Case Title: State v. Christopher Anson

Citation: 2005 WI 96

Docket Number: 2003AP001444-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 96 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1444-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Christopher Anson,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 155 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 832, 686 N.W.2d 712 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 28, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Steven J. 
Watson and Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, St. Johnsbury, VT, and 
oral argument by Steven J. Watson. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1444-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 306) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher Anson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State seeks review of a 
published court of appeals decision, State v. Anson, 2004 WI App 
155, 275 Wis. 2d 832, 686 N.W.2d 712 [hereinafter "Anson II"].  
The court of appeals reversed Christopher Anson's (Anson's) 
judgment of conviction for second-degree sexual assault of a 
child and an order of the Walworth County Circuit Court, James 
L. Carlson, Judge, affirming that conviction and remanded for a 
new trial.  Id., ¶1.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm 
the court of appeals' decision, which remanded the case for a 
new trial.   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
2 
 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶2 
This case has a lengthy factual and procedural 
background.  The relevant facts are not in dispute, and in the 
interest 
of 
judicial 
economy, 
we 
set 
forth 
the 
factual 
background of this case as stated by the court of appeals in 
Anson's original appeal: 
On July 26, 2000, the State issued an arrest warrant 
for Anson.  On July 26, the State charged Anson with 
three counts of sexual contact with a child under the 
age of sixteen in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) 
(1999-2000). 
 
Each 
count 
of 
the 
complaint 
is 
distinguished by time and place.  Counts one and two 
relate to an incident allegedly occurring "on a glider 
type chair" on the "porch of the home."  Count three 
relates to the allegation that "the defendant later 
came back downstairs" and "touched [the victim's] 
vagina while she was lying on a couch."  
In early August, an officer from the Fontana 
police 
department 
contacted 
the 
Orange 
County 
California sheriff and asked for assistance in getting 
a statement from Anson.  On August 3, the Orange 
county investigator who initiated the discussion with 
Anson first learned about the warrant for Anson's 
arrest. On August 7, the officer sent a fax that 
contained an eight-page narrative, a copy of the 
criminal complaint, and a Xerox of a photo of Anson 
and the victim to the investigator.  On August 8, the 
investigator 
and 
his 
partner 
went 
to 
Anson's 
workplace, both to get a statement from him regarding 
an alleged sexual assault that had occurred in 
Wisconsin and ultimately to arrest Anson.  Anson 
agreed to speak with the investigators.  
At the beginning of the interrogation, Anson 
asked, "I haven't been charged with anything yet," and 
the investigator responded, "Right."  The investigator 
then asked Anson, "You understand you are not under 
arrest right now?"  Anson responded affirmatively.  
After a preliminary discussion, the interrogation 
turned to the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
3 
 
contact between Anson and the alleged victim of the 
sexual assault.  The investigator asked Anson why the 
victim would make up such a story and Anson stated 
that she had some grounds for the allegation.  Anson 
then admitted to the investigators that the victim 
took his hand and placed it over her clothes on her 
vagina and he left his hand there for a period of 
time.  Anson told the investigators that from his 
point of view nothing happened on the porch swing.  
After the interview, the investigators placed Anson 
under arrest.  
Prior to trial, Anson filed a motion to suppress 
the statements he made to the investigators.  The 
trial court denied the motion.[1]  At trial, the 
inculpatory statements were introduced through the 
testimony of one of the investigators.  Anson also 
took the stand at trial and testified, as he had told 
the investigators, that the victim had taken his hand 
and placed it on her vagina.  Anson denied ever having 
put his hands up the victim's shirt or touching her 
breasts on the porch swing.  
A jury convicted Anson on count three of the 
information, second-degree sexual assault of a child 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The jury 
found Anson not guilty on counts one and two of the 
information.   
State v. Anson, 2002 WI App 270, ¶¶2-7, 258 Wis. 2d 433, 654 
N.W.2d 48 [hereinafter "Anson I"].   
¶3 
On appeal, the court of appeals in Anson I held that 
"the State violated Anson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
when it undertook its interrogation, and accordingly, the trial 
court erred when it failed to suppress Anson's statements."  
                                                 
1 The court of appeals rejected Anson's interlocutory appeal 
of the denial of his motion to suppress.  Anson II, 2004 WI App 
155, ¶5, 275 Wis. 2d 832, 686 N.W.2d 712.  In his petition for 
leave to appeal the circuit court's order, Anson stated:  
"Admission of the statement will strategically force the 
defendant to testify despite his right of silence."   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
4 
 
Id., ¶21.  The court of appeals also considered "whether, by 
taking 
the 
stand, 
Anson 
waived 
his 
right 
against 
self-
incrimination, thereby rendering any error harmless."  Id., ¶26.   
¶4 
As to the second issue, the court of appeals, relying 
on Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), and State v. 
Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1986), 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
State's use of the illegally obtained statements induced Anson 
to take the stand in order to overcome the impact of those 
statements: 
We direct the trial court on remand to hear 
evidence 
and 
make 
findings 
of 
historical 
fact 
concerning 
whether 
Anson 
testified 
in 
order 
to 
overcome the impact of the incriminating statements he 
made to the investigators.  The State bears the burden 
of showing that its use of the unlawfully obtained 
statements did not induce Anson's testimony.  Further, 
even if the trial court finds that Anson would have 
testified anyway, Harrison dictates that for the State 
to meet its burden of proving that Anson's testimony 
was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable 
from the underlying constitutional violation, it must 
dispel the natural inference that Anson would not have 
repeated the inculpatory statements when he took the 
stand.  If the trial court finds that a link in fact 
exists between the State's constitutional violation 
and Anson's subsequent decision to take the stand and 
repeat the inculpatory statements, Anson has not 
waived his right against self-incrimination and is 
entitled to a new trial. 
Anson I, 258 Wis. 2d 433, ¶29.     
¶5 
On remand, the circuit court held an evidentiary 
hearing, the contents of which were summarized by the court of 
appeals in Anson II.  The State's sole witness was Jeffrey 
Recknagel, its primary investigating officer, who testified 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
5 
 
"that Anson did not have any criminal history and that Anson was 
calm and articulate on the taped California interview.  He 
further testified as to the appearance and demeanor of several 
State's witnesses during the trial."  Anson II, 275 Wis. 2d 832, 
¶14.  The State also introduced transcripts of the trial.  Id., 
¶15.  Anson's sole witness was his trial attorney, Larry Steen, 
who testified that the only reason Anson testified was to 
counteract the effect of the illegally obtained confession.  He 
testified that Anson did not wish to take the stand and did so 
only on his (Steen's) advice.  Steen stated that aside from the 
testimony of the victim, the statement was the only piece of 
evidence the State possessed and that he told Anson it was 
absolutely necessary that he take the stand in order to counter 
the damaging effect of that statement.  Id., ¶16.   
¶6 
The State argued that Anson would have taken the stand 
despite the introduction of the illegally obtained statement 
because:  1) his attorney announced during opening statement 
that Anson would testify; 2) Anson testified about matters 
outside the California statement; 3) Anson's testimony was 
consistent with the California statement; and 4) the State's 
witnesses were very credible.  Id., ¶¶14-15.  Anson, on the 
other hand, argued that he would not have testified but for the 
introduction of the illegally obtained statement because:  1) by 
the time of his opening statement his interlocutory appeal had 
already been denied; 2) the State announced in its opening 
statement that it would use the statement Anson gave to police 
in California; 3) the State told the jury that Anson admitted 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
6 
 
lying to his wife in the California statement; 4) the State told 
the jury that Anson admitted the victim may have had grounds for 
the allegations; and 5) the State told the jury that Anson 
admitted in the California statement that the victim placed his 
hand on her vagina and he left it there for three minutes.  Id., 
¶17.   
¶7 
Following the hearing, the circuit court found and 
ruled as follows: 
 
I think the court's findings have to be, or I do 
make the following findings:  that [Anson] would have 
testified; that there was an independent distinguished 
basis for his testimony other than the state's 
confession, as it's called a confession.  First of 
all, the statement to the police denied contact on the 
porch, and it did admit touching, but explained it by 
the concept of consent.  The distinguished reason 
here, in my opinion, is that there was a whole host of 
other testimony here that the state relied on:  the 
direct testimony of the victim, which in detail listed 
the offenses complained of . . . .  But the defendant 
really had no other reason not to testify:  such as; a 
criminal record that would impeach his credibility.  
And the fact of the matter is, when given the chance 
to testify, he told substantially the same story as he 
told the police officer, to explain then to the police 
officer that it was consensual contact.  We must 
assess the defendant's reaction to the use of his 
confession at trial on the basis of the information 
then available to him.  When he testifies he has a 
whole plethora of other evidence against him, a very 
small play on his prior statement that he must 
explain.  He can, if he wishes, to sit back and not 
take the stand.  But regardless of Mr. Steen's 
testimony, I know he didn’t really say he wouldn’t 
take the stand or advise him to take the stand; 
otherwise if he doesn't explain it, he's going to get 
convicted.  So, I mean in this case, we have that 
independent line of testimony facing him at the time 
when he must make the decision regardless of Mr. 
Steen's testimony, that that was the reason.  I just 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
7 
 
can't put that much weight on that as a link.  And 
again, it's not like he's walking away from the 
statement he made before telling a whole different 
story . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . I don't construe the case that if there 
was a link as being there's a possibility or a 
whatever.  I think the state must establish that there 
is a substantial and independent reason for his 
testifying.  And that the live in court testimony of 
the niece I think is a compelling reason to take the 
stand and have to testify.  Quite honestly, also 
perhaps to have some kind of compatibility with what 
he had told his wife before.  That might not have been 
known to the state, but that might have been something 
he had to face the family to get up there and take the 
stand.  And I saw the whole family scenario here as 
trial Judge.  So I know there was a tremendous 
division, and reason for him to take the stand and 
deny or explain it.  If he didn’t take the stand, he 
had a right to do that.  But his credibility before 
the jury and the family, I think, you know, would have 
been strongly diminished, even if that would have been 
his attorney's advice; although I doubt it would have 
been.  I didn’t hear the attorney say that.  I did 
hear the attorney say he didn’t want to take the 
stand, and he told him he had to do it; he did say 
that. 
 . . . . 
I'm 
making 
my 
determination 
that 
[Anson's 
testimony is] not linked in the sense that is set 
forth in the Harris (sic) case, which I believe was 
adopted in the other case, and that's it.   
 . . . . 
Not a causal link for his testifying.   
(Emphasis added.)  
¶8 
Therefore, the circuit court ruled that the admission 
of the California statement was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The circuit court entered an order on May 10, 2003, 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
8 
 
