Case Title: McDuffy v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: 279, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BRENDA MCDUFFY and LOUIS
MCDUFFY,
Plaintiffs Below-
Appellants,
v.
LUMBERMEN’S MUTUAL
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 279, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  C.A. No. 99C-10-139
§
§
§
§
Submitted: October 12, 2001
  Decided:   December 17, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 17th day of December 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The plaintiffs-appellants, Brenda McDuffy and Louis McDuffy
(jointly, the “McDuffys”), filed this appeal from the May 31, 2001 order of
the Superior Court dismissing their complaint against the defendant-appellee,
Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company (“Lumbermen’s”).  We find no
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM in C.A. No. 99C-10-139 and
REMAND in C.A. No. 98C-11-213.
121 Del. C. § 2118(a) (2).  The PIP claims arose out of automobile accidents in
1997 and 1998 in which Brenda McDuffy allegedly sustained personal injuries.
221 Del. C. § 2118(j).
3The parties now appear to agree that Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company was
(continued...)
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(2)
In this appeal, the McDuffys claim that the Superior Court erred
in granting the motion of Lumbermen’s to dismiss their complaint on the
ground that it constituted an untimely appeal from the decision of an
automobile arbitration panel and that it duplicated claims they had asserted
previously in a separate pending case.  The McDuffys also claim that the
Superior Court should not have dismissed their complaint because they did not
have an opportunity to fully litigate their claims before the automobile
arbitration panel.
(3)
In October 1998 Brenda McDuffy filed a claim for Personal
Injury Protection (“PIP”)1 benefits with the Delaware Department of
Insurance.2  A hearing before an arbitration panel took place on October 20,
1998.  The “State of Delaware Automobile Arbitration Panel Award” form,
which was issued following the hearing, reflects that both Brenda McDuffy
and “Kemper,” the named defendant, were represented by counsel at the
hearing.3  The form also reflects that Brenda McDuffy was awarded no money
3(...continued)
the proper party defendant.
421 Del. C. § 2118(j) (5).
5The handwritten phrase “Personal Injury Auto” is crossed out and the handwritten
words “Auto Arbitration Appeal” appear to the right.  
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because she “failed to satisfy the burden of proof.”  The form, finally, reflects
a “Date of Award” of October 23, 1998 and contains the following notice:
“This award may be appealed by either side provided an appeal is filed with
Superior Court within 30 days of the date of this award.”4  
(4)
On November 20, 1998, within the prescribed appeal period, the
McDuffys filed a complaint in the Superior Court (C.A. No. 98C-11-213) (the
“first complaint”).  The “Superior Court Civil Case Information Statement”
or “CIS” indicates that this complaint was filed as an appeal from the decision
of the arbitration panel.5  The complaint itself, however, does not refer to that
decision and consists solely of tort claims against Louis Marsico, the driver
of the vehicle involved in the automobile accident with the McDuffys in 1997,
and Joseph Schorah, the driver of the vehicle involved in the automobile
accident with Brenda McDuffy in 1998.  Attached to the first  complaint were
certified copies of the Automobile Arbitration Panel forms and a handwritten
note signed by Brenda McDuffy  stating that the transcript of the arbitration
6Attached to the McDuffys’ opening brief is a copy of a letter from the
Prothonotary’s office dated November 24, 1998, notifying the McDuffys that they had
until December 11, 1998 to provide a copy of the hearing transcript and a copy of the
award form, as well as sign their complaint, or their appeal would be dismissed.  In this
appeal, we do not reach the question whether the McDuffys properly filed an appeal to the
Superior Court from the decision of the Automobile Arbitration Panel. 
7The transcript of the motion hearing reflects that the Superior Court did not
squarely address the issues raised by the McDuffys in their motion to amend.  It appears
that the Superior Court was operating under the mistaken assumption that the McDuffys
sought to amend their complaint (which the Superior Court believed was based solely on
claims arising under the 1997 accident) to add claims arising under the 1998 accident.  The
Superior Court denied the McDuffys’ motion on the ground that they had failed to
establish an adequate factual nexus between the two accidents.
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hearing had been requested.  The record reflects that, on at least one occasion,
the Prothonotary’s Office treated the first complaint as an appeal to the
Superior Court from the decision of the Automobile Arbitration Panel.6
(5)
On April 15, 1999, the McDuffys filed a motion to amend the
first complaint to add as defendants an additional driver involved in the 1998
accident and “Kemper” and to add claims of bad faith, racial discrimination,
fraud and emotional distress against Kemper and a claim for punitive damages
against Louis Marsico.  On June 10, 1999, the Superior Court denied the
McDuffys’ motion to amend.7
  
(6)
On October 14, 1999, the McDuffys filed another complaint in
the Superior Court (C.A. No. 99C-10-139) (the “second complaint”).  The
second complaint contained the same claims asserted in the first complaint and
8The Superior Court notes that the McDuffys also filed a third complaint on
January 19, 2001 (C.A. No. 00C-01-160) containing essentially the same claims.
921 Del. C. § 2118(j) (5).
10Super. Ct. Civ. R. 7 and 8.
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also asserted the additional claims the McDuffys had sought to add in their
motion to amend.  It is the second complaint that was dismissed by the
Superior Court and that is the subject of the instant appeal.8           
(7)
There was no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the
Superior Court in dismissing the McDuffys’ second complaint.  To the extent
the second complaint sought to appeal the October 23, 1998 decision of the
Automobile Arbitration Panel, the Superior Court correctly dismissed it as
untimely.9  To the extent the second complaint reiterated claims already
asserted in the first complaint, the Superior Court correctly dismissed it as
duplicative.10  While the Superior Court also found that the filing of the
second complaint amounted to an “impermissible ‘end run’” around the
Superior Court’s previous denial of the McDuffys’ motion to amend their first
complaint, the record reflects that the McDuffys may have filed their second
11At this point in the litigation, the McDuffys were acting pro se.
12Super. Ct. Civ. Rules 18 and 20.
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complaint based on a misinterpretation of the Superior Court’s ruling on their
motion to amend.11  
(8)
Because the Superior Court in C.A. No. 98C-11-213 did not
squarely address the issues the McDuffys raised in their motion to amend, we
conclude in the interest of justice that the Superior Court should be permitted
to rule on those issues should the McDuffys decide to re-assert them.12  In
addition, it will also be for the Superior Court to decide in the first instance
whether the first complaint constituted an appeal from the decision of the
Automobile Arbitration Panel and the extent to which any PIP claims the
McDuffys may attempt to assert in the first complaint are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata, should such issues be raised. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED in C.A. No. 99C-10-139 and REMANDED in
C.A. No. 98C-11-213 for further proceedings in accordance with this Order.
         BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice