Case Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Marzocco

Citation: 1997-Ohio-385

Docket Number: 19962434

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. MARZOCCO. 
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Marzocco (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 186.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — Engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice — Engaging in conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Charging or collecting an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee. 
(No. 96-2434 — Submitted April 15, 1997 — Decided July 16, 1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-02. 
 
On February 5, 1996, relator, Dayton Bar Association, filed a complaint 
against respondent, Ralph L. Marzocco of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0020072, alleging in one count that by failing to comply with a  court order 
and failing to make payment under the terms of a settlement agreement, 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely 
reflecting on his fitness to practice law), and 1-102(A)(1) (violating a Disciplinary 
Rule).  In another count relator charged that by demanding that a trust, from which 
he had resigned, pay him trustee compensation and legal fees, respondent violated 
DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5), and (6), and 2-106(A) and (B) (charging or collecting an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee). 
 
After respondent filed an answer, a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) heard the matter.  The 
respondent appeared briefly before the panel, objected to the introduction of a 
videotaped deposition, and then left the hearing room. 
 
2
 
The panel, after receiving evidence, found that in May 1980, respondent had 
prepared a revocable living trust for Ellen Bolling and designated himself as 
trustee.  In 1993, relator filed a disciplinary action against respondent because of 
irregularities in his administration of the trust and his handling of a patent 
application for another client.  On December 23, 1994, we indefinitely suspended 
respondent from the practice of law.  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Marzocco (1994), 71 
Ohio St.3d 306, 643 N.E.2d 1079. 
 
The panel found  that also in 1993, concurrently with the disciplinary action 
that resulted in respondent’s indefinite suspension, the guardian of Bolling 
brought an action in common pleas court to remove respondent as trustee, and for 
compensatory and punitive damages resulting from breach of fiduciary duty, legal 
malpractice, conversion, and fraud in respondent’s administration of the trust.  The 
guardian’s suit was settled by an agreed entry involving respondent’s resignation 
as trustee and his promise to pay $33,500 to the trust no later than December 24, 
1993.  Respondent did not pay the sum as agreed, and judgment was entered 
against him in April 1994.  In February 1994, two months prior to the judgment, 
respondent transferred his real estate to his wife for no consideration, thereby 
requiring the successor trustee to file suit against respondent to set aside the 
conveyance. 
 
The panel found that on March 20, 1995, the Kettering Municipal Court 
dismissed with prejudice respondent’s suit to recover $5,600 in attorney fees, 
which respondent incurred in defending the action to remove him as trustee.  On 
September 8, 1995, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the municipal 
court and termed respondent’s claim for attorney fees as “absurd.”  Marzocco v. 
Titus (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 112, 665 N.E.2d 294. 
 
3
 
On June 30, 1995, respondent filed another action in the same municipal 
court against the trust seeking approximately $4,000 in unpaid trustee fees, and the 
municipal court dismissed this action on December 4, 1995, calling the suit 
“totally frivolous and without merit.”  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, 
and noted that “the absurdly unprofessional management of the trust represented 
by [the trust] making an unsecured loan of the entire trust corpus to Marzocco’s 
brother, without, apparently, any expectation of the payment of interest or 
principal on a regular basis, cannot possibly justify the recovery of a fee.  Gilding 
the lily is Marzocco’s admission that he did nothing to justify a fee beyond the 
mere insertion of new figures and dates in the successive promissory notes signed 
by his brother.”  Marzocco v. Titus (July 26, 1996), Montgomery App. No. 15747, 
unreported, 1996 WL 417001.  As a result of these lawsuits, which the panel 
found to be “generally scurrilous and without merit,” the successor trustee 
incurred obligations for attorney fees of $26,600. 
 
The panel concluded that by failing to obey a court order and failing to pay 
the settlement agreement, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5), and (6).  
The panel further concluded that respondent’s actions to recover attorney and 
trustee fees violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5),and (6), and 2-106(A) and (B). 
 
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions, noted that 
the panel had characterized respondent’s actions as “grossly unethical and clearly 
an abuse of the legal process,” and recommended that respondent be permanently 
disbarred. 
___________________ 
 
Edward J. Dowd, for relator. 
 
Ralph L. Marzocco, pro se. 
___________________ 
 
4
 
Per Curiam.  We have reviewed the record and adopt the findings of the 
board.  We previously suspended respondent from the practice of law for his 
failure to act properly in the administration of a trust.  To settle a suit for damages 
which arose out of his improper administration, respondent signed an agreed order 
that required him to pay $33,500 to the successor trustee.  Respondent not only 
failed to make the payments as ordered, but prior to judgment being entered 
against him, conveyed significant assets to his wife.  Respondent’s refusal to obey 
a court order and his apparent attempt to transfer property to evade the effect of a 
judgment combined with his previous disciplinary record reflect a pattern of 
misconduct that demonstrates respondent’s unfitness to continue as a member of 
the bar.  See Florida Bar v. Rood (Fla.1993), 620 So.2d 1252.  Like the board, we 
conclude that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5), and (6), by failing to 
pay the judgment as ordered which he, himself, agreed to and by attempting to put 
his assets beyond the reach of his creditors. 
 
In addition, respondent applied both for legal fees incurred in defending 
himself pro se from the action to remove him as trustee and for unpaid trustee fees 
for his minimal work in making trust loans to his brother.  The court of appeals 
aptly noted that respondent’s requests for fees from the trust to defend his own 
personal interests “raises chutzpah [defined by the court as ‘unmitigated effrontery 
or impudence’] to a new and astonishing level.”  Marzocco v. Titus (1995), 106 
Ohio App.3d 113, 665 N.E.2d 294.  Our Disciplinary Rules prohibit the collection 
of clearly excessive fees.  Respondent’s attempts to charge the trust for 
unsuccessfully defending himself from charges of malfeasance and for minimal 
work as trustee are violations of DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5),and (6), and 2-106(A) 
and (B). 
 
5
 
We adopt the recommendation of the board.  Respondent is permanently 
disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to the respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.