Case Title: Lovelace v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981447

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
JOHN DAVID LOVELACE 
v. Record No. 981447  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  November 5, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
John David Lovelace was convicted of possession of 
marijuana and possession with the intent to distribute 
cocaine in the Circuit Court of Halifax County.  He 
appealed, alleging that the circuit court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence that was seized from him 
during a search of his person.1  The Court of Appeals of 
Virginia affirmed the convictions.  Lovelace v. 
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 575, 500 S.E.2d 267 (1998).  This 
Court refused Lovelace’s petition for appeal and his 
subsequent petition for rehearing.  Thereafter, the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted Lovelace a writ of 
certiorari, vacated the judgment of this Court, and 
remanded the case to this Court for further consideration 
in light of its decision in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 
119 S.Ct. 484 (1998).  Lovelace v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 
119 S.Ct. 1751 (1999).  Because we conclude that the search 
                     
1 Lovelace also claimed the evidence was insufficient 
to prove he intended to distribute cocaine.  That issue is 
not before us. 
of Lovelace violated his Fourth Amendment rights, we will 
reverse his convictions. 
FACTS 
 
Deputy Sheriff Shawn Sweeney was on patrol in the Cody 
area of Halifax County about 10:00 p.m. on August 23, 1996.  
Sweeney, along with Deputy Sheriff Mike Womack and some 
other police officers, were conducting a “jump-out” 
operation.  At that time, Sweeney observed the defendant 
standing on the premises of a car wash/convenience store 
(the store).  Womack had previously observed drug 
trafficking at that location.  He described the area as an 
“open air drug market.” 
As Sweeney arrived at the store and got out of his 
vehicle, he saw Lovelace holding a green glass bottle 
containing what Sweeney assumed was an alcoholic beverage.  
According to Sweeney, Lovelace “had the bottle up to his 
mouth and appeared to be drinking from it.”  Sweeney told 
Lovelace to drop the bottle and lie face down on the 
ground.  When Lovelace dropped the bottle, it broke and the 
pieces were not recovered from the scene. 
 
According to Womack, the defendant was standing at the  
store “among a couple of guys” with open bottles of beer.  
Womack testified that the defendant and the other two or 
three people standing in the store’s parking lot were 
 
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ordered to lie face down on the ground after the officers 
saw a bottle fly through the air and hit a car.2  Although 
Womack did not see who threw the bottle, he stated that it 
came from the area where Lovelace was standing. 
 
Womack then approached Lovelace, who was lying on the 
ground as directed, and asked the defendant his name.  
Lovelace responded by identifying himself, but remained 
silent when Womack questioned whether he had any drugs or 
guns.  When Lovelace did not respond to Womack’s 
questioning regarding drugs or guns, Womack performed a 
“patdown” of the defendant.  During the “patdown,” Womack 
felt something like a bag in Lovelace’s pocket.  Womack 
admitted that he did not know “if it was a plastic bag or 
what at that time,” but said he felt some lumps and 
something that was “squooshy.”  It was a kind of bag with 
which he was familiar, and based on his experience, he knew 
that people sometimes carry drugs in that type of bag. 
 
Although Womack admitted that the object in Lovelace’s 
pocket did not feel like a gun, that he did not know what 
was in the bag, and that he did not have a search warrant, 
Womack nevertheless reached into the defendant’s pocket and 
retrieved the bag.  The substance in the bag was later 
                     
2 Womack later testified that the bottle hit the car as 
he was putting Lovelace “down on the ground.” 
 
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identified through laboratory testing as crack cocaine.  
The analysis also identified some marijuana.3
During the search, Lovelace continued to lie on the 
ground and did not make any threatening gestures toward the 
officers.  Womack acknowledged that he had not arrested 
Lovelace and did not have him in custody when he searched 
Lovelace.  Rather, Womack insisted that he was detaining 
the defendant because of the open containers of beer, the 
bottle-throwing incident, and the odor of alcohol that he 
noticed when speaking with Lovelace.  However, Womack 
admitted that he could not determine whether the odor of 
alcohol was coming from the defendant. 
Womack did not actually arrest Lovelace until after he 
retrieved the bag from the defendant’s pocket.  Lovelace 
was then arrested for possession of marijuana and 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but was not 
charged with any alcohol-related offense.4  In fact, no one 
                     
3 It is not apparent from the record whether the 
marijuana was in the bag with the cocaine or was discovered 
elsewhere on Lovelace’s person. 
  While searching Lovelace, Womack also found $121.00 
in a black pouch and $171.30 in the defendant’s pocket. 
 
4 Womack’s testimony was unclear with regard to what 
charges he placed against Lovelace at the scene.  However, 
a magistrate issued warrants for possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine and possession of marijuana during the 
early morning hours on August 24, 1996.  A grand jury 
subsequently indicted Lovelace for possession with intent 
 
4
else standing on the premises of the store with Lovelace 
was charged with any violation of law despite the open 
bottles of beer that Womack observed.  The other 
individuals were all released after being identified. 
ANALYSIS 
Pursuant to the remand order issued by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, we must consider the 
constitutionality of the search of Lovelace’s person in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Knowles.  
Accordingly, we will discuss that decision before 
addressing the arguments presented by the parties in this 
case. 
Knowles involved an Iowa statute providing that the 
issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest “does not 
affect the officer’s authority to conduct an otherwise 
lawful search.”  Iowa Code Ann. § 805.1(4) (West Supp. 
1997).  Pursuant to that statute, an Iowa police officer, 
who had stopped Knowles for speeding, searched Knowles’ car 
after issuing Knowles a citation in lieu of arresting him.  
During the search, the officer found a bag containing 
marijuana and a “pot pipe” under the driver’s seat.  The 
______________________ 
to distribute cocaine.  After Lovelace was found guilty of 
the marijuana charge in the Halifax County General District 
Court, he appealed, and both charges were tried together in 
circuit court. 
 
5
officer subsequently arrested Knowles for violating Iowa 
laws dealing with controlled substances.  Knowles, 525 U.S. 
at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 486.  The Iowa Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the search, but the Supreme Court 
reversed that holding.  Id. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 487. 
In Knowles’ challenge to the Iowa statute as applied 
to him, the Supreme Court framed the question presented as 
“whether such a procedure authorizes the officer, 
consistent[] with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full 
search of the car.”  525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 486.  
The Court answered that question “no” because neither of 
the two historical rationales for the “search incident to 
arrest” exception, i.e., “(1) the need to disarm the 
suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need 
to preserve evidence for later use at trial,” was 
sufficient to justify the officer’s search of Knowles’ car.  
Id. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 487.  Based on the facts in 
Knowles, the Court concluded that the threat to the 
officer’s safety was not as great as the threat inherent in 
the context of a custodial arrest.  Id. at ___, 119 S.Ct. 
at 487.  It also determined that Iowa had not shown a need 
to preserve or discover evidence because no further 
evidence of excessive speed existed once Knowles was 
 
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stopped for speeding and issued a citation.  Id. at  ___, 
119 S.Ct. at 488. 
Although asked to do so, the Court refused to extend 
the “bright-line rule” established in United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), to a “search incident to 
citation.”  Knowles, 525 U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. at 488.  The 
“bright-line rule” allows a police officer to conduct a 
full field-type search of the person incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.  The Court in 
Robinson determined that such a search is permitted as “an 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment,” and is “also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.”  Id.  In so holding, the Court stated that  
[t]he authority to search the person incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on 
what a court may later decide was the probability in a 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence 
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. 
 
Id.  In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the 
Supreme Court extended the “bright-line rule” to a search 
of the passenger compartment of an automobile when such a 
search is conducted as “a contemporaneous incident” of a 
lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of the automobile.  
Id. at 460.  See Glasco v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433, 513 
S.E.2d 139 (1999). 
 
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In declining to extend the “bright-line rule” to a 
“search incident to citation,” the Court in Knowles 
compared a routine traffic stop to a “Terry stop” because 
such a traffic stop is a “relatively brief encounter,” 
unlike the extended exposure attending an actual custodial 
arrest.  Knowles, 525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 488.  
However, the Supreme Court recognized that the concern for 
officer safety is not absent in a routine traffic stop and 
may justify some additional intrusion.  However, by itself, 
it does not warrant the greater intrusion accompanying “a 
full field-type search.”  Id. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 488. 
Summarizing, we have no doubt, based on Knowles, that 
the Robinson “bright-line rule” does not apply to an 
encounter similar to a routine traffic stop in which a 
police officer issues only a citation or summons.  Because 
the nature and duration of such an encounter are 
significantly different and less threatening than in the 
case of an officer effecting a custodial arrest, the 
rationales justifying a full field-type search are not 
sufficient to authorize such a search incident to the 
issuance of a citation.  When a police officer issues a 
citation or summons in lieu of a custodial arrest, the 
officer can nevertheless impose some further intrusions, 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, if either historical 
 
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rationale for the “search incident to arrest” exception is 
present.  We believe that the scope of these further 
intrusions is limited to what is necessary to answer the 
concerns raised by the presence of either historical 
rationale.  In other words, an encounter between a police 
officer and an individual that is similar to a routine 
traffic stop and results in the issuance of a citation or 
summons may involve some degree of danger to the officer or 
some need to preserve or discover evidence sufficient to 
warrant an additional intrusion, but it will not 
necessarily justify a full field-type search. 
Having analyzed Knowles, we now turn to the parties’ 
arguments.  Lovelace contends that the search of his person 
violated the Fourth Amendment because he was not subject to 
a custodial arrest.  He asserts that, if he had been 
charged with drinking an alcoholic beverage in public in 
violation of Code § 4.1-308, the officer could have issued 
only a summons pursuant to Code § 19.2-74(A)(2).5  
Continuing, Lovelace argues that neither a concern for 
                     
5 Code § 19.2-74(A)(2) provides that “[w]henever any 
person is detained by . . . an arresting officer for a 
violation . . . of any provision of this Code, punishable 
as a Class 3 or Class 4 misdemeanor or any other 
misdemeanor for which he cannot receive a jail sentence, . 
. . the arresting officer shall take the name and address 
of such person and issue a summons . . . [and] shall 
forthwith release him from custody.” 
 
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officer safety nor a need to preserve or discover evidence 
existed during his encounter with Sweeney and Womack.  
Thus, he contends that Womack had no basis upon which to 
justify the extensive search that he conducted. 
The Commonwealth, however, contends that the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Lovelace for drinking an 
alcoholic beverage in public and thus could conduct a 
search incident to arrest.  It is the Commonwealth’s 
position that the presence of probable cause for an arrest, 
rather than an actual custodial arrest, determines the 
reasonableness of a search.  While conceding that Code 
§ 19.2-74(A)(2) generally requires that a suspect be 
released from custody when charged with a Class 4 
misdemeanor, the Commonwealth asserts that a full search 
incident to arrest is nonetheless justified in that 
situation because “[a]n officer . . . does not know upon 
making the arrest whether he will, in fact, be releasing 
the individual or formally taking him into custody.” 
With regard to the effect of the decision in Knowles, 
the Commonwealth first argues that Knowles is inapplicable 
because Lovelace was, in fact, in custody when Womack 
searched him.  The Commonwealth premises this argument on 
the language of Code § 19.2-74(A)(2) providing that an 
individual is released “from custody” after the officer 
 
10
takes the name and address of the person and issues a 
summons. 
In the alternative, the Commonwealth argues that, if 
Knowles applies to the instant case, both of the historical 
rationales for a “search incident to arrest” were present.  
The Commonwealth states that officer safety was a concern 
because the encounter with Lovelace occurred in an “open 
air drug market,” there were several people assembled on 
the parking lot of the store, and a bottle had been thrown 
by someone.  The Commonwealth also posits that Womack 
needed to discover evidence, such as cash register receipts 
to establish a recent purchase of alcoholic beverages by 
Lovelace since the bottle he had been holding could not be 
recovered from the scene.  Having conceded at oral argument 
that it must demonstrate that Womack had a right to conduct 
a full search incident to arrest in order to prevail in 
this appeal, the Commonwealth further contends that 
whenever either of the historical rationales for search 
incident to arrest is present, an officer can conduct a 
full field-type search even though only a citation or 
summons is issued.  We do not agree with any of the 
Commonwealth’s arguments. 
Initially, we conclude that Knowles is applicable.  
The encounter between Lovelace and the officers, while not 
 
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involving a traffic offense, was nonetheless similar in 
nature and duration to a routine traffic stop.  We reach 
this conclusion primarily because the initial reason for 
detaining Lovelace was his alleged commission of a Class 4 
misdemeanor for which the issuance of a summons was 
authorized under Code § 19.2-74(A)(2).  Only if Lovelace 
had failed or refused to discontinue the unlawful act could 
the officer have effected a custodial arrest and taken the 
defendant before a magistrate.  Code § 19.2-74(A)(2).  
However, there is no evidence in the record that Lovelace 
acted in such a manner.  The fact that the officers could 
have issued only a summons for the alcohol-related offense 
also negates the Commonwealth’s argument that the existence 
of probable cause to charge Lovelace with drinking an 
alcoholic beverage in public allowed Womack to search him.  
After Knowles, an “arrest” that is effected by issuing a 
citation or summons rather than taking the suspect into 
custody does not, by itself, justify a full field-type 
search. 
Nor do we believe that Code § 19.2-74(A)(2) 
contemplates a custodial situation equivalent to an actual 
custodial arrest.  Under that statute, a suspect is 
detained, or in the custody of the police officer, only 
long enough for the officer to take down the name and 
 
12
address of the person and issue a summons.  One of the 
reasons that the Knowles Court did not extend the Robinson 
“bright-line rule” to a “search incident to citation” was 
because the duration of the encounter between a police 
officer and a defendant is “relatively brief” when the 
officer issues a citation.  Thus, the threat to officer 
safety is less. 
Next, assuming without deciding that there was a need 
to discover evidence or a threat to the officers’ safety, 
we conclude that the extent of Womack’s search exceeded the 
scope necessary to accomplish either of those objectives.  
Once Womack conducted his “patdown” of Lovelace and felt 
nothing similar to a weapon, any reasonable concern for 
officer safety was resolved.  Likewise, Womack did not 
testify that he felt something that was evidence related to 
Lovelace’s drinking an alcoholic beverage in public.  
Instead, he felt a “squooshy” bag.  In other words, Womack 
did not “reasonably believe” that the bag was either a 
weapon or evidence related to Lovelace’s alleged alcohol 
offense.  Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 213, 308 
S.E.2d 106, 112 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984).  
Thus, Womack’s subsequent reach into Lovelace’s pocket to 
retrieve the “squooshy” bag was not in furtherance of 
either officer safety or the preservation of evidence.  
 
13
Once Womack satisfied himself that Lovelace did not have a 
weapon or evidence of an alcohol offense on his person, the 
officer had no basis to continue his search.  See Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 152, 400 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1991) 
(Terry “patdown” must cease once officer determines that 
individual does not possess weapon). 
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Knowles, we 
therefore conclude that the search of Lovelace was not 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the circuit court’s 
denial of Lovelace’s motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the search.  For these reasons, we will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, dismiss the 
indictment charging Lovelace with possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine, and dismiss the warrant charging 
Lovelace with possession of marijuana.6
Reversed and dismissed.
                     
6 In Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 641, 513 
S.E.2d 904 (1999), the Court of Appeals found a “search 
incident to citation” unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, based on the decision in Knowles.  Although the 
decision in Rhodes was handed down before the Supreme Court 
of the United States remanded the instant case to this 
Court, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that, to the 
extent that its prior decision in Lovelace is inconsistent 
with the decision in Knowles, “Lovelace is no longer a 
viable precedent.”  Rhodes, 29 Va. App. at 643 n.1, 513 
S.E.2d at 905.  While that acknowledgement is correct in 
 
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______________________ 
light of our decision today, it does not afford any relief 
to Lovelace. 
 
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