Case Title: Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio

Citation: 

Docket Number: 79/16

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sadie M. Castruccio v. The Estate of Peter A. Castruccio et al., No. 79, September Term, 
2016.  Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
ESTATES & TRUSTS — VALIDITY OF A WILL — STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS — ATTESTATION 
Attestation does not require that the witnesses sign the will on the same page as the testator 
or on physically connected pages.  Therefore, an otherwise valid will is not invalid merely 
because the witnesses signed the will on a different page than the testator, and the pages 
were not physically connected at the time of signing. 
Furthermore, neither a complete attestation clause nor having the testator initial each page 
of the will are requirements for valid execution of a will.  Therefore, the absence of these 
elements in a testamentary document does not serve to invalidate the will, nor prevent the 
presumption of due execution from attaching to it. 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. 02-C-13-181345 
Argued: May 5, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
   
No. 79 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
  
SADIE M. CASTRUCCIO 
 
 
 
v. 
 
THE ESTATE OF PETER A. CASTRUCCIO 
et al. 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. 
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
 
Filed: August 25, 2017 
 
 
If from the whole evidence, the jury shall find that Tilghman Waters executed 
the will in controversy, in the presence of three subscribing witnesses thereto, 
and that they, at his request, in his presence, and in the presence of each other, 
signed their names as witnesses thereto; that at the time of the execution 
thereof, he, the said Tilghman, was capable of understanding the business in 
which he was engaged—the property he desired to dispose of, and the object 
of his bounty named in said will, and that the same was his free and voluntary 
act, they will find for the defendants. 
Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 531, 536 (1872). 
 
Remarkably similar to the formulation quoted by this Court in Waters in 1872, the 
current testamentary statute provides that “every will shall be (1) in writing, (2) signed by 
the testator, or by some other person for him, in his presence and by his express direction, 
and (3) attested and signed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the 
testator.”  Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Estates & Trusts (“ET”) § 4-102. 
 
In fact, the statutory requirements for the valid execution of a will have remained 
virtually unchanged in Maryland for over two hundred years.  In 1798, the General 
Assembly enacted the first testamentary statute in Maryland, which included strikingly 
similar language for devises: 
All devises and bequests of any lands or tenements, devisable by law, shall 
be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other 
person in his presence, and by his express directions, and shall be attested 
and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor, by three or four credible 
witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect[.] 
1798 Md. Laws, ch. 101, sub-ch. 1, § 4.  This Court has previously traced the foundational 
roots of these longstanding testamentary formalities to the English Statute of Frauds.  See 
Casson v. Swogell, 304 Md. 641, 648–50 (1985). 
 
2 
 
Relatively few changes have been made to the language of the 1798 statute.  In 
1884, the statute was amended such that only “two or more credible witnesses” were 
required for attestation.  1884 Md. Laws, ch. 293.  In 1943, the statute was amended to add 
a paragraph (b), which provided exceptions to the statutory formalities for persons serving 
in the armed forces located outside of the United States.1  1943 Md. Laws, ch. 799.  The 
current language of the statute first appeared in 1969 as Article 93, § 4-102 of the Maryland 
Code.  See 1969 Md. Laws, ch. 3, § 1.  In 1974, the former Article 93 was recodified as the 
Estates and Trusts Article during Code Revision.  See 1974 Md. Laws, ch. 11, § 2.  The 
statute has not been substantively amended since its enactment in its current form in 1969.  
But see 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 72, § 5 (nonsubstantive amendment).   
In this appeal, we must determine whether a will admitted to probate satisfied the 
statutory requirements for valid execution, particularly the requirement of attestation.  For 
the following reasons, we hold that the will at issue satisfied the statutory requirements for 
valid execution, and therefore the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the testator’s estate.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Dr. Peter Castruccio died on February 19, 2013, at the age of eighty-nine.  He was 
survived by his wife of sixty-two years, Sadie Castruccio, who was ninety-two years old at 
the time of his death. 
                                                 
1 The language of the former paragraph (b) is now codified as ET § 4-103. 
 
3 
 
A. 
Drafting and Execution of the 2010 Will 
 
Peter signed a last will and testament on September 28, 2008, which he filed with 
the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County for safekeeping.  In September 2010, Peter 
asked his attorney, John Greiber, to retrieve the 2008 Will so that he could revise it.  When 
Peter received the 2008 Will, he marked up the document in the presence of Mr. Greiber, 
and asked his longtime employee, Darlene Barclay, to transcribe his changes.  Darlene 
made the requested changes and returned the draft 2010 Will to Peter, who reviewed it with 
Mr. Greiber on September 28, 2010. 
 
On September 29, 2010, Peter signed the 2010 Will in the presence of three 
witnesses: Mr. Greiber, his daughter Samantha Greiber, and Darlene’s daughter Kim 
Barclay, who had also been employed by Peter for approximately six years.  Peter called 
the three witnesses into his office and requested that they sign the papers on his desk, which 
he identified as his will.  Peter then signed the Will in the presence of Mr. Greiber, 
Samantha, and Kim.  Next, each of the three witnesses signed the Will in the presence of 
Peter and each other.  Six weeks later, on November 17, 2010, Mr. Greiber deposited the 
Will with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, where it remained until one week 
after Peter’s death. 
B. 
Format and Substance of the 2010 Will 
 
The 2010 Will, which is reproduced in the appendix to this opinion, consists of six 
pages, which are consecutively numbered as pages 1 of 6, 2 of 6, etc.  The page numbers 
are centered on the bottom of each page.  The words “Peter Adalbert Castruccio” are 
 
4 
 
centered in large font on the top of page 1 of 6; otherwise, the font and type-size are 
consistent throughout the document. 
 
In the first paragraph on page 1 of 6 of the Will, Peter “declare[s] this instrument as 
his WILL IN TESTAMENT [sic].”  The second paragraph on page 1 of 6 states that, upon 
his death, Peter “hereby declare[s] the following:[.]”  Following these introductory 
paragraphs, the 2010 Will contains eleven consecutively numbered paragraphs labeled 
Item 1, Item 2, etc.  Some paragraphs are further subdivided into consecutively numbered 
subparagraphs. 
 
Item 1 names Mr. Greiber as Peter’s personal representative for the administration 
of his estate.  Item 7 leaves cash bequests of varying amounts to three specified individuals, 
including Darlene.  Item 8 leaves “the rest and remainder” of Peter’s estate to Sadie, 
“should she one, survive [Peter] and two provided she has made and executed a Will prior 
to [Peter’s] death.”  Item 10, entitled “Residuary Clause,” appearing on page 5 of 6, 
provides as follows: 
 
Should, at the time of my death, my beloved wife not have a valid 
Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated prior 
thereto these, I hereby give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of 
my Estate and property, whether imposition, expectancy will remainder, 
including all property over which I may have Power of Appointment to the 
following individuals share and share alike per stirpes and not per capita to 
DARLENE BARCLAY, [address redacted], Glen Burnie, Maryland, 
21061.[2] 
                                                 
2 According to Mr. Greiber, Peter was concerned that Sadie would leave her estate to 
certain family members of whom he did not approve.  He sought assurances that Sadie 
would not leave her assets, or at least the assets that she would receive from him, to those 
family members.  Thus, he conditioned Sadie’s bequests under the 2010 Will upon her 
 
5 
 
 
Also on page 5 of 6 of the Will, below the “Residuary Clause” and Item 11, appears 
a concluding paragraph: 
 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, the above mentioned testator have 
hereunto set my hands and seals to this six page instrument, and have initial 
[sic] each page hereof, which instrument is intendant [sic] to be my Last Will 
and Testament, this 29th day of September, 2010. 
(The date “29th” is handwritten above a blank line.)  Contrary to this statement, none of the 
pages of the 2010 Will are initialed.  Below this concluding paragraph, Peter signed his 
full name above the typewritten words “PETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO[.]”  Below 
his signature are the words “SIGNED, SEALED, PUBLISHED AND DECLARE [sic], 
BY PETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO.”  Another line down, the last two lines of page 
5 of 6 read as follows: “The above named individual, does declare for his Last Will and 
Testament this instrument, have hereunto subscribed to have witness on the date last 
mentioned above, and at the location, and [. . . .]” 
 
The first two lines of the next page of the Will, page 6 of 6, appear to be a 
continuation of the sentence that began on the previous page: “I do hereby attest that the 
testator to be of sound mind, fully able to understand this instrument, and the testator 
voluntarily and freely did sign same.”  Below these words are the signatures of Mr. Greiber, 
Kim, and Samantha, each appearing under the word “WITNESS:” and above a line that 
reads, “Signature, residing at:[.]”  Below each signature appears the witness’ address.  (Mr. 
Greiber’s address is typed consistent with the text of the document; Kim’s and Samantha’s 
                                                 
having made and filed a will that disclosed whether she intended to make testamentary 
gifts to those family members. 
 
