Case Title: OPINION OF THE JUSTICES (VOTING AGE IN PRIMARY ELECTIONS II)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2009-251

State: new-hampshire

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

Request of the Senate

No. 2009-251
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES
(Voting Age in Primary Elections II)
Submitted: May 4, 2009
Opinion Issued: May 6, 2009
Jeffrey A. Meyers, senate legal counsel, filed a memorandum on behalf of

the President of the New Hampshire Senate in favor of the constitutionality of
Senate Bill 21

Peter H. Burling, of Cornish, and Kathleen N. Sullivan, of Manchester,
filed a memorandum as members of the New Hampshire Democratic National
Committee in favor of the constitutionality of Senate Bill 21

Brendan P. Bertagnoll, filed a memorandum on behalf of the New
Hampshire Legislative Youth Advisory Council, in favor of the constitutionality.
of Senate Bill 21

‘The New Hampshire Senate adopted the following resolution on April 1,
2009, and filed it with the supreme court on April 3, 2009:

“Whereas, SB 21, ‘An act enabling certain persons to vote in primaries
prior to turning 18 years of age,’ is presently pending in the senate; and

“Whereas, SB 21 would provide that a person who is 17 years of age and
who otherwise meets voter eligibility requirements may vote at a state primary
election or a presidential primary election preceding a general election at which
the person will be 18 years of age; and

“Whereas, in Opinion of the Justices (Voting Age in Primaries) issued by
the Court on May 19, 2008 in response to the request of the House of
Representatives in HR 32 adopted on April 23, 2008, the Court answered in the
affirmative the question of whether SB 436 would violate Part I, Article 11 of
the New Hampshire Constitution; and

“Whereas, in the same Opinion of the Justices, the Court noted that it
had not been asked and therefore did not opine upon whether SB 436 would
infringe upon the associational rights of political parties guaranteed by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and

“Whereas, the provisions of SB 21 are identical to SB 436; and

“Whereas, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution includes partisan political organization|s}; and

“Whereas, a question has arisen as to whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution provide greater protection than
do Part I, Article 11 and Part I, Article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution of
the associational rights of any political party such that the legislature may
allow an otherwise qualified 17-year-old person to vote in a state or presidential
primary that precedes a general election at which the person will be 18 years of
‘age, in order to permit stich persons to participate in choosing the party's,
nominee for the general election; and

“Whereas, it is important that this constitutional question be settled
before the bill is enacted; now, therefore, be it

“Resolved by the Senate:

“That the justices of the supreme court be respectfully requested to give
their opinion upon the following questions of law:

“1, Would enactment of SB 21 to allow voting in a state primary and
presidential primary election by 17-year-old persons who will be 18 years of age
at the next general election, in order to allow such persons to participate in
choosing the party's nominee for the general election, infringe upon the
associational rights guaranteed to political parties under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

“2. Do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution provide greater protection than do Part I, Article 11 and Part,
Article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution of the associational rights of
political parties such that the legislature may allow an otherwise qualified 17-
year-old person to vote in a state or presidential primary that precedes a
general election at which the person will be 18 years of age, as would be
permitted under SB 21?
“3. If the Court answers the second question in the affirmative, would
‘SB 21 be constitutional notwithstanding the Opinion of the Justices, No. 2008-
292, issued on May 19, 2008?"

To the Honorable Senate:
The following response is respectfully returned:

Senate Bill (SB) 21 proposes to amend RSA 654:1 (2008) by adding a new
section, RSA 654:1, III, which would provide: “A person who is 17 years of age,
who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of paragraph I, may vote at a
state primary election or a presidential primary election preceding a general
lection at which the person will be 18 years of age.”

‘SB 21 also proposes to amend RSA 654:7 (2008) to add the following
emphasized language to the voter registration form prescribed by the secretary
of state: “I understand that to vote in this city/town, I must be at least 18,

years of age, or 17 years of age to vote in a state primary or presidential
jeneral election at which L wil ‘ears of age, ani

Tmust be a United States citizen, and I must be domiciled in this city/town.”

Additionally, SB 21 proposes to add a new statute, RSA 654:7-c,
“Registration by 17-Year-Old Voting at Primary Election,” which would provide:

1. A person who is 17 years of age, who otherwise meets the
eligibility requirements of RSA 654:1, I, may register to vote at a
state primary clection or a presidential primary election preceding
a general election at which the person will be 18 years of age.
‘Such person may only register at the polling place on the
applicable election day.

Il, If the supervisors of the checklist determine that the person
registering under this section is qualified to vote, the person shall
be entitled to vote as if his or her name is on the checklist. The
supervisors shall retain the person’s voter registration form and
shall add the person's name to the checklist at their meeting next
following the person’s eighteenth birthday.

Finally, SB 21 proposes to amend RSA 654:12, I(b) (2008) to include the
following emphasized language: “AGE. Any reasonable documentation

indicating the applicant is 18 years of age or older, or that the applicant is 17
he dat

‘person is registering under RSA 654:7-c.”
 

SB 21 is identical to the legislation upon which we were asked to opine in
Opinion of the Justices (Voting Age in Primaries), 157 N.H. 265, 267 (2008)
(Woting Age I). In Voting Age I, we were asked whether the proposed legislation
violated Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which provides,
in pertinent part, that “every inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and
‘upwards shall have an equal right to vote in any election.” Voting Age I, 157
N.H. at 267. We concluded that the proposed legislation, which allowed
individuals who were younger than eighteen years of age to vote in presidential
and state primary elections, violated Part I, Article 11 of the State Constitution,
Id. In Voting Age I, we observed that although those submitting memoranda
addressed the issue, we had not been asked and therefore would not opine
upon whether the proposed legislation infringed upon the associational rights
of political parties guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Id.

 

In the instant matter, we have been asked to give our opinion upon three
questions that are related to the issue we left open in Voting Age I: (1) whether
‘enactment of SB 21 would “infringe upon the associational rights guaranteed
to political parties under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
‘States Constitution”; (2) whether Part I, Article 11 and Part I, Article 32 of the
New Hampshire Constitution provide less protection to the associational rights
of political parties than do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution; and (3) if the answer to the second question is “yes,” would
SB 21 be constitutional notwithstanding our opinion in Voting Age

In discussing these questions, the President of the New Hampshire
Senate argues that Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution, as we
interpreted it in Voting Age I, impermissibly burdens the right of association
guaranteed to political parties by the Federal Constitution to the extent that it
precludes an otherwise qualified seventeen-year-old voter from voting in a state
or presidential primary, and, therefore, Part I, Article 11 must yield to this,
federal constitutional right.

Based, in part, upon her submission, we have reframed the questions as
follows: (1) whether Part I, Article 11 of the State Constitution, as we
interpreted it in Voting Age I, conflicts with the associational rights guaranteed
to political parties by Part I, Article 32 of the State Constitution and the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution in that it precludes
the State from allowing political parties to invite unqualified voters to vote in
primary elections; and (2) whether Part I, Article 32 of the State Constitution is
less protective of the associational rights of political parties than are the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution such that, under the
Supremacy Clause, the First and Fourteenth Amendments take precedence
We answer both questions in the negative

 
We first address the protection available to the associational rights of
political parties under Part I, Article 32 of the State Constitution. Part I, Article
982 of the State Constitution provides: “The people have a right, in an orderly
and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good, give
instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by
‘way of petition or remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the
grievances they suffer.” This provision “guarantees the same right to free
speech and association” as does the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 434, 437 (1981). In
interpreting Part I, Article 32, therefore, we rely upon federal cases interpreting
the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution for guidance. See Associated
Press v, State of N.H., 153 N,H. 120, 140 (2008).

Part I, Article 32, like the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
“protects the right of citizens to associate and to form political parties for the
advancement of common political goals and ideas.” Timmons v, Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S, 351, 357 (1997). “Freedom of association means not
only that an individual voter has the right to associate with the political party
of her choice, but also that a political party has a right to identify the people
who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best
represents the party's ideologics and preferences.” Bu v. San Francisco
Democratic Comm,, 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989) (citations and quotation omitted).
“As a result, political parties’ government, structure, and activities enjoy
constitutional protection,” which includes the party's discretion in how to
organize itself, conduct its affairs and select its leaders, Timmons, 520 US. at
358.

‘The right to associate for political purposes, however, is not absolute,
Burdick v, Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992), “States may, and inevitably
must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce
election and campaign-related disorder.” Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358. “As a
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic process.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quotation,
omitted). Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Federal Constitution grants
States broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of state and fecleral
elections. Akins v. Sec'y of State, 154 N.H. 67, 71-72 (2006); see Tashijian v.
Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S, 208, 217 (1986),

Because of these competing constitutional concerns, *[wJhen deciding
whether a state election law violates . . . associational rights, we weigh the
character and magnitude of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights
against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the
extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary.” Timmons,
520 U.S, at 358 (quotations omitted); see Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581,

 
586-87 (2005). “Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged
regulation burden|s|" constitutionally protected associational rights. Burdick,
504 U.S. at 434; sce Akins, 154 N.H. at 72. “[W]hen those rights are subjected
to ‘severe’ restrictions,” the election law at issue must be “narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434
(quotation omitted); sce Akins, 154 N-H. at 72. But ‘[wJhen a state electoral
provision places no heavy burden on associational rights, a State's important
regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.” Clingman, 544 U.S. at 593 (quotation
omitted); see Akins, 154 N.H. at 72.

 

Proponents of SB 21's constitutionality argue that allowing seventeen-
year-olds to vote in political primaries would constitute an exercise of a
political party's constitutional right to determine its own structure and to select,
a standard bearer. See Tashijian, 479 U.S. at 224; Eu, 489 U.S. at 224. They
contend that we must apply strict scrutiny because “(aj [political] party’s
freedom of association would be severely burdened by a state law prohibiting
its ability to lower the age at which its members can vote in its primary.” We
disagree.

Although a political party has the constitutionally-protected right to
select its own structure and standard bearer, it does not follow that it also has
the right to determine voter qualifications. See Tashijian, 479 U.S. at 224; Eu,
489 U.S, at 224. A party is not absolutely entitled to allow anyone it wants to
vote in its primary. Cf. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359,

In Timmons, for instance, the Court ruled that although an independent
political party has the right to select its own candidate, it was not absolutely
entitled to have its nominee appear on the ballot as the party's candidate. Id.
Such a nominee may be ineligible for office, for instance, and in such a case
cannot appear on the ballot. See id. The Court concluded that, under these
circumstances, precluding the party’s nominee from appearing on the ballot
did not severely burden the party’s associational rights. Id. As the Court
explained in Burdick, 504 U.S. at 440 n.10, “limiting the choice of candidates
to those who have complied with state election law requirements is the
prototypical example of a regulation that, while it affects the right to vote, is
eminently reasonable.”

 

 

 

Itis likewise eminently reasonable to restrict voters to those who meet
the qualifications set forth in Part I, Article 11. Any burden on a political
party's freedom of association is limited. We give little weight to the interest
that a political party may have in associating with unqualified voters. Cf.
‘Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (giving little weight to the interest
“the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an
early decision to seek independent ballot status’)

In arguing that we should apply strict scrutiny, the proponents of SB
21's constitutionality mistakenly rely upon Eu. This case is inapposite as it
involved “regulation of political parties’ internal affairs.” Timmons, 520 U.S. at
360. In Eu, the election laws at issue required political parties to establish
their official governing bodies at the county level, imposed term limits for the
chair of the party's state central committee, and required the chair to rotate
between residents of northern and southern California, Eu, 489 U.S. at 229,
230. These restrictions, the Court ruled, directly limited a political party's
discretion in how to organize itself, conduct its own affairs and select its
leaders. Id. at 230-31.

By contrast, Part I, Article 11 is “silent on parties’ internal structure,
governance, and policymaking.” Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363. Part I, Article 11
merely reduces the universe of potential voters to those who meet a minimum
age requirement. As we concluded previously, whatever burden this may
impose upon a political party's associational rights is limited.

More to the point is the proponents’ reliance upon Tashijian. In
‘Tashijian, the law at issue required voters in a party primary to be registered
party members. Tashijian, 479 U.S. at 210-11. This law, the Court ruled,
interfered with a party's associational rights by limiting “the group of registered
voters whom the Party may invite to participate in the basic function of
selecting the Party's candidates.” Id. at 215-16 (quotation omitted)

 

 

While Tashijian involved a political party's “core associational activities,”
Part 1, Article 11 does not, Timmons, 520 U.S. at 360. Part I, Article 11, which
applies to major and minor parties alike, simply precludes the State from
allowing political parties to invite unqualified voters to vote in the primary.
While a political party may have a compelling interest in associating with
registered voters, its interest in associating with unqualified voters is dubious
at best.

In any event, neither Eu nor Tashijian support the proponents’ argument
that strict scrutiny applies to the instant matter. In both cases, the Court
“applied strict scrutiny with little discussion of the magnitude of the burdens
imposed” by the practices at issue upon the parties’ associational rights.
Clingman, 544 U.S. at 591-92. “But not every electoral law that burdens
associational rights is subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, as. . . cases since
‘Tashijian [and Eu) have clarified, strict scrutiny is appropriate only if the
burden is severe.” Id. at 592,

 
We agree with Justice Stewart's analysis in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U,S.112, 294-95 (1970), that it would be futile to use strict scrutiny to analyze
an age qualification for voting, As he observed: “[TJo test the power to
establish an age qualification by the ‘compelling interest’ standard is really to
deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a
‘compelling interest’ in drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather
than another.” Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 294 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Rather, the power to establish an age requirement
necessarily involves the power to choose a reasonable one. Id, at 294-95
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Gaunt v, Brown,
341 F. Supp. 1187, 1188-89, 1192 (S.D. Ohio) (applying reasonableness as test
to equal protection challenge to State law precluding individuals under
cighteen from voting), affd, 409 U.S. 809 (1972). “There is no single specific
day in the life of all citizens in which it can rationally be said that they are
suddenly informed members of the electorate though they were not so one day
before. It is a problem in drawing lines and . . . the clear meaning .. . of the
Constitution is that these lines are for the states to draw.” Letter from
Professor Charles A. Wright to President Richard M. Nixon, April 20, 1970, in
116 Cong. Rec. 20167 (June 17, 1970).

  

We, therefore, do not review whether Part I, Article 11, as interpreted in
Voting Age I, is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but
instead review only whether the State's asserted regulatory interests are
sufficiently weighty to justify the minimal limitation imposed upon the
associational rights of political parties. See Timmons, 520 U.S, at 358.

“States certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and
efficiency of their ballots and election processes as means for electing public
officials.” Id, at 364. “A State indisputably [also] has a compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its election process.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 231
Additionally, the State has a legitimate interest in an informed electorate,
228, and in assuring that those who vote are sufficiently mature to exercise
their right to vote meaningfully. See Meyers v. Roberts, 246 N.W.2d 186, 188
(Minn. 1976) (discussing State's interest in assuring maturity of those holding
public office), appeal dismissed by 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); Wurtzel v. Faleey, 354
A.2d 617, 618 (N.J. 1976) (holding that state con! n’s provision regarding
minimum age requirements for certain elective offices did not violate equal
protection of underage plaintiffs; such classification is expressive of State's
legitimate interest in integrity of ballot by ensuring competent candidates),

 

 

at

 

Towards these ends, “a State may impose certain eligibility requirements
for voters . . . , even though they limit a political party's ability to garner
support and members.” Eu, 489 U.S, at 231. ‘Residence requirements [and]
age . . . are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into
consideration in determining the qualifications of voters.” Lassiter v.

 
Northampton Elections Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); see Eu, 489 U.S. at 231
(State may impose age minimum for voters). The State's interest in
establishing an age qualification for voters is “unimpeachable,” Mitchell, 400
U.S. at 294 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Raza
Unida Rar». Bullock, 49 . Supp. 1272, 1283 (W.D. Tex. 1972), afin part
arton.
White 415 U.S. 767 (1074); Gaunt 341 Supp. at 1190; 1193.

 

We believe that these valid state interests justify whatever burdens Part
1, Article 11 of the State Constitution imposes upon the associational rights of
political parties. Accordingly, we conclude that Part I, Article 11, as interpreted
in Voting Age I, does not conflict with or violate the associational rights of
political parties guaranteed by Part I, Article 32 of the State Constitution.
Consistent with Part I, Article 32, political parties may be precluded from

ing unqualified voters to vote in primary elections.

 

Because Part I, Article 32 provides at least as much protection to the
associational rights of political parties as do the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, see Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H.
at 437, we necessarily reach the same conclusion under both constitutions. In
light of this, we find no conflict between Part I, Article 32 of the State
Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution and no need to yield to the Federal Constitution under the
Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Koor
Communication v. City of Lebanon, 148 N.H. 618, 620 (2002)

 

May 6, 2009