Case Title: BRUCE G. BOYLE V. RENEE R. BOYLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRUCE G. BOYLE V. RENEE R. BOYLE2006 WY 124143 P.3d 368Case Number: 05-258Decided: 09/29/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
BRUCE G. 
BOYLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
RENEE R. 
BOYLE,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCrookCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mary A. Throne and Brandi L. Monger of Hickey & Evans, LLP, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Monger.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Kathryn J. Edelman of Edelman Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Bruce Boyle 
(Husband) appeals from the property disposition in the decree granting Renee 
Boyle's (Wife) complaint for divorce.  
Husband asserts the district court erred by classifying his employment 
benefits, including banked hours, vacation hours, and sick leave, as marital 
property.  He also claims the 
district court abused its discretion in dividing the parties' property.  We conclude the issue of whether 
Husband's employment benefits were marital property was not properly presented 
to the district court and, therefore, decline to consider his argument on 
appeal.  Further, we find no abuse 
of discretion in the district court's division of property.  

 
 
[¶2]      
Affirmed.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Husband states 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 
Was it 
proper for the district court to consider banked hours, vacation hours and sick 
hours as marital property?

 
 
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in the property division set forth in the 
judgment and decree of divorce?

 
 
Wife 
does not set forth a separate statement of issues on 
appeal.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Husband and Wife 
were married on September 9, 1994, in Rapid City, South 
Dakota.  
Husband was a pilot employed by Northwest Airlines.  Wife also worked for Northwest Airlines, 
first as a gate agent and later as a flight attendant.  Husband earned significantly more than 
Wife during the marriage.    
      

 
 
[¶5]      The parties each 
owned a home prior to their marriage, but they sold their individual properties 
and placed the proceeds in their joint accounts.  They used their joint funds to purchase 
property and build a new home in Aladdin.  
The parties also mortgaged the Aladdin property and borrowed against 
their 401(k) retirement accounts and from family members to fund the building 
project.    

 
 
[¶6]      After several 
years of marriage, the parties' relationship deteriorated, culminating in Wife's 
claim Husband was engaged in an extramarital relationship with another 
woman.  Wife moved out of the 
parties' Aladdin residence in July 2004.  
Approximately three weeks later she moved back into the house, but the 
parties' relationship did not improve.  
Over the course of the next several months, there were arguments which 
apparently escalated to physical violence on a couple of occasions.    

 
 
[¶7]      On December 9, 
2004, Wife filed a complaint for divorce and a motion for exclusive possession 
of the marital residence.  Husband 
answered the complaint, and the parties agreed to a temporary arrangement 
wherein Husband would have possession of the marital residence and would pay 
Wife $2,500 per month in spousal support while the divorce proceedings were 
pending.  The court also ordered 
Husband to pay other expenses, including the mortgage payments and vehicle 
expenses.    

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court held a trial on May 25, 2005.  
Both parties testified at the trial, and the district court ordered them 
to prepare written submissions for the court's consideration in issuing its 
final decree.  After the parties 
filed their written submissions, the district court issued a decision letter 
outlining its basic property distribution and indicating it generally adopted 
Wife's proposed distribution of the property.  The court subsequently entered a 
judgment and divorce decree, and Husband appealed.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2005) sets out the statutory requirements for disposition 
of a couple's property in a divorce.  
That statute provides, in relevant part:

 
 
In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party. 

 
 

See 
also, Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1022, 1030 (Wyo. 2004); Hall v. 
Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶¶ 11-12, 40 P.3d 1228, 1229-30 (Wyo. 2002).  The trial court has the discretion to 
determine what weight should be given each of the individual statutory 
factors.  DeJohn v. DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, ¶ 13, 121 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 
2005).  See also, Wallop, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d  at 1030.        

 
 
[¶10]   We expansively discussed the "just 
and equitable" requirement and our standard for reviewing property disposition 
decisions in Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 
82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
A just 
and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be unequal.  [Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 2000)]. 
We evaluate whether the trial court's property division is, in fact, equitable 
from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and 
liabilities rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular 
disposition.  Id. From that 
perspective, we afford the trial court considerable discretion to form a 
distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of each individual 
case, and we will not disturb such a scheme absent a showing that the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion.  
Id. The division 
of property in a divorce case should not be disturbed except on clear grounds as 
the trial court is usually in a better position than the appellate court to 
judge the parties' respective merits and needs.  Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, ¶ 6 
(Wyo.2003).  The trial court is also 
in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and weigh their 
testimony.  Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 
(Wyo.1998).  We, therefore, give 
considerable deference to its findings.  
Id. The ultimate 
question in determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred is whether the 
trial court could reasonably conclude as it did.  Metz, 2003 WY 3, 
¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383.  In answering that 
question, we consider only the evidence of the successful party, ignore the 
evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant the successful party every 
favorable inference that can be drawn from the record.   Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶ 8 
(Wyo.2001).

 
 

See 
also, Houx v. Houx, 2006 
WY 102, ___ P.3d ____ (Wyo. 2006).  
As with 
any appeal, the district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, ¶ 6, 90 P.3d 739, 741 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
A.        Employment 
Benefits

 
 
[¶11]   Husband claims the district court 
erred by including certain employment benefits he had accumulated as a pilot for 
Northwest Airlines in its distribution of the parties' marital property.  In particular, he claims his banked 
hours,1 vacation hours, and accumulated 
sick leave were not marital property subject to distribution.  The district court awarded the 
employment benefits to Husband and included their value in his part of the 
marital estate.  The gist of 
Husband's argument is that, if he would not have been credited with those 
values, he would have received a larger portion of the marital 
estate.

[¶12]   The parties reached an agreement as 
to the disposition of most of their property.  Thus, at trial they focused on 
approximately thirty items still in dispute, either because the parties could 
not agree on who should get the property and/or what value should be assigned to 
the property.  Those items were 
identified in a joint exhibit admitted into evidence at trial.  The joint exhibit was a spreadsheet with 
columns entitled: Property Description, Property Values (including separate 
spaces for Wife's values and Husband's values), Party Requesting Property 
(including spaces marked with an "x" to indicate if Wife wanted the property 
and/or if Husband wanted the property), Court Assignment (with separate spaces 
marked "To P ($)" and "To D ($))," and a column entitled "Notes."  Husband's employment benefits were shown 
as items numbered 455, 456 and 457 on the joint exhibit.  Item 455 was described as NWA banked 
hours pay.  The joint exhibit 
indicated Wife placed a value of $1,327 on the banked hours.  Husband's value column contained a 
question mark.  Neither party marked 
the columns indicating they were requesting the item.  Item 456 was Husband's sick leave which 
Wife valued at $264,060.  The 
"Notes" column indicates Wife's value was calculated by multiplying 1467 
accumulated hours by an hourly rate of $180.  Husband's value column contained a 
question mark, and neither party marked the column indicating he or she was 
requesting the item.  Item 475 was 
Husband's vacation pay.  Wife 
assigned a value of $18,817 to Husband's vacation pay, and the "Notes" column 
indicates she calculated the value by multiplying 104.54 hours at $180 per 
hour.  As with the other two items, 
Husband's value column simply contained a question mark and neither party 
requested the item.     

[¶13]   At the trial, there was no 
testimony concerning these three assets except Wife's answers on 
cross-examination: 

 
 

Q.                
[Wife], 
you didn't testify about your entries on lines 455, 456 and 457.  . . .

 
 
* * 
*

 
 

A.                 
Those 
are all [Husband's] and I don't dispute that.

Q.                  
So 
you're not making any claim to those?

A.                 
No, 
ma'am, no.  

 
 
[¶14]   At the conclusion of the trial, the 
district court asked the parties to submit proposed decrees.  Husband's proposed decree did not 
address the employment benefits at all.  
Wife submitted a written closing argument together with a revised version 
of the joint exhibit presented at trial, outlining her proposed property 
division.  Husband's employment 
benefits were included in Wife's proposed property division in essentially the 
same form as in the joint exhibit, except Wife assigned them to Husband for 
"value."  Husband did not respond to 
Wife's submission and the district court issued a decision letter setting forth 
its general rulings with regard to the parties' property.  The decision letter stated the district 
court generally adopted Wife's proposed property distribution and debt 
allocation summary.    

