Case Title: Namislo v. Akzo Chemical Co., Inc.

Citation: 671 So. 2d 1380

Docket Number: 1940308

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
671 So. 2d 1380 (1995)
Ricky E. NAMISLO and Mary C. Namislo
v.
AKZO CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC., et al.
1940308.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 3, 1995.
Rehearing Denied December 15, 1995.
*1381 Christopher E. Peters of Cherry, Givens, Peters, Lockett & Diaz, P.C., Mobile, J. Farrest Taylor of Cherry, Givens, Peters, Lockett & Diaz, P.C., Dothan, for appellants.
*1382 Carroll H. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Luther and Keith S. Miller of Clark, Scott & Sullivan, Mobile (Jeffrey L. Luther filed notice of withdrawal June 22, 1995), for appellees.
COOK, Justice.
Mary Namislo and her husband, Ricky Namislo, appeal from summary judgments entered in favor of Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc., and Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., on her claims alleging negligence and wantonness; in favor of several co-employee defendants on her claims of "willful conduct" as defined in § 25-5-11(c)(2), Ala.Code 1975; in favor of co-employee defendants on her claims alleging the tort of outrage; in favor of co-employee Fred Cannon, Akzo Chemical Company, Inc., Stauffer, and Chesebrough-Ponds on her claims of intentional fraud; and in favor of Akzo, Stauffer, and co-employee defendants on her claims of intentional suppression of material facts. We affirm.
Mary Namislo began work for Stauffer Chemical Company in 1976, and she worked at the chlorine production plant until 1992. During that time, the plant was sold to Chesebrough-Ponds. In 1987, Chesebrough-Ponds sold the plant to Akzo.
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. The following rendition of the facts is taken from our opinion in the earlier appeal, Namislo v. Akzo Chemicals, Inc., 620 So. 2d 573 (Ala.1993):
620 So. 2d  at 574. This Court reversed and remanded, stating:
620 So. 2d  at 575. (Footnote omitted.) On remand, the trial court entered a summary *1383 judgment for Stauffer and Chesebrough-Ponds on Namislo's claims of negligence and wantonness; in favor of the co-employee defendants on Namislo's claims of "willful conduct" pursuant to § 25-5-11(c)(2) and the tort of outrage; in favor of Akzo, Stauffer, Chesebrough-Ponds, and co-employee Fred Cannon on Namislo's claim alleging intentional fraud; and in favor of Akzo, Stauffer, and the co-employee defendants on Namislo's claim alleging intentional suppression of material facts.
Namislo appeals, contending that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment on her "willful" conduct claims, because, she says, the trial court incorrectly held that the exclusivity provisions of § 25-5-114 barred her claims.
Our earlier opinion stated that Namislo "suffer[s] from mercury poisoning." Actually, she alleges that she does, but whether in fact she does is disputed. It is not contested by the parties that mercury was used at the chlorine production plant where Namislo worked, nor that, if she does in fact have mercury poisoning, she contracted it at her workplace. Section 25-5-110 defines an "occupational disease" as follows:
Occupational diseases are the subject of Article 4 of the Workers' Compensation Act. Article 4, in pertinent part, states as follows:
Section 25-5-114, Ala.Code 1975. Portions of the remainder of the Workers' Compensation Act are applicable to occupational diseases via the language of § 25-5-123, which states:
This Court must determine whether the language in Article 4, and in particular § 25-5-114, set forth above, precludes Namislo's action brought pursuant to § 25-5-11.
While § 25-5-114 seems to exclude all causes of action against co-employees, the wording of § 25-5-11 and Alabama case law indicate that this Court has recognized claims brought under § 25-5-11 for occupational diseases. First, § 25-5-11 makes specific provision for such a cause of action:
The legislature specifically stated that § 25-5-11 would be applicable to Article 4. If § 25-5-114 is interpreted literally, the language in § 25-5-11 referencing Article 4 would have no meaning whatever.
In addition to the Code section, Alabama case law indicates that there is such a cause of action. The plaintiffs rely heavily on Grimes v. Stewart, 628 So. 2d 467, 468 (Ala.1993), to support their argument that Ms. Namislo has a cause of action against the co-employee defendants in this case. In Grimes, Brian Ray Stewart sued former co-employees under § 25-5-11(c)(1), alleging that he had contracted leukemia from breathing the fumes of gasoline-contaminated soil and that his co-employees had intended his injury. Id., 628 So. 2d  at 467. This Court reversed a $7,000,000 judgment[1] in favor of Stewart, finding no evidence to support Stewart's allegation that the co-employee defendants had intended that he contract leukemia or had known with substantial certainty that he would. Id., at 469. Although the judgment in Grimes was reversed because of a lack of evidence of willful conduct, the following language in Grimes supports Namislo's argument that the exclusivity provisions of Article 4 of the Workers' Compensation Act do not apply under the facts of this case:
Grimes, supra, at 468. Clearly, Grimes impliedly recognizes what was specifically stated by this Court in Hubbard v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 599 So. 2d 20 (Ala.1992). In Hubbard, this Court was faced with a statute of limitations question when Hubbard, who suffered from an occupational disease, filed a co-employee action pursuant to § 25-5-11. Hubbard, who conceded that he had missed the deadline imposed by § 6-2-38(g) for filing his action, argued that the provisions of § 25-5-117 tolled the statute of limitations for his action. This Court stated in Hubbard:
Johnson, 565 So. 2d  at 220-21.
599 So. 2d  at 22. Based on Grimes and Hubbard, this Court reaffirms that an employee with an occupational disease can sue co-employees for "willful conduct."
The question then becomes whether Namislo offered substantial evidence to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment on behalf of the co-employee defendants under the facts of this case. Section 25-5-11(b) states:
Specifically, Namislo, who contends that the co-employee defendants removed safety devices from machines, must offer substantial evidence of "willful conduct" as defined in § 25-5-11(c)(2). "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
Section 25-5-11(c)(2) defines "willful conduct" to include the following:
Namislo contends that when she worked at the chemical plant, she spent much of her *1386 time cleaning the "cell house." The cell house is the structure in the plant where chlorine gas is produced. The production of chlorine gas requires the use of mercury as an electrode to generate chlorine gas from brine. Namislo argues that a ventilation system in the cell house known as a scrubber system, the cell house exhaust fans, and a respirator were all "safety devices" or "safety guards" to protect her from exposure to excessive amounts of mercury. Her co-employees' failure to maintain these safety devices, she argues, resulted in her overexposure to mercury and her ultimate injury.
First, we will address Namislo's argument that the scrubber system and the exhaust fans were "safety devices" within the meaning of § 25-5-11(c)(2). In Mallisham v. Kiker, 630 So. 2d 420 (Ala.1993), this Court considered whether the failure to place support timbers in a mine shaft constituted the "removal of a safety device." In determining that the timbers did not constitute "safety devices" within the meaning of the statute, this Court stated:
630 So. 2d  at 423-24.
Namislo claims are similar to the claims of James Curtis Layne, who sued co-employees after injuring himself while wading through an accumulation of water on the floor of a mine. See generally, Layne v. Carr, 631 So. 2d 978 (Ala.1994). He sued his co-employees, claiming the water should have been removed by a pump that had at one time been used to pump water from the very spot where he fell. Layne, supra, at 980. In Layne, we wrote:
631 So. 2d  at 982-83.
Likewise, in Hallmark v. Duke, 624 So. 2d 1058 (Ala.1993), this Court considered the question whether the "splitter box," "transfer lines," and the "ninety-degree elbow joint" of a clarifier were "safety guards" or "safety devices" within the meaning of § 25-5-11(c)(2). We stated:
624 So. 2d  at 1061.
While Namislo would have this Court hold the scrubber system to be a "safety device" or a "safety guard" related to the cell house, our review of the record indicates that the scrubber system and the exhaust fans were not "safety devices" within the meaning of § 25-5-11(c)(2). The purpose of the scrubber system was to maintain a vacuum in the cell. The fans operated to provide ventilation to the cell. While both were part of the system used to produce chlorine, they were not "safety devices" within the contemplation of the statute.
Namislo next contends that the respirator given to her to use when she worked in the cell house was equipped with the wrong filters. She contends that the respirator was a machine and that co-employees failed to equip the respirator with the appropriate filters. She claims that the filters constituted "safety devices" within the meaning of § 25-5-11(c)(2). Again, we note the following language in Mallisham v. Kiker, 630 So.2d at 423-24:
(Emphasis on "machine" original; other emphasis added.) In the case before us, the respirator itself was a device to be utilized to increase safety in the workplace. Nothing was removed from the respirator by the co-employee defendants; rather, Namislo contends that the filter cartridge to be used with the respirator was not properly matched. The respirator simply does not fall within the purview of § 25-5-11(c)(2).
Next, Namislo contends that she should be allowed to maintain her claims against Stauffer and Chesebrough-Ponds alleging negligence and wantonness because she is no longer employed by them and the effects of their actions lingered after they sold their interests in the chlorine production plant.
Section 25-5-116 states:
In holding that Namislo does not have a cause of action against her former employers, we take specific note of the following language in Layne v. Carr, supra:
Layne, supra, 631 So. 2d  at 981-82. (Emphasis added.) The statute specifically provides immunity for former employers for negligent and/or wanton conduct.
We now turn to Namislo's claim against her co-employee defendants alleging outrage; her claim against Akzo, Stauffer, Chesebrough-Ponds, and co-employee Fred Cannon alleging intentional fraud; and her claim against Akzo, Stauffer, and the co-employee defendants alleging intentional suppression of a material fact. First, we note that intentional torts have been recognized by this Court to fall outside the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. In Lowman v. Piedmont Exec. Shirt Manufacturing Co., 547 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1989), we stated:
547 So. 2d  at 95. Namislo contends that the defendants knew she was being exposed to harmful amounts of mercury and that they fraudulently led her to believe that there was no risk should she become pregnant. Namislo testified in her deposition:
R.T. at 683-84; 686. Under the authority of Lowman, Namislo had to offer evidence of intentional suppression a material fact and fraud that, if believed, would constitute clear and convincing evidence of fraud. Lowman, supra, at 95. The only evidence offered by Namislo in support of her claim was the deposition testimony of Steve Powe, who stated that in Europe women of child-bearing age were not allowed to work in a cell house. There is no evidence that Cannon, at the time he made the representation, knew Namislo should not be working in the cell house.
With regard to the tort of outrage, we stated in Lowman, 547 So.2d at 95:
The same must be said under the facts of this case. There is simply no evidence "that the defendants' actions in handling [Namislo's] claim were `so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.'" Id. at 95 (citations omitted).
Based on the foregoing, the summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
BUTTS, J., dissents.
[1]  The jury verdict was actually for $5,250,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court remitted $1,250,000 of the punitive damages award, leaving an award of $7,000,000. Grimes, at 468.