Case Title: MICHAEL JOSEPH BOYKIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-212

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL JOSEPH BOYKIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 15105 P.3d 481Case Number: 03-212Decided: 02/09/2005
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
MICHAEL 
JOSEPH BOYKIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate      Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Sue 
Chatfield, Assistant Attorney General. 

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and BRACKLEY, 
D.J.

 
 
  
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After a jury 
trial, Michael Boykin was convicted of one count of assault and battery on a 
household member, a third offense felony under the Family Violence Protection 
Act (FVPA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003). He 
appeals, claiming the district court abused its discretion in admitting the 
testimony of two witnesses under the excited utterance and prior inconsistent 
statement exceptions to the hearsay rule, W.R.E. 803(2).  We find no abuse of discretion and 
affirm.          

 
 
 
 

 
[¶2]      Mr. Boykin states 
the issues as follows: 

 
 

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred by admitting prejudicial and improper hearsay over 
appellant's objection, determining that such hearsay qualified as an "excited 
utterance" under W.R.E. 803(2).

 
 

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred by admitting prejudicial and improper hearsay over 
appellant's objection, determining that such hearsay qualified as a statement of 
recent perception under W.R.E. 804(b)(5)

 
 

 
 
Whether 
because of the errors made during appellant's trial, cumulative error occurred, 
requiring a new trial.

 
 
            
The State presents a single issue:

 
 
Whether the district court properly admitted the 
testimony of a convenience store clerk and a police 
officer.

 
 
 
 

            

[¶3]      After work on 
October 21, 2002, Mr. Boykin and a couple of friends went to a bar in Natrona 
County, Wyoming.  
Shortly after 2:00 a.m. the following morning, he and his friends 
returned to the home in Evansville, Wyoming where Mr. Boykin lived with his 
girlfriend, Tiffany Potter, and their two young children.  Mr. Boykin looked in the refrigerator 
for a block of cheese in order to make sandwiches.  When he could not find the cheese, Mr. 
Boykin went into the bedroom where Ms. Potter was sleeping, awakened her and 
asked her about the cheese.  She 
informed him she had loaned the cheese to the neighbors.  Shortly thereafter Mr. Boykin and Ms. 
Potter argued in the hallway.  She 
slapped him and he hit her in the nose.  
She took the children and left the house, driving to a nearby convenience 
store.  When she came into the 
store, the convenience store clerk called the police.  At trial, Ms. Potter testified she did 
not remember whether or not she talked to the clerk about what happened.  The clerk testified she told him Mr. 
Boykin hit her.  When a police 
officer arrived, Ms. Potter talked with him about what had happened.  She testified at trial that she first 
told him Mr. Boykin had hit her but then told him she didn't remember what 
happened.  The convenience store 
clerk and the police officer testified that Ms. Potter told them Mr. Boykin hit 
her.  Police arrested Mr. Boykin and 
charged him with domestic violence.

 
 
[¶4]      At trial, over 
defense counsel's hearsay objection, the State called the convenience store 
clerk and police officer to testify concerning the statements Ms. Potter made to 
them on the night in question.  The 
State also called Ms. Potter who testified she could not remember the 
circumstances of the injury.  At the 
close of the evidence, the jury reached a verdict finding Mr. Boykin guilty of 
assault and battery on a family member, a third offense felony as defined by § 
6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii).  The 
district court sentenced Mr. Boykin to serve a term of eighteen to twenty-four 
months in the Wyoming State Penitentiary with credit for twenty-three days 
served.   

 
 
 
 

 
[¶5]      Rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  Urbigkit v. State, 
2003 WY 57, ¶39, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶39 (Wyo. 2003).  We will not disturb such rulings absent 
a clear abuse of discretion.  
Id.   An abuse of discretion occurs when 
it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.   Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, 
¶13, 84 P.3d 320, ¶13 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
            

 

1.                              
Admissibility 
of Statements to Convenience Store Clerk  Excited 
Utterance

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Boykin 
contends the district court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of 
the convenience store clerk under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule.  At trial, the State called 
the convenience store clerk as its first witness.  In the course of inquiring about what 
occurred after Ms. Potter arrived at the convenience store on the night of the 
assault, the State asked the clerk whether he talked with Ms. Potter.  The clerk responded affirmatively.  The State then asked, "What happened?" 
and defense counsel made the following objection:  

 
 
Objection, 
Your Honor. Once again, he's going to testify about what she told him that 
evening. She will be testifying today. This is hearsay going to the truth of the 
matters.

 
 
The 
State responded that the expected testimony was hearsay but fell within the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  The district court overruled the 
objection1, allowing the State to elicit the 
following testimony:

 
 

Q.                
You can 
go ahead and state what it was that she had told you.

 
 
A.        She 
stated that while she was at home, her boyfriend or husband had came home and 
proceeded to go to the kitchen, open up the refrigerator, look for some cheese, 
I believe, a block of cheese. He could not find it. And she stated that he got 
very upset. And once he couldn't find it, he just proceeded to beat her 
up.

 
 
The 
State also elicited testimony from the clerk to the effect that Ms. Potter had 
fresh blood on her face and clothes when she came into the store, she was 
crying, distraught and nervous, and she told him the assault had just 
happened.  The clerk also testified 
Ms. Potter told him what happened in response to his inquiry whether she was all 
right.     

 
 
[¶7]      W.R.E. 803(2) 
provides:

 
 
            
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness:

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
(2) Excited Utterance.  
A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition.

 
 
Addressing 
the excited utterance exception, we have said:

 
 
The exception is founded upon the proposition that a 
statement made during the stress of excitement resulting from a startling event 
is probably trustworthy, since there is not leisure to reflect, contrive or 
fabricate. The rule assumes the presence of a startling event which temporarily 
stills the senses and alleviates any motive to fabricate.  A leading treatise explains that the 
excited utterance exception is justified by "the special reliability that is 
furnished when excitement suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and 
fabrication."   

 
 

Oldman 
v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 961 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶8]      This Court has 
specified five factors the trial court should consider in determining whether 
the excited utterance applies:  1) 
the nature of the startling event; 2) the declarant's physical manifestation of 
excitement; 3) the declarant's age; 4) the lapse of time between the event and 
the hearsay statement: and 5) whether the statement was made in response to an 
inquiry.  James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo. 1994).  We have also said, however, that the 
ultimate inquiry must be whether the "declarant's condition at the time was such 
that the statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product 
of reflection and deliberation."  
Id.  Applying these factors in Oldman, 
998 P.2d  at 963, we said:

 
 
In this 
case, the first factor weighs heavily in favor of admissibility.  The savage beating of a pregnant woman 
disclosed by this record obviously had a shocking effect, and her concerns over 
her own well-being and that of the unborn child inhibited the capacity for 
reflection or fabrication.  The 
second factor also favors admission in this case.  The victim physically manifested her 
excitement in very apparent ways; the examining room physician described her 
demeanor as "quite distraught and hysterical" and "upset."   The third factor is neutral with 
respect to these facts, but the fourth factor favors admission.  The precise time elapsing between the 
beating and the statement is not clear from the record, but the record does show 
that the victim arrived at the police station within minutes after the neighbor 
called 911, and she was transported to the emergency room at the hospital within 
a short time.  The final factor 
heavily favors admission because the victim made the statement to the examining 
room physician that inculpated Oldman before the doctor asked her any 
questions.

 
 
We also 
said admission of the testimony was proper under the ultimate James 
question: 

 
 
Based on the descriptions of the victim, which the 
examining room physician and other witnesses provided at the trial, it is clear 
that the victim's condition indeed was such that her statement was entirely 
spontaneous and not the result of reflection, deliberation, or fabrication.        

 
 
[¶9]      In contrast to 
our determination in James, we held in Urbigkit, ¶37, that the 
preclusion of police officer testimony concerning the statement of an 
unavailable witness was appropriate even though, only a short time before making 
the statement, the witness was in the midst of a gun battle and, according to 
the officer, was nervous and excited when she made the statement.  We reached this result because of the 
time that elapsed between the event and the statement and because the statement 
was made in response to formal police questioning.  We reiterated the James test and 
said,

 
 
[w]hile the event itself was no doubt startling, the 
record establishes that the statement was made by an adult in response to a 
police inquiry at the detention center approximately two and one-half hours 
after the event.  In that sense, it 
is not clear it was a spontaneous utterance in response to the event 
itself.  By itself, [the officer's] 
testimony that [the victim] seemed excited or nervous at the time is not enough 
to bring the statement within W.R.E. 803(2).

 
 

Urbigkit, 
¶39.

 
 
[¶10]   
As these cases reflect, the determination of whether testimony is 
admissible under the excited utterance exception is fact dependent and must be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. With this consideration in mind, we turn to the 
question of whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing the 
convenience store clerk's testimony concerning Ms. Potter's statements to him 
when she arrived at the store and was waiting for police.  Considering both the James 
five-part test and ultimate inquiry, we hold there was no abuse of 
discretion.  Only a short time 
before making the statements, Ms. Potter was involved in what she confirmed was 
a heated, loud argument and physical altercation with her live-in boyfriend in 
the presence of one of her children and within hearing of the other child. 
During the argument, Ms. Potter was struck in the face, causing her nose to 
bleed.  She took her children and 
drove to the convenience store, which she testified was five minutes "if that" 
from her home.  She had fresh blood 
on her face and clothes when she arrived at the store.  The store clerk described her as 
distraught, crying, and nervous. Ms. Potter testified when she arrived at the 
store she was pretty scared about what had happened.  She also testified she was concerned 
about her children.  The fact that 
she made the challenged statement in response to an inquiry is not sufficient 
under the circumstances to take the statement outside the excited utterance 
exception.  The convenience store 
clerk asked, "Are you all right?" Ms. Potter responded according to the store 
clerk that her boyfriend assaulted her when he could not find the cheese.  This non-responsive answer to the store 
clerk's inquiry further suggests that Ms. Potter's statement was spontaneous and 
not the result of reflection, deliberation, or fabrication.  We affirm the district court's ruling 
allowing the convenience store clerk's testimony.

 
 

2.                              
 Admissibility of Police Officer's 
Testimony  Prior Inconsistent Statement

[¶11]   
Mr. Boykin next argues the district court abused its discretion in 
allowing the police officer to testify concerning statements Ms. Potter made to 
him when he arrived at the convenience store.  During the officer's testimony, the 
State asked the officer what he asked Ms. Potter.  Defense counsel objected on the grounds 
of hearsay, reminding the district court that Ms. Potter had already 
testified.  The district court 
overruled the objection on the ground that the testimony concerned a prior 
inconsistent statement.  Later, out 
of the presence of the jury, the district court stated that the officer's 
testimony was perhaps an excited utterance but also was a statement of recent 
perception under W.R.E. 804(b)(5).  
The court reasoned that Ms. Potter's testimony that she could not 
remember what she told the officer made her in essence unavailable to testify 
concerning her conversation with law enforcement, bringing into play the hearsay 
exceptions and specifically 804(b)(5).  
Upon the court's order overruling the objection, the officer testified as 
follows:

 
 
She had stated that her boyfriend had came home about 
2:00. He had been at the bar. That he had got into an argument over a block of 
cheese. The argument turned into more. There was  she stated to me that they 
had shoved each other. It wasn't one part of  that she didn't shove him, but it 
was back and forth. And that her boyfriend had got upset and hit her in the 
nose. 

 
 
[¶12]   
Based upon the record, we must determine whether any one of the three 
grounds advanced by the district court constituted a proper basis for allowing 
the testimony.  That is, we must 
decide whether the officer's testimony was admissible as a prior inconsistent 
statement, an excited utterance, or a statement of recent perception.  Because we find that the testimony was 
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, we do not consider whether it 
falls under either of the hearsay exceptions cited by the district court.      

 
 
[¶13]   
In Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶20, 46 P.3d 890, ¶20 (Wyo. 2002), 
in which the defendant was convicted of felony larceny by bailee for selling 
three horses entrusted to his care, the trial court allowed the State to present 
witness testimony concerning the out-of-court statement of another witness the 
State previously called to testify.  
After the first witness, Ms. Willis, testified that she could not 
remember what happened to the three horses and denied previously stating they 
were sent to auction, the State called the second witness, Ms. Holland, who 
testified Ms. Willis told her that the horses were sent to auction.  We said:  

            

Prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible under W.R.E. 613(b) to impeach by 
contradiction a witness' trial testimony. W.R.E. 613(b) provides:  "Extrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is 
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is 
afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice 
otherwise require." This rule applies when two statements--one made at trial and 
one made previously--are irreconcilably at odds.  In such an event, counsel is permitted 
to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence, if necessary. United 
States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 
558 (1st Cir.1999). The purpose of this type of impeachment evidence is to show 
a witness to be generally capable of making errors in his testimony.  3A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1017 
(Chadbourn rev.1970).  In doing so, 
counsel can resort to the witness' own prior statements in which that witness 
has given a contrary version. Id.

 
 
We stated further:      

Prior statements made by a witness are not hearsay if 
the declarant testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statements. W.R.E. 801(d)(1). The use of a prior inconsistent 
statement is not inadmissible hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted.  Rather, it is 
used as a tool to compare both statements and conclude that the declarant has 
erred in making one or the other without determining which statement is 
erroneous.  3A John Henry Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev.1970).

 
 
Applying 
these principles to the facts in Willis, we 
concluded:

 
 
Ms. 
Holland's testimony properly falls within the scope of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence.  The state asked Ms. 
Willis whether she could recall previously stating the three mares were sent to 
the auction.  She was afforded an 
opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement and denied ever 
making such a statement or knowing what ultimately happened to the horses.  The defense then had full opportunity to 
explore the issue during her cross-examination.  Next, the state used extrinsic 
evidence--Ms.  Holland's testimony--to 
impeach Ms. Willis.  Ms. Holland 
testified that Ms. Willis stated the three mares were sent to the auction.  The state was entitled to introduce 
prior statements made by Ms. Willis that were inconsistent with her trial 
testimony.  Therefore, we conclude 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the impeachment 
evidence.

 
 
[¶14]   Applying this reasoning to Mr. 
Boykin's case compels the same result.  
Ms. Potter testified on direct that she did not recall what happened on 
the night in question and did not know for sure who hit her.  When the State asked what she told the 
police officer that night, she testified that at first she told him Mr. Boykin 
hit her because she was angry with him at the time and wanted to put the blame 
on him.  She then went on to testify 
that she in essence retracted that statement when talking to the police officer 
and told him she really did not know what happened.  The State then called the police officer 
to testify that Ms. Potter told him unequivocally at the convenience store 
immediately after the assault that Mr. Boykin hit her in the nose.  He also testified she did not at any 
time change her story. 

 
 
[¶15]   The police officer's testimony in 
this regard was used to show that Ms. Potter gave two contradictory statements  
the statement she gave to him on the night of the assault that Mr. Boykin hit 
her and the statement she gave at trial indicating she initially told police Mr. 
Boykin hit her but retracted that statement and said she did not remember what 
happened.  Ms. Potter had the 
opportunity during her testimony to explain her statements to the police and 
said she made the statements because she was angry with Mr. Boykin. The defense 
then had the opportunity to explore the inconsistency during 
cross-examination.  Thereafter, the 
State was entitled to introduce prior statements made by Ms. Potter that were 
inconsistent with her trial testimony.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 
impeachment evidence.

 
 
[¶16]   Affirmed.

 
 
 
 

               

 

FOOTNOTE

 
 

1The 
district court did not state the grounds for its evidentiary ruling in open 
court at the time the objection was made.  
However, later, outside the presence of the jury, the district court 
explained the ruling was based on the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule.