Case Title: State v. Dennis

Citation: 1997-Ohio-372

Docket Number: 19961376

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DENNIS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Dennis (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 96-1376 — Submitted July 7, 1997 — Decided September 24, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 17156. 
 
During the early morning hours of June 5, 1994, defendant-appellant, 
Adremy L. Dennis, and Leroy “Lavar” Anderson stopped Dean R. Pizer in the 
Highland Square area of Akron and demanded money.  Pizer escaped, even though 
a shotgun blast was fired at him as he fled.  Shortly thereafter, Dennis shot and 
killed Kurt O. Kyle during a robbery in front of Kyle’s home at 818 Bloomfield 
Road.  Dennis later admitted he shot Kyle during a robbery, and he was 
subsequently convicted of aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder and 
aggravated robbery, and sentenced to death. 
 
Late on Saturday, June 4, and in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 5, 
Dennis and Anderson decided to go to a bar and “meet some chicks.”  Anderson 
spoke of “robbing somebody,” and the pair armed themselves with weapons:  
Dennis with a sawed-off shotgun and Anderson with a .25 caliber handgun.  As 
the pair proceeded to the bar, the shotgun, according to Dennis, accidentally went 
off.  Dennis then reloaded the weapon.  Before arriving at the bar, the two smoked 
marijuana. 
 
After some drinks, Anderson and Dennis left the bar and encountered Dean 
Pizer in an alley near West Market Street and South Highland Avenue.  The “taller 
one” of the two, whom Pizer identified as Dennis, was wearing a long black 
leather coat and told Pizer, “Give me your money. * * * Don’t try and run, don’t 
try and run.  You are going to die tonight, you are going to die.”  Pizer testified 
that he went backwards, slid and rolled down a hill, then ran away unharmed.  He 
 
2
heard a gunshot “just left of me.  There was a trash can or something got hit * * 
*.” 
 
That same night, Kurt Kyle had raced at Barberton Speedway and 
afterwards hosted several friends and family members at his home for a cookout 
and socializing.  Later, as one of his guests, Martin Eberhart, was leaving, Kyle 
walked with him to his car where the two continued conversing for a short time.  
While Eberhart was seated in his car talking with Kyle, they heard a loud noise, 
which Kyle told Eberhart was a gunshot.  About three minutes later, two black 
males approached them in the driveway, out of the view of Kyle’s other guests.  
The man Eberhart identified as Anderson was wearing a green and orange Miami 
Hurricanes Starter jacket, and demanded money while pointing a gun at Eberhart’s 
neck.  Eberhart slowly reached under the car seat for his wallet and handed 
Anderson $15. 
 
At the same time, Dennis, whom Eberhart described as wearing a long, 
three-quarter-length dark coat, asked Kyle for money.  However, Kyle searched 
through his pockets and told Dennis that he had no money with him.  Dennis then 
pulled out a sawed-off shotgun and shot Kyle in the head at point-blank range.  
Kyle died instantly of hypovolemic shock (loss of blood) due to a gunshot wound 
that severed both carotid arteries.  According to Eberhart, the two assailants ran 
away together “sprinting very fast.” 
 
Anita Foraker, who lived in the neighborhood, was out walking her dog at 
around 1:30 a.m. that morning and heard a “loud pop type of sound.”  About a 
minute later, she observed two young black males headed in the opposite direction 
running by her on the other side of Bloomfield Road.  She heard one say to the 
other, “Did you get it?” 
 
3
 
A few days after the murder, Akron police received an anonymous phone 
call stating that someone at 371 Grand Avenue knew about the homicide that past 
weekend.  Detective Donald L. Gaines and another detective went to the address, 
where they met Shirley Morgan and told her that a possible suspect was staying at 
her house.  Morgan invited the detectives in and gave them permission to look 
around the house and to speak to her son, seventeen-year-old Lavar Anderson.  
When the detectives went down to the basement, they noticed a Miami Hurricanes 
jacket and a long, dark overcoat hanging up in the far corner on a bedrail.  At that 
time, they took Anderson into custody, and he provided detectives information 
about the location of the murder weapon. 
 
After procuring a search warrant, police seized several items from Morgan’s 
basement, including the two coats, a .25 caliber pearl handle handgun, a 20 gauge 
sawed-off shotgun, and seven shotgun shells. 
 
Upon completing the search of Morgan’s home, Gaines received a call from 
two officers at 120 Burton Avenue, which was in the same general neighborhood.  
The police surrounded the house on Burton and thereafter apprehended Adremy 
Dennis. 
 
At the police station, Dennis was advised of his Miranda rights, which he 
waived.  Dennis told several versions as to his whereabouts on June 4-5, 1994 to 
Detectives Gaines, Lacy, and Offret.  After Dennis’s second statement, Gaines 
produced a sawed-off shotgun, which Dennis immediately claimed was his own.  
In his fourth statement to detectives, Dennis admitted that he and Anderson had 
planned some robberies that night and admitted holding up Pizer, Eberhart and 
Kyle.  However, while Dennis admitted aiming the sawed-off shotgun at Kyle, he 
also claimed the gun went off accidentally.  Dennis agreed to allow detectives to 
tape his statement. 
 
