Case Title: Latola v. Turk

Citation: 247 N.W.2d 598

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
247 N.W.2d 598 (1976) Cela LATOLA, et al., Petitioners, v. Fred TURK, et al., Respondents. No. 46019. Supreme Court of Minnesota. October 1, 1976. Harper, Eaton, Gustafson, James Harper and Earl B. Gustafson, Duluth, for petitioners. Fred Cina, John L. Holland, Aurora, Ben Constantine, Eveleth, for respondents. Considered and decided by the court en banc. PER CURIAM. The opinion filed on October 10, 1975, in this case is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted in its place. Petitioners seek a writ of quo warranto to test the right of certain town officers to hold office. The challenged officeholders are all residents of the city of Aurora but hold office in the town of White, St. Louis County, Minnesota. These officers were elected by the voters of both the town of White and the city of Aurora. The two governmental units maintain separate taxing districts. We decline to issue the writ. The facts necessary to dispose of the issue presented to us have been stipulated by the parties. The stipulated facts are: The parties could not agree on the facts relative to revenues received and expenditures made by the town of White and the city of Aurora. However, these facts are not necessary to dispose of the issue presented to us, namely, the right of the voters of the city of Aurora to vote in town elections and the right of residents of the city to hold public office in the town of White. The city of Aurora is located within the geographical boundaries of the town of White. A town is merely a political subdivision of a county. L.1858, c. 75. Thus, residents of the city of Aurora who are qualified to vote may vote in both city and county elections. Eligibility to vote in town elections is also provided by statute, Minn.St. 365.57. Minn.St. 365.44 provides a procedure to separate towns from cities for election purposes: An immediate inference from the emphasized language in this quotation is that on all other matters voters residing within the statutory city are entitled to vote at the town meeting, at least until separation occurs. Since separation is "for all purposes," it follows that city residents could not vote in town elections after separation. Petitioners seek to attack Minn.St. 365.44 on the ground it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they point out that under the statutory language the residents of the town of White are precluded from securing a separation election since there are more than two congressional districts located therein and their assessed valuation exceeds $1,500,000. We decline to reach this issue on the record before us. A determination of the equal protection issue, irrespective of which standard is applied, requires presentation in an adversary setting of considerably more factual information than is included in the stipulated facts submitted herewith. Further, there may be other townships affected by such a determination and they should have a right to present their positions in making a record for review by this court. A declaratory judgment action attacking the constitutionality of the statute, with notice to the attorney general, is an appropriate method of developing a proper record for review by this court. Petitioners suggest that since the governmental units constitute separate taxing districts, they must be treated as separate voting districts even though no separation has occurred. We decline to reach this question since it will be moot if separation is effected pursuant to the motion adopted at the March 1975 town meeting. If separation is not effected, this matter can be brought before the district court in mandamus proceedings to test the validity of the present taxing procedures. State ex rel. Marr v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75 N.W. 210 (1898), reversed on other grounds, 179 U.S. 223, 21 S. Ct. 73, 45 L. Ed. 162 (1900). Writ denied.