Case Title: Board of County Com'rs v. Geringer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Board of County Com'rs v. Geringer1997 WY 87941 P.2d 742Case Number: 96-1Decided: 07/03/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Sublette County, 
Wyoming,  

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

v. 

JIM GERINGER, Governor of the State of Wyoming; and 
STAN SMITH, Wyoming State Treasurer,  

Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

Representing 
Appellant: 

Van Graham, 
of Mason & Graham, P.C.; and Ralph E. Wood (argued), of Sievers & Wood, 
Pinedale.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Ron Arnold, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General (argued).

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN JJ. 

* 
Chief Justice at the time of oral argument. 

THOMAS, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      The sole issue 
presented by this appeal is the constitutionality, under our state constitution, 
of Wyoming's statutory provision providing for the establishment and funding of 
a county court in counties with a population of less than 30,000.1 The issue arises under the equal 
protection and uniform operation of the laws requirements found in the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming.2 Sublette County, with a population 
of less than 30,000, was denied full funding to establish a county court, while 
the state legislature has approved full funding for a county court in other 
counties having a population of less than 30,000. We hold that the statutory 
provision does not facially violate the state constitution as special 
legislation, as there exist rational reasons why the legislature could deny 
funding of county courts in counties having a population of less than 30,000. 
However, as applied to this case, the statutory provision violates the 
constitutional mandate for equal protection of the laws because there is 
disparate treatment of counties having populations of less than 30,000. We 
reverse the decision of the district court.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, the Board of County Commissioners, Sublette County, Wyoming states 
the issue as:

I.          
Whether Wyoming Statute § 
5-5-103 is special legislation and violates Wyoming Constitution Article 3, Section 
27?

The State of Wyoming3 restates the issue in the Brief of 
Appellees as:

I.          
Whether Wyoming Statute § 5-5-103 facially violates Wyoming Constitution 
Article 3, Section 27?

[¶3]      The parties filed 
a Stipulation Concerning Factual Issues in which they advised the court that the 
material facts in the case are not in dispute. Each of the parties had filed a 
motion for summary judgment, and for purposes of this appeal, the only facts set 
forth in the record are those alleged in the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. 
From the Complaint we discern that Sublette County, with a population of less 
than 30,000, had established a county court by a resolution of the board of 
county commissioners. The legislature did not provide funding for the county 
court in Sublette County although application for such funding had been 
made.

[¶4]      The statute 
applicable to counties with a population of less than 30,000 is WYO. STAT. § 
5-5-103 (1992) (emphasis added), which provides:

(a) In counties in this state which have a population 
of less than thirty thousand (30,000), according to the latest official federal 
census, the board of county commissioners may establish a county court in their 
county by the adoption of a resolution establishing the same. * * 
*

(b) The judicial salaries, salaries of the clerical 
staff, supplies, operating costs, jury and witness expenses and other expenses 
of the county court may be paid by the 
state.

The statutory provision for 
counties with a population of more than 30,000 requires the state to fund the 
expenses of the county court. WYO. STAT. § 5-5-102 (1992).

[¶5]      In its Complaint, 
Sublette County alleged that the decision to deny funding to Sublette County for 
its county court violated the provisions of Article 3, § 27 of the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming on the ground that it was special legislation on its 
face. The Complaint also alleged that the legislature has funded county courts 
in six other counties with a population of less than 30,000, but refused to fund 
county courts in other counties with a population of less than 30,000. The 
Complaint alleges that the statute permits the legislature to afford a special 
benefit to some counties not provided to other counties that are similarly 
situated.

[¶6]      The district 
court granted the Motion For Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the State and 
denied the Motion For Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Sublette County. The 
effect of the Order Granting Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment was to hold that WYO. STAT. § 5-5-103 is 
constitutional. Sublette County has appealed from that 
order.

[¶7]      The parties, by 
virtue of their stipulation, agree that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact in this case. It was appropriate for the district court to dispose of the 
case as one involving only a question of law. State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470, 472 n. 
1 (Wyo. 1986). See Coyne v. State ex rel. 
Thomas, 595 P.2d 970, 971 (Wyo. 1979); Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828, 829 (Wyo. 
1979); Fugate v. Mayor and City Council 
of Town of Buffalo, 348 P.2d 76, 81 (Wyo. 1959). In such an instance we 
review the grant of a summary judgment without according any deference to the 
decision of the district court on questions of law. Davis v. Black Hills Trucking, Inc., 929 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1996); Duncan v. Town 
of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995). The parties have essentially 
argued the case under the concept of special legislation, and that will be the 
focus of our analysis.

[¶8]      Initially, 
however, we consider the jurisdiction of the court. Neither party has raised 
this issue, but we do have an independent responsibility to test jurisdiction. 
Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993); Kurpjuweit v. 
Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 44 (Wyo. 1985); Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598, 600 
(Wyo. 1962). If the lower court does not have jurisdiction, we also lack 
jurisdiction. Matter of Estate of 
Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658, 660 (Wyo. 1988); Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1048 
(Wyo. 1975); Pritchard v. State, Division 
of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dept. of Health & Social Services, 540 P.2d 523, 527 (Wyo. 1975); Ginn v. 
Parrish, 362 P.2d 824, 828 (Wyo. 1961).

[¶9]      In two cases, we 
have held that, absent a specific constitutional or statutory provision 
authorizing such an action, a county cannot sue the state. Carbon County School Dist. No. 2 v. Wyoming 
State Hosp., 680 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1984); State v. Board of County Com'rs of Johnson 
County, 642 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo. 1982). The thrust of those cases is that a 
public entity, authorized by statute and funded from state coffers or other 
public revenues, that performs functions for the public at large is simply 
another arm of the state. As such it does not possess the essential adversarial 
interest or claim against the state contemplated by a dispute arising between 
two or more parties, and in effect, as a part of the state is endeavoring to sue 
itself. Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. and 
Service Dist. v. Brooks Water and Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶10]   These principles have not been 
applied, however, in actions between agencies of the state and the state itself, 
or between the state and officers of the state in suits to have statutes 
construed and to determine the correlative rights of the parties. Board of County Com'rs of County of Laramie 
v. Laramie County School Dist. Number One, 884 P.2d 946, 950 (Wyo. 1994); Carbon County School Dist. No. 2, 680 P.2d  at 775; Washakie County School Dist. 
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980) (standing is not a rigid or dogmatic rule but is one 
that must be applied with a view to realities as well as practicalities of the 
situation). The limitations are not invoked in proceedings between segments of 
the state when declaratory judgment provisions are available to determine their 
respective rights and liabilities as set forth in constitutional provisions and 
statutory enactments. Simons v. Laramie 
County School Dist. No. One, 741 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1987). We hold that, since 
Sublette County asserts a state statute is in violation of the constitutional 
mandate relating to special legislation, it must be afforded standing to bring 
this action against the state.

[¶11]   Sublette County contends that WYO. 
STAT. § 5-5-103 is special legislation facially violating WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 
27 because the statute discriminates against the class of counties with a 
population of less than 30,000. The county argues that WYO. STAT. § 5-5-103 
affords discretion to the legislature with respect to whether it should fund the 
county court in counties having a population of less than 30,000, while the 
legislature is mandated to fund the county court in those counties having a 
population of more than 30,000 in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 5-5-102. Because 
the essence of Sublette County's claim is unlawful classification, our cases 
addressing classifications in the context of equal protection are analogous and 
pertinent. Indeed we have said that the prohibition against special legislation 
is a guarantee of equal protection. Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
907 P.2d 1238, 1273 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶12]   In treating the question of 
unconstitutionality of a statute, we impose a severe burden upon Sublette 
County. Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 817 (Wyo. 1995), and cases there cited. Sublette County must establish the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and any fact that can be 
rationally conceived to sustain the classification is to be assumed. Allhusen v. State By and Through Wyoming 
Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 885 (Wyo. 1995); Paravecchio v. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie 
County, 742 P.2d 1276, 1282 (Wyo. 1987); Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 722 P.2d 151, 155-56 (Wyo. 1986), and cases there cited. 
Article 3, § 27 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming does not forbid 
legislative classification, but the legislature is required to treat with 
equality citizens or entities that are similarly situated. Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1131 
(Wyo. 1996); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d  at 817; Allhusen, 898 P.2d  at 
884.

[¶13]   Claims of unconstitutional 
classification are treated under two levels of scrutiny. If the class is suspect 
or a fundamental right is involved, a strict scrutiny standard is applied that 
requires a demonstration that the classification is necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest. In re 
Honeycutt, 908 P.2d 976, 979 (Wyo. 1995); Allhusen, 898 P.2d  at 885; Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 
606 P.2d  at 333. If a suspect class or a fundamental right is not involved, the 
applicable standard is the rational relationship test to determine if the 
classification has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 
Neither party to this action asserts that a fundamental right or a suspect class 
is present. Consequently, the classification will be analyzed under the rational 
relationship test.

[¶14]   We invoke the four part test 
articulated in Allhusen in analyzing 
the constitutionality of a classification under the rational relationship test. 
Snyder, 912 P.2d  at 1132. The court 
looks to these factors:

(1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has 
that group been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws; (2) what is 
the public purpose to be served by the law; (3) what is the characteristic of 
the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate treatment; and (4) how are the 
characteristics used to distinguish people for disparate treatment relevant to 
the purpose the challenged law purportedly intends to 
serve.

Allhusen, 
898 P.2d  at 885-886. We hold, in light of the four part test, that WYO. STAT. § 
5-5-103 does not violate Article 3, § 27 of the Wyoming Constitution on its 
face.

