Case Title: SALLY JO GRANZER V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0161

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
SALLY JO GRANZER V. STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 130239 P.3d 640Case Number: S-09-0161Decided: 09/29/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

SALLY 
JO GRANZER,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff)

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief Justice at 
time of oral argument

 
 
[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Appellant Sally Joe Granzer of child endangerment for knowingly and willfully 
permitting a child to enter and remain in a dwelling wherein methamphetamine was 
stored.  Granzer seeks reversal of 
that conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence, double jeopardy, and 
evidentiary error.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Granzer presents 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Should the trial court have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal 
at the close of the State's case and was the evidence presented at trial 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err in declining to dismiss for double 
jeopardy?

 
 
III.        Did 
the trial court err in denying the motion for mistrial?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Around 11:00 
o'clock on the morning of October 10, 2006, Deputies Tony Seeman and Trevor 
Osborn of the Campbell County Sheriff's Office accompanied officials from the 
Department of Family Services (DFS) to Granzer's trailer home in Gillette to 
investigate Granzer's suspected involvement with methamphetamine.  Granzer, her roommate, Melissa Selfe, 
and Selfe's two-year-old daughter, GL, were present when the deputies and DFS 
officials arrived.  During a search 
of the residence, the deputies found several items of drug paraphernalia, 
including numerous pipes and a light bulb used to smoke methamphetamine, and 
several Ziploc baggies.  All of the 
items contained methamphetamine residue.  
The deputies also found a baggie containing a quantifiable amount of 
methamphetamine in crystalline form hidden in a recliner where Granzer was 
sitting during the search.  

 
 
[¶4]      Granzer was 
arrested and later charged with one count of felony child endangerment under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009), for permitting GL to be 
present in her home at the time methamphetamine was being stored.  In August 2007, a jury convicted Granzer 
on the charged crime, and she received a suspended prison sentence of 18 to 36 
months.  We reversed Granzer's 
conviction because of an instructional error and remanded the case for a new 
trial.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶¶ 20-22, 193 P.3d 266, 272 (Wyo. 2008) (Granzer I).

 
 
[¶5]      On remand, 
Granzer moved to dismiss the criminal action on double jeopardy grounds.  Granzer contended that she was being 
placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense because she had already been 
convicted of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2009) stemming from the events of October 
10, 2006, a crime she claimed constituted a lesser-included offense of the 
charged felony child endangerment offense.  
The district court rejected Granzer's double jeopardy claim and denied 
the motion to dismiss.  

 
 
[¶6]      Granzer's trial 
commenced on March 16, 2009.  At the 
close of the State's case, Granzer moved for judgment of acquittal alleging the 
State had failed to provide sufficient evidence proving all of the elements 
necessary for conviction on the charged offense.  The district court denied the motion, 
and Granzer proceeded to present evidence in defense of the charge.  On March 17, a jury once again convicted 
Granzer of child endangerment.  The 
district court imposed the original 18- to 36-month prison sentence, which it 
then suspended in favor of four years of supervised probation.  This appeal ensued.  Additional facts will be set forth in 
our discussion of the issues.

 DISCUSSION

 
 

Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶7]      Granzer questions 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction.  Subsumed in her argument is a challenge 
to the adequacy of the evidence at the close of the State's case and, thus, the 
propriety of the district court's denial of her motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  As noted above, Granzer 
introduced evidence in her defense after the district court denied her 
motion.  We have previously held 
that a defendant's introduction of evidence following the denial of a judgment 
of acquittal motion at the conclusion of the State's case constitutes a waiver 
of that motion, thereby precluding appellate review of the trial court's 
ruling.  Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶¶ 12, 14, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo. 2005); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 
1995).  Consistent with this 
precedent, we hold that Granzer waived her right to challenge the propriety of 
the district court's denial of her motion in this appeal.1

 
 
[¶8]      We now turn our 
attention to Granzer's claim that the trial evidence as a whole is insufficient 
to support her conviction.  When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the 
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State, are adequate to permit the trier of fact to find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Granzer, ¶ 23, 193 P.3d  at 273; 
Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 
29, ¶ 23, 152 P.3d 376, 383 
(Wyo. 2007); Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 645 
(Wyo. 2001).  The jury has the 
responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and 
draw reasonable inferences from the facts.  
Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002).  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements 
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 5, 197 P.3d 156, 159 (Wyo. 2008); 
Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 
132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 
(Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶9]      Granzer was 
convicted of child endangerment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2009), which states in pertinent part: "no person shall knowingly 
and willfully . . . permit any child to . . . [e]nter and remain in a . . . 
dwelling . . . that the person knows is being used to . . . store 
methamphetamines."  At trial, and in 
accordance with the statute, the district court instructed the jury that it 
should not convict Granzer unless it found the following elements were proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt:

 
 

1.            
On 
or about the 10th day of October, 2006;

 
 

2.            
In 
Campbell County, Wyoming;

 
 

3.            
The 
Defendant, Sally Jo Granzer;

 
 

4.            
Knowingly 
and willfully permitted;

 
 

5.            
A 
child (GL);

 
 

6.            
To 
enter and remain in a dwelling;

 
 

7.            
That 
the Defendant knew was being used to     store 
methamphetamines.

 
 
[¶10]   In attacking her conviction, 
Granzer does not challenge the adequacy of the evidence proving that 
methamphetamine was stored in her trailer.  
Nor does she claim the evidence failed to prove she knew of the drug's 
presence.  Rather, her complaint 
concerns whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's 
determination that she knowingly and willfully permitted GL to enter and remain 
in the residence on October 10, 2006.

 
 
[¶11]   At trial, Deputy Seeman testified 
that on the morning of October 10, Granzer informed him that both Melissa Selfe 
and GL were present in the trailer.  
He also testified it appeared GL had been staying with her mother at the 
trailer.  In addition, Selfe 
testified that, although GL resided elsewhere, she occasionally babysat GL 
during the day.  Selfe testified 
that Granzer knew about her babysitting responsibilities, knew it was possible 
GL could be in the trailer at any time, and knew GL had been at the trailer with 
Selfe on October 1.  Based on this 
testimony, the jury could have rationally concluded that Granzer had, for some 
time, extended permission for GL to enter and remain in the trailer for such 
purposes.  The jury could also have 
reasonably inferred from Granzer's knowledge of GL's presence that she had at 
least tacitly given permission for the child to visit and stay with her 
mother.  Although no direct evidence 
was presented that Granzer expressly consented to GL's presence in the trailer 
on October 10, the statute does not require that a defendant give express 
consent or permission for a child to enter and remain in a dwelling, nor does it 
require that the permission be given at the exact time the child enters and 
remains in the dwelling.  We find 
sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's guilty 
verdict.

 
 

Double 
Jeopardy

 
 
[¶12]   Granzer maintains her prosecution 
for felony child endangerment violated the double jeopardy provisions of the 
Wyoming and United States Constitutions, and she faults the district court for 
denying her motion to dismiss the criminal charge.  In particular, Granzer contends she was 
twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when she was prosecuted for child 
endangerment after she had been convicted of misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance stemming from the same methamphetamine found in her trailer 
on October 10.  In support of this 
contention, Granzer argues that misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine is a 
lesser-included offense of the crime of child endangerment.  As such, she claims that she could not 
later be prosecuted separately for the greater child endangerment offense.  We examine de novo the question of whether 
Granzer's constitutional right was violated in this instance.  Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 859, 862 
(Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶13]   The Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution 
guarantee that a person will not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense.  Although the language of 
the two provisions differs slightly, we have recognized that they "have the same 
meaning and are coextensive in application."  Umbach v. State, 2002 WY 42, ¶ 8, 42 P.3d 1006, 1008 
(Wyo. 2002).  Under both provisions, 
we look to the statutory elements test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether an 
offense is a lesser-included offense of another and whether an accused has been 
impermissibly prosecuted twice for the same offense.  That test is articulated as 
follows:

 
 
 
 
The 
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does 
not.

 
 

Pope 
v. State, 
2002 WY 9, ¶ 15, 38 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo. 2002) 
(quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S.  at 
304, 52 S.Ct. at 182); see also State v. 
Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 
1129-30 (Wyo. 1993).  Under the Blockburger test, an offense is a 
lesser-included offense if its elements are a subset of the elements of the 
greater offense.  Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1134. If the offense includes an element which the 
greater offense does not, it is not a lesser-included offense.  Id.  Whatever the sequence may be, double 
jeopardy forbids successive prosecution of a criminal defendant for a greater 
and lesser-included offense.  Daniel, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d  at 862; Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1129; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 
501, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2542, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2227, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977).

 
 
[¶14]   With these legal principles in 
mind, we now consider whether the tenets of double jeopardy were transgressed in 
this instance.  The crime of child 
endangerment under § 6-4-405, as charged in this case, states in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a)  Notwithstanding W.S. 6-4-405(b)(iv), no 
person shall knowingly and willfully . . . permit any child 
to:

 
 
                                                
*  *  * *

 
 
(iii)  Enter and remain in a . . . dwelling . . 
. that the person knows is being used to . . . store 
methamphetamines[.]

 
 
The 
crime of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance under § 35-7-1031 upon 
which Granzer was convicted states in pertinent part:

 
 
(c)  It is unlawful for any person knowingly 
or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was 
obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except 
as otherwise authorized by this act. Any person who violates this 
subsection:

 

 

(i) 
And has in his possession a controlled substance in the amount set forth in this 
paragraph is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . For purposes of this paragraph, the 
amounts of a controlled substance are as follows: 

 

 
                                                            
* * * *

 
 

(C) 
For a controlled substance in powder or crystalline form, no more than three (3) 
grams[.] 

 
 
[¶15]   A comparison of the above statutory 
language makes it obvious that the elements of misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance are not a subset of the elements of the crime of child 
endangerment.  Significantly, 
misdemeanor possession requires that the offender possess a controlled 
substance.  The crime of child 
endangerment contains no such requirement but, rather, simply requires the 
offender to have knowledge of its contemporaneous storage in the same dwelling 
as a child.  Additionally, 
misdemeanor possession pertains to any controlled substance in powder or 
crystalline form, whereas child endangerment requires that the controlled 
substance be methamphetamine.  Given 
the difference in elements and the proof required, it is clear that misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance is not a lesser-included offense of child 
endangerment.  Consequently, 
Granzer's prosecution for child endangerment was not barred by the principles of 
double jeopardy.

 
 
[¶16]   Despite the fact misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance contains elements not found in the crime of 
child endangerment, Granzer maintains misdemeanor possession is a 
lesser-included offense because this Court's decision in Granzer I extended the child 
endangerment statute to include simple possession of methamphetamine in the same 
room or dwelling as a child and held that mere possession constituted storage 
under the statute.  We reject 
Granzer's argument for two reasons.  
First, it mischaracterizes our holding in Granzer I.  Second, it appears to be nothing more 
than a request for this Court to consider the underlying facts and the evidence 
used to prove the elements of the separate offenses.  However, the focus of the Blockburger test is not, as Granzer 
would have it, on the similarity of the evidence relied on to prove the elements 
of the offenses but on the elements themselves.2  Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1130; Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 568 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Denial 
of Motion for Mistrial

 
 
[¶17]   In her final argument, Granzer 
contends the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after the 
prosecutor elicited testimony from Melissa Selfe during cross-examination that 
she had been convicted of child endangerment stemming from the same events 
underlying the charge for which Granzer was on trial.  Granzer's contention of error challenges 
a discretionary decision of the district court.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 
(Wyo. 2006).  We will not disturb 
that decision absent a clear finding of an abuse of discretion and resulting 
prejudice.  In determining whether 
an abuse of discretion occurred, our primary focus is the reasonableness of the 
district court's decision under the circumstances.  Id.

 
 
[¶18]   Granzer's condemnation of the 
district court's ruling is premised on the mistaken belief that Selfe's 
testimony violated the rule of Kwallek v. 
State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 
1979), and its progeny.  In Kwallek, we held that when two persons 
are indicted for separate offenses arising out of the same circumstances, the 
fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other.  Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1375.  Essentially, the Kwallek rule precludes the State from 
presenting evidence of a confederate's conviction on a related offense as 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.  That prohibition, however, applies only 
to conviction evidence offered by the State in its case-in-chief.   Roden v. State, 2010 WY 11, ¶ 22, 225 P.3d 497, 503 
(Wyo. 2010); KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d 217, 223 (Wyo. 2004); Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236, 241 (Wyo. 1994); Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 1979); Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1375-76.  We have never extended the Kwallek rule to encompass conviction 
evidence elicited during the State's cross-examination of a defense witness 
which may otherwise be admissible, for example, under W.R.E. 6093 to impeach the witness' 
credibility.  See, e.g., Porth, 868 P.2d  at 
241.

 
 
[¶19]   In denying Granzer's motion for 
mistrial, the district court recognized the limited reach of the Kwallek rule and its inapplicability to 
Selfe's testimony.  The district 
court found that the evidence concerning Selfe's child endangerment conviction 
was admissible under the strictures of W.R.E. 609 for the limited purpose of 
impeaching Selfe's credibility, a finding that Granzer does not specifically 
challenge in this appeal.  In 
addition, the district court determined that the conviction evidence was not 
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial, and that any potential prejudice 
flowing from that evidence was adequately addressed by the limiting instruction 
it had furnished to the jury, which stated:

 
 
Ladies 
and Gentlemen of the jury:  you have 
heard evidence that Melissa Selfe, a witness in this case, was a defendant in 
two prior cases and that she was convicted of two felonies.  This evidence of convictions was 
admitted for very limited purposes.  
Specifically, the evidence was admitted so that you may assess the 
credibility of this witness as part of your duty in assessing the credibility of 
each and every witness who has appeared in this case.  Under no circumstances should the 
evidence of these convictions be used by you as evidence of the guilt of the 
Defendant.  

 
 
[¶20]   After careful review, we cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion in reaching these 
conclusions.  Consequently, we 
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
mistrial motion.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   We hold that sufficient evidence 
exists to sustain Granzer's conviction for child endangerment.  We also hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Granzer's motion for mistrial and her motion 
to dismiss the criminal charge.  
Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We recognize that in Martin v. 
State, 2007 WY 2, ¶¶ 30-34, 
149 P.3d 707, 714-15 (Wyo. 
2007), we deviated from the waiver rule and considered a challenge to the denial 
of a motion for judgment of acquittal under similar circumstances utilizing the 
plain error standard of review.  We 
conclude that our application of the plain error analysis in Martin was in error.  In future cases, as in this case, we 
will give effect to the waiver principle and decline to consider such 
claims.

 
 

2Granzer also seemingly suggests that the evidence would support a merger 
of the two offenses for sentencing purposes under Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000).  However, Granzer does not develop this 
issue so we will not further consider it.

 
 

3W.R.E. 609, "Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime," permits the 
introduction of conviction evidence for purposes of attacking the credibility of 
a witness if certain conditions are satisfied.