4
 
In his taped statement, Dennis said that he and Anderson had smoked 
marijuana and then drank at a bar before the robberies and murder.  While Dennis 
admitted he fired the sawed-off shotgun three times that night, he asserted that 
each shot was accidental and that he “could barely focus” when they came upon 
Kyle and Eberhart.  After shooting Kyle, Dennis claimed he almost fell down and 
that Anderson had to help him flee the scene. 
 
Yellow shotgun shell casings were found a few days after the murder.  One 
was found in the area where Pizer was accosted, the other was discovered in front 
of Kyle’s home.  Nancy E. Bulger, a forensic scientist with the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation (“BCI”), determined that the two casings were 
fired from the sawed-off shotgun that Dennis identified as his own. 
 
The grand jury indicted Dennis on one count of aggravated murder, one 
count of attempted murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of 
possession of dangerous ordnance.  All of the counts carried a firearms 
specification, and the dangerous ordnance charge also carried a physical-harm 
specification.  The aggravated murder count also carried two death specifications:  
murder during an aggravated robbery, where Dennis was the principal offender 
(R.C. 2929.04[A][7]); and murder committed as a course of conduct involving the 
killing or attempt to kill two or more persons (R.C. 2929.04[A][5]). 
 
A jury trial commenced December 12, 1994.  After deliberation, the jury 
found Dennis guilty as charged. 
 
During the mitigation hearing, several witnesses testified on Dennis’s 
behalf, including an aunt on his mother’s side, his foster mother, and a 
psychologist, Dr. James L. Brown.  Dr. Brown concluded that he found at least 
three factors militating against imposing the death penalty on Dennis: (1)  
Dennis’s development — he lacked effective “parenting” until he was about 
 
5
fifteen years old; (2) Dennis’s intoxication at the time of the offense, due to 
consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana dipped in embalming fluid, which 
further impaired his judgment; and (3) Dennis’s youth. 
 
Dennis gave unsworn testimony and claimed that he didn’t intend to shoot 
Kyle, and that he “was drunk and nervous and scared and the gun went off and I 
ran.”  Dennis expressed remorse for what he had done and stated that he was sorry 
for what he had done to the Kyle family. 
 
The parties stipulated that Dennis has no adult criminal record and only two 
juvenile adjudications: criminal damaging and receiving stolen property. 
 
The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court imposed a 
death sentence on Dennis.  The court also imposed consecutive and concurrent 
sentences for Dennis’s other offenses.  Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed 
the convictions and sentence of death. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Maureen O’Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, Philip D. 
Bogdanoff and Paul M. Maric, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Peter T. Cahoon and Nathan A. Ray, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  In this appeal, Dennis has raised twenty-one 
propositions of law.  Finding none meritorious, we affirm his convictions.  In 
addition, we have independently reviewed the record, weighed the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors, and examined the proportionality of 
the death sentence in this case to the penalty imposed in similar cases.  Upon a 
complete review of the record, we affirm Dennis’s convictions and sentences. 
I 
Pretrial/Voir Dire Issues 
 
6
 
In Proposition of Law No. 1, Dennis contends the trial court erred in failing 
to suppress his oral statements to police.  Dennis further submits that the state 
failed to show that he was sober when he waived his Miranda rights, and therefore 
under the totality of circumstances, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that he 
understood his Miranda rights. 
 
During the suppression hearing, Akron Police Lieutenant Robert Offret 
testified that he and two other detectives interviewed Dennis after he had been 
given Miranda warnings.  In the taped interview, Dennis stated that he had not 
been under a doctor’s care or on any medications, and had not consumed any 
alcohol.  However, Dennis admitted to smoking “two joints” of marijuana two 
hours earlier.  Nevertheless, Offret stated there wasn’t anything about Dennis’s 
behavior that would have led him to believe that Dennis was intoxicated.  
Moreover, Dennis’s responses in the taped interview do not exhibit any of the 
usual symptoms of intoxication, such as slurred speech, inattentiveness, and 
inability to understand questions. 
 
Whether a statement was made voluntarily and whether an accused 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and right 
against self-incrimination are distinct issues.  Both, however, are measured by the 
totality-of-circumstances standard.  State v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 
527 N.E.2d 844, 854. 
 
A review of the tape and transcript indicates that after police read Dennis 
each Miranda right, they asked him if he understood it, and he responded 
affirmatively.  In addition, Dennis initialed each line on the Miranda warning 
form, acknowledging that he understood his rights, and he signed the waiver of 
rights.  Evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accused is strong proof 
that the waiver was valid.  Clark; see North Carolina v. Butler (1979), 441 U.S. 
 
7
369, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758-1759, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 293.  Moreover, there is 
no evidence that police subjected Dennis to threats or physical abuse, or deprived 
him of food, sleep, or medical treatment.  See State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 
20, 28, 544 N.E.2d 895, 908. 
 
Under the totality of circumstances, Dennis made a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition 
of Law No. 1. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 2, Dennis argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to suppress items seized pursuant to a search warrant at the residence of 
Shirley Morgan.  Dennis asserts that he has standing to object to a search of 
Morgan’s home, and that he had an expectation of privacy in the area where the 
items were seized, since he allegedly had permission to spend part of the night 
there on the night of the murder. 
 
