Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V TIWAUN MAURICE CALLOWAY (Opinion on Application)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 153751

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEOPLE v CALLOWAY 
 
Docket Nos. 153636 and 153751.  Decided May 19, 2017. 
 
 
Tiwaun M. Calloway was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, on an 
aiding-and-abetting theory following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court for his role in a 
man’s death.  The court, Megan Maher Brennan, J., sentenced Calloway to 20 to 50 years of 
imprisonment.  At sentencing, the court scored Offense Variable 5 (OV 5), MCL 777.35, at 15 
points for the serious psychological injury suffered by two of the victim’s family members as a 
result of the victim’s death.  Calloway sought delayed leave to appeal.  While his leave 
application was pending, Calloway moved in the trial court for reissuance of the judgment of 
sentence under MCR 6.428.  The trial court granted the motion, and Calloway filed a claim of 
appeal from the reissued judgment.  The Court of Appeals then granted Calloway’s delayed 
application for leave.  The appeals were consolidated.  The Court of Appeals, GLEICHER, P.J., 
and JANSEN and SHAPIRO, JJ., affirmed Calloway’s conviction in an unpublished per curiam 
opinion issued on March 22, 2016, but the Court vacated Calloway’s sentence after it determined 
that OV 5 should have been scored at zero points.  Both Calloway and the prosecution sought 
leave to appeal in the Supreme Court—Calloway, to appeal his conviction, and the prosecution, 
to appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding OV 5. 
 
 
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to 
appeal and without oral argument, held: 
 
 
Points may be assessed for OV 5 even absent proof that a victim’s family member has 
sought or received, or intends to seek or receive, professional treatment.  OV 5 may also be 
scored when a victim’s family member has suffered a serious psychological injury that may 
require professional treatment in the future, regardless of whether the victim’s family member 
presently intends to seek treatment.  Because there was adequate proof of such an injury in this 
case, the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court erred by assessing 15 points for OV 5 had to 
be reversed.   
 
 
1.  Pursuant to MCL 777.22(1), OV 5 must be scored for certain homicide or homicide-
related offenses.  MCL 777.35 specifies that 15 points should be assessed if the serious 
psychological injury to a victim’s family member may require professional treatment and that the 
fact that treatment has not been sought is not determinative.  In scoring OV 5, a trial court should 
consider the severity of the injury and the consequences that flow from it, including how the 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
injury has manifested itself before sentencing and how it is likely to do so in the future, and 
whether professional treatment has been sought or received.  Contrary to the suggestion of the 
Court of Appeals, points may be assessed for OV 5 even when the family member does not have 
a present intention to seek treatment.  All that is required to assess points for OV 5 is the 
existence of a serious psychological injury that may require treatment.  In this case, evidence was 
presented that two of the victim’s family members suffered serious psychological injuries that 
may require professional treatment in the future.  The trial court properly assessed 15 points for 
OV 5 because there was ample evidence of the seriousness of the injuries and their long-lasting 
effects.  The Court of Appeals’ contrary ruling had to be reversed. 
 
 
2.  Calloway’s application for leave to appeal that portion of the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment rejecting his challenges to his conviction was denied for failure to persuade the Court 
that the questions presented in his application should be reviewed.   
 
 
3.  Remand was required under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015), given the 
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court engaged in judicial fact-finding in scoring two 
offense variables.   
 
Reversed in part and remanded. 
 
Justice WILDER took no part in the decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2017 State of Michigan 
FILED  May 19, 2017 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 153636 
 
TIWAUN MAURICE CALLOWAY, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 153751 
 
TIWAUN MAURICE CALLOWAY, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except WILDER, J.) 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
 
 
2 
 
At issue in this case is whether the trial court properly assessed 15 points for 
Offense Variable 5 (OV 5).1  This question turns on whether the proofs were sufficient to 
establish that a “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred 
to a victim’s family.”2  We hold that 15 points may be assessed for OV 5 even absent 
proof that a victim’s family member has sought or received, or intends to seek or receive, 
professional treatment.  In particular, OV 5 may also be scored when a victim’s family 
member has suffered a serious psychological injury that may require professional 
treatment in the future, regardless of whether the victim’s family member presently 
intends to seek treatment.  Because there was adequate proof of such an injury in this 
case, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court erred by assessing 15 
points for OV 5.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant, Tiwaun Calloway, and his friend Damian Jones were searching for the 
man they believed stole a cell phone from Jones’s girlfriend.  Defendant drove to Jones’s 
residence, where Jones retrieved an AK-47 rifle.  They later confronted the suspected 
thief.  As the man tried to run away, Jones opened fire, killing him.  Defendant then 
drove Jones away from the scene.  Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder3 on 
an aiding and abetting theory and was sentenced to 20 to 50 years in prison. 
                                              
1 MCL 777.35.  
2 MCL 777.35(1)(a). 
3 MCL 750.317. 
 
3 
At sentencing, the trial court scored OV 5 at 15 points.  The Court of Appeals 
summarized the evidence supporting this score as follows:  
The presentence investigation report (PSIR) reflects that the victim’s 
stepfather was interviewed.  He stated that the victim’s mother was “having 
a very hard time dealing with this situation,” and explained that the 
“incident has had a tremendous, traumatic effect on him and his family.”  
He explained that the incident “will change them for the rest of their lives.”  
The victim’s stepfather expressed similar thoughts when he made a 
statement at sentencing.[4]   
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that OV 5 should have been scored at 
zero points because  
there is no evidence indicating that any member of the victim’s family 
intended to receive professional treatment in relation to the incident or 
required professional treatment because of the incident.  See People v 
Portellos, 298 Mich App 431, 449; 827 NW2d 725 (2012) (affirming the 
trial court’s refusal to assess points for OV 5 when there was no evidence 
that members of the victim’s family intended to receive treatment).[5]   
The prosecution now seeks leave to appeal in this Court from the Court of 
Appeals’ holding that OV 5 was misscored.6 
                                              
4 People v Calloway, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
March 22, 2016 (Docket Nos. 323776 and 325524), p 7. 
5 Id. 
6 Defendant also seeks leave to appeal in Docket No. 153636 from the portion of the 
Court of Appeals’ opinion rejecting defendant’s challenges to his conviction.  However, 
with respect to defendant’s separate application, leave to appeal is denied because we are 
not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.  
Defendant’s motion to remand for a new trial is also denied.  
 
4 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court’s factual determinations must be supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence and are reviewed for clear error.7  “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to 
satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the 
law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.”8   
In interpreting statutes, “our goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, 
focusing first on the statute’s plain language.”9  In doing so, “we examine the statute as a 
whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative 
scheme.  When a statute’s language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended 
the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written.”10 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
OV 5 is scored when a homicide or homicide-related crime11 causes psychological 
injury to a member of a victim’s family.  MCL 777.35, which governs OV 5, provides as 
follows: 
                                              
7 People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). 
8 Id. 
9 Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014). 
10 Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
11 In particular, OV 5 is scored for “homicide, attempted homicide, conspiracy or 
solicitation to commit a homicide, or assault with intent to commit murder.”  MCL 
777.22(1).  This limitation may be contrasted with Offense Variable 4 (OV 4), which is 
scored for all crimes against a person, property, public order, public trust, and public 
safety when there is psychological injury to a victim.  MCL 777.22. 
 
5 
(1) Offense variable 5 is psychological injury to a member of a 
victim’s family.  Score offense variable 5 by determining which of the 
following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the 
one that has the highest number of points:  
(a) Serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment 
occurred to a victim’s family  
..........................................................  15 points  
(b) No serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment 
occurred to a victim’s family  
............................................................  0 points  
(2) Score 15 points if the serious psychological injury to the victim’s 
family may require professional treatment.  In making this determination, 
the fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive. 
Therefore, a trial court properly assesses 15 points for OV 5 when “[s]erious 
psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim’s family.”12  
However, the very next subsection of the statute provides that 15 points should be 
assessed “if the serious psychological injury to the victim’s family may require 
professional treatment,” and that “[i]n making this determination, the fact that treatment 
has not been sought is not conclusive.”13 
At first blush, the second subsection of MCL 777.35 appears to contradict the first 
concerning whether professional treatment is required for points to be assessed.  
However, the more specific second subsection is clearly intended as a further explication 
of the circumstances justifying a 15-point score.  “[W]e examine the statute as a whole, 
reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme.”14  
                                              
12 MCL 777.35(1)(a). 
 
13 MCL 777.35(2) (emphasis added).   
14 Madugula, 496 Mich at 696. 
 
6 
In addition, when a statute contains a general provision and a specific provision, the 
specific provision controls.15  While MCL 777.35(1)(a) requires the injury to be one 
“requiring professional treatment,” the statute does not require proof that a victim’s 
family member has already sought or received, or intends to seek or receive, professional 
treatment.  The second subsection makes this clear by stating that “the fact that treatment 
has not been sought is not conclusive,” and by specifying that a 15-point score is 
appropriate if the injury “may require professional treatment.”16  
Although this threshold may seem low, trial courts must bear in mind that OV 5 
requires a “serious psychological injury.”  In this context, “serious” is defined as “having 
important or dangerous possible consequences.”17  Thus, in scoring OV 5, a trial court 
should consider the severity of the injury and the consequences that flow from it, 
including how the injury has manifested itself before sentencing and is likely to do so in 
the future, and whether professional treatment has been sought or received.  However, 
even when professional treatment has not yet been sought or received, points are properly 
                                              
15 DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 367 n 22; 817 NW2d 504 
(2012). 
16 MCL 777.35(2) (emphasis added); see Browder v Int’l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 
612; 321 NW2d 668 (1982) (“[C]ourts should give the ordinary and accepted meaning 
to . . . the permissive word ‘may’ unless to do so would clearly frustrate legislative 
intent . . . .”).   
17 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed).  To understand the meaning of 
words in a statute that are not otherwise defined, we may resort to dictionary definitions 
for guidance.  Ronnisch Constr Group, Inc v Lofts on the Nine, LLC, 499 Mich 544, 559 
n 41; 886 NW2d 113 (2016). 
 
7 
assessed for OV 5 when a victim’s family member has suffered a serious psychological 
injury that may require professional treatment in the future.18 
We disagree with the Court of Appeals to the extent that it held that in order to 
properly assess points for OV 5 in the absence of evidence that a victim’s family member 
sought or received treatment, there must at least be evidence that a victim’s family 
member had a present intention to seek or receive professional treatment.  The Court of 
Appeals’ holding on this point is not entirely clear because, after reviewing some of the 
statements by the victim’s stepfather, the Court simply concluded its analysis by stating 
that “there is no evidence indicating that any member of the victim’s family intended to 
receive professional treatment in relation to the incident or required professional 
treatment because of the incident.”19   
Portellos, the case the Court of Appeals cited in its OV 5 analysis, is equally 
opaque.  There, to support its conclusion that OV 5 was properly scored at zero, the Court 
of Appeals stated as follows: 
Though [the victim’s grandmother] expressed her emotional response to the 
[victim’s] death, she did not state that she intended to receive treatment.  
Nor did [the victim’s father] state that he intended to receive treatment.  
[The victim’s grandmother] only stated that she hoped that [the defendant] 
would be able to receive treatment while in prison.[20] 
                                              
18 See MCL 777.35(2) (“[T]he fact that treatment has not been sought is not 
conclusive.”).  By like token, the fact that treatment has been sought or received will not 
always be dispositive—for example, when the treatment sought or received is not 
indicated by the injury. 
19 Calloway, unpub op at 7, citing Portellos, 298 Mich App at 449.   
20 Portellos, 298 Mich App at 449. 
 
