Case Title: Harvey v. Hwang

Citation: 2004-Ohio-4112

Docket Number: 20031066

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Harvey v. Hwang, 103 Ohio St.3d 16, 2004-Ohio-4112.] 
 
 
HARVEY, APPELLEE, V. HWANG ET AL.; ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Harvey v. Hwang, 103 Ohio St.3d 16, 2004-Ohio-4112.] 
Posttrial procedure – Motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict—Time for filing — Civ.R. 6(E) does not extend time for filing when 
clerk of court serves notice of judgment by ordinary mail. 
(No. 2003-1066 — Submitted April 28, 2004 — Decided August 18, 2004.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA2003-03-010. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Civ.R. 6(E) does not extend by three days the time for filing a Civ.R. 50(B) 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for serving a 
Civ.R. 59 motion for a new trial where a clerk of a trial court serves 
notice of a judgment to the parties by ordinary mail. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Anne Marie Harvey, appellee, filed a complaint alleging that 
she had been injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of 
Yong Hwang and the driver of an unidentified or phantom vehicle.  She also 
named as defendants a number of insurance companies, including the 
appellant, Illinois National Insurance Company (“INIC”).  Harvey claimed 
that a policy issued by INIC to her employer provided her excess uninsured 
motorists coverage pursuant to our decision in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116.1  
                                                 
1.  We markedly restricted Scott-Pontzer on November 5, 2003, in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 
100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. 
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{¶ 2} The case was tried to a jury, and, on December 30, 2002, the 
trial court entered final judgment against INIC in the amount of $8,531,488, 
expressly noting that the judgment constituted a final appealable order.  The 
next day, the clerk of the common pleas court certified that copies of the 
court’s decision and judgment entry had been sent by regular mail to counsel 
of record for INIC. 
{¶ 3} On January 15, 2003, 16 days after entry of the court’s final 
judgment, INIC served on opposing counsel, and filed with the court, a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), or in the 
alternative, for new trial, or for remittitur.  In response, Harvey moved the 
court to strike INIC’s posttrial motion, observing that pursuant to Civ.R. 
50(B) and 59(B), a party has “fourteen days after” the entry of judgment to 
file a motion for JNOV or serve a motion for a new trial, and further 
observing that Civ.R. 6(B) forbids a trial court to extend those 14-day 
deadlines.  In response to Harvey’s challenge to the timeliness of this 
motion, counsel for INIC acknowledged that on January 3, 2003, he received 
a copy of the December 30, 2002 final judgment entry in the mail. 
{¶ 4} The trial court overruled the motion for JNOV on February 
25, 2003, without discussing its timeliness.  It summarily entered judgment 
overruling the motion for a new trial on March 4, 2003. 
{¶ 5} On March 13, 2003, INIC filed a single notice of appeal 
seeking to appeal the three judgments, i.e., the December 30 judgment entry 
on the verdict, the February 25 entry overruling its motion for JNOV, and 
the March 4 entry denying a new trial.  Harvey, however, filed a motion 
seeking dismissal of INIC’s appeal.  She asserted again, as she had in the 
trial court, that INIC’s motion seeking JNOV, or alternatively, a new trial 
had not been timely filed.  She argued that the court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to hear INIC’s appeal of the December 30, 2002 judgment entry 
January Term, 2004 
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on the verdict, because INIC had not filed its notice of appeal of that 
judgment within 30 days after entry, as required by App.R. 4(A).  In 
addition, she asserted that App.R. 4(B)(2) did not provide an extension of 
that time because INIC’s motion for JNOV or a new trial was itself not 
timely filed.  That rule provides that where a timely Civ.R. 50(B) motion for 
JNOV or a timely Civ.R. 59(B) motion for new trial has been filed, “the time 
for filing a notice of appeal begins to run as to all parties when the order 
disposing of the motion is entered.” 
{¶ 6} In response, INIC contended that its motion for JNOV and a 
new trial had been timely filed in the trial court.  It claimed that Civ.R. 6(E) 
provided three additional days for filing the Civ.R. 50(B) and 59(B) motion 
because the clerk of the trial court had served notice of the judgment on the 
verdict by ordinary mail. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals disagreed and held that the motion for 
JNOV and a new trial was not timely filed or served within 14 days after 
entry of judgment as required by Civ.R. 50(B) and 59(B).  It rejected INIC’s 
argument that Civ.R. 6(E) extended the deadline for these motions by three 
additional days from the date the court entered judgment on the verdict.  It 
concluded that “[s]ince the judgment appealed from in this case was entered 
on December 30, 2002, INIC was required to file its motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial within fourteen (14) days or on 
or before January 13, 2003.  The motions were filed two days late on 
January 15, 2003.”  The court entered judgment dismissing the appeal of the 
December 30 judgment entry on the $8.5 million verdict as untimely filed. 
{¶ 8} INIC timely filed a motion to certify a conflict pursuant to 
Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25.  It asserted 
that the judgment of the court of appeals conflicted with the judgment of the 
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Seventh District in Larry Murphy Dump Truck Serv., Inc. v. Sam Abdalla 
Ents. (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 271, 683 N.E.2d 64. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals granted the motion and certified the 
following question for our resolution: “[W]hether Civ.R. 6(E) extends the 
time for filing a motion for new trial under Civ.R. 59(B) or motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Civ.R. 50(B) beyond 14 days 
after the entry of judgment when the judgment entry is mailed to the 
parties.” 
{¶ 10} We agreed to answer the certified question.  99 Ohio St.3d 
1509, 2003-Ohio-3957, 792 N.E.2d 197.  We today answer it in the negative.  
We hold that Civ.R. 6(E) does not apply to extend by three days the time for 
filing a Civ.R. 50(B) motion for JNOV or for serving a Civ.R. 59 motion for 
a new trial where a clerk of a trial court serves notice of a judgment to the 
parties by ordinary mail. 
{¶ 11} Our conclusion is mandated by the clear language of those 
rules.  Civ.R. 50(B) provides that a motion for JNOV may be filed “not later 
than fourteen days after entry of judgment.”  Similarly, Civ.R. 59(B) 
provides that a motion for a new trial shall be served “not later than fourteen 
days after the entry of the judgment.” 
{¶ 12} Civ.R. 6(E) provides that whenever “a party has the right or is 
required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper 
is served upon him by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed 
period.”  (Emphasis added.)  Civ.R. 50(B) and 59(B) provide parties the 
right to file a motion for JNOV and to serve a motion for a new trial within 
the prescribed period of 14 days after entry of judgment—not “within a 
prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper.” 
January Term, 2004 
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{¶ 13} Civ.R. 12 supplies an example where Civ.R. 6(E) applies.  
Civ.R. 12(A)(1) provides, “The defendant shall serve his answer within 
twenty-eight days after service of the summons and complaint upon him.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Civ.R. 12(A)(2) provides that a party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within 28 days after the service upon him of the pleading.  Similarly, Civ.R. 
15(A), governing amended pleadings, provides that a party “shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to 
the original pleading or within fourteen days after service of the amended 
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
orders.”  (Emphasis added.)  See, also, Civ.R. 31(A) (providing a party the 
right to serve cross-questions to depositions upon written questions within 
21 days “after the notice and written questions are served” [emphasis 
added]); Civ.R. 38(C) (allowing a party to demand a jury trial on additional 
issues “within fourteen days after service of the demand for jury trial on 
specified issues” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 14} The act of entering judgment is distinct from the act of 
serving notice of the entry of judgment.  See Civ.R. 58(B): “Within three 
days of entering the judgment upon the journal, the clerk shall serve the 
parties in a manner prescribed by Civ. R. 5(B) and note the service in the 
appearance docket.  Upon serving the notice and notation of the service in 
the appearance docket, the service is complete. The failure of the clerk to 
serve notice does not affect the validity of the judgment or the running of the 
time for appeal except as provided in App. R. 4(A).”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 15} App.R. 4(A) also clearly recognizes that entry of judgment 
and service of the notice of judgment are two distinct acts: “A party shall file 
the notice of appeal * * * within thirty days of the later of entry of the 
judgment * * *, or, in a civil case, service of the notice of judgment and its 
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entry if service is not made on the party within the three day period in Rule 
58(B) * * *.” (Emphasis added.)  In short, we reject the appellant’s 
contention that entry of judgment does not occur until the clerk serves notice 
of the entry of judgment. 
{¶ 16} Our construction of these rules is consistent with the greater 
weight of authority both in Ohio and elsewhere. See, e.g., Martin v. Lesko 
(1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 752, 756, 729 N.E.2d 839 (Civ.R. 6[E] does not 
extend time for filing an appeal from an arbitration award where time runs 
from the date of “entry of the award”); Socorro Livestock Market, Inc. v. 
Orona (1978), 92 N.M. 236, 586 P.2d 317 (party notified of judgment by 
mail cannot take advantage of three-day extension in Civ.R. 6[e] to appeal); 
Ex Parte Thrailkill (Ala.Civ.App.1989), 543 So.2d 1201 (same); Cavaliere 
v. Allstate Ins. Co. (C.A.11, 1993), 996 F.2d 1111, 1113-1114 (citing 
Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk [C.A.3, 1970], 420 F.2d 858, and 
Flint v. Howard [C.A.1, 1972], 464 F.2d 1084, 1087, for the proposition that 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6[e] does not provide three extra days for the filing of a motion 
for new trial). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has observed that every court that 
has considered the narrow issue whether Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) provides an extra 
three days to invoke Rule 59 has rejected that argument. FHC Equities, 
L.L.C. v. MBL Life Assur. Corp. (C.A.6,1999), 188 F.3d 678, 681-682 
(listing cases). See, also, Weissenberger’s Ohio Civil Procedure 2000 
Litigation Manual (1999) 63 (“Properly construed, Rule 6[E] applies only to 
time periods that are triggered by the service of a document or notice.  Time 
periods that are triggered by acts other than a service of a document or notice 
are not subject to the 3-day extension” [emphasis sic]); 1 Baldwin’s Ohio 
Practice: Klein & Darling, Civil Practice (1997) 604, Section AT 6-42 
(“Rule 6[E] is limited to situations in which action is required after service 
of a notice or other paper” [emphasis sic]). 
January Term, 2004 
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{¶ 17} Our holding is also consistent with our decision in Duganitz 
v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 556, 557, 751 N.E.2d 
1058.  We there held that Civ.R. 6(E) does not apply to extend the time to 
file objections to a magistrate’s decision issued pursuant to Civ.R. 53(E).  
Civ.R. 53(E) provides a party with the opportunity to file written objections 
to a magistrate’s decision “within fourteen days of the filing of the 
decision.”  Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(a). 
{¶ 18} INIC presents numerous policy arguments in support of its 
contention that it should be credited with three extra days to file a Civ.R. 
50(B) or serve a 59(B) motion where a trial court clerk uses ordinary mail to 
fulfill its obligation under Civ.R. 58 to notify parties of the entry of 
judgment.  These arguments might constitute grounds for reviewing Civ.R. 
6(E) for possible amendment—they do not overcome, however, the 
unambiguous language of its text.  
 
{¶ 19} The fourteenth day after entry of judgment on the verdict was 
January 13, 2003, and that date was thus the last day INIC could timely file a 
motion for JNOV or serve a motion for a new trial.  INIC did not timely file 
or serve its motion within that deadline.  Therefore, INIC was required to 
file a notice of appeal of the $8,531,488 judgment against it within 30 days 
from its entry, i.e., on or before January 29, 2003.  INIC did not timely file a 
notice of appeal on or before that date, and the judgment against it then 
became final. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
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Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., L.P.A., Dale D. Cook 
and Michael L. Close, for appellant. 
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Brenner, Brown, Golian & McCaffrey Co., L.P.A., Philip F. Brown 
and Michael E. Heffernan; Stephen J. Brown Co., L.P.A., and Stephen J. 
Brown, for appellee. 
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