Case Title: In re Carpenter

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50321

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  July 29, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
JIM CARPENTER,
Accused.
(OSB 02-32; SC S50321)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted November 7, 2003.
Ryan S. Joslin, Carpenter & Joslin, P.C., John Day, argued
the cause and filed the brief for the accused.
Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.  On the briefs was
Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel.
PER CURIAM
The accused is publicly reprimanded.
Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Kistler,
J., joined.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that the accused violated Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3)
(prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation). 
The facts centered on a posting by the accused of a message on an
Internet site in which he identified himself by the name of a
teacher, who served as a local high school counselor and coach,
and implied in that message that the teacher had engaged in
sexual behavior with students.  A trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board concluded that the accused had not violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
and dismissed the charge.  The Bar sought review under ORS
9.536(1) and Bar Rules of Procedure (BR) 10.1 and 10.3.
We review a decision of the trial panel de novo. 
ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6.  The Bar has the burden of establishing
the alleged conduct by clear and convincing evidence, which means
"evidence establishing that the truth of the facts asserted is
highly probable[.]" In re Dugger, 334 Or 602, 604, 54 P3d
595 (2002).  Although we review de novo, we generally give
weight to the trial panels's credibility findings. Id.  For
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(3) and impose the sanction of a public reprimand.
I.  FINDINGS OF FACT
The facts are undisputed.  The accused became a member
of the Oregon State Bar in October 2000.  He has no prior record
of discipline.
The alleged violation of the disciplinary rule at issue
in this proceeding occurred in February 2001, when the accused
accessed the Classmates.com website.  That website allows
subscribers to post information about themselves and to contact
other subscribers.  The website lists information by school, year
of graduation, and the subscribers' names.  The website limits
the information that nonsubscribers can obtain.  
Both the accused and the teacher had attended the same
high school in the mid-1980s.  The accused filled out an online
form on Classmates.com and set up an account in the name of the
teacher.  After registering the account in the teacher's name,
the accused posted the following message:
"Hey all!  How is it going.  I am married to an
incredibly beautiful woman, AND I get to hang out with
high school chicks all day (and some evenings too).  I
have even been lucky with a few.  It just doesn't get
better than this."
When the accused posted the message, the teacher was a
counselor and coach at the same high school that the teacher and
the accused had attended.  The accused testified that he acted on
a whim and had in mind only a practical joke when he posted the
message.  He also testified that he believed that the teacher's
friends would read the message and think it was funny; however,
he did not think that anyone would believe that the teacher
posted the message himself because of its outlandish nature.
When he posted the message, the accused had heard that
the teacher had engaged in an extramarital affair with a young
woman who had been a student at the high school while the teacher
was working there.  School officials placed a window in the door
of the teacher's counseling office around the same time that
allegations about the affair arose.  The police also commenced an
investigation into the affair, but terminated it when the former
student refused to disclose whether the affair had begun while
she was still a student at the high school.  
Other rumors circulated in the community that the
teacher had engaged in affairs with one or more school-age girls. 
The accused testified that he had heard the rumors from persons
whom he knew and respected in the community and that, based on
those rumors, he believed that the representations in the message
that he posted on the website were true.
Shortly thereafter, someone other than the accused sent
a letter and a printed copy of the online message to the high
school's principal, the school superintendent, and the members of
the school board.  That letter expressed disgust at the online
message and demanded that the school officials protect students
from the teacher and hold him accountable for his actions.
Based on the letter, school officials initiated an
inquiry into the teacher's conduct.  The teacher denied posting
the message and denied having sexual relationships with students. 
The principal and the superintendent indicated that the teacher
should discover who had posted the message.
The teacher attempted to discover the author of the
message through Classmates.com.  However, because Classmates.com
would not provide that information, he reported the matter to the
Oregon State Police.  The investigating police officer, Sergeant
Larson, forwarded the matter to the district attorney's office,
which issued a subpoena.
Based on information received from Classmates.com,
Larson interviewed the accused on June 1.  The accused admitted
that he created the online account and posted the message.  He
told Larson that he posted the message "to be a thorn in [the
teacher's] side" in the context of a joke.  Larson forwarded the
results of his investigation to the district attorney.  However,
the state brought no criminal charges against the accused.  The
teacher reported the results of the investigation to school
officials, who then closed the inquiry and took no further
action.
On June 5, the accused contacted the teacher,
apologized for his conduct, and offered to help rectify the
situation.  Around the same time, the accused was running for
election to the local district attorney position, and the local
newspaper was publishing related articles.  When the newspaper
contacted the accused about the matter, the accused followed the
teacher's request that he not respond.  The accused also
testified that he ceased campaigning for the office of district
attorney to avoid further publicity.
The Bar filed a formal complaint against the accused in
May 2002.  In its complaint, the Bar alleged that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by setting up an account in the teacher's
name, by posting a message purporting to be written by the
teacher, and by suggesting in that message that the teacher had
sexual relationships with high school students.  In his answer,
the accused admitted to engaging in the alleged conduct, but
denied that that conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3).  After a
hearing, the trial panel dismissed the complaint against the
accused, stating that "[t]he reach of DR 1-102(A)(3) does not
extend to the kind of non-professional, unregulated conduct found
in this case."
On review, the Bar requests that this court find that
the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and impose a 60-day
suspension.  In response, the accused asserts that his conduct
did not violate DR 1-102(A)(3) and requests that, if this court
does determine that a violation occurred, it should impose a
sanction no greater than a public reprimand.
II.  ALLEGATION OF DISHONESTY
We first address whether the trial panel erred in
dismissing the Bar's complaint on the basis of the trial panel's
legal conclusion that that rule applies only to professional
conduct or conduct that otherwise is subject to criminal or
administrative sanctions.
DR 1-102(A)(3) provides:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"* * * * *
"(3)  Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]"
We begin by noting that the text of DR 1-102(A)(3)
contains no requirement that, to violate that rule, the lawyer's
conduct must be subject to criminal or administrative sanctions. 
Although the rule does refer to "professional misconduct," this
court has held that the rule does not require that the lawyer be
acting in his or her capacity as a lawyer. In re Coe, 302
Or 553, 565, 731 P2d 1028 (1987).  This court has concluded that
accused lawyers have violated DR 1-102(A)(3) even when their
conduct did not involve the practice of law and may not have been
subject to other regulation. See In re Germundson,
301 Or 656, 662, 724 P2d 793 (1986) (holding that lawyer's act of
executing promissory note as representative of corporation when
lawyer knew he had no authority to act on behalf of that
corporation violated DR 1-102(A)(3)); In re Houchin, 290 Or
433, 438, 622 P2d 723 (1981) (holding that lawyer's act of
enrolling as student in course he was teaching for purpose of
preventing reduction in governmental benefits when lawyer knew
that he was not entitled to receive credit as student violated
former DR 1-102(A)(4)).
It is true, however, that the underlying purpose of
lawyer discipline proceedings -- the protection of the public --
helps this court to determine when a lawyer's conduct constitutes
professional misconduct within the meaning of the rule.  In In
re Murdock, 328 Or 18, 24-25, 968 P2d 1270 (1998), this court
stated: 
"The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect
the public and the administration of justice from
lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or
are unlikely to discharge properly their professional
duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and
the legal profession.  American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards), Standard 1.1; see
In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998)
(same).
"'Members of the public are entitled to be
able to trust lawyers to protect their property,
liberty, and their lives.  The community expects
lawyers to exhibit the highest standards of
honesty and integrity, and lawyers have a duty not
to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
or interference with the administration of
justice.'  ABA Standards at 5."
Guided by that purpose, this court examines lawyer conduct that
occurs outside the scope of professional relationships, such as
that of attorney and client, to determine whether the conduct
jeopardizes the public's interest in the integrity and
trustworthiness of lawyers.  Not every lawyer misstatement poses
that risk:  telling the story of Santa Claus to children is an
example.  Instead, there must be a rational connection between
the conduct that gives rise to an allegation of a rule violation
and the purpose of the lawyer discipline system.  That is, the
accused lawyer's conduct must demonstrate that the lawyer lacks
those characteristics that are essential to the practice of law.
In most situations involving business communications
with clients, the courts, other lawyers, and governmental
entities, when an accused lawyer engages in conduct involving
dishonesty or misrepresentation that connection will be apparent. 
There are circumstances, however, when such a connection will not
be apparent, because, although the lawyer's conduct involves the
making of a false or dishonest statement, the conduct is so
divorced from the realm of professional conduct that it does not
necessarily speak to the lawyer's professional character.  In
those situations, it is necessary to identify the nexus between
the lawyer's conduct and the lawyer's fitness to practice law to
establish that the lawyer's conduct is of the type of conduct for
which this court may call the lawyer to answer.  If the evidence
in a discipline case does not establish such a nexus, then the
lawyer is not subject to professional discipline.  
The trial panel, however, did not purport to enforce a
qualification of that sort when it dismissed the complaint
against the accused.  Instead, it confined DR 1-102(A)(3) to a
lawyer's professional conduct or conduct that violates criminal
laws or administrative rules.  As the foregoing discussion
indicates, we have declined to read into the text of DR 1-102(A)(3) the limitations on which the trial panel relied here.
We turn now to whether the accused's conduct violated
DR 1-102(A)(3).  As this court previously has stated, it is this
court's practice to consider only the theories that the Bar
presents when analyzing an accused lawyer's conduct under DR 1-102(A)(3). See, e.g., In re Kluge, 335 Or 326,
340, 66 P3d 492 (2003) (considering Bar's allegation that accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) only under theories presented in its
brief). Accordingly, we confine our analysis of DR 1-102(A)(3) to the theories of misrepresentation and dishonesty
that the Bar argued before the trial panel and in its brief to
this court.
We first address whether the accused engaged in conduct
involving misrepresentation.  Under DR 1-102(A)(3), an
affirmative misrepresentation is a knowing, false statement of
material fact. In re Kumley, 335 Or 639, 644, 75 P3d 432
(2003).  "When considering an assertion that a lawyer has engaged
in affirmative misstatement, our initial focus is on the truth or
falsity of the fact asserted." Id. at 644-45.  Here, the
Bar alleged that the accused knowingly made affirmative false
statements in the online message when he stated that the teacher
had engaged in sexual conduct with students.  However, at oral
argument, the Bar conceded that it had not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the statements regarding sexual conduct
with students in the online message were false.  That concession
is well taken, and we conclude that the accused did not engage in
conduct involving misrepresentation.
We next address whether the accused engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty.  We analyze the conduct that allegedly
constitutes dishonesty on a case-by-case basis. In re
Gallagher, 332 Or 173, 181, 26 P3d 131 (2001).  To engage in
conduct involving dishonesty in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), the
accused must have acted with a mental state of knowledge or
intent. See In re Martin, 328 Or 177, 185-86, 970 P2d
638 (1998) (stating that "[t]he term 'dishonesty' imports with it
a notion of knowledge or intentionality" and reviewing prior case
law suggesting knowledge or intent is required).  Under DR 1-102(A)(3), conduct involving "[d]ishonesty is conduct that
indicates a disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; or a lack of integrity." Dugger, 334 Or
at 609.  The characteristics that this court's definition of
dishonesty embraces are those that reflect on a lawyer's fitness
to practice law. In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 158, 734 P2d
877 (1987) ("Trustworthiness and integrity are key concepts in
the Code of Professional Responsibility ***.").  Consequently,
to violate DR 1-102(A)(3) by dishonesty, the lawyer's conduct
must indicate that the lawyer lacks those characteristics of
trustworthiness and integrity that are essential to the practice
of law.
The Bar argues that the accused engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty when he created a Classmates.com account in
the teacher's name, posted a message purporting to be written by
the teacher, and led others to believe that the teacher had
posted the message.  The Bar asserts that the court should treat
the accused, who misrepresented his identity to disseminate
information, the same as a lawyer who misrepresents his identity
to obtain information. See In re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 8
P3d 966 (2000) (finding violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) when lawyer
intentionally misrepresented his identity and purpose to obtain
information for use in litigation).
The accused responds that the Bar did not prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he acted dishonestly because
the Bar did not show that he intended to deceive, that is, that
he intended to lead others to believe that the teacher had posted
the message.  The accused asserts that he believed, due to the
outlandish nature of the message, that anyone reading the message
would understand that the teacher had not authored the message
and that it was a joke.  The accused also argues that, to violate
DR 1-102(A)(3), the alleged conduct must reflect adversely on the
accused lawyer's fitness to practice law.  The accused asserts
that his conduct was so far removed from the practice of law that
the court should infer no adverse reflection on his fitness to
practice law.
We address each of the accused's assertions in turn. 
This court has held that intent to deceive is an element of
conduct involving deceit or fraud under DR 1-102(A)(3). In re
Hiller, 298 Or 526, 533, 694 P2d 540 (1985) ("A
misrepresentation becomes fraud or deceit when it is intended to
be acted upon without being discovered.").  However, dishonesty
is a broader concept than deceit or fraud, and does not require
the same level of culpability. See In re Leonard, 308
Or 560, 569, 784 P2d 95 (1989) (stating that dishonesty is
broader concept than deceit or fraud); In re Holman,
297 Or 36, 57, 682 P2d 243 (1984) ("The grouping of the noun
'dishonesty' with the other three nouns, 'fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation,' might suggest that in order for conduct to
involve dishonesty it must partake of some kind of deception in
the sense of misleading the victim of the conduct.  We do not so
conclude.").  As stated above, dishonesty requires a mental state
of knowledge or intent.  Thus, contrary to the accused's
position, the Bar need not prove that the accused acted
intentionally to demonstrate a violation of that rule; nor
does the rule require the Bar to prove that the accused had a
purpose to deceive others into believing that the teacher had
authored the message.  However, as we discuss in more detail
below, we are satisfied that the accused acted intentionally in
violating DR 1-102(A)(3) by dishonesty in this instance.
Regarding the accused's second argument, as we stated
above, the accused lawyer's conduct must be connected rationally
to the lawyer's fitness to practice law to constitute a violation
of DR 1-102(A)(3) by dishonesty.  However, we conclude that the
accused's conduct does reflect adversely on his fitness to
practice law.
The accused does not dispute that it was dishonest for
him to assume the teacher's identity and post a message that
purported to be written by the teacher and indicated that the
teacher had engaged in sexual behavior with high school girls. 
When he acted, the accused had heard that the teacher had engaged
in an extramarital affair with a young woman who had attended the
high school while the teacher worked there.  The accused also
knew that there were rumors in the community about that affair
and rumors that the teacher had engaged in inappropriate
relationships with students.  Thus, the accused knew that the
teacher, whose reputation was in question in at least some parts
of the community, was uniquely vulnerable to the content of the
message, because it pretended to be an admission by the teacher
that the community rumors about inappropriate conduct were true. 
We conclude that, in so conducting himself, the accused
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, because that conduct
indicates that the accused lacks aspects of trustworthiness and
integrity that are relevant to the practice of law.  By adopting
the teacher's identity and posting the online message that he
composed, the accused created a significant risk that his actions
would affect the teacher's legal rights adversely.  The message
purported to be an admission by the teacher that he had engaged
in socially and legally unacceptable behavior.  The purported
admission had the potential to harm the teacher's career and
subject him to a criminal investigation.  Also, the medium
through which the accused chose to act increased the likelihood
of that potential harm, because the Classmates.com website
provided no contextual clues that the teacher was not the author
of the message or that someone intended the message to be a joke. 
It is unreasonable, in our view, that the accused believed that
anyone reading the message would view it only as a joke because
of the nature of the message itself.  The message was available
for viewing by a wide audience of unknown persons who would not
know the teacher personally and who would be unaware of other
circumstances outside the message itself that would indicate to
them that someone intended the message as a joke and that they
should view it in that manner.  The accused's conduct
demonstrates a willingness to disregard the teacher's legal
rights.  That willingness reflects adversely on the accused's
fitness to practice law, because it causes us to question whether
the accused possesses the requisite trustworthiness and integrity
to handle important matters involving legal rights that clients
commonly entrust to lawyers.  We conclude that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
III.  SANCTION

Having concluded that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), we now must determine the appropriate sanction.  To do
so, the court examines the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended
1992) (ABA Standards) and Oregon case law. In re Huffman,
331 Or 209, 223, 13 P3d 994 (2000).  We first determine
preliminarily the appropriate sanction by considering (1) the
duty violated, (2) the accused's mental state, and (3) the actual
or potential injury that the misconduct caused.  ABA Standard
3.0.  We then examine any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to determine whether we should adjust the
preliminary sanction, and, finally, we review our prior case law
for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction.
Huffman, 331 Or at 223.
A. Duty Violated
By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, the
accused violated his duty to the public to maintain his personal
integrity.  ABA Standard5.1.
B. Mental State
The ABA Standards provide that a lawyer acts with
"intent" if it is the lawyer's "conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result."  ABA Standards at 7.  A lawyer
acts with "knowledge" if the lawyer acts with "the conscious
awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct
but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result." Id.
The Bar asserts that the accused acted with "intent"
because the accused told Sergeant Larson that he posted the
message "to be a thorn in [the teacher's] side."  The accused
testified that he acted "minutes after it came to mind" without
considering the potential effect of his actions.  He also
testified that, as he explained to Larson when he made that
statement, he meant the statement "to be a thorn in [the
teacher's] side" to be understood solely in terms of a practical
joke.  
The accused's argument that his sole purpose in posting
the Internet message was to carry out a joke does not establish
that he acted only with knowledge.  Although the accused may have
contemplated his action for only a few moments, he had a clear
objective:  to put the teacher through the mental anguish of
learning that a message on an Internet website was announcing his
purported confession to engaging periodically in illegal sexual
conduct with female students.  That is intentional conduct within
the meaning of the ABA Standards.  The Bar need not prove that
the accused also had other specific objectives in mind, such as
to hurt the teacher professionally or to advance his own career
in some way.  We conclude that the accused acted intentionally
because he had the conscious objective to harm the teacher in the
manner described above.   
C. Actual and Potential Injury
The accused's conduct caused some degree of actual
harm.  The teacher, law enforcement officers, and the District
Attorney's office had to expend time investigating the matter. 
The accused's conduct also fueled suspicions about the teacher's
conduct toward students and spurred someone to send an angry
letter to school officials.  The accused's conduct also created
the risk of potential injury to the teacher's career and
reputation, and potential injury to the high school and
community.
D. Preliminary Sanction
The ABA Standards provide the following guidance for an
appropriate sanction for conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation:  
"Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
upon application of the factors set out in Standard
3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate
in cases involving commission of a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, or in cases with conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation:
"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
"(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct
a necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution
or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
"(b) a lawyer engaged in any other intentional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice."  
ABA Standard 5.11.
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11
[disbarment] and that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice."
ABA Standard 5.12.
"Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law." 
ABA Standard 5.13. 
The Bar contends that the ABA standards quoted above
"may not be a perfect fit in this case because the only
one that addresses a lawyer's intentional failure to
maintain personal integrity is Standard 5.11 concerning
disbarment.  Although the Bar asserts that the
[a]ccused acted intentionally, it does not contend that
he should be disbarred for his conduct in this case."
The Bar's observation about the ABA Standards is
correct.  By contrast to ABA Standard 5.11(b), ABA Standards 5.12
and 5.13 refer to an accused lawyer's knowing conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  The
principal difference between those two standards is the extent to
which the conduct adversely reflects on the accused lawyer's
fitness to practice law.  Additionally, the standards indicate
that a suspension is generally appropriate when the accused
lawyer engages in criminal conduct.
We already have concluded that the accused's dishonest
act is of a kind that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.  We also note, however, that the accused was
not charged with a crime and the Bar does not argue that the
accused engaged in criminal conduct.  In addition, the accused's
conduct did not arise from the practice of law and he did not
benefit personally from his improper conduct.  Although the
accused acted intentionally and caused some actual injury, the
above facts lead us to conclude that the accused's conduct does
not "seriously" adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law. 
As a result, we determine preliminarily that the ABA Standard
that most closely fits the conduct in this proceeding is Standard
5.13.
E. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
The ABA Standards list aggravating factors that the
court may consider to "justify an increase in the degree of
discipline to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.21.  We find that one
aggravating circumstance is present:  the vulnerability of the
victim.  ABA Standard 9.22(h).  
The Bar asserts that the accused acted with a selfish
motive, ABA Standard 9.22(b), and that the accused submitted
false statements during the disciplinary process, ABA Standard
9.22(f).  The Bar argues that the accused had a selfish motive
because he acted out of "personal animosity towards [the
teacher]."  We do not agree, because the proof regarding those
matters is equivocal.  Specifically, the Bar's evidence is
insufficient to prove that the accused's motive was directed at
achieving personal or financial gain or to "exact revenge."
See, e.g., In re McDonough, 336 Or 36, 44, 77
P3d 306 (2003) (finding selfish motive because lawyer acted to
serve own personal convenience by driving with suspended
license); In re Flannery, 334 Or 224, 234, 47 P3d 891 (2002) (finding selfish motive when lawyer falsified address to
renew Oregon driver license so he could rent car for upcoming
trip); In re Lackey, 333 Or 215, 229, 37 P3d 172 (2002) (finding selfish motive because lawyer sought to "exact revenge"
on his superiors).  We do not think that the evidence in this
proceeding supports the aggravating factor of "selfish motive." 
As to the other aggravating factor on which the Bar
relies, the Bar has not presented any evidence that the accused
testified falsely when he stated that there were rumors in the
community about the teacher having had sexual relationships with
high school students.  We note that the teacher testified that
such "vague rumors" did exist in the community and that the trial
panel found that "[t]he posted message was, in essence, a re-publication of existing rumors and other information concerning
[the teacher], all of which had gained some circulation * * *." 
To make that finding, the trial panel implicitly accepted the
accused's testimony and found him to be credible.  In light of
both the evidence in the record and the trial panel's finding, we
conclude that the Bar did not prove that the accused submitted
false statements to the trial panel. 
The ABA Standards also list factors that the court may
consider in mitigation.  We find that several mitigating
circumstances are present:  the accused has no prior disciplinary
record, (1) ABA Standard 9.32(a); the accused made a full and
free disclosure to the trial panel and had a cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings, ABA Standard 9.32(e); the accused was
inexperienced in the practice of law, ABA Standard 9.32(f); and
the accused showed genuine remorse, ABA Standard 9.32(l). 
Sergeant Larson testified that the accused had good character and
a good reputation with law enforcement and the local court, ABA
Standard 9.32(g), and we credit that testimony.  
We conclude that the mitigating circumstances outweigh
the aggravating circumstance in this case. 
F. Case Law
The Bar argues that prior case law indicates that the
court should suspend the accused for 60 days.  The Bar cites
In re Hopp, 291 Or 697, 634 P2d 238 (1981) (lawyer
suspended for 60 days for taking action for purpose of harassing
another lawyer, violating DR 7-102(A)(1), and for misrepresenting
that he had done so on behalf of his "client," violating
former DR 1-102(A)(4), when lawyer registered local
business's recently expired assumed business name and then
demanded $100 to relinquish registration), and In re
Spencer, 335 Or 71, 58 P3d 228 (2002) (lawyer suspended for 60
days for assisting to register California resident's motor home
in Oregon, violating DR 1-102(A)(3), and for allowing documents
to be destroyed that prospective client had entrusted to him for
purpose of determining whether to represent her, violating DR 9-101(C)(4)).  In both those cases, the accused lawyer's misconduct
was more egregious than the accused's conduct in this proceeding,
because the conduct arose directly from the practice of law or
involved criminal conduct.  Also, this court based the sanction
in those two cases on violations of multiple disciplinary rules. 
Thus, those cases provide only limited guidance in the present
matter.
In our view, the prior lawyer discipline proceedings
that most closely resemble this one are Kumley and
Flannery.  In Kumley, the accused lawyer, who was an
inactive member of the Bar, filed forms in connection with his
candidacy for the Oregon Legislative Assembly.  On three of those
forms he listed "attorney" as one of his present occupations,
while omitting mention of his former occupation as a practicing
attorney.  Because the accused lawyer gave the false impression
that he was presently qualified to practice law and because he
committed the criminal act of false swearing, the court concluded
that the accused lawyer violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(2)
(prohibiting commission of "a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law"), and ORS 9.160 (providing in part that "no person
shall *** represent that person as qualified to practice law
unless that person is an active member of the Oregon State Bar"). 
355 Or at 648, 650.
In determining the appropriate sanction, this court
found that the accused acted knowingly and caused potential harm. 
Because his conduct did not "seriously" adversely reflect on his
fitness to practice law, the court determined preliminarily that
the accused lawyer should be reprimanded, rather than suspended. 
In aggravation, the court found that the accused lawyer had
committed multiple offenses and, in mitigation, that he had no
prior record of discipline.  Relying on Flannery, the court
concluded that its prior case law confirmed that a reprimand was
the appropriate sanction. Kumley, 335 Or at 653.
In Flannery, the accused lawyer, a resident
of Washington, had used a friend's Oregon address to renew his
Oregon driver license.  The accused conceded that his conduct
violated DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), and ORS 9.527(2)
(subject to discipline for being convicted of crime involving
moral turpitude).  334 Or at 227.  
In determining the appropriate sanction, the court
concluded that the accused had acted intentionally, but that his
conduct did not "seriously" adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law.  The court determined that, in aggravation, the
accused had a selfish motive and substantial experience in the
practice of law.  In mitigation, the court found that the accused
had no prior disciplinary record, had provided information fully
and freely to the trial panel and had cooperated in the
disciplinary process, had a good character and good reputation,
was subject to other penalties and sanctions, and was remorseful. 
The court took into consideration the fact that the conduct was
unlikely to recur and imposed a public reprimand. Id. at
237.
The present proceeding is distinguishable from both
Kumley and Flannery in that the accused's conduct
caused some degree of actual injury, as discussed above, he acted
intentionally, rather than knowingly as in Kumley, and he
has not suffered other penalties or sanctions as in
Flannery.  However, in both Kumley and
Flannery, this court emphasized that a reprimand, rather
than a suspension, was the appropriate sanction because the
accused lawyer's conduct did not "seriously" adversely reflect on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law.  In this proceeding, we
also conclude, as discussed above, that, although the accused's
conduct reflects adversely on his fitness to practice law, it
does not do so "seriously."  In so concluding, we emphasize that,
unlike the lawyers in Kumley and Flannery, the
accused has not been charged with a crime, nor has the Bar
asserted that he committed a criminal act.  
In addition, the mitigating factors in this proceeding
outweigh the aggravating factors.  This court has relied on that
circumstance in prior cases to justify imposing a reprimand
rather than a suspension. See, e.g., Flannery,
334 Or at 235; In re Howser, 329 Or 404, 987 P2d 496 (1999)
(although ABA Standards provided preliminarily that suspension
was appropriate when accused lawyer knew he had current client
conflict and failed to withdraw promptly, accused lawyer publicly
reprimanded when mitigating factors outweighed aggravating
factors).  Finally, we are persuaded here, as this court
was in Flannery, that the conduct giving rise to this
proceeding is unlikely to recur. See also In re
Fulop, 297 Or 354, 685 P2d 414 (1984) (lawyer publicly
reprimanded for attempting to assist friend in defrauding
creditor because violation was "isolated instance of
misbehavior"); In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 683 P2d 992
(1984) (lawyer convicted of misdemeanor theft for signing wife's
name to certificate of title for item of personal property held
jointly and then selling it publicly reprimanded in part because
lawyer's conduct was unlikely to recur).
