Case Title: State v. Sherez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

+ NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

oats

 

No. 26571

E+ Kd 81 Lo0sue

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

ROBERT SHEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(TR 57P, HPD No, 5647984M0)

Moon, C.J., Levinson and Acoba, JJ.; and Nakayama and
Duffy, JJ., dissenting)

On Septenber 26, 2005, the defendant-appellant-

(By:

petitioner Robert Sherez filed an application for a writ of

certiorari urging this court to review the summary disposition

order (800) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State
(hereinafter, “the ICA's

ws-Sherez, No. 26571 (Aug. 25, 2005)

S00"). The ICA affirmed the judgment and order of the district
court of the first circuit (1) convicting Sherez of reckless
driving in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-2

(1993) and (2) sentencing him to pay a fine of $300.00 and
attend a driver's education course. On September 30, 2005, we

granted certiorari.

 

HRS § 291-2 provides in relevant part: ‘Whoever operates any
vehicle . . « recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or property is
pollty of reckless driving of vehicle ©...” Effective July 20, 1998, the
Yegisleture amendec HAS § 291-2 in respecte fot material te the present

matter. gee 1999 Haw, Sees. L- Act 267, § 2 at 956.

 
‘#4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

In his application, Sherez contends that the ICA
gravely erred in affirming his conviction in the absence of
sufficient evidence.

Inasmuch as the ICA’s SDO reflects grave errors of law
and is inconsistent with the ICA's own recent decision in State
vsMoser, 107 Hawai'i 159, 111 P.3d 54 (App. 2005), see HRS §
602-59(b) (1993), we reverse the ICA's S00, vacate the district
court's judgment and sentence, and remand this matter to the

district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

1. BACKGROUND

Sherez's bench trial came before the district court on
April 16, 2004. During the trial, the plaintiff-appellee:
respondent State of Hawai'i [hereinafter, “the prosecution”)
adduced the following evidence.

‘The prosecution's witness, Honolulu Police Department
(HPD) Sergeant Kurt Ng, testified that, on December 11, 2003, at
approximately 7:49 p.m., he was on duty and operating “a
motorized patrol car.” Traffic into Waikiki was “rather
congested.” Sergeant Ng was “in the makai most [right] lane” on

Kalakaua Avenue, heading into Waikiki. According to Sergeant Ng,

 

while the approaching traffic light was yellow, Sherez, who was
operating a motorcycle, “cut{] in front of [Sergeant Ng]” from
the center lane, “causing [Sergeant Ng] to brake suddenly.”
Sergeant Ng testified that Sherez was not speeding, but that
“[t]here wasn't a sufficient area to clock.” On redirect

examination, the deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) asked Sergeant
4#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

Ng, “Did you feel [Shezez} was driving an appropriate speed with
the conditions, considering the traffic, at that time,” to which
Sergeant Ng answered “No.”

Sergeant Ng “decided to stop [Sherez] after the light
turned green, on the opposite side” of Ala Wai Boulevard. After
the light changed, Sergeant Ng observed Sherez “cut across two
lanes, crossing the safety zone area, . . . causing the vehicle
next to [Sergeant Ng] to brake suddenly, and causing the other

“vehicle in the mauka most [left] lane to brake suddenly to avoid
@ collision with him.” When the DPA asked Sergeant Ng how he
‘kn[elw that they braked suddenly,” Sergeant Ng answered that
“the nose(s] of their vehicles had dipped a little, and I could
see their brake lights on.” Sergeant Ng next testified that,
after Sherez “swerved over towards on the makai direction again,
. . « (Sergeant Ng] could see it was safe for [him] to pull
[sherez] over.” Sergeant Ng pulled Sherez over at the
intersection of Kalakaua and Ala Moana Boulevard.

on redirect examination, the DPA asked Sergeant Ng how
he decided for what offense to cite Sherez. Sergeant Ng

responded as follows:

 

Well, I take into (consideration) what the person does
first, okay. in this scenario... Shere: had forced me to
breke suddenly, okay. So firet oh Ale failure to yield the
Fight of wey. Oks!

The" second one he dig vas failure to signal his lane
change, and he crossed over the center median, And also
failure to yield to the right of way of the other two
Vehicles. Okay. So that's approxinately another two to
three citations.

COST THhen also taking in the fact that it was
rather dangerous uhat he had done, seeing that he did have a
passenger ‘on his motorcycle

ome, “that encompassed reckless driving. So instead
of citing him for five to six other citations, I just cited

  

 

3
‘** NOT FOR PUBLICATION *

 

hin for the reckless driving.
Sherez called Sayuri Ogawa, his passenger on his
motorcycle on the date of the alleged offense, to testity.
Ogawa, and later Sherez himself, testified that, while the two of
them waited at the traffic light at Kalakaua and Ala Wai, “the
car on our left was behind the line. So we had a little bit of a
gap there.” Ogawa testified that Sherez “gave the signal to go
to the left. . J [alnd also he gave . . . the arm turn signal.”
According to Ogawa, “[bJefore the light went green, the driver of
the middle lane acknowledge[d] our wish to go to the left lane,”
at which point Sherez steered into the middie lane, into the gap
in front of the adjacent car. Ogawa testified that, after the

Light turned green, Sherez again activated the left turn signal

 

and moved into the left lane with “a clearance of at least 50, 60
feet."

Sherez testified on his own behalf that he had pulled
into the right lane on Kalakaua about fifty feet from the
intersection with Ala Wai and that he had “signalled right, stuck
out [his] hand, and. . . moved in.” Once stopped at the light,
Sherez signalled to the driver in the middle lane, and noved his
vehicle partially into that lane. Sherez testified that after
the Light changed, he continued straight ahead in the middle
lane, then “signalled, and . . . made a left into thle far left]
lane.” At that time, Sherez stated, the closest car behind hin
in the left lane “was at least 25 feet . . . behind me.”
 

*#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION

The district court orally “f[ound] [Sergeant Ng]’s

version more credible than that of (Sherez] and [Ogawa]”:

[First of all, (Sergeant Ng] vas in the back, having &
better sight of what vas going on in front. And. .
[Sergeant tig) could have cut across all the way to the mavka
Jane, but of course, according to him, it'- --- wasn't safe
for him to try to do that. So he stayed in the lane where
he was, and tried to follow you

And in addition . ..- according to (Sergeant Ng), the
ether cars in front of hin'.”. . had'to brakes And.
even (Sergeant Ng) hinself had to brake to avoid eny
cident when (Sherez] cut in front of him «+ +

 

 

 

‘The district court found Sherez guilty as charged and sentenced
him to a fine of $300.00, plus a compensation fee of $25.00,
court costs, and driver education. On May 12, 2004, Sherez
timely filed a notice of appeal.

on appeal, Sherez argued that the prosecution was
required to prove that he “consciously disregarded a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that he was operating his motorcycle in a

reckless manner, such that it amounted to a gross deviation from

 

the standard of conduct that a law abiding person would observe

in the same situation.” (Citing HRS § 702-206(3) (1993).}*

 

+ RS § 702-206(3) states in relevant part:

Definitions of states of aind.
isi Srdckresery.”
(@) A person acts recklessly with respect to his conduct
When he consciously disregards « substantiel and unjustifiable
isk that the person’ conduct ie of the specified nature.

(b) A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant
cizcumstances when he consciously disregards a substantial and
Gnjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist.

(c) Alperson acts recklessly with respect to  resulé of his
conduct when he consciously disregards = substantial and
Unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a
result.

(a) Avrisk 4s substantial and unjustifiable within the
Resning of this section if, considering the nature and

(Continued...)

 

 
#** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

sherez argued, inter alia, that, insofar as “there was no
evidence of how close the cars were to the motorcycle, nor’. . «
even a near-accident . . . [nor] speeding, squealing brakes, or
honking horns,” the prosecution did not produce sufficient
“evidence of any gross deviation from the standard of conduct

that a law-abiding person should have observed.”

 

Sherez further argued that the prosecution produced
insufficient evidence that he was “aware that his conduct created
a risk of harm” and therefore “there was insufficient evidence

. that . . . Sherez had the requisite state of mind of

recklessness - -

‘The prosecution countered that the district court found
Sergeant Ng's testimony more credible than that of Sherez and
Ogawa. The prosecution argued that

[alt the speed (Sherez] was traveling, with the congested
ldteic conditions and..”s . might lighting conditions, his
Sections of cutting in front ef 3 different drivers where
there was an unsafe distance between Alin] and other cara,
Tepeated failure to signal lane changes, driving over e
fety zone and the center median, cutting off other
Wenicies, land) swerving across lanes of traffic on
Kel alkaue Avenue show Ris actions to be a gross deviation
fon the standaré a law abiding person would have observed.

 

 

   

With respect to Sherez’s awareness of the risk, the prosecution
argued that

e]xceeding the speed limit, cutting off cars, almost
ising several venicle coliisions, simultaneously cutting
Scrose multiple lanes of traffic in congested traftic

Gonditions without signaling his intention, driving over

 

  

 

continsed}
(purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances know to
Eine ine disregard of the risk involves @ gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that « law-abiding person would
observe in the sone situation.

 

 
‘*#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

   

egarded a

other persons
Property. Other drivers barely avoided motor vehicle
Collisions because of his reckless driving

‘The ICA affirmed Sherez’s conviction in its SD0'filed

 

 

on August 25, 2005. The majority, comprised of the Honorable
Corinne K.A. Watanabe and the Honorable Daniel R. Foley, held
that “there was ‘substantial evidence to support the conclusion
of the trier of fact’ that Sherez was guilty of reckless driving
in violation of HRS § 291-21, see supra note 1].‘” (Quoting
State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai'i 131, 135, 913 P.2d $7, 61 (1996).)
‘The Honorable Chief Judge James S. Burns dissented,
arguing that Sherez’s driving involved, at most, six traffic
infractions, not the criminal offense of reckless driving. Chief
Judge Burns disagreed that Sherez's conduct, “[c]onsidering the
evidence in the strongest light for the prosecution,” rose to “a
substantial risk that . . . persons would be injured and/or that
Property would be damaged.” Chief Judge Burns asserted that
the risk of what would happen is exactly what happened in
this case ~~ "no personal injury and no damage to property.
Even assuming there 9 substantial evidence that. thet
was a substantial risk... , is there evidence that the
Sisregard of that substantial risk involved a "gross
deviation” from the standard of conduct thet a lawabiding
Person would observe in the sane situation?
Finally, Chief Judge Burns posed the rhetorical question, “when
did what Sherez did change from various traffic infractions to

     

one traffic crime?” Based on the foregoing reasons, Chief Judge
Burns “conclude(d) that the evidence d[id] not support the
findings necessary to support a conclusion that Sherez committed

a traffic crime.”
‘## NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

on September 26, 2005, Sherez timely filed an

application for a writ of certiorari.

TT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Jeals from the ICR are governed by HRS § 602-59(b)
(1393)))unich prescribes that

 

fan application for writ of certior:
laterite grounds which must include (1) grave
Sf daw of of fact, oF (2) obelous inconsistencies in
the decision of the intermediate appellate court with
Ghat of the suprene court, federal decisions, or its
Sun decision, and the magnitude of such errors or

Gneonsistences cictating the nea for further appeal.

In _re Doe, Born on June 20, 1995, 95 Hawai'i 183, 189, 20 P.3d

616, 622 (2001).

 

 

IIT. DISCUSSION
sherez’s states in his application that “(t]he ICA
gravely erred in affirming the conviction where there was not
substantial evidence that . . . Sherez operated his vehicle in
disregard of a substantial and (un]justifiable risk to the safety
[of] persons or property nor that he acted in conscious disregard

that

 

of such a risk.” Sherez argu

 

elven assuming that . . . Sherez changed lanes without
Eignsiing so chat other cars had to "brake suddenly,” such
Eoaduct, without nore, does not create a substantial risk
OSE harm oF injufy. ~~ Sherez's lane changes were
hot dovabrupt as to cause tires to screech or trigger the
Grivers te honk thelr horns. There was no evidence of how
Giose'Ene cars were to the notoreyele. Thus, there was no
Gvidence establishing the 1ikelinced or probability of a
collision:
Sherez further argues that there was not sufficient

 

 

 

 

evidence of his “subjective awareness’
‘the [ICA) based its decision... on. . . Slergeant] No's

Bercageion of the driving conditions... .  Slergeant] NG
Perceives the care breking sucdenly. But, he testified he
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

wos aware that the cars were braking suddenly only because
‘able to see their tail lights cone on and the noses
lightly. There was fo evidence that. -
Sherez perceived the braking response by the other driver:
‘There was no sound of screeching tires, horne honking,
or’ rencnsteations from the drivers. significantly, there
was no evidence that... Shere: had to take any ection
Rinselé to avoid contact with the other vehicles’ “And,
+ Sherez was traveling below the speed limit.
oe yp fact, [the] terial court later stated at the
sentencing phase... that .  . shere: “nay have thought
itwas gafe(,"] ackhowledging | | . Sherez's subjective
state of mind.

         

 

 

We agree with Sherez’s arguments; we further note that the Ica’s
SDO is inconsistent with the ICA’s own recent decision in Moser.
For the following reasons, we reverse the ICA’ S00, vacate the
district court’s judgment and sentence, and remand the matter to
the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

‘The district court, as the trier of fact, had
discretion to believe one version of the facts over another. See
State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 249, 831 P.2d 924, 931 (1992).
Nonetheless, the facts as construed most favorably for the
Prosecution do not show the requisite state of mind for
recklessness pursuant to HRS § 702-206(3), see supra note 2.

Given the difficulty of proving the reguisite state of mind

by direct evidence in criminal cases, “[vle nave

consistently held that proof by circumstantial

evidence and reasonable inferences arising from

Circunstances surrounding the [defendant's conduct) is

Sufficient... . Thus, the mind of an alleged offender may

be read from his’ acts, conduct and inferences fairly drawn
from all the circumstances.”

 

Batson, 73 Haw. at 254, 631 P.2d at 934 (quoting State v. Sadino,
64 Haw. 427, 430, 642 P.2d 534, 536-37 (1962) (citations
omitted)). In the present matter, the prosecution adduced no

evidence of behavior or omissions by Sherez that would manifest
‘** NOT FOR PUBLICATION *

 

his own awareness of any risk. Sergeant Ng did not testify as to

 

 

the distance between Sherez's motorcycle and either of the cars
Sherez allegedly cut off. Furthermore, there was no evidence of
screeching tires, honking horns, nor any other warning that
should have been perceptible to Sherez. Sergeant Ng, from his
vantage point behind Sherez and the adjacent cars, saw the
adjacent cars brake “suddenly”; nevertheless, the record does not
support the inference that Sherez knew whether “the safety of
persons or property” was in peril. Cf. State v, Cadus, 70 Haw.
314, 315-16, 320, 769 P.2d 1105, 1107, 1110 (1989) (affirming
conviction for reckless driving where the defendant “sped through

= crowded intersections with screeching tires, prevented many
pedestrians from traversing the crosswalks, caused other
pedestrians already on the road to jump back onto the’ curb, and
disregarded the right-of-way which other vehicles had
possessed”). At most, the evidence “is of sufficient quality and
probative value to enable a [person] of reasonable caution to
support 2 conclusion,” see Batson, 73 Haw. at 248-49, @31 P.2d at
991, that Sherez committed several traffic infractions, ive,
failing to yield three times, failing to signal two lane changes,
and driving across the safety zone.

Futhermore, we agree with Chief Judge Burns's
conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of a “*gross
deviation’ from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the same situation.” By affirming the district
court's conviction, the ICA diverged from its own recent

construction of the term “gross.” In Moser, the ICA explained

10
‘*4* NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

that

SGross deviation” is not defined in the disorderly conauct
nor doss Hawai'i case law explain the meaning of
defines “gross” as “[o}ut
‘beyond allowance; Flagrant; shameful; 28 8
Gross dereliction of duty, a gross injustice, gross
jsoness or negligence. Such conduct as’ is not to be
excused.” Black's Law Dictionary 702 (6th ed. 1990)
(citation onitted).. See also State Bd. of Dental Exan'rs v
Sauelle, . . . © P.2d 693, 696 ([Cole.) 1932) (adopting
Shove definition of "gross"

107 Hawai" at 172, 111 P.3d at 67. Assuming arquendo that. “all
failures to yield the right-of-way . . . involve an unjustifiable

risk,” (emphasis added), the evidence does not show any risk that

    

 

 

was “substantial,” i.e., “gross,” i.e., “beyond allowance

+ + not to be excused.” Sherez’s behavior of changing lanes in
front of three cars, and driving across a safety zone, was at
most evidence of several traffic infractions, not reckless
driving.

We believe that the ICA gravely erred in affirming

Sherez’s conviction, insofar as the prosecution failed to adduce
substantial evidence that Sherez “consciously disregardied],” HRS
§ 702-206(3), see supra note 2 (emphasis added), any risk to “the
safety of persons or property,” HRS § 291-2, see supra note 1.
Moreover, even viewed “in the strongest light for the
prosecution,” the evidence was not “of sufficient quality and
probative value to enable a (person) of reasonable caution to
support a conclusion,” Batson, 73 Haw, at 248-49, 831 P.2d at
931, that Sherez’s driving “involve[d) a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the same situation,” HRS § 702-206(3) (d), see supra note 2
(emphasis added) .

n
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

 

IV. coNcLusioN

In light of the foregoing analysis, we reverse the
ICA's Sp0, vacate the April 16, 2004 judgment and sentence of the
district court, and remand the matter to the district court for
the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 18, 2005.

Gor

BaaBerccen

oN

(ay: Nakayama and buffy, 99.)
Inasmuch a ve agree with the ICA majority that there
was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier
of fact, ve would dismiss the application for writ of certiorart

as improvidentiy granted.

Nencu eo nuucey arb
Gone. Osos +

on the weit:

Deborah L. Kim,
Deputy Public Defender,
for the defendant-appellant-
petitioner, Robert Sherez

a2