Case Title: State v. Steele

Citation: 2013-Ohio-2470

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Steele, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2470.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2470 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. STEELE, APPELLEE 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Steele, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2470.] 
Criminal 
law—Offenses—Intimidation—R.C. 
2921.03—Abduction—R.C. 
2905.02(A)(1) and (A)—Police officer not exempt from prosecution for 
offense of intimidation for abusing power to interrogate or for knowingly 
filing a materially false complaint to intimidate or influence witness—Jury 
instruction defining “privilege” in context of police officer’s privilege to 
arrest and detain is not plain error when instruction is identical to 
definition of “privilege” in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12). 
(Nos. 2011-2075 and 2011-2178—Submitted March 12, 2013—Decided  
June 18, 2013.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-100637, 2011-Ohio-5479. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal and cross-appeal, we are presented with two issues.  
First, we consider whether police officers are exempt from prosecution for the 
offense of intimidation when accused of abusing their power to interrogate.  We 
hold that R.C. 2921.03 provides no such exemption.  A police officer may be 
convicted of intimidation when the state presents evidence that the police officer 
knowingly filed a materially false complaint in order to influence or intimidate a 
witness. 
{¶ 2} Second, we consider what instructions a trial court must provide to 
a jury on the definition of the “privilege” exception to the offense of abduction 
where the defendant is a police officer accused of abusing his privilege to arrest 
and detain.  We hold that when a trial court’s definition of “privilege” is identical 
to the definition provided in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12), such an instruction does not 
constitute plain error. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 3} On May 26, 2009, police officer Julian Steele was indicted on ten 
counts, including abduction, intimidation, extortion, rape, and sexual battery.  The 
charges stemmed from Steele’s investigation of a series of six robberies that 
occurred in the same neighborhood in Cincinnati, Ohio.  Shortly after one of the 
robberies, a resident in the neighborhood saw a vehicle driving suspiciously.  The 
resident provided the vehicle’s license-plate number to police, who linked the 
vehicle to Alicia Maxton. 
{¶ 4} The state presented evidence at trial that once Steele became aware 
that Alicia had children, he went to their school, arrested three children, and had 
their lockers searched.  One of those children was R.M.  Steele took R.M. into 
custody by handcuffing him and placing him in the caged back seat of a police 
cruiser.  Steele told the school employees not to tell Alicia that he had taken R.M. 
into custody.  Steele also told school employees the next day that he knew that 
January Term, 2013 
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R.M. was innocent.  Although R.M. did not fit the physical descriptions of the 
robbers, Steele took R.M. to the police station and interrogated him extensively, 
using threatening and coercive tactics, prior to any attempt to offer him his 
constitutionally guaranteed Miranda warning.  Specifically, after R.M. flatly and 
strongly denied knowledge of or involvement in the robberies, Steele threatened 
R.M. by telling him that his mother would be jailed and his siblings would be 
taken away if R.M. did not confess to the robberies.  R.M. succumbed to the 
coercion and made a false confession.  Steele then Mirandized R.M. and taped his 
confession. 
{¶ 5} Using R.M.’s false statement, Steele was able to formally bring 
charges against R.M. for the six robberies and had R.M. imprisoned in juvenile 
detention. 
{¶ 6} While R.M. was in detention, Steele repeatedly persuaded R.M.’s 
mother Alicia to meet with him under the guise of talking about R.M.’s case, and 
eventually convinced her to come to his apartment.  Steele stated to Alicia that he 
would be able to get R.M. out of detention, but that it would involve quite a 
“process.”  During one of Alicia’s visits to Steele’s apartment, Steele asked her to 
engage in sexual activity with him.  Alicia testified that she complied with 
Steele’s requests because she believed that he had the power over R.M.’s release. 
{¶ 7} While R.M. was spending nine days in detention, Steele repeatedly 
told the assistant prosecutor that he knew that R.M. had nothing to do with the 
robberies, but that he had locked R.M. up in order to compel Alicia to cooperate 
with the investigation.  The prosecutor mistakenly assumed that R.M. had been 
sent home on the day of his arrest.  When, on the ninth day, she discovered that 
R.M. was still in lock-up, she immediately had R.M. released and dismissed his 
charges.  The prosecutor’s office then had Steele questioned about his actions.  
The state submitted a recording of the questioning, during which Steele admitted 
that he had excluded R.M. as a suspect prior to locking him up.  Steele admitted 
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that he thought R.M. had given a false confession.  Steele admitted that he had 
told Alicia that he did not think R.M. committed any of the robberies.  Steele 
stated that he does not make arrests solely based on witness identification, but 
instead he utilizes the technique called “bullshitting,” which apparently refers to 
arresting people on less than probable cause in the hope that something promising 
will result. 
{¶ 8} Steele was charged with two counts of abduction, three counts of 
extortion, two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of 
intimidation, all with firearm specifications.  A jury trial was held, and Steele did 
not testify. 
{¶ 9} At the close of the evidence, the parties and the court discussed 
alterations to the proposed jury instructions.  The court provided the revised jury 
instructions to the parties, and counsel for Steele stated that the instructions “look 
fine, and they incorporate all of the changes that we discussed yesterday.”  
Pursuant to the agreed-upon jury instructions, the trial court provided the jury 
with definitions for “privilege,” “arrest,” “probable cause,” and “reasonable 
grounds,” as they are used in R.C. 2905.02, 2901.01(A)(12), and 2935.03. 
{¶ 10} The trial court defined privilege as “an immunity, license, or right 
conferred by law or bestowed by express or implied grant or arising out of status, 
position, office, or relationship or growing out of necessity.”  The trial court 
stated that when an arrest is made without probable cause, it is an illegal arrest.  
The trial court instructed that probable cause exists “when an officer has 
knowledge of existing facts and circumstances which would warrant a prudent 
police officer in believing that a crime was committed, and that the person to be 
arrested has committed the crime.”  The trial court then explained that a police 
officer has the authority to arrest and detain a person if the police officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is guilty of committing a crime.  
Steele had no objections to the foregoing explanations. 
January Term, 2013 
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{¶ 11} The jury found Steele guilty of abduction of R.M. in violation of 
R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) and (A)(2) and intimidation of R.M. in violation of R.C. 
2921.03, each with an accompanying firearm specification.  The jury acquitted 
Steele on the remaining charges.  He received a prison sentence of five years and 
an additional five years of community control. 
{¶ 12} On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals rejected Steele’s 
arguments that his intimidation conviction was not supported by sufficient 
evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence and affirmed the 
conviction.  The appellate court reversed Steele’s abduction convictions, however, 
holding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury on the offense of abduction 
were fatally deficient.  The appellate court held that the trial court should have 
explained to the jury that a police officer loses the privilege to arrest and detain a 
citizen only if he does not have a good-faith belief that there is probable cause for 
the arrest.  “In essence,” the court held, “the jury was instructed that an officer 
loses the privilege to arrest when the arrest is made without probable cause.”  Id. 
at ¶ 9.  The appellate court concluded that because Steele’s conviction hinged on 
whether Steele’s actions were in good faith, the deficiency in the instructions rose 
to the level of plain error, requiring reversal despite Steele’s agreement to the 
instruction. 
{¶ 13} The appellate court dismissed Steele’s sufficiency and manifest-
weight arguments regarding the abduction convictions as moot.  Finally, the 
appellate court reversed all of the gun specifications, as no evidence had been 
presented at trial that Steele had a firearm on or about his person when he 
committed the offenses.  The appellate court thus partially reversed and remanded 
the case for a new trial on the charges of abduction. 
{¶ 14} Both the state and Steele sought this court’s discretionary review.  
In case No. 2011-2075, we accepted the state’s appeal regarding the appellate 
court’s reversal on the issue of jury instructions on the offense of abduction.  131 
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Ohio St.3d 1472, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 803.  In case No, 2011-2178, we 
accepted Steele’s delayed appeal regarding his intimidation conviction.  132 Ohio 
St.3d 1422, 2012-Ohio-2729, 969 N.E.2d 270.  The two cases were consolidated, 
and the state’s appeal was designated a cross-appeal.  Id. 
Analysis 
Intimidation and Police Officers 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2921.03(A) provides: 
 
No person, knowingly and by force, by unlawful threat of 
harm to any person or property, or by filing, recording, or 
otherwise using a materially false or fraudulent writing with 
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, 
shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public servant, 
party official, or witness in the discharge of the person’s duty. 
 
{¶ 16} Steele proposes that a police officer cannot be prosecuted for the 
offense of intimidation, in violation of R.C. 2921.03(A), based on actions taken 
by the police officer while conducting an interrogation.  We disagree. 
{¶ 17} In our examination of R.C. 2921.03, we begin by noting that our 
“paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.”  State v. S.R., 
63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 589 N.E.2d 1319 (1992).  We must give effect to the 
plain meaning of the words used in a statute, and we must not modify an 
unambiguous statute by adding or deleting words.  Id. at 595. 
