrase "burden of proof" encompasses two 
distinct legal doctrines:  the 
burden of persuasion and the burden of production.  Bando v. Clure Bros. 
Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 330 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Casper Iron & 
Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n of Dep't of Employment, 845 P.2d 387, 393 (Wyo. 1993).  In 
Bando we further explained the two legal doctrines as 
follows:

 
         

The 
burden of persuasion, which normally becomes operative only after all the 
evidence is submitted, attaches to the party that runs the risk of 
nonpersuasion.  This means if the 
party with the burden of persuasion has not sustained his burden, that party 
must fail.  The related term, burden 
of production, is also known as the burden of producing evidence or going 
forward with the evidence.  The 
burden involves the obligation of a party to present, at the appropriate time, 
evidence of sufficient substance on the issue involved to permit the fact finder 
to act upon it.  Unlike the burden 
of persuasion, the burden of production shifts during the presentation of 
evidence.    

   

Id. (citation omitted).

 
 
 

[¶19]   With these principles in mind, we 
hold that the following procedure should apply when a defendant attacks the 
validity of the protection order.  
The defendant has the burden of production for making a prima facie 
showing that the order of protection was entered in violation of his 
constitutional rights.  Should the 
defendant meet this burden of production, then the burden shifts and the 
prosecution must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the order was 
constitutionally obtained.5  The trial court should determine such 
questions of law at a pretrial hearing.      

 

[¶20]   The procedure outlined above is 
similar to the procedure for prior criminal convictions that become the basis 
for later habitual criminal status under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 
2001).  In those 
proceedings the following rules apply to the burden of production:

 
    
       

            
In Evans [v. State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982)], we 
indicated that a defendant has the burden of proof when asserting an affirmative 
defense (such as invalidity of an underlying conviction) in an habitual criminal 
proceeding.  Evans, at 
1222.  Since then, we have refined 
our burden of proof standard in the context of a conviction of an habitual 
traffic offender.  In City of 
Laramie v. Cowden, 777 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Wyo. 1989), we stated that the 
defendant mounting a constitutional challenge to an underlying conviction in an 
habitual traffic offender proceeding must make a prima facie showing that one or 
more of his underlying convictions was not obtained in accordance with his 
constitutional rights.  Once the 
defendant makes this showing, the prosecution has the burden of establishing, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the conviction was constitutionally 
obtained.[6]  We now hold this same standard applies to 
proceedings under the habitual criminal statute.

 
       
      

Johnston 
v. State, 
829 P.2d 1179, 1180-81 (Wyo. 1992).  

 

[¶21]   Upon an examination of the facts, 
we see that the above-mentioned process is essentially what happened in this 
case.  Joyner mounted a 
constitutional challenge to the underlying protection order, and the State was 
unable to prove the validity of that order beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Joyner's motion to 
dismiss.

 
      
    

[¶22]   Given this resolution, there is no need 
to address Joyner's remaining issues.

 
      
     

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   We conclude that the district court 
erred in denying Joyner's motion to dismiss.  We, therefore, reverse and remand this matter 
to the district court with instruction to (1) allow Joyner to withdraw his 
conditional guilty plea; (2) dismiss the felony information; and 
(3) remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings on the 
misdemeanor stalking charge.

 
      
           
         
            
   

FOOTNOTES

  1The purpose of the hearing was to 
determine whether the ex parte order should be extended for the three 
months allowed by statute and to establish the terms of any order so 
extended.  See Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 7-3-508 through 7-3-510 (LexisNexis 2001).

  2The parties stipulated at the 
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss that the Goshen County Circuit Court Judge was 
aware during the April 3 hearing that Joyner was being involuntarily detained at 
UMC in Cheyenne. 

   3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) 
states:

Unless 
otherwise provided by law, a person commits the crime of stalking if, with 
intent to harass another person, the person engages in a course of conduct 
reasonably likely to harass that person, including but not limited to any 
combination of the following . . . .

   4Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(e) 
states:

A 
person convicted of stalking under subsection (b) of this section is guilty of 
felony stalking punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, 
if:

                                    
* * *

(iv)        The 
defendant committed the offense of stalking in violation of a temporary or 
permanent order of protection issued pursuant to W.S. 7-3-508 or 509, or 
pursuant to a substantially similar law of another 
jurisdiction.

5As 
applied to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(e)(iv), this court has never decided 
whether the violation of such order is a sentencing enhancement provision or an 
element of the offense.  It looks to 
be an element of the offense.  
However, even if it is merely a sentencing enhancement provision, the 
State still bore the burden to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.  Besides the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.    Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).   As a protection order is not a 
prior conviction, we impose a reasonable doubt standard rather than the 
preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to prior criminal convictions 
that become the basis for later habitual criminal status.  

6Lest 
there be any confusion, as noted above, the State must establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the order of protection is valid.