A few days after the Kyle murder, police received an anonymous phone call 
supplying information regarding the whereabouts of a possible suspect in the 
murder.  After obtaining this information, police received permission from 
Morgan to speak to her son, Lavar Anderson, and to look around her house for 
coats that were reportedly worn by the suspects to the murder.  After finding coats 
in the basement that matched the description of the coats they sought, the police 
asked permission to take them, but Morgan refused their request and said she 
needed to talk to her attorney.  At that time, police took Anderson into custody, 
and Anderson later told them where he and Dennis hid the weapons in the 
basement after the murder.  Based on this information and their personal 
observations, police obtained a search warrant for Morgan’s home and later seized 
the coats and the weapons used in the robberies and murder. 
 
8
 
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may not be vicariously 
asserted by others.  Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 
961, 966-967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, 187; Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 133-
134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394; State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio 
St.3d 298, 306, 544 N.E.2d 622, 631.  A defendant bears the burden of proving not 
only that the search was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the area searched.  See Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 448 U.S. 98, 104, 
100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641. 
 
Dennis has failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
Morgan’s residence.  While an overnight guest has standing to challenge the 
legality of a search, Minnesota v. Olson (1990), 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 
1684, 1688, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 93, there was no evidence that Dennis stayed 
overnight or that he was residing at Morgan’s home at the time of the search.  In 
fact, once Morgan discovered that Dennis was in her house the night of the 
murder, she made him go home. 
 
Dennis has failed to demonstrate that he had standing to object to the 
warrant or subsequent search.  Coleman.  Moreover, Morgan clearly had authority 
over the premises that she permitted police to enter and view.  See Illinois v. 
Rodriguez (1990), 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 
161.  The police had Morgan’s consent to search the premises, and the items 
seized were therefore the fruits of a valid search.  Accordingly, Proposition of Law 
No. 2 is not well taken. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 5, Dennis contends that the court erred in 
refusing to excuse juror Terri Harris once it discovered that she had been a victim 
of crime. 
 
9
 
During the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations, the trial court learned that 
Harris had been a victim of sexual abuse as a child, when a detective asked the 
court to momentarily excuse Harris from deliberations in order to sign a criminal 
complaint.  The court brought Harris into chambers before the parties and 
conducted a voir-dire examination of her at that time.  Harris explained that she 
had decided not to mention the sexual abuse during the original voir-dire 
examination because she did not feel it fit the definition of violent crime.  She 
reached this conclusion after asking the trial judge’s bailiff during jury selection 
for a definition of “violent crime.”  Harris indicated that at that time, she 
concluded that her experience was not “violent” when compared to murder, and, 
therefore, did not bring it to the court’s attention. 
 
The court questioned Harris extensively, and she was adamant that her 
status as a victim of sexual abuse had nothing to do with what happened to the 
Kyle family or Dennis, and that she could separate the two experiences and be 
impartial.  The court asked defense counsel if they had anything they wished to put 
on the record, and defense counsel indicated they did not.  After Harris returned to 
the jury room, counsel for both sides informed the court that just prior to trial they 
became aware of the fact that Harris had been a witness to sexual abuse.  Counsel 
for both parties agreed that it probably wasn’t necessary for them to act upon it.  
However, at the end of the trial, defense counsel filed a motion for mistrial upon 
learning that Harris was a victim of sexual abuse, and not just a witness. 
 
A trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining a juror’s ability to be 
impartial.  State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 288, 6 OBR 345, 351, 452 
N.E.2d 1323, 1331.  The trial court’s decision to allow Harris to remain on the jury 
did not amount to an abuse of discretion, especially in light of the court’s voir-dire 
examination of Harris conducted in chambers during penalty-phase deliberations.  
 
10
See State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 250-251, 15 OBR 379, 389, 473 
N.E.2d 768, 781.  Accordingly, Proposition of Law No. 5 is overruled. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 7, Dennis asserts the trial court erred in 
permitting the prosecution’s peremptory challenges of two prospective jurors who 
were African-Americans in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 
106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.  Dennis submits that the prosecution failed to 
provide a neutral explanation for exercising peremptory challenges on prospective 
jurors McGinnis and Dortch. 
 
In order to state a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under 
Batson, an accused must demonstrate (1) that members of a recognized racial 
group were peremptorily challenged, and (2) that the facts and circumstances raise 
an inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges to exclude 
prospective jurors on account of their race.  State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 577, 582, 589 N.E.2d 1310, 1313; State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 
444-445, 653 N.E.2d 271, 282.  If the accused makes a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the state must then come forward with a neutral explanation.  Id.  
However, a trial court’s finding of no discriminatory intent “will not be reversed 
on appeal absent a determination that it was clearly erroneous.”  Hernandez at 
583, 589 N.E.2d at 1314. 
 
The trial court held that “with Batson in mind,” the state’s peremptory 
challenges of prospective jurors McGinnis and Dortch were proper.  Moreover, the 
court’s ruling was not “clearly erroneous” under Hernandez.  The facts and 
circumstances underlying the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptories on the two 
prospective jurors in issue do not appear to be racially motivated.  Both 
prospective jurors expressed opposition to the death penalty on religious grounds.  
While, after defense questioning, both prospective jurors eventually opined that 
 
11
they thought they could impose a death sentence, the fact remains that both were 
still opposed to capital punishment on religious grounds. 
 
