Case Title: Burdette v. Brush Mountain Estates

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082079

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
KELLY BURDETTE 
 
OPINION BY  
v.   RECORD NO. 082079 
 
     JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 
BRUSH MOUNTAIN ESTATES, LLC  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY  
Robert M.D. Turk, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider two questions:  (1) whether the 
provisions of Code § 55-2, requiring that estates in lands be 
conveyed by a deed or will, apply to the conveyance of an 
easement; and (2) whether the circuit court erred in determining 
that two certain parcels of real property are encumbered with a 
50-foot easement for ingress, egress, and public utilities.  
Although we conclude that Code § 55-2 is inapplicable to the 
conveyance of easements because an easement is not an estate, we 
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court.  The deeds at 
issue, along with a plat incorporated therein for descriptive 
purposes, do not contain operative words manifesting an 
intention to grant an easement. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The appellant, Kelly Burdette, owns 8.281 acres of land, 
consisting of Parcel "A" and Parcel "B," located in Montgomery 
County.  Burdette acquired the real property from Thomas E. 
Davis and Margaret V. Davis by deed dated December 8, 1999 
(Davis/Burdette deed).  The appellee, Brush Mountain Estates, 
LLC, owns an adjacent parcel of real property located on the 
east side of Burdette's property, identified as Tax Parcel 
27(A)40. 
The Davis/Burdette deed contained the following pertinent 
language: 
That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten 
Dollars ($10.00), and other good and valuable 
consideration, all cash in hand paid by the Grantee to 
the Grantors, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, the said Grantors do hereby bargain, 
grant, sell and convey [to the] Grantee, all that 
certain lot or parcel of land, lying and being in 
. . . Montgomery County, Virginia, containing 8.281 
acres, consisting of and being Parcel "A", containing 
6.487 acres and Parcel "B", containing 1.794 acres, as 
shown on a plat of survey entitled "PLAT OF SURVEY OF 
BOUNDARY LINE ADJUSTMENT FOR THOMAS E. DAVIS & 
MARGARET DAVIS", . . . designated Document No. 17214-
02, which plat of survey is of record in the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, 
Virginia, in Plat Book 19, Page 223. 
 
The deed also stated that the conveyance was "made subject to 
all easements, reservations, restrictions and conditions of 
record affecting the hereinabove described property."  
The boundary line adjustment plat (the Plat) referenced in 
the Davis/Burdette deed was prepared and recorded in conjunction 
with a September 2, 1999 deed from Gordon M. Roberts, II and 
Mary Alice Roberts, and the Harvey Family Partnership # 1 to the 
Davises (Roberts/Davis deed).  In that deed, the Davises 
acquired Parcel "B."  They already owned Parcel "A."  The 
Roberts/Davis deed contained substantially the same language as 
2 
that set forth in the subsequent Davis/Burdette deed, including 
the statement that the conveyance was "made subject to all 
easements, restrictions and conditions of record affecting the 
hereinabove described property." 
Brush Mountain, as a party of the third part, executed the 
Roberts/Davis deed in order to effect a release of its option to 
purchase Parcel "B."  The stated consideration for the release 
was "One ($1.00) Dollar, cash in hand paid, and other good and 
valuable consideration." 
The Plat referenced in both deeds depicts a 50-foot 
easement that traverses the southern portion of Parcel "A" and 
Parcel "B" and contains two separate notations stating, "SEE 
NOTE # 6."  Note # 6 on the Plat contains the following 
language:  "50' PRIVATE EASEMENT FOR INGRESS, EGRESS AND PUBLIC 
UTILITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF TAX PARCEL 27(A)40 [Brush Mountain's 
real property], IS HEREBY CONVEYED."  The Plat was signed before 
notaries public by the Robertses, the Harvey Family Partnership 
# 1, Brush Mountain, and the Davises. 
Brush Mountain submitted a request to rezone its Tax Parcel 
27(A)40, indicating its intent to develop the property and 
access it via the easement shown on the Plat.  Burdette 
apparently learned of Brush Mountain's intent and filed a 
complaint for declaratory judgment against Brush Mountain in the 
circuit court.  Burdette contested Brush Mountain's claim of an 
3 
easement over her property, alleging "there is no easement 
established by any of the methods recognized in law and that 
there is no deed or will granting [such] rights to [Brush 
Mountain]."  In response, Brush Mountain filed an answer and 
counter-complaint for declaratory judgment, asking the circuit 
court to declare that Brush Mountain is "entitled to 
unrestricted use" of the easement as shown on the Plat. 
Brush Mountain then moved for summary judgment.  After 
considering the parties' letter memoranda, the circuit court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Brush Mountain, holding 
that "a 50-foot private easement for ingress, egress and pubic 
utility" exists for the benefit of Tax Parcel 27(A)40, owned by 
Brush Mountain, over the real property owned by Burdette and 
ordering Burdette not to interfere with Brush Mountain's use of 
the easement as shown on the Plat.  In a letter opinion 
incorporated in the final order, the circuit court framed the 
question before it as whether the notes on the Plat were 
sufficient to create an easement for the benefit of Brush 
Mountain.  The court concluded 
in this particular instance, an easement to Brush 
Mountain Estates, LLC exists as a result of the [P]lat 
referenced herein.  It is clear from the documents 
presented that Thomas E. Davis and Margaret V. Davis 
granted, pursuant to this [P]lat, a 50-foot easement 
to benefit Brush Mountain Estates, LLC.  Kelly 
Burdette then obtained the property from the Davis[es] 
with at least constructive knowledge that this 
easement existed. 
4 
. . . . 
These deeds all conveyed property that was subject to 
existing easements.  Clearly, the public record shows 
that an easement did, in fact, exist for Brush 
Mountain Estates, LLC.  By incorporating the [P]lat 
into [their deed, the Davises] accepted all notations 
that were made on that [P]lat and all easements and 
whatever encumbrances on [their] property it may have 
shown. 
 
Burdette now appeals from the circuit court's judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
Relying on Code § 55-2, Burdette argues that any interest 
in land, including an easement, can be conveyed only by a deed 
or will and that Code § 55-48 provides the proper form for a 
deed.  Burdette further contends there is no deed conveying the 
easement at issue to either Brush Mountain or its predecessors 
in title and that the Plat, being neither a deed nor a will, did 
not convey the easement.  According to Burdette, the circuit 
court properly framed the issue as whether the notes on the Plat 
were sufficient to create an easement but then erroneously 
concluded that the Davises granted, pursuant to the Plat, a 50-
foot easement to Brush Mountain despite the absence of any 
language of conveyance in either the Roberts/Davis deed or the 
Davis/Burdette deed. 
Brush Mountain, however, asserts that the provisions of 
Code § 55-2 are not applicable and the existence of a deed 
complying with the requirements of Code § 55-48 is not essential 
5 
to the conveyance of an easement.  Brush Mountain further argues 
that, even assuming Code § 55-2 does require an easement to be 
conveyed by a deed in the prescribed form, the Roberts/Davis 
deed and the Davis/Burdette deed suffice.  According to Brush 
Mountain, both deeds refer to and incorporate the Plat and both 
contain language stating that the particular conveyance was 
subject to easements of record affecting the described property. 
In relevant part, Code § 55-2 provides:  "No estate of 
inheritance or freehold or for a term of more than five years in 
lands shall be conveyed unless by deed or will."1  The provisions 
of Code § 55-2, by their plain terms, apply only to estates.  
Although this Court has never specifically addressed whether an 
easement is an estate, we have held that "[e]asements are not 
ownership interests in the servient tract but 'the privilege to 
use the land of another in a particular manner and for a 
particular purpose.'"  Russakoff v. Scruggs, 241 Va. 135, 138, 
400 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1991) (quoting Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 
216, 355 S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (1987)); see also Clayborn v. 
Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 392, 105 S.E. 117, 120 
(1920) (referring to an easement as an incorporeal 
hereditament); Restatement of Property § 467 cmt. c ("An estate 
differs from an easement in that an estate is an interest in 
                     
1 Code § 55-48 merely sets out the proper form of a deed. 
6 
land which is or may become possessory while an easement is 
never a possessory interest."). 
If an easement is not an ownership interest in land, it is 
axiomatic that an easement is not an estate.  This conclusion is 
consistent with authorities from numerous jurisdictions.  See, 
e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 
585, 589 (Cal. 1867) ("The public took nothing but an easement, 
and that term excludes the idea of an estate in the land on 
which the servitude was imposed."); Posick v. Mark IV Constr. 
Co., 952 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) ("An easement is 
not an estate in land, but is merely an interest in land in the 
possession of another."); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franchise Fin. 
Corp. of Am., 711 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
("An easement is an incorporeal, nonpossessory interest in land 
which concerns the use of the land of another.  An easement is 
not an estate in land and does not convey title to land or 
dispossess the owner of the land subject to the easement.  
Instead, an easement only grants the right to use the property 
for some particular purpose or purposes."); Sun Valley Land & 
Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 66 P.3d 798, 802 (Idaho 2003) ("An 
easement is not an estate in land, but is merely an interest in 
land in the possession of another."); Farnes v. Lane, 161 N.W.2d 
297, 299 (Minn. 1968) ("A private easement appurtenant is not an 
estate in land.  It is an incorporeal hereditament which permits 
7 
use of the land of another in a way fixed by the scope and 
nature of the easement granted or otherwise acquired."); Voltmer 
Family Farms, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 343 N.W.2d 755, 757 
(Neb. 1984) ("An easement is not an estate in land, and the 
estate in fee simple from which an easement is granted is not 
reduced to a lesser estate as a result of the easement. . . .  
An easement is an interest in real estate, an incorporeal 
hereditament, which permits use of another's land for a 
specified purpose." (citations omitted)); Douglas v. Medical 
Investors, Inc., 182 S.E.2d 720, 722 (S.C. 1971) ("An easement 
is a right which one person has to use the land of another for a 
specific purpose and gives no title to the land on which the 
servitude is imposed.  An easement is therefore not an estate in 
lands in the usual sense." (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)); Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946) 
(defining an easement as a servitude rather than an interest in 
land); Town of Menasha v. City of Menasha, 168 N.W.2d 161, 165 
(Wis. 1969) ("An easement is not an estate in land[.]  An 
easement . . . exist[s] distinct from the ownership of the 
soil. . . . an easement differs from a fee or a limited fee in 
that in case of an easement title does not pass but only a right 
to use or privilege in the land of another." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
8 
Since an easement is not an estate, the provisions of Code 
§ 55-2 do not control the conveyance of an easement.  The 
history of that statute supports this holding.  "While its 
Virginian statutory antecedents date back to 1705, Code § 55-2, 
sometimes called the statute of conveyances, see, e.g., Smith v. 
Payne, 153 Va. 746, 756, 151 S.E. 295, 298 (1930), apparently is 
based in part upon section three of the English Statute of 
Frauds, 29 Chas. II, c.3 (1677)."  Burns v. Equitable Assocs., 
220 Va. 1020, 1031, 265 S.E.2d 737, 744 (1980).  Section three 
of the English Statute of Frauds provided, in relevant part: 
[N]o Leafes, Eftates or Interefts, either of Freehold, 
or Terms of Years, or any uncertain Intereft, not 
being Copyhold or cuftomary Intereft, of, in, to or 
out of any Meffuages, Manors, Lands, Tenements or 
Hereditaments, fhall . . . be affigned, granted or 
furrendred, unlefs it be by Deed or Note in Writing, 
figned by the Party fo affigning, granting or 
furrendring the fame.  
 
29 Chas. II, c. 3 (1676).  Notably, that statute included 
interests in land; whereas Code § 55-2 omits any reference to 
mere interests in land.  The General Assembly, by limiting Code 
§ 55-2 to estates, clearly intended to exclude easements from 
the requirements of Code § 55-2. 
Furthermore, this Court has found that an easement was 
granted pursuant to a written instrument not in the form of a 
deed, see, e.g., Corbett v. Ruben, 223 Va. 468, 470-71, 290 
S.E.2d 847, 848-49 (1982) (recognizing grant of an easement 
9 
pursuant to a "document styled 'Declaration and Easement'"); 
Davis v. Cleve Marsh Hunt Club, 242 Va. 29, 34, 405 S.E.2d 839, 
842 (1991) (finding an express grant of a permanent right-of-way 
in a contract for sale), and by an oral agreement and part 
performance, see, e.g., Buckles v. Kennedy Coal Corp., 134 Va. 
