Case Title: McCluskey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LELAND McCLUSKEY,
§
§  No.  1, 2001
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§  Court BelowSuperior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
v.
§  in and for Sussex County
§  Cr.A. No.  IS96-03-0134, 0135
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
§  Def.  ID No.  9602012146
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee. 
§
Submitted: June 5, 2001
Decided:
July 27, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
O R D E R
This 27th day of July 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Leland McCluskey, has appealed from the
Superior Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  The State of Delaware has
moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of McCluskey’s opening brief that the appeal is without
merit.  We agree and affirm.
2
(2)
McCluskey was indicted on charges of Criminal Solicitation in
the First Degree and Attempted Murder in the First Degree.  A jury trial was
held in the Superior Court beginning on July 22, 1996.  At the close of the
State’s case, and again at the close of the defense evidence, McCluskey
moved for a judgment of acquittal on the Attempted Murder charge.  The
Superior Court denied the motions.  On July 24, 1996, the jury found
McCluskey guilty as charged.  McCluskey then filed a motion for judgment
of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  By letter dated August 1,
1996, the Superior Court denied McCluskey’s motion.  On direct appeal,
McCluskey alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support the
Attempted Murder conviction.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s
judgment.1
                                                 
1McCluskey v.  State, Del.  Supr., No.  422, 1996, Berger, J., 1997 WL (Oct.  7,
1997) (ORDER).
(3)
In August 2000, McCluskey filed a pro se motion for
postconviction relief.  McCluskey’s motion, as supplemented, alleged
numerous overlapping grounds for relief that, collectively, alleged the
following six cognizable claims: (i) that the police made a promise of leniency
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to a State’s witness in exchange for the witness’ testimony against McCluskey;
(ii) that the victim’s presence in the courtroom during portions of the trial
testimony prejudiced the jury against McCluskey; (iii) that, for various
reasons, tapes and transcripts of conversations between McCluskey and others
should not have been admitted into evidence or presented to the jury; (iv) that
McCluskey was incompetent at the time he committed the crimes, was
coerced into committing the crimes, and was incompetent during trial; (v)
prosecutorial misconduct; and (vi) ineffective assistance of counsel.  By well-
reasoned decision dated November 29, 2000, the Superior Court denied
McCluskey’s postconviction motion.  This appeal followed.
(4)
In his opening brief on appeal, McCluskey raises the following
two claims that he raised in his postconviction motion: (i) that the Superior
Court erred in denying a pretrial defense request for a neurological
examination of McCluskey, who has epilepsy; and (ii) that a defense witness’
post-trial written statement, allegedly establishing that McCluskey was
coerced into committing the crimes, proves that the conviction and sentence
were based upon a “material misapprehension of fact.”  To the extent
4
McCluskey has not briefed his other postconviction claims, those claims are
deemed waived and abandoned on appeal.2
(5)
When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction
motion pursuant to Rule 61, this Court first must consider the procedural
requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues.3  Rule
61(i)(3) bars from consideration any ground for relief that was not raised in
the proceedings leading to the conviction unless the petitioner can establish:
 (i) cause for failing to timely raise the claim, and (ii) actual prejudice from
failing to raise the claim.  Rule 61(i)(4) bars any ground for relief that was
formerly adjudicated, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the
interest of justice.   
(6)
McCluskey did not claim on direct appeal that the Superior Court
erred when it denied his pretrial request for a neurological examination. 
Consequently, that claim is barred under Rule 61(i)(3), as McCluskey has not
alleged “cause” for his failure to raise the claim nor has he demonstrated
“prejudice” as a result of the alleged error.  Moreover, McCluskey has not
                                                 
2Murphy v. State, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993).
3Younger v.  State, Del.  Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
5
presented any reason why reconsideration of the Superior Court’s denial of
his request is warranted in the interest of justice.  Consequently, the claim is
also barred as previously adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4).  McCluskey has not
presented any information that establishes that he was incompetent either at
the time of trial or when he committed the crimes.4
(7)
McCluskey did not raise the claim on direct appeal that he was
coerced into committing the crimes for which he was convicted.  McCluskey
                                                 
4Indeed, the record establishes to the contrary.  By order of the Superior Court,
McCluskey underwent a psychiatric evaluation in March 1996, after his arrest in February
1996.  In a written report filed with the Superior Court on April 1, 1996 (approximately
three months prior to trial), the examining psychiatrist reached the following conclusions:
  McCluskey, at the time of the examination (i) was not suffering from any mental illness
or defect; (ii) was able to comprehend and appreciate the nature of the information and
penalties to which he would be subjected if found guilty; (iii) was able to assist his attorney
in the preparation of his case and understood court proceedings; (iv) was not suffering
from any mental illness defect or condition on or about February 22, 1996, when the
crimes were allegedly committed; (v) did not lack capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct; (vi) did not lack sufficient willpower to choose whether he would commit
the crime or refrain from doing it; and (vii) did have the capacity and control to conform
6
has neither alleged “cause” for his failure to raise the claim nor has he
demonstrated “prejudice” as a result of the alleged violation.  Consequently,
that claim is barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).
                                                                                                                                                   
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
(8)
In support of his claim that he was coerced into committing the
crimes for which he was convicted, McCluskey submits a written statement,
dated August 11, 1998 (ten months after the case was affirmed on direct
appeal), from a defense witness, who testified at trial that he overheard
McCluskey’s side of a phone call.  The statement appears to add to the
witness’ recollection about what McCluskey said during the phone call.  The
Superior Court refused to consider the witness’ statement, because it was
unsworn and purported to add to the witness’ trial testimony.  Moreover, this
Court does not agree, as McCluskey seems to contend, that the statement
proves, or even suggests, that he was coerced into committing the crimes for
which he was convicted.
(9)
In this case, the Superior Court’s denial of McCluskey’s motion
for postconviction relief was appropriate.  It is manifest on the face of
McCluskey’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  The issues raised
7
are clearly controlled by settled Delaware law, and to the extent the issues on
appeal implicate the exercise of judicial discretion, there was no abuse of
discretion.
8
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice