Case Title: O NEIL LUMBER CO v NICKELODEON CO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-190 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 O'NEIL LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- THE NICKELODEON COMPANIES, DORIS PICCARTER, Secretary, J. R . McCARTER, Presidient, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: Dist. Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, The Honor- able Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jerry O'Neil, Pro Se, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : E. Eugene Atherton, Kalispell, Montana LL 3 1 < Submitted on Briefs: August 13, 1980 Decided: ' p p M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O f N e i l Lumber Company, proceeding p r o se, f i l e d s u i t i n t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Flathead, a l l e g i n g The Nickelodeon Companies had f a i l e d t o make payment on m a t e r i a l s supplied by O ' N e i l . The t r i a l c o u r t granted judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f b u t would n o t allow a t t o r n e y f e e s o r i n t e r e s t a t a r a t e of 1.5 percent per month on t h e unpaid balance a s asked. P l a i n t i f f appeals. O n J u l y 30 and August 9 of 1979, defendant agreed t o purchase c e r t a i n building m a t e r i a l s from p l a i n t i f f f o r $1,666.60. The purchases w e r e itemized and i d e n t i f i e d on four invoices. Each invoice s t a t e d t h a t a 1.5 percent s e r v i c e charge would be l e v i e d on past-due accounts. The m a t e r i a l s w e r e delivered, b u t a f t e r numerous r e q u e s t s by p l a i n t i f f , defendant f a i l e d t o tender payment. On November 5, 1979, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a mechanic's l i e n a g a i n s t defendant's r e a l property i n t h e amount of $1,716.96, representing t h e amount due on t h e unpaid account and a s e r v i c e charge a t t h e r a t e of 1.5 percent f o r two months. P l a i n t i f f a l s o asked f o r post-judgment i n t e r e s t a t a rate of 1.5 percent per month, a t t o r n e y f e e s , and c o s t s . The p r e s e n t a c t i o n was f i l e d i n District Court f o r f o r e c l o s u r e of s a i d l i e n . A f ter t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied p l a i n t i f f s motion f o r summary judgment, t h e m a t t e r was t r i e d i n chambers on May 16, 1980. A t t h e beginning of t h e t r i a l , defendant f i l e d a confession of judgment f o r t h e f u l l amount of t h e purchases, p l u s i n t e r e s t a t a l e g a l r a t e and a l l accumulated and tax- a b l e c o s t s . P l a i n t i f f r e j e c t e d t h e confession of judgment. v he ~ i s t r i c t Court t h e r e a f t e r rendered f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f f o r t h e amount of purchases $1,666.60, p l u s i n t e r e s t a t a rate of 1 0 percent p e r annum and a l l accumulated and taxable c o s t s amounting t o $37.04. The t r i a l c o u r t disallowed a t t o r n e y f e e s . Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on appeal: 1. Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n disallowing a s li- quidated damages a s e r v i c e charge a t a r a t e of 1.5 percent per month on t h e unpaid balance. 2. Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o allow a t t o r n e y f e e s . Appellant argues t h a t t h e invoices specifying an i n t e r - e s t r a t e of 1.5 percent on t h e unpaid balance coupled with respondent's p r i o r d e a l i n g with him i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o r e p r e s e n t a c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n and should be enforced a s such. Respondent, on t h e o t h e r hand, argues t h a t appel- l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o plead and prove t h e e x i s t e n c e of a w r i t t e n agreement, signed by both p a r t i e s , p r e s c r i b i n g t h e e x a c t t e r m s of t h e retail i n s t a l l m e n t t r a n s a c t i o n , prevent appel- l a n t from being e n t i t l e d t o a 1.5 percent s e r v i c e charge. Respondent f u r t h e r argues t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o plead and prove t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n express c o n t r a c t i n w r i t i n g f i x i n g a d i f f e r e n t r a t e of i n t e r e s t precludes it from col- l e c t i n g post-judgment i n t e r e s t a t a r a t e i n excess of t h a t allowed by l a w . Regarding t h e f i r s t i s s u e , s e c t i o n 31-1-241(4), MCA, of t h e Montana R e t a i l I n s t a l l m e n t S a l e s A c t , s t a t e s t h a t ". . . a retail charge account agreement may provide f o r and t h e seller o r holder may charge, c o l l e c t , and r e c e i v e a finance charge a s s p e c i f i e d h e r e i n f o r t h e p r i v i l e g e of paying i n s t a l l m e n t s thereunder." The finance charge may n o t exceed a monthly r a t e of 1.5 percent. This s t a t u t e c l e a r l y i n d i - c a t e s t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e charged by a p p e l l a n t w a s n o t i n excess of t h a t allowed by law. The question remaining i s whether invoices r e p r e s e n t a r e t a i l i n s t a l l m e n t c o n t r a c t . W e remember t h e words of J u s t i c e John H. Clarke: "The p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n t r a c t , with f u l l under- standing of t h e r e s u l t s of delay, and before d i f f e r e n c e s o r i n t e r e s t e d views had a r i s e n between them, w e r e much more competent t o j u s t l y determine what t h e amount of damage would be--an amount n e c e s s a r i l y l a r g e l y con- j e c t u r a l and r e s t i n g i n estimate--than a c o u r t o r jury would be . . ." Wise v. United S t a t e s (1919), 249 U.S. 361, 366-67, 39 S.Ct. 303, 63 L.Ed. 647. W e hold t h a t t h e invoices, two of which w e r e signed by both p a r t i e s , describing t h e m a t e r i a l s purchased and s t a t i n g t h e amount, including i n t e r e s t r a t e t o be charged, a r e suf- f i c i e n t evidence t o o b l i g a t e respondent t o pay 1.5 p e r c e n t on t h e unpaid balance from September 1979 t o May 1980. Although t h e invoices do n o t meet a l l t h e s t a t u t o r y speci- f i c a t i o n s of a r e t a i l i n s t a l l m e n t c o n t r a c t , t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i s i n i s s u e ; t h e r e f u r e , a p p e l l a n t ' s admis- s i o n as t o t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e invoices and a p p e l l a n t ' s confession of judgment more than adequately evidence t h a t t h e s e purchases w e r e retail i n s t a l l m e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s and should be enforced a s such. See S28-2-905 (1) (b) , MCA. Also, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 25-9-205, MCA, respondent i s l i a b l e f o r post-judgment i n t e r e s t a t a rate of 10 percent per annum p l u s accumulated and taxable c o s t s amounting t o $37.04. There was no evidence o r contention before t h i s Court t h a t J e r r y O'Neil, a v i c e p r e s i d e n t of and a t t o r n e y pro se f o r O ' N e i l Lumber Company, i s duly admitted and l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law i n Montana. Section 37-61-215, MCA, provides: " I t s h a l l be unlawful f o r any c o u r t within t h i s s t a t e t o allow attorney f e e s i n any ac- t i o n o r proceeding before s a i d c o u r t i n which attorney f e e s a r e allowed by law t o e i t h e r p a r t y t o such a c t i o n o r proceeding when such p a r t y i s represented by anyone other than a duly admitted o r licensed attorney a t law." Therefore, the t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err i n refusing a p p e l l a n t attorney fees. The judgment of the t r i a l c o u r t i s affirmed as t o the r e f u s a l of attorney f e e s and the allowance of post-judgment i n t e r e s t a t a r a t e of 10 percent per annum plus c o s t s ; t h e judgment i s reversed a s t o t h e disallowance of a 1.5 percent service charge a s liquidated damages. W e concur: "bndd 94l&&QQp Chief J u s t i c e J u s t i c e s