Case Title: Romanies v. WCAB (BOR. OF LEESPORT)

Citation: 537 Pa. 440, 644 A.2d 1164

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1994-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
537 Pa. 440 (1994) 644 A.2d 1164 Alex ROMANIES, Appellee, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (BOROUGH OF LEESPORT), Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Decided July 1, 1994. Submitted March 2, 1994. *441 David R. Beane, Reading, for appellant. Anthony C. Busillo, Harrisburg, for appellee. *442 Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ. ZAPPALA, Justice. We granted allocatur to determine whether the harassing phone calls made by the mayor of the Borough of Leesport to Appellee, Alex Romanies, the borough's police chief, were sufficient to create abnormal working conditions which resulted in Appellee's psychiatric injury 534 Pa. 642, 626 A.2d 1159. Because there was no medical evidence that the harassing phone calls alone caused, or were a substantial contributing factor in causing Appellee's psychiatric problems, we now reverse. Appellee filed a claim for workmen's compensation benefits alleging that he suffered a psychic injury as a result of continuous pressure and harassment from the mayor and borough counsel over a five-year period. When he was denied benefits, Appellee appealed and the referee held hearings. Thereafter, the referee denied benefits in a decision dated October 7, 1987, from which Appellee appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board vacated this decision and remanded the case because the referee presented summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact. Another referee heard the case on remand and awarded benefits to Appellee from February 15, 1985, with the Borough of Leesport (Employer) to pay costs and medical expenses. In the April 17, 1991 decision, the referee, relying on Appellee's testimony, specifically found that the mayor ordered a number of changes in Appellee's terms and conditions of employment, and that the mayor had called Appellee several times at home and yelled at him. The referee further found that Appellee's medical witness, Dr. Wiswesser, was credible as to his opinion that Appellee's depression and anxiety were work-related. The referee concluded that Appellee suffered a psychic injury from abnormal working conditions. On appeal, the Board reversed, concluding that the referee's findings of fact did not support such a finding. Appellee then appealed to *443 the Commonwealth Court which reversed the Board's order and reinstated the referee's decision awarding workmen's compensation benefits to Appellee. In an unreported opinion, a divided Commonwealth Court panel agreed with the Board and the referee that Appellee proved that he sustained psychiatric injuries through the objective evidence of his medical expert's testimony, Dr. Wiswesser, which the referee found credible. However, the court disagreed with the Board that Appellee failed to prove that his psychiatric injuries were caused by abnormal working conditions. Although the court found that the work changes, largely upon which Appellee based his claims were normal working conditions, the majority of the court reversed solely on the basis that the mayor had called Appellee several times at home to yell at him, and that behavior constituted an abnormal working condition. The court assumed that the Board's decision rested on the lack of evidence to corroborate the Claimant's testimony about the threatening phone calls from the mayor. Relying on Archer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (General Motors), 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 309, 319, 587 A.2d 901, 906 (1991), the court again stated that it could find no support in the case law for requiring corroboration of harassment and mistreatment. The burden of proof faced by a claimant to recover workmen's compensation benefits for a psychiatric injury is two-fold: first it must be proven by objective evidence that the claimant suffered a psychiatric injury and then it must be demonstrated that such injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. Martin v. Ketchum, 523 Pa. 509, 568 A.2d 159 (1990). However, unequivocal medical testimony is required to establish causation where the causal connection between the injury and the employment is not obvious. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (DeMay), 87 Pa. Cmwlth. 558, 487 A.2d 1053 (1985). There is no dispute that Appellee proved that he sustained psychiatric injury through the objective evidence of *444 the testimony of Dr. Wiswesser, Appellee's medical expert. While the Appellee satisfied the first prong of the Martin test, we now turn to an examination of the second prong of that test relative to the phone calls Appellee received from the mayor. Appellant, Employer, argues that there was no medical evidence that the harassing phone calls alone caused, or were a substantial contributing factor in causing Appellee's psychiatric problems. Conversely, Appellee contends, based upon the totality of the record evidence which disclose instances of improper job-related interference, that as the result of Employer's pressure and harassment, he suffered a work-related injury due to abnormal working conditions. Appellee argues that the abnormal working conditions included the threatening telephone calls. A review of the record, as Judge Pellegrini notes in his cogent dissent, reveals that the Appellee testified that the phone calls he received were only one of many factors, most of which were normal, that cause him stress. Similarly, Dr. Wiswesser did not testify specifically that the phone calls from the mayor had caused the Claimant's psychiatric injury but rather that the cumulative effect of both the normal work stress and phone calls were the cause of his condition. Dr. Wiswesser's testimony in pertinent part reveals the following: RR. 164a-166a. The record also reveals that the referee made the following specific findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to the phone calls and the abnormal working conditions: RR. 20a-22a. The causal connection between the Appellee's psychological injury and the telephone calls he received from the mayor is *447 not obvious from this record. Furthermore, there was no medical evidence presented that the harassing phone calls alone caused or were a substantial contributing factor in causing Appellee's psychological injury. This fact is underscored by the fact that the referee did not specifically find that the phone calls were an abnormal working condition or the sole cause of Appellee's psychiatric injury. For these reasons, we now reverse. The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed. MONTEMURO, J., is sitting by designation as Senior Justice pursuant to Judicial Assignment Docket No. 94 R1801, due to the unavailability of LARSEN, J., see No. 127 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1, filed October 28, 1993.