Case Title: Wilhelm v. Ryan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 175, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ROGER WILHELM, JR., 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 175, 2005 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
CATHERINE RYAN and  
 
)  C.A. No. 03C-05-016  
MARY K. RYAN,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellees.  
 
) 
 
Submitted:  June 14, 2006 
Decided:  July 18, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Joseph M. Jachetti, Kenneth R. Schuster & Associates, P.C., 
Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Edward F. Kafader, Wilmington, Delaware for appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2
Catherine Ryan, the defendant appellee, operated her vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol.  She disobeyed a traffic signal and collided 
with Cameron Logan’s vehicle.  Logan’s vehicle then spun out of control 
and struck Robert Wilhelm’s vehicle.  Logan later died from injuries 
suffered in the accident.  Ryan pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide as a 
result of causing Logan’s death. 
Wilhelm brought a civil suit against Ryan claiming negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  Wilhelm sought compensatory and punitive damages for 
his claims.  Before trial, Ryan sent Wilhelm an offer of judgment for 
$25,000.  Wilhelm rejected the offer and the case went to a trial before a 
jury.  The jury returned a verdict in Wilhelm’s favor and awarded him 
$4,108 in compensatory damages.  As the prevailing party, Wilhelm filed a 
motion for costs under Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d).  The trial judge 
granted Wilhelm’s motion for his costs incurred before the offer of 
judgment, but denied his motion for his costs incurred after the offer of 
judgment.  Moreover, the trial judge granted Ryan her costs incurred after 
the offer of judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 68. 
 
On appeal Wilhelm raises three claims of error: (1) the trial judge 
erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude Ryan’s testimony about her 
 
3
criminal conviction and remorse for her actions; (2) the trial judge erred by 
denying his motion for a new trial or additur; and (3) the trial judge erred by 
failing to grant him the costs he incurred after Ryan’s offer of judgment.  
Because the trial judge acted within his discretion and committed no legal 
error, we affirm. 
I.  Facts 
 
On May 6, 2001, Ryan operated her motor vehicle on Route 202 in 
New Castle County while she was under the influence of alcohol.  Ryan, 
who drove at approximately 80 mph, disobeyed a traffic signal and collided 
with Logan’s vehicle.  Logan’s vehicle then spun out of control and struck 
Wilhelm’s vehicle.  After the collision, Wilhelm got out of his vehicle and 
attempted to help Logan and Ryan.  Wilhelm approached Logan’s vehicle 
and observed Logan bleeding from his eyes, mouth, nose and ears.  Wilhelm 
then attempted to assist Logan with his injuries.1  Logan died shortly after 
the accident, and Wilhelm witnessed Logan’s death.  
                                                 
1  
We recognize that the extent to which Wilhelm assisted Logan, if at all, was in 
dispute at trial.  Wilhelm claimed that he pinched Logan’s nose because he was 
“concerned about the amount of blood coming out of his nose.”  Moreover, Wilhelm 
testified that the police did not arrive until five to ten minutes after the collision. 
 
Officer Fyock, a New Castle County Police Officer, testified that he was driving 
on Route 202 at the time of the accident and arrived on the scene ten or fifteen seconds 
after the collision.  He claimed that he saw a white male attempting to open the driver’s 
side door of Logan’s vehicle and he instructed him to stop for safety reasons.  Fyock then 
entered Logan’s vehicle through the back window or passenger side door and gave 
medical assistance to Logan until a paramedic unit arrived a few minutes later.   
 
4
 
Because of the accident, Wilhelm developed pain in his neck and 
back.2  Wilhelm visited his primary physician on May 8, 2001 to discuss his 
physical injuries and the shock of witnessing Logan’s death.  Wilhelm also 
had an MRI scan.  This 2001 MRI scan, according to Ryan’s medical expert, 
revealed substantially the same condition that a 1998 MRI scan had 
indicated. 3 Wilhelm visited his physician two more times in the summer of 
2001.4  Wilhelm did not visit his physician again until January of 2003 when 
he again complained of severe neck pain.  Wilhelm’s physician then ordered 
him to undergo another MRI scan.  This 2003 MRI scan revealed a major 
disc herniation that the earlier MRIs did not reveal.5  On August 25, 2003, 
two years after his accident with Ryan, Wilhelm had surgery to repair two 
herniated discs in his back.6   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2  
Wilhelm also had neck and back problems from two previous car accidents.  
Wilhelm was involved in car accidents in 1990 and 1998.  After the 1998 accident, 
Wilhelm’s physicians recommended that he undergo “a two level surgical procedure, 
anterior cervical fusion at C5-6, C6-C7.”   
 
