Case Title: State v. Merrill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1987-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 86-421


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont
                                             Unit No. 2, Washington Circuit
Bradley D. Merrill
                                             September Term, 1987


Shireen A. Fisher, J.

Jane Woodruff, Washington County Deputy State's Attorney, Barre, for
plaintiff-appellee

Steven B. McLeod, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., and Peck, Dooley and Mahady, JJ., and Barney, C.J.
          (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     DOOLEY, J.   The defendant was convicted of simple assault following a
trial by jury.  Both at arraignment and throughout the trial he represented
himself.  He appeals his conviction, presenting the issue whether he made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.  The record below is
insufficient to determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Accordingly, the judgment is stricken and the case remanded for the trial
court to consider such post-trial motions as would allow the trial court in
the first instance to determine whether the waiver was knowing and
intelligent.
     The trial judge had two discussions with the defendant about
representation.  The first took place at arraignment.  The trial judge first
asked defendant if he wanted to "talk to the public defender or hire an
attorney."  Defendant replied that he did not.  He was then asked whether he
wanted to represent himself, to which he answered "Yes, that's correct."
After dealing with whether the defendant had heard his rights read, and
reviewing a copy of the information  and affidavit, and his plea of not
guilty, the judge advised him in several interchanges that he might do
better to have the advice of an attorney.  First, the judge suggested,
"[I]f I were you, I would consult with counsel.  And I'd be happy to give
you some time to talk to Mr. Rubin here or if you'd like to hire counsel
you'll be given an opportunity to do that."  The judge also said,     "And
before you talk to a police officer or the State it would be probably a good
idea to talk to an attorney about it [be]cause it is a serious offense."
     After defendant attempted to begin discussion of his self-defense
defense, the trial judge asked him not to "get into that now," saying:
         Because whatever you say now can be used against you
         later.  But if you have questions about that and whether
         you do have a defense and whether the charges are -- are
         valid or not, you should talk to a  lawyer about that.
         And Mr. Rubin is here today if you want to talk to him
         [about] it?

Defendant stated "No, I feel I'm -- I'm old enough to represent myself," to
which the judge responded, "I see you are old enough.  But I would suggest
to you, sir, that an attorney might have some knowledge that you might not
about what a valid defense would be or wouldn't be," and asked him what he
would like to do at that point.  He persisted both in his plea of not guilty
and, in response to the judge's question "Are you going to hire an attorney"
said "No, I'll be pro se."  The judge inquired, "You'll be representing
yourself?" and defendant responded "That's correct."  He was given the
waiver form to sign, and the rest of the arraignment formalities were
completed.
     The second discussion between defendant and the judge about defendant's
representation took place at trial.  During defendant's opening statement,
he said," This is kind of hard for me, you know, I don't have a lawyer.  I
can't afford to have one, so I have to do this myself."  The trial judge
called defendant and the prosecuting attorney to the bench, and told
defendant:
     Mr. Merrill, when you were arraigned . . . I explained to you that
     you had or might have a right to have a public defender. At that
     time, you chose not to apply for one.  Now do you, at this point,
     want a public defender, because if you can't afford a lawyer, I
     will assign one to you?

After continued inquiry yielded Mr. Merrill's statement that he did not want
to "tie up the Court," the trial judge said:
     It's not a question of tying up the Court, Mr. Merrill.  Your
     statement to the jury was inappropriate.  Now I'm not going to say
     anything because I'm afraid at this point it might prejudice your
     case, but I'm quite upset about the statement to . . . the jury
     because it is inappropriate.  You have a right that was explained
     to you, and I'm perfectly willing to let you exercise that right
     if you'd like to apply for a public defender, even to the point of
     continuing today's proceeding, if that's what you want. Now is it?

Defendant answered, "No," and reaffirmed that he was proceeding pro se and
waiving his right to counsel.
     This case presents the state of tension between two constitutional
rights: the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright,