Case Title: THUNDERBASIN LAND, LIVESTOCK & INV. CO. v. COUNTY OF LARAMIE COUNTY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-19

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
THUNDERBASIN LAND, LIVESTOCK & INV. CO. v. COUNTY OF LARAMIE COUNTY2000 WY 1105 P.3d 774Case Number: 99-19Decided: 05/02/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
THUNDERBASIN LAND, 
LIVESTOCK & INVESTMENT CO.; LORENZ RANCH, INC., FERGUSON RANCH, INC.; DON 
BOSMAN, and BONHAM CATTLE CO., Appellants (Petitioners),v.THE COUNTY OF 
LARAMIE COUNTY, WYOMING THE LARAMIE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, JEFF KETCHAM, 
Chairman, in his official capacity, NICK MIRICH, Commissioner, in his official 
capacity; and FRED EMERICH, Vice Chairman, in his official capacity, Appellees 
(Respondents).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellants: Karen Budd-Falen, L. 
Eric Lundgren and Franklin J. Falen of Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.Representing Appellees: Peter Froelicher, Laramie County 
Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and John C. McKinley of Davis & Cannon, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The 
dispositive question in this case is whether a district court must conduct a 
trial de novo in reviewing an award of damages by a board of county 
commissioners in a road establishment proceeding. Thunderbasin Land, Livestock 
& Investment Co., Lorenz Ranch, Inc., Ferguson Ranch, Inc., Don Bosman, and 
Bonham Cattle Co. (collectively Thunderbasin) appeal a decision of the district 
court that affirmed the award of damages made by the Board of County 
Commissioners for Laramie County (the Board) for lands taken for the road. 
Thunderbasin contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121 (Lexis 1999) requires 
those damages to be determined as in a civil action. The Board argues that the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115 (Lexis 1999), is the controlling law in this instance, and the district 
court need only review the decision of the Board. We hold that the adoption of 
the WAPA did not repeal the procedure set forth in the road establishment 
statutes, and that the district court was required upon appeal to determine the 
damages to the several Thunderbasin interests as in a civil action. The Order on 
Petition for Review entered in the district court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Appellant's Opening 
Brief:

A. Whether Board of 
County Commissioners' decision to reduce a just compensation appraisal by ninety 
percent with no supporting evidence was arbitrary and 
capricious.

B. Whether the district 
court denied appellants' constitutional rights to due process of law and just 
compensation by denying them a de novo trial before an impartial 
tribunal.

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues on Appeal is found in the Brief of 
Appellees:

1. Is the Laramie County 
Board of County Commissioners' decision awarding compensation for the road 
establishment supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and 
capricious?

2. Does the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedures Act ("Wyoming APA") and W.R.A.P. provide the exclusive 
methodology for appealing the Laramie County Board of County Commissioners' 
decision awarding damages?

3. Is the Laramie County 
Board of County Commissioners' decision establishing Road 101 as a county road 
supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and 
capricious?

[¶4] 
Thunderbasin owned property located between Happy Jack Road (Happy Jack) and the 
North Crow Reservoir, west of Cheyenne in Laramie County. For nearly forty 
years, the public gained access to the reservoir by traveling over a road four 
miles long (now County Road 101) that traversed Thunderbasin's property. Since 
1978, Laramie County has maintained the road by grading it, draining it, and 
providing an all weather surface, but the Board did not designate the road as, 
or declare it to be, a public road. In 1993, Thunderbasin closed the road to 
public access, claiming that previously the public had trespassed on their 
property in traveling to and from the reservoir.

[¶5] At the same 
time, Thunderbasin conveyed a perpetual utility easement to the Cheyenne Board 
of Public Utilities (the BOPU) to provide access to monitor, maintain, and 
repair the North Crow Reservoir Dam. The North Crow Reservoir Dam was one 
feature of the BOPU's multi-million dollar rehabilitation project of the North 
Crow Reservoir. The BOPU paid $640 per acre for the easement, and it was 
prohibited, by a restriction in the easement, from permitting public use of this 
easement.

[¶6] As a result 
of the closure by Thunderbasin, the public users of the road were denied access 
to the reservoir, and, on March 28, 1994, some members of the public filed a 
petition for road establishment, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-101(b) 
(Michie Repl. 1993),[fn1a] which they presented to the Board on April 5, 1994. 
In response to this petition, Thunderbasin filed objections to establishing 
County Road 101; filed a claim for damages; and requested a hearing. The Board 
then followed the procedure set forth in the statutes for establishing public 
roads, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-103 through 24-3-118 (Lexis 1999). The Laramie 
County Engineer was designated to be the viewer pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-3-103. The County Engineer proceeded, in accordance with the applicable 
statutes (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-104 through 24-3-106), and submitted a report 
to the Board on May 10, 1994. In that report, the County Engineer offered his 
explanation of the method for arriving at damages stating that "actual estimated 
damages * * * should be computed based only on the market value of the property 
used to contain the road."

[¶7] The Board 
also appointed a committee, including representatives from Thunderbasin and the 
BOPU, the County Engineer, the United States Forest Service, a state 
representative from Albany County, two members of the petitioner's group, and 
others to address and resolve issues surrounding the road. Although the 
committee did not unanimously agree on the location of the road, the Board 
established County Road 101 as a public road. Both the BOPU and Thunderbasin 
filed damage claims, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-111. Thunderbasin sent a 
"Notice of Objection" dated August 15, 1994, to the Board objecting to the 
establishment of the road, making a claim for damages, and requesting a 
contested case hearing before the Board.

[¶8] As provided 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-114, the Board appointed appraisers in November of 
1994 to determine Thunderbasin's damages. The appraisers submitted their report 
to the County Clerk, in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-116, in which 
they found that, on November 10, 1994, the market value of the lands taken for 
the road was the same as the market value of the surrounding lands, $1,000.00 
per acre. Ultimately, the total damage reported by the appraisers for the 
approximate twenty acres affected was $67,299.00. In accordance with Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-3-118, the report of the appraisers was considered by the Board at a 
contested case hearing, which began on February 7, 1995. In the course of the 
hearing, which continued on three separated days, the Board received evidence 
relating to the establishment of the road and the damages to the several owners. 
The damages the Board ultimately awarded, however, were significantly reduced 
from the amounts claimed, in part because the BOPU taking was of an easement 
rather than a fee simple interest.

[¶9] In March of 
1995, the Board decided to adopt a moratorium regarding the road establishment 
decision, and it appointed another committee to complete the management study. 
The following February, the Board conducted a second contested case hearing, 
and, at the end of that hearing, the decision to establish the road was 
postponed for another month. In March of 1996, the Board entered an order 
establishing County Road 101, and at that time the assessment of damages was 
reduced to a combined total of $5,363.63. Rather than using the appraisers' 
estimate, the Board followed the County Engineer's advice to assess the damages 
by computing the market value of the area occupied by the road as 
established.

[¶10] 
Thunderbasin rejected the assessed damages, and a judicial review from the final 
Commissioners' Order Establishing Road 101 and Diminishing Damages was pursued 
in the district court. In a decision letter, dated January 27, 1997, the 
district court initially affirmed the establishment of County Road 101, finding 
that it was established in substantial compliance with the statutes and that 
Thunderbasin had been afforded its procedural rights. In accordance with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121, the district court determined Thunderbasin was entitled 
to a trial de novo to determine its damages using a "before and after valuation" 
standard. Moreover, the district court concluded that the WAPA did not repeal by 
implication either Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-119 or § 24-3-121 (Lexis 1999). In 
that decision letter, the district court invited the parties to brief the issue 
of the right of Thunderbasin to a trial de novo on the 
damages.

