Case Title: KIPP v WILLOUGHBY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 12108

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12108 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA ELEANOR M. KIPP, A s Guardian A d Litem of JEWELL ANN KIPP, a Minor, Plaintiff and Appellant, CHUCK WILLOUGHBY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Burgess, Joyce, Prothero , Whelan and OILeary, Butte, Montana. Thomas F. Joyce argued and Robert T. olieary argued, Butte, Montana. For Respondent: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana R. D. Corette, Jr. argued, Butte, Montana. Submitted: January 23, 1973 Decided : E B 2 6' 1973 = ~i I r I - B 2 8'i973 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal i s from a judgment entered on a jury verdict i n favor of defendant Chuck Willoughby i n the d i s t r i c t court of the second j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Silver Bow. The case concerns a motorbike-automobile c o l l i s o n on February 25, 1970. Jewell Ann Kipp, 15 years of age, was driving a 1970 Honda 70 motorbike. Chuck Willoughby, 19 years of age, was driving a 1965 Ford automobile. As a r e s u l t of the c o l l i s i o n , Jewell Kipp received a broken leg. Willoughby was not injured. Upon reviewing the f a c t s concerning the c o l l i s i o n , we find a c o n f l i c t on several points within the testimony of the liti- gants and witnesses. It would appear from the record t h a t the c o l l i s i o n occurred on an unimproved s t r e e t known a s Four-and-a-Half- Mile Vue Road which runs north and south on t h e southern o u t s k i r t s of the c i t y of Butte. The time was approximately 4:45 p.m.; the weather conditions were c l e a r and dry; v i s i b i l i t y was good. Willoughby t e s t i f i e d he had gone t o the residence of a M r . Chapman f o r the purpose of obtaining used auto p a r t s f o r a friend, Keith Smith, who accompanied him. The Chapman driveway i s perpendicular t o and adjoins Four-and-a-Half-Mile Vue Road, Immediately before the c o l l i s i o n Willoughby was e i t h e r i n the process of backing out o r had completed backing out of the drive- way, turning the r e a r end of h i s vehicle t o the south s o t h a t it would be facing i n a northerly direction. H i s own testimony ap- pears i n c o n f l i c t a s t o whether he was moving a t the time of t h e impact . Jewell Kipp and a passenger, Phyllis Baxter, aged 12, were proceeding north on the motorbike a t a speed of about 15 t o 20 miles per hour. Jewell Kipp t e s t i f i e d she was unable t o see i n t o the Chapman driveway from the road because of numerous wrecked c a r s and a t r a c t o r i n the l o t adjacent t o the driveway, Willoughby t e s t i f i e d he had a c l e a r view of the road from 20 f e e t within the driveway; that he did look south down the road; that he did not see the Kipp motorbike; and that he did not stop u n t i l he f e l t a slight bump on the back of h i s car. Jewell Kipp t e s t i - fied she f i r s t saw the Willoughby car when it backed onto the road i n front of her and that she did not t r y t o stop the motor- bike because she f e l t she was unable t o stop i n time. She stated that although she attempted t o turn the motorbike t o the l e f t t o avoid the car, it was h i t by the l e f t r e a r fender of the Willoughby car. Phyllis Baxter, the passenger on the motorbike, t e s t i f i e d that Jewell tried t o avoid the car, but it kept coming and h i t the motorbike. She also t e s t i f i e d that she received a knee injury i n the collision and was on crutches for two weeks. Keith Smith, the passenger i n the Willoughby car, t e s t i f i e d that he did not know whether the car was moving a t the time of the impact and was f i r s t aware of the collision when he heard the impact . Jewell Kipp had owned a Honda 50 motorbike since March 1969, and had more recently received the Honda 70 as a g i f t from her father. O n appeal, two assignments of error are presented on behalf of appellant: (1) That the d i s t r i c t court erred i n giving an instruc- tion on the law of assumption of r i s k and permitting defendant t o argue that plaintiff assumed the r i s k of injury because she had no Montana driver's license. (2) That the d i s t r i c t court erred i n permitting jury argument that failure t o have a Montana driver's license consti- tuted negligence a f t e r having refused defendant's instruction on that theory. W e find merit i n the f i r s t assignment of error. The assumption of r i s k instruction was improper i n t h i s case. There was no evidence introduced a t t r i a l which indicated that Jewell Kipp had committed any act or omission, which under Xontana law could be construed as constituting an assumption of risk of the injury she received in the accident. There was considerable argument and some record reference and argument during settlement of instructions concerning statute violations, some of which went to the question of negligence of both parties. There was considerable reference to a statute vio- lation on the part of Jewell Kipp for failure to have a Montana driver's license. The record also discloses that Willoughby had a valid driver's license, but failed to comply with the statute in regard to obtaining license plates for the vehicle he was driving. Neither the violations of statute by Jewell Kipp nor those by Willoughby place either of them in a legal classification of "trespasser" on the streets nor do the violations invoke any legal doctrine of "assumption of risk" toward either of them. The assumption of risk instruction has no application to the determinations which were required to be made by the jury and, consequently, could only serve to confuse and mislead it. The doctrine of assumption of risk has its historical origin in the master-servant relationship and was gradually given application to other types of contractual relationships. See: Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 31 N,J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82 ALR2d 1208. 7 C.J.S. Assumption, p . 137, gives this definition of assumption of risk: I I The term presupposes some danger, a knowledge thereof, a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the nature of the risk, and ordinarily implies appreciation thereof, and acquiescence therein; and has been defined as the acquiescence of an ordinarily prudent man in a known dan er, the risk of which he assumes by contract. 6 However, the doctrine has been extended beyond the con- tractual and quasi-contractual relationships and applied as a theory of defense to preclude recovery in negligence cases. An explanation of these applications was given by the federal dis- trict court in Montellier v. United States, 202 F.Supp. 384, 394: "Assumption of r i s k i s a term which has been surrounded by much confusion because it has been used by the courts in a t least four dif- ferent senses and the distinctions a r e seldom made clear. Since the defendant here has not specified the exact sense i n which it i s in- voking the defense, the court w i l l consider a l l of them. In i t s simplest sense the doctrine means that p l a i n t i f f has given h i s express con- sent t o relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and has agreed t o take h i s chance of injury from a known risk. A second meaning is that p l a i n t i f f , with knowledge of the r i s k , has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which necessarily involves danger of harm from a known r i s k , and thus impliedly consents t o take h i s own chances. In a third sense, the plaintiff may a c t entirely reasonably but, by voluntarily encountering a known r i s k which defendant has negligently allowed t o come into being, he relieves the defendant of l i a b i l i t y , In the fourth sense of assumption of r i s k , p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct is i t s e l f unreasonable and amounts t o and i s equivalent of contributory negligence, Prosser, Torts, 303-04 (1955). " Here, there was no contractual, quasi-contractual or consentual relationship between the l i t i g a n t s . So it i s the fourth of the above enumerated applications of assumption of r i s k with which we are concerned. Used i n t h i s sense, the con- cept of assumption of r i s k i s a more conclusive form of contri- butory negligence, W e hold, i n l i g h t of the evidence presented, that it was a matter for jury determination whether the facts indicated that Jewel1 Kipp i n operation of the motorbike contributed as a proximate cause to her injury in the collision between her motor- bike and the vehicle of Willoughby. The second assignment of error involves arguments made by counsel t o the jury i n closing argument. This Court has no record from which t o determine what specific arguments were made. For t h i s reason, we cannot review the second assignment of error. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s reversed and the cause remanded for a new t r i a l . - Associate Justice Concur: 1 / Chief Justice / P ssociate ~ust/ices u Mr, Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent. The majority opinion admits that a conflict in the evidence occurred. The jury resolved those conflicts in favor of defendant. The evidence proved that Kipp simply ran into the rear end of Willoughby's car. Willoughby's car was in the street heading in the same direction as Kipp. The car was stopped and it was in forward gear, Phyllis Baxter, the passenger on the motorbike, testified that when she first saw the car it was in the street, pointed in the same direction the motorbike was going. While on direct examination, she said the car was backing out of the Chapman driveway and sideswiped the motorbike, on cross-examination she admitted she did not see the car except in the street pointing in the same direction the motor- bike was going. There is some slight conflict in the evidence on the above facts, but the jury resolved those, I agree with the majority that "* * * in light of the evidence presented, that it was a matter for jury determination whether the facts indicated that Jewel1 Kipp in operation of the motorbike contributed as a proximate cause to her injury in the collision between her motorbike and the vehicle of Willoughby." This the jury did, and I would affirm. ~ssocia ~ J U S tice .