Case Title: State v. C.L.K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001414, 2017AP001413

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
S.M.H., a person under the age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
C. L. K., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
------------------------------------------------ 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
J.E.H., a person under the age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
C. L. K., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 742, 905 N.W.2d 845  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 19, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 24, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
(opinion filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: DALLET, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jeffrey W. Jensen and Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Jensen.  
There was an oral argument by Jeffrey W. Jensen. 
 
 
 
2
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Matthew Westphal, assistant district attorney, with whom on the 
brief was John T. Chisholm, district attorney.  There was an 
oral argument by Matthew Westphal. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Michael S. Holzman 
and Rosen and Holzman Ltd., Waukesha. 
2019 WI 14 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
(L.C. Nos. 2016TP302 & 2016TP303) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
S.M.H., a person under the age of 17: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
C. L. K., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
FEB 19, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
J.E.H., a person under the age of 17: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
C. L. K., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   The State of Wisconsin petitioned 
the Milwaukee County Circuit Court to terminate C.L.K.'s 
parental rights, following which the matter went to trial in due 
course.1  After the State rested, the circuit court immediately 
decided that Mr. K. was an unfit parent.  That is, the circuit 
court decided the matter before giving Mr. K. an opportunity to 
present his case.  The State concedes this was error, but says 
it is susceptible to a "harmless-error" review.  It is not.  We 
hold that denying a defendant the opportunity to present his 
case-in-chief is a structural error, the consequence of which is 
an automatic new trial. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The State petitioned the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court to terminate Mr. K.'s parental rights with respect to his 
two children, S.M.H. and J.E.H.2  The State's petition alleged 
that Mr. K.:  (1) abandoned his children, within the meaning of 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of 
appeals, 
State 
v. 
C.L.K., 
Nos. 
17AP1413 
& 
17AP1414, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017), affirming 
the orders of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Christopher R. Foley presiding. 
2 The State's petitions also sought to terminate the 
parental rights of E.A.S., the children's mother.  Ms. S. did 
not contest the petition and voluntarily relinquished her 
parental rights to the children. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(a)2 (2015-16);3 and (2) failed to assume 
parental responsibility, within the meaning of § 48.415(6).  Mr. 
K. contested these allegations, and so the matter proceeded to a 
bench trial after Mr. K. waived his right to a jury. 
¶3 
When the State wishes to terminate a parent's rights, 
it 
must 
follow 
a 
statutorily-mandated, 
two-phase 
trial 
procedure.4  The first is the "grounds" phase, the purpose of 
which is to determine "if the allegations in a . . . petition to 
terminate parental rights are proved by clear and convincing 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1).  The result of this first 
phase is a determination regarding the parent's fitness:  "If 
grounds for the termination of parental rights are found by the 
court or jury, the court shall find the parent unfit."  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.424(4).  If the parent is found unfit, then (and only 
then) may the court proceed to the dispositional phase.  During 
this phase of the proceedings "the court is called upon to 
decide whether it is in the best interest of the child that the 
parent's rights be permanently extinguished."  Steven V. v. 
Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  Although the parent may still 
participate in the disposition phase (through the presentation 
of evidence and argument), the circuit court does not revisit 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-
16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 
678 N.W.2d 856 ("Wisconsin has a two-part statutory procedure 
for the involuntary termination of parental rights."). 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
4 
 
the finding of parental unfitness.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.427(1) 
("Any party may present evidence relevant to the issue of 
disposition . . . ."); Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 
¶23, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 ("The parent has the right to 
present evidence and be heard at the dispositional phase."); 
Sheboygan Cty. DHHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶37, 255 
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402 ("Once a basis for termination has 
been found by the jury and confirmed with a finding of unfitness 
by the court, the court must move to the second-step, the 
dispositional hearing . . . ."); see also § 48.424(4) (Upon 
finding grounds to terminate parental rights, the court shall 
find the parent unfit and "proceed immediately to hear evidence 
and motions related to the dispositions . . . ."). 
¶4 
This case involves only the "grounds" phase of the 
trial, at which the State called Mr. K. as its sole witness.  
Mr. K. testified that he had not seen his children "for a couple 
of months" and wasn't involved in their lives.  He testified 
that he didn't visit his children, speak to them, write to them, 
text them, or contact their foster home from July 2015 to 
September 2016.  When the State asked Mr. K. why he didn't 
contact his children, Mr. K. stated he didn't have a phone and 
that a social worker told him he couldn't contact the foster 
home.  Mr. K. admits that he didn't make any effort to contact 
his children and was hardly involved in their lives for three 
years.  When pressed as to whether he had a good reason for not 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
5 
 
contacting them, he said:  "There's no reason at all.  There's 
no excuse."5 
¶5 
On cross-examination by his own attorney, Mr. K. 
reiterated that a social worker told him that he wasn't 
permitted to contact his children or allowed to have the foster 
home's phone number.  Mr. K.'s attorney didn't explore any other 
aspects of Mr. K.'s direct testimony. 
¶6 
On redirect, Mr. K. again admitted that he took no 
steps to contact his children and that he did not make any 
inquiries about how or if he could contact them.  The circuit 
court itself asked Mr. K. to relate what the social worker told 
him.  "[S]he told me that she wasn't allowed to give me any 
information on [my children,]" he said.  The circuit court also 
asked him why he chose not to visit his children even though he 
had visitation rights.  Mr. K. said he moved out of town in July 
2015 for a better job and was unable to visit his children. 
¶7 
The guardian ad litem renewed his examination, asking 
Mr. K. whether anything prevented him from visiting his 
children.  Mr. K. said that other than being out of town, 
nothing prevented him from exercising his visitation rights.  
Mr. K's testimony ended with his attorney asking him about the 
contact information Mr. K. gave to the social worker. 
¶8 
The State rested the "grounds" phase of its case at 
the conclusion of Mr. K.'s testimony.  After some discussion 
                                                 
5 The guardian ad litem's questioning elicited similar 
testimony. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
6 
 
amongst the parties and the circuit court about the next 
procedural step in the case, Mr. K.'s attorney asked that he be 
allowed to "put my client on the stand and finish our side of 
the case."  Before he could do so, however, the guardian ad 
litem moved the circuit court for a directed verdict arguing 
that the State had proved adequate grounds for terminating Mr. 
K.'s parental rights. 
¶9 
Even though Mr. K. had not yet put on his case, the 
circuit court granted the motion.  It decided that, even when 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. K., he 
had abandoned S.M.H. and J.E.H. within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(a)2.6  After finding Mr. K. to be an unfit parent, the 
circuit court proceeded later that same day to the "disposition" 
phase of the trial to determine the children's best interests.  
At its conclusion, the circuit court permanently terminated Mr. 
K.'s parental rights to both his children. 
¶10 Mr. K. appealed.7  He argued that deciding whether he 
was an unfit parent before he could present his case violated 
his due process rights.  Further, and more significantly for our 
purposes here, Mr. K. said this was no run-of-the-mill error, it 
                                                 
6 Because it found sufficient grounds for termination based 
on abandonment, the circuit court chose not to address the 
State's second allegation——that Mr. K. failed to assume parental 
responsibility within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6). 
7 On August 9, 2017, the court of appeals consolidated the 
two orders terminating Mr. K.'s parental rights and considered 
both of them in a single appeal.  
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
7 
 
was structural error, the consequence of which is a mandatory 
reversal.  The State admitted error (it could hardly do 
otherwise), but maintained the circuit court's decision was 
subject to a "harmless-error" review. 
¶11 The court of appeals agreed with the State.  The court 
of appeals said the evidentiary record (to which Mr. K. was 
unable 
to 
contribute 
except 
through 
the 
State's 
adverse 
examination 
and 
his 
own 
counsel's 
cross-examination) 
overwhelmingly established grounds for termination.  So the 
error, it concluded, was harmless.  We granted Mr. K.'s petition 
for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 The issue we consider here presents a question of law:  
"Whether a particular error is structural and therefore not 
subject to a harmless error review is a question of law for our 
independent review."  State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶18, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317 (citing State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, 
¶9, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491.).  Thus, our review is de 
novo. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶13 The parties agree the circuit court erred when it 
decided he was an unfit parent before he had an opportunity to 
present his defense.  But they go their separate ways with 
respect to whether this error was "structural," as opposed to 
something subject to "harmless-error" review.  Travis, 347 
Wis. 2d 142, ¶55 ("Constitutional errors may be structural 
errors or may be subject to harmless error analysis.").  The 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
8 
 
difference is important because the former category requires an 
automatic reversal, while the latter allows the circuit court's 
judgment to stand so long as there is no consequential injury to 
the defendant's case. 
¶14 The United States Supreme Court provides the rubric we 
use in categorizing trial errors.  The potentially harmless 
ones, it says, are those that "occur[] during presentation of 
the case to the jury and their effect may be quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
determine whether [they were] harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 
(2006) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 
(1991)) (internal marks omitted).  Only a very limited number of 
errors 
"require 
automatic 
reversal," 
because 
"most 
constitutional errors can be harmless . . . ."  Nelson, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, ¶29 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306) (internal 
marks omitted).  In fact, "there is a strong presumption that 
any . . . errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-
error analysis."  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) 
(quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)). 
¶15 A "structural error," on the other hand, is not 
discrete.  It is something that either affects the entire 
proceeding, or affects it in an unquantifiable way: 
Structural errors are different from regular trial 
errors because they "are structural defects in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy 
analysis by 'harmless-error' standards."  Structural 
defects affect "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from 
beginning to end."  An error also may be structural 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
9 
 
because of the difficulty of determining how the error 
affected the trial. 
State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶49, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207 
(quoted source omitted); see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 
S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) ("The purpose of the structural error 
doctrine 
is 
to 
ensure 
insistence 
on 
certain 
basic, 
constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of 
any criminal trial.").8  So we recognize a structural error by 
how it "affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than being simply an error in the trial process itself."  
Id. at 1907 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310) (internal 
marks omitted).  That is to say, structural errors "permeate the 
entire 
process." 
 
Nelson, 
355 
Wis. 2d 722, 
¶34.9 
 
Upon 
encountering structural error, we must reverse.  Neder, 527 
                                                 
8 A defendant's constitutionally-protected right to due 
process applies here just as much as it does in the criminal 
context:  "The due process protections of the 14th Amendment 
apply in termination of parental rights cases.  When the State 
seeks to terminate familial bonds, it must provide a fair 
procedure to the parents, even when the parents have been 
derelict in their parental duties."  Brown Cty. v. Shannon R., 
2005 WI 160, ¶56, 286 Wis. 2d 278, 706 N.W.2d 269.  See also 
id., ¶59 ("Although they are civil proceedings, termination of 
parental 
rights 
proceedings 
deserve 
heightened 
protections 
because 
they 
implicate 
a 
parent's 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest."). 
9 Structural errors include (but are not limited to) denying 
the defendant the right to counsel, the right to counsel of his 
choice, the right to self-representation, the right to an 
impartial judge, the right to a jury selected without reference 
to race, and the right to a public trial.  See State v. Nelson, 
2014 WI 70, ¶34, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317 (citations 
omitted); State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶50, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 
N.W.2d 207. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
10 
 
U.S. 1, 7 (1999) ("Errors of this type are so intrinsically 
harmful 
as 
to 
require 
automatic 
reversal 
(i.e., 
'affect 
substantial rights') without regard to their effect on the 
outcome.").10 
¶16 For the reasons we discuss below, we conclude that a 
proceeding in which a court decides a disputed matter in favor 
of the State, before allowing the respondent the option of 
presenting 
his 
case-in-chief, 
adversely 
affects 
the 
very 
framework within which the trial is supposed to take place.  
                                                 
10 The dissent says the United States Supreme Court recently 
clarified that "a new trial does not automatically follow from a 
determination that a trial error was structural."  Dissent, ¶72 
(citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017)).  
But Weaver addresses the structural error doctrine only in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Id. at 
1911 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984)).  Because of that posture, the Weaver court had to 
harmonize:  (1) Strickland's holding that there is no Sixth 
Amendment violation unless counsel's error prejudiced the 
defense; with (2) the "structural error" doctrine's provision 
that reversal is the appropriate remedy without a showing of 
prejudice. 
However, when the defendant presents the structural error 
on direct appeal, as he did here, Weaver reaffirms Neder's 
prescription that the remedy is an automatic reversal.  See 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).  The very quote upon which the dissent relies 
says so:  "'[S]tructural error' carries with it no talismanic 
significance as a doctrinal matter. It means only that the 
government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new 
trial by showing that the error was 'harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'"  Dissent, ¶72 (quoting Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 
1910).  There is only one thing a court may do when the State 
may not prove an error's harmlessness:  Reverse the judgment 
encompassing the error.  So Weaver does not support the 
proposition for which the dissent cites it. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
11 
 
Consequently, the error so permeates the proceeding that it is 
incapable of producing a constitutionally-sound result.  The 
error is, therefore, structural. 
¶17 One of our most familiar constitutional guarantees is 
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1.  Part of the process due to every citizen is 
"the opportunity to be heard," which must occur "at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner."  Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (citation and internal marks omitted).  
This guarantee is foundational:  "The 'right to be heard before 
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though 
it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.'"  Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoted source omitted). 
¶18 The primary mechanism by which we hear litigants' 
disputes is through the adversarial process.  "The Constitution 
requires (unless the defendant waives his rights) a certain 
modicum of adversary procedure even if the outcome is a foregone 
conclusion . . . ."  Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 482 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1074 (7th 
Cir. 1985)).  That is why "litigants must be given their day in 
court.  Access to the courts is an essential ingredient of the 
constitutional guarantee of due process."  Piper v. Popp, 167 
Wis. 2d 633, 644, 482 N.W.2d 353 (1992). 
¶19 The value of having one's day in court, however, 
depends entirely on what the defendant may do with it:  "The 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
12 
 
opportunity to be heard includes the right to 'present a 
complete defense.'"  Brown Cty. v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, ¶65, 
286 
Wis. 2d 278, 
706 
N.W.2d 269 
(quoting 
California 
v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).  That means our inquiry 
must here become more pointed, more focused.  We must determine 
whether a proceeding in which the defendant is not afforded an 
opportunity to present his case may be fairly characterized as a 
"trial" capable of satisfying the demands of Mathews and Piper. 
¶20 Our history, and English history too, teach us that 
one of the oldest and most constant features of a trial is the 
adversarial presentation of a case.  That is, a trial is a 
procedurally balanced proceeding in which the parties face no 
disparate structural barriers in presenting their respective 
cases to the decision-maker.  Although its precise origins are 
unknown, the adversarial trial took root in England shortly 
after the Norman conquest of 1066.  Ellen E. Sward, The History 
of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 Kan. L. Rev. 347, 
354 (2003) (citing James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise 
on Evidence at the Common Law, 54-67 (Rothman Reprints 1969) 
(1898)).  The trial mechanism evolved over time, but manifested 
many of its modern characteristics as early as the late-
fifteenth century.  Some accounts, dating back to 1468, describe 
a trial as a proceeding in which "the parties or their counsel 
in open court present their evidence to the jury, and witnesses 
are examined upon oath."  Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise 
History of Common Law, 129-30 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th Ed. 1956) 
(citation omitted). 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
13 
 
¶21 Today, Sir William Blackstone's eighteenth-century 
description of a proper trial is readily familiar: 
The nature of the case, and the evidence intended to 
be produced, are next laid before [the jury] by 
counsel also on the [opening] side; and, when their 
evidence is gone through, the advocate on the other 
side opens the adverse case, and supports it by 
evidence; and then the party which began is heard by 
way of reply. 
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England ch. 
23, at 367 (Richard Couch, London 21st ed. 1844) (1768).  
Commentators since then have consistently described trials as 
embodying this mutuality of opportunity. See, e.g., Robert W. 
Millar, 
The 
Formative 
Principles 
of 
Civil 
Procedure, 
18 
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1923) ("Most obvious . . . of the conceptions 
in 
question 
is 
the 
idea 
that 
both 
parties 
must 
be 
heard . . . ."); 
Henry 
John 
Stephen, 
A 
Treatise 
on 
the 
Principles 
of 
Pleading 
in 
Civil 
Actions 
58 
(3d Am. ed. 
Washington, D.C.:  W.H. Morrison 1882) ("The appearance of the 
parties . . . in open court . . . was requisite.  Upon such 
appearance followed the allegations of fact, mutually made on 
either side, by which the court received information of the 
nature of the controversy.")  (Original emphasis omitted and 
emphasis added.); Stephan Landsman A Brief Survey of the 
Development of the Adversarial System, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 713, 714 
(1983) ("[T]he key element[] in the system . . . [was] reliance 
on party presentation of evidence . . . ."); Ellen E. Sward, 
Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System 64 
Ind. L. Rev. 301, 312 (1989) ("[T]he parties themselves are 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
14 
 
responsible for gathering and presenting evidence and arguments 
on behalf of their positions."); Sward, supra, at 302 ("The 
adversary system is characterized by party . . . presentation of 
evidence and argument, and by a passive decision-maker who 
merely listens to both sides . . . ."). 
¶22 Our history teaches us that one of the essential 
attributes of an adversarial trial is the mutuality of the 
parties' opportunity to present their cases.  The defendant may 
choose to forgo his presentation, of course, but without the 
option of going forward we cannot dignify the proceeding with 
the appellation "trial."  Such a proceeding is structurally 
unbalanced 
because 
the 
defendant 
faces 
an 
impediment 
to 
presenting his case that the State does not.  Here, for example, 
the State had the option of choosing who would testify, the 
order in which it would present its witnesses, and the 
information it would adduce from each witness.  It is of no 
constitutional moment that the State's case consisted solely of 
Mr. K.'s testimony.  The relevant fact is that the State enjoyed 
the liberty of choosing the parameters of its case. 
¶23 Mr. K. enjoyed no such liberty.  In the "grounds" 
phase of the trial, the circuit court did not allow him to 
decide who his witnesses would be, the order in which they would 
testify, or the evidence he would seek from each one.  By 
denying to Mr. K. the same opportunity allowed to the State, the 
circuit court required that he present his case only in response 
to the prosecutor's questions and within the constraints of his 
attorney's cross-examination.  Mr. K.'s attorney obviously 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
15 
 
believed there was more to the defense than he was able to 
squeeze into the interstices of the State's case.  After the 
State rested, he asked "to be able to put my client on the stand 
and finish our side of the case."  The record does not reflect 
with certainty whether "finishing" the case would have involved 
additional witnesses.11  But it does show that his attorney 
thought there was more to Mr. K.'s defense and that he was not 
waiving his right to present it.12 
¶24 The State says the circuit court's error was of the 
same general nature as those we have previously assayed for 
harmlessness.  It points out that in Nelson, for example, we 
observed 
that 
"[a] 
criminal 
defendant 
has 
a 
personal, 
fundamental right to testify and present his own version of 
events in his own words."  355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶19 (internal marks 
                                                 
11 The dissent purports to find conclusive evidence that Mr. 
K. would have had no other witness than himself in the "grounds" 
phase of the trial.  Dissent, ¶84 n.12.  That conclusion, 
however, depends on the dissent's assumption that the witnesses 
in the "disposition" phase of the trial will necessarily be the 
same as those in the "grounds" phase.  Because the different 
phases address different questions, the assumption is unsound. 
12 The 
breadth 
of 
cross-examination 
allowable 
under 
Wisconsin's procedural rules does not affect this analysis.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 906.11(2) ("A witness may be cross-examined on any 
matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. 
In the interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-
examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct 
examination.").  Although the circuit court could have limited 
Mr. K's testimony to matters educed by the State, there is no 
indication it did.  Nonetheless, the comments of Mr. K.'s 
attorney demonstrate that, in anticipation of putting on his own 
case, he did not introduce all of his evidence through cross-
examination. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
16 
 
omitted).  Nonetheless, we said that "[a]n error denying the 
defendant . . . the right to testify on his or her own behalf 
bears the hallmark of a trial error."  Id., ¶32.  We concluded, 
therefore, that this error's effect "on the jury's verdict can 
be 'quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Id.  (quoting Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 308.).  The State also cites State v. Kramer for the 
proposition that "a violation of the right to present a defense 
is subject to harmless error analysis."  2006 WI App 133, ¶26, 
294 Wis. 2d 780, 720 N.W.2d 459 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683, 691 (1986)).  But Kramer's statement is considerably 
more ambitious than its holding.  Mr. Kramer actually did 
present a defense; the circuit court simply excluded the 
testimony of one of his witnesses.  Id., ¶21.  Nelson and 
Kramer, therefore, both stand for the proposition that exclusion 
of a witness's testimony, whether that of the defendant (Nelson) 
or of another (Kramer), is subject to harmless-error review.  
The United States Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion 
after considering a defendant's claim that his trial was 
defective because the trial court excluded evidence that could 
have cast doubt on the credibility of his confession.  The Court 
said that, "[i]n the absence of any valid state justification, 
exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a 
defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case 
encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial 
testing.'"  Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91 (quoted source omitted).  
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
17 
 
However, both the parties and the Court agreed that this 
deprivation was subject to a harmless-error review.  Id. at 691. 
¶25 The State says the circuit court's error in this case 
is of a piece with Nelson, Kramer, and Crane.  They may not all 
share the same spot on the continuum between harmlessness and 
harmfulness, it suggests, but they nonetheless all exist on that 
continuum.  The difference, it argues, is one of magnitude, not 
type.  Conceptually, excluding a single piece of evidence is a 
fractional denial of the defendant's opportunity to put on his 
case.  So, if excluding a fractional part of the defendant's 
case is subject to harmless-error review (as the State asserts), 
it follows that excluding the whole would be subject to the same 
test. 
¶26 The State's observation is accurate, as far as it 
goes.  But it does not go far enough.  If a trial were a two-
dimensional 
affair, 
the 
State's 
argument 
would 
be 
more 
persuasive.  If a case were merely a compilation of individual 
facts, then the difference between excluding one piece of the 
defendant's 
evidence 
and 
excluding 
the 
entirety 
of 
the 
defendant's case is just a question of quantity.  But a trial is 
not a formless jumble of evidence dumped in the factfinder's 
lap, nor does the factfinder adjudge a party's success by the 
size of the heap.  A trial is, instead, an exhibition of 
evidence presented within an intentionally-ordered construct 
designed to produce an intelligible and persuasive account of 
the matter sub judice.  It is, in that sense, three-dimensional, 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
18 
 
all components of which combine to produce depth, emphasis, 
cohesion, and——ultimately——understanding. 
¶27 So a trial is not just a contest between competing 
facts; it is a contest between the constructs in which they are 
presented, something practitioners call the "theory of the 
case."  The competition between the theories of the case is what 
makes the trial adversarial, a dynamic that affects every aspect 
of the proceeding, including the type, nature, and extent of 
evidence a party may choose to elicit during the opposing 
party's case-in-chief.  If defense counsel knew beforehand that 
the court would deny him the right to present his case, he might 
shoehorn as much of his presentation as possible into the 
State's case.  That might solve the quantitative problem 
presented by the circuit court's error.  But it could do very 
little, if anything, to preserve the defendant's ability to 
present his facts according to his theory of the case. 
¶28 The error in this case did not affect just the 
quantity of evidence presented, such as in Nelson, Kramer, and 
Crane.  It was, instead, an error affecting the adversarial 
nature of the trial.  This matter was presented to the circuit 
court according to only the State's theory of the case.  This 
lack of mutuality made the hearing less like an adversarial 
contest between the parties and more like a continental-European 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
19 
 
inquisitorial proceeding.13  The State might be more likely to 
see the permeating flaw this introduces into the very framework 
of the trial if the defense controlled the sequence of the 
State's witnesses and their direct examination, or if the State 
could present its case only through the cross-examination of its 
own witnesses. 
¶29 The harmless-error rubric is incapable of reaching an 
error that affects the framework of the trial.  By its own 
terms, it is designed to address errors whose effect "may 
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other 
evidence presented in order to determine whether [it was] 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 
307-08 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
But 
there 
is 
no 
quantitative 
assessment that can measure the harm of a proceeding in which 
                                                 
13 In contrast to our adversarial system, which relies on 
the parties——plural——to illuminate the case through their 
competing presentations, is the inquisitorial system, which 
emphasizes the judge's role in elucidating the facts.  See 
Mathew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function:  The Search 
for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in the Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 Int'l Legal Persp. 185, 218 
(2001-2002) (The inquisitorial system "allocates most of its 
investigatory 
power 
in 
judges."); 
Abraham 
S. 
Goldstein, 
Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American 
Criminal Procedure, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1009, 1018 (1976) ("The 
judge dominates the proceeding and often appears to move 
relentlessly toward a predetermined result of conviction.").  
The inquisitorial system places "little emphasis on oral 
presentation of evidence or on cross-examination by [a party's] 
counsel." Goldstein, supra, at 1018-19.  "Instead, the trial is 
mainly a public recapitulation of written materials included in 
a dossier compiled earlier by an investigating magistrate."  Id. 
at 1019. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
20 
 
only the State is allowed to present a theory of the case.  As 
we noted in Nelson, we cannot review a circuit court's error for 
harmlessness if its effects are "inherently elusive [and] 
intangible . . . ."  355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶33 (quoting Palmer v. 
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 399 (3d Cir. 2010)).  We have no tools 
with which to winnow the ill effects of this type of error, 
which makes the harm suffered by Mr. K. inherently elusive and 
intangible, 
and 
therefore 
structural. 
 
See 
Pinno, 
356 
Wis. 2d 106, ¶49 ("An error also may be structural because of 
the difficulty of determining how the error affected the 
trial.").14 
¶30 The dissent's spirited defense of this state-centric 
half-trial gets the order of the analysis the wrong way around.  
The proper order is first to determine whether the error is 
structural in nature.  If it is not, then (and only then) we 
assay the error's harmlessness——that is to say, we consider 
whether it prejudiced the defense.  The dissent, however, 
started with the second step.  It conducted a minute examination 
of the record to assess the sufficiency of the evidence, 
reasoning that "[p]recedent and fundamental fairness to C.L.K. 
                                                 
14 The dissent says our opinion "does not explain how the 
error so affected the trial that its effect could not be 
measured or that its burden continued from the start of the 
trial without relief to the end of the trial.  Instead, ipse 
dixit, the majority opinion discovers a new type of structural 
error."  Dissent, ¶80.  This is a surprising statement, inasmuch 
as the preceding sixteen paragraphs are devoted to nothing but 
that explanation. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
21 
 
and to his two children require that we consider evidence 
presented at both the factfinding hearing and the dispositional 
hearing when determining the effect of the error."  Dissent, 
¶87.  But the "effect on C.L.K." is what we consider when 
conducting the second step of the analysis.  The first step 
(determining whether the error is structural) depends on the 
error's effect on the proceedings, not the prejudice to C.L.K. 
¶31 This is why cases addressing structural error do not 
scrutinize the evidence presented at trial, as the dissent 
insists we must do.  Dissent, ¶79.  The two cases foundational 
to the structural error doctrine, Gonzalez-Lopez and Fulminante, 
illustrate this neatly.  The issue in Gonzalez-Lopez was whether 
denying a defendant his right to counsel of his choice was a 
structural error.  548 U.S. at 150.  He had gone through a 
complete trial, so there was an evidentiary record for the Court 
to consider if that had been relevant to the question.  But in 
the course of reaching its decision, the Court completely 
ignored it.  There is no mystery as to why——the evidence of 
record simply has nothing to say about whether an error is 
structural.  Similarly, in Fulminante, the Court addressed 
whether coerced confessions qualified as structural errors.  499 
U.S. at 306-12.  As in Gonzalez-Lopez, there was an evidentiary 
record available for the Court's consideration.  But in 
concluding there was no structural error, no part of its opinion 
addressed the evidence adduced at trial.  As these cases 
demonstrate, a reviewing court does not determine whether an 
error is structural by perusing the evidence.  It discovers that 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
22 
 
answer by evaluating the nature of the error in relation to the 
damage it causes to the trial mechanism.  So when the dissent 
faults us for not joining in an in-depth review of the evidence 
against Mr. K., it is actually adjuring us to look in the wrong 
place for signs of structural error. 
¶32 If we could start with a harmless-error review, as the 
dissent does, we would have no need for the structural error 
doctrine at all, because we would just affirm all judgments in 
which we believe the error caused no harm.  That, of course, 
depends on the assumption that no error can hide potentially 
useful information from us, that we can always perform a 
quantitative harmless-error analysis.  But the whole point of 
the structural error doctrine is that some errors so undermine 
the proceeding's integrity that we cannot know what we do not 
know.  The dissent's approach depends on the belief that a 
state-centric half-trial in which the defendant was not allowed 
to present his case-in-chief could not have deprived the court 
of any instructive information.  Based on that assumption, it 
totted up the information that is in the record and declared it 
good enough.  Nowhere, however, does it explore the actual 
question presented by this case, to wit, whether the circuit 
court's proceedings had enough structural integrity to adduce 
the information necessary to decide whether Mr. K. was an unfit 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
23 
 
parent.  So the dissent proceeded as if the error was not 
structural without ever inquiring into whether it actually was.15 
¶33 Not even the precedent on which the dissent relied for 
the motive force of its reasoning supports its conclusion.  The 
dissent says that Evelyn C.R. teaches us that the solution to 
the problem created by the circuit court's error is to borrow 
from the "disposition" phase of the trial to supply any deficit 
in the "grounds" phase.  Dissent, ¶78 (citing Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶28, 32.).  That is to say, the dissent believes we 
should 
import 
evidence 
and 
argument 
regarding 
the 
"best 
interests of the child" into the ex ante question of Mr. K.'s 
fitness as a parent.  But that would be helpful only if we are 
looking for a way to paper over the circuit court's error.  The 
first 
and 
second 
phases 
of 
the 
trial 
address 
different 
questions, so it is not immediately apparent how evidence and 
argument from the second could supply the structural integrity 
lacking in the first.  Nor does the circuit court revisit the 
question of the parent's fitness in the "disposition" phase of 
the trial, so as a practical matter, the borrowed evidence and 
argument will always have precisely zero effect on the circuit 
court's determination in the "grounds" phase.  A remedy that 
depends on ex post facto evidence and argument to justify a 
prior judicial determination is rhetoric, not reality. 
                                                 
15 We will not address the substance of the dissent's 
harmless-error review.  The error's structural nature means that 
any 
attempt 
at 
assessing 
its 
prejudicial 
effect 
is, 
by 
definition, an exercise in speculation. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
24 
 
¶34 Furthermore, Evelyn C.R. cannot inform our analysis 
because the asserted errors there and here are not the same.  
Although both cases involve parents who were not allowed to 
present their case-in-chief, that is the only similarity they 
share.  In Evelyn C.R., the mother (Tykila S.) lost her right to 
present her case as a sanction for her failure to appear at 
trial.  Id., ¶16.  She did not contest the default and conceded 
that failing to appear deprived her of the right to challenge 
the State's case.  Consequently, the right to put on one's case-
in-chief was not at issue on appeal, and so it should come as no 
surprise that our opinion said nothing about it.  Tykila S.'s 
assignment of error was instead that the circuit court failed to 
satisfy its independent statutory and constitutional obligation 
to identify sufficient evidence of record to support the state's 
case.  Id.  The issue, therefore, was a straightforward 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Our holding that 
evidence presented at the "disposition" phase may supply the 
deficit in the "grounds" phase, id., ¶36, says nothing about the 
nature of a parent's right to contest the State's case.  So 
Evelyn C.R. can give us no instruction here for the simple 
reason that it did not address, even tangentially, the question 
now before the court. 
¶35 We have little difficulty in concluding that the error 
presented in this matter "affect[s] the framework within which 
the trial proceeds, rather than being simply an error in the 
trial process itself."  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1907.  The error 
did not just "affect" the framework, it completely eliminated 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
25 
 
half of it.  Further, the remaining half left the State as the 
sole expositor of the theory of the case.  With so much of the 
adversarial nature of the trial excised, there is no adequate 
context within which to conduct a quantitative analysis of the 
missing testimony.  Therefore, we cannot engage in a harmless-
error review.  The dissent worries that, in so concluding, we 
have recognized a structural error that has no provenance in 
prior pronouncements from either this court or the United States 
Supreme Court.  Dissent, ¶38.  Perhaps, however, neither of 
these courts have had occasion to address this issue because the 
proposition that a state-centric half-trial can produce a 
structurally sound result is so astonishing that no one has 
thought to make the argument before. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We hold that denying the defendant an opportunity to 
present his case-in-chief is a structural error, one that is "so 
intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal."  Neder, 
527 U.S. at 7.  Consequently, we reverse the court of appeals 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414 
 
26 
 
and remand the cause to the circuit court to conduct a new 
trial.16 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions. 
¶37 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., did not participate. 
                                                 
16 We decline the State's request that, should we reverse 
the court of appeals, we allow the circuit court to resume the 
trial where it left off.  Perhaps the first part of the trial 
could be salvaged by appending Mr. K.'s presentation.  That, 
however, 
would 
require 
a 
meticulous 
examination 
of 
the 
transcripts to satisfy ourselves that nothing the circuit court 
said or did during the State's case foreshadowed its decision to 
pretermit the proceedings.  This is the type of "'inherently 
elusive [and] intangible'" error that is not susceptible to 
harmless-error review, which is why there must be a new trial ab 
initio.  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶33 (quoting Palmer v. 
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 399 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
1
¶38 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Structural error is not a "legal rabbit" that a court can pull 
out of its hat, and thereby avoid a thorough examination of the 
record and the legal principles that must be reviewed when a 
parent's rights are terminated.  Yet, that is just what the 
majority opinion has done today when it creates this new 
structural error, never before recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court or by this court.   
¶39 Although I agree that the circuit court erred in 
shortening C.L.K.'s presentation at the factfinding hearing, the 
error was a trial error.  It was not a structural error because 
it did not affect the framework of the entire trial.  Rather, 
the framework of the trial was established through C.L.K.'s 
vigorous representation by counsel before an unbiased factfinder 
from which framework we can quantitatively assess the effect of 
the error.  Accordingly, because the complained-of error is not 
structural, it is subject to a harmless-error analysis.   
¶40 Furthermore, the error did not affect the validity of 
the finding that C.L.K. had abandoned his two young children or 
that it was in the best interests of the children that C.L.K.'s 
parental rights be terminated so that their foster parents can 
adopt them.  Because I conclude that the circuit court error was 
harmless and, therefore, the two children who were abandoned by 
C.L.K. should have a permanent home in which to grow, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
2
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶41 On September 13, 2016, when J.E.H. and S.M.H. were 
five and six years old, respectively, the State filed a petition 
to terminate C.L.K.'s parental rights based on abandonment, as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(a)2. (2015-16).1  Both children 
have lived with their foster parents, who are their maternal 
great aunt and uncle, since March 17, 2014.   
¶42 Prior to being removed from their mother's home, 
J.E.H.'s mother inflicted second and third-degree burns on both 
his feet, requiring hospitalization and extensive treatment for 
the burns and for the abuse he suffered.  The children's mother 
voluntarily terminated her parental rights to both children.  
C.L.K. chose to retain his parental rights; therefore, a 
petition for involuntary termination was filed for C.L.K. 
¶43 On March 23, 2017, the circuit court held the trial on 
the termination of C.L.K.'s parental rights, which is a two-step 
process.2  C.L.K. was present and he was represented by counsel 
at both hearings, as he has been throughout the proceedings that 
relate to J.E.H. and S.M.H.3     
                                                 
1 All further references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2015-16 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 The first hearing focuses on whether facts sufficient to 
support a ground for termination exists, and the second hearing 
focuses on whether termination of parental rights is in the 
child's best interest.  Wis. Stat. § 48.424 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.427.   
3 For example, C.L.K. was represented by counsel at his 
deposition on January 24, 2017. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
3
¶44 C.L.K testified.  He admitted that from July of 2015 
to September of 2016 he had no contact with the children.  He 
did not visit them, or speak with them by phone, or send them 
letters or messages of any type.  He also testified that during 
that 15-month period, he had no contact of any type with the 
foster parents.  He admitted that he could have called the 
foster parents, but he did not try to do so.  He also said he 
sent the foster parents no letters, nor did he try to have 
contact with the children or the foster parents through the 
"Bureau."  When asked if he could have done so, he said "Yes, I 
could have."  When asked, "Was there any reason why you could 
not?"  C.L.K. said, "No."   
¶45 C.L.K. was asked if he had any contact with anyone 
from the "Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare."  Again, he said 
that he did not.  He also was asked: 
Q  Did you make any effort to reach them to find 
out about your children? 
A  No, I did not. 
Q  Could you have? 
A  Yes, I could have. 
Q  Should you have? 
A  Yes, I should have. 
Q  Was there any reason why you did not? 
A  There's no reason at all.  There's no excuse. 
. . . .  
Q  What is the name of their school? 
A  I don't know. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
4
Q  Have you ever spoken to their doctor? 
A  No. 
Q  Have you ever spoken to their dentist? 
A  No. 
Q  Have you ever spoken to their therapist? 
A  No.   
. . . .  
Q  So for the past three years what have you done 
to be involved in the children's lives? 
A  Nothing. 
The court then asked C.L.K.'s attorney whether he had further 
questions for C.L.K.  He said, "I'm going to reserve questioning 
if this case is allowed to proceed past this point, but I do 
have one or two at this point."  Counsel then asked C.L.K. his 
reasons for having sparse contact with his children and the 
foster parents: 
Q  You mentioned the former social worker led you 
to believe -– what was it? 
A  That I wasn't allowed to have any information 
concerning where my children are located. 
Q  And what led you to believe that? 
A  That's what she told me.   
. . . .  
Q  What information? 
A  I was asking for information to get a number 
for Ms. Cupil so I can call my children, but I was 
told I couldn't have that number.   
. . . .  
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
5
Q  So did that prevent you from having contact 
with your children? 
A  Yes.   
¶46 On re-direct, the State asked: 
Q  And since they were brought into care, you've 
known where they were because they've always been with 
the Cupils. 
A  Yes.   
Q  And you testified that you made no efforts 
during that time period to get in touch with the 
Cupils. 
A  Yes. 
Q  And you testified in your deposition that you 
could have called, but you didn't. 
A  I could have tried harder, yes.  That's what I 
meant when I said I could have called.   
¶47 After C.L.K.'s testimony the State submitted certified 
copies of relevant orders, which the court admitted into 
evidence.  The State then rested.  
¶48 As the State did so, counsel for C.L.K. began to argue 
to the court: 
Well, your Honor, I think at this stage you have to 
take it in the light most favorable to [C.L.K.].  And 
to believe [C.L.K.] has good reason for not having 
communication over that period of time we're talking 
about is that he, in his mind -– it's subjective -– 
but he, in his mind, thought he couldn't because of 
what was told to him directly by a social worker.  And 
also that social worker, [C.L.K.] thought, had a way 
to communicate with him if he or she wanted to. . . .   
 
So I think [C.L.K.], again, at this point, 
believing everything that he says, that he gives a 
good enough reason to have not had the communication.    
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
6
THE COURT:  Well, you've argued a motion that 
hasn't been made yet; although I suspected it was 
coming.   
¶49 The record shows that counsel for C.L.K. actually was 
arguing to dismiss the State's case because C.L.K.'s stated 
reason constituted good cause for not contacting the children, 
the foster parents or the social worker.  However, the circuit 
court interpreted counsel's argument as opposing a State motion 
for a directed verdict, which the State never made.   
¶50 It is not clear from the transcript whether the 
attorney for the State thought the court's reference to a 
"directed verdict" was a motion to dismiss the State's case, 
which would have been logical given that it was defense counsel 
who made the argument when the State rested, or something else.  
Counsel for the State then summarized the overwhelming evidence 
of 
abandonment 
that 
had 
been 
presented 
by 
C.L.K.'s 
own 
testimony.   
¶51 Before the court ruled, counsel for C.L.K. said, "[i]f 
this is not a directed verdict motion at this point then and the 
State rests its case in chief, then I'm going to ask to be able 
to put my client on the stand and finish our side of the case."  
¶52 The 
circuit 
court 
clearly 
interpreted 
defense 
counsel's argument at the conclusion of the State's proof on 
abandonment as arguing against a State motion for a directed 
verdict in favor of the State on the ground of abandonment, 
which the State never made.  Therefore, after a brief argument 
by the guardian ad litem, the court found: 
THE COURT:  I'm granting the implicit motion for 
a directed verdict.  I get it, that in [C.L.K.]'s mind 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
7
there was justification for what happened here.  But 
legally, there is not.  And I'm addressing only the 
abandonment claim.   
The court then held that the State had met its burden of proof 
of abandonment as a ground for terminating C.L.K.'s parental 
rights.4   
¶53 Subsequently, with the agreement of counsel, the court 
held the dispositional hearing that same day.  The State's first 
witness was Ms. Cupil, the foster mother.   
¶54 Ms. Cupil testified that the children have resided 
with her since March of 2014.  She testified that she and John, 
her husband, wanted to adopt the children.  She explained that 
she was the children's great aunt and that she loved the 
                                                 
4 Abandonment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(a)2. was 
alleged here, which provides in relevant part:   
(1) ABANDONMENT.  (a) Abandonment, which, subject to par. 
(c), shall be established by proving any of the following: 
. . . .  
2. That the child has been placed, or continued in a 
placement, outside the parent's home by a court order . . . and 
the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for 
a period of 3 months or longer. 
. . . .  
(c) Abandonment 
is 
not 
established 
under 
par. 
(a)2. . . . if the parent proves all of the following by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That the parent had good cause for having failed to 
visit with the child throughout the time period specified in 
par. (a)2.  . . . .  
2. That the parent had good cause for having failed to 
communicate with the child throughout the time period specified 
in par. (a)2. . . . .   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
8
children very much.  She said that when the children first came 
to live with her and her husband they were two and four years 
old, respectively.  At the date of the hearing, March 23, 2017, 
they were five and seven years old.5   
¶55 She explained that the children were well, but that 
both children had Von Willebrand's Disease.6  She said she had to 
be mindful of cuts and if they hit their heads, because if they 
bled, the bleeding could continue.  She said that they regularly 
visited the doctor, but their symptoms were mild, and that the 
children's medical condition did not affect their desire to 
adopt them.   
¶56 She 
said 
that 
the 
children's 
mother, 
who 
is 
incarcerated for severely burning the younger child, regularly 
sends the children notes and has talked on the phone with them.  
In regard to C.L.K., she testified: 
Q  What kind of relationship do the kids have 
with [C.L.K.]?    
A  None. 
Q  Do they ever ask about him in the home? 
A  No.   
Q  Have they ever asked to go see him? 
                                                 
5 The children are now eight and ten years of age.   
6 Von Willebrand's Disease is an inherited disorder wherein 
the person's blood clots more slowly, which may cause problems 
from cuts, or nose bleeds, or other soft tissue injuries.  Mayo 
Clinic 
Von 
Willebrand 
Disease 
at 
https://mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/von-willebrand-
disease/symptoms, last visited December 14, 2018. 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
9
A  No.   
Q  Have they ever asked to call him? 
A  No.  
Q  Now, there was a little over a year-long 
period where there were no visits; correct? 
A  Yes. 
Q  Was [C.L.K.] in contact with your home at all 
during that time?  
A  No. 
Q  Did he send any letters during that time? 
A  No.    
. . . .  
Q  Now, have you ever talked with the children 
about where they want to stay? 
A  Yes. 
Q  What have they said? 
A  We want to stay here with you, mommy and 
daddy. 
. . . .  
Q  Do you think you could provide [S.M.H.] and 
[J.E.H.] with a permanent and stable situation for 
their life? 
A  Yes, we can.  
¶57 C.L.K.'s counsel then questioned Ms. Cupil in regard 
to C.L.K.'s parental rights: 
Q  Do you think it's necessary to terminate 
[C.L.K.]'s parental rights? 
A  Yes.  
Q  Why? 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
10
A  He hasn't been there.  I mean, he has not been 
there.  We have been their family.  We have been there 
for them every day from day one to now.  We have been 
there. 
 
He has been there because it's court-ordered.  
When it wasn't, he didn't make any effort before then.  
He didn't call between times.  He doesn't make any 
efforts to be at any of their appointments.  He did 
not call just because.  He only called because when he 
was instructed to.  He only called at the times they 
told him to call.  He didn't do anything more than 
that.  He only did what he was told to do.    
. . . .  
So him being the biological father, then be the 
father.  See, I didn't say that I have a problem with 
him.  I'm just saying there is no relationship because 
he made no effort to make a relationship with us or 
his children.  That's what I'm saying to you. 
¶58 The case manager, Ms. Mariah Ahles, was the next 
witness.  She had been in charge of the children's case since 
September of 2015.   
¶59 She was asked about the suitability of the Cupils as 
an adoptive home.   
Q  Do you believe the Cupils are a good fit for 
the children? 
A  Yes, I do. 
Q  Why is that? 
A  The Cupils have demonstrated over the last 
three years that they are able to make sure that the 
children's basic needs are met such as food, shelter, 
their schooling.   
 
They work with their school very well to make 
sure the kids' mental health needs are met at school.  
They've been able to get them to the doctor, the 
dentist.  When they had therapy services, they were in 
therapy.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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They've also been able to build relationships 
with 
the 
children. 
 
The 
children 
have 
built 
relationships with the Cupils' other children and 
their maternal great grandmother.   
. . . .  
Q  Have the children ever asked to go see 
[C.L.K.]? 
A  They have never mentioned him besides when I 
mention him.  
Q  Have they ever asked to call him? 
A  No. 
Q  Have they ever just spoke about him? 
A  No.  
. . . .  
Q  Do you believe a termination and adoption 
would provide the children with more permanence and 
stability than any other outcome? 
A  I do.  
¶60 She 
explained 
that 
she 
called 
C.L.K. 
monthly 
attempting to make connections between him and the children.  
His phone became disconnected; however, the letters she sent to 
the mailing address C.L.K. gave were not returned.  
¶61 C.L.K.'s attorney questioned Ms. Ahles about visits 
that the children have had with C.L.K and their responses to 
those visits, indicating that their responses generally were 
positive.   
¶62 The State then rested its termination of parental 
rights evidentiary submissions.  C.L.K.'s attorney first moved 
the defense exhibits that he had used during the proceedings 
into evidence.  He then called C.L.K. to the witness stand.  
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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C.L.K. began by explaining that he, S.M.K. and the children's 
mother lived together when S.M.K. was nine months old until she 
was about two.   
Q  And can you tell me what you did, just 
generally?  Generally, what was your role? 
A  Generally, I went to work.  And then when I 
came home from work, I helped change diapers or 
whatever else I needed to do for [S.M.K.] at that 
time.  
Q  All right.  And then you moved away, is that 
it, or separated somehow?  
A  Yes.  We separated.  
Q  Okay. 
 
And 
then 
you 
had 
another 
child 
together? 
A  By the time we separated, she was pregnant 
with [J.E.H.] then.  
. . . .  
Q  Okay.  So are you saying the mother of the 
children essentially stopped you from visiting the 
children at some point? 
A  Yes. 
Q  Do you know about when that was? 
A  I'm going to say [J.E.H.] was about one, a 
little over one.  One and a half, probably. 
Q  Okay.  And then at some point you moved to 
Green Bay; is that right?  
A  Yes. 
Q  When was that? 
A  That was in July of 2015. 
. . . .  
Q  Are you currently working? 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
13
A  Yes. 
Q  Can you describe your -– Tell us about your 
job. 
A  I'm a PCW for my god son, Mateo Escavel. 
Q  All right.  And where do you currently live?  
Is it a house you own or a house you rent?   
A  No.  I'm living with a friend right now. 
Q  Okay. 
 
You 
understand 
you're 
up 
here 
testifying because you're asking that you be reunited 
-– or have your children returned; right?   
A  Correct. 
Q  You understand that, you know, the reality is 
they're probably not going to return them to you if 
you don't have a place for them to live; right? 
A  Correct.  
. . . .  
Q  What about health insurance.  How would the 
kids, if at all, be covered by health insurance? 
A  I'm already in the process of looking for a 
second job.  And the second job, I'll make sure it do 
have insurance so I can get it.   
. . . .  
Q  And it was mentioned in testimony earlier that 
you're currently in therapy.   
A  Yes. 
. . . .  
Q  Okay.  And can you tell me what your therapy -
– what you cover in therapy? 
A  We 
cover 
my 
thinking 
pattern 
and 
my 
depression.   
. . . .  
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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Q  Is there anything else you want to tell the 
Court here regarding reunification with your children? 
A  I know -- Like I said, I know I messed up.  
But that mess-up don't make me a bad parent.  I mean, 
nobody is perfect.  I mean, everybody makes mistakes.  
I made mine.  I learned from it.  To me, that should 
be the most important thing, you learn from your 
mistakes.   
¶63 The State then conducted cross-examination as did the 
guardian ad litem.  The guardian ad litem's questioning focused 
on the extremely sparse contacts that C.L.K. had with the 
children and concerns about his mental health. 
Q  You've had -– Every other week you've had 
three visits in the last two years with the kids 
supervised; correct? 
A  Yes.  
Q  And, also, you've had the opportunity to have 
phone calls after those visits on Sundays. 
A  Yes. 
Q  And you haven't had those phone calls, have 
you? 
A  No.   
Q  So you've had these three visits and that's 
it; correct?  
A  Yes.   
Q  In terms of the medication and the mental 
health treatment you are getting at the present time, 
you've been diagnosed with bipolar disorder? 
A  Yes. 
Q  And your doctors recommended medication for 
that? 
A  Yes. 
Q  And you're not taking medication, are you? 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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A  No. 
¶64 When C.L.K.'s testimony concluded, the court asked his 
attorney whether he had other witnesses to present.  Counsel 
said he had no further witnesses.  The argument of counsel 
followed.  The court took the case under advisement and issued 
the written ruling that terminated C.L.K.'s parental rights, 
which is the subject of this review.   
¶65 The court of appeals affirmed, and I would do likewise 
because any error in shortening the factfinding on abandonment 
was abrogated by the evidentiary hearing that continued that 
same day.  C.L.K., who was his own only witness in defense, 
testified extensively about his contacts with the children and 
why he was absent from their lives for extended periods of time.  
No structural error occurred here.  The majority errs, and I 
respectfully dissent.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶66 Whether an error is structural and, therefore, not 
subject to a harmless error review, is a question of law for our 
independent consideration.  State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶18, 
355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317.  If an error, though 
structural, arises through ineffective assistance of counsel, we 
determine as a matter of law whether counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial.  Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 
S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017).  If the error is not structural, we 
independently determine whether the error was harmless.  Nelson, 
355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶18.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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B.  Structural Error 
1.  General Principles 
¶67 Structural error is a judicially created criminal law 
doctrine. 
 
Structural 
errors 
arise 
out 
of 
concerns 
for 
constitutional principles that are required to be upheld to 
achieve a fair trial.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 282 
(1991).  Structural errors affect the framework in which the 
entire trial takes place; they differ from other serious errors 
that may occur in a trial.  State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶43, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270.  Although the concept of 
structural error developed in a criminal law context, it has 
been applied in a termination of parental rights proceeding, 
which is civil in nature.  State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, 
¶63, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623.   
¶68 In regard to structural error, we have adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's framework for assessing trial 
errors that are of a constitutional nature.  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 
722, ¶31 (explaining that we have "embraced" the federal method 
for assessing when error may be analyzed as harmless and when 
that analysis may not be employed because the error is 
structural).  When the effect of an error on the outcome of a 
trial is capable of assessment, the error is not structural.  
Id., ¶5 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08).  Stated 
otherwise, a trial error, i.e., an error that occurs in the 
presentation of the case to the factfinder and which therefore 
may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence, 
is not structural.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.     
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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¶69 The United States Supreme Court decision in Weaver 
provides a helpful summary and a clear roadmap for assessing 
whether a constitutional error is structural.  Weaver explained 
that, generally, structural errors fall within one of three 
categories, although the categories may overlap.  They are:  
(1) affect an underlying right that protects some interest other 
than an adverse determination for the defendant; (2) the error's 
quantitative effect on the trial is too hard to measure; and 
(3) fundamental unfairness results from the error.  Weaver, 137 
S. Ct. at 1908.  Stated otherwise, structural errors are so 
profound in their effect that "a criminal trial cannot reliably 
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or 
innocence."  Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986).  
However, "if the defendant had counsel and was tried before an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any 
other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-
error analysis."  Id. at 579.   
¶70 There are many errors that can occur during a trial, 
some are serious and require reversal and some are harmless, not 
requiring reversal.  However, not all serious errors are 
structural; the list of structural errors is limited:  Complete 
denial of the right to counsel has been held to be structural 
error, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); as has trial 
before a biased judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); 
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, Vasquez 
v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); and the complete denial of 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 
(1984).   
¶71 The above-listed errors affect the framework in which 
a trial is conducted.  Their effect starts at the beginning of 
the trial and continues throughout the trial.  There is no 
relief from the burden they impose.     
¶72 However, Weaver recently clarified that a new trial 
does not automatically follow from a determination that a trial 
error 
was 
structural. 
 
Weaver, 
137 
S. Ct. 
at 
1910 
("'[S]tructural 
error' 
carries 
with 
it 
no 
talismanic 
significance as a doctrinal matter.  It means only that the 
government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new 
trial by showing that the error was 'harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'").   
¶73 In regard to the denial of the right to a public 
trial, the structural error that was the focus of Weaver, the 
court concluded that because the error was raised in the course 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel review, the defendant 
had to prove prejudice before a new trial would be ordered.  Id.  
Because Weaver failed in that proof, he failed in his efforts to 
obtain a new trial.  Therefore, as the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, the conclusion that a structural error 
occurred does not automatically result in a new trial——sometimes 
it does and sometimes it does not.  Id.; see also State v. 
Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶63, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207 
(concluding that the denial of "the Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial may be forfeited when a defendant knows that the 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
19
judge has ordered the public to leave the courtroom but does not 
object.").   
2.  C.L.K.'s Parental Rights Trial 
¶74 C.L.K. was represented by competent counsel in all 
proceedings before and during the two-step trial.7  The trial was 
public and the adjudicator was impartial.  Accordingly, there is 
a "strong presumption" that any error by the circuit court was 
not structural.  Rose, 478 U.S. at 579. 
¶75 Although evidence on grounds for termination of 
C.L.K.'s parental rights and on C.L.K.'s reason for failing to 
communicate with his children and with the foster parents was 
presented at the first hearing, C.L.K. presented additional 
testimony relative to abandonment at the second hearing upon 
direct examination by his counsel.  It was after the second 
hearing and argument of counsel that the court decided to 
terminate C.L.K.'s parental rights.  These events are similar to 
the process that occurred in another case where a termination of 
parental rights resulted, Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 
246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.       
¶76 In Evelyn C.R., the issue was whether Tykila's 
parental rights should be terminated because she had abandoned 
her son.  Id., ¶1.  When Tykila violated a court order to appear 
in person at the factfinding hearing, the circuit court entered 
a default judgment on the grounds of abandonment without taking 
                                                 
7 No allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel has 
been raised.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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sufficient testimony to support a finding of abandonment by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Id., ¶3. 
¶77 We held that the circuit court erred in making a 
finding of abandonment without first taking evidence sufficient 
to support that finding.  Id., ¶19.  We explained that the 
procedure used "failed to comply with the constitutional and 
statutory requirements for termination of parental rights."  Id.  
However, we also explained that at the second step in the two-
step statutory process applicable to termination of parental 
rights trials, the "parent's rights are not ignored.  The parent 
has the right to present evidence and be heard."  Id., ¶23.   
¶78 We then explained, that notwithstanding the error that 
occurred at the factfinding hearing, "we nonetheless must 
examine the entire record to determine whether it provides a 
factual basis to support the court's finding of grounds for 
termination."  Id. at ¶32.  We did not ignore what had occurred 
at the second hearing where proof of abandonment was provided.  
We relied on Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) in part for that conclusion.  
Section 805.18(2) provides in relevant part: 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of . . . error as to any matter of pleading or 
procedure, unless . . . after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the 
error complained of has affected the substantial 
rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial.    
Id., ¶28 (emphasis in Evelyn C.R.).   
¶79 So too, in the case before us, we must examine the 
entire trial record to determine whether the error of shortening 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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the factfinding hearing was abrogated by the participation and 
evidence that C.L.K. presented at the second step——i.e., the 
dispositional hearing.  Id., ¶33.  Stated otherwise, we must 
consider 
C.L.K.'s 
testimony 
at 
the 
dispositional 
hearing 
relative to abandonment in order to assess whether the error at 
the grounds hearing permeated the entire trial.    
a.  Structural Error 
¶80 I begin my discussion, based on the record before us 
and the applicable law in which structural error is grounded.  
It should be noted that the majority opinion refuses to consider 
the entire trial that took place before C.L.K.'s parental rights 
were terminated.  It also does no analysis of the law when 
concluding that the error at the factfinding hearing was 
structural error.  It gives only lip service to the "strong 
presumption" that an error is not structural when counsel was 
afforded and the factfinder was impartial, which is required by 
Rose v. Clark.  It does not explain how the error so affected 
the trial that its effect could not be measured or that its 
burden continued from the start of the trial without relief to 
the end of the trial after which C.L.K.'s parental rights were 
terminated.  Instead, ipse dixit, the majority opinion discovers 
a new type of structural error.8   
¶81 However, the structural error factors identified in 
                                                 
8 Neither United States Supreme Court, nor this court, has 
ever said that affecting the adversary system is structural 
error.     
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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Weaver are my guides.9  As I explain as this discussion of 
structural error progresses, the framework in which this 
termination of parental rights trial was conducted was sound.  
It consisted of vigorous representation by counsel before an 
unbiased judge.  Although protection of an interest beyond that 
of an adverse decision for a defendant can be structural error, 
for example when there is a complete denial of the right to 
counsel at trial, as in Gideon, the majority opinion identifies 
no such interest, and I could find none in this record.   
¶82 The majority eloquently and expansively expounds on 
the merits of the adversary system.10  It grounds its newly 
minted structural error in the alleged failure to permit "the 
respondent the option of presenting his case-in-chief" at the 
first step of a two-step trial.11  However, the majority opinion 
sets out no reasoning and applies no structural error precedent 
to support its broad assertion that an error at one hearing 
cannot be abrogated by presentations later in the trial.   
¶83 Furthermore, the quantitative effect of the error that 
occurred in the factfinding hearing is easily measured.  Review 
                                                 
9 In ¶69 above, I identified three categories into which 
structural errors generally fall.  As an assist to the reader, I 
repeat them here.  They are:  (1) affect an underlying right 
that protects some interest other than an adverse determination 
for the defendant; (2) the error's quantitative effect on the 
trial is too hard to measure; and (3) fundamental unfairness 
results from the error.  Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 
1899, 1908 (2017).   
10 See e.g., majority op., ¶¶17-22.  
11 Majority op., ¶16.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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of the full record, i.e., both hearings that were held March 23, 
2017, shows that C.L.K. fully testified about why he had had so 
little contact with his children and the foster parents.  He 
explained why he thought he had an excuse for "messing-up" and 
that he loved his children.  The foreshortening of C.L.K.'s 
testimony that occurred at the first-step of the trial, was 
abrogated by his direct testimony at the second-step, as well as 
by his counsel's thorough cross-examination of all witnesses the 
State presented at both hearings.  As Nelson explained, when the 
effect of the error on the outcome of a trial is capable of 
assessment, the error is not structural.  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 
722, ¶5 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08).  However, 
notwithstanding the law and the record, the majority opinion 
ignores the second hearing and all of C.L.K.'s direct testimony.   
¶84 In addition, C.L.K. had no witnesses who were not 
allowed to testify, as his counsel explained twice.12  First, at 
the factfinding hearing counsel said, "[i]f this is not a 
directed verdict motion at this point then and the State rests 
its case in chief, then I'm going to ask to be able to put my 
client on the stand and finish our side of the case."  C.L.K., 
himself, was his only witness.  Second, his attorney confirmed 
                                                 
12 The majority opinion states, "the circuit court did not 
allow him to decide who his witnesses would be, the order in 
which they would testify, or the evidence he would seek from 
each one."  Majority. op., ¶23.  The transcript of the trial 
conclusively proves that C.L.K. had only one witness, himself, 
at both hearings and that he testified fully.  There is 
absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that C.L.K. had any 
witnesses other than himself whom he sought to present during 
any part of the trial.     
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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that C.L.K. had no other witnesses to present when C.L.K.'s 
testimony at the dispositional hearing was concluded and counsel 
told the court that he had no further witnesses.  And think 
about it, who besides C.L.K. would know why he did not see, 
speak with or attempt to contact his two young children and 
their foster parents for 15 months.   
¶85 C.L.K. had a full opportunity to explain why his 
absence should not be sufficient to prove abandonment.  The 
transcript 
of 
the 
trial 
conclusively 
demonstrates 
that.  
Therefore, we can measure the quantitative effect of this error, 
which we could not do if this error were structural.  This trial 
was not fundamentally unfair.  
¶86 Furthermore, Evelyn C.R., which also involved an 
ultimate finding of abandonment when the factfinding hearing had 
been deficient in regard to proof of abandonment, requires that 
we consider the entire record when a proof problem occurs at the 
factfinding 
hearing. 
 
Evelyn 
C.R., 
246 
Wis. 2d 
1, 
¶32 
(explaining that "we nonetheless must examine the entire record 
to determine whether it provides a factual basis to support the 
court's finding of grounds for termination.").  That is, on 
review, we must consider evidence presented at both hearings 
that are components of a termination of parental rights trial 
before concluding that an initial error in one part of the trial 
is sufficient to require a new trial.  Id., ¶¶23, 32.   
¶87 Precedent and fundamental fairness to C.L.K. and to 
his two children require that we consider evidence presented at 
both the factfinding hearing and the dispositional hearing when 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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determining the effect of the error on the trial.  Id.  After 
having fully considered the record and the law, I conclude that 
structural error is nowhere to be found in this record. 
b.  Harmless Error 
¶88 Because the error that occurred is not structural, I 
examine whether it is harmless.  State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, 
¶66, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491.  The State has the burden 
of proving the error was harmless.  State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 
66, ¶3, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.   
¶89 A termination of parental rights proceeding is civil 
in nature.  Door Cty. DHFS v. Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 465, 
602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999).  Wisconsin has codified its 
harmless error doctrine in Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2), which we 
quoted in Evelyn C.R. and which I repeated at ¶78 above.   
¶90 Notwithstanding that codification, which is applicable 
in a criminal law context as well as a civil context, our 
decisions have expressed harmless error in a variety of ways:   
[I]n order to conclude that an error "did not 
contribute to the verdict" within the meaning of 
Chapman, a court must be able to conclude "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error."   
State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶48 n.14, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (citation omitted). 
In other words, if it is "clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have convicted absent 
the error," then the error did not "contribute to the 
verdict."   
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶67 n.54. 
[T]he standard for harmless error is the same for 
civil as well as criminal cases.   
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
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Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶43 (Crooks, J. concurring). 
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) provides that an error 
requires reversal only where it has "affected the 
substantial 
rights 
of 
the 
party" 
claiming 
error. . . .  An error is significant enough to 
undermine confidence in the outcome if there is a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome without 
the error.   
Id., ¶46.  I conclude that the complained-of error in the 
presentation of evidence in a termination of parental rights 
trial is harmless unless there is a reasonable probability that 
absent the error, the trial outcome would have been different, 
i.e., the parent's rights would not have been terminated.   
¶91 The shortening of C.L.K.'s testimony at the first 
hearing is the error of which he complains.  In order to assess 
whether that error was harmless, we must consider the record of 
the entire termination of parental rights trial.  Waukesha Cty. 
v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶58, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607 
(concluding 
that 
"[a] 
factual 
basis 
for 
several 
of 
the 
allegations in the petition can be teased out of the testimony 
of other witnesses at other hearings"); Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 
1, ¶32 (concluding that we "must examine the entire record to 
determine whether it provides a factual basis to support the 
court's finding of grounds for termination.").     
¶92 Upon review of the applicable law and the entire 
transcript of the two-step trial after which C.L.K.'s parental 
rights were terminated, it is apparent that C.L.K. did not 
suffer a violation of his substantial rights because the outcome 
of the trial would not have been different if he had given the 
testimony relative to abandonment at the first hearing that he 
Nos.  2017AP1413 & 2017AP1414.pdr 
 
 
 
27
gave at the second hearing.  Accordingly, I conclude that the 
State has proved that it is not reasonably probable that there 
would have been a different outcome if the error had not 
occurred.  Therefore, the error was harmless.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶93 In conclusion, although I agree that the circuit court 
erred in shortening C.L.K.'s presentation at the factfinding 
hearing, the error was a trial error.  It was not a structural 
error because it did not affect the framework of the entire 
trial.   Rather, the framework of the trial was established 
through C.L.K.'s vigorous representation by counsel before an 
unbiased factfinder from which framework we can quantitatively 
assess the effect of the error.  Accordingly, because the 
complained-of error is not structural, it is subject to a 
harmless-error analysis.     
¶94 Furthermore, the error did not affect the validity of 
the finding that C.L.K. had abandoned his two young children or 
that it was in the best interests of the children that C.L.K.'s 
parental rights be terminated so that their foster parents can 
adopt them.  Because I conclude that the circuit court error was 
harmless and, therefore, the two children who were abandoned by 
C.L.K. should have a permanent home in which to grow, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.   
¶95 I am authorized to state that ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, J. joins this dissent. 
 
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1