Case Title: Loomer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Loomer v. State1989 WY 35768 P.2d 1042Case Number: 87-253Decided: 02/08/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DAVID 
FOREST LOOMER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender (argued), and Steven E. Weerts, Asst. Public 
Defender, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen A. Byrne, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant David Loomer 
appeals his jury conviction of the charges of aggravated robbery for which he 
was sentenced to 20 to 25 years and kidnapping for which he was sentenced to 25 
to 40 years. Appellant was also ordered to pay $50 to the Wyoming State Victim's 
Compensation Fund and $2500 to ConverseCounty as "reimbursement of costs in this 
matter."

 
 

[¶2.]     The issues, as 
presented by appellant for our determination, are:

 
 
"Whether 
the district court erred in placing the burden of proof on the defense to show 
that Appellant was incompetent to proceed to trial."

 
 
"Whether or 
not it was error to refuse to instruct on the lesser-included offense of 
kidnapping."

 
 
"Whether or 
not the district court erred in limiting the defense's questioning into the bias 
of the StateHospital."

 
 
"Whether or 
not the district court erred in assessing costs of 
prosecution."

 
 

[¶3.]     We affirm, except as to 
costs.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     On March 21, 1987, 
appellant purchased a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol at a sporting goods 
store in Douglas, Wyoming. That evening he entered the 
Pump-n-Pak East store in Douglas, where a 
clerk, Kyla Bohlander, was working the night shift. He asked if the manager was 
there. She said no but that he would be back shortly. Appellant then produced 
the pistol and told her to get the money out the register. She complied, putting 
the money in a brown paper bag.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant next told her 
to get her keys because she was taking him to Casper. As she reached for her keys, her hand 
covered with her coat, she pushed a button triggering a silent alarm. They went 
outside and entered the truck she had driven to work. Appellant directed Ms. 
Bohlander to drive out of town towards Casper. She told him to take the truck and 
leave her, but he told her to shut up and drive. They reached the interstate and 
headed for Casper.

 
 

[¶6.]     Meanwhile, back in 
Douglas, police officers had responded to the 
alarm and had arrived just in time to see the truck leave. After checking out 
the store, they determined that a robbery had occurred and notified the 
dispatcher. The dispatcher, by radio, notified area law enforcement to pick up 
and hold the occupants of the truck. A highway patrolman saw the truck, followed 
it, identified it as matching the description given over the radio, and called 
for assistance.

 
 

[¶7.]     Ms. Bohlander noticed 
the lights of the car following them. She testified that appellant apparently 
realized that they were being followed, that "he got real nervous" and told her 
to speed up. The highway patrolman following the truck had turned on his 
flashing lights when another patrolman arrived to assist. When the patrolman 
turned on his flashing lights, appellant rolled down the window, and the 
patrolman observed the paper bag being thrown out. Shortly thereafter, appellant 
ordered her to pull over and stop. A deputy sheriff, summoned by radio, searched 
the side of the road and found a brown paper bag containing a loaded .22 caliber 
semi-automatic pistol and $583 in loose cash. The gun was later identified as 
the one appellant used in the robbery, and the cash corresponded to the amount 
missing from the store. 

 
 

[¶8.]     At his arraignment, 
appellant pled not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, 
and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency. Appellant was 
committed to the WyomingStateHospital pursuant to W.S. 
7-11-303 and examined by Dr. F.W. Allport. As a result of motions by defense 
counsel, appellant was also examined by Dr. Brian Miracle and Dr. Arthur N. 
Merrell. A competency hearing was held on September 28, 1987. Appellant was 
found competent to stand trial. He was tried the next day and convicted of 
aggravated robbery in violation of W.S. 6-2-401(a)(ii), (c)(ii) and kidnapping 
in violation of W.S. 6-2-201(a)(ii), (b)(i), (d).

 
 
I

 
 

[¶9.]     At the hearing to 
determine competency, the trial court placed the burden upon appellant to prove 
lack of competency. After hearing testimony from two psychiatrists, appellant's 
defense counsel, and appellant himself, the court found that appellant was 
competent to stand trial and stated that it would have reached the same decision 
on competency regardless of the allocation of the burden of 
proof.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant argues that it was error to 
place the burden on the defense to prove incompetency and that the result would 
have been different had the burden of proof been placed with the State. W.S. 
7-11-303 provides a detailed procedure to determine competency when there is 
reasonable cause to believe that defendant may be unfit to proceed due to mental 
illness or deficiency. A hearing is required when the opinion of the designated 
examiner as to competency to stand trial is contested. W.S. 7-11-303(f). The 
statute is silent concerning burden of proof on the issue of 
competency.

