Case Title: Sandra Bell v. Luther Strange, as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al. (Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-12-1146). Affirmed. No Opinion.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120603

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/27/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
____________________
1120603
____________________
Sandra Bell
v.
Luther Strange, as Attorney General of the State of Alabama,
et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-12-1146)
STUART, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
Bolin, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Parker and Shaw, JJ., concur specially.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
1120603
PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
On April 28, 2011, the Alabama Legislature passed Act No.
2011-197 ("Act No. 197"), a Senate Joint Resolution, creating
the "Constitutional Revision Commission" ("the commission"). 
Act No. 197 charged the commission with reviewing certain
articles of the Alabama Constitution and with recommending
amendments to that document to the legislature.
On November 5, 2012, Sandra Bell filed a declaratory-
judgment action, naming as defendants in their official
capacities Attorney General Luther Strange, Lieutenant
Governor Kay Ivy, President Pro Tempore of the Alabama Senate
Del Marsh, Speaker of the Alabama House Mike Hubbard, and
Secretary of State Beth Chapman.  In her complaint, Bell asked
the trial court to declare Act No. 2012-275 ("Act No. 275")
and Act No. 2012-276 ("Act No. 276"), Ala. Acts 2012,
violative of Art. XVIII, § 286, Ala. Const. 1901, which
provides the exclusive means of rewriting the Alabama
Constitution.  According to Bell, Act No. 197 circumvented the
exclusive procedure for proposing a new constitution, as
provided in § 286, by establishing the commission to recommend
changes in the Alabama Constitution article by article.  She
2
1120603
also asked the trial court to declare that the legislature
exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting Act No. 275
and Act. No. 276.  She further sought an injunction
prohibiting the secretary of state from certifying 
the 
results
of the November 2012 vote on Amendments 9 (Act No. 275) and 10
(Act No. 276), which propose repealing and replacing certain
sections of the Alabama Constitution.
On January 16, 2013, the trial court dismissed Bell's
complaint on the basis that her complaint failed to state a
justiciable controversy.  On February 21, 2013, Bell filed her
notice of appeal.  On appeal, Bell addresses her arguments
exclusively to Act No. 197, the joint resolution establishing
the commission, instead of to Act No. 275 and Act No. 276, the
acts 
proposing 
article 
by 
article 
constitutional 
amendments 
to
a vote of the people.  Thus, Bell has waived her arguments as
to Act No. 275 and Act No. 276.
For that reason, I concur with the Court's affirmance of
the trial court's dismissal of Bell's complaint.  I write
separately  to express my concern not with Act No. 197
specifically, but with legislative proposals, allegedly
proposed to the people pursuant to Art. XVIII, § 284, Ala.
3
1120603
Const. 1901, to amend many sections of the Alabama
Constitution by the validation of a single amendment, as was
done with Act No. 275 and Act No. 276, which resulted in
Amendments 9 and 10, respectively, being placed on the
November 6, 2012, ballot.
As Chief Justice Torbert noted in his special concurrence
in State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864 (Ala. 1983):
"There is a difference between the power of the
Legislature to enact statutes and the power to
change the Constitution. Jones v. McDade, 200 Ala.
230, 75 So. 988 (1917). In Bourbon v. Governor of
Maryland, 258 Md. 252, 257-58, 265 A. 2d 477, 480
(1970), the Maryland Court of Appeals, considering
the legislature's role in initiating constitutional
change, wrote:
"'[T]he legislature does not exercise its
ordinary 
legislative 
power 
or 
any
sovereignty of the people that has been
entrusted to it but acts under a limited
power which the people have conferred upon
it and which with equal propriety and
appropriateness might have been conferred
upon either house, the governor, a special
commission or other body or tribunal. In
proposing 
amendment 
of 
the 
Constitution 
the
legislature does not have the plenary
powers it has in enacting laws but only the
powers specifically delegated to it.'
"(Citations omitted). The Legislature has plenary
power with respect to statutory matters, but only a
limited power as to constitutional matters. Johnson
v. Craft, [205 Ala. 386, 80 So. 375 (1921)]; Opinion
of the Justices[No. 92], 252 Ala. 89, 39 So. 2d 665
4
1120603
(1949). In regard to its powers to change the
Constitution, the Legislature, as the representative
of the people, has only those powers specifically
granted by the people through the Constitution.
Opinion of the Justices[No. 116], [254 Ala. 183, 47
So. 2d 713 (1950)]."
Manley, 441 So. 2d at 877-78 (Torbert, C.J., concurring).
The people, through the Alabama Constitution, have
entrusted to the legislature two powers in regard to amending
or changing the constitution: 1) to propose an amendment to
the people for validation by their vote, pursuant to either §
284 or Art. XVIII, § 284.01, Ala. Const. 1901, and 2) to call
a constitutional convention, pursuant to § 286, which will
commence only upon a majority vote of the people.  The effect
of an article-by-article 
amendment approach is the creation of
a third legislative power in regard to changing the
constitution.  This is an enlargement of legislative power in
contravention of Art. I, § 2, Ala. Const. 1901, which
provides, in pertinent part: "That all political power is
inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority, and instituted for their benefit ...."
It is the "tendency of vested power to broaden and exalt
itself."  Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 345, 99 N.E. 1, 4
(1912).  For this reason, it is "[t]he people[] in whom
5
1120603
resides the vital power in reference to organic law" and not
the Legislature.  Callier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, 105
(1854). 
 
Through 
the 
constitution, 
the 
people 
have
"'prescribe[d] the exclusive modes by which it may be altered
or amended, or its effect and operation changed.'"  Manley,
441 So. 2d at 873 (quoting Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386,
393, 80 So. 375, 380 (1921)).  As stated by Chief Justice
Torbert, the legislature is limited to the powers entrusted to
it by the people.  Because of the tendency of governments to
expand their own power and suppress the rights of the people,
this Court must vigilantly protect the "inalienable and
indefeasible right" of the people to create and maintain the
form and function of the State "in such manner as they may
deem expedient."  Art. I, § 2, Ala. Const. 1901. 
6
1120603
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).   
In the trial court, the pro se plaintiff, Sandra Bell,
attacked two acts of the legislature, Act No. 2012-275 and Act
No. 2012-276, Ala. Acts 2012, which allowed for a vote of the
electorate on what were styled as two constitutional
"amendments" altering Article XII and Article XIII of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901.  Although the legislature may
adopt an act submitting to the electorate an amendment to the
constitution, see Ala. Const. 1901, Art. XVIII, § 284, it may
not adopt an act submitting to the electorate a new
constitution, because that must be done by a constitutional
convention, see Ala. Const. 1901, Art. XVIII, § 286.  State v.
Manley, 441 So. 2d 864 (Ala. 1983).  
The defendants raised numerous issues in the trial court,
including: that the case was barred by the legislative
immunity of all the defendants, that the case was moot, and
that there had been no violation of § 284 and § 286.  None of
these issues are challenged on appeal.   Instead, in her
1
As the defendants argued in the trial court, the acts in
1
question did not propose an entirely new constitution.  As
discussed below, whether the acts submitted mere amendments,
something more, or something impermissible, is not at issue in
this appeal.
7
1120603
brief, Bell challenges only Act No. 2011-197, Ala. Acts 2011, 
a Senate Joint Resolution that created the Constitutional
Revision Commission, the entity that recommended Act Nos.
2012-275 and 2012-276 to the legislature.    
"When 
an 
appellant confronts an 
issue 
below 
that
the appellee contends warrants a judgment in its
favor and the trial court's order does not specify
a basis for its ruling, the omission of any argument
on appeal as to that issue in the appellant's
principal brief constitutes a waiver with respect to
the issue."
Fogarty v. Southworth, 953 So. 2d 1225, 1232 (Ala. 2006).  See
also Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (Ala. 1983)
("[T]he appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error
upon the record."), and Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.
(providing that an appellant's brief shall contain 
an 
argument
"with respect to the issues presented").  Because Bell has
elected not to address the issues upon which the defendants
relied in the trial court (immunity, mootness, and lack of
merit), she has waived those issues for purposes of appeal. 
We cannot address those issues on Bell's behalf: "[T]his Court
will not 'reverse a trial court's judgment ... based on
arguments not made to this [C]ourt.'  Brown v. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc., 864 So. 2d 1100, 1104 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
8
1120603
This principle applies with particular force to issues
involving the constitutionality of a statute."  Yellow Dog
Dev., LLC v. Bibb Cnty., 871 So. 2d 39, 41-42 (Ala. 2003)
(citations omitted).  Bell's failure to attempt to show why
the case is not barred by legislative immunity, why it is not
moot, and why Act No. 2012-275 and Act No. 2012-276 are
unconstitutional requires that the judgment of the 
trial 
court
be affirmed.  
As to the issue whether the Senate Joint Resolution 
creating the Constitutional Revision Commission sets up a
scheme that is unconstitutional under 
the rationale of 
Manley,
supra, I note that joint resolutions are not law.
 
"A resolution such as this one is not a law....
The Legislature has no power to make or change law
by resolution. Art. IV, § 61, Ala. Constitution ('No
law shall be passed except by bill....'); Gunter v.
Beasley, 414 So. 2d 41 (Ala. 1982). Whatever the
Legislature may have intended by Resolution 99–94 is
irrelevant to our resolution of the issues presented
on this appeal. The controlling law here is that
expressed in the applicable ... acts. See Opinion of
the Justices No. 275, 396 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1981);
Opinion of the Justices No. 265, 381 So. 2d 183
(Ala. 1980) (a statute cannot be amended by a joint
resolution of the Legislature)."
Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Alabama Educ. Ass'n, 769 So. 2d 872,
883 (Ala. 2000).  The legislature, however, is by no means
9
1120603
bound by the commission, which has no power or authority: it
only makes recommendations.  The commission might 
recommend to
the legislature an act to propose a constitutional change that
violates § 284 of the constitution, or it might recommend an
act that does not violate § 284.  It is the legislature's
adoption 
of 
the 
recommended 
act 
that 
might 
be
unconstitutional. The focus is not on "[w]hatever the
Legislature may have intended" by its resolution; 
instead, 
the
"controlling law here is that expressed in the applicable ...
acts," namely, Act No. 2012-275 and Act No. 2012-276.  It was
the legislature, not the commission, that purportedly
attempted to revise or amend the constitution.  Act No. 2011-
197 could not change the law or constitution because it is
itself a resolution; it is not a law.  Instead, Act No. 2012-
275 and Act No. 2012-276 changed the law and the constitution,
but they are not challenged on appeal.  
10
1120603
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Every judicial officer in this State takes an oath to
uphold the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Alabama. Art. XVI, § 279, Ala.
Const. 1901. I consider this case to be one of the most
important to be before this Court in recent history. For the
reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent from the
majority's no-opinion affirmance of the trial court's
dismissal of this case. From my own inquiry I have found very
few citizens who fully understand the changes made by the
recent amendments to the Alabama Constitution under the act
challenged in this case or who comprehend the potential danger
of future changes to the constitution under this act. This
Court spends the majority of its time deliberating on the
meaning of the words in statutes, yet here we decline to
review the action of the legislature -- one branch of our
government -- in initiating a revision of the entire Alabama
Constitution.
I. Background
A. Facts
11
1120603
In 2011, the legislature passed and the governor signed
Senate Joint Resolution 82, which created a 12-member
Constitutional 
Revision 
Commission 
("the 
commission"). 
Act 
No.
2011-197, Ala. Acts 2011 ("the Act"). The Act gave each of
three specified members -- the governor, the speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the president pro tempore of the
Senate -- the authority to appoint three additional members.
The intellectual engine of the Commission is the Alabama Law
Institute:2
"(c) The Alabama Law Institute shall serve as
staff for the Commission. The institute will analyze
the current Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as
amended, with a view toward identifying those
provisions which are antiquated, unnecessary, or
duplicative of other provisions. The goal of the
institute's analysis shall be the following:
"(1) To provide the commission with
specific 
guidance 
for 
constitutional
revision.
"(2) To recommend to the commission an
article-by-article 
revision 
of 
the
constitution.
"(3) To report its recommendations to
the commission of articles to be revised
for the next regular session of the
The Alabama Law Institute is "an official advisory law
2
revision and law reform agency of the State of Alabama." § 29-
8-1(a), Ala. Code 1975. 
12
1120603
Legislature 
by 
December 
31 
beginning
December 31, 2011."
Act No. 197, § (c).
The Act created a timetable for review of 11 of the 18
articles of the Alabama Constitution.
"(d) The goal of the Legislature is to consider
reviewing the Constitution according to the schedule
as follows:
"(1) In 2011:
"Article XII, Private Corporations.
"Article XIII, Banking.
"Remove 
unconstitutional 
language
throughout the Constitution.
"(2) In 2012:
"Article III, Distribution of Powers.
"Article IV, Legislative Department.
"Article IX, Representation.
"(3) In 2013:
"Article I, Declaration of Rights.
"Article V, Executive Department.
"Article XIV, Education.
"(4) In 2014:
"Article VII, Impeachments.
13
1120603
"Article X, Exemptions.
"Article XVII, Miscellaneous."
Act No. 197, § (d).
Six of the remaining seven articles "shall be excluded
from consideration by the commission due to a previous
revision of the article or because revision is not considered
needed ...." Act No. 197, § (e). Finally, "Article XI Taxation
is excluded from the consideration by the commission at this
time and not subject to the timetable established by this
resolution." Act No. 197, § (f) (emphasis added).
The Act charged the commission with "the following duties
and responsibilities":
"(1) Create a public awareness of and educate
the public on the changes recommended.
"(2) 
Provide 
the 
Legislature 
with
recommendations for any changes to the article under
consideration.
"(3) 
Report 
its 
findings, 
conclusions,
recommendations, and suggestions to each article to
be considered in each House of the Legislature by
the third legislative day of each year after 2011."
Act No. 197, § (g).
Nine years before the passage of the Act, the then
director of the Alabama Law Institute identified an article-
14
1120603
by-article revision of the constitution according to a multi-
year timetable as one approach to revising the 1901
constitution. See Robert L. McCurley, Jr., Constitutional
Revision, 63 Ala. Law. 92 (2002). "Under this first approach,
approximately two or three articles are considered 
and 
revised
by the legislature each year. A revision of the entire
constitution could be accomplished in the next three years."
Id. at 93. The defendants in this case noted that the
commission "serves primarily as an intermediary giving voice
to 
the 
Alabama 
Law 
Institute's 
recommendations 
for
constitutional change." (Defendants' trial brief of Dec. 12,
2012, p. 4.)
Pursuant to the schedule set out in the Act, the
commission prepared proposed revisions of Articles XII and
XIII. The legislature approved the proposals, which became
statewide Amendments 9 and 10 on the 2012 general election
ballot. Both were adopted. 
B. Procedural History
On November 5, 2012, one day before the general election,
Sandra Bell filed a complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court 
seeking 
declaratory 
and 
injunctive 
relief 
against 
five 
Alabama
15
1120603
state officials: the attorney general, the lieutenant
governor, the president pro tempore of the Senate, the speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the secretary of state.
"The goal of [the Act]," Bell stated, "is to allow the
Legislature ... to propose a new constitution for the State
article by article according to a certain 
schedule." 
According
to Bell, statewide Amendments 9 and 10, scheduled for a vote
the following day, "would beg[i]n the process of rewriting the
entire Constitution of Alabama of 1901 ...." 
The Act, Bell alleged, "violated Section 286 of the
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, which provides the exclusive
method for the purpose of proposing a new constitution."  She
3
further alleged that submission of the two 
proposed 
amendments
to the voters, which resulted from implementation of the Act,
also violated § 286. Additionally, she alleged that the Act
abridged her right as a voter under § 286 "to approve or
disapprove the call for constitutional convention." Bell
sought a judgment declaring  that the defendants had "acted in
excess of their authority as set forth in Section 286 of the
To call a constitutional convention, Article XVIII, §
3
286, Ala. Const. 1901, requires "a vote  of a majority of all
the members elected to each house" followed by a majority vote
"of all the qualified electors of the state."
16
1120603
Constitution of Alabama of 1901." She also sought preliminary
and permanent injunctions directing the secretary of 
state 
not
to certify the results of the vote on Amendments 9 and 10. The
trial court took no action on Bell's complaint in the
afternoon before election day.
On November 27, 2012, the legislative defendants filed a
motion 
to 
dismiss 
Bell's 
action, 
claiming 
absolute 
legislative
immunity. 
On 
December 
12, 
2012, 
all 
the 
defendants
collectively filed a motion to dismiss, reiterating the
defense of legislative immunity and arguing that the
certification of the election results on November 28, 2012,
rendered injunctive relief against the secretary of state
moot. Thus, they argued, legislative immunity and mootness
combined to render the controversy nonjusticiable. On January
16, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss. Bell presented to the court a brief opposing the
motion, which is not included in the record; a transcript of
the hearing, however, is. She argued as follows:
"I am here about our State Constitution.
"....
"[W]e need you to determine whether the Legislature,
if they acted within their constitutional ability in
17
1120603
putting forth [the Act], in passing that. We don't
believe they were existing within their authority.
"I'll reference Alabama v. Manley[, 441 So. 2d
864 (Ala. 1983)]. I have a copy here for you,
Judge."
Referring to Amendments 9 and 10, Bell stated:
"According to [§] 286 in our Constitution, a
Constitutional Convention has to be put together to
do that, not by the legislative process. They can't
do it this way. It has to be very narrow and limited
as to how they can amend it through this method,
through the legislative method. It can only be done
through the constitutional method according to
Manley.
"If you look at what they are planning to do in
2011, it was dealing with private corporations,
banking, and even removing things all the way
through the Constitution. And they can't do that
according to Manley."
The defendants, resting on their brief, did not present
argument at the hearing. During the hearing the trial court
gave no indication of its views on the motion. Later the same
day the court granted the motion to dismiss by noting on the
bottom of the first page: "1/16/13 Granted. Dismissed."
On appeal Bell renews her argument that only a
constitutional convention called pursuant to § 286 can engage
in the broad revision of the Alabama Constitution that the Act
18
1120603
contemplates. The defendants in response argue primarily that
the matter is nonjusticiable for lack of a proper defendant.  
4
II. Standard of Review
"Where a [Rule] 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion
has been granted and this Court is called upon to
review the dismissal of the complaint, we must
examine the allegations contained therein and
construe them so as to resolve all doubts concerning
the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff. First National Bank v. Gilbert Imported
Hardwoods, Inc., 398 So. 2d 258 (Ala. 1981). In so
doing, this Court does not consider whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, only whether he
has stated a claim under which he may possibly
prevail. Karagan v. City of Mobile, 420 So. 2d 57
(Ala. 1982)."
Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala. 1985). "[I]f
under a provable set of facts, upon any cognizable theory of
law, a complaint states a claim upon which relief could be
granted, the complaint should not be dismissed." Id. 
III. Justiciability
A. Legislative Immunity
Justice Shaw in his special concurrence implies that
4
because the Act is a legislative resolution and not a law, it
is not subject to a constitutional challenge. However, in
Gunter v. Beasley, 414 So. 2d 41 (1982), this Court considered
at length a challenge to the constitutional and statutory
validity of two resolutions passed during the 1971 Regular
Session of the Alabama Legislature, holding ultimately that
they "do not offend any of the constitutional and statutory
provisions 
against 
which 
the 
State 
challenges 
their 
validity."
414 So. 2d at 49.
19
1120603
The defendants are correct that ordinarily legislators
cannot be sued for their role in enacting legislation. "It is
beyond doubt that the Speech or Debate Clause protects against
inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the
legislative process and into the motivation for those acts."
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1971) (quoted in 
Marion v. Hall, 429 So. 2d 937, 944 (Ala. 1983) (Torbert,
C.J., concurring specially)). Invocation of this principle,
however, misses the point. Bell does not attack the process by
which the Act was passed. She instead argues that the Act
itself 
is 
unconstitutional. 
Surely 
an 
unconstitutional 
act 
may
be attacked in the courts without implicating legislative
immunity. A number of Supreme Court cases "reflect a decidedly
jaundiced view towards extending the Clause so as to privilege
illegal or unconstitutional conduct beyond that essential to
foreclose executive control of legislative speech or debate
and associated matters such as voting and committee reports
and proceedings." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 620
(1972).
The legislators are named as defendants, not for their
role in passing the law, but as representatives of the body
20
1120603
that 
is 
administering 
the 
law. 
The 
Act 
creates 
a
Constitutional Revision Commission within the legislature and
a procedure for the commission to propose 
large-scale 
revision
to the constitution. The legislature's role in administering
the revision process under the Act makes the legislators
proper defendants, just as the head of an executive agency
that implements an unconstitutional law may be sued to enjoin
enforcement of the law. Two of the legislators, the speaker of
the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate, sit on
the commission and have appointed six of the other members.
Thus, between themselves and their appointees they account 
for
8 of the 12 members of the commission. Four legislative
committee chairs are ex officio members of the commission. Act
No. 197, § (a)(7). The commission is staffed by the Alabama
Law Institute, an official advisory body to the legislature
whose "reports, studies and recommended publications shall be
printed and shall be distributed by the Secretary of State in
the same manner as acts of the Legislature." §§ 29-8-4 and -5,
Ala. Code 1975. One of the "duties and responsibilities" of
the commission is to "[p]rovide the Legislature with
recommendations for any changes to the article under
21
1120603
consideration." Act No. 197, § (g)(2). See Albert L. Sturm,
The Procedure of State Constitutional Change - With Special
Emphasis on the South and Florida, 5 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 569,
585 (1977) ("Constitutional commissions were developed
initially and have been used primarily, as auxiliary staff
arms of state legislative assemblies.").
In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 188 F. Supp. 916
(E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961), the federal
district court enjoined a legislative committee from assuming
control of the New Orleans public schools. The committee and
its members claimed legislative immunity.
"The argument is specious. There is no effort to
restrain the Louisiana Legislature as a whole, or
any individual legislator, in the performance of a
legislative function. It is only insofar as the
lawmakers purport to act as administrators of the
local schools that they, as well as all others
concerned, are sought to be restrained from
implementing measures which are alleged to violate
the 
Constitution. 
Having 
found 
a 
statute
unconstitutional, it is elementary that a court has
power to enjoin all those charged with its
execution. Normally, these are officers of the
executive branch, but when the legislature itself
seeks to act as executor of its own laws, then,
quite obviously, it is no longer legislating and is
no more immune from process than the administrative
officials it supersedes." 
22
1120603
188 F. Supp. at 922. In this case, two of the legislative
defendants sit on the commission and are authorized to appoint
six other members who together with them constitute a two-
thirds majority of the commission. Thus, the legislature is
both 
the 
law-making and 
law-implementing 
agency. The
legislature, acting as "executor of its own laws ... is no
longer legislating" and thus is not cloaked with legislative
immunity. See Ex parte Simpson, 36 So. 3d 15, 30 (Ala. 2009)
("'[Legislative] immunity applies only to actions that are
inherently 
legislative 
(policy-making) 
as 
opposed 
to
administrative 
(policy-applying).'" 
(quoting 
Grider 
v. 
City 
of
Auburn, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2009))); Black's
Law Dictionary 45 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "[a]dministrative
acts" as "[t]hose acts which are necessary to be done to carry
out  legislative policies and purposes already declared by the
legislative body ....").
Furthermore, the legislature, when proposing amendments
to the constitution, does not act in its law-making capacity.
When considering ordinary legislation, a majority vote
suffices for passage and gubernatorial approval is required.
§§ 63, 125, Ala. Const. 1901. Bills proposing constitutional
23
1120603
amendments, however, require a three-fifths vote of all
members, and no executive approval is needed. §§ 284, 287,
Ala. Const. 1901. See Gafford v. Pemberton, 409 So. 2d 1367,
1374 (Ala. 1982) (noting "differences between proposed
constitutional amendments and acts of the Legislature");
Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 394, 87 So. 375, 381 (1921)
(stating that "in proposing amendments to [the constitution],
to be voted upon by the electorate, the Legislature is not
exercising its other power to make laws"). 
B. Mootness
The defendants argue that the claim for injunctive relief
to prevent the secretary of state from certifying the results
of the vote on Amendments 9 and 10 is now moot. The election
is over and the vote was certified on November 28, 2012.
However, under Alabama law the holding of an election on a
constitutional amendment followed by certification of the
results does not preclude judicial inquiry. "The theory that
a favorable vote by the electorate, however unanimous, on a
proposal to amend a Constitution, may cure, render innocuous,
all or any antecedent failures to observe commands of that
Constitution in respect of the formulation or submission of
24
1120603
proposed amendments thereto, does not prevail in 
Alabama 
...."
Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. at 400, 87 So. at 387. In Craft,
the Court set aside a "road-bond" amendment in response to a
constitutional challenge filed 10 months after the amendment
was certified as adopted. Id.
In this case, Bell's challenge to Amendments 9 and 10 was
filed a day before the election, not 10 months after. If the
Act is unconstitutional, then the amendments presented to the
electorate in accordance with its plan are invalid. "[E]very
principle of public law and sound constitutional policy
requires the courts to pronounce against every amendment,
which is shown not to have been made in accordance with the
rules prescribed by the fundamental law." Collier 
v. 
Frierson,
24 Ala. 100, 109 (1854). See also Hunt v. Decatur City Bd. of
Educ., 628 So. 2d 393, 396-97 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the
rule that "prescribed amendment procedures must be strictly
followed ... applies notwithstanding a vote by the electorate
in favor of the amendment").
IV. Merits
A. Amendment versus Revision
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Sections 284 through 286 of the Alabama Constitution
provide the exclusive modes for amending, altering, or
revising the constitution. State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864,
873 (Ala. 1983). Section 284 prescribes the manner in which
"[a]mendments may be proposed to this Constitution by the
legislature." Three-fifths of all the members elected to both
the Alabama Senate and the Alabama House of Representatives
must approve the proposed amendments, after which the
proposals must proceed to a vote by the electorate. Id. If
approved by a majority of voters, "such amendments shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as parts of this
Constitution." Id.
Section 286 prescribes the manner of holding a convention
"for the purpose of altering or amending the Constitution of
this state." § 286, Ala. Const. 1901. A majority of the
legislature must approve "an act or resolution calling a
convention," after which the voters must decide "the question
of convention or no convention." Id. 
"[N]othing herein contained shall be construed as
restricting the jurisdiction and power of the
convention, when duly assembled in pursuance of this
section, to establish such ordinances and to do and
perform such things as to the convention may seem
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necessary or proper for the purpose of altering,
revising, or amending the existing Constitution." 
§ 286, Ala. Const. 1901(emphasis added).
In 1983, this Court considered whether the Alabama
Constitution permitted the 
legislature 
to submit to the voters 
a total revision of the constitution as an amendment under §
284 without calling a constitutional convention. "[T]he
legislature’s power to initiate proceedings toward a new
constitution," the Court held, "is limited to the provisions
of § 286." Manley, 441 So. 2d at 876. The proposed "amendment"
would have repealed the existing constitution and replaced it
with a new constitution. The Manley Court held the act
unconstitutional because it embodied a plan to revise the
constitution, rather than merely to amend it. Id. at 872-75.
"[T]he Constitution distinguishes between 'amendment' and
'revisions.' ... Only § 
286, providing for conventions, speaks
of 'revisions' to the Constitution; § 284, providing for
direct proposals by the Legislature, speaks only of
alterations or amendments." Id. at 878 (Torbert, C.J.,
concurring specially). This "juxtaposition" reveals "that the
people intended to reserve to themselves [by means of a
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constitutional 
convention] 
the 
power 
of 
general 
revision." 
Id.
at 878-79 (Torbert, C.J., concurring specially).
Section 284 provides that amendments duly approved "shall
be valid to all intents and purposes as parts of this
Constitution." § 284, Ala. Const. 1901 (emphasis added). A
replacement document does not become "part of" the document
sought to be replaced because "to destroy is not to amend. A
thing amended survives." Manley, 441 So. 2d at 875 (quoting
City of Ensley v. Simpson, 52 So. 61, 65 (Ala. 1909)).
Sections 284 and 286 preclude the legislature from initiating
a wholesale revision of the constitution. "[O]nly conventions
have the power to make ... sweeping change."  Manley, 441 So.
2d at 875. This Court has distinguished between the
"legislative mode" for amending the constitution and the
"convention mode" for revising it:
"'[T]he purpose of the legislative mode is to bring
about amendments which are few and simple and
independent; and on the other hand, that of the mode
through Conventions is to revise the entire
Constitution, with a view to propose either a new
one or, as the greater includes the less, to propose
specific and particular amendments to it. Where a
few particular amendments only are desired, if the
Constitution 
provides 
for 
both 
modes, 
the
legislative mode should be employed; but if a
revision is or may be desired, the mode by a
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Convention 
only 
is 
appropriate, 
or 
...
permissible.'"
Manley, 441 So. 2d at 869 (quoting John Alexander Jameson, A
Treatise on Constitutional Conventions 
§ 574c (4th ed. 1887)).
Constitutional revision can take two forms: (1) replacing
the current constitution with a new constitution, or (2)
amending the current constitution so substantially as to
transform it into a different document. "[A] revision of the
whole Constitution [has] the purpose of proposing either,
first, a new one, or, secondly, the old one, if on the whole
satisfactory, but with such amendments as to the Convention
should seem desirable." Manley, 441 So. 2d at 870 (quoting
Jameson, § 574c). A § 286 revision, therefore, can occur even
if the constitution is not replaced in its entirety.
B. The Express Purpose of the Act is Revision, Not Amendment
The Act appoints the Alabama Law Institute to "analyze
the current Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as amended, with
a view toward identifying those provisions which are
antiquated, unnecessary, or duplicative of other provisions,"
and empowers the Institute "[t]o provide the commission with
specific guidance for constitutional revision [and t]o
recommend to the commission an article-by-article revision of
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the constitution." Act No. 197, § (c) (emphasis added). In
addition to naming the new commission the Constitutional
Revision Commission, the Act used the word "revise" or
"revision" with respect to the constitution or its articles a
total of four times. See Act No. 197, §§ (c) & (e). A
"revision" is "[a] general and thorough rewriting of a
governing document in which the entire document is open to
amendment." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (9th ed. 2009). The
Act never refers to "amending" or "altering" 
the 
constitution,
only to "revising" it.
