Case Title: Kuhlman v. Keith

Citation: 409 So. 2d 804

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1982-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
409 So. 2d 804 (1982)
Angela Keith KUHLMAN
v.
S. P. KEITH, Jr., and Hilda Tant.
80-742.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 22, 1982.
*805 Gould H. K. Blair, Birmingham, for appellant.
W. J. Sullivan, Jr., of Sadler, Sadler, Sullivan, Sharp & Stutts, Birmingham, for appellee S. P. Keith, Jr.
Joel E. Dillard of Baxley, Beck & Dillard, Birmingham, for appellee Hilda Tant.
SHORES, Justice.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Angela Keith Kuhlman, of the trial court's order which dismissed Hilda Tant as a party defendant and granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendant, S. P. Keith, Jr. In its order, the trial court said:
In relation to the motion by Tant to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, the court said:
In the granting of Keith's motion for summary judgment, the trial court did not enumerate all of its reasons but did find the following to be of paramount importance:
The trial court concluded by stating:
In her appeal, the appellant first of all argues that the trial court erred in dismissing Tant as a party defendant because the statute of limitations was tolled by her suit against Tant in federal court, so that amendment under Rule 15, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, would be appropriate in the circuit court. Appellant also argues that the statement of the court which said "[t]he record is without contradiction that the defendant, Tant, was known to the plaintiff" evidences that the court did not restrict itself to the pleadings, which had the effect of turning the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, thereby requiring Tant to show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Appellant asserts that Tant failed to meet that burden so the court should be reversed. We cannot agree.
We hold that there was sufficient evidence present through the pleadings alone for the trial court to determine that procedurally the appellant was barred from amending her suit to bring in Tant as a party defendant. The appellant, in her pleadings, shows that she knew the identity of Tant when she first filed suit against Keith on November 2, 1978. Paragraph five of the complaint alleged:
On May 13, 1981, the appellant amended her complaint to add Hilda Tant ("Mrs. Tant") as a party defendant, alleging the following:
On May 22, 1981, the appellant once again amended her complaint:
The law is well settled in this state that appellant's action against Tant is barred by the statute of limitations. Minton v. Whisenhant, 402 So. 2d 971 (Ala.1981); Fowlkes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 392 So. 2d 803 (Ala.1980); Hinton v. Hobbs, 349 So. 2d 28 (Ala.1977).
It makes no difference to the disposition of this case whether the appellant tried to amend to add Tant pursuant to the fictitious party rule of ARCP 9(h) or pursuant to Rules 15(a) and 15(c), ARCP. The fact remains that the appellant knew of the identity and actions of Tant at the time the original suit was filed, but waited for over two years to bring her into the action. Appellant's suit in federal court did not toll the statute of limitations in circuit court. Indeed, the only effect it has on this disposition is to even further evidence that the appellant had knowledge of Tant's identity.
*808 The appellant also claims that the court erred in granting summary judgment against her in her suit against S. P. Keith for fraud and negligence. This raises the issue of whether material questions of fact exist as to either the fraud or the negligence count, thereby causing a reversal of the judgment, or whether the judgment should be affirmed as a matter of law. Rule 56, ARCP. Material questions of fact do not exist; we, therefore, affirm.
The appellant's allegations of fraud claim that S. P. Keith, through his agents Hilda Tant and Robert Keith, misrepresented to the appellant the impact of the consent agreement, thereby causing her to lose the custody of her children.
In order to recover in this instance, the plaintiff must prove that she relied on the alleged fraudulent representations made by Tant and Keith. Jordan v. Pickett, 78 Ala. 331 (1894).
In her deposition, appellant states that she fully understood the agreement and all of the documents she signed. She also states that Tant made no effort to influence her decision either through threats or suggestions. Also, appellant's actions subsequent to her signing the documents in Missouri show affirmatively that she knew and understood what she was signing and also the consequences of her actions. The facts before the court showed that, without the appellant's knowledge, a petition had been filed to challenge the judgment based on the agreement. A letter was presented which showed that subsequently the appellant wrote to an attorney stating that the petition had been filed without her consent and should be dropped since the settlement agreement "was drawn up to my specifications.... I made a few changes in the agreement when Tant brought it to me in St. Louis, but I am happy with the agreement as it reads." In addition, the appellant appeared in court and asked that the petition be dismissed. Judge Barber's order dismissing the petition shows that it was entered only after he had ascertained that she knew and understood the nature of the proceedings and the consequences of her actions.
The facts also show that during this time period the appellant consulted several other attorneys besides S. P. Keith. Therefore, appellant has failed to show that it was in reliance upon a statement or act of S. P. Keith or his agents that she signed the agreement.
In addition, an action for fraud must have proof that the plaintiff has suffered damages. Old Southern Life Insurance Company v. Woodall, 348 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. 1977). Appellant has failed to satisfy this burden since the facts show that she gave up her children voluntarily.
Appellant also contends that as a result of S. P. Keith's negligence, she has suffered great mental anguish stemming from her inability to regain custody of the children.
Herston v. Whitesell, 348 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Ala.1977).
A legal question arises regarding the issue of proximate cause. Could the appellant have received custody of the children but for the negligence of S. P. Keith? If she cannot show that, then any negligence of S. P. Keith could not have proximately caused her loss of custody of the children. See, Herston v. Whitesell, supra, at 1057.
As we have pointed out previously, the facts show that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily gave up custody of her children in the original divorce agreement and later chose not to contest the same when she asked that the petition to challenge the judgment be dismissed. We find that it *809 was the appellant's actions, not S. P. Keith's, that were the proximate cause of her loss of the custody of the children. Therefore, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.