Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 2014 WI 4

Docket Number: 2011AP002698-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2698-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Curtis L. Jackson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 62, 823 N.W.2d 840 
(Ct. App. – Unpublished)   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 22, 2014    
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 18, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel Konkol/Richard Sankovitz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
BRADLEY, J., joins Part I of dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by James Rebholz and Rebholz & Auberry, Wauwatosa, and oral 
argument by James Rebholz.   
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Marguerite Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
  
 
 
2014 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2698-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF5563) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Curtis L. Jackson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JAN 22, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Jackson, 
No. 2011AP2698-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 
2012), that affirmed the judgment and order of the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court,1 which convicted Curtis L. Jackson 
("Jackson") of second-degree reckless homicide by use of a 
dangerous weapon, and denied his motion for a new trial. 
¶2 
Jackson's petition for review presents the narrow 
question of whether a defendant in a homicide prosecution may 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Daniel L. Konkol presided over the pretrial 
proceedings and the trial. The Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz 
presided over the postconviction motion for a new trial. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
2 
 
introduce evidence of the victim's reputation for violence, when 
the defendant did not know of the victim's reputation at the 
time of the offense. 
¶3 
The issues underlying this case are more complex than 
as set forth in the petition for review.  Specifically, this 
court must decide whether the circuit court improperly excluded 
trial evidence regarding both the shooting victim's reputation 
for violence and the victim's specific violent acts. 
¶4 
Jackson was charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.50(3)(a), and 939.63(1)(b) (2009-10),2 a 
class A felony.  Jackson argued that the victim was behaving in 
a threatening manner, that he believed the victim was armed, and 
that he killed the victim in self-defense.  Jackson had neither 
met the victim, nor knew of the victim's character prior to the 
night of the shooting. 
¶5 
In support of his self-defense theory, Jackson moved 
the circuit court to admit character evidence.  While the motion 
cited to several statutory provisions, it focused on the 
admission of three specific acts to prove the victim's character 
for violence.  The motion did not set forth a foundational basis 
for the admission of reputation testimony.  The circuit court 
denied the motion.  Following his jury trial Jackson brought a 
postconviction motion for a new trial in which he argued, in 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
3 
 
part, that the trial court erred by not allowing Jackson to 
introduce character evidence to show that the victim was the 
"first aggressor" in the confrontation.  The circuit court also 
denied Jackson's postconviction motion, and Jackson appealed. 
¶6 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
relying on McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 
(1973).  In the court of appeals, Jackson conceded that the 
specific acts of violence were inadmissible to prove the 
character of the victim under Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2), but argued 
that the victim's violent character could still have been proved 
by reputation testimony under § 904.05(1).3  Jackson did not 
appeal the circuit court's exclusion of other acts evidence 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).4  The court of appeals affirmed the 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.05 provides: 
(1)  Reputation or opinion.  In all cases in 
which evidence of character or a trait of character of 
a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony 
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an 
opinion.  On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable 
in relevant specific instances. 
(2)  Specific instances of conduct.  In cases in 
which character or a trait of character of a person is 
an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, 
proof may also be made of specific instances of the 
person's conduct.  
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) provides, in relevant part: 
(a)  Except as provided in par. (b), evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that 
the 
person 
acted 
in 
conformity 
therewith. 
This 
subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered 
for 
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
4 
 
circuit court, concluding that a "defendant's prior knowledge of 
the victim's character, either by reputation or specific acts, 
has consistently been a prerequisite to admission of such 
evidence as part of a self-defense claim."  Jackson, No. 
2011AP2698-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶21.  
¶7 
Jackson petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on February 12, 2013. 
¶8 
We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in denying Jackson's motion to admit 
character evidence.  The circuit court properly determined that 
in order for specific acts of violence to be admissible, 
"character or a trait of character of a person" must be "an 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense."  In a 
homicide case where a claim of self-defense is raised, character 
evidence may be admissible as evidence of the defendant's state 
of mind so long as the defendant had knowledge of the prior acts 
at the time of the offense.  McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d at 152.  We 
also conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying 
Jackson's motion to admit testimony that the victim had a 
reputation for violence under Wis. Stat. § 904.05(1).  Jackson 
failed to establish a proper foundation for the court to 
determine that evidence of the victim's reputation for violence 
was admissible.  We further conclude that, even assuming error 
                                                                                                                                                             
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
5 
 
occurred, that error was harmless.  Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶9 
On November 4, 2008, Milwaukee Police Department 
Officer Frank Galloway ("Officer Galloway") responded to a shots 
fired call at 3776 North 60th Street in the City of Milwaukee.  
Upon arrival, Officer Galloway was directed by witnesses to the 
rear of the residence where he found the victim, Angelo McCaleb 
("McCaleb"), lying on his back. 
¶10 McCaleb was declared dead at the scene.  His body was 
later transported to the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner's 
Office where an autopsy confirmed that McCaleb had died as the 
result of a single gunshot wound to the chest. 
¶11 While at the scene, Officer Galloway encountered 
Jackson.  Officer Galloway asked Jackson if he knew who had shot 
the victim, to which Jackson responded: "I did it.  I shot him.  
The gun is over there on top of the car.  Sorry, I did not mean 
to do it."  Officer Galloway took Jackson into custody. 
¶12 Although the five witnesses to the shooting differed 
on the details, the basic facts are undisputed.  On the evening 
of November 4, 2008, Tanya Davis ("Davis") borrowed Jackson's 
car to go to a bar.  While at the bar, Davis met McCaleb and his 
friend Wayne Johnson ("Johnson") and had drinks with them.  It 
would later be established that McCaleb had a .18 blood alcohol 
concentration at the time of his death.  While Davis was at the 
bar, Jackson left phone messages asking her to return his car.  
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
6 
 
Davis testified that McCaleb responded to these messages by 
saying "fuck that nigger" in reference to Jackson. 
¶13 Davis eventually returned the car to Jackson's house.  
She was followed by McCaleb and Johnson.  Upon arriving, McCaleb 
and Johnson got into an argument with Jackson and two women, 
Francheska Garcia ("Garcia") and Lawanda Knight ("Knight"), who 
lived with Jackson at the time.  Jackson would later testify 
that, when he knocked on McCaleb's car window, McCaleb said that 
Jackson "had some fuckin' nerve knockin' on somebody's car 
window like that."  Jackson and McCaleb then argued, "yelling 
back and forth" about whether Davis would be going back out that 
evening.  During the course of the argument, Jackson testified 
that McCaleb "lunged" at Garcia with his fist "clenched" and 
"[a]nger in his face."  This was corroborated by testimony from 
Garcia, who stated that McCaleb stepped towards her "like to 
hit" her at one point during the argument.  Jackson then 
retrieved a handgun from his vehicle.   
¶14 Knight later testified that Jackson used that gun to 
shoot McCaleb only after McCaleb got "so mad" and returned to 
Johnson's car as if to retrieve something.  McCaleb then walked 
back towards Jackson "really fast with one hand behind his 
back," saying "something for you, motherfucker."  Further, 
Knight told police that McCaleb was "pulling at his waistband as 
if he was going for a gun."  In an interview with a Milwaukee 
Police Department detective following the shooting, Jackson said 
that McCaleb was behaving in a threatening manner, and that he 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
7 
 
believed McCaleb had armed himself as well.  McCaleb was, in 
fact, unarmed.  
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶15 On 
November 
8, 
2008, 
Jackson 
made 
his 
initial 
appearance.  The criminal complaint alleged a single count of 
first-degree reckless homicide while armed, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.63, a class B felony.  Cash bail was 
set at $150,000. 
¶16 On November 17, 2008, the court held Jackson's 
preliminary hearing.  Following testimony from a Milwaukee 
Police Department detective regarding the circumstances of the 
shooting, the State moved to bind Jackson over for trial.  
Jackson moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he had acted 
in self-defense.5  The court denied Jackson's motion to dismiss, 
granted the State's motion, and Jackson was bound over for 
trial. 
                                                 
5 Self-defense is detailed in Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1), which 
provides: 
A 
person 
is 
privileged 
to 
threaten 
or 
intentionally use force against another for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person by such other person. The actor 
may intentionally use only such force or threat 
thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor 
may not intentionally use force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the 
actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
8 
 
¶17 On December 9, 2008, Jackson was arraigned on the 
Information which charged him with one count of first-degree 
reckless homicide while armed.  Jackson waived a reading of the 
Information and pled not guilty to the charge.  On February 6, 
2009, the court held a pretrial conference and set a trial date 
of May 4, 2009. 
¶18 On February 12, 2009, the State filed an Amended 
Information which charged Jackson with first-degree intentional 
homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.50(3)(a), and 939.63(1)(b), a class A 
felony. 
¶19 On April 7, 2009, Jackson filed a Motion to Admit 
Character and Habit Evidence.6  Jackson offered three prior acts 
of violence by McCaleb as evidence of his "history of violent 
and assaultive behavior."  First, Jackson offered McCaleb's 1995 
conviction for criminal trespass and disorderly conduct for 
McCaleb's role as one of a dozen individuals involved in a home 
invasion altercation where McCaleb pretended to have an object 
that appeared to be a firearm or other weapon and during the 
invasion struck an individual repeatedly with a bar stool.  
Second, Jackson offered a November 7, 2004, City of Milwaukee 
                                                 
6 Although mentioned in this filing, Jackson never sought to 
admit evidence of a "habit" under Wis. Stat. § 904.06, nor did 
the circuit court rule on the issue.  Jackson's motion also 
cites to Wis. Stat. § 906.08, which governs evidence of the 
character of a witness, but he similarly fails to develop an 
argument around that statute.  This opinion, therefore, does not 
address habit evidence or evidence of the character of a witness 
as these issues have not been raised on appeal. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
9 
 
assault and battery citation McCaleb received for pushing his 
girlfriend during a domestic dispute outside of a tavern.  
Finally, Jackson offered a January 18, 2008, citation McCaleb 
received for, after being at a party, kicking in the door of an 
individual named Adam Comp ("Comp") and punching him. 
¶20 Jackson argued in his pretrial motion papers that 
these three prior acts of violence were admissible as other acts 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Jackson also argued that 
"evidence of a pertinent trait" of McCaleb's character would be 
admissible under § 904.04(1).7  Jackson conceded in his motion 
that: 
Mr. Jackson was not acquainted with Mr. McCaleb 
and was not aware of these previous acts of violence 
at the time of the shooting, thus he is not able to 
admit evidence of these acts pursuant to doctrines set 
forth in McMorris v. State . . . which permit the 
admission of specific violent acts of a victim 
previously known to a defendant in a self-defense 
case.  
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(1) "Character Evidence Generally" 
provides, in relevant part: 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
the person's character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
 . . . . 
(b) Character of victim. Except as provided in s. 
972.11(2), evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered 
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
10 
 
Jackson nonetheless argued that "in a self-defense case where 
the violent character of the deceased is an essential element of 
the defense," testimony concerning the victim's reputation for 
violence is admissible.  Wis. Stat. §§ 904.04(1)(b), 904.05(1).  
Jackson's motion muddled its discussion of McCaleb's prior 
violent acts with its reference to reputation evidence.  While 
mentioning reputation evidence, Jackson's motion did not offer 
any foundation for the admission of reputation evidence.  
Further, while Jackson's motion contained the phrase "first 
aggressor," the phrase is merely a quote of the language in 
§ 904.04(1)(b).  Jackson never explained how first aggressor is 
at issue so as to affect the admissibility of character 
evidence.  The pretrial motion focused on the admission of the 
three specific acts Jackson sought to introduce to prove 
McCaleb's character. 
¶21 On April 21, 2009, the State responded to Jackson's 
motion.  The State opposed Jackson's motion, arguing that 
McCaleb's prior acts of violence were not admissible.  The State 
argued that the specific acts of violence were irrelevant, being 
too distant in time and too factually distinct from the 
circumstances of the case.  The State also argued that, assuming 
the specific acts had any probative value, that value was 
substantially outweighed by the prejudice that would result from 
admitting them.  The State asserted that these specific acts 
would unfairly indicate that the victim had acted in conformity 
with his past conduct.  The State did not respond to Jackson's 
citation to reputation evidence and, like the defendant's 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
11 
 
motion, focused instead on the admissibility of the three 
specific acts of violence. 
¶22 On April 27, 2009, at the motion hearing, the circuit 
court denied Jackson's motion.  The court concluded that 
McCaleb's prior specific acts were inadmissible under McMorris 
because "[i]t's got to be something that the defendant knew.  
Otherwise, it is doing something improper.  So since the 
defendant did not know about those acts, I don't believe that 
the defense is allowed to go into those."  The court further 
explained that the specific acts of violence were also not 
admissible as other acts evidence: 
Again, you have indicated that these two people 
didn't even know each other, so I don't think that 
substantiates any type of motive to do something to 
the defendant. I don't think it even qualifies under 
the first analysis [sic] with regard to the Sullivan 
analysis. So I don't even think you can get beyond 
that, but even if you have, I think the probative 
value would be substantially outweighed by the danger 
of prejudice, unfair prejudice, so that evidence is 
not admissible. 
¶23 With the specific acts of violence excluded on both 
character evidence and other acts evidence grounds, the record 
could be read to reflect that defense counsel then made an 
attempt, albeit fleeting, to admit reputation or opinion 
testimony that McCaleb was a violent person: 
 
Okay.  Then I guess, first of all, I understand 
the Court's ruling.  Then I'm asking how the Court is 
going to rule then specifically——omitting specific 
acts but asking specifically I think that it is 
admissible for the defense to proffer opinion and 
reputation evidence of Mr. McCaleb, the witness, 
assuming I can lay a foundation, I believe I can, that 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
12 
 
Mr. McCaleb is a violent person, the witness' opinion 
that he is a violent person and that McCaleb had a 
reputation for violence. 
This attempt, however, failed to identify a witness, establish a 
foundation, or even clarify that what counsel sought to admit 
was the statement "McCaleb had a reputation for violence." 
¶24 The State then focused on the admissibility of 
character evidence as it related to credibility and stated: 
 
Judge, my understanding of character evidence, 
the admissible character evidence is it bears on 
credibility and I don't think that obviously would 
bear on credibility since the victim is not here to 
defend himself as to those accusations or opinions, so 
I don't think they're relevant under the character 
evidence statute. 
The court, perhaps not fully digesting that Jackson's argument 
had shifted from the admissibility of the specific acts to 
admissibility of the statement "McCaleb had a reputation for 
violence," replied: 
 
All right.  I agree.  I don't believe that those 
matters would be relevant, so they would not be 
allowed. 
¶25 Despite the court not specifically responding to her 
reputation evidence argument, counsel did not object to the 
court's rulings, or ask for a specific ruling on reputation 
evidence.  Further, counsel did not clarify her request and did 
not request the opportunity to make a proffer.  In addition, 
counsel did not specifically raise the first aggressor issue.  
Instead, counsel stated:  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  All right.  Okay.  So the 
Court is denying the defense proffer opinion and 
reputation— 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
13 
 
THE 
COURT:  Character 
evidence, 
Number 
2, 
I 
believe that is what it is entitled. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  And that, in its entirety, is denied. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  All right.  Well, 
there was one other matter [relating to a different 
motion] . . . . 
After the court had addressed the balance of the pretrial 
matters, Jackson's counsel did not insist on a specific ruling 
from the court, nor did she ask to make a proffer to preserve 
the issue for appeal, and instead concluded: 
I think that really, except for the more boilerplate 
motion in limine, that we have then addressed all the 
issues that the defense has raised in these two 
motions. 
¶26 On October 5, 2009, a six-day jury trial began.8  In 
short, the State's theory was that Jackson shot and killed 
McCaleb because he was jealous and angry, rather than fearful 
and acting in self-defense.  Jackson was the only party who was 
armed during the confrontation.  The State elicited testimony to 
the effect that Jackson believed he was in a committed 
relationship with Davis, and that he had received information 
that she was hugging and kissing McCaleb the night of the 
shooting.  Testimony indicated that McCaleb and Jackson had been 
arguing and "yelling back and forth" before the fatal shooting.  
Testimony also indicated that McCaleb charged at Jackson just 
before McCaleb was shot.  
                                                 
8 May 4, 2009, was Jackson's initial trial date.  The court 
was forced to reschedule Jackson's trial due to a conflict with 
a prior adjourned homicide case. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 Jackson contended that he was acting in self-defense.  
The jury heard testimony that McCaleb, who was described as 
being taller, heavier, and more muscular than Jackson, drove up 
to Jackson's home in a black car with deeply tinted windows.  
The jury heard testimony that McCaleb was drunk and high and 
acting belligerently, and that he shouted statements such as 
"you must got some fuckin' nerve knockin' on somebody's window 
like that," "you don't know who the fuck I am," and "who the 
fuck are you?"  The jury heard that McCaleb approached one of 
the witnesses "like to hit" her with his fist "clenched" and 
"[a]nger in his face" during the course of the argument.  The 
jury also heard that McCaleb stated "you got me fucked up" and 
that he had "something for you, motherfucker" just before the 
fatal shot was fired.  Jackson's theory of the case was entirely 
focused on self-defense.  Jackson testified himself, and 
elicited testimony from other witnesses, that he acted in a 
restrained and reasonable manner, and that he shot McCaleb only 
after McCaleb charged at him. 
¶28 Neither the State nor Jackson specifically argued 
"first aggressor" until after all the evidence had been 
presented at trial.  To the extent that first aggressor was 
presented at or before the trial, it was during the State's 
closing arguments, when it argued "[t]his isn't one-sided.  This 
isn't just Angelo McCaleb acting out of control, creating chaos 
and being the aggressor out there.  This is an argument between 
both he and Mr. Jackson." 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
15 
 
¶29 On October 12, 2009, the jury found Jackson guilty of 
the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide 
while armed, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06(1) and 939.63(1), 
a class D felony.  The court entered the judgment of conviction 
against Jackson, and ordered a presentence investigation report. 
¶30 On December 15, 2009, Jackson filed a sentencing 
memorandum with the court.  For the first time, in this 
document, Jackson provided a foundation that Comp knew McCaleb 
outside of the single violent incident on January 18, 2008, 
mentioned in Jackson's motion to admit character evidence. 
¶31 On January 19, 2010, the court sentenced Jackson to 15 
years 
imprisonment, 
comprised 
of 
ten 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement 
to 
be 
followed 
by 
five 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  On January 29, 2010, Jackson filed a notice of 
intent to pursue postconviction relief. 
¶32 On December 6, 2010, after having received two 
extensions, Jackson filed a notice of appeal in the court of 
appeals.  Thereafter, Jackson sought to dismiss that appeal 
without prejudice.  On March 21, 2011, the court of appeals 
granted Jackson's motion to dismiss because Jackson needed to 
first raise the issues in a postconviction motion before the 
circuit court.  State v. Jackson, No. 2010AP2961-CR, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2011). 
¶33 On June 15, 2011, Jackson filed a postconviction 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30 in the 
circuit court.  Jackson's motion alleged that the circuit court 
erred when it denied admission of "the victim's reputation and 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
16 
 
specific prior acts of violence."9  Jackson argued that "[t]he 
court's decision denying the motion was erroneous and prejudiced 
Jackson because it prevented him from impeaching the prosecution 
theory that Jackson was the 'aggressor' and the one 'who put all 
this stuff in motion.'"  He argued that the evidence pertained 
to "determining who was the aggressor, and the defendant's 
apprehension of danger."  Jackson argued that the evidence was 
admissible regardless of whether Jackson knew of the victim's 
violent tendencies:  
Notwithstanding the reasonable apprehension of 
courts to allow character evidence to prove conduct, 
some form of evidence tending to show the victim's 
violent character should have been admissible for the 
limited purpose of supporting the defendant's self-
defense claim that the victim was the first aggressor. 
Jackson's postconviction motion was the first time that the 
defense began to outline a possible foundation for reputation 
testimony, 
citing 
to 
the 
sentencing 
memorandum. 
 
The 
postconviction motion seemingly averred that through trial 
counsel "[t]he defendant sought to offer the testimony of Adam 
Comp and others to establish McCabe's [sic] reputation and 
character for violence against strangers and others" citing to 
the sentencing memorandum.  Counsel failed to indicate how this 
argument was properly made pretrial or how any proffer before 
                                                 
9 Jackson also alleged in his postconviction motion that the 
jury had been improperly instructed and that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of the defective 
instruction. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
17 
 
trial established a foundational basis for the reputation 
testimony. 
¶34 In his postconviction motion, Jackson did not assert 
that the circuit court erred in excluding the three specific 
violent 
acts 
as 
other 
acts 
evidence 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2). 
¶35 On July 21, 2011, the State responded to Jackson's 
motion for a new trial.  The State contended that the circuit 
court's exclusion of McCaleb's prior acts of violence had been a 
proper exercise of discretion.  The State noted that in the 
majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, specific prior acts are inadmissible to prove a 
victim's conduct if the acts are unknown to the defendant 
because the acts are not relevant to an element of the offense.  
The State conceded that reputation evidence may be admissible to 
prove a victim's violent character, but argued that since 
Jackson failed to lay a proper foundation for reputation 
testimony, that evidence was properly excluded.  
¶36 On 
October 
17, 
2011, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Jackson's postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing.  
The court concluded that McCaleb's prior violent acts had been 
properly excluded.  The postconviction court reasoned that, as a 
specific act, Jackson had not shown "how Mr. McCaleb's supposed 
propensity for throwing the first punch was an essential element 
of self-defense" and therefore admissible under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.05(2).  Jackson did not assert that he knew McCaleb such 
that the evidence would establish that "he had any reason to 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
18 
 
fear Mr. McCaleb."  The court noted that Jackson did not "offer 
any authority for the proposition that it is essential to a 
claim of self-defense to demonstrate that the victim has a 
violent character."  The court concluded, "[a]nd think about it 
– do we generally allow defendants to put on a self-defense case 
without evidence that the victim had a propensity for violence?  
All the time; hence evidence of the kind Mr. Jackson wished to 
introduce at trial cannot be deemed essential to his defense."  
As to Jackson's argument that he needed to introduce the 
specific acts in order to "impeach the prosecution theory that 
Jackson was the 'aggressor' and the one 'who put all this stuff 
in motion,'" the court also noted that the first aggressor issue 
was not even arguably raised until closing arguments, and so it 
was "too late" to introduce evidence at that point.  The court 
concluded that Jackson failed to raise, at any point earlier in 
the trial, "any argument or evidence needed rebutting with 
evidence showing that Mr. McCaleb was the first aggressor."  
¶37 The postconviction court also concluded that the 
specific acts evidence "does not tend to show that Mr. McCaleb 
had the character of a first aggressor."  The court outlined 
that even assuming "specific instances of the victim's violent 
past were generally admissible, the court would not have 
admitted the three particular instances offered by Mr. Jackson 
here."  The court also outlined why each instance would be 
inadmissible.  The court noted the evidentiary deficiencies, 
stating that the 1995 and 2004 acts "lacked sufficient probative 
value."  The court went on, concluding that the 2008 act "would 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
19 
 
have triggered a satellite trial over whether . . . Mr. McCaleb 
was the first aggressor or not, the kind of sideshow that courts 
have long lamented as the reason for excluding character 
evidence consisting of specific instances of conduct rather than 
reputation or opinion testimony." 
¶38 The court noted that in some circumstances a victim's 
reputation for violence could be admissible, but concluded that 
Werner 
v. 
State, 
66 
Wis. 2d 736, 
226 
N.W.2d 402 
(1975), 
precludes the use of specific acts of violence to prove the 
first aggressor issue: "[e]vidence of specific acts of violence 
from Mr. McCaleb's past are not admissible to prove that he has 
a propensity for violence or that Mr. Jackson was acting in 
self-defense." 
¶39 On November 21, 2011, Jackson filed a notice of appeal 
from the judgment of conviction entered on January 19, 2010, and 
from the order denying his motion for a new trial entered on 
October 17, 2011.  Jackson renewed the arguments he raised in 
his postconviction motion, but framed the evidentiary issue 
differently.  Rather than arguing that the three specific acts 
of violence were improperly excluded, Jackson conceded that 
"[i]f . . . the defendant was not acquainted with the victim or 
his specific instances of violent conduct prior to their violent 
encounter, the defendant is limited to introducing evidence of 
the victim's violent character by way of reputation or opinion 
evidence."  Jackson's argument, for the first time, focused on 
the exclusion of testimony as to McCaleb's reputation for 
violence, rather than the exclusion of the specific prior acts.  
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
20 
 
He argued that not allowing testimony regarding McCaleb's 
reputation for violence denied him the opportunity to show that 
McCaleb possessed a violent character and was likely the first 
aggressor.  Jackson did not appeal the circuit court's exclusion 
of McCaleb's prior violent conduct as other acts evidence under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). 
¶40 On May 9, 2012, the State filed its brief in the court 
of appeals.  The State noted the shift in Jackson's position, 
and then argued that reputation evidence is also inadmissible 
where the defendant is unaware of the victim's reputation.  The 
State also argued that in any event Jackson had failed to lay a 
proper foundation for any reputation evidence.  
¶41 On October 10, 2012, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  Jackson, No. 2011AP2698-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶14, 23. The court of appeals concluded with respect to 
the exclusion of evidence that "a defendant's prior knowledge of 
the victim's character, either by reputation or specific acts, 
has consistently been a prerequisite to admission of such 
evidence as part of a self-defense claim."  Id., ¶21.  Because 
Jackson did not have knowledge of McCaleb's violent character, 
the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had 
properly excluded evidence of that character.  Id.  Although 
Jackson did not raise it in his briefing, the court of appeals 
also rejected the argument that the prior acts could be admitted 
to prove "McCaleb's motive, opportunity and lack of accident or 
mistake," reasoning that none of those were an element of 
Jackson's self-defense claim.  Id., ¶22. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
21 
 
¶42 Jackson petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on February 12, 2013. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶43 "This court will not disturb a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion."  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 
67, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (citing State v. 
Ringer, 2010 WI 69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448).  "A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies 
an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably 
supported by the facts of record."  Id. (citing Johnson v. 
Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811 
N.W.2d 756). 
¶44 "[A] circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion 
does not warrant a new trial if the error was harmless."  
Weborg, 341 Wis. 2d 668, ¶43 (citing State v. Harris, 2008 WI 
15, ¶85, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397). "Application of the 
harmless error rule presents a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo."  Id. (citing State v. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 
258, ¶26, 268 Wis. 2d 468, 673 N.W.2d 369). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶45 Our analysis begins with the understanding that "the 
circuit court's decisions to admit or exclude evidence are 
entitled to great deference . . . ."  State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 
¶43, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413 (citing Martindale v. Ripp, 
2001 WI 113, ¶29, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698).  This court 
will reverse a discretionary decision only if the circuit 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
22 
 
court's exercise of discretion "is based on an error of law."  
Id. 
¶46 In this case, the circuit court was called upon, in 
part, to consider whether character evidence was admissible 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 904.04 and 904.05.  As a general rule, 
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of the person's 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the 
person 
acted 
in 
conformity 
therewith 
on 
a 
particular 
occasion . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1). 
¶47 An exception to this general rule is the admission of 
"pertinent" character evidence of a victim offered by a criminal 
defendant:  
Except as provided in s. 972.11(2), evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution 
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim 
was the first aggressor. 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b). 
¶48  When the exception has been satisfied, one way 
character evidence may be presented is in the form of reputation 
or opinion testimony.  Wis. Stat. § 904.05(1).  When the 
exception has been satisfied and a defendant seeks to admit 
specific instances of the victim's prior conduct, however, it 
must be the case that "character or a trait of character" of the 
victim "is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense."  
Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2). 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
23 
 
