Case Title: Davis v. Dembeck

Citation: 2003-Ohio-2462

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Davis v. Dembeck, 99 Ohio St.3d 49, 2003-Ohio-2462.] 
 
 
DAVIS, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. DEMBEK, APPELLEE; 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Davis v. Dembek, 99 Ohio St.3d 49, 2003-Ohio-2462.] 
Insurance — Underinsured motorist coverage — Discretionary appeal allowed — 
Court of appeals’ judgment reversed — Cause remanded to trial court to 
apply Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. — Cross-appeal denied. 
(No. 2003-0054 — Submitted March 25, 2003 — Decided May 16, 2003.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
01AP-1450, 2002-Ohio-6443. 
__________________ 
{¶1} 
The discretionary appeal is allowed. 
{¶2} 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court to apply Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 
Ohio St.3d 186, 2002-Ohio-7217, 781 N.E.2d 927. 
{¶3} 
The cross-appeal is denied. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
O’CONNOR, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶4} 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this 
case for an analysis of prejudice under Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 
Ohio St.3d 186, 2002-Ohio-7217, 781 N.E.2d 927.  I dissented from paragraph 
two of the Ferrando syllabus, in which the court merely presumed the prejudicial 
effect of an insured’s breach of a subrogation provision in an insurance policy.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Id. at ¶ 105.  I believe that an insured’s breach of a subrogation-related provision 
of an insurance policy is per se prejudicial.  There is no need for the additional 
time and expense of a factual inquiry into the issue.  This is particularly so in a 
Scott-Pontzer case, in which a party may be asserting an extremely stale claim or 
one in which the possibility of collection from the tortfeasor never existed and 
therefore the usual issues of the insurer’s refusal to defend or participate never 
arose.  See Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 
710 N.E.2d 1116. 
{¶5} 
As I explained in Ferrando, the rights of the insurer are actually 
prejudiced by the breach of a consent-to-settle or subrogation provision of an 
insurance policy.  If a tortfeasor has been released from further liability, it is my 
opinion that any inquiry is a useless exercise that merely prolongs the tortuous 
routes created by Scott-Pontzer. 
{¶6} 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
decision to remand.  In addition, I would allow the cross-appeal by 
Transcontinental Insurance Company and Continental Casualty Company. 
__________________ 
 
Clark, Perdue, Roberts & Scott Co., L.P.A., and Paul O. Scott, for 
appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Keener, Doucher, Curley & Patterson, L.P.A., and Thomas J. Keener, for 
appellees and cross-appellants Transcontinental Insurance Company and 
Continental Casualty Company. 
__________________