Case Title: State v. Burns

Citation: 

Docket Number: 103088

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,088 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
VERNIE BURNS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When the jury submits a question during deliberations, the trial court is required to 
advise counsel, provide the parties with the question, and give them an opportunity for 
input in the presence of the defendant. Once the appropriate answer is determined, the 
trial court should respond to the jury's question in writing, in the presence of the 
defendant. 
 
2. 
When the defendant has been charged with multiple counts and the jury requests 
clarification on the differences between the counts, the trial court must not respond in a 
way which concludes that the crimes were committed. 
 
3. 
Prosecutorial misconduct has occurred during closing arguments when the 
prosecutor urges the jury to let the victims "know that they did the right thing" by 
reporting the crimes. Such a comment is outside the wide latitude of language and 
manner afforded a prosecutor in making closing arguments. 
 
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4.  
It is error to include the following language in an Allen-type instruction given to 
the jury:  "Another trial would be a burden on both sides." 
 
5. 
This court evaluates cumulative error claims by determining whether the totality 
of the circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a 
fair trial. 
 
6.  
Aggravated criminal sodomy, as charged in this case, is defined by K.S.A. 21-
3506(a)(1) as sodomy with a child who is under 14 years of age. The definition of 
sodomy in K.S.A. 21-3501(2) further provides:  "'Sodomy' means oral contact or oral 
penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia; anal penetration, 
however slight, of a male or female by any body part or object; or oral or anal copulation 
or sexual intercourse between a person and an animal." 
 
7. 
The actus reus of aggravated criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1) is the 
defendant's act of sodomy with a child who is under 14 years of age. The definition in 
K.S.A. 21-3501(2) creates three alternative means of committing sodomy:  (1) oral 
contact, (2) anal penetration, and (3) sexual intercourse with an animal. 
 
8. 
 
Within the second alternative means of committing sodomy, the anal penetration 
charged here, the definition in K.S.A. 21-3501(2) only presents options within a means, 
that is, various factual circumstances that would prove the crime. 
 
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Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed October 26, 
2012. Reversed and remanded with directions. 
 
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  After a jury trial, Vernie Burns was convicted of two counts of 
aggravated criminal sodomy and two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. 
He was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences, each with a mandatory 40-year 
prison term. Burns raises two alternative means issues, multiple trial errors, and several 
issues related to his sentences. 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
In October 2007, Vernie Burns and his wife, Deborah, frequently spent time at 
Deborah's daughter's house. Deborah helped her daughter with cooking, laundry, and, on 
occasion, babysitting her three young granddaughters—K.W., Ar.W., and Av.W.  
 
On November 9, 2007, the children's father picked them up from school because 
their mother had gone to pick up Burns and his wife for the weekend. When the children 
learned why their mother was not picking them up, they told their father that they did not 
want Burns to come over. When their father asked why, the children explained that "he 
[did] nasty stuff" to them. After a bit more discussion, he called his wife and asked that 
she not bring Burns to the house. Only Deborah came to the house that evening. The 
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parents left the children with Deborah and went to a church event, where they discussed 
the matter with one of the pastors. They called the police the next morning.  
 
Officer Robert Ward responded to their call. He talked to the three children 
together, getting only the basic outline of their complaints. On November 19, 2007, the 
girls were interviewed, individually, on video at the Sunflower House—a child advocacy 
and abuse prevention center. The video recordings of their interviews were admitted at 
trial and played for the jury. On November 30, 2007, the girls were examined at the 
Sunflower House. As expected for an exam more than 48 hours after the alleged abuse, 
the physical examinations showed no injuries.  
 
K.W., who was 8 years old in October 2007, described several touches that 
occurred in the bedroom she shared with her sisters, Ar.W. and Av.W. She explained that 
Burns would have her lie on her sister's bed, which was the lower bunk of a bunk bed. 
Burns would then touch her beneath her clothing on her "butt."  
 
Ar.W., who was 6 years old in October 2007, described one "bad touch" that 
occurred in the back room under a blanket. She explained that she wanted to hug Burns 
and that she was falling asleep against him. She said Burns was awake and that he put his 
hand underneath her clothing and underwear and touched the inside of her bottom. She 
described a second touch that happened in the front room while she was sharing a blanket 
with Burns. Again she described the touch as Burns reaching his hand underneath her 
clothing and touching the inside of her bottom. Ar.W. also testified that she saw Burns 
touching K.W.'s bottom in their bedroom on one occasion.  
 