The prosecutor explained that he exercised peremptory challenges on 
McGinnis and Dortch based on their views of the death penalty.  In addition, the 
prosecutor cited the fact that Dortch stated she had a cousin who had been 
murdered.  Thus, the prosecutor gave a race-neutral explanation for the 
peremptory challenges.  Hill; Hernandez.  Accordingly, Proposition of Law No. 7 
is without merit. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 9, Dennis argues that the prosecutor’s systematic 
use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who expressed 
reservations about the death penalty deprived him of an impartial jury. 
 
Once again, Dennis claims error in the exclusion of prospective jurors 
McGinnis and Dortch from the panel.  However, apart from excluding prospective 
jurors based on gender or race, as discussed above, prosecutors can exercise a 
peremptory challenge for any reason, without inquiry, and without a court’s 
control.  See, e.g., State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 13, 564 N.E.2d 408, 
419.  Therefore, we overrule Proposition of Law No. 9. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 8, Dennis contends he was denied a fair trial 
when prospective jurors Spencer and Williams were improperly excused for cause 
based on their views on the death penalty. 
 
In State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 327, 652 N.E.2d 1000, 1006, 
we reaffirmed the standard in Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 
844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 
 
“ ‘The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be 
excluded for cause based on his views on capital punishment is whether the juror’s 
 
12
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.’ ” 
 
Prospective juror Spencer stated unequivocally during voir dire that she did 
not feel she could recommend the death sentence.  She further stated that she 
would have a “lot of trouble” imposing death, even if the court instructed the jury 
that it was worthy of consideration.  Spencer also indicated that she did not feel 
she could put her beliefs aside and follow the law.  When asked if she could 
recommend the death penalty, Spencer replied, “I don’t feel I could really do that.” 
 
Prospective juror Williams also indicated that based on religious and moral 
grounds, she could not follow the law and recommend the death penalty.  After 
further questioning, Williams insisted that “[i]t will be a big problem for me to 
sign and say that, yes, I believe in the death penalty or I believe this person should 
be given the death penalty.” 
 
We have previously stated that where the trial court is left with a definite 
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially 
apply the law, deference must be given to the trial judge who sees and hears the 
prospective juror.  State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38, 526 N.E.2d 274, 
284-285.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the two 
prospective jurors for cause.  Both expressed views that would prevent or 
substantially impair them from fulfilling their duties as jurors.  State v. Tyler 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 30, 553 N.E.2d 576, 586.  Accordingly, we overrule 
Proposition of Law No. 8. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 3, Dennis argues the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to sever the counts with which he was charged.  Dennis asserts that the 
charges against him regarding his encounter with Pizer are not sufficiently related 
in point of time and circumstance with the Kyle murder-robbery. 
 
13
 
Crim.R. 8(A) permits joinder of offenses that are a part of a common 
scheme or plan, or part of a course of criminal conduct.  Crim.R. 14, however, 
requires a separate trial of counts if it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses for trial. 
 
In our view, Dennis’s claim must be rejected because he fails to demonstrate 
how he was prejudiced by the joinder of counts.  State v. Roberts (1980), 62 Ohio 
St.2d 170, 175, 16 O.O.3d 201, 204, 405 N.E.2d 247, 251; State v. Benner (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 301, 305, 533 N.E.2d 701, 708.  See, also, State v. Lott (1990), 51 
Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293, 298.  Similar to the situation presented in 
State v. Hamblin (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 524 N.E.2d 476, the counts alleging 
the crimes committed against Pizer, Kyle, and Eberhart were sufficiently related in 
point of time and circumstance.  The crimes were the fruit of Dennis and 
Anderson’s plan to rob some people that night.  Both incidents occurred within a 
few blocks and a few minutes of each other.  See State v. Woodard (1993), 68 
Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 623 N.E.2d 75, 78.  Moreover, the robbery and attempted 
murder of Pizer strongly supports the inference that Dennis intended to kill Kyle, 
thus negating Dennis’s assertion that the Kyle murder was accidental.  Cf. Evid.R. 
404(B).  Thus, the Pizer robbery would have been admissible even if no joinder 
had been accomplished, in order to prove intent and the multiple-murder death 
penalty specification in the Kyle murder.  In any event, the failure to sever the 
counts did not amount to an abuse of discretion.  See Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 
250, 15 OBR at 388-389, 473 N.E.2d at 780-781.  Therefore, we reject Proposition 
of Law No. 3. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 6, Dennis complains that he was denied due 
process when the trial court precluded defense counsel from questioning 
prospective jurors about specific mitigating factors.  However, as Dennis 
 
14
concedes, we rejected this same argument in State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
381, 385-387, 659 N.E.2d 292, 300-301.  Similar to Wilson, the trial court here 
allowed adequate, detailed questioning of prospective jurors to expose faults that 
would render a juror ineligible.  No abuse of discretion is apparent, and, therefore, 
this proposition of law is overruled. 
II 
Trial Issues 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 11, Dennis contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of 
evidence.  Dennis asserts that the charge of attempted aggravated murder of Pizer 
is not supported by the evidence, and that, therefore, the attendant course of 
conduct specification cannot be maintained. 
 
When reviewing a claim as to sufficiency of evidence, the relevant inquiry 
is whether any rational factfinder viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the state could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573; State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 
492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The verdict will not be disturbed unless the 
appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached 
by the trier-of-fact.  Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273, 574 N.E.2d at 503.  See, also, 
State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 9 O.O.3d 401, 381 N.E.2d 184, 
syllabus. 
 
