Case Title: People v. Hudson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84062, 84063

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 84062, 84063 cons.Agenda 4September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v. RENALDO HUDSON, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Opinion filed March 2, 2001.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 1983, defendant, Renaldo Hudson, was indicted in the
circuit court of Cook County on four counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.
38, par. 91(a)), armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 182),
unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 103), aggravated arson
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 201.1), residential burglary (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 193); two counts of home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 1211); and three counts of armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 33A2). At the ensuing trial, a jury was unable to reach a
verdict, and the circuit court declared a mistrial. After an unsuccessful
interlocutory appeal to the appellate court (see People v. Hudson, 171
Ill. App. 3d 1029 (1987)), a new trial was held. A jury convicted defendant of
murder, armed robbery and aggravated arson. The same jury subsequently found
defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 91(b)(6) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 91(b)(6)). The jury
further concluded, after hearing the evidence in aggravation and mitigation,
that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of
the death penalty, and the circuit court sentenced defendant to death. This
court affirmed the convictions and sentence on direct appeal, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 844, 130 L. Ed. 2d 77, 115 S. Ct. 135 (1994).
Defendant thereafter timely filed a petition, to which an
addendum was later filed, for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(725 ILCS 5/1221 et seq. (West 1994)). The State moved to dismiss the
petition. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the State's motion with
respect to all but one of the claims raised in the petition. As to the remaining
issue, the circuit court ruled that, pursuant to this court's decision in People
v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), defendant's death sentence had to be
vacated and a new sentencing hearing had to be held as a matter of law. Both the
State and defendant appealed the orders (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)), and this
court consolidated the appeals.
 
BACKGROUND
Defendant's convictions stem from the June 7, 1983, murder
and armed robbery of Folke Peterson. This court previously detailed the facts
leading to defendant's convictions in our opinion on direct appeal. See Hudson,
157 Ill. 2d 401. In light of our disposition of the cause, we need not repeat
those facts here. At the conclusion of the direct appeal proceedings, defendant
filed, on April 3, 1995, a petition for post-conviction relief, which was
amended on October 20, 1995. The petition contained allegations of ineffective
assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, as well as a claim of gender
discrimination during jury selection. Defendant subsequently filed an addendum
to his amended petition, in which he raised an additional claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel based upon this court's decision in People
v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995).
The State moved to dismiss defendant's petition in its
entirety. After hearing arguments on the motion, the circuit court granted the
State's motion with respect to all of defendant's claims, with the exception
of the claim involving the death-eligibility verdict. The court concluded that Mack
compelled vacatur of defendant's death sentence and ordered a new sentencing
hearing.
As noted previously, both the State and defendant appealed
from the circuit court's order. Defendant's appeal concerns the propriety of
the circuit court's dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of, inter
alia, several claims pertaining to the guilt phase of his trial. We must
consider these claims first, for if a new trial is necessary, then the need for
the court-ordered new sentencing hearing (pursuant to Mack) is obviated.
 
ANALYSIS
We begin our discussion by noting the familiar principles
involved in post-conviction proceedings. The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (725 ILCS 5/1221 et seq. (West 1994)) provides a statutory remedy
by which prisoners may collaterally attack a prior conviction and sentence. People
v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995). The scope of the proceeding is
limited to constitutional matters that neither have been, nor could not have
been, previously adjudicated. Any issues which could have been raised on direct
appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted (People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989)), and any issues which have previously been decided by a
reviewing court are barred by the doctrine of res judicata (People v.
Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987)). Nevertheless, this court recognized,
in People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989), that where fundamental
fairness requires, "the rule of waiver will not be applied in
post-conviction proceedings." This recognition was premised upon the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977). There, the Supreme Court described when it
would be necessary for a court to consider the fundamental fairness principle
when the prosecutor relies on a claim of waiver. As we explained in Owens,
the Supreme Court noted that " fundamental fairness' requires
courts to review procedurally defaulted claims in collateral proceedings only
when a defendant shows cognizable cause' for his failure to make timely
objection, and shows actual prejudice' flowing from the error now
complained of." Owens, 129 Ill. 2d  at 317. See also People v.
Mahaffey, No. 85215 (October 13, 2000); People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1995).
To that end, this court has noted that the term
"cause" denotes "  "some objective factor external to the
defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim' in an
earlier proceeding." People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (1992),
quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 544, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488,
91 L. Ed. 2d 397, 408, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986). Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has identified objective factors that constitute cause to include
"  "interference by officials" ' that makes
compliance with the State's procedural rule impracticable, and a showing
that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to
counsel.' [Citation.] In addition, constitutionally [i]neffective
assistance of counsel ... is cause.' [Citation.] Attorney error short of
ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause ***."
McCleskey, 499 U.S.  at 493-94, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 544, 111 S. Ct.  at 1470.
To establish actual prejudice, a petitioner "must show not merely that
the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked
to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions.' " Murray, 477 U.S.  at
494, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 412, 106 S. Ct.  at 2648, quoting United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 170, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816, 832, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982).
Moreover, even if a federal habeas petitioner cannot show cause and
prejudice, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless
be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would
result from a failure to entertain the claim. In order to demonstrate a
miscarriage of justice to excuse the application of the procedural bar, a
petitioner must show actual innocence. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). In the context of the death
penalty, a defendant must show "by clear and convincing evidence that but
for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would [have found him or her]
eligible for the death penalty under [the applicable state] law." Sawyer,
505 U.S.  at 348, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 285, 112 S. Ct.  at 2523.
In addition to the procedural bars mentioned above, a
defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations set
forth in the petition, as supported by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People
v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). The dismissal of a post-conviction
petition is warranted only when the petition's allegations of factliberally
construed in favor of the petitioner and in light of the original trial recordfail
to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382. On appeal, the circuit court's decision to dismiss the
petition without an evidentiary hearing is subject to plenary review. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 387-88.
Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a new trial
because he was deprived of equal protection of the law under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution by the State's alleged use of a
peremptory challenge to exclude a juror on the basis of gender. The arguments of
the parties with respect to this issue, as well as our resolution of it,
necessitate a review of what occurred during jury selection.
During voir dire, the State exercised 11 peremptory
challenges. The State excused five black venirepersons. See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 428-29. Six of the State's peremptory challenges were used to
strike women. After voir dire, the jury consisted of seven women and five
men.
The record reveals that, at the end of voir dire,
defendant, relying on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69,
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), moved to strike the jury on the grounds that the State
had engaged in purposeful racial discrimination in exercising its peremptory
challenges. Although the trial judge stated that he did not believe that
defendant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination
during voir dire, he asked the prosecutor to state on the record his
reasons for striking the prospective African-American jurors. One of these
prospective jurors was Robin Praser, a female. The trial judge ultimately denied
the Batson challenge on the basis that the State's reasons for striking
the venirepersons in question were race-neutral.
This court, on direct appeal, rejected defendant's
contention that the State had engaged in purposeful racial discrimination during
voir dire. See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 424-34. We issued our
decision on defendant's direct appeal on November 18, 1993, and denied
defendant's subsequent petition for rehearing on January 31, 1994. Defendant
then filed a petition for writ of certiorari before the United States
Supreme Court, which was denied on October 3, 1994. While that petition was
pending, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), in
which the Court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibited gender discrimination by the State during jury selection.
In his post-conviction petition, defendant relied on J.E.B.
to argue that the State had engaged in gender discrimination during voir dire
because venireperson Praser had been excluded on the basis of gender. The
circuit court dismissed this claim on the ground that defendant had failed to
make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination. The court also
stated, alternatively, that defendant had waived the claim because he had failed
to raise it on direct appeal.
