Case Title: State v. William E. Spaeth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP001827-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
William E. Spaeth, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 20, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Washington County, Richard T. Becker, Circuit Court Judge.  
Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification by the court of appeals, following the sentencing 
of the defendant, William E. Spaeth, by the circuit court for 
Washington County, Richard T. Becker, Judge, for a fifth offense 
within a five-year period of operating a motor vehicle after 
revocation (OAR).  The defendant asserts that he did not admit 
to, and the State did not prove, the four prior OAR convictions 
necessary to impose the statutorily enhanced penalties prescribed 
for fifth-time OAR offenders.  Because we conclude that the 
record does not adequately establish the defendant’s prior OAR 
convictions, we reverse and commute the defendant's sentence.  
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
2
Initially, we must determine the appropriate standard for 
proving prior OAR convictions for purposes of sentencing under 
the repeat OAR penalty enhancement provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2) (1993-94).
1 We then consider whether the record in 
this case satisfies that standard.  The resolution of these 
issues requires us to apply statutory language and constitutional 
principles to undisputed facts, which we do without deference to 
the circuit court.  Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 305-
06, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995); State v. Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d 653, 
667-68, 416 N.W.2d 276 (1987). 
I. 
 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On July 24, 1994, 
Donald Kocan informed the Washington County Sheriff’s Department 
that he observed the defendant driving an automobile in a 
dangerous manner on Main Street in the Town of Addison.  Based 
upon Kocan’s statement, Kocan's identification of the defendant 
in a photograph array, and a record check revealing that the 
defendant's operating privileges were in a revoked status, Deputy 
Dale K. Schmidt issued a citation to the defendant for operating 
after revocation.  The citation alleged that the defendant was an 
“HTO,” or habitual traffic offender, and that the incident was 
his fifth OAR violation. 
At his initial appearance, without counsel, the defendant 
was provided with a copy of the criminal complaint.  The 
complaint is subscribed and sworn by Captain John G. Theusch of 
                                                          
 
1 
Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
future 
statutory 
references are to the 1993-94 volume. 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
3
the Washington County Sheriff's Department.  Theusch alleges that 
the defendant operated a motor vehicle on July 24, 1994, during a 
period of license revocation.  He then recites the enhanced 
penalties prescribed for both a fifth OAR offense and for 
committing an OAR offense while revoked as a habitual traffic 
offender.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(2)(e)1, 351.08.
2  Theusch 
                                                          
 
2 Wis. Stat. § 343.44 provides in relevant part: 
Driving while disqualified, out of service or after 
license revoked or suspended. (1) No person whose 
operating privilege has been duly revoked or suspended 
pursuant to the laws of this state shall operate a 
motor vehicle upon any highway in this state during 
such suspension or revocation or thereafter before 
. . . that person has obtained a new license in this 
state, including an occupational license, or the 
person's operating privilege has been reinstated under 
the laws of this state. . . .  
 
    (2) Except as provided in subs. (2g) and (2m), any 
person violating this section is subject to the 
following penalties: 
 
(a) For the first conviction under this section 
. . . within a 5-year period the person may be required 
to forfeit not more than $600, except that, if the 
person's operating privilege was revoked under ch. 351 
at the time of the offense, the penalty may be a fine 
of not more than $600. 
 
(b) 1. . . . for a 2nd conviction . . . within a 
5-year period, a person may be fined not more than 
$1,000 and shall be imprisoned for not more than 6 
months. 
 
(c) 1. . . . for a 3rd conviction . . . within a 
5-year period, a person may be fined not more than 
$2,000 and may be imprisoned for not more than 9 
months. 
 
(d) 1. . . . for a 4th conviction . . . within a 
5-year period, a person may be fined not more than 
$2,000 and may be imprisoned for not more than one year 
in the county jail. 
 
(e)  1. . . . for a 5th or subsequent conviction 
. . . within a 5-year period, a person may be fined not 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
4
provides two sources for the allegations he makes in the 
complaint.  He first refers to Kocan's statement that the latter 
observed the defendant driving on the date in question.  The 
complaint then provides: 
Complainant further bases his information upon review 
of the official police report of Deputy Dale K. Schmidt 
of the Washington County Sheriff's Department, who 
states 
that 
upon 
verifying 
the 
defendant's 
identification a subsequent record check with the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle 
Division, 
indicated 
that 
the 
defendant's 
driving 
privileges were revoked on November 21, 1990 as an 
habitual traffic offender for a period of five years 
and have not been reinstated.  Said record check 
further indicates that notice of revocation was sent to 
the defendant at his last known address by first class 
mail on January 31, 1991 and that same was not returned 
for any reason.  Said record check further indicates 
that the defendant was convicted of operating after 
revocation on February 28, 1990 for an offense 
occurring on December 17, 1989, on November 21, 1990 
for an offense occurring on May 27, 1990, on June 6, 
1993 for an offense occurring on October 1, 1992 and on 
May 4, 1994 for an offense occurring on March 16, 1994.        
During the defendant’s initial appearance, the circuit court 
engaged him in a colloquy, describing the charged offense and its 
potential penalties.  When asked if he understood that he was 
being charged with a fifth OAR offense within a five-year period, 
and with driving during a habitual traffic offender revocation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
more than $2,500 and may be imprisoned for not more 
than one year in the county jail. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 351.08 provides in relevant part: 
Operation of motor vehicle by habitual traffic offender 
or 
repeat 
habitual 
traffic 
offender 
prohibited; 
penalty; enforcement. Any person who is convicted of 
operating a motor vehicle in this state while the 
revocation under this chapter is in effect shall, in 
addition to any penalty imposed under s. 343.44, be 
fined not to exceed $5,000 and imprisoned not to exceed 
180 days. . . .   
 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
5
the defendant answered affirmatively.  The defendant also stated 
that he understood the potential penalties for being convicted of 
the charged offense.  At a subsequent hearing, the defendant, now 
represented by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 
Before trial, the defendant stipulated that his license was 
revoked on the date in question, and that he had knowledge of the 
revocation.  In response to the circuit court’s questioning, the 
defendant acknowledged that the only element of OAR remaining for 
the State to establish was that he was driving on July 24, 1994.  
After a trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and the 
circuit court proceeded immediately to sentencing. 
At sentencing, the State requested a 60-day jail term, fines 
of $568, and a six-month revocation of the defendant’s driving 
privileges.  In support of its request, the State noted: 
[c]onsidering this is the fifth offense and he is 
alleged to be, and is, a habitual traffic offender, I 
think the sentence recommended is well within the 
limitations . . . provided by the statute. 
Defense counsel argued instead for a 30-day sentence and a  
minimal fine, stating that “I understand that there is some jail 
time that is necessary in this case . . . .”  Before imposing its 
sentence, the circuit court remarked:  
[c]onsidering that we have got an HTO, alleged HTO 
situation, certainly there is not going to be a 
sentence greater than the base sentence for the charge, 
so whether or not Mr. Spaeth is actually an HTO is not 
particularly relevant.  But I note the number of prior 
convictions here.  In ’89 offenses, convictions in ’90; 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
6
offenses in ’89, ’90, ’92 and ’94.  Certainly calls for 
some jail time.
3 
The court then ordered a 60-day jail sentence, a $311.80 fine, 
and a six-month license revocation. 
The defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief with 
the circuit court.  In his motion, the defendant requested an 
order vacating that portion of his sentence attributable to any 
repeater enhancement.  The defendant argued that he had not 
admitted, and the State had failed to prove, the existence of 
prior OAR convictions.  According to the defendant, he should 
have been sentenced as a first-time offender, which would have 
resulted in no jail time.
4 
In denying the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief, 
the circuit court acknowledged that the defendant did not admit 
the prior OAR convictions, and that the State had presented no 
proof of prior convictions either at trial or at sentencing.  The 
circuit court nevertheless concluded that the defendant was 
properly sentenced.  The court reasoned that because the enhanced 
penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(e)1 are "self-executing," 
the State need not come forward with specific proof of a 
defendant's prior OAR convictions. 
The defendant appealed.  The court of appeals certified the 
case to this court based upon our earlier acceptance of a 
                                                          
 
3 From this statement, it is apparent that the defendant's 
HTO status was irrelevant to the circuit court's sentencing 
determination.  Instead, the court sentenced the defendant based 
solely on his status as a fifth-time OAR offender. 
4 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(a) 
prescribes 
only 
a 
civil 
forfeiture for a first OAR offense. 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
7
petition for review of State v. Wideman, No. 95-0852-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995).  
II. 
The defendant argues that the enhanced penalties for OAR 
recidivism are substantially similar to the increased penalties 
for habitual criminality provided in Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1), the 
general repeater statute.
5  He maintains that case law, as well 
                                                          
 
5 Wis. Stat. § 939.62 provides in relevant part: 
Increased penalty for habitual criminality.  (1) If the 
actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in sub. 
(2), and the present conviction is for any crime for 
which imprisonment may be imposed . . . the maximum 
term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime 
may be increased as follows: 
 
    (a)  A maximum term of one year or less may be 
increased to not more than 3 years. 
 
    (b)  A maximum term of more than one year but not 
more than 10 years may be increased by not more than 2 
years if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors 
and by not more than 6 years if the prior conviction 
was for a felony. 
 
    (c)  A maximum term of more than 10 years may be 
increased by not more than 2 years if the prior 
convictions were for misdemeanors and by not more than 
10 years if the prior conviction was for a felony. 
 
    (2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was 
convicted of a felony during the 5-year period 
immediately preceding the commission of the crime for 
which the actor presently is being sentenced, or if the 
actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate 
occasions during that same period, which convictions 
remain of record and unreversed. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) In this section "felony" and "misdemeanor"  
have the following meanings: 
 
(a)  In case of crimes committed in this state, 
the terms do not include motor vehicle offenses under 
chs. 341 to 349 and offenses handled through court 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
8
as equal protection and due process considerations, require the 
State to prove prior OAR convictions under the same standards as 
exist for proving prior convictions under the general repeater 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).
6 
Section 343.44(2) 
provides a framework 
of 
escalating 
penalties for successive OAR convictions.  However, the statute 
provides no procedural rules for establishing the existence of 
the prior OAR convictions necessary to invoke its penalty 
enhancements.  The statute's legislative history is similarly 
bereft of any mention of a proof standard. 
This court has previously determined that § 343.44(2) "is 
essentially in the nature of a repeater statute."  Steeno v. 
State, 85 Wis. 2d 663, 672, 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978); see also State 
v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 64, 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992) (concluding 
that "the OAR statute uses prior OAR convictions primarily to 
enhance punishment").  The defendant derives from this statement 
the proposition that the similarity between the escalating 
penalty structures of §§ 343.44(2) and 939.62(1) requires the 
State to prove prior OAR convictions in the same manner as it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proceedings under ch. 48, but otherwise have the 
meanings designated in s. 939.60. 
 
6 Wis. Stat. § 973.12 provides in relevant part: 
Sentence of a repeater or persistent repeater.  
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if 
convicted . . . [and if] the prior convictions are 
admitted by the defendant or proved by the state, he or 
she shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 
. . . .  An official report of the F.B.I. or any other 
governmental agency of the United States or of this or 
any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any 
conviction or sentence therein reported.  
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
9
required to prove prior convictions under the general repeater 
statute. 
Initially, we note that the defendant does not, and cannot, 
assert a statutory mandate for applying the proof requirements 
under the general repeater statute to sentencing for successive 
OAR offenses.  When a person is charged as a "repeater" under 
§ 939.62(2), that section's enhanced penalties become available 
"[i]f the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or 
proved by the state. . . ."  § 973.12(1).  Prima facie evidence 
of the prior convictions is established by an agency's official 
report documenting each conviction.  Id. 
The defendant is not a repeater for purposes of § 973.12(1).  
As defined by § 939.62(2), a repeater is a person who has been 
convicted of at least one felony or three misdemeanors in the 
five years prior to the crime for which he or she is being 
sentenced.  However, convictions for motor vehicle offenses under 
chs. 341-349 are expressly excluded from the definitions of 
"felony" and "misdemeanor."  See § 939.62(3).  Thus, a defendant 
can never be a § 973.12(1) repeater solely by virtue of multiple 
prior OAR convictions. 
The nature of the criminal penalties for repeat OAR offenses 
also distinguishes § 343.44(2) from § 939.62(1).  Sections 
343.44(2)(b)-(e) provide the only criminal penalties for the 
underlying OAR offense.  In contrast, criminal sanctions under 
§ 939.62(1) are in addition to those provided for the underlying 
offense.  Furthermore, the penalties for serial OAR offenses are 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
10
relatively 
light 
in 
comparison 
to 
those 
prescribed 
in 
§ 939.62(1). 
Finally, for the reasons stated today in State v. Wideman, 
No. 95-0852-CR, op. at 12-13 (S. Ct. Dec. 20, 1996), we reject 
the defendant's attempt to analogize this case to State v. 
Coolidge, 173 Wis. 2d 783, 496 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993).  In 
Coolidge, the court of appeals held that the proof standards of 
§ 973.12(1) apply to the repeater provisions of ch. 161, the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  Chapter 161 offenses, unlike 
offenses under chs. 341-349, are not excluded from § 973.12(1).  
Additionally, ch. 161 offenses are more similar to the offenses 
to which § 973.12(1) applies than are chs. 341-349 offenses.  See 
Wideman, op. at 12.  
The legislature has unambiguously excluded repeat OAR 
offenses from the general repeater statute, § 939.62(1), and, by 
extension, from the proof standards prescribed in § 973.12(1).  
We have also determined that §§ 343.44(2) and 939.62(1) are 
substantially dissimilar.  We therefore conclude that § 973.12(1) 
does not govern the method of proving prior OAR convictions.  
The defendant asserts that using a different standard for 
proving 
prior 
convictions 
under 
§ 343.44(2) 
than 
under 
§ 973.12(1) infringes on his due process and equal protection 
rights.  This same argument is addressed by Wideman in the 
context of repeat OWI offenses under § 346.65(2).  We believe 
that the reasoning in that case applies with equal vigor to 
repeat OAR offenses.  
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
11
We conclude that the difference between the two 
statutes rests upon a rational basis. The nature of OWI 
offenses and the penalties under § 346.65(2) justify 
the legislature's imposing on the State different proof 
requirements than those prescribed by § 973.12(1).  
Large 
numbers 
of 
OWI 
offenses 
are 
prosecuted.  
Moreover, in contrast with § 973.12(1), the enhanced 
penalties 
under 
§ 346.65(2) 
are 
penalties 
for 
misdemeanors, 
with 
relatively 
short 
periods 
of 
incarceration and moderate fines.  The efficient 
administration of the justice system militates in favor 
of the legislature's choice not to require the same 
method 
of 
establishing 
repeat 
offenses 
under 
§ 346.65(2) as under § 973.12(1). 
Wideman, op. at 16.  Thus, we conclude that the legislature acted 
with a rational basis when it allowed a different, streamlined 
standard for proving prior OAR convictions.  
III. 
We next determine the appropriate standard for establishing 
prior OAR convictions for purposes of § 343.44(2).  The State 
must establish prior convictions by placing before the circuit 
court "competent proof" of prior convictions.  State v. 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 539, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982) (prior 
OWI 
convictions 
are 
established 
by 
"certified 
copies 
of 
conviction or other competent proof").  Generally, competent 
proof of prior OAR convictions may emanate from either of two 
sources. 
 
First, 
a 
defendant's 
admission, 
whether 
given 
personally or imputed through counsel, is competent proof of 
prior OAR convictions.  Wideman, op. at 14-15; State v. Meyer, 
258 Wis. 326, 338, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951).  Second, in the absence 
of an admission, the State may establish prior OAR convictions by 
placing before the court reliable documentary proof of each 
conviction.  McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 539.  We now examine the 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
12
record for competent proof of the defendant's prior OAR 
convictions. 
The State asserts that defense counsel admitted the 
defendant's four prior OAR convictions.  At the sentencing 
hearing, defense counsel responded to the State's proposed 
sentence by stating, "I understand that there is some jail time 
that is necessary in this case . . . ."   The State submits that 
defense counsel's statement amounts to an implicit acknowledgment 
of the defendant's four prior OAR convictions, since a first-time 
OAR 
offender 
would 
face 
no 
potential 
jail 
time. 
 
See 
§ 343.44(2)(a).   
As a preliminary matter, we reject the defendant's assertion 
that under State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 658-59, 350 N.W.2d 640 
(1984), defense counsel may not admit a prior OAR conviction on 
the defendant's behalf.  The Farr holding is limited to 
situations in which the proof standards of § 973.12(1) apply.  
Because this court determines today that § 973.12(1) does not 
apply to § 343.44(2), we find Farr inapposite.   
 
Defense 
counsel's 
statement 
at 
sentencing 
that 
she 
understood 
"that 
some 
jail 
time 
. . . 
is 
necessary" 
is 
insufficient to constitute an admission of four prior OAR 
convictions on behalf of the defendant.  It is difficult to 
equate the statement that jail time is "necessary" with an 
admission that the defendant has four previous convictions.  The 
potential for imprisonment begins with the second OAR offense.  
See § 343.44(2)(b).  Thus, we are unable to determine from 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
13
defense counsel's statement the number of prior OAR convictions 
to which the defendant “stipulates.”   
Additionally, while imprisonment may be appropriate for a 
given repeat OAR offense, it is not "necessary" in the sense of a 
statutory mandate.  There are no mandatory minimum sentences for 
serial OAR offenses under § 343.44(2).  While this is perhaps 
only a semantic distinction, defense counsel's statement that 
jail time is "necessary" nevertheless raises questions about the 
nature of the purported admission.  This court therefore 
concludes that the defendant did not admit personally, or through 
counsel, the existence of four prior OAR convictions.  We next 
consider whether the State has offered other competent proof of 
the defendant's four prior OAR convictions.   
The State bears the burden of proving prior OAR convictions 
under § 343.44(2).  Wideman, op. at 3.  Contrary to the State's 
assertion, the enhanced penalties prescribed under § 343.44(2) 
are not "self-executing" in the sense that a court may base a 
repeater sentence solely upon the State's assertion of prior OAR 
convictions.  It is difficult to discern the substance of a 
burden that the State may discharge with a mere assertion.  
Rather, the State discharges its burden of proving prior OAR 
convictions under § 343.44(2) when it presents to the court 
competent proof of each prior conviction.  McAllister, 107 Wis. 
2d at 539. 
Admittedly, our prior decisions have not elaborated on the 
meaning of "competent proof" of prior OAR convictions in the 
context of § 343.44(2).  However, for purposes of sentencing for 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
14
serial OAR offenses, competent proof must reliably demonstrate, 
with particularity, the existence of each prior OAR conviction.  
In this case, the only material in the record describing with any 
detail the defendant's prior OAR convictions is the complaint.   
A complaint's inadmissibility as evidence is immaterial in 
the sentencing context, for a sentencing court is not restricted 
by the rules of evidence applicable to a trial.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 911.01(4)(c); Handel v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 699, 702, 247 N.W.2d 
711 (1976); Hammill v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 118, 120, 187 N.W.2d 792 
(1971).  A court may base an enhanced penalty for a repeat OAR 
conviction upon reliable information otherwise inadmissible at 
trial, since:    
[t]here is no presumption of innocence accruing to the 
defendant regarding . . . previous . . . convictions; 
such convictions have already been determined in the 
justice system and the defendant was protected by his 
rights in those actions. 
 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 539.  We emphasize that while prior 
convictions are not an element of the underlying OAR offense to 
be proven at trial, they are elements of any repeater sentence, 
and must be established by competent proof before a court may 
properly impose § 343.44(2) penalty enhancements. Id. at 537-38. 
Arguably, a sworn and subscribed complaint is of sufficient 
reliability that a circuit court may rely solely upon it in 
determining the existence of prior OAR convictions.  However, the 
sheer number of OAR cases, and the acknowledged complexity of the 
OAR statute, militate in favor of a proof standard which 
maximizes the reliability of information a sentencing court has 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
15
on prior OAR convictions, while minimizing the cost to the State 
of providing that information. 
A recent Governor's Task Force has concluded that the OAR 
law is causing "absolute confusion among law enforcement, DAs, 
attorneys, public defenders and the courts."  John Sobotik, 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Governor's Task Force on 
Operating After Revocation and Operating While Intoxicated: 
Wisconsin's Operating After Revocation Law 3 (October 1995).  The 
report notes that some of the confusion arises because the OAR 
statute excepts from criminal sanctions an offender whose license 
has been revoked due to failure to pay a fine or forfeiture.  See 
§§ 343.44(2)(b)2, (c)2, (d)2, (e)2.
7  Thus, in order to determine 
whether an offender should be charged as a criminal, an arresting 
officer must "decode a long driver record to figure out why the 
person's license is revoked . . . ."  Task Force Report at 3.  
The report also points out there were nearly 300,000 license 
revocations and over 50,000 OAR convictions in 1994, the most 
recent year for which figures are available.  Id. at 1.  The 
                                                          
 
7 For example, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b)2 provides: 
2.  If the revocation or suspension that is the 
basis of a violation was imposed solely due to a 
failure to pay a fine or a forfeiture, or was imposed 
solely due to a failure to pay a fine or forfeiture and 
one or more subsequent convictions for violating sub. 
(1), the person may be required to forfeit not more 
than $1,000.  This subdivision applies regardless of 
the person's failure to reinstate his or her operating 
privilege. 
 
The statute prescribes escalating fines, but no term of 
imprisonment, for subsequent OAR convictions when the underlying 
revocation or suspension is the result of a failure to pay a fine 
or forfeiture. 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
16
author of the report, who serves as counsel for the Department of 
Transportation, has commented that he would have difficulty 
determining the number and nature of prior OAR convictions under 
the time pressures typically experienced by officers in the 
field.  License Laws Create a Mess, Wis. State J., Nov. 10, 1996, 
at 1.
8 
An officer swearing out a complaint is faced with the task 
of setting forth accurate information in the complaint.  Given 
the large number of revocations and the potential for confusion 
caused by the complexity of the OAR statute, this court concludes 
that, hereafter, when the State chooses to rely solely on the 
complaint to establish serial OAR convictions, the complaint must 
be accompanied by reliable documentary corroboration of the 
asserted convictions.  Such documentary corroboration must 
describe the dates of each prior OAR offense and conviction, as 
well as the basis for the underlying license revocation.  
Furthermore, 
in 
the 
interest 
of 
promoting 
the 
efficient 
administration of justice, this court believes that a bright-line 
rule should be established to guide counsel and the circuit court 
in determining the existence of prior OAR convictions.            
We hold that hereafter, the State establishes the existence 
of a defendant's prior OAR convictions by competent proof when, 
at a minimum, it introduces into the record at any time prior to 
the imposition of sentence, either:  (1) an admission; (2) copies 
of prior judgments of conviction for OAR; or (3) a teletype of 
                                                          
 
8 
Mr. 
Sobotik 
stated: 
 
"The 
officer 
can't 
make 
a 
determination that fast. . . .  I can't make it that fast and I'm 
the state expert on this issue." 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
17
the defendant's Department of Transportation (DOT) driving 
record.  It is anticipated that in most cases the State will 
satisfy the described standard by attaching to the complaint the 
DOT teletype of the defendant's driving record.  The adoption of 
this standard does not affect any sentence based upon prior OAR 
convictions that have been established by competent proof other 
than a DOT teletype, copies of prior judgments of conviction, or 
an admission. 
We conclude that regardless of the measure of competent 
proof, the State has failed to discharge its burden in this case.  
The State has essentially chosen to rely solely upon the 
complaint to establish the defendant's status as a fifth-time OAR 
offender.  However, the complaint fails to meet the above 
standard, because it is not accompanied, at a minimum, by one of 
the described sources of prior OAR convictions.  Instead, the 
complaining officer based his allegations upon a reading of a 
report of the officer issuing the citation, who in turn relied 
upon a DOT record check.  We stress that the complaint is not 
unreliable for want of veracity of the written allegations of 
either officer.  Rather, its reliability is diminished for two 
reasons.  First, the complexity of the OAR penalty provisions 
creates the potential for error when, as here, information from a 
source document must pass through two layers of interpretation 
and transcription.  Second, without supplemental corroborating 
documentation, a sentencing court has no means of verifying the 
assertions in the complaint.   
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
18
Because it fails to satisfy the standard we have set out 
above for establishing prior OAR convictions, the complaint falls 
below the quantum of reliability embodied in the term "competent 
proof."  As such, the record is devoid of reliable documentary 
proof of the defendant's four prior OAR convictions. 
We reject the State's argument that by his silence, the 
defendant waived any objection to being sentenced on the record 
as a fifth-time OAR offender.  The State's burden to prove prior 
OAR convictions by competent proof is triggered:  
if the accused or defense counsel challenges the 
existence or applicability of a prior offense, or 
asserts a lack of information or remains silent about a 
prior offense . . . .  
Wideman, op. at 3-4 (emphasis added).  On the facts of this case, 
the defendant's silence will not excuse the State's failure to 
discharge its burden of establishing his four prior OAR 
convictions.   
This court is mindful of the heavy prosecutorial burden 
placed upon the State by the sheer number of OAR cases.  However, 
establishing prior OAR convictions by competent proof is not an 
onerous task.  The State may do so through introduction of the 
reliable documentary proof mentioned earlier in this opinion.  
Alternatively, competent proof can be established through an 
admission by the defendant or defense counsel.  A direct question 
from either the prosecutor or the circuit court asking whether 
the defendant admits to the existence of each prior OAR 
conviction should resolve the issue.  We urge the circuit court 
to include such a question in its colloquy with the defendant at 
the plea hearing or at sentencing. 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
19
 
This court has determined that the defendant did not admit, 
either personally or through defense counsel, that he had four 
prior OAR convictions.  The only documentary proof in the record 
of the defendant's prior OAR convictions is the complaint.  
However, the complaint does not meet the standard of reliability 
that we have described for establishing prior OAR convictions, 
because it is not supplemented with, for example, a DOT teletype 
or a copy of a judgment of conviction.  We therefore conclude 
that the record in this case is insufficient to support the 
defendant's 
sentence 
as 
a 
fifth-time 
offender 
under 
§ 343.44(2)(e)1. 
Finally, the defendant argues that because the record lacks 
competent proof of the four prior OAR convictions, that portion 
of 
his 
sentence 
imposed 
pursuant 
to 
§ 343.44(2) 
penalty 
enhancements should be commuted.  The State disagrees, asserting 
instead that this court should remand for a new sentencing 
hearing.   
When a court imposes a sentence greater than that authorized 
by law, Wis. Stat. § 973.13
9 voids the excess portion of the 
sentence.  The sentence is commuted, without further proceedings, 
to the maximum allowed by statute.  State v. Theriault, 187 
Wis. 2d 125, 132-33, 522 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994) (enhanced 
sentence for repeater is "not authorized by law" and must be 
                                                          
 
9 Wis. Stat. § 973.13 provides: 
Excessive sentence, errors cured.  In any case where the 
court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that authorized by 
law, such excess shall be void and the sentence shall be valid 
only to the extent of the maximum term authorized by statute and 
shall stand commuted without further proceedings. 
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
20
commuted when defendant does not admit, and State fails to prove, 
prior convictions necessary to establish habitual criminal 
status); State v. Zimmerman, 185 Wis. 2d 549, 558, 518 N.W.2d 303 
(Ct. App. 1994) (enhanced sentence for repeater is "not permitted 
by law" and must be commuted when the State fails to prove that 
an admitted prior conviction occurred within the statutorily-
prescribed five-year "lookback" period).  The legislative note 
accompanying 
the 
creation 
of 
§ 973.13 
states 
that 
"this 
corrective provision should apply to all sentences."  § 63, ch. 
255, Laws of 1969 (emphasis added).  We therefore apply § 973.13 
to the sentence imposed in the instant case.  
Because the State failed to prove the existence of the 
defendant's prior OAR convictions, the circuit court erred in 
sentencing him as a fifth-time OAR offender.  The record before 
us supports only a sentence for a first OAR offense.  We 
therefore reverse and remand to the circuit court, commuting the 
defendant's sentence to the maximum permitted by law.  On remand, 
the circuit court is directed to enter an amended judgment of 
conviction consistent with this opinion.   
By the Court.The decision of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded with directions.  
No. 95-1827-CR 
 
21
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
Case No.:  
95-1827-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
William E. Spaeth, 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
 
December 20, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
September 25, 1996 
Oral Argument:  
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
 
RICHARD T. BECKER 
 
 
JUSTICES:  
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant the cause was submitted 
on the briefs of John D. Lubarsky, assistant state public 
defender. 
  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was submitted on the 
brie of Pamela Magee, assistant attorney general and James E. 
Doyle, attorney general.