Av.W., who was 5 years old in October 2007, explained that Burns touched her 
several times on different days. She said all of these touches happened in the back room 
under a blanket where she had joined Burns to watch television. She described Burns 
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reaching under her clothing and touching both her front private (the part she "go[es] pee" 
with) and inside her back private (the part she "go[es] poop" with). At trial, she added 
that Burns also touched her with his part that he "go[es] potty with." Av.W. also testified 
that she had seen Burns touch K.W. in a similar manner in the back room.  
 
Burns was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy of K.W., two 
counts of aggravated indecent liberties with Ar.W., and two counts of aggravated 
criminal sodomy of Av.W. The jury convicted Burns of both counts involving Ar.W., and 
one count each involving K.W. and Av.W.  
 
ALLEGED TRIAL ERRORS 
 
Burns alleges that the following trial errors, individually or in combination, 
prejudiced his right to a fair trial:  (1) the manner in which the district court responded to 
jury questions, (2) the prosecutor's improper statements during closing arguments, and (3) 
the error in the Allen-type instruction. An examination of the total record shows that these 
cumulative errors denied Burns a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse his convictions and 
remand for new trial. 
 
Did the district court err in answering a question from the jury? 
 
Burns claims that the trial court twice violated his right to be present during 
critical stages of his trial; both instances involved questions from the jury during 
deliberations. In the first incident, the district judge received two questions from the jury. 
With defense counsel present, the judge spoke to the attorney for the State on the 
telephone. With Burns and his counsel present, the judge read the questions into the 
record, proposed his answers, and asked if the defendant had any objection. The jury had 
sent a question requesting a DVD player to review the girls' Sunflower House interviews, 
6 
 
 
 
and the judge answered in the affirmative and sent the equipment in with the bailiff. The 
jury also requested the initial police report, which the judge denied because it was not an 
admitted exhibit. Burns complains it was error to allow the DVD player to be sent back to 
the jury room instead of playing the DVD again in open court. Burns concedes that this 
alleged violation was harmless.  
 
The jury also requested a read back of certain testimony; Burns does not allege 
any violations with regard to the read back. When the jury returned to the jury room to 
consider its verdict the following day, the jury sent out a question that is the basis for 
Burns' second allegation. The following is a portion of the record addressing this 
question: 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Let the record reflect the same appearances. The defendant and 
counsel are present outside the presence of the jury. 
 
"We are in receipt of another question from the jury. And I will quote this into 
the record: Can we get clarification from Judge on Count 2 and Count 6? 
 
"When I received that, I sent this message back with the bailiff:  Can you be 
more specific on what you want? They came back then with this question:  In comparison 
to Count 1, is Count 2 meaning the crime happened multiple times? In comparison to 
Count 5, is Count—they crossed it out, but I think they mean Count 6—meaning the 
crime happened multiple times? 
 
"The accurate answer to their question is, I believe: Yes, comma, it happened 
more than once, period. That's how I propose to answer both questions. Any objections? 
 
"MS. LIDTKE:  No. 
 
"MR. MAHONEY:  Judge, this is the form I would ask that you couch it in, the 
terms:  The State has alleged it happened more than once. You're giving them the 
impression this happened more than once. I realize it's semantics. 
 
"THE COURT:  It is. And I'm not going to do that. I've answered it and I will 
have the bailiff send this back further with the—they have asked for some more 
testimony to be read back. The court reporter is isolating those parts of the testimony now 
and we will bring them back. She is just about ready with that, too. So we have got a few 
7 
 
 
 
more items on my regular docket. As soon as we get a window of time, we will read back 
the testimony. Thank you."  
 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Burns frames the issue as a deprivation of his right to be present at every critical 
stage of his trial. If his right to be present is at issue, the appropriate standard of review is 
a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. See State v. Martinez, 
288 Kan. 443, 449, 204 P.3d 601 (2009). 
 
If instead the issue is whether the trial judge properly responded to a jury question 
during deliberations, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Adams, 292 
Kan. 151, 163, 254 P.3d 515 (2011). In State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 901 
(2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012), we clarified our abuse of discretion standard 
as follows: 
 
"Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is 
based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; 
or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support 
a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is 
based. [Citation omitted.]"  
 