1, 15-16, 114 S.E. 233, 237 (1922) (recognizing that the statute 
of frauds can be evaded by part performance of obligations and 
"that it would be strange indeed if it did not also include the 
parol creation of an easement").  See also Bunn v. Offutt, 216 
Va. 681, 684, 222 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1976) ("Easements may be 
created by express grant or reservation, by implication, by 
estoppel or by prescription.").  Certainly, a deed may convey an 
easement.  See Code § 55-6 ("Any interest in or claim to real 
estate, including easements in gross, may be disposed of by deed 
or will.").  The permissive language of Code § 55-6, i.e., "may 
be disposed of by deed," refutes, however, the argument that 
Code § 55-2 requires easements to be conveyed by a deed in the 
form prescribed by Code § 55-48. 
Our holding that Code § 55-2 is inapplicable to the 
conveyance of easements, however, does not end our analysis.  
The circuit court did not mention Code § 55-2 in its final order 
or letter opinion.  Instead, the court concluded that, by 
incorporating the Plat into their deed, the Davises accepted all 
notations on the Plat, including the 50-foot easement that 
10 
encumbered their property.  The court specifically relied on the 
language in the Roberts/Davis deed and the Davis/Burdette deed 
subjecting the respective conveyance to easements of record 
affecting the described property. 
In Davis v. Henning, 250 Va. 271, 275, 462 S.E.2d 106, 108 
(1995), we considered "subject to" language in a deed and 
resolved whether such language "was sufficient to bring an 
easement into existence or whether the language merely 
acknowledged the easement as a previously existing right 
burdening the servient tract being conveyed."  There, Parco 
Building Corporation executed in 1980 a deed of easement 
granting George J. Parker the right to use a dirt road to access 
Parker Lane, a public right of way, from the "Davis parcel," 
which was owned by Parker and was a portion of a tract that 
formerly contained 7.103 acres.  Id. at 273, 462 S.E.2d at 107.  
A few days later, Parker acquired the remainder of the 7.103-
acre tract, and the parties agreed that the 1980 deed of 
easement from Parco to Parker was extinguished pursuant to the 
doctrine of merger when Parker acquired both the Davis parcel 
and the remainder of the 7.103-acre tract.  Id. at 274, 462 
S.E.2d at 107.  In 1984, Parker conveyed all of the 7.103-acre 
tract except the Davis parcel to Parker Road Associates.  Id. at 
273, 462 S.E.2d at 107.  That deed contained language stating 
"[t]his deed is made subject to . . . that certain easement of 
11 
right of way granted to George J. Parker by deed of Parco 
Building Corporation . . . dated July 11, 1980 and duly of 
record in the Clerk's Office above mentioned."  Id. at 274, 462 
S.E.2d at 107 (second alteration in original). 
That deed provision was the source of the parties' 
disagreement as to whether the then owner of the Davis parcel 
had an easement over the remainder of the 7.103-acre tract to 
access Parker Lane.  Id. at 274, 462 S.E.2d at 108.  We observed 
that the phrase "subject to" "is generally a phrase of 
'qualification and notice' and that it 'does not create 
affirmative rights.' "  Id. (quoting S. L. Nusbaum & Co. v. 
Atlantic Virginia Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 679, 146 S.E.2d 
205, 209 (1966)).  That observation, however, did not dispose of 
the case; we also considered what the parties intended when they 
used the phrase "subject to" in the 1984 deed.  Id. at 274-75, 
462 S.E.2d at 108. 
Recognizing that Parker may have been unaware that the 1980 
deed of easement was extinguished by merger when he acquired 
both tracts, we concluded that the "subject to" language was 
"consistent with acknowledging an existing right which is 
excepted from the transfer, thereby continuing an existing 
limitation on the grantee's fee simple ownership of the dirt 
road [and] inconsistent with creating or recreating a right not 
in existence and reserving that right for the grantor's 
12 
benefit."  Id. at 275, 462 S.E.2d at 108.  Thus, considering the 
"subject to" language and the circumstances when the deed was 
executed, we held "that the 1984 deed did not create an express 
easement in favor of the Davis parcel."  Id.; see also Taylor v. 
McConchie, 264 Va. 377, 383, 569 S.E.2d 35, 38 (2002) (language 
in a deed stating the conveyance was "'subject to all easements 
. . . of record'" meant merely that any existing rights were 
excepted from the conveyance). 
In Strickland v. Barnes, 209 Va. 438, 164 S.E.2d 768 
(1968), however, this Court reached an ostensibly contrary 
result.  There, a deed to the plaintiffs' predecessor in title 
stated that the conveyance was "made subject to the easements 
and restrictions shown on the said plat."  Id. at 439, 164 
S.E.2d at 770.  The referenced plat depicted several easements, 
one of which was a 25-foot strip " 'Reserved for future R.R. 
Siding.' "  Id.  The 25-foot strip was situated along the 
southern boundary of several lots, two of which were owned by 
the plaintiffs.  Id. at 446, 164 S.E.2d at 774. 
Although the "crucial question" in the case was whether the 
deed granted an easement for ingress and egress across the 25-
foot strip or only an easement to use a railroad siding if one 
were constructed on the 25-foot strip sometime in the future, we 
first addressed the defendants' assertion that their predecessor 
in title did not convey any easement across the 25-foot strip 
13 
but merely reserved the strip for his own use.  Id. at 439, 442, 
164 S.E.2d at 770.  We rejected that argument because the 
defendants' predecessor owned fee simple title to the 25-foot 
strip and such a reservation would therefore have been 
meaningless.  Id.  Thus, we concluded that in the context of the 
particular deed at issue, the language stating "[t]his deed is 
made subject to the easements and restrictions shown on the said 
plat" were "words of conveyance."  Id. 
We find several significant factual differences between the 
case before us and Strickland.  First, we are confronted in the 
Roberts/Davis deed and the Davis/Burdette deed with "subject to" 
language commonly used, i.e., "boiler plate" language, to notify 
a purchaser of real property about existing encumbrances that 
may apply to the property.  But see Davis, 250 Va. at 275, 462 
S.E.2d at 108 (language subjecting a conveyance to a particular 
easement of record was not "boiler plate" language).  The 
"subject to" language at issue in Strickland referred to 
easements on a specific plat; whereas, the "subject to" language 
in both the Roberts/Davis deed and the Davis/Burdette deed fails 
to mention a specific easement or plat.  Further, the lots 
comprising the dominant estate in Strickland were identifiable 
on the referenced plat, but the Plat here depicts a 50-foot 
easement across Parcels "A" and "B" and continuing to real 
property not included in the survey and identified only in Note 
14 
# 6 as "Tax Parcel 27(A)40."  Looking solely at the Plat, a 
person could not determine the size of Tax Parcel 27(A)40 and 
thus could not glean any information about the extent of the 
burden imposed on the servient estate. 
Additionally, the purported owner of the dominant estate, 
Brush Mountain, was a stranger to the Roberts/Davis deed except 
for the limited purpose of releasing its option to purchase 
Parcel "B" and was a complete stranger to the Davis/Burdette 
deed.  Brush Mountain, nevertheless, asserts it has an express 
easement for the benefit of Tax Parcel 27(A)40 across Parcel "A" 
and Parcel "B" based on the depiction of a 50-foot easement on 
the Plat, Note # 6, and the "subject to" language in the 
Roberts/Davis deed and the Davis/Burdette deed.  We do not 
agree. 
Neither statutory nor common law requires the grantor of an 
easement to employ any particular words of art so long as "'the 
intention to "grant" is so manifest on the face of the 
instrument that no other construction could be put upon it.'"  
Corbett, 223 Va. at 471, 290 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting Albert v. 
Holt, 137 Va. 5, 10, 119 S.E. 120, 122 (1923)); accord 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Properties One, Inc., 
247 Va. 136, 139, 439 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1994).  "Thus, a 
provision in an instrument claimed to create an easement must be 
strictly construed, with any doubt being resolved against the 
15 
establishment of the easement."  Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 
247 Va. at 139, 439 S.E.2d at 371 (citing Town of Vinton v. City 
of Roanoke, 195 Va. 881, 893, 80 S.E.2d 608, 615 (1954)). 
Considering the particular circumstances of the two deeds 
and Plat at issue, and resolving any doubt against the 
establishment of an easement, we conclude there was no 
conveyance of an express easement across Parcels "A" and "B" for 
the benefit of Brush Mountain's Tax Parcel 27(A)40.  We are 
persuaded by the rationale in Davis and conclude, as we did 
there, that the "subject to" language in the Roberts/Davis deed 
and the Davis/Burdette deed operates only as a phrase of 
" 'qualification and notice' " and " 'does not create 
affirmative rights.' "  Davis, 250 Va. at 274, 462 S.E.2d at 108 
(quoting Nusbaum, 206 Va. at 679, 146 S.E.2d at 209).  The only 
reference to the Plat in the two deeds was in connection with 
the property being conveyed.  Neither deed mentions the Plat in 
the phrase subjecting the conveyances to easements of record. 
Furthermore, the Plat alone cannot serve as an instrument 
of conveyance.  When a deed incorporates a plat by reference, 
the plat is considered part of the deed itself but only for 
descriptive purposes to establish the metes and bounds of the 
property being conveyed.  See Auerbach v. County of Hanover, 252 
Va. 410, 414-15, 478 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1996) (noting that a plat 
incorporated by reference in a deed is considered part of the 
16 
deed itself, but utilizing the plat only for the purpose of 
establishing metes and bounds); Faison v. Union Camp Corp., 224 
Va. 54, 59, 294 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1982) (same); Mahoney v. 
Friedberg, 117 Va. 520, 528-29, 85 S.E. 581, 583 (1915) ("But 
when a lot is thus described as on a map or plat, to which 
reference is made, such map or plat becomes, for the purpose of 
description a part of the deed and has the same effect as though 
it were incorporated into the instrument."); Edmunds v. Barrow, 
112 Va. 330, 332, 71 S.E. 544, 544 (1911) (noting that a survey 
report was a part of a plat and both were referred to "in the 
partition deed for the purpose of fixing the metes and bounds of 
the several parcels of land conveyed[, therefore t]he report of 
survey and plat were . . . as much a part of the deed of 
partition as if they had been copied into the deed"); Schwalm v. 
Beardsley, 106 Va. 407, 409, 56 S.E. 135, 136 (1907) ("The 
description on the plat . . . is therefore as much a part of the 
deed . . . as if it were copied into the deed."); State Savings 
Bank v. Stewart, 93 Va. 447, 453, 25 S.E. 543, 544 (1896) 
("Where a map of land is referred to in a deed for the purpose 
of fixing its boundaries, the effect is the same as if it were 
copied into the deed."); see also Il Giardino, LLC v. Belle 
Haven Land Co., 757 A.2d 1103, 1119 (Conn. 2000) ("[R]eference 
to a map in a conveyance normally is utilized merely as a 
descriptive tool to identify the property and, therefore, does 
17 
not itself convey."); Roberts v. Osburn, 589 P.2d 985, 993 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 1979) ("It would appear that even though a plat may be 
incorporated by reference into a deed for descriptive purposes, 
its effect is limited to being a descriptive tool.  The plat 
itself does not convey."); Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc., 144 
S.E.2d 209, 211 (S.C. 1965) ("A plat, however, is not an index 
to encumbrances, and the mere reference in a deed, as in this 
case, to a plat for descriptive purposes does not incorporate a 
notation thereon as to an easement held by a third party so as 
to exclude such easement from the covenant against encumbrances 
in the absence of a clear intention that it so operate."). 
In sum, the Plat, despite its Note # 6 and the fact that 
all the parties to the Roberts/Davis deed signed the Plat, 
cannot serve as an instrument of conveyance.  While the Plat was 
incorporated into both deeds for descriptive purposes, there 
still must be an instrument of conveyance, though not 
necessarily a deed in the form prescribed by Code § 55-48, in 
order to grant an express easement.  See Corbett, 223 Va. at 
471, 290 S.E.2d at 849 (the phrase "hereby create and establish" 
signified an intent to grant an easement).  Also, the instrument 
must contain operative words of conveyance sufficient to 
demonstrate the manifest intention to grant an easement.  Id.  
As we have already explained, neither the Roberts/Davis deed nor 
18 
the Davis/Burdette deed contained the necessary words of 
conveyance.2 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand for entry of an order consistent with 
this opinion to be recorded in the land records of Montgomery 
County. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
2 The case before us is not analogous to those instances 
when we held that purchasers of subdivision lots acquire private 
easements over the rights-of-way that are shown on the 
subdivision plats.  See, e.g., Ryder v. Petrea, 243 Va. 421, 
423, 416 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1992); Lindsay v. James, 188 Va. 646, 
653, 51 S.E.2d 326, 329 (1949).  Our decision today should not 
be viewed as casting doubt on the holdings in such cases. 
19