Case Title: Commonwealth v. Drayton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-10667 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KENJI DRAYTON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 10, 2015. - October 1, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Fingerprints, 
Hearsay, Declaration of deceased person.  Constitutional 
Law, Right to hearing.  Witness, Expert.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Hearsay, Assistance of 
counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 11, 2001. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Regina L. Quinlan, J., and 
motions for a new trial, filed on December 12, 2006, and April 
2, 2012, were heard by her. 
 
 
 
Cathryn A. Neaves for the defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree for a shooting that took place in an alleged 
territorial conflict over the control of a "crack house," an 
apartment used to sell "crack" cocaine.  The bulk of the 
2 
 
 
evidence at trial against the defendant and his codefendant at 
trial, Levino Williams, who was acquitted, derived from the 
testimony of a single witness, James Jackson.  Jackson was a 
crack addict and alcoholic who lived in the apartment, allowed 
others to sell drugs there in exchange for free drugs, and 
claimed to have witnessed the defendant shoot the victim, 
Michael Greene.  Approximately one and one-half years after the 
defendant’s conviction, another individual, Debra Bell,1 came 
forward.  Explaining that she had been diagnosed with metastatic 
cancer and did not want her failure to disclose what she knew 
about the shooting on her conscience, Debra claimed in an 
affidavit that she was with Jackson using drugs and having sex 
in the bathroom of the apartment at the time the shooting took 
place, and that as a result Jackson could not have seen the 
shooting. 
Based on Debra's affidavit, the defendant moved for a new 
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.  Defense 
counsel also moved to take a videotaped deposition to preserve 
Debra's testimony.  Debra died, however, one week after the 
motion was filed, and before the judge acted on it.  The motion 
judge, who was also the trial judge, concluded that Debra's 
affidavit was inadmissible hearsay, and denied the motion for a 
                                                 
 
1  Because Debra Bell shares a last name with her sister, 
Betty Jo Bell, who is also relevant to this case, we refer to 
both by their first names. 
3 
 
 
new trial.  The defendant later submitted a second motion for a 
new trial, which the judge also denied.  In that motion, the 
defendant argued that trial counsel acted ineffectively in 
failing to call an expert witness regarding the effects of drug 
and alcohol use or sleep deprivation on Jackson's testimony, and 
that he was deprived of his right to a public trial due to the 
unobjected-to exclusion of his mother and friend from the court 
room during the jury empanelment process. 
The case comes to this court on a consolidated appeal from 
the convictions of murder in the first degree and unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and from the denial of the defendant's 
motions for a new trial.  We reject the claims of error at trial 
that the defendant asserts, both on direct appeal and in his 
second motion for a new trial,2 and decline to grant the 
defendant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  However, with 
regard to the defendant's first motion for a new trial, based on 
newly discovered evidence, we conclude that, under the unusual 
circumstances of this case, there is a substantial issue whether 
Debra's affidavit falls within a narrow, constitutionally based 
exception to the hearsay rule, which applies where otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay is critical to the defense and bears 
                                                 
 
2  The defendant does not assert before this court the 
arguments that he made in his second motion for a new trial, but 
we review them pursuant to our obligations under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
4 
 
 
persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness.  We therefore remand 
for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Evidence at trial.  The Commonwealth 
offered evidence at trial that supported the following theory of 
the crime.  Since 1993, Jackson had leased an apartment in 
Boston.  Several months before the shooting, Jackson became 
acquainted with Greene, who was a crack dealer.  In exchange for 
money and free drugs, Jackson authorized Greene to sell crack 
cocaine out of the apartment, and permitted other individuals to 
use crack cocaine in the apartment. 
In the weeks leading up to the shooting, Jackson and Greene 
had entered into a dispute, due to Greene's increasingly violent 
behavior and his efforts to exert control over the apartment.  
At the same time, Jackson entered into an arrangement with the 
defendant, and with his codefendant, Williams, similar to his 
arrangement with Greene:  Jackson permitted them to sell drugs 
from the apartment, and in exchange received from them free 
drugs and financial support.  One week before the shooting, 
Jackson informed Greene that he no longer wanted him selling 
drugs in the apartment. 
On the day of the shooting, September 20, 2001, the 
defendant and Williams were in the apartment, rolling "oolies" -
                                                 
 
3  We recognize that the trial judge is now retired and that 
such a hearing must be conducted by a different judge. 
5 
 
 
- cigarettes laced with cocaine and "reefer" -- and drinking.  
Greene appeared, and Jackson again informed him that he was no 
longer permitting him to sell drugs in the apartment.  Greene 
became enraged.  He made a call from a cellular telephone, and 
threatened to "kill 'em all" and burn down the apartment.  While 
Greene was on the telephone, Jackson went into the bathroom.  As 
Jackson was preparing to leave the bathroom, he heard a gunshot.  
When he emerged from the bathroom and entered the living room, 
he observed the defendant fire five additional shots at Greene.  
The defendant shot the victim using a gun that Jackson had 
observed in the defendant's waistband several days previously. 
At trial, Jackson was the sole percipient witness to the 
shooting; he was also the sole source of evidence regarding the 
conflict among the defendant, Williams, and Greene that 
allegedly motivated the shooting.  The problems with Jackson's 
credibility were legion.  He indicated that he had begun 
drinking alcohol at age seven, began using cocaine at age 
twenty-eight, and had been using crack cocaine for nearly a 
decade prior to the shooting.  He acknowledged that he had been 
smoking crack and drinking alcohol on the day of the shooting, 
and had been awake nearly continuously in the days leading up to 
the shooting.  He explained his belief that that his drug and 
alcohol use would not have affected his ability to perceive the 
shooting by noting that, because he had been using drugs and 
6 
 
 
alcohol "24-7 . . . over a period of years," he was "immune" to 
the effects of them. 
Jackson's testimony at trial contradicted his initial 
statement to police during an emergency 911 call, in which he 
indicated that an unknown assailant had pushed through the 
apartment door and shot Greene.  His testimony at trial also 
partly contradicted prior testimony before the grand jury.  
Jackson told the grand jury that he saw Williams standing close 
behind the defendant as the defendant fired at Greene.  At 
trial, however, Jackson asserted that this testimony was untrue, 
and that he had not seen Williams when the defendant shot 
Greene. 
Jackson's testimony was replete with other inconsistencies 
and seeming obfuscations.  For instance, Jackson insisted that 
his earlier statement to police officers that he "had a pint of 
Hennessy" on the day of the shooting did not mean that he drank 
a pint of Hennessy cognac on that day, but merely that he 
possessed a pint of Hennessy, of which he drank some.  
Confronted with the apparent conflict between his grand jury 
testimony that he "never slept" on the day before the shooting 
and his trial testimony that he "took a nap" the night before 
the shooting, Jackson insisted that he did not "call taking a 
nap sleeping," but merely "resting [his] eyes."  Similarly, 
while Jackson provided the times for various events to police 
7 
 
 
officers in an initial interview on the day of the shooting, he 
asserted at trial that "all those times were just a guess time," 
explaining that he "didn't keep up with no time" because he "had 
no place to go" and "didn't have to worry about the time."   
Jackson acknowledged near the end of his testimony that he "made 
a whole lot of mistakes in [his] testimony." 
Despite the severe challenges to Jackson's credibility, the 
Commonwealth offered little additional evidence to corroborate 
his account.  The Commonwealth never located the firearm used in 
the shooting.  The physical evidence offered at trial linking 
the defendant to the apartment was limited to a beer bottle, 
which a prosecution expert testified contained a latent 
fingerprint that matched the defendant's right middle finger 
joint, and a cellular telephone, which was traced to a person 
known to both the defendant and Williams.  Several items of 
physical evidence, including the telephone and crack cocaine 
seized from the apartment, were lost while in police custody 
before the trial. 
b.  Postconviction proceedings.  A Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree, on 
theories of both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity 
or cruelty, in April, 2005.  The defendant also was convicted of 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  Williams, who was tried with 
the defendant as a joint venturer, was acquitted of the same 
8 
 
 
offenses. 
On December 12, 2006, while the defendant's appeal of his 
convictions was still pending, the defendant filed his first 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, in 
the form of Debra's affidavit.  Debra had given a statement to 
police shortly after the shooting, but she had otherwise avoided 
speaking to attorneys and others investigating the crime.  In 
her affidavit, she claimed that her statement to police was "not 
completely truthful" because she "was afraid of the officers, 
. . . did not want to get involved in the case," and had been 
told that "the officers . . . would take care of arrest warrants 
that were pending against [her] in different courts."  She 
apparently made herself unavailable to testify at a motion to 
suppress hearing that occurred shortly before trial, and at 
trial itself. 
Whereas Jackson testified at trial that he was in the 
bathroom by himself when the first shot was fired, and emerged 
from the bathroom to witness the defendant fire several 
additional shots at the victim, Debra asserted in her affidavit 
that she was in the bathroom with Jackson at the time of the 
shooting, and that Jackson remained in the bathroom for the 
entirety of the shooting.  Debra said that, after hearing noises 
from outside the bathroom, she waited a few minutes before 
opening the door and "briefly peek[ing] out," at which point she 
9 
 
 
saw "a person's legs on the floor."  She "screamed to . . . 
Jackson to look out the door," to which he "replied the 'Hell 
with it' or words to that effect and slammed the door closed," 
stating that "he did not care about what was going on."  Debra 
concluded that "there was absolutely no way that either he or 
[she] could have seen who shot . . . Greene or who was in the 
apartment at that time." 
After Debra's death in December, 2006, defense counsel 
submitted additional support for his first motion for a new 
trial, in the form of affidavits from two additional witnesses.  
One affidavit came from Betty Jo, Debra's sister.  Like Debra, 
Betty Jo also gave a statement to police shortly after the 
shooting, although she too claimed that she was "not truthful" 
because she "was afraid of the officers" and they had offered to 
"'clear' about three warrants that were pending for [her] 
arrest" if she cooperated with them.  Betty Jo also testified at 
a hearing on the defendants' pretrial motions to suppress, her 
name appeared on the Commonwealth's witness list for trial, and 
she was available to testify during the trial.  Shortly before 
the trial, however, she indicated that she refused to speak to 
defense counsel, and neither party called her at trial. 
In her affidavit, Betty Jo indicated that "[e]very now and 
then after the shooting on September 20, 2001, . . . Debra . . . 
would tell [her] about what had occurred in the apartment . . . 
10 
 
 
and she would say that she and . . . Jackson were in the 
bathroom getting high on crack cocaine and engaging in sexual 
activity when the shooting occurred."  Betty Jo also claimed 
that Jackson had admitted to her, nearly five years after the 
shooting, that he and Debra were in the bathroom "doing their 
thing" and that he "did not know what was going on" at the time 
of the shooting.  Betty Jo stated that she had accompanied Debra 
to her interview with police after the shooting, and both had 
been independently interviewed by officers investigating the 
crime.  She asserted that, during the interview, police officers 
sought to prompt her to identify certain photographs even though 
she did not recognize them. 
Defense counsel also submitted two affidavits from an 
individual named Joseph Anderson, which further support Debra's 
account of the events leading up to the shooting.  Anderson 
indicated that he went to Jackson's apartment on September 20, 
2001, to purchase crack cocaine for a friend.  He stated that, 
after he made the purchase from Jackson, he "saw . . . Jackson 
going into the bathroom with a black woman, who was known to 
[him] as Debra."  Anderson observed "two black males and one 
black female sitting . . . in the parlor" when he purchased the 
crack cocaine; upon leaving, he also "saw a black male, who was 
standing in the hallway in the apartment arguing with a light 
skinned male, who appeared to be Puerto Rican."  Finally, 
11 
 
 
Anderson indicated that, "[a]bout three or four days after the 
shooting," he encountered Jackson at a liquor store.  The two 
conversed, and Jackson allegedly said that he did not "know 
anything about" the shooting and did not "give a fuck about it." 
In November, 2007, the motion judge, who was also the trial 
judge, denied the defendant's first motion for a new trial in a 
brief opinion.  The judge explained that she initially 
considered holding an evidentiary hearing, but concluded based 
on her review of the affidavits that an evidentiary hearing was 
not necessary.  The judge explained that, were Debra alive, "her 
testimony . . . would tend to impeach the testimony of Jackson 
[and] would not be sufficient to warrant a new trial."  The 
judge further observed that Debra's alleged statements would not 
be admissible as a "dying declaration" because they did not 
concern the cause or the circumstances of her own death.  
Although the defendant argued that his constitutional rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights required the admissibility of the affidavit regardless 
whether it constituted a dying declaration under State 
evidentiary law, the judge's decision did not address that 
argument. 
The defendant filed a second motion for a new trial in 
April, 2012.  There he asserted an ineffective assistance of 
12 
 
 
counsel claim, based on trial counsel's failure to offer expert 
testimony regarding the impact of sleep deprivation on 
perception and memory to impeach Jackson's testimony, and a 
claim for a violation of the right to a public trial, based on 
the alleged exclusion of a family member and a friend from the 
jury empanelment process.  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
judge denied the defendant's second motion for a new trial. 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant raises three specific issues 
on appeal; in addition, he urges the court to grant him relief 
pursuant to its general superintendence power under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  The first issue relates to the conduct of the 
trial itself:  the defendant contends that the trial judge 
improperly admitted certain testimony of the Commonwealth's 
fingerprint expert.  We reject that argument, as well as the two 
arguments that the defendant asserted in his second motion for a 
new trial, and decline to grant the defendant relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  The second issue relates to the judge's denial 
of the defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence.  We conclude that the defendant's motion 
raised a substantial issue, and therefore remand for an 
evidentiary hearing.  The third issue relates to defense 
counsel's posttrial conduct with respect to the defendant's 
motion for a new trial:  the defendant argues that defense 
counsel did not act sufficiently quickly to move for a 
13 
 
 
videotaped deposition of Debra, thus depriving the defendant of 
effective assistance of counsel.  In light of our remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence, we decline to reach that 
issue. 
a.  Issues on direct appeal.  The Commonwealth's expert 
testified that she "individualized or identified" a latent 
fingerprint found on a beer bottle at the crime scene to 
defendant's "right middle finger joint."  The defendant contends 
that the admission of this testimony was in error.  Because 
trial counsel did not object, we review to determine "whether 
there was error, and if so, whether it created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Perez, 
460 Mass. 683, 689-690 (2011). 
 We have "concluded that the underlying theory and process 
of latent fingerprint identification . . . are sufficiently 
reliable to admit expert opinion testimony regarding the 
matching of a latent impression with a full fingerprint" 
(citation and quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 
467 Mass. 192, 204 (2014).  We have "warned," however, "that 
testimony to the effect that a print matches, or is 
'individualized' to, a known print should be presented as an 
opinion, not a fact, and opinions expressing absolute certainty 
about, or the infallibility of, an 'individualization' of a 
14 
 
 
print should be avoided"  (citation, quotation, and alterations 
omitted).  Id.  Here, on direct examination, the expert 
testified that the print was "individualized or identified" with 
the defendant's print, but did not describe that 
individualization as an absolute certainty.  On cross-
examination the expert did indicate that she was "positive that 
[she] identified" the defendant's print.  Because this testimony 
occurred on cross-examination, however, and because there was no 
motion to strike, we identify no error in the testimony, much 
less an error sufficient to create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See id. at 205. 
b.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Pursuant to our 
obligations under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have reviewed the 
entire record and considered the issues raised in the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial.  We agree with the 
motion judge's determination that, because the effects of 
Jackson's alcohol and drug use and sleep deprivation on his 
capacity to perceive and recall events were thoroughly developed 
through cross-examination, calling an expert on those issues 
would not have accomplished something meaningful for the 
defense.  We also conclude that the motion judge properly 
determined that the defendant had not borne his burden of 
demonstrating that the court room was closed during any portion 
of the jury selection, because the defendant offered no evidence 
15 
 
 
indicating that the court room was closed by any specific order 
or that court officers ever told anyone to leave.  We identify 
no basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, either to reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree or to order a new trial. 
c.  Motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence.  Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), a trial judge "may grant a new trial at any 
time if it appears that justice may not have been done."  Where 
the defendant moves for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence, the defendant "must establish both that the 
evidence is newly discovered and that it casts real doubt on the 
justice of the conviction," which entails a showing that it 
"probably would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305-306 
(1986).  The defendant "also bears the burden of demonstrating 
that any newly discovered evidence is admissible."  Commonwealth 
v. Weichell, 446 Mass. 785, 799 (2006). 
In adjudicating a motion for a new trial, the "judge may 
rule on the issue or issues presented by such motion on the 
basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without further 
hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or 
affidavits."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  "When a substantial issue has been raised, 
16 
 
 
and supported by a substantial evidentiary showing," however, 
"the judge should hold an evidentiary hearing" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Muniur M., 467 Mass. 1010, 
1011 (2014).  See also Reporters' Notes to Rule 30, Mass. Ann. 
Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1709 
(LexisNexis 2014-2015) ("Where a substantial issue is 
raised, . . . the better practice is to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing").  We generally review a judge's decision on a motion 
for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.  
Commonwealth v. Muniur M., supra at 1012.  Where the defendant's 
motion for a new trial raises an issue "of constitutional 
dimension," however, "we are not bound by an abuse of discretion 
standard, but rather examine the issue independently."  
Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66-67, (2004), S.C., 452 
Mass. 1022 (2008).  Because we conclude that the defendant's 
first motion for a new trial raises a sufficiently substantial 
issue whether Debra's affidavit falls within a narrow, 
constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule, we remand 
for an evidentiary hearing. 
The judge's decision to deny the defendant's first motion 
for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing appears 
to have rested in large part on the judge's determination that 
Debra's affidavit was not admissible as a dying declaration.  
That determination, as the defendant concedes, was correct.  
17 
 
 
Under the "dying declaration" exception to the hearsay rule, "a 
statement made by a declarant-victim" is admissible in a 
prosecution for homicide, provided that the statement was made 
"under the belief of imminent death," that the declarant "died 
shortly after making the statement," and that the statement 
"concern[ed] the cause or circumstances of what the declarant 
believed to be her own impending death."  Commonwealth v. 
Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 251-252 (2008).  Because Debra's 
statement in her affidavit did not concern the cause or 
circumstances of her impending death, her statement is not 
admissible under the traditional hearsay exception for dying 
declarations. 
The defendant also correctly concedes that this court has 
not yet recognized, as a matter of evidentiary law, any other 
hearsay exception that would encompass Debra's affidavit.  For 
instance, the Federal rules of evidence include a "residual" 
exception, which allows the admission of hearsay evidence that 
is not admissible under any other exception where the court 
determines that (a) "the statement has equivalent guarantees of 
trustworthiness"; (b) "the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact"; (c) the statement "is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the 
proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts"; and (d) "the 
purposes of [the] rules [of evidence] and the interests of 
18 
 
 
justice" will best be served by the admission of the statement 
into evidence.  Fed. R. Evid. 807.  Thirty-one States have 
adopted some form of a "residual" or "catchall" exception to the 
hearsay rule, often patterned on the Federal rule.4  On several 
occasions, however, this court has declined to recognize an 
"'innominate' or residual exception to the hearsay rule" 
(citation and quotation omitted) akin to the Federal residual 
exception.  Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 281-282 (1986).  
See Commonwealth v. Semedo, 422 Mass. 716, 728 (1996); 
Commonwealth v. Costello, 411 Mass. 371, 377 (1991); 
Commonwealth v. Meech, 380 Mass. 490, 496-497 (1980); 
Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 713 (1976); M.S. Brodin & 
M. Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence § 8.25 (8th ed. 
2007). 
In nearly all of those States that, like Massachusetts, 
have not adopted a broader residual hearsay exception akin to 
                                                 
 
4 See Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(5); Ariz. R. Evid. 807; Ark. R. 
Evid. 804(b)(5); Colo. R. Evid. 807; Conn. Code Evid. 8-9; Del. 
R. Evid. 807; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-8-807 (LexisNexis 2015); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 626-1, Rule 804; Idaho R. Evid. 804; Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 5.807 (West 2014); La. Code Evid. art. 804(b)(6); Md. Rule 5-
803(b)(24); Mich. R. Evid. 804(b)(7); Minn. R. Evid. 807; Miss. 
R. Evid. 804(b)(5); Mont. R. Evid. 804(b)(5); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 27-804(2)(e); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.315; N.H. R. Evid. 
804(b)(6); N.M. R. Evid. 11-807(A); N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1, 
804(b)(5); N.D. R. Evid. 807(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2804.1; 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.465(3)(h); R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(5); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 19-19-807; Utah R. Evid. 807(a); W. Va. R. Evid. 
807(a); Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6); Wyo. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).  See 
also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 10 (1999). 
 
19 
 
 
the Federal rule, courts and commentators have acknowledged the 
existence of a far narrower, constitutionally based hearsay 
exception, rooted in the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (Chambers).5  
                                                 
 
5  See Ex parte Griffin, 790 So. 2d 351, 355 (Ala. 2000) 
("[W]e follow the United States Supreme Court's holding in 
Chambers and hold that [the defendant's] constitutional rights 
supersede the hearsay rule in the Alabama Rules of Evidence"); 
People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 665 (1979) (en banc) 
(acknowledging that, under Chambers, court may "not elevate a 
fastidious adherence to the technicalities of the law of 
evidence over the right to a fair trial"); Marek v. State, 14 
So. 3d 985, 995 (Fla. 2009) (acknowledging that, in some 
circumstances, Chambers requires admission of otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay, but "only where the [statement] sought to 
be admitted bears indicia of reliability"); People v. Tenney, 
205 Ill. 2d 411, 434 (2002) (concluding, based on Chambers, 
that, "where hearsay testimony bears persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness and is critical to the accused's defense, its 
exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with 
due process"); Thomas v. State, 580 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. 1991) 
(altering State evidentiary law to bring it into compliance with 
Chambers); State v. Hills, 264 Kan. 437, 445 (1998) ("Kansas 
courts have . . . disallowed the mechanical application of 
evidentiary rules where the failure to do so would result in the 
State not receiving a fair trial"); Crawley v. Commonwealth, 568 
S.W.2d 927, 931 (Ky. 1978) (adopting a broader exception for 
statements against interest to bring State evidentiary law into 
compliance with constitutional requirements articulated in 
Chambers); State v. Webb, 424 So. 2d 233, 238-240 (La. 1982) 
(reversing conviction of murder after determining that trial 
judge's restriction on defense counsel's cross-examination of 
police detective regarding alleged third party's confession 
"represent[ed] error of constitutionally significant 
proportions"); McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 346 (Mo. 
2012) ("The United States Supreme Court case of Chambers . . . 
set forth the constitutionally based exception to the rule 
against the admission of hearsay during the guilt phase of 
trial, which this Court applies"); State v. Bunyan, 154 N.J. 
261, 265, 266 (1998) (concluding that, while "New Jersey has 
declined to adopt a residual exception" akin to Federal residual 
hearsay exception, "constitutional provisions, such as the 
20 
 
 
There the defendant sought to defend against a prosecution for 
murder by introducing a third party's subsequently repudiated 
confession to the crime.  Id. at 289-290.  The defendant's 
efforts were largely thwarted by the combination of the State’s 
hearsay rule and its "party witness" or "voucher" rule, which 
prohibited the defense from calling the third party and then 
                                                                                                                                                             
compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment [to the United 
States Constitution], may require admission of evidence even 
though the evidence would be inadmissible according to State 
rules of evidence"); People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 286 (2004) 
("grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness . . . must be 
admitted when it is material, exculpatory and has sufficient 
indicia of reliability"); People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 650 
(1997) (concluding that, although not authorized by statute, 
defendant's "constitutional right to due process" requires 
admission of grand jury testimony where declarant is unavailable 
and hearsay testimony at issue "is material, exculpatory and has 
sufficient indicia of reliability"); State v. Sumlin, 69 Ohio 
St. 3d 105, 110 (1994) (after determining that trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in declining to allow statements into 
evidence under State evidentiary law, "consider[ing] whether 
fundamental principles of due process required the trial court 
to admit the statements"); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 472 Pa. 235, 
240-241 (1977) (observing that conclusion that statements at 
issue "were undoubtedly hearsay . . . does not end our 
consideration of this issue," before analyzing admissibility of 
statements under Chambers); Advisory Commission Comment to Tenn. 
R. Evid. 804 (observing that, while "[t]here is no residual 
exception even where declarants are unavailable[,] 
[o]ccasionally . . . constitutional considerations require that 
a tribunal permit the accused in a criminal case to introduce 
trustworthy hearsay not falling within a traditional 
exception").  See also Inwinkelried, The Constitutionalization 
of Hearsay:  The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 
Minn. L. Rev. 521, 547 (1992) ("To successfully invoke the 
constitutional right to present evidence, the accused must 
persuade the judge that the testimony in question is crucial to 
the defense"). 
 
21 
 
 
challenging his repudiation of his confession on cross-
examination.  Id. at 294.  The United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the application of State evidentiary rules may 
produce results that conflict with the defendant's rights under 
the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment or the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 302.  The 
Court observed that, "[a]lthough perhaps no rule of evidence has 
been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials 
than that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions 
tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in fact is 
likely to be trustworthy have long existed."  Id.  Because the 
sworn confession at issue in the case "bore persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness" and "also was critical to [the 
defendant's] defense," the Court concluded that "the hearsay 
rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice."  Id.  See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) 
(constitutionally impermissible for State to apply hearsay rule 
to bar third-party confession where confession was "highly 
relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the 
trial" and "substantial reasons existed to assume its 
reliability"). 
This court has already recognized a constitutionally based 
hearsay exception in one context.  Because the right to defend 
against criminal charges by presenting third-party culprit 
22 
 
 
evidence "is of a constitutional dimension," we have held that a 
defendant may offer otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to 
support the assertion that a third party is the true culprit, 
provided certain conditions are met.  Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801, 804 n.26 (2009).  The defendant 
must establish that the hearsay statement is "otherwise 
relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury," 
displays "substantial connecting links to the crime," has "a 
rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises," and is 
not "too remote or speculative" (citations and quotations 
omitted).  Id. at 804.  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 
343, 355-357 (2007); Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2015). 
To be sure, Debra's affidavit does not constitute third-
party culprit evidence.  The United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Chambers, however, was not expressly limited to 
third-party culprit evidence.  The Supreme Court and other 
courts have applied the principle articulated in Chambers to 
cases that did not involve the exclusion of third-party culprit 
evidence.  See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 (1986) 
(holding that trial court violated principle articulated in 
Chambers when it barred defendant from introducing evidence to 
challenge voluntariness of his confession); State v. Bunyan, 154 
N.J. 261, 265, 269-272 (1998) (applying Chambers principle to 
affidavit from purported eyewitness asserting that defendant did 
23 
 
 
not commit crime of which he was convicted). 
We identify no persuasive reasons for confining our 
recognition of a constitutionally based hearsay exception to the 
context of third-party culprit evidence.  Third-party culprit 
evidence challenges the prosecution's case in a way that, while 
potentially powerful, is ultimately indirect:  it seeks to 
create reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt by 
suggesting that another person in fact committed the crime.  An 
affidavit that directly contradicts the testimony of the sole 
purported eyewitness to a crime likewise undermines the 
prosecution's case in a way that is indirect yet potentially 
powerful.  Accordingly, we believe that the principle 
articulated in Chambers applies to Debra's affidavit:  the 
affidavit will be admissible, despite its failure to fall into 
any of our traditional hearsay exceptions, provided that the 
defendant establishes both that it "[i]s critical to [the 
defendant's] defense" and that it bears "persuasive assurances 
of trustworthiness."  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. 
Having recognized that the principle articulated in 
Chambers applies to Debra's affidavit, we conclude that the 
defendant's first motion for a new trial raises a substantial 
issue, warranting an evidentiary hearing.  Debra's affidavit 
plainly would have been critical to the defense.  The affidavit 
directly contradicts Jackson's testimony, indicating that he 
24 
 
 
could not possibly have observed what he claimed at trial to 
have observed.  Jackson's other testimony suggested that both 
the defendant and the defendant's acquitted codefendant, 
Williams, had a motive to murder Greene.  In the absence of 
Jackson's statement that he saw the defendant shooting Greene, 
however, there is no evidence that makes it more likely than not 
-- much less evidence capable of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt -- that the defendant, rather than Williams, was the 
perpetrator. 
Because Debra's affidavit is critical to the defense, its 
admissibility hinges on whether the defendant establishes that 
it bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness.  Although the 
record as it stands does not permit us to answer that question, 
the evidence submitted by the defendant establishes that there 
is a substantial issue whether the affidavit has sufficient 
assurances of trustworthiness.  In reaching this determination, 
we draw on several instructive similarities between the 
circumstances at issue here and those involved in Chambers.  Cf. 
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1996) (plurality 
opinion) (characterizing Chambers as "fact-intensive" and "an 
exercise in highly case-specific error correction"); State v. 
Bunyan, 154 N.J. at 270 ("Because the holding of Chambers is so 
intimately related to the facts and circumstances of that 
case, . . . we must consider the facts of Chambers and compare 
25 
 
 
them to the facts of this case" [citation and quotation 
omitted]). 
In Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-301, the United States Supreme 
Court observed that, while the hearsay statement at issue fell 
outside of the hearsay exception for statements against 
interest, the admission of the statement was consistent with the 
underlying "rationale" for that exception.  Here, similarly, 
while Debra's affidavit fails to satisfy the technical 
requirements for the dying declaration hearsay exception, it 
appears to fall within the rationale for the exception.  A 
traditional justification for the dying declaration exception is 
that, when a person is "under a sense of impending death" and 
"every hope of this world is gone[,] . . . the mind is induced 
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth" 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Giles v. California, 554 
U.S. 353, 397 (2008).  See Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1006 
(9th Cir. 2004) (although hearsay statement at issue did "not 
technically meet the definition of a dying declaration, it was 
given when [the declarant] knew that he was in real danger of 
imminent death -- a traditional indicium of reliability").  
Consistent with that justification, in her affidavit Debra 
attributed her decision to come forward to the "uncertainty of 
[her] medical condition" and her desire to clear her conscience 
of her prior failure to come forward with what she knew about 
26 
 
 
the shooting.  Indeed, according to Betty Jo, Debra's plea that 
she "make the truth known about the shooting in . . . Jackson's 
apartment" was her "sister's dying words."  These circumstances, 
particularly given that the Commonwealth has as of yet offered 
no alternative explanation for why Debra would have an incentive 
to lie in her affidavit, tend to support the trustworthiness of 
Debra's statement. 
The United States Supreme Court also observed in Chambers, 
410 U.S. at 300, that the hearsay statement at issue bore 
persuasive assurances of trustworthiness because it "was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case."  Here 
similarly, Debra's affidavit is corroborated by Jackson's own 
initial statements to police, in which he asserted that he did 
not see the shooter.  The four affidavits of Debra, Betty Jo, 
and Anderson, moreover, bolster one another through their 
inclusion of shared details.  For instance, Jackson testified at 
trial that only he, the defendant, Williams, and the victim were 
present in the apartment at the time of the shooting.  Both 
Debra and Anderson, however, indicate that there were others 
present moments before the shooting.  Debra and Anderson appear 
to have observed one another, with Anderson remarking that he 
"saw . . . Jackson going into the bathroom with a black 
woman . . . known to [him] as Debra," and Debra observing that 
she saw "a black male known to [her] as Joe."  Both Debra and 
27 
 
 
Betty Jo also observed the presence of a woman known to them as 
"Sandra." 
Finally, in Chambers the Supreme Court remarked that the 
third party confessed on multiple occasions.  The Court 
concluded that "[t]he sheer number of independent confessions 
provided additional corroboration for each," particularly since 
each confession "was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance 
shortly after the murder had occurred."  Id.  Here, Betty Jo's 
affidavit indicates that, following the shooting and until 
Debra's death, Debra on multiple occasions told her "that she 
and . . . Jackson were in the bathroom at the time of the 
shooting and that they could not see what had occurred or who 
had been involved in the shooting." 
In identifying these elements that arguably may support the 
trustworthiness of Debra's affidavit, we do not in any way 
suggest that the affidavit ultimately is admissible.  We 
conclude only that there is a substantial issue whether Debra's 
affidavit is supported by sufficiently persuasive guarantees of 
trustworthiness that it is admissible under the constitutional 
principle articulated in Chambers, and that the resolution of 
that issue will benefit from an evidentiary hearing.6 
                                                 
 
6  There is no indication in the record that either Betty Jo 
or Anderson is unavailable to testify and expand upon the 
matters addressed in their affidavits.  Were they to testify at 
an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a new 
28 
 
 
If the judge determines on remand that Debra's affidavit is 
supported by sufficiently persuasive guarantees of 
trustworthiness to be admissible, the result will not be an 
automatic new trial.  Instead, the judge must then decide 
whether Debra's affidavit, together with the evidence offered by 
Betty Jo and Anderson, satisfies the established standard for a 
motion for a new trial.  That standard requires a showing "both 
that the evidence is newly discovered and that it casts real 
doubt on the justice of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 
397 Mass. at 305.  The inquiry into whether the defendant has 
satisfied the new trial standard is conceptually distinct from 
the threshold inquiry into whether Debra's affidavit is 
admissible at all, although many of the same considerations that 
inform a judge's assessment of the affidavit's trustworthiness 
may well also inform the judge's assessment whether it casts 
real doubt on the justice of the conviction.7 
                                                                                                                                                             
trial, the judge could assess their credibility as it bears on 
the trustworthiness of Debra's affidavit.  Similarly, there may 
also be testimony taken from the lawyer who prepared Debra's 
affidavit, who could provide information about her physical and 
mental condition at the relevant time.  The Commonwealth 
likewise could call witnesses and probe factors relating to, 
among other things, Debra's potential motives and state of mind 
at the time she gave her affidavit and before her death.  For 
instance, it could be explored whether Debra had any sort of 
relationship with the defendant that might have created a motive 
for her to lie in order to support the defendant's motion for a 
new trial. 
 
 
7 In addition to concluding that Debra's affidavit was not 
29 
 
 
To establish that evidence is "newly discovered," the 
defendant must show that the evidence was "unknown to the 
defendant or his counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them 
at the time of trial."  Id. at 306.  The Commonwealth asserts 
that, regardless of whether the affidavit is admissible, it is 
not newly discovered.  The Commonwealth concedes that Debra was 
unavailable at the time of the trial, given the prosecution's 
unsuccessful efforts to locate her.  The Commonwealth, however, 
contends that Betty Jo was available at the time of trial.  
Because Betty Jo allegedly knew that her sister claimed to have 
been in the bathroom with Jackson at the time of the shooting, 
and because defense counsel chose not to call Betty Jo as a 
witness, the Commonwealth contends that the defendant has not 
met his burden of showing that the substance of Debra's 
affidavit was not reasonably discoverable at the time of the 
trial. 
                                                                                                                                                             
admissible as a dying declaration, the judge also determined 
that Debra's statements "would not be sufficient to warrant a 
new trial" because it only "tend[s] to impeach the testimony of 
Jackson."  In Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 621 (2015), 
however, which we decided after the judge denied the defendant's 
first motion for a new trial, we clarified that "we have never 
adopted an inflexible rule that newly discovered evidence that 
merely corroborates or impeaches a witness's testimony is an 
insufficient basis for a motion for a new trial."  Indeed, we 
noted that, "in rare cases, a new trial may be warranted where 
the Commonwealth's case depends so heavily on the testimony of a 
witness and where the newly discovered evidence seriously 
undermines the credibility of that witness" (citations, 
quotations, and alterations omitted).  Id. 
 
30 
 
 
The motion judge did not address the question whether the 
evidence offered by the defendant was newly discovered, likely 
because of her determination that, in any event, Debra's 
affidavit would not be admissible.  Like the issue whether 
Debra's affidavit bears persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness, we believe that the question whether the 
substance of Debra's affidavit is newly discovered warrants an 
evidentiary hearing.  We note, for instance, that Betty Jo's 
affidavit indicates that she was "not completely truthful" with 
the police officers who questioned her because she "did not want 
to get involved in the case," and that she stated at the 
suppression hearing conducted shortly before the trial that she 
refused to speak with defense counsel.  We also have no 
information about whether Anderson was available at the time of 
the trial.  In light of these circumstances, we think that the 
answer to the question whether "reasonable pretrial diligence 
would . . . have uncovered" (quotation omitted) the information 
contained in Debra's affidavit hinges on questions of fact that 
warrant an evidentiary hearing.  Commonwealth v. Weichell, 446 
Mass. 785, 799 (2006). 
We conclude by emphasizing the narrowness of the 
constitutional principle that governs this case and necessitates 
our remand.  Our decision does not signal a departure from our 
long-standing refusal to adopt a broad residual hearsay rule 
31 
 
 
modeled on the Federal rule.  In the vast majority of cases, the 
established hearsay exceptions will continue to govern the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence at most criminal trials, with 
this constitutional hearsay exception operating only in the 
rarest of cases, where otherwise inadmissible evidence is both 
truly critical to the defense's case and bears persuasive 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense 
counsel's posttrial conduct.  The defendant argues that, if this 
court concludes that Debra's affidavit is not admissible, then 
we should find that counsel provided ineffective assistance in 
failing to act immediately to preserve Debra's testimony, and 
that counsel's error caused a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Because of the inadequacy of the record 
before us at this point and because we are remanding the case 
for a determination whether Debra's affidavit is admissible 
under the standard articulated in Chambers, we decline to reach 
the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
defense counsel's posttrial conduct.  If the judge on remand 
concludes that the affidavit is not admissible, the defendant 
may then bring a motion for a new trial based on defense 
counsel's allegedly ineffective posttrial conduct in handling 
the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions are affirmed, 
32 
 
 
as is the order denying the defendant's second motion for a new 
trial.  The order denying the defendant's first motion for a new 
trial, however, is vacated, and the case is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further consideration of that motion in a 
manner consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.