Case Title: Brenner v. City of Casper

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brenner v. City of Casper1986 WY 156723 P.2d 558Case Number: 85-267Decided: 07/25/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lynnanne BRENNER, 
Appellant (Appellant/Defendant),

v.

CITY OF CASPER, Appellee 
(Appellee/Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Robert A. 
Monteith and Donald J. Rissler of Monteith and Associates, Casper, for appellant.

Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ. 

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
in municipal court of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI), a 
violation of § 24-27 of the Casper city code (as amended July 3, 1984, by 
Ordinance No. 24-84). Upon entering a plea of not guilty, appellant demanded a 
jury trial. The court denied the demand, and the case was tried to the court. On 
August 6, 1985, the court entered its finding of guilty and imposed a $750 fine 
and a 30-day jail sentence. Appellant appealed her conviction to the district 
court. She now appeals to this Court from the district court's order affirming 
her conviction.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"I. DID THE MUNICIPAL 
COURT OF THE CITY OF CASPER ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE APPELLANT, 
LYNNANNE BRENNER, A TRIAL BY JURY OF THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE AGAINST 
HER?

"II. IS THE MUNICIPAL 
COURT[']S REFUSAL TO GRANT THE [DEMAND OF] APPELLANT, LYNNANNE BRENNER, 
ARBITRARY AND THEREBY VIOLATING THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 34, OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION AND 
THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

"III. WAS THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL HEREIN SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE APPELLANT, 
LYNNANN[E] BRENNER, WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE, OR IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL 
OF THE SAME, WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL TO A [DEGREE] THAT RENDERED 
HER INCAPABLE OF SAFELY DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE?"

[¶4.]     We must determine 
whether appellant was entitled to a jury trial at the municipal court level. As 
a necessary part of our inquiry, we must also determine whether § 5-6-207, W.S. 
1977, constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right to trial by 
jury.1

[¶5.]     This is not the first 
time this Court has addressed the question of whether one charged under a city 
ordinance is entitled to a jury trial in municipal court. In Lapp v. City of 
Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980), we held that a defendant who was charged 
with DWUI under a city ordinance authorizing a jail sentence was entitled to a 
jury trial in municipal court, regardless of whether a sentence was ultimately 
imposed. However, the manner in which we arrived at that result has created 
uncertainty in this area of the law and, in fact, may have led in part to the 
appeal now before us. In Lapp we acknowledged the existence of § 5-6-207, which 
provides as follows: 

"Cases in the police 
court for violations of city ordinances shall be tried and determined by the 
police justice without the intervention of a jury, and the trial of such cases 
before such police justice shall be conducted in all respects, not herein 
otherwise provided for, in like manner as criminal cases before justices of the 
peace."

Despite the 
clear language of the statute, we held that under Art. 1, § 9 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and Rule 5(d), W.R.Cr.P. J.C., the defendant was entitled to a jury 
trial. Article 1, § 9 provides in relevant part:

"The right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases * * *."

[¶6.]     When Lapp was decided, 
Rule 5(d), W.R.Cr. P.J.C., provided:

"Jury in municipal court. - There shall 
be no right to demand a jury trial in municipal courts unless a jail sentence is 
to be imposed upon conviction; but in all other respects, except as otherwise 
provided, the trial shall be conducted in like manner as criminal cases are 
tried before justices of the peace."2

Although we did 
not discuss the inconsistency between Art. 1, § 9 and the statute, we did 
address the conflicting provisions contained in Rule 5(d) and the statute. We 
noted that § 5-2-114, W.S. 1977, authorizes this Court to establish procedural, 
but not substantive, rules for Wyoming courts and that the right to a jury 
trial is considered to be a substantive right. However, we attempted to 
eliminate that problem by characterizing Rule 5(d) as purely procedural. We 
said:

"* * * We do not disturb 
the legislature's right to require a jury trial in misdemeanor cases in 
municipal prosecutions for ordinance violations. We only move the trial by jury 
procedurally from the district court to the municipal court. * * *" Lapp v. City 
of Worland, 612 P.2d  at 873.

In a later 
opinion, Justice Raper provided further clarification of the Lapp 
decision:

"Lapp v. City of Worland 
* * * honors the discretion of the legislature that there be trial by jury upon 
demand as a substantive right but only as a matter of procedure recognized the 
right of this court to by rule place the jury trial in the trial court where it 
belongs rather than in the district court sitting as an appellate court. * * *" 
Goodman v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1982) (Raper, 
Justice, concurring).

Thus, Lapp gave 
effect to Rule 29, W.R.Cr. P.J.C., which provided that § 5-6-207 was superseded 
by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure for Justice 
Courts.

[¶7.]     In characterizing our 
determination to move the right to jury trial from district court to municipal 
court as purely procedural and, therefore, within our authority, we avoided the 
critical question before us - whether a statute which denies the right to a jury 
trial in municipal court for any violation of a city ordinance, regardless of 
severity, is constitutional.

[¶8.]     It is well established 
that the legislature may pass any acts which are not expressly or by necessary 
implication inhibited by the Wyoming Constitution. Budge v. Board of Com'rs of 
LincolnCounty, 29 Wyo. 35, 208 P. 874 (1922). Although we have a 
duty to give great deference to legislative pronouncements and to uphold their 
constitutionality where possible, it is equally imperative that we declare them 
invalid when they transgress the Wyoming Constitution. White v. Fisher, 
Wyo., 689 P.2d 102 (1984).

[¶9.]     As demonstrated above, 
the Wyoming Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in criminal cases. 
In accordance with that provision, we recognize, as does the federal judiciary, 
that the 

"* * * general grant of 
jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing 
miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all 
defendants. * * *" Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-158, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, reh. denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S. Ct. 2270, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1412 (1968).

[¶10.]  Appellant does not disagree. She does not 
contend that Art. 1, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantees the right to a 
jury trial in all criminal cases regardless of how serious. She openly 
recognizes "[t]he general rule and the rule adopted by [this Court] that jury 
trials are not required for petty offenses." She limits her contention instead 
to whether the offense with which she was charged is "serious" and, therefore, 
within the protection of the constitutional guarantee.

[¶11.]  Appellee similarly limits its claim. The 
city contends that even if the right to a jury trial exists in municipal court 
for serious offenses, the conviction before us is valid and constitutional 
because appellant was sentenced to only 30 days in jail.

[¶12.]  Both parties having limited the issue to 
what constitutes a serious offense subject to constitutional protection, we 
limit our inquiry accordingly. Accepting the idea that there has always existed 
a class of minor offenses not subject to the constitutional guarantee, we are 
left with the task of drawing the line between that class and the class of more 
serious offenses requiring a jury trial.

[¶13.]  The United States Supreme Court has 
traditionally distinguished the two classes on the basis of the length of the 
sentence which may be imposed. In Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970), the Supreme Court held that an offense 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment constitutes a serious offense 
subject to the constitutional guarantee. Crimes carrying possible penalties up 
to six months, on the other hand, were deemed to be outside the scope of 
constitutional protection.

[¶14.]  While recognizing the standard utilized 
by the United States Supreme Court, it is our conclusion that greater protection 
is afforded by the Wyoming Constitution.

"It is the general rule 
that where the language of the state and federal constitutions is similar, the 
interpretation given by the United States Supreme Court to the federal provision 
will be applied to the state provision. [Citation.] However, the state courts 
are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own constitutions a 
greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution * * *." 
(Emphasis added.) City of Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d 87, 653 P.2d 618, 623 (1983), citing Oregon v. 
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975).

Keeping these 
general principles in mind, we hold that a crime punishable by any jail term, 
regardless of length, is a serious crime subject to the constitutional right to 
a jury trial. In our view, no offense which carries with it a potential jail 
sentence can be deemed so minor as to warrant denying the fundamental right to a 
jury trial.

[¶15.]  Section 5-6-207 unconditionally denies 
the right to a jury trial in all cases in municipal court involving violations 
of city ordinances without regard to the potential sentences. We, therefore, 
find it unconstitutional.

[¶16.]  Because we find § 5-6-207 
unconstitutional and reverse appellant's conviction, we find it unnecessary to 
consider whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the 
conviction.

[¶17.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 In its order affirming 
appellant's conviction, the district court refused to consider the 
constitutionality of § 5-6-207 for the reason that appellant failed to serve a 
copy of her brief upon the attorney general as required by Rule 5.07, 
W.R.A.P.C.L.J. Appellee claims that appellant's failure is a jurisdictional 
defect which prevented the district court from considering the constitutionality 
of § 5-6-207 and now prevents this Court from considering the 
question.

As a preliminary matter, 
we note that the failure to serve a brief upon the attorney general is not a 
jurisdictional defect preventing the district court from considering a 
constitutional question. Rule 1.02, W.R.A.P.C.L.J., provides in 
part:

"The timely filing of a 
notice of appeal is jurisdictional. The failure to comply with any other of these 
rules * * * does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the district court 
deems appropriate, including but not limited to * * * refusal to consider the 
offending party's contentions * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

Under this rule, it is 
clearly within the district court's discretion to decide whether or not to 
consider a constitutional question raised in an appellate brief which has not 
been served upon the attorney general.

