Case Title: State v. Willan

Citation: 2013-Ohio-2405

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Willan, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2405.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2405 
THE STATE OF OHIO, CROSS-APPELLANT, v. WILLAN, CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Willan, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2405.] 
Criminal law—Sentencing—Mandatory ten-year prison term for certain crimes of 
corrupt activity—R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) and 2923.32. 
(No. 2012-0216—Submitted March 13, 2013—Decided June 11, 2013.) 
CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. CA-24894, 2011-Ohio-6603. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider the scope of the language in R.C. 
2929.14(D)(3)(a)1 requiring a mandatory ten-year prison term for an offender 
“guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt 
activity being a felony of the first degree.”  We hold that this language is 
                                                          
 
1 R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) has since been amended and is now codified in R.C. 2929.14(B)(3).  2011 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86.  All references to R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) in this opinion are to the former 
version of the statute. 
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unambiguous and conclude that the court of appeals erred by restricting the 
meaning of “corrupt activity” to refer only to activity associated with the offenses 
listed in R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a). 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In December 2008, a jury found cross-appellee, David Willan, 
guilty of 68 counts, including one first-degree-felony count of engaging in a 
pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32, Ohio’s Racketeer-
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute.  The corrupt-activity 
count was predicated on, inter alia, five first-degree-felony counts of making false 
representations for the purpose of registering securities in violation of R.C. 
1707.44(B)(1).  At sentencing, which took place after Willan was found guilty of 
two counts tried separately, the trial court imposed an aggregate total prison term 
of 16 years.  The trial court determined that R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) required a 
mandatory ten-year prison term for the corrupt-activity count. 
{¶ 3} The court of appeals affirmed the guilty verdicts for the corrupt-
activity count and three of the predicate violations of R.C. 1707.44(B)(1), but 
reversed most of the remaining guilty verdicts based on insufficiency of the 
evidence.  9th Dist. No. 24894, 2011-Ohio-6603, ¶ 71, 85, 94.  The court went on 
to vacate the mandatory ten-year prison term imposed for the corrupt-activity 
count, declaring R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) ambiguous as to whether the mandatory 
ten-year term applied to Willan.  Id. at ¶ 119.  Because the statute “did not 
identify the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity by its Revised 
Code section number, R.C. 2923.32,” but did use section numbers to identify 
several other offenses in surrounding language, the court determined that it was 
“reasonable to infer that the mandatory ten-year prison term * * * was only 
intended to apply to corrupt activity associated with” those other offenses.  Id. at 
¶ 107. 
January Term, 2013 
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{¶ 4} We declined to accept jurisdiction over Willan’s appeal.  We 
accepted jurisdiction over the state’s cross-appeal to consider the following 
proposition of law: “R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) establishes a mandatory 10-year 
sentence where a defendant is found guilty of a corrupt activity where the most 
serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity is a felony of the first degree.” 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 5} To decide the scope of R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a),2 or any statute, we 
begin with its text, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them 
according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”  State ex rel. Steele v. 
Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21; R.C. 
1.42.  If words and phrases “have acquired a technical or particular meaning, 
whether by legislative definition or otherwise,” we will construe them 
                                                          
 
2 In its entirety, former R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) provided: 
 
Except when an offender commits a violation of section 2903.01 or 
2907.02 of the Revised Code and the penalty imposed for the violation is life 
imprisonment or commits a violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code, if 
the offender commits a violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.11 of the Revised 
Code and that section classifies the offender as a major drug offender and 
requires the imposition of a ten-year prison term on the offender, if the offender 
commits a felony violation of section 2925.02, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.36, 
3719.07, 3719.08, 3719.16, 3719.161, 4729.37, or 4729.61, division (C) or (D) 
of section 3719.172, division (C) of section 4729.51, or division (J) of section 
4729.54 of the Revised Code that includes the sale, offer to sell, or possession of 
a schedule I or II controlled substance, with the exception of marihuana, and the 
court imposing sentence upon the offender finds that the offender is guilty of a 
specification of the type described in section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code 
charging that the offender is a major drug offender, if the court imposing 
sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is guilty of corrupt 
activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a 
felony of the first degree, or if the offender is guilty of an attempted violation of 
section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and, had the offender completed the 
violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code that was attempted, the 
offender would have been subject to a sentence of life imprisonment or life 
imprisonment without parole for the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised 
Code, the court shall impose upon the offender for the felony violation a ten-
year prison term that cannot be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20 or Chapter 
2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code. 
 
2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5735. 
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accordingly.  R.C. 1.42.  We will attempt to give effect to “every word, phrase, 
sentence, and part of the statute” and to avoid an interpretation that would 
“restrict, constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge, or abridge the General Assembly’s 
wording.”  State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 
Ohio St.3d 478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 18.  If language in a statute 
is plain and unambiguous, we will apply it as written.  State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) lists four conditions—divided  into separate 
clauses and expressed in the disjunctive—in which a sentencing court “shall 
impose * * * a ten-year prison term that cannot be reduced pursuant to section 
2929.20 or Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code.”  At issue here is the 
third conditional clause, which triggers the mandatory ten-year term “if the court 
imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is guilty 
of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity 
being a felony of the first degree.”  The first two clauses pertain to different 
categories of major drug offender (“MDO”) and require the mandatory prison 
term if the offender is classified as an MDO by committing certain violations of 
R.C. 2925.03 or 2925.11, or if the offender is found guilty of an MDO 
specification in addition to a felony violation of any of the 14 enumerated 
offenses.  The fourth clause (beginning with the disjunctive “or”) applies if an 
offender is guilty of attempted rape and would have been subject to a sentence of 
life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole had the rape been 
completed. 
{¶ 7} R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) is unambiguous on the question before us.  
Willan was found guilty of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 
2923.32(A)(1), predicated on three first-degree-felony violations of R.C. 
1707.44(B).  R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) states that “[n]o person employed by, or 
associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or 
January Term, 2013 
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indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the 
collection of an unlawful debt.”  R.C. 2923.31(I), in turn, defines “[c]orrupt 
activity”  as “engaging in, attempting to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or 
soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to engage in” any of several 
enumerated categories of predicate conduct, including conduct constituting a 
violation of R.C. 1707.44(B).  R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(a).  Thus, because Willan was 
“guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt 
activity being a felony of the first degree,” R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) required the 
trial court to impose the mandatory ten-year term of imprisonment. 
{¶ 8} We discern no support for the court of appeals’ interpretation that 
to trigger the mandatory ten-year term, the corrupt activity must also be 
“associated with” one of the drug offenses and the attempted-rape offense 
“explicitly enumerated in R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a).”  2011-Ohio-6603 at ¶ 107.  
That construction overlooks the fact that R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) lists the four 
offender categories in the disjunctive, signaling that each has a meaning 
independent from the others and that the existence of any one is sufficient to 
trigger the mandatory ten-year prison term.  “ ‘[C]anons of construction ordinarily 
suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless 
the context dictates otherwise * * *.’ ”  O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 
2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 51, quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 
U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979).  Here, we discern only the 
General Assembly’s intent to require increased penalties in four separate offender 
categories, two of which happen to pertain to MDOs.  In that respect, the corrupt-
activity clause is no different from the language in R.C. 2929.13(F)(10), which 
states that “the court shall impose a prison term * * * for * * * [c]orrupt activity in 
violation of section 2923.32 of the Revised Code when the most serious offense in 
the pattern of corrupt activity that is the basis of the offense is a felony of the first 
degree.” 
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{¶ 9} We also reject the premise underlying the court of appeals’ 
determination that the statute is ambiguous.  According to the court of appeals, 
ambiguity existed “in light of the [statute’s] explicit application of the mandatory 
sentence to sixteen different offenses identified by their Revised Code section 
number, and the failure to include any statutory reference to R.C. 2923.32.”  
2011-Ohio-6603 at ¶ 107.  While we disagree with the characterization of the 
statute as a simple list of offenses to which the mandatory prison term 
automatically applies, we fail to see how specifying the code number of the 
general corrupt-activity statute, R.C. 2923.32, would further clarify which 
predicate offenses are sufficient to trigger the mandatory prison term.  Regardless, 
R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) already identifies which predicate offense triggers the 
mandatory prison term: “the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity 
being a felony of the first degree.”  To add the requirement that the predicate 
offense must also be one of the drug offenses or the attempted-rape offense would 
amount to judicial legislation, and we decline to do so. 
{¶ 10} Equally unconvincing is Willan’s reliance on the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis.  Under that interpretive canon, “whenever words of general 
meaning follow the enumeration of a particular class, then the general words are 
to be construed as limited to those things which pertain to the particularly 
enumerated class.”  Akron Home Med. Servs., Inc. v. Lindley, 25 Ohio St.3d 107, 
109, 495 N.E.2d 417 (1986).  “Corrupt activity” is not a word of general meaning; 
we must construe it according to its specific legislative definition set forth in R.C. 
2923.31(I).  There is simply no syntactic or contextual canon of construction that 
allows us to overlook the only possible meaning of “corrupt activity” or the 
unambiguous meaning of R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 11} We acknowledge that R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) is, like most 
sentencing statutes, complex, but “the mere possibility of clearer phrasing” will 
January Term, 2013 
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not defeat the most natural reading of the statute.  Caraco Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1670, 1682, 182 
L.Ed.2d 678 (2012).  Nor must the General Assembly draft a law with “scientific 
precision” before we will enforce it.  State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 174, 
566 N.E.2d 1224 (1991).  We hold that there is only one reasonable construction 
of R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a): a mandatory ten-year prison term is required “if the 
court imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is 
guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt 
activity being a felony of the first degree.”  Because Willan fell squarely within 
the scope of this provision, the trial court correctly imposed the mandatory ten-
year prison term.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. 
Judgment reversed. 
HALL, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
MICHAEL T. HALL, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 12} I join Justice Lanzinger’s well-reasoned dissent, but write 
separately to highlight the General Assembly’s failure in legislative drafting 
exemplified by former R.C. 2929.14(D)(3), which the majority opinion relegates 
to a footnote to fully accommodate its 24 lines of unrelenting abstruseness 
consisting, remarkably, of the sum total of 307 words and a mere one period, a 
punctuation mark set out as a lone sentinel facing odds similar to that of the 
Spartans at the Battle of Thermopylae, a battle that occurred over the course of 
three days during the second Persian invasion of Greece, and is estimated by 
historians to have occurred in either August or September, or perhaps both, in 480 
B.C., pitting an alliance of Greek city-states, led by King Leonidas of Sparta, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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against the Persian Empire of Xerxes I, bravely standing before the onslaught of 
invaders but ultimately unable to stanch the unrelenting tide of the overpowering 
hordes of words and statutory numbers including R.C. 2903.01, 2907.02, 2903.02, 
2925.04, 2925.11, 2925.02, 2925.06, 2925.36, 3719.07, 3719.08, 3719.16, 
3719.161, 4729.37, 4729.61, 3719.172, 4729.51, 4729.54, 2941.1410, 2929.20, 
without so much as a helping hand from a single, solitary semicolon, colon, or 
parenthesis, other than the parentheses surrounding the capital letters denoting the 
divisions of statutory sections that are sprinkled throughout the statute, a statute 
that purports to inform the citizenry of the potential penalty for certain 
enumerated criminal acts, but by cramming so many words about sentencing into 
one sentence, sentences itself to uselessness, especially in the case of an offender 
involved in a pattern of corrupt activity, regarding which R.C. 2929.14(D)(3) 
surprisingly is completely without specificity, in that it fails to cite a statutory 
section outlining what constitutes corrupt activity when it otherwise lists specific 
statutory sections relating to all the other offenses to which it applies, a statutory 
circumstance up with which we should not put. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 13} The majority reads former R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) as  unambiguous, 
concluding that “R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) lists the four offender categories in the 
disjunctive, signaling that each has a meaning independent from the others and 
that the existence of any one is sufficient to trigger the mandatory ten-year prison 
term.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 8.  This conclusion is a rejection of an alternative 
and plausible interpretation accepted by the three judges on the appellate panel of 
the Ninth District—that there was no legislative intent to “unequivocally impose a 
mandatory 10-year prison term for any offender found guilty of the general 
offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity set forth in R.C. 2923.32.”  
2011-Ohio-6603, ¶ 104.  The court of appeals held that  the statute does not 
January Term, 2013 
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clearly state “whether the mandatory ten-year term applied to all convictions of 
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, or only those that involve the offenses 
that are explicitly identified in the statute.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) is ambiguous 
{¶ 14} In rejecting the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statute, the 
majority views the statute as unambiguously containing four alternative clauses, 
each independently calling for a mandatory ten-year prison term.  But 
grammatically, that is not so.  Former R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) is  a single sentence, 
consisting of 307 words and containing separate references to over 20 other 
criminal statues, none of which is R.C. 2923.32, the critical offense of which 
Willan was convicted.  When examined fully, the statutory language is hardly 
plain. 
{¶ 15} The sentence begins with a compound exception, referring to 
aggravated murder and rape: “[e]xcept when an offender commits a violation of 
section 2903.01 or 2907.02 of the Revised Code and the penalty imposed for the 
violation is life imprisonment.”  Then murder is referred to as an alternative 
exception: “or commits a violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code.”  The 
first if clause relates to drug offenses with two conditions: “if the offender 
commits a violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.11 of the Revised Code and that 
section classifies the offender as a major drug offender and requires the 
imposition of a ten-year prison term on the offender.” The second if clause 
specifically refers to other drug offenses— 
 
if the offender commits a felony violation of section 2925.02, 
2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.36, 3719.07, 3719.08, 3719.16, 3719.161, 
4729.37, or 4729.61, division (C) or (D) of section 3719.172, 
division (C) of section 4729.51, or division (J) of section 4729.54 
of the Revised Code that includes the sale, offer to sell, or 
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possession of a schedule I or II controlled substance, with the 
exception of marihuana 
 
—but then adds an additional clause relating to a sentencing statute: “and the 
court imposing sentence upon the offender finds that the offender is guilty of a 
specification of the type described in section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code 
charging that the offender is a major drug offender.”  The next if clause is a 
compound alternative with three references to rape and says: 
 
if the court imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds 
that the offender is guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious 
offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony of the first 
degree, or if the offender is guilty of an attempted violation of 
section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and, had the offender 
completed the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code 
that was attempted, the offender would have been subject to a 
sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole 
for the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code. 
 
Finally, the sentence concludes, stating that a prison term of ten years may not be 
reduced by judicial release, the Adult Parole Authority, or the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction: “the court shall impose upon the offender for the 
felony violation a ten-year prison term that cannot be reduced pursuant to section 
2929.20 or Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code.”  2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5735. 
{¶ 16} Willan was convicted of violating R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), predicated 
on five first-degree-felony violations of R.C. 1707.44(B).  The corrupt activity of 
which he was convicted has nothing to do with any of the offenses explicitly 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
enumerated in former R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a), now R.C. 2929.14(B)(3).  It is easy 
to discern that the omission of any cross-reference to a mandatory ten-year 
sentence for a violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) means that a mandatory ten-year 
prison term does not apply in these circumstances.  I agree with the court of 
appeals that 
 
[i]t is reasonable to conclude that if the legislature intended the 
mandatory ten-year term imposed by R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) to 
apply to the general offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt 
activity, it would have cross-referenced  the mandatory penalty of  
R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) in its explanation of the penalties associated 
with the general offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity 
set forth in R.C. 2923.32(B(1), as it did in great detail for each of 
the specified drug offenses. 
 
 2011-Ohio-6603, ¶ 111. 
{¶ 17} This interpretation of the General Assembly’s intent is bolstered by 
amendments to R.C. 2923.32 to increase the penalty for engaging in a pattern of 
corrupt activity if the offender is convicted of a human-trafficking specification.  
2008 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 280.  R.C. 2923.32 is now enumerated within the 
definition of “human trafficking” in R.C. 2929.01(AAA) and the human-
trafficking specification in R.C. 2941.1422. R.C. 2923.32(B)(1) also provides that 
if an offender is convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 
2923.32 and is also convicted of the human-trafficking specification under R.C. 
2941.1422, “engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity is a felony of the first 
degree, and the court shall sentence the offender to a mandatory prison term as 
provided in” R.C. 2929.14(B)(7).  I agree with the court of appeals that it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that the legislature understood that such offenses 
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under R.C. 2923.32 were already subject to a more severe penalty under former 
R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) and current R.C. 2929.14(B)(3) in light of these 
amendments. 
The rule of lenity applies to R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) 
{¶ 18} The majority opinion discusses canons of construction but omits 
one important principle to be used in construing criminal statutes:  the rule of 
lenity.  We have emphasized that “ ‘where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, 
doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ”  State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 
370, 374, 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 
348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). 
{¶ 19} “Ambiguity” is defined as “the condition of admitting of two or 
more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two 
or more things at the same time.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
66 (1986).  The rule of lenity is codified in R.C. 2901.04(A), which provides that 
sections of the Revised Code that define penalties “shall be strictly construed 
against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused.” 
{¶ 20} As we have explained, 
 
The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory construction that 
provides that a court will not interpret a criminal statute so as to 
increase the penalty it imposes on a defendant if the intended scope 
of the statute is ambiguous. See Moskal v. United States (1990), 
498 U.S. 103, 107-108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449, quoting 
Bifulco v. United States (1980), 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 
65 L.Ed.2d 205, quoting Lewis v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 
55, 65, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (“ ‘the “touchstone” of the 
rule of lenity “is statutory ambiguity” ’ ”);  State v. Arnold (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 175, 178, 573 N.E.2d 1079. Under the rule, 
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ambiguity in a criminal statute is construed strictly so as to apply 
the statute only to conduct that is clearly proscribed. United States 
v. Lanier (1997), 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 
432. 
 
State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-Ohio- 3478, 912 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 38.  
Thus, Willan was on notice that for a conviction of corrupt activity within the 
meaning of R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a)’s specified drug-related offenses or attempted 
rape, he could be subject to the mandatory ten-year prison sentence.  But Willan’s 
conviction for corrupt activity was based upon false representations in registering 
securities. Because the defined offense of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32 
does not cross-reference R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a), the mandatory ten-year prison 
term is not applicable. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 21} Perhaps if the statute simply said that a mandatory ten-year prison 
term was required for an offender “guilty of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32 
with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony of 
the first degree,” I could join in judgment.  However, it does not. The statute is 
ambiguous because the court of appeals accepted and explained a second, 
reasonable interpretation of R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a).  The rule of lenity requires 
that we construe this ambiguous statute liberally in favor of the defendant.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Ninth District 
Court of Appeals. 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and O’NEILL, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Brad L. Tammaro, Assistant Attorney General, as Special Prosecuting 
Attorney, and Colleen Sims, Assistant Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, for 
cross-appellant. 
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William T. Whitaker Co., L.P.A., Andrea L. Whitaker, and William T. 
Whitaker, for cross-appellee. 
 
John Murphy, Executive Director, Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
________________________