Case Title: Mays v. City of Los Angeles

Citation: 43 Cal. 4th 313 original opinion

Docket Number: S149455

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 4/17/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JON MAYS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S149455 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B188527 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BS 090169 
___________________________________ ) 
 
This case concerns the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act.  
(Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.)1  Section 3304, subdivision (d) (section 3304(d)), 
provides a limitations period specifying that “no punitive action” may be imposed 
upon any public safety officer for alleged misconduct unless the public agency 
investigating the allegations “complete[s] its investigation and notif[ies] the public 
safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action” within one year of discovering 
the alleged misconduct.  We granted review to address the question of whether the 
notice required by section 3304(d) is satisfied by informing an accused officer, 
within the statutory one-year period, that the agency proposes that certain 
misconduct charges “be adjudicated by a Board of Rights.”   
                                              
1  
Our opinion refers to this statute by its commonly-used name, the Peace 
Officers Bill of Rights Act or POBRA.  All further statutory references are to the 
Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2 
In the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), a “Board of Rights” is an 
administrative tribunal charged under the Los Angeles City Charter (L.A. Charter) 
with the adjudication of charges of police officer misconduct.  (L.A. Charter, 
§ 1070(a).)  At the conclusion of a Board of Rights hearing, the board is required 
to make a finding of “guilty” or “not guilty” on each charge and to prescribe, for 
any positive finding of misconduct, a penalty from a specified range of 
disciplinary options including reprimand, suspension, demotion, and dismissal.  
(Id., § 1070(n).)  The Los Angeles Chief of Police (Chief of Police) has the 
discretion to accept or reduce, but not to increase, any punishment recommended 
by the Board of Rights.  (Id., § 1070(p).) 
The Court of Appeal held that a notice informing plaintiff that the LAPD 
was proposing to the Chief of Police that several counts of misconduct “be 
adjudicated by a Board of Rights” failed to comply with section 3304(d) because 
the notice did not specifically identify any contemplated punishment or discipline.  
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon language from Sanchez v. City of 
Los Angeles (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1069 (Sanchez).  The Court of Appeal also 
concluded that a second notice subsequently provided to plaintiff, although 
sufficiently specific, was served upon him too late — slightly more than one year 
after discovery of the alleged misconduct.  Accordingly, the appellate court 
directed the trial court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the discipline (a 
written reprimand) that ultimately was imposed upon plaintiff for the misconduct 
at issue. 
We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in interpreting section 3304(d) 
to require notice of specific proposed punishment.  To the contrary, the notice 
contemplated by the language and context of section 3304(d) is simply notice that 
the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct 
within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against 
3 
the officer for specified misconduct.  Although the agency is not precluded from 
proposing specific discipline at that time, it is not required by section 3304(d) to 
do so.  A notice informing an officer of a proposed Board of Rights adjudication 
not only informs him or her that disciplinary action may be taken as the result of 
the investigation into the alleged misconduct — the notice required by the 
statute — but also identifies the procedural mechanism by which the officer’s 
punishment, if any, will be determined.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
therefore reversed.   
I. 
We provide only a very brief summary of the facts of this case sufficient to 
enable us to address the question upon which review was granted.  On July 23, 
2002, plaintiff, Sergeant Jon Mays, received a written form entitled “Notice of 
Proposed Disciplinary Action” from his employer, the LAPD.  The notice and 
related materials advised plaintiff that he faced disciplinary charges for, among 
other things, failing to (1) adequately secure confidential department materials or 
(2) promptly report their loss.2  This form listed four “penalties” that could be 
proposed to the Chief of Police for misconduct involving sworn tenured 
employees:  (1) suspension for a specified period of days; (2) demotion to a 
specified rank; (3) suspension for a specified period of days plus demotion to a 
specified rank; or (4) “[t]hat the matter be adjudicated by a Board of Rights.”3  
                                              
2 
These charges arose out of allegations that plaintiff (1) lost internal affairs 
documents when the documents were taken from his automobile during a burglary 
that occurred when the vehicle was parked in the driveway of his residence and  
(2) failed promptly to report the loss.  Defendants concede that this alleged 
misconduct, which is the subject of the reprimand at issue, was discovered by the 
LAPD on July 26, 2001.     
3  
Pursuant to the LAPD manual, adjudication by a Board of Rights is itself 
characterized as a “penalty” that a commanding officer may recommend when a 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
4 
Only the last option was checked on the form provided to plaintiff.4  Accordingly, 
the notice informed plaintiff that the LAPD was proposing to the Chief of Police 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
disciplinary complaint against a sworn employee is sustained.  (See 3 LAPD 2007 
1st Quarter Manual, §§ 820.30, 825.10 (LAPD Manual).)  Generally, LAPD 
officers cannot be “suspended, demoted in rank, suspended and demoted in rank, 
removed, or otherwise separated from the service of the department . . . except for 
good and sufficient cause shown upon a finding of guilty of the specific charge or 
charges . . . after a full, fair, and impartial hearing” before a Board of Rights.  
(L.A. Charter, § 1070(a).)  Exceptions to this rule allow the Chief of Police to 
(1) temporarily relieve an officer from duty pending a hearing before and decision 
by a Board of Rights, (2) suspend an officer for 22 working days (or less) with 
loss of pay and with or without reprimand, (3) demote an officer with or without 
suspension or reprimand, or both, or (4) demote the member in rank, with or 
without temporary relief from duty or cancellation of such relief from duty.  (Id., 
§ 1070(b).)  Even in circumstances falling within the exceptions, however, the 
actions of the Chief of Police are subject to predisciplinary procedures otherwise 
required by law and to the officer’s right to file an application for a hearing before 
a Board of Rights which, if invoked, automatically stays any suspension and/or 
demotion.  (Id., § 1070(b).)  If the Chief of Police decides that a suspension of 
more than 22 working days or termination is appropriate, the case automatically 
proceeds to a Board of Rights hearing.  
 
A Board of Rights hearing is considered a de novo hearing.  (L.A. Charter, 
§ 1070(f).)  Comprised of two officers with the rank of captain or above and one 
civilian, a Board of Rights has the authority to examine witnesses under oath and 
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents.  (Id., 
§ 1070(h), (j).)  In a Board of Rights proceeding, the LAPD has the burden of 
proving each charge by a preponderance of the evidence, and the accused officer 
has the right to appear in person (and by counsel or a representative, at the 
officer’s expense) and defend against the charges, and may produce witnesses and 
cross-examine witnesses.  (Id., § 1070(l), (m).)   
4  
The notice further informed plaintiff of his right to representation prior to 
engaging in discussion of the matter, of the opportunity to respond either orally or 
in writing by a certain date, and that his response would be reviewed and 
forwarded to the Chief of Police for evaluation prior to adjudication of the matter. 
5 
that the disciplinary charges alleged against plaintiff go forward and be 
adjudicated by a Board of Rights.   
Section 1070(n) of the L.A. Charter sets forth the possible punishment that 
may be prescribed by a Board of Rights upon a positive finding of officer 
misconduct.  These options range from reprimand to removal.  (See L.A. Charter, 
§ 1070(n); Board of Rights Manual (12th ed. 2005) § 272.30.)  But, following a 
series of procedural complications that are not relevant to the issue before us, two 
of the charges of alleged misconduct contained in the July 23, 2002 notice — that 
is (1) the failure to secure confidential materials adequately and (2) the failure to 
report their loss promptly — ultimately were not submitted to a Board of Rights 
hearing, but instead were sustained by the Chief of Police in the official letter of 
reprimand at issue in this case.5 
                                              
5  
These complications include the following.  On August 12, 2002, several 
weeks after providing him with the initial July 23 notice, the LAPD served 
plaintiff with a second document entitled “Complaint and Relief from Duty, 
Suspension or Demotion.”  That document referred to both of the instances of 
alleged misconduct set forth in the July 23 notice (including the failure to secure 
confidential materials adequately or promptly report their loss), and also to an 
additional charge relating to false statements allegedly made by plaintiff during an 
official investigation.  It further informed plaintiff that, on the basis of this alleged 
misconduct, he was being demoted in rank effective August 17, 2002, and was not 
being relieved of duty “pending a hearing before and decision by [a Board of 
Rights]” on the charges. 
 
