Case Title: ROBINSON v. PACIFICORP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-365

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBINSON v. PACIFICORP2000 WY 17610 P.3d 1133Case Number: 98-365Decided: 09/15/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
LINDA ROBINSON, 
individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Paul 
Robinson, a/k/a Michael P. Robinson, deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff),v. 
PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation; OLIN CORP., a Virginia 
corporation; BAYER CORP., an Indiana corporation; LeROY RUFINNI, an individual; 
WILLIAM ROSSETTI, an individual; STEVE WOTRUBA, an individual; GREG HEGER, an 
individual; RICK WOOLEY, an individual; DON VINCENT, an individual; BILL 
BOLINDER, an individual; LADD POOR, an individual; and JEFF WALSH, an 
individual, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sweetwater County The Honorable Jere Ryckman, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Tim Newcomb and Maynard 
Grant of Grant & Newcomb, Laramie, Wyoming; Roger Griffin, Logan, Utah; and 
Rodney Jack Reynolds of Gregory, Johnson & Barton, P.C., Houston, 
Texas.Representing Appellees: Richard E. Day of Williams, Porter, Day 
and Neville, Casper, Wyoming; H. James Clegg, Salt Lake City, Utah; Dennis 
Lancaster of Phillips and Lancaster, Evanston, Wyoming; Joe M. Teig, P.C. of 
Holland & Hart, Jackson, Wyoming; and Mark G. Zellmer of Husch & 
Eppenberger, LLC, St. Louis, Missouri.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY*, GOLDEN & HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 2000. 

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Linda Robinson, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of 
Michael Paul Robinson, appeals from an order which dismissed her wrongful death 
action against Appellees Pacificorp, Olin Corp., Bayer Corp., LeRoy Rufinni, 
William Rossetti, Steve Wotruba, Greg Heger, Rick Wooley, Don Vincent, Bill 
Bolinder, Ladd Poor, and Jeff Walsh under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

[¶2] We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3] Robinson 
presents three issues to this Court:

ISSUE 
ONE:

[¶4] Whether the 
district court erred in holding that Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by 
W.S. § 1-38-102(d)'s two-year statute of repose or condition precedent in that, 
as applied herein, the said statute is unconstitutional as violating Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.

ISSUE 
TWO:

[¶5] Whether the 
district court erred in dismissing this case where the Plaintiff's pleadings 
allege concealment of the cause of Plaintiff's husband's death by Defendants, 
sufficient to toll even an absolute two-year statute of 
repose.

ISSUE 
THREE:

[¶6] Whether the 
District Court erred in failing to apply the four-year discovery statute of 
limitations from W. S. § 1-3-105 applicable to a survival cause of action under 
W.S. § 1-4-101.

FACTS

[¶7] Robinson's 
husband, Michael Paul Robinson, was employed by Pacific Power and Light from 
1982 to 1987 at the Jim Bridger Power Plant in Sweetwater County. Robinson 
alleges that, during the course of his employment, her husband was exposed to 
lethal levels of hydrazine. She contends that he began experiencing pain and 
suffering in July of 1987 and ultimately died on November 20, 1987, as a result 
of his exposure to this chemical.

[¶8] Robinson 
filed a complaint against the appellees on November 21, 1997. She filed an 
amended complaint on January 9, 1998, wherein she asserted that she did not 
discover the cause of her husband's death until December of 
1995.

[¶9] The 
appellees filed motions to dismiss, asserting that Robinson's wrongful death 
claim was time barred. In her response to these motions, Robinson maintained 
that the allegations in her complaints gave rise to an action arising under the 
wrongful death statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-38-101 and 1-38-102 (LEXIS 1999), 
or alternatively to a negligence claim. She contended that the negligence claim 
survived her husband's death under the survival statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-4-101 (LEXIS 1999).

[¶10] Before the 
hearing was held on the appellees' motions, the Wyoming Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438 (Wyo. 1998), wherein it held that 
the two-year limitation period contained within the wrongful death statutes is a 
condition precedent as opposed to a statute of limitation which can be tolled by 
the discovery rule. 955 P.2d  at 443. Because the decision in Corkill precluded a 
wrongful death claim, Robinson argued that her claim could still be brought 
under the survival statute.

