Case Title: Duncan v. Afton, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-24

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Duncan v. Afton, Inc.1999 WY 154991 P.2d 739Case Number: 99-24Decided: 11/30/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
HARVEY J. DUNCAN, a/k/a JIM DUNCAN, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

AFTON, INC., a Tennessee 
corporation, d/b/a HEALTHCOMP EVALUATION SERVICES CORPORATION, d/b/a NATIONAL 
AMERITEST, a/k/a AMERITEST; and LEIGH ANN SHEARS, an individual, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Jere Ryckman, 
Judge.

Sharon M. Rose 
of Vehar, Beppler, Lavery & Rose, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming, representing 
appellant.

John P. LaBuda 
and Stephen K. Palmer of Palmer & LaBuda, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming. 
Argument by Mr. LaBuda representing appellee.

Thomas J. 
Klepperich of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, Wyoming, representing Wyoming 
Trial Lawyers Association as Amicus Curie.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

Golden, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A company and its 
employee were hired to collect a urine specimen in the first phase of a 
substance abuse testing program implemented by Solvay Minerals (Solvay) for its 
employees. In this case of first impression for Wyoming, we must decide whether 
the collecting company and its employee owe a duty of reasonable care to 
Solvay's employee who is required to submit a urine specimen. The district court 
ruled that, until it had direction from this Court, it would not hold that 
Wyoming law recognized such a duty; consequently, the district court dismissed 
the complaint containing negligence claims against Afton, Ameritest,1 and its employee. That action was 
filed by Harvey J. Duncan who was terminated by his employer, Solvay, when it 
received a report that Mr. Duncan's urine specimen, collected by Afton and its 
employee and analyzed by another company, Northwest Toxicology, showed a .32 
urine alcohol content.

[¶2]      We hold that a 
collection company owes a duty of care to an employee when collecting, handling, 
and processing urine specimens for the purpose of performing substance abuse 
testing. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Duncan presents 
the following issues for our review:

A. Did the 
district court err in dismissing the complaint and failing to recognize that 
plaintiff had also pled a cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation.

B. Did the 
district court err in failing to recognize a duty of care from a collection 
company, who at the request of an employer, collects urine specimens of 
employees for the purpose of performing drug and alcohol testing, to the 
donor/employee.

Afton rephrases 
the issues as:

A. Did the 
District Court properly dismiss Plaintiff's complaint finding that no legal duty 
exists between Plaintiff and Defendants?

B. Did the 
District Court err in not separately addressing Plaintiff's alleged claim of 
negligent misrepresentation?

[¶4]      The Amicus Curiae 
brief of Wyoming Trial Lawyers Association accepted the issues presented by 
Duncan and did not present others.

FACTS

[¶5]      Duncan was an 
employee of Solvay Minerals in Sweetwater County. Solvay contracted with Afton 
to collect urine specimens of Solvay's employees from time to time for drug and 
alcohol testing. Solvay separately contracted with a laboratory, Northwest 
Toxicology, Inc. of Salt Lake City, Utah, to analyze the specimens and report 
the results to Solvay.

[¶6]      On December 15, 
1997, Solvay ordered Duncan to submit a urine specimen for drug and alcohol 
testing. Duncan was randomly selected for the test in accordance with Solvay's 
substance abuse policy. Defendant Leigh Ann Shears, an employee of Afton, 
supervised the collection of a urine specimen from Duncan at Solvay's place of 
business.

