Case Title: Troyer v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Services, Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-17

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Troyer v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Services, Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation1986 WY 151722 P.2d 158Case Number: 86-17Decided: 07/14/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Earnest L. TROYER and 
Charlyne Troyer, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 
DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, Appellees (Defendants), Welding & 
Machine, Inc., Charles W. Emswiler, Dutton-Lainson, a Nebraska corporation 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

John E. 
Stanfield (argued), Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, John B. Speight, Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

Bruce A. 
Salzburg (argued), Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, Laramie, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE and 
URBIGKIT, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Ernest 
Troyer, a victim of multiple sclerosis, suffered back injuries when an elevator 
in his home malfunctioned. He brought suit against the seller of the elevator, 
the manufacturer of the component part which failed, and the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation of the Wyoming Department of Health and Social 
Services (division), which had procured and inspected the elevator on 
appellant's behalf. The district court granted the division's motion to dismiss 
with prejudice on grounds that the claim was barred by the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act (Claims Act). We must decide whether the "health care provider" 
exception to the Claims Act permits the claim against the division and in the 
alternative whether the Claims Act is unconstitutional under several provisions 
of the Wyoming and United States 
constitutions.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Since this is an appeal 
from a dismissal on the pleadings, we must accept the allegations in the amended 
complaint as true. Gates v. Richardson, Wyo., 719 P.2d 193 (1986). According to the 
amended complaint, appellant entered into a program with the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation to assist him in his saw-sharpening business. It was 
difficult for appellant to go from his garage to his workshop in a wheelchair 
because the garage was situated above the workshop. The division, therefore, 
agreed to help him select, install and finance an 
elevator.

[¶3.]     The division insisted 
that appellant solicit bids; and he did so, receiving them from both the Otis 
Elevator and Montgomery Elevator companies. But, because these bids exceeded 
budget limitations, the division asked appellant to get a third bid; and he 
complied. This bid, from Charles W. Emswiler and Welding & Machine, Inc. 
(Emswiler), was lower than the other two; and the division accepted 
it.

[¶4.]     In the process of 
constructing the elevator, Emswiler selected and installed a Strongarm Electric 
Winch, manufactured by the Dutton-Lainson Company. The winch contained a warning 
label which stated: "CAUTION 1. NOT FOR MOVING HUMANS. NEVER USE IN APPLICATION 
WHERE PERSONS WOULD BE POSITIONED ON OR UNDER THE LOAD." Emswiler cut off the 
warning label and ignored it. The division paid Emswiler for the elevator after 
a division representative inspected it. 

[¶5.]     On July 17, 1984, when 
appellant was sitting in his wheelchair in the elevator, the winch failed, and 
the elevator fell to the ground. Appellant suffered several compression 
fractures of his vertebrae and other special and general damages. He filed a 
complaint against Emswiler on January 14, 1985, and submitted a claim to the 
division on July 10, 1985. After the claim was rejected by the division, 
appellant amended his complaint by adding both the division and the 
manufacturer, Dutton-Lainson Company, as defendants.

[¶6.]     The division filed a 
motion to dismiss on October 3, 1985, on grounds that the claim was barred by 
the Claims Act. The district court agreed and ordered a dismissal with prejudice 
on December 16. The court certified, under Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P., that there was 
no just cause for delay, so the dismissal became immediately appealable even 
though all the claims had not been adjudicated.

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
the Claims Act does not bar his action against the division because the health 
care provider exception of § 1-39-110, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, applies. In 
the alternative, he argues that the Claims Act violates Art. 1, § 8 and Art. 10, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution as well as the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

THE GOVERNMENTAL CLAIMS 
ACT

[¶8.]     The parties agree that 
unless one of the exceptions to the Governmental Claims Act applies, this action 
against the State is barred by § 1-39-104(a), W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985, which 
provides in part:

"A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112."

The only 
exception argued by appellant is found in § 1-39-110, supra, which 
states:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of health care providers who are employees of 
the governmental entity while acting within the scope of their 
duties."

The plaintiff's 
claim can withstand a motion to dismiss under this exception only if, under the 
plaintiff's allegations: (1) the division employees who caused his harm were 
health care providers; and (2) they were acting within the scope of their duties 
when they caused it.

[¶9.]     Under the broad 
definition of "scope of duties" found in § 1-39-103(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985, an employee acts within the scope of his duties when he 
performs

"any duties which a governmental entity 
requests, requires or authorizes a public employee to perform * * 
*."

The division 
personnel were authorized by their employer to purchase and inspect the elevator 
and were, therefore, acting within the scope of their 
duties.

[¶10.]  The critical question presented for our 
determination is whether, under § 1-39-110, supra, the employees who allegedly 
caused appellant's harm were health care providers. Normally, a plaintiff should 
name the particular governmental employees in his complaint so that the court 
can determine whether they were health care providers. See Comment, Wyoming's Governmental 
Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions - A Statutory Analysis, 15 Land 
& Water L.Rev. 619, 631 (1980). But appellant has not done so. Throughout 
his claim, he consistently directs his allegations to the "State of Wyoming," by which he 
means the division. Specific employees are mentioned in only two places in the 
amended complaint; and, even then, the references are too vague to identify them 
as health care providers.1 

[¶11.]  Appellant contends that the division's 
general responsibility is health care; and, therefore, all of its employees must 
be classified as health care providers regardless of whether they were providing 
health care at the time of the incident causing his harm. We cannot accept this 
argument. Section 1-39-110, supra, does not focus on the general roles of 
agencies, departments, divisions or other subdivisions of the State. By its 
terms, the exception focuses upon the employees. They are the ones who must be 
health care providers for the exception to apply, and that is true even though 
the State may be vicariously liable for the acts of its 
employees.

[¶12.]  Appellant's second argument is that the 
particular division employees, whoever they were, acted as health care providers 
when they arranged for his elevator; and, because they acted as health care 
providers, they were health care 
providers for purposes of the statutory exception. We agree with appellant's 
logic, but we must examine the correctness of the premise before we can accept 
the conclusion. We must ascertain whether the division employees acted as health 
care providers when they supervised the purchase of the 
elevator.

[¶13.]  The term health care provider is not 
defined in the definition section of the Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-103, 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, and we are faced with a challenge similar to the one 
that confronted us in Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 
(1985). In that case, we had to interpret the term "law enforcement officer" as 
used in § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985, without the benefit of a 
statutory definition. We started our analysis with the proposition 
that

"[i]f possible, words 
contained in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning." 
Id. at 1132. 
See also State v. Stovall, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 543, 544 
(1982).

[¶14.]  Appellant contends in his brief that the 
term health care provider is ambiguous, but he has not offered any statutory 
provisions in the Claims Act which give it two possible meanings. In fact, there 
is no reason why the plain and ordinary dictionary meaning of the term is 
impossible to apply. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(1981), the noun "care" means "responsibility for or attention to safety and 
wellbeing." When used as an adjective, "health" means "of, relating to, or 
engaged in welfare work directed to the cure and prevention of disease." 
"Disease" is defined as

"an impairment of the 
normal state of the living animal or plant body or of any of its components that 
interrupts or modifies the performance of the vital functions, being a response 
to environmental factors, * * * to specific infective agents, * * * to inherent 
defects of the organism, * * * or to combinations of these 
factors."

Summarizing and 
combining these ordinary definitions, a health care provider is one who cures or 
prevents impairments of the normal state of the body.

[¶15.]  When the division employees financed and 
inspected the elevator, they were not attempting to cure or prevent appellant's 
multiple sclerosis. They were merely providing a means of transportation which 
enabled him to work despite the disease. Appellant argues that by allowing him 
to work, the elevator combatted his feelings of uselessness and thereby became a 
crucial part of his health care program. But this argument proves too much. 
Under this analysis, any kind of vocational training, business loan, or other 
governmental largess given an unemployed person with a partially debilitating 
disease would be classified as health care because it would improve his mental 
outlook.

[¶16.]  Appellant argues that this almost 
unlimited interpretation of the term health care provider would further the 
required liberal construction of the Claims Act. But we think his construction 
would go much further than the legislature anticipated.

"Although this act should 
be liberally construed, `* * * a liberal construction does not require that 
words be accorded a forced, strained, or unnatural meaning, or warrant an 
extension of the statute to the suppression of supposed evils or the 
effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes not referred to, nor indicated 
in any of the terms used.' Crawford, Construction of Statutes § 238 at 451-452 
(1940)." Hurst v. State, supra, 698 P.2d  at 1133; 
see also Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, Wyo., 651 P.2d 778 
(1982).

