Case Title: Wallace v. Belleview Properties Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1100902

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
r e l : 12/21/2012 
Notice: T h i s 
o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l 
r e v i s i o n b e f o r e 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n 
t h e 
advance 
s h e e t s o f 
Southern Reporter. 
R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o 
n o t i f y t h e 
Reporter of 
Decisions, 
Alabama 
A p p e l l a t e 
C o u r t s , 
300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 
((334) 
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
any t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made 
b e f o r e t h e 
o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
1100902 
Dr. Stephen L. Wallace 
v. 
Belleview Properties Corporation e t a l . 
Appeal from Jefferson C i r c u i t Court, 
Bessemer D i v i s i o n 
(CV-05-1619) 
WISE, J u s t i c e . 
Dr. 
Stephen 
d e f e n d a n t 
below, 
L. 
W a l l a c e , 
t h e p l a i n t i f f / c o u n t e r c l a i m -
a p p e a l s 
from a summary 
judgment o f 
t h e 
1100902 
J e f f e r s o n 
C i r c u i t 
C o u r t 
i n 
f a v o r 
of 
B e l l e v i e w 
P r o p e r t i e s 
C o r p o r a t i o n , 
I P F / B e l l e v i e w 
L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p 
("IPF"), 
H R / B e l l e v i e w , 
L.P., 
and 
I n f i n i t y 
P r o p e r t y 
Management 
C o r p o r a t i o n 
( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o 
c o l l e c t i v e l y 
as 
"the 
d e f e n d a n t s " ) . 
We d i s m i s s the 
a p p e a l . 
F a c t s and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y 
In 
August 
1991, 
W a l l a c e 
l e a s e d 
o f f i c e 
space 
i n 
the 
B e l l e v i e w Shopping C e n t e r 
i n F a i r f i e l d , Alabama, t o use 
f o r 
h i s d e n t a l p r a c t i c e . 
Around 1996, 
the d e f e n d a n t s p u r c h a s e d 
the s h o p p i n g 
c e n t e r and renewed W a l l a c e ' s 
l e a s e . 
The 
l e a s e 
was renewed a second time i n 2003 f o r a term of f i v e 
y e a r s . 
On 
December 
22, 
2005, 
W a l l a c e 
sued 
the 
d e f e n d a n t s ,
1 
a l l e g i n g f r a u d and s u p p r e s s i o n ; n e g l i g e n c e ; w a n t o n n e s s ; b r e a c h 
of 
c o n t r a c t ; u n j u s t 
e n r i c h m e n t ; 
and 
n e g l i g e n t 
t r a i n i n g , 
s u p e r v i s i o n , and r e t e n t i o n . W a l l a c e a l l e g e d t h a t , d u r i n g the 
term of the l e a s e , he r e p o r t e d v a r i o u s maintenance problems t o 
the d e f e n d a n t s . 
He a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h the d e f e n d a n t s 
a s s u r e d him 
t h a t the problems would be t a k e n 
c a r e o f , 
t h e y 
1 W a l l a c e 
a l s o named Kenneth Rosen, an o f f i c e r or manager 
of one or more of the d e f e n d a n t s , 
as a d e f e n d a n t . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t u l t i m a t e l y e n t e r e d a summary judgment i n f a v o r of Rosen, 
and W a l l a c e does not c h a l l e n g e t h a t judgment i n t h i s 
a p p e a l . 
2 
1100902 
were n o t . 
W a l l a c e 
a s s e r t e d t h a t , as a r e s u l t o f r e p o r t e d 
water l e a k s t h a t were l e f t u n r e p a i r e d , the o f f i c e was i n f e s t e d 
w i t h t o x i c mold. 
T h e r e f o r e , he a s s e r t e d , i n A p r i l 2005, he 
c l o s e d h i s p r a c t i c e t o a v o i d e x p o s i n g h i s employees and 
h i s 
p a t i e n t s t o t h e t o x i c mold. 
The 
d e f e n d a n t s 
f i l e d 
answers 
t o t h e 
c o m p l a i n t 
and 
a s s e r t e d a f f i r m a t i v e 
d e f e n s e s . 
A l s o , IPF f i l e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m 
a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t , e s s e n t i a l l y s e e k i n g u n p a i d r e n t . 
W a l l a c e 
answered t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m , 
a l l e g i n g 
t h a t he was 
c o n s t r u c t i v e l y e v i c t e d from t h e p r e m i s e s because o f t h e mold 
i n f e s t a t i o n and a s s e r t i n g d e f e n s e s t o IPF's 
c o u n t e r c l a i m . 
On August 28, 2009, the d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d a motion f o r 
a 
summary judgment as t o W a l l a c e ' s 
c l a i m s 
a g a i n s t them. 
On 
September 11, 2009, IPF f i l e d a motion f o r 
a summary judgment 
on i t s c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t W a l l a c e . 
On January 20, 2010, 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on the motions f o r 
a summary 
judgment. 
On January 27, 2010, t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r 
g r a n t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r 
a summary judgment as t o 
W a l l a c e ' s 
c l a i m s a g a i n s t them. The t r i a l c o u r t c e r t i f i e d t h e 
judgment as t o a l l c l a i m s 
f i l e d by W a l l a c e as f i n a l 
p u r s u a n t 
3 
1100902 
t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. 
C i v . P.
2 
F i n a l l y , 
i t s t a t e d t h a t i t 
was 
t a k i n g IPF's 
motion 
f o r a summary judgment as 
t o i t s 
c o u n t e r c l a i m under advisement. 
On F e b r u a r y 11, 2010, 
W a l l a c e 
f i l e d a motion a s k i n g 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
t o r e c o n s i d e r 
or v a c a t e 
i t s J a n u a r y 27, 
2010, 
o r d e r and 
t o s e t the m a t t e r f o r a h e a r i n g . 
The 
d e f e n d a n t s 
f i l e d a motion i n o p p o s i t i o n t o W a l l a c e ' s 
m o t i o n . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on the m o t i o n on A p r i l 27, 2010. 
On 
December 15, 
2010, 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g 
on 
IPF's 
m o t i o n 
f o r 
a summary judgment 
on 
i t s 
c o u n t e r c l a i m 
a g a i n s t W a l l a c e . 
On December 27, 2010, 
the t r i a l c o u r t 
d e n i e d 
the 
m o t i o n 
f o r 
a summary judgment 
on 
the 
c o u n t e r c l a i m , 
e x p l a i n i n g as f o l l o w s : "The C o u r t i s of the o p i n i o n t h a t t h i s 
case s h o u l d be 
t r i e d and h e a r d because the C o u r t n o t e s t h a t 
t h e r e 
i s a 
s e r i o u s 
q u e s t i o n 
of 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n 
and 
2 R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., p r o v i d e s , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : 
"When more t h a n one c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s p r e s e n t e d 
i n 
an 
a c t i o n , 
whether 
as 
a 
c l a i m , 
c o u n t e r c l a i m , 
c r o s s - c l a i m , or t h i r d - p a r t y c l a i m , or when m u l t i p l e 
p a r t i e s are i n v o l v e d , the c o u r t may 
d i r e c t the e n t r y 
of a f i n a l judgment as t o one or more but fewer than 
a l l 
of the c l a i m s or p a r t i e s o n l y upon an 
e x p r e s s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y 
and 
upon 
an 
e x p r e s s 
d i r e c t i o n 
f o r 
the 
e n t r y 
of 
judgment." 
4 
1100902 
p r o m i s s o r y 
e s t o p p e l as a defense 
of the 
p l a i n t i f f t o 
s a i d 
c o u n t e r c l a i m . " 
I n t h a t o r d e r , the 
t r i a l c o u r t a l s o s t a t e d : 
"Any 
o t h e r motions are hereby 
o v e r r u l e d and 
d e n i e d . " 
On 
F e b r u a r y 14, 2011, W a l l a c e 
f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
of the December 27, 2010, 
o r d e r . 
D u r i n g 
a h e a r i n g on March 21, 
2011, 
c o u n s e l 
f o r I P F 
s p e c i f i c a l l y asked t h a t the c o u n t e r c l a i m be d i s m i s s e d . 
As a 
r e s u l t , on March 21, 2011, 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t e n t e r e d a 
f i n a l 
o r d e r of d i s m i s s a l i n the c a s e . 
W a l l a c e 
f i l e d a n o t i c e of 
a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t on May 
2, 
2011. 
D i s c u s s i o n 
I n 
h i s 
n o t i c e 
of 
a p p e a l 
and 
i n 
the 
s t a t e m e n t 
of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n h i s b r i e f t o t h i s C o u r t , W a l l a c e p u r p o r t s t o 
a p p e a l from the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s March 21, 2011, 
f i n a l o r d e r of 
d i s m i s s a l . 
However, he c a t e g o r i z e s h i s arguments as f o l l o w s 
i n h i s b r i e f t o t h i s 
C o u r t : 
1. 
"The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s o r d e r g r a n t i n g 
p a r t i a l 
summary judgment was i n e r r o r because genuine i s s u e s 
of m a t e r i a l f a c t 
e x i s t . " 
2. 
"The 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s December 27, 2010, 
o r d e r 
d e n y i n g 
r e l i e f 
under 
Rule 
60 
was 
an 
abuse 
of 
d i s c r e t i o n . " 
3. 
"The 
T r i a l C o u r t ' s Rule 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
was 
i n e f f e c t i v e 
o r , i n the 
a l t e r n a t i v e , 
the 
r u l e 
5 
1100902 
adopted i n A l l e n v. B r i g g s , 60 So. 3d 899 ( A l a . C i v . 
App. 
2010), s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d o r m o d i f i e d based 
on t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e . " 
A l s o , i n t h e summary o f t h e argument p o r t i o n o f h i s b r i e f t o 
t h i s 
C o u r t , 
W a l l a c e 
s t a t e s : 
" T h i s 
a p p e a l 
i s f i l e d 
t o 
c h a l l e n g e an e r r o n e o u s g r a n t o f summary judgment, d e n i a l o f a 
R u l e 60 m o t i o n , and an improper and i n e f f e c t i v e R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n . " 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t 
W a l l a c e i s 
c h a l l e n g i n g t h e summary judgment the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i n 
f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s on J a n u a r y 27, 2010, and t h e d e n i a l o f 
h i s motion f o r 
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , r a t h e r than t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
March 21, 2011, f i n a l o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l . 
The d e f e n d a n t s argue t h a t t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d d i s m i s s t h i s 
a p p e a l as u n t i m e l y . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , 
t h e y 
c o n t e n d 
t h a t t h e 
n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was f i l e d more t h a n 42 days a f t e r t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t 
c e r t i f i e d t h e summary judgment on W a l l a c e ' s 
c l a i m s 
a g a i n s t them as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) . 
The d e f e n d a n t s 
a l s o a s s e r t t h a t , i f W a l l a c e ' s motion t o r e c o n s i d e r was 
f i l e d 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59, i t 
was d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f law a f t e r 
90 days, and t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was n o t f i l e d w i t h i n 42 days 
a f t e r t h a t d e n i a l . 
F i n a l l y , t h e y a l l e g e t h a t , i f W a l l a c e ' s 
motion t o r e c o n s i d e r was f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , i t was 
6 
1100902 
d e n i e d on December 27, 2010, and the n o t i c e of a p p e a l was 
not 
f i l e d 
w i t h i n 
42 days 
a f t e r 
t h a t d a t e . 
We 
agree w i t h the 
d e f e n d a n t s t h a t W a l l a c e ' s a p p e a l i s u n t i m e l y . 
W i t h 
r e g a r d t o when an 
a p p e a l 
s h o u l d be 
t a k e n , 
R u l e 
4 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. P., p r o v i d e s : 
"Except as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d h e r e i n , i n a l l cases 
i n which an a p p e a l i s p e r m i t t e d by law as of 
r i g h t 
to the supreme c o u r t or t o a c o u r t of a p p e a l s , the 
n o t i c e o f a p p e a l r e q u i r e d by R u l e 3 [ , A l a . R. 
App. 
P.,] 
s h a l l be 
f i l e d 
w i t h the 
c l e r k 
of the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t w i t h i n 42 days 
(6 weeks) of the date of the 
e n t r y of the judgment or o r d e r a p p e a l e d from 
" 
W i t h r e g a r d t o t o l l i n g the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l , 
R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. App. P., p r o v i d e s : 
"The 
f i l i n g 
o f a post-judgment 
m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o 
R u l e s 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama R u l e s o f 
C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e 
( [ A l a . 
R. 
C i v . P.]) 
s h a l l 
suspend 
the 
r u n n i n g of the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l . 
I n 
cases where post-judgment 
motions are f i l e d , 
the 
f u l l time f i x e d f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l 
s h a l l 
be computed from the date of the e n t r y i n the 
c i v i l 
d o c k e t of an o r d e r g r a n t i n g or d e n y i n g such m o t i o n . 
I f such post-judgment 
motion i s deemed d e n i e d under 
the p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 59.1 o f the Alabama R u l e s o f 
C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , t h e n the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e 
of a p p e a l s h a l l be computed from the date o f d e n i a l 
of such motion by o p e r a t i o n of law, as p r o v i d e d f o r 
i n R u l e 59.1." 
W i t h r e g a r d t o postjudgment motions i n c i v i l c a s e s , R u l e 59, 
A l a . 
R. C i v . P., p r o v i d e s , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : 
7 
1100902 
" ( e ) 
M o t i o n t o A l t e r , 
Amend, o r V a c a t e a 
Judgment. 
A motion t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e t h e 
judgment s h a l l be f i l e d n o t l a t e r than t h i r t y (30) 
days a f t e r e n t r y o f t h e judgment." 
F i n a l l y , R u l e 59.1, A l a . 
R. C i v . 
P., p r o v i d e s : 
"No postjudgment motion f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 
50, 52, 55, o r 59 s h a l l remain p e n d i n g i n t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t f o r 
more than n i n e t y (90) days, u n l e s s w i t h 
the 
e x p r e s s 
consent 
o f a l l 
t h e p a r t i e s , 
which 
consent s h a l l appear o f r e c o r d , o r u n l e s s e x t e n d e d 
by the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o w h i c h an a p p e a l o f the 
judgment would 
l i e , and such time may be 
f u r t h e r 
e x t e n d e d f o r good cause shown. 
A f a i l u r e by the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t t o r e n d e r an o r d e r d i s p o s i n g o f any 
p e n d i n g 
postjudgment 
motion 
w i t h i n 
t h e 
time 
p e r m i t t e d hereunder, o r any e x t e n s i o n t h e r e o f , 
s h a l l 
c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l o f such motion as o f t h e date o f 
the 
e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e p e r i o d . " 
As t h e d e f e n d a n t s n o t e , W a l l a c e c l e a r l y f i l e d h i s n o t i c e 
of a p p e a l more t h a n 42 days a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
c e r t i f i e d 
the summary judgment i n t h e i r f a v o r as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 
54(b) on J a n u a r y 27, 2010. 
However, on F e b r u a r y 11, 2010, 
W a l l a c e f i l e d a motion a s k i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o r e c o n s i d e r 
o r 
v a c a t e i t s J a n u a r y 27, 2010, o r d e r . 
I f t h a t 
motion i s 
c o n s i d e r e d a postjudgment motion t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e 
f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59, i t 
was d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f law 
90 days a f t e r i t 
was f i l e d , because t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d 
n o t 
r u l e on i t 
w i t h i n 90 days and t h e time f o r r u l i n g on i t 
was 
not extended. 
W a l l a c e d i d n o t f i l e h i s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l 
8 
1100902 
w i t h i n 
42 
days 
a f t e r 
the 
date 
the 
motion 
was 
d e n i e d 
by 
o p e r a t i o n of l a w . 
T h e r e f o r e , i f the motion t o r e c o n s i d e r was 
a postjudgment 
motion 
f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59, 
W a l l a c e ' s 
a p p e a l i s not t i m e l y . 
W a l l a c e argues t h a t h i s postjudgment motion t o r e c o n s i d e r 
was 
f i l e d 
p u r s u a n t 
t o 
R u l e 
60(b) , 
r a t h e r 
t h a n 
R u l e 
59, 
because, he s a y s , he sought 
r e l i e f as the r e s u l t o f m i s t a k e , 
i n a d v e r t e n c e , s u r p r i s e , o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t . 
I f the motion 
was 
f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 60(b) and not R u l e 59.1, 
" i t was 
not d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n of law p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59.1 a f t e r 90 
days had 
e x p i r e d from the time i t was 
f i l e d . " 
Conway v.  
Housing A u t h . o f Birmingham D i s t . , 676 So. 2d 344, 345 ( A l a . 
C i v . 
App. 1996) . See a l s o 
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 38 So. 3d 54, 63 
( A l a . 
C i v . App. 
2009) 
("[T]he 
90-day p e r i o d f o r r u l i n g 
on 
postjudgment motions announced i n R u l e 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P., 
a p p l i e s o n l y t o motions 
f i l e d under R u l e s 50, 52, 55, and 59, 
and not t h o s e 
f i l e d under R u l e 6 0 ( b ) . " ) . 
However, even i f 
W a l l a c e ' s motion t o r e c o n s i d e r was a postjudgment motion 
f i l e d 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 60, i t was d e n i e d on December 27, 2010, 
and 
W a l l a c e d i d not f i l e h i s n o t i c e of a p p e a l w i t h i n 42 days a f t e r 
9 
1100902 
t h a t d a t e .
3 T h e r e f o r e , whether W a l l a c e ' s motion t o r e c o n s i d e r 
c o n s t i t u t e d 
a postjudgment 
m o t i o n 
p u r s u a n t 
t o R u l e 
59 
or 
p u r s u a n t 
t o R u l e 
60, h i s n o t i c e 
of a p p e a l was 
not 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d . 
I n what i s a p p a r e n t l y an attempt t o a v o i d a d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h a t h i s a p p e a l i s u n t i m e l y , W a l l a c e argues t h a t , because the 
i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d i n h i s c l a i m s were 
i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h 
the 
i s s u e s i n I P F ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m , the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i n t h i s 
case was 
i m p r o p e r ; t h e r e f o r e , 
W a l l a c e 
a r g u e s , the time f o r f i l i n g 
an a p p e a l d i d not 
s t a r t 
t o run 
u n t i l a l l the c l a i m s i n the case were d i s p o s e d of by the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s March 21, 2011, o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g I P F ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m . 
3We 
r e c o g n i z e 
t h a t 
W a l l a c e 
f i l e d 
a 
r e q u e s t 
f o r 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the December 27, 2010, o r d e r on F e b r u a r y 14, 
2011. 
However, 
" [ a ] f t e r 
a 
t r i a l 
c o u r t has 
d e n i e d a 
postjudgment 
motion p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , t h a t c o u r t does not 
have 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
t o 
e n t e r t a i n 
a 
s u c c e s s i v e 
postjudgment 
motion 
t o 
' r e c o n s i d e r ' or 
o t h e r w i s e 
r e v i e w i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g the R u l e 60(b) m o t i o n , 
and 
such 
a 
s u c c e s s i v e postjudgment 
motion 
does 
not 
suspend the r u n n i n g of the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e 
of a p p e a l . " 
Ex p a r t e K e i t h , 771 So. 2d 1018, 1022 
( A l a . 1998) . T h e r e f o r e , 
even assuming t h a t i t was t i m e l y f i l e d , 
W a l l a c e ' s r e q u e s t f o r 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
d i d not suspend 
the r u n n i n g of the time f o r 
f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l from the December 27, 2010, o r d e r . 
10 
1100902 
In 
A l l e n v. B r i g g s , 60 So. 3d 899, 903-05 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 
2010), 
t h e Alabama C o u r t 
of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s 
a d d r e s s e d 
and 
r e j e c t e d a s i m i l a r c o n t e n t i o n , r e a s o n i n g as f o l l o w s : 
" A l l e n 
f i r s t a t t e m p t s t o c h a l l e n g e t h e summary 
judgment i n f a v o r of EBMC. 
However, t h e summary 
judgment i n f a v o r of EBMC was e x p r e s s l y 
made a f i n a l 
judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . 
R. C i v . 
P., by 
the i n c l u s i o n of some of t h e language 
c o n t a i n e d i n 
t h a t r u l e i n t h e summary-judgment o r d e r . See Sho-Me  
Motor Lodges, I n c . 
v. J e h l e - S l a u s o n C o n s t r . Co., 4 
66 
So. 
2d 83, 87 
( A l a . 1985) 
( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e 
s t a t e m e n t 
' [ t ] h e C o u r t 
f u r t h e r 
f i n d s 
t h e r e i s no 
j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y i n the e n t r y o f s a i d 
f i n a l 
judgment' was 
s u f f i c i e n t t o make a judgment 
f i n a l 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) ); see a l s o S c h n e i d e r 
N a t ' l  
C a r r i e r s , I n c . v. Tinney, 776 So. 2d 753, 755 
( A l a . 
2000) ( n o t i n g t h a t ' i f 
i t 
i s c l e a r and o b v i o u s from 
t h e language used by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t i n i t s 
o r d e r 
t h a t 
t h e c o u r t i n t e n d e d t o e n t e r a 
f i n a l 
o r d e r 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , then we w i l l t r e a t t h e o r d e r 
as a f i n a l judgment' even though t h e o r d e r may not 
c o n t a i n a l l 
t h e language 
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i t i s , 
i n 
f a c t , 
an 
o r d e r 
d i r e c t i n g 
t h e e n t r y o f a 
f i n a l 
judgment). 
A l t h o u g h A l l e n argues on a p p e a l t h a t a 
R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n was not p r o p e r i n 
t h i s 
case, we have h e l d t h a t he i s p r e c l u d e d from 
r a i s i n g 
t h a t i s s u e now, because, 
i n s o f a r as h i s a p p e a l i s 
from t h e summary-judgment o r d e r , h i s a p p e a l comes 
too 
l a t e , h a v i n g been f i l e d more than 42 days a f t e r 
the e n t r y of t h e summary-judgment o r d e r on J u l y 31, 
2009. 
See L a r y v. Gardener, 908 So. 2d 955, 957 n.1 
( A l a . C i v . 
App. 2005) 
( c i t i n g B a g l e y v. Mazda Motor  
Corp. , 864 So. 2d 301, 316-17 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ) ; see a l s o  
Ex p a r t e K i n g , 776 So. 2d 31, 38 ( A l a . 2000) (Lyons, 
J . , 
c o n c u r r i n g 
s p e c i a l l y ) 
( i n d i c a t i n g 
t h a t , 
i n 
J u s t i c e Lyons's o p i n i o n , t h e remedy f o r 
a p a r t y who 
b e l i e v e s 
t h a t 
a 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i s 
d e f e c t i v e i s t o ' t i m e l y f i l [ e ] a p e t i t i o n f o r 
a w r i t 
of mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e t r i a l judge t o s e t a s i d e 
11 
1100902 
the 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n , 
p o s s i b l y 
as 
an 
a l t e r n a t i v e remedy sought 
a t the same time as 
an 
a p p e a l 
i s t a k e n 
from 
the 
o r d e r p u r p o r t e d l y made 
f i n a l by the R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n ' ) . 
" D e s p i t e our h o l d i n g i n L a r y , the d i s s e n t argues 
t h a t 
a 
p a r t y 
s h o u l d 
be 
p e r m i t t e d 
t o 
r a i s e 
a 
c h a l l e n g e t o a R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
on 
a p p e a l 
from a s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d judgment. 
60 So. 3d a t 
908. 
The 
d i s s e n t a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h L a r y on 
the b a s i s t h a t the p l a i n t i f f i n L a r y d i d not have a 
v a l i d c h a l l e n g e t o the R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
60 
So. 3d a t 908. 
However, i n L a r y we d i d not d i s c u s s 
the m e r i t s of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i s s u e ; i n s t e a d , 
we 
c l e a r l y 
i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t the c h a l l e n g e t o the 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n would not be c o n s i d e r e d because 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s ' c h a l l e n g e s are u n t i m e l y because he 
d i d not f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o [ t h e 
R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
of the summary] judgment 
w i t h i n 42 days o f i t s e n t r y . ' 
L a r y , 908 So. 2d a t 
957 
n.1. 
"However, the d i s s e n t ' s approach i s not w i t h o u t 
s u p p o r t . 
An 
a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t 
may 
r a i s e 
the 
i m p r o p r i e t y of a R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
ex mero  
motu when t h a t judgment i s p r e s e n t e d i n a 
t i m e l y 
a p p e a l . 
Gregory v. Ferguson, 
10 So. 
3d 596, 
597 
( A l a . 
C i v . App. 2008) . 
The 
r i g h t o f an 
a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r ex mero motu the p r o p r i e t y of a 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
stems from 
i t s power t o 
d e t e r m i n e i t s own 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
which 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
f l o w s , i n p a r t , from the t i m e l y a p p e a l from a 
f i n a l , 
a p p e a l a b l e judgment. 
See Dzwonkowski v. S o n i t r o l of  
M o b i l e , 
I n c . , 
892 
So. 
2d 
354, 
361 
( A l a . 2004) 
( s t a t i n g , i n an o p i n i o n d i s m i s s i n g an a p p e a l based 
on an improper use o f a R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n , 
t h a t ' a l l p a r t i e s have o v e r l o o k e d a fundamental f l a w 
i n t h e s e a p p e l l a t e p r o c e e d i n g s 
the absence of an  
a p p e a l a b l e judgment'); 
Gregory, 
10 
So. 
3d a t 
597 
('However, t h i s c o u r t may 
c o n s i d e r [the] i s s u e [of 
the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n ] 
ex mero motu because the i s s u e whether a judgment or 
12 
1100902 
o r d e r i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
f i n a l t o s u p p o r t an a p p e a l i s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l . ' ) . 
Thus, 
i f a 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d t o have been 
i m p r o p e r l y 
e n t e r e d , t h e judgment so c e r t i f i e d i s c o n s i d e r e d t o 
be 
n o n f i n a l and t h e r e f o r e 
u n a b l e t o s u p p o r t an 
a p p e a l . 
Dzwonkowski, 892 So. 2d a t 361. I f t h a t i s 
the 
case, and an i m p r o p e r l y 
c e r t i f i e d judgment i s 
not 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment 
because 
o f an 
improper 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n , 
why 
s h o u l d 
an a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t 
be 
p r e c l u d e d 
from 
c o n s i d e r i n g , 
on 
a p p e a l 
from t h e 
judgment r e s o l v i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m o r c l a i m s , 
the 
p r o p r i e t y o f t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
and, i f t h e 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
was improper, t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g 
i n t e r l o c u t o r y judgment? 
"Our r e s e a r c h has r e v e a l e d t h a t o n l y two f e d e r a l 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have c o n s i d e r e d 
t h i s p r e c i s e 
i s s u e 
and 
t h a t 
t h o s e 
two 
c o u r t s 
r e a c h e d 
o p p o s i t e 
c o n c l u s i o n s . 
See I n r e L i n d s a y , 
59 F.3d 942, 951 
(9th 
C i r . 1995) 
( h o l d i n g 
t h a t 
'[a] R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n , 
r i g h t o r wrong, s t a r t s t h e time f o r 
a p p e a l 
r u n n i n g ' ) , 
and Page v. P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 
336, 338 ( 8 t h C i r . 1978) 
( h o l d i n g 
t h a t 
'when a 
d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t 
e r r o n e o u s l y 
c e r t i f i e s 
a 
c l a i m as 
a p p r o p r i a t e f o r 
immediate a p p e a l under R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , 
a p a r t y may r a i s e t h a t c l a i m i n 
a t i m e l y a p p e a l from 
an a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n on t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s i n 
t h e 
l a w s u i t ' ) . 
A l t h o u g h we comprehend t h e 
r e a s o n i n g 
b e h i n d t h e r u l e announced i n Page, w h i c h h i n g e s on 
the i d e a t h a t an e r r o n e o u s l y 
c e r t i f i e d judgment 
i s , 
i n f a c t , not a f i n a l judgment a t a l l , Page, 585 F.2d 
a t 338, we b e l i e v e 
t h a t t h e b e t t e r 
c o u r s e i s t o 
r e q u i r e 
t h a t 
a 
p a r t y 
s e e k i n g 
t o 
c h a l l e n g e 
t h e 
p r o p r i e t y o f a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n do so i n a 
t i m e l y 
a p p e a l 
from t h e c e r t i f i e d 
judgment. 
As 
e x p l a i n e d 
i n 
I n 
r e 
L i n d s a y , 
' [ t ] h i s 
a v o i d s 
u n c e r t a i n t y f o r c o u n s e l about when t o a p p e a l . ' 
I n 
re L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d a t 951. 
"Alabama law i s w e l l s e t t l e d -- '[a] judgment 
c e r t i f i e d by a t r i a l c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) i s 
a f i n a l a p p e a l a b l e judgment[, and] t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
13 
1100902 
t r i g g e r s the r u n n i n g 
of the 42-day a p p e a l p e r i o d . ' 
Lewis v. S t a t e , 463 So. 2d 154, 
155 
( A l a . 1985) .
3 
To 
a l l o w 
a 
l a t e r 
a p p e a l 
of 
a judgment 
c e r t i f i e d 
as 
f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) 
i n t h o s e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
i n 
w h i c h 
a 
p a r t y 
d e s i r e s 
t o 
argue 
t h a t 
the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
was 
improper 
i n j e c t s 
u n c e r t a i n t y 
r e g a r d i n g 
the 
time t o a p p e a l and 
the 
f i n a l i t y 
of 
judgments. 
I f a judgment c e r t i f i e d as 
f i n a l may 
be 
a p p e a l e d a t a l a t e r d a t e , 
the p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i s 
l e f t i n l i m b o , u n c e r t a i n whether the judgment i n i t s 
f a v o r i s , i n f a c t , f i n a l or whether i t might, a t the 
time the r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m or c l a i m s i n the a c t i o n are 
r e s o l v e d , 
be 
r e n d e r e d 
i n e f f e c t i v e 
because 
the 
a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t 
d e t e r m i n e s 
t h a t 
the 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n was i m p r o p e r . 
In a d d i t i o n , i f a p a r t y 
w a i t s 
t o a p p e a l the 
c e r t i f i e d judgment because i t 
b e l i e v e s 
t h a t 
the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
was 
i m p r o p e r l y 
g r a n t e d , t h a t p a r t y r i s k s an a p p e l l a t e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h a t the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n was, 
i n f a c t , p r o p e r l y made, 
w i t h 
the 
r e s u l t i n g 
f o r e c l o s u r e 
of 
the 
r i g h t 
t o 
a p p e a l r e g a r d i n g 
the 
c e r t i f i e d judgment. 
See 
15A 
C h a r l e s 
A. 
W r i g h t 
e t 
a l . 
F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e 
& 
 
