Case Title: Jewel v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 992257

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
GARY E. JEWEL 
 
v.  Record No. 992257     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
November 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Gary E. Jewel was convicted by a Warren County jury of 
two counts of grand larceny by false pretenses and sentenced 
to one year imprisonment on one count and two years 
imprisonment on the other count.  Jewel appealed his 
conviction to the Court of Appeals asserting, inter alia, that 
the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to impeach 
him by using two prior felony convictions, when at the time of 
trial the "convictions" consisted of two guilty pleas which 
had been accepted by the judge but for which no order had been 
entered stating a finding of guilt or imposing sentence.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.  Jewel v. 
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 416, 517 S.E.2d 264 (1999).  Jewel 
raises the same issue in his appeal to this Court. 
 
Code § 19.2-269 provides that "[a] person convicted of a 
felony or perjury shall not be incompetent to testify, but the 
fact of conviction may be shown in evidence to affect his 
credit."  Jewel asserts that "there must be a final sentencing 
order complying with all jurisdictional requirements . . . 
before there is a conviction for any purpose."  Because no 
such orders were entered regarding his prior felonies at the 
time of his trial on the instant charges, Jewel argues that 
there were no convictions and the trial court erred in 
allowing the Commonwealth to use the prior felonies to impeach 
him. 
 
We have not construed the term "conviction" as it is used 
in Code § 19.2-269.*  We have, however, construed the term in 
the context of other statutes and factual situations.  In 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 589, 113 S.E. 707 (1922), we 
concluded that "convicted" as used in former Code § 2705 
relating to the removal of an elected or appointed official 
from office meant "convicted by judgment, and requires a 
judgment of conviction, in addition to the verdict of the 
jury" when the accused has pled not guilty.  134 Va. at 592, 
113 S.E. at 708. 
We came to a similar conclusion when considering the use 
of the term in Code § 53.1-151(B1) relating to ineligibility 
for parole.  In Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 518, 450 
S.E.2d 360 (1994), we held that because judgment had not been 
                     
* Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 
(1976), involved witnesses who were impeached by prior 
felonies to which they had pled guilty but had not been 
sentenced.  However, whether the use of such felonies for 
impeachment was proper was not an issue addressed or decided 
in that case. 
 
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entered on the jury verdict of guilty, the verdict alone 
"cannot be considered as a conviction under Code § 53.1-
151(B1)."  248 Va. at 520, 450 S.E.2d at 361. 
 
These cases are not dispositive, however, because they 
did not involve construction of the statute at issue here, 
Code § 19.2-269, and they did not involve a guilty plea 
entered by the defendant in the prior proceedings.  We have 
described a guilty plea as "in reality, a self-supplied 
conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by 
law."  Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 
(1969).  We also have said a plea is "a conviction and nothing 
is left but the imposition of the prescribed punishment."  
Miracle v. Peyton, 211 Va. 123, 126, 176 S.E.2d 339, 341 
(1970). 
The difference in the status of a guilty plea and a jury 
verdict of conviction is significant.  In pleading guilty, the 
defendant admits to all elements of the crime charged and 
waives many rights, including the right to have the charged 
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  When pleading not 
guilty, those rights are not waived, and, even though the jury 
returns a verdict of guilty, that verdict remains subject to 
being set aside by the trial court for error committed during 
the trial or for insufficient evidence.  Rule 3A:15(b).  This 
additional avenue of potential relief afforded a defendant who 
 
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pleaded not guilty extends the time before the matter of guilt 
is finally resolved.  This is a significant distinction in 
determining whether the stage of the proceedings qualifies as 
a "conviction." 
Finally, in this case we consider the word "conviction" 
in the context of the impeachment of a witness.  The use of a 
prior conviction in this context does not have the impact of 
establishing an element of a crime, Smith, or dictating a 
status for parole, Ramdass.  Its purpose is limited to 
presenting information on the credibility of a witness to a 
jury and it is the jury that decides the impact of such 
information. 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that for the limited 
purposes of Code § 19.2-269, the word "conviction" includes a 
guilty plea accepted by the court.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.
 
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