Case Title: Stout v. Madden

Citation: 208 Or. 294, 300 P.2d 461

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1956-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed July 31, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied September 19, 1956.
*295 Thomas H. Tongue, III, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Hicks, Davis & Tongue, and Walden Stout, Portland.
Howard K. Beebe, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Maguire, Shields, Morrison & Bailey, Portland.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, J.
This is an action by Lansing Stout against John R. Madden, dba Jolly John's, and Eddie Williams, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in being run down and injured by an automobile operated by defendant Williams and purchased by *296 Williams from defendant Madden. From an order of the trial court sustaining a motion for an involuntary nonsuit as to defendant Madden, plaintiff brings this appeal.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for defendant Williams, a minor, but no appearance was made by him or on his behalf. He was present during the trial, but not represented by counsel. No judgment has been entered against or in favor of Williams, and he is not a party to this appeal.
For the purposes of this opinion we will refer to defendant Eddie Williams as "Williams", and to the defendant John R. Madden, dba Jolly John's, as the "defendant."
The complaint charged that defendant was guilty of negligence, proximately causing plaintiff's injuries, as follows:
The defendant moved for an involuntary nonsuit as follows:
The trial court granted this motion, and the granting of this motion is plaintiff's sole assignment of error. "* * * In considering the propriety of these rulings, the motions must be regarded as having admitted the truth of plaintiff's evidence, and of every inference of fact that may be drawn from the evidence. The evidence itself must be interpreted in the light *298 most favorable to plaintiff. McCall v. Inter Harbor Nav. Co., 154 Or 252, 59 P2d 697. Where the evidence conflicts, the court may not infringe upon the function of the jury by seeking to weigh or evaluate it, but is concerned only with the question of whether or not there was substantial evidence to carry the case to the jury and to support the verdict." Fish v. Southern Pacific Co., 173 Or 294, 301, 143 P2d 917, 145 P2d 991.
On March 7, 1952, Williams purchased a certain 1950 Ford convertible automobile from defendant under a conditional sales contract. Williams and defendant testified that before Williams purchased the car, the defendant assured him that the car had been sent to the shop and that "it had been mechanically gone over completely, and it was in good shape. Not only the motor, but the entire mechanism of the car was in good shape." Later, on the day of the purchase, Williams attempted to stop the car at a stop light, and the brakes, both foot and emergency, failed to function. Williams coasted the car into a service station and had the attendant, Chester L. Toombs, check the brakes. Toombs testified that he looked underneath the car, observed considerable wet and caked brake fluid on the left front tire, wheel and brake drum and added braked fluid to the system. After adding fluid, the brakes operated satisfactorily up until March 16. Williams testified as to the events of that day:
The next brake failure occurred at the time of the accident on March 20, 1952. Williams described his activities prior to the accident as follows:
Liability of the manufacturer or vendor of a chattel for negligence to a remote vendee, or to anyone likely to use or come in contact with the chattel, has been the subject of increasing judicial attention. The decisions in this field were influenced by an asserted "general rule" that a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote vendee or *301 other person with whom he has had no contractual relation. This asserted general rule had its origin in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, decided in 1842. The complaint in that case was directed against the furnisher of a coach. It alleged that he had furnished an unsafe coach in violation of his contract, with the result that the coach broke down and hurt the plaintiff coachman. There was no allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant, and, since the plaintiff was not a party to the contract upon which he based his complaint, a demurrer rightfully was sustained. However, there was certain dictum in the opinion of Lord Abinger, C.B., to the effect that there could be no liability for negligence upon the defendant contractor for the basic reason that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant contractor. Lord Abinger set out the reason for his statement in 10 M&W, at p. 114:
The dictum of Lord Abinger was applied in several American cases: Davidson v Nichols, 11 Allen (Mass) 514; National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 US 195, 25 L ed 621; and became fixed as a common law rule of the law of negligence in both American cases and textbooks. As soon as the general rule became recognized, however, exceptions began to develop. The exceptions, for the most part, have stemmed from the case of Thomas v. Winchester, 6 NY 397, 57 AmDec *302 455, decided in 1852, wherein a manufacturing druggist falsely labeled poison; a sale was made to a druggist who in turn sold to the plaintiff, a customer. The customer recovered damages from the manufacturing druggist who negligently affixed the label. The court cited Winterbottom v. Wright, supra, with approval, but held that the general rule did not apply to the sale of a poisonous drug in place of a harmless medicine, a substance which was imminently dangerous. In Thomas v. Winchester, supra, p. 409, the court stated:
The exception was permitted to apply only in cases involving what has been described as "inherently dangerous" chattels, such as poisons, drugs, explosives, inflammable oils, and guns, articles or products which in and of themselves contained danger to human life and limb. However, the courts were not uniform in the application of the words "inherently dangerous." The phrases "intrinsically dangerous," "dangerous instrumentality," and "imminently dangerous" were adopted and applied with a variety of results. There was constant pressure to enlarge the concept of "inherently dangerous" chattels and to narrow the *303 things covered by the general rule of nonliability. This was accomplished largely by defining an "imminently dangerous" article as one which, although safe to be used for the purpose intended if properly constructed, by reason of its defective design or construction, may reasonably be apprehended to cause injury to anyone properly using the article for the purpose for which it was intended.
In Devlin v. Smith, 89 NY 470, 42 Am Rep 311, the exception was extended to a situation where a contractor built a scaffold for a painter. The painter's servants were injured and the contractor was held liable on the theory that, although a scaffold is not inherently dangerous, due to the negligent construction of that particular scaffold, it was imminently dangerous to human life, and the contractor breached a duty to make it safe which he owed to all who were likely to use it.
In Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 49 Minn 331, 51 NW 1103, 15 LRA 818, it was held that where a painter purchased from a manufacturer a stepladder, and one of the painter's employees was injured by the breaking of a step caused by the negligence of the manufacturer, the latter was liable to the employee.
Judge Sanborn in Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F 865, stated that the Devlin and Schubert cases were the only decisions in conflict with the general rule set out in Winterbottom v. Wright, supra. At page 867 of the opinion Judge Sanborn stated:
Judge Sanborn also stated, p. 870, that there were three exceptions to the rule:
The problems created by the rule and its exceptions are stated in 164 ALR 584:
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050, pointed the way toward a return to reliance on the fundamental principles of the common law of negligence, and to the abandonment of the general rule and its exceptions. In that case, a manufacturer sold an automobile equipped with a defective wheel to a dealer and was held liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, who purchased the car from the dealer, when the wheel collapsed. In his opinion, p. 385, Justice Cardozo *307 set forth the rule of liability in Thomas v. Winchester, supra, and stated:
He then extended this principle so as to apply generally, p. 389:
The doctrine set forth in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, is now of general acceptance. 2 Restatement 1073-1089, Torts §§ 394-402; Prosser, Torts, 206-210, 673-688. But we need not at this time, for the purposes of this case, determine whether the general rule of nonliability to persons not in privity of contract still exists or is to be denied in this state; see Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd., 319 Mass 92, 64 NE2d 693, 164 ALR 559; for the facts of this case place the plaintiff's rights clearly under the generally recognized and accepted exception to the general rule.
In Bogart v. Cohen-Anderson Co., 164 Or 233, 236, 98 P2d 720, we said:
While in Bogart v. Cohen-Anderson Co., supra, the relationship was that of bailor and bailee, the principle involved applies with equal force where the relationship is that of seller and purchaser.
1. There is ample evidence in the record to show that defendant should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, that the brakes were defective. Mr. Toombs, the service station attendant who added brake fluid to the car on the day it was purchased, testified that there was considerable caked and fresh brake fluid on the wheel and brake drum that could have been discovered easily by an external observation. Mr. Bissio, the mechanic who repaired the brakes after the accident, testified that the piston, rubbers, and cylinder walls were worn and scored, and there was sufficient testimony for the jury to *309 find that this condition existed to a great extent at the time of the sale. We feel that any reasonable man must have foreseen that the operation of this car on the crowded streets of Portland would bring it into contact with third parties, both motorists and pedestrians, who were using the streets and sidewalks. Thus a duty arose upon the part of the defendant to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to that class of third parties of which plaintiff was a member.
2, 3. It is well-established in this state that for a cause of action for negligence to exist there must be (1) a legal duty to use care, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) damage to the plaintiff which (4) was proximately caused by the breach. Schumann v. Bank of California, N.A., 114 Or 336, 233 P 860, 37 ALR 1531; Chambers v. Everding & Farrell, 71 Or 521, 136 P 885, 143 P 616. Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to establish a legal duty, and the fact that plaintiff suffered substantial injuries is not questioned. It is also clear that defendant breached his legal duty, but some difficulty arises in determining the nature of his breach. Defendant contends that the only duty imposed upon a used car dealer is to warn the purchaser of defects known to him or discoverable by a reasonable inspection, and that the only breach here involved is his failure to warn.
Plaintiff states his theory in his brief in the following language:
In 5 Am Jur 690, Automobiles § 349, it is stated that there is a conflict of authority on this point:
We do not believe there is an absolute duty to repair. A duty to third parties arises only when *311 danger to them reasonably may be foreseen. Where the dealer warns the purchaser of the defect, it, normally, would be unreasonable to foresee danger to third parties, for the dealer can rely on the purchaser to make the necessary repairs before operating it in public contrary to the laws of the state. However, where the purchaser is incompetent, notoriously reckless, or financially incapable of making the repairs, and the dealer is aware or as a reasonable man should be aware of these facts, then a warning is not sufficient. In other words, it is still foreseeable that third parties may be exposed to the danger and the dealer owes a duty which, under these circumstances, would be to repair the car, before selling it.
The duty is described in 42 ALR 1250, as follows:
This rule was adopted in Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis 196, 218 NW 855, 60 ALR 357, in which a dealer was held liable for injuries to a third person as a proximate result of defendant's negligence in selling a used car. The court held, p. 209:
In Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F2d 373, 375, 122 ALR 987, the court held:
The rule in the Egan case has been quoted and adopted in Jones et al. v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 *313 NC 693, 9 SE2d 395, and in McLeod v. Holt Motor Co., 208 Minn 473, 294 NW 479.
In O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 13 NJ 319, 335, 99 A2d 577, 586, a manufacturer of hooks used on tree climber's safety belts was held liable for injuries to the plaintiff incurred when a defective hook broke and the plaintiff fell. The court held:
In Bock v. Truck and Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash2d 458, 475, 139 P2d 706, 713, the court held:
Defendant points out that, in all the aforementioned cases, there was no evidence that the interviewing purchaser acquired knowledge of the defect, and contends, therefore, that the statements in these cases, that a dealer owes a duty to repair, are dicta for the holdings can be sustained on the theory that the dealer failed to warn. While defendant's observation is correct, we do not agree with his resultant contention. As stated before, it is true in the normal case, that there is no duty to repair where the dealer warns the purchaser of the defects. In that case it is not foreseeable that third parties will be exposed to any danger. But where the dealer represents the car to be in good condition, or where the dealer warns *314 a purchaser who probably will not repair the defect before operating the car on the public streets, it becomes foreseeable that third parties may be injured. Failure to warn gives rise to the duty to third persons. To fulfill this duty, dealers, in the exercise of reasonable care, must repair the defects and make the automobile safe.
4, 5. Although there was sufficient substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that defendant was negligent in failing to repair the defective brakes, there must be evidence that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries before defendant can be held liable. Defendant contends that the accident was due to the negligence of Williams in failing to repair the brakes after learning of the defect; that any negligence on defendant's part was insulated by the negligence of Williams, and the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was no fault of defendant's.
Plaintiff contends that defendant's negligence was established as the proximate cause of the accident since, but for that negligence, the accident would not have happened. Plaintiff cites State of Oregon v. Berry and Walker, 204 Or 69, 80, 267 P2d 993, 267 P2d 995, 282 P2d 344, 282 P2d 347, which quotes from Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, Rev Ed, § 39, as follows:
Plaintiff neglects that part of the rule which requires a legal cause to be an efficient one. In Wheeler v. *315 Nickels, 168 Or 604, 612, 126 P2d 32, we approved a quotation from 1 Beven, Negligence in Law, 3 ed, 155:
The general rule for determining proximate cause is set out in 38 Am Jur 729, Negligence § 72:
Elsewhere, this authority notes the conditions upon this general rule, (1) that the intervening actor shall be a conscious agency and (2) that his conduct could not have been reasonably anticipated. Discussing this phase of the question, this text reads at p. 731:
This rule was adopted and applied in a case similar to the one at bar in Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn 392 401, 192 SW2d 840, 844, 164 ALR 364, wherein the court held:
It hardly can be denied that Williams was negligent. He operated an automobile on the public streets without efficient brakes and thus became guilty of negligence per se by violating § 115-376a, OCLA, now ORS 483.444. No duty evolved upon Williams at the time of the sale to inspect the brakes.
In Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra, p. 201, it was held:
In the case at bar, defendant represented to Williams that the car had been reconditioned and was in good operating condition. He reasonably should have foreseen that Williams would operate the car in the condition in which he received it without conducting an inspection.
Plaintiff contends that even though Williams' negligence, after knowledge of the defective condition of the car, constituted an independent, efficient and conscious act, defendant remains liable on the grounds that he reasonably should have foreseen that Williams would continue to drive after discovering the defective brakes. His basis for this contention is that (1) the car was a "hot rod"; it had dual exhausts, was "blacked out" (the chrome had been removed), and was equipped with a 1948 Mercury motor; (2) anyone interested in this car would be a "hot rod" driver, and it is common knowledge that "hot rod" drivers are, as a class, notoriously given to taking chances with the safety of themselves and others; (3) Williams wore a mustache; (4) Williams was financially incapable of repairing the brakes; (5) Williams was only 19 years old; (6) Williams' driver's license had been suspended due to his failure to furnish proof of financial responsibility in connection with one of three previous accidents.
We do not believe the evidence is sufficient to charge the defendant with negligence in selling to Williams. Defendant was not aware of all the facts *318 mentioned above at the time of the sale. We find no evidence to support an inference that Williams was a "hot rod" driver. He used the car to go to and from work. He testified that he was interested in the car because it had a new motor "which would last longer than the original motor would." Although Williams was only 19 years old, he was a married man, the father of one child, and was a high school graduate. He held two jobs and was earning $235 per month. The cost of the brake repairs would have been only $10 or $11. He had owned three automobiles prior to the purchase of this one. There was no evidence offered that he was at fault in any of his three prior accidents, or that defendant knew of the facts surrounding these accidents. It would have been error to have submitted this issue to the jury.
The car involved in the case at bar had no emergency brake or horn, and the foot brakes were defective. The absence of the horn could not have been the proximate cause of the accident for the evidence is uncontroverted that Williams did not see plaintiff before the accident and made no effort to sound the horn in warning. Williams was aware of the fact that the emergency brake was useless before the accident occurred. Although it may have been reasonably foreseeable that Williams would drive the car without an emergency brake so long as he was not conscious of the defective foot brakes, we do not believe, as held above, that it was foreseeable that he would drive the car when he was conscious of the fact that the emergency brake was useless and that the foot brakes were so defective as to fail at any time.
The question that must be answered in determining *319 whether Williams' negligence superseded that of respondent is whether Williams was conscious of the dangerous defect in the foot brake system and of the risk involved.
This issue was considered in Ford Motor Co. et al. v. Wagoner, supra, and was the basis for the decision that the defendant manufacturer was not liable. In that case defendant Ford Motor Company sold an automobile to the Volunteer Motor Co., one of defendant's sales agencies. Volunteer Motor Co. sold the car to Norman, one of its salesmen, who used it as a demonstrator. After driving the car some 10,000 miles, Norman severed his connections with Volunteer Motors and sold the car to one Baxendale. Shortly after this model was put upon the market, the attention of defendant was called to the fact that the hood catch, with which these cars were equipped, was defective and would come loose upon subjection to a sever jolt, and immediately defendant supplied its agencies with auxiliary catches to be installed on all cars of this model. It was after Norman had severed connections with Volunteer Motors and before he sold the car to Baxendale that Norman was offered one of the auxiliary catches. He declined the offer. Plaintiff, a guest of Baxendale, was injured when the hood catch gave way and the hood flew up blinding the driver, and an accident resulted. The jury found for the defendant, but the court of appeals reversed. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's judgment for defendant, stated at page 392:
*320 In the case before us, defendant represented to Williams that the car had been reconditioned and that the "working parts" were in good operating condition. The brakes failed on the day of the purchase and Williams had brake fluid installed. The brakes then functioned, and Williams testified that he thought the failure was due merely to the evaporation of the fluid. Nine days later, while Williams was operating the car, the brakes failed a second time. Williams testified:
Williams testified that, at that time, he knew there was something wrong more than just the evaporation of the fluid, but that he thought the brakes would last for six more days when he could take the car back to defendant. After the second failing, the brakes worked up to the time of the accident, which occurred four days later.
We do not believe that the fact that Williams continued to use the automobile after he discovered the brakes were defective, because he thought they would last six days, can be considered as a reasonable anticipation from the sale of the automobile to be guarded against by the seller. Williams knew the brakes were defective and subject to failure; to say that he could gamble as to the time and place of failure and the defendant then would be liable would, in effect, make the defendant an insurer of the conduct of Williams.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.