Case Title: SHUMWAY v. WORTHEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-171

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHUMWAY v. WORTHEY2001 WY 13037 P.3d 361Case Number: 01-171Decided: 12/20/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
  

MAYOR 
JOSEPH SHUMWAY and

THE CITY 
OF LARAMIE, WYOMING, 

Appellants(Defendants),

v.

WILL 
WORTHEY, ANNE WORTHEY,

STEPHEN 
NIELSEN, EMERY BRUNETT,

CHRISTIE 
LEE, HAL WEDEL, JOHN

MCKAY, 
NANCY FALLAS, PRISCILLA

MOREE, 
a/k/a the WARD SYSTEM

COMMITTEE,

                                                     Appellees(Plaintiffs).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Hugh B. McFadden Jr. of Corthell & King, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellees:

Megan L. 
Hayes of Dwyer, Huddleston & Ray, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants are 
the City of Laramie (Laramie) and its Mayor, Joe Shumway (Shumway).  Appellees are members of a group of 
petitioners (hereafter Petitioners) who sought to alter Laramie's method of 
electing the members of the city council.  
Petitioners succeeded in obtaining the requisite number of signatures on 
their petition, so that in an election held on November 7, 2000, Laramie voters 
considered a ballot question that included three options:  (1) "Shall the city councilmen be 
elected at large?  (Current method 
of selection)"; (2) "Shall the city councilmen be elected by wards?  (Nine wards)"; and (3) "Shall the city 
councilmen be elected by a combination of wards and at large as follows:  Divide Laramie into seven wards, one 
councilman per ward, with two councilmen elected at large?"  Retention of the current at large method 
garnered 30.78% of the vote, the nine-ward system 18.44%, and the 7/2-ward 
system 43.65%.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-11-105(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added)1 requires that such a question be 
placed on the ballot in that form.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-105(b)(v) provides:  "The method approved by a plurality vote 
shall be proclaimed adopted by the mayor."  
The Mayor of Laramie2 refused to issue such a 
proclamation on the theory that the statute was unconstitutional and/or that the 
statute had to be construed in light of other later statutes, which impliedly 
repealed the "plurality" provision.  
The Petitioners then filed a declaratory judgment action in the district 
court seeking an order of the district court that Shumway issue the 
legislatively mandated proclamation.  
The district court agreed with the Petitioners and ordered Shumway to 
issue a proclamation adopting the 7/2-ward system.  Laramie and Shumway have appealed that 
order, which we will affirm.

[¶2]      Laramie and 
Shumway state these issues:

I.          
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-105, as read by appellees, prescribes an 
unconstitutional method of deciding the outcome of a ballot proposition election 
because the method violates Article I [sic] Section 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution which requires all elections to be free and 
equal.

II.          
The 1998 change in the Election Code requires all ballot propositions to 
pass by a majority, impliedly repealing the inconsistent plurality language in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-105.

III.         
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-105, as read by appellees and the district court, 
prescribes an unconstitutional method of deciding the outcome of a ballot 
proposition election because the method violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States of America.

Petitioners 
re-articulate the issues as follows:

1.  The plain and unambiguous language of 
W.S. § 15-11-105(b) (2000), requires the mayor of Laramie to proclaim as adopted 
the 7/2 ward system method for electing council members that was approved by the 
voters at the November 7, 2000 election.

2.  The Appellant's have waived their 
arguments that W.S. § 15-11-105(b) (2000) allows only a single-subject petition 
and that W.S. § 15-11-105(b) was impliedly repealed by a more recently enacted 
election code provision, because these arguments were not raised in the district 
court.

3.  The plain language of W.S. § 
15-11-105(b) (2000) authorizes petitions to include two alternative methods of 
selecting council members and is fully consistent with other Wyoming election 
code provisions.

4.  The District Court's construction of 
W.S. § 15-11-105(b) (2000) does not violate any federal constitutional 
guarantees.

[¶3]      The parties 
agreed to the essential facts.  
Petitioners organized an effort to alter Laramie's method of electing the 
members of the city council.  Before 
their efforts began, all nine members of the city council were elected on an at 
large basis.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-11-105(b)(i)-(iv) provides:

            
(b) Councilmen in a municipality adopting the city manager form of 
government shall be elected at large, unless a petition requesting an alternate 
method of selection by wards, or by a combination of wards and at large, is 
approved at a special election on the question by a majority vote of the 
electors voting on the question:

            
(i) Such petition shall be signed by not less than ten percent (10%) of 
the qualified electors registered in the municipality;