P r o c e d u r e § 3914.7 (2d ed. 
1992) 
( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t , 
t y p i c a l l y , 
i f 
a 
p a r t y 
f a i l s 
t o 
a p p e a l 
from 
a 
judgment c e r t i f i e d as 
f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , 
Fed. 
R. 
C i v . 
P., 
the 
r i g h t t o r e v i e w 
i s l o s t 
and 
s t a t i n g t h a t 
'a p a r t y who 
b e l i e v e s t h a t a judgment 
was 
i m p r o p e r l y 
e n t e r e d would be 
b e t t e r a d v i s e d 
t o 
t a k e a p r o t e c t i v e a p p e a l and urge t h a t the a p p e a l be 
d i s m i s s e d ' ) . 
We t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t the r u l e announced 
i n 
Page 
and, 
c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h 
L a r y , 
embrace 
the 
h o l d i n g i n In re L i n d s a y . 
Thus, i n s o f a r as A l l e n ' s 
a p p e a l r e l a t e s t o the summary judgment e n t e r e d 
i n 
f a v o r of EBMC, the a p p e a l i s d i s m i s s e d . 
II 
"
3Of 
c o u r s e , 
the 
time 
f o r 
a p p e a l 
would 
be 
suspended 
by 
a 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d 
postjudgment 
motion 
d i r e c t e d 
t o 
the 
c e r t i f i e d 
judgment, 
see 
R u l e 
4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , 
A l a . 
R. 
App. 
P. 
('The 
f i l i n g 
of 
a 
post-judgment m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55 or 
14 
1100902 
59 
of 
the Alabama R u l e s 
of 
C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e 
... 
f i l i n g 
a n o t i c e 
of a p p e a l . ' ) , and, 
t h e r e f o r e , 
i n 
t h o s e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
the 
time 
f o r a p p e a l 
would 
e x p i r e upon the g r a n t or d e n i a l of the postjudgment 
m o t i o n . " 
(Footnote o m i t t e d . ) 
W a l l a c e 
argues 
t h a t he 
s h o u l d not be bound by 
A l l e n 
because t h a t case was d e c i d e d s e v e r a l months a f t e r the R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n was e n t e r e d i n t h i s case. 
However, h i s 
argument i s not w e l l t a k e n because t h i s C o u r t and the C o u r t of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s 
had 
a p p l i e d 
the same r e a s o n i n g i n p r e v i o u s 
c a s e s . 
In Lewis v. S t a t e , 463 So. 2d 154, 155 
( A l a . 1985), 
t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d : 
"A judgment c e r t i f i e d by a 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) 
i s a 
f i n a l a p p e a l a b l e judgment; the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
t r i g g e r s 
the 
r u n n i n g 
o f 
the 
42-day 
a p p e a l 
p e r i o d . " 
In 
B a g l e y v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864 
So. 
2d 301 
( A l a . 
2003), t h i s C o u r t a d d r e s s e d a s i t u a t i o n s i m i l a r t o W a l l a c e ' s 
as 
f o l l o w s : 
"The B a g l e y s ' f i n a l argument i s t h a t the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g 
a summary judgment 
f o r 
C r e e k s i d e 
r e g a r d i n g t h e 
f r a u d 
c l a i m . 
C r e e k s i d e 
argues 
t h a t the B a g l e y s ' a p p e a l on 
t h i s 
c l a i m 
was 
u n t i m e l y . 
We 
note t h a t the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
i n i t i a l l y 
e n t e r e d a summary judgment f o r C r e e k s i d e on May 
11, 
1998, and s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t i t 
was 
c e r t i f y i n g 
t h a t judgment as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . 
15 
1100902 
R. C i v . P. 
The c o u r t amended i t s summary-judgment 
o r d e r on May 
21, 1998, 
t o c l a r i f y 
t h a t the May 
11 
judgment c o v e r e d o n l y the f r a u d c l a i m . On J u l y 
14, 
1998, the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an 'Amended Order Nunc 
Pro Tunc,' a g a i n e n t e r i n g a p a r t i a l summary judgment 
f o r 
C r e e k s i d e 
on 
the 
f r a u d 
c l a i m , 
and 
a g a i n 
c e r t i f y i n g 
the 
judgment 
as 
f i n a l . 
R u l e 
54(b) 
s t a t e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : 
"'When more than one 
c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s 
p r e s e n t e d i n an a c t i o n , 
... the c o u r t may 
d i r e c t the e n t r y of a f i n a l judgment as t o 
one 
o r more but 
fewer 
than 
a l l o f 
the 
c l a i m s 
or 
p a r t i e s 
o n l y upon 
an 
e x p r e s s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n 
f o r d e l a y and upon an e x p r e s s d i r e c t i o n f o r 
the e n t r y of judgment.' 
" R u l e 
4, A l a . R. 
App. 
P., 
p r o v i d e s , i n 
r e l e v a n t 
p a r t , 
t h a t , 
' i n a l l cases 
i n which 
an a p p e a l i s 
p e r m i t t e d by law ... the n o t i c e of a p p e a l 
r e q u i r e d 
by R u l e 3 s h a l l be f i l e d w i t h the c l e r k o f the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t w i t h i n 42 days 
(6 weeks) of the d a t e o f the 
e n t r y of the judgment or o r d e r a p p e a l e d from 
' 
" I n 
o p p o s i n g C r e e k s i d e ' s t i m e l i n e s s c h a l l e n g e , 
the 
B a g l e y s 
c i t e 
Brown 
v. 
W h i t a k e r 
C o n t r a c t i n g  
Corp. , 681 
So. 2d 226 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1996) . 
In 
Brown, the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t e n t e r e d a summary judgment 
f o r the d e f e n d a n t and c e r t i f i e d i t as f i n a l p u r s u a n t 
t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. 
The C o u r t of C i v i l 
A p p e a l s h e l d t h a t genuine 
i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l 
f a c t 
e x i s t e d as t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
c l a i m . 
The C o u r t o f 
C i v i l A p p e a l s went on t o s t a t e : 
"'The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t , 
i n i t s o r d e r , s h o u l d 
l i s t 
the 
f a c t o r s which 
i t c o n s i d e r e d i n 
r e a c h i n g i t s d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g whether t o 
c e r t i f y 
the 
judgment, 
p u r s u a n t 
t o 
R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , i n o r d e r t h a t the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i s 
b e t t e r e q u i p p e d t o r e v i e w the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
a c t i o n 
16 
1100902 
"'... 
H e r e a f t e r , 
i f a 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
s h o u l d 
f a i l t o l i s t t h e f a c t o r s c o n s i d e r e d , 
then t h e case w i l l be r e t u r n e d so t h a t t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t can l i s t t h o s e 
f a c t o r s . ' 
"681 So. 2d a t 229. I n S c h n e i d e r N a t i o n a l C a r r i e r s ,  
I n c . v. T i n n e y , 776 So. 2d 753, 755 ( A l a . 2000), 
t h i s C o u r t e x p r e s s l y o v e r r u l e d Brown, p o i n t i n g 
o u t : 
"'We h e l d i n 
Sho-Me [Motor Lodges, I n c . v.  
J e h l e - S l a u s o n 
C o n s t r u c t i o n Co., 466 So. 2d 
83 
( A l a . 1985),] t h a t i f 
i t 
i s c l e a r and 
o b v i o u s from t h e language used by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t i n i t s o r d e r t h a t t h e c o u r t 
i n t e n d e d 
t o e n t e r a f i n a l 
o r d e r 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , 
t h e n we w i l l t r e a t t h e o r d e r as a 
f i n a l judgment 
' 
" I n S c h n e i d e r , we f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t ' [ n ] o t h i n g i n 
R u l e 
54(b) 
r e q u i r e s 
f i n d i n g s 
t o 
b u t t r e s s 
t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n " t h a t t h e r e i s 
no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y . " 
A l l t h a t i s 
r e q u i r e d i s 
an " e x p r e s s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . " ' 
776 So. 2d a t 755-56. 
"The 
B a g l e y s argue t h a t r e l y i n g on Brown t h e y 
'took no a c t i o n t o a p p e a l s a i d Order as under t h e 
law a t t h a t time i t 
c o u l d n o t 
be c o n s i d e r e d a 
f i n a l 
o r d e r 
s i n c e t h e Judgment m e r e l y s t a t e d t h a t i t 
was 
"a 
f i n a l Summary Judgment" and t h a t 
t h e r e was no 
j u s t 
r e a s o n f o r d e l a y . ' 
However, Brown 
p r o v i d e d 
t h a t i f 
t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t 
f a i l e d t o l i s t t h e f a c t o r s 
c o n s i d e r e d 
i n 
c e r t i f y i n g 
a 
judgment 
as 
f i n a l 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , t h e case would be remanded 
f o r 
t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
t o 
l i s t 
t h e f a c t o r s . 
The 
approach 
a d v o c a t e d 
i n Brown was n o t 
r e a s o n a b l y 
s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s 
o r d e r 
was n o t a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e 
o r d e r because i t l a c k e d 
c e r t a i n p h r a s e o l o g y ; i n o r d e r f o r 
t h e case p r o p e r l y 
t o be remanded, r a t h e r than t h e a p p e a l ' s j u s t 
b e i n g 
d i s m i s s e d , t h e judgment would have t o be one t h a t 
would s u p p o r t an a p p e a l . 
I n 
Ex p a r t e P r i t c h e t t , 812 
So. 2d 1157 ( A l a . 2000), t h i s C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e 
17 
1100902 
i n 
e f f e c t of Brown and n o t e d t h a t a f t e r the d e c i s i o n 
Brown, 
'the 
C o u r t 
of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s 
r o u t i n e l y 
remanded 
cases 
t h a t 
d i d 
not meet 
the 
l e v e l 
of 
s p e c i f i c i t y r e q u i r e d by Brown.' 
812 So. 2d a t 
1158. 
"In 
the 
p r e s e n t 
case, 
the 
42-day 
p e r i o d 
p r e s c r i b e d by Rule 4, A l a . R. App. P., f o r f i l i n g an 
a p p e a l began t o run on J u l y 14, 1998, a t the 
l a t e s t , 
the day the 
t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r nunc p r o 
t u n c , 
w h i c h , 
f o r 
the 
second 
t i m e , 
e x p r e s s l y 
c e r t i f i e d the p a r t i a l summary judgment i n f a v o r of 
C r e e k s i d e as t o the f r a u d c l a i m as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o 
Rule 5 4 ( b ) . 
Even i f C r e e k s i d e had not p o i n t e d out 
the u n t i m e l i n e s s of the a p p e a l of t h a t r u l i n g , ' [ i ] t 
i s 
the d u t y 
of 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
t o t a k e n o t i c e of 
the 
f i l i n g date of an a p p e a l and, i f f i n d i n g the a p p e a l 
to be u n t i m e l y , t o d i s m i s s i t ex mero motu. 
S t e w a r t 
 
