Case Title: Town of Levant v. Lawrence A. Taylor et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: Pen-10-466

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 64 
Docket: 
Pen-10-466 
Submitted 
   On Briefs: February 24, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
May 31, 2011 
  
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
Majority:        LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
Dissent:  
ALEXANDER, J. 
 
 
TOWN OF LEVANT 
 
v.  
 
LAWRENCE A. TAYLOR et al. 
 
 
LEVY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Lawrence A. Taylor and Donald C. Taylor appeal from a judgment of 
the District Court (Newport, Sparaco, J.) concluding that they violated the Town 
of Levant’s Land Use Ordinance and awarding civil penalties, costs, and attorney 
fees in the Town’s action brought pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80K and 30-A M.R.S. 
§ 4452 (2010).  The Taylors contend that they cannot be held responsible for a land 
use violation resulting from actions taken on their land by a third party.  We affirm 
the judgment.   
I.  CASE HISTORY 
 
[¶2]  The facts in this case are largely not in dispute.  At all times relevant to 
this case, the Taylors owned a lot in the Town of Levant.  They were negotiating to 
 
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sell the lot to a third person, Timothy Linnell.  At some point, Linnell parked a 
mobile home on the Taylors’ lot.  The court found that Linnell was “storing” the 
mobile home on the lot pending a sale of the lot to him.  While parked on the lot, 
the mobile home sat on a trailer, with tires attached.  The mobile home remained 
unoccupied and was not connected to any plumbing or utilities.  There was no 
evidence of any site work being done on the lot preparatory to placement of the 
mobile home on a foundation.    
 
[¶3]  The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) sent the Taylors a notice 
dated December 30, 2009, asserting that the placement of the mobile home on the 
lot was a violation of the Town’s land use ordinance.  The letter warned, “If this 
mobile home is not removed this violation will be placed in the hands of the town 
attorney for legal action.”  The notice was followed by a letter from the Town 
attorney dated January 21, 2010, directing the Taylors to cease the violation within 
fifteen days of the date of the letter.  When that letter did not resolve the matter, the 
Town filed a complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80K against the Taylors on March 
9, 2010.  The complaint alleged that storing the mobile home on the Taylors’ lot 
violated six specific provisions of the Town of Levant’s Land Use Ordinance.   
 
[¶4]  After a hearing, the court entered a detailed judgment in which it found 
that the Town had failed to prove violations of five of the six articles of the Town’s 
 
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Land Use Ordinance cited in the Town’s Rule 80K complaint.1  The court did find 
that the Taylors violated Article 1010, which requires a CEO permit for 
“[r]elocating or locating 1 or 2 buildings on to a lot.”  Article 1010 consists of a 
table that lists three categories of activities for which there is either “No Permit 
Required,” a “CEO Permit Required,” or a “Planning Board Permit & CEO Permit 
Required.”  Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 1010 (June 23, 2007).  Noting 
that it was addressing a question that we left open in Your Home, Inc. v. City of 
Portland, 432 A.2d 1250, 1258 (Me. 1981)—whether a mobile home becomes a 
building merely by being parked on a lot—the court concluded that the Taylors’ 
mobile home was properly treated as a building for which a permit was required.  
The court based its conclusion on definitions provided in the Ordinance, reasoning 
as follows: 
Article 1610 provides that the word “building” includes the word 
“structure.”  Article 1620, in turn, expressly states that “mobile homes 
are structures.”  Therefore, it follows that mobile homes are buildings 
under this Ordinance.  Accordingly, pursuant to the table set forth in 
Article 1010 “locating” a mobile home on a lot requires a CEO 
permit. 
 
                                                
1  The Town failed to prove violations of: (1) Article 1000, generally requiring permits for buildings 
or structures to be “constructed,” “inhabited,” or “used”; (2) Article 1005(A), requiring payment of fees 
for obtaining permits, which the court found did not constitute a separate violation; (3) Article 1020(A), 
addressing the procedure for applying for a permit, which the court found did not constitute a separate 
violation; (4) Article 1020(F), requiring that no building permit be issued unless a plumbing permit had 
been issued; and (5) Article 1350, stating required design criteria for mobile homes, which the court 
found not to have been violated because “the mobile home was being stored and not occupied while on 
the lot.”  Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance (June 23, 2007). 
 
 
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[¶5]  The court also rejected the Taylors’ contention that they had played no 
role in allowing the mobile home to be moved onto and to remain on their land: 
Even after receiving two letters from the Town charging them with 
violations as a result of the presence of the mobile home on their land, 
the Defendants remained silent regarding their alleged lack of 
culpability.  More importantly, there is no evidence that the 
Defendants, after having been placed on notice of the alleged 
violations occurring on their land, took significant steps to obtain a 
permit or to have the mobile home legally removed from their land.  
Under such circumstances, the court finds that the Defendants can be 
held liable for allowing the mobile home to remain on the property 
without a permit. 
   
[¶6]  Having found the violation, the court assessed a civil penalty of $2500, 
plus attorney fees, expert witness fees, and costs.  Article 1440 of the Ordinance 
authorizes fines against a landowner in accordance with 30-A M.R.S. § 4452.  This 
appeal followed. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
[¶7]  We address (A) the Taylors’ contention that the court erred because 
they cannot be held responsible for a violation of Article 1010 caused by a third 
party and there was no evidence from which the court could infer that they played 
a role in leaving the mobile home on their property; and (B) the dissenting 
opinion’s contention that the language of Article 1010 does not, itself, establish 
specific permitting requirements independent of those otherwise specified in 
Articles 1000 through 1350 of the Ordinance.   
 
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A. 
Violation of Article 1010 
[¶8]  We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and do not disturb 
a finding unless there is no competent evidence in the record to support it.  Town of 
Vassalboro v. Barnett, 2011 ME 21, ¶ 19, 13 A.3d 784, 790.  We review the 
court’s application of the law to its findings de novo.  Degenhardt v. EWE Ltd. 
P’ship, 2011 ME 23, ¶ 7, 13 A.3d 790, 793. 
[¶9]  The court determined from the evidence presented that the Taylors, as 
owners of the lot, had notice of the violation and the ability and opportunity to 
correct the violation but failed to do so.  The Taylors received notice of the 
violation from letters sent by the Town’s CEO and the Town’s attorney.  The two 
letters provided fourteen days and fifteen days, respectively, for the Taylors to 
remove the trailer and avoid legal action.  The court rejected, as not credible, the 
Taylors’ contention that they played no role in allowing the mobile home to be 
stored on their lot.  The court inferred the contrary because there was no evidence 
that the Taylors, after receiving notice of the violation, had asked Linnell to 
remove the mobile home, sought to obtain a proper permit, or otherwise sought to 
have the mobile home removed from the land.  The record evidence supports the 
court’s findings.   
[¶10]  Furthermore, the court did not err in concluding that the Taylors, as 
landowners, were responsible for the land use violation committed on their 
 
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property.  The violation applies to the Taylors because (1) the Ordinance 
authorizes fines against the landowner for this violation, Levant, Me., Land Use 
Ordinance, art. 1440; 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(2) (specifying that “[a]ny person, 
including, but not limited to, a landowner . . . who violates” municipal land use 
ordinances is liable for penalties); (2) they had notice of the violation; (3) they, as 
landowners, had control over the use of their land; and (4) they had a reasonable 
opportunity to correct the violation.  See Town of Boothbay v. Jenness, 2003 ME 
50, ¶¶ 17-18, 822 A.2d 1169, 1174-75 (applying a four-factor analysis to conclude 
that a landlord can be held responsible for a tenant’s violation of an ordinance). 
B. 
Interpretation of Article 1010  
[¶11]  We next address the dissenting opinion’s contention that the language 
of Article 1010 does not establish a permitting requirement independent of other 
permitting requirements specified in Articles 1000 through 1350, based on the 
Ordinance’s definition of “mobile home” in Article 1620.  This contention was not 
raised by the Taylors before the District Court and did not factor in the court’s 
analysis.  Neither has it been raised by the Taylors in this appeal.  
[¶12]  We review a court’s interpretation of a local ordinance de novo.  
Barnett, 2011 ME 21, ¶ 6, 13 A.3d at 786.  Article 1010 indicates that a “CEO 
Permit [is] Required” for “[r]elocating or locating 1 or 2 buildings on to a lot.”  
The Ordinance also specifies that “the word ‘building’ includes the word 
 