{¶ 18} R.C. Chapter 2921 criminalizes offenses committed against justice 
and public administration.  “Chapter 2921 deals with acts tending to subvert the 
processes of democratic government, including bribery, perjury, and related 
offenses, crimes which hamper law enforcement and the administration of justice, 
and peculation, conflict of interests, dereliction of duty, and other offenses of 
January Term, 2013 
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public officials.”  Committee Comment to R.C. Chapter 2921, 1972 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 511.  Thus, R.C. Chapter 2921 was separately enacted within Ohio’s criminal 
code to focus on the special societal ills created by improper interference in the 
administration of justice or the discharge of a public duty. 
{¶ 19} R.C. 2921.03 makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly take 
certain actions to influence, intimidate, or hinder a witness, a party official, or a 
public servant in the discharge of a duty.  R.C. 2921.03(A).  The ways in which it 
is illegal to exert such improper influence are by knowingly (1) using force, (2) 
unlawfully threatening harm against any person or property, or (3) using a 
materially false or fraudulent writing in any way with malice, bad faith, 
wantonness, or recklessness.  Id.  Thus, there are specified actions that are 
criminalized when committed against a specified set of people.  However, there 
are no such limitations as to the identity or status of the person who might commit 
the offense of intimidation. 
{¶ 20} By contrast, the General Assembly has enacted various criminal 
statutes that provide exceptions for certain categories of people.  For example, 
statutes prohibiting the possession or distribution of controlled substances provide 
a number of exceptions for certain authorized health professionals, police officers, 
and other parties.  See, e.g., R.C. 2925.02(B) (corrupting another with drugs);  
2925.03(B) (trafficking offenses);  2925.11(B) (drug-possession offenses).  The 
offense of coercion provides certain exceptions for prosecutors acting in good 
faith and in the interests of justice.  R.C. 2905.12(B).  Many weapons-possession 
statutes explicitly exclude authorized law-enforcement officers who are acting 
within the scope of their duties.  See, e.g., R.C. 2923.12(C)(1)(a) (carrying 
concealed weapons); 2923.121(B)(1)(a) (possessing a firearm in liquor permit 
premises); 2923.122(D)(1)(a) (possessing a deadly weapon in a school safety 
zone); 2923.17(C)(1) (possessing a dangerous ordnance). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 21} We cannot add an exception to R.C. 2921.03 where there is none 
present.  And by reading R.C. 2921.03 in light of the statutes in the preceding 
paragraph, we cannot presume that an exception to R.C. 2921.03 was intended 
when other statutes explicitly specify when police officers are exempted from 
certain offenses.  See S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d at 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319; State v. 
Cunningham, 113 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245, 863 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 20; State 
v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 45.  “It always 
has been deemed necessary to enact laws to compel performance of duty and to 
prevent corruption on the part of public officers. They are not attended by any 
special presumption that general language in disciplinary measures does not 
extend to them.”  Donnelley v. United States, 276 U.S. 505, 516, 48 S.Ct. 400, 72 
L.Ed. 676 (1928). 
{¶ 22} Further, it is true that police may draw from a wide variety of 
interrogation tactics and may even use certain kinds of deception to elicit a 
confession.  See State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 81, 571 N.E.2d 97 (1991); 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).  
However, there is no authority for the contention that police officers may use 
physical force, unlawful threats of harm, or a materially false or fraudulent 
writing with malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness as part of a legitimate 
interrogation of a suspect.  Accordingly, we hold that a police officer may be 
prosecuted for the offense of intimidation where the police officer’s actions 
during an interrogation satisfy the elements provided in R.C. 2921.03. 
{¶ 23} The evidence submitted at Steele’s trial indicated that despite 
Steele’s repeatedly stated belief that R.M. was not involved in the robberies, 
Steele coerced R.M. into giving a false confession.  Despite knowing that the 
confession was false, Steele filed a criminal complaint against R.M. using that 
false writing in an attempt to force R.M.’s mother to admit what he believed she 
knew about the robberies.  Thus, Steele used a materially false writing in bad faith 
January Term, 2013 
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to influence and  intimidate a witness within the meaning of R.C. 2921.03(A).  
We therefore affirm the First District’s conclusion that Steele’s intimidation 
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. 
Abduction, Privilege, Police Officers, and Plain Error 
{¶ 24} The state proposes that in the context of the offense of abduction, 
when a trial court provides a jury instruction defining “privilege” exactly as it is 
defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12), the trial court’s failure to sua sponte provide 
additional, more specific instructions on “privilege” does not rise to the level of 
plain error.  We agree. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2905.02 provides: 
 
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly 
do any of the following: 
(1) By force or threat, remove another from the place where 
the other person is found; 
(2) By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person 
under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the 
victim or place the other person in fear. 
 
{¶ 26} Thus, in order to convict a defendant for the offense of abduction, 
the finder of fact must determine that the defendant removed and/or restrained the 
victim by force or threat “without privilege to do so.”  R.C. 2905.02(A).  
“Privilege” is defined as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, 
bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or 
relationship, or growing out of necessity.”  R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).  A police officer 
has a right conferred by law to execute a warrantless arrest of any person who the 
police officer has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of certain enumerated 
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offenses, including theft offenses and offenses of violence.  R.C. 2935.03(B)(1).  
A police officer has reasonable or probable cause to arrest when the events 
leading up to the arrest, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 
police officer, amount to” probable cause.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).  Probable cause exists when 
there are facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge that are 
sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect is committing or has 
committed an offense.  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 
142 (1964), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 
L.Ed. 543 (1925).  If an arrest is made without probable cause, the arrest is 
constitutionally invalid.  State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122, 127, 311 N.E.2d 16 
(1974). 
{¶ 27} It is undisputed that the trial court provided accurate instructions 
on all of the above terms and that it followed the corresponding statutory 
language virtually verbatim.  The appellate court concluded that the trial court 
erred by not providing additional instructions sua sponte.  Specifically, the trial 
court explained when probable cause exists and when it does not.  It explained 
that a privilege to arrest exists when there is probable cause, but it did not explain 
that the privilege is not lost merely because probable cause was lacking.  It is this 
omission that the court of appeals found to be fatal. 
{¶ 28} Under normal circumstances, the consequence of an illegal arrest is 
that evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible at trial.  State v. Henderson, 51 
Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 554 N.E.2d 104 (1990), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).  However, a police officer is not 
automatically stripped of statutory privilege and exposed to criminal liability if a 
court finds in hindsight that the officer made an arrest on less than probable cause.  
When looking at a police officer’s liability in the civil context, privilege is lost 
when “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [a 
January Term, 2013 
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clearly established] right.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 
3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).  We find this principle to be applicable to the 
context of a police officer’s authority to arrest, pursuant to R.C. 2935.03, and 
correspondingly, the officer’s “privilege” as defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).  
Accordingly, a police officer does not lose the privilege to arrest merely because 
probable cause is lacking.  However, the police officer loses the privilege to arrest 
when a reasonable police officer would understand that probable cause is lacking. 
{¶ 29} It would have been ideal for the trial court to provide additional 
instructions regarding the loss of privilege in the specific context of a police 
officer’s authority to arrest.  However, it must be remembered that we are not 
looking for the ideal in this case.  We are merely looking for the absence of plain 
error. There was no objection to the jury instruction in issue.  “On appeal, a party 
may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any instructions unless the 
party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the 
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.”  Crim.R. 30(A).  It is 
undisputed that Steele negotiated for and agreed to the revised jury instructions 
provided by the trial court, that he lodged no objections to the instructions related 
to the abduction charges, and that he has therefore forfeited all but plain error. 
{¶ 30} For a court to notice plain error, the error must be an obvious 
defect in a trial’s proceedings, it must have affected substantial rights, and it must 
have affected the outcome of the trial.  State v. Eafford, 132 Ohio St.3d 159, 
2012-Ohio-2224, 970 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 11, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 
502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306;  State v. Lynn, 129 Ohio St.3d 146, 2011-
Ohio-2722, 950 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 13.  See also Crim.R. 52(B).  Because there was no 
explicit case law or statutory guidance in Ohio on the standard of proving a police 
officer’s loss of privilege to arrest, it would be difficult to conclude that the trial 
court’s failure to invent such an instruction constitutes an obvious error.  
Regardless, even when these minimum requirements have been met, a reviewing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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court should still be conservative in its application of plain-error review, reserving 
notice of plain error for situations involving more than merely theoretical 
prejudice to substantial rights.  See State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 94, 372 
N.E.2d 804 (1978).  “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken 
with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 31} Here, the appellate court concluded that the lack of an instruction 
on loss of privilege amounted to plain error because “[i]t relieved the state of its 
burden to prove all elements of abduction beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2011-
Ohio-5479 at ¶ 21, citing State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 
817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 97.  In Adams, we did note that relieving the state of its burden 
of proving an element of the offense violates a defendant’s right to due process.  
Id.  However, we went on to hold in Adams that such an error in jury instructions 
is waived where there was no objection and where the outcome of the trial was 
not affected.  Id. at ¶ 100 and 102.  We have long held that improperly reducing 
the state’s burden of proving an element of a crime is not plain error unless the 
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.  State v. Cooperrider, 4 
Ohio St.3d 226, 227-228, 448 N.E.2d 452 (1983); State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 14, 444 N.E.2d 1332 (1983); Long at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 32} Due to the trial court’s failure to sua sponte provide additional 
instructions on “privilege,” the appellate court determined that the jury was in 
essence instructed that a police officer could be criminally liable any time an 
arrest is made on less than probable cause.  2011-Ohio-5479 at ¶ 9.  Certainly 
such an instruction would be erroneous.  But the trial court did not provide any 
incorrect statements of the law in its instructions, and we cannot assume that the 
jury in fact made this improper inference. 
{¶ 33} By concluding that an erroneous instruction, by itself, constituted 
plain error, the appellate court did not complete its plain-error analysis.  Instead, 
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“an appellate court must review the instructions as a whole and the entire record 
to determine whether a manifest miscarriage of justice has occurred as a result of 
the error in the instructions.”  State v. Wamsley, 117 Ohio St.3d 388, 2008-Ohio-
1195, 884 N.E.2d 45, ¶ 17.  The totality of the instructions and of the record in 
this case does not support a finding of plain error, particularly when considering 
Steele’s intimidation and abduction charges together. 
{¶ 34} The facts underlying Steele’s charge for abduction were 
inextricably intertwined with those underlying the charges for intimidation.  He 
took R.M. out of school in handcuffs, placed him in an interrogation room, and 
blatantly intimidated him with dire threats directed at his entire family, including 
his school-aged siblings.  Steele admitted to school employees, R.M.’s mother, 
and to the prosecutor that he knew that R.M. was not involved with the robberies.  
He coerced a confession from R.M., which he admittedly thought was false, and 
filed a criminal complaint against R.M. using that false confession. 
{¶ 35} In order to be convicted of knowingly filing a false writing in 
satisfaction of the elements of the offense of intimidation, Steele needed to 
believe that R.M.’s confession was false, i.e., that R.M. had not committed the 
crime.  If Steele believed that R.M. had not committed a crime, then a reasonable 
police officer in Steele’s position would have understood that probable cause was 
clearly lacking.  Thus, because Steele’s accusation against R.M. had to be 
knowingly false in order for the jury to find Steele guilty of intimidation, and 
because the jury did find Steele guilty of intimidation, there is nothing to indicate 
that the trial court’s failure to explain a higher standard of loss of privilege for 
police officers affected Steele’s convictions for abduction.  Further, there is 
nothing in the record to support the proposition that Steele had anything even 
approaching probable cause to arrest when he took this youngster out of school in 
handcuffs.  At the very best, there was the suspicion that the child’s mother’s car 
had been used in the crime.  No reasonable police officer could possibly 
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categorize that as reasonable suspicion sufficient to satisfy the United States 
Constitution. 
{¶ 36} Although we hold today that the trial court did not commit plain 
error in its failure to provide specific instructions for a police officer’s loss of 
privilege, we must stress that we are in no way attempting to tie the hands of 
police officers in their broad authority to arrest and detain suspects.  Police 
officers must often act quickly and decisively, as a delay in response could have 
dire consequences or even constitute dereliction of duty.  See Davis v. Scherer, 
468 U.S. 183, 196, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984).  Police officers 
performing their valuable and often dangerous duties cannot be made to fear 
criminal charges any time an arrest or detention is made with what turns out to be 
less than probable cause.  Thus, our holding today would reach only the rare 
circumstance of a police officer depriving a person of his or her liberty when a 
reasonable police officer would know that there is no probable cause supporting 
the detention, no matter how brief. 
{¶ 37} Because the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction did not rise to 
the level of plain error, we reverse the First District’s decision to reverse and 
remand Steele’s abduction convictions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 38} We hold that the First District Court of Appeals correctly upheld 
Steele’s intimidation conviction, but incorrectly held that the definition of 
“privilege” provided by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas constituted 
plain error.  We therefore partially reverse and remand the decision to the First 
District Court of Appeals, for consideration of additional assignments of error that 
were mooted by its original holding. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
____________________ 
 
Daniel J. Breyer, Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-
appellee. 
Byron L. Potts & Co., L.P.A., and Gloria L. Smith, for appellee and cross-
appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Francisco E. Lüttecke, 
Assistant Public Defender, in support of neither party on behalf of amicus curiae, 
Ohio Public Defender. 
________________________