Case Title: Fischer v. Kipp

Citation: 177 Kan. 196, 277 P.2d 598

Docket Number: 39,521

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1954-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
177 Kan. 196 (1954)
277 P.2d 598
CHARLES M. FISCHER, Appellee,
v.
ALYCE KIPP and GERTRUDE KIPP, also known as PEGGY KIPP, Appellants.
No. 39,521

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 11, 1954.
Horace A. Santry, of Salina, argued the cause, and John I. Young, of Salina, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
George D. Miner, of Ellsworth, argued the cause, and Paul L. Aylward, of Ellsworth, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This was an action upon three judgments rendered by the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, State of California, against the defendants, Alyce Kipp and Gertrude Kipp, upon which *197 a new judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff by the district court of Ellsworth County, from which the defendants appeal.
The action was commenced in the district court by the filing of a petition containing three causes of action. The sufficiency of this pleading is not challenged and for present purposes it suffices to say each cause of action therein set forth, to which an authenticated copy of the particular judgment involved was attached, contains allegations sufficient to warrant the granting of the relief therein prayed for.
Defendants appeared in the action. Following this appearance they filed a second amended answer in which they denied generally all allegations of the petition and specifically denied the judgments sued on were entitled to full faith and credit. Other matters pleaded in the answer, subsequently denied by a reply, are not involved and need not be detailed.
With issues joined as heretofore indicated the cause came on for trial by the Court. Plaintiff then submitted his cause on evidence consisting of the pleadings, the files of the case and, over defendants' objections, authenticated copies of each of the involved judgments. Thereupon defendants demurred to plaintiff's evidence. At the same time they announced they would offer no evidence and stand upon their demurrer. Following this action the Court took the case under advisement. Later it overruled the demurrer, found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendants upon the authenticated copies of the judgments sued on, specified the amounts due on each such judgment, and then rendered judgment against defendants in accord with its findings. After rendition of this judgment defendants filed a motion for new trial. When it was overruled they appealed from that ruling; from the ruling on their demurrer to the evidence; and from the judgment.
At the outset the issues will be simplified by stating that appellants recognize the general rule of universal application, long since established by this court (See French v. Pease, 10 Kan.2d ed. 48, 51) and courts of other jurisdictions (See, e.g., 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, 141 § 533), that a properly authenticated judgment rendered by a court of one state is, under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, Article 4, Section 1, entitled in the courts of another state to the force, the effect, and the full faith and credit, it has by law in the courts of the state where *198 the judgment was rendered. Moreover, with the view of further simplifying the issues it may be stated appellants concede the judgments relied on in the instant action were authenticated in the manner required by existing statutes, both Federal (28 U.S.C.A., 1738) and State (G.S. 1949, 60-2853).
Upon careful analysis of the record it can be stated in a general way that the essence of the over-all, and for that matter the paramount, question raised by appellants relates to the degree of proof required to sustain appellee's causes of action on the judgments sued on. Specifically, although they concede the rule to be that a judgment rendered by a sister state court of general jurisdiction is presumed to be valid and the introduction of its judgment in evidence in a court of this state makes out a prima facie case, their position on this point is (1) that the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, State of California, is a court of inferior jurisdiction and (2) that judgments of courts of inferior jurisdiction are not entitled to the presumptions accorded courts of general jurisdiction, hence the trial court erred in overruling their demurrer and rendering judgment against them on the basis of the evidence presented by appellee.
In view of what has been stated and is to be presently related we are not disposed to here attempt to discuss or distinguish the myriad decisions dealing with the presumptions to be given judgments entitled to full faith and credit. However, in passing we desire to point out we are inclined to the view that under our own decisions (See, e.g., French v. Pease, supra; Dickson v. Patterson, 106 Kan. 794, 189 Pac. 912; Denton v. Miller, 110 Kan. 292, 203 Pac. 693; Poorman v. Carlton, 122 Kan. 762, 253 Pac. 424; Chamberlin v. Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P.2d 571; In re Estate of Moore, 163 Kan. 147, 159, 181 P.2d 299; Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Unknown Successors, etc., Okla. Royalty Corp., 167 Kan. 432, 207 P.2d 417), as well as other well recognized authorities (See 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, 86, 172, §§ 424, 425, 571; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, 463, 500 to 502, Incl., §§ 884, 893), the rule recognizing the presumptions on which appellants rely is not limited solely to courts of general jurisdiction but extends to and includes judgments of all courts of record. Be that as it may the question now under consideration can and will be disposed of on appellants' factual contention relating to the status and/or rank of the foreign courts rendering the involved judgments.
*199 Mindful of the mandate of our statute (G.S. 1949, 60-2878) relating to judicial notice of foreign laws and providing courts shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States, also the rule (50 C.J.S., Judgments, 444 § 869; 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, 144 § 534) that in an action on a foreign judgment its validity and finality are to be tested by the law of the jurisdiction where such judgment was rendered, we have little difficulty in concluding appellants' contention the Municipal Court of Los Angeles is not a court of general jurisdiction cannot be upheld.
Article 6, Section 12 of the Constitution of California provides:
Statutes of California 1951, Chapter 861, Page 2370, now appearing as Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reads:
In the early case of Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391, 94 Am. Dec. 742, the supreme court of California, in a general discussion of the subject now under consideration, said:
In the more recent case of Schwartz, Inc., v. Burnett Phar., 112 Cal. App. Supp. 781, 295 Pac. 508, the court held that in determining application of presumption as to jurisdiction Municipal Courts are regarded as courts of superior or general jurisdiction; and that their jurisdiction in civil cases need not affirmatively appear from pleadings or other proceedings. In the opinion of the same case, with direct reference to the force and effect to be given Hahn v. Kelly, supra, it is said:
See, also, the comparatively recent case of Villanazul v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 718, 235 P.2d 16, where, although the question of the faith and credit to be given a judgment of a municipal *201 court was not involved, the Supreme Court of California held that municipal courts were courts of record; that the primary purpose in creating them was to relieve congestion in the superior courts of the state; and that in certain classes of cases their jurisdiction was exclusive.
From the foregoing references to the law of California it becomes apparent, that contrary to appellants' contention, the Municipal Court of Los Angeles is to be regarded as a court of general jurisdiction, at least for the purpose of suits for money amounting to $3,000 or less, and we so hold. The result is the judgments herein sued on were entitled to the presumptions appellants themselves concede are accorded to judgments of courts of general jurisdiction.
The next contention advanced by appellants is that the evidence introduced by appellee, consisting of the pleadings, the files and authenticated copies of the California judgments, was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Differently stated, that appellee had the burden of proving the existing status of such judgments. We do not agree. That contention, in our opinion, was determined long ago, contrary to appellants' position, in French v. Pease, supra, where it is said:
In addition see Saville v. Schroyer, 65 Kan. 303, 68 Pac. 1130, where it is held:
For general authorities supporting our conclusions respecting the foregoing contention see 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, 352, 353, 355 §§ 859, 860, 864; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, 462 § 884.
Appellants' final contention to the effect that as to one cause of action (the first) there was a variance between the allegations of the petition and the proof requires little if any consideration. It is true the petition alleged that particular judgment was rendered on September 24, 1952, whereas the judgment was actually rendered on October 1, 1952. The trouble from their standpoint is that *202 attached to and made a part of the first cause of action was an authenticated copy of the judgment in question which disclosed the true date of its rendition. In that situation our decisions (See West's Kansas Digest, Pleading §§ 310, 312) are uniform to the effect the attached copy controls recitals of the petition at variance therewith. It follows the trial court did not err in admitting in evidence an authenticated copy of the judgment, identical with the one attached to the petition.
We find nothing in other contentions advanced by appellants which requires further discussion or warrants a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.