v. Younger, 375 So. 2d 428 
( A l a . 1979).' 
Lewis 
v.  
S t a t e , 
463 
So. 
2d 
154, 
155 
( A l a . 1985) . 
The 
B a g l e y s ' n o t i c e of a p p e a l , 
f i l e d on A p r i l 29, 2002, 
a l m o s t f o u r y e a r s a f t e r the p a r t i a l summary judgment 
was 
l a s t c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l , i s u n t i m e l y as t o t h a t 
p a r t i a l summary judgment and 
the B a g l e y s ' 
a p p e a l 
from t h a t p a r t i a l judgment i s d i s m i s s e d . " 
B a g l e y , 864 So. 2d a t 315-17. 
A l s o , i n L a r y v. Gardener, 908 So. 2d 955 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
2005), L a r y sued Gardener, a l l e g i n g n e g l i g e n c e i n c o n n e c t i o n 
w i t h a m o t o r - v e h i c l e c o l l i s i o n t h a t damaged h i s v e h i c l e . 
He 
a l s o 
sued 
Farm 
Bureau, 
Gardener's 
a u t o m o b i l e - l i a b i l i t y 
i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r , a l l e g i n g t h a t i t had a c t e d i n bad f a i t h by 
f a i l i n g t o i n v e s t i g a t e the c o l l i s i o n and t o pay b e n e f i t s under 
Gardener's p o l i c y . 
Farm Bureau 
f i l e d 
a motion 
t o d i s m i s s 
L a r y ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t i t . 
On June 30, 2003, the t r i a l c o u r t 
18 
1100902 
e n t e r e d a judgment i n Farm Bureau's f a v o r and d i r e c t e d t h e 
e n t r y of a f i n a l judgment as t o a l l c l a i m s a g a i n s t Farm Bureau 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. 
On A p r i l 12, 2004, 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
e n t e r e d 
a summary judgment 
i n f a v o r 
of 
Gardener, and L a r y 
f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on May 20, 2004. 
On a p p e a l , 
L a r y a t t e m p t e d t o c h a l l e n g e t h e judgment i n 
f a v o r of Farm Bureau and t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
w i t h 
r e g a r d t o t h o s e c l a i m s . 
The C o u r t of C i v i l A p p e a l s r e j e c t e d 
t h o s e c l a i m s as u n t i m e l y , 
h o l d i n g : 
" A l t h o u g h L a r y has a s s e r t e d i n h i s b r i e f s t o 
t h i s c o u r t t h a t t h a t judgment, and t h e d i r e c t i o n of 
the 
e n t r y 
of a 
f i n a l 
judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , were e r r o n e o u s , h i s c h a l l e n g e s a r e 
u n t i m e l y 
because he d i d not 
f i l e 
a n o t i c e of a p p e a l 
w i t h 
r e s p e c t 
t o t h a t 
judgment 
w i t h i n 
42 days of i t s 
e n t r y . 
See B a g l e y v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864 So. 2d 
301, 
315-17 
( A l a . 2003) 
( h o l d i n g 
t h a t an 
a p p e a l 
t a k e n a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f a judgment d i s p o s i n g of a l l 
r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s 
and p a r t i e s was 
i n e f f e c t i v e 
t o 
s e c u r e 
a p p e l l a t e 
r e v i e w 
of 
a 
judgment 
e n t e r e d 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) s e v e r a l y e a r s 
b e f o r e h a n d , 
d e s p i t e 
the 
c o n t e n t i o n 
t h a t 
t h e 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n had been 
i m p r o p e r ) . " 
L a r y , 908 So. 2d a t 957 n.1. 
Both B a g l e y and L a r y i n v o l v e d arguments t h a t R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s were 
improper and 
i n v a l i d . 
A l s o , 
i n b o t h 
c a s e s , 
t h e c o u r t s 
found t h a t the R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
c o u l d not be c h a l l e n g e d a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s 
19 
1100902 
i n t h e case because t h e a p p e a l s were u n t i m e l y f i l e d . 
A l t h o u g h 
t h e d e c i s i o n i n A l l e n was t h e f i r s t time t h e C o u r t of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s r e f e r e n c e d In re L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d 942 (9th 
C i r . 1995), 
i t was not t h e f i r s t time t h a t c o u r t had r e f u s e d t o hear an 
u n t i m e l y a p p e a l from a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
R a t h e r , t h a t 
c o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n 
i n A l l e n 
was 
s u p p o r t e d by i t s p r e v i o u s 
d e c i s i o n i n L a r y and by t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s i n Lewis and 
B a g l e y . 
T h e r e f o r e , we 
r e j e c t 
W a l l a c e ' s argument 
t h a t 
he 
s h o u l d not be bound by t h e h o l d i n g i n A l l e n . 
In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , W a l l a c e argues t h a t t h e r u l e 
adopted 
i n A l l e n s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d or m o d i f i e d based on t h e f a c t s 
of 
t h i s case. 
W a l l a c e 
a l s o argues 
t h a t t h e A l l e n o p i n i o n 
makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s s u p p o r t f o r h i s argument t h a t an 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d be a b l e t o r e v i e w t h e p r o p r i e t y of a 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
on 
an 
a p p e a l 
from 
a 
judgment 
r e s o l v i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s i n t h e case, and he urges us t o 
f o l l o w Page v. P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 336 (8th C i r . 1978), 
r a t h e r 
than In re L i n d s a y . 
A l t h o u g h t h e r e may be some s u p p o r t f o r a 
d i f f e r e n t f i n d i n g , i n i t s 
o p i n i o n i n A l l e n t h e C o u r t of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s 
c l e a r l y 
and 
c o n c i s e l y 
e x p l a i n e d i t s reasons f o r 
" r e j e c t [ i n g ] t h e r u l e announced i n Page and, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
20 
1100902 
L a r y , embrac[ing] t h e 
h o l d i n g i n 
I n 
r e L i n d s a y . " 60 So. 
3d 
a t 
905. 
We agree w i t h t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s ' a n a l y s i s o f 
the p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n A l l e n and w i t h t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t c o u r t r e a c h e d i n A l l e n . 
"The 
f i l i n g o f a t i m e l y 
n o t i c e o f a p p e a l i s a 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a c t . Lewis v. S t a t e , 463 So. 
2d 
154, 
155 
( A l a . 1985). 
'A judgment c e r t i f i e d by a t r i a l 
c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) i s 
a f i n a l a p p e a l a b l e 
judgment; t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n t r i g g e r s t h e r u n n i n g o f 
the 42-day a p p e a l p e r i o d . ' 
463 So. 2d a t 155." 
P a i n t e r v. McWane C a s t I r o n P i p e Co., 987 So. 2d 522, 
529 
( A l a . 
2007). 
"An 
a p p e a l 
s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d i f t h e n o t i c e o f 
a p p e a l 
was 
n o t 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d 
t o 
i n v o k e t h e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t . " 
R u l e 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. P. When t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r s a 
R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e i s a f a c i a l l y v a l i d o r d e r from 
which t h e time f o r 
f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l s t a r t s t o r u n .
4 
4We n o t e , as d i d t h e 
C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s i n 
A l l e n , 60 
So. 3d a t 904 
n.3: 
"Of c o u r s e , t h e time f o r 
a p p e a l would be suspended 
by a t i m e l y 
f i l e d postjudgment 
motion 
d i r e c t e d t o 
the 
c e r t i f i e d judgment, see R u l e 
4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. 
App. 
P. ('The 
f i l i n g 
o f a post-judgment 
m o t i o n 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55 o r 59 o f t h e Alabama 
R u l e s o f C i v i l 
Procedure 
... 
s h a l l 
suspend t h e 
r u n n i n g 
o f t h e time 
f o r f i l i n g 
a 
n o t i c e o f 
a p p e a l . ' ) , and, t h e r e f o r e , i n t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
the time f o r a p p e a l would e x p i r e upon t h e g r a n t o r 
21 
1100902 
As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r 
t h e N i n t h C i r c u i t 
n o t e d i n 
I n r e L i n d s a y : "A R u l e 54(b) d e t e r m i n a t i o n , r i g h t o r 
wrong, 
s t a r t s t h e time f o r a p p e a l 
r u n n i n g . 
T h i s 
a v o i d s 
u n c e r t a i n t y f o r c o u n s e l about when t o a p p e a l . " 
59 F.3d a t 
951. Any o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would e v i s c e r a t e R u l e 54(b) 
and 
r e n d e r 
i t m e a n i n g l e s s . 
T h e r e f o r e , we 
r e j e c t 
W a l l a c e ' s 
a l t e r n a t i v e argument. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
For t h e reasons s e t f o r t h h e r e i n , W a l l a c e d i d 
n o t t i m e l y 
f i l e h i s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , we d i s m i s s 
t h i s 
a p p e a l f o r 
l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
See R u l e 2 ( a ) , A l a . 
R. App. 
P. ("An a p p e a l s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d i f 
t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was 
not t i m e l y f i l e d t o i n v o k e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t . " ) . 
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
Malone, C.J., 
and S t u a r t , P a r k e r , and Main, J J . , concur. 
Murdock, J . , 
concurs 
s p e c i a l l y . 
W o o d a l l , B o l i n , and Shaw, J J . , d i s s e n t . 
d e n i a l o f t h e postjudgment 
m o t i o n . " 
22 
1100902 
MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g 
s p e c i a l l y ) . 
I agree w i t h t h e 
main o p i n i o n . 
I w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y 
f i r s t 
t o o f f e r i n P a r t A below a r a t i o n a l e f o r 
t h e 
main o p i n i o n and 
f o r t h e a u t h o r i t i e s upon w h i c h i t r e l i e s . 
P a r t B o f t h i s 
w r i t i n g 
c o n s i s t s o f a d d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and r e a s o n s i n 
s u p p o r t o f our h o l d i n g t o d a y . 
F i n a l l y , i n P a r t C, I comment 
upon t h e n e c e s s a r i l y synonymous 
n a t u r e 
o f 
f i n a l i t y f o r 
purposes o f e x e c u t i o n and f i n a l i t y f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p e a l . 
A. 
A 
c o u r t ' s 
a u t h o r i t y 
t o make 
a 
d e c i s i o n 
and t h e 
c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h a t d e c i s i o n a r e two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . 
The 
a u t h o r i t y t o 
make a d e c i s i o n i s 
n o t dependent upon t h e making 
of a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n . A c o u r t w i t h a u t h o r i t y t o d e c i d e may 
e r r , 
b u t , u n l e s s 
t h e e r r o r i s r e c o g n i z e d 
and a d d r e s s e d 
p u r s u a n t t o a p p l i c a b l e p r o c e d u r e s , 
i n c l u d i n g any t e m p o r a l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t a r e p a r t o f those p r o c e d u r e s , 
t h e c o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n w i l l 
s t a n d . 
Under our R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e , t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t 
i s 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 
g i v e n t h e a u t h o r i t y t o make an 
" e x p r e s s [ ] 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n " as t o whether t h e r e i s any " j u s t r e a s o n f o r 
d e l a y " i n 
making f i n a l an o r d e r t h a t a d j u d i c a t e s a t l e a s t one 
o f , b u t l e s s t h a n a l l , t h e c l a i m s i n 
an a c t i o n . 
R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , 
23 
1100902 
A l a . 
R. C i v . P. 
The 
t r i a l c o u r t may make a " c o r r e c t " d e c i s i o n 
or 
an 
" e r r o n e o u s " 
d e c i s i o n 
b u t , 
u n l e s s 
d e t e r m i n e d 
t o 
be 
e r r o n e o u s 
and 
r e v e r s e d 
i n 
a c c o r d a n c e 
w i t h 
e s t a b l i s h e d 
a p p e l l a t e p r o c e d u r e s , the d e c i s i o n i t makes w i l l s t a n d . 
T h i s 
i s the n a t u r e of the a u t h o r i t y t o 
d e c i d e . 
In most c a s e s , the g r a n t of a u t h o r i t y t o a t r i a l c o u r t 
t o 
d e c i d e i f t h e r e i s "no 
j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y " t r a n s l a t e s t o a 
g r a n t 
of 
a u t h o r i t y 
t o 
d e c i d e 
whether 
the 
c l a i m 
b e i n g 
a d j u d i c a t e d i s "so c l o s e l y i n t e r t w i n e d " w i t h a c l a i m t h a t 
w i l l 
remain p e n d i n g 
" ' t h a t 
s e p a r a t e 
a d j u d i c a t i o n 
would pose 
an 
u n r e a s o n a b l e 
r i s k 
of 
i n c o n s i s t e n t 
r e s u l t s . ' " 
See, 
e.g., 
H i g h l a n d s of Lay, 
LLC 
v. Murphree, 
[Ms. 
1110674, August 
10, 
2012] 
So. 3d 
, 
( A l a . 2012) 
( q u o t i n g L i g h t i n g F a i r , 
I n c . v. Rosenberg, 63 So. 3d 1256, 
1263 
( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ) , and 
the 
cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . 
T h i s 
i s a d e c i s i o n t h a t 
r e q u i r e s 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t t o c a r e f u l l y a s s e s s the f a c t u a l , as w e l l as 
l e g a l , 
i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n the r e s p e c t i v e 
c l a i m s 
and 
l i k e w i s e a s s e s s 
the 
r i s k 
of 
i n c o n s i s t e n t 
r e s u l t s 
i f 
t h o s e 
c l a i m s 
are 
a d j u d i c a t e d 
s e p a r a t e l y . 
I d . 
A l t h o u g h 
i t i s 
a 
d e c i s i o n 
s u s c e p t i b l e 
t o 
j u d i c i a l 
r e v i e w 
f o r 
e r r o r , 
i t i s 
s t i l l 
a 
d e c i s i o n committed i n the 
f i r s t p l a c e t o the a u t h o r i t y of 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t . 
24 
1100902 
I f , 
t h e n , a d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o whether t h e r e i s o r 
i s 
not a 
" j u s t 
r e a s o n f o r d e l a y " i s one t h a t i s w i t h i n t h e 
a u t h o r i t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , a d e c i s i o n by t h a t c o u r t as t o 
t h a t 
i s s u e i s n o t " i n v a l i d and v o i d " i n t h e same way a 
d e c i s i o n i s v o i d when i t 
i s 
made i n a c i r c u m s t a n c e 
i n which 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t has no a u t h o r i t y t o make i t . 
The d i s s e n t i s 
i n c o r r e c t , 
t h e r e f o r e , 
t o 
s u g g e s t 
t h a t 
a 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o whether t h e r e i s any " j u s t r e a s o n f o r 
d e l a y " i s " i n v a l i d " o r " v o i d . " 
I t may be i n c o r r e c t and 
s u b j e c t t o r e v e r s a l , b u t i t 
i s 
a d e c i s i o n t h a t i s w i t h i n t h e 
power o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o 
make, a t l e a s t under t h e p r e d i c a t e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
d e s c r i b e d i n R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , i . e . , where more than 
one c l a i m i s 
p r e s e n t e d and t h e t r i a l c o u r t has a d j u d i c a t e d t h e 
e n t i r e t y o f a t l e a s t one o f , 
b u t l e s s than a l l , those 
c l a i m s .
5 
5The p r e d i c a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
d e s c r i b e d i n 
R u l e 54(b) were 
not p r e s e n t i n 
Page v. P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 336 (8th 
C i r . 1978), 
d i s c u s s e d i n 
b o t h t h e 
main o p i n i o n and t h e d i s s e n t . 
I n Page, 
the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a s i t u a t i o n where t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
had a t t e m p t e d t o 
c e r t i f y 
as 
f i n a l 
n o t t h e 
a d j u d i c a t i o n o f an e n t i r e c l a i m , b u t a d e c i s i o n by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t as t o 
t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f o n l y one o f s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e 
" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i e s " p r o p o s e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f i n s u p p o r t 
of t h e o n l y c l a i m a l l e g e d i n 
h e r c o m p l a i n t . 
As t h e Page c o u r t 
e x p l a i n e d : 
" I n h e r c o m p l a i n t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 
Page 
sought t o have c e r t a i n Iowa r e g u l a t i o n s i n v a l i d a t e d . 
She a s s e r t e d a l t e r n a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i e s i n 
25 
1100902 
P r o f e s s o r Moore e x p l a i n s t h a t i t i s a judgment " e n t e r e d 
under the a u t h o r i t y of R u l e 54(b) " t h a t "begins the r u n n i n g of 
time 
t o a p p e a l . " 
10 James W i l l i a m Moore Moore's F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e § 54.26[1] (3d ed. 2012) . Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
a c c o r d i n g 
t o 
P r o f e s s o r Moore, 
" [ a ] n a g g r i e v e d p a r t y must 
a p p e a l a R u l e 54(b) judgment w i t h i n the time p e r m i t t e d by 
A p p e l l a t e R u l e 4(a) and may 
not seek r e v i e w of the judgment 
a f t e r the r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s have been a d j u d i c a t e d . " I d . 
Even 
more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , 
P r o f e s s o r 
Moore 
e x p l a i n s 
w i t h o u t 
e q u i v o c a t i o n as 
f o l l o w s : 
"A R u l e 54(b) 
judgment b e g i n s the r u n n i n g of the 
time t o a p p e a l r e g a r d l e s s of the p r o p r i e t y o f the  
e n t r y of t h a t judgment. 
In o t h e r words, whether or  
not 
the 
c o u r t abused 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
i n 
e n t e r i n g 
s u p p o r t of 
her argument. Her 
c o m p l a i n t , however, 
a r o s e out of a s i n g l e t r a n s a c t i o n and a s s e r t e d o n l y 
a 
s i n g l e 
c l a i m . 
See Edney v. 
F i d e l i t y 
& 
Guaranty  
L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company, s u p r a , 348 F.2d [136] a t 138 
[ ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 6 8 ) ] . As the Supreme C o u r t has 
r e c e n t l y 
s t a t e d : 
424 
"'Rule 54(b) 
'does not a p p l y t o a 
s i n g l e  
c l a i m 
a c t i o n . ' " 
585 F.2d a t 339 
( q u o t i n g L i b e r t y Mut. I n s . Co. v. W e t z e l , 
U.S. 
737, 743 
(1976) (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . 
T h i s may p o i n t t o a 
b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Page from the p r e s e n t case and the 
cases r e l i e d upon by the main o p i n i o n , see a l s o note 9, 
i n f r a , 
though i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t o f u l l y c o n s i d e r t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y 
f o r purposes o f t h i s 
case. 
26 
1100902 
judgment i s i r r e l e v a n t t o the p a r t i e s ' o b l i g a t i o n t o  
t i m e l y 
a p p e a l . " 
I d . 
(emphasis added). 
I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s C o u r t and the C o u r t of C i v i l A p p e a l s 
r e p e a t e d l y 
have 
a c t e d 
ex mero motu when we 
or 
t h e y 
have 
p e r c e i v e d e r r o r by the t r i a l c o u r t i n i t s d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e r e 
was 
no 
" j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y . " 
See, 
e.g., Hammock v. 
Wal- 
Mart S t o r e s , I n c . , 8 So. 
3d 939 
( A l a . 2008); Watson v. 
L i f e  
Ins. 
Co. of Alabama, 74 So. 3d 470 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
2011) . 
We 
have done so, however, because e r r o r by the t r i a l c o u r t as t o 
t h a t d e c i s i o n would have meant t h a t the u n d e r l y i n g judgment 
p r e s e n t e d 
on a p p e a l 
c o u l d not i n f a c t p r o p e r l y be 
c o n s i d e r e d 
f i n a l 
f o r purposes of i t s a p p e a l a b i l i t y . 
That i s , we 
have 
found i t n e c e s s a r y 
t o a d d r e s s the "no 
j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y " 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
by 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t , 
d e s p i t e 
the 
absence 
of 
a p p r o p r i a t e arguments i n the 
b r i e f s 
c o n c e r n i n g 
i t , because 
e r r o r 
i n 
t h a t 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
would 
have 
i m p l i c a t e d 
the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o a s s e s s 
the m e r i t s 
of 
the u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t a n t i v e judgment p r e s e n t e d i n the case. 
In 
those cases where we have r e v e r s e d the t r i a l c o u r t ' s "no 
j u s t 
r e a s o n 
f o r d e l a y " 
d e c i s i o n , we 
have never h e l d 
t h a t 
t h a t 
 
d e c i s i o n -- a l t h o u g h 
i n e r r o r — 
was beyond the a u t h o r i t y or 
27 
1100902 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the t r i a l c o u r t . 
To the c o n t r a r y , when we 
have found f a u l t w i t h t h a t d e c i s i o n , we have done so on i t s  
m e r i t s and not on the ground t h a t the d e c i s i o n was 
v o i d . 
We 
have been 
a b l e 
t o 
r e v i e w 
the 
"no 
j u s t 
r e a s o n 
f o r 
d e l a y " 
d e c i s i o n i t s e l f , on i t s m e r i t s , i n each case because i n each 
case t h a t d e c i s i o n i t s e l f has been b r o u g h t w i t h i n the "bosom" 
of the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i n a t i m e l y manner. i . e . , w i t h i n the 
42 
day days from the e n t r y of t h a t d e c i s i o n 
i t s e l f .
6 
Our 
o p i n i o n s 
t o date and 
t h o s e of 
the 
C o u r t of 
C i v i l 
A p p e a l s , 
d i s c u s s e d 
i n P a r t 
B below, 
t h e r e f o r e 
r e f l e c t 
the 
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y and 
u n i q u e l y 
f i n a l n a t u r e of a R u l e 
54(b) 
d e c i s i o n , a d e c i s i o n t h a t not o n l y i s i n t e n d e d 
as the 
f i n a l 
word of the 
t r i a l c o u r t as t o the c l a i m i t a d d r e s s e s but i s i n 
f a c t the a c t t h a t i m p a r t s 
f i n a l i t y t o an o t h e r w i s e n o n f i n a l 
a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h a t c l a i m . 
U l t i m a t e l y , t h e s e o p i n i o n s 
are 
e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the f a c t t h a t t h i s i s a 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
6See g e n e r a l l y G o l l o t t e v. P e t e r b i l t of M o b i l e , I n c . , 
582 
So.2d 459, 
463 
( A l a . 1991) 
("The 
e n t r y 
of a 
f i n a l judgment 
made 
a l l r u l i n g s 
l e a d i n g 
up 
t o 
t h a t 
judgment 
s u b j e c t 
t o 
a p p e a l , 
and an a p p e a l from t h a t judgment a l l o w s the 
a p p e l l a n t 
t o argue on 
a p p e a l any 
a l l e g e d e r r o r 
a t 
any 
p o i n t 
i n 
the 
p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t l e d t o t h a t judgment."); Lewis v. S t a t e , 4 63 
So. 
2d 
154, 
155 
( A l a . 
1985) 
( r e c o g n i z i n g 
t h a t 
the 
42-day 
p e r i o d a p p l i c a b l e t o a p p e a l s from f i n a l judgments runs from 
the date of e n t r y of the R u l e 54(b) 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
i t s e l f , 
not 
from the d a t e of e n t r y of the u n d e r l y i n g 
judgment). 
28 
1100902 
w i t h i n t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and moreover i s 
one 
t h a t c o n t e m p l a t e s no f u r t h e r a c t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e t r i a l  
c o u r t and t h a t , 
t h e r e f o r e , i s p r o p e r l y 
t r e a t e d as a 
f i n a l  
judgment i n and o f i t s e l f .
7 
I t i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t t h e 
7"A f i n a l judgment has been d e f i n e d by t h e c o u r t s as one 
t h a t 'ends t h e l i t i g a t i o n on t h e 
m e r i t s and l e a v e s n o t h i n g f o r 
the c o u r t t o do b u t e x e c u t e t h e judgment.'" 
Moore's 
F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e 
§ 202.02 (3d ed. 2012) ( q u o t i n g 
C a t l i n v. 
U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , 324 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)). See, e.g., K e i t h v. Truck  
Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 746 (3d C i r . 1990) ("An 
o r d e r 
s u b s t a n t i v e l y c h a n g i n g a judgment c o n s t i t u t e s a new judgment 
w i t h i t s own time f o r 
a p p e a l a t l e a s t where t h e change i s t h e 
s u b j e c t m a t t e r t o be r e v i e w e d . " ) . 
See g e n e r a l l y 15B C h a r l e s 
A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e § 3916 (2d 
ed. 1992), q u o t i n g 
w i t h a p p r o v a l 
from I n r e Farmers' Loan &  
T r u s t Co., 129 U.S. 206, 213 (1889), t o e x p l a i n as f o l l o w s : 
"'[T]he d o c t r i n e t h a t , a f t e r a decree w h i c h 
d i s p o s e s 
of a p r i n c i p a l s u b j e c t o f l i t i g a t i o n and s e t t l e s 
t h e 
r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s i n r e g a r d 
t o t h a t 
m a t t e r , 
t h e r e 
may 
s u b s e q u e n t l y 
a r i s e 
i m p o r t a n t 
m a t t e r s 
r e q u i r i n g 
t h e 
j u d i c i a l 
a c t i o n 
o f t h e c o u r t i n 
r e l a t i o n t o t h e same p r o p e r t y , and some o f t h e same 
r i g h t s l i t i g a t e d i n 
t h e main s u i t , making n e c e s s a r y 
s u b s t a n t i v e 
and i m p o r t a n t 
o r d e r s 
and d e c r e e s i n 
w h i c h t h e 
most m a t e r i a l r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s may be 
p a s s e d upon by t h e c o u r t , 
and w h i c h , when 
t h e y 
p a r t a k e o f t h e n a t u r e o f f i n a l 
d e c i s i o n s o f t h o s e 
r i g h t s , may be a p p e a l e d from, i s 
w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by 
the d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s 
c o u r t . ' " 
(The 
t r e a t i s e a l s o n o t e s "the s i m p l e 
p o i n t 
t h a t once t h e 
o r i g i n a l t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s have been completed, f i n a l judgment 
a p p e a l 
s h o u l d 
be 
a v a i l a b l e 
upon 
c o n c l u s i o n 
o f 
most 
post-judgment 
p r o c e e d i n g s " 
and 
t h a t 
" [ t ] h e 
f i n a l i t y 
r e q u i r e m e n t i s met by o r d e r s e n t e r e d a f t e r f i n a l judgment, 
t o o 
l a t e o r t o o c o l l a t e r a l t o be r e v i e w e d e f f e c t i v e l y on a p p e a l 
from t h e f i n a l 
judgment, upon complete d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e 
29 
1100902 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s 
no j u s t r e a s o n f o r 
d e l a y and t h a t 
the u n d e r l y i n g judgment s h o u l d be f i n a l must be a p p e a l e d , 
i f 
a t a l l , w i t h i n t h e 42-day p e r i o d f o r a p p e a l i n g f i n a l judgments 
p r e s c r i b e d by our r u l e s . 
B. 
The 
w e l l 
r e s p e c t e d 
t r e a t i s e , 
F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e and 
P r o c e d u r e , e x p l a i n s as f o l l o w s : 
"The 
v a r i o u s p u r p o s e s t h a t may prompt e n t r y o f  
judgment under R u l e 54(b) a l l 
s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r i g h t  
t o 
r e v i e w 
s h o u l d be l o s t i f a p p e a l 
i s n o t t a k e n 
w i t h i n t h e o r d i n a r y a p p e a l 
time r u l e s as measured 
from t h e e n t r y o f judgment. 
Only 
t h i s 
r u l e can  
a c h i e v e 
repose 
f o r a d e f e n d a n t , 
s u p p o r t 
prompt 
 
e x e c u t i o n , 
and e f f e c t u a t e a purpose t o conduct  
f u r t h e r 
p r o c e e d i n g s 
w i t h t h e knowledge 
t h a t some  
m a t t e r s a r e f i n a l l y 
r e s o l v e d o r i n s t e a d must be  
d e a l t w i t h anew i n l i g h t o f t h e views o f t h e c o u r t  
of a p p e a l s . And so i t 
has been h e l d t h a t t h e r i g h t 
t o r e v i e w i s l o s t . " 
15A C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e 
§ 3914.7 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis added; f o o t n o t e 
o m i t t e d ) . 
The same t r e a t i s e f u r t h e r s t a t e s : 
post-judgment p r o c e e d i n g . " ) 
Compare S t a t e v. C h a n d l e r , 
4 
60 
So. 2d 1302, 1305 ( A l a . C i v . 
App. 1984) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t an 
o r d e r 
d e n y i n g 
c o l l e c t i o n o f a p r i o r judgment was 
i t s e l f a 
f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e judgment because i t c o n t e m p l a t e d no f u r t h e r 
a c t i o n by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t : "The d e n i a l o f t h e motion t o 
e n f o r c e 
t h e s u p e r s e d e a s bonds 
e f f e c t i v e l y 
t e r m i n a t e d t h e 
S t a t e ' s e f f o r t s t o c o l l e c t i t s judgment from t h e s u r e t i e s on 
the bond. 
I t 
was a f i n a l judgment." (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . 
30 
1100902 
" [ R u l e 54] does not r e q u i r e t h a t a judgment be 
e n t e r e d when the 
c o u r t d i s p o s e s of 
one 
o r more 
c l a i m s o r t e r m i n a t e s the a c t i o n as t o one o r more 
p a r t i e s . R a t h e r , i t g i v e s the c o u r t d i s c r e t i o n t o 
e n t e r a f i n a l judgment i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and i t 
 
p r o v i d e s much-needed c e r t a i n t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g when  
a 
f i n a l and a p p e a l a b l e judgment has been e n t e r e d . 
"The 
r e q u i r e m e n t i n R u l e 54(b) 
t h a t the c o u r t 
make an e x p r e s s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no 
j u s t 
r e a s o n 
f o r d e l a y i n g the r e v i e w o f a judgment 
on 
fewer than a l l of the c l a i m s or i n v o l v i n g fewer than 
a l l of the p a r t i e s i n an a c t i o n e l i m i n a t e s any doubt  
whether 
an 
immediate 
a p p e a l 
may 
be 
sought. 
 
C o n v e r s e l y , i t makes c l e a r when an a p p e a l must be  
sought o r the r i g h t t o a p p e a l w i l l be 
l o s t , 
s i n c e 
 
the time f o r a p p e a l b e g i n s t o run from the e n t r y of  
an o r d e r t h a t meets the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the 
r u l e . " 
10 C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e 
§ 2654 (3d ed. 1998) 
(emphasis added). 
In 
J a c q u o t v. Rozum, 790 N.W.2d 498 
(S.D. 
2010), 
the 
South 
Dakota Supreme C o u r t 
r e v i e w e d 
the same two 
f e d e r a l 
a p p e l l a t e 
d e c i s i o n s 
n o t e d 
i n the main 
o p i n i o n : 
Page 
v.  
P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 336 
(8th C i r . 1978), and In re L i n d s a y , 59 
F.3d 
942 
(9th C i r . 1995), which r e a c h o p p o s i t e r e s u l t s . 
As 
the main 
o p i n i o n n o t e s , 
i n L i n d s a y the 
f e d e r a l 
c o u r t 
of 
a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t "'[a] R u l e 54(b) 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , r i g h t 
or 
wrong, s t a r t s the time f o r a p p e a l r u n n i n g . ' " 
So. 3d a t 
( q u o t i n g L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d a t 951). 
31 
1100902 
The 
South Dakota Supreme C o u r t , 
a f t e r d i s c u s s i n g b o t h 
Page and L i n d s a y , 
c o n c l u d e d 
t h a t t h e b e t t e r 
c o u r s e i s t o 
r e q u i r e a p a r t y s e e k i n g t o c h a l l e n g e a R u l e 54(b) o r d e r t o do 
so by a 
t i m e l y 
a p p e a l 
a f t e r t h e e n t r y 
o f t h a t 
p a r t i a l 
judgment. I n so d o i n g i t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i e d upon L i n d s a y and 
one o t h e r case, t h e d e c i s i o n o f our 
own C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s 
i n 
A l l e n v. B r i g g s , 
60 So.3d 899 ( A l a . 
C i v . 
App. 2010), 
q u o t i n g much o f t h e passage from A l l e n t h a t appears i n 
t h e 
main o p i n i o n . 
See 
So. 3d a t 
. I f i n d b o t h A l l e n and 
the 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e South Dakota Supreme C o u r t t o be w e l l 
reasoned. 
The d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t our " c a s e l a w " i s 
a t 
odds w i t h t o d a y ' s d e c i s i o n . I t 
s u g g e s t s t h a t we s h o u l d adhere 
t o 
" l o n g - s t a n d i n g 
p r a c t i c e found i n our c a s e l a w " and n o t 
"abandon our c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e . " 
So. 3d a t 
. I f i n d no 
r e p o r t e d Alabama " c a s e l a w " a t odds w i t h our d e c i s i o n today, 
nor do I f i n d any Alabama cases t h a t h e r e t o f o r e have e n d o r s e d 
some " l o n g - s t a n d i n g " o r " c u r r e n t " p r a c t i c e d i f f e r e n t than t h a t 
a r t i c u l a t e d by t h e main o p i n i o n today. 
To t h e c o n t r a r y , f o u r Alabama p r e c e d e n t s d i s c u s s e d i n t h e 
main o p i n i o n 
i n d i c a t e a " c u r r e n t " p r a c t i c e t h a t i s e x a c t l y 
32 
1100902 
what i s a r t i c u l a t e d 
i n t h e main 
o p i n i o n . 
Two 
o f 
t h e s e 
d e c i s i o n s were r e n d e r e d by t h i s C o u r t and a r t i c u l a t e 
a c l e a r 
r u l e 
f u l l y i n a c c o r d 
w i t h t h e h o l d i n g i n t h e main 
o p i n i o n . 
See t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e main o p i n i o n of Lewis v. S t a t e , 463 
So. 2d 154, 155 ( A l a . 
1985) ("A judgment c e r t i f i e d by a 
t r i a l 
c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54 (b) i s a f i n a l a p p e a l a b l e 
judgment; 
the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
t r i g g e r s t h e r u n n i n g of t h e 42-day a p p e a l 
p e r i o d . " ) , and B a g l e y v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864 So. 2d 301, 
317 
( A l a . 
2003) ("The B a g l e y s ' 
n o t i c e of a p p e a l , 
f i l e d 
... 
a l m o s t f o u r y e a r s a f t e r t h e p a r t i a l summary judgment was 
l a s t 
c e r t i f i e d as 
f i n a l , 
i s u n t i m e l y 
as t o t h a t p a r t i a l summary 
judgment and the B a g l e y s ' a p p e a l from t h a t p a r t i a l judgment i s 
d i s m i s s e d . " ) . 
So. 3d a t 
. 
Moreover, two o t h e r Alabama a p p e l l a t e c o u r t o p i n i o n s have 
e x p r e s s l y 
a d d r e s s e d 
c h a l l e n g e s 
t o t h e 
p r o p r i e t y 
of t h e 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i t s e l f 
and have 
h e l d 
t h a t 
t h e 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t can a d d r e s s t h a t i s s u e o n l y i n the c o n t e x t o f 
an a p p e a l b r o u g h t w i t h i n 42 days of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
See 
A l l e n v. B r i g g s , 60 So. 3d a t 903 ("Although A l l e n argues on  
a p p e a l t h a t a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n was not p r o p e r i n t h i s 
c a s e , we have h e l d t h a t he i s p r e c l u d e d 
from 
r a i s i n g 
t h a t 
33 
1100902 
i s s u e now, because, 
i n s o f a r as h i s a p p e a l i s from the summary-
judgment o r d e r , h i s a p p e a l comes t o o l a t e , h a v i n g been 
f i l e d 
more t h a n 
42 days a f t e r the e n t r y of the summary-judgment 
o r d e r on J u l y 31, 200 9." 
(emphasis a d d e d ) ) ; L a r y v. 
Gardener, 
908 So. 2d 955, 957 n.1 
( A l a . C i v . App. 2005) ("Although L a r y  
has a s s e r t e d i n h i s b r i e f s t o t h i s c o u r t t h a t [the c e r t i f i e d ] 
judgment, and the d i r e c t i o n of the e n t r y o f a f i n a l judgment  
p u r s u a n t 
t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , were e r r o n e o u s , 
h i s c h a l l e n g e s are 
u n t i m e l y because he 
d i d not 
f i l e 
a n o t i c e of a p p e a l 
w i t h 
r e s p e c t 
t o 
t h a t judgment 
w i t h i n 
42 
days 
of 
i t s e n t r y . " 
(emphasis 
a d d e d ) ) .
8 
The d i s s e n t a l s o 
s t a t e s : 
" [ U ] n c e r t a i n t y as t o the 
f i n a l i t y 
o f a 
c e r t i f i e d 
judgment 
s t i l l e x i s t s d e s p i t e the r u l e e x p r e s s e d i n 
the 
main 
o p i n i o n . 
A l t h o u g h 
a 
p a r t y 
must 
now 
i m m e d i a t e l y 
c h a l l e n g e 
an 
improper 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n by a p p e a l , n o t h i n g p r e v e n t s the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
from 
l a t e r 
r e c o g n i z i n g 
t h a t 
the 
c l a i m s 
8 C o n s i s t e n t w i t h my own r e s e a r c h , t h e r e i s no mention i n 
any of t h e s e f o u r c a s e s , i n c l u d i n g A l l e n , d e c i d e d i n 2010, 
of 
any p r e c e d e n t s o f t h i s C o u r t or o f the C o u r t of C i v i l A p p e a l s 
e v e r a p p r o v i n g o f a " p r a c t i c e " of a p p e l l a t e - c o u r t r e v i e w o f 
the p r o p r i e t y o f a R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
as p a r t of 
an 
a p p e a l (a) t h a t c h a l l e n g e s s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d judgments and 
(b) t h a t i s f i l e d more than 42 days a f t e r the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
o r d e r . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , 
the o n l y i s s u e as t o the o v e r r u l i n g of 
p r i o r p r e c e d e n t t h a t e x i s t s i n the p r e s e n t case i s p r e s e n t e d 
by Dr. Stephen L. W a l l a c e , the p l a i n t i f f below, who 
f i n d s i t 
n e c e s s a r y t o ask us t o o v e r r u l e A l l e n . 
34 
1100902 
d i s p o s e d i n 
t h e p r i o r judgment a r e i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h 
r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s 
i n t h e case and v a c a t i n g 
t h a t 
i m p r o v i d e n t 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n . " 
So. 3d a t 
. I b e l i e v e t h a t b o t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n 
s t a t e d 
a t t h e o u t s e t o f t h i s passage and t h e p r e d i c a t e f o r t h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n 
s t a t e d i n t h e l a s t 
s e n t e n c e 
m i s r e a d t h e main 
o p i n i o n . 
As t o t h e p r e d i c a t e n o t i o n t h a t " n o t h i n g 
p r e v e n t s 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
from 
l a t e r 
r e c o g n i z i n g 
t h a t t h e 
c l a i m s 
d i s p o s e d ... a r e 
i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s , " t h e 
whole 
p o i n t o f our h o l d i n g t o d a y i s t h a t t h e a p p e a l must be t a k e n 
from a judgment 
c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l i n t h e same way as an 
a p p e a l must be t a k e n from any o t h e r 
f i n a l judgment. 
When an 
a p p e a l i s 
n o t t a k e n , 
t h a t judgment becomes " f i n a l " and " r e s 
j u d i c a t a " i n 
t h e same sense as does any f i n a l judgment from 
w h i c h no a p p e a l i s t a k e n . 
Having e n t e r e d a f i n a l 
judgment 
f i n d i n g 
t h a t t h e a d j u d i c a t e d 
c l a i m i s 
n o t i n t e r t w i n e d 
w i t h 
r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s and t h a t t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e c l a i m is_ 
a p p r o p r i a t e f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n , and 
no a p p e a l h a v i n g been t a k e n 
from t h a t judgment, t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s 
i n f a c t p r e v e n t e d from 
l a t e r c h a n g i n g i t s mind and t r y i n g t o 
undo what i t 
has a l r e a d y 
made f i n a l . 
Such i s 
t h e n a t u r e o f a " f i n a l judgment." 
L i k e w i s e , 
t h e r e f o r e , 
I d i s a g r e e 
w i t h 
t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n 
s t a t e d a t t h e o u t s e t o f t h e above-quoted passage, i . e . , t h a t 
35 
1100902 
u n c e r t a i n t y as t o the 
f i n a l i t y of a c e r t i f i e d judgment 
" s t i l l 
e x i s t s . " 
The 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a p a r t y 
t a k e 
an immediate a p p e a l from a judgment c e r t i f i e d as 
f i n a l under 
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s case c r e a t e s 
c e r t a i n t y , 
not 
u n c e r t a i n t y . 
In an attempt t o s u p p o r t i t s p o s i t i o n as q u o t e d above, 
the 
d i s s e n t 
f u r t h e r a s s e r t s 
i n a f o o t n o t e 
t h a t 
" [ t ] h e main 
o p i n i o n a d d r e s s e s the i s s u e i n t h i s case i n terms of a w a i v e r " 
and 
t h a t , 
" [ i ] f the main o p i n i o n 
p u r p o r t s 
t o h o l d 
t h a t 
an 
i m p r o p e r l y 
c e r t i f i e d judgment, l e f t u n c h a l l e n g e d , i s a c t u a l l y 
f i n a l , t h e n the 
t r i a l c o u r t would l o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
the 
judgment a f t e r 30 
days." 
So. 
3d 
a t 
n. 
11. 
The 
d i s s e n t adds t h a t t h i s approach would " f o r e c l o s e " an "avenue" 
t h a t s h o u l d be a v a i l a b l e t o the l o s i n g p a r t y . 
A g a i n , I b e l i e v e the d i s s e n t m i s r e a d s the main 
o p i n i o n . 
The main o p i n i o n does i n d e e d h o l d t h a t a judgment as t o 
the 
e n t i r e t y 
of 
one 
of 
s e v e r a l 
c l a i m s 
i n 
an 
a c t i o n 
t h a t 
i s 
c e r t i f i e d as 
" f i n a l " under R u l e 54(b) 
i s " a c t u a l l y 
f i n a l . " 
That i n f a c t i s the v e r y p o i n t of the main o p i n i o n , j u s t as i t 
i s the p o i n t of the a u t h o r i t i e s upon w h i c h the main 
o p i n i o n 
r e l i e s . 
Of c o u r s e , t h i s a l s o can be e x p r e s s e d as a " w a i v e r . " 
When someone f o r g o e s t h e i r r i g h t t o a p p e a l any 
f i n a l judgment, 
36 
1100902 
t h e y can be 
s a i d t o have "waived" 
t h e i r 
r i g h t 
t o a p p e a l . 
A g a i n , the s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a p a r t y must t a k e 
an immediate a p p e a l from a judgment c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l 
under 
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s case c r e a t e s c e r t a i n t y ; i t 
f o r e c l o s e s no "avenue" not 
f o r e c l o s e d 
f o l l o w i n g any 
f i n a l , 
u n a p p e a l e d judgment. 
C. 
F i n a l l y , 
i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o acknowledge 
the synonymous 
n a t u r e o f the f i n a l i t y o f a R u l e 54 (b) judgment f o r purposes 
of 
e x e c u t i o n and f o r purposes o f a p p e a l . 
The purposes 
and 
e f f e c t s of a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t an 
o r d e r c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l under R u l e 54(b) i s f i n a l f o r a l l the 
same purposes as any o t h e r judgment and, a c c o r d i n g l y , must be 
v i e w e d as b e i n g "as 
f i n a l " as any o t h e r f i n a l judgment. 
10 
C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and 
Procedure 
§ 2654 (3d ed. 1998), f o r example, 
s t a t e s t h a t "Rule 
54(b)  
a l s o 
i s i m p o r t a n t because 
of the 
c o l l a t e r a l 
e f f e c t s 
o f a  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
under 
the 
r u l e . " 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
The 
r e f e r e n c e d " c o l l a t e r a l e f f e c t s " of a R u l e 54(b) judgment are 
the same as t h o s e of any o t h e r judgment. 
As f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d 
i n F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e : 
37 
1100902 
"Because 
R u l e 
54(b) 
p r o v i d e s 
a 
means 
of 
r e n d e r i n g 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment 
on 
p a r t 
of 
a 
m u l t i p l e - c l a i m or m u l t i p l e - p a r t y a c t i o n , i t has an 
e f f e c t 
on 
v a r i o u s 
o t h e r 
r u l e s 
or 
p r o c e d u r e s 
c o n n e c t e d 
w i t h 
the 
r e n d i t i o n of 
judgment. 
For 
example, as was s t a t e d e a r l i e r , once t h e r e has been 
a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n and a f i n a l judgment has 
been e n t e r e d , 
t h e time f o r a p p e a l 
b e g i n s 
t o r u n . 
S i m i l a r l y , 
p r e c l u s i o n 
p r i n c i p l e s 
a r e based on a 
f i n a l judgment so t h a t s i n c e a R u l e 54(b) o r d e r i s  
v i e w e d as f i n a l , i t 
has b i n d i n g e f f e c t . On the o t h e r 
hand, i f 
no c e r t i f i c a t e i s s u e s , t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n 
or o r d e r remains i n t e r l o c u t o r y 
and t h e above e f f e c t s 
w i l l not t a k e p l a c e . 
"Other m a t t e r s t h a t s h o u l d be n o t e d i n r e l a t i o n 
t o the e n t r y o f a judgment under R u l e 54(b) a r e t h a t 
i t 
e n a b l e s a 
l i e n 
t o be imposed on the judgment 
d e b t o r ' s 
p r o p e r t y 
and a w r i t o f e x e c u t i o n 
t o be 
i s s u e d 
t o 
b e g i n 
t h e 
p r o c e s s 
o f 
c o l l e c t i n g 
any 
damage[s] award. S e c t i o n 1962 of T i t l e 28 
p r o v i d e s 
t h a t e v e r y 
d i s t r i c t - c o u r t judgment s h a l l be a 
l i e n 
on t h e p r o p e r t y i n t h e s t a t e i n w h i c h the c o u r t i s 
s i t t i n g , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e law of t h a t s t a t e ; 
s t a t e law commonly r e q u i r e s a judgment t o be 
f i n a l 
 
i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e a 
l i e n . 
"Another e f f e c t of a R u l e 54(b) o r d e r i s on the  
a c c r u a l of i n t e r e s t on a judgment, s i n c e 
i n t e r e s t 
b e g i n s 
t o accumulate o n l y on a judgment t h a t has 
become 
f i n a l . " 
10 F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e § 2661. 
P r o f e s s o r Moore 
l i k e w i s e e x p l a i n s t h a t a judgment 
c e r t i f i e d as 
f i n a l under 
R u l e 
54(b) 
i s 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment 
" f o r a l l p u r p o s e s , " 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 
e m p h a s i z i n g i t s f i n a l i t y 
f o r purposes of the 
" r u n n i n g 
o f time t o a p p e a l , " 
as w e l l as f o r p u r p o s e s of 
" r e s j u d i c a t a , " t h e a c c r u a l of i n t e r e s t and " e x e c u t i o n . " 
See 
38 
1100902 
Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e § 5 4 . 2 6 [ 1 ] - [ 4 ] . 
See a l s o Redding &  
Co. v. Russwine C o n s t r . Corp., 417 F.2d 721, 728 (D.C. C i r . 
1969) 
("[T]he r o l e Rule 54(b) p l a y s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
f i n a l i t y o f a judgment f o r purposes o f a p p e a l has 
i m p l i c a t i o n s 
as r e g a r d s 
i t s f i n a l i t y f o r 
purposes o f e x e c u t i o n as w e l l . " 
( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) ) . 
The 
l a t t e r 
a u t h o r i t i e s , 
i n c l u d i n g t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia i n 
Redding, p o i n t t o t h e a b s o l u t e u n w o r k a b i l i t y — 
"chaos" would 
be t h e r i g h t word i n many cases — 
o f a s c e n a r i o where a 
judgment as t o a c l a i m i s c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l and e x e c u t i o n 
ensues (so t h a t a money judgment i s c o l l e c t e d o r a judgment 
deed t o l a n d i s d e l i v e r e d ) , o n l y t o have t h e l o s i n g 
p a r t y 
d e c i d e y e a r s 
l a t e r t h a t he o r she s h o u l d n o t so r e a d i l y have 
a c q u i e s c e d i n 
t h e c e r t i f i e d judgment and t h e r e f o r e choose t o 
a p p e a l an a l r e a d y e x e c u t e d judgment a l o n g w i t h t h e judgment 
e n t e r e d on t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e c l a i m s i n t h e c a s e .
9 
A 
judgment i s e i t h e r f i n a l o r i t i s 
n o t . The law does n o t have 
9 T h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d n o t ensue from t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f 
an o r d e r o f t h e n a t u r e 
c e r t i f i e d i n Page. 
Where a c o u r t has 
m e r e l y e x p r e s s e d 
i t s v i e w as t o one o f s e v e r a l elements o f a 
c l a i m o r , as i n Page, one o f s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e arguments 
made i n s u p p o r t o f a c l a i m , t h e r e i s 
no " o r d e r " o r "judgment" 
i n p l a c e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g 
r e l i e d upon o r e x e c u t e d . 
39 
1100902 
two t y p e s of f i n a l i t y , one b r a n d o f f i n a l i t y f o r purposes of  
b e i n g a b l e t o e x e c u t e upon a judgment and a n o t h e r b r a n d of  
f i n a l i t y 
f o r purposes 
of 
a p p e a l a b i l i t y . 
F i n a l i t y f o r 
purposes of a p p e a l and f o r purposes of e x e c u t i o n are the same. 
"Enforcement 
of a judgment by e x e c u t i o n ... 
presupposes 
a 
judgment 
which 
d e t e r m i n e s 
w i t h 
f i n a l i t y 
t h e 
r i g h t s 
and 
l i a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s . " 
30 Am. J u r . 2d E x e c u t i o n s , E t c . 
§ 57 
(2005). See 
a l s o , 
e.g., 
2 F e d e r a l P r o c e d u r e , 
Lawyer  
E d i t i o n § 3:133 
("Since an e x e c u t i o n o r d i n a r i l y i s s u e s o n l y 
upon a f i n a l judgment, f i n a l i t y f o r purposes of e x e c u t i o n and 
f i n a l i t y f o r purposes of a p p e a l s h o u l d be the same."). 
A r u l i n g by t h i s C o u r t t h a t a d e f e n d a n t (or a 
p l a i n t i f f ) 
can be t o l d y e a r s a f t e r the e n t r y of a judgment, c e r t i f i e d 
as 
f i n a l by an a u t h o r i z e d t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r t h a t was not a p p e a l e d 
a t t h e time by the o p p o s i n g p a r t y , t h a t t h a t judgment was i n 
f a c t not f i n a l and t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who thought he c o u l d move 
on w i t h h i s l i f e may be f o r c e d back i n t o the l i t i g a t i o n 
(or 
t h a t a p l a i n t i f f 
and the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
l a w y e r may be 
r e q u i r e d 
y e a r s l a t e r t o d i s g o r g e t h e m s e l v e s o f a monetary r e c o v e r y , 
c o n t i n g e n c y f e e s , and expense reimbursements from a c o l l e c t e d 
judgment, or t o s u r r e n d e r l a n d upon which 
c o n s t r u c t i o n 
may 
have 
s i n c e 
o c c u r r e d ) 
no 
doubt 
would 
be 
a s o u r c e o f 
r e a l 
40 
1100902 
c o n s t e r n a t i o n among the bench 
and 
the b a r . 
I n s o f a r 
as 
R u l e 54(b) i s concerned, such a r u l i n g would t a k e the 
" f i n a l " 
out o f the word 
" f i n a l . " 
41 
1100902 
SHAW, J u s t i c e 
( d i s s e n t i n g ) . 
I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . 
E x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by 
law, 
a p p e a l s 
l i e o n l y 
from 
f i n a l 
judgments. 
G i l b e r t 
v. 
 
N i c h o l s o n , 
845 
So. 
2d 
785, 
790 
( A l a . 2002) 
("It 
i s w e l l 
s e t t l e d 
t h a t 
' [ a ] n 
a p p e a l 
w i l l 
not 
l i e from 
an 
o r d e r 
or 
judgment w h i c h i s not 
f i n a l . ' " 
( q u o t i n g Robinson v. Computer  
S e r v i c e n t e r s , I n c . , 360 So. 2d 299, 
302 
( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) ) ) . 
T h i s 
p r i n c i p l e i s not a s p i r a t i o n a l ; i t i s s t a t u t o r y . See A l a . Code 
1975, § 12-22-2 ("From any f i n a l judgment of the c i r c u i t c o u r t 
or p r o b a t e c o u r t , an a p p e a l 
l i e s t o the a p p r o p r i a t e a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t as a m a t t e r of r i g h t 
. . . . " ) ; John C r a n e - H o u d a i l l e , 
I n c .  
v. Lucas, 534 So. 2d 1070, 
1073 
( A l a . 1988) 
( " [ S e c t i o n 12-22¬
2] embodies our t i m e - h o n o r e d r u l e t h a t a f i n a l judgment i s an 
e s s e n t i a l p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r a p p e a l i n g t o t h i s C o u r t . " ) . 
E x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by law, t h i s Court does not 
have 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over 
a 
n o n f i n a l judgment. 
C r u t c h e r 
v. 
 
W i l l i a m s , 
12 
So. 
3d 
631, 
636 
( A l a . 2008) ("'"The q u e s t i o n 
whether 
an 
o r d e r 
a p p e a l e d 
from 
i s 
f i n a l 
i s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l . . . . " ' " 
( q u o t i n g Hinson v. H i n s o n , 
745 
So. 
2d 
280, 
281 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1999), q u o t i n g 
i n t u r n P o w e l l 
v. 
 
P o w e l l , 718 
So. 2d 80, 82 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1 9 9 8 ) ) ) . 
T h i s i s 
because a n o n f i n a l judgment i s i n t e r l o c u t o r y and i s s u b j e c t t o 
42 
1100902 
change by a t r i a l c o u r t , which r e t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e 
r e m a i n d e r of the case. 
M i l l e r v. S a n t i a g o , 642 So. 2d 446, 
447 ( A l a . 
1994) ("However, because no f i n a l judgment had been 
e n t e r e d 
i n t h i s 
case, 
a l l o r d e r s 
up t o t h a t p o i n t 
were 
i n t e r l o c u t o r y , and, t h e r e f o r e , s u b j e c t t o change."). 
F u r t h e r , 
such a n o n f i n a l , i n t e r l o c u t o r y judgment "does 'not t e r m i n a t e 
the a c t i o n as t o any o f t h e c l a i m s or p a r t i e s , and t h e o r d e r 
or o t h e r form o f d e c i s i o n i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n a t any time  
b e f o r e t h e e n t r y o f judgment a d j u d i c a t i n g a l l 
t h e c l a i m s and  
the r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s o f a l l 
t h e p a r t i e s . ' " 
Hallman v.  
M a r i o n Corp., 411 So. 2d 130, 132 ( A l a . 
1982) 
( q u o t i n g Rule 
5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P . ) . 
A p r o p e r c e r t i f i c a t i o n under Rule 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . 
R. C i v . P., 
w i l l 
deem an 
o t h e r w i s e 
n o n f i n a l judgment as 
" f i n a l " 
f o r 
purposes 
of 
a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Sparks 
v. 
C i t y 
of 
 
F l o r e n c e , 936 So. 2d 508, 512 ( A l a . 
2006) ("Rule 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . 
R. C i v . P., c o n f e r s a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n over an o t h e r w i s e 
n o n f i n a l o r d e r 
" ) . An improper Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , 
however, does not r e n d e r a n o n f i n a l judgment a p p e a l a b l e , does 
not c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h i s C o u r t , and w i l l not s u p p o r t an 
a p p e a l . 
Dzwonkowski v. S o n i t r o l o f M o b i l e , I n c . , 892 So. 2d 
354, 
362 
( A l a . 2004) 
("'[T]he 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
cannot 
c o n f e r 
43 
1100902 
a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n upon 
t h i s 
[ C ] o u r t t h r o u g h 
d i r e c t i n g 
e n t r y o f judgment under R u l e 54(b) 
i f 
t h e judgment i s n o t 
o t h e r w i s e " f i n a l . " ' " ( q u o t i n g 
Computer S e r v i c e n t e r s , I n c . , 360 
So. 2d 
a t 3 0 2 ) ) ; H a r l a n Home B u i l d e r s , I n c . 
v. H a y s l i p , 58 
So. 
3d 102, 108 
n.3 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ( " [ T ] h e summary judgment e n t e r e d 
by 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t was n o t 
a f i n a l judgment t h a t was p r o p e r l y 
a p p e a l a b l e t o t h i s C o u r t a t 
t h e 
time i t 
was e n t e r e d o r 
a t t h e 
time i t 
was p u r p o r t e d l y c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ; 
t h e r e f o r e , 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
a c q u i r e d no 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over t h e 
p u r p o r t e d a p p e a l o f t h a t judgment."). 
Thus, i f 
a R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s 
i n v a l i d and v o i d , t h e 
judgment i s n o n f i n a l , 
and t h i s C o u r t w i l l ex mero motu note our l a c k o f a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n and d i s m i s s t h e 
a p p e a l . 
Dzwonkowski, 892 So. 
2d 
at 362 ("'"When i t 
i s 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t an o r d e r a p p e a l e d from 
i s n o t a f i n a l 
judgment, i t 
i s t h e d u t y o f t h e C o u r t t o 
d i s m i s s t h e 
a p p e a l ex 
mero motu."'" ( q u o t i n g Tatum v. Freeman, 
858 So. 2d 979, 980 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 2003), q u o t i n g i n t u r n 
P o w e l l v. R e p u b l i c N a t ' l L i f e I n s . 
Co., 
293 
A l a . 101, 
102, 300 
So. 2d 359, 360 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) ) . We do n o t 
a d d r e s s , ex mero motu, a 
mere m i s t a k e ; we do, however, a d d r e s s , ex mero motu, t h e f a c t 
t h a t a judgment i s n o t f i n a l 
and t h a t t h e C o u r t 
l a c k s 
a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
44 
1100902 
F u r t h e r , 
an 
i m p r o p e r R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i s 
s e t 
a s i d e not because of a t e c h n i c a l d e f a u l t , but because of 
the 
r i s k of an i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t between the judgment c e r t i f i e d 
as 
f i n a l and 
the subsequent f i n a l judgment on the 
r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s . 
S c h l a r b 
v. Lee, 
955 
So. 
2d 418, 
419-20 ( A l a . 2006) 
("[A] 
R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d 
not be 
e n t e r e d 
i f the 
i s s u e s 
i n the 
c l a i m b e i n g 
c e r t i f i e d 
and 
a c l a i m t h a t 
w i l l 
remain p e n d i n g i n the t r i a l c o u r t '"are so c l o s e l y i n t e r t w i n e d 
t h a t s e p a r a t e a d j u d i c a t i o n would pose an u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k of 
i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s . " ' " ( q u o t i n g C l a r k e - M o b i l e 
C o u n t i e s 
Gas 
 
D i s t . v. P r i o r Energy Corp., 834 
So. 
2d 88, 
95 
( A l a . 2002), 
q u o t i n g i n t u r n Branch v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank of Dothan, N.A., 
514 
So. 
2d 1373, 
1374 
( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ) ) . 
Such i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s 
may 
p r e j u d i c e b o t h p a r t i e s t o the l i t i g a t i o n . 
I 
b e l i e v e 
t h a t 
our 
c a s e l a w 
i s 
c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h 
the 
d e c i s i o n 
i n Page v. 
P r e i s s e r , 585 
F.2d 
336, 
338 
(8th C i r . 
1978) : 
" I t i s c l e a r t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o 
i s s u e a R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t e 
i s not 
c o n c l u s i v e . 
A p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t s 
have 
b r o a d 
r e v i e w i n g 
power 
i n 
d e t e r m i n i n g 
whether a 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t 
has 
p r o p e r l y 
a p p l i e d the r u l e and c o r r e c t l y c e r t i f i e d an 
a p p e a l . 
See 
Schwartz v. Compagnie G e n e r a l 
T r a n s a t l a n t i q u e , 
405 
F.2d 
270, 
274 
(2d 
C i r . 
1968); 
RePass 
v. 
 
V r e e l a n d , 
357 
F.2d 
801, 804-805 (3d C i r . 1966); 
10 
C. 
W r i g h t 
& 
A. 
M i l l e r , 
F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e 
and 
45 
1100902 
P r o c e d u r e § 2655 a t 35 
(1973). 
I n most 
c a s e s , 
however, 
u n l i k e 
t h e p r e s e n t 
a c t i o n , 
t h e 
p a r t y 
c h a l l e n g i n g t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n t a k e s a t i m e l y 
a p p e a l 
from t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r . Our r e s e a r c h has f a i l e d t o 
d i s c l o s e any cases s p e c i f i c a l l y 
d e c i d i n g whether a 
p a r t y who n e g l e c t s t o t a k e a t i m e l y a p p e a l 
from a 
d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
may 
c h a l l e n g e t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h a t c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
a f t e r 
the p e r i o d o f time f o r 
t a k i n g an a p p e a l has e x p i r e d ; 
and 
i f t h e 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i s h e l d 
t o have 
been 
e r r o n e o u s , whether t h e p a r t y may, i n 
h i s 
a p p e a l from 
the c o u r t ' s f i n a l judgment o f t h e r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s , 
seek r e v i e w o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n 
on t h e s u b s t a n t i v e c l a i m u n d e r l y i n g t h e R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
"We h o l d t h a t such c h a l l e n g e s may be made; and 
when a d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y 
c e r t i f i e s a c l a i m 
as 
a p p r o p r i a t e 
f o r immediate 
a p p e a l 
under 
R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , a p a r t y may 
r a i s e 
t h a t 
c l a i m i n a t i m e l y 
a p p e a l 
from an a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n on t h e 
r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s 
i n t h e l a w s u i t . 
W h i l e , 
t e c h n i c a l l y , t h e 
p e r i o d f o r t a k i n g an a p p e a l b e g i n s t o run from t h e 
time 
t h e 
d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t 
e n t e r s 
f i n a l 
judgment 
p u r s u a n t t o t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , 
i f 
t h e 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s e r r o n e o u s , t h e r e 
i s , i n f a c t , no 
p r o p e r 
f i n a l 
judgment 
from 
w h i c h 
a 
p a r t y 
must 
a p p e a l . Thus, i f 
an a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g a s i n g l e c l a i m  
i s i n c o r r e c t l y c a t e g o r i z e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t as  
one 
i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e c l a i m s , a p a r t y ought n o t be 
 
p r e c l u d e d from r a i s i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e c o u r t ' s  
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i n a t i m e l y a p p e a l 
from an a d v e r s e  
judgment on t h e o t h e r c l a i m s i n t h e l a w s u i t . " 
(Emphasis added.) An e r r o n e o u s R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n does 
not 
c o n f e r 
a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
on t h i s 
C o u r t ; 
a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
e x i s t s 
o n l y when a judgment i s f i n a l , and an 
e r r o n e o u s R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
does not c r e a t e a 
f i n a l 
judgment. 
46 
1100902 
The main o p i n i o n r e v e r s e s t h i s 
l o n g - s t a n d i n g p r a c t i c e 
found 
i n our c a s e l a w . 
Here, 
t h e C o u r t 
h o l d s 
t h a t t h e 
a g g r i e v e d p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e t o a p p e a l i m m e d i a t e l y from a f a u l t y 
R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
and t h e r e s u l t i n g 
u n a p p e a l a b l e , 
n o n f i n a l judgment waives any f u t u r e c h a l l e n g e t o t h e improper 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
Thus, what was an e r r o n e o u s , m i s t a k e n , 
i n v a l i d 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
t h a t would n o t c o n f e r a p p e l l a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over the u n d e r l y i n g judgment has become u n a s s a i l a b l e by t h e 
p a r t i e s . 
I see no need t o abandon our c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e . 
The main 
o p i n i o n n o t e s t h a t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
n a t u r e o f a d e f e c t i v e 
R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
can r a i s e 
p r o b l e m a t i c i s s u e s o f 
c e r t a i n t y 
when 
an 
immediate 
a p p e a l 
i s 
not 
t a k e n .
1 0 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , 
the C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s s t a t e d i n A l l e n v.  
B r i g g s , 
60 So. 3d 899 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 2010), 
t h a t 
t h e r e 
e x i s t e d u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d i n g t h e time i n 
which t o a p p e a l . I 
see no u n c e r t a i n t y . 
Under our c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e , a l t h o u g h a 
p a r t y can w a i t u n t i l a f i n a l judgment i s e n t e r e d , a t which 
time a l l 
t h e c l a i m s i n an a c t i o n a r e d i s p o s e d o f , and then 
c h a l l e n g e t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , i f 
t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
1 0These u n c e r t a i n t i e s a r e h y p o t h e t i c a l - - t h e y 
a r e n o t a t 
p l a y under t h e f a c t s o f t h e i n s t a n t case. 
47 
1100902 
i s u p h e l d , then a c h a l l e n g e 
t o the m e r i t s 
of the 
judgment 
p r e v i o u s l y 
c e r t i f i e d as 
f i n a l under R u l e 54(b) 
i s 
u n t i m e l y . 
Thus, t o ensure t h a t an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t can hear a 
c h a l l e n g e 
t o the 
c e r t i f i e d judgment, a p r u d e n t p a r t y must a p p e a l . 
The 
p r o p e r c o u r s e of a c t i o n i s c e r t a i n ; f a i l u r e 
t o a p p e a l i s a 
known r i s k the a g g r i e v e d p a r t y may 
a c c e p t . 
A l l e n a l s o notes a n o t h e r p u r p o r t e d 
u n c e r t a i n t y 
a r i s i n g 
out of our c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e , namely the u n c e r t a i n t y as t o the 
f i n a l i t y of the c e r t i f i e d judgment. 
In o t h e r words, 
a l t h o u g h 
the 
c e r t i f i e d judgment would appear 
f i n a l by v i r t u e of 
the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f , such c e r t i f i c a t i o n can be c h a l l e n g e d 
and 
v a c a t e d when a f i n a l judgment d i s p o s i n g of a l l the c l a i m s i n 
the a c t i o n i s e n t e r e d , thus e x p o s i n g the p r e v i o u s l y 
c e r t i f i e d 
judgment t o a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . 
But i t cannot be s a i d t h a t the 
p a r t i e s 
are unaware 
of 
such 
" u n c e r t a i n t y " ; 
r e l i a n c e on 
a 
c e r t i f i e d judgment b e f o r e the e n t i r e case i s f i n i s h e d i s y e t 
a n o t h e r known r i s k the p a r t i e s may 
e l e c t t o 
t a k e . 
In any 
e v e n t , the u n c e r t a i n t y as t o the 
f i n a l i t y 
of 
a 
c e r t i f i e d judgment s t i l l e x i s t s d e s p i t e the r u l e e x p r e s s e d i n 
the main 
o p i n i o n . 
A l t h o u g h 
a p a r t y must now 
i m m e d i a t e l y 
c h a l l e n g e 
an 
i m p r o p e r R u l e 
54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
by 
a p p e a l , 
n o t h i n g p r e v e n t s 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t from l a t e r r e c o g n i z i n g 
t h a t 
48 
1100902 
the c l a i m s d i s p o s e d i n the p r i o r judgment are i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h 
r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m s 
i n the case and 
v a c a t i n g t h a t 
i m p r o v i d e n t 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n .
1
1 
A l t h o u g h 
the 
main 
o p i n i o n 
u n d e r t a k e s 
t o 
cure 
the 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s i d e n t i f i e d i n A l l e n , none of those u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
a c t u a l l y a f f e c t the i n s t a n t case. 
But the p r o b l e m a t i c 
i s s u e 
t h a t does e x i s t i s the danger of an i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t , w h i c h 
c l e a r l y 
o c c u r r e d 
i n 
t h i s 
case. 
The 
main 
o p i n i o n , 
i n 
an 
attempt t o address u n c e r t a i n t i e s not a t p l a y , has 
e n s h r i n e d 
the i n c o n s i s t e n t judgments. 
Both the u n c e r t a i n t i e s i d e n t i f i e d i n the main o p i n i o n and 
the 
r i s k 
of i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s 
can 
be 
a l l e v i a t e d 
i f our 
o f t e n s t a t e d i n v i t a t i o n t o c a u t i o n i s heeded: 
1 1The 
main o p i n i o n a d d r e s s e s the i s s u e i n t h i s case i n 
terms of a w a i v e r 
by 
the 
a g g r i e v e d 
p a r t y 
of any 
r i g h t 
t o 
c h a l l e n g e the c e r t i f i c a t i o n ; i t does not appear t o h o l d t h a t 
an 
i m p r o p e r l y 
c e r t i f i e d 
judgment, 
l e f t 
u n c h a l l e n g e d , 
i s 
a c t u a l l y f i n a l . 
I f the main o p i n i o n p u r p o r t s t o h o l d t h a t an 
i m p r o p e r l y 
c e r t i f i e d judgment, l e f t u n c h a l l e n g e d , 
i s a c t u a l l y 
f i n a l , t h e n the 
t r i a l c o u r t would l o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over the 
judgment a f t e r 30 days. 
See George v. Sims, 888 So. 2d 
1224, 
1227 
( A l a . 
2004) 
( " G e n e r a l l y , 
a 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
has 
no 
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y or amend a 
f i n a l o r d e r more than 
30 
days a f t e r the judgment has been e n t e r e d , e x c e p t t o c o r r e c t 
c l e r i c a l e r r o r s . " ) . 
Such a h o l d i n g , I s u b m i t , would f u r t h e r 
c o m p l i c a t e our R u l e 54(b) 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e by o f t e n f o r e c l o s i n g 
the o n l y r e m a i n i n g avenue a v a i l a b l e t o a d d r e s s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s , as d i s c u s s e d i n S c h l a r b , 
s u p r a . 
49 
1100902 
" T h i s 
C o u r t 
l o o k s 
w i t h 
some 
d i s f a v o r 
upon 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 
under R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) . 
" ' I t 
b e a r s 
r e p e a t i n g , 
h e r e , 
t h a t 
" ' [ c ] e r t i f i c a t i o n s 
under R u l e 54(b) s h o u l d 
be 
e n t e r e d 
o n l y i n e x c e p t i o n a l cases and 
s h o u l d not 
be e n t e r e d r o u t i n e l y . ' " S t a t e v.  
Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720, 725 ( A l a . 2002) 
( q u o t i n g Baker v. B e n n e t t , 644 So. 2d 
901, 
903 
( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) . . . . ) . 
" ' " A p p e l l a t e 
r e v i e w 
i n a p i e c e m e a l f a s h i o n i s 
not f a v o r e d . " ' " 
Goldome C r e d i t Corp. [v. 
P l a y e r , 869 So. 2d 
1146, 1148 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2003)] 
( q u o t i n g 
Harper 
S a l e s 
Co. 
v. 
Brown, 
S t a g n e r , 
 
R i c h a r d s o n , 
I n c . , 742 So. 2d 190, 192 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 1999), q u o t i n g i n t u r n Brown v.  
W h i t a k e r C o n t r a c t i n g Corp., 681 So. 2d 
226, 
229 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1996)) 
(emphasis 
added).'" 
S c h l a r b , 955 So. 2d a t 419 ( q u o t i n g Dzwonkowski, 892 So. 2d 
a t 
363). 
I t i s t h e improper 
i s s u a n c e 
o f a 
R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
t h a t 
c r e a t e s 
u n c e r t a i n t y 
and 
i n c o n s i s t e n t 
r e s u l t s ; no u n c e r t a i n t y e x i s t s i f 
t h e p r i o r judgment remains 
u n c e r t i f i e d 
and 
t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
r e f u s e s 
t o 
i s s u e 
a 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n when a c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s i m p r o p e r . 
I 
b e l i e v e 
t h a t 
t h e main 
o p i n i o n 
t r a d e s 
t h e 
e a s i l y 
r e c o g n i z e d " u n c e r t a i n t i e s " c r e a t e d by an e r r o n e o u s R u l e 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r an 
i n c r e a s e d 
" u n r e a s o n a b l e 
r i s k 
o f 
i n c o n s i s t e n t 
r e s u l t s . " 
S c h l a r b , 955 So. 2d a t 419-20. 
I 
would 
a p p l y 
t h e w e l l 
s e t t l e d 
p r i n c i p l e s 
t h a t a judgment 
i m p r o p e r l y c e r t i f i e d under R u l e 54(b) i s 
not 
a f i n a l judgment, 
50 
1100902 
Dzwonkowski, s u p r a ; t h a t n o n f i n a l judgments a r e i n t e r l o c u t o r y 
and s u b j e c t t o m o d i f i c a t i o n and change by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t , 
M i l l e r , s u p r a ; and t h a t a n o n f i n a l judgment i s g e n e r a l l y not 
s u b j e c t t o a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
S p a r k s , 
s u p r a . 
B o l i n , J . , c o n c u r s . 
51