Case Title: ROSE M. HULL v. MICHAEL D'ARCY, DEBRA ANN D'ARCY and JACK DALTON

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0058

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROSE M. HULL v. MICHAEL D'ARCY, DEBRA ANN D'ARCY and JACK DALTON2009 WY 30202 P.3d 417Case Number: No. S-08-0058Decided: 03/05/2009
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ROSE 
M. HULL,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MICHAEL 
D'ARCY, DEBRA ANN D'ARCY, and JACK DALTON,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Frank 
J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

            
Jack John C. Hoard, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
This 
appeal concerns the validity of a tax deed.  Rose Hull, the former owner, contends 
that the tax deed is invalid because she did not receive the statutorily 
required notice prior to issuance of the deed.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the tax deed grantee, Jack Dalton, and the current owners 
of the property, Michael and Debra D'Arcy.  
Ms. Hull challenges that decision.  
We find that genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, we 
reverse.

ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]        
Did 
the tax purchaser comply with the notice requirements set forth in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-13-108(e) (LexisNexis 2007) prior to obtaining the tax 
deed?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Ms. 
Hull and her husband, Warren Hull, owned a residential property in Guernsey, 
Wyoming.  The Hulls did not pay the 
property taxes for 1999 and on July 24, 2000, the Platte County Treasurer 
conducted a tax sale of the property.  Mr. Dalton paid the delinquent taxes and 
obtained a certificate of purchase to the property.  In January 2006, Mr. Dalton applied for, 
and received, a tax deed.  He 
subsequently conveyed the property to the D'Arcys.  They are the current owners of the 
property and have made improvements to the property since obtaining ownership. 

 
 

[¶4]        
On 
February 2, 2007, Ms. Hull commenced this action against Mr. Dalton and the 
D'Arcys alleging that the tax deed is invalid because she did not receive the 
statutorily required notice.  The 
defendants generally denied the allegations.  They contended that proper notice was 
given and that the deed was valid.  
The defendants also asserted affirmative defenses and filed counterclaims 
alleging that the D'Arcys were entitled to reimbursement, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(viii), for taxes they have paid, and pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-32-207 et seq., for 
improvements they have made to the property.1  Ms. Hull concedes that, if the deed is 
invalid, she is liable to the D'Arcys for the value of improvements they have 
made to the property.2

[¶5]        
The 
parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment.  The defendants supported their motion 
with Mr. Dalton's affidavit and accompanying exhibits.  Ms. Hull responded with an affidavit of 
her own, as well as excerpts from Mr. Dalton's deposition.  The parties also submitted legal 
memoranda in support of their positions.  
After hearing argument, the district court determined that summary 
judgment should be awarded in favor of Mr. Dalton and the D'Arcys.  Ms. Hull appeals that 
decision.

Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶6]        
"Because 
summary judgment 
involves a purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a 
trial court's summary judgment decision."  Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin 
Coal Co., 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 129 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
Summary 
judgment is 
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  Accord, e.g., Jacobs Ranch Coal Co., ¶ 8, 191 P.3d  at 
128; Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 
(Wyo. 2002).  "A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or 
refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties 
have asserted."  Id.  We view the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and give that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the record.  E.g., Stevens v. Elk Run Homeowners' Ass'n, 
Inc., 2004 WY 63, ¶ 11, 90 P.3d 1162, 1165 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 

[¶8]        
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v) sets forth certain requirements for issuance of a 
tax deed.  That provision states, in 
pertinent part:

(A)    The county treasurer shall 
accept applications and issue tax deeds for unredeemed real property subject to 
a certificate of purchase not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) years 
from the date of the original sale for taxes to the person in whose name the 
certificate of purchase was delivered or his assigns upon proper application, 
return of the certificate of purchase, payment of fees and proof of compliance 
with the notice requirements of this section to consist of the fact of personal 
service and the contents of the notice served in cases where personal service is 
made, or, in the case of service by publication, a sworn statement attached to a 
copy of the notice indicating the time of service by the publisher, manager or 
editor of the newspaper in which publication of notice was 
made;

(B)    Holders 
of certificates of purchase of real property sold for delinquent taxes, 
including a holder's or county's assigns, upon application for a tax deed 
therefor shall furnish proof to the county treasurer:

(I)         
That at least three (3) months prior to the application a written or 
printed notice was served on each person 
in actual possession or occupancy of the real property and the person in whose 
name the property was taxed or assessed if upon diligent inquiry the 
persons 
can be found in the county; 
or

(II)        
If 
no person is in actual possession or occupancy of the property and if the person 
in whose name the property was taxed or assessed cannot be found in the county, 
that notice was published in a newspaper printed in the county, or if no 
newspaper is printed in the county, then in a newspaper printed in Wyoming 
nearest to the county seat of the county in which the property is located. The 
notice shall be published once a week for three (3) weeks, the first publication 
not more than five (5) months and the last publication not less than three (3) 
months prior to the application; and

(III)       That notice 
was sent by certified or registered mail to the record owner and mortgagees, if 
any, of the real property if their addresses are known or disclosed by the 
public records.

