Case Title: Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP001508

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1508 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Patti J. Roberts and David Roberts, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
T.H.E. Insurance Company, Sundog Ballooning, 
LLC, Kerry M.  
Hanson and Jodi L. Hanson, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Dean Health Plan, Inc., 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 363 Wis. 2d 656, 862 N.W.2d 656) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 15, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph G. Sciascia 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs. 
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
 
PROSSER, J., joined by ROGGENSACK, C.J. concur 
and dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
BRADLEY, R.G., J., joined by PROSSER, J. 
(except footnote 4) dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Timothy S. Knurr and Gruber Law Offices, LLC, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Timothy S. Knurr. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by Ward 
I. Richter, David G. Ress and Bell, Moore & Richter, S.C., 
Madison, WI and oral argument by David G. Ress. 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2014AP1508 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV391) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Patti J. Roberts and David Roberts,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,   
 
 
v. 
 
T.H.E. Insurance Company, Sundog Ballooning, 
LLC, Kerry M. Hanson and Jodi L. Hanson,    
 
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Dean Health Plan, Inc.,    
 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  
Petitioners, Patti and David 
Roberts, seek review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
that affirmed the circuit court's order for summary judgment, 
dismissing their claims.1  The court of appeals determined that 
                                                 
1 Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., No. 2014AP1508, unpublished 
slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015) (affirming order of 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
2 
 
Wisconsin's 
recreational 
immunity 
statute 
barred 
the 
petitioners' claims because Patti Roberts was engaged in the 
recreational activity of hot air ballooning at the time she was 
injured.2 
¶2 
Roberts 
argues 
that 
the 
respondents, 
Sundog 
Ballooning, LLC, Kerry Hanson, Jodi Hanson, and T.H.E. Insurance 
Company (collectively "Sundog") are not entitled to immunity 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because Sundog was not an owner 
under the statute.  She contends that Sundog was neither an 
"occupier" of the land nor was the hot air balloon "property."3   
¶3 
In reply, Sundog asserts that even if it were not 
entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52, Roberts' claims 
are barred because she signed a waiver of liability form. 
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
Sundog 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
recreational immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because it 
is not an owner under the statute.  Sundog was not an "occupier" 
of the land and the hot air balloon was not "property" because 
                                                                                                                                                             
summary judgment entered by the circuit court for Dodge County, 
Joseph G. Sciascia, J., presiding). 
 
2 Although Patti's husband, David Roberts, is also a 
petitioner, we will refer to Patti Roberts as the lone 
petitioner for ease of discussion. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
3 
 
it was not a "structure."4  Finally, we determine that Sundog's 
waiver 
of 
liability 
form 
violates 
public 
policy 
and 
is 
unenforceable as a matter of law.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
I. 
¶5 
The relevant facts of this case are undisputed.    
Patti J. Roberts was injured at a charity event sponsored by 
Green 
Valley 
Enterprises 
("Green 
Valley"). 
 
Beaver 
Dam 
Conservationists, 
LLC 
("the 
Conservationists") 
owned 
the 
shooting range where the charity event was held.   
¶6 
Sundog Ballooning, LLC was the owner and operator of a 
hot air balloon providing tethered rides at the event.  Kerry 
and Jodi Hanson, the owners of Sundog, donated hot air balloon 
rides to promote Green Valley's charity event.   
¶7 
On the day of the event, Sundog set up a display, a 
sign-up table and a waiting area for the ride.  The hot air 
balloon was tethered to two trees and a pick-up truck.  During 
                                                 
4 Roberts also argues that Sundog is not entitled to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because Sundog's negligence 
was not associated with a condition of the land.  We need not 
reach this argument because we conclude that Sundog was not an 
owner under the statute.  The issue of whether a party's 
negligence is associated with a condition of the land applies 
only if that party is an owner under the statute.  See, e.g., 
Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 719, 516 N.W.2d 
427 (1994); see also Kosky v. Int'l Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 210 
Wis. 2d 463, 475, 565 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
4 
 
rides, the balloon operator raised the balloon to the length of 
the ropes and then lowered it back to the ground.  
¶8 
Patti Roberts and her family watched the balloon rides 
and then entered the line to take a ride.  While in line, Sundog 
gave Roberts a waiver of liability form that she was required to 
sign prior to riding in the hot air balloon.  Roberts signed the 
waiver form, but never returned it to Sundog.  The signed waiver 
form was found on the event grounds after Roberts sustained her 
injuries. 
¶9 
The liability waiver form states in part:  
I expressly, willing, and voluntarily assume full 
responsibility for all risks of any and every kind 
involved with or arising from my participation in hot 
air balloon activities with Company whether during 
flight preparation, take-off, flight, landing, travel 
to 
or 
from 
the 
take-off 
or 
landing 
areas, 
or 
otherwise. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I 
hereby irrevocably release Company, its employees, 
agents, representatives, contractors, subcontractors, 
successors, heirs, assigns, affiliates, and legal 
representatives (the "Released Parties") from, and 
hold them harmless for, all claims, rights, demands or 
causes of action whether known or unknown, suspected 
or 
unsuspected, 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
ballooning 
activities . . . .  
¶10 After signing the form, Roberts waited in line for 20 
to 30 minutes.  During this time, strong winds caused one of the 
balloon's tether lines to snap.  As a result, the untethered 
balloon moved toward the spectators in line.  Roberts was 
injured when she was struck by the balloon's basket and knocked 
to the ground. 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
5 
 
¶11 The 
evidence 
submitted 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
demonstrated that defendant Kerry Hanson, the balloon operator, 
had limited experience with tethered ballooning before giving 
rides at Green Valley's event.  Hanson testified in his 
deposition that he should have obtained information regarding 
weather fronts in the area.  Had he known about the weather 
front on the day Roberts was injured, Hanson testified that he 
would have suspended the ride. 
¶12 Hot air ballooning is governed by FAA guidelines and 
rules.  See, e.g., Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Dep't. of Transp., 
Pub. No. FAA-H-8083-11A, Balloon Flying Handbook 7-13 (2008).  
The FAA's safety recommendations instruct the balloon operator 
to plan for the failure of one or more of the tethered lines and 
have a backup plan for safety.  See id. at 7-14.  In addition, 
the operator should organize participants "far back" from the 
balloon and tether lines.  Id.  At his deposition, Hanson agreed 
that had he moved the sign-up table and waiting line further 
back from the balloon, Roberts would not have been injured. 
¶13 Roberts filed a lawsuit against Sundog, alleging that 
its negligence caused her injuries.  Sundog moved the circuit 
court for summary judgment, arguing that it is entitled to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 and that Roberts' claims were 
barred by the waiver of liability form that she signed. 
¶14 The circuit court granted Sundog's summary judgment 
motion, dismissing Roberts' claims and concluding that Sundog 
was entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. §  895.52.  It also 
determined that the waiver of liability form Roberts signed was 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
6 
 
valid as a matter of law, although an issue of fact remained as 
to whether she had accepted the terms.   
¶15 On appeal, Roberts argued that Sundog is not entitled 
to immunity because her injury was not related to a condition 
associated with the land.  Roberts asserted that under Linville 
v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994) 
and Kosky v. Int'l Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565 
N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997), no immunity attaches for negligent 
conduct unassociated with the land.   
¶16 The court of appeals rejected Roberts' argument, 
determining that it was "based on a misreading of the case 
law . . . which has no application to the facts of this case."5  
See Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., No. 2014AP1508, unpublished slip 
op., ¶17 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015).  It explained that this 
was "the only argument that Roberts makes directed to the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 895.[52]."  Id., ¶22.  The court of 
appeals did not address the validity of the liability waiver 
                                                 
5 This Court has previously expressed its concern that the 
recreational immunity statue is often difficult to apply and has 
recommended that the legislature reexamine this statute.  See, 
e.g., Auman v. School Dist. Of Stanley-Boyd, 2001 WI 125, ¶11, 
248 Wis. 2d 548, 635 N.W.2d 762 ("This court has wrestled with 
applying 
the 
recreational 
immunity 
statute . . . since 
its 
enactment. . . .  We continue to be frustrated in our efforts to 
state a test that can be applied easily because of the seeming 
lack of basic underlying principles in the statute."); see also 
Urban v. Grasser, 2001 WI 63, ¶12, 243 Wis. 2d 673, 627 N.W.2d 
511 ("Circuit courts, the court of appeals, and this court have 
wrestled with recreational immunity since the legislature first 
provided for such immunity under the law.  We have all been 
frustrated by the seeming lack of basic underlying principles in 
our efforts to state a test that can be easily applied.").  
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
7 
 
form because its decision as to immunity disposed of the appeal.  
Id., ¶2 n.2. 
¶17 Before this court, Roberts renews her argument that 
Sundog's negligence was not connected to a condition associated 
with the land.  Because this court ordered briefing on an 
additional issue, she also asserts that Sundog is not entitled 
to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because it is not an owner 
under the statute.  Roberts argues that Sundog was not an 
"occupier" of the land and that the hot air balloon was not 
"property" because it was not a "structure."  Sundog replies 
that even if it is not entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52, Roberts' claims are barred because she signed a waiver 
of liability form. 
II. 
 
¶18 In this case we are asked to review the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment.  We review grants of summary 
judgment applying the same methodology employed by the circuit 
court.  Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶13, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 
843 N.W.2d 373.  Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is 
entitled to [] judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2). 
¶19 Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact.  
Accordingly, we focus on whether the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52 
bars 
Roberts' 
claims. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
presents a question of law that we review independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
8 
 
appeals.  State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶28, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 
N.W.2d 787.   
¶20 In interpreting a statute we begin by examining its 
language, giving words and phrases their common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Statutory language must be interpreted reasonably to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.  Id., ¶46.   
¶21 When the legislature has expressly stated the purpose 
of a statute, the purpose is relevant to the plain meaning 
interpretation of the statute.  See id., ¶48.  "[A] plain-
meaning 
interpretation 
cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually 
or 
contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Id., ¶49. 
¶22 In examining an exculpatory contract, we likewise 
apply the same summary judgment methodology as employed by the 
circuit court.  See Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 
1010-11, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994) (citing Dobratz v. Thompson, 161 
Wis. 2d 502, 513, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991)).  The validity of an 
exculpatory contract is reviewed as a matter of law.  Id. at 
1011.  
III. 
¶23 We begin our analysis with a brief explanation of what 
is not in dispute.  Neither party disputes that Roberts was 
participating in a recreational activity at the time she was 
injured because ballooning is listed in the statutory definition 
of "recreational activity."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g) defines 
"recreational activity" as: [A]ny outdoor activity undertaken 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
9 
 
for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including 
practice or instruction in any such activity.  "Recreational 
activity" 
includes 
hunting, 
fishing, 
trapping, 
camping,... 
ballooning, hang gliding, hiking . . . ." (emphasis added). 
¶24 Furthermore, "[t]he case law is clear that a spectator 
who attends a recreational activity is engaged in a recreational 
activity."  Meyer v. School Dist. Of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 
710, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999); see also Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 
717 (concluding that preparation for a recreational activity 
that takes place at a recreational facility that is open for 
public use is a "recreational activity" as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(g)).  Given that Roberts was on recreational land open 
to the public, watching the balloon rides as a spectator, and 
preparing for the balloon ride by waiting in line, she was 
engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(g). 
A. 
¶25 Although Roberts does not dispute that she was engaged 
in a recreational activity, she does contest the issue of 
immunity.  Roberts argues that Sundog is not entitled to 
immunity as an occupier of the property where she was engaged in 
a recreational activity.   
¶26 The recreational immunity statute Wis. Stat. § 895.52 
provides:  
(2) NO DUTY; IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. 
(a) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner 
and no officer, employee or agent of an owner owes to 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
10 
 
any person who enters the owner's property to engage 
in a recreational activity: 
1.  A duty to keep the property safe for 
recreational activities. 
2.  A duty to inspect the property, except as 
provided under s. 23.115(2). 
3.  A duty to give warning of an unsafe 
condition, use or activity on the property. 
(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner 
and no officer, employee, or agent of an owner is 
liable for the death of, any injury to, or any death 
or 
injury 
caused 
by, 
a 
person 
engaging 
in 
a 
recreational activity on the owner's property . . . . 
¶27 Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1 defines an "owner" as "[a] 
person, including a governmental body or nonprofit organization, 
that 
owns 
leases 
or 
occupies 
property." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(f) further defines "property" as "real property and 
buildings, structures and improvements thereon . . . ."  
¶28 The legislative purpose of the recreational immunity 
statute is set forth in 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.  Its stated 
purpose is to limit liability in order to encourage property 
owners to open their lands to the public: 
The legislature intends by this act to limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use 
their 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities 
under 
circumstances in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit.  While it is not 
possible to specify in a statute every activity which 
might constitute a recreational activity, this act 
provides examples of the kinds of activities that are 
meant to be included, and the legislature intends 
that, where substantially similar circumstances or 
activities exist, this legislation should be liberally 
construed in favor of property owners to protect them 
from liability . . . .  1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1. 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
11 
 
As our cases have explained, "the impetus for this law is the 
continual shrinkage of the public's access to recreational land 
in the ever more populated modern world."  Hall v. Turtle Lake 
Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 489, 431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 
1988).   
¶29 In reply, Sundog argues that it is entitled to 
recreational immunity because Roberts was injured at an event 
similar to those in prior cases.  Sundog asserts that it is 
entitled to immunity as an "occupier" of the land, for the same 
reasons that the producer of a fair or event qualifies for 
recreational immunity.  Prior cases interpreting Wisconsin's 
recreational immunity law have concluded that the producer of a 
fair or event "occupied" property.  See, e.g., Id., at 490; Lee 
v. Elk Rod & Gun Club, Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 103, 106, 473 
N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1991); Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 179 
Wis. 2d 774, 777 n.2, 508 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1993).   
¶30 As Sundog's counsel aptly argued, Wisconsin courts 
have concluded private organizations hosting an event on land 
they did not own are entitled to recreational immunity.  In 
Hall, the plaintiff was injured when he stepped in a hole on the 
grounds of the Turtle Lake Village Park during a fair sponsored 
by the Turtle Lake Lions Club.  146 Wis. 2d at 487.  The Lion's 
Club was not the titled owner of the land on which it held the 
fair.  Id. at 490.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
Lions 
Club 
was 
entitled 
to 
recreational 
immunity 
as 
a 
"landowner" that allowed Hall entry for "recreational activity."  
Id. at 487-89.   
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
12 
 
¶31 Likewise, in Lee, the plaintiff was injured when he 
slipped and fell on icy ground beneath a tent erected by the Elk 
Rod & Gun Club for a fishing contest on Bugle Lake.  164 Wis. 2d 
at 105.  Lee explained that "[t]he club, as an occupant of the 
city park land, is treated as a landowner for purposes of 
recreational immunity."  Id. at 107 (citing Hall, 146 Wis. 2d at 
490-91).   
¶32 Again, in Weina, the plaintiff was injured playing 
softball at a church picnic held at a public park.  179 Wis. 2d 
at 776.  The plaintiff sued both the church and the teammate who 
hit the injurious baseball.  Id.  Granting summary judgment in 
favor of the church, the circuit court denied the teammate's 
motion for summary judgment.  Id. at 77 n.1.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment that the church, 
as the event organizer, was entitled to immunity.  Id. at 779.    
¶33 This case is different from prior cases, however, 
because Roberts did not bring claims against the event producer 
or owner of the property.  Green Valley Enterprises, not Sundog, 
produced the charity event where Roberts was injured.  The 
Conservationists, not Sundog, was the owner of the property 
where the event took place.  None of the prior cases 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 895.52 has granted immunity to a third 
party not responsible for opening up the land to the public.6 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) grants immunity to officers, 
employees, or agents of an owner.  Because the parties in this 
case did not argue or brief the issue of whether Sundog was an 
officer, employee, or agent of either the Conservationists or 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
13 
 
¶34 The distinction between Sundog and the producer of a 
fair or event is supported by case law analyzing the definition 
of "occupy" in the context of the statute's policy.  In Doane v. 
Helenville Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 355, 575 N.W.2d 734 
(Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals held that the owner of an 
ice shanty was not an occupier under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  As 
Doane explained, "occupy" is defined as "to take and hold 
possession."  Id. at 354 (citing Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary 794 (8th ed. 1974)).  The term "occupy," as it is 
used in Wis. Stat. § 895.52, has been defined as "requiring a 
degree of permanence, as opposed to mere use."  Id. (citations 
ommitted). 
¶35 Underlying the Doane decision was the same statutory 
policy at issue here.  As Doane explained, to define the owner 
of the ice shanty as an occupier "would not further the policy 
which underlies the statute, i.e., of opening as much property 
as possible for recreational use, because the lake was already 
held in trust for public recreational purposes, such as 
fishing."  Id. at 355.  Here, as in Doane, defining Sundog as an 
"occupier" would not further the policy underlying the statute 
because the Conservationists' property was already open for 
public recreational purposes.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Green Valley, we do not address it.  We need not address issues 
that have not been raised or argued by the parties.  See, e.g., 
State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53, ¶28, 347 Wis. 2d 683, 832 N.W.2d 
101. 
 
 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
14 
 
¶36 The Linville court also explained that we must 
consider whether immunity will encourage landowners to open the 
land for public use: 
The benefits of granting immunity, i.e., encouraging 
landowners to open their lands to the public, comes 
from immunizing people or municipalities in their 
capacities as landowners . . . .  Extending immunity 
to landowners for negligently performing in a capacity 
unrelated to the land . . . will not contribute to a 
landowner's decision to open the land for public use.   
184 Wis. 2d 705. 
¶37 Here, it was Green Valley and the Conservationists——
not Sundog——that were responsible for opening the land to the 
public.  The Conservationists allowed Green Valley to host an 
event on the land.  Green Valley was responsible for organizing 
the event and bringing people onto the land.  Sundog provided 
hot 
air 
balloon 
rides 
on 
land 
that 
was 
owned 
by 
the 
Conservationists and occupied by Green Valley.  Immunizing 
Sundog would have no effect on whether the public had access to 
private land, because Sundog is not responsible for opening the 
land to the public. 
¶38 We also find Linville instructive in determining the 
logical stopping point for immunity.  In Linville, the court 
analyzed whether granting immunity to city paramedics could 
create limitless immunity for all medical services provided for 
injuries sustained while recreating.  184 Wis. 2d 705.  "Such 
services could conceivably take place days or even weeks after 
the recreational activity, at facilities far removed from the 
site of recreation, and by persons in no way connected to the 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
15 
 
land on which the accident occurred."  Id. at 720.  "Such a 
result is absurd, leaves immunity limitless, and therefore could 
not have been intended by the legislature."  Id.   
¶39 Wis. Stat. § 895.52 "was not enacted to provide 
indiscriminate 
immunity 
for 
landowners 
without 
regard 
to 
possible consequences."  Id. at 719 (quoting Ervin v. City of 
Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 477, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991)).  
Extending immunity to Sundog could lead to limitless immunity.  
Sundog is not the owner of the land.  It is not occupying the 
land as an event organizer and is therefore not responsible for 
opening up the land to the public.  If Sundog——who has no 
connection to the land——is granted immunity, there will be no 
stopping point to recreational immunity. 
¶40 For example, what if Roberts brought a claim against 
the manufacturer of the hot air balloon that injured her?  What 
if the tether that broke loose was due to a fault in the 
manufacture of the balloon, rather than the wind?  Should the 
balloon manufacturer, which had no connection to opening the 
land to the public, be immunized because ballooning is a 
recreational activity?   
¶41 Granting immunity to third parties that are not 
responsible for opening up the land to the public is unsupported 
by our prior case law.  In addition, it would create an absurd 
result with no logical stopping point that does nothing to 
further the legislative purpose of the statute.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Sundog is not entitled to recreational immunity 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
16 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because it was not an "occupier" of 
the land.   
B. 
¶42 Next, Sundog argues that it is entitled to immunity 
not only as an "occupier" of real property, but also as an owner 
of "property" because the hot air balloon is a structure 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f).  "Property" means real 
property and buildings, structures and improvements thereon.  
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f). 
¶43 The term "structure" is not defined in Wis. Stat. § 
895.52, and is therefore given its common and ordinary meaning.  
Peterson v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 131, ¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 
567, 636 N.W.2d 727.  A "structure" is "something constructed," 
or "something made up of a number of parts that are held or put 
together in a particular way."  Id. (citing American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, 1782 (3d ed. 1992)).  
"Structure" is also defined as "[a]ny construction, or any 
production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of 
parts joined together in some definite manner." Id. (citing 
Black's Law Dictionary, 1424 (6th ed. 1991)). 
¶44 Sundog relies on Peterson, in which this court held 
that the owner of a tree stand was entitled to immunity as the 
owner of a "structure" on real property.  Id., ¶4.  Peterson 
adopted the court of appeals' decision in Doane.  Peterson, 248 
Wis. 2d 567, ¶20.  The Doane court identified three categories 
of property that qualify owners for immunity: (1) real property; 
(2) buildings, structures and improvements thereon; and (3) 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
17 
 
waters of the state.  Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 352.  Sundog argues 
that like the tree stand in Peterson, the hot air balloon is a 
structure because it was constructed or put together in a 
particular way and made up of parts joined together.   
¶45 Although it may have been made up of parts joined 
together, the hot air balloon ride was not constructed on real 
property.   In Peterson, the tree stand was permanent and built 
or constructed on the real property.  See Peterson, 248 Wis. 2d 
567, ¶¶5-7.  The hot air balloon in this case was transient and 
designed to be moved at the end of the day.  It was also not 
designed to remain in one place.  The balloon was tethered to 
two trees and a pick-up truck because of the manner in which 
Sundog was using it on the day of the event.  Thus, we conclude 
that the hot air balloon is not a structure as that term is 
applied in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f). 
¶46 Accordingly, we conclude that Sundog is not entitled 
to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because it is 
not an owner under the statute.  Sundog was not an "occupier" of 
the land and the hot air balloon was not "property" because it 
is not a "structure." 
IV. 
¶47 Having determined that Sundog is not entitled to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52, we must address whether 
Roberts' claims are barred by Sundog's exculpatory release.  
Sundog argues that the waiver of liability form that Roberts 
signed is valid under Wisconsin law. 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
18 
 
¶48 Wisconsin 
case 
law 
does 
not 
favor 
exculpatory 
agreements.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness 
Center, 2005 WI 4, ¶12, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334.  "While 
this court has not held that an exculpatory clause is invalid 
per se, we have held that such a provision must be construed 
strictly against the party seeking to rely on it."  Id., ¶12 
(citing Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81, 557 
N.W.2d 60 (1996); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210-11, 321 
N.W.2d 173 (1982)). 
¶49 Our analysis of an exculpatory contract begins with 
examining the facts and circumstances of the agreement to 
determine if it covers the activity at issue.  Atkins, 277 Wis. 
2d 303, ¶13 (citing Arnold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc'y, 111 
Wis. 2d 203, 211, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other 
grounds).  If the contract covers the activity, we proceed to a 
public policy analysis, "which remains the 'germane analysis' 
for exculpatory clauses."  Id., ¶13 (citing Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d 
at 86).  "We generally define public policy as 'that principle 
of law under which freedom of contract or private dealings is 
restricted by law for the good of the community.'"  Id., ¶14 
(quoting Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213).   
¶50 This court has found an exculpatory agreement to be 
invalid if it contains misrepresentations, if it too broadly 
defines the location and actions covered, or if it is ambiguous 
and uncertain.  See, e.g., Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 214-15; see 
also Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211-13; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 526.  
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
19 
 
Our prior decisions have also set forth the factors to apply in 
analyzing whether a contract is void as a matter of law. 
¶51 In Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, the plaintiff was 
injured while accompanying her husband on a trip.  The waiver in 
Richards was both an application for permission to be a 
passenger and a release of all claims against the trucking 
company.  Id. at 1012.  Richards held that the contract was void 
as against public policy because: (1) the contract served two 
purposes which were not clearly identified or distinguished; (2) 
the release was extremely broad and all-inclusive; and (3) the 
release was in a standardized agreement printed on the Company’s 
form, offering little or no opportunity for negotiation or free 
and voluntary bargaining.  Id. at 1011.  
¶52 In Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d 76, an 11-year old skier was 
killed when she struck a concrete ski lift tower pylon.  Prior 
to the ski season, her father signed an "application" for a 
season family lift ticket.  Id. at 79.  The application stated: 
"I agree that [] [t]here are certain inherent risks in skiing 
and that we agree to hold [the ski resort] harmless on account 
of any injury incurred . . . on the [ski resort] premises."  Id. 
at 79.  "Inherent risks" and "premises" were not defined.  Id. 
at 84-85. 
¶53 The Yauger court unanimously concluded 
that the 
agreement was void as against public policy because: (1) it 
failed to clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably explain to 
the signatory that he was accepting the risk of Hidden Valley’s 
negligence; and (2) the form when considered in its entirety 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
20 
 
failed to alert the signer to the nature and significance of the 
document being signed.  Id. at 78.  
¶54 More recently in Atkins, this court considered the 
enforceability of an exculpatory agreement after a swimmer 
drowned in a lap pool at a fitness center.  Atkins, 277 Wis. 2d 
303.  As a condition of being allowed to use the center, the 
swimmer had to complete a guest registration and waiver release 
statement form.  Id., ¶3.  The form was preprinted on a five and 
one-half inch square card, and the entire card was printed in 
capital letters of the same size, font, and color.  Id., ¶4. 
¶55 Atkins held that the waiver was invalid, noting that 
"Wisconsin case law does not favor [exculpatory] agreements," 
and "such a provision must be construed strictly against the 
party seeking to rely on it."  Id., ¶12.  The Atkins court 
adopted a combination of the Yauger and Richards factors in its 
decision: (1) the waiver was overly broad and all-inclusive; (2) 
the form served two functions and did not provide the signer 
adequate notification of the waiver's nature and significance; 
and (3) there was little or no opportunity to bargain or 
negotiate in regard to the exculpatory language in question.  
Id., 
¶18; 
see 
also 
Alexander 
T. 
Pendleton, 
Enforceable 
Exculpatory Agreements: Do They Still Exist?, 78 Wis. Law. 16, 
46 (Aug. 2005).  
¶56 Turning to the release at issue in this case, it is 
undisputed that Sundog required Roberts to sign a waiver prior 
to riding in the hot air balloon.  Roberts signed the waiver 
while she was waiting in line for the ride, but never returned 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
21 
 
it.  The signed waiver was found on the event grounds after she 
was injured by the hot air balloon. 
¶57 Sundog 
argues 
that 
Roberts 
read 
the 
release, 
understood its importance, and understood she was waiving her 
right to bring a negligence claim.  It also asserts that Roberts 
had the opportunity to bargain and ask questions, but failed to 
do so.  Roberts counters that she never accepted the liability 
waiver form because she never returned it to Sundog.  She also 
argues that the waiver is void as a matter of law because it 
violates public policy. 
¶58 We agree with Roberts that the waiver of liability 
form is unenforceable as a matter of law because it fails to 
satisfy the factors set forth in our prior case law.  Because 
the waiver is void as a matter of law, we need not address the 
question of whether Roberts accepted the agreement.7 
¶59 First, Sundog's exculpatory waiver is overly broad and 
all-inclusive.  As our prior cases have explained, an agreement 
cannot be so broad "that it would absolve [the defendant] from 
any injury to the [plaintiff] for any reason."  Richards, 181 
Wis. 2d at 1015 (citing College Mobile Home Park & Sales v. 
Hoffman, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 521-22, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976)).   
¶60 The waiver in this case would absolve Sundog for any 
activity for any reason, known or unknown: 
I expressly, willing, and voluntarily assume full 
responsibility for all risks of any and every kind 
                                                 
7 Additionally, we do not address whether the question of 
Roberts' "acceptance" presents a question of fact or law here. 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
22 
 
involved with or arising from my participation in hot 
air balloon activities with Company whether during 
flight preparation, take-off, flight, landing, travel 
to 
or 
from 
the 
take-off 
or 
landing 
areas, 
or 
otherwise. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I 
hereby irrevocably release Company, its employees, 
agents, representatives, contractors, subcontractors, 
successors, heirs, assigns, affiliates, and legal 
representatives (the "Released Parties") from, and 
hold them harmless for, all claims, rights, demands or 
causes of action whether known or unknown, suspected 
or 
unsuspected, 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
ballooning 
activities... 
Not only is the waiver overly broad, it is not clear whether 
waiting in line for the ride is something Roberts would have 
contemplated as being covered by the waiver, especially because 
she was not required to return the waiver before she got into 
the line. 
¶61 Second, the release was a standard agreement printed 
on the company's form, offering Roberts no opportunity to 
bargain or negotiate in regard to the exculpatory language in 
question.  See Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1011.  "Freedom of 
contract is premised on a bargain freely and voluntarily made 
through a bargaining process that has integrity."  Id. at 1016.   
¶62 Sundog concedes that the waiver of liability was a 
standard form.  In order to ride the balloon, Roberts was told 
she would have to sign "this document."  Sundog did not discuss 
the content of the waiver or any of the risk associated with 
ballooning activities or watching others ride with Roberts.  
There was also no pre-flight meeting as referenced in the 
agreement.  Roberts was not asked if she had any complaints or 
No. 
2014AP1508   
 
23 
 
concerns with the waiver and she did not have an opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of the waiver. 
¶63 Thus, the liability waiver form is void as a matter of 
law.  It is overly broad, printed on a standard form, and Sundog 
did not provide Roberts with an opportunity to bargain over the 
terms of the contract.  As our prior case law demands, we will 
not uphold a waiver of liability that violates public policy. 
V. 
¶64 
In sum, we conclude that Sundog is not entitled to 
recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 because it is 
not an owner under the statute.  Sundog was not an "occupier" of 
the land and the hot air balloon was not "property" because it 
was not a "structure." 
¶65 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court. – The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶66 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the opinion of the court because I agree that Sundog is not 
entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 
(2013-14) and that Sundog's waiver of liability form is 
unenforceable.  The court appropriately does not reach the 
questions of whether Roberts' injuries arose from a condition or 
maintenance of the land and, if not, whether Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994), and Kosky v. 
International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565 
N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997), preclude the attachment of immunity 
to Sundog under § 895.52, see majority op., ¶4 n.4, because 
resolution of that issue is not necessary to the disposition of 
this case. 
¶67 I feel compelled to comment briefly on the condition-
or-maintenance issue so that the position set forth by the court 
of appeals below is not read as the only possible view of the 
matter.  Simply stated, while the policy behind the statute is 
to encourage landowners to open their land to the public, the 
recreational immunity statute does not cloak a negligent actor 
with immunity no matter what they do.  
¶68 Unlike the court of appeals below, I conclude that 
there is a patent "division of functions" at play in this case.  
Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., No. 2014AP1508, unpublished slip 
op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015).  Put differently, 
Sundog's 
"immunity 
for 
its 
functions 
as 
[occupier] 
of 
recreational land cannot shelter its liability for negligently 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
2 
 
performing another function," namely the operation of its hot 
air balloon business.  Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 
Wis. 2d 705, 711 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  This conclusion is 
consistent with Linville, Kosky, and the recreational immunity 
statute. 
¶69 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) states in part, "[N]o 
owner . . . is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any 
death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational 
activity on the owner's property . . . ."  Despite the broad 
nature of this language, we concluded in Linville that an 
"owner" under the statute might sometimes function in a capacity 
unrelated to its ownership of land, and that the owner should 
not be immunized against claims that the owner engaged in 
negligent conduct when operating in that capacity.  Linville, 
184 Wis. 2d at 720-21.  Hence, a municipal owner of a pond in 
which a four-year-old boy drowned despite the efforts of 
paramedics employed by the owner was immune under § 895.52 from 
claims that its pond was negligently maintained, but not immune 
from claims that it negligently performed in its capacity as 
provider of paramedic services.  Id.  
¶70 This conclusion followed from our recognition that 
"[t]he policy behind the statute is to encourage property owners 
to open their lands for recreational activities by removing a 
property user's potential cause of action against a property 
owner's alleged negligence."  Id. at 715.  We reasoned that Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52 "was not enacted to provide indiscriminate 
immunity for landowners without regard to possible consequences" 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
3 
 
and that "[e]xtending immunity to landowners for negligently 
performing in a capacity unrelated to the land . . . will not 
contribute to a landowner's decision to open the land for public 
use."  Id. at 719 (citation omitted). 
¶71 The court of appeals applied Linville just a few years 
later when an individual who suffered injuries assisting in the 
detonation of fireworks for a display sued the owner of land on 
which the fireworks display occurred, alleging that the owner 
had negligently managed the display.  Kosky v. Int'l Ass'n of 
Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 468-70, 476-77, 565 N.W.2d 260 
(Ct. App. 1997).  The court of appeals concluded, relying on 
Linville, that the landowner——which was an "occupie[r]" under 
the recreational immunity statute——was not immune because the 
allegedly negligent activities of the owner and its employees 
related to the detonation of fireworks, not "the condition or 
maintenance of the land" which it owned.  Id. at 468, 470 n.3, 
476-77.  "[R]ecreational immunity," the court determined, "does 
not attach to the landowner when an act of the landowner's 
officer, employee or agent that is unrelated to the condition or 
maintenance of the land causes injury to a recreational land 
user."  Id. at 475. 
¶72 In the instant case, Roberts cites Linville and Kosky 
and argues that Sundog's alleged negligence——the use of an 
"improper tethering system" and the decision "to proceed with a 
tethered balloon event in the face of a known storm/gust front"—
—did not relate to a condition of the land.  Therefore, Roberts 
argues, immunity does not attach.  In dismissing this argument, 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
4 
 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
declared: 
"Roberts 
identifies 
no . . . division of functions here.  Rather, as stated above, 
Roberts sued Sundog as owner of property on which Patti Roberts 
was engaging in a recreational activity."   Roberts, unpublished 
slip op., ¶20.  
¶73 This conclusion is perplexing, because there is a 
clear potential division of functions in this case: Sundog the 
property owner (occupier) and Sundog the hot air balloon company 
owner.1  The approach taken by the court of appeals below leads 
to the "indiscriminate immunity" against which we warned in 
Linville, upsetting the balance struck by the Legislature in 
both ensuring the protection of the public and incentivizing 
landowners to allow access to their land.  Linville, 184 Wis. 2d 
at 719; see Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 478, 464 
N.W.2d 654 (1991). 
¶74 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 protects property owners who 
open their land to the public, but it does not necessarily 
provide a shield to business owners who are negligent in the 
operation of their business.  See § 895.52(1)(d)1. (defining 
"[o]wner" to mean, inter alia, "[a] person . . . that owns, 
leases or occupies property" (emphasis added)).  Indeed, it is 
the partial purpose of § 895.52's sister statute, § 895.525 
("Participation in recreational activities; restrictions on 
civil liability, assumption of risk"), "to help assure the 
                                                 
1 The division of functions is only "potential" because, as 
explained, Sundog is not actually an owner under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(d).  See majority op. ¶4. 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
5 
 
continued availability in this state of enterprises that offer 
recreational activities to the public."  Wis. Stat. § 895.525(1) 
(emphasis added).  These enterprises are nowhere mentioned in 
§ 895.52, which does not pertain to them.  
¶75 The Linville and Kosky courts recognized that Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52 grants recreational immunity, not sovereign 
immunity, and that the protections offered by § 895.52 end when 
a landowner performs negligently in a capacity unrelated to the 
individual's ownership of the land.  These considerations govern 
here. 
¶76 A hypothetical helps illustrate.  One of the many 
pleasant diversions included in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g)'s 
definition of "[r]ecreational activity" is "rock-climbing."  
§ 895.52(1)(g).  If a landowner in northern Wisconsin owns a 
piece of property with a cliff on it and wishes, out of the 
goodness of her heart, to allow the local weekend rock-climbers' 
club to use the cliff for practice, the legislature has 
determined via § 895.52 that she should not be penalized if, for 
example, an unfortunate climber plummets to his death from the 
cliff.  This seems reasonable enough, as a grant of such 
immunity encourages the landowner to open the land to climbers 
without fear of negative repercussions.  See Linville, 184 Wis. 
2d at 715.  On the other hand, imagine that the landowner 
decides to capitalize on her property's attraction and opens an 
outdoor rock-climbing business, providing training, ropes, and 
safety equipment to climbers.  Under the  interpretation of the 
statute espoused by the court of appeals, if the landowner 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
6 
 
should decide to continue allowing the unsuspecting local club 
to climb for free, or opens up her land for a charity event, she 
can operate her business negligently with respect to the club or 
to the eventgoers——snapping ropes, cracked helmets, improper 
training——without fear.  
¶77 This hypothetical is not much different than the 
current case:  in both instances there is a potential 
landowner/occupier who provides access to land but who also 
allegedly negligently provides recreational activity services on 
that land. 
¶78 The scope of immunity provided by this reading of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52 is potentially enormous, but there is a more 
reasonable interpretation: the one applied in Linville and 
Kosky.  Assuming that Sundog could be characterized as an 
"owner" under § 895.52(1)(d)——and the opinion of the court 
correctly concludes that it can not, see majority op. ¶4——then 
it is immune insofar as it is sued in its capacity as "owner" of 
the patch of land on which it was offering free balloon rides.  
It is not immune, however, insofar as it is sued in its capacity 
as owner of a hot air balloon company.  This is the division of 
functions that the court of appeals found lacking.  Just as 
holding the cliff-owner in the hypothetical liable for snapping 
ropes, 
cracked 
helmets, 
and 
improper 
training 
will 
not 
discourage the owner from allowing climbers to use the cliff 
without the involvement of her business, failing to grant Sundog 
immunity as a business operator will not discourage it from 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
7 
 
"opening" its land for recreational activities (that is, 
activities not conducted by Sundog). 
¶79 In fairness, application of the statute to facts such 
as these produces some cognitive dissonance, because, had Sundog 
been found to be an "occupie[r]," it would not really be a 
property owner in the sense that most people are used to 
thinking about that phrase.  Sundog would only be a property 
owner under the recreational immunity statute because it 
"occupie[d]" the Conservationists' land, and it was only 
occupying the Conservationists' land because it wanted to offer 
free balloon rides.  But it must be remembered that we are 
essentially thinking of two Sundogs for purposes of the 
Linville/Kosky analysis: business owner Sundog, which provides 
hot air balloon rides, and occupier Sundog, which stands on the 
sidelines and watches the eventgoers happily use "its" property 
free of charge.  
¶80 Importantly, and contrary to what Roberts seems to 
argue, this interpretation should not be misconstrued to mean 
that immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 extends only to injuries 
associated with the physical land itself, e.g., injuries from 
holes in the ground.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) provides 
immunity to owners for any "death of, any injury to, or any 
death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational 
activity on the owner's property."  § 895.52(2)(b) (emphases 
added).  But the fact remains that immunity is extended to the 
"owner," i.e. the property owner——not to, for instance, a 
business operator also on that property.  Thus, if someone is 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
8 
 
accidentally shot while hunting on a landowner's property, the 
landowner is seemingly immune from suit against her as landowner 
(even though the bullet is not "associated" with a condition of 
the land).  But if the landowner also operates a hunting supply 
shop on the land, opens the land for a charity event, and 
proceeds 
to 
provide 
negligently-maintained 
firearms 
to 
participants, it might be that recreational immunity would not 
attach to the entity in its capacity as a business owner.   
¶81 Ultimately, because Sundog is not an "owner" under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d), the question of whether it operated 
in two distinct capacities at the charity event is not relevant 
to the outcome of this case.  However, the court of appeals 
should not be the only word on this important question, which is 
wisely left unanswered by the opinion of the court.2  
                                                 
2 Justice Prosser's partial concurrence criticizes my post-
Linville analysis through use of a pre-Linville case, Ervin v. 
City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) (and, 
even more daringly, through use of a pre-1983 Wis. Act 418 case, 
Wirth 
v. 
Ehly, 
93 
Wis. 2d 433, 
287 
N.W.2d 140 
(1980)). 
Concurrence, ¶¶125, 127.  The partial concurrence notes that the 
author of Linville was also the sole dissenter from Ervin. 
Concurrence, ¶128.  If the question is whether Linville eroded 
any of the principles in Ervin, one would think this fact 
hinders rather than helps the partial concurrence's case.  
Regardless, there is no need to attempt to divine the meaning of 
Linville's authorship, because my analysis is not "squarely at 
odds" with Ervin.  Concurrence, ¶125. 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
This is because the City of Kenosha's ("the City") actions 
in Ervin were arguably performed in its capacity as property 
owner rather than, for instance, in its capacity as a business 
owner. The facts underlying that case took place at a beach 
owned by the City of Kenosha and "staffed by four lifeguards 
employed and trained by the City."  Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 469-
70. In the summer of 1987, two minors drowned in the water off 
the beach. Id. at 468-69.  The City was sued, among other 
things, for the alleged negligence of its lifeguards and for its 
own allegedly negligent hiring and failure to train them.  Id. 
at 471-72.  This court held that the City was immune from such 
allegations under the recreational immunity statute.  Id. at 
469. 
Returning to my earlier hypothetical, Ervin is analogous to 
a circumstance in which a cliff-owner (or somebody hired by the 
cliff-owner) stands by and watches while a climber using the 
cliff for free plummets to her death. Nothing in Ervin indicates 
that the City was stepping outside of its role as landowner 
(indeed, it had not formally interviewed its lifeguards or even 
provided its lifeguards with "skills testing [or] lifeguard, 
first-aid or rescue training").  Id. at 471.  Put differently, 
although the Ervin court seemingly rejected an "active/passive 
negligence distinction" with respect to landowners' negligence 
under the recreational immunity statute, the court said nothing 
about the operation of the statute when landowners act in a non-
proprietary capacity.  See, e.g., id., at 476-77 ("If liability 
were imposed on landowners for negligence in failing to provide 
adequate safety measures, it would encourage landowners to 
provide no safety measures." (emphases added)).  That came 
later, in Linville.  As opposed to Ervin, wherein the City had 
"gratuitously" provided a few "lifeguards" without "skills 
testing [or] lifeguard, first-aid or rescue training" to stand 
post on the single parcel of property at issue, id., 471-77, the 
City of Janesville operated a team of paramedics which provided 
city-wide services and which had little to do with the ownership 
of the municipal pond in particular.  See State v. Linville, 184 
Wis. 2d 705, 720-21, 516 N.W.2d 427. 
While I understand the partial concurrence's reading of 
Linville and find it to be a reasonable one in isolation, it is 
at odds with a principal expositor of Linville, Kosky v. 
International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565 
N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997).  Justice Prosser would need to 
overrule a substantial amount of law to arrive at his 
interpretation of the recreational immunity statute.  
No.  2014AP1508.akz 
 
10 
 
¶82 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶83 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part; dissenting 
in part).  This case involves an unfortunate accident that 
occurred at a charity event in Beaver Dam on July 30, 2011.  I 
agree with the majority opinion that "Sundog's waiver of 
liability form violates public policy and is unenforceable as a 
matter of law."  Majority op., ¶4.  However, I also agree with 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Rebecca G. Bradley that 
"Sundog meets the statutory requirements to obtain recreational 
immunity because: (1) it falls within the definition of 'owner,' 
which includes 'a person . . . that . . . occupies property;' 
and (2) Patti Roberts engaged in a recreational activity on the 
property occupied by Sundog."  Dissent, ¶132.  Consequently, I 
join the dissenting opinion of Justice Rebecca Bradley except 
for footnote 4. 
¶84 My purpose in writing is to reinforce the inexorable 
logic 
of 
Justice 
Bradley's 
dissent 
and 
respond 
to 
the 
concurrence of Justice Ziegler. 
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 reads in part as follows: 
 
(2) NO DUTY; IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.  (a)
 
Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner 
and no officer, employee or agent of an owner owes to 
any person who enters the owner's property to engage 
in a recreational activity: 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
3. 
A duty to give warning of an unsafe 
condition, use or activity on the property. 
 
(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no 
owner and no officer, employee or agent of an owner is 
liable for . . . any injury to . . . a person engaging 
in 
a 
recreational 
activity 
on 
the 
owner's 
property . . . . 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶86 Critical to the interpretation of this statute is the 
definition of "owner." 
 
"Owner" means either of the following: 
 
1. 
A person, including a governmental body or 
nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies 
property. 
 
2. 
A 
governmental 
body 
or 
nonprofit 
organization that has a recreational agreement with 
another owner. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d). 
 
¶87 In this case, we should analyze three different 
entities: (1) Beaver Dam Conservationists, LLC; (2) Green Valley 
Enterprises; and (3) Sundog Ballooning, LLC (and its owners, 
Kerry M. Hanson and Jodi L. Hanson) (Sundog). 
¶88 "Beaver 
Dam 
Conservationists, 
LLC . . . owned 
the 
shooting range where the charity event was held."  Majority op., 
¶5.  The shooting club was thus an owner. 
¶89 The shooting club donated use of its property to Green 
Valley Enterprises, a charitable organization, which opened the 
property free to the public as part of a charitable fundraiser.  
Of course, Green Valley could not have opened up the property to 
the public if Beaver Dam Conservationists had not "opened up" 
the property for Green Valley's charitable event. 
¶90 Green 
Valley 
was 
an 
"owner" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(d)1. because it occupied the property with the 
permission of an owner.  In addition, it was an owner under 
(d)2. if it signed "a recreational agreement" with Beaver Dam 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
3 
 
Conservationists.1  Whether Green Valley actually signed a 
"recreational agreement" is not known. 
¶91 The principal issue in this court is whether Sundog 
also is an "owner" by virtue of occupying the property. 
¶92 This was not the principal issue in the circuit court.  
In fact, this was not an issue at all in the circuit court.  In 
its motion for summary judgment, Sundog explained at length that 
it was an "owner" under the statute because it occupied the 
property. 
¶93 The plaintiffs did not dispute this contention.  The 
plaintiffs instead took a different position: 
 
The liability of the Defendant in this case has 
absolutely nothing to do with the condition of the 
land, any structures upon it, or use of the land 
itself by the Plaintiffs or the Defendant. 
 
. . . .  
 
Negligent acts or decisions not directed at the 
condition of the land are not entitled to immunity. 
¶94 The Dodge County Circuit Court, Joseph G. Sciascia, 
Judge, wrote the following: "The [plaintiffs] do not dispute 
that the plaintiff was on the property for a recreational 
purpose.  The plaintiff raises the issue of whether or not the 
statute applies in this case because the injury was caused by an 
                                                 
1 "Recreational 
agreement" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(h) to mean "a written authorization granted by an 
owner 
to 
a 
governmental 
body 
or 
nonprofit 
organization 
permitting public access to all or a specific part of the 
owner's property for any recreational activity." 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
4 
 
act 
unrelated 
to 
the 
condition 
or 
maintenance 
of 
the 
land . . . ." 
¶95 Whether Sundog occupied the property was not an issue 
in the court of appeals either.  The court's opinion stated: 
 
Roberts 
does 
not 
contest 
that 
Sundog 
was 
occupying, and therefore was an "owner" of, "property" 
on which Patti Roberts was engaging in "recreational 
activity."  See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d), (f), (g).  
Roberts also does not dispute that "the activity 
giving 
rise 
to 
[Patti 
Roberts'] 
injury 
was 
a 
'recreational activity' as defined by the statute," 
that is, ballooning. 
Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., No. 2014AP1508, unpublished slip 
op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015) (alteration in original). 
¶96 The reason why "occupies" is the principal issue in 
this court is because this court made it the principal issue by 
asking the parties to brief it.  The court's order granting 
review stated in part: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties' briefs shall 
address the following additional issue: 
Whether the defendants/respondents Sundog Ballooning, 
LLC, Kerry M. Hanson, and Jodi L. Hanson, were 
"occupiers" of the property in question for purposes 
of the recreational immunity statute at the time of 
the 
accident 
in 
question. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(d); see also Doane v. Helenville Mut. Ins. 
Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 575 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶97 This court has broad authority to ask that additional 
issues be briefed, but the court should be careful not to fault 
a party for failing to supply complete evidence on an issue that 
was not contested, or chide a party for not arguing or briefing 
an issue that was not necessary because of the party's success 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
5 
 
in circuit court on a more encompassing issue.  See Majority 
op., ¶33 n.6. 
¶98 As I see it, Sundog took possession of a large, wide-
open 
space 
at 
the 
recreational 
property 
of 
Beaver 
Dam 
Conservationists at the express invitation of Green Valley 
Enterprises.  Its balloon was tethered to two trees and a pickup 
truck that was brought into and parked on the property.  The two 
trees and truck formed a triangle with the large balloon in the 
middle.  The Hansons flagged off the whole area.  They set up a 
display and a sign-up table for the balloon ride, and they 
designated a waiting area for people to line up for a ride.  In 
short, the Hansons completely controlled one section of the 
property for their ballooning operation.  They "filled up" the 
space.  They not only "used" the space but also governed the 
space during the time they were authorized to be there.  In sum, 
they occupied the property. 
¶99 In Doane, the court of appeals said, "An occupant is 
one who has actual possession of the property, but is more 
transient than either a lessee or an owner with legal title."  
Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351 (citing Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions 
Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 491, 431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1988)).  
This, in essence, is the rule applied in multiple cases.  There 
can really be no dispute that Sundog satisfied the test of 
"occupies" under this rule. 
¶100 The Doane court added, however, that "'occupancy,' in 
the statutory sense, signifies a degree of permanence, as 
opposed to the mere use of the property in question."  Id. 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
6 
 
(citing Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 823 F.2d 
1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1987)).  The Doane court later stated: 
"Occupy" 
is 
defined 
as 
"to 
take 
and 
hold 
possession."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 794 
(8th 
ed. 
1974). 
 
That 
definition 
could 
imply 
possession for some unstated period of time or it 
could be understood in a way in which time is not 
relevant.  Therefore, reasonable persons could differ 
in their assessments of whether Ehle "occupied" a 
portion of the lake with his shanty within the meaning 
of the statute.  However, occupy, as used in § 895.52 
Stats., has been defined by this court as requiring a 
degree of permanence, as opposed to mere use.  See 
Hall, 146 Wis. 2d at 491, 431 N.W.2d at 698 (citing 
Smith, 823 F.2d at 1197). 
Id. at 354 (emphasis added). 
¶101 The court of appeals reached the correct decision in 
Doane, but it did so, at least in part, for the wrong reason.  
The Hall case never discussed "a degree of permanence" because 
Hall never quoted that portion of the Seventh Circuit's opinion.  
Hall clearly sidestepped the "permanence" part of the Seventh 
Circuit's opinion and instead quoted language that the Seventh 
Circuit had quoted from the underlying District Court decision.  
The language quoted from the District Court's decision made 
absolutely no reference to "permanence."  Until Doane, no 
Wisconsin case had ever used the phrase "degree of permanence." 
¶102 The Hall case involved a Lions Club in Turtle Lake 
that sponsored a fair on the grounds of the Turtle Lake Village 
Park.  The Village granted the Lions permission to use the park.  
The Hall court said: "[W]hen a third party such as the Lions 
Club produces a fair on the land of another, it 'occupies' the 
land within the intended definition."  Hall, 146 Wis. 2d at 490.  
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
7 
 
Then the court quoted language that the Seventh Circuit had 
quoted from the underlying District Court decision in Smith: 
[O]ccupant include[s] persons who, while not owners or 
tenants, have the actual use of land.. . . .  While 
"occupant" includes [an] owner and lessee, it also 
means one who has the actual use of property without 
legal title, dominion or tenancy.  In order to give 
meaning to [occupies], the term should be interpreted 
to encompass a resident of land who is more transient 
than either a lessee or an owner. 
Id. at 491 (alterations in original)(quoting Smith, 823 F.2d at 
1197, which had quoted Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, 
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1579, 1582 (E.D. Wis. 1986)).   
¶103 If the Doane case is controlling, it substantially 
changed the law in Wisconsin, disregarding prior court of 
appeals precedent, when it quoted from the Seventh Circuit's 
independent analysis in Smith, rather than language quoted from 
the District Court's underlying decision. 
¶104 In the Seventh Circuit case, the losing party, Smith, 
relied on Labree v. Millville Manufacturing, Inc., 481 A.2d 286 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), a New Jersey case in which a 
contractor was sued after excavating land as part of the 
construction of a highway.  Smith, 823 F.2d at 1196-97.  "The 
excavation and transfer of sand and gravel resulted in the man-
made creation of a twenty acre lake in which people swam on an 
informal basis."  Id. at 1197.  David Labree later dove into the 
lake and hit his head, rendering him a quadriplegic.  Id.  The 
contractor, who was sued after he had left the land, claimed 
recreational immunity under a New Jersey statute.  The New 
Jersey court said:  
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
8 
 
We believe use of the word "occupant" in the 
statute signifies an intent to provide immunity for an 
entity with a degree of permanence in the occupancy, 
not merely one who is using the property, as was the 
case with Gaskill.  [Gaskill] "occupied" the property 
not really as one in occupancy but rather as one 
removing dirt and gravel from it. 
Id. (alterations omitted)(quoting Labree, 481 A.2d at 291). 
 
¶105 The Seventh Circuit opinion in Smith borrowed the 
"degree of permanence" language from the New Jersey court and 
used it against the losing party.  But it is very doubtful that 
the Seventh Circuit intended to create a "degree of permanence" 
test for "occupants."  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit favorably 
referred to the language from the underlying District Court 
opinion, quoted in Hall, when explaining that if the court "were 
to circumscribe and interpret 'occupant' as one in actual 
possession 
or 
exclusive 
control 
the 
term 
would 
be 
indistinguishable from owner."  Smith, 823 F.2d at 1198.  Our 
court of appeals should not have embraced the phrase "degree of 
permanence" as established Wisconsin law to bootstrap its 
decision in Doane. 
 
¶106 This court cannot adopt the "permanence" test from the 
Seventh Circuit decision without overruling Hall and numerous 
other cases, and also effectively ruling that Green Valley 
Enterprises did not "occupy" the property.  If a "permanence" 
test disqualifies Sundog, it would disqualify Green Valley 
Enterprises as well because Green Valley did not own or lease 
the property——it occupied the property.  Green Valley's few 
extra 
hours 
of 
occupancy 
at 
the 
shooting 
range 
cannot 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
9 
 
realistically be viewed as being more "permanent" than Sundog's 
occupancy. 
¶107 The majority's decision to disqualify Sundog from any 
status as an "owner" and send this case back for trial does not 
end the immunity issue.  If Green Valley is still considered an 
occupant, we must anticipate that Sundog will assert that it was 
Green Valley's "agent" under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(a) and (b).  
There is no definition of "agent" in the recreational immunity 
statute, meaning that the circuit court may resort to a 
dictionary.  "Agent" is defined as (1) one that acts or has the 
power or authority to act, or (2) one empowered to act for or 
represent another.  American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 33 (3d ed. 1992). 
¶108 Kerry Hanson explained in his deposition that he and 
his wife lived in Rhinelander but had family ties to Beaver Dam.  
In fact, his sister, Kristin Hanson, was manager for agency 
development 
for 
Green 
Valley 
Enterprises. 
 
Kerry 
Hanson 
testified as follows: 
Q. 
How was it that it came about that you were going 
to be involved in this event in the first place? 
 
. . . .  
A. 
--the head of the Green Valley Enterprises, a 
business that services special needs people, was 
actually in the neighborhood, saw my balloon tethered.  
He employs my sister, who is a marketing director for 
Green Valley Enterprises.  He saw it and said, wow, 
what a cool thing; maybe we could use that at our 
fundraiser to increase awareness, and I believe that 
began the process. 
Q. 
And eventually it was agreed that you would do 
that. 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
10 
 
Correct? 
A. 
Right. 
Q. 
And it's my understanding that you were donating 
your services that day? 
A. 
Right. 
¶109 In 
other 
depositions, 
witnesses 
testified 
that 
Sundog's balloon rides were advertised as an attraction for 
Green Valley Enterprises' fundraising event. 
¶110 Under the circumstances, it would be rather difficult 
to conclude that Sundog was not an "agent" of Green Valley 
Enterprises if Green Valley was an "owner." 
 
¶111 The "agent" of an "owner" is immune under the statute.  
However, the majority's conceptual dilemma is that any "agent" 
in this situation is likely to be "a third party not responsible 
for opening up the land to the public," Majority op., ¶33, which 
the majority now deems essential to qualifying for immunity: 
"Here . . . defining Sundog as an 'occupier' would not further 
the policy underlying the statute because the Conservationists' 
property was already open for public recreational purposes."  
Id., ¶35. 
 
¶112 The majority opinion adds, "Immunizing Sundog would 
have no effect on whether the public had access to private land, 
because Sundog is not responsible for opening the land to the 
public."  Id., ¶37. 
 
¶113 This analysis would appear to deny immunity to any 
"officer, employee or agent" who did not "open up the land" to 
the public. 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
11 
 
 
¶114 This analysis also is deficient because it ignores the 
fact that people often come to a property because they have been 
attracted by the promise of recreational activities there.  
Example: the Roberts family came to the shooting range, in part, 
because 
they 
heard 
there 
would 
be 
balloon 
rides. 
 
If 
organizations and people providing bona fide recreational 
activities are stripped of recreational immunity because they 
did not "open up the land to the public," they will have to 
rethink whether they are willing to participate in such 
activities. 
¶115 In sum, the majority opinion seriously misinterprets 
the meaning of "owner" in the statute. 
 
¶116 As noted above, the Robertses contended at trial that 
recreational immunity must be linked to a "condition of the 
land, any structures upon it, or use of the land itself."  See 
supra, ¶93.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence champions this 
proposition by relying on Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 
Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994), and Kosky v. International 
Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
 
¶117 Linville is the tragic case in which a man took a 
mother and her four-year-old son to a city-owned pond in 
Janesville.  The man intended to take the boy fishing, and he 
was checking out fishing spots for the next day.  Through a 
series of bizarre events, the man drove his van too close to the 
water, got stuck in mud, then inadvertently drove the van into 
the water where he and the boy drowned.  Plaintiffs sued the 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
12 
 
city claiming that the city's paramedics were negligent in their 
rescue of the boy and negligent in providing medical services to 
the boy.  The city defended with a claim of recreational 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52. 
¶118 This court first struggled with the question of 
whether the three people at the pond were engaging in a 
"recreational activity" at the time two of them died.  The court 
said they were.  But that did not settle the question of whether 
the city could claim recreational immunity for the alleged 
negligence of its paramedics in the rescue effort. 
¶119 The court determined that the city could not assert 
recreational 
immunity 
for 
the 
alleged 
negligence 
of 
its 
paramedics because it was virtually coincidental that the 
alleged negligence of the paramedics occurred at a city-owned 
recreational site and came after a mishap in recreational 
activity for which the city bore no responsibility. 
¶120 The court said: "The City's immunity for its functions 
as owner of recreational land cannot shelter its liability for 
negligently 
performing 
another 
function." 
 
Linville, 
184 
Wis. 2d at 711. 
¶121 In discussing this conclusion, the court observed: "We 
must determine whether this statute immunizes the paramedics and 
the City simply because the paramedics are employees of the City 
which owns the Pond."  Id. at 718. 
[G]ranting 
immunity 
to 
the 
landowner 
when 
the 
landowner and the employer of the negligent employee 
are functioning in two different capacities and are 
therefore not the same entity in the eyes of the law 
would produce absurd consequences. . . .  To interpret 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
13 
 
the language of sec. 895.52(2)(b), Stats., to include 
injury resulting from negligent rescue and treatment 
by the paramedics in this case, would produce absurd 
consequences. 
Id. at 719.  The court continued: "The paramedics provide 
emergency medical treatment in every part of the City, no matter 
the situs.  Thus the City's rescue attempts and medical 
treatment are separate and apart from the City's ownership of or 
activities as owner of recreational land."  Id. at 721. 
¶122 The Linville court bolstered its analysis by repeated 
reference to the purported purpose of the recreational immunity 
statute, e.g., property owners should be encouraged to open up 
land to the public.  In my view, this discussion of policy was 
not necessary to a limitation of immunity and is not relevant 
when dealing with public land that is intended for use by the 
public.2 
                                                 
2 Kosky 
v. 
International 
Ass'n 
of 
Lions 
Clubs, 
210 
Wis. 2d 463, 565 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997), also is cited in 
Justice Ziegler's concurrence.  This case requires close 
examination. 
Kosky involved a man whose hands were badly injured as he 
was participating in a three-person team detonating "explosive 
fireworks" at the annual Fourth of July fireworks celebration in 
Land O'Lakes, Wisconsin.  Kosky sued the Land O'Lakes Lions Club 
and other sponsors of the show, as well as several co-workers.  
The defendants claimed recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52. 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In his brief to the court of appeals, the plaintiff 
asserted that the "extra-hazardous activity of detonating 
explosive fireworks" was not a "recreational activity" protected 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  (capitalization and title case 
omitted.)  He also asserted that although he had ties to the 
area, he came from Niles, Illinois, at the specific request of 
the Land O'Lakes Lions Club "to perform work tasks with a team 
of people detonating explosive fireworks."  He declared that he 
personally was not engaging in recreational activity because he 
was working, not watching the fireworks. 
The court of appeals rejected Kosky's argument that the 
detonation of fireworks could not be a recreational activity 
because it is an inherently dangerous, extra-hazardous activity.  
Kosky, 210 Wis. 2d at 474.  On the other hand, the court was not 
willing to say that the detonation of fireworks was a 
recreational activity in the circumstances presented.  Instead, 
the court concluded that "recreational immunity does not attach 
to the landowner when an act of the landowner's officer, 
employee or agent that is unrelated to the condition or 
maintenance of the land causes injury to a recreational land 
user."  Id. at 475. 
The Kosky court quoted from Linville: "Extending immunity 
to landowners for negligently performing in a capacity unrelated 
to the land or to their employees whose employment activities 
have nothing to do with the land will not contribute to a 
landowner's decision to open the land for public use."  Id. at 
476 (quoting Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 719). 
To support this conclusion, Linville cited Ervin v. City of 
Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 472-76, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991), for the 
following proposition: "The legislature, in sec. 895.52, Stats., 
granted immunity to landowners with respect to the condition of 
the land and to the landowners' (or its employees') actions with 
respect to the land."  Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 718. 
As will be seen, this statement is not an accurate 
description of Ervin.  Moreover, it does not take into account 
that lessees and occupiers and persons with a recreational 
agreement cannot "open the land" until the actual landowner puts 
them in a position to open the land.  It also fails to 
acknowledge that public land is normally open to the public 
already. 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶123 Justice Ziegler's concurrence builds on Linville and 
would state the law as follows: 
(1) While the policy of the recreational immunity statute 
encourages landowners to open their land to the 
public, the recreational immunity statute does not 
cloak negligent actors with immunity no matter what 
they do.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶67. 
(2) A "person" who owns, leases, occupies, or has a 
"recreational agreement" to use recreational property 
is not sheltered from liability for "negligently 
performing" another function such as operating or 
otherwise participating in a "recreational activity," 
as defined in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  See id., 
¶69.  An "owner" under the statute "might sometimes 
function in a capacity unrelated to its ownership of 
the land, and that . . . owner should not be immunized 
against claims that the owner engaged in negligent 
conduct when operating in that capacity."  Id. 
¶124 Justice Ziegler writes that the "municipal owner of a 
pond in which a four-year-old boy drowned despite the efforts of 
paramedics employed by the owner was immune under § 895.52 from 
claims that its pond was negligently maintained, but not immune 
from claims that it negligently performed in its capacity as 
provider of paramedic services."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶125 Justice Ziegler's summary of the law is squarely at 
odds with the court's discussion in Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 
159 Wis. 2d 464, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991).  In that case, two 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
16 
 
youths drowned at a public beach owned and operated by the City 
of Kenosha.  The youths' parents sued the City for negligently 
hiring and failing to properly train and instruct lifeguards, 
and for the lifeguards' alleged negligent performance at the 
time of the drownings.  This court was confronted with arguments 
about separating the City's ownership of the land from its 
operation and oversight of the beach by its lifeguards.  The 
court 
concluded 
that 
"the 
City 
is 
immune 
from 
liability . . . for its negligence in hiring or failing to 
properly train the lifeguards, [and] for the lifeguards' 
negligent performance."  Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 469. 
¶126 The Ervin court's opinion reads in part: 
The parents argue that sec. 895.52(2), Stats., does 
not 
immunize 
the 
City 
from 
liability 
for 
the 
lifeguards' negligence or for its own negligent hiring 
and failure to train them.  The parents contend that 
the City's conduct represented "active" negligence, 
and that the statute was intended to immunize only 
"passive" or "condition of the premises" negligence.  
We disagree because: (a) the plain language of the 
statute 
does 
not 
support 
this 
contention, 
(b) 
Wisconsin 
case 
law 
permits 
immunity 
under 
the 
recreational use statute for both active and passive 
negligence, 
and 
(c) 
legislative 
intent 
clearly 
supports granting immunity for both active and passive 
negligence. 
Id. at 472. 
¶127 The Ervin court also quoted approvingly from this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Wirth 
v. 
Ehly, 
93 
Wis. 2d 433, 
287 
N.W.2d 140 (1980): 
The statute does not contemplate that the land subject 
to public recreational use shall remain static.  Since 
the purpose of the statute was to open land for 
recreational use, it would be inconsistent for the 
statute to provide protection only if the owner or 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
17 
 
occupant does not perform any potentially negligent 
activities on the land. 
Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 475 (alteration omitted) (quoting Wirth, 
93 Wis. 2d at 446). 
¶128 It should be noted that the only justice who dissented 
in Ervin was Justice William Bablitch, the author of the 
Linville opinion.  In his dissent, Justice Bablitch wrote: 
By placing unqualified lifeguards on a public 
beach, the City of Kenosha . . . created a trap for 
the unwary.  The presence of the lifeguards created 
the perception of a safe condition that was not 
justified.  I do not agree with the majority that the 
recreational 
use 
statute 
exempts 
owners 
of 
recreational property from liability when the actions 
of the owner create a perception of safety that does 
not in reality exist.  The legislature could not have 
intended such an absurd result. 
Id. at 485 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).  In Justice Bablitch's 
Linville opinion, the court did not overrule Ervin. 
¶129 In her concurrence, Justice Ziegler formulates a 
rational policy of limited recreational immunity, but that 
policy would require this court to overrule a number of cases 
including Ervin and Wirth, disregard controlling language in the 
statute, and clean up internal inconsistencies in her own 
concurring opinion.  If we were to assume the correctness of a 
strict separation of functions analysis, that separation would 
apply irrespective of whether the separation affects an owner, a 
lessee, an occupier, a recreational agreement holder, or an 
officer, employee, or agent of an owner.  Neither the 
concurrence 
nor 
the 
majority 
opinion 
has 
confronted 
the 
consequences of such a change in the law. 
No.  2014AP1508.dtp 
 
18 
 
¶130 I would not hesitate for a moment supporting the 
unfortunate victim of this balloon accident if the statute 
provided a reasonable means to do so.  I do not hesitate now to 
recommend that the legislature promptly review the recreational 
immunity statute.  I respectfully dissent, however, from any 
notion that the court itself should rewrite the statute to reach 
a desirable objective. 
¶131 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶132 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).  I would affirm 
the court of appeals1 and hold that Sundog2 is immune from 
liability under Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2).3  Sundog meets the statutory requirements to 
obtain recreational immunity because: (1) it falls within the 
definition of "owner," which includes "a person . . . that . . . 
occupies 
property," 
and 
(2) 
Patti 
Roberts 
engaged 
in 
a 
recreational activity on the property occupied by Sundog.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1., (2)(b).  By actually using the land 
during a charity event, Sundog meets the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of "occupies."  This conclusion comports with the 
legislative purpose of recreational immunity and would not, as 
the majority fears, result in the limitless application of the 
recreational immunity statute.  As a result, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion because a plain reading of the 
                                                 
1 Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., No. 2014AP1508, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 26, 2015).  
2 Sundog refers to the Respondents: Sundog Ballooning, LLC, 
Kerry Hanson, Jodi Hanson, and T.H.E. Insurance Company.  See 
majority op., ¶2. 
3 Whether Sundog met the statutory definition of an "owner" 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1. was not an issue before the court 
of appeals.  In our order granting the petition for review, this 
court ordered the parties to brief and address that issue.   
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
2 
 
statute 
demonstrates 
Sundog 
is 
entitled 
to 
recreational 
immunity.4   
¶133 Subject to exceptions not applicable in this case, 
property "owners," as defined by Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1.-2., 
are immune from liability for injuries sustained as a result of 
                                                 
4 Because Sundog is entitled to recreational immunity, I 
would not reach the issue of whether the waiver of liability 
violates public policy. 
Similarly, because I conclude that recreational immunity 
applies to Sundog, it is unnecessary to decide whether Sundog 
qualifies for recreational immunity based on its argument that 
the hot air balloon constitutes "property" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(f).  I disagree, however, with the majority's 
conclusion that because the hot air balloon was not "constructed 
on real property" it fails to meet the definition of property in 
the statute.  See majority op., ¶45.  Although the majority's 
structure analysis could be read to require that the structure 
be built or put together on site, the majority suggests that for 
purposes 
of 
recreational 
immunity, 
a 
structure 
must 
be 
permanently affixed to real property.  This requirement is not 
found in the text of the recreational immunity statute, but the 
majority imposes the requirement based on Peterson v. Midwest 
Sec. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 131, ¶17, 248 Wis. 2d 567, 636 N.W.2d 
727.  Peterson held that a tree stand used for hunting 
constituted a structure within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(f).  Id., ¶4.  The majority asserts that unlike 
Sundog's hot air balloon, "the tree stand was permanent and 
built or constructed on the real property."  Majority op., ¶45.  
This differentiation between a hot air balloon and a tree stand, 
however, should not determine whether Sundog's hot air balloon 
meets the common and ordinary meaning of the word "structure."     
Based on the statutory language alone, Sundog's alternative 
argument for recreational immunity fails because Patti Roberts 
did not ever enter or get on the hot air balloon, which is 
required by the recreational immunity statute.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2)(a)(making recreational immunity available to owners 
when a person "enters the owner's property"); see also Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2)(b)(making recreational immunity available to 
owners when "a person engag[es] in a recreational activity on 
the owner's property") (emphases added). 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
3 
 
recreational activities that occur on their property.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2).  The parties dispute whether Sundog meets the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
an 
"owner" 
to 
qualify 
it 
for 
recreational immunity.  Applicable here is § 895.52(1)(d)1., 
which defines an owner as: "A person, including a governmental 
body or nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies 
property" (emphasis added).5  There is no assertion that Sundog 
owns legal title to the property or that it leased the property 
in question.  The only way that Sundog meets the statutory 
definition of "owner" is if Sundog "occupies [the] property."  
See § 895.52(1)(d)1. 
¶134 Unlike "owner," the word "occupies" is not defined in 
the 
recreational 
immunity 
statute. 
 
However, 
the 
plain, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning of "occupies" can be readily 
determined by reference to the dictionary definition of an 
"occupant."  An occupant is "[o]ne that resides in or uses a 
physical space."  Occupant, The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1218 (5th ed. 2015).  This definition 
indicates that a person who occupies property is one who has 
actual use of the property. 
¶135 Here, Sundog donated tethered, hot air balloon rides 
at a charity event sponsored by Green Valley Enterprises.  To 
provide this recreational ballooning activity, Sundog set up the 
tethered hot air balloon on property legally owned by Beaver Dam 
                                                 
5 It is not disputed that Sundog Ballooning, LLC qualifies as 
"a person" in the definition of "owner" found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(d)1.  
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
4 
 
Conservationists, LLC.  It used both ropes and flags to 
designate an area surrounding the hot air balloon.  These facts 
show that Sundog actually used the property to provide a 
recreational activity, ballooning, (specifically mentioned by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(g)) 
when 
Patti 
Roberts 
sustained 
injuries.  This actual use of the property meets the plain, 
common, and ordinary meaning of "[a] person . . . that  . . . 
occupies property."  See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1.  Therefore, 
Sundog meets the definition of a statutory owner as one who 
occupied the property and therefore is entitled to recreational 
immunity.   
¶136 This conclusion is consistent with the legislative 
purpose of the recreational immunity statute: to "limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use their 
property for recreational activities under circumstances in 
which the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary 
benefit."  1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.  This statement of 
legislative purpose is often summarized as "encourag[ing] 
landowners to open up their land for recreational activity."  
Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 477, 464 N.W.2d 654 
(1991) (emphasis added); see majority op., ¶28.  The purpose of 
the recreational immunity statute, however, is much broader as 
evidenced by the legislature's decision to include in its 
definition of "owner" both lessees and occupiers of property.  
In interpreting the meaning of "property" defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(f), we reached a similar conclusion: "[I]t is 
abundantly clear from the language of the statute and the 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
5 
 
statement of legislative intent that the purpose of the statute 
is broader, and recreational immunity is not in fact limited 
only to landowners."  Peterson v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
131, ¶22, 248 Wis. 2d 567, 636 N.W.2d 727.   
¶137 This broad legislative purpose, evidenced by the 
legislative policy statement read in conjunction with the 
statutory text refutes the majority's claim that "[i]mmunizing 
Sundog would have no effect on whether the public had access to 
private land, because Sundog is not responsible for opening the 
land to the public."  See majority op., ¶37.   
¶138 Here, Sundog provided the recreational ballooning 
activity free of cost to members of the public who attended the 
charity event.  Depriving Sundog of immunity because Green 
Valley and the Conservationists, rather than Sundog, "opened" 
the land to the public, creates a distinction between Sundog on 
the one hand, and Green Valley and the Conservationists on the 
other, that is not only unsupported by the broad legislative 
purpose of the recreational immunity statute but wholly absent 
from the statutory definition of the term "owner."  Furthermore, 
the creation of this unsupported distinction ignores the fact 
that the Conservationists allowed Green Valley to hold an event 
that included a recreational ballooning activity provided by 
Sundog.  Sundog's participation in the charity event undoubtedly 
encouraged the public to attend the event and, in some 
instances, take part in the recreational ballooning activity.  
Declining 
to 
recognize 
Sundog's 
statutory 
immunity 
will 
discourage 
organizations 
such 
as 
Sundog 
from 
donating 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
6 
 
recreational activities at charity events for fear of incurring 
liability, which, in turn, will reduce sponsorship of such 
events by organizations because they will have less recreational 
options——if any at all——to draw attendance.  Ultimately, public 
access to private land will be reduced.  This runs counter to 
the legislative purpose of the recreational immunity statute.  
¶139 As further support for its decision to treat Sundog 
differently than Green Valley and the Conservationists, the 
majority indicates that prior case law has not granted immunity 
to a "third-party" organization such as Sundog.  See majority 
op., ¶33.  Simply because the appellate courts apparently have 
not previously been presented with a similar fact pattern does 
not eliminate immunity created by the statute.  Sundog satisfies 
the requirements of the statute and therefore is entitled to the 
immunity it provides.   
¶140 Further, the majority does not explain how its 
conclusion——that an organization such as Sundog that did not 
open land to the public cannot "occupy" the property——accounts 
for the plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning of the term 
"occupies."  See majority op., ¶41.  Although the majority 
opinion references the "requiring a degree of permanence, as 
opposed to mere use" definition of "occupies" utilized by the 
court of appeals in Doane v. Helenville Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 
2d 345, 354, 575 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1998), majority op., ¶34, 
it fails to apply the Doane definition to the facts of this case 
and fails to address the fact that the court of appeals has used 
differing definitions of "occupies," as explained below, when 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
7 
 
determining whether an individual or group meets the definition 
of "owner" in Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1. 
¶141 On several occasions, the court of appeals has 
addressed the meaning of "occupies" in the definition of "owner" 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1. and concluded that "occupies" 
requires actual use of the property.  In Hall v. Turtle Lake 
Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 490-91, 431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 
1988), the court of appeals adopted a definition of "occupies" 
from a case decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: 
[O]ccupant include[s] persons who, while not owners or 
tenants, have the actual use of land . . . . While 
"occupant" includes [an] owner and lessee, it also 
means one who has the actual use of property without 
legal title, dominion or tenancy. In order to give 
meaning to [occupies], the term should be interpreted 
to encompass a resident of land who is more transient 
than either a lessee or an owner. 
Id. at 491 (citing Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 
823 F.2d 1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1987))(quoting Smith v. Sno Eagles 
Snowmobile Club, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1579, 1582 (E.D. Wis. 
1986)).6  Subsequent cases have cited Hall and relied on its 
definition of "occupies property."  See Leu v. Prince Cty. 
Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶¶11-13, 280 Wis. 
2d 765, 695 N.W.2d 889; Mooney v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 164 
Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 476 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1991); Lee v. Elk 
                                                 
6 Although Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 823 
F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1987), applied Wis. Stat. § 29.68, the 
precursor 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52, 
both 
statutes 
grant 
recreational 
immunity 
to 
owners, 
lessees, 
and 
occupants.  
Compare 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 29.68(1)(1981-82) 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(d)1. and (2) (2013-14). 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
8 
 
Rod & Gun Club, Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 103, 107, 473 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. 
App. 1991).  
¶142 However, in Doane, the court of appeals determined 
that "occupies property" within the definition of "owner" under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1. requires some degree of permanence 
in addition to actual use of the property.  Doane, 216 Wis. 2d 
at 351.  The court of appeals recently applied the some degree 
of permanence definition of "occupies" from Doane in WEA 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 139, ¶21, 352 Wis. 2d 73, 
841 N.W.2d 290.   
¶143 The majority, however, fails to apply the some degree 
of permanence definition of Doane to the facts of this case.  
Instead, it compares this case to Doane by focusing on the 
purpose underlying the recreational immunity statute——to open up 
land for recreation.  Majority op., ¶35.  Doane involved the 
owner of an ice shanty on a lake already open for public 
recreational purposes, who was not present at the invitation of 
the titled owner or lessee but who was simply using public 
waters as any member of the public could.  See Doane, 216 Wis. 
2d at 348, 353-54.  An entirely different situation is presented 
here, where Sundog, the owner of a hot air balloon, was invited 
to occupy land for purposes of attracting members of the public 
to a charity event by offering the recreational activity of 
ballooning.  The majority likens Sundog to the owner of the ice 
shanty because the Conservationists' property, like the lake in 
Doane, was already open for public recreational purposes; 
therefore, the majority reasons, recognizing immunity "'would 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
9 
 
not further the policy which underlies the statute, i.e., of 
opening 
as 
much 
property 
as 
possible 
for 
recreational 
use . . . .'"  Majority op., ¶35 (citing Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 
355).  The majority's analogy fails because in Hall, 146 Wis. 2d 
at 487, the Turtle Lake Lions Club was immunized from liability 
for an injury occurring on the grounds of a public park and in 
Lee, 164 Wis. 2d at 107, the Elk Rod & Gun Club was considered a 
"landowner" under the recreational immunity statute as an 
occupant of a city park.  The recreational immunity statute 
simply does not restrict immunity to occupiers of land that is 
not already open to the public. 
¶144 The definition of "occupies" adopted in Hall comports 
with the plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning of the word as 
well as the legislative purpose of the recreational immunity 
statute.  There is no temporal requirement embedded in the 
definition of occupy.  The broad definition of "owner," which 
expressly encompasses a person that "occupies" property, is not 
limited to those who "host" or "organize" an event on the land.  
The recreational immunity statute immunizes a person that "owns, 
leases or occupies property"; the statute does not restrict 
immunity to only those occupiers who are event "hosts" or 
"organizers," a limitation the majority invents in this case.  
In an apparent attempt to further narrow the scope of 
recreational immunity beyond the words of the statute, the 
majority reads into the statute language that simply is not 
present.  Whether recreational immunity should be further 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
10 
 
limited is a policy judgment for the legislature and not this 
court to make. 
¶145  Furthermore, I am not persuaded by the majority's 
conclusion that granting recreational immunity to Sundog would 
result in the limitless application of Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).  
See majority op., ¶¶38-40.  A plain meaning interpretation of 
"occupies property," requires actual use of the land.  For 
example, in Mooney, 164 Wis. 2d at 522-23, the court of appeals 
held that a snowmobile club that had left the property following 
the conclusion of an event did not meet the definition of an 
occupier and could not receive recreational immunity.  The same 
would be true of a hot air balloon manufacturer because the 
manufacturer is not located on the property at the event using 
the land, and therefore is not an "occupier."  It should go 
without saying that the recreational immunity statute does not 
extend to the manufacturer of Sundog's balloon yet the majority 
uses this example to create an unnecessary limiting principle by 
stirring unfounded fears that otherwise "there will be no 
stopping point to recreational immunity" despite statutory 
language that plainly restricts immunity to those who own, lease 
or occupy property.  See majority op., ¶39.  Of course, the 
manufacturer of Sundog's balloon fits none of these categories.  
The legislature created a stopping point.  It is not this 
court's role to second-guess the legislature's policy judgments 
by moving the mark. 
¶146 Finally, the majority relies on Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994), to declare a 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
11 
 
new limiting principle for recreational immunity.  Majority op., 
¶¶38-39.  In Linville, the court declined to extend immunity to 
city paramedics providing services for injuries sustained during 
a recreational activity, noting that such services could take 
place days or weeks after the event and away from the site of 
the recreational activity.  Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 711, 720.  
Specifically, relying on Linville, the majority asserts that 
Sundog has "no connection to the land" and therefore should not 
qualify for recreational immunity.  Majority op., ¶39.  The use 
of Linville and this particular limiting principle is perplexing 
in two respects.  First, the majority's reliance on Linville 
implicitly addresses the Roberts's alternative argument——that an 
injury must arise from a condition associated with the land——
despite the majority opinion's pronouncement that it does not 
decide this issue.  See majority op., ¶4 n.4.  Second, not only 
was Sundog present on the land during the charity event, but its 
hot air balloon was literally connected to the land by ropes 
that tethered the hot air balloon to two trees (and a truck) on 
the property.  Unlike the paramedics in Linville, Sundog was the 
entity actually providing the recreational activity, notably one 
that is specifically mentioned as a "recreational activity" in 
the recreational immunity statute.  See 895.52(1)(g).   
¶147 I would affirm the court of appeals and hold that 
Sundog is entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52.   
¶148 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2014AP1508.RGB 
 
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¶149 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent except for footnote 4. 
 
 
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