            
(ii) If the petition is for a combination of wards and at large, it shall 
state the number of wards, the number of councilmen to be elected from each 
ward, and the number of councilmen to be elected at large.  A petition seeking ward representation 
or combination of wards and at large shall contain the names of petitioners to 
serve on the ward boundary committee;

            
(iii) The petition shall be filed with the city clerk, who shall 
determine whether the petition is legally sufficient;

            
(iv) If the petition is legally sufficient, the question shall be 
submitted to the voters at a special municipal election and shall be in the 
following form:

The 
Petitioners submitted petitions to the Albany County Clerk with the requisite 
number of signatures.  The wording 
of the petition soliciting signatures of eligible Laramie voters was 
this:

THIS 
PETITION IS TO CHANGE THE METHOD OF SELECTING THE MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF 
LARAMIE, WYOMING IN ACCORDANCE WITH WYOMING STATUTE 15-11-105.  CHANGING FROM THE CURRENT AT LARGE 
SYSTEM TO ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS:

To 
divide Laramie into nine wards, one councilman per ward.

Or to 
divide Laramie into seven wards, one councilman per ward, with two councilmen 
elected at large.

[¶4]      The Albany County 
Clerk ascertained that the petition was legally sufficient and directed that the 
question should be submitted to the voters at the November 7, 2000 General 
Election.  At that election, the 
question appeared on the ballot in this form:

MUNICIPAL

BALLOT 
PROPOSITION

Please 
vote on the following alternative methods of selection for city councilmen.  Vote Yes on one proposition 
only.

1.  Shall the city councilmen be elected at 
large?  (Current method of 
selection)

                                                                        
YES

                                                                        
NO

2.  Shall the city councilmen be elected by 
wards?  (Nine 
wards)

                                                                        
YES

                                                                        
NO

3.  Shall the city councilmen be elected by 
a combination of wards and at large as follows:

Divide 
Laramie into seven wards, one councilman per ward, with two councilmen elected 
at large?

                                                                        
YES

                                                                        
NO

[¶5]      All parties 
conceded that the ballot proposition, as presented on the ballot in the form 
required by the statute, complicated the voting.  It was necessary that the ballots be 
hand counted with respect to this ballot question.  As noted above, 43.65% of those voting 
selected the 7/2-ward system; 18.44% selected the nine-ward system; and 30.78% 
selected the at large system.  In 
addition, 7.13% of voters selected "Yes" on more than one of the three choices, 
and those ballots were disqualified.

[¶6]      The record 
indicates that the mayor was advised by the city attorney for Laramie that a 
complex statutory construction problem operated to invalidate the vote, and that 
Shumway should not issue a proclamation under § 15-11-105(b)(v).  The mayor did not issue such a 
proclamation.  Petitioners filed a 
declaratory judgment action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-102,3 -107,4 and 109.5  Both parties submitted motions for 
summary judgment and agreed that the questions presented to the district court 
were purely questions of law.  The 
district court rejected the statutory construction arguments advocated by the 
City of Laramie and Shumway and determined that the unambiguous language of § 
15-11-105 governed the outcome of this matter.

[¶7]      The propriety of 
granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual 
finding that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Williams Gas ProcessingWamsutter 
Company v. Union Pacific Resources Company, 2001 WY 57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, 
¶11 (Wyo. 2001); Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Company, 2001 WY 16, 
¶9, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶9, (Wyo. 2001).  
In this instance, both parties agree that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact, and that one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Our decision turns on the 
construction of the applicable statutes, as was the case in the district 
court.

[¶8]      Our standard of 
review with respect to the construction of statutes is well known.  In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo. We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  
When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of 
statutory construction.  Wyoming 
Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶12 (Wyo. 2001); Murphy v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 
679 (Wyo. 2000).  Moreover, we must 
not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is 
susceptible of another interpretation.  
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 (Wyo. 1990) (citing McGuire 
v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (Wyo. 1980)).

[¶9]      Appellants 
contend that a fundamental right, i.e., the right to vote equally, is at 
stake here and, therefore, this Court must apply a strict scrutiny 
standard.  Cogent argument or 
pertinent authority does not support this contention, and we decline to accept 
this as a part of our review standard in this case.  Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, 
¶11, 18 P.3d 641, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  
Indeed, quite the opposite is true.  
The right to vote is fundamental, and we construe statutes that confer or 
extend the elective franchise liberally (as opposed to those limiting the right 
to vote in some way, which then invokes strict scrutiny).  Murphy, 12 P.3d  at 680 (and cases 
cited therein).

[¶10]   Article 1, § 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides:  "Elections 
shall be open, free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any 
time interfere to prevent an untrammeled exercise of the right of 
suffrage."  It does not appear that 
this precise question was presented to the district court below.  However, we are content to note that we 
find no cogent argument or pertinent authority in the Appellants' brief to 
support this argument, and we will not further consider this particular aspect 
of it.  See Statezny, 
¶11.

[¶11]   Moreover, an analysis of the 
statute, in the light of the conventions governing the construction of statutes, 
reveals that the statute at issue is unambiguous and its intended meaning 
readily apparent.  In reaching that 
conclusion, it is necessary to generously employ the mandate that we 
not 
give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  When the 
applicable statutory construction conventions are given their full head, any 
suggestion that the statute at issue violates Article 1, § 27 falls by the 
wayside.

[¶12]   We agree with the district court 
that our first effort must be directed to looking only at the statute in 
question.  Appellants contend that 
the statute is internally inconsistent and, thus, we must look to other statutes 
outside of Title 15 to find a complete answer.  Appellees contend that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-11-105(b) says both that the sought after change must be passed by a majority 
and only a plurality.  That argument 
denies the existence of legislative logic and reason, as well as the literal 
language of the statute.  The 
statute requires that voters decide whether to elect council members at large or 
by "an alternative method"  that is the question that must be decided by a 
majority of voters.  The language of 
the statute mandates only that a "petition" be approved by a majority vote.  Appellants contend that such an 
interpretation treats a nine-ward system and a 7/2-system as the same 
thing.  We disagree.  The two are different methods of 
selecting council members.  However, 
each constitutes an "alternative method" of selection and a vote for either 
signifies an approval of the petition requesting an "alternative method of 
selection."  The plain language 
makes clear that the voters must choose between keeping the system they have and 
choosing something new.  This choice 
must garner approval of a majority of the voters.  Appellants also suggest that it is 
improper for the voters to choose between three alternatives, the status quo, 
nine-ward system, and 7/2-ward system, because § 15-11-105(b) says that the 
voters should choose between one or the other of the nine-ward system or the 
7/2-ward system.  Such a 
construction is strained even when reading § 15-11-105(b) in isolation, but when 
it is read in conjunction with § 15-11-105(b)(iv), it does not hold up. 

[¶13]   Once the petition is approved by a 
majority of the voters, then the selection of one of three alternatives becomes 
the next question, which must garner the approval of at least a plurality of 
voters.  The statute requires that 
the three alternatives appear on the ballot, so it is always a possibility that 
only a plurality vote can be achieved.  
It is clear from the statutory distinction between the "majority" 
language required for the petition and the "plurality" language required for the 
method of selection that the legislature intended a different degree of 
acceptance between the decision for change in a general sense, and the specific 
methods allowed by the statute.  
Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that a "majority" of the voters 
approved a change, and a "plurality" of the voters chose the 7/2-ward 
system.  This is exactly the process 
which is contemplated by the plain language of the statute.  The statute is confusing only if one 
reads its various provisions in isolation (rather than in pari materia) 
and with a jaundiced eye focused on creating an ambiguity.  Likewise, Appellants' contention that 
"one cannot cast a free and equal vote when that vote is compelled to be counted 
in a way one does not intend," thus violating Article 1, § 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, is incorrect because each vote cast was counted exactly as the 
legislature contemplated.  Only 
those who voted "Yes" twice, contrary to the explicit directions given on the 
ballot, did not have their vote counted.6

[¶14]   Appellants also suggest that we 
look at other statutes, which they contend tend to support their arguments 
(e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-11-301 and 302, and § 22-2-117(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Having 
determined that the statute is not ambiguous on its face, we need not, indeed 
cannot, look to other statutes in order to construct an 
ambiguity.

[¶15]   Appellants contend that the core 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-105 have been impliedly repealed by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 22-2-117(c) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides:  " With the exception of constitutional 
amendments and statewide initiatives and referenda, all ballot propositions 
shall be passed if the majority of those casting ballots on that proposition 
vote in favor of such proposition."  
Although it is not clear that this issue was raised in the district 
court, and it is clear that the district court did not directly address it in 
its decision letter, nonetheless a response readily flows from the discussion we 
have set out above.  We have held 
above that § 15-11-105(b) does require a majority vote for "the petition," and 
we see no distinction between the phrase, "ballot proposition," and the phrase, 
"the petition," as it is used in that context.  Moreover, when both of the statutes 
mentioned above were amended, in the same Bill, in 1998, the legislature did not 
directly repeal any part of the renumbered statute § 15-11-105.  1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 100, §§ 2 and 
4.  Had the legislature intended the 
change championed by Appellants, it readily could have made it.  Finally, our longstanding rule is that 
repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged if there is any 
other reasonable construction.  One 
asserting implied repeal bears the burden of demonstrating beyond question that 
the legislature intended that its later legislative action evinced an 
unequivocal purpose of affecting a repeal.  
Furthermore, it must be shown that the later statute is so repugnant to 
the earlier one that the two cannot logically stand together, or that the whole 
subject of the earlier statute is covered by the later one having the same 
object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable to the 
subject.  Thunderbasin Land 
Livestock & Investment Company v. County of Laramie County, 5 P.3d 774, 
781 (Wyo. 2000).  Appellants have 
met no part of that burden here.

