Case Title: Krawczuk v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-680, SC11-10

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Nos. SC10-680 & SC11-10 
________________________ 
 
ANTON KRAWCZUK,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
 
ANTON KRAWCZUK, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH S. TUCKER, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 12, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Anton Krawczuk appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 
vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
FACTS 
 
The facts of the underlying murder were detailed in this Court‟s opinion on 
direct appeal and are provided below: 
 
On September 13, 1990, a decomposing body was found in a 
rural wooded area of Charlotte County.  Earlier, David Staker‟s 
employer notified Lee County authorities that he had missed several 
days of work and had not picked up his paycheck.  When she went to 
his home, she found the door open, and it appeared that the house had 
been robbed.  Near the end of September, the Charlotte County body 
was identified as Staker, and Gary Sigelmier called the Charlotte 
County Sheriff‟s office to report that he may have bought the property 
stolen from Staker‟s home.  Sigelmier identified Krawczuk and Billy 
Poirier as the men who sold him the stolen goods, and Lee and 
Charlotte deputies went to the home Krawczuk and Poirier shared in 
Lee County.  They found both men at home and took them to the Lee 
County Sheriff‟s office where, after waiving his Miranda [v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966)] rights, Krawczuk confessed to killing Staker. 
 
According to his confession, Krawczuk had known Staker for 
about six months and had a casual homosexual relationship with him, 
as did Poirier.  The week before the murder, the pair decided to rob 
and kill Staker.  Krawczuk called and arranged for him and Poirier to 
visit Staker.  Krawczuk picked Poirier up at work and drove him 
home to change clothes.  He parked in a shopping area, and the pair 
walked to Staker‟s house.  Once there, they watched television for 
twenty to thirty minutes, and Krawczuk then suggested that they go to 
the bedroom.  With the undressed trio on the bed, Krawczuk started 
roughing up Staker and eventually began choking him.  Poirier 
assisted by holding Staker‟s mouth shut and pinching his nose closed.  
Staker resisted and tried to hit Krawczuk with a lamp, but Poirier took 
it away from him.  The choking continued for almost ten minutes, 
after which Krawczuk twice poured drain cleaner and water into 
Staker‟s mouth.  When fluid began coming from Staker‟s mouth, 
Poirier put a wash cloth in it and tape over Staker‟s mouth.  Krawczuk 
tied Staker‟s ankles together, and the pair put him in the bathtub.  
They then stole two television sets, stereo equipment, a video 
recorder, five rifles, and a pistol, among other things, from the house 
and put them in Staker‟s pickup truck.  After putting the body in the 
 
 
- 3 - 
truck as well, they drove to Sigelmier‟s.  Sigelmier bought some of 
the stolen items and agreed to store the others.  Krawczuk and Poirier 
returned to their car, transferred Staker‟s body to it, and abandoned 
Staker‟s truck.  Krawczuk had scouted a rural location earlier, and 
they dumped Staker‟s body there. 
 
When the deputies went to Krawczuk‟s home, they had neither 
a search warrant nor an arrest warrant.  Krawczuk moved to suppress 
his confession as the product of an illegal arrest.  In denying that 
motion the court held that the deputies had probable cause to arrest 
Krawczuk when they went to his house but that Poirier‟s mere 
submission to authority did not provide legal consent to enter the 
house.  Although the judge found that Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed. 2d 639 (1980), had been violated, he 
also found Krawczuk‟s confession, made after Miranda rights were 
given and waived, admissible under New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 
110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed. 2d 13 (1990).  After losing the motion to 
suppress, Krawczuk sought to change his plea to guilty.  The court 
held an extensive plea colloquy, during which Krawczuk was 
reminded that pleading guilty cut off the right to appeal all prior 
rulings.  Krawczuk and his counsel also informed the court that 
Krawczuk wished to waive the penalty proceeding.  Neither the state 
nor the court agreed to this, and the penalty phase took place in early 
February 1992. 
 
Krawczuk refused to allow his counsel to participate in 
selecting the penalty phase jury and forbade her from presenting 
evidence on his behalf.  The jury unanimously recommended that he 
be sentenced to death.  Afterwards, the court set a date for hearing the 
parties and a later date for imposition of sentence.  At the next hearing 
the judge, over Krawczuk‟s personal objection, stated that he would 
look at the presentence investigation report and the confidential 
defense psychiatrist‟s report for possible mitigating evidence.  At the 
final hearing the court sentenced Krawczuk to death, finding three 
aggravators and one statutory mitigator. 
Krawczuk v. State, 634 So. 2d 1070, 1071-72 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 881 
(1994).  On appeal, Krawczuk raised four claims: (1) that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress his confession, (2) that the trial court failed to 
 
 
- 4 - 
conduct a proper plea colloquy to ensure that his plea was knowingly and 
intelligently given, (3) that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator and erred in finding that it applied, and (4) 
that the trial court erred in failing to find the existence of nonstatutory mitigation.  
This Court denied each of his claims, and found competent substantial evidence to 
affirm his conviction and sentence.  Id. at 1073-74.   
 