 
 

[¶11.]  We have said that the question of 
competency to stand trial "is a threshold issue, necessary to be resolved to 
prevent a violation of due process through conviction of a person incompetent to 
stand trial." Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 563 (Wyo. 1979); see W.S. 7-11-302. This position 
is consistent with that taken by the United States Supreme Court in Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975). In Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), the Court said that mental competency to stand trial is an element 
of the due process right to a fair trial. When there is reasonable cause to 
believe an accused is unfit to proceed, this due process right is best protected 
by allocating the burden of proof to the party who is seeking to show that the 
accused is competent to stand trial. We hold, therefore, that in a W.S. 
7-11-303(f) hearing arising from a contested opinion on competency, the burden 
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence rests on the party seeking to 
establish that the accused is competent.

 
 

[¶12.]  Although the trial court erred in this 
case by placing the burden of proof with appellant, it was harmless error. In 
order to constitute a ground for reversal, an error must be prejudicial and 
affect the substantial rights of appellant. Matter of Jones, 702 P.2d 1299 
(Wyo. 1985). 
The burden is on appellant to establish an error as prejudicial. McCarthy v. 
Whitlock Const. and Supply, 715 P.2d 218 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant argues that placing the burden 
of proof on the State would have resulted in a finding that defendant was 
incompetent. The thrust of his argument is that the evidence raises an inference 
that he lacked capacity to cooperate with counsel due to mental illness or 
deficiency. Defense counsel testified that communication with appellant was 
difficult, and he was uncooperative. Defendant may not prevent his trial by 
refusing to communicate with his counsel. State v. Platt, 130 Ariz. 570, 637 P.2d 1073 
(1981). A psychiatrist called by the defense testified that in his opinion 
appellant had a diminished capacity, but declined to say that appellant had a 
total lack of capacity. The psychiatrist called by the State testified that, 
while appellant may be mentally ill, his mental illness did not prevent him from 
cooperating with counsel.

 
 

[¶14.]  The trial court specifically found the 
evidence such that it would have held the appellant competent to stand trial 
regardless of the allocation of the burden of proof. "Allocation of the burden 
of proof will be significant, in theory at least, only in the rare case when, 
assuming the evidence is weighed by the preponderance of evidence standard, the 
conflicting evidence is in equipoise in the mind of the fact finder." 
United 
States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3rd Cir. 
1976). In light of the evidence supporting the court's decision and the court's 
finding that it would have found appellant competent had the burden been placed 
on the State, we find the error in allocation of the burden of proof to be 
harmless.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant claims he was entitled to a 
lesser-included offense instruction. The kidnapping statute, W.S. 6-2-201, 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"(a) A 
person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place 
of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the 
removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with intent 
to:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) 
Facilitate the commission of a felony * * *.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(b) A 
removal or confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished:

 
 
"(i) By 
force, threat or deception * * *."

 
 
The crime 
of kidnapping is complete when subsections (a) and (b) of W.S. 6-2-201 have been 
accomplished. In this case, it is not contested that appellant was guilty of the 
crime of kidnapping.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant argues that the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on what he contends is a lesser-included 
offense set forth in subsection (c) of W.S. 6-2-201, which 
provides:

 
 
"(c) If the 
defendant voluntarily releases the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe 
place prior to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than twenty (20) years."

 
 

[¶17.]  The test for a lesser-included offense is 
given in Balsley v. State, 668 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1983), wherein we 
said:

 
 
"[A] crime 
described by statute may not be necessarily included within another statutory 
offense unless all of the elements within the claimed lesser offense are to be 
found in the greater, and unless the greater offense cannot be committed without 
also committing the putative lesser offense." 668 P.2d  at 
1329.

 
 
Subsection 
(c) does not create a lesser-included offense. It describes mitigating 
circumstances rather than elements of the offense.

 
 

[¶18.]  Subsection (d) of W.S. 6-2-201 
provides:

 
 
"(d) If the 
defendant does not voluntarily release the victim substantially unharmed and in 
a safe place prior to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than twenty (20) years or for life except as provided in W.S. 
6-2-101."

 
 
Subsections 
(c) and (d) pose one question: Did the defendant voluntarily release the victim 
substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial? If that question is 
answered in the affirmative, punishment is imprisonment for not more than 20 
years; if in the negative, it is 20 years to life.

 
 

[¶19.]  The statute defines a single crime, 
kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a 
reduced sentence based upon defendant's conduct subsequent to the kidnapping. 
Thus, subsection (c) provides for a lesser sentence if four conditions are 
established: (1) the defendant voluntarily releases the victim, (2) 
substantially unharmed, (3) in a safe place, (4) prior to trial. If any of these 
four conditions are not met, the lesser-sentence provision is not 
applicable.

