Case Title: State v. Hoer

Citation: 231 Neb. 336, 436 N.W.2d 179

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
436 N.W.2d 179 (1989) 231 Neb. 336 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Christopher J. HOER, Appellant. No. 88-469. Supreme Court of Nebraska. February 24, 1989. Stephen C. Hansen, of Luckey, Sipple, Hansen, Emerson & Schumacher, Columbus, for appellant. Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen., and Kenneth W. Payne, Alliance, for appellee. BOSLAUGH, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ., and CARLSON, District Judge. *180 SHANAHAN, Justice. As the result of a bench trial, Christopher J. Hoer was convicted of possessing a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-416(3) (Cum.Supp.1986). In his motion to suppress physical evidence, see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-822 (Reissue 1985), Hoer claimed that methamphetamine obtained in a warrantless search of his automobile was inadmissible as the product of an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution. The court overruled Hoer's suppression motion and, over Hoer's objection at trial, admitted the methamphetamine into evidence, which resulted in Hoer's conviction. State v. Abdouch, 230 Neb. 929, 930, 434 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1989). Deputy R.D. Mayer of the Platte County Sheriff's Department stopped a car for speeding and running a stop sign. Christopher Hoer was the car's driver and only occupant. On arrival at the driver's door of Hoer's car, where Hoer was seated behind the wheel, Mayer smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from inside the vehicle and also detected the odor of alcohol on Hoer's breath. Mayer asked for Hoer's license to operate a motor vehicle and the vehicle's registration. Hoer's license showed that he was under 21 years of age. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 53-180.02 (Reissue 1988) prohibits a minor, that is, anyone under the age of 21 years, from possessing or physically controlling any alcoholic liquor inside a vehicle on a public street, alley, road, or highway. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 53-103(23) (Reissue 1988) (a minor is any person under 21 years of age). Mayer then asked Hoer to perform field sobriety tests, including a balance test, and administered a preliminary breath test to Hoer. The tests indicated that Hoer was intoxicated. Mayer arrested Hoer for drunk driving and told him the consequences of refusing to give a blood or breath sample under the implied consent law. According to Mayer, Hoer displayed "mood swings," alternating between hostility and cooperativeness. Although Hoer agreed to supply a sample of his blood for testing, he "appeared to be nervous" and asked Mayer whether the blood test was limited to a disclosure of alcohol only. In that setting, Mayer concluded that Hoer "had ingested something into his body other than alcohol that he didn't want his blood to be screened for." After Hoer's arrest, Mayer searched Hoer's car and looked primarily for alcohol, but also for "other contraband." Under the driver's seat, Mayer found a partially consumed bottle of wine, a "750 milliliter bottle of MD 20/20 wine that contains a clear plastic straw." Under the front passenger's seat, Mayer discovered a cardboard box, 6½ by 4 by 1½ inches, held together with black electrical tape. Mayer opened the cardboard box because it might contain a relatively small container of alcohol, or, in Mayer's words: Inside the box, Mayer, who had law enforcement training in identifying controlled substances, found a plastic packet containing a white powder, which he believed to be a controlled substance and which was later tested and determined to be methamphetamine. Hoer contends the methamphetamine, found inside the cardboard box, was constitutionally inadmissible evidence obtained through an unreasonable search of his automobile. The Supreme Court, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), held that, when police officers have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, a vehicular search by officers without a warrant is reasonable under the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In Carroll, the Court found that officers had probable cause to search a car for alcohol and, therefore, justification for ripping the car's upholstery to locate concealed whiskey. The Court in Carroll observed: 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S. Ct. at 288. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), police officers, with probable cause to search an automobile for narcotics, searched inside a brown paper bag and a zippered red leather pouch found in the automobile's trunk. With the background of Carroll, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of probable cause which justified a warrantless vehicle search: 456 U.S. at 808-09, 102 S. Ct. at 2164-65. Referring to Carroll, the Court in Ross noted: .... In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sustained warrantless searches of containers found during a lawful search of an automobile. In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S. Ct. 240, 75 L. Ed. 629 (1931), the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of *182 whiskey found during a search of an automobile, some of which was discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other goods. In Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S. Ct. 174, 83 L. Ed. 151 (1938), federal officers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a warrant. 