Case Title: Carstarphen v. Milsner

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev, Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JOHN CARSTARPHEN,

Appellant,

vs

RICHARD L. MILSNER, AS A
SHAREHOLDER AND TREASURER OF
AMERICAN MEDFLIGHT, INC.,
Respondent.

No, 51631

FILED

   

  

 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a corporations
action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, Brent T. Adams,
dudge.

Reversed and remanded,

King & Russo, Ltd., and J. Scott Russo and Patrick O. King, Minden,
for Appellant.

Richard G. Hill, Chartered, and Richard G. Hill and LaRee L. Beck, Reno,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
In this appeal, we address the factors that the district court
must consider when determining whether to grant or deny 2 motion for a
preferential trial date to avoid the expiration of NRCP 41(0)'s five-year
period. We conclude that, in accordance with our decision in Monroe, Ltd,
v. Central Telephone Co,, 91 Nev. 450, 456, 538 P.2d 152, 156 (1975),

14-0657)

 
when evaluating such a motion, the district court must consider the time
remaining in the five-year period when the motion is filed and the
diligence of the moving party and his or her counsel in prosecuting the
case. Here, appellant brought his motion for a preferential trial date with
more than three months remaining in the five-year period and
demonstrated sufficient diligence in prosecuting his case so that it was an
abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the motion. Accordingly,
we reverse the interlocutory order denying the preferential trial date
motion, and, as a result, we further reverse the subsequent order
dismissing the complaint under NRCP 41(e). Since the five-year period
had expired at the time the complaint was dismissed on that basis,
however, we must determine how much time appellant should have, on
remand, to bring his case to trial. As this court's body of jurisprudence
contains competing lines of precedent with regard to the time a plaintiff
has to bring a case to trial, after the reversal and remand of an erroneous
judgment or dismissal entered before the commencement of trial, in order
to avoid dismissal under NRCP 41(c), we take this opportunity to clarify
our precedent addressing this issue and hold that a plaintiff has three
years from the date the remittitur is filed in the district court to bring his,
or her case to trial.
BACKGROUND

NRCP 41(¢)'s five-year rule provides that a district court shall

dismiss an action not brought to trial within five years of the date on

which the plaintiff filed the action, unless the parties stipulate, in writing,

that the time for bringing the action to trial may be extended. Here, on

 

 
August 13, 2007, with less than seven months left in the five-year period,
the parties held a status conference during which they stipulated to vacate
an October 15, 2007, trial date and stay all discovery and motion practice
until further stipulation of the parties or order of the court, in anticipation
of settlement negotiations. In accordance with the stipulation, the
October trial date was vacated and trial of the matter was reset for May
12, 2008, beyond the expiration date of the five-year period. ‘The district
court subsequently entered a written order memorializing the parties

‘ipulation and the new trial date, No mention of the running of the

 

NRCP 41(¢) period was made cither at the status conference or in the

 

istrict court's order.

Appellant, the plaintiff below, was subsequently unable to
obtain an agreement to extend the five-year period up to the scheduled
trial date. As a result, the district court was ultimately presented with
competing motions by appellant that sought to either confirm that the
parties’ stipulation at the status conference and the order entered thereon
acted to toll or extend the five-year period or obtain a proferential trial
date before the expiration of the NRCP 41(e) period. Respondent opposed
both motions. ‘The district court denied the preferential trial motion,
without explanation, and instead granted the motion to confirm that the

five-year rule had been tolled or extended. In granting the motion, the
district court concluded that “[dJefendants, by stipulating to vacate the
October trial date and agreeing to set trial in May 2008, implicitly agreed
to extend the five-year rule of NRCP 41(e).”