affirming the judgment of conviction.  Anson again appealed and 
the court of appeals reversed.   
¶9 
The court of appeals began by addressing the proper 
scope of a Harrison/Middleton hearing and held that "at an 
evidentiary hearing under Harrison/Middleton, the State may 
examine the defendant or defendant's counsel regarding the 
defendant's reason for testifying, and may use the entire record 
to meet its burden of showing that its use of an unlawfully 
obtained 
statement 
did 
not 
induce 
the 
defendant's 
trial 
testimony."  Anson II, 275 Wis. 2d 832, ¶12.  However the court 
of appeals held that it was improper for the circuit court to 
"stray from the record and consider intangible or speculative 
information from the trial."  Id.     
¶10 Addressing whether the State met its burden at the 
hearing, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
applied the wrong legal standard by stating that "Anson 'really 
had no other reason not to testify[.]'"  Id., ¶21.  Next, the 
court of appeals ruled it was improper for the circuit court to 
consider "the family's courtroom interactions during trial[.]"  
Id., ¶22.  The court of appeals also ruled that the circuit 
court failed to apply the second prong of the Harrison test and 
that "[e]ven if Anson would have chosen to testify, it is 
unlikely that he would have said that the victim 'may have some 
grounds for the allegation,' or referenced a three-minute time 
frame for the touching episode, or admitted lying to his wife 
about the incident."  Id., ¶23.  The court of appeals further 
noted that the only direct evidence of why Anson testified came 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
9 
 
from the testimony of his attorney and that this testimony was 
not contradicted or rebutted.   
¶11 Therefore, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
held: 
 
"Our 
independent review of the record allows us to draw only one 
reasonable inference:  that the State's use of the illegally 
obtained California statement at trial impelled Anson to take 
the stand and testify in rebuttal. . . . "  Id., ¶25.  As such, 
the court of appeals further held that "the State's original 
violation of Anson's constitutional right to counsel is not 
harmless."  Id., ¶26.   
II. ISSUES 
 
¶12 Two issues are presented in this case.  The first 
issue concerns the scope of a Harrison/Middleton hearing.  The 
State argues that the court of appeals' decision in Anson II, by 
allowing the State to call the defendant and/or his attorney, 
violates the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  The 
State also asserts that it is not error for a circuit court to 
consider "intangibles" such as witness demeanor, credibility, 
and courtroom observations.  Further, the State suggests that 
the court of appeals' decision in Anson I, setting forth the 
standard to be applied at such hearings, is inconsistent with 
Harrison and Middleton.  The second issue is whether the State 
met its burden in proving that its introduction of Anson's 
statement to the California authorities was harmless beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
by 
demonstrating 
that 
Anson 
would 
have 
testified 
despite 
the 
introduction 
of 
the 
California 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
10 
 
"confession" and further would have repeated the incriminating 
statements contained in the "confession."   
¶13 We hold that a Harrison hearing is not an evidentiary 
hearing and overrule the court of appeals' decision in Middleton 
to the extent it held a circuit court may take additional 
evidence at such a hearing.  We hold that a Harrison hearing is 
a paper review during which a circuit court makes findings of 
historical fact based on the record.  The circuit court should 
make findings of historical fact based on the entire record.  
While a circuit court may make credibility determinations based 
on material in the record when making its historical factual 
findings, it may not rely on its personal knowledge of events 
not appearing in the record.  The circuit court thus may state 
that it found a witness' testimony at trial not credible or 
implausible in light of other testimony and evidence presented.  
However, the circuit court may not state, for example, its 
opinion the witness was being intimidated by the presence of 
several well-known gang members in the courtroom, if the 
presence and behavior of these individuals was not documented in 
the record. 
¶14 Once a circuit court has made the requisite findings 
of historical fact, it must determine, as a matter of law, 
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that its 
prior constitutional violation did not impel the defendant to 
testify under the standards set forth in Harrison.  A Harrison 
analysis is a two-part inquiry.  First, the circuit court must 
consider whether the defendant testified "in order to overcome 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
11 
 
the 
impact 
of 
[statements] 
illegally 
obtained 
and 
hence 
improperly introduced[.]"  Harrison, 392 U.S. at 223.  Second, 
even if the court concludes that the defendant would have taken 
the stand, it must determine whether the defendant would have 
repeated the damaging testimonial admissions "if the prosecutor 
had not already spread the petitioner's confessions before the 
jury."  Id. at 225-26.   
 
¶15 We conclude that the State has not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Anson did not take the stand "in order to 
overcome the impact of . . .  [the] illegally obtained and 
 . . . improperly 
introduced 
[statement]." 
 
Id. 
at 
223.  
Further, we conclude that even if Anson would have taken the 
stand in the absence of the illegally obtained confession, the 
State did not meet its burden in dispelling the "natural 
inference [] that no testimonial admission so damaging would 
have been made if the prosecutor had not already spread 
[Anson's] confession[] before the jury."  Id. at 225-26.   
¶16 Therefore, we hold that the State has not demonstrated 
"that [Anson's] testimony was obtained 'by means sufficiently 
distinguishable' from the underlying illegality 'to be purged of 
the primary taint.'"  Id. at 226 (quoting Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).  As such, we hold that the 
State's underlying constitutional violation of Anson's right to 
counsel and the circuit court's error in not suppressing the 
tape-recorded statement was not harmless.  We therefore remand 
for a new trial.   
 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
12 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶17 The 
question 
of 
the 
proper 
scope 
of 
a 
Harrison/Middleton hearing presents a question of law subject to 
de novo review.  The second question is whether the State's 
introduction of Anson's illegally obtained confession "impelled" 
him to testify at trial.  Id. at 224.  The purpose of this 
inquiry is to determine whether Anson's testimony was the 
"fruit" of the State's unconstitutional procurement and use of 
Anson's confession to the California authorities, see id. at 
222,2 
or 
whether 
the 
"testimony 
was 
obtained 
'by 
means 
sufficiently distinguishable' from the underlying illegality 'to 
be purged of the primary taint.'"  Id. at 226 (quoting Wong Sun, 
371 U.S. at 488).   
¶18 The question of whether evidence is the fruit of a 
prior constitutional violation or whether "the evidence was 
sufficiently attenuated so as to be purged of the taint" is one 
of constitutional fact.  State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, ¶25 n.7, 
240 Wis. 2d 349, 620 N.W.2d 781 (citing State v. Anderson, 165 
Wis. 2d 441, 447-48, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991)).  "When we review a 
question of constitutional fact, we adopt the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, 
but we independently apply those facts to the constitutional 
                                                 
2 The Court in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 221 
(1968), framed the issue as "whether the petitioner's trial 
testimony was the inadmissible fruit of the illegally procured 
confessions."   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
13 
 
standard." 
 
