Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo

Citation: 2010-Ohio-605

Docket Number: 20082360

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-605.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-605 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. RUSSO, JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-605.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Three violations of the Canons of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct — Mitigation found — One-year license suspension, 
conditionally stayed. 
(No. 2008-2360 ⎯ Submitted December 2, 2009 ⎯ Decided February 25, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-049. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We must decide in this case the appropriate sanction for 
respondent, a judge who has been convicted twice on charges of disorderly 
conduct because of physical altercations with a girlfriend.  Respondent admits that 
his behavior violated ethical standards incumbent on the Ohio judiciary. The 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has recommended a six-
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month suspension of his license to practice, with the suspension stayed in full on 
conditions, including two years of probation and the obligation to manage his 
alcohol dependency.  We accept the admissions of judicial misconduct; however, 
to further ensure that respondent refrains from such conduct in the future, we 
order a one-year suspension of his license to practice, to be stayed on the 
recommended conditions. 
{¶ 2} Respondent, Joseph Russo of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0037923, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1987 
and has served as a judge in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court since 1998.  In 
2008, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with violations of the 
Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct that were then in effect:1  Canon 1, 
requiring a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary; Canon 
2, requiring a judge to respect and comply with the law and act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary, and Canon 4, requiring a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance 
of impropriety in all the judge’s activities. 
{¶ 3} The board initially considered the case on a consent-to-discipline 
agreement, filed pursuant to the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”) 11.  The parties stipulated in that agreement to 
the charged misconduct, referenced the alcohol abuse that contributed to cause the 
misconduct, and proposed a six-month suspension of respondent's license, all 
stayed.  The board accepted the agreement and recommended the agreed-upon 
sanction. 
{¶ 4} Upon review of the board's certified report, we rejected the 
recommendation and returned the cause to the board “for further proceedings, 
                                                 
1.  These Canons were superseded by a new Code of Judicial Conduct on March 1, 2009. 
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including consideration of a more severe sanction.”  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Russo, 120 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2009-Ohio-381, 900 N.E.2d 617.  A panel of the 
board then heard the case and, based on the parties’ stipulations and evidence, 
again found violations of former Canons 1, 2, and 4.  The panel also again 
recommended a stayed six-month suspension from practice, this time enumerating 
specific conditions for the stay⎯that respondent be placed on probation for two 
years, maintain his sobriety, comply with his Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”) recovery contract, and commit no further misconduct.  The board 
adopted the panel's findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶ 5} The parties have not objected to the board’s report 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} Judicial misconduct must be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 
193, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “Clear and convincing evidence” has been 
defined as “ ‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere 
“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is 
required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce 
in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to 
be established.’ ”  Id. at 331, 708 N.E.2d 193, quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 
161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
The proof of respondent’s improprieties meets this standard. 
{¶ 7} In the early morning hours of September 6, 2006, respondent and 
his girlfriend became embroiled in an argument while driving home after dinner 
and drinks at a restaurant.  When the argument escalated into a physical 
altercation, they stopped at a gas station, where the fight continued.  Both were 
arrested and charged with “disorderly conduct⎯intoxicated,” a minor 
misdemeanor.  Later that month, respondent signed a waiver admitting his guilt 
and paid a $100 fine. 
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{¶ 8} In the early morning hours of July 4, 2007, another physical 
altercation ensued after an argument between respondent and the girlfriend, this 
time at the couple’s condominium.  A neighbor called police, but by the time 
police arrived, respondent had left the condominium to check into a nearby hotel. 
{¶ 9} Police interviewed the girlfriend, who asked for a domestic-
violence temporary protection order.  Police also interviewed respondent, who 
initially denied the fight.  When police told him of the domestic-violence charge, 
however, he claimed that his girlfriend had attacked him.  The next day, the 
Rocky River Municipal Court granted a domestic-violence temporary protection 
order against respondent. 
{¶ 10} In early March 2008, the domestic-violence charge was amended 
to “disorderly conduct⎯persistent,” a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.  
Respondent pleaded no contest and was convicted.  Later that month, respondent 
received a 30-day suspended jail sentence and was ordered to continue counseling 
for alcohol abuse and anger management.  He was also placed on probation for 
one year and was fined $250. 
{¶ 11} By engaging in the foregoing criminal activity, respondent failed to 
uphold the integrity of the judiciary, failed to comply with laws and promote 
public confidence in the judiciary, and failed to avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.  We therefore accept his admissions to having violated 
former Canons 1, 2, and 4. 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} We decide disciplinary matters on a case-by-case basis.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 693 N.E.2d 
1078.  In determining the appropriate sanction to impose for respondent's 
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, we consider all relevant factors, 
including the duties he violated, the injury caused by his misconduct, and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  We then weigh the aggravating and 
January Term, 2010 
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mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B) to see whether extenuating 
circumstances warrant a more lenient or severe sanction.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Kaup, 102 Ohio St.3d 29, 2004-Ohio-1525, 806 N.E.2d 513, ¶ 11; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 474, 477, 756 N.E.2d 104. 
{¶ 13} Judges are subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct.  
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko (1958), 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 5 O.O.2d 282, 
151 N.E.2d 17.  In violating the duties set forth in former Canons 1, 2, and 4, 
respondent diminished public confidence in the judiciary.  As we observed in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 
N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33: 
{¶ 14} “An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to 
justice in our society.  Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The primary 
purpose of judicial discipline is to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded 
administration of justice, and maintain and enhance public confidence in the 
integrity of this institution.  Kloepfer v. Comm. on Judicial Performance (1989), 
49 Cal.3d 826, 864-865, 264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239.  Judicial misconduct 
undermines these goals and, in so doing, demeans the judicial system itself.  See 
In re Probert (1981), 411 Mich. 210, 225, 308 N.W.2d 773.” 
{¶ 15} The board’s recommended six-month suspension from practice, all 
conditionally stayed, is within the range of sanctions that we have ordered for 
judges who have committed misdemeanor offenses precipitated by substance 
abuse.  As the board observed, at one end of the spectrum is a case in which we 
suspended a municipal court judge from practice for two years.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ault, 110 Ohio St.3d 207, 2006-Ohio-4247, 852 N.E.2d 727, ¶ 19.  
That judge had persuaded doctors into overprescribing painkilling medication for 
several years and had been convicted twice of attempting to obtain a dangerous 
drug by deception, a misdemeanor.  Because of his commitment to sobriety and 
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the fact that his abuses had not impaired his performance on the bench, we stayed 
his two-year suspension on the condition that he continue to receive treatment for 
his drug addiction.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 16} As a midrange sanction, the board cited a case in which a common 
pleas judge received a six-month suspension because he had been convicted 
multiple times of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and 
had a prior disciplinary record.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Connor, 105 Ohio St.3d 
100, 2004-Ohio-6902, 822 N.E.2d 1235.  We also stayed that suspension and 
allowed the judge to remain on the bench because his two years of sobriety and 
his uncompromised performance as a judge showed that he posed no risk to the 
public, providing he complied with his treatment regimen.  Id. at ¶ 20-21.  As the 
least egregious example, the board referred to a case in which a supreme court 
justice was publicly reprimanded for a single conviction of driving a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  In Re Complaint Against Resnick, 
108 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-6800, 842 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 17} Here, respondent concedes that he suffers from alcohol 
dependency.  He has satisfied the test in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through 
(iv) for attributing mitigating effect to this condition.  He has provided reliable 
proof that (1) he is alcohol dependent, (2) the dependency contributed to cause the 
misconduct, (3) he has been sober since the incident in July 2007 due to having 
successfully completed an approved treatment program, and (4) he is able to 
return to the ethical professional practice of law, providing he remains in 
recovery. 
{¶ 18} The board, in adopting the panel’s report, found: 
{¶ 19} “Following the 2007 incident, Respondent voluntarily contacted 
Dr. Gintautas Sabataitis for an alcohol evaluation.  Respondent has continued 
counseling with Dr. Sabataitis as required by his sentence in the 2007 criminal 
case.” 
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{¶ 20} “Respondent has completed a two-year outpatient treatment 
program administered by Dr. Sabataitis.” 
{¶ 21} “At the recommendation of Dr. Sabataitis, Respondent is 
participating in the 12-step [Alcoholics Anonymous] recovery program.” 
{¶ 22} “Respondent asserts, and Dr. Sabataitis agrees, that his alcoholism 
did not interfere with his performance of his judicial duties except for 
occasionally making him tardy for his work.” 
{¶ 23} “Dr. Sabataitis recommends that Respondent must continue to 
refrain from the use of alcohol and to remain compliant with the AA protocols.” 
{¶ 24} “Paul A. Caimi, OLAP Associate Director, testified that 
Respondent has successfully completed a two-year OLAP contract. Respondent 
voluntarily renewed the contract on August 12, 2009, for an additional two year 
period. Respondent passed all random drug tests while he has been under contract 
with OLAP. Mr. Caimi has weekly contact with Respondent, and in Caimi’s 
opinion, Respondent has a good attitude and is satisfactorily working his 
program.” 
{¶ 25} The board found that respondent is of good character and 
reputation in the greater Cleveland legal community and that the following 
considerations also weighed in his favor: 
{¶ 26} “1. Respondent has no prior disciplinary record. 
{¶ 27} “2. Respondent made a timely good faith effort to rectify the 
consequences of his misconduct. 
{¶ 28} “3. Respondent made full and free disclosure to, and cooperated 
fully with the investigation by Disciplinary Counsel concerning his misconduct. 
{¶ 29} “4. Respondent admitted his guilt and paid the fine assessed in the 
2006 criminal case.” 
{¶ 30} The board found no aggravating factors. 
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{¶ 31} We accept the board’s findings with respect to aggravation and 
mitigation; however, a sanction more rigorous than the board’s recommendation 
is required for the harm caused by respondent’s improprieties.  We therefore order 
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year.  The 
suspension is stayed, however, on the conditions that respondent complete a two-
year probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9), fully comply with the terms 
of his current OLAP contract, completely refrain from the use of alcohol, and 
commit no further violations of either the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  If respondent fails to comply with the conditions of this 
stay, the stay will be lifted, and he will be suspended from practice for one year. 
{¶ 32} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Mary L. Cibella, for respondent. 
______________________