Case Title: RE: Termination of Parental Rights of Jane (2011-24) Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 39465-2011

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2012-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 39465-2011 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL 
RIGHTS OF:  
 
JANE (2011-24) DOE, 
 
       Respondent-Appellant, 
 
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Boise, March 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No.  64 
 
Filed: April 26, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Canyon County.  The Hon. Brian D. Lee, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Mikela A. French, Deputy Canyon County Public Defender, Caldwell, for 
appellant. 
 
Brent King, Deputy Attorney General, Caldwell, for respondent. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment terminating the appellant’s parental rights with respect 
to her two children.  We affirm the judgment on the ground that there was substantial and 
competent evidence supporting the magistrate court’s findings of fact. 
 
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
Appellant is the mother of two minor children who were placed into the custody of the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare on suspicion that they were abused or neglected.  On 
March 27, 2009, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney filed a petition under the Child 
Protective Act alleging that Appellant’s infant daughter was abused.  On April 8, 2009, the 
prosecutor filed an amended petition adding Appellant’s son and alleging that he was neglected.  
On May 29, 2009, Appellant appeared in court with her attorney for the adjudicatory hearing, 
 
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and she stipulated that her two children were within the jurisdiction of the magistrate court under 
the Child Protective Act.1  Pursuant to that stipulation, on June 3, 2009, the magistrate court 
entered a decree of protective custody of the Department for an indeterminate period not to 
exceed their eighteenth birthdays.  On June 16, 2009, Appellant signed a case plan that had been 
prepared pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-1621 to set forth reasonable efforts that would make 
it possible for the children to return to Appellant’s home. 
 
On July 27, 2010, the prosecutor filed a petition seeking to terminate Appellant’s parental 
rights in her two children.  The matter was tried to the magistrate court, which on December 7, 
2011, issued its decision.  The court found that Appellant had failed to complete the tasks 
required of her under the case plan. 
 
The case plan required that Appellant demonstrate adequate parenting and protective 
skills with her children.  This matter had come to the attention of law enforcement and the 
Department because Appellant’s son had physically attacked the son of Appellant’s boyfriend 
when they were residing in the same house.  They took the boyfriend’s son to the hospital, and 
the medical personnel became suspicious and contacted police because Appellant and her 
boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the boyfriend’s son had been injured.  Although 
Appellant attended parenting classes, the court found that Appellant was never able to 
demonstrate during visits with her children that she was able to implement what she had been 
taught in order to properly care for both children.  The court found that during those visits 
Appellant failed to respond appropriately to her son’s outbursts and failed to engage him in age 
and developmentally appropriate activities.  It further found that she was unable to recognize the 
deficiencies in her behavior and resisted suggestions for improvement from her caseworkers. 
The case plan also required that Appellant secure safe and stable housing approved by the 
Department.  She moved into low-income housing with the assistance of the Department, but she 
was evicted because of violations of the lease.  She moved into a homeless shelter, and by the 
time of trial was living in a camp trailer that she stipulated was unsafe for children and that the 
                                                 
1 To be within the jurisdiction of the magistrate court under the Child Protective Act, a child must be neglected, 
abused, or abandoned by his or her parents, legal guardian, or other legal custodian; or the child must be homeless; 
or the child’s parents or other legal custodian must have failed to provide a stable home environment.  I.C. § 16-
1603(1).  If a child is found within the court’s jurisdiction under section 16-1603(1), another child living or having 
custodial visitation in the same household can be within the jurisdiction of the court if the child has been exposed to 
or at risk of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.  I.C. § 16-1603(2). 
 
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magistrate court found was unfit for habitation.  The trailer had one bedroom, it did not have 
running water, and its only heat source was a wood stove. 
When the case plan was adopted, Appellant was not working and was living on her son’s 
SSI benefits.  The case plan required that she secure and maintain legitimate employment 
sufficient to meet the needs of herself and her children.  The magistrate court found that she had 
failed to do so. 
The court found that Appellant was unwilling to make changes in her behavior and her 
decision-making processes that would be necessary for her to successfully complete her case 
plan.  It further found that the evidence did not support a reasonable expectation that she would 
complete the case plan even if she were given more time to do so.  The court concluded that 
Appellant was unable to discharge her parental duties, that such inability will continue for a 
prolonged and indeterminate period, and that it would be injurious to the health, morals, or well-
being of her children.  Finally, the court found that it was in the children’s best interests to 
terminate Appellant’s parental rights. 
The court found that the prosecuting attorney had proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the children 
and that the following conditions, each of which is a statutorily sufficient for termination, 
existed: 
(a) Appellant had neglected her children as defined in Idaho Code sections 16-
2005(1)(b); 16-2002(3)(a); and 16-1602(25)(a) because they were without proper parental care 
and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for their well-being 
because of the conduct or omission of their mother or her neglect or refusal to provide for them; 
(b) Appellant had neglected her children as defined in Idaho Code sections 16-
2005(1)(b); 16-2002(3)(a); and 16-1602(25)(b) because she was unable to discharge her parental 
responsibilities, to and for the children and, as a result of such inability, the children lacked the 
parental care necessary for their health, safety or well-being; 
(c) Appellant had neglected her children as defined in Idaho Code sections 16-
2005(1)(b), 16-2002(3)(b), and 16-1629(9) by failing to comply with her case plan so that her 
children could be reunified with her within the required time period; and 
 
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(d) Appellant was unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability will 
continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-
being of the child, as set forth in Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(d). 
On January 27, 2012, the court entered its judgment, from which Appellant timely 
appealed. 
 
II. 
Were the Magistrate Court’s Findings of Fact Supported 
by Substantial and Competent Evidence?  
 
A trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); 
I.R.C.P. 52(a).  When deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not 
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court.  Camp, 137 Idaho at 856, 55 P.3d at 310.  
It is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of 
witnesses.  Id.  On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.  Id.  Evidence is regarded as substantial if a 
reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point 
of fact has been proven.  Id. 
 
In challenging the findings, Appellant focuses upon the magistrate court’s findings that 
she had failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing and had failed to secure and 
maintain legitimate employment sufficient to meet the needs of herself and her children.  With 
respect to the safe and stable housing, Appellant contends that she lived in one apartment for 
approximately the first year of this case and that her son resided with her for seven consecutive 
months of that period.  Mother testified that she lived in a house in Middleton with her 
boyfriend, her father and mother, and her sister when the Child Protective Act proceedings 
commenced in March 2009.  She moved out of that house in July 2009 and moved into a low-
income housing with the assistance of the Department.  She was evicted from that housing in 
March 2010 for repeated violations of the lease agreement.  She testified that she cannot 
remember where she lived from then until June 16, 2010, when she moved into a shelter.  She 
moved out of the shelter at the end of November 2010 and moved into the trailer in which she 
was living at the time of trial in December 2010.  She stipulated that the trailer was unsafe for 
 
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children, and the magistrate court found it unfit for habitation, which finding is not contested.  
The trailer appeared to be located in the midst of a junk yard, had no running water, and had 
exposed wiring inside. 
 
With respect to securing and maintaining employment, Appellant contends that she 
collected scrap metal in an attempt to financially provide for herself and her children, applied for 
low wage work, and ran a business delivering wooden pallets and recycling glass.  Appellant 
testified at trial that she owned a business repairing and making wooden pallets, that she 
established the business about four to six weeks before trial, and that she has three to four 
employees.  She said the business was profitable, earning her a monthly income of “[p]robably 
between $300 and $600, $700.”   The magistrate court found, “The evidence presented at trial 
that was intended to demonstrate that [Appellant] had a positive source of income was not 
believable.”  The court also found that she could not fully and clearly explain her claimed 
employment and that it “appeared at best to be only partially legitimate.”  It is the province of the 
trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses.  Camp, 137 
Idaho at 856, 55 P.3d at 310. 
The court’s findings, that Appellant failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing 
and to secure and maintain legitimate employment as required by the case plan, are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.  The court also found that Appellant had failed to 
demonstrate adequate parenting and protective skills with her children as required by her case 
plan, and Appellant does not challenge that finding on appeal.  The court did not err in 
concluding that Appellant had neglected her children by failing to comply with her case plan so 
that they could be reunited with her. 
In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must also find that termination 
is in the best interests of the child.  I.C. § 16-2005(1).  The magistrate court found that the 
children were in need of guidance, care, and support that Appellant had not provided and that it 
was in the children’s best interests for Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated.  Appellant 
contends that this finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence because she 
“has not neglected her children, has substantially completed her case plan, and is able to 
discharge her parental duties.”  As stated above, the findings that she had neglected her children 
by failing to complete her case plan were supported by substantial and competent evidence.  A 
psychological evaluation admitted into evidence stated that Appellant “is operating at a limited 
 
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level of cognitive function” and that she has “a lack of reasoning for the needs of children.”  The 
report concluded that “[s]he has little prospect or motivation for finding and maintaining gainful 
employment and a means for caring for her children.”  The court found that Appellant “is 
generally unwilling to make the changes in her behavior and her decision-making processes that 
would be necessary for her to complete her case plan.”  It also found that Appellant’s “defiant 
and incredulous attitude toward these failures [regarding completing her case plan] also supports 
the conclusion that she is unable to discharge her parental duties and that such inability will 
continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or 
well-being of her children.”  Appellant does not challenge these findings on appeal.  There is 
substantial and competent evidence supporting the finding that termination of Appellant’s 
parental rights is in the best interests of her children. 
The statutory grounds for terminating parental rights listed in subsections (a) through (e) 
of Idaho Code section 16-2005(1) are independent.  Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 179, 125 P.3d 
530, 535 (2005).  Having affirmed the finding of neglect under Idaho Code section 16-
2005(1)(b) and 16-2002(3)(b), we need not address the other grounds found by the magistrate 
court.  Id. 
 
III. 
Conclusion. 
 
We affirm the judgment of the magistrate court terminating Appellant’s parental rights in 
her children. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.