Case Title: State v. Chamblis

Citation: 2015 WI 53

Docket Number: 2012AP002782-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2782-CR    
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andre M. Chamblis, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 622, 848 N.W.2d 903) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 12, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Elliott M. Levine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs. (Opinion Filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner, 
there were briefs by Steven W. Zaleski and Zaleski Law Firm, 
Madison, and oral argument by Steven W. Zaleski.  
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent, the cause was 
argued by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2015 WI 53
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2782-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF644) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andre M. Chamblis, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Andre Chamblis (Chamblis) 
pleaded 
guilty 
to 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration (PAC) as a sixth offense in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) (2011-12).1  Prior to accepting the plea, 
the circuit court2 informed Chamblis that the offense constituted 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-
12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 La Crosse County, the Honorable Elliott M. Levine, 
presiding. 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
2 
 
a Class H felony which carried a minimum penalty of 6 months 
imprisonment and a $600 fine and a maximum penalty of 6 years 
imprisonment (three years confinement and three years extended 
supervision) and a $10,000 fine.  Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(am)5., 
939.50(3)(h)., 973.01(2)(b)8.  The circuit court ultimately 
sentenced Chamblis to four years imprisonment comprised of two 
years confinement and two years extended supervision.   
¶2 
The State appealed the judgment of conviction.  It 
argued that the circuit court erred by excluding additional 
evidence the State sought to submit to prove that Chamblis 
possessed a sixth prior drunk-driving related conviction.  Had 
the circuit court admitted the evidence and found it sufficient 
to establish the alleged prior conviction, Chamblis would have 
faced the decision to plead guilty to the charge of operating 
with a PAC as a seventh offense.  That offense constituted a 
Class G felony and would have subjected Chamblis to an increased 
range 
of 
punishment. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6.  
Specifically, the minimum penalty for a seventh offense was a 
term of imprisonment that included three years confinement and a 
period of extended supervision.  Id.  The maximum penalty was 10 
years imprisonment (five years confinement and five years 
extended 
supervision) 
and 
a 
$25,000 
fine. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 973.01(2)(b)7., 939.50(3)g.  
¶3 
The court of appeals agreed that the circuit court 
erred in excluding the additional evidence.  It further 
determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove the alleged 
prior conviction.  As a result, the court of appeals reversed 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
3 
 
the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the circuit 
court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of 
conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and 
impose sentence for a seventh offense.3  
¶4 
This case presents two issues for our review.  The 
first is whether the circuit court erred in excluding the 
additional evidence the State sought to submit to enhance 
Chamblis's punishment on the basis that the State offered the 
evidence "too late."  The second is whether the court of 
appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's right to due process by 
rendering 
his 
guilty 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, 
and 
involuntary.  
¶5 
We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court 
erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to 
submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment.    
¶6 
Although we assume error, we hold that the court of 
appeals' decision remanding the case to the circuit court with 
instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for 
operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence 
for a seventh offense violates Chamblis's right to due process.  
Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty 
plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a 
seventh offense.  Because a seventh offense carries a greater 
range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of 
                                                 
3 State v. Chamblis, No. 2012AP2782-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2014).  
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
4 
 
appeals' 
remedy 
renders 
Chamblis's 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary.  We further conclude that a 
remedy which requires Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is 
fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process under the 
facts of this case. 
¶7 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and uphold Chamblis's conviction.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
On November 22, 2011, Chamblis was arrested on 
suspicion of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant (OWI) in La Crosse.  The criminal complaint, dated 
November 30, 2011, charged Chamblis with the following: (1) OWI 
as a fifth or sixth offense and as a repeater contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a); (2) operating with a PAC as a fifth or 
sixth offense and as a repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b); and (3) obstructing an officer as a repeater 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).4  The criminal complaint 
alleged that Chamblis possessed five prior drunk-driving related 
                                                 
4 On April 10, 2012, Chamblis was also charged with battery 
by prisoner contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1).  The State filed 
that charge in a separate action in La Crosse County.    
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
5 
 
convictions 
from 
Minnesota 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
penalty 
enhancement under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am).5    
¶9 
In January 2012, the circuit court granted the State's 
motion to amend the information6 to charge Chamblis with OWI as a 
seventh, eighth, or ninth offense and as a repeater, and 
operating with a PAC as a seventh, eighth, or ninth offense and 
as a repeater.  The State claimed that Chamblis had two prior 
drunk-driving related convictions from Illinois in addition to 
the five from Minnesota and submitted documentation to that 
effect.   
¶10 On August 6, 2012, Chamblis filed a motion challenging 
the purported Illinois convictions on two grounds that are 
relevant 
here. 
 
First, 
he 
argued 
that 
the 
two 
alleged 
convictions should be counted as one conviction because they 
stemmed from the same incident.  Second, he contended that the 
                                                 
5 Under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am), repeated violations of 
drunk-driving related offenses are subject to increasingly 
severe penalties.  "This graduated penalty structure is nothing 
more than a penalty enhancer similar to a repeater statute which 
does not in any way alter the nature of the substantive offense, 
i.e., the prohibited conduct, but rather goes only to the 
question of punishment."  State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 
535, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982).  The penalty range for operating 
with a PAC as a fifth or sixth offense is less severe than the 
penalty 
range 
for 
a 
seventh 
offense. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)5.-6.     
6 "The information is the accusatory pleading under our 
criminal system to which the defendant must plead and stand 
trial . . . ."  Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 142 
N.W.2d 187 (1966).   
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
6 
 
State had offered insufficient documentation to prove the 
purported convictions.  
¶11 The circuit court held a hearing on Chamblis's motion 
on September 12, 2012.  The circuit court agreed that the two 
alleged 
Illinois 
convictions 
should 
be 
treated 
as 
one 
conviction.  However, it determined that the State's proffered 
evidence of the purported conviction——an Illinois driver's 
abstract——was insufficient to establish that Chamblis had been 
convicted of a drunk-driving related offense in Illinois.  In 
rendering its decision, the circuit court recognized that "we 
are not at sentencing" and "there could be further proof that 
comes up."  It informed the prosecutor that if "more evidence is 
supplied . . . we will review it at that point in time . . . ."   
¶12 At the final pretrial hearing on September 14, 2012, 
the parties informed the circuit court that Chamblis wished to 
enter a guilty plea.  Neither the parties nor the circuit court 
raised the issue of the disputed Illinois conviction.  Because 
the State intended to request a presentence investigation 
report, the circuit court did not schedule a sentencing hearing 
to go along with the plea date.   
¶13 Chamblis's plea hearing took place on September 19, 
2012.  The parties advised the circuit court that Chamblis 
planned to enter a guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a 
fourth offense "or greater" without a repeater.7  Chamblis was 
                                                 
