Case Title: State ex rel English v. Multnomah County

Citation: 

Docket Number: S057387

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: June 17, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE ex rel DOROTHY ENGLISH,
Deceased,
by and through DOUGLAS JAMES SELLERS,
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Dorothy English, Deceased,
Respondent on Review,
v.
MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
a public corporation incorporated in the State of Oregon;
CAROL FORD,
in her capacity as Director of the Department of County Management for Multnomah County;
and MINDY HARRIS,
in her capacity as Finance Officer for Multnomah County,
Petitioners on Review.
(CC 070708042; CA A137217; SC
S057387)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 6, 2010.
Stephen L. Madkour, Assistant County
Attorney, Office of Multnomah County Attorney, Portland, argued the cause and
filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was Agnes
Sowle, County Attorney for Multnomah County.
D. Joe Willis, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt,
P.C., Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the
brief were Michael T. Garone and Andrew J. Lee.
Stephanie L. Striffler, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, filed a brief for amicus curiae State of
Oregon.  With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and
Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
Barton C. Bobbitt, Sisters, and Jeannette
L. Moore, The Gilroy Law Firm, PC, Tigard, filed a brief for amici curiae Virginia
Louise Bleeg, Darrin Black, Roger J. Miracle, Ann M. Miracle, Harold
MacLaughlan, and Rebeca MacLaughlan.
Before De Muniz,
Chief Justice, and Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Linder, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to issue a peremptory
writ of mandamus directing the county to pay the judgment for $1,150,000.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit
Court, Jerry B. Hodson, Judge. 227 Or App 419, 206 P3d 224 (2009).
**Gillette, J., did not
participate in decision of this case.  Walters, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
This mandamus action requires us to
determine the effect of a final judgment, containing a "money award,"
that was entered "pursuant to" Measure 37, a land use statute that
applies here but that has now been substantially superseded by later
legislation.  Dorothy English, an owner of land in Multnomah County, filed a cause
of action under Measure 37 against the county, ultimately obtaining a judgment "against
[the county] for just compensation pursuant to the provisions of [Measure 37]
in the sum of $1,150,000."  Although the county initially appealed that
judgment, it later dismissed its appeal.  English requested payment of the
trial court judgment, and, when the county failed to pay the $1,150,000, she
sought mandamus to compel payment.(1) 
The mandamus court dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus, concluding that
the trial court judgment was payable only at the county's discretion.  English
appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to
issue a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the county to pay the judgment
for $1,150,000.  State ex rel English v. Multnomah County, 227 Or App
419, 206 P3d 224 (2009).  We allowed the county's petition for review and, for
the reasons that follow, now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I.  MEASURE 37
In 2004, the voters approved Ballot
Measure 37 (2004), codified at ORS 197.352 (2005), renumbered as
ORS 195.305 (2007) (Measure 37(2)),
which authorized awards of "just compensation" to landowners if a
government entity enforced land use regulations that reduced the fair market
value of the landowners' property.  In particular, ORS 197.352(1) provided:
"If a public entity enacts or enforces a
new land use regulation or enforces a land use regulation enacted prior to
December 2, 2004, that restricts the use of private real property or any
interest therein and has the effect of reducing the fair market value of the
property, or any interest therein, then the owner of the property shall be paid
just compensation."
Certain land use regulations were exempt from the
compensation provision, including those "[r]estricting or prohibiting
activities for the protection of public health and safety."  ORS
197.352(3)(B).(3)
 The statute authorized a landowner whose property had been affected by a
nonexempt regulation to submit a "written demand for compensation * * * to
the public entity enacting or enforcing the land use regulation."  ORS 197.352(4),
(5).  If the public entity continued to apply the regulation to the property
more than 180 days after the landowner made that written demand, the landowner
was permitted to file an action in the circuit court:
"If a land use regulation continues to
apply to the subject property more than 180 days after the present owner of the
property has made written demand for compensation under this section, the
present owner of the property, or any interest therein, shall have a cause of
action for compensation under this section in the circuit court in which the
real property is located, and the present owner of the real property shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney fees, expenses, costs, and other disbursements
reasonably incurred to collect the compensation."  
ORS 197.352(6).  
Measure 37 also contained a provision
that permitted the public entity to waive the relevant land use regulation or
land use regulations instead of paying just compensation:
"Notwithstanding any other state statute or
the availability of funds under subsection (10) of this section, in lieu of
payment of just compensation under this section, the governing body responsible
for enacting the land use regulation may modify, remove, or not to apply [sic]
the land use regulation or land use regulations to allow the owner to use the
property for a use permitted at the time the owner acquired the property."
ORS 197.352(8).  Finally, the statute contained a provision
addressing both payment of claims and waiver of regulations:
"Claims made under this section shall be
paid from funds, if any, specifically allocated by the legislature, city, county,
or metropolitan service district for payment of claims under this section. 
