Case Title: Roach v. Caudle

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-6984

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Roach v. Caudle  954 P.2d 1039 (1998) Hillard T. ROACH, Appellant, v. Larry L. CAUDLE, Appellee. No. S-6984. Supreme Court of Alaska. March 13, 1998. *1040 Edgar Paul Boyko and Robin L. Koutchak, Edgar Paul Boyko and Associates, Anchorage, for Appellant. Larry L. Caudle, pro se, Law Office of Larry L. Caudle, Anchorage, Appellee. Before COMPTON, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH and FABE, JJ. OPINION FABE, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Hillard Roach appeals the superior court's decision to dismiss his legal malpractice suit for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse the superior court's judgment and remand the case. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Roach hired attorney Larry Caudle to appeal a federal bankruptcy court's decision. That appeal was dismissed on April 28, 1988, for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. On July 13, 1994, Roach sued Caudle in state court for legal malpractice. In his complaint, Roach alleged that Caudle "never informed plaintiff [Roach] that his appeal had been dismissed and plaintiff did not discover that dismissal until July 15, 1992." Caudle moved to dismiss Roach's malpractice action for failure to state a claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6), on the ground that the suit was time-barred. The superior court ruled that a six-year statute of limitations applied and began to run on the date Roach's bankruptcy appeal was dismissed. The superior court also concluded that the discovery rule did not render Roach's complaint timely. Noting that "Roach was aware of his cause of action by 15 July 1992," the superior court found that Roach had unreasonably delayed filing his malpractice claim until July 1994. Therefore, it granted Caudle's motion. This appeal followed. III. DISCUSSION[1]A. A Six-Year Statute of Limitations Applies to Roach's Legal Malpractice Claim. Roach asserts that the superior court erred when it applied a six-year statute of limitations to his case. We disagree. We recently stated that "[t]he six-year statute of limitations generally applies to professional malpractice actions claiming economic loss." Breck v. Moore, 910 P.2d 599 , 603 (Alaska 1996) (citing Lee Houston & Assocs. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848 , 855 (Alaska 1991)). Roach's complaint principally alleged economic loss, stating: As a result of defendant Larry L. Caudle's breach of his duty of due care to plaintiff, plaintiff has been damaged, which damage *1041 includes, but is not limited to, his inability to retain any interest in, or pursue litigation based upon, a promissory note from Minnesota Construction Company and others in his favor in the principle [sic] amount of $459,000 and the related deed of trust, all to plaintiff's damage in an amount in excess of $50,000, the exact amount to be proven at time of trial. Therefore, the six-year limitations period applies. B. The Superior Court Erred in Dismissing Roach's Complaint Based upon the Statute of Limitations. Roach argues that the superior court should have denied Caudle's Rule 12(b)(6) motion because the statute of limitations did not begin running until July 15, 1992. Thus, Roach alleges that his July 13, 1994 complaint was timely. We have recognized that in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court should focus on whether the complaint sets forth "allegations of fact consistent with and appropriate to some enforceable cause of action." Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171 , 173 (Alaska 1983). The court "must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true" and should deny the motion to dismiss if "within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff." Kollodge v. State, 757 P.2d 1024 , 1026 (Alaska 1988) (quoting 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.07 (2d ed. 1986); see also Linck, 667 P.2d at 173). We have determined that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. See Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362 , 1366 (Alaska 1991). Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues "when a person discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action." Id. In his complaint, Roach alleged that "Caudle never informed [him] that his [bankruptcy] appeal had been dismissed and [Roach] did not discover that dismissal until July 15, 1992." Because we must presume the assertions in Roach's complaint to be true for purposes of examining Caudle's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we conclude that the six-year statute of limitations did not begin running until Roach allegedly discovered his potential cause of action on July 15, 1992. Because Roach filed his complaint within six years after this date, the superior court should not have dismissed his lawsuit based upon the statute of limitations.[2] *1042 IV. CONCLUSION Assuming the validity of the allegations in Roach's complaint, we conclude that the statute of limitations applicable to Roach's legal malpractice claim did not expire before he filed his July 13, 1994, complaint. Therefore, we REVERSE the superior court's decision to dismiss Roach's complaint and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.