Case Title: Gwin v. Church

Citation: 133 So. 2d 880

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1961-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
133 So. 2d 880 (1961)
Shirley Eugene GWIN
v.
Archie Calvin CHURCH.
6 Div. 325.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 14, 1961.
Rehearing Denied November 2, 1961.
*881 Dominick & Roberts, Tuscaloosa, and James L. Shores, Jr., and Donald L. Morris, Birmingham, for appellant.
Ralph Roger Williams and E. M. Ford, Jr., Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
The plaintiff, appellee, brought this action for damages for personal injury allegedly resulting from the negligence of defendant in driving his automobile into the automobile which plaintiff was driving on a public highway in Tuscaloosa County. Defendant filed pleas of recoupment seeking to recover for his own injuries and charging that the collision was caused by the negligence or wantonness of plaintiff. To the respective claims against them, the parties pleaded in short by consent the general issue with leave, etc., in the usual form. On the verdict of a jury, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and defendant has appealed. The judgment overruling defendant's motion for new trial is assigned as error.
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial for that the plaintiff repeatedly and improperly injected into the trial the fact that defendant was protected by insurance. The following excerpts from the *882 record are substantially in chronological order. The numerals in parentheses indicate those instances where plaintiff's reference to insurance, as it appears to us, was clearly improper.
One. The record discloses that:
During qualification of the jury the following occurred:
"Mr. E. L. Bolton: (A Juror) Pardon me, what was that question?
"The Court: Any other questions for the Plaintiff?
"Mr. Dominick: We object to that question.
So far as this record discloses, neither the Farm Bureau Insurance Company nor Farm Bureau itself had any connection with this case. No reason has been shown for making this inquiry, either to determine the qualification of jurors or to inform plaintiff of possible bias so that plaintiff could intelligently exercise his right to strike.
Two. On further examination of the jurors, the plaintiff propounded a question to which defendant objected as shown by the following excerpt from the record:
"Mr. Shores: We object to that.
"The Court: Sustained.
"Mr. Shores: We move for a mistrial.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Mr. Shores: Except."
Three. On cross-examination of plaintiff, counsel for defendant exhibited to plaintiff and placed in evidence a written statement bearing plaintiff's signature. Plaintiff admitted that when he was in the hospital, he had made the statement to Mr. John Rutledge. On redirect examination of plaintiff the following occurred:
"Q. Is that your handwriting? A. No.
"Mr. Dominick: We object.
"The Court: Sustained.
"Q. What did he tell you?
"Mr. Dominick: We object. He said he was pretty sure.
"Q. Did he give you one? A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you, subsequent thereto in writing, request
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"Mr. Ford: Let me finish the question.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"The Court: Sustained.
"Mr. Shores: We object; and ask for a mistrial.
"Mr. Shores: We move for a mistrial.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Mr. Ford: I would like to show such request was made.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"The Witness: This man by the insurance company
"Mr. Shores: We object.
*884 "The Witness: I'm not under the
"Mr. Shores: Except.
"Q. Did you ever get a copy of this statement? A. No, sir.
"Q. Have you ever gotten one? A. No, sir.
"Mr. Shores: We object. That is leading.
"The Court: Sustain the objection.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"A. No, sir.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Q. Did you make this statement in good faith? A. Yes, sir.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"The Court: Sustain the objection.
Four. On recross and further redirect examination of plaintiff the following appears:
"Q. In your best recollection, how much is that? A. The bill?
"Q. Yes, sir. A. I would say the bill is around $600.00.
"By Mr. Ford:
"Mr. Dominick: We object.
"Mr. Dominick: We object.
"The Court: Sustained.
"Q. Who paid the premiums on your policy? A. Hayes Aircraft.
"Q. Who do you work for? A. Hayes Aircraft."
Five. The plaintiff's witness, Bernholz, had been a passenger in plaintiff's automobile at the time of collision. During and shortly before the end of the direct examination of Bernholz, the court recessed. During this recess, out of the presence of the jury, the record discloses the following colloquy between court and defendant's counsel:
"Mr. Dominick: We except to the Court's ruling."
Cross-examination of Bernholz followed shortly thereafter, and during that crossexamination, defendant questioned Bernholz touching a statement he had given to Mr. Rutledge. Defendant introduced the statement in evidence and the following occurred:
"Mr. Dominick: Do you know we have had them?
(6)"Mr. Ford: The insurance company or somebody had them.
"Mr. Dominick: We move for a mistrial; that is highly prejudicial.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Mr. Dominick: Except.
Six. Defendant undertook to show that after plaintiff left the hospital plaintiff had visited defendant at his home, and that plaintiff, on that occasion, had told defendant that if defendant would say his lights were off, defendant would receive money. On cross-examination of plaintiff, the record discloses the following:
"Q. Did you make that statement? A. No.";
and on redirect examination of plaintiff:
On redirect examination of defendant, the following occurred:
"Mr. Ford: We object.
"The Court: Overruled.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Mr. Ford: Except."
On recross examination of defendant, the following appears in the record:
"Q. In whose presence? A. His cousins.
"Q. His cousins presence? A. That is right.
"Q. Where? A. Insurance Company.
"Q. What insurance company? A. Mine.
"Q. Your insurance company? A. That is right.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"The Court: Sustained.
"Mr. Shores: We object.
"The Court: Sustained."
The rule is firmly settled in this state that the plaintiff is entitled, upon his seasonable and proper motion, to have the jurors qualified as to their relation to, or interest in, any insurance company which would be liable, in whole or in part, for any judgment that might be rendered against the defendant. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lee, 182 Ala. 561, 62 So. 199; Vredenburgh Saw Mill Co. v. Black, 251 Ala. 302, 37 So. 2d 212; Code 1940, Title 30, § 55, as amended by Act No. 260, 1955 Acts, page 605. On the other hand, counsel should be careful to avoid saying or doing anything which would lead the jury to believe that his opponent has insurance to protect him in respect to the matter in controversy when reference to insurance is not admissible for any proper purpose, Pearson v. Birmingham Transit Company, 264 Ala. 350, 87 So. 2d 857; and
In the case at bar, the matter of defendant's insurance was brought to the attention of the injury on a number of occasions wherein plaintiff cannot correctly be charged with making improper reference to insurance. There are also, however, other instances where in our opinion plaintiff's reference to insurance was improper, to wit; (1) and (2) reference on voir dire to the Farm Bureau Insurance Company; (3) asking plaintiff did he, by letter, ask the Mutual Insurance Company of Birmingham for a copy of his statement and (4) subsequent offer to show that plaintiff made such request; (5) asking plaintiff if Mutual Savings Fire Insurance Company paid any premiums on plaintiff's hospital insurance; (6) stating that the "insurance company" had the statement made by Bernholz; (7) asking defendant if he knew that plaintiff had given a statement to "the insurance adjuster for your company"; and (8) asking defendant if he had given a statement "to your insurance company." Without discussing each instance in detail, we think it is clear that the eight instances last noted *888 were improper references to defendant's insurance or insurer.
We are not to be understood as holding that all the references to insurance made by plaintiff, other than the eight we have specifically noted, were proper. We have merely noted the eight instances which we think were patently improper. There may be others, which we have not specifically noted, which also were improper.
Appellee's argument is summarized, as we understand it, in the following excerpts from his brief:
While we do not agree that defendant set the stage for all of plaintiff's references to insurance, defendant did set the state, so to speak, in certain instances, and defendant himself testified that plaintiff told defendant that he $1,000 would be paid by defendant's insurance company. We think plaintiff was within his rights in bringing out all of the conversation relating to the $1,000 offer because defendant had brought out part of that conversation. So the question for decision becomes one of deciding whether the improper references to insurance, considered together with references which were not improper, are so prejudicial as to require a new trial.
After careful consideration of the entire record, we are of opinion that the improper references to insurance made by plaintiff require a new trial in this case. It might be that any one, or even two, of the eight instances noted, would not, standing alone, require a new trial, but we cannot conclude other than that the repeated, improper references to insurance again and again, eight times, unduly emphasized to the jury the fact that a verdict against defendant would be paid, not by defendant, but by his insurer. The cumulative effect of this repetition deprived defendant of a trial free from the prejudicial effect of improper reference to insurance.
Comprehensive annotations on the question here involved appear in: 56 A.L.R. 1418; 74 A.L.R. 849; 95 A.L.R. 388; 105 A.L.R. 1319; and 4 A.L.R.2d 761. The last annotation states:
Nonetheless, we are of opinion that the more recent cases in this jurisdiction require a new trial in the instant case. Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381; Thorne v. Parrish, 265 Ala. 193, 90 So. 2d 781.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Appellee says that on original deliverance we erred in interpretation of well-settled principles of law and that the cases we cited do not support the decision.
*889 It may be that the reason for reversal is not clearly spelled out in the original opinion. To eliminate doubt, we state the applicable rule as follows:
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel repeatedly asked questions which suggested that defendant had insurance to cover his liability in this case, and in each instance where defendant objected to the question, the objection was sustained. The action of the court in ruling against plaintiff, repeatedly, could but serve to warn him that his references to insurance were improper. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352, 19 Ann.Cas. 294, quoted in Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Blackwell, supra. See also: Birmingham National Bank v. Bradley, 108 Ala. 205, 19 So. 791; Birmingham Electric Company v. Ryder, 225 Ala. 369, 144 So. 18; City of Birmingham v. Williams, 231 Ala. 232, 164 So. 101; Porter Coal Company v. Davis, 231 Ala. 359, 165 So. 93; Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Stanfield, 234 Ala. 44, 173 So. 392; Travis v. Hubbard, 267 Ala. 670, 104 So. 2d 712.
Opinion extended.
Application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.