Case Title: SANDERS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-48

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SANDERS v. STATE2000 WY 1447 P.3d 891Case Number: 99-48Decided: 07/06/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MICHAEL ANTHONY SANDERS, 
Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, The Honorable Barton R. Voight, Judge. 

Representing 
Appelant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel; Scott Mitchel Guthrie, Assistant public Defender. Argument by 
Mr. Gunthrie.Representing Appelle: Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbets, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Theodore E. Lauer, Faculty Director, Emily R. Rankin, Student Intern, 
and Patrick Moran, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program. 
Argument by Ms. Rankin and Mr. Moran.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1] Michael 
Anthony Sanders (Sanders) appeals his conviction on one count of first degree 
murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (Lexis 1999).1 Sanders challenges the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter, 
and its admission of a statement given to police by his co-defendant. Finding no 
abuse of the trial court's discretion in either of those rulings, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] In his 
initial brief Sanders raises this issue:

Did the district court 
deprive Appellant of his due process right to a fair trial, and abuse its 
discretion by refusing to offer the jury the defense's theory of the case 
instruction and a manslaughter instruction, when the evidence clearly warranted 
such instruction, as a lesser-included offense?

[¶3] Sanders 
offers this issue in a supplemental brief:

Whether the admission of 
Sharay Burnett's out of court statement to police officers was a violation of 
Michael Sanders' sixth amendment right to confrontation and not harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.

[¶4] The State's 
brief contains this statement of the issues:

I. Did the district court 
properly refuse to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter?

II. Did the district 
court properly admit into evidence the out-of-court statements of Sharay Burnett 
under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which excepts statements against penal 
interest from the hearsay rule?

FACTS

[¶5] The facts 
of this case are presented in our decision on the appeal of Sanders' 
co-defendant, Sharay Burnett. Burnett v. State, 997 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Wyo. 
2000).

[¶6] In 
September 1997, Burnett and the victim moved in together and planned to be 
married. On October 8, 1997, Burnett's friend called her on the telephone. 
Sometime during their conversation, her friend had to use the restroom. He gave 
the telephone to Michael Sanders, and Sanders and Burnett conversed for several 
hours. Two evenings later, Sanders visited Burnett and the victim at their home. 
Sanders and the victim drank beer while Burnett cleaned another part of the 
home. The victim became intoxicated and despondent, and he told Sanders and 
Burnett he wanted to die. Sanders, obliging and resourceful, fashioned a weapon 
from a disposable razor, a plastic spoon, and a piece of electrical tape. 
Burnett filled the bathtub with water, kissed the victim goodbye, and went into 
the bedroom to chant and meditate. The victim got into the 
bathtub.

[¶7] Within a 
few minutes, Burnett heard the victim scream repeatedly, "Please, I changed my 
mind. I don't want to do this. I changed my mind." When she went to the bathroom 
to investigate, she saw the victim was injured, but still alive. Sanders told 
Burnett he needed a sharper knife and specifically asked for a steak knife, 
which Burnett obtained for him from her kitchen. Burnett returned to the 
bedroom, where she heard the victim continue to plead with Sanders. She returned 
to the bathroom in time to see Sanders stab the victim in the neck with the 
steak knife. Burnett lit a cigarette for Sanders, and then she sat by the door 
while Sanders stabbed the victim several more times.

[¶8] Burnett and 
Sanders agreed that, if anyone inquired about the victim, they would say he went 
to get beer and marijuana but never returned. They walked to a liquor store to 
purchase beer and snacks, and then they returned to the house where they talked 
until about five o'clock in the morning. Later that morning, Sanders told a 
co-worker about the killing, showed him the victim's body, and asked for help in 
disposing of it. The co-worker called the police, and the police proceeded to 
the house where they found Burnett and the body. After the police informed 
Burnett of her rights, she gave a detailed rendition of the previous night's 
events.