[¶17.]  The natural, unforced meaning of the term 
health care provider is evidenced by the legislature's definition of the similar 
phrase "providers of health care" in § 35-2-202(b), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, 
of the New Institutional Health Services Act:

"As used in W.S. 
35-2-203, `provider of health care' means a direct provider including a 
physician, dentist, nurse, podiatrist, optometrist, physician assistant or other 
physician supervised personnel, an individual primarily responsible for the 
administration of a health care facility or a person holding a fiduciary 
position in or receiving more than twenty percent (20%) of his annual income 
from:

"(i) Fees or other 
compensation from research or instruction in the provision of health 
care;

"(ii) Issuing individual 
or group health insurance policies or contracts or hospital or medical service 
benefits;

"(iii) Entities providing 
health care or related research or instruction; or

"(iv) Entities producing 
drugs or other articles for individuals or entities providing health care or 
research in the provision of health care."

While this 
definition is not necessarily dispositive, it does tend to support the 
definition of the term health care provider that we have recognized above. If 
there is a distinction, the term health care provider, as used in the Claims 
Act, is narrower than the term, "provider of health care," as used in the New 
Institutional Health Services Act. A health care provider under the Claims Act 
is an employee, not an agency or institution, and is probably no more than the 
"direct provider" referred to at the beginning of § 35-2-202(b), W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1985. In any event, the division employees were not providing health 
care to appellant under either definition and were not health care providers. 
The exception of § 1-39-110, supra, does not apply to appellant's action; and it 
is, therefore, barred by the Governmental Claims Act unless that entire act is 
unconstitutional.

THE WYOMING 
CONSTITUTION

Article 1, Section 
8

[¶18.]  Appellant contends that the Claims Act 
violates Art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution which 
states:

"All courts shall be open 
and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have 
justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against 
the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law 
direct."

Under 
appellant's interpretation, this constitutional provision guarantees the right 
to sue the State subject only to certain procedural limitations. This same 
interpretation was put forth by Justice Rose in his dissent in Worthington v. State, Wyo., 598 P.2d 796, 809-812 (1979), where he 
stated:

"I would * * * hold that 
Article 1, Section 8, clearly implies a restriction on the legislature's power 
to modify the State's amenability to sue, and that any legislation which goes 
beyond procedures or venue is illegitimate legislation." Id. at 
812.

[¶19.]  A majority of this court carefully 
considered Justice Rose's position and rejected it. After analyzing the cases in 
which other state courts construed similar constitutional provisions, Justice 
Guthrie, writing for the majority, concluded that

"[t]he constitutional 
provision here considered can hardly be construed as anything but a delegation 
to the legislature of the power to regulate the entire field and not an 
invitation to the courts to invade that domain." Id. at 804.

Appellant has 
not raised any new points or authorities which were not considered in the 
majority's analysis in Worthington v. State, supra, and we decline to 
overrule that decision. The Claims Act does not violate Art. 1, § 8 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution.

Article 10, Section 
4

[¶20.]  Appellant also argues that the Claims Act 
violates Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution which 
provides:

"No law shall be enacted limiting the amount 
of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person. 
Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages 
for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. As to all extra 
hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation 
and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as 
may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured 
in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as the result of 
such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence 
of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be accumulated, paid into the 
state treasury and maintained in such manner as may be provided by law. The 
right of each employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and 
shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer 
contributing as required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons 
by reason of any such injuries or death." (Emphasis 
added.)

According to 
appellant, the elimination of his cause of action amounts to a limitation on his 
damages because, if there is no cause of action, no damages will be recoverable. 
This argument was explicitly rejected in Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 
641 P.2d 1235 (1982), where we held that the legislature's limits on causes of 
action against co-employees, codified in § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, did not 
violate Art. 10, § 4. We stated:

"The fact that the first 
sentence of Art. 10, § 4 relates only to the amount of damages is exemplified by 
the second sentence which pertains to the `right to recover.' A `limitation in 
amount' and a `right to recover' were regarded as separate issues and treated 
separately by the framers of the Wyoming Constitution. See Journal and Debate of 
the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, pp. 443-454 and 614-616 (1889). The 
plain language of [the] first sentence and its ordinary meaning reflect its 
prohibition to be against laws limiting the `amount of damages.' Section 
27-12-103(a) does not do that. This fact is determinative of the 
constitutionality of [the] section insofar as Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution is concerned. Furthermore, if the first sentence of Art. 10, § 4, 
were given the broad application urged by appellee, it would conflict with, and 
would make enactments impermissible on, such subjects as comparable negligence, 
statutes of limitation, contribution among joint tortfeasors, etc." (Footnote 
omitted.) Meyer v. Kendig, supra, 641 P.2d  at 1239.

[¶21.]  The reasoning expressed in this quotation 
is still sound. Art. 10, § 4 may prevent the legislature from imposing arbitrary 
limits on damages, but it does not prevent limitations on the types of actions 
which may be brought against the State.

THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT

Equal 
Protection

[¶22.]  Appellant claims in his brief 
that

"[t]he true issue is 
whether the total denial of any remedy[,] solely because of the identity of the 
wrongdoer[,] offends the Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution * * *." 

Appellant has 
not satisfied his substantial burden of proving the claimed constitutional 
infirmity.

"When the 
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, we are governed by the following 
standards:

"`Statutes are presumed 
to be constitutional unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, and one who 
would deny the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. The alleged 
unconstitutionality must be clearly and exactly shown beyond any reasonable 
doubt.'" Meyer v. Kendig, supra, 641 P.2d  at 1238 (citing Stephenson v. Mitchell 
ex rel. Workmen's Compensation 
Department, Wyo., 569 P.2d 95, 97 (1977)).

[¶23.]  Appellant provides us with no equal 
protection analysis. He refers us to a law review article by Professor David 
Minge and several state court decisions. Professor Minge's analysis is limited 
to several bald assertions followed by a case citation as 
follows:

"Tort immunity denies 
justice, damages private property without compensation or due process of law, 
and denies persons injured by public wrongs protection equal to that afforded 
those injured by private wrongs. * * * An intermediate Ohio court recently 
granted recovery against the state on the basis of the equal protection clause, 
but neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the right to justice arguments have 
been used as a basis of recovery in other jurisdictions." (Footnotes omitted.) 
D. Minge, Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming, 7 Land & 
Water L.Rev. 229, 238 (1972).

These assertions 
are insufficient to show an equal protection violation 
because

"one who contests the 
constitutionality of a statute must do more than make bald assertions of what he 
thinks is discriminatory. The party urging the statute to be unconstitutional 
must demonstrate that proposition beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citations 
omitted.) Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 821, 824 
(1980).

Moreover, the 
case cited by Professor Minge is not support for the statement cited because it 
was overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court which held that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity does not violate the equal protection clause. Krause v. 
State, 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, 745, 
appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 1052, 93 S. Ct. 557, 34 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1972).

[¶24.]  After discussing Professor Minge's 
article, appellant launches into a discussion of how immunity has been held 
unconstitutional by various state courts. But only one of the state cases he 
cites actually involves federal constitutional problems with sovereign 
immunity.2 That case, White v. State, 
Mont., 661 P.2d 1272, 1274-1275, 43 A.L.R.4th 1 (1983), constitutes the only cogent 
argument presented by appellant in support of his equal protection 
claim.

[¶25.]  The Montana statute challenged in White v. State, 
supra, barred a plaintiff from recovering any non-economic damages in a suit 
against the State, and it limited his recovery of economic damages to $300,000. 
White v. State, supra, 661 P.2d  at 1274. According to the supreme court, this 
statute classified plaintiffs according to the identity of the tortfeasor and 
discriminated against those who happened to sue a governmental tortfeasor. The 
court decided that because the right infringed (the right to bring a valid cause 
of action for personal injuries), was fundamental, the classification scheme had 
to satisfy a compelling state interest. The State's interest in preserving its 
funds for the benefit of the taxpayers was not compelling, the court concluded, 
and, therefore, tort plaintiffs should not be treated unequally based on the 
identity of the defendant.

[¶26.]  We disagree with the Montana court's unique 
premise that the right to sue a particular defendant is fundamental. The supreme 
courts of Alaska and Colorado, to name but 
two, have held that "the interest in suing a particular party, in this case a 
governmental entity, is not fundamental." Wilson 
v. Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (1983); see also Fritz 
v. Regents of University of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23, 25 (1978) (en banc).3 Without a suspect class or a 
fundamental right involved, we need only examine the classification to decide 
whether it is rationally related to a legitimate state objective. Meyer v. 
Kendig, supra, 641 P.2d  at 1239 (citing Washakie County School District Number 
One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (1980)).

[¶27.]  The sovereign immunity provided by the 
Claims Act does not create a classification system wholly unrelated to the 
purpose of the statute. On the contrary, the distinction it makes between those 
injured by the State and those injured by private defendants is a distinction 
based entirely on the statute's purpose of protecting public funds for broad 
public benefits, certainly a legitimate purpose. See § 1-39-102(a), W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1985. The two classes of plaintiffs "are not similarly situated and 
they may be treated differently." O'Dell v. School District of Independence, Mo., 521 S.W.2d 403, 409 (1975) (en banc); 
Krause v. State, supra, 285 N.E.2d 736; Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 341 A.2d 282, 285 (1975).

[¶28.]  Sovereign immunity, created by either 
statute or common law, has been attacked on equal protection grounds in almost 
every jurisdiction. The State cites 36 cases in its brief where the equal 
protection challenge has failed, and our research has disclosed at least ten 
more to the same effect. These courts have consistently held that sovereign 
immunity has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., 
Fritz v. Regents of University of Colorado, supra, 586 P.2d  at 25; Brown v. 
Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, 1025, appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 806, 97 S. Ct. 41, 50 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1976). White v. State, supra, 661 P.2d 1272, is the only case we have found which reaches the contrary 
result.

Due 
Process

[¶29.]  The Montana Supreme Court did not discuss 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in White v. State, supra. The 
only due process argument or authority in appellant's brief consists of the 
remarks of Professor Minge in his law review article, supra. These cursory 
remarks are insufficient to discharge the heavy burden imposed on a party 
attacking the constitutionality of a statute. See Meyer v. Kendig, supra, 641 P.2d  at 1238. We will not explore the due process argument except to note that 
the United States Supreme Court has minimized the impact of the due process 
clause on sovereign immunity in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S. Ct. 553, 557, 62 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1980):

"[E]ven if one 
characterizes the immunity defense as a statutory deprivation [of a property 
interest], it would remain true that the State's interest in fashioning its own 
rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except 
perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that 
is wholly arbitrary or irrational.

"We have no difficulty in 
accepting California's conclusion that there `is a 
rational relationship between the state's purposes and the 
statute.'"

[¶30.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant's two 
references to employees are:

"Defendant, State of 
Wyoming, 
personnel insisted that the amount of money for an elevator to be installed by 
Otis Elevator Company or Montgomery Elevator Company would be too great to 
provide such an elevator due to budget limitations."

"Before payment on the 
project, which was by State Voucher, dated March 15, 1982, the State of 
Wyoming, 
through a representative of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, inspected 
and used the elevator."

2 In one of the cases 
cited, Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 n. 14 (1975), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly noted:

"We have been urged to 
declare the doctrine of sovereign immunity to be unconstitutional as a violation 
of due process or equal protection. However, because of our belief that the 
legislature will recognize the fairness and wisdom of allowing a wrongfully 
injured party to be compensated for his injuries, we decline to consider these 
constitutional questions."

The other 
inapplicable cases cited by appellant are: Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 
55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Willis v. Dep't of 
Conservation and Economic Development, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Mayle v. 
Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709, 716-720 (1978); 
Pruett v. City of Rosedale, Miss., 421 So. 2d 1046 (1982); McCall by Andrews v. 
Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985); State v. Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 
470 A.2d 869 (1983).

3 Appellant has not 
alleged that the Claims Act discriminates against a suspect class, and the 
Montana court 
did not mention this possibility in its opinion. Therefore, it is not raised for 
our review in this case. We note, however, that there are no distinctions in the 
Claims Act based on the characteristics of the plaintiffs. The act applies 
equally to every person who suffers tortious injury at the hands of the State. 
Therefore, there is no suspect classification that would trigger a search for a 
compelling state interest.