Case Title: PATRICK MANN SR V ST CLAIR COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122845

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 30, 2004 
PATRICK MANN, SR., AND GAYLE MANN,
INDIVIDUALLY and as next friend of 
PATRICK MANN, JR., MINOR, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 122845 
ST. CLAIR COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.   
The sole issue before the Court is whether the safety 
belt use statute’s cap on the reduction of damages, MCL 
257.710e(6), applies when suit is brought against a county 
road commission under the highway exception to governmental 
immunity. 
MCL 257.710e(6) provides that a plaintiff’s 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or 
operation of a motor vehicle can be reduced by no more than 
five percent because of a plaintiff’s failure to wear a 
safety belt. 
We adopt Justice Boyle’s concurrence in 
Klinke v Mitsubishi Motors Corp, 
458 Mich 582; 581 NW2d 
 
 
 
 
272 (1998), and hold that MCL 257.710e(6) by its express 
terms limits application of its cap on the reduction of 
damages to cases arising under the no-fault act, MCL 
500.3101 et seq. Here the plaintiffs’ claim is not brought 
under the no-fault act; instead, the suit is based on the 
civil liability of a county road commission for its 
maintenance of a highway under the highway exception to 
governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402. 
Thus, the safety 
belt statute’s cap on reduction of damages does not apply. 
We reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the 
trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an 
order consistent with this opinion. 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 26, 1997, Patrick Mann, Sr., lost control 
of his pickup truck after he left the roadway and attempted 
to bring his vehicle back onto the paved surface. 
Mann 
collided with a tree on the side of the roadway, resulting 
in injures to both himself and Patrick Mann, Jr. 
There is 
a dispute over whether the Manns were wearing their safety 
belts during the accident. 
Patrick Mann, Sr., and Gayle Mann, for herself and as 
next friend of Patrick Mann, Jr., a minor, brought suit, 
alleging that the accident was caused by a roadway “edge 
drop,” and that defendant, the county road commission, is 
2  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
liable under the highway exception to governmental immunity 
for failing to keep the roadway in reasonable repair.1 
Defendant 
seeks 
to 
offer 
at 
trial 
testimony 
of 
a 
biomechanical 
expert 
that 
the 
vehicle 
occupants 
(plaintiffs) were not wearing safety belts at the time of 
the accident and that they would have escaped with minor, 
superficial injuries had they been wearing safety belts. 
Before trial, defendant brought a motion in limine, 
asking that the circuit court enter an order holding that 
the safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction of damages, 
MCL 257.710e(6), does not apply. 
If the safety belt 
statute’s cap were to apply, then plaintiffs’ negligence in 
failing to wear a safety belt could reduce their damages by 
no more than five percent. 
Defendant sought to have 
plaintiffs’ damages reduced by more than that amount under 
common-law comparative negligence. 
Following argument on 
defendant’s motion in limine, the trial court denied 
defendant’s motion. The trial court declined to extend the 
rationale of Klinke, beyond a products liability action, 
and held that the safety belt statute’s cap on reduction of 
damages does apply. 
1 For purposes of this appeal, we accept plaintiffs’
allegations as true. 
3  
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s application 
for leave for an interlocutory appeal and affirmed. 
254 
Mich App 86; 657 NW2d 517 (2002). This Court granted leave 
to appeal, limiting the grant to “whether the limitation on 
the reduction of damages based on a plaintiff’s negligence 
established by MCL 257.710e(6) applies in this case.” 
Mich 942 (2003). 
ANALYSIS 
468 
The issue before us is whether the safety belt 
statute’s cap on the reduction of damages, MCL 257.710e(6), 
applies to a suit against a county road commission brought 
under the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 
691.1402. 
This case presents a question of statutory 
interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. 
Stozicki v 
Allied Paper Co, Inc, 464 Mich 257, 263; 627 NW2d 293 
(2001). 
A 
Before 1985, evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to use 
a safety belt was not admissible in any tort action. 
Romankewiz v Black, 16 Mich App 119; 167 NW2d 606 (1969). 
In 1985, the Legislature adopted a safety belt law, MCL 
257.710e, requiring front safety passengers in automobiles 
to wear safety belts and providing that failure to use a 
safety belt “may be considered evidence of negligence and 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.” 
MCL 257.710e(6). 
The safety belt law limits the amount by 
which recovery for damages may be reduced to no more than 
five percent of the damages: “such negligence shall not 
reduce the recovery for damages by more than five percent.” 
MCL 257.710e(6). 
Two years later, in deciding an automobile products 
liability action, this Court held that under the common-law 
a plaintiff’s failure to wear a safety belt could be used 
at trial for purposes of comparative negligence. 
Lowe v 
Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439; 410 NW2d 706 (1987). 
In 
Lowe the accident occurred before the effective date of MCL 
257.710e, and the Court’s decision was not based on the 
statute. 
As a result, in a tort suit there are two alternative 
grounds for admitting evidence of the failure to use a 
safety 
belt—the 
safety 
belt 
statute 
or 
common-law 
comparative negligence.2  The primary difference between the 
2 In this case, if the evidence of plaintiffs’ failure
to wear safety belts were not admitted under the safety
belt statute, it would be admitted under the common law for
the purpose of comparative negligence. MCL 691.1412 of the 
governmental immunity act provides that “[c]laims under 
5  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
two is that when evidence of the failure to use a safety 
belt is admitted under the safety belt statute, there is a 
five percent cap on the reduction of damages; when evidence 
of the failure to use a safety belt is admitted under 
common-law comparative negligence, the safety belt statute 
and its cap do not apply. 
B 
The question here is whether the safety belt statute’s 
cap on the reduction of damages, MCL 257.710e(6), applies 
to 
a 
suit 
brought 
under 
the 
highway 
exception 
to 
governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402. 
The safety belt statute, MCL 257.710e, requires the 
use of safety belts in an automobile.3  It allows evidence 
of the failure to use a safety belt to be admitted in court 
(…continued) 
this act are subject to all of the defenses available to 
claims sounding in tort brought against private persons.”  
3 MCL 257.710e(3) states: 
Each driver and front safety passenger of a
motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in
this state shall wear a properly adjusted and
fastened safety belt, except that a child less
than 4 years of age shall be protected as 
required in section 710d. If there are more 
passengers than safety belts available for use,
and all safety belts in the motor vehicle are
being utilized in compliance with this section,
the driver of the motor vehicle is in compliance
with this section. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
to 
prove 
comparative 
negligence, 
while 
limiting 
the 
reduction for recovery of damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle to 
no more than five percent: 
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation
of this section may be considered evidence of
negligence and may reduce the recovery for 
damages 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.
However, such negligence shall not reduce the
recovery for damages by more than five percent.
[MCL 257.710e(6).] 
We hold that the safety belt statute’s cap on the 
reduction of damages is applicable only to tort actions 
brought under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. 
By its own terms, § 710e(6) is limited to “damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of 
a motor vehicle.” 
A loss involving the ownership, 
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a 
motor vehicle is a “motor vehicle accident” under the no­
fault act.4
 Tort liability arising from the ownership, 
4 MCL 500.3101(2)(f) provides: 
“Motor 
vehicle 
accident” 
means 
a 
loss 
involving the ownership, operation, maintenance,
or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle 
regardless of whether the accident also involves
the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of
a motorcycle as a motorcycle. 
7  
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle within Michigan has 
been abolished, allowing for certain exceptions within MCL 
500.5135(3).5
 Thus, the cap on reduction of damages for 
(…continued) 
The no-fault act applies to motor vehicle accidents  
occurring on or after October 1, 1973. MCL 500.3179.  
5 MCL 500.3135(3) provides: 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, tort liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance, or use within this state of a motor
vehicle with respect to which the security
required by section 3101 was in effect is 
abolished except as to: 
(a) Intentionally caused harm to persons or
property. Even though a person knows that harm to
persons or property is substantially certain to
be caused by his or her act or omission, the
person does not cause or suffer that harm 
intentionally if he or she acts or refrains from
acting for the purpose of averting injury to any
person, including himself or herself, or for the
purpose of averting damage to tangible property. 
(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided
and limited in subsections (1) and (2). 
(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work 
loss, and survivor's loss as defined in sections
3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly, and
3-year limitations contained in those sections.
The party liable for damages is entitled to an
exemption reducing his or her liability by the 
amount of taxes that would have been payable on
account of income the injured person would have
received if he or she had not been injured. 
(d) 
Damages 
for 
economic 
loss 
by 
a 
nonresident in excess of the personal protection
insurance 
benefits 
provided 
under 
section 
8  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
failure to wear a safety belt, § 710e(6), can only apply in 
those limited tort suits allowed under the no-fault act.6 
As Justice Boyle stated in her concurrence in Klinke, supra 
at 594 “[t]he fact that the safety belt statute tracks the 
language of the no-fault act demonstrates the Legislature’s 
clear intent to apply the five-percent limitation on 
reduction of damages for a plaintiff’s negligence within 
the context of the no-fault act.” 
The question in this case is whether the safety belt 
statute’s cap on the reduction of damages applies when suit 
is brought against a county road commission under the 
(…continued)
3163(4). Damages under this subdivision are not
recoverable to the extent that benefits covering
the same loss are available from other sources,
regardless of the nature or number of benefit
sources available and regardless of the nature or
form of the benefits. 
(e) Damages up to $500.00 to motor vehicles,
to the extent that the damages are not covered by
insurance. An action for damages pursuant to this
subdivision shall be conducted in compliance with
subsection (4). 
6 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our holding is
not based solely on the similarity of language in the
safety belt statute and the no-fault act. 
Rather, as
explained above, we recognize that the terms of the safety
belt statute limit its applicability to motor vehicle 
accidents under the no-fault act. 
Thus, the only tort
suits to which the safety belt statute will apply are those
allowed under the no-fault act. 
9  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
highway exception to governmental immunity. 
We hold that 
because the plaintiff’s suit was not brought under the no­
fault act, the safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction 
of damages, § 710e(6), does not apply.7 
C 
The safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction of 
damages is also inapplicable in this case because the 
plaintiffs do not allege that their damages arose out of 
the “ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor 
vehicle.” 
Rather, plaintiffs allege that the accident and 
their damages were caused by a roadway “edge drop,” and 
7 Because we conclude that this cap only applies to
cases arising under the no-fault act, and that since this
case does not arise under the no-fault act the safety belt
statute’s cap on the reduction of damages does not apply,
we 
do not address whether the application of the cap in
this case would violate the Title-Object Clause. 
But we note that in its analysis the Court of Appeals
applied the wrong test to determine whether the Title-
Object Clause was violated. 
The Court of Appeals panel
reasoned that applying the safety belt cap in a suit for a
defective highway did not violate the scope of the title of
the Vehicle Code because “there is a natural correlation or 
connection between governmental liability for failing to
maintain a highway in reasonable repair and the Michigan
Vehicle Code, which governs the operation of vehicles on
those same public highways.” 
254 Mich App 99. 
The proper
test for determining whether a statute violates the Title-
Object Clause is whether it contains “subjects diverse in
their nature and having no necessary connection,” People ex 
rel Drake v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 494-495 (1865), Pohutski 
v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 691; 641 NW2d 219
(2002), not whether there is a “natural correlation or
connection.” 
10  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
that defendant is liable under the highway exception to 
governmental immunity for failing to keep the roadway in 
reasonable repair. 
Plaintiffs allege that their damages 
arose from the failure to keep the roadway in reasonable 
repair, not from the ownership, maintenance, or operation 
of a motor vehicle. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals panel held that 
the safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction of damages 
applied here, in a suit under the highway exception to 
governmental immunity, because the damages did arise out of 
the operation of a motor vehicle.8
 This is an incorrect 
8 The Court of Appeals opinion stated: 
Subsection 710e(6) does not provide that 
“liability” must arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle, but rather that “damages” must so
arise, and subsection 710e(6) does not provide
that damages must arise out of the operation of a
particular party’s motor vehicle, but rather only
that the damages arise out of the operation of a 
motor vehicle. 
Therefore, the clear language of
subsection 710e(6) required only that plaintiffs
suffered damages arising out of the operation of
a motor vehicle as alleged here. 
If plaintiffs
had not been operating a motor vehicle, there
would not have been an accident, injuries, and
damages. 
The operation of a motor vehicle was a
necessary component giving rise to plaintiffs’
cause of action, and there was a nexus between
their damages and the operation of a motor 
vehicle. 
[254 Mich App 86, 103; 657 NW2d 517
(2002).] 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
interpretation of “damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.” 
This Court has construed almost identical language, 
“tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or 
use within this state of a motor vehicle,” as referring to 
liability caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a 
motor vehicle. 
Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 
Mich 536, 544; 309 NW2d 174 (1981). 
In Tuttle, the 
liability arose from the defendant’s improper keeping of 
his cow, not the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor 
vehicle. 
Here the damages arose from the improper 
maintenance of the highway, not the ownership, maintenance, 
or operation of a motor vehicle. 
This interpretation is in accord with the Court of 
Appeals decision in Klinke v Mitsubishi Motors Corp, 219 
Mich App 500; 556 NW2d 528 (1996), written by Judge 
Markman, and with Justice Boyle’s concurring opinion in 
Klinke, 458 Mich 595 n 5, which recognized that there 
“[t]he 
only 
damages 
‘arising 
out 
of 
the 
ownership, 
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle’ in this 
litigation are the damages caused by plaintiff’s fault. To 
the extent that plaintiff’s damages were caused by a 
product defect, they do not arise out of ‘ownership, 
12  
 
 
maintenance, or operation.’ 
Thus, the five-percent cap 
would not apply.” 
In Klinke the Court of Appeals concluded that the five 
percent cap on the reduction of damages for failure to wear 
a safety belt found in the Vehicle Code does not apply to 
products 
liability 
actions 
against 
automobile 
manufacturers. 
“[B]y its plain meaning, this provision is 
expressly limited to damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle.’” 
219 Mich 
App 509. 
“Conspicuously absent is any reference to the 
design or construction of a motor vehicle. 
Even the most 
liberal interpretation of the words ‘ownership,’ ‘common 
maintenance’ and ‘operation’ cannot stretch far enough to 
include design and construction.” Id., quoting LaHue v Gen 
Motors Corp, 716 F Supp 412 (WD Mo, 1989). 
Likewise, even the most liberal interpretation of the 
words “ownership,” “common maintenance,” and “operation” 
cannot stretch far enough to include maintenance of a 
highway. Plaintiffs here are attempting to recover damages 
arising out of the road commission’s failure to maintain 
the highway; they are not attempting to recover damages 
arising out of “the ownership, maintenance, or operation of 
a motor vehicle.” 
In other words, plaintiffs are not 
seeking damages for the “operation of a motor vehicle”; 
13  
 
 
 
rather, they are seeking damages for the road commission’s 
failure to maintain the highway in a condition reasonably 
safe and fit for travel. 
Because the plaintiffs’ suit is based on the civil 
liability of a county road commission for its maintenance 
of a highway, the safety belt statute’s cap on reduction of 
damages does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion in 
limine to preclude application of the five percent damage 
reduction cap in MCL 257.710e(6). We reverse the decisions 
of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and remand the 
case to the trial court for entry of an order granting 
defendant’s motion, consistent with this opinion. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PATRICK MANN, SR., and GAYE MANN,
individually and as next friend of
PATRICK MANN, JR., minor, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
No. 122845 
ST. CLAIR COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I would find that the five percent cap on damage 
reduction for failure to wear one's safety belt applies to 
a suit brought under the highway exception to governmental 
immunity. 
This would be consistent with my dissenting 
opinion in Klinke v Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, 458 Mich 
582; 581 NW2d 272 (1998). 
Statutory Analysis 
The safety belt statute provides: 
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation
of this section may be considered evidence of
negligence and may reduce the recovery for 
damages 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.
However, such negligence shall not reduce the
recovery for damages by more than 5%. [MCL
257.710e(6).] 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The majority holds that, in an action pleaded in 
avoidance of governmental immunity premised on the highway 
exception, plaintiff's damages do not "arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle." 
It bases this conclusion on the fact that the Legislature 
used similar language in the no-fault act.1
 That act 
provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
tort 
liability 
arising 
from 
the 
ownership,
maintenance, or use within this state of a motor
vehicle . . . is abolished . . . . [MCL
500.3135(3).] 
Although similarity exists in the language of the two 
statutes, it is deceptive and should not be taken to 
indicate that the Legislature intended identical results 
when applying them. A comparison of the two reveals that 
they 
are 
not 
identical. 
The 
difference 
in 
the 
Legislature's choice of language is telling. 
1 The majority maintains that its holding is not based
solely on the similarity in the language of the safety belt
statute and the no-fault act. It insists instead that "the 
terms of the safety belt statute limit its applicability to
motor vehicle accidents under the no-fault act." Ante at 9 
n 6. 
However, the safety belt statute makes no reference
to the no-fault act. 
Therefore, despite its assertion to
the contrary, the majority bases this conclusion solely on
the fact that the Legislature used similar language in the
no-fault act. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The no-fault act refers to "liability arising from the 
ownership, maintenance, or use . . . of a motor vehicle 
. . . ."  The safety belt law refers to "damages arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor 
vehicle." Here, plaintiffs' damages arose out the operation 
of the vehicle. The majority maintains that plaintiffs are 
not seeking damages "for" the operation of a motor vehicle. 
Ante at 14. 
However, that misconstrues the safety belt 
statute. By definition, the liability arising from an act 
and the damages caused by it are not identical. I agree 
with the Court of Appeals analysis: 
[MCL 257.710e(6)] does not provide that 
"liability" must arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle, but rather that "damages" must so
arise, and subsection 710e(6) does not provide
that damages must arise out of the operation of a
particular party's motor vehicle, but rather only
that the damages arise out of the operation of a 
motor vehicle. Therefore, the clear language of
subsection 710e(6) required only that plaintiffs
suffered damages arising out of the operation of
a motor vehicle as alleged here. If plaintiffs 
had not been operating a motor vehicle, there
would not have been an accident, injuries, and
damages. The operation of a motor vehicle was a
necessary component giving rise to plaintiffs'
cause of action, and there was a nexus between
their damages and the operation of a motor 
vehicle. [254 Mich App 86, 103; 657 NW2d 517
(2002) (emphasis added).] 
The premise upon which the majority builds its 
analysis is that the safety belt statute applies only in 
conjunction with the no-fault act. 
MCL 500.3135. I 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
continue to believe that the Legislature intended the 
broadly based, tort damage recovery limitation of the 
safety belt statute to be applicable in any action 
involving a motor vehicle accident. 
At common law, the failure to use a safety belt was 
not admissible to prove contributory negligence. 
When the 
safety belt statute was enacted, it was intended as a 
punishment for plaintiffs who did not use their safety 
belts, reducing their available damages. The statute 
encouraged drivers to wear their safety belts. 
By 
contrast, the purpose of the five percent cap was "to 
prevent the injured party from recovering substantially 
less based solely on the failure to wear a safety belt," as 
I noted in Ullery v Sobie, 196 Mich App 76, 80; 492 NW2d 
739 (1992). Similarly, as the Court of Appeals observed in 
this case2 and in Thompson v Fitzpatrick,3 the five percent 
cap was "intended by the Legislature to protect plaintiffs 
against drastic reduction in damage awards." Id. at 8. 
The Legislature apparently concluded that limiting 
recovery for those who fail to wear safety belts would 
2 254 Mich App 103-104.  
3 199 Mich App 5; 501 NW2d 172 (1993).  
4  
 
 
 
further both goals. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with this 
observation: 
The 
Senate 
Bill 
Analysis 
regarding
supporting arguments for the 1985 amendment of
MCL 257.710e indicated that "seat belt use saves 
lives and reduces the number and severity of
injuries. Experience has shown that mandatory
seat belt laws produce a significant and lasting
increase in the use of seat belts, even when
enforcement is relaxed." Senate Analysis, SB 6,
February 26, 1985. 
It is abundantly clear that
the Legislature intended to encourage all drivers
to wear their seat belts for purposes of public
safety and to limit attacks on damage awards
based on comparative negligence where a defendant
is negligent. [254 Mich App 104-105.]
Thus, the more legal actions in which the damage cap 
applies, the more effective the act will be. The fact that 
the state of the law has changed does not retroactively 
alter the Legislature's intent in passing the safety belt 
statute. 
The majority acts to frustrate this legislative 
intent. 
The language of the safety belt statute reduces 
one's damages by five percent. 
Nothing suggests that the 
Legislature wanted to reduce damages by five percent in a 
two-car accident, but set no limit where only one car was 
involved. 
Absent some indication of such intent, it is 
illogical to conclude that the Legislature intended such 
disparate results from the same negligence, failing to wear 
a safety belt. 
5  
 
 
 
For example, if a motorist whose only negligence is 
his failure to wear a safety belt is hit by a truck, his 
damages will be reduced by five percent under the statute. 
However, if, instead, the accident involves a negligent 
bicyclist, applying the majority's interpretation, the same 
injured motorist could experience a much greater damage 
reduction for failing to wear a safety belt. 
The Legislature enacted a standard of care, the 
wearing of safety belts, that carries a limited penalty for 
its violation. 
The majority frustrates the Legislature's 
intent and limits its power by finding a clear indication 
of intent that the statute be applied only to no-fault 
cases. 
This is despite the fact that the safety belt 
statute itself contains no such limitation. 
The majority 
extrapolates the limitation from the Legislature's use of 
the same string of words in the no-fault act as in the 
Vehicle Code. 
I interpret the use of the phrase 
"ownership, maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle" as 
a convenient description for the common uses of motor 
vehicles, not a limitation of the damage cap to no-fault 
claims. 
Conclusion 
I would find that the five percent cap on damages 
reduction for failure to wear a safety belt applies to a 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
suit brought under the highway exception to governmental 
immunity. 
It is apparent that the intent of the 
Legislature in passing the safety belt act was twofold: to 
foster public safety and to limit attacks on damage awards 
based on a motorist's comparative negligence in failing to 
wear a safety belt. 
Subsequent changes in the law cannot 
affect the Legislature's intent at the time that the cap 
was enacted. 
Applying the cap only to no-fault cases 
defies the Legislature's intent and reads into the statute 
a limitation not written there. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and of the trial court. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
7