Case Title: State ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt

Citation: 2017-Ohio-7172

Docket Number: 2017-0753

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7172.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7172 
THE STATE EX REL. LANGHENRY, LAW DIR., ET AL. v. BRITT, CLERK. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-7172.] 
Mandamus—Elections—Under the Cleveland City Charter, an emergency measure 
providing for the usual daily operation of a municipal department is subject 
to referendum—Clerk of the Cleveland City Council had a clear legal duty 
to verify the sufficiency of petition signatures—Relators have a clear legal 
right to compel performance of that ministerial duty—The right to seek 
repeal of a law by initiative is not an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law—Clerk and law director have adverse legal interests in 
this case—Writ granted. 
(No. 2017-0753—Submitted July 26, 2017—Decided August 10, 2017.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, J. 
I. 
Introduction 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Patricia Britt, clerk of the Cleveland City Council (“the 
clerk”), rejected a referendum petition on the grounds that it would 
unconstitutionally abridge an existing contract.  Relator, Barbara A. Langhenry, 
law director of the city of Cleveland, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk 
to determine the sufficiency of the referendum petition.  We grant the writ. 
II. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On September 15, 1992, the city of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County 
entered into a “Cooperative Agreement” relating to the “Gateway Arena Project” 
to construct, among other things, a new professional basketball arena.  As part of 
the agreement, the county agreed to issue “Series 1992 Arena Bonds” to finance 
the cost of constructing the arena.  The county also agreed to make the construction 
funds available to the Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater 
Cleveland (“Gateway”) through a revolving loan agreement. 
{¶ 3} To assist with the financing, the city passed Cleveland Ordinance No. 
324-92, exempting arena admissions proceeds from municipal taxation, so long as 
the Series 1992 Arena Bonds remained outstanding.  The ordinance required 
Gateway to place in trust the amount it otherwise would have paid to the city in 
taxes, with those funds being used to service the bonds and with the excess payable 
to the city’s general revenue fund. 
{¶ 4} Twenty-five years later, on April 24, 2017, the Cleveland City 
Council adopted Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17.  The ordinance contained two 
relevant provisions.  First, it added an admission-proceeds-tax exemption relating 
to new “Series 2017 Arena Bonds” issued by Cuyahoga County to finance 
renovations to the arena.  The exemption, issued under similar terms and conditions 
as the original 1992 tax exemption, would remain in effect so long as the Series 
2017 Arena Bonds remained outstanding.  Second, the ordinance authorized the 
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city’s directors of finance and law to enter into an amendment to the Cooperative 
Agreement. 
{¶ 5} The city council approved the ordinance as an emergency measure, to 
take effect immediately, by a vote of more than two-thirds of the members.  
Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 therefore became effective on April 25, 2017. 
{¶ 6} Also on April 25, 2017, the city, through its directors of finance and 
law, and Cuyahoga County executed “Supplemental Agreement No. 1” to the 
Cooperative Agreement.  Supplemental Agreement No. 1 was based on the 
county’s issuance of Series 2017 Arena Bonds to finance improvements to the 
arena. This agreement recognized the city’s commitment to keep admissions 
proceeds exempt from taxation during the life of the Series 2017 Arena Bonds so 
long as the amount Gateway otherwise would have paid to the city in taxes is held 
in trust to service the bonds. 
{¶ 7} On May 22, 2017, the clerk received a petition for a referendum on 
Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17.  Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk did not 
determine the sufficiency of the signatures on the part-petitions.  Instead, acting 
through her deputy clerk, she rejected the petition on the ground that repealing 
Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 “would unconstitutionally impair an already 
existing and binding contract.” 
{¶ 8} On May 26, 2017, Diane S. Bufford, Jennifer A. Blakeney, Verdia Y. 
Conner, Khalilah A. Worley, and Linda C. Robinson sent a letter to the law director, 
demanding that she exercise her authority to seek a writ of mandamus compelling 
the clerk to accept the petition.  In response, Langhenry commenced the present 
complaint for a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 9} On July 12, 2017, we denied motions to dismiss and issued an 
alternative writ of mandamus.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-5799, ___ N.E.3d 
___.  In the same order, we granted Bufford, Blakeney, Conner, Worley, and 
Robinson leave to intervene as relators.  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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III. 
Legal Analysis 
A. The Law Director is Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a 
clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 
131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  Although this case 
primarily concerns the first two prongs—clear legal right and clear legal duty—the 
clerk also disputes the third element. 
{¶ 11} A writ of mandamus is not available if the relator has an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman, 133 
Ohio St.3d 297, 2012-Ohio-4425, 978 N.E.2d 153, ¶ 15.  The clerk contends that 
there is an adequate remedy available: opponents of the ordinance could attempt to 
repeal it by initiative.  But “[t]he principle that mandamus will not lie where there 
is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law signifies such latter remedy 
in the courts.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Conn v. Noble, 165 Ohio St. 564, 566, 
138 N.E.2d 302 (1956) (rejecting claim that the right of initiative was an adequate 
remedy at law).  The relators in this case have no adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  We therefore must consider whether they have shown the 
existence of a legal right and a legal duty. 
1. The right of referendum under the Cleveland City Charter 
{¶ 12} The constitutional right of referendum “ ‘ “amount[s] to a veto 
power, over enactments of representative bodies.” ’ ”  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org 
v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 18, quoting 
Eastlake v. Forest City Ents., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 
132 (1976), quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 
L.Ed.2d 678 (1971).  The Ohio Constitution reserves to the people the right to 
referenda of laws passed by the General Assembly and provides that no law shall 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
go into effect for a period of 90 days following enactment, so as to allow time for 
a referendum.  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1c.  However, there are certain 
categories of state laws to which the right of referendum does not extend, one of 
which is emergency laws that go into effect immediately.  Ohio Constitution, 
Article II, Section 1d. 
{¶ 13} The Cleveland City Charter provision governing municipal 
referenda is significantly different.  Under the charter, an emergency measure may 
address either of two contingencies: (1) it may be “for the immediate preservation 
of the public peace, property, health, or safety,” or (2) it may “provid[e] for the 
usual daily operation of a Municipal department.”  Cleveland City Charter Section 
36.  One category of emergency legislation is subject to the right of referendum, 
and the other is not: 
 
Ordinances passed as emergency measures for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, property, health, or safety and 
providing for the refinancing of bonds, notes or other securities of the 
City shall not be subject to referendum.  Otherwise, emergency 
measures shall be subject to referendum in like manner as other 
ordinances, except that they shall go into effect at the time indicated 
in the ordinances. 
 
Cleveland City Charter Section 64. 
{¶ 14} The first clause of Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 states, “[T]his 
ordinance constitutes an emergency measure providing for the usual daily operation 
of a municipal department.”  By its plain language, Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-
17 is subject to referendum. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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2. The authority of the clerk 
{¶ 15} The central question in this case is whether the clerk had the 
authority to reject the referendum petition.  As a general rule, when reviewing the 
sufficiency of a petition, municipal legislative officials have limited discretion to 
assess matters of form and no authority to review matters of substance such as the 
legality of the proposed measure.  See State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition v. Webb, 
106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 30-31 (village clerk 
exceeded her authority by deciding that the initiative petition involved a subject 
that the village was not authorized to control by legislative action). 
{¶ 16} The Cleveland charter confers no greater discretion upon the clerk.  
“When [a referendum] petition is filed with the Clerk of the Council he shall 
determine the sufficiency thereof in the manner provided in this Charter for an 
initiative petition for an ordinance.”  Cleveland City Charter Section 60.  In 
accordance with Section 51 of the Cleveland City Charter, the clerk shall determine 
whether the petition has been signed by the required number of qualified electors.  
Cleveland City Charter Section 51. 
{¶ 17} The clerk suggests a number of reasons why it was within her 
discretion to reject the petitions.  She argues that the petitions were untimely 
because the emergency ordinance had already gone into effect before they were 
filed, but she cites no authority for her proposition that a referendum petition must 
in all cases be filed before the ordinance goes into effect.  Indeed, Section 64 of the 
Cleveland City Charter clearly contemplates that some emergency measures will 
be subject to referendum notwithstanding the fact that they take effect immediately.  
The final sentence of Section 64 even addresses what happens when an ordinance 
is rejected in a referendum after taking effect: 
 