6 
 
addresses are handwritten in what appears to be the same handwriting as their signatures.)  
No other text appears on page 6 of 6, other than the pagination at the bottom of the page. 
C. 
Petition to Caveat the 2010 Will 
 
On February 26, 2013, one week after Peter’s death, Mr. Greiber filed a Petition for 
Administrative Probate with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, requesting 
appointment as personal representative of Peter’s estate and admission to probate of the 
2010 Will.  The next day, the Register of Wills issued an Administrative Probate Order, 
appointing Mr. Greiber as personal representative of Peter’s estate and admitting the 2010 
Will to administrative probate. 
 
At the time of Peter’s death, Sadie had not filed a valid will with the Register of 
Wills for Anne Arundel County.  Thus, under Mr. Greiber’s interpretation of Peter’s 2010 
Will (and specifically the Residuary Clause), the residue of Peter’s estate would pass to 
Darlene, not to Sadie.  Seeking to avoid this result, on March 27, 2013, Sadie filed a Petition 
to Caveat Will in the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County.  On July 2, 2013, Sadie 
petitioned the Orphans’ Court to transmit issues related to the caveat to the circuit court. 
 
On August 1, 2013, the Orphans’ Court entered an order transmitting seven issues 
to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for trial, designating Sadie as the plaintiff 
and the Estate of Peter Castruccio (“Estate”) as the defendant.  The seven issues were 
designated as follows: 
A. 
Was the six (6) page paper writing dated September 29, 2010, 
captioned “Peter Adalbert Castruccio” (the “Will”) executed by Peter 
Adalbert Castruccio (the “Testator”)[?] 
 
7 
 
B. 
Did the Testator execute the Will intending it to constitute his last will 
and testament? 
C. 
Are all of the pages of the Will the genuine pages the Testator believed 
comprised the Will he intended to execute? 
D. 
Was the execution of the Will procured by undue influence? 
E. 
Was the execution of the Will procured by fraud? 
F. 
Was the Will actually attested and signed by credible witnesses in the 
presence of the Testator? 
G. 
Were the contents of the Will read by or to the Testator or known to 
him at or before the time of its purported execution? 
On September 17, 2013, the circuit court granted a motion to intervene filed by Darlene, 
and designated her as a defendant. 
D. 
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
 
On October 10, 2013, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment on all seven 
issues.  Sadie filed an opposition to the motion on October 30, 2013.  The circuit court held 
hearings on the motion on February 21, 2014 and May 2, 2014.  Meanwhile, on April 8, 
2014, Sadie filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as to Issue F, arguing that the 2010 
Will did not satisfy the statutory requirement of attestation because the witnesses did not 
sign on the same page as the testator or on “physically connected pages.”  Sadie submitted 
the affidavit of her attorney, who declared that he inspected the 2010 Will at the Register 
of Wills on March 27, 2013, and found that it “consisted of six separate, unattached pages, 
without any staple holes or other evidence of having ever been physically connected 
together.” 
 
8 
 
 
   Sadie also submitted the deposition testimony of Mr. Greiber and his daughter 
Samantha, both of whom were witnesses to the 2010 Will.  In his deposition, Mr. Greiber 
recalled that the Will had been stapled when it was signed: 
Q. So he took his signature page and the— 
A. The whole will, I think everything was stapled together I’m pretty sure. 
Q. It was stapled at that time? 
A. I think, I’m pretty sure.  Again, Peter had a habit of stapling everything.  
I don’t staple everything. 
Q. So—and this is not a will but—so if it was stapled, was it stapled like 
here— 
A. Yes. 
 
 
Samantha also testified in her deposition that the 2010 Will was stapled at the time of 
signing: 
Q. Do you remember when he gave you the will— 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And again, if you don’t remember please let me know. 
A. Okay. 
Q. But whether it was actually stapled as one unit— 
A. Yes. 
Q. –or whether it was just loose papers? 
A. Stapled. 
 
In addition, Samantha testified that she remembered seeing Peter initial each page of the 
Will: 
Q. But you do remember seeing him sign it? 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. Do you remember seeing him initial each page? 
[Counsel for the Estate]: Object to the question.  Go ahead and answer. 
A. Yes.  Yeah.  I remember him signing and then him getting up and giving 
the will to me. 
 
Based on this testimony and the affidavit of her attorney, Sadie argued that summary 
judgment as to the remaining issues (other than Issue F) was inappropriate because there 
 
9 
 
were disputed issues of material facts.  Specifically, Sadie noted that the 2010 Will 
admitted to probate did not match the physical description of the will provided by Mr. 
Greiber and Samantha: The 2010 Will was not stapled nor was each page initialed, even 
though Mr. Greiber and Samantha stated that it was at the time of signing. 
E. 
The Lower Courts’ Rulings 
 
On September 23, 2014, the circuit court issued a memorandum decision granting 
the Estate’s motion for summary judgment on all issues and denying Sadie’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment as to Issue F.  In reaching its decision, the circuit court “proceeded 
. . . on the assumption . . . that the separate sheets of the Will were not mechanically affixed 
by a staple or other device and were not so affixed when deposited with the Register of 
Wills for safekeeping on November 17, 2010.”  The court then concluded, as to Issue F, 
“that the focus should be on a more holistic inquiry about whether the document purporting 
to be the will holds together as the unitary document completed by the testator and signed 
by the witnesses rather than an inquiry that at a certain point some or all of the pages were 
mechanically affixed to each other.” 
 
As to the remaining issues, the circuit court found that the 2010 Will contained a 
proper attestation clause, and therefore the presumption of due execution attached.  The 
court also found that Sadie had not presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome 
the presumption.  Finally, regarding Peter’s testamentary capacity, the court found “that 
while Peter was at age 84, elderly, he appears to have been fully in control of what his 
desires and intentions were and was not one to be lead [sic] by others or even to take 
advice—including good advice—that he did not appreciate.” 
 
10 
 
 
On October 2, 2014, the circuit court entered an order consistent with its 
memorandum decision.  In its order, the court found that 
A. 
the six page paper writing dated September 29, 2010, captioned “Peter 
Adalbert Castruccio” (the “Will”) was executed by Peter Adalbert 
Castruccio (the “Testator”); 
B. 
the Testator executed his Will with the intention that it constituted his 
last will and testament; 
C. 
all of the pages of the Will are the genuine pages the Testator believed 
comprised the Will he intended to execute; 
D. 
the Will was not procured by undue influence; 
E. 
the Will was not procured by fraud; 
F. 
the Will was actually attested and signed by credible witnesses in the 
presence of the testator; and 
G. 
the contents of the Will were read by the Testator and known to him 
at and before the time of the execution of the Will on September 29, 
2010. 
On October 9, 2014, Sadie filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in a reported 
opinion issued on July 28, 2016.  Sadie filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
intermediate appellate court granted in part and denied in part.  The Court of Special 
Appeals issued a revised opinion on September 29, 2016.  Castruccio v. Estate of 
Castruccio, 230 Md. App. 118 (2016).  Sadie then petitioned this Court for a writ of 
certiorari, which this Court granted on January 9, 2017.  Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 
451 Md. 248 (2017).  Sadie presents three questions for our review: 
I. 
Can a Will satisfy the requirements of valid execution in Maryland if 
(a) the testator and the witnesses do not sign on the same page, or on 
physically connected pages, (b) the Will contains no proper attestation 
 
11 
 
clause, and (c) the Will was not otherwise regular on its face because it 
expressly states the pages were initialed, but they were not? 
II. 
Can a presumption of due execution attach to a Will (a) executed by 
the testator and the witnesses on separate, loose pages, (b) containing no 
valid attestation clause, (c) expressly stating the pages were initialed, when 
they were not, and (d) lacking any other evidence that the witnesses signed 
in the presence of the testator, based on a common font, consecutive page 
numbering, and continuation of language? 
III. 
Can summary judgment as to a Will’s validity be granted where the 
physical description of the Will by two of the witnesses directly contradict[s] 
the actual physical condition of the Will submitted for probate? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The question of whether a trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
was proper is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal.  In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501, we 
independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly 
generated a dispute of material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We review the record in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party. 
Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 366 (2011) (quoting Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 
Md. 469, 479 (2007)). 
DISCUSSION 
 
In Maryland, in order to be validly executed, a will must be “(1) in writing, (2) 
signed by the testator, or by some other person for him, in his presence and by his express 
direction, and (3) attested and signed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of 
the testator.”  ET § 4-102.  The proponent of the will bears “[t]he burden of proving the 
existence of these elements, by a preponderance of the evidence[.]”  Groat v. Sundberg, 
213 Md. App. 144, 152 (2013). 
 
12 
 
 
One way to establish the validity of a will is through an attestation clause in the will 
itself.  “An attestation clause is a ‘provision at the end of an instrument (esp. a will) that is 
signed by the instrument’s witnesses and that recites the formalities required by the 
jurisdiction in which the instrument might take effect (such as where the will might be 
probated).’”  Slack v. Truitt, 368 Md. 2, 8 n.5 (2002) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 124 
(7th ed. 1999)).  “[A]n attestation clause reciting facts necessary for the valid execution of 
a will is prima facie evidence of the due execution of the will, if it bears the genuine 
signatures of the testator and subscribing witnesses.”  Van Meter v. Van Meter, 183 Md. 
614, 617–18 (1944).  Furthermore, “a presumption of due execution attaches to a will that 
contains the testator’s signature and an attestation clause signed by the witnesses.”  Slack, 
368 Md. at 7–8 (footnote omitted).  “[O]nce the presumption attaches, the burden of proof 
is on the caveator to show by clear and convincing evidence that the facts stated in the 
attestation clause are untrue.”  Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
 
On the other hand, an attestation clause is not a requirement for a valid will.  See id. 
at 8 n.5 (“A formal attestation clause is not an essential part of a will.”); Van Meter, 183 
Md. at 617 (“The validity of the execution of a will depends, not upon an attestation clause, 
but upon conformity of the execution with the requirements of the statute, and also the 
testimony of the subscribing witnesses if they are produced and examined.”).  Nor is an 
attestation clause required in order to establish the presumption of due execution.  See 
Slack, 368 Md. at 12 (“[A]n attestation clause is not the sine qua non of the presumption 
of due execution.”).  “[I]n the absence of an attestation clause, if a proponent of a 
testamentary document can adduce sufficient evidence from the document and/or 
 
13 
 
surrounding circumstances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction of the statutory 
requirements for execution of a will, the presumption of due execution attaches.”  Groat, 
213 Md. App. at 156–57.  Thus, a proper attestation clause in a will is itself sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case for the validity of the will, but is not necessary to do so. 
 
“The attestation of the will is the act of the witnesses in seeing that those things exist 
and are done which the attestation clause declares were done and which the statute 
requires.”  McIntyre v. Saltysiak, 205 Md. 415, 421 (1954).  In other words, the witnesses’ 
attestation confirms that the will was executed in accordance with the requirements of ET 
§ 4-102.  Attestation requires that “the testator directly or indirectly request[] those persons 
who do attest [the will] to subscribe their names to it as witnesses.”  Casson, 304 Md. at 
654–55 (quoting Gross v. Burneston, 91 Md. 383, 387 (1900)).  “[T]he testator need not 
formally ask the witness to sign the paper, his implied assent being sufficient.”  Id. at 654.  
Furthermore, “where the testator signs a will in front of the witnesses, proper attestation 
does not require that the testator inform the witnesses that they are signing a will.”  Slack, 
368 Md. at 13 (citing Casson, 304 Md. at 656).  Nor does attestation require that the 
witnesses “see the testator sign the will.”  Van Meter, 183 Md. at 617.  But, if the witnesses 
do not observe the testator signing the will, then “the testator must acknowledge his 
signature before the witnesses or declare the document to be his will.”  Slack, 368 Md. at 
13 (citing Casson, 304 Md. at 655). 
In contrast, the witnesses must always sign the will in the presence of the testator.  
See Groat, 213 Md. App. at 161–62; ET § 4-102(3).  “In the presence of the testator” means 
“within the unobstructed range of vision of the testator, although if he is able to see it, 
 
14 
 
without any material change of position, the fact that he does or does not avail himself of 
the privilege is immaterial.”  Groat, 213 Md. App. at 161–62 (quoting Brittingham v. 
Brittingham, 147 Md. 153, 160 (1925)).  In other words, “[i]t is not necessary for the 
testator to have watched the witnesses sign, as long as the testator could have watched them 
sign.”  Id. at 162 (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills 
and Other Donative Transfers § 3.1 cmt. p (1999)). 
 
In this appeal, Sadie does not dispute that the 2010 Will satisfies the requirements 
of ET § 4-102(1) and (2)—it is a writing, signed by Peter, the testator.  Sadie also does not 
dispute that the Will was “signed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the 
testator”—it was in fact signed by three credible witnesses in the presence of Peter and 
each other.  Furthermore, there is no dispute over the requirement that the witnesses either 
see the testator sign the will or that he acknowledge his signature or declare the document 
to be his will.  In fact, Peter signed the 2010 Will in the presence of the three witnesses, 
and he identified the document as his will. 
 
Instead, Sadie contends that the 2010 Will does not satisfy the requirement of ET § 
4-102(3) that the will be “attested . . . by two or more credible witnesses.”  Quoting Shane 
v. Wooley, 138 Md. 75, 78 (1921), Sadie argues that attestation requires “that the witnesses 
must sign, either upon the same sheet as the signature of the testator, or on some sheet 
physically connected with it.”  Because Peter signed on page 5 of 6 of the 2010 Will, and 
the three witnesses signed on page 6 of 6, and those pages were not physically connected 
at the time of signing (or, at a minimum, there is a factual dispute as to whether the pages 
were physically connected when signed), Sadie argues that the circuit court erred in 
 
15 
 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate on the issue of attestation.  In addition, 
Sadie contends that the 2010 Will is otherwise invalid because it does not contain a “proper 
attestation clause,” and because the Will “expressly states [that] the pages were initialed, 
but they were not.”  In the alternative, Sadie argues that even if these deficiencies do not 
necessarily invalidate the 2010 Will, the circuit court nonetheless erred in finding that the 
presumption of due execution attached to the Will, thereby requiring Sadie to rebut the 
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 
A. 
Attestation on a Different Page than the Testator’s Signature 
 
The primary issue in this case is whether attestation requires that the testator and the 
witnesses sign on the same page of the will, or else on physically connected pages.  Sadie 
cites Shane v. Wooley for the proposition that attestation requires “that the witnesses must 
sign, either upon the same sheet as the signature of the testator, or on some sheet physically 
connected with it.”  Shane, 138 Md. at 78.  The Estate and Darlene respond that the 
“physically connected” rule of Shane applies only when the attestation is “on a document 
separate from the will itself”; this rule does not apply, they contend, to separate pages of a 
multi-page will. 
 
Shane involved a one-page will that had been signed by the testatrix, placed in an 
envelope, and sealed.  138 Md. at 76.  The following language “appeared across the sealed 
portion of the envelope,” followed by the signatures of three witnesses: “We have seen the 
said Mrs. Catherine Shane sign and seal this paper in our presence and at her request we 
hereby sign our names as witnesses.”  Id.  The plaintiffs argued that the will was invalid 
 
16 
 
because the witnesses signing on the envelope rather than the will itself did not satisfy the 
statutory requirement of attestation.  Id. at 77. 
 
In Shane, this Court examined a variety of cases (both in state and out of state) and 
treatises, and arrived at the following observation: 
While there is no provision of the statute of this State which requires in terms 
that the attestation clause and the signatures of the witnesses shall be at the 
end of the will or at any particular place of the will, as in some of the States 
of the Union, the weight of authority, however, appears to be that the 
witnesses must sign, either upon the same sheet as the signature of the 
testator, or on some sheet physically connected with it, to constitute a valid 
will. 
Id. at 78.  After summarizing those authorities, the Court concluded that “it is obvious, 
under the authorities cited, the formalities prescribed by law, in the execution of wills, have 
not been complied with, to constitute a valid will.”  Id. at 80. 
 
As the Estate and Darlene note, however, the facts of Shane and the cases cited 
therein are materially distinguishable from the facts of this case.  For example, the Shane 
Court quoted Brengle v. Tucker for the proposition that “[t]o subscribe means that the 
witnesses shall sign their name to the same paper for the purpose of identification, and 
implies that attestation has been performed.”  Id. at 78 (quoting Brengle v. Tucker, 114 Md. 
597, 602 (1911)).  In Brengle, the testator wrote and signed a will from a hospital bed 
immediately before going into surgery.  Brengle, 114 Md. at 599–600.  After writing the 
purported will on a piece of paper he had received from his doctor, the testator handed the 
paper back to the doctor and asked him to sign it.  Id. at 600.  The doctor complied.  Id.  
Although there were three other people in the hospital room who had also witnessed these 
events, none of them signed the purported will.  Id. at 601.  The Court held that the 
 
17 
 
purported will did not satisfy the statutory requirements because there was “only one 
subscribing witness to [the] paper writing.”  Id. at 602. 
Thus, the issue in Brengle was not where the witnesses must sign in order to satisfy 
the statutory requirement of attestation, but whether the “witnesses” must sign the will at 
all in order to satisfy the requirement, when it is undisputed that they actually witnessed 
the testator write and sign the will.  In this case, there is no dispute that three witnesses 
actually signed the 2010 Will in the presence of Peter and each other. 
The Shane Court also cited In re Baldwin’s Will for the proposition that “[t]he 
authorities hold that the attestation or subscription by witnesses must be on the same sheet 
of paper as that which contains the testator’s signature, or else upon some paper physically 
connected with that sheet.”  Shane, 138 Md. at 78 (quoting In re Baldwin’s Will, 59 S.E. 
163, 165 (N.C. 1907)).  In Baldwin, Mr. Covington wrote a will that was dictated to him 
by the testator, Mr. Baldwin.  Baldwin, 59 S.E. at 164.  Mr. Baldwin signed the will in Mr. 
Covington’s presence, and Mr. Covington signed the will as a witness in the presence of 
Mr. Baldwin.  Id.  Later, Mr. Covington took the paper writing with his and Mr. Baldwin’s 
signatures to his home and “transcribed it on better paper.”  Id.  There, outside the presence 
of Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Covington signed this new copy of the will as a witness.  Id.  At some 
point after Mr. Covington returned the new copy to Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Baldwin signed it 
outside the presence of Mr. Covington.  Id.  Thereafter, another witness named Mr. Bowles 
signed the new copy of the will at the request and in the presence of Mr. Baldwin.  Id. at 
164–65.  After Mr. Baldwin’s death, his wife burned the original copy of the will, and only 
the second copy (on better paper) was admitted to probate.  Id. at 165. 
 
18 
 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the second copy of the will did not 
satisfy the statutory “requirement that the will shall be subscribed in the presence of the 
testator by two witnesses at least.”  Id.  This was because Mr. Covington signed the second 
copy of the will before Mr. Baldwin had signed it and outside his presence.  Id.  It was 
immaterial that Mr. Covington had signed the original copy in Mr. Baldwin’s presence, 
because this copy “was not attached in any way to the paper offered for probate and had 
no physical connection with it.”  Id.  Therefore, the Court held that, “[i]n the absence of 
any sort of physical connection between the two papers, resort cannot be had to parol proof 
to show a similarity of contents, and that they constituted one and the same will.”  Id. 
Thus, the issue in Baldwin was whether a witness’ proper attestation of one copy of 
a will could essentially transfer to a second copy of the will, when the witness’ signature 
on the second copy occurred outside the presence of the testator and consequently was 
invalid.  In this case, all three witnesses signed the 2010 Will after Peter had signed it, in 
the presence of Peter and each other.  All four signatories signed the same document (albeit 
on separate pages) as part of the same transaction. 
The Shane Court also relied on James Schouler, Law of Wills, Executors, and 
Administrators § 336 (5th ed. 1915).  Shane, 138 Md. at 79.  That section is entitled 
“Attestation on a Different Paper” and provides, 
But the attestation or subscription by witnesses must be on the same 
sheet of paper as that which contains the testator’s own signature, or else 
upon some paper physically connected with that sheet.  No particular mode 
of connection is prescribed by law; and hence the fastening by tape, by 
eyelets, by mucilage, or even by a pin, seems unobjectionable.  Where papers 
are thus connected, the testator may sign on one paper and the witnesses on 
another, provided their intent corresponded. 
 
19 
 
But attestation or a subscription by witnesses on a piece of paper, 
detached and separated from the will and the testator’s signature, nor 
affixed in his presence to the paper at the time of execution, fails of 
compliance with the policy of our law; we may assume it to be void, as 
otherwise a door would be open to much fraud and perjury. 
Schouler, supra at § 336 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Notably, the Shane Court 
did not cite to the next section of Schouler, § 337, which is entitled “Attestation where a 
Will is written on Several Sheets.”  That section provides, 
[I]f the will be written on several sheets, whether fastened together or not, 
and the last sheet alone is attested in form, the whole will is well executed, 
provided all the sheets were in the room.  . . . and unquestionably, if the 
several pieces of paper are connected in their provisions and form a 
connected series, and are brought in this shape before the attesting witnesses 
at the time of their subscription, a single attestation will suffice for the whole. 
The fact that the Shane Court cited § 336, which discusses attestation “on a piece of 
paper detached and separated from the will,” but did not cite § 337, which describes a will 
“written on several sheets, whether fastened together or not,” supports the Estate’s and 
Darlene’s position that the Shane Court was only concerned with the validity of the 
attestation when the witnesses sign a document other than the will itself, not when the 
witnesses sign the will on a different piece of paper than the testator.  Indeed, these were 
the facts in Shane: the testator signed a one-page will, while the witnesses signed on a 
sealed envelope containing the will.  Unlike here, where the three witnesses signed the will 
on a different page than the testator, the witnesses in Shane did not sign the will at all.  
Therefore, we conclude that the “physically connected” rule of Shane does not apply to 
loose pages of a multi-page will.  Instead, Shane stands for the proposition that, when the 
 
20 
 
witnesses sign on a piece of paper that is not part of the will itself, the paper must be 
physically connected to the will in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of attestation. 
As we have just determined, Shane did not address the issue presented in this case: 
when the witnesses sign the will on a different page than the testator, must the pages be 
physically connected in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of attestation?  In fact, 
the majority of the cases cited by the parties to this Court are generally concerned with the 
validity of a multi-page will whose pages are not physically connected at the time of 
execution, rather than the validity of the attestation when it is not on the same page as the 
testator’s signature.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Beale, 113 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1962); In re 
Covington’s Estate, 33 A.2d 235 (Pa. 1943); In re Swaim’s Will, 78 S.E. 72 (N.C. 1913).  
Those cases generally hold that a multi-page will is not invalid merely because its pages 
are not physically connected, as long as “they are connected by their internal sense by 
coherence or adaptation of parts.”  Swaim, 78 S.E. at 73; see also id. (“[T]he papers 
themselves bear intrinsic evidence that, while separate, they were tacked together in the 
mind of the testator.”). 
Sadie acknowledges that “[t]he overwhelming majority of the cited material 
confirms that a properly executed will may be valid even if written on disconnected sheets,” 
and she does not challenge this principle.  Thus, Sadie does not dispute the validity of the 
2010 Will merely because its pages were not physically connected.  Nor does she dispute 
whether the page containing Peter’s signature (page 5 of 6) and the page containing the 
witnesses’ signatures (page 6 of 6) are part of the same document constituting the 2010 
Will.  Instead, Sadie argues that the 2010 Will was not properly attested, because the 
 
21 
 
witnesses did not sign on the same page as the testator’s signature or on a page physically 
connected to it. 
The parties have cited, and this Court has been able to find, only one case in 
American jurisprudence that addresses this precise issue: In re Kaiser’s Estate, 34 N.W.2d 
366 (Neb. 1948).3  The will in Kaiser “consisted of two sheets numbered (1) and (2) 
respectively.  The dispositive portion of the will thus written, and signed by the testator, 
all appeared on page (1).  The perfected attestation clause thereof, subscribed by the 
witnesses, alone appeared on page (2).”  Kaiser, 34 N.W.2d at 370.  The evidence did not 
affirmatively show “[w]hether or not the two sheets were physically attached to each other 
at the time of execution.”  Id.  “[A]fter the execution of the will[,] both pages were placed 
in a sealed envelope and on the same day delivered into the custody of the county judge, 
who thereafter opened it only after [the] testator’s death.”  Id. 
                                                 
3 The appellant in Goroum v. Rynarzewski, 89 Md. App. 676 (1991) raised a similar issue, 
but the Court of Special Appeals did not address the argument on the merits.  In Goroum, 
the attestation clause and the signatures of the witnesses appeared on a page that contained 
no other provisions of the will.  89 Md. App. at 684.  “[T]he testator [had] initialed and 
signed each and every page of his will, except the attestation page, in the presence of the 
witnesses.”  Id. at 683.  The appellant argued that the will was invalid based on one of the 
witnesses’ testimony that it was the normal practice of the law office “that the sheets were 
not stapled together when wills were signed.”  Id. at 680 n.2. 
The court noted that “[n]o one testified that the attestation page of this will was at any time 
unaffixed.”  Id. at 681.  Furthermore, “[a] law office’s general practice to do things a certain 
way is not clear and convincing evidence that it was done that way in a specific instance.  
Simply put, there is no evidence that at the time the testator and witnesses executed this 
will, its pages were unaffixed.”  Id.  Therefore, the court declined to address whether the 
will would have satisfied the statutory requirements if the attestation page had not been 
affixed to the remainder of the will.  Id. at 684. 
 
22 
 
The Kaiser Court noted that “[t]here is no statutory provision in this state 
designating just where a will shall be attested and subscribed by the witnesses, or 
forbidding the use of separate sheets in making a will, or directing how or that they shall 
be physically attached to each other in order to make a valid will.”  Id. at 373.  The Court 
also observed, “[i]n the case at bar, the sheets were not only connected by their internal 
sense, but identified by the subscribing witnesses as connected parts of [the] testator’s 
will.”  Id.  Therefore, the Court upheld the validity of the will.  Id. at 374. 
Sadie attempts to distinguish Kaiser by noting that the will in that case “contained 
a valid attestation clause,” and “was placed in a sealed envelope after it was signed, from 
which it did not emerge until the testator’s death.”  Indeed, these additional facts provide 
further indications of the validity of the will in Kaiser.  However, these additional facts 
have no bearing on whether attestation requires the witnesses to sign on the same page as 
the testator, or else on physically connected pages.  If attestation required the witnesses to 
sign on the same page as the testator, or else on physically connected pages, then it would 
not matter that the will bore certain other indicia of its validity, such as having a valid 
attestation clause and remaining in a sealed envelope.  In other words, if the will was not 
properly attested as required by statute, then it would have been invalid, regardless of any 
other indicia of validity. 
This Court considered a similar issue in Casson.  In that case, the Court rejected an 
argument “that the will is invalid because the signatures of both witnesses do not appear at 
the end of the will, and do not appear in close proximity to one another at any particular 
place on the document.”  304 Md. at 657.  The Court noted that ET § 4-102 “does not 
 
23 
 
require the witnesses to sign together, or at any particular place on the will.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the Court concluded that “[w]hile the fact that the two 
witnesses did not sign in the same place may bear on the jury question of whether the will 
is a fraud, it does not constitute a fatal variance from the required procedure for lawful 
execution.”  Id. 
Furthermore, we believe that the holding of Kaiser comports with previous 
decisions of this Court emphasizing the effectuation of the testator’s intent over strict 
compliance with the statutory formalities.  For example, in Slack, this Court held that the 
presumption of due execution attaches to a will notwithstanding the absence of an 
attestation clause, as long as the will bears sufficient other indicia of due execution.  368 
Md. at 12.  Moreover, the Slack Court declined to invalidate the will at issue in that case 
even though one of the witnesses “testified that she did not know that the paper she was 
signing was a will, and could not remember whether she saw [the testator]’s signature on 
the document.”  Id. at 14.  The Court noted that the purpose of ET § 4-102 “was to remove 
uncertainty in the making of wills and to prevent the practice of imposition and fraud upon 
testators.”  Id. at 17.  The Court then observed that the circumstances of that case did “not 
suggest that there was any fraud worked upon the testator.  The will was found in [the] 
testator’s home after his death, duly signed and witnessed; this shows that the testator 
thought it was a valid will.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, the Slack Court concluded 
that “the will was entitled to probate as a validly executed will.”  Id. at 18.  Additionally, 
in Casson, this Court held that “[t]o fulfill the requirement that a testator request a witness 
sign a document it is not necessary that the witness know it is a will.”  304 Md. at 654. 
 
24 
 
Thus, this Court’s decisions in Casson and Slack indicate that the Court is generally 
reluctant to impose formalities beyond those specifically required by statute, and that the 
testator’s intention that the document act as his will is paramount.  Cf. Carney v. Kosko, 
229 Md. 112, 117 (1962) (“[A] will or a codicil need not be in any particular form, so long 
as it (a) makes a disposition of the testator’s property, and (b) such disposition is to take 
effect only upon death.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) 
§ 3.1, cmt. f (“A court should never impose formal requirements beyond those in the 
statute.”). 
Moreover, we believe that Sadie’s proposed rule—that the witnesses must sign on 
the same page as the testator, or on physically connected pages—would not serve the 
purpose of ET § 4-102, “to prevent the practice of imposition and fraud upon testators.”  
Slack, 368 Md. at 17.  To the contrary, we believe that Sadie’s rule would result in the 
invalidation of numerous wills that otherwise comply with the statutory requirements and 
present no evidence of fraud.  As the Court of Special Appeals noted, 
One need not strain to consider the unfortunate results that could occur when 
a will is drafted on word-processing software, as most undoubtedly are these 
days.  Even if the places for the witnesses’ signatures are initially adjacent to 
the testator’s, the slightest revisions or additions to the body of the will may 
send them to a new page, presumably in violation of the strict rule that 
[Sadie] advances.  The results may attend changes to the font, font size, or 
margins.  Facing such potentially ruinous results, the testator might have to 
compose the document on a scroll. 
Castruccio, 230 Md. App. at 142 n.13.  In addition, “the physical-connection rule is fraught 
with vagueness and uncertainty.  Would a paperclip or binder clip suffice?  What if 
 
25 
 
someone pinched the pages between her thumb and index finger while the witnesses 
signed?  What if the pages were pressed together under a paperweight?”  Id. at 143. 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that attestation does not require the witnesses 
to sign on the same page as the testator, or on physically connected pages.  Instead, 
attestation requires (1) that two or more credible witnesses sign the will in the presence of 
the testator, and (2) that the witnesses either observe the testator sign the will, or that the 
testator acknowledges his signature on the document or acknowledges that the document 
is his will. 
In this case, three credible witnesses observed Peter sign on page 5 of 6 of the 2010 
Will, and Peter informed the witnesses that the document was his will.  After having 
witnessed this, the three witnesses each signed on page 6 of 6 of the 2010 Will.  Whether 
they were physically connected or not, all six pages of the document were in the room, 
together, at the time of signing.  The six pages are consecutively numbered, the font and 
typeface are consistent throughout, and the text flows continuously from one page to the 
next.  “[T]hey are connected by their internal sense by coherence or adaptation of parts” 
and “the papers themselves bear intrinsic evidence that, while separate, they were tacked 
together in the mind of the testator.”  Swaim, 78 S.E. at 73. 
The evidence does not reveal whether the pages were physically connected to each 
other at the time of signing, but this fact is immaterial to the Will’s validity.  Regardless of 
whether the last two pages (or any of the pages, for that matter) were physically connected, 
it is clear from “the papers themselves” that they were intended to form a single document 
constituting the 2010 Will.  Attestation does not require that the witnesses sign on the same 
 
26 
 
page as the testator, or on physically connected pages.  Therefore, the fact that the last two 
pages of the 2010 Will may not have been physically connected at the time of signing does 
not render the Will invalid, nor prevent the presumption of due execution from attaching 
to it.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Sadie’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment as to Issue F (attestation). 
B. 
Imperfect Attestation Clause and the Presumption of Due Execution 
 
Next, Sadie argues that the 2010 Will is invalid because it does not contain a “proper 
attestation clause,” and “it expressly states [that] the pages were initialed [by Peter], but 
they were not.”  Alternatively, Sadie argues that even if these deficiencies do not 
necessarily invalidate the 2010 Will, they nonetheless should prevent the presumption of 
due execution from attaching to it.  Therefore, Sadie asserts that she should not have been 
required to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.  Accordingly, Sadie 
contends that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate 
on all transmitted issues. 
The Estate and Darlene respond that these purported deficiencies do not invalidate 
the 2010 Will because neither a “proper attestation clause” nor having the testator initial 
each page are requirements for a valid will.  Furthermore, the Estate and Darlene maintain 
that even if the attestation clause in the 2010 Will was itself insufficient to give rise to the 
presumption of due execution, the Will contained other sufficient indicia of due execution 
such that the presumption should attach.  Additionally, the Estate and Darlene assert that 
Sadie produced no evidence to rebut the presumption of due execution, let alone clear and 
 
27 
 
convincing evidence.  Therefore, the Estate and Darlene contend that the circuit court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on all transmitted issues. 
Sadie is correct that page 5 of 6 of the 2010 Will states that Peter has “initial [sic] 
each page hereof,” when in fact he did not, as his initials do not appear on any pages of the 
Will.  However, Sadie cites to no authority, and we have found none, supporting her 
position that this error either invalidates the Will or prevents the presumption of due 
execution from attaching to it.  We see no reason why an error such as this—stating that 
the pages were initialed when in fact they were not—should either invalidate an otherwise 
valid will or prevent the presumption of due execution from attaching to it, so long as the 
will contains sufficient other indicia of due execution.  Having the testator initial each page 
of a multi-page will is not required by statute, and therefore we decline to impose such a 
requirement here.  See Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 3.1, cmt. 
f (“A court should never impose formal requirements beyond those in the statute.”). 
Turning to the allegedly “improper” attestation clause, we note that the attestation 
clause appearing in the 2010 Will is admittedly imperfect.  It states, 
The above named individual, does declare for his Last Will and 
Testament this instrument, have hereunto subscribed to have witness on the 
date last mentioned above, and at the location, and [//4] I do hereby attest 
that the testator to be of sound mind, fully able to understand this instrument, 
and the testator voluntarily and freely did sign same. 
                                                 
4 These symbols have been inserted to indicate the page break between the bottom of page 
5 of 6 and the top of page 6 of 6 in the 2010 Will. 
 
28 
 
The attestation clause does not recite the statutory requirement that the witnesses signed 
the Will “in the presence of the testator.”  See ET § 4-102(3).  Thus, it does not “recite[] 
the formalities required by the jurisdiction in which the instrument might take effect (such 
as where the will might be probated).”  Slack, 368 Md. at 8 n.5 (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 124 (7th ed. 1999)).  As such, the attestation clause in the 2010 Will, standing 
alone, does not provide prima facie evidence for the validity of the Will.  See Van Meter, 
183 Md. at 617–18  (“[A]n attestation clause reciting facts necessary for the valid 
execution of a will is prima facie evidence of the due execution of the will, if it bears the 
genuine signatures of the testator and subscribing witnesses.” (emphasis added)). 
However, as discussed earlier in this opinion, we agree with the Estate and Darlene 
that an attestation clause is not a requirement of a valid will, and therefore an “improper” 
or incomplete attestation clause does not serve to invalidate an otherwise valid will.  “The 
validity of the execution of a will depends, not upon an attestation clause, but upon 
conformity of the execution with the requirements of the statute, and also the testimony of 
the subscribing witnesses if they are produced and examined.”  Id. at 617; see also Slack, 
368 Md. at 8 n.5 (“A formal attestation clause is not an essential part of a will.”).  Nor is a 
“proper” attestation clause required for the presumption of due execution to attach to a will.  
See Slack, 368 Md. at 12 (“[A]n attestation clause is not the sine qua non of the presumption 
of due execution.”).  “[I]n the absence of an attestation clause, if a proponent of a 
testamentary document can adduce sufficient evidence from the document and/or 
surrounding circumstances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction of the statutory 
 
29 
 
requirements for execution of a will, the presumption of due execution attaches.”  Groat, 
213 Md. App. at 156–57 (citing Slack, 368 Md. at 12). 
 
In this case, the circuit court did not err in finding “sufficient evidence from the 
document and/or surrounding circumstances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction 
of the statutory requirements for execution of a will,” id. at 157, and thus properly found 
that the presumption of due execution attached to the 2010 Will.  Although the attestation 
clause itself is imperfect, each of the three witnesses signed their names under the word 
“WITNESS:.”  Cf. Slack, 368 Md. at 12 (that “[t]he two witnesses, in the presence of the 
testator, signed beneath the words ‘Witnessed By’” provides an indication of due 
execution).  The witnesses’ signatures all appear on the same page, which is the next 
consecutively numbered page following the one that contains the testator’s signature.  Cf. 
id. (that the testator’s signature “was nearly adjacent to the signatures of the witnesses” 
provides an indication of due execution).  Additionally, the imperfect attestation clause 
includes a recitation of some (though not all) of the statutory requirements for execution of 
a will, including witnessing Peter sign the will and a statement of Peter’s testamentary 
capacity. 
 
Furthermore, the “surrounding circumstances” in this case provide additional 
evidence of satisfaction of the statutory requirements.  All three witnesses testified that 
they observed Peter sign the 2010 Will, that he declared the document to be his will, and 
that they all signed the Will in his presence and in the presence of each other.  See Van 
Meter, 183 Md. at 617 (“The validity of the execution of a will depends, not upon an 
attestation clause, but upon conformity with the requirements of the statute, and also the 
 
30 
 
testimony of the subscribing witnesses if they are produced and examined.” (emphasis 
added)). 
Therefore, based on the document itself and the circumstances surrounding its 
execution, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding sufficient evidence “to 
make a prima facie case for the satisfaction of the statutory requirements for execution of 
a will,” Groat, 213 Md. App. at 157, and thus finding that the presumption of due execution 
attached to the 2010 Will.5  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Estate on all transmitted issues. 
C. 
Disputed Facts 
Finally, Sadie argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Estate because she produced evidence that generated disputed issues of 
material facts.  Specifically, Sadie contends that the 2010 Will admitted to probate did not 
match the physical description of the will provided by Mr. Greiber and Samantha in their 
depositions.  Both Mr. Greiber and Samantha testified that they remembered that the 2010 
Will was stapled when it was signed, and Samantha recalled that Peter had initialed each 
page.  The Will admitted to probate, however, bore no indication of ever having been 
stapled, and did not contain Peter’s initials on any of the pages.  Sadie contends that 
whether the Will was stapled and initialed are material facts bearing on its validity, and 
                                                 
5 Sadie only argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the presumption of due 
execution attached to the 2010 Will.  She does not argue, in the alternative, that if the 
presumption did attach, she nonetheless produced clear and convincing evidence to rebut 
the presumption.  Therefore, we need not consider whether Sadie produced sufficient 
evidence to overcome the presumption of due execution regarding the 2010 Will. 
 
31 
 
therefore the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate.  The 
Estate and Darlene do not respond to Sadie’s argument regarding disputed issues of 
material facts. 
“A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome 
of the case.  Consequently, a dispute over a non-material fact will not preclude summary 
judgment.”  King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 (1985) (citation omitted).  In other words, 
[m]erely proving the existence of a factual dispute is not necessarily fatal to 
a summary judgment motion.  A dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon 
which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material 
fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment. 
Boland, 423 Md. at 366 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
As discussed in Part A above, whether the 2010 Will was stapled at the time of 
signing has no bearing on its validity.  As such, resolution of this disputed fact would not 
affect the outcome of the case.  Indeed, in granting the Estate’s motion for summary 
judgment, the circuit court “proceeded . . . on the assumption . . . that the separate sheets 
of the Will were not mechanically affixed by a staple or other device and were not so 
affixed when deposited with the Register of Wills for safekeeping on November 17, 2010.”  
Therefore, the dispute about whether the 2010 Will was stapled at the time of signing 
“relate[d] to grounds upon which the [circuit court’s] decision [was] not rested.”  Boland, 
423 Md. at 366.  Similarly, as discussed in Part B above, whether the 2010 Will was 
initialed by Peter also has no bearing on its validity.  Accordingly, resolution of this 
disputed fact would not affect the outcome of the case. 
 
32 
 
 
Sadie contends that these disputed facts are material because the contrary 
descriptions of the 2010 Will by the witnesses indicate that the will that was signed by 
Peter and the three witnesses on September 29, 2010 might not be the same will that was 
admitted to probate.  However, in order to defeat summary judgment, “[a] plaintiff’s claim 
must be supported by more than a ‘scintilla of evidence[,]’ as ‘there must be evidence upon 
which [a] jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’”  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 
Md. 100, 108 (2014) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Beatty v. 
Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738–39 (1993)).  Furthermore, when a witness to a 
testamentary document provides testimony that is contrary to the description provided in 
the document itself, “[t]he court views such contradictory testimony with great caution and 
scans it with grave suspicion[.]”  Van Meter, 183 Md. at 618; see also Slack, 368 Md. at 
15 (“This Court and most other state courts consistently have found that a witness’ inability 
to remember certain events should not overcome the presumption of due execution.”). 
 
Therefore, we conclude that Mr. Grieber’s and Samantha’s inaccurate recollections 
about whether the 2010 Will was stapled and initialed on each page at the time of signing 
were insufficient to generate disputed issues of material fact.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate on all transmitted issues. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The statutory requirements for a validly executed will are that it must be “(1) in 
writing, (2) signed by the testator, or by some other person for him, in his presence and by 
his express direction, and (3) attested and signed by two or more credible witnesses in the 
presence of the testator.”  ET § 4-102.  When the testator and the witnesses sign on separate 
 
33 
 
pages of a multi-page will, attestation does not require that the pages be “physically 
connected” at the time of signing.  Furthermore, neither a complete attestation clause nor 
having the testator initial each page of the will are requirements for valid execution.  
Therefore, the absence of these elements in a testamentary document does not serve to 
invalidate the will, nor prevent the presumption of due execution from attaching to it. 
In this case, the Estate and Darlene produced “sufficient evidence from the 
document and/or surrounding circumstances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction 
of the statutory requirements for execution of a will.”  Groat, 213 Md. App. at 157.  Thus, 
the circuit court properly found that the presumption of due execution attached to the 2010 
Will, and Sadie does not argue that she produced clear and convincing evidence to 
overcome the presumption.  Therefore, the circuit court correctly denied Sadie’s cross-
motion for summary judgment as to Issue F (attestation), and properly granted the Estate’s 
motion for summary judgment on all transmitted issues.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
E. 000526
$$$$$$$$$$$
E.0000528
FI
LED 
PETER 
ADALBERT 
CASTRUCCI
O  
FEB 21 2013 
REG I
SI
ER 
O F 
W I
LLS 
-
NNE 
ARUNDEL 
CO UNTY,
 
M D 
I
,
 
PETER 
ADALBERT 
CASTRUCCI
 
O ,
 
r
esi
di
ng 
at
 
8229 
Angl
er
s 
Edge 
Tr
ai
l
,
 
G l
en 
Bur
ni
e,
 
M ar
yl
and 21060,
 bei
ng of
 
sound and di
sposi
ng m i
nd,
 m em or
y and under
st
andi
ng,
 do her
eby 
vol
unt
ar
i
l
y 
m ake,
 publ
i
sh and decl
ar
e t
hi
s i
nst
r
um ent
 as hi
s W I
LL 
I
N 
TESTAM ENT,
 
t
her
eby 
r
evoki
ng 
any 
and 
al
l
 
pr
evi
ous 
W i
l
l
s 
and 
Codi
ci
l
s 
her
ei
n 
bef
or
e 
m ade 
by 
m e.
 
W HEREAS,
 i
t
 
i
s m y i
nt
ent
i
on 
t
hat
 on m y 
deat
h,
 al
l
 pr
ovi
si
ons of
 
t
hi
s i
nst
r
um ent
 wi
l
l
 
const
i
t
ut
e 
m y 
Last
 
W i
l
l
 
I
n 
Test
am ent
;
 
t
her
ef
or
e,
 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
decl
ar
e 
t
he 
f
ol
l
owi
ng:
 
I
TEM  
1:
 
RI
G HTS 
AND 
O BLI
G ATI
O NS 
O F 
M Y 
PERSO NAL 
REPRESENTATI
VE 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
nom i
nat
e,
 
const
i
t
ut
e 
and 
appoi
nt
 
m y 
f
r
i
end 
and 
counsel
 
of
 
m any 
year
s,
 
JO HN 
RALPH 
G REI
BER,
 
J 
R.
 
t
o 
act
 
as 
m y 
Per
sona]
 Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
f
or
 
t
he 
adm i
ni
st
r
at
i
on 
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e.
 
