Case Title: State v. Tahash

Citation: 136 N.W.2d 617

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1965-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
136 N.W.2d 617 (1965) STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Raymond SMITH, Appellant, v. Ralph H. TAHASH, Warden, Minnesota State Prison, Respondent. No. 39665. Supreme Court of Minnesota. August 20, 1965. Donald E. Gross, St. Paul, for appellant. Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., Gerard W. Snell, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent. SHERAN, Justice. Appeal from an order of the district court denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing. The petition for the writ verified July 17, 1964, was venued in the District Court of Washington County. In substance, it asserts that the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the crime of robbery in the second degree when arraigned and charged by information with having committed the crime of robbery in the first degree; that he was not guilty of the offense charged in the information or the lesser offense to which he pleaded guilty; and that the plea entered by him was not voluntary. The trial court was of the opinion that a fact hearing was not warranted for the reason, among others, that the allegations mentioned "are in conflict with the record and are sham and frivolous." The petitioner, born March 9, 1940, was raised on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. He had little education and no knowledge or understanding of the law. He asserts *618 in effect that the crime charged was committed by Abraham Smith (a brother) and that he did not participate in the theft himself or aid in its accomplishment. The petition asserts that the plea of guilty to robbery in the second degree was entered only because the defendant was advised by court-appointed counsel that "he would face prison terms of seven years for each of two alleged escapes from the County Jail and forty years for conviction of First Degree robbery" if he did not plead guilty to second-degree robbery. The petition also states: The testimony given initially by Raymond Smith with respect to his claimed participation in the offense was, in part, as follows: Had no further testimony been taken it would have been the duty of the trial court to reject the plea of guilty.[1] However, further testimony was taken after a recess declared by the trial judge at the request of the defendant's court-appointed counsel. It is petitioner's claim that during this recess he was induced to testify to participation in the offense upon the representation that the trial judge would not accept the plea of guilty in light of the answers that had been given. What actually occurred during the recess we cannot tell from the record before us, but the transcript of the proceedings relevant to the plea of guilty discloses that at the conclusion of the recess the defendant was interrogated by his own attorney as follows: The court then ordered a presentence investigation. Later, in open court with the defendant and his attorney present, the county attorney moved that defendant be sentenced on the charge of robbery in the second degree. The court inquired as to whether either counsel wished to say anything before sentence was pronounced and both declined. Sentence was then imposed by the court in this way: The situation in summary is one where a man is confined following conviction for a felony of which he could not be guilty were his original representations to the court true. There is nothing in the record to explain why, following the recess, defendant changed his testimony so as to admit facts which, if true, made him guilty of robbery in the first degree. The relevant statutes in force when the alleged crime was committed are Minn.St. 1961, §§ 619.41, 619.42, 619.43, and 610.12. Section 619.41 provided: Section 619.42 provided: *621 Section 619.43 provided: Section 610.12 provided: In light of the recent decisions of this court in State ex rel. Dinneen v. Tahash, Minn., 136 N.W.2d 847, filed July 23, 1965, and State v. DeCloux, Minn., 136 N.W.2d 657, filed August 6, 1965, we feel that the better course under the circumstances will be to hear the available evidence in support of defendant's claim and in rebuttal thereto. The trial court can then make the findings of fact and conclusions of law needed to set at rest, one way or the other, the claim of the defendant that he was induced to recant his testimony with respect to the occurrence only because he felt that if he failed to do so he would and could be severely punished. The likelihood that this was the case may be remote. But in our judgment, the averments of Raymond Smith coupled with the proceedings disclosed by the transcript of the arraignment make a hearing advisable. We remand this case to the district court for a fact hearing on the question of whether the plea of guilty was voluntarily made. If it was, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied on the merits. If it was not, the plea should be vacated and the defendant tried or otherwise released. Remanded to the district court for a fact hearing. [1] See, State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153; State v. Olson, 270 Minn. 329, 133 N.W.2d 489.