Case Title: Waterhouse v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-107

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-107 
____________ 
 
ROBERT BRIAN WATERHOUSE,  
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
[February 8, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Robert Brian Waterhouse, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the 
denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
Fla. Const.  On January 4, 2012, the Governor signed a death warrant for 
Waterhouse, with the execution scheduled for February 15, 2012.  Waterhouse 
subsequently sought postconviction relief in the circuit court, presenting two 
claims.  The circuit court summarily denied relief on one claim and ordered an 
evidentiary hearing on the other.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court denied relief on Waterhouse‟s second claim.  For the reasons discussed 
 
 
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below, we now affirm the circuit court‟s orders and deny Waterhouse‟s request for 
a stay of execution. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 2, 1980, Robert Waterhouse was convicted of the first-degree 
murder of Deborah Kammerer.  The facts of the murder were stated in the opinion 
of this Court affirming the judgment and sentence of death in the initial direct 
appeal:   
On the morning of January 3, 1980, the St. Petersburg police 
responded to the call of a citizen who had discovered the dead body of 
a woman lying face down in the mud flats at low tide on the shore of 
Tampa Bay.  An examination of the body revealed severe lacerations 
on the head and bruises around the throat.  Examination of the body 
also revealed—and this fact is recited not for its sensationalism but 
because it became relevant in the course of the police investigation—
that a blood-soaked tampon had been stuffed in the victim‟s mouth.  
The victim‟s wounds were such that they were probably made with a 
hard instrument such as a steel tire changing tool.  Examination of the 
body also revealed lacerations of the rectum.  The cause of death was 
determined to have been drowning, and there was evidence to indicate 
that the body had been dragged from a grassy area on the shore into 
the water at high tide.  The body when discovered was completely 
unclothed.  Several items of clothing were gathered from along the 
shore at the scene. 
The body showed evidence of thirty lacerations and thirty-six 
bruises.  Hemorrhaging indicated the victim was alive, and defense 
wounds indicated she was conscious, at the time these lacerations and 
bruises were inflicted.  Acid phosphotase was found in the victim‟s 
rectum in sufficient amount to strongly indicate the presence of semen 
there.  Also, the lacerations in this area indicated that the victim had 
been battered by the insertion of a large object.  The medical examiner 
was also able to determine that at the time of the murder the victim 
was having her menstrual period. 
 
 
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After several days of investigation the police were unable to 
identify the victim, so they announced the situation to the public.  
They then received an anonymous telephone call simply informing 
them of appellant‟s automobile tag number and advising them to 
investigate it. 
The police also learned the identity of the victim from two of 
her neighbors.  These two acquaintances, Yohan Wenz and Carol 
Byers, testified at trial that they went to the ABC lounge with the 
victim on Wednesday night, January 2, 1980.  They testified that they 
later left the lounge and that Ms. Kammerer remained there at that 
time.  Kyoe Ginn, who was working there as a bartender that night, 
testified that the victim came into the bar with a man and a woman, 
that they later left, that Ms. Kammerer then began talking with 
appellant (who was known to the witness) and that at about 1:00 a.m. 
appellant and Kammerer left the bar together. 
On the evening of January 7, 1980, police officers asked 
appellant to voluntarily go with them to police headquarters for an 
interview.  At this time he said that he did not know any girl named 
Debbie and that he went to the ABC lounge on January 2 but did not 
leave with a woman.  After this interview appellant was allowed to 
leave but his car was impounded for searching pursuant to warrant.  
The automobile was searched on January 8 and appellant was arrested 
on January 9. 
Detectives Murry and Hitchcox arrested appellant.  In the car 
on the way to the police station, after advising appellant of his rights, 
Hitchcox asked him, “We were right the other night, weren‟t we, 
when we talked to you about being involved in this case?”  Appellant 
responded simply, “Might.”  Shown a picture of Deborah Kammerer, 
appellant this time admitted that he did in fact know her. 
On the afternoon of January 9, the detectives again interviewed 
appellant. Detective Murry testified concerning this interview.  She 
said that appellant became emotionally upset and said repeatedly that 
his life was over, that he was going to the electric chair.  He said that 
he wanted to talk to his interviewers as people and not as police 
officers.  He then said that he had some personal problems with 
alcohol, sex, and violence. 
The two detectives interrogated appellant again on January 10. 
Again appellant said he wanted to talk to them as people rather than as 
police officers.  Detective Murry testified that appellant again 
indicated that he experienced a problem involving sexual activity. He 
 
 
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said that when he drinks a lot, it is like something snaps and he then 
finds himself doing things that he knows are terrible and bad, and that 
he cannot control his behavior on such occasions.  Appellant also told 
the officers that when he wanted to engage in sexual activity with a 
woman but learned that she was having her menstrual period, he 
would become frustrated and angry and that this is what had happened 
the previous Wednesday night [i.e., the night of the murder].  He also 
said that he had had a lot to drink on Wednesday night. 
Inspection of the interior of appellant‟s car revealed the 
presence of visible blood stains, and a luminol test revealed that a 
large quantity of blood had been in the car but had been wiped up.  
Analysis of the blood in the car and comparison with known blood 
samples of appellant and the victim revealed that the blood in 
appellant‟s car could have come from the victim but was not 
appellant‟s blood. 
A forensic blood analyst testified that it is possible through 
analysis of blood stains on certain surfaces to make estimates 
concerning the direction and velocity of motion of the blood making 
the stains.  This witness concluded from her analysis that the blood in 
appellant‟s car was deposited in the course of a violent attack. 
A forensic hair analyst testified that hairs found in appellant‟s 
car were consistent in their characteristics with known hair samples 
from the victim. 
A forensic fiber analyst testified that fibers found in the debris 
adhering to the victim‟s coat were similar to fibers from the fabric of 
the seat cover in appellant‟s car.  Also, fibers were found in the car 
that had the same characteristics as fibers from the victim‟s coat and 
pants. 
Appellant was employed as a plaster and drywall worker. His 
foreman testified at trial that on the morning of January 3, appellant 
arrived at work asking for the day off.  He appeared to have a 
hangover and said he was feeling rough.  The witness said that at this 
time appellant had scratches on his face.  The witness also said that 
appellant had told him that he liked anal intercourse and liked being 
with women who allowed themselves to be hit and slapped. 
 
Waterhouse v. State, 429 So. 2d 301, 302-04 (Fla. 1983) (Waterhouse I), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).  The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, 
 
 
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a sentence of death.  See id. at 302.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the 
conviction and sentence.  See id.  The Court also affirmed the denial of 
Waterhouse‟s initial rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief.  See Waterhouse 
v. State, 522 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1988) (Waterhouse II).  However, the Court 
granted Waterhouse‟s petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated his death 
sentence because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to consider evidence of 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in violation of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 
U.S. 393 (1987), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).  See Waterhouse II, 
522 So. 2d at 344.   
After a resentencing proceeding, a unanimous jury again recommended a 
sentence of death, and the trial court followed the jury‟s recommendation.  On 
appeal, this Court affirmed the sentence.  See Waterhouse v. State, 596 So. 2d 
1008, 1018 (Fla.) (Waterhouse III), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 957 (1992).  The Court 
subsequently affirmed an order that summarily denied Waterhouse relief under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, see Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 
1176, 1196 (Fla. 2001) (Waterhouse IV), and denied a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus filed by Waterhouse, see Waterhouse v. Moore, 838 So. 2d 480, 484 (Fla. 
2002) (Waterhouse V).  Finally, in October 2006, this Court affirmed an order that 
denied a motion for postconviction DNA testing filed by Waterhouse pursuant to 
 
 
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Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.  See Waterhouse v. State, 942 So. 2d 
414 (Fla. 2006) (table decision).  
On January 4, 2012, the Governor signed a death warrant for Waterhouse, 
with the execution scheduled for February 15, 2012.  Following the signing of the 
death warrant, Waterhouse filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, 
asserting two claims. 
1. Execution of an inmate should be constitutionally prohibited 
when a person under sentence of death who has consistently 
maintained his innocence, and who in good faith has filed a 
motion for postconviction DNA testing to establish his 
innocence, is precluded from obtaining testing due to the 
destruction of evidence through the negligence of a government 
agency in violation of state law. 
 
