Case Title: Sellers v. Sellers

Citation: 638 So. 2d 481

Docket Number: 92-CA-0693

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
638 So. 2d 481 (1994) Raymond Steven SELLERS v. Carolyn Ann Harvey SELLERS. No. 92-CA-0693. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 9, 1994. Albert B. Smith, III, Cleveland, for appellant. A.E. (Rusty) Harlow, Jr., Harlow & Harlow, Grenada, for appellee. Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ. JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., Justice, for the Court: On July 3, 1992, the Chancery Court of Bolivar County granted the appellant, Raymond Steven Sellers ("Mr. Sellers"), a divorce from his wife, the appellee, Carolyn Ann Harvey Sellers ("Mrs. Sellers"), on the *482 ground of adultery. The chancellor denied Mrs. Seller's prayer for a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and also denied her request for alimony. In addition, the chancellor stated that neither parent was fit at that time to have custody of Anna, the one child born of this marriage, and awarded custody of Anna to Barbara Outz ("Mrs. Outz"), the child's maternal aunt. From this ruling, Mr. Sellers appeals, citing the following error: We hold that the chancellor erred in awarding custody of the child to her maternal aunt, as there was no finding that Mr. Sellers was clearly unfit. We reverse and remand for findings on Mr. Sellers' current fitness as a parent. Raymond and Carolyn Sellers were married on May 16, 1988. The couple had one child, Anna Sellers, born November 17, 1987. Mrs. Sellers had been married twice previously, in 1981 and 1986, and had one child by the first marriage, Jeremy Edmonds. The couple separated on June 7, 1991, when Mrs. Sellers moved out of the marital home with the children. Mrs. Sellers left the following note: After leaving Mr. Sellers, Mrs. Sellers moved to Grenada and moved into the residence of Tonya and Frank Ratliff, where Jimmy Phillips had been residing for quite some time. Although she claims she began dating Jimmy Phillips after her separation from Mr. Sellers, Bonnie Shields, a next door neighbor of Tonya and Frank Ratliff, testified that Mrs. Sellers and Jimmy Phillips moved in together the first or second week of June, 1991, approximately the same time she left Mr. Sellers. Mrs. Sellers lived with Jimmy Phillips at the Ratliff residence for approximately six months before an incident of abuse of Jeremy that led to the removal of the minor children from Mrs. Sellers's custody. The incident of abuse occurred in the summer of 1991. Jimmy Phillips beat Jeremy with the wire end of a flyswatter on the front porch of the house at approximately 1:00 a.m. Phillips then left the child on the front porch until approximately 3:00 a.m., periodically coming outside to verbally abuse him. During this time, Jeremy was clad only in a pair of little girl's panties. Jeremy was forced to remain in the panties the next day while standing in a corner. Jimmy Phillips called over Jeremy's friends, his own friends, relatives, and neighbors to view Jeremy. This treatment continued until that night when Tonya Ratliff finally put an end to the abuse. This abuse was witnessed by an abundance of witnesses, including Mrs. Sellers, who testified that she approved of the punishment by stating, "It wasn't any worse than anything Raymond ever did." Jeremy was punished for stating he used a bathcloth when he took a bath when in fact he had not used one. It should be noted that Mrs. Sellers's insinuation that Mr. Sellers had abused Jeremy was not substantiated by any evidence whatsoever. In fact, Mrs. Outz, Mrs. Sellers's own sister, testified that Mr. Sellers was a good father figure for Jeremy. The children were removed from Mrs. Sellers's custody and placed in the custody of Mrs. Outz by the Department of Human Services on September 12, 1991. The children have been in her custody ever since. Mrs. Outz testified that during this time, Mrs. Sellers visited the children 10-15 times and never had them overnight. She further testified that Mr. Sellers only missed three weekends during this entire time and kept both children overnight on several occasions. *483 By all accounts, both children love Mr. Sellers, and Jeremy, by his own initiative, even calls Mr. Sellers "daddy." Despite these facts, the chancellor awarded custody of the children to Mrs. Outz. This appeal followed. Mr. Sellers contends that the decision to award custody of Anna to her aunt was based on the chancellor's unwillingness to separate Anna from her half-brother Jeremy. Mr. Sellers argues that in basing his decision on this factor, the chancellor violated the presumption that the child's best interest is placement with the parent or parents. Mrs. Sellers counters that the chancellor's decision was based not on the fact that the chancellor did not want to separate the children, but rather, on a finding that both parents were unfit to care for the children at the time. Therefore, Mrs. Sellers argues, the problem of separating the children was but one factor in the chancellor's decision to place the children with the maternal aunt. This Court is bound to uphold the factual findings of a chancellor if the findings are not manifestly wrong or substantially erroneous. Crow v. Crow, 622 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Miss. 1993); Bell v. Parker, 563 So. 2d 594, 596-597 (Miss. 1990). However, in the case at bar, the chancellor made no explicit factual finding as to the fitness of either parent, nor did he state whether his custody decision was based on a desire to keep the children together. The chancellor stated in part: The chancellor granted both parents liberal visitation rights, including the right to have the children with them overnight. In addition, the chancellor ordered both parents to contribute to the children's support. In custody battles involving a natural parent and a third party, it is presumed that a child's best interest will be served by placement in the custody of his or her natural parent, as against any third party. In order to overcome this presumption there must be a clear showing that the natural parent has 1) abandoned the child; 2) the conduct of the parent is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child; or 3) that the parent is unfit mentally or otherwise to have custody. Keely v. Keely, 495 So. 2d 452, 453 (Miss. 1986). See also Carson v. Natchez Children's Home, 580 So. 2d 1248, 1257 (Miss. 1991); Matter of Marriage of Smith, 555 So. 2d 73, 75 (Miss. 1989). We have no such general rule regarding the separation of sibling children. We stated in Sparkman v. Sparkman, 441 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Miss. 1983): Sparkman, 441 So. 2d at 1362. In this case, the children and the chancellor were torn between two concerns: that children should be with a natural parent as against a third party, and that siblings should not be required to live apart. In Carson v. Natchez Children's Home, 580 So. 2d 1248 (Miss. 1991), we indicated the relative weight of each concern: Carson, 580 So. 2d at 1257 (emphasis added). We take this opportunity to clarify that the presumption in favor of awarding custody to a natural parent should prevail over any imperative regarding the separating of siblings. This conclusion supports Mr. Sellers' position on appeal. Nevertheless, Mr. Sellers' assertion that the chancellor based his decision solely on a desire to keep the children together is clearly mistaken. A reading of the chancellor's ruling above reveals that the separation issue was but one of several factors he considered in reaching his decision. In all child custody cases, the polestar consideration is the best interest of the child. Smith v. Todd, 464 So. 2d 1155 (Miss. 1985); Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). In Albright v. Albright, we set forth a number of factors to be considered by chancellors in weighing custody decisions: Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005. We noted in Smith v. Todd, 464 So. 2d 1155 (Miss. 1985) that this list "was surely not intended to be exhaustive but a beginning point ..." Therefore, the chancellor in the case at bar correctly considered several issues in reaching his decision, including the stability of the parties' respective homes, the personal qualities of the parties, and, in addition, the separation of the children. While the chancellor did not base his decision entirely on the separation issue, it is apparent that this was his primary concern and the foundation of his ruling. However important this consideration may be, it may not be used as a basis to deprive a parent of his child in favor of a third party unless the parent has been found unfit. In Keely v. Keely, 495 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 1986), custody of the minor child of divorcing parties was awarded to the maternal grandfather by the Youth Court of Newton County. The Newton County Chancery Court entered a temporary custody order granting custody to the maternal grandfather until the final hearing of the divorce. At trial, the chancellor refused to hear any testimony as to the custody of the child, and allowed the child to remain in the custody of the grandfather, while granting the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Finding that the chancellor had erred in refusing to allow the father to present evidence concerning custody of his son, we reversed and awarded custody to the father, without prejudice to a third party seeking to overcome the presumption in favor of the natural parent. In Moody v. Moody, 211 So. 2d 842 (Miss. 1968), the appellant father was awarded a divorce on the grounds of adultery. However, the chancellor found that both parents were unfit to have custody of the only child of the marriage, and thus awarded custody to the maternal grandparents. The father appealed to this Court, and we reversed. While recognizing that it is within the power of the chancellor to award custody to a third party when the parents are unfit, we stated that "it is the strong policy of the law of this State that a child shall remain in the custody of one of the parents unless there has been a clear showing that both are unfit." Moody, 211 So. 2d at 844 (emphasis added). In interpreting the rational behind this rule, we stated: Moody, 211 So. 2d at 844. We reversed the chancellor's ruling because there was no evidence of immoral conduct or abandonment, nor was there any showing that the best interest of the child would be served by awarding custody to the grandparents. All testimony presented demonstrated that the appellant loved his son and cared for his welfare; that he was a hard worker, earned enough money to support and educate the child, and that he was morally fit to care for him. Although the appellant worked and someone else had to care for the child during the day, we found that the appellant's mother was physically able and willing to help her son in caring for the child while he worked. In Hale v. Hood, 313 So. 2d 18 (Miss. 1975), a maternal aunt petitioned for custody of her sister's child. Her petition was contested by the child's father, who also sought for custody. At a trial on the merits, the grandmother and mother of the child testified that the father was a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. However, the chancellor awarded custody to the child's maternal aunt, holding that this was in the child's best interest. We reversed and rendered, noting that the trial court "did not find, nor was there evidence to support a finding, that appellant had abandoned the child or that he had been guilty of any immoral conduct or was otherwise unfit to have the custody of the child." Hale, 313 So. 2d at 19. We stated: Hale, 313 So. 2d at 19-20. In the case at bar, the chancellor did not clearly hold, nor did the evidence support such a finding, that Raymond was unfit to have custody of his daughter Anna. In fact, all evidence indicated that Raymond was a loving and devoted parent. Evidence showed that Raymond 1) had held the same job for over seven years; 2) had lived in the same home for over two years; 3) regularly took his daughter to church, and 4) missed seeing his daughter for only three weekends for the year Anna was in foster care with Barbara Outz. There were no allegations of abuse, and an expert testified that Raymond was fit to take care of his daughter. All testimony revealed that Raymond was a good father. Mrs. Outz, Carolyn's own sister, testified that Raymond was a "good father image" and had a good relationship with the children. Barbara Bedwell, Raymond's sister, testified that Raymond had an extremely close relationship with Anna and that Anna appeared to love her father very much. Willie Dean Willis, Raymond's mother, testified that "Raymond is responsible for his child. He has been keeping her and I have seen him with the child. He takes good care of her always. She is first." In his holding, the chancellor noted that Anna would have to spend much time in the care of a non-relative neighbor while Raymond was at work. However, both Raymond's sister and mother testified that they were willing to help Raymond take care of Anna. In addition, there were no allegations that the neighbor would not take good care of Anna, a fact recognized by the chancellor. Significantly, the chancellor also noted that "the father has a stable home environment." The only factor weighing against Raymond was his history of marijuana use. However, *487 this fact was not mentioned by the chancellor in his ruling. Raymond testified that after he was refused custody of his children at the original Youth Court hearing, he completely stopped using marijuana. He further testified that he had not used marijuana in over a year, a fact that was not disputed by any party, and also volunteered to submit to drug testing, day or night, if he were awarded custody of Anna. Based on the evidence presented, Raymond appears to have overcome his problem with marijuana. The chancellor did not find that Raymond was clearly unfit to have custody of his child. In any event, the evidence presented would not have supported such a finding. As a result, the chancellor erred in awarding custody of Anna Sellers to her maternal aunt rather than her father, Raymond Sellers. We therefore reverse and remand for findings on Raymond's current fitness for custody of Anna. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, and SMITH, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., specially concurs with separate written opinion joined by BANKS and McRAE, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by my brother, Justice James L. Roberts, Jr., but write separately to explain my rationale. It is apparent from the chancellor's findings, in this very difficult situation, that the chancellor did consider most of the pertinent factors in reaching a decision that was in the temporary best interest of the children. I quote from his findings: (emphasis added) This was intended as a temporary order as indicated by the chancellor's statement that, "[h]opefully sometime in the future she will be able to establish a responsible, loving household into which these children might possibly come. I will say the same thing of Mr. Sellers." The chancellor indicated that his order did not mandate a permanent arrangement and that he hoped that these children would be *488 placed with one of their natural parents at some future date, stating that: (emphasis added) Therefore, I believe that, at that time, the chancellor did, at least on a temporary basis, the very best he could in arriving at a solution that is in the overall best interest of these children, while reserving the option to look at the situation at a later time for a more permanent solution. The learned chancellor, faced with this difficult situation, observed their demeanor and listened to the testimony of the witnesses. Being fully advised of all the circumstances then and there existing, the chancellor made his findings, and those findings should not be disturbed. Hammett v. Woods, 602 So. 2d 825, 827 (Miss. 1992) (citing Clark v. Myrick, 523 So. 2d 79, 80 (Miss. 1988)). "This Court will not disturb those findings, unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard is applied." Faries v. Faries, 607 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992) (citing Hill v. Southeastern Floor Covering Co., 596 So. 2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1992)). In keeping with the chancellor's announcement that his ruling represented a temporary arrangement and the indication that he needed to review the situation after the father and mother had stabilized or changed their circumstances, the best interest of the children was protected. I would affirm his temporary order, but concur that this cause should be remanded for the chancellor to determine the best interest of the children in light of circumstances existing some 2 years after the June 3, 1992 trial. BANKS and McRAE, JJ., join this opinion.