Case Title: Nerri v. Adu-Gyamfi

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042344

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
GIZACHEW NERRI 
 
v.  Record No. 042344     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 9, 2005 
VIVIAN ADU-GYAMFI, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
 
The trial court granted Vivian and Charles Adu-Gyamfi a 
non-suit in a proceeding in which their motion for judgment 
was signed by an attorney whose license to practice law in the 
Commonwealth had been administratively suspended by the 
Virginia State Bar.  We will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court because an attorney whose license has been 
administratively suspended is not authorized to practice law 
and, thus, any pleadings filed by such attorney are invalid. 
Proceedings 
 
On January 29, 2004, Burman A. Berger filed a motion for 
judgment on behalf of his clients, Vivian and Charles Adu-
Gyamfi, for injuries they suffered in an automobile accident 
allegedly caused by Gizachew Nerri.  When Berger signed the 
pleading, his license to practice law in this Commonwealth had 
been suspended.  On July 9, 2004, Nerri filed a motion 
seeking, inter alia, to strike the pleadings in the case 
because Berger was not a member in good standing of the 
 
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Virginia State Bar at the time he filed the motion for 
judgment. 
 
At the hearing on Nerri's motion, Berger conceded that 
his license to practice law had been administratively 
suspended at the time the motion for judgment was filed and 
that his license had not been reinstated.  The Adu-Gyamfis, 
acting pro se, then asked for a non-suit.  The trial court 
granted the motion for non-suit.  We granted Nerri an appeal. 
Discussion 
 
In an exhibit attached to Nerri's motion to strike, the 
Virginia State Bar certified that Berger was an "ACTIVE MEMBER 
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR, NOT IN GOOD STANDING," and that his 
license to practice law had been suspended since March 19, 
2003, for non-compliance with the requirements for continuing 
legal education, failure to pay annual membership dues, and 
failure to file an insurance certification.  Even though the 
State Bar's description of Berger's status implies that he 
remains a member of the Virginia State Bar during the period 
of his suspension, under the statutes and rules regulating the 
practice of law and licensing of lawyers Berger was not 
authorized to practice law during this period. 
Berger's license was suspended pursuant to Paragraph 19 
of Part 6, § IV of the Rules of Court.  Under the provisions 
of that paragraph, a licensed attorney who fails to comply 
 
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with the rules relating to membership including the 
requirement for continuing legal education is notified by the 
Secretary-Treasurer of the State Bar that his or her license 
to practice law will be suspended if he or she does not 
correct the deficiency within 60 days and pay a delinquency 
fee.  If the deficiency is not corrected and delinquency fees 
are not paid, the attorney's license is suspended and the 
attorney may no longer practice law in the Commonwealth "or in 
any way hold himself out as a member of the Virginia State 
Bar."  Paragraph 19 also provides that the attorney's 
"membership in the Virginia State Bar" may only be reinstated 
upon meeting the conditions set out in that paragraph. 
 
As these provisions demonstrate, the status of an 
attorney during the time his or her license is 
administratively suspended is no different from that of an 
individual or an attorney who has never been licensed in 
Virginia – neither is authorized to practice law in this 
Commonwealth and both are subject to prosecution for 
practicing law without a license.  Code § 54.1-3904.  We have 
held that a pleading signed by a foreign attorney who is not 
authorized to practice law in this Commonwealth is invalid and 
has "no legal effect."  Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining 
Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283, 568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002); Rule 
1A:4.  Just as there is no practical distinction between the 
 
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ability of the unlicensed foreign attorney to practice law and 
the attorney on administrative suspension, we find no rational 
basis to treat the pleadings filed by the former as invalid 
and those filed by the latter as valid. 
Berger was not entitled to practice law in this 
Commonwealth at the time he signed and filed the motion for 
judgment on behalf of the Gyamfis. That pleading was invalid 
and had no legal effect.  Therefore, no valid proceeding was 
pending which could be non-suited. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter judgment in favor of Nerri. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  This case involves the 
application of the so-called “nullity rule” which, as 
pertinent here, broadly provides that a pleading filed on 
behalf of another by an individual not authorized to practice 
law in the jurisdiction is to be treated as a nullity.  The 
acknowledged purpose of this rule is to protect the public 
from the unauthorized practice of law.  In my view, the strict 
adherence to the nullity rule under the particular 
circumstances of the present case is unduly harsh and does 
little to foster public confidence that protection from the 
unauthorized practice of law is being advanced. 
 
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Vivian and Charles Adu-Gyamfi are the undisputed innocent 
victims of Burman A. Berger’s unauthorized practice of law.  
When they retained him, Berger was licensed to practice law in 
Virginia and his membership in the Bar was in good standing.  
Nothing in the record suggests that they would have had any 
reason to know, or even to suspect, that Berger’s license to 
practice law had been administratively suspended when he 
subsequently filed the motion for judgment on their behalf 
against Gizachew Nerri.  Nor does it appear that Nerri 
suffered any prejudice during the period in which the case 
proceeded prior to the discovery of the suspension of Berger’s 
license by Nerri’s counsel.  Strict adherence to the nullity 
rule by declaring the motion for judgment had no legal effect 
and, therefore, no valid proceeding was pending which could be 
non-suited punishes the innocent litigant rather than the 
offending attorney.  When considered in light of the fact that 
no prejudice resulted to the opposing party in the suit, the 
harshness of this result is palpable. 
 
While Code § 54.1-3904 punishes the unauthorized practice 
of law as a Class 1 misdemeanor, no statute expressly dictates 
how a court should treat a pleading filed by an attorney 
admitted to practice law in Virginia but whose license to 
practice law has been administratively suspended at the time 
the pleading is filed.  Rule 1A:4 provides that certain 
 
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pleadings signed by a foreign attorney not licensed to 
practice law in Virginia are invalid.  We applied this rule, 
as the majority notes, in Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining 
Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283, 568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002).  This 
rule, however, applies only to foreign attorneys.  Walker v. 
American Ass’n of Prof’l Eye Care Specialists, P.C., 268 Va. 
117, 121, 598 S.E.2d 47, 49 (2004). 
 
The nullity rule is not carved in stone and is properly 
subject to exceptions when its strict application produces an 
unduly harsh result.  See Torrey v. Leesburg Regional Med. 
Ctr., 769 So.2d 1040, 1044 (Fla. 2000); see also Practice 
Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Walding, 138 F.R.D. 148, 149 (M.D. Fla. 
1991).  In the absence of a specific statute or rule of this 
Court requiring a holding that the motion for judgment at 
issue in the present case is a nullity and of “no legal 
effect,” I would hold, in accord with the reasoning of 
Practice Management, that the appropriate sanction under the 
circumstances of the present case would be to require the 
offending attorney to pay the reasonable costs incurred by the 
opposing party for attorney fees or other costs arising from 
the offending attorney’s action, while permitting the innocent 
litigant to either amend the motion for judgment or be granted 
a non-suit.  Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s 
judgment in this case. 
 
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Finally, I am compelled to acknowledge that the 
majority’s holding in this case is consistent with the view 
held by the majority of other jurisdictions.  See e.g., 
Davenport v. Lee, 40 S.W.3d 346, 349-50 (Ark. App. 2001) 
(citing cases), rev’d, 72 S.W.3d 85 (Ark. 2002).  
Nevertheless, I find no solace in following a view that 
admittedly produces a harsh result when the suspended 
attorney’s only action was to file a pleading and no prejudice 
was caused to the opposing party.  Perhaps the General 
Assembly by statute or this Court by rule will someday fashion 
a remedy more appropriate to the circumstances of the present 
case.