Case Title: State v. Adams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 104068

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
Nos. 104,068 
        104,432 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
TABATHA L. ADAMS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents mixed questions of law and 
fact. When such a claim is brought under K.S.A. 60-1507 and a district court conducts a 
full evidentiary hearing to review the claim, an appellate court reviews the district court's 
factual findings for substantial competent evidence and determines whether the court's 
factual findings support its conclusions of law. The district court's conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo. 
 
2. 
 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must first show that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, the 
defendant must demonstrate the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 
 
3. 
 
When a defendant enters into a plea bargain and later claims ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the proper inquiry under the second prong of Strickland is whether, absent 
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trial counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial. 
 
4. 
 
Under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 
(1984), in certain narrow circumstances a defendant is not required to prove prejudice 
under the second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. One 
such circumstance is when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutor's case to 
meaningful adversarial testing. 
 
5. 
 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) permits a district court to allow a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing if doing so would correct manifest injustice. 
When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate counsel's performance violated 
the Sixth Amendment in order to establish manifest injustice. 
 
Appeal from Ford District Court; VAN Z. HAMPTON, judge. Opinion filed June 21, 2013. 
Affirmed. 
 
Christina M. Kerls, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Kevin B. Salzman, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Terry J. Malone, county 
attorney, David Belling, deputy county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on 
the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
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MORITZ, J.:  In this consolidated appeal, Tabatha Adams seeks review of (1) the 
district court's denial of her K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in which she contended her trial 
counsel was constitutionally defective in negotiating her guilty plea to one count of 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and (2) the district court's denial of her motion 
in the underlying criminal case seeking to withdraw her guilty plea.  
 
Although a lack of factual findings from the district court hinders our ability to 
review Adams' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude Adams failed to 
demonstrate that even if she had received effective assistance of counsel, she would have 
declined to plead guilty and insisted on going to trial. Therefore, we affirm the district 
court's denial of her K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
 
The State charged Adams with aggravated indecent liberties with a child, 
aggravated criminal sodomy, and sexual exploitation of a child. The State later amended 
the complaint to add a second count of sexual exploitation of a child. The charges arose 
when police were given a memory card containing 50 photographs depicting an 8-year-
old female child and two adults engaged in a variety of sexual acts. Authorities identified 
the adults as Zach Noble and Adams and the child as Adams' biological daughter, S.A. 
Adams acknowledged during questioning by law enforcement that the photographs 
depicted her, her daughter, and her boyfriend, Noble. She also confessed to police that 
while the photographs were taken at Noble's home in Nebraska, she and S.A. had 
engaged in sexual acts in Dodge City while Noble watched via webcam.  
 
Adams' appointed counsel, Linda Eckelman, negotiated a plea agreement in which 
Adams agreed to plead guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child and agreed to 
testify against Noble. The agreement also prohibited Adams from filing a departure 
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motion or contacting S.A. until S.A. turns 18. In return, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining three counts.  
 
At the plea hearing, the district court informed Adams that pursuant to her plea she 
would be sentenced to life imprisonment and required to serve 25 years before being 
eligible for parole. Adams affirmed she was satisfied with Eckelman's services, 
understood the terms of the plea, and understood the sentence. Adams pled guilty to 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and the district court accepted her plea and 
entered the conviction.  
 
Soon after the plea hearing, Adams sought to have Eckelman removed as counsel 
based on Adams' dissatisfaction with Eckelman's services. At the attorney status hearing, 
the district court informed Adams that even if Eckelman withdrew from the case, Adams 
would remain bound by the plea agreement. Adams told the district court she wanted to 
retain Eckelman as her attorney, indicating, "I guess I've just been frustrated with the 
whole process. But, my parents spoke with someone else, and they said under the 
conditions and stuff, that I was probably getting the best I was gonna get."  
 
At sentencing, Eckelman submitted several letters on Adams' behalf, and Adams' 
stepfather testified that Adams was a "model citizen" before she became involved with 
Noble. Adams also informed the court that she agreed to the plea to protect her daughter 
and she lived with guilt every day for what happened to S.A. The district court sentenced 
Adams to a hard 25 life sentence in accordance with Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-
4643(a)(1)(C).  
 
Adams subsequently filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, arguing Eckelman was 
ineffective in negotiating Adams' plea. Adams' new appointed counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw Adams' plea in the underlying criminal case. Broadly stated, the filings alleged 
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Adams received ineffective assistance of counsel because Eckelman abandoned her role 
as Adams' counsel, failed to ensure Adams understood the sentence for the crime to 
which she pled, failed to investigate potential defenses, and failed to notify the district 
court that the factual basis for the plea was defective. Adams also asserted that Eckelman 
shamed her into taking the plea by telling her that S.A. hated Adams and if Adams had 
any decency she would not proceed to trial. 
 
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Adams' K.S.A. 60-1507 
motion and motion to withdraw her plea. Adams and Eckelman both testified at the 
hearing, and on every critical issue, their testimony conflicted. For instance, Adams 
claimed Eckelman failed to advise her she would be sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole for 25 years and that her plea required her to waive her statutory 
right to file a departure motion. In contrast, Eckelman testified she informed Adams of 
the mandatory sentence, and explained to Adams her right to file a departure motion and 
that she was agreeing to waive that right by pleading guilty. Adams also testified 
Eckelman failed to investigate a number of defenses and should have informed the court 
the State provided a deficient factual basis for the plea. Eckelman denied these 
allegations.  
 
Without making any credibility determinations or factual findings regarding 
Adams' claims of ineffectiveness, the district court rejected Adams' claim of prejudice. 
Specifically, the district court concluded Adams' guilty plea was motivated by the 
overwhelming evidence against her, the "near certainty of her conviction," and Adams' 
desire to prevent her daughter from having to testify.  
 
We have jurisdiction over Adams' consolidated appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
3601(b)(1). 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Adams asserts that under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2), this court should allow her to 
withdraw her guilty plea because she received ineffective assistance of counsel from her 
attorney, Eckelman. We address each contention in turn.  
 
ADAMS HAS NOT PROVEN THAT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THIS COURT TO 
ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF HER GUILTY PLEA 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, with limited 
exception, a criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel. Adams asserts she 
received ineffective assistance because Eckelman failed to advise her adequately of the 
consequences of her plea, including the sentence and its mandatory nature; failed to 
investigate her potential defenses; failed to inform the judge of a potential jurisdictional 
defect in the prosecutor's recitation of facts during the plea hearing; and made statements 
shaming Adams into taking the plea. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents mixed questions of law and 
fact. When such a claim is brought under K.S.A. 60-1507 and the district court conducts 
a full evidentiary hearing on the claim, we review the district court's factual findings for 
substantial competent evidence and determine whether the court's factual findings 
support its conclusions of law. The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo. Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 715-16, 270 P.3d 1089 (2011). 
 
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Analysis 
 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
674 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated the test for determining whether a 
defendant has received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment and when that deficient representation requires reversal. Pursuant to 
Strickland, the defendant must first show that the "counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, the 
defendant must demonstrate the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 466 U.S. at 
687.  
 
In a decision issued the same day as Strickland, the Court in Cronic articulated 
narrow exceptions to Strickland's second requirement, holding a defendant is not required 
to prove prejudice in three situations. One such circumstance is when counsel "entirely 
fails" to subject the prosecutor's case to meaningful adversarial testing. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 659. Adams asserts her counsel was constitutionally ineffective under both Cronic and 
Strickland. 
 
As noted, although the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, it made no 
factual findings regarding Adams' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor did it 
specifically determine whether Eckelman's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Despite this failure, both parties urge this court on appeal to 
consider whether Eckelman rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to Adams. But 
because Eckelman and Adams testified inconsistently regarding Eckelman's performance 
and this court is not permitted to make credibility findings, the district court's failure to 
make factual findings precludes our review of this issue. See State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 
__, Syl. ¶ 1, 298 P.3d 311 (2013) (appellate courts are not in position to make credibility 
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determinations). Instead, we will assume for purposes of review that the district court 
found Eckelman ineffective. However, we caution that the better practice is for district 
courts to make detailed factual findings following an evidentiary hearing in order to aid 
in appellate review.  
 
Adams' complained-of errors do not fall into the limited Cronic exception. 
 
Adams argues Eckelman completely abandoned her role as Adams' counsel by 
failing to challenge the State's case and therefore, pursuant to Cronic, this court need not 
consider whether Adams was prejudiced by her counsel's deficient performance. Adams 
argues Eckelman abandoned her adversarial role because:  (1) Eckelman acted as the 
victim's advocate when she told Adams she had destroyed her daughter's life and that if 
she had any decency she would plead guilty, and (2) Eckelman failed or refused to 
investigate Adams' claim that Noble had threatened her and failed to ask for a 
psychological evaluation.  
 
Errors evaluated under Cronic are rare, and most alleged deficiencies are properly 
evaluated under Strickland rather than Cronic. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 189-
90, 125 S. Ct. 551, 160 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2004) (noting that Cronic itself illustrates "just 
how infrequently" cases will fall into its exception). To fall under the Cronic exception, 
counsel's abandonment of the defendant must be "complete," and counsel must fail 
"entirely" to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See, e.g., United 
States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2005) (attorney, who had filed motion to 
withdraw, declined to comment at defendant's competency hearing and mentioned he 
possessed probative evidence but did not introduce it; court held right to counsel denied 
because no meaningful adversarial testing); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 
1992) (finding appointed counsel at resentencing hearing was ineffective under Cronic 
because he did not consult with defendant, had scant knowledge of facts, and made no 
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helpful comments at sentencing); see also State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 14 P.3d 1138 
(2000) (finding counsel ineffective under Cronic when defendant's trial counsel conceded 
defendant had killed victim and instead focused on premeditation issue, despite 
defendant's disagreement with counsel's strategy). But see Edgar v. State, 294 Kan. 828, 
842-43, 283 P.3d 152 (2012) (Carter decision called into question).  
 
But even assuming the deficiencies Adams alleges occurred, Eckelman did not 
entirely fail to function as Adams' advocate or fail to subject the State's case to testing. As 
the State points out, the record shows Adams hoped to enter a plea and Eckelman's plea 
negotiations resulted in the State dismissing three charges, including another Jessica's 
Law charge and two severity level 5 felonies. Eckelman also reviewed photographs, 
S.A.'s interview, and police reports to determine the strength of the State's case. These 
actions demonstrate Eckelman did not entirely fail to represent Adams, and, therefore, 
this case does not present the rare situation in which a defendant is not required to prove 
prejudice.  
 
Adams is not entitled to relief under Strickland because she failed to demonstrate 
she was prejudiced by any deficiency. 
 
Next, we consider whether Adams is entitled to relief under Strickland. Adams 
points to three areas in which Eckelman's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness:  (1) Eckelman failed to ensure Adams understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty, particularly the mandatory nature of the sentence; (2) Eckelman failed to 
investigate potential defenses; and (3) Eckelman failed to notify the district court at the 
plea hearing that Adams believed the factual basis for the charge was jurisdictionally 
defective. Assuming Eckelman provided ineffective counsel in each of these areas, we 
must next determine whether Adams proved that, absent Eckelman's errors, Adams 
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See State v. 
Szczygiel, 294 Kan. 642, 647, 279 P.3d 700 (2012).  
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In concluding Adams was not prejudiced by any of Eckelman's failures, the 
district court discussed the strength of the State's evidence and the reasons for Adams' 
plea. Specifically, the district court found Adams' plea was motivated by the "near 
certainty of conviction" and her desire to protect her daughter from testifying. Ultimately, 
the district court rejected Adams' assertion that had she been effectively represented, she 
would not have pled guilty. 
 
Based on these factual findings, which are supported by the record, Adams has not 
proven to a reasonable probability she would have insisted on going to trial absent the 
errors committed by her counsel. As the district court found, in addition to her desire to 
protect her daughter, Adams faced overwhelming evidence of guilt, including her own 
Mirandized confession that she and her daughter engaged in sexual acts in Dodge City, 
testimony from her daughter, and potential testimony from Noble. Given the weight of 
this evidence, we conclude it is unlikely Adams would have risked a trial. Additionally, 
had she proceeded to trial, this evidence likely would have resulted in convictions for 
additional crimes, including another crime under Jessica's Law, and a much greater 
sentence. These facts dispel the possibility that, but for Eckelman's errors, Adams would 
have proceeded to trial. See State v. Bricker, 292 Kan. 239, 255, 252 P.3d 118 (2011). 
 
Further, Adams' own statements call into question whether she would have 
forgone a plea and proceeded to trial. A few weeks before her plea, Adams sent 
Eckelman a letter advising Eckelman that she was unhappy that the apparent current plea 
offer was 25 years, but also indicating:  "I had always hoped we would be able to make a 
plea because I did not want my daughter dragged through court." Adams reiterated a 
similar feeling at sentencing, stating, "I agreed to the plea to keep my daughter out of 
court. I do know that I put her through a lot in those couple of months. And, I didn't want 
to have to drag her through any more."  
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In support of her claim that had her counsel not been ineffective she would have 
gone to trial, Adams points to a statement she made at the combined hearing on her 
motion to withdraw her plea and her K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. But even that statement, 
made in hindsight, expressed her primary desire to protect her daughter from testifying:  
 
 
"Honestly I would hate to see [S.A.] testify. I would hope that something could 
be met before that but if it comes down to it I feel like I should fight this time because I 
did nothing the first time because I was such an emotional wreck and I was worried about 
my daughter. I'm still worried about my daughter. But my parents have also told me that 
they have done lots of studies and sometimes it helps kids to testify. So I don't know. It's 
a risk I guess at this point I would be willing to take."  
 
Significantly, the district court heard Adams' tepid statement indicating a 
willingness to risk trial and apparently discounted that statement in finding a lack of 
prejudice. This rejection is tantamount to a credibility determination—a determination we 
are not free to reconsider. 
 
To summarize, Adams is burdened with demonstrating that a reasonable 
probability exists that, but for Eckelman's errors, she would have insisted on going to 
trial. But the weight of the evidence against Adams, her repeated expressed desires to 
protect her daughter from testifying, and the potential for a much greater sentence all 
weigh against Adams' assertions that had she been effectively counseled she would have 
risked a trial. The district court correctly held that Adams failed to meet her burden to 
demonstrate prejudice.  
 
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ADAMS' CLAIM THAT UNDER K.S.A. 2012 SUPP. 22-3210 SHE SHOULD BE ABLE TO 
WITHDRAW HER GUILTY PLEA ALSO FAILS. 
 
In contending the district court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) to correct manifest injustice, Adams 
essentially incorporates and restates her contentions regarding her K.S.A. 60-1507 claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) permits a district court to allow a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing in order to "correct manifest injustice." But to 
establish manifest injustice in this circumstance, a defendant must first demonstrate 
counsel's performance deprived the defendant of his or her Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. See Bricker, 292 Kan. at 245-46. Based on our rejection of Adams' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, Adams' statutory argument also fails.  
 
Affirmed.