[¶11] Laramie 
County did not take advantage of that invitation until August 14, 1998. 
Following a change of personnel in the office of county attorney, Laramie County 
moved to vacate the trial de novo set by the district court in its January 27, 
1997, letter. On October 12, 1998, the district court issued a second decision 
letter reversing its earlier ruling that Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial de 
novo on damages. Although the decision letter addressed several issues, the 
essential purpose was to determine that the WAPA and the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.) superseded Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-119 through 
24-3-121 (Lexis 1999). The district court concluded that W.R.A.P. 12.01 through 
12.12 provided the exclusive means of seeking judicial review of final 
administrative action, and held that the statutory provisions were superseded. 
Consequently, the district court ruled that Thunderbasin was not entitled to a 
new determination of damages, and the district court vacated the trial de novo 
it originally granted in its January 27, 1997 decision letter. The district 
court then proceeded to review Thunderbasin's claim pursuant to the procedures 
specified in the W.R.A.P. under the standards provided in the WAPA. It ruled 
that the Board's decision to establish County Road 101 and the reduced damage 
award were supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the law. 
Thunderbasin appealed that decision to this Court.

[¶12] The point 
of convergence of the diverse views in this road establishment case is whether 
the trial de novo procedure for damages, found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121, 
must yield to the judicial review provisions of the WAPA and the W.R.A.P. This 
focused issue is emphasized by the two conflicting decision letters issued by 
the district court. The road establishment statutes address the appeal to the 
district court in three sections, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-119, 24-3-120 and 
24-3-121:

§ 24-3-119. Appeals from 
decisions of county commissioners; notice; bond required.

[¶13] Any 
applicant for damages claimed, or caused by the establishment or alteration of 
any road, may appeal from the final decision of the board of the county 
commissioners to the district court of the county, in which the land lies, for 
the taking of which for a public road, damages are asked; but notice of such 
appeal must be made to the county clerk, within thirty (30) days after such 
decision has been made by the said board, or such claim shall be deemed to have 
been abandoned. No appeal shall be allowed, unless a good and sufficient bond be 
given by the party appealing, in a sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) to 
cover costs, said bond to be approved by the clerk of the district 
court.

§ 24-3-120. Appeals from 
decisions of county commissioners; duties of county clerk.

[¶14] The county 
clerk shall, within ten (10) days after the notice of an appeal as provided for 
in W.S. 24-3-119 is filed in his office, make out and file in the office of the 
clerk of the district court, in his county, a transcript of the papers on file 
in his office, and the proceedings of the board in relation to such 
damages.

§ 24-3-121. Appeals from 
decisions of county commissioners; recovery of damages; court 
costs.

[¶15] The amount 
of damages to which the claimant shall be entitled on such appeal shall be 
ascertained in the same manner as in a civil action, and the amount so 
ascertained, if any, shall be entered of record, but no judgment shall be 
entered therefor. The amount thus ascertained shall be certified by the clerk of 
the court to the county clerk who shall thereafter proceed as if such amount had 
been allowed by the board of the county commissioners to the claimant as 
damages. If the appellant shall fail to recover an amount exceeding fifty 
dollars ($50.00) above the amount allowed to him by the board of the county 
commissioners, he shall pay all costs of the appeal.

(Emphasis 
added.) These statutes use the mandatory verb form of "shall." Perhaps even more 
importantly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-119 provides for an appeal for damages 
rather than a review.

[¶16] The 
judicial review statute included in the WAPA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114, reads 
in pertinent part:

(a) Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any 
person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review 
in the district court for the county in which the administrative action or 
inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by the administrative 
action or inaction is located, or if no real property is involved, in the 
district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected 
by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its principal place of 
business. The procedure to be followed in the proceeding before the district 
court shall be in accordance with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the 
Wyoming supreme court.

(b) The supreme court's 
authority to adopt rules governing review from agencies to the district courts 
shall include authority to determine the content of the record upon review, the 
pleadings to be filed, the time and manner for filing the pleadings, records and 
other documents and the extent to which supplemental testimony and evidence may 
be taken or considered by the district court. The rules adopted by the supreme 
court under this provision may supersede existing statutory 
provisions.

(Emphasis 
added.) Similarly, W.R.A.P. 12.01 is phrased in a permissive rather than 
mandatory tone:

[¶17] To the 
extent judicial review of administrative action by a district court is 
available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final 
decision of an agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely 
affected in fact by any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by that agency, may obtain such review as 
provided in this rule. All appeals from administrative agencies shall be 
governed by these rules.

[¶18] Both the 
WAPA provision and the court rule acknowledge that there may be a specific 
statutory provision limiting review.

[¶19] This case 
could have been resolved rather readily by reversing the Board for failure to 
invoke the proper rule for arriving at damages in a road condemnation case. In 
determining damages, the Board clearly relied on the advice of the County 
Engineer to assess the damages by computing the market value of the area 
occupied by the road as established. That approach eschewed the existing law in 
this regard. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 
790 P.2d 663, 669-72 (Wyo. 1990). Subsequently, in amending the Wyoming Eminent 
Domain Act, the legislature adopted specific rules for determining damages for 
the taking of property. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-701 through 1-26-710 (Lexis 
1999). Remanding the case for the purpose of requiring the Board to apply the 
proper law for determining damages, however, would have begged the question. The 
district court initially recognized the right of Thunderbasin to have its 
damages determined as in a civil action, but later ruled that the damages were 
subject only to judicial review under the WAPA. We are satisfied that the 
district court proceeded as it did in order to have the law settled on this 
point.

[¶20] The clear 
and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121 provides "[t]he amount of 
damages to which the claimant shall be entitled on such appeal shall be 
ascertained in the same manner as in a civil action * * *." Thunderbasin claims 
that under this language, they are entitled to a de novo trial before the 
district court to determine the proper damages they are entitled to receive. In 
contrast, the Board argues that since it is an agency, the WAPA controls and 
provides the exclusive means for review of an agency action. Under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (C), the relevant statutory provisions in this 
case, district courts review agency decisions and:

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶21] The Board 
claims the establishment of County Road 101 was supported by substantial 
evidence, and in all respects comported with the statutory factors material to 
review in the district court.

[¶22] An issue 
of statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Butts v. Wyoming State 
Bd. of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996); Parker Land & Cattle Co. 
v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). In interpreting 
statutes, we primarily determine the legislature's intent. State ex rel. Motor 
Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983). If the language is 
sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction. Id. We apply our 
general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when 
the language is unambiguous. Parker Land, 845 P.2d  at 
1042.

Kirbens v. Wyoming State 
Bd. of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶23] In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 
736 (Wyo. 1983). All statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in 
ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same 
subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be considered and construed in 
harmony. Id. at 735. Holtz explained our statutory construction 
rules:

"If the language is 
sufficiently clear, there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When 
the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief 
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its 
enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other 
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted 
rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent."

Holtz, 674 P.2d  
at 736.

Peterson v. Wyoming Game 
and Fish Com'n, 989 P.2d 113, 118 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶24] When the 
legislature adopts a statute it is presumed to have done so with full knowledge 
of the existing state of law with reference to the subject matter of the 
statute. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979); White v. Board of Land 
Commissioners, Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979); and Matter of Adoption of Voss [Wyo., 
550 P.2d 481 (1976)], supra. In this latter case we said:

"* * * All statutes are 
presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing 
state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed 
in harmony with the existing law, and as part of an overall and uniform system 
of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in 
connection, not only with the common law and constitution, but also with 
reference to the decisions of the courts. * * *" 550 P.2d  at 
486.

Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶25] In 
honoring the foregoing principles of law, we are constrained to look at the 
broad area of eminent domain proceedings in Wyoming because we are satisfied 
that the road establishment statutes are simply a method of exercising the power 
of eminent domain. We held in L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d  at 674-75, that the Board 
could proceed under either the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-26-501 through 1-26-817 (Lexis 1999), or under the road establishment 
statutes. Applying that decision, the district court was correct in ruling that 
the Board followed the proper procedure to establish County Road 101. We hold 
that the road was established according to law.