 
 

[¶20.]  The purpose of the voluntary release 
provisions is to provide an incentive to release the victim unharmed after a 
kidnap has occurred. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries, part II, vol. 1 at 
pp. 232-5 (discussing Model Penal Code § 212.1, which is substantially similar 
to W.S. 6-2-201). The statute provides a means for reducing a defendant's 
possible sentence after he has committed the crime of kidnapping. Defendant is 
the only person who will benefit from showing that mitigating circumstances are 
present. State v. Cornute, 64 Ohio App.2d 199, 412 N.E.2d 416 (1979). 
Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show 
that the circumstances exist. The burden of showing mitigating circumstances 
which are not an element of the offense may be placed on a defendant without 
violating due process requirements. Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977). If competent evidence is produced and a proper instruction is 
offered, the court should instruct the jury to determine whether the elements of 
subsection (c) have been established. Cf. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 
(Wyo. 1987). 
After the jury answers the questions posed, the court will sentence 
accordingly.

 
 

[¶21.]  Some courts have interpreted similar 
state kidnapping statutes to place consideration of mitigating circumstances 
solely in the hands of the sentencing judge. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 175 
Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138 (1977); State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 249 S.E.2d 709 (1978). 
However, in light of the express factual conditions set out in W.S. 6-2-201, the 
legislature apparently intended that the discretion of the sentencing court be 
limited. Therefore, the question should be submitted to the jury when the 
evidence presented raises the issue.

 
 

[¶22.]  In this case, the question of voluntary 
release was submitted to the jury in Instruction No. 13, which provided in 
relevant part:

 
 
"The 
necessary elements of the crime of kidnapping are * * *:

 
 
"1. The 
crime occurred within the County of Converse on or about the date of March 21, 
1987; and the defendant

 
 
"2. 
Unlawfully removed another

 
 
"3. From 
her place of business

 
 
"4. With 
the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony

 
 
"5. And did 
not voluntarily release the victim substantially unharmed in a safe 
place.

 
 
"If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has 
not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
not guilty."

 
 

[¶23.]  The instruction was incorrect as given in 
that it placed with the State the burden of proving that defendant did not 
voluntarily release the victim unharmed in a safe place. Had the State failed in 
this burden of proof, appellant would have been acquitted. That would clearly 
have been an incorrect result in this case. The instruction as given, however, 
could only have been of benefit to appellant. The issue of voluntary release was 
placed before the jury. The jury found that appellant had not voluntarily 
released the victim substantially unharmed in a safe place. Thus, Instruction 
No. 13 presented to the jury the very issue for which appellant now argues. If 
there was error in the instruction, it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶24.]  Appellant argues that defense counsel 
were improperly precluded from cross-examining Dr. Allport in regard to bias. 
Dr. Allport was the psychiatrist at the StateHospital who examined appellant after a 
court order pursuant to W.S. 7-11-303. He subsequently reported to the court 
that appellant did not demonstrate mental illness or deficiency either at the 
time of examination or at the time of the crime.

 
 

[¶25.]  State Hospital records covering a period 
of approximately 20 years prior to trial show that appellant had been diagnosed 
as schizophrenic on several occasions, including a 1976 diagnosis by Dr. Allport 
of appellant as a paranoid schizophrenic. Dr. Allport testified at the 
competency hearing that, while he was aware of prior diagnoses of schizophrenia, 
his current diagnosis was that appellant was feigning mental 
illness.

 
 

[¶26.]  Defense counsel was allowed to examine 
Dr. Allport concerning these apparent inconsistencies at both the competency 
hearing and at trial. Defense counsel then attempted to impeach Dr. Allport by 
suggesting an improper motive for his diagnosis, i.e., that Dr. Allport might 
fabricate a diagnosis in order to limit possible civil liability of the State 
Hospital. The prosecutor objected to this line of questioning, and the trial 
court excluded it, effectively ruling that the prejudice of cross-examination 
outweighed its probative value.

 
 

[¶27.]  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires a defendant to have some opportunity to show bias on the 
part of a prosecution witness. Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). However, this does not confer a right to 
unlimited cross-examination. Attempts to demonstrate bias through 
cross-examination are subject to the wide discretion of the trial court in 
determining the admissibility of evidence. United 
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S. Ct. 465, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1984).

 
 

[¶28.]  The theory of bias on the part of Dr. 
Allport advanced by appellant1 depends in large part on a chain of 
conjecture. The logic of appellant's theory of motive is as 
follows:

 
 
1) Dr. 
Allport works for the StateHospital;

 
 
2) the 
records of the StateHospital show that appellant had 
previously been described as "a danger to others";

 
 
3) 
appellant was released rather than kept in the StateHospital;

 
 
4) after 
his release, appellant committed aggravated robbery and 
kidnapping:

 
 
ergo,

 
 
a) 
appellant could not have committed these crimes unless he was released by the 
StateHospital;

 
 
b) the 
victims of these crimes might sue the StateHospital for releasing 
appellant;

 
 
c) Dr. 
Allport might have considered the possibility of such litigation when making his 
diagnosis;

 
 
d) Dr. 
Allport's diagnosis might benefit the StateHospital if such civil litigation was 
filed;

 
 
therefore, 
appellant argues, Dr. Allport might have had a motive to fabricate his 
diagnosis.