2. Waterhouse was denied an adversarial testing during his capital 
trial due to the failure of the State to disclose a material witness 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the 
presentation of false testimony under Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972), in light of the affidavit of Leglio 
Sotolongo which, in the alternative, may also be construed as 
newly discovered evidence.   
Waterhouse also sought a stay of execution.   
 
With regard to the first claim, Waterhouse stated that in the context of a 
prior rule 3.853 motion for postconviction DNA testing, it was determined that the 
Office of the Clerk of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida had destroyed “all 
 
 
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evidence in this case” in violation of section 43.195, Florida Statutes (1987).1  
Waterhouse contended that as a result of this negligent destruction, he is precluded 
from establishing his innocence of the murder through DNA testing.  Waterhouse 
asserted that the negligent destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence by a 
state agency should operate as a bar to execution under the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Florida and United States Constitutions.  In support of this 
assertion, Waterhouse referenced two states—North Carolina and Virginia—where 
executions allegedly were precluded due to the destruction of evidence.  
Waterhouse claimed that this issue is different from that which he previously 
presented in his rule 3.853 motion: 
The issue of retroactivity is inapplicable as this presents a question of 
first impression and seeks the recognition of a fundamental 
constitutional right for the first time.  The claim has not been 
previously raised because until the warrant was signed the issue was 
not ripe for review. 
Waterhouse‟s second claim arises from an affidavit signed by Leglio 
Sotolongo on January 9, 2012.  According to the affidavit, Sotolongo was 
employed as a doorman at the ABC lounge.  He was at the lounge on the night of 
                                         
 
1.  Section 43.195, Florida Statutes (1987), provided:  “The clerk of any 
circuit court or county court may dispose of items of physical evidence which have 
been held as exhibits in excess of 10 years in cases on which no appeal is pending 
or can be made.”  In 1989, the statute was amended to allow for destruction of such 
evidence after three years.  See ch. 89-176, § 2, Laws of Fla.  In 2003, this statute 
was renumbered as section 28.213.  See ch. 2003-402, § 26, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
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the murder, but cannot remember if he was actually working that night.  Sotolongo 
averred that he remembers that night particularly because Waterhouse repaid 
money that he had previously borrowed from Sotolongo.  Sotolongo states that 
Waterhouse arrived at the ABC lounge at approximately 7-8 p.m.  After the 
murder, Sotolongo informed the police that he saw Waterhouse leave with two 
men.  Sotolongo states, “I cannot be precise regarding the time, but it was before 
closing time, which was 2:00 A.M.”  He also stated that, from her position at the 
center bar, bartender and State witness Kyoe Ginn would not have been able to see 
the exit door to the lounge.  According to Sotolongo, although he informed 
Detective Gary Hitchcox that he saw Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men, 
the police report prepared by Hitchcox instead stated that Sotolongo did not 
“remember when Mr. Waterhouse left the lounge.”  Sotolongo states that this 
portion of Hitchcox‟s police report “is false.”  Sotolongo also states that after his 
interview with Hitchcox, Sotolongo and Leon Vasquez, a bouncer who was 
working at the ABC lounge on the night of the murder, encountered the detective 
at Murphy‟s Bar.  According to the affidavit:  
Detective Hitchcox came up to us and got into our faces.  The 
Detective accused us of trying to protect a murderer.  The situation 
was such that there was almost a physical altercation, but there 
wasn‟t, and we left the bar.  
 
 
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Waterhouse‟s motion sets forth Sotolongo‟s address and phone number, and states 
that had Sotolongo been contacted, he would have been available to testify at the 
time of trial and the postconviction proceedings.   
Waterhouse argued that, in failing to disclose Sotolongo‟s exculpatory 
statement, the State committed a Brady violation.   Waterhouse asserted that 
Sotolongo‟s testimony would have not only impeached that of bartender Ginn, who 
testified that she saw Waterhouse leave with the victim, but would have also 
corroborated the testimony of defense witness Leon Vasquez, who testified that he 
saw Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men.  Waterhouse next argued that, by 
knowingly permitting bartender Ginn to falsely testify that she saw the victim and 
Waterhouse leave together, the State committed a Giglio violation.   Finally, and in 
the alternative, Waterhouse contended that the affidavit of Sotolongo constituted 
newly discovered evidence, which could not have been discovered previously due 
to the false statement in Detective Hitchcox‟s police report.  According to 
Waterhouse, impeachment of bartender Ginn was critical to Waterhouse‟s defense 
and, if Sotolongo had been allowed to testify, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different.   
Waterhouse attached to his motion nearly identical affidavits of guilt-phase 
defense counsel.  The trial level attorneys averred that they relied upon Detective 
Hitchcox‟s report being an accurate and truthful statement from Sotolongo.  
 
 
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Because they relied upon the veracity of the report, “apparently no one from the 
defense team contacted or spoke with Mr. Sotolongo prior to trial.”  Both attorneys 
stated that, had they been aware of Sotolongo‟s statement, they would have 
presented him as a witness “for the purpose of impeaching Ms. Ginn and to 
corroborate other defense testimony [i.e., that of Leon Vasquez].”   
On January 13, 2012, the postconviction court held a rule 3.851 case 
management conference on Waterhouse‟s successive motion.  After that hearing, 
the court issued an order that summarily denied the destruction of evidence claim 
as improperly pled, procedurally barred, successive, and untimely.  The 
postconviction court first held that, since Waterhouse is seeking the recognition of 
a new fundamental right, rather than retroactive application of an established 
fundamental right, this claim is not properly pled under rule 3.851(d)(2)(B).  The 
court next found that the issue presented in this first claim “[has] already been 
litigated and considered in the courts through Waterhouse‟s prior motion for 
postconviction DNA testing and subsequent appeal.  Therefore, the current 
iteration of the claim is barred from review.”  The postconviction court also 
concluded that this claim is not timely because even though Waterhouse chose not 
to raise this claim until the warrant was signed, “nothing prevented [him] from 
addressing this matter years earlier.”  Lastly, with regard to Waterhouse‟s reliance 
on recent actions in North Carolina and Virginia, the postconviction court found 
 
 
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that “[t]he decisions of the executive branches in other states have no legal bearing 
upon this court.”   
The postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on the second 
claim, which was based upon the affidavit of Leglio Sotolongo.  In ordering an 
evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court relied upon Mungin v. State, 36 Fla. 
L. Weekly S610 (Fla. Oct. 27, 2011), in which this Court reversed a summary 
denial of Brady and Giglio claims and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.2   
The Evidentiary Hearing 
The postconviction court held the evidentiary hearing on January 17, 2012.  
Waterhouse advised the court by telephone that he chose to waive his personal 
appearance at the hearing.  The testimony of Leglio Sotolongo was presented by 
Waterhouse, and Detective Gary Hitchcox was presented as a witness by the State.  
Waterhouse‟s guilt-phase trial counsel did not testify during the evidentiary 
hearing.  Instead, the State and Waterhouse stipulated that trial counsel would have 
testified consistent with affidavits filed with the court.   
Sotolongo testified that in 1980, he was moonlighting as a doorman at the 
ABC lounge in St. Petersburg.  Detective Hitchcox questioned Solotongo in 
                                         
 
2.  In Mungin, a witness came forward and asserted that “he was the first 
person on the scene after the murder and that no other person was present in the 
store.  He states that he told this to police the night of the murder and that the 
police report is false.”  Id. at S610 (emphasis supplied). 
 
