Case Title: State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6384

Docket Number: 20041477

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 104 Ohio St.3d 279, 2004-Ohio-6384.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MASON, PROS. ATTY., v. GRIFFIN, JUDGE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 104 Ohio St.3d 279, 2004-Ohio-6384.] 
Criminal law – Sentencing – Jurisdiction to sentence a criminal defendant is 
vested by law exclusively in the court – Juries have no authority to 
determine a defendant’s sentence. 
(No. 2004-1477 ─ Submitted November 23, 2004 ─ Decided December 1, 2004.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Terrance Moore was indicted in two separate criminal cases in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  After Moore waived his right to a 
jury trial on the charges, respondent, Judge Burt W. Griffin, conducted a bench 
trial of the criminal cases.  The trial concluded on June 17, 2004. 
{¶2} 
On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
a Washington trial court’s sentencing of a criminal defendant to more than three 
years above the statutory maximum of the standard range for second-degree 
kidnapping involving the use of a firearm, which was based on the sentencing 
judge’s finding under Washington law that the defendant acted with deliberate 
cruelty, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Blakely v. 
Washington (2004), ___ U.S. ____, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. 
{¶3} 
On July 7, 2004, Judge Griffin convicted Moore of multiple counts 
of trafficking in drugs, some of which had accompanying major-drug-offender 
specifications, and possession of drugs.  Judge Griffin also found Moore guilty of 
having weapons while under disability and possessing criminal tools. 
{¶4} 
At a July 26, 2004 presentencing hearing, Judge Griffin advised 
Moore that the court believed that he had a right to a jury trial for sentencing if 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the state sought a prison term longer than the initial statutory maximum for the 
major-drug-offender specifications or requested consecutive sentences.  Judge 
Griffin cited Blakely in support of the jury-trial option.  On July 27, 2004, the 
state, represented by the office of relator, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney 
William D. Mason, announced its intention to seek more than the initial statutory 
maximum for the convictions.  Moore then elected a jury sentencing hearing 
pursuant to Blakely.  By entries dated July 29, 2004, Judge Griffin scheduled the 
jury sentencing hearing for October 6. 
{¶5} 
In August 2004, Mason, on behalf of the state, filed a written 
objection to the jury sentencing hearing. 
{¶6} 
On September 3, 2004, Mason filed this action for a writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Griffin “from creating and presiding over a non-
statutory sentencing procedure by which a jury will make findings necessary to 
support certain sentences”  in Moore’s criminal cases.  On September 22, 2004, 
Judge Griffin moved to dismiss the prohibition action.  On that same date, Judge 
Griffin held another presentencing conference at which he concluded that a 
hearing should be held before he determined whether a Blakely jury sentencing 
hearing would be required.  By entries dated September 28 and October 5, 2004, 
Judge Griffin set the hearing for October 6 “to determine any Blakely issues.”  
Judge Griffin did not, however, cancel the previously scheduled jury sentencing 
hearing. 
{¶7} 
On October 1, 2004, we denied Judge Griffin’s motion to dismiss, 
granted an alternative writ of prohibition, and ordered the submission of evidence 
and briefing.  State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 103 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2004-Ohio-
5294, 815 N.E.2d 1122.  For his evidence, Judge Griffin submitted an affidavit in 
which he stated, “I am unable to determine if a jury sentencing hearing is 
appropriate until I am satisfied, based both on proposed evidence and an 
examination of the law, that the State is able to justify the imposition of an 
January Term, 2004 
3 
enhanced sentence[] because of the major drug offender specifications of which 
defendant was convicted or other specifications for which Blakely would require a 
jury sentencing hearing.”  Judge Griffin specified that he set the hearing on 
October 6 “to provide the parties with the opportunity to show what evidence they 
intended to present which would warrant a Blakely hearing.” 
{¶8} 
Mason provided evidence that established that Judge Griffin never 
expressly cancelled the jury sentencing hearing and that he understood that 
“Judge Griffin intends to create and preside over a jury sentencing trial in 
violation of Ohio sentencing statutes, if the State seeks consecutive sentences, a 
sentence on the [major-drug-offender] specification[s] or maximum sentences in 
[Moore’s criminal cases].”  On November 16, Judge Griffin filed his brief.  On 
November 17, Moore moved to intervene in this proceeding. 
{¶9} 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of Moore’s 
motion to intervene and for a decision on the merits. 
Motion to Intervene 
{¶10} Moore moves to intervene as a respondent in this case.  We deny 
the motion for the following reasons.  Even though Moore either knew or should 
have known of this case shortly after it was filed in September, he waited until 
after we granted an alternative writ and the parties filed their evidence and initial 
briefs before attempting to intervene on November 17.  Under these 
circumstances, Moore’s motion was not timely.  See, generally, State ex rel. First 
New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 501, 503, 696 
N.E.2d 1058.  In addition, Moore did not file the required pleading with his 
motion.  See Civ.R. 24(C); State ex rel. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Milligan, 
100 Ohio St.3d 366, 2003-Ohio-6608, 800 N.E.2d 361, ¶ 13; see, also, State ex 
rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203, fn. 
1, and cases cited therein. 
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{¶11} Nevertheless, because Moore was entitled to file an amicus curiae 
brief without leave of court as long as he filed it by the date that Judge Griffin’s 
brief was due, we treat his brief as an amicus curiae brief and consider it in 
resolving this case.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(8) and VI(6). 
Prohibition 
{¶12} Mason seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Griffin from 
holding a jury sentencing hearing in the underlying criminal cases.  In order to be 
entitled to the writ, Mason must establish that (1) Judge Griffin is about to 
exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is not authorized by law, 
and (3) denial of the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law exists.  Campaign to Elect Larry Carver Sheriff v. 
Campaign to Elect Anthony Stankiewicz Sheriff, 101 Ohio St.3d 256, 2004-Ohio-
812, 804 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 9. 
{¶13} Mason asserts that Judge Griffin patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to hold the jury sentencing hearing in the criminal cases.  “ ‘If a lower 
court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, 
prohibition * * * will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of 
jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized 
actions.’ ”  State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 Ohio St.3d 
349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Mayer v. 
Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  “In cases of 
a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack of an 
adequate remedy at law need not be proven because the availability of alternate 
remedies like appeal would be immaterial.”  State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18. 
{¶14} For 
the 
following 
reasons, 
Judge 
Griffin 
patently 
and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hold a jury sentencing hearing, and Mason is 
entitled to a writ of prohibition. 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶15} Neither the Ohio Constitution nor any statute authorizes Judge 
Griffin to conduct a jury sentencing hearing.  The Ohio Constitution does not 
confer jurisdiction on courts of common pleas; the Constitution instead provides 
that jurisdiction must be conferred on these courts by the General Assembly.  
Section 4(B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution (“The courts of common pleas and 
divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters 
and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies 
as may be provided by law” [emphasis added]); In re Seltzer (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 220, 222, 616 N.E.2d 1108; Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co. (1996), 113 Ohio 
App.3d 495, 499, 681 N.E.2d 470.  (Emphasis added.)  No statute authorizes 
Judge Griffin to convene a jury to make findings concerning sentencing in the 
underlying criminal cases. 
{¶16} In fact, the sentencing statutes pertinent to Moore’s criminal cases 
vest the exclusive responsibility to make these determinations in the court and not 
in a jury.  See, e.g., R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) (“if the offender commits a felony 
violation * * * that includes the sale, offer to sell, or possession of a schedule I or 
II controlled substance, with the exception of marihuana, and the court imposing 
the sentence upon the offender finds that the offender is guilty of a specification of 
the type described in section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code charging that the 
offender is a major drug offender * * * the court shall impose upon the offender 
for the felony violation a ten-year prison term * * * ”); 2929.14(D)(3)(b) (“The 
court imposing a prison term on an offender under division [D][3][a] of this 
section may impose an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, 
seven, eight, nine, or ten years, if the court * * * makes both of the findings set 
forth in divisions [D][2][b][i] and [ii] of this section”); 2929.14(C) (“[T]he court 
imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose the longest prison 
term * * * only upon offenders who committed the worst forms of the offense, 
upon offenders who pose the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes, 
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upon certain major drug offenders under division [D][3] of this section, and upon 
certain repeat violent offenders * * *”); 2929.14(E)(4) (“If multiple prison terms 
are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may 
require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that 
the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to 
punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the offender’s conduct”).  (Emphases added.)  
{¶17} Moreover, insofar as Judge Griffin determined that Blakely might 
render these statutes unconstitutional, he should apply the pertinent sentencing 
statutes without any enhancement provisions found to be unconstitutional by him.  
Instead, he ordered a hybrid procedure – a jury sentencing hearing to make certain 
findings upon which he would base his sentencing decision – that is not 
sanctioned by any current or former version of a statute.  That is, Judge Griffin 
had two choices:  (1) apply the statutes as if Blakely did not render them 
unconstitutional and conduct a sentencing hearing without a jury or (2) find the 
statutes unconstitutional under Blakely and refuse to impose those enhancement 
provisions he deemed unconstitutional.  By choosing neither, he proceeded in a 
manner in which he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to act. 
{¶18} Finally, Judge Griffin claims that until he “decides, based both on 
proposed evidence and an examination of the law, that a jury determination would 
be appropriate for factors relevant to an enhanced sentence, a jury sentencing 
hearing will not go forward” and that there is thus “no issue at this point for the 
Supreme Court to resolve.”  Moore raises the same argument.  Admittedly, a 
prohibition claim can be rendered moot when the act sought to be prevented is 
discontinued or abandoned by the respondent.  See State ex rel. Denton v. 
Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 784 N.E.2d 99, ¶ 26 (“to the 
extent that [relators] sought to prevent a policy that had already been discontinued 
by [respondents], their prohibition claim was moot”); see, also, State ex rel. 
January Term, 2004 
7 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 
809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 12 (“Because [relator] sought the writ [of prohibition] to 
prevent the commission from granting the applications [for rehearing] [and the 
commission has now denied the applications], its request appears moot”).  
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶19} Here, however, Judge Griffin never cancelled the jury sentencing 
hearing that he originally ordered in July 2004.  Moreover, the state understands 
that Judge Griffin’s most recent order simply means that if it requests more jail 
time for the major-drug-offender specifications or consecutive sentences, the 
judge will order a jury sentencing hearing.  In fact, the state has already indicated 
in the criminal cases that it will seek these enhanced sentences.  Therefore, this 
prohibition action is neither moot nor premature. 
{¶20} By so holding, we need not address the constitutional issue posed 
by Blakely in this case.  See State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 
2004-Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114 (“ ‘[c]ourts decide constitutional 
issues only when absolutely necessary’ ”). 
{¶21} Based on the foregoing, Judge Griffin patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction to conduct a jury sentencing hearing in the underlying criminal 
cases.  Therefore, we grant a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Griffin from 
conducting a jury sentencing hearing.  In addition, any hearing to determine 
whether to proceed with the jury sentencing hearing is unnecessary. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa 
Reitz Williamson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for relator. 
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Rebecca M. Horst, for respondent. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging denial of writ for amicus curiae, Terrance 
Moore. 
____________________