3  
Ryan’s expert medical witness testified that there “really [was] not much change” 
from the 1998 MRI to the 2001 MRI. 
 
4  
In addition to Wilhlem’s May 8, 2001 visit, he also saw his physicians on May 25, 
2001, and in August of 2001.   
 
5  
Ryan’s medical expert testified that the 2003 MRI scan revealed “a major disc 
herniation now at C6-C7 that wasn’t present before.” 
 
6  
Wilhelm had the same surgery that his physicians recommended he undergo in 
1998.  See supra n.2. 
 
 
5
 
Wilhelm filed a lawsuit against Ryan for negligence, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
punitive damages.  In addition to pain and suffering, Wilhelm claimed that 
he sustained wage loss and medical bills of $72,000 directly resulting from 
Ryan’s negligence. 
 
The case went to trial before a jury.  Ryan conceded liability and 
contested damages.  A Superior Court jury returned a verdict granting 
Wilhelm $4,108 in compensatory damages and no punitive damages.7  After 
the trial, the trial judge awarded Wilhelm, as the “prevailing party,” his costs 
incurred before the offer of judgment, but required Wilhelm to pay both his 
and Ryan’s costs incurred after the offer of judgment because Ryan’s timely 
$25,000 offer of judgment exceeded the jury’s award. 
II.  Wilhelm’s claims on appeal 
A. 
Wilhelm’s claim that the trial judge erred by denying his motion 
in limine to exclude Ryan’s testimony about her criminal 
conviction and remorse over Logan’s death. 
 
 
Before trial, Wilhelm filed a motion in limine to exclude Ryan’s 
testimony about Ryan’s criminal conviction, remorse for her actions, and 
                                                 
7  
The award was a general award of compensatory damages.  The Civil Trial 
Activity Sheet stated “$4,108 awarded to plaintiff for compensation for injuries sustained 
as a result of the accident on May 6, 2001.” 
 
 
6
planned reconciliation with Logan’s mother.8  The trial judge denied 
Wilhelm’s motion.   
Wilhelm now claims that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
failing to grant his motion in limine to exclude Ryan’s testimony because 
Ryan’s testimony about her criminal conviction (both the crime to which she 
pleaded guilty and the sentence she received) was not admissible under 
Delaware common law.  Wilhelm also argues that Ryan’s testimony, if 
admissible under Delaware common law, was irrelevant or, if relevant, was 
unfairly prejudicial.  Ryan counters by asserting that the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion by admitting her testimony about her criminal 
punishment because the testimony was relevant and highly probative to 
mitigate Wilhlem’s claim for punitive damages.  Therefore, the primary 
issue with respect to this contention is whether Delaware’s law allows a 
defendant’s earlier criminal conviction to be admitted to mitigate a 
plaintiff’s civil claim for punitive damages when the plaintiff’s civil claim 
for punitive damages arises from the same actions for which the defendant 
received a criminal sentence.  Whether Delaware permits a party to 
introduce evidence of a criminal conviction to mitigate a civil claim for 
                                                 
8  
Ryan testified that she planned to meet with Logan’s mother to express her 
remorse. 
 
7
punitive damages is a question of law.  We review questions of law de 
novo.9 
 
In his opening brief, Wilhelm relied on Armstrong v. Rhoades10 and 
Keller v. Taylor11 to suggest that Delaware’s common law prohibited the 
admission of Ryan’s testimony to mitigate punitive damages.12  Putting aside 
the fact that these cases are over 100 years old, Wilhelm’s reliance is 
misplaced.  Neither Armstrong nor Keller involved a claim for punitive 
damages; in both cases the Superior Court merely held that evidence of a 
criminal conviction could not be admitted to mitigate compensatory 
damages. 
 
We would not be able to conclude that the trial judge legally erred by 
failing to follow either Armstrong or Keller.  Ryan’s counsel, following his 
ethical duty to cite all relevant cases, however, brought Jefferson v. Adams13 
                                                 
9  
Schadt v. Latchford, 843 A.2d 689, 691 (Del. 2004).   
 
10  
20 Del. 151 (Del. Super. Ct. 1902). 
 
11  
7 Del. 20 (Del. Super. Ct. 1858). 
 
12  
Armstrong and Keller are the only cases cited by Wilhelm in his opening brief for 
his claim that Ryan’s testimony was inadmissible to mitigate punitive damages under 
Delaware common law.  
 
13  
4 Del. 321 (Del. Super. Ct. 1845).   
 
 
8
to our attention in his answering brief.14  We discuss Jefferson to remove 
any confusion about whether a defendant’s earlier criminal conviction is 
admissible to mitigate a plaintiff’s civil claim for punitive damages. 
 
In Jefferson, the plaintiff brought a civil lawsuit against the defendant 
for compensatory and punitive damages because the defendant forcibly 
entered the plaintiff’s home and violently assaulted him.  By the time of trial 
in the plaintiff’s civil case, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced 
for a criminal offense.  The defendant contended that his criminal conviction 
and substantial fine barred the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, or in 
the alternative, were proper evidence admissible to mitigate punitive 
damages.  The trial judge determined that the plaintiff’s claim for punitive 
damages was not barred and that the defendant’s criminal conviction was not 
admissible to mitigate punitive damages:  
It was for the jury to say whether there were circumstances of 
aggravation in this case, which ought in their judgment, to 
require a departure from the general rule of compensatory 
damages; and which called on them to add any thing by way of 
public example or punishment. As to the proceedings in the 
criminal court, they were not evidence, and could not have been 
                                                 
14  
Based on Wilhelm’s counsel’s opening brief, it appears that his research did not 
produce Jefferson.  We commend Ryan’s counsel for citing Jefferson despite the fact that 
it is contrary to his position.  Del. Prof. Cond. R. 3.3 (a)(2)(2006) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed 
by opposing counsel.”).  Ryan’s counsel’s action conforms with the highest traditions of 
the Delaware Bar and is an example of the reason why Delaware remains a favorable 
environment for the practice of law. 
 
9
given in evidence in this case, and were not to enter into the 
consideration of the jury in deciding it either as to the propriety 
of a verdict against the defendants, or for the amount of the 
damages. The indictment was between other parties; the State 
and these defendants, and not this plaintiff and the defendants; 
the verdict was rendered upon other testimony than that given 
in this case; even upon the testimony of the plaintiff himself 
and his wife; and the punishment, if any such has been inflicted, 
had reference to the public peace and not to this plaintiff's 
wrongs. It would obviously, therefore, be improper that these 
proceedings in the criminal court should enter into the present 
case for any purpose.15 
 
Jefferson suggests that evidence of a defendant’s criminal conviction should 
not be admissible where a plaintiff brings a civil claim for punitive damages  
out of the same set of facts because criminal punishment and punitive 
damages serve two separate purposes.  In other words, criminal punishment 
provides retribution for the public while punitive damages provide 
retribution for the plaintiff.  We can endorse Jefferson for the proposition 
that a defendant’s earlier criminal conviction does not bar a plaintiff’s civil 
claim for punitive damages on Double Jeopardy grounds,16 but we cannot 
                                                 
15  
Jefferson, 4 Del. 321 at 323. 
 
16  
For a discussion on Jefferson’s holding that the Double Jeopardy clause would not 
bar a plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages when the defendant was punished criminally 
for the same action see Hetrick v. Locklear, 1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 15, at *7-8 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1991)(“Having concluded that punitive damages address a civil 
wrong, unrelated to any fines that were or could have been imposed in connection with 
the criminal action, I conclude that double jeopardy has no application as there is no 
attempt here to punish criminally a second time for the same offense.”). 
 
 
10
follow Jefferson’s apparent holding that a defendant’s criminal conviction is 
not relevant to mitigate an award of punitive damages.17  In other words, we 
think the preferable rule is that a defendant’s criminal conviction will not 
prohibit a plaintiff’s civil claim for punitive damages, but the defendant will 
be permitted to admit evidence of her criminal conviction to mitigate any 
award of punitive damages.18  One recent case discussing punitive damages 
is consistent with this rule.  In Jardel Company, Inc. v. Hughes,19 we stated: 
A majority of jurisdictions now accept that punitive 
damages serve a dual purpose -- to punish wrongdoers and 
deter others from similar conduct.  This dual purpose is 
reflected in § 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979), 
which provides in part: ‘Punitive damages are damages, other 
                                                 
17  
At oral argument, Wilhelm’s counsel expressed confusion about the history of the 
Delaware Supreme Court and whether Jefferson is binding authority.  Jefferson was 
decided in 1845.  Before 1951 we were without a separate Supreme Court.  The highest 
appellate authority during that time consisted of a panel of judges from trial courts.  
Jefferson is not an appellate level case and neither binds us nor requires us to overrule its 
holding.  See JUSTICE RANDY J. HOLLAND & HELEN L. WINSLOW, DELAWARE SUPREME 
COURT GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1-15 (2001). 
 
18  
Other jurisdictions follow this approach.  Puz v. McDonald, 140 Ariz. 77, 78-79 
(Arz. Ct. App. 1984); Crider v. Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)(“[W]e 
note that evidence of criminal convictions and penalties is admissible in punitive 
damages cases to mitigate, but not to bar, the award of punitive damages.”);  Cheevers v. 
Clark, 214 Ga. App. 866, 869 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“Georgia among those states which 
permit the use of criminal punishments to mitigate civil punitive damages arising from 
the same act.”);  Anderson v. Amundson, 354 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984)(“Evidence of criminal penalty incurred as a result of driving while intoxicated is 
relevant in a subsequent civil suit for punitive damages and should be considered by the 
jury in assessing those damages.”);  see also Annotation, Assault:  Criminal Liability as 
Barring or Mitigating Recovery of Punitive Damages, 98 A.L.R. 3d 870 (1980)(updated 
Dec. 1994). 
 
19  
523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987). 
 
 
11
than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a 
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter 
him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.’ 
 
The punishment/deterrence rationale underlying punitive 
damages has caused them to be characterized as civil penalties 
which serve as a substitute for criminal prosecution for 
conduct which, though criminal, often goes unpunished by 
the public prosecutor.20 
 
While this language does not squarely address the question of whether a 
defendant should be permitted to admit evidence of his criminal conviction 
to mitigate a civil claim for punitive damages, it clearly implies that the 
admission of the criminal conviction would be the only logical result.  
Because our case law recognizes that punitive damages can be awarded both 
to punish the defendant and to deter others for similar conduct, and because 
punitive damages traditionally served as civil penalties to substitute for 
criminal prosecution, it logically follows that the jury should be permitted to 
consider the amount of punishment the defendant has already received in the 
criminal action against her in order to determine whether to award punitive 
damages.  In other words, because punitive damages and criminal 
prosecution serve the same purpose (to punish the defendant), the jury 
should have the opportunity to consider the defendant’s criminal punishment 
(crime and sentence) when assessing punitive damages.  Therefore, because 
                                                 
20  
Id. at 529. 
 
12
the trial judge acted in conformity with Delaware law, we find that he did 
not abuse his discretion by admitting Ryan’s criminal conviction for 
vehicular homicide to mitigate Wilhelm’s claim for punitive damages. 
 
Wilhelm also argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
admitting Ryan’s testimony about her conviction, remorse for her actions, 
and her plan of reconciliation with Logan’s mother because the testimony 
was irrelevant, or in the alternative, unfairly prejudicial.  Rulings on whether 
evidence is irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial are matters within the discretion 
of the trial judge that we will reverse only upon a showing of an abuse of 
discretion.21 
 
Here, we cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion.  As 
discussed above, one purpose of punitive damages is to punish the 
defendant.  Certainly Ryan’s conviction, remorse, and her intended 
reconciliation with Logan’s mother were relevant to mitigate any need to 
punish Ryan financially.  Likewise, we cannot find that the trial judge 
abused his discretion by determining that the probative value of Ryan’s 
testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
                                                 
21  
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Norman Gershman's Things to Wear, 
Inc., 596 A.2d 1358, 1366 (Del. 1991) (“Determination of relevancy under D.R.E. 401 
and unfair prejudice under D.R.E. 403 are matters within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and will not be reversed in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.”).   
 
 
13
prejudice.22  The mitigating value of Ryan’s testimony, an acknowledgement 
of the impact of her actions on herself, outweighed any danger that the jury 
would feel sympathy for Ryan, a convicted felon, and allow that sympathy 
to affect its award of compensatory damages.  Moreover, assuming that any 
jury could be sympathetic to a felon convicted of killing someone as a result 
of drunk driving, the trial judge prevented any danger that the jury would 
allow that sympathy to enter into their verdict when he instructed the jury 
before deliberations.  At the beginning of his instruction the trial judge 
stated: 
 
 
You have been chosen and sworn as jurors to decide issues of 
fact.  You must perform these duties without bias for or against the 
parties.  The law does not allow you to be influenced by sympathy, 
prejudice, or public opinion… 
 
 
Near the end of the jury instruction, the trial judge reiterated what he said 
earlier: 
 
 
 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, your verdict must be based solely on the 
evidence in the case.  You must not be governed by prejudice, 
sympathy, or any other motive except a fair and impartial 
consideration of the evidence.  You must not, under any 
circumstances, allow any sympathy that you might have for any of 
the parties to influence you in any way in arriving at your verdict. 
 
I am not telling you not to sympathize with the parties.  It is only 
natural and human to sympathize with the persons involved in 
litigation.  You must not allow that sympathy to enter into your 
consideration of the case or to influence your verdict. 
 
                                                 
22  
See D. R. E. 403. 
 
14
We presume that the jury followed these instructions.23 
 
B. 
Wilhelm’s claim that the trial judge erred by failing to grant 
additur or a new trial. 
 
 
 
After the jury’s verdict, Wilhelm filed a motion for a new trial for 
damages or, alternatively, additur.  Wilhelm claimed that the jury’s award 
was so grossly disproportionate that it should have shocked the trial judge’s 
conscience.  In support of his claim that the jury’s award was grossly 
inadequate, Wilhelm cited to the fact that liability was not in dispute and the 
uncontested evidence that he incurred lost wages and medical expenses of 
$72,000. Ryan countered claiming that there was substantial evidence 
supporting the jury’s verdict; namely, evidence suggesting that Wilhelm’s 
back injuries and the expenses allegedly related to them did not result from 
Ryan’s admitted negligence.  The trial judge denied Wilhelm’s motion for a 
new trial and additur.  Wilhelm now claims that the trial judge erred by 
denying his motion. 
 
We review a trial judge’s denial of a motion for additur for an abuse 
of discretion.24  We have recently discussed the standard for granting 
additur.  In Young v. Frase, we stated: 
                                                 
23  
Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 589 (Del. 2001)(“As a general rule, we must 
presume that ‘the jurors followed the court's instruction.’”)(quoting Shelton v. State, 744 
A.2d 465, 483 (2000)). 
 
 
15
Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury 
verdicts.  In the face of any reasonable difference of opinion, 
courts will yield to the jury's decision. It follows that, in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, the validity of damages 
determined by the jury should likewise be presumed.  
Accordingly, a jury award should be set aside only in the 
unusual case where it is clear that the award is so grossly out 
of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's 
conscience and sense of justice.  
 
  
A jury award will meet this standard when it is so 
inadequate that it must have been based on passion, prejudice or 
misconduct rather than on an objective consideration of the trial 
evidence. Therefore, as a practical test, a court presented with 
a request for additur must review the record and determine 
whether the jury's award of damages is within a range 
supported by the evidence. As long as there is a sufficient 
evidentiary basis for the amount of the award, the jury's 
verdict should not be disturbed by a grant of additur or a new 
trial as to damages. This Court will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court in determining issues of granting 
additur or a new trial. 25 
 
Here, Wilhelm presented evidence that he suffered $72,000 in medical 
expenses and wages.  Most of these expenses and losses arose from 
Wilhelm’s back surgery in 2003.  Wilhelm claimed that he required back 
surgery as a result of his accident with Ryan.  As the trial judge stated when 
denying the motion for a new trial or additur, the jury obviously did not find 
that Ryan’s negligence caused the need for Wilhelm’s back surgery.   
                                                                                                                                                 
24  
Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1997)(“We review for abuse of discretion 
a decision by a trial court denying a motion for additur or a new trial.”)(citing Cloroben 
Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 893 (1983)). 
 
25  
Id at 1236-37. 
 
16
 
The jury certainly could have found that Wilhlem’s back surgery (and 
the corresponding $72,000 in damages) were not related to his accident with 
Ryan based on the fact that Wilhelm was involved in two previous car 
accidents in 1990 and 1998, and after those accidents, was told by his 
physicians that he needed surgery.26  Even if that alone were not enough, the 
jury also could have found that Wilhelm’s back injury and surgery bore no 
relationship to his accident with Ryan because Wilhelm did not have back 
surgery until after a February 2003 MRI revealed a worse condition that, 
according to Ryan’s medical expert, was not medically related to any injury 
                                                 
26  
Wilhelm seems to also suggest that because the trial judge instructed the jury that 
the defendant was injured as a matter of law and that the jury “must award the plaintiff 
damages,” it should have shocked the court’s conscious that he only received $4,108 
when he submitted $72,000 in lost wages and medical expenses.  The trial judge 
instructed: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, I instruct you as a matter of law that since the 
defendant has admitted she was responsible for causing the collision that 
took place on May 6, 2001, and that the plaintiff suffered some injury as a 
result, you must award the plaintiff damages.  You must, therefore, 
consider the compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled.  However, a 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover for injuries – damages, for injuries not 
found to have been caused by the individual or individuals alleged to 
have committed the negligence… Nor may he recover for any aggravation 
of a preexisting condition unless the aggravation is specifically 
attributable to the conduct of the individual or individuals alleged to have 
been negligent...   
 
As the trial judge’s instruction indicated, the jury had to find that Ryan’s conceded 
negligence produced Wilhelm’s claimed injuries.  Obviously, as discussed above, the jury 
did not so find. 
 
 
17
Wilhelm received in the accident of May 6, 2001.  Ryan’s medical expert, 
who examined Wilhelm in preparation for trial, testified: 
Q: 
Just one or two other things I would ask of you.  I would ask 
 
that when you do have to render opinions today that you render 
 
those opinions to a reasonable medical probability, which 
 
basically means that something, some particular fact is more 
 
likely than not? 
A: 
Right…. 
Q: 
But one question that I have to ask you is whether there is a 
 
relationship between the May 2001 accident and the 
 
problems, especially the surgery that occurred in February 
 
– symptoms that occurred in February of 2003 and 
 
subsequent surgery in August of 2003? 
A: 
Right.  It is clear, it is absolutely clear in my mind that May 6, 
 
2001 was just a spike in the chronology of events.  That, in and 
 
of itself, did not cause a disc herniation.  This herniation 
 
occurred spontaneously independent of the auto accident of 
 
May 6, 2001 in February of 2003.  That is when the symptoms 
 
occurred, symptoms that when all complaints changed, that is 
 
when we saw a new MRI of the cervical spine being acquired, 
 
what  had been acquired since 2001.  Everything changed in 
 
2003…. 
Q: 
Did you conclude that there was any injury that Mr. Wilhelm 
 
suffered as a result of the automobile accident in May of 2001. 
A: 
Again, I wasn’t there to see him there, wanting to be – say that 
 
auto accidents will often times cause strains and sprains and 
 
whiplash type injuries.  It wasn’t something severe, it was self-
 
limited and Dr. Vitt’s reports indicate things got better.  He 
 
stopped treating.  
 
In sum, the jury could properly rely on the physician’s testimony that, within 
a reasonable medical probability, the May 6, 2001 accident did not cause the 
condition revealed by the February 2003 MRI and was “just a spike in the 
chronology of events” between the two earlier accidents meriting surgery 
 
18
and the MRI and surgery in 2003.  The jury’s award did fairly reflect 
“strains and sprains . . .” that were not “severe” and that “got better.” 
 
The evidence also supported the jury’s decision to award little, if any, 
damages for Wilhelm’s claims of emotional distress.  Wilhelm claimed that 
he suffered “severe” emotional distress because he witnessed the death of 
Logan, but provided no medical evidence that he did so.  He never received 
treatment from a psychologist, psychiatrist, or counselor resulting from the 
impact the accident had on him.  Moreover, at trial, a disinterested police 
officer disputed Wilhelm’s testimony about the extent of his involvement in 
helping Logan – involvement which Wilhelm claimed caused him severe 
distress.27  This evidence obviously supports a finding that Wilhelm could 
not have suffered “severe” emotional distress as a result of witnessing 
Logan’s injuries or death.  In sum, we cannot find that the trial judge abused 
his discretion by denying Wilhelm’s motion for additur because there was 
some evidence to support the jury’s limited award of compensatory 
damages.   
 
We also cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
denying Wilhelm’s motion for a new trial.  “The denial of a motion for a 
new trial will constitute an abuse of discretion if the jury verdict was against 
                                                 
27  
See supra n.1. 
 
 
19
the great weight of the evidence, no reasonable jury could have reached the 
result, and the denial was untenable and unreasonable.”28  For the reasons 
discussed above, the jury verdict was not against the great weight of the 
evidence because there was ample evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. 
C. 
Wilhelm’s claim that the granting in part and denial in part of 
plaintiff’s motion for costs under Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d) was 
an abuse of discretion and clear error of law. 
 
 
Before trial, Ryan sent Wilhelm an offer of judgment for $25,000.  
Wilhelm rejected the offer and the jury returned a verdict in Wilhelm’s favor 
for $4,108.  After trial, Wilhelm, as the prevailing party, filed a motion for 
costs under Superior Court Rule 54(d).  Wilhelm claimed that he was 
entitled to his costs incurred both before and after the offer of judgment.  
Ryan countered claiming that she was entitled to her costs incurred after the 
offer of judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 68 because the offer of 
judgment exceeded the jury’s verdict.  Moreover, Ryan contended that 
Wilhelm was not entitled to any costs incurred before or after the offer of 
judgment, under Greenage v. Ward.29  The trial judge declined to follow 
Greenage and granted Wilhelm his costs incurred before the offer of 
                                                 
28  
Pesta v. Warren, 2005 Del. LEXIS 510, at *5 (Del. Dec. 14, 2005) (ORDER) 
(citing Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979)). 
 
29  
2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 327 (Del. Super. August 1, 2001). 
 
 
20
judgment but denied him his costs incurred after the offer of judgment.  The 
trial judge also granted Ryan her costs incurred after the offer of judgment. 
 
Wilhelm now contends on appeal that the trial judge erred by denying 
him his costs incurred after the offer of judgment.  Wilhelm’s claim requires 
us to analyze Rule 54(d) and Rule 68.  Rule 54(d) provides: 
 
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute or in these Rules or in the Rules of the Supreme Court, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party upon 
application to the Court within ten (10) days of the entry of 
final judgment unless the Court otherwise directs. 
 
Rule 68 provides: 
 
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins a 
party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse 
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the 
defending party for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 
days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves 
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then 
file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of 
service thereof and thereupon the Clerk shall enter judgment. 
An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence 
thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine 
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not 
more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs 
incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer 
is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. 
When the liability of one party to another has been determined 
by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the 
liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the 
party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which 
shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is 
served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to 
 
21
the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or 
extent of liability. 
 
Wilhelm contends that it is clear from a plain reading of Rule 54(d) that 
plaintiff “shall” be awarded “costs” as the prevailing party, and that “costs” 
must be read to include those incurred both before and after the offer of 
judgment.  Wilhelm suggests that Rule 54(d) grants the prevailing party a 
virtual unqualified right to costs.  Wilhelm’s argument lacks merit.  Wilhelm 
ignores the fact that Rule 54(d) states that “except when express provision 
therefore is made … in these rules.”  Certainly this phrase makes the 
qualifying party’s right to receive costs subject to Rule 68.   
 
Rule 68 expressly provides that: “if the judgment finally obtained by 
the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the 
costs incurred after the making of the offer.”  Reading this provision in 
connection with Rule 54(d), we find that Rule 68 subjects the prevailing 
party’s right to costs incurred after a proper offer of judgment is filed to the 
condition that he be awarded an amount in excess of that offer of judgment.  
Rule 68 does not place any condition on the prevailing party’s recovery of 
costs incurred before the offer of judgment, but does condition the recovery 
of costs incurred after an offer of judgment on the offerree receiving an 
award in excess of the offer of judgment. 
 
22
 
Our interpretation of Rule 68 and Rule 54(d) is consistent with Rule 
68’s purpose. The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement by shifting 
the risk of proceeding with the lawsuit to the offeree.30  If we accepted 
Wilhelm’s contention and interpreted Rule 54(d) and Rule 68 to mean that 
the offeree is always entitled to his costs if he prevails (including costs 
incurred after the offer of judgment when the verdict is less than the offer of 
judgment) then very little risk would shift to the offeree.  The offeree would 
simply have to pay the offeror’s costs incurred after the offer of judgment if 
the offer of judgment exceeded the verdict while receiving his own directly 
or as a credit.  This cannot be what the rule contemplated because the risk of 
bearing all costs incurred after the offer of judgment must be placed on the 
offeree to strike the proper balance and encourage settlement.  Therefore, we 
hold that when an offeree receives a verdict in his favor, but one less than a 
properly filed Rule 68 offer of judgment, the offeree will be permitted to 
recover his costs incurred before the offer of judgment under Rule 54(d), but 
                                                 
30  
Flood v. Riley, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 526, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 31, 2002) 
(citing Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981)(“The purpose of Rule 68 
is to encourage the settlement of litigation. In all litigation, the adverse consequences of 
potential defeat provide both parties with an incentive to settle in advance of trial. Rule 
68 provides an additional inducement to settle in those cases in which there is a strong 
probability that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment but the amount of recovery is 
uncertain. Because prevailing plaintiffs presumptively will obtain costs under Rule 54 
(d), Rule 68 imposes a special burden on the plaintiff to whom a formal settlement offer 
is made. If a plaintiff rejects a Rule 68 settlement offer, he will lose some of the 
benefits of victory if his recovery is less than the offer.”). 
 
 
23
will be liable for costs incurred after the offer of judgment, including his 
own, under Rule 68. 
  
Ryan asked the trial judge to follow Greenage31 and to decline to give 
Wilhelm any costs, but the trial judge refused to follow Greenage.  In 
Greenage, the plaintiffs received a verdict less than an offer of judgment.32  
After the trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion, as the prevailing party, for their 
costs incurred before the offer of judgment.33  There, the plaintiffs conceded 
that they were not entitled to their costs incurred after the offer of judgment 
under Rule 68.34  The trial judge found that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
his costs incurred before the offer of judgment because “by rejecting a Rule 
68 offer of judgment, plaintiffs increased their burden to recover costs under 
Rule 54(d) to victory in excess of the pre trial offer of judgment.”35 
 
As the trial judge did in this case, we decline to follow Greenage.  
Rule 68 cannot be fairly read to limit an offeree’s ability to recover his costs 
incurred before the offer of judgment.  The rule explicitly states that “the 
offeree must pay costs after the making of the offer.”  Moreover, it would 
                                                 
31  
2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 327. 
 
32  
Id. at *2-3. 
 
33  
Id at *1-2. 
 
34  
Id at *2. 
 
35  
Id at *3. 
 
24
be unfair to limit the offeree’s right to recover costs incurred before the offer 
of judgment because they are costs that will not be avoided by accepting the 
offer of judgment.  Put simply, the offeree would have incurred those costs 
even if he accepted the offer of judgment.  Thus, to the extent Greenage is 
inconsistent with this Opinion, it is overruled. 
 
In sum, the trial judge did not legally err by only awarding Wilhelm 
his costs incurred before the offer of judgment.  We find that the only 
reasonable interpretation of Rule 54(d) and Rule 68 requires a prevailing 
plaintiff, who receives an award less than the offer of judgment, to pay all 
costs incurred after the offer of judgment, including his own. 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Superior Court are 
AFFIRMED.