In analyzing defendant's claim, we must first determine
whether the holding in J.E.B. applies to this case. As this court has
previously noted, judicial opinions announcing new constitutional rules
applicable to criminal cases are retroactive to all cases pending on direct
review at the time the new constitutional rule is declared. People. v.
Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 288 (1987), citing Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). In Griffith, the
Supreme Court ruled that its decision in Batson applied retroactively to
all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. Given
that J.E.B. is an extension of Batson, we believe that Griffith
controls on the question of retroactivity. Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari
was pending when the Court decided J.E.B; consequently, the
constitutional rule announced in J.E.B. is applicable. See People v.
Blackwell, 164 Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1995).
Having decided that the holding in J.E.B. applies to
the case at bar, we must next determine whether defendant, as the State
suggests, has procedurally defaulted the claim due to his failure to raise the
issue on direct appeal. We note that defendant has established cause for his
failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. Although arguments concerning
gender bias during voir dire had been raised in other appellate cases at
the time of defendant's direct appeal (see People v. Washington, 257
Ill. App. 3d 26, 31-34 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 917,
927 (1992), aff'd in part, vacated in part & cause remanded, 155 Ill. 2d 344, 356-57 (1993)), the United States Supreme Court did not
definitively speak to the issue until its decision in J.E.B., which was
announced while defendant's petition for certiorari was pending.
Defendant therefore has established cause, as he is seeking to assert a legal
claim the basis of which was not readily available to counsel at the time the
direct appeal was taken.
We must next determine whether defendant has established the
requisite prejudice in this matter. As we explain below, we believe that an
evidentiary hearing is needed in order to determine if defendant has established
the needed prejudice to excuse the procedural default.
The crux of defendant's claim is that the State
discriminated against venireperson Praser because of her gender. According to
the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B., a defendant must first make a prima
facie showing that the State exercised the peremptory challenge to exclude
the venireperson on account of gender. J.E.B., 511 U.S.  at 144-45, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 106-07, 114 S. Ct.  at 1429. As in a Batson challenge, if the
trial court determines that a prima facie case has been made, the burden
then shifts to the State to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the
challenge at issue. J.E.B., 511 U.S.  at 144-45, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 106-07,
114 S. Ct.  at 1429. The State's explanation need not rise to the level
justifying a challenge for cause, but must be based on a juror characteristic
other than gender and cannot be pretextual. J.E.B., 511 U.S.  at 145, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 107, 114 S. Ct.  at 1430. The Supreme Court has clarified that in
order to satisfy this second step, "a legitimate reason' is not a
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection."
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 840, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). The trial court must then assess the State's explanations
and determine whether the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination.
As noted, the post-conviction judge here ruled that defendant
failed to make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination. To
establish a prima facie showing of discrimination, a defendant must
demonstrate that the State struck a member of a constitutionally protected
class, and that all of the relevant circumstances raised an inference of
intentional discrimination. See United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154,
1159 (7th Cir. 1994). This court has noted that relevant circumstances include (i)
the pattern of strikes against venirepersons comprised of the protected class,
(ii) the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire and in
exercising the challenges, (iii) the disproportionate use of peremptory
challenges against members of the protected class, (iv) the level of
representation, with respect to the protected class, in the venire as compared
to that of the jury, (v) whether the excluded members of the protected class
were a heterogeneous group sharing only membership in the protected class as
their only common characteristic, and (vii) whether the witnesses are also
members of the protected class. People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 153
(1991).
Defendant argues, however, that this court should dispense
with the prima facie requirement in this case because the State did
assert on the record its reasons for the exclusion of venireperson Praser and
the reasons demonstrate purposeful gender discrimination. Defendant points to
the following comments, made by the prosecutor in response to defendant's Batson
motion at the conclusion of voir dire:
"She [Praser] was unemployed, has not worked since
    last October. We look for working people when we pick a jury. We think they
    have more at stake in the community and are more inclined to follow the law
    as your Honor instructs them. Also her attention to detail was not good as
    indicated by the card. She did not fill the card out completely, left
    various areas blank. She showed a lack of attention to instructions. Her
    demeanor during the jury selection process was also inappropriate. She was
    inattentive during questioning and at that particular point in the jury
    selection process she was the least desirable of the jurors. We were looking
    for more men to balance out the jury. We had more women seated on the jury
    at that point."
Defendant argues that this statement is an admission of
discriminatory intent which requires that his conviction be reversed and a
retrial be ordered.
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries
undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Batson,
476 U.S.  at 87, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 81, 106 S. Ct.  at 1718. The Court held that the
equal protection clause prohibits a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges
solely on account of race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will
be unable to impartially consider the prosecution against a black defendant. Batson,
476 U.S.  at 95, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 87, 106 S. Ct.  at 1722. In J.E.B., the
Court addressed the question of whether the equal protection clause prohibits
intentional discrimination on the basis of gender. In that case, a paternity
suit, the State had used its peremptory challenges to remove nearly all of the
men from the jury. The State asserted that men would be more receptive to the
putative father while women would be more sympathetic to the child's mother. J.E.B.,
511 U.S.  at 137-38, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 102, 114 S. Ct at 1426. The Court ruled
that such a practice runs afoul of equal protection, holding that gender, like
race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality,
especially where the discrimination perpetuates invidious stereotypes about men
and women. J.E.B., 511 U.S.  at 138-40, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 102-04, 114 S. Ct.  at 1426-27.
We note that in J.E.B., the State based its decision
to strike almost all of the males from the jury on the perception that men might
be more sympathetic to the putative father in a paternity suit and women might
be more sympathetic to the mother. The Supreme Court refused to accept, as a
defense, the same type of stereotype that which the law itself condemns. It is
important to recognize that no such invidious stereotype has been advanced or
suggested in the case at bar. Rather, we are faced with a statement that, on its
face, indicates that the prosecutor was, among other things, attempting to seat
a jury with a diverse character. We have found no case in Illinois on point with
that at bar. The closest case, factually, is People v. Blackwell, 164 Ill. 2d 67 (1995), in which this court was faced with another J.E.B.-based
claim of gender discrimination during voir dire. As in this case, the J.E.B.
decision post-dated the actual jury selection at issue. In Blackwell, the
prosecutor attempted to show, at the conclusion of voir dire, that his
strikes were not based on race. Of the State's 17 peremptory challenges, 15
were used to remove women from the venire. The prosecutor stated that he was
concerned " about the sympathy factor when the jurors are
confronted with the testimony of the defendant's mother.' " Blackwell,
164 Ill. 2d  at 72. The trial judge concluded that the strikes were not made on
the basis of race. On direct appeal, however, the defendant argued that venire
members were eliminated on the basis of gender. We held that the prosecutor's
statement that sympathy for the defendant's mother was a gender-related reason
because it was based on the theory that women, being women, would automatically
sympathize with defendant's mother and would be unable to be impartial. Along
with the State's pattern of strikes, we concluded that defendant had
established a prima facie case of gender discrimination. See Blackwell,
164 Ill. 2d  at 74-76. Unlike Blackwell, however, this case does not
contain such a clear statement of invidious stereotyping and, for that reason,
we do not find it helpful to our analysis.
Nevertheless, we believe that two cases from outside our
jurisdiction provide some illumination to the questions raised by the facts in
this case. We discuss each in turn.
In United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir.
1996), the defendants argued that the government improperly exercised its
peremptory challenges to remove men from the venire. The government exercised
its first ten strikes to remove men, and after a defense objection, it struck
three more men in addition to three women. In responding to the defense's
assertion of improper striking, the government argued that a smaller number of
women were in the venire and that the defense engaged in its own practice of
striking women. The government conceded:
" We did not strike men just to strike men
    nor did we strike women just to strike women. *** In fact, the defendant
    could have wiped out the entire sex of women with their strikes and still
    had five to go and as a matter of principle, I think that every sex should
    be represented at a trial of this nature as should every race be represented
    and so we undertook a course of action anticipating the defendants would do
    what they did, which was strike almost in the exact opposite proportion of
    women to men ***.' " Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1532.
The government also argued that men had not been declared to
be cognizable group for purposes of a Batson challenge.
The trial judge agreed with the government that men did not
constitute a cognizable group for purposes of Batson. Nevertheless, the
judge, noting that the federal circuit courts of appeal had split on the
question and that J.E.B. was then pending in the Supreme Court, asked
that the government place on the record its reasons for striking the men. The
government proceeded to state gender-neutral reasons for each of the strikes.
The trial judge overruled the defendants' objections, and the case proceeded
to trial with a jury composed of eight men and four women. Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1532.
After the jury returned guilty verdicts, one of the
defendants, Mason, moved for a new trial on the basis of the newly issued J.E.B.
decision. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that J.E.B. could not
be given a retroactive application because it was not forecast by prior
decisions to the same degree as was Batson. The trial judge, however,
also found that the government's proffered reasons were nonpretextual. See Tokars,
95 F.3d  at 1532.
On appeal, the defendants challenged the district court's
ruling on the gender discrimination claim. They argued that the government's
statements following defendant Tokars' challenge constituted a blatant
admission of discriminatory intent that negated the relevance of any other
nondiscriminatory reasons offered and required a new trial. The court of appeals
first ruled that the trial court incorrectly concluded that J.E.B. could
not be given retroactive application. Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1532. Turning to
the merits, the court noted that the case presented a "situation of mixed
motives" and acknowledged that it "was apparent from the government's
statements following Tokars's challenge that gender was indeed a factor that
was considered in exercising its strikes." Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1533.
Notwithstanding this fact, the court did not believe a new trial was required.
Rather, the court noted that the Eleventh Circuit, along with the Second,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits, had adopted the "dual motivation
analysis" for purposes of Batson. Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1533
(collecting cases).
"Dual motivation analysis grants the proponent of a
    strike the opportunity to raise an affirmative defense after the opponent of
    the strike has established a prima facie case of discrimination.
    [Citations.] In order to prove this affirmative defense, the proponent of
    the strike bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the strike would have been exercised even in the absence of the
    discriminatory motivation." Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1533.
The dual motivation analysis has its roots in equal
protection cases which hold that an action motivated in part by an impermissible
reason will nonetheless be valid if the same action would have been taken in the
absence of the impermissible motivation. Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1533 n.4
(citing Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993), and Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977)).
After carefully reviewing the record, the court of appeals
concluded that the district court's specific findingthat the government's
reasons for the strikes were gender-neutralwas not clearly erroneous:
"The district court conducted a hearing during which it reviewed each of
the government's reasons for striking the jurors and found them to be
gender-neutral. In making a finding of no pretext, the district court in effect
made the appropriate findings necessary for dual motivation analysis. Applying
dual motivation, we conclude that the government would have exercised the
strikes in the absence of any discriminatory motivation." Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1533-34.
Tokars thus teaches that the mention of gender as a
reason for exclusion, even if done for the purpose of attempting to seat a more
representative and diverse jury, will trigger the second step of the inquiry set
forth in Batson. Tokars also illustrates that the mention of
gender as a reason for exclusion, in such circumstances, does not always require
a new trial. Another case, from Delaware and somewhat more apposite to the case
at bar, compels a similar conclusion.
In Gattis v. Delaware, 697 A.2d 1174 (Del. 1997), the
defendant raised a J.E.B. violation for the first time on post-conviction
proceedings. The post-conviction judge dismissed the claims, but the Delaware
Supreme Court summarily remanded the matter to the post-conviction judge for
further inquiry into whether the State improperly excluded a potential juror for
gender-related reasons. See Gattis, 697 A.2d  at 1176 n.4. The question
arose in the following factual context as set forth in the memorandum of opinion
filed on remand. See State v. Gattis, No. 90004576DI (Del. Super.
December 11, 1996).
During jury selection, a prospective juror, Wilfred Moore,
had trouble articulating whether he would be able to follow the death penalty
law. After several questions, the prosecutor sought to strike the juror for
cause because he believed Moore was uncomfortable being asked to vote for death
and unsure of his ability to do so. The trial judge, however, did not believe
that Moore's ambivalence about the death penalty was strong enough to prevent
Moore from following the court's instruction or his oath as a juror. The
prosecutor then resorted to utilizing a peremptory challenge to strike Moore.
The prosecutor also stated for the record his reasons for his action since a
question had previously been raised concerning a possible Batson
violation:
"Number One, I believe that this juror was very,
    very conservative in his application of the possible application of the
    death penalty. *** Number Two, he is an older gentleman and we have, I
    believe four or five older gentlemen on the jury panel already. And I would
    suggest that it's the State's point of view that we would prefer to have
    some more women on the jury." Gattis, No. 900004576DI.
The trial judge remarked that in light of Moore's
responses, it "was not surprising that the State utilized a challenge and I'm
convinced beyond any doubt whatsoever that the challenge was not predicated upon
racial motives." Gattis, No. 900004576DI. The jury ultimately found
the defendant guilty and sentenced him to death.
As noted, the gender claim arose during post-conviction
proceedings. At the remand proceedings ordered by the Delaware Supreme Court,
the defendant argued that the prosecution removed Moore for gender-related
reasons in violation of the equal protection clause and J.E.B. The State
argued that even though one of the grounds for the prosecutor's challenge was
based on gender, another ground was Moore's reluctance to impose the death
penalty. For that reason, the State maintained that the paramount reason for the
strike was gender-neutral. In evaluating these contentions, the post-conviction
judge utilized the dual motivation analysis adopted in the federal courts, but
first noted that "the need for a prima facie showing of intentional
discrimination is obviated by the fact that the State in effect concedes that
gender played a part in its decision." Gattis, No. 900004576DI. The
post-conviction judge ultimately concluded that the State carried its burden of
showing that the prosecutor would have challenged Moore even in the absence of
any gender-related reason.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction judge's
findings in all respects. The court initially endorsed the judge's use of the
dual motivation analysis. See Gattis, 697 A.2d  at 1184, citing United
States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the court
stated that it would not disturb the post-conviction judge's specific finding
that gender was not the prosecution's primary motivation for striking Moore,
noting that the " evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind
based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge's
province.' " Gattis, 697 A.2d  at 1184 n.40, quoting Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 409, 111 S. Ct. 1859,
1869 (1991). These state court proceedings on the issue of gender discrimination
during jury selection were upheld by the United States district court during
federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Gattis v. Delaware, 46 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Del. 1999).
Although both the Tokars and Gattis cases
differ factually in some ways from the case at bar, certain similarities cannot
be overlooked. For example, as in this case, both cases deal with voir dires
that took place before the decision in J.E.B. was announced. In addition,
both cases deal with situations in which the prosecution stated that it was
seeking gender "balance" on the jury. In both cases, this fact caused
the courts to require the prosecution to demonstrate that the strike would have
nevertheless been exercised even if an improper factor had not motivated in part
the decision to strike. As in these aforementioned cases, one of the reasons
articulated by the prosecutor for striking venireperson Praser raises the
specter of motivation driven by considerations of gender. We, therefore, believe
that under these circumstances, the post-conviction judge here wrongly dismissed
the claim on the basis of defendant's failure to establish a prima facie
case of gender discrimination. An evidentiary hearing must be held to determine
whether the State would have struck Praser even in the absence of any
gender-related reasons. Moreover, without findings from such a hearing, it is
impossible to determine whether defendant has established the requisite
prejudice in order to obtain post-conviction relief, i.e., a new trial,
on the basis of his claim of gender discrimination during jury selection. See United
States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1982) (remanding
cause with directions that a hearing be held to determine whether the defendant
satisfied the cause and prejudice standard). If the facts at the hearing
demonstrate that the State would have struck Praser even in the absence of the
gender-related reason, then defendant cannot be said to have established
prejudice and this claim should be denied. If the State is unable to prove the
proposition, however, then defendant has satisfied his burden of establishing
prejudice and relief should be granted.
To that end, we believe that the Gattis opinions
provide a blueprint for the type of inquiry that should be utilized in this
case. In evaluating the claim, the court should consider "all relevant
circumstances." Batson, 476 U.S.  at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 88, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Batson, the decision
entails a " factual inquiry' that takes into account all
possible explanatory factors' in the particular case." Batson, 476 U.S.  at 95, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 87, 106 S. Ct.  at 1722, quoting Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536, 541-42, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1225
(1972). One relevant aspect of the inquiry is the prosecutor's credibility.
The Supreme Court has noted that a trial judge's finding as to intent is a
"pure issue of fact" and that the "evaluation of the prosecutor's
state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a
trial judge's province.' " Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 409, 111 S. Ct.  at 1869, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 854, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854 (1985).
Finally, in adopting the dual motivation analysis in this
case, we echo the sentiments of the Eleventh Circuit in Tokars regarding
its future use:
"[R]esort to dual motivation will rarely be
    necessary. By now, no competent prosecutor or defense attorney is unaware of
    the fact that strikes on the basis of race or gender are prohibited. The
    procedural posture of this case is unusual in that the law at the time of
    trial was unclear as to whether Batson would be extended to
    gender." Tokars, 95 F.3d  at 1534.
We are confident that the circumstances present in this case
will not be repeated in future cases.
Pursuant to this court's supervisory authority, we retain
jurisdiction and remand this cause to the circuit court of Cook County for a
hearing to determine whether the State would have struck Praser even in the
absence of the gender-related motivation. The circuit court is directed to make
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as to this question. The
circuit court's decision, together with a record of the proceedings on remand,
shall be filed with the clerk of this court within 90 days of the date that this
decision becomes final.
 
CONCLUSION
The cause is remanded with directions to the circuit
court to hold an evidentiary hearing in the manner described in this opinion.
 
Cause remanded with directions.
 
JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Robin Praser is a black woman. Defendant originally charged
that the State had excluded her from the jury because she is black, an action
which would violate Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). In response to that charge, the State asserted that the
color of Praser's skin had nothing to do with its decision. According to the
State, the real reason it struck her from the jury pool was because, among other
things, it wanted "more men to balance out the jury." People v.
Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 432 (1993).
Although gender can be used as a pretext for racial
discrimination (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89, 107, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994)) our court has held that it was not
pretextual in this case. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 432. For the purposes of
this discussion, I am therefore willing to accept the State's explanation.
Praser was not sent home because she was African American. She was sent home
because, inter alia, the State wanted more men and she was not a man.
Excluding a woman from the jury in order to obtain more men
is directly analogous to excluding African Americans in order to obtain more
whites. Favoring whites over African Americans is plainly prohibited. Favoring
men over women is equally unlawful. Just as the jury selection process must be
race neutral, it must be blind to gender. Under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), the government may not
exclude a person from jury service based on whether the person is a man or a
woman. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89,
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Exclusion of even one potential juror on the basis of
gender requires reversal. People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338, 349
(1996).
There is no need to conduct another evidentiary hearing on
the State's motives for excluding Praser in this case. The State was quite
clear about why it did what it did. As previously indicated, Praser was denied a
seat on the jury because she was not a man. To be sure, other reasons were also
given for why Praser was sent home, specifically, her unemployment,
inappropriate demeanor, and lack of attention to detail and instructions.
Nevertheless, the existence of valid, nondiscriminatory explanations cannot
counteract an overtly stated and blatantly unlawful motive. As legitimate as the
other reasons given by the State may have been, it is clear that the State would
not have acted as it did had it not been for the additional fact of Praser's
gender.
The majority would surely have bristled had the State
contended that Praser was excused because she was an unemployed, inattentive black
person who acted inappropriately. I cannot imagine why the majority thinks
it any better for the State to have excluded her on the grounds that she was an
unemployed, inattentive woman who acted inappropriately.
Under the law, Praser's sex simply should not have entered
into the State's determination. No matter how many other women were already on
the jury, the State had no right to take Praser's gender into account when it
considered her. Achieving gender "balance" is not a legally defensible
objective. Rather, it is an example of precisely the sort of gender stereotyping
condemned by the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). It cannot be tolerated.
As the Court wrote in that case:
"All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve
    on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily because of
    discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce
    patterns of historical discrimination. Striking individual jurors on the
    assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is
    practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
    inferiority.' [Citation.] It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror,
    and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclusion from political
    participation. The message it sends to all those in the courtroom, and all
    those who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain
    individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by
    state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons
    could disagree." J.E.B., 511 U.S.  at 141-42, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at
    105, 114 S. Ct.  at 1428.
The State should not be allowed to escape the proscriptions
of J.E.B. by being given the opportunity to show that it would have
excluded Praser even if she had not been a woman. The State has already been
given the opportunity to explain its decision to exclude Praser, and it admitted
taking gender into account. Nearly a decade has passed since then. At this
point, it is difficult to see how the State could credibly establish that gender
did not matter after all.
Even absent the lapse of time, problems of proving an
alternative and independent motivation would be substantial. Ultimately, the
issue will turn on the representations of the individual prosecutors. While
there may be some external corroboration for why they excluded persons of one
sex, that is not enough. Prosecutors must also explain why they failed to strike
persons of the opposite sex. For that there will be no record. Prosecutors do
not memorialize why they have accepted a juror. As a result, the prosecutor's post
hoc explanations will be virtually unchallengeable. As long as the court
finds the prosecutor credible, the prosecutor's justifications will be
controlling.
The consequences of such a system are easy to foresee. If
there is no meaningful review of a prosecutor's claim that he would have
excluded a woman anyway, even if she had not been female, hearings regarding the
prosecutor's motives will be reduced to an exercise in creative after-the-fact
rationalization. Prosecutors will almost always be able to generate an
alternative, non-gender-based explanation for their actions, and courts will
have little choice but to accept their explanations at face value. The result is
that J.E.B. will be rendered a nullity.
Justice Thurgood Marshall addressed the same problem in
criticizing application of the "dual motivation" test to cases
involving Batson and racial discrimination in jury selection. He wrote:
"To excuse *** prejudice when it does surface, on
    the ground that a prosecutor can also articulate nonracial factors for his
    challenges, would be absurd. Batson would thereby become irrelevant,
    and racial discrimination in jury selection, perhaps the greatest
    embarrassment in the administration of our criminal justice system, would go
    undeterred. If such smoking guns' are ignored, we have little hope of
    combating the more subtle forms of racial discrimination." Wilkerson
    v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928, 107 L. Ed. 2d 272, 275, 110 S. Ct. 292, 295
    (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting on denial of cert., joined by
    Brennan, J.).
I agree with Justice Marshall, not with the lower court decisions cited by
the majority in this case. The "dual motivation" test cannot be
squared with the principles underlying Batson and J.E.B. If
prosecutors must provide a race- and gender-neutral basis for a peremptory
challenge, and the law says they must, their explanation must be free from any
taint of racial or gender bias. The explanation proffered by the prosecution in
this case does not meet that test. Defendant should therefore be granted a new
trial.