 
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reference to the homicide.  While Sotolongo did not recall Hitchcox showing him a 
photo of the victim, Sotolongo stated that he would not dispute that this occurred if 
Hitchcox testified to this fact.  Sotolongo testified that it was his belief that he was 
working at the ABC lounge on the night of the murder; however, when shown 
Detective Hitchcox‟s report—which stated that Sotolongo was at the bar, but not 
working that night—Sotolongo testified, “If I said it to [Hitchcox] way back then, 
then that recollection, if true, is probably more accurate than not.”   
Although Sotolongo stated in his affidavit that he remembers the night of 
January 2, 1980, because Waterhouse paid Sotolongo money that he had 
previously borrowed, Sotolongo testified during the evidentiary hearing that 
Waterhouse may have actually repaid him the previous night.  While Sotolongo 
was certain that he saw Waterhouse leave the ABC lounge with two males that 
night, he had difficulty specifying the time that this occurred, as evidenced by the 
following exchange during cross-examination: 
Q: 
Now, and you‟re fairly clear in your affidavit.  [Y]ou say you saw him 
leave the lounge.  You can‟t be precise as to what time he left? 
 
A: 
That‟s correct. 
 
Q:   
Okay.  But it was before closing? 
 
A:  
Yes. 
 
Q: 
That‟s pretty fair to say, correct?  I mean, he was going to have left 
before closing, right? 
 
 
 
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A: 
Agreed. 
 
Q: 
Okay.  But you don‟t know if that was 12:15, 12:30? 
 
A: 
Correct. 
 
Q: 
Because if you were working, you would have been there that late.  
But it‟s possible that you left early that night, right? 
 
A:   
I didn‟t leave early that night, but it is possible.  You‟re right.  I mean, 
that is almost counter-indication [sic].   
 
Q:  
Well, I guess what I‟m asking then, what time did you leave that 
night? 
 
A: 
I don‟t know exactly.  If I was working, then I left past 2:00. 
 
Q: 
Okay.  And if you weren‟t working, you could have left— 
 
A: 
Earlier. 
 
Q: 
12:00, 1:00, 10:00, 11:00? 
 
A: 
No.  No.  No. 
 
Q: 
Okay.  Well, let‟s talk some parameters here.  What time could you 
have—could you have left at midnight? 
 
A: 
I remember him leaving that bar towards the end of the shift. 
 
Q: 
Okay.  You weren‟t working.  So towards the end of the night? 
 
A: 
Well, sir, like I said, I believe that I was working that evening. 
 
Q: 
Okay. 
 
A: 
But you indicate that I stated that I might not have. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
 
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A: 
. . . let me word it this way, towards the end of the evening. 
 
Q: 
But you can‟t say when that was. 
 
A: 
Correct. 
 
Q: 
You can‟t tell if it‟s quarter to 12:00, quarter after 12:00, 12:30, 1:00? 
 
A: 
You are correct. 
 
Q: 
And if you weren‟t working, is it possible that you weren‟t there at the 
end of the evening?  Let‟s just say that you saw Mr. Waterhouse leave. 
 
A: 
Right. 
 
Q: 
Is it possible after he left you left but the bar hadn‟t closed— 
 
A: 
No. 
 
Q: 
—if you weren‟t working? 
 
A: 
I was there the whole evening. 
 
Q: 
From start to finish? 
 
A: 
Yes. 
 
Q: 
You‟re sure. 
 
A: 
I‟m not positive. 
 
Q: 
Okay.  So I will ask you again. 
 
A: 
Yes. 
 
Q: 
Is it possible now— 
 
A: 
No.  I understand.  I understand.  And believe me, from the sound that 
I just made, I‟m not being facetious.  It is.  It is a long time ago, and you‟re 
correct.  Forgive me. 
 
 
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Sotolongo also admitted that his memory was better thirty-two years ago than it is 
now.   
 
Sotolongo testified that from her position at the bar, bartender Kyoe Ginn 
would not have been able to see the exit at which Sotolongo was supposedly 
working that night, which was also the exit through which Sotolongo observed 
Waterhouse leave.  However, Sotolongo acknowledged that there was a second 
exit to the lounge, and it was possible that Ginn could see that other exit.  
Sotolongo also conceded that if he was checking identifications at the exit 
referenced in his affidavit, he would not have been able to see what was happening 
in the lounge.  Sotolongo stated that he knew bouncer Leon Vasquez, and that 
Vasquez testified during trial that he had seen Waterhouse leave the lounge with 
two men.  When asked by the postconviction court why Sotolongo did not seek out 
the defense attorneys during Waterhouse‟s trial, Sotolongo replied, “I thought 
things would evolve the way they‟re supposed to.  Since I gave my statement to the 
detective, I thought that my testimony probably wasn‟t needed, and that‟s why I 
wasn‟t called to testify.”   
 
Detective Gary Hitchcox admitted that he did not have an independent 
recollection of the interview with Sotolongo, and he was testifying to what was 
provided in his 1980 report.  However, Hitchcox explained that, during his time 
with the police department, when he conducted an interview, he would take notes 
 
 
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on a notepad and then dictate his report from those notes.  According to the report, 
Sotolongo told Hitchcox that he was at the ABC lounge on the night of the murder 
from 10:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m.  Hitchcox denied that during the interview 
Sotolongo ever stated he saw Waterhouse leave the bar with two men and testified 
that Sotolongo‟s affidavit is false.3  Hitchcox testified that if Sotolongo had 
informed him of this fact during the interview, he would have “[a]bsolutely” 
included it in his report.   
 
On cross-examination, Hitchcox admitted that the notes he took during the 
interview with Sotolongo no longer exist.  When asked if he would have omitted 
information from his report about Sotolongo observing Waterhouse leave the 
lounge, Hitchcox replied: 
[T]wo men leaving with the suspect would be very important.  We 
would want to pursue that.  I would—that would be something that I 
would get excited about as an investigator.  [Sotolongo] told me he 
didn‟t see [Waterhouse] leave, and there was nothing said about 
leaving with two men.  That would have been in the report. 
 
When asked why he did not write a report about bouncer Leon Vasquez, Hitchcox 
stated that he did not recall interviewing Vasquez.   When presented with his 1980 
trial testimony during which he testified that he interviewed Vasquez, Hitchcox 
stated: 
                                         
 
3.  He also denied the alleged altercation at Murphy‟s Bar, stating that it 
“[n]ever happened.”   
 
 
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[T]he only thing that I can tell you about that is I testified to 
interviewing Vasquez.  I would think that there would be a police 
report indicating that I interviewed him with the same type of setup:  
Me interviewing, where it happened, when I talked to him, what he 
said.  And I don‟t have that. 
 
 
. . . .  
So my testimony at that trial had to be from my knowledge back what, 
32 years ago, of some type of documentation which would be maybe a 
police report, something to that effect, and what I testified to in court 
would have been my knowledge of either my report, another report, a 
deposition, something to reflect my memory, or perhaps just from 
memory.   
 
When asked by the postconviction court whether other officers were investigating 
the murder and taking statements from witnesses, Hitchcox replied in the 
affirmative.  On redirect, Hitchcox testified that he would have been privy to any 
reports that other detectives compiled about Vasquez.   
 
After testimony concluded, but before closing statements, the State argued 
that Waterhouse‟s postconviction counsel had failed to demonstrate due diligence 
in discovering Sotolongo and, therefore, the rule 3.851 motion was untimely.  In 
making this assertion, the State noted that Waterhouse‟s current counsel had 
represented Waterhouse since 2003.  According to the State, Waterhouse‟s current 
counsel must “show that he did everything he could going through this file, looked 
at all these witnesses, and could not find this witness.  He‟s not made that 
representation.”  Counsel for Waterhouse responded as follows: 
[S]imilar to what the Defense attorney[sic] said in their affidavit, that 
I in reading [Detective Hitchcox‟s report] would sit there and read it 
and take it on face value that that‟s what [Sotolongo‟s] statement said.  
 
 
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And as a Defense attorney frankly—and I think the Supreme Court 
recognizes this in Mungin, and what disturbed them in Mungin was 
the fact that they felt officers of the Court, attorneys, should be able to 
rely on police reports.  And it would disturb them that attorneys are 
put in a position of relying on police reports that aren‟t true. 
 
And so I would have read that.  I have read the discovery in the 
case.  I would have accepted it on face value just like [defense 
counsel] did.  So that‟s the answer.   
 
During closing statements, counsel for Waterhouse abandoned the Giglio claim.   
Order Denying Successive Postconviction Relief 
 
On January 20, 2012, the postconviction court entered an order denying 
relief on Waterhouse‟s second claim.  First, the postconviction court found that 
Waterhouse had satisfied the first prong of the standard for newly discovered 
evidence, concluding that Waterhouse had established that Sotolongo‟s testimony 
was unknown by Waterhouse, his counsel, or the circuit court at the time of trial 
and could not have been discovered by due diligence.4  The postconviction court 
relied on Mungin in reaching this conclusion: 
As alluded to by the Court in Mungin, it is difficult to discern how 
counsel would have known of the substance of Sotolongo‟s testimony, 
as stated in the January 9, 2012 affidavit, if they had relied upon the 
truthfulness of Hitchcox‟s police report.  Mungin further leads this 
[c]ourt to conclude that due diligence surely does not require that 
counsel allocate limited pre-trial resources in investigating a witness 
that is reported by police to have said something contrary to what the 
witness now claims. 
                                         
 
4.  The postconviction court also found that Waterhouse‟s second claim was 
properly pled under rule 3.851.   
 
 
- 19 - 
See Mungin, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S613 (“We are troubled by the possibility that a 
false police report was submitted and then relied on by defense counsel.”).   
However, the postconviction court further held that Waterhouse had failed to 
establish the second prong of a claim for relief based upon newly discovered 
evidence “because Sotolongo‟s testimony is not of such a nature that it would 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial in that it would not give rise to a 
reasonable doubt as to Waterhouse‟s culpability.”  In reaching this conclusion, the 
postconviction court comprehensively detailed the facts that provided both direct 
and circumstantial evidence of Waterhouse‟s guilt.  In addition to the facts detailed 
by this Court in Waterhouse I, see 429 So. 2d at 302-04, the postconviction court 
discussed additional facts from the trial court record: 
1. Waterhouse informed police that nobody had used his vehicle for 
at least two weeks prior to the murder. 
2. During the January 9, 1980, interview with police, in addition to 
stating that his life was over and that he was going to the electric 
chair, Waterhouse also stated that “nothing will bring her back.” 
3. On January 10, 1980, Waterhouse discussed his problems with 
alcohol and violence with the police, explaining that “this 
problem would just come over him very quickly, like flipping a 
switch.”  Waterhouse advised the police that on the night of the 
murder he consumed eight or nine beers before arriving at the 
ABC lounge and four or five white russians while at the lounge.  
After admitting to this heavy alcohol consumption, Waterhouse 
asked the police, “why do you think I quit drinking since 
Wednesday night?”   
4. During trial, bartender Kyoe Ginn testified that after the night of 
the murder, Waterhouse only drank orange juice when he came to 
the ABC lounge and left the lounge prior to closing. 
 
 
- 20 - 
5. During the January 10 interview, Waterhouse admitted that he 
knew the victim for at least six months prior to the murder, and 
that they had engaged in sexual intercourse on approximately 
three occasions.   
6. Robert Van Vuren, the foreman at Waterhouse‟s place of 
employment, testified that, in addition to Waterhouse appearing 
at work on the day after the murder with scratches on his face, 
Waterhouse seemed to be wearing makeup on January 7, 1980, 
i.e., four days after the murder, in an effort to cover the scratches.  
Van Vuren also testified that he had previously seen a tire tool in 
Waterhouse‟s vehicle.5 
7. Inmate Kenneth Young testified with regard to an incident that 
occurred in the jail while Young‟s trial was pending.  According 
to Young, Waterhouse held a shank to the throat of another 
inmate and ordered everyone else, except the captive inmate, out 
of the room.  Young testified that Waterhouse left the room a few 
minutes later and stated, “I wonder how he‟d like a Coke bottle 
up his ass like I gave her.”  The medical examiner testified during 
trial that the victim‟s rectum was damaged consistent with a 
foreign object, such as a Coke bottle, being inserted.  The police 
found a Coke bottle inside Waterhouse‟s vehicle. 
8. When Waterhouse learned that Van Vuren would be called as a 
witness to testify that Waterhouse appeared at work on January 3 
with scratches on his face, Waterhouse told Inmate Young that 
Van Vuren was incorrect.  Waterhouse instead told Young that he 
was so scratched up that he did not go to work at all that day.   
9. Kenneth Norwood, who lived with Waterhouse at the time of the 
murder, testified that on January 3, he saw Waterhouse washing 
his car, and it appeared that he was cleaning the interior of the 
vehicle.   
 
The postconviction court concluded that, in light of the testimony and 
evidence presented during trial, “Sotolongo‟s testimony would probably not 
produce an acquittal on retrial.”  The postconviction court further found that 
                                         
5.  According to Waterhouse I, “[t]he victim‟s wounds were such that they 
were probably made with a hard instrument such as a steel tire changing tool.”  429 
So. 2d at 303. 
 
 
- 21 - 
Sotolongo‟s testimony that he saw Waterhouse leave the lounge with two men 
“was not reliable because of the long passage of time, the fact that his memory 
when interviewed by Hitchox was closer to the time of the event, and his memory 
at the time of the January 12, 2012 evidentiary hearing was admittedly weaker.”  
The postconviction court also noted that the testimony of Sotolongo was 
cumulative to that of bouncer Leon Vasquez, which left open the time frame that 
Waterhouse could have returned to the lounge later that evening.  Finally, the court 
noted that “Vasquez‟s testimony was contrary to [bartender] Ginn‟s testimony and 
it was the jury‟s function to weigh the credibility of these witnesses in accepting or 
rejecting the testimony relied upon in reaching a verdict.”   
 
With regard to the Brady claim, the postconviction court held that 
Waterhouse was not entitled to relief.  First, the court found that Sotolongo‟s 
testimony would have impeached the testimony of bartender Ginn, and 
corroborated the testimony of bouncer Vasquez, thereby satisfying the first prong 
of Brady.  However, the court determined that this evidence had not been 
suppressed by the State and, therefore, failed the second prong of a Brady claim.  
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that Waterhouse failed to establish the 
police report was, in fact, falsified: 
[T]he description of Sotolongo‟s interview by Hitchcox is more 
reliable since it was reduced to writing at the time of the interview.  
Additionally, the passage of time and Sotolongo‟s weak recollection 
militate against the reliability of Sotolongo‟s statements. 
 
 
- 22 - 
Finally, the postconviction court found that, even if Waterhouse had met the 
second prong of Brady, Waterhouse failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief 
because he could not establish prejudice under the third prong of Brady due to the 
“other uncontroverted evidence presented by the State, including Waterhouse‟s 
own incriminating statements, and the physical and circumstantial evidence against 
him.”   
Waterhouse filed his Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2012.  On January 23, 
the State filed a notice of cross-appeal, challenging the postconviction court‟s 
determination that Waterhouse‟s second claim was timely filed pursuant to rule 
3.851(d)(2)(A).   
ANALYSIS 
Destruction of Evidence Claim 
Standard of Review 
 
In his first claim, Waterhouse appeals the summary denial of his claim that 
his execution should be barred because he was unable to obtain DNA testing of 
certain exhibits due to their premature destruction by the Clerk‟s Office of the 
Sixth Judicial Circuit.  We have explained that “[t]he decision of whether to grant 
an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on the written 
materials before the court, and the ruling of the postconviction trial court on that 
issue is tantamount to a pure question of law subject to de novo review.”  Troy v. 
 
 
- 23 - 
State, 57 So. 3d 828, 834 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 526 
(Fla. 2009)).   
Sufficiency of the Pleading 
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(1), “[a]ny motion to 
vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the prisoner 
within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.”  A claim is properly 
raised in a rule 3.851 motion beyond the time limits articulated in subdivision 
(d)(1) only where:   
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to 
the movant or the movant‟s attorney and could not have been 
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or  
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not 
established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and 
has been held to apply retroactively, or  
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the 
motion. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2).  As noted by the postconviction court‟s summary 
denial order, Waterhouse‟s claim does not satisfy any subdivision of rule 
3.851(d)(2) and is, therefore, improperly included in the present successive 
motion.6  First, Waterhouse has been aware of the destruction of evidence from his 
case since at least October 15, 2003, when the State announced in its response to 
Waterhouse‟s Rule 3.853 Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing that the 
                                         
 
6.  Neither party disputes that this claim was not filed pursuant to 
subdivision (C). 
 
 
- 24 - 
evidence at issue had been erroneously destroyed.  Second, Waterhouse himself 
acknowledges that he is not seeking relief under an existing fundamental right, but 
instead “seeks the recognition of a fundamental constitutional right for the first 
time.”  Waterhouse does not rely upon a single case in which such a right has 
previously been recognized.  Accordingly, the destruction of evidence claim raised 
by Waterhouse is not properly pled in a successive rule 3.851 motion, and the 
postconviction court properly denied Waterhouse‟s first claim on this basis.   
Procedural Bars  
 
Further, we agree with the postconviction court that this claim is also 
procedurally barred, successive, and untimely.  A prior challenge to the destruction 
of DNA evidence in this case was thoroughly litigated and resolved against 
Waterhouse. 
 
On September 30, 2003, Waterhouse filed a rule 3.853 motion for 
postconviction DNA testing.  In the motion, Waterhouse listed the following 
evidentiary items to be tested for DNA: 
alleged areas of blood found in [Waterhouse‟s] motor vehicle, alleged 
areas of blood on [Waterhouse‟s] clothing, serology evidence 
recovered from the victim at the autopsy, the clothing of the victim, 
and hair evidence. 
Waterhouse asserted that the State utilized the evidence he listed for testing to 
support its claim that Waterhouse raped and killed the victim.  Waterhouse 
 
 
- 25 - 
explained that DNA testing would either exonerate him of the crime or mitigate his 
sentence as follows: 
The Defendant is innocent.  The DNA testing requested by this 
motion will exonerate the Defendant of the crimes for which he was 
sentenced.  The State‟s case was based largely on circumstantial 
evidence.  A major component of the State‟s circumstantial evidence 
was the above-described Exhibits and the testimony related thereto.  
Without this evidence the Defendant would have been exonerated.  
DNA testing of these items would negate the evidentiary value of 
these items for the State, and would establish affirmative evidence 
that the Defendant is innocent.  The results of the DNA testing of this 
physical evidence would be admissible at trial.  The nature of this 
evidence is such that there is no question that the evidence containing 
the tested DNA is authentic and would be admissible at a future 
hearing. 
On October 15, 2003, the State responded that “the exhibits that Defendant 
Waterhouse wishes to test are no longer in the possession of the Clerk of Court, 
having been destroyed in 1988.”  The State described how the evidence was 
prematurely destroyed: 
As best the State can reconstruct the events, the Clerk of Court 
submitted an order to Judge Robert Beach in 1983 that authorized 
destruction of evidence held by the Clerk for a large number of 
criminal cases.  The cases were identified in [sic] by case number in 
an appended list of approximately forty pages.  The actual order 
signed by Judge Beach did not refer to case number 80-192 and did 
not authorize destruction of the evidence introduced in the 
Waterhouse case.  Destruction of evidence on the list apparently 
began in 1986 and continued through at least 1988.  The Clerk‟s 
office employees handling the destruction apparently worked from an 
earlier list or draft of the order which differed from the final version 
and which included the Waterhouse case number even though it was a 
death penalty case and had still been pending appeal at the time of 
 
 
- 26 - 
Judge Beach‟s order.  As a result the Clerk‟s office erroneously 
destroyed the Waterhouse evidence in 1988. 
(Footnote omitted.)7  The State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit added that he 
was “confident that the State Attorney‟s Office would never have concurred with 
the destruction of evidence in any capital case.”  Since the evidence that 
Waterhouse sought to be tested had been destroyed, the State requested that the 
postconviction court deny the motion for postconviction DNA testing.   
 
On May 5, 2004, Sixth Judicial Circuit Court Judge R. Timothy Peters 
ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine the circumstances 
surrounding the destruction of the evidence.  In this order, Judge Peters stated that 
Waterhouse‟s rule 3.853 motion “appear[ed] to be facially sufficient.”  In response 
to a request by the State that Judge Beach—the judge who presided over 
Waterhouse‟s trial and prior postconviction proceedings—preside over the 
evidentiary hearing, the order entered by Judge Peters provided: 
[T]his court is concerned that, given the arguments presented, Judge 
Beach may be a witness with respect to the facts and circumstances of 
the destruction of the evidence.  At the least, Judge Beach should be 
available to either the State or the defense should they choose to call 
                                         
7.  Contrary to Waterhouse‟s assertion in his successive postconviction 
motion, “all” of the evidence from trial was not destroyed.  For example, fingernail 
clippings from the victim were preserved.  However, DNA testing on the clippings 
from one hand failed to disclose any pertinent facts, and testing on the clippings 
from the other hand only indicated female DNA.  However, all of the exhibits 
listed by Waterhouse in his motion for postconviction DNA testing had been 
destroyed.   
 
 
- 27 - 
him as a witness.  Therefore, Judge R. Timothy Peters . . . shall 
preside over this hearing.[8]   
 
After the evidentiary hearing, Judge Peters entered an order on April 19, 
2005, finding that the destruction of the DNA in Waterhouse‟s case was 
“inadvertent and not done in bad faith.”  Thereafter, Waterhouse filed an Amended 
Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing.  He requested a new trial, contending 
that the destruction of the biological evidence was a constitutional due process 
violation and also a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.   
 
On June 2, 2005, Judge Beach—who at some point was reassigned to the 
rule 3.853 proceedings—entered an order denying Waterhouse‟s amended motion.  
Judge Beach first found that, because the destruction of the evidence in 
Waterhouse‟s case was inadvertent and not in bad faith, Waterhouse could not 
establish a due process violation under the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (“[U]nless a criminal 
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 
                                         
8.  On June 3, 2004, the State filed a petition with this Court seeking review 
of Judge Peters‟ non-final order.  See State v. Waterhouse, No. SC04-956 (Fla. 
petition filed June 3, 2004).  The State requested that the Court reverse the order 
mandating an evidentiary hearing on the circumstances surrounding the destruction 
of the evidence and finding the motion for DNA testing to be facially sufficient.  
On November 3, 2004, this Court dismissed the State‟s petition without prejudice.  
See State v. Waterhouse, 888 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2004) (table decision).  
 
 
- 28 - 
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”).  
Judge Beach next elected to revisit Judge Peters‟ finding of the “apparent” 
sufficiency of Waterhouse‟s rule 3.853 motion.  Judge Beach found that 
Waterhouse‟s motion was insufficient on its face: 
 
In both motions, the Defendant states that he is innocent and 
that the DNA testing will exonerate him.  Further, he alleges that 
without the “evidence the Defendant would have been exonerated.”  
He further alleges that DNA testing would “negate the evidentiary 
value of these items for the State, and would establish affirmative 
evidence that the Defendant is innocent.” . . .  
 
The Defendant fails to allege how this exoneration will come 
about, or specifically what the DNA testing evidence will show.  In 
order for the trial court to make the required findings, the movant 
must demonstrate the nexus between the potential results of DNA 
testing on each piece of evidence and the issues in the case.  
Waterhouse has failed to demonstrate or even allege such a nexus. 
 
Judge Beach relied upon this Court‟s decision in Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23 
(Fla. 2004), in which this Court affirmed the denial of a rule 3.853 motion for 
postconviction DNA testing where the defendant failed to “explain, with reference 
to specific facts about the crime and the items he wished to have tested, „how the 
DNA testing requested by the motion will exonerate the movant of the crime for 
which the movant was sentenced, or . . . will mitigate the sentence received by the 
movant for that crime.‟”  Id. at 28. 
 
The denial order next noted that under rule 3.853, relief is warranted only 
where there is a reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted 
or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at 
 
 
- 29 - 
trial.  Relying upon the facts of this Court‟s decision in Waterhouse I, the order 
concluded that “even if the possible DNA evidence were not considered, there is 
still sufficient evidence to support Defendant‟s conviction.”  That postconviction 
court noted that “the things done to the victim match those for which the 
Defendant admitted a proclivity: violence, slapping, hitting, rage when finding a 
woman is menstruating, and anal intercourse.”  That postconviction court also 
found that Waterhouse‟s denial, and then subsequent admission, of knowing the 
victim were indicative of guilt, as were the facts that Waterhouse was seen leaving 
the lounge with the victim and that Waterhouse had “scratches on his face the day 
after her violent rape and murder.”  The postconviction court at that time found 
that although the evidence was circumstantial, “in the context of the trial, and 
based on the demeanor of the witnesses, it is sufficient to support a conviction.”   
Finally, to the extent that Waterhouse claimed that the blood splattered 
around his car did not belong to the victim, the former postconviction court 
concluded that even if DNA testing had proved the assertion, “this would not 
exonerate Defendant.”    
On appeal, Waterhouse claimed that “[t]he trial court erred in denying 
[Waterhouse‟s] request for relief . . . where the destruction of biological evidence 
violated the due process rights of Mr. Waterhouse under both the United States 
Constitution and the Florida Constitution.”  In his initial brief, Waterhouse not 
 
 
- 30 - 
only contended that this Court should adopt an exception to the “bad faith” 
requirement in Youngblood, but also asserted that heightened safeguards should be 
applicable to capital proceedings.  This Court ultimately issued an order that 
affirmed the former postconviction court‟s denial of Waterhouse‟s rule 3.853 
motion for DNA testing.  See Waterhouse v. State, No. SC05-1404 (Fla. Oct. 13, 
2006) (unpublished order) (942 So. 2d 414).  The order relied upon our prior 
decision in Hitchcock.   
While the reference to Hitchcock indicates that the former postconviction 
court‟s denial was affirmed solely on the basis of facial insufficiency, we have 
comprehensively reviewed the file in the rule 3.853 appeal filed by Waterhouse.  
Our review demonstrates that Waterhouse‟s due process challenge to the 
destruction of evidence in his case was previously fully presented, considered, and 
rejected by both the former postconviction court and this Court.   Accordingly, 
Waterhouse‟s current claim is both procedurally barred and successive.  See 
generally Hunter v. State, 29 So. 3d 256, 267 (Fla. 2008) (“Claims raised in prior 
postconviction proceedings cannot be relitigated in a subsequent postconviction 
motion unless the movant can demonstrate that the grounds for relief were not 
known and could not have been known at the time of the earlier proceeding.”). 
Further, as previously noted, in his prior rule 3.853 proceeding, Waterhouse 
asserted constitutional due process and Eighth Amendment challenges to the 
 
 
- 31 - 
destruction of evidence in his capital case.  There is no reason that he could not 
have asked the postconviction court at that time and in that proceeding to recognize 
a bar to execution on these bases.9  Therefore, to the extent Waterhouse is 
attempting to simply argue a variant of this earlier claim in the instant proceeding, 
it is also untimely.  See Peterka v. State, No. SC08-1413, order at 2, 15 So. 3d 581 
(Fla. May 22, 2009) (unpublished order) (denying successive rule 3.851 motion as 
untimely where the defendant raised “a variant on a claim that he has already 
raised in prior proceedings by relying upon evidence that has been known since his 
trial”). 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court‟s summary 
denial of Waterhouse‟s destruction of evidence claim.  
The Sotolongo Affidavit Claim 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
To obtain relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant is 
required to demonstrate that “(1) the asserted evidence [was] unknown by the trial 
court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence; 
                                         
9.  Waterhouse presents no authority to support the proposition that such a 
challenge is not ripe until a warrant is signed.  Cf. Barnhill v. State, 971 So. 2d 
106, 118 (Fla. 2007) (“Barnhill concedes that his claim involving competency to 
be executed is not ripe for review as he has not yet been found incompetent and a 
death warrant has not been signed.”). 
 
 
- 32 - 
and (2) the newly discovered evidence must be of such a nature that it would 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 99 (Fla. 
2011) (citing Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)).  Newly discovered 
evidence satisfies the second prong of the test articulated in Jones, and reaffirmed 
in Wyatt, if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a 
reasonable doubt as to his culpability.”  Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. 
State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  We discussed the parameters for 
evaluating the prejudice prong of a newly discovered evidence claim in Marek v. 
State, 14 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2009), as follows: 
In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the 
postconviction court must “consider all newly discovered evidence 
which would be admissible” and must “evaluate the weight of both 
the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was 
introduced at the trial.”  [Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 
1991).]  This determination includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or 
whether it constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial 
court should also determine whether this evidence is 
cumulative to other evidence in the case.  The trial court 
should further consider the materiality and relevance of 
the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
Marek, 14 So. 3d at 990 (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521). 
 
This Court has explained that “[w]hen the trial court rules on a newly 
discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, we accept the trial court‟s 
findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the 
 
 
- 33 - 
evidence if based upon competent, substantial evidence.”  Hitchcock v. State, 991 
So. 2d 337, 349 (Fla. 2008). 
In the instant proceeding, the State challenges the postconviction court‟s 
determination that Waterhouse satisfied the due diligence prong of a newly 
discovered evidence claim and, therefore, his second claim is untimely for 
purposes of rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).  Conversely, Waterhouse agrees with the 
postconviction court‟s determination that due diligence was established, but 
challenges the court‟s holding that the information provided by Sotolongo was not 
of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  We address 
each of these challenges.   
Due Diligence 
 
The postconviction court first found that Waterhouse had established that 
neither he, his counsel, nor the trial court could have known of the evidence 
provided in Sotolongo‟s affidavit because Detective Hitchcox‟s report stated that 
Sotolongo “does not remember when [Waterhouse] left or when the vic[tim] left as 
this is not the type of thing he keeps track of.”  The postconviction court here 
relied on this Court‟s decision in Mungin v. State, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S610, S613 
(Fla. Oct. 27, 2011), for the conclusion that “due diligence surely does not require 
that counsel allocate limited pre-trial resources in investigating a witness that is 
 
 
- 34 - 
reported by police to have said something contrary to what the witness now 
claims.”   
In Mungin, a capital defendant filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief, contending that a newly discovered witness impeached the testimony of a 
State witness (Ronald Kirkland) who, during trial, “identified Mungin as leaving 
the crime scene immediately after the murder.”  Id. at S610.  The newly discovered 
witness, George Brown, testified that he, not Kirkland, was the first person on 
scene after the murder, and that the homicide report prepared after the murder was 
“false.”  See id.  Mungin also offered an affidavit from his trial counsel explaining 
why counsel did not discover this information before: 
5.  
Prior to trial, the State provided me with a copy of Detective 
Gilbreath‟s homicide report, in which there is brief mention made of 
George Brown and the information he supposedly told Detective 
Conn when he was interviewed on the day Ms. Woods was shot.  I 
relied on this police report as being an accurate and truthful account of 
what Mr. Brown told the police.  The version of Mr. Brown‟s 
statement contained in the homicide report generally supported the 
version of facts provided by Mr. Kirkland, and provided no suggestion 
that Mr. Brown had information that would be useful to impeach Mr. 
Kirkland‟s version of the events. 
7.  
[sic] Because the information contained in the police report 
appeared to be of much less importance than the information provided 
by Kirkland, and due to the fact that Kirkland became the chief 
prosecution identification witness, our efforts focused on attempting 
to undermine Kirkland‟s testimony at trial.  Because I relied on the 
veracity of the police report, apparently no one from the defense team 
contacted or spoke with Mr. Brown prior to trial. 
 
 
- 35 - 
8.  
. . . Had the State provided me with an accurate report 
containing the true version of events that Mr. Brown witnessed, this 
would have made a tremendous difference in terms of the presentation 
of Mr. Mungin‟s case.  Every effort would have been made to 
interview Mr. Brown and to present his conflicting testimony, given 
that it contradicts and impeaches Kirkland‟s version of events and his 
identification of Anthony Mungin. 
Id. at S611-12 (emphasis supplied).  Mungin asserted that the newly discovered 
evidence from Brown demonstrated that the State violated both Brady and Giglio.  
See id. at S610.  The postconviction court there denied Mungin‟s motion without 
an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Mungin had failed to establish prejudice.  
See id. at S612.  On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing with regard to Brown‟s claim that the police report was false.  See id. at 
S613-14.10  Relevant to the instant proceeding, we stated that we were “troubled by 
the possibility that a false police report was submitted and then relied on by 
defense counsel.”  Id. at S613 (emphasis supplied).   
The State contends on cross-appeal that the fact that Leglio Sotolongo‟s 
name was mentioned in the police report placed collateral counsel on notice that 
Sotolongo was a potential witness—even though the police report stated that 
Sotolongo did not know when Waterhouse or the victim left the ABC lounge.  It is 
undisputed that Waterhouse‟s trial counsel, and all subsequent counsel, possessed 
                                         
10.  However, we rejected a newly discovered evidence claim, holding that 
Mungin could not demonstrate that the information provided by Brown was of 
such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See id. at 
S614.   
 
 
- 36 - 
the January 7, 1980, report prepared by Detective Hitchcox which mentioned 
Sotolongo.  The State contends that Waterhouse has failed to carry his burden to 
demonstrate why, after more than thirty years, neither he nor his counsel could 
have not easily discovered the witness now being presented.   
In Mungin, we expressed concern with the fact that defense counsel may 
have relied upon a false report.  See id. at S613.  In Mungin, we did not state that 
defense counsel, or collateral counsel, upon receiving a police report, must 
presume that the report is false and thereafter independently verify every detail of 
the report or every statement made by a witness to the police.  To place the onus of 
verifying every aspect of an unambiguous police report on defense or collateral 
counsel would not only create a substantial amount of work in a capital case, but 
also could be viewed as downplaying the seriousness of allegedly false police 
reports.  Moreover, to hold that collateral counsel must investigate every aspect of 
a police report—even where it appears that such investigation would be fruitless—
is inconsistent with a prior case where we held, in the context of an alleged Brady 
violation, that due diligence by trial counsel was satisfied even though the witness 
who provided the impeaching evidence had been named in a police document that 
was provided to defense counsel. 
In a similar manner, in State v. Huggins, 788 So. 2d 238, 243 (Fla. 2001), 
during discovery, defense counsel was provided with hundreds of “lead sheets” 
 
 
- 37 - 
from the police, including one regarding a potential witness named Ausley.  
However, the information provided in that lead sheet was inaccurate and did not 
provide defense counsel with any indication that Ausley had information that was 
useful to the defense.  See id.  For this reason, defense counsel did not interview 
Ausley.  See id.  Prior to trial, Ausley gave a second statement to the prosecution 
which accurately depicted the information that he possessed.  See id. at 241-42.  
The prosecutor concluded that this information “did not support what he believed 
the defense‟s theory of the case would be” and did not reveal this information to 
the defense.  Id. at 242.  After the defendant was convicted of murder, Ausley 
approached defense counsel and informed them of the exculpatory information that 
he possessed.  See id. at 242.   
In evaluating the Brady claim in that case, the trial court found that the 
defendant could not have possessed the suppressed information with the use of due 
diligence.  See id. at 243.  On appeal, this Court affirmed these findings, holding 
that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the lower tribunal‟s 
determination that the State had suppressed favorable evidence which was 
unavailable to the defendant.  See id.  We reached this conclusion despite the 
State‟s assertion that the information was not suppressed because the State had 
“disclosed lead sheet 302 and if defense counsel had interviewed Ausley prior to 
the trial, they would have learned the substance of Ausley‟s tape-recorded 
 
 
- 38 - 
statement.”  Id.  Relevant to this case, in Huggins, this Court noted that defense 
counsel only became aware of Ausley‟s evidence when Ausley contacted the 
defense.  See id. at 242.  Thus, defense counsel in Huggins was not required to 
investigate hundreds of leads provided by the police—including leads which “did 
not reveal that further investigation would produce useful results”—in order to 
satisfy due diligence.  Id. at 243.   
The issue presented by the State‟s cross-appeal is whether the analysis 
applicable to defense counsel in Huggins should apply to collateral counsel.  
Essentially, we must determine whether collateral counsel should be held to a 
different, higher standard of investigation than original trial counsel.  Having 
considered the assertions of the State and Waterhouse, we conclude that collateral 
counsel should not be held to a higher standard.  While pretrial resources are 
unquestionably limited, collateral counsel‟s resources are also not unlimited.  Thus, 
requiring collateral counsel to verify every detail and contact every witness in a 
police report—even where the police report indicates that the witness has no useful 
information—would place an equally onerous burden on collateral counsel, with 
little chance of discovering helpful or useful information.11  
                                         
 
11.  Arguably, cases in which a witness comes forward years after a 
defendant is convicted of capital murder and contends that the police provided 
false information in a document are not common, and should not be deemed the 
norm in capital murder investigations.  Instead, as asserted by Waterhouse, 
attorneys and judges should be able to rely upon the veracity of a police report.   
 
 
- 39 - 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the “due diligence” prong of a newly 
discovered evidence claim is satisfied when: 
1. A witness swears in an affidavit that he or she spoke with the police 
about the crime, but the information ultimately included in the police 
report is either inaccurate or false; and  
2. The defendant‟s counsel swears that he or she relied upon the veracity 
of that police report and did not contact that witness because the report 
indicated that the witness would not have any pertinent information 
about the crime. 
 
Here, the police report by Detective Hitchcox indicated that Sotolongo did not 
possess any information that was favorable to the defense.  Neither trial counsel 
nor collateral counsel interviewed Sotolongo because they relied upon the veracity 
of this report.  In light of these facts and the decision in Huggins, we conclude that 
Waterhouse has established the due diligence prong of his newly discovered 
evidence claim.  We further conclude that Waterhouse‟s second claim is properly 
raised under rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).  Accordingly, we reject the State‟s cross-appeal.   
Likelihood of an Acquittal on Retrial 
 
Although Waterhouse may have satisfied the first prong of a newly 
discovered evidence claim, Waterhouse cannot demonstrate that Sotolongo‟s 
testimony is of such a nature that it probably would produce an acquittal on retrial.  
See Wyatt, 71 So. 3d at 99.  First, the postconviction court found that, due to the 
passage of time, Sotolongo‟s testimony during the evidentiary hearing was not 
reliable.  This Court must accept the postconviction court‟s determination with 
 
 
- 40 - 
regard to the credibility of Sotolongo as a witness, provided that the determination 
is based upon competent, substantial evidence.  See Hitchcock, 991 So. 2d at 349.   
The transcript of the evidentiary hearing reveals that Sotolongo was 
uncertain during much of his testimony.  For example, in his affidavit, Sotolongo 
states that Waterhouse repaid him on the night of the murder, but in cross-
examination during the evidentiary hearing, he said that he could not be absolutely 
certain that Waterhouse repaid him on that night.  Sotolongo also could not 
remember if he was working on the night of the murder.  Sotolongo admitted that 
his memory was better thirty-two years ago than it is now, and that the events in 
question occurred “a long time ago.”  Finally, Sotolongo testified that the 
statements in his affidavit are true “as far as [he] can recall.”  Given Sotolongo‟s 
equivocal responses during the evidentiary hearing, and the sheer passage of time 
since the relevant events occurred, we conclude that competent, substantial 
evidence supports the postconviction court‟s finding that Sotolongo‟s testimony 
was not reliable.   
Second, we agree with the postconviction court that Sotolongo‟s testimony 
is not “of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  
Wyatt, 71 So. 3d at 99.  The postconviction court‟s January 20, 2012, denial order 
comprehensively details the significant evidence presented during the 1980 trial 
 
 
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that supports Waterhouse‟s guilt of the murder.12  It is true that Sotolongo‟s 
statement would have corroborated the testimony of bouncer Leon Vasquez, who 
testified during trial that he saw Waterhouse leave the bar with two men, and 
arguably impeached the testimony of bartender Ginn, who testified that she saw the 
victim leave with Waterhouse.  However, in light of the other compelling evidence 
of Waterhouse‟s guilt, the fact that a second person saw Waterhouse leave the bar 
with two men would be insufficient to produce an acquittal on retrial.   
Moreover, although the denial order provides that “Vasquez‟s testimony was 
contrary to Ginn‟s testimony and it was the jury‟s function to weigh the credibility 
of these witnesses in accepting or rejecting the testimony relied upon in reaching a 
verdict,” it is arguable whether the testimony of these two individuals is, in fact, 
inconsistent.  A review of the trial record from Waterhouse‟s guilt phase produces 
a timeline of events on the night of the murder based upon the testimony with 
                                         
12.  Contrary to Waterhouse‟s assertion, the significance of the newly 
discovered evidence is not to be considered in conjunction with evidence that 
might be presented at a future, speculative retrial.  Instead, as we noted in Marek:  
 
In determining whether newly discovered evidence would 
probably result in an acquittal or a lesser sentence, the new evidence 
must be viewed in conjunction with the evidence presented at trial. 
Thus, the Court evaluates all the admissible newly discovered 
evidence, including any admissible newly discovered evidence 
presented in prior postconviction proceedings, and compares it with 
the evidence that was introduced at trial. 
 
14 So. 3d at 990-91 (emphasis supplied).   
 
 
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regard to approximate times presented by both Ginn and Vasquez.  In this timeline, 
the testimony can be interpreted to be consistent with Waterhouse being seen by 
both Vasquez and Sotolongo departing the ABC lounge with two men, with a time 
in the record being approximately 11:50 p.m., to complete a drug purchase.  
During trial, Vasquez testified that after leaving with two men for approximately 
forty-five minutes, Waterhouse was observed returning to the parking lot of the 
ABC lounge.  Vasquez stated that the man who sold Waterhouse the drugs exited 
the car and re-entered the lounge.  Thus, the evidence is uncontroverted that after 
Waterhouse departed from the ABC lounge with the two males, he returned to the 
lounge parking lot later that same night.  Waterhouse was in the vicinity of the 
ABC lounge parking lot at approximately 12:30 a.m., and he re-entered the lounge, 
although unseen by Vasquez (as there was more than one entrance to the lounge), 
because he was actually observed by bartender Ginn inside the lounge drinking 
with the victim before they departed together at approximately 1:00 a.m.  Vasquez 
testified that he also saw the victim in the lounge after 1:00 a.m., but he did not 
know if she left with Waterhouse because he did not see the victim leave the bar.   
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that even if Sotolongo had told 
Detective Hitchcox that he saw Waterhouse leave the ABC lounge with two men 
on January 2, 1980, this testimony would add nothing to that which was already 
presented during trial.  Vasquez already presented these facts, and actually set forth 
 
 
- 43 - 
a more precise timeline than Sotolongo.  Not only did Vasquez testify that he saw 
Waterhouse leave the lounge with two males at 11:50 p.m., he also observed 
Waterhouse in the parking lot of the lounge around 12:30 a.m.  Because Sotolongo 
did not see the victim leave the ABC lounge, his testimony during the evidentiary 
hearing does not undermine an analysis that Waterhouse returned to the lounge 
after his initial departure, and then later left with the victim.   
Waterhouse has failed to establish that Sotolongo‟s testimony is of such a 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Wyatt, 71 So. 3d 
at 99.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of relief based 
upon Waterhouse‟s claim of newly discovered evidence.   
Brady Claim 
 
Waterhouse next claims that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose 
Sotolongo‟s testimony to defense counsel.  A Brady violation occurs when “(1) . . . 
favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, 
the defendant was prejudiced.”  Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011).  
This Court has expressed the standard of review of a Brady claim denial as 
follows: 
Brady claims present mixed questions of law and fact.  See Sochor v. 
State, 883 So. 2d 766, 785 (Fla. 2004). Thus, as to findings of fact, we 
will defer to the lower court‟s findings if they are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  See id.  “[T]his Court will not 
 
 
- 44 - 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, 
likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be 
given to the evidence by the trial court.”  Hurst [v. State, 18 So. 3d 
975, 988 (Fla. 2009)] (quoting Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 30 (Fla. 
2008)).  We review the trial court‟s application of the law to the facts 
de novo. 
Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 102 (Fla. 2011). 
 
 
In rejecting this claim, the postconviction court noted that it was faced with 
the conflicting testimonies of Sotolongo and Detective Hitchcox.  The court 
ultimately found Detective Hitchcox‟s testimony with regard to the interview to be 
more reliable than that of Sotolongo because “it was reduced to writing” at the 
time of the 1980 interview.  Further, the court found that the passage of time and 
Sotolongo‟s “weak recollection militate against the reliability of [his] statements.”  
Because the postconviction court concluded that Hitchcox‟s depiction of the 
interview was accurate, it held that no favorable evidence was suppressed by the 
State.   
 
Waterhouse has not established that a Brady violation occurred.  As with the 
newly discovered evidence claim, the postconviction court heard the testimony of 
Sotolongo, and concluded that Detective Hitchcox‟s testimony with regard to the 
1980 interview was more reliable.  Given the passage of time and Sotolongo‟s 
admission that his memory of the interview was better thirty-two years ago than it 
was on January 17, 2012, we conclude that the postconviction court‟s finding is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 102 
 
 
- 45 - 
(stating that this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
postconviction court on issues of witness credibility).  Thus, if the interview 
occurred as reflected in the report, and as testified to by Detective Hitchcox, then 
the State did not suppress impeaching evidence because the report was not false.   
Moreover, even if this Court were to reject the postconviction court‟s 
determination of witness credibility, and conclude that the State suppressed 
impeaching evidence because Detective Hitchcox‟s report is false (which we do 
not), Waterhouse‟s claim would nonetheless fail because he cannot establish 
prejudice under Brady.  In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.  See 373 U.S. at 87.  
The Supreme Court has explained that to establish prejudice under the materiality 
prong of Brady, a defendant must demonstrate 
“a reasonable probability” that the result of the trial would have been 
different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the 
defense.  As we stressed in Kyles[ v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 
(1995)]: “[T]he adjective is important. The question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict 
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  514 
U.S. at 434. 
. . . [T]he materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining 
whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the 
undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support 
the jury's conclusions.  Id. at 434-435.  Rather, the question is whether 
“the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole 
 
 
- 46 - 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.”  Id. at 435. 
 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-90 (1999); see also Rodriguez v. State, 39 
So. 3d 275, 288 (Fla. 2010) (holding that defendant “failed to show prejudice—i.e., 
that „the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.‟” (quoting 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290)). 
First, as previously discussed in the analysis of the newly discovered 
evidence claim, the testimony of Sotolongo, Vasquez, and Ginn are not necessarily 
inconsistent and can be reconciled.  Sotolongo‟s testimony is not, therefore, 
actually impeaching.  Second, even if Sotolongo‟s testimony could be viewed as 
impeaching, in light of Waterhouse‟s incriminating statements and the other 
evidence of his guilt, this cumulative testimony cannot “reasonably be taken to put 
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435); see Rodriguez, 39 So. 
3d at 288.  Accordingly, Sotolongo‟s testimony fails the materiality and prejudice 
prong of Brady, and we conclude that the claim presented by Waterhouse is 
without merit.  
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with our analysis above, we affirm the circuit court‟s denial of 
postconviction relief.  Further, we reject the State‟s cross-appeal and affirm the 
 
 
- 47 - 
determination of the postconviction court that Waterhouse‟s second claim satisfied 
the due diligence component of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851(d)(2)(A).  No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The 
mandate shall issue immediately.  Waterhouse‟s request for a stay of execution is 
denied. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result with respect to the affirmance of the trial court‟s 
order denying relief to Waterhouse, but dissents with respect to the decision on the 
State‟s cross-appeal. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Robert Edward Beach, Senior Judge - Case No. CRC80-192-CFASO-A 
 
Robert A. Norgard and Andrea M. Norgard of Norgard and Norgard, Bartow, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Candance M. Sabella, 
Bureau Chief, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee