Case Title: Jake Murray, Jr. v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC96-048

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1See § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC96048
____________
JAKE MURRAY, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 11, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review the decision in State v. Murray, 732 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in State v.
Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). 
We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 Murray makes numerous challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act1
(the “Act”), all on grounds that have been addressed by this Court in other
2The district court, in affirming Murray’s sentence, cites to Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th
DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1999).  In Cotton, we disapproved the decision in Speed to
the extent that it was inconsistent with our opinion in Cotton. 
-2-
opinions.  See McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a
defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does
not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence
regarding the defendant’s eligibility  for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender);
Grant v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1032 (Fla. Nov. 2, 2000) (rejecting an ex post
facto challenge to the Act, and holding that the Act violates neither the single
subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); Ellis v. State, 762 So.
2d 912 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of
Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the
consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142
(Fla. 1991)); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (holding that the Act
violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a
“victim veto” that precludes application of the Act, as well as holding that the Act
is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual
punishment).  Accordingly,  the decision in Murray is approved to the extent it is
consistent with Cotton,2 Ellis, McKnight, and Grant. 
It is so ordered.
-3-
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d
345, 358-59 (Fla. 2000).
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D98-3072 
(Orange County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Dee Ball, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Belle B. Schumann, Kellie A. Nielan,
and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent