Case Title: State v. White

Citation: 

Docket Number: S53087

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: November 9, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
NATHANIEL DALE WHITE,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CR0001843; CA A114793; SC S53087)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 6, 2006.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Anne Fujita Munsey, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director,
and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer and Kistler, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Alan R. Jack, Judge. 202 Or App 1, 121 P3d 3 (2005). 
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Walters, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal appeal, we are asked to explain the
correct application of ORS 161.067, the so-called anti-merger
statute, in circumstances in which a defendant is charged with
multiple counts of burglary based on the same incident.  The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court misapplied ORS 161.067
when it denied defendant's request to merge two convictions for
first-degree burglary.  State v. White, 202 Or App 1, 121 P3d 3
(2005).  The state contends that the Court of Appeals is wrong
and that the trial court's decision was correct.  As we shall
explain, we agree with the Court of Appeals that only one
judgment of conviction for first-degree burglary should have been
entered.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The relevant facts are as follows.  Defendant and the
victim were romantically involved and shared an apartment until
late August 2000.  At that time, defendant was arrested on
assault charges and spent the next two weeks in custody.  While
defendant was in custody, the victim obtained a restraining order
against him and moved to another apartment.  
At some point thereafter, the victim encountered
defendant as she was leaving her apartment to go to work.  She
retreated into her apartment and locked the door.  After a few
minutes had passed, the victim believed that defendant had left
and opened the door.  Defendant, who had been hiding beside the
door, shoved the door open and pushed the victim back inside. 
Defendant then entered the apartment, covered the victim's mouth
with his hand, and grabbed her throat.  He told her, "These games
will stop" and also told her not to scream.  The victim indicated
that she understood, and defendant then told the victim, "We're
going to close the blinds."  
When defendant let go of the victim to close the blinds
to a window, the victim unlocked and opened the door to the
balcony, ran outside, and started to scream to her neighbors for
help.  Defendant came out after the victim, grabbed her legs, and
tried to pull her back into the apartment.  The victim held onto
the balcony railing and continued screaming.  Neighbors then
observed defendant punching the victim "until she went down on
her side," then "stomping" on the victim's head and body. 
Defendant eventually fled, leaving the victim with a fractured
right wrist, facial fractures, a shoulder injury, broken teeth
and a cut lip.       
Defendant was charged with various crimes, including
two counts of first-degree burglary.  One burglary count alleged
that defendant "did unlawfully and knowingly enter and remain in
a building * * * with the intent to commit the crime of assault
therein."  (Emphasis added.)  The other burglary count charged
that defendant "did unlawfully and knowingly enter and remain in
a building * * * with the intent to commit the crime of menacing
therein."  (Emphasis added.)  After a trial to the bench, the
trial court found defendant guilty of most of the charged crimes,
including the two burglary counts. Defendant then asked the trial
court to merge the two burglary convictions into a single
conviction, arguing that the two counts were not "separately
punishable offenses" under the so-called anti-merger statute, ORS
161.067.  The trial court denied defendant's request, but did
agree to "merge" the two counts "for purposes of
sentencing." (1) 
Defendant appealed that decision, arguing that there
was no basis in the law, and particularly not under ORS 161.067,
for entering anything more than a single first-degree burglary
conviction.  In that regard, defendant noted that the two
burglary counts against him described a single unlawful entry and
a single victim, and both referred to a single statutory
provision, i.e., ORS 164.225 (the statutory definition of
burglary in the first degree).  Defendant argued that, contrary
to the trial court's apparent view, the fact that a person
intends to commit more than one crime against a single victim at
the time that he or she unlawfully enters a building does not
transform that single entry into multiple burglaries.  Thus,
defendant argued, even if he were guilty of unlawfully entering
the victim's apartment with the intent to commit two crimes
(assault and menacing), in the end, he could be convicted of only
a single count of burglary.
Before the Court of Appeals, the state responded by
pointing to State v. Barnum, 333 Or 297, 39 P3d 178 (2002), a
case that similarly involved a single unlawful entry that
resulted in two burglary convictions.  In Barnum, this court held
that the defendant "properly [had been] charged [with] and
convicted of two counts of burglary" because "there was
sufficient evidence that defendant entered or remained unlawfully
with the intent to commit arson and that he entered or remained
unlawfully with the intent to commit theft."  Id. at 302-03.  The
state argued that the foregoing holding in Barnum established
"unequivocally that separate convictions are appropriate when the
entry and remaining are done with intent to commit different
crimes."
In the ensuing decision and opinion in this case, the
Court of Appeals confessed to a certain amount of confusion over
the Barnum case, particularly in light of this court's previous
precedents, including State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 10 P3d 901
(2000).  The Court of Appeals repeated its earlier observation in
State v. Lucio-Camargo, 186 Or App 144, 62 P3d 811 (2003), that 
"'Barnum appears, without explanation, to authorize
multiple convictions and punishments even though the
defendant's conduct violated only one statutory
provision and does not otherwise qualify under
subsections (2) and (3) of ORS 161.067.'"
White, 202 Or App at 12-13 (quoting Lucio-Camargo, 186 Or App at
154). Apparently at a loss as to how to proceed, the Court of
Appeals resorted to the stated policy behind ORS 161.067 -- that
there are only as many separately punishable offenses as there
are separate statutory violations -- and concluded that defendant
could be convicted of only one burglary.  White, 202 Or App at
13.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's
judgment in part and remanded with instructions to enter a single
judgment of conviction for first-degree burglary reflecting that
defendant had been convicted on both of the state's theories,
i.e., unlawful entry with an intent to menace and unlawful entry
with an intent to assault.  Id.
Before this court, the state argues that the trial
court correctly entered two judgments of conviction and that the
Court of Appeals erred in vacating one of those judgments.  The
state contends, as it did below, that Barnum is directly on point 
and controlling, insofar as it holds that the law permits
multiple burglary convictions based on a single unlawful
entry. (2)  Defendant responds that the outcome in Barnum
cannot be reconciled with this court's previous "merger" cases
and that, in any event, Barnum's analytical underpinnings are so
unclear that the Court of Appeals correctly declined to follow
it.
Before we turn to the specifics of the parties'
arguments, we set out the statutes and other background relevant
to those arguments.  We begin with ORS 164.225, the statute that
defines burglary in the first degree.  It provides, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of burglary in the
first degree if the person violates ORS 164.215 and the
building is a dwelling, or if in effecting entry or
while in a building or in immediate flight therefrom
the person:
"* * * * *
"(b) Causes or attempts to cause physical injury
to any person." ORS 164.215, the statute referred to ORS 164.225, provides, in
part:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 164.255,
a person commits the crime of burglary in the second
degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a
building with intent to commit a crime therein." 
Also central to the present controversy is ORS 161.067, the so-called anti-merger statute, which provides, in part: 
"(1) When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each
provision requires proof of an element that the others
do not, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are separate statutory violations. 
"(2) When the same conduct or criminal episode,
though violating only one statutory provision involves
two or more victims, there are as many separately
punishable offenses as there are victims. * * *
"* * * * *
"(3) When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates only one statutory provision and involves only
one victim, but nevertheless involves repeated
violations of the same statutory provision against the
same victim, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are violations, except that each
violation, to be separately punishable under this
subsection, must be separated from other such
violations by a sufficient pause in the defendant's
criminal conduct to afford the defendant an opportunity
to renounce the criminal intent."
This court briefly described the history and purpose of
ORS 161.067 (in the context of its nearly identical precursor,
former ORS 161.062 (1987) (amended by Or Laws 1991, ch 386, § 9;
Or Laws 2003, ch 629, § 4) in State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 770
P2d 600 (1989).  There, we noted that the statute was adopted by
the people in 1986 as part of the "Crime Victims' Bill of Rights"
initiative and it appears to reject earlier decisions of this
court requiring consolidation of multiple convictions and
sentences arising from the same criminal episode.  We concluded
that the provision reflects a legislative intent that "a person
who commits multiple crimes by the same conduct or during the
same criminal episode should have a criminal record reflecting
each crime committed."  Id. at 276-77.  In Crotsley, this court
applied that legislative intent to hold that a defendant who had
forcibly raped a 14-year-old girl was properly convicted of both
first- and third-degree rape because, in a single act, he had
violated both the forcible rape statute, ORS 163.375(1)(a), and a
separate statutory provision, ORS 163.355, pertaining to sexual
intercourse with a person under 16 years of age. (3)  The court
concluded that, in the context of ORS 161.062(1) (almost
identical counterpart of ORS 161.067(1)), the term "two or more
statutory provisions" meant provisions that addressed "separate
and distinct legislative concerns."  Id. at 278.   
On the same day that this court decided Crotsley, it
also decided another merger case, State v. Kizer, 308 Or 238, 779
P2d 604 (1989).  In Kizer, the defendant argued that the trial
court had erred in convicting and sentencing him on two counts of
forgery when he had forged and passed a single check.  The court
held that, although the forgery statute, ORS 165.007,
superficially appeared to contain two separate criminal
prohibitions (against "making" or "uttering" a forged
instrument), the accompanying legislative commentary clearly
revealed a legislative intent to define a single crime. (4)  As
such, the Kizer court concluded, the defendant could not be
convicted of two separate counts of forgery -- one for "making" a
bad check and the other for "uttering" that same check.  Id. at
243-44.  Kizer thus demonstrates that it is necessary to examine
the relevant substantive statute (or statutes) in order to
determine whether the legislature intended that particular
conduct be treated as violating "two or more statutory
provisions" for purposes of ORS 161.067(1).   
Finally, in Barrett, this court considered a
defendant's claim that, even if the state properly had charged
him with three counts of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095, each on
a different theory of aggravation, he could be convicted of only
a single count of that crime when there had been a single murder
victim.  We began by noting that ORS 163.095 sets out a number of
circumstances that transform ordinary murder into aggravated
murder.  After examining that statute, the court concluded that
the legislature did not intend to treat each of the enumerated
aggravating circumstance as a separately punishable crime but,
instead, intended to set out the various theories that could be
used to prove one element ("aggravation") of a single crime,
aggravated murder.  Thus, the court held, the fact 
"[t]hat [the] defendant's conduct in intentionally
murdering the victim * * * was 'aggravated' by 'any,'
i.e., one or more, act surrounding that conduct does
not convert that conduct into more than one separately
punishable offense." 
Barrett, 331 Or at 36.  That is, this court concluded that the
defendant could be convicted of only a single count of aggravated
murder.
The court acknowledged, however, that the fact of
unanimous guilty verdicts on multiple theories of aggravation
should in some fashion be memorialized.  The court explained:
"If the trial court were to enter a conviction on only
one count, and dismiss the other two, it always would
be possible that an appeal would result in a reversal,
for insufficient evidence, of the count that was
selected to serve as the basis for conviction.  With
the other two counts dismissed, defendant would be able
to argue that he was entitled to a judgment of
acquittal on the charge of aggravated murder.  Such an
outcome would be inappropriate, if there were evidence
to sustain defendant's guilt under * * * the other * * * counts."
Id. at 36-37.  Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the
circuit court for resentencing, with instructions to enter a
single judgment of conviction for aggravated murder, which
judgment would enumerate each of the aggravating circumstances
that the jury had found to exist.  Id. at 37. 
That brings us to Barnum.  As noted, Barnum is
factually similar to the present case, in that it also involved
multiple charges of first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225, based on
the same conduct or criminal episode.  In Barnum, the defendant
broke into the victim's home while she was on vacation, stole the
victim's house keys and other items, and set fire to the home. 
Based on that incident, the defendant was charged with, among
other things, two separate counts of first-degree burglary.  The
first count alleged that the defendant had "entered and remained
in the victim's home * * * with the intent to commit arson,"
while the second count alleged that he had "entered and remained
in the victim's home * * * with the intent to commit theft."  333
Or at 300.  After a bench trial, the trial court found the
defendant guilty of both counts.  The defendant moved to merge
the two convictions.  The trial court denied the motion, finding
that the requirements for merger set out at ORS 161.067 had not
been met because there were "'different elements in each
offense'" and a "'sufficient pause between the stealing of the
keys and the setting of the fire to allow a termination of the
criminal conduct.'"  State v. Barnum, 157 Or App 68, 77, 970 P2d
1214 (1998) (quoting trial court's statement).  The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that, given that there had been a
single unlawful entry, the trial court's conclusion that there
were different elements in each burglary offense was erroneous. 
Id. at 78. 
On review, this court affirmed in part and reversed in
part.  The court noted, first, that ORS 164.225(1) provides that
a person commits burglary when he or she "enters or remains
unlawfully" in a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime
therein.  Barnum, 333 Or at 302.  The court then suggested that,
given that the defendant had not challenged his indictment on two
counts of burglary, he properly could be convicted of both counts
as long as the trier of fact found (as it had) that each element
of each count had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  As
authority for that proposition, the court relied upon the passage
from Barrett that we quoted earlier:
"'If the trial court were to enter a conviction on only
one count [of aggravated murder], and dismiss the other
* * *, it always would be possible that an appeal would
result in a reversal, for insufficient evidence, of the
count that was selected to serve as the basis for
conviction.  With the other [count] dismissed,
defendant would be able to argue that he was entitled
to a judgment of acquittal on the [remaining charge].'"
Id. (quoting Barrett, 331 Or at 36-37) (brackets in original).
This court in Barnum then proceeded to a different
question:  "May [the] defendant be punished separately for each
of the two counts?"  Barnum, 333 Or at 302.  The court indicated
that the answer to that question depended on whether the
defendant's two violations of the same statute "were 'repeated
violations * * * separated * * * by a sufficient pause in
defendant's criminal conduct * * *' within the meaning of ORS
161.067(3)."  Id.  Ultimately, the court concluded that the
evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support a
conclusion of repeated violations separated by a sufficient
pause, and that the Court of Appeals had been correct in holding
that the two burglaries could not be separately punished.  Id.
As noted, the parties in the present case disagree
about Barnum's relevance.  According to the state, Barnum
exemplifies the idea, first discussed in Crotsley, 308 Or at 276-77, that ORS 161.067 reflects the legislature's intent that 
"criminal records [should] accurately reflect all
crimes actually committed and that a person who commits
multiple crimes by the same conduct or during the same
criminal episode should have a criminal record
reflecting each crime committed rather than only a
single conviction which would not accurately portray
the nature and extent of that person's conduct."
The state suggests that that broadly stated intent compelled the
first holding in Barnum -- that the defendant there properly had
been convicted of two burglaries -- and that the factual
similarities between Barnum and the present case compel a similar
result here.  However, the state does not explain how the words
of ORS 161.067 relate to that analysis or to its general
contention that a defendant's single unlawful entry properly may
result in the entry of two burglary convictions.  
The state's reticence may arise out of its view that
ORS 161.067 really is directed at a different issue -- whether
multiple convictions arising out of the same conduct or criminal
episode are "separately punishable."  The state argues, in that
regard, that ORS 161.067 functions primarily as a "gatekeeper"
statute, aimed at determining whether multiple convictions are
potentially subject to consecutive sentencing under a different
statute, ORS 137.123.  The state contends that this court took
that view in Barnum.  
Defendant does not deny that the state's theory is
consistent with Barnum.  He contends, however, that, in light of
the words and history of ORS 161.067 and this court's previous
cases interpreting it, the court's holdings in Barnum and,
indeed, the ultimate outcome of Barnum, should not be treated as
controlling.  We agree with that assessment. 
Barnum's problems began, we think, with its failure to
address directly the definition of first-degree burglary in ORS
164.225:  The court assumed, without analysis, that, when the
statute referred to "enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a
building with intent to commit a crime therein," it was
describing two separate statutory violations that could arise out
of a single unlawful entry -- one accomplished by entering the
building with a criminal intent and the other accomplished by
thereafter remaining in the building with a criminal intent. 
Working from that assumption, this court treated the question of
multiple convictions in that case purely as a matter of
sufficiency of the evidence:  The court concluded that, even if
there had been only one entry into the victim's home, the
defendant properly could be convicted of two burglaries -- one
for entering unlawfully and one for remaining unlawfully -- as
long as the evidence was sufficient to support the two
convictions.  Barnum, 333 Or at 302-03. 
By assuming, rather than searching for, the legislative
intent behind the burglary statutes, this court in Barnum short-circuited the process that it discussed and employed in its
earlier cases to determine whether the defendant had violated
"two or more statutory provisions" for purposes of ORS
161.067(1).  In fact, this court's opinion erroneously obscures
the role of ORS 161.067 in deciding questions of "merger" like
the one that was before it in Barnum. (5) 
This court may have compounded the problem in Barnum by
treating the inquiry under ORS 161.067(3) as addressing a
different question from the propriety of multiple burglary
convictions, and in describing that inquiry in terms of "whether
defendant's two violations of the same statute (ORS 164.225) are
separately punishable."  Id. at 303 (emphasis added).  In doing
so, the court incorrectly suggested that ORS 161.067(3) might be
about something other than the number of separately punishable
offenses that a defendant can be adjudged to have committed in a
single episode.  In fact, in the present case, the state assumes
-- apparently based on Barnum -- that ORS 161.067(3) is about the
potential for consecutive sentencing.  
It is not, and this case presents the opportunity to
say so.  For one thing, an entirely different statute -- ORS
137.123 -- is directed explicitly at determining when consecutive
sentences are permitted, a fact that would seem to run counter to
the idea that ORS 161.067(3) also is directed in some fashion to
that issue.  Furthermore, the state's theory would have the term
"separately punishable offense" meaning something different in
subsection (3) of ORS 161.067 than it does in subsection (1). 
However, under our usual rules of construction, and consistent
with the overall structure of the statute, we ordinarily would
assume that the term as it is used in ORS 161.067(3) would carry
the same meaning that it has in ORS 161.067(1).  We see no reason
to depart from the usual rule here.  In Barrett, this court
clearly interpreted that term as it was used in ORS 161.067(1) as
referring only to a conviction entered in the ultimate judgment,
to which some sentence could attach. (6)  We adhere to that
view.  It follows that subsection (3) of the same statute has the
same scope.  Any suggestion to the contrary in Barnum was
unintended and, in any event, is wrong.
Finally, we must acknowledge that the ultimate decision
in Barnum, affirming in part and reversing in part the decision
of the Court of Appeals, may be wrong.  On the one hand, the
relevant holding -- that the defendant properly was "charged and
convicted of two counts of burglary," 333 Or at 303 -- could be
interpreted as referring only to the propriety of two guilty
verdicts.  Such a holding would have been consistent with our
prior merger cases.  However, if the court had intended that
meaning in Barnum, it would have had no reason to reverse any
part of the Court of Appeals decision.  But it did reverse that
court's decision in part, and its decision to do so can only
reasonably be understood as a rejection of the Court of Appeals
holding that the trial court had erred in entering two judgments
of conviction for first-degree burglary.    
In the end, then, we agree with defendant that Barnum
is an anomaly in the body of cases that discuss the proper
application of ORS 161.067 when a defendant is charged with
multiple offenses in connection with the same conduct or criminal
episode.  To the extent that it appears to depart from the cases
that precede it, Barnum should not be followed.
The foregoing discussion brings us back to the present
case and the question that it presents:  When defendant was found
guilty of "entering and remaining unlawfully" with the intent to
menace and also was found guilty of "entering and remaining
unlawfully" with the intent to commit assault, and both guilty
verdicts arose out of the same unlawful entry into the victim's
apartment, does Oregon law permit entry of two separate judgments
of conviction for first-degree burglary?  To answer that
question, we must determine whether the conduct at issue gave
rise to more than one "separately punishable offense" within the
meaning of ORS 161.067.  As described above, that statute
provides that multiple "separately punishable offenses" may arise
out of the same conduct or criminal episode in three
circumstances: (1) when the conduct or criminal episode "violates
two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires
proof of an element that the others do not," ORS 161.067(1); (2)
when the conduct or criminal episode violates only one statutory
provision but involves two or more victims, ORS 161.067(2); and
(3) when the conduct or criminal episode "involves repeated
violations of the same statutory violation against the same
victim" but only if each violation is "separated from other such
violations by a sufficient pause in the defendant's criminal
conduct to afford the defendant an opportunity to renounce the
criminal intent," ORS 161.067(3).  Subsection (2) clearly is
irrelevant to the present case:  There is no claim that
defendant's criminal conduct was directed against more than one
victim.  We need only consider, then, whether defendant committed
two "separately punishable" burglaries under subsections (1) or
(3).
We already have touched briefly upon subsection (1) in
our discussion of Barnum:  We have acknowledged that the court's
mistaken decision in Barnum seemingly arose out of an assumption
that the burglary statute contains two separate "statutory
provisions" within the meaning of ORS 161.067(1) -- one directed
at unlawfully entering a residence with a criminal intent and
another directed at unlawfully remaining in a residence with a
criminal intent.  As we will explain, that assumption does not
survive close examination.    
In Barrett, this court discussed the meaning of the
term "statutory provisions" as it is used in ORS 161.067(1) and
its now-repealed counterpart, former ORS 161.062(1) (1987).  The
court noted that it had interpreted the phrase "'two or more
statutory provisions'" in Crotsley to refer to prohibitions that
"'address separate and distinct legislative concerns.'"  Barrett,
331 Or at 33 (quoting Crotsley, 308 Or at 278).  The court also
noted that, in Kizer, it had explained that the term 
"'was not defined to mean a section, subsection, or
paragraph; consistent with its purpose, the term can be
interpreted to mean any provision defining a "single
crime," whatever visual form the provision is given.'"
Id. (quoting Kizer, 308 Or at 243).  Finally, the court in
Barrett noted that, in Kizer, the question under former ORS
161.062(1) (1987) -- whether the conduct at issue had violated
"two or more statutory provisions" -- was resolved by determining
whether the legislature intended the forgery statute at issue to
define multiple crimes.  Id. at 33-34.  
Barrett thus maps out the proper approach to the
question whether defendant's conduct in the present case violated
"two or more statutory provisions" pertaining to burglary for
purposes of ORS 161.067(1).  It indicates that we must determine
if the legislature intended to define a single crime or two
separate crimes when it enacted the first-degree burglary
statute, and what elements constitute that crime (or crimes).  
To make that determination, we begin with the critical
wording of the general burglary statute that is incorporated by
reference into ORS 164.225: "[A] person commits the crime of
burglary * * * if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a
building with intent to commit a crime therein."  ORS 164.215. 
That definition has two plausible meanings.  On the one hand, the
legislature could have intended to present alternative methods of
committing a single crime (burglary) -- by entering unlawfully or
by remaining unlawfully after an initial lawful entry.  On the
other hand, the legislature could have intended to define two
separate crimes -- entering unlawfully and remaining unlawfully.  
 Legislative history resolves that question.  The
official legislative commentary to the burglary statutes includes
the following statement:
"As applied to the burglary sections, the concept
of one committing the crime by 'remaining unlawfully'
represents a departure from the traditional notion that
burglary requires a 'breaking and entering' of an
'unlawful entry.' * * * Under the proposed definition
an initial lawful entry followed by an unlawful
remaining would constitute burglary if accompanied by
an intent to commit a crime."
Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed
Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report § 135 (July 1970)
(emphasis added).  In other words, the legislature included the
"remains unlawfully" wording in the burglary statute solely to
clarify that burglary could occur by remaining unlawfully after
an initial lawful entry.  It did not intend to provide that a
defendant who commits burglary by entering a building unlawfully
commits an additional, separate violation of the burglary statute
by remaining in the dwelling thereafter. (7) 
It follows that, although the legislature intended to
provide two alternative ways to commit the crime of burglary, it
did not define those alternatives in a manner that would permit
multiple burglary convictions to arise out of a single unlawful
entry.  It did not intend to provide that a defendant would
violate separate "statutory provisions" contained within the
burglary statutes by, first, unlawfully entering a building and
then by unlawfully remaining therein.  
Neither do the burglary statutes suggest a legislative
intent to treat a single unlawful entry or remainder as violating
more than one "statutory provision" based on the burglar's intent
to commit more than one crime inside the building.  The burglary
statute refers to an "intent to commit a crime" (emphasis added)
inside the building -- any crime.  Under the clear words of the
statute, the state must prove some criminal intent, but the
nature of the intended crime is irrelevant.  That is, there is no
apparent basis for differentiating a burglary based on an intent
to assault from a burglary based on an intent to menace. 
Defendant's act of unlawfully entering the victim's apartment
with either intent or with both intents would violate only one
statutory provision.  
We turn to the other potential basis for a claim that
the trial court properly entered convictions for two burglaries -- the idea that defendant's conduct involved repeated violations
of the same statutory provision within the meaning of ORS
161.067(3).  The state has suggested that the present case fits
into that rule and that the only question remaining is whether
each burglary was separated from the other "by a sufficient pause
in the defendant's criminal conduct to afford the defendant an
opportunity to renounce the criminal intent."  ORS 161.067(3). 
However, given that we have rejected the idea that the
legislature intended to define as a separate crime the act of
remaining unlawfully in a building after an unlawful entry, the
idea that one could unlawfully enter the building in question
only once yet "repeatedly" violate the burglary statute cannot be
sustained.  An unlawful entry is a unitary act.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, although
defendant properly was charged with and even found guilty of two
counts of first-degree burglary, each of which alleged a
different crime that defendant intended to commit at the time of
his unlawful entry, the trial court could not enter two judgments
of convictions based on those verdicts.  Under ORS 161.067,
defendant did not commit two "separately punishable" burglaries,
even if he broke into the victim's apartment with the intent to
commit two different crimes.  The Court of Appeals was correct in
so holding.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. Defendant also requested that the trial court merge certain of the other convictions, and
the trial court denied those requests as well.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court had erred in denying those other merger requests.  White, 202 Or App at 5-11.  The
state does not challenge those other aspects of the Court of Appeals decision, and we do not
address them in this opinion.     
2. The state contends that this court, in Barnum, was faced with an additional "thornier"
question -- "whether separate punishment could be imposed on [the] defendant's two burglary
convictions" -- which this court resolved by examining the factual record to determine whether
the evidence showed a "sufficient pause" in the defendant's conduct within the meaning of ORS
161.067(3).  The state suggests that that "thornier" question is not before the court in the present
case because the trial court did not impose "separate," i.e., consecutive, punishments for
defendant's two burglary convictions.   
3. The court made a similar determination with respect to the defendant's convictions for
first-degree and third-degree sodomy.
4. In Kizer, this court acknowledged the state's theory that "making" and "uttering" the same
forged instrument might constitute distinct crimes "when there is a significant time separation
between the making and the uttering," but concluded that the evidence presented at trial did not
suggest any such time lag and that, as such, the case did not present an occasion to test the state's
theory.  Id. at 243. 
5. As this court has stated in other cases, the term "merger" in the strict sense refers to
lesser-included offenses that "merge" if a defendant is convicted of a greater offense.  See State v.
Kessler, 297 Or 460, 462-63, 686 P2d 345 (1984) (describing that meaning).  However, we use
the term here in its expansive sense, i.e., to refer to the process of combining guilty verdicts on
multiple counts of a crime into a single count for purposes of entry of judgment.   
6. That meaning is apparent from the analysis in Barrett:  This court held that, although the
defendant properly had been charged and "convicted," i.e., found guilty, of three counts of
aggravated murder based on three different aggravating circumstances, the trial court could only
"enter one judgment of conviction reflecting the defendant's guilt on the charge of aggravated
murder, which judgment separately would enumerate each of the existing aggravating factors." 
Barrett, 331 Or at 37.      
7. See also State v. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or App 298, 18 P3d 467 (2001), where the Court
of Appeals set out extensive legislative history that is consistent with the point that we draw from
the official commentary.  Although that history is helpful and confirms our view of the
legislature's intent, we find the official commentary to be determinative.