After considering our precedents, we do not agree with
the Bar that the accused's misconduct requires a 60-day
suspension.  Instead, those precedents persuade us that a public
reprimand will protect the public adequately.  
The accused is publicly reprimanded.
BALMER, J., dissenting.
I agree with the majority that "professional
misconduct," which DR 1-102(A)(3) prohibits, may include conduct
by a lawyer involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation," even if that conduct does not violate the
criminal law or occur in the course of the practice of law.  I
further agree with the majority that the accused's conduct here
was boorish and perhaps tortious, and that it showed a singular
lack of judgment.  I disagree, however, with the majority's
conclusion that the accused's conduct in this instance violated
DR 1-102(A)(3) and, for that reason, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority correctly observes, not every instance
of dishonesty or deceit violates DR 1-102(A)(3).  A "false or
dishonest statement" unrelated to professional conduct is not
subject to professional discipline unless there is a nexus
between that statement and "the lawyer's fitness to practice
law."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 8).  No one would argue, for
example, that a lawyer's untrue statement to a child regarding
the tooth fairy violates the rule, because the false statement
does not demonstrate that the lawyer lacks the integrity or
honesty necessary to practice law.  However, a lawyer's pattern
of dishonest statements to a spouse or employer about matters
that are important to the spouse or employer, depending on the
circumstances, could violate DR 1-102(A)(3).  This court recently
defined the term "dishonesty" in DR 1-102(A)(3) as "conduct that
indicates a disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; or a lack of integrity." In re Dugger,
334 Or 602, 609, 54 P3d 595 (2002) (emphasis added).  That
definition properly focuses the issue in the disciplinary
proceeding on whether the accused lawyer's dishonest conduct
likely was an isolated event or, instead, indicates a disposition
to act in a manner that calls into question the lawyer's fitness
to practice law.
The majority rephrases that test as whether the
lawyer's conduct "indicate[s] that the lawyer lacks those
characteristics of trustworthiness and integrity that are
essential to the practice of law."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op
at 10-11) (emphasis added).  However, the inquiry is still the
same:  should the court infer from a lawyer's specific act or
acts of dishonesty a general disposition to lie, cheat, or
defraud.  In my view, the majority fails to apply that test
properly to these facts.
The majority opinion accurately describes the accused's
conduct in registering on the classmates.com website, falsely
using the name of a classmate of his who was now a high school
teacher, and posting an inflammatory and personal message about
the teacher.  The accused's conduct took place over a period of
minutes on February 19, 2001.  The trial panel found that the
message was removed within a matters of days.  The record
reflects that at least one person viewed the accused's posted
message before its removal.  That person sent a letter critical
of the teacher, together with a copy of the message, to various
school officials, causing harm to the teacher.  
On those facts, I do not believe that the Bar has
proved that the accused's dishonest conduct indicates a
disposition to dishonesty or demonstrates that the accused lacks
the integrity necessary to practice law.  The record shows no
dishonest or deceitful conduct by the accused other than his
action on February 19, 2001.  When the accused was informed of
the consequences of his conduct, he contacted the teacher,
apologized, and took steps that the teacher suggested to minimize
the adverse impact of the accused's conduct.  
Neither the brevity of the misconduct nor the accused's
explanation that he intended it as a practical joke excuses what
the accused did.  However, not every dishonest act or lapse of
judgment, even one that harms another person, violates DR 1-102(A)(3), and that is the case here.  I do not disagree with the
majority's determination that the accused acted dishonestly, but
only with its conclusion that the disciplinary rules extend to
that dishonest conduct. 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Kistler, J., joins in this separate opinion.
1. We note that, although the mitigating circumstance of a
lack of prior discipline applies here, we afford it little weight
because, at the time of his conduct, the accused had been
admitted to the practice of law in Oregon for only five months.