Case Title: Ex parte Southeastern Energy Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1150294, 1150033

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 04/15/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1150033
____________________
Ex parte Southeastern Energy Corp.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Clatus Junkin
v.
Southeastern Energy Corp. et al.)
____________________
1150294
____________________
Ex parte Southeastern Energy Corp.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Clatus Junkin
v.
Southeastern Energy Corp. et al.)
(Fayette Circuit Court, CV-15-900039)
STUART, Justice.
On October 14, 2015, Southeastern Energy Corp. petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Fayette 
Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Southeastern
Energy's motion for a change of venue for the underlying
action and directing the Fayette Circuit Court to grant the
motion and transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court
(case no. 1150033).  On December 18, 2015, Southeastern Energy
filed a second petition for a writ of mandamus asking this
Court to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate an order
it entered on December 16, 2015, transferring the underlying
action to the Lowndes Circuit Court and to direct the Fayette
Circuit Court to enter an order transferring the action to the
Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150294).  We dismiss
Southeastern Energy's petition in case no. 1150033, and we
deny its petition in case no. 1150294.
Facts
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1150033, 1150294
The materials before us indicate that Clatus Junkin, a
resident of Fayette County, owns and operates Johnco
Materials, Inc., a sand and gravel pit located in Lowndes
County.  At some point in time, Junkin purchased diesel fuel
from Southeastern Energy and had it delivered to Johnco
Materials.  When Southeastern Energy did not receive payment
for the fuel, Southeastern Energy sued Johnco Materials and
Junkin, individually, in Lowndes County.  With regard to
Junkin, Southeastern Energy alleged that  "Junkin was
personally liable to Southeastern Energy for diesel fuel that
was sold and delivered to Johnco Materials."  At the request
of the parties, the Lowndes Circuit Court entered a consent
judgment against Johnco Materials and in favor 
of 
Southeastern
Energy for an agreed-upon amount and dismissed Junkin from the
action with prejudice.  
On June 29, 2015, Junkin sued Southeastern Energy in the
Fayette Circuit Court alleging malicious prosecution by 
Southeastern Energy in the Lowndes County case.  On August 2,
2015, Southeastern Energy moved to dismiss the malicious-
prosecution action or, in the alternative, to transfer the
action to "Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other proper
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1150033, 1150294
venue, pursuant to Rule 82(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., and governing
law."  In support of its request for a change of venue,
Southeastern Energy attached an affidavit from Jack R. Pitts,
the president of Southeastern Energy, who averred:
"2. 
 
Southeastern 
Energy 
Corporation 
does not 
do
business by agent or otherwise in Fayette County,
Alabama in any form or fashion and has never done
business in Fayette County, Alabama.
"3.  On September 11, 2014, Southeastern Energy
filed a complaint against Johnco Materials, Inc.,
and Clatus Junkin in the circuit court for Lowndes
County, Alabama, ... to collect monies owed for the
sale and delivery of diesel fuel to [Johnco
Materials and Junkin's] gravel pit operations in
White Hall, Lowndes County, Alabama.  Clatus Junkin
was and is the 100 percent owner of Johnco
Materials, Inc., and was named an individual
defendant because he assumed certain of the
obligations to Southeastern Energy by, in part,
paying for diesel fuel purchased by Johnco Materials
with personal funds.  [Johnco Materials and Junkin]
ceased operation of the sand and gravel pit in
Lowndes County, Alabama, and left owing Southeastern
Energy 
over 
$67,000 
worth 
of 
diesel 
fuel
Southeastern 
Energy 
had 
supplied 
to 
[their]
operations; and never paid for.  A consent judgment
was ultimately entered in this Lowndes County action
whereby Defendant Johnco Materials consented to a
judgment for all monies claimed by Southeastern
Energy plus interest totaling at the time $77,969.41
on February 23, 2015.
"4. 
 
All 
matters 
related 
to 
the 
above-referenced
litigation in Lowndes County, Alabama occurred in
Lowndes or Montgomery County, Alabama, and at no
time had anything to do with Fayette County,
Alabama.  Johnco Materials and its owner, Clatus
4
1150033, 1150294
Junkin, determined to open and operate a sand and
gravel pit as noted in Lowndes County, Alabama, and
to purchase its diesel fuel for such operations from
Southeastern 
Energy 
Corporation 
in 
Montgomery
County, Alabama."
On September 23, 2015, the Fayette Circuit Court denied
Southeastern 
Energy's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
or, 
in 
the
alternative, for a change of venue.
On October 14, 2015, Southeastern Energy petitioned this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Fayette Circuit
Court to vacate its September 23, 2015, order and to direct
the Fayette Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the
underlying action or, in the alternative, transferring the
action to Montgomery Circuit Court  (case no. 1150033). 
Southeastern Energy did not request a stay of the action in
the trial court pending resolution of its request for mandamus
relief.  On November 23, 2015, this Court denied Southeastern
Energy's request for mandamus relief with regard to the
dismissal of the action but ordered answers and briefs to
determine 
whether 
Southeastern 
Energy 
was 
entitled 
to 
mandamus
relief with regard to its request for a change of venue.
On December 16, 2015, the Fayette Circuit Court ordered
the case transferred to the Lowndes Circuit Court.  On
5
1150033, 1150294
December 18, 2015, Southeastern Energy moved this Court to
stay the underlying action until resolution of its earlier
request for mandamus relief with regard to venue.  It also
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Fayette Circuit Court to vacate its December 16, 2015, order
transferring the action to the Lowndes Circuit Court (case no.
1150294).  On January 14, 2016, this Court granted
Southeastern Energy's motion to stay, ordered answers and
briefs to address the request for mandamus relief in case no.
1150294, and consolidated case nos. 1150033 and 1150294 for
purposes of writing one opinion.
Standard of Review 
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So. 2d 886,
888 (Ala. 2000).  'Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995). ...
"'The burden of proving improper venue is on the
party raising the issue and on review of an order
transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of
mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear
6
1150033, 1150294
showing of error on the part of the trial judge.' 
Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458, 460
(Ala. 1987)."
Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.
2002).
Discussion
Case No. 1150033
Southeastern Energy contends that the trial court erred
in denying its motion to transfer the case from Fayette County
to Montgomery County.  In its motion, Southeastern Energy
asked the trial court to transfer the underlying action to
"Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other proper venue,
pursuant to Rule 82(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., and governing law." 
Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"(1) As of the Commencement of the Action.  When
an action is commenced laying venue in the wrong
county, the court, on timely motion of any
defendant, shall transfer the action to the court in
which the action might have been properly filed and
the case shall proceed as though originally filed
therein."
In Ex parte Pike Fabrication, this Court set forth the law
with regard to proper venue:
"'The question of proper venue for an action is
determined at the commencement of the action.'  Ex
parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 534 (Ala. 2001); see
also Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. 'If venue is not
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1150033, 1150294
proper at the commencement of an action, then, upon
motion of the defendant, the action must be
transferred to a court where venue would be proper.' 
Ex parte Overstreet, 748 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala.
1999).
"Section 6–3–7, Ala. Code 1975, governs venue
for actions against corporate defendants.  That
section provides:
"'(a) 
All 
civil 
actions 
against
corporations may be brought in any of the
following counties:
"'(1) In the county in which
a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred, or a substantial
part of real property that is the
subject 
of 
the 
action 
is
situated; or
"'(2) In the county of the
corporation's principal office in
this state; or
"'(3) In the county in which
the plaintiff resided, or if the
plaintiff is an entity other than
an 
individual, 
where 
the
plaintiff 
had 
its 
principal
office in this state, at the time
of the accrual of the cause of
action, if such corporation does
business by agent in the county
of the plaintiff's residence; or
"'(4) If subdivisions (1),
(2), or (3) do not apply, in any
county in which the corporation
was doing business by agent at
8
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the time of the accrual of the
cause of action.'
"A party may submit evidentiary material in
support of a motion to dismiss attacking venue.  Ex
parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370, 372
(Ala. 2001)...."
859 So. 2d at 1091-92.  
The materials before us demonstrate that the trial court
erred in denying Southeastern Energy's motion for a change of
venue.  Southeastern Energy made a prima facie showing that 
venue is not proper in Fayette County.  Pitts's affidavit
states that Southeastern Energy does not do business by agent
or otherwise in Fayette County, that Southeastern Energy is
located in Montgomery County, and that all matters relating to
the underlying facts supporting Junkin's claim of malicious
prosecution occurred in Lowndes County or Montgomery County. 
The burden then shifted to Junkin to prove that Southeastern
Energy did in fact conduct business in Fayette County.  See Ex
parte Citizens State Bank, 989 So. 2d 507, 508 (Ala.
2008)(explaining that § 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, provides
that venue is proper in the county of a plaintiff's residence
when the plaintiff establishes that the corporation does
business by agent in that county).  Junkin, however, did not
9
1150033, 1150294
respond to Southeastern Energy's motion.  Therefore, the only
evidence before the trial court when it ruled on Southeastern
Energy's motion indicated that venue is not proper in Fayette
County but is proper in either Lowndes County, see § 6-3-
7(a)(1), or in Montgomery County, see § 6-3-7(a)(2).  The
trial court erred on September 23, 2015, when it denied
Southeastern Energy's motion for a change of venue.
However, after Southeastern Energy filed its petition for
a writ of mandamus asking this Court to vacate the trial
court's September 23, 2015, order and to direct the trial
court to enter an order transferring the case, but before this
Court exercised its supervisory power and addressed the
matter, the trial court sua sponte reconsidered Southeastern
Energy's motion for a change of venue, determined that venue
was not proper in Fayette County, and ordered that the case be 
transferred to Lowndes County.  Because the parties did not
ask for a stay of the proceedings in the trial court while
this Court considered Southeastern Energy's mandamus petition
in case no. 1150033, the trial court had jurisdiction to
reconsider its order denying a change of venue and to enter an
order transferring the case.  See State v. Webber, 892 So. 2d
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1150033, 1150294
869, 871 (Ala. 2004)("The filing of a petition for a writ of
mandamus against a trial judge does not divest the trial court
of jurisdiction, stay the case, or toll the running of any
period for obeying an order or perfecting a filing in the case
....  The petition for a writ of mandamus, if meritorious,
merely prompts the appellate court to exercise 
its 
supervisory
power to tell the trial judge, as an official, as
distinguished from the trial court itself, to do his or her
duty when that duty is so clear that there are no two ways
about it.").  By reconsidering Southeastern Energy's motion
for a change of venue and transferring the case to Lowndes
County, the trial court performed its duty, and Southeastern
Energy's request for mandamus relief in case no. 1150033
became moot; therefore, the petition is dismissed. 
Case No. 1150294
In case no. 1150294, Southeastern Energy's second
petition for a writ of mandamus, Southeastern Energy asks this
Court to "hold for naught" the trial court's order
transferring the case to Lowndes County.  However, as
previously discussed, the trial court had jurisdiction to
reconsider its decision on Southeastern Energy's motion for a
11
1150033, 1150294
change of venue.  Therefore, Southeastern Energy has not
established a clear, legal right to have the trial court's
order transferring the case to Lowndes County vacated based on
the timing of the entry of the order. 
A fair reading of Southeastern Energy's petition
establishes that Southeastern Energy's actual objection is
that the trial court transferred the case to Lowndes County,
"a venue nobody had sought."  However, a review of the
materials submitted to this Court indicates that Southeastern
Energy asked the trial court to transfer venue to "Montgomery
County, Alabama, or any other proper venue, pursuant to Rule
82(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., and governing law."  The materials
also establish that "a substantial part of the events or
omissions 
giving 
rise 
to" 
Junkin's 
malicious-prosecution 
claim
occurred in Lowndes County; therefore, venue is proper in
Lowndes County, see § 6-3-7(a)(1).  Because the materials
before us indicate that the transfer ordered by the trial
court is proper, Southeastern Energy has not demonstrated a
clear, legal right to have the trial court's order vacated;
therefore, Southeastern Energy's petition in case no. 1150294
is denied.
12
1150033, 1150294
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Southeastern Energy's petition in
case no. 1150033 is dismissed as moot and Southeastern
Energy's petition in case no. 1150294 is denied.
1150033 -- PETITION DISMISSED.  
1150294 -- PETITION DENIED.
Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Moore, C.J., recuses himself.
13