Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Conese

Citation: 2002-Ohio-4797

Docket Number: 20020313

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Conese, 96 Ohio St.3d 458, 2002-Ohio-4797.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CONESE. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Conese, 96 Ohio St.3d 458, 2002-Ohio-4797.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension with six months of the 
suspension stayed on condition that attorney commit no further 
misconduct — Failing to deposit client funds in an identifiable trust 
account — Failing to keep records and appropriately account for 
client’s funds — Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation — Conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
(No. 2002-0313 — Submitted June 26, 2002 — Decided October 2, 2002.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-41. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
This case requires us to decide the sanction for an attorney who 
failed to deposit in a trust account funds earmarked to pay his client’s child 
support arrearages and then did not honestly account for these funds.  We must 
also decide whether procedural delay compromised the attorney’s right to a fair 
hearing.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found that 
respondent, Michael Conese of Hamilton, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
0032804, engaged in this misconduct and thereby violated DR 9-102(A) (failing 
to deposit client funds in an identifiable trust account), (B)(3) (failing to keep 
records and appropriately account for client’s funds), 1-102(A)(4) (conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and (5) (conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice).  The board did not find any 
prejudicial delay and recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
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practice of law in Ohio for one year with six months of this sanction stayed.  We 
agree with the board’s findings and recommendation. 
{¶2} 
On February 24, 1997, a client retained respondent to defend him 
against a felony charge of failure to pay child support.  On that day, respondent 
and the client met before his arraignment, and they signed an agreement for a total 
fee of $3,500, payable in two installments.  The first installment of $2,000 was to 
be paid immediately, and $1,500 was to be paid on March 26, 1997.  The client 
gave respondent a check for $2,000 pursuant to the agreement, but the check was 
returned for insufficient funds, and he paid nothing on March 26, 1997.  The 
client later met respondent on April 23, 1997, the date the client appeared in court 
to enter a guilty plea, and gave him a bank check for $4,000 payable to 
respondent.  Respondent thereafter deposited the entire $4,000 in his office bank 
account. 
{¶3} 
At least two different explanations exist for what happened 
between respondent and his client on the day the client tendered this $4,000 
check.  Respondent submits that he and his client changed their initial fee 
arrangement because respondent had spent so much time on the case and that both 
orally agreed to a revised $4,000 fee.  The client, however, recalled that 
respondent promised to apply $1,000 to reduce the arrearage in his child support 
payment, and the client assumed that respondent would keep the remaining 
$3,000 as his fee. 
{¶4} 
An assistant prosecutor in charge of enforcing the client’s child 
support obligation corroborated the client’s recollection.  The prosecutor recalled 
discussing with respondent his fee arrangement with his client on two separate 
occasions.  On the first occasion, which was either on February 24 or April 23, 
1997, she recalled respondent’s saying that he had placed $1,000 in his trust 
account and intended to apply the amount to the client’s child support arrearage.  
But at a sentencing hearing on July 23, 1997, at which the client failed to appear, 
January Term, 2002 
3 
the prosecutor recalled respondent’s saying that his client had given him money 
only to pay his legal fees. 
{¶5} 
The prosecutor did not suspect until more than a year later that 
respondent had kept more of his client’s money than he should have.  In the 
meantime, the client was charged for his failure to appear on July 23, 1997, and 
had retained a new attorney.  At a plea hearing in August 1998 on the charge of 
failure to appear, the prosecutor learned from the client and his new attorney that 
the client had paid respondent $4,000 so that $3,000 would be used for 
respondent’s legal fees and $1,000 would be used for owed child support.  The 
prosecutor also learned that the $1,000 had not been applied to the arrearage. 
{¶6} 
On October 16, 1998, the prosecutor reported to the Butler County 
Bar Association the possibility that respondent had retained his client’s money 
without authority.  A representative of the bar association began to investigate and 
sent a letter, dated March 2, 1999, to the client inquiring about his relationship 
with respondent.  Thereafter, the bar association transferred the cause to relator, 
Disciplinary Counsel, to complete the investigation. 
{¶7} 
During the investigation, relator asked respondent to explain what 
happened to the $4,000 his client gave him on February 24, 1997.  Respondent 
had no office accounting records of the transaction, and in his written response, he 
never mentioned any agreement to revise the contract for his professional 
services.  He instead represented that his client had signed the bank check over to 
him, that they went to a bank and cashed the check, and that respondent kept 
$3,000 while his client, who was there with his parents, kept the balance. 
{¶8} 
Relator filed a complaint on June 5, 2000, charging respondent 
with various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  After 
respondent’s motion to dismiss due to investigative delay was overruled, a panel 
of the board found the facts as stated.  The panel concluded that respondent 
violated DR 9-102(A) and (B)(3) by keeping $1,000 of his client’s money and 
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then failing to properly account for the client’s funds.  The panel also found 
violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). 
{¶9} 
In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel 
considered as mitigating the fact that respondent had “never been in any difficulty 
with the law” and had served honorably as municipal court judge in Butler 
County.  In aggravation, the panel considered that respondent had lied during the 
investigation of his misconduct because respondent falsely represented that he had 
returned the $1,000 in dispute to his client.  The panel then accepted the sanction 
suggested by relator and recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for one year, with six months of this sanction stayed on the 
condition that he commit no further misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation. 
{¶10} We concur in the board’s decision.  Moreover, while the 
investigation in this case took approximately one year and eight months, which is 
prima facie evidence of unreasonable delay under Gov.Bar R. V(4)(D)(3) 
(investigation should be concluded in one year from date grievance is filed), we 
see no prejudice to respondent.  Respondent’s only complaint in this regard is that 
he had difficulty recalling what had happened to the money his client had given 
him because those events happened in 1997.  But as relator argues, respondent’s 
inability to explain his actions resulted not from the passage of time but from his 
failure to maintain the required records of his client’s funds. 
{¶11} Accordingly, for his violations of DR 9-102(A) and (B)(3) and 1-
102(A)(4) and (5), respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for one year; however, six months of this sanction are stayed on the 
condition that he commit no further misconduct.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
 
RESNICK, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. 
{¶12} Although the majority opinion does not expressly say so, this case 
involves the misappropriation of client funds.  In such cases, we must begin our 
consideration with the presumptive sanction of disbarment.  Cleveland Bar Assn. 
v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, at ¶ 15.  On some 
occasions, however, we have given weight to a board’s recommendation of a 
lesser sanction because of mitigating circumstances.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Wise (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 707 N.E.2d 852. 
{¶13} It is true that the record shows some mitigating circumstances in 
this case.  But the record also reveals a significant aggravating circumstance: the 
respondent lied during the relator’s investigation of his misconduct.  Given the 
respondent’s conduct and the serious aggravating circumstance involved here, I 
cannot join the majority’s significant downward departure from the presumptive 
sanction of disbarment.  The respondent should be indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  See, e.g., Wise, 85 Ohio St.3d at 171, 707 N.E.2d 
852.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kevin L. Williams, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
George M. Parker, for respondent. 
__________________