Case Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11775

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11775 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CLAUZELL JONES. 
 
 
Worcester.     March 2, 2015. - September 21, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Rape-Shield Statute.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  
Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses, Public 
trial.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Scientific test, Hearsay, 
Chain of custody, Sexual conduct.  Witness, Expert.  
Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses, Public 
trial, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 17, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on July 5, 2013, was heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kathleen M. O'Connell for the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Brad A. Compston, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was indicted on charges of rape, in 
2 
 
 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b), and furnishing alcohol to a 
minor, in violation of G. L. c. 138, § 34.  At trial, the 
defendant testified both that his sexual contact with the victim 
did not involve penetration and that it was consensual.  To 
establish the element of penetration necessary to sustain a 
conviction of rape, the Commonwealth offered, in addition to the 
victim's testimony, results of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing that purportedly identified the defendant's saliva on 
"intimate" swabs taken from the victim's vagina.  To prove that 
the sexual contact was nonconsensual, the Commonwealth offered, 
among other evidence, testimony concerning the victim's conduct 
shortly after the alleged rape occurred.  The defendant was 
convicted by a Superior Court jury in May, 2011, on both 
indictments. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in 
allowing the Commonwealth to introduce, through the testimony of 
an expert witness who was not present when the victim's "rape 
kit" examination was performed, evidence concerning how the 
various swabs that the expert tested were collected.  The 
defendant further contends that the judge violated his right to 
a public trial by holding, pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 21B (rape 
shield law), an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility 
of evidence relating to the victim's prior sexual contact with 
the individual to whom the victim first reported the alleged 
3 
 
 
rape (first complaint witness).  Finally, the defendant 
challenges the judge's decision, also based on the rape shield 
law, to prohibit defense counsel from introducing evidence 
regarding the victim's prior sexual relationship with the first 
complaint witness, and challenges the jury instructions as 
inconsistent with a decision issued by this court after the 
defendant's trial. 
We hold that the judge erred in permitting the expert to 
testify about how the various swabs she tested had been 
collected, and that the preserved error was prejudicial.  We 
therefore vacate the defendant's convictions and remand for a 
new trial.  We further conclude that the judge erred in closing 
the rape shield hearing without conducting the four-prong 
analysis required for court room closures under Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (Waller).  Because we are 
ordering a new trial based on the erroneously admitted expert 
testimony, we address only briefly the defendant's two remaining 
arguments. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence presented at 
trial, with particular focus on the evidence relevant to the 
defendant's arguments on appeal.  We reserve certain substantive 
and procedural facts for later discussion. 
4 
 
 
On October 17, 2008, the victim, P.B.,1 then a high school 
senior, attended a party at the defendant's house in Gardner.  
Also in attendance were several other high school age friends of 
the victim:  Rachel, Tim, and the defendant's son, Chris.2  The 
victim and Rachel testified that, shortly after they arrived, 
they drank some beer, followed by "nips," small containers of 
flavored alcoholic beverages.  The group then played a game of 
"strip poker," although the victim testified that she only took 
off her sweatshirt and possibly her socks.  The defendant 
provided marijuana, which everyone smoked. 
The defendant then offered P.B. and Rachel shots of rum, 
which they accepted.  He served the rum out of wine glasses.  
Both P.B. and Rachel testified that they saw some type of pink 
substance in the glasses before they drank. 
After drinking the rum, both the victim and Rachel became 
violently ill.  Although the victim had consumed alcohol before, 
she testified that she had never felt as sick as she did that 
night.  She vomited in the bathroom for approximately ten 
minutes, and then went limp.  The other attendees picked the 
victim up from the bathroom floor and placed her on a couch in 
the defendant's bedroom.  While she was being carried, her head 
struck the doorframe. 
                                                 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
5 
 
 
When the victim awoke, she was lying naked on her stomach 
on the bed with the defendant behind her.  She felt the 
defendant's fingers in her vagina; she then felt the defendant's 
penis in her vagina.  When she turned over, he jumped out of the 
bed and announced that he had to go to the bathroom.  After the 
victim put her clothes on, the defendant emerged from the 
bathroom wearing a robe.  The victim said, "I don't want to be 
here.  I'm leaving." 
The victim entered the living room and climbed onto the 
couch where Tim was sleeping, placing herself between the couch 
and Tim's legs.  Tim said, "Nah," pushed the victim away, and 
moved to another seat.  At that point, the victim said, 
"[Chris]'s dad just fucked me," and began to cry.  The victim 
then spent forty-five minutes to one hour making telephone calls 
and sending text messages, trying to contact someone to pick her 
up from the defendant's house. 
Sometime between 4 and 4:30 A.M., the victim finally 
reached a school friend, Alexis.  The victim left the 
defendant's house and went to a nearby twenty-four hour 
pharmacy.  Alexis, in a vehicle driven by her mother, arrived to 
pick up the victim.  They found her sitting on the curb outside 
the pharmacy, crying. 
Alexis's mother urged the victim to go to the hospital.  
The victim initially declined.  Instead, she went into Alexis's 
6 
 
 
room, and the two talked for a while.  Another school friend, 
Ellen, along with Ellen's boy friend, then came to get the 
victim and drove her to Ellen's house.  There, the victim was 
picked up by her boy friend, Chad, and taken to her house. 
That afternoon, Chad took the victim to the hospital.  They 
first went to a hospital in Fitchburg.  From there, they were 
directed to a hospital in Leominster, where a sexual assault 
nurse examiner (SANE) performed a "rape kit" examination on the 
victim. 
At trial, the defendant, testifying in his own defense, 
offered a different account of the events of the evening.  
According to the defendant's testimony, after the victim was 
laid on his bed (rather than on the couch in his bedroom, as 
other witnesses testified), the group continued drinking.  The 
defendant then went into his room to watch television.  He sat 
down on the bed next to the victim, who was sleeping and was 
still fully clothed.  After the defendant watched television for 
fifteen or twenty minutes, the victim woke up.  She rolled over 
and said, "Hey, what's up?"  The pair watched television 
together for about twenty minutes.  The victim then invited the 
defendant to rub her back.  He began rubbing her back, and then 
began touching her buttocks.  The victim pressed her buttocks 
against the defendant's genitals, and removed her pants.  The 
defendant licked his finger, reached around, and "touched her 
7 
 
 
vagina."  The defendant testified that he touched the "top part" 
of her vagina, that the touch was very brief, that he "felt 
mostly hair," and that he did not feel either "the lips of her 
vagina" or "a wet part of her vagina." 
 
The defendant then announced that he had to go to the 
bathroom.  When he returned from the bathroom, the victim was on 
the couch in the living room with Tim.  The defendant testified 
that he believed that the victim was interested in having sex, 
and that he too wanted to have sex.  He claimed, however, that 
he never penetrated her vagina, either with his penis or with 
his finger. 
 
The Commonwealth offered the testimony of two experts that 
contradicted the defendant's account.  The first expert, a 
chemist at the State police crime laboratory, testified that she 
performed testing on three swabs purportedly collected from the 
victim during the "rape kit" examination at the hospital in 
Leominster:  a genital swab, which the expert testified was 
taken from "the outside of the genital area"; a vaginal swab, 
which the expert described as "an intimate swab of the vagina"; 
and a peri-anal swab, which the expert testified was taken "from 
the outside of the anal area."  The expert indicated that all of 
the swabs tested negative for semen agellin.  The vaginal and 
genital swabs, however, tested positive for human alpha-amylase, 
commonly known as saliva. 
8 
 
 
 
The second expert was also a chemist at the State police 
crime laboratory.  She testified that she performed DNA analysis 
on the saliva recovered from the vaginal and genital swabs.  She 
indicated that the DNA profile obtained from the vaginal swab 
matched a DNA sample acquired from the defendant.  She testified 
that, based on currently available databases, the DNA profile 
obtained was "not expected to occur more frequently than 1 in 
1,065 Caucasian males, 1 in 936 African-American males, 1 in 561 
Hispanic males, and 1 in 198 Asian males." 
 
After the defendant's convictions on both indictments, he 
moved for a new trial on the basis of the court room closure 
during the rape shield hearing.  Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied 
the defendant's motion.  The defendant appealed from his 
convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial.  
We granted the defendant's petition for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Confrontation clause and common-law 
evidentiary rules.  The Commonwealth did not offer at trial the 
testimony of the nurse at the hospital in Leominster who 
conducted the "rape kit" examination.  Instead, the judge 
permitted the Commonwealth's first expert witness, who was not 
present during the examination and had no apparent connection to 
the hospital at which the swabs were taken, to testify to her 
"understanding" of how the three swabs had been collected.  That 
9 
 
 
understanding was apparently based, in part, on information the 
expert learned from the "evidence collection inventory list" 
purportedly completed by the nurse who conducted the "rape kit" 
examination. 
 
The defendant objected to the admission of the expert's 
testimony "identify[ing] what swab came from where."  Defense 
counsel argued that it was "improper" for the first expert "to 
testify to facts for which [she] [was not] present," that 
defense counsel had "no ability to cross examine" the expert as 
to "how that swab was taken, or whether it was taken with the 
correct procedure," and that the admission of the testimony 
would violate the defendant's right to be confronted with 
witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  In response, the prosecutor did not assert 
that the nurse was unavailable to testify.  Indeed, she 
indicated that the defense had the nurse on the witness list.  
She further indicated that she would request a continuance to 
secure the nurse's presence if the judge deemed the nurse's 
testimony necessary, but urged the judge to reject the 
defendant's confrontation clause argument.  The judge overruled 
the defendant's objections and allowed the testimony. 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."  Article 12 
10 
 
 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights similarly protects a 
criminal defendant's right "to meet the witnesses against him 
face to face."  Although art. 12 "has been interpreted to 
provide a criminal defendant more protection than the Sixth 
Amendment in certain respects, . . . when the question involves 
the relationship between the hearsay rule and its exceptions, on 
the one hand, and the right to confrontation, on the other hand, 
the protection provided by art. 12 is coextensive with the 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment" (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 388 (2008). 
 
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Crawford), 
the United States Supreme Court swept aside its prior approach 
to the confrontation clause, under which the admission of 
hearsay statements against a criminal defendant did not violate 
the confrontation clause so long as the statements "f[ell] 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or showed 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."  Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  See id. at 65 n.7.  Instead, 
the Court held in Crawford, supra at 68, that, "[w]here 
testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment 
demands what the common law required:  unavailability and a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination." 
Although the hearsay evidence at issue in Crawford, supra 
at 38-42, involved statements to police officers, the rule 
11 
 
 
articulated in the case called into question the admissibility 
at criminal trials of the results of scientific or forensic 
testing.  See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).  During the Ohio v. 
Roberts era of confrontation clause jurisprudence, such results 
had been admitted routinely, even without the opportunity to 
cross-examine the analyst who actually conducted the testing, on 
the theory that the results showed particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  The Court's holding in Crawford eliminated 
that rationale, potentially suggesting that any person who 
played a role in the forensic or scientific testing of evidence 
must be called to testify before the prosecution may present 
expert opinion testimony regarding the evidence.  See Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, supra at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
This court responded to the difficulty posed by forensic or 
scientific opinion testimony in Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 
Mass. 580, 593 (Greineder), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013).  
There we held that, under our common-law evidentiary rules, 
"[e]xpert opinion testimony, even if based on facts and data not 
in evidence, does not violate the right of confrontation," 
provided that the facts and data "are independently admissible 
and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in 
formulating an opinion," and that two further conditions are met 
12 
 
 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 583, 584.  See Department of Youth 
Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 527-528 (1986).  First, the 
expert must "not present on direct examination the specific 
information on which he or she relied"; second, the expert 
witness must have the capacity to "be meaningfully cross-
examined about the reliability of the underlying data."  
Greineder, supra at 583, 595.  We characterized this evidentiary 
rule as "more protective . . . than the [United States] Supreme 
Court would require," and observed that, by fashioning such a 
rule, we "necessarily satisfy the mandates of the Sixth 
Amendment."  Id. at 593. 
Our common-law evidentiary rules, therefore, afford the 
defendant a choice.  If the defendant challenges the reliability 
of the expert's underlying data on cross-examination, then 
"basis evidence that is hearsay may become available to the jury 
to evaluate a witness's credibility."  Id. at 600.  By contrast, 
"[i]f a defendant does not open the door on cross-examination to 
the hearsay basis of an expert's opinion, then the jury may 
properly accord less weight to the expert's opinion" due to the 
absence of any testimony providing the basis for the expert's 
opinion.  Id. 
Our common-law evidentiary rules decisively resolve this 
case.  In labeling the various swabs and completing the "rape 
kit" "inventory list," the nurse essentially made a series of 
13 
 
 
factual statements concerning how the various swabs were 
collected.  The purpose of a "rape kit" is to gather forensic 
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.  See What is a Rape 
Kit?, Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, 
https://rainn.org/get-information/sexual-assault-recovery/rape-
kit [http://perma.cc/R7AN-NJM5].  Therefore, these statements 
were plainly testimonial.  See Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 
379, 394 (2008) (evidence is testimonial where "a reasonable 
person in [the speaker's] position would anticipate his 
[findings and conclusions] being used against the accused in 
investigating and prosecuting a crime" [citation omitted]).  See 
also Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015) (rejecting 
confrontation clause claim where hearsay statements at issue 
"clearly were not made with the primary purpose of creating 
evidence for [the defendant's] prosecution"); Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (statements to police 
officers are "testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution").  And because the Commonwealth's first expert then 
recited these testimonial statements to the jury, they also were 
plainly hearsay.  Although the prosecutor suggested at trial 
that the first expert's recitation was permissible because the 
14 
 
