Case Title: Allan Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company

Citation: 2003 WI 64

Docket Number: 2000AP002703

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 64 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2703 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Allan Hoffmann and Beverly Hoffmann,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
 
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  255 Wis. 2d 831, 646 N.W. 2d 854 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca   
 
JUDGE: 
Philip M. Kirk   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs by Owen Thomas Armstrong, John A. Casey, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and Terrence C. Thom and Quale, 
Feldbruegge, Calvelli, Thom & Croke, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Owen Thomas Armstrong. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross-appellants there was a 
brief by Lynn R. Laufenberg and Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and Scott Lawrence and Lawrence & Des Rochers, S.C., 
St. Nazianz, and oral argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg and Scott 
Lawrence. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by H. Dale Peterson, 
Heather L. Boudreau, and Stroud, Willink & Howard, LLC, Madison, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, Cooperative, 
 
 
2
the National Farmers Organization, and the Dairy Business 
Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David A. Ludwig, 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Public 
Service 
Commission 
of 
Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Trevor J. Will, G. 
Michael Halfenger, Eric L. Maassen, and Foley & Lardner, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Utilities Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Naomi E. Soldon, Jill 
M. Hartley, and Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & 
Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2150, AFL-CIO. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stuart G. Mondschein 
and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Electric Cooperative Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III, and Law Offices of Williams C. Gleisner, III, Milwaukee, 
and Rhonda L. Lanford and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by George Burnett, Sara 
Ramaker, and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green 
Bay, on behalf of the Six Districts of the Granton Amish 
Community and the Spencer Amish Church. 
 
 
2003 WI 64 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2703   
(L.C. No. 
97 CV 144) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Allan Hoffmann and Beverly Hoffmann,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.  
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Wisconsin Electric Power 
Company 
(WEPCO) 
petitioned 
this 
court 
for 
review 
of 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which upheld a 
jury's verdict in favor of Wisconsin farmers, Allan and Beverly 
Hoffmann.  At issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict that the Hoffmanns' dairy herd was 
harmed by electrical current resulting from a deteriorated WEPCO 
electrical distribution cable.  Because we conclude that there 
                                                 
1 Hoffmann 
v. 
Wis. 
Electric Power 
Co., 
No. 00-2703, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2002). 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
2 
 
was ample evidence to support the jury's finding that WEPCO's 
deteriorated electrical distribution cable was a cause of damage 
to the Hoffmanns' dairy herd, we uphold the court of appeals' 
decision on this issue.  WEPCO also petitioned this court to 
review whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by ordering a specific method of abatement that was 
requested by the Hoffmanns.  We conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering the specific 
electrical system requested by the Hoffmanns because the court 
(1) relied on the improper factor that the Hoffmanns were the 
"victors" of the lawsuit and (2) failed to take into account 
relevant factors, such as the safety and reliability of the 
system ordered and whether the system complies with Wisconsin's 
electrical code.  Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court 
of appeals' decision that upheld the circuit court's abatement 
order, and remand to the circuit court for Waupaca County to 
properly exercise its discretion in ordering a method of 
abatement.       
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
The Hoffmanns have operated a dairy farm in New 
London, Wisconsin since 1977.  That same year, WEPCO installed 
an 
underground, 
bare-concentric, 
multi-grounded 
electrical 
distribution cable along a road that is adjacent to the 
Hoffmanns' farm.  From 1977 to 1987, the Hoffmanns built a dairy 
herd, which was generally healthy and productive.  However, they 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
3 
 
felt their milk production was not as high as it should have 
been, based on state averages for milk production.   
¶3 
In the late 1980s, the Hoffmanns noticed that their 
cows were behaving erratically, kicking at milkers, acting 
listless and lame, and failing to eat and drink normally.  The 
herd also had a high calf mortality rate.  The Hoffmanns worked 
to address the problems with their dairy herd, including 
installing a new free stall barn in 1994, and working closely 
with their herd veterinarian and nutritionist.  The Hoffmanns 
made a number of management decisions over the years to improve 
the herd's health and milk production, but despite all their 
efforts, there was no significant change, and milk production 
continued to significantly drop.  After examining possible 
causes for their problems with the herd, including facilities, 
disease, 
nutrition, 
reproduction, 
and 
udder 
health, 
the 
Hoffmanns' veterinarian concluded that the only factor that had 
not been eliminated was electricity.               
¶4 
In response, the Hoffmanns made several electrical 
changes on their farm from 1988 to 1999.  One of the changes 
involved installing an equipotential plane in their newly 
constructed milking parlor in order to deal with potential 
"stray voltage."  "Stray voltage" has been defined by the 
Wisconsin Public Service Commission (PSC) as voltage that is 
present across points (generally grounded metal objects), in 
which 
an 
electrical 
current 
is 
produced 
when 
an 
animal 
simultaneously contacts two conductive points to complete a 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
4 
 
circuit, which allows an electrical current to flow.2  While an 
equipotential plane may reduce traditional stray voltage as 
measured by "cow contact points,"3 there was testimony at trial 
that equipotential planes do not reduce all electrical currents 
in an animal's environment and may actually increase the ground 
current beneath the animal.  The potential effect of ground 
current was discussed by expert witnesses for the Hoffmanns, who 
differentiated between traditional stray voltage and "non-
traditional" stray voltage, such as ground current.  "Ground 
currents" are currents that are associated with the grounding 
system of an electrical utility's primary distribution system 
and an individual's secondary system (e.g. barn wiring).4  Once 
electrical currents leave a grounding system and go into the 
earth, they are referred to as "earth currents."5  According to 
                                                 
2 Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Investigation on 
the Commission's Own Motion Into the Practices, Policies and 
Procedures Concerning Stray Voltage for Electric Distribution 
Utilities in Wisconsin, Docket #05-EI-106 at 5 (1989) (Docket 
106).   
3 "Cow 
contact 
points" 
are 
areas 
where 
an 
animal 
simultaneously accesses two points of different voltage of a 
sufficient magnitude, which causes an objectionable current to 
flow through the animal.  Id. at 8. 
4 Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Investigation on 
the Commission's Own Motion Into the Practices, Policies and 
Procedures of Providing Electric Utility Service as It Relates 
to the Potential Adverse Effects on Dairy Livestock From 
Electromagnetic Fields, Ground Currents, and Direct Currents 
Associated With That Service, Docket #05-EI-108 at 3 (1995) 
(Docket 108).   
5 Rural Electric Power Services, "Glossary of Terms," 10 
(2002), at http://psc.wi.gov/electric/newsinfo/document/glossary 
.pdf.   
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
5 
 
the Hoffmanns, in addition to traditional stray voltage, "non-
traditional" stray voltage, such as ground or earth currents, 
can be harmful to animals.      
¶5 
In an attempt to divert a portion of the ground 
current, the Hoffmanns had a ring of copper wire buried around 
the dairy complex.  After installing the copper wire, calf 
mortality improved, but milk production remained erratic.  The 
Hoffmanns also contacted WEPCO to test for stray voltage on 
their farm.  In November 1995, WEPCO tested for traditional 
stray voltage on the Hoffmann farm, in accordance with the PSC's 
protocol as set forth in Docket 106, and concluded that the 
current detected was below the PSC's "level of concern."  The 
"level of concern" has been defined by the PSC as the level 
above which corrective or mitigative action should be taken if 
production 
or 
behavioral 
problems 
exist, 
which 
is 
one 
milliampere in the "cow contact" areas.6  One of the Hoffmanns' 
expert witnesses testified that the WEPCO engineer who visited 
the farm told him that WEPCO would also test for "non-
traditional" stray voltage; however, this testing was never 
conducted by WEPCO.                      
 
¶6 
In 
an 
unrelated 
testing, 
WEPCO 
examined 
the 
underground, 
bare-concentric, 
multi-grounded 
electrical 
distribution cable that served the Hoffmanns' farm, as part of a 
developmental test protocol for corrosion.  The cable was found 
to have deteriorated more rapidly than expected due to corrosion 
                                                 
6 Docket 106 at 4. 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
6 
 
and had a bad splice, which was replaced.  According to the 
trial 
testimony, 
there 
was 
no 
way 
to 
predict 
future 
deterioration of the cable and only follow-up testing could 
confirm whether the cable was still performing in an acceptable 
manner.  WEPCO refused to remove and replace the bare-concentric 
cable, instead favoring the less expensive option of testing and 
mitigation.  WEPCO further refused to re-test the cable until 
shortly before trial, and at the Hoffmanns' expense.  Upon re-
testing, the cable showed further deterioration.  The expert 
witnesses for WEPCO testified that the deterioration of the 
cable did not present any significant threat of traditional 
stray voltage.  However, the expert witnesses for the Hoffmanns 
contended that the deteriorating cable led to increased "non-
traditional" stray voltage that adversely affected the dairy 
herd.          
¶7 
In June 1997, the Hoffmanns sued WEPCO on theories of 
negligence 
and 
nuisance, 
alleging 
that 
WEPCO's 
electrical 
distribution system was causing excessive amounts of electrical 
current to flow through their farm, which was damaging the 
health and productivity of their livestock.  The Hoffmanns 
sought damages and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court for 
Waupaca County, Philip M. Kirk, Judge.  After a month-long 
trial, the jury found in favor of the Hoffmanns on both the 
negligence and nuisance counts and assessed damages in the 
amount of $1,241,000.7  The circuit court entered a money 
                                                 
7 On the special verdict form submitted to the jury, the 
jury answered "Yes" to the following questions: 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
7 
 
judgment based on the jury's verdict and entered an abatement 
order 
requiring 
WEPCO 
to 
replace 
the 
underground, 
bare-
concentric, multi-grounded electrical distribution cable with an 
overhead, ungrounded delta system.  WEPCO appealed both the 
money judgment and the abatement order.  The circuit court 
refused to grant a stay of execution of the money judgment, but 
it stayed enforcement of the abatement order, pending appellate 
review. 
¶8 
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the court of 
appeals affirmed both the money judgment and the abatement order 
of the circuit court.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's decision to uphold the jury's verdict because the 
verdict was supported by the record, and the court affirmed the 
abatement order because it was within the discretion of the 
circuit court.  WEPCO petitioned this court to review whether 
the jury's verdict should be upheld and whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by ordering a method 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Was Wisconsin Electric Power Company negligent 
with respect to the electrical service and facilities 
which it provided to the Hoffmann farm? 
(2) Was such negligence a cause of any damage 
sustained by the Hoffmanns? 
(3) Did Wisconsin Electric Power Company distribute 
electricity to the Hoffmann farm in a manner that 
constituted a nuisance? 
(4) Was such nuisance a cause of any damage sustained 
by the Hoffmanns? 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
8 
 
of abatement specifically requested by the Hoffmanns.  This 
court granted WEPCO's petition for review on June 11, 2002.               
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
Appellate review of a jury's verdict is very limited, 
narrow, and circumscribed.  See, e.g., Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 
WI 51, ¶38, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659.  This court must 
sustain a jury verdict if there is any credible evidence to 
support the verdict.  Id.; Meurer v. ITT Gen. Controls, 90 
Wis. 2d 438, 
450, 
280 
N.W.2d 156 
(1979); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 805.14 (2001-02).8  This court views the evidence in 
the light most favorable to a jury's verdict and must sustain 
the verdict if there is any credible evidence in the record to 
support it, regardless of whether there is evidence to support a 
different verdict.  Meurer, 90 Wis. 2d at 450-51.  In addition, 
the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their 
testimony is for the judgment of the jury, not an appellate 
court.  Morden, 235 Wis. 2d 325, ¶39.  Moreover, special 
deference is afforded to a jury determination that has been 
upheld by the circuit court.  Kuklinski v. Rodriguez, 203 
Wis. 2d 324, 331, 552 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1996).  This court 
will uphold a jury verdict even if it is contradicted by 
evidence that is stronger and more convincing.  Morden, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, ¶39; Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 
Wis. 2d 365, 390, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995).  Therefore, this court 
                                                 
8 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
9 
 
will not upset a jury verdict unless there is such a complete 
failure of proof that the verdict must have been based on 
speculation.  Coryell v. Connecticut, 88 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 276 
N.W.2d 723 (1979).         
¶10 The standard of review of a circuit court's decision 
to grant injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the 
circuit court.  Sunnyside Feed Co., Inc. v. City of Portage, 222 
Wis. 2d 461, 468, 588 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State 
v. Seigel, 163 Wis. 2d 871, 889, 472 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 
1991)).  Therefore, an injunction ordered by a circuit court 
will be reviewed to determine whether there was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Id.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶11 At the outset, we briefly address WEPCO's contention 
that the PSC's findings have the force and effect of law, having 
the same status as statutes enacted by the legislature.  WEPCO 
essentially 
argues 
that 
pursuant 
to 
its 
authority 
under  
Wis. Stat. § 196.857,9 the cow contacts protocol, as established 
by the PSC in Docket 106, is the only valid measurement of stray 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 196.857 provides: 
(1g) Program Elements.  (a) The commission shall 
establish and administer a stray voltage program.  The 
program 
shall 
focus 
on 
regulation, 
education, 
inspection 
and 
investigation 
relating 
to 
stray 
voltage. 
(b)  The commission shall identify standardized 
test procedures check lists and equipment to be used 
by public utilities to investigate stray voltage.  The 
commission may audit the results of investigations.   
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
10 
 
voltage and its effect on cows.  According to the PSC's cow 
contacts protocol, a cow cannot be harmed by stray voltage if 
the electrical current measures less than one milliampere.  
Thus, WEPCO contends that without this necessary element of 
causation, the Hoffmanns cannot prevail.           
¶12 We note that it is a "well-established rule that the 
enactment of safety statutes or legislation giving a commission 
jurisdiction over a certain activity does not abolish the duty 
arising under common-law negligence."  Kemp v. Wis. Elec. Power 
Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 579, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969) (citing Schulz 
v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. RY., 260 Wis. 541, 51 N.W.2d 542 
(1952)).  This court has determined that 
[A] 
safety statute 
merely establishes 
a 
minimum 
standard 
of 
care 
and 
the 
conduct, 
even 
though 
sanctioned or in conformity with the statute, is not 
thereby necessarily relieved of conforming to the 
common-law requirements of ordinary care.  In any 
event the establishment of a statutory definition of 
negligence per se does not thereby result in a 
preemption of the entire negligence question.  There 
remains 
the 
question 
of 
possible 
common-law 
negligence. 
Blanchard v. Terpstra, 37 Wis. 2d 292, 299, 155 N.W.2d 156 
(1967).  See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 288C (1979). 
¶13 Furthermore, it is well-recognized that a "statute 
does not change the common law unless the legislative purpose to 
do so is clearly expressed in the language of the statute.  To 
accomplish a change in the common law, the language of the 
statute 
must 
be 
clear, 
unambiguous, 
and 
peremptory."  
Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶25, 244 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833 (citations omitted).  Nowhere in the 
language of chapter 196 of the Wisconsin Statutes is common-law 
negligence, with respect to stray voltage, changed or altered.  
In fact, such a change has been specifically considered and was 
rejected.  In Wisconsin's initial budget bill for 2001-2002, a 
provision was included that would have changed the standards for 
civil liability with respect to stray voltage.  The bill 
proposed creating a statute, providing that "[a] public utility 
is immune from liability for any damage caused by or resulting 
from stray voltage contributed by the public utility if that 
stray voltage is below the level of concern established by the 
public service commission . . . ."  2001 S.B. 55, § 3866.  
However, after severe public criticism, the provision was 
withdrawn and was never passed into law.10   
¶14 Based on the above, we must decline WEPCO's invitation 
to hold that it cannot be liable to the Hoffmanns if there are 
no cow contact measurements of more than one milliampere because 
the PSC's findings have the force and effect of law.  Moreover, 
even if WEPCO is correct, the Hoffmanns presented an alternative 
theory at trial: that non-traditional stray voltage was harming 
their dairy herd and that traditional stray voltage is not the 
only kind of electrical current that can harm animals.  The jury 
believed 
the 
case 
presented 
by 
the 
Hoffmanns 
that 
non-
traditional stray voltage was a cause of the damage to their 
                                                 
10 See Deborah Kades & Chris Hardie, "Governor retracts 
utilities' immunity," The LaCrosse Tribune, Mar. 22, 2001, at A-
1.   
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
12 
 
dairy herd.  Therefore, whether the PSC's findings regarding cow 
contact measurements have the force and effect of law is not 
dispositive in this case since these findings only deal with 
traditional stray voltage, not non-traditional stray voltage.11  
Accordingly, our inquiry focuses on the sufficiency of the 
evidence for the jury's verdict that non-traditional stray 
voltage was a cause of the damages sustained by the Hoffmanns.  
Specifically, we examine whether there is any credible evidence 
to support the verdict.  Morden, 235 Wis. 2d 325, ¶38.             
A.  Sufficiency of Evidence: Negligence and Nuisance  
 
¶15 The jury found that WEPCO was negligent in providing 
electrical 
service 
to 
the 
Hoffmann 
farm 
and 
that 
its 
distribution of electricity to the farm constituted a nuisance.  
The jury found that WEPCO's negligence and the nuisance were 
each a cause of the damages sustained by the Hoffmanns.12  It is 
                                                 
11 In Docket 106, the PSC made findings regarding the effect 
of "traditional" stray voltage on cows, utilizing "cow contact" 
measurements.  In contrast, the PSC's findings in Docket 108 
were inconclusive regarding "non-traditional" stray voltage, 
such as ground current.   
12 The circuit court gave several instructions to the jury, 
including instructions on the burden of proof, negligence, 
nuisance, causation, and damages.  The circuit court instructed 
the jury, in part: 
The burden of proof, rests upon the party 
contending that the answer to a question should be 
"yes."  This burden is to satisfy you to a reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that "yes" should be the answer. 
Credible evidence is evidence which in the light of 
reason and common sense is worthy of your belief.  
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
13 
 
undisputed that the Hoffmanns were having problems with the 
health and milk production of their dairy herd.  Rather, the 
point of contention between WEPCO and the Hoffmanns is whether 
WEPCO's delivery of electricity to the Hoffmann farm was a cause 
of these problems.   
 
¶16 Both WEPCO and the Hoffmanns produced various expert 
witnesses who testified regarding the effect of electricity on 
the health and milk production of dairy cows.  In Wisconsin, a 
witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education may give his or her expert 
                                                                                                                                                             
A person [company] fails to exercise ordinary 
care, when, without intending to do any harm, it does 
something or fails to do something under circumstances 
in which a reasonable person would foresee that by its 
action or failure to act, it will subject a person or 
property to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage. 
The cause questions ask whether there was a 
causal connection between the negligence of Wisconsin 
Electric Power Company and any damages sustained by 
the Hoffmanns.  These questions do not ask about "the 
cause" but rather "a cause."  The reason for this is 
that there may be more than one cause of damage.  
Before you find that negligence was a cause of damage, 
you must find that the negligence was a substantial 
factor in producing the damages.  
A nuisance is an unreasonable activity that 
interferes 
substantially 
with 
another 
person's 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.  To 
be a nuisance, an activity must cause significant 
harm.   
If ordinary persons living in the community would 
regard the activity in question as substantially 
offensive, seriously annoying, or intolerable, then 
the interference is significant.     
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
14 
 
opinion 
if 
his 
or 
her 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge 
will 
assist 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
to 
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  In cases where there is conflicting expert 
testimony, it is up to the jury, as the trier of fact, to 
determine weight and credibility.  Schultz v. State, 87 
Wis. 2d 167, 173, 274 N.W.2d 614 (1979).  As Judge Kirk 
commented in his decision on motions after verdict, the jury 
determines the weight of expert testimony and, in this case, the 
jury chose the Hoffmanns' experts.              
 
¶17 During the course of the trial, the Hoffmanns and 
their witnesses testified that non-traditional stray voltage, or 
ground 
currents, 
resulting 
from 
WEPCO's 
deteriorated, 
underground, bare-concentric electrical distribution cable, was 
a cause of the problems with the Hoffmanns' dairy herd.  The PSC 
made findings in Dockets 106 and 11513 that dealt with the effect 
of traditional stray voltage on cows; however, in Docket 108, 
the findings of the PSC were inconclusive with respect to the 
effect of ground currents or non-traditional stray voltage on 
cows.  Although the PSC's findings were inconclusive regarding 
the effect of ground currents, the Hoffmanns' expert witnesses 
testified that there can be negative effects on the health and 
performance of dairy cows when electrical currents are flowing 
                                                 
13 Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Investigation on 
the Commission's Own Motion Into the Practices, Policies and 
Procedures Concerning Stray Voltage for Electric Distribution 
Utilities in Wisconsin, Docket #05-EI-115 (1996) (Docket 115).   
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
15 
 
through their environment, regardless of the magnitude of cow 
contact measurements for traditional stray voltage.14  Thus, the 
Hoffmanns 
argued 
that 
despite 
WEPCO's 
assertions 
to 
the 
contrary, cow contact measurements do not tell the whole story 
about the negative impact of electrical current on dairy cows.          
 
¶18 The Hoffmanns' expert witnesses also disputed studies 
introduced at trial by WEPCO's expert witnesses regarding the 
effect of electricity on cows.  The Hoffmanns' expert witnesses 
testified that there is a significant difference between 
controlled laboratory studies, where cows are exposed to 
electricity for only short periods of time, and constant, long-
term exposure to electrical currents, which is what the 
Hoffmanns contended that their cows had experienced.  
 
¶19 The Hoffmanns' witnesses further testified that the 
substantial electrical current on the Hoffmann farm was due to 
WEPCO's deteriorated, underground cable.  There was testimony 
that in testing the electrical current on the farm using a 
ground ring, there was an increase in earth current when the 
electrical load on WEPCO's underground line was increased, 
rather than an increased return current on the primary neutral, 
where the current was supposed to be.  In contrast, when the 
same increased load was placed on a farm generator, there was no 
increase in earth current.  There was also trial testimony that 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Gerald R. Bodman, P.E., Ground Currents:  A 
Cause of Undesirable Animal Performance?, Address at the 1994 
Winter Meeting of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers 
(Dec. 13-16, 1994). 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
16 
 
WEPCO employees had told the Hoffmanns that this particular 
bare-concentric cable had been causing problems for years, but 
WEPCO had not done anything about it.         
¶20 The Hoffmanns also presented evidence that WEPCO was 
negligent in failing to address the problems caused by non-
traditional stray voltage on their farm.  The Hoffmanns argued 
that WEPCO was negligent when it realized that the underground, 
bare-concentric cable was deteriorating at a faster rate than 
expected due to corrosion, but yet failed to remove and replace 
the line.  One of the Hoffmanns' expert witnesses, William 
English, P.E., testified that this kind of cable was originally 
thought to last 25-30 years, but that they have generally only 
lasted 10-15 years.  Moreover, Mr. English testified that this 
kind of cable is no longer generally used in the utility 
industry due to its inadequate performance.  Consistent with Mr. 
English's testimony, when WEPCO re-tested the cable shortly 
before trial, it showed further deterioration from the first 
time it was tested in 1989.       
 
¶21 In 
addition, 
the 
Hoffmanns 
themselves 
testified 
regarding their extensive efforts to address the problems with 
their dairy herd, which were largely to no avail.  The 
Hoffmanns, with the assistance of their herd veterinarian and 
nutritionist, explored and exhausted possible causes of the poor 
health and reduced milk production of their cows, and ultimately 
concluded that electricity was the only source that had not been 
eliminated. 
  
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
17 
 
¶22 Based on all the above, we agree with Judge Kirk that 
the "entire evidentiary picture [as] painted by the plaintiffs' 
experts and [the] plaintiffs personally . . . is sufficient to 
sustain the verdict."  As the trier of fact, the jury determines 
the weight and credibility of the evidence presented, and we 
will uphold their findings if there is any credible evidence to 
support their verdict.  In light of the substantial testimony of 
the Hoffmanns and their witnesses, we conclude that there was 
ample evidence for the jury to find that non-traditional stray 
voltage resulting from WEPCO's deteriorated, underground, bare-
concentric electrical distribution cable was a cause of damage 
to the Hoffmanns' dairy herd.      
B.  Abatement Order  
 
¶23 A circuit court's decision to grant an injunction, 
determine its form, and determine its scope, are within the 
broad discretion of the circuit court.  City of Wis. Dells v. 
Dells Fireworks, Inc., 197 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 539 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (citing Seigel, 163 Wis. 2d at 889-90)).  When a 
party seeks injunctive relief, a circuit court "exercises its 
discretion in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, and 
if so, in what form."  Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 
670, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).  Thus, it is within a court's 
discretion to order a specific method of abatement.  See, e.g., 
Bubolz v. Dane County, 159 Wis. 2d 284, 296, 464 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. 
App. 1990) ("Injunctive relief should be tailored to the 
necessities of the particular case." (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
18 
 
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975))).  This court has 
recognized that in ordering an injunction, a court is not 
required 
to 
specify 
the 
method 
of 
abatement, 
but 
such 
specificity may be ordered in certain cases.   
Generally the means whereby the nuisance is to be 
abated is left to the direction of the defendant 
tortfeasor.  If the means by which the defendant may 
abate the nuisance is immaterial and the court is 
looking solely to the end-result, it has been said 
that the means of abating the nuisance is of no 
concern 
of 
the 
court. . . . However, 
there 
are 
situations in which the balancing of convenience or 
equities is attempted by the court and the decree does 
provide in detail how the nuisance shall be abated or 
partially controlled.  It is recognized the court may 
require the defendant to adopt methods and appliances 
where 
their 
adoption 
will 
avoid 
the 
conditions 
complained of. 
Costas v. Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 418 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964) 
(citations omitted). 
¶24 In this case, it was disputed whether merely replacing 
the underground, multi-grounded cable would effectively abate 
the nuisance or whether an overhead delta system is needed.  
Consequently, it appears that it was proper for the circuit 
court 
to 
specify 
the 
method 
of 
abatement 
in 
order 
to 
satisfactorily address the jury's finding that the Hoffmanns' 
cows were being damaged by the deteriorated WEPCO line.      
 
¶25 WEPCO contends that even if the circuit court had the 
authority to order a specific method of abatement, the court did 
not have to order the method that is most likely to minimize the 
potential for future stray voltage problems.  Conversely, the 
Hoffmanns contend that the circuit court does not have to order 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
19 
 
the method that is least costly or most convenient for WEPCO.  
While both WEPCO and the Hoffmanns raise valid considerations, 
neither answers the pertinent issue: whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in specifically ordering 
the ungrounded, overhead delta system.  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it (1) fails to consider 
and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination; 
(2) considers clearly irrelevant factors or improper factors; 
and (3) clearly gives too much weight to one factor.  Sunnyside, 
222 Wis. 2d at 471.       
 
¶26 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
ordering the ungrounded, overhead delta system by relying on an 
improper factor.  In the transcript of a motion hearing on 
September 29, 2000, Judge Kirk stated: 
The reason that I believe that the plaintiffs are 
entitled to this relief to the overhead delta system 
that they request is that they were the victors of 
this hard-fought lawsuit.  As much as we attempt in 
our business to dress things up and doing [sic] 
justice and doing [sic] equity, there is still a lot 
to be said for that philosophy that, "To the victor 
goes the spoils."        
¶27 In ruling on motions after verdict, Judge Kirk 
reasoned: "I will grant the injunctive relief as requested by 
plaintiffs and include in that order that . . . the type of 
overhead delta system to be installed is as the plaintiff has 
requested . . . ."  It was an erroneous exercise of discretion 
for the circuit court to order an overhead, ungrounded delta 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
20 
 
system based on the fact that the Hoffmanns were the "victors" 
of the case, and had specifically requested an overhead, 
ungrounded delta system.  Although we understand and perhaps are 
even sympathetic to the circuit court's position, we cannot let 
it stand.  The ordering of an electrical system must be based on 
the merits of the system with a record to support that order.          
 
¶28 In addition, the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion by failing to take into account relevant factors 
in ordering a method of abatement.  Specifically, there appears 
to be uncertainty regarding the safety and reliability of an 
ungrounded delta system, as well as whether an ungrounded delta 
system complies with Wisconsin's electrical code.  See Wis. 
Admin. Code ch. PSC 114 (Sept., 1997).   
¶29 WEPCO claims that these kinds of findings are within 
the PSC's area of expertise; therefore, the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by not deferring to the PSC 
on the issue of abatement.  While we conclude that the circuit 
court did not properly take into account all of the relevant 
factors in ordering a specific method of abatement, we disagree 
with WEPCO that the circuit court should have deferred its 
jurisdiction to the PSC on the abatement issue.  Only a court 
has the authority to grant an injunction; therefore, it was not 
an erroneous exercise of discretion for the circuit court not to 
defer its jurisdiction to the PSC.  See, e.g., Madison Teachers 
v. Madison Sch. Dist., 197 Wis. 2d 731, 747, 541 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  Nevertheless, based on the PSC's knowledge and 
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
21 
 
expertise regarding the distribution of electricity, the circuit 
court could have requested and considered information and 
feedback from the PSC in making its determination regarding a 
method of abatement.15  Specifically, the circuit court could 
have taken into account comments from the PSC concerning the 
safety and reliability of an ungrounded, overhead delta system 
and whether such a system complies with Wisconsin's electrical 
code.   
¶30 Consequently, we conclude that remand to the circuit 
court is required for the court to properly exercise its 
discretion by considering the following relevant factors: (1) 
the safety and reliability of an overhead, ungrounded delta 
system and (2) whether an ungrounded delta system complies with 
Wisconsin's electrical code, and if the court deems necessary——
requesting comments from the PSC regarding these factors.      
¶31 In sum, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
to support the jury's verdict that WEPCO's deteriorated, 
underground, bare-concentric electrical distribution cable was a 
                                                 
15 The electrical code for the State of Wisconsin is issued 
and administered by the PSC, along with the department of 
commerce, division of safety and buildings.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ PSC 
114.001(1). 
 
In 
addition, 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ PSC 
114.002(1) states:  
The 
purpose 
of 
this 
chapter 
is 
the 
practical 
safeguarding 
of 
persons 
during 
the 
installation, 
operation 
or 
maintenance 
of 
electric 
supply and 
communication lines and their associated equipment.  
This chapter contains minimum provisions considered 
necessary for the safety of employees and the public.  
[However,] [t]his chapter is not intended as a design 
specification or an instruction manual.   
No. 
00-2703 
   
 
22 
 
cause of damage to the Hoffmanns' dairy herd.  We further 
conclude that remand to the circuit court is required on the 
abatement 
issue 
for 
the 
court 
to 
properly 
exercise 
its 
discretion in ordering a method of abatement.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit 
court for Waupaca County for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
 
 
No.  00-2703.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶32 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I join the mandate.  I do not join the opinion because I am 
concerned about key aspects of the opinion. 
¶33 First, the majority opinion rejects WEPCO's argument 
that the circuit court should have deferred its jurisdiction to 
the PSC on the abatement issue.  The reason the majority opinion 
gives is that "[o]nly a court has the authority to grant an 
injunction."16  The majority opinion cites to Madison Teachers, 
Inc. v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 197 Wis. 2d 731, 
747, 541 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶34 Madison Teachers, however, does not provide support 
for the majority opinion's conclusion that the circuit court need 
not defer to the PSC on abatement.  Madison Teachers involved a 
question of the court deferring to Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission (WERC).  Madison Teachers states only that WERC cannot 
provide injunctive relief.17  The basis for the decision in 
Madison Teachers is a statute granting courts the power to issue 
equitable (injunctive) relief in WERC matters.18  The statement in 
Madison Teachers that "only a court may grant an injunction" is 
gratuitous, is made without citation, and probably is no more 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶29. 
17 The same is true for the case Madison Teachers relies on, 
Local 913 v. Manitowoc County, 140 Wis. 2d 476, 485, 410 
N.W.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1987). 
18 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 197 
Wis. 2d 731, 747, 541 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)). 
No.  00-2703.ssa 
 
2 
 
than a truism (because by definition an injunction is a court 
order). 
¶35 The majority opinion in the present case picks up this 
sentence from Madison Teachers relating to WERC and injunctions 
and apparently equates WERC with the PSC and "injunction" with 
"abatement."  At least some administrative agencies do, however, 
have the power to issue abatement orders.19  No one disputes the 
PSC's power to abate. 
¶36 Second, the majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that the 
circuit court could have consulted with the PSC in making its 
determination regarding the method of abatement.20  It offers no 
authority for this conclusion. The Commission's amicus brief 
states that the Commission "is certainly willing to advise a 
trial court whenever questions about public safety and utility 
systems arise."21  Administrative agencies have only those powers 
conferred by statute.22  What statute authorizes the PSC, under 
the circumstances of this case, to answer questions posed by a 
circuit court, to make findings in response to a court's inquiry, 
or to issue rulings at the request of a court? 
                                                 
19 See State v. Dairyland Power Co-op., 52 Wis. 2d 45, 54, 
187 N.W.2d 878 (1971). 
20 Majority op., ¶29. 
21 Public Service Commission Amicus Brief at 9. 
22 See Mid-Plains Tel., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 56 
Wis. 2d 780, 786, 202 N.W.2d 907 (1973). 
No.  00-2703.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶37 I join the mandate to remand the matter to the circuit 
court.  The majority opinion does not prevent the circuit court 
from deferring to the PSC on the abatement issue. 
¶38 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  00-2703.ssa 
 
 
 
1