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“structure’” and that “mobile homes are structures.”  Levant, Me., Land Use 
Ordinance, arts. 1610, 1620.   
[¶13]  A “mobile home” is defined by the Ordinance as “[m]anufactured 
housing which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a 
dwelling, with or without permanent foundation, when connected to the required 
utilities, including plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems 
contained therein.”  Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 1620.  The three 
elements of this definition require that the object be (1) manufactured2 housing, 
(2) built on a permanent chassis, and (3) designed for use as a dwelling, with or 
without a permanent foundation, when connected to the required utilities.   
[¶14]  By reasoning that a mobile home is not a mobile home under the 
Ordinance until it is actually connected to the required utilities, the dissenting 
opinion treats the design element of the definition as an actual use requirement.  
The definition in Article 1620, however, does not require that the mobile home be 
“designed to be used as a dwelling” and be “connected to the required utilities.”  
                                                
2  The Ordinance defines “Manufactured” as follows: 
 
A structural unit or housing units designed for occupancy, constructed in a manufacturing 
facility, and then transported by the use of its own chassis or placement on an 
independent chassis to a building site.  The term includes any type of building which is 
constructed at a manufacturing facility and then transported to a building site where it is 
utilized for housing and may be purchased or sold by a dealer in the interim. 
 
Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 1620 (June 23, 2007). 
 
 
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The Ordinance takes a similar approach in its definition of other terms, such as 
“Camper,”3 “Dwelling Unit,”4 and “Structure,”5 all of which focus on design and 
intended use, and not on actual use.  See Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 
1620.  Any doubt as to whether the Ordinance seeks to regulate objects based on 
their design and intended use, as opposed to their actual use, is clarified in Article 
1610, Construction of Language, which provides: “The words ‘used’ or 
‘occupied’ include the words ‘intended,’ ‘designed,’ or ‘arranged to be used or 
occupied.’”  Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 1610. 
The entry is: 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3  “Camper” is defined as: “A vehicle designed to be moved on wheels and intended as a temporary 
dwelling for travel, recreation and vacation use.  This term shall also include travel trailers, 
camper-trailers, and other short-term shelter vehicles or devices, including tents.”  Levant, Me., Land Use 
Ordinance, art. 1620. 
 
4  “Dwelling Unit” is defined as: “A room or group of rooms designed and equipped exclusively for 
use as living quarters for only one family, including provisions for living, sleeping, cooking and eating.” 
Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 1620. 
 
5  “Structure” is defined as: “Anything constructed or erected, except a fence or boundary wall, the 
use of which requires permanent location on the ground or permanent attachment to something on the 
ground.  Signs, satellite dishes, and mobile homes are structures.”  Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance, art. 
1620. 
 
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ALEXANDER, J., dissenting. 
 
[¶15]  Because there is no provision in the Town of Levant Land Use 
Ordinance that expressly prohibits the temporary parking of an unconnected and 
unoccupied house trailer on a parcel of land, I respectfully dissent.  
[¶16]  Article 1010 of the Town of Levant Land Use Ordinance is best 
interpreted as a summary chart outlining the specific permitting requirements of 
the Ordinance stated in Articles 1000 through 1350.  It depicts what actions upon 
the land in the Town require no permit, what actions require a permit from the 
CEO, and what actions require both planning board approval and a permit from the 
CEO, pursuant to the separate individual permitting requirements of the Ordinance.  
[¶17]  Article 1010 immediately follows Article 1000, which states that 
permits are required before buildings are constructed, inhabited, or used.  Notably, 
the court found no violation of the comprehensive permitting requirement stated in 
Article 1000 and no violation of any other specific permitting requirement.  The 
court found only a violation of the summary chart in Article 1010. 
 
[¶18]  We review local interpretations of local ordinances de novo as a 
question of law.  Aydelott v. City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, ¶ 10, 990 A.2d 1024, 
1026; Kittery Retail Ventures, LLC v. Town of Kittery, 2004 ME 65, ¶ 10, 856 A.2d 
1183, 1188.  In this review, we examine the ordinance for its plain meaning and 
“construe its terms reasonably in light of the purposes and objectives of the 
 
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ordinance and its general structure.”  Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2002 ME 81, 
¶ 6, 797 A.2d 27, 29.  
[¶19]  Article 1010 is placed between Article 1000 and the next numbered 
article, Article 1005.  It appears to have been a later amendment to the Ordinance, 
placed immediately after Article 1000 to summarize those activities that require 
permitting pursuant to Article 1000 and subsequent articles between 1005 and 
1350, describing specific permitting requirements, fees and processes.  However, 
the language of Article 1010 does not, itself, establish specific permitting 
requirements independent of those specified in Articles 1000 through 1350.   
[¶20]  The court found no violation proved of any of the specific permitting 
requirements of articles that the Town alleged were violated between Article 1000 
and Article 1350.  De novo review of Articles 1000 through 1350 indicates none 
that would apply to a mobile home parked on a lot while remaining on its mobile 
home trailer, when the mobile home is not occupied or used for any purpose or 
connected to plumbing or any other utilities, and no site work is being done to 
prepare the lot for placement of the mobile home on the lot.   
 
[¶21]  A “mobile home” that would require a permit is defined in Article 
1620 of the Town Ordinance.  The definition of mobile home is “[m]anufactured 
housing which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a 
dwelling, with or without permanent foundation, when connected to the required 
 
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utilities, including plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems 
contained therein.”  (Emphasis added).     
 
[¶22]  The definition of “mobile home” in Article 1620, by its terms, 
excludes the parked, unoccupied, unused, and unconnected mobile home at issue 
here from the several permitting requirements applicable to occupied and 
connected mobile homes.   
 
[¶23]  The term “locating” in Article 1010 is ambiguous as to whether it may 
include temporary parking of a mobile home, or anything else, on a property.  
However, when read in the context of the specific permitting requirements of the 
Ordinance that the court found not to be violated, including the general permitting 
requirement in Article 1000, the term “locating” in Article 1010 must be construed 
not to extend to the temporary parking of a mobile home on a lot as occurred in 
this case.  Ordinances must be construed by looking at the entire context and 
structure of the ordinance, including related sections. See Stewart, 2002 ME 81, 
¶ 6, 797 A.2d at 29.  
[¶24]  So construed, the court erred in concluding that the parking or storing 
activity in this case required a code enforcement officer permit and that the lack of 
such a permit constituted a violation of Article 1010.  Accordingly, I would vacate 
the District Court’s judgment and the nearly $12,000 it awarded pursuant to 
 
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30-A M.R.S. § 4452 (2010) as penalties, fees, and costs for temporarily parking 
this mobile home. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney for Lawrence A. Taylor and Donald C. Taylor: 
 
Joseph L. Ferris, Esq. 
120 North Main Street 
Brewer, Maine  04412 
 
 
Attorney for the Town of Levant: 
 
David F. Szewczyk, Esq. 
One Cumberland Place, Suite 314 
Bangor, Maine  04401 
 
 
 
 
Newport District Court docket number CV-2010-36 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY