Case Title: Guardianship of B.V.G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11925

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11925 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF B.V.G. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     December 7, 2015. - May 23, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Guardian, Incompetent person.  Probate Court, Guardian, 
Standing.  Practice, Civil, Appointment of guardian, 
Intervention, Standing.  Words, "Interested person." 
 
 
 
 
Petition for guardianship filed in the Norfolk Division of 
the Probate and Family Court Department on February 16, 2011. 
 
 
A motion to intervene was heard by George F. Phelan, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Anthony D. Martin (Jennifer L. Mikels with him) for the 
grandfather. 
 
Adam J. Nussenbaum for the father. 
 
Frederick M. Misilo, Jr., for The Arc of Massachusetts, 
Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The maternal grandfather of B.V.G., a young 
woman with intellectual disabilities, sought to intervene in 
permanent guardianship proceedings pending in the Probate and 
2 
 
Family Court on the petition of B.V.G.'s father, who had been 
appointed B.V.G.'s temporary guardian when she was eighteen 
years old.1  The grandfather asserted that his relationship with 
B.V.G. has been restricted by her father in his capacity as 
temporary guardian, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her 
desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him 
via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s 
best interests.  The grandfather filed a motion to intervene, 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 24, 365 Mass. 769 (1974),2 in the 
guardianship proceedings, seeking to limit the father's ability 
to restrict B.V.G.'s access to the grandfather. 
 
Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing to 
intervene because he was not an "interested person" within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), a Probate and Family 
Court judge denied the motion.  The grandfather appealed, and 
the Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on grounds other than 
those relied upon by the motion judge.  See Guardianship of 
B.V.G., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 250 (2015).  We allowed the 
                                                 
 
1 B.V.G.'s father had had sole legal and physical custody of 
her as a minor, from approximately the age of twelve, following 
her parents' divorce. 
 
 
2 The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure apply to 
Probate and Family Court proceedings in which equitable relief 
is sought, including matters relative to guardianship and 
conservatorship.  See G. L. c. 215, § 6; Mass. R. Civ. P. 1, as 
amended, 450 Mass. 1403 (2008). 
3 
 
grandfather's petition for further appellate review.3 
 
General Laws c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), provides that the 
Probate and Family Court may, "on its own motion or on 
appropriate petition or motion of the incapacitated person or 
other interested person, . . . limit the powers of a 
guardian . . . and thereby create a limited guardianship."  
Based on our review of the record and the judge's findings, we 
conclude that the facts relevant to the grandfather's standing 
to bring the petition are not disputed, and that those facts 
support the conclusion that the grandfather is an "interested 
person" within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c).  As 
such, the grandfather is entitled to intervene as of right in 
the pending proceeding for permanent guardianship.4 
                                                 
 
3 The guardianship proceeding was stayed pending resolution 
of the appeal. 
 
 
4 In his brief, the father contested B.V.G.'s interest in 
maintaining a relationship with the grandfather, and also 
challenged whether the grandfather is an "interested person" 
under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c).  He challenged also whether 
the grandfather is entitled to file a motion to intervene to 
limit the proposed permanent guardianship, or to file a separate 
petition to limit the guardianship pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-306 (c).  At argument before us, the father's position had 
changed considerably.  The father agreed that B.V.G. desires 
contact with her grandfather, the grandfather is an "interested 
person" within the meaning of the statute, an "interested 
person" in that context is one interested in the well-being of 
the subject of the guardianship petition, and an "interested 
person" pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), is entitled to 
file a separate petition to limit a guardianship.  The father 
stated that his remaining challenge was as to whether the 
grandfather is entitled to intervene in the father's pending 
4 
 
 
In that proceeding, the grandfather may pursue his claim 
that the guardianship should be limited because it is in the 
best interests of B.V.G. that she be permitted to communicate 
with him if she continues to express a wish to do so.  We 
therefore reverse the order denying the grandfather's motion to 
intervene and remand the matter to the Probate and Family Court 
for further proceedings in the pending petition for permanent 
guardianship, consistent with this opinion.5 
 
1.  Background and prior proceedings.  In considering the 
grandfather's standing to intervene,6 the motion judge conducted 
a nonevidentiary hearing at which B.V.G.'s appointed counsel,7 
                                                                                                                                                             
petition for permanent guardianship, rather than filing a 
subsequent petition to limit the proposed permanent guardianship 
if and when it has been established. 
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed in support of the 
plaintiff submitted by The Arc of Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
 
6 Intervention as of right is permitted under Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 24 (a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974), "when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition 
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties." 
 
 
7 B.V.G.'s attorney expressed generally that he viewed 
contact with her grandfather positively, but took no official 
position regarding the motion to intervene. 
 
 
B.V.G.'s attorney had conducted negotiations, on B.V.G.'s 
request, to improve her relationship with her mother, which 
resulted in the father's and mother's stipulation concerning 
B.V.G.'s having increased contact with her mother, and a 
stipulation added to the temporary guardianship order that the 
5 
 
the father's counsel, the grandfather's counsel, and the mother, 
appearing pro se, were each permitted to make representations 
and submit documentary material.  We summarize the uncontested 
facts based on the judge's decision, supplemented by uncontested 
statements and documents presented at the hearing.  See Board of 
Registration in Med. v. Doe, 457 Mass. 738, 745 (2010) (party's 
concessions and exhibits attached to party's pleadings 
sufficient to establish facts despite lack of evidentiary 
hearing). 
 
B.V.G. was born in February, 1993.  She has an intellectual 
disability as well as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
and Tourette's syndrome.  B.V.G.'s parents, who separated when 
she was quite young, were divorced following a lengthy and 
acrimonious custody dispute over B.V.G.  The father was awarded 
sole legal and physical custody of B.V.G. in 2005, when she was 
twelve years old.  Although B.V.G. had enjoyed contact with the 
grandfather until 2005, thereafter, the father precluded contact 
between B.V.G. and her maternal relatives, including the 
grandfather.  According to B.V.G.'s mother, B.V.G. had had a 
"strong relationship" with her grandfather, which B.V.G. wished 
to maintain while the father had tried to "cut off" this 
relationship. 
                                                                                                                                                             
father was not to interfere; the attorney stated that he 
preferred to take this route with the grandfather, and that 
negotiations were ongoing. 
6 
 
 
In February, 2011, when B.V.G. reached the age of eighteen, 
the father filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court 
seeking to be appointed her legal guardian on the basis of her 
intellectual disability.  The father was appointed B.V.G.'s 
temporary legal guardian in December, 2011.8  See G. L. c. 190B, 
§§ 5-303, 5-308.  The order establishing the temporary 
guardianship authorized B.V.G. to determine with whom she 
socialized, except for her mother; the order allowed limited 
supervised visitation between B.V.G. and her mother.9 
 
In January, 2013, the father filed a petition seeking 
permanent guardianship.  At that time, the father's temporary 
guardianship was extended through April, 2013, pending a hearing 
on his petition for permanent guardianship.  A stipulation by 
the father, the mother, and an attorney appointed to represent 
B.V.G. was incorporated in the extended guardianship, 
                                                 
 
8 General Laws c. 190B, §§ 5-303 and 5-308, authorize the 
appointment of permanent and temporary guardians for an 
"incapacitated person."  Under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-101 (9), an 
"incapacitated person" is 
 
"an individual who for reasons other than advanced age or 
minority, has a clinically diagnosed condition that results 
in an inability to receive and evaluate information or make 
or communicate decisions to such an extent that the 
individual lacks the ability to meet essential requirements 
for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with 
appropriate technological assistance." 
 
