Case Title: Tennant v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tennant v. State1990 WY 4786 P.2d 339Case Number: 89-14Decided: 01/19/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT 
TENNANT,

 APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Mike Cornia, 
Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The significant 
question to be resolved in this case is whether the trial court erred in 
excluding from evidence, as hearsay, the testimony of a witness called by the 
defendant. The appellant, Robert Tennant (Tennant), also asserts, as 
constituting prejudicial error, other issues relating to the denial of a motion 
in limine, which Tennant contends chilled his right to defend by inhibiting the 
exercise of his right to testify; improper questioning of prospective jurors 
during voir dire; and prosecutorial misconduct in the presentation of closing 
argument. We are not persuaded, in light of the record and the applicable law, 
that any reversible error occurred in connection with Tennant's trial, and we 
affirm the Judgment and Sentence.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Tennant sets forth these issues for consideration by the 
court:

"I. Whether the court 
erred in ruling that evidence of prior bad acts would be admissable 
substantively if the appellant testified and such error denied the appellant his 
right `to defend in person' as guaranteed by Article 1 § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

"II. Whether the trial 
court erred in excluding the testimony of proposed witness Allen.

"III. Whether statements 
elicited by the prosecutor caused the jury to believe the trial court would 
correct any errors in their guilt determination and deprived the appellant of 
his right to a jury trial.

"IV. Whether the comments 
made by counsel for the State constituted misconduct and were prejudicial to the 
defendant."

The State of 
Wyoming (State), as Appellee, restates the issues in this way:

"I. Whether the trial 
court properly denied appellant's Motion in Limine concerning the admissibility 
of appellant's prior convictions.

"II. Whether the trial 
court should have concluded that the proposed testimony of Geraldine Allen was 
inadmissible hearsay.

"III. Whether the 
prosecutor's questions on voir dire constituted error.

"IV. Whether the 
prosecutor's statements in closing argument were appropriate."

[¶3]      Tennant was 
charged with, tried for, and convicted of one count of larceny and a second 
count of larceny by a bailee, each alleged to be a violation of the applicable 
provisions of § 6-3-402, W.S. 1977,1 and § 6-3-410, W.S. 1977.2 These charges and convictions are 
the product of two separate occasions when Tennant obtained the funds of a 
fellow prisoner in the Natrona County Jail, $1,300 in each instance. The State 
and Tennant stipulated that the counts should be merged for purposes of 
sentencing, and the court then imposed a sentence of "not less than twelve 
months nor more than eighteen months; said sentence * * * [to] run consecutive 
with the penitentiary sentence handed down in District Court No. 10316." See 
Tennant v. State, 776 P.2d 761 (Wyo. 1989). Tennant has taken his appeal from 
this Judgment and Sentence.

[¶4]      The facts 
relating to Tennant's convictions are not complicated. In April of 1988, the 
victim returned to the Natrona County jail from the State Hospital in Evanston 
where he had been sent for evaluation. Tennant and the victim became cell mates, 
and the victim, at some point, told Tennant of the difficulty he had encountered 
at the State Hospital in endeavoring to retrieve funds from his checking account 
at a bank in Wichita Falls, Texas. The victim had been successful in arranging a 
wire transfer of funds, but he was denied the freedom to pick up the money from 
the bank in Evanston. The victim expressed the desire to obtain funds from his 
bank account so that he would have money for purchasing items from the jail 
commissary. He could not use a check because of jail policy, and he assumed that 
he would have the same difficulties with a wire transfer that he had encountered 
in Evanston.

[¶5]      Tennant offered 
to assist the victim by having the wire transfer sent to Tennant's mother in 
Cheyenne. Tennant suggested that the money could be transferred to his mother 
who then would forward the funds to the victim in the Natrona County jail. 
Following this suggestion, the victim arranged to have $1,300 sent to Tennant's 
mother in Cheyenne. This transfer of funds was accomplished on May 31, 1988. 
None of the money ever reached the victim, however, and, when he inquired, 
Tennant explained that his mother was unable to obtain the transferred funds 
because the victim's bank had made a mistake and put the transfer order in two 
names, the victim's and Tennant's mother's names. Tennant then suggested that 
the victim write his bank again requesting the wire transfer of another $1,300, 
this time only in the name of Tennant's mother. The victim did that, and the 
second wire transfer of funds was accomplished on June 13, 1988. The victim did 
not receive any of that money either and, when he was able to telephone his 
bank, he learned that both fund transfers had been accomplished according to his 
directions. He then reported the situation to the authorities at the Natrona 
County jail, and the investigation leading to Tennant's prosecution was 
instituted.

[¶6]      In the meantime, 
Tennant's mother, who had never before had so much money, was concerned about 
the source of the funds represented by the wire transfers. She inquired of 
Tennant who first told her that the money had been paid for work that he had 
performed prior to being incarcerated in the Natrona County jail. After Tennant 
was charged, he telephoned his mother and told her the funds really were the 
proceeds of a gambling debt that the victim owed to him from a bet relating to 
some game on television.

[¶7]      The only evidence 
in the case was presented by the State. After making an offer of proof 
concerning the proposed testimony of a witness who would have testified about a 
statement made to her by Tennant that he had won the money from the victim in 
two bets on televised horse races, the defense rested without introducing any 
evidence. Additional facts relating to the several issues on appeal will be 
included within the discussion of those issues.

[¶8]      We need not dwell 
on Tennant's first issue because it is controlled by Vaupel v. State, 708 P.2d 1248 (Wyo. 1985). Tennant filed a Motion in Limine seeking an order that no 
witnesses be permitted to testify about his prior criminal record, particularly 
the conviction upon which he was being held in the Natrona County jail at the 
time these crimes were committed. When the motion was argued immediately prior 
to the trial, the State advised the trial court that it would offer evidence of 
two prior convictions for purposes of impeachment pursuant to Rule 609(a), 
W.R.E.3 The State also asserted that the 
conviction for which Tennant then was being held in the Natrona County jail was 
admissible, pursuant to Rule 404(b), W.R.E.,4 as substantive "proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident." The district judge, in ruling on the motion, 
said:

"These motions in limine 
are always difficult because I can't see the full picture, but the Defendant 
should be aware that my inclination at this moment is that the prior bad acts, 
the conviction of 1988, can be offered both for impeachment and as an 
illustration of prior bad acts. The 1984 conviction seems to be unrelated to 
that. I would permit that to go in for impeachment purposes only."

The initial 
phrase of the trial court's ruling is almost a paraphrase of language used by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 
41, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984), where the Court said:

"A reviewing court is 
handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a 
factual context." (Footnote omitted.)

Vaupel, 708 P.2d 1248, in which this court adopted and relied upon Luce in applying Rule 609, 
W.R.E., sustains the ruling of the trial court on the impeachment aspect of the 
motion in limine.

"We hold that if an 
accused does not testify, he does not preserve the issue of the propriety of a 
ruling on his motion in limine for appeal." Vaupel, 708 P.2d  at 
1250.

Tennant did not 
testify, and his claim of error with respect to the denial of the motion in 
limine by the trial court on the use of prior convictions for impeachment is 
negated by Vaupel.

[¶9]      We are satisfied 
that the principles articulated in Luce, and adopted in Vaupel, extend to the 
thrust of the motion in limine with respect to the use of the one prior 
conviction for the purposes set forth in Rule 404(b). In light of the State's 
announced position that it would only offer the evidence of the previous crime 
under Rule 404(b) if Tennant testified, the parameters of the issue are 
identical. The trial court would need to have before it all the factual 
circumstances of the case, including the testimony of Tennant, in order to rule 
on any objection to such evidence.

[¶10]   Furthermore, with respect to 
evidence offered under Rule 404(b), admissibility does not depend upon the 
decision of a defendant to testify as does the use of such evidence for 
impeachment. If such evidence is admissible, then it can be produced as part of 
the State's case in chief which has no impact, chilling or otherwise, upon the 
defendant's decision to testify. An announced choice by the State to use such 
evidence only for rebuttal perhaps affords the defendant an advantage that the 
law does not demand, but that choice could not be prejudicial to the defendant 
under the circumstances of this case.

[¶11]   The more significant question in 
this case, essentially because it presents somewhat novel propositions in 
Wyoming, is the claim that the trial court erred in excluding certain proffered 
testimony as hearsay. After the prosecution had rested its case, a hearing was 
held in chambers to address the motion for judgment of acquittal by the 
defendant and, at that time, the State moved to exclude as hearsay the testimony 
of a witness who had been subpoenaed by Tennant. According to the offer of 
proof, the proposed witness would have testified about a telephone conversation 
with Tennant during which Tennant had told the witness that he had won the 
$2,600 in issue through bets on two separate horse races that had been 
televised.

[¶12]   Tennant's contention at trial was 
that the proffered evidence constituted an admission against his penal interest 
even though it tended to be exculpatory. The theory suggested to the court was 
that the statement did constitute an admission that he had possession of, and 
controlled, the funds. Essentially, Tennant was urging to the trial court that 
the proffered testimony was not hearsay according to the definition found in 
Rule 801(d)(2), W.R.E., relating to an admission by a party opponent. On this 
theory, the trial court's ruling clearly was correct because such an admission 
is admissible as non-hearsay only when "the statement is offered against a party 
* * *." Rule 801(d)(2).

[¶13]   In his appeal, Tennant has shifted 
his approach and contends that the testimony was admissible even if it is 
characterized as hearsay. Our consideration of the issue is premised upon our 
well-established rule that decisions of the trial court with respect to the 
admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable deference and, as long as 
there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will 
not be reversed on appeal. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), cert. 
denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). We also recognize 
that hearsay evidence, ordinarily inadmissible, may be admitted under an 
exception to the hearsay rule if the requirements for the particular exception 
are met. Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶14]   The proffered testimony fits within 
the definition of hearsay in Rule 801(c), W.R.E., which is:

"`Hearsay' is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."

Tennant is the 
declarant with respect to this statement, and it is hearsay. We already have 
explained that it is not excluded from the hearsay definition by the provisions 
of 801(d)(2). Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided. Rule 802, 
W.R.E.

[¶15]   This brings us to Tennant's new 
contentions that this testimony was admissible pursuant to hearsay exceptions 
found in Rules 803(24), W.R.E., and 804(b)(3) and (6), W.R.E. Tennant now also 
asserts that the testimony would be admissible pursuant to the provisions of 
Rules 801 and 806, W.R.E. We conclude that none of these suggested exceptions to 
the hearsay rule are applicable so as to justify a finding of error with respect 
to the ruling of the trial court excluding the testimony as hearsay. We shall 
consider each claim separately and briefly.

[¶16]   Rule 803(24) is known as the 
"catchall" exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. In order to invoke 
this rule, the court should conclude that the proffered evidence possesses 
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," and "that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence on which 
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence." Rule 803(24). We have held that the 
purpose of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is to allow trustworthy hearsay 
evidence to be admitted, but that should happen only when it is both, in fact, 
worthy of trust and necessary to effectuate justice. Hopkinson, 632 P.2d 79. The 
trustworthiness of a hearsay statement is to be analyzed by evaluating the 
circumstances in which the declarant made the statement and the incentive he had 
to speak truthfully or falsely. An analysis of this record discloses that, at 
the time the district court ruled on the State's objection, it knew that Tennant 
had made two different statements of explanation to his mother. While one of 
those was close to the version in the proffered testimony, it was not identical. 
We could not fault the trial court in refusing to admit this testimony because 
it does not possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to 
those specifically listed exceptions preceding the exception set forth in Rule 
803(24).

[¶17]   Tennant also urges that the 
statement ought to be admitted under the provisions of either Rule 804(b)(3) or 
(6), which include, in exceptions to the hearsay rule, a statement against the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or one tending to subject him to 
civil or criminal liability, and a broad other exception, like that found in 
Rule 803(24), if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. The effort to invoke 
Rule 804(b)(3) is foreclosed by the last sentence of that rule which 
states:

"A statement tending to 
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused 
is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement; * * *."

