Case Title: Hildenbrand v. Brand

Citation: 183 Kan. 414, 327 P.2d 887

Docket Number: 41,039

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1958-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
183 Kan. 414 (1958)
327 P.2d 887
LOLA L. HILDENBRAND, Administratrix De Bonis Non of the Estate of William H. Schulz, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
JOHN W. BRAND, Executor of the Will and Estate of Emma D. Schulz, Deceased, Appellee.
No. 41,039

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 7, 1958.
Eugene Clyde Riling, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and John J. Riling, of Lawrence, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
John W. Brand, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and Richard B. Stevens, of Lawrence, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
William H. and Emma D. Schulz, husband and wife, lived in Lawrence. On July 16, 1955, William died intestate. Later, *415 on a date not shown, Emma died testate. Their respective estates are being administered in the probate court of Douglas County.
On a date not shown, the administratrix of William's estate filed an action in the district court of Douglas County against the executor of Emma's will.
In order properly to present the issue the petition must be shown in full. It reads:
Defendant executor filed a demurrer on the grounds that (1) the petition showed on its face that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of defendant or of the subject of the action, and (2) that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendant and in favor of plaintiff.
This demurrer was sustained as to the first ground thereof  that is, that the court lacked jurisdiction of the person of defendant executor and of the subject of the action.
Plaintiff administratrix has appealed from that ruling.
The position of the bank which, we are advised, also was joined as a defendant, is not made clear, but, in any event, it is not a party to this appeal.
The only question in this case is whether the action was properly filed in the district court, or whether it is a matter over which the probate court had exclusive original jurisdiction.
Briefly stated, the contentions of the parties are substantially as follow:
Plaintiff administratrix contends that inasmuch as the money in question has never been a part of Emma's estate, and is merely being held by the bank until its ownership can be determined, the action is not one to obtain something out of her estate, but rather, is an action to bring something into William's estate  therefore it was properly brought in the district court.
Defendant executor contends that notwithstanding the fact the action seeks to bring something into William's estate, it nevertheless seeks to take something out of Emma's estate, and, her estate being in the process of administration, the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction of the matter  therefore the action should have been filed in the form of a claim against her estate in that court.
The rule is well established that, generally speaking, when the purpose of an action or claim is to get something out of an estate of a decedent the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction of the matter, and the action or claim must be filed in that court. (In re Estate of Thompson, 164 Kan. 518, 190 P.2d 879; Gebers v. Marquart, 166 Kan. 604, 608, 203 P.2d 125; Rowe v. Childers, 169 Kan. 616, 219 P.2d 1066; In re Estate of Weaver, 175 Kan. 284, 287, 262 P.2d 818.)
*417 The rule is equally well established that, generally speaking, when the purpose of an action or claim is to bring something into an estate of a decedent  that is, when an estate has a claim which its personal representative is attempting to enforce  the action is to be filed in the district court or some other court of competent jurisdiction. (In re Estate of Thompson, supra; In re Estate of Weaver, supra; Coffey v. Shrope, 180 Kan. 621, 306 P.2d 164.)
The latter rule is of course subject to the following qualification and exception, and its application to the question before us is readily apparent: When one estate seeks to recover from another estate, that is, attempts to get something out of it  the action or claim must be filed in the probate court notwithstanding that the successful enforcement thereof results in bringing something into the claimant estate  the reason being that the action or claim seeks to get something out of defendant estate.
From the written memorandum filed when this demurrer was sustained it is clear the trial court had the foregoing rules and principles well in mind and based its ruling on the proposition that, essentially, the action seeks to take something out of Emma's estate  therefore the district court had no jurisdiction of the person of defendant executor or the subject of the action.
There being no uncertainty as to the rules of law applicable to matters of this nature, the proposition really narrows down to the question whether the trial court's analysis of the allegations of the petition was correct. That is to say  if the action seeks to recover something from Emma's estate the demurrer was properly sustained. Irrespective whether it be considered as an action to bring something into William's estate  if it does not seek to recover something from Emma's estate the district court had jurisdiction, in which event the demurrer was erroneously sustained.
Although, due to the peculiar and unusual facts and circumstances alleged, it may be conceded the question is a "close" one, we are of the opinion the trial court erroneously concluded that the action is one to recover from Emma's estate.
The allegations of the petition disclose that following William's death Emma removed $9,000 from his safety deposit box and took the same to their home where it was later found by plaintiff administratrix who then delivered it to defendant executor with the understanding and agreement that it should be placed in the bank until definitely determined whether it was the property of William; that *418 Emma also removed from the safety deposit box money in excess of $6,000 which plaintiff administratrix has been unable to find, and that it was further agreed between plaintiff administratrix and defendant executor that all money in the bank, together with that which had been found, should remain in the possession and control of the bank until it had been determined to which estate it actually belonged. Then follow allegations to the effect that all money that was in the safety deposit box was the property of William; that defendant executor has refused to authorize the bank to deliver it to plaintiff administratrix, and that defendant executor has refused to deliver the money in question to plaintiff administratrix.
In other words, we believe that a reasonable construction of the petition is that it seeks to enforce the agreement between the two personal representatives that the money should be held by the bank until ownership thereof is determined. The action is not for enforcement of any agreement or contract made by Emma. Plaintiff administratrix is not asserting any claim as an heir of Emma or under her will. In the final analysis, the action is really one to enforce the agreement between two personal representatives to maintain the status quo until ownership of the money is determined. It is true the answer to that question will have the practical effect of enhancing one of the estates and decreasing the other, but we think it may not be said that, within the meaning of the rule heretofore mentioned, the oallegations of this petition are to be construed as an action to get something out of the estate of Emma so as to lodge the exclusive original jurisdiction for the enforcement thereof in the probate court.
It follows, therefore, that the demurrer on the ground the district court had no jurisdiction of the person of defendant executor or of the subject of the action, was erroneously sustained. The basis of our ruling is not that the action is one to bring something into William's estate and therefore the district court has jurisdiction  but rather, that it is not one to get something out of Emma's estate.
The judgment is therefore reversed.