Case Title: Golden v. County of Union

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-105-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). VERNIERO, J., writing for a majority of the Court. By statute, assistant prosecutors serve in their positions at the pleasure of the respective prosecutors . . . . N.J.S.A. 2A:158-15. This appeal requires the Court to consider whether a prosecutor must conduct an internal hearing pursuant to an employee manual prior to discharging an assistant prosecutor, or whether the statute allows the prosecutor to dismiss the assistant prosecutor immediately. Howard Golden was employed as an assistant prosecutor in the Union County Prosecutor's Office from 1977 to February 24, 1995, the day of his discharge. On that day, Golden reacted to a work assignment by delivering what another employee described as a tirade. The trial supervisor who observed Golden's reaction stated that Golden exploded, becoming loud, using expletives, and questioning the competence of a colleague that was assigned to assist him. That colleague overheard the outburst. Golden's reaction was immediately reported to then Prosecutor Andrew K. Ruotolo, Jr., who convened a meeting of his senior aides. The trial supervisor who attended the meeting stated that it was clear that a breach of professional conduct had occurred. There was a discussion about Golden's past negative conduct. It was determined among those at the meeting that dismissal was appropriate. The prosecutor asked Golden to join the meeting and the prosecutor expressed his disapproval. Golden responded with a litany of his own complaints, including his displeasure at being paired with the specific attorney. The prosecutor told Golden that he had heard enough and that his position was terminated. The prosecutor afforded Golden thirty days to find a new job, permitting him to remain on the payroll during that period. In April 1995, Golden's attorney asserted in a letter that the discharge constituted a breach of an implied contract allegedly formed by provisions of an employee manual. Those provisions included procedures to be followed prior to removal, including: formal written charges and notice of disciplinary action; a hearing between 15 and 30 days after service of the notice; the notice must inform the employee of the right to be represented by counsel; and a final notice of disciplinary action shall issue at the conclusion of the process. The prosecutor took the position that the procedures did not apply to assistant prosecutors. Golden filed a complaint alleging that the failure to abide by the manual procedures constituted a breach of contract. The complaint demanded Golden's reinstatement to his prior position with back pay and interest or prospective lost wages, together with costs of suit and counsel fees. The trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss, relying on this Court's decision in Walsh v. State, 147 N.J. 595 (1997)(oral agreement by Public Defender to promote a deputy public defender at a future date is unenforceable because inconsistent with statutory mandate that deputy public defenders serve at the pleasure of the Public Defender). The trial court found that requiring a hearing in accordance with the manual would impede and delay the prosecutor's statutory right to immediately terminate an assistant prosecutor. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the procedural aspects of the manual could be harmonized with the prosecutor's statutory right to hire and discharge assistant prosecutors. Golden v. County of Union, 317 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1998). It ordered the prosecutor to conduct a hearing. This Court granted defendants' petition for certification and denied Golden's cross-petition involving the question of remedies. HELD: The employee manual's provisions requiring a hearing prior to termination are not enforceable as to assistant prosecutors because the statute unambiguously designates assistant prosecutors as at-will employees. 2. This Court's recent decision in Walsh is consistent with the principle that public employers retain wide latitude in hiring and firing employees who serve in at-will, statutorily-created positions. In Walsh, this Court reversed the majority of the Appellate Division (which concluded that the contract was enforceable) based on Judge Skillman's dissent. Judge Skillman noted that the majority's conclusion was based on private sector employment decisions recognizing implied-in-fact contracts in the at-will employment setting. He explained that the relationship between public officials and the agencies appointing them is not necessarily contractual in character, but is instead controlled by the statutes pursuant to which the public official has been appointed. Although the Walsh statute pertained to the Public Defender's Office, its operative language is similar to the text of the statute here. (Pp. 12-15) 3. In view of the clear statutory language establishing Golden's at-will employment status, it is not necessary to address whether a public agency may be bound by an implied contract or whether the manual here represented such a contract. The statute trumps whatever implied contract may have existed between the parties. The Court disagrees with the conclusion of the Appellate Division (and the dissent) that the manual's procedures could be enforced without unduly infringing on the prosecutor's substantive rights. Requiring the prosecutor to engage in a lengthy process that includes the service of notice with built-in time delays and a formal hearing attended by adverse counsel would limit the prosecutor's ability immediately to discharge a subordinate. That limitation would be contrary to the statute. (Pp. 15-18) 4. Although the issue of damages is not before the Court, it became clear at oral argument that Golden considers the hearing only the first phase of this litigation, and that he wishes to pursue a claim of monetary damages in the next phase. This convinces the Court that its conclusion is correct. The Legislature simply did not intend for prosecutors to be encumbered in their personnel actions or to be exposed to monetary damages for the discharge of a supposedly at-will employee. (Pp. 18-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. JUSTICE O'HERN, dissenting, is of the view that the procedures in the manual confer no substantive rights on the employee and therefore do not unduly compromise the prosecutor's unfettered discretion. He further states that a hearing may well forestall an incorrect decision. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN, joined by JUSTICE STEIN, has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. HOWARD GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. COUNTY OF UNION and THE UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Defendants-Appellants. Argued January 3, 2000 -- Decided May 9, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 317 N.J. Super. 64 (1998). Paul L. Kleinbaum and William T. Donegan argued the cause for appellants (Zazzali, Zazzali, Fagella & Nowak, attorneys for Union County Prosecutor's Office and Carol I. Cohen, Union County Counsel, attorney for County of Union; Mr. Kleinbaum, Mr. Donegan and Christine M. Nugent, on the joint briefs). Richard S. Lehrich argued the cause for respondent. The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. Plaintiff, Howard Golden, commenced this action challenging his discharge from the position of assistant county prosecutor in the Union County Prosecutor's Office. By statute, assistant prosecutors serve in their positions at the pleasure of the respective prosecutors . . . . N.J.S.A. 2A:158-15. This appeal requires us to consider the interplay between that statutory provision and certain language contained in an employee manual in existence at the time of plaintiff's removal. The narrow issue is whether the prosecutor must conduct an internal hearing pursuant to the manual before discharging plaintiff or whether the statute allows for plaintiff's immediate dismissal. The trial court found in favor of defendants, concluding that the manual's requirement of a hearing, if applied in this instance, would impermissibly infringe upon the prosecutor's statutory prerogatives. The Appellate Division disagreed, holding that the procedural aspects of the manual could be harmonized with the prosecutor's unfettered right to hire and discharge assistant prosecutors. Golden v. County of Union, 317 N.J. Super. 64, 67 (App. Div. 1998). The panel directed the prosecutor to conduct a hearing. Id. at 72. We granted defendants' petition for certification, and denied plaintiff's cross-petition involving the question of remedies, 160 N.J. 479 (1999). We now reverse. On its face, the statute unambiguously creates an at-will employment relationship between the prosecutor and all assistant prosecutors, including plaintiff. The issue is whether the statute compels us to sustain plaintiff's discharge or whether any other statute or principle of law would require defendant to conduct a section 5 hearing prior to imposing that discipline. The reported cases that have touched upon the hiring and firing prerogatives of a county prosecutor have uniformly been resolved in favor of the prosecutor. Perhaps the clearest example is this Court's decision in Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320 (1960). In that case, the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Essex County appointed the plaintiff to a legal assistant prosecutor position for an indefinite term. The incoming acting prosecutor sought the plaintiff's discharge. The plaintiff filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, alleging that as a veteran of the armed services he was entitled to tenure pursuant to the provisions of the Veterans' Tenure Act. (That act generally provides procedural protections to employees who have served in the armed services. N.J.S.A. 38:16-1 to -4.) This Court upheld the plaintiff's discharge by citing, among other things, the earlier version of N.J.S.A. 2A:158-15, the relevant portion of which contained language nearly identical to its present text. After reviewing the history of the prosecutor position from the time of New Jersey's 1776 Constitution, we observed: The Legislature as well as the courts have long recognized the strong policy considerations which dictate that since the county prosecutor is charged with heavy enforcement responsibilities he must be given broad powers to appoint his own personnel; thus he appoints his own assistant prosecutors and investigators