Case Title: State v. David C. Polashek

Citation: 2002 WI 74

Docket Number: 2000AP001570-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 74 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1570-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
David C. Polashek,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 130 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 627, 630 N.W.2d 545 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oconto   
 
JUDGE: 
Larry Jeske   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there was a brief 
by Nila Jean Robinson and Robinson, Peterson, Berk & Cross, 
S.C., Appleton, and oral argument by Nila Jean Robinson. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Sandra 
L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas R. Schrimpf, 
Charles David Schmidt and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee, on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Association 
of 
School 
District 
Administrators. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Teresa M. Elguézabal 
and Rebecca L. Ferber on behalf of the Wisconsin Education 
Association Council. 
 
 
2
 
 
2002 WI 74 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1570-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CM 158) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David C. Polashek, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   In this case we review a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Polashek, 2001 
WI App 130, 246 Wis. 2d 627, 630 N.W.2d 545.  In that case, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
interpreted 
several 
requirements 
for 
a 
prosecution 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7) 
(1999-2000),1 
the 
statute that provides a criminal penalty for the unauthorized 
disclosure of confidential information relating to reports of 
suspected child abuse or neglect.  The court of appeals held 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
2 
 
that when the State charges a defendant with a violation of 
§ 48.981(7), the State is not required to prove that the 
recipient of the confidential information2 had no prior knowledge 
of the information, and the State is not required to prove the 
defendant's mental state because § 48.981(7) creates a strict 
liability offense.  We disagree with the court of appeals on the 
first issue, but agree with the court of appeals on the second 
issue. 
¶2 
David C. Polashek was charged with a violation of 
§ 48.981(7).  Before trial, Polashek offered a jury instruction, 
which stated that to prove that the defendant "disclosed" the 
confidential information, the State must show that the recipient 
did not know the confidential information at the time the 
information was conveyed.  The proposed jury instructions 
further provided that the State would be required to prove that 
the disclosure was intentional.  The Oconto County Circuit 
Court, Larry L. Jeske, Judge, accepted Polashek's proposed 
instructions. 
¶3 
The State was granted leave for an interlocutory 
appeal, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision.  We accepted Polashek's petition for review, and we 
now affirm the holding of the court of appeals in part, and 
reverse in part.  First, we hold that the term "disclose" in 
§ 48.981(7) requires that the recipient not have knowledge of 
                                                 
2 Hereafter, any person to whom confidential information is 
conveyed is referred to as a "recipient." 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
3 
 
the information communicated.  However, we agree with the court 
of appeals that the statute creates a strict liability offense.  
We thus remand the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I3 
¶4 
In March 1999, Reporter4 A noticed a mark on a 
student's forehead, and suspected it was the result of child 
abuse.  Reporter A removed the student from the classroom and 
informed Reporter B, who was a required reporter of suspected 
child abuse under Wis. Stat. § 48.981(2).  Reporter B then 
notified the Oconto County Department of Human Services about 
the suspected abuse.  A social worker arrived, spoke with the 
student, and apparently determined that abuse was unlikely. 
¶5 
The student's parents, upset with the handling of the 
incident, met with the student's teacher and then with the 
school principal.  Finally, the parents met with Polashek, who 
is the superintendent of the Oconto Falls Area School District.  
After 
the 
parents 
met 
with 
Polashek, 
Polashek 
met 
with 
Reporter A and Reporter B to discuss the incident.  Following 
that meeting, Polashek wrote a letter to the student's parents, 
explaining the situation; copies of the letter were mailed to 
                                                 
3 We provide only a brief summary of the factual background 
in this case because many of the facts are still contested, and 
they are, for the most part, irrelevant to our decision. 
4 "Reporter," as used here, is a statutorily defined term 
that refers to a person who reports suspected child abuse or 
neglect under § 48.981.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.981(1)(g). 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
4 
 
Reporter A and Reporter B.  In the text of the letter, Polashek 
allegedly used the names of Reporter A and Reporter B. 
¶6 
A criminal complaint was filed against Polashek, 
alleging that, by including the names of the reporters in the 
letter, Polashek violated Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7)(e) and (f).5  
Polashek pleaded not guilty to the charge and requested a jury 
trial. 
¶7 
Because there are no model jury instructions for a 
charge of violating § 48.981(7), Polashek and the State each 
submitted proposed jury instructions on the elements of the 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7) provides, in relevant part: 
(a) All reports made under this section . . . and 
records maintained by an agency and other persons, 
officials and institutions shall be confidential.  
Reports and records may be disclosed only to the 
following persons: 
. . . . 
3m. A child's parent, guardian or legal 
custodian . . . except that the person or agency 
maintaining the record or report may not disclose 
any information that would identify the reporter. 
. . . . 
(e) A person to whom a report or record is 
disclosed 
under this 
subsection 
may not 
further 
disclose it, except to the persons and for the 
purposes specified in this section. 
(f) Any person who violates this subsection, or 
who 
permits 
or 
encourages 
the 
unauthorized 
dissemination or use of information contained in 
reports and records made under this section, may be 
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 
6 months or both. 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
5 
 
crime.  After a series of amendments, the court accepted 
Polashek's proposed instructions.  Those instructions, with 
respect to the third element of the crime, read: 
The 
third 
element 
requires 
that 
David 
Polashek 
communicated the identity of the reporter [to the 
parents] so as to disclose that identity.  Before you 
may find that Mr. Polashek disclosed the identity of a 
reporter, you must find that he exposed to view, or 
revealed, information of identity which was previously 
secret or unknown [to the parents].  It is not 
sufficient that the information was merely repeated; 
you should not find David Polashek guilty unless you 
find 
that 
he 
laid 
bare 
information 
which 
was 
previously unknown or secret [to the parents]. 
The State objected to the instruction on this element, arguing 
that it should not be required to prove that the identity of the 
reporter 
was 
unknown 
to 
the 
recipient 
before 
Polashek's 
disclosure.  The State sought permission to appeal the order, 
and the court of appeals granted the request. 
¶8 
In a published decision, State v. Polashek, 2001 WI 
App 130, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order.  The court of appeals concluded that the term "disclose" 
was ambiguous, but looked to the legislative history and the 
purpose of the statute to determine that the recipient's prior 
knowledge did not alter the fact that a disclosure was made.  
The court of appeals thus held that the term "disclose" does not 
require that the State prove that the confidential information 
was unknown to the recipient of the information, and further 
held 
that 
the 
defendant's 
proposed 
jury 
instruction 
was 
inappropriate. 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
6 
 
¶9 
Although the State did not object to the proposed 
instruction in the trial court, it also challenged the fourth 
element of Polashek's proposed jury instructions on appeal.  
That instruction would have required that the State prove that 
the 
defendant 
intentionally 
disclosed 
the 
confidential 
information.  The court of appeals chose to address this 
question pursuant to Apex Electronics Corp. v. Gee, 217 
Wis. 2d 378, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998), and held that § 48.981 is a 
strict liability statute. 
¶10 Polashek petitioned this court for review on both 
issues, and we accepted.  On review, we disagree with the court 
of appeals' interpretation of "disclose."  Rather, we hold that 
information cannot be "disclosed" to a recipient who already 
knows the information communicated.  However, we agree with the 
court of appeals that § 48.981(7) creates a strict liability 
offense.  We therefore affirm the holding of the court of 
appeals in part, reverse the holding in part, and remand the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
II 
¶11 We begin by briefly addressing the question of 
timeliness.  Polashek claims that the State's appeal in this 
case was untimely because it was not made within the prescribed 
statutory time limits and that the State therefore waived its 
right to appeal the non-final order.  We disagree. 
¶12 After the initial submission of the proposed jury 
instructions, and several amendments to the instructions, the 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
7 
 
circuit court sent a letter to each of the parties.  The letter, 
which was filed on March 9, 2000, stated that the court was "not 
satisfied with either [jury] instruction," but felt that 
Polashek's proposed instruction was "closer to the mark."  The 
letter went on to state that if either party wished to provide 
further jury instructions, the court would consider them, but 
that the court was convinced that "the information transmitted 
must have been previously unknown to the recipient."  The letter 
was signed by Judge Jeske. 
¶13 On June 2, 2000, the State filed a motion with the 
circuit 
court, 
asking 
for 
an 
immediate 
ruling 
on 
which 
substantive jury instruction the court intended to use.  The 
court issued an order on June 6, 2000, stating that it intended 
to use 
the instructions 
attached 
to 
the 
order.  
These 
attachments included Polashek's proposed instructions——the ones 
currently under dispute.  The order was dated nunc pro tunc, 
March 9, 2000.  The State appealed this order. 
¶14 Polashek contends that the original letter constituted 
the order from which the State should have appealed.  Citing 
Fredrick v. City of Janesville, 92 Wis. 2d 685, 285 N.W.2d 655 
(1979), and Orth v. Ameritrade, Inc., 187 Wis. 2d 162, 522 
N.W.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1994), Polashek argues that the letter did 
not contemplate further action by the court, and therefore 
constituted an order for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2). 
¶15 We disagree with Polashek for two reasons.  First, the 
letter was simply not an order from a circuit court.  As 
Polashek himself notes, in Fredrick we held that the test of 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
8 
 
"finality" is "not what later happened in the case but rather, 
whether the trial court contemplated the document to be a final 
judgment or order at the time it was entered."  Fredrick, 92 
Wis. 2d at 688.  Here, the plain text of the circuit court's 
letter anticipated that there could be further amendments to the 
jury instructions, undercutting the conclusion that the letter 
constituted a final order.  And even though the June 6th order 
was labeled "nunc pro tunc," that authority could not create a 
retroactive order where none previously existed.  We agree with 
the decision in State v. Jeffrie C.B., 218 Wis. 2d 145, 150, 579 
N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1998), where the court of appeals stated, 
"'A court cannot modify or amend its judgment to make it conform 
to what the court ought to have or intended to adjudge.'  Even a 
court's nunc pro tunc authority is limited to rectifying what 
might be termed 'mechanical errors' in our judicial system."  
(quoting Strawser v. Strawser, 126 Wis. 2d 485, 490, 377 
N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
¶16 Second, the court of appeals may, on its own motion, 
"enlarge . . . the time prescribed by these rules or court order 
for doing any act, or waive or permit an act to be done after 
the expiration of the prescribed time."  Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2).  
In this case, the question of timeliness was fully briefed in 
Polashek's 
response 
to 
the 
State's 
motion 
to 
seek 
an 
interlocutory appeal, and a three-judge panel of the court of 
appeals, which decided the petition for leave to appeal, granted 
the appeal nonetheless.  This was sufficient to show that the 
court of appeals exercised its discretionary power to waive the 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
9 
 
non-jurisdictional timeliness issue.  Thus, we hold that the 
appeal should not be barred for untimeliness. 
III 
¶17 We next examine the jury instruction on the third 
element of the crime——the "disclosure."  The definition of 
"disclose" is a question of statutory interpretation, which we 
review de novo.  State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, 
¶6, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686. 
¶18 The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to 
determine and to give effect to the intent of the legislature.  
Anderson v. City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 25, 559 N.W.2d 
563 (1997).  To determine the intent of the legislature, we 
first look to the text of the statute.  Clark v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 169, 173, 577 N.W.2d 790 (1998).  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we do not look beyond the 
statutory language to determine legislative intent.  State v. 
Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 415, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997). 
¶19 In this case, the term "disclose" is not defined in 
the statute, and the term has not been interpreted in any 
decision of a Wisconsin court prior to this case.  If a word is 
not defined in the statute, our next recourse has normally been 
to use a recognized dictionary to determine the common and 
ordinary meaning of the word.  State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, ¶23, 
244 Wis. 2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820. 
¶20 Both parties acknowledge Black's Law Dictionary as an 
appropriate source.  Black's defines "disclosure" as "The act or 
process of making known something that was previously unknown; a 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
10 
 
revelation of facts."  Black's Law Dictionary 477 (7th ed. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  A plain reading of this definition suggests 
that in order for a dissemination of information to be a 
"disclosure," the recipient must not have previous knowledge of 
the information disseminated. 
¶21 Other 
dictionaries 
provide 
a 
similar 
definition.  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "disclose" 
as "to expose to view: lay open or uncover (something hidden 
from 
view) . . . to 
make 
known: 
open 
up 
to 
general 
knowledge . . . to reveal in words (something that is secret or 
generally 
not 
known): 
divulge." 
 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
(Unabridged) 
645 
(1986) 
(emphasis 
added), and the Oxford English Dictionary defines "disclose" as 
"To uncover (anything covered up from view); to remove a cover 
from and expose to view (anything material) . . . To open up to 
the knowledge of others; to make openly known, reveal, declare 
(secrets, purposes, beliefs, etc.). . . ."  4 Oxford English 
Dictionary 737 (2d ed. 1989) (examples omitted) (emphasis 
added).  Like Black's, these definitions also suggest that a 
disclosure requires that the recipient not have known the 
information prior to the disclosure.  This leads us to the 
conclusion that a lack of knowledge on the part of the recipient 
is inherent in a disclosure. 
¶22 As Polashek points out, several federal courts have 
interpreted "disclose" in a similar manner when interpreting the 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
11 
 
Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).6  See Pellerin v. 
Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that a "dissemination of information to a person or persons who 
were previously aware of the information is not a disclosure 
under the Privacy Act"); Sullivan v. United States Postal Serv., 
944 F. Supp. 191, 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that "common 
sense requires that [disclosure] be taken to denote the 
imparting of information which in itself has meaning and which 
was previously unknown to the person to whom it was imparted"); 
Brooks v. Veterans Admin., 773 F. Supp. 1483, 1485 n.1 (D. Kan. 
1991) (stating that when the recipient had knowledge of certain 
protected information, any discussion of that matter with the 
recipient would not qualify as a disclosure under the Privacy 
Act).  Although the court of appeals identifies Pilon v. United 
States Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1996), for the 
principle that any unauthorized dissemination is presumptively a 
"disclosure" under the Privacy Act, we note (as did the court of 
appeals) that even in Pilon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit made an exception to that rule when the recipient 
had already received the information legally from the discloser.  
See 
Pilon, 
73 
F.3d at 
1124 
(holding 
that 
an 
agency's 
                                                 
6 The Privacy Act provides, in relevant part, that "No 
agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system 
of records by any means of communication to any person, or to 
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with 
the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record 
pertains."  The statute contains some exceptions to this rule, 
and does not define the word "disclose."  5 U.S.C. § 552a 
(2000). 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
12 
 
unauthorized release of a protected record constitutes a 
"disclosure," except under circumstances where the agency has 
previously, and lawfully disseminated the information to the 
recipient, who is fully able to reconstruct its contents). 
¶23 We conclude, then, that to "disclose" information 
under § 48.981(7), the recipient must have been previously 
unaware of the information at the time of the communication.  
Because the disclosure of the confidential information is an 
element of the crime, the State has the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the disclosure took place.  In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).  We thus reverse the court of appeals 
on this issue. 
IV 
¶24 Finally, 
we 
address 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
§ 48.981(7)(f) is a strict liability statute.  In the jury 
instructions accepted by the circuit court, the State would have 
been required to show that the defendant intended to disclose 
the confidential information in order to convict him.  The State 
challenged this instruction for the first time on appeal. 
¶25 Polashek first argues that the appeal was waived 
because it was not raised in the circuit court.  We disagree.  
The court of appeals correctly noted that, although the general 
rule is that issues not raised in the circuit court are deemed 
waived, the rule is not absolute and does not relate to the 
appellate court's jurisdiction.  See Apex Elec., 217 Wis. 2d at 
384.  Because the issue involved a question of law that had been 
fully briefed by both parties, and was of sufficient public 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
13 
 
interest to merit a decision, the court of appeals exercised its 
discretion to address the issue.  Id.; Polashek, 2001 WI App 
130, ¶28.  We agree with the court of appeals' reasoning, and 
conclude that the court of appeals properly addressed the issue. 
¶26 We find it appropriate to address the issue as well 
and we find, as did the court of appeals, that the legislature 
intended to create a strict liability offense in § 48.981(7)(f).  
We also agree substantially with the reasoning of the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
¶27 An offense is a strict liability offense if it 
punishes a defendant's behavior without regard to the mental 
state of the defendant.  State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 664, 
594 N.W.2d 780 (1999).  To convict a defendant of a strict 
liability offense, the State is not required to prove that the 
defendant acted with a culpable state of mind while committing 
the offense.  State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 75, 396 
N.W.2d 177 (1986).  Whether a statute imposes strict liability 
or not is ultimately an issue of statutory construction, which 
turns on legislative intent.  Id. at 75.  We review such a 
question de novo. 
¶28 Both parties here agree that the plain language of 
§ 48.981(7)(f), does not specify a mental state.  Often, when 
the statute makes no reference to intent, we have held that the 
statute creates a strict liability offense.  See, e.g., State v. 
Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶19, 242 Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363  (citing 
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 664; State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 
207, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996)).  However, the mere fact that there 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
14 
 
is no mention of a mental state in the statute does not 
inevitably lead to that conclusion. 
¶29 We have occasionally found a requisite mental state 
for an offense when the statute is silent regarding the mens rea 
requirement.  Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d at 77.  When we have done so, 
we have looked at a number of factors to determine the 
legislative intent of the statute.  These include the statute's 
plain language, the legislative history of the statute, the 
seriousness of the potential penalty imposed, the statute's 
purpose, and the practical requirements of effective law 
enforcement.  Id. at 76 (citing State v. Stanfield, 105 
Wis. 2d 533, 560-61, 314 N.W.2d 339 (1982); State v. Collova, 79 
Wis. 2d 473, 478-80, 482, 485, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977)).  Taken 
together here, we, like the court of appeals, conclude that 
§ 48.981(7)(f) creates a strict liability offense. 
¶30 We 
first 
note 
that 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
§ 48.981(7)(f) contains no explicit or implicit requirement of a 
mental state.  The statute states that "Any person who violates 
this subsection, or who permits or encourages the unauthorized 
dissemination or use of information contained in reports and 
records made under this section, may be fined not more than 
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both."  However, 
in another section of the same statute, the legislature has 
chosen to include an element of intent.  Section 48.981(6), the 
section immediately preceding the one at issue here, states 
"Whoever intentionally violates this section . . . ." (emphasis 
added).  The inclusion of a mental state in one section of the 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
15 
 
statute tends to indicate to us a deliberate choice on the part 
of the legislature to exclude a mental state from subsection 
(7)(f). 
¶31 The statute's purpose also supports this conclusion.  
In the past, we have noted that "[w]hen the legislature's goal 
is primarily to regulate, to accomplish a social good, or to 
obtain a high standard of care, proof of a criminal state of 
mind is often eliminated to achieve the desired result."  
Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d at 79 (citing Collova, 79 Wis. 2d at 485).  
Here, 
the 
legislature, 
by 
establishing 
a 
confidentiality 
requirement, was clearly attempting to impose a high standard of 
care on those with access to records and reports of child abuse 
and neglect.  In such a case, it is not unfathomable that the 
legislature would eliminate a mental state to enforce such a 
standard. 
¶32 Consideration of the seriousness of the penalty is 
only somewhat helpful to our analysis.  We consider the penalty 
for an offense because a particularly strict penalty would tend 
to indicate the legislative expectation of a more culpable 
mental state.  Id. at 81.  Here, the maximum penalty is a fine 
of no more than $1000 and a maximum of six months' imprisonment.  
Although the potential for imprisonment indicates a crime of 
some seriousness, we cannot find that is sufficiently serious to 
necessitate a mental state, since we have found some statutes 
that carry significantly longer sentences to be legitimate 
strict liability statutes.  See, e.g., Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 
207 (felon in possession of a firearm, § 941.29(2), a Class D 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
16 
 
felony); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 445, 516 N.W.2d 399 
(1994) (felony murder, § 940.03, punishable by 20 years in 
excess of the maximum penalty for the underlying felony). 
¶33 Finally, we consider the practical needs for the 
effective enforcement of the statute.  To prove that a defendant 
intended an action, the State is required to prove that the 
defendant "has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result 
specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically 
certain to cause that result."  Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3).  In 
addition, the State must show that the actor had "knowledge of 
those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct 
criminal."  Id.  As the court of appeals concluded, in a case 
under § 48.981(7), this would require the police and prosecutors 
to examine the defendant's personal knowledge of the statutes, 
the defendant's knowledge of the actual information, and the 
defendant's 
knowledge 
of 
whether 
the 
information 
was 
confidential at the time he disclosed it.  Given the regulatory 
purpose of the statute, and the high level of responsibility 
imposed upon the keepers of such information, the requirement of 
a mental state would hamper effective enforcement of the 
statute. 
¶34 Taking into account all of these factors, we conclude 
that the legislature intended to create a strict liability 
offense in § 48.981(7).  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' 
decision that the appropriate jury instruction should not 
contain a requirement that the State prove intent. 
No. 
00-1570-CR   
 
17 
 
V 
¶35 In sum, we hold, for the purposes of § 48.981(7), that 
"disclose" 
is 
defined 
to 
require 
that 
the 
information 
communicated must have been previously unknown by the recipient.  
With regard to the required mental state, we also hold that 
§ 48.981(7)(f), creates a strict liability offense.  We thus 
affirm the holding of the court of appeals in part, and reverse 
in part, and we remand the case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 
 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶36 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I cannot join 
Part III of the majority's opinion because I disagree with the 
majority's interpretation of the term "disclose."  According to 
the majority, "to 'disclose' information under [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 48.981(7), the recipient must have been previously unaware of 
the information at the time of the communication."  Majority op. 
at ¶23.  I respectfully dissent because I conclude that the term 
"disclose" in § 48.981(7) is ambiguous, and that, consistent 
with the goals and purposes of the statute, the definition of 
"disclose" does not require lack of knowledge on the part of the 
recipient. 
¶37 Based on various dictionary definitions, the majority 
concludes that the term disclose is unambiguous and requires 
that the recipient must not have known the information prior to 
the communication.  Majority op. at ¶21.  The majority finds 
further support for that interpretation in several federal court 
decisions.  Id. at ¶22.  I agree that the court should turn to 
recognized dictionaries to determine the common and ordinary 
meaning of "disclose."  State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, ¶23, 244 
Wis. 2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820.  I disagree, however, that based on 
the dictionary definitions of "disclose" and the federal court 
decisions, the term "disclose" in Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7) is 
unambiguous. 
¶38 The 
majority 
presents 
the 
following 
dictionary 
definitions of disclosure:  (1) "The act or process of making 
known something that was previously unknown; a revelation of 
facts."  Black's Law Dictionary 477 (7th ed. 1999); (2) "To 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
expose to view: lay open or uncover (something hidden from 
view); 
to 
make 
known: 
open 
up 
something 
to 
general 
knowledge . . . to reveal in words (something that is secret or 
generally 
not 
known): 
 