 
expert merely was "identif[ying] . . . the hearsay material on 
which . . . she relied," Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 
400, 411 (2011), the expert obviously was "testifying to, and 
asserting the truth of, [the] statements recorded by" the nurse.  
Commonwealth v. Nardi, supra at 392.  Indeed, the very relevancy 
of both experts' testimony was dependent upon the jury accepting 
the nurse's assertions about how and from where the various 
swabs had been collected, relayed through the first expert, for 
the truth of the matter asserted.  Without the nurse's 
statements linking the swabs to the examination performed on the 
victim, the Commonwealth merely would have presented two experts 
who performed various tests on three swabs -- origin unknown -- 
and identified on two of them saliva containing DNA that matched 
the defendant's DNA. 
Because the challenged parts of the first expert's 
testimony constituted testimonial hearsay, their admission was 
permissible only if it complied with the rule articulated in 
Greineder.  It did not. 
First, the Greineder rule only allows an expert, on cross-
examination, to present the specific underlying facts, derived 
from hearsay statements, on which the expert relied.  The 
challenged testimony at issue here, however, came in on direct 
examination.  Indeed, the expert's statements concerning how the 
various swabs had been collected were made near the beginning of 
15 
 
 
her testimony, because the import of the test results that she 
later described hinged on those statements. 
Second, the Greineder rule demands that "the expert 
witness . . . can be meaningfully cross-examined about the 
reliability of the underlying data."  Greineder, supra at 595.  
See Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 392 (2014) 
(Tassone); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 790-791 
(2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011).  Greineder 
responded to a recurrent situation involving forensic and 
scientific evidence whereby the testifying analyst, in 
formulating her expert opinion, draws upon testing conducted and 
results reached by other analysts, who do not testify.  See 
Greineder, supra at 582.  We held that such testimony is 
permissible provided that the testifying analyst "reviewed the 
nontestifying analyst's work, . . . conducted an independent 
evaluation of the data," and "then expressed her own opinion, 
and did not merely act as a conduit for the opinions of others" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 595. 
This case presents a significantly different scenario from 
that involved in Greineder or in the United States Supreme 
Court's confrontation clause decisions involving forensic or 
scientific testimony.  The case does not involve a situation 
where a testifying analyst reviewed and then built on the 
findings of a nontestifying analyst in reaching his or her 
16 
 
 
expert opinion.  See Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 
398 Mass. at 527-528.  Instead, the hearsay testimony at issue 
here involved the circumstances under which the evidence that 
the testifying expert tested was collected in the first place.  
For the Commonwealth's expert to testify to how the swabs were 
collected from the victim would be akin to allowing a chemist to 
testify to the chemist's "understanding," based on information 
relayed to the chemist in a report drafted by nontestifying 
police officers, that a substance later determined to be cocaine 
had been found in the defendant's trouser pocket. 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth's expert did not "review" or 
make an "independent evaluation" of the nurse's representations 
indicating that a given swab was collected from a particular 
part of the victim's body.  Having no personal knowledge of the 
process by which the swabs were collected, the expert lacked any 
capacity to do so.  Under these circumstances, the expert could 
not be "meaningfully cross-examined about the reliability" of 
the nurse's representations concerning the origins of the swabs.  
Greineder, 464 Mass. at 595. 
The expert also lacked any capacity to address the chain of 
custody and evidence-handling protocols relevant to the process 
by which the swabs were collected.  See Tassone, 468 Mass. at 
401.  In Tassone, supra at 394, the Commonwealth's expert 
purportedly had conducted an "independent review" of a DNA 
17 
 
 
profile generated by a nontestifying analyst from a swab taken 
from eyeglasses found at the scene of a crime, before concluding 
that that profile matched the defendant's DNA profile.  We 
nevertheless held that, because the testifying expert was "a 
chemist at the State police laboratory," while the DNA profile 
had been generated by Cellmark, an outside laboratory, the 
defendant was deprived of a "meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine the expert as to the reliability of the underlying facts 
or data."  Id. at 400, 401.  The expert, we observed, "was not 
in a position to confirm that the DNA profile was from the 
eyeglasses swab; she knew only that Cellmark said that it was."  
Id. 
Here, similarly, the expert, by her own account, had "no 
idea how [the swabs] were collected."  Consequently, the 
defendant was deprived of any opportunity to question the expert 
about the protocols in place to ensure that the swabs were 
properly collected and labeled.  Simply put, the expert took it 
as given that the swabs were collected as the nurse said they 
were, and then relayed these statements to the jury.  Where the 
only answer that the expert can give to questions concerning the 
chain of custody and evidence-handling protocols is "I don't 
know," a defendant has been deprived of the opportunity for 
meaningful cross-examination. 
We have observed that a meaningful opportunity to cross-
18 
 
 
examine an expert witness regarding chain of custody and 
evidence-handling protocols is especially crucial in relation to 
DNA evidence.  "[W]ith DNA analysis, the testing techniques are 
so reliable and the science so sound that fraud and errors in 
labeling or handling may be the only reasons why an opinion is 
flawed."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. at 790.  By 
introducing the critical facts concerning how the swabs were 
collected from the victim through the testimony of an expert 
witness who played no role in the collection process whatsoever, 
therefore, the Commonwealth sidestepped the one aspect of the 
forensic evidence presented in this case that was likely most 
"meet for cross-examination."  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 
S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2011).3 
Because defense counsel objected to the first expert's 
testimony, we must determine "whether the error was 
nonprejudicial, that is whether the error did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect" (quotation and citation 
                                                 
 
3  As a general rule, information concerning how such swabs 
were collected should be admitted through the testimony of a 
person, such as, without limitation, the nurse or the victim, 
who has personal knowledge of the specific "rape kit" 
examination at issue.  We leave for another day the question 
whether evidence concerning the collection of the swabs could be 
admitted through the testimony of a person who lacks personal 
knowledge of the specific "rape kit" examination, but who is 
familiar with the general procedures and protocols ordinarily 
employed at a given facility in connection with the conduct of a 
"rape kit" examination. 
 
19 
 
 
omitted).  Tassone, 468 Mass. at 403.  We conclude that the 
error was prejudicial.  The defendant testified that he licked 
his finger and touched the outside of the victim's vagina, but 
did not penetrate her or come into contact with her vulva or 
labia, as required for a conviction of rape.  See Commonwealth 
v. Donlan, 436 Mass. 329, 336 (2002).  The victim, by contrast, 
testified that the defendant penetrated her vagina with his 
finger and penis.  Because the expert testified that the 
defendant's saliva was found on "an intimate swab" taken from 
the victim's vagina, the expert's testimony supported the 
victim's account and undermined the defendant's account on a key 
aspect of the Commonwealth's case.4  During closing argument, the 
                                                 
 
4 Because the testimonial hearsay related to a key factual 
dispute, this case differs from those decisions in which we have 
determined that testimonial hearsay was improperly admitted, but 
did not necessitate a new trial.  In a few of these cases, the 
defendant objected, but this court concluded that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 421-422 (2011); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
459 Mass. 249, 264-266, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 813 (2011).  In 
most, however, the defendant failed to object, causing us to 
review only for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Furthermore, in most of these cases, the hearsay 
evidence at issue was an autopsy report, and the cause of death 
was not a contested issue at trial, leading us to affirm despite 
the error.  See Commonwealth v. Emeny, 463 Mass. 138, 144-146 
(2012); Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 470, 479-480 (2012); 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 594 n.6 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 710 (2011); Commonwealth 
v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 211 (2010); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
455 Mass. 372, 377-378 (2009); Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 Mass. 
1, 15 (2009); Commonwealth v. Hensley, 454 Mass. 721, 732-734 
(2009).  Compare Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 582-588 
(2010) (reversing where medical examiner's testimony was 
20 
 
 
prosecutor argued that the defendant's testimony reflected an 
effort "to come up with an explanation that's short of 
penetration to get the saliva there," and attacked that 
explanation as inconsistent with the DNA test results, asking, 
"if he just touched her, then how did the saliva get inside her 
vagina?" 
Had the nurse or some other individual with knowledge of 
the process by which the swabs were collected testified, a 
skillful defense attorney could have asked questions aimed at 
challenging the integrity of the evidence-gathering process.  
Defense counsel might have questioned, for instance, whether the 
purportedly "intimate" swab taken from within the victim's 
vagina could have come into contact with the "external" genital 
swab, thereby creating the false impression that the defendant's 
saliva was contained within the victim's vagina.  In responding 
to such questions, the nurse or other individual would have made 
"representations . . . relating to past events and human 
actions" that are "not revealed in raw, machine-produced data."  
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. at 2714.  Such 
questioning has prompted expert witnesses to realize that they 
had made labeling or handling errors, thereby preventing 
convictions based on incorrect or misleading DNA test results.  
                                                                                                                                                             
improperly admitted, issue was preserved, and "[t]he cause of 
death was very much a disputed issue"). 
 
21 
 
 
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
Of course, faced with these questions, the nurse or other 
individual might have provided answers that convinced the jury 
of the reliability and integrity of the evidence-collection 
process.  But that is precisely why our evidentiary rules demand 
an opportunity meaningfully to cross-examine the expert 
regarding chain of custody and evidence-handling protocols.  By 
requiring that opportunity, our common-law evidentiary rules, 
like the confrontation clause itself, "command[] . . . that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner:  by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination."  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
61.  Because the process by which the swabs were collected was 
crucial to the Commonwealth's case, and because, as a result of 
the trial judge's error, the defendant was deprived of the 
opportunity for cross-examination regarding that process, we 
conclude that the error was prejudicial and requires a new 
trial.  See Tassone, 468 Mass. at 402-404. 
Finally, we do not agree with the Commonwealth's suggestion 
that the defendant waived his confrontation clause claim by 
agreeing to the admission of the unredacted inventory list from 
the defendant's "rape kit" examination.  It is true that, before 
the expert testified, the judge allowed the victim's medical 
records to be marked as exhibits, and these records included the 
22 
 
 
inventory list purportedly completed by the nurse who examined 
the victim.  At that time, however, defense counsel observed 
that the medical records had "to be redacted significantly."   
The Commonwealth agreed "there are redactions," and indicated 
that "they won't go to the jury until counsel and I have agreed 
on the redactions." 
Later, when the Commonwealth's expert testified, defense 
counsel made clear that she believed that it would violate the 
confrontation clause for the expert to testify to facts that 
were based in part on information learned from the inventory 
list.  Defense counsel stated that, "if [the prosecutor] wanted 
to put on a case which wouldn't raise questions about 
confrontation, she would have put on the SANE [i.e., the 
nurse] . . . as her witness.  She didn't."  Defense counsel 
further objected that "[t]he only way it's coming in is through 
this expert."  The judge acknowledged that "there could be 
testimony from the person who did the swabbing that 'I took this 
swab from the defendant and the vaginal area of the complaining 
witness,'" but rejected defense counsel's confrontation clause 
argument.  The judge noted defense counsel's continuing 
objection to the evidence. 
Defense counsel later apparently agreed to the admission of 
the medical records, including the inventory list.  Counsel's 
apparent agreement to allow the inventory list to be presented 
23 
 
 
to the jury, however, occurred long after the expert had already 
testified -- over defense counsel's strenuous objection -- to 
her "understanding" regarding how the swabs had been collected.  
While the better practice would have been for defense counsel to 
renew her objection to the information concerning the collection 
of the swabs, we do not regard the subsequent admission of the 
unredacted inventory list as a retroactive waiver of the 
objection that defense counsel clearly voiced earlier. 
The inventory list, moreover, did not include the actual 
content regarding how the swabs were collected.  The list, for 
instance, simply indicates "Vaginal Swabs and Smear" with a 
check mark next to it, without describing the swab as an 
"intimate swab of the vagina."  By testifying to her 
"understanding" concerning how the swabs were collected, 
therefore, the Commonwealth's expert testified to underlying 
facts of which she had no personal knowledge, and that went 
beyond the facts later admitted in evidence via the inventory 
list.  For both of these reasons, we reject the Commonwealth's 
waiver argument. 
b.  Public trial right.  At trial, the defendant sought to 
offer evidence of the victim's prior sexual relationship with 
Tim, the first complaint witness.  Defense counsel argued that 
this prior sexual relationship was "directly related to [the 
victim's] motivation to lie."  Defense counsel contended that 
24 
 
 
the victim's conduct, in climbing onto the couch where Tim was 
sleeping, constituted a sexual advance.  Tim's apparent 
rejection of that sexual advance, defense counsel claimed, gave 
the victim an incentive to fabricate her rape allegation against 
the defendant.  The Commonwealth countered that the proposed 
testimony was inadmissible under the rape shield law. 
The judge held an evidentiary hearing on the proposed 
testimony.  Before the hearing began, the prosecutor asked that 
the court room be closed, contending that the rape shield 
statute required that the hearing "be done in camera."  The 
judge agreed, and "ask[ed] the court officers, for the purposes 
of this rape shield hearing, to make sure that no member of the 
public comes in for a short period of time."  Defense counsel 
requested "that Mr. Jones's family be allowed to be with him 
during this stage of the trial."  The judge asked, "They would 
be members of the public, no?"  Defense counsel argued that, as 
"with any trial proceeding, [the defendant] should have the 
right to have the support of his family there."  The parties 
then disputed the purpose of the rape shield statute, with the 
defendant contending that its purpose is to guard against 
evidence introduced for the "improper purpose" of arguing that 
the victim's lack of chastity established consent, rather than 
for the more general purpose of "protecting the privacy of the 
alleged victim."  The judge, after noting that the statute 
25 
 
 
specifically provides for an "in camera hearing," denied the 
defendant's request and closed the court room. 
Following his conviction, the defendant moved for a new 
trial on the basis of the court room closure during the rape 
shield hearing.  In support of his motion, the defendant 
submitted affidavits from various individuals who indicated that 
they were excluded from the court room during the hearing.  The 
Commonwealth stipulated that potential observers were excluded 
from the hearing, and did not argue that the public trial issue 
was unpreserved.  The motion judge denied the motion, concluding 
that the court room was closed properly during the rape shield 
hearing in accordance with the requirements of G. L. c. 233, 
§ 21B, the rape shield law. 
The rape shield law provides: 
"Evidence of the reputation of a victim's sexual 
conduct shall not be admissible in an investigation or 
proceeding before a grand jury or a court of the 
commonwealth for a violation of [certain sexual offense 
statutes].  Evidence of specific instances of a victim's 
sexual conduct in such an investigation or proceeding shall 
not be admissible except evidence of the victim's sexual 
conduct with the defendant or evidence of recent conduct of 
the victim alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, 
characteristic, or condition of the victim; provided, 
however, that such evidence shall be admissible only after 
an in camera hearing on a written motion for admission of 
same and an offer of proof.  If, after said hearing, the 
court finds that the weight and relevancy of said evidence 
is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the 
victim, the evidence shall be admitted; otherwise not.  If 
the proceeding is a trial with jury, said hearing shall be 
held in the absence of the jury.  The finding of the court 
shall be in writing and filed but shall not be made 
26 
 
 
available to the jury." 
 
G. L. c. 233, § 21B.  In addition to the express exceptions to 
inadmissibility articulated in the statute, this court has 
determined "that other exceptions may arise under the United 
States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights."  Commonwealth v. Mountry, 463 Mass. 80, 86 (2012).  One 
of these exceptions applies where evidence that otherwise would 
be barred by the statute "is relevant to the question of a 
victim's bias or motive to fabricate."  Id. 
 
The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, rejected 
the defendant's contention "that G. L. c. 233, § 21B[,] allows 
for public attendance at its required 'in camera hearing,'" and 
concluded that this mandatory closure rule was permissible.  We 
agree with the motion judge that the requirement of G. L. 
c. 233, § 21B, for "an in camera hearing" indicates that the 
court room must be closed during the proceeding.  The term "in 
camera" derives from the Latin meaning "in a chamber," and may 
denote a proceeding taken either "[i]n the judge's private 
chambers" or "[i]n the court room with all spectators excluded."  
Black's Law Dictionary 878 (10th ed. 2010).  Under either 
definition, therefore, an "in camera hearing" denotes one from 
which the public is excluded. 
 
While we agree with the motion judge that the statute 
provides for mandatory closure of the rape shield hearing, we 
27 
 
 
conclude that the mandatory closure rule is impermissible.  In 
reaching that conclusion, we emphasize at the outset that we do 
not question the compelling interest underlying the rape shield 
statute.  That statute, like similar statutes in other States, 
was enacted in response to the pervasive practice of attacking a 
victim's testimony that she did not consent to sex with evidence 
of the victim's "lack of chastity."  Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 
Mass. 222, 227-228, 231 (1981) ("The major innovative thrust of 
the rape-shield statute is found in the first sentence, which 
reverses the common law rule under which evidence of the 
complainant's general reputation for unchastity was 
admissible").  See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:  
Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1977) 
(Berger).  And although "[t]he primary purpose of the statute is 
to prevent a general credibility attack of a victim with 
evidence of his or her promiscuity," Commonwealth v. Mountry, 
463 Mass. at 86, the statute's requirement for an "in camera 
hearing" on the admissibility of evidence of sexual conduct 
reflects a legitimate interest in guarding against the public 
"revelation of facts that can only smear" a rape victim, and in 
"protecting complainants and encouraging victim cooperation in 
bringing suspected assailants to trial."  See Berger, supra at 
96. 
 
We also stress the narrowness of our holding:  we do not 
28 
 
 
determine that this particular rape shield hearing should have 
been open to the public, much less that all rape shield hearings 
must be open to the public.  Instead, we merely conclude that, 
before a judge may order the court room closed for a rape shield 
hearing, the judge must make a case-by-case determination in 
accordance with the four-prong framework articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, decided 
after the enactment of the rape shield law at issue here. 
 
The Sixth Amendment, which applies in State court 
proceedings, guarantees to the accused "in all criminal 
proceedings . . . the right to a speedy and public trial."  See 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267 (1948).  The closing of a 
criminal proceeding to the public also may implicate rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 
106 (2010).  "[T]he explicit Sixth Amendment right of the 
accused," however, "is no less protective of a public trial than 
the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public."  
Waller, supra at 46.  Because the public trial right is 
constitutionally based, in reviewing an asserted violation of 
the right, the court "exercise[s] its own judgment on the 
ultimate factual as well as legal conclusions" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), supra at 105. 
 
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial "covers the 
29 
 
 
entire trial, including the impaneling of the jury and the 
return of the verdict" (footnote omitted).  6 W.R. LaFave, J.H. 
Israel, N.J. King, & O.S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 24.1(a) (3d 
ed. 2007).  See United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 722 
(3d Cir. 1949).  Even where the public trial right attaches to a 
given proceeding, however, the right is "not absolute."  Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 
U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (Globe Newspaper Co.).  A court room 
closure may be permissible, provided the party seeking the 
closure satisfies the four-part test articulated in Waller, 467 
U.S. at 48:  "[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must 
advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; 
[2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect 
that interest; [3] the trial court must consider reasonable 
alternatives to closing the proceeding; and [4] it must make 
findings adequate to support the closure." 
 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has 
articulated a clear test for determining the threshold question 
whether a given proceeding constitutes part of the "trial" for 
purposes of the public trial right.  In Waller, supra, the 
United States Supreme Court determined that the public trial 
right attaches to a pretrial suppression hearing.  In reaching 
that conclusion, the Court identified several values that the 
public trial right serves.  Id. at 46-47.  Various United States 
30 
 
 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have enumerated these values, and 
turned to them to determine whether the public trial right 
attaches to a given proceeding. 
 
These courts have determined that the public trial right 
attaches to a given proceeding where recognition of the right 
would serve "1) to ensure a fair trial; 2) to remind the 
prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and 
the importance of their functions; 3) to encourage witnesses to 
come forward; and 4) to discourage perjury."  Peterson v. 
Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).  See United States v. 
Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890-891 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Braun v. Powell, 
227 F.3d 908, 918-919 (7th Cir. 2000).  Based on these factors, 
these courts have found violations of the public trial right 
where the court room was closed "during [a] hearing" at which 
"matters of vital importance were discussed and decided."  
United States v. Rivera, supra at 1232 (finding violation of 
public trial right where defendant's family members were 
excluded from sentencing proceedings).  By contrast, courts have 
rejected Sixth Amendment challenges based on court room closures 
during "routine jury administrative matters," United States v. 
Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding no violation 
of public trial right where judge closed court room to address 
jurors' concerns about their safety), or where the closure was 
31 
 
 
"so trivial as not to implicate the right to a public trial." 
Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2005) (no violation 
of public trial right where judge excluded defendant's ex-
mother-in-law from court room during testimony of single 
witness).  See Braun v. Powell, supra at 919 (no violation where 
judge excluded former member of venire from trial); Peterson v. 
Williams, supra at 41 (no violation where judge inadvertently 
closed court room during defendant's testimony, which lasted 
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes). 
 
A rape shield hearing is neither a routine administrative 
matter nor is it "trivial" to the trial.  On the contrary, a 
rape shield hearing has a far closer kinship to pretrial 
suppression hearings, to which the United States Supreme Court 
decided in Waller that the Sixth Amendment public trial right 
attaches, than to any of the routine administrative matters that 
courts have subsequently determined may be conducted in a closed 
court room.  Like a pretrial suppression hearing, the 
determination emerging from a rape shield hearing often will 
have a critical impact on the trial itself, particularly in 
cases that hinge on the issue of consent.  Additionally, the 
admissibility of evidence otherwise barred under the rape shield 
law hinges on a showing that the evidence fits into one of the 
exceptions to the statute, and that its "weight and 
relevancy . . . is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect 
32 
 
 
to the victim."  G. L. c. 233, § 21B.  The outcome of a rape 
shield hearing, then, like that of a pretrial suppression 
hearing, "frequently depends on a resolution of factual 
matters."  Waller, 467 U.S. at 47. 
 
Citing a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit in United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 
37, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2008), the Commonwealth contends that the 
rape shield hearing is "more akin to 'question-and-answer' offer 
of proof hearings . . . than to potentially dispositive 
suppression hearings to which the public trial right applies."  
In that decision, however, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit expressly "le[ft] open the possibility 
that the public-trial right may apply to some offer-of-proof 
hearings," only "declin[ing] to recognize such a right on facts 
as uncompelling as these."  Id. at 52.  In concluding that the 
public trial right did not attach to the particular offer of 
proof hearing at issue in that case, moreover, the court 
emphasized that the hearing "differed in at least two 
fundamental respects from the categories of non-trial hearings 
to which the Sixth Amendment public-trial right has been held to 
apply in the past . . . . First, the evidence elicited at the 
hearing had already . . . been ruled irrelevant. . . . Second, 
the district court was under no obligation to hold the hearing 
in the first place, but chose to do so for our and the 
33 
 
 
defendants' benefit . . . ."  Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, the judge did not hold the rape shield 
hearing solely "in order to create a record" of a relevancy 
decision that it had already made for appellate review.  Id. at 
45.  On the contrary, it was only after the rape shield hearing, 
and on the basis of the testimony presented and the arguments 
offered by the attorneys at that hearing, that the judge here 
made his decision regarding the admissibility of the evidence of 
the victim's prior sexual conduct.  Furthermore, the judge had 
no choice whether to hold the hearing.  Rather, the judge was 
obligated, under the rape shield statute, to hold the hearing 
before reaching a decision on the admissibility of evidence 
purportedly barred by the statute. 
 
In determining that the public trial right attaches to a 
rape shield hearing, we acknowledge that courts of other States 
have reached differing conclusions.  On the one hand, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a trial judge erred in 
justifying the closure of the court room for a rape shield 
hearing on the basis of a "general reference to the rape shield 
statute," as also occurred here.  State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 
374 (1988).  Instead, the court held that, before closing the 
court room, the trial judge should have made the case-specific 
"findings as required by Waller."  Id.  See Kelly v. Meachum, 
950 F. Supp. 461, 468 (D. Conn. 1996) (on collateral challenge 
34 
 
 
to defendant's conviction, "concur[ring] with the [Connecticut] 
Supreme Court's finding that the trial court improperly closed 
the courtroom at the petitioner's trial in that the trial court 
failed to make any findings adequate to support the closure," 
but rejecting Connecticut Supreme Court's requirement that 
petitioner prove prejudice to obtain relief for Sixth Amendment 
violation). 
 
On the other hand, courts in Oregon and North Carolina have 
rejected public trial challenges to statutes mandating the 
closure of court rooms during rape shield hearings.  See State 
v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App. 235, 242 (1990); State v. MacBale, 353 
Or. 789, 813-815 (2013); State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 909-
920 (1981).  The crux of the reasoning in these decisions is 
that, because a "rape shield" hearing "is a preliminary one and 
is conducted only to exclude from the trial that which is 
irrelevant to the proceeding," and because "[u]nder the rules of 
evidence, that which is irrelevant should not be heard at all," 
the closure of the court room for the hearing does not violate 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  State 
v. Blake, supra at 919.  See State v. MacBale, supra at 814; 
State v. McNeil, supra. 
 
We are not persuaded by the analysis in these decisions.  
First, evidence barred under the rape shield statute does not 
necessarily fail to meet the "minimal standard" of 
35 
 
 
"[r]elevancy."  State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. at 919.  On the 
contrary, Massachusetts's rape shield statute precludes the 
admission of evidence concerning a victim's past sexual conduct 
unless the evidence fits within the exceptions to the statute 
and the judge finds "that the weight and relevancy of said 
evidence is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the 
victim."  G. L. c. 233, § 21B.  The statute, then, contemplates 
situations in which evidence is relevant, but its relevance is 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect to the victim.  Second, the 
rape shield hearing may result in a finding that the weight and 
relevancy of the evidence does outweigh its prejudicial effect, 
and that the evidence consequently may be presented at trial.  
In Waller, 467 U.S. at 43, the United States Supreme Court 
observed that, following the petitioners' trial, "the transcript 
of the suppression hearing was released to the public," yet the 
public release of the transcript had no impact on the Court's 
determination that the closure of the court room during the 
hearing violated the petitioners' right to a public trial.  
Similarly, the fact that a defendant "will ultimately have the 
use of all . . . evidence" deemed relevant at the rape shield 
hearing has no bearing on the constitutionality of the court 
room closure during the hearing.  State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. at 
919.  The subsequent presentation of certain evidence at trial 
cannot "cure" the problem resulting from the mandatory closure 
36 
 
 
rule any more than the subsequent release of a pretrial 
suppression hearing transcript could "cure" the closure of the 
hearing.  The notion that the ultimate presentation of evidence 
at trial somehow may retroactively remedy the closure of the 
hearing is particularly misguided because it was the improperly 
closed hearing itself that determined the scope of the evidence 
that could be presented at trial. 
 
Finally, we discern no support for the assumption that the 
public trial right attaches only to proceedings at which 
relevant evidence is presented.  On the contrary, the United 
States Supreme Court has made clear that the public right 
"extends beyond the actual proof at trial."  Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 44.  The right, for instance, encompasses the pretrial jury 
selection process, Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. at 213; opening 
statements by counsel, Commonwealth v. Patry, 48 Mass. App. 
Ct. 470, 474 (2000); instructions to the jury, id.; the return 
of the verdict, id.; and posttrial sentencing proceedings, 
United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d at 1228.  At none of these 
proceedings is relevant evidence presented, yet the public trial 
right attaches to all of them because of the values that the 
right serves.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly 
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and 
the government as a whole. . . .  [I]n the broadest terms, 
37 
 
 
public access to criminal trials permits the public to 
participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process -- 
an essential component in our structure of self-government."  
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606. 
 
Courts that have determined that the public trial right 
does not attach to a rape shield proceeding have further 
observed that "a rape victim who is examined about the details 
of her personal sexual background may be less likely to be 
forthcoming if forced to discuss the matter in open court."  
State v. MacBale, 353 Or. at 814.  See State v. Blake, 53 Or. 
App. at 920.  That analysis confuses the threshold inquiry into 
whether the public trial right attaches to a rape shield hearing 
at all with the ultimate validity of a decision to close the 
court room during the hearing.  The "public trial guarantee" is 
"one created for the benefit of the defendant," Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979); it is built on the premise 
that "[t]he knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to 
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."  In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).  In light of the important 
role that the public trial guarantee provides in protecting the 
rights of criminal defendants, we decline to conclude that a 
crucial hearing, whose outcome has a significant impact on a 
prosecution, falls outside of the public trial right altogether. 
38 
 
 
 
That conclusion does not mean, however, that we cannot 
consider other interests, including the interest in guarding 
against "harassment and further humiliation of the victim" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. at 228.  
As noted, the public trial right is not absolute, but may give 
way in the face of "an overriding interest."  Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 48.  Accordingly, the judge is free to consider, among other 
things, the complainant's privacy interests and the potential 
impact that the public disclosure of intimate details concerning 
a rape victim's sexual history may have on a complainant's 
willingness to come forward. 
 
Indeed, this court and others have upheld court room 
closures in a variety of contexts where trial judges complied 
with these constitutional requirements.  In Commonwealth v. 
Caldwell, 459 Mass. 271, 283-284 (2011), for instance, we 
concluded that the trial judge, after making the findings 
required by Waller, properly excluded from the court room 
spectators who threatened a court officer with bodily harm.  
Other courts have concluded that a trial judge, again after 
making the findings required by Waller, properly closed the 
court room during an undercover police officer's testimony 
during a drug trial.  See, e.g., Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 
529, 537-539 (2d Cir. 1998); People v. Jones, 96 N.Y.2d 213, 220 
(2001).  Similarly, this court has found that, generally, "the 
39 
 
 
judge's verification of the validity of" an assertion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination must "be based on 
information provided in open court."  Pixley v. Commonwealth, 
453 Mass. 827, 833 (2009).  A judge may hold an in camera 
hearing (called a "Martin hearing," see Commonwealth v. Martin, 
423 Mass. 496 [1996]) on the validity of an assertion of the 
right against self-incrimination only after holding an open 
hearing at which the parties are "invite[d] . . . to provide the 
court with information that may shed light on whether the 
witness's testimony . . . could possibly tend to incriminate 
him."  Pixley v. Commonwealth, supra.  "Only in those rare 
circumstances where this information is inadequate to allow the 
judge to make an informed determination should the judge conduct 
an in camera Martin hearing with the witness to verify the claim 
of privilege."  Id. ("a Martin hearing should be conducted only 
as an exception to the general rule that the judge's 
verification of the validity of the privilege be based on 
information provided in open court").  See Commonwealth v. 
Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 295–296 (2008). 
 
Our conclusion that the public trial right attaches to rape 
shield hearings, therefore, does not mean that such hearings 
must be open to the public.  It does not contemplate a major 
change in the practice of court room closures during rape shield 
hearings; the State's overriding interest in protecting the 
40 
 
 
privacy rights of rape victims and the absence of any other more 
narrowly tailored means of accommodating that interest may well 
mean that the majority of rape shield proceedings properly are 
closed.  Our conclusion simply means that, in view of the 
importance of the public trial right, before the court room 
properly may be closed during a rape shield procedure, the trial 
judge must conduct an individualized analysis consistent with 
the constitutional requirements set forth in Waller, supra. 
 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 598, is instructive.  That case 
concerned a statute that required the closure of a court room 
during the testimony of child victims of sexual assault.  The 
Commonwealth contended that the statute sought to protect "minor 
victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment."  
Id. at 607.  The Court agreed that the Commonwealth's asserted 
interest was "a compelling one."  Id.  The Court concluded, 
however, that, "as compelling as that interest is, it does not 
justify a mandatory closure rule," noting that "[a] trial court 
can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is 
necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim."  Id. at 
607-608.  The Court further concluded that, because the statute 
"requires closure even if the victim does not seek the exclusion 
of the press and general public," and because the statute did 
not take into account whether "the names of the minor victims 
41 
 
 
were already in the public record" or whether the victims would 
"have been willing to testify despite the presence of the 
press," the statute could not "be viewed as a narrowly tailored 
means of accommodating the State's asserted interest."  Id. at 
608-609.  See G. L. c. 278, § 16D (b) (1) (requiring judicial 
determination before child witness's testimony may be offered in 
closed court room). 
 
The same reasoning applies to the rape shield law.  The 
public undoubtedly does have a compelling interest in protecting 
the privacy rights of rape victims and guarding against 
retraumatization through the public disclosure of intimate 
details regarding their past sexual conduct.  Like the similarly 
compelling interest in protecting minor victims of sexual abuse, 
however, the interest in protecting rape victims does not 
require a mandatory closure rule, which commands that the 
proceeding be conducted in camera regardless of the wishes of 
the victim or any other factors that might argue against 
closure.  In sum, the mandatory closure rule cannot be regarded 
as narrowly tailored to the State's compelling interest in 
protecting rape victims against retraumatization and smear 
tactics, because that interest could be served equally well by a 
case-by-case assessment, in accordance with the constitutional 
framework articulated in Waller.  On remand for a new trial, 
therefore, the trial judge may close the rape shield hearing 
42 
 
 
only after making the findings as required by Waller. 
  
Finally, we make a few remarks to clarify the implications 
of our determination regarding the public trial issue for other 
cases.  Here, we are ordering a new trial on the basis of the 
impermissible admission of the first expert's testimony 
concerning how the swabs she tested were collected.  Because the 
trial must be conducted anew, so must the rape shield hearing, 
if the defendant again seeks to offer evidence of the 
complainant's prior sexual interactions with the first complaint 
witness.  In doing so, the judge must conduct the individualized 
analysis required by Waller before ordering a court room 
closure.  While a violation of the public trial right is a 
structural error, the failure to comply with the Waller 
requirements before ordering a court room closure does not, 
standing alone, require a new trial.  Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50.  
See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 118-119 (2010).  
Rather, in Waller itself, the United States Supreme Court, after 
concluding that the suppression hearing was closed improperly, 
held that "the remedy should be appropriate to the violation."  
Waller, 467 U.S. at 50.  Consequently, the Court required only a 
new suppression hearing, observing that, "[i]f, after a new 
suppression hearing, essentially the same evidence is 
suppressed, a new trial presumably would be a windfall for the 
defendant, and not in the public interest."  Id.  Based on the 
43 
 
 
Waller Court's observations, various courts have concluded that, 
where a court room closure could have been justified, but the 
judge failed to comply with the requirement for individualized 
findings under Waller, the proper course is "to remand the 
case . . . for a hearing to reconstruct the circumstances that 
existed at the time of the trial and to determine whether the 
application to close the courtroom was well justified."  
Gonzalez v. Quinones, 211 F.3d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 2000).  See 
United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1991); 
State v. Weber, 137 N.H. 193, 197 (1993). 
 
We believe that the same approach is appropriate where a 
trial judge improperly closed a rape shield hearing without 
making the case-specific findings required in Waller.  In such 
cases, assuming the objection to the closure of the hearing was 
properly preserved, and the case is still on direct appeal, the 
proper remedy will be to remand to the trial judge to determine 
whether the circumstances that existed at the time of the trial 
would have warranted the closure of the court room for the rape 
shield hearing.  Even if the judge concludes that the 
circumstances did not warrant the closure of the hearing, the 
result will not necessarily be a new trial.  Rather, the judge 
should then conduct the rape shield hearing anew.  If the new 
rape shield hearing results in a determination regarding the 
admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct by the victim 
44 
 
 
that is "essentially the same" as the determination that emerged 
from the original hearing, then no new trial is required.  See 
Waller, 467 U.S. at 50.  A new trial will be necessary as a 
result of our holding, therefore, only if the circumstances that 
existed at the time of the trial did not justify the court room 
closure during the rape shield hearing, and only if the judge's 
decision in the wake of the new rape shield hearing is not 
"essentially the same" as the decision that emerged from the 
original rape shield hearing. 
 
c.  Remaining arguments.  The defendant offers two 
additional arguments.  Because we have granted a new trial on 
the basis of the expert's improper testimony, we address these 
issues only briefly. 
 
First, the defendant argues that his rights to a fair 
trial, to confront witnesses against him, and to present a 
defense were violated by the judge's decision to prohibit 
defense counsel from questioning either the victim or Tim about 
their prior sexual contact.  Because this decision was based on 
the testimony and argument presented at the closed rape shield 
hearing, and our remand may result in a new rape shield hearing, 
we do not address the defendant's argument at this time. 
 
Second, the defendant argues that the judge erred in 
instructing the jury regarding the impact of the defendant's 
voluntary intoxication on whether he "reasonably should have 
45 
 
 
known" of the victim's capacity to consent.  In response to a 
jury question regarding the meaning of "reasonably should have 
known," the judge indicated that the phrase denotes "an 
objective rather than subjective standard" that "requires you to 
consider all of the believable evidence in determining 
whether . . . an ordinary, prudent person would have considered 
the complainant too impaired to give consent."  In its brief, 
the Commonwealth acknowledges that the jury instruction was 
inconsistent with this court's subsequent decision in 
Commonwealth v. Mountry, 463 Mass. at 92, where we held that the 
"element of knowledge is not purely objective," and that the 
Commonwealth must "prove what the defendant reasonably should 
have known, not what the average reasonable unintoxicated person 
would have known" (quotation omitted).  Because that case was 
decided after the defendant's trial, however, and because the 
new standard it articulates is a common-law rule and is not 
constitutionally compelled, the Commonwealth argues that it 
should be applied only prospectively.  Since we are remanding 
for a new trial, we need not address this question.  At the 
defendant's new trial, the judge should instruct the jury in 
accordance with the new standard articulated in Commonwealth v. 
Mountry, supra. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions are vacated 
and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
46 
 
 
a new trial and for other proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Spina, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that making a determination in accordance 
with Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48-50 (1984), is 
constitutionally required before closing a court room to conduct 
a rape shield hearing under G. L. c. 233, § 21B.  Ante at    .  
I also recognize that, because § 21B requires the hearing to be 
conducted "in camera," the public has been excluded from the 
court room without a Waller determination for most, if not all, 
rape shield hearings conducted prior to the issuance of this 
opinion.  Consequently, some may fear that this opinion will 
generate a plethora of motions for a new trial claiming 
structural error as a result of the violation of the public 
trial right.  I write separately to provide some perspective. 
 
A motion for new trial (or a claim on direct appeal) based 
on the absence of a Waller determination will almost certainly 
be futile unless, as in this case, the defendant objected to the 
closing of the court room at the time of the rape shield 
hearing.  Ante at    .  I doubt that many defendants timely made 
such an objection.  Without doing so, a defendant will be deemed 
to have waived his or her claim of error regarding the closure 
of the court room for such a hearing, and may only claim that 
defense counsel was ineffective for having failed to object.  
See Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102-103, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 356 (2014) ("the right to a public trial may 
2 
 
 
be procedurally waived by a failure to lodge a timely objection 
to the offending error," and if waived, "we still may have 
occasion to review that error in the postconviction context of a 
challenge to trial counsel's effectiveness in failing to raise 
the objection").  To prevail, a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel would require a finding that a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice arose from the absence of such an 
objection, and under these circumstances it is difficult to 
imagine a case where such a finding would be warranted.  See 
Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857-858 (2014). 
 
In the rare case where a defendant has preserved his or her 
claim of error by objecting to the closure of the court room 
during a rape shield hearing, the remedy the court provides is a 
remand for a posttrial Waller hearing, where the trial judge (or 
another judge, if the trial judge is no longer on the bench) 
will determine whether the closure of the court room would have 
satisfied the constitutional requirements of Waller had the 
judge made a Waller determination at the time of trial.  Ante 
at    .  The court states in its opinion that "the State's 
overriding interest in protecting the privacy rights of rape 
victims and the absence of any other more narrowly tailored 
means of accommodating that interest may well mean that the 
majority of rape shield proceedings properly are closed."  Ante 
at    .  Thus, I expect that few, if any, posttrial Waller 
3 
 
 
hearings will lead to a finding that the court room would not 
have been closed had the judge made a Waller determination at 
the time of trial. 
 
Where there is such a finding, the court makes clear that 
the remedy is a new rape shield hearing with an open court room, 
not a new trial.  Ante at    .  A new trial will be required 
only if the judge determines at the new rape shield hearing that 
significant evidence of prior sexual conduct by the victim, 
which was found inadmissible at the earlier rape shield hearing, 
would be admissible at a new trial.  Id.  I can understand why a 
judge, upon revisiting a rape shield issue, may come to a 
different conclusion regarding the admissibility of evidence of 
the victim's prior sexual conduct, but it is hard to imagine 
that this determination would be materially affected by whether 
the court room was open or closed. 
 
Consequently, I foresee that very few, if any, defendants 
will receive a new trial as a result of this opinion.  As with 
Waller, the opinion here is not limited to prospective 
application, but its practical impact will be.