Case Title: Swett v. Bradbury

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  April 11, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MICHAEL SWETT;
DAVID FIDANQUE;
and the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF OREGON, INC.,
	Respondents on Review,
	v.
BILL BRADBURY,
Secretary of State,
and the STATE OF OREGON,
	Petitioners on Review,
	and
VIRGINIA MARKELL,
LAURENCE PERRY, and SUSAN REMMERS,
	Intervenors-Respondents.
(CC 98-C-20484; CA A107552 (Control), 

A107799; SC S48116)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 6, 2001.
	Philip Schradle, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.  With
him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Thomas M. Christ, of Cosgrave, Verger & Kester LLP,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on
review.
	No appearance for intervenors-respondents.  
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  
	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Richard D. Barber, Sr., Judge. 171 Or App 119, 15 P3d 50 (2000).
		GILLETTE, J.
		Plaintiffs brought this action against the State of
Oregon and the Secretary of State (defendants) under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.010 et seq., challenging the
constitutionality of Ballot Measure 62 (1998) (Measure 62), the
"Open and Fair Elections Act."  Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia,
that Measure 62 contained two or more constitutional amendments
that should have been voted on separately under Article XVII,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, set out post.  The circuit
court disagreed, and plaintiffs appealed.  The Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that Measure 62 violated the separate-vote
provision of Article XVII, section 1, because it made multiple,
substantive changes to the Oregon Constitution that were not
closely related.  Swett v. Keisling, 171 Or App 119, 127, 15 P3d
50 (2000).  We allowed defendants' petition for review and now
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
		The people approved Measure 62 at the November 1998
general election.  It purports to add ten new sections to the
Oregon Constitution.  It provides, in part:
"OPEN AND FAIR ELECTIONS ACT

		"The following sections are added to and made a
part of the Constitution of the State of Oregon:
	"Section 1.  Disclosure of Large Contributions
		"In addition to any other disclosures required by
law, the recipient of aggregate political contributions
of $500 or more from one contributor during any one
calendar year shall disclose such contribution and any
subsequent contributions from that contributor to the
Secretary of State or other appropriate reporting
authority within seven days of receipt. * * *
	"Section 2.  Disclosure of Contributions During
Petition Signature Gathering
		"(1) The chief petitioner(s) on all petitions for
a statewide initiative or referendum shall be
responsible for disclosing to the Secretary of State
all contributions received and expenditures made in
support of the petition, including expenditures made
for the purpose of collecting signatures or paying
signature gatherers. * * * 
		"(2) Before any entity receives a contribution or
makes an expenditure for the purpose of influencing the
collection of signatures on a proposed statewide
initiative or referendum petition, that entity shall
file a statement of organization with the Secretary of
State, form a petition political committee, and
thereafter disclose contributions and expenditures as
required in subsection (1) herein.
	"Section 3.  Making Signature Gatherers Be Registered
Oregon Voters, Permitting Regulation of Payment for
Signatures, and Specifying Effective Date of This
Constitutional Amendment
		"Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution of the
State of Oregon, is amended by adding a new subsection,
and the Constitution of the State of Oregon is amended
by creating new Sections 1b and 1c to be added to and
made a part of Article IV to read:
			"A person gathering signatures on an
initiative or referendum petition shall be
registered to vote in this state in the manner
provided by law.	 
			"Section 1b. Permitting Regulation of
Payment for Signatures
			"The Legislative Assembly may pass laws
which prohibit or regulate payment for
gathering signatures for initiative or
referendum petitions on a per signature
basis if the Legislative Assembly finds
that the practice has caused fraud or
other abuses.
			"* * * * *"  
		Plaintiffs are two voters and the American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Inc.  They filed this challenge on
December 2, 1998, the day before the Secretary of State
officially certified that the voters had adopted Measure 62. 
		In their first claim for relief, plaintiffs sought a
declaration that Measure 62 was adopted in violation of two
provisions of the Oregon Constitution:  the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1, as noted above, and the
single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). (1)  In
their second claim for relief, plaintiffs sought a declaration
that section 2(2) of Measure 62, set out above, concerning 
disclosure by any entity of contributions made or received "for
the purpose of influencing the collection of signatures on a
proposed statewide initiative or referendum petition," violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States.  Their third claim for relief concerned attorney
fees.  The chief petitioners for Measure 62 intervened.
		The parties submitted cross-motions for summary
judgment on the separate-vote issue only.  The trial court,
without opinion, denied plaintiffs' and granted defendants' and
intervenors' motions.  Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
remaining claims, and the trial court entered judgment in favor
of defendants and intervenors.  As noted, plaintiffs appealed.  
		In the Court of Appeals, the parties agreed that, to
determine whether a proposed constitutional amendment violates
the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, "the
proper inquiry is to determine whether, if adopted, the proposal
would make two or more changes to the constitution that are
substantive and that are not closely related."  See Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 277, 959 P2d 49 (1998) (stating that
test).  Furthermore, plaintiffs and defendants agreed that
Measure 62 purported to make more than one substantive change to
the Oregon Constitution. (2)  They disagreed, however, about whether
the changes that Measure 62 made to the constitution were
"closely related."  Plaintiffs argued that, under the Court of
Appeals' decision in Dale v. Keisling, 167 Or App 394, 404, 999
P2d 1229 (2000), the changes were not "closely related" because a
vote in favor of one change did not "necessarily imply" a vote in
favor of the others, as the Dale decision required.  Defendants
argued that the Court of Appeals should reconsider its decision
in Dale.  They further argued that that court should adopt
defendants' own proposed standard and conclude that the changes
that Measure 62 made were "closely related" because they "were so
logically interrelated as to present one specific, discrete,
cohesive policy choice."      
		As noted above, the Court of Appeals reversed.  That
court explained that, under either the standard that it had
articulated in Dale or the standard that defendants had offered,
Measure 62 purported to make substantive changes to the Oregon
Constitution that were not closely related.  Swett, 171 Or App at
127.  By way of example, the Court of Appeals focused on sections
1 and 3 of Measure 62 and explained:
		"[S]ection 1 of Measure 62 requires disclosure of
certain large political contributions, while section 3
requires that initiative petition signature gatherers
be registered Oregon voters.  We are hard-pressed to
understand the single, specific[,] unifying purpose
that is accomplished by the enactment of those two
sections.  The Secretary suggests that the measure is
designed to prevent, control or expose the influence of
money in the electoral process.  Yet even that
explanation fails to account for the requirement that
initiative petition signature gatherers be registered
Oregon voters."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Defendants, but not
intervenors, petitioned for review.  
		On review, defendants for the first time raise an issue
of subject matter jurisdiction.  They argue that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to hear this challenge under ORS 28.010
because ORS 250.044 (3) provides the exclusive means of bringing a
ballot-measure challenge after the voters adopt a measure.  They
further argue that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
under ORS 250.044, because any challenge under that statute may
not be brought until after the Secretary of State formally
certifies the results of an election and, in this case,
plaintiffs brought their challenge on the day before the
Secretary of State formally certified that Measure 62 had
passed. (4)  As to the merits, defendants renew the arguments that
they made in the Court of Appeals.
		We begin our discussion of the issues in this case by
addressing defendants' argument concerning subject matter
jurisdiction.  As noted, the trial court assumed jurisdiction
under ORS 28.010, which provides, in part:
		"Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. * * *"
Although a trial court has broad power to provide declaratory
relief, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under ORS 28.010 if
some other exclusive remedy exists.  Alto v. State Fire Marshal,
319 Or 382, 395, 876 P2d 774 (1994).  In this case, defendants
argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under ORS 28.010
because the legislature intended ORS 250.044 to be the exclusive
means for challenging a ballot measure after an election.  To
determine if defendants are correct in that regard, we examine
the text and context of ORS 250.044.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-612, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (to
determine legislative intent, first step is to examine text of
statute, read in context).  
		ORS 250.044 provides, in part: 	"(1) An action that challenges the
constitutionality of a measure initiated by the people
or referred to the people for a vote must be commenced
in the Circuit Court for Marion County if:
	"(a) The action is filed by a plaintiff asserting
a claim for relief that challenges the
constitutionality of a state statute or an amendment to
the Oregon Constitution initiated by the people or
referred to the people under section 1 (1) to (4),
Article IV of the Oregon Constitution;
	"(b) The action is commenced on or after the date
that the Secretary of State certifies that the
challenged measure has been adopted by the electors and
within 180 days after the effective date of the
measure; and
	"(c) The action may not be commenced in the Oregon
Tax Court.
	"* * * * *"
		The use of the verb "must" and the conjunction "if" in
the first sentence of ORS 250.044(1) indicates that the
legislature intended the statute to apply to all ballot-measure
challenges that fit a particular description.  The precise
question, therefore, is not whether the legislature intended ORS
250.044(1) to be the exclusive method of bringing certain ballot-measure challenges.  By its terms, it did.  The question,
instead, is whether ORS 250.044(1) applies to all ballot-measure
challenges, including those filed after the election but before
the Secretary of State certifies the result of that election.  As
discussed below, we conclude that it does not.
  		As noted, ORS 250.044(1) provides that a ballot-measure
challenge "must be commenced in the Circuit Court for Marion
County if: * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  Three paragraphs,
identified as (a), (b), and (c), then follow.  Those three
paragraphs are joined by the conjunction "and" between paragraphs
(b) and (c).  The plain wording and punctuation of the statute
therefore convey that the mandate of ORS 250.044(1) -- the
requirement of filing a ballot measure challenge in Marion County
Circuit Court -- applies to ballot-measure challenges that fit
the description set out in paragraphs (a) through (c).
		Consistent with that structure of the statute,
paragraph (a) describes the substantive nature of the type of
ballot-measure challenge to which ORS 250.044(1) applies, viz., 
challenges to ballot measures upon constitutional grounds.  The
crucial part of the statute to the jurisdictional issue before
us, however, is paragraph (b), which sets out the second in the
list of three requirements that follow the "if" clause of ORS
250.044(1):  
		"[T]he action is commenced on or after the date
that the Secretary of State certifies that the
challenged measure has been adopted * * * and within
180 days after the effective date of the measure."   
Taken together, paragraphs (a) and (b) collectively have only one
plausible reading:  Ballot measure challenges, brought on
constitutional grounds and during the period commencing when the
Secretary of State certifies that the measure has been adopted
and ending 180 days after the measure's effective date, must be
commenced in the Circuit Court for Marion County (but not in the
Oregon Tax Court).  So read, the statute is a completed, albeit
limited, thought.  It does not address actions that might be
commenced on other grounds, during any other period of time, in
either the Circuit Court for Marion County or elsewhere.
		Despite the location of paragraph (b) in the text of
ORS 250.044(1), defendants contend that it is not simply one
requirement in a list of three respecting when and where a
certain class of ballot-measure challenges must be filed. 
Defendants argue that the legislature intended paragraph (b) to
prohibit the filing of any ballot-measure challenge other than
the kind described in ORS 250.044(1)(a), either before the
Secretary of State certifies that the measure was adopted or
after 180 days have passed following the effective date of the
measure.  In support of that argument, however, defendants argue
only that any other interpretation of ORS 250.044(1)(b) would so
narrow the application of ORS 250.044(1) that the statute would
serve no useful purpose.  
		We disagree.  There are reasons that the legislature
would create a statute that addresses those ballot-measure
challenges that are filed within 180 days of the effective date
of the measure, such as a desire to have all such proceedings
conducted in a single forum and to have that forum be the circuit
court in the county in which the two state officials who would be
most involved in such cases (the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General) have their principal offices.  In any event, we
cannot disregard the plain, unambiguous wording of ORS
250.044(1).  See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (if legislative intent clear
at first level of analysis, inquiry ends).  We hold that ORS
250.044 does not provide the exclusive means of challenging a
ballot measure after an election, and it does not apply to a
ballot-measure challenge, like the one before us, brought before
the Secretary of State certifies that a measure had been adopted
by the people.  It follows that jurisdiction is proper under ORS
28.010.  We turn to the merits.
		Article XVII, section 1, provides, in part:
	"When two or more amendments shall be submitted * * *
to the voters of this state at the same election, they
shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be
voted on separately."
Plaintiffs and defendants disagree not only about whether Measure
62 violates that separate-vote requirement, but also about the
appropriate "test" that a court should use to analyze whether any
ballot measure violates that requirement.  However, our recent
decision in Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 241-42, 37 P3d 989
(2002), a decision that was not available to the parties or to
the Court of Appeals at the time they considered this case,
resolves the issue concerning the appropriate test. (5) 
		In Lehman, we considered the "necessary-implication"
test that the Court of Appeals announced in Dale, as well as
defendants' proposed "cohesive policy choice" test for whether a
ballot measure offends the separate-vote requirement.  We
rejected both.  Lehman, 333 Or at 242.  We instead adhered to the
test announced in Armatta, holding that, when a proposed
constitutional amendment is challenged on the ground that it
violates the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section
1, the "'proper inquiry is to determine whether, if adopted, the
proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that
are substantive and that are not closely related.'"  Id. at 239
(emphasis in original), quoting Armatta, 327 Or at 277.  We turn
to that inquiry now.  
		Ordinarily, we begin any separate-vote inquiry by
identifying the changes, both explicit and implicit, that the
ballot measure purports to make to the Oregon Constitution. 
Lehman, 333 Or at 242-43.  We then determine if those changes are
substantive.  Id. at 244.  If they are, we then determine if
those substantive changes are "closely related."  Id.  In Lehman,
we described that analytical process this way:
		"* * * First, we examine the relationship among
the constitutional provisions that the measure affects
* * *.  If the affected provisions of the existing
constitution themselves are not related, then it is
likely that changes to those provisions will offend the
separate-vote requirement. * * * [T]he fact that a
proposed amendment asks the people, in one vote,
substantively to change multiple provisions of the
Oregon Constitution that are not themselves related is
one indication that the proposed amendment might
violate the separate-vote requirement.
		"Next, we must consider the constitutional changes
themselves.  That is, * * * we must determine whether
the changes made to those * * * constitutional
provisions are closely related.  If they are closely
related, the measure under consideration survives
scrutiny under Article XVII, section 1.  If they are
not, it does not."
Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
		The foregoing statement from Lehman was descriptive,
not prescriptive.  That is, it is equally valid analytically to
start the inquiry by focusing on the changes themselves.  This
case illustrates the point.  We need not discuss each of the
steps described above, because the parties' arguments narrow the
focus of our inquiry.  First, the parties agree that Measure 62
makes more than one change to the Oregon Constitution and that
the changes are substantive.  Among those, they agree, are the
two that were the focus of the Court of Appeals' opinion, viz., 
the requirement in section 1 of Measure 62 that "the recipient of
aggregate political contributions of $500 or more from one
contributor during any one calendar year * * * disclose such
contribution[s]" and the requirement in section 3 of Measure 62
that "[a] person gathering signatures on an initiative or
referendum petition * * * be registered to vote in this state * * *."  Because we conclude, below, that those two changes
are not closely related, the other substantive changes that
Measure 62 purports to make to the Oregon Constitution, if any,
have no bearing on this decision.  
		Respecting the changes that we have singled out for
discussion here, the parties also agree that they affect more
than one provision of the Oregon Constitution.  At a minimum,
section 1 of Measure 62 implicitly changes Article II, concerning
suffrage and elections. (6)  That article contains various
eligibility requirements for publicly elected officials.  See
e.g., Lehman, 333 Or at 247 (discussing provisions of Article II
respecting circumstances that disqualify person from holding
elective office).  Section 1 of Measure 62 imposes an additional
requirement on those publicly elected officials if they receive
political contributions in excess of $500 from any one
contributor:  The officials must disclose the amount and source
of the contribution.  Meanwhile, section 3 of Measure 62 affects
Article IV, section 1(2), concerning the legislative power:  It
explicitly amends that constitutional provision to require that
persons who gather signatures for initiative and referendum
petitions be registered voters.  
		Having described the common ground between the parties,
we turn to a consideration of the relationship between the
changes that Measure 62 makes to the Oregon Constitution.  As
noted, because our decision turns on the lack of close
relationship between the changes that Measure 62 makes to the
constitution, regardless of the relationship between the affected
constitutional provisions, we discuss the changes themselves. 
   	     As they did in the Court of Appeals, defendants contend
that the constitutional changes that Measure 62 makes in 
sections 1 and 3 of that measure are closely related because,
like other changes proposed by Measure 62, "they are regulations
designed to prevent, control, or expose the influence of money in
the initiative [and] referendum * * * process."  However,
defendants again fail to explain how the voter-registration
requirement of section 3 bears any relationship to that suggested
design.  At oral argument, defendants stated that the voter-registration requirement would prevent out-of-state signature-gatherers from participating in the initiative process and that
that, in turn, would inhibit out-of-state financial influence on
Oregon elections, but we find that argument too attenuated to be
persuasive.  Even if a residency requirement were related to the
purpose of Measure 62 as described by defendants, voter
registration is not synonymous with residency.  Section 3
precludes Oregonians who are not registered to vote from
gathering signatures, just as it precludes those who live in
other states from doing so.  Put differently, the scope of the
measure exceeds even defendants' proffered rationale for it.  
		More importantly, however, defendants' argument fails
because it is an attempt to show that sections 1 and 3 of Measure
62 share the same subject matter.  That may or may not be true,
but it is beside the point in an analysis under Article XVII,
section 1.  Defendants do not focus, as they must in a separate-vote challenge, on the particular changes made to the
constitution.  See Lehman at 241-42 (separate-vote requirement,
in contrast to single-subject requirement, focuses on extent to
which proposed amendment modifies existing constitution). 
Section 1 of Measure 62, by imposing a disclosure requirement on
those who receive political contributions, adds an additional
rule to those already set out in Article II concerning how a
publicly elected official must act.  By contrast, section 3 of
Measure 62, by creating an eligibility requirement for those who
undertake the task of gathering signatures for initiative and
referendum petitions, limits the legislative power of the people
as described in Article IV, section 1(2).  Those two
constitutional changes, as far as we can tell either from our own
analysis or on the basis of defendants' arguments, are not
closely related to each other.  As did the Court of Appeals, we
conclude that the contribution-disclosure requirement in Measure
62, section 1, and the voter-registration for signature-gatherers
requirement in Measure 62, section 3, constitute at least two
proposed amendments to the Oregon Constitution, and could not be
submitted to the voters in a single measure.  Because that is
what occurred respecting Measure 62, we hold that the measure
offends the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1,
of the Oregon Constitution.  The measure was not properly adopted
by the people and is invalid.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  	



1. 	Article IV, section 1(2)(d), provides, in part:
	"A proposed law or amendment to the Constitution shall
embrace one subject only and matters properly connected
therewith." 

2. 	Intervenors, for their part, argued that Measure 62
purported to make only one substantive change to the Oregon
Constitution.  They alternatively argued that, if Measure 62 did
make more than one such change, the changes were closely related. 
		As noted below, intervenors did not petition for review
of the Court of Appeals' decision.  Accordingly, we do not
address their arguments further. 

3. 	The text of ORS 250.044 is set out post, ___ Or at___
(slip op at 7-8). 

4. 	Despite those alleged jurisdictional defects,
defendants do not ask this court to dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction; they ask instead that this court deem the matter
properly filed under ORS 250.044 so that, in the name of
efficiency and the interests of justice, this court may proceed
to resolve the important issues of law presented by this case. 
Because we hold that there is jurisdiction under ORS 28.010, ___
Or at ___ (slip op at 10), we need not address defendants'
suggestion further. 

5. 	In Lehman, this court held that Ballot Measure 3
(1992), the "Term Limits Initiative," contained two or more
amendments to the Oregon Constitution that should have been voted
on separately.  That case came to this court by means of the
direct appeal provision of Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 145, section
3(5), and was argued on the same day as the case presently before
us.

6. 	Plaintiffs argue that section 1 of Measure 62 also
implicitly changes Article I, section 8, because the
contribution-disclosure requirement addressed in section 1 is a
burden on a form of political speech.  Defendants disagree. 
Because the changes about which the parties agree are sufficient
to support our holding, that Measure 62 makes two or more changes
to the constitution that are not closely related, we do not reach
plaintiffs' argument concerning Measure 62's impact, if any, on
rights guaranteed under Article I, section 8.