Case Title: Shaffer v. Victoria Station

Citation: 588 P.2d 233, 91 Wash. 2d 295

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1978-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
91 Wn.2d 295 (1978) 588 P.2d 233 DANIEL R. SHAFFER, Petitioner, v. VICTORIA STATION, INC., ET AL, Respondents. No. 45449. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. December 28, 1978. *296 Jones, Grey & Bayley and Charles F. Vulliet, for petitioner. Merrick, Hofstedt & Lindsey and Andrew C. Gauen, for respondents. DOLLIVER, J. On March 26, 1974, plaintiff Shaffer ordered a glass of wine at the Victoria Station, a restaurant operated by defendant. In the course of taking his first or second sip, the wine glass broke in Mr. Shaffer's hand, resulting in alleged permanent injury. Plaintiff brought this action based upon three theories: negligence, breach of implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code, and strict liability under the theory of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The manufacturer of the glass was named as a defendant, but was never served. Prior to trial, as counsel and the trial judge were discussing proposed instructions, plaintiff's attorney indicated that he could not prove negligence, and wished to submit the case to the jury on the grounds of breach of warranty and strict liability. Plaintiff then took a voluntary nonsuit on the negligence issue. At the same time, the court ruled the case sounded in negligence alone, and granted the defendant's motion for dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wn. App. 816, 572 P.2d 737 (1977). We reverse the Court of Appeals. Defendant argues the Uniform Commercial Code (RCW 62A) does not apply since the restaurant was not a merchant with respect to wine glasses as defined in RCW 62 A. 2-104 and, since the glass itself was not sold, there was no passing of title as required under RCW 62 A. 2-106. Plaintiff, however, points to RCW 62 A. 2-314 as being decisive. We agree. RCW 62 A. 2-314 reads, inter alia: [1] It is our opinion that, when the Uniform Commercial Code states "the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale" and that such food and drink must be "adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require", it covers entirely the situation before us. Plaintiff ordered a drink (a glass of wine) from defendant. Defendant sold and served the glass of wine to plaintiff to be consumed by plaintiff on the premises. The wine could not be served as a drink nor could it be consumed without an adequate container. The drink sold includes the wine and the container both of which must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which used. Plaintiff alleges the drink sold wine in a glass was unfit and has, therefore, stated a cause of action. In addition to the language of RCW 62 A. 2-314, we believe the language of RCW 62 A. 1-103 is applicable. It states: Plaintiff urges that cases which apply the Uniform Commercial Code where the goods are leased rather than sold (see, e.g., Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wn.2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971)), or are under a bailment for mutual benefit (see, *298 e.g., Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 271 Ore. 449, 533 P.2d 316 (1975)), be extended to the facts before us. We believe this is unnecessary. A more straightforward and less tortuous approach is that adopted in Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961). In that case, a bottle of milk delivered to the plaintiff's home shattered and cut the plaintiff's hand. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, relying on the Massachusetts sales act (which was not, as argued by defendant, significantly different in its applicable part from the Uniform Commercial Code), held at page 627, "In our view it is immaterial whether or not the property in the jug passed to the plaintiff." The court goes on to cite Geddling v. Marsh, (1920) 1 K.B. 668. In that case, a retailer received bottled mineral water from the manufacturer and was injured by an exploding bottle. The court found the bottles were not sold to the retailer but held the retailer could recover under a breach of an implied warranty of fitness. The court said at pages 671-72: *299 See also Sartin v. Blackwell, 200 Miss. 579, 28 So. 2d 222 (1946). Plaintiff has a cause of action both on the face of the statute and under the principles of case law elucidated above. We also hold an action lies under the strict liability theory of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The policy questions of strict liability and their application to retailers have been previously determined. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert Volkswagen of America, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). The only question remaining is whether section 402A applies to the transaction here. In addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals expressed concern over an uncontrollable broadening of the doctrine of strict liability: Shaffer, at 820-21. [2] We do not agree with the gloomy view of the Court of Appeals of the consequences of allowing the plaintiff to proceed with this action. We hold the sale of a glass of wine is subject to the strict liability provisions of section 402A. If their predictions as to future lawsuits come to pass, we will *300 deal with the litigation at that time. Confirmation of the applicability of section 402A to this case is given in comment h, which says: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment h at 352 (1965). Plaintiff has stated a cause of action under theories of implied warranty of fitness and strict liability. The Court of Appeals is reversed. WRIGHT, C.J., and ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, STAFFORD, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, and HICKS, JJ., concur.