[¶26] The 
critical issue we must address is whether Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial 
de novo on the issue of damages under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121. The statute 
specifies that "damages * * * shall be ascertained in the same manner as in a 
civil action * * *." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121. The reference to a civil action 
invokes the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,1 which apply 
in condemnation cases generally. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-501 (Lexis 1999). The 
rules provide, consistently with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121, that "issues of 
fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only * * * shall be tried by a 
jury unless a jury trial be waived, or a reference be ordered." W.R.C.P. 38(a). 
The rules pertaining to condemnation are set forth in W.R.C.P. 71.1. This rule 
articulates the procedure for a special civil action relating to condemnation of 
property, and W.R.C.P. 71.1(j) provides for a jury trial.2 Although the 
parties in the case before us did not request a jury trial, W.R.C.P. 39(b) 
affords to the court discretion to order a jury trial. There is no ambiguity in 
the road establishment statute nor the rule, and the language is clear and 
unequivocal. Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial de novo on the issue of 
damages upon review in the district court, and a jury trial if 
requested.

[¶27] The 
district court apparently accepted the Board's argument that the enactment of 
the WAPA repealed by implication Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121 of the road 
establishment statutes. Under the circumstances, a refutation of the Board's 
contentions is appropriate. Recently, in Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming v. 
Transportation Com'n of Wyoming, 970 P.2d 858, 863 (Wyo. 1998), we revisited the 
doctrine of statutory repeal by implication. In a limited number of cases, we 
have held that the legislature repealed a statute by implication,3 but "our 
longstanding rule that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be 
indulged if there is any other reasonable construction" continues to be the law. 
Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming, 970 P.2d  at 863. "The party asserting 
implied repeal bears the burden of demonstrating beyond question that the 
legislature intended that its later legislative action evinced an unequivocal 
purpose of effecting a repeal." Id. (citing Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 73 
(Wyo. 1978)). "It must be shown that the later statute is so repugnant to the 
earlier one that the two cannot logically stand together, or that the whole 
subject of the earlier statute is covered by the later one having the same 
object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable to the 
subject." Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming, 970 P.2d  at 863. See also Town of 
Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 252, [79 Wyo. 262] 283-84, 333 P.2d 700, 709 (1958).

[¶28] The Board 
bases its argument on Section 17 of the original WAPA legislation, Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 108 (1965), which states that "[a]ll acts or parts of acts which are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed * * *." The 
Board then cites City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., 647 P.2d 1378, 1384 (Wyo. 
1982), in which we said "[w]ith the adoption of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act (WAPA) in 1965, the trial de novo provisions were replaced and all 
judicial review of an administrative agency's action was required to be 
conducted in accord with what is now [Wyo. Stat. Ann § 16-3-114(c)]." This is an 
accurate reading of the general rule, because prior to the adoption of the WAPA, 
judicial review was accomplished by a trial de novo. The statute upon which the 
Board relies also stated, "[p]rovided, however, to the extent not inconsistent 
herewith existing procedures provided by statute shall be deemed preserved and 
the procedures provided for by this Act shall be in addition and supplementary 
thereto." Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 108 (1965).

[¶29] The Board 
has not demonstrated in this instance that the WAPA "is so repugnant to the 
[road establishment statute] that the two cannot logically stand together, or 
that the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the later one having 
the same object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable to the 
subject." Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming, 970 P.2d  at 863. The contentions 
of the Board fall far short of carrying its "burden of demonstrating beyond 
question that the legislature intended that its later legislative action evinced 
an unequivocal purpose of effecting a repeal." Id. Instead, as we have 
explained, there is a rather comprehensive scheme for exercising the power of 
eminent domain, of which the establishment of a county road is only one part, 
and that scheme almost universally incorporates a right to a jury trial to 
determine the damages to the landowner. The limited reach of the WAPA into this 
comprehensive scheme is quite contrary to the burden assigned to the 
Board.

[¶30] Indeed, 
other rules of statutory construction provide useful criteria to aid us in our 
fundamental effort to determine legislative intent. We have held a specific 
statute controls over a general statute on the same subject. Rock Springs Ford 
Nissan v. State Bd. of Equalization, Wyoming Dept. of Revenue, 890 P.2d 1100, 
1103 (Wyo. 1995) (citing L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d at 674). A specific provision 
in a statute controls over an inconsistent general provision pertaining to the 
same subject. The WAPA limits the court's review of an agency decision to 
whether an agency decision is "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A). It addresses in a general way the review of damages for land 
taken for a county road, but Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121 provides a specific 
procedure to ascertain damages. The latter statute is limited exclusively to a 
determination of damages in connection with condemnation for a road, while the 
WAPA provision addresses all types of agency decisions. Although the Board is 
correct in its assertion that the WAPA was enacted subsequent to the county road 
statute and repeals all acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with it, 
that does not control the application of other rules of statutory construction. 
The WAPA imposes basic procedural due process standards upon administrative 
activities and provides a mechanism for agencies to adopt procedural rules, 
which guide agency decision making in a predictable manner. First Nat. Bank of 
Thermopolis v. Bonham, 559 P.2d 42, 47 (Wyo. 1977). The specific statute 
controls over the general when they address the same subject. As indicated by 
its title, the WAPA is procedural and not substantive in nature, it does not 
serve to repeal by implication the more specific statute. Sage Club, Inc. v. 
Employment Sec. Commission of Wyoming, 601 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Wyo. 1979). These 
principles are particularly applicable in an area of the law that implicates 
constitutional protection of property rights, and the constitutional right to a 
jury trial.

[¶31] The 
district court failed to provide Thunderbasin with its statutorily guaranteed de 
novo trial to determine damages for the twenty acres at issue. Although the WAPA 
provides that courts must review an agency decision to determine whether the 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion or otherwise not 
in accordance with the law, a statute that specifies the procedure in an appeal 
of an agency's damages determination controls. The road establishment statute 
requires that Thunderbasin's damages be determined in the same manner as in a 
civil action, which includes the right to a jury trial. The district court 
failed to follow the proper procedure prescribed by statute. We reverse the 
district court's decision, and remand this case for further proceedings to 
properly afford Thunderbasin an opportunity to have its damages determined as in 
a civil action.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-3-101(b) provides:

(b) 
(i) Any person desiring the establishment, vacation or alteration of a county 
highway shall file in the office of the county clerk of the proper county, a 
petition signed by five (5) or more electors of the county residing within 
twenty-five (25) miles of the road proposed to be established, altered, or 
vacated, in substance as follows: To the Board of County Commissioners of. . . . 
County. The undersigned ask that a county highway, commencing at. . . . and 
running thence. . . . and terminating at. . . . be established (altered or 
vacated as the case may be).

(ii) With said petition shall be filed a list containing the names and 
also the known post office address of each person owning or having an interest 
in any land over which the proposed establishment, vacation or alteration of a 
county highway is to be made.

2 Those rules 
state, in pertinent part:

Rule 1. Scope and purpose of rules.

These rules govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of 
Wyoming, in all actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature and in all 
special statutory proceedings except as provided in Rule 81. They shall be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.

Rule 2. One form of action.

There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil 
action".

3 W.R.C.P. 
71.1 provides, in pertinent part:

Rule 71.1 Condemnation of property.

* * 
*

(j) 
Formal trial; jury trial. - If a judgment has been entered on the basis of 
informal proceedings, any party may file, within 30 days after such entry of 
judgment, a written demand for a formal trial to the court or for a jury trial, 
whereupon the action shall proceed as though no informal proceedings had 
occurred. If an assessment has been made by appraisers, any party not satisfied 
with the award may file, within 30 days after the certificate of assessment has 
been filed, a written demand for a trial by jury on the issue of just 
compensation, whereupon the action shall proceed to a jury trial on that 
issue.

(1) 
Demand. - The demand, whether for a formal trial to the court or for a jury 
trial, shall be filed with the clerk and served upon the other parties in 
accordance with Rule 5(b).

(2) 
Procedure. - The formal trial or trial by jury shall be conducted in the same 
manner as other civil actions.

(3) 
Decision; verdict. - If the action is tried without jury, the court shall 
determine the compensation to be made to the defendant or defendants, and shall 
render its decision in writing, and enter its judgment accordingly. If the 
action is tried with jury, the jury shall determine these matters, and shall 
render its verdict in writing, signed by the foreman, and the verdict shall be 
entered in the record.

4 See 
Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832, 834 (Wyo. 1968), where we held that when the 
two statutes were read together they were so repugnant to each other that we 
held it was the manifest legislative intent that the general statute have 
universal application and repeal by implication the earlier specific 
statute.