Case Title: Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co1995 WY 32891 P.2d 773Case Number: 94-80Decided: 03/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Alexander Henry THUNDER HAWK, Jr., By and Through his 
Guardian ad Litem, Georg JENSEN; by and through his Conservators, Alexander 
Henry Thunder Hawk, Sr. and Iona Thunder Hawk; and Alexander Henry Thunder Hawk, 
Sr. and Iona Thunder Hawk, Individually, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
and John Does I-X, Individually and as Agents, Servants and Employees of the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Ronald E. Triggs, Cheyenne, 
for 
appellants.

Bradley T. Cave of Holland 
& Hart, Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants 
Alexander Thunder Hawk, Jr., Alexander Thunder Hawk, Sr., and Iona Thunder Hawk 
appeal from the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of Appellee Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, from the order which denied Appellants' motion for a 
new trial, and from the judgment entered against them for 
costs.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      In their 
statement of the issues, Appellants present five issues for our 
review:

Issue 
One: The court's untimely hearings 
on pre-trial motions obscured the issues and distracted the court from the 
evidentiary matters which should have been presented to the 
jury.

Issue 
Two: Exclusion of evidence kept 
relevant evidence on the attractive nuisance doctrine and on punitive damage 
issues from the jury.

Issue 
Three: The handling of evidentiary 
questions and matters presented a one-sided view of this case to the jury and 
made it impossible for them to arrive at a just and fair verdict. 

Issue 
Four: The instructions given the 
jury and the verdict form so confused the jury on the issues as to require them 
to ignore a substantial body of evidence relating to the learning disability of 
the minor plaintiff, and were tantamount to directing them to find for the 
defendant.

Issue 
Five: The finding of the jury was in 
direct contravention to the evidence produced at trial.

Facts

[¶4]      The salient facts 
of this case are articulated in Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1992). On July 20, 1989, 
six-year-old Alexander Thunder Hawk, Jr. (Alex) was involved in an accident 
while he was playing on a train located in Union Pacific's rail yard. Alex's 
left leg was severed as a result of the accident. Alex, by and through his 
guardian ad litem and his conservators, sued Union Pacific for negligence, gross 
negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct. His parents, Alexander Thunder 
Hawk, Sr. and Iona Thunder Hawk, also asserted claims for Alex's medical 
expenses and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 844 P.2d  at 
1046.

[¶5]      The district 
court granted partial summary judgments in favor of Union Pacific, ruling (1) 
"that Alex was a trespasser or at most a bare licensee to whom Union Pacific 
owed a duty not to willfully or wantonly harm and that the attractive nuisance 
doctrine could not be invoked under the facts of the case to elevate the 
standard of care"; (2) "that no evidence existed to show that Union Pacific 
breached its duty not to willfully or wantonly harm Alex"; and (3) "that the 
parents could not maintain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress under the undisputed facts of the case." 844 P.2d  at 
1047.

[¶6]      Appellants 
appealed from the district court's orders, and this Court affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 844 P.2d  at 
1046. In that case, we adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965), 
which is generally referred to as the attractive nuisance 
doctrine:

[¶7]      A possessor of 
land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon 
caused by an artificial condition upon the land if

(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon 
which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to 
trespass, and

(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows 
or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an 
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, 
and

(c) the children because of their youth do not 
discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or 
in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and

(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the 
condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with 
the risk to children involved, and

(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care 
to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the 
children.

After adopting § 339, the 
Court elaborated on what a plaintiff is required to show in order to recover 
under that section:

To recover under § 339, a child trespasser must first 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence at trial the existence of 
elements (a) through (d). If the child trespasser is successful in doing so, the 
duty of reasonable care under element (e) attaches to the land possessor. The 
child trespasser must then, as in any other negligence case, prove the elements 
of breach, proximate causation, and damages by a preponderance of the 
evidence.

844 P.2d  at 1049. We held 
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to elements (a) through (d) of § 
339 and reversed the summary judgment on the attractive-nuisance issue. 844 P.2d  
at 1049, 1051. We reversed the summary judgment on Alex's 
willful-and-wanton-misconduct claim but affirmed the summary judgment on the 
parents' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 844 P.2d  at 
1051-52. 

[¶8]      We remanded the 
case, and the district court held a jury trial. The jury returned a special 
verdict in favor of Union Pacific in which it answered the interrogatories as 
follows:

1. Is the place where the condition exists one which 
Union Pacific knows or has reason to know that children are likely to 
trespass?

____ 
YES v    
NO

2. Is the condition one of which Union Pacific knows 
or has reason to know and which Union Pacific realizes or should realize will 
involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such 
children?

____ 
YES v   
NO

3. Did Alexander Thunder Hawk, Jr., because of his 
youth fail to discover the condition or realize the risk involved in meddling 
with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it?

v YES ____ 
NO

4. Is the utility to Union Pacific of maintaining the 
condition and the burden of eliminating the danger slight as compared with the 
risk to children involved?

____ 
YES v   
NO

5. Did Union Pacific fail to exercise reasonable care 
to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect Alexander Thunder Hawk, 
Jr.?

____ 
YES v   
NO

6. Was Union Pacific's failure to exercise reasonable 
care a proximate cause of the accident?

____ 
YES v   
NO

7. Considering all of the fault at one hundred 
percent, what percentage of the total fault is attributable to each of the 
following:

Alexander Thunder Hawk, Jr., Plaintiff            
95% of fault 

Union Pacific Railroad, Defendant                   
   5% of 
fault 

   
TOTAL                                              
100%

8. Without considering the percentage of fault found 
in Question No. [7], what total amount of damages do you find was sustained by 
Alexander Thunder Hawk, Jr., Plaintiff:

$ 
- 0 - -----

The district court entered a 
judgment on the jury verdict and ordered Appellants to pay Union Pacific's 
costs. The district court also denied Appellants' motion for a new trial. 
Appellants appealed from the district court's orders.

Pretrial 
Motions

[¶9]      Appellants allege 
that the district court committed reversible error when it did not hear their 
pretrial motions in a timely manner. They also contend that the district court's 
rulings with regard to those motions were improper.

Appellants' pretrial motions 
were:

- 
Notice of objection to Union Pacific's designated witnesses and 
exhibits;

- 
Motion to strike the trial testimony of Union Pacific expert witness Jack 
Sanford;

- 
Notice of continuing objections to Union Pacific's designation of witnesses and 
exhibits;

- 
Motion to compel Union Pacific to produce witnesses and motion to strike Union 
Pacific's               
witnesses and exhibits;

- 
Motion to allow Appellants' expert witness, Dennis Bergquist, to inspect the 
site of the accident;

- 
Motion to strike Union Pacific's exhibits;

- 
Motion for an order setting a hearing;

- 
Motion to strike the trial testimony of Union Pacific witness Ed 
Smedley;

- 
Motion to strike the updated calculations of Union Pacific witness Everett 
Sechtem;

- 
Motion to allow Appellants to call J.C. Cox, who was designated as a Union 
Pacific witness, as their witness;

- 
Motion to strike Union Pacific expert witness Douglas 
Filter;

- 
Motion for an order setting a hearing on Appellants' motion to strike the trial 
testimony of various Union Pacific witnesses;

- 
Motion to strike J.C. Cox as a Union Pacific witness;

- 
Motion to strike Union Pacific witness Sandra Walraven; 
and

- 
Motion in limine.

A. Timeliness 
of Hearing

[¶10]   Appellants contend that the 
district court erred when it did not hear their pretrial motions prior to trial 
and in time for Appellants to take corrective measures to remedy Union Pacific's 
interferences with their discovery.

[¶11]   A district court has the power to 
control its own docket. Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth 
Judicial District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 713-15 (Wyo. 1987). 
Appellants do not direct us to any rule of civil procedure which governs as to 
when a district court must hear pretrial motions such as those filed by 
Appellants. On the contrary, W.R.C.P. 16(d) requires district courts to hold 
final pretrial conferences "as close to the time of trial as reasonable under 
the circumstances."

[¶12]   The district court heard 
Appellants' pretrial motions just before the trial began. Taking into account 
the nature of Appellants' motions and the circumstances of the case, we conclude 
that the district court did not err by failing to hear the motions at an earlier 
time. Further, Appellants do not explain how they were prejudiced by the 
district court's decision to wait until just before the trial began to hear 
their motions. See W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.A.P. 9.04; see also Casteel v. News-Record, 
Inc., 875 P.2d 21, 23 (Wyo. 1994).

B. Propriety 
of District Court's Rulings

1. ISSUES 
NOT SUPPORTED BY COGENT ARGUMENT

[¶13]   With regard to most of their 
fifteen pretrial motions, Appellants do not offer any argument, cogent or 
otherwise, to demonstrate that the district court erred when it did not grant 
their motions. We will consider only those issues which are supported with 
cogent argument. W.R.A.P. 7.01(f).

2. MOOT 
ISSUES

[¶14]   Appellants suggest that the 
district court erred when it denied their motions to strike Union Pacific 
witnesses Douglas Filter and Sandra Walraven. Any issues with regard to the 
district court's rulings which pertained to Mr. Filter and Ms. Walraven are moot 
because Union Pacific did not call them to testify at trial. "[T]he mootness 
doctrine requires that a justiciable issue remain before the court throughout 
the duration of the suit." Reiman Corporation v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).

3. J.C. 
COX

[¶15]   Union Pacific designated J.C. Cox 
as one of its witnesses. Appellants filed a motion to strike Mr. Cox from Union 
Pacific's witness list and a motion to add Mr. Cox to their witness list. The 
district court denied Appellants' motions.

[¶16]   Appellants maintain that the 
district court erred when it denied their motions because "the effectiveness of 
[Mr. Cox's] testimony was lost by refusing to allow the plaintiffs to use Mr. 
Cox as a witness in their case in chief." In the motion hearing before the 
district court, Appellants indicated that during Mr. Cox's deposition they 
learned that he had knowledge about children being present in the rail yard 
prior to the time when Alex was injured.

[¶17]   W.R.E. 611(a) 
provides:

(a) Control by court. - The court shall exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of 
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment.

Under W.R.E. 611(a), the 
district court has wide discretion to control the presentation of witnesses and 
evidence at trial. McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 712 (Wyo. 1983). We will reverse a district court's ruling on the presentation 
of witnesses at trial only when an abuse of discretion has been 
shown.

"`A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an 
error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances.'"

Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1991) 
(quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 
1980)).

Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶18]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion by refusing to grant Appellants' motions. Union Pacific could 
properly present Mr. Cox in its case in chief since Union Pacific had originally 
designated Mr. Cox as its witness and since Appellants did not give any concrete 
explanation as to how their case would be harmed if the district court did not 
grant their motions. Additionally, Appellants did not take advantage of their 
opportunity to question Mr. Cox on cross-examination; therefore, they cannot now 
show that they were prejudiced by the district court's 
rulings.

Expert 
Testimony

A. Expert 
Witness Designation

[¶19]   Appellants argue that the district 
court erred when it refused to allow one of their expert witnesses, Richard 
Radecki, M.D., to testify about how Alex's learning disability affected his 
ability to understand warnings. The district court refused to allow the expert 
to testify on that matter because the offered testimony was beyond the scope of 
Appellants' expert witness designation for Dr. Radecki. The district court did 
not err.

[¶20]   By a pretrial order, the district 
court directed the parties to designate their expert witnesses' opinions by a 
certain date.

[A]ny requirement of adherence to a pretrial order 
entered in accordance with our Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court. Claims of error in that regard are examined 
under an abuse of discretion standard.

Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 237-38 (Wyo. 1988). The trial court also has discretion to construe 
the requirements in its own orders, which includes deciding whether the offered 
testimony falls within the expert's designation. 755 P.2d  at 
238.

[¶21]   Appellants did not specifically 
state in their submissions to the district court that Dr. Radecki would testify 
about how Alex's learning disability affected his ability to understand 
warnings. The designation included in the record presented to us on appeal 
stated:

4. Richard Radecki. Dr. Radecki is expected to 
testify in accordance with his trial deposition testimony and [about] the 
medical care and treatment provided to Alexander Thunder Hawk Jr. since that 
time. Medical records have been requested and will be provided upon receipt. Dr. 
Radecki is expected to testify about Alexander Thunder Hawk Jr.'s continuing 
problems with his prosthesis and the medical problems he can expect to face in 
the future.

Appellant's pretrial 
memorandum also indicated that Dr. Radecki would testify in accordance with his 
deposition. We have reviewed the transcripts of Dr. Radecki's depositions and 
can find no instance where he was specifically asked about his opinion on how 
Alex's learning disability affected his ability to understand warnings. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Dr. Radecki's testimony 
to that which was specified in his expert witness 
designation.

B. Federal 
Railway Administration Records

[¶22]   The district court granted Union 
Pacific's motion in limine, prohibiting Appellants' liability expert, Dennis 
Bergquist, from testifying about certain Federal Railway Administration (FRA) 
records or giving his opinions as to the statistics contained in those records. 
The statistics were a compilation of railroad data which had been gathered over 
a ten-year period on nonemployee accidents. Mr. Bergquist had relied upon those 
statistics in concluding that "there had been an `explosion' of injuries" on 
Union Pacific's railway system. Appellants argue that the district court erred 
when it decided to exclude that evidence because

[t]he Union Pacific Railroad Company provided that 
data to the Federal Railroad Administration; it was fully aware of the problems 
on its own system, and yet it allowed it to proceed without any significant 
effort being made to abate the problem of which it was aware. This matter not 
only went to the scienter of the railroad relative to injuries and fatalities, 
but also was important evidence relative to the issue of punitive 
damages.

Appellants do not argue that 
the statistics were admissible evidence. Instead, they assert that they should 
have been allowed to present the evidence to the jury pursuant to W.R.E. 
703:

The facts or data in the particular case upon which 
an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.

The decision as to whether 
or not to allow evidence to be presented to the jury rests within the sound 
discretion of the district court. See Contreras by and through Contreras v. 
Carbon County School District # 1, 843 P.2d 589, 595 (Wyo. 1992); Madison v. 
Marlatt, 619 P.2d 708, 716 (Wyo. 1980) (per curiam). If a proper foundation has 
not been laid, the district court may refuse to allow the evidence to be 
presented to the jury. Ferris v. Myers, 625 P.2d 199, 204 (Wyo. 1981); see also 
Contreras by and through Contreras, 843 P.2d  at 595.

[¶23]   In order to establish a proper 
foundation pursuant to W.R.E. 703, the proponent of the evidence must show that 
the evidence is information of a type customarily relied upon by experts in the 
field and that the evidence is sufficiently trustworthy to make the expert's 
reliance upon it reasonable. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
EVIDENCE § 6651 (interim ed. 1992); see also United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846, 107 S. Ct. 163, 93 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1986).

[¶24]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion by prohibiting Appellants' expert witness from testifying about 
statistics contained in the FRA records. Appellants did not make any attempt to 
establish a foundation for the information. They did not present any testimony 
to show that the statistics were facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in railroad safety when they are determining whether a railroad met 
its standard of care. See W.R.E. 103; see also Contreras by and through 
Contreras, 843 P.2d  at 595.

Depositions

A. Robert 
Charging Hawk

[¶25]   Appellants contend that the 
district court erred when it refused to admit the complete deposition of Robert 
Charging Hawk (Robert) into evidence at the trial after it had permitted Union 
Pacific to introduce a portion of that deposition. They argue that the complete 
deposition would have shown that Robert saw a child on board a locomotive just 
prior to Alex's accident, and they insist that Robert's deposition was relevant 
to prove their claim under § 339.

[¶26]   Robert was a young boy who was 
playing with Alex near the rail yard on the day that Alex was injured. During 
the discovery period, Robert was deposed, and his deposition was presented at 
the trial. Union Pacific filed a motion in limine to exclude the portions of 
Robert's deposition which pertained to him seeing a boy on board a locomotive. 
The district court granted Union Pacific's motion because it found that those 
portions of Robert's deposition were irrelevant.

[¶27]   W.R.C.P. 32 sets out the rules for 
using depositions at trial:

(a) Use of depositions. - At the trial or upon the 
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a 
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though 
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who 
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable 
notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following 
provisions:

(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the 
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness, 
or for any other purpose permitted by the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence;

.           
.            
.           
.           
.

(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a 
party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court 
finds:

.           
.           
.           
.           
.

(B) That the witness is absent from the state, unless 
it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering 
the deposition;

.           
.           
.           
.           
.

(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in 
evidence by a party, an adverse party may require the offeror to introduce any 
other part which ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, 
and any party may introduce any other parts.

. . . .

(b) Objections to admissibility. - Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 28(b) and subdivision (d)(3) of this rule, objection may be 
made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part 
thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the 
witness were then present and testifying.

[¶28]   The ruling on the admissibility of 
a deposition rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. MMOE v. MJE, 
841 P.2d 820, 828 (Wyo. 1992); see also L.U. Sheep Company v. Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 1990). 
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not 
admissible. W.R.E. 402.

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.

W.R.E. 
401.

[¶29]   Robert testified that the boy he 
saw on board the locomotive was accompanied by an adult who was "driving" the 
train. Section 339 pertains only to child trespassers. Since the boy was in the 
company of railroad personnel, he was not a trespasser, and his presence had no 
bearing on any element of § 339. Appellants argued to the district court that 
the boy's presence was pertinent to the "attraction" element of their claim. 
Appellants have misconstrued the requirements of § 339. Although § 339 is 
commonly referred to as the attractive nuisance doctrine,

the term "attractive nuisance" is somewhat of a 
misnomer. Section 339 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS does not require that 
a child be attracted to the land possessor's premises by a dangerous condition 
or instrumentality and that he be injured by the particular attraction. Nor does 
§ 339 rely upon the legal fiction of "implied invitation" to elevate a land 
possessor's duty of care to child trespassers. Despite these recognized 
differences, the courts, including this one, continue to refer to 
injured-child-trespasser cases popularly as "attractive nuisance" 
cases.

Thunder Hawk by and through 
Jensen, 844 P.2d  at 1048 n. 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion 
by excluding the portions of Robert's deposition which pertained to the boy he 
saw on board the locomotive because the testimony was 
irrelevant.

B. Jeremy 
Charging Hawk

[¶30]   Jeremy Charging Hawk (Jeremy) was 
also playing with Alex near the rail yard shortly before Alex's accident. 
Jeremy's testimony was presented at trial through his deposition transcript. 
Appellants contend that the district court erred when it refused to allow them 
to read those portions of Jeremy's deposition to the jury which included 
comments Jeremy's mother made while she was present during the taking of 
Jeremy's deposition. They argue: "The court's ruling excluded the remarks from 
the mother that directed, interfered with, and arguably influenced the testimony 
of this little boy."

[¶31]   Under the circumstances of this 
case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow the mother's remarks to be admitted into evidence. Jeremy's mother 
clarified some of Jeremy's answers, and she told Jeremy that he did not have to 
answer certain questions. She also made some comments about what she had 
observed at the accident site. Most of the mother's comments did not fall within 
the definition of relevant evidence because they did not have "any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more or less probable" than it would have been without the evidence. 
W.R.E. 401.

[¶32]   Although some of the comments may 
have been relevant evidence, the district court properly excluded those comments 
because their probative value was "substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice . . . or misleading the jury." W.R.E. 403. The mother was not 
under oath when she made her comments. The jury could have improperly considered 
the information related by Jeremy's mother when it was making its 
determinations. Since Jeremy's mother was not a witness and had not been sworn 
to tell the truth, the district court properly excluded those portions of the 
deposition. See generally Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1304-05 (Wyo. 
1991).

C. Alexander 
Thunder Hawk, Jr.

[¶33]   Appellants argue that the district 
court erred when it allowed Union Pacific to read portions of Alex's deposition 
to the jury during its opening statement and at the conclusion of its case in 
chief. They contend that admission of Alex's deposition was improper since he 
testified in person and was subjected to cross-examination by Union Pacific. We 
disagree.

[¶34]   W.R.C.P. 32(a)(1) allows any 
deposition to be used against any party for any purpose which is permitted by 
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. The statements which Alex made in his deposition 
were admissible because they were admissions by a party-opponent. W.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(A).

Damages

[¶35]   Appellants assert that the district 
court erred when it failed to admit Appellant's complete medical expenses and 
the State of Wyoming's subrogation claim into evidence. Appellants also argue 
that the jury erred when it failed to make findings of special and general 
damages for medical expenses.

[¶36]   In its answers to the 
interrogatories on the special verdict form, the jury determined that Appellants 
had failed to establish that Union Pacific owed a duty of reasonable care to 
Alex under § 339. Any error associated with the damages portion of the trial 
was, therefore, harmless and cannot constitute a basis for reversal. W.R.C.P. 
61; W.R.A.P. 9.04; see also Shisler v. Town of Jackson, Wyoming, 890 P.2d 555, 
558 (Wyo. 1995).

Jury 
Instructions

[¶37]   Appellants allege that the district 
court erred when it refused to give three instructions which they had offered.1 We disagree.

In considering the validity of instructions to a 
jury, we must determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately 
advise the jury of the applicable law. . . . The ruling of a trial court on an 
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless there is a showing of 
prejudice, which connotes a demonstration by the complaining party that the 
instruction misled or confused the jury with respect to the applicable 
principles of law.

L.U. Sheep Company, 790 P.2d  
at 672. See also Little v. Kobos by and through Kobos, 877 P.2d 752, 759 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶38]   Although the actual proffered 
instructions do not appear in the record on appeal, Appellants read their 
proposed instructions into the record at the jury instruction conference. The 
first instruction which Appellants offered tracked the language of WYO. STAT. § 
37-9-1101 (Supp. 1994):

[E]xcept in cases of attractive nuisance, no person 
owning, operating, loading or unloading a railroad car or train shall be liable 
for any damages for the accidental death or injury of a person occurring while 
the person was riding a railroad car or train in violation of Wyoming statutes 
37-12-104, or while the person was boarding or unboarding from the railroad car 
or train without the consent of the owner or operator of the railroad car or 
train.

The district court properly 
refused to give Appellants' proposed instruction. The statute immunizes 
railroads from claims which have been asserted by trespassers "[e]xcept in cases 
of attractive nuisance." Since this is an attractive nuisance case, § 37-9-1101 
does not apply. The district court's refusal to give the instruction did not 
mislead the jury.

[¶39]   Appellants also offered an 
instruction which pertained to willful and wanton misconduct. The district court 
refused to give that instruction because it concluded that no evidence had been 
presented to the jury which would justify the jury finding that Union Pacific 
had engaged in willful and wanton misconduct toward Alex.

[¶40]   "`[A] party is entitled to have a 
jury instruction upon its theory of the case but only if such theory is 
supported by competent evidence and a proper request for the instruction is 
made.'" Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 894 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Short v. Spring 
Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Wyo. 1987)).

[¶41]   Appellants argue on appeal that, if 
the district court had permitted Mr. Bergquist to testify about the statistics 
contained in the FRA records and to give his opinion that an "`explosion' of 
injuries" had occurred on Union Pacific's railroad system, sufficient evidence 
would have existed to support the willful-and-wanton-misconduct instruction. We 
have already determined that the district court correctly excluded the 
statistical evidence and Mr. Bergquist's opinion relative thereto; accordingly, 
we conclude that the district court properly ruled that Appellants had not 
presented sufficient evidence to support their proposed 
instruction.

Verdict

[¶42]   Appellants assert that the verdict 
form which was presented to the jury was confusing and inaccurate. At the jury 
instruction hearing, Appellants argued that the verdict form should instruct the 
jury members that "it is their responsibility to independently determine the 
measure of damages" regardless of how they find on the liability issues. In 
response to Appellants' objection, the district court modified the verdict form 
by instructing the jury: "Without considering the percentage of fault found in 
Question No. [7], what total amount of damages do you find was sustained by 
Alexander Thunder Hawk, Jr., Plaintiff[?]" Appellants accepted the district 
court's change by stating that it was "a reasonable modification." Since the 
district court modified the verdict form in accordance with Appellants' request, 
Appellants cannot show any error or prejudice on appeal.

[¶43]   Appellants also argue that the 
third interrogatory on the verdict form did not conform with this Court's 
decision in Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen because, although it instructed 
the jury to take Alex's youth into account when it was determining whether he 
had failed to discover the dangerous condition or realize the risk involved, it 
did not have the jury take Alex's learning disability, intellectual age, and 
other relevant facts into consideration. Appellants did not make this objection 
at trial; therefore, we apply the plain error standard. Since the jury answered 
the interrogatory in Appellants' favor, Appellants were not prejudiced; 
therefore, they cannot show on appeal that plain error resulted. See Natural Gas 
Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1187-88 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶44]   Appellants also contend that the 
verdict revealed that the jury was confused. In this argument, Appellants are 
asserting that the jury's verdict was inconsistent because it found that Alex 
was unable to comprehend the danger involved with trains and yet it found that 
he was comparatively negligent. We refuse to address this issue on appeal 
because Appellants failed to raise it in the district court before the jury was 
discharged.

Failure to raise this matter before the jury was 
released, as provided for in WYO. STAT. § 1-11-213 (1988), results in waiver of 
the right to complain about inconsistencies or irregularities in the verdict. 
Moreover, because of the opportunity to correct the verdict offered by § 
1-11-213, the complaining party will be held to have waived the error 
notwithstanding its degree of irregularity or impropriety. . . . [N]o matter how 
obvious the irregularity, the right to complain of the verdict was 
waived.

Halliburton Company v. 
Claypoole, 868 P.2d 252, 258 (Wyo. 1994). See also Big-O Tires, Inc. v. Santini, 
838 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1992).

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶45]   Appellants contend that the 
evidence adduced at trial did not sustain the jury verdict. We 
disagree.

"The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence is well established. On review, this court assumes that the evidence in 
favor of the successful party is true. We leave out of consideration entirely 
the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the 
evidence of the successful party, and we afford to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it."

Kadrmas v. Valley West Homeowner's Association, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993) (citation omitted).

Sannerud v. Brantz, 879 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶46]   Each of the jury's findings was 
supported by sufficient evidence. The jury reasonably concluded that Union 
Pacific did not know or have reason to know that the place where the condition 
existed was a place where children were likely to trespass. The evidence 
revealed that in only a few instances had children been sighted trespassing in 
Union Pacific's rail yard and that most of those trespassings were in areas of 
the rail yard other than where Alex had been injured. The evidence produced at 
trial also established that the area where Alex was hurt was not easily 
accessible.

[¶47]   The jury properly found that Union 
Pacific did not realize and should not have realized that the operation of 
trains through the rail yard was an activity which could pose an unreasonable 
risk of death or serious bodily injury to trespassing children. The evidence 
showed that no child had been injured or killed in the rail yard within at least 
the last sixteen years.

[¶48]   The jury found in Appellants' favor 
on the third interrogatory by concluding that Alex had failed to realize the 
risk associated with playing on a train. Appellants cannot logically challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence for that finding.

[¶49]   Sufficient evidence supported the 
jury's negative answer to the fourth interrogatory: "Is the utility to Union 
Pacific of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger 
slight as compared with the risk to children involved?" As we stated above, the 
evidence indicated that the risk to children was not great, and Appellants fail 
to direct us to any evidence which demonstrated that the utility to Union 
Pacific of maintaining the rail yard was slight as compared to the risk to 
children.

[¶50]   Since the jury determined that 
Appellants had failed to establish that Union Pacific owed a duty of reasonable 
care to Alex under § 339, the remainder of its findings were immaterial. Thunder 
Hawk by and through Jensen, 844 P.2d  at 1049.

Violations 
of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure

[¶51]   It is apparent from the length of 
this opinion that Appellants' arguments illustrate a "shotgun" approach to 
appellate advocacy. Almost every paragraph in the argument section of 
Appellants' brief contains a new and individual allegation of error. Many of 
Appellants' arguments are not presented in an organized or coherent fashion, and 
their briefs fail in many respects to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See W.R.A.P. 7.01; McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 
n. 2 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶52]   Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03, this 
Court can refuse to consider parties' issues on appeal when they violate the 
rules of appellate procedure. We have done our best to decipher Appellants' 
arguments; therefore, they cannot complain if some of their poorly presented 
contentions have not been addressed as fully in this decision as they would 
like.

[¶53]   A few examples of Appellants 
misguided arguments are in order: (1) Appellants contend that the extent to 
which Union Pacific can claim an attorney-client privilege between itself and 
Union Pacific employees is a tangential issue, but they do not offer any cogent 
argument as to how this issue affected the trial or their case; (2) Appellants 
paraphrase Cathy Donaldson's trial testimony with regard to Alex's intellectual 
capabilities, but they fail to put her testimony into context or to explain how 
it relates to any purported district court error; (3) Appellants complain about 
their inability to establish a foundation for Dr. Louis R. Brown to testify 
about Alex's learning disability, but they do not explain how the district court 
erred; and (4) Appellants complain that they were denied the opportunity to 
display exhibits to the jury, but they fail to present cogent argument as to why 
they should have been allowed to present those exhibits. This Court is not 
obliged to discuss any contentions which have not been supported by cogent 
argument. Miller Land & Mineral Company v. State Highway Commission of 
Wyoming, 757 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 1988).

Conclusion

[¶54]   We have reviewed the entire record 
in this case and can reach only one conclusion: Appellants simply feel unhappy 
about the jury verdict. "`Unsuccessful litigants often harbor these feelings.'" 
Little, 877 P.2d  at 756 (quoting Stevens v. Murphy, 680 P.2d 78, 80 (Wyo. 
1984)). Appellants, however, received a fair trial, and the district court did 
not commit any errors which warrant reversal in this case.

[¶55]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1 On appeal, Appellants present arguments 
for only two instructions. From our review of the parties' arguments on jury 
instructions, it appears that Appellants offered three instructions in the 
district court: (1) an instruction which used WYO. STAT. § 37-9-1101 (Supp. 
1994) as its basis; (2) a willful-and-wanton-misconduct instruction; and (3) an 
instruction which covered stipulated facts. The district court refused to give 
Appellants' § 37-9-1101 and willful-and-wanton-misconduct instructions, but it 
incorporated the language which Appellants suggested in their proposed 
stipulated-facts instruction into another instruction which the district court 
gave to the jury. Appellants, therefore, have no basis for asserting that the 
district court erred with regard to the stipulated-facts 
instruction.