At trial, Pizer testified that Dennis and another individual accosted him with 
guns when he was in the Highland Square area on the night or early morning hours 
of June 4-5, 1994.  Dennis did most of the talking, and asked Pizer for his money.  
Then, Dennis told him, “Don’t try and run, don’t try and run.  You are going to die 
 
15
tonight, you are going to die.”  When Pizer fled the scene, he “heard a gunshot just 
left of me.  There was a trash can or something got hit.” 
 
In his recorded statement, Dennis admitted that he and Anderson held up a 
man near the bar in Highland Square.  Dennis stated that when the victim took off 
running, “I got the gauge [shotgun] out and * * * shot it again.” 
 
One witness testified that two days after the shooting, he found a yellow 
shotgun shell on the sidewalk near the bar in the Highland Square area.  The 
shotgun shell was determined to have been fired from the murder weapon. 
 
Construing this evidence in a light most favorable to the state, a rational 
factfinder could have found the essential elements of the attempted aggravated 
murder charge and course-of-conduct specification proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Therefore, we overrule Proposition of Law No. 11. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 17, Dennis asserts the trial court erred in 
admitting what he claims were gruesome, prejudicial, and cumulative 
photographs.   
 
Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs and similar 
evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Maurer,  15 Ohio St.3d 
at 264, 15 OBR at 401, 473 N.E.2d at 791.  Nonrepetitive photographs in capital 
cases, even if gruesome, are admissible if the probative value of each photograph 
outweighs the danger of material prejudice to the accused.  Maurer at paragraph 
seven of the syllabus; see, also, State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601-
602, 605 N.E.2d 916, 923. 
 
Dennis specifically objected to three of the five photos of the murder victim 
admitted at trial.  Thus, any error in the admission of the other two photos is 
waived due to the lack of an objection.  See Slagle, supra, 65 Ohio St.3d at 604, 
605 N.E.2d at 924-925. 
 
16
 
One of the photos alleged to be objectionable, State Exhibit 18, shows 
Kyle’s body on the ground in his driveway next to Eberhart’s car, with Kyle’s 
hand in his pocket.  This photo supports Eberhart’s testimony as to the robbery, 
and that Kyle was searching through his pockets looking for money.  State Exhibit 
19, a closer view of Kyle’s body, shows the wound on the right side of his head, 
and his head in a pool of blood.  This photograph corroborates Eberhart’s and the 
expert’s testimony that Kyle was shot at point-blank range.  It also supports 
Eberhart’s and the coroner’s testimony as to the cause and immediacy of death, 
and is probative of Dennis’s purposeful intent. 
 
The last photo, State Exhibit 20, is arguably cumulative to the others, 
especially State Exhibit 19.  This photo, a close-up of Kyle’s head, clearly shows 
the entrance wound from the shotgun blast.  While this photo displays more 
explicit detail in support of the state’s witnesses testimony, either this photo or 
State Exhibit 19 perhaps should have been excluded. 
 
In view of the abundant evidence of Dennis’s guilt, his substantial rights 
were not affected.  In addition, any prejudicial impact this evidence may have had 
on the sentencing phase is eliminated by this court’s independent review of the 
sentence.  State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 486, 653 N.E.2d 304, 318; 
State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 115, 559 N.E.2d 710, 721.  
Proposition of Law No. 17 is without merit. 
III 
Penalty Phase Issues 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 4, Dennis argues the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to merge the convictions of aggravated robbery of Eberhart and Kyle 
into the allied offense conviction for aggravated murder.  However, merger 
pursuant to R.C. 2941.25 is not warranted in this case because aggravated robbery 
 
17
is not an allied offense of similar import to aggravated murder.  See State v. Moss 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 23 O.O.3d 447, 433 N.E.2d 181, paragraph two of the 
syllabus; State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 528 N.E.2d 1237, 
1242; Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d at 342-343, 652 N.E.2d at 1016.   
 
Dennis also claims error in the court’s failure to merge the attempted 
aggravated murder of Pizer count with the course-of-conduct specification.  
However, specifications required for the imposition of the death penalty do not, in 
and of themselves, constitute separate criminal offenses.  Therefore, a 
specification cannot merge with a substantive offense.  State v. Adams (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 223, 226, 7 O.O.3d 393, 395, 374 N.E.2d 137, 139-140.  “Since the 
specification does not charge a separate offense and R.C. 2941.25(A) relates to 
instances where the same conduct of the defendant constitutes allied offenses of 
similar import, that statute is not applicable.”  Id. at 226-227, 7 O.O.3d at 395, 374 
N.E.2d at 140.  Accordingly, Proposition of Law No. 4 is overruled. 
 
In Propositions of Law Nos. 10 and 13, Dennis argues that the trial court 
erred in allowing victim-impact testimony by Craig Kyle, brother of the decedent, 
and Doreen Kyle, decedent’s mother. 
 
During the mitigation phase, Craig Kyle testified about the close 
relationship he had experienced with his brother, as well as the good relationship 
decedent had had with his parents.  At the sentencing proceeding held after the 
jury was discharged but before sentence was pronounced, Doreen Kyle made a 
statement wherein she eulogized the accomplishments and character of her late 
son.  However, neither statement expressed any opinion or suggestion as to what 
sentence should be imposed on defendant, and therefore did not constitute 
prejudicial error. 
 
