Case Title: Yunker v. Quillan

Citation: 202 Or. 362, 275 P.2d 240

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1954-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed October 13, 1954.
Earl A. Fewless, of Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
E. Wayne Cordes, of Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Alexander G. Brown, City Attorney, and David R. Williams, of Portland.
Before LATOURETTE, Chief Justice, and WARNER, ROSSMAN and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Francis F. Yunker, from a judgment order of the circuit court which dismissed a writ of review issued upon his petition to the Honorable J.J. Quillin, one of the judges of the municipal court of the city of Portland, and to Mr. Dave Palmer, clerk of that court. The plaintiff-appellant submits this assignment of error:
*363 Immediately following that assignment of error the plaintiff's brief sets forth the following proposition in order to elucidate his contention:
The answer contained a copy of the complaint which had been filed against the plaintiff in the municipal court. Continuing, the brief declares:
From the foregoing, it appears that Mr. Yunker, the plaintiff, wishes to attack the sufficiency of the complaint which was filed against him in the municipal court of Portland. The complaint charged him with nothing more serious than a traffic violation. Mr. Yunker is a member of the Oregon Bar, and seemingly views this case as one which affords opportunity to effect clarification of a legal principle which engages his attention.
Although the plaintiff now takes the position which is indicated by the quoted language, the petition, which resulted in the issuance of the writ, did not aver the *364 grounds which the assignment of error and its clarifying proposition submit. Referring to his trial in the municipal court and the practice which was there employed, the petition charged:
In short, it was based upon a charge that no complaint whatever was ever filed in that case. Thus, the petition charged that, although no complaint was filed, nevertheless Mr. Yunker was adjudged guilty and was assessed with a penalty. ORS 34.030, which is a part of our laws governing the writ of review, says:
It is essential that the petition set forth "the errors alleged to have been committed" in the entry of the order which is under attack. It will be observed that the language just quoted twice makes the demand. We have noticed that the purported errors mentioned in the petition were supplanted, when the brief submitted to this court was prepared, with the contention which underlies the assignment of error and its accompanying proposition. Notwithstanding that fact, we will consider the contention advanced in the brief before us.
The complaint which the city filed against Mr. Yunker in the municipal court assumed the form commonly *365 known as a traffic ticket. The entries of an individual nature upon it were written by hand; the other entries are printed material. Following is a copy of the face of the complaint:
*366 Upon the reverse side of the complaint appears the jurat which shows that the complaining witness made oath to the complaint before the defendant Palmer, clerk of the municipal court. The reverse side identifies ordinance 75,607 by quoting its title. Further, the reverse side contains a list of abbreviations and their meaning which indicates that "Dis. Sig." means "disregard signal."
Section 3-807, Administrative Code of the City of Portland, says:
ORS 156.030 provides:
ORS 132.520 says:
In 1942 Mr. George Warren, on behalf of the National Conference of Judicial Councils and the National Committee on Traffic Law Enforcement, made a *367 nation-wide survey of traffic courts, with the objective in view of improving their procedure and elevating their standard. His study eventually assumed the form of a volume entitled "Traffic Courts" which the Judicial Administrative Series published as a public service. Mr. Warren's text in the volume is preceded by a foreword contributed by the Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, who is now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. We take the following from the volume (pp. 44-45):
Although lawyers, in writing pleadings, display a peculiar affection for the dead language of the law, a layman who faces a charge of a traffic violation, such as speeding, receives superior information if the complaint charges "speeding" than if it went on with accustomed verbosity to say, "The said defendant did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contrary to the ordinances in such cases made and provided, drive, propel and operate his vehicle, to-wit, an automobile, * * *."
When Mr. Yunker was confronted with the charge which the above-quoted complaint made against him, he did not ask for additional particulars. He plead not guilty. It appears to us that the complaint, in language which anyone who made reasonable effort could readily understand, charged disobedience to a traffic signal. In short, the complaint made that accusation "in ordinary and concise language * * * and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding *369 to know what" was intended. Mr. Yunker did not challenge the sufficiency of the complaint until he filed his petition for a writ of review; in fact, he did not attack its sufficiency even then. So far as we know, he found no fault in it until he prepared his assignment of error. We believe that the complaint was sufficient and that the assignment of error is without merit.
By expressing ourselves in the above manner we do not mean to minimize the gravity of the situation when a charge is filed against a motorist in a traffic court. Hundreds of citizens daily receive significant impressions of their government, of their courts and of the administration of justice through being summoned before such courts. The author of these lines knows whereof he speaks, for he was, for four and one-half years, himself judge of the municipal court of Portland. Thirty-seven years of service on the bench has made him realize that traffic charges many times touch the heart and pride of the accused, whereas a case in an appellate court frequently reaches nothing more important than the pocketbook. It is highly essential that traffic courts concern themselves, not only with the rights of the city, but also with the rights of the accused. They must apprise the accused adequately of the charge against him. But we know of no reason for believing that a citizen will obtain a better conception of the law in action and be more fully acquainted with the accusation if he hears the clerk of the court drone off a charge couched in legalistic terms, than if he is handed a traffic ticket which states the charge against him in terms which he readily understands.
Judgment affirmed.