Case Title: Branford v. Santa Barbara

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC18090

State: connecticut

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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TOWN OF BRANFORD v. THOMAS SANTA
BARBARA, JR., ET AL.
(SC 18090)
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Zarella and McLachlan, Js.*
Argued May 26, 2009—officially released February 16, 2010
Linda L. Morkan, with whom, on the brief, were
Steven R. Humphrey, Brian R. Smith and Jeffrey J.
White, for the appellants (plaintiffs Thomas Santa Bar-
bara, Jr., et al.).
Wesley W. Horton and William H. Clendenen, Jr.,
with whom were Kimberly A. Knox and, on the brief,
Kevin C. Shea, Michael S. Taylor, David A. Reif and
Matthew A. Weiner, for the appellee (defendant town
of Branford).
Opinion
McLACHLAN, J. The question raised by this appeal is
whether the offer of judgment statute, General Statutes
(Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a,1 applies in the context of con-
demnation appeals. The plaintiffs, Thomas Santa Bar-
bara, Jr., and Frank Perrotti, Jr., the owners of real
property (owners) condemned by the defendant town
of Branford (town),2 appeal from the judgment of the
trial court sustaining the town’s objection to the owners’
offer of judgment.3 The owners claim that the court
improperly concluded, on the basis of its determination
that the offer of judgment statute conflicts with General
Statutes § 8-130,4 which specifically limits the award of
prejudgment interest in condemnation cases, that § 52-
192a cannot be utilized in a condemnation appeal. The
owners contend that the eminent domain statutory
scheme can be read harmoniously with § 52-192a, and
that failure to apply § 52-192a to condemnation appeals
would run contrary to that statute’s well established
purpose of encouraging pretrial settlements. The town
maintains that General Statutes §§ 8-1335 and 37-3c6 pro-
vide the exclusive remedy for awards of prejudgment
interest to property owners in condemnation cases and,
therefore, the offer of judgment statute is inapplicable.
The town also argues, for the first time on appeal, that
the owners’ offer of judgment was invalid because it
did not offer to settle the case for a ‘‘ ‘sum certain’ ’’
as required by § 52-192a (a). We affirm the judgment
of the trial court, albeit on different grounds.
The facts underlying this appeal are set out more
fully in the companion cases of Branford v. Santa Bar-
bara, 294 Conn. 785,
A.2d
(2010), and New
England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817,
A.2d
(2010), which were released on the same date
as this opinion. The following additional facts are neces-
sary for the resolution of this appeal. On December 18,
2003, pursuant to General Statutes § 8-129 (a) (3),7 the
town filed a statement of compensation for the taking
of property known as 48-86 Tabor Drive in Branford in
the amount of $1,167,800. The town also deposited the
sum of $1,167,800 with the clerk in the Superior Court.
In May, 2004, the owners, believing the amount of the
compensation to be inadequate, filed an appeal and
application for review of the statement of compensation
pursuant to General Statutes § 8-132 (a).8 Thereafter,
in May, 2005, pursuant to § 52-192a (a), the owners filed
an offer of judgment in the amount of $3,967,800. In its
objection to the offer of judgment, the town argued that
an offer of judgment is not appropriate in condemnation
cases because an appeal from a statement of compensa-
tion does not seek the recovery of money damages and
that the application of § 52-192a would be inconsistent
with § 37-3c because § 37-3c specifically provides for
the recovery of interest in condemnation cases.
Following a hearing on September 19, 2005, the court,
Blue, J., sustained the objection to the offer of judg-
ment. In its memorandum of decision, the court con-
cluded that § 52-192a, which awards prejudgment
interest on the entire amount recovered, cannot be
applied to condemnation appeals without violating § 8-
130, which prohibits the assessment of interest on the
amount deposited by the town in accordance with § 8-
129 (a) (3). The court reasoned that applying § 8-130
to the exclusion of § 52-192a is consistent with the well
established principle that statutes specific to a particu-
lar subject matter control over a more general statute
that may also be applicable. See, e.g., Griswold Airport,
Inc. v. Madison, 289 Conn. 723, 729 n.10, 961 A.2d 338
(2008) (‘‘[i]t is a well-settled principle of [statutory]
construction that specific terms covering [a] given sub-
ject matter will prevail over general language of . . .
another statute which might otherwise prove control-
ling’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly,
the trial court concluded that an offer of judgment can-
not be made in condemnation cases.
The question of whether § 52-192a applies properly
to an appeal from a statement of compensation presents
a question of statutory construction, over which we
employ plenary review. Saunders v. Firtel, 293 Conn.
515, 525, 978 A.2d 487 (2009). ‘‘When construing a stat-
ute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In
other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned man-
ner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied
to the facts of [the] case, including the question of
whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seek-
ing to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z
directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself
and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining
such text and considering such relationship, the mean-
ing of such text is plain and unambiguous and does
not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual
evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) PJM &
Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 134, 971
A.2d 24 (2009).
Our inquiry in any issue of statutory interpretation
begins with the language of the statute at issue. See
General Statutes § 1-2z; Director of Health Affairs Pol-
icy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission,
293 Conn. 164, 170, 977 A.2d 148 (2009). The relevant
language of § 52-192a (a) provides: ‘‘After commence-
ment of any civil action based upon contract or seeking
the recovery of money damages, whether or not other
relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not later than thirty
days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written
‘offer of judgment’ signed by the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff’s attorney, directed to the defendant or the defen-
dant’s attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying
the action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum
certain. . . .’’
Section 52-192a is silent as to the inclusion or exclu-
sion of condemnation appeals.9 Therefore, we must
determine whether those appeals come within the pur-
view of § 52-192a. By its terms, § 52-192a (a) sets out
three elements that must be met in order to benefit
from the offer of judgment statute. Specifically, the
party must be: (1) a plaintiff; (2) in a civil action; (3)
that is based upon contract or seeking the recovery of
money damages. We turn our attention, then, to whether
a
condemnation
appeal
satisfies
these
three
requirements.
Because the question of whether persons who file an
appeal from a statement of compensation are ‘‘plain-
tiffs’’ pursuant to § 52-192a (a) turns, in part, on whether
such an appeal is a civil action, we first consider
whether an appeal from a statement of compensation
brought pursuant to § 8-132 is a civil action.10 Although
§ 52-192a does not define ‘‘civil action,’’ a civil action
generally is an action that is commenced by service of
process. See General Statutes §§ 52-45a and 52-91;11 see
also Board of Education v. Tavares Pediatric Center,
276 Conn. 544, 557–58, 888 A.2d 65 (2006) (Rhode Island
administrative proceeding not civil action because not
commenced by service of process or controlled by rules
of pleading). This rule, however, is not a hard and fast
one. Administrative appeals, for example, are civil
actions in some circumstances. See Practice Book § 14-
6.12 The offer of judgment statute, therefore, is not clear
and unambiguous. See PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridge-
port, supra, 292 Conn. 134 (‘‘[t]he test to determine
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context,
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly,
we turn to extratextual sources for further guidance as
to legislative intent.
A subsequent amendment to § 52-192a (a) is instruc-
tive. See Chambers v. Electric Boat Corp., 283 Conn.
840, 855 n.8, 930 A.2d 653 (2007) (this court has pre-
viously considered subsequent enactments to illumi-
nate
legislative
intent
with
respect
to
earlier
legislation). In 2007, as part of its changes to eminent
domain legislation following our decision in Kelo v. New
London, 268 Conn. 1, 843 A.2d 500 (2004), aff’d, 545
U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2005), the
legislature added the following language to § 52-192a
(a): ‘‘For the purposes of this section, such plaintiff
includes a counterclaim plaintiff under [§] 8-132 . . . .’’
Public Acts 2007, No. 07-141, § 16 (P.A. 07-141). Public
Act 07-141, § 9, also added the following language to
§ 8-132 (a): ‘‘For the purposes of [an application for
review of a statement of compensation], review and
appeal therefrom, and for the purposes of sections 52-
192a to 52-195, inclusive . . . such applicant shall be
deemed a counterclaim plaintiff.’’ Thus, in 2007, the
legislature unambiguously evidenced an intent that con-
demnation appeals should be subject to the offer of
judgment statute. Significantly, the legislature made the
amendments effective from the date of passage of the
act, June 25, 2007, and with respect to § 8-132 the
changes were ‘‘applicable to property acquired on or
after said date’’; P.A. 07-141, § 9; and with respect to
§ 52-192a ‘‘applicable to applications filed on or after
said date . . . .’’ P.A. 07-141, § 16. ‘‘[W]e will not impute
to the legislature an intent that is not apparent from
unambiguous statutory language in the absence of a
compelling reason to do so. Rather, [w]e are bound
to interpret legislative intent by referring to what the
legislative text contains, not by what it might have con-
tained.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Laliberte
v. United Security, Inc., 261 Conn. 181, 186, 801 A.2d
783 (2002). Accordingly, by the express terms of P.A.
07-141, the 2007 amendments cannot be applied in the
present case. See also In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621,
627, 784 A.2d 317 (2001) (‘‘[i]n determining the effect
of a subsequent statutory amendment on earlier legisla-
tion . . . [w]e recognize the usual presumption that,
in enacting a statute, the legislature intended a change
in existing law’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Additionally, like the trial court, we are mindful that
‘‘specific terms in a statute covering a given subject
matter will prevail over the more general language of
the same or another statute that otherwise might be
controlling. . . . This oft-stated principle reflects the
fact that specific statutory language constitutes a more
accurate representation of the legislature’s purpose or
intent than more general pronouncements concerning
the same subject matter.’’ (Citations omitted.) Thibo-
deau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn.
691, 713–14, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). Here, the legislature’s
amendment adding language that specifically applies
the offer of judgment statute to condemnation appeals,
effective after the passage of P.A. 07-141, controls over
more general language, which does not directly impli-
cate § 8-132. In other words, the amendment of § 52-
192a in 2007 evidences the legislature’s understanding
that an amendment was necessary to bring condemna-
tion appeals within the ambit of the offer of judgment
statute. The corollary to that is the conclusion that,
prior to 2007, the legislature did not intend for § 52-
192a to be applicable to condemnation appeals. We
conclude, therefore, that the offer of judgment statute
did not, in 2005, apply in the context of condemna-
tion appeals.
The punitive nature of the offer of judgment statute
supports our conclusion. See Accettullo v. Worcester
Ins. Co., 256 Conn. 667, 672, 775 A.2d 943 (2001) (‘‘The
statute is admittedly punitive in nature. . . . It is the
punitive aspect of the statute that effectuates the under-
lying purpose of the statute and provides the impetus
to settle cases.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]);
Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 208
Conn.
91
(§ 52-192a
imposes
‘‘interest
penalty’’).
Because § 52-192a is punitive, we are required to con-
strue it with ‘‘reasonable strictness in determining
whether the act complained of comes within the
description in the statute of the acts for which the
person in fault is made liable.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Freeman v. Alamo Management Co.,
221 Conn. 674, 684, 607 A.2d 370 (1992) (discussing
punitive provisions in context of General Statutes § 47a-
46). Given the ambiguity of § 52-192a, we must interpret
it in favor of the party who would be subject to the
punitive consequences of the statute rather than in favor
of the party who would benefit from those conse-
quences. Accordingly, in the absence of clear evidence
that the legislature intended the offer of judgment stat-
ute to apply to condemnation appeals prior to 2007, we
cannot impose the consequences of § 52-192a on the
town in the present case.
We recognize that in Loomis Institute v. Windsor, 234
Conn. 169, 179–80, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995), we concluded,
relying on the rules of practice, that § 52-192a applied
in the context of tax appeals. Specifically, we noted
that the rules of practice directly implement § 52-192a
through Practice Book § 17-14, formerly Practice Book,
1978–97, § 346,13 which ‘‘mirror[s] the usage of ‘civil
action’ that is found in the statute.’’ Id., 180. We then
concluded that because Practice Book §§ 14-514 and 14-
6, formerly Practice Book, 1978–97, §§ 255 and 256,
respectively, define a tax appeal as a civil action, the
trial court properly awarded interest to the taxpayer
pursuant to § 52-192a. Id., 180–81. Although condemna-
tion appeals, like tax appeals, fit within the definition
of administrative appeals in the rules of practice, our
rules of statutory construction lead us to conclude that
the subsequent amendment to § 52-192a is the more
persuasive extratextual source because it applies spe-
cifically to § 8-132.
We also acknowledge the owners’ argument that the
application of § 52-192a to condemnation appeals
would be consistent with the well established purpose
of that statute: to encourage the settlement of cases
and to provide punitive consequences for litigants who
reject reasonable settlement offers. The town contends
that § 8-133, which grants the court discretion to shift
costs of court to the condemning agency; see footnote
5 of this opinion; is the sole remedy for owners who
recover more than the sum in the statement of compen-
sation. Although the General Assembly apparently
agrees with the owners in this regard, P.A. 07-141 pro-
vides that § 52-192a is applicable only to property con-
demned on or after July 25, 2007, and, as we have
recognized, it is the legislature, and not this court, that
is responsible for formulating and implementing public
policy. See Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects,
LLC, supra, 260 Conn. 715. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court properly concluded that § 52-192a
could not be used in this condemnation appeal pursuant
to § 8-132.15
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* This case was argued prior to the implementation of the policy of this
court to hear all cases en banc.
1 General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking
the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the
plaintiff may, not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of
the court a written ‘offer of judgment’ signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s
attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, offering to
settle the claim underlying the action and to stipulate to a judgment for a
sum certain. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of settlement to the
defendant’s attorney . . . . Within sixty days after being notified of the
filing of the ‘offer of judgment’ and prior to the rendering of a verdict by
the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or the defendant’s attorney
may file with the clerk of the court a written ‘acceptance of offer of judgment’
agreeing to a stipulation for judgment as contained in plaintiff’s ‘offer of
judgment’. Upon such filing, the clerk shall enter judgment immediately on
the stipulation. If the ‘offer of judgment’ is not accepted within sixty days
and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court,
the ‘offer of judgment’ shall be considered rejected and not subject to
acceptance unless refiled. . . .
‘‘(b) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether
the plaintiff made an ‘offer of judgment’ which the defendant failed to accept.
If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an
amount equal to or greater than the sum certain stated in the plaintiff’s
‘offer of judgment’, the court shall add to the amount so recovered twelve
per cent annual interest on said amount, computed from the date such offer
was filed in actions commenced before October 1, 1981. In those actions
commenced on or after October 1, 1981, the interest shall be computed
from the date the complaint in the civil action was filed with the court if
the ‘offer of judgment’ was filed not later than eighteen months from the
filing of such complaint. . . . The court may award reasonable attorney’s
fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render
judgment accordingly. . . .’’ All references to § 52-192a in this opinion are
to the 2005 revision of the statute.
Section 52-192a was amended in 2005 by, inter alia, the substitution of
‘‘offer of compromise’’ for ‘‘offer of judgment.’’ See Public Acts 2005, No.
05-275, § 4 (P.A. 05-275). Because P.A. 05-275 is applicable to actions accruing
on or after October 1, 2005, it is not applicable to the present matter.
Therefore, we refer to the owners’ offer as an ‘‘offer of judgment’’ rather
than employing the current statutory terminology.
2 After the town condemned the owners’ property and filed a statement
of compensation, the owners filed an appeal challenging the statement of
compensation. Although this case is captioned Town of Branford v. Thomas
Santa Barbara, Jr., et al., because the town filed the certificate of taking,
this court has recognized that the filing of a statement of compensation does
not originate a civil action. See footnote 10 of this opinion. Consequently, we
recognize the town as the defendant and the owners as the plaintiffs in this
appeal. In order to avoid any confusion that might result from contrary
identification by the parties in certain pleadings at the trial level, and to
ensure consistency between this case and two companion cases released
on the same date as this opinion; see Branford v. Santa Barbara, 294 Conn.
785,
A.2d
(2010); New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn.
817,
A.2d
(2010); we refer to the parties by name rather than by
party status.
3 The owners appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
4 General Statutes § 8-130 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever any rede-
velopment agency files a statement of compensation as provided for in
section 8-129, it shall deposit with the clerk of the Superior Court a sum of
money equal to the amount set forth in the statement of compensation to
the use of the persons entitled thereto. . . . If the amount of compensation
is finally determined through the filing of an amended statement of compen-
sation which is thereafter accepted by the owners and all other persons
having a record interest therein as provided for in section 8-131, the redevel-
opment agency shall deposit with such amended statement an additional
sum of money representing the excess over the amount appearing in the
original statement of compensation. Interest shall not be allowed in any
judgment on so much of the amount as has been deposited in court. . . .
If the compensation finally awarded exceeds the total amount of money so
deposited or received by any person or persons entitled thereto, the court
shall enter judgment against the municipality for the amount of the defi-
ciency.’’
5 General Statutes § 8-133 provides: ‘‘If, as the result of any review under
the provisions of section 8-132, the applicant obtains an award from the court
greater than the amount determined as compensation by the redevelopment
agency, costs of court, including such appraisal fees as the court determines
to be reasonable, shall be awarded to the applicant and taxed against the
redevelopment agency in addition to the amount fixed by the judgment.’’
6 General Statutes § 37-3c provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judgment of
compensation for a taking of property by eminent domain shall include
interest at a rate that is reasonable and just on the amount of the compensa-
tion awarded. . . .’’
7 General Statutes § 8-129 (a) (3) provides: ‘‘The redevelopment agency
shall file a statement of compensation, containing a description of the prop-
erty to be taken and the names of all persons having a record interest therein
and setting forth the amount of such compensation, and a deposit as provided
in section 8-130, with the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district
in which the property affected is located.’’ Although § 8-129 (a) (3) refers
only to redevelopment agencies, it is the proper procedure for a town
exercising its power of eminent domain pursuant to General Statutes § 48-
6 (a). See General Statutes § 48-6 (a) (any municipal corporation purchasing
real property for its municipal purposes shall, if it cannot agree with owner
regarding amount to be paid for property taken, proceed in accordance with
General Statutes § 48-12); General Statutes § 48-12 (procedure for condemn-
ing land under § 48-6 shall be in manner specified for redevelopment agencies
in accordance with General Statutes §§ 8-128 to 8-133, inclusive).
8 General Statutes § 8-132 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person claim-
ing to be aggrieved by the statement of compensation filed by the redevelop-
ment agency may, at any time within six months after the statement of
compensation has been filed, apply to the superior court for the judicial
district in which such property is situated for a review of such statement
of compensation so far as it affects such applicant. . . .’’
9 As we have already explained, in its memorandum of decision, the trial
court concluded that § 52-192a appears to conflict with § 8-130. We do not
necessarily agree that the two statutes cannot be reconciled; see Rainforest
Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 378, 977 A.2d 650
(2009) (‘‘[i]f a court can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field
of operation for two allegedly inconsistent statutes, without destroying or
preventing their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the court to
do so’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); and note that, in other contexts,
this court has harmonized seemingly conflicting statutes by considering the
term ‘‘amount so recovered’’; see General Statutes § 52-192a (b); within the
context of the particular litigation. See, e.g., Stiffler v. Continental Ins. Co.,
288 Conn. 38, 49–50, 950 A.2d 1270 (2008) (when applying § 52-192a in
context of uninsured motorist claims pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-
336 [b], offer of judgment interest is based on judgment after remittitur
rather than verdict amount); Cardenas v. Mixcus, 264 Conn. 314, 318–19,
324, 823 A.2d 321 (2003) (jury verdict rather than award due plaintiff after
apportionment to employer, who had previously paid plaintiff’s workers’
compensation benefits, should be used to determine offer of judgment inter-
est because employer stood in shoes of plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes
§ 31-293); Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 208 Conn. 82, 91,
544 A.2d 158 (1988) (plaintiff not entitled to offer of judgment interest when
jury returned verdict greater than amount in offer of judgment but amount
recovered was reduced by remittitur pursuant to General Statutes § 52-
216a). We need not address this issue, however, for two reasons. First, as
we conclude later in this opinion, the owners’ appeal from the statement
of compensation did not come within the class of cases to which § 52-192a
was applicable in 2005. Second, the 2007 amendment to § 52-192a, which
explicitly applies that statute to condemnation appeals, resolves any conflict
with § 8-130. General Statutes § 52-192a (c), following its amendment by
Public Acts 2007, No. 07-141, § 16, provides in relevant part that ‘‘in the case
of a counterclaim plaintiff under [§] 8-132, the court shall add to the amount
so recovered eight per cent annual interest on the difference between the
amount so recovered and the sum certain specified in the counterclaim
plaintiff’s offer of compromise. . . .’’ The statute, as amended, does not,
therefore, allow for interest on the amount deposited, thereby avoiding
conflict with § 8-130.
10 This court has recognized that the filing of a statement of compensation
does not originate a civil action. Simmons v. State, 160 Conn. 492, 494 n.1,
280 A.2d 351 (1971). A condemnation appeal, however, is distinct from the
initiation of the condemnation process.
11 General Statutes § 52-45a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Civil actions shall
be commenced by legal process consisting of a writ of summons or attach-
ment . . . .’’
General Statutes § 52-91 provides in relevant part: ‘‘There shall be one
form of civil action. The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be
known as the complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constitut-
ing the cause of action and, on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for
the relief, which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought. . . .’’
12 Practice Book § 14-6 provides: ‘‘For purposes of these rules, administra-
tive appeals are civil actions. Whenever these rules refer to civil actions,
actions, civil causes, causes or cases, the reference shall include administra-
tive appeals except that: (a) appeals from judgments of the superior court
in administrative appeals shall be by certification only as provided by General
Statutes § 51-197b as amended, and by chapter 72 of these rules; and (b)
an administrative appeal shall not be deemed an action for purposes of
General Statutes §§ 52-591, 52-592 or 52-593.’’
13 Practice Book, 1978–97, § 346 (now § 17-14), provided in relevant part:
‘‘After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking
the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the
plaintiff may, before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written ‘offer of
judgment’ signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney, directed to the
defendant or the defendant’s attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying
such action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum certain. . . .’’ Although
Practice Book § 17-14 subsequently has been amended in accordance with
amendments to § 52-192a, the provision in effect in 2005 is substantially the
same as the provision in effect in Loomis.
14 Practice Book § 14-5 provides: ‘‘For the purposes of these rules, adminis-
trative appeals are those appeals taken pursuant to statute from decisions
of officers, boards, commissions or agencies of the state or of any political
subdivision of the state, and include specifically appeals taken pursuant to:
‘‘(1) chapter 54 of the General Statutes;
‘‘(2) chapters 124 through 134 of the General Statutes; or
‘‘(3) other enabling legislation.’’
15 Because we conclude that the trial court properly sustained the town’s
objection to the owners’ offer of judgment, we need not consider the town’s
argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that § 52-192a is inapplicable
to the present case because the offer of judgment filed by the owners did
not offer to settle for a ‘‘ ‘sum certain’ ’’ as required by § 52-192a.