Case Title: Broyles v. Broyles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Broyles v. Broyles1985 WY 201711 P.2d 1119Case Number: 84-290Decided: 12/17/1985SHANNON LOU BROYLES, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

DANIEL ROBERT BROYLES, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHANNON LOU BROYLES, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

DANIEL ROBERT BROYLES, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
James L. Edwards 
of Sheehan, Stevens & Sansonetti, Gillette, for appellant.

Franklin J. 
Smith of Pattno-Smith and Associates, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, 
C.J., and ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Shannon Broyles appeals 
from an order of the district court terminating appellee Daniel Broyles' duty to 
provide child support pursuant to the parties' divorce decree and finding her 
liable for $10,300 in damages for the failure to abide by the property 
settlement incorporated into the decree. The district court also found that 
appellee owed $10,300 for past-due child support and entered judgment for that 
amount in favor of appellant. The court determined that the damages award offset 
the judgment for child support arrearages and denied recovery to both 
parties.

[¶2.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues for review:

"I. Did plaintiff 
[appellee] present sufficient evidence of his right to or the value of the 
property claimed to sustain an award of $10,300.00 against 
Appellant?

"II. Did the judge err in 
considering sentimental value as part of the award against 
Appellant?

"III. Did the trial judge 
err in setting off the judgment for child support against the judgment for the 
value of the personal property which the court deemed Appellant failed to return 
to the Appellee?

"IV. Did the judge err in 
modifying the divorce decree and property settlement agreement so as to strike 
all further requirements for child support and insurance 
coverage?

"V. Did the judge err in 
emancipating the child from Appellee?

"VI. Did the judge abuse 
his discretion in failing to award attorney's fees to 
Appellant?"

[¶3.]     Appellee raises an 
additional issue:

"[Whether] [t]he trial 
Court has the power, and duty when necessary, under both its equitable powers 
and Wyoming Statute § 20-2-116 (1977),[1] to refuse to assess child support 
arrearages * * *." 

[¶4.]     We will reverse those 
portions of the judgment which permit a setoff against the child support 
deficiency and which terminate appellee's duty to provide future child support. 
We will affirm the district court's finding of liability for appellant's 
violation of the parties' property agreement, but will remand for a hearing on 
the issue of damages. We will affirm the court's denial of attorney's fees. We 
will not address the issue raised by appellee since he has not filed a 
cross-appeal to this court.

FACTS

[¶5.]     Appellant and appellee 
were divorced from each other in July, 1980. The divorce decree incorporated the 
parties' property settlement and child-custody agreement, which agreement 
awarded appellant custody of the parties' minor child, subject to specified 
visitation rights in appellee. The agreement obligated appellee to pay child 
support of $200 per month, with increments over a period of four years to $275 
per month. Each party retained his clothing and personal effects under the 
property settlement.

[¶6.]     In the months following 
the entry of the divorce decree, both parties filed numerous motions seeking to 
enforce the child support, visitation and property provisions of the decree. 
Despite court orders compelling compliance with the decree, the parties 
continued to disregard its requirements. On May 2, 1984, appellant moved the 
court to order appellee to show cause why he had not contributed to the support 
of his child since April, 1981. In his answer, appellee admitted the alleged 
deficiencies in child support, but raised, as an affirmative defense, the 
refusal of appellant to allow him to exercise his visitation rights. In 
addition, appellee moved the court to hold appellant in contempt for her refusal 
to abide by the visitation and property provisions of the divorce decree. 
Appellee also filed a motion to modify the decree so as to grant him custody of 
his daughter or, alternatively, to suspend his child-support obligation during 
those times that appellant refused to permit visitation.

[¶7.]     At the hearing, 
appellee testified that he had not been permitted to visit his daughter for more 
than three years and, for that reason, he had failed to make child-support 
payments amounting to $10,300. The daughter, who was 17 years old at the time of 
the hearing, testified that she did not wish to visit her father and that she, 
not her mother, had made that decision.

[¶8.]     In support of his claim 
that appellant had violated the property-settlement agreement, appellee 
submitted a list of items, including clothing, tools, a saddle, a snow-machine, 
a diamond ring, and savings bonds, that appellant had not released to him after 
the divorce. He valued the ring at $3,000, the snowmachine at $1,700, and the 
bonds at $175. He also testified that he had paid obligations of appellant 
totaling $1,009 and that she had appropriated his share, $470, of their 1979 
federal income tax refund.

[¶9.]     Following the hearing, 
the court ruled that it had no authority to forgive the deficiency in child 
support by reason of the denial of visitation rights and entered judgment 
against appellee for $10,300. The court determined that appellant had violated 
the property-settlement agreement by retaining property awarded to appellee and 
by failing to pay her obligations. The court noted the difficulty in assigning a 
value to some of the unreturned property, but concluded that appellee should 
have judgment in the sum of $10,300. In entering these monetary judgments, the 
court ruled

"[t]hat equity demands 
the above-mentioned off-setting judgments and neither party owes the other 
anything as of this date."

[¶10.]  The court further determined that the 
daughter had emancipated herself from her father and that appellant had the 
financial resources to care for her. Accordingly, the court modified the divorce 
decree to terminate appellee's obligation to support his daughter in the future. 
Finally, the court ruled that the parties should pay their respective attorney's 
fees and costs.

ISSUES PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT

[¶11.]  Without taking a cross-appeal to this 
court, appellee raises a claim rejected by the district court: The denial of 
visitation rights is a valid defense to an action for child-support 
arrearages.

[¶12.]  The trial court entered judgment in 
appellant's favor for $10,300 in past-due child support, but permitted appellee 
to off-set the full amount of the deficiency. Appellee urges this court to 
affirm the effective denial of recovery for arrearages on the ground that 
appellant's refusal to permit visitation with the child excused his support 
obligations.

[¶13.]  The rules are well settled concerning 
matters which an appellee properly may raise in response to an appeal taken by 
the adverse party. An appellee need not cross-appeal to assert an alternative 
theory, offered to and rejected by the district court, which would support the 
district court's ultimate disposition of the case. First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. Trans 
Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., Wyo., 602 P.2d 1219 (1979). Conversely, to 
attack the effect of the judgment, an appellee must perfect a cross-appeal to 
this court. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo., 551 P.2d 687 (1976). We said in Wyoming 
State Treasurer, 551 P.2d at 693:

"The controlling rule has 
been settled for many years. In United States v. American Railway Express Co., 1924, 
265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S. Ct. 560, 564, 68 L. Ed. 1087, 1093, it was said:

"`* * * [A] party who 
does not appeal from a final decree of the trial court cannot be heard in 
opposition thereto when the case is brought here by the appeal of the adverse 
party. In other words, the appellee may not attack the decree with a view either 
to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his 
adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the 
decree with respect to a matter not dealt with below. * * 
*'

"In summary, a 
non-appealing party may not attack the ultimate effect of the judgment below but 
may support it by any matter appearing in the record. The rejection of a 
contention, argument or theory in support of a claim does not reject the final 
upholding of the claim itself."

[¶14.]  In the case at bar, the trial court 
rejected appellee's claim that the denial of visitation excused his support 
obligation and that no judgment for arrearages should enter against him. 
Appellee now seeks to alter the effect of the judgment by asking this court to 
reverse the district court's ruling that appellant established her claim to 
$10,300 for past child support. Appellee's contention, if adopted by this court, 
would reduce appellant's rights under the judgment while retaining his own right 
to recover damages. Such an issue can be raised only by a cross-appeal. Appellee 
has not perfected an appeal to this court and, therefore, we will not address 
whether the denial of visitation privileges is a defense to an action for 
child-support arrearages.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE AWARD FOR VIOLATION OF THE PROPERTY 
AGREEMENT

[¶15.]  Appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellee had a right to 
the claimed personal property or that the value of the property justified a 
damages award of $10,300. When the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
judgment is at issue, we have a duty to examine the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prevailing party and to resolve all conflicts in the testimony 
and exhibits in his favor. True v. 
Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 991, 996 (1978). We will not 
set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Id. However, 
findings of fact which are not supported by the evidence, contrary to the 
evidence, or against the great weight of evidence cannot stand. Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 
594 P.2d 972 (1979).

[¶16.]  At the hearing in the instant case, 
appellee introduced into evidence a list of 28 items of property which he 
testified had not been released to him pursuant to the terms of the divorce 
decree. Appellee identified these items as his clothing or other personal 
effects, some of which were gifts to him or nonmarital 
property.

[¶17.]  Appellant concedes that appellee had the 
right to possess his "clothing and personal effects" under the terms of the 
divorce decree. Appellant takes the position, however, that the court erred in 
treating all of the claimed property as appellee's "personal effects." According 
to appellant, the following items are more properly characterized as "household 
goods, appliances and furnishings" or "tack and equipment," which categories of 
property the decree awarded to appellant: tools, antique bookcase, handyman 
jack, coffee-pot collection, dictionary, bottle collection, records and tapes, 
campstove and lantern, dining table and chairs, wheelbarrow, and 
snowmobile.

[¶18.]  We find, however, that the evidence, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to appellee, is sufficient to support the trial 
court's treatment of the property in question as the personal effects of 
appellee. Appellee testified that all of the property specified in his exhibit 
were "personal items" belonging to him. He established that he inherited the 
tools from his grandfather and that he owned the jack and camping equipment 
prior to the marriage. He testified that his grandmother loaned the parties the 
dining table and chairs. Under these circumstances we refuse to substitute our 
view of the facts for that of the trial court so as to hold that particular 
pieces of property were not the "personal effects" of 
appellee.

[¶19.]  We turn next to the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the damages award of $10,300. The measure 
of damages for the loss or conversion of personal property is the fair market 
value of the property or, in the case of goods having no ascertainable market 
value, the actual economic value to the owner. Shikany v. Salt Creek Transportation 
Co., 48 Wyo. 190, 45 P.2d 645 (1935). See also Frost v. Eggeman, Wyo., 638 P.2d 141 (1981); Chittim v. Armco Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 407 P.2d 1015 (1965). Generally, a 
claimant may not recover for the sentimental or fanciful value placed on lost 
property such as photographs, portraits and heirlooms. Shikany v. Salt Creek Transportation 
Co., supra; 4 Minzer, Damages in Tort Actions, §§ 37.21[2] and 37.22[2], pp. 
37-54 through 37-56, 37-59 through 37-61 (1985). The burden of proving the value 
of lost property rests on the party seeking recovery and may be satisfied 
through the opinion testimony of the owner, who is presumed to have a 
specialized knowledge of the property. Ely v. Kirk, Wyo., 707 P.2d 706 
(1985); Shikany v. Salt Creek 
Transportation Co., supra; Minzer, Damages in Tort Actions, supra, § 37.01, 
pp. 37-5 through 37-18.

[¶20.]  At the hearing in the instant case, the 
court permitted appellee to give his opinion as to the value of the claimed 
property. He estimated that the diamond ring had a market value of $3,000 and 
the snowmachine a value of $1,700. He testified that no amount of money could 
replace his school yearbooks and collection of photographs. He did not assign a 
value to the other items of personal property in question. He testified that 
appellant had retained $645 in proceeds from his savings bonds and federal 
income tax refund. He testified that he had paid appellant's debts amounting to 
$1,009 and offered, in support of this claim, a notice of deficiency to the 
parties from the Internal Revenue Service.

[¶21.]  This evidence, viewed in a light most 
favorable to appellee, establishes a loss of $6,354 to appellee for property and 
funds retained by appellant in violation of the divorce decree and for 
appellee's payment of appellant's obligations. No evidence in the record 
supports the district court's damages award of $10,300. Although appellee 
itemized, with some specificity, the personal property that he failed to receive 
after the divorce, he offered no evidence as to the value of most of this 
property. The finder of fact cannot be permitted to speculate concerning the 
value of property. Ely v. Kirk, 
supra. Nor can the court allow recovery for the sentimental value attached to 
photographs and yearbooks. Shikany v. 
Salt Creek Transportation Co., supra. Since the evidence is insufficient to 
support the damages awarded to appellee by the district court, we will remand 
this case for a new hearing on the question of damages.

SETOFF

[¶22.]  Appellant challenges the propriety of the 
trial court's decision to offset the damages award against the judgment for 
child-support arrearages. Appellant contends that this decision permits a 
dispute between the former spouses to adversely affect the independent rights of 
the child to support.

[¶23.]  While we have not addressed this issue 
previously, courts in other jurisdictions generally have held that the special 
nature of child-support payments precludes their reduction by way of setoff, at 
least where the offsetting funds were not directed to the exclusive benefit of 
the child. Smith v. Rabago, Tex. 
App., 672 S.W.2d 38 (1984); Hinton v. Reynolds, Fla.App., 442 So. 2d 1111 (1983); Gaines v. Gaines, 
Ky.App., 566 S.W.2d 814 (1978). In Smith 
v. Rabago, supra, the trial judge had denied recovery to either party where 
the father owed $7,000 in past child support and the mother had derived $7,000 
in benefits during her wrongful possession of the real property awarded to the 
father by the divorce decree. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, finding this 
setoff between child-support arrearages and imputed rentals to be 
improper:

"* * * [W]e find that the 
offset here was improper. The judge offset child support, a payment which is exclusively for the benefit of the 
child, against rentals, which benefitted the mother, child, and anyone else 
residing on the property. Because of the special nature of child support 
payments, we cannot say that the demands of appellant and appellee were mutual. 
Further, the integrity of enforcement procedures for child support awards should 
not be compromised by money judgment offsets unless such offsets are exclusively 
applicable to the support of the child." 672 S.W.2d  at 40.

[¶24.]  In Gaines v. Gaines, supra, the trial court 
had allowed the father to offset his support obligations by the amount that he 
had paid to reduce the mother's debts. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found this 
procedure inconsistent with the rights and welfare of the 
child:

"* * * Professor 
Petrilli, in his volume on Kentucky Family Law (§ 27.4 at 492) maintains that 
the right of support belongs to the child, and we can conceive of no reason why 
a portion of a debt of one of the parents should be allowed as a set-off against 
those sustenance payments. Our conclusion finds support in the logic of the 
California 
courts in Williams v. Williams, 8 Cal. App. 3d 636, 87 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1970), when it denied a husband's set-off of 
his wife's portion of the net deficit resulting from the operation of a 
community property apartment house against child support payments, for the 
reason that such support was not an ordinary debt but rather a court-imposed 
parental duty, and for further reason that the obligation resulting from the 
deficit was that of the wife and not the child's. This jurisdiction has always 
placed the immediate welfare of the offspring first regardless of whatever 
equitable adjustments should be made between the parents, [citation] and 
accordingly, we will reverse the trial court's judgment in this respect." 566 S.W.2d  at 818.

[¶25.]  We find the reasoning in these decisions 
persuasive and compatible with our long-standing position that the welfare of 
the child is a primary concern in cases involving support payments. Manners v. Manners, Wyo., 706 P.2d 671 (1985); Rose v. Rose, Wyo., 
576 P.2d 458 (1978). Child support payments are court-imposed obligations based 
on the parent's ability to pay and designed to meet the needs of the children of 
the marriage. Manners v. Manners, supra; § 20-2-113(a).2 The trial court in the instant case 
allowed appellee to offset his past-due support obligation by the amount of 
damages sustained as a result of appellant's violation of the parties' property 
agreement. Nothing in the record suggests that appellee's property, wrongfully 
retained by appellant, was used for the exclusive benefit of the child, nor were 
the debts which appellee paid those of the child. The setoff between judgments 
impaired the child's right to support and was improper. Therefore, we reverse 
the trial court in this respect.

FUTURE CHILD 
SUPPORT

[¶26.]  The district court modified the parties' 
divorce decree to eliminate all further obligation on the part of appellee to 
support his daughter or to maintain life insurance policies for her benefit. The 
court based its decision on its findings that the child had emancipated herself 
from her father and that appellant had adequate resources to support 
her:

"That by the actions of 
[the daughter], together with the fact that she is 17 years old in her senior 
year of high school and her testimony concerning her father and that she has no 
desire to see him or visit with him in any manner the Court finds that [she] has 
emancipated herself from her father and her mother has the resources to take 
care of her * * *."

The divorce 
decree expressly authorizes the termination of support payments upon the child's 
emancipation.

[¶27.]  This court in previous decisions has 
considered grounds other than emancipation for the modification of a divorce 
decree with respect to child support. We have held that the party seeking 
modification must demonstrate a material or substantial change in circumstances 
since the entry of the decree. Manners v. 
Manners, supra; Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 156 (1981). In determining the existence of a change in circumstances, 
the trial court must consider the resources of the parents, the needs of the 
child, and all other surrounding conditions. Mentock v. Mentock, 
supra. The welfare of the child is a primary concern, and the obligation of 
support is a continuing one. Rose v. 
Rose, supra. In deciding the propriety of the decree modification in the 
case at bar, we will address the issue of the child's emancipation as well as 
the issue of a material or substantial change in 
circumstances.

Emancipation

[¶28.]  The divorce decree in the instant case 
imposes a continuing duty of support upon appellee during his daughter's 
formative years:

"* * * Child support 
payments * * * shall continue until the child shall reach the age of majority, 
marry or otherwise become emancipated. In the event that said minor child shall 
choose to go to an institution of higher learning after completion of her high 
school education, then said child support payments shall continue for so long as 
said minor child is enrolled as a full time student and until said child shall 
reach the age of 23 years."

The provision 
that a child's emancipation terminates a parent's support obligation is 
frequently found in decrees involving the custody and maintenance of minor 
children. Used in this context, emancipation refers not to the child's 
unwillingness to visit the noncustodial parent, but to the child's establishment 
as a self-supporting individual, independent of parental control. Straver v. Straver, 26 N.J. Misc. 218, 
59 A.2d 39 (1948). When a child still has a need for care, custody and 
maintenance, the child is not emancipated and the duty to provide support 
continues. Kamp v. Kamp, 
Wyo., 640 P.2d 48, 53 (1982) (Rooney, J., specially 
concurring, with whom Raper, J., joins).

[¶29.]  The trial court in the case at bar 
declared the child emancipated because she is a senior in high school and 
refuses to visit her father. Nothing in the record suggests that the child is 
self-supporting or that she is outside of the control of the custodial parent. 
The evidence, in fact, supports a contrary conclusion, as indicated by the 
court's finding that the mother has the necessary resources to care for her 
daughter. Under these circumstances the child is not emancipated as contemplated 
by the divorce decree, and appellant's support obligation 
continues.

Substantial Change in 
Circumstances

[¶30.]  While many older cases hold to the 
contrary, the modern view is that the denial of visitation rights by the 
custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in circumstances 
which justifies the reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's 
support obligation. Hester v. Hester, Okla., 663 P.2d 727 (1983); Gruber v. Wallner, 
198 Colo. 235, 598 P.2d 135 (1979); Hester v. Hester, 59 Tenn. App. 613, 443 S.W.2d 28 (1968). The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hester v. Hester, supra, 663 P.2d 727, 
expressly overruled Irby v. Irby, 
Okla.App., 629 P.2d 813 (1981), in which the court of appeals had held that the 
trial court could terminate child support payments if the custodial parent 
unjustifiably refused to honor the paying parent's right to visit. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court reasoned:

"* * * The welfare of the 
child is paramount, and the duty of a non-custodial parent to support his or her 
child is contingent upon the needs of the children. It is not dependent upon the 
opportunity of the parents to exercise visitation privileges. Whether the 
children refuse to see the non-custodial parent, either on their own volition or 
as a result of the explicit or implicit urging of the custodial parent, there is 
no justification in subjecting the children to possible hardship because of the 
interference of the custodial parent. A minor child cannot waive the right to 
support and refusal of the child to visit the non-custodial parent does not 
release the parent from the obligation to make support payments pursuant to the 
decree of divorce. The duties of support and visitation are not interdependent 
and should be separately enforced.

"Visitation is primarily 
for the benefit of the child, and ordinarily a support order must be paid even 
if the custodial parent wrongfully denies the non-custodial parent's right to 
visitation. The custodial parent's misconduct cannot destroy the child's right 
to support, nor may child support payments be used as a weapon to force a 
child's visitation with a non-custodial parent. The duty to support one's minor 
child is a continuing obligation. Entitlement to child support is not contingent 
upon visitation rights." 663 P.2d  at 728-729.

[¶31.]  In Gruber v. Wallner, supra, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that violations of visitation provisions in a custody decree 
cannot relieve a parent of his support obligation. The court relied on the 
following analysis found in its companion case of County of Clearwater, Minnesota v. 
Petrash, 198 Colo. 231, 598 P.2d 138, 139-140 (1979):

"We are of the opinion 
that the better reasoned view is that a child's right to support is unaffected 
by the misconduct of his parents. `Certainly the dissensions of the parents 
shall not deprive their children of the right to support commensurate with the 
(parents') means and station in life.' McQuade v. McQuade, [144 Colo. 11, 354 P.2d 597 
(1960)]. When matters concerning children appear before the courts, the welfare 
and best interests of the child are of paramount importance. [Citations.] A 
parent's right to the company and affection of his child is of great value, Reiter v. Reiter, 225 Ark. 157, 278 S.W.2d 644 (1955), and an aggrieved parent is not without remedies to ensure 
compliance with custody orders. [Citations.] But when a child is in need of 
support, questions relating to custody are immaterial. Reiter v. Reiter, 
supra."

[¶32.]  While we have not considered previously 
the identical issue before us in the present case, we have reversed a district 
court order suspending the father's future support obligations until the mother 
complied with the custody provisions of the divorce decree. In Wardle v. Wardle, Wyo., 
464 P.2d 854 (1970), the mother had indicated her willingness to permit the 
children to visit their father during the summer months as required by the 
decree. Nevertheless, the trial court suspended the father's obligation to make 
support payments until the end of the summer, approximately eight months after 
the hearing. Our analysis in that case is instructive concerning the rights of 
the child when questions arise involving support 
obligations:

"We think the court was 
not warranted in forgiving future payments. To do so was to penalize the 
children. Their need was apparent from the testimony and was not in fact denied. 
* * *

"Apparently the trial 
court adopted the theory that the mother could not purge her contempt until 
another summer came and the mother permitted the children to be with their 
father. It may be that the mother would not purge her contempt until she was 
able to show what her future conduct would be. But she should not be punished by 
taking present and future support from the children. * *

* * * * * 
*

"If it is deemed 
necessary, it would be proper for the court to reorder plaintiff to abide by the 
custody provisions of the original decree, consideration being given to the need 
or lack of need for a bond for plaintiff's compliance. In the event either party 
hereafter fails to abide by the court's orders, appropriate action can be taken 
by the court upon proper application by the aggrieved party. This applies both 
to a failure on the part of the husband to make support payments and to a 
failure on the part of the wife to abide by provisions of the decree relating to 
custody." 464 P.2d  at 857-858.

[¶33.]  In light of the foregoing authority from 
this court and other jurisdictions, we hold that the denial of visitation rights 
by either the custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in 
circumstances justifying the reduction or termination of the noncustodial 
parent's support obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability 
to pay are not related to questions concerning visitation. The welfare of the 
child is a primary concern, and the duty of a noncustodial parent to support his 
or her child cannot depend on that parent's opportunity to exercise visitation 
rights.

[¶34.]  This conclusion is supported by the 
intent of the legislature as reflected in its adoption of the Revised Uniform 
Recriprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), §§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138, 
W.S. 1977, in 1973. Section 20-4-123, W.S. 1977, of that Act 
provides:

"In any hearing for the 
civil enforcement of this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] the court is 
governed by the rules of evidence applicable in a civil court action in the 
district court. If the action is based on a support order issued by another 
court, a certified copy of the order shall be received as evidence of the duty 
of support, subject only to defenses available to an obligor with respect to 
paternity or to a defendant in an action or a proceeding to enforce a foreign 
money judgment. The determination or 
enforcement of a duty of support owed to one (1) obligee is unaffected by any 
interference by another obligee with rights of custody or visitation granted by 
a court." (Emphasis added.)

Although this 
statute does not control the instant action by appellee to modify the divorce 
decree, the statute's policy with respect to the independent nature of support 
and visitation duties cannot be ignored. The order of the district court 
modifying the divorce decree so as to terminate appellee's obligation to provide 
child support and insurance protection is reversed.

ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

[¶35.]  Appellant contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees pursuant to § 
20-2-111, W.S. 1977. That statute provides in part:

"In every action brought 
for divorce, the court may require either party to pay any sum necessary to 
enable the other to carry on or defend the action * * *."

This language 
has been interpreted as authorizing the reimbursement of a party's attorney's 
fees in proceedings to modify or enforce divorce decrees, as well as in original 
actions for divorce. Ulrich v. Ulrich, Wyo., 
366 P.2d 999 (1961). The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
award fees pursuant to this statutory provision. Karns v. Karns, Wyo., 511 P.2d 955 (1973); Book v. Book, 59 
Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546, 167 A.L.R. 352 (1943).

[¶36.]  Nothing in the record in this case 
establishes that appellant needed the allowance of attorney's fees to enable her 
to carry on the action to enforce the decree or to defend appellee's action to 
modify the decree. She has a master's degree in special education and is 
employed as an educational diagnostician for the CampbellCountySchool 
District. Under these circumstances, we refuse to 
hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's 
attorney's fees under § 20-2-111, supra.

[¶37.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings on the issue of the damages sustained by 
appellee.

CARDINE and ROONEY, JJ., both filed specially 
concurring opinions.

1 Section 20-2-116, W.S. 
1977, authorizes judicial modification of the support provisions of a divorce 
decree:

"After a decree for 
alimony or other allowance for a party or children and after a decree for the 
appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of a party 
or children, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either of the 
parties, revise and alter the decree respecting the amount of the alimony or 
allowance or the payment thereof and respecting the appropriation and payment of 
the principal and income of the property so held in trust and may make any 
decree respecting any of the matters which the court might have made in the 
original action."

2 Section 20-2-113(a) 
provides:

"In granting a divorce or 
annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as 
appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. * * * 
On the petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires."

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶38.]  Initially I was of the opinion that 
appellee's judgment on his counterclaim should be reduced to the amount he had 
proven, or $6,354. It was his burden to prove his damages. If he failed to prove 
more than that amount, the award should be reduced accordingly. Upon further 
consideration, however, I find myself in agreement with Justice Rooney's 
specially concurring opinion, i.e. that the remand should provide that the 
property listed in Exhibit 4 should be ordered returned to appellee, and, if it 
cannot be returned, that appellee recover whatever amount he can prove as its 
fair and reasonable value.

[¶39.]  My greatest concern with the majority 
opinion here is that it holds that if Mr. Broyles' daughter is unemancipated, 
his obligation of support continues irrespective of all other considerations. 
This court has never decided whether a noncustodial parent can be relieved of 
his support obligation because a child refuses the right of visitation. Other 
courts have generally held that the two factors which should be considered in 
determining whether a noncustodial parent should be relieved of the support 
obligation are:

1. Whether it is the 
custodial parent who is preventing the visitation or is it the child alone 
refusing such visitation?

2. Whether the custodial 
parent can support the child if the noncustodial parent is relieved of the 
support obligation.

It is uniformly 
held that the noncustodial parent will not be relieved of his obligation of 
support if the custodial parent is unable alone to properly support an 
unemancipated child. Reiter v. 
Reiter, 225 Ark. 157, 278 S.W.2d 644 (1955). Instances in 
which the noncustodial parent has been relieved of the support obligation have 
been those in which the custodial parent could provide sufficient support for 
the unemancipated minor. Cooper v. 
Cooper, 59 Ill. App.3d 457, 16 Ill.Dec. 818, 375 N.E.2d 925 (1978); Barela v. Barela, 91 N.M. 
686, 579 P.2d 1253 (1978); Benum v. 
Benum, 116 R.I. 641, 360 A.2d 108 (1976). In Benum, the court, after noting that 
suspension of support payments would be proper only if the needs of the child 
were otherwise provided for, suspended support payments for a 14-year-old child 
in the custody of the mother, stating: 

"[I]t is within the 
judicial discretion of the court to suspend payments ordered for support of a 
minor child where said child refuses to comply with visitation rights granted to 
a father under a court decree * * *." 360 A.2d  at 110.

See also Snellings v. Snellings, 272 Ala. 254, 130 So. 2d 363 
(1961), holding the suspension of support payments under similar circumstances 
to be within the discretion of the trial court. In Barbara "M" v. Harry "M", 117 Misc.2d 
142, 458 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1982), emphasizing the son's age and the father's limited 
financial means, the court held that a 19-year-old student's refusal to visit 
with his father justified the termination of that father's support 
obligation.

I suggest the 
better rule to be that a noncustodial parent must continue support payments 
unless,

1. the custodial parent 
is capable of providing support for the unemancipated minor child, 
and

2. the custodial parent 
is at fault or at least substantially involved in the unemancipated minor's 
refusal to afford visitation rights to the noncustodial 
parent.

There is obvious 
merit in imposing sanctions upon a custodial parent who interferes with the 
right of visitation, for such sanctions may result in the noncustodial parent 
being afforded an opportunity to see and know and visit with the child. If, 
however, the custodial parent does not interfere with visitation but the child 
alone determines that he will not visit the noncustodial parent, then not much 
is achieved by employing the suspension-of-payment sanction, except perhaps to 
punish the child. The rights of the parent and the child must coexist. If the 
child, of his own volition, determines not to visit the noncustodial parent, it 
seems that the child may have a right to those feelings. Neither the child nor 
the custodial parent should be punished for that choice. As the Michigan Court 
of Appeals said in Henshaw v. 
Henshaw, 83 Mich. App. 68, 268 N.W.2d 289, 291 (1978):

"Affection is bestowed, 
not bought. Family relations cannot be regulated by the clock. Obviously, any 
coerced companionship the defendant might compel by a cutoff of child support 
would be utterly devoid of the sentiments of filial love and respect whose 
encouragement furnished the only admissible ground for visitation in the first 
place."

[¶40.]  In this case the trial court might have 
found that if the father's obligations for support were terminated, the child 
would be adequately provided for by the mother who earned $29,000 in 1984. It 
was clear, however, from the record that the 17-year-old daughter of the parties 
was an unemancipated minor child and that she alone was responsible for her 
refusal to visit with her father. She testified that she was afraid of her 
father because he had beaten her mother and that she did not wish to visit her 
father because he had not spent time with her during the marriage when the 
parties were living together. Finally, the record in the case at bar indicates 
that the custodial parent did not in any way interfere or refuse appellee's 
right of visitation with his daughter.

[¶41.]  For the reasons stated, I concur in the 
opinion of the court.

ROONEY, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶42.]  I only add to the majority opinion my 
belief that the more specific determination of that designated as personal 
effects in the settlement agreement and in the decree should result in a 
direction to deliver to appellee the items determined to be properly those of 
appellee with the award of damages being restricted to the value of that which 
is no longer available for delivery.