If, when submitted to a vote of the electors of the City, an emergency 
measure be not approved by a majority of those voting thereon, it 
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shall be considered repealed as regards any further action 
thereunder; but the measure so repealed shall be deemed sufficient 
authority for payment in accordance with the ordinance, of any 
expense incurred previous to the referendum vote thereon. 
 
Rejecting the petition on the grounds that it was untimely would therefore have 
been an error and an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 18} Alternatively, the clerk contends that she was within her rights to 
reject the referendum petition because Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 was an 
administrative measure and therefore not subject to referendum.  The constitutional 
power of referendum applies to matters that municipalities are authorized to control 
“by legislative action.”  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section1f.  When a city 
council acts in an administrative fashion, its resolutions and ordinances are not 
subject to referendum.  State ex rel. Ebersole v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
140 Ohio St.3d 487, 2014-Ohio-4077, 20 N.E.3d 678, ¶ 27.  We need not reach the 
question whether the clerk has discretion to determine whether a measure is 
administrative because Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 is a legislative measure. 
{¶ 19} “The test for determining whether an action is legislative or 
administrative is ‘whether the action taken is one enacting a law, ordinance, or 
regulation, or executing a law, ordinance, or regulation already in existence.’ ”  Id. 
at ¶ 30, quoting Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 
(1968), paragraph two of the syllabus.  Stated differently, an ordinance that merely 
carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative body is an 
administrative action.  State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 N.E.2d 
902, ¶ 44.  So, for example, approval of a development plan that comports with 
existing zoning regulations is administrative.  State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for 
Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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529, ¶ 27-28.  But an amendment to the zoning code itself is a legislative act.  See 
State ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio St.3d 165, 168-169, 
685 N.E.2d 224 (1997). 
{¶ 20} In 1992, Cleveland City Council approved a tax abatement to help 
finance the construction of a downtown basketball arena.  That abatement 
contained a sunset provision: it expired upon repayment of the Series 1992 Arena 
Bonds.  The city did not, in 1992, obligate itself to pay for future renovations to the 
arena.  Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 therefore represents the adoption of a new 
policy and a new undertaking: the refurbishment of the arena, financed by Series 
2017 Arena Bonds.  City officials in 2017 had no legislative authority to enter into 
a new agreement with the county absent an enabling ordinance.  We therefore 
conclude that Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 is a legislative measure and not an 
administrative one. 
{¶ 21} Finally, the clerk contends that she was correct to reject the 
referendum petition because it is unconstitutional.  Whether the referendum is 
unconstitutional is a different question from whether the clerk has the legal 
authority to make that determination.  To bridge the gap, the clerk posits a 
distinction between the referendum petition itself and the substance of the petition, 
claiming that she 
 
