Case Title: Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2551

Docket Number: 20081038

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2551.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2551 
KAUFFMAN RACING EQUIPMENT, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. ROBERTS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2551.] 
Civil procedure — Long-arm jurisdiction — Alleged defamation via Internet — 
Right to due process not violated here — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2008-1038 — Submitted April 22, 2009 — Decided June 10, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Knox County, No. 07-CA-14, 
2008-Ohio-1922. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we address whether an Ohio court can properly assert 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when jurisdiction is predicated 
on that defendant’s publication of allegedly defamatory statements on the 
Internet.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court erred when it 
declined to assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in this case. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C. (“KRE”) is an 
Ohio limited liability company that constructs engine blocks and related high-
performance automotive equipment for public sale.  Although its business 
dealings are nationwide, KRE maintains its sole business operations and office in 
Glenmont, Ohio. 
{¶ 3} Appellant, Scott Roberts, is a 30-year resident of Virginia.  Roberts 
has never physically entered Ohio.  On February 6, 2006, using the name “Central 
Virginia Machine,” Roberts purchased from KRE an MR-1 Pontiac engine block 
after viewing the block on KRE’s website. 
{¶ 4} In October 2006, eight months after purchasing the engine block, 
Roberts contacted KRE by telephone, claiming that the block was defective.  
Although its products are sold “as-is,” KRE offered to retrieve the block from 
Virginia and bring it back to KRE’s Ohio office for inspection.  KRE and Roberts 
agreed that if KRE could verify that the product was defective, it would buy back 
the engine block at the price paid by Roberts. 
{¶ 5} KRE’s inspection revealed that after KRE had delivered the block 
to Roberts, substantial modifications had been made from the block’s original 
specifications.  When KRE contacted Roberts and presented this information, 
Roberts admitted that Central Virginia Machine had altered the block.  Because 
KRE believed that Roberts’s modifications were the cause of the defects, it 
declined to buy back the block and instead shipped it back to Roberts in Virginia. 
{¶ 6} Roberts was dissatisfied.  As a result, from October 18, 2006, 
through November 2006, Roberts posted numerous rancorous criticisms of KRE 
on various websites devoted to automobile racing equipment and related subjects.  
His commentary appeared on the public-forum section of the websites 
PerformanceYears.com and PontiacStreetPerformance.com and in an item 
description on the Internet auction website, eBay Motors. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 7} Roberts sought to affect KRE’s reputation.  In an October 18, 2006 
post on the PerformanceYears.com website, Roberts wrote: 
{¶ 8} “Bought a MR-1 Block from Kauffman in march [sic] of this year 
* * * 
{¶ 9} “Now, I have and have had since the day the block was delivered, 
a USELESS BLOCK.  I didn’t say worthless!  I plan to get a lot of mileage out of 
it[.]  And when I’m [sic] done Steve Kauffman will be able to attest to its worth." 
(Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 10} Later the same day, Roberts added: 
{¶ 11} “I did send it back.  They still have it.  Steve Kauffman admitted 
on the phone that he got similar numbers on the sonic test as i [sic] did but he 
won’t take it back because I did some work to it and have had it to [sic] long.  I 
guess it doesn’t matter that the day I got it all of the defects exsisted [sic] and 
nothing I have done caused them.  But don’t worry about that.  What I loose [sic] 
in dollars I will make up in entertainment at their expence [sic].”  (Boldface sic.) 
{¶ 12} The following day, October 19, 2006, Roberts wrote: 
{¶ 13} “You don't seem to understand.  As far as Steve kauffinan [sic] is 
concerned the issue is resolved. * * * Again, this is not to get a resolution.  I have 
a much bigger and dastardly plan than that and this is the perfect place to start. * * 
* (LOL) * * *  Here is another good board to visit! * * * Just trying to help other 
potential victims.”  (Emoticons omitted.)  
{¶ 14} On the eBay Motors auction site, Roberts ostensibly listed the 
block for sale.  In the item description, he wrote: 
{¶ 15} “This is a Kauffman MR-1 Block.  It has some real issues. * * * 
Steve Kaufmann [sic] says it’s the best aftermarket block out there for a Pontiac, 
but I now know better.  * * * Basically this block is junk and I have bought an IA-
II block to replace it.  It has never been assembled. * * *  Also the service you 
would get from Steve Kauffman of K&M performance is less than honorable.  I 
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brought the issues to his attention and he basically gave me the middle finger 
salute.  He would not take it back because I had it for more than 90 days.  I will 
never do business with Kauffman or KRE again.  Not just because of the block 
issues but mostly the lack of service issues.  E-mail me and I will tell you the 
whole story.  However the block (junk) is for sale ‘as is’!” 
{¶ 16} Roberts explained his eBay Motors auction in another post on 
PerformanceYears.com: 
{¶ 17} “As far as the block on e-bay.  Thats [sic] nothing more than 
getting the FACTS out to more people.  Do you believe anyone will read that add 
[sic] and buy it?  I can assure you this block issue is faaaaar from over.  Do you 
think I would spread this around like I have and plan to if I thought I couldn’t 
back EVERYTHING up? 
{¶ 18} “Again, I am not here to stir any pots.  I posted facts I can back up 
100%.  I can’t control what others say or do!” (Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 19} Steve Kauffman of KRE personally received separate inquiries 
regarding Roberts’s Internet postings from at least five Ohio residents. 
{¶ 20} Consequently, KRE filed a complaint in Knox County Court of 
Common Pleas seeking money damages from Roberts for defamation and 
intentional interference with contracts and business relationships.  The trial court 
granted Roberts’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on June 1, 
2007, and dismissed KRE’s complaint. 
{¶ 21} KRE appealed.  The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court’s judgment. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, Knox App. 
No. 07-CA-14, 2008-Ohio-1922, ¶ 36.  The court of appeals held that the Ohio 
long-arm statute and Civ.R. 4.3(A) confer jurisdiction on the trial court and that 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Roberts did not deprive him of his right 
to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Id. at ¶ 23. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 22} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts 119 Ohio St.3d 
1471, 2008-Ohio-4911, 894 N.E.2d 331. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 23} This case emanates from comments Roberts allegedly made on the 
Internet.  Does this fact affect the way this court should approach the 
jurisdictional question?  In this case, we think not. 
{¶ 24} Over 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
that 
jurisdictional 
jurisprudence 
must 
evolve 
alongside 
technological 
developments:  “As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce 
between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a 
similar increase.”  Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235, 250-251, 78 S.Ct. 
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283.  Along comes the Internet, and with it, the opportunity for 
civil disputes has greatly expanded.  “As [Internet] availability expands, the 
opportunity for civil disputes could expand proportionately, meaning that the 
American court system will be called upon to adjudicate an even greater number 
of cases. Since these cases will be predicated on Internet activity, the parties often 
will be from different parts of the country, or even from different countries. As a 
threshold issue, courts must decide whether such cases are properly before them.” 
Scott T. Jansen, Oh, What a Tangled Web * * * the Continuing Evolution of 
Personal Jurisdiction Derived from Internet-Based Contacts (2006), 71 Mo.L.Rev. 
177, 180. 
{¶ 25} The rise in Internet-related disputes does not mean courts should 
ignore traditional jurisdiction principles.  “ ‘[T]he Internet does not pose unique 
jurisdictional challenges.  People have been inflicting injury on each other from 
afar for a long time.  Although the Internet may have increased the quantity of 
these occurrences, it has not created problems that are qualitatively more 
difficult.’ ”  Jansen, 71 Mo.L.Rev. at 182, 183, quoting Allen R. Stein, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through 
the Lens of Regulatory Precision (2004), 98 NW.U.L.Rev. 411. 
{¶ 26} In some cases involving the Internet, the Zippo test, developed in 
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (W.D.Pa.1997), 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124, 
has been employed to determine whether Internet activity between the defendant 
and the forum state establishes jurisdiction.  The court established a “sliding 
scale” approach to Internet-based jurisdiction whereby the level of interactivity of 
the website is examined to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
is proper.  At one end of the scale are “situations where a defendant clearly does 
business over the Internet.” Id. “A defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of acting in a state through its website if the website is interactive to a 
degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the state.” 
Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. (C.A.6, 2002), 282 F.3d 883, 890.  At 
the other end of the Zippo scale are informational websites.  Zippo, 952 F. 
Supp.2d at 1124.  But as Roberts points out in his brief, “[t]he Zippo model was 
developed in a commercial or business context and is factually distinct from this 
case.”  When the Internet activity in question “is non-commercial in nature, the 
Zippo analysis * * * offers little to supplement the traditional framework for 
considering questions of personal jurisdiction.”  Oasis Corp. v. Judd (S.D.Ohio 
2001), 132 F. Supp.2d 612, 622, fn. 9, citing Mink v. AAAA Dev. L.L.C., (C.A.5, 
1999) 190 F.3d 333, 336.  We continue, then, with a traditional jurisdictional 
analysis. 
{¶ 27} Personal jurisdiction is a question of law that appellate courts 
review de novo.  In this case, upon Roberts’s motion to dismiss, it became KRE’s 
burden to show that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Roberts; because 
the trial court decided Roberts’s Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion upon written submissions 
and without an evidentiary hearing, KRE had to make only a prima facie showing 
of jurisdiction.  Fallang v. Hickey, (1988) 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 532 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
117.  In making its determination, the court must “view allegations in the 
pleadings and the documentary evidence in a light most favorable” to the plaintiff 
and resolving all reasonable competing inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 
Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541. 
{¶ 28} Determining whether an Ohio trial court has personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant involves a two-step analysis:  (1) whether the long-
arm statute and the applicable rule of civil procedure confer jurisdiction, and if so, 
(2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the nonresident defendant 
of the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  U.S. Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s 
Foods, Inc. (1994) 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183-184, 624 N.E.2d 1048.  We address 
those two factors in turn. 
{¶ 29} Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, enumerates specific acts 
that give rise to personal jurisdiction and provides: 
{¶ 30} “(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who 
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s: 
{¶ 31} “* * * 
{¶ 32} “(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;  
{¶ 33} “ * * * 
{¶ 34} “(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act 
outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might 
reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this 
state.” 
{¶ 35} Civ.R. 4.3 allows service of process on nonresidents in certain 
circumstances and mirrors the long-arm statute: 
{¶ 36} “(A) Service of process may be made outside of this state, as 
provided in this rule, in any action in this state, upon a person who, at the time of 
service of process, is a nonresident of this state or is a resident of this state who is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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absent from this state. ‘Person’ includes an individual * * * who, acting directly 
or by an agent, has caused an event to occur out of which the claim that is the 
subject of the complaint arose, from the person's:  
{¶ 37} “ * * * 
{¶ 38} “(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state, 
including, but not limited to, actions arising out of the ownership, operation, or 
use of a motor vehicle or aircraft in this state; 
{¶ 39} “ * * * 
{¶ 40} “(9) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act 
outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when the person 
to be served might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured 
by the act in this state.” 
{¶ 41} Roberts contends that Ohio’s long-arm statute does not confer 
personal jurisdiction because he did not direct the alleged tortious statements to 
Ohio or publish them here.  Despite the fact that Roberts’s publication of his 
comments did not emanate from Ohio, those comments were received in Ohio.  
KRE submitted evidence that at least five Ohio residents had seen the comments 
posted by Roberts.  In Fallang, 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 532 N.E.2d 117, paragraph 
one of the syllabus, this court held, “Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3) authorizes assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a defamation action when 
publication of the offending communication occurs in Ohio.”  In Fallang, the 
defendant had written an allegedly defamatory letter and had sent it to a person in 
Ohio.  “The tort of libel occurs in the locale where the offending material is 
circulated (published) by the defendant to a third party. Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. (1984), 465 U.S. 770, 777, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790.  In the 
instant case, [the defamatory] letter was published in Ohio by virtue of its receipt 
through the mail.  Thus, under the principle announced in Keeton, supra, the tort 
was committed in Ohio.”  Fallang, 40 Ohio St.3d at 107, 532 N.E.2d 117. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
{¶ 42} Roberts posted his allegedly defamatory statements on the Internet, 
ostensibly for the entire world to see.  How much of the world saw the comments 
is unknown; but we do know that at least five Ohioans saw Roberts’s statements.  
The comments were thus published in Ohio.  Because Roberts’s allegedly 
defamatory statements were published in Ohio, his alleged tort was committed in 
Ohio, and he falls within the grasp of R.C. 2307.382(A)(3) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3). 
{¶ 43} But even if Roberts did not publish or circulate his statements 
within the territorial boundaries of Ohio, he is not shielded him from the reach of 
Ohio’s long arm.  “R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(9) permit a court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and provide for 
service of process to effectuate that jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from a 
tortious act committed outside Ohio with the purpose of injuring persons, when 
the nonresident defendant might reasonably have expected that some person 
would be injured thereby in Ohio.”  Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 
313, 695 N.E.2d 751. 
{¶ 44} Thus, even if we assume that Roberts’s alleged tortious conduct 
did not take place within the territorial boundaries of Ohio, he nonetheless “might 
reasonably have expected that [KRE] would be injured in this state.”  R.C. 
2307.382(A)(6).  When defamatory statements regarding an Ohio plaintiff are 
made outside the state yet with the purpose of causing injury to the Ohio resident 
and there is a reasonable expectation that the purposefully inflicted injury will 
occur in Ohio, the requirements of R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) are satisfied.  It is clear 
from the postings that Roberts’s statements were made with the purpose of 
injuring KRE.  Therefore, the long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Roberts in Ohio. 
{¶ 45} Ohio’s long-arm statute is not coterminous with due process. 
Goldstein, 70 Ohio St.3d at 238, 638 N.E.2d 541, fn. 1.  Therefore, although 
Ohio’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over Roberts, an Ohio court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Roberts if doing so would violate his 
constitutional right to due process.  The United States Supreme Court noted in 
International Shoe that due process is satisfied if the defendant has “minimum 
contacts” with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”  326 U.S. at 
316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, quoting Milliken v. Meyer (1940), 311 U.S. 457, 
463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed.2d 278.  The minimum contacts requirement is met 
when a nonresident defendant “purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State.”  Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. 
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283. 
{¶ 46} Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific, depending 
upon the nature of the contacts that the defendant has with the forum state. Conti 
v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp. (C.A.6, 1992), 977 F.2d 978, 981.  “General 
jurisdiction is proper only where ‘a defendant's contacts with the forum state are 
of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant's 
contacts with the state.’ ”  Bird v. Parsons (C.A.6, 2002), 289 F.3d 865, 873, 
quoting Third Natl. Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc. (C.A.6, 1989), 882 
F.2d 1087, 1089.  KRE does not allege that Roberts has continuous and 
systematic contacts in Ohio such that he would be amenable to jurisdiction for 
claims arising outside of Ohio. 
{¶ 47} Instead, KRE asserts that Ohio has specific jurisdiction over 
Roberts. Specific jurisdiction applies when “a State exercises personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with 
the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984), 466 U.S. 
408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, fn. 8.  KRE alleges that its cause of 
action is related to or arises out of the defendant's contact with Ohio. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 48} In Bird, the court held that specific jurisdiction “is permissible 
only if [a defendant’s] contacts with Ohio satisfy the three-part test that this court 
established in Southern Machine Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 
374, 381 (6th Cir.1968): 
{¶ 49} “ ‘First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the 
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. 
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there.  
Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must 
have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.’ ”  Bird, 289 F.3d at 874. 
{¶ 50} In this case, we, too, employ the three-part test from S. Machine 
Co., 401 F.2d at 381, in determining whether specific jurisdiction here is 
consistent with due process. 
{¶ 51} The first S. Machine factor is whether the defendant purposefully 
availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a 
consequence in the forum state.  “Purposeful availment” is present where the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state “proximately result from actions by the 
defendant himself  that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” 
(Emphasis sic.)  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 
S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, quoting McGee v. Internatl. Life Ins. Co. (1957), 355 
U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223.  The defendant’s conduct and 
connection with the forum must be such that he “ ‘should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there.’ ”  Id. at 474, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490.  “This 
‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into 
a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts,” 
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790, or of the “ ‘unilateral 
activity of another party or third person.’ ”  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, quoting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404.  In 
certain circumstances, the “plaintiff’s residence in the forum may, because of 
defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, enhance the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum.  Plaintiff’s residence may be the focus of the activities of the defendant 
out of which the suit arises.”  Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 at 780, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 
L.Ed.2d 790. 
{¶ 52} This is a defamation case.  The United States Supreme Court 
addressed purposeful availment in regard to jurisdiction in defamation cases in 
Calder v. Jones (1984), 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804.  In 
Calder, a California resident and actress, Shirley Jones, brought a libel action in 
California against Florida-resident employees of the National Enquirer, a Florida 
corporation. Id. at 785.  The defendants were the writer and editor of an article 
that was written in Florida and appeared in the National Enquirer, alleging that 
Jones drank so heavily that she was unable to fulfill her professional obligations. 
Id. at 785-786, 788-789, fn. 9.  The court held that jurisdiction was proper in 
California because “[t]he allegedly libelous story concerned the California 
activities of a California resident.  It impugned the professionalism of an 
entertainer whose television career was centered in California.  The article was 
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms of [Jones’s] 
emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in 
California.  In sum, California is the focal point of both the story and the harm 
suffered.  Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on 
the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”  Id at 788-789. 
{¶ 53} The defendants argued that California lacked personal jurisdiction 
over them because it was their publisher that was responsible for the circulation of 
the article in California, not they.  The defendants analogized themselves to 
welders employed in Florida who worked on a boiler that subsequently exploded 
in California.  They argued that although jurisdiction would be proper over the 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
manufacturer, it should not be applied to welders, who have no control over and 
derive no direct benefit from their employer’s sales in another state. 
{¶ 54} The court exploded the defendants’ boiler analogy, focusing on the 
targeted nature of their activity: 
{¶ 55} “Whatever the status of their hypothetical welder, petitioners are 
not charged with mere untargeted negligence.  Rather, their intentional, and 
allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.  Petitioner South 
wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a 
potentially devastating impact upon respondent.  And they knew that the brunt of 
that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works 
and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.  Under the 
circumstances, petitioners must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 
490; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1699-1700, 56 
L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2586, 
53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).  An individual injured in California need not go to Florida 
to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause 
the injury in California.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 
804. 
{¶ 56} To rephrase the court’s conclusion in Calder in a question, should 
a company injured in Ohio need to go to Virginia to seek redress from a person 
who, though remaining in Virginia, knowingly caused injury in Ohio?  Like the 
defendants in Calder, Roberts is not alleged to have engaged in untargeted 
negligence.  Roberts’s Internet commentary reveals a blatant intent to harm 
KRE’s reputation.  Roberts knew that KRE was an Ohio company.  Roberts 
impugned the activities that KRE undertakes in Ohio.  Roberts hoped that his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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commentary would have a devastating effect on KRE and that if there were 
fallout from his comments, the brunt of the harm would be suffered in Ohio. 
{¶ 57} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Calder “effects” 
test narrowly in Reynolds v. Internatl. Amateur Athletic Fedn. (1994), 23 F.3d 
1110.  In that case, Butch Reynolds, an Olympic gold-medal-winning track star 
from Ohio, brought a defamation claim against the International Amateur Athletic 
Federation (“IAAF”) for its publication of a press release announcing that 
following a Monte Carlo track meet, Reynolds had tested positive for banned 
substances.  Reynolds alleged personal jurisdiction against the nonresident 
defendant, IAFF, because its defamatory acts had brought injury to Reynolds in 
Ohio. 
{¶ 58} The court held: 
{¶ 59} “We find Calder distinguishable for several reasons.  First, the 
press release concerned Reynolds' activities in Monaco, not Ohio.  Second, the 
source of the controversial report was the drug sample taken in Monaco and the 
laboratory testing in France.  Third, Reynolds is an international athlete whose 
professional reputation is not centered in Ohio.  Fourth, the defendant itself did 
not publish or circulate the report in Ohio; Ohio periodicals disseminated the 
report.  Fifth, Ohio was not the ‘focal point’ of the press release.  The fact that the 
IAAF could foresee that the report would be circulated and have an effect in Ohio 
is not, in itself, enough to create personal jurisdiction.  World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566[, 62 L.Ed.2d 490].  Finally, although 
Reynolds lost Ohio corporate-endorsement contracts and appearance fees in Ohio, 
there is no evidence that the IAAF knew of the contracts or of their Ohio origin.  
Calder is a much more compelling case for finding personal jurisdiction.”  
Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1120. 
{¶ 60} The within case is much closer to Calder than it is to Reynolds.  
The distinguishing aspects in Reynolds are not at play here.  Unlike the IAAF’s 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
statements about Reynolds’s Monaco drug test, Roberts’s statements concerned 
KRE’s Ohio activities – the manufacture and post-sale inspection of the engine 
block.  Unlike Reynolds, who ran races throughout the world, KRE’s reputation is 
centered in Ohio, where it performs all its work.  Also, Roberts’s Internet postings 
were published to Ohio residents by Roberts, not by third parties.  In sum, the 
facts of this case square with Calder rather than Reynolds. 
{¶ 61} We note that neither Calder nor Reynolds involved Internet 
communication of the allegedly defamatory material.  Two cases from the Sixth 
Circuit do involve defamation cases arising from Internet activity; in both cases, 
courts attempt to determine whether the case is closer to Calder or to Reynolds. 
{¶ 62} In Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann (C.A.6, 2005), 123 Fed.Appx. 675, 
Schlichtmann, of Massachusetts, created a website to reveal what he believed to 
be the unlawful activities of Cadle, an Ohio-based debt collector, in 
Massachusetts.  Cadle filed suit in Ohio for defamation.  The court, while 
proclaiming that Schlichtmann’s operation of a website would alone be 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, did acknowledge that Schlichtmann’s 
statements on the website may be sufficient to justify jurisdiction.  Id. at 678-679.  
The court, in determining whether the defendant’s Internet statements gave rise to 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction, then looked to Calder and Reynolds and 
distinguished the two cases.  Finding the facts more like those in Reynolds, the 
court declined to assert personal jurisdiction because the alleged defamatory 
statements were not related to any activities Cadle undertook in Ohio. Id. at 680.  
In contrast, in this case, Roberts’s posts were premised solely on the activities of 
KRE in Ohio. 
{¶ 63} In Oasis Corp., 132 F.Supp.2d 612, Oklahoma residents had 
launched a “gripe site” concerning the products of an Ohio corporation. Id. at 614.  
The Oklahoma residents had not purchased any item from Oasis, but were upset 
that an Oasis water cooler had caused a fire in a building the defendants were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
renting. Id.  The district court declined to exercise personal jurisdiction because 
there was no evidence to suggest that the defendants’ communications were 
received by anyone in Ohio other than the plaintiff. Id. at 621.  Further, the court 
found more of a tie to Reynolds than to Calder: 
{¶ 64} “The facts of this case much more closely resemble Reynolds than 
Calder.  First, Defendants claim on their site that a defective Oasis water cooler 
started a fire in Oklahoma, not Ohio.  Second, Oasis is an international company 
whose reputation is not centered in Ohio.  Third, Defendants’ site does not 
specifically target an Ohio audience.  As in Reynolds, ‘[t]he fact that [Defendants] 
could foresee that [their proclamations would be viewed] and have an effect in 
Ohio is not, in itself, enough to create personal jurisdiction.’ ”  Id. at 624, quoting 
Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1120. 
{¶ 65} In contrast to the plaintiff in Oasis Corp., Kauffman has alleged – 
and produced at least some evidence – that the alleged defamatory statements 
were communicated to Ohio residents other than Kauffman.  Kauffman received 
inquiries from at least five Ohio residents who read the Roberts postings.  
Moreover, KRE is an Ohio-based company whose reputation is centered in Ohio 
and that had engaged in commercial activity with Roberts before the controversy. 
{¶ 66} The Calder effects test is not beyond reproach.  It has been called 
“the source of considerable uncertainty because Internet-based activity can 
ordinarily be said to cause effects in most jurisdictions.”  Michael A. Geist, Is 
There a There? Toward Greater Certainty For Internet Jurisdiction (2001) 16 
Berkeley Tech.L.J. 1345, 1381.  We find this criticism to be invalid.  The effects 
analysis necessitates conduct “calculated to cause injury” in a “focal point” where 
the “brunt” of the injury is experienced.  Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-791.  “While the 
effects of Internet conduct may be felt in many [forums], the intent requirement 
allows a court to find a particular focal point.”  Jansen, 71 Mo.L.Rev. at 192. 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
{¶ 67} Roberts argues that mere foreseeability by a nonresident defendant 
of the effects in the forum state is insufficient to justify the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.  Roberts’s reliance of this conclusion is inapposite because the effects 
of his conduct went well beyond foreseeability:  Roberts intended the effects of 
his conduct to be felt in Ohio.  His statements were communicated with the very 
purpose of having their consequences felt by KRE in Ohio.  The contention that 
his statements were not made with the purpose of injuring some person in Ohio is 
unavailing.  The postings themselves indicate his purpose of injuring Kauffman.  
For example, on his October 18, 2006, posting, Roberts stated:  “[w]hat I loose 
[sic] in dollars I will make up in entertainment at their expence [sic].”  On 
October 19, 2006, he wrote:  “[a]gain, this is not to get a resolution.  I have a 
much bigger and dastardly plan than that and this is a good place to start.”  Many 
of the postings name Kauffman directly and specifically mention Ohio. 
{¶ 68} Here, Roberts not only knew that Ohio resident KRE could be the 
victim, he intended it be the victim.  The allegedly defamatory communications 
concerned KRE’s activities in Ohio.  We are not dealing with a situation in which 
jurisdiction is premised on a single, isolated transaction.  The posts detailed the 
transactions between Roberts and KRE.  Moreover, the purchase of the engine 
block and subsequent transfers from Virginia to Ohio and back again served as 
the foundation from which this dispute arose.  Roberts’s allegedly defamatory 
posts were predicated on his course of dealing with an Ohio resident corporation.  
At least five Ohio residents other than Kauffman read these postings.  Finally, 
although KRE does business nationwide, its business reputation is centered in 
Ohio, because Ohio is the location of its sole base of operations.  Roberts knew, 
and in fact intended, that the brunt of the harm caused be felt by KRE in Ohio.  
Thus, the focal point of the damage was Ohio, and Roberts’s actions therefore 
fulfill the requirement of causing a consequence in Ohio. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
{¶ 69} Here, KRE has made a prima facie showing that Roberts 
purposefully availed himself of Ohio law.  When viewed in a light most favorable 
to KRE, the evidence shows that Roberts intentionally and tortiously sought to 
harm KRE’s reputation and negatively affect its contracts and business 
relationships.  Therefore, KRE meets the first of the S. Machine factors. 
{¶ 70} Having established Roberts’s contacts in Ohio, the second S. 
Machine prong involves an analysis of whether KRE’s claims arise from those 
contacts.  “If a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are related to the 
operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to have arisen 
from those contacts.”  CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson (C.A.6, 1996), 89 F.3d 
1257, 1267.  This “does not require that the cause of action formally ‘arise from’ 
defendant's contacts with the forum; rather, this criterion requires only ‘that the 
cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the 
defendant's in-state activities.’ ” (Emphasis added in Third Natl.) Third Natl. 
Bank, 882 F.2d  at 1091, quoting S. Machine Co., 401 F.2d at 384, fn. 27.  
Further, a “lenient standard * * * applies when evaluating the ‘arising from’ 
criterion.”  Bird, 289 F.3d at 875.  Under this standard, KRE has made a prima 
facie showing that the cause of action arose from Roberts’s contacts with Ohio.  
Not only does the cause of action arise from defamatory statements, those 
statements themselves are predicated on the business dealings between Roberts 
and KRE.  The catalyst for Roberts’s actions was his Ohio contacts.  In fact, but 
for his contacts with Ohio, Roberts’s allegedly defamatory statements would not 
have been posted. 
{¶ 71} Under the third and final prong of the S. Machine test, the acts of 
the nonresident defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a 
substantial connection with the forum state to make exercise of jurisdiction over 
the defendant reasonable.  When “the first two elements of a prima facie case [are 
satisfied] then an inference arises that this third factor is also present.”  
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1268, citing Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn (C.A.6, 
1988), 839 F.2d 1164, 1170.  “ ‘[O]nly the unusual case will not meet this third 
criterion.’ ”  Am. Greetings, 839 F.2d at 1170, quoting First Natl. Bank of 
Louisville v. J.W. Brewer Tire Co. (C.A.6, 1982), 680 F.2d 1123, 1126. 
{¶ 72} A number of factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.  A 
court first must consider Ohio’s interest in the controversy.  In-Flight Servs. Corp. 
v. Van Dusen Air, Inc. (C.A.6, 1972), 466 F.2d 220, 232.  “[I]t is beyond dispute 
that [a forum state] has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually 
occur within the State.”  Keeton, 465 U.S at 776, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790.  
“Ohio has a legitimate interest in protecting the business interests of its citizens * 
* *.”  Bird, 289 F.3d at 875.  “The United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
a high degree of unfairness is required to erect a constitutional barrier against 
jurisdiction. * * * This is especially true in a case (such as the one herein) in 
which the defendant has intentionally directed his activity at forum residents * * 
*, and the ‘effects’ of the activity occur in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, supra, 
465 U.S. at 788-789, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-87[, 79 L.Ed.2d 804].”   Fallang, 40 Ohio 
St.3d at 108, 532 N.E.2d 117.  KRE and Ohio clearly have an interest in KRE’s 
obtaining the relief sought, and Ohio is the appropriate forum. 
{¶ 73} We conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over Roberts in this 
case is reasonable, satisfying the third part of the S. Machine test. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 74} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to KRE, we 
conclude that Ohio’s long-arm statute and the applicable rule of civil procedure 
confer jurisdiction over Roberts and that an exercise of jurisdiction of the trial 
court would not deprive this nonresident defendant of the right to due process of 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  KRE has 
made a sufficient showing that Roberts caused tortious injury in this state by acts 
committed outside of Ohio with the purpose of injuring KRE.  His 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
communications specifically targeted a known Ohio resident, and the cause of 
action arises from the substantial connection Roberts made with Ohio through his 
course of dealing with KRE.  We decline to allow a nonresident defendant to take 
advantage of the conveniences that modern technology affords and 
simultaneously be shielded from the consequences of his intentionally tortious 
conduct.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 75} Respectfully, I dissent.  Today, the majority has extended the 
personal jurisdiction of Ohio courts to cover any individual in any state who 
purchases a product from an Ohio company and posts a criticism of it on the 
Internet with the intent to damage the seller.  This holding changes long-arm 
jurisdiction dramatically.  In my view, because minimum contacts with Ohio are 
not present in all such circumstances, the majority’s holding does not withstand 
due process scrutiny. 
{¶ 76} “[T]he constitutional touchstone [of long-arm jurisdiction] remains 
whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum 
State.”  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 
2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528.  While the majority focuses on the fact that Roberts could 
foresee and even intended to cause injury to Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C. 
(“KRE”), an Ohio company, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently 
held that this kind of foreseeability is not a ‘sufficient benchmark’ for exercising 
personal jurisdiction.” Id. quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson 
(1980), 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490.  Rather, personal 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
jurisdiction is proper if the defendant’s conduct and connections with the forum 
state “proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 
‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.”  Id. at 475, quoting Mcgee v. 
Internatl. Life Ins. Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223.  
The defendant’s actions must have created that connection to such a degree that 
he “ ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ ”  Id., quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen at 297.  When the defendant does not have an ongoing 
relationship with the forum state, a defendant must deliberately engage in 
significant activities within that state and “ ‘purposefully direct[]’ his activities at 
residents of the forum” to satisfy this standard. Id. at 472, quoting Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984), 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.E.2d 790; 
see also Anilas, Inc. v. Kern (1987),  31 Ohio St.3d 163, 164, 31 OBR 366, 509 
N.E.2d 1267 (“the focus of analysis ought to be whether one purposely 
established contacts with the forum state.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 77} Relying primarily on Calder v. Jones (1984), 465 U.S. 783, 104 
S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.E.d.2d 804, the majority concludes that Roberts exercised 
minimum contacts with Ohio sufficient to satisfy due process because he posted 
defamatory comments relating to a consumer transaction with KRE on three 
websites, intending them to have effects felt in Ohio, and the evidence indicates 
that five identified Ohio residents read them.  However, Calder does not 
conclusively confer jurisdiction in the forum state simply because the defendant’s 
intended effects of the communication are felt in that state.  Rather, the court in 
Calder considered the location of the injury and the pervasive nature of the 
contact when assessing whether the defendants had the minimum contacts with 
the forum state.  The court stressed that the newspaper in which the article 
appeared, The National Enquirer, had its largest circulation, almost twice that in 
any other state, in California, where the plaintiff resided.  It was that detail 
coupled with the fact that the person about whom the article was written lived and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
would suffer injury in California that rendered California the focal point of the 
publication.  Based upon those facts, the court identified minimum contacts 
sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants could “reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there.”  Id. at 790, quoting World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 
297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490. 
{¶ 78} But the facts of this case are easily distinguishable from those in 
Calder.  Here, Roberts posted his comments on three general auto-racing websites 
and an auction site, none of which have any specific connection to Ohio or are 
more likely to be viewed by a resident of Ohio than by a resident of any other 
state.  In fact, KRE could identify only five Ohio residents it believes actually 
viewed Roberts’s comments.  In Calder, on the other hand, the National Enquirer 
sold approximately 600,000 copies of the offending article in the forum state.  
Calder, 465 U.S. at 785, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804.  The reach of Roberts’s 
comments to Ohio residents is not at all comparable to the reach of the National 
Enquirer’s circulation to California residents. 
{¶ 79} By merely posting to general websites, Roberts neither deliberately 
engaged in significant activities within Ohio nor purposefully directed his 
activities at an Ohio resident sufficient to establish minimum contacts and satisfy 
due process — regardless of his intent.1  See, e.g., Oasis Corp. v. Judd (S.D.Ohio 
2001), 132 F. Supp.2d 612, 623 (declining to find jurisdiction because “[t]he 
computers hosting Defendants’ [web]site are not located in Ohio, there has been 
                                                 
1.  The majority does not find sufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction based solely on the parties’ 
underlying transaction, nor should it. See Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 314, 695 
N.E.2d 751, 756, quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L.E.2d 528 (finding 
that an in-state plaintiff's contract with an out-of-state defendant, standing alone, does not establish 
sufficient minimum contacts and that “ ‘prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, 
along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing’ ” must be 
considered).  Here, while the transaction involved the purchase and return of a product, there is no 
evidence that the parties expressly or implicitly contemplated future consequences or a longer 
relationship.   
 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
no meaningful interactivity between the site and a significant number of Ohioans, 
and the site is not directed toward an Ohio audience * * *”); see also Young v. 
New Haven Advocate (C.A.4, 2002), 315 F.3d 256, 263  (“the fact that the 
newspapers’ websites could be accessed anywhere, including Virginia, does not 
by itself demonstrate that the newspapers were intentionally directing their 
website content to a Virginia audience”).  While it is evident from Roberts’s 
Internet posts that he sought to discourage others from purchasing KRE’s 
products, any individual who posts a negative review of a product or service in a 
public forum arguably seeks the same objective.  Subjecting all individuals to suit 
in Ohio who post Internet reviews — no matter how scathing — of purchases 
made from Ohio companies does not comport with the due process notions of 
“fair play and substantial justice.”  Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of 
Unemployment & Placement (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 
95. 
{¶ 80} The foreseeability of causing injury to an Ohio company, whether 
the injury is intended or not, without directing activity at forum residents, is not 
sufficient to establish minimum contacts.  See Burger King,471 U.S. at 474, 105 
S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528; see also New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d at 263 
(narrowly construing Calder and holding that “[t]he newspapers must, through the 
Internet postings, manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers”). 
Notwithstanding this traditional jurisdictional principle, the majority has 
ostensibly provided an avenue for any affected Ohioan to sue the originator of any 
negative Internet post in an Ohio court when the product has been purchased in 
Ohio and the negative post is read by an Ohio resident.  But this standard falls far 
short of due process. 
{¶ 81} Since this case is limited to the jurisdictional aspects of the 
litigation, the parties have not briefed, nor has the court addressed, the First 
Amendment rights of those who post comments on the Internet.  The Supreme 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
Court of the United States in Calder “reject[ed] the suggestion that First 
Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis [and] declined *  * * to 
grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions 
in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws.” 
Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-791, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804.  Nonetheless, the 
practical impact of the majority’s holding in this case is to unnecessarily chill the 
exercise of free speech. 
{¶ 82} Because Roberts’s conduct does not establish minimum contacts 
with Ohio sufficient to comport with due process, I would reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Brett Jaffe and Dennis C. Belli, for appellee. 
 
Kepko & Phillips Co., L.P.A., William J. Kepko, and Sherry M. Phillips, 
for appellant. 
_____________________