Case Title: LORA GILSTRAP; CRISS CORALLINO; CAROLE CORALLINO; DAVE GILSTRAP; IRIS HEHN; and JEANARAE BOOTH f/k/a Jeanarae Shannon Herbert V. JUNE EISELE WARREN TRUST; JEAN EARL EISELE; WILLIAM EISELE FAMILY MINERAL TRUST; MARION SCOTT; MARY SCOTT; JAMES SCOTT; PATTY SCOTT; DONALD SCOTT; VONONA SCOTT; MARILYN STORMS; and DOUGLAS SCOTT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
LORA GILSTRAP; CRISS CORALLINO; CAROLE CORALLINO; DAVE GILSTRAP; IRIS HEHN; and JEANARAE BOOTH f/k/a Jeanarae Shannon Herbert V. JUNE EISELE WARREN TRUST; JEAN EARL EISELE; WILLIAM EISELE FAMILY MINERAL TRUST; MARION SCOTT; MARY SCOTT; JAMES SCOTT; PATTY SCOTT; DONALD SCOTT; VONONA SCOTT; MARILYN STORMS; and DOUGLAS SCOTT2005 WY 21106 P.3d 858Case Number: 04-42Decided: 02/23/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                

 
 
LORA 
GILSTRAP; CRISS CORALLINO;

CAROLE 
CORALLINO; DAVE GILSTRAP;

IRIS 
HEHN; and JEANARAE BOOTH,

f/k/a 
Jeanarae Shannon Herbert,

 
 
Appellants

(Plantiffs) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
JUNE EISELEWARREN TRUST; JEAN EARL

EISELE; 
WILLIAM EISELE FAMILY MINERAL

TRUST; 
MARION SCOTT; MARY SCOTT;

JAMES 
SCOTT; PATTY SCOTT; DONALD SCOTT;

VONONA 
SCOTT; MARILYN STORMS; and

DOUGLAS 
SCOTT,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants) 
.

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Thomas E. Lubnau, II and Nathan S. McLeland of Lubnau, Bailey & 
Dumbrill, P.C., Gillette, 
Wyoming.   

 
 
Representing 
Appellees June Eisele Warren Trust, Jean Earl Eisele, William Eisele Family 
Mineral Trust, Marion Scott and Mary Scott:

            
Randall T. Cox, Gillette, Wyoming.  

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellees James Scott, Patty Scott, Donald Scott, Vonona Scott, Marilyn Storms 
and Douglas Scott:

James L. 
Edwards and Kurt A. Infanger of Stevens, Edwards, Hallock & Carpenter, P.C., 
Gillette, Wyoming.  

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Ret.

 
 
 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After their 
mother died in 1938, each of three siblings, Ray E. Gilstrap (Ray), William P. 
Gilstrap (William) and Daisy Pearl Williams (Daisy), received an undivided 
one-third interest in a 680-acre ranch with a 320-acre mineral estate pursuant 
to her will.  However, the siblings 
agreed to an alternative distribution of the estate:  Ray received the entire surface estate, 
Ray and William each received one-half of the mineral estate, and Daisy received 
other assets.  William and Daisy 
subsequently executed a warranty deed purporting to convey the entire 680-acre 
ranch to Ray, and reserving to each of them a one-third interest in the mineral 
estate.  In 2003, William and 
Daisy's heirs (appellants) initiated a quiet title action claiming an interest 
in the minerals.  The district court 
granted Ray's successors' (appellees) motion for summary judgment finding the 
appellants had no interest in the mineral estate.1  We reverse.  

 
 
 

 
[¶2]      The appellants 
raise the following issues on appeal:

 
 

A.       
Did the 
District Court misapply the Duhig 
doctrine as stated in Duhig v. 
Peavey-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940), and adopted by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1959), when 
it purported to enforce the warranty so as to grant to Ray E. Gilstrap more than 
was necessary to make him whole?

 
 

B.       
Did the 
District Court err by not examining the objective knowledge of the parties at 
the time the deed was executed, based on the documents of record, as a specific 
fact and circumstance to discern the objective intent of the 
parties?

 
 
The 
Eisele appellees state the issues as:

 
 

1.                  
What is 
the meaning of an attempt to reserve all of the grantor's estate, or more than 
he owns, in the same instrument by which he conveys and warrants such 
estate?

 
 
2.         
May the Appellants assert a new theory of the case after entry of 
judgment, asking this appellate body to reform the deed, when the Appellants did 
not petition for, nor prove, reformation in the trial 
court?

 
 
The 
Scott appellees present a single issue:

 
 
Were the 
appellees entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law?

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Mrs. Sigel 
Gilstrap died in August of 1938.  In 
her will, she left a 680-acre surface estate with a 320-acre mineral estate to 
her three children, Ray, William and Daisy.  The siblings agreed, however, to divide 
the property differently than their mother decreed in her will.  In 1939, pursuant to the siblings' 
agreement, the district court entered a decree of distribution.  The decree ordered that Ray receive the 
entire 680-acre surface estate and one-half of the 320-acre mineral estate, 
William receive the other one-half of the mineral estate and other assets, and 
Daisy receive other assets, but no real property.  

 
 
[¶4]      In November of 
1940, William, Daisy and their spouses executed a warranty deed purporting to 
convey the entire property, both surface and minerals, to Ray, as grantee, for 
$1,500 consideration.  However, the 
deed also provided as follows:

 
 
            
Excepting and reserving however to Daisy Pearl Williams, formerly Daisy 
Pearl Rose, Gridley, Butte 
County, California, an undivided one-third interest, and to 
William Preston Gilstrap of Gillette, Campbell County, Wyoming, an undivided 
one-third interest, in and to all oil, gas and other mineral rights in said 
lands not heretofore reserved by the United 
States.

 
 
[¶5]      In February 2003, 
William and Daisy's heirs brought a quiet title action claiming an interest in 
the mineral estate.  They alleged 
the parties to the deed intended to vest a one-third mineral interest in each 
sibling.  However, they conceded 
that because Ray did not join as a grantor to the warranty deed, his one-half 
interest remained unaffected.  Ray's 
successors counterclaimed and asked that the title to all of the mineral 
interest be quieted in their favor.  
They claimed the warranty deed conveyed the entire mineral estate to Ray 
because Daisy's attempt to reserve an interest she did not own should be 
attributed to William, causing his reservation to exceed the one-half interest 
he owned.  Thus, they claimed they 
were entitled to the entire mineral estate pursuant to the rule established in 
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940).  Both parties moved for summary 
judgment.  

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court granted the defendants' motions and denied the plaintiffs', ruling that, 
pursuant to the Duhig rule, Ray's successors own the entire mineral 
estate.  William and Daisy's heirs 
appeal the order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment.

 
 
 
 

 
 

[¶7]      The district 
court resolved this case by granting and denying cross motions for summary 
judgment.  Generally, a denial of a 
motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order.  Wolter v. Equitable Resources Energy 
Co., 979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo. 1999).  However, as we stated in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com 
LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 356 (Wyo. 2000), there are exceptions to 
this rule.  When the district court 
grants one party's motion for summary judgment and denies the opposing party's 
motion for summary judgment and the district court's decision completely 
resolves the case, both the grant and the denial of the motions for summary 
judgment are subject to appeal.  
Id.  The district court disposed of the 
entire case in a single order by denying the appellant's motion and granting the 
appellees' motions.  We will, 
therefore, review the entire matter.  
 

 
 
[¶8]      Our standard for 
reviewing summary judgments is well settled:

 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue 
as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a 
judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a 
disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the 
parties have asserted. We examine the record from the vantage point most 
favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the 
benefit of all the favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower 
court.  We do not accord any 
deference to the district court's decision on issues of 
law.

 
 

Bixler v. 
Oro Mgmt., L.L.C., 2004 WY 
29, ¶10, 86 P.3d 843, ¶10 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted).  
Neither party disputes the relevant facts of this case, and thus, this 
Court must only determine whether summary judgment was proper as a matter of 
law.  Cities Service Oil and Gas 
Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1992).  

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶9]      The ultimate 
issue to be decided in this appeal is what portion of the mineral estate the 
1940 warranty deed conveyed to Ray.  
The district court concluded that because Daisy owned no interest in the 
mineral estate, her reservation of one-third failed and was attributed to 
William, thus causing William to reserve two-thirds when he only owned 
one-half.  On the basis of that 
conclusion, the district court applied the rule that where a grantor conveys and 
reserves an interest in minerals in the same instrument, and there is a prior 
outstanding interest which is not excepted from the operation of the deed so 
that effect may not be given to both the grant and the reservation, the 
attempted reservation fails because the conveyance is necessary to make the 
grantee whole.  R. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas, p. 92  (3d ed. 1991).

 
 
[¶10]   The appellants argue the deed's 
language is unambiguous and evidences William and Daisy's intent that they each 
reserved one-third of the minerals and only granted Ray a one-third 
interest.  They argue that to give 
effect to the plain language of the deed we must look at both Daisy's and 
William's attempted reservation.  In 
addition, appellants claim the objective evidence of Ray's knowledge of his own 
outstanding interest should prevent him from receiving all of the minerals as a 
result of this deed because the parties could not have intended that 
result.  However, the appellants 
then offer two possible interpretations of what the parties might have 
intended.  Appellants suggest the 
parties to the deed could have intended that William reserved a full one-third 
interest or they could have intended that he reserved only one-third of his 
one-half interest.  In the latter 
case, they suggest the parties could have intended that Daisy also reserved 
one-third of one-half, although they do not explain out of whose interest that 
would have been carved.  In 
addition, they point out that it does not matter what interest Daisy may have 
acquired, because she left her estate to William. 

 
 
[¶11]   The appellees agree with the 
district court's ruling.  Further, 
they argue the appellants are essentially claiming the deed should be reformed, 
a claim that was not made to the district court.

 
 

[¶12]   We interpret a warranty deed like a contract "from 
specific language of the deed," and "begin by looking at the instrument 
itself."  Bixler, 
¶16.  We must first examine the terms of the 
deed and give them their plain and ordinary meaning.  Plain meaning is that "meaning which 
[the] language would convey to reasonable persons at the time and place of its 
use."  Id., 
¶14.  When the provisions 
in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four 
corners" of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties.  Determining the parties' intent is our 
prime focus in interpreting or construing a contract.  Boley v. 
Greenough, 2001 WY 
47, ¶11, 22 P.3d 854, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001). 

 
 

[¶13]   Although substantial disagreement 
exists over the meaning of this deed, neither party suggests the deed's language 
is ambiguous.  Differing interpretations of contracts alone do 
not constitute ambiguity requiring extrinsic 
evidence.  Newman v. RAG Wyoming 
Land Co., 2002 WY 132, ¶11, 53 P.3d 540, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).  Said another way, a contract is not 
ambiguous only because the parties urge varying interpretations.  In re:  Estate of Corpening, 2001 WY 18, 
¶10, 19 P.3d 514, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).  
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be decided by the 
court.  Id., 
¶8.  In interpreting unambiguous 
contracts involving mineral interests, we have consistently looked to 
surrounding facts and circumstances, the relations of the parties, the subject 
matter of the contract, and the apparent purpose of making the contract. 
 Boley, ¶11.  See also Newman, 
¶11; 
Samuel 
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 32:7 (4th ed. 1999) 
(footnotes omitted).  In the absence 
of any ambiguity, the contract will be 
enforced according to its terms because no construction is appropriate.  Caballo Coal Co. v. Fidelity 
Exploration & Production Co., 2004 WY 6, ¶11, 84 P.3d 311, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶14]   In deeds with express reservations 
or exceptions, "the key question is, not what the grantor purported to retain 
for himself, but what he purported to give to the grantee."  1 Howard R. Williams and Charles J. 
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 311, p. 580.34 (Rev. 2003).  

 
 
Specifically, there are three quanta of interest that 
must be ascertained in order to construe a deed that contains a 
reservation.  First, the quantum of 
interest specified in the granting clause must be determined.  If the granting clause does not 
expressly limit the grant to a lesser amount, then the quantum of interest 
purportedly conveyed is 100 percent of all right, title and interest.  The next step in this process is to 
ascertain the quantum of interest reserved in a subsequent clause. 

 
 
The final quantum to be determined is that quantum of 
interest the grantee is to receive under the deed.  This amount can be calculated by 
subtracting the quantum of interest reserved to the grantor from the quantum of 
interest conveyed in the granting clause.

 
 

Cole v. 
Minor, 518 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ala. 1987) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶15]   In the deed in this case, the 
quantum of interest in the granting clause is 100% of all title, right and 
interest, including mineral rights, in the described property.  The language of the granting clause is 
clear and unambiguous and describes the full 680-acres.  When the surface is granted without 
reference to the mineral estate, it is presumed the mineral estate is 
included.  Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 779 P.2d 1180 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶16]   
Next, we turn to the reservation.  
The grantors each expressly reserved an undivided one-third interest "in 
and to all oil, gas and other mineral rights in said lands . . . ."  The reservation clause reflects the 
grantors' intention to reserve two-thirds of the minerals collectively and, 
therefore, the intention to grant one-third. 

 
 
[¶17]   In situations where a party 
attempts to grant more property than he or she owns, that excess grant is a 
nullity and the party is simply deemed to have conveyed all of the interest 
owned.  Williams and Meyers, supra, at 580.  However, if such a grant is made with a 
warranty deed, the grantor is warranting, or promising, that he owns what the 
deed purports to convey and if he does not, he is liable for a breach of 
warranty.  Id.  Where a mineral owner makes a grant and 
also attempts to reserve an interest, but does not own a sufficient interest to 
cover both grants because of an outstanding interest, some jurisdictions have 
adopted the rule established in Duhig 
which requires the reservation to fail to the extent necessary to effect the 
grant.  Williams and Meyers, supra, at 580.29.

 
 
In 
Duhig, a third party owned an outstanding 1/2 mineral interest in certain 
land and the grantor owned the surface and the remaining 1/2 mineral interest. 
The grantor conveyed the surface to the grantee by warranty deed with a 
reservation of 1/2 interest in all the minerals under the surface. The grantor 
and grantee both claimed the 1/2 mineral interest that was not owned by the 
third party. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the grantee owned the 
surface and a 1/2 mineral interest, the third party owned the outstanding 1/2 
mineral interest, and the grantor owned nothing.

 
 

Acoma 
Oil Corp. v. Wilson, 471 N.W.2d 476, 479 (N.D. 1991).  The 
effect of Duhig is that if a grantor does not own a large enough mineral 
interest to satisfy both the grant and the reservation, the grant must be 
satisfied first because the obligation incurred by the grant is superior to the 
reservation.  Id.

 
 
[¶18]   This Court adopted 
Duhig in Body v. 
McDonald, 334 P.2d 513 
( 
Wyo. 
1959).  In Body, 
the grantors held only a three-quarters mineral interest, a one-quarter 
interest having been previously reserved to a third party.  They transferred the property by a 
warranty deed that described the entire mineral interest and reserved a 
one-quarter mineral interest.   
We held the grantors were estopped from claiming that the grantees 
received less than three-quarters of the mineral interest even though the 
grantees had actual notice of the outstanding one-quarter interest.  Although the grantee was aware of the 
outstanding one-quarter interest, we held that notice is irrelevant as the 
grantor may warrant title even when he does not own what he is warranting.  Id. at 
515.

 
 
[¶19]   Two rationales support the result 
reached in both Duhig and Body.  First, because the deed purported to 
reserve the same percentage interest as had been previously reserved, the 
reservation clause could simply be construed as having withdrawn the previously 
reserved interest not owned by the grantor from the operation of the deed.  Williams and Meyers, supra, at 580.31-32.  
A second rationale relied upon in both cases is based upon a two-step 
reasoning.  First, the properly 
construed deed conveyed a one-half interest in Duhig and a three-quarter interest in Body.  Second, the reservation clause attempted 
to retain an interest in the grantor which was in addition to the outstanding 
interest in a third party and that breached the grantor's warranty of title to 
the conveyed interest.  Analogizing 
to the doctrine of estoppel by deed, the courts in both cases held the grantors 
were estopped from asserting the reservation against the grantees.  Thus, the grantees owned what was 
purported to have been conveyed and the reservation failed.  Id. at 580.33.  As noted by Williams and Meyers, "the 
key question is, not what the grantor purported to retain for himself, but what 
he purported to give to the grantee." Id. at 580.34.

 
 
[¶20]   Both courts and commentators have 
questioned, criticized, and distinguished the so-called Duhig rule, focusing particularly on 
whether or not it gives effect to the intent of the parties and whether its 
application results in the grantee getting more than what he bargained for.  Williams & Meyers, supra, at 
580.37.  These concerns arise most 
often where the grantee has actual or constructive notice of the outstanding 
interest and, therefore, arguably is not expecting a conveyance of 100% of the 
mineral interest less the grantor's purported reservation.  Some courts faced with this situation 
have refused to apply Duhig and have 
instead reached a result they find more consistent with the parties' 
intent.  Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1979); 
Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981).  However, that 
approach raises questions of subjective deed interpretation where reformation 
based upon extrinsic evidence may be the proper remedy, versus objective deed 
construction, which provides certainty for title examiners and the 
marketplace.  Willis H. Ellis, Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 Rocky 
Mt. Min. L. Inst., p. 954 (1983); Richard C. Maxwell, Some Comments on North Dakota Oil and Gas 
Law-Three Cases from the Eighties, 58 N.Dak. L. Rev., p. 439 (1982).  In Body, this Court specifically rejected 
the argument that notice should defeat the application of the rule stating, 
"learned counsel have failed to distinguish between an estoppel in pais and an 
estoppel by deed."  Body, 334 P.2d  at 517.  Williams and Meyers points out that 
constructive notice exists in all cases involving recorded title and that breach 
of warranty actions and estoppel by deed are not barred by actual or 
constructive notice.  Williams and 
Meyers, supra, 580.37 and 580.45.

 
 
[¶21]   Before applying the accepted rules 
of construction to this deed, we note that the facts in this case differ in 
three important ways from those in other cases we found in researching this 
issue:  first, in this case, the 
deed contained two grantors which raised the question of whether they each 
warranted ownership of the full amount of the grant; second, one of the grantors 
who reserved a one-third interest owned no interest; and third, the grantee 
seeking to enforce the warranty is a co-tenant of one of the grantors and, thus, 
the owner of the outstanding interest.  
With regard to the scope of the warranty in the context of multiple 
grantors, the general assumption is that the warranty obligation is joint, not 
several, unless specific language is included in the deed indicating that each 
grantor is warranting only his or her individual interest.  Windell v. Miller, 687 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1997).  In this case, the 
deed contains no such language of "severance", thus, William and Daisy are 
jointly liable for the warranty.  

 
 
[¶22]   Before determining whether a breach 
of warranty occurred, thus triggering application of the Duhig rule, we must first determine what 
interest was conveyed.  This 
particular warranty deed unambiguously conveyed the entire 680-acre estate and 
reserved to William and Daisy separately an undivided one-third interest in the 
minerals.  That language is 
clear.  Giving effect to the plain 
language of the conveyance and the reservation, the deed purported to convey to 
Ray one-third of the mineral interest. 

 
 
[¶23]   However, the district court, 
considering facts outside the four corners of the deed, determined that because 
Daisy had no interest in the minerals at the time the deed was executed, her 
reservation was a nullity.  It then 
concluded the interest unsuccessfully reserved to her should be attributed to 
William causing him to reserve two-thirds to himself, an amount exceeding his 
one-half interest, and resulting in a breach of warranty.  Applying Duhig under those determinations, the 
district court concluded the entire reservation failed and Ray received all of 
the mineral interest.  The Scott 
appellees suggest another approach to Daisy's reservation that reaches the same 
result. They contend that because the reservation to Daisy "has no meaning," and 
William granted 100% of the minerals and only reserved one-third to himself, the 
deed, in effect, conveyed two-thirds to Ray. However, because William only owned 
one-half, he, in effect, conveyed all he owned and the reservation 
failed.

 
 
[¶24]   We find both interpretations of 
Daisy's attempted reservation flawed.  
Faced with a dearth of guidance from other jurisdictions concerning the 
impact of one grantor's failed reservation on the other grantor and the grantee, 
we examine first the nature of the attempted reservation and why it failed.  While, as we held in Simpson v. Kistler, 713 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 
1986), William could have used a reservation to carve out an interest from his 
own to grant to Daisy, a stranger to the title, we find nothing in the language 
of the deed to indicate such an intent.  
She cannot reserve what she does not own, and, consequently, her 
attempted reservation failed.  
However, while Daisy's reservation may have been ineffective in creating 
any interest in her, it cannot be ignored when considering what the parties 
intended Ray to receive under this deed that purported to convey to him only a 
one-third interest.  Both the 
district court's reasoning, which added the failed reservation to William's 
reservation, and the interpretation urged by the Scott appellees, which added it 
to the interest conveyed to the grantee, require us to ignore the face of the 
deed, which purports to grant only a one-third interest to Ray.  We find no authority to support either 
rationale.  Instead, as recognized 
in commentary and analysis of Duhig 
and its progeny, the rule that imposes the risk of failure of title on the 
grantor was aimed at protecting the interest the deed purports to convey to the 
grantee.  We find no precedent to 
support giving the grantee more than the deed itself granted.  

 
 
[¶25]   Neither the doctrine of estoppel by 
deed nor enforcement of a warranty, which are both underpinnings of the Duhig rule, create an interest in the 
grantee greater than the deed itself would have done.  "Estoppel by deed is a defensive 
doctrine which cannot be used to create a right where none existed.  Its function is not to create rights but 
to preserve them.  Consequently, 
estoppel by deed cannot be used to confer upon the grantee a greater title than 
the deed would have conferred had it been effective."  Hawkins v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 
724 S.W.2d 878, 888 (Tex. App. 
1987) (citations omitted).  
Likewise, a warranty warrants only that purportedly conveyed by the 
language of the deed.  Ellis, 
supra, at 953.  Since the 
deed purported to convey a one-third interest to Ray, a one-third interest to 
Ray is the extent of William's warranty.  
That grant can be fulfilled out of William's one-half interest, leaving 
him with a one-sixth interest without breaching the warranty.  Williams and Meyers, supra, at 580.36.

 
 
[¶26]   Even if the district court or 
appellees were correct that Daisy's failed reservation meant William's grant or 
reservation was different than stated in the deed, an interpretation conveying 
all of the interest to Ray was supportable only if William intended to warrant 
to Ray that he owned 100% of the minerals.  
No such intent was shown given that Ray owned the outstanding 
interest.

 
 

[¶27]   The Duhig rule 
seeks to enforce the warranty of ownership of 100% created by a warranty deed, 
such as the one at issue here, which purports to convey the entire 
interest.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-2-103 provides that grantors of warranty deeds covenant that 1) the grantor 
was lawfully seized of an indefeasible fee simple estate in the property with 
the right to convey the same, 2) the estate was then free of encumbrances, and 
3) the grantor warrants possession of the property and promises to defend the 
title thereto "against all persons who may lawfully claim the same."  The grantee in a warranty deed may sue his or her 
immediate grantor for breach of covenant in the deed.  The ordinary remedy for breach of a 
covenant of title in a conveyance of land is an action at law for damages.  20 Am. Jur. 2D §102 (1995).  In a suit for breach of warranty of title, the 
burden is on the plaintiff to show eviction, or that which amounts to 
eviction, or 
an outstanding paramount title which he was obliged to yield to a third 
person.  Weiss v. 
Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 
584 S.E.2d 710, 712-713 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).  
Because he already owned the property, Ray did not and could not suffer 
any actual or constructive eviction as a result of the outstanding interest, 
thus a hypothetical breach of warranty claim by Ray would have failed.  

 
 
[¶28]   Consequently, we conclude where the 
grantee is a co-tenant and thus the owner of the outstanding interest, that 
interest must be subtracted from the interest purportedly warranted by the 
grantor.   We do not reach this 
conclusion because of the grantee's actual or constructive knowledge of the 
outstanding interest, which we observe could be found in any conveyance 
involving recorded title.  Neither 
do we reach this conclusion in reliance upon our interpretation of the parties' 
subjective intent, an approach that injects an unacceptable level of uncertainty 
into recorded title.  Instead, we 
simply hold that a grantee  may not 
bring an action for breach of warranty where he owns the outstanding interest 
that the grantor is alleged to have warranted.

 
 

[¶29]   In the only other case found in our 
research involving a grant to a co-tenant, Gilbertson, 301 N.W.2d 144, 
the 
court refused to interpret the deed as conveying 100% and apply Duhig 
because the grantee had actual and constructive notice of the outstanding 
interest.  The 
court concluded:

 
 
Because of the actual notice of the existence of the 
31 2/3 percent interest in the minerals to the grantees, the constructive notice 
of the five percent reservation of the minerals in the state, and the 50 percent 
reservation of the minerals in the deed by which the grantees received the 
surface, the grantees were clearly made aware that the grantors were not 
warranting title to 50 percent of the minerals plus the five percent of the 
minerals reserved by the state and the 31 2/3 percent of the minerals then owned 
by the grantees. Under these circumstances, there can be no implied warranty 
that the grantors are warranting what they have reserved. 

 
 

Id. 
at 148 
(citation omitted).  The reasoning 
of the court focused on actual and constructive notice and on the court's 
interpretation of what the parties intended. 

 
 
[¶30]   While we recognize determining the 
parties' intent is the focus of our effort when interpreting a deed, we find it 
difficult to speculate as to Ray, William and Daisy's intent in the case before 
us.  It could be argued they were 
trying to undo the agreement to distribute the estate differently than their 
mother's will had done and to cause each sibling to own a one-third interest in 
the minerals.  However, that 
interpretation is questionable given the fact that Ray did not join as a 
grantor, thus indicating he had no intent to convey any of his one-half interest 
to his siblings.  Appellees argue 
that because Ray paid $1,500 in consideration, a substantial amount in 1940, he 
must have intended to get all of the mineral interest.  However, no facts regarding the value of 
the mineral estate appear in the record to support that conclusion.  Nothing in the record or the language of 
the deed tells us why Daisy, who had no interest to grant or reserve, joined in 
the deed.  Extrinsic evidence of all 
of these theories may have been relevant in a claim for reformation due to 
mutual mistake.  However, no such 
claim was made.  Given the plain 
language of the deed, we see no reason to speculate as to the parties' 
subjective intent.

 
 
[¶31]   When we apply this holding 
regarding co-tenants to the two different treatments of Daisy's reservation 
suggested by the district court and the Scott appellees respectively, the result 
is the same as we reached by simply construing the plain language of the 
deed.  Even if Daisy's failed 
reservation is somehow attributed to William causing his attempted reservation 
to be two-thirds as suggested by the district court, he owns and warrants only 
one-half (having deducted his co-tenant's one-half interest) and the deed's 
plain language conveying one-third can be fully effected, and one-sixth remains 
with William.  If Daisy's failed 
reservation is added to the amount purportedly conveyed as suggested by the 
Scott appellees, the result exceeds the amount conveyed on the face of the deed 
and the amount warranted (one-half).  
William's attempted reservation of one-third can be given effect under 
the otherwise applicable Duhig-Body estoppel/warranty analysis by 
deducting his one-third reserved from the one-half he warrants, resulting in a 
reservation of one-sixth.  Giving 
effect to William's reservation of one-third does not violate Duhig-Body 
principles because the warranty is not breached, even though a part of the grant 
failsi.e. Ray does not receive two-thirds, but only one-third.  This result is more consistent with the 
party's likely intent since Ray cannot expect to receive a two-thirds interest 
because he already owns one-half.

 
 
[¶32]   Giving effect to the plain language 
of the deed, Ray is entitled to his one-third interest, which can be satisfied 
out of the one-half interest owned and warranted by William, and William is 
entitled to the remainder of his interest, which is one-sixth.  William did not retain a full one-third 
interest because he could not fulfill his grant of one-third interest and still 
retain a one-third interest when he only owned a one-half interest.  If both the grant and the reservation 
cannot be given effect, the risk of title failure is on the grantor and the 
grant must prevail. 

            

[¶33]   
We reverse the district court's grant of the appellees' motions for 
summary judgment and remand for entry of an order consistent with this 
opinion.  

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

1The appellants herein are heirs of 
William and Daisy.  They are Lora 
Gilstrap, Criss Corallino, Carole Corallino, Dave Gilstrap, Iris Hehn and 
Jeanarae Booth.  The appellees are 
successors in title to Ray.  They 
are the June Eisele Warren Trust, Jean Earl Eisele, William Eisele Family 
Mineral Trust, Marion Scott, Mary Scott, James Scott, Patty Scott, Donald Scott, 
Vonona Scott, Marilyn Storms, and Douglas Scott.