Case Title: People v. Salazar

Citation: 

Docket Number: S275788

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
NORMAN THOMAS SALAZAR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S275788 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B309803 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2018027995 
 
 
November 20, 2023 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
S275788 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
After Norman Salazar had been sentenced but while his 
appeal was still pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) (Senate 
Bill 567).  Though Salazar received a middle term sentence at 
the time of his original sentencing, the new statute creates a 
presumption that the sentencing court “shall” enter a lower 
term sentence when, among other things, a “psychological, 
physical, or childhood trauma” contributed to the offense.  (Pen. 
Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (A).)1  The sentencing court may 
only depart from this lower term presumption if it finds that the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances such that the lower term would be contrary to 
“the interests of justice.”  (Id., subd. (b)(6).)  The parties agree 
that this new legislation applies on appeal to Salazar’s nonfinal 
case.  (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745.)  The 
Attorney General further concedes that the record discloses that 
Salazar may have suffered a qualifying trauma, which would 
appear to meet the statute’s threshold requirement for 
triggering the lower term presumption.  (See People v. Frahs 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 638–640 (Frahs).) 
 In People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Gutierrez), 
we held that, in a case like this one, when a sentencing court 
 
1  
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
was not aware of the full scope of its discretionary powers at the 
time the defendant was sentenced, “the appropriate remedy is 
to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ 
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion 
‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 1391.)  We granted review to determine whether the Court of 
Appeal erred here by finding that the record “ ‘clearly 
indicate[s]’ ” the trial court would not have imposed a lower term 
sentence if it had been aware of the scope of its discretion.  (Ibid.)  
We find no clear indication in the record that the sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence had it been aware 
of “ ‘the scope of its discretionary powers’ ” under the current 
section 1170.  (Gutierrez, at p. 1391.)  We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the 
superior court for resentencing. 
I. Background 
In 2018, Salazar and M.Q. were in a dating relationship.  
On August 12, 2018, after their relationship had ended, M.Q. 
knocked on the door to Salazar’s motel room around 2:00 or 3:00 
p.m.  M.Q. testified that Salazar pulled her inside by the shirt 
and punched her in the head, causing her to bleed.  Within a few 
minutes, he put a desk in front of the door to prevent M.Q. from 
leaving.  
Salazar accused M.Q. of being followed or bringing people 
with her.  Even though his motorcycle was in the parking lot, 
Salazar repeatedly claimed M.Q. stole it and sold it to someone 
who replaced it with a different bike.  By 7:00 p.m., Salazar had 
punched M.Q. five to ten times and sprayed her with pepper 
spray five to 10 times.  Around 7:00 p.m., Salazar also 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
threatened to kill M.Q.  Later in the evening, Salazar kicked 
M.Q. between the thighs, knocking her to the ground.  Salazar 
ingested five lines of methamphetamine while in the motel 
room. 
According to M.Q., around 8:00 p.m., Salazar insisted that 
she accompany him in her car to purchase more drugs.  Before 
leaving the motel room, Salazar broke M.Q.’s phone into two and 
took keys from her purse.  From about 11:00 p.m. until about 
9:00 a.m. the next morning, Salazar drove M.Q.’s car while she 
sat in the passenger seat.  He continued to punch and spray her 
with pepper spray and with glass cleaner. 
M.Q. testified that at about 9:00 a.m., they returned to the 
motel room.  At about 10:00 a.m., Salazar drove M.Q.’s car to a 
park, with M.Q. following in his truck.  Once there, he became 
angry that she did not park his truck correctly and bit her face, 
making her bleed.  Salazar then drove the two of them back to 
the motel in his truck, leaving M.Q.’s car behind.  They then 
returned to the park a second time with M.Q. driving the truck 
and Salazar driving his motorcycle.  M.Q. and Salazar then both 
rode to the motel on Salazar’s motorcycle, leaving the truck 
behind at the park. 
The two then proceeded on Salazar’s motorcycle to Chase 
Bank.  When they arrived at the bank, Salazar said “we’re going 
to go to the ATM to pull out the $3,000 that [M.Q.] owed him” 
for his motorcycle.  M.Q. replied that they had to go inside 
because ATMs do not give out $3,000.  When they went inside, 
M.Q. pulled her sunglasses up and asked a bank employee to 
call the police.  Police responded and arrested Salazar.   
M.Q. went to the hospital for treatment.  The treating 
physician found that she had a fractured cheek bone, a closed 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
head injury, swelling around her eye, and an injury consistent 
with a bite mark on her face. 
The jury acquitted Salazar of kidnapping but found him 
guilty of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment by 
violence or menace (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)).  The jury also found 
Salazar guilty of infliction of corporal injury on a person with 
whom he had a current or former dating relationship (§ 273.5, 
subd. (a)).  The jury acquitted Salazar of attempted robbery 
(§§ 664, 211).  The jury did not reach agreement on an allegation 
that Salazar personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, 
subd. (e)), and this charge was subsequently dismissed pursuant 
to section 1383.  Salazar admitted a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. 
(c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)).  
At Salazar’s sentencing hearing in November 2020, the 
court considered a probation report, a defense sentencing 
memorandum, and the prosecution’s statement in aggravation.  
The defense sentencing memorandum reported that Salazar’s 
father was an alcoholic and strictly disciplined him.  According 
to Salazar, he first tried alcohol, smoked marijuana, and snorted 
cocaine when he was 13.  From the age of 13 to 20, he used 
psychedelic drugs such as LSD frequently, sometimes daily.  
Arrest records reflect that Salazar used methamphetamine.  
The sentencing memorandum also indicates that Salazar 
was diagnosed with paranoid schizoaffective disorder, anxiety, 
and claustrophobia, his mother and sister were diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder, and his father was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia.  In 2011, Salazar’s father passed away, and in 
2013, his mother died of pancreatic cancer. 
In November 2009, at the age of 36 years old, Salazar was 
admitted to the Ventura County Psychiatric Unit.  According to 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
the intake form, Salazar stated he had tried to kill himself, he 
thought his mother’s boyfriend was trying to kill him, and he 
had a history of self-harm and suicidal ideations.  In December 
2009, at a subsequent adult services assessment, Salazar 
exhibited paranoid ideation and reported hallucinations.  
Salazar reported that he drank seven to eight beers daily and 
occasionally used cocaine. 
A Ventura County Behavior Health Client Assessment 
Form, dated December 2011, states that prior records indicate 
that Salazar was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, 
depressed type, in May 2010 and had a history of paranoia and 
depression since he was 10 years old.  During the December 
2011 client assessment, Salazar further reported that his father 
was physically abusive beginning at age five.  He reported visual 
hallucinations since childhood.  The client assessment form 
states that Salazar has symptoms of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), including flashbacks of rapes/physical assaults 
when in prison, as well as symptoms of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) that “were likely related to 
trauma in childhood.”  The client assessment form concluded 
that Salazar meets the criteria for schizoaffective disorder, 
major depressive disorder, and dysthymic disorder. 
The prosecution also filed a statement in aggravation.  The 
statement details Salazar’s prior criminal history, which 
includes a misdemeanor conviction for assault with a deadly 
weapon in 1997 (§ 245); a conviction for battery on a spouse in 
1998 (§ 243, subd. (e)); a misdemeanor conviction for inflicting 
injury on a spouse in 1998 (§ 273.5, subd. (a)); a conviction for 
possessing a stolen vehicle from 2009 (§ 496d, subd. (a)); a 
conviction for battery from 2009 (§ 242); a conviction for evading 
police with willful disregard for safety from 2012 (§ 2800.2, 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
subd. (a)); and a conviction for evading police with willful 
disregard for safety from 2014 (§ 2800.2, subd. (a)).  The 
prosecution’s statement notes that after Salazar was arrested 
for the present case, six new cases had been filed against him.  
The statement also notes that Salazar has been committed to 
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 11 times 
since 2001. 
At the sentencing hearing, the court denied Salazar’s 
request to dismiss the prior strike conviction.  (See People v. 
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.)  Before doing 
so, the court praised Salazar’s courtroom conduct, stating:  “You 
presented yourself very well.  You could not have been more 
respectful, both to your counsel and to [the prosecutor] and to 
me and to the jury.”  The court was “hopeful that once this is 
done, that you can become the best version of yourself, like your 
sister is indicating.”  The court added that “it seems to me like 
you have more that you could offer.”  The court denied the 
Romero motion though because Salazar had a “long and 
continuous criminal history” and the strike was a “serious 
offense.”  The court noted that Salazar had been arrested six 
times since the offenses in this case were committed and had a 
23-year criminal history from 1995 to 2018, plus a juvenile 
offense in 1991.  The court found that “a lot” of that criminal 
history “is drug related, and a lot of it may be because of 
suffering from your father’s death, and then I think it was a 
couple years later, your mother’s death.  And it sounds like you 
were very much involved in your mother’s last few months of 
life, and you and she were lucky to have that opportunity.  But 
I simply cannot, based on that history, strike the strike.” 
The court also denied Salazar’s request to stay sentencing 
on the false imprisonment conviction pursuant to section 654 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
because “I cannot find that this is an ongoing singular 
continuous course of conduct.  I think that there were breaks.”  
“Based on everything that I’ve said,” the court then also denied 
the defense request to impose concurrent sentences on false 
imprisonment and inflicting corporal injury, and instead 
imposed consecutive sentences.2   
Ultimately, the court imposed the middle term of three 
years on inflicting corporal injury, doubled because of the prior 
strike, plus a consecutive eight months for false imprisonment 
(one-third the middle term), doubled because of the prior strike, 
for a total prison sentence of seven years and four months.  The 
court explained: “I’m going to select not the high term, but the 
mid term, and that’s based on having heard the evidence and 
based on the fact that the last seven years or so, the defendant’s 
criminal history has been drug related.”  The court found “that 
defendant has a history of drug abuse and/or alcohol abuse and 
recommend[ed] that he participate in a treatment program.”  
The court also issued a criminal protective order, protecting 
M.Q. from Salazar for ten years. 
Effective January 1, 2022 and while Salazar’s appeal was 
pending, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170 to provide that 
“unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the 
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court 
 
2  
The decision to grant a stay in this context is contingent 
upon section 654, which generally prohibits a defendant from 
being punished for “multiple offenses based on the same course 
of conduct.”  (People v. Lopez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 268, fn. 5.)  
The decision to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence 
similarly takes into account whether the offenses involved the 
same or separate conduct.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425.) 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
shall order imposition of the lower term if,” among other things, 
the defendant “has experienced psychological, physical, or 
childhood trauma,” and this trauma “was a contributing factor 
in the commission of the offense.”  (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (A).)3  
The Court of Appeal asked the parties to submit supplemental 
briefing discussing the application of the new legislation, if any, 
to the case.  In a supplemental brief, Salazar argued he was 
entitled to resentencing pursuant to these amendments to 
section 1170.  In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeal declined 
to remand for resentencing in light of the new law.  (People v. 
Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453, 464 (Salazar).)  The 
majority concluded “the record ‘ “clearly indicate[s]” ’ the trial 
court would not have imposed the low term had it been aware of 
its discretion to do so under Senate Bill 567.”  (Ibid.)  The 
majority reasoned (1) the probation report identified multiple 
aggravating factors; (2) the trial court denied Salazar’s Romero 
motion and request for probation, highlighting his lengthy 
criminal history; (3) the trial court imposed consecutive 
sentences instead of concurrent sentences; (4) “the current 
offenses were aggravated, sadistic, and extended over the course 
of 20 hours”; and (5) the trial court imposed a criminal protective 
order against Salazar and the probation report indicated he had 
a record of violence against other women.  (Id. at p. 464; id. at 
p. 463.)  In contrast, the dissent would have remanded the case 
 
3  
Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 695) both concerned amendments to 
section 1170 and were both passed by the Legislature in 
September 2021 and approved by the Governor and filed with 
the Secretary of State on October 8, 2021.  Senate Bill 567 
expressly incorporated Assembly Bill 124 and bears the highest 
chapter number and so is presumed to be the last of the two 
approved by the Governor.  (Gov. Code, § 9510.) 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
for resentencing.  (Id. at p. 466 (dis. opn. of Tangeman, J.).)  The 
dissent believed the record is not clear that the court would have 
found “ ‘the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 
contrary to the interests of justice.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The dissent noted 
that by selecting the middle term, “the trial court impliedly 
found the aggravating factors were not sufficient to warrant 
imposition of the high term.”  (Ibid.)  The dissent concluded that 
the “majority’s approach of substituting its judgment for that of 
the trial court contravenes our Supreme Court’s holding that 
remand is required ‘unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that 
the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if 
it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  We 
granted review. 
II. Discussion 
The Attorney General argues that the record clearly 
indicates that the trial court would have imposed the same 
middle term sentence even if it had been aware of the current 
section 1170 lower term presumption.  We disagree. 
“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in 
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.  
(See United States v. Tucker (1972) 404 U.S. 443, 447 [30 
L.Ed.2d 592, 596, 92 S.Ct. 589]; Townsend v. Burke (1948) 
334 U.S. 736, 741 [92 L.Ed. 1690, 1693, 68 S.Ct. 1252].)  A court 
which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no 
more exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose 
sentence is or may have been based on misinformation 
regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’  (People v. 
Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 
667 P.2d 686].)  In such circumstances, we have held that the 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the 
record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have 
reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it 
had such discretion.’ ”  (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; 
accord, People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 437; People v. 
Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431–432 (Flores).)   
In Gutierrez, we disapproved case law establishing a 
presumption in favor of life without parole for juveniles 
convicted of special circumstance murder.  (Gutierrez, supra, 
58 Cal.4th at p. 1390.)  We had consolidated two cases under 
review on our own motion.  (Id. at p. 1361.)  We then remanded 
the two cases for resentencing, even though the trial courts in 
each case had made statements indicating that life without 
parole was the appropriate sentence.  (Id. at p. 1364 [noting the 
trial court’s statement that defendant Moffett’s actions and 
criminal history “ ‘do not support, in my opinion, this Court 
exercising [its] discretion and sentencing him to a determinate 
term of twenty-five years to life.  I do not find that sentence 
appropriate in this particular case under the circumstances of 
this case’ ”]; see id. at p. 1367 [noting the other trial court’s 
statement, regarding defendant Gutierrez’s sentence, that it 
was “ ‘absolutely convinced at this stage of the proceedings that 
life without the possibility of parole is the only thing that the 
Court can do that could redress the amount of violence that was 
inflicted in this case’ ”].)  We reasoned that, while “the trial 
courts in these cases understood that they had some discretion 
in sentencing, the records do not clearly indicate that they would 
have imposed the same sentence had they been aware of the full 
scope of their discretion.  Because the trial courts operated 
under a governing presumption in favor of life without parole, 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
we cannot say with confidence what sentence they would have 
imposed absent the presumption.”  (Id. at p. 1391.)  
The Court of Appeal here emphasized that “[t]he 
California Constitution admonishes our appellate judiciary not 
to reverse any trial court judgment unless there has been a 
miscarriage of justice.  There should only be a reversal where it 
is reasonably probable that a more favorable outcome will result 
upon reversal.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] . . . .)”  (Salazar, supra, 
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 462.)  However, the Court of Appeal was 
mistaken to suggest that Watson provides the applicable 
standard.  Indeed, “there is a practical difference in assessing 
the effect of an error when the court has not articulated whether 
a discretionary decision was made in the first place, as compared 
to when there were errors in a decision the court actually 
rendered.”  (In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 716.)  Where, as 
here, the sentencing court was not aware of the scope of its 
discretionary powers at sentencing, Watson does not properly 
take into consideration the “more speculative inquiry” of what 
choice the court is likely to make in the first instance.  (Ibid.; 
accord, People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426.)  
Indeed, when the applicable law governing the defendant’s 
sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is 
almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the 
sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of 
its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.  Accordingly, 
when, as here, a sentencing court was not fully aware of the 
scope of its discretionary powers, “the appropriate remedy is to 
remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ 
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion 
‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ”  
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; see also People v. 
Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 242; People v. Gerson (2022) 
80 Cal.App.5th 
1067, 
1096; 
People 
v. 
Fuller 
(2022) 
83 Cal.App.5th 394, 400.)4 
Here, the sentencing court did not clearly indicate that it 
would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware 
of the scope of its discretionary powers under the current section 
1170.  The Attorney General concedes that the record supports 
that Salazar may have suffered a qualifying trauma that would 
meet the statute’s threshold requirement for triggering the 
lower term presumption.5  (See Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
 
4  
The Court of Appeal further found that our court’s order 
in People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, “denying the 
request for depublication and review is a cue that Flores is the 
standard governing appellate review.”  (Salazar, supra, 
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 465.)  To the contrary, and as we have 
reiterated, an order granting or denying a petition for review or 
granting or denying a request for depublication is not an 
expression of opinion on the merits of the case.  (See Camper v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 679, 689, fn. 8; Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.1125(d).) 
 
5  
The Attorney General argues that drug addiction, mental 
health issues, or death of a parent may not qualify as “trauma” 
within the meaning of the current section 1170, subdivision 
(b)(6)(A).  The Attorney General also argues that, given the 
thorough presentation that was already made in this case, 
Salazar would likely not have presented further evidence of 
qualifying trauma if the amended statute had been in effect at 
the time of his sentencing.  We do not reach these issues here 
because the Attorney General concedes there is at least an 
affirmative indication in the record that Salazar may have 
suffered a qualifying trauma and that such qualifying trauma 
may have been a contributing factor to the offense. 
 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
pp. 638–640.)  Instead, the Attorney General argues that the 
record clearly indicates that even if the sentencing court was 
aware that it was required to impose the lower term unless “the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 
contrary to the interests of justice” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)), it still 
would have refused to impose the lower term.  We disagree.    
First, the Attorney General points to Salazar’s “long and 
continuous criminal history,” that includes six additional 
offenses after the commission of the present offenses.  The 
Attorney General also cites to the particularly aggravated facts 
of the present case, including the fact that Salazar repeatedly 
struck the victim and sprayed her with pepper spray over a 
prolonged period, causing her significant injuries.  However, 
even though the offenses in this case were certainly abhorrent 
and the sentencing court did note Salazar’s “long and continuous 
criminal history,” this does not constitute a clear indication that 
it would have imposed the middle term under the new law.   
Under the former law, section 1170 vested the court with 
“sound discretion” to simply weigh circumstances in aggravation 
or mitigation, and any other relevant factors, and then impose 
any of the three prescribed terms (low, middle, or high) it found 
to “best serve[] the interests of justice.”  (§ 1170, former subd. 
(b).)  The new law dramatically restrains that discretion to 
impose the middle or upper term, now requiring the court to 
impose the lower term if a qualifying trauma was a contributing 
factor in the commission of the offense “unless the court finds 
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 
contrary to the interests of justice.”  (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)  
Accordingly, under the new law, the presumption is that the 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
court “shall order imposition of the lower term” whenever the 
defendant has a qualifying trauma.  (Ibid., italics added.)   
Here, the facts that the offenses were violent and occurred 
over an extended period and that the sentencing court noted 
Salazar had an extensive criminal history does not suffice to 
provide a clear indication the court would have departed from 
this presumptive lower term in the “interests of justice.”  
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)  With respect to the nature of the crime, it 
is notable that the sentencing court did not even mention the 
nature of the crime as part of its sentencing determination, 
other than to agree that the People’s estimate that the crime 
lasted “20 hours is probably pretty accurate.”6  The Court of 
Appeal stated that the current offenses were “aggravated, 
sadistic” and “akin to torture.”  (Salazar, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 464.)  However, the sentencing court never made any 
similar statements about the nature of the crime and the Court 
of Appeal may not substitute its own view of the offenses for the 
sentencing 
court’s 
in 
determining 
whether 
remand 
is 
appropriate.   
As to Salazar’s criminal history, though the sentencing 
court referenced his extensive criminal history, it also noted 
several mitigating factors in conjunction with that history.  As 
mentioned above, the sentencing court found that “a lot” of 
Salazar’s criminal history “is drug related, and a lot of it may be 
because of suffering from your father’s death, and then I think 
it was a couple years later, your mother’s death.”  The 
 
6  
Furthermore, the court’s reference to “20 hours” was not 
even made in reference to determining which term to impose.   
Instead, the comment was made in connection with Salazar’s 
request to stay his false imprisonment conviction. 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
sentencing court further praised Salazar’s courtroom conduct, 
explaining: “You presented yourself very well.  You could not 
have been more respectful, both to your counsel and to [the 
prosecutor] and to me and to the jury.”  The court explained that 
it was “hopeful that once this is done, that you can become the 
best version of yourself, like your sister is indicating.”  The court 
added that “it seems to me like you have more that you could 
offer.”  The Attorney General concedes that the parties and the 
court below all acknowledged that Salazar’s “criminality 
appeared to be primarily bound up with his drug addiction and 
mental health issues, and possibly the effects of losing his 
parents several years before the current offenses.”  Notably, 
under the former law the sentencing court had “sound 
discretion” (§ 1170, former subd. (b)) to impose any term, but did 
not use that “sound discretion” (ibid.) to impose an upper term.7   
This is simply not the kind of record upon which we can 
conclude that there is a clear indication that the sentencing 
court would have exercised its discretion under the current 
section 1170 to impose the same middle term as before.  Here, 
the court emphasized how drug use affected Salazar’s criminal 
history, underscored the impact that Salazar’s parents’ deaths 
had on him, noted how respectful Salazar had been in court, and 
expressed hope that he would have an opportunity for 
rehabilitation and become the best version of himself.  On this 
 
7  
We have granted review in People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, 
C094174) (nonpub. opn.), review granted August 10, 2022, 
S274942, to decide what prejudice standard applies on appeal 
when determining whether a case with an upper term sentence 
should be remanded for resentencing under Senate Bill 567.  We 
do not address that issue here. 
 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
record, we cannot say that simply because the sentencing court 
made a cursory reference to the extended duration of the crime 
and mentioned Salazar’s long criminal history that this provides 
a clear indication that the court would have concluded that “the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)8   
The Attorney General next argues that we can glean a 
clear indication of the sentencing court’s intent from its denial 
of Salazar’s Romero motion.  However, a Romero motion, which 
is utilized by defendants facing a prison sentence under 
California’s Three Strikes law, requires the sentencing court to 
utilize a different legal standard with a different presumption 
than would be applied under the current section 1170.  “ ‘[T]he 
Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing 
choice, as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing 
requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has 
at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court 
 
8  
The Court of Appeal concluded that “[a]s a matter of law, 
(1) the aggravating circumstances are overwhelming and 
outweigh any theoretical mitigating circumstances, and (2) 
selection of the low term would be ‘contrary to the interests of 
justice.’ ” 
 
(Salazar, 
supra, 
80 Cal.App.5th 
at 
p. 464.)  
Discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether “the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 
contrary to the interests of justice” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847; People v. Williams (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 148, 162 (Williams).)  For the reasons detailed above, 
it would not be an abuse of a trial court’s broad sentencing 
discretion to leave Salazar’s sentence unchanged, nor for it to 
grant Salazar the benefit of the recent ameliorative legislation.    
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
“conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made 
because, for articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny 
for abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he 
actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)  In ruling on a Romero 
motion, the court must consider whether “the defendant may be 
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and 
hence should be treated as though he had not previously been 
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.”  
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)  Thus, the Three Strikes 
law establishes a “strong presumption” in favor of a harsher 
sentence and requires the court to explicitly articulate its 
reasoning if it is to depart from a harsher sentence by granting 
the Romero motion.  (Carmony, at p. 378.)  In contrast, the 
current section 1170 does just the opposite: In cases where the 
defendant can establish certain qualifying attributes, such as 
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma that contributed to 
the offense, the statute now creates a presumption in favor of a 
more lenient, lower term sentence.  This lower term 
presumption under section 1170 can then only be departed from 
if “the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 
contrary to the interests of justice.”  (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)  As 
explained in People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 153, “[a]s for 
the court’s statement about [the defendant’s] Romero motion, it 
is only a ‘clear indication’ of its views on that particular 
sentencing decision.  We cannot speculate from the court’s 
statements and decision as to one sentencing issue to divine 
what the court would have done if it had broadened discretion 
on another sentencing issue.”  (Id. at p. 200.)  Accordingly, the 
fact that the sentencing court denied Salazar’s Romero motion 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
tells us little about what it would have done if given the 
opportunity to exercise its discretion on another sentencing 
issue under the current section 1170.   
The Attorney General also argues that the sentencing 
court’s rejection of Salazar’s request to impose concurrent 
sentences on the false imprisonment and inflicting corporal 
injury charges and the court’s corresponding statement provide 
a clear indication that it would have imposed the middle term 
even if it had been aware of its discretion under the current 
section 1170.  However, a review of the record again shows that 
the sentencing court was focused on a very different inquiry 
here.  The sentencing court’s statement that it was imposing 
consecutive sentences “[b]ased on everything that I’ve said” 
appears to refer to its denial of Salazar’s request to stay 
sentencing on the false imprisonment conviction because “there 
were breaks” between offenses, rather than “an ongoing 
singular continuous course of conduct.”   In deciding whether to 
impose consecutive sentences, the sentencing court here, 
consistent with well-settled law, was considering whether the 
“crimes were committed at different times or separate places, 
rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to 
indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.”  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 4.425(a)(3).)  The court’s decision to impose 
consecutive sentences based upon its determination that the 
conduct at issue was not continuous is a wholly distinct inquiry 
from whether a lower term would be contrary to “the interests 
of justice.”  (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)   
 The Attorney General responds by noting that because 
the 
sentencing 
court 
may 
also 
consider 
aggravating 
circumstances as part of its decision to impose consecutive 
sentences, this “ ‘clearly indicate[s]’ ” that it would not have 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
imposed the lower term under the current section 1170.  
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; see Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 4.425.)  “In deciding whether to impose consecutive terms, 
the trial court may consider aggravating and mitigating 
factors.”  (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 822.)  However, 
“there is no requirement that, in order to justify the imposition 
of consecutive terms, the court find that an aggravating 
circumstance exists.”  (Ibid.; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
4.425.)  Thus, the sentencing court is not required to find that 
any 
aggravating 
circumstances 
exist 
before 
imposing 
consecutive sentences and, notably, the court here did not 
specifically articulate any aggravating circumstances in 
conjunction with its imposition of consecutive terms.  By 
contrast, under section 1170, in order to depart from the lower 
term after the lower term presumption is triggered, the court 
must 
make 
a 
specific 
finding 
that 
“the 
aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that 
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests 
of justice.”  (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)  Consequently, the court’s 
decision to impose consecutive sentences cannot be a clear 
indication of its intent to impose the middle term under the 
current section 1170.9 
 
9  
In finding a clear indication of the sentencing court’s 
intent, the Court of Appeal also relied upon the facts that the 
sentencing court imposed a criminal protective order against 
Salazar and the probation report indicated he had a record of 
violence against other women.  However, the Attorney General 
does not rely upon these facts, and for good reason.  The 
sentencing court made no mention whatsoever of the record of 
violence against women and the court merely recited the terms 
of the protective order without any explanation as to why a 
 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
Finally, the Attorney General argues that a clear 
indication of the sentencing court’s intent is shown by the 
statement that “I’m going to select not the high term, but the 
mid term, and that’s based on having heard the evidence, and 
based on the fact that the last seven years or so, the defendant’s 
criminal history has been drug related.”  The Attorney General 
emphasizes that the court did not indicate here or elsewhere 
that it was contemplating the lower term as an appropriate 
sentence.  However, the court never had the opportunity to 
consider the new lower term presumption for qualifying 
offenders.  The fact that the court did not expressly indicate that 
it was considering imposing the lower term reveals very little, 
as the newly enacted presumption in favor of the lower term did 
not exist at the time of Salazar’s sentencing.  In Gutierrez we 
remanded the cases for resentencing even though the sentencing 
courts made statements indicating that a lengthier sentence 
was appropriate.  (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1364, 
1367.)  In fact, we remanded in Gutierrez even though the 
sentencing court provided a much more forceful justification for 
imposing a lengthy sentence than the sentencing court did here.  
(See id. at p. 1367 [the sentencing court stated it was 
“ ‘absolutely convinced’ ” that life without the possibility of 
parole was “ ‘the only thing that the Court can do that could 
redress the amount of violence that was inflicted in this case’ ”].)  
The Attorney General’s framing here would flip the “clearly 
indicate” standard on its head: the sentencing court’s mere 
silence about whether it was considering the lower term cannot 
constitute a clear indication that it would not have imposed a 
 
protective order was being imposed.  These facts do little to 
impart a clear indication from the sentencing court.  
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
lower term even if it were applying the new law.  If anything, 
“[b]y selecting the middle term [under the former law], the trial 
court impliedly found the aggravating factors were not sufficient 
to warrant imposition of the high term.”  (Salazar, supra, 
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 466 (dis. opn. of Tangeman, J.).)   
Indeed, the record is very different from the circumstances 
in which we have previously found a clear indication that the 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence had it 
been aware of the scope of its discretionary powers.  For 
example, in Flores, the sentencing court stated, “ ‘I think Mr. 
Flores does fall into the category of the worst of the worst 
offenders thereby deserving the ultimate sentence of death.’ ”  
(Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 432.)  The sentencing court noted 
the defendant, “ ‘show[ed] absolutely no remorse’; ‘[i]t’s as if he 
has no soul.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In the sentencing court’s “ ‘opinion[,] 
justice will be served’ by a death sentence.”  (Ibid.)  Given that 
the sentencing court explicitly said it thought it “ ‘just[ ]’ ” for 
the defendant to receive a death sentence — “the most severe 
sentence available under California law” — we found it clear the 
sentencing court would not have exercised its newly conferred 
discretion to eliminate firearm enhancements “ ‘in the interest 
of justice.’ ”  (Ibid.)  However, we emphasized that “[w]e express 
no opinion” on the utility of remand in light of the newly 
conferred discretion to eliminate firearm enhancements “where 
the record shows the trial court approved of a high sentence 
short of the death penalty.”  (Id. at p. 432, fn. 16.)  Flores is thus 
distinct from the present case, which does not involve a death 
sentence and where the sentencing court’s comments are not at 
all comparable to those in Flores.  This case also does not present 
the circumstances in which the sentencing court announces that 
it is aware of forthcoming legislation and then explains how it 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
would exercise its discretion under that legislation.  The 
sentencing court’s statements here do not provide this type of 
clear indication of intent.   
In sum, in Gutierrez, we established that when a court has 
not exercised its informed discretion, remand is the default 
“unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would 
have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that 
it had such discretion.’ ”  (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 1391.)  We emphasize that principle again: unless there is a 
clear indication from the sentencing court that it would be idle 
to do so, remand for resentencing is required.  When the 
applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has 
substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always 
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing 
court would have done if it had known the scope of its 
discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.  Mere reliance 
on the length of the original sentence and attendant decisions, 
such as imposing consecutive sentences, imposing middle or 
upper term sentences, or declining to strike enhancements, is 
not sufficient to provide a clear indication of what a sentencing 
court might do on remand if it had been fully aware of the scope 
of its discretionary powers.  (See, e.g., People v. Almanza (2018) 
24 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1110–1111.)  Given the Attorney General’s 
concession that there is at least an affirmative indication in the 
record that Salazar may have suffered a qualifying trauma and 
that such qualifying trauma may have been a contributing 
factor to the offense; given that the sentencing court expressly 
referenced various mitigating factors in its ruling; and given 
that the sentencing court declined to impose the high term, we 
find no clear indication that the sentencing court would impose 
the same sentence even under the new law.  The current section 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
1170 is an ameliorative law that requires the sentencing court 
to impose the low term in cases where a qualifying trauma 
contributed to the offense and permits the sentencing court to 
depart from the lower term only in specific circumstances.  This 
is a marked departure from the prior law under which Salazar 
was sentenced.  The record must, accordingly, be clear before a 
reviewing court declines to remand and precludes the 
sentencing court from exercising discretion that it never knew it 
had.  On this record, “we cannot say with confidence what 
sentence [the court] would have imposed” if it were applying 
Senate Bill 567 in the first instance.  (Gutierrez, at p. 1391.)  The 
Legislature has created a procedure for a defendant to seek 
resentencing and the parties agree that Salazar, whose case is 
not yet final on appeal, is entitled to its application in this case.  
Having reviewed the record under the standard enunciated in 
Gutierrez, we conclude the appropriate remedy is to remand the 
matter to allow the sentencing court to exercise its discretion in 
the first instance.  We express no view as to how the court should 
resolve that question. 
 
III. Disposition 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to 
remand the case to the superior court for resentencing. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. SALAZAR 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Salazar 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 80 Cal.App.5th 453 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S275788 
Date Filed:  November 20, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Ventura 
Judge:  Anthony J. Sabo 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, 
Chung L. Mar, Steven D. Matthews and David F. Glassman, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Arielle Bases 
Bases & Bases, APC 
16633 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 500 
Encino, CA 91436 
(818) 905-1144 
 
David F. Glassman 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street  
Los Angeles, CA 90013  
(213) 269-6207