To 
t
hat
 
af
f
ect
,
 
I
 
do 
conf
er
 
upon 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
t
he 
f
ol
l
owi
ng 
r
i
ght
s 
and 
obl
i
gat
i
ons:
 
1.
 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
expr
ess 
t
he 
desi
r
e 
t
hat
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
pay 
m y 
j
ust
 
debt
s,
 
ﬁnal
 
expenses 
and 
t
axes,
 
as soon 
as 
pr
act
i
cal
 
af
t
er
 
m y 
deat
h.
 Fi
r
st
l
y 
out
 
of
 
cash 
or
 
l
i
qui
d 
asset
s 
wi
t
hi
n 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 
secondl
y 
by 
of
 
t
he 
sal
e 
of
 
any 
per
sonal
 
pr
oper
t
y 
i
n 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 and t
hi
r
dl
y out
 of
 
any r
eal
 est
at
e whi
ch i
s subj
ect
 t
o m y cont
r
ol
 and 
di
sposi
t
i
on.
 
2.
 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
di
r
ect
 
t
hat
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
pay 
f
r
om  
m y 
Est
at
e,
 
pr
i
m ar
i
l
y 
f
r
om  
t
he 
r
esi
duar
y 
cl
ause,
 
al
l
 
gover
nm ent
,
 
Est
at
e 
or
 
i
nher
i
t
ance t
axes,
 
whi
ch 
m ay 
be 
due 
and 
payabl
e 
by 
r
eason 
of
 
m y 
debt
,
 
wi
t
hout
 
r
equi
r
i
ng 
cont
r
i
but
i
on 
f
r
om  
anyone,
 
who,
 
i
n 
t
he 
absence 
of
 
t
hi
s 
exoner
at
i
on,
 
woul
d 
be 
l
i
abl
e 
f
or
 
paym ent
 
of
 
any 
por
t
i
on 
of
 
such 
t
axes 
by 
vi
r
t
ue 
of
 
t
he 
i
nher
i
t
ance 
of
 
t
he 
st
at
us 
of
 
beneﬁci
ar
y.
 
3.
 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
r
equest
 
t
hat
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
be 
excused 
f
r
om  
t
he 
necessi
t
y 
of
 
gi
vi
ng 
bond,
 
unl
ess 
absol
ut
el
y 
r
equi
r
ed 
by 
l
aw,
 
and 
i
n 
t
hat
 
event
,
 m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
shal
l
 
gi
ve 
such 
bond 
i
n 
such 
m i
ni
m um  
am ount
 
as 
woul
d 
be 
r
equi
r
ed 
by 
l
aw.
,
 
‘\
x
i
 
“
gm  
1 of
 
6 (
1"
 
V.
_.
.
_’
:
.
.
'
:
'
.
'
__.
.
"
"
"
'
.
’
 '
 ”
CT .
'
_'
.
I
f
;
'
£’
.
:
:
.
.
:
_’
.
.
_’
f
7‘
.
"
 "
 i
i
"
;I
J
D 
[
-
 
EL
_
.
 
«r
m — -
 
E.
0000528 
E 007:
2»:
E. 000527
$$$$$$$$$$$
E.0000529
10.
 
11.
 
For
 
any and al
l
 
act
i
vi
t
i
es of
 
m y Per
sonal
 Repr
esent
at
i
ve,
 I
 
do her
eby di
r
ect
 
and 
r
equest
 
t
hat
 
he 
be 
r
el
i
eved 
f
r
om  
t
he 
necessi
t
y 
of
 
secur
i
ng 
any 
pr
evi
ousl
y 
obt
ai
ned 
aut
hor
i
t
y or
 subsequent
 r
at
i
ﬁcat
i
on f
r
om  any cour
t
,
 t
o per
f
or
m  t
he act
i
vi
t
i
es of
 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve.
 
M y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
shal
l
 
not
 
be l
i
abl
e 
f
or
 
any 
act
 
or
 
om i
ssi
on 
on 
hi
s 
par
t
 
whi
ch r
esul
t
s f
r
om  m er
e negl
i
gence,
 unl
ess such act
i
vi
t
y by t
he Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
const
i
t
ut
es 
f
r
aud 
or
 
wi
l
l
ﬁJI
 
m i
sconduct
.
 
M y 
Per
sonal
 Repr
esent
at
i
ve i
s her
eby aut
hor
i
zed t
o sel
l
,
 l
ease,
 gi
ve 
opt
i
on,
 or
 
ot
her
wi
se 
di
spose 
of
 
any 
and 
al
l
 
pr
oper
t
y 
const
i
t
ut
i
ng 
a 
par
t
 
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 whet
her
 
r
eal
,
 
per
sonal
 
or
 
m i
x,
 
at
 
ei
t
har
 
publ
i
c 
or
 
pr
i
vat
e 
sal
e,
 
al
l
 
wi
t
hi
n 
t
he 
per
f
or
m ance 
of
 
t
he 
act
i
vi
t
i
es 
of
 
t
he 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
i
n 
t
he 
f
ur
t
her
ance 
of
 
adm i
ni
st
er
i
ng 
m y 
Est
at
e.
 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
di
r
ect
 
t
hat
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
pay 
t
he 
cost
 
of
 
any 
and 
al
l
 
f
uner
al
 
expenses 
and 
t
hat
 
t
hese 
cost
 
be 
pai
d 
out
 
of
 
t
he 
f
unds 
avai
l
abl
e 
i
n 
m y 
Est
at
e.
 
I
 
do 
her
eby 
aut
hor
i
ze 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
t
o 
car
r
y 
on 
m y 
busi
ness 
f
or
 
such 
a r
easonabl
e per
i
od of
 
t
i
m e as i
s necessar
y t
o br
i
ng t
he busi
ness t
o a or
der
l
y 
concl
usi
on,
 
or
,
 
i
f
 
i
n 
t
he 
di
scr
et
i
on 
of
 
t
he 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve,
 
t
o 
cont
i
nue 
t
o 
car
r
y 
on 
such 
busi
ness 
f
or
 
such 
a 
r
easonabl
e 
per
i
od 
of
 
t
i
m e 
as 
m aybe 
appr
opr
i
at
e 
f
or
 
t
he 
event
ual
 t
er
m i
nat
i
on of
 
m y Est
at
e,
 wher
eby I
 her
eby aut
hor
i
ze m y Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
t
o 
act
 
wi
t
h 
t
he 
sam e 
aut
hor
i
t
y 
whi
ch 
I
 
m ay 
have 
had 
i
n 
t
he 
conduct
 
of
 
such 
busi
ness.
 
I
 her
eby aut
hor
i
ze m y Per
sonal
 Repr
esent
at
i
ve t
o be em power
ed,
 by sal
e or
 
ot
her
wi
se,
 
t
o 
deal
 
wi
t
h 
any 
per
sonal
 
pr
openy 
i
n 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 
i
ncl
udi
ng 
st
ocks,
 
bonds,
 
secun'
t
i
es 
or
 
ot
her
 
si
m i
l
ar
 
m at
t
er
s,
 
i
ncl
udi
ng 
t
he 
r
i
ght
 
t
o 
cast
 
vot
e 
on 
such 
sécur
i
t
i
es,
 
ei
t
her
 
i
n 
per
son 
or
 
by 
l
i
m i
t
ed 
gener
al
 
pr
oxy.
 
M y 
Per
sonal
 Repr
esent
at
i
ve i
s 
her
eby aut
hor
i
zed 
t
o enf
or
ce,
 com pr
om i
se and/
or
 
l
i
t
i
gat
e 
any 
cl
ai
m  
agai
nst
 
or
 
i
n 
f
avor
 
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e.
 
M y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve i
s her
eby 
aut
hor
i
zed 
t
o execut
e such 
guar
ant
ees and 
i
ndem ni
t
y 
agr
eem ent
s 
bi
ndi
ng 
upon 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 whi
ch,
 i
n 
hi
s sol
e di
scr
et
i
on,
 ar
e 
appr
opr
i
at
e 
t
o 
t
he 
handl
i
ng 
of
 
t
he 
adm i
ni
st
r
at
i
on 
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e.
 
20f
6 
E.
0000529 
E 007527
E. 000528
$$$$$$$$$$$
E.0000530
12.
 
M y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
i
s 
her
eby 
aut
hor
i
zed 
t
o 
pr
epar
e,
 ﬁl
e 
and 
execut
e 
i
n 
m y 
nam e,
 
or
 
on 
behal
f
 
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e 
any 
and 
al
l
 
i
ncom e 
or
 
ot
her
 
Tax 
Ret
ur
ns.
 
1 3.
 
M y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve 
i
s 
her
eby 
aut
hor
i
zed 
t
o 
exer
ci
se 
any 
and 
al
l
 
ot
her
 
power
s 
whi
ch 
ar
e 
r
easonabl
e 
and 
necessar
y 
f
or
 
t
he 
pr
oper
 
handl
i
ng 
of
 
t
he 
adm i
ni
st
r
at
i
on 
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e.
 