More importantly, this 
Court's consideration of a constitutional question is entirely unaffected by the 
district court's disposition of the matter. We are at liberty to decide a case 
upon any point which in our opinion the ends of justice require, particularly on 
a point so fundamental that we must take cognizance of it. White v. Fisher, 
Wyo., 689 P.2d 102 (1984).

2 On May 3, 1984, Rule 
5(d), W.R.Cr.P.J.C., was amended. It now provides as 
follows:

"Jury in municipal court. - There shall 
be no right to demand a jury trial in municipal courts unless a jail sentence is 
provided for by ordinance upon 
conviction; but in all other respects, except as otherwise provided, the trial 
shall be conducted in a like manner as criminal cases are tried before justices 
of the peace." (Emphasis added.)

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶18.]  I agree with the conclusion reached by 
the majority. There is no question that Lynnanne Brenner was entitled to have a 
trial by jury in the municipal court of the City of Casper. I cannot accede to 
the rationale which is adopted in the majority opinion to justify that 
conclusion. There is no justification for considering the constitutionality of § 
5-6-207, W.S. 1977. This court historically has pursued a policy of judicial 
restraint with respect to addressing the constitutionality of statutes. In one 
way or another the court has said many times that the question of 
constitutionality will not be addressed if there is another appropriate way to 
resolve the issue presented in any given case. E.g., Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 
582 P.2d 67 (1978); Schoeller v. Board of County Commissioners, Wyo., 568 P.2d 869 (1977); Stambaugh v. State, Wyo., 566 P.2d 993 (1977); Bowers v. Getter 
Trucking Co., Wyo., 514 P.2d 837 (1973); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming 
Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550 (1968); State ex rel. 
Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F. v. Kingham, Wyo., 420 P.2d 254 (1966); Marion 
v. City of Lander, Wyo., 394 P.2d 910 (1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 925, 85 S. Ct. 929, 13 L. Ed. 2d 810, reh. denied 380 U.S. 989, 85 S. Ct. 1352, 14 L. Ed. 2d 283 (1965); Gorrell v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 371 P.2d 835 (1962).

[¶19.]  While the City of Casper has structured 
an artful argument in an attempt to demonstrate the proposition that a jury 
trial in the municipal court is foreclosed by the provisions of § 5-6-207, W.S. 
1977, the City's position cannot stand in the light of the history of pertinent 
legislation and the construction of that legislation by this court. This case 
can be disposed of without addressing the constitutionality of the statute, and 
that is the appropriate resolution.

[¶20.]  Section 5-6-207, W.S. 1977, has been 
superseded by Rule 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C., which specifically refers to § 5-130, W.S. 
1957, the same statute as § 5-6-207, W.S. 1977. I must confess some apprehension 
with respect to a conclusion by this court to address the constitutionality of a 
statute which at one time the court believed it could supersede by a procedural 
rule. Some might conclude that the court was not confident of its authority to 
adopt procedural rules.

[¶21.]  There is no legislative or 
jurisprudential history in the state of Wyoming which suggests that Ms. Brenner is not 
entitled to a trial by jury. Beginning with Stutsman v. City of Cheyenne, 18 
Wyo. 499, 113 P. 322 (1911), which addressed a different statutory scheme, and 
continuing through State v. District Court of Sheridan County, 74 Wyo. 48, 283 P.2d 1023 (1955); Shafsky v. City of Casper, Wyo., 487 P.2d 468 (1971); Cisneros 
v. City of Casper, Wyo., 479 P.2d 198 (1971); and Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 
612 P.2d 868 (1980), the statutory scheme in Wyoming consistently was construed 
to provide for a right of trial by jury in a case such as this. The only 
difference found in the statutory scheme was whether the jury trial would occur 
in the municipal court or the district court. To summarize briefly, the 
legislature had provided that there was no jury trial in the municipal court (§ 
5-6-207, W.S. 1977), but then did provide for an appeal to the district court 
which was to be treated as an appeal from a justice of the peace court (§ 
5-6-203, W.S. 1977). With respect to appeals from a justice of the peace court, 
a "trial anew" in the district court was provided (§ 7-16-207, W.S. 1977), and 
in State v. District Court of Sheridan County, supra, this court held that this 
statute provided a substantive right to a jury trial in such a 
case.

[¶22.]  Later an amendment to the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming and a new statutory provision 
authorized this court to promulgate rules of procedure for justice of the peace 
and municipal courts. Pursuant to this authority, Rule 5(d) of W.R.Cr. P.J.C. 
was adopted, and the language of that rule clearly provides for a jury trial in 
municipal court. In Lapp v. City of Worland, supra, we said at 612 P.2d 
873:

"We do not disturb the 
legislature's right to require a jury trial in misdemeanor cases in municipal 
prosecutions for ordinance violations. We only move the trial by jury 
procedurally from the district court to the municipal court. We find, for the 
purposes of this case, that the legislature intended to give an individual the 
right to jury trial for violation of a municipal ordinance. We consider it a 
substantive right of a person, * * *."

 

We held that 
Rule 5(d), W.R.Cr.P.J.C., in recognition of the substantive right to a jury 
trial, simply provided for a jury trial in municipal court when a jail sentence 
was to be imposed. Subsequently, the rule was amended to require a jury trial 
when "a jail sentence is provided for by ordinance upon conviction." In light of 
the jurisprudential history leading up to the decision in Lapp v. City of 
Worland, supra, there is no basis for the City of 
Casper to argue 
against a right to a jury trial in this case. A jury trial is required by Rule 
5(d), W.R.Cr.P. J.C., and the court should dispose of the case on that 
ground.

[¶23.]  The majority opinion goes even further 
than striking the statute as unconstitutional, however, and provides an advisory 
opinion with respect to a constitutional right to a jury trial under the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming. This question was not raised by the 
parties, and is the style of issue which manifests the wisdom of requiring, in 
accordance with Rule 5.07, W.R. A.P.C.L.J., and 5.07, W.R.A.P., service of a 
brief upon the attorney general. We do not honor the adversary system, and 
perhaps do not provide ourselves with all the information that would be useful 
to us, by deciding such questions on our own motion without the benefit of 
briefs or arguments from interested parties, including particularly the attorney 
general. If such a constitutional right is to be espoused it should only be done 
in a case in which the issue is specifically and vigorously presented. Were that 
issue before the court, I might well agree with Justice Brown that our 
Constitution does not require a jury trial in all cases involving petty 
offenses. SeeState v. DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty, supra. It well may be that the 
right is afforded by statute, as construed, and not by the 
Constitution.

BROWN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶24.]  More than a few of our citizens presume 
they have an unalienable right to quaff spirits and an unalienable right to 
drive automobiles. Society pays a high price when these perceived rights are 
exercised in concert, and our legislature and courts have done little to 
discourage this habit. Even the Warren Court did not make it as difficult 
to try an accused as the majority in this court has.

[¶25.]  Neither the United States Constitution 
nor the Wyoming constitution, requiring jury trials in 
criminal cases, apply to petty offenses. The United States Supreme Court has 
explicitly said so in Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S. Ct. 1503, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969); and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, reh. denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S. Ct. 2270, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1412 (1968). In 
determining whether an offense is petty or not, the court stated in Codispoti v. 
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512, 94 S. Ct. 2687, 2691, 41 L. Ed. 2d 912, 919 
(1974), that "* * * [O]ur decisions have established a fixed dividing line 
between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more 
than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months 
or less are petty crimes. * * *"

[¶26.]  When the constitutionality of a statute 
is attacked, we begin with a presumption of constitutionality and we resolve any 
reasonable doubts by upholding the statute if possible. Armijo v. State, 
Wyo., 678 P.2d 864 (1984); and Sorenson v. 
State, Wyo., 
604 P.2d 1031 (1979). To the extent that § 5-6-207, W.S. 1977, may be construed 
to provide that petty offenses with a possible maximum jail sentence of six 
months shall be tried without a jury, I would uphold its constitutionality. I 
disagree with the majority's holding that any crime punishable by a jail term is 
a serious one. To hold this is to abolish the category of petty offense as 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Arguably, the Wyoming 
Constitution contemplates greater jury trial rights than does the United States 
Constitution. However, I do not read the Wyoming Constitution to mandate a jury 
trial in order to provide for a day in jail.

[¶27.]  As a practical matter, the lower courts 
are not going to try DWUI cases if a jail sentence is involved. It is difficult 
to justify a $500 to $1,000 jury so that a defendant can spend a day in jail. 
Economics will prevail over justice. If the legislature provided for a convicted 
defendant to pay the cost of a jury, his enthusiasm for a jury trial would 
diminish. Oft times in DWUI cases a short jail sentence has a salutory effect. 
The most successful sentence I imposed as a district judge was one hour in the 
county jail after a drunk driving conviction.

[¶28.]  The common law did not require a jury 
trial for petty offenses. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra. 
Wyoming's Constitution was adopted with that 
background, since Wyoming expressly adopted the common law as 
modified by judicial decisions. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983); and Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714 (1979). Section 8-1-101, 
W.S. 1977 (Aug. 1978 Replacement), reads:

"The common law of 
England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is of a general 
nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts or statutes 
made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth 
year of James the First (Excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 
forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and ninth 
chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature and 
not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority."

[¶29.]  The majority opinion is well written and 
not illogical; however, it establishes a policy not required by the Wyoming 
Constitution. I would affirm the trial court.