Case Title: NATHAN L. WIMBLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0174

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
NATHAN L. WIMBLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 72208 P.3d 608Case Number: S-08-0174Decided: 06/02/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
NATHAN 
L. WIMBLEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Nathan 
Wimbley was convicted and sentenced on one felony count of obtaining property by 
false pretenses in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-407(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2007).  On appeal, he asserts that 
the district court improperly admitted evidence of other misconduct that should 
have been excluded pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), and evidence that was unduly 
prejudicial and should have been excluded pursuant to W.R.E. 403.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Wimbley presents these appeal issues:

 
 
1.   Did the trial court err in its 
overbroad admission of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b)?

 
 
2.   Did the trial court err in 
admission of argument and evidence that Mr. Wimbley was on parole for 
another offense and that he was incarcerated in Yuma County, 
Colorado?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Joseph 
Lex Madden is one of the owners of Torrington Livestock Markets, LLC.  According to Mr. Madden's trial 
testimony, he received a telephone call from a man who identified himself as 
Nathan Wimbley.  Mr. Wimbley 
said that he was a broker and dealer in pipe, and that he had pipe in Denver he 
wanted to sell.  As it happened, 
Mr. Madden was interested in purchasing some pipe, and agreed to purchase 
one semi-truck load of pipe, or 9,000 feet, for 80¢ per foot, or $7,200.  Mr. Madden believed this was a good 
deal, as he thought that the going price for such pipe was $1.00 to $1.25 per 
foot.  Mr. Wimbley indicated 
that, because he had never done business with Torrington Livestock Markets 
before, he wanted the $7,200 wired to him in advance.  Mr. Madden wired the money from his bank 
in Torrington, Wyoming, to Mr. Wimbley's account at a bank in Cahokia, 
Illinois.

 
 

[¶4]        
The 
pipe was supposed to be delivered the following day.  It was not.  Mr. Madden tried to contact Mr. 
Wimbley, but Mr. Wimbley did not answer the phone.  Mr. Madden left messages, but Mr. 
Wimbley never returned his calls.  
Mr. Madden then asked his Special Projects Manager, Doug Chamberlain, to 
look into the situation. 

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. 
Wimbley answered Mr. Chamberlain's phone call.  Asked about the pipe, Mr. Wimbley 
said that there had been problems arranging for its transportation to 
Torrington.  He said that he could 
deliver the pipe within a month.  
Mr. Chamberlain said that was not acceptable, and asked Mr. Wimbley 
to return the $7,200.  Mr. Wimbley 
agreed to return the money, but he never did, nor did he ever deliver the 
pipe.  Mr. Chamberlain 
contacted law enforcement authorities, and Mr. Wimbley was charged with 
obtaining 
property by false pretenses, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-407(a)(i).1

 
 

[¶6]        
More 
than a month before trial, Mr. Wimbley's counsel filed a "Demand Pursuant to 
Rule 404(b)," seeking notice of the State's intent to introduce any evidence 
under W.R.E. 404(b).  The State 
provided its notice nine days later.  
It listed two different types of evidence it intended to offer at 
trial.  

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
first was testimony from several persons to the effect that Mr. Wimbley had 
offered to sell them either pipe or fertilizer, and had requested payment in 
advance.  Some of them had made the 
advance payment, but never received the product.  In connection with this testimony, the 
State also intended to offer testimony from a representative of Mr. Wimbley's 
bank that when Mr. Wimbley's account was credited with these advance 
payments, Mr. Wimbley immediately withdrew the money and depleted the 
account.  The State contended that 
this evidence demonstrated "a plan, scheme and course of conduct between [Mr.] 
Wimbley and his customers,'" and was "relevant to show [Mr.] Wimbley's false 
pretenses and intent to defraud."  

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
second was testimony from Mr. Wimbley's parole officer in Illinois, who could 
provide identifying information concerning Mr. Wimbley.  This evidence was needed to establish 
identity, the State asserted, because Mr. Madden and Mr. Chamberlain 
had only talked to Mr. Wimbley by telephone, and had never met with him in 
person.  Shortly after filing the 
written notice, the State notified counsel for Mr. Wimbley that it also 
intended to offer testimony from an official from the jail in Yuma County, 
Colorado, where Mr. Wimbley had been incarcerated.  This testimony was also offered to 
establish Mr. Wimbley's identity, and to provide foundation for recordings 
of telephone calls Mr. Wimbley had made from the jail.

 
 

[¶9]        
Nearly 
a month before trial, the district court held a hearing on pending motions and 
on the State's intended use of evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b).  After thorough consideration, it ruled 
that the State's evidence was admissible.  
The evidence was admitted at trial, and Mr. Wimbley was 
convicted.  He filed this timely 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶10]     
We 
review this case for abuse of discretion.

 
 
A 
trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  
"[A]s long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, 
¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

Leyva 
v. State, 
2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Testimony 
from others who had dealings with Mr. Wimbley

 
 

[¶11]     
At 
trial, the State presented testimony from four persons whose experiences with 
Mr. Wimbley were similar to Mr. Madden's.  Jay Bowers testified that someone 
identifying himself as Nathan Wimbley contacted him with an offer to sell 
pipe.  Mr. Bowers wired $4,072 
to Mr. Wimbley's bank account.  
Dana Barrow, Mr. Bowers' employee, testified that she was the person 
who made the wire transfer.  The 
pipe was never delivered to Mr. Bowers.  
Charles Warner testified that he received several faxes from a man 
calling himself Nathan Wimbley, offering to sell pipe.  Mr. Wimbley requested a wire 
transfer of money in advance, but Mr. Warner refused.  Mr. Wimbley contacted 
Mr. Warner several times, trying to convince him to make the advance 
payment.  Don Andrews testified that 
he received an e-mail message from an individual identifying himself as Nathan 
Wimbley, offering to sell guardrail and pipe.  Mr. Wimbley asked for money in 
advance, and Mr. Andrews sent the money.  The pipe and guardrail were never 
delivered.

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. Wimbley 
contends that this evidence should have been excluded from trial pursuant to 
W.R.E. 404(b), which reads as follows:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
A 
core principle of this rule is that a defendant in a criminal case "should not 
be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but 
only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged."  1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 
§ 4:21, at 691-92 (3d ed. 2007).  
For that reason, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is excluded 
when "its only purpose is to show a defendant has a disposition to commit 
crimes."  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 
150 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 

[¶13]     
Such 
evidence is admissible, however, if it serves some other, proper purpose.  Leyva, ¶ 27, 165 P.3d  at 454.  When deciding whether to admit such 
evidence, the trial court must consider the following:  (1) Is the evidence offered for a proper 
purpose? (2) Is the evidence relevant? (3) Is the probative value of the 
evidence substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice? (4) 
Upon request, should the jury be given a limiting instruction?  Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, 
¶ 31, 100 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 

[¶14]     
On 
appeal, as before the district court, the State contends that this evidence was 
admitted for a proper purpose.  To 
convict a defendant of obtaining property by false pretenses, the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly obtained property 
from another, by false pretenses, with intent to defraud.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-407(a).  To establish that Mr. Wimbley had 
given Mr. Madden false information and intended to defraud him, the State 
offered the testimony of Mr. Bowers, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Andrews 
that Mr. Wimbley had offered to sell them pipe and asked for money in 
advance, but did not provide the pipe.  
This testimony was relevant because it made it less likely that 
Mr. Wimbley had inadvertently or accidentally failed to deliver the pipe to 
Mr. Madden, and more likely that he intended to defraud Mr. Madden.  It was offered for the proper purposes 
of showing the falsity of Mr. Wimbley's statements to Mr. Madden and 
Mr. Chamberlain, and of showing Mr. Wimbley's intent, plan, and lack of 
mistake.

 
 

[¶15]     
On 
appeal, Mr. Wimbley concedes that, given the potential defenses of "mistake or 
accident, calling one individual to testify about a course of dealings with 
Mr. Wimbley might have been relevant."  His argument, however, is that it was 
unnecessary to call more than one such witness, and calling several to talk 
about past transactions was unnecessarily cumulative and highly 
prejudicial.  This is particularly 
true, he asserts, because in addition to these four individuals, the jury also 
heard from the bank representative about Mr. Wimbley depleting his bank 
account of funds immediately after they were wired to the account, from a 
probation officer who testified that Mr. Wimbley was on parole, and from a 
jailer who testified that Mr. Wimbley had been 
incarcerated.

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
district court considered Mr. Wimbley's argument that this evidence was 
unnecessarily cumulative:

 
 
The 
. . . defendant argued hard on this issue, that the volume of these other acts 
is unnecessarily cum[]ulative; but when the issue is intent, it may be necessary 
to prove several transactions.  That 
may be the primary way  in fact it sounds like it is the primary way the State 
has of proving that it wasn't just a mistake, a bad business deal, that there 
was some intent to defraud; and the State has that high burden of proving intent 
to defraud; so the Court can't find that these are unnecessarily 
cum[]ulative.

 
 
The 
district court concluded that, when intent is at issue, evidence of several 
similar, prior acts may be admissible.  
This conclusion finds convincing support in treatises on evidence.  "[W]hen prior acts are offered to show 
intent . . . the inference of intent is also stronger if the acts are often 
repeated, because sheer repetition strengthens an inference of intent."  Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra § 4:34, at 821-22.  See also 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 
§ 5:06, at 16 (Thompson/West 2008) ("[T]he more often the defendant 
performs the actus reus, the smaller is the likelihood that the defendant acted 
with an innocent state of mind.").  
Or, put more colorfully, "the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three 
successive similar occasions are extremely small."  2 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 302, at 241 (Chadbourne 
rev. 1979).  

 
 

[¶17]     
We 
also note that, despite Mr. Wimbley's protestation that "an enormous amount 
of the State's case was devoted to the presentation of 404(b) evidence," the 
State offered only four witnesses to talk about three prior transactions.  The record reflects that the State was 
aware of at least four other occasions on which Mr. Wimbley had engaged in 
similar conduct, but witnesses were not called to discuss those incidents.  Eight such witnesses might have been 
needlessly cumulative, but Mr. Wimbley has failed to convince us 
that 
the four witnesses were unnecessarily repetitive or unduly prejudicial.  Compare Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Minn. 
2004) (error to admit testimony of 24 witnesses who took three days of trial 
testifying to redundant details of defendant's prior bad act).  We cannot conclude that the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.

 
 
Testimony 
of parole officer and jail official

 
 

[¶18]     
At 
trial, the district court allowed testimony from Jesse Teverbaugh, who was 
Mr. Wimbley's parole officer in Illinois.  Mr. Wimbley essentially concedes that 
much of Mr. Teverbaugh's testimony was relevant and admissible.  "Mr. Teverbaugh had in fact met 
Mr. Wimbley face-to-face, unlike many of the other witnesses.  Therefore, it is conceivable that Mr. 
Teverbaugh could have been called to identify Mr. Wimbley, as an individual he 
knew, using the address and phone number in question in this case."  However, Mr. Wimbley argues that it was 
"absolutely irrelevant" and "extremely prejudicial" for Mr. Teverbaugh to 
testify that he was Mr. Wimbley's parole officer.  This evidence, he contends, should have 
been excluded pursuant to W.R.E. 403, which provides as 
follows:

 
 
Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

 
 

[¶19]     
Similarly, 
Mr. Wimbley objects to the admission of testimony from Daniel Copley, the jail 
sergeant for the Yuma County Sheriff's Office in Wray, Colorado.  The State used this testimony largely to 
provide foundation for the admission of recordings of phone calls 
Mr. Wimbley had made from the jail, in which he mentioned his dealings with 
Mr. Madden.  Mr. Wimbley 
contends that evidence of his being in jail was unduly prejudicial, and should 
have been excluded under W.R.E. 403.

 
 

[¶20]     
For 
us to conclude that a trial court abused its discretion in weighing evidence 
under W.R.E. 403, "the appellant must show that the testimony has little or 
no value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced solely for the 
purpose of inflaming the jury."  Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1305 
(Wyo. 1991).  In this case, the 
testimony of Mr. Teverbaugh did have probative value in establishing Mr. 
Wimbley's identity.  Mr. Madden 
had the phone number Mr. Wimbley had given him, and Mr. Teverbaugh 
confirmed that this was Mr. Wimbley's phone number.  Mr. Madden had the number of the bank 
account to which he wired the money.  
The bank had Mr. Wimbley's social security number in connection with the 
account, and Mr. Teverbaugh confirmed that this was Mr. Wimbley's social 
security number.  Mr. Wimbley 
had told Mr. Madden he was a pipe dealer.  Mr. Teverbaugh testified that Mr. 
Wimbley was employed as a tree trimmer, not as a pipe dealer.  

 
 

[¶21]     
We 
agree with Mr. Wimbley that the fact he was on parole in Illinois was 
potentially prejudicial.  But it was 
also needed to explain why Mr. Teverbaugh knew Mr. Wimbley's phone number, 
social security number, and employment.  
As the State pointed out, this is "normally private information," and 
without explanation, the jury could have questioned Mr. Teverbaugh's 
credibility.  Similarly, the fact 
that Mr. Wimbley had been incarcerated in Yuma County, Colorado, was 
potentially prejudicial.  But 
without revealing that information, Sergeant Copley could hardly have explained 
why he had recordings of Mr. Wimbley's telephone calls.  The potentially prejudicial information 
was therefore relevant, and was not introduced solely to inflame the jury.  We cannot conclude that the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence at 
trial.

 
 

[¶22]     
We 
also note the restraint with which the State presented this evidence.  The witnesses stated only briefly, and 
without elaboration, that Mr. Wimbley was on parole and incarcerated.  The record suggests that Mr. Teverbaugh, 
in particular, knew additional prejudicial information about Mr. Wimbley's past, 
but the State avoided any questions that might have solicited that 
information.  Moreover, the district 
court twice gave the jury an oral limiting instruction concerning 
Mr. Teverbaugh's testimony, and gave another oral limiting instruction 
concerning Sergeant Copley's.  The 
district court followed up with this written jury 
instruction:

 
 
The 
Court admitted the testimony of Jesse Teverbaugh for the limited purpose 
of[:]  1. Establishing identity 
information for the Defendant, 2. Showing Mr. Teverbaugh's knowledge 
of the Defendant's employment, and 3. Providing background information for 
the entry of exhibits.  You must not 
consider Mr. Teverbaugh's testimony for any other purpose.  

 
 
Testimony 
showed that the Defendant was under the supervision of Mr. Teverbaugh as a 
parole agent.  You may not draw any 
inference from the fact that the Defendant was under the supervision of a parole 
agent, and you may not speculate from that evidence.

 
 
Evidence 
showed that the Defendant was confined in and made calls from a detention center 
in Yuma County, Colorado.  You may 
not draw any inference from the fact that the Defendant was incarcerated, and 
you may not speculate from that evidence.

 
 
We 
presume that the jury followed this limiting instruction.  Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 17, 
176 P.3d 647, 653 (Wyo. 2008).  We 
also agree with the district court that the prejudicial effect of this evidence 
did not substantially outweigh its probative value.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting this evidence at trial.  We affirm Mr. Wimbley's conviction 
and sentence.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-407(a) provides, in relevant part, that "A person who 
knowingly obtains property from another person by false pretenses with intent to 
defraud the person is guilty of:  
(i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if 
the value of the property is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
more.