¶49 In his pretrial motion, Jackson sought to admit three 
prior violent acts by McCaleb in support of his argument that he 
shot McCaleb in self-defense.  Jackson argued that the prior 
acts were admissible in two different ways.  First, Jackson 
argued that McCaleb's violent acts were admissible as other acts 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Second, Jackson argued 
that McCaleb's prior violent acts were admissible as evidence of 
McCaleb's 
"character 
for 
violence" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 904.04(1)(b), 904.05(1) and (2).  Although mentioned in 
passing, Jackson's motion and argument never focused on the 
admission of McCaleb's "reputation for violence," but rather the 
argument before the circuit court focused on the admissibility 
of McCaleb's specific acts.  In other words, the focus of both 
the pretrial and postconviction motions, and therefore the focus 
of the court's attention, was on Jackson's attempt to establish 
McCaleb's character for violence by introducing these three 
specific acts of violence.  Jackson never established a 
foundation or made a proffer for the admission of the statement 
"McCaleb had a reputation for violence."  Jackson also never 
requested a specific ruling from the court regarding the 
admissibility of that evidence.   
¶50 Reputation evidence, such as the statement "McCaleb 
had a reputation for violence," is not proven by the admission 
of testimony of specific acts.  Specific act testimony has far 
more persuasive value than the one-liner "X had a reputation for 
violence," and so it is much more appealing to introduce 
specific acts evidence.  Not surprisingly then, the focus of 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
24 
 
Jackson's counsel, the State, and the trial court was on the 
admission of the three specific acts, and not general reputation 
testimony.   
¶51 The record reflects that counsel never clearly argued 
to lay the foundation and for admissibility of reputation 
testimony before the circuit court.  If Jackson's counsel did 
intend that reputation testimony be admitted, when it seemed the 
State and the court were not following that argument, counsel 
should have clarified the issue, laid the foundation, and 
requested a specific ruling on reputation evidence.  Instead, 
the moving papers do not set forth the foundation for 
admissibility, an oral proffer was not made at argument, and 
thus, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. 
¶52 Pretrial, Jackson did not argue that the evidence he 
sought to introduce would be "McCaleb had a reputation for 
violence."  He did not frame his analysis in terms of the 
admission of general reputation evidence to establish first 
aggressor.  He did not argue that McCaleb was the first 
aggressor at trial, although he claims the State argued first 
aggressor in its closing argument.  Jackson's first mention of 
introducing general "reputation for violence" evidence to 
establish first aggressor was in his postconviction motion.  
Although Jackson now argues that the defect in the circuit 
court's ruling was exclusion of general reputation testimony, it 
is also telling that his pretrial and postconviction motions are 
primarily cast in terms of the admissibility of the three 
specific acts he offered in his pretrial motion.  This court has 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
25 
 
held that "all claims of error that a criminal defendant can 
bring should be consolidated into one motion or appeal."  State 
v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶44, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756 (emphasis 
in original).  Claims that are not so consolidated are barred 
"absent a showing of a sufficient reason for why the claims were 
not raised . . . ."  Id.  
¶53 Character 
evidence, 
in 
the 
form 
of 
reputation, 
opinion, or specific acts, and other acts evidence may appear 
intertwined, but each requires a different legal analysis for 
admission.  Jackson seemingly conflated character evidence, by 
reputation and specific acts, and other acts evidence in his 
motions before the circuit court.  Even though reputation 
evidence is the focus of this appeal, in an effort to clarify 
the law this opinion will address other acts evidence, character 
shown by reputation or opinion evidence, and character shown by 
specific incidents of conduct.  Each evidentiary principle 
carries a unique analysis.  In this case, however, we conclude 
that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding the evidence under any of these principles. 
A. Other Acts Evidence 
¶54 Jackson argued in his pretrial motion that three prior 
acts of violence were admissible as other acts evidence under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Postconviction, Jackson has not argued 
that the trial court erred in excluding the other acts evidence.  
Pretrial, Jackson asserted that the 1995 disorderly conduct 
conviction, the 2004 assault and battery citation, and the 2008 
disorderly conduct citation were relevant to show McCaleb's 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
26 
 
"motive, opportunity and lack of accident or mistake."  The 
circuit court rejected these arguments and concluded that the 
evidence was not offered for an acceptable purpose, was 
irrelevant to the case, and alternatively that the probative 
value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of prejudice. 
¶55 The admissibility of other acts evidence is addressed 
using a three-step analysis: 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2), 
such 
as 
establishing 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, 
plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident? 
(2) Is the other acts evidence relevant, considering 
the two facets of relevance set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 904.01?  The first consideration 
in assessing relevance is whether the other acts 
evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is 
of consequence to the determination of the 
action.  The second consideration in assessing 
relevance is whether the evidence has probative 
value, that is, whether the other acts evidence 
has a tendency to make the consequential fact or 
proposition more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts evidence 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste 
of 
time 
or 
needless 
presentation 
of 
cumulative evidence?  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03. 
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998) 
(footnote omitted). 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
27 
 
¶56 Here, the circuit court properly excluded the evidence 
of McCaleb's past violent conduct under each of the three prongs 
of the Sullivan test.  
¶57 First, although his motion recited the language from 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) and Sullivan, Jackson failed to connect 
the specific instances of violence with any of the permissible 
purposes described in those sources.  The Sullivan court made 
clear that the proponent of other acts evidence has the burden 
of showing how the evidence meets each prong of the analysis.  
216 Wis. 2d at 774.  A separate analysis is required for each 
piece of evidence.  State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶43, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771.  
¶58 Jackson purportedly offered the evidence to show 
McCaleb's "motive, opportunity and lack of accident or mistake" 
but he never explained how the evidence met the criteria for 
admission as other acts evidence.  The circuit court determined 
that "you have indicated that these two people didn't even know 
each other, so I don't think that substantiates any type of 
motive to do something to the defendant.  I don't think it even 
qualifies under the first analysis [sic] with regard to the 
Sullivan analysis."  Simply stated, Jackson failed to show how 
the other acts evidence was related to an acceptable purpose 
under the statute. 
¶59 Second, we agree with the circuit court that Jackson 
failed to show how the other acts evidence is relevant under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Jackson did not show that the past 
conduct related to a consequential fact, nor did he show its 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
28 
 
probative value.  In a first-degree intentional homicide case, 
self-defense is applicable if the defendant (1) reasonably 
believed that he or she was facing a threat of "imminent death 
or great bodily harm," and (2) reasonably believed the amount of 
force used was "necessary to prevent" the threat.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 939.48(1); Wis. JI——Criminal 805.  At least in part 
because 
he 
was 
unaware 
of 
McCaleb's 
past 
conduct, 
the 
reasonableness of Jackson's beliefs was not impacted by that 
conduct.  Thus, as the circuit court concluded, these specific 
acts by McCaleb were irrelevant. 
¶60 Third, the circuit court determined that the probative 
value was substantially outweighed by the prejudice:  
I don't think it even qualifies under the first 
analysis [sic] with regard to the Sullivan analysis.  
So I don't even think you can get beyond that, but 
even if you have, I think the probative value would be 
substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, 
unfair prejudice, so that evidence is not admissible. 
¶61 For purposes of other acts evidence, the circuit court 
properly applied the facts before it to the proper legal 
standard and excluded the three prior acts of violence.  Based 
on the record, we cannot conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Given that Jackson has 
focused his appeal on character evidence, we can conclude that 
he now agrees. 
B. Character Evidence 
¶62 Before the circuit court, Jackson argued that three 
prior acts could be admitted to show "evidence of a pertinent 
trait" of McCaleb's character under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1).  
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
29 
 
Jackson also argued that "in a self-defense case where the 
violent character of the deceased is an essential element of the 
defense," testimony concerning the victim's reputation for 
violence is admissible.  Jackson did not identify any witnesses 
in his motion who could testify that "McCaleb had a reputation 
for violence," and he did not lay a foundation for the 
admissibility of that general testimony.  Jackson also did not 
show how McCaleb's violent character was "an essential element 
of a charge, claim, or defense," such that the specific acts 
were admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2). 
¶63 The circuit court rejected Jackson's arguments and 
concluded: "I think the probative value would be substantially 
outweighed by the danger of prejudice, unfair prejudice, so that 
evidence is not admissible." 
¶64 Generally 
speaking, 
"[e]vidence 
of 
a 
person's 
character or a trait of the person's character is not admissible 
for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity 
therewith 
on 
a 
particular 
occasion . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(1).  "[T]he law of evidence disdains the use of 
character to show propensity to behave in a certain way."  7 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 405.1, at 225 (3d ed. 2008).  We agree. 
¶65 There are, however, exceptions to this general rule, 
one of which is evidence of a "pertinent character trait" of the 
deceased in a homicide prosecution.  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b).  
When character is at issue, proof may be made at trial by 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
30 
 
reputation testimony, opinion testimony, and by specific acts.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.05(1) and (2). 
¶66 Reputation testimony is one form of hearsay in which a 
witness will testify about the subject's reputation within the 
community.  Opinion testimony permits the witness to testify 
about his or her own opinion of the subject's character.  
Neither reputation nor opinion testimony include evidence of 
specific 
instances 
of 
conduct, 
except 
perhaps 
in 
cross-
examination or rebuttal.   
¶67 Reputation and opinion testimony have significant 
persuasive limitations before a jury because they tend to be of 
a sweeping and conclusory nature.  Reputation testimony, in 
particular, "has been aptly but disparagingly described as the 
'irresponsible 
product 
of 
multiple 
guesses 
and 
gossip.'"  
Blinka, supra, § 405.2, at 226.  This type of reputation 
testimony, which would tend to show that "McCaleb had a 
reputation for violence," does not permit the jury to hear about 
specific acts of violence. 
¶68 On the other hand, the introduction of specific acts 
to prove character requires a different analysis.  "Of the three 
methods of proving character provided by the rule, evidence of 
specific instances of conduct is the most convincing.  At the 
same 
time 
it 
possesses 
the 
greatest 
capacity 
to 
arouse 
prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time."  
Advisory Committee Notes-1972 Proposed Rules, Fed. R. Evid. 405.  
A court may properly consider the value of the admissibility of 
specific acts against competing interests such as prejudice, 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
31 
 
