Case Title: KENNETH ALAN PROFFIT, SR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0079

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
KENNETH ALAN PROFFIT, SR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 103191 P.3d 974Case Number: NO. S-07-0079Decided: 09/03/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KENT 
ALAN PROFFIT, SR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, WyomingState Public Defender; Tina 
N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael 
Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Kent 
Alan Proffit, Sr. ("Proffit") was convicted following a jury trial of first 
degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder.  He was sentenced to two consecutive 
terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  On appeal, Proffit challenges several 
evidentiary rulings of the district court and assails the prosecutor for 
misconduct during closing argument.  
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Proffit presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err in admitting hearsay statements of Chris 
Hicks?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it did not allow defense 
expert witness Roger Willard to testify at the trial?

 
 
III.        Did 
the trial court incorrectly allow law enforcement to offer hearsay statements of 
Jacob Martinez and Michael Seiser?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct when he objected to proposed defense evidence, and 
then mischaracterized the defense evidence in closing 
argument?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During the fall 
of 2005, Proffit lived in a trailer home in Gillette with his son, Kent Proffit, 
Jr.  Also living there were three 
young men, Chris Hicks, Jacob Martinez, and Jeremy Forquer.  A frequent visitor to the trailer was 
Michael Seiser. 

 
 
[¶4]      In early 
September, Hicks told Martinez about a plot to bring a large quantity 
of marijuana, valued at around $500,000.00, to Gillette.  Martinez agreed to help Hicks sell it.  However, in mid-September something went 
wrong with the deal.  Hicks received 
a telephone call advising him that the shipment of marijuana had been "lost," 
and that he would be held responsible for it.  Hicks became visibly upset by this news, 
so much that he attempted to kill himself.  
When Martinez attempted to intervene in that effort, 
a fight ensued and the others in the trailer became alarmed.  Recognizing their alarm, Hicks and 
Martinez 
explained what had happened.  
Proffit told the young men that he had "connections" and could take care 
of the problem for them.  After 
making a telephone call, Proffit assured the men that the situation had been 
resolved.  Proffit also told them 
that they "owed him favors" for his involvement in and solution of the 
problem.  

 
 
[¶5]      Approximately a 
week later, Hicks and Martinez learned that their debt to Proffit 
would involve the murder of Forquer.  
At that time, Proffit told Hicks and Martinez that Forquer was "working for the 
cops" and that he needed to be eliminated.  
Over the next several weeks, Proffit, Hicks and Martinez discussed various 
ways the murder could be accomplished.  
Around mid-October, Proffit devised a plan in which Forquer would be 
tricked into a lethal chokehold by Hicks.  
According to the plan, Proffit would ask Hicks to show him a chokehold 
that would incapacitate a person; Hicks would agree to show him; they would get 
Forquer to volunteer for the demonstration; and Hicks would apply the chokehold 
on Forquer and continue to strangle him until he was dead.  

 
 
[¶6]      On October 28, 
Proffit decided to put the plan into action.1  Around midnight, in accordance with the 
plan, Proffit asked Hicks to show him a chokehold that he could use to take a 
person down.  When Hicks stated that 
he needed a demonstration partner, Forquer volunteered.2 Hicks placed his arms around 
Forquer and choked him until he lost consciousness.  Shortly thereafter, both men slumped to 
the floor.  When Hicks indicated 
that he was tiring, Proffit directed Martinez to 
get a rope, which Martinez then tightened around Forquer's neck 
for several minutes until he was dead.  
Martinez 
also punched Forquer in his throat several times to ensure that Forquer could 
not regain his breath.  

 
 
[¶7]      After talking and 
laughing about the murder, specifically the fact that Forquer had urinated on 
himself, Proffit, Hicks, Martinez, and Seiser began the process of 
cleaning the trailer and disposing of Forquer's personal belongings and any 
evidence related to his murder.  
Proffit directed Hicks and Martinez to clean the area and wipe down 
Forquer's body with a bleach solution, while he and Seiser gathered Forquer's 
personal belongings.  At Proffit's 
direction, the young men then lined the trunk of Hicks' Dodge Intrepid with 
several large trash bags and placed Forquer's body inside, along with Forquer's 
personal belongings. 

 
 
[¶8]      The four men then 
got into the vehicle and drove away.  
At Proffit's direction, Hicks proceeded westbound on Interstate 90 toward 
Buffalo, Wyoming, to find a ravine wherein Forquer's 
body could be dumped.  During the 
drive, Martinez 
tossed Forquer's wallet and cellular telephone out of the window.  Before reaching Buffalo, they turned 
around and headed back toward Gillette.  
Eventually, Proffit found the perfect location.  At Proffit's direction, the young men 
concealed Forquer's body under a large pine tree not too far from the 
highway.  They then resumed their 
journey back to Gillette, disposing of the rest of Forquer's belongings at 
various locations along the highway.  

 
 
[¶9]      Forquer's murder 
came to light on December 23, 2005, when Martinez, who was incarcerated on charges 
relating to another murder, spoke to Lieutenant Eric Seeman of the Campbell 
County Sheriff's Department.  
Martinez 
explained how he, Hicks and Proffit killed Forquer and disposed of Forquer's 
body and personal belongings.  He 
also directed law enforcement to the location where Forquer's body had been 
secreted.3  

 
 
[¶10]   Following his arrest on December 
24, 2005, Proffit spoke with Lieutenant Seeman.  Proffit admitted to being in the trailer 
at the time of Forquer's murder, and confirmed the manner in which Forquer was 
killed, including the use of the rope.  
He also admitted accompanying Hicks and Martinez on the excursion to dispose of 
Forquer's body.  Proffit, however, 
insisted that Forquer's death was an accident and that he tried to convince 
Hicks and Martinez to report it to the sheriff's 
office.   

 
 
[¶11]   Additional facts will be set forth 
as necessary to address the issues raised by Proffit.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
A.        
Evidentiary Rulings

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶12]   We recently reiterated the standard 
for reviewing challenges to the admission of evidence:

 
 
Generally, 
decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.  Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 14, 98 P.3d 181, 187 (Wyo. 2004).  We afford 
considerable deference to the district court's decision and, as long as a 
legitimate basis exists for the district court's ruling, it will not be reversed 
on appeal.  Id.  Under the abuse of discretion standard, 
our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court's 
decision.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 20, 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo. 2007); Wilde v. 
State, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo. 2003).  The burden of establishing an abuse of 
discretion rests with the appellant.  
Martin, ¶ 20, 157 P.3d  at 
928.

 
 

If 
we find that the district court erred in admitting the evidence, we must then 
determine whether or not the error affected [the appellant's] substantial 
rights, providing grounds for reversal, or whether the error was harmless.  See Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 2001); W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52.  The error is harmful if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to [the 
appellant] if the error had never occurred.  Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 767.  To demonstrate harmful error, [the 
appellant] must prove prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."  Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 
(Wyo. 
1990)).

 
 
To 
the extent no objection is made at trial to the evidence challenged on appeal, 
our review is limited to determining whether plain error occurred.  We will not find plain error 
unless:  (1) the record clearly 
reflects the error; (2) the party claiming the error demonstrates that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable, way; and (3) the party proves that the violation adversely affected a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 698, 702 (Wyo. 2007); Cazier v. 
State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 2006); Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Humphrey 
v. State, 
2008 WY 67, ¶¶ 44-46, 185 P.3d 1236, 1249-50 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

Issue 
I  Hearsay statements of Chris Hicks

 
 
[¶13]   At trial, Martinez testified, 
without objection, that Hicks told him in early September 2005 that he had 
arranged for a large quantity of marijuana, valued at approximately $500,000.00, 
to be delivered to Gillette for them to sell; Hicks subsequently received a 
telephone call around mid-September, during which he heard Hicks ask "not to be 
killed or not to be blamed for something he didn't do"; Hicks told Martinez that 
the shipment of marijuana had been "lost" and the supplier was holding him 
responsible for it; after Hicks told Proffit about the situation, Proffit 
informed them that he was "connected" and would take care of it; a day or two 
later, Proffit told them that they "owed him favors" for taking care of the 
problem; and Proffit later told them that one of the favors would be the killing 
of Forquer.  

