Case Title: Davidson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 22S-CT-00318

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CT-318 
Kathryn Davidson, 
Appellant, 
–v– 
State of Indiana, et al., 
Appellees. 
Argued: November 15, 2022 | Decided: June 21, 2023 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court 
No. 53C01-2003-CT-621 
The Honorable AmyMarie Travis, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-CT-1516 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Molter concur. 
Justice Goff concurs in the judgment with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 21 2023, 9:35 am
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Slaughter, Justice. 
The Indiana Comparative Fault Act does not apply to “tort claims” 
against government defendants. But it does require the factfinder to 
consider the fault of “all persons who caused or contributed to cause” the 
plaintiff’s alleged injury. Here, after obtaining a judgment in Lake County 
against a non-government defendant for injuries sustained in a highway 
collision, the plaintiff sued again in Monroe County, seeking relief against 
other defendants (both government and non-government) for injuries 
arising out of the same accident. We hold that the claims asserted in 
Monroe County are barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. To avoid 
this result, a plaintiff seeking tort damages from both government and 
non-government defendants must sue all such tortfeasors in one lawsuit. 
I 
A 
In April 2018, Kathryn Davidson was a passenger in a semi-truck 
driven by her boyfriend, Brandon Nicholson, who at the time was acting 
within the scope of his employment with J Trucking, LLC. While driving 
northbound on State Road 37 in Monroe County, Nicholson fell asleep, 
lost control, and collided with an overpass-bridge pier. As a result of the 
collision, Davidson was ejected from the semi-truck, sustained serious and 
permanent injuries, and is now quadriplegic. 
Davidson sent a timely tort-claim notice to the State. Her notice alleged 
(1) the collision occurred in a construction zone within the Interstate 69 
construction project, and (2) the Indiana Department of Transportation’s 
negligence caused her injuries. Specifically, she claimed the department 
was at fault in planning and setting up the construction zone and for 
failing to place a barrier before the bridge pier to prevent or lessen any 
impact. Davidson also sought various public records from the department 
concerning traffic control, the construction project, her own accident, and 
any other accidents at the site. The State denied her tort claim in 
November 2018. 
The next month, Davidson, who lives in Lake County, filed a 
negligence action against J Trucking in the Lake Superior Court. 
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According to Davidson, the sole purpose of the Lake County lawsuit was 
to obtain a final judgment against J Trucking to satisfy the requirements 
for obtaining insurance coverage from J Trucking’s insurer, Progressive 
Southeastern Insurance Company. After a bench trial, the trial court 
entered judgment in favor of Davidson and against J Trucking for more 
than $3.2 million. The court found that “Nicholson’s negligence was a 
proximate cause of the motor vehicle collision . . . [and] of [Davidson’s] 
claimed injuries, medical treatment, and medical expenses.” The court 
further found that “[a]ll of [Davidson’s] past treatment and medical 
charges were reasonable, necessary, and caused by the negligence of 
Nicholson in the collision at issue.” And it found J Trucking vicariously 
liable for Nicholson’s negligence.  
In January 2020, Davidson and Progressive settled her insurance claim 
for $725,000, which was $25,000 short of policy limits. The settlement 
discharged all liability, liens, damages, and costs against J Trucking. The 
parties voluntarily dismissed the Lake County action in February 2020. 
B 
In March 2020, Davidson again sued for the same injuries she sustained 
in the same I-69 construction zone. This time she sued in the Monroe 
Circuit Court against six other defendants: State of Indiana; Indiana 
Department of Transportation; I-69 Development Partners, LLC; DLZ 
Indiana, LLC; Aztec Engineering Group, Inc.; and Walsh Construction 
Company II, LLC. Davidson alleged these defendants were responsible for 
designing, planning, building, and operating section 5 of the I-69 project, 
as well as maintaining traffic and planning and placing barriers in front of 
the bridge pier at the accident scene. 
The defendants moved to dismiss Davidson’s action for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. One of the defendants, Aztec, 
also moved for judgment on the pleadings. These Rule 12 motions argued 
the Lake County judgment for Davidson barred her Monroe County 
claims under the doctrines of claim splitting, collateral estoppel, and 
judicial estoppel. The defendants attached materials in support of their 
motions, and Davidson attached materials to her response. Davidson 
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moved to strike the defendants’ attached materials or, alternatively, to 
consider the Rule 12 motions as motions for summary judgment.  
The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12 motions and dismissed 
Davidson’s action with prejudice, holding that collateral estoppel and 
claim splitting barred her claims but judicial estoppel did not apply. The 
court refused to treat the Rule 12 motions as motions under Rule 56. The 
court took judicial notice of most of the attached materials the defendants 
submitted, including the complaint, ruling, and stipulation for dismissal 
in the Lake County action; the complaint in the present action; and the 
public-records request. The court also took judicial notice of the tort-claim 
notice, which Davidson attached in support of her response. But the court 
did not take judicial notice of most of the evidence Davidson introduced, 
including affidavits explaining why she did not sue the Monroe County 
defendants in Lake County, evidence the department failed to respond to 
requests for information, and her settlement agreement with Progressive. 
The court denied her post-judgment motions to correct error and to 
amend her complaint.  
Davidson appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that 
neither collateral estoppel nor claim splitting barred her claims. Davidson 
v. State, 187 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The defendants then 
sought transfer, which we granted, 194 N.E.3d 602 (Ind. 2022), thus 
vacating the appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
II 
Davidson raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues the trial court 
erred in dismissing her action under doctrines of claim splitting (also 
known as claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (also known as issue 
preclusion). We hold that claim preclusion does not apply here, but issue 
preclusion does, and the trial court was correct in dismissing her action on 
the latter ground. Second, she argues the court erred in refusing to treat 
the Rule 12 motions as motions for summary judgment, in dismissing her 
action with prejudice, and in violating her due-process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We hold there was no error. The court was not 
obliged to review the Rule 12 motions as motions under Rule 56. And it 
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was entitled to dismiss the action with prejudice, so it did not violate her 
due-process rights. 
A 
We begin with Davidson’s argument that the trial court wrongfully 
dismissed her action under the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. 
We agree the court should not have dismissed her action based on claim 
preclusion. But dismissal was warranted under issue preclusion. 
1 
The trial court erred in dismissing the Monroe County action based on 
claim preclusion—a preclusive doctrine requiring four elements to be 
satisfied: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the 
matter at issue in the present action was or might have been determined 
in the prior action; and (4) the prior action was between the same parties 
in the present action or their privies. Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 
(Ind. 2019). Here, the fourth element was not met because none of these 
defendants or their privies were parties in Lake County. 
2 
The trial court, though, was correct in dismissing the Monroe County 
action based on issue preclusion. Issue preclusion bars relitigating the 
same fact or issue when that fact or issue was necessarily decided in a 
prior lawsuit by a court of competent jurisdiction. Nat’l Wine & Spirits, Inc. 
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012) (holding defensive 
collateral estoppel barred plaintiff’s claim). The party to be estopped must 
also have been a party (or its privy) in the prior suit. Ibid. Here, the 
defendants argue that Davidson is barred from litigating the negligent 
cause of her injuries and damages in Monroe County because this issue 
was necessarily adjudicated in Lake County. We agree. Under our 
comparative fault act, Ind. Code ch. 34-51-2, the Lake County court 
determined, conclusively, that only J Trucking was at fault for Davidson’s 
injuries. 
 
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a 
When applying issue preclusion to actions under the Act, we embrace 
the approach of our court of appeals in Bornstein v. Watson’s of Indianapolis, 
Inc., 771 N.E.2d 663, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Bornstein held that because 
the Act requires the trial court to apportion 100 percent of the fault for 
both parties and nonparties, a judgment under the Act necessarily 
adjudicates the negligent cause or causes of a plaintiff’s alleged injuries in 
their entirety. Ibid. Under the Act, plaintiffs can recover damages only 
from named defendants. Defendants, in turn, can limit their own liability 
to plaintiffs by naming nonparties that contributed to plaintiffs’ loss. The 
jury must determine “the percentage of fault of the claimant, of the 
defendants, and of any person who is a nonparty.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-8 
(applies to two or more defendants); id. § 34-51-2-7 (single-party 
defendant). The jury then multiplies the percentage of fault by the 
claimant’s total damages regardless of fault and enters a verdict against 
each defendant for its share of the damages. Ibid. When the action is tried 
without a jury, the court sitting as factfinder must award damages 
according to the same principles specified for juries. Id. § 34-51-2-9. The 
result is that a single action under the Act necessarily adjudicates all the 
liability and damages for the plaintiff’s alleged injury. Bornstein, 771 
N.E.2d at 666.  
By establishing a system that apportions all liability and damages in the 
same lawsuit, the Act functionally requires plaintiffs to name all 
defendants in a single suit. Otherwise, serial suits against different 
tortfeasors in connection with the same injury could lead to inconsistent 
judgments. Id. at 667. For example, a Monroe County judgment 
apportioning any fault to Davidson or the six defendants here would be at 
odds with Lake County’s assignment of all fault to J Trucking. The Act 
does not countenance such inconsistencies. Tort claimants in a later 
lawsuit are thus foreclosed from recovering from tortfeasors omitted from 
the first lawsuit. Ibid. 
At the same time, defendants bear the burden of naming nonparties 
against which the jury can apportion fault. “The burden of proof of a 
nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the 
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defense.” I.C. § 34-51-2-15. A nonparty defense limits the defendant’s 
liability to the plaintiff to the proportion of the defendant’s own fault. 
Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005). To assert a 
nonparty defense, the defendant must name the nonparty when filing its 
answer, or with reasonable promptness if the defendant discovers the 
nonparty after filing its answer, to give the plaintiff the opportunity to 
add the nonparty as a defendant. I.C. § 34-51-2-16; Owens Corning 
Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 913 (Ind. 2001) (interpreting 
similar provision in Products Liability Act). While the defendant must 
name all nonparties to limit its liability to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must 
still sue all responsible persons to maximize her own recovery from 
tortfeasors. A nonparty has no liability to the plaintiff. 
Here, both the Lake County and Monroe County lawsuits are subject to 
the Act because in both suits Davidson has sought damages for injuries to 
her person resulting from the collision. The Act “governs any action based 
on fault that is brought to recover damages for injury or death to a person 
or harm to property”. I.C. § 34-51-2-1(a). In the Lake County action, after a 
bench trial, the trial court found Nicholson’s negligence, which it imputed 
to his principal, J Trucking, was a proximate cause of Davidson’s claimed 
injuries. The court apportioned all fault to J Trucking. The court found 
only Nicholson a proximate cause of Davidson’s injuries, attributed all of 
Davidson’s damages to Nicholson’s negligence, and entered a verdict 
against J Trucking for the full judgment amount. The Lake County court 
could not apportion fault to any Monroe County defendant named below 
because none was a party or named nonparty in Lake County. In effect, 
then, Davidson seeks to relitigate in Monroe County the apportionment of 
fault already adjudicated in Lake County. 
Davidson counters that defensive issue preclusion does not apply here 
because she did not “lose” her suit in Lake County. We disagree. 
Defensive issue preclusion, to be sure, applies when the plaintiff 
previously litigated the issue and lost. Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 
N.E.2d 165, 167 n.3 (Ind. 1996). But relevant here, when a plaintiff fails to 
name a potential defendant in an action under the Act, as Davidson failed 
to do in Lake County, the plaintiff “loses” against the unnamed defendant 
by failing to obtain an allocation of fault against that defendant. For 
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example, in Bornstein, defensive issue preclusion barred the plaintiff’s 
wrongful-death claim against the later-sued defendant because 100 
percent of the fault had been apportioned in a prior suit the plaintiff 
brought for the same underlying incident, leaving no fault to apportion to 
the subsequent defendant. 771 N.E.2d at 666. In suits brought under the 
Act, “a plaintiff is obliged to name all alleged joint tortfeasors as 
defendants in one suit or face the possibility of being estopped from 
pursuing a remedy against the unnamed tortfeasor in a subsequent 
lawsuit.” Id. at 667. Thus, Davidson really did “lose” on the issue of 
whether to apportion any fault to persons omitted as defendants or 
nonparties in Lake County. 
b 
Next, Davidson argues that even if the Lake County suit necessarily 
adjudicated who caused the injuries of which she complains, that suit 
could not adjudicate any such cause vis-à-vis the State and the department 
because government tort claims are excluded from the Act. Again, we 
disagree. 
The Act’s plain language shows it applies here to the Monroe County 
suit and to all its defendants, including the government defendants. By its 
terms, the Act has far-reaching scope. It “governs any action based on 
fault that is brought to recover damages for injury or death to a person or 
harm to property, except as provided in subsection (b).” I.C. § 34-51-2-1(a). 
As subsection 1(a) explains, the Act presumptively applies to any 
negligence action to “recover damages for injury”. Davidson’s Monroe 
County action is clearly subject to the Act under this definition. And 
nothing in subsection 1(b) exempts the Monroe County action from its 
coverage. The only actions the Act does not govern are those it expressly 
exempts. Subsection 1(b) lists only two categories of exempt actions: (1) 
those “brought against a qualified health care provider . . . for medical 
malpractice” and (2) those accruing before 1985. Id. § 34-51-2-1(b). Stated 
differently, the Act specifies which “actions” it excludes from coverage 
and, notably, does not exclude actions against government defendants. 
While the Act thus applies to “actions” against government defendants, 
it does not apply to “tort claims” asserted within such actions against 
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government defendants. “This chapter [the comparative fault act] does not 
apply in any manner to tort claims against governmental entities or public 
employees under IC 34-13-3[.]” Id. § 34-51-2-2 (emphasis added). But the 
jury must nevertheless consider the fault of “all persons who caused or 
contributed to cause the alleged injury” regardless of whether they could 
be named as parties. Id. §§ 34-51-2-7(b)(1), 34-51-2-8(b)(1). Thus, if one 
claim is subject to the Act, the method of apportioning fault requires 
joinder of all claims against persons “who caused or contributed to cause 
the alleged injury” for full apportionment of fault. Ibid. 
In practice, when a plaintiff brings a mixed-theory case that alleges both 
government and non-government defendants are at fault for the plaintiff’s 
injuries, the Act applies to require the jury to apportion a percentage of 
fault and damages to all defendants and nonparties. But this 
apportionment of damages has no effect on the underlying government 
tort claims, which are still governed by common-law principles such as 
contributory negligence. 
We disagree with Davidson that applying issue preclusion to the claims 
against the government defendants here would contradict our holding in 
State v. Snyder, 594 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 1992). Snyder is inapposite for two 
reasons. First, Snyder did not address issue preclusion but whether a new 
trial was required because of inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 785–87. Second, 
although the majority in Snyder declined to review the verdicts’ 
inconsistency, the concurrence noted the verdicts were not inconsistent 
because the jury could have found the plaintiff incurred a risk against the 
non-government defendant without also finding the plaintiff incurred a 
risk against the State. Id. at 788–89 (Dickson, J., concurring). 
Government defendants are not excluded from actions (as opposed to 
claims) governed by the Act. Relevant here, that means the Lake County 
court needed to consider the fault of both the State and the department of 
transportation if Davidson wanted to recover from them. Thus, the 
apportionment of fault solely to J Trucking in Lake County necessarily 
determined that these government defendants had no fault—and thus no 
liability—to Davidson for purposes of issue preclusion. 
 
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c 
A court applying issue preclusion must also consider (1) whether the 
party against whom the prior judgment is being asserted—here 
Davidson—had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first 
suit; and (2) whether it would be unfair under the circumstances for the 
Monroe County defendants to use issue preclusion against her in the 
second suit. Sullivan v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134, 138 
(Ind. 1992). Davidson argues a question of fact remains on whether issue 
preclusion should apply under these two factors. We disagree. 
First, because Davidson was able to discover the defendants through 
reasonable, diligent investigation before obtaining a judgment in Lake 
County, she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate against the 
defendants there. Typically, even a meritorious defense is not a basis for 
dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) unless a plaintiff has pleaded herself out of 
court by alleging, and thus admitting, the essential elements of the 
defense. Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 464 
(Ind. 2017). Davidson relies on the Rule 12(B)(6) standard in only one 
portion of her brief where she argues the tort-claim notice was not 
conclusive evidence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims 
against Walsh, DLZ, Aztec, and I-69 Development. But Davidson 
conceded in both the trial and appellate courts that she discovered the 
defendants in this case by meeting with a construction-zone expert and an 
accident reconstructionist. And she offers no reason why she could not 
have consulted these experts in the initial investigation of her claims 
before she sued and obtained a judgment in Lake County.  
Second, it is not unfair on this record to find Davidson’s Monroe 
County claims barred by issue preclusion. She argues the fairness factors 
weigh in her favor, and the government defendants concealed evidence 
thereby preventing Davidson from suing them in the Lake County suit. In 
fact, Davidson named the State and the department in the tort-claim 
notice months before she sued in Lake County. Davidson argues she could 
not raise her claims against the defendants in Lake County without being 
subject to sanctions under Trial Rule 11. But what she alleged in Monroe 
County is no more detailed than what she alleged in the tort-claim notice, 
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which she filed before suing in Lake County. Both the tort-claim notice 
and the Monroe County complaint allege the department was at fault in 
planning and maintaining the construction area and in failing to place a 
barrier before the bridge pier. Thus, when Davidson served her tort-claim 
notice, she had “reasonable cause to believe the existence” of the State’s 
and the department’s negligent acts she alleged in her complaint. Ind. 
Trial Rule 11. The trial court below did not consider Davidson’s 
designated evidence concerning the State’s eventual denial of her tort 
claim and its failure to respond to her public-record requests, so we 
likewise decline to consider them here.  
Davidson also argues that financial and health considerations make it 
unfair to apply issue preclusion here. But materials supporting these 
considerations were not before the trial court, and we decline to consider 
them here in the first instance. The trial court considered only the 
pleadings, certain filings in the Lake County action, the tort-claim notice, 
and the public-records request. None of these documents concern her 
financial and health considerations when she sued only J Trucking in the 
first suit. 
B 
Finally, we consider whether the trial court erred by refusing to treat 
the Rule 12 motions as motions for summary judgment and by dismissing 
Davidson’s action with prejudice. We hold it did not. And because there 
was no error, there was no violation of Davidson’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due-process rights. 
1 
Davidson argues the trial court erred when it judicially noticed some 
materials without taking judicial notice of Davidson’s opposing evidence 
or converting the Rule 12 motions to motions for summary judgment. 
Under Trial Rule 12, if “matters outside the pleading[s] are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56”. T.R. 12(B), 
12(C). A trial court converts a Rule 12 motion to a motion for summary 
judgment “by its consideration of extraneous matters” regardless of 
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whether the court converts the motion to one for summary judgment 
expressly. Milestone Contractors, L.P. v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 739 N.E.2d 174, 
176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).  
Here, the trial court correctly declined to consider the Rule 12 motions 
as summary-judgment motions because it considered only the pleadings 
and materials of which it took judicial notice and no outside materials. 
When deciding the Rule 12 motions, the trial court took judicial notice of 
certain materials, including the filings in the Lake County action, the 
public-records request, and the tort-claim notice. The trial court did not 
consider any other outside materials. In the context of Rule 12 motions, 
“materials of which a trial court may take judicial notice . . . are not 
considered ‘matters outside the pleading.’” Moss v. Horizon Bank, N.A., 120 
N.E.3d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, the trial court did not consider 
any extraneous materials that would require converting the Rule 12 
motions to motions under Rule 56.  
Davidson waived any argument that the court should not have 
judicially noticed these materials by failing to raise the argument in her 
opening appellate brief. See Monroe Guar. Ins. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 
N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005) (finding waiver of issues not raised in 
appellant’s initial brief). Davidson also waived her argument that the trial 
court should have taken judicial notice of her opposing evidence because 
she insufficiently developed the argument and cited no authority that her 
evidence fell within the judicial-notice rule. “A litigant who fails to 
support his arguments with appropriate citations to legal authority and 
record evidence waives those arguments for our review.” Pierce v. State, 29 
N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015); see also App. R. 46(A)(8) (providing that 
appellant’s brief must support each contention with cogent reasoning and 
citations to authorities, statutes, and the record). 