7 As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss 
the charges of OWI as a repeater, obstructing an officer as a 
repeater, and battery by prisoner (from the related case). 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
7 
 
willing to admit to the five prior convictions from Minnesota 
but continued to dispute the alleged conviction from Illinois.  
Accordingly, a question remained whether Chamblis would face the 
penalty range for operating with a PAC as a sixth offense or as 
a seventh offense upon conviction. 
¶14 Recognizing 
the 
uncertainty 
regarding 
Chamblis's 
potential punishment, defense counsel stated on the record the 
minimum and maximum penalties for both offenses.  Defense 
counsel then expressed his confusion with handling the plea in 
such a manner.  This prompted the circuit court to inquire into 
the status of the alleged Illinois conviction.  The prosecutor 
explained that he had obtained additional information from 
Illinois and that he planned to submit an offer of proof prior 
to sentencing.  Defense counsel objected to the State offering 
the new evidence at that point in the proceedings.   
¶15 The circuit court determined that the State was 
attempting to offer the additional evidence "too late."  It 
reasoned that Chamblis could not enter a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary guilty plea without understanding the precise 
minimum 
and 
maximum 
penalties 
associated 
with 
the 
plea.  
Determining that it was unfair to put off the plea date, the 
circuit court declared that discovery was "done."  It noted that 
the case had "been set for trial a long time"; that the issue 
concerning proof of the purported Illinois conviction "was 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
8 
 
flagged a long time ago"8; and that the issue prevented the 
parties from resolving the case "in a way that would have made 
more sense months ago . . . ."  As a result of its decision, the 
circuit court indicated that it would accept a plea only to the 
lower charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense.  
¶16 The State chose to go through with the plea agreement 
anyway.  The circuit court then personally addressed Chamblis to 
ensure that he understood the nature of the charge and the 
implications of the plea.  It began by asking whether Chamblis 
understood the plea agreement "at this point in time," to which 
Chamblis responded "I do now, sir."  The circuit court proceeded 
to explain the minimum and maximum penalties commensurate with a 
conviction for operating with a PAC as a sixth offense.  Upon 
accepting the plea, the circuit court sentenced Chamblis to four 
years imprisonment comprised of two years confinement and two 
years extended supervision. 
¶17 The State appealed the judgment of conviction.  The 
court of appeals determined that the circuit court erred in 
excluding the State's additional evidence for two reasons.  
First, this court's decisions in State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 
2d 532, 539, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982), and State v. Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d 91, 104-05, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), provide a general 
rule that prior drunk-driving related convictions must be proved 
                                                 
8 Although Chamblis did not file his motion challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence of the purported Illinois conviction 
until August 6, 2012, the transcript from the plea hearing 
indicates that defense counsel raised the issue with the State 
months earlier.  
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
9 
 
before sentencing.  Second, the circuit court "explicitly 
invited" the State to bring forth additional evidence of the 
alleged Illinois conviction prior to sentencing.  The court of 
appeals 
further 
concluded 
that 
the 
additional 
evidence 
sufficiently established that Chamblis had been convicted of a 
drunk-driving related offense in Illinois. 
¶18 Consequently, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the circuit 
court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of 
conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and 
impose sentence for a seventh offense.  In fashioning its 
remedy, the court of appeals rejected Chamblis's contention that 
such relief would violate his constitutional right to due 
process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, 
and involuntary.9  The court of appeals reasoned that Chamblis 
was "aware both of the 'specific penalty' he faced if convicted 
of operating with a PAC as a seventh offense, and that he faced 
this possible punishment if the State succeeded in proving the 
purported Illinois conviction."  
¶19 We granted Chamblis's petition for review.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 We are asked to decide whether the circuit court erred 
in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to submit 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals also dismissed Chamblis's second 
argument that the remedy violated his constitutional right to be 
free from double jeopardy, reasoning that it was underdeveloped.  
We did not accept Chamblis's petition for review on that issue.   
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
10 
 
at Chamblis's plea hearing.  We review that decision under the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  Martindale v. Ripp, 
2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.  "In making 
evidentiary rulings, the circuit court has broad discretion."  
Id.  "As with other discretionary determinations, this court 
will uphold a decision to admit or exclude evidence if the 
circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
legal standard, and, using a demonstrated rational process, 
reached a reasonable conclusion."  Id.   
¶21 We are also asked to determine whether the court of 
appeals' remedy in this case violates Chamblis's right to due 
process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, 
and involuntary.  This presents a question of constitutional 
fact.  State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199.  "We will not upset the circuit court's findings of 
historical 
or 
evidentiary 
facts 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous."  Id.  "We review constitutional issues independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the 
court of appeals."  Id.   
III. DISCUSSION  
¶22 Both issues in this case require us to examine the 
legal principles fundamental to guilty pleas.  Accordingly, we 
begin by discussing the constitutional standard that a guilty 
plea be affirmatively shown to be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  We then proceed to consider whether the circuit 
court erred in excluding the additional evidence the State 
sought to submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment.  We assume 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
11 
 
without deciding that the decision was error.  We next address 
whether the court of appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's right 
to 
due 
process 
by 
rendering 
his 
guilty 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, 
and 
involuntary, 
concluding 
that 
it 
does.  
Finally, we explain why a remedy which requires Chamblis to 
withdraw his guilty plea is fundamentally unfair and thus 
violative of due process under the facts of this case.            
A. Analytical Framework 
¶23 Since "[s]everal federal constitutional rights are 
involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is 
entered in a state criminal trial," Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 243 (1969), fundamental due process requires that a plea be 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  State v. Cross, 2010 WI 
70, ¶16, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64.  A defendant 
contemplating a guilty plea must possess "sufficient awareness 
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."  Brady 
v. 
United 
States, 
397 
U.S. 
742, 
748 
(1970). 
 
Relevant 
circumstances include the nature of both the charge to which the 
defendant is pleading and the constitutional rights he or she is 
waiving.  State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 139-40, 569 N.W.2d 
577 (1997).  In this case, however, we are concerned with the 
constitutional 
requirement 
that 
defendants 
understand 
the 
"'direct consequences' of their pleas."  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 
561, ¶16 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755).   
¶24 "A direct consequence represents one that has a 
definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range 
of defendant's punishment."  Id.  "Matters concerning the nature 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
12 
 
of the sentence that could be imposed are most likely to be 
viewed as direct consequences."  5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal 
Procedure § 21.4(d), 817 (3d ed. 2007).  Accordingly, the 
general practice is to advise defendants of the minimum and 
maximum penalties associated with a plea.  Id.; see also State 
v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 479-80, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972) 
(discussing the importance of informing the defendant of the 
maximum penalty possible upon entry of a plea); State v. Mohr, 
201 Wis. 2d 693, 700, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
that circuit courts must advise defendants of the presumptive 
minimum sentence associated with a plea).  
¶25 A 
defendant's 
failure 
to 
understand 
the 
precise 
maximum punishment is not necessarily a due process violation.  
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶37 (holding that there is no due 
process violation where the sentence communicated to the 
defendant is higher, but not substantially higher, than that 
authorized by law).  However, "when the defendant is told the 
sentence is lower than the amount allowed by law, a defendant's 
due process rights are at greater risk . . . ."  Id., ¶39.  
Indeed, this court has previously recognized that "[c]oncepts of 
fundamental fairness require that a defendant not receive a 
greater sentence of imprisonment than that which he was told he 
could receive on pleading guilty."  Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
62, 76, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977); accord Hart v. Marion Corr. 
Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
defendant's due process rights were violated when he was given a 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
13 
 
sentence higher than that which he believed to be the maximum 
when he pleaded guilty).  
¶26 To ensure that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary, Wis. Stat. § 971.08, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 
2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and subsequent cases impose 
certain procedural duties on circuit courts.  State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  In Brown, we 
reiterated that one of those duties is to notify the defendant 
of the direct consequences of his or her plea.  Id., ¶35.  
Relatedly, we explained that circuit courts must "[e]stablish 
the defendant’s understanding of the . . . range of punishments 
to which he is subjecting himself by entering a plea . . . ."  
Id. 
(citing 
Bangert, 
132 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
262; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a)).  However, a circuit court's failure to comply 
with the above duties is not a per se due process violation, as 
it is possible that the defendant may learn of the implications 
of his or her plea from another source.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 
2d at 272-76.  That is why we consider the totality of the 
circumstances in determining the knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary nature of a plea.  Id. at 258.      
¶27 The bottom line is that a plea made in ignorance of 
its direct consequences is not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  In such situations, the plea "has been obtained in 
violation of due process and is therefore void."  McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).    
B. Error 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
14 
 
¶28 We now turn to consider whether the circuit court 
erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to 
submit to prove that Chamblis possessed a sixth prior drunk-
driving related conviction for the purpose of increasing his 
punishment.  As noted, the circuit court determined that the 
additional evidence was untimely.  Its reasoning was two-fold: 
(1) Chamblis could not enter a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary guilty plea without understanding the precise minimum 
and maximum penalties associated with the plea; and (2) it was 
unfair to put off the plea date given the State's action in 
delaying the proceedings by failing to obtain the evidence 
sooner.  
¶29 The parties focus their arguments on whether the 
circuit court mistakenly believed it needed to determine the 
number of prior convictions that would count toward sentencing 
before accepting Chamblis's guilty plea.   
¶30 Chamblis argues that in the context of a guilty plea a 
circuit court must determine the number of prior convictions 
that will count toward sentencing before accepting the plea.  
According to Chamblis, this is to ensure that a defendant 
understands the direct consequences of his or her plea.  To 
support his position, Chamblis notes that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am), the number of prior convictions influences the 
severity of a defendant's punishment for operating with a PAC. 
¶31 The State contends that it has until sentencing to 
prove the prior convictions, citing to our decisions in 
McAllister and Wideman for support.  It also argues that the 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
15 
 
statutory scheme governing the penalties for operating with a 
PAC requires that a circuit court determine the number of prior 
convictions at the time of sentencing, once a defendant has 
pleaded guilty or no contest or been found guilty at trial.  
Where a defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea and disputes the 
number of prior convictions, the State maintains that a circuit 
court could simply advise the defendant of the different ranges 
of punishment that he or she might face depending on how the 
issue is resolved.  For example, in this case, the circuit court 
could have informed Chamblis of the range of penalties for 
operating with a PAC as a sixth offense and as a seventh 
offense.   
¶32 The circuit court correctly recognized that there are 
situations in which a determination of prior convictions for 
sentence enhancement should be made before accepting a guilty 
plea in order to ensure the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
nature of the plea.  In a case like this one, where the 
defendant disputes the number of prior convictions and the issue 
affects the range of punishment he faces upon conviction, the 
better practice is to determine the number of prior convictions 
before accepting the plea.  This assures that a defendant 
understands the direct consequences of his or her plea.   
¶33 Our decisions in McAllister and Wideman do not compel 
a different conclusion.  In McAllister, we held that prior 
violations of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) are not "elements of the 
crime of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance, thereby 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
16 
 
requiring that the question of their existence be submitted to 
the jury."  McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 532-33.  In Wideman, we 
concluded that the requirements for establishing prior offenses 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), the general repeat offender 
statute, are not applicable to establishing prior offenses under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2), the OWI/PAC penalty enhancement statute.  
Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 94-95.  In both cases, we made general 
statements supporting the proposition that the State may prove 
prior drunk-driving related convictions for sentence enhancement 
"before sentencing" or "at sentencing."  See McAllister, 107 
Wis. 2d at 539; Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 108.  However, in both 
McAllister and Wideman, the defendant was convicted after a 
trial in which the State did not need to prove the prior drunk-
driving related convictions to meet the elements of the 
substantive charge.  McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 532-33.  Thus, 
McAllister and Wideman are inapposite, as neither case dealt 
with the constitutional considerations that are at stake where a 
defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea and disputes the number 
of prior convictions that will count toward enhancing his or her 
punishment. 
¶34 The statutory scheme governing the penalties for 
operating with a PAC does not undermine our determination 
either.  The State argues that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 343.307(1)10 and 346.65(2)(am)611 provides that the time for 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1), 
entitled 
"Prior 
convictions, suspensions, or revocations to be counted as 
offenses," provides: 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) The court shall count the following to determine 
the length of a revocation under s. 343.30(1q)(b) and 
to determine the penalty under ss. 114.09(2) and 
346.65(2): 
(a) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(1), or 
a local ordinance in conformity with that section. 
(b) Convictions for violations of a law of a federally 
recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state 
in conformity with s. 346.63(1). 
(c) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(2) or 
940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense involved the 
use of a vehicle. 
(d) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction 
that prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing 
or using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under 
the influence of a controlled substance or controlled 
substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an 
excess or specified range of alcohol concentration; 
while under the influence of any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely driving; or 
while having a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or 
substantially 
similar 
terms 
are 
used 
in 
that 
jurisdiction's laws. 
(e) Operating privilege suspensions or revocations 
under the law of another jurisdiction arising out of a 
refusal to submit to chemical testing. 
(f) Revocations under s. 343.305(10). 
(g) Convictions for violations under s. 114.09(1)(b)1. 
or 1m. 
11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6 
provides 
that 
"any 
person violating s. 346.63(1) . . . is guilty of a Class G 
felony if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of 
suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 
343.307(1), equals 7, 8, or 9 . . . ." 
 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
18 
 
counting 
the 
number 
of 
prior 
convictions 
for 
sentence 
enhancement is at sentencing, once there has been a conviction 
for the underlying offense.  Under the State's interpretation, 
there will be instances in which a defendant enters a guilty 
plea without understanding the direct consequences of that 
decision.  Specifically, the State reasons, "[i]n a case in 
which the court does not impose sentence immediately after 
accepting the plea, the court cannot definitely tell the 
defendant how many convictions will be counted because, the 
court cannot know how many convictions the defendant will have 
at the time of sentencing." 
¶35 We see nothing in the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 343.307(1) and 346.65(2)(am)6 that prevents a circuit court 
from determining the number of prior convictions that will count 
toward sentencing prior to accepting a plea in order to ensure 
the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea.  We 
further 
note 
that 
the 
State's 
interpretation 
raises 
constitutional concerns that we wish to avoid.  See Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 
667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998) ("A cardinal rule of statutory 
interpretation is that the legislature intended to adopt a 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
19 
 
constitutional statute and that a court should preserve a law 
and hold it constitutional when possible.").12 
¶36 We acknowledge the State's contention that in a case 
like this one, a circuit court could ensure that a defendant 
understands the direct consequences of his or her plea by 
informing the defendant of the different ranges of punishment 
that are possible depending on how many prior convictions the 
State 
later 
establishes. 
 
While 
that 
approach 
may 
be 
constitutionally permissible in a particular case, we note that 
the penalty ranges could vary dramatically depending on the 
number of prior convictions the defendant disputes.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.-7.  For that reason, the better practice 
in this type of situation is to determine the number of prior 
convictions that will count toward sentencing prior to accepting 
the plea. 
¶37 Although we conclude that the circuit court correctly 
recognized the need to determine the number of prior convictions 
before accepting Chamblis's guilty plea, the question remains 
whether the circuit court reasonably excluded the State's 
additional evidence of the purported Illinois conviction after 
explicitly welcoming the evidence a week earlier. 
                                                 
12 In apparent recognition of the constitutional problems 
created by its statutory construction, the State suggests that 
"any problem that result[s] from counting convictions after 
entry of a guilty plea could be easily remedied by a motion to 
withdraw the plea."  But as discussed in section C(ii) below, a 
defendant may not wish to withdraw his or her guilty plea, and 
requiring the defendant to do so raises its own constitutional 
concerns.  
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
20 
 
¶38 At the motion hearing on September 12, 2012, the 
circuit court made several statements indicating that it would 
consider additional evidence of the alleged Illinois conviction 
if the State came up with anything.  Two days later, at the 
final pre-trial hearing, the parties informed the circuit court 
that Chamblis wished to enter a guilty plea.  Notwithstanding 
the circuit court's inclination to determine the number of prior 
convictions that would count toward sentencing before accepting 
the plea, there was no discussion of the status of the purported 
Illinois conviction.  Under these circumstances, we can see why 
the prosecutor thought he had time to submit the additional 
evidence. 
¶39 That said, our review of the plea hearing transcript 
indicates that the circuit court was extremely frustrated with 
the manner in which the State prosecuted this case.  As we 
explained at the outset of this opinion, the issue of the 
alleged Illinois conviction appeared to delay the resolution of 
this matter.  Given the situation presented, we understand the 
circuit court's desire to move the case forward and accept 
Chamblis's guilty plea at the September 19 hearing.  Thus, we 
assume, without deciding, that the circuit court erred in 
excluding the State's additional evidence of the purported 
Illinois conviction.   
C. Remedy 
i. The court of appeals' remedy 
¶40 Assuming error, we proceed to consider whether the 
court of appeals' remedy in this case——a remand to the circuit 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
21 
 
court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of 
conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and 
impose sentence for a seventh offense——violates Chamblis's right 
to 
due 
process 
by 
rendering 
his 
guilty 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary.   
¶41 Chamblis argues that the court of appeals' remedy 
invalidates his guilty plea.  He maintains that he entered a 
guilty plea to the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth 
offense with an understanding that, as a direct consequence of 
his decision, he faced a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment 
and a $10,000 fine.  He notes that the maximum penalty 
commensurate with a conviction for operating with a PAC as a 
seventh offense is more punitive: 10 years imprisonment and a 
$25,000 fine.  Thus, according to Chamblis, the court of 
appeals' 
remedy 
renders 
his 
guilty 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary, thereby violating his right to 
due process by subjecting him to a greater sentence of 
imprisonment than that which he was told he could receive upon 
pleading guilty.  He further contends that it would be 
fundamentally unfair to resentence him because he has already 
served the confinement portion of his originally imposed 
sentence. 
¶42 The State argues that the court of appeals' remedy 
does not invalidate Chamblis's guilty plea.  According to the 
State, the court of appeals correctly determined that Chamblis 
understood that he could be sentenced for a seventh offense upon 
pleading guilty.  The State further submits that it would not be 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
22 
 
fundamentally unfair to resentence Chamblis consistent with a 
seventh offense because he knew the State would be appealing the 
circuit court's evidentiary ruling.  Thus, the State maintains 
that Chamblis cannot reasonably claim an expectation of finality 
in his sentence. 
¶43 We agree with Chamblis that the court of appeals' 
remedy in this case violates his right to due process by 
rendering 
his 
guilty 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, 
and 
involuntary.   
¶44 The record clearly establishes that Chamblis entered a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to the charge of 
operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh 
offense.  Initially, there was confusion regarding the direct 
consequences of Chamblis's plea: it was unclear whether Chamblis 
was pleading guilty to a sixth offense——a Class H felony 
carrying a maximum punishment of 6 years imprisonment and a 
$10,000 fine——or a seventh offense——a Class G felony carrying a 
maximum punishment of 10 years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine.  
However, the circuit court dispelled all confusion once it 
engaged Chamblis in the plea colloquy mandated by Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08.    
¶45 At the outset of the plea colloquy, the circuit court 
clarified that it was proceeding with a plea to the charge of 
operating with a PAC as a sixth offense.  It then asked Chamblis 
whether he understood the plea agreement.  Chamblis responded "I 
do now, sir."  The circuit court informed Chamblis that the plea 
carried a minimum penalty of 6 months imprisonment and a $600 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
23 
 
fine and a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 
fine.  Chamblis stated that he understood the penalty range and 
pleaded guilty. 
¶46 Later in the plea colloquy, the circuit court ensured 
that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to 
the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense: 
THE COURT: Is there anything about your case that you 
don't understand at this point? 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't [understand] at first, but 
now, no, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. You feel like you fully understand 
everything? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And it's been sort of a complicated matter. 
Do you feel you have a clear understanding of what 
these issues are? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the Court's not 
bound by any sentencing recommendation or any other 
plea agreement or any arguments made by any of the 
attorneys at the time of sentencing? Do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And in fact, upon your plea of guilty, the 
court may impose a maximum penalty in spite of any 
agreement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Of course, the maximum penalty to which the circuit court 
referred and Chamblis understood was that associated with a 
sixth offense: 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.  The 
plea colloquy therefore demonstrates that Chamblis entered a 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
24 
 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating 
with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense.  
¶47 However, as noted, we are not confined to the plea 
colloquy 
in 
evaluating 
Chamblis's 
due 
process 
challenge.  
Rather, we consider the totality of the circumstances in 
determining the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of 
his plea.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 258.  That means we consider 
other portions of the record to determine if Chamblis understood 
that, as a direct consequence of his plea, he could be sentenced 
for a seventh offense.  
¶48 The court of appeals found significance in the fact 
that defense counsel had stated on the record the minimum and 
maximum penalties associated with a conviction for operating 
with a PAC as a seventh offense.  But these statements occurred 
prior to the circuit court's explicit determination that it 
would  accept a plea only to the lower charge of a sixth 
offense.  In fact, as we indicated above, the record clearly 
establishes 
that 
Chamblis 
did 
not 
understand 
the 
direct 
consequences of his plea at the time in which these statements 
were made.  That is precisely why we require the circuit court 
to personally engage the defendant in ascertaining the knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary nature of a plea.  See Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶50-52.  Given that the circuit court later 
informed Chamblis that the minimum and maximum penalties he 
faced were those commensurate with a sixth offense, it cannot 
reasonably 
be 
argued 
that 
defense 
counsel's 
statements 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
25 
 
demonstrate that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary to a seventh offense.     
¶49 The court of appeals also found it important that the 
"Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form indicated a maximum 
punishment 
consistent 
with 
a 
seventh 
offense: 
10 
years 
imprisonment and a $25,000 fine.  However, similar to defense 
counsel's statements, the "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" 
form is of marginal value to the present issue.  Chamblis 
executed the form a day before his plea hearing amid the 
uncertainty regarding the direct consequences of his plea.13  We 
further note that the form did not list the minimum penalty 
corresponding to a seventh offense.  This deficiency exemplifies 
why a plea questionnaire is not a substitute for the circuit 
court personally addressing the defendant to ensure that he or 
she understands the implications the plea.  See id., ¶52.  Put 
simply, the "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form, executed 
prior to the plea colloquy in this case, does not establish that 
Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to a 
seventh offense. 
¶50 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that Chamblis entered into a plea agreement with an 
understanding that the minimum penalty he could face was 6 
months imprisonment and a $600 fine and the maximum penalty he 
could face was 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.  That 
                                                 
13 The "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form is dated 
September 18, 2012.  Chamblis’s plea hearing took place on 
September 19, 2012.   
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
26 
 
means Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a 
seventh offense.  Thus, the court of appeals' remedy which 
subjects Chamblis to a greater sentence of imprisonment than 
that which he was told he could receive upon pleading guilty 
violates his right to due process. 
ii. The State's proposed remedy 
¶51 In its brief and at oral argument, the State argued 
that even if the court of appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's 
right to due process, the proper remedy is to allow Chamblis to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  Drawing on Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
283, the State maintains that plea withdrawal is the exclusive 
remedy for a defendant's plea being unknowing, unintelligent, 
and involuntary.  While that may be true where a defendant 
appeals his or her conviction seeking plea withdrawal, that is 
hardly the situation we have here. 
¶52 In Bangert, we set forth a burden-shifting procedure 
for circuit courts to follow when faced with a defendant's 
motion to withdraw his or her guilty or no contest plea on the 
basis that it was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-76.  That procedure is not 
implicated in the instant action because Chamblis neither filed 
a 
motion 
to 
withdraw 
his 
guilty 
plea 
nor 
appealed 
his 
conviction.  Indeed, defense counsel made clear at oral argument 
that Chamblis does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea. 
¶53 The State suggests that Chamblis should be required to 
withdraw his plea anyway.  According to the State, Chamblis is 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
27 
 
not entitled to conviction and sentence for a sixth offense 
because the evidence shows that he already possessed six prior 
drunk-driving related convictions when he entered his guilty 
plea in this case.14  Colloquially speaking, the State argues 
that Chamblis should not get a "free pass" on the circuit 
court's purported mistake.   
¶54 We find it fundamentally unfair and thus violative of 
due process to require Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea in 
this case.15  "[T]he concern of due process is fundamental 
fairness."  State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 
177 N.W.2d 106 (1970).  "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.'"  Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).   
¶55 Here, we can think of at least a couple reasons that 
requiring Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is fundamentally 
unfair.  First and foremost, forced plea withdrawal deprives 
Chamblis of the benefit of his bargain.  "A criminal defendant 
has a constitutional right to the enforcement of a negotiated 
plea agreement."  State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 271, 558 
                                                 
14 Chamblis did not appeal the portion of the court of 
appeals' decision that concluded the State had sufficiently 
proved the prior Illinois conviction. 
15 In response to a question at oral argument, defense 
counsel maintained that Chamblis could not be required to 
withdraw his guilty plea without violating his constitutional 
right to be free from double jeopardy.  We choose not to address 
that argument because it was not briefed by the parties. 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
28 
 
N.W.2d 379 (1997).  "'Although a defendant has no right to call 
upon the prosecution to perform while the agreement is wholly 
executory, once the defendant has given up his bargaining chip 
by pleading guilty, due process requires that the defendant's 
expectations be fulfilled.'"  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶56 A substantial number of plea bargains are "no doubt 
motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser 
penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict 
after a trial to judge or jury."  Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.  This 
case is no different.  Chamblis entered into the plea agreement 
with the hope that he would face a less severe penalty than if 
he went to trial.  As noted, the State agreed to dismiss charges 
of OWI as a repeater, obstructing an officer as a repeater, and 
battery by prisoner in exchange for Chamblis's plea and 
voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.  Thus, a forced plea 
withdrawal in this case subjects Chamblis to greater punishment, 
not just with respect to the charge of operating with a PAC, but 
to these additional charges as well.  That is fundamentally 
unfair, particularly in light of the fact that Chamblis has 
already served the 2 year confinement portion of his originally 
imposed sentence and therefore has an expectation of finality in 
that sentence. 
¶57 Second, we note that the State was not without options 
to avoid this dilemma.  For example, the State could have 
withdrawn its plea offer in response to the circuit court's   
determination that it would accept a plea only to the lower 
charge.  In fact, the circuit court went out of its way to give 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
29 
 
the prosecutor and defense counsel an opportunity to discuss 
whether the State wished to proceed with the plea given the 
evidentiary ruling.   The State then could have sought review of 
the circuit court's decision by filing a petition for leave to 
appeal a non-final order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).16  
However, the State chose to go through with the plea agreement 
anyway, despite the constitutional implications, perhaps because 
it too benefits from such a bargain.  Id. ("For the State there 
are also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after 
an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives 
of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial 
and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in 
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or 
in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain 
its burden of proof.").  
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) provides: 
Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
(a) 
Materially 
advance 
the 
termination 
of 
the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
(b) 
Protect 
the 
petitioner 
from 
substantial 
or 
irreparable injury; or 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the 
administration of justice. 
 
No. 
2012AP2782-CR   
 
30 
 
¶58 For these reasons, we reject the State's contention 
that plea withdrawal is an appropriate remedy in this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶59 We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court 
erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to 
submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment.     
¶60 Although we assume error, we hold that the court of 
appeals' decision remanding the case to the circuit court with 
instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for 
operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence 
for a seventh offense violates Chamblis's right to due process.  
Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty 
plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a 
seventh offense.  Because a seventh offense carries a greater 
range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of 
appeals' 
remedy 
renders 
Chamblis's 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary.  We further conclude that a 
remedy which requires Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is 
fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process under the 
facts of this case. 
¶61 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and uphold Chamblis's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶62 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring).  
Although I join the majority opinion, I depart from the majority 
analysis because I would not assume without deciding that the 
circuit court erred by excluding the State's proffered evidence 
of two Illinois convictions.  Instead, I would conclude that the 
circuit court did not err because it did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion.1  A circuit court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence is "'entitled to great deference.'"  State v. 
Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶45, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791 
(quoting State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶43, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 
N.W.2d 413).  "'This court will not disturb a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.'"  Id., ¶43 (quoting 
Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 
N.W.2d 191).  
                                                 
1 It is unclear why the majority opinion does not explicitly 
hold that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion.  The court of appeals in the present case held "that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when, at 
the September 19 plea hearing, it excluded the additional 
evidence of the purported Illinois conviction as 'too late.'"  
State v. Chamblis, No. 2012AP2782-CR, unpublished order, ¶21 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2014).  The court of appeals reasoned 
that the circuit court erred because, under State v. Wideman, 
206 Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), and State v. McAllister, 
107 Wis. 2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982), the State was not 
required to prove the number of Chamblis's prior convictions 
until the sentencing hearing.  Id.  The majority opinion rejects 
that view of Wideman and McAllister.  Majority op., ¶¶31-33.  
Thus, the majority opinion seems to implicitly conclude that the 
circuit court did not err.  
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶63 At the plea hearing, the circuit court denied the 
State's request to submit additional evidence of Illinois 
convictions at a later hearing, deeming this request "too late."  
The State made that request seven days after the circuit court 
held that the State's original evidence was insufficient, six 
weeks after Chamblis filed a motion challenging the State's 
evidence, and six months after the State learned that Chamblis 
was going to challenge its evidence.  Ultimately, the circuit 
court reasoned that "this case has been set for trial a long 
time," the State "had plenty of time" to prove the number of 
Chamblis's prior convictions, and the court did not wish to 
delay the case any longer.  Under the facts of this case, the 
circuit court's decision to exclude the proffered evidence was 
well within its discretion.  A contrary conclusion not only 
raises concern regarding fairness and the ability of a defendant 
to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead but also, it 
neuters the court's ability to control the docket and calendar.  
In the case at issue the court correctly determined that the 
time had come for the parties to know the scope of the charges 
and the potential penalties.  While a court is endowed with the 
ability 
to 
allow 
amendment 
of 
charges 
under 
appropriate 
circumstances, 
a 
circuit 
court 
should 
likewise 
have 
the 
discretion to say enough is enough, as the court did here.    
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶64 A discussion of the procedural history of this case 
demonstrates why the circuit court appropriately exercised its 
discretion when it excluded the State's after-the-fact, "last 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
second," proffer of evidence.  On November 22, 2011, Chamblis 
was arrested, he appeared at a bond hearing, and $5,000 cash 
bail was set.  Unable to post bail, he remained in custody 
throughout this case.  Eight days later, on November 30, the 
State 
filed 
a 
complaint 
and 
Chamblis 
made 
his 
initial 
appearance.  The complaint charged Chamblis with operating while 
intoxicated ("OWI") (fifth or sixth offense) and operating with 
a prohibited alcohol concentration ("PAC") (fifth or sixth 
offense).  The complaint alleged that he had five prior drunk 
driving convictions from Minnesota.  On December 7, 2011, a 
preliminary examination was held and Chamblis was bound over for 
trial.  At the end of the preliminary hearing, the State filed 
an information and Chamblis pled not guilty.  The information 
contained the same charges as the complaint.  Two days later, on 
December 9, Chamblis filed a demand for a speedy trial.2  
¶65 On December 12, 2011, the court scheduled jury 
selection for February 27, 2012.  Sometime in mid- to late-
December, the court scheduled a jury trial for March 2, 2012.3  
On December 27 the State sent an e-mail to the circuit court, 
requesting that the trial date be moved ahead one day to 
March 1.  The State made this request because its analyst 
witness was unavailable to testify on March 2.  On January 4, 
                                                 
2 Chamblis withdrew this demand on May 25, 2012. 
3 The record does not indicate precisely when the court 
scheduled the trial for March 2, 2012.  The only reference that 
the record makes to a trial date of March 2 is an e-mail from 
the State to the circuit court, dated December 27, 2011, in 
which the State requested moving the trial date from March 2 to 
March 1. 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
2012, the court granted the State's request and rescheduled the 
jury trial for March 1.  
¶66 On January 12, 2012, the State filed an amended 
information, which charged Chamblis with OWI (seventh, eighth, 
or ninth offense) and operating with a PAC (seventh, eighth, or 
ninth offense).  The amended information alleged the same five 
prior convictions from Minnesota that were alleged in the 
complaint and original information and an additional two prior 
convictions from Illinois.  
¶67 On January 23, 2012, the circuit court moved the trial 
date to March 8, 2012, because the State's analyst witness was 
unavailable on the date for which the trial had been scheduled. 
¶68 On January 30, 2012, Chamblis's attorney withdrew from 
representation.  On February 9 the State Public Defender's 
Office assigned replacement counsel.  On February 14 the circuit 
court entered an order appointing the new counsel.  
¶69 Sometime shortly after being appointed, Chamblis's new 
attorney informed the State that Chamblis intended to challenge 
the alleged Illinois convictions.4  
¶70 On February 15, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing 
that was scheduled to be a final pre-trial hearing.  Chamblis's 
                                                 
4 As Chamblis's new attorney explained several months later 
at 
the 
plea 
hearing 
on 
September 
19, 
2012, 
"I've 
been 
complaining about [the sufficiency of the State's evidence of 
Illinois convictions] for the last, over six months.  [The 
District Attorney's Office and I] have had numerous e-mails 
going back and forth."  The circuit court found Chamblis's 
attorney credible, stating that "[t]he issue was flagged a long 
time ago to the Court and I'm sure it was flagged, I trust 
[Chamblis's counsel] is saying that he told the District 
Attorney's office about this six months ago." 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
new attorney did not appear because he was unaware of this 
hearing, as he was appointed counsel the previous day.  In a 
letter to the court dated February 15, Chamblis's attorney 
stated that he has "not had a chance to review the file, let 
alone decide whether to proceed to trial."  He requested that 
the court remove the case from the trial calendar and schedule 
the case for a status conference.  On February 17 the court 
granted that request.  
¶71 At a March 20 status conference, the circuit court 
rescheduled jury selection for June 11, and the jury trial for 
June 15, 2012. 
¶72 On May 25, 2012, the circuit court held another final 
pre-trial hearing.  Chamblis's attorney informed the circuit 
court that he had another trial scheduled for the same day as 
the trial in this case.  Accordingly, the court rescheduled jury 
selection for September 24 and a jury trial for September 26, 
2012.  
¶73 On August 6, 2012, Chamblis filed a motion challenging 
the Illinois convictions alleged in the amended information.  
The State's deadline for filing a brief in response to the 
motion was August 22.  However, the State did not file a brief 
until September 5, two weeks late.  
¶74 Two weeks before trial, on Wednesday, September 12, 
2012, the circuit court held a hearing on Chamblis's motion 
challenging the alleged Illinois convictions.  The court 
determined that the State's evidence did not prove that Chamblis 
was convicted in Illinois of a drunk driving-related offense.  
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
The 
court 
stated 
that 
"if . . . more 
evidence 
is 
supplied, . . . we will review it at that point in time . . . ." 
¶75 Two days later, on September 14, the circuit court 
held a final pre-trial hearing.  This hearing was very brief, 
and no one mentioned the status of the alleged Illinois 
convictions.  Chamblis's attorney informed the court that 
Chamblis would like to plead guilty.  He further informed the 
court that a sentencing hearing should be held on a later date 
than the plea hearing because the State would be requesting a 
presentence investigation.  
¶76 On Wednesday, September 19, 2012, the circuit court 
held a plea hearing.  Chamblis's attorney stated that, pursuant 
to a plea agreement, Chamblis would plead guilty to operating 
with a PAC as a fourth offense or greater.  At that time, the 
pending charges were still those alleged in the January 2012 
amended information, namely OWI (seventh, eighth, or ninth 
offense) and operating with a PAC (seventh, eighth, or ninth 
offense).  The State explained that it wished to make an offer 
of proof regarding the alleged Illinois convictions at the 
sentencing hearing, which would be held at a later date.  An 
Illinois conviction would have made Chamblis's PAC offense in 
the present case a seventh, rather than sixth, offense.  
¶77 The 
mandatory 
minimum 
and 
maximum 
penalties 
for 
Chamblis's offense varied greatly depending on whether it was a 
sixth or seventh offense.  A person who is convicted of a fifth 
or sixth OWI or PAC offense "shall be fined not less than $600 
and imprisoned for not less than 6 months."  Wis. Stat. 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
§ 346.65(2)(am)5.  The maximum penalty for that offense is "a 
fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 
years, 
or 
both." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
939.50(3)(h); 
see 
also 
§ 346.65(2)(am)5.  By contrast, a person who is convicted of a 
seventh, eighth, or ninth OWI or PAC offense "shall [receive] a 
bifurcated sentence . . . and the confinement portion of the 
bifurcated sentence . . . shall be not less than 3 years."  Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. (2013-14); see also State v. Williams, 
2014 WI 64, ¶47, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467.  The maximum 
penalty for that offense is "a fine not to exceed $25,000 or 
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both."  § 939.50(3)(g); 
see also § 346.65(2)(am)6.  Thus, if the State proved that 
Chamblis had an Illinois conviction, his mandatory minimum 
penalty would increase from six months of imprisonment to three 
years of confinement.  Similarly, his maximum penalty would 
increase from six years of imprisonment to ten years of 
imprisonment.  Chamblis did not plead to charges that carried 
the higher penalties. 
¶78 At the plea hearing, the court stated that it was "not 
going to consider the new evidence" because that evidence was 
being offered "way too late."  As Chamblis' attorney explained, 
"I've been complaining about [the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence of Illinois convictions] for the last, over six months.  
[The District Attorney's Office and I] have had numerous e-mails 
going back and forth."  The circuit court found Chamblis's 
attorney credible, stating that "[t]he issue was flagged a long 
time ago to the Court and I'm sure it was flagged, I trust 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
[Chamblis's counsel] is saying that he told the District 
Attorney's office about this six months ago."  The court 
explained how "frustrating" it was that the case had not been 
resolved already.  The court noted that "this case has been set 
for trial a long time."  The court explained that the dispute 
over the alleged Illinois convictions had prevented "this case 
[from being] resolved in a way that would have made more sense 
months ago."  
¶79 The court explained that the State contributed to the 
delay of this case.  According to the court, the State "had 
plenty of time" to prove the number of Chamblis's prior 
convictions and "did not take this [matter] seriously enough."  
The court further noted that the State was two weeks late in 
filing its response to Chamblis's motion challenging the 
Illinois convictions. 
¶80 The court refused to consider the State's proffered 
evidence in part because doing so would further delay resolution 
of this case.  The court explained that "I don't think I can do 
a 
plea 
without 
[the 
number 
of 
prior 
convictions] 
being 
determined.  It is not a trial with a sentencing at a later 
date.  This is a plea.  It's a different type of procedure."  
The 
court 
stated 
that 
it 
"want[ed] 
the 
determination 
of . . . how many prior convictions [there] are before we 
actually enter into the plea, so Mr. Chamblis knows what he's 
pleading guilty to."  The court expressed concern with further 
delaying the case for a later plea hearing, stating that 
"[d]iscovery requires discovery to be done in a timely fashion, 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
[and] to have this done last second like this . . . continues to 
prolong the process . . . ."  The court also stated that, 
because Chamblis "sat in jail, days, months, waiting for [the 
State to determine his number of prior convictions]," it would 
not be "fair to him" to further delay the case by admitting the 
State's proffered evidence.  The court concluded that it "can't 
justify extending things more" and that "discovery at some point 
has to end. . . .  The discovery is done."  
¶81 The court stated that "[i]f we need to put [this case] 
back on the trial calendar, we can."  The court gave the parties 
15 to 20 minutes to decide whether to proceed with a guilty plea 
to operating with a PAC (fifth or sixth offense).  The parties 
then informed the court that they reached a new plea agreement.  
Pursuant to that agreement, Chamblis pled guilty to operating 
with a PAC as a sixth offense.  As a result, Chamblis faced a 
mandatory minimum penalty of six months' imprisonment and a 
maximum penalty of six years' imprisonment.  
 
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY  
EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION 
¶82 "'This court will not disturb a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.'" 
 
Jackson, 
352 
Wis. 2d 249, ¶43 (quoting Weborg, 341 Wis. 2d 668, ¶41).  "'A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies 
an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably 
supported by the facts of record.'"  Id. (quoting Weborg, 341 
Wis. 2d 668, ¶41).  "'[T]he circuit court's decisions to admit 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
or exclude evidence are entitled to great deference . . . .'"  
Id., ¶45 (quoting Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶43).  
¶83 In the present case, the circuit court's concerns with 
fairness to the defendant and controlling the calendar by not 
prolonging the case any further were reasonable.5  Chamblis had 
initially requested a speedy trial.  A jury trial was first 
scheduled for March 2, which was approximately three months 
after Chamblis was bound over for trial.  The trial date was 
delayed three months to June 15 and then delayed another three 
months to September 26.  Similarly, a final pre-trial hearing 
had been scheduled for February, was moved to May, and was then 
moved to September.  The plea hearing was held approximately ten 
months after the State filed its complaint against Chamblis, and 
he remained in custody that entire time awaiting trial.  The 
State learned more than six months before the plea hearing that 
Chamblis believed that its evidence failed to prove that he had 
Illinois convictions for drunk driving.  Nevertheless, the State 
did not obtain additional evidence of Illinois convictions until 
September 14, which was five days before the plea hearing.  
Further, the State was not prepared to present that additional 
evidence at the plea hearing, but instead wished to offer it at 
the sentencing hearing at a later date.6  
¶84 As noted earlier, Chamblis had initially requested a 
speedy trial.  At the time of that request there was no 
                                                 
5 The majority opinion implicitly recognizes that the 
circuit court did not make a mistake of law.  See supra note 1. 
6 The sentencing hearing was held on November 5, 2012. 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
indication that the State wished to amend the charges.  Had the 
case been tried, it appears that the charges would have remained 
the charges to which he ultimately pled.  This is not to say 
that the State's hands were tied, but under the facts of this 
case the circuit court was not incorrect to conclude that the 
State was barred from essentially amending the charges and 
penalties post-plea. 
¶85 Under 
these 
facts, 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  A circuit court may 
exclude 
relevant 
evidence 
"if 
its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially 
outweighed . . . by 
considerations 
of 
undue 
delay . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 904.03.7  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.10(3)(d), (5)(d) (stating that a circuit court may control 
its calendar and speedily dispose of actions by setting a time 
limit for discovery and ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
pre-trial). 
 
Further, 
"[c]ircuit 
courts 
possess 
inherent 
discretionary authority to control their dockets with economy of 
time and effort."  State ex rel. Collins v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 153 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 429 (1990) (citing Rupert 
v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 405 N.W.2d 661 (Ct. 
App. 1987)).  See also Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶31, 
312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820 ("Wisconsin circuit courts have 
discretion to control their dockets.  This power is inherent to 
their function."); Schopper v. Gehring, 210 Wis. 2d 208, 215, 
565 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted) ("The trial 
                                                 
7 The circuit court's explicit concerns with undue delay 
"tacitly invoked" Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  See State v. Smith, 2002 
WI App 118, ¶16, 254 Wis. 2d 654, 648 N.W.2d 15. 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
court has the inherent power to control its calendar and 
scheduling.").  A circuit court's power to control its calendar 
"is essential to the [circuit] courts' ability to function 
because it provides the courts with the authority to control 
their judicial business."  Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 465-
66, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Neylan v. Vorwald, 
124 Wis. 2d 85, 94, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985)). 
¶86 Accordingly, the "courts cannot allow litigants to 
control judicial calendars."  Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246, 
254, 270 N.W.2d 397 (1978).  See also State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 
20, ¶76, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10  ("'The trial process 
would be a shambles if either party had an absolute right to 
control the time and content of his witnesses' testimony.'" 
(quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410–411 (1988))).  If 
we were to conclude that under these facts the circuit court 
erroneously denied the State's request to introduce evidence at 
a later date, we would impermissibly allow the parties to 
control the circuit court's calendar and at the same time 
endorse the idea that a defendant need not know the charges to 
which he pleads or their penalties.   
¶87 Chamblis pled guilty to a charge that had different 
penalties than the charge in the amended information that 
included the unproven prior offenses.  Knowing the potential 
penalties is fundamental to entering a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary plea.  See State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶57, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 
614 
N.W.2d 477 
(citation 
omitted) 
("When 
a 
defendant is not aware of the potential punishment, the plea is 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently . . . .").  
This case is not one where the circuit court denied the State's 
attempt to amend charges to conform to the evidence or to timely 
amend charges so that a defendant can be on notice.  Rather, 
this case is one where the State wished to essentially amend the 
charges, after a guilty plea, and have the defendant be exposed 
to greater penalties and mandatory minimums than those that were 
associated with the charge to which he pled guilty.  The court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying the 
State's request.  The defendant did not plead to the charges 
that relied upon the Illinois prior offenses and thus, carried 
higher mandatory minimums and greater exposure.  Chamblis pled 
guilty to the original charge because the court determined that 
the State had not proven the Illinois prior convictions.  The 
court accepted Chamblis's plea for one offense with one set of 
penalties.  It would invoke fundamental principles of fairness 
to allow that plea to morph into an amended conviction for an 
offense to which he did not plead.  
¶88 In sum, although I join the majority opinion, I would 
explicitly conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it excluded the evidence that the 
State attempted to submit "too late."   
¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2012AP2782-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1