Case Title: In re D.F.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91556

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91556–Agenda 6–March 2002.
In re D.F. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois,
Appellant, v. Nancy F., Appellee).
Opinion filed September 19, 2002.
 
      JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
 
      In December 1999, the State filed a petition to terminate 
respondent mother’s parental rights, pursuant to the Adoption Act 
(Act) (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)). The petition, as 
amended in May 2000, alleged six separate grounds for a finding 
of unfitness: (1) substantial neglect of the children that was 
continuous or repeated (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West Supp. 1999)); 
(2) other neglect of, or misconduct toward the children (750 ILCS 
50/1(D)(h) (West Supp. 1999)); (3) inability to discharge parental 
responsibilities (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West Supp. 1999)); (4) 
failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that 
were the basis for the removal of the children (750 ILCS 
50/1(D)(m)(i) (West Supp. 1999)); (5) failure to make reasonable 
progress toward the return of the children within nine months 
following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) 
(West Supp. 1999)); and (6) failure to make reasonable progress 
toward the return of the children during any nine-month period 
after the end of the initial nine-month period following the 
adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West Supp. 
1999)). Following a fitness hearing in May 2000, the trial court 
found respondent unfit under the first, second, fourth, and sixth 
grounds alleged. A dispositional hearing was held and the trial 
court found it to be in the children’s best interest to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights. She appealed.
      The appellate court reversed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
Specifically, the appellate court held that the trial court’s finding
regarding the first ground, substantial neglect (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(d) (West Supp. 1999)), was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. 321 Ill. App. 3d 211, 221. As to the second
ground, “[o]ther neglect of, or misconduct toward” the children
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(h) (West Supp. 1999)), the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s ruling on the basis that section 1(D)(h) is
unconstitutionally vague. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 223. Finally, as to the
fourth and sixth grounds, the appellate court vacated the judgment
of the trial court on the basis that the trial court considered
evidence of events occurring outside the applicable time periods.
321 Ill. App. 3d at 223.
      Respondent also argued on appeal that the trial court erred by
denying her motion for substitution of judge for cause pursuant to
section 2–1001(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2–1001(a)(3) (West 1998)). The appellate court rejected this
argument, finding that respondent’s motion was premature
because it was filed prior to the filing of the State’s motion to
terminate parental rights, which “initiated an entirely new
proceeding.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 224. The appellate court further
stated, in dicta, that if the motion had been identified as a motion
to substitute judge as of right (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(2) (West
1998)) and filed promptly after the filing of the termination
petition, it would have been error for the trial court to deny it. 321
Ill. App. 3d at 224.
      We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
 
BACKGROUND
      Respondent is the mother of three daughters, E.K. (born
September 16, 1987), T.K. (born November 30, 1991), and D.F.
(born February 13, 1997). In December 1997, the State filed a
petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that the girls were
neglected, pursuant to section 2–3(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (705 ILCS 405/2–3(1) (West 1996)). In April 1998,
respondent admitted and stipulated to the State’s allegations that
the children were not receiving proper or necessary support or
other care necessary for their well-being (705 ILCS 405/2–3(1)(a)
(West 1996)), based on the unsanitary condition of the home. The
State agreed to the dismissal of a separate allegation that D.F. was
living in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS
405/2–3(1)(b) (West 1996)), based on the diagnosis of
“nonorganic failure to thrive” syndrome. The girls were
adjudicated neglected minors and made wards of the court. D.F.
continued to reside with respondent and her husband, Chris F.,
while E.K. and T.K. spent an extended period of visitation in
Wisconsin with their father, John K., and his wife, Karen K. Later,
the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was
appointed guardian and placed the two older girls with their father.
The baby, D.F., who is a half-sister to the older girls, was placed
with foster parents.
      On September 17, 1999, following a permanency hearing, the
trial court entered a permanency order setting the goal for E.K. and
T.K. as remaining in their father’s home and for D.F., as substitute
care pending a court determination on a petition to terminate
parental rights. On that same date, respondent filed a motion for
substitution of judge for cause, pursuant to section 2–1001(a) of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a) (West 1998)).
A hearing was held on November 1, 1999, before a different judge.
Counsel for respondent argued that certain comments made by the
original judge evidenced bias or prejudice against the respondent
parents. The State argued that the judge’s comments related to the
credibility of witnesses, including the respondent parents, and
were therefore appropriate. Counsel for DCFS pointed out that at
the same hearing in which the judge made the disputed comments,
he also made comments that were favorable to the respondent
parents. The guardian ad litem opposed the motion. The motion
for substitution of judge for cause was denied.
      In December 1999, the State filed a petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights as to all three children. (The petition
also sought to terminate the parental rights of D.F.’s father. He is
not a part of the present appeal. See In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d
461 (2000).) After conducting the required hearings into the
fitness of respondent and the best interests of the children, the trial
court terminated her parental rights, placing full legal and physical
custody of E.K. and T.K. with their father and also giving him the
authority to consent to their adoption by their stepmother. The trial
court also terminated respondent’s rights with respect to D.F.,
appointing DCFS as her guardian, with the power to consent to
adoption. Because the issues in this case relate only to the trial
court’s finding of unfitness, we limit our summary of the
testimony to that adduced at the fitness portion of the termination
proceedings.
      Child protective investigator Mike Mucci testified that he
visited respondent’s home in September 1995 in response to a hot-line report of environmental neglect. The home was extremely
cluttered, with the floors and flat surfaces such as chairs and
countertops piled with clothing and other items. A litter box in the
bathroom was overflowing with cat feces and there were cat feces
throughout the house. Three cats and three kittens were present.
The electricity had been turned off and the food in the refrigerator
was spoiled. The house smelled strongly of spoiled food and cat
urine and feces. E.K. was seven years old at the time and T.K. was
four. As a result of this investigation, respondent was indicated for
environmental neglect and services were offered. The household
also included respondent’s second husband, Robert Riley, whom
she accused of domestic violence. Mucci subsequently learned that
Riley was a sex offender and he informed respondent of this fact.
The children were interviewed and given physical examinations.
E.K. reported that she had seen Riley touch her sister in the
vaginal area. Riley was indicated for risk of sexual harm and
respondent was advised to allow her children to have no further
contact with him.
      Betty Schapmire, another DCFS investigator, received a hot-line report of environmental neglect in November 1997. She
visited respondent’s home and found respondent living with her
new husband, Chris F.; their infant daughter, D.F.; her two
daughters, E.K. and T.K.; and an adult roommate in a two
bedroom apartment. The apartment was very cluttered, particularly
in the bedrooms and the kitchen. A cat litter box in the hallway
was “filled to the top” with feces and overflowing onto the floor.
The odor of cat feces was “heavy” and noticeable when she
entered the door to the apartment. The bedroom floors were
covered with clothing to the point that the doors could not be fully
opened. The floor in the girls’ bedroom was not visible due to the
clutter. Dishes were stacked on the kitchen counters and bits of
food were scattered on the kitchen floor. Schapmire filed an
indicated report on the basis of environmental neglect and referred
the family for services.
      Schapmire also noticed during the visit that D.F. was quite
small for her age. When questioned, respondent and her husband
were unconcerned about D.F.’s size or weight. Schapmire
arranged for a medical examination and the doctor diagnosed D.F.
with nonorganic failure to thrive syndrome. Schapmire made an
indicated report to that effect as well. It was this second indicated
report that precipitated the filing of a petition for wardship.
      Schapmire stated that she checked DCFS records prior to her
initial visit to respondent’s apartment and was aware of the prior
indicated reports for environmental neglect and risk of sexual
abuse. However, when she asked respondent and her husband
about prior involvement with DCFS, they denied any prior
contacts. She also learned from the DCFS records that there had
been a contact in 1994, prior to Mucci’s investigation. Respondent
was informed at that time that her then-husband, Riley, was a sex
offender. Thus, she had already been aware of Riley’s status as a
sex offender when Mucci informed her of that fact following his
1995 investigation, but had continued to give Riley access to her
daughters.
      DCFS caseworker Theresa Kelly testified that she had been
assigned to respondent’s case since late 1997. Schapmire had
referred this case to Family First for intensive services, first to deal
with the cleanliness issue and later to address D.F.’s failure to
thrive. One of Kelly’s duties was to monitor the effectiveness of
the services provided by Family First. Initially, T.K. was thin, her
hair was dull, and she had poor hygiene and body odor. E.K. was
combative and argumentative. She yelled and swore at the Family
First workers. Kelly stated that E.K. had become “parentified,”
that is, the adults in the household had placed adult expectations
on her and she responded by attempting to perform parental
functions. For example, she would answer the door when social
services personnel arrived, and would lie to the workers, telling
them that her mother was not at home. E.K. was also failing in
school. D.F. had been diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive,
indicating problems with feeding and bonding. Respondent was in
the habit of feeding the baby in her walker, which is not conducive
to either weight gain or bonding. She made some progress in this
area and D.F. slowly began to gain weight. Kelly also testified that
respondent was frequently dishonest with the service providers
and that the time needed to get to the truth took away from
providing services. The family moved frequently. At the time
Kelly became involved, an adult roommate named Kevin was also
living with respondent, her husband, and the three children.
       In early 1998, during a visit, John K. took the two older girls
to the dentist because T.K. was complaining of a toothache. The
dentist discovered four deep holes in her molars, including one
that was abscessed and one that was very close to being abscessed.
He recommended a dental procedure that would have required
treatment on two separate days. DCFS asked respondent to allow
the children to remain in Wisconsin for the additional time needed
to complete the dental work. They were on spring break at the time
and it would not have disrupted school attendance. Respondent,
however, obtained an emergency order of protection in Du Page
County (where her divorce from John had been entered) and
utilized the services of the sheriff’s department in Wisconsin to
remove the children. Respondent later explained to Kelly that she
had intended to take T.K. to a dentist, but admitted that she had
not tried to make an appointment and could not afford to pay for
dental care in any event. The needed dental work was eventually
completed on a subsequent visit to Wisconsin.
      Kelly further explained that the initial plan developed for the
family called for the children to remain in the home. Specific goals
included maintaining an adequate environment; getting rid of the
cats that were the source of much of the filth; following the
doctor’s recommendations regarding feeding of the infant;
obtaining routine medical care such as immunizations; obtaining
steady employment or benefits sufficient to meet basic needs; and
refraining from negative comments about John and Karen K. In
April 1998, respondent and her husband were rated “satisfactory”
on their progress under the initial plan, but the Family First
personnel commented that they “had just minimally made the
minimal parenting standards.” In addition, Family First expressed
grave concerns about the family’s economic and housing situations
remaining stable.
      At the August 1998 case review, respondent and her husband
were rated “unsatisfactory” on every goal except cooperation with
Services for Parent Infant Child Education (SPICE) by
participating in therapy for the developmental delay that resulted
from D.F.’s failure to thrive. Unmet goals included maintaining
employment, maintaining stable and suitable housing, cooperating
with the home interventionist, attending counseling on a regular
basis, and adhering to court orders.
      Kelly also testified regarding an incident that occurred in July
1998, when E.K. and T.K. returned from a visit with John and
Karen K. Kelly was present at the “hand off” between John and
respondent. The girls appeared clean and healthy. They were tan
and their hair was shiny. T.K. had gained some weight and lost her
“waif-like appearance.” Respondent and the children left as Kelly
was talking to John and Karen about the summer visit. Kelly asked
about a bruise she had noticed on T.K.’s thigh and Karen
explained that her leg had been pinched by the restraining bar of
a carnival ride several days before. Respondent then reappeared,
“visibly agitated,” and insisted that T.K. show Kelly the bruise on
her thigh and a smaller bruise on her arm. Kelly stated that she was
aware of the bruises and that Karen had already explained the
cause. T.K. smiled and nodded in agreement when Kelly
mentioned the carnival ride. Respondent, however, insisted that
T.K. had been abused. Despite Kelly’s suggestion that it was a
violation of a court order to have such a discussion in front of the
children, respondent persisted.
      Respondent subsequently contacted the caseworker in
Wisconsin to inform her of the alleged abuse. She told the
Wisconsin caseworker, falsely, that Kelly had been reprimanded
and taken off this case. Respondent also took T.K. to a hospital
emergency room to have the bruise examined. Kelly then insisted
that the girls be brought to her office for an interview regarding the
alleged abuse. When they arrived, they smelled of urine, feces, and
body odor. Their skin was ashen and their hair was dull. The
interview took place within a week of their return from Wisconsin.
During the interview, E.K. said that her mother left her at a
friend’s house rather than take her along to the emergency room
because E.K. would have told the doctor the truth. T.K. admitted
telling the doctor that Karen hit her with a wooden spoon but also
admitted that this was a lie. She lied to the doctor because her
mother and her grandparents promised her “lots of fun things” and
a swimming pool.
      Kelly also testified about difficulties with telephone contacts
between the girls and their father. Respondent would not allow the
girls to talk to their father, telling them that it was against a court
order for them to do so. By this time, in August 1998, respondent
had taken in another cat. D.F. was beginning to gain weight, but
she was still thin and her hair was dull. Respondent indicated to
Kelly that she thought the baby was gaining too much weight and
that the pediatrician agreed with her. However, when Kelly
contacted the doctor, she learned that the doctor was pleased with
the baby’s weight gain and advised that it should continue. Rather
than being below the lowest percentile on the growth charts, D.F.
had reached the twenty-fifth percentile for her age.
      Dr. Marty Traver, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified
that she evaluated respondent for DCFS on two occasions, in
November 1998 and December 1999. In 1998, Traver found
respondent to have average intelligence and appropriate affect, but
“no insight into her situation with DCFS.” For example, she did
not accept the diagnosis of failure to thrive regarding D.F., and she
did not agree that unsanitary conditions in her home were a serious
concern.
      Respondent made several statements to Traver that were “not
congruent with the report” provided by DCFS. Respondent told
Traver that she first became involved with DCFS in September
1997. The case history, however, showed involvement as far back
as 1994. Respondent did not acknowledge unsanitary conditions
in her home, admitting only to the “normal amount of dirty
dishes.” Respondent also believed that her youngest child was
merely small for her age and that the caseworker persuaded the
doctor to diagnose failure to thrive.
      Traver administered various personality and psychological
tests. Respondent produced an invalid profile in several tests by
giving answers designed to present herself in a unrealistically
positive light. Her answers showed “significant resistance” to the
tests and were “highly defensive.” Traver concluded that
respondent’s strengths included her intellectual functioning and
her love for her children. On the other hand, she did not exhibit
empathy. She failed to maintain stability in employment, housing,
or relationships. Despite evidence of unhygienic conditions and
the children’s unmet need for dental care, respondent “did not
understand concerns about her parenting” and “appeared to blame
others for her situation.” With regard to respondent’s
untruthfulness, Traver found that respondent “often impulsively
makes up responses” when she wants to present herself in a
positive light and that she may be “somewhat delusional” in that
“her denial system is very strong.” In response to DCFS’s inquiry
about respondent’s compliance with court orders, Traver stated
that respondent would be unlikely to comply if an order did not
“make emotional sense to her.” She has a “sense of entitlement
and tries to manipulate situations.”
      Traver diagnosed a personality disorder with histrionic,
narcissistic, and passive-aggressive features. She concluded that
respondent had the intelligence needed to meet minimum
parenting standards. However, respondent’s defensiveness and
failure to acknowledge her problems made it unlikely that she
would be motivated to comply. Traver recommended both
individual and marital therapy.
      Traver evaluated respondent again in 1999 and found that she
continued to have poor insight into her situation. Traver
administered another battery of tests, in part because DCFS had
again expressed concern that respondent’s level of mental
functioning was low. Traver found that respondent’s intellectual
functioning was average but that she lacked empathy for others
and showed narcissistic traits. Respondent still did not understand
why D.F. had been removed from her custody. Traver described
her as living “partly in a fantasy world and partly in reality.” She
had made no progress as far as understanding her parenting
deficiencies. Because her denial system was so strong, respondent
was at risk for relapsing into unsanitary living conditions. Traver
recommended further counseling.
      Holly Hardin, a clinical psychologist, counseled respondent
from February 1999 to August 1999. During that time, respondent
attended 13 of 20 scheduled sessions and did not complete several
“homework” assignments. Hardin testified that, overall,
respondent did not make satisfactory progress. After a great deal
of discussion, respondent finally acknowledged that there was
“some value” in dental care for the children. She continued to
believe that John K.’s efforts to obtain dental care while the
children were visiting him was merely a ploy to increase the length
of the visits. Respondent also resisted taking any responsibility for
the infant’s failure to thrive. She insisted that she had been worried
about the baby gaining too much weight and that the pediatrician
had placed the baby on a “diet.” Respondent tended to blame
others, particularly John K., for all of her difficulties. Respondent
did acknowledge her habit of lying or exaggerating and seemed to
recognize that it affected her parenting ability. However,
respondent did not do the assigned homework or practice
alternative behaviors that could have led to progress on this point.
Respondent did begin to understand that her impulsiveness
contributed to her frequent job changes, her nomadic lifestyle, and
other factors that were disruptive in the household, but she did not
make any progress changing this behavior. Hardin’s most
“generous” evaluation was that, although respondent had begun to
understand some issues, she had not made sufficient progress for
“true change” to have occurred. The prognosis for change was
“very poor,” because respondent was unwilling or unable to
change.
      Court-appointed special advocate Shannon Perkins testified
that she was assigned to respondent’s case from April 1999 to May
2000. Her primary role became one of attempting to verify
whether the information provided by respondent about her housing
and employment situations was true. Respondent had five different
employers during the 13-month period. In each case, the
explanation given by the employer for respondent’s termination
differed from respondent’s story. Perkins believed that respondent
tried to meet the goals of the client service plan, but that “when
things got too much” for her, she “quit and put the blame on
somebody else.” In addition, respondent was “unwilling to take
advantage” of the services offered to help her get D.F. back.
      Respondent testified that she had been married to John K.
from 1985 to 1993. Upon their divorce, they were awarded joint
custody of E.K. and T.K. She was granted physical custody. She
and John had no contact from 1993 to July 1997. During that time
she moved seven times, twice out of state, and changed her name
twice due to remarriage. She acknowledged that she failed to
inform the court that had jurisdiction over the custody and support
of E.K. and T.K. of her many address changes. She denied,
however, that she intentionally kept the children from John and
stated that she kept in touch with his parents and that he could
have reached her at any time by contacting her mother. She also
denied using E.K.’s name and social security number to obtain
telephone services in 1994, when the child was six or seven years
old. Respondent stated that she had never seen the proffered credit
report listing an outstanding telephone bill in E.K.’s name for
services to an address in Streator, Illinois, at which she admitted
living in 1994. Respondent apparently had at least eight different
jobs and moved several more times during the pendency of this
case. She continued to minimize the significance of the failure to
thrive diagnosis, claiming that D.F. “never lost weight” while in
her care, she just gained weight “slowly.” Respondent stated that
D.F.’s sudden increase in weight once she was in a foster home
must have been due to her moving from formula and baby food to
solid food. Finally, respondent remains convinced that at least
some of the DCFS personnel involved in this case were personal
friends of John and Karen K. and were trying to make sure that she
lost her children. She testified to her belief that T.K. was coerced
into recanting her accusation of abuse by Karen.
      In the end, however, respondent stated that she believed it was
in the best interests of E.K. and T.K. to remain with their father in
Wisconsin, but that her parental rights should not be terminated.
She also believed that if D.F. could not be returned to her, custody
of D.F. should be given to her husband’s mother and stepfather,
who live in North Carolina.
      Karen K. testified that she and John made many attempts
between 1994 and 1997 to locate E.K. and T.K. He called
respondent’s mother, who told him that she did not know where
the respondent was. Karen even wrote to a television talk show in
the hope of obtaining publicity that would lead to their finding the
girls. Finally, in 1997, Karen obtained respondent’s phone number
by having a friend pose as a high school classmate of respondent
and call her mother, pretending to be looking for respondent for a
high school reunion. Karen also testified that T.K. admitted to her
that she lied about the source of her bruise because her mother and
grandparents promised her camping trips and a swimming pool.
      Following arguments by counsel and the guardian ad litem,
the court issued its ruling. After summarizing the history of this
case in detail, the court commented on D.F.’s failure to thrive,
observing that although D.F. “did a little better” in respondent’s
care after Family First became involved, the baby “prospered once
not in her care.” In addition, respondent and her husband, “after
months and months of work, really hadn’t resolved the issues in
this case and, indeed, created new issues and new concerns.” The
court then commented on respondent’s history of lying. The court
noted that the lies were not limited to “white lies,” like claiming
to have quit a job rather than having been fired to make herself
look better in the eyes of another. Specifically, the court found that
respondent was not telling the truth about John’s inability to see
E.K. and T.K. from 1993 to 1997. “[I]n fact,” the court stated, “she
withheld or secreted her children from their father during that
period.” The court also concluded that respondent lied about “the
bruise situation” and “put her child up to making a false
statement.” Withholding the older children from their father “for
a period of years is a serious act of neglect.” Having a child falsely
accuse Karen of hitting her was an “extremely serious substantial
act of neglect or misconduct toward a child.” In addition,
“environmental matters on several occasions were serious.” In
sum, the court found “substantial neglect over a period of years,”
under section 1(D)(d) of the Act, based on four factors:
environmental matters, D.F.’s failure to thrive, withholding E.K.
and T.K. from their father, and the “bruise situation.” The court
found three additional grounds for unfitness proven, and two of
the asserted grounds unproven.
      On appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court’s
finding of unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(d) was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 221. However,
before reaching this conclusion, the appellate court interpreted
section 1(D)(d), “substantial neglect of the child if continuous or
repeated” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West 1998)), as requiring acts of
neglect “so severe that giving the offending parent an opportunity
to remediate them would be unconscionable.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at
220.
 
 
ANALYSIS
      The involuntary termination of parental rights upon the
petition of the State is governed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 1998)), and the Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)). A two-step process is mandated.
First, the State must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the parent is “unfit,” as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)). In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). If properly proven, any one of the several
grounds that are enumerated in section 1(D) is sufficient for a
finding of unfitness. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)
(providing that a finding of unfitness may be based on “any one or
more” of the enumerated grounds). If the court makes such a
finding, it will then consider whether it is in the best interests of
the child that parental rights be terminated. See 705 ILCS
405/2–29(2) (West 1998); In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 209 (2001).
      When the respondent parent challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, a reviewing court will reverse a trial court’s finding of
unfitness only where it is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 417. If, however, the question
presented is one of statutory construction, we will review it de
novo. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 418. We, therefore, address the first
question discussed by the appellate court–the interpretation of
section 1(D)(d)–de novo.
 
Substantial Neglect
      Section 1(D)(d) provides that a person may be declared an
unfit parent upon proof of “[s]ubstantial neglect of the child if
continuous or repeated.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West Supp. 1999).
The Act does not define the terms “substantial” or “neglect,” but
does contain a definition of “neglected child”:
“any child whose parent or other person responsible for
the child’s welfare withholds or denies nourishment or
medically indicated treatment *** or otherwise does not
provide the proper or necessary support, education as
required by law, or medical or other remedial care
recognized under State law as necessary for a child’s well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being,
including adequate food, clothing and shelter; or who is
abandoned by his or her parents or other person
responsible for the child’s welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(Q)
(West 1998).
      This definition provides a baseline for a finding of neglect,
but does not distinguish neglect from substantial neglect. In the
absence of a statutory definition indicating legislative intent, an
undefined word must be given its ordinary and popularly
understood meaning. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d  at 211. Webster’s defines
“substantial” as “consisting of, relating to, sharing the nature of,
or constituting substance” and as “considerable in amount, value,
or worth.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280
(1986). Synonyms include “consequential,” “considerable,”
“material,” “meaningful,” “momentous,” “significant,” and
“weighty.”
      As an initial matter, we agree with the appellate court that the
legislature’s use of the term “substantial neglect” in section
1(D)(d) evidences a recognition that there are degrees of parental
neglect, ranging from “neglect” to “substantial neglect.” While
neglect may justify state intervention (see, e.g., 705 ILCS
405/2–3(1) (West 1998)), substantial neglect, if continuous or
repeated, is grounds for the outright termination of parental rights
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West 1998)).
      In its effort to further clarify the meaning of “substantial
neglect,” the appellate court contrasted section 1(D)(d), under
which a parent’s rights may be terminated outright, with certain
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act under which “the parent
responsible for the neglect is given an opportunity to remediate the
circumstances that gave rise to the neglect finding.” 321 Ill. App.
3d at 220. On the basis of this comparison, the appellate court
concluded that the legislature’s use of the modifier “substantial”
in section 1(D)(d) “manifests the legislature’s belief that some
cases of neglect are so heinous that a child’s best interest can only
be served by severance of parental rights without giving the parent
the chance to remediate.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 220. Undoubtedly,
such cases do involve substantial neglect. However, the appellate
court then extended this reasoning even further by concluding that
“when the State alleges unfitness under section 1(D)(d) of the Act,
the instances of 'substantial neglect’ should be such that
remediation would not be an appropriate option.” 321 Ill. App. 3d
at 220. No authority was cited for this conclusion, which
impermissibly reads into the statute a limitation that the legislature
did not express. See In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000).
      Although the appellate court has formulated one possible test
of “substantial neglect,” it is by no means the only possible
standard. For example, substantial neglect could be distinguished
from neglect on the basis of harm–neglect poses a risk of harm,
while substantial neglect causes actual harm or, perhaps,
permanent harm. The legislature could have defined substantial
neglect in any one of a number of ways, but has chosen not to do
so. Instead, the legislature has apparently intended for a trial court
to apply the ordinary meaning of the term “substantial” to the
entire body of evidence before it. Thus, whether remediation was
or might have been attempted and whether actual harm resulted
from the neglect are factors to be considered when assessing the
degree of neglect. Neither is a limitation or condition that
constrains the trial court’s judgment.
      The appellate court’s rigid definition of substantial neglect
also ignores the wide range of factual circumstances in which
these cases arise. For example, the State might proceed initially by
giving a parent the opportunity to remediate but discover as the
case goes on that the neglect has been so extreme, or the
consequences so grave, that it constitutes substantial neglect. In
another case, the State might recognize substantial neglect
initially, but provide remedial services to the parent because the
neglect, while substantial, has not yet been repeated or continuous.
See D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 422 (noting that in cases involving
termination of parental rights, each case is sui generis).
      We must conclude that the legislature intended for the trial
court to determine whether neglect in a given case, proven by clear
and convincing evidence (D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 417) and based on
the totality of circumstances, is substantial. We note that trial
courts are not unfamiliar with the concept of substantiality. A
glance at Black’s Law Dictionary reveals, among other entries, the
substantial-capacity and substantial-step tests in criminal law, the
substantial-certainty test and the substantial similarity-standard in
copyright law, the substantial-continuity doctrine in corporate law,
the substantial-factor test in tort law, and the doctrine of
substantial performance in the law of contracts. Black’s Law
Dictionary 1442-43 (7th ed. 1999). The adjective “substantial” is
not in need of precise and inflexible definition. Substantial neglect
is a matter of degree, and one which the trial court, as the finder of
fact, is in the best position to assess.
      We find, therefore, that the appellate court’s unduly restrictive
definition of the statutory term “substantial neglect” is in error.
There being no need for the creation of a bright-line rule to divide
neglect from substantial neglect, the proper role of a reviewing
court in this case is to determine whether the trial court’s finding
of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.N.,
196 Ill. 2d  at 208. A determination will be found to be against the
manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident (C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208) or the determination is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented
(Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106
(1995)). Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, we
give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is
in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
parties and the witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with the
evidence that a reviewing court cannot possibly obtain. A
reviewing court, therefore, must not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.
In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 204 (1997).
      The trial court, in its comments from the bench, stated that its
finding of substantial neglect was based on four factors: (1) the
unsanitary conditions in respondent’s home, (2) D.F.’s failure to
thrive, (3) respondent’s withholding E.K. and T.K. from their
father for several years, and (4) respondent’s manipulation of T.K.
into making false accusations of physical abuse against Karen K.
The implication was that even if no single one of these, standing
alone, constituted substantial neglect, the cumulative effect of all
four was substantial and affected all three children.
      Neglect may take many forms. The statutory definition of a
neglected child mentions, inter alia, lack of proper nourishment,
denial of needed medical care, lack of education, failure to provide
adequate clothing and shelter, and abandonment. 750 ILCS
50/1(Q) (West 1998). Section 1(D)(d) does not require that one
single form of neglect be proven to be substantial. We agree with
the trial court that substantial neglect may result from the
cumulative effect of several forms of neglect. As this court
observed many years ago, “[n]eglect *** is the failure to exercise
the care that the circumstances justly demand. It embraces wilful
as well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of fixed
and measured meaning. It takes its content always from specific
circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of
surrounding circumstances changes.” People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624 (1952).
      Respondent argues, however, that of the four bases relied on
by the trial court, only the second, failure to thrive, was relevant
to D.F. The first reported instance of environmental neglect
occurred prior to her birth, so that her exposure to unsanitary
conditions in the home was neither continuous nor repeated. She
also asserts that the third and fourth bases relate only to the older
girls. Similarly, she argues that D.F.’s failure to thrive cannot be
considered a factor in assessing the degree of neglect of T.K. and
E.K.
      D.F.’s situation differed from that of her half-sisters in several
respects. She alone was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to
thrive syndrome and was in need of SPICE services to overcome
her developmental delay. She was too young to have been directly
affected by respondent’s habit of lying and of inducing her
children to lie on her behalf.
      This court has never had occasion to consider whether
evidence supporting a finding of unfitness as to one of a parent’s
children may serve as a basis for a finding of unfitness as to
another child. We agree with the numerous appellate court
decisions that have concluded that such evidence may be relevant.
See In re G.V., 292 Ill. App. 3d 301, 307 (1997) (evidence that
respondent failed to protect child who was killed by her paramour
could serve as basis for termination of parental rights to other
child); In re S.H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 392, 400-01 (1996) (evidence
of respondent’s sexual abuse of one child may serve as basis for
terminating of parental rights to other children, even when the
evidence relates to events that occurred prior to the birth of some
of the children); In re Henry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 792 (1988)
(even though two of the respondent mother’s eight children were
born after she had been found unfit with regard to older children,
the trial court properly considered her earlier neglect as a basis for
finding her unfit with regard to the infants). We conclude that
depending on the type of neglect alleged, evidence of neglect
toward one child may be relevant to the question of a parent’s
fitness with respect to another child.
      In the present case, E.K. and T.K. lived in extremely
unsanitary conditions, twice resulting in DCFS intervention. The
testimony regarding filthy floors, spoiled food, and cat feces
throughout the home on two separate occasions, several years
apart, supports a finding that the environmental neglect was not
only severe, but was, at best, repeated, and at worst, continuous.
They had poor personal hygiene that resulted not only in dirty hair
and skin, but offensive body odor. Their dental needs were
neglected to the point that T.K. had an abscessed tooth and several
that were bordering on that condition. The dentist stated that she
must have been in extreme pain. Indeed, when dental care was
finally provided to her by her father, respondent interfered. In
addition, respondent deliberately kept E.K. and T.K. hidden from
their father for four years, during which she moved seven times.
She married a convicted sex offender and remained with him
despite being informed of the risk to the girls. Only after an
incident of domestic violence and a second notification by DCFS
of his status as a sex offender did she separate from her second
husband. Respondent pressured T.K. to make a false accusation
against her stepmother. The record also demonstrates that she was
in the habit of making the girls lie for her, as when E.K. would be
sent to answer the door to falsely tell caseworkers that her mother
was not at home. The trial court concluded that these various
forms of neglect, considered as a whole, constituted substantial
neglect “over a period of years.”
      Having reviewed the record in detail, we cannot say that the
trial court’s determination of substantial and continuous neglect of
E.K. and T.K. was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence presented. We, therefore, reverse the appellate court, and
hold that the trial court properly found respondent unfit as to E.K.
and T.K. on the basis of section 1(D)(d) of the Act.
      Respondent argues, however, that the evidence at the fitness
hearing was not sufficient to support the judge’s finding that she
withheld E.K. and T.K. from their father for four years and that,
therefore, this particular form of neglect cannot be considered part
of a pattern of overall neglect. We disagree. Karen K., whom the
trial court specifically found to be a credible witness, testified
regarding the efforts she and John K. made from 1993 to 1997 to
locate his daughters. She described eventually having to resort to
the pretext of a class reunion and having a third party contact
respondent’s mother, who had previously denied knowing
respondent’s whereabouts. Karen’s testimony was corroborated,
in part, by respondent’s own testimony in which she
acknowledged frequent moves and name changes and admitted
that she did not notify the circuit court of Du Page County, which
had retained jurisdiction over issues related to her divorce from
John, of her address changes. In addition, the trial court took
judicial notice of relevant portions of the case file, which further
corroborated Karen’s testimony regarding their unsuccessful
efforts to locate the girls for several years. And, finally, the trial
court found that respondent lied on repeated occasions to
caseworkers, therapists, and to the court, thus making her denials
on this issue unworthy of belief. Her refusal, as late as August of
1998, to allow E.K. and T.K. to speak on the telephone to their
father, and her telling the girls that she was doing so because there
was a court order prohibiting it, further undermined her credibility
when she disclaimed any deliberate hiding of the girls from their
father. In the end, the trial court’s findings of fact with regard to
this particular form of neglect were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
      As to D.F., even if the other grounds affecting her sisters are
not considered, her failure to thrive combined with the horrendous
conditions of the home could be deemed substantial neglect. At
the time D.F. was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive, her
weight was so low that it was below the first percentile on the
weight charts. After respondent was instructed on the proper way
to feed the baby, she was still in the habit of leaving D.F. in the
walker with a bottle, expecting the child to feed herself. After
being instructed to get rid of the walker, respondent continued to
use it, hiding it when caseworkers or service providers were in the
home. On one occasion, after D.F. was placed in foster care,
respondent, during supervised visitation, placed the baby on her
back on a table and handed her a bottle. Not until the caseworker
intervened, pointing out that the formula was draining down the
baby’s neck onto the table, did respondent pick her up to feed her
properly. Respondent’s neglect of D.F.’s nutritional and bonding
needs resulted in her very low weight and in developmental delay
that required therapy. Again, we cannot say that the trial court’s
determination of substantial neglect based on respondent’s
responsibility for D.F.’s failure to thrive and on the unsanitary
conditions under which D.F. lived for several months, at a time
when she was old enough to be crawling on filthy, feces-strewn
floors, was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence
presented. The neglect was also continuous, beginning in D.F.’s
infancy, before the diagnosis of failure to thrive was made, and
continuing even during supervised visits with the child.
      Respondent argues, however, that the State should be
estopped from relying on the diagnosis of failure to thrive as a
basis for finding her unfit. Citing no authority for such an
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, she asserts that
because the trial court dismissed the allegation of neglect based on
D.F.’s failure to thrive as part of the original neglect adjudication,
the State may not now use that allegation as a basis for finding her
unfit. She claims that, in effect, she gave up her right to litigate
this claim when she stipulated to the allegations of environmental
neglect in return for the State’s agreement to dismiss the failure to
thrive allegation.
      She is mistaken. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies
only when the point or question at issue was fully litigated in a
previous case and there was a final judgment on the merits. The
doctrine is not applicable to other matters that might have been
litigated. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390
(2001). The dismissal of the initial allegation of neglect based on
failure to thrive did not constitute a decision on the merits. See In
re Chilean D., 304 Ill. App. 3d 580 (1999) (the State voluntarily
withdrew the petition to terminate parental rights after the finding
of unfitness, but before consideration of the best interests of the
child; thus, the unfitness finding was not a final adjudication on
the merits and the parent cannot be estopped from relitigating
fitness in the future). In any event, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel requires “two separate and consecutive cases arising on
different causes of action.” Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d  at 389. The present
case, although taking place in several stages, does not meet this
requirement for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
      Respondent next argues that the environmental neglect cannot
have been substantial because the State did not act immediately to
remove all three children from the home. Respondent cites no
authority for this assertion and we find none. We conclude that the
fact that the children were left, for a time, in respondent’s home
despite its appalling conditions goes to the weight the finder of
fact might give to this information. As we observed earlier, even
if the environmental neglect, standing alone, was not substantial,
it was part of an overall pattern of neglect that was substantial.
      Respondent also asserts that she has remedied the
environmental conditions that gave rise to the initial adjudication
of neglect, pointing to the trial court’s ruling that the State failed
to prove that she had not made reasonable progress. If a finding of
substantial neglect is based on her “dirty house,” she argues, then
the provisions in the Act relating to reasonable progress and
reasonable efforts (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)), “would be
rendered superfluous” because a parent could make both
reasonable progress and reasonable efforts, but still be found unfit
based on section 1(D)(d).
      The finding of substantial neglect was not based entirely on
the condition of the house. Rather, the environmental neglect was
one of several factors that contributed to the trial court’s finding
of substantial neglect. In any event, respondent’s argument about
the interplay between sections 1(D)(d) and 1(D)(m) is without
merit. The grounds for a finding of unfitness contained in section
1(D) of the Act are listed in the alternative. Thus, the legislature
clearly intended that a parent could make both reasonable efforts
and reasonable progress, defeating allegations of unfitness
pursuant to section 1(D)(m), and still be found unfit based on one
of the other listed grounds. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998).
Reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are not affirmative
defenses that can be raised by a parent to refute an allegation of
neglect under one of the other subsections of 1(D). Rather, lack of
reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are separate and distinct
bases for a finding of unfitness. A parent in respondent’s position,
who has been found unfit on another ground, may certainly argue
to the trial court at the best interests stage that her efforts and
progress demonstrate that it would be in the best interests of the
children for her to retain parental rights.
      In sum, we find that the trial court’s judgment that respondent
is unfit based on her substantial and continuous neglect of E.K.,
T.K., and D.F. is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the trial
court’s ruling on this matter, is reversed.
 
Vagueness
      Because parental rights may be terminated upon proof, by
clear and convincing evidence, of a single statutory ground for
unfitness, it is unnecessary to consider whether section 1(D)(h) of
the Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(h) (West 1998)) is unconstitutionally
vague, as held by the appellate court. We, therefore, vacate that
portion of the appellate court’s judgment.
      Similarly, we need not consider the appellate court’s ruling
with regard to the other two grounds upon which the trial court
found respondent unfit.
 
Motion for Substitution of Judge
      Section 2–1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a party
to a civil action to petition for a substitution of judge for any one
of several enumerated reasons. 735 ILCS 5/2–1001 (West 1998).
Respondent sought a substitution of judge for cause, pursuant to
section 2–1001(a)(3), and a hearing was held as required. 735
ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(3) (West 1998). The judge who presided at the
hearing determined that respondent had not shown cause and
denied the motion.
      Respondent argued before the appellate court that the trial
court erred by denying her motion for substitution of judge for
cause. The appellate court rejected her argument but did not
review the merits of the trial court’s ruling. Instead, the appellate
court found her motion untimely because it was filed before the
State filed its petition to terminate parental rights, which according
to the appellate court, “initiated an entirely new proceeding.” 321
Ill. App. 3d at 224. The appellate court then commented that if the
respondent had filed a motion for substitution as of right pursuant
to section 2–1001(2) (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(2) (West 1998)), and
done so promptly upon the State’s filing of the termination
petition, it would have been error for the trial court to deny it. 321
Ill. App. 3d at 224.
      The State, as appellant, argues to this court that the appellate
court’s additional comments are dicta and urges this court to
vacate that portion of the appellate court’s judgment or else to
address the issue on the merits. In addition, the State points out
that the appellate court offered no authority for its conclusion that
the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, in a case that
has been proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act for several
years, “begins a new case within that case number.” 321 Ill. App.
3d at 224. Respondent argues, in turn, that if the termination
proceedings are new proceedings that permit either party to obtain
a substitution of judge as of right, the new proceeding should be
deemed to have begun when the permanency goal is changed to
substitute care pending determination on a petition to terminate
parental rights.
      After a careful review of the transcripts of the hearing on
respondent’s petition for substitution and of the hearing in which
she asserts the judge displayed some bias towards her, we
conclude that the judge’s comments, while critical of respondent’s
credibility, did not demonstrate bias against her. We, therefore,
affirm the judgment of the trial court denying respondent’s motion
for substitution for cause. We need not consider the issue raised
sua sponte by the appellate court–whether the motion was
timely–because the motion failed on the merits. The remainder of
the appellate court’s discussion of this issue, concluding that the
filing of a petition to terminate parental rights initiates an entirely
new proceeding, is dicta, which we vacate.
 
CONCLUSION
      For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of the
judgment of the appellate court which reversed the circuit court’s
termination of respondent’s parental rights under section 1(D)(d).
We vacate that part of the appellate court’s judgment which held
section 1(D)(h) unconstitutional. We affirm that part of the
appellate court’s judgment which affirmed the circuit court’s
denial of respondent’s motion for a substitution of judge, but we
reject the rationale offered by the appellate court. The judgment of
the circuit court is affirmed.
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part,
 vacated in part, and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 
      JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.