Case Title: MARK GRIESS and ROBERT PATE v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, STEVE LINDNER, and Does I and II

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK GRIESS and ROBERT PATE v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, STEVE LINDNER, and Does I and II1989 WY 147776 P.2d 75Case Number: 89-19Decided: 07/05/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK GRIESS AND ROBERT 
PATE, PETITIONERS,

v.

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 
CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, STEVE LINDNER, AND DOES I AND II, 
RESPONDENTS.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for petitioners.

George Santini 
of Graves, Santini & Villemez, Cheyenne, for Wyoming Trial Lawyers 
Associations, Amicus Curiae Committee in 
support of position of petitioners.

George Zunker of 
Sullivan & Zunker, Cheyenne, and Lee Dale 
(argued) and Gilbert M. Roman of Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo., for respondents.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     We are presented with 
the following certified question from the United States 
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit:

"Whether Wyoming law 
provides an employee, injured in the course of his employment, a cause of action 
against his employer for retaliatory discharge based upon a violation of the 
State's public policy, where the employer discharges the employee as a result of 
the employee's worker's compensation claim and where the employee is not covered 
by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement."

We answer this 
question in the affirmative.

[¶2.]     The following facts are 
taken from the certification order. Mark Griess and Robert Pate were employed by 
Consolidated Freightways (CF) as part-time or "casual" dockworkers. Griess and 
Pate were injured in separate accidents involving a forklift while working for 
CF and were told by CF that they would not be called back to work if they filed 
worker's compensation claims. Ignoring this warning, both filed claims. CF 
removed their names from the list of available workers.

[¶3.]     Griess and Pate filed 
suit in Wyoming state court, alleging retaliatory 
discharge in violation of state public policy and culpable negligence on the 
part of coworkers. CF removed the action to federal district court, which 
granted summary judgment to defendants. Griess and Pate appealed from the 
summary judgment, and the federal circuit court of appeals certified the 
aforementioned question to this court.

DISCUSSION

[¶4.]     The historic rule in 
Wyoming has 
been that employment for an indefinite period may be terminated by either party 
at any time and for any reason without incurring liability. Rompf v. John Q. 
Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 1984). We have previously discussed the 
availability of a tort action for retaliatory discharge as an exception to the 
general rule of "at will" employment. In Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 
1985) we said:

"A tort action premised 
on violation of public policy results from a recognition that allowing a 
discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go 
unvindicated. If there exists another remedy for violation of the social policy 
which resulted in the discharge of the employee, there is no need for a 
court-imposed separate tort action premised on public 
policy."

While in Allen 
we declined to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge where 
another remedy was available, we noted that the case did not involve "discharge 
in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claims." Allen, 699 P.2d  at 284; 
see also Rompf, 685 P.2d 25, 27-28, n. 1.

[¶5.]     In the present case, 
another remedy is not available, and recognition of an action in tort will 
protect the exercise of statutory rights and vindicate the public policy 
expressed in Wyoming's constitution and statutes. Thus, 
Art. 19, § 7 of the Wyoming constitution 
provides:

"It shall be unlawful for 
any person, company or corporation, to require of its servants or employes as a 
condition of their employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby 
such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from 
liability or responsibility, on account of personal injuries received by such 
servants or employes * * *."

Article 10, § 4 
of the Wyoming 
constitution provides in pertinent part:

"Any contract or 
agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the 
death or injury of any employee shall be void. As to all extrahazardous 
employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and 
maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation * * *. 
The right of each employee to compensation from the fund shall be in lieu of and 
shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer 
contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any person or persons by 
reason of the injuries or death."

Wyoming Statute 
§ 27-14-104(b) provides:

"No contract, rule, 
regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability 
created by this act except as otherwise provided by this 
act."

[¶6.]     While these provisions 
do not directly address retaliatory discharge, they do evidence a strong public 
policy favoring unfettered exercise of the right to compensation for 
work-related injuries through the worker's compensation system. If employers 
could penalize employees for exercising statutory rights to compensation, this 
public policy would be defeated. Fear of discharge would chill the exercise of a 
statutory right. Faced with a choice between receiving compensation and 
continuing their employment, many employees might choose the latter, thus 
reducing the number of claims filed. This reduction would directly affect the 
liability of the employer for premium payments, since under the Wyoming statutory scheme 
premium calculation is based in part on the number of claims paid. W.S. 
27-14-201. Actions by an employer which are intended to discourage valid 
compensation claims in order to reduce the employer's liability for premiums 
violate the public policy expressed by W.S. 27-14-104(b), quoted 
above.

[¶7.]     Appellees argue that a 
tort remedy to vindicate this public policy is precluded by the portion of W.S. 
27-14-104(a) which states that remedies under the act "are in lieu of all other 
rights and remedies * * *." The contention is that the employee has a single 
cause of action under worker's compensation with all other claims being barred 
by the act. The complete language of that section, however, when read in 
context, compels the opposite conclusion:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act for an employee and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous 
employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer 
making contributions required by this act * * *." W.S. 27-14-104(a). (emphasis 
added)

The term 
"injury" as used in the act is defined in W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi). The statutory 
definition of injury generally is stated as "harmful change in the human 
organism"; it does not encompass the discharge itself from employment. 
Therefore, a tort action for retaliatory discharge is not precluded by the 
statute, since it is not a "remedy" for an "injury incurred" in employment as 
defined by the statute.

[¶8.]     We have been cautious 
about approving tort actions which might interfere with the traditional rule of 
"at will" employment. See, e.g., Allen, 699 P.2d 277; Rompf, 685 P.2d 25. 
However, in the unique situation presented here, where a strong public policy is 
embodied in the worker's compensation statutes and the constitution and no other 
remedy is available, an exception to the doctrine of "at will" employment is 
justified.

[¶9.]     We hold that a person 
whose employment is terminated for exercising rights under the worker's 
compensation statutes and who is not covered by the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement has a cause of action in tort against the employer for 
damages.