[¶9] Sanders was 
arrested that same morning and charged with one count of first degree murder. 
His trial commenced on October 19, 1998. He was convicted and sentenced to life 
in prison. Sanders appeals his conviction to this Court.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶10] Sanders' 
claims of error concern jury instructions and the admission of evidence. We 
review a trial court's rulings in both of those areas under our abuse of 
discretion standard. Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 943-44 (Wyo. 1998); 
Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 1998). We have described that 
standard as follows:

[¶11] We 
perceive the core of our inquiry as reaching the question of reasonableness of 
the choice made by the trial court. Henceforth, we will turn to a definition 
adopted in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), in which we 
said:

Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria: it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

[¶12] Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).

Jury 
Instruction

[¶13] In his 
first assignment of error, Sanders scores the trial court for refusing his 
proffered jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.2 We review a refusal of a proposed 
lesser-included offense instruction by applying the following 
test:

The trial judge must 
first determine if all the elements of the lesser offense are found within the 
greater; and, if so, is there some evidence that would rationally permit the 
jury to find the accused guilty of the lesser and not guilty of the greater 
offense. If such evidence is present, the instruction should be 
given.

[¶14] State v. 
Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1140 (Wyo. 1993) (Cardine, J., concurring). See also 
Paramo v. State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Wyo. 1995) ("A district court's failure to 
give a lesser included offense instruction when such an offense indeed exists, 
and the evidence presented would support conviction upon that offense, 
constitutes reversible error. Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 
1988).")

[¶15] Sanders 
contends, and we agree, that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense 
of first degree murder. See Warren v. State, 835 P.2d 304, 322 (Wyo. 1992) 
(Urbikit, C.J., dissenting). The first part of the Keffer test is therefore 
satisfied. The second part of the Keffer test requires us to determine whether 
the evidence presented at trial would have rationally permitted the jury to find 
Sanders guilty of manslaughter but not guilty of first degree murder. Sanders 
contends that the evidence supports a conclusion that he killed the victim but 
did so without malice. That characterization of the evidence, if accurate, would 
support a manslaughter instruction. In support of his claim that he killed 
without malice, Sanders points to testimony that he bore no ill will toward the 
victim; the victim asked Sanders to kill him; the two men drank beer together as 
new friends; and Sanders felt sorry for the victim.

[¶16] We have 
accepted a definition of malice as an "intentional killing without legal 
justification or excuse and under circumstances which are insufficient to reduce 
the crime to manslaughter." Braley v. State 741 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wyo. 1987). 
Thus, his claim is sustainable if the evidence at trial would allow the jury to 
reasonably conclude that he killed the victim with legal justification, or under 
circumstances that reduce the crime to manslaughter.

[¶17] Sanders 
claims legal justification from the testimony that the victim wanted to die and 
asked Sanders to kill him. While there exists no Wyoming statutory or case law 
directly on point, an abundance of authority from other sources demonstrates the 
rule that a victim's consent to be killed is not a defense to a homicide charge. 
Gentry v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1268, 1273 (Ind. App. 1993) ("First, consent is not 
a defense to conduct causing another human being's death."); State v. Couser, 
567 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1997) ("A substantial number of cases from other 
jurisdictions hold that one who actually performs or actively assists in 
performing an overt act resulting in the death of another person is guilty of 
homicide, irrespective of the victim's desire to die."); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide 
§ 105 (1999) ("In application of the general principle that private persons 
cannot license crime, so that the criminal cannot be excused by anyone's consent 
thereto, it is the rule that, in a prosecution for homicide, consent of the 
deceased is no excuse. The right to life and to personal security is not only 
sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable.") Sanders, 
therefore, cannot show that he was legally justified in killing the 
victim.

[¶18] To 
convince this Court that he killed the victim under circumstances that reduce 
the crime to manslaughter, Sanders would need to show that he acted in the heat 
of passion. We have accepted the following definition of that 
term:

"Heat of passion" means 
such passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances as those in question 
which would cause him to act rashly, without reflection and deliberation, and 
from passion rather than from judgment.