[¶11] A hearing 
was held, and the district court granted the appellees' motions to dismiss, 
finding that "a personal injury action which subsequently resulted in death 
could only be maintained as a wrongful death action" and that this Court's 
Corkill decision precluded recovery by Robinson. Robinson appeals to this 
Court.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12] When 
reviewing a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court accepts all facts stated in 
the complaint as being true and views them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 1997). Dismissal is a drastic 
remedy and is sparingly granted. Rissler & McMurry Co. v. State, 917 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Wyo. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1091 (1997). Nevertheless, we 
will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of 
the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would 
entitle her to relief. Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶13] Neither of 
Robinson's first two issues was raised in the district court. We generally will 
not consider issues which are raised for the first time on appeal unless they 
are jurisdictional issues or issues of such a fundamental nature that they must 
be considered. WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 
1998).

A. Tolling the Two-Year 
Condition Precedent

[¶14] A party is 
required to plead a fraudulent concealment cause of action with particularity. 
Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop Partner ship, 946 P.2d 417, 424 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 
9(b). Robinson's claim that the two-year condition precedent contained within 
the wrongful death statutes should be tolled because the appellees "concealed 
and misrepresented material facts from [Robinson's] husband regarding the 
dangers associated with exposure to hydrazine" was not pleaded with sufficient 
particularity to enable us to conclude that the issue was raised below. We, 
therefore, decline to address that issue.

B. "Open Courts" 
Provision

[¶15] Robinson's 
"open courts" issue, although not raised below, involves a fundamental right of 
which we will take cognizance. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 54 (Wyo. 1992). 
She charges that the district court's dismissal of the complaint, based upon a 
strict application of the two-year condition precedent set forth in § 
1-38-102(d) of the wrongful death statutes, violates the "open courts" provision 
of Article 1, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, which provides in relevant 
part: "All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, 
reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or 
delay." She reasons that the application of the absolute two-year time limit of 
the wrongful death law foreclosed her legal remedy before she had knowledge of 
her claim. She asserts, therefore, that the statutory provision must necessarily 
yield to the constitutional provision.

[¶16] In her 
treatment of this issue, Robinson has not undertaken an appropriate 
constitutional analysis of the meaning of the "open courts" provision and has 
made no effort to discern the distinct purposes behind that provision. Her 
treatment falls far short of the sound historical research and rigorous 
constitutional analysis that form the necessary predicate to principled 
constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Dworkin v. L. F. P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909-12 (Wyo. 1992) (analysis of Article 1, Section 20 of the Wyoming 
Constitution). There have been scholarly examinations of the "open courts" 
provision which appears, in one form or another, in most of the state 
constitutions. See, e.g., William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's Open 
Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the 
Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 333 (1997); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By 
the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State 
Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 (1995); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 
65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197 (1992); John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State 
Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
237 (1991) (appendix is compilation of the provisions found in thirty-eight 
state constitutions); and Ruth A. Mickelsen, The Use and Interpretation of 
Article I, Section Eight of the Minnesota Constitution 1861-1984, 10 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 667 (1984). As the law review articles reveal, state courts 
have been active in interpreting the "open courts" provision in a variety of 
contexts and "have adopted an equally daunting variety of remedy guarantee 
interpretations." Schuman, supra, at 1203. A variety of interpretations may be 
found within a single court. See, e.g., Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. 
Butler Manufacturing Company, 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999); Estate of Makos by 
Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 564 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1997), 
overruled by Aicher by LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2000). 

[¶17] Forgoing 
appropriate constitutional analysis, Robinson supports her position on the issue 
presented by referring to two inapplicable Wyoming cases and two inapplicable 
Texas cases. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), was not a 
wrongful death case but rather involved a statute of repose in a homeowner's 
action against a builder for negligence and breach of implied warranty of 
fitness in the construction of footings for a house. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990), was also 
not a wrongful death case but instead involved a statute of limitations in a 
worker's compensation case in which benefits were awarded to a child who had 
been born out of wedlock after his father was killed in a work-related accident. 
The two Texas cases were also not wrongful death cases but rather involved a 
statute of limitations in medical negligence litigation. Texas Medical Liability 
Trust v. Garza, 918 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), overruled sub nom. State v. 
Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 933 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1996), and Jennings v. Burgess, 
917 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1996). That these nonwrongful death cases are clearly 
inapplicable to the issue presented is convincingly shown by Moreno v. Sterling 
Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1990), which is directly on point. In Moreno, 
the Texas Supreme Court held that the two-year absolute period of limitations in 
the Texas wrongful death law does not violate the "open courts" provision of the 
Texas Constitution. 787 S.W.2d  at 349. The essential facts were these: The 
plaintiffs' infants died of Reye's syndrome in 1981; days before their deaths, 
they had ingested doses of aspirin manufactured by the defendant; after the 
infants' deaths, their plaintiff parents learned that, in some instances, the 
use of aspirin factored into Reye's syndrome deaths; under Texas' wrongful death 
statute, suit must be brought not later than two years after the death; and, in 
1985, four years after the infants' deaths, the plaintiff parents brought their 
wrongful death actions. In the plaintiffs' "open courts" argument, they 
contended that the two-year absolute period made their "remedy contingent on an 
impossible condition, namely, the discovery of the connection between aspirin 
and Reye's syndrome within two years after [their children's deaths]." 787 S.W.2d  at 355. Further, the plaintiff parents contended that the two-year 
absolute period was "unreasonable and arbitrary because it denie[d them] a 
remedy that would have been available to [them] had [their children] lived 
instead of died." Id. The court reviewed Texas' "open courts" provision, which 
reads: "`All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, and 
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy1 by due course of law.'" Id.; see 
also Tex. Const. art. I, § 13.

[¶18] The court 
then noted:

In order to establish an 
"open courts" violation, a litigant must satisfy a two-part test: first, he must 
show that he has a well-recognized common-law cause of action that is being 
restricted; and second, he must show that the restriction is unreasonable or 
arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the 
statute.

[¶19] Moreno, 
787 S.W.2d  at 355. In considering whether the plaintiffs were asserting a 
common-law cause of action in their wrongful death suit, the court reviewed its 
precedent which recognized "the distinction between a court's power to apply 
`open courts' protection to common-law causes of action on the one hand, and 
statutorily created actions on the other." Id. The court 
explained:

[¶20] A 
common-law cause of action exists without a legislative enactment. As such, 
article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution mandates that the courts be open 
to pursuing such claims. The legislature is not entitled to restrict or abrogate 
a common-law cause of action without a reasonable basis and without providing an 
adequate substitute. If, however, a cause of action was not recognized at common 
law, but was itself created by the legislature, any legislative abrogation of 
the cause of action would not be a true abrogation of a constitutional right. 
Rather, the legislature would simply not have granted as extensive a right as it 
might have. See Castillo v. Hidalgo County Water Dist. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633, 636 
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) ("Open Courts" provision does not apply 
to wrongful death action, which is a statutory cause of action "that expands the 
rights of an individual beyond those granted by the common law"); see also Stout 
v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist., 733 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, 
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray, 712 S.W.2d 271, 273 
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

[¶21] This court 
has repeatedly said there was no recognized common-law cause of action for 
wrongful death. See Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 505-06; Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 n. 2 (Tex. 1980); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 186 
(Tex. 1968); Elliott v. City of Brownwood, 106 Tex. 292, 166 S.W. 1129 (1914); 
Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio R.R. Co. v. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189, 199 
(1879). Wrongful death causes of action owe their existence to statutes changing 
this common-law rule. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002; Duhart, 610 S.W.2d  at 742 n. 2; Marmon, 430 S.W.2d  at 182.[7]

[7] The 
common-law not only "denied a tort recovery for injury once the tort victim had 
died, it also refused to recognize any new and independent cause of action in 
the victim's dependents or heirs for their own loss at his death." W. Keeton, D. 
Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 
945 (5th ed. 1984). (citations omitted). This rule denying a common-law right to 
assert a wrongful death action was confirmed in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 
170 Eng. Reprint 1033 (1808). In response to Baker, the English Parliament, in 
1846, enacted "an Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by 
Accident," otherwise known as Lord Campbell's Act. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 § 2 
(1846). See Witty v. American General Distrib., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 
1987) ("Prior [to] the passage of Lord Campbell's Act, there was no statutory or 
common-law cause of action for wrongful death.") This statute served as the 
pattern for Texas' first wrongful death statute, enacted in 1860. Tex. Gen. Laws 
32; March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 (1877); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983). 

[¶21] 787 S.W.2d  
at 355-56. Relying on this precedent, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' 
constitutional attack on the two-year absolute statute is not premised upon 
restriction of a common-law cause of action, and, therefore, necessarily fails 
the first prong of the open courts test. See Castillo v. Hidalgo County Water 
Dist. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (wrongful 
death action did not exist at common law, and it is only by virtue of statutory 
authority that such suits can be maintained; therefore, "open courts" provision 
simply does not apply).

[¶23] 787 S.W.2d  
at 357. Moreno continues to be the law in Texas. See, e.g., Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264, 276-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); Andress v. MacGregor Medical 
Association, P.A., 5 S.W.3d 855, 858-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); Diaz v. Westphal, 
941 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1997); and Baptist Memorial Hospital System v. Arredondo, 
922 S.W.2d 120, 121-22 (Tex. 1996). The Moreno court also held, as we did in 
Corkill, 955 P.2d  at 443, that the discovery rule does not apply to the wrongful 
death law. Moreno, 787 S.W.2d  at 353 ("The overwhelming majority of states 
construing absolute statutes with similar or identical language to that found in 
[the Texas wrongful death statute] have held that the discovery rule does not 
apply"); see also Lujan v. Regents of University of California, 69 F.3d 1511, 
1516-21 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying New Mexico law) ("There was no right to sue 
for wrongful death at common law. A wrongful death statute creates and defines 
the right of action. Where the statute includes a limitations provision, `[t]he 
time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the 
liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone. It is a condition 
attached to the right to sue at all.'" 69 F.3d  at 1517 (citations omitted)); and 
see Bregant v. Fink, 724 S.W.2d 337, 338 (Mo.Ct.App. 1987) (legislature's 
creation of three-year statute of limitations in wrongful death statute does not 
violate state constitution's "open courts" provision); Ecker v. Town of West 
Hartford, 530 A.2d 1056, 1062-64 (Conn. 1987) (legislature's creation of 
three-year statute of repose in wrongful death statute does not violate state 
constitution's "open courts" provision).

[¶24] It has 
already been determined that we have no historical record from which we can 
determine the original understanding of the drafters and ratifiers of the "open 
courts" provision of the Wyoming Constitution. Mills, 837 P.2d  at 68-69 (Golden, 
J., dissenting, with Thomas, J., joining). It has been helpful to us to have the 
interpretations given the "open courts" language by the Texas decisions and the 
other decisions we have mentioned above. Like Texas and those other states, in 
Wyoming "[t]he right to sue for wrongful death is created purely by statute. The 
two year limitation upon the bringing of an action for wrongful death is an 
integral part of the statute itself, creating a condition precedent to the 
bringing of the action." Corkill, 955 P.2d  at 442. Robinson has given us no 
authority, and our own research has not revealed any, which would contradict the 
interpretation of the "open courts" language we have found in the authority we 
have considered. Given the strong presumption of constitutionality that a 
statute enjoys and the persuasive authority we have considered, we hold that the 
two-year condition precedent of our wrongful death statute does not violate 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.

C. Wrongful Death Versus 
Survival Action

[¶25] Robinson 
queries whether the two-year condition precedent for wrongful death actions or 
the four-year limitation for survival actions applies in this situation. The 
survival statute provides:

§ 1-4-101. Causes of 
action that survive.

[¶26] In 
addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action 
for mesne profits, injuries to the person, an injury to real or personal estate, 
or any deceit or fraud also survive. An action may be brought notwithstanding 
the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, but in actions for 
personal injury damages, if the person entitled thereto dies recovery is limited 
to damages for wrongful death.

[¶27] Section 
1-4-101. The wrongful death statutes provide in pertinent 
part:

§ 1-38-101. Actions for 
wrongful death which survive; proceedings against executor or administrator of 
person liable.

[¶28] Whenever 
the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as 
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages 
if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not 
ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death was caused 
under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree or 
manslaughter. If the person liable dies, the action may be brought against the 
executor or administrator of his estate. If he left no estate within the state 
of Wyoming, the court may appoint an administrator upon 
application.

[¶29] Section 
1-38-101.

§ 1-38-102. Action to be 
brought by personal representative; recovery exempt from debts; measure and 
element of damages; limitation period.

(d) Every such action 
shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the deceased 
person.

[¶30] Section 
1-38-102(d).

Robinson claims that, 
under Wyoming law, her suit can proceed under the survival statute and that her 
suit was filed within the statute's limitation as extended by the discovery 
rule. She maintains that, under this Court's decision in Parsons v. Roussalis, 
488 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1971), her case can be brought under either the 
wrongful death statutes or the survival statute but that the damages recoverable 
are limited to those which are allowed under the wrongful death statutes. The 
appellees cite DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479 (Wyo. 1977), for their 
argument that a personal injury which subsequently results in death can be 
maintained only as a wrongful death action and that, under the wrongful death 
statutes, Robinson's claim is barred by the two-year condition 
precedent.

[¶31] We 
acknowledge that our decision in Parsons states:

[¶32] Where a 
decedent's death is due to wrongful injuries, suit is permitted under either § 
1-28 [now § 1-4-101] or §§ 1-1065 and 1-1066 [now §§ 1-38-101 and 1-38-102]; but 
recovery is limited to that stemming from wrongful death-pain and suffering of 
the decedent, according to the words of the statute, having no part in 
establishing damages.

[¶33] 488 P.2d  
at 1052. We subsequently interpreted the survival statute, however, in 
DeHerrera, 565 P.2d  at 481-82. Relying on a Kansas case, even though it had been 
subsequently reversed, we held that, when a person dies as a result of injuries 
inflicted by another, the cause of action is limited to one for wrongful 
death:

[¶34] However, 
in Prowant v. Kings-X, Inc., 1959, 184 Kan. 413, 337 P.2d 1021, the court held 
that where a person is injured by another, if he dies from other causes, an 
action for personal injury survives but if death results from the same injuries, 
the action may not be maintained by the personal representative for the estate 
but may be brought under its wrongful death act for the next of kin. Thus, was 
reached the same result we visualize exists in Wyoming by virtue of § 1-28 [now 
§ 1-4-101], as interpreted by Par sons, [488 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1971),] along with 
our own holding here. The personal injury survival statute in Kansas had no such 
proviso as in § 1-28 [now § 1-4-101] but the court, by judicial interpretation, 
construed its wrongful death act to be the exclusive remedy if death ensued as a 
result of the negligence and the survival statute to apply if there was no death 
caused by the other. The court did there, by judicial fiat, what the Wyoming 
legislature has done by statute. The Kansas court later, on rehearing, though, 
in Prowant v. Kings-X, Inc., 1959, 185 Kan. 602, 347 P.2d 254, reversed itself 
and concluded that the survival statute means what it says and allows a recovery 
on behalf of the estate for its losses, separate and apart from the wrongful 
death act.

[¶35] DeHerrera, 
565 P.2d  at 483.

[¶36] We remain 
convinced that this is the correct interpretation of Wyoming's unique survival 
statute. Accordingly, because Robinson alleges that her husband's death resulted 
from injuries inflicted by the appellees, her claim is limited to a wrongful 
death cause of action.

[¶37] Given this 
result, we turn our attention to the question of whether Robinson's claim was 
filed within the required time limitation set forth in the wrongful death 
statutes. This Court addressed this issue in Corkill, wherein we held that the 
two-year limitation contained within § 1-38-102(d) creates a condition precedent 
rather than a statute of limitation and that the statute's language does not 
lend itself to the application of the discovery rule. 955 P.2d  at 442. In the 
case at bar, Robinson's husband's death occurred in November of 1987, and the 
two-year condition precedent began to run on that date. Robinson did not bring a 
claim against the appellees until ten years later; consequently, her claim is 
untimely. The district court, therefore, properly granted the appellees' motions 
to dismiss.

[¶38] 
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The word 
"remedy" appears in the constitutions of all states except Wyoming, Arizona, 
Florida (redress), Georgia, and Washington. Bauman, supra, at 284-88. 
Interestingly, Justice Stewart of Utah maintains that the absence of the word 
"remedy" or its equivalent suggests a guarantee limited to protection of the 
procedural rights of access to the courthouse and a speedy administration of 
judicial proceedings. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc., 974 P.2d  at 1208 
(Stewart, J., concurring).