 
 
[¶14]   Proffit now contends that plain 
error occurred when the district court admitted into evidence Hicks' 
out-of-court statements to Martinez because the statements are hearsay4 and do not qualify for admission 
under any of the hearsay exceptions.  
He also claims the admission of Hicks' statements violated his 
confrontation rights under both the state and federal 
constitutions.

 
 
[¶15]   We recently rejected an identical 
argument in Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 
102,  ___ P.3d ____ (Wyo. 
2008).  In that case we 
determined:

 
 
Hicks' 
statements to Martinez would only be hearsay if they were 
being offered to prove the assertions being made by Hicks.  Thus, the statements would be hearsay if 
they were being offered to prove, for instance, that Hicks had arranged a 
500-pound marijuana deal, or that the deal had "gone bad," or that he and 
Martinez were 
being threatened with death.  The 
statements were not, however, offered for that purpose.  Rather, they were offered for the 
purpose of showing the effect the statements had upon Martinez and 
[Proffit]  See Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 
853-54 (Wyo. 1999) (credibility of the declarant not the 
issue).

 
 
The 
fact that Hicks' statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted also defeats [Proffit's] contention that admission of the statements 
violated his constitutional confrontation rights.  Crawford, itself, notes that the 
confrontation clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted."  Crawford [v. Washington], 541 U.S. [36], 59 n.9, 
124 S.Ct. [1354], 1369 n.9[, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)]; Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 11, 169 P.3d 81, 85 (Wyo. 2007); Szymanski v. 
State, 2007 WY 139, ¶¶ 20-26, 166 P.3d 879, 884-86 (Wyo. 2007).  [Proffit] has failed to show plain 
error.

 
 

Proffit, 
¶¶ 21-22, ___ P.3d at ___.  Our 
decision in that case is equally dispositive of  Proffit's claim in this case.5

 
 

Issue 
II  Exclusion of expert testimony

 
 
[¶16]   On the final day of trial, the 
State objected to the proposed testimony of defense expert witness, Roger 
Willard, whom the defense intended to testify about the investigation conducted 
in the case, including the interviews and the crime scene evidence collection.6  The prosecutor argued that Willard 
should not be permitted to testify about the collection of "trace" evidence from 
the crime scenes because Willard's curriculum vitae did not show that he 
had any specialized training or experience in evidence collection.  The prosecutor also argued that any 
testimony concerning police interrogation practices was not relevant to 
establish or dispute the existence of any facts at issue in the case, noting 
that there had been no issue raised during trial that police did anything 
improper during the interviews, nor was there any universally accepted policy or 
law mandating that law enforcement officers conduct their interviews in any 
specific manner.  

 
 
[¶17]   In response to the prosecutor's 
objection, the defense first argued that the prosecutor's objection was untimely 
and should have been raised earlier in the proceedings.  The defense then briefly discussed 
Willard's background and his qualifications to testify generally about crime 
scene evidence collection and the protocols to be followed.  In addition, after generally noting 
there were some discrepancies in Lieutenant Seeman's and Investigator Peyrot's 
recollection as to what Seiser had reported, the defense argued that Willard's 
proposed testimony was relevant, stating that the way law enforcement "conducted 
the interviews and the investigation is always relevant in any case to talk 
about."  The prosecutor then 
questioned whether Willard's proposed testimony would entail improper comments 
upon the credibility of the officers, and reiterated his earlier argument 
concerning the lack of relevance Willard's testimony had to any issue contested 
at trial.  

 
 
[¶18]   Unable to determine whether the 
proposed testimony would be probative to any issue at trial or whether it was 
merely intended to impugn the credibility of the witnesses, the district court 
requested an offer of proof.  During 
the offer of proof, defense counsel questioned Willard about his background, the 
materials he had reviewed, and about the substance of his proposed testimony. 
Willard testified that he had been in law enforcement since 1962 and was an 
"expert" in police policies and protocols.  
Although Willard believed that the officers conducting the interview had 
reconstructed their reports solely from their recollections, defense counsel was 
forced to correct Willard by pointing out that the officers actually had taken 
notes, which were then used to write their formal reports.  Based on that information, Willard 
acknowledged that at least one of the primary protocols concerning police 
interviews was satisfied.  However, 
Willard indicated that it was a "trend" in modern law enforcement to record 
interviews, especially those interviews conducted during the investigation of 
serious crimes, to ensure that the credibility of the investigation, the 
interviewing officer, and the person being interviewed is protected.  Willard generally noted the differences 
in the statements of Martinez and Seiser and questioned whether 
"there was an opportunity for those two witnesses to compare their statements 
and to conspire to ensure that certain statements that they made were 
consistent."  

 
 
[¶19]   Willard also expressed some doubt 
as to the ability of the crime scene technicians to conduct a thorough 
investigation  specifically, the collection of evidence at the site where 
Forquer's body was found  at night via high-powered floodlights.7  He testified that "standard protocol" 
would have been to secure the scene until the daylight hours when a more 
thorough examination could be performed.  Finally, Willard testified that protocols 
were violated by the failure to conduct a forensic examination of the trailer 
home where the homicide occurred and the vehicle that was used to transfer 
Forquer's body.8  

 
 
[¶20]   On cross-examination, Willard 
acknowledged that, in spite of his personal belief that there was a "trend" in 
modern law enforcement to record interviews, many law enforcement agencies, 
including those in Colorado with which Willard was most familiar, 
did not require the recording of interviews.  Willard also acknowledged that the 
"recording" protocols he espoused were actually suggested practices, and that he 
knew of no legal requirement for the recording of interviews. In addition, 
Willard indicated that if personnel from the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory had 
in fact conducted "trace" evidence collection from the trailer where Forquer was 
murdered and the car in which his body was transported, as well as the site 
where his body was found, the protocols for crime scene investigations would 
have been satisfied.  

 
 
[¶21]   Following Willard's testimony, 
defense counsel again generally argued that Willard's proposed expert testimony 
was relevant:

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I think I've 
explained my position on this already.  
I think that the relevance question concerning the investigation of this 
case, the interviews, the crime scene investigation, his testimony directly goes 
to the credibility of that investigation and allows, I think, the jury to 
consider that there are protocols that were not followed in this case that are 
generally accepted throughout the nation, and I think that's the impetus of his 
testimony and should be allowed.  

 
 
The 
prosecutor countered:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, if that is the direction 
that the defense would intend this testimony to take, I believe that Mr. 
Willard's testimony would have to beat [sic] the Daubert test and there would have to be 
testimony by him that this is a generally accepted principle by everybody in the 
country, that it's set down nationwide protocol that all of the experts in the 
field agree that the recording has to be done.

 
 
The 
best that he can do is tell you that it's a suggestion by nationwide police 
agencies.  And more importantly, his 
testimony is that there's a trend across the country that there be 
recordings.  There's no requirement 
legally by his testimony.  There's 
no requirement constitutionally in Wyoming.  
And as a result of that, Your Honor, that testimony with respect to 
recording, is a lay witness' opinion that in his opinion this should have been 
recorded.

 
 
When 
you take it a step further and you consider his testimony, I can't remember how 
many times he said words like credibility and reliability and truthfulness, and 
clearly, that testimony is completely inappropriate for any witness to 
utter.  He is defining for the jury 
how to evaluate each witness that has testified, and that's their 
job.

 
 
With 
respect to evidence collection, Your Honor, I don't think that's an issue 
anymore.  The testimony before this 
Court from Agent Hamilton was that the crime lab processed all three 
scenes.  He specifically testified 
he watched them take trace evidence, so it's not even relevant with respect to 
that area.  

 
 
[¶22]   After considering the offer of 
proof and counsel's arguments, the district court sustained the State's 
objection to Willard's testimony:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right, And there are 
several things about this testimony that troubles me.

 
 
First, 
it appears that the witness did not have an understanding that notes were taken 
and then destroyed.  It appears that 
his analysis initially of the statements was that the  essentially, law 
enforcement was reconstructing a report purely on memory.  That's not the 
testimony.

 
 
Further, 
then we turn to the crime scene.  
His understanding was there was no trace evidence taken.  That's not the evidence before the 
Court.  The Court remembers 
specifically hearing from the crime lab, hearing about putting on special suits 
for transporting the vehicle, other matters.  As a consequence, it appears that that 
information was not supplied to this witness.

 
 
Turning 
then to the test of whether or not this witness' testimony would be, in fact, 
directly probative and helpful to the jury or whether it would merely confuse 
the issue, the Court finds that it has a greater capability of confusing the 
issue.

 
 
Finally, 
I don't  I'm not exactly sure whether this is a Daubert test or not.[9]   It might be, and if it is, the Daubert standard has not been met.  For that reason, the Court will sustain 
the State's objection.  

 
 
[¶23]   Proffit contends the district court 
erred in refusing to allow Willard to testify about what he perceived to be 
deficiencies in the investigation of Forquer's murder.  Proffit claims the district court's 
erroneous ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense 
and his right to compulsory process.10  In his argument, Proffit alludes to 
matters that were not presented to the district court.  Our review on this issue, however, is 
limited to whether the district court's decision, given the evidence and 
arguments at the time, was reasonable.  

 
 
[¶24]   There is no question that a 
criminal defendant has the right to present evidence in his own defense.  That right, however, is not 
unlimited.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2003).  For 
evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant.  W.R.E. 402.  Evidence is relevant if it has a 
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."  W.R.E. 
401.  Relevant evidence may be 
excluded, however, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury."  W.R.E. 403.  

 
 
[¶25]   After a careful review of the 
record in this case, we agree with the district court that Willard's testimony 
was not relevant.  The crux of 
Proffit's trial defense was that he was not involved in Forquer's murder and 
that the primary witnesses against him  Martinez and Seiser  were simply liars with 
ulterior motives.  Although defense 
counsel did at times ask witnesses whether interviews were taped or crimes 
scenes were processed in a certain manner, the defense did not question the 
manner in which "trace" evidence was collected or processed, nor did the defense 
allege any improprieties in the interviews of Martinez and Seiser or question 
whether the recording of their statements would have made a difference in the 
stories they told.  Willard's 
testimony therefore would not have proved or disproved any fact of consequence 
to the determination of the case.  
Furthermore, it is clear Willard's opinions that certain investigative 
protocols were not followed in this case, specifically the investigating 
officers' alleged failure to make notes of the interviews with Martinez and 
Seiser and the alleged failure to process the trailer and Hicks' car, had little 
to no basis in fact.  As the 
district court determined, the admission of Willard's testimony in this regard 
in light of the other trial evidence would have only served to confuse the 
jury.  Considering the extent of the 
trial evidence and defense counsel's offer of proof, we hold that the district 
court's exclusion of Willard's proposed testimony was 
reasonable.

 
 

Issue 
III  Hearsay statements of Jacob Martinez and Michael Seiser

 
 
[¶26]   Proffit next claims the district 
court erred when it admitted the hearsay testimony of two law enforcement 
officers  Lieutenant Seeman and Investigator Duane Peyrot of the Campbell 
County Sheriff's Department  who recounted what two other witnesses in the 
case, Jacob Martinez and Michael Seiser, told them about Forquer's murder.  He insists the district court 
incorrectly determined that the out-of-court statements of Martinez and Seiser were 
admissible as "prior consistent statements" under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) because 
the statements were made after the motive to fabricate their stories arose.  W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
states:

 
 
(d)  Statements which are not hearsay.   A statement is not hearsay 
if:

(1) 
Prior Statement by Witness.  The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement 
is . . .  (B) consistent with his 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive . . . .

 
 
[¶27]   Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not contain 
a temporal requirement for admissibility of a prior consistent statement.  That is, the rule permits the admission 
of a prior consistent statement regardless of whether it was made before or 
after the alleged improper influence or motive to fabricate arose.  Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 
(Wyo. 
1999).  We have held that a prior 
consistent statement may be used as substantive evidence if the alleged improper 
motive or influence arose after the statement was made.  Id.; see also Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 367 
(Wyo. 
1991).  However, if the prior 
consistent statement does not precede the alleged improper influence or motive, 
the statement may only be used for rehabilitative purposes.  Dike, 990 P.2d  at 1024.  When a prior consistent statement is 
admissible only for rehabilitative purposes, a limiting instruction must be 
given, but only if requested.  
Id.

 
 
[¶28]   Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows for the 
use of a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility 
has been impeached.  By its plain 
language, four requirements must be satisfied before a prior consistent 
statement may be properly admitted into evidence: "(1) The declarant testifies 
at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the prior 
statement; (3) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's trial 
testimony; and (4) the prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive."  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo. 2007).  We have 
held that the fourth requirement does not mandate a specific allegation during 
cross-examination; rather, it may be made by implication or innuendo, and it may 
be found in the thrust of the defense theory and the testimony presented at 
trial.  Id.; see also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 80, 89 
(Wyo. 2002); Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 698-99 (Wyo. 2000); Humphrey v. 
State, 962 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶29]   In this case, Proffit defended on 
the theory that both Martinez and Seiser had lied from the outset 
and falsely implicated him in Forquer's murder to garner leniency from the 
State.  From opening statements to 
closing argument, and at every opportunity in between, Proffit vigorously 
attacked the men's credibility and attempted to discredit every aspect of their 
account of the events surrounding Forquer's death.  Proffit's persistent attack on Martinez and Seiser opened 
the door for the State's use of their prior statements for rehabilitative 
purposes.  Without belaboring the 
testimony, Lieutenant Seeman and Investigator Peyrot related what Martinez and Seiser had 
reported to them, and the statements were consistent with the men's trial 
testimony.  Accordingly, the prior 
statements of Martinez and Seiser were properly admitted as 
nonhearsay under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

 
 
[¶30]   Proffit relies heavily on Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, 74 P.3d 699 
(Wyo. 2003), claiming his case is factually similar and, therefore, we should 
likewise find reversible error.  We 
disagree.  Wilde involved the statements of a minor 
victim.  In that case, Wilde 
attacked the competency and reliability of the victim.  The State, in an attempt to bolster the 
victim's testimony, presented six witnesses  the mother, sister, police 
officer, physician, nurse and forensic interviewer  to whom the victim had told 
her story.  Each of these witnesses 
then repeated the victim's story without much variation.  It was under these specific 
circumstances  where six people repeated the statements to the jury  that this 
Court found the trial court abused its discretion, amounting to reversible 
error.  Id., ¶ 14, 74 P.3d  at 707-08.  The facts in Wilde are clearly distinguishable from 
this case.  Here, the same concerns 
are not present.

 
 
[¶31]   Proffit also relies on Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012 (Wyo. 1999), to support 
his argument that reversible error occurred.  Proffit seems to be arguing that, 
because the statements were post-motive, the district court had a legal duty 
under Dike to sua sponte give a limiting instruction 
ensuring the jury considered the statements for the sole purpose of evaluating 
the credibility of Martinez and Seiser.  Dike, however, imposed no such duty on 
the district court.  Rather, Dike reiterated that a trial court's 
obligation to give a limiting instruction was predicated on a request by the 
defendant.  In Dike, we declined to find reversible 
error in the trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction for the reason 
the defendant had not requested that one be given.  Id. at 1024.  In this case, Proffit did not ask for a 
limiting instruction.  Accordingly, 
the district court was not legally obligated to give one, and no error can be 
premised on its failure to do so. 

 
 
B.        
Prosecutorial misconduct

 
 
[¶32]   During the defense case-in-chief, 
defense counsel attempted to have Proffit's sister, Chris Adsit, testify that 
Proffit had borrowed $200.00 from her in October 2005 for the purpose of 
purchasing a bus ticket for Forquer to return home to Missouri.  The prosecutor objected to Adsit's 
testimony on hearsay grounds.  After 
an extended discussion, the district court ruled that Adsit's testimony about 
the reason Proffit sought the money was hearsay and, therefore, 
inadmissible.  The court, however, 
allowed the defense the opportunity to show that Adsit sent Proffit a $200.00 
check, a copy of which was admitted into evidence.  

 
 
[¶33]   During his closing argument, the 
prosecutor referenced Adsit's testimony concerning the money Proffit had 
borrowed from her:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]      Good afternoon, 
ladies and gentlemen.  In evaluating 
this case, the State would ask that you consider the bigger picture as you begin 
to look at the evidence and make your decisions.

 
 
The 
bigger picture of this case began at a trailer . . . depicted in evidence in 
State's Exhibit Number 23.  In that 
trailer in September, October, November and December of last year, resided four 
young men; Jeremy Forquer, Jacob Martinez, Christopher Hicks and Kent Proffit, 
Junior.

 
 
In 
early September of last year a fifth person entered that trailer and entered 
that big picture, and that fifth person is right over there, ladies and 
gentlemen, the defendant in this case and the father of Kent Proffit, Junior; 
Kent Proffit, Senior.

 
 
You 
heard evidence describing the conditions in that trailer, ladies and 
gentlemen.  You heard in that 
trailer was really nobody who had a job.  
Nobody had any means of income.  
In fact, you even heard testimony 
from the defendant's own sister that sometime later in that year he had to 
borrow money from her.

 
 
With 
that background, ladies and gentlemen, the State would ask you to look at the 
evidence that you heard over the course of this trial.  You heard testimony from two 
eyewitnesses to the crime that was  that occurred in this case.  You heard testimony from Mike Seiser and 
Jacob Martinez.  And that testimony, 
ladies and gentlemen, was consistent.  

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The prosecutor then went 
over the evidence presented at trial, but did not mention Adsit's testimony 
again.

 
 
[¶34]   Proffit contends that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by objecting to the proposed testimony of Adsit 
as to the reason she had loaned him the $200.00, and then noting during closing 
argument the fact he had borrowed the money.  He claims the manner in which the 
prosecutor referenced the money was improper.  Proffit concedes he did not object to 
the prosecutor's comment and, consequently, his claim must be reviewed for plain 
error.  As noted above, plain error 
exists if (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) Proffit 
demonstrates a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) Proffit 
proves the error adversely affected a substantial right to his material 
prejudice.  Humphrey, ¶ 46, 185 P.3d at 1249-50; see also Magallanes v. State, 2006 WY 119, ¶ 24, 
142 P.3d 1147, 1154 (Wyo. 2006); Duke v. 
State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 101, 99 P.3d 928, 957 (Wyo. 2004).  To satisfy the prejudice prong, Proffit 
must demonstrate a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the 
alleged error, the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable to 
him.  Magallanes, ¶ 24, 142 P.3d  at 1154; Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶35]   The first prong of the plain error 
test is met because the record clearly reflects the prosecutor's comment alleged 
as error.  As to the second prong, 
Proffit contends the prosecutor's statement constituted a mischaracterization of 
the evidence and an impermissible attempt to mislead the jury regarding the 
appropriate inferences it could draw from that evidence  i.e., that he was an "unemployed person 
sponging off his sister."  According 
to Proffit, "[i]f the prosecutor knew the true inference of the evidence was 
that [he] wanted money to buy Mr. Forquer a bus ticket, then he should not have 
argued any other inference."  He 
claims the prosecutor's comment violated the American Bar Association Standards 
for Criminal Justice endorsed by this Court in Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, 110 P.3d 1206 
(Wyo. 2005), Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 
100, 49 P.3d 975 (Wyo. 2002), and Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, 44 P.3d 22 (Wyo. 2002).  After a careful 
review of the cited authorities in light of the record in this case, we find no 
hint of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Defense counsel chose to introduce the evidence that Proffit had borrowed 
$200.00 from his sister.  There was 
certainly nothing wrong with the prosecutor commenting on that 
evidence.

 
 
[¶36]   We find it especially egregious 
that Proffit would select this trivial, isolated statement as grounds for an 
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct when he did not even attempt to 
demonstrate real prejudice from this comment.  Proffit's argument on the prejudice 
component principally consists of a general condemnation of what he perceives is 
a widespread epidemic of prosecutorial misconduct in Wyoming and throughout the 
United States and the failure of appellate courts, including this Court, to curb 
that epidemic.  Aside from that 
diatribe, Proffit makes no effort to explain, within the context of the evidence 
in this case, how the prosecutor's comment materially prejudiced him.  Instead, he merely asserts that the 
prosecutor's conduct denied him a fair trial.  Needless to say, Proffit's frivolous 
ranting and bald assertion of prejudice are wholly insufficient to satisfy the 
plain error standard.  Magallanes, ¶ 25, 142 P.3d  at 1154; Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d 963, 971 (Wyo. 2006).

 

[¶37]   Notwithstanding Proffit's poor 
argumentation, because of the severity of the charges and the attendant 
penalties, we have independently conducted a review of the challenged comment in 
light of the entire record and conclude that Proffit's complaint is 
meritless.  The prosecutor's 
reference to Adsit's testimony was brief and was not intended to draw improper 
attention to any particular aspect of the case against Proffit.  The prosecutor did not further mention 
Proffit's lack of income or the fact he had borrowed money from his sister.11  Considering the overwhelming evidence 
against him, we do not believe the prosecutor's isolated statement about this 
infinitesimal matter had a substantial effect on the jury's determination of 
Proffit's guilt.  We therefore 
conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the absence of the challenged 
comment would have led to a more favorable verdict.  We find no plain error to warrant 
reversal of Proffit's convictions.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶38]   Proffit has failed to convince this 
Court that any reversible error exists with respect to any of the issues raised 
in this appeal.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Seiser and 
Kent Proffit, Jr. were present in the trailer when the plan to kill Forquer was 
put into action, but took no part in the actual murder.  Kent Proffit, Jr. apparently slept 
during the entire incident.  

 
 

2Prior to 
volunteering for the demonstration, Forquer was in his bedroom packing for a 
brief trip home to Missouri to visit his 
family.

 
 

3Forquer's 
personal items were later found along the highway in the areas described by 
Martinez.

 
 

4Hearsay is 
defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."  W.R.E. 801(c).  Pursuant to W.R.E. 802, hearsay is 
inadmissible except as provided by court rules or by 
statute.

 
 

5We recognize 
there are minor discrepancies in Martinez's testimony.  However, we do not find those 
discrepancies significant as to alter our decision in this 
case.

 
 

6The record 
indicates that the State did not receive any information before trial concerning 
the substance of Willard's testimony or his curriculum 
vitae.

 
 

7The scene 
was processed by personnel from the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory and law 
enforcement on December 24, between the hours of 1:12 a.m. and 3:38 a.m., using 
large floodlights provided by the Campbell County Fire Department.    

 
 

8Willard was 
apparently unaware that the trailer home and Hicks' vehicle were processed for 
evidence on December 24, 2005, the day after law enforcement learned of 
Forquer's murder.

 
 

9In Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471 
(Wyo. 1999), this Court adopted the two-pronged test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), for determining 
the admissibility of expert testimony.  
The first prong requires the trial court to determine whether the 
expert's methodology is reliable. If the trial court concludes that it is 
reliable, then the court must determine whether the expert's proposed testimony 
is relevant.  Bunting, 984 P.2d 471-72.

 
 

10A violation 
of the Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause occurs "when a defendant is 
arbitrarily deprived of testimony that would have been relevant, material, and 
vital to his defense."  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

11We note 
that, although Adsit's testimony concerning the reason Proffit had borrowed the 
$200.00 was ruled inadmissible, defense counsel nevertheless stated during his 
closing argument that Proffit had borrowed the money for the purpose of 
purchasing a bus ticket for Forquer.