State 
v. 
Tomlinson, 
2002 
WI 
91, 
¶39, 
254 
Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
¶19 In order to determine the proper scope of a Harrison 
hearing, we begin by examining the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in that case.  In Harrison, the defendant was convicted 
on a charge of felony murder and his conviction was overturned 
on the basis that his confessions had been illegally obtained 
and were inadmissible.  Harrison, 392 U.S. at 220.  At retrial, 
the prosecution introduced the defendant's testimony from the 
prior trial, which placed the defendant at the scene of the 
crime with the murder weapon in hand.  Id. at 221.  The 
defendant objected, contending that his prior testimony had been 
induced by the prosecution's introduction of the inadmissible 
confessions.  Id.  The defendant was convicted.  Id.  On appeal, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
considered 
"whether 
the 
petitioner's trial testimony was the inadmissible fruit of the 
illegally obtained confessions."  Id.   
 
¶20 The Court began its analysis by noting that generally, 
a defendant can waive his right against compulsory self-
incrimination, even if his motivation in so testifying is the 
"strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him."  Id. at 
222.  However, if the defendant testifies only after the 
prosecution introduces evidence obtained in an unlawful manner, 
"the same principle that prohibits the use of confessions so 
procured also prohibits the use of any testimony impelled 
thereby——the fruit of the poisonous tree . . . ."  Id.   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
14 
 
 
¶21 The Court stated that it is irrelevant that the 
defendant made a tactical decision to testify in hopes of 
seeking acquittal:  "The question is not whether the petitioner 
made a knowing decision to testify, but why.  If he did so in 
order to overcome the impact of confessions illegally obtained 
and hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted 
by the same illegality that rendered the confessions themselves 
inadmissible."  Id. at 223.  Thus, the Court stated that the 
pertinent question is "whether the petitioner's trial testimony 
was in fact impelled by the prosecution's wrongful use of his 
illegally obtained confessions."  Id. at 224.   
 
¶22 The Court placed the burden on the prosecution to 
demonstrate "that its illegal action did not induce his 
testimony."  Id. at 225.  The Court then concluded that the 
prosecution had failed to meet its burden: 
No such showing has been made here.  In his 
opening 
statement 
to 
the 
jury, 
defense 
counsel 
announced that the petitioner would not testify on his 
own behalf.  Only after his confessions had been 
admitted in evidence did he take the stand.  It thus 
appears that, but for the use of his confessions, the 
petitioner might not have testified at all.   
Id.  
¶23 However, the Court placed an additional burden on the 
prosecution: 
But even if the petitioner would have decided to 
testify whether or not his confessions had been used, 
it does not follow that he would have admitted being 
at the scene of the crime and holding the gun when the 
fatal shot was fired.  On the contrary, the more 
natural inference is that no testimonial admission so 
damaging would have been made if the prosecutor had 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
15 
 
not already spread the petitioner's confessions before 
the jury.  This is an inference the Government has not 
dispelled.   
Id. at 225-26.   
 
¶24 Therefore, 
the 
Court 
reversed 
the 
defendant's 
conviction because "[it] has not been demonstrated . . . that 
the petitioner's testimony was obtained 'by means sufficiently 
distinguishable' from the underlying illegality 'to be purged of 
the primary taint.'"  Id. at 226 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
488).   
 
¶25 In this case, the court of appeals in Anson I ordered 
that the case be remanded and an evidentiary hearing conducted 
in order to determine whether the State's procurement and use of 
Anson's confession to the California authorities, in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment, induced him to testify.  Anson I, 258 
Wis. 2d 433, ¶29.  The parties dispute the proper scope of this 
hearing.  Specifically, the State argues that the court of 
appeals' decision in Anson II, which held that the State could 
examine the defendant and his counsel, violates a defendant's 
Fifth 
and 
Sixth 
Amendment 
rights. 
 
See 
Anson 
II, 
275 
Wis. 2d 832, ¶12.  Anson generally concurs in this statement, 
but asserts the State has no standing to raise these issues and 
that, in any event, Anson never invoked his constitutional 
rights.  There is also a dispute as to the State's burden of 
proof at the hearing.  Finally, the parties dispute whether the 
circuit court is entitled to rely on "intangibles," such as:  1) 
its determination of witness credibility based on testimony or 
events contained in the record; and 2) its own personal 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
16 
 
observations of courtroom activity and events not appearing in 
the record.   
 
¶26 Addressing the State's first concern regarding the 
court of appeals' opinion in Anson II, we need not decide 
whether the State may call the defendant or his attorney during 
a hearing to determine whether the defendant was impelled to 
testify because we conclude a Harrison hearing is not an 
evidentiary hearing.  Rather, we conclude that a Harrison 
hearing is a paper review, focusing on the entire record before 
the circuit court.   
 
¶27 The notion of an evidentiary hearing comes from the 
court of appeals' decision in Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d at 323, 
where it directed the circuit court to "make an analysis under 
Harrison, supra, to find whether Middleton's testimony was 
impelled by those admissions."  The Middleton court cited no 
authority for the proposition that an evidentiary hearing is 
required to undertake a Harrison analysis.  This conclusion from 
Middleton seems to stem from its statement that "[w]hy [the 
defendant] testified is a fact which must be inferred from other 
evidence[,]" id. at 320 (citing Harrison, 392 U.S. at 226), and 
its apparent assumption that why the defendant testified is a 
historical fact.  See id. at 317 ("We reemphasize that this 
court will not decide whether Middleton's testimony, was, in 
fact, so impelled . . . since the trial court must make that 
finding."); id. at 321 ("Whether Middleton in fact testified 
because the state used his confessions will be for the trial 
court to decide.").     
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
17 
 
 
¶28 However, the Harrison Court never stated that "[w]hy 
[the defendant] testified is a fact which must be inferred from 
other evidence."  Id. at 320 (citing Harrison, 392 U.S. at 226).  
Rather, the Court in Harrison conducted an independent review of 
the record and concluded that the government did not prove that 
it did not induce the defendant to testify.  Harrison, 392 U.S. 
at 225-26.  This analysis is consistent with the way the Court 
framed the issue:  "[W]hether the petitioner's trial testimony 
was 
the 
inadmissible 
fruit 
of 
the 
illegally 
procured 
confessions."  Id. at 221.  As we discussed supra, a "fruits" 
analysis presents a question of constitutional fact.  Simply 
put, at no point did the Harrison Court state that the question 
of whether the defendant's testimony was impelled was a question 
of historical fact.   
 
¶29 Furthermore, at no point did the Court in Harrison 
provide that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine 
whether the defendant's testimony was impelled.  The Harrison 
Court stated: 
"In evaluating the possibility that the erroneous 
introduction 
of 
[a] 
defendant's 
extrajudicial 
confession 
might 
have 
induced 
his 
subsequent 
testimonial 
confession, 
we 
must 
assess 
[the] 
defendant's reaction to the use of his confession at 
trial on the basis of the information then available 
to him . . . ."  
Id. at 225 n.13 (quoting People v. Spencer, 424 P.2d 715, 720 
(Cal. 1967)).  However, in making this assessment in the case at 
hand, the Court never looked beyond the record.  See Harrison, 
392 U.S. at 225-26.   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
18 
 
 
¶30 Therefore we can find no support in Harrison that an 
evidentiary hearing is needed in order to determine whether the 
defendant's testimony was impelled by the State's use of 
illegally obtained evidence.  We conclude that because the 
ultimate conclusion as to whether the defendant was impelled to 
testify is a question of constitutional fact, the circuit court 
may not hold an evidentiary hearing when making a Harrison 
determination.  Instead, we hold that a Harrison hearing is a 
paper review during which a circuit court makes findings of 
historical fact based on the record.   
¶31 The circuit court should consider the entire record in 
"'assess[ing] [the] defendant's reaction to the use of his 
confession at trial . . . .'"  Id. at 225 n.13 (quoting Spencer, 
424 P.2d at 720) (first alteration added).  Although the circuit 
court should make findings of fact based on the entire record, 
we see no need for the court to take additional evidence.  As 
such, we overrule the court of appeals' decision in Middleton, 
to the extent it holds that the circuit court may conduct a full 
evidentiary hearing when engaging in a Harrison analysis.   
¶32 Further, we conclude that when making its findings of 
fact, the circuit court may make credibility determinations 
based on testimony and events appearing in the record.   
When, however, the trial court acts as the finder of 
fact 
it 
is 
the 
ultimate 
arbiter 
of 
both 
the 
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be 
given 
to 
each 
witness' 
testimony[.] 
 
This 
is 
especially true because the trier of fact has the 
opportunity 
to 
observe 
the 
witnesses 
and 
their 
demeanor on the witness stand. 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
19 
 
Pindel v. Czerniejewski, 185 Wis. 2d 892, 898, 519 N.W.2d 702 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted)(emphasis added).   
 
¶33 However, we hold that the circuit court may not rely 
on its own personal observations of events not contained in the 
record.  A circuit court that relies on its own personal 
observation of events not contained in the record as the basis 
for factual findings is essentially acting as a witness in the 
case by providing testimony.  Wisconsin Stat. § 906.05 (2003-04)3 
prohibits a judge from testifying in a trial as a witness at 
which the judge is presiding.   
¶34 Therefore, while a circuit court may make credibility 
determinations based on material in the record when making its 
historical factual findings, it may not rely on its personal 
knowledge of events not appearing in the record.  The circuit 
court thus may state that it found a witness' testimony at trial 
not credible or implausible in light of other testimony and 
evidence presented.  However, the circuit court may not state, 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version.  Wisconsin Stat. § 906.05 provides:  "The 
judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a 
witness.  No objection need be made in order to preserve the 
point."  Compare Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2): 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that it is any of the 
following:   
(a) A 
fact 
generally 
known 
within 
the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.   
(b) A 
fact 
capable 
of 
accurate 
and 
ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
20 
 
for example, its opinion the witness was being intimidated by 
the 
presence 
of 
several 
well-known 
gang 
members 
in 
the 
courtroom, if the presence and behavior of these individuals was 
not documented in the record. 
¶35 Once a circuit court has made the requisite findings 
of historical fact based on the entire record, it must engage in 
a Harrison analysis and determine, as a matter of law, whether, 
based on those historical facts, the State proved that its prior 
constitutional violation did not impel the defendant to testify.  
We next address the issue of what burden of proof the State has 
at a Harrison hearing.   
¶36 While Harrison clearly stated that the burden of 
proving the defendant was not impelled to testify is on the 
State, it did not describe what that burden was:  "[W]hen the 
prosecution seeks to use testimony given after the introduction 
in evidence of a confession unlawfully obtained, it has the 
burden of proving that the defendant's testimony was not 
produced by the illegal use of his confession at trial."  Id. at 
225 n.12.  Further, the court stated: 
It is, of course, difficult to unravel the many 
considerations that might have led the petitioner to 
take the witness stand at his former trial.  But, 
having illegally placed his confessions before the 
jury, the Government can hardly demand a demonstration 
by the petitioner that he would not have testified as 
he did if his inadmissible confessions had not been 
used.   
Id. at 224.  That the Harrison Court did not address this issue 
is not surprising, as it was concerned with whether the 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
21 
 
defendant's allegedly impelled testimony could be used on 
retrial, not whether the defendant's conviction in the first 
trial should have been overturned because of the testimony.  See 
id. at 221.  
¶37 The State argues, relying on United States v. Pelullo, 
173 F.3d 131, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1999), that the government must 
meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence.  The Third 
Circuit in Pelullo concluded that a preponderance of the 
evidence burden of proof was appropriate because Harrison 
resulted in an exclusionary rule and "[c]ourts almost invariably 
have required the government to prove only by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the causal link between the constitutional 
violation and the later-revealed evidence is sufficiently weak 
or remote to merit admission of the evidence."  Id. at 137 
(collecting cases).   
¶38 We disagree with the Third Circuit's decision in 
Pelullo.  The principal problem with the court's analysis in 
Pelullo is that the cases it cites all focus on whether the 
evidence in question was properly obtained or admitted.  See id. 
at 137-38.  Here, the question is not whether Anson's testimony 
was properly admitted, but whether "by taking the stand, Anson 
waived his right against self-incrimination, thereby rendering 
any error [in the unconstitutional procurement and use of his 
California statement] harmless."  Anson I, 258 Wis. 2d 433, ¶26.  
See also id., ¶29.  The test for harmless error "is '"whether it 
appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'"'"  State v. Weed, 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
22 
 
2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485 (quoted sources 
omitted).    
¶39 Turning back to Harrison, we note that the Court 
relied heavily upon, and quoted extensively from, the California 
Supreme Court's decision in Spencer.  See Harrison, 392 U.S. at 
223-25 & nn.12-13.  The Spencer court explicitly utilized a 
harmless-error analysis when evaluating whether an illegally 
obtained confession induced the defendant to testify and repeat 
the incriminating statements: 
In 
determining 
the 
effect 
of 
defendant's 
extrajudicial confession upon the outcome of the 
instant trial, we must consider the likelihood that it 
contributed to the verdict by inducing the defendant 
to admit his guilt in open court. 
 . . . . 
To overcome the likelihood that the erroneous 
introduction of defendant's extrajudicial confession 
impelled his testimonial one, the State bears the 
burden of showing that the causative link between the 
two confessions had been broken.  "[T]he beneficiary 
of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."   
Spencer, 424 P.2d at 719, 722 (emphasis in original)(quoting 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  In fact, 
Harrison itself quoted Chapman immediately after stating that 
the burden to prove the defendant's testimony was not impelled 
belonged to the State.  Harrison, 392 U.S at 225 n.12.   
 
¶40 Therefore, we conclude that when a defendant alleges 
that his trial testimony was impelled by the State's illegal 
introduction of evidence unconstitutionally obtained, the State 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
23 
 
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
prior constitutional violation did not impel the defendant's 
testimony.    
 
¶41 Having set forth the appropriate scope of a Harrison 
hearing, we now proceed to determine whether the State proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that its illegal procurement and 
improper use of Anson's statement to the California authorities 
induced him to testify.  At the outset, the State argues that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
remand 
instructions 
in 
Anson 
I 
mischaracterized the Harrison analysis by stating that the 
circuit court was to determine if "a link in fact exists between 
the State's constitutional violation and Anson's subsequent 
decision 
to 
take 
the 
stand 
and 
repeat 
the 
inculpatory 
statements[.]"  Anson I, 258 Wis. 2d 433, ¶29.  We disagree.  
 
¶42 As noted, the Harrison Court set forth a two-pronged 
test to determine whether a defendant's testimony was impelled 
by 
the 
government's 
improper 
use 
of 
prior 
incriminating 
statements.  First, it must be determined whether the defendant 
took the stand in order to overcome the impact of the illegally 
obtained statements.  Harrison, 392 U.S. at 223.  In determining 
whether this part of the analysis had been satisfied in the case 
before it, the Harrison Court stated:  "It thus appears that, 
but for the use of his confessions, the petitioner might not 
have testified at all."  Id. at 225 (emphasis added).  Next, 
even if the defendant would have taken the stand in the absence 
of the use of his incriminating statements, the court must 
determine 
whether 
the 
defendant 
would 
have 
repeated 
the 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
24 
 
incriminating statements "if the prosecutor had not already 
spread the petitioner's confessions before the jury."  Id. at 
225-26.  If the State fails to prove either prong of the test, 
then it follows that the State has failed to demonstrate that 
the defendant's testimony "was obtained 'by means sufficiently 
distinguishable' from the underlying illegality 'to be purged of 
the primary taint.'"  Id. at 226 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
488).  Given the above language from Harrison, including its use 
of the "but for" test, we cannot conclude that the court of 
appeals' remand directions in Anson I improperly stated the 
Harrison analysis.  The courts of appeals' statement that the 
circuit court must determine whether "a link in fact exists 
between 
the 
State's 
constitutional 
violation 
and 
Anson's 
subsequent decision to take the stand and repeat the inculpatory 
statements," Anson I, 258 Wis. 2d 433, ¶29, was merely a 
shorthand method of summarizing both prongs of the Harrison 
analysis.   
 
¶43 Addressing the first of the two Harrison prongs, we 
hold that the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Anson did not take the stand in order to overcome the 
effect of the illegally obtained and improperly introduced 
statements he made to the California authorities.   
¶44 Anson's statement to the California authorities was 
tape recorded while he sat in a police vehicle.4  On the tape, 
                                                 
4 Due to the fact that the tape recorder was placed behind 
Anson's seat and the air conditioner was running, several 
portions of the tape are inaudible.   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
25 
 
Anson admitted to the California authorities that the victim 
"had some grounds" for one of the touching allegations.  Anson 
admitted that he touched the alleged victim on the outside of 
her clothes, over her vagina, but that the victim placed his 
hand there.  Anson stated that when she did this, he "froze."  
Anson also admitted that he later lied to his wife about the 
incident by telling her that the victim placed his hand on her 
breast.  He stated that he lied to his wife in order to protect 
her.  Furthermore, he stated that the touching incident lasted 
three minutes, although, due to the poor quality of the 
recording, it is unclear whether he stated that the entire 
incident of him getting up, going downstairs, touching the 
victim, and returning to bed lasted three minutes, or whether he 
stated that he "froze" for three minutes when the victim moved 
his hand over her genitalia.   
¶45 Following the denial of his motion to suppress the 
statement he gave to the California authorities, Anson filed a 
petition for leave to appeal and a motion to stay the trial 
pending appeal.  His petition stated:  "Admission of the 
statement will strategically force the defendant to testify 
despite his right of silence."  The court of appeals denied his 
request.  Anson II, 275 Wis. 2d 832, ¶5.   
¶46 During opening statements, the State discussed at 
length Anson's tape-recorded statement:   
Part of what you are going to hear on the tape——part 
of what you are going to hear the defendant say is, 
well, when the officer asks him why would [the victim] 
say these things, he said she had some grounds for 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
26 
 
these allegations, and he tells his side of it, at 
least a partial version of it, and he totally denies 
anything happening on the porch. . . . But he does 
talk about the couch incident when everybody else had 
gone to bed.  He said that he went downstairs to get a 
drink of water; he noticed [the victim] was awake, and 
he walked up to her by the couch and he said how he 
was stroking her hair, and the defendant said to the 
officer, well, I had put my hand on her thigh, and 
then she took my hand and she placed it on her vagina.  
And he tells the officer that I froze for three 
minutes and I didn’t know what to do when this 13 year 
old girl had taken my hand and put it on her vagina.  
And in that statement the defendant admits that he 
lied to his wife when finally this come out, and he 
didn't tell anybody either for a couple of years; that 
he told his wife that [the victim] had taken his hand 
and placed it on her breast, not her vagina.   
(Emphasis added.)   
 
¶47 During Anson's opening statement, his attorney put 
forth the theory that the victim's allegations of abuse were 
raised by her mother as a way to gain a tactical advantage in 
her divorce proceeding with the victim's father.  His attorney 
also discussed Anson's tape-recorded statement and stated that 
Anson admitted the entire couch episode lasted three minutes but 
that his hand was on the victim's genitalia only for a couple of 
seconds.  Anson's attorney stated that Anson never admitted to 
placing his hand on the victim for three minutes but that the 
officers repeatedly attempted to get him to admit this.  Anson's 
attorney also stated that Anson would testify that he lied to 
his wife because he didn’t think his wife would believe him and 
that if he told her the entire truth she would become very angry 
with the victim.   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
27 
 
 
¶48 At 
trial, 
the 
jury 
heard 
Anson's 
tape-recorded 
statement to the California authorities.  The State also 
published two separate copies of a transcript of the tape, with 
different versions of corrections one of the officers made.  The 
officer testified that during the interview Anson told him his 
hand was placed on the victim's genitalia for three minutes.   
 
¶49 Anson testified in conformity with counsel's opening 
statement.  He testified that he woke up, went downstairs for a 
glass of water, saw the victim was awake, sat down next to her, 
asked her what was the matter, and that she placed his hand on 
top of her clothing over her vagina.  Anson testified that the 
reference to three minutes on the audiotape was meant to 
encompass the entire episode of getting up, going downstairs, 
and returning to bed.  He stated his hand was only on the victim 
for a second.  Finally, he stated that he had lied to his wife 
because he was unsure if she would believe him and that he was 
afraid she would be in an extreme rage against the victim if he 
told her what actually happened.   
 
¶50 In addition, the defense, through cross-examination of 
the State's witnesses, made allegations that the victim's mother 
encouraged the victim to make false accusations in order to gain 
a tactical advantage in her ongoing custody dispute with the 
victim's father.   
¶51 The State argues that Anson would have testified 
regardless of the California statement because its other 
witnesses, including the victim, were very credible and gave 
very compelling testimony.  The State notes that Anson's 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
28 
 
attorney announced during opening statements that he would 
testify.  The State also argues that Anson would have taken the 
stand because his testimony at trial went beyond explaining the 
California statement and that he testified as to his past and 
the family's history.  Finally, the State argues that Anson 
would have testified anyway because he needed to not only 
explain the third touching incident but also deny the first two 
alleged incidents.   
 
¶52 While the State sets forth a strong argument, there 
are several countervailing considerations.  First, the State 
announced to the jury that it would introduce Anson's statement 
to the California authorities before Anson's counsel made his 
opening statement to the jury.  Second, Anson's petition for 
leave to appeal and for a stay of the trial pending appeal 
supports Anson's position that he testified because of the 
State's use of the California statement.  Further, the State 
relied heavily upon the tape-recorded statement during its 
opening statement and the evidentiary phase of the trial.  In 
addition to hearing the audiotape, the jury was presented with 
two different transcripts of the taped statement.  Moreover, the 
State presented the tape recording as indicating that Anson had 
left his hand on the victim's vagina for three full minutes.  It 
also emphasized that Anson lied to his wife.  Given the State's 
representations, Anson needed to take the stand and explain his 
statement 
to 
the 
California 
authorities, particularly his 
reference to "three minutes" in relation to the touching 
episode. 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
29 
 
¶53 In addition, while one of the defense's theories was 
that the victim initiated the touching on the couch and that the 
touching was not intended, Anson had an entirely independent 
theory of the case.  As noted, one of the defense strategies was 
to allege that the victim's mother had fabricated the assaults 
as a means of gaining a tactical advantage during her custody 
dispute with the victim's father.  Finally, aside from Anson's 
own testimony, the State had no lawfully obtained, independent 
evidence 
to 
corroborate 
the 
incriminating 
statement 
in 
California.  Thus, this is not a case where the illegal evidence 
was duplicative or cumulative of other evidence.  Had the State 
not introduced the California evidence, Anson could have 
presented an effective defense without testifying.   
 
¶54 Viewing the trial proceedings in context, we cannot 
conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Anson would have testified despite the introduction of his 
incriminating 
statements 
to 
the 
California 
authorities, 
regardless of how credible and compelling the testimony was from 
the State's witnesses.  Further, even if we were to conclude 
that the State had met this burden, it has not demonstrated that 
had Anson taken the stand, he would have repeated the damaging 
admissions. 
 
¶55 We agree with the court of appeals in Anson II:   
Even if Anson would have chosen to testify, it is 
unlikely that he would have said that the victim "may 
have some grounds for the allegation," or referenced a 
three-minute time frame for the touching episode, or 
admitted lying to his wife about the incident.  The 
State 
has 
not 
therefore, 
defeated 
the 
"natural 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
30 
 
inference" that "no testimonial admission so damaging 
would have been made if the prosecutor had not already 
spread the petitioner's confessions before the jury." 
Anson II, 275 Wis. 2d 832, ¶23 (quoting Harrison, 392 U.S. at 
225-26).   
 
¶56 We hold that the State has not demonstrated that "the 
petitioner's testimony was obtained "'by means sufficiently 
distinguishable' from the underlying illegality 'to be purged of 
the primary taint.'"  Harrison, 392 U.S. at 226 (quoting Wong 
Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).  As such, we hold that Anson's testimony 
was impelled by the State's underlying constitutional violation.  
Thus, we hold that the circuit court's error in failing to 
suppress Anson's tape-recorded statement, which violated his 
Sixth Amendment rights, was not harmless.  Therefore, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand for a new trial.5   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶57 We hold that a Harrison hearing is not an evidentiary 
hearing and overrule the court of appeals' decision in Middleton 
to the extent it held a circuit court may take additional 
evidence at such a hearing.  We hold that a Harrison hearing is 
a paper review during which a circuit court makes findings of 
historical fact based on the record.  The circuit court should 
make findings of historical fact based on the entire record.  
While a circuit court may make credibility determinations based 
on material in the record when making its historical factual 
                                                 
5 On retrial, use of Anson's statement is limited to the 
parameters set forth in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
31 
 
findings, it may not rely on its personal knowledge of events 
not appearing in the record.     
¶58 Once a circuit court has made the requisite findings 
of historical fact, it must determine, as a matter of law, 
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that its 
prior constitutional violation did not impel the defendant to 
testify under the standards set forth in Harrison.  A Harrison 
analysis is a two-part inquiry.  First, the circuit court must 
consider whether the defendant testified "in order to overcome 
the 
impact 
of 
[statements] 
illegally 
obtained 
and 
hence 
improperly introduced[.]"  Id. at 223.  Second, even if the 
court concludes that the defendant would have taken the stand, 
it must determine whether the defendant would have repeated the 
damaging testimonial admissions "if the prosecutor had not 
already spread the petitioner's confession before the jury."  
Id. at 225-26.   
 
¶59 We conclude that the State has not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Anson did not take the stand "in order to 
overcome the impact of . . .  [the] illegally obtained and 
 . . . improperly 
introduced 
[statement]." 
 
Id. 
at 
223.  
Further, we conclude that even if Anson would have taken the 
stand in the absence of the illegally obtained confession, the 
State did not meet its burden in dispelling the "natural 
inference [] that no testimonial admission so damaging would 
have been made if the prosecutor had not already spread 
[Anson's] confession[] before the jury."  Id. at 225-26.   
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
32 
 
¶60 Therefore, we hold that the State has not demonstrated 
"that [Anson's] testimony was obtained 'by means sufficiently 
distinguishable' from the underlying illegality 'to be purged of 
the primary taint.'"  Id. at 226 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
488).  As such, we hold that the circuit court's error in 
failing to suppress Anson's tape-recorded statement, which 
violated his Sixth Amendment rights, was not harmless.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals and remand for a new 
trial.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
No. 
2003AP1444-CR   
 
 
 
1