Case Title: Glass v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1387 
____________ 
 
MARIE ANN GLASS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
January 4, 2019 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
Marie Ann Glass seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal in Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2017), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with Bank of New York 
v. Williams, 979 So. 2d 347 (Fla 1st DCA 2008), on the question of whether a 
voluntary dismissal provides a basis for being considered the prevailing party for 
the purpose of appellate attorney fees.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 
Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we quash the decision of the Fourth 
District. 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
 
On December 17, 2013, Nationstar Mortgage filed a verified complaint 
against Marie Ann Glass, pursuing an in rem action to foreclose a mortgage on real 
property in Broward County, Florida.  The mortgage, a Home Equity Conversion 
Loan Agreement (commonly called a reverse mortgage), was prepared on 
November 16, 2007, and properly recorded.  The complaint alleged that on March 
18, 2013, the loan went into default due to non-payment of taxes and/or insurance 
on the property.  Nationstar requested the full balance of the loan: $205,397.93, 
plus interest, escrow, title search expenses, and attorney’s fees as defined in the 
loan agreement.  
 
On May 22, 2014, Glass filed a motion to dismiss the verified complaint, 
arguing that it “fails to allege necessary ‘approval by an authorized representative 
of the Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development],’ ” to declare a default of 
the loan.  Glass then provided four reasons that the complaint should be dismissed.  
Last, Glass alleged that Nationstar attached the incorrect document to its pleading. 
 
On June 26, 2014, the parties agreed to an order permitting Nationstar to 
amend its complaint by providing additional filings.  Nationstar submitted the 
correct loan agreement on June 30, 2014.  On July 16, 2014, Glass filed a motion 
to dismiss the amended complaint, making the same arguments as before and 
adding that Nationstar’s amendment appended as an exhibit loan documents that 
 
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named Countrywide Bank as the lender and failed to allege or demonstrate that 
Nationstar was the proper holder of the note.  On October 20, 2014, Nationstar 
responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing that it had met its legal duty in the 
complaint and requested attorney’s fees pursuant to the terms of the note and 
mortgage. 
 
On October 23, 2014, the trial court granted Glass’s motion to dismiss 
without prejudice for Nationstar to file an amended pleading within 30 days.  
Nationstar filed its amended complaint on November 24, 2014.  On December 4, 
2014, Glass filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the amended complaint failed 
to correct any of its previous defects.  On April 15, 2015, the trial court granted 
Glass’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.1  Glass sought attorney’s fees pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525, the mortgage, and section 57.105(7), 
Florida Statutes (2014). 
 
Nationstar filed a notice of appeal with the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
on November 30, 2015.  Nationstar filed its initial brief on September 26, 2016, 
arguing, in part, that none of the arguments offered by Glass in her motions to 
dismiss had merit and “all of the possible grounds for the circuit court’s order are 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court granted rehearing and struck the language, “having been 
afforded an opportunity to amend its pleading, Plaintiff has failed to do so” from 
the order and issued a revised order on November 5, 2015. 
 
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incorrect as a matter of law.”   After briefing, Nationstar filed a notice of voluntary 
dismissal on March 13, 2017.  Glass filed a renewed motion for appellate 
attorney’s fees based on section 57.105(7) and Nationstar’s voluntary dismissal.  
The Fourth District issued an opinion denying Glass’s motion, granted rehearing 
en banc, and issued a nearly identical opinion on rehearing en banc.  
 
Glass sought the discretionary review of this Court. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue presented in this case is a homeowner’s entitlement to appellate 
attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes, after a bank files a 
notice of voluntary dismissal in the district court of appeal.  Below, the Fourth 
District found that Glass was not entitled to appellate attorney’s fees because she 
prevailed on her standing argument presented in the trial court.  Because our 
caselaw is clear that a voluntary dismissal of an appeal renders the opposing party 
the prevailing party for the purpose of appellate attorney fees and because 
Nationstar maintained its right to enforce the reverse mortgage contract in its 
appeal until the dismissal, we quash the decision below.  Additionally, we write to 
address the mischaracterization of the procedural history of this case by the district 
court. 
In relevant part, the Fourth District’s opinion in Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. 
Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), held: 
 
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The Borrower prevailed in the circuit court based on her 
argument that the Lender lacked standing under the contract.  On 
appeal, she argued that the court correctly dismissed the Lender’s 
complaint for lack of standing.  In a situation such as this, where a 
party prevails by arguing the plaintiff failed to establish it had the 
right pursuant to the contract to bring the action, the party cannot 
simultaneously seek to take advantage of a fee provision in that same 
contract. 
Id. at 898.  Further, the Fourth District explained: 
Simply put, to be entitled to fees pursuant to the reciprocity 
provision of section 57.105(7), the movant must establish that the 
parties to the suit are also entitled to enforce the contract containing 
the fee provision.  A party that prevails on its argument that dismissal 
is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the 
contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same 
contract. 
Id. at 899.  The Fourth District therefore denied Glass’s motion for appellate 
attorney’s fees.  Id.    
Nationstar did not seek review of the attorney’s fees order in the district 
court.  Instead, Nationstar appealed the dismissal order, stating in its Notice of 
Appeal, “[Nationstar] appeals to the Fourth District Court of Appeal the Order of 
this Court dated November 5, 2015 . . . .  The nature of the order is a final order 
dismissing Plaintiff’s case against Defendant with prejudice.”  Nationstar then 
voluntarily dismissed the appeal.  The Fourth District denied Glass’s motion for 
appellate attorney’s fees based not on the voluntary dismissal on appeal but instead 
on the ancillary issue of her successful dismissal of the complaint at trial.  
Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, No. 4D15-4561 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 12, 2017).  
 
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On motion for rehearing en banc, the district court reiterated its prior opinion, 
stating, “We grant the Borrower’s motion for rehearing en banc and, after en banc 
consideration, adopt the panel opinion as revised below.”  Glass, 219 So. 3d at 
897.   
 
In Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990), we 
held, “In general, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the defendant is 
the prevailing party.”  Id. at 919 (citing Stuart Plaza, Ltd. v. Atl. Coast Dev. Corp., 
493 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)).  Accordingly, notwithstanding the issues 
with the lower court’s dismissal, the Fourth District improperly denied Glass 
appellate attorney’s fees based on Nationstar’s voluntary dismissal of the appeal.    
 
In its decision, instead of addressing the entitlement to appellate attorney’s 
fees based on the voluntary dismissal, the Fourth District opined that section 
57.105(7) precluded an award of attorney’s fees because Glass prevailed in having 
Nationstar’s complaint dismissed.  The Fourth District’s conclusion that Glass was 
not entitled to appellate attorney’s fees after Nationstar voluntarily dismissed its 
appeal was predicated on Glass’s argument in the trial court that Nationstar failed 
to adequately allege that it had standing to foreclose her mortgage.  This reasoning 
both misstates the basis of the trial court’s ruling on Glass’s motion for dismissal 
and fails to address Glass’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees based on the 
voluntary dismissal. 
 
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In the trial court, Glass moved to dismiss the foreclosure action against her, 
arguing four bases for her motion.  First, Glass alleged that Nationstar’s complaint 
failed to allege any assignment from Countrywide and that Nationstar’s status as 
holder of the note was insufficient.  Second, Glass alleged that Nationstar failed to 
allege a breach of the contract because the contract provided that the lender would 
pay such property charges as loan advances.  Third, Glass alleged that Nationstar 
failed to demonstrate that it had received approval from HUD to accelerate the 
loan, as required by the terms of the loan.  Fourth, Glass alleged that the exhibits to 
the complaint contravened the finding that nonpayment of taxes is a default 
because there was sufficient equity remaining on the line of credit to fund taxes 
and insurance.  The trial court granted the dismissal but did not provide any 
reasoning for its decision.  It is, therefore, inaccurate to state that Glass was 
successful only for demonstrating that Nationstar lacked standing. 
Further, the Fourth District stated, “On appeal, [Glass] argued that the court 
correctly dismissed the Lender’s complaint for lack of standing.”  Nationstar 
Mortgage, 219 So. 3d at 898.  This is not an accurate statement of Glass’s 
argument.  In her answer brief to the Fourth District, Glass asserted that the trial 
court properly dismissed the complaint based on defects in the amended complaint 
and re-asserted three of the four reasons she raised in her motion to dismiss: (1) 
failure to allege standing, (2) inappropriate remedy, and (3) failure to allege HUD 
 
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Secretary approval.  Additionally, Glass argued that the trial court properly 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice after Nationstar failed to amend the defects 
in the complaint after the first dismissal.   
 
The Fourth District’s decision partly relies on the decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeal in Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Fitzgerald, 215 
So. 3d 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), wherein the district court held that because no 
contract existed between the bank and Fitzgerald, she could not invoke the 
reciprocity provisions of section 57.105(7).  There are factual distinctions between 
Fitzgerald and Glass.  Fitzgerald entered into a mortgage with Northstar and 
concurrently signed a promissory note made payable to Northstar that bore a 
special indorsement stating, “PAY TO THE ORDER OF JPMORGAN CHASE 
BANK, N.A., ITS SUCCESSORS AND/OR ASSIGNS WITHOUT RECOURSE.”  
Id. at 117-18.  The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company filed an action 
against Fitzgerald seeking to foreclose the mortgage and attached a copy of the 
note and mortgage.  Fitzgerald filed her answer and affirmative defenses, asserting 
that the bank lacked standing because the note was specially indorsed to an entity 
other than the bank and the bank was not the lawful assignee.  The case proceeded 
to non-jury trial and the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Fitzgerald 
after finding that Bank of New York Mellon Trust failed to establish assignment of 
the mortgage or transfer or any actual delivery of the note on the part of J.P. 
 
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Morgan Chase Bank.  Id. at 118.  This is unlike the present case where the trial 
court made no specific findings and Glass alleged that Nationstar failed to 
demonstrate a step in the transfer or assignment of the mortgage and note as one of 
four reasons the trial court should dismiss the complaint.   
Below, Glass alleged, “The Complaint has an assignment from Bank of 
America to Plaintiff appended; however, the Complaint fails to allege the 
assignment of transfer from Countywide [sic] Bank, FSB to Bank of America.”  
Additionally, she alleged, “The exhibits show Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the 
claims alleged as it is not the ‘lender’ under the reserve mortgage, the Amended 
Complaint (like the previous iteration) still fails to allege any assignment from the 
Lender and Plaintiff’s status as ‘holder’ of the Note does not give Plaintiff standing 
as the Note is not a negotiable instrument.”  Even if the trial court’s dismissal was 
based on lack of standing, it was not based on a finding that Nationstar did not hold 
the note but on a finding that Nationstar’s complaint was legally insufficient for 
failure to properly demonstrate the chain of title.  
 
In Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 
1985), we explained: 
At the outset, we note that some of the decisions of this Court 
contain the historically incorrect statement that attorney fee statutes 
are “in derogation of the common law.”  At the time of the American 
Revolution, the English court generally awarded attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in all civil litigation.  By its decisions, however, this 
Court, along with the majority of other jurisdiction in this country, 
 
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refused to accept the “English Rule” that attorney fees are part of the 
costs to be charged by a taxing master, adopting instead the 
“American Rule” that attorney fees may be awarded by a court only 
when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties. . . . This 
state has recognized a limited exception to this general American Rule 
in situations involving inequitable conduct. 
Id. at 1147-48 (footnote and citations omitted).  Further, we have stated, “It is well-
settled that attorneys’ fees can derive only from either a statutory basis or an 
agreement between the parties.”  Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194, 1198 
(Fla. 2009) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 
1993)).  And finally, “where a motion for attorney’s fees is based on a prevailing-
party provision of a document, the fact that a contract never existed precludes an 
award of attorney’s fees.”  David v. Richman, 568 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1990). 
 
Our caselaw is clear that a party is precluded from claiming attorney’s fees 
under a contract that has been found to have never existed.  See id.  However, we 
have also held “that when parties enter into a contract and litigation later ensues 
over that contract, attorney’s fees may be recovered under a prevailing-party 
attorney’s fee provision contained therein even though the contract is rescinded or 
held to be unenforceable.”  Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 
1989).  We explained: 
The legal fictions which accompany a judgment of rescission do not 
change the fact that a contract did exist.  It would be unjust to 
preclude the prevailing party to the dispute over the contract which 
led to its rescission from recovering the very attorney’s fees which 
were contemplated by that contract.  This analysis does no violence to 
 
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our recent opinion in Gibson v. Courtois [539 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1989)] 
in which we held that the prevailing party is not entitled to collect 
attorney’s fees under a provision in the document which would have 
formed the contract where the court finds that the contract never 
existed. 
Katz, 546 So. 2d at 1049.  
 
In the instant case, a reverse mortgage contract clearly existed between 
Glass and Countrywide Mortgage Company, which was assigned from its 
successor in interest, Bank of America, to Nationstar Mortgage.2  Even if we 
assume that Glass prevailed on her standing argument, the contract was merely 
unenforceable by Nationstar because it failed to demonstrate that it was the rightful 
successor in interest.  We therefore conclude that, had the issue been presented as 
an issue on appeal to the Fourth District, Glass would be entitled to attorney’s fees 
at the trial level.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we quash the decision of the Fourth District in 
Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), and 
approve the decision in Bank of New York v. Williams, 979 So. 2d 347 (Fla 1st 
                                          
 
 
2.  Bank of America purchased Countrywide Financial Corporation on July 
1, 2008.  See Press Release, Bank of America Completes Countrywide Financial 
Purchase (July 1, 2008), available at 
http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1171009#fbid=eZ2TlYp6FgM.  
 
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DCA 2008), on the question of whether a voluntary dismissal provides a basis for 
being considered the prevailing party for the purpose of appellate attorney fees.   
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, 
J., concur. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
This Court does not have the constitutional authority to review this case 
because the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Nationstar Mortgage 
LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), does not expressly and directly 
conflict with the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Bank of New York v. 
Williams, 979 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), on the same question of law.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
In Glass, 219 So. 3d at 898, the Fourth District explained that, to be entitled 
to attorney’s fees under section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes, two requirements must 
be met:  “First, the party must have prevailed.  Second, the party had to be a party 
to the contract containing the fee provision.”  Then, the Fourth District proceeded 
to discuss the legal issue at hand, which involved the second requirement of 
whether the party was a party to the contract.  Id. at 898-99.  The Fourth District 
explained that, “[s]imply put, to be entitled to fees pursuant to the reciprocity 
 
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provision of section 57.105(7), the movant must establish that the parties to the suit 
are also entitled to enforce the contract containing the fee provision.”  Id. at 899.  
Thus, the Fourth District held that, “[i]n a situation such as this, where a party 
prevails by arguing the plaintiff failed to establish it had the right pursuant to the 
contract to bring the action, the party cannot simultaneously seek to take advantage 
of a fee provision in that same contract.”  Id. at 898.    
 
In contrast, in granting a motion for attorney’s fees, the First District in 
Williams only addressed the first requirement of section 57.105(7).  Specifically, 
the First District addressed the Bank of New York’s argument “that Williams was 
not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because she was not a prevailing party 
under section 57.105(7).”  Williams, 979 So. 2d at 347.  The Bank of New York 
contended “that because the same factual and legal issues raised in the dismissed 
action are also the subject of the new litigation, Williams cannot be the prevailing 
party under section 57.105(7).”  Id. at 347-48.  The First District disagreed, 
holding that “[t]he refiling of the same suit after the voluntary dismissal does not 
alter the appellees’ right to recover prevailing party attorney’s fees incurred in 
defense of the first suit.”  Id. at 348 (quoting State ex rel. Marsh v. Doran, 958 So. 
2d 1082, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)).  The First District stated that, “since the 
complaint was dismissed with prejudice, it is clear that Williams was the prevailing 
party.”  Id. 
 
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Accordingly, because Glass involved the second requirement of section 
57.105(7) while Williams involved the first, the two cases do not expressly and 
directly conflict on the same question of law.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, J., concur. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D15-4561  
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
F. Malcolm Cunningham, Jr. and Amy L. Fischer of The Cunningham Law Firm, 
P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Marc James Ayers of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, 
Alabama, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Nicholas A. Vidoni of Watson, Soileau, DeLeo & Burgett, P.A., Cocoa, FL; and 
Beau Bowin of Bowin Law Group, Melbourne, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Brevard County Legal Aid, Inc. 
 
Michael Wrubel of Michael Jay Wrubel, P.A., Davie, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Jerry Warren and Michael Jay Wrubel, P.A. 
 
Brian K. Korte of Korte & Wortman, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Korte & Wortman, P.A. 
 
Peter Ticktin, Jamie Alan Sasson, and Kendrick Almaguer of The Ticktin Law 
Group, P.L.L.C., Deerfield Beach, Florida, 
 
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for Amicus Curiae The Ticktin Law Group, P.L.L.C. 
 
Mandy L. Mills and Matt Bayard of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Miami, 
Florida; Lynn Drysdale of Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Jacksonville, Florida; 
and Alice M. Vickers of Florida Alliance for Consumer Protection, Inc., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida Legal Aid and Legal Services Consumer Group, 
Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., 
and Florida Alliance for Consumer Protection, Inc. 
 
Geoffrey E. Sherman, Jacquelyn Trask, Yanina Zilberman, and Roy D. Oppenheim 
of Oppenheim Pilelsky, P.A., Weston, Florida; and Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. 
Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Frederick and Janelle Sabido and Oppenheim Pilelsky, 
P.A. 
 
Robert R. Edwards of Choice Legal Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; David 
Rosenberg of Robertson, Anschutz & Schneid, P.L., Boca Raton, Florida; Marissa 
M. Yaker of Padgett Law Group, Tallahassee, Florida; and Andrea R. Tromberg of 
Tromberg Law Group, P.A, Boca Raton, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae American Legal and Financial Network