has not made a determination as to the legality or constitutionality 
of the substantive terms of the referendum petition or the Ordinance.  
Instead, [she] has applied a separate legal principle * * * to 
determine that the referendum petition itself, not the substance of 
the measure being initiated or the Ordinance that is sought to be 
repealed, violates the Contract Clause. 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
This proposed distinction finds no support in the Cleveland City Charter or the 
jurisprudence of this court.  In fact, it conflicts with the rule that “the city council 
[cannot] assess the constitutionality of a proposal, because that role is reserved for 
the courts.”  State ex rel. Ebersole v. Powell, 141 Ohio St.3d 17, 2014-Ohio-4283, 
21 N.E.3d 274, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 22} Ebersole v. Powell suggests that we should grant the writ of 
mandamus without reaching the constitutional question.  See id. at ¶ 13-14.  One of 
the amici, the Cavaliers Operating Company, L.L.C., argues that we should deny 
the writ without reaching the constitutional question. 
{¶ 23} The Cavaliers urge the court to find that the referendum is a nullity 
because it seeks to repeal legal authorization of acts that have already been fully 
performed.  Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 authorized city officials to enter into 
the Supplemental Agreement, and they have done so.  According to the Cavaliers, 
therefore, there is nothing left for a referendum to invalidate.  This argument rests 
on a false premise.  Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17 contained a second relevant 
provision, namely, the admission-proceeds-tax exemption in connection with the 
Series 2017 Arena Bonds.  That provision has not been fully performed.  Therefore, 
the Cavaliers mootness argument is not well taken. 
{¶ 24} The clerk had a clear legal duty to perform the ministerial function 
of her office—verifying the sufficiency of the petition signatures—and relators 
have a clear legal right to compel the performance of that duty.  Relators are without 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  We therefore grant the writ 
of mandamus. 
3. The constitutional claim 
{¶ 25} In light of the foregoing analysis, it is unnecessary to address the 
underlying constitutional question at this juncture.  See Ebersole v. Powell, 141 
Ohio St.3d 17, 2014-Ohio-4283, 21 N.E.3d 274, at ¶ 13 (“The proper time for an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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aggrieved party to challenge the constitutionality of the charter amendment is after 
the voters approve the measure, assuming they do so”). 
B. The Cleveland Director of Law Has Standing 
{¶ 26} None of the seven justices has expressed any disagreement with the 
premise set forth above: the clerk violated the Cleveland City Charter when she 
refused to carry out her ministerial duty.  The dissenting justices would dismiss the 
case.  They would hold that the law director and the clerk are not adverse parties.  
That, however, is not so. 
{¶ 27} The charter commands that when a city officer “fails to perform any 
duty required by law,” the law director “shall” make an application for a writ of 
mandamus.  Cleveland City Charter Section 89.  The clerk failed to perform a duty 
required by law when she refused to review the petition, so the law director was 
legally required to file this lawsuit.  The law director would have been in violation 
of the charter if she had not done so. 
{¶ 28} The dissent seems to think that there is no adversity of interest 
between the parties because the director of law worked with the city council and 
the mayor on the deal to renovate the arena.  But the issue before us is not whether 
the arena deal should go forward.  The issue here is simpler: whether the clerk must 
determine the sufficiency of the petition and, if the petition is sufficient, allow the 
people to vote on the referendum.  One may reasonably be in favor of both the arena 
renovation and providing citizens the opportunity to vote on the renovation. 
{¶ 29} Moreover, there is a genuine dispute in this case because the charter 
mandates that the law director file a mandamus action if the clerk fails to perform 
any of her duties.  And here, the clerk has failed to perform a duty.  The law director 
argues that the clerk must review the sufficiency of the petitions.  The clerk argues 
that she does not have to complete this task because the proposed referendum is 
unconstitutional.  Therefore, the law director and the clerk have adverse legal 
interests in this case. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 30} In addition, the adversity requirement is met because in filing this 
mandamus action, the law director was defending a “public right,” and it has long 
been understood that “the people are regarded as the real party” in such a lawsuit.  
State ex rel. Nimon v. Springdale, 6 Ohio St.2d 1, 5, 215 N.E.2d 592 (1966). 
{¶ 31} In reaching the opposite conclusion, the dissent relies on three cases 
that are highly distinguishable because none of them involves a director of law or 
her responsibility to ensure that an officer of a municipal corporation performs her 
public duty according to charter and statute.  In State ex rel. Wood v. McClelland, 
a lawyer representing a mortgagor in a foreclosure action filed a writ of prohibition 
in his own name attempting to prevent the judge and magistrate in the underlying 
action from exercising jurisdiction over a count in the complaint. 140 Ohio St.3d 
331, 2014-Ohio-3969, 18 N.E.3d 423, ¶ 1-2, 10.  In State ex rel. Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Lorain Cty. Court of Common Pleas, we granted a writ of prohibition 
preventing a common pleas judge from ordering the county commissioners to pay 
the sheriff to provide security for court operations, because no lawsuit had been 
filed between the commissioners and the sheriff.  143 Ohio St.3d 522, 2015-Ohio-
3704, 39 N.E.3d 1245, ¶ 2, 21, 26-27.  Lastly, in Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., this court 
correctly held that when an insured has not actually presented a claim for expenses 
to an insurer for payment, “there is no actual controversy.”  128 Ohio St.3d 322, 
2010-Ohio-6036, 944 N.E.2d 207, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 32} One wonders what would happen if the dissent’s view carried the 
day.  In this case, the intervenors sought to dismiss the law director’s lawsuit and 
to pursue their own taxpayer lawsuit.  In moving to dismiss, the intervenors raised 
arguments similar to those advanced by the dissent today.  The court voted six to 
one to overrule the intervenors’ motion to dismiss and allowed them to intervene in 
this lawsuit.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-5799, ___ N.E.3d ___.  As a 
consequence, the intervenors filed an application to dismiss their separate taxpayer 
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lawsuit, which this court granted.  Cleveland ex rel. Blakeney v. Britt, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-5832, ___ N.E.3d ___. 
{¶ 33} Imagine if the court now reversed course and, as urged by the 
dissent, dismissed the law director’s lawsuit.  Almost certainly, the intervenors 
would refile the lawsuit they had dismissed.  The Cleveland City Charter allows for 
a taxpayer lawsuit if after demand upon the law director, the law director fails to 
file a lawsuit.  Cleveland City Charter Section 90.  If the dissent’s view were 
adopted, we would have to figure out how to apply this provision.  There are only 
two possible options. 
{¶ 34} One possibility is that we could say the taxpayers couldn’t pursue 
their lawsuit because the law director had not failed to file a lawsuit—indeed, the 
law director filed one and we dismissed it.  This would be a literal reading of the 
charter.  The result, though, would be that no one could challenge the clerk’s refusal 
to follow the law—not the law director because, in the dissent’s view, there wasn’t 
the requisite adversity and not the taxpayers because the law director had not failed 
to file a lawsuit.  It’s the ultimate Catch-22: heads, the city wins; tails, the taxpayers 
lose. 
{¶ 35} The other possibility is that we could decide to ignore the “fail to 
file” requirement because we had dismissed the law director’s lawsuit.  This 
scenario would at least preserve the rights guaranteed to taxpayers under the 
charter.  But it would not get the opponents of the referendum what they want.  
Faced with such a lawsuit, we would have little choice but to grant the writ of 
mandamus: municipal clerks plainly don’t have the authority under Ohio law to 
decide if a referendum petition is constitutional.  So under this scenario—if the 
dissent’s view were to carry the day—the result would be the same as the one 
reached by the majority today.  All we would be doing is delaying the inevitable. 
 