C. Only a Convention Can Revise the Constitution
Contrary to the defendants' argument (Strange's brief,
pp. 13-14), the exclusion of 7 of 18 articles of the
constitution from review for possible change does not make the
Act any less of a plan to revise the constitution. The Act
sets a four-year timetable for legislative review of articles
I, III-V, VII, IX-X, XII-XIV, and XVII. Because they were
previously amended, or because "revision is not considered
needed," Articles II, VI, VIII, XI, XV, XVI, and XVIII are
excluded from consideration by the commission. Act No. 197, §§
30
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(d) & (e).  Although specifically assigning only 11 out of 18
5
articles to the commission for review, the legislature in the
process has reviewed every article in the constitution.
Instead of serving, therefore, as the Act's saving grace, the
exclusion of seven articles from review by the commission
vividly illustrates the fatal flaw of the Act. The
legislature, not the people, determined that 11 articles are
due for an overhaul but that 7 others should remain untouched.
The legislature, not the people, deemed certain unspecified
provisions of the constitution to be "antiquated" and
"unnecessary." The legislature, not the people, is now
overseeing an extensive and unified program of constitutional
revision. The Act thus represents a complete review and
revision of the entire constitution. Even in the process of
building a new house, "[s]ome of the material contained in the
old house may be used again, some of the rooms may by
constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that
Although the comprehensive revision of the judicial
5
article in 1973 and the suffrage and elections article in 1996
may seem to establish a precedent for using § 284 in place of
calling a § 286 constitutional convention, "a few sporadic
offenses against an unambiguous constitutional mandate will
not suffice to establish the basis for a subversion of its
terms." Craft, 205 Ala. at 402, 87 So. at 388-89.
31
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you have altogether another or a new house." Manley, 441 So.
2d at 874 (quoting Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323,
330, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1946) (emphasis added)).
The defendants argue that the Act merely authorizes
recommendations for amendments (Strange's brief, p. 5), and
that the procedural requirements of § 284 will govern all
proposed amendments generated by the commission. (Strange's
brief, p. 11.) In fact, however, the Act, like the act held
unconstitutional in Manley, involves "numerous changes on a
great many different subjects." 441 So. 2d at 873. Such a
global plan of revision can be the fruit only of a § 286
convention, not of the legislative-amendment process under §
284. See id. at 868-69.  By undertaking to massively revise
the 
constitution, 
the 
legislature 
"circumvent[ed] 
the 
people's
right to vote initially on the question of whether to call a
constitutional convention, prior to an election regarding the
recommendations of such a convention." Manley, 441 So. 2d at
872 n.8. Additionally, as Bell notes, the people lost their
ability "to have input in selecting the drafters of the
proposed new constitution." (Bell's brief, p. 18.)
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Stretching out the revision process over a number of
years by submitting to the people two or three revised
articles per general election under the amendment procedures
of § 284 does not change the reality that a near total
revision of the constitution is occurring. The Act's design to
achieve large-scale revision by a carefully planned series of
amendments is an artful evasion of the constitutional-
convention process. The legislature's assumed prerogative to
initiate and control the process of constitutional revision is
a notable and disturbing innovation. By wresting the
convention process from the people, the legislature has made
itself the paramount mechanism of constitutional revision.6
See Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions
We may search in vain for any meaningful term-limits
6
provision in the legislature's new proposed constitution. The
commission apparently considered, but rejected, a term-limits
provision. Article IV, § 46, Ala. Const. 1901, which defines
the term of office for legislators, has no term limits. In its
Tentative Final Revision of November 11, 2012, the commission
lists as an "alternative" a term limit of "20 years of total
service." 
Subcommittee 
minutes 
indicate 
that 
this 
proposal 
was
rejected. The notes to the draft revision of § 46 state:
"Commission members requested a term limit proposal be
included but was rejected by the Subcommittee." By contrast,
a citizens commission not authorized by the legislature
proposed to "[l]imit service of any legislator to three terms
per chamber." Jim Bennett & Sallie C. Creel, Final Report:
Alabama Citizen's Commission for Constitutional Reform, 33
Cumb. L. rev. 597, 609 (2003). 
33
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Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional
Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 Hofstra L. &
Pol'y 
Symp. 
1, 
4 
(1996)(noting 
that 
constitutional 
commissions
have been used "as devices for assisting legislatures in
avoiding 
conventions, 
and 
thus 
retaining 
control 
of
constitutional 
change"); 
James 
A. 
Henretta, 
Foreword:
Rethinking 
the 
State 
Constitutional 
Tradition, 
22 
Rutgers 
L.J.
819, 831 (1991) (noting that constitutional commissions
"represented a diminution of activist popular sovereignty. In
a carefully calculated fashion, these maneuvers removed power
from the hands of the citizenry. The result was a constitution
revised as much through administrative procedures as through
constitutional debate and political compromise."); Albert L.
Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12
Publius: the Journal of Federalism 57, 84 (1982) ("The
mounting 
popularity 
of 
constitutional 
commissions 
is
attributable mainly to their general acceptability to state
legislators who prefer to rely on bodies over whose proposals
they have control."); W. Brooke Graves, State Constitutional
Law: A Twenty-Five Year Summary, 8 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 10
(1966) (stating that constitutional commissions have "'one
34
1120603
inherent and fatal weakness in that their every act is
measured in terms of what they believe the legislature will
accept'" (quoting Bennett M. Rich, Convention or Commission?,
Nat'l Mun. Rev. 133-39 (March 1948))). Almost 50 years ago two
students of constitutional commissions observed:
"The crux of the matter is ultimate legislative
control. Legislative bodies are jealous of their
constitutional amendment and revision prerogative.
When they are presented with an alternative that
enables them to preserve this prerogative, in
contrast with one, such as the constitutional
convention, over which their powers are far more
limited, the choice is obvious to most lawmakers."
Albert L. Strum and James B. Craig, Jr., State Constitutional
Commissions: Fifteen Years of Increasing Use, 39 State Gov't
56, 63 (1966).
Sections 284 and 286 require that a program of total
revision, such as the Act mandates, must arise from the
citizens of Alabama in a constitutional convention, and not
from 
a 
legislatively 
created 
advisory 
commission. 
"Revision 
by
commission" is an unauthorized method to propose to the people
of Alabama a comprehensive rewriting of the constitution. The
legislature has only the power to amend the constitution, not
to revise it. "In proposing amendment of the Constitution the
legislature does not have the plenary powers it has in
35
1120603
enacting laws but only the powers specifically delegated to
it." Manley, 441 So. 2d at 878 (Torbert, C.J., concurring
specially) (quoting Bourbon v. Governor of Maryland, 258 Md.
252, 257-58, 265 A.2d 477, 480 (1970)). The people delegated
to the legislature only the power to propose "amendments which
are few and simple and independent." Manley, 441 So. 2d at 869
(quoting Jameson, § 574c). "The people of this State ... have
decreed that they reserve, in revising or replacing the
Constitution, a role much more active than merely passing upon
a proposal someone else has written." Id. at 877 (Torbert,
C.J., concurring specially). The effect of the Act is to
achieve article by article what the constitution 
prohibits the
legislature from doing all at once. If, instead of placing all
the courses of a banquet on the table at the same time, they
are served individually in sequence separated by intervals of
time, the gastronomic result is still the same, even though
the latter presentation may appear easier to digest.
If the legislature inherently possessed plenary power to
propose a massive revision of the constitution, then § 284,
the provision authorizing the legislature to propose discrete
36
1120603
amendments, would be superfluous. The presence of § 284 in the
Alabama Constitution, however,
"'fights against the contention that the general
grant of legislative authority bears in its broad
arms, by implication, any power to formulate and
submit proposed organic law, whether in the form of
an entire and complete instrument of government to
supersede the existing one, or a single amendment.
For if the General Assembly has the greater power,
unfettered power [of revision], under the general
grant, what necessity could there have existed for
giving the lesser, special power [of amendment],
with the checks and limitations accompanying it?'"
Manley, 441 So. 2d at 872 (quoting Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind.
336, 356, 99 N.E. 1, 8 (1912)). A construction of the
constitution that renders one of its provisions superfluous
conflicts with this Court's acknowledgment that "[t]he
Constitution contains no idle assertions, no meaningless
language, no ephemeral purpose." Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. at
399, 87 So. at 386.
V. Conclusion
"[T]he 
legislature's 
power 
to 
initiate 
proceedings 
toward
a new constitution is limited to the provisions of § 286."
Manley, 441 So. 2d at 876 (emphasis added). A constitutional
convention may convene only after the voters have approved a
legislative act or resolution calling for the convention.
37
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Thus, a legislature desirous of revising the Alabama
Constitution has one, and only one, option at its disposal:
"pass[] an act or resolution calling a convention." § 286,
Ala. Const. 1901. The treatise on constitutional conventions
relied on in Manley states that "whenever a Constitution needs
a general revision, a convention is indispensably necessary."
Jameson, § 219. As this Court has stated: "Section 286 of the
Constitution of 1901 does not vest in the legislature the
power to call a constitutional convention." Opinion of the
Justices No. 141, 81 So. 2d 688, 689 (Ala. 1955). The
legislature may not evade this limitation on its power through
the ingenious mechanism of an in-house constitutional
convention dubbed a "Constitutional Revision Commission." 
Creating a Constitutional Revision Commission and
granting it the responsibility to propose an article-by-
article revision of the constitution exceeds the scope of the
legislature's authority under §§ 284 and 286 of the Alabama
Constitution. Because the Act is likely unconstitutional as a
legislative usurpation 
of the exclusive and sovereign right 
of
the people to revise the constitution through a convention
called for that purpose, I would reverse the order granting
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the motion to dismiss and remand the case for further
proceedings. Bell has stated a cognizable theory of law and
therefore may possibly prevail on her complaint. Nothing more
is required at the pleading stage. Additionally, because
legislative immunity does not shield the named legislators
from being defendants in this matter, and because Bell's
challenge to Amendments 9 and 10 is not moot, questions of
justiciability, in my view, do not defeat Bell's complaint.
This Court has recognized "the settled principle that the
people have forbidden the Legislature from conducting itself
in a manner inconsistent with their constitution and when it
does, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to nullify a
legislative enactment contrary to the constitution." Rice v.
English, 835 So. 2d 157, 162 (Ala. 2002). That principle has
full application to the prerogative of the people to call a
constitutional convention, "the great agency through which
democracy finds expression." Henretta, Rethinking the State
Constitutional Tradition, 22 Rutgers L.J. at 829 (quoting J.
Dealey, Growth of American State Constitutions 258 (1915)).
39