[¶19] Yung v. 
State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Wyo. 1995). Sanders does not even attempt to 
convince us that he acted "from passion rather than from judgment." Such an 
attempt would be unavailing for two reasons. First, the victim's plea for death 
and Burnett's acquiescence therein are not the type of circumstances to which a 
reasonable person would react with a deadly passion. Second, there is no 
evidence that Sanders did in fact kill the victim in the heat of passion. 
Instead, the evidence clearly contradicts such a claim. Sanders refused to kill 
the victim until Burnett consented, hardly the act of someone consumed by 
passion. In addition, fashioning a weapon from three separate components is not 
a hallmark of passion, but an indication of planning and 
deliberation.

[¶20] Sanders 
further argues that he was too intoxicated at the time of the killing to form 
the requisite intent for first degree murder. The State responds to Sanders' 
intoxication claim in two ways. First, while first degree murder is a specific 
intent crime, second degree murder is not; therefore, the absence of specific 
intent could reduce the charge to second degree murder but not to manslaughter. 
Second, the jury was instructed on the defense of intoxication but convicted 
Sanders nonetheless.

[¶21] The 
evidence at trial cannot support a lesser-included offense instruction for 
manslaughter because there is no evidence that Sanders killed without malice in 
the heat of passion. In addition, Sanders' claim of voluntary intoxication does 
not require a manslaughter instruction. We, therefore, hold that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by refusing Sanders' proffered manslaughter 
instruction.

Admission of Burnett's 
Statements

[¶22] Sanders 
next contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements 
Sharay Burnett made to a police detective. He argues that those statements were 
hearsay, and their admission violated his right to confront the witnesses 
against him. "Hearsay evidence is ordinarily inadmissible; however, it can be 
received in evidence if it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule found in the Wyoming Rules of Evidence and it bears sufficient indicia of 
reliability to avoid violation of the Confrontation Clause." Johnson v. State, 
930 P.2d 358, 361-62 (Wyo. 1996). Sanders' brief disputes many of Burnett's 
statements that were not admitted at trial and fails to contest some that were 
admitted. We will, therefore, examine all the admitted statements for 
error.

[¶23] Under 
W.R.E. 804(b)(3), statements that were against a declarant's penal interests 
when made are excepted from the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable to 
testify.3 That exception applies to 
statements that are self-inculpatory, including those that are "intertwined or 
closely connected to statements that another was also involved" and applies 
"even if spreading the blame serves the interests of the declarant." Brown v. 
State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1178 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶24] The 
following exchanges took place during the State's direct examination of the 
detective who questioned Burnett: 

Q. During the course of 
your interview with Sharay Burnett, did she ever state that there came a time 
when there was formed some kind of an agreement or understanding between herself 
and Mr. Sanders that [the victim] would die?

A. 
Yes.

Q. Explain that, if you 
would.

A. Mr. Sanders had 
approached Sharay and said that he could not kill [the victim] without her 
permission. And she subsequently gave her permission by answering, yeah, 
whatever.

Q. Did he specifically 
ask her the question, do I have your approval to do this?

A. 
Correct.

Q. And she 
responded?

A. Yeah, 
whatever.

[¶25] The 
statements of Burnett recounted above were clearly against her penal interests 
when made because they could aid her prosecution on a charge of conspiracy to 
commit murder. The next recorded admission of Burnett's statement 
is:

Q. According to Sharay 
Burnett, how long did this episode involving [the victim] and his death - when 
did it end?

A. Less than an hour, it 
concluded a little after 1:00 in the morning.

Q. According to Sharay 
Burnett, were there any other discussions between herself and Mr. Sanders after 
this initial part that you testified, do I have your approval? Were there any 
other discussions after that between herself and Mr. Sanders as to how [the 
victim] would die?

A. 
Yes.

Q. What did she state 
they discussed?

A. They discussed that 
they would use a razor. Sharay Drecollects that it was Mike Sanders who broke 
the razor; that it was herself, Sharay, who provided the pipe with the tape on 
it.

Q. This is the marijuana 
pipe we heard about?

A. Correct, and it was 
Mike Sanders who had the spoon. That it was Mike Sanders who attached the blade 
of the disposable razor to the spoon using electrical 
tape.

[¶26] These 
statements are even more inculpatory because Burnett not only D conspired, she 
knowingly provided a portion of the intended murder weapon. The next use of 
Burnett's statements continues along the same lines:

Q. And who affixed the 
blade to the spoon handle?

A. Mr. Sanders 
did.

Q. According to 
him?

A. According to him and 
Sharay.

[¶27] Although 
this portion is more inculpatory of Sanders than of Burnett, it shows that 
Burnett knew what was happening, agreed to the plan, and did nothing to stop it. 
In addition, the information is substantiated not only by Sanders' statement to 
the detectives, but also by Sanders' testimony at trial. The use of Burnett's 
statements continued with:

Q. As it concerns the 
course of events that we talked about thus far - do I have your approval, and 
the preparations of this instrument - what act did Ms. Burnett say she did 
herself?

A. She provided the pipe 
with the tape on it.

Q. Who ran the bath 
water?

A. She 
did.

Q. Moving on, according 
to Sharay Burnett, did she reflect to you in your interview with her any 
statements made by [the victim] once this agreement had been set in motion after 
this instrument has been prepared, after [the victim is] in the bathtub, did she 
reflect any statements made then by [the victim]?

A. Yes, sir, she 
did.

Q. Lay that out, if you 
would, so we know the context and what was said.

A. Sharay was in her 
bedroom, which is a common wall to the bathroom, and she heard [the victim] 
scream out, "Please stop. I changed my mind." 

Q. Did she indicate in 
the course of your interview how many times this was said by [the 
victim]?

A. She said over and 
over, 10, 20 times.

Q. You used the words 
scream out. Were those her words?

A. 
Yes.

Q. "Please stop. I've 
changed my mind." Anything else?

A. If you want to refer 
me to the correct page.

Q. , 
.

A. Her 
statement?

Q. Yes, 
sorry.

A. "Please, I changed my 
mind. I changed my mind."

Q. As it goes into , any 
other statements made?

A. "Please, I changed my 
mind. I don't want to do this. I changed my mind."

Q. You indicated where 
was [the victim] at that time?

A. In the bathtub in the 
upstairs bathroom.

Q. Did she indicate she 
could hear any noises in addition to the statements?

A. 
Yes.

Q. What 
noise?

A. Thrashing of the 
water. The water was turned on in the tub. Thumping 
sounds.

Q. So hearing this 
thrashing and the water rushing, the noises, and please stop, what did she state 
she did?

A. She left the bedroom 
and went towards the bathroom.

[¶28] These 
statements are also self-inculpatory. The beginning of this exchange revisits 
Burnett's culpability for conspiracy and her part in preparing the intended 
weapon. The latter part shows that Burnett knew the victim was struggling and 
leading for his life, yet she did nothing to assist him or summon help. The 
testimony continued with:

Q. Sharay moves to the 
bathroom area. Was there any conversation then she related to you between 
herself and Mr. Sanders?

A. 
Yes.

Q. What was that 
conversation?

A. Mr. Sanders asked 
Sharay if they had a sharper knife.

Q. And how did she 
respond?

A. She stated 
no.

Q. Did she state she 
could hear anything coming out of the bathroom at that 
time?

A. She could hear [the 
victim] gurgling.

Q. Any other conversation 
between herself and Mr. Sanders?

A. Mr. Sanders asked if 
they had a steak knife and Sharay said she did.

Q. What did she 
do?

A. She walked downstairs 
to the kitchen area and retrieved the steak knife.

Q. What did she do with 
it?

A. Walked up the first 
set of stairs to the landing, and she gave it to Mike 
Sanders.

[¶29] In the 
above exchange, Burnett admitted again that she heard the victim's plight and 
took no action to prevent his death. In addition, she provided a second weapon 
after the first one failed. The same information was presented again, as 
recorded below:

Q. Let's go back and do 
that sequence to make sure it's - after the point in time where you have got 
Sharay Burnett where she told you she is in her bedroom and she hears, "Please 
stop. I changed my mind," from [the victim], you indicated she went to the 
bathroom doorway. What conversation then was had, according to Ms. 
Burnett?