18
 
In State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 439, 650 N.E.2d 878, 
882, this court recognized Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 
2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, and held that statements restricted to the impact the 
victim’s death has on family and friends did not constitute prejudicial error under 
the circumstances therein.  Nor do we think the statements in issue here run afoul 
of the Fautenberry standard. 
 
Moreover, the statement made by Doreen Kyle was made after the jury was 
discharged, and thus could not have affected the jury’s sentence recommendation.  
Even if it is assumed, as Dennis suggests, that the trial court necessarily 
considered the testimony of Dennis Kyle’s mother in its sentencing, this court will 
presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent 
evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from 
the record.  State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759; 
State v. Eubank (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 183, 187, 14 O.O.3d 416, 418, 398 N.E.2d 
567, 570.  A review of the transcript and sentencing opinion reveals no prejudice 
to Dennis.  Therefore, we reject both Propositions of Law Nos. 10 and 13. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 12, Dennis claims error in the trial court’s failure 
to give the jury a supplemental instruction pursuant to State v. Howard (1989), 42 
Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d 188, when the jury indicated that it was unable to reach 
a unanimous verdict. 
 
At the close of the mitigation phase, the jury retired to deliberate sometime 
during the afternoon.  On that same day following their dinner break, the jury sent 
a note to the court asking, “Judge Spicer, what do we do when we have voted four 
times and we are unable to come to a unanimous verdict?”  In the presence of 
counsel for both parties, the court responded to the jury within fifteen minutes as 
follows:  “This has been a very short time of deliberation on a very major case.  
 
19
You must not be discouraged and continue your deliberations.  Reread the 
instructions.  Judge Spicer.” 
 
In Howard, we rejected further use of the so-called Allen charge that was a 
standard supplemental instruction given to juries which were deadlocked on the 
question of conviction or acquittal.  This court then adopted a new supplemental 
instruction to be given to deadlocked juries in the trial phase of a case.  This court 
has not addressed the applicability of a Howard charge in the penalty phase of a 
capital case, and therefore we need not address that issue here to resolve this 
proposition. 
 
The trial judge’s response was proper, neutral, and noncoercive under the 
circumstances.  The jury was not deadlocked, since it had deliberated only a few 
hours before it posed the question in issue.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of 
Law No. 12. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 14, Dennis asserts that the trial court erred by 
making its sentence decision prior to defendant’s statement and the arguments of 
counsel at the sentencing proceeding.  Dennis asserts that the following statement 
made by the court indicates its predisposition:  “It’s my understanding at this point 
that, obviously, we are here today for sentencing, and I have done my homework 
and made my determinations.” 
 
R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) requires the court to consider, inter alia, relevant 
evidence, the statement of defendant and the arguments of counsel, before 
imposing sentence.  However, the court’s statement cited above does not 
necessarily indicate that the court ignored the statement of Dennis or the 
arguments of counsel.  Dennis’s assertion to the contrary is merely speculative.  
Even assuming that Dennis raises a legitimate point, our independent review will 
 
20
readily cure any perceived error in this vein.  See State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 
170, 555 N.E.2d at 304.  Therefore, we reject Proposition of Law No. 14. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 16, Dennis contends that the prosecutor made an 
improper and inflammatory statement of personal opinion during closing 
argument: 
 
“I urge you to give this man the same consideration he gave Kurt 
Kyle on the morning of June 5, 1994, and if you do that, you will find that 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors and you will 
return to this Court a recommendation that the death sentence be imposed in 
this case and I ask you to do that.” 
 
Defense counsel did not object to this statement, and therefore waived all 
but plain error.  Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 604, 605 N.E.2d at 925.  Plain error does 
not exist unless it can be said “that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would 
clearly have been otherwise.”  See, e.g., State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
344, 357, 662 N.E.2d 311, 322. 
 
Nevertheless, the statement complained of by Dennis does not appear to be 
either inflammatory or prejudicial.  Even if the statement is characterized as the 
prosecutor’s personal opinion, such a statement is permissible, since it was based 
on the evidence presented during the penalty phase.  See State v. Durr (1991), 58 
Ohio St.3d 86, 96, 568 N.E.2d 674, 684.  Proposition of Law No. 16 is without 
merit. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 19, Dennis reviews the mitigation evidence 
presented before the trial court and claims that imposition of the death sentence 
was inappropriate in this case.  We disagree and find this proposition to be without 
merit.  See our discussion of “Independent Review and Proportionality Analysis,” 
infra. 
 
21
IV 
Constitutional Issues 
 
Propositions of Law Nos. 18, 20, and 21 raise arguments we have already 
rejected numerous times.  See, e.g., State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d at 
28-29, 528 N.E.2d at 1242-1243, and paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. 
Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 317, 652 N.E.2d 988, 997; State v. Steffen 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the 
syllabus; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 168, 15 OBR 311, 314-315, 
473 N.E.2d 264, 273; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 63-66, 512 N.E.2d 
585, 592-594; State v. Lawrence (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 24, 27, 541 N.E.2d 451, 
455; State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 198, 616 N.E.2d 909, 920; 
and State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 141, 22 OBR 203, 217-218, 489 
N.E.2d 795, 810.  We summarily overrule these propositions.  State v. Poindexter 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
V 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 15, Dennis asserts that he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel during voir dire and the mitigation phase.  
 
Reversal of a conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance requires 
defendant to show, first, “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and second, 
that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense * * * so seriously as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 
668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  However, Dennis has not 
demonstrated prejudice — “a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”  State v. Bradley (1989), 
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
22
 
Dennis first cites counsel’s failure to object to the court’s numerous 
statements to prospective jurors that their role in the penalty phase was merely to 
“recommend” a sentence to the court.  However, counsel’s decision not to 
interrupt reflected an “objective standard of reasonable representation,”  Bradley, 
at paragraph two of the syllabus, given this court’s prior pronouncements on this 
issue.  See, e.g., Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 77-78, 623 N.E.2d at 81. 
 
Dennis next asserts that counsel failed to inform the jurors that intoxication 
could be considered for its effect on the accused’s mental state and the mental 
element of the crime.  Dennis also contends that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to request an instruction on intoxication as a mitigating factor. 
 
However, counsel’s decision to not pursue some type of intoxication 
defense was not unreasonable, especially since two key witnesses, Pizer and 
Eberhart, testified that Dennis did not appear to be intoxicated.  In addition, while 
intoxication may reduce one’s inhibitions, even severe intoxication can co-exist 
with purpose to kill.  State v. Hicks (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 72, 74, 583 N.E.2d 
1030, 1034.  Likewise, counsel did not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable representation by failing to request an instruction on intoxication as a 
mitigating factor. “[V]oluntary drunkenness and drug use are not mitigating 
factors.”  Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 614, 605 N.E.2d at 931.  At best, voluntary 
intoxication is a “weak” mitigating factor entitled to little or no weight.  State v. 
D’Ambrosio (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 141, 145, 652 N.E.2d 710, 714.  Moreover, this 
court has held that trial courts are not required to instruct the jury on individual, 
nonstatutory mitigating factors which can be considered by the jury under the R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7) “catch-all” factor.  Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 122, 559 N.E.2d at 
710. 
 
23
 
Dennis also criticizes counsel’s failure to ask prospective jurors questions 
about attitudes on race; questions about whether they could consider the 
mitigation evidence that would be presented; or questions “tailored to fit the 
circumstances” of this case.  However, “[t]he conduct of voir dire by defense 
counsel does not have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions have to 
be asked.”  State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1056.  
Dennis does not demonstrate prejudice that affected the outcome of his trial under 
Strickland and Bradley. 
 
Dennis also cites counsel’s failure to “rehabilitate” favorable prospective 
jurors, to timely object to the excusal of two prospective jurors for their views on 
the death penalty, or to object to the peremptory challenges of the prosecution. 
 
We rejected a similar “failure to rehabilitate” argument in Bradley, 42 Ohio 
St.3d at 143, 538 N.E.2d at 381.  Counsel is in a much better position to determine 
if jurors could be “rehabilitated” than this court, and a decision not to 
“rehabilitate” particular jurors is within the scope of acceptable practice 
envisioned in Strickland.  Counsel’s failure to object to the excusal of the two 
prospective jurors for their death penalty views and failure to object to the 
prosecution’s peremptory challenges did not constitute error.  (See discussion 
under Propositions of Law Nos. 7, 8, and 9.)  Since none of these claims amounts 
to reversible error, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.  
 
Last, Dennis submits that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
supplemental jury instruction pursuant to State v. Howard, and for failing to 
request a mistrial when the court allowed juror Harris to remain on the jury.  Yet, 
as discussed under Proposition of Law No. 12, a Howard instruction was not 
warranted at the time the jury sent its note to the trial judge indicating it could not 
reach a unanimous verdict. 
 
24
 
Nor did counsel’s failure to make a timely motion for a mistrial constitute 
ineffective assistance, since Dennis does not show how he was prejudiced by the 
court’s failure to remove juror Harris.  Moreover, the court did entertain defense 
counsel’s motion for a mistrial on that ground after the jury was excused.  The 
court overruled the motion for mistrial, and we find no abuse of discretion in this 
decision.  See State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182, 31 OBR 375, 382, 
510 N.E.2d 343, 349-350.  Proposition of Law No. 15 is without merit. 
VI 
Independent Review and Proportionality Analysis 
 
After independent assessment, we find that the evidence supports beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that Dennis murdered Kurt Kyle 
while committing aggravated robbery and that Dennis was the principal offender.  
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  In addition, the evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt 
the aggravating circumstance that Dennis attempted to kill Pizer before murdering 
Kyle as part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing or attempt to 
kill two or more persons.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
 
Nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense appears mitigating.  
Dennis and Lavar Anderson decided to go out on a robbery spree armed with guns.  
Perhaps to help them summon up the courage to do so, the pair smoked marijuana 
and drank at a bar before encountering their first victim, Dean Pizer.  Dennis told 
Pizer, “you are going to die tonight, * * *,” and tried to kill Pizer when he fled.  
Minutes later, Dennis and Anderson held up Kyle and Eberhart in Kyle’s 
driveway.  Eberhart handed money over to Anderson, but Kyle told Dennis he 
didn’t have any money on him.  Before Kyle could even get his hand out of his 
pocket, Dennis raised his shotgun and fired, at point-blank range, a blast at Kyle’s 
 
25
head, killing him instantly.  Dennis and Anderson fled the scene and were not 
apprehended until several days later, when the police acted on an anonymous tip. 
 
Dennis’s claim that he was so intoxicated he could barely stand or walk that 
evening lacks credibility in view of all the evidence and testimony adduced and 
proffered at trial. 
 
Dennis’s history, character, and background indicate some mitigating 
features.  Dennis’s mother was nineteen when he was born, and his parents 
experienced marital difficulties from the time Dennis was three weeks old.  The 
problems with the marriage culminated in the parents’ separating when Dennis 
was five to six years old.  In school, Dennis had a history of limited academic 
success, and his numerous absences and academic difficulties caused him to repeat 
both kindergarten and first grade.  In later grades, Dennis continued to miss many 
days of school and failed most subjects. 
 
When Dennis became a teenager, his home situation grew worse.  Dennis’s 
mother became a person who was “just not caring” about anything with her two 
children.  All of the utilities at home were shut off.  As a result, the county 
children services board (“CSB”) took the Dennis children from the mother, and 
Dennis was eventually placed in a foster home. 
 
Dennis suffered a coma as the result of a swimming accident during the 
summer of 1992 and almost drowned.  As Dennis approached adulthood, he 
completed an independent living program operated by the CSB.  Dennis later 
asked the CSB about the Job Corps, and in February 1994, he went to Edinburg, 
Indiana, to obtain job training and earn his G.E.D., which he did.  Dennis returned 
to his foster home in Akron in April 1994, and the CSB requested termination of 
his long-term foster care, since he had reached the age of majority. 
 
26
 
During the mitigation hearing, Dennis gave unsworn testimony describing 
the events leading up to and including the robberies and murder.  Dennis 
expressed remorse and sorrow for Kyle’s family and claimed he never meant to 
kill Kyle. 
 
Dr. James L. Brown, a clinical and forensic psychologist, also testified on 
Dennis’s behalf.  Dr. Brown reviewed Dennis’s school and medical records and 
interviewed Dennis, his aunt and foster mother.  In addition, Dr. Brown reviewed 
Dennis’s psychosocial history and gave him the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory.  Dr. Brown opined that Dennis had difficulties with social 
and interpersonal relationships and that he tended towards antisocial activities.  
Dennis has exceedingly poor judgment and great difficulty learning from 
experience.  Typically, Dennis would view emotional feelings as a weakness and 
would therefore tend to put on a strong, uncaring facade. 
 
In Dr. Brown’s opinion, three factors should mitigate against imposing 
death on Dennis:  (1) He lacked any effective “parenting” until around age fifteen; 
(2) he was intoxicated at the time of the offense, due to drinking alcohol and 
smoking marijuana dipped in embalming fluid to intensify its effect; and (3) he 
was only eighteen at the time of the offense.  Dr. Brown stated that Dennis has an 
I.Q. of 86, which would put him in the low average range of intelligence.  
However, Dr. Brown conceded that Dennis knew right from wrong.  Dr. Brown 
did not testify that Dennis’s developmental problems gave rise to any mental 
disease or defect. 
 
With regard to the statutory mitigating factors, R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) is 
entitled to appropriate appreciable weight in mitigation, since Dennis was eighteen 
years old at the time of the offense. 
 
27
 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) is also relevant since his only prior convictions were 
two juvenile adjudications for criminal damaging and receiving stolen property.  
While Dennis admitted using marijuana, he had never been charged with a drug 
offense. 
 
Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), several facts testified to by Dr. Brown are 
mitigating, such as the lack of any effective guidance for Dennis during most of 
his life, resulting in antisocial psychological tendencies.  In addition, Dennis’s 
apparent remorse over his criminal behavior should be given modest weight in 
mitigation.  However, we assign no mitigating weight to Dennis’s voluntary 
drunkenness and marijuana intoxication.  See Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 614, 605 
N.E.2d at 931.  Voluntary intoxication can constitute a “weak” mitigating factor, 
but only in certain circumstances.  D’Ambrosio, 73 Ohio St.3d at 145, 652 N.E.2d 
at 714. 
 
Upon 
independent 
weighing, 
we conclude that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Dennis 
and his accomplice armed themselves and set out to rob people on the night of 
June 4, 1994.  Dennis’s drinking and marijuana smoking before the crimes are 
indicative of someone trying to raise up the courage to follow through with his 
intentions.  Dennis fired his sawed-off shotgun at Pizer when Pizer fled.  Dennis 
reloaded his sawed-off shotgun, showing that he was not content to use it merely 
as a prop to rob money from his next victim.  While Dennis and Anderson robbed 
Kyle and Eberhart, Dennis fired his weapon again when Kyle produced no money, 
even though Anderson successfully robbed Eberhart at the same time.  Dennis’s 
course of action that night was clear:  if he did not obtain money from his robbery 
victims, he would fire a shotgun blast their way.  We hold that in spite of the 
 
28
mitigating factors present in this case, Dennis’s actions in these crimes merit the 
capital penalty to which he was sentenced. 
 
We further find that the death penalty imposed in this case is both 
appropriate and proportionate when compared with similar cases of murder as a 
course of conduct involving the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more 
persons.  See, e.g., State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 641 N.E.2d 1082; 
Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 653 N.E.2d 304.  The penalty is also appropriate 
and proportionate when compared with capital cases combining aggravated 
murder with aggravated robbery.  See, e.g., State v. Green (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 
141, 609 N.E.2d 1253; Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 293. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.