Case Title: Tortorello v. Tortorello. ICA Opinion, filed 06/30/2006 [pdf], 112 Haw. 219. Dissenting Opinion by J. Fujise [pdf]. ICA Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 08/07/0006 [pdf], 111 Haw. 325. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/16/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 113 Haw. 432

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAWLIBRARY

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West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

000 ---

 

RENEE A. TORTORELLO, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellee,

WILSON TORTORELLO, JR., Respondent /Respondent -Appellant

 

No. 27459

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APP!
(FC-DA NO. 05-1-1453)

g

oats

:
e

MARCH 7, 2007

Lvs
sun dS

 

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

on February 16, 2007, this court accepted
petitioner/petitioner-appellee Renee A. Tortorello’s (wife)
timely application for writ of certiorari, filed January 16,

2007, requesting this court to review the Intermediate Court of

(Ica) opinion in Tortorello v. Tortorelle, 112 Hawai'i

Appeals’
filed June 30, 2006, and the ICA's

219, 145 P.3d 762 (App. 2006),

order granting respondent /respondent-appellant Wilson Tortorello,
Gx.’ (iusband) request for coste in the amount of $628.41, filed
eptenber 13, 2006. In its published opinion, the ICA reversed
the Family Court of the First Circuit’s August 1, 2005 order for
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SS

protection’ in favor of Wife and against respondent /respondent-

 

appellant Wilson Tortorello, Jr. (Husband) .*
In her application, Wife contends, inter alia, that the
ICA erred in applying the doctrine of reg judicata to the instant

jexts that the ICA‘s decision should be

 

case. Wife also
applied prospectively. Lastly, Wife maintaine that the ICA erred
in awarding costs incurred on appeal in favor of Husband.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the ICA's

 

October 18, 2006 judgment on appeal with respect to the merits of

Husband's appeal. We vacate, however, the ICA’s award of costs

 

to Husband and, instead, award costs in the amount of $280.80 in
favor of Husband as against Wife.
1. BACKGROUND

AL Petition

At all times relevant herein, Husband and Wife were
married and have two minor children. On June 28, 2005, wife
filed an “Ex Parte Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order for
Protection and Statement’ in the family court, pursuant to

Hawai'i Revieed Statutes (ERS) chapter 586 (relating to domestic

 

ble Darryl ¥.C. choy presided over the underlying
Cthervise indicated.

 

The ICA's judgeent on appeal was entered on October 18, 2006. we
note that the judgnent on appea: does not include any reference to the Jex'e
avard of coste in favor of Husband and as against Wife

 

 
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abuse protective orders)’ [hereinafter, Petition I].‘ The ICA

 

eunmarized Wife's allegations in Petition I as follows

(Husbana) chr
he, finel,] Ti

  

ened that (,] "if

1. on gune 24, 2
make it twice

you take a hard 1ine wi
ip hard on you."
2. Uhusbend) subjected her to vextrene

 

xyehological

 

   

abuse by: sereaming at {her,] calling (her) @ ‘fuckin
Bien’ repeat r) enilat. s .
{fusband) attacked [her] sister(] . «in front of (wife's

five year] old (child) -- pushed & nit her (sister! .
(Husband) hse displayed extreme irrationality & violence.
The last date (Musband) wiureAia was on June 14, 2005

3. “She ie in immediate danger of (Husband) abusing
hher “because of hie extrene irrational & violent behavicr”
and the fact that "(hje is very insecure and tries to
Soninate & invalidate (Wife) .”

‘. “She Believes that [Husband] would very soon
physically harm, injure, of assault her, burt her family,
Bnd take Her children to Brazii without her permission. (*]

Tortorello v, Tortorello, 112 Hawai'i 219, 220, 145 P.3d 762, 763

(2006) (some brackets and ellipses in original) (bold emphai

     

 

added). on the same day (June 28, 2005), the family court, the
Honorable Paul T. Murakami presiding, granted a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to Wife, with an expiration date of

September 26, 2005.

 

> RS § 586-4 (2006) provides in relevant part:

 

(a) Upon petition 22 2 family court Judge, an ex parte
temporary restrsining order nay be granted without notice to
‘either or both parties from contacting,
(tening, oF physically abueing each other,
notwithstanding that a complaint for annulment, diverc
Separation has not been filed.

 

 

 

ici ie family court judge may issue the ex parte
temporary restraining order orally, if the person being
festrained is present in court. The order shall state that
there 1e probable cause to Believe that a past act or acte
Sf abuse have occurred, or that threate of sbuse make ie
probable that acte of abuse may be imminent

that Wige completed the form utilized as Petition 1

 

 

+ according to Wife, Husband “hse dual citizeaship in Brazil.-

 
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on duly 12, 2005, a show cause hearing as to why the
TRO should not continue was held by the family court.‘ At the

hearing, the following colloquy ensued when Wife commenced her

 

eimony
[By Mife’s counse2) [Wife], how long have you
been sarried to "[xuebend]?
Ar [By Wife) Eight yeare.
Q: okay. And during that time, has there been any

physical abuse in your relationship?
And what has been the frequency of the abuse and

‘Ai About three tines a year when an issue vould
cove up and I wanted to discuss it, 1t would

{counsel for susband) + I’m Going to object to this
line of questioning. The restraining order ~~ we're talking
about three years. ago

   

 

‘THE COURT: a
cions in -here reaarai 2
fon [ii.-Becsuas
‘0: (By Wife's counsel) “i'd Tike eo turn your
attention to .”.'. Petition [1].

HE COURT: “so anyways =~ pardon me -- the objection
sustained!

‘Q: iy Wife's counsel! I'd like to turn your
attention to the reason behind the filing of .- . Petition
[1]. could you explain to the judge the purpose of the
tiling of . <. Petition {1], why you felt you needed to
He.

Ay Iny Mitel
June 14th on the evening,

4

 

‘An altercation took place on
jpproximately 11:25 p.m

 

 

(Bmphases added.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the family
court ruled that Wife had “not met her burden of proving that an
order for protection is necessary to prevent a donestic abuse or
a recurrence of donestic abuse. And that [Husband] has shown
cause as to why the [TRO] should not continse.* Consequently,

the family court dissolved the TRO.

‘The Honorable Matthew J. Viola presided over the instant hearing.
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B. Petition Ir

on July 19, 2005, Wife filed a second “Ex Parte
Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order for Protection and
Statement in the family court (hereinafter, Petition II]. In
Petition 11, Wife essentially alleged the same “facts, fears, and
beliefs” that ehe alleged in Petition 1. Id, at 221, 145 P.3d at
764. Wife, however, included additional allegations in Petition
II that were not made in the earlier Petition I, The ICA

summarized Wife's further allegations in Petition II as follow:

 

5. Many times in the Last six years

(husband) hurt
and shoved her.

  

{Susband) maliciously damaged her property by
changing all three locke on ehe doors to her hone and the
howe was a nese. The last date this occurred was July
2008.

 

Id. (bold emphases added).” On the same day, the family court
entered a TRO against Husband, with an expiration date of October
17, 2008.

on duly 27, 2005, Husband filed a menorandum in
opposition to Petition 1. Husband contended that:

Petition [11] is [W)sfe’e attempt to revisit and
gelitigate the unfoundea allegations alzesdy heard and
Fejected by the family court. All satter [sic] previously
Iitigated cn 7/12/05 should be excluded from evidence at the
[upcoming] Bearing on [Petition 11). Further, as the
‘ifegatione contained in. Petition (11) have had a full
Rearing and have been found wanting, this matter is ree
dudicata(.1

 

 

+ Me note that the ICA numbered the additional allegations contained in
petition Tr ae ws" and "6" to continue from the initial four allegations made
Tn Petition 2. We Believe the ICA numbered the allegations ae such in order

£0 refer to the allegations by nunber in its opinion.

 
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Wife} alleges no new contact in her written filings

which would provide the basis for a new Order for

Protection. [Wife] hes had ample opportunity to litigate

the cizcunstances prior to the 7/22/0s hearing, and her

request for an() Crder of Protection was found wanting. she

how files a second request for lan) Order of Protection yet

alleges no new contact with [susband) vhick provide the

basis for the Order, she simply wante a second bite at the

‘apple.

on August 1, 2005, a show cause hearing as to why the
TRO should not continue was held by the family court. At the
hearing, the family court initially ruled that “[tloday’s
proceeding will not involve the allegations of June 241, 2005,
ise., allegation No. 2]." As such, there was no evidence
admitted with regard to allegation No. 1 at the hearing. The
parties presented evidence with respect to allegation No. 5,
specifically focusing on one incident occurring in May 2005. Id.
(stating that, “[w]ith regard to allegation [Nlo. 5, . . . there
was evidence of only one incident, and it happened in May 2005").
At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court entered an
order for protection, set to expire on August 1, 2015. On August
23, 2005, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal.
C. IGA Appeal and Disposition

On appeal before the ICA, Husband maintained that the

family court “erred in allowing [Wife] to proceed with [Petition

 

32] because such re-1itigation was barred by rea judicata
Husband asserted that the fanily court reviewed Petition I and
Petition IT and decided that whatever allegations were not made

in the text of [Petition I] were permissible as claims to be

 
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decided in the hearing on [Petition 11]. The [family clourt did

not take into consideration whether any of the claims made in

[Petition 11] could have been asserted in [Petition 1].* Husband

argued that:

ples judicata requires that # (pletitioner is required to
aetert all elaine that "might have been properly ssserted in
the fixet action," or risk the bar of zen judicata in any
Subsequent action involving the same parties. The idea
Behing the rule ie to avoid multiple suite and to enc
Parties to resolve all of thei disputes in as few ci
Rossibie, so ae to encourage proper use of judicial

‘Permitting multiple petitions will wreak havoc on our

judicial system, ‘Claimants can, and will, after losing «|

 

 

 

   

  

 

{pletition, re-tile it, ae (wife) did bere (within three
weeks), adding a few new facts or allegations, and clain
That’ they had forgotten co make ouch allegations and claims,
and be allowed, ae the

(fectiy clourt aid in this case,
ited result.

put into [Petition 12)

could have Been asserted in (Petition 1]. The ‘new claim

for the most part, occurred in May() 2005. [Petition I]

fied on Sune 26,2005. Thus, as of the filing date of

[Petition i, ali of the new and unasverted clei

[petition 1}, were known to [hife]

[Petition #1 and failed to make the appropriate

allegations.

‘As such, iG judicata precludes relitigation of an
application for [a] restraining order, based upon allegedly
wTingfol conduct that wae supposed to have taken place pricr
YOrthe date of execution of (Petition 1] on June 28, 2005
All of the ‘nev claims" pre-dated June 28, 2005. Hence, all
Claims in [petition I1] should have been barred.

 
 
   

     

 

 

 

 

 

Husband also contended that the family court erred “in allowing
[Wife] to proceed with [Petition IT] because such re-litigation
was barred by collateral estoppel.” Finally, Husband contended
that the family court erred in “restricting the trial time of

each party because to do so unduly restricted (Husband's) ability

to present evidence and make appropriate and cogent argument, and

thereby properly present a defense.”

 
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on June 30, 2006, the ICA issued ite published opinion,
reversing the family court’s August 1, 2008 order for protection.

‘The majority held that the doctrine of ree judicata ‘applies to

 

successive HRS [cJhapter 586 . . . protective order cases filed
by the same petitioner against the same respondent where the
second case is based on events that occurred, and that the
petitioner knew about, prior to the filing of the first
petition|.J* Id, at 222, 145 P.ad at 765. Specifically, the ICA

stated:

 

In the June 28, 2005 petition {, Petition 1], (wite]
alleged that ah ineident on Jute 14, 2005, and other actions
by [Musband] made a protective order necessary to prevent
Gonestic abuse or 4 recurrence of abuse. At the hearing on
uly 32, 2008, (iveband) showed cause why the order should
hot be continued and that a protective order was not
Fy to prevent domestic abuse oF a recurrence of
In the July 19, 2005 petition{, i.e., Petition IJ),
[Wife] re-alleged the allegations stated in {petition 1) and
added allegations of events happening pre-June 26, 2005, and
post-June 28, 2005. The post-cune 28, 2005 events are
Tasugeieient to support a protective order. With respect to
the evente happening pre-dune 28, 2008, ali of the reasons
for the rag judicata doctrine are applicable. (Petition T)
presented [Wife] with ber one opportunity to request an
folder for [plrotection for acts and threats of abuse
occurring, and that [wife] knew about, prior te the filing
of [Petition 1], and subjected (Musband| to his one duty to
defend againat that request. {Petition 1] could

(Wife's) allegations
8 of abuse that made a
Protective order necessary to prevent domestic sbuse oF @
Fecurrence of abuse.

 
 

 

   

 

 

 

   

    

Id, Lastly, the majority stated that the family court form
utilized by Wife to file Petitions I and IT supports its position
of applying xes iudicata to the instant case and replicated the

on of the form in ite opinion. Id.

 

relevant po:
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ynting opinion,

 

ICA Associate Judge Fujise issued a dij

stating that she would affirm the August 1, 2005 order for

 

protection (the dissent). According to the dissent,

  

‘this appeal turns, not on whether the May 2008 incident
should have-been itigated in (Petition I), but whether,
having effectively prevented her fron presenting evidence of
any incidenta not included in [Petition 1), (Husband)
Gifectively waived reliance on the defense of reg iudicata
fo prevent the consideration of (Petition II) which relied
primarily on the May 2005 incident of physical abuse.

 

Id, at 222-23, 145 P.3d at 765-66 (Fujise, J., dissenting). The

dissent maintained that:

ke appears that [susband) waived his res iudicats
Getense insofar as he now argues It ie « complete bar to
[petition Ii], for two reasons: (1) the record does not
Feveal that he argued for a complete bar below(;] and (2) a
party who actively prevents the litigation of certain claims
Tn the firet action should not be heard to complain when a
second action is brought to litigate those clains.

Id. at 223, 145 P.3d at 766 (Fujise, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) -

on July 32, 2006, Wife moved for reconsideration of the
ICA's published opinion. The ICA entered an order denying wife's
motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2006. On August 25,
2006, Husband moved for an award of costs incurred on appeal in
the amount of $626.41. On September 12, 2006, Wife filed her
objections to Husband's request for costs, contending that
Husband’s request was untinely filed and that Husband failed to
‘provide any statenents of authority for the requested items for
cost and. . . failfed) to provide copies of invoices, bills,
vouchers{,] or receipts.” On September 13, 2006, the ICA entered

an order granting Husband’s request for costs in its entirety,

 
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1.0, $628.41. The ICA’s order expressly indicated that it

objections to Husband’s request

 

considered wife

On October 38, 2006, the ICA entered its judgment on
appeal. See also supra note 2, Wife timely filed her
application for writ of certiorari on January 16, 2007. Husband
did not £1le a reeponse

IT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘The acceptance or rejection of an application for writ
of certiorari is discretionary. HRS § 602-59(a) (Supp. 2006).
In deciding whether to accept an application, thie court reviews
the decision of the ICA for (1) grave errors of law or of fact or
(2) obvious inconsistencies in the decision of the ICA with that
of the supreme court, federal decisions, or ite own decision and
whether the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencies dictate
the need for further appeal. HRS § 602-59(b) .

IIT. DISCUSSION

As previously mentioned, Wife contends that the ICA
erred in applying the doctrine of xes judicata to the instant
case. Wife also argues that “the form promulgated by the
Judiciary under BRS [c]hapter 586 failed to explicit [sic] warm
[Wife] that she had only ‘one opportunity’ to petition for a
protective order.” Moreover, Wife asserts that the ICA’s
decision should be applied prospectively. Finally, Wife alleges
fusband. Each

 

that the ICA erred in awarding costs in favor of
of Wife's contentions will be addressed in turn.

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A. Res dudicata

preliminarily, Wife asserts that Husband waived the
defense of reg judicata. Wife also argues that “the ICA erred in
failing to apply the proper res judicata analysis as set forth by
the Hawai" Supreme Court." And, Wife argues that “(t]he
application of rea judicata has been soundly rejected in other
jurisdictions in domestic abuse protection order proceedings.”

a. Waiver

Wife maintains that thie court’s decision in Solarana
v. Industrial Electronics, Inc., 50 Haw. 22, 428 P.2d 412 (2967),
“compels a conclusion that [Husband] had waived the ree judicata

 

defense.* In Solarang, this court held tha

me defense of ree judicata will be deened to have been
Waived when based ch a judgment of disnissal ina prior suit
Yn which, on defendant's insistence, the subject matter of
the second sult was excluded from consideration as being
utedde the scope of the pleadings and laintitt wae

‘snendin the implication being
Ent another suit would lie

 

    

Id. at 22, 428 P.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
At the July 12, 2005 show cause hearing on Petition I
in this case, Husband objected to Wife’s attempt to introduce

of physical abuse -- the subject matter of

 

evidence of instance
Petition II -- on the basis of relevance. The family court

 

sustained the objection, stating that, I read. . . Petition
(2), there are no allegations in here regarding physical abuse so
i'm constrained to limit the hearing to the matters that are

identified in. . . Petition [I]. Because, otherwise, [Husband]

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didn’t have notice of those allegations.” As such, the family
court excluded from consideration the instances of physical abuse
ae being outaide the scope of the pleadings, i.e, Petition I.
Wife, however, was not precluded from amending Petition I to
include the instances of physical abuse. tn fact, Wife does not
point to anywhere in the record to indicate that she sought leave

from the family court to amend Petition I in order to include the

 

instances of physical abuse. See Hawai'i Family Court Rul
(HPCR) Rule 15 (2007)." Consequently, under the circumstances of
this case, the doctrine of reg judicata has not been waived by
Husband.

2. Applicability of Res Judicata

Wife next contends that “the May and June abuse

incidents were not the sane transaction or series of
transactions, as the term ‘transaction’ is used and defined in
applying the doctrine of res judicata." (Emphasis in original
omitted.) Although not entirely clear, it appears that Wife is

arguing that, because the instances of physical abuse that

 

* MERC Rule 25 provides in relevant part:

(a) amendmente. A party may amend the party's pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no,
Fesponsive pleading i¢ permitted and the action har not been
placed upon the trial celendar, the party say so amend it at
any tine within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise &
party say anend the party's pleading only by leave of court,
Or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
Be freely given when justice so requires:

 

 

 

(Bephasie in original.)

 
 

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allegedly occurred in May 2005 did not arise from the “same

ction or series of transactions” as the instances of

 

trai

 

psychological abuse of Wife and physical abuse of Wife’s sister
that allegedly occurred in June 2005, rea judicata is
inapplicable to this case.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, ie a doctrine “that
Limits] a litigant to one opportunity to litigate aspects of the
case to prevent inconsistent results and miltiplicity of suits
and to promote finality and judicial economy." Bremer v. Weeks,
104 Hawai's 43, 53, 85 P.34 150, 160 (2004) (citation and
footnote omitted). Res judicata “prohibits a party from
relitigating a previously adjudicated cause of action." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition,

che judgnent of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar

Seele"StiS fee Contetelog the sane sublece master, and

precludse the selitigation, not only of the issues wnich

Sere actually litigated inthe firee action, but also of all

Grounds of clais and defense which aight have
‘but vere sot litsgates oF
Geeidea-

 

 

 

 

Id. at 53-54, 85 P.3d at 160-61 (citation, brackets, and some
emphases omitted) (some emphases added). Finally,

[edhe party asserting claim preclusion has the burden of
Getabliching that. (1) there was a final judgment on the
Serite, (2) both parties are the sane or in privity with the
Parties in the original suit, and (3) the claim decided in

 

 

Id, at 54, 85 P.3d at 161 (emphasis added).
In her application, Wife does not dispute that the

first and second prongs of res judicata are met in the present

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case. Instead, Wife appears to believe that the claim decided in

 

the “original suit,” i.e., Petition I, is not identical with the
one presented in “the action in question,” ive., Petition 12,
However, as Husband-aptly pointed out in his reply brief on
appeal, “[t]he claim in both Petitions is based upon entitlement
to a restraining order/{o]rder of [p]rotection.* Inasmuch as
both Petitions sought an order of protection against Husband, the
claim decided in Petition I is identical with the one presented
in Petition IZ. Accordingly, we do not believe the ICA committed
“grave errors of law or fact" or that the ICA’s decision contains
any “obvious inconsistencies” dictating the need for further
appeal with regard to this issue.

3. Domestic Abuse Protection Order Proceedings in other
Jurisdictions

Wife also contends that “other jurisdictions have
soundly rejected the application of zea dudicata when the
enforcement would reault in defeating the primary purpose of
to prevent harm.* In
support, Wife relies on four cases: (1) Liu, striuli, 36 P.
pplying Rhede Island law); (2) Hott

 

domestic abuse protection orders

 

Supp. 24 452 (D.R.T. 1999)

 

Brown, No. 2000CA00325, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)

(unpublished); (3) Skiles v. Dearth, Nos. 2000-CA-30, 00-DR-0252,
slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (unpublished); and (4) Muna v.

Muma, 60 P.3d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)

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In her answering brief on appeal, Wife relied on the
aforementioned four cases in support of the same proposition she

advocates in her application, i.e., that res judicata should not

 

be applied when it ‘would result in defeating the primary purpose

 

of domestic abuse protection ordera -- to prevent harm.”
Clearly, the ICA either (1) considered the four cases but
rejected their application to the instant case or (2) did not
consider the four cases in rendering its decision. As previously
mentioned, in deciding whether to accept an application for writ
of certiorari, we review the decision of the ICA for, inter alia,
obvious inconsistencies in the decision of the ICA with that of
the suprene court, federal decisions, or its own decision and
whether the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencies dictate
the need for further appeal. Three of the four cases cited by
Wife were rendered by the Ohio and Washington Courts of Appeals
and, thus, are not binding on the ICA. Although Liu is a federal
decision, the United states District Court for the District of
Rhode Island applied Rhode Ieland law in its analysis of res
judicata to the facte of that case. Consequently, the ICA was
not obligated to follow any of these four cases because none of
them are considered controlling authority. Accordingly, it
cannot be said that the ICA’s decision contains any “obvious
inconsistencies” with that of the suprene court, federal
decisions, or ite own decision that dictate the need for further
appeal with regard to this issue

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B. The Family Court Form Utilized as Petitions 1 and it

As previously indicated, Wife asserts that “the form

 

promulgated by the Judiciary under HRS [eJhapter 586 failed to
explicit [sic] warn [Wife] that she had only ‘one opportunity’ to
petition for a protective order." Specifically, Wife argues that
the ICA’s decision establishes “a bright line rule that petitions
for orders of protection filed under [HRS cJhapter 586 must
include a11 acts or threats of abuse committed prior to the
filing of the petition and that any failure to do go will result
in an absolute bar from raising them in a subsequent petition to
support the issuance of an order for protection." (Emphases in
original omitted). Wife asserts that such “an absolute bar" was
vnever made clear in either on the Judiciary form itself or by
Judiciary personnel." (Bnphasis in original omitted). wife

argue:

 

In HRS [elhapter 586, the Legislature promulgated «
statutory requirement that ‘petitioners for order(s] of
protection are required to use forns provided by the
Susiciary. “Im eftect, thie statutory requirenett charged
the Judiciary with the task of creating forms upon which
petitioners must use to petition the court for orders of
Protection. “Additionally, che Legislature charged the
Sudiciary to provide assistance to petitioners in completing
these forms. "HRS § 586-3 [(2006)] (epetition for relie!
shall be in writing upes forms provided by the court” and
the “family court shail designate an enployee or appropriate
honjudieial agency to ‘he person in completing the
petition.” (Buphasis added.)) Consequently, ‘the forms or

ust properly and adequately advise &
petitioner, especially 2 pro se petitioner, of her one
Spportunity. In this context, [wife] submits that (.) in
effect (,) the Legislature has charged the Judiciary to
Perforn'a function that is analogous to an agency function,

 

 

 

     

 

     

 

 

 

 

(Emphases in original omitted). Accordingly, Wife maintains

that, “[iln the context of agency actions, the Hawai'i Supreme

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court has ruled that{,] ‘{blefore a right to relief is barred

1, the agency process ought to be of such a nature as to
impress fully on the litigant the opportunity for recourse it
supplies and the consequence of failure to seek such recourse.'*
(citing Hawai'i Blind Vendors Ass‘n v. Dep't of Hunan Serve., 72
Haw. 367, 374, 791 P.2d 1261, 1265 (1990) [hereinafter, Hawai't
Blind Vendors], overruled on other grounds by Tamashixo v. Dep't
of Human Serve,, 112 Hawai'i 388, 146 P.3d 103 (2006) .)

As previously stated, the majority opinion concluded
that Petition I “could have and should have included all of
Wite’s} allegations about all past acts of abuse and threats of
abuse that made a protective order necessary to prevent domestic
abuse or a recurrence of abuse.” Tortorello, 112 Hawai'i at 222,
145 P.3d at 765. The majority opinion also stated that the
family court form utilized by Wife to file Petitions t and If
‘eupports [ite] position{.]* Id. Indeed, a review of Petition t
indicates that Wife left that portion of the form requesting
information on “incident (s) of domestic abuse [that] has/have
happened" blank. 11 Petition II, however, Wife completed that
portion of the form to indicate that she was physically abused in

that i

 

May 2005. To conclude as Wife desires in this ca to

 

 

allow the filing of successive petitions based on alleged p:
acts of abuse that could have been indicated in the earlier
petition, would result in clogging the family courts with

excessive hearings and straining the resources of not only the

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parties, but of the family and appellate courts of this state.
such potential problems are recognized in the policies behind res
Gudicata, which, as previously mentioned, is a doctrine “that

Limit [s] a litigant to one opportunity to litigate aspects of the

case to prevent inconsietent resulte and multiplicity of suite
and to promote finality and judicial economy.” Bremer, 104
Hawai'i at 53, 85 P.3d at 160 (citation and footnote omitted)
(emphasis added) .

Moreover, we cannot agree with Wife's implicit
assertion that domestic abuse protection order proceedings are
somehow transformed into agency actions because “the Legislature
has charged the Judiciary [with] performling] a function that is
analogous to an agency function." Wife does not present any
argument as to how the legislature’s directive in HRS § 586-3
that the family court designate an employee or appropriate non-
judicial agency to provide court users with what seemingly
amounts to clerical assistance with court forms “is analogous to
an agency function.* Moreover, domestic abuse protection order
proceedings, like the present case, are governed by ERS chapter
586. Nore specifically, under HRS § 586-2 (2006), entitled
“Court jurisdiction,” “[aln application for relief under this
chapter may be filed in any family court in the circuit court in
which the petitioner resides. Actions under this chapter shall
be given docket priorities by the court.” (Emphases added.)
Thus, the present domestic abuse protection order proceeding is

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clearly an adjudication by a court of law, not by an agency.

Consequently, Hawai'i Blind Vendors is not applicable to this
case. Accordingly, the ICA did not gravely err with respect to
this issue.
Cc. Prospective Application

Wife next contends that the ICA's “tone opportunity’ to
petition for a protective order” rule should be applied
prospectively. This court has previously stated that, “where
substantial prejudice results from the retrospective application
of new legal principles to a given set of facts, the inequity may
be avoided by giving the guiding principles prospective
application only." State v. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 220-22, 857
P.2d 593, 598 (1983) (footnote omitted). In Ikezawa, this court
considered whether: (1) “the decision establishes a new
principle of law’; (2) “retroactivity furthers or retards the
purpose and effect of the rule in question"; and (3) “retroactive
application produces substantially inequitable results.” Id. at
221 n.i1, 857 P.2d at 598 n.11 (citation omitted).

decision in this

 

Here, it cannot be said that the Ica
case “establishe (a) a new principle of law." id, Tortorelle aid
not overrule any clear precedent as set forth in any decision
made by this court or the ICA. Cf. Lindinha v. Hiilo Const
Processing Co., 104 Hawai's 164, 170, 86 P.34 973, 979 (2004)
(applying its deciaion prospectively *[blecause the law at the
time appeared to mandate” a different course of action); Ikezawa,

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75 Haw. at 221, 857 P.3d at 598 (stating that a decision

“establishe[d] a new principle of law because it overrule [4]

 

[this court's] clear precedent as set forth in [a prior

decision]*). Rather, Tortorello essentially confirms the notion

 

that a petition ‘could have and should have included all of [the
petitioner's) allegations about ali past acts of abuse and
threats of abuse that made a protective order necessary to
prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse." Id, at 222,
145 P.3d at 765. Indeed, common sense dictates that, the more
instances of abuse that are included in the petition, the greater
Likelihood of success that 2 TRO and/or order of protection would
be issued. Thus, the ICA did not gravely err by not applying its
decision prospectively.

In sum, based on the foregoing, Wife fails to establish
grave error on the part of the ICA with respect to the merits of
the case. We next address the ICA's award of costs incurred on
appeal in favor of Husband.

D. Award of Costs

Finally, Wife contends that the ICA erred in awarding
costs in favor of Husband. As previously mentioned, the ICA
awarded Husband's request for costs in its entirety, iie.,
$628.41. Specifically, Husband had sought reimbursement of:

(2) $298.42 for photocopies and postage; (2) $255.00 for filing

 

fees; and (3) $75.00 for transcript fees. As more fully
discussed below, Wife asserts that: (1) Husband’s request for

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costs wi and (2) the request failed “to provide

 

untimely filed,

copies of invoices, bille, vouchers or receipts” and the costs

 

requested are “either unauthorized or are excessive." We discui
each assertion in turn.
2. Timeliness
Wife asserts that Husband untimely filed his request
for costs on August 25, 2006, four days after the deadline for
submission. Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule
39(@) (2) (2007) provides in relevant part that

a} request for fees and costs or necessary expenses must be
Hied with the appellate clerk, with proof of service, 0
[ater than i4 daye after the tine for filing a motion’ for
jaration hae expired or che motion for
been decided.

 

    

(Emphases added.) Here, the ICA decided Wife’s motion for
reconsideration on August 7, 2006. As such, Husband’s request
for costs should have been filed no later than fourteen days
after August 7, 2006, that ie, August 22, 2006. However, Husband
did not file hie request for costs until August 25, 2006, four
days after the deadline for submission. Nevertheless, HRAP Rule
39(d) (2) expressly indicates that an untimely request for costs

“nay be denied." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the ICA was not

 

required to deny Husband’s request for costs due to

 

 

+ although the appellate courte are not required to deny « request due
to untinelinens, the appellate courte have exerciged that discretion in
Genying outright an untimely request for fees and/or costs. Thus, ve take
this opportunity to caution counsel co comply with RAP Rule 39(a) (2)'s
(continued...)

 

 

 

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Wife's Remaining Objections to the Award of Costs

 

Wife argues that

usband’s request] should be summarily denied for ite
failure to provide copies of invoices, bills, vouchers or
receipts, as required by (HRAP] Rule 39(4) (2) {(2007)]
Further, ‘the costs listed in his schedule are either
unauthorized or are excessive. — [MRAP] Rule 39(c) {(2007) .)
The rule only authorizes rel 3 forthe cost of
‘copying briefs, nothing else. Coste for copying of briefs
Should be reduced to $24.64, if they were not stricken aa
not having been properly supported and verstied.[l The

 

 

Sther fees should pe complet a2 they are either

ndacimented or are not authorized by Rule. Osher than
her rule

‘and argunent are act forth in

‘The basis, authoriei
aetaii in [isfe's] [olojections to (Husband's) Bill of Cot
tnd Request. for Payment filed on Septenber 12, 2006 and are
Incorporated by reference.

‘Consequently, [Wife] gubmite that the $628.42 approved
by the Tek fe in contravention of (MRAP) Rule 39(-]

   

 

 

 

(emphases added.)

 

*(. continued)
mandate that such requests for fees and/or costs be filed no later than

fourteen days after the tine for filing a notion fer reconsideration has
expired or the notion for reconsideration has been decided

 

% tn her opposition to msband’s request for costa at the ICA level,
ige explained more fully why coste for copying of Briefs should be reduced to
$24.64, asserting that:

 

[the Opening Brief ie 30 pages. 7 sets of 30 paces at &
cents per page would anount to $16.80" the Reply Brief
Eotales 14 pages. So that should anount to $7.64
Accordingly, the permissible (HRAP) Rule 39(e) copying
Charges should only anount £0 $24.64, if they were not
Stricken ae not having been properly supported and verified.

 

Wite apparently chose eight cents per page as the rate because, according to
the "declaration of counsel” affixed to ner opposition, counsel deciarea that
(2) "Kinko's Office an Print Center located at 590 Queen St., Honolulu,
Havai't, charges §.068 to §.08 per copy, depending oa volume” and (2) Newtech
Inaging locates ae 333 Queen St-, Honolulu, Hawaii, charges §-07 per copy.”
Although not entirely clear, it appeare chat Musbard chose thirey vente per
page ae the rate. However, as stated infra, HRAP Rule 39(c) expressly states
Phat “copying costs shail tot exceed 20 cence per page(.]"  (Brackere in
original onieeed.)

    

 

 

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HRAP Rule 39 provides in relevant part:

(e) Conte defined. costs in the appellate courts are

 

 

defined as: (1) the cost of the original and one copy of
Sen he-appealy (2) the premiums paid tor

 

 

jopersedeae bonds cr_other bonds to preserve rights pending
appeal; (3) the fee for filing the appeal; (4) the cost of
ints roduc ary copies of brie:

0 [eente| per pase, (5) necedsary poatase, cost of
faceinsie, interstate travel, ong distance telephone
charges; and (e) any other costs authorized by statute or
rule

(@) Request tor Fees and conte: objections.

(3) A party who cesives an avard of - .- costs shall.
reguest then by submitting an itemized and verifies bill of

coats, together with 2 statement of authority for each

Gaiegory of itens and, where appropriate, copies of
{hvolees, Bille, vouchers, and receipts. .-

 

  

 

 

(Some emphases in original and some added.) (Brackets in
original.) As previously mentioned, Husband had sought

reimbursement of: (1) $298.41 for photocopies and postage;

 

(2) $255.00 for filing fees; and (3) $75.00 for transcript fe

a. photecony costs

In his request for costs, Husband sought $254.70 for
photocopying numerous documents, including his opening and reply
briefs, pursuant to HRAP Rule 39." As previously stated, HRAP
Rule 39(c) defines costs in the appellate courts as, inter alia,
“the cost of printing or otherwise producing necessary copies of
briefs and appendices[.]” This court has stated that,

“[alssigning a duly broad scope to ‘briefs and appendices’ as

 

© Ag stated intra, musbend’s postage costs totaled $9.71. As such,
usband’s total costs for photocopies and postage should be $264.42 (5254.70 +
29.71). Nowever, as stated gpra, Musband had sought reinbureenent of

for photocopies and postage. Thus, it appears that Husband overstated hie
Feguest for veinbureenent of photocepien and postage by 434.00 (9380.43 =
5264.42)

 

 

 

 

 

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used in HRAP Rule 39(c) (4) . . . [this court) need not reimburse
@ prevailing party for filings other than those briefs

Jed by HRAP Rule 28, including the number of copies

 

encomp:
quired by HRAP Appendix A.* Kamalu v, ParEn, Inc., 110 Hawai'i

269, 279, 132 P.3d 378, 388 (2006). HRAP Rule 28(a) (2005)

 

provides that *[a]11 briefs shall conform with Rule 32 and be
accompanied by proof of service of two copies on each party to
the appeal.” (Emphasis added.) HRAP Rule 32.1 (2005) further

states in relevant part that:

‘the original of all docusents shall be filed with the
appellate clerk and copies shall be subsitted as follows:

(a) Opening, ansvering, and reply briefs. two copie
are required when filing. After Briefing ie completed, th
appeliste clerk will notify the parties of any additional
copies required.

 

 

ic) there directed by the appellate clerk. In all
‘the appellate clerk may direct that a epecific number
tional copies be furnished on oF before a specified

 

(underscored emphases in original and bold emphasis added.)"

See, 2.¢., Mikelson v. United Serve. Auto. Ass'n, 108 Hawai'i
358, 120 P.3d 257 (2005) (determining that “the HRAP states that

two copies of the answering brief must be submitted to the
appellate clerk at the time of filing, two copies must be served

on each party to the appeal . . ., and an additional nunber of

 

® ks previously stated, Husband's appeal was filed on August 23, 2005
Inasmuch #8 Husband's flied before the new MRAP Rules took effect
on July 1, 2008, we re 2008 version of the MRAP Rules for the
Gerermnation ag to the number of briefs necessary for the appeal

 

 

© MRAP Appendix A merely confirna that two copies are required in
addition to the Griginal decunent submitted co the appellate clark for filing

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copies . . . may be directed by the appellate clerk") (footnotes
omitted) .

In this case, Husband's opening brief contained a total

 

of thirty (30) pages and Husband's reply brief contained a total
of fourteen (14) pages, for a total of forty-four (44) pages. on
April 27, 2006, the appellate clerk notified the parties of the
sorder of Assignment," which indicated that three additional
copies of the briefs previously submitted to the appellate clerk
for filing were required. Consequently, as Wife aptiy

calculated, see supra note 10, Husband was entitled to

 

reimbursenent of seven copies of the opening and reply briefs
(five copies for the ICA and two copies for Wife). Contrary to
both parties, however, Husband is entitled to ‘copying costs

. not exceed[ing] 20 cents per pagel.]* HRAP Rule 39(c) (4)
(brackets in original omitted); see supra note 10. Thus, Husband
could have sought $61.60 (44 pages x 7 copies x §.20) in
photocopying costs for his opening and reply briefs. However, a
review of Husband's request indicates that he only sought $55.80
in photocopying costs for his opening and reply briefs.

Noreover, with respect to the other copying charges,

Husband did not cite to any “statute or . . . rule which
authorizes reimbursement for costs for which he seeks,” as Wife
pointed out to the ICA, Thus, Husband's copying costs should be
Limited to the requested $55.80 for photocopying the necessary
briefs, Accordingly, the ICA gravely erred in reinbursing

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Husband (1) $198.90 (the requested $254.70 minus the allowable
$55.80) for his photocopying costs and (2) the additional $34.00
for no apparent reason. See supra note 11.

b. costs for postage

‘Ae previously etated, Husband sought $9.71 for postage.

 

Husband’ s request indicated seven entries for posta:

 

 

 

 

 

 

(08/23/05 | Postage file marked Nee of 2 | 6a.66
Appeal; Bx i CoS to Renee &
Elen

08/23/06 | Postage mail titc of Appeal to | 2 [6 -60
Ellen Politano, Beq. Ret

32/01/08 | Postage ier to Supreme cout | 2 [8 .74
Re 30 day ext, for Opening
Brief |

07/17/06 | Postage ti to Renee A. a [snes

Torsorello re: Respondent
appellant's Opening Brief;
Statement of Respondent & COS

 

(03/02/06 | Postage ti to Theodore Chinn, | 2 [6 .27
Eng. fe: 1 file marked
Petitioner-Appeliee’s Response
fo Supplemental Meno of Law in
Reply to Respondent Appellant's
Meno in Opp £0 Petitioner
Appellee'a Men fo Dismiss for
Failure to File Opening Brief
and for Lack of Juriediceion
ana cos

 

 

(02/08/06 | Postage to Theodore chinn, 2 | s2.30
Filed copies of pleedings
transmittal dated 2/8/06

 

04/12/06 | Postage ti to Theodore chinn, | 2 | 61.1
Fe: 1 file marked Respondent
Appellant's Reply Brief 6 COS

 

 

 

 

 

 

RAP Rule 39(c) (5) defines costs in the appellate courts as,
inter alia, “necessary postage(.]” Here, no receipt or proof of

the amount being charged was attached to the request. Nor did

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ee
Husband file a response to Wife's application in order to provide

any documentation for this court to conclude that the requested

jnably and necessarily incurred in

 

amounts in postage were r
the appeal to the ICA. Consequently, Husband did not reasonably
denonstrate hie expenses for postage. Accordingly, the ICA
gravely erred in reimbureing Husband $9.71 in costs incurred for
postage.

filing fees

As previously mentioned, Husband sought $255.00 for

 

reimbursement for filing fees. Specifically, Husband’s request

indicated:

0/23/05 _| Piling Fee $225.00 $225.00

03/26/06 | Filing Fee $30.00 (client paid by | 30.00
Check 3/1/08) Ze: Men to Suppineent
Record; Dec of NSK) Bx 11 COS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

HRAP Rule 39(c) (3) defines costs in the appellate courts as,

inter alia, “the fee for filing the appeal." This court has

 

Inesmuch as appeals by non-indigent parties generally
require prepaynent of fees, the "why," “when,” and *to whom”
are selfvevident as to. $225.00[.] See HRAP Rule 45(e) (5)
Ti200s)] (supreme Court filing fee of $100.00); HRS $8 607-
Stel (23) (supp. 2004) (eireule court fee of $100.00 upon
filing of novice of appeal), 607-5.7 (Supp. 2002) (525.00
Surcharge for indigent legal services); MRAP Rule 3(a), (f)
(consequences of failure to pay, including disnissel of
appeal)

Kamau, 110 Hawai'i at 279, 132 P.3d at 388. Consequently, the

 

 

 

9225.00 requested by Husband is reimbursable, pursuant to HRAP
Rule 39(c) (3). However, inaemich as Husband did not cite to any

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authority which permits reimbursement for the $30.00 filing fee
allegedly incurred on January 26, 2006 for filing a motion to
supplement the record, Husband's request for reinbursement of
filing fees should be limited to $225.00, Accordingly, the ICA
gravely erred in reimbursing Husband $255.00 in costs incurred
for filing £

4. transcript fees
Finally, Husband requested $75.00 for transcript f

 

 

 

HRAP Rule 39(c) (1) defines coste in the appellate courte a
Anter alia, "the cost of the original and one copy of the
reporter's transcripts if necessary for the determination of the
appeal.” In Kamau, this court concluded that the prevailing

wonably demonstrated” ite tranecript fees over the

 

party had *

losing party's objection of inadequate documentation, noting

that:

(the prevailing party] Liste two charges apparently
‘to transcript production, to wit, $112.60 for
Ekristine Jordan," and $210.94 for

jukayana." [The prevailing

party] also ai ‘co be a photocopy of ite

Gua leager, recording che outlays to Jordan (December 6,

2001) and Teuksyana (Decenber 24, 2001). consequently, (the

prevailing party] has reasonably demonstrated expenses of
$210.84, which equals $323.54

    

   

Id, at 279 n.13, 132 P.3d at 386 n.13. In this case, however,

Husband’s request merely listed the following:

 

  

[Tone
03/03/08 | Tranecript Fee £75.00 $75.00
(eltene pass by check #345)

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Husband did not attach any documentation in his request nor did

Husband file a response to Wife’s application in order to provide
any documentation for this court to conclude that the requested

was reasonably and nece

 

transcript f ry incurred in the

 

 

appeal to the ICA. Consequently, Husband did not jonably

for transcript fees. Accordingly,

 

demonstrate []* his expen
the ICA gravely erred in reimbureing Husband $75.00 in costs
incurred for transcript fees.
IV. CONCLUSTON
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ICA's October 18,
2006 judgment on appeal with respect to the merits of Husband's
appeal. We vacate, however, the ICA’s award of costs to Husband

and, instead, award costs in the amount of $280.80 in favor of

Grr

Theodore ¥. Hl. Chinn and BBL ntore

Edie A. Feldman, for

titioner/petitioner-
a ‘ are

Husband as against wife.

on the brief

 

appellee
Mark 8. Kawata and Qa ort—m
Craig T. Dela Cruz, we

for respondent /respondent- Une

appellant Dates

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