Notwithstanding the availability of funds under this subsection, a metropolitan
service district, city, county, or state agency shall have discretion to use
available funds to pay claims or to modify, remove, or not apply a land use
regulation or land use regulations pursuant to subsection (6) of this section
[providing landowner with a cause of action for compensation].  If a claim has
not been paid within two years from the date on which it accrues, the owner
shall be allowed to use the property as permitted at the time the owner
acquired the property."  
ORS 197.352(10).  The government's option, based on those
sections of Measure 37, to pay compensation or to waive applicable land use
regulations, is sometimes referred to as "pay or waive."
II.  FACTUAL
BACKGROUND AND TRIAL COURT PROCEEDING 
On December 2, 2004, the day that
Measure 37 became effective, English filed a written demand for compensation
with Multnomah County in the amount of $1,150,000.  She argued that, when she
purchased her property in 1953, she lawfully could have used the property by
partitioning it to create two separate parcels per year and constructing single-family
homes on those parcels.  Ultimately, she argued, she could have created at
least eight separate parcels.  She listed various regulations that were being
enforced against her property that she claimed prevented or restricted that
originally permissible use.  In response, the Board of County Commissioners
issued an order (the 2005 order), in which it waived some of the 61 regulations
listed in English's written demand.  It refused to waive the other listed
regulations, asserting that those regulations either were exempt from Measure
37 or did not prevent English from partitioning her land into two parcels per
year for a total of eight parcels, the intended use that she had described in
her written demand.
English was unsatisfied with the board's
order, and, on May 16, 2006, she filed an action for just compensation in the
Multnomah County Circuit Court.  The complaint alleged that various land use
regulations restricted English's intended use of the property --
"partitioning it into two parcels per year and then selling the
partitioned parcels for construction of single family homes and appropriate
amenities" -- and that, as a result, she was entitled to just compensation
"in the amount of $1,150,000 (and probably an even higher figure based on
information learned after submitting the written demand for Just
Compensation)."  The complaint alleged that that figure "represents
the amount equal to the reduction in value of the fair market value of the
Property on or about December 2, 2004, resulting from enactment or enforcement
of the land use regulations complained of."  
Two days after English filed her
complaint, the board issued another order (the 2006 order), in which it waived additional
regulations.  The county then filed an answer to English's complaint,
asserting, as an affirmative defense, that it had waived all regulations
affecting the proposed development of English's property, except "1)
regulations restricting or prohibiting activities for protection of public
health and safety, and 2) regulations which provide for the procedure for land
divisions and development of real property in Multnomah County."  The county
explained that health and safety regulations are expressly exempt from Measure
37 and argued that the procedural regulations "are not within the purview
of Measure 37 because they do not restrict the use of private real
property."  
On August 2, 2006, English moved for
summary judgment, arguing that she had demonstrated that she was entitled to just
compensation as a matter of law in the amount of $1,150,000 and that there was
no genuine dispute as to any fact material to her claim.  In the alternative,
she argued that, if any factual dispute existed as to the amount of
compensation due, she was entitled at least to summary judgment "on all
liability issues."  Again, the county responded that it had waived all
nonexempt regulations and that English was therefore not entitled to any
compensation.  On September 22, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on
English's motion for summary judgment.  English argued that the waivers in the
2006 order were irrelevant because they came too late.  According to English, the
county was required to waive the regulations within 180 days of her written
demand.  Because it had failed to do so, she asserted that the county had an
absolute obligation to pay her just compensation and no longer had the option
to "pay or waive."  In any event, she argued, the 2006 order did not
waive all the relevant regulations; specifically, she argued (1) that Measure
37 did not provide the exemption that the county claimed for procedural
regulations and (2) that at least some of the regulations that the county had labeled
as "health and safety regulations" did not qualify for that exempt
status.  
The trial court granted English's motion
for summary judgment as to liability.  The court reasoned that, although health
and safety regulations were exempt from Measure 37, the county had refused to
waive "quite a few" regulations "that have nothing to do with
health and safety."  The court also rejected the county's position that
various procedural regulations were not within the purview of Measure 37.  Because
"the County did fail to modify, remove or not apply various land use
ordinances, including a land division ordinance[,] in its March 17, 2005 order,
or in its May 18, 2006 order," the court granted English's motion for
summary judgment "as to liability."  However, the court refused to
grant summary judgment as to the amount of just compensation, because English had
presented no evidence proving the amount of the reduction in her property value
that had been caused by the county's continued enforcement of the nonexempt regulations.
After the court entered an order
granting English's motion for summary judgment, the county moved to bifurcate
trial on the two remaining issues in the case:  (1) which regulations were
exempt as health and safety regulations under Measure 37 and (2) how much
English's property value had been decreased by the continued enforcement of
each nonexempt regulation.  The court acknowledged that "there's more to
the case than just trying the amount of damages," but nonetheless denied
the county's motion, reasoning that "liability and damages are commonly
combined in one trial." 
The court then set a trial date of
December 11, 2006, and the parties submitted trial memoranda.  However, before
trial, the county stipulated that "just compensation for the claim set
forth in [English's] Complaint is $1,150,000."  As a result, the court
never decided which regulations were exempt as health and safety regulations(4)
or how much the enforcement of each individual regulation decreased the value
of English's property.  
The parties then submitted proposed
forms of judgment.  Each party's proposed judgment stated that English would
"have judgment against [the county] for just compensation pursuant to the
provisions of ORS 197.352 in the sum of $1,150,000."  Each party's
proposed judgment also included a separate section labeled "Money
Judgment," including information such as the judgment creditor's name and
address, the judgment debtor's name and address, and the amount of the award.(5) 
The county's proposed judgment included an additional paragraph, stating that
"pursuant to ORS 197[.]352(10)[,] the judgment for $1,150,000 shall be
payable only from funds, if any, specifically allocated by [the county] for
payment of claims under ORS 197.352."  The only other significant
difference between the two judgments was that English's proposed judgment
included interest in the "Money Judgment" section, and the county's
did not.  
At the hearing on the form of judgment,
the trial court first concluded that English was not entitled to interest. 
When English offered to "type * * * up" a new judgment that did not
include interest, the court noted that the county had submitted a proposed
judgment that did not include interest.  The court was concerned, however,
about the additional paragraph providing that the judgment would be payable
only from specifically allocated funds, stating that it "would sign a
judgment exactly like this one that was submitted without that paragraph. 
Because the actual statute has other provisions that allow the County to use
its discretion to pay it from other available funds and so forth."  The
court reasoned, "The law is what it is, and I don't think it's necessary
to be included in the general judgment."  The county argued that it was
important to include the statutory wording regarding the specifically allocated
funds so as to limit English's ability to enforce the judgment, but the court stated,
"My preference would be to just say that the judgment shall be payable
pursuant to [ORS] 197.352(10)."  
Several days after the hearing, the
court entered a judgment.  That judgment was entitled "General
Judgment" and provided, in part:
"Based on the stipulation of the parties as
to just compensation,
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
"1.       That [English] have judgment
against [the county] for just compensation pursuant to the provisions of ORS
197.352 in the sum of $1,150,000.
"2.       That [English] have judgment for
her reasonable attorney fees, expenses, costs and other disbursements
reasonably incurred pursuant to 197.352, ORCP 68 and Supplemental Judgment.
The court later entered a corrected judgment, in which it
crossed out the word "Judgment" in the section heading "MONEY
JUDGMENT" and replaced it with the word "Award," to track the
wording of ORS 18.042, which describes the information that must be included in
a judgment in order to create a judgment lien.(6) 
The county appealed.
On February 15, 2007, a little over a
month after the trial court had entered the trial court judgment, the board
issued a third order, in which it waived the procedural rules, provided a
process for English to request approval of her new parcels, and listed several
regulations that would continue to be enforced as "health and safety"
regulations.  On that same day, the county moved to dismiss its appeal of the
trial court judgment.  The Court of Appeals granted the motion, and the
appellate judgment issued on February 23, 2007.  On May 24, 2007, the board
issued a fourth order, in which it waived another "health and safety"
regulation and modified the process for English to request approval of her
parcels.  English maintains that even the fourth order did not waive all
necessary regulations.  
III.  MANDAMUS
PROCEEDING 
On June 6, 2007, English sent the county
a certified copy of the trial court judgment and requested that the county pay
the $1,150,000 money award.  See ORS 30.390 (describing process for
obtaining satisfaction of judgment against a public corporation).  The county failed
to pay, and English initiated this mandamus action.  The mandamus court issued
an alternative writ of mandamus, directing the county to pay the award or show
cause why it had not done so.  The county moved to dismiss the alternative writ,
arguing that, even after English's claim was reduced to a final judgment, the county
retained the discretion to determine whether it would pay the award of just
compensation or waive the applicable regulations.  The county argued that it
had exercised its discretion to waive the applicable regulations, and it
therefore was not required to pay the $1,150,000 award.  The trial court
granted the county's motion, concluding that "a judgment entered pursuant
to [Measure 37] is payable only at the discretion of the government[] and that
[English] cannot compel the payment of the judgment."  
English appealed, arguing that,
because the county had dismissed its original appeal and allowed the trial
court judgment to become final, it was prohibited from raising any defenses that
it may have had under Measure 37 to the judgment requiring it to pay just
compensation.  The county responded that English's claim was moot in light of
the passage of Ballot Measure 49 (2007), Oregon Laws 2007, chapter 424 (Measure
49), which fundamentally altered the claims and remedies that previously had
been available to landowners under Measure 37.  The county also contended that
claim preclusion did not prohibit its defenses to English's attempt to collect
the judgment and that, under Measure 37, the county had complete discretion as
to whether to pay the judgment.
