Case Title: Padilla v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.

Citation: 295 P.2d 1023, 61 N.M. 115

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1956-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
295 P.2d 1023 (1956) 61 N.M. 115 Solomon S. PADILLA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. No. 6017. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 12, 1956. Rehearing Denied April 24, 1956. *1024 B.G. Johnson, James T. Paulantis, Albuquerque, for appellant. Lorenzo A. Chavez, Arturo G. Ortega, Albuquerque, for appellee. McGHEE, Justice. The defendant has appealed from a judgment rendered upon a jury verdict which awarded to plaintiff the sum of $23,750 (the full amount asked) in damages for injuries incurred by him in discharge of his duties as a sheet metal worker in the Albuquerque shops of the defendant. The action was based upon an alleged violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as amended 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed the defendant failed to furnish him a reasonably safe place to work and as a result a steel block used by him at times to aid in repairing metal jackets removed from steam locomotives fell from the bench where he was working, hitting one of his big toes with a resulting deterioration of his foot and partial loss of use thereof, in addition to pain and suffering; that he is no longer able to work at his trade of sheet metal worker and has had to accept such employment as he could obtain and hold as a laborer unable to stand while working. The defendant denied any negligence on its part and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Under the statute under which this action was brought the defense of contributory negligence does not defeat a recovery but only reduces the damages in the proportion such negligence contributes to the injury and the defense of assumed risk has been abolished. There is no dispute here that the federal decisions are controlling; in passing upon cases brought under the Act federal decisional law is binding upon us. The first point made by defendant is that the plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof that defendant was negligent, but, on the contrary, that the accident was caused by the sole negligence of the plaintiff; that, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to sustain defendant's motion for a directed verdict first made at the close of plaintiff's case and later renewed at the close of all of the evidence. On February 1, 1954, the date of the injury, plaintiff's principal duty as a sheet metal worker was to repair metal jackets which had been removed from steam locomotives and brought into the sheet metal shop. In repairing these jackets plaintiff worked on a table constructed of wood with a half-inch steel plate on top. The table was 34¾ inches high and measured 81×96 inches on top, being¼ inch low at one *1025 corner. It had been in the sheet metal shop since 1925 and the plaintiff first used it in connection with his work in 1928. He had assigned to him a mallet, steel hammer, chisel, screw driver, two pair of snips and electric shears, all of which he would place in the tool box behind him. In addition to these tools plaintiff used two metal blocks, one of steel and the other of lead. The steel block was approximately 5×3×2½ inches and weighed between 8 and 10 pounds. The plaintiff stated that as he would pound on the jackets which he placed on top of the table the piece of steel would move along the table and sometimes fall as he was hammering away. At the time of his injury, while plaintiff was pounding on a jacket with a hammer, the steel block fell off the table, striking him on the right foot. It seems agreed the tool box was not a suitable place for the storage of the steel block when it was not in use, but there was a small shelf on the tool box (smaller than the block) on which it could have been placed. The excuse given by the plaintiff for leaving it on the table where he was pounding was that he was required to keep such tool handy and in front of him on the table, and also, that he would have been reprimanded by the foreman had he not kept it there; that he realized the danger of keeping the block on the table and had asked the foreman for a railing around the table so the block would not fall off, or for a peg on which he could put the block and tie it with a string. He also testified he had reported the dangerous condition of the place where he worked at a safety meeting at which the foreman was present. In this testimony he was corroborated by several fellow workers. The foreman testified he did not remember the matter being reported at a safety meeting or any such complaint by the plaintiff. When asked by the plaintiff for the minutes or record of the safety meeting, the foreman answered he had been transferred to California some four or five weeks before the trial and had been unable to find the record since his return. No attempt was made by the defendant to account for the loss of the record. The plaintiff testified that shortly before his injury he had placed the steel block at the corner of the table about five inches from the edge; that because of the vibration resulting from his pounding it fell from the table and struck his foot. The foreman testified it was not practical to make the change on the table the plaintiff said should have been made that often a workman had a jacket to repair which was as large as the table so that a guard or railing was not practical. He also said he would be against the use of a peg mentioned above. In view of the testimony of the plaintiff and others that the steel block had fallen from the table several times as the result of vibration, we think the definition of negligence by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P.R. Co., 1907, 205 U.S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 407, 409, 51 L. Ed. 681, is applicable here: The defendant showed the plaintiff had used the identical bench on which he was working when injured since 1928, arguing it should not be held liable when he was finally hurt by the falling block. This has the sound of a plea of assumption of risk which is not allowable since the 1939 amendment, Act August 11, 1939, 45 U.S.C.A. § 54. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1943, 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 446, 87 L. Ed. 610, it was stated: *1026 A like long use without accident was interposed in Margevich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 1953, 1 Ill. App.2d 162, 116 N.E.2d 914, 917, which that court disposed of in the following language: It seems if there is any evidence in the case to sustain a finding of negligence by a jury, whether it be established by direct evidence or reasonable inference, the United States Supreme Court will not allow an appellate court to overturn such verdict. See Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 1943, 319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444; Blair v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 1945, 323 U.S. 600, 65 S. Ct. 545, 89 L. Ed. 490; Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 1944, 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 1949, 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497. After a careful study of the record and the authorities we hold there was sufficient evidence of negligence calling for the submission of the case to the jury and the trial court did not err in declining to sustain the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict in its behalf. Error is assigned because the plaintiff was allowed to introduce in evidence a mortality table showing his life expectancy. The defendant objected to its introduction on the ground there was no competent evidence showing permanent disability of the plaintiff. The testimony of the medical experts was in conflict as to whether the injury was permanent, hence the trial court did not err in admitting such table. Thayer v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 1916, 21 N.M. 330, 365, 154 P. 691, and the authority therein cited. The third point relied upon for reversal is that the trial court erred in not granting the defendant a new trial because the damages allowed were excessive. The members of this Court participating in the opinion agree the damages are excessive, but, like the members of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Scott v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 1945, 151 F.2d 61, 64, 65, there is nothing we can do about it, in view of the federal decisional law on the subject and the lack of anything in the record indicating the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice. We quote all that was said in the above cited case on the subject: We also quote from an opinion in the Seventh Circuit on the subject in the case of Larsen v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 1948, 171 F.2d 841, 845: The action of the jury in awarding damages for the full amount asked necessarily included a finding the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, else it would have followed the instructions on the subject and reduced the damages in proportion to the degree the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to his injury. We are unable to say as a matter of law the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, so the case might be sent back for a new trial on the question of damages. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, it is stated: The trial judges have a heavy responsibility in these Federal Employer Liability cases to see the damages are kept within reasonable bounds. They apparently have considerable discretion in passing on motions for a new trial based on claimed excessive verdicts. They sense the atmosphere of the trial, have the feel of the case and have opportunity to observe whether bias, passion or prejudice are present. Without intending the slightest intimation the trial court did not discharge its full duty in this regard, we admonish the trial judges of future cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of their responsibilities in this regard. The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN, J., concur. KIKER, J., not participating. SADLER, Justice (specially concurring). The verdict in this case comes very close to furnishing something "in the record" which, alone and unaided, and in and of itself, reflects the verdict was "the result of passion or prejudice." The complaint first prayed damages in the sum of $13,750. It was later amended to ask for $23,750. The jury gave plaintiff all he asked for. If he had prayed for $50,000 and the jury had continued the generosity of its award by keeping pace with the prayer, is there nothing we could do about it? I do not interpret the federal decisions as going so far as to say so. In my opinion, when the size of the verdict exceeds all bounds of fairness and reason that fact, in and of itself, affords proof of passion and prejudice. If mere approval of the verdict by the trial judge, in denying motion for new trial, ties our hands in the matter of awarding relief against an obviously excessive verdict under the Federal Employer's Liability Act; then, it is my view we should, in each and every instance, let the United States Supreme Court so declare. I do not think, nor do I interpret what is said in the prevailing opinion as holding, that our hands are so tied. If I believed our present opinion embraced such a holding, I would dissent, instead of specially concurring, as I do. DAVID W. CARMODY, District Judge, concurs.