456 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S. Ct. at 2169-70. The Ross Court continued: 456 U.S. at 820, 102 S. Ct. at 2170. In reaffirming the constitutional validity of a vehicular search such as that considered in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the Supreme Court in Ross concluded: United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172-73, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). Finally, the Court in United States v. Ross held: 456 U.S. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173. This court has previously relied on the vehicle exception to a search warrant requirement, exemplified by Ross, in upholding searches of containers found during a probable cause search of a vehicle. In State v. McGuire, 218 Neb. 511, 357 N.W.2d 192 (1984), the search of luggage inside an automobile's trunk was reasonable when the searching police officer had probable cause to search the car for a .45 automatic reportedly carried by the defendant. In State v. Hansen, 221 Neb. 103, 375 N.W.2d 605 (1985), the search of the defendant's purse found inside her car was reasonable when the searching officer had probable cause to search the car for a *183 controlled substance "which could have been secreted in a small container...." 221 Neb. at 109, 375 N.W.2d at 610. If a reasonable person, viewing all the objective circumstances encountered by a law enforcement officer and considering the officer's possession of reasonably trustworthy information, would believe that a vehicle likely contained contraband or other evidence of criminal activity, a law enforcement officer has probable cause to search the vehicle notwithstanding the absence of a search warrant. State v. Aden, 196 Neb. 149, 241 N.W.2d 669 (1976); United States v. Ross, supra; Carroll v. United States, supra. The scope of a warrantless search of a vehicle, as in a search pursuant to a warrant, United States v. Ross, supra 456 U.S. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2172. We need not decide whether Deputy Mayer had probable cause to search Hoer's car and the cardboard box found inside the car in an effort to locate some unspecified controlled substance, because we find that Mayer's discovery of the methamphetamine was the result of a probable cause search for alcohol in Hoer's automobile. Mayer smelled alcohol coming from Hoer's automobile and breath, saw Hoer fail the field sobriety tests, witnessed Hoer's failure of the preliminary breath test, and knew from the displayed operator's license that Hoer was underage for possession of alcohol. Given these facts, a reasonable person would conclude that a search of the automobile would likely reveal alcohol possessed by a minor in violation of § 53-180.02. Therefore, Mayer had probable cause to search for alcohol in the automobile operated by Hoer, who was a minor. Cf., State v. Peterson, 407 N.W.2d 221 (S.D.1987) (odor of alcohol from car and driver gave probable cause to search for violations of "open container" law); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1983) (odor of alcohol from car gave probable cause to search for violations of "open container" law). With probable cause to search for alcohol in Hoer's automobile, Mayer was authorized to search inside the car for anything which might serve as an alcohol container, including the cardboard box found under the front passenger's seat inasmuch as the cardboard box was capable of concealing a small bottle or container of alcohol. United States v. Ross, supra. The controlled substance inside the box was properly seized under the "plain view" doctrine. In State v. Haselhorst, 218 Neb. 233, 353 N.W.2d 7 (1984), we listed three requirements which must be met to uphold a warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: Haselhorst, supra at 236, 353 N.W.2d at 10. See, also, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983). In Hoer's case, Mayer's seizure of methamphetamine met all the requirements for application of the plain view doctrine. First, the methamphetamine was discovered in a place where Mayer was lawfully conducting a search, namely, a box that may have concealed a container of alcohol *184 inside Hoer's automobile. Second, although Mayer suspected that the box might contain an undetermined controlled substance, Mayer's search of the box was not a pretensed search for alcohol to cover an actual search for a controlled substance. Mayer was searching the car for alcohol and found the box which may have contained alcohol. Consequently, Mayer's discovery of the methamphetamine was inadvertent. Third, it was immediately apparent to Mayer that the white powder, encased in plastic, was probably a controlled substance. The seizure of the methamphetamine in Hoer's car was constitutional. The methamphetamine was inadvertently discovered during a lawful warrantless vehicle search based on probable cause that Hoer, an intoxicated motorist and a minor, had alcohol in his automobile. Therefore, the trial court properly overruled Hoer's motion to suppress the methamphetamine obtained through a valid search of Hoer's automobile. The methamphetamine, as physical evidence taken from Hoer's automobile, was constitutionally admissible in Hoer's trial. AFFIRMED.