Case Title: In Re Fisher

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 89-617

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1990


In re George Fisher            }              APPEALED FROM:
                               }
                               }               
                               }              
                               }             Orleans Superior Court
                               }
                               }             DOCKET NO. S60-88 OsC


                 In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

     In response to the petitioner's motion for reargument, we have recalled
the opinion and partially redrafted Part V. A.  The revision does not change
the result.  Other issues raised in the motion for reargument fail to identify
points of law or fact misapprehended or overlooked by this Court.  The motion
is therefore denied.


                                        BY THE COURT:


                                        ________________________________
                                        Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice

                                        __________________________________
                                        Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

                                        ________________________________
                                        John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                        _________________________________
[ ]  Publish                            James L. Morse, Associate Justice

[ ]  Do Not Publish                     _________________________________
                                        Louis P. Peck, Associate Justice (Ret.),
                                        Specially Assigned
________________________________________________________________________________

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-617


In re George Fisher                          Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Orleans Superior Court

                                             October Term, 1990


Stephen B. Martin, J.

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, Kenneth A. Schatz, Acting Defender
  General, and Jeffrey Dworkin, Prisoners' Rights Office, Montpelier, for
  petitioner-appellant

Jane Woodruff, Orleans County State's Attorney, Newport, and Gary Kessler
  and Pamela Hall Johnson, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier, for
  respondent-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned



     GIBSON, J.   Petitioner George Fisher appeals from the superior
court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  We affirm.
                                   I.
     Petitioner began cohabiting with Barbara V. and her four children in
1971.  Three of the children are females and victims of sexual assaults by
petitioner, who was charged in district court with two counts of sexual
assault.  Because petitioner was on probation for an arson conviction
arising from his having burned down a dwelling occupied by the three girls,
conviction on the sexual assault charge also resulted in probation-violation
charges.  On June 25, 1984, petitioner entered into a plea agreement with
the State whereby one of the two counts would be dismissed, the state's
attorney would recommend a sentence of two-to-five years to serve with the
probation-violation penalty to be served concurrently, petitioner would be
free to argue for a lesser sentence, and petitioner would waive any
objection to background information about his sexual activity with the three
children.
     On the basis of the agreement, petitioner tendered a plea of guilty.
The court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) but withheld entry of
judgment, stating, "We'll wait until time of sentencing to enter judgment."
     The PSI detailed petitioner's sexual assaults on all three female
children.  Petitioner readily admitted having repeated sexual contact with
each of them, but attempted to excuse his conduct on grounds of alcohol, an
alcoholic father, and a promiscuous mother.  The police officer's report,
which was attached to the PSI, further detailed the sexual assaults.  In its
conclusion, the PSI recommended that the plea agreement be rejected and
urged the court to consider a five-to-fifteen-year sentence.
     At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the judge told the parties
that he was troubled by the PSI and inclined to reject the plea agreement.
In defense of the agreement, the State informed the court that petitioner
would be expected to participate in the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual
Aggressors, commonly called the "Pithers program," that a two-year sentence
is the minimum time necessary for qualification for the program, and that
the State believed five years was an appropriate maximum sentence.  The
judge, however, expressed concern that the plea agreement did not provide
for a proper degree of punishment and did not adequately protect society.
The court noted that, in addition to the sexual assault charges, petitioner
had  violated his probation conditions.  The court stated that it was
prepared to reject the agreement, but that petitioner could try to change
its mind.  After being given the opportunity to speak privately with his
attorney, petitioner decided to proceed with the sentencing hearing.
     During the hearing, the court called the parties into chambers and
indicated that it was willing to go along with a "low minimum" of two years
"in light of the fact that [petitioner] wouldn't necessarily get out in two
years unless he was in fact responding appropriately to whatever sexual
reorientation program . . . is being administered."  The court was still
concerned, however, that the maximum sentence was too low, indicating that
it believed a twelve-to-fifteen-year maximum would be more appropriate.
After the chambers conference ended, the court again allowed petitioner and
his attorney to confer privately regarding withdrawal of the plea.  Again,
petitioner decided not to do so, electing instead to continue with the
sentencing hearing.
     At the close of the evidence, the court told the parties it was going
to reject the plea agreement and that, in its opinion, a two-to-twelve-year
sentence was more appropriate.  The court then gave petitioner another
opportunity to withdraw his plea.  After consulting with Barbara V., peti-
tioner declined.  The State continued to defend the plea agreement, with
its two-year minimum and five-year maximum, adding that with the Pithers
program there is "some discretion as to eligibility for release date."  The
State argued in the same vein against consecutive sentences for the sexual
assault charge and the probation violation.  After petitioner's attorney
argued against long-term incarceration, petitioner acknowledged his under-
standing that if he were sent to jail he would be expected to participate in
"the program."  The court then imposed a two-to-twelve-year sentence on the
sexual assault charge, to run concurrently with a two-to-five-year penalty
for the probation violation.
     During the sentencing proceedings, petitioner's attorney incorrectly
advised him that he would probably be released at or near his minimum
sentence if he were not a disciplinary problem while in prison.  She did not
advise him that his successful participation in the Pithers program would
have a substantial impact on his parole eligibility.  Since being sentenced,
petitioner has received no disciplinary convictions and is a participant in
the program.  Although he has been before the Parole Board several times
since August 1986, he has been denied parole each time because the Board
believed petitioner needed further treatment.
     Nearly two years after being sentenced, petitioner filed this post-
conviction-relief action in superior court.  The court denied petitioner's
request to vacate the conviction, holding that (1) the record disclosed a
sufficient factual basis for the plea, (2) plaintiff was not prejudiced by
his attorney's incorrect advice regarding parole eligibility, and (3) the
record did not support petitioner's argument that his plea was coerced and
the result of material misunderstandings.
     On appeal, petitioner makes five arguments: (1) his plea was coerced
and therefore involuntary; (2) the degree of participation by the sentencing
judge denied him his constitutional right to an impartial judge; (3) his
plea was rendered involuntary because of a mistaken belief regarding parole
eligibility; (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) the
sentencing court did not establish an adequate factual basis for the plea.
                                   II.
     Petitioner argues initially that the sentencing court coerced a plea of
guilty by threatening an enhanced sentence if he proceeded to trial, thereby
rendering his plea involuntary under the federal constitution. (FN1) In support
of his argument, petitioner points to the following passage from the
chambers discussion:
          THE COURT: I want to outline where I come from in terms
          of the way that I stated initially here.

            What I did not say initially is that if he is con-
          victed of this and after a jury trial, he might well
          fit into those categories of people I give 12 to 20 to
          serve.

            After listening to what the State's Attorney has said
          here, and knowing that no one is pressing for more than
          three years, but that a long term handle seems to be the
          biggest thing that Mr. Haygood wants and something at
          the moment I think is necessary, too.  Two to twelve.
          It is a long-term handle.

   For legal support, petitioner relies on North Carolina v. Pearce,