Case Title: People v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85354

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed April 20, 2000.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, William T. Jones, was convicted in the circuit court of 
Jefferson County of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, residential 
burglary, and aggravated battery. Defendant waived his right to a jury for 
purposes of sentencing, and the trial court found him eligible for the death 
penalty. After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to death.
Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal (People v. 
Jones, 123 Ill. 2d 387 (1988)), and the United States Supreme Court denied 
review (People v. Jones, 489 U.S. 1040, 103 L. Ed. 2d 236, 109 S. Ct. 1174 (1989)). Subsequently, defendant filed a pro se petition for 
post-conviction relief. After the trial court appointed counsel to assist 
defendant in his post-conviction proceedings, defendant filed an amended 
petition. Thereafter, on the State's motion, the trial court dismissed the 
post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court affirmed the 
circuit court, and the United States Supreme Court denied review. People v. 
Jones, 155 Ill. 2d 357 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 966, 126 L. Ed. 2d 378, 114 S. Ct. 444 (1993).
On August 15, 1996, defendant filed a second petition for post-conviction 
relief. In this petition, defendant alleged that at the time of his trial, he 
was taking the psychotropic medication Valium. At the time of defendant's trial, 
section 104-21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1985, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a) (later codified as 725 ILCS 5/104-21(a))) required 
a court that was informed that a criminal defendant was taking psychotropic 
medication to hold a hearing to determine the defendant's fitness for trial. 
Defendant's petition alleged that even though defendant's use of Valium was 
disclosed to the trial court, the court failed to conduct the required fitness 
hearing. According to defendant, the trial court's actions deprived him of due 
process of law. In addition, defendant's petition claimed that his attorney's 
failure to request a fitness hearing constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.
The trial court dismissed defendant's second post-conviction petition without 
an evidentiary hearing on the grounds that the petition was time-barred by 
defendant's noncompliance with the statute of limitations and that, in any 
event, defendant's petition improperly sought the benefit of a new rule of 
criminal procedure on collateral review. Defendant now appeals directly to this 
court. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 651.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the State argues that defendant's petition is 
time-barred because it was filed outside the statutory limitations period. 725 
ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1998). At the time defendant was sentenced on October 17, 
1985, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act required defendant to file his 
post-conviction petition within 10 years from the date of his conviction. Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122-1. Defendant was sentenced on October 17, 
1985. However, effective January 1, 1992, the General Assembly shortened the 
applicable limitations period to three years from the date of the conviction. 
This amendment was made retroactive to final judgments rendered before its 
January 1, 1992, effective date. Thus, the last day defendant could have timely 
filed his post-conviction petition was December 31, 1991 (the day before the 
effective date of the amendment). Defendant, however, did not file the instant 
post-conviction petition until August 15, 1996. As a consequence, the State 
argues, defendant's petition is untimely.
In addition, the State argues that defendant's claims are procedurally 
defaulted due to defendant's failure to raise them in either his direct appeal 
or his initial post-conviction petition. According to the State, claims raised 
in a successive post-conviction petition are not reviewable unless the defendant 
shows that the initial proceedings were deficient in some fundamental way. The 
State argues that defendant has failed to make such a showing.
Defendant argues that the late filing of his second post-conviction petition 
should be excused. Defendant correctly notes that a post-conviction petition 
will not be considered time-barred if the petition alleges facts demonstrating 
the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1985, ch. 38, par. 122-1. In the instant case, defendant argues, the claims 
raised in his second petition were predicated upon this court's decision in 
People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996). In Nitz, this court 
held that the failure to hold a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing was a 
constitutional error which could be raised for the first time in post-conviction 
proceedings. Because Nitz was decided just two months before defendant 
filed the instant petition, defendant argues that his petition should not be 
considered untimely. Furthermore, defendant argues that this court's decisions 
in People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994), People v. Gevas, 
166 Ill. 2d 461 (1995), People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995), 
People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996), and People v. Britz, 
174 Ill. 2d 163 (1996), suggest that the issue of the failure to hold a section 
104-21 (a) fitness hearing can never be waived and thus is not subject to 
procedural default.
After considering the arguments of the parties, we hold that the claims 
raised in defendant's second post-conviction petition have been procedurally 
defaulted and cannot properly be raised in this successive petition. 
Accordingly, we need not address whether defendant's petition established a lack 
of culpable negligence sufficient to delay his late filing.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the filing of only one 
post-conviction petition. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273 
(1992); People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 375 (1988). Moreover, section 
122-3 of the Act provides that "[a]ny claim of substantial denial of 
constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is 
waived." 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1998); Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 274; 
Free, 122 Ill. 2d  at 375-76. Furthermore, a ruling on an initial 
post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all 
claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial petition. 
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 274; Free, 122 Ill. 2d  at 376. As a 
consequence, a defendant faces a daunting procedural hurdle when bringing a 
successive post-conviction petition.
In the instant case, defendant's second post-conviction petition alleges that 
he was taking psychotropic medication at the time of his trial. Based upon this 
allegation, defendant claims that: (1) he was denied his right to due process 
because the circuit court failed to conduct a fitness hearing; and (2) his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing. We note that 
under our recent decision in People v. Mitchell, No. 83281 (January 27, 
1999), the first claim is not cognizable on post-conviction review. Even if it 
were, however, defendant has waived both claims by failing to raise them in his 
first post-conviction petition.
This court held in Flores that the procedural bars of waiver and 
res judicata may be relaxed with respect to successive post-conviction 
petitions under certain circumstances. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 274. In 
Flores, we adopted the "cause and prejudice" test, borrowed from United 
States Supreme Court cases considering successive habeas corpus 
petitions, as the proper means of identifying the extremely narrow class of 
cases in which a defendant's successive post-conviction petition is entitled to 
consideration on the merits. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279. Under the test 
announced in Flores, claims in a successive post-conviction petition 
are barred unless the defendant can establish good cause for failing to raise 
his claims in prior proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from the claimed 
errors. For purposes of this test, "cause" is further defined as some objective 
factor external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim 
in an earlier proceeding, and "prejudice" is defined as an error which so 
infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. 
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279.
Applying the cause and prejudice test to the instant case, it is clear that 
defendant remains procedurally barred from bringing his claims in this second 
post-conviction petition. Even if defendant were able to show cause for failing 
to raise his claims earlier, he would not be able to establish prejudice 
resulting from the alleged error of failing to hold a section 104-21(a) fitness 
hearing.
Under section 104-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is unfit 
for trial "if, because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to 
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in 
his defense." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 104-10. Here, the record belies 
any claim that defendant did not understand the nature of the proceedings or was 
unable to assist in his defense. A review of the transcripts which defendant 
attached to his petition reveals that, after the trial judge was informed that 
defendant was being treated with Valium, the following discussion took place 
between the court and the defendant:
Defendant's exchanges with the trial judge do not display any confusion about 
the nature of the proceedings. Moreover, defendant assisted in his defense by 
testifying on his own behalf. Finally, in his conversation with the judge, the 
defendant specifically denied that he had any difficulty understanding the 
nature of the proceedings, assisting his attorneys with his defense, or making 
decisions regarding the conduct of his defense. Under the facts of this case, we 
find that even if defendant's attorney had requested a fitness hearing, there 
was no reasonable probability that defendant would have been found unfit. Thus, 
defendant's due process fitness claim and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim would both fail. See People v. Mitchell, No. 83281 (January 27, 
1999). Accordingly, defendant's petition fails to establish actual prejudice 
within the meaning of the cause and prejudice test. Defendant's successive 
post-conviction petition is therefore procedurally barred and the trial court 
properly dismissed the petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
defendant's second post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. The 
clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, September 
20, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death entered in the circuit 
court of Jefferson County is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in 
the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk of this 
court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of 
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of 
the institution where defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. 
Defendant filed his petition for post-conviction relief on August 15, 1996. 
At that time, the law in this state provided an automatic rule of reversal for 
those defendants who were entitled to a fitness hearing by virtue of their 
ingestion of psychotropic drugs. See People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 
(1996); People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464 (1996); People v. 
Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994). By the time the parties completed the 
briefing in this case, in June 1999, the law had changed from one of automatic 
reversal to a case-specific inquiry. See People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997); People v. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541 (1997). Unfortunately for 
defendant, this court has again changed the law in this area by virtue of the 
recent decision in People v. Mitchell, No. 83281 (January 27, 2000). 
This latest change occurred after the parties had oral argument in this 
case.
In Mitchell, this court held, contrary to prior precedent, that a 
psychotropic drug claim couched in terms of a denial of due process is not 
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The court further held that, 
in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to 
request the statutorily mandated fitness hearing, a defendant must show that 
such a hearing would have resulted in a finding that defendant was, in fact, 
unfit. I dissented in Mitchell, arguing that the decision was contrary 
to stare decisis. See Mitchell, slip op. at 38 (Freeman, J., 
dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J., and McMorrow, J.). I continue to believe 
that the court's action in Mitchell was unwarranted and would, 
therefore, decide this appeal, along with its procedural complexities, on the 
basis of the law as it stood prior to the issuance of Mitchell. See 
Mitchell, slip op. at 67 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, 
C.J., and McMorrow, J.).
Notwithstanding the above, I also take issue with deciding this appeal 
without the benefit of ordering the parties to rebrief the issue in light of 
Mitchell. Just as in Mitchell, defendant here has not been 
heard in this court's sua sponte debate over the correctness of 
Brandon and its progeny. See Mitchell, slip op. at 38 
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J., and McMorrow, J.). At the 
same time that the Mitchell appeal was under advisement, several 
similar cases were also under advisement. As such, the briefing in those cases 
was completed prior to the date Mitchell was released. Each of the 
defendants in those cases is affected by the change in law precipitated by the 
decision. In this case, as in our recent case of People v. Moore, No. 
85359 (February 17, 2000), the law changed in mid-appeal. I demonstrated in my 
dissent in Moore the debilitating effect the change of law had on 
defendant Moore's burden of proof. See Moore, slip op. at 18-19 
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.). The change in law caused by 
Mitchell is even more harmful to this defendant because the court today 
rules entirely on procedural grounds that did not exist at the time defendant 
filed his brief and argued the case.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and JUSTICE McMORROW join in this 
dissent.