Case Title: Bell Atlantic v. Arlington County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 961830

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
BELL ATLANTIC-VIRGINIA, INC. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v.  Record No. 961830 
                                    June 6, 1997 
ARLINGTON COUNTY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
 
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge 
 
 
In this inverse condemnation proceeding, we decide whether 
the trial court erred in (1) sustaining the defendant's plea in 
bar on the ground of sovereign immunity and (2) sustaining the 
defendant's demurrer on the ground that the plaintiff's second 
amended motion for judgment fails to state a claim for damages 
under Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
 
Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. (Bell Atlantic) filed a second 
amended motion for judgment against Arlington County (the 
County), seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to Code § 8.01-
184 and "just compensation due to [the County's] taking or 
damaging of [Bell Atlantic's] property on or about:  September 
30, 1992; and June 8, 1994."  Count I of the motion for judgment 
relates to the September 30, 1992 incident, and Count II pertains 
to the June 8, 1994 incident. 
 
In each count, Bell Atlantic alleges that "the County took 
and/or damaged Bell Atlantic's underground utility facilities for 
public use."
1  In Count I, Bell Atlantic further alleges the 
                     
     
1The property allegedly taken or damaged on September 30, 
1992, is described as including "the following communications  
lines:  (a) 2100 pair cable; and (b) 1800 pair cable."  The 
property allegedly taken or damaged on June 8, 1994, is described 
as including "the following lines:  (a) 200 pair cable; and (b) 
600 pair cable." 
 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
following:  (1) "the damage or taking occurred so [the County] 
could construct, install or maintain its waterworks system;" (2) 
"[t]he actions of [the County] were unconstitutional in that [the 
County] took or damaged Bell Atlantic's property and applied it 
for public use without just compensation being made, and without 
Bell Atlantic's consent, contrary to Article I, Section 11, of 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia;" and (3) "Bell 
Atlantic therefore brings suit upon an implied contract" to 
recover the damages resulting from the taking or damage.  Bell 
Atlantic's allegations in Count II are virtually identical to 
those in Count I except that, in Count II, the alleged taking or 
damage occurred in connection with the County's sewage disposal 
system. 
 
The County filed a demurrer, asserting, inter alia, that 
"[t]he claims alleged in the Second Amended Motion for Judgment 
are barred by the County's sovereign immunity" and that Bell 
Atlantic failed "to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of 
action for either breach of implied contract or a taking of 
property without just compensation."  The County also filed a 
plea in bar, asserting that Bell Atlantic's action is a simple 
tort action and, thus, is barred by sovereign immunity.   
 
In its final order entered June 10, 1996, the trial court 
sustained the County's demurrer and plea in bar, concluding that 
"the Second Amended Motion for Judgment does not contain 
allegations sufficient to plead violations of Article I, Section 
 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
11 of the Virginia Constitution and/or for breach of implied 
contract and that such allegations are barred by the County's 
sovereign immunity."  We awarded Bell Atlantic an appeal. 
 
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia 
provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
"public uses," as that term is defined by the General Assembly,  
without just compensation.  The General Assembly, in Code § 15.1-
276, defines the term "public uses" to "embrace all uses which 
are necessary for public purposes."  Code § 15.1-292 empowers a 
County to acquire property by purchase, condemnation, or 
otherwise in order to construct, operate, or maintain its 
waterworks, and Code § 15.1-320 similarly empowers a County 
regarding its sewage disposal system. 
 
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution is self-executing 
and permits a property owner to enforce his constitutional right 
to just compensation in a common law action.  We have held that 
such an action is not a tort action; rather, it is a contract 
action and, therefore, is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  Jenkins v. County of Shenandoah, 246 Va. 467, 470, 436 
S.E.2d 607, 609 (1993); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 218 Va. 
625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1977).   
 
In the present case, the County did not present any evidence 
in support of its plea in bar.  Therefore, in deciding both the 
plea in bar and the County's demurrer, we, like the trial court, 
must confine our consideration to the allegations contained in 
 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
Bell Atlantic's second amended motion for judgment.
2
 
A demurrer admits as true all material facts well pleaded, 
facts impliedly alleged, and facts that may be fairly inferred 
from those alleged.  Palumbo v. Bennett, 242 Va. 248, 249, 409 
S.E.2d 152, 152 (1991); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 
Va. 534, 536, 331 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1985).   
 
From the allegations contained in the second amended motion 
for judgment, it is clear that Bell Atlantic states a claim for 
just compensation under Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution 
of Virginia.
3  Therefore, the trial court erred in sustaining the 
County's plea in bar and demurrer. 
 
Consequently, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
     
2The County contends that, in deciding this case, we should 
consider allegations made by Bell Atlantic in its original motion 
for judgment and amended motion for judgment.  We do not agree.  
Demurrers and pleas in bar were sustained as to those pleadings. 
 Thereafter, with leave of court, Bell Atlantic filed its second 
amended motion for judgment.  In so doing, it did not incorporate 
or refer to any of the allegations that were set forth in its 
original or amended motions for judgment.  The trial court based 
its decision "on [the County's] Demurrer and Special Plea in Bar 
to the Second Amended Motion for Judgment," and we cannot do 
otherwise (emphasis added).  See Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. 
Sutherland, 105 Va. 545, 549-50, 54 S.E. 465, 466 (1906). 
     
3We express no opinion, however, whether such a claim will 
be viable after the facts are fully developed by the evidence.