Krawczuk filed his initial motion for postconviction relief on October 3, 
1995 under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  On March 15, 2002, he 
filed an amended motion to vacate, raising twenty-four claims.  A Huff1 hearing 
commenced on August 21, 2002, at which the lower court granted an evidentiary 
hearing for several claims, which was held on January 20-21, 2004, and March 8, 
2004.   
 
After hearing the evidence, Judge James Thompson denied Krawczuk‟s 
motion in an expansive order.2  Krawczuk now seeks review of some of his claims.  
As discussed in more detail below, we find no merit in Krawczuk‟s claims and 
                                         
 
1.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
2.  We take this opportunity to note that the delay between the evidentiary 
hearing and the issuance of the order denying relief was unusually long.  Although 
the evidentiary hearings were held in January and March 2004, the court did not 
issue its order until January 25, 2010.  During oral argument, appellate counsel 
could not offer an explanation for the delay.  We are concerned that this sort of 
delay undermines the interests of justice. 
 
 
- 5 - 
affirm the order denying postconviction relief and deny his petition for habeas 
relief.   
Judicial Bias  
 
In this issue Krawczuk argues that the postconviction court improperly 
denied his motion to disqualify the judge and that the judge demonstrated bias by 
relying on extra-record information.  Because, Krawczuk cannot demonstrate bias, 
we disagree. 
 
The question of whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient is a 
question of law, which is reviewed de novo.  See Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 78 
(Fla. 2008).  To the extent that Krawczuk is arguing that the trial court improperly 
denied his motion to disqualify, we conclude that this claim is without merit.  To 
the extent that Krawczuk is alleging that the trial court erred by relying on extra-
record information in violation of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), we 
conclude that although there was error, the error was harmless. 
 
A motion to disqualify is governed by section 38.10, Florida Statutes (2011), 
and Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330.  See Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 
974, 981 (Fla. 2009) (citing Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1995)).  When 
ruling on the motion, the trial judge is limited to determining the legal sufficiency 
of the motion:   
The term “legal sufficiency” encompasses more than mere technical 
compliance with the rule and the statute.  The standard for viewing the 
 
 
- 6 - 
legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify is whether the facts alleged, 
which must be assumed to be true, would cause the movant to have a 
well-founded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial at the 
hands of that judge.  See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(d)(1).  Further, 
this fear of judicial bias must be objectively reasonable.  See State v. 
Shaw, 643 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).  The subjective 
fear of a party seeking the disqualification of a judge is not sufficient. 
See Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).  
Rather, the facts and reasons given for the disqualification of a judge 
must tend to show “the judge‟s undue bias, prejudice, or sympathy.” 
Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. 1992); see also Rivera v. 
State, 717 So. 2d 477, 480-81 (Fla. 1998).  Where the claim of judicial 
bias is based on very general and speculative assertions about the trial 
judge‟s attitudes, no relief is warranted.  McCrae v. State, 510 So. 2d 
874, 880 (Fla. 1987). 
Parker, 3 So. 3d at 982. 
 
First, to the extent that Krawczuk is arguing that Judge Thompson 
improperly denied the motion to recuse himself, his claim is without merit.  To 
establish bias, Krawczuk must demonstrate that he “fears that he . . . will not 
receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of 
the judge.”  Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330.  In the instant case, the court properly 
denied Krawczuk‟s motion to disqualify.  Nothing in the record indicates that 
Judge Thompson was biased or prejudiced.  As discussed below, although Judge 
Thompson‟s actions were error, they were not indicative of bias.  Judge Thompson 
provided multiple reasons for finding that Dr. Crown‟s testimony was not credible, 
one of which was that Dr. Crown had only briefly met with Krawczuk.   
 
 
- 7 - 
 
Next, to the extent that Krawczuk is alleging that the court improperly relied 
on extra-record information, there was error, but the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The United States Supreme Court has condemned the practice 
of judges using extra-record information to impose the death penalty.  Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).  Further, we have recognized the impropriety of such 
actions and have stated: 
 
In Gardner, the United States Supreme Court reminded us that 
the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the 
requirements of the due process clause.  Gardner held that using 
portions of a presentence investigation report without notice to the 
defendant and without an accompanying opportunity afforded to the 
defendant to rebut or challenge the report denied due process.  That 
ruling should extend to a deposition or any other information 
considered by the court in the sentencing process which is not 
presented in open court.  Should a sentencing judge intend to use any 
information not presented in open court as a factual basis for a 
sentence, he must advise the defendant of what it is and afford the 
defendant an opportunity to rebut it. 
Porter v. State, 400 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1981) (citations omitted).  Thus, it is well 
settled that if a trial judge uses information not stated in open court to make a 
determination that the death sentence is appropriate, he or she must give the 
defendant an opportunity to rebut the information. 
 
We have found some instances of reliance on extra-record information to be 
harmless error: 
[W]hile the sentencing order did state that the judge read all of the 
depositions, read the medical examiner‟s report, and checked the 
victim‟s probate records, all of which constitute extra-record 
 
 
- 8 - 
materials, the trial judge revealed his consideration of these matters 
both in letters to the parties and during a motion hearing prior to the 
penalty phase.  Thus, unlike both Gardner and Porter, Vining was 
advised by the trial judge of his consideration of extra-record 
information and afforded an opportunity to rebut or impeach the 
information.  Further, like Consalvo, the information relied upon in 
the sentencing order to support the aggravating factors was otherwise 
proven at trial.  And like Lockhart, “given the overwhelming evidence 
supporting [the] aggravating factors, this error did not injuriously 
affect [the defendant‟s] substantial rights.” 
Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 209-10 (Fla. 2002) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 74 (Fla. 1955)); see also Consalvo v. State, 697 
So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1996) (“Although we find that it was error for the trial court to 
utilize these out-of-court deposition statements, we find these errors are harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt [because] the trial court here made reference to facts 
which were established at trial by evidence other than that referred to in the 
sentencing order.”); Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 74 (Fla. 1995) (finding a 
Gardner error where “the sentencing order indicate[d] that the judge relied on 
information from the newspaper articles to support his finding of no mitigation”  
but also finding “given the overwhelming evidence supporting three aggravating 
factors, this error did not injuriously affect Lockhart‟s substantial rights”).  We 
also find the error here harmless.  Although Dr. Crown‟s testimony was provided 
to establish possible mitigation, two other experts testified regarding Krawczuk‟s 
mental health, which served as a part of the basis for Judge Thompson‟s findings.   
 
 
- 9 - 
 
We find it disconcerting for a judge, sitting as finder of fact in an evidentiary 
hearing, to perform his own research into the credentials of an expert witness.  We 
strongly discourage trial judges from performing such actions in the future.  There 
is no reason apparent to this Court for the trial judge to perform his or her own 
research on the credibility of an expert witness outside of open court.  However, in 
this case, we find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because (1) 
the information was not used to sentence Krawczuk, (2) the information was 
readily available, and (3) the court‟s order denying relief references facts that were 
established at the evidentiary hearing in addition to the extra-record information. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Krawczuk raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We find 
that the postconviction court properly denied relief on these claims. 
 
Following the United State Supreme Court‟s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, the defendant must demonstrate both 
deficiency and prejudice: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
 
- 10 - 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986)). 
 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‟s performance 
was not deficient.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  “A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made 
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel‟s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel‟s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action „might be considered sound 
trial strategy.‟ ”  Id.  (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 
(1955)).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel‟s performance must be highly 
deferential.”   Id.  “[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel‟s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 
(Fla. 2000).   Furthermore, where this Court previously has rejected a 
substantive claim on the merits, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to make a meritless argument.   Melendez v. State, 612 So. 
2d 1366, 1369 (Fla.1992).   
 
In demonstrating prejudice, the defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that “but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Because both prongs of the 
Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court 
employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court‟s 
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
but reviewing the circuit court‟s legal conclusions de novo.  See 
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771–72 (Fla. 2004). 
Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 737 (Fla. 2011) (parallel citations omitted).   
 
As this Court has said, “the obligation to investigate and prepare for the 
penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated.”  State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 
1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002).   
 
 
- 11 - 
[O]ur principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised 
“reasonable professional judgmen[t]” is not whether counsel should 
have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the 
investigation supporting counsel‟s decision not to introduce mitigating 
evidence . . . was itself reasonable.  In assessing counsel‟s 
investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their 
performance, measured for “reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms,” which includes a context-dependent 
consideration of the challenged conduct as see[n] “from counsel‟s 
perspective at the time.” 
Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 731 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003)). 
 
First, Krawczuk claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
and present mitigation.  Further, Krawczuk claims that counsel‟s failure rendered 
his waiver of mitigation in the penalty phase invalid.  The lower court found 
counsel deficient for failing to discover mitigation related to Krawczuk‟s 
background, but found that Krawczuk was not prejudiced because he was emphatic 
that counsel not contact his family and probably would not have permitted counsel 
to present the information during the penalty phase.  The postconviction court 
properly denied this claim. 
 
In Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2007), the defendant was tried and 
found guilty of first-degree murder and instructed his attorneys not to present 
mitigating evidence.  The trial court conducted a Koon3 hearing and determined 
                                         
 
3.  Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993).  Koon is not applicable to 
the present case because the penalty phase occurred in 1992, before Koon was 
 
 
- 12 - 
that Grim freely, voluntarily, and knowingly decided to waive mitigation.  Grim, 
971 So. 2d at 91.  Grim expressed his desire multiple times during the proceedings 
to receive either a not guilty verdict or the death penalty.  During postconviction 
proceedings, Grim argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to fully 
investigate and present mitigation and that these failures rendered his waiver 
invalid.  Id. at 99.  We noted: 
When a defendant, against his counsel‟s advice, refuses to permit the 
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must 
inform the court on the record of the defendant‟s decision. Counsel 
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably 
believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and 
what the evidence would be.  The court should then require the 
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed 
these matters with him, and despite counsel‟s recommendation, he 
wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase evidence. 
 
Grim, 971 So. 2d at 100 (quoting Koon, 619 So. 2d at 250).  We further noted: 
 
We have recognized that a defendant‟s waiver of his right to 
present mitigation does not relieve trial counsel of the duty to 
investigate and ensure that the defendant‟s decision is fully informed. 
See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002) 
(“Although a defendant may waive mitigation, he cannot do so 
blindly; counsel must first investigate all avenues and advise the 
defendant so that the defendant reasonably understands what is being 
waived and its ramifications and hence is able to make an informed, 
intelligent decision.”). 
                                                                                                                                   
decided.  See, e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1184 (Fla. 2001) (“Koon 
is technically inapplicable to this case because the penalty phase proceedings 
below occurred some three years prior to the Koon decision becoming final . . . .”); 
Allen v. State, 662 So. 2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1995) (noting that the ruling in Koon was 
prospective).   
 
 
- 13 - 
 
Grim, 971 So. 2d at 100.  Ultimately, we found that the record did not support a 
claim of failure to investigate because counsel “did not latch onto Grim‟s desire 
not to present mitigation, but instead, repeatedly tried to dissuade him.”  Id.   
 
Likewise, in Waterhouse, we found: 
[T]his was not simply a case where a defense attorney latched on to a 
defendant‟s refusal to present mitigating evidence.  The evidence in 
support of mitigation had already been investigated and accumulated 
as part of Waterhouse‟s previous collateral and habeas proceedings.  
In fact, the record in this case includes the affidavit of Dr. Fred S. 
Berlin, who concluded that Waterhouse may have been under the 
influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the 
commission of the crime and that this may have impaired his capacity 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  Defense 
counsel had also obtained the necessary paperwork to bring 
Waterhouse‟s brother from Louisiana, but Waterhouse indicated that 
if that were done, he would contact his brother and tell him to avoid 
the proceedings.  Additionally, after the trial court appointed Dr. 
Charles H. Wheaton to examine Waterhouse for the possibility that he 
might suffer from organic brain damage, Waterhouse refused to meet 
with the doctor. 
 
Accordingly, because the only reason why mitigating evidence 
was not presented was entirely due to Waterhouse‟s own conduct, we 
cannot deem defense counsel deficient for failing to present such 
evidence.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied an 
evidentiary hearing as to this claim. 
Waterhouse, 792 So. 2d at 1184 (footnote omitted). 
 
In each of these cases, we concluded that trial counsel could not be deemed 
ineffective for following their client‟s wishes not to present mitigation.  “An 
attorney will not be deemed ineffective for honoring his client‟s wishes.”  Brown 
v. State, 894 So. 2d 137, 146 (Fla. 2004) (citing Waterhouse, 792 So. 2d at 1183); 
 
 
- 14 - 
Sims v. State, 602 So. 2d 1253, 1257-58 (Fla. 1992)); see also Sims v. State, 602 
So. 2d 1253, 1257-58 (Fla. 1992) (“[W]e do not believe counsel can be considered 
ineffective for honoring the client's wishes”).  The record demonstrates that 
Krawczuk would not permit his attorney to involve his family.  Accordingly, 
counsel‟s ability was limited by the defendant‟s desire not to include his family.  
See Brown, 894 So. 2d at 146.  Therefore, we agree that counsel‟s actions could 
not be deemed ineffective.  Id. 
 
It is clear that there was significant mitigation available that was not 
uncovered by counsel.  However, it is equally clear that Krawczuk repeatedly 
insisted that counsel not pursue mitigation and not involve his family.  Further, the 
postconviction court found that the information that would have been presented by 
the family was available through Dr. Keown‟s report, which Krawczuk also 
refused to allow counsel to present.  Because of Krawczuk‟s instructions to counsel 
not to involve his family, we find that Krawczuk cannot establish prejudice.   
 
Next, Krawczuk combines three of his postconviction claims and argues that 
the prosecutor made inappropriate remarks during the trial, that the trial court 
improperly instructed the jury, and that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because she failed to object to the comments made by the prosecutor and 
failed to request a jury instruction on mercy.  The lower court denied these claims 
finding that they were procedurally barred and without merit, that any error made 
 
 
- 15 - 
by the prosecutor was harmless, and that Krawczuk could not establish deficient 
performance.  Because Krawczuk‟s claim is not supported by the record and, even 
if it were, because Krawczuk cannot establish prejudice, the lower court properly 
denied relief on this claim. 
 
Third, Krawczuk argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the trial court‟s instruction that sympathy should play no role in their deliberations, 
this claim is without merit.  The trial judge used the standard jury instruction, 
stating that “[t]his case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel 
sorry for anyone or are angry at anyone.”  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.10.  
Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to the standard 
instruction. 
 
Fourth, Krawczuk argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when trial counsel failed to raise and litigate the voluntariness of his confession.  
The lower court granted an evidentiary hearing on this issue, but determined that 
Krawczuk was not entitled to relief because the claim was procedurally barred and 
without merit.  Because Krawczuk is re-arguing the merits of the trial court‟s 
denial of the motion to suppress his confession, the claim is procedurally barred.  
His assertion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.  
Additionally, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise and 
litigate the voluntariness of his confession, the claim is insufficiently pleaded and 
 
 
- 16 - 
without merit.  As noted by this Court on direct appeal and by the lower court in its 
order denying postconviction relief, trial counsel raised this issue in a motion to 
suppress.  See Krawczuk, 634 So. 2d at 1072-73.  Further, Krawczuk failed to 
allege that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel‟s alleged deficiency.  
Because the record reflects that counsel raised the voluntariness of Krawczuk‟s 
confession in a motion to suppress and demonstrates that Krawczuk did not allege 
prejudice, we do not find that counsel was ineffective.   
 
Finally, Krawczuk argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
offer testimony of mental health experts and others at the hearing on the motion for 
suppression.  The lower court properly found the claim was unsupported by the 
evidence or law.  Specifically, the lower court found that trial counsel completely 
and fully litigated the motion to suppress and that Krawczuk presented no 
additional evidence at his postconviction evidentiary hearing that would have 
changed the court‟s denial of the motion to suppress. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the lower court properly found that Krawczuk was 
unable to prove prejudice. 
Prosecutor’s Remarks 
 
Krawczuk argues that at trial the prosecutor made several erroneous remarks 
that led the jury to believe that they had no choice but to return a recommendation 
for the death sentence.  Krawczuk further argues that the trial court improperly 
 
 
- 17 - 
instructed the jury, which compounded this error.  Finally, Krawczuk argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective for her failure to object or otherwise attempt to correct 
these errors.  Each of these claims must fail. 
 
Turning to the prosecutor‟s remarks, Krawczuk claims that during voir dire 
and closing arguments, the prosecutor suggested that the law required the jury to 
recommend the death penalty if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances.  Additionally, Krawczuk argues that the prosecutor 
suggested on multiple occasions that the jury should decide the case without regard 
for sympathy.  The postconviction court correctly concluded that the claim was 
procedurally barred because trial counsel failed to object to the comments and the 
issue was not raised on direct appeal, nor did the remarks constitute fundamental 
error.  See Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 547 (Fla. 2007) (“We have consistently 
held that substantive claims of prosecutorial misconduct could and should be raised 
on direct appeal and are thus procedurally barred from consideration in a 
postconviction motion.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Lamarca v. 
State, 931 So. 2d 838, 851 n.8 (Fla. 2006). 
 
As for Krawczuk‟s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
these remarks, we find no deficiency where counsel was not permitted to 
participate in the proceeding.  As it relates to the prosecutor‟s comments regarding 
the jury‟s recommendation, we have said: 
 
 
- 18 - 
Florida law provides that a penalty phase jury, after deliberating, shall 
render an advisory sentence to the court.  That sentence is to be based 
on:  
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances 
exist . . . 
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist 
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to 
exist; and 
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.  
§ 921.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).  “[A] jury is neither compelled nor 
required to recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh 
mitigating factors.”  Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 717 (Fla. 2002) 
(quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2 d 239, 249-50 (Fla. 1996)). 
Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 517 (Fla. 2009).  Further, we found that a 
defendant is “not prejudiced by the improper statements of the prosecutors [where] 
the juries were given the proper instructions for analyzing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.”  Anderson, 18 So. 3d at 517.  As noted by the 
postconviction court, the record indicates that the jury was properly instructed.  
Accordingly, we find that Krawczuk has not demonstrated prejudice. 
Innocent of the Death Penalty 
 
Krawczuk claims that he is innocent of the death penalty because he 
received a disparate sentence even though he was as culpable or less culpable than 
Poirier, who received a sentence of thirty-five years.  Because this claim was, or 
should have been, raised on direct appeal, the lower court correctly found that it 
 
 
- 19 - 
was procedurally barred.4  Further, even if we consider the claim, it is without 
merit because Poirier pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.  See Smith v. State, 
998 So. 2d 516, 528 (Fla. 2008); England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 406 (Fla. 2006); 
Kight v. State, 784 So. 2d 396, 401 (Fla. 2001) (“[I]n instances where the 
codefendant‟s lesser sentence was the result of a plea agreement or prosecutorial 
discretion, this Court has rejected claims of disparate sentencing.”); Brown v. 
State, 473 So. 2d 1260, 1268 (Fla. 1985).   Here, because Poirier pleaded guilty to 
second-degree murder and was sentenced to thirty-five years, Krawczuk‟s claim is 
without merit.  Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1368-69 (Fla. 1992) 
(“Arguments relating to proportionality and disparate treatment are not appropriate 
where the prosecutor has not charged the accomplice with a capital offense.”). 
 
Lastly, we previously found that Krawczuk was the more culpable party.  As 
summarized by the lower court‟s findings: (1) Krawczuk met the victim six months 
                                         
 
4.  We addressed the issue in a footnote:  
 
The court found no disparate treatment between Krawczuk and 
Poirier, noting that Krawczuk “scouted the site to dispose [of] the 
body, made the arrangements with the victim to go to his house, 
physically strangled the victim with the co-defendant‟s assistance, 
placed the drain cleaner in the victim‟s mouth and steadied the co-
defendant when he was on the point of becoming sick” and that the 
psychiatrist thought Krawczuk was overstating when he said he had 
been influenced by Poirier.  Additionally, Krawczuk was older and 
bigger than Poirier.  
Krawczuk, 634 So. 2d at 1073 n.5 (quoting trial court‟s order).   
 
 
- 20 - 
before the incident and started going to the victim‟s house three months prior, but 
Poirier had only been with Krawczuk to the victim‟s house one time prior to the 
murder; (2) Krawczuk initiated the events by suggesting they go to the bedroom, 
he initiated the roughhousing, he pinned the victim down, choked him, poured 
Crystal Vanish down the victim‟s throat, and poured water in; and (3) Krawczuk 
was older and bigger than Poirier, more aggressive, and Poirier was called 
Krawczuk‟s protégé.  See Krawczuk, 634 So. 2d at 1074 n.5 (“Krawczuk „scouted 
the site to dispose [of] the body, made the arrangements with the victim to go to his 
house, physically strangled the victim with the co-defendant‟s assistance, placed 
the drain cleaner in the victim‟s mouth and steadied the co-defendant when he was 
on the point of becoming sick‟ and . . . the psychiatrist thought Krawczuk was 
overstating when he said he had been influenced by Poirier.  Additionally, 
Krawczuk was older and bigger than Poirier.”).  
Krawczuk’s Confession 
 
With respect to Krawczuk‟s argument that his statement to the police was 
involuntary, the lower court properly found this claim procedurally barred because 
the issue was already considered and rejected by this Court on direct appeal.  
See Krawczuk, 634 So. 2d at 1072 (“[W]e hold that the court‟s ruling on the 
motion to suppress is not cognizable on appeal. . . . [Even] if the issue had been 
 
 
- 21 - 
preserved . . . we would find it to have no merit.”).  Accordingly, Krawczuk‟s 
attempt to raise this claim anew is procedurally barred.   
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Krawczuk‟s single claim on petition for habeas corpus can be summarized as 
a complaint against this Court‟s proportionality review.  The subparts to this claim 
are that (a) this Court failed to complete a meaningful proportionality review 
because it did not look to other cases, (b) this Court‟s review was hindered by the 
incomplete investigation into mitigating factors, and (c) appellate counsel did not 
raise disparate treatment on appeal.  Because each of these subclaims should be 
denied, we deny the petition. 
 
First, relating to Krawczuk‟s first two points, a petition for habeas corpus is 
not the proper method for raising a claim that could have been raised on appeal or 
in a postconviction proceeding.  Mills v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1990) 
(“Habeas corpus is not to be used for additional appeals of issues that could have 
been or . . . were raised on appeal or in other postconviction motions.”).   
Accordingly, Krawczuk‟s allegations regarding trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness and 
the lack of mitigation on the record are not properly before this Court.  
Additionally, they are a rehashing of his arguments in his postconviction appeal. 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
Further, to the extent that Krawczuk claims that this Court failed to perform 
a proportionality review, his argument is not supported by the record or caselaw.  
On direct appeal in the instant case, we stated: 
The trial court followed the dictates of Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 
415 (Fla.1990), and Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988), and 
there is competent substantial evidence to support the conclusion that 
death is the appropriate sentence.  Cf. Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 
810 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1010, 113 S.Ct. 1660, 123 
L.Ed.2d 279 (1993); Pettit v. State, 591 So. 2d 618 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 836, 113 S.Ct. 110, 121 L.Ed.2d 68 (1992). 
Krawczuk v. State, 634 So. 2d 1070, 1073-74 (Fla. 1994).  Thus, the Court found 
the death sentence appropriate.  This Court has stated, “[A] proportionality review 
is inherent in this Court‟s direct appellate review and the issue is considered 
regardless of whether it is discussed in the opinion or raised by a party . . . .” 
Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004).  The Patton court further 
explained: 
“The mere fact that proportionality is not mentioned in the written 
opinion does not mean that no proportionality review was conducted.” 
Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 58 (Fla.1994) (citing Booker v. 
State, 441 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla.1983)).  In Booker, this Court 
explained that failure to mention proportionality in its opinion does 
not mean that the Court did not consider it.  See 441 So. 2d at 153. 
This Court stated that a proportionality review “is an inherent aspect 
of our review of all capital cases.  We need not specifically state that 
we are doing that which we have already determined to be an integral 
part of our review process.”  Id. 
 
 
- 23 - 
Patton, 878 So. 2d at 380.  Further, relating to the argument that the Court did not 
mention other cases in its review, we have said: 
[A]lthough we did not specifically mention other capital cases in our 
decision on Booker‟s direct appeal, we did in fact undertake 
proportionality review.  That review is an inherent aspect of our 
review of all capital cases. We need not specifically state that we are 
doing that which we have already determined to be an integral part of 
our review process. 
Booker v. State, 441 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1983).  Additionally, we have stated, 
“We reject the assertion that in our written opinion we must explicitly compare 
each death sentence with past capital cases.”  Messer v. State, 439 So. 2d 875, 879 
(Fla. 1983).  Accordingly, Krawczuk‟s argument that this Court‟s failure to 
explicitly weigh the proportionality of his sentence in its opinion must fail. 
 
Finally, as it relates to Krawczuk‟s third point and to the extent that 
Krawczuk argues that appellate counsel failed to raise his and Poirier‟s disparate 
sentencing, this argument is not supported by the record.  Appellate counsel did 
mention Poirier‟s sentence in the initial brief although not as a distinct issue.  
Further, even if it had been raised as a distinct issue it would have been rejected by 
this Court because Poirier pleaded to, and was convicted of, a lesser offense.  We 
noted in our opinion that Krawczuk was the more culpable defendant.  See 
Krawczuk, 634 So. 2d at 1073 n.5.  We have repeatedly upheld death sentences 
where a codefendant pleaded guilty and received a life sentence.  See Smith v. 
State, 998 So. 2d 516, 528 (Fla. 2008); England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 406 (Fla. 
 
 
- 24 - 
2006); Kight v. State, 784 So. 2d 396, 401 (Fla. 2001) (“[I]n instances where the 
codefendant‟s lesser sentence was the result of a plea agreement or prosecutorial 
discretion, this Court has rejected claims of disparate sentencing.”); Brown v. 
State, 473 So. 2d 1260, 1268 (Fla. 1985).   We do not address the remainder of  
Krawczuk‟s petition because it is a reassertion of his claims on appeal of the denial 
of his postconviction motion. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court‟s denial of Krawczuk‟s 
motion for postconviction relief.  Additionally, we deny his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.   
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
I concur in denying postconviction relief, but write to emphasize the 
importance of counsel conscientiously investigating all avenues of mitigation, even 
in light of a difficult defendant.  The defendant claimed that his waiver of 
mitigation was neither knowing nor voluntary; I agree that postconviction relief on 
this issue was properly denied.  However, I disagree with the majority‟s reasoning 
 
 
- 25 - 
that Krawczuk failed to establish prejudice based on his refusal to allow counsel to 
contact his family.  See majority op. at 14.  Rather, when a defendant waives 
mitigation, the finding of prejudice must be centered on whether the waiver of 
mitigation is knowing and voluntary.  See, e.g., Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4, 8 
(Fla. 1993).   
In this case, the trial court in fact found that defense counsel‟s investigation 
was deficient because the record did “not support the unequivocal direction to not 
investigate . . . required by the law as it existed at the time in question.”  
Ultimately, however, the trial court found that even if Krawczuk had been more 
fully advised about the potential mitigation evidence, he failed to show that “he 
would have authorized trial counsel to present such evidence at either the penalty 
phase trial or at the Spencer hearing.” 
It is undeniably a challenge for defense counsel, faced with a client who 
states that he does not want to pursue mitigation or have the lawyer contact his 
family, to nevertheless comply with the duties that have been imposed by case law.  
However, because we are dealing literally with a life or death matter and a client 
who may not have yet faced the reality that the death penalty may be imposed, 
counsel‟s very weighty obligations do not end with the fact that the client 
expresses the desire to not present mitigation or contact family members.  As was 
explained in Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 100 (Fla. 2007), despite the client‟s 
 
 
- 26 - 
wishes, the lawyer appropriately “recognized he still had a duty to develop 
mitigation.”  Therefore, the lawyer in Grim did not “latch onto Grim‟s desire not to 
present mitigation, but instead, repeatedly tried to dissuade him.”  Id.  Further, the 
lawyer uncovered a substantial amount of mitigation, obtained a mental health 
expert, and contacted several mitigation witnesses.  For all of these reasons, we 
upheld the trial court‟s conclusion that that trial counsel conducted a reasonable 
investigation in light of Grim‟s decision to waive mitigation and determined that 
trial counsel‟s actions were not deficient and that Grim could not establish 
prejudice.  Id. at 100-01; see also Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1183-84 
(Fla. 2001) (rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the 
defendant refused to permit his attorney to present mitigating evidence and refused 
to meet with the mental health expert in light of the fact that his attorney had 
already investigated potential mitigation). 
 
In addition, in Grim, despite the waiver of mitigation, the trial court ordered 
a presentence investigation report and appointed special counsel to investigate and 
present available mitigation.  Grim, 971 So. 2d at 90.  In other words, not only did 
counsel act properly, but the court also proceeded diligently by taking the extra 
step of appointing special counsel.  See, e.g., Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 
363-64 (Fla. 2001) (approving the procedure that allows trial courts to call 
witnesses on their own to determine whether mitigating circumstances apply and 
 
 
- 27 - 
granting trial courts the discretion to appoint special counsel to assist in 
discovering mitigation).  These extra steps assist this Court in ensuring that a death 
sentence for a defendant who insists on waiving mitigation does not lead to the 
death penalty being arbitrarily imposed on any particular defendant.  See 
Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 368-69 (Pariente, J., concurring specially); Russ v. 
State, 73 So. 3d 178, 200-02 (Fla. 2011) (Pariente, J., concurring).  
 
At the evidentiary hearing in this case, Krawczuk presented testimony from 
his brother and stepfather that related to extensive abuse he had endured at the 
hands of his mother.  However, at the time of the waiver, counsel had the report of 
Dr. Keown that indicated the abuse had occurred and that report had been 
furnished to Krawczuk.  In addition, trial counsel had obtained military records and 
a psychiatrist‟s report, both of which had been given to Dr. Keown.  Given the 
facts developed at the evidentiary hearing and the findings of the postconviction 
court, I do not find a basis for concluding that the waiver of mitigation was not 
knowing or voluntary and therefore agree that Krawczuk cannot establish 
prejudice.  
Thus, I concur in the affirmance of the denial of postconviction relief.  
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lee County,  
James R. Thompson, Judge - Case No. 90-2007CF-B 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
 
- 28 - 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers Keffer, 
Assistant CCR Counsel, and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, CCRC Southern Region, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent