Case Title: J.D. KELLIHER AND NEAL CARROLL, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), COLOSSAL ENTERPRISES, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; CHARLES WALTON, AND RICHARD D. INBERG v. LEROY HERMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
J.D. KELLIHER AND NEAL CARROLL, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), COLOSSAL ENTERPRISES, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; CHARLES WALTON, AND RICHARD D. INBERG  v. LEROY HERMAN1985 WY 83701 P.2d 1157Case Number: 84-220Decided: 07/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
J.D. KELLIHER AND NEAL 
CARROLL, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), COLOSSAL ENTERPRISES, INC., A WYOMING 
CORPORATION; CHARLES WALTON, AND RICHARD D. INBERG (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

LEROY HERMAN, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Rehearing Denied August 
26, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Frank M. 
Andrews, Jr., Andrews & Anderson, Riverton, for appellants.

Joel M. Vincent, 
Hettinger & Leedy, P.C., Riverton, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants, with 
others, were stockholders in Colossal Enterprises, Inc., a Wyoming corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as "Colossal"). Appellants and Colossal, with others, 
were stockholders in A & I Equipment, Inc., a Wyoming corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as "A & I"). A & I executed a promissory note 
to appellee in the principal amount of $260,590.00. Colossal and appellants, 
with others, personally guaranteed the payment of the note "as is equal to the 
percentage of stock ownership held by such individual guarantor in" A & I. A 
& I became insolvent; and all guarantors (including appellants) except 
Colossal (which also became insolvent) settled with appellee under their 
individual guarantees. Appellee instituted this action to obtain payment from 
appellants, and others, for Colossal's share of the guaranty. After a jury 
trial, judgment was entered in favor of appellee. This appeal is from that 
judgment.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellants word the 
issues on appeal:

"1. Did the District 
Court err in denying Appellants' motion for directed verdict or motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict?

"2. Was there sufficient 
evidence to support a judgment against the individual shareholders, on the 
theory that the corporation was a mere alter ego of the 
shareholders?

"3. Were the findings of 
fact by the jury clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence?

"4. Did the Appellee 
waive his right to sue the Appellants, by giving them a release, or 
waiver?

"5. Was the Appellee 
estopped from suing the Appellants on the note by failing to disclose his future 
intent to sue?"

[¶4.]     Our determination that 
the releases given by appellee to appellants releasing them from all obligations 
arising out of the promissory note makes it unnecessary to consider the other 
issues.

[¶5.]     The operative portion 
of the release given to appellant Kelliher provides:

"NOW, THEREFORE, for and 
in consideration of the payment of the sum of $31,917.35 from J.D. Kelliher and 
Francis J. Kelliher, I, LeRoy Herman, do hereby release, acquit, and forever 
discharge said J.D. Kelliher and Francis J. Kelliher, their heirs, successors, 
and assigns, of and from any and all actions, causes of actions, claims, 
demands, damages, costs, loss of services, loss of wages, expense, and 
compensation known or unknown, which I may now have, or may hereafter have, on 
account of, or arising out of, the promissory note executed by A & I 
Equipment, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, on the 26th day of October, 1979, and 
which was guaranteed as to payment in accordance with the percentage of share 
ownership held by J.D. Kelliher and Francis J. Kelliher in the aforesaid 
corporation. This release contains the entire agreement between the parties and 
the terms are contractual and not a mere recital."

[¶6.]     The operative portion 
of the release given to appellant Carroll contains the identical language except 
that the consideration is recited to be:

"* * * the payment and 
execution of a promissory note of even date herewith, in the sum of $10,000.00 
from NEAL F. CARROLL and JUDITH A. CARROLL * * *."

And the names of 
appellant Carroll and his wife were inserted instead of the names of appellant 
Kelliher and his wife. 

[¶7.]     The intent of the 
parties is definitely expressed in plain, clear and unambiguous language. A 
release is contractual in nature and is a contract or a species of contract. Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, Wyo., 624 P.2d 1199, 1203 (1981). We have defined an 
ambiguous contract as

"* * * an agreement which 
is obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of expression, or because a 
double meaning is present. * * *" Bulis 
v. Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487, 490 
(1977).

It would be 
difficult to find language which is more definite or which sets forth a more 
single meaning or intention than that used in these releases. In the releases, 
appellee states that:

"I, * * * hereby release, 
acquit, and forever discharge * * * from * * * all actions, causes of action, 
claims, * * * which I may now have, or may hereafter have, on account of, or 
arising out of the promissory note executed by A & I Equipment, Inc. * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

The claims or 
causes of action under which appellee seeks recovery in this case, whether 
against appellants directly, against Colossal, or against appellants because of 
their relationship with Colossal, are "on account of, or arising out of," the A 
& I note. The meaning is not obscure. The releases are not ambiguous.1

[¶8.]     If there is no 
ambiguity, we assume that the words of the contract express the intention of the 
parties. Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 74, 77 (1983); Schacht v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Rawlins, Wyo., 
620 P.2d 561, 563 (1980); Amoco 
Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 
(1980).

[¶9.]     Whether ambiguity 
exists is a question of law. Amoco 
Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, supra. The 
interpretation and construction of a contract is also a question of law and is 
done by the court. Bulis v. Wells, 
supra; Amoco Production Company v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, supra.

[¶10.]  A release discharges another from an 
existing or asserted duty, claim or obligation, and it bars recovery thereon. 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 284 (1981); Calamari and Perillo, The Law of 
Contracts § 21-10 (2d Ed. 1977); 76 C.J.S. Release § 40 (1952); 66 Am.Jur.2d 
Release § 1 (1973).

[¶11.]  Inasmuch as the intent of the parties was 
plainly and unambiguously expressed in the releases to discharge appellants from 
all claims, causes of action and actions "on account of, or arising out of, the 
promissory note" of A & I Equipment, Inc., and inasmuch as appellee's claims 
and causes of action in this matter are "on account of, or arising out of" such 
note, he cannot prevail.

[¶12.]  Reversed.

1 If there were 
ambiguities, appellee would have to overcome the proposition that a contract is 
considered most strongly against the party that scrivened it. McGinnis v. General Petroleum Corporation, 
Wyo., 385 P.2d 198, 201 (1963). The releases in this case were scrivened by 
appellee.