[¶15]   If we assume counties with a 
population of less than 30,000 are harmed, we then consider whether they have 
been subjected to a tradition of disfavor in the law. Counties with a population 
of less than 30,000 have not been subjected to a tradition of disfavor in our 
law. Nothing in the record so suggests. In the absence of a demonstration of a 
tradition of disfavor we could not conclude that the legislature has classified 
those counties as a product of a pattern of disparate treatment. We then 
consider the purpose of the legislative conclusion to provide state funding for 
county courts in those counties with a population of more than 30,000, but 
maintaining its discretion as to whether it should fund those courts in counties 
with a population of less than 30,000. By WYO. STAT. § 5-5-102 counties with a 
population of more than 30,000 are required to establish a county court. 
Conversely, if the population of the county is less than 30,000, the board of 
county commissioners is afforded discretion with respect to the establishment of 
a county court. WYO. STAT. § 5-5-103(a). In such instances, the legislature 
reserved the determination of whether it would or would not fund a county court 
in a county less than 30,000 population. WYO. STAT. § 
5-5-103(b).

[¶16]   Several factors may reasonably be 
conceived to justify this classification. The legislature might have considered 
the fact that more sparsely populated counties would not need the services of a 
county court because the volume of court business would not justify a county 
court. Rationally, the legislature could have concluded that the state coffers 
were not adequate to fund a county court in all 23 counties of the state. It is 
possible that the legislature conceived that counties that could not justify the 
full-time services of a county court judge would voluntarily join with other 
counties to create a county court district and that the discretion to not fund 
would induce them to do so.

[¶17]   The public purpose factor is 
closely related to the third factor involved in the Allhusen test, that is the 
characteristics of counties having populations of less than 30,000 that justify 
disparate treatment. Some of the same facts that support the public purpose are 
involved with respect to the justification for disparate treatment. A lower 
volume of court business would perhaps justify the classification. The much 
larger number of counties leading to a significantly greater expenditure from 
the public coffers is readily apparent. The adequacy of judicial service 
provided by a justice of the peace court is more probable in a smaller county. 
It may be appropriate to encourage such counties to share judicial services on a 
district premise.

[¶18]   The fourth factor we must consider 
is how those characteristics that might distinguish counties with a population 
of less than 30,000 are relevant to assure the legislative purposes. Again the 
relevance is demonstrated by the characteristics discussed above. The lower 
population would lend credence to a conclusion that the volume of court business 
would not justify a county court. The relatively small number of counties with 
more than 30,000 people would not impose the same burden upon the state coffers 
that a county court in smaller counties would. Again the legislature may have 
been concerned about structuring a potential for collaboration among 
counties.

[¶19]   We conclude that, applying the 
Allhusen test, the classification of counties with less than 30,000 population 
is rationally related to the purposes to be achieved and is not facially 
unconstitutional. Sublette County, however, in its Complaint and in its brief to 
this Court, argues that the statute is unconstitutional as it has been applied 
because sub-classifications exist within the counties of less than 30,000 
population and there is no rational basis to support the sub-classifications. 
Like equal protection, the contemplation of special legislation "mandates that 
all persons similarly situated should be treated alike, both in the privileges 
conferred and in the liabilities imposed." Allhusen, 898 P.2d  at 884 (quoting Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 
1984)); Snyder, 912 P.2d  at 1131 (a 
statute must operate alike upon all persons in the same or similar 
circumstances).

[¶20]   While this action was instituted by 
Sublette County, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that the county 
entity represents the citizens who reside there. We find it implicit, if not 
explicit, in our decisions relating to the expenditure of public funds that 
citizens in one county or area are entitled to have the law function in such a 
way that public funds are expended equitably. Simons v. Laramie County School Dist. No. 
1, 741 P.2d  at 1121; Washakie County 
School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d  at 335. It is patent from the dynamics of 
this case that Sublette County is spending money for the maintenance of its 
county court that other counties with populations of less than 30,000 do not 
have to spend for that purpose. The public funds are not expended 
equitably.

[¶21]   Under the statutory structure as it 
exists, the legislature has funded county courts in at least six different 
counties all having a population of less than 30,000. The legislature denied 
funding for the county court in Sublette County. We apply the same four factor 
test of Allhusen to determine whether 
the statute is unconstitutional as applied.

We also know that "[a]ll laws of a general nature 
shall have a uniform operation." Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 34; Washakie County School District No. 1. v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied 
sub nom Hot Springs County School District No. 1 v. Washakie County School 
District No. 1, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). See Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 
(Wyo. 1978). This rule demands that these statutes be applied uniformly 
throughout the state, * * *.

Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Wyo. 1991). There is nothing 
in the record that would serve to justify the approval of funding for county 
courts in six other counties with populations of less than 30,000 while denying 
funding for a county court in Sublette County. As the statute is applied, WYO. 
STAT. § 5-5-103 does not operate alike upon all counties in the same or similar 
circumstances. The differentiation between Sublette County and other counties 
with a population of less than 30,000 is not justified by this record, and since 
the classification is not justified, the statute as it has been applied must be 
perceived as special legislation in violation of Article 3, § 27 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming. It must be declared 
unconstitutional.

[¶22]   The decision of the district court 
is reversed.

Footnotes

1 WYO. STAT. § 5-5-103 
(1992).

2 WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 27 & WYO. 
CONST. art. 1, § 34.

3 The named parties are the Governor and 
the State Treasurer, but it is clear they are sued in their official capacities. 
Consequently, the State of Wyoming will be treated as the party in this case.