Despite the grant of appellant's motion to confirm the
extension of the five-year rule, on March 5, 2008, shortly after the five-

 

 
oe

 

year anniversary of the filing of appellant's complaint, respondent moved
the district court to dismiss the action based on appellant's failure to bring
the case to trial within five years. Respondent argued that the district
court had improperly concluded that an implicit agreement to extend the
five-year rule existed. Because the parties’ stipulation to reschedule the
trial date, as reflected in the transcript of the status conference, made no
mention of the five-year period, respondent asserted that no stipulation to
extend the period had been made, and thus, the district court was required

to dismiss the case pursuant to NRCP 41(e). After full briefing of

 

respondent's motion, the district court entered an order granting the
me

 

mn and dismissing the underlying case. Finding that the stipulation
was in fact silent on the five-year period, the district court concluded that
the stipulation was insufficient to toll or extend the running of that period.
It further found that “its order {confirming the extension of the five-year
period] was ineffoctive, as
followed.

 

was based upon an error of law.” This appeal

On appeal, appellant primarily argues that the district court's
denial of his motion for a preferential trial date was improper, and as a
result, the dismissal of his case under the five-year rule should be
reversed, Respondent disagrees. Based on the reasoning set forth below,
we agree with appellant's contention and therefore reverse the denial of
the preferential trial date motion and the resulting dismissal of the case
under NRCP 41(e), and we remand the matter to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DISCUSSION

In dismissing the underlying action based on appellant's

failure to bring the case to trial within the five-year period, the district

 
ome ee

 

court concluded that its order confirming the extension of the NRCP 41(e)
period was “ineffective” and “based upon an error of law.” We agree with
the district court's conclusion. Indeed, the district court's finding of an
implied agreement to toll or extend the NRCP 41(e) period ignored both
the plain language of the rule and this court's long-standing authority.
See NRCP 41(e) (requiring dismissal for failure to bring a matter to trial
within five years of filing the complaint “except where the parties have
stipulated in writing that the time may be extended”); see also Prostack v.
Lowden, 96 Nev. 230, 231, 606 P.2d 1099, 1099-1100 (1980) (recognizing
that “an oral stipulation, entered into in open court, approved by the
judge, and spread upon the minutes, is the equivalent of a written
stipulation,” but declining to find any agreement to extend the five-year
period where the stipulation “was silent as to the expiration of the five
year limit, and the judge who heard the motion was not made aware of the
problem”); Flintkote Co, v, Interstate Equip, Corp,, 93 Nev. 597, 571 P.2d
815 (1977) (rejecting an argument that the parties’ stipulation contained

 

an implied waiver of the five-year rule and noting that NRCP 41(0)
requires any such stipulation to be in writing); Thran v. District: Court, 79
Nev. 176, 181, 380 P.2d 297, 300 (1963) (concluding that “[wlords and
conduct, short of a written stipulation” cannot estop a defendant from
seeking dismissal pursuant to the five-year rule). Regardless of whether
the infirmity of the implied waiver conclusion was brought to the district
court's attention in the course of its consideration of the motion to confirm
the extension or that the five-year period had been tolled, the district court
should have been aware that no implied waiver could be found and

rejected the motion accordingly.

 
Further compounding its error in granting the motion to
confirm the extension of the NRCP 41(c) period, the district court
summarily denied appellant's preferential trial motion, ostensibly based
on its conclusion that the parties had stipulated to extend the five-year
period.* In reaching this conclusion, the district court failed to weigh the
relevant considerations set forth in Monroe, Ltd. v. Central Telephone Co.,
91 Nev. 450, 456, 538 P.2d 152, 156 (1975), for evaluating a motion for a
preferential trial date brought to avoid dismissal under NRCP 41(¢)'s five-
year rule, and thus, we conclude that the denial of appellant’s motion was
‘an abuse of discretion. Monroe, 91 Nev. at 456, 538 P.2d at 156 (“Setting
trial dates and other matters done in the arrangement of a trial court's
calendar is within the discretion of that court, and in the absence of
arbitrary conduct will not be interfered with by this court.”),

In Monroe, this court rejected appellant's argument that the
district court improperly denied a motion for a preferential trial setting
brought to avoid the running of the NRCP 41(@) period. Id, ‘There, the
plaintiff brought the preferential trial date motion less than three weeks
before the five-year period expired and, with the exception of the dismissal
of one defendant based on a settlement shortly after the complaint was
filed, nothing took place in the district court until a “note for trial docket”

"The district court's order denying the preferential trial motion
provides no explanation for its denial. That motion and the motion to
confirm the extension of the five-year period were essentially brought as
alternatives, however, with appellant asserting that the preferential trial
motion could be denied if the district court concluded that the five-year
period had been extended and both motions were resolved by orders
entered on the same day.

 

 
was filed by the plaintiff four years and eleven months after the date the
complaint was filed. Id. at 452, 538 P.2d at 153. In concluding that no
abuse of discretion occurred in denying the preferential trial motion, the
Monroe court emphasized the fact that appellant had delayed filing its
application until “just before dismissal would have been required under
NRCP 41(e).” Id, at 456, 538 P.2d at 156. The court further held that the
diligence required on the part of appellant and its counsel was not
reflected in the record, noting that “{njo valid reason or explanation was

given for the pendency of this case for some four years after it had been at

 

issue.” Id, Albeit obscured by the extreme situation at issue in that ease,
the Monroe court nonetheless announced the salient considerations that a
district court must weigh when entertaining a motion for a preferential
trial date brought to avoid an NRCP 41(0) dismissal? We reaffirm
‘Monroe's determination that, in evaluating such a motion, the district
1d when

 

court must consider (1) the time remaining in the five-year p«

*Focusing on an overly narrow reading of our application of Monroe
to the facts of the instant case, instead of the actual considerations set
forth in that decision, our dissenting colleague incorrectly asserts that we
adopt a new rule governing the resolution of preferential trial motions
brought to avoid dismissal under NRCP 41(e) and advocates instead for
adoption of the factors set forth in the California Supreme Court's decision
in Salas v, Sears, Roebuck & Co,, 721 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1986), to guide the
resolution of such motions. Contrary to the dissent’s position, the
approach set forth in Monroe provides a straightforward methodology that
can be easily implemented by the district courts to resolve preferential
trial motions brought under these circumstances, and thus, we see no
reason to cast aside our existing precedent in favor of the approach
favored by the dissent.

 

 
the motion is filed, and (2) the diligence of the moving party and his or her
counsel in prosecuting the case. 91 Nev. at 456, 588 P.2d at 156.

Applying the factors to the present case, the record reveals
that appellant filed his preferential trial motion on November 26, 2007,
more than three months before the five-year period was set to expire on
March 3, 2008. In addition, the record reflects that appellant diligently
moved his case forward and actively pursued discovery. Indeed, on April
4, 2006, with the case more than three years into the five-year period,
respondent actually stipulated to the fact that the parties were diligently
working on discovery as part of a stipulation between the parties to vacate
a trial date. Finally, the record reveals that the underlying case was
never allowed to languish through prolonged periods of inactivity.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude the district court abused
its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a preferential trial date.
Id, As a result, both the

resulting dismi

 

's denial of that motion and the

 

1 of this case pursuant to NRCP 41(e) must be reversed
and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant appellant a
preferential trial date.t This conclusion does not end our analysis,
however, as, given that the five-year period had expired at the time that
appellant's complaint was dismissed, it becomes necessary to determine
how much time appellant should have, on remand, to bring his case to

trial. Our examination of this court's precedent determining how much

"ln light of our decision with regard to the preferential trial issue,
we need not address appellant's remaining contentions. Additionally, to
the extent that respondent's arguments in support of affirming the district
court's decision are not discussed herein, we have fully considered those
arguments and found them to be without merit,

 

 
one

 

time a plaintiff has, under NRCP 41(e), to bring his or her case to trial
following a reversal and remand of an erroneous judgment or dismissal
entered in a case that has not yet been brought to trial reveals
inconsistencies in how this court has resolved that issue.

We begin with this court’s 1981 case, McGinnis yy,
Consolidated Casinos Corp,, 97 Nev. 31, 623 P.2d 974 (1981), in which the
court addressed the impact of an earlier appellate reversal and remand of
an order dismissing the underlying case on the running of the NRCP 41(e)
period. To resolve the issue, the McGinnis court considered the relevance
of the portion of NRCP 41(0) providing that, “[wJhen in an action after
judgment, an appeal has been taken and judgment reversed with [the]
‘cause remanded for a new trial . .. the action must be dismissed . .. unless
brought to trial within [3] years from the date upon which remittitur is
filed by the clerk of the trial court” to situations in which an errant
judgment, entered prior to the commencement of trial, is reversed and
remanded on appeal. Id, While noting the rule’s silence with regard to
cases in which trial had not yet commenced, the McGinnis court
nonetheless concluded that the policy considerations that underlie NRCP
41(e)’s express grant of three years to bring a case to trial when an
erroneous judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial were equally
applicable in cases where an errant judgment is reversed and remanded
for trial in the first instance. Id, As a result, the McGinnis court held
that, when a judgment entered before trial has commenced is reversed on
appeal, on remand, the parties have three years from the date the
remittitur is filed in district court to bring the case to trial. Id.
Subsequent to this court’s issuance of the McGinnis decision, this court
has applied or acknowledged the rule adopted in that case on several

 
occasions. See, ¢.g., Monroe v, Columbia Sunrise Hosp,, 123 Nev. 96, 102,
158 P.3d 1008, 1011-12 (2007); Bell & Gossett Co, v. Oak Grove Investors,
108 Nev. 958, 961-62, 843 P.2d 361, 353 (1992); Massey v. Sunrise
Hospital, 102 Nev. 367, 369-70, 724 P.2d 208, 209-10 (1986).

In 2004, without any mention of the McGinnis opinion, this
court applied a different rule in Rickard v. Ward & Co., 120

Nev. 493, 498-99, 96 P.3d 743, 747 (2004), to determine the time
remaining to bring a case to trial on remand from a reversal of a district
court’s order dismissing a case for failure to bring the matter to trial
within the NRCP 41(c) five-year period. The Rickard court reversed the
five-year dismissal at issue in that appeal based on its conclusion that the
time in which the case had been subject to a bankruptcy stay should have
been excluded from the calculation of the five-year period, and thus, the
time for bringing the case to trial had not yet expired when the district
court dismissed the case, 120 Nev. at 498, 96 P.3d at 747, Apparently,
operating under the view that, on remand, a plaintiff would generally only
have the remaining portion of the five-year period to bring his or her case
to trial, the Rickard court noted that only a short time remained in the
five-year period when the case was dismissed and that the court failed to
see how the case could be calendared and brought to trial in the time
remaining. Id, at 498-99, 96 P.3d at 747. As a result, to ensure that

sufficient time would be available to allow the appellant to bring the case
to trial on remand, the Rickard court concluded that, for equitable
reasons, the appellant should be given a “reasonable period of time to set
and bring his case to trial,” provided he acted expeditiously. Id, at 499, 96
P.3d at 747.

 

 
In light of the inconsistent rules employed in McGinnis and
Rickard to determine the time a plaintiff has to bring his or her case to
trial following the reversal and remand on appeal of an erroneous pretrial
judgment or dismissal and the inherent incompatibility of the three-year
and reasonable period of time rules applied in those decisions, we take this
opportunity to clarify our precedent with regard to this issue. Having
fully evaluated the methodology adopted in the McGinnis and Rickard
decisions, we conclude that the McGinnis rule constitutes the better-
reasoned approach, as, unlike the ambiguous reasonable period for
bringing a case to trial utilized in Rickard, which could vary widely
depending on the judicial district in which the case is pending and the
volume of cases on the district court’s docket, the provision of a fixed three
years to bring a case to trial provides the parties with certainty as to the
time remaining, on remand, to bring the case to trial and avoid a
subsequent dismissal under NRCP 41(e). Accordingly, we reaffirm
McGinnis’s holding that, when an erroneous judgment or dismissal
entered before trial has commenced is reversed on appeal, on remand, the
parties have three years from the date that the remittitur is filed in
district court to bring the case to trial in the first instance, McGinnis, 97
Nev. at 33, 623 P.2d at 975, and we overrule Rickard to the extent that it

is inconsistent with this conclusion.* As a result, on remand of the instant

“In Johann v. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 97 Nev. 80, 82, 624 P.2d 493, 494
(1981), this court, in reversing a dismissal under NRCP 41(e)'s five-year
rule, decreed, without explanation, that on remand the case was to be
brought to trial within 120 days of receipt of the remittitur. As we
reaffirm the McGinnis rule, we necessarily reject Johann's conclusion that,
on remand, such cases must be brought to trial within 120 days,

 

 
nee

 

matter to the district court, appellant shall have three years from the date
that the remittitur is filed in district court to bring his case to trial.
CONCLUSION

In resolving a motion for a proferential trial date brought to
avoid dismissal under NRCP 41(0)'s five-year rule, district courts must
evaluate (1) the time remaining in the five-year period when the motion is
filed, and (2) the diligence of the moving party and his or her counsel in
prosecuting the case, Applying these factors to the prosent case, because
appellant filed his preferential trial motion with more than three months
remaining in the five-year period and the record reflects that appellant
diligently moved his case forward, wo conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a preferential trial
date. As a result, we reverse the district court’s denial of that motion and
the resulting dismissal of the underlying case pursuant to NRCP 41(c),
and we remand this matter to the district court with instructions to grant
appellant a preferential trial date,

In addition, we reaffirm the holding in McGinnis_v,
Consolidated Casinos Corp,, 97 Nev. 31, 623 P.2d 974 (1981), that on
remand from an erroneous judgment or dismissal entered before trial has
‘commenced that is reversed on appeal, the parties have three years from
the date that the remittitur is filed in district court to bring the case to

5As noted in our December 31, 2008, order, this court will not
consider appellant's challenge to the district court's award of costs to
respondent. In light of our disposition of this matter, however, appellant
is not precluded from moving the district court for relief from that award.
Additionally, appellant's request for costs on appeal, made in his opening
brief, is denied.

12

 
[trial. To the extent that Rickard v, Montgomery Ward & Co,, 120 Nev.
1493, 498-99, 96 P.3d 748, 747 (2004), is inconsistent with McGinnis's

conclusion, it is overruled.

 

 
sr ee

 

PICKERING, J., dissenting:

‘The error that leads the majority to find a reversible abuse of
discretion by the district court originated with the appellant, Carstarphen,
and his counsel, not the district court. Because a civil litigant may not

secure reversal of an adverse judgment based on an error he invited, 1

 

respectfully dissent. I also disagree with, and therefore dissent from, the
test the majority announces for judging preferential-trial-setting motions
in the NRCP 41(e) context. In my view, the new test is incomplete and, in
its incompleteness, potentially disruptive and unfair.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Carstarphen filed this case on March 3, 2003. Under NRCP
41(¢), he had until March 3, 2008, to bring the action to trial. In October

 

2007, Carstarphen changed counsel; his new counsel recognized that the
existing May 12, 2008, trial date went beyond NRCP 41(e)'s five-year
limit. This led Carstarphen to file two alternative motions in the district
court, The first asked the district court to find that “the
parties .. . implicitly agreed to waive the five[-Jyear rule” when, in August
2007, they had stipulated to vacate an earlier trial date and reset it for
May 2008. The second asked the district court to grant Carstarphen “an
order of preference in setting [the] case for trial” before March 3, 2008,
when the five-year rule otherwise would run,

In the district court, Carstarphen presented these as
alternative motions and expressed a distinct preference for the first, the
implicit-waiver motion. Thus, Carstarphen described the second,
preferential-setting motion as a “fallback”; acknowledged that the relief it
sought would impose a “burden [on the district] Court, the parties and
their counsel, and the prospective jury in this case of having to bring this
case to trial prior to the expiration of the fivel-lyear rule”; and affirmed

 
ones

 

that “Carstarphen and his counsel are fine with the current May 12, 2008,
trial date so long as the Five Year [implicit-waiver] Motion is again
granted.” Carstarphen advised the court that “[iJf the Five Year Motion
[is] granted, this Motion [for preferential trial setting] will be moot.”

Consistent with his strategic preference for the implicit~\

 

motion—and the extra weeks of trial-preparation time it bought his newly
substituted counsel—Carstarphen did not counter Milsner’s showings, in
opposition to the preferential-setting motion, that: (1) Carstarphen still
‘owed Milsner long-promised party and expert discovery; (2) Carstarphen
had protectively refiled his case in federal court in case his five-year-rule
motions failed; (3) expert witness availability was doubtful; and (4)
Milsner’s counsel had two trials acheduled already for February, making a
trial in February instead of May in this action difficult, if not impossible.
Unlike Carstarphen, who offered mainly argument, not evidence, to
support his motions, Milsner substantiated his arguments with affidavits,
requests for judicial notice, and exhibits, which were included in
respondent's separate appendix on this appeal.

Given this record, it is not surprising that, on December 14,
2007, the district court granted the first of Carstarphen’s alternative
motions (the implicit-waiver motion) and summarily denied the second
(the preferential-setting motion). It did so in terms taken almost verbatim
from Carstarphen’s papers: “The Court finds Defendants, by stipulating to
vacate the October trial date and agreeing to set trial in May 2008,
implicitly agreed to extend the five-year rule of NRCP 41(e).” (Emphasis,
added.) No further motions were filed in the case until March 5, 2008,
when Milsner moved to dismiss based on Prostack v, Lowden, 96 Nev. 230,

 
conn

 

281, 606 P.2d 1099, 1099-1100 (1980), which holds that only an express
agreement, not an implicit one, will suspend NRCP 41(e).
ANALYSIS
Prostack’s facts are similar, if not identical, to those presented
here, ‘The plaintiffs moved for and were granted a preferential trial
setting to avert an impending five-year rule dismissal, Id, at 230, 606
P.2d at 1099. Thereafter, to deal with a late-disclosed witness, the

 

defendants moved to vacate the existing trial date. Id, at 231, 606 P.2d at
1099. The plaintiffs did not oppose the motion, and the district court reset
the trial to a date beyond the five-year rule deadline. Id. After the five-
year rule deadline had passed, the defendants moved to dismiss under
NRCP 41(e). Id, The plaintiffs argued that, implicit in the defendants’
unopposed request for additional discovery and a new trial date, was their
agreement to waive the five-year rule. Jd, The district court disagreed
and dismissed the case, [d, This court affirmed, holding that “four
previous decisions construing NRCP 41(0) clearly indicate that mandatory
dismissal for failure to bring an action to trial within five years from the
filing of the complaint can be avoided only by a written stipulation
between the parties extending the time.” Id, (citing Johnson v. Harber, 94
Nev. 524, 582 P.2d 800 (1978). We further stated that “[iJt is upon the
plaintiffs, the appellants here, that the duty rests to bring the case to trial
within the period specified by the rule.” Jd, at 231, 606 P.2d at 1100.
Applying Prostack, the district court's dismissal should be
affirmed, not reversed. Carstarphen made a legal error when he assumed,
as the plaintiffs did in Prostack, that a stipulation to vacate and reset an
existing trial date implicitly waives the five-year rule. This legal error led
Carstarphen to commit three additional errors: (1) to urge the district
court to deny his preferential-setting motion as moot if it granted his

 
eo Be

 

implicit-waiver motion; (2) not to develop his motion for a preferential trial
setting or respond meaningfully to Milsner’s opposition to it; and (3) to fail
to recognize the error in the December 14, 2007, “implicit waiver” order
until the five-year rule ran on March 4, 2008."

“The doctrine of “invited error” embodies the principle that a
party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself
induced or provoked the [district] court... to commit.” Pearson_v.
Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) (quoting 5 Am. Jur,
2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962). Reversal based on errors Carstarphen
“induced or provoked” is inappropriate. The invited error doctrine applies,
not just to the failure to recognize that Prostack defeats the implicit-
waiver argument on which Carstarphen chiefly relied, but also to

Carstarphen’s failure to recognize and argue that the preferential-setting

'These errors, while understandable, differ little from the errors
held insufficient to overcome NRCP 41(e)'s mandatory five-year rule in our
established precedent. See Allyn v. McDonald, 117 Nev. 907, 912, 34 P.3d
584, 587 (2001) (“except in very limited circumstances, we uphold NRCP
41(@) dismissals without regard to the plaintiff's reasons for allowing the
mandatory period to lapse” (footnote omitted)); Johnson, 94 Nev. at 526,
582 P.2d at 801 (Although appellant appears to be the victim of
unfortunate circumstances, this Court has consistently held that dismissal
pursuant to NRCP 41(e) for failure to bring to trial a claim within five
years of filing the complaint is mandatory.” (citing cases)); Thran_v,
District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 181, 182, 380 P.2d 297, 300 (1963) (dismissal
is mandatory when the five-year mark is passed: “tho exercise of discretion
is not involved” and “[p}rejudice is presumed”); see also De Santiago v. D.
and G Plumbing, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882, 887 (Ct. App. 2007) (The
exercise of reasonable diligence includes a duty ‘to monitor the case in the
trial court to ascertain whether any filing, scheduling or calendaring
errors have occurred.” (quoting Tamburina_v. Combined Ins. Co, of
America, 64 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 175, 184 (2007).

 

 
motion had to be granted or certain dismissal would follow under NRCP
41(). Iam hard-pressed to find, consistent with Pearson, an abuse of
discretion by the district court in failing to recognize the dire consequences
to Carstarphen of crediting his lawyer's arguments. Cf. Nelgon_v.
Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2011) (“the district court [is
not] obliged to research and construct legal arguments for parties
especially when they are represented by counsel,” “is not obliged to grant

relief from a lawyer's mistaken reading of a rule or statute,” and “abuses

 

its discretion only when no reasonable person could agree with [its]
decision”),

Carstarphen's failure to develop a record on the preferential-
trial-setting motion leads the majority to adopt a rule that is so broad as
to be unworkable: A district court commits an abuse of discretion when it
denies a cursory preferential-setting motion if the record demonstrates
some diligence and the motion is made more than three months before
trial. While I agree that, in an appropriate case, a district court has
discretion to grant a litigant a preferential trial setting to avoid NRCP
41(e)'s five-year rule, the factors that inform that discretion, and our
deferential review of its exercise, should be much more inclusive than the
majority suggests.

Nevada has historically consulted California law, which also
has a five-year rule, in interpreting NRCP 41(e). Thran v. District Court,
79 Nev. 176, 179, 380 P.2d 297, 299 (1963). In Salas v, Sears, Roebuck &
Co, 721 P.2d 590, 594 (Cal. 1986), the California Supreme Court, after
considerable debate, set out the factors that should guide a district court

in assessing a motion for preferential trial setting to avoid a five-year
deadline like that in NRCP 41(e):

 

 
——s

4 trial court does not have a mandatory duty to set,
preferential trial date, even when the five-year
deadline approaches. Its discretion is not wholly
unfettered: it must consider the ‘total
picture,’... including the condition of the court
calendar, dilatory conduct by plaintiff, prejudice to
defendant of an accelerated trial date, and the
likelihood of eventual mandatory dismissal if the
early trial date is denied,

Applying a “total picture” approach, Carstarphen cannot

 

demonstrate an abuse of discretion (assuming, arguendo, he could avoid
the invited error doctrine). While the record shows some case activity and
Carstarphen's motions were filed three months before the five-year rule
would run, he failed to address the prejudice to Milsner, the mitigating
factor of the parallel federal suit, the discovery he (Carstarphen) still
owed, the availability of witnesses, including experts, Milsner’s trial
counsel's calendar, the case's complexity, and the district court's calendar.
Th

 

factors needed to be vetted in the district court but they were not,
because Carstarphen did not press the motion for preferential trial
sotting. On this record, an abuse of discretion has not been shown.
Respectfully, I dissent.

     

Pickering

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