Case Title: PEITSMEYER v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEITSMEYER v. STATE2001 WY 3821 P.3d 733Case Number: 00-108Decided: 04/11/2001
 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                       
April 11, 2001 

 

THOMAS 
PEITSMEYER,

Appellant(Defendant),

 v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

  

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward Grant, Judge

 Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Assistant Appellant Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

             
HILL, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Thomas 
Peitsmeyer, contends that the district court erred in imposing sentence on a 
charge of aggravated assault and battery1, to which Peitsmeyer entered a plea 
of nolo contendere.  The basis of 
his contention is that the district court did not comply with the requirement of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) that:  
"Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not 
enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it 
that there is a factual basis for the plea."  He asks as a remedy that we vacate the 
district court's judgment and sentence and remand to the district court with 
directions that Peitsmeyer be permitted to withdraw his plea of nolo 
contendere2.

 

[¶2]      We shall affirm 
on the dual bases that the district court is not required to ensure that a 
factual basis appears in the record when accepting a plea of nolo contendere and 
because the record indisputably establishes that a full factual basis was 
presented to the district court.

 

[¶3]      Peitsmeyer 
advances only one argument in this appeal:

 

Should 
Appellant be allowed to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere to the charge of 
aggravated assault, as there was no factual basis for the 
plea?

 

[¶4]      The pertinent 
facts are these.  Peitsmeyer 
obtained stolen credit cards and was using them at Frontier Mall in 
Cheyenne.  Security staff at the 
mall became suspicious and called the police.  A police officer arrived as Peitsmeyer 
was fleeing the mall, pursued by a security officer.  The police officer was in the process of 
attempting to arrest Peitsmeyer, when Peitsmeyer looked the police officer in 
the eye, and put his car in gear and accelerated, striking the police officer in 
the knee and thigh.  Peitsmeyer was 
taken into custody after he rolled his car while being pursued by law 
enforcement officers.  At the time 
he entered his plea, Peitsmeyer was even asked if he had any quarrel with that 
recitation of the factual basis for his plea, and he indicated that he did 
not.  During allocution at his 
sentencing, Peitsmeyer indicated to the district court that he did not really 
intend to cause any injury to the police officer3.  In propounding his argument, Peitsmeyer 
relies in part on a statement of the trial court he contends indicates that the 
sentencing judge did not believe Peitsmeyer had attempted to injure the police 
officer.  In context, we conclude 
that the sentencing court only indicated that the police officer had not been 
injured (but the inference stands that Peitsmeyer attempted to injure the police 
officer).

 

[¶5]      We hold that the 
record contained a satisfactory presentation of the factual basis for 
Peitsmeyer's crime and his plea, and the district court did not err in accepting 
the plea or in sentencing Peitsmeyer for it.

 

[¶6]      The record is 
also clear that all elements of the crime of assault and battery are contained 
in the amended information.  We note 
the following authority:

 

            
At one time in the past the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules proposed 
that a plea of nolo contendere not be accepted without the court first 
satisfying itself that the defendant committed the crime charged.  This overlooked the fact that an 
innocent defendant may not wish to contest the charge and that the nolo plea is 
a means for him or her to do this.  
Accordingly that proposal was not adopted and Rule 11(f), requiring the 
court to determine the accuracy of a plea, applies to guilty pleas but not to 
pleas of nolo contendere.

 

1A 
Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 3d § 177 
(1999).

 

[¶7]      We embrace that 
proposition because any other reading of W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) would obliterate the 
distinction between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere.  State v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, 
1028 (Wyo. 1980); State v. Merino, 81 Hawai'i 198, 915 P.2d 672, 691-92 
(1996).  Thus, we expressly hold 
that a district court need not obtain a factual basis when accepting a plea of 
nolo contendere, so long as the charging document, whether it be an information, 
indictment, or other charging form, contains an accurate and complete statement 
of all the elements of the crime charged.

 

[¶8]      The judgment and 
sentence of the district court is affirmed in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) provides:

 

(a)  A person is guilty of aggravated assault 
and battery if he:

. . . .

      (ii)  Attempts to cause, or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon;

 

The definition of deadly weapon includes 
a motorized vehicle.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999).

   2In an effort to make sure the 
proceedings are clear to our readership, we point out that Peitsmeyer did not 
file a motion to withdraw his plea either before or after 
sentencing.

   3Peitsmeyer had similar explanations 
about most of the other 23 felonies (most of which occurred in Colorado), for 
which he was convicted in the seven years preceding his sentencing in the 
instant case.