within the maxima prescribed by statute . . . . Nowhere have we found any statutory language which supports the notion that an outside legislative agency such as the board of freeholders has the right to appoint assistants to the prosecutor, particularly legal assistants who are often entrusted with high enforcement responsibilities in the administration of justice comparable to those exercised by the prosecutor himself. . . . . [T]he plaintiff expressly acknowledges that of necessity, for the proper functioning of these high offices the incumbent must have free [reign] to select and remove his very close associates, to whom he entrusts sensitive and private confidences. See also Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 346 (1999) (noting in summarizing Cetrulo that legal assistant prosecutor's claim was rejected because an appointment to that position is personal to each prosecutor and because the Legislature intended to exclude a county prosecutor's confidential employees such as legal assistants from acquiring tenure under the [Veterans'] Tenure Act, N.J.S.A. 38:16-1 ). Likewise, in State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152 (1953), the Court recognized that the Legislature intended to confer wide latitude upon county prosecutors to enable them to discharge their responsibilities, including authority in respect of personnel decisions. As Chief Justice Vanderbilt noted on behalf of the Court: Clearly the Legislature intended to give [the prosecutor] dominant position and the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the criminal laws, not merely by conferring authority on him [or her] but by giving him [or her] the means of implementing such authority. See also Murphy v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Bergen County, 110 N.J.L. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (holding that county prosecutor has inherent power to appoint investigators in absence of express statutory authority). Our recent decision in Walsh, supra, 147 N.J. 595, is consistent with the principle that public employers retain wide latitude in hiring and firing employees who serve in at-will, statutorily-created positions. Although briefly summarized above, the facts and holding in Walsh warrant additional discussion. The Walsh plaintiff was employed as an assistant deputy public defender in the Public Defender's Bergen regional office from 1980 to 1986, during which he received at least two promotions. Walsh, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 5. The plaintiff voluntary left his public position to enter private practice. Ibid. Two years later, in 1988, the person in charge of the Public Defender's Hudson office invited the plaintiff to resume his public employment. Ibid. The plaintiff was offered a position at a level lower than the position he held in 1986 with the understanding that he would be quickly promoted to his prior senior position, conditioned only on his maintaining a satisfactory work record. Id. at 5-7. The plaintiff accepted the invitation and began work in July 1988. Id. at 7. Over the course of the next three years the plaintiff was denied three promotions. Ibid. The record indicated that the denials were due to a continuing freeze on promotions; no one disputed that the plaintiff fully performed his duties in accordance with the high expectations of the parties. Id. at 6 n.4, 7. The plaintiff filed suit seeking damages for breach of the alleged oral agreement to promote him. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding 'there was an offer. It was reasonably understood by the plaintiff to be an offer. And he accepted [by] performance.' Id. at 9. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. The majority concluded: Only by enforcing the promise made by the commissioner's duly delegated representatives can defendants fulfill their obligations of good faith and fair dealings to [the plaintiff] in these circumstances. Id. at 12. Judge Skillman disagreed. He concluded that in establishing an at-will relationship between the Public Defender and his or her deputies pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-6, the Legislature intended to confer wide discretion on the Public Defender in respect of employment matters. He described the authority of the Public Defender as expansive in the personnel context, noting, so long as his personnel actions are not invidiously discriminatory, the Public Defender has unfettered discretion in determining when to hire, discharge, transfer, demote or withhold promotion from an [a]ssistant [d]eputy [p]ublic [d]efender. Id. at 13. No voluntary promise by the Public Defender's Office could infringe upon that discretion. Ibid. The dissent disagreed with the contrary belief expressed by the majority, explaining: The majority's conclusion that subordinates of the Public Defender made an enforceable promise to promote plaintiff . . . rests upon private sector employment decisions that have been willing to recognize implied-in fact contracts in the at-will employment setting. (maj. op. at 10, 674 A. 2d at 993). See Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985). However, the relationship between an [a]ssistant [d]eputy [p]ublic [d]efender and the Public Defender, like the relationship between other public officials and the agencies appointing them, is not ipso facto contractual in character, Espinos v. Township of Monroe, 81 N.J. Super. 283, 288, 195 A.2d 478 (App. Div. 1963), but is instead controlled by the statutes pursuant to which the public official has been appointed. [Id. at 15.] In a unanimous decision, we reversed the majority on the basis of Judge Skillman's dissent. Walsh, supra, 147 N.J. 595. As indicated, although the Walsh statute pertained to the Public Defender's Office, its operative language is similar to the text of the statute at issue here. HOWARD GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. COUNTY OF UNION and THE UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Defendants-Appellants. O'HERN, J., dissenting. The Court holds today that adherence to agreed-upon procedures, to afford assistant prosecutors a hearing before firing them, impermissibly infringes on a prosecutor's unfettered right to discharge from office an assistant prosecutor. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 18). I respectfully disagree primarily for the reasons stated by Judge Pressler in the opinion of the Appellate Division reported at 317 N.J. Super. 64 (1998). Specifically, I agree that [m]ost significantly, the Prosecutor's adherence to [the Manual's] procedures confer and has the capacity to confer absolutely no substantive job rights on the employee, unlike the case in Walsh. Chapter 5 does not prescribe any substantive limitation on the Prosecutor's exclusive disciplinary authority either by defining conduct eligible for any degree of discipline or by superimposing any conditions or standards on the Prosecutor's substantive disciplinary determination. Nor does it provide for any mediation or arbitration, and, clearly, in view of the scope of the Prosecutor's authority pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:158-15, there is no review of or appeal from the Prosecutor's unilateral decision. That is to say, the Manual's adoption of applicable provisions of law with respect to appeals must be read as incorporating N.J.S.A. 2A:158-15, pursuant to which there can be no appeal for at-will assistant prosecutors. Moreover, there is nothing in the disciplinary procedures interfering with the Prosecutor's right to suspend summarily an assistant prosecutor pending the hearing. Thus, all that the disciplinary procedures require is that the assistant prosecutor be notified of the charges against him and have a right to be heard thereon by the Prosecutor. We do not regard the holding of a hearing and the maximum thirty-day delay in effecting dismissal of a suspended employee as unduly compromising the Prosecutor's unfettered discretion, particularly in view of the countervailing considerations. [Id. at 70.] I add only these observations. To hold that a prosecutor cannot even agree to use fair procedures in discharging an assistant prosecutor sends the wrong message to county prosecutors in whom so much discretion is vested. In its previous decisions, this Court has explained that agreed-upon procedures for implementing substantive decisions . . . pose no significant threat of interference with the public employer's ability to make substantive policy determinations. [Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218-19 (1963).] In terms of justice, [a]udi alteram partem [to hear the other side] is said to be 'certainly the oldest established principle in Anglo-American administrative law.' Julian M. Joshua, The Right to be Heard in EEC Competition Procedures, 15 Fordham Int'l L.J. 16 (1991)(quoting Bernard Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law 105 (2d ed. 1962)). What separates our system of law from all others is our unflinching insistence on the value of procedure. It is the Due Process of the law that is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, not any particular substantive right. I realize that the prosecutor who made the agreement with his assistants has died, but I fail to understand why it is so burdensome that a successor prosecutor could not take the small amount of time that would be required at least to hear the assistant prosecutor's side of the case. That is the fair thing to do. Emerging democracies understand the value of fair procedure. The right to an administrative hearing is of paramount importance because it compels a decision-maker to see and hear the affected individual and confront that person's side of the dispute. As a result, a hearing may well forestall an incorrect decision or cause an agency to exercise discretion more favorably to the individual than it otherwise would have done. Beyond these utilitarian benefits, a hearing is important because it safeguards an individual's dignitary interest, treating that person as a human being . . . . [Michael Asimow, Toward a South African Administrative Justice Act, 3 Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 6-7 (1997).] The Court should not hold that a prosecutor cannot agree to be fair about implementing a decision to fire an assistant prosecutor. Justice Stein joins in this opinion. NO. A-105 HOWARD GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. COUNTY OF UNION and THE UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED May 9, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz