Case Title: Blind Industries v. DGS

Citation: 371 Md. 221

Docket Number: 32/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Blind Industries v. DGS
No. 32 , September Term 2000
HEADNOTE:
BLIND INDUSTRIES & SERVICES OF MARYLAND; PREFERENCE;
STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION; 
PREFE RENC E; 
AMB IGUOUS;
PROCUREMENT; MANUFACTURE; LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The preference in favor of the supplies and services of Blind Industries & Services of
Maryland prescribed in Maryland Code (1957, 1995  Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.) § 14-103
of the State Finance and Procurement Article does not apply when Blind Industries provides
supplies and services as a broker, rather than as a manufacturer.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 03-C-99-012149
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 32
September Term, 2000
BLIND INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES
OF MARYLAND
v.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF
GENERAL SERVICES
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky*
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Filed:   October 9, 2002
*Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of 
this case while an active member 
of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1Unless otherwise indicated, future references will be to Md. Code (1957, 1995
Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.) of the State Finance and Procurement Article.
2During oral argument, the Court raised questions with respect to whether, because
Blind Industries & Services of Maryland is a creature of the State and the Department of
General Services, an agency of the executive branch of State government, the dispute
before the Court is justiciable by the courts or is one that must be resolved by the
Governor, as the head of the executive branch.   We asked the parties to address the issue
by way of supplemental briefing.    They did so and concluded that the dispute is
justiciable and, further, that Blind Industries is neither a State agency nor so closely
regulated by the State, or the Governor, in particular, as to permit the Governor to resolve
the dispute unilaterally.    We agree that the dispute is justiciable.
Blind Industries came into being in 1908, when the General Assembly enacted
legislation providing for “The Maryland Workshop for the Blind,” a body corporate, the
board of trustees for which was appointed by the Governor and, initially, by the Board of
Directors of the Maryland School for the Blind.   1908 Maryland Laws, ch. 566.   
Originally codified in Maryland Code (1912) Article 30, that law gave the organization a
small annual amount of financial support and its board of directors broad latitude to
manage its own operations.   Aside from providing for the ownership of property, the
right to sue and be sued, to hire necessary employees and set their compensation, the
statute allowed the board of directors to:
“... acquire suitable quarters by lease, purchase or otherwise in Baltimore
City ... and ...  establish, maintain, direct and supervise all matters
pertaining to the workshop, its maintenance and regulation, including the
purchase of all machinery as may seem to them to be suitable and necessary,
and the barter or exchange of articles or manufactures entrusted to them for
disposal.”
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve whether the preference in favor of the
supplies and services of Blind Industries & Services of Maryland (“Blind Industries”), the
appellant, prescribed in Maryland Code (1957, 1995  Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.) § 14-103
of the State Finance and Procurement Article,1 applies when Blind Industries provides
supplies and services not ordinarily provided by it and it provides the supplies and services
as a broker, rather than as a manufacturer.    The Circuit Court for Baltimore County
answered, “no” and so shall we.2
Article 30, § 6.   Other than the change of name to the present one, See 1973 Maryland
Laws, ch.164, the change in the number of directors from five to eleven, See 1973
Maryland Laws, ch. 164, the change in the composition of the board, requiring that four
directors be blind persons, See 1988 Maryland Laws, ch. 453, and the change in the 
appointing authority, the Governor now appoints all directors, See 1976 Maryland Laws,
ch. 122, the organizational structure and the relation of the organization to the State has
not changed.
Blind Industries is incorporated under the Maryland Corporations law and, in fact
has acquired nonprofit, charitable corporation status under § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.  See 26 U.S.C. §501.    Since its inception, the board has been subjected
to “limited indicia of State control,” 78 Md. Op. Atty. Gen. 128, 135 (1993), by being
required to keep proper records of Blind Industries’ funds and accounts, being  audited
annually, and being required to make an annual report to the Governor, the General
Assembly, and the Chairman of the Joint Budget and Audit Committee.   Maryland Code
(1957, 1997 Replacement Volume) Article 30, § 6 (e).     Nevertheless, Blind Industries’
budget is not a part of the State budget, 78 Op.Atty. Gen., at 135 (“[a]lthough BISM
receives money from the State pursuant to a grant agreement, the State is under no
statutory obligation to fund BISM”); its employees are not State employees, 53 Op. Atty.
Gen. 249, 250 (1968); and Blind Industries, although described as a “quasi-public
corporation,” 78 Op. Atty. Gen. at 135-136, because, “despite its public welfare role, [it]
does not exercise governmental powers,” id., is not a State agency.  See Maryland
Manual, in which the State Archivist has classified Blind Industries under its Table of
Contents as a “Private Agenc[y] with Government Boards.” 
We agree, in any event, with the appellant that the dispute is justiciable by the
courts, involving both an issue that traditionally is justiciable and one where there is a
genuine dispute and adversity. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S.
426, 430, 69 S. Ct. 1410, 1413, 93 L. Ed. 1451, 1457 (1949) (“courts must look behind 
names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is
presented.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 1058, 94 S.
Ct. 3090, 3102 (1974) (dispute between special prosecutor and president presents
traditionally justiciable issue); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217, 144 L. Ed. 2d 196,
203, 119 S. Ct. 1906, 1909-10 (1999) (holding  that the EEOC has the authority to require
federal agencies to pay compensatory damages in employment discrimination cases);
Pulaski County v. Jacuzzi Bros., 875 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ark. 1994); Friedrichs v. Goldy,
387 P.2d 274, 277 (Colo. 1963); State v. CNA Ins. Cos., 779 A.2d 662, 668 (Vt. 2001).
2
3
Blind Industries, legislatively created to train and employ blind citizens, filed a
declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in which it also
sought injunctive relief against the Department of General Services, the appellee, in response
to the appellee’s refusal to award it, pursuant to the statutory preference it enjoys and, thus,
without competitive bidding, the Statewide Office Supply contract.    At the heart of the case
was, and is,  § 14-103.    It provides, as relevant:
“The State or a State aided or controlled entity shall buy supplies and
services from:
*     *     *     *
“(2) Blind Industries and Services of Maryland, if:
“(i) Blind Industries and Services of Maryland
provides the supplies or services;  and
“(ii) State Use Industries does not provide the
supplies or services ....”
There was, to be sure, no disagreement as to the fact that Blind Industries was entitled to a
preference; rather, the dispute revolved around to what the preference related.    In other
words, the issue the declaratory judgment action presented was the meaning and reach of the
statutory preference.
Relevant to the interpretation of § 14-103 is the manner in which the appellant
proposed to provide the supplies and services, as well as what the appellant intended to
provide.    Traditionally, Blind Industries has operated manufacturing plants, producing
various goods, at which blind citizens are employed in the manufacturing process.    Among
3While acknowledging the importance of any profit, which it, agreeing with the
parties, believed would be substantial, to the full realization of the work that Blind
Industries does, the court commented that “[e]ven at $10 per hour for ten full time
workers, the earnings inuring to the benefit of [the blind individuals hired to run the
brokering operation] [are] very, very small compared to the overall value of the total
contract and the profits to be realized.”
The court’s finding as to how the appellant intends to proceed is consistent with
the appellant’s own description of its proposed operation:
“Essentially, Blind Industries would act as a distributor or retailer.   The
ordering agency would place an order with Blind Industries who would then
process the order and, for supplies not actually manufactured by Blind
Industries, procure those products from a wholesaler and arrange delivery to
the ordering State agency.    In other words, Blind Industries would simply
be doing precisely what Boise [the contract holder] was doing.”
The appellant conceded that there are differences, which it characterizes as “slight,”
between its proposal and the manner in which the present contract holder, Boise-Cascade
Office Products fulfilled the contract: Boise, unlike the appellant, maintains a warehouse
of inventory and it maintains a small fleet of delivery trucks.   
4
the goods manufactured, and relevant to the case sub judice are paper products, such as legal
pads and easel paper, for office use.    In addition to these products, the evidence presented
at trial was, and the court found, that 
“What Blind Industries proposes to do is to utilize the services of 6-10
individuals who are legally blind: (1) to staff an office with phones and
computers, (2) to take orders from State agencies needing office supplies under
the contract to be awarded, (3) to order the goods, primarily from a single third
party, and (4) to have most of the goods drop shipped from the third party to
the agency placing the order.    Profits of a substantial nature would inure to
the benefit of Blind Industries if the contract is awarded to it, which profits
would be used to provide services to the blind people of Maryland for whom
it exists and works, in addition to the employment of as many as ten (10)
individuals, who are legally blind, and would thereby directly profit by having
full time employment.” [3]
Following a two day non-jury trial, the Circuit Court declared, “under the facts
5
presented of record, Blind Industries and Services of Maryland ... is not entitled to a statutory
preference by...§ 14-103 so as to require the State of Maryland to award it the Maryland State
Office Supply Contract for the year 2000.”    In so declaring, the court rejected the
appellant’s argument that the preference applies whatever the source of the supplies and
services provided, whether through manufacture, passthrough or subcontract, concluding, on
the contrary, that it applied “to those goods and services being predominantly manufactured
or otherwise provided by individuals who are legally blind.”    Relevant to that conclusion,
the court pointed out, was the emphasis in the statutes on “articles ‘manufactured’ by the
blind.”   It cited Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Replacement Volume) Article 30, § 3, which
provides:
“Powers of board of trustees of Blind Industries and Services of Maryland.
The board of trustees of Blind Industries and Services of Maryland is
authorized and empowered to apply such portion of their endowment fund and
annual income as they may deem expedient to establish training and
employment centers and to open a store for the sale of articles manufactured
by the blind, and to extend the benefits of such centers and store to the adult
blind of this State not resident in the institutions, on such terms and under such
regulations as they may prescribe,”
and § 6 (c) and (d):
“(c) Duties generally.-The Blind Industries and Services of Maryland shall be
open for the labor and manufactures of all blind citizens of Maryland over
eighteen years of age, who can give satisfactory evidences of character and of
their ability to do the work required of them.  All the profits arising from the
operation of blind industries shall be used in furthering its usefulness.
“(d) Acquisition of property; supervision, etc., of blind industries- The board
shall acquire suitable quarters by lease, purchase or otherwise in the State of
Maryland and shall have full power to establish, maintain, direct and supervise
6
all matters pertaining to blind industries, its maintenance and regulation,
including the purchase of all machinery and materials as may seem to them
suitable and necessary, and the barter or exchange of articles or manufactures
entrusted to them for disposal.”
(Emphasis added).
Aggrieved by that judgment, the appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals and, at the same time, filed in this Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.    We
granted the petition while the case was pending in the intermediate appellate court.  Blind
Industries v. DGS, 359 Md. 28, 753 A.2d 1 (2000).
The appellant submits that resolution of this case involves statutory interpretation.
Section 14-103 is, to the appellant, “crystal clear.”   Thus, application of  the canons of
statutory construction to the interpretation of § 14-103, it insists,  leads to a clear and
equitable result, that it is entitled to the preference even though it does not manufacture all
of the products it will supply pursuant to the contract.   Where the words of the statute are
clear and unambiguous and express a clear meaning, the appellant asserts, effect will be
given to the statute; there is no occasion to resort to legislative history.
 The key word is “provide,” the appellant argues.   Noting that it is defined by Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990), p. 1224, as “to make, procure, or furnish for future use,” it
states that “the statute’s requirement that the State purchase any supplies or services
‘provided’ by Blind Industries, specifically includes supplies and services which Blind
Industries obtains (or procures) from third parties and then provides to the State.”   Indeed,
as the appellant sees it, “[b]ecause the statute requires State agencies to purchase office
4COMAR 21.11.05.01.B (1) provides:
“‘Blind Industries and Services of Maryland’ means the entity designated
by law to produce supplies manufactured and assembled by processes
involving blind workers.” 
7
supplies ‘provided’ by Blind Industries, awarding the Office Supply Contract to anyone but
Blind Industries would be an ultra vires act.”    
The appellee, of course, does not agree.   It agrees with the judgment of the Circuit
Court because it believes that the preference to which Blind Industries is entitled applies only
to awards of contracts involving supplies that Blind Industries manufactures or assembles.
This, it asserts, is the Legislature’s intent, which is clearly discerned from the legislative
history of the preference, the statutory context and the purpose of the preference.    As to the
latter, like the Circuit Court, the appellee finds relevant that the emphasis in passing the
initial legislation, continued to today, citing and quoting COMAR 21.11.05.01.B (1), 4 was
on articles manufactured by blind individuals.   Accordingly, it concludes:
“By attempting to take over the statewide contract for office supplies, for
which Blind Industries would neither manufacture the goods provided nor add
value to the goods provided, Blind Industries is overreaching its legislatively
mandated preference.”
Also relevant, the appellee submits, is the fact that when the preference was initially
given to the appellant, the appellant was engaged in the manufacture of textiles, including
uniforms, surgical drapes and surgical wraps.   Furthermore, asserting that “[t]he
Procurement Law generally requires that goods and services be purchased with competitive
5§ 11-201 (a) provides:
“(a) The purposes and policies of this Division II include:
“(1) providing for increased confidence in State procurement;
“(2) ensuring fair and equitable treatment of all persons who
deal with the State procurement system;
“(3) providing safeguards for maintaining a State procurement
system of quality and integrity;
“(4) fostering effective broad-based competition in the State
through support of the free enterprise system;
“(5) promoting increased long-term economic efficiency and
responsibility in the State by encouraging the use of recycled
materials;
“(6) providing increased economy in the State procurement
system;
“(7) getting the maximum benefit from the purchasing power
of the State;
“(8) simplifying, clarifying, and modernizing the law that
governs State procurement;
“(9) allowing the continued development of procurement
regulations, policies, and practices in the State;  and
“(10) promoting development of uniform State procurement
procedures to the extent possible.”  
8
means to promote the integrity and maximize value to the State,” citing § 11-201,5 the
appellee cites Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education, 358
Md. 129,135, 747 A. 2d 625, 628 (2000), quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308
Md. 69, 75, 517 A. 2d 730, 732 (1986), for the proposition that adopting the construction
urged by the appellant would lead to “an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is
inconsistent with common sense.”  
Alternatively, the appellee contends that, apart from the statutory language and the
legislative history, the § 14-103 preference simply can not apply in the situation where the
6Pursuant to COMAR 21.11.05.02.A., “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these
regulations,” state agencies and affected entities are mandated to procure all supplies and
services available from a “selling entity.”   Subsection 01.B. (7) defines “selling entity” to
include, in addition to State Use Industries and sheltered workshops, Blind Industries and
Services of Maryland.   Subsection 02.C.  provides: “This Chapter does not apply to
supplies or services provided under subcontract to a selling entity.”
9
provider of goods and supplies is a mere broker of the goods and supplies.    Such a
construction of § 14-103, it asserts, is inconsistent with the procurement regulations
applicable to the appellant, Chapter 05. of COMAR 21.11., 6 and would undermine the goals
of State procurement, “to foster competition and to obtain the best value for the taxpayer.”
“The paramount object of statutory construction is the ascertainment and effectuation
of the real intention of the Legislature.”  Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366
Md. 295, 301, 783 A.2d 667, 670 (2001).   As we have said many times, most recently in
WCI v. Geiger, ___Md., ___, ___ A. 2d, ___,(2002) [slip op. at 11-12], we start our search
for legislative intent with the words of the statute being construed.    When those words are
clear and unambiguous, viewed  “in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the manner
in which they are most commonly understood,” Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d
478, 483 (2000), we look no further, Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445, 697
A.2d 455, 458; rather, as the appellant points out, giving the words their commonly
understood meaning, we give effect to the statute as written. Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255,
261, 647 A. 2d 1204, 1206-1207 (1994).    Moreover, we neither add nor delete words in
order to give the statute a meaning not otherwise communicated by the language used or to
10
“reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,” Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632
A.2d 753, 755 (1993).    And we do not construe the statute with “‘forced or subtle
interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” Id. (quoting  Tucker v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).   Only when the statutory
language is unclear and ambiguous, will we look to other sources, such as the legislative
history, to discover legislative intent. Geiger, ___Md., ___, ___ A. 2d, ___,(2002) [slip op.
at 12];  Degren, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999); Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md.
380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992).
 With regard to determining whether a statute is ambiguous, we have been clear; an
ambiguity may still exist even when the words of the statute are themselves “crystal clear.”
That occurs when its application in a given situation is not clear.  See  Gardner v. State, 344
Md. 642, 649 A.2d 610, 613 (1997).    This is consistent with this Court’s recognition that
a term which is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another.  Webster v. State,
359 Md. 465, 481, 754 A.2d 1004, 1012 (2000); Sullins v. Allstate, 340 Md. 503, 508, 667
A.2d 617, 619 (1995);  Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. at 74, 517 A.2d at 732
(“That a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful
application in another context is well settled.”).  We have also acknowledged that
“[l]anguage can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects: 1) it may be intrinsically
unclear ...;  or 2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a particular
object or circumstance may be uncertain.”  Gardner v. State, 344 Md. at 648-49, 689 A.2d
11
at 613, (quoting Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45, 54, 648 A.2d 1047,
1051 (1994) quoting Town & Country  v. Comcast Cablevision, 70 Md. App. 272, 280, 520
A.2d 1129, 1132, cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d 954 (1987)). 
“Provide” is the critical word.    We also agree with the appellant that it has a clear
and an expansive meaning.    In addition to making it, a product or good can be provided if
it is procured or otherwise furnished for future use.    See Black’s Law Dictionary, at1224.
Thus, given the expansive meaning of “provide,” the requirements of the § 14-103 preference
conceivably could be complied with either by Blind Industries providing products it makes
or those that it procures for later resale.
The appellant admits that it provides only the office supplies it manufactures, although
it is quick to point out that it is able to - it could - procure the other supplies and services
called for by the Statewide Office Supply contract:
“With respect to office supplies, Blind Industries provides (or at least has the
ability to provide) two types of products: (1) products it actually manufactures
itself (e.g. certain paper products) and (2) products manufactured by others
which Blind Industries procures and sells, like a retailer, to an end user.”
Because “provides” encompasses both manufacture and procurement, by its own
admission, the appellant  has not provided supplies and services by means of procurement,
although prepared to do so now.   Furthermore, when awarded the preference at issue, the
appellant “provided” only products that it manufactured.   It follows, therefore, that  the
question that must be answered is whether the General Assembly intended the preference to
apply to the latter products or to all products  that the appellant could, or has the ability to,
12
provide.   
Section 14-103 speaks in the present tense.   It refers to supplies and services that the
appellant “provides;” it does not by its terms refer to those that the appellant has the ability
to provide.    This raises the question of whether the preference applies only to those supplies
and services actually provided, however acquired,  or to those that the appellant could, but
has yet to, provide.   Given the context in general and in which “provides” is used, and
particularly that the appellant has never provided products that it did not manufacture,
legislative intent on this point is at least unclear.    Therefore, the term, “provides,” is
ambiguous.
Having determined that the statute is ambiguous, it is necessary that we seek the
legislative intent by reviewing the history of the preference.    The subject preference was
enacted in 1970, See 1970 Maryland Laws, ch. 271.   Codified at Maryland Code (1957,
1967 Repl. Vol., 1970 Cum. Supp.) Art. 30 § 6A, it provided: “The State and all state-aided,
owned, controlled, or managed public or quasi-public institutions and agencies shall purchase
from the workshop for the blind those products and/or services not supplied by the
Department of Correctional Services.”    At that time, as the appellee points out, the appellant
supplied certain textile “products,” i.e. uniforms, surgical drapes and wraps.   Significantly,
§ 6A also required “[t]he workshop [to] send a list of products and services supplied by it to
the Secretary of  the Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning, and to all persons
responsible for purchasing for the above mentioned institutions.”  
13
With the enactment of a unified procurement law, codified in Article 21, See 1980
Maryland Laws, ch. 775, Art. 30, § 6A was transferred to Article 21 § 8-202.   Although
substantively the same as its predecessor, rather than “products and/or services,” what was
required to be purchased were, consistent with the defined terms in the new law, See Art.21,
§ 1-101 (o) and (r), “supplies or services.”    The requirement that a list of supplies and
services be sent to the affected institutions was retained, except that the Department of
General Services was substituted for the Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning.  
 The next change in statutory language, resulting in the present statutory formulation,
came in 1988, during Code revision, See 1988 Maryland Laws, ch. 48.      It was during this
process that “provides” was added to the statute, requiring the State to purchase supplies and
services that the appellant “provides” and State Use Industries does not provide.    The
Revisor’s note to § 14-103 advises that the provision as to the preference to Blind Industries
is “new language derived without substantive change” from the prior law.   See Blevins v.
Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 642, 724 A.2d 22, 32 (1999), in which we stated that “a
change in a statute as part of a general recodification will ordinarily not be deemed to modify
the law unless the change is such that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law is
unmistakable.” (Quoting Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 257, 455 A.2d 955 (1983)).  See
In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576-77, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983) (“even a
change in the phraseology of a statute by a codification will not ordinarily modify the law
unless the change is so material that the intention of the General Assembly to modify the law
14
appears unmistakably from the language of the Code”).  The provision requiring
dissemination of a list of Blind Industries’ supplies and services was also carried over, but
in a different section, § 14-105.    As revised, it provided:
“Every 6 months, Blind Industries and Services of Maryland shall:
  “(1) revise the list of supplies and services that it provides; and 
  “(2) send the list to the Secretary of General Services and each person        
  responsible for buying supplies or services for the State or a State aided or 
  controlled entity.”
As in the case of the preference, the Revisor’s Notes to that section indicated that it was not
intended as a substantive change.
This history supports the appellee’s and the Circuit Court’s construction of the
preference.   It confirms that when the preference was given, it applied only to those products
and services that Blind Industries actually supplied and which the Division of Correction did
not.    There was absolutely no indication or suggestion in the language of the statute that
the preference extended to, or was intended to cover, products and services that Blind
Industries could have - had the ability to supply - , but did not, in fact, supply.    In fact, the
opposite is the case.    By requiring the appellant to send a list of the supplies and services
that it supplies or provides to the affected State agencies and entities, the Legislature clearly
intended, if not manufacture, that the appellant actually supply or provide the supplies or
services to which the preference relates.    Had the Legislature intended the preference to
apply to supplies and services that the appellant had the ability to provide, but did not then
provide, it undoubtedly would have said so; the statute very easily could have included the
7Boise-Cascade Office Products, the present contract holder.
15
phrase, “or may in the future provide.”   Indeed, that is the effect of the construction for
which the appellant is arguing.
The appellant emphasizes that, if awarded the Statewide Office Supply contract, it
“would simply be doing precisely what Boise[7] was doing,” acting as a distributor or a
retailer.    There is, however, a rather significant difference.    To get the contract,  Boise had
to submit to competitive bidding.    If the appellant is correct, it is not subjected to
competitive bidding.    A much different situation is presented if there were no preference
at issue in this case.     The appellant certainly is free to broker the contract so long as it is
competing competitively.   
Whatever the meaning of COMAR 21.11.05.02.C. and however it applies to the case
sub judice, the interpretation of the preference that the appellant urges will have, as the
appellee argues, an adverse impact on the goals of the procurement laws.    If the appellant
is correct, then the wholesaler from whom it procures the supplies and services for delivery
to the end-user will receive the benefit of the preference by not having to engage in
competitive bidding, in clear contradiction, at the very least, of the spirit of the procurement
law.  Given the goals of that law, it is inconceivable that that could have been the
Legislature’s intent. 
Moreover, the implications of such an interpretation are illogical and far-reaching.
The appellee insightfully points out:
16
“If Blind Industries’ theory that any blind employment justifies giving a
preference is taken to its logical conclusion, its weakness becomes even
clearer.   Blind Industries could employ a single blind individual to take orders
from State buyers for construction services, cars, highways, bridges, or
gasoline, relay the orders to an appropriate private company, and receive a
preference because it ‘provides,’ i.e. procures, the goods or services.   This
interpretation is inconsistent with the purposes of the General Procurement
Law set forth in SFP §11-201, of which Blind Industries’ preference is a part,
to foster broad-based competition, promote integrity, and get maximum value
from the State’s dollars.   See SFP § 11-201 (b) (procurement law “shall be
construed liberally and applied to promote the purposes and policies
enumerated in subsection (a) of this section”) ....” 
We hold that the § 14-103 preference does not apply in this case, where the appellant,
though entitled to a preference for supplies or services it provides, does not actually or
ordinarily provide the supplies and services it offers to provide and proposes to do so by
procuring them as a broker or retailer and transferring them to the purchaser. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.