Case Title: STATE EX REL BRICENO v DIST COUR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13832

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 1 3 8 3 2 I N THE SUFREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 7 7 THE STATE OF ElONTANA ex rel. SOL BRICENO and J E S S I E BRICENO, R e l a t o r s , THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH J U D I C I A L DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, I n and for t h e C o u n t y of Y e l l o w s t o n e , and the Hon. C. B. Sande, R e s p o n d e n t s . O r i g i n a l P r o c e e d i n g : C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For R e l a t o r s : M o s e s , T o l l i v e r & Wright, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a R a l p h A l l a n B e c k argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : H a r o l d F. H a n s e r , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n q s , M o n t a n a C h a r l e s B r a d l e y argued, D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , IvlOntana S u b m i t t e d : June 2 2 , 1 9 7 7 F i l e d : - =w<q ,~~ clerk M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an original proceeding. Relators Sol Briceno and Jessie Briceno, defendants i n a criminal action, seek a w r i t of supervisory control or other appropriate w r i t from t h i s Court to require the presiding judge of the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, annul and s e t aside the denial of relators' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy t r i a l . Defendants Sol and Jessie Briceno, father and son respectively, were arrested i n Billings on November 20, 1975, and charged with the crime of aggravated assault, a felony. The offense was alleged to have occurred on July 7, 1975. Defendants appeared i n justice court on November 20, 1975, and were released upon posting bond the next day. On April 28, 1976, the Yellowstone County attorney and de- fendants, accompanied by counsel, appeared in d i s t r i c t court. The county attorney moved for and was granted leave t o f i l e an Inform- tion formally charging defendants with aggravated assault. De- fendants were arraigned during the proceedings and pled "NOT GUILTY" to the charge. T w o weeks thereafter the t r i a l date was s e t for M a y 26, 1976. O n M a y 18, 1976, counsel for defendants moved for a continuance and, i n addition t o other matters, for a dismissal of the charges for lack of a speedy t r i a l . The motion stated i n part : "The defendants agree that they w i l l waive any right they have by law t o complain as t o a speedy t r i a l by reason of any delay i n their t r i a l date caused by t h i s mot ion ." The t r i a l was reset for September 1976. Defendants, on September 2, 1976, renewed their motion t o dismiss. Various pre- t r i a l proceedings were had between September 1976 and March 1977. O n April 12, 1977, following a hearing, the d i s t r i c t court orally denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy t r i a l . Thereupon defendants filed the instant applica- tion for a w r i t of supervisory control with t h i s Court, seeking that the d i s t r i c t court order of April 12, 1977, denying the motion to dismiss be s e t aside and annulled. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Information should be dismissed because defendants have been denied their constitu- tional right to a speedy t r i a l . Defendants argue that, under the facts of this case, a delay of 4 1/2 months between the date of the alleged offense and their arrest and of over 6 months between the arrest and the filing of the Information is sufficiently long to s h i f t to the s t a t e the burden of explaining the delay and showing the absence of pre- judice t o defendants. Their argument is grounded in the constitu- tional principles outlined by the United States Supreme Court i n . Fs . L j 4 t Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 99&, 18 L ed 2d and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101; as further developed by this court's decisions in State ex rel. Thomas v. District Court, 151 Mont, 1, 438 P.2d 554; Fitzpatrick v. C r i s t , 165 Mont, 382, 528 P.2d 1322; State v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178; and State v. Keller, Mont . , 553 P.2d 1013, 33 St. Rep. 795. These cases involve a sensitive balancing of four factors, in which the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed i n determining whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy t r i a l . The four- factors t o be evaluated and balanced are: . (1) Length of delay; (2) Reason for delay; (3) Assertion of the right by defendant; and (4) Prejudice to the defendant. Defendants aseert the facts of the instant case, when con- sidered and balanced in the context of the above four factors, clearly demonstrate they have been denied the right t o a speedy t r i a l . They stress (1) the Iefigth of the delay was unreasonable; (2) the delay was aggravated by the fact the investigation which formed the basis for the Information was completed during August 1975, more than 8 months prior to the filing of the Information, aad the entire period of delay can be characterized as one of t o t a l inaction on the part of the prosecution, chargeable as such t o the prosecution; (3) the denial of the right to a speedy t r i a l was asserted through counsel shortly following the f i l i n g of the Information and arraignment i n d i s t r i c t court; and (4) severe actual prejudice has resulted through the loss of an essential defense witness, The state concedes the applicability of the four factor balancing process of Barker,,as accepted in the various Montana decisions, It contends the inability to resolve one of the four factors i n favor of the accused is sufficient gmetwd for rejecting a lack of speedy t r i a l argument. The s t a t e argues the delay i n the instant case was neither purposeful nor oppressive; that the anxiety and concern of the defendants were minimized by reason of no pretrial incarceration, and no actual prejudice resulted from the loss of the defense witness. The state relies on t h i s Court's decision in State v. Carden, - Mont . - 9 P.2d , 34 St.Rep. 420, wherein the Court indicated that not every delay i n a criminal action is properly chargeable to the state. It is maintained the delays i n the instant case f a l l 'under the rule of Carden and, as such, are not chargeable t o the state. No attempt is made to distinguish Fitzpatrick, Steward or Keller . The right to a speedy t r i a l is expressly guaranteed by the United States and Montana Constitutions. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In a l l criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public t r i a l * * *." A r t . 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution states: "In a l l criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right t o * * * a speedy public t r i a l * * *." The right to a speedy t r i a l has been classified as a funda- mental right, applicable t o the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra. The touchstone i n any analysis of the speedy t r i a l issue is Barker v. Wingo, supra. Both parties, a t least implicitly, recognize the primary authority of Barker. W e find no need to reiterate the theoretical foundations of the four factor balancing approach of Barker a s adopted by numerous Montana decisions. It is suf fieient to say the balancing t e s t involves a weighing of these four factors with consideration given to the conduct of the accused and prosecution, respectively: (1) Length of delay; (2) Reason for delay; (3) ~efendant's assertion of the right; and (4) Prejudice to the defendant. First, the length of delay in t h i s case. There were two basic delays involved (a) 4 1/2 months between the alleged offense and the actual arrest, and (b) 6 months between the arrest and the filing of the Information. A-similar delay was considered by t h i s Court i n Fitzpatrick: "Length of delay: Seven months. W e emphasize t h i s delay is not considered a per se violation of peti- tioner's right t o a speedy trix, but under the c i r - cumstances here it is thought long enough t o s h i f t t o the s t a t e the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice t o petitioner." 165 Mont. 382, 388. Here, a s i n Fitzpatrick, we find the burden t o have shifted to the s t a t e by reason of the delays. Unlike the situation i n Carden, the entire 10 1/2 month delay i n t h i s case consists primarily of "dead t i m e " . The prosecution simply was not pursued with reasonable diligence u n t i l the time the Information was filed. Indeed, the investigation of the case which furnished the information necessary t o charge these defendants was com- pleted a t least 8 months prior t o the filing of the Information. Second, the reason for the delay. The state argues it was not made aware of the fact defendants were arrested and brought before the justice court on November 20, 1975, u n t i l shortly prior to the time the Information was filed. This is not *a case involving delays occasioned i n any manner, whether thcough time consuming investigations or good f a i t h motions, by the conduct of the defendants. It is true the state, i n a given case, is not automatically chargeable with a l l delays not attributable to the defendant. State v. Carden, supra. The delays here appear to be unintentional rather than deliberate, nevertheless they are substantial delays resulting directly from a breakdown i n the chain of prosecution, for which the s t a t e w i l l be held responsible. The reason for the delay advanced by the s t a t e is insufficient to justify the lengthy delay. Third, w e find defendants' assertion of the right t o a speedy t r i a l was timely. A s stated in Steward: "The 'appropriate motion' i s a motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy t r i a l . The proper time to assert the right t o a speedy t r i a l is prior t o the actual commencement of the t r i a l , usually a t the t i m e the t r i a l date is s e t , or the time the case is called t o trial." 168 Mont. 385, 390. Here, defendants moved t o dismiss for lack of a speecy t r i a l two weeks following arraignment in d i s t r i c t court and less than a week a f t e r the f i r s t t r i a l date was set. Under these circumstances w e find the assertion of the right was properly and timely made. Defendants' waiver of the right regarding any delay occasioned by their motion t o dismiss has no effect on the propriety of the assertion. Fourth, prejudice, both presumptive and actual, to defendants. The primary interests which l i e a t the heart of thPs factor are s e t forth i n Barker: "* * * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed i n the light of the interest of defendants which the speedy t r i a l right was designed t o protect. This Court has identified three such interests: ( i ) t o prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; ( i i ) t o minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and ( i i i ) to l i m i t the possibility that the defense w i l l be impaired. O f these, the most important is the l a s t , because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. I f witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice i f defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown." 407 U.S. 514, 532. Defendants acknowledge they were not prejudiced with regard t o oppressive pretrial confinement. There was no pretrial con£ iaement . The second interest t o be protected by a speedy t r i a l , minimization of an accused's anxiety and concern, is difficult to show as such is not readily subject t o proof by objective evidence. State v. Steward, supra. Here, while the record contains no facts conclusively showing anxiety and concern have been caused t o defendants, various statements appearing i n defendants' brief support the conclusion defendants have likely been subject t o substantial anxiety and emotional abuse because of the delays. W e find, under the facts, some prejudice i n the nature of anxiety and concern can be presumed t o have occurred. It is the third and most important OF the interests outlined above which concerns us here. The defense was seriously impaired by the death of an essential witness and it has resulted i n actual prejudice to defendants. Its deleterious effect on the a b i l i t y of defendants to prepare an adequate defense is more than obvious. It is no argument t o say the testimony of the deceased witness might have been controverted by testimony of state's witnesses. W e cannot allow any defendant's right t o an adequately prepared case t o be dismissed i n t h i s manner. After considering the circumstances i n the light of the factors established by Barker, we hold there has been an excessive delay; that no viable justification for the delay has been demonstrated; that defendants' assertion of the right to a speedy t r i a l was proper and timely; and that some preaudice, both actual and presumptive, resulted directly from the delay. Accordingly, it is ordered the district court annul and set aside its oral order of April 12, 1977, denying defendants' motion to dismiss and substitute therefor an order of dismissal. Justice W e Concur: n Cbief Justice f