Case Title: Stark v. Lackey

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 4

Docket Number: 74449

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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136 Nev., Advance Opinion 41
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CAROLYN STARK, AN INDIVIDUAL, No. 74449
D/B/A NDOW WATCH KEEPING THEM.

TAMPA, FILED

Appellant,

CARL LACKEY, FEB 27 amy

Respondent. as Eee

Appeal from a district court order denying a special motion to
dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
County; Connie J. Steinheimer, Judge.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

 

Winter Street Law Group and Stephanie R. Rice and Richard A. Salvatore,
Reno,
for Appellant.

Gerber Law Offices, LLP, and Zachary A. Gerber and Travis W. Gerber,
Elko; Durney & Brennan, Ltd., and Thomas R. Brennan, Reno; Rose Law
Office and Sean P. Rose, Reno,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

Third-party comments posted to appellant Carolyn Stark's
public Facebook page criticize respondent Carl Lackey for his handling of
bears in his official capacity as a Nevada Department of Wildlife (NDOW)

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9

 

biologist. Lackey sued based on these comments, and in response, Stark
filed a special motion to dismiss the action under Nevada's anti-SLAPP
(strategic lawsuit against public participation) statutes. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that not all of the comments were related to
a matter of public interest or were shown to be true or made without
knowledge of any falsehood, such that they constituted good-faith
‘communications entitled to anti-SLAPP protections.

On appeal from the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion to
dismiss, we hold that Stark met her burden of showing that the action was
“based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to
petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of
Public concern,” thus satisfying prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis set
forth in NRS 41.660. Because the comments were directly connected with
an issue of public concern, and because Stark submitted an affidavit that,
in the absence of conflicting evidence, satisfies the requirement of showing
that the comments were true or made without knowledge of any falsehood,
the district court erred in finding that she failed to satisfy prong one so as
to shift the burden to Lackey to demonstrate that the claims should be
allowed to proceed. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to
the district court to address prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

PACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Stark created and administers a public Facebook page entitled
“NDOW Watch Keeping Them Transparent” (NDOW Watch). NDOW
Watch serves as a forum for Stark and other NDOW Watch followers to
comment on NDOW’s treatment of wildlife. Lackey, a biologist with NDOW,
manages the bear population in the state. Atissue here are comments made
by third-party followers on the NDOW Watch Facebook page that criticize
Lackey and his actions concerning the Northern Nevada bear population.

 

2

 
Lackey brought suit against Stark based on these third-party
comments. He alleged claims of defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil
conspiracy. Stark sought to dismiss these claims pursuant to both an anti-
SLAPP special motion to dismiss under NRS 41.635-.670 and a motion to
dismiss under NRCP 12(b\5). In her motions, Stark contended that she
cannot be held liable for statements made by third parties on the NDOW
Watch Facebook page on the sole basis that she administers the Facebook
page. In addition, Stark affixed affidavits to her motions in which she
affirmed that she has only made true statements on NDOW Watch and that
she believes that the statements made by others on the Facebook page are
either statements of opinion or contain substantial truth.

The district court denied Stark's motions. In denying the anti-
SLAPP motion, the district court determined that several of the comments

  

on the NDOW Watch Facebook page were not related to a matter of public
interest, and that, even if they were, Stark’s affidavit attesting to the
veracity of the posts did not conclusively establish that the third-party posts
were true or otherwise made without knowledge of their falsehood. In
ruling on the Rule 12(bX5) motion to dismiss, the district court determined
that only one of the five alleged defamatory statements was not actionable.
Stark appeals the district court's denial of the anti-SLAPP moti
remaining actionable statements, maintaining that the district court erred.

as to the

 

in its analysis.

!While Stark does not specifically challenge the district court's denial
of her NRCP 12(b\(5) motion to dismiss, Lackey asked us to affirm the same
in his answering brief. Because Stark does not actually challenge the

 

 
DISCUSSION

The district court erred in finding that Stark failed to satisfy prong one of
the anti-SLAPP analysis

“A SLAPP suit is a meritless lawsuit that a party initiates
primarily to chill a defendant's exercise of his or her First Amendment free
speech rights.” Stubbs v. Strickland, 129 Nev. 146, 150, 297 P.3d 326, 329
(2013). Nevada’ anti-SLAPP statutes provide defendants with a
procedural mechanism whereby they may file a special motion to dismiss
the meritless lawsuit before incurring significant costs of litigation. NRS
41.660(1); see also Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748
(2019). We review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. Coker, 135
Nev. at 10-11, 432 P.3d at 748-49.