14.
 
The 
enum er
at
i
on 
of
 
t
he 
f
or
egoi
ng 
power
s 
ar
e 
gi
ven 
f
or
 
t
he 
pur
pose 
of
 
enum er
at
i
ng 
som e of
 
t
he 
power
 
of
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve,
 
and 
not
 
by 
way 
of
 
l
i
m i
t
at
i
ons;
 
t
her
ef
or
e,
 
any 
and 
al
l
 
ot
her
 
power
s 
per
m i
t
t
ed 
t
o 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ves,
 
under
 
t
he 
l
aws 
of
 
t
he 
St
at
e 
of
 
m y 
r
esi
dence 
at
 
t
he 
t
i
m e 
of
 
m y 
deat
h 
ar
e 
expr
essl
y 
gr
ant
ed 
unt
o 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve.
 
I
TEM  
2:
 SURVI
VAL 
O F 
BENEFI
CI
ARY 
I
f
 
any 
beneﬁci
ar
y or
 
beneﬁci
ar
i
es under
 
t
hi
s 
i
nst
r
um ent
,
 and I
 
shoul
d di
e i
n 
a com m on 
di
sast
er
 
or
 
acci
dent
,
 
or
 
under
 
such 
ci
r
cum st
ances 
t
hat
 
i
t
 
i
s 
doubt
f
ul
 
as 
t
o 
whi
ch 
of
 
us 
di
ed 
ﬁr
st
,
 
t
hen 
al
l
 
pr
ovi
si
ons 
of
 
t
hi
s 
W i
l
l
 
shal
l
 
be ef
f
ect
i
ve 
as t
hough 
any 
such 
beneﬁci
ar
y 
or
 
beneﬁci
ar
i
es 
shal
l
 
have 
pr
edeceased 
m e.
 Fur
t
her
,
 
i
n 
t
he 
event
 
t
hat
 
any 
benef
i
ci
ar
y 
under
 
t
hi
s 
W i
l
l
 
shal
l
 
di
e 
wi
t
hi
n 
(
30)
 
days 
af
t
er
 
m y 
deat
h,
 
t
hen 
such 
beneﬁci
ar
y 
shal
l
 
be 
deem ed 
t
o 
have 
pr
edeceased 
m e,
 
and
4 
I
 
di
r
ect
 
t
hat
 
t
he 
pr
ovi
si
ons 
of
 
t
hi
s 
W i
l
l
 
shal
l
 
be 
const
r
ued 
upon 
t
hat
 
assum pt
i
on.
 
I
TEM  
3:
 M EM O RANDUM  
O F 
I
NTENT 
Al
]
 
t
he 
bequest
s 
cont
ai
ned 
i
n 
m y 
W i
l
l
 
ar
e 
absol
ut
e,
 i
t
 
i
s 
m y 
desi
r
e 
t
hat
 
any 
m em or
andum  
[
whi
ch 
I
 
m ay 
l
eave,
 
addr
essed 
t
o 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve,
 or
 
t
o 
any 
beneﬁci
ar
y,
 
i
ndi
cat
i
ng 
m y 
desi
r
e 
wi
t
h 
r
egar
d 
t
o 
t
he 
di
sposal
 
of
 
any 
i
t
em  
of
 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 
or
 
m anner
 
of
 
handl
i
ng 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 
shal
l
 
be gi
ven due r
egar
d i
n so f
ar
 
as i
t
 
i
s deem ed pr
act
i
cal
 i
n 
t
he sol
e di
scr
et
i
on of
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
Repr
esent
at
i
ve,
 
and 
pr
ovi
ded 
t
hese 
di
r
ect
i
ons 
ar
e 
ot
her
wi
se 
l
egal
.
 
I
TEM  
4:
 PRI
O R 
DI
STRI
BUTI
O N 
O F 
BEQ UEST 
As 
t
o 
any 
speci
ﬁc 
i
t
em  
of
 
pr
oper
t
y,
 
whet
her
 
r
eal
,
 
per
sonal
 
or
 
m i
x,
 
i
ndi
cat
ed 
t
o 
be 
l
ef
t
 
t
o a 
bcneﬁci
ar
y,
 
under
 
t
he 
pr
ovi
si
ons 
of
 
t
hi
s 
W i
l
l
,
 
i
f
 
such 
beneﬁci
ar
y 
shal
l
 
have 
r
ecei
ved 
al
l
 
or
 
par
t
 
of
 
any such asset
 pr
i
or
 
t
o t
he ﬁnal
 
adm i
ni
st
r
at
i
on of
 
m y 
Est
at
e,
 t
hen I
 
do di
r
ect
 
t
hat
 
m y 
Per
sonal
 
30f
6 
E.
0000530 
E om  
n 3
.
u
Representative deduct from the Estate to be received by such beneficiary all such advances made to 
such beneficiary. 
ITEM S: ADVANCES TO BENEFICIARIES 
By his sole discretion, my Personal Representative shall be empowered to make such 
advances of 
assets to any such beneficiary mentioned herein, provided such advances made prior to 
final administration of this Estate, shall be taken to reduce the eventual distribution to any such 
beneficiary. 
ITEM 6: EFFECT OF UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO VOID 
In the event that any party, whether they are a beneficiary or not, shall file any proceeding 
in an attempt to void any and all provisions of 
this instrument, in that event, such 
party shall receive no benefits whatsoever from my Estate, in the event that such proceedings are 
unsuccessful. 
ITEM 7: CASH BEQUESTS 
wife: 
The following individuals shall receive cash bequests, prior to any bequest to my beloved 
!. 
DARLENE BARCLAY, 107 Foxhound Drive, Glen Burnie, Maryland, 21061, 
Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($800,000) which includes the Four Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($400,000) already set aside with Wachovia. 
2. 
ADRIANA LANATA, Via Trieste 45, Chiavari 16043, Italy, One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) 
3. 
ERNEST STINCHCOMB, JR., 1141-B Dicus Mill Road, Millersville, Maryland, 
21108, One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) 
ITEMS: 
To my loving wife,. Sadie, excluding the individual bequest made in Item 7, I leave the rest 
and remainder of 
my Estate to her should she one, survive me and two provided she has made and 
executed a Will prior to my death. 
4 of 6 
E. 000529
$$$$$$$$$$$
E.0000531
ITEM 9: PERSONALITY 
I have instructed my friend and Attorney of many years to draft a letter, which we have 
discussed, to advise my family members of 
my demise and reasons for the beneficiary distribution 
of 
my estate. 
ITEM 10: RESIDUARY CLAUSE 
Should, at the time of 
my death, my beloved wife not have a valid Will filed with the Register 
of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated prior thereto these, I hereby give, devise and bequeath all 
the rest and residue of my Estate and property, whether imposition, expectancy will remainder, 
including all property over which I may have Power of Appointment to the following individuals 
share and share alike per stirpes and not per capita to DARLENE BARCLAY, I 
07 Foxhound Drive, 
Glen Burnie, Maryland, 21061. 
ITEM 11. 
As above noted, should any beneficiary be deceased at the time of his or her 
distribution under the proceeds of 
my last Will, it is my express intention that his or her share shall 
be distributed to his or her heirs equally. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, the above mentioned testator have hereunto set my hands 
and seals to this six page instrument, and have initial each page hereof, which instrument is intendant 
to be my Last Will and Testament, this ~ 
9""-fay;;fseptember, 2010. 
~1(~ QJil kt f 
a<,y1;v1vi o 
ETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO 
SIGNED, SEALED, PUBLISHED AND DECLARE, BY PETER AD ALBERT CASTRUCCIO. 
The above named individual, does declare for his Last Will and Testament this instrument, 
have hereunto subscribed to have witness on the date last mentioned above, and at the location, and 
5 of 6 
E. 000530
$$$$$$$$$$$
E.0000532
E. 000531
$$$$$$$$$$$
E.0000533
I
 
do 
her
eby 
at
t
est
 
t
hat
 
t
he 
t
est
at
or
 
t
o 
be 
of
 
sound 
m i
nd,
 
f
ul
l
y 
abl
e 
t
o 
under
st
and 
t
hi
s 
i
nst
r
um ent
,
 
and 
t
he 
t
est
at
or
 
vol
unt
ar
i
l
y 
and 
f
r
eel
y 
di
d 
Si
gn 
sam e.
 
at
ur
e,
 
r
eadi
ng 
at
:
 
Hul
l
 
Avenue 
’
/
 
Annapoki
s,
 
M D 
2140 
W I
TNESS:
 
W I
TNESS:
 
W I
TNESS:
 
W  
vﬁgwwi
ﬂw 
Si
gnat
ur
e,
 
r
esi
di
ng 
at
:
 
Si
gnat
ur
e,
 
r
esi
di
ng 
at
:
 
7L0 
6? 
87 Z'
d 
AV? 
.
 
/
/
~-
v/
/
uzQ /
Q ,
 
4,
11% ,
 
G awNG I
M D 
5% c 
@ m f
m /
Q W O B 
60f
6 
E.
0000533 
E 02053: