Case Title: Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017-SC-000041-DG, 2017-SC-000042-DG

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 1, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED 2017-SC-000041-DG THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY APPELLANT V. ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 2015-CA-001892-MR WARREN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-CI-00954 CHARLES ARMSTRONG, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CRAIG ARMSTRONG APPELLEE AND 2017-SC-000042-DG MARTIN CADILLAC, INC. D/B/A/ MARTIN DOCGE JEEP CHRYSLER APPELLANT V. ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 2015-CA-001892-MR WARREN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-CI-00954 CHARLES ARMSTRONG, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CRAIG ARMSTRONG APPELLEE OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER REVERSING AND REINSTATING Char l e s Ar mst r o ng sue d Mar t in Cad il l ac , Inc ., D/B/A/ Mar t in Do d ge Je e p Chr ysl e r (Mar t in); The Tr ave l e r s Ind e mnit y Co mpany (Tr ave l e r s), Mar t in’s insur e r ; t he Est at e o f Jo nat han El mo r e ; St at e Far m Mut ual Aut o mo bil e Insur anc e Co mpany (St at e Far m); and Ne ws Publ ishing, LLCy in War r e n Cir c uit Co ur t fo r t he wr o ngful d e at h o f his so n, Cr aig Ar mst r o ng. Char l e s se r ve d as ad minist r at o r o f Cr aig’s e st at e . i ABC Bo wl ing Gr e e n, LLC (ABC) was al so l at e r ad d e d as a par t y.2 El mo r e was d r iving t he ve hic l e in whic h Cr aig was a passe nge r ; bo t h El mo r e and Cr aig we r e kil l e d in t he ac c id e nt . It is und isput e d t hat El mo r e c ause d t he wr e c k. A numbe r o f par t ie s we r e sue d , inc l ud ing e ac h o f t he par t ie s ’ r e spe c t ive insur anc e c o mpanie s, al l in c o nne c t io n wit h who o wne d , o pe r at e d , o r was financ ial l y r e spo nsibl e fo r t he ve hic l e El mo r e was d r iving. The War r e n Cir c uit Co ur t gr ant e d summar y jud gme nt t o Tr ave l e r s and Mar t in, find ing t hat El mo r e was t he o wne r o f t he ve hic l e and t hus, Mar t in, and by e xt e nsio n. Tr ave l e r s, we r e no t financ ial l y l iabl e fo r t he l o ss. Aft e r t he Co ur t o f Appe al s r e ve r se d , we gr ant e d d isc r e t io naiy r e vie w t o e xamine Ke nt uc ky Re vise d St at ut e (KRS) 186A.220 and d e t e r mine t he impl ic at io ns o f t he st at ut o r y l anguage t o t he sal e o f t he ve hic l e in que st io n. 1 Fo r c l ar it y, we shal l r e fe r t o t he ar gume nt s and ac t io ns o f Char l e s as ad minist r at o r o f Cr aig’s e st at e c o l l e c t ive l y as “Ar mst r o ng.” 2 Mar t in fil e d a t hir d -par t y c o mpl aint against ABC, naming it as a t hir d -par t y d e fe nd ant . ABC was d ismisse d as a par t y aft e r Mar t in was gr ant e d summar y jud gme nt and d ismisse d fr o m t he pr o c e e d ings. ABC was no t a par t y t o t his appe al but was gr ant e d t o l e ave t o fil e an amic us br ie f. 1. BACKGROUND On No ve mbe r 30, 2013, Mar t in, a l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r , ac c e pt e d a 1996 Che vr o l e t Caval ie r (t he ve hic l e ) in t r ad e . On De c e mbe r 6, 2013, Mar t in gave t he ve hic l e t o ABC t o be so l d at an auc t io n. That same d ay, Te r r e z De Wal t (De Wal t ), r e pr e se nt at ive fo r De Wal t Aut o Sal e s (De Wal t Aut o ), a l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r , pl ac e d t he highe st bid fo r t he ve hic l e . De Wal t t o o k po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e o n t he same d ay. The t it l e had no t be e n pr o vid e d t o ABC, no r was it pr o vid e d t o De Wal t o r De Wal t Aut o . On De c e mbe r 26, 2013, Mar t in c o mpl e t e d t he st at ut o r il y r e quir e d No t ic e t o Cl e r k o f Ac quisit io n, r e que st ing t he c o unt y c l e r k t o r e c o r d t it l e assignme nt . Mar t in c o nc e d e s t hat t his pape r wo r k was no t t ime l y fil e d ; d e al e r s must no t ify t he c o unt y c l e r k o f t he assignme nt o f ve hic l e s t o t he d e al e r ship wit hin fift e e n d ays o f ac quir ing t he ve hic l e . KRS 186A.220(l ). This assignme nt by Mar t in was no t r e c o r d e d and no t e d in t he o nl ine syst e m wit h t he c o unt y c l e r k unt il Januar y 2, 2014. On Januar y 19, 2014, El mo r e pur c hase d t he ve hic l e fr o m De Wal t Aut o . He paid in c ash. On Januar y 20, 2014, he r e t ur ne d and sho we d De Wal t Aut o pr o o f o f insur anc e ,3 pur suant t o KRS 186A.220(5), and t o o k physic al po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . On Januar y 24, 2014, Mar t in d e l ive r e d pape r wo r k t r ansfe r r ing t it l e t o ABC and ABC d e l ive r e d a c he c k t o Mar t in fo r t he sal e o f t he ve hic l e . ABC d id no t no t e r e c e ipt o f t he pape r wo r k in it s syst e m unt il Mar c h 3 El mo r e was insur e d by Nat io nwid e in a po l ic y wit h $100,000 pe r inc id e nt and $50,000 pe r pe r so n l imit s. Nat io nwid e d e l ive r e d t he ful l $50,000 o f it s po l ic y l imit at io n t o t he War r e n Cir c uit Co ur t Cl e r k as t he po l ic y was und isput e d l y in e ffe c t at t he t ime o f t he fat al c ar ac c id e nt in t his c ase . 18, 2014 but r e pr e se nt at ive s ad mit t e d d ur ing d isc o ve r y t hat t his se e ms t o be in e r r o r and t he pape r wo r k was r e c e ive d in Januar y. On Apr il 5, 2014, El mo r e was d r iving t he ve hic l e , d e l ive r ing ne wspape r s fo r Ne ws Publ ishing, LLC. Cr aig was r id ing in t he ve hic l e as a passe nge r . El mo r e pul l e d int o t he pat h o f ano t he r ve hic l e at an int e r se c t io n and t he ve hic l e was hit by t he o nc o ming d r ive r . Bo t h El mo r e and Cr aig we r e fat al l y injur e d . Char l e s br o ught t his suit in his c apac it y as ad minist r at o r o f Cr aig’s e st at e . The main issue be fo r e t he c ir c uit c o ur t was who was t he st at ut o r y “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e at t he t ime o f t he c o l l isio n, and t hus, whic h insur anc e c o mpany was pr imar il y r e spo nsibl e fo r l iabil it y c o ve r age . Ac c o r d ing t o KRS 186.010(7)(a), t he “o wne r ” o f a ve hic l e is “a pe r so n who ho l d s t he l e gal t it l e o f a ve hic l e o r a pe r so n who pur suant t o a bo na fid e sal e has r e c e ive d physic al po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e subje c t t o any appl ic abl e se c ur it y int e r e st .” At t he t ime o f t he wr e c k, t he t it l e was st il l in Mar t in’s name as it had be e n assigne d t o t he d e al e r ship at t r ad e -in. Ho we ve r , it is al so und isput e d t hat Mar t in no l o nge r had physic al po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . KRS 186.010(7)(c ) d ic t at e s t hat “[a] l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r who t r ansfe r s physic al po sse ssio n o f a mo t o r ve hic l e t o a pur c hase r pur suant t o a bo na fid e sal e , and c o mpl ie s wit h t he r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220, shal l no t be d e e me d t he o wne r o f t hat mo t o r ve hic l e so l e l y d ue t o an assignme nt t o his d e al e r ship o r a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e in t he d e al e r ship’s name .” The r e fo r e , t he e nsuing que st io n is: d id Mar t in c o mpl y wit h KRS 186A.220 in o r d e r t o r e d e e m t he r ight in KRS 186.010(7)(c ) and e nd it s id e nt it y as “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e ? At t he c r ux o f bo t h par t ie s ’ ar gume nt as t o l iabil it y is KRS 186A.220(5) whic h st at e s: Whe n [t he d e al e r ] assigns t he ve hic l e t o a purchaser for use, he shal l d e l ive r t he pr o pe r l y assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e , and o t he r d o c ume nt s if appr o pr iat e , t o suc h pur c hase r , who shal l make appl ic at io n fo r r e gist r at io n and a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e t he r e o n. The d e al e r may, wit h t he c o nse nt o f t he pur c hase r , d e l ive r t he assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e , and o t he r appr o pr iat e d o c ume nt s o f a ne w o r use d ve hic l e , d ir e c t l y t o t he c o unt y c l e r k, and o n be hal f o f t he pur c hase r , make appl ic at io n fo r r e gist r at io n and a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e . In so d o ing, t he d e al e r shall require from the purchaser proof of insurance as mand at e d by KRS 304.39-080 be fo r e d e l ive r ing po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . ... (e mphasis ad d e d ). It is und isput e d t hat Mar t in d id no t r e quir e pr o o f o f insur anc e fr o m e it he r ABC o r De Wal t upo n t he pur c hase o f t he ve hic l e . Ar mst r o ng ar gue s t hat Mar t in fail e d t o st r ic t l y c o mpl y wit h t his st at ut o r y pr o visio n; t he r e fo r e , it is unabl e t o c l aim t he e xc e pt io n o f KRS 186.010{7)(c ) and Mar t in is st il l t he l e gal “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e fo r insur anc e l iabil it y. Mar t in and Tr ave l e r s, ho we ve r , ar gue t hat e it he r (1) t he “pur c hase r fo r use ” l anguage in t he r e quir e me nt me ans t hat it o nl y appl ie s in d e al e r -t o -c o nsume r sal e s, r at he r t han d e al e r -t o -d e al e r t r ansac t io ns o r (2) if Mar t in was r e quir e d t o ve r ify insur anc e , De Wal t ’s l at e r c o mpl ianc e wit h t he r e quir e me nt in t he sal e t o El mo r e o ve r r id e s any l iabil it y Mar t in may have had . The st at ut e was r e c e nt l y ame nd e d in 2016. At t he t ime o f t he ve hic l e c o l l isio n, t his is t he l anguage o f t he st at ut e . The ame nd me nt s d ivid e t his se c t io n int o se ve r al subse c t io ns but d o no t mat e r ial l y al t e r t he r e quir e me nt s. The c ir c uit c o ur t int e r pr e t e d t he st at ut e t he same as Mar t in and Tr ave l e r s. In it s o r d e r , t he c o ur t int e r pr e t e d “pur c hase r fo r use ” as “a pur c hase r who int e nd s t o use t he ve hic l e .” The c o ur t we nt fur t he r t o l imit t he appl ic at io n t o “pur c hase r s who int e nd t o use t he c ar by d r iving it .” De Wal t was no t a pur c hase r fo r use und e r t his d e finit io n and Mar t in was no t r e quir e d t o ve r ify t he buye r ’s insur anc e . As suc h, und e r KRS 186.010(7)(c ), Mar t in c o ul d no t be he l d t he “o wne r ” o n t he so l e basis o f t it l e be ing in it s name . El mo r e pr o c ur e d t he ve hic l e in a bo na fid e t r ansac t io n and t he r e , t he se l l e r , De Wal t Aut o , d id c o mpl y wit h t he r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220(5). As suc h, El mo r e was t he st at ut o r y “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e , e ve n t ho ugh t it l e was st il l in Mar t in’s name . The c ir c uit c o ur t al so d ismisse d al l c l aims o f bad fait h against Tr ave l e r s aft e r t his r ul ing. The Co ur t o f Appe al s int e r pr e t e d t he st at ut e d iffe r e nt l y. It d e t e r mine d t hat “[t ]he st at ut o r y d ut y t o o bt ain pr o o f o f insur anc e be fo r e d e l ive r ing po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e t o t he pur c hase r appl ie s e ve n whe n a d e al e r se l l s t he ve hic l e t o ano t he r d e al e r ,” r e l ying upo n ano t he r Co ur t o f Appe al s d e c isio n, Calhoun v. Provence, 395 S.W.3d 476 (Ky. App. 2012). The Co ur t d e t e r mine d t hat Mar t in sho we d a “who l e sc al e d isr e gar d fo r t he st at ut o r y r e quir e me nt s ” and suc h d isr e gar d “fl ie s in t he fac e o f l o ngst and ing Ke nt uc ky jur ispr ud e nc e r e quir ing st r ic t st at ut o r y c o mpl ianc e .” It fo und t hat Mar t in was r e quir e d t o ve r ify pr o o f o f insur anc e be fo r e t he buye r t o o k po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . The Co ur t o f Appe al s d id no t d e fine o r e xpl ain t he me aning o f “pur c hase r fo r use ,” st at ing o nl y t hat d e al e r s al so “use ve hic l e s o n t he ir l o t fo r a var ie t y o f pur po se s. inc l ud ing sal e s fo r pr o fit .” It al so he l d t hat t he d e l ay in t r ansfe r r ing t it l e by bo t h Mar t in and De Wal t Aut o was pivo t al t o o wne r ship and unc l e ar fr o m t he r e c o r d . It r e ve r se d t he gr ant o f summar y jud gme nt and r e mand e d fo r t he t r ial c o ur t t o c o nd uc t fur t he r pr o c e e d ings o n whe t he r Mar t in pr o mpt l y c o mpl ie d wit h it s st at ut o r y r e quir e me nt s. Base d o n t his find ing, it al so r e ve r se d t he d ismissal o f t he bad fait h c l aims. IL STANDARD OF REVIEW The pr imar y issue no w be fo r e t he Co ur t is int e r pr e t at io n o f KRS 186A.220. The c o nst r uc t io n and appl ic at io n o f st at ut e s is a mat t e r o f l aw, whic h we r e vie w de novo, Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Com. Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1998), wit ho ut any d e fe r e nc e t o t he int e r pr e t at io n affo r d e d by t he c ir c uit c o ur t . Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998) (c it ing Louisville Edible Oil Products, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet Commonwealth of Kentucky, 957 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. App. 1997)); see also Jefferson County Bd. OfEduc. V. Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Ky. 2012) (c it ing Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007)). III. ANALYSIS A. KENTUCKY IS A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE STATE, BUT THERE IS AN EXCEPTION. Pur suant t o KRS Chapt e r 186A, and wit h t he c hapt e r ’s e ffe c t uat io n, “Ke nt uc ky is a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e st at e fo r t he pur po se s o f d e t e r mining o wne r ship o f a mo t o r ve hic l e and r e quir ing l iabil it y insur anc e c o ve r age .” Potts 7 V. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Ky. 1993). Unl e ss c e r t ain st at ut o r y pr o visio ns ar e me t , “[t ]he o wne r o f a mo t o r ve hic l e is t he t it l e ho l d e r [.]” Id. “The ad o pt io n o f K.R.S. Chapt e r 186A ... had t he e ffe c t o f c hanging t he l aw o f Ke nt uc ky fr o m an e quit abl e t it l e st at e t o a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e st at e fo r t he pur po se s o f d e t e r mining o wne r ship o f a mo t o r ve hic l e fo r l iabil it y insur anc e r e quir e me nt s.” Id. Thus, t he t it l e o wne r wo ul d no r mal l y be c o nsid e r e d t he st at ut o r y o wne r o f t he ve hic l e and t hat o wne r ’s insur anc e c o mpany wo ul d be l iabl e in c e r t ain c ir c umst anc e s. Ho we ve r , in 1994, t he l e gisl at ur e ad d e d t he l anguage at issue in t his c ase in KRS 186A.220(5), “c r e at [ing] an e xc e pt io n t o t he ge ne r al st at ut o r y sc he me t hat make s t he t it l e ho l d e r t he o wne r o f a ve hic l e fo r insur anc e pur po se s.” Auto Acceptance Corp. v. T.IG. Ins. Co., 89 S.W.Sd 398, 401 (Ky. 2002). As pr e vio usl y quo t e d , KRS 186.010(7)(c ) st at e s t hat “[a] l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r who t r ansfe r s physic al po sse ssio n o f a mo t o r ve hic l e t o a pur c hase r pur suant t o a bo na fid e sal e , and c o mpl ie s wit h t he r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220, shal l no t be d e e me d t he o wne r o f t hat mo t o r ve hic l e so l e l y d ue t o an assignme nt t o his d e al e r ship o r a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e in t he d e al e r ship’s name .” This c r e at e s a c l e ar e xc e pt io n t o t he c e r t ific at e o f t it l e ho l d e r be ing t he l e gal o wne r o f a ve hic l e . No t abl y, t he e xc e pt io n o nl y appl ie s t o “l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r [s]”. The l e gisl at ur e c l e ar l y c o nt e mpl at e d po int s whe r e a d e al e r may st il l be a t it l e ho l d e r but , in o r d e r t o e ffe c t uat e t he e ffic ie nt fl o w o f c o mme r c e t o buye r s, int e nd e d t hat t he ac t ual buye r sho ul d be c o nsid e r e d t he “o wne r ” e ve n be fo r e t he c e r t ific at e o f t it l e has be e n r e c o r d e d in t hat buye r ’s 8 name . Ho we ve r , t o pr o pe r l y c o nse r ve t he po l ic y int e nt o f KRS Chapt e r 186A, as we l l as t he Mo t o r Ve hic l e Re par at io ns Ac t (MVRA), t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y r e quir e d t he d e al e r t o c o mpl y wit h c e r t ain r e quir e me nt s t o avail it se l f o f t his e xc e pt io n and c ut o ff it s po t e nt ial l iabil it y. Tho se r e quir e me nt s ar e c o d ifie d in KRS 186A.220. The r e ar e se ve n se par at e subse c t io ns t o KRS 186A.220. KRS 186A.220(l ): Exc e pt as o t he r wise pr o vid e d in t his c hapt e r , whe n any mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r l ic e nse d in t his st at e buys o r ac c e pt s suc h a ve hic l e in t r ad e , whic h has be e n pr e vio usl y r e gist e r e d o r t it l e d fo r use in t his o r ano t he r st at e , and whic h he ho l d s fo r r e sal e , he shal l no t be r e quir e d t o o bt ain a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e fo r it , but shal l , wit hin fift e e n (15) d ays aft e r ac quir ing suc h ve hic l e , no t ify t he c o unt y c l e r k o f t he assignme nt o f t he mo t o r ve hic l e t o his d e al e r ship and pay t he r e quir e d t r ansfe r o r fe e . No t abl y he r e , t he l e gisl at ur e mad e t his se c t io n appl ic abl e t o ve hic l e s t hat a d e al e r ship ac c e pt s in t r ad e o r buys fo r t he e xpr e ss pur po se o f resale. In t ho se c ir c umst anc e s, t he d e al e r is not st at ut o r il y r e quir e d t o o bt ain a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e but is o bl igat e d t o no t ify t he c o unt y c l e r k o f t he ve hic l e ’s ac quisit io n. KRS 186A.220(2): Upo n pur c hasing suc h a ve hic l e o r ac c e pt ing it in t r ad e , t he d e al e r shal l o bt ain fr o m his t r ansfe r o r , pr o pe r l y e xe c ut e d , al l d o c ume nt s r e quir e d by KRS 186A.215, t o inc l ud e t he o d o me t e r d isc l o sur e st at e me nt t he r e o n, t o ge t he r wit h a pr o pe r l y assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e . This se c t io n pr o vid e s in o bt aining “suc h ve hic l e [s,]” in o t he r wo r d s, ve hic l e s bo ught o r ac c e pt e d in t r ad e fo r r e sal e t hat have be e n pr e vio usl y r e gist e r e d o r t it l e d , t he d e al e r must o bt ain al l t he d o c ume nt s und e r KRS 186A.215. The se d o c ume nt s inc l ud e t he c e r t ific at e o f t it l e fr o m t he t r ansfe r o r , whic h c an t he n be 9 assigne d t o t he d e al e r ship. KRS 186A.215 al so o ut l ine s t he r e quir e me nt s t hat bo t h t r ansfe r o r and t r ansfe r e e must und e r t ake t o pr o mpt l y and pr o pe r l y t r ansfe r t it l e o wne r ship in a ve hic l e be t we e n t he par t ie s. He r e , t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y c ho se t o o ut l ine a d iffe r e nt pr o c e d ur e whe n t his kind o f ve hic l e is ac c e pt e d o r bo ught by a l ic e nse d d e al e r ship. It st il l r e quir e d t he same d o c ume nt at io n but al l o ws an assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e fo r t he d e al e r t o go fo r war d . KRS 186A.220(3): The d e al e r shal l e xe c ut e his appl ic at io n fo r assignme nt upo n d o c ume nt s d e signat e d by t he De par t me nt o f Ve hic l e Re gul at io n, t o t he c o unt y c l e r k o f t he c o unt y in whic h he maint ains his pr inc ipal pl ac e o f busine ss. Suc h c l e r k shal l e nt e r t he assignme nt upo n t he aut o mat e d syst e m. This st at ut o r y pr o visio n is simpl e and st r aight fo r war d . The d e al e r is inst r uc t e d t o fil e t he r e quir e d d o c ume nt s in t he c o unt y whe r e he has his pr inc ipal pl ac e o f busine ss. This po r t io n al so d ir e c t s t he c l e r k t o e nt e r suc h assignme nt s int o t he aut o mat e d syst e m, al l o wing no t ic e o f suc h assignme nt s fo r int e r e st e d par t ie s. KRS 186A.220(4): The d e al e r shal l r e t ain t he pr o pe r l y assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e fr o m his t r ansfe r o r , and may make any r e assignme nt s t he r e o n unt il t he fo r ms fo r d e al e r assignme nt o n t he c e r t ific at e o f t it l e ar e e xhaust e d . The De par t me nt o f Ve hic l e Re gul at io n may, if it d e e ms it war r ant e d , pr o vid e a spe c ial d o c ume nt t o al l o w fo r ad d it io nal d e al e r assignme nt s wit ho ut r e quir ing syst e m ge ne r at e d d o c ume nt s. 10 This pr o visio n se e ms t o be mo r e o f an as-ne e d e d al l o wanc e . It al l o ws fo r d e al e r s t o r e assign o n t he t r ansfe r o r ’s c e r t ific at e o f t it l e o r , as ne e d e d , o bt ain a spe c ial d o c ume nt t o al l o w fo r ad d it io nal assignme nt s. KRS 186A.220(5): Whe n he assigns t he ve hic l e t o a pur c hase r fo r use , he shal l d e l ive r t he pr o pe r l y assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e , and o t he r d o c ume nt s if appr o pr iat e , t o suc h pur c hase r , who shal l make appl ic at io n fo r r e gist r at io n and a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e t he r e o n. The d e al e r may, wit h t he c o nse nt o f t he pur c hase r , d e l ive r t he assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e , and o t he r appr o pr iat e d o c ume nt s o f a ne w o r use d ve hic l e , d ir e c t l y t o t he c o unt y c l e r k, and o n be hal f o f t he pur c hase r , make appl ic at io n fo r r e gist r at io n and a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e . In so d o ing, t he d e al e r shal l r e quir e fr o m t he pur c hase r pr o o f o f insur anc e as mand at e d by KRS 304.39-080 be fo r e d e l ive r ing po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . No t wit hst and ing t he pr o visio ns o f KRS 186.020, 186A.065, 186A.095, 186A.215, and 186A.300, if a d e al e r e l e c t s t o d e l ive r t he t it l e d o c ume nt s t o t he c o unt y c l e r k and has no t r e c e ive d a c l e ar c e r t ific at e o f t it l e fr o m a pr io r o wne r , t he d e al e r shal l r e t ain t he d o c ume nt s in his po sse ssio n unt il t he c e r t ific at e o f t it l e is o bt aine d . KRS 186A.220(5) is t he pr o visio n in que st io n fo r t his t r ansac t io n. It is c l e ar l y a r e quir e me nt fo r d e al e r s. The “he ” at t he be ginning r e fe r s t o t he “d e al e r ” as ant e c e d e nt . But what is unc l e ar is what e xac t l y t he l e gisl at ur e me ant by “pur c hase r fo r use ”. KRS 186A.220(6-7) ar e d ir e c t ive s t o st at e d e par t me nt s and age nc ie s in pr o c e ssing r e gist r at io n appl ic at io ns, c e r t ific at e s o f t it l e , and fe e s. B. KRS 186A.22O(5) DOES NOT APPLY TO DEALER-TO-DEALER TRANSACTIONS. It is c l e ar t o t his Co ur t , fr o m an in-d e pt h e xaminat io n o f t he st at ut o r y l anguage at issue , t hat a “pur c hase r fo r use ” in KRS 186A.220(5) d o e s not impl ic at e t r ansac t io ns fr o m d e al e r t o d e al e r fo r t he pur po se o f r e sal e . The 11 e xac t me aning o f “pur c hase r fo r use ” is und e fine d in KRS Chapt e r 186A. Ho we ve r , l o o king t o t he int e nt o f t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y, t he st at ut o r y c o nt e xt , o t he r st at ut o r y pr o visio ns, and r ul e s o f c o nst r uc t io n, we c an d isc e r n t he me aning. A pur c hase r fo r use is a c o nsume r buye r ; it d o e s no t inc l ud e l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r s t hat ar e pur c hasing ve hic l e s fo r t he so l e pur po se o f r e sal e . a. The plain language of the statute is unclear. “We must l o o k fir st t o t he pl ain l anguage o f a st at ut e and , if t he l anguage is c l e ar , o ur inquir y e nd s.” Seeger v. Lanham, 542 S.W.Sd 286, 291 (Ky. 2018) (c it ing Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.Sd 815, 819 (Ky. 2005)). Ho we ve r , if a st at ut e is “r e aso nabl y c apabl e o f be ing und e r st o o d in mo r e t han o ne se nse ,” it is ambiguo us and t he Co ur t must t ur n t o o t he r me t ho d s o f int e r pr e t at io n. Jefferson County Bd. Of Educ., 391 S.W.Sd at 723 (quo t ing MPM Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton, 289 S.W.Sd 193, 197 (Ky. 2009)). The d e t e r minat ive phr ase he r e is “pur c hase r fo r use .” Pur c hase r is c l e ar but “fo r use ” c o ul d have mul t ipl e me anings. “Use ” in t he We bst e r ’s d ic t io nar y is d e fine d bo t h as a no un and a ve r b. The no un fo r m is d e fine d as “t he ac t o r pr ac t ic e o f e mpl o ying so me t hing,” and t he ve r b fo r m is “t o put int o ac t io n o r se r vic e ” o r “t o avail o ne se l f o f” It is unc l e ar e xac t l y what “fo r use ” e nc o mpasse s. The d e finit io n c o ul d be so e xpansive as t o be c o me gr at uit o us; pr ac t ic al l y anyt hing c o ul d be c o nsid e r e d a “use ” und e r a br o ad e no ugh int e nt . Thus, t he d e finit io nal guid anc e pr o vid e s no e nl ight e nme nt as t o t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y’s int e nt he r e . It c o ul d me an an ac t ive “use ” as in d r iving; it c o ul d 12 me an a passive “use ” as in buying fo r inve st me nt pur po se s. The po ssibil it ie s ar e e nd l e ss. We must assume t he wo r d s ut il ize d by t he l e gisl at ur e have pur po se and signific anc e . As suc h, we ar e fo r c e d t o mo ve be yo nd t he pl ain l anguage o f t he st at ut e t o asc e r t ain t he l e gisl at ive me aning. b. The legislature intended an efficient system of sale and registration, while still protecting operators from uninsured drivers. “The fund ame nt al r ul e in st at ut o r y int e r pr e t at io n is t o give e ffe c t t o t he l e gisl at ive int e nt .” Kentucky Indus. Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1998) (c it ing Wesley v. Bd. OfEduc. Of Nicholas County, 403 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1966)). We int e r pr e t st at ut e s “ac c o r d ing t o t he pl ain me aning o f t he ac t and in ac c o r d anc e wit h t he l e gisl at ive int e nt .” Pate v. Department of Corrections, 466 S.W.3d 480, 488 (Ky. 2015) (quo t ing Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Ky. 2002) (c it ing Commonwealth V. Montague, 23 S.W.3d 629 (Ky. 2000))). KRS 446.080 al so inst r uc t s t hat “[a]l l st at ut e s o f t his st at e shal l be l ibe r al l y c o nst r ue d wit h a vie w t o pr o mo t e t he ir o bje c t s and c ar iy o ut t he int e nt o f t he l e gisl at ur e [.]” KRS Chapt e r 186A was e nac t e d t o d e ve l o p “[a]n aut o mat e d mo t o r ve hic l e and t r ail e r r e gist r at io n and t it l ing syst e mf.]” KRS 186A.010(1). The syst e m was int e nd e d : t o e nabl e Ke nt uc ky ’s c o unt y c l e r ks t o pr o d uc e mo t o r ve hic l e and t r ail e r c e r t ific at e s o f r e gist r at io n in t he ir o ffic e s, and c e r t ific at e s o f t it l e in Fr ankfo r t , by aut o mat e d me ans ut il izing t e l e c o mmunic at io n t e r minal s and asso c iat e d d e vic e s suppl ie d by t he Co mmo nwe al t h, t o inhibit r e gist r at io n and t r ansfe r o f st o l e n mo t o r ve hic l e s o r t r ail e r s, t o impr o ve t he c apabil it y o f d e t e c t ing and r e c o ve r ing suc h ve hic l e s, t o e nsur e d e ve l o pme nt o f a c o mmo n ve hic l e info r mat io n 13 d at abase t o impr o ve e ffic ie nc y in aud it ing mo t o r ve hic l e usage t ax, l ic e nse fe e c o l l e c t io ns, and in c o l l e c t ing pe r so nal pr o pe r t y t ax t o pr o vid e info r mat io n t o t he t r affic r e c o r d syst e m, and t o pr o vid e impr o ve d se c ur it y int e r e st pr o t e c t e d t o po t e nt ial c r e d it o r s t hr o ugho ut Ke nt uc ky whil e simul t ane o usl y r e d uc ing t he numbe r o f fo r ms t hat must be pr o c e sse d and st o r e d e ac h ye ar in Ke nt uc ky. Id. This go al o f an “e ffic ie nt ” syst e m make s mo r e se nse in l ight o f KRS 190.015, d e c l ar ing “t hat t he d ist r ibut io n and sal e o f ve hic l e s wit hin t his st at e vit al l y affe c t s t he ge ne r al e c o no my o f t he st at e and publ ic int e r e st and t he publ ic we l far e [.]” Find ing t his vit al int e r e st , t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y fo und t hat it was impe r at ive “t o r e gul at e and l ic e nse d e al e r s o f ve hic l e s d o ing busine ss in t his st at e , in o r d e r t o pr e ve nt fr aud s, impo sit io ns, and o t he r abuse s upo n it s c it ize ns, and t o pr o t e c t and pr e se r ve t he inve st me nt s and pr o pe r t ie s o f t he c it ize ns o f t his st at e .” Id. KRS 186A.220(5) al so spe c ific al l y c it e s t o t he insur anc e r e quir e me nt s o f t he MVRA, int e r t wining t ho se l e gisl at ive go al s, as we l l . That Ac t was int e nd e d t o c r e at e a be t t e r insur anc e syst e m wit h ad e quat e r e gul at io ns, pr o mpt payme nt s t o vic t ims, and “guar ant e e [] c o nt inue d avail abil it y o f mo t o r ve hic l e insur anc e at r e aso nabl e pr ic e s by a mo r e e ffic ie nt , e c o no mic al and e quit abl e syst e m o f mo t o r ve hic l e ac c id e nt r e par at io ns!.]” KRS 304.39-010. Suc c inc t l y, Ke nt uc ky’s po l ic y wit hin t he MVRA is “t o ke e p uninsur e d mo t o r ist s o ff Ke nt uc ky ’s r o ad s.” Auto Acceptance Corp., 89 S.W.3d at 401 (quo t ing Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru, 947 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1997)). In many ways, t he pr o visio ns o f KRS Chapt e r s 186 (Lic e nsing o f Mo t o r Ve hic l e s, Ope r at o r s, and Tr ail e r s), 186A (Aut o mat e d Mo t o r Ve hic l e Re gist r at io n Syst e m), 190 (Mo t o r Ve hic l e Sal e s), and 304.39 (MVRA) wo r k in c o nc e r t t o 14 pr o t e c t c o nsume r s and d r ive r s fr o m var io us d ange r s: fr aud , uninsur e d d r ive r s, d amage s r e l at e d t o ac c id e nt s, e t c . Thus, it is impo r t ant fo r t his Co ur t t o r e c o gnize t his c o nt e xt o f a mul t i-fac e t e d , mul t i-l aye r syst e m t hat d r ive r s ar e e nme she d in by buying and ut il izing ve hic l e s in Ke nt uc ky. Give n t he se pr o visio ns, we must int e r pr e t t he st at ut e in o r d e r t o ac c o mpl ish t he l e gisl at ive go al s o f pr e ve nt ing uninsur e d d r ive r s fr o m e nd ange r ing o t he r s o n t he r o ad ways whil e al so maint aining an e ffic ie nt and e c o no mic al syst e m fo r c o nsume r s and busine sse s t o c o nd uc t sal e s t r ansac t io ns fo r ve hic l e s in t he Co mmo nwe al t h. c. The statutory scheme as a whole shows a difference between “purchaser for use” and a dealer purchase for “resale.” We pr e sume t hat t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y int e nd e d fo r t he st at ut o r y sc he me t o be c o nst r ue d as a who l e . Hall v. Hospitality Resources, Inc., 276 S.W.Sd 775, 784 (Ky. 2008) (c it ing Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op Corp., 189 S.W.Sd 87, 92 (Ky. 2005)). “Ge ne r al pr inc ipl e s o f st at ut o r y c o nst r uc t io n ho l d t hat a c o ur t must no t be guid e d by a singl e se nt e nc e o f a st at ut e but must l o o k t o t he pr o visio ns o f t he who l e st at ut e and it s o bje c t and po l ic y.” Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.Sd 56, 58 (Ky. 2004) (quo t ing County of Harlan v. Appalachian Reg’I Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.Sd 607, 611 (Ky. 2002)). The phr ase “pur c hase r fo r use ” o nl y appe ar s o ne o t he r t ime in KRS Chapt e r 186A.5 KRS 186A. 120(1) st at e s t hat an o wne r must appl y fo r c e r t ific at e o f r e gist r at io n o r t it l e and a l ic e nse pl at e in t he c o unt y in whic h t he 5 In fac t , t he phr ase o nl y appe ar s o ne o t he r pl ac e in al l o f Ke nt uc ky ’s st at ut e s o t he r t han t he se t wo st at ut e s in KRS Chapt e r 186A. In KRS 235.220(4), t he r e is r e fe r e nc e t o t he pr o c e ss fo r a d e al e r assigning a mo t o r bo at t o a “pur c hase r fo r use .” 15 o wne r r e sid e s. Ho we ve r , “if a ve hic l e is pur c hase d fr o m a d e al e r o t he r t han in t he c o unt y in whic h t he purchaser for use r e sid e s, t he pur c hase r , o r t he d e al e r o n be hal f o f t he pur c hase r , may make appl ic at io n fo r r e gist r at io n t o t he c o unt y c l e r k in e it he r t he c o unt y in whic h t he pur c hase r r e sid e s, o r in t he c o unt y in whic h t he d e al e r ’s pr inc ipal pl ac e o f busine ss is l o c at e d .” Id. (e mphasis ad d e d ). The l e gisl at ur e he r e d iffe r e nt iat e d be t we e n a “pur c hase r fo r use [‘s]” residence and a d e al e r ’s pr inc ipal pl ac e o f business. The infe r e nc e is t hat d e al e r s, me aning pl ac e s o f busine ss, ar e se par at e and d ist inc t fr o m a c o nsume r , a “pur c hase r fo r use .” This d iffe r e nt iat io n c o nt inue s in t he d iffe r e nt pr o visio ns o f KRS 186A.220. KRS 186A.220(1) st at e s t hat “whe n any mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r l ic e nse d in t his st at e buys o r ac c e pt s suc h a ve hic l e in t r ad e , whic h has be e n pr e vio usl y r e gist e r e d o r t it l e d fo r use in t his o r ano t he r st at e , and which he holds for resale, he shal l no t be r e quir e d t o o bt ain a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e fo r it ” (e mphasis ad d e d ). Inst e ad , in suc h c ir c umst anc e s, t he d e al e r is r e quir e d t o fil e a no t ic e wit h t he c o unt y c l e r k. See id. The l e gisl at ur e has e xpr e ssl y pr o vid e d t hat whe n a l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r ho l d s a ve hic l e fo r r e sal e , t he d e al e r is no t r e quir e d t o o bt ain a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e . Ho we ve r , in KRS 186A.220(5), whe n t he ve hic l e is assigne d t o a “pur c hase r fo r use ,” t hat pur c hase r “shal l make appl ic at io n fo r r e gist r at io n and a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e t he r e o n.”^ Of c o ur se . 6 The Co ur t o f Appe al s infe r r e d fr o m t he l anguage o f t he st at ut e t hat t he l at e r st and -al o ne “pur c hase r ” t e r m r at he r t han c o nt inuing t o use t he ful l phr ase o f “pur c hase r fo r use ” t hr o ugho ut KRS 186A.220(5) r e fe r r e d t o t wo se par at e e nt it ie s. We d o no t find suc h an infe r e nc e pe r suasive . Aft e r using t he t e r m “pur c hase r fo r use ,” t he l e gisl at ur e t he n r e fe r r e d t o “suc h pur c hase r ,” c l e ar l y r e fe r e nc ing bac k t o t he 16 t his pr o visio n al so pr o vid e s t hat upo n e xpr e ss c o nse nt fr o m t he pur c hase r and pr o o f o f t he pur c hase r ’s insur anc e , t he d e al e r c an o bt ain t it l e and r e gist r at io n fo r t he pur c hase r . Ho we ve r , what is impo r t ant he r e is t he mand at o r y shall. A pur c hase r fo r use is mand at o r il y r e quir e d t o o bt ain c e r t ific at e o f t it l e and r e gist e r t he ve hic l e . If a l ic e nse d d e al e r buying a ve hic l e fo r r e sal e is t he same as a pur c hase r fo r use , t he n t he r e is an e xpl ic it c o nfl ic t be t we e n se c t io ns 1 and 5. Se c t io n 1 pr o vid e s t hat suc h a d e al e r is no t r e quir e d t o o bt ain a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e but se c t io n 5 mand at e s t hat t he pur c hase r shall o bt ain t he t it l e . “Whe n t he appl ic at io n o f t wo st at ut e s l e ad s t o appar e nt c o nfl ic t , we have a d ut y t o har mo nize t he m so as t o give e ffe c t t o bo t h, if po ssibl e .” Spees v. Kentucky Legal Aid, 274 S.W.Sd 447, 450 (Ky. 2009) (c it ing Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. V. McBumey, 993 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1999)). The o nl y way t o har mo nize t he se t wo pr o visio ns is t o und e r st and t hat t he int e nt was t o t r e at d e al e r s pur c hasing fo r r e sal e differently t han pur c hase r s fo r use . A “pur c hase r fo r use ” in KRS 186A.220(5) c anno t be int e r pr e t e d so e xpansive l y as t o inc l ud e t he d e al e r s who ar e pur c hasing o r ac c e pt ing t r ad e d ve hic l e s fo r r e sal e , as d e sc r ibe d in KRS 186A.220(1). d. The Motor Vehicle Commission has interpreted “purchaser for use” as a consumer. “Jud ic ial no t ic e may be t ake n at any st age o f t he pr o c e e d ing.” Ke nt uc ky Rul e o f Evid e nc e (KRE) 201(1). “A jud ic ial l y no t ic e d fac t must be o ne no t phr ase “pur c hase r fo r use .” We c an pr e sume , t he n, t hat t he e nt ir e se c t io n o f KRS 186A.220(5) r e fe r s t o t he r e quir e me nt s fo r a t r ansac t io n wit h a “pur c hase r fo r use .” 17 subje c t t o r e aso nabl e d isput e in t hat it is e it he r : (1) Ge ne r al l y kno wn wit hin t he c o unt y fr o m whic h t he jur o r s ar e d r awn, o r , ... in whic h t he ve nue o f t he ac t io n is fixe d ; o r (2) Capabl e o f ac c ur at e and r e ad y d e t e r minat io n by r e so r t t o so ur c e s who se ac c ur ac y c anno t r e aso nabl y be que st io ne d .” KRE 201(b). This pr o visio n “me r e l y c o d ifie d t he c o mmo n l aw o f Ke nt uc ky whic h r e c o gnize d t he aut ho r it y o f an appe l l at e c o ur t t o t ake jud ic ial no t ic e o f an appr o pr iat e fac t .” Doe V. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Ky. App. 2005) (c it at io n o mit t e d ). Ho we ve r , “jud ic ial no t ic e sho ul d be use d c aut io usl y o n appe al so as , no t t o subve r t t he r ul e s c o nc e r ning pr e se r vat io n o f e r r o r .” Id. (int e r nal c it at io n o mit t e d ). “A c o ur t may pr o pe r l y t ake jud ic ial no t ic e o f publ ic r e c o r d s and go ve r nme nt d o c ume nt s, inc l ud ing publ ic r e c o r d s and go ve r nme nt d o c ume nt s avail abl e fr o m r e l iabl e so ur c e s o n t he int e r ne t .” Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Ky. App. 2004) (c it at io n o mit t e d ). Mar t in and Tr ave l e r s have aske d t his Co ur t t o t ake jud ic ial no t ic e o f t he Ke nt uc ky Mo t o r Ve hic l e Co mmissio n De al e r Hand bo o k. The Appe l l ant s have pr o vid e d a c o py o f t he hand bo o k, in it s e nt ir e t y, as an e xhibit t o it s br ie fs, and t he hand bo o k is r e ad il y avail abl e fr o m t he Mo t o r Ve hic l e Co mmissio n’s we bsit e o nl ine . Kentucky Motor Vehicle Commission, Kentucky Motor Vehicle Commission Dealer Handbook (2O14).7 Give n it s po r t abl e d o c ume nt fil e t ype , t he fac t t hat it is pr o d uc e d and publ ishe d by a st at ut o r il y-c r e at e d c o mmissio n,» 7 This hand bo o k c an be fo und at ht t ps: / ! mvc .kv. go v / Re so ur c e s / De al e r Hand bo o k2014 .pd f. 8 See KRS 190.010 and KRS 190.020. 18 and it s avail abil it y via a go ve r nme nt we bsit e , we ho l d it is an appr o pr iat e mat e r ial o f whic h t o t ake jud ic ial no t ic e und e r KRE 201. Se c t io n VI o f t he Hand bo o k is e nt it l e d “Ve hic l e Ac quisit io n and Tr ansfe r Re quir e me nt s by a De al e r .” The hand bo o k inst r uc t s d e al e r s t hat t he y ar e no t r e quir e d t o o bt ain t it l e s fo r mo t o r ve hic l e s “ac quir e d by a d e al e r ship fo r t he pur po se o f r e sal e ” unl e ss t he t r ansfe r r ing t it l e d o c ume nt r uns o ut o f spac e fo r fur t he r t r ansfe r s o r is no t a c o nfo r ming d o c ume nt it se l f. Id. De pe nd ing upo n “[wjhe t he r a ve hic l e is ‘t it l e d ’ t o a d e al e r o r ‘d e al e r assigne d ’ t o a d e al e r wil l have an impac t o n ho w t he d e al e r is t axe d fo r t hat ve hic l e . Al l ve hic l e s t it l e d in a d e al e r ship name as o f Januar y 1 o f e ac h ye ar wil l be t axe d at a r at e c o nsid e r abl y highe r t han if t ho se same ve hic l e s ar e d e al e r assigne d in t he d e al e r ship name .” Id. The hand bo o k al so inst r uc t s t hat “[w]he n a d e al e r se l l s a use d mo t o r ve hic l e t o a pur c hase r fo r use (a c o nsume r ), t he d e al e r must al so give t o t he pur c hase r a pr o pe r l y assigne d c e r t ific at e o f t it l e at t he t ime o f d e l ive r y” o r o bt ain pe r missio n fr o m t he buye r fo r t he d e al e r t o make appl ic at io n fo r t he t it l e o n t he pur c hase r ’s be hal f. Id. It al so d ir e c t s d e al e r s t hat t he y must ac quir e pr o o f o f insur anc e fr o m t he buye r be fo r e d e l ive r ing po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . The Mo t o r Ve hic l e Co mmissio n t hus int e r pr e t s KRS 186A.220 as d ist inguishing be t we e n t r ansac t io ns t o consumers and o t he r t r ansac t io ns; it inst r uc t s d e al e r s d o ing busine ss in Ke nt uc ky o f t he same d ist inc t io n. e. The usage tax statutes also show a legislative distinction between **purchaser for use” and a purchase for resale. Mar t in and Tr ave l e r s al so ar gue t hat t he pr o visio ns o f KRS 138.460 and 138.470, o ut l ining t he mo t o r ve hic l e usage t ax and e xc e pt io ns, sho ws t he 19 l e gisl at ive int e nt t o d e mar c at e t he d iffe r e nc e be t we e n “use ” and “r e sal e ” by a d e al e r . KRS 138.460 se t s t he r at e o f t axat io n o n e ve r y mo t o r ve hic l e use d in t he st at e , as we l l as o t he r pr o visio ns o f t he usage t ax, inc l ud ing t he t ime at whic h t he t ax is t o be paid . Ho we ve r , pr e vio usl y r e gist e r e d o r t it l e d mo t o r ve hic l e s ar e e xe mpt fr o m t his usage t ax “whe n be ing so l d o r t r ansfe r r e d t o l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r s for resale.” KRS 138.470(3) (e mphasis ad d e d ). The se mo t o r ve hic l e s “shall be he l d fo r r e sal e o nl y.” Id. (e mphasis ad d e d ). Al t ho ugh Ar mst r o ng c o nt e nd s t hat t he t axat io n r at e fo r mo t o r ve hic l e s is inappl ic abl e and ir r e l e vant , t he st at ut o r y c o nt e xt is pe r suasive . Onc e again, we se e t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y d ist inguishing be t we e n ho w ve hic l e s sho ul d be t r e at e d , d e pe nd ing o n whe t he r t he y ar e be ing “use d ” o n t he r o ad ways o f Ke nt uc ky o r he l d “fo r r e sal e .” The se ar e se par at e st at ut o r y c hapt e r s and we must l o o k t o t he guid anc e o f suc h l anguage c aut io usl y. Ho we ve r , we c an infe r so me insight int o t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y’s int e nt in t he way it phr ase d t he se st at ut o r y pr o visio ns. Onc e again, we no t ic e a c o mmo n t he me : a d ive r ge nc e in t he t r e at me nt o f ve hic l e s so l d fo r use and ve hic l e s he l d by d e al e r s fo r r e sal e . “If t he ve hic l e is o ne whic h is pur c hase d by t he d e al e r fo r use , and no t fo r r e sal e , he is r e quir e d , just as t he ind ivid ual is, t o r e gist e r t hat ve hic l e ... and pay t he ad val o r e m t ax whe n r e gist e r e d o r upo n r e ne wal .” Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Ky. 1984). This Co ur t , in d e t e r mining t he c o nst it ut io nal it y o f t he se t axe s, st at e d t hat t he ad val o r e m t ax o n mo t o r ve hic l e s is appl ic abl e t o “al l pe r so ns, inc l ud ing an ind ivid ual o r a d e al e r , who intend to operate the vehicle on the highways of this state.” Id. (e mphasis 20 ad d e d ). The Co ur t st at e d t hat in a r e sal e sit uat io n, “[t ]he d e al e r is a me r e c o nd uit in t he c hain[.]” Id. Be c ause t he d e al e r is a “me r e c o nd uit ”, t he e xc l usio n o f d e al e r s fr o m payme nt o f t ax l ie ns was pe r missibl e . Id. at 384. The int e gr al d e t e r minat io n fo r r e gist r at io n and t ax payme nt was whe t he r “t he ve hic l e [was] t o be o pe r at e d o n [t he ] highways[.]” Id. This t r e at me nt is se nsibl e in l ight o f t he po l ic ie s and und e r l ying pur po se o f t he se var io us ac t s: t o pr o t e c t d r ive r s and c it ize ns o f t he Co mmo nwe al t h fr o m uninsur e d d r ive r s. If t he ve hic l e is me r e l y be ing he l d fo r r e sal e and t he d e al e r is no t hing but a “c o nd uit ,” t he r e is no r e aso n t o t r e at t hat d e al e r t he same exact way as a pur c hase r who wil l be o pe r at ing t he ve hic l e o n t he r o ad ways o f Ke nt uc ky. The r e is a c l e ar r e aso n t o t r e at t he se t wo gr o ups o f pe o pl e d iffe r e nt l y und e r t he se st at ut o r y sc he me s. The l e gisl at ur e ’s r e c o gnit io n o f t his fac t is appar e nt fr o m t he t axing r e gul at io ns and c an be impar t e d int o t his Co ur t ’s int e r pr e t at io n o f KRS 186A.220(5). f. The broad interpretation by the Court of Appeals makes language of the statute meaningless. “Al l par t s o f t he st at ut e must be give n e qual e ffe c t so t hat no par t o f t he st at ut e wil l be c o me me aningl e ss o r ine ffe c t ual .” Lewis, 189 S.W.3d at 92. “One o f t he mo st basic int e r pr e t at ive c ano ns ” o f st at ut o r y int e r pr e t at io n is t hat “[a] st at ut e sho ul d be c o nst r ue d so t hat e ffe c t is give n t o al l it s pr o visio ns, so t hat no par t wil l be ino pe r at ive o r supe r fl uo us, vo id o r insignific ant [.]” Corley V. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quo t ing Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (int e r nal c it at io n o mit t e d )). “We pr e sume ... t hat t he Ge ne r al 21 Asse mbl y int e nd e d fo r t he st at ut e t o be c o nst r ue d as a who l e and fo r al l it s par t s t o have me aning.” King Drugs, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.Sd 643, 645 (Ky. 2008) (c it ing Lewis, 189 S.W.Sd 87). Ar mst r o ng pr o po se s an e xc e pt io nal l y e xpansive int e r pr e t at io n o f “pur c hase r fo r use .” It s ar gume nt is t hat use c o ul d be fo r inve nt o r y, fl o o r mo d e l , d e mo d r ive r , fo r par t s, o r use in mul t ipl e ways t o make a pr o fit . The pr o bl e m wit h t his int e r pr e t at io n, ho we ve r , is t hat it is so br o ad as t o be c o me supe r fl uo us. If e ve r yt hing c an be a use , t he n why inc l ud e t he l anguage at al l ? We pr e sume e ve r y wo r d wit hin a st at ut e t o have so me me aning. The Ge ne r al Asse mbl y spe c ific al l y inc l ud e d t he phr ase “fo r use ” in t his r e quir e me nt . It is e ve n mo r e no t e wo r t hy c o nsid e r ing t he phr ase o c c ur s so spar ingl y t hr o ugho ut any o t he r st at ut e . Cl e ar l y, t he ad d it io n was int e nt io nal and pur po se ful . We wo ul d be d ispl aying a st r ain o f jud ic ial ac t ivism by int e r pr e t ing suc h a br o ad and use l e ss me aning in ad o pt ing t he pr o po se d vie w. We must d isc e r n t he me aning o f t he l anguage give n t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y’s ut il izat io n o f t he se wo r d s wit hin t he o ve r al l st at ut o r y c o nt e xt . Give n t he fac t o r s as we have d e sc r ibe d , we ho l d t hat “pur c hase r fo r use ” is a d ist inc t subse t o f pur c hase r s fr o m l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r s t hat ar e pur c hasing ve hic l e s fo r r e sal e . g. Purchase for use is different than purchase for resale. Our inquir y d o e s no t e nd he r e , ho we ve r . We must at t e mpt t o d e sc r ibe what a “pur c hase r fo r use ” is and give guid anc e fo r t r ansac t ing par t ie s in t he fut ur e . Give n t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y’s spe c ific d ist inc t io n o f licensed mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r s pur c hasing o r ac quir ing t r ad e s fo r resale, we ho l d t hat t he t e r m 22 “pur c hase r fo r use ” e nc o mpasse s al l o t he r pur c hasing t r ansac t io ns. We have no o t he r l e gisl at ive l anguage fr o m whic h t o infe r o t he r e xc e pt io ns t o t he r ul e . Thus, it must be t hat t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y c o nt e mpl at e d t wo kind s o f t r ansac t io ns: pur c hase s by l ic e nse d d e al e r s (as e vid e nc e d by t he spe c ific r e fe r e nc e t o licensed d e al e r s in KRS 186.010(7) and 186A.220(1)) fo r r e sal e pur po se s and al l o t he r t r ansac t io ns. Eve n pur c hase s by d e al e r s fo r d r iving pur po se s wo ul d be inc l ud e d as a “pur c hase r fo r use .” This me aning is al so e vid e nc e d by t his Co ur t ’s l anguage in Kling. 667 S.W.2d at 383 (The r e quir e me nt fo r r e gist r at io n and t axat io n o n mo t o r ve hic l e s is inc umbe nt upo n “al l pe r so ns, inc l ud ing an ind ivid ual o r a d e al e r , who intend to operate the vehicle on the highways of this state.” (e mphasis ad d e d )). The int e nse e xaminat io n o f t he wo r d -by-wo r d anal ysis o f a st at ut e t e nd s t o mud d l e t he bigge r pic t ur e o f t he st at ut e ’s me aning. Thus, we no w c l ar ify e xac t l y what t his int e r pr e t at io n me ans. Be c ause Ke nt uc ky is a c e r t ific at e o f t it l e st at e , t he t it l e ho l d e r is no r mal l y c o nsid e r e d t he “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e ac c o r d ing t o st at ut e s. Ho we ve r , KRS 186.010(7) o ut l ine s a way t hat l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r s, d e spit e be ing t he t it l e ho l d e r o f t he ve hic l e , wil l no t be c o nsid e r e d t he “o wne r .” If t he t r ansac t io n in que st io n is t o a pur c hase r fo r use , o r a c o nsume r buye r fo r use o n t he r o ad ways o f Ke nt uc ky, t he d e al e r must c o mpl y wit h al l t he r e l e vant r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220, inc l ud ing se c t io n 5 t o ve r ify pr o o f o f insur anc e . Ho we ve r , if t he t r ansac t io n is t o a l ic e nse d d e al e r int e nd ing t he ve hic l e fo r r e sal e , t he n t he d e al e r must o nl y 23 c o mpl y wit h KRS 186A.220, se c t io ns 1 t o 4 in o r d e r t o qual ify fo r t he e xe mpt io n in KRS 186.010(7), Ar mst r o ng r aise s a val id po int in que st io ning t his int e r pr e t at io n. He st at e s t hat t he int e r pr e t at io n “igno r e s t he fac t t hat a se l l e r /d e al e r c anno t e ve r kno w t he int e nd e d use o f a pur c hase r - e ve n if t hat pur c hase r is ano t he r d e al e r .” Whil e at fac e val ue t his se e ms ac c ur at e , t he ac t ual me aning is mo r e t he o r e t ic al t han pr ac t ic al . Whe n a t r ansac t io n is happe ning, whe t he r it be be t we e n a pe r so n c o ming t o a c ar sal e sman t o find t he r ight ve hic l e o r ano t he r d e al e r buying an o l d e r mo d e l fr o m ano t he r d e al e r , t he pe o pl e invo l ve d in t he t r ansac t io n wil l und e r st and t he pur po se o f t hat t r ansac t io n. Ho we ve r , t he c o ur t s sho ul d st il l ho l d t he se l l e r /d e al e r r e spo nsibl e fo r c o mpl ianc e wit h KRS 186A.220. Thus, if fo r so me r e aso n, a pur c hase r is be l ie ve d t o be a d e al e r buying fo r r e sal e but is ac t ual l y a pur c hase r fo r use , t he n t he fail ur e t o ask fo r insur anc e as r e quir e d by KRS 186A.220(5) c o ul d st il l l e ave t hat se l l e r /d e al e r t he st at ut o r y “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e . It wil l be o bl igat o r y fo r c o ur t s t o ho l d t he se se l l e r s t o t he ir d ue d il ige nc e in making pr o pe r inquir ie s and r e spo nsibl e c ho ic e s in t he se t r ansac t io ns. It wil l be up t o d e al e r s and se l l e r s t o make appr o pr iat e po l ic y and pr o c e d ur e c hange s t o c o mpl y wit h t he se r e quir e me nt s. Whil e t his r e spo nsibil it y upo n se l l e r /d e al e r s may se e m bur d e nso me , it is l e ss bur d e nso me t han int e r pr e t ing t he insur anc e ve r ific at io n as be ing r e quir e d in all t r ansac t io ns. It is al so in c o nc e r t wit h t he po l ic y d e l ine at e d in Gainsco Companies v. Gentry, 191 S.W.Sd 633 (Ky. 2006). The Co ur t st at e d t hat “o ne o bvio us pur po se o f [KRS 186A.220] is t o ke e p uninsur e d ve hic l e s o ff Ke nt uc ky 24 r o ad ways, [but ] t he l anguage o f t he pr o visio n e vid e nc e s a fur t he r go al o f t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y: t o pl ac e t he bur d e n o n t he c ar d e al e r t o pr o c ur e pr o o f o f insur anc e c o ve r age be fo r e po sse ssio n is t r ansfe r r e d .” Id. at 637. That bur d e n is st il l upo n d e al e r s, whe n t he r e spo nsibil it y t o pr o c ur e pr o o f o f c o ve r age is r e quir e d . It is t he d e al e r ’s bur d e n t o be ar and if t he d e al e r is mist ake n o r assume s t hat a l ic e nse d d e al e r is no t pur c hasing fo r use , t his d o e s no t shift t hat bur d e n o nt o t he o t he r par t y. The r e wil l o f c o ur se be e quit abl e d e c isio ns l e ft t o t he c o ur t s in r ar e c ir c umst anc e s (e .g. fr aud o n t he par t o f t he buye r ) but , fo r t he mo st par t , t he guid ing po l ic y is t hat t he l e gisl at ur e has c ho se n t o impar t t his r e spo nsibil it y upo n l ic e nse d d e al e r s. We c anno t shift t hat po l ic y. We must me r e l y int e r pr e t t he l anguage in ac c o r d anc e wit h t he po l ic y. The c l e ar l anguage sho ws an int e nt t o t r e at pur c hase s fo r r e sal e d iffe r e nt l y but t hat int e r pr e t at io n d o e s no t affe c t t he d e al e r ’s c o nt inuing bur d e n t o ve r ify insur anc e whe n t he pur c hase is fo r use . The l anguage o f Gainsco may be se e n as br o ad , but t he ho l d ing r e mains bind ing pr e c e d e nt , e ve n give n o ur ho l d ing t o d ay. The pur po se s o f KRS 186A.220 ar e ac c ur at e l y d e sc r ibe d wit hin Gainsco’s ho l d ing. In t hat c ase , t he d e al e r /se l l e r fail e d t o ve r ify t he buye r ’s insur anc e and was, t hus, t he st at ut o r y “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e fo r insur anc e pur po se s. We ar e me r e l y r e fining t he ho l d ing o f t he c ase t o c o nfir m t hat t he spe c ific pr o visio n in KRS 186A.220(5) r e fe r s t o t r ansac t io ns invo l ving “pur c hase r [s] fo r use ” and d o e s no t inc l ud e sal e s t o l ic e nse d d e al e r s fo r r e sal e . In c o nt r ast t o Gainsco, ho we ve r , t he o ft - c it e d c ase by Ar mst r o ng, Calhoun v. Provence, must no w be o ve r r ul e d so far as 25 it c o nfl ic t s wit h t o d ay’s ho l d ing. The r e , a d e al e r /se l l e r , Le ge nd Suzuki, so l d a ve hic l e t o ano t he r d e al e r /se l l e r , Yad e n’s Aut o Sal e s, wit ho ut ve r ifying Yad e n’s pr o o f o f insur anc e . Calhoun, 395 S.W.Sd at 482-83. The c o ur t d e e me d t his a fail ur e und e r KRS 186A.220(5) and fo und t hat Le ge nd Suzuki was st il l t he “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e . Id. at 483. The pr o bl e m in t his ho l d ing is t hat it d o e s no t appe ar t hat t he me aning o f “pur c hase r fo r use ” was e ve r e xpl aine d o r ar gue d in Calhoun. See id. at 482-83. Thus, we c anno t say t hat und e r o ur r e aso ning t o d ay, t he r e sul t wo ul d abso l ut e l y have be e n d iffe r e nt . We c anno t r e -r e vie w al l t he mat e r ial s, e vid e nc e , and ar gume nt s mad e be fo r e t he Co ur t o f Appe al s at t hat t ime . What we c an c o nfir m, ho we ve r , is t hat in a sal e fr o m l ic e nse d d e al e r t o l ic e nse d d e al e r fo r t he so l e pur po se o f r e sal e , t he se l l e r is no t r e quir e d t o ve r ify pr o o f o f insur anc e . Our ho l d ing and d e finit io n al so ad vanc e s t he pur po se s o f KRS Chapt e r s 186, 186A, 190, and t he MVRA. Al l o wing l ic e nse d d e al e r s t o c o nt inue t o se l l and buy wit ho ut fur t he r e nc umbr anc e s pr o mo t e s t he e ffic ie nt d ist r ibut io n and sal e o f ve hic l e s in o ur st at e , a “vit al int e r e st .” KRS 190.015. It impr o ve s e ffic ie nc y o f t he r e gist r at io n and t it l e pr o c e d ur e fo r d e al e r s whil e st il l pr o t e c t ing t he impo r t ant int e r e st s o f t he c o nsume r s buying t ho se ve hic l e s fo r pe r so nal use . This ho l d ing d o e s no t int e r fe r e wit h pr o mo t ing t he go al s o f t he MVRA “t o ke e p uninsur e d mo t o r ist s o ff Ke nt uc ky’s r o ad s.” Auto Acceptance Corp., 89 S.W.3d at 401 (quo t ing Nantz, 947 S.W.2d at 38). De al e r s pur c hasing fo r r e sal e wil l no t have t ho se ve hic l e s o n Ke nt uc ky ’s r o ad s; l ic e nse d d e al e r s ar e r e quir e d , by l aw, t o have t he pr o pe r insur anc e c o ve r age t o maint ain t he ir 26 l ic e nse s. We ar e pe r suad e d t hat t his c o nt inue s t o pr o t e c t Ke nt uc ky’s d r ive r s whil e fo st e r ing t he gr o wt h and suc c e ss o f Ke nt uc ky’s aut o ind ust r y, a c r it ic al int e r e st fo r many o f Ke nt uc ky ’s c it ize ns. C. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH KRS 186A.220. In Ellis V. Browning Pontiac-Chevrolet-GMC Truck-Geo, Inc., t he Co ur t o f Appe al s he l d t hat t he r e was a “pr o mpt ne ss r e quir e me nt ... [fo r ] al l t r ansfe r s inc l ud ing t ho se c o ve r e d by KRS 186A.220.’’ 125 S.W.Sd 306, 308 (Ky. App. 2003). The Co ur t was pe r suad e d by t he po ssibil it y “t hat unjust ifie d d e l ays in t r ansfe r r ing t it l e c o ul d po t e nt ial l y r e sul t in uninsur e d d r ive r s o n o ur r o ad ways.” Id. The Co ur t d e t e r mine d t he d e al e r . Br o wning, in a d e al e r t o c o nsume r t r ansac t io n, “c o ul d r e l inquish po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e be fo r e t aking t he ne c e ssar y t it l e t r ansfe r d o c ume nt s t o t he c o unt y c l e r k. Ho we ve r , t o c o mpl y wit h t he l anguage and int e nt o f t he e nt ir e t it l ing sc he me , it was r e quir e d t o use d ue d il ige nc e in making a pr o mpt t r ansfe r .” Id. This Co ur t has al so spe c ific al l y he l d t hat a d e al e r must “st r ic t l y c o mpl y wit h t he st at ut o r y pr o c e d ur e s o f KRS 186A.220(5)” in o r d e r t o “val id l y t r ansfe r o wne r ship.” Gainsco, 191 S.W.3d at 637. In Gainsco, t his Co ur t he l d t hat st r ic t c o mpl ianc e r e quir e d a d e al e r t o ve r ify insur anc e o f t he pur c hase r fo r use “be yo nd me r e assumpt io n o r kno wl e d ge .” Id. at 638. We have al r e ad y he l d t hat t he ve r ific at io n o f insur anc e r e quir e me nt in KRS 186A.220(5) d o e s no t appl y t o d e al e r -t o -d e al e r t r ansac t io ns in pur c hase s fo r r e sal e . Thus, t he st r ic t c o mpl ianc e l anguage in Gainsco is so me what ir r e l e vant . Ho we ve r , fr o m t he ho l d ings in bo t h Gainsco and Ellis, we must 21 d e t e r mine whe t he r st r ic t c o mpl ianc e wit h t he o t he r pr o visio ns o f KRS 186A.220 is r e quir e d in d e al e r -t o -d e al e r t r ansac t io ns t o val id l y t r ansfe r t he ve hic l e . Mar t in has ad mit t e d t hat it d id no t strictly c o mpl y. It s no t ic e und e r KRS 186A.220(l ) was ad mit t e d l y l at e . Ho w d o e s t his affe c t t he subse que nt t r ansfe r t o De Wal t ? To simpl y say t hat no t fo l l o wing t he l e t t e r o f t he l aw in KRS 186A.220 has no e ffe c t wo ul d und e r mine and d iminish t he l e gisl at ive int e nt . This Co ur t c anno t say t hat fail ing t o fo l l o w t he se r e quir e me nt s has no fur t he r e ffe c t o r c o nse que nc e t o t he se l l e r /d e al e r . Ho we ve r , we al so c anno t , in ac c o r d anc e wit h l e gisl at ive int e nt , d e t e r mine t hat o ne fail ur e t o c o mpl y wit h a r e quir e me nt in KRS 186A.220, se c t io ns 1 t o 4, (e .g. fil ing t he no t ic e t o t he c o unt y c l e r k in 16 d ays, r at he r t han 15) c ause s t he se l l e r /d e al e r t o r e main t he st at ut o r y “o wne r ” fo r e ve r , wit ho ut any r e c o ur se . Suc h a po l ic y wo ul d br ing t he aut o ind ust r y t o a hal t and c ause a whir l wind o f l e gal squabbl e s wit ho ut me r it , al so und e r mining t he go al s o f t he se st at ut o r y pr o visio ns. “In o r d e r t o d e t e r mine whe t he r st r ic t c o mpl ianc e o r subst ant ial c o mpl ianc e is suffic ie nt t o sat isfy a st at ut o r y pr o visio n, it fir st must be d e t e r mine d whe t he r t he appl ic abl e pr o visio n is mand at o r y o r d ir e c t o r y.” Knox County V. Hammons, 129 S.W.Sd 839, 842 (Ky. 2004). To d e t e r mine whe t he r a st at ut e is mand at o r y o r d ir e c t o r y, t he Co ur t l o o ks “no t o n fo r m, but o n t he l e gisl at ive int e nt , whic h is t o be asc e r t aine d by int e r pr e t at io n fr o m c o nsid e r at io n o f t he e nt ir e ac t , it s nat ur e and o bje c t , and t he c o nse que nc e o f c o nst r uc t io n o ne way o r t he o t he r .” Id. at 843 (quo t ing Skaggs u. Fyffe, 98 28 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Ky. 1936)). “[I]f t he d ir e c t io ns give n by t he st at ut e t o ac c o mpl ish a give n e nd ar e vio l at e d , but t he give n e nd is in fac t ac c o mpl ishe d , wit ho ut affe c t ing t he r e al me r it s o f t he c ase , t he n t he st at ut e is t o be r e gar d e d as d ir e c t o r y me r e l y.” Hammons, 129 S.W.Sd at 843 (quo t ing Skaggs, 98 S.W.2d at 886). In Gainsco, t his Co ur t d e t e r mine d t hat t he fac t t hat t he d r ive r o f t he ve hic l e in t he ac c id e nt was insur e d was inc o nse que nt ial t o t he se l l e r /d e al e r ’s c o mpl ianc e . 191 S.W.Sd at 637-38. This r e quir e me nt fo r strict c o mpl ianc e st e mme d fr o m t he find ing t hat t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y int e nd e d “t o pl ac e t he bur d e n o n t he c ar d e al e r t o pr o c ur e pr o o f o f insur anc e .” Id. at 637 (c it ing Nantz, 947 S.W.2d at 39)). In ac c o r d anc e wit h t he po l ic y we have pr e vio usl y o ut l ine d in Gainsco and Ellis, t he pur po se be hind t he c o nst r uc t io n o f t he se st at ut e s is t o e nsur e t hat e ac h ve hic l e o n t he r o ad way is pr o pe r l y and ad e quat e l y insur e d . Thus, we ho l d fir m t o t he d e t e r minat io n t hat a d e al e r must st r ic t l y c o mpl y wit h t he r e quir e me nt in KRS 186A.220(5). Ho we ve r , as we have pr e vio usl y he l d , t he r e quir e me nt fo r pr o o f o f insur anc e is ir r e l e vant in t his d e al e r -t o -d e al e r t r ansac t io n. Thus, must t he d e al e r strictly c o mpl y wit h t he o t he r r e quir e me nt s in KRS 186A.220, se c t io ns 1 t o 4, o r is substantial c o mpl ianc e suffic ie nt ? The pr o visio ns in se c t io ns 1 t o 4 o f KRS 186A.220 ar e d ir e c t o r y, r at he r t han mand at o r y. By vio l at ing t he st r ic t r e quir e me nt s o f t he pr o visio ns (name l y, t he 15 d ay r e quir e me nt ) but st il l ac c o mpl ishing t he go al (no t ifying t he c l e r k o f t he ac quisit io n o f t he ve hic l e ), t he int e nt io n o f t he st at ut e is st il l 29 uphe l d . We no t e t hat , in d e sc r ibing t his st at ut e as d ir e c t o r y, t his d o e s no t me an no n-c o mpl ianc e is pe r missibl e .^ If t he d e al e r fail s t o c o mpl y, at al l , t he n t he r e is no c o mpl ianc e wit h KRS 186A.220 and t he d e al e r is st il l t he “o wne r .” Ho we ve r , subst ant ial c o mpl ianc e , i.e., l at e c o mpl ianc e , may st il l al l o w t he d e al e r t o t ake ad vant age o f t he e xc e pt io n in KRS 186.010(7)(c ). The int e nt io n o f t he l e gisl at ur e in t ho se pr o visio ns was t o e ffe c t uat e an e ffic ie nt r e gist r at io n and t it l ing pr o c e ss. If a d e al e r c o mpl ie s wit h t he se r e quir e me nt s l at e , it d o e s no t vit iat e t he o ve r ar c hing go al . Thus, t he st at ut e is d ir e c t o r y and subst ant ial c o mpl ianc e is suffic ie nt fo r t ho se se c t io ns. A l ic e nse d d e al e r , t he r e fo r e , c an c ur e an unt ime l y c o mpl ianc e wit h KRS 186A.220, se c t io ns 1 t hr o ugh 4, by c o mpl ying at a l at e r d at e . If an ac c id e nt o c c ur s before t he d e al e r has c o mpl ie d (in whic h c ase , at t hat po int , t he r e wo ul d be no c o mpl ianc e r at he r t han subst ant ial c o mpl ianc e ), t hat d e al e r wil l st il l be t he st at ut o r y “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e . If t he d e al e r has c o mpl ie d be fo r e t he ac c id e nt , it c an st il l avail it se l f o f t he e xc e pt io n in KRS 186.Ol O(7)(c ).io It , t he r e fo r e , gr e at l y be ho o ve s a d e al e r t o t ime l y c o mpl y wit h t he se r e quir e me nt s l e st it be l iabl e fo r d amage s be fo r e it c o mpl ie s. 9 Ad d it io nal l y, t he use o f t he wo r d “shal l ” in t he se st at ut e s d o e s no t aut o mat ic al l y r e nd e r a st at ut o r y pr o visio n as mand at o r y fo r t he st r ic t vs. subst ant ial c o mpl ianc e anal ysis. See Hammons, 129 S.W.Sd at 843. 10 We r e it e r at e o ur ho l d ing, ho we ve r , in Gainsco, t hat t he bur d e n is o n t he d e al e r , whe n se l l ing t o a pur c hase r fo r use , t o ac t ive l y ve r ify t hat t he buye r has insur anc e be fo r e t r ansfe r r ing po sse ssio n o f t he ve hic l e . Fail ur e t o pr o mpt l y c o mpl y wit h t he r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220(5) in a t r ansac t io n wit h a pur c hase r fo r use c anno t be c ur e d and t he d e al e r may st il l be c o nsid e r e d t he “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e in que st io n. 30 “[W]he n t he pr o pe r l e gal d o c ume nt s ar e t r ansfe r r e d fr o m t he d e al e r t o t he buye r , t he r e spo nsibil it y fo r insur anc e c o ve r age o n t he par t o f t he d e al e r c e ase s.” Auto Acceptance Corp., 89 S.W.Sd at 400-01 (quo t ing Nantz, 947 S.W.2d at 38-39 (c it ing Potts, 864 S.W.Sd 896 and Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. App. 1998))). This pr inc ipl e ho l d s t r ue . At t he t ime o f t he ac c id e nt in que st io n, Mar t in had t r ansfe r r e d t he ne c e ssar y pape r wo r k t o ABC as De Wal t ’s age nt in t he pur c hase t r ansac t io n. Mar t in had al so se nt t he no t ic e t o t he c o unt y c l e r k, d e spit e it be ing unt ime l y. At t he t ime o f t he ac c id e nt , Mar t in had subst ant ial l y c o mpl ie d wit h al l t he r e l e vant r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220.i2 Mar t in, t he n, und e r KRS 186.010(7) c anno t be d e e me d t he o wne r o f t he ve hic l e so l e l y be c ause t he t it l e was st il l in Mar t in’s name . Mar t in was no t t he o wne r o f t he ve hic l e at t he t ime o f t he ac c id e nt . D. BECAUSE TRAVELERS IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR COVERAGE, ARMSTRONG’S BAD FAITH CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED. The r e ar e t hr e e e st abl ishe d e l e me nt s t o a c ause o f ac t io n against an insur e r fo r bad fait h: (1) The insur e r must be o bl igat e d t o pay t he c l aim und e r t he t e r ms o f t he po l ic y; (2) t he insur e r must l ac k a r e aso nabl e basis in l aw o r fac t fo r d e nying t he c l aim; and (3) it must be sho wn t hat t he u Tr ave l e r s at t ac he d t his gr ant o f aut ho r it y as Exhibit 4 t o it s Cr o ss Mo t io n fo r Par t ial Summar y Jud gme nt . It c an be fo und in t he t r ial c o ur t r e c o r d . Vo l ume IV, page 572. We wo ul d no t e , ho we ve r , t hat ne it he r ABC no r De Wal t ar e par t ie s t o t his appe al . Thus, t he e ffe c t o f d e l ive r y o f t he t it l e pape r wo r k t o ABC, as DeWalt’s agent whil e simul t ane o usl y ac t ing as Mar t in’s age nt , is ne it he r r aise d no r pr o pe r l y be fo r e t his Co ur t . We , t he r e fo r e , d e c l ine t o ad d r e ss any suc h issue at t his t ime . *2 It d o e s no t appe ar t hat Ar mst r o ng c o nc e d e d t o Mar t in t aking t he d o c ume nt s t o ABC in Januar y 2014; but it appe ar s unc o nt r o ve r t e d fr o m t he r e c o r d t hat , at l e ast by Mar c h 2014, Mar t in had d e l ive r e d t he pr o pe r d o c ume nt at io n t o ABC fo r t he t r ansfe r o f t it l e . 31 insur e r e it he r kne w t he r e was no r e aso nabl e basis fo r d e nying t he c l aim o r ac t e d wit h r e c kl e ss d isr e gar d fo r whe t he r suc h a basis e xist e d . Kentucky Nat. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer, 155 S.W.Sd 738, 741-42 (Ky. App. 2004) (quo t ing Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993) (c it at io ns o mit t e d )). “[l ]t is so und pr inc ipl e t hat , in abse nc e o f a c o nt r ac t ual o bl igat io n in an insur anc e po l ic y fo r c o ve r age , t he r e c an be no c l aim fo r bad fait h.” Shaffer, 155 S.W.Sd at 742. Be c ause we have d e t e r mine d t hat , give n t he me aning o f “pur c hase r fo r use ,” Mar t in was no t t he o wne r o f t he ve hic l e at t he t ime o f t he ac c id e nt and , t hus. Tr ave l e r s had no c o nt r ac t ual o bl igat io n fo r c o ve r age o n t he ve hic l e , t he r e was no o bl igat io n fo r Tr ave l e r s t o pay. Wit ho ut t hat o bl igat io n, t he bad fait h c l aim must fail as a mat t e r o f l aw. Ad d it io nal l y, t his c l aim wo ul d fail as a mat t e r o f l aw und e r t he se c o nd e l e me nt : t hat t he insur e r “l ac k[e d ] a r e aso nabl e basis in l aw o r fac t fo r d e nying t he c l aim[.]” Id. (quo t ing Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890). “|l ]f a par t ic ul ar c l aim is ‘fair l y d e bat abl e ,’ t he insur e r is e nt it l e d t o d e bat e t hat c l aim r e gar d l e ss o f whe t he r t he d e bat e c o nc e r ns a mat t e r o f fac t o r o ne o f l aw.” Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Simpsonville Wrecker Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 886, 889-90 (Ky. App. 1994) (c it ing Davis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 303 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. 1981) and Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978)). “If a ge nuine d isput e d o e s e xist as t o t he st at us o f t he l aw go ve r ning t he c o ve r age que st io n, t he insur e d ’s c l aim is fair l y d e bat abl e and t he t o r t c l aim fo r bad fait h base d upo n t he insur e r ’s r e fusal t o pay t he c l aim may no t be maint aine d .” Empire Fire, 880 S.W.2d at 890. 32 In Empire Fire, t he Co ur t o f Appe al s d e t e r mine d t hat , be c ause “t he fac t t hat t he c o ve r age issue pr e se nt e d by t his c ase was o ne o f fir st impr e ssio n in Ke nt uc ky,” and t he r e we r e mul t ipl e jur isd ic t io ns suppo r t ing o ppo sit e vie ws, t he issue was “fair l y d e bat abl e .” Id. He r e , t he par t ie s pr e se nt e d an issue o f fir st impr e ssio n at t he c r ux o f who was r e spo nsibl e fo r c o ve r age : what was int e nd e d by t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y in st at ing a “pur c hase r fo r use ”? The issue he r e , l ike in t he Co ur t o f Appe al s c ase , was fair l y d e bat abl e . Und e r suc h c ir c umst anc e s, we c anno t say t hat Tr ave l e r s e xhibit e d bad fait h. The t r ial c o ur t pr o pe r l y d ismisse d t he se c l aims o n Tr ave l e r s ’ mo t io n fo r summar y jud gme nt . We r e ve r se t he Co ur t o f Appe al s ho l d ing r e mand ing t he c l aim and no w r e inst at e t he t r ial c o ur t ’s d ismissal . IV. CONCLUSION KRS 186.010(7) o ut l ine s an e xc e pt io n t o t he no r mal find ing t hat t he t it l e ho l d e r o f a mo t o r ve hic l e is t he “o wne r .” To o bt ain c o nsid e r at io n o f t hat e xc e pt io n, t he l ic e nse d mo t o r ve hic l e d e al e r se l l ing t he ve hic l e must c o mpl y wit h al l t he r e l e vant pr o visio ns o f KRS 186A.220. Ho we ve r , t he r e quir e me nt o f KRS 186A.220(5) spe c ific al l y r e fe r s t o “pur c hase r fo r use ” and d o e s no t appl y t o t r ansac t io ns fr o m d e al e r t o d e al e r fo r t he pur po se o f r e sal e . The r e quir e me nt s o f KRS 186A.220, se c t io ns 1 t hr o ugh 4, ar e d ir e c t o r y and subst ant ial c o mpl ianc e is suffic ie nt . Be fo r e t he t ime o f t he c o l l isio n in t he ve hic l e , Mar t in had subst ant ial l y c o mpl ie d wit h t he se r e quir e me nt s. Mar t in qual ifie d fo r t he e xc e pt io n in KRS 186.010(7), e ve n t ho ugh it was t he t it l e ho l d e r o f t he ve hic l e , and was, t he r e fo r e , no t t he “o wne r ” o f t he ve hic l e . 33 Mar t in, and Tr ave l e r s, we r e no t r e spo nsibl e fo r c o ve r age o f t he ve hic l e . The c ir c uit c o ur t c o r r e c t l y fo und t hat Mar t in was no t t he o wne r o f t he ve hic l e and we r e inst at e it s o r d e r gr ant ing summar y jud gme nt o n al l c l aims against Mar t in and Tr ave l e r s. Mint o n, C.J., Cunningham, Ke l l e r , Ve nt e r s, Wr ight , JJ., and Cl ar k and Ro yse , SJ., sit t ing. Al l c o nc ur . Hughe s and VanMe t e r , JJ., no t sit t ing. 34 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY: Mic hae l She a Mal o ne y St e phe n Co nno r Ke l l e r Sc hil l e r Bar ne s Mal o ne y PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, MARTIN CADILLAC, INC., D/B/A MARTIN DODGE JEEP CHRYSLER: Guy Ed war d Hughe s Ro be r t Se an Quigl e y Case y Bail e y 85 Maine s, PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Mat t he w Jame s Bake r COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, ABC BOWLING GREEN, LLC AND NATIONAL AUTO AUCTION ASSOCIATION, INC.: Dar e l l R. Pie r c e Jul ie F. Shad o an Pie r c e 85 Shad o an Mic hae l G. Abe l o w Laur e n Z. Cur r y She r r ar d Ro e Vo igt 86 Har biso n, PLC COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, KENTUCKY AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION: Cl ayt o n B. Pat r ic k Pat r ic k Law Fir m 35