[¶7]      Our standard for 
reviewing dismissed actions requires that we accept as true all of the facts 
alleged in the complaint. Feltner v. Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206, 207 
(Wyo. 1995). Duncan alleges that upon providing a urine specimen to Shears in an 
unsealed container, Shears directed him to return to the restroom to wash his 
hands. While Duncan was in the restroom, the specimen remained unsealed and out 
of Duncan's direct sight for that period of time. He alleges that upon his 
return from the restroom, Shears proceeded to seal the urine specimen and to 
obtain Duncan's initials on the specimen label. Shears failed to note the 
temperature of the specimen at the time it was taken as required by standard 
testing protocol. Duncan further alleges that Afton and Shears subsequently 
altered the chain of custody documents to make it appear that the temperature 
had been properly tested.2

[¶8]      Solvay received a 
report that Duncan's specimen had a urine alcohol content of .32, which Duncan 
alleges is an amount that would have rendered him so intoxicated that he would 
have been unable to function and would have appeared blatantly intoxicated. The 
specimen was collected approximately ten hours into Duncan's twelve-hour shift. 
Duncan denies consuming alcohol that day. Duncan claims that grievous errors in 
the collection process and the inherent unreliability of the process of testing 
urine for alcohol content caused the test result.

[¶9]      Based on the .32 
report, Solvay terminated Duncan's employment on December 23, 1997. He filed 
suit in June of 1998, naming Afton and Shears as defendants, claiming that Afton 
negligently instructed and trained Shears; failed to employ proper collection 
and handling procedures for urinalysis of alcohol content; failed to inform 
Solvay that urinalysis is unreliable if specific procedures are not followed; 
and misrepresented to Solvay the accuracy and reliability of urine alcohol 
testing. Appellees answered the complaint and filed a motion to dismiss, 
contending that they did not owe a duty of reasonable care in the collection of 
the urine specimen, and filed for a protective order to stay discovery, pending 
the ruling on dismissal, which order was granted on October 1, 1998. That order 
prevented investigation of all other stages of the testing process to determine 
if other defendants should be named. The suit was dismissed before discovery, 
thus precluding Duncan from amending the complaint to name the employer and the 
laboratory performing the test as defendants.

[¶10]   In its decision letter, the 
district court noted that a duty of care was not established by contract or 
statute, and, under common law Wyoming had not established such a duty of care 
and it would not find such a duty without direction from this Court. In further 
analyzing whether the duty of care owed a patient by a physician provided a 
common law basis for the proposed duty of care in this instance, the district 
court determined that the rule of law is that a physician examining an employee 
for an employer owes no duty of care to an employee because a physician-patient 
relationship does not exist. The court ruled the relationship did not extend to 
create a duty of care to be imposed on Afton and its employee. Holding that a 
duty of care was not created by contract, statute, or common law, the district 
court entered an order dismissing the action, and this appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶11]   In considering a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must focus on the allegations contained 
in the complaint and liberally construe them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Feltner, 902 P.2d  at 207. We affirm an order of dismissal only when 
it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert 
any facts which would entitle him to relief. Dismissal is a drastic remedy which 
should be granted sparingly; however, it "is the proper method for testing the 
legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when the complaint 
shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Id. at 
208.

[¶12]   The elements of a cause of action 
for negligence include: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff; (2) a breach, or 
violation of that duty; (3) which is the proximate cause of (4) plaintiff's 
injuries. Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 
1993).

Essential to any 
negligence cause of action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon defendant. 
See, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 931 (Wyo. 1981). The question 
of the existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to decide. Id., at 
932. A duty exists where, "upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists 
between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one 
for the benefit of the other - or, more simply, whether the interest of the 
plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the 
hands of the defendant." Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 37 at 236 (5th ed. 
1984).

Goodrich v. 
Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 1994). Whether Afton owed a duty to Duncan 
to use reasonable care in the collection and processing of the urine specimen is 
a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id.

Parties' 
Arguments

[¶13]   Preliminarily, Duncan contends that 
privity of contract is not necessary to give rise to a duty in the drug and 
alcohol testing context. No contract or statute is in effect that would impose a 
duty of care on a collector of urine specimens to an employee or potential 
employee; accordingly, any duty owed arises from common law principles. Noting 
that case authorities involve both testing laboratories and collectors of 
specimens, Duncan claims that this Court need not distinguish between a testing 
laboratory and a collector because the rationale imposing a duty is the same: 
that the party in the best position to guard against injury owes a legal duty of 
reasonable care when the risk of significant injury from the party's conduct is 
foreseeable and the likelihood of injury is great.