2 
Davidson also argues the trial court erred by dismissing her action with 
prejudice. We disagree. A plaintiff has the right to amend her pleading as 
of right within ten days after a trial court grants a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(B)(6). Rule 12(C) does not provide the same automatic right to 
amend. Thus, unlike under Rule 12(B)(6), a first-time dismissal with 
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prejudice under Rule 12(C) is not improper. Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ford 
Motor Co., 747 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
In the Monroe County case, defendant Walsh filed a motion to dismiss, 
which defendants DLZ, the State, the department, and Aztec joined. 
Defendant I-69 Development filed a separate motion to dismiss. And 
Aztec filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Although no other 
defendant filed a formal written notice joining Aztec’s 12(C) motion, the 
court below found that all defendants were “considered to have joined in 
and supported” both the Rule 12(B)(6) and 12(C) motions. No party, 
including Davidson, objected to the trial court’s procedural treatment of 
these motions, and so we likewise treat all defendants as having joined 
Aztec’s 12(C) motion. 
Davidson argues the Rule 12(C) motion should have been considered as 
a Rule 12(B)(6) motion because it argued that she failed to state a claim for 
relief. A 12(C) motion that argues the plaintiff’s allegations did not state a 
claim for relief must be treated as a 12(B)(6) motion, but a 12(C) motion 
that does not object to the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations 
need not be treated as a 12(B)(6) motion. Gregory & Appel, Inc. v. Duck, 459 
N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Aztec’s 12(C) motion argued that 
Davidson’s claims are barred under the affirmative defense of collateral 
estoppel, not that Davidson’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief. 
And Aztec’s answer specifically asserted the affirmative defense of 
collateral estoppel. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Davidson 
leave to amend her complaint after it granted the defendants’ 12(C) 
motion. 
3 
Davidson last argues the trial court violated her due-process rights by 
committing cumulative procedural errors when it declined to treat the 
Rule 12 motions as Rule 56 motions. These errors, according to Davidson, 
deprived her of the right to introduce her evidence in opposition to the 
defendants’ judicially noticed materials and led the court erroneously to 
dismiss her action with prejudice. Davidson’s argument fails because the 
court did not err in declining to treat the Rule 12 motions as motions for 
summary judgment, for the reasons discussed above in Section II.B.1, 
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supra, at 11–12. Thus, the court did not err in dismissing her action with 
prejudice. 
* 
* 
* 
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the 
Monroe County action with prejudice and denying Davidson’s motions to 
correct error and to amend her complaint. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Molter, JJ., concur. 
Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  KA T H R YN  DA V I DS O N  
Roberto Alejandro Mendoza 
Alex Mendoza Law, LLC 
Hammond, Indiana 
William D. Beyers 
Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C. 
Zionsville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE ES STA TE  OF  I N DIA N A A N D I ND I A NA 
D E P A RT ME NT  O F TR A N SP O R TA T I ON  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana  
 
Benjamin M. L. Jones 
Assistant Section Chief, Civil Appeals 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Joshua T. Martin 
Lewis and Wilkins LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023 
Page 15 of 15 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E I -69  DE VEL O P ME NT  PA R TN E RS , L LC  
Anne K. Ricchiuto 
Matthew C. Olsen  
Jane Dall Wilson 
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E DL Z  I N D IA NA , L LC  
Richard R. Skiles 
Carlo T. Girolamo 
Skiles DeTrude 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  A Z TE C E NG I N EE R I N G G R O U P, I NC .  
William E. Kelley, Jr. 
Alexander C. Trueblood 
Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP 
Carmel, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E WA LS H CO N S T RU CT I O N C OM PA N Y  
I I,  L LC 
James P. Scheidler 
Nicholas G. Brunette 
Katherine M. Haire 
Reminger Co., LPA 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC US CU R IA E D EFE NS E T RI AL  C OU NSE L O F 
I N D IA NA  
Lucy R. Dollens 
Quarles & Brady, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Crystal G. Rowe 
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP 
New Albany, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023 
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Goff, J., concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court that Kathryn Davidson is precluded from 
relitigating the allocation of fault in this case. However, in the course of 
ruling for the State, I believe the Court is making new law in a vexingly 
complicated area: the interplay between Indiana’s common-law and 
comparative-fault negligence schemes. Our predecessors recognized the 
dangers lurking here. I would not lay down a hard and fast rule of 
procedure in mixed-theory cases involving both private and 
governmental defendants. Rather, I would encourage all parties to make 
use of the flexibility provided by the Comparative Fault Act and to 
consider how the difficulty of litigating cases like this may be eased. 