 
 

[¶29.]  No evidence of any planned or pending 
civil litigation was presented. There was no indication of a threat of 
litigation involving the StateHospital or that Dr. Allport considered 
such or was motivated to "fabricate" his diagnosis. Defense counsel's theory of 
bias rests solely on inferences drawn from an improbable, remote hypothetical 
set of circumstances.

 
 

[¶30.]  Assuming arguendo that this is relevant 
evidence, the trial court has discretion under Rule 403, W.R.E. to exclude 
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury * * 
*." The scope of extended cross-examination tending to show bias or interest 
rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241 
(Wyo. 1977). 
"A trial court's discretionary ruling on evidence will not be upset except for 
clear abuse which is appellant's burden to demonstrate." Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Wyo. 1985). Given the highly speculative 
nature of defense counsel's theory, we do not find the trial court abused its 
discretion by limiting cross-examination in this area.

 
 
IV

 
 

[¶31.]  Prior to trial, appellant filed an 
affidavit of indigency which listed approximately $120 in assets. He has been 
represented throughout all proceedings by counsel provided through the public 
defender's office. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked that 
appellant be "ordered to reimburse the State for a portion of his cost of 
defense and the cost of this trial." In addition to the sentence of 
imprisonment, the judgment and sentence of the trial court included an order for 
appellant to pay ConverseCounty $2500 "as reimbursement of costs in 
this matter." After the trial court was informed that appellant had a bank 
account with a balance in excess of $2500, it entered an order for release of 
funds in the amount of $2500, to be paid to the trial expense account of the 
Converse County Attorney's office.

 
 

[¶32.]  We have previously held that a court 
cannot tax costs in a criminal case without express statutory authority. Burke 
v. State, 746 P.2d 852 (Wyo. 1987). The current Wyoming Statutes 
provide that "[p]ayment of the costs of prosecution may be added to and made a 
part of the sentence in any felony or misdemeanor case." W.S. 7-11-505. This 
statute was enacted in 1987, with an effective date of May 22, 1987. 1987 
Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 126 § 2. The statutes in effect immediately prior to the 
enactment of W.S. 7-11-505 did not authorize assessing costs of prosecution 
against a convicted defendant. Burke v. State, 746 P.2d  at 
858.

 
 

[¶33.]  Appellant committed his crimes on March 
21, 1987, prior to the effective date of W.S. 7-11-505. He now argues that 
imposition of costs as part of his sentence was not statutorily authorized, and 
as applied to him, W.S. 7-11-505 is a constitutionally prohibited ex post facto 
law.

 
 

[¶34.]  The United States 
Constitution, Art. 1, § 10, and the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 35, both 
prohibit ex post facto laws. We have previously said that "the constitutional 
interdiction of ex post facto laws reaches out to every law which deprives the 
accused of any substantial right or immunity possessed by him at the time when 
he is said to have committed the offense charged." In Interest of Jones, 500 P.2d 690, 692 (Wyo. 1972). However, not every change in the 
law that adversely affects a defendant is subject to the prohibition against ex 
post facto laws. Changes in procedure generally do not come within the ex post 
facto doctrine. In Interest of Jones, 500 P.2d  at 692. Therefore, this issue 
turns on whether assessment of costs is a procedural or substantive 
detriment.

 
 

[¶35.]  The United States Supreme Court has said 
"`any statute * * * which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, 
after its commission, * * * is prohibited as ex post facto.'" Dobbert v. 
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 2298, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. Ct. 68, 68, 70 L. Ed. 216 (1925)). The language of W.S. 7-11-505 clearly authorizes costs of 
prosecution to be "added to and made a 
part of the sentence." An increase in the potential sentence for a crime 
which becomes effective after the criminal act is a substantive detriment. 
Therefore, costs of prosecution may not be assessed against appellant under W.S. 
7-11-505 without violating the ex post facto prohibition.

 
 

[¶36.]  The judgment and sentence of the court 
does not specify if the costs imposed are "costs of prosecution." Since other 
costs may be legally imposed, we modify the sentence to delete the reference to 
costs, and remand to the district court for a determination of what costs may be 
imposed under the statutes in effect at the time appellant committed his 
criminal acts.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellant also asks that we find W.S. 
7-11-505 facially unconstitutional. In light of our holding that the statute 
does not apply to appellant, we do not reach this issue.

 
 

[¶38.]  AFFIRMED AS 
MODIFIED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 At trial, 
defense counsel characterized this bias as a "possible conflict of interest" on 
the part of Dr. Allport. On appeal, it is characterized as "the possible bias of 
the WyomingStateHospital to fabricate a 
diagnosis."