A. According to Ms. 
Burnett, Mike Sanders asked her if she had a sharper knife, where she responded 
no. Mike Sanders then asked her if she had a steak knife, and she responded 
yes.

Q. And then what did Miss 
Burnett state she did, after saying, yeah, I got a steak 
knife?

A. She went to the 
kitchen downstairs and retrieved the knife.

Q. What did Ms. Burnett 
state she did with that knife?

A. Back up the staircase, 
and about the landing of that staircase, Ms. Burnett stated this is when she 
gave this knife to Mike Sanders.

[¶30] The final 
use of Burnett's statement is recorded as:

Q. Turning back then to 
your interview with Ms. Burnett. At this point in time where she hands the knife 
to Mr. Sanders on the landing of the stairs, did she indicate there was any 
further conversation between herself and Mr. Sanders then?

A. 
Yes.

Q. What did she state 
that was?

A. That - according to 
Ms. Burnett, that Mike Sanders had stated that they had to finish it; that it 
had gone too far.

Q. Did she agree with 
this?

A. 
Yes.

Q. According to Ms. 
Burnett, where did they then go?

A. They went back to her 
bedroom.

Q. Did she state she 
heard anything from [the victim] at that time?

A. 
Yes.

Q. What did she say she 
could hear from [the victim]?

A. [The victim] was 
saying please.

Q. Did she indicate she 
heard any statements from Mr. Sanders at that time?

A. Yes, she 
did.

Q. What did she state he 
was saying?

A. Mr. Sanders was 
stating, "Let go of my arm. Let go of my arm. Lay your arms 
down."

Q. Afterwards, sticking 
still with your interview with Ms. Burnett, [the victim] is dead, any 
conversation then about cover-up, what to say, what to do?

A. Yes, it 
was.

Q. What did Ms. Burnett 
state that conversation was?

A. That Mike instructed 
her if anyone should ask concerning [the victim], she should tell them that [the 
victim] left with two Mexicans to go buy some beer and 
marijuana.

Q. Did she agree that she 
could do that?

A. Yes, she 
did.

Q. And you had discussion 
about disposing of the body?

A. Yes, Mr. Sanders said 
that he would take care of that.

[¶31] In this 
final excerpt, Burnett admitted that she conspired with Sanders to cover up the 
murder, another statement clearly against her penal 
interests.

[¶32] Having 
determined that Burnett's statements were admissible under the rules of 
evidence, we must next, in accordance with our standard articulated in Johnson, 
determine whether they bear sufficient indicia of reliability to avoid violation 
of the Confrontation Clause. We hold that they do. First, the statements were 
very incriminating of Burnett. In fact, Burnett's entire statement to the 
detective was admitted at her trial; she was convicted as an accessory to first 
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. See Brown, 953 P.2d  at 1179-80 
("the very fact that a statement is self-inculpatory is itself one of the 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that makes a statement admissible 
under the Confrontation Clause.") Second, Burnett was not offered any leniency 
in exchange for her statement, as evidenced by her conviction and life 
sentence.

[¶33] Id. at 
1180. Finally, much of the detailed information in Burnett's statement is 
corroborated by Sanders' statement and testimony, the testimony of other 
witnesses, and the physical evidence presented at trial. Id. An example of that 
corroboration is her mention of the steak knife, which law enforcement officials 
did not locate until several days after Burnett's 
statement.

[¶34] Burnett's 
statements to the detective were properly admitted under our rules of evidence 
and bore sufficient indicia of reliability. We, therefore, hold that its 
admission at trial was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Because the 
trial court did not err in the admission of that testimony or in its 
instructions to the jury, we affirm Sanders' conviction and 
sentence.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (Lexis 1999) reads:

Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration 
of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, 
escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen (16) years, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

2 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-105(a) (Lexis 1999) reads:

A 
person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without 
malice, expressed or implied, either:

(i) 
Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion; or

(ii) Involuntarily, but recklessly except under circumstances 
constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-106(b).

3 Sanders' 
trial counsel conceded that Burnett was not available to testify because her 
appeal of her conviction was pending at the time of Sanders' trial.