 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 36} For the reasons stated above, we hold that relators are entitled to the 
requested writ of mandamus. 
Writ granted. 
O’NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’Connor, C.J., and 
French, J. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 37} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 38} Before this court will issue a writ of mandamus, the circumstances 
must demonstrate that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that 
the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that the 
relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh, 142 
Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 18.  “The writ of mandamus is 
not granted by right. It is a high prerogative writ, and its issuance rests in the sound 
discretion of the court.”  Patton v. Springfield Bd. of Edn., 40 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 
531 N.E.2d 310 (1988). 
{¶ 39} Nonetheless, this court only decides cases that present actual 
controversies.  State ex rel. Ebersole v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 140 Ohio 
St.3d 487, 2014-Ohio-4077, 20 N.E.3d 678, ¶ 44; Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 
13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970). 
{¶ 40} And as we explained in State ex rel. Barclays Bank, P.L.C. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 660 N.E.2d 458 (1996),  
 
Actual controversies are presented only when the plaintiff sues an 
adverse party. This means not merely a party in sharp and 
acrimonious disagreement with the plaintiff, but a party from whose 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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adverse conduct or adverse property interest the plaintiff properly 
claims the protection of the law. Thus, we hold that the presence of 
a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is 
insufficient to create an actual controversy if the parties to the action 
do not have adverse legal interests. 
 
