Case Title: RWR v. EKB AND JDB

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-00-13

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
RWR v. EKB AND JDB2001 WY 11835 P.3d 1224Case Number: C-00-13Decided: 12/07/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
  

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, Division of Child

Support 
Enforcement, STATE OF WYOMING

ex rel., 
NDB, MINOR CHILD:

 

RWR, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

EKB and 
JDB, 

Appellees(Respondents).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Weston County

The 
Honorable Terrence O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Patrick 
F. Crow of Law Office of Patrick F. Crow, Newcastle, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Crow. 

Representing 
Appellee State of Wyoming, Division of Child Support 
Enforcement: 

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. 
Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Peggy A. Trent, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Wilde. 

Representing 
Appellee EKB: 

            
No appearance.

 Representing 
Appellee JDB: 

Daniel 
B. Bailey of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Bailey.

 Guardian 
Ad Litem: 

            
Kathryn J. Edelman, Gillette, Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

HILL, 
J., delivered 
the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a specially concurring 
opinion, in which LEHMAN, C.J., joined.

 
            
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      The district 
court determined that RWR (hereafter "Father") was the biologic1 father of NDB (hereafter 
"Child").  Father challenges that 
decision on a variety of grounds.  
The other parties to this appeal are the State of Wyoming, Division of 
Child Support Enforcement (State), Child's Mother, EKB (hereafter "Mother"), and 
JDB, who was married to Child's Mother at the time of Child's 
birth.

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

 

 

[¶3]      Father raises 
these issues:

 

1)  Did the District Court err when it ruled 
it was not required by the Wyoming Parentage Act to recognize the parentage 
determinations contained in a decree of divorce?

 

2)  Did the District Court err in a 
paternity proceeding in which there were two men each of whom was a presumed 
father as defined in Wyoming Statutes Section 14-2-102(a) (LEXIS 1999), when it 
ordered the parties to submit to genetic testing?

 

3)  Did the District Court err when it used 
genetic testing to determine the paternity of NDB [Child] rather than resolving 
conflicting presumptions of paternity as defined in Wyoming Statutes Section 
14-2-102(a) (LEXIS 1999), by deciding which presumption is supported by 
weightier considerations of policy and logic?

 

4)  Did the District Court violate the right 
of Appellant [Father] to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure when 
it ordered the taking of tissue samples for genetic testing and the introduction 
of reports of genetic tests made with those samples?

 

The 
State posits this issue for our determination:

 

I.  Did the Wyoming district court violate 
Appellant's [Father's] constitutional rights by ordering him to submit to 
genetic tests in its determination of NDB's [Child's] 
paternity?

 

JDB 
poses these issues:

 

A.  Is the minor child precluded by 
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel from 
seeking a judicial determination of his biological father from among two 
statutorily presumed fathers?

 

B.  Where conflicting statutory presumptions 
exist, is the rebuttal of a single presumption 
dispositive?

 

C.  Does it matter who the biological father 
of the child is, or that a fraud was perpetrated on the Court to hide the 
Mother's pregnancy?

 

D.  Did the district court violate 
Appellant's [Father's] constitutional rights by ordering him to submit to 
genetic tests in its determination of NDB's [Child's] 
paternity?

 

 

[¶4]      Child was born on 
September 21, 1992, and from the date of his birth until July of 1998, all 
parties believed JDB was the biologic father of Child.  Mother was married to Father2 at the time Child was conceived, 
but she believed Father to be incapable of producing a child because he had been 
diagnosed by a physician as having a low sperm count and low sperm 
motility.  For more than a year and 
a half Mother and Father attempted to become pregnant, but those efforts had 
apparently failed.  During 
the final months of her marriage to Father, Mother engaged in an affair with 
JDB, and when she discovered she was pregnant in January of 1992, she assumed 
Child's biologic father to be JDB.3  By decree entered on April 30, 1992, 
Mother was divorced from Father.  
The parties reached a settlement that was appended to the divorce 
decree.  It contained this 
provision:  "No children have been 
born to the parties during their marriage and no children are expected to be 
born as issue of this marriage."  
Similar language is found in the divorce decree.

 

[¶5]      Mother was 
married to JDB on August 14, 1992.  
JDB and Mother lived together as man and wife for about two and one-half 
years but were divorced by decree entered on September 1, 1995.  That decree contained this 
provision:  "That one (1) child has 
been born as issue of this marriage of the parties, namely, [Child] born 
September 21, 1992."

 

[¶6]      After JDB and 
Mother were divorced, JDB continued to have some visitation with Child.  While Child was with JDB during the 
summer of 1998, JDB obtained a mail order DNA testing kit and sent in buccal 
swabs (saliva/tissue samples) from himself and Child for analysis.  That test result eliminated JDB as the 
biologic father of Child.

 

[¶7]      The instant 
litigation was initiated on December 9, 1998, when the State filed a petition to 
establish paternity on behalf of Child.  
Father questions the sincerity of the State's motivation in initiating 
this action.  However, the record 
demonstrates that the State did so at Mother's request.  On July 29, 1998, JDB had called Mother 
and told her that he was not the biologic father of Child and wanted to know who 
was.  Mother decided to initiate 
this litigation because she wanted to know "the truth" and because JDB was 
insistent that it be done.  After 
some preliminary proceedings, the district court ordered that genetic testing be 
done.4  The district court entered that order 
reluctantly and stated in the order that he "could not veto the good faith 
decision of the guardian ad litem" to proceed with genetic testing.  The genetic tests established that JDB 
could not be the biologic father of Child and that RWR was, indeed, his 
Father.

 

[¶8]      The most 
perplexing hurdle in this very difficult case arises because Father did not want 
genetic testing done and, even after the test results were made available, he 
resisted efforts to establish the true paternity of Child.  Father was unequivocal in stating that 
he did not desire to have a father-child relationship with Child.  JDB, who had some semblance of a 
father-child relationship with Child, did not wish to continue that relationship 
unless Child initiated it.  JDB 
contended that his relationship with Child was minimal because he had been 
absent from the home due to his work during much of the two and one-half years 
he was married to Mother.  After his 
divorce from Mother, JDB had only limited visitation because Mother tended to 
interfere with his court-ordered visitation.  To the extent there was visitation, it 
was JDB's sense that Child did not want to be with him and did not like him 
(thus, he did not want to force Child to continue an unsatisfactory father-child 
relationship).

 

 

INTRODUCTION

[¶9]      Before we embark 
on a discussion designed to resolve the issues actually raised in this appeal, 
it is prudent that we clear some debris from the path we intend to follow in 
reaching our decision.  Cases 
determining the paternity of children often present unique and perplexing fact 
situations, and this one is no exception.  
The issues to be decided are those set out in the "ISSUES" section 
above.  In the course of presenting 
the germane arguments, many other issues are either explicitly or implicitly 
introduced into the mix, and given the circumstances of this case, we are 
constrained to mention those matters which have little or nothing to do with 
this case.  Father summarizes his 
view of this case thus:  "This case 
involves a decision by the district court which effectively shattered what was 
left of a family and forced a six-year-old boy to substitute a stranger for the 
father he had known all of his life."  
Quite the opposite is true.  
Mother, Father, and JDB shattered the family relationships that are the 
subject of this appeal and they then sought the aid of the courts in their 
attempt to put them back together again.  
The reality is that it simply will not go back together again, and 
neither the district court nor the State of Wyoming is responsible for those 
circumstances.

 

[¶10]   The first misleading notion we must 
put aside is that of a concern for the legitimacy of Child.  If anything, he has a surfeit of male 
parents insofar as legitimacy is concerned, and at no juncture has there been a 
threat that the result would be anything other than one that sustained his 
legitimacy.  The very broaching of 
that issue was a disservice to Child, to the law, and it is an affront to 
intellectual honesty.

 

[¶11]   In this case, there is no prior 
proceeding in which Child was a party, so we have no concern with the principles 
of res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or laches.  See Matter of Paternity of SDM, 
882 P.2d 1217, 1220-25 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶12]   Some concern has been expressed 
about a fraud on the district court in the divorce between Mother and 
Father.  The facts most strongly 
suggest all parties genuinely believed the facts relating to Mother's pregnancy 
to be other than what they actually turned out to be upon microscopic scientific 
examination.  In this appeal, we 
have neither the need nor the proper legal vehicle to resolve any concerns about 
a fraud upon the court.5

 

[¶13]   We will discard any suggestion that 
the State should be scapegoated for the misdeeds of some of the principals in 
this litigation.  The State filed 
this suit at the urging of Mother,6 who acted at the insistence of 
JDB.  The State filed the suit in 
accordance with law and because it is the entity upon whose shoulders the burden 
of litigation of this nature usually falls.  See State Department of Family 
Services, Division of Public Assistance and Social Services v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022 (Wyo. 1998).  A guardian 
ad litem (GAL) was appointed by the district court.  Mother, JDB, and the GAL all favored the 
use of genetic testing to resolve this case.  The State took no position on that 
issue.  Father resisted the use of 
genetic testing.  Father's 
resistance is premised on a hypertechnical reading of the law but with knowledge 
that preliminary genetic testing eliminated JDB as the biologic father.  The suggestion cannot be avoided that 
Father may have been motivated by a desire to avoid the financial obligation of 
child support, as well as the responsibilities of 
fatherhood.

 

[¶14]   Father injects the "best interests 
of the child" at several junctures.  
There are some circumstances where the best interests of the child are at 
issue in a paternity proceeding.  
TL ex. rel. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wyo. 1999).  However, much like the TL case, 
such an analysis was rendered unnecessary because the statute permitted this 
action and mandated genetic testing if requested by even one party.  Id.  Here, we do not have a circumstance 
where a biologic father seeks to disrupt an established father-child 
relationship.  Instead, we have a 
presumptive father who seeks to dissolve what he contends is not an established 
and functional father-child relationship in favor of a man who has been 
determined to be the biologic father.  
Courts simply are not always capable of resolving the sorts of profound 
human dilemmas that are brought to their doorsteps, at least not in a way that 
will avoid all potential hardship to even innocent parties.  Here, though Child has two presumptive 
fathers, he has none who wishes to fully embrace that role and the 
responsibility that goes with it.  
We cannot disagree with the position of Mother, JDB, and the GAL (as well 
as the reluctantly-reached decision of the district court) that "the truth" was 
the best result that could be salvaged in this case.7

 

 

 

[¶15]   It is the Father's contention that 
the district court failed to properly construe the pertinent statutes in terms 
of how conflicting presumptions of paternity are to be resolved.  Father's argument continues that JDB was 
a presumptive biologic father because he was married to Mother at the time of 
Child's birth, that JDB took Child into his home and he held Child out as his 
own, and that there was a divorce decree that established JDB as the 
biologic father.  Continuing, Father 
contends that the district court should not have looked to the genetic testing 
provision in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109 (Michie 1997) because § 14-2-102 
commanded that JDB be designated the biologic father.  We do not agree with that analysis of 
the statutes.

 

[¶16]   The standard of review to be 
applied to the first three issues raised by Father are those principles that 
pertain to the construction of statutes.  
In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  Fontaine v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 894-95 (Wyo. 2000) (and cases 
cited therein); and see Wyoming Department of Transportation v. Haglund, 
982 P.2d 699, 701-3 (Wyo. 1999); and Richards v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Sweetwater County, 6 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶17]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (Michie 
1997)8 provides:

(a)  A man is presumed to be the natural 
father of a child if:

                        
(i)  He and the child's 
natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born 
during the marriage, or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is 
terminated by death, annulment or divorce or after a decree of separation is 
entered by a court;

. . . 
.

                        
(iv)  While the child is 
under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child. 

. . . 
.

            
(b)  A presumption under 
subsection (a) of this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by 
clear and convincing evidence.  If 
two (2) or more presumptions under subsection (a) of this section arise which 
conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.  A presumption under subsection (a) of 
this section is rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity of the child 
by another man.

 

[¶18]   Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-102(a)(i), JDB was a presumed biologic father because Child was born during 
his marriage to Mother.  Of course, 
under that same provision, Father was also a presumed biologic father because 
Child was born within 300 days of his divorce from Mother.  Father also looks to § 14-2-102(a)(iv) 
as a basis for establishing JDB as the presumptive father.  Father then contends that as 
contemplated by § 14-2-102(b), there were conflicting presumptions and, thus, 
the district court was required to apply the statutory language, "[a] 
presumption under subsection (a) of this section is rebutted by a court decree 
establishing paternity of the child by another man."  It is Father's contention that his 
"presumed" paternity was rebutted by the decree dissolving the marriage between 
Mother and JDB because one of its provisions stated that Child was a product of 
that marriage.

 

[¶19]   However, the district court did not 
follow that path, but instead ordered that genetic tests be performed upon the 
request of the Child's GAL, as well as other parties.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109 (Michie 1997) 
(emphasis added) provides:

 

(a) As 
used in W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120:

(i) 
"Genetic markers" mean separate identifiable genes or complexes of genes 
generally isolated as a result of blood typing, at least seven (7) of which are 
normally tested in a paternity determination;

(ii) 
"Genetic tests" means blood or tissue typing tests including, but not limited 
to, tests of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, 
serum proteins or deoxyribonucleic acid.

            
(b) The court may, and upon request of a party shall, require the 
child, mother or alleged father to submit to genetic tests.   The tests shall be performed by 
an expert qualified as an examiner of genetic markers appointed by the 
court.  The tests shall be of 
a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies designated by 
the United States secretary of health and human services and performed by a 
laboratory approved by such an accreditation body.

            
(c)  The court, upon reasonable request of a 
party, shall order that independent tests be performed by other experts 
qualified as examiners of genetic markers.  
The party requesting the test shall be ordered by the court to pay for 
the test.  Any objection to the 
results of a genetic test shall be made in writing not later than twenty (20) 
days after the results of the test are received by the person making the 
objection.

 

[¶20]   As noted above, Father resisted all 
efforts to subject him to genetic tests based on his statutory construction 
theory set out above, as well as on constitutional grounds which we will discuss 
later.  However, Father did not 
otherwise challenge the accuracy or reliability of the tests performed.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-109(e)(iv) (Michie 1997), and TL, 975 P.2d  at 
1068-69.

 

[¶21]   In addition to those pivotal 
statutes set out above, this effort at statutory construction must take account 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-101 (Michie 1997):

 

(a) As 
used in W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120,  
"parent and child relationship" means the legal relationship existing 
between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law 
confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations.  It includes both the mother and child 
relationship and the father and child relationship and extends equally to every 
child and parent regardless of the marital status of the 
parents.

            
(b) The parent and child relationship may be established between a child 
and:

(i) The 
natural mother by proof of her having given birth to the child or as provided by 
W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120;

(ii) The 
natural father as provided by W.S. 14-2-101 through 
14-2-120;

                        
(iii) An adoptive parent by proof of adoption.

 

[¶22]   Not only do the principles of 
statutory construction tell us that we must read all of these statutes together 
(in pari materia), but the statute set out above says that same thing in 
virtually those same words.  Section 
14-2-102 sets out a list of presumptions that apply to the paternity equation, 
but § 14-2-109(b) allows, and in the instant circumstances where three of the 
five parties requested genetic testing, commands that genetic testing be carried 
out.  We hold that the district 
court properly construed and applied the governing statutes under the 
circumstances of this case.

 

[¶23]   Finally, Father contends that his 
being subjected to genetic testing was a constitutionally unreasonable search 
and seizure.  Cogent argument or 
pertinent authority does not support this contention, and we will not consider 
it.9  Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22 
¶11, 18 P.3d 641, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001); Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 
(Wyo. 2000); McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 8 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶24]   The dispositive order of the 
district court is affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

   
1The phrase, 
"biologic father," is used as a synonym for the somewhat less accurate phrase, 
"natural father," which is used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (Michie 1997) 
infra.

   2Father was 
married to Mother from May of 1987 through April of 
1992.

 

  
3JDB shared that 
assumption, as did Father.  Mother 
reached her assumption even though she used contraception during intercourse 
with JDB but not during intercourse with her husband.  Mother was engaging in intercourse with 
both men during the time frame in which she 
conceived.

   
4Throughout the 
proceedings the district court expressed its misgivings about and even hostility 
toward what the parties were doing, including the guardian ad litem (GAL), who 
was appointed by the district court.  
Although JDB did an informal genetic test, that test only eliminated him 
as the biologic father.  Mother 
insisted on genetic testing, JDB insisted on genetic testing, and the GAL 
favored genetic testing on behalf of Child.  Only Father objected to the genetic 
tests.  The parties rejected a 
settlement proposal that was offered by the district court to the effect that 
JDB would continue to pay child support and that Father would also pay child 
support into a trust for Child (the trust was not to be under the control of 
Mother).

   5The same 
district judge presided in all pertinent cases  the divorce of Mother and 
Father, the divorce of Mother and JDB, and the instant 
proceedings.

   6Mother was 
concerned with the continuation of child support 
payments.

 

   7A child's 
interests in an accurate paternity determination are broader than the interests 
of all others and include support, inheritance, and medical support.  An accurate determination of paternity 
results in intangible, psychological, and emotional benefits for the child, 
including familial bonds and learning of cultural heritage.  Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 977 P.2d 776, 781 (Ariz. 1999).

   
8We apply the 
pertinent portions of the statutes in Title 14, Chapter 2, as they existed at 
the time this litigation was filed and resolved.  Many of the statutes in Title 14, 
Chapter 2, have been substantively amended since this litigation was completed 
in the district court.

   9In re 
Paternity of D.A.A.P., 117 Wis. 2d 120, 344 N.W.2d 200, 204-5 (1983); 
State on Behalf of Kremin v. Graham, 318 N.W.2d 853, 855-56 (Minn. 1982) 
(holding that genetic testing is not an unconstitutional invasion of the person 
or of a person's privacy).

  

GOLDEN, J., 
specially concurring, in which LEHMAN, C.J., joins.

 [¶25]       
By this 
action, a man legally presumed to be the father of Child has been able to 
legally terminate his parental rights and obligations to Child.  While I concur in the result, this case 
presents disturbing issues.  The 
legal establishment of the non-existence of a parent-child relationship raises 
special public policy concerns.  
Questions arise as to who should be able to bring such an action, the 
timing of the action, and the process to be followed once the action is 
brought.  Unfortunately, I cannot 
discern a clear policy in the current statutes on these issues.  

 

[¶26]       
Initially, 
I wonder whether this case ever should have entered the judicial system.1  The 
underlying case was originally brought by the Department of Family Services, ex 
rel Child, and titled "[p]etition for declaration of non-paternity and 
establishment of paternity and support."  
Although none of the parties raised the issue before this Court, I have a 
concern regarding the authority of the Department to bring an action to declare 
the non-paternity of a presumed, acknowledged, and adjudicated father 
(JDB).  

 

[¶27]       
I have searched 
the applicable statutes and find the issue unclear and disturbing.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
Title 14 clearly barred JDB, RWR and EKB from bringing an action setting aside 
the parent-child relationship between JDB and Child.2  
Title 20, chapter 6 contains the statutory grant of authority for the 
Child Support Enforcement Division of the Department to bring actions to 
establish paternity.  The statutes 
seem to reflect that the child support enforcement agency only has an interest 
in making sure there is a father obligated to support a child.  This child had such a father.  I fear the Department overstepped its 
authority by bringing an action to disestablish paternity and, in the process, 
set itself up to be misused by parents wanting to disown their parental 
obligations well after they are barred from challenging a paternity 
determination in their own name.  
Although troubled by such an outcome, I must leave the conclusive answer 
to this inquiry for another day when the issue is squarely before this Court and 
supported by appropriate briefing.3  

 

[¶28]       
In terms 
of process, it is clear that, under the statutes applicable to this case, the 
district court simply has no discretion regarding ordering genetic testing.  Genetic testing was required to be 
ordered upon the request of any party.  
It seems the legislature has recently reviewed this issue since some of 
the pertinent statutory language within the paternity statute has been 
amended.  While somewhat confusing, 
the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109 now seems to suggest that ordering 
genetic testing may be discretionary with the district court.4  
This discretion is limited, however, by language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-110(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) that states: "[i]f a man has been identified 
as a possible father of the child, the court may and upon request of a party 
shall require the child, the mother or the man to submit to appropriate 
tests."  Thus, even under the new 
statute, the ordering of genetic testing remains mandatory under certain 
circumstances.  Even should 
circumstances arise where the ordering of genetic testing might be 
discretionary, the legislature offers no guidance for the courts on what factors 
to consider in exercising such discretion.

 

[¶29]       
These 
are only a few of the issues raised by this case.  The legal system certainly cannot bring 
love into a family, but it should at least provide a clear and coherent process 
when called upon to define a family.  
This is especially true when the legal system is used to disestablish 
paternity.  Such an action has 
severe consequences for the family (most importantly the child) and raises 
serious questions of public policy.  
The legislature is, of course, the proper body to set such public 
policy.  The questions arising from 
the current statutory framework suggest that perhaps it would be appropriate for 
the legislature to comprehensively review that framework to resolve any 
ambiguities and ensure it accurately codifies legislative policy 
determinations.

 

Footnotes for the Concurring 
Opinion
 

  1The moral 
response to this inquiry can only be answered by the parties involved.  In this instance, my concern is with the 
legal response.  

  
2See Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-104(a) and (c) (Lexis 1999) (amended 2000) that provide in pertinent 
part:

            
(a) A child, his natural mother or a man presumed to be his father under 
W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) may bring 
action:

      (i) At any time 
for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child relationship 
presumed under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii);  or

      (ii) To declare 
the nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under W.S. 
14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), provided:

            
(A) The action is brought not later than three (3) years after the child 
reaches the age of majority if the action is brought by or on behalf of the 
child or by the department of family services;

            
(B) The action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining 
knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later than five (5) years after the 
child's birth in all other cases;

            
(C) After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by 
another man may be determined in the same action if he has been made a 
party.

            
* * * *

            
(c) * * * Any man alleging that he is the natural father of a child 
having a presumed father under W.S. 14-2-102 may, within six (6) months of the 
child's birth or on or before December 31, 1994, whichever is later, bring an 
action under this section to declare his paternity of the child and accordingly 
rebut the presumption of a father and child relationship between the child and 
the presumed father. . . .

 

  
3I do note with 
interest that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-104 has been amended effective July 1, 
2000.  This statute, entitled 
"[c]hild support enforcement services generally," provides that the services 
provided by the DFS now include "[t]he establishment of paternity for out of 
wedlock children pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 et seq."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-104(a)(viii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).

 

  
4"Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (d) of this section, the court 
or the department of family services may require the child, mother or alleged 
father to submit to genetic tests for the purpose of establishing 
paternity."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-109(g) (LexisNexis 2001).