Only the charge relating to alleged false statements proceeded to a Board of 
Rights, however.  The remaining charges (including the charges relating to the 
failure to secure confidential materials adequately or promptly report their loss) 
were sustained in the reprimand that is the subject of the present appeal.  The 
Chief of Police signed the reprimand on February 4, 2003, but apparently it was 
not formally served on plaintiff while the false-statement charge was awaiting a 
Board of Rights hearing.  On May 12, 2003, the Board of Rights found plaintiff 
“not guilty” of that charge.  Shortly thereafter, on May 22, 2003, the LAPD served 
plaintiff with the challenged reprimand. 
6 
Plaintiff challenged the reprimand by initiating an administrative appeal 
and filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court.  In the writ 
proceeding, plaintiff asserted, among other claims, that the notice he received on 
July 23, 2002, did not satisfy section 3304(d), because no specific penalty was 
mentioned.  The trial court denied the petition, finding that plaintiff was 
adequately notified within one year of the “proposed disciplinary action,” as 
required by section 3304(d) when he received the July 23, 2002 notice.   
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding in relevant part that the notice 
received by plaintiff on July 23, 2002, although given within one year of 
discovery of the alleged misconduct, was insufficient to satisfy section 3304(d), 
because it informed him only of the action proposed to the Chief of Police that the 
misconduct be adjudicated by a Board of Rights, and “did not specify any 
‘proposed disciplinary action’ as explicitly required by section [3304(d)].”  We 
granted review to address the Court of Appeal’s holding that section 3304(d) 
requires that an accused officer be notified of a specific proposed discipline. 
II. 
This case calls upon us to interpret a provision of the Peace Officers Bill of 
Rights Act.  Initially enacted in 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 465, § 1, p. 1202), POBRA 
“sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace 
officers [citation] by the public entities which employ them.  It is a catalogue of 
the minimum rights [citation] the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable 
employer-employee relations [citation].”  (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 
135; see also White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [noting 
that POBRA “is concerned primarily with affording individual police officers 
certain procedural rights during the course of proceedings which might lead to the 
imposition of penalties against them”].)  The various procedural protections 
provided by POBRA “balance the public interest in maintaining the efficiency and 
7 
integrity of the police force with the police officer’s interest in receiving fair 
treatment.”  (Jackson v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 899, 909 
(Jackson), citing Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 564, 569.) 
Section 3304 provides a number of procedural rights for public safety 
officers who may be accused of misconduct in the course of their employment.  
Subdivision (d), providing for a limitations period, states in pertinent part:  
“Except [as otherwise provided,] no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on 
grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission or other 
allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed 
within one year of the public agency’s discovery . . . of an act, omission, or other 
misconduct.  This one-year limitation period shall apply only if the act, omission, 
or other misconduct occurred on or after January 1, 1998.  In the event that the 
public agency determines that discipline may be taken, it shall complete its 
investigation and notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action 
within that year, except [as specifically provided].”  (§ 3304(d).)6   
At issue in this appeal is the meaning of the language in section 3304(d) 
requiring a public agency to “notify the public safety officer of its proposed 
disciplinary action.”  Defendants contend that the quoted language requires only 
that notice of the misconduct charges be provided.  Plaintiff and the Court of 
Appeal, however, view section 3304(d) as mandating notice of the specific 
punishment or discipline that is contemplated for the charged misconduct.  As we 
                                              