Id. at 542. 
{¶ 41} Here, the law director and the clerk are not adverse parties with 
adverse legal interests.  Pursuant to Section 78 of the Cleveland City Charter, the 
law director serves at the pleasure of the mayor, and pursuant to Section 31, the 
council clerk serves at the pleasure of the city council.  Thus, the law director and 
the council clerk each answer to people whose interests are aligned in favor of the 
arena renovation and in opposition to the referendum.  The law director worked 
with the mayor and the city council—as required by Cleveland City Charter Section 
83—in enacting the tax exemption to secure financing for the arena renovation.  
Supplemental Agreement No. 1 to the Cooperative Agreement contains the 
endorsement by the law director as required by Section 83, and the law director, 
along with the finance director of the city of Cleveland, are signatories on behalf of 
the city. 
{¶ 42} When the petition seeking a referendum was presented to the clerk 
of the city council and the clerk refused to certify it, Cleveland City Charter Section 
89 required the law director to file an action in mandamus.  That section provides: 
“In case any officer or commission fails to perform any duty required by law, the 
Director of Law shall apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the performance of such duty.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 43} Nonetheless, the charter contemplates that the law director may be 
unwilling or unable to bring such an action, and it states in Section 90:  
 
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15 
In case the Director of Law, upon written request of any taxpayer of 
the City, fails to make any application provided for in the preceding 
three sections, such taxpayer may institute suit or proceedings for 
such purpose in his own name on behalf of the City.  No such suit 
or proceeding shall be entertained by any court until such request to 
the Director of Law shall first have been made, nor until the taxpayer 
shall have given security for the costs of the proceedings. 
 
Thus, when the law director cannot or does not comply with Section 89, Section 90 
authorizes a taxpayer to institute a mandamus action if the taxpayer has asked the 
law director to institute an action and the law director fails to do so. 
{¶ 44} But here, the law director seems to have recognized that filing this 
mandamus action may have raised a conflict of interest, and she appointed outside 
counsel to represent both parties and then brought this action in her own name.  
However, the appointment of outside counsel does not change the fact that the 
named parties to this mandamus action lack adverse legal interests—outside 
counsel is not the party in this case but only an advocate with no standing to bring 
this action in its own right.  See State ex rel. Wood v. McClelland, 140 Ohio St.3d 
331, 2014-Ohio-3969, 18 N.E.3d 423, ¶ 10 (“lawyers do not have standing to bring 
claims in their own names based on violations of their clients’ rights”).  And 
without adverse parties to this litigation, there is no justiciable issue that this court 
can decide. 
{¶ 45} The majority confuses standing with the need for an adverse legal 
interest.  After all, State ex rel. Nimon v. Springdale, 6 Ohio St.2d 1, 5, 215 N.E.2d 
592 (1966), on which it relies, is a taxpayer standing case.  And although standing 
and an adverse legal interest are both necessary components of a justiciable case, 
they are different concepts—standing requires either a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy, Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 
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Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 21, or the authority to sue 
created by legislation, Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 
975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 48. 
{¶ 46} Section 89 of the Cleveland City Charter gives the law director 
standing to seek a writ of mandamus to compel an officer or commission to perform 
a duty required by law without having any personal stake in the controversy.  But 
the existence of standing, by itself, does not demonstrate that the law director and 
the city council clerk in fact have adverse legal interests in this mandamus action. 
{¶ 47} In my view, the court ought not to wade into this morass, where the 
city is essentially suing itself to repeal legislation approved by the legislative 
branch—because it was enacted by the city council—and authorized by the 
executive branch—because it was signed into law by the mayor—all in an effort to 
invalidate a contract that the relator herself signed.  This matter is analogous to 
State ex rel. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Lorain Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
143 Ohio St.3d 522, 2015-Ohio-3704, 39 N.E.3d 1245, in which the common pleas 
court ordered the county commissioners to appropriate funds to pay for security at 
the courthouse and another facility.  In that case, we explained that the common 
pleas court had no authority to adjudicate the dispute between the county 
commissioners and the county sheriff; because the sheriff had not sued the 
commissioners, there were no adverse parties before the court and no justiciable 
controversy presented for decision.  Id. at ¶ 2, 21. 
{¶ 48} Similarly here, the law director and the clerk are not adverse parties, 
there is no justiciable controversy for this court to decide, and this action should be 
dismissed.  See Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 322, 2010-Ohio-6036, 944 
N.E.2d 207, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 49} I recognize that the taxpayers who circulated the referendum 
petitions have been permitted to intervene in this action.  However, that does not 
save this case from dismissal.  We determine justiciability as of the commencement 
January Term, 2017 
 
17 
of suit, and post-filing events, such as the substitution of the real party in interest 
for a party with no standing to sue, cannot cure a lack of justiciability at the outset.  
See Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, at ¶ 24-
26, 38.  These intervenors were not the parties that filed this action, and therefore 
they cannot make this nonjusticiable controversy retroactively justiciable. 
{¶ 50} The majority’s reliance on its forecast of a parade of horribles is 
nothing more than an “in terrorem” argument that the taxpayers may or may not be 
able to institute suit in their own names if the court were to dismiss this case, and 
its speculation that eventually the case might end up in the same place as proposed 
by the majority is contrary to our role as a court.  After all, it is well-settled law that 
this court does not issue advisory opinions.  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. 
Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51; State ex rel. 
White v. Kilbane Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848, 775 N.E.2d 508,  
¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 90 Ohio St.3d 
238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893 (2000), and Egan v. Natl. Distillers & Chem. Corp., 25 
Ohio St.3d 176, 495 N.E.2d 904 (1986), syllabus.  The predictive exercise is also 
highly unseemly because it reads like an advocate’s brief rather than an opinion of 
this court. 
{¶ 51} A thorough review of the facts of this case leads to the conclusion 
that there is no justiciable issue for this court to decide because the law director and 
the city council clerk lack adverse legal interests, and therefore I would dismiss the 
complaint. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
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Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Stephen W. Funk, and Leighann K. Fink, for 
relator. 
The Chandra Law Firm, L.L.C., Subodh Chandra, and Peter Pattakos, for 
intervening relators. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
Walter Haverfield, L.L.P., R. Todd Hunt, Aimee W. Lane, and Benjamin 
G. Chojnacki, for respondent. 
Mayle, Ray & Mayle, L.L.C., and Andrew R. Mayle, urging granting of the 
writ for amicus curiae Property Investor’s Network, Inc. 
Goldstein Gragel, L.L.C., Susan L. Gragel, and Richard L. Stoper Jr., urging 
denial of the writ for amicus curiae Building Laborers’ Union Local 310. 
Michael W. Deemer, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Downtown 
Cleveland Alliance and Greater Cleveland Sports Commission. 
Jason Hillman, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Cavaliers 
Operating Company, L.L.C. 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., and James F. Lang, urging denial of the 
writ for amicus curiae Rick Chiricosta, Christopher M. Connor, Dr. Delos 
Cosgrove, Alexander Cutler, Carole Hoover, Chuck Jones, Jerry Kelsheimer, Bill 
Lacey, Ed Largent, A. Malachi Mixon III, Beth Mooney, Bernie Moreno, Merrick 
Murphy, Joe Roman, Matthew A. Ouimet, Albert Ratner, and Dr. Jerry Sue 
Thornton. 
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