(C)    Notices required by this 
paragraph shall contain the following:

(I)         
When the applicant purchased the real property;

(II)        In 
whose name the real property was taxed;

(III)         
A 
description of the real property;

(IV)        
The 
year the property was taxed or assessed;

(V)         
When 
the time of redemption will expire;

(VI)        
When 
application for a tax deed will be made;

(VII)       
The 
amount of any special assessments for local or public 
improvements.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶9]        
Examination 
of the statute reveals that the operative due diligence inquiry is whether the 
owner is able to be found within the county by the exercise of due 
diligence.  If so, the statute 
requires that the tax deed applicant provide actual notice of the tax sale 
details.  Otherwise, the 
constructive notice procedures specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-13-108(e)(v)(B)(II) are adequate.  
In the district court, Ms. Hull contended that she did not receive 
service of the notice required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B) prior to 
issuance of the tax deed to Mr. Dalton.  
Appellees responded with two arguments that are relevant for our 
review.  First, they contended that 
Ms. Hull received notice because it was mailed to her at her address of record 
and that the notice was received by her husband.  Alternatively, Appellees contended that 
they complied with the relevant notice provision by giving constructive notice 
as provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B)(II).  They alleged that constructive notice 
was sufficient because Ms. Hull could not be found within Platte County with the 
exercise of due diligence.  
Consequently, there were two possible issues of fact in the summary 
judgment proceedings.  The first was 
whether Ms. Hull received actual notice of the tax sale.  If she did not, the second question was 
whether she could be found within Platte County upon the exercise of due 
diligence.

[¶10]     
Ms. 
Hull and her husband owned the property as "tenants by the entireties."  The couple and their children lived on 
the property until May 30, 2001, when the house was damaged by a fire.  The Hulls moved to Hartville, Wyoming, 
after the fire.  Ms. Hull moved to 
Wheatland in December 2004.3  The Hulls separated at some time prior 
to September 9, 2005, but it is not clear from Ms. Hull's affidavit when the 
separation occurred, or where the couple was living at the time of the 
separation. 

[¶11]     
Mr. 
Dalton obtained a certificate of purchase to the property in 2000.  He determined that the property was 
owned by the Hulls, and that their address of record with the Platte County 
Treasurer was a post office box in Hartville, Wyoming.  In 2005, Mr. Dalton sent a letter 
addressed to both Mr. Hull and Ms. Hull at the Hartville post office box stating 
his intention to begin the deed application process.  Mr. Dalton did not receive a reply to 
this letter.

[¶12]     
Mr. 
Dalton also attempted to contact the Hulls by telephone.  He called a Hartville telephone number 
that he obtained from the telephone directory.  In that telephone call, he spoke to an 
unidentified woman he "believe[d]"  but was "not certain  was Mr. Hull's 
mother."  Mr. Dalton indicated in 
his deposition that he did not have much recollection regarding the substance of 
that conversation.  He recalled 
asking for Mr. Hull and being told that Mr. Hull was not there.  He did not recall whether he asked for 
information concerning the whereabouts of Ms. Hull.

[¶13]     
Mr. 
Dalton subsequently published notice in the Platte County Record-Times containing 
the disclosures required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(C).  This notice was published on August 31, 
September 7, and September 14, 2005.  Mr. Dalton sent a certified letter, 
return receipt requested, to each of the Hulls at the address of record advising 
of his intention to apply for the tax deed and including a copy of the published 
notice.  The letters were both 
signed for by Mr. Hull.  Mr. Dalton 
received no response to the letters.

