Case Title: State v. Rance

Citation: 1999-Ohio-291

Docket Number: 19980002

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Rance, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 1999-Ohio-291.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. RANCE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Rance (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Criminal law — Indictment — Multiple counts — Under R.C. 2941.25(A) analysis, 
statutorily defined elements of offense claimed to be of similar import are 
compared in the abstract — Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated 
robbery are not allied offenses of similar import — R.C. 2941.25(A) and 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy do not prohibit trial 
courts from imposing separate sentences for both involuntary manslaughter 
and aggravated robbery. 
1. 
Under an R.C. 2941.25(A) analysis, the statutorily defined elements of 
offenses that are claimed to be of similar import are compared in the 
abstract.  (Newark v. Vazirani [1990], 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 549 N.E.2d 520, 
overruled.) 
2. 
Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses of 
similar import. 
3. 
In Ohio it is unnecessary to resort to the Blockburger test in determining 
whether cumulative punishments imposed within a single trial for more than 
one offense resulting from the same criminal conduct violate the federal and 
state constitutional provisions against double jeopardy.  Instead, R.C. 
2941.25’s two-step test answers the constitutional and state statutory 
inquiries.  The statute manifests the General Assembly’s intent to permit, in 
appropriate cases, cumulative punishments for the same conduct.  (Garrett v. 
United States [1985], 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764; 
Albernaz v. United States [1981], 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 
 
 
2
275; State v. Bickerstaff [1984], 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 10 OBR 352, 461 N.E.2d 
892, approved and followed.) 
(Nos. 98-2 and 98-130 — Submitted February 9, 1999 — Decided June 16, 1999.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-96-
277. 
 
Giano Rance pleaded guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter and 
one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and former  
2911.01(A)(2), now (A)(3).  The trial court sentenced Rance to consecutive terms 
of imprisonment on each count, imposing an aggregate sentence of sixteen to fifty 
years.  Rance moved to correct his sentence, claiming that involuntary 
manslaughter and aggravated robbery are allied offenses of similar import as 
defined in R.C. 2941.25(A).  He appealed the sentence, however, before the trial 
court ruled on the motion. 
 
On appeal, Rance argued that R.C. 2941.25(A) and the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions preclude the trial court from 
imposing separate, consecutive sentences for involuntary manslaughter and 
aggravated robbery.  The court of appeals determined that because “involuntary 
manslaughter necessarily encompasses all of the elements of aggravated robbery,” 
sentencing Rance for both crimes violated R.C. 2941.25(A) and the state and 
federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.  State v. Rance (Dec. 5, 
1997), Lucas App. No. L-96-277, unreported, at 5, 1997 WL 770974.  Recognizing 
the discord between its decision and those of other Ohio appellate courts, the Sixth 
District Court of Appeals certified a conflict in this case. 
 
Case No. 98-2 is before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists.  Case No. 98-130 is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, Craig T. Pearson, 
Brenda J. Majdalani and Dean P. Mandross, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  Do R.C. 2941.25(A) and the constitutional protections against 
double jeopardy prohibit trial courts from imposing separate sentences for both 
involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery?  Pursuant to Ohio’s multiple-
count statute, R.C. 2941.25, our answer to this question is “No.” 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
The double jeopardy protections afforded by the federal and state 
Constitutions guard citizens against both successive prosecutions and cumulative 
punishments for the “same offense.”  State v. Moss (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 518, 
23 O.O.3d 447, 448-449, 433 N.E.2d 181, 184.  This case does not involve the 
successive-prosecution branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Instead, Rance 
objects to the cumulative punishments imposed in a single trial for his convictions 
of two separate offenses that he claims constitute the same offense for double 
jeopardy purposes. 
 
We initially note that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause (made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment) and Ohio’s counterpart are 
sufficiently similar to warrant consultation of federal jurisprudence when analyzing 
Ohio’s proscription against placing persons “twice * * * in jeopardy for the same 
offense.”  Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution.  See, e.g., Moss, supra. 
 
Rance contends that according to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 
 
 
4
L.Ed. 306, 309, he cannot be convicted of both involuntary manslaughter and 
aggravated robbery when the same act provides the grounds for both charges.  The 
test outlined in Blockburger for determining whether two offenses are the same for 
double jeopardy purposes is whether each offense requires proof of an element that 
the other does not.  Id.  See, also, Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 165-166, 97 
S.Ct. 2221, 2225-2226, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194-195. 
 
A legislature, however, may prescribe the imposition of cumulative 
punishments for crimes that constitute the same offense under Blockburger without 
violating the federal protection against double jeopardy or corresponding 
provisions of a state’s constitution.  Albernaz v. United States (1981), 450 U.S. 
333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d 275, 285; State v. Bickerstaff (1984), 
10 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 10 OBR 352, 355, 461 N.E.2d 892, 895.  In this regard, 
where a legislature expresses its intent to permit cumulative punishments for such 
crimes, the Blockburger test must yield.  Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 
1143, 67 L.Ed.2d at 282.  See, also, Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d at 66, 10 OBR at 
356, 461 N.E.2d at 896, fn. 1.  “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than 
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended.”  Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 
673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 542.  See, also, Moss, 69 Ohio St.2d at 518, 23 O.O.3d 
at 449, 433 N.E.2d at 184-185. 
 
For this reason, although two offenses constitute the same offense under 
Blockburger, when a legislature signals its intent to either prohibit or permit 
cumulative punishments for conduct that may qualify as two crimes, application of 
Blockburger would be improper; the legislature’s expressed intent is  dispositive.  
See Ohio v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2541, 81 L.Ed.2d  
425, 433. 
 
 
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We agree, therefore, with the state’s contention that the familiar Blockburger 
test, which is a rule of statutory construction, is not useful where the General 
Assembly’s intent is clear.  “[T]he Blockburger rule is not controlling when the 
legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.”  
Garrett v. United States (1985), 471 U.S. 773, 779, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 
L.Ed.2d 764, 771.  We thus evaluate Rance’s double jeopardy argument by 
deciding whether the General Assembly intended as a sentencing possibility 
separate, cumulative punishments for both aggravated robbery and involuntary 
manslaughter when the two offenses stem from a single criminal act. 
OHIO’S MULTIPLE-COUNT STATUTE 
 
We discern the General Assembly’s intent on this subject through review of 
Ohio’s multiple-count statute, R.C. 2941.25.  If the court’s sentencing of Rance 
accords with the multiple-count statute, that harmony with the legislative intent 
precludes an “unconstitutional” label.  See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 
1145, 67 L.Ed.2d at 285; Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d at 65-66, 10 OBR at 355-356, 
461 N.E.2d at 895-896.  This court has stated that Ohio’s multiple-count statute “is 
a clear indication of the General Assembly’s intent to permit cumulative 
sentencing for the commission of certain offenses.”  Id. at 66, 10 OBR at 356, 461 
N.E.2d at 896, fn. 1. 
 
With its multiple-count statute Ohio intends to permit a defendant to be 
punished for multiple offenses of dissimilar import.  R.C. 2941.25(B); State v. 
Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816, 817.  If, however, a 
defendant’s actions “can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of 
similar import,” the defendant may be convicted (i.e., found guilty and punished) 
of only one.  R.C. 2941.25(A).  But if a defendant commits offenses of similar 
import separately or with a separate animus, he may be punished for both pursuant 
 
 
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to R.C. 2941.25(B).  State v. Jones (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 12, 13-14, 676 N.E.2d 
80, 81. 
 
Were Rance’s crimes allied offenses of similar import? The applicable test 
for deciding that issue is as follows:  If the elements of the crimes “ ‘correspond to 
such a degree that the commission of one crime will result in the commission of 
the other, the crimes are allied offenses of similar import.’ ”  Id. at 13, 676 N.E.2d 
at 81, quoting Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d at 117, 526 N.E.2d at 817.  If the 
elements do not so correspond, the offenses are of dissimilar import and the court’s 
inquiry ends — the multiple convictions are permitted.  R.C. 2941.25(B).  See, 
also, State v. Mughni (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 68, 514 N.E.2d 870, 873. 
 
A problem inherent in the application of the test for similar/dissimilar import 
is whether the court should contrast the statutory elements in the abstract or 
consider the particular facts of the case.  We think it useful to settle this issue for 
Ohio courts, and we believe that comparison of the statutory elements in the 
abstract is the more functional test, producing “clear legal lines capable of 
application in particular cases.”  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), 526 
U.S. ___, ___, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 250. 
 
Because the comparison of elements of offenses outlined in Blockburger is 
reflected in R.C. 2941.25(A), courts engage in a similar analysis whether applying 
Blockburger or Ohio’s multiple-count statute.  Therefore, cases discussing and 
applying Blockburger are helpful, though not controlling, in our examination of 
Ohio law.  For example, in its Whalen decision the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether to analyze abstract elements or particular facts upon review of 
a case with a factual scenario similar to the instant case.  Whalen v. United States 
(1980), 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715.  Whalen was convicted of 
rape and of killing the victim during the commission of the rape.  Discussing 
 
 
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Blockburger’s applicability to multiple punishments imposed in a single criminal 
proceeding, and in particular to compound and predicate offenses,1 Justice 
Rehnquist observed: 
 
“The multiplicity of predicates creates problems when one attempts to apply 
Blockburger.  If one applies the test in the abstract by looking solely to the 
wording of [the statutes], Blockburger would always permit imposition of 
cumulative sentences * * *.  If, on the other hand, one looks to the facts alleged in 
a particular indictment brought under [the statute], then Blockburger would bar 
cumulative punishments for violating [the compound offense] and the particular 
predicate offense charged in the indictment, since proof of the former would 
necessarily entail proof of the latter. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“If one tests the above-quoted statutes in the abstract, one can see that rape is 
not a lesser included offense of felony murder, because proof of the latter will not 
necessarily require proof of the former.  One can commit felony murder without 
rape and one can rape without committing felony murder.  If one chooses to apply 
Blockburger to the indictment in the present case, however, rape is a ‘lesser 
included offense’ of felony murder because in this particular case, the prosecution 
could not prove felony murder without proving the predicate rape. 
 
“Because this Court has never been forced to apply Blockburger in the 
context of compound and predicate offenses, we have not had to decide whether 
Blockburger should be applied abstractly to the statutes in question or specifically 
to the indictment as framed in a particular case.  Our past decisions seem to have 
assumed, however, that Blockburger’s analysis stands or falls on the wording of 
the statutes alone.  * * * Moreover, because the Blockburger test is simply an 
attempt to determine legislative intent, it seems more natural to apply it to the 
 
 
8
language as drafted by the legislature than to the wording of a particular 
indictment.”  (Emphasis sic; footnote omitted.)  Id. at 709-711, 100 S.Ct. at 1447-
1448, 63 L.Ed.2d at 735-737 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 
We agree with Justice Rehnquist’s view that if it is necessary to compare 
criminal elements in order to resolve a case, those elements should be compared in 
the statutory abstract.  In the past this court has applied R.C. 2941.25(A) both 
ways.  In some cases the court has compared the elements of the crimes by 
reference to the particular facts alleged in the indictment.  See, e.g., Newark v. 
Vazirani (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 83, 549 N.E.2d 520, 522 (“Given the facts of 
this case, we find that [the two crimes charged are allied offenses of similar 
import]”).  (Emphasis added.)  In other cases, this court has compared the statutory 
elements of the offenses in the abstract.  See, e.g., State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 353, 369, 595 N.E.2d 915, 928 (aggravated murder requires purposefully 
killing another while committing only one of nine specified felonies; aggravated 
arson, one of the nine specified felonies, does not require a purposeful killing).  
This inconsistency has caused disharmony among the appellate courts.  See State v. 
Anderson (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 251, 254, 16 OBR 275, 277-278, 475 N.E.2d 
492, 496, overruled on other grounds, State v. Campbell (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 
352, 598 N.E.2d 1244; State v. Metcalf (Mar. 25, 1998), Highland App. No. 
97CA937, unreported, 1998 WL 131517; State v. Brown (May 1, 1991), Lorain 
App. Nos. 90CA004836 and 90CA004838, unreported, 1991 WL 70817 (all 
comparing statutory elements in the abstract when undertaking the first step in the 
R.C. 2941.25 analysis).  Cf. State v. Lang (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 243, 656 
N.E.2d 1358; Dayton v. McLaughlin (1988), 50 Ohio App.3d 69, 552 N.E.2d 965; 
State v. Johnson (May 1, 1998), Hamilton App. No. C-970180, unreported, 1998 
WL 212752 (all comparing elements of offenses in light of the particular facts in 
 
 
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the case). 
 
In Rance’s case, the court of appeals examined the particular facts of the 
case in determining whether aggravated robbery and involuntary manslaughter are 
of similar import.  Rance’s accomplice beat the robbery victim to death with a 
large stick while Rance took items from the victim’s home.  Comparing the 
elements of the offenses in light of the particular facts, the lower court concluded 
that the two are allied: beating the victim to facilitate taking his property 
constituted aggravated robbery and beating the victim to death to facilitate taking 
his property constituted involuntary manslaughter.  The court of appeals 
concluded, therefore, that in this particular case and on these specific facts, the 
involuntary manslaughter charge encompassed the aggravated robbery — proof of 
the facts constituting the aggravated robbery was necessary to prove involuntary 
manslaughter.2 
 
But contrary to the approach taken by the court of appeals, we today clarify 
that under an R.C. 2941.25(A) analysis the statutorily defined elements of offenses 
that are claimed to be of similar import are compared in the abstract.  Newark v. 
Vazirani, supra, and language in other opinions to the contrary, are overruled.  
Courts should assess, by aligning the elements of each crime in the abstract, 
whether the statutory elements of the crimes “correspond to such a degree that the 
commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other.”  Jones, 78 
Ohio St.3d at 14, 676 N.E.2d at 81.  And if the elements do so correspond, the 
defendant may not be convicted of both unless the court finds that the defendant 
committed the crimes separately or with separate animus.  R.C. 2941.25(B); Jones, 
78 Ohio St.3d at 14, 676 N.E.2d at 81 (a defendant may be convicted of allied 
offenses of similar import if the defendant’s conduct reveals that the crimes were 
committed separately or with separate animus). 
 
 
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Aligning the elements of Rance’s offenses, we determine that involuntary 
manslaughter and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses of similar import.  In 
this case, the particular charge was causing the death of another during the 
commission of a felonious assault — the assault, in turn, occurred during a 
robbery.  Involuntary manslaughter requires causing the death of another as a 
proximate result of committing or attempting to commit a felony.  R.C. 
2903.04(A).  Aggravated robbery does not require that the victim be killed or even 
injured.  Violation of the particular code section with which Rance was charged 
requires only that the defendant inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm.  
Former R.C. 2911.01(A)(2), now (A)(3).  Aggravated robbery requires a theft 
offense or an attempt to commit one.  Involuntary manslaughter does not, since 
aggravated robbery is only one of the many felonies that may support a charge of 
involuntary manslaughter.  Because each offense requires proof of an element that 
the other does not, they are not allied offenses of similar import. 
 
Reviewed in the abstract, then, involuntary manslaughter and aggravated 
robbery are not allied offenses because the commission of one will not 
automatically result in commission of the other.  State v. Preston (1986), 23 Ohio 
St.3d 64, 23 OBR 197, 491 N.E.2d 685.  Because these offenses are of dissimilar 
import based on an abstract comparison of the statutory elements, Rance may be 
punished for both, and his separate sentence for each offense does not violate R.C. 
2941.25 or the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Ohio it is unnecessary to resort to the Blockburger test in determining 
whether cumulative punishments imposed within a single trial for more than one 
offense resulting from the same criminal conduct violate the federal and state 
constitutional provisions against double jeopardy.  Instead, R.C. 2941.25’s two-
 
 
11
step test answers the constitutional and state statutory inquiries.  The statute 
manifests the General Assembly’s intent to permit, in appropriate cases, 
cumulative punishments for the same conduct.  The sole question, then, is one of 
state statutory construction: are the offenses at issue those certain offenses for 
which the General Assembly has approved multiple convictions pursuant to R.C. 
2941.25? 
 
Under R.C. 2941.25(A), involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery 
are not allied offenses of similar import.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and reinstate the original sentences imposed by the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in paragraphs one and two of the syllabus and in the 
judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Felonious assault was actually the charged predicate offense to the 
involuntary manslaughter count against Rance.  The felonious assault was the act 
of beating the victim during and in furtherance of the robbery.  Although 
aggravated robbery technically was not the predicate offense underlying the 
involuntary manslaughter charge, the assault that resulted in the victim’s death was 
the single criminal act supporting both the aggravated robbery and involuntary 
manslaughter charges.  Justice Rehnquist’s analysis is therefore appropriate in this 
case. 
2. 
Even when looking at the specific facts of Rance’s case, however, the court 
of appeals failed to consider that the predicate offense to the involuntary 
 
 
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manslaughter charge was felonious assault, not aggravated robbery.  Thus, 
although proof of the beating was necessary to prove involuntary manslaughter, a 
finder of fact might have concluded that while the beating was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, theft was not.  Even examining the particular facts of this case, 
then, proof of aggravated robbery was not necessary to proving involuntary 
manslaughter.