Case Title: People v. Garcia

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90958

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90958-Agenda 14-September 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								SAUL GARCIA, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.


	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The primary issue in this case is whether the 15-year
sentencing enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of
a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) is valid and
enforceable. We hold that it is not.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant, Saul Garcia, was charged with several offenses,
including armed robbery while in possession of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)). Although armed robbery is
classified generally as a Class X felony, subsection (b) of the
armed robbery statute provides that, for armed robberies while in
possession of a firearm, "15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West
2000). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion arguing that the 15-year sentencing enhancement violates the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11).
The circuit court of Kane County agreed with defendant's
argument and invalidated the 15-year enhancement. The State
immediately appealed under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145
Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), construing the trial court's order as an
effective dismissal of the portion of the indictment charging
defendant with armed robbery while in possession of a firearm. 
Because the trial court's ruling invalidates a statute of this state,
the appeal was taken directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.

ANALYSIS
	A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging
the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. In re
K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550 (1999). This court has a duty to construe
a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality
if it reasonably can be done. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413,
418 (2000). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law
that we review de novo. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 418.
	This appeal is controlled by our decision People v. Walden,
No. 90976 (April 18, 2002). In Walden, this court concluded that
the 15-year sentencing enhancement for armed robbery while in
possession of a firearm violates the proportionate penalties clause
of the Illinois Constitution and therefore is unenforceable. Walden,
slip op. at 5. Given the identity of issue between this appeal and
Walden, we hold that the trial court's order invalidating the 15-year enhancement in this case was proper.
	By way of a cross-appeal, defendant seeks dismissal of the
charges against him on the grounds that the delay occasioned by
this appeal has denied him his rights under the speedy-trial
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/103-5 (West 2000)). In making this argument, defendant
overlooks Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(4), which provides:
			"The time during which an appeal by the State is
pending is not counted for the purpose of determining
whether an accused is entitled to discharge under section
103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963."
(Emphasis added.) 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(4).
We therefore conclude that defendant's speedy-trial argument is
wholly without merit.

CONCLUSION
	The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed,
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Affirmed and remanded.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:
	Garcia was charged by information in the circuit court of
Kane County with armed robbery in violation of section 18-2(a)
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000))
and with three other offenses in connection with the February 1,
2000, attack on and robbery of Gwen Flores. The information was
superceded by a grand jury indictment charging the same offenses.
Prior to trial, Garcia moved to declare the sentencing portion of
the armed robbery statute, section 18-2(b) (720 ILCS 5/18-2(b)
(West 2000)), unconstitutional. His motion was granted. This
appeal by the State followed.
	The armed robbery statute formerly provided that "[a] person
commits armed robbery when he or she violates [the robbery
statute] while he or she carries on or about his or her person, or is
otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)
(West 1996). The statute further provided that armed robbery was
a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 1996).
	The terms of the statute were amended by Public Act 91-404,
which took effect January 1, 2000. Under the amended version of
the law, there are now four different subcategories of the offense.
What differentiates those subcategories is whether the dangerous
weapon with which the person was armed during the robbery was
a firearm, and, if so, whether the firearm was discharged and, if
discharged, whether "great bodily harm, permanent disability,
permanent disfigurement, or death" was proximately caused
thereby to another person. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) through (a)(4)
(West 2000).
	The significance of the categorization pertains to sentencing.
All subcategories remain Class X felonies, but subsection (b) of
the statute, as amended, mandates the imposition of additional
years of imprisonment where the weapon involved in the armed
robbery was a firearm. If the weapon was a firearm, the offense is
a Class X felony "for which 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West
2000). If the weapon was a firearm and was personally discharged
by the offender, the offense is a Class X felony "for which 20
years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2000). Finally, if the weapon
was a firearm and was personally discharged by the offender and
"great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
disfigurement, or death to another person" was proximately caused
thereby, the offense is a Class X felony "for which 25 years ***
shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court."
720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4), (b) (West 2000).
	Garcia does not take issue with subsection (a) of the statute
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000)), which creates the four new
subcategories of armed robbery. Garcia's challenge pertains
exclusively to the extended-term sentencing provisions in
subsection (b) (720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2000)). According to
Garcia, those sentencing provisions violate the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that
"[a]ll penalties shall be determined *** according to the
seriousness of the offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11.
	The circuit court found Garcia's contention meritorious and
based its order declaring the sentencing provisions
unconstitutional on the proportionate penalties clause. In urging
that the circuit court's order be upheld, Garcia renews his
proportionate penalties challenge. He further argues, however, that
the sentencing provisions are unconstitutional for the additional
reason that they violate due process in that they fail to "set a fixed
maximum sentence for the crime" and utilize an impermissible
double enhancement.
	In addition to advancing his substantive claims, Garcia seeks
to uphold the circuit court's ruling by arguing that it is not
appealable by the State under our Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1)), because it did not have the substantive effect of
dismissing the armed robbery charge, as Rule 604(a)(1) requires.
In Garcia's view, the ruling by the circuit court merely invalidated
the enhanced sentencing provisions of that statute. The State's
ability to prosecute him for armed robbery in violation of section
18-2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2)
(West 2000)) remains unimpeded.
	This argument is well taken. Unlike People v. Walden, No.
90976 (April 18, 2002), and People v. Devenny, No. 91291 (April
18, 2002), the defendant here did not move to dismiss the charges
against him, and the circuit court's order did not invalidate the
entire statute. All Garcia sought and all the circuit court granted
was a declaration that the enhanced sentencing provisions of the
statute were invalid. Accordingly, the circuit court's order did not
have the substantive effect of dismissing the charge. The
underlying prosecution remains pending. The State is simply
precluded from seeking imposition of an enhanced sentence in the
event Garcia is convicted.
	Whether the State may appeal a nonfinal order entered by the
circuit court in a criminal case is determined exclusively by Rule
604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151 (1997). The order entered by the circuit court in this case,
which merely precludes the State from seeking a certain sentence,
does not fall within any of the provisions of that rule. The State
therefore has no right to appeal the order to this or any court of
review, and its appeal should have been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. People v. Ruiz, 194 Ill. 2d 454, 465 (2000) (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting).
	Although this issue was presented to our court, my colleagues
rejected it without explanation in an order entered prior to oral
argument. Having taken that action, the court subsequently
assumed that it was free to consider the appeal on the merits. I
note, however, that even if we had jurisdiction to entertain the
State's appeal, which we do not, there is a separate impediment to
our consideration whether the circuit court acted properly in
upholding Garcia's challenge: that challenge is premature. Unlike
the defendants in Walden and Devenny, whose armed robbery
charges were dismissed, Garcia is still awaiting trial. He is
presumed innocent and may never be subject to the penalty
provisions he contests. That is fatal to his claim, for unless and
until there is an adjudication of guilty and imposition of sentence,
our court can make no pronouncement concerning the
reasonableness of the penalties attached to a statute. That is so
because any such a pronouncement would be rendered gratuitous
by a subsequent adjudication of not guilty. People v. Matkovick,
101 Ill. 2d 268, 277 (1984), citing People v. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d 261,
280 (1981). The circuit court should therefore have denied
Garcia's motion to invalidate the challenged sentencing
provisions, and the validity of those provisions should not have
been addressed by our court on appeal.
	In People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996), which was
subsequently followed in People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495 (1997),
our court did consider the proportionality of criminal penalties
where the defendant had not yet been convicted. In those cases,
however, the defect in the penalties was so intertwined with the
offenses charged that the prosecutions could not go forward. Once
the circuit court found the penalty provisions invalid, it dismissed
the charges. Once the charges were dismissed, there was nothing
more to be done. The matter was at an end. Accordingly, a review
of the penalties' validity by our court was not subject to challenge
on the grounds that it was premature. Unlike the present case,
where the prosecution of the defendant remains pending, there
were no circumstances in which a ruling by this court could later
have been rendered advisory.
	In addition, the decision in Lewis, which was the predicate for
Davis, overlooked our prior decisions in People v. Matkovick, 101 Ill. 2d 268, 277 (1984), and People v. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d 261, 280
(1981). Instead, it invoked People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210
(1995), People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194 (1995), People v. Johns,
153 Ill. 2d 436 (1992), and People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201
(1992). Although those cases did consider proportionality issues
where the defendant had not yet gone to trial, none of them
purported to take up the question of whether a defendant should be
permitted to challenge a sentencing scheme where he has yet to be
found guilty. The issue was simply not addressed.(1) Because a
judicial opinion is authority only for what is actually decided
(Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Chicago
State University v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n,
78 Ill. 2d 143, 149 (1979)), those cases were not proper precedent
for the principle for which Lewis cited them.
	There is a cogent policy against overruling cases by
implication (Anderson v. Brown, 340 Ill. App. 613, 622 (1950)),
and we would have had no reason to depart from that policy with
respect to Matkovick or Haron. The holding in those cases that a
court should not address the constitutionality of sentencing
provisions where the defendant still faces trial and has not yet been
found guilty is a sound one. That is so for two reasons. First, as
noted in Matkovick and Haron, a subsequent adjudication of not
guilty would render any pronouncement by our court gratuitous.
Second, allowing a defendant to challenge a sentencing statute
before he has been found guilty is contrary to the principles that a
court should address the constitutionality of a statute only when
doing so is essential to the disposition of a case and should avoid
declaring legislation unconstitutional if the case does not require
it. See East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East
St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 408 (1997). Matkovick and Haron therefore remain
good law. To the extent that Lewis and Davis conflict with those
decisions, they should be overruled.
	Adherence to Matkovick and Haron would not foreclose
Garcia from challenging the constitutionality of the extended-term
sentencing provisions in section 18-2(b) of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2000)). If Garcia were ultimately
found guilty and given a sentence he believed to be
unconstitutional, he could file a motion to challenge the
constitutionality of the sentencing statute at that time. If his motion
were denied, he could appeal the final judgment to the appellate
court pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 602 and 603 (134 Ill. 2d
Rs. 602, 603).
	Although I cannot sanction the majority's disregard of these
matters, I nevertheless believe that immediate intervention by our
court is appropriate under the facts of this case. In Walden and
Devenny, which were not flawed by the problems attendant to this
case, our court properly reached the merits of the challenged
statutory provisions and found them to be unconstitutional. The
rule announced in those cases applies to all pending cases,
including this one. The provisions invalidated in Walden and
Devenny can no longer be enforced against any defendant by any
court in Illinois. Accordingly, in the exercise of our general
supervisory authority, we should enter an order directing the
circuit court to dismiss the armed robbery charge against Garcia.(2) 
 
 
1.       1The same is true of People v. Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330 (1996), People
v. Espinoza, 184 Ill. 2d 252 (1998), and People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998). Sentencing proportionality issues were taken up in those
cases, but our court gave no consideration to whether review of those
issues was premature under Matkovick and Haron. The issue was not
raised or decided.

2.      2The relief granted by the majority is not only technically improper,
it is insufficient. Because the order of the circuit court in this case
merely declared the enhanced sentencing provisions unconstitutional,
the underlying armed robbery charge remains pending. As a result,
merely affirming the circuit court's order will not afford Garcia the
same relief received by the defendants in Walden and Devenny, who had
the charges against them dismissed.