 
9 The parties do not dispute that the father has not sought 
to restrict B.V.G.'s contact with her paternal relatives, that 
she has had unlimited access to contact with them, and that she 
has maintained relationships with them. 
7 
 
authorizing slightly increased visitation between B.V.G. and her 
mother.10  The order for temporary guardianship also was amended 
to authorize certain limited contact between B.V.G. and her 
grandfather.11  Under the terms of that stipulation, the 
grandfather was permitted to send B.V.G. one electronic mail 
message per day, and to receive no more than one electronic mail 
message from her.  This stipulation, however, did not result in 
increased contact between B.V.G. and the grandfather.  B.V.G. 
did not have access to electronic mail at the residential 
treatment program where she lived during the week, and the 
grandfather contends that, on the weekends, when B.V.G. lived 
with her father, the father did not permit her to receive 
electronic mail messages from the grandfather. 
 
Arguing that the father was not furthering B.V.G.'s best 
                                                 
 
10 Counsel for B.V.G.'s father represented at the 
nonevidentiary hearing on the grandfather's motion to intervene 
that B.V.G. and her mother have made some progress in rebuilding 
their relationship, and that, by agreement, visits have been 
expanded beyond the terms set forth in the order for temporary 
guardianship. 
 
 
11 The initial guardianship order stated that B.V.G. could 
choose her own associations, except with respect to the 
stipulation concerning the mother.  There was no provision in 
that order restricting B.V.G.'s relationship with her maternal 
grandfather; on its face, therefore, the first order for 
temporary guardianship allowed unlimited contact between B.V.G. 
and the grandfather.  It is undisputed, however, that the father 
did not permit such contact.  Counsel for B.V.G. stated at the 
hearing on the grandfather's motion to intervene that "we all 
took it for granted that grandfather had no rights . . . and 
father could restrict the contact." 
8 
 
interests by restricting her relationship with him, the 
grandfather filed a motion to intervene, seeking to limit the 
pending permanent guardianship pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-
306 (c).  In support of his motion that he was an "interested 
person," the grandfather submitted printouts of his electronic 
communications with B.V.G. through a social media Web site as 
evidence of his caring for B.V.G., and of her wish to have 
contact with him.  The grandfather's assertion that it was 
B.V.G. who initiated the electronic contact is supported by 
these documents.12 
 
The father does not suggest that there is any reason that 
B.V.G. should not be allowed to maintain a relationship with her 
grandfather, and no longer contests that the grandfather has an 
interest in B.V.G.'s welfare.  The father also does not dispute 
that he has restricted B.V.G.'s relationship with the 
grandfather.  Rather, in response to the grandfather's 
contention that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best 
interests, the father maintains that, as B.V.G.'s legal 
guardian, he has the right to determine those with whom she 
associates. 
 
Concluding that the grandfather was not an "interested 
                                                 
 
12 Among other things, B.V.G. made the initial "friend" 
request to her grandfather on a social media Web site, asking to 
have contact with him; in other messages, B.V.G. told her 
grandfather that she loves and misses him. 
9 
 
person" within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), the 
judge denied the grandfather's motion to intervene as of right.13  
The judge also appointed a guardian ad litem, however, to report 
to the court on whether B.V.G.'s best interests are served with 
her present circle of activities, acquaintances, and contacts. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Review of a question of statutory 
interpretation is de novo.  Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010).  In 
reviewing a motion to intervene, which involves questions of 
fact and of law, "[a] judge has discretion in determining 
whether an intervening party has demonstrated facts that entitle 
him or her to intervention as of right, and we accordingly 
review the judge's factual findings for clear error."  
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 217 (2011). 
Apart from the discretion to find facts, however, a judge's 
ruling on a motion to intervene as of right is a ruling of law, 
not a discretionary matter.  See id. ("Whether those facts are 
sufficient to meet the requirements for intervention is a 
question of law, . . . and is reviewed as such"). 
                                                 
 
13 In his motion to intervene, the grandfather also argued 
that he should be allowed to intervene permissively, pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (b); that motion was denied.  Although he 
filed a notice of appeal from that denial, in his brief the 
grandfather does not pursue any argument relative to the motion 
for permissive intervention.  The father argues that there was 
no error in denying the motion for permissive intervention 
because the grandfather has no right to intervene.  See part 
2.b, infra. 
10 
 
 
Here, the motion judge properly concluded that G. L. 
c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), creates a cognizable interest that may 
provide the basis upon which to intervene in a pending matter in 
a motion filed pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a).  As stated, 
the judge then determined that the grandfather was not an 
"interested person" within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-
306 (c).  We turn first to the judge's determination that the 
grandfather is not an "interested person." 
 
a.  Meaning of "interested person."  General Laws c. 190B, 
§ 5-306 (c), provides that the Probate and Family Court may, "on 
its own motion or on appropriate petition or motion of the 
incapacitated person or other interested person, . . . limit the 
powers of a guardian . . . and thereby create a limited 
guardianship."  An "interested person," as defined by G. L. 
c. 190B, § 1-201 (24), 
"includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or 
claims against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, 
ward, or protected person.  It also includes persons having 
priority for appointment as personal representative, and 
other fiduciaries representing interested persons.  The 
meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from 
time to time and shall be determined according to the 
particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any 
proceeding." 
 
This definition is applicable, inter alia, to all types of 
guardianships and conservatorships under G. L. c. 190B, 
including those over minors and incapacitated adults. 
11 
 
 
In reaching his conclusion that the grandfather is not an 
"interested person," the motion judge commented that the 
enumerated definitions of "interested person" in G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 1-201 (24), applicable to all guardianships and 
conservatorships, "hint of a financial, but not visceral, stake 
in the underlying proceedings," and that an individual who is 
"interested in the welfare" of an incapacitated person "may not 
be sufficient." 
 
To determine the meaning of "interested person" under G. L. 
c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), we apply fundamental principles of 
statutory construction.  "[A] statute must be interpreted 
according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all 
its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language, considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished" (citation omitted).  
Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 
565 (2010). 
 
Considering the plain language of the limited guardianship 
provision outside its statutory context, the "interest" required 
to qualify as an "interested person" might be viewed both as a 
potential intervener's own interests in protecting the 
incapacitated person's estate and as an interest in the well-
being of the incapacitated person.  "Statutes are to be 
12 
 
interpreted, [however,] not alone according to their simple, 
literal or strict verbal meaning, but in connection with their 
development, their progression through the legislative body, the 
history of the times, [and] prior legislation. . . .  General 
expressions may be restrained by relevant circumstances showing 
a legislative intent that they be narrowed and used in a 
particular sense" (citation omitted).  Sullivan v. Chief Justice 
for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 24 (2006). 
 
A guardianship proceeding is designed to effectuate the 
best interests of the incapacitated person.  See Matter of 
McKnight, 406 Mass. 787, 791 (1990); Guardianship of Anthony, 
402 Mass. 723, 726 (1988); King v. Dolan, 255 Mass. 236, 237 
(1926).  A focus solely on the interests of the potential 
intervener in the financial estate of the incapacitated person, 
that might be read in some of the provisions of G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 1-201 (24), does not take into account the express mandate of 
the expansive language of the last, catch-all provision, stating 
that "[t]he meaning [of 'interested person'] as it relates to 
particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be 
determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter 
involved in, any proceeding."  See G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201 (24).
 
That purpose is set forth explicitly in G. L. c. 190B, § 5-
306 (a):  "The court shall exercise the authority conferred in 
[G. L. c. 190B, §§ 5-301 et seq.,] so as to encourage the 
13 
 
development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the 
incapacitated person and make appointive and other orders only 
to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated person's 
limitations or other conditions warranting the procedure." 
 
The statutory purpose is further explained in the comment 
accompanying this language in the Uniform Probate Code: 
 
"The purpose of subsections (a) and (c) is to remind 
an appointing court that a guardianship under this 
legislation should not confer more authority over the 
person of the [incapacitated person] than appears necessary 
to alleviate the problems caused by the [person's] 
incapacity.  This is a statement of the general principle 
underlying a 'limited guardianship' concept.  For example, 
if the principal reason for the guardianship is the 
[incapacitated person's] inability to comprehend a personal 
medical problem, the guardian's authority could be limited 
to making a judgment, after evaluation of all 
circumstances, concerning the advisability and form of 
treatment and to authorize actions necessary to carry out 
the decision.  Or, if the [incapacitated person's] 
principal problem stems from memory lapses and associated 
wanderings, a guardian with authority limited to making 
arrangements for suitable security against this risk might 
be indicated. . . .  
 
 
"[I]f the court determines that most of a respondent's 
demonstrated problems probably could be alleviated by the 
institution of an appropriate authority to manage the 
[incapacitated person's] property and make appropriate 
expenditures for the [incapacitated person's] well-being, 
the court should utilize subsection (b) to recast the 
proceedings so that a conservator, rather than a guardian, 
would be appointed." 
 
Uniform Probate Code prior § 5-306 comment, 8 U.L.A. (Part III) 
186 (Master ed. 2013). 
 
 
Given this, reading "interested person" within the meaning 
of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), as providing a means by which to 
14 
 
protect the intervener's own interests, as distinct from the 
intervener's interest in advancing those of the incapacitated 
person, is inconsistent with the express purpose of the 
statutory provision.  See Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 
Mass. 113, 117 (2011) (Legislature presumably is aware of 
statutory and common law that governs matter which it is 
enacting).  See also Matter of McKnight, supra at 791; 
Guardianship of Anthony, supra at 726.  Consistent with the 
purpose underlying the Legislature's 2008 adoption of the 
guardianship provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, see St. 
2008, c. 521, the ability to create a limited guardianship is 
intended to maximize the liberty and autonomy of a person 
subject to guardianship.14  See G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (b) (8) 
(court should craft guardianship orders only to extent "person's 
needs cannot be met by less restrictive means"). 
 
From this statutory context, it is clear that the 
                                                 
 
14 The concept of a limited guardianship arises from the 
enactment of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), in 2008, as part of 
Massachusetts's adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.  See St. 
2008, c. 521, § 9.  Even before codification of this provision, 
however, Massachusetts courts recognized that "a conscientious 
judge" must consider carefully the extent to which a 
guardianship is necessary, being "mindful of the adverse social 
consequences which might follow an adjudication [that a 
guardianship is necessary]."  See Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 
415, 425 (1981).  We also have emphasized repeatedly that a 
determination of "incompetence" does not eliminate an 
individual's interest in dignity and in the expression of 
autonomous values and desires.  See, e.g., Guardianship of Doe, 
411 Mass. 512, 517-518, cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Gross, 503 
U.S. 950 (1992); Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 566 (1982). 
15 
 
Legislature intended G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), to provide a 
means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an 
incapacitated person could advocate on behalf of that person's 
interests in obtaining such a limited guardianship.  We 
therefore conclude that an "interested person" as defined by 
G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201, within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-306 (c), is a "person interested in the welfare of the 
incapacitated person."  See, e.g., G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (a). 
 
Other provisions in G. L. c. 190B further demonstrate that 
the phrase "interested person" in G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), is 
intended to refer to a "person interested in the incapacitated 
person's welfare."15  See Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. 
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 443 Mass. 837, 859 (2005) (meaning of 
term should be construed in harmony with surrounding statutory 
sections).  General Laws c. 190B, §§ 5-303 (a) and 5-311 (a), 
for instance, permit a court to appoint or remove a guardian for 
an adult incapacitated person, on petition of any person 
interested in the incapacitated person's welfare.16  The power to 
                                                 
 
15 Indeed, the form promulgated by the Probate and Family 
Court for litigants to use in petitioning to limit an existing 
guardianship of an incapacitated adult allows a "person 
interested in the welfare" of an incapacitated person to file 
such a petition.  See Probate and Family Court Guardianship and 
Conservatorship Form MPC 220. 
 
 
16 Pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-309 (a), defining the 
powers, rights, and duties of a guardian, 
 
16 
 
limit a guardianship is inherent in the power to appoint and 
remove a guardian, and is made explicit in the statutory 
language.  An individual petitioning for appointment of a 
guardian, for example, may, at the same time, seek limitations 
to that appointment.17  See G. L. c. 190B, § 5-303 (a) (petition 
to appoint guardian may seek "a determination of incapacity, in 
whole or in part, and the appointment of a guardian, limited or 
general"). 
 
b.  Whether the grandfather is an "interested person."  
Because the motion judge determined that the grandfather was not 
an "interested person" within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-
306 (c), he did not reach any determination on the question of 
the grandfather's and B.V.G.'s interests.  We conclude that, 
                                                                                                                                                             
"[a] guardian shall exercise authority only as necessitated 
by the incapacitated person's mental and adaptive 
limitations, and, to the extent possible, shall encourage 
the incapacitated person to participate in decisions, to 
act on his own behalf, and to develop or regain the 
capacity to manage personal affairs.  A guardian, to the 
extent known, shall consider the expressed desires and 
personal values of the incapacitated person when making 
decisions, and shall otherwise act in the incapacitated 
person's best interest and exercise reasonable care, 
diligence, and prudence.  A guardian shall immediately 
notify the court if the incapacitated person's condition 
has changed so that he or she is capable of exercising 
rights previously limited." 
 
 
17 The right to intervene to limit a particular aspect of a 
guardianship does not, by contrast, extend to participation in 
the proceeding as a whole.  As noted, the removal or appointment 
of a guardian is governed by other statutory provisions.  See 
G. L. c. 190B, §§ 5-303 (a), 5-311 (a). 
17 
 
based on undisputed facts in the record, the grandfather has 
demonstrated an interest in B.V.G.'s welfare sufficient to 
establish that he is an "interested person" within the meaning 
of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c). 
 
The grandfather specifically asserted in his motion to 
intervene that B.V.G. has expressed her interest in having a 
relationship with him, an interest he reciprocates.  Indeed, 
both B.V.G.'s expressed interest in maintaining a relationship 
with her grandfather, and the grandfather's ongoing interest in 
her welfare, are at this point undisputed.  Although the father 
questioned in his brief whether B.V.G. had expressed an interest 
in a relationship with the grandfather, at oral argument he 
conceded that she had.  Nothing in the record before us 
indicates that increased contact between B.V.G. and her 
grandfather would be harmful, and the record reflects that the 
grandfather has an interest in advocating on B.V.G.'s behalf to 
limit the guardianship. 
 
The judge noted that the father, as temporary guardian, 
disagreed with the idea of B.V.G. having any relationship with 
the grandfather, and the father concedes that he has restricted 
that relationship.  Although G. L. c. 190B, § 5-309 (a), 
requires a guardian to "consider the expressed desires and 
personal values of the incapacitated person when making 
decisions," the father has maintained consistently that, as 
18 
 
guardian, absent an express limitation on his authority, he may 
restrict B.V.G.'s relationship with her grandfather, because he 
has the authority to do so.18  The record, therefore, supports 
the conclusion that the grandfather is an "interested person" 
pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c). 
 
The father argues that intervention in the guardianship 
proceeding is not appropriate because the grandfather has no 
right to intervene under Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a), which 
generally focuses on the intervener's interests, while a 
guardianship proceeding focuses on the interests of the 
incapacitated person.  He argues also that the grandfather has 
no due process right to intervention, and that the judge did not 
err in denying permissive intervention.19 
 
The father's argument that the grandfather is not entitled 
to intervene misconstrues the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-
306 (c).  As her temporary guardian, the father properly may 
argue at a hearing on limiting the guardianship that B.V.G.'s 
best interests do not include a relationship with her 
                                                 
 
18 The motion judge, agreeing with the father's view as to 
this, commented that the grandfather's petition "derogates 
Father's authority" as the "lifestyle standard bearer for 
[B.V.G.] pursuant to Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)," a 
case applicable to parents' control over their minor children. 
 
 
19 As stated, see note 13, supra, on appeal the grandfather 
does not pursue any argument relative to permissive 
intervention, and because of the result we reach, we do not 
address it. 
19 
 
grandfather.  As discussed supra, however, the father's argument 
that the grandfather's intervention is not proper does not take 
into account the plain language of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), 
which, on its face, entitles an "interested person," one we have 
concluded is interested in the welfare of the incapacitated 
person, to intervene to limit a guardianship. 
 
c.  Adequacy of representation.  After concluding that the 
grandfather was an "interested person," the Appeals Court 
affirmed the denial of the grandfather's motion on the ground 
that B.V.G.'s interests were adequately represented by her 
counsel and the newly appointed guardian ad litem.  See 
Guardianship of B.V.G., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 258-259 (2015).  
General Laws c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), however, protects an 
interested person's interest in advocating on behalf of an 
incapacitated person's right to the most appropriately limited 
guardianship, regardless whether the incapacitated person is 
already represented.  The provision authorizes a court to limit 
a guardianship "on its own motion or on appropriate petition or 
motion of the incapacitated person or other interested person."  
This language unambiguously grants an "interested person" an 
equal and unconditional right to petition to limit the 
guardianship, along with that of the incapacitated person.20 
                                                 
 
20 During argument before us, the parties expressed 
uncertainty regarding the proper procedure for seeking 
20 
 
 
Nothing in the statutory language, or in its legislative 
history, suggests that an interested person must establish that 
an incapacitated person is not already adequately represented 
before being permitted to intervene to limit a guardianship.  In 
adopting the Uniform Probate Code in 2008, and G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-306, in particular, the Legislature was aware that a court 
may appoint both an attorney and a guardian ad litem for an 
incapacitated person, pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-106 (a) 
and (b), if the court determines that the person's interests are 
not adequately represented, but nevertheless provided an 
"interested person" the ability to file a motion seeking to 
limit a guardianship. 
 
Moreover, the language of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-311 (b), 
relating to the removal or resignation of a guardian and 
termination of incapacity, and the comments accompanying that 
language in the Uniform Probate Code, see Uniform Probate Code 
art. V prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. (Part III) 19 (Master ed. 2013), 
                                                                                                                                                             
intervention pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (c).  General 
Laws c. 190B, § 5-306 (c), affords an "interested person" a 
statutory right to proceed by motion to intervene in an ongoing 
guardianship proceeding, to seek to limit the guardianship.  
Such a motion to intervene may be brought under Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 24 (a); once a judge has determined, however, that the movant 
is an "interested person" within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-306 (c), as a practical matter, the interested person's 
ability to vindicate that interest will be impeded if the 
individual is not allowed to intervene.  Where there is no 
pending petition for guardianship, a person seeking to limit an 
existing guardianship should file a petition using Probate and 
Family Court Guardianship and Conservatorship Form MPC 220. 
21 
 
further indicate a legislative preference for encouraging an 
incapacitated person and other "interested person[s]" to 
advocate to the court to safeguard the liberty interests of the 
incapacitated person.  General Laws c. 190B, §  5-311 (b), 
provides: 
 
"The incapacitated person or any person interested in 
the welfare of the incapacitated person may petition for an 
order that the person is no longer incapacitated and for 
termination of the guardianship.  A request for an order 
may also be made informally to the court." 
 
The comment accompanying this language in the Uniform Probate 
Code states: 
 
"The provisions of subsection (b) were designed to 
provide another protection against the use of guardianship 
proceedings to secure a lock-up of a person who is not 
capable of looking out for his or her personal needs.  If 
the safeguards imposed at the time of appointment fail to 
prevent an unnecessary guardianship, subsection (b) is 
intended to facilitate [an incapacitated person's] unaided 
or unassisted efforts to inform the court that an injustice 
has occurred as a result of the guardianship." 
 
Uniform Probate Code prior § 5-311 comment, 8 U.L.A. (Part III) 
198 (Master ed. 2013). 
 
Thus, the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate 
Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an 
incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited 
guardianship.  Once a judge has concluded that a proposed 
intervener is an "interested person," therefore, nothing more is 
required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene as 
of right. 
22 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment denying the grandfather's 
motion to intervene is reversed.  The matter is remanded to the 
Probate and Family Court for further proceedings in the pending 
petition for permanent guardianship, consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.