Case Title: Pouech v. Pouech

Citation: 180 Vt. 1, 2006 VT 40, 904 A.2d 70

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pouech v. Pouech (2004-423); 180 Vt. 1; 904 A.2d 70

2006 VT 40

[Filed 12-May-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 40

                                No. 2004-423


  Natacha Pouech                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Chittenden Family Court


  Phillip Pouech                                November Term, 2005


  Mark J. Keller, J.

  John R. Durrance, Jr. of Gaston, Durrance & Fairbanks, Montpelier, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Christopher L. Davis and Devin McLaughlin of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP,
    Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned


       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   Wife appeals the family court's decision
  refusing to allow her to amend her divorce complaint to seek maintenance. 
  We conclude that the family court applied the wrong standard in determining
  whether to consider her request for maintenance in light of the stipulated
  settlement that the parties had filed.  Accordingly, while we affirm the
  divorce decree, we reverse the family court's August 5, 2004 decision and
  remand the matter for the court to reconsider wife's maintenance request
  and whether to accept or reject the parties' stipulation in whole or in
  part.
   
       ¶  2.  The parties were married in 1981 and separated in 2003.  They
  have three children, born in October 1982, May 1986, and February 1993. 
  After the parties separated, they negotiated a settlement between
  themselves with the help of a mediator and then a lawyer, who assisted both
  parties in finalizing a stipulation drafted by husband.  The lawyer advised
  the parties to consult independent counsel.  Husband did, but wife did not. 
  On October 20, 2003, the parties signed a document entitled "Stipulation
  for Temporary and Final Order and Decree of Divorce."  The document
  contains twenty-five paragraphs that deal with, among other things,
  parental rights and responsibilities, child support, marital property, and
  marital debt.  The agreement is silent with respect to maintenance.

       ¶  3.  On October 27, 2003, one week after the document was signed,
  wife filed the parties' stipulation along with her divorce complaint.  She
  did not check the box on the complaint form that would have indicated she
  was seeking maintenance.  Approximately five months later, before the final
  divorce hearing, an attorney entered an appearance on behalf of wife and
  filed a motion to amend the complaint to allow wife to seek maintenance. 
  Husband opposed the motion, arguing that the court should not permit wife
  to present evidence on the issue of spousal maintenance, and, in the
  alternative, that maintenance should not be awarded because the stipulation
  was not inequitable.  Over two days in late May 2004, the court held a
  hearing on wife's motion, and both parties testified.
   
       ¶  4.  At the hearing, wife's attorney stated that wife was not
  asking the court to set aside the whole stipulation.  Nevertheless, when
  the court expressed its belief that opening up the issue of maintenance
  would effectively require it to consider all financial aspects of the
  parties' divorce, wife's attorney still insisted that wife wanted
  maintenance, even if it meant that the stipulation would have to be set
  aside.  On direct examination, wife stated that she knew she had a right to
  maintenance, but did not ask for it when the parties negotiated the
  stipulation because of feelings of guilt about leaving her family.  Husband
  testified that wife told him she did not expect him to pay her anything. 
  In a post-hearing memorandum in support of her motion to amend, wife argued
  that the stipulation should be interpreted to allow her to request
  maintenance, and that, in the alternative, there was a mutual mistake
  regarding the issue of maintenance.  The principal thrust of her first
  argument was that, although the parties' stipulation was a binding
  contract, the absence of any provision on maintenance did not permit the
  court to assume that the parties had an agreement regarding maintenance. 
  She also contended, however, that the family court had an independent
  obligation to assure that the stipulation was equitable.
   
       ¶  5.  Following the hearing, in an August 2004 order, the family
  court denied wife's motion to amend.  In arriving at its decision, the
  court noted that wife's attorney had explicitly indicated that wife was not
  seeking to set aside the agreement on the grounds that its terms were
  unfair or unconscionable, but rather was arguing only that: (1) because the
  agreement was silent on the issue of maintenance, the court had the
  authority to impose maintenance; and (2) the court could void the agreement
  based on mutual mistake.  With respect to wife's mutual mistake argument,
  the court found that wife knew she had a right to maintenance but did not
  ask for it, and that even if she had mistakenly believed she could seek
  maintenance at the final divorce hearing notwithstanding the absence of a
  provision on maintenance in the parties' stipulation, it was a unilateral
  mistake on her part.  Further, the court found that the parties intended
  their stipulation to be a final, complete resolution of their divorce and
  that the stipulation unambiguously omitted any mention of maintenance. 
  Hence, the court refused to allow wife to seek maintenance over and above
  the terms of the agreement.  On August 26, 2004, the court entered a decree
  of divorce incorporating the parties' stipulation into the final order. 
  Wife appeals, raising several interrelated arguments.


       ¶  6.  Wife first argues that, by stating in their stipulation that
  the terms and conditions of the agreement "may constitute the basis for" a
  final order and decree of divorce, the parties intended to resolve only
  those matters explicitly dealt with in the stipulation, but not to the
  exclusion of other unmentioned matters over which the court had
  jurisdiction.  According to wife, the stipulation's silence on the issue of
  maintenance demonstrated that the parties had not come to any agreement on
  that issue, and therefore the court was free to consider it.

       ¶  7.  We reject this argument because it is contrary to the family
  court's findings and conclusions, which are supported by the evidence.  
  The court found that wife knew she had a right to maintenance, but
  nevertheless did not ask for it in the stipulation, and that the parties
  intended the stipulation to be a complete, final agreement on their
  divorce. (FN1)  Both the language of the parties' stipulation and the
  circumstances surrounding its execution support the court's determination
  that the stipulation unambiguously excluded maintenance as part of the
  parties' intended final divorce settlement.  See Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch
  Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 579,