I. All the fault for Davidson’s injuries has already 
been adjudicated. 
As the majority opinion relates, Davidson was seriously injured as a 
passenger in a motor accident. She first brought suit against the driver’s 
employer, J Trucking. This claim went to trial and resulted in a judgment 
that held J Trucking at fault for Davidson’s injuries and liable for her 
damages. Because J Trucking was an ordinary private defendant, the 
action was subject to Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act, Indiana Code 
chapter 34-51-2. Pursuant to statute, the verdict in that first suit 
adjudicated “the fault of all persons who caused or contributed to cause 
the alleged injury” and implicitly allocated “one hundred percent” of that 
fault. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-7(b)(1); see also Mendenhall v. Skinner and 
Broadbent Co., Inc., 728 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2000) (a comparative fault 
judgment allocates shares of the “total fault contributing to the injury”). 
The Act requires that any nonparty who might share fault be named if 
they are to be considered by the factfinder. I.C. § 34-51-2-15. No nonparty 
was named or allocated fault in Davidson’s suit. Therefore, the verdict 
held J Trucking at sole fault for Davidson’s injuries. 
This judgment has preclusive consequences in Davidson’s present, 
successive action against new private defendants and the State. The 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments indicates that relitigation is precluded 
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when an issue was “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.” Am. Law 
Inst., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). Looking to the 
Restatement for guidance on the law of preclusion, as this Court does, 
NIPSCO Indus. Grp. v. N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 100 N.E.3d 234, 244 (Ind. 
2018), it is notable that Section 27 says nothing about whether the party to 
be precluded must have been a loser in the previous suit. Granted, this 
Court has phrased the test as requiring the party to have “lost” on the 
issue concerned. Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 
(Ind. 1993). The opinion of the Court reasons that Davidson “really did 
‘lose’” when she failed to pin any fault on persons not named as 
defendants in her first suit. Ante, at 8. In the comparative-fault context, 
however, I find it immaterial that Davidson previously won on the issue. 
A plaintiff cannot reasonably expect to pin the same fault on multiple 
defendants in series. There cannot be more than one hundred percent of 
the fault to allocate. Here, the allocation of all the fault for Davidson’s 
injuries was litigated, determined, and essential to the judgment against J 
Trucking, meaning it cannot be relitigated. 
Of course, issue preclusion (previously called “collateral estoppel”) will 
not apply in a subsequent action against new defendants when the party 
to be precluded “lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 
first action or other circumstances justify” permitting relitigation. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29. But I agree with the Court that 
Davidson had a fair opportunity to sue all of the defendants involved in 
this suit at the time of her suit against J Trucking. Ante, at 10–11. Her 
present claims against both the private defendants and the State are 
therefore precluded. 
I am concerned, however, that the Court’s explanation of how the 
Comparative Fault Act applies to the State will cause difficulties. 
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II. 
 The Court should not lay down a hard and fast 
rule for handling mixed-theory cases. 
Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act went into effect in 1985. Penn Harris 
Madison School Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2007). Its 
provisions differed in numerous ways from the common law of 
negligence that had developed up to that time. For example, the doctrine 
of contributory negligence, which “barred recovery on a plaintiff’s 
negligence claim if the plaintiff was even slightly at fault,” was 
substantially revised, so that a plaintiff would be barred recovery only if 
their “own fault was greater than fifty percent.” Id. Joint and several 
liability for damages was abolished in favor of liability in proportion to 
fault. Indiana Dep’t. of Ins. v. Everhart, 960 N.E.2d 129, 138 (Ind. 2012). 
However, the common law of negligence was retained for governmental 
defendants. Howard, 861 N.E.2d at 1193. The Act “does not apply in any 
manner to tort claims against governmental entities or public employees.” 
I.C. § 34-51-2-2. Sharp legal minds foresaw that complications would arise 
in Indiana’s “dual system of liability.” Lawrence P. Wilkins, The Indiana 
Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance, 17 Ind. L. Rev. 687, 729 
(1984). Defendants subject to different legal regimes might be involved in 
the same case, leading to “uncertainty and confusion.” Id. at 732. 
This problem came to a head in State Highway Department. v. Snyder, 594 
N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 1992). In that case, the plaintiff sued both a private driver 
and the State after a motor accident. Id. at 784–85. The jury found in the 
driver’s favor, indicating that the plaintiff was more than fifty percent at 
fault. Id. at 785. However, the same jury found against the State, which 
then appealed on the grounds of verdict inconsistency. Id. If the plaintiff 
was more than fifty percent at fault, the State argued, then he was 
necessarily contributorily negligent. Id. This Court refused to entertain the 
State’s claim, stating that “[b]ecause the legal theories under which the 
two claims were prosecuted are not consistent, we will not reverse the 
judgments entered pursuant to these legal theories merely because such 
verdicts may appear to be inconsistent.” Id. at 786. Noting the “confusion 
created by this predicament” of dual negligence rules, the Court refrained 
from trying to “reconcile inconsistencies which are not necessarily 
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reconcilable.” Id. at 786–87. The Court would “not review the consistency 
of verdicts rendered under the Comparative Fault Act and verdicts 
rendered under common law principles in cases such as this.” Id. at 787. 
Additionally, the Court advised “[p]arties who find themselves faced with 
prosecuting or defending mixed-theory cases such as this” on how to 
proceed. Id. They could “file separate law suits or request separate trials.” 
Id. Snyder predated this Court’s adoption of non-mutual issue preclusion 
in Sullivan v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. 
1992). And that explains why the Snyder Court considered it obvious that 
the verdicts rendered in separate suits or trials need not “be consistent.” 
594 N.E.2d at 787. But nor would the Court so require when two verdicts 
were rendered in the same trial. Id. 
I agree with the Court that today’s case differs from Snyder. Ante, at 9. It 
involves a successive suit, rather than parallel trials. And issue preclusion 
is now established law. As discussed above, this doctrine generally bars 
relitigation of any fault that has already been allocated by a judgment. 
Here, the allocation of all the fault to J Trucking precludes attribution of 
any fault to the State. I am also persuaded that Davidson did not rely on 
Snyder in choosing not to sue the State in her first suit. Rather, she made 
this decision believing she lacked sufficient information to initiate a claim. 
There was wisdom, however, in the Snyder Court’s reluctance to try to 
bring order out of confusion. The dual-system conundrum has not been 
resolved to this day. The majority attempts a solution, directing that 
“when a plaintiff brings a mixed-theory case that alleges both government 
and non-government defendants are at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, the 
Act applies to require the jury to apportion a percentage of fault and 
damages to all defendants and nonparties.” Id. at 9. But this procedure 
would break down in practice because it conflicts with the comparative-
fault scheme itself. 
As Snyder suggested, the trial court in a mixed-theory case may 
minimize the jury’s perplexity by conducting separate trials, one for 
common-law defendants, such as the State, and one for comparative-fault 
private defendants. 594 N.E.2d at 787. See also Ind. Trial Rule 42(B). But 
then, how could the State’s fault be determined in the comparative-fault 
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trial? The State would not be a nonparty whom the defendants might 
name, for a nonparty must be a person “who has not been joined in the 
action as a defendant.” I.C. § 34-6-2-88. Nor could the State be a defendant 
in the comparative-fault trial, for the Act does not apply “in any manner” 
to a tort claim against a governmental defendant. I.C. § 34-51-2-2. And the 
State would defend itself only in the common-law trial. Professor Wilkins 
foresaw the two sides of this paradox. See Wilkins, supra, at 730. 
In light of this problem, and the risk of confusing the jury by asking it 
to apply two bodies of law to the same defendant, I would not lay down a 
single mode of proceeding in mixed-theory cases. Instead, I would point 
to Indiana Code subsections 34-51-2-7(b) and 34-51-2-8(b), which allow the 
parties to vary the usual rules for comparative-fault adjudications and 
thus devise procedures that make sense in a given case. 
Because Davidson is precluded from relitigating the fault for her 
injuries, I concur in the Court’s judgment. However, I would encourage 
the bench and bar, and my colleagues in the General Assembly, to 
consider how the confusing predicament of litigating mixed-theory cases 
may be eased.