Case Title: Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council1994 WY 21869 P.2d 435Case Number: 93-97Decided: 02/18/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
POWDER RIVER BASIN RESOURCE COUNCIL,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL,

 Appellee (Respondent).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Maynard 
D. Grant of Grant & Newcomb, Cheyenne, Reed Zars, Denver, CO.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Roan, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ. 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Powder 
River Basin Resource Council (PRBRC) and the Wyoming Environmental Quality 
Council (EQC) jointly petitioned for certification of this appeal pursuant to 
WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09. We are asked to resolve whether the Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Act authorizes attorney fees against a government agency. EQC affirmed a 
decision by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) denying attorney fees 
to PRBRC.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      Appellant phrases 
the issue as:

[Whether] 
the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council ("EQC"), as a matter of law, 
incorrectly upheld the decision of the Wyoming Department of Environmental 
Quality ("DEQ") that found the agency had no authority to provide attorney's 
fees to citizen-group Powder River Basin Resource Council ("Powder River") after 
Powder River substantially prevailed in its administrative action against 
DEQ.

[¶4]      EQC presented 
four issues for review:

I. 
Whether the Environmental Quality Council's decision to deny the payment of 
attorneys fees because there were no rules to authorize payment was arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.

II. 
Whether the Environmental Quality Council's decision to deny payment of 
attorneys fees to the Powder River Basin Resource Council should be affirmed 
because the award of attorneys fees for the kind of proceeding in which the 
Powder River Basin Resource Council participated is not authorized by Wyoming 
statute.

III. 
Whether the payment of attorneys fees, absent express statutory or regulatory 
authority, would have resulted in the abrogation of the state's sovereign 
immunity.

IV. 
Whether the Powder River Basin Resource Council waived its claim to attorneys 
fees when it settled the matter and dismissed its objection to the mine permit 
renewal.

FACTS

[¶5]      In February of 
1991, a nonprofit citizen-conservation organization, PRBRC, challenged a DEQ 
decision which renewed a permit for Thunder Basin Coal Company (TBCC) to conduct 
strip mining operations at its Black Thunder Mine. At issue was whether DEQ 
could lawfully approve this particular permit renewal without providing the 
notice and opportunity for public participation which the law required of 
significant revisions to a permit. TBCC had proposed adding a large permanent 
water impoundment to the original permit's reclamation plan. DEQ had approved 
the proposal despite the fact that final design criteria had not been 
established for the impoundment. EQC scheduled a contested case hearing on 
PRBRC's objection to DEQ's action for March 12, 1991. However, negotiations were 
held and, on March 11, 1991, DEQ, TBCC, and PRBRC entered into a settlement 
agreement. The settlement agreement required DEQ to withdraw approval of the 
permanent impoundment that, in concept, had previously been approved. Further, 
the agreement required DEQ to afford the public proper notice of all future 
changes to a proposed mining operation. On April 24, 1991, the Council entered 
an order dismissing the contested case hearing because the dispute had been 
settled.

[¶6]      In June of 1991, 
counsel for PRBRC petitioned DEQ to pay its attorney fees under WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-437(f)(1988). DEQ's initial response to the petition was to recommend that 
DEQ approve payment of the attorney fees. The Wyoming Mining Association (WMA) 
and TBCC objected to any payment of attorney fees under the act. WMA was 
permitted to intervene and TBCC was permitted to continue as a party and both 
submitted numerous memoranda, letters, and briefs opposing payment of the 
attorney fees. DEQ permitted WMA and TBCC to present arguments at an informal 
conference on September 30, 1991. Their primary arguments were that the statute 
did not authorize attorney fees since, in their view, permit review proceedings 
were not enforcement actions and the rules did not permit attorney fees against 
the state. 

[¶7]      In his 
conclusions of law, the DEQ director rejected contentions that the 
"administrative proceeding" language of WYO. STAT. § 35-11-437(f) only applied 
to enforcement actions. The director concluded that PRBRC's objections and 
subsequent settlement with all parties constituted an administrative proceeding. 
The director concluded, as a matter of law, that the rules did not address an 
award in this type of case, and it was unclear whether the statute directs a 
decision contrary to the rules. The director denied an award of attorney fees to 
PRBRC. EQC affirmed the director's decision, and this appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      PRBRC contends 
that the sum and substance of the DEQ director's decision which the EQC affirmed 
is that attorney fees were denied because agency rules were silent on the 
matter. We agree that the DEQ director denied attorney fees because he discerned 
from EQC's statement of principal reasons for adoption filed with the current 
rules an intent by EQC to adopt rules which restricted awards from DEQ. It was 
the director's specific decision that:

The 
argument can be made that since the rules address Environmental Quality Council 
actions and the statute states that awards are to be determined by the Director 
that either the rules do not restrict an award not addressed by the rule or that 
the rules are not consistent with the law and I may ignore them. This I cannot 
do. The intent of the Environmental Quality Council is clear as outlined in the 
Statement of Reasons. The rules were appropriately adopted with full public 
participation. I cannot and will not presume to make a decision which 
contradicts properly adopted rules. While I may or may not agree with some 
decisions of the Environmental Quality Council, unless their decision is clearly 
illegal on its face, I am clearly bound unless they are overturned by a higher 
decision making authority. In this case, while the argument can be made that the 
statute directs a decision contrary to the rules, I do not believe that is 
clear. Absent a clear statutory direction which contradicts the Environmental 
Quality Council's action and rules, I believe I am bound to follow the rules and 
Statement of Reasons.

The 
precise question before us is whether DEQ had the legal authority to pay PRBRC's 
attorney fees.1

[¶9]  It is fundamental in administrative law 
that a silent rule is not a bar to agency action which is authorized by statute. 
See WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990) (requiring reviewing courts to compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld); and Jackson v. State, 786 P.2d 874, 880 
(Wyo. 1990) (holding that an agency may not disregard a controlling statute). 
Resolution of whether an award of attorney fees against DEQ is authorized is 
necessarily a question of statutory interpretation. This is a question of law 
and our standard of review for any conclusion of law is straightforward. If the 
conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is affirmed and if it is not in 
accordance with law, it is to be corrected. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶10]   WYO. STAT. § 35-11-437(f)2 (1988) states:

Whenever 
an order is issued under this section, at the request of any person, a sum equal 
to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) as 
determined by the director to have been reasonably incurred by such person for 
or in connection with his participation in such proceedings, including any 
judicial review of agency actions, may be assessed against either party as the 
court or the director deems proper. This subsection shall apply to any 
administrative proceeding under this act as it provides for the regulation of 
surface coal mining and reclamation operations in accordance with P.L. 95-87, as 
that law is worded on August 3, 1977.

[¶11]   In construing a statute, we 
determine whether the statutory language is clear or ambiguous. Parker, 
845 P.2d  at 1043. We first look to its language and if clear, we give the words 
their plain and ordinary meaning. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043; Keene v. 
State, 812 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 1991). Statutory language is clear if 
reasonable persons are able to agree to its meaning with consistence and 
predictability. Parker, at 1043. In Parker we stated:

We 
read the text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relation between the parts and the whole. We make the determination 
as to meaning, that is, whether the statute's meaning is subject to varying 
interpretations. If we determine that the meaning is not subject to varying 
interpretations, that may end the exercise, although we may resort to extrinsic 
aids of interpretation, such as legislative history if available and rules of 
construction, to confirm the determination.

Parker, 
845 P.2d  at 1045. EQC contends the statute does not authorize an award against 
DEQ because the agency was not a party; an enforcement order was not issued; and 
PRBRC's objections to the mine permit renewal and its settlement agreement did 
not constitute an administrative proceeding.

[¶12]   The thrust of EQC's argument is 
that the "administrative proceeding" language in the statute should be narrowly 
applied to only those enforcement actions against a permittee which result in an 
order by the agency. EQC reasons that if the statute applies only in these 
situations, then settlement agreements would preclude attorney fees because an 
order was not issued. In the alternative, EQC claims that a mine permit renewal 
proceeding is not an enforcement action and the "parties" can necessarily only 
be the objector and the permittee, never the administrative agency. EQC relies 
upon Utah International, Inc. v. Dep't of the Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810 
(D. Utah 1986). However, our reading of that case convinces us that the plain 
meaning of the statute is not subject to varying interpretations, and such a 
narrow interpretation is without merit. A Department of Interior decision 
factually similar to this case supports our view. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 96 Interior Dec. 83 (1989) (hereinafter NRDC).

[¶13]   Both of these cases interpreted the 
attorney fee provision of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
(SMCRA), P.L. 95-87, 91 STAT. 511, Title V, § 525(e) (1977) (codified as amended 
at 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (1989)). This act is the federal counterpart to Wyoming's 
statute.3 Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. 
State, 766 P.2d 537, 544 (Wyo. 1988). Since we have previously held that 
"there can be no question that Wyoming implemented the policy of the SMCRA," the 
decisions in Utah International and NRDC are instructive. Belle 
Fourche at 548; and see Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1981) 
(holding that when the legislature adopts a statute derived from another 
jurisdiction, case law followed in that jurisdiction construing the statute is 
persuasive authority).

[¶14]   The attorney fee issue arose in 
Utah International following a decision by the Department of Interior 
(Department) to designate certain lands as unsuitable for surface coal mining. 
Utah International, 643 F. Supp.  at 812, 813. Environmental groups 
participated in the unsuitability proceedings and were later aligned with the 
Department during litigation to defend the decision. Utah International 
at 812, 813, 818, 820-21. There were also proceedings where the groups opposed 
the Department's motion to remand the unsuitability designation to a different 
Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 827. The Utah International 
court distinguished between the Department's role during the unsuitability 
proceedings and the Department's role when the Department moved for remand of 
the unsuitability designation decision. The court determined that attorney fees 
could not be awarded to the environmental groups against the Department when 
that Department was not a party and when the groups were aligned with the 
Department. Id. at 825; 820. In the first proceeding, the Department was 
not a "party" but rather a factfinder or legislator, and the environmental 
groups were ineligible for attorney fees. Id. at 825. In the second proceeding, 
the groups were not aligned with the Department; the Department was a party and 
the groups were eligible for attorney fees against the Department. Id. at 
828.

[¶15]   Although EQC correctly states that 
a statute which waives sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed in a 
narrow fashion in favor of the government, EQC misconstrues Utah 
International with its claim that the attorney fee provision does not apply 
to mine permit renewals. We agree with the NRDC case which considered similar 
arguments and interpreted the Utah International decision to state that 
permit reviews were proceedings related to the enforcement scheme of the Act.4 NRDC at 94. DEQ was a 
party5 in the proceedings which followed 
once PRBRC opposed DEQ's decision to renew the mine permit.

[¶16]   We conclude from the plain meaning 
of WYO. STAT. § 35-11-437(f) and the precedent discussed above that EQC's 
contention that no legal authority exists to award attorney fees to PRBRC is 
without merit. It is also noted that since EQC's decision, a rule authorizing 
such an award against the Department has been promulgated and adopted. See 
Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 834 F. Supp. 358 (D.Wyo. 
1993).

[¶17]   Although it is clear that PRBRC is 
eligible for attorney fees from DEQ under WYO. STAT. § 35-11-437(f), it is a 
separate determination whether PRBRC is entitled to attorney fees. PRBRC 
requests attorney fees incurred in the proceedings leading up to the settlement 
agreement and attorney fees incurred in appealing the denial of those attorney 
fees. The record indicates that DEQ has already determined PRBRC's successful 
negotiation of the settlement agreement6 entitled them to attorney fees. DEQ 
must now determine whether PRBRC is entitled to attorney fees for this 
appeal.

[¶18]   Because WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(i) 
(1990) directs us to compel agency action unlawfully withheld, we remand to the 
agency for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 
In its reply brief, PRBRC argues that EQC had stipulated to just one issue in 
the joint petition certified by the district court to this court. PRBRC 
concludes that the stipulation precluded EQC from arguing the sovereign immunity 
and waiver issues and presenting arguments on the stipulated issue which DEQ's 
decision had rejected.

WYO.R.APP.P. 
12.09(a) states that "the reviewing court * * * shall be confined to the record 
* * * and to the issues set forth in the petition and raised before the agency." 
The sovereign immunity issue was raised before EQC by DEQ and is entitled to our 
review. The waiver issue was not raised and is not considered by this 
court.

2 
WYO. STAT. § 35-11-437(f) was amended in 1993. The act was signed into law in 
March of 1993, and provides that it shall apply to all actions filed on or after 
the effective date of this act. 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 154, § 3.

3 
The language of the federal act is similar to WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-437(f):

Whenever 
an order is issued under this section, or as a result of any administrative 
proceeding under this chapter, at the request of any person, a sum equal to the 
aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney fees) as 
determined by the Secretary to have been reasonably incurred by such person for 
or in connection with his participation in such proceedings, including any 
judicial review of agency actions, may be assessed against either party as the 
court, resulting from judicial review or the Secretary, resulting from 
administrative proceedings, deems proper.

30 
U.S.C. § 1275(e) (1989).

4 
The NRDC decision stated in pertinent part:

[W]e 
have no doubt that were the Utah International court faced with the issue in 
this case - whether a permit review proceeding falls within the scope of section 
525(e) - it would reach the same result that we have. Our basis for that 
conclusion is that OSMRE seeks to exclude from the scope of section 525(e) a 
proceeding (permit review) which the court expressly indicated was included. The 
court noted that the Department had limited section 525(e) to "proceedings 
related to the enforcement scheme of the Act." 643 F. Supp.  at 824. In a 
footnote to that statement, citing 30 U.S.C. § 1264, 1268(b), and 1275(a)(2) 
(1982), the court stated that "proceedings involving the Act's enforcement 
scheme are also necessarily adjudicatory proceedings." 643 F. Supp.  at 824 n. 
25. 30 U.S.C. § 1264 is the provision of SMCRA governing permit 
review.

NRDC, 
96 Interior Dec. at 94.

5 
DEQ's Rules of Practice and Procedure for Contested Cases would have permitted 
the appearance and representation of DEQ as a party at the contested case 
hearing scheduled by the EQC. See RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO 
HEARINGS IN CONTESTED CASES, ch. II, § 6(a)(6) (DEQ, Aug. 17, 1982). DEQ also 
signed the settlement agreement with PRBRC and TBCC.

6 
Resolution by a settlement agreement does not prevent eligibility for attorney 
fees. Wyoming's APA authorizes agencies to informally dispose of a contested 
case by agreed settlement in appropriate circumstances. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-107(n) 
(1990 & Supp. 1993).