6  
In addition to satisfying the requirements of section 3304(d), a public entity 
must accord constitutional procedural due process before depriving an officer of 
any significant property interest in his or her employment.  (See Skelly v. State 
Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215; Burrell v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 
209 Cal.App.3d 568, 577.)   
8 
shall explain, we believe the Court of Appeal’s interpretation is not consistent with 
the language or purpose of the statute.   
In construing statutes, “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of 
the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’  [Citations.]  We 
begin by examining the statutory language because it generally is the most reliable 
indicator of legislative intent.  [Citation.]  We give the language its usual and 
ordinary meaning, and ‘[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers 
meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.’  [Citation.]  
If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, ‘we may resort to extrinsic 
sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative 
history.’  [Citation.]  Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most 
closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather 
than defeating the general purpose of the statute.  [Citations.]”  (Allen v. Sully-
Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.)  
Viewing the terms of section 3304(d) as a whole, it appears clear that the 
fundamental purpose of this provision is to place a one-year limitation on 
investigations of officer misconduct.  The one-year period runs from the time the 
misconduct is discovered.  Once the public agency decides that discipline may be 
warranted (“that discipline may be taken” (ibid.)), it must so inform the public 
safety officer (must “notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary 
action” (ibid.)).  In this context, it seems most reasonable to interpret the language 
“proposed disciplinary action” as referring to the agency’s determination that 
“discipline may be taken.”  (Ibid.)  Not only completion of the investigation, but 
also the requisite notification to the officer, must be accomplished within a year of 
discovery of the misconduct.  This interpretation is consistent with the apparent 
purpose of the subdivision, which is to ensure that an officer will not be faced with 
the uncertainty of a lingering investigation, but will know within one year of the 
9 
agency’s discovery of the officer’s act or omission that it may be necessary for the 
officer to respond in the event he or she wishes to defend against possible 
discipline.   
A contrary conclusion — that section 3304(d) requires notification of the 
specific discipline contemplated by the public agency — prematurely would 
impose a requirement that is unreasonable in view of the timing of the notice.  
Section 3304(d) refers to an agency decision that “discipline may be taken.”  
(Italics added.)  The use of the conditional word “may” demonstrates the 
preliminary nature of the proceedings at the time the notice is required under 
subdivision (d).  It would be anomalous to require the public agency to reach a 
conclusion regarding potential discipline prior to any predisciplinary proceedings 
or response on the part of the officer.  (See Sulier v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 
125 Cal.App.4th 21, 29 (Sulier) [“the notice contemplated by section 3304(d) is 
given at a time when the disciplinary authority has not necessarily committed itself 
to disciplining the employee”].)  Such a requirement also could have the practical 
effect of always leading the public agency to propose the maximum punishment in 
order to ensure it retained the full range of options in the subsequent disciplinary 
proceedings.  
Another subdivision of section 3304 — subdivision (f) — strongly supports 
the foregoing interpretation of section 3304(d).  Subdivision (f) provides:  “If, 
after investigation and any predisciplinary response or procedure, the public 
agency decides to impose discipline, the public agency shall notify the public 
safety officer in writing of its decision to impose discipline, including the date that 
the discipline will be imposed, within 30 days of its decision, except if the public 
safety officer is unavailable for discipline.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, it appears that, 
ordinarily, a predisciplinary response and/or hearing will occur subsequent to the 
investigation but prior to the agency’s conclusion regarding the specific discipline 
10 
to be imposed.  Once the agency follows its relevant procedural mechanism and 
decides the level of specific discipline it intends to impose, it then has 30 days to 
so notify the officer.   (See Sulier, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 29-30 [a formal 
notice of adverse action containing a statement of the nature of such action is 
required when the public agency decides to impose discipline and serves a formal 
notice pursuant to § 3304, subd. (f)].)  When the two subdivisions are read 
together, it is evident that section 3304(d) limits the duration of the investigation 
and provides, through its notice requirement that discipline may be imposed, a 
starting point for predisciplinary responses or procedures, whereas subdivision (f) 
is directed at providing the officer with written notice of the discipline that the 
agency — after considering the officer’s predisciplinary response — has decided 
to impose.   
Another subdivision of section 3304 also merits consideration.  
Subdivision (b) provides:  “No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on 
grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency against any 
public safety officer who has successfully completed the probationary period . . . 
without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative 
appeal.”  (Ibid.)  Section 3304 itself, however, does not provide a mechanism for 
administrative appeal; rather, public agencies employ a number of locally created 
mechanisms, including those established by collective bargaining agreements, for 
that purpose.  There is no indication in the statute that the local mechanism cannot 
provide for a determination of the precise discipline at a hearing occurring 
subsequent to the notification envisioned by section 3304(d).     
We reiterate that section 3304(d) functions as a limitations period.  (See 
Moore v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 373, 381; Breslin v. City 
and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1075; Parra v. City 
and County of San Francisco (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 977, 988, fn. 7; Jackson, 
11 
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.)  Limitations statutes ordinarily establish the 
period in which an action must be initiated (see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 335-
340.6; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 739, 755-756; see also Jackson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 909 
[applying ordinary principles governing limitations statutes to § 3304(d)]), but the 
outcome of the claim or charges generally remains to be adjudicated pursuant to 
separate statutes governing the specified subsequent procedure.  It would be 
inconsistent with the general function of limitations statutes to treat the limitations 
provision contained in section 3304(d) as requiring the public agency to reach a 
firm conclusion with respect to the discipline or punishment actually intended to 
be imposed at a point ordinarily viewed as the commencement of an action. 
Nor is there any indication in section 3304(d)’s legislative history that the 
Legislature intended to require that public agencies propose a specific punishment 
at the stage when an investigation has been completed but disciplinary 
proceedings have yet to commence.  Indeed, that history reveals no discussion or 
debate concerning the meaning of section 3304(d)’s phrase “notify the public 
safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action.”  Rather, the history confirms 
that section 3304(d) was intended to function primarily as a limitation upon 
investigations of misconduct.  The express purpose of the bill that encompasses 
what is now section 3304(d) was “to enact specific time limits and exceptions for 
investigating alleged acts or omissions which may lead to punitive actions, as 
specified.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 1436 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 17, 1997, p. 3, 
italics added.)  Relevant committee reports express concern about the length of 
disciplinary investigations and focus upon the need to conclude those 
investigations in a timely fashion.  (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on 
Assem. Bill No. 1436 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) June 10, 1997, p. 4 [“ ‘it is unfair to 
12 
our peace officer[s] not to investigate and bring charges or dismiss the action 
within a reasonable time,’ ” and “ ‘[o]ne year is the agreed-upon time by both 
labor and management’ ”].)  There is no documented discussion of the specific 
content of the notice to be provided to the officer once the investigation is 
completed and discipline is being contemplated.  Accordingly, in enacting section 
3304(d), it is clear that the Legislature was focused upon preventing a perceived 
lack of fairness caused by a drawn-out investigatory process — and not with 
requiring that officers receive notice of specific intended discipline at that early 
stage of the process. 
Had the Legislature intended section 3304(d) to require public agencies to 
propose precise disciplinary consequences or punishment for alleged misconduct, 
we believe that it would have made this intention clear in the language of the 
provision, or at least that such an intent would appear in the legislative reports 
concerning the provision.  And yet we find no such indication in either source.  In 
light of the circumstance that section 3304(d) is concerned primarily with setting a 
one-year deadline for the completion of the public agency’s investigation of 
allegations of officer misconduct, it is more reasonable to conclude that the notice 
it contemplates is intended only to inform the officer that the agency has found the 
allegations to be sufficiently serious that they may subject the officer to discipline. 
In the present case, plaintiff received notice of the misconduct charges and 
that the LAPD was proposing to the Chief of Police an adjudication of the charges 
by a Board of Rights.  Notice of charges and of a proposed Board of Rights 
adjudication informs the officer that the public agency is pursuing disciplinary 
action.  Under the L.A. Charter, a Board of Rights must indicate a penalty from a 
specified range of disciplinary options (dismissal, demotion, suspension, or 
written reprimand) for any officer it finds “guilty” of misconduct; the 
recommended penalty then is imposed or reduced by the Chief of Police.  (L.A. 
13 
Charter, § 1070(n), (p).)  Indeed, notice of proposed adjudication by a Board of 
Rights not only fulfills the statutory requirement of section 3304(d) by notifying 
the officer that “discipline may be taken” for the alleged misconduct, but also 
informs him or her of the intended procedural mechanism under which it is 
proposed that any potential punishment be determined. 
In construing section 3304(d) to require substantially more detail 
concerning contemplated discipline than is required by statute, the Court of 
Appeal focused upon language in Sanchez, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 1069, stating 
that section 3304(d) requires the public agency “to notify the officer of the specific 
disciplinary action that is being proposed, not merely to advise the officer that 
some disciplinary action is being contemplated.”  (Sanchez, supra, at p. 1081.)  In 
Sanchez, the department recommended a 20-day suspension within section 
3304(d)’s one-year period following the police department’s discovery of the 
operative facts giving rise to the disciplinary action.  With respect to 
“ ‘Demotion/Downgrade Considerations,’ ” the report at that time stated 
“ ‘None.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1072.)  Subsequent to the expiration of the one-year period, 
however, the department decided to pursue a downgrade in addition to a 
suspension.   
The appellate court in Sanchez held that the notice of proposed disciplinary 
action, which specifically proposed a 20-day suspension and rejected a 
downgrade, was insufficient to notify the officer that he faced a possible 
downgrade — and thus further held that the resulting punitive action was untimely 
under section 3304(d).  (Sanchez, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1080-1083.)  
Although the court appeared to believe that section 3304(d) required notice of “the 
specific disciplinary action that is being proposed” (Sanchez, supra, at p. 1081), 
the import of the case is that the agency actively misled the officer by later 
pursuing a downgrade that had been affirmatively eschewed in the section 3304(d) 
14 
notice.  Nonetheless, to the extent Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 140 
Cal.App.4th 1069, purports to interpret section 3304(d) to require notice of 
specific discipline rather than notice that disciplinary action may be taken, it is 
disapproved. 
III. 
We conclude that the notice contemplated by section 3304(d) is notice that 
the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct 
within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against 
the officer for specified misconduct.  A notice proposing that alleged misconduct be 
adjudicated by a Board of Rights constitutes sufficient notice of proposed 
disciplinary action under section 3304(d).   
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Mays v. City of Los Angeles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 145 Cal.App.4h 932 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S149455 
Date Filed: April 17, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Dzintra I. Janavs 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Diane Marchant for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine, Stephen H. Silver, Enrique A. Hernandez, Susan Silver and 
Elizabeth Silver Tourgeman for Los Angeles Protective League and California Association of Highway 
Patrolmen as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Clishman & Sortor, William H. Sortor and Lawrence J. Friedman for Peace Officers Research Association 
of California Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, and Gerald 
Masahiro Sato, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Diane Marchant 
1308 West 8th Street, Suite 206 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 531-2327 
 
Stephen H. Silver 
Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine 
1428 Second Street 
Santa Monica, CA  90407-2161 
(310) 393-1486 
 
Gerald Masahiro Sato 
Deputy City Attorney 
900 City Hall East 
200 N. Main Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90012-4129 
(213) 978-7734