Our anti-SLAPP statutes posit a two-prong analysis to
determine the viability of a special motion to dismiss. See Coker, 135 Nev.
at 12, 432 P.3d at 749. First, the district court must “(dJetermine whether
the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the
right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue
of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3Xa). Second, if the district court finds the

defendant has met his or her burden, the court must then “determine

ruling, and because the denial of a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(bX5),
unlike a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statutes, is not
independently appealable, we do not address it. Compare Kirsch v. Traber,
134 Nev. 163, 168, 414 P.3d 818, 822 (2018) (stating an order denying a
motion to dismiss is not appealable), and NRAP 3A(b) (listing the
appealable determinations), with NRS 41.670(4) (providing for
interlocutory review of an order denying an anti-SLAPP special motion to
dismiss).

 

 
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a
probability of prevailing on the claim.” NRS 41.660(3Xb)..

‘The showing required by the defendant to satisfy prong one has
two components. The first componentiis that the comments at issue fall into
one of the four categories of protected communications enumerated in NRS
41.637. See Deluechi v. Songer, 133 Nev. 290, 299, 396 P.3d 826, 833 (2017).
‘The category at issue in this case is “[clommunication made in direct
‘connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or
in a public forum.” NRS 41.637(4). The second component is that the
communication “is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”
NRS 41.637; see Delucchi, 133 Nev. at 299, 396 P.3d at 833.

Here, the district court found that Stark failed to meet her
burden because not all of the comments on the NDOW Watch Facebook
posts were sufficiently related to the stated public interest and because her
affidavit failed to establish that the third-party posts were true or otherwise
made without knowledge of their falsehood. We disagree.

But before discussing the district. court's error, we note that
throughout briefing and oral argument, Stark argues that she is immunized
from liability in this matter by the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47
ULS.C. § 230 (2012), because she did not author any of the third-party posts
and served only as a provider or user of an interactive computer service.
However, the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis does not require that
the comments at issue actually be made by the defendant, and instead
focuses only on whether the comments constituted protected
communication made in good faith. See NRS 41.660(1) (setting forth the
procedure for when “an action is brought against a person based upon a

00d faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right

 

 
to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern”
(emphasis added)). The issue of whether the defendant may be held liable
for the communication only becomes a consideration in the second prong of
the anti-SLAPP analysis, when the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate “a probability of prevailing on the claim.” NRS 41.660(3\(b).
In this case, because the district court never reached the second prong and
did not go beyond the allegations in addressing it in relation to the NRCP
12(bX5) motion, we do not address Stark’s immunity argument but instead,
as provided below, instruct the district court to consider the argument on
remand.

‘The statements were “made in direct connection with an issue of public
interest... . in a public forum"

Regarding the first required showing under prong one,? Stark
claimed that the statements were made in connection with an issue of public
interest—namely, the treatment of wildlife in Lake Tahoe and, specifically,
concerns stemming from NDOW’s trapping and euthanizing bears in the
Lake Tahoe region. In determining whether an issue is in the publie
interest, we use the guiding principles that we adopted from California:

(1) “public interest” does not equate with
mere curiosity;

We note that the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that NDOW
Watch Facebook page is a public forum. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d
510, 514 n.4 (Cal. 2006) (“Web sites accessible to the public . . . are ‘public
forums’ for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ); Cross v. Facebook,
Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250, 258 (Ct. App. 2017) (agreeing with the trial
court's determination that “lilt cannot be disputed that Facebook's website
and the Facebook pages at issue are ‘public forums, as they are accessible
to anyone who consents to Facebook's Terms” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, our analysis here focuses on whether the comments were
made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

 

 
ome

 

(2)a matter of public interest should be
something of concern to a substantial number of
people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a
relatively small specific audience is not a matter of
public interest;

(3) there should be some degree of closeness
between the challenged statements and the
asserted public interest—the assertion of a broad
and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;

(4) the focus of the speaker's conduct should
be the public interest rather than a mere effort to
gather ammunition for another round of private
controversy; and

(5)a person cannot turn otherwise private
information into a matter of public interest simply
by communicating it to a large number of people.

Shapiro v, Welt, 133 Nev. 35, 39-40, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017) (quoting
Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 24
957, 968 (N.D, Cal. 2013), aff'd, 609 F. App'x 497 (9th Cir. 2015).

Applying these factors here, we conclude that the treatment of
‘Nevada wildlife, and specifically bears in the Tahoe Basin, surpasses mere
curiosity and is a concern to many people throughout the state. See Shapiro,
133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.Sd at 268. Furthermore, each of the four comments
at issue expresses a critique of NDOW’s handling of the bear population or
a critique of Lackey in his role as an NDOW biologist, demonstrating

sufficient closeness to the asserted public interest. For example, one

°The four statements from the first amended complaint at issue on
appeal are as follows:

q.“He and his family directly benefit by him
moving bears to a hunting area if they are issued a
license and the killing of them in the name of public

 
comment (statement q) states that “if we can establish that he or his family
benefits financially from selling bear parts or selling the location where he
recently released a bear—he should go to jail.” The district court
erroneously found that this comment did not relate to the stated public
interest because its “main focus concerns potential benefits Lackey may
receive, and hypothesizes that Lackey should go to jail if they can prove he
sells bear parts.” In fact, this comment directly relates to the stated public
interest of the treatment of bears in Nevada because it questions Lackey's
activities in his role as an NDOW biologist. Just because the comment
presented a hypothetical about Lackey’s conduct, it does not follow that it
was not directly related to the public interest. We conclude that alll four
comments concern the handling of bears by NDOW or Lackey and thus

 

safety must simply be something that excites him—
all of it in conflict with NDOW's mission.
Additionally, if we can establish that he or his
family benefits financially from selling bear parts
or selling the location where he recently released a
bear—he should go to jail.”

r. “Yes he should go to jail! The treatment of our
bears is paramount cruelty. Moving mothers
without their cubs, moving them to hunt zones,
moving them great distances knowing full well
there are no food sources or water and that they will,
try to return home! Animal cruelty is a felony in all,
50 states. Him and his NDOW murderers need to
go to jail and stay there.”

ss. “It’s time for the NV ENGINEERED bear hunt.”

y. ‘Lackey is such an incompetent asshole!! Fire
his ass!!”

We reiterate our conclusion that each comment directly concerns the
asserted public interest in critiquing either NDOW or its employees in their
handling of the bear population.

 

 
directly relate to the stated public interest of the treatment of bears in
Nevada. See Coker, 135 Nev. at 14, 432 P.3d at 751 (defining an issue of
public interest broadly for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statutes).

‘Stark's affidavit, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, met her
burden of showing that the communications were truthful or made
without knowledge of falsity

With respect to the second required showing under prong one
of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the defendant bears the burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence that the communication “is truthful or
is made without knowledge of its falsehood.” NRS 41.637; NRS 41.660(3Xa).
In Stark's affidavit, attached to her anti-SLAPP motion, she stated that she
has only made true statements on NDOW Watch and that she believes that
the statements made by others on NDOW Watch are either statements of
opinion or contain substantial truth. ‘The district court determined that
Stark failed to meet her burden because her affidavit did not specifically
address the individual factual allegations in each comment. We conclude
this finding was clearly erroneous.

Though the affidavit did not address the individual factual
allegations in the statements or specifically attest to the truthfulness of the
speaker who made the statements, we have previously held that a sworn
declaration like Stark's is sufficient evidence that the statements were
truthful or made without knowledge of their falsehood. See Delucchi, 133
Nev. at 300, 396 P.3d at 833. We acknowledge that our holding in Delucchi
involved the pre-2013 version of NRS 41.660, which imposed a summary-
judgment burden of proof on the defendant rather than the preponderance
of the evidence burden required in the current version of the statute. See
Coker, 135 Nev. at 10, 432 P.3d at 748 (“In 2013, the Legislature removed

the language likening an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss to a motion for

 

 
 

summary judgment and set forth a specific burden-shifting framework.”
Despite this change in evidentiary burden, we now hold that even under the
preponderance standard, an affidavit stating that the defendant believed
the communications to be truthful or made them without knowledge of their
falsehood is sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden absent contradictory
evidence in the record. Cf. Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 867 (Wash. 2015)
(contrasting the more exacting summary judgment standard, which
requires “a legal certainty” that can be defeated by a dispute of a materi

 

fact, with a preponderance of the evidence burden, which examines
“whether the evidence crosses a certain threshold of proving a likelihood of
prevailing on the claim”), abrogated on other grounds by Maytown Sand &
Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cty., 423 P.3d 223, 440 n.15 (Wash. 2018),
abrogated in part by Yim v. City of Seattle, 451 P.3d 694, 704-05 (Wash.
2019). Because Stark's affidavit made it more likely than not that the
communications were truthful or made without knowledge of their
falsehood, and there is no evidence in the record to the contrary, we conclude
that she met her burden of showing that the third-party comments were
made in good faith, so as to satisfy prong one.
CONCLUSION

The district court erred in determining that the comments at
issue were not in the public interest and were not made in good faith.
Because Stark's affidavit established that the comments were protected
communications and were truthful or made without knowledge of their
falsehood, Stark met her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP
analysis. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order denying Stark’s
special motion to dismiss and remand this matter to the district court with
instructions for it to address prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis
Specifically, we instruct the district court to consider the applicability of the

10

 

  
   

Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012), in determining
whether Lackey can demonstrate “a probability of prevailing on the claim.”*
NRS 41.660(3)(b).

 

 

‘Because the CDA precludes liability where applicable, and because
the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis asks whether the plaintiff's
claims will likely succeed, we decline to address these arguments, as they
are more properly considered under the second prong. We further advise
the district court to permit discovery to the extent necessary to determine
whether the CDA immunizes Stark from liability in its consideration of
prong two.