Case Title: Thomas v. Evans

Citation: 200 Kan. 584, 438 P.2d 69

Docket Number: 44,947

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1968-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
200 Kan. 584 (1968)
438 P.2d 69
MARVIN L. THOMAS, Appellee,
v.
THOMAS M. EVANS, Appellant.
No. 44,947

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 9, 1968.
Charles S. Fisher, Jr., of Topeka, argued the cause, and O. B. Eidson, Philip H. Lewis, James W. Porter, William G. Haynes, Charles N. Henson, Peter F. Caldwell, Roscoe E. Long, R. Austin Nothern and Brock R. Snyder, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Frank M. Rice, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Howard A. Jones, William E. Haney, Wilburn Dillon and Larry Nuss, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This was an action to recover the unpaid balance due under a written contract for architectural services.
Plaintiff commenced this action against Thomas M. Evans, Dana K. Anderson and Allen D. Kemble d/b/a Evans, Anderson & Kemble. He alleged that the three defendants were doing business as a partnership; that under a written contract with the defendants, he performed certain architectural services, and there remained due and owing him for such services an unpaid balance of $3,931.15 with interest.
Attached to the petition was a copy of the contract in the form of a letter from plaintiff addressed to Evans, Anderson & Kemble setting forth a proposal by plaintiff to design seven basic houses *585 and exterior elevation variations for defendants' use in subdivision development upon certain terms and conditions including compensation to be paid to plaintiff. The contract concluded as follows:
The defendants, Anderson and Kemble, filed separate answers in which each of them denied he was ever a partner with any other defendant named in the petition; alleged that the three defendants were doing business as a corporation; that they had no knowledge of any contracts between plaintiff and the defendants and in the event such contracts were executed by any one or more of the defendants, plaintiff was aware that said defendants signed said contracts as officers of the said corporation; that if any one or more of the defendants did execute a contract in any capacity other than as an officer of the corporation then said defendants did so without the acquiescence or consent of the answering defendant, and that said acts, if any were performed by the other defendants, were made as individual acts of their own.
The defendant, Thomas M. Evans, filed a separate answer denying that Evans, Anderson & Kemble were ever a partnership; alleging that any business done with plaintiff was done by a Kansas corporation known as Evans, Anderson, Kemble & Hohman, and that if plaintiff has a claim, the claim is against said corporation.
The case was tried to the court. At the close of the evidence the court gave plaintiff leave to amend on the following motion:
*586 Judgment was then rendered against Evans in favor of the plaintiff and Evans has appealed.
The appellant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to amend the petition, after the close of all the evidence, to raise an issue not raised by the pleadings and which was not tried.
The record does not support the contention. After the issues were framed, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the ground the petition did not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. In overruling the motion the trial court stated the issues in dispute as follows:
We must give consideration to K.S.A. 60-215 (b) which provides in part:
The defendants went to trial without objecting to the issues as defined by the trial court. There can be no objection to the amendment of the petition to conform to the issues so defined and tried.
The appellant next contends the trial court erred in holding Thomas M. Evans individually liable on the contract for the reason that the undisputed evidence showed appellee could and should have known that Evans, Anderson and Kemble was a corporation and he "had reason to know of the corporation."
Appellant calls our attention to the Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, Vol. 1, Section 4, where it is stated in Comment (a) as follows:
and to Section 9 of the same work where it is stated:
Also to Comment (d) of Section 9 above where it is stated in part:
The rule as to notice which appellant calls to our attention does not appear to be materially different from the rule announced by this court. In Pope v. Nichols, 61 Kan. 230, 59 Pac. 257, this court said at page 236 of the opinion:
The trial court made oral findings and conclusions which we quote in part:
The appellant suggests that the trial court's finding that the appellee did not have actual knowledge was not the test but rather the true test was, did the appellee have "reason to know" that he was dealing with a corporation? Appellant further suggests that the undisputed evidence shows that the appellee had reason to know.
We do not believe that the trial judge was confused. He was using actual knowledge to include those things which import actual knowledge, i.e., reason to know. A quite similar situation arose in Edwards v. Myers, 127 Kan. 221, 273 Pac. 468, where this court said beginning at page 224:
Both Pope v. Nichols, supra, and the Edwards case were cited in the recent case of Lane v. Courange, 187 Kan. 645, 359 P.2d 1115.
We are inclined to believe that the trial court used "actual knowledge" as including "reason to know."
Whether or not the appellee had "actual knowledge," including "reason to know," was one of fact to be determined by the trial court upon the evidence. (Parker v. Maslin, 85 Kan. 130, 116 Pac. 227.)
We are forced to conclude without detailing all of the evidence that the facts as stated by the trial court  the additional positive statement of the appellee that he did not know of a corporation; the signature of Evans as for a partnership rather than as a corporate officer; the statement of Mr. Evans to prepare the contract for Evans, Anderson & Kemble, and the fact that the corporation had only been in existence two months, November 7, 1961, to January 9, 1962  constituted ample evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.