[¶14]   Afton contends that other parties 
are involved in drug and alcohol testing and relies upon an eight-part test 
articulated in Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1995), to assert that a 
collector is the party least to blame for a false positive result. Afton states 
that other jurisdictions have divided in deciding that a specimen collector owes 
a duty to an employee, and contends that a duty should not be recognized unless 
the parties have a contract. Because Afton had no contract with Duncan, it 
reasons it owed him no duty.

Privity

[¶15]   The privity requirement has long 
been imposed to eliminate the threat of indeterminate, unchecked liability for 
economic damages. Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 804-05 (Wyo. 1991). Without a contractual relationship between Afton 
and Duncan, the privity requirement would prohibit imposing liability. We have 
previously ruled, however, that the privity requirement should be discarded when 
the legal theory is negligence or negligent 
misrepresentation:

Traditionally, 
attempts by injured third parties to recover for damages arising out of the 
negligent performance of a contractual duty fail because of lack of privity. See 
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) and see 
generally 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence, § 123 (1989). Courts first discarded the 
requirement of privity in product liability cases based on negligence. See 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The basis of 
liability may be negligent misrepresentation. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 
359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957). Damages in product liability suits have not been 
limited to physical injury; recovery has also been permitted for economic loss. 
See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). An 
exhaustive review of economic loss damages is provided in Continental Ins. v. 
Page Engineering Co., 783 P.2d 641, 666-82 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting.

Courts, upon 
abandonment of the privity requirement, expanded tort liability by holding that 
a third party, not in privity of contract with a professional person or entity, 
may recover for negligence which proximately causes a foreseeable economic 
injury to him. The general principle is delineated in Restatement (Second) 
Torts, supra, § 552 (Topic 3. Negligent 
Misrepresentation).

Century 
Ready-Mix Co., 816 P.2d  at 804-05 (footnote omitted).

[¶16]   Duncan has advanced both negligence 
and negligent misrepresentation theories; therefore, privity concerns are not 
presented in this case. Under ordinary negligence principles, we must explore 
whether a third party stands in such a relationship with collection agencies 
that policy considerations require that tort liability should be 
imposed.

Duty

[¶17]   On the several occasions that 
courts have addressed the liability of parties performing drug and alcohol 
testing, variations in the particular facts, the legal theories advanced, and 
the rationale employed resulted in few decisions containing a comprehensive duty 
of care analysis. Courts have divided in deciding whether a party involved in 
performing drug and alcohol testing of employees and potential employees owes a 
duty of care to those persons.3

[¶18]   As support for the proposition that 
it owes no duty of reasonable care to the employee, Afton relies on the 
reasoning of Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995). 
Smithkline ruled that a drug tester retained by an employer to screen a 
potential employee owes no duty to that potential employee to warn her about the 
possible effects of consuming poppy seeds prior to the test. Id. at 351-54. 
Rationalizing that it was impossible either to inform a test subject of all 
possible causes of positive results other than using drugs or to warn that test 
results might be misinterpreted, the Texas Supreme Court determined that any 
duty of care was a burden more properly placed with employers, the clients of 
Smithkline. Smithkline, 903 S.W.2d  at 354; see also Smithkline, 903 S.W.2d  at 
358-59 (Gammage, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit interpreted Smithkline as 
authority that no duty is owed and withdrew an earlier decision that generally 
held a drug tester owes a duty of reasonable care to the employee. Willis v. 
Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1995); Willis v. Roche 
Biomedical Labs, Inc., 21 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1994).

[¶19]   The court in Smithkline thought it 
significant that the New York Court of Appeals had held that no tort duty to use 
reasonable care should be imposed on polygraph test operators when polygraph 
results would be a factor in hiring and firing decisions. Smithkline, 903 S.W.2d  
at 352 (citing Hall v. United Parcel Serv. Of America, 76 N.Y.2d 27, 556 N.Y.S.2d 21, 555 N.E.2d 273, 276-78 (N.Y. 1990)). Concerning this point, a 
federal court sitting in New York has recently found that "the Hall case, while 
persuasive and helpful, is not controlling. Polygraphs and urinalyses are 
distinct enough that this court believes the New York Court of Appeals would 
engage in fresh analysis to decide whether or not the common law of this state 
recognizes the action Santiago is attempting to pursue." Santiago v. Greyhound, 
956 F. Supp. 144, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). The court in Santiago conducted a 
comprehensive duty analysis and found a duty to exist.

[¶20]   Afton directs our attention to two 
other cases specifically holding that a testing laboratory owes no duty of care 
to an employee, Caputo v. Compuchem Laboratories, Civ. A. No. 92-6123, 1994 WL 
100084 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 23, 1994), and Herbert v. Placid Refining Co., 564 So. 2d 371, 374 (La. App.), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 981 (La. 1990). Both of these cases 
reached their holdings with little or no duty of care analysis. Caputo refused 
to find that a drug tester owed any duty beyond providing an accurate report. 
Caputo, at *3. The laboratory reported a urinalysis as positive for morphine and 
the employer terminated plaintiff's employment based upon this result. Claiming 
that the result was due to poppy seed consumption, the employee had an 
independent laboratory test the same specimen and confirmed the accuracy of the 
result. However, the positive result was at such a low level that, among other 
claims, plaintiff contended the laboratory had a duty either to corroborate the 
result by an additional test identified in federal regulations before reporting 
the positive result to the employer, or to ensure the employer properly 
interpreted the result. Caputo, at *2. The federal district court disagreed, 
finding it inappropriate to impose a duty on the laboratory to verify positive 
results or to notify the employer, and finding that neither the facts nor the 
law supported holding a laboratory negligent for accurately reporting a positive 
result without verifying the result. Caputo, at *3.

[¶21]   In Herbert, a Louisiana 
intermediate appellate court held that a testing laboratory had no duty to 
competently analyze the urine of a plaintiff. Analogizing the action to one of 
negligent interference with a contract, a tort not recognized in Louisiana, the 
court limited its analysis to a determination that no relationship existed 
between the plaintiff-employee and the testing laboratory that would justify 
imposing a duty. Herbert, 564 So. 2d  at 373-74. Other Louisiana intermediate 
appellate courts have specifically rejected the holding in Herbert, holding that 
a claim in general negligence exists based on a breach of a duty to perform drug 
tests in a competent and non-negligent manner. Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915, 
917 (La. App. 1992); Elliott v. Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 588 So. 2d 175, 176 
(La. App. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992); Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 588 So. 2d 167, 170 n.3 (La. App. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 411 (La. 
1992).

[¶22]   When this Court has considered 
whether a duty should be imposed based on a particular relationship, we have 
balanced numerous factors to aid in that determination:4

(1) the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to 
the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the 
extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community 
and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance 
for the risk involved.

Ortega v. Flaim, 
902 P.2d 199, 203, 206 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Mostert, 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 
1987), citing to Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986), quoting 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 
1976)).

[¶23]   Afton contends that harm to Duncan 
is not foreseeable merely by its selection of urine as the subject of collection 
and analysis. Duncan disagrees, indicating evidence exists that urinalysis for 
alcohol content is unreliable and Afton negligently recommended it to Solvay. 
Duncan further contends that Afton negligently collected and handled his urine 
specimen. We find that Afton could foresee that improper collecting and handling 
of the specimen could contribute to a false positive result and could injure an 
employee. Santiago, 956 F. Supp. at 152-53; accord Stinson v. Physicians 
Immediate Care, Ltd., 646 N.E.2d 930, 933-34 (Ill. App. 1995); Lewis, 588 So. 2d  
at 170.; Elliott, 588 So. 2d  at 176. It is foreseeable that in recommending 
testing to an employer, Afton's failing to inform the employer about the proper 
interpretation and procedures when positive results occur could injure an 
employee.

[¶24]   Assisted by Santiago's discussion 
of the social considerations supporting the imposition of a duty, we see the 
emergence of a connection between Afton's conduct and Duncan's injury. Companies 
performing drug and alcohol testing benefit financially from a market increasing 
for two reasons: research showed that testing is now commonplace by employers 
because employee substance abuse is perceived as causing lost productivity, and 
because employers generally believe in the accuracy of drug tests, it "may lead 
employers to repose undue confidence in their results." Santiago, 956 F. Supp. 
at 151.

One statistical 
study found that "two out of every five workers testing positive truly are drug 
free." Drug screens are plagued by the problems of "cross-reactivity" - namely, 
the familiar concern that metabolites of benign consumables, like poppy seed 
muffins, will be confused with metabolites of illicit substances; "impairment 
detectability" . . .; "passive inhalation" . . .; specimen dilution, 
substitution or adulteration; improper calibration or cleaning of testing 
equipment; and simple technician error.

Id. (citations 
omitted). As a company contracting with an employer to collect and handle 
specimens for employee alcohol testing, Afton is aware that the likely effect of 
a false positive result is significant and devastating; employment will likely 
be terminated and future prospects of employment adversely impacted. Duncan 
presents a claim that, as a direct result of Afton's negligent conduct, his 
employer terminated his employment because of erroneous alcohol testing results, 
and Afton's conduct ascertainably injured Duncan, satisfying the second and 
third factors in our duty analysis. See Santiago, 956 F. Supp.  at 
151.

[¶25]   In assessing the moral blame 
factor, several considerations make it appropriate to impose a duty of 
reasonable care upon a collection company: its direct financial benefit in 
providing alcohol testing services to Duncan's employer; its direct control over 
establishing and ensuring proper collection and handling procedures; its ability 
to hire and train competent personnel to perform services; and its ability to 
contract with the employer to ensure test results are properly interpreted and 
utilized.

[¶26]   Perhaps the most important factor 
in this analysis is whether the policy of preventing future harm is at issue. 
Afton does not present an argument on this particular factor. Companies like 
Afton provide services that present a risk of harm great enough to hold them 
accountable. The particular services provided demand adequate protection of 
employees' interests to prevent future harm, and the imposition of a duty to act 
reasonably will reduce the likelihood of injury. There is little question that 
our ruling that Afton owes a duty places a burden upon Afton to act in a 
"scientifically reasonable manner" and guard against human error; however, Afton 
is in the best position to guard against employee injury arising from its 
collection and handling procedures. Elliot, 588 So. 2d  at 176. Because Afton is 
paid for its services, it is better able to bear the burden financially than the 
individual wrongly maligned by a false positive report. Stinson, 646 N.E.2d  at 
934.

[¶27]   Afton argues that it is the 
employer and the laboratory performing the test which are in the best position 
to bear the burden of liability. In this case, Solvay contracted with another 
laboratory to perform the test and did not involve Afton in its decision to use 
Duncan's test result to terminate his employment. Duncan responds that it was 
Afton that represented to Solvay that urinalysis was a reliable method of 
testing for alcohol, and Solvay relied upon those representations. Duncan 
concedes that his discovery, limited by protective order, followed by the 
dismissal of this action, leaves him uncertain whether other actors will be 
joined in the complaint if this case is remanded. That others may have acted 
wrongfully in terminating Duncan's employment is not proper grounds for refusing 
to impose a duty of care on Afton to collect and handle urine specimens and, 
when it makes representations, to properly educate employers with reasonable 
care because there is no question that it is in a better position to do 
so.

[¶28]   The factor of "the consequences to 
the community and the court system" scrutinizes the negative aspects inflicted 
upon society by creating a new cause of action. The positive consequences to the 
community in protecting employees' interests are not outweighed by society's 
interest in detecting substance abuse. In considering whether the court system 
is adversely affected by recognizing this new cause of action, our general 
concern is the burdensome increase of litigation. Afton has argued that its role 
in the process is too remote to find that it is a proper defendant. It claims 
that the employer and the testing laboratory are the proper parties to this suit 
because any harm to Duncan was the result of their actions in reporting an 
erroneous test result, and in acting upon the erroneous information. Afton 
contends that if it is found to owe a duty of care then any actor involved in 
this process, such as the company that ships the specimen to the laboratory, 
will be joined in the action as defendant. Our analysis has already determined 
that Afton was not remote to this process of substance abuse testing. It exists 
to perform these services and is in a position to control the accuracy and the 
reliability of the testing method and collection process. We do not believe it 
can be said that shipping specimens as part of a general shipping business 
places the shipping company in a position to control similar aspects of the 
testing process. The imposition of a duty of care on the part of Afton will not 
unduly burden the court system.

[¶29]   Finally, Afton presents no argument 
on the final factor's concern with availability and prevalence of insurance, and 
we do not find it necessary to our consideration.

[¶30]   Duty is an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is entitled to protection. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196. The sum total of 
our considerations supports imposing a duty upon Afton. We reverse the district 
court's order dismissing the action and remand for further 
proceedings.

Negligent 
Misrepresentation

[¶31]   Duncan contends that the district 
court, in dismissing this suit, failed to recognize that he had presented a 
claim of negligent misrepresentation. The dispositive issue before the district 
court was the existence of a duty; having found no duty, the district court 
dismissed the entire suit. Because we hold Afton owes such a duty, Duncan is 
free to amend his complaint under W.R.C.P. 15 to separately plead this cause of 
action.

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   A company collecting urine 
specimens as part of an employer's substance abuse testing program owes a duty 
of care to the employee who submits a specimen. We reverse the district court's 
order dismissing Duncan's suit and remand for further 
proceedings.

Footnotes

1 Duncan 
filed suit against "Afton, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, d/b/a Healthcomp 
Evaluation Services Corporation, d/b/a National Ameritest, a/k/a Ameritest; and 
Leigh Ann Shears, an individual." The specimen was collected by Ameritest. For 
purposes of this appeal, we shall refer to these appellees as Afton. Our 
decision applies to all appellees.

2 At oral 
argument, Duncan explained that his copy of the paperwork showed no temperature 
was taken, other copies retained by Afton indicated a 
temperature.

3 A duty of 
care was recognized in Santiago v. Greyhound, 956 F. Supp. 144, 147-53 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997); Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915, 917-18 (La. App. 1992); Elliott v. 
Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 588 So. 2d 175, 176 (La. App. 1991); Lewis v. 
Aluminum Co. of America, 588 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 1991); Stinson v. Physicians 
Immediate Care, Ltd., 646 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ill. App. 
1995).

Those cases refusing to find a duty are Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 
903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995), and Caputo v. Compuchem Labs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 
92-6123, 1994 WL 100084 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 23, 1994).

Decisions made upon legal theories other than negligence include Herbert 
v. Placid Refining Co., 564 So. 2d 371, 374 (La. App. 1990) (dismissed on grounds 
that Louisiana does not recognize the tort of negligent interference with 
contract); Devine v. Roche Biomedical Labs.,Inc., 637 A.2d 441, 447-48 (Me. 
1994) (tort claims denied without conducting a duty of care 
analysis).

4 Besides 
Wyoming's balance of factors test, we note that two other common methods for 
determining the existence of a duty, the foreseeability test and the risk-duty 
analysis, are used in those decisions analyzing an employee's drug testing 
claim. Amy Newnam, Jay M. Feinman, Liability of a Laboratory for Negligent 
Employment or Pre-Employment Drug Testing, 30 Rutgers L.J. 473, 478-83 
(1999).