Case Title: State v. Ramirez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S054267

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 13, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ANASTACIO RAMIREZ,
Respondent on Review.
(CC C030767CR; CA A123657; SC S054267)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 2, 2007.
Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Jamesa J. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender,
Legal Services Division, Office of Public Defense Services.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and
Walters, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining assignments of error.
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Mark Gardner, Judge. 205 Or App 113, 133 P3d 343, adh'd to on recons, 207 Or App 1, 139 P3d 981 
(2006).
**Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This criminal case is the latest in a series of cases that reflect the efforts of
the Court of Appeals and of this court to understand, follow, and apply the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L
Ed 2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d
403 (2004).  In those cases, the Court held that a criminal defendant has a right under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to have a jury determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, virtually all facts legally essential to the sentence that a defendant
receives. (1)  No one at this point is quarreling respecting the meaning or scope of the
Apprendi/Blakely rule.  However, the parties are at odds over whether, on the facts of this
case, an arguable Apprendi/Blakely violation that was not brought to the trial court's
attention at the time that it occurred nonetheless is (or could be) "an error of law apparent
on the face of the record" (i.e., "plain error"), (2) as that phrase is used in ORAP
5.45(1). (3)  The Court of Appeals determined that an Apprendi/Blakely violation was
present in this case, resulting in defendant receiving a sentence in excess of that
authorized by law.  The court further determined that the error was plain.  
State v. Ramirez, 205 Or App 113, 123-25, 133 P3d 343, adh'd to on recons, 207 Or App 1, 139
P3d 981 (2006).  The court then went on to hold that defendant's conviction should be
reversed, stating: "The state has no valid interest in requiring defendant to serve an
unlawful sentence; for defendant, * * * [on the other hand,] a significant liberty interest is
at stake."  Id. at 125.    We allowed the state's petition for review to consider whether the
Court of Appeals properly applied the rule of ORAP 5.45(1) respecting plain errors.  We
now hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the claimed error.  
The procedural facts relevant to the legal issue before us are undisputed; it
is their legal significance that causes debate.  Defendant accosted a woman outside the
building where she worked.  He placed a handgun to her head and threatened to kill her. 
Defendant then ordered the victim onto her hands and knees, shot her in the head, and ran
off.  The victim survived, but lost her right eye and suffered other injuries.  Defendant
was charged with attempted murder, first-degree assault, and unlawful use of a weapon. 
He invoked his right to a jury trial, and a jury ultimately found him guilty on all
counts. (4)  At the conclusion of that part of the trial, the court thanked the jurors for
their time and effort and discharged them.  Defendant did not object to that procedure. 
Neither, however, did he at that time execute a written waiver of jury trial respecting the
fact-finding process that was yet to come.
The court then conducted a sentencing hearing without a jury.  At the
conclusion of that hearing, the court made factual findings to support an "upward
departure" sentence for the first-degree assault conviction, i.e., a sentence of greater
length than that which, under existing sentencing guidelines, could be imposed solely by
virtue of the jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of that offense.  Specifically, the court
found that the defendant caused permanent injury to the victim, that the victim was
particularly vulnerable, and that defendant was persistently involved in criminal activities. 
The court also stated that, in its view, any of the findings, standing alone, justified an
upward departure sentence.  Defendant did not object on the record to having those
departure facts determined by the trial judge rather than by the jury.  The court then
imposed an upward departure sentence on the assault conviction, ordered that that
sentence be served consecutively with the sentence imposed on defendant's attempted
murder conviction, ordered that defendant's sentence on the unlawful use of a weapon
conviction be served consecutive to the other two sentences, and denied defendant
eligibility either for early release or sentence reduction programs. 
Defendant appealed his sentences to the Court of Appeals.  There, he
argued that, under Blakely, the trial court erred in imposing a departure sentence based on
facts that he did not admit and that had not been found by a jury. (5)  Defendant
acknowledged that he had not made that argument in the trial court, but contended that
the Court of Appeals should consider the matter as plain error under ORAP 5.45(1).  
The Court of Appeals began by reviewing this court's case law explaining
the procedure that an appellate court should follow before reaching an inadequately
preserved or inadequately raised claim of error.  It noted that our cases have identified
three criteria that must be met for a claim of error to be considered plain error:  
"'(1) [The claimed error] is an error of law; (2) the [claimed] error is
obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) it appears on the face of the
record, i.e., the reviewing court need [not] go outside the record to identify
the error or choose between competing inferences, and the facts constituting
the error must be irrefutable.'"
Ramirez, 205 Or App at 115-16 (quoting 
State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435, 7
P3d 522 (2000), which, in turn, cites Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991)).
The Court of Appeals then extensively reviewed this court's recent decision
in State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 130 P3d 780 (2006), a case in which a defendant, after
waiving his right to a jury trial and being convicted by a trial court, claimed that the trial
court committed plain error at sentencing by imposing an upward departure sentence
based on aggravating facts that the trial court found.  The Court of Appeals concluded
that this court rejected that plain error argument in Gornick, because we believed that it
was permissible to infer, from the fact that the defendant had waived his right to a jury
trial respecting his guilt and had not objected when the trial court found departure facts,
that the defendant did not wish to assert any right that he may have had to have a jury
determine those departure facts.  Ramirez, 205 Or App at 118-22.  The Court of Appeals
then stated, with respect to this court's decision in Gornick:  
"Gornick stands for the proposition that, if we are able to draw at least two
inferences from the defendant's failure to object, one of which suggests that
the trial court erred and another of which suggests that the trial court did not
err, then the error is not 'plain' within the meaning of ORAP 5.45(1).  It
further seems fair to say that Gornick holds that, on the facts of that case --
in which the defendant waived a jury trial and expressly consented to the
trial court's authority to impose the maximum sentence -- multiple
inferences could be drawn from the defendant's failure to object to the trial
court making aggravation findings.  One of those inferences was that the
defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial as to the departure sentence
facts, in which case the trial court erred.  A second of those inferences was
that the defendant did waive his right to a jury trial as to those facts, in
which case the trial court did not err.  We do not read Gornick broadly to
hold that, in all cases in which a defendant failed to object to the trial court's
departure findings, we cannot properly conclude that the trial court plainly
erred in violation of Blakely and Apprendi.  Whether the trial court
committed plain error will depend on the facts of each case." 
Ramirez, 205 Or App at 123 (emphasis in original).
Turning to the present case, the Court of Appeals distinguished the facts
from those in Gornick.  The court emphasized that, in the present case, defendant had not
waived his right to a jury before trial and had never expressly consented to the trial court's
authority to proceed without the aid of a jury to find facts to support a departure sentence;
neither had defendant admitted those departure facts.  From that procedural history, the
Court of Appeals concluded that, unlike in Gornick, it could not infer that defendant
intended to forgo his right to have a jury determine whether departure factors were
present in the case.  It followed, the court held, that no competing inferences arose out of
defendant's failure to object when the trial court made those findings.  Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed plain error when it made those
findings itself and relied on them to impose a departure sentence.  Ramirez, 205 Or App
at 124-25.  The court then elected to exercise its discretion to address that error, citing the
interests of the parties and the gravity of the error.  Having done so, the Court of Appeals
vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court.  Id. at 125.  We
allowed the state's petition for review. (6)  
In reviewing the Court of Appeals' determination to consider the error at
issue as plain error, we ordinarily would approach the matter using the same two-step
analysis that we employed in Gornick.  First, we would consider the three "plain error"
criteria set out in Ailes (was the claimed error one of law, was it obvious and not
reasonably in dispute, does it appear on the face of the record without requiring the court
to choose between competing inferences).  Next, we would determine whether, assuming
that the Ailes inquiry discloses a "plain" error, the appellate court properly exercised its
discretion to consider that error.  Gornick, 340 Or at 166. 
That ordinary line of inquiry immediately presents us with two choices in
this case.  The first choice would be to omit any discussion of the first step of the plain
error analysis because, if we are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in the manner
in which it dealt with the second step of the plain error analysis (and we are of that view),
there is no need to address the first step.
This court could, if it chose, nonetheless undertake to review the Court of
Appeals' approach to the first half of the analysis.  Under that analysis, it could be argued,
inter alia, that, having had a jury trial respecting guilt, defendant needed to speak up
when the trial judge thereafter dismissed the jury without submitting the alleged departure
factors to them if, as he now claims, defendant in fact was opposed to the trial court
following that procedure.  On the other hand, that argument, although interesting, may not
arise again in future cases because the legislature has seen fit to enact a statutory
procedure governing the issue.  Or Laws 2005, ch 463, §§ 1-7, compiled as a note at ORS
chapter 136 (2005); see also Or Laws 2007, ch 16, § 1 (repealing Oregon Laws 2005,
chapter 463, section 20, which provided for sunset of sections one through seven on
January 2, 2008).  In this case, we think that it is more expeditious to assume that the
judge's act in dismissing the jury was error and to move directly to the second half of the
Ailes analysis, viz., a determination whether the Court of Appeals properly exercised its
discretion to review the alleged error.  We turn to that inquiry.
Respecting that issue, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
"Considering the interests of the parties and the gravity of the error, we
conclude that it is appropriate [to reach it].  The state has no valid interest
in requiring defendant to serve an unlawful sentence; for defendant,
however, a significant liberty interest is at stake."
205 Or App at 125 (emphasis added).  That sentiment notwithstanding, however, we think
that even a brief consideration of defendant's Sixth Amendment claim in the context of
the facts of this case establishes that the Court of Appeals erred in exercising its
discretion to reach that claim.
As noted, the trial court explained that it would have imposed an enhanced
sentence in this case based solely on its finding that the victim suffered a permanent
injury as a result of defendant's crimes.  See OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(I) (listing
"permanent injury to the victim" as a basis for imposing a departure sentence).  The
undisputed evidence in the record on that issue is that the victim lost her right eye as a
result of being shot in the head.  That loss unquestionably is permanent.
In light of those facts, consideration of the competing "interests of the
parties" -- the factor on which the Court of Appeals relied -- leads to precisely the
opposite conclusion from the one that the Court of Appeals reached.  If, as the record
reveals, there is no legitimate debate that the victim suffered a permanent injury as a
result of the shooting, then defendant's interest in a second hearing is minimal, if not
nonexistent: A second hearing would only confirm that the departure sentence was
warranted.  The state, for its part, has a significant interest in avoiding a second,
unnecessary sentencing hearing.  Viewed in that light, the competing interests of the
parties establish that this was not an appropriate case in which to consider defendant's
unpreserved error.
The Court of Appeals also relied, in choosing to exercise its discretion, on
the "gravity of the [trial court's] error."  Again, viewed in context, the failure to submit
the question whether the victim sustained a permanent injury to a jury can hardly be
described as grave.  On this record, no reasonable factfinder (whether a judge or a jury)
could conclude anything other than that the victim suffered a permanent injury.  Once
again, this consideration does not support the Court of Appeals' discretionary choice.
Furthermore, this court has listed a number of other factors that bear on
whether an appellate court should exercise its discretion to reach an unpreserved error.  
Ailes, 312 Or at 382 n 6.  One of those factors, "the ends of justice in the particular case,"
requires a court to consider whether, in the context of an individual case, reaching the
unpreserved error would advance the ends of justice.  When, as in this case, the evidence
on a sentencing factor is overwhelming, it would not advance the ends of justice to
remand for an unnecessary hearing.
Finally, there is the court's assertion that the state "has no valid interest in
requiring defendant to serve an unlawful sentence."  Although that rationale has a nice
ring to it, it makes little real-world sense in cases like the present one, in which the record
all but demands imposition of precisely the sentences that the trial court elected to
impose.  That factor does not, on the facts of this case, justify the Court of Appeals'
exercise of discretion.  See also State v. Fults, ___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (decided this
date) (further elaborating on limited utility of the "no valid interest" rationale).
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Court of Appeals
abused its discretion and, therefore, erred in considering the allegedly plain error
committed by the trial court.  The Court of Appeals decision to do so is reversed.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining assignments of error.
1. More specifically, the Court held in Apprendi that,
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."
530 US at 490.  In Blakely, the Court clarified its ruling, making clear that, by the phrase
"statutory maximum," the Court meant the "maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 
Blakely, 542 US at 303 (emphasis in original).  
2. We hereafter use the phrase "plain error" in order to spare the reader
endless repetition of the phrase, "an error of law apparent on the face of the record."
3. ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part:
"No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal
unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court and
assigned as error in the opening brief * * *, provided that the
appellate court may consider an error of law apparent on the
face of the record."
4. At trial and at sentencing, defendant never disputed that someone shot the
victim and caused her to lose sight in her right eye.  The only dispute that he raised was
whether he was the person who shot her.  The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant caused that injury when it convicted him of attempted murder and first-degree
assault.
5. Defendant also assigned error to the trial court's imposition of a consecutive
sentence on the unlawful use of a weapon conviction, and to the trial court's decision
denying him eligibility for "good time" credits.  The Court of Appeals did not separately
discuss those claims of error but remanded the entire case to the trial court for
resentencing.  Ramirez, 205 Or App at 125.  Consistent with that approach, the state's
petition for review and our own discussion of the case focus only on the departure
sentence issue.
6. Before turning to the state's challenge, we briefly address an argument that
the defendant raised, for the first time, in his brief on the merits in this court.  Defendant
argues that, in addition to any other error that the trial court might have made, the trial
court committed plain error by failing to employ the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof to its departure factor findings.  Defendant observes that the court did
not state on the record that it found those factors "beyond a reasonable doubt."  According
to defendant, because case law at the time of the sentencing hearing permitted sentencing
courts to employ a lesser standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt" in finding the
departure factors, this court cannot reasonably infer that the trial court in this case found
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover (according to defendant), a defendant
never can be presumed to have waived the reasonable doubt standard of proof and,
therefore, the error is plain.  Whatever the merits of defendant's argument, we do not
reach them here.  As noted, defendant not only failed to raise his point in the trial court,
he also failed to raise it in the Court of Appeals.  Defendant's argument simply comes too
late to be entitled to discussion now.  We focus on the errors that defendant did raise in
the Court of Appeals and that that court elected to consider.