[¶14]     
Ms. 
Hull stated in her affidavit that she never received a copy of any of the 
letters sent by Mr. Dalton and that she did not see the notice published in the 
newspaper.  She asserted that she 
did not receive any notice of the tax sale or the pending expiration of the 
redemption period prior to issuance of the tax deed.  She said that she was told by her 
attorney during her divorce proceedings in 2006 that the property had been sold 
for taxes.  She specifically stated 
in the affidavit that she had not authorized Mr. Hull to act as her agent for 
the purpose of receiving mail.  She 
also stated that she was living in Wheatland at the time notice was provided to 
Mr. Hull and published in the newspaper.  
She described her Wheatland residence during the time as 
follows:

In 
December of 2004 I moved to Wheatland, Wyoming, which is in Platte County.  During the time involved in the tax deed 
issue in this case, July, 2005, through January, 2006, I lived in Wheatland, 
Wyoming.  I had experienced an 
unfortunate situation involving some wrongdoing on my part.  During this time period I was on parole 
through the State of Wyoming.

[¶15]     
In 
her affidavit, Ms. Hull did not disclose her mailing or residence address during 
the time she lived in Wheatland.  
She did not indicate that she ever provided the postal service with a 
change of address form.  She did not 
dispute that the Platte County records reflected that her mailing address was 
the Hartville post office box where Mr. Dalton sent the letters.  She did not state that she ever 
instructed Mr. Hull or his mother to provide information concerning her 
whereabouts to anyone who might inquire.  
She asserted in her affidavit that the Guernsey schools and the Platte 
County law enforcement officials knew where she could be found, but she did not 
indicate that she instructed any individual to provide her location upon 
inquiry.  She did not allege that 
her name or address was published in any Platte County telephone 
directory.

[¶16]     
Based 
upon these facts, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants.  The court explained: 

[Ms.] 
Hull has presented no evidence that would indicate Dalton should have been on 
notice that the Hulls were estranged; that Ms. Hull was not living with Mr. 
Hull; and that Mr. Hull was not forwarding messages or mail to her.  In the absence of any such indication, 
Dalton's efforts were reasonable and sufficient to meet the statutory 
requirements.

. 
. .

Ms. 
Hull left the marital home at an unspecified time . . . .  She has provided no evidence that she 
made efforts to change her mailing address, provide a forwarding address, nor to 
update the county records.  Under 
these facts, it can be said that Hull, by her actions, appointed Mr. Hull as her 
agent to receive mail, including the letters sent by 
Dalton.

The 
district court appeared to conclude that, as a matter of law, Ms. Hull received 
actual notice of the forthcoming application for a tax deed.  In light of Ms. Hull's specific and 
uncontested statements in her affidavit that she did not receive notice, the 
conclusion of the district court is apparently based upon its finding that Mr. 
Hull was Ms. Hull's agent for receipt of mailed notice.4  

[¶17]     
The 
party alleging agency has the burden of establishing the existence and nature of 
the agency relationship.  Fowler v. Westair Enters., Inc., 906 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wyo. 1995).  
"Agency relationships may be classified as express or implied, according 
to the manner in which the agency is created . . . ."  2A C.J.S. Agency § 7 (2008).  An implied agency may be determined 
"from the words or conduct of the parties, depending upon the 
circumstances."  True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Mach., Inc., 
577 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1978).  
Agency cannot be implied merely from the existence of a family 
relationship.  See Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 
31, 55 P.3d 1219, 1228 (Wyo. 2002).

Rather, 
the existence of an agency between a husband and wife is a question of fact, 
resting upon the same considerations or rules applying to any other agency.  Marriage is a factor to be considered in 
determining if an agency relationship exists, and the effect of the marriage 
relationship has been said to make it more likely that other circumstances will 
be found to raise an inference of agency.

41 
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 87 (2008) 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶18]     
In 
this case, there is simply insufficient information indicating agency to justify 
a finding that, as a matter of law, Mr. Hull was Ms. Hull's agent.  A court considering summary judgment 
must give the opposing party every favorable inference from the evidence.  Here, it appears that the district court 
weighed or discounted evidence in determining that Mr. Hull was Ms. Hull's agent 
for service of notice.  Ms. Hull 
specifically stated the following in her affidavit: "I never authorized Warren 
Hull to act as an agent for me."  
Despite this evidence, the district court relied upon the fact that 
Ms. Hull left the address unchanged in the county records.  The court apparently inferred that in 
doing so, she intended that mail concerning the property was to be sent to 
Mr. Hull, indicating that he was her agent for receipt of mail.  It is equally possible, however, to 
infer that Ms. Hull simply neglected to change her address in the county 
records, which does not indicate an intent that Mr. Hull be her agent.  

[¶19]     
In 
determining that Mr. Hull was Ms. Hull's agent, the district court also relied 
extensively upon the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Arbabi, 584 S.E.2d 113 (S.C. 
2003).  Johnson, however, is distinguishable 
from the current case.  
Dr. Arbabi had moved out of the marital home, and Mrs. Arbabi did 
not forward the tax sale notices to him.  
As a result, he was unaware of the tax sale until after the tax deed was 
issued.  Johnson, 584 S.E.2d  at 114.  After trial, the Master-in-Equitythe 
fact finderfound that an implied agency existed.  Id. at 115.  The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld 
the Master's finding and noted the following facts supporting its 
conclusion:

Dr. 
Arbabi left the marital home in April 1991.  Yet, on April 22, 1991, his attorney 
wrote the County a letter requesting the Assessor's office to send all future 
tax bills directly to Dr. Arbabi at the [marital home].  Moreover, Dr. Arbabi stated he never 
returned to the marital home and Mrs. Arbabi delivered the mail either to him or 
his attorney.  This arrangement 
apparently went on from April 1991 through, at least, November 1992over a year 
and a half.  Certainly, 
Dr. Arbabi knew he was going to receive mail related to the [property at 
issue] during that time period.  
Yet, there is no evidence in 
the record that Dr. Arbabi at any time filed a change of address form with the 
post office or wrote the County with another, more appropriate, address for 
him.  Under this evidence, we find 
that Dr. Arbabi, by his actions, appointed Mrs. Arbabi his agent for receiving 
any and all mail that was directed to the [marital home].

Id. 
at 117 (emphasis in original).

[¶20]     
In 
Johnson, Dr. Arbabi's failure to 
change his address with the county or the postal service was only one component 
of the implied agency.  Critically, 
Dr. Arbabi deliberately acted by writing to the County Assessor, through his 
attorney, directing that mail related to the property be sent to the marital 
home.  That act foreclosed the 
possibility that Dr. Arbabi was simply neglectful regarding his address of 
record.  He also received mail from 
Mrs. Arbabi over an extended period of time, which indicated his consent to this 
practice.  In contrast, there is no 
evidence that Ms. Hull took any affirmative action after separating with Mr. 
Hull to cause her mail to be delivered to him.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
Mr. Hull ever received any mail intended for Ms. Hull other than the 
letters sent by Mr. Dalton, or that Ms. Hull ever received any mail sent to the 
Hartville post office box.  Indeed, 
the record contains nothing to suggest any interaction whatsoever between the 
Hulls regarding mail received by Mr. Hull.  
Given this evidence, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, and summary judgment in favor of Appellees based on the agency issue was 
inappropriate.

[¶21]     
We 
next ask if a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Ms. Hull 
could be found within Platte County upon the exercise of due diligence.5  Due diligence is generally a question of 
fact.  Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, ¶ 14, 189 P.3d 859, 864 (Wyo. 2008).  We have 
stated that "the legislature placed upon the shoulders of the tax deed grantee 
a duty of diligent inquiry to find and serve' the specified individuals."  Thompson-Green, ¶ 8, 143 P.3d  at 900 
(quoting Trefren v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 328 (Wyo. 1993)).  "Diligent' 
means [c]areful; attentive; persistent in doing something.'"  Thompson-Green, ¶ 8, 143 P.3d  at 900 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 489 
(8th ed. 2004)).

We 
have described the concept of "due diligence" in another context as 
follows:

   "The diligence to be pursued and 
shown . . . is that which is reasonable under the circumstances and not all 
possible diligence which may be conceived.  
Nor is it that diligence which stops just short of the place where if it 
were continued might reasonably be expected to uncover an address . . . of the 
person on whom service is sought . . . .  
Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each 
case.  It is that diligence which is 
appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably calculated to 
do so."

Id. 
(quoting Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565, 568 (Wyo. 1991)).  Accord Daniel, ¶ 14, 189 P.3d  at 864. 
 "The inquiry extends to those 
places where information is likely to be obtained and to those persons who, in 
the ordinary course of events, would be likely to receive news of or from the 
absent person[s].'"  Thompson-Green, ¶ 8, 143 P.3d  at 900 
(quoting 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 
229, at 799 (2005)).

[¶22]     
In 
Thompson-Green, we addressed a 
similar situation to that presented by the current case.  The land at issue was located within 
Laramie County and was owned by a father and his three sons as tenants in 
common.  Id., ¶ 3, 143 P.3d  at 898.  The father lived on the property, and 
one of the three sons lived within Laramie County.  Id., ¶ 11, 143 P.3d  at 901.  That son had specifically instructed his 
father to provide his contact information, including his address, to anyone who 
inquired.  Id.  The tax sale buyer, 
Ms. Thompson-Green, sent several notices addressed to the four owners.  All notices were sent to the 
property.  She also attempted to 
have the sheriff's department serve all owners at the property, and the return 
of service indicated that the father accepted service for his three sons.  Ms. Thompson-Green did not contact the 
father and ask him where any of the other title owners could be found.  The district court ordered summary 
judgment in favor of the original title owners, and we 
affirmed.

[¶23]     
We 
concluded that the undisputed evidence established that the son living within 
Laramie County could be found upon diligent inquiry.

A 
diligent inquiryone reasonably calculated to locate the other [owners]would 
have included an attempt to contact [the father] (this could have been 
accomplished easily by calling the telephone number [listed in the telephone 
directory]) and determine what other information he had regarding the location 
of the other three [owners] (whether at the property's address or 
elsewhere).  One could reasonably 
expect that such contact, if successful, would have uncovered this information 
for [one of the sons].

Id., 
¶ 11, 143 P.3d  at 901.  
Consequently, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(A) and 
(B)(I), Ms. Thompson-Green was required to serve actual notice upon the son who 
was able to be found within the county.  
Because that service never occurred, the tax deed was invalid.  Id., ¶¶ 18-20, 143 P.3d  at 
903-04.

[¶24]     
With 
our discussion of Thompson-Green 
serving as the legal context, we now address Appellees' motion for summary 
judgment.  Viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to Ms. Hull, as we must, we infer that an inquiry may have 
revealed her location.  As we 
recognized in Thompson-Green, a 
diligent inquiry would have included an attempt to determine what information 
Mr. Hull or his mother had regarding where Ms. Hull could be found.  It appears undisputed that they were 
aware of Ms. Hull's location, however Ms. Hull's affidavit does not conclusively 
establish that Mr. Hull or his mother would have divulged Ms. Hull's location to 
Mr. Dalton if asked.  In contrast to 
the facts presented in Thompson-Green, Ms. Hull made no 
specific allegation that Mr. Hull or his mother had been instructed to 
disclose her location to those who inquired.  Neither did Ms. Hull set forth specific 
facts that compel that conclusion.  
That they would have done so, however, is certainly a reasonable 
inference based on the facts that she set forth.  When we consider Ms. Hull's affidavit in 
the light most favorable to her, we conclude that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed regarding whether she could be found within the county upon the 
exercise of due diligence.6  Consequently, summary judgment in favor 
of Appellees was inappropriate.

[¶25]     
Reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
D'Arcys alleged in their counterclaim that they "made substantial improvements 
spending tens of thousands of dollars and doing substantial work to the subject 
premises."

 
 

2If, 
on remand, Ms. Hull prevails in her claim that the tax deed is invalid, the 
court must proceed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-32-207 et seq. and 39-13-108(e)(viii)(B)-(C) to 
determine and enforce amounts that the D'Arcys are owed for property taxes paid 
and the value of improvements they have made to the 
property.

 
 

3Ms. 
Hull's affidavit does not reveal where she lived between May 30, 2001 and 
December 2004.  The record does show 
that the mailing address in the property records was a post office box in 
Hartville.  It is possible that Ms. 
Hull was incarcerated for part of this intervening period.  While the district court's decision 
letter states that Ms. Hull was on probation part of the time that she lived in 
Wheatland, Ms. Hull's affidavit states that she was instead on 
parole.

4We 
have never been required to determine what constitutes proper service pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B)(I).  See Thompson-Green v. Drobish, 2006 WY 
126, ¶ 13, 143 P.3d 897, 902 (Wyo. 2006).  
The parties do not raise that question in this 
appeal.

5We 
note that it is undisputed that Guernsey, Wheatland, and Hartville are all 
located within Platte County.

6Ms. 
Hull's affidavit also contains many allegations that her location was generally 
known and that, in short, Mr. Dalton had merely to ask unspecified residents of 
Hartville and Guernsey, or law enforcement officials in these towns, to 
determine where she could be found.  
Ms. Hull never states specifically where she could be found during the 
relevant period of time.  Even if 
due diligence under the circumstances included an obligation to inquire of law 
enforcement or the general publica dubious propositionwe find her conclusion 
that this inquiry would have yielded positive results to be speculative at 
best.  The district court properly 
disregarded this portion of her affidavit.