 
Analysis 
 
Burns claims that sending an answer back to the jury rather than reading the 
answer in the presence of the defendant violates his constitutional right to be present at 
all critical stages of the trial, citing State v. Coyote, 268 Kan. 726, 732, 1 P.3d 836 
(2000). Burns' reliance on Coyote is misplaced. In Coyote, this court stated: 
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"The trial court's written response of 'no' to the jury without more is error. A trial 
court, when confronted with a question submitted to it by a jury during deliberations is 
required to advise counsel, provide the parties with the question, and give them an 
opportunity for input in the presence of the defendant. Thereafter, the court is required to 
respond in writing to the jury in the presence of the defendant. The court did not follow 
this procedure and its failure constitutes error." (Emphasis added.) Coyote, 268 Kan. at 
732. 
 
Here, the trial court followed the procedure outlined by this court in Coyote. Burns 
and his counsel were present and informed of the jury's question. The judge asked if there 
were any objections, and defense counsel proposed an alternative phrasing for the 
answer. The judge rejected this phrasing and answered the question in writing, "Yes, it 
happened more than once." 
 
Based on the record of the trial, the district judge requested clarification on the 
question from the jury without the defendant's presence. But at the hearing for a new trial, 
the judge relates a different version of events. At that time, the judge says the defendant 
and counsel were in the courtroom when the generic question was discussed. The judge 
describes the events as: 
 
"The first question that they wrote out was, can we get clarification from Judge on 
Counts 2 and 6? The defendant was brought into the courtroom. We discussed the matter 
with counsel and the defendant was present when the answer was crafted and that was, 
and I'll quote, can you be more specific on what you want? We sent that back to the jury 
and they responded with two questions."  
 
But even if the trial record is more accurate, it is difficult to imagine any impact 
the judge's request for clarification had on the verdict. The jury's first question—"Can we 
get clarification from Judge on Count 2 and Count 6?"—is too generic to answer. Burns 
9 
 
 
 
was present when the judge read the amended question and proposed his answer. Defense 
counsel was allowed to object and propose an answer to the jury's question. 
 
The more compelling argument is whether the judge improperly answered the jury 
question and as a result improperly injected himself into the jury deliberations. This 
question is reviewed under the more lenient abuse of discretion standard. But even under 
that standard, a judge should not answer a jury question by concluding that the crime 
happened on more than one occasion, especially when the defendant is charged with 
multiple counts of the crimes. The primary question in reviewing the court's answer to a 
jury question is "'whether [the answer] was a correct statement of the law as applied to 
the facts brought out in the evidence.'" State v. Murdock, 286 Kan. 661, 683, 187 P.3d 
1267 (2008) (quoting State v. Wilson, 169 Kan. 659, 663, 220 P.2d 121 [1950]). 
 
The State argues that if the jury had read the judge's answer to mean "the court 
believes it happened more than once" and placed an undue reliance on that answer, the 
jury would have returned guilty verdicts for counts two and six, which it did not. This 
ignores the fact that the jury could have believed the crimes did not occur at all as to 
those two victims but, because of the judge's answer, felt compelled to find Burns guilty 
at least once for each victim. We are therefore left to speculate as to what effect the 
judge's answer had—none or undue prejudice. 
 
When the jury asked for clarification on the difference between two identical 
counts, the judge responded by telling the jury, "Yes, it happened more than once." By 
suggesting that the court believed the crimes happened multiple times when the defendant 
was charged with multiple counts, the judge essentially directed a verdict against the 
defendant. The court could properly have given Burns' proposed answer:  "The State has 
alleged it happened more than once." Or, the court could have given an answer that 
referred to the instructions explaining how the jury was supposed to consider multiple 
10 
 
 
 
counts when multiple acts are alleged by the State. It was an abuse of discretion for the 
judge to answer a jury question by stating that the crime happened at all, let alone that the 
crime happened more than once. 
 
Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by urging the 
jury to let the girls know "they did the right thing"? 
 
Burns alleges that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments when the prosecutor urged the jury to let the victims "know that they did the 
right thing" by reporting the crimes. The State concedes that the comment was improper 
based on this court's holding in State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1015, 236 P.3d 481 
(2010). But the State argues that the misconduct was not gross and flagrant, did not show 
ill will, and was harmless in light of the evidence presented against the defendant. 
 
Burns also complains about the prosecutor's discussion of charging decisions 
during closing arguments, regarding the State's decision to charge two counts based on 
the events described by Av.W. despite the child's description in the initial interview that 
it happened "eight to ten times." Burns acknowledges that the jury found him not guilty 
of the second count of aggravated criminal sodomy against Av.W. despite the 
prosecutor's comments. Instead, Burns alleges that this comment, along with the 
statement "let them know that they did the right thing," shows ill will on the part of the 
prosecutor.  
 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
"This court employs a two-step analysis for allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct regardless of whether a timely objection is made. First, the court determines 
whether the prosecutor's statements exceeded the wide latitude of language and manner 
afforded a prosecutor in making closing arguments. Inherent in this latitude is the 
11 
 
 
 
prosecutor's freedom to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. Second, the court 
must determine whether the prosecutor's comments constitute plain error. This occurs 
when the statements are so gross and flagrant they prejudiced the jury against the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. [Citation omitted.] 
 
"The second step requires the examination of three factors:  (1) whether the 
misconduct was so gross and flagrant it denied the accused a fair trial; (2) whether the 
remarks showed ill will by the prosecutor; and (3) whether the evidence against the 
defendant was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the prosecutor's statements 
would not have much weight in the jurors' minds. [Citation omitted.] 
 
"But none of these factors is controlling. Further, the third factor can never 
override the first two factors until the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 
(prosecutor's statements were inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 
(1967) . . . , have been met. [Citations omitted.]" Martinez, 290 Kan. at 1012. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The State acknowledges that this was the same prosecutor as in Martinez. But this 
case was tried more than a year before the Martinez decision was published, so the 
prosecutor did not disregard the law in making this statement. The State argues that the 
fact that this prosecutor used that remark in closing arguments for many child sexual 
abuse cases actually shows that she did not grossly or maliciously target this particular 
defendant. 
 
As in Martinez, the statement was made to appeal to the jurors' parental and 
protective instincts to validate and affirm the children's beliefs. As such, it was an 
improper comment on matters outside the evidence and the law. Unlike Martinez, the 
disputed statement was not made during the State's rebuttal closing argument in response 
to something the defense attorney said during his closing argument. Here, the statement 
12 
 
 
 
was made during the first portion of the State's closing argument. But the statement does 
not suggest that the children will face future harm if the jury returned a not guilty verdict. 
 
Finally, the jury returned not guilty verdicts on two of the six counts charged 
against Burns. The State suggests that this supports finding that the statement had no 
reasonable possibility of changing the result of the trial because the jury overlooked the 
statement at least with regard to two of the charges. But, as we have already discussed, 
that verdict may have been influenced by the judge's improper answer to a jury question. 
 
Even so, considering the entirety of closing arguments, the statements are not so 
gross and flagrant that they denied Burns a fair trial. The remarks do not appear to show 
ill will by the prosecutor. And the evidence, albeit hinging entirely on the credibility of 
the three victims, provided substantial evidence of guilt. The statement, while error, was 
not reversible error standing alone. 
 
Did the district court err by instructing the jury, prior to deliberation, that "[a]nother 
trial would be a burden on both sides"?  
 
Burns argues that it was clear error for the trial court to include the following 
language in its instructions to the jury:  "Another trial would be a burden on both sides." 
This language was included in the Allen-type instruction. Burns did not object to this 
instruction. The State concedes that it was error for the court to include that language in 
the instruction based on State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, Syl. ¶ 2, 200 P.3d 464 (2009), 
although Salts was decided after the trial in this case. We agree that the instruction was in 
error. While this error would not be grounds for reversal alone, it contributes to the 
cumulative trial error determination. 
 
 
 
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CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"This court evaluates cumulative error claims by determining 'whether the totality 
of circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair 
trial. No prejudicial error may be found upon this cumulative effect rule, however, if the 
evidence is overwhelming against the defendant.'" State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 553, 
243 P.3d 683 (2010) (quoting State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, Syl. ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 1105 
[2009]). 
 
 
"We recently clarified that under the harmless error standards of K.S.A. 60-261, 
K.S.A. 60-2105, and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), the test is whether the error affected substantial 
rights, meaning whether the error affected the outcome of the trial. See Ward, 292 Kan. 
541, Syl. ¶¶ 5-6. As we stated in Ward: 
 
'The degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not affect 
the outcome of the trial will vary depending on whether the error infringes upon a right 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does not, the . . . court should apply 
K.S.A. 60-261 and determine if there is a reasonable probability that the error did or will 
affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. If the fundamental failure 
infringes upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the . . . court should 
apply the constitutional harmless error standard defined in Chapman, in which case the 
error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of 
the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the verdict.' Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6." State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 
176, 193-94, 262 P.3d 314 (2011). 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Burns argues that the combination of the judge's error in answering the jury 
question, the State's improper statements during closing arguments, and the error in the 
Allen-type instruction combined to prejudice him and deny him a fair trial. The State 
maintains that no substantial errors were made during the trial and argues that the 
evidence was overwhelming. When considering a claim of cumulative error, this court 
examines the errors in the context of the record as a whole. We consider how the trial 
court dealt with the errors as they arose, the number of errors committed, the nature of 
those errors, the relationship of the errors to one another, and the strength of the evidence 
against the defendant. Tully, 293 Kan. at 205-06. 
 
As discussed above, there were three errors in this case. These errors occurred in 
close temporal proximity, playing off one another to deny Burns his right to a fair trial. 
The jury was first improperly instructed with the inaccurate and misleading language 
used in the Allen-type instruction. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor improperly 
appealed to the emotions of the jurors, asking them to protect the child victims by 
supporting their version of the events. Finally, the judge compounded these errors by 
responding to a jury question by informing the jury that the abuse had happened more 
than once. The interrelationship of these errors significantly increases their effect. We 
conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the cumulative errors affected the 
verdict. Because these errors substantially prejudiced Burns and denied him a fair trial, 
his convictions must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.  
 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
 
Because we are reversing Burns' convictions based on cumulative trial errors, we 
would not ordinarily address other claims of error. We consider those claims to determine 
15 
 
 
 
a sufficiency of the evidence claim for double jeopardy purposes. Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1, 16-18, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). While two of the sentencing 
issues Burns raised are moot, the third merits mention. Burns alleges that the State failed 
to prove his age at trial and that the trial court's failure to include the element of age on 
the jury instructions prohibits the State from seeking the enhanced sentence under the 
provisions of Jessica's Law. The State agreed with Burns' request that the case be 
remanded for resentencing using the grid sentence. But we are unable to decide this issue 
in light of the remand because the parties have not argued this issue before the trial court. 
See State v. Hernandez, 294 Kan. 200, 211, 273 P.3d 774 (2012). 
 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS 
 
Like the sentencing issues, the alternative means claims Burns raised are rendered 
moot by our reversal of his convictions. But we may also address such a claim of error to 
provide guidance to the trial court on issues likely to arise on remand. See State v. Wells, 
289 Kan. 1219, 1234, 221 P.3d 561 (2009). In the recently decided case, State v. Brown, 
295 Kan. ___, 284 P.3d 977 (August 24, 2012), we expanded our analysis of alternative 
means. We provide guidance on how that analysis applies to the crimes charged in this 
case. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
"A criminal defendant has a statutory right to a unanimous jury verdict. But 
unanimity is not required as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as 
substantial evidence supports each alternative means." 
 
 
"In an alternative means case, the State must present sufficient evidence to permit 
a jury to find each means of committing the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When the 
16 
 
 
 
jury is instructed on alternative means of committing a single crime and the State fails to 
present sufficient evidence to support both means, reversal is required." 
 
 
"In determining if the legislature intended to state alternative means of 
committing a crime, a court must analyze whether the legislature listed alternative 
distinct, material elements of a crime—that is, separate or distinct mens rea, actus reus, 
and, in some statutes, causation elements. Or, did the legislature list options within a 
means, that is [,] options that merely describe a material element or describe a factual 
circumstance that would prove the element?" 
 
 
"The listing of alternative, distinct, material elements, when incorporated into an 
elements instruction, creates an alternative means issue demanding super-sufficiency of 
the evidence. However, the legislature generally does not intend to create alternative 
means when it merely describes a material element or a factual circumstance that would 
prove the crime. Such descriptions are secondary matters—options within a means—that 
do not, even if included in a jury instruction, raise a sufficiency issue that requires a court 
to examine whether the option is supported by evidence." State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 
Kan. ___, Syl. ¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 16, 285 P.3d 361 (September 21, 2012). 
 
Aggravated Criminal Sodomy 
 
Burns claims that, as charged and instructed in this case, aggravated criminal 
sodomy could be committed by (1) anal penetration by a body part or (2) anal penetration 
by an object. Burns alleges that there was only sufficient evidence of anal penetration by 
a body part, specifically, a hand. The State responds that these are not alternative means 
because these alternatives were found in the statutory definition, rather than in the 
element instruction. Further, the State argues that a hand is an object; therefore, even if 
alternative means were charged, there was sufficient evidence of both alternative means. 
 
As we stated in Brown, the court's analysis must begin by determining whether the 
jury was presented with alternative means on this count of aggravated criminal sodomy. 
17 
 
 
 
To do this, we examine the language of the relevant statutes, K.S.A. 21-3501(2) and 
K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1). We review whether alternatives within a statute define alternative 
means or an "option within a means" de novo because this is a question of law. Rojas-
Marceleno, 295 Kan. at ___. 
 
At the time of the offense, K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1) provided:  "Aggravated criminal 
sodomy is:  (1) Sodomy with a child who is under 14 years of age." The proposed 
alternative means comes from the definition of sodomy in K.S.A. 21-3501(2), which 
states:  "'Sodomy' means oral contact or oral penetration of the female genitalia or oral 
contact of the male genitalia; anal penetration, however slight, of a male or female by any 
body part or object; or oral or anal copulation or sexual intercourse between a person and 
an animal." 
 
K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1) proscribes the crime of engaging in the act of sodomy with a 
child who is under 14 years of age. The language and punctuation of K.S.A. 21-3501(2) 
indicates that there are three general but distinct ways in which one can complete the act 
of sodomy:  (1) oral contact of genitalia, (2) anal penetration, and (3) sexual intercourse 
with an animal. We note that each act described within the definition of sodomy is 
separate and distinct from the other—the acts are factually different from one another, 
and one act is not inclusive of the others. Furthermore, each act is separated by a 
semicolon, which suggests that the legislature intended for each act to constitute a 
specific means of completing the general act of sodomy.   
 
The actus reus of aggravated criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1) is the 
defendant's act of sodomy with a child who is under 14 years of age. The definition in 
K.S.A. 21-3501(2) creates three alternative means of committing sodomy, but within the 
second alternative means, the anal penetration charged here, the definition only presents 
18 
 
 
 
"options within a means," that is, various factual circumstances that would prove the 
crime. 
 
In the phrase "anal penetration, however slight, of a male or female by any body 
part or object," the legislature did not define two or more distinct actus reus for this 
crime. The language on which Burns focuses, "by any body part or object," merely 
describes different factual circumstances by which a defendant might perpetrate the 
required anal penetration. The inclusion of "by any body part or object" does not state 
material elements of sodomy but merely gives a full description of one of the means of 
committing sodomy; thus, it does not establish two alternative means of committing anal 
sodomy. Instead, the phrase only establishes one means of committing sodomy—anal 
penetration. The language "by any body part or object" does not establish alternative 
means, but options within a means. Therefore, the inclusion of this language in the jury 
instructions does not make this an alternative means case and does not trigger concerns of 
jury unanimity. Burns concedes that there was sufficient evidence of anal penetration by 
a body part, specifically, his hand. As a result, Burns is not entitled to reversal of his 
convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy based on this argument. 
 
Aggravated Indecent Liberties 
 
Burns was charged and the jury was instructed under the statutory language "with 
the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either [the child] or the defendant, or 
both." Burns claims that aggravated indecent liberties could be committed by lewd 
touching with the intent (1) to arouse the child, (2) to arouse himself, (3) to arouse both, 
(4) to satisfy the sexual desires of the child, (5) to satisfy his own sexual desires, or (6) to 
satisfy the sexual desires of both the child and the defendant. Burns alleges that no 
evidence was presented on whether he intended anyone involved in these incidents to be 
aroused, but he concedes that circumstantial evidence might support an inference of 
19 
 
 
 
intent to satisfy his own sexual desires. Following our analysis in Brown, 295 Kan. at 
___, we reject Burns' argument that these different mental states create alternative means. 
 
As we stated in Brown, K.S.A. 21-3504(a) does provide several alternative means 
of committing the crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Burns, like Brown, 
was charged with only one of these means—that set forth in K.S.A. 21-2504(a)(3)(A), 
any lewd fondling or touching of either a child who is under 14 years of age or the 
offender "done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of 
either the child or the offender, or both." See Brown, 295 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 12. The 
language on which Burns focuses is merely a description of the factual circumstances that 
may prove the single, distinct, material element of intent to arouse or satisfy sexual 
desires. This phrase merely outlines options within a means. 
 
As a result, the jury was not instructed on alternative means, and the instruction 
does not trigger concerns of jury unanimity. Burns was charged with a single means of 
committing aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The jury, following the 
instructions given in this case, had to unanimously agree that Burns possessed the 
culpable mental state of an intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. Burns concedes that 
circumstantial evidence allowed the jury to infer that he acted with the intent to satisfy 
his own sexual desires. 
 
Because this case does not present alternative means and Burns concedes there 
was evidence of sexual intent, he is not entitled to reversal. 
 
Reversed and remanded with directions.