divulge." 
 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International Dictionary (Unabridged) 645 (1986); and (3)  "To 
uncover (anything covered up from view); to remove a cover from 
and expose to view (anything material) . . . To open up to the 
knowledge of others; to make openly known, reveal, declare 
(secrets, purposes, beliefs, etc.) . . . ."  4 Oxford English 
Dictionary 737 (2d ed. 1989).  Majority op. at ¶¶20-21.  While 
these definitions may suggest a previous lack of knowledge on 
the part of the recipient, contrary to the majority, I do not 
interpret these definitions as unambiguously imposing such a 
requirement.  Several parts of the definitions, including "to 
make 
known," 
"open 
up 
something 
to 
general 
knowledge," 
"generally not known," and "to make openly known," indicate that 
a disclosure does not necessarily require a previous lack of 
knowledge by the recipient.  After examining the definitions of 
"disclosure," therefore, I conclude that the term is ambiguous 
on its face. 
¶39 In 
addition 
to 
the 
dictionary 
definitions, 
the 
majority relies on some federal court decisions interpreting the 
term "disclose."  Majority op. at ¶22.  Some federal courts have 
interpreted the term "disclose" under the Federal Privacy Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552a (2000), such that there is no violation of the Act 
where the agency makes available information already known by 
the recipient.  See Pellerin v. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 1553 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
(11th Cir. 1986); Sullivan v. United States Postal Serv., 944 F. 
Supp. 191 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Brooks v. Veterans Admin. 773 F. 
Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1991).  In Pilon v. United States Dep't of 
Justice, 73 F.3d 1111, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1996), however, the court 
concluded 
that 
any 
unauthorized 
release 
of 
confidential 
information constitutes a disclosure under the Privacy Act, 
except 
under 
narrow 
circumstances 
where 
the 
information 
disclosed was previously and lawfully disseminated by the agency 
to the recipient, who is fully able to reconstruct its contents.  
I disagree with the majority's interpretation of these cases as 
further support for the conclusion that "disclose" unambiguously 
requires a lack of prior knowledge by the recipient, in regard 
to the information communicated.  The noted exception in Pilon 
is narrow and it does not encompass the context we are faced 
with here, regarding professionals who are entrusted with 
confidential information about suspected child abuse or neglect.  
Furthermore, the court in Pilon expressed the ambiguous nature 
of "disclose" when it presented the example of a government 
employee who must set forth his or her assets in a "financial 
disclosure 
statement" even 
though 
the 
statement 
discloses 
information identical to that which the recipient knows from the 
employee's prior years' statement.  Id. at 1119.  I agree with 
the court of appeals, therefore, that the federal cases are 
helpful only to the extent that they show reasonable minds can 
differ as to the meaning of "disclose." 
¶40 Based on the varied dictionary definitions and the 
federal court decisions, I conclude, as did the court of 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
appeals, that the term "disclose" is ambiguous.  See id.  When a 
statute is ambiguous, we then look to the scope, history, 
context, subject matter and purpose of the statute to determine 
the legislative intent.  Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 2002 WI 
22, ¶21, 250 Wis. 2d 357, 639 N.W.2d 733.  Here, the purpose of 
the statute leads me to conclude that a previous lack of 
knowledge requirement was not intended, and is therefore not 
required under Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7). 
¶41 As the court of appeals acknowledged, the purpose of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.981 is to encourage the reporting of suspected 
child abuse and neglect, to assure that the appropriate services 
are provided to the families of abused and neglected children.   
State v. Polashek, 2001 WI App 130, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 627, 630 
N.W.2d 545 (citing Laws of 1977, ch. 355, § 1).  To encourage 
reporting, the legislature mandated that certain professionals, 
including physicians, nurses, social workers, teachers, and 
counselors, 
report 
suspected 
child 
abuse 
and 
neglect.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.981(2).  The legislature also required that all 
mandatory 
reporters 
receive 
training 
on 
identifying 
and 
reporting suspected child abuse and neglect.  § 48.981(8).   
¶42 Furthermore, 
the 
legislature 
created 
several 
protections for mandatory reporters.  Under Wis. Stat. § 48.981, 
reporters are immune from civil and criminal liability for the 
good faith reporting——which is presumed in all cases——of 
suspected abuse or neglect, and reporters cannot be fired from a 
job for reporting suspected abuse or neglect. §§  48.981(2), 
(4), (7)(cr)5.  Moreover, § 48.981(7) specifically provides that 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
reports 
made 
pursuant 
to 
the 
statute 
are 
to 
be 
kept 
confidential, although with explicit exceptions.  Especially 
significant 
here, 
§ 48.981(7) 
also 
protects 
against 
the 
"disclosure" of information that would identify the reporter.  
This ban on disclosing identifying information about the 
reporter 
furthers 
the 
statute's 
purpose 
of 
encouraging 
reporting, because it restricts the ability of parents or 
guardians of a child to retaliate against the reporter for 
making the mandatory report. 
¶43 Based on the legislature's intent, I conclude that the 
dissemination of confidential information is a "disclosure" 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7).  The actual knowledge of the 
recipient is wholly unrelated to encouraging reporting of child 
abuse and neglect.  The goal is to protect children, and in 
order to do so, to protect the identity of persons mandated to 
report 
suspected 
child 
abuse 
and 
neglect. 
 
Interpreting 
"disclose" to require that the recipient be unaware previously 
of the information does not further this purpose, because it 
allows for open discussion of confidential information if such 
information were previously known.  Similarly, the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council (WEAC) notes in its amicus curiae 
brief that applying the majority's interpretation of "disclose" 
to § 48.981 produces inconsistent results.  Section 48.981(7)(a) 
enumerates exceptions to the confidentiality requirement; thus, 
reports and records of suspected child abuse may be disclosed to 
certain identified persons.  Contrary to the plain language of 
the 
statute, 
however, 
the 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
"disclose" essentially adds to that list persons who have prior 
knowledge 
of 
the 
information 
communicated, 
and 
might 
be 
interpreted as allowing extensive discussion of a report with 
anyone who had some familiarity with the information in such a 
report. 
¶44 Furthermore, under the majority's interpretation of 
"disclose," someone who discloses the identity of the reporter 
would not be held responsible for violating the statute simply 
because the recipient was aware previously of the information.  
To me, this seems illogical and contrary to the legislature's 
intent. 
 
"[T]he 
recipient's 
previous 
knowledge 
of 
the 
information does not alter the fact that a disclosure was made."  
Polashek, 2001 WI App 130, ¶26.  Consistent with the legislative 
purpose of § 48.981, therefore, I would affirm the court of 
appeals' conclusion that the definition of "disclose" does not 
require the State to prove a lack of knowledge on the part of 
the recipient.  See id. 
¶45 Finally, I note that the majority's interpretation of 
"disclose" seems inconsistent with the majority's conclusion 
that Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7) is a strict liability statute.  The 
majority relies on several factors in drawing its conclusion on 
the strict liability issue.  Two of those factors, however, seem 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
majority's 
prior 
conclusion 
that 
"disclose" requires that the recipient not have prior knowledge 
of the information. 
¶46 First, the majority acknowledges the statute's purpose 
and states: 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
by establishing a confidentiality requirement, [the 
legislature] was clearly attempting to impose a high 
standard of care on those with access to records and 
reports of child abuse and neglect.  In such a case, 
it is not unfathomable that the legislature would 
eliminate a mental state to enforce such a standard. 
Majority op. at ¶31 (emphasis added).  Second, the majority 
notes that the practical needs for effective enforcement of the 
statute lead to the conclusion that the legislature intended a 
strict 
liability 
offense. 
 
The 
majority 
recognizes 
that 
interpreting 
the 
statute 
to 
require 
intent 
would 
hamper 
effective enforcement of the statute, because police and 
prosecutors would have to "examine the defendant's personal 
knowledge of the statutes, the defendant's knowledge of the 
actual information, and the defendant's knowledge of whether the 
information was confidential at the time he disclosed it."  
Majority op. at ¶33.   
¶47 These 
factors 
seem 
contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
conclusion that "disclose" requires that the recipient not have 
prior knowledge of the information.  Similar to imposing an 
intent requirement, imposing a prior knowledge requirement on 
the 
part 
of 
the 
recipient 
seems 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
legislature's intent to impose a "high standard of care on those 
with access to records and reports of child abuse and neglect."  
Majority 
op. 
at 
¶31. 
 
The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
"disclose" is contrary to a high standard of care because, as I 
stated earlier, it allows open discussion of confidential 
information 
if 
the 
recipient 
has 
previous 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, the majority's interpretation of "disclose" hampers 
effective enforcement of the statute by requiring the State to 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
prove that the recipient did not have prior knowledge of the 
information.  Under the majority's interpretation of "disclose" 
the 
police 
and 
prosecutors 
are 
required 
to 
examine 
the 
recipient's personal knowledge of the information.  Moreover, 
although I agree with the majority's conclusion that § 48.981(7) 
is a strict liability offense, I find several factors, leading 
to that conclusion, seemingly inconsistent with the majority's 
prior conclusion that "disclose" requires that the recipient 
lack knowledge of the information communicated. 
¶48 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from 
Part III of the majority's opinion. 
 
 
No.  00-1570-CR.npc 
 
1