There is nothing 
in the offer of proof, or in the record otherwise, that satisfies this 
requirement of Rule 804(b)(3). We cannot fault the exercise of discretion by the 
trial judge in excluding the hearsay statement offered under this 
exception.

[¶18]   Rule 804(b)(6) has substantially 
the same language as Rule 803(24) and, like that exception, is to be cautiously 
used and only in exceptional cases when it is necessary in the interests of 
justice. Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc., 720 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1986). The 
effort to invoke Rule 804(b)(6) suffers from the same absence of the requisite 
trustworthiness as was discussed above. Consequently, again, we find no error in 
the refusal of the district court to admit the proper testimony because of this 
rule.

[¶19]   The State suggests that no proper 
showing was made of Tennant's unavailability as a witness, and that obligation 
is imposed on the proponent of the evidence. Williams. We do not invoke that 
requirement in disposing of this case, however, because of the definition of 
unavailability found in Rule 804. As the defendant, Tennant had available to him 
a privilege not to testify concerning the subject matter of this declaration 
and, consequently, the court could conclude by implication that Tennant was not 
available as a witness.

[¶20]   Both Rule 803(24) and Rule 
804(b)(6) encompass a requirement that the proponent must make known to the 
adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, 
including the name and address of the declarant, sufficiently in advance of 
trial to provide the adverse party an appropriate opportunity to meet it. This 
record is devoid of any such notice to the State by Tennant, but the record 
demonstrates rather definitely that the State was aware of the existence of the 
witness and the nature of the testimony. It had the opportunity to raise the 
matter before the witness was even called to testify, and the record discloses 
that the witness had been interviewed by the State. Consequently, we do not rest 
our disposition of this issue upon the absence of notice, but we do remind 
practitioners of that requirement.

[¶21]   Turning to Rule 801(d)(1), which 
Tennant attempts to invoke out of context, we note that this rule is directed to 
the admissibility of prior statements by a witness. Tennant did not take the 
stand; he was not a witness; and the suggestion that his prior statements come 
within the penumbra of Rule 801(d)(1) is not apt. Insofar as the argument rests 
upon Rule 801(d)(2), that provision in the rules requires that the party's 
statement be offered against him. It does not serve as a premise for a party to 
offer the statement for his own benefit.

[¶22]   With respect to the contention that 
Rule 806 has some application to this case, we are satisfied that the sole 
purpose of that rule is to permit impeachment of a declarant whose out-of-court 
statement has been admitted into evidence. It also permits cross-examination by 
a party calling a declarant as a witness after a hearsay statement has been 
admitted against that party. As we perceive this rule, it is limited in its 
application and has no prospect for justifying the admissibility vel non 
of the proffered hearsay statement.

[¶23]   Tennant's third and fourth issues 
share a common denominator.  No 
objection was lodged to the questions asked by the prosecutor on voir dire. Even 
more interesting, counsel for Tennant pursued much the same line of questioning 
when pursuing voir dire on Tennant's behalf. The record similarly discloses that 
no objection was made to the comments of the prosecutor in closing argument. In 
neither instance did Tennant seek any other relief, such as a motion for a 
mistrial. Consequently, both of these issues must satisfy the requirements of 
our plain error doctrine before they can be considered on the merits. It is our 
conclusion that neither of these contentions can satisfy the requirements of the 
plain error doctrine.

[¶24]   Our plain error doctrine was 
announced in Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507-08 (Wyo. 1977), where we 
said:

"While this Court has 
recognized that the plain error concept must be applied to each case on its own 
particular facts, and any attempt to define the term `plain error or defects 
affecting substantial rights' is unlikely to be helpful, still there are some 
accepted criteria which we invoke when a claim of plain error is presented. When 
review is sought under the plain error doctrine this Court must be able to 
discern from the record, without resort to speculation or equivocal inference, 
what occurred at trial, that is, we are entitled to know the particular facts. 
Further, the proponent of plain error must demonstrate the existence of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and 
obvious, not merely arguable, way. If these criteria are met, the error or 
defect must adversely affect some substantial right of the accused in order to 
avoid the application of the harmless error concept procedurally expressed in 
Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P. The assertion of a constitutional ground of error will not 
avoid the application of these criteria, and if they are not satisfied any claim 
for review under the plain error doctrine must fail." (Citations 
omitted.)

We have 
consistently followed these criteria. E.g., McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964 
(Wyo. 1989); King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1989); Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1989); Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1988); McDonald v. 
State, 715 P.2d 209 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶25]   Relying upon Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985), Tennant 
contends that the prosecutor's questions on voir dire could have caused the 
jurors to disregard their duties so as to deny him a fair trial. In Caldwell, a 
death sentence was reversed in the instance of a murder conviction because the 
prosecutor, in closing argument, told the jury that the sentence to death was 
subject to review by an appellate court and, for that reason, the jury's 
decision was not final. This case is distinguishable from Caldwell to the end 
that no clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.

[¶26]   In this case, the jurors, who had 
been involved in prior cases in which a directed verdict or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict had occurred, stated that they understood the 
importance of their role as jurors and that they would not be affected in 
Tennant's case by their previous experiences. In light of Caldwell, counsel for 
both the State and Tennant obviously felt it was important to make the inquiry. 
The prospective jurors were asked only about their prior jury service, and no 
attempt was made to suggest to them that their decision was of no import or was 
not final. These questions are well within the range of permissible latitude in 
interrogating jurors that is controlled by the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Gerard v. State, 511 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 585, 38 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1973). There was no plain error that would justify 
review of this issue.

[¶27]   In making his argument on his 
fourth issue, Tennant complains of the closing argument by the prosecutor during 
which Tennant was referred to as a leech, a blood sucker, and a predator on 
society. Further, counsel for the State suggested that he might go out and find 
crippled children to pick on next. Tennant also argues that counsel for the 
State vouched for the credibility of the victim in this case. In addition, 
complaint is made of one instance in which the prosecutor suggested that counsel 
for Tennant and Tennant had a problem with reality. In this latter instance, an 
objection was lodged, and the trial court admonished counsel about making 
personal references to opposing counsel.

[¶28]   Our rule is that we must examine 
the entire record to determine whether the conduct asserted as prosecutorial 
misconduct resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant amounting to the 
denial of a fair trial. Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1986). The burden 
of establishing prejudice is assigned to the defendant when prosecutorial 
misconduct is asserted. Capshaw v. State, 714 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 1986). While the 
remarks of the prosecutor were unprofessional, they do not fit within those 
kinds of statements that this court has considered as prosecutorial misconduct 
under the plain error doctrine. They do not match the criteria that we discussed 
in Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986), or in Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1982), as justifying a consideration of the claim of error under the 
plain error doctrine. Here, the evidence was overwhelming and, in the absence of 
any objection by trial counsel, we cannot say that there was any prejudicial 
denial of a fair trial. Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1987). In the 
absence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law controlling the argument that was 
made, and any clear prejudice to Tennant, there was no plain error for us to 
review.

[¶29]   The Judgment and Sentence is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-3-402, W.S. 
1977, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny.

"(b) A bailee, a public 
servant as defined by W.S. 6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person entrusted with the 
control, care, or custody of any money or other property who, with intent to 
steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own 
or another's use is guilty of larceny.

"(c) Except as provided 
by subsection (e) of this section, larceny is:

"(i) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five 
hundred ($500.00) or more; * * *."

2 Section 6-3-410, W.S. 
1977, provides that:

"The amount of property 
involved in violations of W.S. 6-3-402 through 6-3-404 and 6-3-406 through 
6-3-408 committed pursuant to a common scheme or the same transaction, whether 
the property is taken from the same person or different persons, may be 
aggregated in determining the value of the property."

3 Rule 609(a), W.R.E., 
provides:

"(a) General rule. - For 
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable 
by death or imprisonment in excess of one (1) year under the law under which he 
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment."

4 Rule 404(b), W.R.E., 
provides:

"(b) Other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident."