Case Title: Merrow v. Bofferding

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106331-6

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided July 31, 1998. *697 Cady, Mastromarco & Jahn, P.C. (By Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr.), Saginaw, for plaintiffs-appellees. Chasnis, Dogger & Grierson, P.C. (by David G. Dogger), Saginaw, for defendants-appellants. Charters, Heck, O'Donnell, Petrulis & Zorza, P.C. (by Eric S. Goldstein), Troy, amicus curiae for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association. Opinion MALLETT, Chief Justice. This premises liability personal injury case involves whether a statement contained in a medical record that was relevant to causation, but that the plaintiff alleges was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment, is admissible. The defendants contend that it was properly admitted under MRE 803(6), the business record exception to exclusion of hearsay statements, and that the Court of Appeals clearly erred in reversing and remanding the case for a new trial. Alternatively, defendants believe that it was admissible for impeachment purposes under MRE 613(b) or as an admission of a party opponent under MRE 801(d)(2). Because we conclude that the contested portion of the medical record was not admissible and that its admission was not harmless error, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision. I Plaintiff Greg Merrow initiated this negligence action after he sustained a serious permanent injury to his dominant arm when it broke through a pane of glass in the upper portion of the aluminum storm door at the rear of the residence he leased from defendants. The plaintiff testified that the injury occurred when he stuck out his right arm to stop the door in order to prevent it from striking his two-year-old daughter who had stepped onto the top step as he was preparing to take his wife to work. The glass *698 broke, cutting him severely.[1] Immediately after the injury, Julie Merrow, who was married to the plaintiff at the time, used a belt as a make-shift tourniquet to control the profuse bleeding and rushed plaintiff to the emergency room at St. Luke's Hospital in Saginaw, Michigan. This action ensued two weeks after the incident. Julie Merrow also sued individually and as next friend of the couple's two children. The trial court dismissed her individual claim before trial because the couple had divorced. It also dismissed the children's claims.[2] Plaintiff's negligence theory during the jury trial was that the defendants breached their duty to maintain the door in a safe condition and that this breach led to the injuries. He alleged several problems with the door that caused the injuries. The hydraulic plunger did not work properly, causing the door to slam shut. Residents of the dwelling had dented the aluminum plate at the base by using their feet to keep the door from slamming. The door also had a tendency to stick on the top step of a makeshift wooden porch and then close suddenly when someone stepped on the top step. Further, the upper portion of the door was plate glass rather than safety glass or plastic as plaintiff alleges should have been used, and was affixed with sheet-metal screws and duct tape. Plaintiff alleges that defendants had been notified several times about the problems with the door before the injury occurred. The defendants' theory was that they are not liable because Mr. Merrow's own actions caused the cut when he purposefully punched his arm through the glass. Defense counsel argued that this theory was supported by an excerpt from a document titled "History and Physical" found in plaintiff's hospital record, photographs, and testimonial inconsistencies. The trial court's admission of the excerpt from the hospital record is the focus of this appeal. It states as follows: This is a 23-year-old caucasian male who was involved in a fight with his girlfriend and subsequently put his right arm through a plate glass window, suffering a large laceration across the right antecubital fossa. [Emphasis added.] The second page of this document was signed by Gregory M. Yasuda, M.D., and Gerardo Reyes, M.D. Apparently, Dr. Yasuda, then a resident physician, actually took the history. Dr. Reyes was the supervising physician. Plaintiff first challenged the disputed statement in the record on the first day of trial, before jury selection, on the ground that the remark was inadmissible hearsay. Counsel emphasized that Dr. Yasuda, who had since moved from Michigan, had not been deposed or subpoenaed to testify in person. Further, counsel argued that the remark was not reliable because there was no indication of a girlfriend. The plaintiff was living with his wife at the time of the accident and she was the one who had driven him to the hospital. Counsel argued that the "fight with his girlfriend" remark was not admissible under MRE 803(4), the medical record exception to the general inadmissibility of hearsay, because it was not made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis. Further, plaintiffs' counsel argued that it was not admissible under MRE 803(6) as a record kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, because the remark lacked the requisite level of trustworthiness required to qualify for admission under that particular hearsay exception. After a brief recess, the trial court agreed with the plaintiff that the disputed words were not admissible under MRE 803(4). However, the court indicated that the statement might be admissible for impeachment purposes under MRE 613(b), which allows impeachment by a previous inconsistent statement of a witness, if a sufficient foundation could be established that Greg Merrow *699 in fact had made the statement. It did not rule on this issue at that time. During trial, plaintiff Greg Merrow denied telling hospital personnel that he was involved in a fight with his girlfriend and subsequently put his right arm through a plate glass window. Upon further questioning during crossexamination, he acknowledged that he and Julie Merrow had separated five and a half weeks after this incident, and that he had moved in with a girlfriend. Out of the jury's presence, the parties again debated the admissibility of the disputed portion of the medical record. The court then ruled that defense counsel could inquire whether Greg Merrow was living with Julie Merrow at the time of the accident, or with a girlfriend, but not whether the girlfriend he joined after separating with his wife was his girlfriend while he was living in the marital home. Julie Merrow's testimony confirmed that she had been living with the plaintiff at the time of the accident. She also confirmed Greg Merrow's testimony about the problems with the storm door.[3] Later in the trial, defense counsel called Kimberly K. Leptich, who worked in the medical records department of St. Luke's Hospital. She explained that according to hospital protocol, a physician generally obtains the patient's history from the patient within twenty-four hours of admission. The physician dictates the history and then reviews and signs it after it is transcribed. When a resident physician obtains the history, the supervising physician would also review and sign it. Ms. Leptich also testified that the "History and Physical" is a record that is compiled and kept by St. Luke's in the regular course of business. Ms. Leptich explained that Mr. Merrow's history was obtained sometime between 9:31 a.m., when he was admitted to the emergency room, and 10:50 a.m., when hospital personnel administered anesthesia in preparation for surgery. She acknowledged, however, that she had no personal knowledge of who provided the history at issue in this case. Neither could Dr. Reyes shed light on exactly who made the statement regarding the fight with a girlfriend. Once again, the parties debated the admissibility of the contested portion of the medical record. The plaintiff's attorney again argued that the remark was not admissible because the document was not trustworthy. This time the trial court ruled the record, including the disputed statement, admissible under MRE 803(6). It reasoned that the plaintiff's objections concerned credibility and the weight to be given the statements by the jury, rather than a threshold issue of admissibility.[4] Ms. Leptich then read the record into evidence before the jury. *700 Using a special verdict form, the jury found that the defendants were negligent, but that their negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.[5] The trial court entered judgment for the defendants and denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, in an unpublished opinion per curiam, by a vote of two to one and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.[6] The majority concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing into evidence the disputed statement in the medical record. The majority also reinstated the claims of the Merrow children. This Court granted leave to appeal,[7] and we now affirm. II Admission of the disputed portion of the medical record implicates the concept of hearsay within hearsay. MRE 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it comes within an established exception. MRE 802; People v. Eady, 409 Mich. 356, 294 N.W.2d 202 (1980). Hearsay within hearsay, in the context of a history recorded in a medical record, is explained in 2 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed.), § 293, p. 279: Under standard practice, a trained attendant at hospitals enters upon the record a "personal history," including an identification of the patient, an account of the present injury or illness, and the events and symptoms leading up to it. This information, which may be obtained from the patient directly or from a companion, is elicited to aid in the diagnosis and treatment of the patient's injury or disease. Is this history admissible to prove assertions of facts it may contain? Two layers of hearsay are involved here, with the first being the use of the hospital record to prove that the statement was made. We note that in this case, the two levels of hearsay consist of (1) the document itself found in the medical record labeled "History and Physical" and signed by Dr. Yasuda, and (2) the statement in the document indicating that the injury occurred after the plaintiff had a fight with his girlfriend. Our analysis begins with the first level of hearsay, the document itself. The document itself was admissible under MRE 803(6), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for records of regularly conducted activity. MRE 803(6) provides: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, transactions, occurrences, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. [Emphasis added.] The defense, through the testimony of Ms. Leptich, established that the "History and Physical" is a record that is compiled and kept in the regular course of business by the *701 hospital. Consequently, we find that the document itself was admissible under MRE 803(6). However, not every statement contained within the document is admissible merely because the document as a whole is one kept in the regular course of business. Where, as here, the document contains a contested hearsay statement, a separate justification must exist for its admission, i.e., it must qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule or be properly admissible as nonhearsay.[8] We conclude that because the second level of hearsay is not justified under an exception to the hearsay rule and because the defendants failed to lay a sufficient foundation regarding the source of the statement in order to allow its admission under a nonhearsay justification, the statement concerning the "fight with his girlfriend" was improperly admitted. III In analyzing the second level of hearsay, we will first turn our attention to the medical records exception.[9] A. Medical Record Exception MRE 803(4) Regardless of the availability of the declarant as a witness, MRE 803(4) allows admission of [s]tatments made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment. This Court has noted that exceptions to the hearsay rule, including the medical records exception, are justified by the belief that the particular categories of hearsay covered by the exceptions are both necessary and inherently trustworthy. See Solomon v. Shuell, 435 Mich. 104, 119, 457 N.W.2d 669 (1990); People v. Meeboer (After Remand), 439 Mich. 310, 322, 484 N.W.2d 621 (1992). Specifically, this Court has explained that the "supporting rationale for MRE 803(4) is the existence of (1) the self-interested motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient." Solomon, supra at 119, 457 N.W.2d 669 . The trial court, relying on Bradbury v. Ford Motor Co., 123 Mich.App. 179, 187, 333 N.W.2d 214 (1983), modified on other grounds 419 Mich. 550, 358 N.W.2d 550 (1984), ruled that the contested portion of the medical record concerning the fight with a girlfriend was not admissible under this hearsay exception because it was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment. We agree. Bradbury involved a products liability claim brought by an individual who was injured after he got out of a parked car and it *702 began to unexpectedly roll in reverse. His leg was pinned between the car and a light pole while he was attempting to reach the car's controls. The plaintiff had testified that he placed the gear selector in park before getting out of the vehicle. The Court of Appeals ruled that an excerpt in the medical record, which related that the plaintiff said he did not place the shift selector in park, was inadmissible under MRE 803(4). The Court reasoned that "[w]hile a doctor may need to know that a leg was crushed, or was pinned between a moving car and a post, the plaintiff's actions in setting the shift selector are medically irrelevant and, therefore, do not fall within this hearsay section." 123 Mich.App. at 187, 333 N.W.2d 214. We agree with this reasoning and find it applicable here. The statement in the medical record relating that the plaintiff's injury resulted from his arm going through a plate glass window was information reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment. This statement carries with it the inherent indicia of trustworthiness in accordance with the rationale underlying the medical records exception. However, the statement in the medical record relating what occurred before the plaintiff's arm went through the window, i.e., he had a fight with his girlfriend, was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and, thus, falls outside the rationale underlying the exception. Consequently, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that MRE 803(4) could not be the basis for admission of the contested portion of the medical record.[10] B. Nonhearsay Justifications Defendants argue that the trial court did not err in admitting the contested portion of the medical record because it qualifies as a previous inconsistent statement of a witness, admissible for purposes of impeachment under MRE 613(b).[11] A previous inconsistent statement of a witness, admissible to impeach credibility, is not regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is not offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the statement, but only to prove that the witness in fact made the statement. People v. Rodgers, 388 Mich. 513, 201 N.W.2d 621 (1972). We first note that there are foundational problems concerning admission of the statement under this rule. The trial court indicated that the statement contained in the record might properly be admitted for purposes of impeachment under this rule if it could be established that Mr. Merrow actually made the statement contained in the hospital record. Because the statement was later admitted under MRE 803(6), the trial court never made a definitive ruling on whether the foundational requirement under MRE 613(b) had been met. The only evidence offered that Mr. Merrow made the statement was the testimony of Ms. Leptich, who could only speculate that the statement came from the patient, Mr. Merrow, because this was the regular course of practice. She specifically testified that she had no personal knowledge that Mr. Merrow had in fact made the statement or *703 who Dr. Yasuda had in fact taken the history from. This foundation is insufficient.[12] Further, even if there had been a proper foundation for admission as a previous inconsistent statement, the fact remains that the contested statement was not admitted for impeachment purposes, but was admitted substantively and was used in defense counsel's argument on the crucial issue of causation. Consequently, even absent the lack of a proper foundation, we could not uphold the statement's admission under this rule.[13] Finally, admission of the disputed statement cannot be justified under MRE 801(d)(2), which allows as nonhearsay, an admission by a party-opponent. MRE 801(d)(2) allows admission of a statement offered against a party when it is the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity. However, as already discussed, the defendants failed to establish a sufficient foundation concerning the source of the recorded statement. A statement cannot be used as a party admission unless the party made the statement. Because there was insufficient evidence offered to establish that the plaintiff, or for that matter his ex-wife, made the statement, its admission was improper.[14] *704 IV. Harmless Error An error in the admission of evidence will be found if it affects a substantial right of a party. MRE 103. Further, such an error is not harmless if the error was prejudicial. An error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is ground for granting a new trial if refusal to take this action appears inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A); People v. Mateo, 453 Mich. 203, 214, 551 N.W.2d 891 (1996). Although the defendants contend that the core of their argument concerning causation was based on the impossibility of the plaintiff's version of the events, given the physical evidence of the location of the broken glass and blood, our review of the record indicates otherwise.[15] We agree with the Court of Appeals analysis and conclusion that there was error and that it was not harmless: There is no question in this case that the error was not harmless and that it affected a substantial right. This testimony provided the key evidence in support of defendant's theory that the injury was received by plaintiff's deliberate action in putting his arm through the glass. While defense counsel relied on physical evidence to support his argument that the injury was received in this fashion, plaintiff's statement provided the core of the argument. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a new trial. [Slip op. at 4]. The conclusion that the error was not harmless is especially evident considering the jury's answers on the special verdict form. The jury specifically found that the defendants were negligent, but that their negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. We think it evident that the jury's decision on proximate cause was influenced by the improperly admitted medical record evidence.[16] V. Conclusion The disputed hearsay remark relating to causation of the injury was not admissible because it did not qualify under any applicable exception to the hearsay rule and because a sufficient foundation was never established concerning the source of the statement regarding the fight with the girlfriend. Further, its admission was not harmless error. For these reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision and remand the case for a new trial. BRICKLEY, MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, MARILYN J. KELLY, and TAYLOR, JJ., concurred with MALLETT, C.J. BOYLE, Justice (dissenting). Because I find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the medical record evidence, I dissent. The Court reviews a trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidentiary issues for an abuse of discretion.[1] In reviewing evidentiary issues, we are mindful that *705 "[c]lose questions arising from the trial judge's exercise of discretion on matters concerning the admission of evidence do not call for appellate reversal because the reviewing justices would have ruled differently. Reversal is warranted only if the resolution of the question by the trial court amounted to an abuse of discretion. The decision upon a close evidentiary question by definition ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion."[[2]] The second hearsay event, the oral statement made to the physician, is properly admitted as a nonhearsay party admission under MRE 801(d)(2). An admission is "simply words or actions inconsistent with the party's position at trial, relevant to the substantive issues in the case, and offered against the party."[3] While most hearsay exceptions are grounded on a probability of trustworthiness, "the admissibility of an admission made by the party himself does not rest upon a notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier of fact with adequate means of evaluating the statement."[4] This is because the out-of-court declarant, the party-opponent, "has but to take the stand" to subject the statement "to the safeguard of cross-examination."[5] The Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 801(d)(2) state: Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission. The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstance, and from the restrictive influences of the opinion rule and the rule requiring first-hand knowledge, when taken with the apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results, calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility. Whether plaintiff made the statement at issue is a disputed preliminary factual question. As with any preliminary factual question of admissibility under MRE 104(a), the condition is met if it is more likely than not that the fact occurred. Disputed preliminary questions of fact are resolved by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.[6] In making the determination, the trial judge may consider all available evidence, including otherwise inadmissible evidence.[7] The contested statement in the medical record, which on its face purports to have been made by a person with knowledge of the facts, is itself evidence that the statement was made by the plaintiff.[8] There is also *706 evidence in the context of the medical record supporting the contention that Mr. Merrow was the declarant.[9] The medical record reports that the plaintiff was alert and oriented at the time the history and physical examination was conducted. Furthermore, the testimony of Ms. Leptich revealed that hospital protocol required that the physician obtain the medical history directly from the patient.[10] Under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, there is sufficient evidence showing that the statement was made by Mr. Merrow. Factors cited by the majority, such as the administration of narcotic analgesics, are relevant only to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. Assuming arguendo that the admission of the contested statement was erroneous, we note that the statement was admitted by the trial court and argued by the parties pursuant to MRE 803(6). The majority properly finds that the medical record is admissible under the business records exception. However, the multiple hearsay issue was not raised by the opponent of the evidence. MRE 103 requires that evidentiary errors affect a "substantial right" of a party;[11] in addition, "a timely objection or motion to strike" must appear in the record, "stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground [is] not apparent from the context."[12] Even if the admission of the *707 statement was erroneous, the issue of the second level of hearsay was not preserved for appellate review.[13] The majority further errs in evaluating the admissibility of the out-of-court statement under MRE 613(b) because the rule is simply inapplicable to party admissions. The plain language of the rule states that "[t]his provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2)."[14] This is because admissions are substantive evidence, not merely impeaching statements, and "no preliminary foundation need be laid by examining the declarant concerning the admission...."[15] Because I believe that there is competent evidence in the record and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contested statement in the medical record, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. WEAVER, J., concurred with BOYLE, J.