Case Title: Chesterfield County v. Stigall

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002942

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002942 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 2, 2001 
MARGARET B. STIGALL, TRUSTEE, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Michael C. Allen, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 58.1-3241(A) 
authorizes Chesterfield County to assess “roll-back” taxes, 
defined in Code § 58.1-3237, against certain real property as a 
result of conveyances of the entire property in two separate 
parcels by the owner, in the absence of a change in the use of 
the property. 
BACKGROUND 
The material facts are not in dispute.  In 1954, Charles W. 
Stigall acquired, by single deed, two contiguous parcels of real 
property consisting of approximately 135 acres in Chesterfield 
County.  The larger of the two parcels, denominated by the 
parties in this case as the “Falling Creek” parcel, consisted of 
approximately 120 acres.  The smaller parcel, denominated by 
those parties as the “A.G. Tyler” parcel, consisted of 
approximately 15 acres.1
                     
1For clarity we will hereafter omit any reference to the 
A.G. Tyler parcel even though the record reflects that a portion 
In 1975, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the 
statutory scheme for Special Assessment for Land Preservation 
contained in Code § 58.1-3229 et seq., Chesterfield County 
adopted an ordinance providing for reduced assessment and 
taxation of real estate devoted to agricultural, horticultural, 
forest, or open space use (special land use tax program).  
Thereafter, the Falling Creek parcel was devoted to forest use, 
as defined in Code § 58.1-3230, and accepted by the County as 
qualified for reduced assessment and taxation under its special 
land use tax program. 
In 1979 or 1980, the Commonwealth acquired by eminent 
domain a portion of the Falling Creek parcel for the 
construction of the Powhite Parkway, “a limited access, 
interstate grade freeway.”  The Powhite Parkway bisected the 
Falling Creek parcel into two unequal sections; one with 
approximately 26 acres lying north of the freeway and the other 
with approximately 84 acres lying south of the freeway.  
Although the two sections of the Falling Creek parcel were 
physically separated by the construction of the Powhite Parkway, 
                                                                  
of it was involved in the various proceedings and conveyances 
which we will subsequently relate.  We do so because there is a 
discrepancy in the record regarding the total acreage of that 
parcel impacted by those proceedings and conveyances, and the 
parties agree that taxation of the A.G. Tyler parcel is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
 
 
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the County continued to tax the Falling Creek parcel as a single 
unit under its special land use tax program.  At the time of the 
eminent domain taking of a portion of this parcel, Charles 
Stigall did not record a subdivision plat or otherwise take any 
action that would reflect in the County’s land records a legal 
separation of the parcel into two separate tracts. 
Following the death of Charles Stigall in 1998, the Falling 
Creek parcel became the property of his widow, Margaret B. 
Stigall.  On October 7, 1999, for the purpose of estate 
planning, Margaret Stigall conveyed that portion of the Falling 
Creek parcel lying south of the Powhite Parkway by deed to The 
Margaret B. Stigall Living Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust.  
On the same date and for the same purpose, she conveyed that 
portion of the Falling Creek parcel lying north of the Powhite 
Parkway by deed to The Stigall Family Limited Partnership.  
These deeds along with a 1988 plat reflecting the physical 
division of the Falling Creek parcel were duly recorded in the 
County land records.  No change in the use of the property 
occurred as a result of these conveyances. 
On December 27, 1999, the County, pursuant to Code § 58.1-
3241(A), assessed roll-back taxes against the Falling Creek 
parcel in the amount of $22,087.74 based on the above described 
conveyances by Margaret Stigall.  The amount of the tax 
represented the difference between the actual tax paid under the 
 
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special land use tax program and the tax which would have been 
due had the real estate been taxed on its fair market value 
assessment during “the five most recent complete tax years.”  
Code § 58.1-3237(B).  Thereafter, on May 25, 2000, Margaret 
Stigall, in her capacity as trustee of her inter vivos trust, 
and The Stigall Family Limited Partnership (collectively, the 
taxpayers) filed a joint application in the Circuit Court of 
Chesterfield County for correction of erroneous assessment of 
these roll-back taxes. 
Upon the filing of the County’s responsive pleading and the 
parties’ agreement that the material facts were not disputed, 
the trial court permitted the taxpayers to make an oral motion 
for summary judgment.2  In a letter opinion dated August 21, 
                     
2The County styled its pleading responding to the taxpayers’ 
application as a “demurrer” and subsequently filed a “Memorandum 
in Support of Demurrer.”  Within these pleadings, however, the 
County contested the factual allegations of the application and, 
thus, its challenge to the suit cannot be viewed as constituting 
a “demurrer” and proper supporting argument for that form of 
pleading, which admits the truth of the facts contained in the 
pleading to which it is addressed.  Cox Cable Hampton Roads, 
Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 
(1991).  It is evident from the record, however, that the County 
consented to the case being resolved by the trial court on the 
taxpayers’ oral motion for summary judgment because the facts 
asserted in the taxpayers’ application were not disputed for 
purposes of resolving the legal issue before the trial court.  
Accordingly, we will review the judgment of the trial court 
under the standard of review applicable in such cases.  Shelor 
Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 478, 544 S.E.2d 345, 348 
(2001). 
 
 
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2000, and subsequently adopted by reference in the final order, 
the trial court, applying what it characterized as the “ordinary 
and commonly understood meanings” of the terms used in Code 
§ 58.1-3241(A), initially ruled that the Falling Creek parcel 
“was not separated and split[-off] when [Margaret] Stigall made 
the conveyances of 1999, but years earlier – when the 
Commonwealth built the Powhite Parkway.”  Because this 
separation did not result from an “action of the owner,” the 
trial court concluded that the roll-back tax assessment 
permitted by Code § 58.1-3241(A) was not triggered.  The trial 
court further ruled that following the 1999 conveyances to the 
trust and the partnership, the taxpayers “made the necessary 
attestation that the properties will continue to be devoted to 
‘forest use,’ and each of the parcels is of sufficient acreage 
to qualify for inclusion in the land use [tax] program 
authorized by Code § 58.1-3231” and, thus, “satisfy the 
requirements of Code § 58.1-3237(D).” 
In its final order, entered on September 12, 2000, the 
trial court incorporated by reference its prior letter opinion, 
granted the taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment, and ordered 
that the County “exonerate [the property in question] of all 
roll-back taxes imposed in 1999.”  In an order dated February 
23, 2001, we awarded the County this appeal. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
Beyond question the statutory scheme invoked by this case 
regarding a special land use tax program that provides for 
reduced assessment and taxation of real estate devoted to 
agricultural, horticultural, forest, or open space use is 
intended by the legislature to promote the preservation of such 
real estate for the public benefit.  The key to that 
preservation is the amelioration of the pressure that forces 
landowners to convert their property to more intensive uses.  
One source of that pressure is the assessment of property 
devoted to one or more of these uses at values incompatible with 
such use.  See Code § 58.1-3229 (1984 Repl. Vol.). 
In this context, one intended goal of this statutory scheme 
is the continued qualifying use of property which has qualified 
previously for the reduced taxation provided by a special land 
use tax program following a proper application by the owner.  
Code § 58.1-3234.  Thus, under Code § 58.1-3237(A), when the 
qualifying use of particular real property changes to a 
“nonqualifying use” or the zoning of that property is changed to 
a “more intensive use” at the request of the owner or his agent, 
that portion of the property which no longer qualifies for 
reduced assessment and taxation “shall be subject to additional 
taxes . . . referred to as roll-back taxes.”  Pertinent to the 
present case, Code § 58.1-3237(D) expressly provides that 
 
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“[l]iability to the roll-back taxes shall attach when a change 
in use occurs . . . .  Liability to the roll-back taxes shall 
not attach when a change in ownership of the title takes place 
if the new owner . . . continues the real estate in the use for 
which it is classified” prior to the transfer of title to the 
new owner. 
In the present case, the County concedes that the real 
estate in question has not undergone a change in use and in 
subsequent years will qualify for reduced assessment and 
taxation under its special land use tax program so long as that 
real estate continues to be devoted to forest use by the new 
owners.  Nonetheless, the County contends here, as it did in the 
trial court, that Code § 58.1-3241(A) authorizes it to assess 
roll-back taxes against that real estate as a result of the 1999 
conveyances by Margaret Stigall. 
Code § 58.1-3241(A) provides that: 
Separation or split-off of lots, pieces or 
parcels of land from the real estate which is being 
valued, assessed and taxed under an ordinance adopted 
pursuant to this article, either by conveyance or 
other action of the owner of such real estate, shall 
subject the real estate so separated to liability for 
the roll-back taxes applicable thereto, but shall not 
impair the right of each subdivided parcel of such 
real estate to qualify for such valuation, assessment 
and taxation in any and all future years, provided it 
meets the minimum acreage requirements and such other 
conditions of this article as may be applicable.  Such 
separation or split-off of lots shall not impair the 
right of the remaining real estate to continuance of 
such valuation, assessment and taxation without 
 
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liability for roll-back taxes, provided it meets the 
minimum acreage requirements and other applicable 
conditions of this article. 
No subdivision of property which results in 
parcels which meet the minimum acreage requirements of 
this article, and which the owner attests is for one 
or more of the purposes set forth in § 58.1-3230, 
shall be subject to the provisions of this subsection. 
 
The County asserts that although the Falling Creek parcel 
was physically “separated” as a result of the prior eminent 
domain taking of a portion of it by the Commonwealth, Code 
§ 58.1-3241(A) contemplates a legal separation, which occurred 
when the remaining acreage of that parcel was conveyed in 
separate parcels to two different owners in 1999 by Margaret 
Stigall.  The County further asserts that the “safe-harbor” 
provision provided by the second paragraph of Code § 58.1-
3241(A) is not applicable because the taxpayers concede that the 
purpose of the 1999 conveyances was for estate planning and, 
thus, Margaret Stigall could not, and did not, attest that the 
purpose of the legal separation was for one or more of the 
purposes of agricultural, horticultural, forest, or open space 
use set forth in Code § 58.1-3230. 
In response, the taxpayers first contend that the trial 
court properly ruled the eminent domain taking by the 
Commonwealth caused the separation of the Falling Creek parcel 
rather than the 1999 conveyances by Margaret Stigall.  
Continuing, the taxpayers further contend that because the 
 
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eminent domain taking did not subject the property to liability 
for roll-back taxes at that time, Code § 58.1-3242, the trial 
court correctly determined that Code § 58.1-3237(D) rather than 
Code § 58.1-3241(A) controlled whether roll-back taxes were to 
be assessed against the “separated” parcels.  Finally, the 
taxpayers maintain that even if the 1999 conveyances potentially 
subjected these parcels to liability for roll-back taxes under 
Code § 58.1-3241(A), the safe-harbor provision of that statute 
applies because the separated parcels continue to be used “for 
one or more of the purposes set forth in Code § 58.1-3230.” 
We do not agree with the contentions of either party in 
their entirety.  However, for the reasons that follow, we are of 
opinion that the trial court reached the correct result although 
for the wrong reason.  Accordingly, we will assign the correct 
reason and affirm that result.  See Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 
179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2000). 
Under familiar principles, when we construe a statute we 
endeavor to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature.  In doing so, we must assume that the legislature 
chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and 
we are bound by those words when we apply the statute.  Barr v. 
Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 
(1990).  Moreover, we examine a statute in its entirety, rather 
than by isolating particular words or phrases.  Shelor Motor 
 
9
Co., 261 Va. at 479, 544 S.E.2d at 348.  With respect to a 
special land use tax program, we also are of opinion that the 
relief it affords in the form of a special assessment “operates 
as an exemption or deferral from taxation.  Consequently, all 
provisions of the [authorizing] Act ought to be strictly 
construed against the taxpayer.”  1978-79 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 
273, 274. 
With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis by 
addressing the trial court’s initial conclusion that the eminent 
domain taking by the Commonwealth of a portion of the Falling 
Creek parcel constituted a “separation or split-off” of that 
property as contemplated by Code § 58.1-3241(A).  Undoubtedly, 
this taking and, more particularly, the barrier created by the 
subsequent construction of the Powhite Parkway resulted in a 
physical division of the Falling Creek parcel.  By its express 
terms, however, this statute is only applicable to a “conveyance 
or other action of the owner.”  A taking by eminent domain is 
not an action of the owner in any sense.  Moreover, this 
statute, viewed in its entirety, clearly evinces a legislative 
intent that the triggering “subdivision of property” into “lots, 
pieces or parcels of land” be a legal separation rather than a 
mere physical separation. 
The creation of new lots, pieces, or parcels of land is a 
legal separation of property because it results from action by 
 
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the owner and involves, at a minimum, a change in the legal 
description of the property, either by metes and bounds or by 
plat, which is duly recorded in the appropriate land records.  
Such was exactly the case when Margaret Stigall recorded the 
1999 deeds and the 1988 plat in the County’s land records, 
legally separating the Falling Creek parcel into two separate 
parcels owned by the taxpayers.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
trial court erred in ruling that the eminent domain taking of a 
portion of the Falling Creek parcel caused a “separation or 
split-off” of that property as contemplated by Code 
§ 58.1-3241(A). 
As we have previously noted, the trial court’s conclusion 
that the Falling Creek parcel was separated by the eminent 
domain taking of a portion of that parcel, rather than by 
Margaret Stigall’s conveyances, logically led it to then apply 
the provisions of Code § 58.1-3237(D) which, if applicable, 
would support the ultimate result reached by the trial court 
that the property in question was not liable to the assessment 
of roll-back taxes.  This would be so because the County 
concedes that no change in the use or zoning of the property had 
occurred and the taxpayers, as new owners, continued to devote 
the property to forest use for which it had qualified for 
reduced assessment and taxation under the County’s special land 
use tax program.  We are of opinion, however, that the proper 
 
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construction of Code § 58.1-3241(A) nonetheless supports the 
result reached by the trial court under the facts of this case. 
Code § 58.1-3241(A) is only applicable when the conveyance 
or other action of the owner of real estate causes a separation 
or split-off of lots, pieces, or parcels of land “from the real 
estate which is being valued, assessed and taxed” under a local 
special land use tax ordinance.  (Emphasis added).  The 
“remaining real estate” continues to receive the benefit of 
reduced assessment and taxation “without liability for roll-back 
taxes” provided it continues to qualify for beneficial 
treatment.  Thus, by its express terms, this statute 
contemplates a separation or split-off of a portion of the real 
estate in such a manner that there is a “remaining” portion of 
the original parcel.3  It does not contemplate or address the 
conveyance of the original parcel in its entirety by the owner.  
Rather, when the owner conveys the real estate in its entirety 
to a new owner or owners either as one parcel or as separate 
“lots, pieces or parcels,” the liability to roll-back taxes, if 
any, is controlled by the provisions of Code § 58.1-3237(D).  In 
addition, the owner need not satisfy the safe-harbor provision 
                     
3In the present case, the County concedes that it did not 
treat either of the two parcels created by the 1999 conveyances 
as the “remaining real estate” that was not subject to roll-back 
taxes.  Rather, the County taxed both parcels. 
 
 
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of Code § 58.1-3241(A) by attesting that the subdivision of the 
property is for one or more of the purposes set forth in Code 
§ 58.1-3230 because the potential liability to roll-back taxes 
under Code § 58.1-3241(A) has not been triggered by such a 
conveyance or conveyances. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that only a change in 
ownership occurred and the property continued to be devoted to 
forest use and qualified for reduced assessment and taxation 
under the County’s special land use tax program.  Accordingly, 
we hold that the trial court reached the right result that the 
property in question was not liable to the roll-back taxes 
assessed against it by the County. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court in favor of the taxpayers. 
Affirmed. 
 
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