 
 
[¶15]   In response to the decision letter, 
Husband filed a list of questions with the district court.  Question No. 2 stated:  "Should items 455, 456 and 457 on 
Plaintiff's proposed property summary be addressed in the Decree?  [Wife's] testimony and the spreadsheet 
are inconsistent as she indicated she was not seeking these "assets" yet they 
are included."  Wife's attorney 
responded, by e-mail, to Husband's question:  

 
 
I write 
to clarify what I believe to be a misperception contained in Ms. Day's letter of 
July 28, 2005.  

 
 
[Wife]did 
testify that she was not seeking the assets listed at lines 455, 456 and 457 of 
the Joint Exhibit.  Her testimony 
was designed to indicate her knowledge that Northwest Airlines would not 
transfer those assets to her, regardless of any contrary order.  She cannot have those assets and is not 
requesting that they be set over to her.  
That, of course, is entirely different from saying that the assets should 
not be valued and set over to [Husband], which is what we 
requested.

 
 
She 
subsequently sent another e-mail to clarify her position, stating:  "I just reread my earlier e-mail to you 
and think that I have created more confusion than clarity.  It was [Wife's] position that the assets 
at lines 455, 456 and 457 be set over to [Husband] at the values shown on the 
Joint Exhibit."  The district court 
responded as follows:  "Items 455, 
456 and 457 are to be valued in their entirety.  The court adopts [Wife's] position as to 
these items."  Husband did not 
object to the district court's ruling.  

 
 
[¶16]   On appeal, Husband argues, as a 
matter of law, his employment benefits are not marital property  As Husband points out, this Court has 
never before directly considered whether employment benefits are marital 
property.  He claims, however, under 
the rationale of Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 
1970), his employment benefits amount to nothing more than a future expectancy 
and, therefore, should not have been included in the marital estate.  

 
 
[¶17]   In Storm, we ruled a spouse's inheritance, 
which did not mature until several months after the divorce action had been 
filed, should not be included in the marital estate.  Id. 
at 370-71.  Husband also cites to 
cases from other jurisdictions addressing whether employment benefits are 
includable as part of the marital estate and points out there is a split among 
other jurisdictions on the issue.   
See e.g., Thomasian v. Thomasian, 556 A.2d 675 
(Md. App. 1989) (holding holiday and vacation time was not a marital asset); Schober v. Schober, 692 P.2d 267 
(Alaska 1984) 
(holding unused personal leave was a marital asset).  He claims we should adopt the position 
that, because accrued employment benefits are a form of alternative wages, they 
should not be included in the marital estate.  

 
 
[¶18]   Husband may be correct in his legal 
analysis; however, this is not the right case to make that determination because 
he provided no evidence at trial concerning the nature of these benefits and/or 
whether they had present value.2  In addition, he did not argue in the 
district court that, as a matter of law, his employment benefits were nothing 
more than expectancy under the Storm 
decision or that they were not marital property.  Although his assigned value for the 
employment benefits was denoted with a question mark, the joint exhibit was 
intended to describe the property still in dispute and gave no indication 
Husband disagreed with treatment of those items as marital assets.  This is in contrast to other items in 
the joint exhibit which Husband clearly claimed were "premarital" or "inherited" 
items and not marital assets.  
Because there is no evidence in the record about whether his employment 
benefits have cash value and Husband did not argue his employment benefits were 
not marital assets to the district court, there is no basis for us to decide his 
claim.  

 
 
This 
court has long held that issues not brought before the district court may not be 
reviewed on appeal.  "We 'strongly 
adhere to the rule forbidding us to "consider for the first time on appeal 
issues that were neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court," except for 
those issues which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature.'" Donaghy v. 
Board of Adjustment, 2002 WY 150, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 707, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2002) (quoting 
Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446 (Wyo.1993) and Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo.1991)).

 
 

Wallop, ¶ 47, 
88 P.3d  at 1034.   In order to 
decide this issue on the merits, the case would have to be remanded to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing.  
That would give Husband a proverbial "second bite at the apple."  Husband is not entitled to a second 
opportunity to present this issue to the district court; consequently, we 
decline to consider whether employment benefits such as those in dispute in this 
matter, are, as a matter of law, marital property subject to disposition in a 
divorce.

 
 
[¶19]   Husband also argues the evidence 
does not support attributing the value of the employment benefits to him.  This argument is somewhat difficult to 
follow because he falls back on his position that the employment benefits should 
not be included in the marital estate.  
To the extent this argument rehashes his first argument, we decline to 
consider it.  

 
 
[¶20]   Husband also submits a factual 
argument the employment benefits have no "cash value" to him.  In other words, he insists he is only to 
be allowed to use the benefits to compensate him for time he actually takes off 
work but he is not entitled to be paid in cash for his benefits when his 
employment terminates.  The record 
does not, however, support Husband's assertion because it contains no evidence 
as to if or when Husband was entitled to cash out his employment benefits.  On the other hand, the record does 
contain evidence about the value of the employment benefits.  The joint exhibit clearly showed his 
accrued employment benefits and rate of pay, and Husband does not claim those 
values are incorrect.3  Based upon the record before us, the 
district court properly valued the benefits when it set them over to Husband4.  

 
 
            
B.        Property 
Division

 
 
[¶21]   Husband argues the district court 
abused its discretion when it divided the parties' marital property.  Applying a "shot-gun" approach, Husband 
takes issue with the district court's disposition of many of the individual 
property items and allocation of certain debts.  In reviewing Husband's contentions, we 
must keep in mind "a primary question that must be answered in a review such as 
this is whether or not the evidence adduced at trial supports the property 
division as a whole, not necessarily each individual part of it."     DeJohn, ¶ 15, 121 P.3d  at 808; Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 9, 35 P.3d 409, 412 
(Wyo. 2001).   

 
 
[¶22]   The largest asset of the marital 
estate was the Aladdin real property valued at $1,600,000.  The district court awarded the real 
property to Husband, together with the mortgage debt on the property.  In order to equalize the division of the 
marital estate, the district court ordered Husband to pay Wife $729,400, on or 
before September 30, 2006.  Husband 
argues the district court failed to account for the costs of selling the real 
property, including commissions, listing fees and taxes, and the September 30, 
2006, deadline was unreasonable for selling such a large and expensive piece of 
property.   

 
 
[¶23]   Husband's argument assumes he is 
required to sell the property.  The 
district court specifically stated it was not ordering Husband to sell the 
property, but, in order to satisfy his debt to Wife, Husband "may have to choose 
between either selling the CrookCounty property or refinancing the 
same."  Evidence was presented 
suggesting Husband could refinance the property if he chose to keep it.  Furthermore, Husband presented no 
evidence about the costs associated with selling the property.  With regard to the deadline for paying 
off Wife, the record shows the decision letter was dated July 15, 2005, more 
than a year prior to the September 30, 2006, deadline.  On appeal, Husband makes the 
unsubstantiated claim he could not make arrangements to pay off the debt to 
Wife, either by selling or refinancing the property, within that period of 
time.  Even if he could make that 
claim at this late date, the court's order made provisions for that possibility 
by requiring him to continue spousal support of $2,500 per month, not to be 
credited against the judgment, until the debt was paid.5    

 
 
[¶24]   Husband also claims the district 
court's decision failed to acknowledge his premarital assets and the relative 
contributions of each party to the marital estate.  In particular, he asserts the district 
court did not account for his contribution of approximately $154,000 from the 
proceeds of the sale of his pre-marital home to the parties' Aladdin home or his 
premarital contributions to his retirement accounts.   Husband contends, as well, the 
district court did not properly credit him for his greater income which allowed 
him to contribute more than Wife to the accumulation of the martial 
property.   

 
 
[¶25]   The record does not support 
Husband's assertion.  The district 
court expressly considered the parties' contributions of premarital assets and 
the relative financial contributions of each party to the marital estate, 
together with the other statutory factors, and ruled as 
follows:

 
 
1.  Both of the parties here appear to be 
intelligent, articulate individuals with some life experience prior to this 
marriage.  As a consequence, 
concerns about relative premarital financial conditions could have been 
addressed in some type of prenuptial agreement, or in some other fashion. 
Rather, the parties here chose to substantially co-mingle and share their assets 
and go forward as one, apparently even prior to the time they were wed.  While not singularly determinative of 
the outcome of this matter, the court has assigned this factor substantial 
weight. 

 
 
2.         
While husband contributed in greater part to the financial condition of 
the parties, it appears that as a result of this marriage wife left a position 
that paid her significantly more than she is making now.  Wife's testimony at trial was that early 
in the marriage husband encouraged her to move to Wyoming, and that move meant 
that she had to take a lesser paying position with her employer.  Wife also testified that husband 
encouraged her to work less, and rely on husband's income.  The court finds wife's testimony highly 
credible and believes that wife made a substantial sacrifice of her earning 
potential by acceding to husband's wishes. The court acknowledges that while 
wife was more than likely a willing participant in this plan, ultimately the 
court must "make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just 
and equitable having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the 
condition in which they will be left by the divorce . . ."  W.S. § 20-2-114.  While quoting the foregoing statute in 
part, the court has not ignored the fact the relative financial situations of 
the parties as they entered this marriage, nor has the court ignored the fact 
that the husband was the primary income provider.  What the court determines here is that 
given all of the facts and circumstances of this case the requirement that the 
court consider "the party through whom the property was acquired" is less 
significant given the way that the parties conducted themselves from the outset 
of this relationship.

 
 
Although 
Husband does not agree with the district court's ruling, the decision letter 
clearly demonstrates consideration of the proper factors.  The court explicitly took into account 
both parties' premarital contributions and Husband's greater income during the 
marriage, but rejected Husband's argument that, as a result of those 
contributions, he was entitled to a greater share of the marital estate.   Husband has failed to show the 
district court abused its discretion in making that determination.   

 
 
[¶26]   Husband asserts the district court 
erred by not specifying a total value for the marital estate or explaining how 
the $729,400 award to Wife was a just and equitable division and objects to the 
award of certain individual assets and debts to each party.  For example, he challenges the award of 
the parties' dogs to Wife, disposition of the parties' retirement funds, and 
allocation of debts owed to each of their mothers.  In making these arguments, Husband 
misconstrues his obligation on appeal.  
As acknowledged by this Court in Holland, 35 P.3d  at 412, a party contesting the 
district court's division of the property must demonstrate the evidence adduced 
at trial does not support the property distribution as a whole.  The judge's decision letter stated it 
intended "that the positions of the parties . . . be more or less 
equalized."  Other than a general 
allegation the disposition was not proper, Husband does not explain why the 
equalization payment was not just and equitable or how the district court abused 
its discretion.  

 
 
[¶27]   Husband claims the district court's 
ruling was meant to punish him and reward Wife because of evidence he had an 
extra-marital affair.  Of course, a 
judge may not use his discretion in dividing marital property to reward one 
party and punish the other.  See, e.g., McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 8 
(Wyo. 2000); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 
1980).  In this case, however, there 
is no indication of any retribution.  
Indeed, the district court specifically stated it had no intent to punish 
Husband.  The district court did 
refer to the extra-marital affair in its decision letter, but only in the 
context of ruling on the credibility of the parties.  The court specifically stated Husband's 
testimony about his "paramour" was not believable.  Consequently, the district court 
ruled:  "the court finds the only 
logical path open to it is to resolve disputed matters involving credibility in 
favor of wife, and against husband."  
As we have acknowledged innumerable times, issues of credibility belong 
to the trial court.  See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 7, 125 P.3d 284, 287 (Wyo. 2005); Dunham v. Dunham, 
2006 WY 1, ¶ 6, 125 P.3d 1015, 1017 (Wyo. 2005).  Husband's claim the district court 
improperly applied its discretion to punish him is not supported by the 
record.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   Because Husband failed to preserve 
the legal argument his employment benefits could not be considered as part of 
the martial property, we decline to consider that issue.  With regard to Husband's argument the 
district court abused its discretion in dividing the parties' marital property, 
"our statutory scheme for distribution of marital property requires our courts 
to consider the respective merits of the parties in forming a distributive 
scheme appropriate to the particular circumstances of each individual case." Houx, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d at ___.  Husband has not demonstrated the 
district court failed to fulfill its statutory obligation in this case.  We, therefore, find no basis on which to 
overrule the district court's decision and affirm.  

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶29]   I respectfully dissent.  The district court ordered Husband to 
pay Wife $729,400 in order to "equalize the division of the marital 
estate."  In arriving at the payment 
amount, the district court included $284,204 in employment benefits as assets of 
the marriage and awarded the assets to Husband.  There is insufficient evidence to 
support the district court's valuation of the employment benefits and its 
finding that the employment benefits are marital assets.

 
 
[¶30]   As mentioned by the majority, we 
have not had prior occasion to determine whether employment benefits of the type 
at issue are marital assets.  It 
seems appropriate, as suggested by the majority, that in order for those 
benefits to be considered marital assets there must be evidence that the 
benefits are more than a substitute for wages.  The majority correctly notes there is no 
evidence in the record indicating that the employment benefits had, or would 
have, any cash value.  According to 
the majority, the absence of such evidence is fatal to Husband's appeal.  I disagree.

 
 
[¶31]   As Plaintiff, and the party 
asserting the claim, Wife had the burden of providing sufficient evidence at 
trial to support her claim.  Morrison v. Reilly, 511 P.2d 970, 972 
(Wyo. 1973) 
("burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of any issue").6  Husband and Wife were the only witnesses 
at trial.  Wife testified 
first.  She provided testimony 
regarding most of the "items still in dispute" reflected in the joint exhibit 
but did not provide any testimony during direct examination regarding the 
employment benefits.  During cross 
examination, Wife testified unequivocally that she was making no claim to the 
employment benefits.  Wife's 
disavowal was the only testimony presented at trial regarding the employment 
benefits.7  

 
 
[¶32]   The joint exhibit provided the only 
other reference to the employment benefits at trial.  The joint exhibit was identified by 
Wife's attorney as a list of "items still in dispute."  There was no stipulation that the 
disputed items were marital assets.  
The exhibit clearly reflected that Husband disputed Wife's valuation of 
the employment benefits and contained no indication that Wife was requesting 
that the employment benefits be awarded to Husband.  

 
 
[¶33]   In light of Wife's stated position 
that she was making no claim to the benefits and the lack of any evidentiary 
support for valuation of the benefits, Husband's failure to provide any 
testimony or other evidence regarding the benefits is understandable and 
appropriate.  Husband was under no 
obligation to provide any evidence regarding the benefits.  Wife, not Husband, was required to prove 
the employment benefits were marital assets and the value of those assets.  

 
 
[¶34]   Perhaps recognizing that the trial 
record contains insufficient evidence, the majority relies upon evidence in the 
form of pay stubs admitted as exhibits at a motion hearing regarding temporary 
support held a month prior to trial.  
The trial record contains no indication that the parties stipulated that 
evidence produced at the motion hearing could be considered by the district 
court as trial evidence.  More 
importantly, the pay records do not reflect that the employment benefits are 
anything other than a substitute for wages.

[¶35]   The only testimony regarding sick 
pay appearing in the record was presented at the motion hearing where Husband 
testified as follows:

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
Counsel]: And with respect to sick where it shows 1467, colon, 37, what does 
that number mean?

 
 
[Defendant]:  That's if I'm sick they'll pay 
me.

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
Counsel]:  They'll pay you what, 
$1,467?

 
 
[Defendant]:  1,467 hours.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
Counsel]:  Okay. And back to 
Defendant's Exhibit 6, you think that the colon after the 1467, this number 
represents hours banked  or, well, not hours banked, I guess, but sick hours 
available to you, rather than dollar amount?

 
 
Sir, 
what I'm asking essentially is, is this like the banked time where you get up to 
$1467 worth of pay?

 
 
[Defendant]:  No, 1467 is the pay 
hours.

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
Counsel]:  So if you were to be ill and off your job 
1467 hours, then you'd be paid for those hours, 
correct?

 
 
[Defendant]:  Right.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶36]   Similar testimony was presented at 
the motion hearing regarding the banked hours.  Husband testified at the motion hearing 
that, if he failed to fly his "guaranteed hours," banked pay could be used to 
get a full pay check for the time period.  
No testimony was presented at either the motion hearing or the trial 
regarding vacation pay.

 
 
[¶37]   Although, on appeal, we must review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case 
there was no evidence which supports the district court's valuation of the 
employment benefits as marital assets.  
Even if the joint exhibit and the pay stubs are construed as providing 
evidentiary support, review of the entire record leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the district court's valuation of the employment benefits was 
clearly erroneous.  "A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed."  Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 
(Wyo. 1999) (quoting Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 1997)).

 
 
[¶38]   No evidence was presented that the 
employment benefits had cash value or could be cashed out upon termination of 
Husband's employment.  The only 
trial evidence directed to the issue is Wife's unqualified testimony that she 
was making no claim to the employment benefits.  If evidence from the motion hearing is 
considered, it only supports a finding that the employment benefits are a wage 
substitute.  Because Wife failed to 
meet her burden of proof, the finding of the district court that Husband's 
employment benefits are marital property worth $284,204 is clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
[¶39]   I would reverse and remand to allow 
the district court to fashion an equitable property distribution without 
inclusion of the employment benefits as marital property.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Husband 
explained he earned "banked hours" in his pilot position.  The banked hours were used if he did not 
work his maximum number of hours in a pay period so that he could get a full 
paycheck for that pay period.

   

2There was 
some discussion at a pre-trial hearing on Husband's Motion for Relief from 
Temporary Alimony, about his employment benefits.  At that hearing, Husband indicated his 
sick leave could be used to pay him if he missed work because he was ill.  Contrary to Husband's assertion on 
appeal, there was no testimony about whether the sick leave or his other 
benefits had cash value upon termination of his employment. 

  

3Other than 
the joint exhibit, the trial record does not contain evidence regarding the 
values of Husband's employment benefits.  
However, the values contained in the joint exhibit are shown on Husband's 
pay stubs which were admitted into evidence at a motion hearing held before 
trial.  Both parties cite to this 
motion hearing to support their arguments about the employment benefits issue on 
appeal and, more importantly, Husband does not claim the values are 
incorrect.  

 
 

4Husband also 
includes a couple of statements in his brief, suggesting Wife waived her claim 
to the employment benefits.  Although this argument was briefly raised in 
the district court when Husband questioned the district court about its 
inclusion of the employment benefits in the marital estate in light of Wife's 
testimony that she did not make any claim to the employment benefits, he does 
not cite to any pertinent authority or present any cogent argument on appeal to 
support a claim of waiver.  See 
BP America Production Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WY 27, ¶ 25, 130 P.3d 438, 466 (Wyo. 2006).    

 
 

5Under the 
terms of the decree, Husband was ordered to pay $2,500 per month in spousal 
support.  All timely payments made 
before the September 30, 2006, deadline were to be credited against the amounts 
he owed Wife.  Once he satisfied the 
judgment, his spousal support obligation ceased.    

 
 

6Husband did 
not file a counterclaim.

 
 

7On redirect examination, 
Wife's attorney did not ask any questions in an effort to clarify Wife's 
position regarding the employment benefits.  No questions were asked of Wife 
regarding valuation of the employment benefits.  No exhibits were introduced providing 
evidentiary support for Wife's valuation of the benefits that was reflected in 
the "notes" column of the joint exhibit.