Case Title: In Re: Emileigh F.

Citation: 353 Md. 30

Docket Number: 53/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Re: Emileigh F., No. 53, September Term, 1998
JUVENILES--HEARINGS--CLOSING ARGUMENT  Litigants in a CINA proceeding
ordinarily have a right, based on nonconstitutional Maryland common law, to have an
opportunity to make closing argument. 
District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County,
Sitting as a Juvenile Court
Case # 29611402
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 53
September Term, 1998
                                                                           
  
 
IN RE: EMILEIGH F.
                                                                           
 
Bell, C.J.
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Bloom,
  (Retired, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
                                                                           
 
Opinion by Raker, J.
                                                                           
 
Filed:  February 18, 1999
  Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references herein shall be to MD. CODE
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ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. (1998 Repl. Vol.).
  The petition alleged that Emileigh F. was a child in need of assistance because
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Danielle W., the child’s Mother, and Mr. F., the child’s Father, were not able to provide
ordinary and proper care and attention to their daughter, Emileigh F. 
“Child in need of assistance” is defined in § 3-801(e) as a child who requires the
assistance of the court because:
(1) The child is mentally handicapped or is not receiving
ordinary and proper care and attention, and
(2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or
(continued...)
We granted certiorari to consider whether litigants in a Child in Need of Assistance
proceeding pursuant to MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801 et seq.   have a right to
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present closing argument.  We shall hold that they do.
I.
This case arises out of an order of the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery
County, sitting as a juvenile court, awarding custody of Emileigh F., a child adjudged to be
a Child in Need of Assistance (hereinafter CINA), to her Father, John F.  Emileigh was born
to Danielle W. and John F. on April 5, 1995.    
On April 23, 1996, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition in
the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging
that Emileigh F., the daughter of Petitioner Danielle W., was a CINA.   See § 3-801.   The
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3
2
(...continued)
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unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the
child’s problems provided, however, a child shall not be deemed
to be in need of assistance for the sole reason that the child is
being furnished nonmedical remedial care and treatment
recognized by State law. 
  Section 3-820 provides that after the court holds an adjudicatory hearing, and unless
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the petition is dismissed or the hearing is waived, the court shall hold a separate disposition
hearing.  The priorities in making a disposition are the public safety and a program of
treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral welfare
of the child consistent with the public interest.  In making a disposition on the petition, the
court, inter alia, may place the child on probation or under supervision in his own home or
in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person.  The court may
commit the child to the custody or under the guardianship of the Department of Juvenile
Justice, a local department of social services, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
or a public or licensed private agency on terms that the court considers appropriate.  The
court may order the child, parents, guardian or custodian to participate in rehabilitative
services that are in the best interest of the child and the family.    
  The petition noted that John F. was in the Coast Guard, stationed in New Jersey,
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and that he was providing child support through a military allotment.  Since he had not
sought custody or visitation, the court orders did not pertain to him.  In April, 1997, John F.
began regular visitation with Emileigh.  
court appointed counsel to represent Emileigh.    
On April 25, 1996, the court adjudicated Emileigh a CINA and committed her to the
care of the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter DHHS), placing her in
the custody of her maternal grandmother, Karen O.  On July 10, 1996, in a disposition
hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Emileigh be continued in her grandmother’s care and
that her Mother, Danielle W. participate in regular mental health treatment and therapy.   The
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court held two subsequent review hearings and continued custody of Emileigh with her
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  Danielle W. moved from Montgomery County to Norfolk, Virginia.  She married
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Nathan W., a member of the United States Navy, in Norfolk.  John F. was discharged from
the Coast Guard, married Becky, and began working full-time for an ambulance service in
New Jersey.
grandmother and the visitations with Danielle W.5
On November 21, 1996, DHHS conducted a family evaluation and sent the report to
the juvenile court.  The recommendation was that the court “consider reunification of Mrs.
W. and her daughter if all of the above mentioned stipulations are appropriately met and that
this reunification only occur after the return of Mr. W. and the birth of their first child.”  The
April 10, 1997, DHHS Status Report, Permanent Plan recommendation was to return
Emileigh to the care and custody of one of her natural parents.
On April 14, 1997, the court held a review hearing and ordered visitation between
Emileigh and John F. and Danielle W., as well as another family evaluation.  On May 27,
1997,  John F. filed in the juvenile court a motion seeking custody of Emileigh.  Danielle W.
responded, requesting that John F.’s motion be denied.  
On June 20, 1997, through the social worker, James Flaherty, and the Permanency
Planning Supervisor, Sandra Grijalva, DHHS made the following recommendation:
The Department believes that both the W. family and the F.
family are ready and able to meet Emileigh’s needs for safety,
stability, and nurturing and that there are no further child
welfare issues regarding her care.  Mrs. W. has demonstrated
increased stability and maturity for handling the stresses in her
life and being more available to her children, by using available
therapeutic and community resources and by relying on the
assistance of her husband.  Mr. F. has demonstrated a new sense
of responsibility and dedication as Emileigh’s parent, and he
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and his wife have taken all the necessary steps in preparing a
home for Emileigh.  
*          *          *          *          *
Emileigh has two sets of capable parents wanting to
provide her a stable, loving home.  The Department suggests a
period of increasing visitation to help Emileigh adjust to living
in a new home and leaving the home of her grandparents, where
she has lived most of her life. . . .
On the same day, the Child and Adolescent Forensic Evaluation Services provided a family
assessment and recommended that Emileigh be returned to the care and custody of her
mother, Danielle W. by September, 1997 so as to provide her with a stable and permanent
living situation.  
On June 27, 1997, the juvenile court held a further review hearing.  The focus of the
hearing was the custody of Emileigh.  All parties were represented by counsel.  The court
heard from several witnesses, including James Flaherty, the DHHS social worker, the
maternal grandmother who had custody of Emileigh, John F., and Danielle W.  
At the conclusion of all the testimony, the court inquired if the attorneys had any
further evidence to present.  Counsel responded that there was no further evidence.  Counsel
for John F. stated that he had no further evidence to present, “[j]ust argument.”  The court
stated as follows:
COURT: Okay.  Well, I’m not going to let you all argue.  I’ve
heard enough.  And I told you that I was going to quit five
5
  The court had previously stated:
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COURT: . . .  I’m just going to tell all of you that I’m not going
past 4:30.  It is Friday, I’m not going to require staff to stay later
than that.  That’s the normal time we stop. . . . 
minutes ago.[6]
Obviously I’m presented with a decision that is difficult
to make.  But I don’t have any trouble making that decision.  I
find that Mr. F. is a very appropriate person, and I’m going to
grant him custody of Emileigh.  I’m going to ask the Department
to remain involved in the case, to make sure that the transition
is smooth.  I want Emileigh to continue to have visits with her
mother.  
The Department said that they had no Protective Service
concerns.  I have many Protective Service concerns about
Emileigh being in the custody of her mother.  I’m very
concerned about the mother’s instability, about her failure to
follow through with therapy and parenting classes, the fact that
there’s no home study that’s been done.  Uh . . . the fact that she
doesn’t recognize any of the issues that were stipulated to,  that
were the basis of the CINA finding over a year ago. 
Clearly she has improved.  Her emotional stability has
improved, but I have never believed in the Prince Charming
School of Social Work.  And I don’t believe that marrying
someone solves the problems that you have.  
I’m very happy that she’s made progress in her life, and
hopefully she’s taking good care of her child, McKenzie, but at
this time, I’m going to grant the father custody of the child. 
The court awarded custody of Emileigh to her Father, John F. 
Danielle W. filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
appellate court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that because Danielle W. did not object to the
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failure of the court to receive closing argument, the objection was waived and was not
properly before the appellate court.  We granted Danielle W.’s petition for writ of certiorari
to answer the following questions:
I.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that since
parents of children adjudged in need of assistance do not have
a constitutional right to counsel in CINA proceedings, they have
no right to present closing argument in such proceedings and,
therefore, there was no error in denying Petitioner’s counsel the
right to present closing argument?
II.  Should custody of two year old Emileigh F. have been
awarded to her father rather than to Petitioner?
II.
We shall first address Respondent’s threshold argument that the issue was not
preserved for appellate review because Petitioner never raised it below.  Respondent asserts
that Mr. F., as the only party who asked for the opportunity to make closing argument, was
the only one denied the opportunity to do so.  Because Petitioner did not object when the
court denied Mr. F. the opportunity to argue, or complain that she was denied the opportunity
to argue, her claim is not properly preserved for appeal.
Petitioner counters that the preservation issue is not contained within the certiorari
petition, and moreover, if the question were properly before this Court, that the issue was
preserved.  Petitioner points out that the judge said: “I’m not going to let you all argue.  I’ve
heard enough.”  The judge then proceeded immediately to give her ruling.  Petitioner argues
that the court’s ruling clearly applied to Petitioner as well as Respondent and that any
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objection would have been futile.  
We agree with Petitioner and find that the issue is preserved for our review.  As we
said in Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 515, 601 A.2d 1093, 1094 (1992), “[i]t was apparent
that his ruling on further objection would be unfavorable to the defense. . . . In the
circumstances, the absence of a further objection did not constitute a waiver.  See Md.  Rule
4-323(c).”
The instant case is remarkably similar to Bundy v. State, 334 Md. 131, 638 A.2d 84
(1994).  In that case, the defendant Bundy had not objected to the State’s use of peremptory
challenges, although his codefendant had objected.  Id. at 135-36, 638 A.2d at 86-87.  The
State argued that because Bundy failed to make known to the court the action he desired the
court to take, or to object to the action of the trial court, he had not preserved the issue for
appeal.  Id. at 138, 638 A.2d at 88.  We concluded that the ruling of the trial judge suggested
that Bundy would receive the benefit of his codefendant’s objection.  Id. at 146-147, 638
A.2d at 92-93.  Writing for the Court, Judge Chasanow  stated:
[T]he trial judge was ‘kind enough’ to acknowledge that the
codefendant’s objection also benefitted Bundy.  When the
codefendant exclaimed, ‘Your Honor, I’m sorry.  I thought the
State had exhausted her strikes,’ the judge explicitly addressed
both of the parties in overruling the objection.  He immediately
stated, ‘You each get four.  The State gets eight.’  (Emphasis
added).  Thus, the manner in which the trial judge summarily
overruled the objection in this case adequately reflects that he
assumed the objection was made on behalf of both defendants.
As such, Bundy sufficiently preserved the peremptory challenge
issue for appellate review.  
Id., 638 A.2d at 92.  We noted that immediately after the codefendant’s objection the trial
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court ruled on the objection.  Id. at 147, 638 A.2d at 92.  We held that the issue was
sufficiently preserved, reasoning that “[t]he manner of that ruling obviated Bundy’s need to
join in the objection because the judge acknowledged that the objection inured to Bundy’s
benefit by expressly directing his ruling (‘You each get four.  The State gets eight.’) to both
defendants.”  Id., 638 A.2d at 93.
  
Likewise, in the instant case, the judge ruled immediately after the other party
requested closing argument.  It was apparent that the ruling applied to all parties.  In light of
the judge’s statement that she would not let anyone argue--- “I’m not going to let you all
argue” ---it would have been futile for Petitioner to have objected.  The court could hardly
have permitted Petitioner closing argument and have denied the other parties the same
opportunity.  Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not waive her right to closing
argument by her failure to interpose an objection.
III.
Courts around the country are split as to whether there is an absolute right to closing
argument in civil cases.  It is clear that in criminal cases, in both jury and non-jury cases, it
is a violation of the constitutional right to counsel to deny a party the opportunity to make
final argument.  Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed.2d 593 (1975);
Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983) (stating that opportunity for closing
argument in non-jury criminal case is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
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Rights).  This right exists “even in cases where the evidence appears to be overwhelming.”
Holmes v. State, 333 Md. 652, 658, 637 A.2d 113, 116 (1994).
In civil cases, there are at least three general approaches.  Some courts have held that
the right is a constitutional right that is absolute, and the denial of that right is reversible
error.  See e.g. Pettry v. Pettry, 706 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
“due process requires that a party be given the opportunity to present closing argument”);
Nestor v. George, 46 A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. 1946) (holding that “a litigant’s right to be fully
represented by counsel is an integral part of . . . ‘due process of law’”).  Other courts have
held that the right exists but argument may be precluded by the court when no factual issues
exist or when the parties waive or acquiesce in the denial of the opportunity.  See e.g.,
Aladdin Oil Burner Corp. v. Morton, 187 A. 350, 350 (N.J. 1936) (holding that in a case
exhibiting issues of fact, the right to present analysis and inferences from the evidence is
absolute); Douglass v. Hill, 29 Kan. 527 (1883) (without indicating the basis of the right, the
court held that a party to a law suit has an absolute right to be heard, “not merely in the
testimony of his witnesses, but also in the arguments of his counsel”).  Finally, some courts
have held that in civil, non-jury cases, the matter is entirely discretionary with the court.  See
e.g., Fritts v. Fritts, 11 Md. App. 195, 199, 273 A.2d. 648, 650 (1971) (holding that
“argument by counsel upon submission of a civil case tried without a jury is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court”);  Korbelik v. Staschke, 596 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that in a civil proceeding, non-jury, closing argument is a privilege, not a
right, and is within the discretion of the court);  Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 262 F.2d 422,
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425 (5  Cir. 1959) (same).  See cases collected Annot., Argument of Counsel---Denial---
th
Prejudice 38 A.L.R.2d 1396-1439 (1989 & 1998 Supp.).
Although the question of whether a party has a right to have an opportunity to make
closing argument in a CINA proceeding has not been decided by this Court, the Court of
Special Appeals considered whether there is a right to closing argument in a civil proceeding
directing the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to
pay child support.  In Lee v. State, 56 Md. App. 613, 624, 468 A. 2d 656, 661 (1983),
overruled in part on other grounds, Cherry v. State, 62 Md. App. 425, 433 n.2, 489 A.2d
1138, 1142 n.2 (1985), the court held that a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot
be sentenced to a period of incarceration unless his counsel is afforded the right to make
closing argument.  The intermediate court based this right on the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.  Id., 468 A.2d at 661.  
In State v. Brown, 324 Md. 532, 597 A.2d 978 (1991), we considered the question of
whether, in a criminal case, a defendant has a right to present argument at the conclusion of
an evidentiary motion to suppress his confession.  We initially noted that the rule set out in
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858-59, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2553-54, 45 L. Ed.2d 593
(1975), that the defendant has an absolute right to make closing argument, is limited to the
presentation of argument at the conclusion of a criminal trial.  Brown, 324 Md. at 541, 597
A.2d at 982.  We observed that the Supreme Court has not as yet recognized an absolute
constitutional right to present closing argument at the conclusion of a suppression hearing.
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Id., 597 A.2d at 983.  We held, however, that as a matter of Maryland nonconstitutional
common law, “when a suppression hearing is held each party ordinarily should be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present argument.”  Id. at 546, 597 A.2d at 985.  Judge
McAuliffe, writing for the Court, discussed the limits that a trial court appropriately may be
set on closing argument:
The extent of the argument may depend on the complexity of
the legal issues, whether evidence has been received, whether
there is a conflict in the evidence, and other factors.  The trial
judge, of necessity, must have great latitude in controlling the
duration and limiting the scope of these arguments.  The trial
judge may limit counsel to a reasonable time, ensure that the
argument does not stray unduly from the mark, and terminate
argument when continuation would be repetitive or redundant.
Id., 597 A.2d at 985.
As we have indicated, several states have held that there is a right to closing argument
in civil cases as well as criminal ones.  For example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
held in Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 101 (1977), that “litigants in civil nonjury
cases (and, of course, in all criminal and jury cases as well) have a right to have their
attorneys make a final argument.”  The court qualified this absolute right, as we did in
Brown, noting that this right “may be limited as to content so as to preclude improper
argument . . .”  Id.  In Aladdin Oil Burner Corp., 187 A. at 350, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that in a contract matter, the trial court’s denial of the right to closing argument
arbitrarily denied the litigant an absolute right to present to the trier of fact an analysis of the
evidence and the inferences to be deduced therefrom.
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We now hold that litigants in a CINA proceeding ordinarily have a right, based on
nonconstitutional Maryland common law, to have an opportunity to make closing argument.
Although our holding is grounded in nonconstitutional law, the Supreme Court’s rationale
in Herring, 422 U.S. at 863, 95 S. Ct. at 2556, is equally applicable:
Some cases may appear to the trial judge to be simple---
open and shut---at the close of the evidence.  And surely in
many such cases a closing argument will, in the words of Mr.
Justice Jackson, be ‘likely to leave [a] judge just where it found
him.’  But just as surely, there will be cases where closing
argument may correct a premature misjudgment and avoid an
otherwise erroneous verdict.  And there is no certain way for a
trial judge to identify accurately which cases these will be, until
the judge has heard the closing summation of counsel.
(Alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).  Among other benefits of argument, counsel’s
remarks may highlight portions of the testimony considered most favorable or significant,
point out inferences to be drawn from the evidence, or explain seemingly irrelevant
testimony.  The court may limit this right as to content so as to prevent improper argument,
and to impose reasonable time limits, but may not deny the right altogether.  We have noted
that the right to be heard by counsel exists “however simple, clear, unimpeached, and
conclusive the evidence may seem, unless [counsel] has waived his right to such argument
. . . .”  Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 207, 178 A.2d 879, 881 (1962).   
In a CINA dispositional proceeding, the juvenile court has the power to commit a
child to the custody or under the guardianship of the Department of Juvenile Justice, a local
department of social services, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, or a public or
licensed private agency where the child is to be accommodated until custody or guardianship
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is terminated with approval of the court. § 3-820(c)(1)(ii).  An indigent, custodial parent or
guardian of the child alleged to be in need of assistance is entitled to the assistance of
counsel if the proceeding is under § 3-820.  See § 3-821.  The right to a hearing under these
circumstances means more than simply listening to the examination of witnesses.  It includes
the arguments of counsel, or, if the party is unrepresented, of the party.   
In CINA cases involving a dispositional review hearing, the issues are very often fact-
intensive.  This is true in the instant case.  Although the right to present argument may be
limited, it should not have been totally denied.  Counsel should have been permitted to
present argument to the court.  Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in totally
denying Petitioner the opportunity for closing argument.
IV.
Petitioner’s final argument is that the juvenile court’s findings were clearly erroneous
and that the court should have awarded custody of Emileigh F. to Danielle W.  She argues
that “it is impossible to conclude that anyone other than Danielle W. should have been
awarded custody of Emileigh F.”  This argument has no merit.  
The evidence before the court was that “Emileigh has two sets of capable parents
wanting to provide her a stable, loving home.”  DHHS Status Report dated June 20, 1997.
See also, DHHS Child and Adolescent Forensic Evaluation Service Report and
14
  Maryland Rule 8-604 provides in pertinent part:
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(d) Remand.  (1) Generally.  If the Court concludes that the
substantial merits of a case will not be determined by affirming,
reversing or modifying the judgment, or that justice will be
served by permitting further proceedings, the Court may remand
the case to a lower court.  In the order remanding a case, the
appellate court shall state the purpose for the remand.  The order
of remand and the opinion upon which the order is based are
conclusive as to the points decided.  Upon remand, the lower
court shall conduct any further proceedings necessary to
determine the action in accordance with the opinion and order
of the appellate court.
Recommendation.  Accordingly, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-604(d) , we shall remand the
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case to the District Court of Maryland  for further proceedings.  The District Court, sitting
as the juvenile court, shall conduct a review hearing and determine anew as of the time of
the hearing the placement for the care and custody of Emileigh F.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REMAND CASE TO THE DISTRICT
COURT 
OF 
MARYLAND 
FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.