Case Title: Ex Parte Cater

Citation: 772 So. 2d 1117

Docket Number: 1980615

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
772 So. 2d 1117 (2000)
Ex parte Lula Dell CATER.
(Re Lula Dell Cater v. Etoile Nichols.)
1980615.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 10, 2000.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 2000.
Edward T. Hines of Thompson, Garrett & Hines, L.L.P., Brewton, for petitioner.
*1118 J. Milton Coxwell, Jr., of Coxwell & Coxwell, Monroeville, for respondent.
SEE, Justice.
This is a private-condemnation case. The circuit court, acting pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 18-3-1, granted Etoile Nichols a nonexclusive, private easement for ingress and egress over the property of Lula Dell Cater. Cater was awarded $500 in compensation for the condemnation of the private easement. Cater appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, on October 9, 1998, affirmed, without an opinion. Cater v. Nichols (No. 2970710), 771 So. 2d 511 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (table). We granted Cater's petition for the writ of certiorari to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that two other possible routes to and from Nichols's property were not reasonably adequate means of access. We conclude that Nichols failed to satisfy her burden of proving the necessity for the easement and that the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the facts of this case. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
Nichols owns a 191-acre tract of land in Monroe County. No one lives on the property, and it is used primarily as timberland. The property is divided into western and eastern parcels by a creek, known as Flat Creek, which runs in a generally southeasterly direction across the property. Flat Creek is deep enough to prevent fording, but it is only 12 to 15 feet wide. The western part of Nichols's property contains 33 acres, and the eastern part contains 158 acres. The eastern part of Nichols's property is accessible by a private road that connects to a public road; the western part, Nichols claims, is landlocked. The easement granted by the trial court is 12 feet wide and 500 yards long; it follows an existing gravel road, which was used for several years as a county road but has since been abandoned. Cater uses this road to access her property, and Nichols also used this road to access her property until Cater erected a gate across it.
Nichols's property was once part of an approximately 622-acre tract of land, owned by Nichols's father, that fronted Alabama Highway 21. She acquired her property from her father. While Nichols's father owned the larger tract, he accessed the western part of what Nichols now owns by a private road. That road, which runs from that western portion southward, still exists, but is in disrepair and is impassable during the winter. Cater's property is located to the west of Nichols's property and is separated from Nichols's property by another parcel. The owner of the parcel separating Cater's property from Nichols's property is not a party to this action. Cater's property fronts a public road.
Nichols petitioned the Probate Court of Monroe County to condemn a right-of-way over Cater's property to provide Nichols with an outlet to the public road that is adjacent to Cater's property. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 18-3-1 and 18-3-3. The probate court granted Nichols a right-of-way, and Cater appealed to the Circuit Court of Monroe County.
After conducting an ore tenus hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Nichols, making, in pertinent part, the following findings of facts and conclusions of law:
Cater appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals, without opinion, affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
Ala.Code 1975, § 18-3-1, provides:
Under the ore tenus rule, a trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and its judgment will be reversed only if plainly or palpably wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence. See DeWitt v. Stevens, 598 So. 2d 849, 850 (Ala.1992); Brothers v. Holloway, 692 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala.Civ.App.1997); Tate v. Loper, 459 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). The ore tenus rule is especially applicable in private condemnation cases under § 18-3-1. See Tate, 459 So. 2d  at 894; see also Brothers, 692 So. 2d  at 847-48 ("We note that our standard of review in condemnation cases is highly deferential.").
However, § 18-3-1 "`is not a favored statute,'" Southern Ry. v. Hall, 267 Ala. 143, 147, 100 So. 2d 722, 725 (1957) (quoting State ex rel. Carlson v. Superior Court, 107 Wash. 228, 232, 181 P. 689, 691), and the ore tenus presumption of correctness "does not apply where the trial court has incorrectly applied the law to [the] facts," DeWitt, 598 So. 2d  at 850. The law applicable to private-condemnation proceedings under the statute is well established. As this Court has stated:
Oyler v. Gilliland, 382 So. 2d 517, 519 (Ala. 1980) (citations omitted).
*1120 Cater, relying mainly on Southern Railway Co., argues that the trial court erred in granting Nichols a right-of-way over Cater's property because, she says, Nichols had two other reasonably adequate means of access: she says that at a minimal cost Nichols could either 1) build a bridge over Flat Creek and thereby gain access across the eastern portion of her land to the private road that connects to the public road; or 2) repair the private road formerly used by Nichols's father and thereby have access southward to Highway 21. In Southern Railway Co., this Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petitioner a right-of-way because the petitioner already had an existing means of access to his landsthe "clay pit crossing." In that case, the petitioner had sought a right-of-way over the lands of the defendant railroad company, a right-of-way that would have been more convenient than the clay pit crossing. This Court, construing § 18-3-1 (then codified at Title 19, § 56, Code of Ala.1940), stated:
*1121 267 Ala. at 146-47, 100 So. 2d  at 724-25 (emphasis added). Thus, under § 18-3-1, a landowner is not entitled to condemn a right-of-way across a neighbor's intervening land if the landowner has an existing, reasonably adequate means of access to his property, or if he could construct such access without prohibitive expense.
Cater contends that Nichols could build a bridge across Flat Creek with no undue burden and thereby gain access across the eastern part of the Nichols property to the private road that connects to the public road. Cater cites Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d 66 (1945). In Condry, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated:
184 Md. at 322, 41 A.2d  at 68 (emphasis added). The Maryland court's statement is in accord with Alabama law. Cater asserts that the record contains no evidence of what it would cost Nichols to build a bridge across Flat Creek, and, thus, certainly no evidence to indicate that the cost of the bridge would be prohibitive or disproportionate to the value of Nichols's property. Cater also contends that Nichols already has a reasonably adequate means of access to the western part of the property, by the road formerly used by Nichols's father. Cater asserts that this road is the shortest and nearest route to a public road. Cater also asserts that this road, even though it is in poor condition, can be repaired with minor expense and that Nichols presented no evidence of what it would cost to repair the road, and, thus, certainly no evidence to indicate that the cost of repair would be prohibitive. According to Cater, the trial court excluded that road as a means of access merely because it would be inconvenient for Nichols to repair it. "This [C]ourt has held that the physical convenience of both landowners is a material consideration in determining whether to condemn a right-of-way over a person's property." DeWitt, 598 So. 2d  at 852. However, this Court has also held that a right-of-way cannot be granted under § 18-3-1 "`as a matter of mere convenience or as a mere matter of saving expense[; instead,] [t]here must be real necessity before private property can be invaded by a citizen for private purposes.'" Southern Ry., 267 Ala. at 147, 100 So. 2d  at 725 (quoting Roberts v. Prassenos, 219 Miss. 486, 69 So. 2d 215 (1954)).
After examining the record, including the trial transcript, we agree with Cater that Nichols did not carry her burden of proving that the cost of building a bridge across Flat Creek, or of improving the old road formerly used by her father, would be prohibitive in proportion to the value of Nichols's property. Indeed, the record contains no evidence whatever indicating what it would cost to build a bridge or to improve the old road. Thus, Nichols did not satisfy her burden of proof under § 18-3-1 so as to entitle her to a right-of-way across Cater's property. Moreover, the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the facts of this case. The trial court incorrectly balanced the relative inconveniences and burdens to Cater and to Nichols in determining whether to grant Nichols an easement by necessity. Under Alabama law, in determining whether to grant Nichols an easement by necessity, the issue is not whether the right-of-way she seeks is, of the three possible routes, the nearest and most convenient means of access to her property. Nichols is required under § 18-3-1 to show more than that "the burden which would be imposed upon [Cater] by an access easement in favor of [Nichols] is less than the burden which *1122 would be imposed upon [Nichols] by constructing and maintaining a bridge across Flat Creek." (Trial court's order, supra, at.) Instead, Nichols must show that for her to build a bridge across Flat Creek, or to repair the old road, would be cost-prohibitive, that is, that the expense of building a bridge, or repairing the old road, would be an unreasonable expense disproportionate to the value of her property. As we have stated, the record indicates that Nichols did not make this showing; thus, the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of condemnation granting Nichols a private easement. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.