The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded with instructions to the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of
mandamus directing the county to pay the $1,150,000 judgment.  The court first
concluded that Measure 49 did not deprive final judgments that had been
issued pursuant to Measure 37 of continuing viability.  Thus, because English's
Measure 37 claim had been reduced to a final judgment, Measure 49 did not
prevent her from seeking enforcement of that judgment.  English, 227 Or
App at 428.  Next, the court held that the county was prohibited from raising
defenses that it could have raised in the underlying trial court proceeding -- in
particular, its defenses (1) that it was not required to pay English just
compensation because it had not specifically allocated funds for that purpose;
(2) that it was not required to pay just compensation because it had waived all
land use regulations that restricted English's intended use of her property;
and (3) that, two years after English's cause of action accrued, the land use
regulations were automatically waived under Measure 37, and the county
therefore was not required to pay just compensation.  Id. at 430-33.  Finally,
the court held that Measure 37 did not make payment of the final, unconditional
judgment contingent upon the county's exercise of discretion.  Id. at
433.  The county then filed a petition for review, which we allowed.  
IV.  ANALYSIS
A.        Effect of Measure 49
On review, the county first renews
its argument that English's claim for just compensation is controlled by
Measure 49 and that the judgment that she received pursuant to Measure 37 therefore
has no continuing legal effect.  In November 2007, more than eight months after
English's trial court judgment became final, Oregon voters approved Measure 49,
which altered the remedies and procedures that had been available under Measure
37.  As we explained in Corey v. DLCD, 344 Or 457, 465, 184 P3d 1109 (2008), Measure 49 "extinguish[ed] and replace[d] the benefits and
procedures that Measure 37 granted to landowners."  Further, "Measure
49 pertains to all Measure 37 claims, successful or not, and regardless
of where they are in the Measure 37 process."  Id. (emphasis in
original).  As a result, the county argues, Measure 49 applies to English's
claim, despite the fact that she was successful in obtaining a final judgment
against the county pursuant to Measure 37.  According to the county, English
must pursue her claim under Measure 49, rather than requesting that the court
enforce her final judgment by writ of mandamus.  In short, the county argues
that the passage of Measure 49 renders English's Measure 37 judgment
unenforceable.  
We disagree.  As the Court of Appeals
correctly reasoned, when a claim is reduced to a final judgment, the underlying
claim is extinguished, "merging" into the judgment; as a result, the "rights
upon the judgment are substituted for the former claim."  Barrett and
Barrett, 320 Or 372, 378, 886 P2d 1 (1994).  For example, if a trial court
incorporates a contract, such as a settlement agreement in a dissolution case,
into its final judgment, then the parties' contract claims are extinguished,
and the parties' rights to enforce the judgment are substituted for the previously
held rights on the contract.  See Webber v. Olsen, 330 Or 189, 196, 998 P2d 666 (2000) (noting that once settlement agreement is incorporated into
judgment, contractual remedies are no longer available); see also Rigdon v.
Rigdon, 219 Or 271, 276-79, 347 P2d 43 (1959) (concluding that settlement
agreement merged with judgment).
That rule applies equally in this
context:  English's Measure 37 claim was extinguished once her claim was
reduced to a final judgment.  When the county dismissed its appeal and the
Court of Appeals issued the appellate judgment, English's rights under Measure
37 were replaced with her rights -- if any -- under the trial court judgment.  The
issue in this mandamus proceeding, therefore, is the interpretation and
enforceability of English's final judgment against the county in the amount of
$1,150,000, not the propriety of her claim under Measure 37.  Although, as we
discuss below, the proper interpretation of Measure 37 might become relevant in
interpreting the trial court judgment, it is the judgment that controls.  Our
interpretation of the judgment and our determination as to whether that
judgment is enforceable are not controlled by Measure 49, as Measure 49 supersedes
only those proceedings that are governed by Measure 37.  See Corey, 344
Or at 466-67 (Measure 49 applies to Measure 37 claims and nullifies "orders
disposing of Measure 37 claims").  The Court of Appeals correctly
determined that the final judgment in this case was not voided by Measure 49.(7)
B.        Claim Preclusion
Having determined that Measure 49 did
not void the trial court judgment, we turn to whether the county is prohibited
by principles of claim preclusion from asserting certain defenses in this
mandamus proceeding.  We begin with a brief overview of the principles concerning
the preclusive effect of a final judgment.  As this court noted in Drews v.
EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 139, 795 P2d 531 (1990), the overarching principle
of preclusion "comprises two doctrines:  claim preclusion, also known as res
judicata, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel."(8) 
(Footnotes omitted.)  Further, the doctrine of claim preclusion can be
separated into two concepts:  the rule of merger and the rule of bar.  See Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 17 (1982) (describing merger, bar, and issue
preclusion); see also Ira v. Columbia Food Co. et al, 226 Or 566, 570, 360
P2d 622 (1961) ("The term res judicata is frequently used in a
broad sense as including merger, bar, [and issue preclusion]."). 
Issue
preclusion prevents parties from relitigating issues that were actually
litigated and determined in a prior action.  Nelson v. Emerald
People's Utility Dist., 318 Or 99, 103-04, 862 P2d 1293 (1993).  See
also Restatement at § 27 (describing issue preclusion).  Claim
preclusion is broader than issue preclusion in that it may bar litigation of an
issue that could have been raised, even if that issue was not actually raised,
in an earlier proceeding.  Drews, 310 Or at 140.  As noted, claim
preclusion can be separated into two concepts:  the rule of merger and the rule
of bar.  
We turn first to the rule of merger.(9) 
As discussed above, once a plaintiff obtains a valid, final judgment, the
plaintiff's underlying claim merges into the final judgment and is extinguished. 
For that reason, the plaintiff can no longer maintain an action on the
underlying claim.  See Barrett, 320 Or at 378 (describing principles).  The
plaintiff may, however, be able to maintain an action to enforce and effectuate
the judgment, and, in that action, "the defendant cannot avail himself of
defenses he might have interposed, or did interpose, in the first
action."  Restatement at § 18; see also Security Inv. Co. v.
Miller, 189 Or 246, 251, 218 P2d 966 (1950) (describing merger and
conclusive effect of judgment).  In other words, when a plaintiff seeks to
enforce a valid judgment, the defendant may not collaterally attack the
judgment as being erroneously issued.  
The second aspect of claim
preclusion, known at common law as the rule of bar, is the principle most often
described by the term "claim preclusion."  That rule prohibits parties from splitting claims by requiring
plaintiffs to "bring all claims arising from the same factual transaction
or circumstances in a single action."  Peterson v. Temple, 323 Or
322, 327, 918 P2d 413 (1996).  Thus, a plaintiff who has brought an action
against a defendant and obtained a final judgment in that action is prohibited
from later bringing an action against the same defendant based on the same
factual transaction or circumstances.  
In past
cases, this court has referred to the foregoing concepts collectively as claim
preclusion, often without distinguishing between merger and bar.  In Drews,
for example, after describing the rule of bar, the court noted that
"[c]laim preclusion applies equally to a defendant's defense."(10)> 
310 Or at 140.  For that proposition, the court cited section 18 of the Restatement,
the section dealing with the rule of merger.  Id.  It is true, as
discussed above, that the rule of mergerapplies to
a defendant's defense:  a defendant cannot raise defenses in an action to
enforce a judgment that he or she did raise or could have raised in the action
in which the judgment was entered.  However, the statement from Drews can
create confusion, because, in Oregon, the rule of bar does not apply in
the same way; instead, under the rule of bar, if, in one action, certain facts
create both a defense and a counterclaim, "failure to assert such facts,
either as a defense or as a counterclaim, does not preclude [the] defendant
from thereafter bringing a separate action based upon those facts."  Buck
v. Mueller, 221 Or 271, 277, 351 P2d 61 (1960).(11) 
That is because, in Oregon, unlike in the federal courts, there are no
compulsory counterclaims.  Compare FRCP 13(a) (pleading "must state"
certain claims as counterclaims) with ORCP 22 A (defendant "may set
forth" counterclaims).  We therefore refer
to the rule at issue in this case as the rule of merger, rather than the more
generic term of "claim preclusion."
With
the foregoing framework in mind, we return to the parties' arguments in this
case.  English argues that the county is prohibited, by the principles of claim
preclusion discussed above, from raising its Measure 37 defenses in this
mandamus action and that the county is bound by the trial court's valid, final
judgment.  Although English uses the more general term "claim
preclusion," the substance of her argument is correct, and the county is
prohibited, by the rule of merger, from raising any defenses in this mandamus
proceeding that it could have raised, or that it raised and lost, in the
original trial court proceeding.               
The county argues, however, that it is
not prohibited from "asserting its defenses to the collectability of the [trial
court] judgment based on the plain language of [Measure 37]," because it
could not have raised those defenses in the trial court proceeding.  The county
contends that the only issue in the trial court proceeding was the amount of
compensation, not the county's obligation to pay compensation.  The county
reasons that the sole purpose of the cause of action provision of Measure 37 was
to provide a procedure for liquidating Measure 37 claims, after which the
governing body (here, the county), could decide whether to pay the liquidated
amount or to waive the regulation.  In the county's view, the trial court
judgment determined only that the value of English's claim was $1,150,000, and
not that the county was required to pay that amount.  Thus, the county argues,
it would have been premature for the county to raise any defense during the trial
court proceeding concerning the county's obligation to pay.
We view the county as arguing, at
least in part, that the trial court judgment potentially created no remedy at
all for English.  In other words, the county appears to argue that, after the trial
court entered the judgment, the county retained the following options:  (1) to
pay English $1,150,000, but only if it specifically allocated funds for that
purpose as described in ORS 197.352(10); (2) to affirmatively waive all
relevant land use regulations; or (3) to do nothing, in which case all relevant
regulations would be automatically waived two years after English's cause of
action accrued, by operation of ORS 197.352(10).  Under the third circumstance,
applying the county's reasoning, English would have no remedy under the
judgment; instead, her only remedy would be the automatic waiver already
contained in Measure 37.  
To the extent that the county argues that
the trial court judgment creates no remedy for English -- and imposes no
obligation on the county -- we disagree.  As noted, the trial court granted
English's motion for summary judgment "as to liability" after
determining that the county had continued to enforce nonexempt land use
regulations that decreased the value of English's property.  Although we agree
with the county that the trial court did not necessarily conclude, in granting
English's motion for summary judgment, that English was entitled to payment,
the trial court did conclude that English was entitled to some remedy --
either payment or waiver of the land use regulations.  Thus, we cannot agree
with the county that the judgment determined only the amount of compensation
and granted English no remedy at all.  
C.        Interpretation of Trial Court Judgment
We also read the county's brief as
raising an additional, slightly more nuanced argument than the one just
described -- an argument based on its interpretation of the judgment itself.  At
times, the county appears to concede that the trial court judgment grants some
remedy to English; the county nonetheless argues that it retained discretion to
elect whether that remedy would be payment or waiver of the regulations.  In
other words, the trial court judgment, although creating an obligation to pay, conditioned
that obligation on the county's continued enforcement of the relevant land use
regulations.  According to the county, that is so because the judgment expressly
provides that it was entered "pursuant to the provisions of [Measure
37]," and Measure 37, in turn, provides the county with the discretion to
either pay just compensation or waive the applicable land use regulations.  As
a result, the county appears to argue, the judgment provides the county
with the discretion to either pay or waive the regulations.  
The county's argument might be
plausible if we considered, in isolation, the wording in the judgment that
states that it is a judgment against the county "for just compensation pursuant
to the provisions of [Measure 37]."  (Emphasis added.)  However, the remainder
of the judgment indicates that the trial court intended to enter an
unconditional judgment awarding $1,150,000 to English.  Initially, we note that
the court included a section labeled "money award," which, like other
judgments making unconditional awards of money, included information about English,
identified as the "judgment creditor," and information about the
county, identified as the "judgment debtor."  ORS 18.042 requires
that any "judgment document for a judgment in a civil action that includes
a money award" contain a section, like the one included in the judgment
here, that is "clearly labeled as a money award" and that provides
certain information about the judgment creditor and judgment debtor.  ORS
18.005(14) then defines a "money award" as "a judgment or
portion of a judgment that requires the payment of money." 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, by including the section labeled "money
award," along with the information required by ORS 18.042, it appears that
the trial court intended for the judgment to require the payment of money.
Moreover, the trial court did not
indicate -- in the trial court judgment, a letter opinion, or elsewhere --
which regulations the county would be required to waive to avoid paying just
compensation.  It is likely that, if the trial court had intended the judgment to
require either payment of $1,150,000 or waiver of certain land use regulations,
the court would have included a list of the land use regulations that the
county would need to waive to satisfy the judgment.  That is particularly true because
it is apparent from the trial court record that the court understood that the
parties disagreed as to which regulations were exempt from Measure 37 and which
regulations reduced the value of English's property; indeed, that was the focus
of the hearing on English's motion for summary judgment.  The county's argument
appears to assume that the trial court intended for that issue to be resolved
in a later proceeding.  That is, once the county had waived certain
regulations, English would bring another action to determine whether she
was entitled to recover some or all of the $1,150,000 award contained in the
judgment.  However, the trial court labeled the judgment a "general
judgment," thereby indicating that the document was a "concluding
decision of [the] court" and "decide[d] all requests for relief in
the action."  ORS 18.005(7), (8).  As a result, we do not interpret the
judgment as leaving open the issue of what was required to satisfy the
judgment.  Instead, it appears that the court included in the text of the
judgment what was required to satisfy it:  payment of $1,150,000. 
The county argues that, despite the
text of the judgment itself, the trial court's statements at the hearing on the
form of judgment indicate that the court did not intend to require the payment
of money when it entered the trial court judgment.(12) 
As noted, the trial court expressed concern about a paragraph in the county's
proposed judgment that provided that the judgment would be payable only from
specifically allocated funds, "[b]ecause the actual statute has other
provisions that allow the County to use its discretion to pay it from other
available funds and so forth."  The court added, "The law is what it
is, and I don't think it's necessary to be included in the general judgment." 
When the county urged the court to include the text from Measure 37 in the
judgment so as to limit the county's liability, the court responded that its
preference "would be to just say that the judgment shall be payable
pursuant to [ORS] 197.352(10)."       
Admittedly, the trial court's
statements at the hearing are not crystal clear.  Those statements are open to several
interpretations, including that the trial court believed (1) that the judgment
would require payment of $1,150,000, (2) that the judgment would require either
payment of $1,150,000 or waiver of some or all complained-of land use
regulations, or (3) that the court did not need to determine what the judgment
would require, because a later court would sort it out.  However, the court more
clearly explained that it was reluctant to include the county's proposed
provision because, notwithstanding the availability of specifically allocated
funds, the county could "use its discretion to pay * * * from other
available funds."  See ORS 197.352(10) (so stating).  Thus, although
some of the court's later statements imply that the court believed that it did
not need to determine whether the judgment could be satisfied by a later waiver,
the record of the proceedings that resulted in the judgment, taken as a whole,
suggests that the trial court intended the judgment to unconditionally require
payment.  In any event, the trial court judgment itself appears to unconditionally
require the payment of money, and the court's statements at the hearing on the
form of judgment do not convince us that the court intended otherwise.  We do not
read the trial court's equivocal statements at a brief, informal hearing to
contradict the text of the judgment, which sets out a "money award"
like any other judgment requiring the payment of money.  We therefore interpret
the judgment as a general judgment requiring payment of $1,150,000.
We now turn to an argument by the
county that is based on the alleged similarity between the framework of ORS
chapter 35, which governs condemnation proceedings, and Measure 37.  In brief,
the county argues that the condemnation statutes permit a condemner to litigate
the amount of compensation that it would be required to pay a property owner
and only then to decide whether to pay that amount and take the property
or, instead, not to take the property; Measure 37, the county asserts, should
be construed similarly.  
Pursuant to the condemnation statutes,
a "condemner" -- an entity with the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain -- that wishes to condemn property must seek out the owner of
the property and attempt to reach an agreement as to the compensation to be
paid for taking the property.  See ORS 35.215(1) (defining
"condemner"); ORS 35.235 (describing agreement).  If the condemner
cannot locate the owner or cannot agree with the owner as to the amount of
compensation, the condemner may commence an action to condemn the property. 
ORS 35.245(1).  The parties then litigate the amount of compensation at trial. 
See ORS 35.305 (describing conduct of trial).  As the county correctly
points out, it may be difficult for the condemner to decide whether to condemn
the property without first liquidating the amount of compensation that it will
be required to pay for the property.  As a result, the condemnation statutes
provide ways for the condemner to elect not to take the property, even
after the jury renders a verdict determining the property value.  For example,
a condemner may, within 60 days after a verdict on the compensation
amount, elect not to take the property, ORS 35.335(3), and thus avoid paying
compensation.  And the judgment in a condemnation case is, by statute, a
conditional judgment.  See ORS 35.325 (after jury assesses compensation,
court "shall give judgment appropriating the property in question to the
condemner, conditioned upon the condemner's paying into court the compensation
assessed by the jury" (emphasis added)).
The county is correct in pointing out that there are procedures
in a condemnation action by which the condemner can avoid paying a compensation
amount that already has been determined in a legal proceeding by electing not
to take the property.  The county may also be correct that similar alternatives
might have been available in Measure 37 actions.  For instance, the trial court
in this case might have entered a judgment that explicitly conditioned the
payment of $1,150,000 on the county's continued enforcement of certain land use
regulations and thereby given the county the express option to "pay or
waive."  Alternatively, the trial court might have granted the county a
certain amount of time, before entering the judgment, to consider whether to
waive the regulations or pay the compensation amount.  Here, however, the court
did not.  As described above, the trial court instead entered an unconditional
judgment awarding English $1,150,000.  The county's arguments regarding the
benefits of first liquidating the amount of compensation and then allowing the
governmental entity to decide whether to pay should have been made before the
trial court and on direct appeal of the trial court judgment.  They were not. 
Rather, despite the county's argument that the trial court include a provision
in the trial court judgment limiting English's ability to enforce the judgment,
the trial court entered a judgment that required the county to pay English a
specified amount.  The county appealed but, for whatever reason, dismissed its
appeal.  
In sum, we conclude that the trial
court judgment is an unconditional money award, requiring the county to pay
English $1,150,000.  The county had the opportunity to litigate the form of
judgment and to request a judgment that either expressly was conditioned on
continued enforcement of the land use regulations or expressly indicated that
it determined only the amount of compensation and did not create any obligation
or remedy.  If the county had wanted to achieve that result in the trial court,
its remedy when it did not was to file a direct appeal.  English obtained a
final, unconditional judgment, including a money award, and the county cannot
now collaterally attack that judgment as erroneous.  We therefore have no
occasion to address the majority of the county's arguments concerning the
proper construction of Measure 37.
D.        Validity of Trial Court Judgment
Having concluded that the trial court
judgment unconditionally requires the payment of money, the only remaining
issue is whether Measure 37 itself prohibits or voids otherwise final,
unconditional judgments.  See State v. McDonnell, 343 Or 557, 562, 176
P3d 1236 (2007) ("[A] void judgment is subject to collateral
attack, while a voidable judgment is subject only to direct attack."
(Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original.)).  In other words,
the county's only remaining argument is that, even if the trial court intended
to enter an unconditional judgment requiring the payment of money, because of
the framework of Measure 37, it was not permitted to do so, and the trial court
judgment is therefore unenforceable.  
That argument is not well taken.  "[W]hen
a trial court has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, a judgment
issued in excess of the court's authority is voidable, not void."  McDonnell,
343 Or at 563.  Thus, even if the county were correct that the trial court
exceeded its authority under Measure 37 by entering a judgment that
unconditionally requires the payment of money, the trial court judgment would
nonetheless be immune from collateral attack, because such a judgment would be
only "voidable."  The only issue that the county can raise in this mandamus
proceeding is whether the trial court judgment is void, not whether the trial
court exceeded its authority under Measure 37 by entering the trial court
judgment.    
The county correctly notes that certain
provisions of Measure 37 indicate that the county (and other governing bodies)
has discretion to decide whether to pay claims for just compensation or waive
the applicable land use regulations.  See ORS 197.352(8), (10) (so providing). 
However, to the extent that the county argues that those provisions also void
final judgments that include unconditional money awards, we disagree.  The
county has pointed to nothing in the text of Measure 37 that would indicate
such an intent, and we will not assume that the voters intended to create such
an extraordinary result without having it clearly expressed in the measure that
they approved.(13)
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that the county's defenses to enforcement of the trial court judgment
are either barred by preclusion principles or lack merit.  The trial court
judgment is a final, valid judgment that requires that the county pay English
$1,150,000.  We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals,
reversing the judgment of the mandamus court.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to issue a peremptory
writ of mandamus directing the county to pay the judgment for $1,150,000.
1. We
refer to the original Measure 37 proceeding as the "trial court proceeding,"
to the circuit court in that proceeding as the "trial court," and to
the judgment entered in that proceeding as the "trial court
judgment."  We refer to this case as the "mandamus proceeding"
and to the circuit court in this case as the "mandamus court."  The
defendants in the mandamus proceeding include two county officials, acting in
their official capacity, as well as the county itself.  During the pendency of
this proceeding, English died and her personal representative was substituted
as the real party in interest.  Throughout this opinion, for sake of clarity,
we refer to the parties in the trial court proceeding and in the mandamus
proceeding as "English" and "the county."
2. For
ease of reference, we refer to the entire statutory scheme of former ORS
197.352 as "Measure 37."  All citations to the specific provisions of
ORS 197.352 are to the 2005 version of the statute. 
3. ORS
197.352(3) provided:
"Subsection (1) of this section [providing
for just compensation] shall not apply to land use regulations:


"(A) Restricting or prohibiting activities commonly and
historically recognized as public nuisances under common law.  * * *;
"(B) Restricting or prohibiting activities
for the protection of public health and safety, such as fire and building
codes, health and sanitation regulations, solid or hazardous waste regulations,
and pollution control regulations;
"(C) To the extent the land use regulation
is required to comply with federal law; 
"(D) Restricting or prohibiting the use of
a property for the purpose of selling pornography or performing nude dancing. 
Nothing in this subsection, however, is intended to affect or alter rights
provided by the Oregon or United States Constitutions; or
"(E) Enacted prior to the date of
acquisition of the property by the owner or a family member of the owner who
owned the subject property prior to acquisition or inheritance by the owner,
whichever occurred first."
4. English
did stipulate that some of the regulations were, in fact, health and safety regulations
under Measure 37.  However, English and the county continued to disagree as to
other regulations.
5. English's
original proposed form of judgment labeled the section "Money Judgment
Information To Comply with ORCP 70A(2)(a)."  The county noted in its
objection to English's proposed form of judgment that ORCP 70 A had been
repealed and that the relevant statute was ORS 18.042.  
6. ORCP
70 A used the term "Money Judgment" in describing the section
containing the information that must be included in a judgment to create a
judgment lien.  As noted, that rule had been repealed at the time of entry of
judgment.  It appears that the use of the term "Money Judgment" was
an oversight, carried over from English's original form of judgment.
7. The
county similarly argues that "English's claim for just compensation relies
on a now non-existent statutory provision" -- Measure 37 -- and that her
claim must fail because "there is no present legal authority for English's
claim for compensation."  For the reasons discussed above, the "legal
authority" for English's claim is the trial court judgment itself, not
Measure 37.   
8. Before
Drews, this court had referred to preclusion principles generally --
including both issue and claim preclusion -- as res judicata.  We now
use "the more exact terms 'claim preclusion' or 'issue preclusion' to
denote the respective branches of preclusion by former adjudication."  Drews,
310 Or at 139.
9. The
rule began as one of common law, but ORS 43.130(2) now codifies it:
"[A] judgment, decree or order is, in
respect to the matter directly determined, conclusive between the parties,
their representatives and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action, suit or proceeding, litigating for the same
thing, under the same title and in the same capacity."
10. Indeed,
the Court of Appeals quoted that sentence from Drews in its claim
preclusion analysis and, throughout its opinion, referred to "claim
preclusion" generally, without distinguishing between the concepts of
merger and bar.  State ex rel English v. Multnomah County, 227 Or App
419, 429-33, 206 P3d 224 (2009).  Although we agree that the rule of merger
prohibits the county from raising any defenses in this mandamus proceeding that
it could have raised in the trial court proceeding, for the reasons discussed
in the text, we refer to the relevant rule as the rule of merger rather than by
the generic term "claim preclusion," which also describes the rule of
bar.
11. Of
course, if the defendant actually raises a counterclaim in the first action,
the rule of bar applies as though the defendant was a plaintiff in the first
action.  Further, the rules of issue preclusion apply so that "a party can
not recover in a separate action on a cause of action which he failed to plead
in a prior action by way of setoff or counterclaim but which was necessarily
adjudicated by the former judgment."  Gwynn v. Wilhelm, 226 Or 606,
610, 360 P2d 312 (1961). 
12. The
county also argues that the trial court's statements indicate that the court
intended the judgment to determine the amount of compensation alone, without
creating any obligations or remedies.  For the reasons discussed above, we
reject that argument.
13. The
county also argues that English's death extinguishes her rights under the trial
court judgment.  We reject that argument without discussion.