Case Title: Commonwealth v. Velez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11503 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  IDELFONSO VELEZ. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 6, 2017. - May 11, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, New trial, 
Capital case.  Insanity.  Mental Impairment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 30, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on August 6, 2014, was heard by 
Kimberly S. Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph T. 
Gentile, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Idelfonso 
Velez, of two counts of murder in the first degree for the 
deaths of Angel Ortiz and Trisha Bennett.  Each conviction was 
based on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
2 
 
 
cruelty.  Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant 
moved for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for pursuing an impracticable third-party culprit 
defense, rather than lack of criminal responsibility or mental 
impairment defenses based on the defendant's record of mental 
health problems and substance use.  The defendant appeals from 
his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial.  We vacate the denial of his motion for a new trial and 
remand the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  In April, 2010, Ortiz and 
Bennett, who were boy friend and girl friend, were living in a 
two-bedroom apartment with Bennett's two year old daughter.  
Ortiz and the defendant were friends, and the defendant had 
previously stayed overnight at the apartment. 
On the evening of April 30, 2010, the defendant was again 
staying overnight at the apartment.  At 3:31 A.M. on May 1, 
2010, the defendant telephoned 911 from Bennett's cellular 
telephone and reported a home invasion.  The defendant told the 
dispatcher that masked men had entered the apartment he was in 
and had stabbed him and his friends.1 
                     
 
1 Between 2:10 and 2:35 A.M., one of the tenants in the 
apartment below Ortiz and Bennett's was bothered by the sound of 
Ortiz and Bennett's washing machine.  Between 2:30 and 2:40 
A.M., that tenant heard a woman's loud scream.  The screaming 
3 
 
 
 
At 3:40 A.M., police officers arrived at Ortiz and 
Bennett's apartment building.  The entryway to the building was 
locked and could only be opened by someone with a key or by a 
resident responding to the doorbell by remotely unlocking, i.e., 
"buzzing" open, the door.  Officers pressed many buzzers until a 
tenant responded and allowed the door to be opened.  Upon 
locating Ortiz and Bennett's apartment, officers found the door 
ajar but saw no sign of damage to the door, lock, or handle.  In 
the apartment, police found a knife and towels in the kitchen 
sink, both with blood on them.  There was blood in the bathroom.  
A vase on the floor and a mirror and a photograph hanging on the 
wall in the hallway appeared undisturbed. 
 
Ortiz and Bennett's bodies were found in the main bedroom.  
Ortiz's body was at the foot of the bed with a comforter tightly 
wrapped around his head.  He had blunt-force injuries to his 
head and an arm and sharp-force injuries to his neck and torso 
and an arm.2  He died from an approximately four and one-half 
                                                                  
continued intermittently for ten to twenty minutes; a woman's 
voice once screamed the word "stop."  At the same time, the 
tenant heard footsteps coming from Ortiz and Bennett's 
apartment.  The footsteps continued after the screaming stopped.  
By 3:13 A.M. the screaming had stopped and the tenant heard 
"words as if a child were having a temper tantrum on the floor."  
The tenant did not telephone the police. 
 
 
2 According to the medical examiner's testimony, a sharp-
force injury is something that has a sharp edge and penetrates 
the body.  Sharp-force injuries are categorized as stab wounds 
or incisions.  A stab wound is a wound that is deeper into the 
4 
 
 
inch deep stab wound to his neck.  Bennett's body was on the 
other side of the room, between the bed and a wall.  She had 
twenty-four sharp-force injuries and died from two stab wounds 
to her neck, either of which alone would have been fatal.  She 
also had blunt-force injuries to her body.  The medical examiner 
testified that Ortiz and Bennett had each experienced pain 
before dying. 
 
In the main bedroom, police found three bloody footprints 
on the bed.  Two were matched to the defendant's footprint, but 
one footprint was never identified.  In the other bedroom, where 
Bennett's daughter usually stayed and where the defendant was to 
sleep that night, there was a computer displaying a pornographic 
Web site.  The computer had been used to view pornography 
between 2:42 and 2:51 A.M. 
 
Officers found the defendant lying on the ground outside 
the building in a fetal position.  He did not respond to 
officers' attempts to communicate, although he seemed conscious 
and alert.  The defendant was wounded on his knee, abdomen, 
forearm, and fingers.  Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) 
arrived and tended to his injuries, eventually moving him to the 
back of a parked ambulance.  While the defendant was being 
                                                                  
body than it is long on the skin's surface.  An incision is the 
opposite:  a wound that is longer on the skin's surface than it 
is deep into the body.  A blunt-force injury occurs when the 
body is struck by an object with a blunted surface, usually 
causing bruises or fractures. 
5 
 
 
treated, he began to get upset and call out someone's name, 
possibly calling out for Ortiz.3  The defendant became more 
physically agitated until a police officer got into the 
ambulance and restrained one of the defendant's legs.  After the 
defendant calmed down, he was transported to a hospital. 
 
b.  The defendant's statements to police.  The same police 
officer who had restrained the defendant's leg rode in the 
ambulance with the defendant and found him to be calm.  The 
officer asked the defendant what happened.  The defendant 
reported drinking beer and using cocaine throughout the evening.  
According to the defendant, he went to sleep in Bennett's 
daughter's bedroom and was awoken by sounds of a struggle in 
Ortiz and Bennett's bedroom.  In that room, he saw Ortiz gasping 
for air while a man stood over him with a knife.  The defendant 
described the man's clothing but could not give any other 
information about him.  After the officer repeated the 
defendant's statement to him, the defendant said that there were 
two men in the room, although only one was holding a knife, and 
that the men must have been waiting for the defendant.  The 
officer asked the defendant to describe the knife; in response 
the defendant put up his hands approximately ten to twelve 
                     
 
3 One officer at the scene testified that the defendant was 
calling out the name "Pluto" or "Flito," but stated that he was 
not sure what the defendant was saying because the officer could 
not understand the defendant.  Ortiz was known by the nickname 
"Filto" to his friends. 
6 
 
 
inches apart, which the officer understood to mean was the 
length of the knife.  The defendant explained that he struggled 
with both of the men, that the man with the knife stabbed him in 
the stomach, and that the defendant continued to fight for the 
knife. 
 
They arrived at the hospital, and the defendant was treated 
for his wounds.  A urine toxicology test was presumptively 
positive for cocaine metabolite and showed that the defendant 
had a serum alcohol level of ninety-six milligrams per 
deciliter, roughly equivalent to a blood alcohol level of 0.096, 
when the sample was taken at 4:32 A.M. 
 
That same day, in the hospital, more police officers spoke 
with the defendant.  The defendant asked if Bennett and Ortiz 
were alive.  The defendant told police that he had been lying 
down in the "kid's room" when he heard Bennett sounding 
distressed and saying, "Baby, baby, baby."  He went to Ortiz and 
Bennett's bedroom and saw both of them bleeding on the floor.  
He was attacked by someone with a knife and tried to defend 
himself.  He saw another person run out of the apartment.  Both 
of these people had their faces covered. 
 
At approximately 11:30 A.M., after he was discharged from 
the hospital, the defendant accompanied officers to the police 
station.  The defendant told officers that after being dropped 
off, Bennett used the buzzer system to allow the defendant 
7 
 
 
access to the building and then allowed him into the apartment.  
The defendant believed both Bennett and Ortiz went to sleep.  
The defendant smoked a cigarette and drank a beer.  At 
approximately 2 A.M., the defendant went into the "kid's room," 
removed his sneakers, and watched pornography for about ten 
minutes.  Then he heard footsteps in the hallway and heard 
Bennett yell, "Baby, baby, baby."  He put on his sneakers and 
looked into Bennett and Ortiz's room.  The defendant saw Ortiz 
lying in a pool of blood and someone standing over Bennett.  The 
person standing over Bennet had a shirt pulled over his head, 
obscuring his face.  The defendant made eye contact with the man 
standing over Bennett and heard someone in the bedroom closet.  
Someone ran out of the bedroom from the closet area wearing a 
hooded sweatshirt pulled around his face so that only his eyes 
were visible.  That person ran toward the defendant and then out 
of the apartment.  The person standing over Bennett then 
attacked the defendant with a knife.  The defendant tried to 
defend himself as the man with the knife attacked him in the 
hallway.  The assailant dropped the knife, ran down the hallway, 
and left the apartment. 
 
The defendant picked up the knife for protection in case 
the intruders returned.  He cleaned his wounds in the bathroom 
and returned to check on Bennett and Ortiz.  He found Ortiz 
lying in a pool of blood, making gasping and gurgling sounds.  
8 
 
 
The sounds made the defendant feel sick so he put the comforter 
over Ortiz.  The defendant went to the kitchen to further wash 
his wounds and placed the knife in a towel in the kitchen sink. 
 
The defendant searched the closet in the victims' bedroom 
for something to create a tourniquet around a wound on his arm.  
He sought a cellular telephone because he believed his own 
telephone was not working.  He searched drawers and Bennett's 
purse until he found her telephone.  The defendant then returned 
to the kitchen and tried to light a cigarette, but he had too 
much blood on his hands so the lighter became clogged.  The 
defendant consumed some of a beer that was on the dining room 
table.  He telephoned 911, left the apartment, and lost 
consciousness outside.  At this point in the conversation, the 
police took a break from interviewing the defendant. 
 
After returning from the break, the defendant reiterated 
his earlier statements with some alterations.  The defendant was 
"really, really scared" and wanted to leave the police station 
to go to Pennsylvania.  At the conclusion of the interview, the 
defendant left the police station.  He was indicted 
approximately five months later on September 30, 2010. 
 
The defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to 
the police on the day of the homicides, arguing that the 
statements were involuntary and therefore inadmissible because 
the defendant had preexisting mental health conditions, had 
9 
 
 
ingested cocaine and alcohol that exacerbated those conditions, 
had received narcotics for pain in the emergency room, and was 
deprived of sleep. 
 
In support of his argument at the hearing on the motion, 
the defendant introduced the testimony of a clinical and 
forensic psychologist who had examined the defendant's records 
and concluded that the defendant could not have knowingly waived 
his rights or made voluntary statements to the police.  The 
defendant also introduced records of his mental health treatment 
and diagnoses. 
 
The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of an EMT who 
treated the defendant and transported him to the hospital, five 
police officers who interviewed or interacted with the 
defendant, and an emergency department physician who treated the 
defendant.  All testified that the defendant appeared coherent 
on the day of the homicides and when speaking with police. 
 
The motion judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress, 
crediting the defense expert's opinion that the defendant was 
"suffering from a serious mental illness and was not taking his 
medication at the time of this incident," but concluding that he 
was able to knowingly waive his Miranda rights.4 
 
c.  Third-party culprit defense.  At trial, in his opening 
statement and in his closing argument, defense counsel argued 
                     
 
4 The defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
10 
 
 
that a third-party culprit, Jonathan Gonzales, was responsible 
for the homicides.  Gonzales is the father of Bennett's daughter 
and was Ortiz's friend until the two became estranged.  Defense 
counsel explained in his opening statement that Gonzales had the 
following motives:  (1) Bennett stopped dating Gonzales to date 
Ortiz; (2) Ortiz stole $10,000 from Gonzales; and (3) Ortiz was 
violent toward Bennett.  In 2009, when Gonzales was 
incarcerated, he told his and Bennett's mutual friend, Shannon 
Begg, that he wanted to hire someone to kill Ortiz.  After the 
homicides, Gonzales told Begg, "Fuck you all.  I did it.  And 
fuck you all." 
 
The Commonwealth disputed this defense through direct 
examination of Gonzales.  He denied killing Ortiz and Bennett or 
hiring others to do so.  He testified that he made the 
inculpatory statement to Begg because he was very frustrated 
after the homicides that people suspected his involvement.  
Gonzales also accounted for his whereabouts throughout the 
evening of the homicides.  The Commonwealth corroborated this 
with testimony from four witnesses, security camera video 
footage, and telephone records.  Defense counsel questioned 
Gonzales about his involvement on cross-examination, but 
introduced no defense witnesses to support a theory that 
Gonzales was the third-party culprit. 
11 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant appeals from his convictions 
and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing in 
both that trial counsel was ineffective for advancing a third-
party culprit defense instead of pursuing defenses based on the 
defendant's mental health or intoxication.  He also urges us to 
exercise our power, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set 
aside the verdicts or reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
When a defendant alleges that his attorney committed a 
strategic error, as the defendant does on appeal and in his 
motion for a new trial, we consider whether trial counsel's 
tactical choice was manifestly unreasonable at the time the 
choice was made.  Commonwealth v. Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 611-
612 (2008).  Where trial counsel's tactic was manifestly 
unreasonable, his representation is ineffective if it created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
A strategy is manifestly unreasonable if "lawyers of 
ordinary training and skill in the criminal law would [not] 
consider [it] competent" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017).  The defendant argues that it was manifestly 
unreasonable to pursue a third-party culprit defense and forsake 
any argument that the defendant was not criminally responsible 
12 
 
 
or could not form the requisite mental state as a result of a 
mental impairment.  The defendant contends that his lengthy 
history of mental illness and consumption of alcohol and cocaine 
prior to the homicides support such defenses.5 
 
The Commonwealth alleges that counsel chose to pursue a 
third-party culprit defense after losing the motion to suppress 
because, presumably, counsel wanted to avoid tainting the 
defendant's credibility by pursuing a defense that was 
inconsistent with the defendant's statements.6  However, on two 
occasions before the motion to suppress was denied, counsel told 
the judge that he would not be pursuing lack of criminal 
                     
 
5 Had trial counsel presented a defense based on the 
defendant's mental health and substance use, such a defense 
could have been one of a lack of criminal responsibility, see 
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 548-555 (1967), or of 
mental impairment, see Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 
680-683 (1980).  A successful defense resulting in a verdict of 
not guilty for lack of criminal responsibility would have 
demonstrated that the defendant lacked "substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law" 
(citation omitted; brackets in original).  McHoul, supra at 547.  
A successful defense of mental impairment, resulting in a 
conviction of a lesser charge, would have proved that "an 
abnormal mental condition negate[d] [the defendant's] capacity 
to form a specific intent or his ability to make a decision in a 
normal manner."  Commonwealth v. Urrea, 443 Mass. 530, 535 
(2005).  The defendant would have had to prove that he lacked 
the mental capacity to engage in premeditation and that he was 
unable to appreciate that his acts were extremely atrocious or 
cruel and to stop committing those acts.  Id. 
 
 
6 The defendant accepted this assumption during the motion 
for a new trial and on appeal, apparently unaware that counsel 
had made this choice before the motion to suppress was denied. 
13 
 
 
responsibility or mental impairment defenses.7  On the first 
occasion, two weeks after the conclusion of the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, counsel informed the judge that he was 
waiving any mental health defense.  On the second occasion, 
nearly two months later, and still before the motion to suppress 
was decided, counsel again assured the judge that he was not 
pursuing defenses based on the defendant's mental health or 
substance use. 
 
To determine whether this was a reasonable strategic choice 
at the time it was made, it is necessary to understand counsel's 
reasoning at the time he informed the judge that he would not 
pursue lack of criminal responsibility or mental impairment 
defenses.  See Almeida, 452 Mass. at 612; Commonwealth v. 
Coonan, 428 Mass. 823, 827 (1999) (we assess if counsel's 
decisions were reasonable "when made").  In support of the 
motion for a new trial, the defendant submitted the psychiatric 
records that had been introduced at the motion to suppress and 
additional psychiatric records.  The defendant argued that his 
history of schizoaffective disorder and his substance use prior 
to the homicides supported defenses of lack of criminal 
                     
 
7 The record did not include a transcript of the events in 
court in which defense counsel made these statements.  In our 
effort to discern why trial counsel chose this strategy and 
fulfil our responsibility under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we ordered 
transcriptions of the status conference and hearing on the 
motion to continue and learned of defense counsel's statements. 
14 
 
 
responsibility and mental impairment.  The defendant also 
submitted an affidavit stating that after the motion to suppress 
had been denied, trial counsel told him that counsel would 
pursue a third-party culprit defense.8  The defendant did not 
submit an affidavit from trial counsel, however, and the 
defendant's affidavit does not explain defense counsel's 
reasoning at the time he waived lack of criminal responsibility 
and mental impairment defenses. 
 
The defendant requested an evidentiary hearing.  The motion 
judge denied the request, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) 
(3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) ("The judge may on 
rule on the issue or issues presented by such motion on the 
basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without further 
hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or 
affidavits").  To determine whether a "substantial issue" has 
been raised, we consider the seriousness of the deficiency 
asserted and the adequacy of the defendant's showing.  
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257-258 (1981).  A 
credible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is serious 
and, when a sufficient showing is made, may merit an evidentiary 
hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Licata, 412 Mass. 654, 660-663 
                     
 
8 This could not be the reason trial counsel did not pursue 
lack of criminal responsibility or mental impairment defenses.  
As we noted, defense counsel told the judge before the motion to 
suppress statements was denied that he would not be pursuing 
such defenses. 
15 
 
 
(1992).  Often, affidavits alone suffice to determine the 
necessity of an evidentiary hearing.  Here, however, when we 
consider the affidavits that were submitted to the motion judge, 
the transcripts that were not originally included in the record 
or submitted to the motion judge, and the defendant's mental 
health records, we perceive inconsistencies that merit a closer 
look.  Trial counsel's decision to pursue a third-party culprit 
defense may have been a sound strategic choice or the choice 
preferred by the defendant.  On this record, however, we cannot 
be certain. 
 
We have reviewed the defendant's mental health records, and 
we cannot say that such a defense did not have potential 
support.  The information in the mental health records suggests 
that defenses of lack of criminal responsibility and mental 
impairment were not necessarily inconsistent with the statements 
the defendant made to the police.  However, this is not a case 
where it is apparent on the face of the record that counsel was 
ineffective in choosing to forgo a mental health or criminal 
responsibility defense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams 
(No. 1), 68 Mass. App. Ct. 287, 290-291 (2007) (remanding for 
further fact finding to determine if trial counsel's performance 
was "manifestly unreasonable" where record was insufficient to 
make such determination).  Some of the evidence in the 
defendant's medical records indicates that, before the 
16 
 
 
homicides, he suffered from hallucinations, including auditory 
hallucinations, that people were telling him to hurt people.  
After the homicides, he reported seeing people coming to hurt 
him.  Such evidence, if developed and if admissible, might have 
supported such defenses.  It might also have served to explain, 
in part, the defendant's statements to the police that others 
were in the apartment.  This evidence was not brought to our 
attention on appeal or to the attention of the judge in the 
motion for a new trial. 
While ordinarily we defer to the discretion of a judge on 
whether a motion for a new trial requires an evidentiary 
hearing, in these unusual circumstances, we believe that an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary in order to determine whether 
trial counsel's strategy was reasonable in light of the 
defendant's particular mental health history.9  Licata, 412 Mass. 
at 660-661.  Without sufficient information about trial 
counsel's intentions and strategic choices, the motion judge 
could not determine whether it was "manifestly unreasonable" for 
trial counsel to forgo these defenses when he chose to do so.  
We conclude that it is necessary to vacate the order denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial and remand this case to the 
Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
9 We express no opinion regarding the merits of the motion 
for a new trial. 
17 
 
 
Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 574 (2016) (vacating denial of motion 
for new trial and remanding for evidentiary hearing on issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant's state of 
mind during interrogation was at issue, defendant did not 
testify at evidentiary hearing, and defendant's affidavit was 
not considered by judge). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  With respect to the defendant's appeal 
from the order denying his motion for a new trial, we vacate 
that order and remand the case to the Superior Court for an 
evidentiary hearing and further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  We do not reach the defendant's direct appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.