[¶16]   Appellants contend that the result 
reached in this case by the district court and by this Court, if we affirm, 
operates in such a manner so as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  This issue was not directly or 
meaningfully raised in the district court, nor is it supported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority in this appeal.  For these reasons we will not consider 
it.  Statezny, 
¶11.

  

[¶17]   For the reasons set out above, the 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

   1

§ 15-11-105. Officers in city or town 
with city manager government; terms; legislative authority; method of selection; 
alternative method.

            
(a) The elective officers of a city or town adopting the city manager 
form of government are councilmen elected as provided by law.  There shall be three (3) councilmen in 
cities and towns having a population of less than four thousand (4,000), seven 
(7) in those having a population of four thousand (4,000) or more but less than 
twenty thousand (20,000) and nine (9) in those having a population of twenty 
thousand (20,000) or more according to the last preceding United States 
census.  The term of office of a 
councilman is four (4) years and until his successor is qualified.  Legislative authority is vested in the 
council.

            
(b) Councilmen in a municipality adopting the city manager form of 
government shall be elected at large, unless a petition requesting an alternate 
method of selection by wards, or by a combination of wards and at large, is 
approved at a special election on the question by a majority vote of the 
electors voting on the question:

            
(i) Such petition shall be signed by not less than ten percent (10%) of 
the qualified electors registered in the 
municipality;

            
(ii) If the petition is for a combination of wards and at large, it shall 
state the number of wards, the number of councilmen to be elected from each 
ward, and the number of councilmen to be elected at large.  A petition seeking ward representation 
or combination of wards and at large shall contain the names of petitioners to 
serve on the ward boundary committee;

            
(iii) The petition shall be filed with the city clerk, who shall 
determine whether the petition is legally 
sufficient;

            
(iv) If the petition is legally sufficient, the question shall be 
submitted to the voters at a special municipal election and shall be in the 
following form:

1.       
Shall the city councilmen 
be elected at large:

Yes  [ ]        
No  [ 
]

2.       
Shall the city councilmen 
be elected by wards?

Yes  [ ]        No  [ ]

3.       
Shall the city councilmen 
be elected by a combination of wards and at large as 
follows:

(Here state the method of combination 
requested in the petition)

Yes  [ ]        
No  [ 
]

            
(v) The method approved by a plurality vote shall be proclaimed 
adopted by the mayor.  A copy of the 
proclamation shall be mailed to the county clerk and the secretary of 
state;

            
(vi) If representation by wards or a combination of wards and at large is 
adopted, ward boundaries shall be determined by a committee composed of the 
governing body and an equal number of petitioners designated in the petition, 
and adopted by ordinance of the governing body.  The creation or elimination of wards 
shall take effect at the next regular municipal primary and general 
elections;

            
(vii) If an alternate method of selecting councilmen is not adopted at 
the special election, the question shall not be submitted to the voters within 
four (4) years after the election.  
If an alternate method of representation is adopted at the special 
election, the question of changing the method of representation shall not be 
submitted to the voters for ten (10) years after the special election. 

   2The Mayor of 
Laramie at this point in time was David F. Williams.  It was actually he who did not issue the 
statutory proclamation.  Indeed, 
recognizing that over 62% of the voters voted for a change, he issued a 
proclamation establishing a three-ward system for Laramie (three council members 
per ward).  Shumway became mayor 
early in the year 2001 and, thus, he was named as one of the defendants in this 
action. 

   3                    
§ 1-37-102. Scope and general 
consideration.

            
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare 
rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or 
could be claimed.  No proceeding is 
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed 
for.  The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
effect of a final judgment.

   4                    
§ 1-37-107. Enumeration not 
exclusive.

            
The enumeration in W.S. 1-37-103 through 1-37-106 does not limit or 
restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in W.S. 1-37-102 in any 
proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree 
will terminate the controversy or remove an 
uncertainty.

   5                    
§ 1-37-109. Review.

            
Final orders and judgments entered in declaratory judgment proceedings 
may be reviewed as in other civil actions.

   6Those who voted 
"No" more than twice, but "Yes" only once did have their vote 
counted.