Case Title: Tovar-Mauricio v T.R. Driscoll, Inc

Citation: 

Docket Number: 9A14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-37 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 November 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Alamance County 
No. 11 CRS 57616 
FLOYD EDWARD MAY, SR. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 19 April 2012 by 
Judge Howard E. Manning in Alamance County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 23 May 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Teresa M. Postell, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for Defendant. 
 
 
DILLON, Judge. 
 
Floyd Edward May, Sr., (Defendant) appeals from judgment 
convicting him of one count of first-degree statutory rape.  We 
conclude that Defendant is entitled to a new trial because the 
State has failed to meet its burden to prove that the trial court’s 
error in charging a deadlocked jury in violation of N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 24 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
-2- 
 
 
Defendant is a divorced adult male in his mid-60’s living on 
social security disability.  Defendant has an adult son, Mike May.  
Mike May lives with his wife Shannon May and their two daughters, 
Beth and Tammy,1 in a mobile home park in Alamance County.  This 
case involves two episodes of Defendant’s alleged sexual abuse of 
Tammy, his younger granddaughter. 
For the better part of fourteen years, Defendant lived with 
his son’s family in their mobile home, sharing a bedroom with his 
older granddaughter Beth.  At some point, Defendant began sleeping 
in a playhouse/shed behind the mobile home.2  By 2011, Defendant 
moved in with a woman in another mobile home in the same park.  
The two alleged episodes between Defendant and Tammy forming 
the basis for the charges against Defendant occurred during the 
summer of 2011, when Tammy was ten years old.  Regarding the first 
episode, Tammy testified that she went into her older sister’s 
bedroom where Defendant was lying on a bed watching television.  
                     
1 Pursuant to N.C.R. App. 4(e), the minor children will be 
referenced with the use of pseudonyms, Beth and Tammy. 
2 Ms. May testified that she forced Defendant to move out of Beth’s 
bedroom and into the shed after she walked in on Defendant lying 
in the same bed with Beth, who was around thirteen years old at 
the time, with his legs “all the way around [Beth][,]” while they 
were watching television – an account which Defendant denied during 
his testimony.  In any case, Ms. May testified that she thought 
the “issue” was resolved and had no problem with her daughters 
continuing to spend time with Defendant. 
-3- 
 
 
Tammy lay down beside Defendant while the door to the bedroom was 
closed.  She testified that while they were watching television, 
Defendant “moved her shorts to the side and put his ‘wee-wee’ in 
[her] ‘moo-moo’3,”  and that Defendant also “stuck his wee-wee” in 
her mouth. 
The second episode occurred on 15 July 2011 in the swimming 
pool behind the mobile home.  Tammy testified that on that day, 
while she and Defendant were in the pool, Defendant moved her 
bathing suit to the side and put his “wee-wee” in her “moo-moo.”  
That same day, Tammy told her mother what Defendant had done to 
her.  Also, Tammy’s father confronted Defendant regarding Tammy’s 
allegations, which Defendant denied.4 
Later on 15 July 2013, Tammy’s parents took her to Alamance 
Regional Hospital where she was seen by Dr. Jade Sung.  Dr. Sung 
testified that Tammy told her about Defendant “vaginally 
penetrat[ing] her in the swimming pool.”  Dr. Sung examined Tammy 
and noted that Tammy had no inner-thigh bruising, no contusions on 
her external genitalia, no tears, rips, cuts or bleeding and “no 
                     
3 The evidence showed that Tammy was not allowed to use anatomical 
terms, but rather was taught to use the term “wee-wee” to describe 
the male sex organ and “moo-moo” for the female sex organ.  
4 The State offered evidence of a third episode involving improper 
sexual conduct by Defendant with Tammy which allegedly occurred in 
the playhouse/shed some time prior to the 15 July 2011 episode. 
-4- 
 
 
signs of physical assault.”  Dr. Sung testified that Tammy had 
some inflammation and irritation around her cervix, which could 
have been caused by a number of things such as chlorine.  Dr. Sung 
testified, in sum, that her physical examination of Tammy was 
“unremarkable.” 
The following day on 16 July 2011, Tammy was examined by nurse 
Rebecca Wheeler and two physicians at UNC Hospital.  Ms. Wheeler 
testified that Tammy told her that she had discomfort in her mid-
abdominal area and that Defendant had “put his thing in her moo-
moo.”5  She testified that their physical examination of Tammy 
revealed that she had a “normal” hymen and “no evident signs of 
physical assault.” 
On 8 September 2011, Tammy was seen by Dr. Dana Hagele at 
Crossroads, a child advocacy center in Alamance County.  Dr. Hagele 
testified that Tammy told her about all three episodes.  Dr. Hagele 
also conducted a physical exam of Tammy, an exam which she 
described as “completely unremarkable.” 
Deputy Bobby Baldwin testified that he interviewed Tammy in 
November 2011.  He stated that the account Tammy gave during the 
interview was consistent with her trial testimony, except in one 
                     
5 Tammy testified that she felt pain, which included a burning 
sensation when she attempted to use the bathroom after each of the 
three episodes.   
-5- 
 
 
regard.  Specifically, Deputy Baldwin testified that in the 
November 2011 interview, Tammy had stated that the first episode, 
which occurred in Beth’s bedroom, only consisted of Defendant 
putting his “wee wee” in her mouth, whereas during the trial, she 
testified that Defendant had also put his “wee wee” in her “moo 
moo.” 
On 31 October 2011, Defendant was indicted on two counts of 
first-degree statutory rape, one count of first-degree sexual 
offense of a child, and one count of indecent liberties with a 
child.  Defendant was tried on 16 April 2012 in Alamance County 
Superior Court.  At the close of evidence, the trial court 
dismissed the charge of indecent liberties with a child but 
submitted the other three charges to the jury. 
The trial court charged the jury three different times:   The 
first charge was given just before the jury began deliberations; 
the second charge was given after the jury had deliberated for 
about two hours, and after it had sent a written note to the trial 
court indicating that they “were deadlocked”; and the third charge 
was given when, after thirty more minutes of deliberation, the 
jury sent another written note to the trial court indicating that 
-6- 
 
 
“it is 10-2 and we are hopelessly deadlocked.”  In its third 
charge6, the trial court addressed the jury as follows: 
[Foreperson], you don’t need to sit down. I 
have you all’s note. And I’m going, in my 
discretion, I’m going to ask you to resume 
your deliberations for another half an hour. 
I’m not going to stretch it any farther than 
that, but I’m going to ask you to give it your 
best shot. And it’s your choice, not mine, but 
I’m not going to hot bond you, and we’re not 
going to make you to stay until 5 o’clock, but 
I’m going to ask you to go back and try again, 
remembering the instructions I gave you. And 
at 3:30 I’m going to ask you to come out, 
unless you’ve hit, hit the button and reached 
the decision prior to that. And that’s your 
choice. 
 
I mean, I can’t tell you what to do. I 
appreciate your note letting me know, but I’m 
going to ask you, since the people have so 
much invested in this, and we don’t want to 
have to redo it again, but anyway, if we have 
to we will. That’s not my call either. That 
doesn’t belong to me.  
 
I’ll ask you just to give us another half hour 
an hour and continue to deliberate with a view 
towards reaching an agreement if it can be 
done without violence to your individual 
judgment. As I said earlier, none of you 
should change your opinion if you, you know, 
if you feel like that’s what your conscience 
                     
6 This third charge, was, in essence, an Allen charge, named for 
the United States Supreme Court case Allen v. United States, 164 
U.S. 492, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896), in which the Court held that it 
was permissible under the Federal Constitution for a trial court 
to give certain instructions to a deadlocked jury for the purpose 
of encouraging the dissenting jurors to reconsider their position.  
A brief history regarding Allen charges can be found in our 
opinion, State v. Lamb, 44 N.C. App. 251, 261 S.E.2d 130 (1979). 
-7- 
 
 
dictates, you stick by it.  
 
So with that, I’m going to ask you to go back 
and continue. 
 
After this third charge, the jury deliberated for exactly thirty 
minutes, upon which it convicted Defendant of one count of first-
degree statutory rape based on the episode in Beth’s bedroom.  The 
jury, however, failed to reach a unanimous verdict as to the other 
two charges; and, accordingly, the trial court declared a mistrial 
as to those charges.  Based on the single conviction, the trial 
court sentenced Defendant to 230 to 285 months imprisonment. From 
this judgment, Defendant appeals.7 
II. Analysis 
On appeal, Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new 
trial because the trial court (A) coerced the jury’s guilty 
                     
7 Defendant was found guilty of first degree rape and judgment was 
entered on 19 April 2012.  On 30 April 2012, Defendant entered 
oral notice of appeal.  The trial court entered appellate entries 
and appointed the Appellate Defender.  N.C.R. App. P. 4(a)(1) and 
(a)(2) require that Defendant must appeal by “giving oral notice 
of appeal at trial,” or by “filing notice of appeal with the clerk 
of superior court and serving copies thereof upon all adverse 
parties within fourteen days after entry of the judgment[.]”  
Defendant did not comply with N.C.R. App. P. 4(a).  However, on 10 
January 2013, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari.  
The State does not oppose the granting of the writ, stating, in 
its response, that “the State respectfully submits that it is 
within this Court’s discretion to allow” the writ.  In any event, 
in our discretion, we grant Defendant’s petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
-8- 
 
 
verdict; (B) erroneously admitted inadmissible expert opinion 
evidence from State’s witnesses Dr. Dana Hagele and Ms. Rebecca 
Wheeler; and (C) erroneously allowed the State to offer evidence 
of “other crimes” allegedly committed by Defendant for which he 
was not indicted.  We address each argument in order below. 
A. 
Jury Instruction 
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because 
the trial court’s third charge to the jury was in violation of the 
standards established by our Legislature in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1235, and that these errors - when viewed in light of the totality 
of the circumstances – resulted in an unconstitutional coercion of 
“a hopelessly deadlocked” jury to return a guilty verdict, in 
violation of N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.  In our analysis, we must 
determine (a) whether the trial court committed error in its third 
charge; (b) if there was error, by what standard this Court is to 
conduct its review; and (c) whether, after applying this standard, 
the error warrants a new trial.  We conclude Defendant is entitled 
to a new trial. 
1. Did the Instruction Constitute Error? 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in that its third 
charge violated the standards adopted by our Legislature in N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235 in a number of respects.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
-9- 
 
 
15A-1235 was enacted in 1978 to serve as “the proper reference for 
standards applicable to charges which may be given a jury that is 
apparently unable to agree upon a verdict.”  State v. Easterling, 
300 N.C. 594, 608, 268 S.E.2d 800, 809 (1980) (citation omitted).  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(a) provides that a trial court must 
instruct a jury that a verdict must be unanimous.  Id.  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1235(b) provides a four-part instruction that a trial 
court may give regarding a juror’s obligations in reaching his 
individual verdict.  Id.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(c) provides 
for the instructions that may be given to a deadlocked jury as 
follows: 
If it appears to the judge that the jury has 
been unable to agree, the judge may require 
the jury to continue its deliberations and may 
give or repeat the instructions provided in 
subsections (a) and (b). The judge may not 
require or threaten to require the jury to 
deliberate for an unreasonable length of time 
or for unreasonable intervals. 
 
Id.  
We agree with Defendant that the trial court’s third charge 
violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235.  For instance, when the trial 
judge was informing the jury that he was requiring them to 
deliberate for an additional thirty minutes, he erred by stating,  
“I’m going to ask you, since the people have so much invested in 
this, and we don’t want to have to redo it again, but anyway, if 
-10- 
 
 
we have to we will.”  Our Courts have held that instructing a 
deadlocked jury regarding the time and expense associated with the 
trial and a possible retrial constitutes error.  See State v. 
Lipfird, 302 N.C. 391, 276 S.E.2d 161 (1981); State v. Easterling, 
300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980); see also State v. Pate, 187 
N.C. App. 442, 663 S.E.2d 212 (2007); State v. Burroughs, 147 N.C. 
App. 693, 556 S.E.2d 344 (2001); State v. Johnson, 80 N.C. App. 
311, 341 S.E.2d 776 (1993); State v. Lamb, 44 N.C. App. 251, 260, 
261 S.E.2d 130 (1979).  In Easterling, our Supreme Court noted 
that prior to the passage of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235 in 1978, 
“the general rule [was] that a trial judge may state to the jury 
the ills attendant upon disagreement including the resulting 
expense . . . and that the case will in all probability have to be 
tried by another jury in the event that the jury fails to agree.”  
Id. at 607, 268 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting State v. Alston, 294 N.C. 
577, 594, 243 S.E.2d 354, 365 (1977)).  The Court then stated that 
it was the Legislature’s intent, with the passage of N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1235 in 1978, that “a North Carolina jury may no longer 
be advised of the potential expense and inconvenience of retrying 
the case should the jury fail to agree.”  Id. at 608, 268 S.E.2d 
at 809. 
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Further, as argued by Defendant, we believe the trial court 
erred in referencing only a portion of the four-part instruction 
contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(b) during its third charge.  
Though, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(c), a trial court 
is not required to give a re-instruction under subsection (b) to 
a deadlocked jury; however, “[w]hen[] a trial judge gives a 
deadlocked jury any of the instructions authorized by N.C.G.S. § 
15A-1235(b), he must give them all.”  State v. Aikens, 342 N.C. 
567, 579, 467 S.E.2d 99, 106 (1996) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
2: What is the Appropriate Standard of Review? 
Having concluded that the trial court committed errors while 
giving its third charge to the jury, we must determine the proper 
standard by which this Court reviews those errors.  Both parties 
agree that the scope of our review is based on a “totality of 
circumstances.”   State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409, 416, 420 S.E.2d 
98, 101 (1992).  In other words, we do not simply review the 
allegedly offending statements in the charge in isolation; but 
rather, we review those statements in the context of the entire 
charge.  Alston, 294 N.C. at 593, 243 S.E.2d at 365 (stating that 
“the isolated mention of the expense and inconvenience of retrying 
a case does not warrant a new trial unless the charge as a whole 
-12- 
 
 
coerces a verdict”) (internal citation omitted).  However, the 
parties disagree as to the proper standard of appellate review.  
The State argues that the proper standard of review is plain error 
because Defendant failed to lodge any objection, or move for 
mistrial, in response to the trial court’s third charge to the 
jury.  Defendant argues, however, that, notwithstanding his 
failure to object at trial, the proper standard of review is 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because the errors 
violated his rights under the North Carolina Constitution. 
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 provides that “[n]o person shall be 
convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in 
open court.”  Id.  Our Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is well 
settled that Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of North 
Carolina prohibits a trial court from coercing a jury to return a 
verdict.”  Patterson, 332 N.C. at 415, 420 S.E.2d at 101. 
As the State argues, our Supreme Court has held that where a 
defendant has failed to object to an offending charge during the 
trial, any argument raised on appeal based on a violation of N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 24 of our State’s constitution is waived, and any 
argument based on a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235 is 
reviewed for plain error.  See Aikens, 342 N.C. at 578, 467 S.E.2d 
at 106 (1996) (stating that the “defendant[,] having failed to 
-13- 
 
 
object to the instruction, our review is to determine whether the 
error, if any, constituted plain error”).  In State v. Bussey, our 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Defendant’s sole assignment of error concerns 
the trial judge’s instructions and remarks to 
the jury following a report by it that it was 
deadlocked. 
 
Because 
defendant 
made 
no 
objection to the additional instructions or 
remarks by the trial judge, the plain error 
standard is applicable.  It is defendant’s 
contention that the judge coerced a guilty 
verdict, thereby violating defendant’s right 
to a fair trial and an impartial jury under 
both the federal and state constitutions and 
N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1232 and -1235.  Because 
defendant 
failed 
to 
raise 
the 
alleged 
constitutional issues before the trial court, 
he has waived these arguments, and they may 
not be raised for the first time in this Court.  
We turn then to the question of whether the 
trial 
court’s 
instructions 
and 
remarks 
constitute plain error under the applicable 
statute and decisions of this Court. 
 
321 N.C. 92, 97, 361 S.E.2d 564, 567 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 
In 2007, we reviewed an allegedly coercive charge based on a 
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235 for plain error in a case 
where a defendant failed to object when a trial judge charged a 
deadlocked jury concerning the time and expense of a retrial.  
Pate, 187 N.C. App. at 449, 653 S.E.2d at 217. 
In 2009, however, our Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile a 
failure to raise a constitutional issue at trial generally waives 
that issue for appeal, where the error violates the right to a 
-14- 
 
 
unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24, it is preserved 
for appeal without any action by counsel.”  State v. Wilson, 363 
N.C. 478, 484, 681 S.E.2d 325, 330 (2009).  The N.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 24 violation in Wilson, though, did not involve a coercive jury 
charge, but rather a situation where the trial judge instructed a 
single juror outside the presence of the other jurors. 
Defendant implicitly argues that the language employed by the 
Supreme Court in Wilson demonstrates that the Court intended that 
the scope of its ruling extend to all situations involving 
violations of N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.  For instance, the Supreme 
Court stated that it was basing its holding on the fact that “the 
right to a unanimous jury verdict is fundamental to our system of 
justice.”  Wilson, 363 N.C. at 486, 681 S.E.2d at 331 (citations 
omitted).  We note that it has long been the concern that a coerced 
jury verdict would result in “what really is a majority, rather 
than a unanimous, verdict.”  State v. McKissick, 268 N.C. 411, 
415, 150 S.E.2d 767, 770-71 (1966).  Further, the plain language 
used by the Supreme Court that “where the error violates the right 
to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24, it is 
preserved for appeal without any action by counsel” suggests that 
its rationale is to be applied to all Article I, Section 24 
violations.  Wilson, 363 N.C. at 484, 681 S.E.2d at 330. 
-15- 
 
 
On the other hand, there is language in Wilson which suggests 
that the Supreme Court intended the scope of its holding to be 
that N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 violations are automatically preserved 
only in the context of a trial court instructing fewer than all 
jurors, and not in the context of a coerced jury instruction given 
to the entire jury.  For instance, the following specific holding 
in Wilson is more limited that other language in the opinion: 
[W]e 
hold 
that 
where 
the 
trial 
court 
instructed a single juror in violation of 
defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict 
under Article I, Section 24, the error is 
deemed preserved for appeal notwithstanding 
defendant’s failure to object. 
 
Id. at 486, 681 S.E.2d at 331.  By arguing for a broad 
interpretation of Wilson, Defendant is effectively contending that 
the Supreme Court intended to overrule its prior holdings in Aiken, 
Bussey and Patterson - where our Supreme Court held that an 
argument based on N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 in the context of a trial 
court’s allegedly coercive charge to a fully empaneled jury was 
waived if not preserved by objection – without explicitly stating 
that this was its intent.  However, the Wilson Court cites a 
ruling, handed down two years prior to Patterson, which held that 
where a defendant failed to object when the trial court addressed 
the jury foreman outside the presence of the rest of the jury, 
“the error violates defendant’s right to a trial by a jury of 
-16- 
 
 
twelve, [and the] defendant’s failure to object is not fatal to 
his right to raise the question on appeal.”  State v. Ashe, 314 
N.C. 28, 39, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985). 
 
Neither party cites any Supreme Court opinion subsequent to 
Wilson in their arguments pertaining to the appropriate standard 
of review.  Further, we have found no case in which the Supreme 
Court clarified whether it intended for its rationale in Wilson to 
apply to all situations involving alleged N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 
violations – thus, effectively overruling Patterson, Bussey and 
Aiken – or whether it intended Wilson to apply only to N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 24 challenges involving a trial court speaking to fewer 
than all the members of the jury. 
 
Our Court, however, has held on at least two occasions that 
the rationale in Wilson does extend to situations involving a 
coercive charge to a fully empaneled jury.  Specifically, in State 
v. Blackwell, we held as follows: 
Defendant first contends that the trial judge 
coerced the jury into reaching a verdict in 
violation of his right to a unanimous jury 
verdict under Article I, Section 24 of the 
North Carolina Constitution.  As an initial 
matter, we note that although defendant failed 
to raise this issue at trial, this argument is 
nonetheless preserved for appellate review. 
 
__ N.C. App. __, __, 747 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2013) (relying on State 
v. Wilson, supra).  Likewise, in State v. Gillikin, our Court, 
-17- 
 
 
also relying on Wilson, applied a harmless error analysis to a 
challenge by the defendant that a “the trial court’s re-
instructions to a deadlocked jury did not contain the substance of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(b) and unconstitutionally coerced 
guilty verdicts in violation of Article I, Section 24 of the North 
Carolina Constitution[,]” notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant did not lodge an objection to the charge at trial.  __ 
N.C. App. __, __, 719 S.E.2d 164, 167 (2011).8  We are bound by 
these holdings, and, accordingly, will review the errors contained 
in the third charge for harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36-37 
(1989). 
3. Was the Error Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? 
The State “bears the burden of showing that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Wilson, 363 N.C. at 487, 681 
S.E.2d at 331.  In its brief, the State does not put forth any 
argument to meet its burden of demonstrating how the trial judge’s 
                     
8 Blackwell, from 2013, and Gillikin, from 2011, are both published 
opinions.  We note that in an unpublished 2012 opinion, our Court 
refused to extend the holding in Wilson and Ashe to an N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 24 challenge where a trial judge instructed a jury on 
alternate theories of a crime.  State v. Guy, __ N.C. App. __, 729 
S.E.2d 128 (2012) (COA12-197) (reviewing for plain error and 
explaining that “[t]he holdings of both Ashe and Wilson are 
narrow[;] [and] [w]e distinguish the facts of the present case and 
decline to extend the holdings of Ashe and Wilson”).     
-18- 
 
 
errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, the 
State contends that it “is not burdened with showing error, if 
any, was harmless (sic), where the alleged constitutional error is 
first raised on appeal, because such an argument is not properly 
raised on appeal.”  Accordingly, because the State has failed to 
meet its burden, we hold that Defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
In any event, after considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we do not believe the errors were harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Unlike many cases in which the courts have 
found error to be harmless, see, e.g., State v. Francis, 343 N.C. 
436, 471 S.E.2d 348 (1996) (holding an error was harmless in light 
of the “plenary” competent evidence of the defendant’s guilt of 
two murders, including testimony by defendant’s accomplice that 
defendant shot both victims and defendant’s own trial testimony 
admitting that he and the accomplice, with weapons, followed the 
victims into an alley where both victims were shot), the evidence 
in this case is not overwhelming.  There was no physical evidence 
suggesting Defendant committed statutory rape on a young girl.  
Rather, the only direct evidence was the testimony of the alleged 
victim.  Further, not only did the trial court fail to include all 
the elements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(b) in its third charge, 
it included a statement regarding the expense and inconvenience 
-19- 
 
 
associated with the trial and possible retrial, see, e.g., State 
v. Lipfird, 302 N.C. 391, 276 S.E.2d 161 (1981), and it imposed a 
30-minute time limit, which the jury was able to meet just in time 
to reach one guilty verdict, see, e.g., State v. Sutton, 31 N.C. 
App. 697, 702, 230 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1976) (stating that “the mere 
fact that a judge prescribes a time limit for the jury’s decision 
does not amount to coercion where the jury does not actually come 
to a decision within the general limits imposed by the judge”).9 
B. 
Expert Witnesses 
Having ordered a new trial for Defendant, we need not address 
Defendant’s remaining arguments.  However, we address those 
arguments as they may arise in a re-trial. 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error 
by allowing the expert testimony of Dr. Dana Hagele and UNC 
Hospital nurse Ms. Rebecca Wheeler.10  Specifically, Defendant 
argues that Dr. Hagele and Ms. Wheeler’s testimony included 
impermissible opinion evidence that Tammy had, in fact, been 
sexually abused.  We disagree. 
                     
9 Defendant advances a number of other arguments as to why the 
trial court’s errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
However, we do not address the merit of these arguments since the 
State failed to meet its burden. 
10 Defendant did not lodge an objection at trial to the experts’ 
testimony as it pertained to the issue now presented on appeal. 
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This Court has well established that “[e]xpert opinion 
testimony is not admissible to establish the credibility of the 
victim as a witness.”  State v. Dixon, 150 N.C. App. 46, 52, 563 
S.E.2d 594, 598, aff’d, 356 N.C. 428, 571 S.E.2d 584 (2002).  
Furthermore, in prosecutions of a sexual offense involving a child 
victim, our Supreme Court has found that “the trial court should 
not admit expert opinion that sexual abuse has in fact occurred 
because, absent physical evidence supporting a diagnosis of sexual 
abuse, such testimony is an impermissible opinion regarding the 
victim’s credibility.”  State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266, 559 S.E.2d 
788, 789 (2002).  Thus, “[t]estimony that a child has been 
‘sexually abused’ based solely on interviews with the child are 
improper.”  State v. Grover, 142 N.C. App. 411, 419, 543 S.E.2d 
179, 183, aff’d, 354 N.C. 354, 553 S.E.2d 679 (2001) (citation 
omitted). 
“However, an expert witness may testify, upon a proper 
foundation, as to the profiles of sexually abused children and 
whether a particular complainant has symptoms or characteristics 
consistent therewith.”  Stancil, 355 N.C. at 267, 559 S.E.2d at 
789.  “The nature of the experts’ jobs and the experience which 
they possess make them better qualified than the jury to form an 
opinion as to the characteristics of abused children.”  Grover, 
-21- 
 
 
142 N.C. App. at 419, 543 S.E.2d at 184.  “Thus, while it is 
impermissible for an expert, in the absence of physical evidence, 
to testify that a child has been sexually abused, it is permissible 
for an expert to testify that a child exhibits ‘characteristics 
[consistent with] abused children.’”  Id. (alterations in 
original). 
1. Testimony of Dr. Dana Hagele 
At trial, Dr. Hagele, a pediatrician that specializes in child 
abuse pediatrics, testified regarding her medical interview and 
physical examination of Tammy at Crossroads on 8 September 2011.  
Defendant contends that Dr. Hagele’s testimony amounted to her 
expert opinion that sexual abuse had in fact occurred. Defendant 
relies on a number of decisions including State v. Ryan, __ N.C. 
App. __, 734 S.E.2d 598 (2012), disc. review denied, __ N.C. __, 
736 S.E.2d 189 (2013), State v. Towe, __ N.C. __, 732 S.E.2d 564 
(2012), State v. Ewell, 168 N.C. App. 98, 606 S.E.2d 914, disc. 
review denied, 359 N.C. 412, 612 S.E.2d 326 (2005), and State v. 
Couser, 163 N.C. App. 727, 594 S.E.2d 420 (2004), for this 
contention.  However, we believe these cases are distinguishable 
because Dr. Hagele never stated that Tammy was, in fact, the victim 
of sexual abuse or attempted to make conclusions or a diagnosis as 
to such.  Instead, Dr. Hagele testified to her experience and 
-22- 
 
 
knowledge regarding sexually abused children and her medical 
interview and physical examination of Tammy, along with an 
explanation of the procedures she followed for Tammy’s examination 
and treatment.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did 
not err, much less commit plain error, by admitting her testimony 
regarding her experience and professional expertise concerning 
sexually abused children and whether Tammy exhibited “symptoms or 
characteristics consistent therewith.”  Stancil, 355 N.C. at 267, 
559 S.E.2d at 789. 
2. Testimony of Ms. Rebecca Wheeler 
At trial, Ms. Wheeler, a registered nurse with a specialty in 
pediatric 
sexual 
assault 
examination, 
testified 
that 
she 
physically examined Tammy on 16 July 2011 for possible sexual 
assault injuries, but the examination showed no signs of assault.   
Defendant contends that Ms. Wheeler’s testimony, like that of 
Dr. Hagele, amounted to opinion evidence that sexual abuse had in 
fact occurred.  Defendant specifically objects to Ms. Wheeler’s 
use of the phrases, “it had happened[,]” and, “it occurred[,]” 
when responding to a question concerning the amount of time that 
had lapsed between the alleged assault and the medical examination.  
However, like Dr. Hagele, at no time during her testimony did 
Ms. Wheeler state that Tammy was the victim of sexual abuse or 
-23- 
 
 
attempt to make conclusions or a diagnosis as to such.  Ms. Wheeler 
merely testified as to her examination procedures, her experience 
and knowledge of “the profiles of sexually abused children[,]” and 
whether Tammy “ha[d] symptoms or characteristics consistent 
therewith.”  Stancil, 355 N.C. at 267, 559 S.E.2d at 789.  
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err, much less 
commit plain error, in admitting Ms. Wheeler’s testimony as it did 
not include impermissible opinion testimony that Tammy had, in 
fact, been sexually abused. 
C. 
Admission of “Other Crimes” Evidence 
 
Finally, Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
plain error11 by admitting the State’s “other crimes” evidence 
regarding Defendant’s uncharged alleged sexual conduct involving 
Tammy in the playhouse/shed and involving her sister, Beth, in 
Beth’s bedroom.  Specifically, Defendant claims this evidence was 
irrelevant and inadmissible under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rules 
401-404.  We disagree. 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, 404(b) (2011) states the following: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
                     
11 Defendant did not lodge any objection to the “other crimes” 
testimony at trial. 
-24- 
 
 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake, entrapment or accident. 
 
Id.  “[O]ur courts have been markedly liberal in admitting evidence 
of similar sex offenses by a defendant for the purposes now 
enumerated in Rule 404(b)[.]”  State v. Summers, 177 N.C. App. 
691, 696, 629 S.E.2d 902, 906, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 653, 
637 S.E.2d 192 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
Moreover, “evidence of prior incidents is admissible to show, inter 
alia, motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, and common plan or 
scheme if the incidents are sufficiently similar and not so remote 
in time as to be more probative than prejudicial under the 
balancing test of Evidence Code Rule 403.”  State v. Stevenson, 
169 N.C. App. 797, 798, 611 S.E.2d 206, 208 (2005) (citation 
omitted).  In Summers, we stated the following: 
[E]vidence of another crime is admissible to 
prove a common plan or scheme to commit the 
offense charged. But, the two acts must be 
sufficiently similar as to logically establish 
a common plan or scheme to commit the offense 
charged, not merely to show the defendant’s 
character or propensity to commit a like 
crime. 
 
Id. at 697, 629 S.E.2d at 907 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  “Remoteness in time [between the other crimes and the 
current charges] generally goes to the weight of the evidence not 
its admissibility.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
-25- 
 
 
“Once the trial court determines evidence is properly 
admissible under Rule 404(b), it must still determine if the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.”  State v. Bidgood, 144 N.C. App. 267, 
272, 550 S.E.2d 198, 202, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 222, 554 S.E.2d 
647 (2001) (citation omitted).  North Carolina Rule of Evidence 
403 states, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2011).  “That determination is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will 
be reversed on appeal only when it is shown that the ruling was so 
arbitrary that it could not have resulted from a reasoned 
decision.”  Bidgood, 144 N.C. App. at 272, 550 S.E.2d at 202 
(citation omitted). 
This Court has stated:  
Although not enumerated in Rule 404(b) itself, 
evidence may also be admitted to establish a 
chain of circumstances leading up to the crime 
charged: 
 
Evidence, not part of the crime charged but 
pertaining to the chain of events explaining 
the context, motive and set-up of the crime, 
is properly admitted if linked in time and 
circumstances with the charged crime, or [if 
it] forms an integral and natural part of an 
account of the crime, or is necessary to 
-26- 
 
 
complete the story of the crime for the jury. 
 
State v. Smith, 152 N.C. App. 29, 34-35, 566 S.E.2d 793, 798, cert. 
denied, 356 N.C. 311, 571 S.E.2d 208 (2002) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
We find no error in the testimony by Tammy’s parents regarding 
Defendant’s alleged conduct involving Beth in her bedroom.  This 
testimony established the time period during which Defendant lived 
with the family, and the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s 
move from Beth’s bedroom to the playhouse/shed.  This testimony 
“pertained to the chain of events explaining the context . . . and 
set-up of the crime[]” and it was “linked in time and circumstances 
with the charged crime[.]”  Id. at 35, 566 S.E.2d at 798 (citation 
omitted). 
Further, we find no error regarding the admission of the 
testimony about the alleged episode involving Defendant and Tammy 
in the playhouse/shed.  This incident happened during the same 
summer as the charged offenses.  In both the alleged conduct in 
the playhouse/shed and the charged conduct, Defendant and Tammy 
lay down together in his bed to watch television when Defendant 
allegedly sexually abused her.  In both the alleged and charged 
conduct, Tammy testified that Defendant moved her shorts to the 
side to penetrate her.  In both the alleged and charged conduct, 
-27- 
 
 
Tammy testified that the penetration hurt and that it made her 
urine burn. 
Because the alleged conduct in the playhouse/shed and the 
charged conduct were not too remote in time and sufficiently 
similar, and because this Court takes an approach that is 
“‘markedly liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex offenses 
by a defendant for the purposes now enumerated in Rule 404(b)[,]’” 
we believe that the testimony of the three witnesses regarding the 
alleged conduct in the playhouse/shed was admissible under Rule 
404(b).  Summers, 177 N.C. App. at 696, 629 S.E.2d at 906 (citation 
omitted).  Moreover, the determination of whether the evidence 
failed the test in Rule 403 “is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court[,]” and we do not find a sufficient showing “that the 
ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have resulted from a 
reasoned decision” in order to reverse the trial court.  Bidgood, 
144 N.C. App. at 272, 550 S.E.2d at 202 (citation omitted).  As 
such, we do not believe the admission of the foregoing evidence 
constituted error, much less plain error. 
III. Conclusion 
The trial court’s third charge to the jury did not follow the 
guidelines set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235.  Defendant 
argues that these errors coerced the deadlocked jury into returning 
-28- 
 
 
a guilty verdict against him, in violation of his right to a 
unanimous jury verdict under N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.  The State 
has failed to meet its burden of proving that these errors were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, Defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
NEW TRIAL 
Judge ELMORE and Judge GEER concur.