Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Brooke

Citation: 374 Md. 155

Docket Number: 36ag/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-02-003874
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 36
September Term, 2002
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
JOHN A. BROOKE
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Wilner and Harrell, JJ., dissent
Filed:   April 11, 2003
*Judge Eldridge participated in the hearing
      of the case but did not participate either in     
      the conference in regard to its decision or in  
   the adoption of the opinion.         
1Rule 1.8 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person
related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift
from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where:
(1) the client is related to the donee; or
(2) the client is represented by independent counsel in
connection with the gift.”
2Rule 5.3 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“With respect to a non-lawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
(c): a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be
a violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; . . .”
3Rule 8.4 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a): violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another; . . .
(d): engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition
with this Court for disciplinary action against respondent alleging violations of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Commission charged respondent with violating Rules
1.8(c) (Conflict of Interest, Prohibited Transactions),1 5.3(c) (Responsibilities Regarding
Non-lawyer Assistants),2 and 8.4 (Misconduct).3  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we
referred the matter to Judge Joseph P. McCurdy, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
to make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.  
Judge McCurdy held an evidentiary hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
Petitioner was represented by Bar Counsel and respondent was represented by counsel.  In
response to the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, respondent filed an Answer,
4At the evidentiary hearing, respondent conceded that the hearing judge had no
authority to dismiss the petition.  See Maryland Rule 16-757.
5Judge McCurdy also found that respondent violated Rule 8.4, but that the
violation merged with the violation of Rule 1.8(c).
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setting forth a series of defenses thereto and a prayer that the hearing court dismiss the
petition.4  Judge McCurdy noted that this matter concerns the fact that respondent was named
Personal Representative and sole legatee in the Last Will of John C. Sherpinski, Sr., and the
allegation of the Attorney Grievance Commission that respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct.  The hearing judge noted that there were two issues presented:  (1)
Was there an attorney-client relationship existing between respondent and the testator with
respect to the preparation of the testator’s Last Will and Testament; and (2) If there was such
a relationship, did respondent violate one or more of the Rules as alleged by Bar Counsel?
Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge McCurdy concluded that respondent had violated
Rule 1.8(c).5
I.
In a memorandum opinion dated November 21, 2002, Judge McCurdy summarized
the events which lead to the present complaint:
“There is little disagreement regarding the facts of this
case.  It is undisputed that the [respondent] and the Testator had
been friends for about twenty years, that the [respondent] had
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performed other types of legal services for the Testator prior to
the will being prepared, and that the Testator spent a great deal
of time engaging in social visits to the [respondent’s] office.
The Testator had also visited the [respondent’s] home on the
eastern shore of Maryland and at some point kept a boat there.
All of the witnesses for the [respondent] testified that the
Testator never actually admitted to having children, but was
circumspect when asked if he had children.
“On September 8, 1999 the Testator visited the
[respondent] and told him that he was being admitted to
Maryland General Hospital the following day and that he
wanted to execute a will naming the [respondent] personal
representative and sole legatee.  [Respondent] also testified
however, that the Testator’s primary concern was that he be
buried at sea.  The [respondent] testified that he told the Testator
that he could write the will in his own hand, and advised the
Testator of the witness requirements under Maryland Law.  The
[respondent] testified that the Testator began to draft a written
document, but (apparently becoming frustrated) gave the
handwritten notes to the [respondent], and asked if he could
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have the [respondent’s] secretary prepare the will.
“The [respondent] testified that he was not aware of the
provision of Rule 1.8(c), which provides that a lawyer shall not
prepare an instrument giving the lawyer . . . any substantial gift
from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where: (1)
the client is related to the donee; or (2) the client is represented
by independent counsel in connection with the gift.
“Catherine Lastner testified that on September 8, 1999,
the Testator met with the [respondent], but that she was not
present and did not know what was discussed.  She testified that
the [respondent] asked her if she could prepare a will by the end
of the day and “dictated” that he, the [respondent], was to be
Personal Representative and sole legatee.  Ms. Lastner testified
that she knew how to prepare a simple will, and that she
prepared a will for the Testator using either a computer program
or by editing another will already on the computer.  She said that
she did not read the will to the Testator, that he said that he
would read it at a later date, and that he asked her to make a
copy and mail it to him in a plain envelope using Ms. Lastner’s
return address.  He also asked her if he could change the will.
-5-
Ms. Lastner testified that she placed the unexecuted will in an
envelope on [respondent’s] desk, and that the [respondent] was
not present at that time, having gone to his apartment on the
second floor of the building.
“Joseph Gorlaski testified that he knew the [respondent]
all his life, that he was a tenant of the [respondent], and that he
is employed at Maryland General Hospital.  He also knew the
Testator and frequently worked with him at Assisi House, which
is a charitable program operated by Saint Patrick’s Roman
Catholic Church in east Baltimore.  Mr. Gorlaski testified that
the [respondent] asked him to take something to Maryland
General Hospital for the Testator.  Mr. Gorlaski testified that he
took the will off the [respondent’s] desk and took it to the
Testator’s hospital room the next day.  Mr. Gorlaski testified
that the Testator signed the will in the presence of Mr. Gorlaski
and Melissa Moreno, R.N., who witnessed the will in the
presence of the Testator and each other.  Mr. Gorlaski testified
that he then took the executed will to his locker, took it with him
when he left work, and left it on M s. Lastner’s desk.”
Judge McCurdy included the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
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Findings of Fact
“Based on the evidence submitted to the court at the hearing including
the exhibits and the admissions of the [respondent], the court finds pursuant
to Rule 16-757(b) that the following facts averred in the Petition have been
proven by clear and convincing evidence:
“1.
That the [respondent] had performed legal
services for the Testator prior to the events which
gave rise to the complaint in this case.
“2.
That on September 8, 1999, the Testator visited
[respondent’s] office to discuss with the
[respondent], the Testator’s wishes to be buried at
sea and to prepare a will.  
“3.
That the [respondent] advised the Testator
regarding the elements of a valid will under
Maryland law. 
“4.
That the [respondent] directed Catherine Lastner
to write a will for the Testator naming the
[respondent] the personal representative and sole
heir.
“5.
That Catherine Lastner is a non-lawyer assistant
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of the [respondent].
“The court further finds pursuant to Rule 16-757(b) that the
[respondent] has proven the following facts by a preponderance of the
evidence.
“6.
That the [respondent] and the Testator were close
social friends of many years standing.
“7.
That the [respondent] was not aware of the
provisions of Rule 1.8.
“8.
That the [respondent] did not exercise undue
influence upon the Testator.  
“9.
That it was the unequivocal intent of the Testator
to name the [respondent] as his sole heir.  
Conclusions of Law
“The court makes the following conclusions of law:
“1.
That an attorney-client relationship existed
between the [respondent] and the Testator with
respect to the preparation of the [respondent’s]
Last Will and Testament.
“2.
That the [respondent] violated Rule 1.8 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
-8-
“3.
That the [respondent] did not violate Rule 5.3.
“4.
That the [respondent’s] violation of Rule 1.8 is
professional misconduct under Rule 8.4.
“5.
That the violations of Rule 1.8 and Rule 8.4
merge.
“Notwithstanding these findings, the Court does not find that the
[respondent’s] actions were taken with the intent to take advantage of a
confidential relationship or to unlawfully harm the Testator’s heirs at law and
that the [respondent] made extraordinary efforts to follow the Testator’s
wishes regarding his burial.  The appropriate sanction is, of course, for the
Court of Appeals to decide.  However, after careful consideration, it is this
Court’s opinion that a reprimand, which would be publicly and formally
recorded would be the appropriate sanction.”
Both parties have taken exceptions to these findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.
II.
 This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539-40, 810 A.2d 457, 474-75 (2002).
In the exercise of our obligation, we conduct an independent review of the record, accepting
the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance
6Respondent told the hearing court that the proffered evidence was admissible to
support his challenge as to the constitutionality of several rules relating to attorney
discipline.  The arguments, included as “defenses” in respondent’s Answer to Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action, were never fully developed before the hearing court, or
raised before this Court. 
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Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763 (2002).  The factual findings of the
hearing judge will not be disturbed if they are based on clear and convincing evidence.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002).  We
consider the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of law de novo.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002).
Bar Counsel excepts to Judge McCurdy’s findings of fact and proposed conclusions
of law and specifically to footnote one on the judge’s memorandum.  Bar Counsel maintains
that the hearing judge erred in admitting evidence of a disposition offered by Bar Counsel
during preliminary negotiations.
During the course of the hearing, Judge McCurdy engaged in a protracted discussion
with Bar Counsel and respondent’s counsel concerning the admissibility of evidence relating
to a proposed reprimand and the recommendation of the peer review panel.  In support of
respondent’s request for dismissal of the disciplinary petition, respondent offered evidence
of Bar Counsel’s proposed disposition and the peer review recommendation.6  Bar Counsel
objected, relying on Rule 16-737(d).  Bar Counsel’s objection was well taken and the hearing
judge sustained the objection.  Respondent asserted that the hearing court’s ruling would
preclude adequate review by this Court.  The hearing judge ruled subsequently that “for the
7Although the hearing judge used the term “admitted,” it is clear that he recognized
the evidence was inadmissible and he included it in the record solely to enable this Court
to review the issue.
-10-
purpose of completing the record, [the evidentiary materials] are admitted but will not be
considered by the Court in making findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
Judge McCurdy, in the memorandum issued along with the findings of fact and
proposed conclusions of law, included the following footnote:
“At the hearing, [respondent] attempted to introduce evidence
of a proposed reprimand by the Commission offered pursuant to
Maryland Rule 16-737(a) and rejected by the Commission
pursuant to Rule 16-737(c)(3).  This was admitted for the
purpose of preserving the record only as [respondent’s] Exhibit
No. 5.  The proceedings under Rule 16-737 were not read or
considered by the Court, nor was the fact that the proceedings
under Rule 16-737 occurred considered.
“Similarly, [respondent] attempted to introduce evidence
regarding a Peer Review process conducted pursuant to Rule 16-
743, which resulted in a recommendation which was not
accepted by the Commission.  This material is contained in
[respondent’s] Exhibit No. 6, which was admitted for the
purpose of preserving the record only, and was likewise not read
or considered by the court.”
Judge McCurdy was correct in not admitting evidence of the recommendation of the peer
review panel and the proposed disposition offered by Bar Counsel during preliminary
discussions.7  See Maryland Rule 16-737(d).  The Rule, precluding the admissibility of such
evidence for any purpose, reads as follows:
“Effect of rejection or disapproval.  If a reprimand is proposed
and rejected or if a reprimand to which the parties have
stipulated is not approved by the Commission, the proceeding
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shall resume as if no reprimand had been proposed, and neither
the fact that a reprimand was proposed, rejected, or not
approved nor the contents of the reprimand and any stipulation
may be admitted into evidence.”
By its plain language, the Rule explicitly precludes the admission into evidence of any
proposed reprimand that has been rejected or disapproved.  Rule 16-737 was crafted to
facilitate dispositions between the Commission and an attorney under investigation.  Such
proceedings are akin to plea negotiations in the criminal context, and are accorded similar
protection from discovery under the disciplinary rules.  See Maryland Rule 5-410
(Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements).  Henceforth, it should be
clear to all that any proposed disposition or proposed reprimand that was offered by Bar
Counsel is not admissible in evidence and should not be brought to the attention of the
hearing judge, either directly or indirectly. 
Respondent excepted to several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and proposed
conclusions of law.  Respondent first excepts to the hearing judge’s finding of fact that “the
Testator visited [respondent’s] office to discuss with the [respondent], the Testator’s wishes
to be buried at sea and to prepare a will.”  Respondent argues that the evidence does not
support the inference that Mr. Sherpinski visited his office “for the purpose of preparing a
will.”  He maintains that Mr. Sherpinski “simply happened to bring up those matters” while
visiting respondent’s office socially.  Respondent notes that such visits by Mr. Sherpinski
were common and that there had been no prior notice or arrangement for such a meeting.
Further, the evidence indicated that other, non-business activities were discussed during the
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visit.
It is undisputed that Mr. Sherpinski visited respondent’s office and, while there,
discussed with respondent the preparation of a will.  Further, respondent testified that Mr.
Sherpinski “was very insistent and very concerned” about making arrangements for his death,
that Mr. Sherpinski “really needed this stuff urgently,” and that “[Mr. Sherpinski] seemed
very, very concerned about the fact that he was going to the hospital [the following day].”
That testimony supports the inference that Mr. Sherpinski’s visit to respondent’s office was
more than a mere social call.  Judge McCurdy’s finding as to the purpose of the visit was
supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Accordingly, this exception is overruled.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that respondent “advised the
Testator regarding the elements of a valid will under Maryland law.”  Respondent
acknowledges that he told Mr. Sherpinski that he “could write the will by hand stating what
his wishes were and have it witnessed by two witnesses.”  Respondent argues that
“[c]onveyance of that minimal information” could simply have been the advice of a well-
meaning friend, rather than a lawyer.  The quantum of information does not determine
whether the advice was given in the capacity of a friend or as an attorney.  The fact that the
requirements of a valid will are minimal does not alter the fact that they were the subject of
respondent’s advice, nor does it render the topic non-legal.  Not all advice provided by an
attorney is of a complex nature.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that
Judge McCurdy’s finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Accordingly,
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this exception is overruled.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “the [respondent] directed
Catherine Lastner to write a will for the Testator naming the [respondent] the personal
representative and sole heir.”  Respondent objects to the hearing judge’s use of the word
“directed,” arguing that the evidence indicates only that respondent asked his secretary to
type up the will “if she had time.”  Respondent claims that his inquiry did not amount to a
directive.
Ms. Lastner, respondent’s secretary, testified as follows:
“A:  So Mr. Brooke called me in and he asked me if I could
possibly have the will ready for Mr. Sherpinski before the end
of the day so that it could be taken to him when he was sent to
the hospital.  At which time I replied, if it wasn’t too long.
“Q:  If it wasn’t too long?
“A:  Wasn’t too involved, you know.  And he told me, at that
time, that it would be just that Mr. Sherpinski simply wanted a
will drawn up naming him as PR and legatee.
*   *   *
“Q:  Okay.  And how did you know what to insert in the—as far
as the information specific to this will?
“A:  Mr. Brooke dictated to me the two things he needed.  I’m
used to working for lawyers.  I have worked for lawyers nine
years.  And if you’re working for them all the time, it’s gotten
to the point where dictation can simply be this is a deed and it’s
going to go from so and so to so and so.”
The testimony supports the inference that respondent directed his secretary to type up the
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will.  Respondent argues that Ms. Lastner later seemed to recant her use of the word
“dictated” during cross-examination.  To the degree the testimony is in conflict, it was up to
the hearing judge to assess the credibility of the evidence.  Judge McCurdy was not clearly
erroneous in accepting the witness’s initial statement.  Furthermore, whether respondent
“dictated” the terms of the will to be drafted, or merely “said” what was to be included, does
not alter the nature of the interaction between respondent and his secretary.  
Respondent also argues that the secretary was not asked to “write” the will, but simply
to type up a form under the direction of Mr. Sherpinski.  Ms. Lastner testified as follows:
“A:  I went in, I found something on the computer, what I call
a simple will.  We have different forms in the computer.
*   *   *
“Q:  And you prepared this will?
“A:  Yes.
“Q:  You typed it up on the computer?
“A:  Yes, sir.
“Q:  And printed it out?
“A:  Yes, sir.
That the secretary was directed to type the information into a computer generated form rather
than to create the document does not undermine the hearing judge’s finding of fact that she
wrote the will.  Judge McCurdy’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Accordingly, these exceptions are overruled.
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Respondent excepts to the hearing court’s finding that “the Testator began to draft a
written document, but (apparently becoming frustrated) gave the handwritten notes to the
[respondent].”  Respondent’s testimony that the Mr. Sherpinski “tore it off the pad and
crunched it up and actually handed it to me” supports the factual statement by the hearing
judge.  Respondent argues that the hearing judge improperly omitted the fact that the paper
containing the notes was discarded by the respondent immediately upon receipt.  Respondent
complains that omission of this fact leads to an inference that respondent acted with
impropriety.  The hearing judge, however, stated explicitly that “the Court does not find that
the [respondent’s] actions were taken with the intent to take advantage of a confidential
relationship.”  Respondent’s exception is overruled.
Finally, respondent claims that the summary of facts as recounted by the hearing judge
attributes the following activities of the secretary and Mr. Sherpinski to the wrong date:
“[Ms. Lastner] said that she did not read the will to the Testator,
that he said that he would read it at a later date, and that he
asked her to make a copy and mail it to him in a plain envelope
using Ms. Lastner’s return address.  He also asked her if he
could change the will.”
Respondent states that the preceding events occurred, not on September 8, 1999, but rather,
during a subsequent visit by Mr. Sherpinski to respondent’s office.  Respondent is correct,
but nonetheless, the conclusions as to his Rule violations are unchanged.
We turn now to respondent’s three exceptions related to the hearing court’s proposed
conclusions of law.  First, respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that an attorney-
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client relationship existed between respondent and Mr. Sherpinski with respect to the
preparation of the will.  Second, argues respondent, because no attorney-client relationship
existed, the hearing judge’s conclusion that respondent violated Rule 1.8(c) was erroneous.
Third, according to respondent, because there was no basis to find a violation of Rule 1.8(c),
the hearing court was also incorrect in finding a violation of Rule 8.4.  In the alternative,
respondent argues that the violation of Rule 8.4 amounts to impermissible double punishment
for the violation of Rule 1.8(c).  We find all of respondent’s exceptions to be without merit.
We turn first to respondent’s contention that the hearing judge erred in concluding that
an attorney-client relationship existed between respondent and the testator with respect to the
will.  The record contains clear and convincing evidence that an attorney-client relationship
was established between respondent and Mr. Sherpinski with respect to the preparation of
the will.
Our predecessors have noted that “[w]hat constitutes an attorney-client relationship
is a rather elusive concept.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 650, 732
A.2d 876, 883 (1999) (quoting Folly Farms I, Inc., v. Trustees, 282 Md. 659, 670, 387 A.2d
248, 254 (1978)).  The question of whether an attorney-client relationship exists has arisen
in a variety of circumstances.  For example, this Court has considered whether the
relationship exists in the context of agency and principal such that the lawyer bound the
purported client to a particular transaction, see Brown v. Hebb, 167 Md. 535, 175 A. 602
(1934); whether a lawyer engaged in a business partnership was in an attorney-client
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relationship vis-a-vis his partners, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kramer, 325 Md. 39,
599 A.2d 100 (1991); and whether an attorney-client relationship exists for purposes of a
claim against the Client Security Trust Fund.  See Folly Farms I, 282 Md. 659, 387 A.2d 248.
See also, McCormick on Evidence § 88, at 352 (5th ed. 1999) (referring to the relationship
in the context of the evidentiary privilege in attorney-client communications). 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan,
763 A.2d 1189 (2001), in a disbarment disciplinary proceeding, recently considered whether
an attorney-client relationship existed between the attorney and a purported client.  The court
reiterated its definition of “client,” stating that “the term ‘client’ includes one who is either
‘rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional legal services from him.’”  Id. at 1192 (quoting Board of Overseers
of the Bar v. Dineen, 500 A.2d 262, 264 (Me. 1985)).  Although an attorney-client
relationship ordinarily rests on contract, the contract need not be express and may be implied
from the conduct of the parties.  See Shaw, 354 Md. at 650-51, 732 A.2d at 883; Healy v.
Gray, 168 N.W. 222 (Iowa 1918).  It is not necessary to the relationship that a retainer be
requested or paid.  See Shaw, 354 Md. at 650, 732 A.2d at 883.  This Court has stated that
the lack of any explicit agreement or payment arrangement did not preclude the formation
of an attorney-client relationship.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James we stated:  
“Although an agreement upon the amount of a retainer and its
payment is rather conclusive evidence of the establishment of
the attorney-client relationship, the absence of such an
agreement or payment does not indicate conclusively that no
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such relationship exists.  Indeed, the payment of fees is not a
necessary element in the relationship of attorney and client.  The
services of an attorney to the client may be rendered
gratuitously but the relationship of attorney and client
nonetheless exists.” 
355 Md. 465, 476-77, 735 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1999) (quoting Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259
Md. 542, 549-50, 270 A.2d 662, 666 (1970)).  Many courts have adopted the following
standard to assess whether the relationship has been established:  An attorney-client
relationship is said to have been created when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from
an attorney; (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney’s
professional competence; and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or
actually gives the desired advice or assistance.  See Board of Overseers of the Bar v.
Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Me. 2001); State v. Gordon, 692 A.2d 505, 506 (N.H.
1997); DeVaux v. American Home Assur. Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983);
Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977); Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259,
1264 (1st Cir. 1991).
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers addresses the formation of
an attorney-client relationship as follows: 
“A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the
lawyer provide legal services for the person; and . . . 
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so,
and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services . . . .”
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000).  The commentary describes
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the means by which an attorney-client relationship may be formed without an express
agreement by the lawyer:
“Like a client, a lawyer may manifest consent to creating a
client-lawyer relationship in many ways.  The lawyer may
explicitly agree to represent the client or may indicate consent
by action, for example by performing services requested by the
client.  An agent for the lawyer may communicate consent, for
example, a secretary or paralegal with express, implied, or
apparent authority to act for the lawyer in undertaking a
representation.”
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14, cmt. (e).  See also DeVaux, 444
N.E.2d at 357-58 (stating that jury could find formation of attorney-client relationship based
on conduct of attorney’s secretary, even absent any conduct by attorney himself).  An
attorney-client relationship, therefore, does not require an explicit agreement.  The
relationship may arise by implication from a client’s reasonable expectation of legal
representation and the attorney’s failure to dispel those expectations. 
Respondent characterizes the interaction between Mr. Sherpinski and himself as “a
product of their long-standing friendship” rather than a professional, attorney-client
relationship.  He identifies the close friendship, the brevity of the discussion, the lack of any
other recent legal work by respondent on Sherpinski’s behalf, and the lack of any agreement
or appointment.
The evidence of close friendship does not negate the existence of an attorney-client
relationship.  Although an attorney providing assistance to a friend does not necessarily enter
into an attorney-client relationship, it has never been the case that social interaction precludes
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an attorney from providing legal services to a client.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Sait, 301 Md. 238, 482 A.2d 898 (1984) (finding no attorney-client relationship between
attorney and family friend where attorney told friend he could not provide legal advice and
counseled securing alternate representation).
It is undisputed that respondent had performed legal work for Mr. Sherpinski in the
past.  On September 8, 1999, Mr. Sherpinski sought advice and assistance from respondent.
The discussion occurred in respondent’s law office, out of the presence of other people.  The
subject of the discussion was the drafting of a will, a matter within respondent’s professional
competence.  The respondent’s secretary drafted the will using respondent’s legal forms.  The
will designated respondent as Mr. Sherpinski’s personal representative.  Perhaps most
compelling, when contacted by the police following the discovery of Mr. Sherpinski’s
remains, respondent informed them that he was Mr. Sherpinski’s attorney.  There is no
indication that the legal relationship of attorney-client, which previously existed between
respondent and Mr. Sherpinski, was ever terminated.  Judge McCurdy’s finding that an
attorney-client relationship existed when the will was created was supported by clear and
convincing evidence.  Accordingly, this exception is overruled. 
Respondent’s second exception to the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of law
relies on the faulty premise that no attorney-client relationship existed.  He argues that
because there was no attorney-client relationship, his interaction with Mr. Sherpinski did not
amount to the practice of law.  Respondent further claims that he did not engage in the
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practice of law because:
“[h]e did not do anything which required legal knowledge or
skill, apply legal principles, exercise his professional judgment
as a lawyer in connection with Mr. Sherpinski’s will, interpret
any documents, give any legal advice, or apply legal principles
to any complex problem.”
To determine whether an individual has engaged in the practice of law, the focus of
the inquiry should “be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and skill
in order to apply legal principles and precedent.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hallmon,
343 Md. 390, 397-98, 682 A.2d 510, 514 (quoting In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ill.
1994)).  “Where trial work is not involved but the preparation of legal documents, their
interpretation, the giving of legal advice, or the application of legal principles to problems
of any complexity, is involved, these activities are still the practice of law.”  Id., 682 A.2d
at 514 (quoting Lukas v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 35 Md. App. 442, 448, 371 A.2d
669, 673, cert. denied, 280 Md. 733 (1977)).  
In the present case, the respondent’s conduct was directly related to the preparation
of a legal document and advice related thereto.  As indicated above, the conduct was taken
within the scope of an attorney-client relationship.  Thus, respondent’s exception is without
merit and is overruled.
Respondent’s final exception is without merit.  As stated, the hearing judge properly
found respondent in violation of Rule 1.8(c).  A violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct may be a basis for finding a violation of Rule 8.4.  Respondent argues that finding
8The hearing judge concluded that “the violations of Rule 1.8 and Rule 8.4 merge.” 
As indicated above, respondent’s conduct constituted separate rule violations, and
“merger” was improper.
-22-
him in violation of both Rule 1.8(c) and Rule 8.4 constitutes double punishment for the same
conduct.  This argument ignores this Court’s repeated assertion that the purpose of
sanctioning an attorney’s conduct is to protect the public rather than to punish the errant
attorney.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789
(2002).  Furthermore, the finding of a rule violation is a separate matter from the imposition
of the sanction.  The severity of the sanction imposed will depend on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case; “the gravity of misconduct is not measured solely by the number
of rules broken but is determined largely by the lawyer’s conduct.” 8  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 568, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000) (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998)).  The
hearing judge’s conclusion that respondent violated Rule 8.4 was supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
III.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  Respondent suggests that the
appropriate sanction is a reprimand.  Bar Counsel recommends an indefinite suspension, with
respondent’s right to seek reinstatement conditioned upon his renunciation of any interest in
-23-
the bequest made to him in the will respondent prepared for his client.
We iterate again that the purpose of sanctioning an attorney’s conduct is to protect the
public rather than to punish the errant attorney.  See Powell, 369 Md. at 474, 800 A.2d at
789.  The severity of the sanction imposed depends on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors or prior disciplinary actions.
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416-18, 800 A.2d 747, 755 (2002).
Respondent has violated Rule 1.8(c) and 8.4.  We recently discussed the seriousness
of a violation of Rule 1.8(c) in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __
(2003):
“There are many potential dangers inherent in an attorney
drafting a will in which he or she is the beneficiary.  Conflict of
interest, the attorney’s incompetency to testify because of a
transaction with the deceased, the attorney’s ability to influence
the testator, the possible jeopardy to probate of the entire will if
its admission is contested, the possible harm to other
beneficiaries and the undermining of the public trust and
confidence in the legal profession are some of the dangers.”
Id. at __, __ A.2d at __.  We also quoted the following passage from the Supreme Court of
Ohio:
“A client’s dependence upon, and trust in, his attorney’s skill,
disinterested advice, and ethical conduct exceeds the trust and
confidence found in most fiduciary relationships. Seldom is the
client’s dependence upon, and trust in, his attorney greater than
when, contemplating his own mortality, he seeks the attorney’s
advice, guidance, and drafting skill in the preparation of a will
to dispose of his estate after death. These consultations are often
among the most private to take place between an attorney and
his client. The client is dealing with his innermost thoughts and
-24-
feelings, which he may not wish to share with his spouse,
children and other next of kin. 
“Because the decisions that go into the preparation of a
will are so inherently private, and because, by definition, the
testator will not be available after his death, when the will is
offered for probate, to correct any errors that the attorney may
have made, whether they are negligent errors or of a more
sinister kind, a client is unusually dependent upon his attorney’s
professional advice and skill when he consults the attorney to
have a will drawn. The client will have no opportunity to protect
himself from the attorney’s negligent or infamous misconduct.”
Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas, 666 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ohio 1996) (quoting Krischbaum
v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1296 (Ohio 1991)).
Respondent recognizes the numerous decisions from other states where attorneys were
suspended for violating those states’ versions of Rule 1.8(c).  See In re Polevoy, 980 P.2d
985 (Colo. 1999); In re McCann, 669 A.2d 49 (Del. 1995); Florida Bar v. Anderson, 638 So.
2d 29 (Fla. 1994); In re Watson, 733 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 2000); Kalled’s Case, 607 A.2d 613
(N.H. 1992); Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandy, 690 N.E.2d 1280 (Ohio 1998); In re
Gillingham, 896 P.2d 656 (Wash. 1995); see also In re Vitko, 519 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1994)
(ordering that attorney with prior disciplinary violations be disbarred for violation of
Minnesota’s Rule 1.8(c) despite absence of actual harm to testator).  
Nonetheless, respondent argues that the circumstances of his situation and the
relationship he had with Mr. Sherpinski, warrant a less severe form of sanction.  As
mitigating factors, respondent cites his lack of prior disciplinary sanctions; that the present
case involves a single act of misconduct; that he was unaware of Rule 1.8(c); and that he did
9Furthermore, like the present case, Stein had not been the subject of prior
disciplinary sanctions; had committed only a single act of misconduct; and stated that he
was unaware of the provisions of Rule 1.8(c).
-25-
not exercise any undue influence upon Mr. Sherpinski.
A similar argument was made before us in Stein, where the attorney also
recommended reprimand as an appropriate sanction.  Stein drafted a will for his client which
left a substantial gift to himself.  The client had been a close friend of Stein’s father, and had
continued the relationship with Stein.  Further, there was no evidence that the attorney placed
undue influence upon his client or that the will represented anything other than the client’s
true intent.9  We rejected Stein’s request for a reprimand, determining that an attorney’s
violation of Rule 1.8(c) warranted indefinite suspension regardless of the lack of evidence
of improper influence by the attorney.  See Stein, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __.
We conclude that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction in the instant
matter.  Respondent violated Rules 1.8(c) and 8.4.  Respondent suggests that a reprimand is
the appropriate sanction because the hearing judge found that respondent did not exercise
undue influence upon the testator.  Rule 1.8(c) is absolute—an attorney may not prepare an
instrument designating himself as legatee under the circumstances presented herein.
Deterrence of such conduct and the public confidence in the legal profession can only be
preserved by protecting against this behavior.  
As in Stein, Bar Counsel recommends that the indefinite suspension be coupled with
a condition for reinstatement.  Bar Counsel suggests “that the right to seek reinstatement be
10The Orphan’s Court has also exercised its jurisdiction to suspend and reinstate
respondent’s powers as personal representative.  The estate, still open, is presently being
administered by the respondent.
-26-
expressly conditioned on the Respondent’s renunciation of any interest in the bequest left to
him by the Will.”  As in Stein, we decline to adopt Bar Counsel’s recommendation.
We noted in Stein that, ordinarily the proper disposition of the testator’s estate is a
subject of a probate proceeding, and that restitution under the Rules of Professional conduct
is inconsistent with the principles set forth in their preamble:
“Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached.  The Rules are designed to provide guidance to
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies.  They are not designed to be a
basis for civil liability.”
In Stein, an Orphans’ Court proceeding to challenge the bequest had been stayed pending the
resolution of the disciplinary proceeding.  In the present case, the testator’s son filed a caveat
and the matter was settled in the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore County.  By its Settlement
Order dated March 13, 2002, the Orphans’ Court approved the settlement in accordance with
terms reached by respondent and Mr. Sherpinski’s son, which distributed the estate 55% to
respondent and 45% to the son.10 
Bar Counsel’s request that we require renunciation of the bequest as a condition of
reinstatement whenever Rule 1.8(c) has been violated fails to consider some of the policy
effects of a per se rule.  Aside from our belief that ordinarily this is not the appropriate forum
11Bar Counsel’s recommendation of renunciation in every case presents other
potential problems.  Although not a concern in the present case or Stein, Rule 1.8(c) is not
restricted to bequests made to the drafting attorney.  The rule also prohibits an attorney
-27-
to determine the proper distribution of an estate, we have concerns about the potential
collateral effects of the per se condition of reinstatement recommended by Bar Counsel.  In
Maryland, an indefinite suspension, by its very terms, is not a permanent status, nor is
disbarment.  Some of our sister jurisdictions provide for permanent disbarment.  See e.g.,
Florida, Fla. Bar. Reg. R. 3-5.1(f); New Jersey, N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-16(i); Ohio, Ohio Gov. Bar.
R. V(6)(C).  In Maryland, following disbarment or indefinite suspension, an attorney may file
a petition for readmission.  See Maryland Rule 16-781 (providing procedures for
reinstatement of attorney “who has been disbarred or suspended indefinitely or for more than
six months.”).  A per se rule requiring renunciation of any bequest under circumstances
presented herein could result, in some circumstances, in a permanent disbarment.  
We do not have before us a complete record of the proceedings in the Orphans’ Court,
but considering that the testator’s death occurred on December 31, 1999, and the Settlement
Order awarding 55% of the estate to respondent was entered as a final judgment in the
Orphans’ Court over a year ago, the statutory nine month period for disclaimer has elapsed.
As a result, respondent may well be unable to disclaim the bequest under the will.  If we
adopt, in this context, the General Assembly’s usage that renouncing is equivalent to
disclaiming, the condition Bar Counsel recommends would be impossible for respondent to
satisfy.11
from drafting an instrument for an unrelated, not independently represented client which
leaves a substantial gift to “a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or
spouse.”  Thus, it may be that an attorney drafts a will improperly, leaving a substantial
bequest to a person who, although related to the lawyer and within the ambit of the rule, is
beyond the control of the lawyer for the purposes of renunciation.  Further, where the gift
has been left to a minor child of the attorney, the laws of this State would seem to prevent
any such renouncement by the child absent the involvement of a separate guardian.  See
Maryland Code (2001) § 13-201 et seq. of the Estates and Trusts Article.  
-28-
Respondent replies to Bar Counsel’s suggestion that he renounce the bequest with the
following averment:
“Should this Court conclude that renouncing his interest is
necessary or advisable, Brooke respectfully submits that he
would be willing to do so on condition that any benefits
involved be earmarked as a fund to be used in the name of the
late Mr. Sherpinski for the benefit of seamen, through an
appropriate organization, rather than go to a child, contrary to
and in violation of Mr. Sherpinski’s express wishes.”
Respondent is free to donate his gift to a charitable institution if he so chooses.  We shall not
negotiate with him as to who shall benefit from the gift.  
Indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction.  It is hereby ordered that: 
1.
Respondent, John A. Brooke, is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
in Maryland.  This period of suspension shall commence thirty (30) days from the date of
entry of this Opinion and Order. 
2.
Respondent is directed to pay all costs associated with these disciplinary
proceedings as taxed by the Clerk of this Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
-29-
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIE VAN CE
COMMISSION AGAINST JOHN A. BROOKE.
Dissenting Opinion follows:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 36
September Term, 2002
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
JOHN A. BROOKE
Bell, C.J.
                    *Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting opinion by Wilner, J.,
joined by Harrell, J.
Filed:    April 11, 2003
*Judge Eldridge participated in the hearing of the
 case but did not participate either in the
 conference in regard to its decision or in the
 adoption of the opinion.
-1-
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein,        Md.
      ,        A.2d        (2003), I dissent from the sanction imposed here.  The only thing that
makes sense is for Brooke either to renounce/disclaim the bequest he wrongfully placed in
his client’s Will or, if that is no longer possible because of the extent to which the estate has
already been administered, to pay the funds over to those who otherwise would have received
them if the bequest had not been made.  That, and that alone, gives the Rule meaning.
Even if, as the Majority surmises, Brooke may not be in a position to
renounce/disclaim formally the bequest he is to receive, the possible repercussions foreseen
by the Majority were Brooke’s readmission tied, expressly or otherwise, to a condition of
renunciation/disclaimer would not be unjust in this case.  Brooke’s claimed lack of
knowledge as to the existence of the requirements of Rule 1.8 (c) at the time the Will was
prepared was accepted as fact by the hearing judge; however, according to information
gleaned from the record, that state of ignorant bliss did not extend beyond March 27, 2000.
On that date, Mr. Sherpinski’s son apparently raised the violation of the Rule as a ground of
his caveat in a hearing in the Orphan’s Court.  The Register of Wills, in a letter of May 16,
2000, notified the Attorney Grievance Commission of the allegation vis à vis Rule 1.8 (c),
the receipt of which letter apparently instigated the Commission’s interest in this matter. Yet,
Brooke thereafter proceeded to formalize a settlement with Mr. Sherpinski’s son, by which
-2-
Brooke secured a 55% interest in the estate bequest.  The order effectuating that settlement
in the Orphan’s Court was entered on March 13, 2002.  Thus, it appears Brooke knew or
should have known of the requirements of Rule 1.8 (c) long before he proceeded to secure
the bequest for himself. 
Judge Harrell authorizes me to state that he joins in this Dissent.