 
8 
However, the Court of Appeals did not discuss any details regarding the victim’s 
grandmother’s “emotional response to the [victim’s] death,” or consider the letter she 
submitted “that spoke about her disbelief, grief, anger, and heartbreak at the loss of [the 
victim].”21  As noted above, OV 5 is not limited to situations in which a victim’s family 
member has already sought or received treatment, or expressed an intention to do so.  
Points are also properly assessed when the serious psychological injury may require 
professional treatment in the future, regardless of whether the victim’s family member 
presently intends to seek treatment.  We overrule Portellos to the extent it stated or 
implied otherwise.22 
IV.  APPLICATION 
Applying the plain language of MCL 777.35 to the facts of this case, the 
statements by the victim’s stepfather in the presentence investigation report and at the 
                                              
21 Id. at 441, 449.   
22 Although our opinion interprets OV 5, we note that our interpretation is consistent with 
published Court of Appeals cases construing OV 4, which contains identical statutory 
language in pertinent part.  See MCL 777.34(1)(a) (requiring trial courts to assess 10 
points for OV 4 when “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment 
occurred to a victim”); MCL 777.34(2) (providing that 10 points should be assessed “if 
the serious psychological injury may require professional treatment.  In making this 
determination, the fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive”).  The Court 
of Appeals has held that OV 4 may properly be scored at 10 points even absent proof that 
a victim sought or received, or intended to seek or receive, professional treatment.  See 
People v Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 197-198; 886 NW2d 173 (2016); People v 
Williams, 298 Mich App 121, 124; 825 NW2d 671 (2012); People v Earl, 297 Mich App 
104, 109-110; 822 NW2d 271 (2012); People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 202-203; 
793 NW2d 120 (2010); People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 681; 780 NW2d 321 
(2009); People v Apgar, 264 Mich App 321, 329; 690 NW2d 312 (2004). 
 
9 
sentencing hearing demonstrate that the victim’s family members suffered serious 
psychological injuries that may require professional treatment in the future.   
In the presentence investigation report, the victim’s stepfather stated that the 
victim’s mother “is having a very hard time dealing with this situation.”  He indicated 
that he met and married the victim’s mother when the victim was approximately four 
months old.  He stated that “this incident has had a tremendous, traumatic effect on him 
and his family.”  He indicated that the victim had just become a father four months 
earlier, and that the incident “will change them for the rest of their lives.” 
The victim’s stepfather also addressed the trial court at sentencing, stating that 
“my family feels horrible about this incident,” and that defendant “[does not] understand 
what he has done to our family and what he has done to my wife.  And that’s something 
that I can’t change.  I’ll never be able to change it.”  After noting that the victim was only 
24 years old when he was killed and that he had a four-month-old baby, the victim’s 
stepfather stated: 
I want you to feel my pain, your Honor.  I want you to feel my pain.  
Because something happened that was final, we can’t change it.  He’ll 
never have another birthday.  He’ll never see his child.  His child will never 
see him.  This is something that I have to go through the rest of my life 
with, I have to teach my grandbaby about her father. 
He further stated that “since [the day of the murder], I’ve thought about this every single 
day, every day.  And I’ll probably think about it for the rest of my life.  But this is 
something that I have to live through.  And I will go through this till [sic] the end.”   
After reviewing this evidence, we believe that the trial court correctly concluded 
that two members of the victim’s family suffered serious psychological injuries that may 
 
10 
require professional treatment in the future.  There was ample evidence of the seriousness 
of the injuries and their long-lasting effects to support the trial court’s decision to assess 
15 points for OV 5. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision that the trial court improperly assessed 
15 points for OV 5, and we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether it 
would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure 
described in People v Lockridge.23 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Joan L. Larsen 
 
WILDER, J., took no part in the decision of this case. 
 
                                              
23 People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).  We remand under 
Lockridge given the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court engaged in judicial 
fact-finding in scoring two offense variables.  Calloway, unpub op at 5-6.