confusion, or creating a trial within a trial.  In other words, 
does the probative value outweigh the prejudicial effect?  The 
use of character evidence shown through specific acts requires 
even more than the foundation required for the admission of 
reputation or opinion testimony.  To admit specific acts to show 
character, the character or trait of character must be "an 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.05(2).  The circuit court still retains great discretion 
in determining whether to admit the evidence. 
¶69 In his pretrial motion, Jackson stated that McCaleb's 
violent character was "pertinent" to his self-defense theory, 
but made little effort to explain further.  At the circuit court 
level, Jackson had sought to prove McCaleb's character for 
violence by introducing the three specific acts of violence 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2).  Critically, Jackson never focused 
his argument on the admissibility of the statement "McCaleb had 
a reputation for violence" in the circuit court.  Instead, he 
primarily 
sought 
to 
prove 
that 
McCaleb 
was 
violent 
by 
introducing specific instances of conduct.  Jackson now claims 
that McCaleb's violent character was relevant to determining who 
the first aggressor was in their confrontation such that the 
circuit court ought to have allowed testimony that "McCaleb had 
a reputation for violence."  On appeal, Jackson has abandoned 
the argument that the circuit court erred when it denied 
admission of the specific instances of conduct.  Jackson's 
change of heart does not afford him the relief he requests. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
32 
 
¶70 We first address whether Jackson laid a proper 
foundation for admitting reputation evidence——"McCaleb had a 
reputation 
for 
violence." 
 
Second, 
even 
though 
Jackson 
apparently now agrees that the offered specific prior acts are 
inadmissible, we address whether the circuit court erroneously 
excluded evidence of McCaleb's violent character through the 
specific instances offered.  In each instance, we conclude that 
the circuit court's exercise of discretion was not erroneous. 
1. Reputation Evidence 
¶71 Jackson asks this court to find that the character 
evidence "McCaleb had a reputation for violence" is admissible 
despite the fact that Jackson was unaware of that reputation at 
the time of the shooting.  We first discuss whether Jackson laid 
a proper foundation for the reputation evidence.  We hold that 
he did not.  We further conclude that Jackson failed to make a 
proffer regarding reputation evidence, and so failed to preserve 
the issue for appeal.  Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1); State v. Winters, 
2009 WI App 48, ¶¶17-19, 317 Wis. 2d 401, 766 N.W.2d 754 
(holding that a party challenging a trial court's ruling 
excluding evidence is obligated to make an offer of proof). 
¶72 "The 
foundation 
for 
reputation 
is 
deliberately 
simplistic.  Properly framed, the reputation testimony can be 
elicited in less than a minute.  The streamlined foundation 
befits the evidence's modest probative value."  Blinka, supra, 
§ 405.2, at 226.  A proper foundation for reputation testimony 
requires showing four elements: 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
33 
 
• The witness belongs to, or is knowledgeable about, a 
community (residential, business, or social) to 
which the subject belongs. 
• The subject has a reputation for a particular 
character trait. 
• The witness knows the reputation. 
• The witness testifies to the reputation. 
Id. 
¶73 Despite these relative modest requirements, Jackson's 
motions before the trial court failed to lay a foundation for 
reputation testimony.  At most, Jackson's postconviction motion 
pointed to "Comp and others" as witnesses who could testify to 
"[McCaleb's] reputation and character for violence."  Notably, 
such reference was not made at the pretrial stage.  At no time 
did Jackson identify the community Comp shared with McCaleb, nor 
did he include any information regarding Comp's knowledge of 
McCaleb beyond the single interaction the two had in January 
2008.  Thus, at the pretrial stage, Jackson made it less than 
clear that he was seeking this general reputation testimony.  
The focus was seemingly on the specific acts.  Without any 
foundation, the circuit court was in no position to make the 
findings necessary to properly admit the reputation testimony. 
¶74 At most, Comp's knowledge of McCaleb's reputation was 
included for the first time as an attachment in Jackson's 
sentencing memorandum.  Even in Jackson's postconviction motion, 
the focus remained on the specific act evidence rather than 
general reputation testimony.  At least the postconviction 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
34 
 
motion began to discuss some foundation for the admission of 
reputation testimony.   
¶75 Additionally, assuming Jackson believed the trial 
court had erred, he never requested the opportunity to proffer a 
foundation for admitting McCaleb's reputation for violence.  
Jackson bore the responsibility to make an offer of proof in 
order to preserve the issue for appeal.  
Winters, 317 
Wis. 2d 401, ¶19.  Here, Jackson's counsel did not make a 
further proffer to the court orally or in writing, nor did 
counsel clarify that a reputation evidence ruling was sought 
from the court.   
¶76 Jackson now asks this court to consider the additional 
information about Comp provided postconviction, rather than 
relying on the original motion papers and argument transcript.  
We decline to do so because:  
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected; and 
 . . .  
(b)  Offer of proof.  In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked. 
Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1); see also Winters, 317 Wis. 2d 401, ¶24. 
¶77 Consequently, the circuit court did not err in 
precluding admission of reputation evidence because it was never 
provided with a foundation to admit that evidence, and we are 
left with no proffer regarding the evidence. 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
35 
 
¶78 Although it was not clearly raised either before the 
trial 
or 
postconviction 
courts, 
Jackson 
now 
argues 
that 
McCaleb's violent reputation, rather than evidence of his 
specific past acts of violence, is relevant to determining 
whether he was the first aggressor in the shooting.  While it 
may be the best argument Jackson now has on appeal, the record 
below demonstrates that this was not the argument being advanced 
by trial counsel, and was not adequately presented to the trial 
court such that the court would recognize the evidence that it 
was being called upon to admit.  The trial court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in not deciding a character 
evidence argument that it never knew was being made to the 
court.  
¶79 It is certainly true that in some self-defense cases 
there is a genuine factual dispute over which party started a 
confrontation.  In those cases, evidence of the victim's 
character for violence might be admissible and the circuit court 
is endowed with the discretion to make that determination.  See, 
e.g., Werner v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 736, 226 N.W.2d 402 (1975).  
The circuit court is empowered to balance the "modest" probative 
value of the reputation testimony against the prejudice and the 
general prohibition against propensity evidence.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 904.01, 904.03. 
¶80 In this case, however, not only is the foundation for 
the character evidence missing and the proffer insufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal, but the circuit court was not 
specifically asked to rule on the admissibility of testimony 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
36 
 
"McCaleb had a reputation for violence" in reference to showing 
first aggressor.  To the extent that the circuit court could 
have perceived that counsel sought to use this reputation 
evidence to address the first aggressor issue, the most relevant 
testimony regarding McCaleb being the first aggressor was 
already before the jury.  The jury heard from five witnesses who 
testified to the events that led up to the shooting and the fact 
that McCaleb was undisputedly violent on the evening in 
question.  Hearing that "McCaleb had a reputation for violence" 
would have been anticlimactic at best.  Consequently, had a 
proper foundation for the evidence been laid, and the circuit 
court been properly presented with a request to admit testimony 
that "McCaleb had a reputation for violence" on the first 
aggressor issue, it could still have reasonably concluded that 
it would be cumulative, that the danger of the jury drawing an 
improper propensity inference and the likelihood of prejudice 
outweighed the probative value. 
2. Specific Acts of Violence 
¶81 The State and Jackson now apparently agree that 
specific acts evidence is not admissible in this case.  Jackson 
does not raise the issue on appeal.  Nonetheless, we will 
briefly address this type of character evidence.  Character 
evidence can be admissible in the form of specific instances of 
conduct.  However, the foundation for the admissibility of 
specific instances of conduct is different than the foundation 
for general reputation or opinion testimony.  If character is 
properly at issue and the exception to admissibility of 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
37 
 
propensity evidence is met, specific acts may still be offered 
only if "character or a trait of character . . . is an essential 
element of a charge, claim, or defense . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.05(2).  Nonetheless, even if character or a trait of 
character is an essential element, the circuit court is endowed 
with 
the 
authority 
to 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
regarding 
admissibility.  In this case, a character trait was not an 
element that the State had to prove, nor was it an element of 
Jackson's self-defense claim.  Thus the circuit court properly 
excluded evidence of McCaleb's prior violent acts.  The court 
ruled: "It's got to be something that the defendant knew.  
Otherwise, it is doing something that's improper.  So since the 
defendant did not know about those acts, I don't believe that 
the defense is allowed to go into those."  The decision of the 
circuit court was not clearly erroneous in excluding this 
evidence. 
¶82 We have held that specific prior acts of violence by 
the victim may be admissible when the defendant is aware of the 
acts.  In the case at issue, we are not presented with 
traditional McMorris evidence.  In McMorris, the circuit court 
concluded the prior acts of violence were known to the 
defendant.  As a result, the prior acts were admissible to show 
that the defendant's apprehension of the threat from the victim 
was reasonable, and thus, went to an essential element of self-
defense.  Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2); Wis. JI——Criminal 805.  
Jackson never claimed to have such knowledge in the present 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
38 
 
case.  Thus, the requested acts are not admissible as McMorris 
evidence. 
¶83 In McMorris, the court held: 
When the issue of self-defense is raised in a 
prosecution for assault or homicide and there is a 
factual basis to support such defense, the defendant 
may, in support of the defense, establish what the 
defendant believed to be the turbulent and violent 
character of the victim by proving prior specific 
instances of violence within his knowledge at the time 
of the incident. 
58 Wis. 2d at 152.10  
¶84 Specific incidents of conduct to prove character are 
not 
admissible 
unless 
"character 
or 
a 
trait 
of 
character . . . is an essential element of a charge, claim, or 
defense."  Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2).  "[T]he law of evidence 
disdains the use of character to show propensity to behave in a 
certain way."  Blinka, supra, § 405.1, at 225.  Allowing 
admission of a victim's specific prior acts of violence, unknown 
to the defendant, would here invite just such an improper 
propensity inference.  Thus, even if Jackson had argued the 
first aggressor issue to the trial court, such prior specific 
acts would nonetheless be inadmissible because "character or a 
                                                 
10 Similarly, in State v. Head this court held "McMorris 
evidence may not be used to support an inference about the 
victim's actual conduct during the incident."  2002 WI 99, ¶128, 
255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413.  But "[i]t may be admitted 
because it 'bear[s] on the reasonableness of the defendant's 
apprehension of danger at the time of the incident.'"  Id.  
(citing McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d at 149); see also Werner v. State, 
66 Wis. 2d 736, 226 N.W.2d 402 (1975). 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
39 
 
trait of character" was not "an essential element of a charge, 
claim, or defense" in this case.  Apparently Jackson now agrees. 
C. Harmless Error 
¶85 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion.  Nonetheless, if we were to assume that 
it was error for the trial court to exclude testimony that 
"McCaleb had a reputation for violence," we also conclude any 
such error on the part of the court was harmless. 
¶86 The State bears the burden of proving that the error 
was harmless.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 792.  The court deems an 
error harmless if it cannot conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error."  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999)). 
¶87 When 
a 
court 
has 
improperly 
admitted 
evidence, 
reversal is not warranted "unless an examination of the entire 
proceeding reveals that the admission of the evidence has 
'affected the substantial rights' of the party seeking the 
reversal."  State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999); see also Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1).  In order to 
support reversal, there must be a "'reasonable probability that, 
but for . . . [the] errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"  Armstrong, 
223 Wis. 2d at 369 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694-95 (1984)).  
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
40 
 
¶88 In this case, considering the trial as a whole, we 
conclude that, if excluding "McCaleb's reputation for violence" 
was error, that error was harmless.11  Even assuming the issue 
had been properly before the circuit court, reputation testimony 
is of "modest probative value."  Blinka, supra, § 405.2, at 227.  
Thus, even if it had been admitted, the general reputation 
evidence "McCaleb had a reputation for violence" would have 
paled in comparison to the detailed evidence that was already 
before the jury. 
¶89 Although the jury did not hear the sentence "McCaleb 
had a reputation for violence," the jury nonetheless heard that 
McCaleb was violent.  The jury heard testimony that McCaleb, who 
was described as being taller, heavier, and more muscular than 
Jackson, drove up to Jackson's home in a black car with deeply 
tinted windows.  The jury heard testimony that McCaleb had a 
blood alcohol content of .18 and was acting belligerently.  When 
referring to Jackson, McCaleb told Davis to "fuck that nigger."  
He shouted statements such as "you've got some fuckin' nerve 
knockin' on a car window," "you don't know who the fuck I am," 
and "who the fuck are you?"  The jury heard that McCaleb came 
toward one of the females "like to hit" her with his fist 
"clenched" and that he had "[a]nger in his face."  The jury also 
                                                 
11 Here, we conclude that this presumed error by the court 
was harmless.  In this case, it follows that counsel's errors 
regarding 
reputation 
testimony 
could 
not 
have 
prejudiced 
Jackson, such that counsel was ineffective.  See State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶37, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-93 (1984)). 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
41 
 
heard that McCaleb got "so mad" and went back to his car as if 
to get something and returned from the car "speed-walking" 
toward Jackson with one of his hands behind his back yelling 
"you got me fucked up" and that he had "something for you, 
motherfucker" just before Jackson fired the fatal shot. 
¶90 Simply 
adding 
general 
reputation 
testimony 
that 
"McCaleb had a reputation for violence" to this substantial body 
of evidence does not create the "reasonable probability" of a 
different outcome.  Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 369.  Moreover, 
any reputation witness would have been subject to rigorous 
cross-examination.  At best, that one sentence——in light of all 
the evidence presented at trial——would have been fleeting and 
cumulative. 
¶91 Therefore, assuming the circuit court erred in denying 
admission of the "modestly" probative evidence, "McCaleb had a 
reputation for violence," that error was harmless in light of 
all the evidence regarding McCaleb being violent on the evening 
in question. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶92 We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in denying Jackson's motion to admit 
character evidence.  The circuit court properly determined that 
in order for specific acts of violence to be admissible, 
"character or a trait of character of a person" must be "an 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense."  In a 
homicide case where a claim of self-defense is raised, character 
evidence may be admissible as evidence of the defendant's state 
No. 
2011AP2698-CR   
 
42 
 
of mind so long as the defendant had knowledge of the prior acts 
at the time of the offense.  McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d at 152.  We 
also conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying 
Jackson's motion to admit testimony that the victim had a 
reputation for violence under Wis. Stat. § 904.05(1).  Jackson 
failed to establish a proper foundation for the court to 
determine that evidence of the victim's reputation for violence 
was admissible.  We further conclude that, even assuming error 
occurred, that error was harmless.  Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶93 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   I 
agree 
with 
the majority and dissent when they determine that evidence of 
the victim's reputation for violence offered to demonstrate the 
identity of the first aggressor is relevant to a defendant's 
self-defense claim.  Majority op., ¶¶47-48, 65, 79; dissent, 
¶¶96-97, 113.  
¶94 I further determine, for reasons set forth in the 
dissent, 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
denied 
the 
defendant's motion to admit evidence of the victim's reputation 
without allowing the defendant an opportunity to present a 
better foundation for reputation evidence.  Therefore, I join 
Part I of the dissent. 
¶95 I ultimately conclude, however, that for reasons set 
forth in the majority opinion, the error is harmless.  As the 
majority notes, in order to reverse a conviction based on an 
erroneous evidentiary ruling, there must be a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different without the error.  Majority op., ¶87 (citing State v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)).  "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 368 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95 (1984)).  I agree with the 
majority that it is unlikely that the reputation evidence would 
have affected the outcome in this case.  Therefore, I join Part 
IV. C. of the majority opinion and respectfully concur. 
  
No.  2011AP2698-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶96 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the majority opinion's implicit holding that evidence of 
the victim's reputation for violence is admissible on the issue 
of first aggressor when a defendant raises a self-defense claim, 
even when the defendant is unaware of the reputation.1  Majority 
op., ¶¶47, 48, 79.   
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(1)(b) provides:  
(1) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's 
character 
or 
a 
trait 
of 
the 
person's 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
that the person acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
. . . . 
(b) Character of victim. Except as provided in s. 
972.11(2), evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered 
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence 
that 
the 
victim 
was 
the 
first 
aggressor . . . . 
"Exception [904.04(1)](b) makes clear that evidence in a 
homicide case claiming the victim was the first aggressor 
affords the prosecution the right to introduce rebutting 
evidence of the peacefulness of the victim."  Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence 
§ 904.04, 
59 
Wis. 2d 
at 
R76 
(Judicial 
Council 
Committee's Note) (1974). 
The Federal Advisory Committee's Note elaborates:  
Character evidence is susceptible of being used for 
the purpose of suggesting an inference that the person 
acted on the occasion in question consistently with 
his character.  This use of character is often 
described as "circumstantial."  Illustrations are: 
evidence of a violent disposition to prove that the 
person was the aggressor in an affray . . . .  
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶97 Character evidence of a victim's violent disposition 
in the form of reputation evidence to prove that the victim was 
the first aggressor in an affray is routinely accepted in the 
evidence 
literature 
as 
a 
paradigmatic 
admissible 
use 
of 
character evidence.2   
¶98 I disagree, however, with the majority opinion's 
analysis that the defendant failed to lay a proper foundation3 
for the introduction of evidence of the victim's reputation and 
failed to follow through with a self-defense claim that the 
victim was the first aggressor.  I also disagree with the 
majority opinion's harmless error analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                             
In most jurisdictions today, the circumstantial use of 
character 
is 
rejected 
but 
with 
important 
exceptions: . . . (2) 
an 
accused 
may 
introduce 
pertinent evidence of the character of the victim, as 
in support of a claim of self-defense to a charge of 
homicide . . . and 
the 
prosecution 
may 
introduce 
similar evidence . . . in a homicide case, to rebut a 
claim that deceased was the first aggressor, however 
proved . . . . 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence § 904.04, 59 Wis. 2d at R76-R77 
(Federal Advisory Committee's Note).  
2 See 1A Wigmore on Evidence, § 63 at 1365 (Peter Tillers 
ed., 1983) ("[T]he most frequent use of character evidence 
against a victim is when a violent crime is charged, to show 
that the victim was the first aggressor.");  1 McCormick on 
Evidence § 193 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013) (noting that 
when "there is a dispute as to who was the first aggressor," 
"the accused can introduce evidence of the victim's character 
for turbulence and violence" limited to "reputation or opinion 
rather than to specific acts"); 22A Fed. Practice & Procedure:  
Evidence § 5237 (Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2013) 
(identifying "'violent disposition' to prove that the victim was 
the aggressor in an affray" as a pertinent trait admissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)).  
3 See majority op., ¶¶8, 49, 51, 71-77. 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
I 
¶99 The majority opinion mistakenly concludes that the 
defendant failed to lay a proper foundation to introduce 
evidence of the victim's reputation and failed to present the 
issue that the victim was the first aggressor as part of his 
self-defense claim.   
A 
¶100 The majority opinion zeroes in on the motion papers to 
show that the defendant did not properly raise the issue of the 
victim's reputation for violence to show that the victim was the 
first aggressor.  Majority op., ¶¶73-75.   
¶101 On the contrary, the motion clearly sought admission 
of evidence of the victim's violence in the form of reputation 
evidence.  Here is the relevant portion of the defendant's 
motion carefully distinguishing between evidence of previous 
acts and evidence of the victim's reputation for violence and 
seeking admission of the latter: 
3. Mr. Jackson was not acquainted with [the victim] 
and was not aware of these previous acts of violence 
at the time of the shooting, thus he is not able to 
admit evidence of these acts pursuant to doctrines set 
forth in McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144 (1973) and 
State v. Daniels, 160 Wis. 2d 85 (1991), which permit 
the admission of specific violent acts of a victim 
previously known to a defendant in a self defense 
case.  However, Wisconsin Statutes § 904.04(1)(b) 
provides for the admissibility of "evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution 
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim 
was the first aggressor."  Thus in a self defense case 
where the violent character of the deceased is an 
essential 
element 
of 
the 
defense, 
opinion 
and 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
reputation 
testimony 
concerning 
the 
victim's 
reputation for violence is relevant and admissible and 
a trial court abuses its discretion in excluding such 
testimony.  State v. Boykins, 119 Wis. 2d 272, 279 
(Ct. App. 1984).  Thus such reputation and opinion 
evidence is permitted to show that the victim acted in 
conformity with his character for violence (Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(1)(b) and § 904.05(1). 
¶102 Moreover, 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
papers 
do 
not 
represent the defendants' entire pretrial argument on the 
admission of evidence of the victim's reputation for violence.   
¶103 In the pretrial hearing on the defendant's motion to 
introduce evidence of the victim's character in the form of 
prior acts or reputation and opinion testimony, the defendant 
attempted to lay a foundation for the proposed testimony about 
the victim's reputation.  The result: the circuit court abruptly 
and completely precluded defense counsel from laying her 
foundation for testimony about the victim's reputation.   
¶104 After the circuit court denied admission of the 
defendant's "other acts" evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), 
defense counsel attempted to offer a foundation for evidence of 
the victim's reputation. 
¶105 The pertinent part of the transcript is as follows: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay.  Then I guess, first of all, 
I understand the Court's ruling.  Then I'm asking how 
the Court is going to rule then specifically——omitting 
specific facts but asking specifically I think that it 
is admissible for the defense to proffer opinion and 
reputation evidence of [the victim], the witness, 
assuming I can lay a foundation, I believe I can, that 
[the victim] is a violent person, the witness' opinion 
that he is a violent person and that [the victim] had 
a reputation for violence. 
THE COURT:  Mr. Williams? 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Judge, my understanding of character 
evidence, the admissible character evidence is it 
bears on credibility and I don't think that obviously 
would bear on credibility since the victim is not here 
to defend himself as to those accusations or opinions, 
so I don't think they're relevant under the character 
evidence statute. 
THE COURT:  All right.  I agree [with the prosecutor].  
I don't believe that those matters would be relevant, 
so they would not be allowed. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  All right.  Okay.  So the court is 
denying the defense proffer opinion and reputation—— 
THE COURT:  Character evidence, Number 2, I believe 
that is what it is entitled. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that, in its entirety, is denied. 
¶106 Defense counsel made a sufficient offer of proof.  
"The offer of proof need not be stated with complete precision 
or in unnecessary detail but it should state an evidentiary 
hypotheses underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to 
warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is 
urged to adopt."  State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 73, 580 
N.W.2d 181 (1998) (citing Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 
284, 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978)).  
¶107 In any event, despite defense counsel's statement that 
she could lay a foundation for the witness's testimony regarding 
the 
victim's 
reputation, 
the 
circuit 
court 
accepted 
the 
prosecutor's mistaken objection to the defendant's motion.  The 
prosecutor erroneously stated the reputation was character 
evidence being offered for the credibility of the victim and not 
relevant.   
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶108 The circuit court never allowed defense counsel to lay 
a better foundation, but instead simply agreed with the 
prosecutor's mistaken objection and ruled that the circuit court 
didn't "believe that those matters would be relevant" (emphasis 
added).   
¶109 Instead of addressing defense counsel's attempt to 
offer evidence of the victim's reputation for violence, the 
circuit court addressed evidence of specific acts, never coming 
to grips with the defendant's proposed reputation testimony.  
Indeed, the majority opinion concedes that the circuit court did 
not digest "that Jackson's argument had shifted from the 
admissibility of the specific acts to admissibility of the 
statement 'McCaleb had a reputation for violence.'"  Majority 
op., ¶24. 
¶110 The majority opinion asserts that the circuit court's 
preclusion of the defendant's attempt to lay a better foundation 
was not erroneous because "counsel did not object to the court's 
rulings, or ask for a specific ruling on reputation evidence," 
nor did defense counsel "clarify her request [or] request the 
opportunity to make a proffer."  Majority op., ¶25.   
¶111 Defense counsel did ask for a specific ruling on the 
reputation evidence, as the transcript clearly shows.  Defense 
counsel obviously disagreed with the circuit court's ruling 
against her.  A bill of exceptions listing objections is not 
needed in order to preserve an issue for appeal.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.11 explicitly bars the use of exceptions and bills of 
exception:  "An objection is not necessary after a ruling or 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
order 
is 
made. . . . 
Exceptions 
shall 
never 
be 
made. . . . Evidentiary objections are governed by [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 901.03."4 
¶112 The transcript and majority opinion demonstrate that 
the circuit court erred as a matter of law in not distinguishing 
between evidence of the victim's reputation and evidence of the 
victim's prior or other acts.5  The circuit court simply barred 
all evidence of the victim's character. 
¶113 As the majority opinion properly notes, evidence of 
the victim's reputation for violence offered to demonstrate the 
identity of the first aggressor is relevant to a defendant's 
self-defense claim.  Majority op., ¶79.  Yet the circuit court 
erroneously ruled that reputation evidence is categorically not 
relevant in a self-defense case.   
¶114 At the pretrial hearing, the circuit court certainly 
knew that the defendant was raising a self-defense claim.  In 
fact, the prosecutor reminded the circuit court of the self-
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 901.03 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected; and 
. . . . 
(b) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked.  
5 The circuit court similarly erred at the postconviction 
motion hearing.  See majority op., ¶¶36-37. 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
defense claim mere moments before the discussion regarding 
reputation evidence.  In opposing the defendant's pretrial 
motion, 
the 
prosecutor 
stated, 
"[McMorris 
v. 
State, 
58 
Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973)] is very clear that the only 
time [evidence of prior acts of violence] can be used in a self-
defense case is if the defendant knew it . . . ." (emphasis 
added).   
¶115 In a self-defense claim, the identity of the first 
aggressor is significant.  A defendant loses the privilege to 
assert a claim of self-defense if he or she was the first 
aggressor.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.48(2); Banks v. State, 51 
Wis. 2d 145, 186 N.W.2d 250 (1971) (holding that identity of 
first aggressor was an essential issue that required reversal in 
the interest of justice); Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Substantive 
Criminal Law § 10.4(e) (2d ed. 2003) ("It is generally said that 
one who is the aggressor in an encounter with another——i.e., one 
who brings about the difficulty with the other——may not avail 
himself of the defense of self-defense."). 
¶116 As 
the 
majority 
opinion 
additionally 
notes, 
"'[p]roperly framed, the reputation testimony can be elicited in 
less than a minute.'"  Majority op., ¶72 (quoting 7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 405.2, 
at 226 (3d ed. 2008)).   
¶117 Nevertheless, the circuit court did not give the 
defendant 
the 
minute. 
 
When 
defense 
counsel 
asked 
for 
clarification of the circuit court's pretrial evidentiary 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
ruling, the circuit court stated simply that "[the character 
evidence], in its entirety, is denied."   
¶118 When a defendant seeks to introduce evidence regarding 
a pertinent character trait of the victim, "[w]ide latitude 
should be granted to defendants in the use of the victim's 
character" as "circumstantial evidence of conduct."  7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 404.5 
(3d ed. 2008).   
¶119 The circuit court failed to grant the defendant any 
latitude, let alone "wide latitude," in presenting the victim's 
reputation for violence as part of the defense.   
¶120 Rather than eliciting a full proffer from defense 
counsel, the circuit court based its evidentiary ruling on an 
erroneous understanding of law.  The circuit court treated 
specific acts evidence and reputation evidence the same way.  
The circuit court erroneously denied the defendant's motion to 
admit evidence of the victim's reputation without allowing the 
defendant an opportunity to present a foundation for the 
reputation evidence.   
¶121 Defense counsel unambiguously raised the victim's 
reputation to support the defendant's self-defense claim and was 
precluded 
from 
making 
a 
better 
proffer 
of 
"opinion 
and 
reputation evidence of [the victim] . . . that [the victim] is a 
violent person, the witness' opinion that [the victim] is a 
violent person."   
¶122 Defense counsel did all she could do to preserve the 
issue for appeal.  She made a motion to include certain evidence 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
and testimony and then attempted a proffer.  She asked for 
clarification and was rebuffed. 
¶123 The circuit court stopped defense counsel from making 
a better proffer and denied her motion in its entirety.  The 
proffer cannot be viewed as insufficient when the circuit court 
precluded any proffer.  The failure, if any, to lay a foundation 
lies with the circuit court, not with defense counsel. 
B 
¶124 In 
addition 
to 
misstating 
the 
substance 
and 
significance of the pretrial proceedings on the defendant's 
motion to admit evidence of the victim's reputation, the 
majority opinion repeatedly errs in stating that the defendant 
did not raise the issue of first aggressor at trial.  Majority 
op., ¶¶28, 36, 52, 84.   
¶125 The issue of who attacked whom first, especially in 
the present case where the victim was the larger, stronger 
person,6 saturates the case as an element of the self-defense 
claim.  The present case provides numerous instances where the 
defense raised the issue that the victim was the first aggressor 
at trial, even though the defense did not always use the words 
"first aggressor."  Nothing in the law requires the defendant to 
use the specific two words "first aggressor" to raise this issue 
in a self-defense claim. 
¶126 The record demonstrates that the issue of who was 
first aggressor was an essential part of the case for both 
                                                 
6 See majority op., ¶27. 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
parties before, during, and after the presentation of evidence.7  
The issue of the identity of the first aggressor was a 
consistent component of both parties' cases-in-chief.   
¶127 In its opening statement, the defense stated that 
"[the victim and his friend] were starting an argument and were 
poised to start something violent with [the defendant] and were 
basically advancing as [the defendant] was retreating."   
¶128 During direct and cross-examination of witnesses, the 
issue of the identity of the first aggressor was a consistent 
component of both parties' questioning.   
¶129 The State, in its questioning of witnesses, asked 
about whether the victim or his companion had "take[n] back a 
hand or a fist and take[n] a swing or slap at [the witness]."  
In a sidebar with the circuit court regarding a witness's 
testimony, defense counsel noted that "here, the defense is 
clearly that the victim was the first aggressor, and my client 
acted 
in 
self-defense. . . . And 
this 
jury 
is 
making 
a 
determination as to who the aggressor was in this particular set 
of circumstances."  During defense counsel's direct examination 
of a witness, defense counsel and the prosecutor disputed the 
use of the word "charging" to describe the victim's approach to 
the defendant.   
¶130 In closing argument, the first aggressor argument was 
central to the defense and was disputed by the prosecution.   
                                                 
7 In contrast, the majority opinion asserts that "[n]either 
the State nor Jackson specifically argued 'first aggressor' 
until after all the evidence had been presented at trial."  
Majority op., ¶28. 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶131 Defense counsel's closing argument restated the first 
aggressor argument:  
Two bigger, stronger, younger men came up to the 
house.  They got out of the car.  They were 
aggressive.  They were cursing.  They were using the F 
word.  [The victim and his companion] were advancing.  
[The 
defendants 
and 
the 
other 
witnesses] 
were 
retreating. 
At some point [the victim] ran to the car, acted like 
he was getting something, came charging back.  And 
that's when [the defendant] fired the shot. 
¶132 The State disputed this claim in its own closing 
statement as follows: 
Who's escalating the situation out here?  You got one 
exchange of wording and [the defendant] feels that I 
need to go get my gun, get it out, rack it up and have 
it at my side.  Who is the aggressor?  [The defendant] 
certainly indicates that it was [the victim] and his 
friend.   
But when you look at the facts, what you know, that's 
not the case.  The aggressor is [the defendant] 
(emphasis added). 
¶133 The question of who was the first aggressor was the 
heart of the self-defense claim and was an issue for both 
parties 
throughout 
every 
stage 
of 
the 
trial, 
from 
the 
defendant's pretrial motion, to the pretrial hearing on the 
defendant's motion, to the presentation of evidence at trial, to 
closing statements, and to the postconviction proceedings. 
¶134 The majority opinion mistakenly states that the 
defendant's "first mention of introducing general 'reputation 
for violence' evidence to establish first aggressor was in his 
postconviction motion."  Majority op., ¶52.  The majority 
opinion further mistakenly states that "[n]either the State nor 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
Jackson specifically argued 'first aggressor' until after all 
the evidence had been presented at trial."  Majority op., ¶28; 
see also majority op., ¶84.  Based on the record before this 
court, the majority opinion has erred.   
¶135 Although the majority opines that the fault lies with 
the defendant's failure to lay a foundation for evidence of the 
victim's reputation and the defendant's failure to rely on the 
defense that the victim was the first aggressor, I conclude on 
the basis of the record that defense counsel tried to lay a 
foundation, but the circuit court precluded defense counsel from 
doing so.  Additionally, I conclude that the record shows that 
the defendant's self-defense claim rested on the premise that 
the victim was the first aggressor. 
II 
¶136 Once again, the court relies on harmless error to deny 
a criminal defendant relief.8  A conclusion of harmless error 
                                                 
8 Scholars have noted the tendency of courts to find errors 
harmless or not based on whether the court believes the 
defendant is guilty.  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is 
Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be 
Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1167, 1187 (1995) ("As matters now 
stand, in many criminal cases an error is harmless so long as 
the appellate court remains convinced of the defendant's guilt; 
an error warrants reversal only where it raises doubts about the 
defendant's culpability.") (footnote omitted); Keith A. Findley 
& Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291, 349-50 (2006) (footnotes 
omitted):  
Even when appellate courts do find constitutional or 
procedural errors at trial, they are disinclined to 
grant relief.  Increasingly, the harmless error 
doctrine enables and encourages appellate courts to 
overlook trial error when they are satisfied that the 
defendant was in fact guilty.  The harmless error 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
requires a finding that there exists no "reasonable probability" 
that the jury could have acquitted.  See State v. Armstrong, 223 
Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999).  If the reputation 
evidence were admitted, it may well have been a deciding factor 
here, particularly because the victim's aggression was at the 
core of the defendant's self-defense claim.   
¶137 The majority opinion asserts that the reputation 
evidence would be only "modestly probative."  Majority op., ¶91 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Consequently, it determines 
that such evidence would be "fleeting and cumulative," majority 
op., ¶90, and could not have had a "reasonable probability" of 
changing the jury's verdict, majority op., ¶90 (citing State v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 369). 
¶138 Yet, the issue of first aggressor was clearly disputed 
by the parties, with extensive testimony on both sides.  This is 
not a case where the facts or inferences are uncontroverted.  
Compare 
State 
v. 
Wenger, 
225 
Wis. 2d 495, 
509-510, 
593 
N.W.2d 467 (1999) (holding that it was harmless error when the 
circuit court failed to include evidence of a victim's violent 
character 
because 
it 
would 
only 
corroborate 
extensive 
uncontroverted evidence); Brandt v. Mason, 256 Wis. 314, 318, 41 
                                                                                                                                                             
doctrine has long posed challenges of definition and 
application for courts. Increasingly, harmless error 
analysis is applied in a way that turns on an 
appellate court's assessment of a defendant's guilt, 
as opposed to whether the error might have had an 
effect on the verdict. . . . Under this doctrine, 
cognitive biases can contribute in powerful ways to a 
conclusion that the defendant was indeed guilty, and 
that the error was therefore harmless.   
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
N.W.2d 272 (1950) (holding that it was harmless error to exclude 
evidence when the evidence would have simply corroborated an 
"undisputed" statement).   
¶139 In contrast, this case was messy, with conflicting 
facts and inferences.  Additional evidence of the victim's 
violent character might have made a difference in the outcome.  
Because the identity of the first aggressor goes to the 
substance of the defendant's self-defense claim and is not a 
collateral issue, even modestly probative evidence can have an 
impact on a jury's decision-making.   
¶140 As the court noted in State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 
Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413, the exclusion of substantial 
evidence regarding a self-defense claim "went beyond harmless 
error to impair fundamentally the defendant's ability to present 
a defense."  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶138.   
¶141 Our case law has long recognized that the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence that directly implicates a self-defense 
claim is not harmless.  See State v. Nett, 50 Wis. 524, 7 
N.W. 344 (1880) (holding that reversal was required when the 
circuit court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's 
reputation where a defendant raised self-defense); Banks v. 
State, 51 Wis. 2d 145, 186 N.W.2d 250 (1971) (holding that 
reversal was required when the circuit court erred in excluding 
evidence that the defendant may have been the first aggressor, 
which would eliminate the privilege of self-defense); McMorris 
v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (holding that reversal 
was required when the circuit court erred in excluding prior 
No.  2011AP2698-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
acts evidence for a self-defense claim); State v. Boykins, 119 
Wis. 2d 272, 279-80, 350 N.W.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
that reversal was required when the circuit court erred in 
excluding evidence of the victim's violent character when the 
"jury was denied the opportunity to evaluate [defendant's] 
asserted defense in light of all relevant evidence").   
¶142 I see no reason to deviate from these cases in the 
instant case.  
¶143 The court cannot read the jury's mind and has no way 
of knowing what effect the excluded reputation testimony would 
have had on the jury.  We do know, contrary to the majority 
opinion at ¶79, that there was a genuine dispute about whether 
the victim was the first aggressor and the degree to which his 
aggression might have led to the defendant's fear for his own 
safety.  We do know that the jury found the defendant guilty of 
the lowest possible included offense, second-degree reckless 
homicide.   
¶144 On the basis of the facts we do know, I conclude that 
there was a reasonable probability that the jury could have been 
convinced by additional evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor. 
¶145 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
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