Case Title: Gordon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-284

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-284 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL A. GORDON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
September 1, 2022 
 
COURIEL, J. 
 
Michael A. Gordon appeals his convictions and sentences of 
death for the January 15, 2015, first-degree murders of Patricia 
Moran and Deborah Royal.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
Fla. Const.  We affirm Gordon’s convictions and sentences. 
I 
The victims in this case were murdered at home, seemingly at 
random, having had no connection to the pawnshop robbery that 
unfolded earlier on the day they died. 
 
 
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A 
Shortly after 5:30 p.m. on January 15, 2015, Chad O’Brien, 
the manager of a Cash America Pawnshop in Auburndale, in Polk 
County, and Richie Soto, one of his pawnbrokers, were talking in 
the store’s office when three armed men rushed into the store, 
demanding at gunpoint that O’Brien and Soto get down.  Gordon, 
one of those armed men, pointed a rifle at O’Brien; another pointed 
a handgun at Soto. 
After noticing O’Brien’s keys, Gordon threatened to kill O’Brien 
if he did not immediately unlock the case.  O’Brien complied.  
Gordon and an accomplice with a crowbar began stuffing jewelry 
into a bag.  When the robber with the handgun yelled that they 
were out of time, the three men grabbed their loot and bolted from 
the store.  They loaded into a red SUV idling outside and fled in the 
direction of Haines City. 
Back at the pawnshop, Soto called 911 and reported the 
robbery, which the store’s security cameras had captured.  Some of 
the stolen jewelry contained GPS tracking devices that had been 
activated when the items were removed.  The Polk County Sheriff’s 
 
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Office had access to the devices’ tracking system and officers were 
immediately sent to follow the items’ GPS signals. 
Three Haines City Police Department officers responded to 
radio calls that the fleeing SUV was headed their way.  As the 
officers closed in on it, someone in the SUV opened fire on them, 
with one shot striking a patrol car.  The SUV continued to race 
toward Haines City, its occupants continually firing at the pursuing 
officers.  When two more officers joined the chase, another patrol 
car was hit.  The SUV was speeding and evasively weaving in and 
out of traffic.  At last, it made a sharp left turn, nearly tipping over 
in the process, drove through a grass median, and pulled into the 
Chanler Ridge subdivision in Haines City. 
Officers followed the SUV into the neighborhood, where it had 
foundered in a field.  Its occupants fled in several directions. One 
man was tracked down by a police dog.  Two men had better luck 
and avoided detection at the scene but were arrested the following 
morning. 
Meanwhile, one block away, three Chanler Ridge residents had 
stepped outside to see what was going on and spotted a man 
running.  He identified himself as a neighbor and said that he was 
 
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fleeing people who were trying to shoot him.  The residents were 
suspicious; they did not recognize him.  One ran to flag down the 
police officers who were swarming the subdivision.  Seeing this, the 
unrecognized man fled toward Astor Drive.  Hearing the sirens, 
additional neighborhood residents gathered and noticed clothes 
strewn across multiple yards.  One of the residents who had earlier 
encountered the stranger found a rifle in their yard and called 911.  
An officer’s police dog tracked the scent from the items to 618 Astor 
Drive. 
While the residents who had encountered the stranger were 
calling 911, a different resident called the authorities to report that 
she heard screaming from her neighbors’ house—at 618 Astor 
Drive.  Officers formed a perimeter around the house.  It was then 
dark enough that the police had started using their flashlights.  
While searching the fenced-in backyard of the house, two officers 
pointed their lights through a window to see inside the house.  Two 
unclothed women with serious lacerations lay motionless on a 
bloody floor.  The officers yelled out what they saw to nearby 
colleagues and their discovery was soon broadcast over the radio to 
all officers on the scene. 
 
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Deputy Jonathan Quintana-Rivera was standing in the 
driveway guarding the front of the house.  Officer Eric Nickels was 
in the street, about 35 feet from the garage door, near the curb.  
Other officers were preparing to enter the house.  From inside a 
closed garage they heard loud noises followed by the revving of a car 
engine, then the sound of squealing tires.  Gordon, at the wheel of 
the victims’ car, burst through the closed garage door.  The garage 
door collapsed on top of the car, staying on its roof while the car 
careened down the driveway.1 
To avoid being hit by the car, Deputy Quintana-Rivera dove 
from the driveway onto the lawn.  The garage door on top of the car 
blocked Deputy Quintana-Rivera’s view of the driver.  Officer 
Nickels, trying to get out of the car’s path, scrambled toward the 
lawn but fell down in the road.  Before he could get up, the car 
made a hard left out of the driveway and began accelerating 
towards him.  Officers began firing at the car.  Even though Officer 
 
 
1.  While the officers’ testimonies disagreed about whether the 
car came out headlights or taillights first, their testimonies were 
consistent that it rapidly accelerated to about 35 to 40 miles per 
hour. 
 
 
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Nickels could not see who was driving, he aimed for the car’s 
windshield, trying to hit the driver.  The car sped down Astor Drive 
past Officer Nickels, made a sharp right turn, and crashed to a halt 
in a nearby field. 
An officer and his police dog apprehended Gordon about 60 to 
75 feet from the crashed vehicle.  Gordon was handcuffed, placed in 
a patrol car, and read his rights.  Following Miranda2 warnings, 
Gordon told officers that a man named Tony Wright, as well as two 
of Wright’s family members, were still in the house at 618 Astor 
Drive. 
 
While Gordon was being arrested, a SWAT team was clearing 
the house.  They found no other suspects, but they did find the 
remains of 72-year-old Patricia Moran and her 51-year-old 
daughter, Deborah Royal.  Their throats had been slashed, their 
 
2.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71 (1966) (“At the 
outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he 
must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has 
the right to remain silent. . . . The warning of the right to remain 
silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said 
can and will be used against the individual in court. . . . [A]n 
individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he 
has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with 
him during interrogation . . . .”). 
 
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bodies repeatedly stabbed.  Several knives were scattered near the 
bodies.  There was blood throughout the house; two T-shirts in the 
washing machine were covered in blood that was later identified as 
Gordon’s.  Medical examiners later concluded that neither woman 
died immediately.  Each had defensive wounds indicating she 
attempted to defend herself before she died from the attack. 
B 
The State charged Gordon in a 15-count indictment for the 
events of January 15.  The offenses included: two counts of first-
degree murder, burglary with assault or battery, conspiracy to 
commit armed robbery, robbery with a firearm, grand theft, fleeing 
or attempting to elude, three counts of attempted first-degree 
murder with a firearm, three counts of attempted first-degree 
murder with a vehicle, grand theft of a vehicle, and possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon.3 
During jury selection, the assistant state attorney asked 
members of the venire to raise their hands if someone close to them 
had ever been charged with a crime.  Kimberly James was among 
 
3.  This final charge, possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, was severed before trial and is not before us on appeal. 
 
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the potential jurors who did.  She explained that her first cousin 
had been sentenced to 25 years in prison, “[b]ut it didn’t affect me.”  
When asked if there was “anything about that incident that would 
impact [her] ability to be fair and impartial as it relates to this 
case,” she answered “[d]efinitely not.” 
At a different point in voir dire, the State asked James whether 
she ever had any casual conversations with anyone about the death 
penalty.  “No,” she said.  Asked whether her jury service at this trial 
had been the first time she had ever really thought about death 
penalty, James said that she had considered the subject “thinking 
to myself,” perhaps while watching crime-related news.  Asked what 
her thoughts about the death penalty were when she saw news 
about it, she said, “sometimes it’s merited and sometimes it’s not 
. . . I’m not there to look like at evidence to see whether the person 
should die, you know.  I’m not God.” 
The State followed up by asking whether her use of the 
phrase, “I’m not God,” was a reference to a religious belief.  James 
replied, “It has nothing to do with religion.  It’s just how I am as a 
person.  I want to see the evidence.  If it warrants death, so be it. If 
it warrants life, life.”  Asked if she would like to serve on the jury, 
 
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James said she would.  Counsel for the State and for Gordon went 
on to conduct an extensive colloquy with members of the panel, 
including James, on a number of topics. 
The State ultimately exercised one of its peremptory strikes to 
remove James—who, like Gordon, is black—from the panel. 
Gordon’s counsel asked the State to supply a race-neutral reason 
for the strike.  The State replied that James’s statement, “I’m not 
God,” caused concern about whether she could be fair and 
impartial in determining whether the death penalty was appropriate 
in this case.  At that point, Gordon’s counsel stated that the State’s 
reason for striking James was not sufficiently race-neutral. 
Applying a version of the procedure required under the 
circumstances in a Melbourne4 and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
 
4.  Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (“A 
party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory challenge on 
racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) 
show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group, 
and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for 
the strike.  If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court 
must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the 
strike.  At this point, the burden of production shifts to the 
proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation (step 2).  If the explanation is facially race-neutral and 
the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the 
 
 
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(1986), challenge, the trial court found that Gordon was black; that 
the venire member in question, James, was black, and that an 
already-seated juror appeared to be black.  Next, the trial court 
considered the State’s explanation for striking James.  It said, “the 
Court is not persuaded that the comments taken, all the answers 
and responses given by Ms. James to the questions both by the 
State and defense, I do not find that what she said and the reason 
articulated by the State is sufficient to allow the cause[5] challenge.” 
 
strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained 
(step 3).  The court’s focus in step 3 is not on the reasonableness of 
the explanation but rather its genuineness.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 
5.  Moments later, the trial court correctly referred to the 
strike as a “peremptory challenge” rather than a cause challenge.  
Notably, at the time of the initial peremptory challenge, the trial 
court only ruled on “whether the neutral explanation is facially 
valid,” not exactly what we have held to be required—that is, 
whether the proffered reason is pretextual.  Melbourne, 679 So. 2d 
at 764 (“If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court 
believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, 
the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained.”); 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (“The prosecutor therefore must articulate a 
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.”); 
United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“Once the prosecution has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for exercising its strikes, . . . the party contesting the strike 
[bears the burden] to demonstrate that the prosecution’s stated 
reasons are pretextual.”). 
 
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When a panel of 12 jurors had been assembled, the State 
again moved to strike James.  The trial court asked whether the 
State had any additional grounds.  The State answered that James 
had also indicated during voir dire that her first cousin had been 
sentenced to 25 years in prison.  The State reasserted its initial 
reason for striking James, arguing that only James among the 
potential jurors earlier said, “I’m not God,” which to the State 
“indicate[d] that she’s saying to us, ‘Who am I to judge somebody or 
be a part of a process that the death would be imposed?  That’s 
God’s job, not anybody else’s.’ ”  Gordon’s counsel renewed its 
argument that the State’s proffered reasons for the strike were not 
race-neutral.  The trial court deferred ruling on the matter, stating 
it would review its notes in addition to what was being presented by 
the State and the defense. 
After seating the other jurors, the trial court stated it had 
“considered the totality of the circumstances . . . and particularly 
the second reason for the peremptory strike to Ms. James,” and 
granted the State’s request to strike Ms. James over the defense’s 
objection. 
 
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After the jury had been selected, defense counsel accepted the 
jury, but renewed all race- and gender-related challenges it had 
made during the voir dire process.  Gordon himself was sworn and 
stated that, other than the objections made on his behalf by his 
counsel, he had no objections to the panel as selected. 
Trial proceeded, and at the conclusion of the State’s evidence, 
Gordon moved for judgment of acquittal.  The trial court granted 
the motion as to one count of attempted murder with a vehicle 
because the officer that the count concerned had previously died 
from unrelated causes. 
Gordon’s counsel did not concede that Gordon participated in 
any of the charged offenses.  For the murders of Moran and Royal, 
Gordon’s counsel argued that Tony Wright, or a different man from 
the fleeing SUV who was not arrested until the next day, could have 
killed the two women.  The two neighbors who encountered a 
suspicious man outside their houses identified Tony Wright when 
shown photo packs and testified to that effect later at trial.  This 
identification was confirmed by the officer who showed both 
neighbors the photo packs.  Gordon’s counsel also contended that 
numerous gaps existed in the police perimeter around 618 Astor 
 
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Drive.  These gaps, Gordon’s lawyers argued, could have allowed 
somebody to escape.  They also hypothesized that the murders may 
have occurred before officers surrounded the house. 
Following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the 
jury.  Guilty as charged, came the verdict, as to the thirteen counts 
against Gordon that had not been dismissed or severed. 
At the penalty phase, the State sought the death penalty 
arguing that four aggravating factors applied: (1) Gordon’s 
conviction of a prior capital felony or other felony involving the use 
or threat of violence to a person; (2) the first-degree murders were 
committed while Gordon was engaged in burglary or flight after the 
commission of robbery with a firearm; (3) Gordon murdered both 
Moran and Royal to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest; and (4) the 
murders were committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC) manner.  The State presented the testimony of an 
expert witness regarding the pain each victim suffered as a result of 
the injuries Gordon inflicted by repeatedly stabbing and cutting her 
with a knife while she remained alive, as well as victim impact 
statements, including photos, from family members and close 
family friends of the victims. 
 
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Gordon presented the testimony of six expert witnesses—a 
former prison warden, a neuropsychologist, a neurocognitive 
imaging specialist, a neurologist, a clinical pharmacologist, and a 
clinical and forensic psychologist—and that of Gordon’s sister, 
Theresa Gordon.  Several of the experts concluded that Gordon 
might have brain damage from the extensive abuse he endured as a 
child.  The jury heard evidence that Gordon’s IQ as measured when 
he was in the second grade was 80, and that a more recent adult IQ 
test had returned a score of 70.6  Gordon’s records showed a variety 
of mental health diagnoses, including schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder depressive type, bipolar disorder, psychosis not otherwise 
specified (NOA), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
Gordon’s sister testified to extensive emotional, verbal, physical, 
and sexual abuse and neglect that she and her brother endured at 
the hands of their father with the tacit consent of their mother.  On 
 
 
6.  No specific IQ score automatically establishes that an 
individual is intellectually disabled.  Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 
723 (2014).  To be barred from receiving the death penalty due to 
intellectual disability, a defendant must exhibit (1) significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning, and (2) concurrent 
deficits in adaptive behavior, (3) that shall have manifested before 
age 18.  § 921.137(1) Fla. Stat. (2013). 
 
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rebuttal, the State called Gordon’s father David Michael Gordon, 
who denied that he had ever abused his children. 
The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the four aggravating factors asserted by the State existed and that 
those aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances 
and recommended that Gordon receive the death penalty. 
In its sentencing order the trial court found that all four 
aggravating factors applied to both murders.  Additionally, the trial 
court found that Gordon established the following mitigating 
circumstances and assigned them the following weight: he was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
(little weight); he suffered from mental illness (little weight); he 
suffered from toxic stress syndrome (moderate weight); he was not 
receiving proper treatment (little weight); he was abused and 
abandoned by his family (little weight); and he was smoking 
synthetic cannabinoids7 on the date of the murders (little weight). 
 
 
7.  Specifically,  the trial court found that Gordon was 
smoking K2 or “spice” the day of the murders, both of which are 
street names for synthetic cannabinoids.  This drug is ingested by 
smoking plant material that has been sprayed with additives or by 
using a liquid in an e-cigarette.  Synthetic Cannabinoids (K2/Spice) 
 
 
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Next, the trial court found that Gordon failed to establish the 
following mitigating circumstances: his capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirement of law was substantially impaired; he was an 
accomplice in the murders and his participation was relatively 
minor; and there were other factors in his background or life or the 
circumstances of the offense that should mitigate his sentence. 
Based on the trial court’s review of the evidence, its weighing 
of the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, its 
consideration of the jury’s sentencing recommendation, and noting 
that it would reach the same conclusion even in the absence of the 
aggravator of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, the trial court 
sentenced Gordon to death for each murder on February 7, 2020.  
Gordon appealed his convictions and sentences on February 24, 
2020.  We denied Gordon’s motion to reconstruct the record to 
reflect the races of certain venire members who later served on the 
jury.  This appeal followed. 
 
DrugFacts, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse (July 2020), 
https://nida.nih.gov/publications/drugfacts/synthetic-
cannabinoids-k2spice. 
 
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II 
Gordon raises seven issues on appeal and the State raises one. 
Two issues raised by Gordon—the State’s strike of juror Kimberly 
James and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions for attempted first-degree murder of Deputy Sheriff 
Quintana-Rivera and Officer Nickels—merit individualized 
discussion. 
A 
Gordon argues that the State was impermissibly motivated by 
race when it struck venireperson Kimberly James from the jury, 
and that its proffered reasons for the strike were pretextual.  We 
reject this argument as improperly preserved. 
In State v. Johnson, we said, “[T]he party opposing a 
peremptory strike must make a specific objection to the proponent's 
proffered race-neutral reason for the strike, if contested, to preserve 
the claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the proffered 
reason was genuine.”  295 So. 3d 710, 716 (Fla. 2020).  A trial 
court’s decision will only be reversed if it is clearly erroneous.  
Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 320 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he trial court’s 
decision turns primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be 
 
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affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” (quoting Melbourne, 
679 So. 2d 759, 764-65 (Fla. 1996))).  Therefore, the defendant 
must create a record containing the legal grounds for his or her 
objection.  See Johnson, 295 So. 3d at 714-15 (“If the opponent of a 
peremptory strike fails to challenge as pretext a proffered reason 
found to be race-neutral, then the trial court is usually left with 
nothing other than the legal presumption that the proponent 
exercised the strike for a genuine reason.”). 
Here, Gordon objected that the State’s proffered reasons for its 
strike—first, James’s “I’m not God” comment, and second, her 
statement during voir dire that her first cousin had been sentenced 
to 25 years in prison—were “insufficiently race-neutral.”  But the 
State’s proffered reasons were facially race-neutral, and Gordon’s 
objection did not put the trial court on notice of the argument he 
advances here—that the State’s facially race-neutral reasons were 
pretextual, and why.  “[P]roper preservation requires the following 
three steps from a party: (1) a timely, contemporaneous objection; 
(2) a legal ground for the objection; and (3) ‘[i]n order for an 
argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific 
contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or 
 
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motion below.’”  Fleitas v. State, 3 So. 3d 351, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008) (quoting Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 940 (Fla. 2005)).  
Here, the second two requirements were lacking.  The trial court 
must be presented with a reason to doubt the genuineness of the 
State’s proffered race-neutral reason for a strike, for it is the 
genuineness of the reason upon which the trial court must rule.  
For this Court to meaningfully review a trial court’s decision to 
allow a strike, the objecting party must specify its objection by 
giving some reasoning as to why the proffered reason for the strike 
is pretextual.  Was it, for example, a consideration that would have 
applied to other members of the venire, some of whom were seated?  
Or was it a consideration that would not bear on the juror’s ability 
to weigh the evidence as required?  That cannot be said of Gordon’s 
counsel’s objection here, which did not put the trial court on notice 
as to the reason the challenged strike was allegedly a pretext for 
racial animus, and therefore did not contain a proper legal ground 
for the objection or a specific contention for us to review. 
Next, Gordon compares James’s voir dire responses with the 
responses of allegedly similarly situated venire members who 
ultimately served on the jury.  But he makes this comparison for 
 
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the first time before us; Gordon failed to preserve for review a 
comparative analysis of venire members’ responses to voir dire. 
We have said that, for this Court to compare voir dire 
responses in a Melbourne appeal, the party must have raised the 
issue to the trial court.  In Hoskins v. State, we found that, because 
“at trial Hoskins did not mention [the similarly situated] jurors . . . 
his [Melbourne] claim is waived as to these jurors.”  965 So. 2d 1, 
10 (Fla. 2007).  Likewise, in King v. State, we said that, “[a]lthough 
King now contends that there were other jurors on the panel who 
[were similarly situated], defense counsel did not raise that 
challenge before the trial court.  Accordingly, that challenge has 
also been waived.”  89 So. 3d 209, 230 (Fla. 2012). 
It was Gordon’s burden to preserve a comparison of venire 
members’ responses for our review.  Despite multiple opportunities 
during jury selection, he failed to make that comparison, or to 
provide, in a manner amenable to our review, an explanation for 
why the State’s proffered reasons for striking James were 
pretextual.  For example, when the State accepted without objection 
each of the venire members who gave similar voir dire responses to 
James, Gordon could have noted that the State did not strike 
 
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people who had similar, or closer, relationships with incarcerated 
people than James.  Or, when the trial court asked Gordon to 
accept the final jury panel, he could have analyzed any comparable 
responses from other members of the panel.  Instead, Gordon made 
a blanket statement purporting to preserve all race- and gender-
based challenges made during voir dire. 
On this record, which contains no reasoned, preserved 
objection regarding the genuineness of the State’s proffered race-
neutral reason for a peremptory strike, we have no basis upon 
which to revisit the trial court’s decision to seat the contested juror. 
B 
Gordon’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails 
because competent, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict 
finding him guilty of two counts of attempted first-degree murder 
with a vehicle.  To sustain a conviction on appeal, there must be 
“substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict” with all 
evidence viewed “in the light most favorable to the State.”  Bush v. 
State, 295 So. 3d 179, 200-01 (Fla. 2020).  Evidence is competent if 
it is “sufficiently relevant and material”; evidence is substantial if 
there is enough that “a reasonable mind would accept [the evidence] 
 
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as adequate to support a conclusion.”  De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 
2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957), cited with approval in Bush, 295 So. 3d at 
201. If “a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” then the 
conviction must be upheld.  Bush, 295 So. 3d at 201 (quoting 
Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019)). 
Of the three elements of attempted first-degree murder,8 
Gordon says that the State failed to produce enough evidence to 
prove one: that his actions were premeditated.  Gordon is correct in 
describing the scene of the crime as chaotic, especially after he 
burst through the garage door.  Both the officers he was later 
convicted of attempting to kill testified that they could not see who 
was driving the car—implying that Gordon could not see them 
either.  Gordon argues that the evidence adduced at trial supports 
 
8.  The three elements of attempted first-degree murder are: 
“(1) an act intending to cause death that went beyond just thinking 
or talking about it; (2) premeditated design to kill; and (3) 
commission of an act which would have resulted in the death of the 
victim except that someone prevented the defendant from killing the 
victim or the defendant failed to do so.”  Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 
17, 21 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds in Valdes v. State, 
3 So. 3d 1067, 1077 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 6.2; §§ 
777.04, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (2015). 
 
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his claim, that he was trying to escape, just as readily as it 
supports the State’s claim, that he purposefully attempted to hit the 
officers as he drove. 
But this argument ultimately fails because it rests on a 
misunderstanding of what constitutes and what establishes 
premeditation.  Premeditation is “understood as requiring proof that 
the defendant was aware of the consequences of the actions that 
caused death, and that the defendant had the opportunity for 
reflection prior to committing the fatal act.”  Sparre v. State, 164 So. 
3d 1183, 1200 (Fla. 2015).  Premeditation does not require lengthy 
deliberation on the part of the actor; the intent to commit 
potentially fatal acts “may be formed a moment before the act but 
must exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection as to 
the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result of 
that act.”  Brown v. State, 126 So. 3d 211, 221 (Fla. 2013) (quoting 
Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).  While Gordon’s 
arguments center around his state of mind as he drove the car, 
there is competent, substantial evidence to support the jury’s 
conclusion that Gordon had already formed the requisite intent 
before he left the garage. 
 
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Specifically, the State presented ample evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that Gordon had sufficient time to reflect upon his 
plan to flee and realize the danger to others inherent in his plan.  
Gordon had been part of a high-speed police chase in the hours 
before the murders, so he knew officers were actively pursuing him.  
The jury heard that officers had shone flashlights through the 
windows of 618 Astor Drive onto the women’s bodies, then shouted 
to one another outside of the house upon discovering the victims’ 
bodies.  From this evidence, the jury could permissibly infer that 
Gordon knew officers had tracked him down and surrounded the 
house.  See Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 578 (Fla. 2007) 
(discussing evidence the jury could have relied on to make the 
inference that the killing was premeditated); Bargesser v. State, 116 
So. 11, 12 (Fla. 1928) (“The jury are the judges of the 
reasonableness, probability, and credibility of the explanation 
offered by the defendant.”); Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 
U.S. 140, 156 (1979) (“Inferences and presumptions are a staple of 
our adversary system of factfinding.  It is often necessary for the 
trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime—
that is, an ‘ultimate’ or ‘elemental’ fact—from the existence of one or 
 
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more ‘evidentiary’ or ‘basic’ facts.”).  Still, in an attempt to escape, 
Gordon plowed the victims’ car through the closed garage door with 
no warning.  On this record, we cannot say that the jury lacked 
competent, substantial evidence to support its conclusion as to 
premeditation. 
C 
 
We briefly address the other issues raised by the parties.  
We reaffirm our decision in Lawrence v. State that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require comparative proportionality review of 
death sentences.  308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the 
mitigating evidence in this case.  A trial judge need not mention 
every relevant piece of evidence in mitigation to properly weigh 
aggravating and mitigating factors under our laws and the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006) (“In 
aggregate, our precedents confer upon defendants the right to 
present sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing 
decision and oblige sentencers to consider that information in 
determining the appropriate sentence.  The thrust of our mitigation 
jurisprudence ends here.”)  A sentencing order is valid when the 
 
- 26 - 
sentencing judge “expressly evaluate[d] . . . each statutory and non-
statutory mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 
Woodel v. State, 804 So. 2d 316, 326 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Ferrell v. 
State, 653 So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 1995)).  While judges cannot merely 
list out the mitigators with no analysis, neither must they 
individually discuss each and every piece of evidence submitted for 
each mitigator.  See Woodel, 804 So. 2d at 327 (rejecting a list-like 
sentencing order that engaged in no analysis and failed to assign 
weight to aggravators or mitigators). 
In Lowe v. State, we upheld the trial court’s weighing of 
mitigators where “it [was] apparent that the trial court considered 
each of the mitigating circumstances proposed by [the defendant] 
and determined that such circumstances hardly distinguished [the 
defendant] from other members of society, were supported by 
‘underwhelming’ evidence, or were in fact not mitigating.”  259 So. 
3d 23, 64 (Fla. 2018).  Here, too, the trial court identified the 
evidence that supported its conclusion regarding the assigned 
weight of each mitigator.  It balanced that weight against that of the 
aggravating factors in the prescribed manner.  On this record, we 
 
- 27 - 
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evaluation of 
aggravation and mitigation. 
We have previously held that the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment does not require a 
categorical bar against the execution of persons who suffer from 
any form of mental illness or brain damage.  McCoy v. State, 132 
So. 3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2013).  The Eighth Amendment broadly 
protects two classes from execution: people who are intellectually 
disabled and minors.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(intellectual disabilities); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(minors).  Gordon’s argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
his execution because he is mentally ill and brain damaged is 
without merit.  At trial, the testifying expert diagnosed Gordon with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), PTSD from severe 
childhood abuse, and schizoaffective disorder depressive type.  The 
trial court heard evidence that Gordon tested to an IQ of 70, 
borderline to the threshold for an intellectual disability.  It also 
heard testimony from experts that brain imaging showed Gordon 
had suffered extensive traumatic brain injury earlier in life, and 
that he likely suffers from chronic traumatic encephalopathy, which 
 
- 28 - 
is caused by repeated head trauma and leads to neurological 
deterioration. 
Yet we have held that, for the purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment, the existence of a traumatic brain injury does not 
reduce an individual’s culpability to the extent they become 
immune from capital punishment.  Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 
26-27 (Fla. 2010) (emphasizing this Court has repeatedly rejected 
the argument “that defendants with mental illness must be treated 
similarly to those with mental retardation because both conditions 
result in reduced culpability”); Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 867 
(Fla. 2007) (“To the extent that Connor is arguing that he cannot be 
executed because of mental conditions that are not insanity or 
mental retardation, the issue has been resolved adversely to his 
position.”).9 
 
 
9.  See also Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013) 
(“Additionally, in [Carroll’s] habeas corpus proceeding in federal 
court, Carroll claimed that he is mentally ill and, under the 
rationale of Atkins, persons who are unable to control their conduct 
due to mental illness act with lesser moral culpability and should 
be exempt from execution.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to extend Atkins to mentally ill persons absent a decision 
from the United States Supreme Court barring execution of the 
mentally ill.  Thus, Carroll’s claim in this proceeding that he is less 
 
 
- 29 - 
The evidence that Gordon committed the murders of both 
Patricia Moran and Deborah Royal is sufficient to sustain his 
convictions.  In appeals contesting a death penalty sentence, 
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(a)(5) and our precedent 
create “a mandatory obligation to determine the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain [a] homicide conviction.”  Truehill v. State, 211 
So. 3d 930, 951 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 
184 (Fla. 2007)).  In conducting a sufficiency review, we view the 
evidence “in the light most favorable to the State to determine 
whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Cozzie v. State, 
225 So. 3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 
2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006)).  Here, there is competent, substantial 
evidence to support Gordon’s convictions for first-degree murder.  
The DNA analysis, witness testimony, police dog tracking, and 
Gordon being the only living person found within the police 
 
culpable because of his mental illness and should be treated 
similarly to the classes of persons protected by Atkins and Roper is 
procedurally barred.  Even if not untimely and procedurally barred, 
this Court has rejected similar claims on the merits in the past.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 
- 30 - 
perimeter all strongly support the jury’s verdict that Gordon 
murdered Patricia Moran and Deborah Royal.  Accordingly, 
sufficient evidence exists to sustain his homicide convictions. 
III 
 
We affirm Gordon’s convictions and sentences of death. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, and GROSSHANS, JJ., 
concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v. 
State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned 
this Court’s decades-long practice of proportionality review in direct 
appeal cases, I can only concur in the result. 
 
Further, because I agree that Gordon failed to properly 
preserve the Melbourne10 issue with respect to juror James, I 
concur in the result. 
 
 
10.  Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996). 
 
- 31 - 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County, 
Jalal A. Harb, Judge 
Case No. 532015CF000476A000XX 
 
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, 
Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. 
Buchwalter, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee