Case Title: Welborn v. Shipman

Citation: 608 So. 2d 334

Docket Number: 1910466

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1992-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
608 So. 2d 334 (1992)
Carolyn WELBORN
v.
Robert M. SHIPMAN.
1910466.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 5, 1992.
Rehearing Denied November 20, 1992.
Samuel Fisher of Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C., Birmingham, and Ernest N. Blasingame, Jr., Florence, for appellant.
J.R. Brooks and Robert E. Ledyard III of Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellee.
INGRAM, Justice.
Carolyn Welborn brought this action pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-570, against her former attorney, Robert M. Shipman, alleging that he had negligently handled her Title VII employment discrimination action in a federal court. The trial court entered a summary judgment for Shipman, holding that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Welborn appeals.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-570 et seq., the "Alabama Legal Services Liability Act" ("ALSLA"), Welborn timely filed her action against Shipman.
Shipman, on behalf of Welborn, filed a complaint under Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Reynolds Metals Company ("Reynolds"). A hearing was held on November 27, 1984, in the federal district court. On November 28, 1984, that court entered a judgment in favor of Reynolds, holding that Welborn had failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. On February 19, 1987, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case. Welborn v. Reynolds Metals Co., 810 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir.1987).
On February 27, 1987, Shipman filed in the district court a motion for an evidentiary hearing and made an offer of proof to prove damages for lost fringe benefits and backpay. On April 16, 1987, the district court entered an order, which, in pertinent part, is as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
On October 23, 1987, the district court issued a final judgment in favor of Welborn on her Title VII employment discrimination claim and awarded her the sum of $1.00 as nominal backpay entitlement. The district court held that all issues must be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties on November 27, 1984. Specifically, the district court wrote:
Welborn appealed that October 23, 1987, order, and on March 20, 1989, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed it. Welborn filed the present ALSLA action in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County on June 6, 1989.
Welborn contends that this action was timely filed, specifically, that it was filed within the two-year statutory period of limitations set out in the ALSLA at § 6-5-574(a). She contends that her cause of action against Shipman did not "accrue" until October 23, 1987, and that, therefore, her June 6, 1989, filing of this case was timely.
The Legislature adopted the ALSLA in 1988 to address a perceived crisis threatening the delivery of legal services to the people of Alabama. It purports to create a unified cause of action against legal services providers and to establish a time limitation in which to sue on such a cause of action. However, considerable ambiguity existed within the ALSLA concerning the time limit and its applicability, and this Court was called upon to resolve conflicts arising from that ambiguity. Michael v. Beasley, 583 So. 2d 245 (Ala.1991).
In Beasley, the attorney, Beasley, filed a personal injury suit on behalf of the Michaels. However, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and against the Michaels. Subsequently, the Michaels sued their former attorney, Beasley, alleging that he had negligently performed legal services while representing them in the personal injury case.
In Beasley, we held that the time limit set out in the ALSLA is to be measured from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. Further, we stated that a cause of action accrues when some injury occurs that gives rise to a cause of action. There, we held that the Michaels' claim accrued when the jury returned its verdict adverse to the Michaels. We concluded that it was then that the Michaels sustained a legal injury sufficient to maintain an action against Beasley. In so concluding, we cited with approval Cofield v. Smith, 495 So. 2d 61 (Ala.1986), and Payne v. Alabama Cemetery Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 1067 (Ala.1982).
413 So. 2d 1067, 1072 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Here, as in Beasley, the pivotal question is when did the cause of action accrue? Stated otherwise, when did Welborn suffer a legal injury as a result of her lawyer's alleged malpractice? After a review of the applicable cases, we hold that Welborn suffered no legal injury until October 23, 1987. It was at that time that the federal district court, in its discretion, denied Shipman's motion (on behalf of Welborn) for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of backpay and awarded Welborn only $1.00 in nominal damages. Until that time, Welborn could not have maintained an action for legal malpractice against Shipman. In other words, until that time the district court could have granted Shipman's motion for an evidentiary hearing and, if it had done so, there would have been no injury sustained by Welborn, and thus no cause of action. Until the adverse ruling on October 23, 1987, Welborn could not have shown that her failure to recover against Reynolds in the underlying suit was "proximately caused" by Shipman's negligence in not introducing any evidence to support an award of backpay. In fact, until that adverse ruling, she could not have shown that she had failed to recover. There was just no injury resulting from Shipman's omission until the district court's October 23, 1987, final order disallowing additional proof of damages and awarding Welborn only $1.00 in nominal damages.
Therefore, because Welborn filed her ALSLA action on June 6, 1989, well within two years of the date her cause of action accrued, the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Shipman based on the statute of limitations.
The judgment is due to be reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.