Case Title: Coral Construction v. S.F.

Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 315

Docket Number: S152934

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/2/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CORAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S152934 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A107803 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN   
) 
FRANCISCO et al., 
) 
(San Francisco County 
   
) 
Super. Ct. No. 319549)  
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
SCHRAM CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
)  
(San Francisco County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 421249) 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN  
) 
FRANCISCO et al., 
) 
 
)  
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Article I, section 31 of the California Constitution (section 31) forbids a city 
awarding public contracts to discriminate or grant preferential treatment based on 
race or gender.  (See generally Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 537 (Hi-Voltage).)  Here, a city whose public contracting laws 
expressly violate section 31 challenges its validity under the so-called political 
structure doctrine, a judicial interpretation of the federal equal protection clause.  
 
2 
(U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; see generally Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 
(1982) 458 U.S. 457 (Seattle) and Hunter v. Erickson (1969) 393 U.S. 385 
(Hunter).)  We conclude section 31 does not violate the political structure 
doctrine.   
I. BACKGROUND 
For the last 26 years, defendant City and County of San Francisco (City) has 
preferentially awarded public contracts to minority-owned business enterprises 
(MBE‟s) and women-owned business enterprises (WBE‟s).  The City‟s Board of 
Supervisors (Board) has mandated these preferences in a series of ordinances 
adopted over time, justifying each with legislative findings purporting to show 
continuing discrimination by the City against MBE‟s and WBE‟s.  The details of 
the program have evolved, partly in response to changes in the law governing the 
validity of such preferences.  Plaintiffs Coral Construction, Inc. (Coral) and 
Schram Construction, Inc. (Schram) challenge the 2003 version of the ordinance1 
as unconstitutional under section 31.   
The City‟s first MBE/WBE ordinance, adopted in 1984, set aside specified 
percentages of public contracting dollars for MBE‟s and WBE‟s.  The ordinance 
also gave bid discounts, which required the City‟s contracting authorities to treat 
bids by MBE‟s and WBE‟s as if they were lower than they in fact were.  Both the 
set-asides and the bid discounts afforded MBE‟s and WBE‟s a competitive 
advantage over other bidders.   
In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the 
City‟s 1984 ordinance violated the federal equal protection clause (U.S. Const., 
                                              
1  
(Version V of “Minority/Women/Local Business Utilization Ordinance,”  
S.F. Ord. No. 134-03 (approved June 6, 2003, expired June 30, 2009 [see fn. 4, 
post]) codified as S.F. Admin. Code, § 12D.A.1—12D.A.22.)   
 
3 
14th Amend.) in giving preferences based on race, and that it also violated the 
City‟s own charter in several respects.  (Assoc. Gen. Contr. of Cal. v. City & 
County of S.F. (9th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 922, 944.)  Shortly thereafter, the United 
States Supreme Court determined that Richmond, Virginia‟s MBE set-asides 
violated equal protection.  (Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469, 
498-506 (Croson).)  The legislative findings supporting Richmond‟s program did 
not show the requisite “ „strong basis in evidence for [the city‟s] conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary.‟ ”  (Id., at p. 500, quoting Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education (1986) 476 U.S. 267, 277 (plur. opn. of Powell, J.).)  Four 
justices suggested, however, that in “the extreme case” not presented in Croson, 
“some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary” as a 
remedy “to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion.”  (Croson, at p. 509 (plur. 
opn. of O‟Connor, J.).)    
Responding to these judicial decisions, San Francisco‟s Board in 1989 passed 
a new ordinance eliminating set-asides but retaining bid discounts and other 
preferences for MBE‟s and WBE‟s.  When an organization of businesses sued to 
enjoin the ordinance‟s enforcement, the City argued the equal protection clause 
required preferences as a remedy for discrimination.  The federal district court 
declined to issue interim relief because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a 
sufficient likelihood of success on the merits.  (Associated General Contractors v. 
San Francisco (N.D.Cal. 1990) 748 F.Supp. 1443, 1456.)  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.  (Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition (9th Cir. 1991) 950 
F.2d 1401, 1418.)   
The voters approved Proposition 209 at the November 1996 general election, 
thus adding section 31 to article I of the state Constitution.  Section 31 declares 
that the state, including its political subdivisions, “shall not discriminate against, 
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
 
4 
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.”  (§ 31, subd. (a).)  The next year, the Ninth 
Circuit held section 31 did not violate the federal equal protection clause, as 
interpreted in the political structure cases (e.g., Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, and 
Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385), and vacated a preliminary injunction against section 
31‟s enforcement issued by the district court.  (Coalition for Economic Equity v. 
Wilson (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 692, 711 (Wilson), vacating judg. in (N.D.Cal. 
1996) 946 F.Supp. 1480.)   
At the time the voters adopted section 31, the MBE/WBE ordinance then in 
effect was set to expire on October 31, 1998.  Before the ordinance expired, the 
City‟s Board and its Human Rights Commission (HRC) conducted investigations 
for the stated purpose of “gaug[ing] the effectiveness of the prior [MBE/WBE] 
Ordinances . . . and to assess the need for further and continuing action.”  (S.F. 
Admin. Code, former § 12D.A.2.)2  The Board found that MBE‟s and WBE‟s 
were receiving a smaller share of City contracts than would be expected based on 
their availability, and that “[t]his poor utilization [could not] be attributed to 
chance” and was, instead, “due to discrimination by the City and discrimination in 
the private market.”  (S.F. Admin. Code, former § 12D.A.2.2.)  In legislative 
findings setting out the basis for this conclusion, the Board cited its own statistical 
studies, similar studies by other governmental entities in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, testimony and oral histories recounting anecdotes of discrimination, “social 
                                              
2  
Citations to “former” section 12D.A. of the San Francisco Administrative 
Code refer to version IV of the “Minority/Women/Local Business Utilization 
Ordinance” (S.F. Ord. 296-98, approved Oct. 5, 1998).  All other citations to 
section 12D.A. refer to version V of this ordinance (S.F. Ord. 134-03, approved 
June 1, 2003, expired June 30, 2008).   
 
5 
science materials concerning discrimination against women and minorities in the 
Bay Area and in public contracting,” and data showing that “the decision makers 
in the City contracting process — the City department heads and general and 
deputy managers — have been and continue to be overwhelmingly Caucasian 
males” operating under an “ „old boy network.‟ ”  (S.F. Admin. Code, former 
§ 12.D.A.2 (findings 1, 15).)   
Based on these findings, the Board in 1998 adopted a new ordinance 
preserving bid discounts for MBE‟s and WBE‟s, and requiring prime contractors 
either to use MBE and WBE subcontractors at levels set by the HRC or to make 
good faith efforts to do so through preferential outreach efforts targeted at such 
businesses.  (S.F. Admin. Code, former §§ 12D.A.4, 12D.A.5, 12D.A.17.)   
In 2000, while San Francisco‟s 1998 ordinance was still in effect, we held 
that section 31 invalidated the City of San Jose‟s public contracting program 
because it mandated participation goals for, and preferential outreach efforts 
directed to, MBE‟s and WBE‟s.  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 562-565.)  
Section 31 does not tolerate, we explained, race- and gender-conscious preferences 
the equal protection clause does not require but merely permits.  (See Hi-Voltage, 
at p. 567.)  Like the plurality in Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, however, we held 
out the possibility that the federal equal protection clause might sometimes require 
race-conscious remedies to remedy intentional discrimination.  (Hi-Voltage, at 
p. 568 [“Where the state or a political subdivision has intentionally discriminated, 
use of a race-conscious or race-specific remedy necessarily follows as the only, or 
at least the most likely, means of rectifying the resulting injury.”]; see Croson, at 
p. 509 (plur. opn. of O‟Connor, J.).)    
In 2001, plaintiff Coral commenced the action now before us in the San 
Francisco Superior Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
1998 ordinance.  The ordinance was set to expire in 2003.  (S.F. Admin. Code, 
 
6 
former § 12D.A.21.)  Before it expired, and while plaintiff‟s action proceeded in 
the superior court, the City conducted additional investigations to determine 
whether discrimination against MBE‟s and WBE‟s continued.  Finding that such 
discrimination did continue, the Board in 2003 reenacted the 1998 ordinance 
without substantial change.  (See S.F. Admin. Code, § 12D.A.2.8.)  From that 
point on, the action proceeded as a challenge to the 2003 ordinance.   
In legislative findings accompanying the 2003 ordinance, the Board once 
again relied on statistical studies showing that MBE‟s and WBE‟s were 
underutilized, both in San Francisco and the surrounding area, on testimony and 
oral histories recounting anecdotes of discrimination, and on social science 
materials.  (S.F. Admin. Code, § 12D.A.2.)  Based on this information, the Board 
found that “the race- and gender-conscious remedial programs authorized by [the 
MBE/WBE] Ordinance continue to be necessary to remedy discrimination against 
minority- and women-owned businesses in City prime contracting and 
subcontracting.”  (S.F. Admin. Code, § 12D.A.2.8.)  The Board also found “that 
the City . . . is actively discriminating against women and minority groups in its 
contracting, and is passively participating in discrimination in the private sector.”  
(Ibid.)  In conclusion, the Board found “that the evidence before it establishes that 
the City‟s current contracting practices are in violation of federal law and that, as a 
result, [the] ordinance continues to be required by federal law to bring the City 
into compliance with federal civil rights laws in its contracting practices.”  (Ibid.)   
More specifically, the Board found that “the following discriminatory 
practices [identified by the HRC in 1998 were still] at work in City contracting:  
(1) listing [MBE‟s and WBE‟s] as subcontractors but never using the listed [MBE 
and WBE] subcontracting firms, (2) the use of additional nonminority, male 
subcontractors never listed on the relevant HRC forms, and (3) the creation of 
fraudulent joint ventures involving minority- or women-owned and majority, men-
 
7 
owned firms.”  (S.F. Admin. Code, § 12D.A.2.7.)  The Board also noted the HRC 
in 2003 “ha[d] encountered . . . additional discriminatory practices in City 
contracting,” including:  “(1) attempts by City personnel to improperly influence 
contract selection panels to ensure that MBEs/WBEs do not obtain City prime 
contracts; (2) attempts by City personnel to blame MBEs/WBEs unjustifiably for 
project delays; (3) the imposition of unnecessary minimum requirements on City 
contracts that act as a barrier to MBEs/WBEs; (4) the failure by City departments 
to submit draft requests for proposals to HRC with sufficient time to permit the 
HRC to ensure that adequate MBE/WBE subcontracting goals have been set; 
(5) attempts by City departments to circumvent the requirements of [the 1998] 
ordinance by extending or modifying existing contracts rather than putting new 
contracts out to bid; (6) the failure by City departments to comply with the prompt 
payment provisions of this ordinance which ensure that MBEs/WBEs do not suffer 
unnecessary financial hardships; and (7) resistance by City prime contractors to 
provid[ing] the City with required subcontractor payment information, making it 
difficult for the City to ensure that MBE/WBE subcontractors receive prompt 
payment for their work on City contracts.”  (Ibid.)   
The City‟s 2003 statistical studies showed that MBE‟s and WBE‟s continued 
“to receive a smaller share of certain types of contracts for the purchases of goods 
and services by the City than would be expected” based on their availability.  (S.F. 
Admin. Code, § 12.D.A.2.3.)  The studies also showed, however, that MBE‟s and 
WBE‟s received a larger share of other types of contracts.  To note just a few 
examples, the City used African-American MBE‟s at 10 times, and WBE‟s at 
more than three times, the expected rate for professional services subcontracts, and 
used Latino MBE‟s at more than twice the expected rate for construction prime 
and subcontracts.  (S.F. Admin. Code, §§ 12D.A.2.4, 12D.A.2.5.)  The Board 
explained its overuse of MBE‟s and WBE‟s as “attributable to the fact that the 
 
8 
City has remedial contracting programs in place,” and found that to discontinue 
the use of preferences would cause MBE and WBE utilization rates to “plummet.”  
(Id., § 12D.A.2.4.)  In comparison, non-MBE/WBE firms were slightly overused 
in most areas of City contracting, significantly overused in a few areas, and 
substantially overused only in prime contracts for architecture and engineering (by 
40 percent) and prime and subcontracts for telecommunications (by 10 and 23 
percent, respectively).   
In contrast to 1998, the Board in 2003 no longer found that decisionmakers in 
the City‟s contracting process were overwhelmingly Caucasian males.  (Compare 
S.F. Admin. Code, former § 12D.A.2.1 with id., present § 12D.A.2 [deleting the 
prior finding].)  The Board noted, however, that “[m]inorities and women [had] 
report[ed] that project managers in many City Departments continue to operate 
under an „old boy network[‟] in awarding City prime contracts.”  (Id., 
§ 12.DA.2.6.)   
The operative provisions of the 2003 ordinance give bid discounts that range 
from 5 to 10 percent, depending on the level of MBE/WBE participation.  (S.F. 
Admin. Code, § 12D.A.9.2.)  For each proposed prime contract, the director of the 
HRC sets MBE/WBE participation goals based on the availability of MBE/WBE 
subcontractors and the extent of subcontracting opportunities available.  (Id., 
§ 12D.A.17(C).)  Prospective prime contractors must demonstrate in their bids that 
they have made good-faith efforts to use MBE/WBE subcontractors, and must also 
identify the particular MBE/WBE subcontractors to be employed and the dollar 
value of their participation.  (Id., § 12D.A.17(D).)  The director may waive the 
MBE/WBE subcontracting goals only on a showing that subcontracting is 
infeasible given the project‟s requirements, that MBE/WBE subcontractors are 
unavailable, or that the available MBE‟s/WBE‟s “have given price quotes that 
exceed competitive levels beyond amounts that can be attributed to cover costs 
 
9 
inflated by the present effects of discrimination.”  (Id., § 12D.A.17(G)3; see also 
id., § 12D.A.17(G)1, 2.)  Bids that do not satisfy these requirements, or that do not 
meet the Director‟s MBE/WBE participation goals, “shall be declared 
nonresponsive.”  (Id., § 12D.A.17(D).)   
The 2003 ordinance defines “minority,” and thus the groups whose 
businesses are entitled to be certified as MBE‟s, to include “African Americans 
(defined as persons whose ancestry is from any of the Black racial groups of 
Africa or the Caribbean); Arab Americans (defined as persons whose ancestry is 
from an Arabic speaking country that is a current or former member of the League 
of Arab States); Asian Americans (defined as persons with Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, Pacific Islander, Samoan, Filipino, Asian Indian, and Southeast Asian 
Ancestry); Iranian Americans (defined as persons whose ancestry is from the 
country of Iran); Latino Americans (defined as persons with Mexican, Puerto 
Rican, Cuban, Central American or South American ancestry[; p]ersons with 
European Spanish ancestry are not included as Latino Americans . . .); and Native 
Americans (defined as any person whose ancestry is from any of the original 
peoples of North America, and who maintains cultural identification through tribal 
affiliation or community recognition[)].”  (S.F. Admin. Code, § 12D.A.5.)   
Finally, the 2003 ordinance declares as a matter of policy that “[t]he City will 
continue to rely on the relationship between the percentages of MBEs/WBEs in 
the relevant sector of the San Francisco business community and their respective 
shares of City contract dollars as a measure of the effectiveness of this ordinance 
in remedying the effects of the aforementioned discrimination.”  (S.F. Admin. 
Code, § 12D.A.3.)   
After the City adopted the 2003 ordinance, plaintiff Schram commenced a 
separate action challenging its validity under section 31 and seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief.  Schram and the City filed cross-motions for summary 
 
10 
judgment.  When briefing on the motions in Shram was complete, the parties to 
Coral joined in the motions, and all parties in both cases stipulated that no further 
briefing or record submissions would be necessary to permit the court to issue 
rulings on summary judgment in both cases.  In view of the stipulation, the 
superior court consolidated Shram and Coral for all purposes.   
The superior court granted plaintiffs‟ motion and denied the City‟s.  Relying 
on Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, the court held the 2003 ordinance violated 
section 31.  Relying on the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Wilson, supra, 122 F.3d 
692, the court held section 31 did not violate the political structure doctrine.  
Finally, the court concluded the ordinance was not required to avoid a loss of 
federal funds and was, thus, not exempt from section 31 on that basis.  (See § 31, 
subd. (e).3)  As relief, the court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
City from enforcing the 2003 ordinance or any similar program in the future.  The 
Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for adjudication 
of the City‟s claim that the federal equal protection clause required the ordinance.  
We granted review.4   
                                              
3  
“Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which 
must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where 
ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the State.”  (§ 31, subd. (e).)   
4  
The 2003 ordinance expired by its own terms on June 30, 2008.  (S.F. 
Admin. Code, § 12D.A.22.)  The case is not therefore moot, however, because the 
injunction bars the City from adopting any similar ordinance in the future, and 
because there is no reason to believe the City would not, but for the injunction, 
renew its long-standing mandate for race- and gender-based preferences.  In any 
event, no party has asked us to dismiss review.   
 
11 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Political Structure Doctrine. 
We first address the City‟s argument that section 31 violates the political 
structure doctrine — an aspect of federal equal protection articulated in Seattle, 
supra, 458 U.S. 457, and Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385.  The City raised this issue 
in its cross-motion for summary judgment as a ground for judgment in its favor.  
Accordingly, the City‟s burden is to show “that there is no triable issue as to any 
material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  We review the matter de novo because it comes to us as 
a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.  (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 67-68.)  We requested briefing on the issue,5 and now hold 
that section 31 does not violate equal protection.   
To determine whether California‟s section 31 is consistent with the federal 
equal protection clause (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) we must first make clear what 
the state provision means.  As the Legislative Analyst explained in the official 
ballot pamphlet presenting the proposed measure to the voters, section 31 was 
intended to “eliminate state and local government affirmative action programs in 
the areas of public employment, public education, and public contracting to the 
extent these programs involve „preferential treatment‟ based on race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin.  The specific programs affected by the measure, 
however, . . . depend on such factors as (1) court rulings on what types of activities 
                                              
5  
Specifically, we asked whether “article I, section 31, of the California 
Constitution, which prohibits government entities from discrimination or 
preference on the basis of race, sex, or color in public contracting, improperly 
disadvantage[s] minority groups and violates equal protection principles by 
making it more difficult to enact legislation on their behalf[.]  (See [Seattle, 
supra,] 458 U.S. 457; [Hunter, supra,] 393 U.S. 385.)”   
 
12 
are considered „preferential treatment‟[6] and (2) whether federal law requires the 
continuation of certain programs.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) 
analysis of Prop. 209 by Legis. Analyst, p. 30.)  Section 31‟s ban on preferences 
includes certain exceptions.  The provision does not affect “bona fide 
qualifications based on sex” (§ 31, subd. (c)), existing court orders or consent 
decrees (id., subd. (d)), and actions which must be taken to avoid a loss of federal 
funds to the state (id., subd. (e)).  (See Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis of Prop. 209, 
p. 30.)   
Most importantly for present purposes, section 31 prohibits race- and gender-
conscious programs the federal equal protection clause permits but does not 
require.  As we explained in Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 567, “[e]qual 
protection allows discrimination and preferential treatment whenever a court 
determines they are justified by a compelling state interest and are narrowly 
tailored to address an identified remedial need.”  In contrast, “section 31 
categorically prohibits discrimination and preferential treatment.  Its literal 
language admits no „compelling state interest‟ exception [and] we find nothing to 
suggest the voters intended to include one sub silentio.”  (Ibid.)  Section 31 poses 
no obstacle, however, to race- or gender-conscious measures required by federal 
law or the federal Constitution.  This is the inescapable effect of the supremacy 
                                              
6  
In Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, we concluded that section 31 uses the 
terms “discrimination” and “preferential treatment” in their “ „natural and ordinary 
meanings . . . .‟ ”  (Hi-Voltage, at p. 559, quoting Amador Valley Union High Sch. 
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245.)  Thus, to 
“ „[d]iscriminate‟ means „to make distinctions in treatment; show partiality (in 
favor of) or prejudice (against),‟ ” and “ „preferential‟ means giving „preference,‟ 
which is „a giving of priority or advantage to one person . . . over others.‟ ”  (Hi-
Voltage, at pp. 559-560, quoting Webster‟s New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1988) 
pp. 392, 1062.)   
 
13 
clause (U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2), which section 31 implicitly acknowledges in a 
savings clause.7   
Addressing an identical challenge to section 31, the Ninth Circuit in Wilson, 
supra, 122 F.3d 692, 701, observed that, “[a]s a matter of „conventional‟ equal 
protection analysis, there is simply no doubt that [section 31] is constitutional.”  
The clause provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.)  
“A core purpose” of the clause is to “do away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race” (Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) 466 U.S. 429, 432, 
fn. omitted), thus ultimately helping to create “a political system in which race no 
longer matters” (Shaw v. Reno (1993) 509 U.S. 630, 657).  To further this goal, the 
clause renders racial classifications presumptively invalid, regardless of purported 
motivation (Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003) 538 U.S. 721, 
736; Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney (1979) 442 U.S. 256, 272), and 
tolerates them only when narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental 
interests (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 224, 226-227 
(Adarand)).  Section 31 is consistent with equal protection, under this analysis, 
because “[a] law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or 
gender a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender” (Wilson, at 
p. 702), and because the federal Constitution does not oblige the state to permit 
racial classifications the federal Constitution itself does not require.  “That the 
                                              
7  
“If any part or parts of this section are found to be in conflict with federal 
law or the United States Constitution, the section shall be implemented to the 
maximum extent that federal law and the United States Constitution permit.”  
(§ 31, subd. (h) [in relevant part].)   
 
14 
Constitution permits the rare race-based or gender-based preference hardly implies 
that the state cannot ban them altogether.”  (Id., at p. 708.)   
To argue that section 31 violates equal protection, the City invokes the rarely 
used political structure doctrine.  The doctrine has its origin in Hunter, supra, 393 
U.S. 385, and Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, and its parameters necessarily emerge 
from those decisions.   
In Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385, a realtor in Akron, Ohio refused to show 
homes to an African-American prospective buyer.  When the buyer sued to 
compel the city to enforce its fair housing ordinance, the city‟s voters repealed the 
ordinance and amended the city charter to require a referendum before any new 
ordinance on the same subject could take effect.  (Id., at pp. 386-387.)  The high 
court held the charter amendment violated equal protection.  While the provision 
“declare[d] no right to discriminate in housing” (id., at p. 389), it still contained 
“an explicitly racial classification,” in the sense that it “treat[ed] racial housing 
matters differently from other racial and housing matters” (ibid.).  “The automatic 
referendum system [did] not,” for example, “reach housing discrimination on 
sexual or political grounds, or against those with children or dogs, nor [did] it 
affect tenants seeking more heat or better maintenance from landlords, nor those 
seeking rent control, urban renewal, public housing, or new building codes.”  (Id., 
at p. 391.)  The referendum system placed a burden only on the minority, the court 
explained, because “[t]he majority needs no protection against discrimination and 
if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than that.”  (Ibid.)  While 
the city might properly have changed the existing ordinance by “majority vote at 
[a] town meeting” (id., at p. 392), the city “instead chose[] a more complex 
system.  Having done so,” the court concluded, “the [city] may no more 
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation 
 
15 
in its behalf than it may dilute any person‟s vote or give any group a smaller 
representation than another of comparable size.”  (Id., at pp. 392-393.)   
In Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, the governing board of a Washington public 
school district voluntarily adopted a plan to end de facto racial segregation by 
busing pupils to reduce racial imbalance in individual schools.  (Id., at pp. 460-
461.)  The state‟s voters responded by amending the state‟s constitution to prohibit 
busing for the purpose of desegregation, while still allowing busing for most of the 
other reasons for which pupils were already being transported (e.g., to provide 
special education and reduce overcrowding).  (Id., at pp. 461-463, 471.)  Relying 
on Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385, the high court held the state constitutional 
provision violated equal protection.  The state provision, the court explained, 
“remove[d] the authority to address a racial problem — and only a racial problem 
— from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority 
interests.”  (Seattle, at p. 474.)  The provision burdened minority interests by 
“lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new and remote level of 
government.”  (Id., at p. 483.)  As a result, “[t]hose favoring the elimination of de 
facto school segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature, or from 
the statewide electorate,” while “authority over all other student assignment 
decisions, as well as over most other areas of educational policy, remains vested in 
the local school board.”  (Id., at p. 474.)   
The “political structure” doctrine that emerges from these decisions is 
perhaps best summarized in the Seattle majority‟s statement that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . reaches „a political structure that treats all individuals as equals,‟ 
. . . yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place 
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.”  
(Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, 467, quoting Mobile v. Bolden (1980) 446 U.S. 55, 
84 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).)  The City argues this doctrine straightforwardly 
 
16 
invalidates section 31 because that provision uses the racial (or gender-based) 
nature of an issue (i.e., preferences) to structure governmental decisionmaking, in 
the sense that groups that seek race- or gender-based preferences in public 
contracting, employment and education must first overcome the obstacle of 
amending the state Constitution, while groups that seek preferences on other bases 
(e.g., disability or veteran status) need not.  Although superficially appealing, the 
City‟s argument is not ultimately persuasive.  The United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have concluded the political structure doctrine 
does not invalidate state laws that broadly forbid preferences and discrimination 
based on race, gender and other similar classifications.  (See Wilson, supra, 122 
F.3d 692, 708-709; Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm (6th Cir. 
2006) 473 F.3d 237, 251 (Granholm).)  While the lower federal courts‟ decisions 
do not bind us, we give them “great weight” when they reflect a consensus, as they 
do here.  (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 58; Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag 
Service, Inc. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 316, 320-321.)   Here, exercising our independent 
judgment on the matter, we conclude the Sixth and Ninth Circuits‟ decisions are 
correct on this point.   
In Wilson, supra, 122 F.3d 692, as previously noted, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the City‟s argument that section 31 violates the political structure doctrine 
— the same argument the City now repeats in this court.  In rejecting the 
argument, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[i]mpediments to preferential treatment 
do not deny equal protection.  It is one thing to say that individuals have equal 
protection rights against political obstructions to equal treatment; it is quite 
another to say that individuals have equal protection rights against political 
obstructions to preferential treatment.  While the [federal] Constitution protects 
against obstructions to equal treatment, it erects obstructions to preferential 
treatment by its own terms.”  (Wilson, at p. 708, fn. omitted.)  “That the 
 
17 
Constitution permits the rare race-based or gender-based preference hardly implies 
that the state cannot ban them altogether.”  (Ibid.)  The Sixth Circuit in Granholm 
relied in part on the same reasoning in declining to issue preliminary injunctive 
relief against a provision of the Michigan Constitution (id., art. I, § 26) identical to 
California‟s section 31.  (Granholm, supra, 473 F.3d 237, 251 [impediments to 
preferential treatment do not deny equal protection, citing Wilson, at p. 708].)8   
The City perceives no important difference between initiatives obstructing 
equal treatment and initiatives banning preferences, describing both as “plac[ing] 
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.”  
(Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, 467.)  We do not think, however, that the term 
“beneficial legislation” can bear the weight the City would place upon it.  Nothing 
in Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385, or Seattle supports extending the political 
structure doctrine to protect race- or gender-based preferences that equal 
protection does not require.   
The ordinance repealed by Akron‟s voters in Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385, 
merely required equal treatment in the sale and lease of real property.  (See id., at 
p. 386.)  The initiative repealing the ordinance had no apparent consequence but to 
perpetuate the unequal treatment of minorities by depriving them of the benefit of 
plainly constitutional legislation.  (Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) 387 U.S. 369, 
affg. Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 529.)  In no sense did the case concern 
preferences, and it therefore offers the City‟s position no support.   
                                              
8  
(See also Coalition to Def. Aff. Act. v. Regents of U. of Mi. (E.D.Mich. 
2008) 539 F.Supp.2d 924, 953-958 [dismissing action]; Coalition v. Regents of 
University of Michigan (E.D.Mich. 2008) 592 F.3d 948, 950-952 [denying motion 
to alter or amend judgment].)   
 
18 
Relying instead on Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, the City contends the local 
pupil transportation programs involved in that case were “designed to move many 
students from schools nearest their homes in order to address „racial imbalances‟ 
in the schools [and thus] can only be described as providing affirmative, race-
conscious relief.”  This characterization of Seattle is accurate, but only so far as it 
goes.  In arguing that Seattle protects presumptively unconstitutional racial 
preferences, the City reads the decision without regard to its historical context and 
thus unjustifiably extends its holding.  Today the race-conscious pupil assignment 
programs repealed by Washington‟s voters would be presumptively 
unconstitutional and, thus, subject to strict scrutiny.  (See Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007) 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(Parents Involved).)  But at the time Seattle was decided, the high court‟s prior 
decisions indicated that the assignment of pupils by ratios to achieve racial balance 
fell “within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities” to formulate 
“educational policy” and to “prepare students to live in a pluralistic society . . . .”  
(Swann v. Board of Education (1971) 402 U.S. 1, 16; see also North Carolina 
State Board of Education v. Swann (1971) 402 U.S. 43, 45.)  Although the dissent 
in Seattle argued that race-conscious pupil-assignment policies were 
“presumptively invalid” and required an “extraordinary justification” (see Seattle, 
at p. 492, fn. 6 (dis. opn. of Powell, J.)), the majority did not address the 
argument.9  Nor does anything in Seattle suggest the high court understood the 
                                              
9  
The majority in Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, noted the litigants had “not 
challenge[d] the propriety of race-conscious student assignments for the purpose 
of achieving integration, even absent a finding of prior de jure segregation.”  (Id., 
at p. 472, fn. 15, citing Swann v. Board of Education, supra, 402 U.S. 1, 16, and 
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, supra, 402 U.S. 43, 45.)  The 
court “therefore [did] not specifically pass on that issue.”  (Seattle, at p. 472, 
fn. 15.)   
 
19 
pupil assignment policies in question as providing unequal preferences, as 
opposed simply to “ „equal educational opportunity‟ ” (Seattle, at p. 479, italics 
added, quoting Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason (Wn. 1972) 495 
P.2d 657, 663) in the plain, immediate sense of sending pupils of different races to 
the same schools.  Accordingly, Seattle cannot fairly be read as holding that the 
political structure doctrine protects presumptively unconstitutional racial 
preferences, as opposed to programs intended to bring about immediate equal 
treatment.  “Even a state law that does restructure the political process can only 
deny equal protection if it burdens an individual‟s right to equal treatment.” 
(Wilson, supra, 122 F.3d 692, 707.)10   
Instead of burdening the right to equal treatment, section 31 directly serves 
the principle that “all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”  
(Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 306, 342; see also Parents Involved, supra, 
551 U.S 701, 760.)  As noted, a “core purpose” of the equal protection clause is to 
“do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race” 
(Palmore v. Sidoti, supra, 466 U.S. 429, 432, fn. omitted), ultimately creating “a 
political system in which race no longer matters” (Shaw v. Reno, supra, 509 U.S. 
630, 657).  Racial preferences are presumptively unconstitutional (Nevada Dept. 
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, supra, 538 U.S. 721, 736) and tolerated only when 
narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests (Adarand, supra, 
515 U.S. 200, 224, 226-227).  The requirement that such preferences withstand 
strict scrutiny “reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, 
                                              
10  
We do not in any way question the political structure doctrine‟s continuing 
validity, despite suggestions to the contrary.  (E.g., conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, 
J., post, at pp. 2, 38.)  Instead, we merely read Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, in its 
historical context to determine how far its holding extends, as we must.   
 
20 
are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the 
interest demands.  Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences 
would offend this fundamental equal protection principle.”  (Grutter v. Bollinger, 
supra, at p. 342.)11  Accordingly, even in the rare case in which racial preferences 
are required by equal protection as a remedy for discrimination, the governmental 
body adopting such remedies must undertake an extraordinary burden of 
justification “to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal 
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in 
the service of the goal of equality itself.”  (Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 510.)  In 
contrast, a generally applicable rule forbidding preferences and discrimination not 
required by equal protection, such as section 31, does not logically require the 
same justification.12   
For all of these reasons, we conclude the political structure doctrine does not 
invalidate section 31.   
B. The Federal Funding Exception. 
The City next contends the 2003 ordinance is unaffected by section 31 
because the ordinance falls within the exception set out in subdivision (e):  
“Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be 
                                              
11  
The high court in Grutter v. Bollinger, supra, 539 U.S. 306, 337, rejected 
an equal protection challenge to a law school admissions policy that used race, 
without preferential quotas, as one factor “in a highly individualized, holistic 
review of each applicant‟s file . . . .”  In its decision, the court noted that states 
“can and should draw on the most promising aspects of . . . race-neutral 
alternatives as they develop” in states such as “California . . . , where racial 
preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law [e.g., section 31] . . . .”  (Id., 
at p. 342.)   
12  
Again, section 31 does not affect preferences required by the federal equal 
protection clause.  (See § 31, subd. (h); see also ante, at pp. 12-13.)   
 
21 
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where 
ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the State.”  (§ 31, subd. (e).)  
The City, which receives federal funds for a variety of projects, argues it is 
compelled to enforce the 2003 ordinance by specific federal regulations imposing 
affirmative action obligations on cities that receive funds.  We asked the parties to 
brief the issue13 and now hold, as did the lower courts, that the City‟s argument 
lacks merit.   
The City invokes the federal funding exception (§ 31, subd. (e)) not as a basis 
for its own motion for summary judgment but, rather, as an argument against 
plaintiffs‟ motion.  Accordingly, the City‟s burden is to show that a triable issue of 
fact exists.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.)  The superior court did not mention the federal 
funding argument in its written ruling granting plaintiffs‟ motion.  The Court of 
Appeal, however, discussed and rejected the argument, concluding that the 
relevant federal regulations do not require racial preferences and that the City has 
not, in any event, made a sufficient factual showing of past discrimination to 
trigger any obligation under the regulations.  Of these two grounds, we find the 
first dispositive and thus do not reach the second.14   
                                              
13  
Specifically, we asked the parties whether “an ordinance that provides 
certain advantages to minority- and female-owned business enterprises with 
respect to the award of city contracts fall[s] within an exception to section 31 for 
actions required of a local government entity to maintain eligibility for federal 
funds under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000d)[.]”   
14  
Accordingly, our analysis and disposition of this issue do not depend on 
whether the City on remand proves, or fails to prove, that it has purposefully 
discriminated against MBE‟s and WBE‟s.  (See post, at p. 24 et seq.)  We address 
here only the question whether the relevant federal regulations, independently of 
the federal equal protection clause (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.), require the 2003 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
22 
The City‟s argument begins with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VI, which 
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, 
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”  (42 U.S.C. § 2000d.)  Title VI also authorizes and directs 
“[e]ach Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity . . . to effectuate the provisions of 
section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with the 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in 
connection with which the action is taken.”  (42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.)  Exercising 
this rulemaking authority, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Secretary 
of Transportation have issued regulations forbidding discrimination in the projects 
they fund and requiring “affirmative action” in specified circumstances.  (40 
C.F.R. § 7.35(a)(7) (2010) [environmental protection];15 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(7) 
(2009) [transportation].16)  In neither regulation, however, is the term “affirmative 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
ordinance.  If the federal equal protection clause itself requires the 2003 ordinance, 
then the City‟s claim under the federal regulations has no practical significance.   
15  
“In administering a program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance in which the recipient has previously discriminated on the basis of race, 
color, sex, or national origin, the recipient shall take affirmative action to provide 
remedies to those who have been injured by the discrimination.”  (40 C.F.R. 
§ 7.35(a)(7) (2010).)   
16  
“This part does not prohibit the consideration of race, color, or national 
origin if the purpose and effect are to remove or overcome the consequences of 
practices or impediments which have restricted the availability of, or participation 
in, the program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, on the grounds of 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
23 
action” defined.  (Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (2010) [environmental protection; 
definitions]; 49 C.F.R. § 21.23 (2009) [transportation; definitions].)   
The City contends these regulations compelled it to adopt the 2003 ordinance 
to avoid a loss of federal funding.  We do not agree.  Although the regulations use 
the broad, undefined term “affirmative action,” no intention to require racial 
preferences emerges from their plain language.  The Environmental Protection 
Agency‟s regulation requires a recipient of federal funds who has “previously 
discriminated” to “take affirmative action to provide remedies to those who have 
been injured by the discrimination.”  (40 C.F.R. § 7.35(a)(7) (2010), italics 
added.)  In this context, the term “affirmative action” clearly refers not to race-
based remedies but, rather, to actions taken to benefit the specific victims of past 
discrimination.  The regulation thus cannot logically mandate an ordinance like the 
City‟s, which confers preferences on bidders based on race without regard to 
specific instances of past discrimination.  The Secretary of Transportation‟s 
regulation more broadly requires the recipients of federal funds to take 
“affirmative action to ensure that no person is excluded from participation” in a 
federally funded program “[e]ven in the absence of prior discriminatory practice 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
race, color, or national origin.  Where prior discriminatory practice or usage tends, 
on the grounds of race, color, or national origin to exclude individuals from 
participation in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject them to discrimination 
under any program or activity to which this part applies, the applicant or recipient 
must take affirmative action to remove or overcome the effects of the prior 
discriminatory practice or usage.  Even in the absence of prior discriminatory 
practice or usage, a recipient in administering a program or activity to which this 
part applies, is expected to take affirmative action to assure that no person is 
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the program or activity on 
the grounds of race, color, or national origin.”  (49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(7) (2009).)   
 
24 
or usage . . . .”  (49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(7) (2009).)  The regulation also mentions 
race-based remedies but is on this point expressly permissive, stating that it “does 
not prohibit the consideration of race . . . to overcome the consequences” of past 
discrimination.   (Ibid., italics added.)  The unmistakable import of this language is 
not that race-based remedies are required, but simply that they are permitted, so 
far as the Secretary is concerned, if no other law precludes them.  That the 
Secretary has no objection to race-based remedies does not establish the federal 
compulsion required to exempt the City‟s 2003 ordinance from section 31.   
For these reasons, we find no merit in the argument that the federal funding 
exception (§ 31, subd. (e)) exempts the 2003 ordinance from section 31‟s general 
prohibition of racial preferences.  No triable issue of fact exists on this point to 
preclude summary judgment for plaintiffs.   
C. The Federal Compulsion Argument. 
Finally, the City contends the federal equal protection clause (U.S. Const., 
14th Amend.) requires the 2003 ordinance as a remedy for the City‟s own 
discrimination.  Although the superior court granted summary judgment for 
plaintiffs, the court did not meaningfully address the City‟s federal compulsion 
argument.  The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court‟s decision to this 
extent and remanded the case “for the limited purpose of adjudicating this issue.”  
Plaintiffs petitioned for review, and we directed the parties to brief the question.17  
We hold the Court of Appeal ruled correctly and affirm its judgment remanding 
for further proceedings.   
                                              
17  
Specifically, we asked whether “the Court of Appeal properly remand[ed] 
the case to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the ordinance 
was required by the federal equal protection clause as a narrowly tailored remedial 
program to remedy ongoing, pervasive discrimination in public contracting[.]”   
 
25 
Plaintiffs assert two procedural objections to remanding for further 
proceedings.  Both lack merit.  First, plaintiffs suggest the City failed to carry its 
burden in the superior court and is merely seeking a second, undeserved chance to 
do so.  Plaintiffs mischaracterize the procedural posture.  Because the City raised 
the federal compulsion theory as an argument against plaintiffs‟ motion for 
summary judgment, the City‟s burden was to show that triable issues of fact exist.  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 
Cal.4th 826, 849.)  All parties have stipulated that no additional briefing or record 
submissions are necessary; the City seeks only a hearing in the superior court to 
determine whether it has carried its burden.  Second, plaintiffs contend the City 
did not properly plead its federal compulsion theory.  To the extent the City was 
required to plead the theory, the City did so by alleging in its answer as an 
affirmative defense that plaintiff Schram‟s complaint “is barred on the ground that 
the federal Constitution preempts the application of Proposition 209 [i.e., section 
31] to invalidate the Ordinance.”  Plaintiffs never objected in the lower courts that 
the City‟s pleading was insufficient to preserve the issue.  Instead, plaintiffs 
responded on the merits, thus waiving the objection.  (Neverkovec v. Fredericks 
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 346, fn. 5.)    
Certainly we have the power to decide the federal compulsion issue in the 
first instance.  We owe the superior court no deference in reviewing its ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment; the standard of review is de novo.  (Johnson v. 
City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th 61, 67-68.)  Furthermore, “[i]t is axiomatic 
that we review the trial court‟s rulings and not its reasoning.”  (People v. Mason 
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944.)  Thus, a reviewing court may affirm a trial court‟s 
decision granting summary judgment for an erroneous reason.  (D’Amico v. Board 
of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19.)  In this case, however, we see 
no detriment and some benefit in affording the City the hearing in the superior 
 
26 
court to which all litigants are entitled as a matter of course.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 437c, subd. (a).)  Unlike the political structure and federal funding issues, which 
we may resolve as questions of law, the federal compulsion claim is largely factual 
and depends on the evidence supporting the Board‟s decision to adopt race-
conscious legislation.  When the government seeks to defend actions based on race 
as remedial, there must be “ „a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary.‟ ”  (Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 500; quoting 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, supra, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (plur. opn. of 
Powell, J.).)  We expect the superior court‟s assessment of the record will assist 
the reviewing courts, if necessary, in determining whether a strong basis in the 
evidence does in fact support the City‟s decision to adopt the 2003 ordinance.18   
We offer the following comments to assist the superior court in resolving the 
federal compulsion issue on remand:  While the parties have not brought to our 
                                              
18  
One remaining procedural issue lies uniquely within the superior court‟s 
knowledge.  The parties disagree on whether or not the City‟s responses to 
plaintiff Coral‟s requests for admission are properly part of the record for purposes 
of summary judgment.  The answer depends on how one interprets the parties‟ 
stipulation concerning the record — a stipulation solicited and approved by the 
superior court.  (See ante, at p. 10.)   
 
The City‟s admissions have possible significance, as they appear to 
concede, subject to certain objections and qualifications:  (1) that since at least 
April 2, 1984, it has not been a policy of the City to discriminate against MBE‟s or 
WBE‟s; (2) that the City cannot identify a specific contract on which a prime 
contractor discriminated against an MBE or WBE subcontractor after November 
5, 1996, where the MBE or WBE was the lowest responsive bidder; and (3) that 
the City has not identified any specific contract-awarding authority which 
discriminated against an MBE or WBE in the awarding of one of the City‟s public 
contracts after November 5, 1996.  The superior court on remand should determine 
whether the City‟s admissions are properly part of the record for summary 
judgment, as defined by the parties‟ stipulation, and, if so, the admissions‟ bearing 
on the question of whether triable issues of fact exist.   
 
27 
attention any decision ordering a governmental entity to adopt race-conscious 
public contracting policies under the compulsion of the federal equal protection 
clause, the relevant decisions hold open the possibility that race-conscious 
measures might be required as a remedy for purposeful discrimination in public 
contracting.  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568 [“Where the state or a 
political subdivision has intentionally discriminated, use of a race-conscious or 
race-specific remedy necessarily follows as the only, or at least the most likely, 
means of rectifying the resulting injury.” ]; see also Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 
509 (plur. opn. of O‟Connor, J.) [“In the extreme case, some form of narrowly 
tailored racial preferences might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate 
exclusion.”].)   
All racial classifications, even those contained in ostensibly remedial laws, 
must survive strict scrutiny.  (Parents Involved, supra, 551 U.S. 701, 720; 
Adarand, supra, 515 U.S. 200, 226-227.)  This is because “ „ “racial classifications 
are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between 
justification and classification.” ‟ ”  (Parents Involved, at p. 720, quoting Gratz v. 
Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 244, 270.)  Under the strict scrutiny test, “such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests.”  (Adarand, at p. 227.)  The only 
possibly compelling governmental interest implicated by the facts of this case is 
the interest in providing a remedy for purposeful discrimination.  (See Croson, 
supra, 488 U.S. 469, 500; see also id., at p. 509 (plur. opn. of O‟Connor, J.); Hi-
Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568.)19  In any event, proof of discriminatory 
                                              
19  
In contrast, outright racial balancing is “patently unconstitutional” and not a 
compelling state interest that can properly justify racial classifications.  (Grutter v. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
28 
purpose or intent is always required to show a violation of the federal equal 
protection clause (Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. (1977) 429 
U.S. 252, 265), and remedial action must actually be necessary (Croson, at 
p. 500).   
Accordingly, to defeat plaintiffs‟ motion for summary judgment, the City 
must show that triable issues of fact exist on each of the factual predicates for its 
federal compulsion claim, namely:  (1) that the City has purposefully or 
intentionally discriminated against MBE‟s and WBE‟s; (2) that the purpose of the 
City‟s 2003 ordinance is to provide a remedy for such discrimination; (3) that the 
ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose; and (4) that a race- and 
gender-conscious remedy is necessary as the only, or at least the most likely, 
means of rectifying the resulting injury.  If any of these points can be resolved as a 
matter of law in plaintiffs‟ favor, it follows that the City cannot establish federal 
compulsion and that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.20   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Bollinger, supra, 539 U.S. 306, 330; see also, e.g., Parents Involved, supra, 551 
U.S. 701, 730; cf. Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 507-508.)   
20  
We note the Board‟s legislative findings on these points do not bind the 
court on remand.  Although “[t]he factfinding process of legislative bodies is 
generally entitled to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the 
judiciary” (Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 500), “[r]acial classifications are suspect, 
and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice” 
(ibid.).  “The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind 
judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no 
place in equal protection analysis.”  (Id., at p. 501.)   
 
A legislative body cannot preclude searching judicial review of 
presumptively unconstitutional racial classifications with findings to the effect that 
such classifications are necessary, however much supporting evidence is claimed 
to exist.  Certainly a legislative body must have a strong basis in evidence for 
determining that race-conscious remedial action is necessary (see Croson, supra, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
29 
On remand, the superior court is to consider the federal compulsion issue 
based on the existing record in accordance with the “Stipulation of All Counsel 
That No Additional Briefing or Record Submissions Are Required for 
Consolidation” (July 9, 2004).   
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
  
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
488 U.S. 469, 500), and “evidence which would support a judicial finding of 
intentional discrimination may suffice also to justify remedial legislative action,” 
even before a court has ordered it (id., at p. 519 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.)).  (Cf. 
conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at pp. 41-42.)  But to say that a legislative 
body can and must act on appropriate evidence does not mean that legislative 
findings constrain judicial review.  The high court‟s decision in Croson is 
precisely to the contrary, and our decisions are in accord:  “ „ “[T]he deference 
afforded to legislative findings does „not foreclose [a court‟s] independent 
judgment on the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.‟ ” ‟ ”  (American 
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 350, quoting 
Professional Engineers v. Department of Tranportation (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 
569; see also Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 
501, 514.)   
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
I concur fully in the judgment affirming the Court of Appeal‟s decision.  I 
write separately to set out an alternative ground for distinguishing the “political 
structure” cases, particularly Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (1982) 458 
U.S. 457 (Seattle), where the high court gave its broadest explanation of that equal 
protection doctrine.  As the majority opinion explains, the Seattle court held that a 
statewide initiative measure prohibiting busing for the purpose of school 
integration violated the equal protection clause by singling out this racial issue and 
removing it from local control, “requir[ing] those championing school integration 
to surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable 
legislative action.”  (Seattle, at p. 474; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)   
Here, the City and County of San Francisco (City) contends that article I, 
section 31 of the California Constitution (section 31) similarly burdens minority 
interests, by imposing a statewide ban on racial or gender preferences in public 
contracting.  The majority opinion reasons that the busing program at issue in 
Seattle was understood by the court in terms of equal educational opportunity, not 
racial preferences.  Therefore, the majority concludes, Seattle‟s holding does not 
extend to racial preferences, which are presumptively unconstitutional under 
subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17-
19.) 
2 
I am not sure this distinction goes far enough.  Affirmative action programs 
always purport to ensure equal opportunity.  The City may fairly claim that its 
contracting ordinance is meant to provide minority businesses with equal access to 
City contracts.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-9.)  Conceivably, it could rewrite the 
ordinance to avoid any mention of preferences, yet awards of public contracts to 
minority businesses in the name of equal opportunity would be no less 
burdensome to other businesses that lost contracts as a result.1  Whether a 
government benefit is awarded on the basis of a “preference” or a requirement of 
“equal treatment” is largely a matter of semantics. 
 
I am, however, convinced that Seattle does not apply in this case for 
additional reasons.  The Seattle court made it plain that it was most concerned 
about the anti-busing initiative‟s narrow focus on the racial aspect of school 
assignments: 
 
“[W]hen the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to 
address racially conscious legislation — and only such legislation — is singled out 
for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly „rests 
on “distinctions based on race.” ‟  [Fn. omitted.]  James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S., at 
141, quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S., at 391.  And when the State‟s 
allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact 
legislation specifically designed to overcome the „special condition‟ of prejudice, 
the governmental action seriously „curtail[s] the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.‟  United States v. 
                                              
1  
As the high court has observed in the equal protection context, “[t]he 
principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not semantics.”  
(Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007) 551 
U.S. 701, 732 (Parents Involved).)  Surely the same reasoning applies under 
section 31. 
3 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n. 4 (1938).  In a most direct sense, 
this implicates the judiciary‟s special role in safeguarding the interests of those 
groups that are „relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.‟  San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).”  (Seattle, 
supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 485-486, italics omitted; see also id. at p. 474 [“The 
initiative removes the authority to address a racial problem — and only a racial 
problem — from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden 
minority interests.”].) 
 
Section 31 does not implicate this concern.  It does not single out racial 
issues or racially oriented legislation for special treatment.  It applies broadly to 
discrimination or preferential treatment “on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, 
or national origin.”  (§ 31.)  The inclusion of gender among the affected groups is 
particularly important, because it significantly broadens the application of the 
measure.  The voters did not focus on a politically powerless racial minority, 
making it uniquely difficult for that group to achieve beneficial legislation.  To the 
contrary, they passed a sweeping reform abolishing preferential treatment for a 
range of groups that includes everyone in the state, in various ways.  Both the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when it reviewed the constitutionality of section 
31, and the Sixth Circuit, when it passed on the parallel Michigan measure, relied 
in part on such considerations to distinguish Seattle.  (Coalition for Economic 
Equity v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 692, 707 (Wilson); Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action v. Granholm (6th Cir. 2006) 473 F.3d 237, 250-251.) 
 
Section 31 is also quite different from the narrow anti-busing measure 
struck down in Seattle because it does not take aim at a particular government 
activity.  It applies generally to a wide range of functions, barring discrimination 
or preferences in “public employment, public education, [and] public contracting.”  
4 
(§ 31.)  As the Seattle court noted, “[w]hen political institutions are more 
generally restructured . . . „[t]he very breadth of [the] scheme . . . negates any 
suggestion‟ of improper purpose.” 2  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 486, fn. 30.)  
Section 31 was a sea change in state policy, of a kind not present in Seattle or any 
other “political structure” case.  For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the 
majority that the “political structure doctrine” does not invalidate section 31.  
 
As alluded to in the majority opinion, the equal protection jurisprudence of 
the United States Supreme Court has undergone a change similar in scale to the 
reform enacted by section 31.  Where the Seattle court once carefully guarded the 
prerogative of school districts to pursue desegregation programs, the Parents 
Involved court recently held that such programs themselves employ presumptively 
unconstitutional racial classifications and are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.  
The court has broadly called for a “logical end point” to “all governmental use of 
race,” and approvingly referred to section 31 as a step in that direction.  (Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 306, 342; maj. opn., ante, pp. 19-20.)  The various 
opinions issued by this court in this case reflect the difficulty of squaring the 
“political structure doctrine” with modern equal protection jurisprudence.  Like 
                                              
2  
The quotation in this passage from Seattle was taken from a concurring 
opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission (1970) 397 U.S. 664, 689, a case involving tax 
exemptions for religious institutions.  That opinion also states:  “Government may 
properly include religious institutions among the variety of private, nonprofit 
groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity of 
association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.  
[Citation.]  To this end, New York extends its exemptions not only to religious and 
social service organizations but also to scientific, literary, bar, library, patriotic, 
and historical groups, and generally to institutions „organized exclusively for the 
moral or mental improvement of men and women.‟ ”  (Ibid. (conc. opn. of 
Brennan, J.).) 
 
Although the context is different, section 31 also extends its reach to a 
variety of activities and groups. 
5 
the Wilson court, we have been “perplexed” by the persistence of this 
anachronistic feature of federal constitutional law.  (Wilson, supra, 122 F.3d at p. 
704; see also id. at p. 705, fn. 13 [noting “seemingly irreconcilable Supreme Court 
precedent”]; Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich. 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) 592 F.Supp.2d 948, 951 [noting “unevenness” created by 
Seattle].)3   
 
It would be helpful for the United States Supreme Court to clarify matters 
by directly addressing the continued viability of the “political structure doctrine,” 
in an appropriate case.  The broad statements in Seattle casting suspicion on laws 
that may be characterized as “special burdens on the ability of minority groups to 
achieve beneficial legislation” (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 467), or as attempts 
to “make[] the enactment of racially beneficial legislation difficult” (id. at p. 483), 
lend themselves to arguments distinctly at odds with the high court‟s own 
approach to racial classifications in such later cases as Parents Involved.  Justice 
Moreno, of course, is correct when he points out that only the high court can 
ultimately resolve this tension.  (See dis. opn., post, at pp. 38-39.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
                                              
3  
The high court itself has avoided employing the doctrine, even when its 
applicability was plain.  (Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620, 625-626; see Evans 
v. Romer (Colo. 1993) 854 P.2d 1270, 1279-1282.) 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
California voters passed Proposition 209 in 1996, adding section 31 to 
article I of the state Constitution (section 31).  The provision forbids public entities 
from discriminating against, “or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in 
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”  
(§ 31, subd. (a), italics added.)  This court later construed section 31 to ban not 
only preferences already prohibited by the federal equal protection clause (U.S. 
Const., 14th Amend., § 1), but also race- and sex-conscious remedial measures that 
the United States Constitution would otherwise permit.  (Hi-Voltage Wire Works, 
Inc. v. City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 567 (Hi-Voltage).)  We are now asked 
to resolve whether section 31 violates the federal Constitution.1 
 
At the outset, I note several uncontroversial facts.  Despite language 
forbidding discrimination (which added nothing to existing law), there can be little 
doubt Proposition 209 was enacted because of its effect on race- and sex-
conscious preferences (and, given the ballot materials, primarily the former).  Nor 
is there any serious uncertainty that the race- and sex-conscious preferences 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to a Constitution or an 
equal protection clause are to the federal Constitution and the federal equal 
protection clause. 
2 
eliminated by section 31 primarily benefitted racial minorities and women and 
were so intended.  Finally, it is uncontroverted that Proposition 209 did more than 
merely repeal existing programs; by amending the state Constitution, Proposition 
209 requires those who would seek new race- and sex-conscious preferential 
programs to obtain the passage of another statewide initiative.  By contrast, those 
seeking preferences on all other bases can resort to the usual, less burdensome, 
political process.2  These facts, I conclude, require section 31 be invalidated as 
unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court‟s decisions in Hunter v. 
Erickson (1969) 393 U.S. 385 (Hunter) and Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 (1982) 458 U.S. 457 (Seattle). 
 
In Hunter and Seattle, the high court established what has been called the 
political structure doctrine, a less familiar variant of equal protection analysis.  In 
sum, the doctrine (and thus, the Constitution) is violated when a facially neutral 
law singles out a racial issue for special treatment and also alters the political 
process, entrenching the result and imposing unique structural burdens on 
minorities‟ future ability to obtain beneficial legislation.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 
at pp. 470-474, 479-480; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391.)  That is, I 
submit, precisely what section 31 accomplishes.  The arguments offered to the 
contrary are thin gruel.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-20; conc. opn. of Corrigan, J., 
ante, at pp. 2-4.)  Whatever the concerns about the ongoing vitality of the political 
structure doctrine (conc. opn. of Corrigan, J., ante, at pp. 4-5), unless the United 
States Supreme Court decides to overrule its decisions, our obligation is to follow 
                                              
2  
One more fact bears emphasizing: the only race-conscious programs 
uniquely affected by section 31 are those that could otherwise withstand strict 
scrutiny; that is, those narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest, such as providing a remedy for purposeful discrimination.  Programs 
unable to survive such scrutiny were already impermissible without section 31. 
3 
its clearly applicable and controlling precedent.  (Rodriguez de Quizas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. (1989) 490 U.S. 477, 484.)  Because the 
majority fails to do so, I must dissent.3 
I. 
 
As the majority relates the facts and history of this case, there is no need to 
repeat them.  However, the extent of the City and County of San Francisco‟s 
(City) efforts to investigate whether discrimination was a problem in its public 
contracting and, if so, whether there was a basis for a legislative remedy bears 
brief mention. 
 
Prior to enacting the 1989 version of the City‟s Minority/Women/Local 
Business Utilization Ordinance (Ordinance), the City “received, among other 
information, testimony from 42 witnesses, and written submittals from 127 
minority, women, local, and other business representatives.  Subsequently . . . the 
City held an additional ten public hearings, commissioned two statistical studies, 
and sought written submissions from the public.”  (Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Cal. v. Coalition (9th Cir. 1991) 950 F.2d 1401, 1404.)   
 
After the 1989 Ordinance expired, the City‟s Board of Supervisors and 
Human Rights Commission held an additional 14 public hearings, heard live 
testimony from 254 witnesses, videotaped testimony from numerous other 
witnesses, and considered additional statistical disparity studies and other 
documentary evidence pertinent to alleged discrimination and bidding 
irregularities.  Minority contractors observed that, as compared with nonminority 
contractors, City inspectors imposed more onerous requirements on them, 
                                              
3  
As discussed below, I generally join the majority‟s analysis of the City‟s 
federal compulsion claim and concur with its decision to remand for further 
proceedings.  I dissent from the holding as to the City‟s federal funding claim. 
4 
scrutinized their work more closely and treated them more harshly if they made 
mistakes.  One minority contractor spoke of being harassed and subject to racist 
and derogatory remarks from City inspectors.  Another complained of being 
subjected to more rigorous vetting despite his extensive qualifications and 
experience.  Out of this process emerged the 1998 Ordinance. 
 
The 1998 Ordinance expired in 2003.  The City conducted further 
investigations, including a disparity analysis and a Human Rights Commission 
report containing additional examples of continuing discrimination in public 
contracting.  The City also conducted additional hearings at which 134 individuals 
testified.  Minority contractors testified of ongoing discrimination in the 
contracting process, and the Board of Supervisors heard evidence that prime 
contractors tried to circumvent compliance with the Ordinance.  The Board of 
Supervisors made extensive legislative findings, including that the small 
percentage of City contracts going to minority- and women-owned businesses was 
due to discrimination by the City and discrimination in the private sector, that the 
City was actively discriminating against women and minority groups in its 
contracting and passively participating in private sector discrimination, that the 
City‟s contracting practices were in violation of federal law, and that the 
Ordinance was required to remedy the discrimination against minority- and 
women-owned businesses.  The City thereafter enacted the 2003 Ordinance, the 
version challenged by plaintiffs in this case.     
II. 
A.  The Political Structure Doctrine 
 
The City contends section 31 violates the political structure doctrine, the 
contours of which are set out in a trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases:  
Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385, and Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457, which established 
the basic tenets of the doctrine, and Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Education 
5 
(1982) 458 U.S. 527 (Crawford), which described the doctrine‟s outer limits.  I 
begin by discussing each case in turn. 
1.  Hunter 
 
In 1964, the city council in Akron, Ohio, enacted a fair housing ordinance 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis “of race, color, religion, ancestry or 
national origin.”  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 386.)  The ordinance established a 
commission in the mayor‟s office to enforce the measure‟s provisions through 
conciliation or persuasion if possible, and court order if necessary.  (Ibid.)  Hunter, 
an African-American woman, filed a complaint with the commission alleging a 
real estate agent had come to show her a list of houses for sale but, upon meeting 
Hunter, said she could not show Hunter the homes “ „because all of the owners 
had specified they did not wish their houses shown to negroes.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 387.)   
 
Hunter was told the ordinance provided no remedy because the city charter 
had been amended in a citywide election to provide that any ordinance enacted by 
the city council regulating real estate transactions “ „on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the 
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election before said 
ordinance shall be effective.  Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the 
adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by the electors as 
provided herein.‟  [Citation.]”  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 387.)  The proposed 
charter amendment had been placed on the ballot after more than 10 percent of 
Akron‟s voters had signed a petition, and the initiative was passed by a majority of 
voters.  (Ibid.)  Hunter sought a writ of mandamus in state court to enforce the 
ordinance, but the trial court ultimately concluded it had been rendered ineffective 
by the amended city charter, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.  (Id. at 
pp. 387-388.)  The high court reversed. 
6 
 
While suggesting the mere repeal of an ordinance would not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 390, fn. 5), the Supreme 
Court noted the charter amendment went further by “not only suspend[ing] the 
operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also 
requir[ing] the approval of the electors before any future ordinance could take 
effect.”  (Id. at p. 390, italics added.)  In doing so, the charter amendment “drew a 
distinction between those groups who sought the law‟s protection against racial, 
religious, or ancestral discriminations in the sale and rental of real estate and those 
who sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other ends.”  
(Ibid.)  Under the amended city charter, it became substantially more difficult for 
religious and racial minorities to secure the enactment of ordinances forbidding 
housing discrimination than for those seeking other ordinances.  (Ibid.)   
 
Ordinances not subject to the charter amendment would become effective 
30 days after passage by the city council (or immediately, if passed as an 
emergency measure) and would be subject to referendum only if 10 percent of the 
voters so requested by signing a petition.  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 390.)  By 
contrast, the city council‟s approval would not be enough for those seeking 
ordinances to forbid racial and religious housing discrimination.  (Ibid.)  Those 
seeking ordinances to prevent housing discrimination would have to overcome the 
unique hurdle of obtaining the approval of a majority of voters in an election 
before such a city council-approved ordinance could be effective.  (Ibid.)   
That the charter amendment was facially neutral was of no moment, the 
high court explained.  Even though it did not distinguish between various religious 
and racial groups, the amended charter “disadvantages those who would benefit 
from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those 
7 
who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the real 
estate market in their favor.”  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391.)4  
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that, “although the law on its face treats 
Negro and white, Jew and gentile in identical manner, the reality is that the law’s 
impact falls on the minority.”  (Id. at p. 391, italics added.)  Placing “special 
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process . . . is no more 
permissible than denying them the vote, on an equal basis with others.  (Cf. 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) 364 U.S. 339; Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 
533; Avery v. Midland County (1968) 390 U.S. 474.)”  (Hunter, at p. 391.)  The 
high court‟s citation to its voting rights decisions (and specifically its vote dilution 
decisions) is enlightening, as it underscores that the doctrine‟s central focus is not 
on the attainment of particular legislative outcomes, but instead on ensuring 
minorities‟ meaningful and equal access to the political process. 
Because the charter amendment singled out an issue of particular import to 
racial minorities and effectively entrenched the result by imposing unique hurdles 
in front of minorities‟ future efforts to achieve beneficial legislation, the court 
concluded it constituted a racial classification and applied strict scrutiny.  (Hunter, 
supra, 393 U.S. at p. 392.)  It ultimately found the asserted justifications for the 
amendment insufficient.  (Ibid.)  Of particular note, the court emphasized that “the 
implementation of this change through popular referendum [does not] immunize 
it.  [Citation.]  The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional 
limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.”  (Ibid.)  Having 
                                              
4  
The high court pointed out, for example, that the charter amendment did not 
affect “housing discrimination on sexual or political grounds, or against those with 
children or dogs, nor [did] it affect tenants seeking more heat or better 
maintenance from landlords, nor those seeking rent control, urban renewal, public 
housing, or new building codes.”  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 391.) 
8 
chosen a process for enacting legislation, the high court concluded, “the State may 
no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact 
legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person‟s vote or give any group a 
smaller representation than other of comparable size.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 393, 
italics added.) 
 
2.  Seattle 
 
In 1977, Seattle School District No. 1 enacted a resolution to combat de 
facto racial segregation in the school system resulting from the housing patterns in 
Seattle, Washington.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 459.)  The school district 
initially employed race-neutral voluntary measures; the steps taken, however, 
actually led to increased racial imbalance in the schools.  (Id. at p. 461.)  The 
school district ultimately determined “that mandatory reassignment of students 
was necessary if racial isolation in its schools was to be eliminated” and thus 
implemented a program involving the extensive use of busing and mandatory 
reassignments in the elementary schools (the Plan).  (Ibid.) 
 
After a failed attempt to enjoin the implementation of the Plan, Seattle 
residents who opposed its remedial measures drafted a statewide ballot measure 
“designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing for purposes of racial 
integration.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 462.)  The proposed initiative, which 
ultimately passed with 66 percent of the vote, prohibited school boards from 
“ „requir[ing] any student to attend a school other than the school which is 
geographically nearest or next nearest the student‟s place of residence . . . and 
which offers the course of study pursued by such student.‟ ”  (Id. at pp. 462-463.)  
While the initiative did not mention race or, “busing for racial purposes,” it 
contained a number of exceptions to its ban (id. at p. 463), such that school 
districts were permitted to “bus their students „for most, if not all,‟ of the 
9 
nonintegrative purposes required by their educational policies.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at 
p. 471.)  In light of these exceptions, the Supreme Court observed, it was clear that 
the measure was aimed solely at eliminating the remedy of “desegregative busing 
in general, and . . . the . . . Plan in particular.”  (Id. at p. 463.)5 
 
Three school districts sued the State of Washington in federal court, 
arguing the initiative violated the equal protection clause.  (Seattle, supra, 458 
U.S. at p. 464.)  The district court concluded the initiative constituted an 
impermissible racial classification in violation of the political structure doctrine 
because it forbade busing from being used as a remedy for racial segregation while 
permitting its use for all nonracial reasons.  (Id. at p. 465.)  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, and the state and state officers appealed.  (Id. at p. 466.)   
The high court began by noting the equal protection clause guarantees 
racial minorities “the right to full participation in the political life of the 
community.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 467.)  To that end, the Fourteenth 
Amendment not only protects minorities‟ right to vote and to enter into the 
political process in a reliable and meaningful manner, but also “reaches „a political 
structure that treats all individuals as equals,‟ [citation], yet more subtly distorts 
governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of 
minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  This 
“political structure” principle, the high court noted, was expressed and applied in 
Hunter and Lee v. Nyquist (W.D.N.Y 1970) 318 F.Supp. 710, summarily affd. 
                                              
5  
Indeed, while the federal district court found that the initiative‟s proponents 
had not “address[ed] „its appeals to the racial biases of the voters‟ [citation]” 
(Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 463), it found that they had communicated that the 
measure‟s passage “would result in „no loss of school district flexibility other than 
in busing for desegregation purposes,‟ [citation]” and they “focused almost 
exclusively on the wisdom of „forced busing‟ for integration.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.) 
10 
(1971) 402 U.S. 935.6  (Seattle, at pp. 467-469.)  From these cases (as well as 
from Justice Harlan‟s concurring opinion in Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pages 393-
396), the Seattle court drew “a simple but central principle” (Seattle, at p. 469): 
“[L]aws structuring political institutions or allocating political power 
according to „neutral principles‟ — such as the executive veto, or the typically 
burdensome requirements for amending state constitutions — are not subject to 
equal protection attack, though they may „make it more difficult for minorities to 
achieve favorable legislation.‟  ([Hunter, supra,] 393 U.S. at [p.] 394 [(conc. opn. 
of Harlan, J.)].)  Because such laws make it more difficult for every group in the 
community to enact comparable laws, they „[provide] a just framework within 
which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete.‟  (Id. at 
p. 393.)  Thus, the political majority may generally restructure the political process 
to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of 
governmental action.  But a different analysis is required when the State allocates 
governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a 
decision to determine the decisionmaking process.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 470.)   
Applying the political structure doctrine to the ballot measure, the Supreme 
Court concluded that, rather than attempting “ „to allocate governmental power on 
the basis of any general principle‟ [citation]” (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 470), it 
                                              
6  
In Lee v. Nyquist, supra, 318 F. Supp. at page 712, state education officials 
directed the City of Buffalo, which had an appointed school board, to implement 
remedies to combat de facto segregation.  In response, the New York Legislature 
enacted a statute barring state officials and appointed (but not elected) school 
boards from assigning students to schools on the basis of race, while leaving the 
school boards and state officials with student assignment authority for all other 
reasons.  (Id. at pp. 712, 719.)  The three-judge Lee court struck down the statute, 
applying the political structure doctrine.  (Id. at pp. 718-719.) 
11 
impermissibly used “the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental 
decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d] substantial and unique burdens on 
racial minorities.”  (Ibid.)   
In so holding, the court conducted a two-part inquiry.  It first inquired 
whether the initiative, despite its facial neutrality, singled out a racial issue for 
special treatment.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 471.)  While the initiative 
nowhere mentioned “race” or “integration,” the court had little difficulty finding it 
was nonetheless “effectively drawn for racial purposes.”  (Ibid.)7  As evidence, the 
court pointed to the fact that the exceptions in the initiative meant that only 
desegregative busing was prohibited, which was consistent with the proponents‟ 
statements during the campaign.  (Ibid.)  “It is beyond reasonable dispute, then, 
that the initiative was enacted „ “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse 
effects upon‟ busing for integration.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)   
In addition, the court noted that busing for integration is a racial issue that, 
“at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority and is designed for that 
purpose.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 471-472, italics added.)  While so 
concluding, the court acknowledged that racial minorities, as well as those in the 
majority, could be counted among both the proponents and opponents of the ballot 
measure, just as both racial minority and majority members benefited from diverse 
schools.  (Id. at p. 472.)  “But neither of these factors serves to distinguish Hunter, 
for we may fairly assume that members of the racial majority both favored and 
benefited from Akron‟s fair housing ordinance.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)  “[I]t is 
                                              
7  
“Racial purpose” does not refer to the drafters‟ (or voters‟) invidious intent.  
(Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 484-486.)  Rather, a racial purpose may be found 
when, among other things, a law is enacted because of, rather than in spite of, its 
effect on the racial issue.  (Id. at p. 471.) 
12 
enough that minorities may consider busing for integration to be ‘legislation that 
is in their interest.’  [Citation.]  Given the racial focus of [the initiative], this 
suffices to trigger application of the Hunter doctrine.”  (Id. at p. 474, italics 
added.) 
For the second part of its inquiry, the high court considered whether “the 
practical effect of [the ballot measure] is to work a reallocation of power of the 
kind condemned in Hunter.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 474, italics added.)  In 
concluding the initiative did so, the court noted that the ballot measure “removes 
the authority to address a racial problem — and only a racial problem — from the 
existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority interests.”  
(Ibid.)  After passage of the measure, those seeking to address school segregation 
had to seek relief from the state legislature or from the statewide electorate; by 
comparison, those wishing to effect any other nonracial school reassignment or 
educational policy needed only petition their local school board.  (Ibid.)  Thus, the 
changed political structure “expressly requires those championing school 
integration to surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking 
comparable legislative action.  As in Hunter, then, the community‟s political 
mechanisms are modified to place effective decisionmaking authority over a racial 
issue at a different level of government.”  (Seattle, at p. 474.)8   
In concluding the initiative had worked an impermissibly nonneutral 
alteration of the political structure, the court considered, and rejected, arguments 
raised by Justice Powell‟s dissent and the defendants.  Justice Powell argued this 
                                              
8  
Under Washington‟s Constitution, voters could propose initiatives (Seattle, 
supra, 458 U.S. at p. 462, fn. 4 [citing Wn. Const., art. II, § 1]) and, if a measure 
passed, it could not be repealed by the legislature for two years (although it could 
be amended within two years by a vote of two-thirds of each house of the 
legislature).  (Seattle, supra, at p. 462, fn. 4 [citing Wn. Const., art. II, § 41].) 
13 
case was unlike Hunter because “the political system [of Washington] has not 
been redrawn or altered.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 498 (dis. opn. of Powell, 
J.).)  The majority dismissed this distinction as facile, pointing out “[t]he evil 
condemned by the Hunter Court was not the particular political obstacle of 
mandatory referenda imposed by the Akron charter amendment; it was, rather, the 
comparative structural burden placed on the political achievement of minority 
interests.”  (Id. at p. 474, fn. 17, italics added.)9  In both cases, the power to enact 
racial legislation was relocated to a more distant level, the citywide electorate in 
Hunter and the statewide electorate or the state legislature in Seattle.  (Ibid.)10    
The court also rejected the defendants‟ contention that the ballot measure 
merely constituted a permissible intervention by the state in its own school system.  
(Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 475-476.)  While it acknowledged that Washington 
had plenary authority over its education system, the court pointed out that “[t]he 
issue here . . . is not whether Washington has the authority to intervene in the 
affairs of local school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has exercised that 
authority in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.”  (Id. at p. 476.)  
                                              
9  
The majority continued, explaining that Hunter would have been virtually 
identical to Seattle had the charter amendment simply precluded the city council 
from passing any fair housing ordinance.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 474, 
fn. 17.)  “Surely, however, Hunter would not have come out the other way had the 
charter amendment made no provision for the passage of fair housing legislation, 
instead of subjecting such legislation to ratification by referendum.”  (Ibid.) 
10  
The majority also rejected Justice Powell‟s claim that Seattle was different 
because proponents of integrated schools remained free to use Washington‟s 
initiative system to achieve their goals.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 474, 
fn. 17.)  The majority pointed out the same was true in Hunter; “[i]t surely is an 
excessively formal exercise, then, to argue that the procedural revisions in Hunter 
imposed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of 
decisionmaking authority worked by [the ballot measure] does not erect 
comparable political obstacles.”  (Ibid.) 
14 
Having previously chosen to vest decisionmaking authority of the type at issue 
here in local school boards (id. at pp. 477-480), the ballot measure “worked a 
major reordering of the State‟s educational decisionmaking process. . . .  After the 
passage of the ballot measure, authority over all but one of those areas remained in 
the hands of the local board.  By placing power over desegregative busing at the 
state level, then, [the initiative] plainly „differentiates between the treatment of 
problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same 
area.‟  [Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 479-480, italics added.)11   
Moreover, the court noted, while voters are free to merely repeal unpopular 
legislation at the ballot box, the initiative went further.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 483.)  “It burdens all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts 
throughout the State, by lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a 
new and remote level of government.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  This new political 
structure “imposes direct and undeniable burdens on minority interests.  „If a 
governmental institution is to be fair, one group cannot always be expected to 
win,‟ [citation]; by the same token, one group cannot be subjected to a debilitating 
and often insurmountable disadvantage.”  (Id. at p. 484.) 
The high court ultimately concluded strict scrutiny applied to the initiative 
because, “when the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to 
address racially conscious legislation — and only such legislation — is singled 
                                              
11  
The majority also emphasized that, despite the dissent‟s assertions to the 
contrary, it was not creating a constitutional right either to local decisionmaking or 
to desegregative busing.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 480, fn. 23.)  Rather, its 
decision was predicated upon “the comparative burden [the ballot measure] 
imposes on minority participation in the political process — that is, the racial 
nature of the way in which it structures the process of decisionmaking. . . .  [T]he 
State remains free to vest all decisionmaking power in state officials, or to remove 
authority from local school boards in a race-neutral manner.”  (Ibid.) 
15 
out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly 
„rests on “distinctions based on race.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 485.)  It continued, “when the State‟s allocation of power places unusual 
burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to 
overcome the „special condition‟ of prejudice, the governmental action seriously 
„[curtails] the operation of those political processes ordinarily relied upon to 
protect minorities.‟  (United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144, 
153, fn. 4.)”  (Seattle, at p. 486.)  The court thus concluded the initiative violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment and was invalid.  (Seattle, at p. 487.)12 
 
3.  Crawford 
 
In 1963, minority students attending school in the Los Angeles Unified 
School District filed a class action in state court seeking to desegregate the 
district‟s schools.  (Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 529-530.)  In 1970, the trial 
court found substantial segregation  in violation of the state and federal 
Constitutions and ordered the district to prepare a desegregation plan.  (Id. at 
p. 530.)  Although the court had found de jure segregation in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we affirmed its ruling based solely upon California‟s 
equal protection clause.  (Ibid. [citing Crawford v. Board of Education (1976) 17 
Cal.3d 280].)  We explained the state Constitution was broader than its federal 
counterpart, requiring districts to take reasonable steps to address segregation, 
                                              
12  
It also noted that, “Certainly, a state requirement that „desegregation or 
antidiscrimination laws,‟ [citation], and only such laws be passed by a unanimous 
vote of the legislature would be constitutionally suspect.  It would be equally 
questionable for a community to require that laws or ordinances „designed to 
ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities,‟ [citation], be confirmed 
by a popular vote of the electorate as a whole, while comparable legislation is 
exempted from a similar procedure.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 486-487.) 
16 
“ „whether [it] be de facto or de jure in origin.‟  ([Crawford v. Board of Education, 
supra,] 17 Cal.3d at [p.] 290.)”  (Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 530-531.) 
 
On remand, the trial court considered possible desegregation plans, first 
approving a plan including mandatory busing and then considering alternatives.  
(Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 531.)  In the meantime, California‟s voters passed 
Proposition 1, amending article I, section 7 of the state Constitution.  (Crawford, 
at pp. 531-532 & fn. 5.)  The proposition conformed the power of state courts to 
order busing for any reason to federal courts‟ power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but did not prohibit schools boards “ „from voluntarily continuing or 
commencing a school integration plan.‟ ” (Id. at p. 532 & fn. 6, quoting Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 7, as amended Nov. 6, 1979.) 
 
Following Proposition 1‟s passage, the school district sought to halt all 
mandatory student reassignment and busing, but the trial court denied the request 
based on its prior finding of de jure segregation in violation of the federal 
Constitution.  (Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 533.)  The state Court of Appeal 
reversed.  It concluded the trial court‟s finding of de jure segregation was not 
supported, and thus Proposition 1 applied, so it barred the trial court from ordering 
mandatory student reassignment and busing.  (Id. at pp. 533-534.)  The Court of 
Appeal also concluded Proposition 1 was constitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because California was not obliged to provide a greater remedy 
against racial segregation than what was provided under the federal Constitution.  
(Crawford, at p. 534.)  We denied review, and the high court granted certiorari.  
(Ibid.) 
 
The Supreme Court held Proposition 1 did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment generally, or the political structure doctrine specifically, concluding 
the initiative merely repealed this court‟s interpretation of California‟s 
Constitution as imposing broader desegregation obligations than those imposed by 
17 
the federal Constitution.  (Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 535-536, 537, fn. 14.)  
The high court distinguished Hunter and Seattle in three critical respects:  first, it 
noted that, under Proposition 1, school districts remained free as before to adopt 
reassignment and busing plans based on race to combat segregation (id. at p. 536); 
second, it noted Proposition 1 did not single out the issue of desegregative student 
assignment and busing, but rather, it removed state courts‟ power to order 
reassignment and busing for any reason, racial or otherwise (id. at p. 538, fn. 18); 
and third, it noted Proposition 1 constituted a mere repeal of a right by the same 
entity — the people — who created it in the first place (via adoption of the state 
Constitution) (Crawford, at p. 542; id. at p. 547 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).)13 
 
4.  Summary of the Doctrine’s Scope 
 
From these cases, the contours of the political structure doctrine can be 
delineated.  For a law to violate the doctrine, and thus require application of 
heightened scrutiny, two conditions must be met.   
 
First, the law must single out a racial issue for special treatment.  (Seattle, 
supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 470-474; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391.)14  That a 
law is facially neutral is of no consequence (Seattle, at p. 471; Hunter, at pp. 390-
391); rather, we ask whether it was “effectively drawn for racial purposes.” 
(Seattle, at p. 471.)  In speaking of a law‟s “purpose,” we do not mean whether it 
                                              
13  
The high court issued its opinions in Seattle and Crawford on the same day.  
Notably, four members in the Seattle majority were also in the Crawford majority 
(Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun (the author of Seattle), and Stevens). 
14  
Although the court‟s analysis in Hunter and Seattle concerned racial 
minorities, nothing suggests the doctrine would not also apply to other suspect 
classes, such as women.  (Cf. Evans v. Romer (Colo. 1993) 854 P.2d 1270, 1279-
1282 [concluding the principle cannot be logically limited to the race context], 
affd. on other grounds sub. nom. Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620.) 
18 
was motivated by invidious intent.  (Id. at pp. 484-486.)  A racial purpose exists 
where the law was enacted because of, rather than in spite of, its effect upon the 
racial issue (id. at p. 471) or where the law‟s “impact falls on the minority” 
(Hunter, at p. 391) because the repealed policy “inures primarily to [minorities‟] 
benefit . . . and is designed for that purpose.”  (Seattle, at pp. 471-472.) 
 
Second, the law must restructure the political process in a nonneutral 
manner, imposing unique burdens on minorities‟ future efforts to enact beneficial 
legislation.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 474, 479-480; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 
at pp. 390-391.)15  In other words, we ask whether the law effectively entrenches 
the result by altering the process such that a “comparative structural burden [is] 
placed on the political achievement of minority interests” (Seattle, at p. 474, 
fn. 17) in contrast to the “ „treatment . . . afforded other problems in the same 
area‟ ” (id. at pp. 479-480). 
 
For a violation of the doctrine to be established, both conditions must be 
met; one alone will not suffice.  For example, the repeal of a law advantaging 
racial minorities certainly singles out a racial issue for special treatment.  
However, without more, the mere repeal of such a law by the enacting 
governmental entity does not run afoul of the doctrine.  (Crawford, 458 U.S. at 
p. 547 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.); Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 483; Hunter, 
supra, 393 U.S. at p. 390 & fn. 5.)16  It simply “reflects the normal operation of 
                                              
15  
As Hunter and Seattle demonstrate, a law can restructure the political 
process either explicitly (e.g., the amended charter in Hunter explicitly required 
that future housing discrimination ordinances receive voter approval before going 
into effect) or implicitly (e.g., the voter initiative taking away school boards‟ 
power to order desegregative busing in Seattle had the practical effect of requiring 
another ballot measure or action by the state legislature). 
16  
Indeed, the high court indicated that, had the voters in Hunter merely 
repealed the fair housing ordinance or had the school board in Seattle ended its 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
19 
the political process in which there are winners and losers.  Repeal of legislation 
favorable to the interests of a racial minority simply indicates that a prior winner 
has lost . . . [but] does not alter or distort the existing political process in any 
way.”  (Amar & Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the 
CCRI (1996) 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1019, 1044 (Amar and Caminker); Hunter, 
at p. 394 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).)   
 
As another example, amending California‟s Constitution to require that 25 
percent of the electorate sign a petition before an initiative can qualify to be placed 
on the ballot (as opposed to the current, lower requirement in Cal. Const., art. II, 
§ 8) would without a doubt “make it more difficult for minorities to achieve 
favorable legislation” via the initiative process.  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at 
pp. 393-394 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).)  However, such an alteration would not 
violate the doctrine because such a change would be “grounded in neutral 
principle.”  (Id. at p. 395; see Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 480, fn. 23.)  Because 
such a change to the process would “make it more difficult for every group in the 
community to enact comparable laws,” there would continue to be a level playing 
field on which vying political groups could compete.  (Id. at p. 470.)   
 
Thus, only when a law singles out a racial issue for special treatment and 
alters the political process, imposing a unique structural burden on minorities‟ 
future ability to achieve beneficial legislation, is the political structure doctrine 
violated and is the law subject to heightened scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
race-conscious busing plan without also altering the process for obtaining future 
legislation, the doctrine would not have been violated.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 483; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 389-390 & fn. 5.) 
20 
B.  Proposition 209 and Hi-Voltage 
 
Before explaining why section 31 violates the political structure doctrine, it 
is necessary to first briefly revisit Proposition 209, the ballot measure that enacted 
section 31, and Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, in which this court construed 
section 31‟s scope. 
1.  Proposition 209 and the November 5, 1996, Election 
 
After Proposition 209 qualified as an initiative constitutional amendment, it 
was placed on the November 5, 1996, General Election ballot.  Prior to the 
election, voters received an official ballot pamphlet prepared by the nonpartisan 
Legislative Analyst‟s Office.  (Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) 946 F.Supp. 1480, 1493 (Coalition I).)17  The ballot pamphlet, which 
included an official description and analysis of each statewide initiative, described 
Proposition 209 as a measure that would eliminate race- and sex-conscious 
affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment, contracting, and 
education.  (Ibid.)  The Legislative Analyst‟s brief summary explained “A YES 
vote on [Proposition 209] means:  The elimination of those affirmative action 
programs for women and minorities run by the state or local governments in the 
areas of public employment, contracting, and education that give „preferential 
treatment‟ on the basis of sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”  “A NO 
vote on [Proposition 209] means:  State and local government affirmative action 
programs would remain in effect to the extent they are permitted under the United 
                                              
17  
The federal district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of Proposition 
209 (Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1510), but the injunction was lifted by 
the Ninth Circuit (Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1997) 122 
F.3d 692, rehg. en banc den. Aug. 27, 1997 (Coalition II)).  I cite the district 
court‟s factual findings, which were also cited by the Ninth Circuit (id. at p. 705) 
and this court (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561). 
21 
States Constitution.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), Legis. Analyst‟s 
brief summary of Prop. 209, p. 6 (Ballot Pamphlet).)   
 
 In addition to its summary of the measure, the Legislative Analyst 
provided a more in-depth analysis, emphasizing that passage of the initiative 
would effectively abolish all race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs.  
“The federal, state, and local governments run many programs intended to 
increase opportunities for various groups — including women and racial and 
ethnic minority groups.  These programs are commonly called „affirmative action‟ 
programs. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  [Proposition 209] would eliminate state and local 
government affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment, public 
education, and public contracting to the extent these programs involve 
„preferential treatment‟ based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”  
(Ballot Pamp., supra, Legis. Analyst‟s analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30.)  The 
Legislative Analyst then discussed various race- and sex-conscious affirmative 
action programs in the areas of public employment, contracting, and education that 
would be banned with the passage of the initiative.  (Id. at p. 31.) 
 
In addition to the nonpartisan analysis by the Legislative Analyst, the Ballot 
Pamphlet contained partisan arguments submitted by proponents and opponents of 
the measure.  These arguments further underscored that the central issue at stake in 
Proposition 209 was race- and sex-conscious affirmative action (and race-
conscious measures in particular).  The argument in favor of the measure stated, 
“ „REVERSE DISCRIMINATION‟ BASED ON RACE OR GENDER IS PLAIN 
WRONG!  [¶] . . . [S]tudents are being rejected from public universities because 
of their RACE.  Job applicants are turned away because their RACE does not meet 
some „goal‟ or „timetable.‟  Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they 
are of the preferred RACE.  [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Proposition 209 will stop the terrible 
programs . . . .”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 209, p. 32.)  The 
22 
argument against the initiative warned that “California law currently allows 
tutoring, mentoring, outreach, recruitment, and counseling to help ensure equal 
opportunity for women and minorities.  Proposition 209 will eliminate affirmative 
action programs like these that help achieve equal opportunity for women and 
minorities in public employment, education, and contracting.”  (Id., argument 
against Prop. 209, p. 33.)   
 
In explaining that Proposition 209 would eliminate race- and sex-conscious 
affirmative action programs, the Legislative Analyst, proponents, and opponents 
implicitly acknowledged preferential treatment on all other bases would be 
unaffected by the ballot measure.  (See Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 566; id. 
at pp. 586-587 (conc. & dis. opn. of George, C.J.).)  Indeed, this was explicitly 
recognized in the rebuttal to the argument against Proposition 209.  “Affirmative 
action programs that don‟t discriminate or grant preferential treatment [on the 
basis of race or sex] will be UNCHANGED. . . . [¶]  Note that Proposition 209 
doesn‟t prohibit consideration of economic disadvantage. . . . The state must 
remain free to help the economically disadvantaged, but not on the basis of race or 
sex.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 209, p. 33.) 
 
On November 5, 1996, Proposition 209 passed, with 54 percent voting in 
favor of the measure and 46 percent voting against.  (Coalition I, supra, 946 
F.Supp. at p. 1495.)  White voters were the only racial group that, as a majority, 
voted in favor of Proposition 209, with 63 percent voting for passage.  (Id. at 
p. 1495, fn. 12.)  74 percent of Black voters, 76 percent of Latino voters, and 61 
percent of Asian-American voters opposed the measure.  (Ibid.)  61 percent of 
men voted in favor, while 52 percent of women voted against.  (Ibid.) 
23 
2.  Hi-Voltage and Our Construction of Section 31    
 
In 2000, this court considered the validity of a program adopted by the City 
of San Jose to encourage the participation of minority-owned business enterprises 
and women-owned business enterprises in public work projects.  (Hi-Voltage, 
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 542.)  Contractors bidding for city projects were required to 
fulfill either an outreach or a participation component, and the plaintiffs argued 
that the program‟s requirements violated section 31.  (Hi-Voltage, at pp. 543-544.)  
We agreed, concluding the program‟s “outreach option affords preferential 
treatment to [minority-/women-owned business enterprise] subcontractors on the 
basis of race or sex, and the participation option discriminates on the same bases 
against non-[minority-/women-owned business enterprise] subcontractors as well 
as general contractors that fail to fulfill either of the options when submitting their 
bids.”  (Id. at p. 560.)   
In reaching this conclusion, we reviewed the language of section 31 as well 
as the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 209.  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 
Cal.4th at pp. 559-562.)  We noted the measure‟s language was not limited in any 
way and effectively prohibited all race- and sex-conscious affirmative action 
programs.  (Id. at pp. 559-560; id. at pp. 591-592 (conc. & dis. opn. of George, 
C.J.).)  Turning to the ballot materials, we concluded the partisan statements and 
the Legislative Analyst‟s analysis provided further support for our construction.  
(Id. at pp. 560-562.)  In particular, we noted the proponents‟ statements focused on 
race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs and evinced a clear desire to 
ban all such programs.  (Id. at pp. 560-561.)   
This court ultimately concluded the electorate intended to do “something 
more” than restate existing law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or 
24 
sex.  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561 [citing Coalition I, supra, 946 
F.Supp. at p. 1489].)18  That “something more,” the majority reasoned, was a 
repudiation of case law permitting race- and sex-conscious measures “formulated 
to remediate the lingering effects of past discrimination or conspicuous 
imbalance” in public contracting, employment, and education.  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 
at p. 566.)  We accordingly held that, following the adoption of section 31, “any 
action that discriminates or grants preferential treatment on the basis of race or sex 
would be forbidden,” including race- and sex-conscious measures that would 
otherwise be permitted by the equal protection clause.  (Hi-Voltage, at pp. 566-
567.) 
Thus, the practical effect of section 31‟s ban of race- and sex-conscious 
measures is limited to just one category of legislation.  It has no independent effect 
on legislation that cannot survive heightened scrutiny because such legislation 
already violates the Constitution.  (See Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561.)  It 
also has no effect on legislation required by the Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, 
cl. 2), when, for example, a public entity seeks to remedy its own past intentional 
discrimination (Hi-Voltage, at p. 568).  Consequently, section 31‟s only 
nonredundant effect is on race- and sex-conscious measures that are permitted, but 
not required, by the Constitution, i.e., legislation that, despite classifying on the 
basis of race or sex, can survive heightened scrutiny.  For race-conscious programs 
to do so, they must be narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling interest.  
                                              
18  
As the court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1488, explained, 
section 31‟s ban on discrimination “simply reaffirms existing anti-discrimination 
protections already provided by the United States and California Constitutions, 
and by the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . [and] creates no change in existing law.” 
25 
(McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184, 191-192.)  Under the high court‟s 
decisions, this category of legislation has become increasingly narrow.  
For example, in public contracting, a race-conscious program must be 
narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination by the public entity 
itself or by private sector entities within its jurisdiction.  (Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (Croson).)  The Supreme Court has 
rejected as insufficiently compelling the remedying of societal discrimination (id. 
at p. 505) or the attainment of racial balance in an industry (id. at p. 507).  
Similarly, in public employment, remedying the effects of past discrimination by 
the public entity is a compelling interest, while remedying societal discrimination 
is not.  (Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986) 476 U.S. 267, 274 (plur. 
opn. of Powell, J.).)  In the public education context, in addition to remedying the 
effects of past discrimination, the high court has found compelling the promotion 
of racial diversity in higher education.  (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 (2007) 551 U.S. 701, 720; Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003) 539 U.S. 306, 325.)  Thus, the only real change section 31 makes to 
existing law is to close an already narrow, albeit significant, window of 
constitutionally permissible remedial legislation.  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 
p. 568.) 
C.  Application of the Political Structure Doctrine to Section 31 
I now discuss why section 31 violates the political structure doctrine.  The 
first step of the inquiry requires consideration of whether section 31, while facially 
neutral, nonetheless singles out a racial issue for special treatment.  (Seattle, supra, 
458 U.S. at p. 471.)  The answer is plainly yes. 
Section 31 prohibits preferential treatment “on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin.”  (§ 31.)  Thus, as with the charter amendment in 
26 
Hunter, section 31 is explicitly race-conscious.  In addition, it singles out a racial 
issue for special treatment inasmuch as it draws a distinction between groups 
seeking beneficial legislation on the basis of race and sex (i.e., racial minorities 
and women) and those seeking beneficial legislation on all other bases (e.g., 
veterans, the economically disadvantaged, in-state residents, local businesses, 
physically disabled, athletes, etc.).  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391; see 
Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 209, p. 33.)  For example: 
California (along with many other entities) grants civil service preferences to 
veterans (see, e.g., Gov. Code, § 18978); cities and counties may grant contracting 
preferences to locally owned or economically disadvantaged businesses (see, e.g., 
S.F. Admin. Code, ch. 6, § 6.4; id., ch. 14A)19; some public school districts grant 
preferences to children of former students (see, e.g., Mehta, Public Schools Offer 
Legacy Admissions, L.A. Times (May 16, 2009) p. A3 [discussing school districts‟ 
adoption of admission policy giving preference to out-of-district children of 
former students]).  Put another way, section 31 does not purport to regulate the 
enactment of all preferential legislation in the operation of public employment, 
public education, or public contracting, but rather only race- and sex-conscious 
preferences in those arenas. 
Moreover, there can be no serious doubt that section 31 was “enacted 
„ “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon‟ ” race- and sex-
based affirmative action, and was therefore “effectively drawn for racial 
                                              
19  
The manner in which a city contracts is generally a municipal affair.  
(Amara v. Cintas No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1175.)  However, the Public 
Contract Code requires cities and counties to use the lowest responsible bidder on 
public works projects (Pub. Contract Code, §§ 20160, 20162 [cities]; id., 
§§ 20120, 20128 [counties]) with certain enumerated exceptions (see, e.g., id., 
§ 2002 [local agencies can give small business preference].)   
27 
purposes.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 471.)  Indeed, the ballot summary and 
the partisan statements underscore that the measure‟s central purpose was to 
effectively eliminate all race- and sex-based affirmative action.  (E.g., Ballot 
Pamp., supra, Legis. Analyst‟s brief summary of Prop. 209, p. 6; id., argument in 
favor of Prop. 209, p. 32.)  We arrived at the same conclusion in Hi-Voltage.  (Hi-
Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 566-567; id. at pp. 591-592 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
George, C.J.).) 
Finally, affirmative action is a racial issue in the same way that the fair 
housing ordinance in Hunter and the desegregative busing in Seattle were racial 
issues.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 471-472; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at 
p. 391.)  That is, “although [section 31] on its face treats [Whites and racial 
minorities, men and women] in identical manner, the reality is that the law‟s 
impact falls on the minority.”  (Hunter, at p. 391.)  Affirmative action “inures 
primarily to the benefit of the minority and is designed for that purpose.”  (Seattle, 
at pp. 471-472.)  And while racial minorities and women could undoubtedly be 
counted among both Proposition 209‟s opponents and supporters, that does not 
serve to distinguish Hunter or Seattle.  (Seattle, at p. 474.)  For our purposes, “it is 
enough that [racial minorities and women] may consider [race- and sex-conscious 
affirmative action] to be „legislation that is in their interest.‟  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)20  
In summary, based on section 31‟s language, its different treatment of race- and 
sex-conscious legislation as compared to other legislation in the same area, its 
avowed purpose, and whom it primarily affects, I conclude section 31 without 
                                              
20  
Indeed, as previously noted, the substantial majority of Blacks (74 percent), 
Latinos (76 percent), and Asian-Americans (61 percent), and a majority of women 
(52 percent), voted against Proposition 209.  (Ante, at p. 22.) 
28 
question singles out a racial issue for special treatment, triggering application of 
the political structure doctrine.   (See Seattle, at p. 474.)21 
 The second step of the inquiry requires consideration of whether section 31 
constitutes a nonneutral restructuring of the political process, placing higher 
hurdles in front of those seeking race- and sex-conscious measures as opposed to 
what those seeking beneficial legislation on all other bases face.  (Seattle, supra, 
458 U.S. at p. 474 & fn. 17.)  As in Hunter and Seattle, the most obvious way to 
answer this question is to examine the impact of Proposition 209‟s passage on the 
process for obtaining favorable legislation.  Because the practical effect of section 
31 is the erection of a steep hurdle in front of those seeking race- and sex-
conscious preferential legislation (as compared with those seeking similar 
legislation on other bases), section 31 obviously “work[s] a reallocation of power 
of the kind condemned [by the high court].”  (Seattle, at p. 474.) 
Prior to Proposition 209, any person seeking beneficial legislation for any 
group in the areas of public contracting, employment, or education could petition 
their government representatives to adopt, amend, or retain such a program.  
(Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1498.)  For example, in matters of public 
                                              
21  
The majority does not dispute that section 31 singles out a racial issue for 
special treatment.  While the concurring opinion does so (conc. opn. of Corrigan, 
J., ante, at p. 3), its rationale lacks a reasoned basis.  It relies on the fact that 
section 31 targets not only race, but gender as well, thus “broaden[ing] the 
application of the measure.”  (Conc. opn. of Corrigan, J., ante, at p. 3.)  Of course, 
the charter amendment in Hunter applied not only to race, but to religion as well; 
this fact did not prevent the charter amendment‟s invalidation.  (Hunter, supra, 
393 U.S. at p. 387.)  Moreover, as noted by Judge Norris in his dissent from the 
Ninth Circuit‟s decision to deny en banc rehearing of the panel decision in 
Coalition II, combining various suspect classes into one undifferentiated group for 
purposes of equal protection analysis is without basis in case law or common 
sense.  (Coalition II, supra, 122 F.3d at p. 716 (opn. of Norris, J. on den. rehg.).) 
29 
contracting, Public Contract Code section 2000 gave local agencies the discretion, 
subject to certain limitations, to give bidding preferences to contractors who had 
complied with affirmative action requirements.  (See Monterey Mechanical Co. v. 
Sacramento Regional County Sanitation Dist. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1400-
1403; Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 810, 820-
822.)  With the passage of Proposition 209, the decision to permit and create such 
programs has been withdrawn from the Legislature and from local agencies, and 
now the adoption of affirmative action programs can only be accomplished via 
amendment of the state Constitution.  Thus, the political mechanisms for seeking 
race- and sex-conscious legislation have been “modified to place effective 
decisionmaking authority over [such legislation] at a different level of 
government.”  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 474.)  On the other hand, the City 
may continue to grant contracting preferences on other bases (see, e.g., S.F. 
Admin. Code, ch. 6, § 6.4; id., ch. 14A), and those seeking preferential legislation 
not involving race or sex continue to have the opportunity to lobby local 
governmental entities and the Legislature for the expansion of such preferences or 
the creation of new ones. 
That section 31‟s placement in the state Constitution erects a new and 
formidable barrier to those advocating for race- and sex-conscious affirmative 
action programs can hardly be doubted.  Amending California‟s Constitution can 
be accomplished via either of two methods, both of which impose heavy burdens.  
First, the state Constitution can be amended via passage of another initiative.  (Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 8.)  To qualify a ballot measure, sponsors would initially have to 
obtain signatures equal to 8 percent of the previous gubernatorial vote.  (Ibid.)  To 
put that in context, to qualify an initiative constitutional amendment for the 2010 
ballot, sponsors would have had to collect 694,354 valid signatures.  (Cal. Sect. of 
State, Initiative Guide (2010), at  [as of Aug. 2, 2010].)  Because a 
number of signatures tend to be disqualified, approximately 50 percent more 
“raw” signatures than the threshold amount must be collected  (Coalition I, supra, 
946 F.Supp. at p. 1498), and they must be obtained within a 150-day period (Elec. 
Code, § 336).22  If enough valid signatures are gathered, the initiative is placed on 
the ballot at the next statewide election and must obtain the approval of a majority 
of voters.  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8.)   
As a second method, the Legislature can amend the state Constitution by 
securing a two-thirds vote of approval of a proposed amendment by both houses.  
(Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 1.)  If the Legislature does so, the measure is placed on 
the ballot and must garner a majority of votes.  (Id., § 4.)  
  
If sponsors are able to successfully navigate getting the proposed 
amendment on the ballot via either process, substantial funds will then be required 
to run a statewide campaign.  (Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1499.)  
Because of the size of California, such campaigns tend to be very expensive — as 
of October 1996, for example, the campaign in support of Proposition 209 had 
spent $3.1 million.  (Ibid.)  As a more recent example, in the November 2008 
election, $75 million was spent in support of and against Proposition 8, the 
initiative to ban same-sex marriage.  (McKinley & Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on 
Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2008) p. A20.)23    
                                              
22  
To collect 150 percent of the threshold number, a measure‟s sponsors 
would have to collect 1,041,531 signatures.  Given a 150-day window, 
approximately 7,000 signatures would have to be collected on average per day. 
23  
Even in the case of a comparatively less controversial November 2008 
ballot measure, like Proposition 2 (Standards for Confining Farm Animals), the 
statewide campaigns in favor and against the initiative spent over $19 million.  
(Cal. Sect. of State, Cal-Access Web site, Campaign Finance Activity,  [as of Aug. 2, 
2010].) 
24  
That racial minorities and women can also seek beneficial legislation on all 
other bases (e.g., a local, minority-owned business can seek preferences available 
to all locally owned businesses) does not alter this conclusion — the same was 
true in Hunter and Seattle.   
25  
The concurring opinion places great weight on the fact section 31 applies to 
public employment and education and contracting, arguing that the broad scope of 
section 31 distinguishes it from the laws at issue in Hunter and Seattle.  (Conc. 
opn. of Corrigan, J., ante, at pp. 3-4.)  I disagree.  As Judge Norris noted, “Neither 
Hunter nor Seattle — nor common sense, for that matter, supports the proposition 
that expanding the levels at which the State disadvantages minorities will render 
that action any less constitutionally suspect.”  (Coalition II, supra, 122 F.3d at 
p. 715 (opn. of Norris, J. on den. rehg.).) 
32 
Thus, the practical effect of section 31 is to restructure the political process in a 
nonneutral fashion.  (Seattle, at pp. 479-480.)26  
 
Although I conclude that section 31‟s ban of race- and sex-conscious 
affirmative action violates the political structure doctrine, this does not mean that, 
once adopted, affirmative action measures may never be abolished.  As the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, the doctrine is not violated when 
enacting governmental entities merely overturn previous policies or when voters 
simply repeal unpopular legislation at the ballot box.  (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 483; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 390, fn. 5.)27  Section 31, however, works 
more than a mere repeal of beneficial legislation by the enacting entity.  (Seattle, 
at p. 483.)  It burdens all future attempts to obtain race- and sex-conscious 
remedies by relocating decisionmaking power over such legislation from the 
public entities that had previously wielded it to a remote level of government, the 
state Constitution.  (Seattle, at p. 483.)28   
                                              
26  
Neither the majority nor the concurrence disputes that section 31 puts 
unique hurdles in front of those who would seek the future enactment of race- and 
sex-conscious preferential legislation as opposed to those who seek preferential 
legislation on all other bases. 
27  
For example, Governor Pete Wilson issued an executive order on June 1, 
1995, repealing race- and gender-conscious employment practices under his 
immediate control.  (Governor‟s Exec. Order No. W-124-95 (June 1, 1995).)  
Similarly, on July 20, 1995, the Regents of the University of California acted of 
their own accord to discontinue the use of race and gender preferences in 
contracting, employment, and admissions decisions.  (Regents of U.C., res. No. 
SP-1 [admissions]; id., res No. SP-2 [contracting and employment].)  While both 
of these pre-Proposition 209 decisions resulted in the elimination of race- and sex-
conscious preferences, they simply reflected the operation of the normal political 
process. 
28  
For example, while the Regents subsequently decided to rescind resolution 
Nos. SP-1 and SP-2 (Policy on Future Admissions, Employment, and Contracting 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
33 
 
Significantly, section 31‟s most profound impact is felt in communities 
where affirmative action does not arouse substantial opposition.  (Seattle, supra, 
458 U.S. at p. 483; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 395-396 (conc. opn. of Harlan, 
J.).)  Where a public entity‟s decision to enact affirmative action would be 
unpopular, voters could have simply overturned the policy via referendum or 
election of new representatives — in such instances, section 31‟s impact is slight.  
Where affirmative action is relatively uncontroversial, however, section 31‟s 
alteration of the process for enacting future legislation “imposes direct and 
undeniable burdens on minority interests.  „If a governmental institution is to be 
fair, one group cannot always be expected to win,‟ [citation]; by the same token, 
one group cannot be subjected to a debilitating and often insurmountable 
advantage.” (Seattle, at p. 484.)29 
 
The majority does not contest that section 31 was enacted because of its 
effect on race- and sex-conscious affirmative action or that, as a result, section 
31‟s impact falls primarily on minorities.  Nor does it dispute that section 31 
works more than a mere repeal, but rather imposes significant burdens on future 
efforts to enact race- and sex-conscious preferential legislation.  These facts, I 
submit, establish a clear violation of the political structure doctrine and require, 
under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, invalidation of section 
31.  The majority concludes otherwise.  Its main — indeed its only — argument is 
that the doctrine does not apply when race- and sex-conscious preferential 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
(May 16, 2001)), the policy reversal is essentially without effect in light of section 
31.  
29  
In San Francisco, for example, 70.5 percent of the electorate opposed 
Proposition 209.  (Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1507.) 
34 
legislation is at issue.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16-20.)30  As this distinction finds 
no support in Hunter or Seattle, however attractive the majority‟s holding might 
be to some as a matter of policy, it is incorrect as a matter of law.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the majority misreads and misapplies the high court‟s political 
structure doctrine cases, imposing requirements and finding exceptions that do not 
appear in, and are not supported by, Hunter or Seattle.   
 
The majority contends the legislation invalidated in Hunter and Seattle is 
distinguishable from section 31 in that the former “obstruct[ed] equal treatment” 
while the latter “ban[s] preferences.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  In response to 
the City‟s argument that race-conscious preferences are as much “beneficial 
legislation” — the phrase used by the Seattle court — as the antidiscrimination 
ordinance in Hunter or the race-conscious busing policy in Seattle, the majority 
declares:  “We do not think, however, that the term „beneficial legislation‟ can 
bear the weight the City would place upon it.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)31  The 
majority‟s rejoinder is curious; it is difficult to see how race-conscious preferential 
                                              
30  
The majority relies on decisions of the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals (Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm (6th Cir. 2006) 473 
F.3d 237; Coalition II, supra, 122 F.3d 692).  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13, 16-17, 
19.)  As the majority acknowledges (id. at p. 16), however, while decisions of 
lower federal courts on questions of federal law are persuasive, they do not bind 
us; rather, we make an independent determination of federal law.  (Barrett v. 
Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 58; see, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson (1974) 415 U.S. 
452, 482, fn. 3 (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) 
31  
To the extent the majority opinion can be read to imply the Supreme Court 
could not have anticipated the phrase “beneficial legislation” might be read to 
include race-conscious affirmative action (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17-19), I 
disagree.  Executive orders promulgated by Presidents Kennedy (Exec. Order No. 
10925, 26 Fed.Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961) and Johnson (Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 
Fed.Reg. 12319 (Sept. 28, 1965)) required the use of affirmative action to combat 
discrimination.  At a minimum, by the time Seattle was decided in 1982, the 
notion of race- and sex-conscious affirmative action was very well understood. 
35 
legislation does not constitute “beneficial legislation” (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 467) or “legislation that is in [minorities‟] interest” (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at 
p. 395 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.)).  It is more reasonable to assume the high court 
understood that “beneficial legislation” is an expansive phrase and used it 
intending it be so construed.  The majority points to nothing in either Hunter or 
Seattle to suggest the Supreme Court intended the cramped reading the majority 
now adopts.  To the contrary, there is substantial evidence in those opinions 
supporting the notion that the high court did intend for its language to be read 
broadly. 
 
For example, the high court discussed minorities‟ ability “to enact 
legislation in [their] behalf” (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 393); “the ability of 
minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation” (Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at 
p. 467); minorities‟ ability “ „to achieve favorable legislation‟ ” (id. at p. 469, 
citing Hunter, at p. 394 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.)); the ability “to achieve 
legislation that is in [minorities‟] interest” (Hunter, at p. 395 (conc. opn. of Harlan, 
J.)); the “burden [on] minority interests” (Seattle, at pp. 474, 484); the “political 
achievement of minority interests” (id. at p. 474, fn. 17); and “the ability of racial 
groups to enact legislation specifically designed to overcome the „special 
condition‟ of prejudice” (id. at p. 486).  That the Supreme Court repeatedly spoke 
in expansive terms bolsters the City‟s argument — the political structure doctrine 
is concerned not with minorities‟ actual legislative goals, but with their equal and 
meaningful access to the political process.  (See ante, at p. 7.)32  The majority‟s 
                                              
32  
The majority goes astray by wrongly focusing on the difference between 
race-conscious preferences on the one hand and the Hunter housing ordinance and 
the Seattle busing policy on the other hand.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17-19.)  The 
focus should instead be on the erected legislative hurdles:  section 31, the Hunter 
charter amendment, and the Seattle statewide initiative.  All three similarly 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
36 
reliance on the preferential nature of the legislation is therefore an inapt basis for 
distinguishing Hunter and Seattle.  
 
Moreover, the majority‟s efforts to distinguish “between initiatives 
obstructing equal treatment and initiatives banning preferences” (maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 17) elides the fact that section 31‟s only practical effect is on the narrow 
group of laws that can survive heightened constitutional scrutiny.  (Ante, at p. 24.)  
Given that reality, the distinction between the race-conscious affirmative action 
here and the antidiscrimination law in Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at page 386, is 
illusory.33  Before adopting race-conscious preferential legislation, a public entity 
must document in some detail the existence of discrimination to provide “a „strong 
basis in evidence that remedial action [is] necessary.‟  [Citation.]”  (Croson, supra, 
488 U.S. at p. 500.)  Thus, the 2003 Ordinance at issue here is in a very direct way 
an antidiscrimination program, in which any preference granted must be strongly 
justified by the tangible continuing effects of the City‟s own past discrimination.  
To withdraw from public entities the ability to engage in this kind of racial 
antidiscrimination program, and to withdraw from minorities the capacity to 
advocate for such local antidiscrimination legislation in the future, while at the 
same time permitting local entities to grant preferences for other groups (without 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
burdened minorities‟ equal and meaningful access to the political process, 
undermining their ability to achieve favorable legislation in a nonneutral fashion. 
33  
The difference between constitutionally permissible affirmative action and 
the race-conscious busing addressing de facto segregation in Seattle is even less 
clear.  Moreover, as regarding the political structure doctrine, the Supreme Court 
necessarily rejected any distinction between the antidiscrimination law in Hunter 
and the race-based remedial efforts in Seattle. 
37 
having to make a similar showing of discrimination), is precisely the kind of 
selective political restructuring that Hunter and Seattle sought to forbid. 
  
 
As an additional rationale for distinguishing section 31, the majority cites 
two related arguments made by the Ninth Circuit.  The first argument is that the 
Constitution does not require race-conscious measures “it barely permits.”  
(Coalition II, supra, 122 F.3d at p. 709; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  This, of 
course, is a red herring.  No one contends the Constitution requires race- or sex-
conscious affirmative action.  Nor is that relevant to the inquiry, as neither the 
adoption of the housing ordinance in Hunter nor the busing policy in Seattle was 
constitutionally required.  Rather, the focus of the political structure doctrine is on 
nonneutral structural obstacles to constitutionally permitted, not required, 
legislation in minorities‟ interest.  “What the Court did hold is that states may not 
place political obstacles in the way of laws that favor minorities, nor may they 
remove such laws wholesale from the political process.  All that is constitutionally 
required is that minorities have the opportunity, on equal terms, to seek 
„legislation in [their] behalf‟ within existing channels of government.  [Citation.]”  
(Coalition II, at p. 715 (opn. of Norris, J. on den. rehg.).)   
 
Second, the majority suggests that section 31 cannot violate the 
Constitution, as it is consistent with the “ „core purpose‟ of the equal protection 
clause.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  The Ninth Circuit put it more lyrically: “ „[I]t 
would be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State thereby had violated it.‟  
(Crawford, [supra,] 458 U.S. at [p.] 535.)”  (Coalition II, supra, at p. 709.)  This is 
a canard.  Section 31 is not coextensive with the equal protection clause.  While it 
is true that the Constitution permits race- and sex-conscious measures only if they 
can survive heightened scrutiny, section 31 goes further.  As the Attorney General 
puts it, “[section 31] closes a door to race- and gender-conscious programs that the 
38 
Fourteenth Amendment leaves open.”  And it does so while simultaneously 
leaving others free to seek preferential legislation on all other bases.  This unique 
burden on the ability of women and racial minorities to achieve beneficial 
legislation in their interest is what violates the political structure doctrine, and thus 
the Constitution.  (Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391.)34 
 
Finally, while the majority disclaims the argument (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 19, fn. 10), it bears noting that Coalition II questioned the vitality of the 
political structure doctrine in light of recent decisions by the high court.  
(Coalition II, supra, 122 F.3d at pp. 704, 705, fn. 13; see also conc. opn. of 
Corrigan, J., ante, at pp. 4-5.)35  I do not perceive the same irreconcilability and 
am not convinced the Supreme Court‟s more recent conventional equal protection 
decisions undermine Hunter and Seattle.  (See Amar & Caminker, supra, 23 
Hastings Const. L.Q. at pp. 1035-1039.)  Whereas more recent Supreme Court 
cases have restricted the type of affirmative action remedies permitted under the 
Constitution, they do not undermine the principle that minorities may not be 
prevented, via nonneutral political restructuring, from seeking beneficial 
legislation — including constitutionally permissible affirmative action remedies. 
 
Moreover, as noted before, our task is to faithfully apply the Supreme 
Court‟s precedent, not to prognosticate what it might do if presented with the 
                                              
34  
As one commentator aptly put it, “[i]f the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit the race and gender preferences barred by Proposition 209, compliance 
with the Equal Protection Clause cannot constitute a justification for Proposition 
209‟s discriminatory invalidation of race and gender preferences.”  (Spann, 
Proposition 209 (1997) 47 Duke L.J. 187, 255.)  
35  
Of course, while the majority states it does not question the doctrine‟s 
“continuing validity” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 19, fn. 10), it nonetheless uses 
“historical context” (ibid.) to justify a cramped reading of the doctrine.  (See ante, 
at pp. 33-34.) 
39 
opportunity to reconsider the doctrine.  “If a precedent of [the high court] has 
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other 
line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, 
leaving to [the high court] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”  
(Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., supra, 490 U.S. at 
p. 484.)36   
Thus, applying the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Hunter and Seattle, I 
conclude section 31‟s ban on constitutionally permissible race- and gender-
conscious remedial measures violates the political structure doctrine, and I would 
remand the case for consideration of whether section 31 can withstand heightened 
scrutiny.  In so concluding, I fully acknowledge the controversial nature of race- 
and sex-conscious measures (even when undertaken to remedy past 
discrimination) and the considerable passions on both sides of the issue.  However, 
as Judge Henderson wisely commented in Coalition I, supra, 946 F. Supp. at page 
1490, “this case does not call upon this Court to adjudicate whether affirmative 
action is right or wrong, or whether it is no longer appropriate policy for 
                                              
36  
In Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. 620, the high court invalidated a state 
initiative prohibiting public entities from taking actions to protect gays and 
lesbians.  The state supreme court concluded the measure was subject to strict 
scrutiny, relying on the political structure doctrine.  (Id. at pp. 625-626.)  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, but based its decision on a conventional 
equal protection analysis.  (Id. at pp. 633-634.)  In dissent, Justice Scalia suggested 
the majority “implicitly reject[ed]” the state supreme court‟s political structure 
doctrine holding.  (Id. at p. 640, fn. 1 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).)  I respectfully 
disagree.  To the contrary, Justice Kennedy‟s majority opinion is fully consistent 
with the underpinnings of the political structure doctrine.  (See id. at p. 633.)  
Moreover, contrary to the concurrence‟s suggestion (conc. opn. of Corrigan, J., 
ante, at p. 5, fn. 3), the applicability of the doctrine in Romer was not so plain.  
Rather, the invalidated initiative in Romer explicitly targeted and burdened gays 
and lesbians.  Thus, a conventional equal protection analysis was called for.       
40 
addressing the continuing effects of past and present discrimination against racial 
minorities and women.  Such questions, while they are most certainly of vital 
public policy interest, lie beyond the purview of this Court. . . .  [¶]  Rather, the 
substantive issues raised by this action are considerably more narrow, albeit no 
less important:  whether the particular method chosen by Proposition 209 to curtail 
affirmative action is unlawful because it . . . violates the rights of women and 
minorities to fully participate in our political system . . . .”  As I conclude the 
answer is yes, I dissent from the majority‟s contrary view. 
III. 
 
The City argues it can demonstrate triable issues exist regarding whether it 
was constitutionally obliged to enact the 2003 Ordinance, given ample evidence of 
pervasive intentional discrimination in the awarding of public contracts; that is, 
that the Ordinance may be the only, or at least the most likely, means of 
remedying purposeful racial discrimination.  As the majority explains, the trial 
court failed to meaningfully address this argument and remanding for a hearing 
would be helpful to reviewing courts.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24-26.)  I fully 
concur. 
 
I also fully agree with the majority that the Board of Supervisor‟s 
legislative findings “do not bind the court on remand” and that, where racial 
classifications are at issue, “ „simple legislative assurances of good intention 
cannot suffice‟ [Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 500].”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28, 
fn. 20.)  When, however, as in the present case, remedial measures rest not on such 
“simple legislative assurances,” but on detailed factual findings, respect for 
constitutional separation of powers requires they be given considerable weight.  
(Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 807, 814.) 
 
To recap, before adopting the 1989 version of the Ordinance, the City 
considered the testimony of 42 witnesses and the written submissions from 127 
41 
minority, women, local, and other business representatives.  The City subsequently 
held another 10 public hearings, commissioned two statistical studies, and sought 
additional written submissions from the public.   
When the 1989 Ordinance expired and the City was considering adopting a 
new version, it held an additional 14 public hearings, considered the live testimony 
of 254 witnesses, videotaped testimony of numerous other witnesses, additional 
statistical disparity studies, and other documentary evidence pertinent to alleged 
discrimination and bidding irregularities.  The City also heard direct evidence 
concerning racial discrimination by City employees.   
When the 1998 Ordinance expired and the City was considering adopting 
the version of the Ordinance challenged here, it conducted additional public 
hearings at which 134 individuals testified.  It heard additional direct evidence of 
ongoing discrimination in the contracting process and also heard evidence that 
prime contractors tried to circumvent compliance with the Ordinance.  An 
additional disparity analysis was conducted, and the City‟s Human Rights 
Commission wrote a report containing additional examples of discrimination in 
the process.  Only after these efforts were completed did the Board of Supervisors 
make extensive legislative findings, including that the paucity of City contracts 
going to minority- and women-owned businesses was due to discrimination by the 
City and discrimination in the private sector, that the City was actively 
discriminating against women and minority groups in its contracting and passively 
participating in private sector discrimination, that the City‟s contracting practices 
were in violation of federal law, and that the Ordinance was required to remedy 
the discrimination against minority- and women-owned businesses. 
As Justice Kennedy noted in Croson, “evidence which would support a 
judicial finding of intentional discrimination may suffice also to justify remedial 
legislative action, for it diminishes the constitutional responsibilities of the 
42 
political branches to say they must wait to act until ordered to do so by a court.”  
(Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 519, italics added (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  
Questions such as whether “a race- and gender-conscious remedy is . . . the most 
likely means of rectifying” injury from past discrimination (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 28) require an assessment of complex historical and socioeconomic data, and a 
government entity‟s answer to such questions, if methodologically sound and 
supported by substantial evidence, should not be lightly overturned by a reviewing 
court. 
IV. 
 
The City also argues the Ordinance is required to maintain the eligibility for 
funding it receives from various federal agencies, including the United States 
Department of Transportation.  If the City is correct, the Ordinance is 
unquestionably exempt from section 31.37  The majority rejects the City‟s 
argument and affirms the granting of plaintiffs‟ summary judgment motion.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 20-24.)  I disagree and would remand for further proceedings. 
 
As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22), title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d) provides that “[n]o person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  Title VI also 
authorizes federal agencies that provide funding to issue regulations implementing 
its requirements.  (42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.)  To that end, the Department of 
Transportation issued a regulation providing that, “Where prior discriminatory 
                                              
37  
Section 31, subdivision (e) exempts actions “which must be taken to 
establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility would 
result in a loss of federal funds to the State.” 
43 
practice or usage tends, on the grounds of race . . . to exclude individuals from 
participation in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject them to discrimination 
under any program or activity . . . , the applicant or recipient must take affirmative 
action to remove or overcome the effects of the prior discriminatory practice or 
usage.  Even in the absence of prior discriminatory practice or usage, a recipient 
. . . is expected to take affirmative action to assure that no person is excluded from 
participation in or denied the benefits of the program or activity on the grounds of 
race . . . .”  (49 C.F.R. § 21.5 (b)(7) (2009), italics added.)  The regulation further 
makes clear that race-conscious measures do not constitute prohibited 
discrimination “if the purpose and effect are to remove or overcome the 
consequences of practices or impediments which have restricted the availability 
of, or participation in, the program or activity . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
 
The majority concludes that the Department of Transportation regulation 
permits, but does not require, funding recipients to use race-conscious measures to 
remedy past discrimination, as “affirmative action,” as that term is meant in the 
regulation, encompasses both race-conscious and race-neutral measures.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 23-24.)  Thus, the majority reasons, a recipient can remain 
eligible for federal funding and comply with section 31 by using race-neutral 
affirmative action to address racial discrimination.  (Id. at p. 24.)  I fully agree in 
most instances.   
 
The majority, however, fails to grapple with what happens if race-neutral 
affirmative action is incapable of remedying the discrimination.  For example, we 
have recognized that, “Where the state or political subdivision has intentionally 
discriminated, use of a race-conscious or race-specific remedy necessarily follows 
as the only, or at least the most likely, means of rectifying the resulting injury.  
[Citations.]”  (Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 568, italics added.)  Indeed, the 
majority has concluded the City should have the opportunity to show whether 
44 
triable issues of fact exist as to whether the Constitution requires adoption of the 
Ordinance because, among other things, “a race- and gender-conscious remedy is 
necessary as the only, or at least the most likely, means of rectifying the 
[discrimination.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24, 27-28.)38  If the City is successful in 
so demonstrating, it would be incongruous to conclude that the Constitution 
requires a race-conscious remedy (because, in part, of the inadequacy of race-
neutral measures) but that the Department of Transportation‟s regulations do 
not.39   
 
Thus, in light of our decision to remand the matter for further consideration 
of the federal compulsion issue, I would also remand this claim so the superior 
court can consider if the City can show triable issues of fact exist as to whether it 
is required to take race-conscious affirmative action to maintain its funding 
eligibility because race-neutral measures are inadequate.
                                              
38  
The majority states that its resolution of this claim would be unaffected 
were the City to demonstrate the existence of purposeful discrimination on 
remand.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21, fn. 14.)  It reasons that, if the Ordinance is 
required by the equal protection clause, the City‟s federal funding claim “has no 
practical significance.”  (Ibid.)  Even assuming the majority is correct on this 
point, if the Ordinance is only permitted, and not required, under the equal 
protection clause, the City should have the opportunity to demonstrate race-neutral 
measures will not suffice to comply with its obligations under federal regulations.    
39  
Funding recipients cannot be reasonably be required to employ ineffective 
race-neutral measures, nor, indeed, would it appear that the use of fruitless 
measures would satisfy entities‟ obligations under title VI and agencies‟ 
implementing regulations. 
45 
 
V. 
   
Accordingly, I dissent from parts II.A and II.B of the majority‟s opinion.  I 
concur with part II.C of the majority‟s opinion and with its decision to remand the 
matter for further proceedings.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 149 Cal.App.4th 1218 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S152934 
Date Filed: August 2, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: James L. Warren 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Wayne K. Snodgrass, Danny Chou, Sherri Sokeland Kaiser and James M. 
Emery, Deputy City Attorneys; Moscone, Emblidge & Quadra, G. Scott Emblidge, Rachel J. Sater, Robert 
D. Sanford, Michael P. Brown; Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Mara E. Rosales, Joseph M. Quinn 
and K. Scott Dickey for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Lewis, Feinberg, Lee, Renaker & Jackson, Bill Lann Lee, Vincent Cheng and Lindsay Nako for Council of 
Asian American Business Associations, Association of Asian American Attorney and CPA Firms, Chinese 
for Affirmative Action, Asian American Justice Center, Asian Law Caucus and Asian American Bar 
Association of the Greater Bay Area as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Nancy Ramirez, Nicholas Espiritu; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Christopher E. Prince, Shirin 
Soleman, Demian L. Pay and Manuel Alvarez, Jr., for Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Bingham McCutchen, Michael Isaku Begert, Karen Lu, Rianne E. Nolan, Renee M. DuPree, Nancy M. 
Wang, Elizabeth M. Hall; Sujal J. Shah; Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil Rights and Oren Sellstom for 
Coalition for Economic Equity as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Frank C. Newman International Human Rights Clinic and Constance de la Vega as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Defendants and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Pacific Legal Foundation, John H. Findley, Sharon L. Browne, Alan W. Foutz and Paul J. Beard II for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Gordon M. Fauth, Jr., and Michael J. Meyer for Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Law Office of Anthony T. Caso and Anthony T. Caso for American Civil Rights Institute as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Sherri Sokeland Kaiser 
Deputy City Attorney 
City Hall, Room 234 
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place 
San Francisco, CA  94102-4682 
(415) 554-4691 
 
Sharon L. Browne 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 
Sacramento, CA  95834 
(916) 419-7111