Case Title: SANDON W. MORRIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0177

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
SANDON W. MORRIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 88210 P.3d 1101Case Number: No. S-08-0177Decided: 07/10/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
SANDON 
W. MORRIS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
Hill, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; Golden, J., writes separately concurring 
in part, dissenting in part.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Sandon W. Morris of felony property destruction.  He appeals the conviction claiming:  (1) the State presented insufficient 
evidence that he "knowingly" damaged the property; (2) plain error occurred when 
the district court failed to instruct the jury concerning the meaning of 
"knowingly;" and (3) the prosecutor incorrectly defined the term "knowingly" in 
closing argument and such argument constituted misconduct requiring reversal of 
his conviction.  His fourth 
contention is that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded 
restitution based upon the fair market value of the damaged property.  We reverse and remand on the basis of 
the prosecutor's misconduct in closing argument.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Morris 
presents the following issues:

 
 

1.             
The 
State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he "knowingly" damaged 
the property of another.

 
 

2.             
The 
trial court committed error in failing to instruct the jury on the element of 
"knowingly."

 
 

3.             
The 
trial court committed plain error in allowing the prosecutor to misdefine the 
element of "knowingly" to the jury.

 
 

4.             
The 
sentence improperly assessed restitution.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the night of 
June 20, 2007, C.P., a high school student, parked her 1994 Toyota Tercel in the 
parking lot of a McDonald's Restaurant in Evanston, Wyoming, while she and her 
boyfriend went "cruising" in his car.  
When her boyfriend returned to the parking lot later, he found her 
vehicle had been damaged.  C.P. 
reported the damage to the police department, and Patrol Sergeant Douglas 
Matthews investigated.

 
 
[¶4]      Sergeant Matthews 
inspected the vehicle and observed that the top of the car was caved in, there 
were scratches all over the hood, there were scuff marks and scratches on the 
trunk, and one of the quarter panels was kicked in.  Sergeant Matthews later spoke with Mr. 
Morris who said he could have been at McDonald's that night but did not damage 
any vehicles.  Sergeant Matthews 
also spoke with Randy Stone who said he saw Mr. Morris jump on the vehicle.  C.P. told Sergeant Matthews an 
automobile repair company estimated the cost of repairs at 
$2,394.98.

 
 
[¶5]      Based on the 
information Sergeant Matthews 
obtained, the State charged Mr. Morris with felony destruction of property in 
violation of the following statute:

 
 
§ 
6-3-201.  Property destruction and 
defacement; grading; penalties; aggregated costs or 
values.

 
 

(a)                       
A 
person is guilty of property destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, 
injures or destroys property of another without the owner's 
consent.

(b)                      
Property 
destruction and defacement is:

. 
. . .

(iii)  A 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the cost of 
restoring injured property or the value of the property if destroyed is one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201 (LexisNexis 2009).  
Mr. Morris entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.  A jury trial convened and concluded when 
the jury returned a guilty verdict.  
The district court sentenced Mr. Morris to serve two to four years, 
splitting the sentence so that he would serve one year in the Uinta County 
Detention Center and four years supervised probation.  The district court further ordered Mr. 
Morris to pay restitution to C.P. in the amount of 
$1,400.00.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.            
Sufficiency 
of the evidence that Mr. Morris "knowingly" destroyed 
property

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Morris claims 
that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the "knowingly" 
element of the crime.  In 
determining whether there was sufficient trial evidence to sustain a conviction, 
we apply the following standard of review:

 
 
            
[W]e examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable 
inferences which can be drawn from it.  
We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant.  We do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably 
concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This standard applies 
whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.  

 
 

Butz 
v. State, 
2007 WY 152, ¶ 10, 67 P.3d 650, 653 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court instructed the jury on the elements of the offense as 
follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Property Destruction and Defacement, where 
the cost of restoring the property is $1,000.00 or more, as charged in this case 
are:

 
 
1.         
On or about the 20th day of June, 
2007

2.         
In Uinta County, Wyoming

3.         
The Defendant, Sandon W. Morris

4.         
Knowingly defaced a 1994 Toyota Tercel belonging to 
[C.P.].

5.         
Without the consent of the owner.

6.         
And the cost of restoring the defaced property is $1,000.00 or 
more.

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty of Property Destruction and Defacement where the cost of restoring the 
property is $1,000.00 or more.

 
 
If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty of Property Destruction and Defacement where the 
cost of restoring the property is $1,000.00 or more.

 
 
The 
district court also instructed the jury on the elements of the lesser included 
offense of destruction or defacement of property where the cost of restoring the 
property is less than $1,000.00, which is a misdemeanor.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court instructed the jury that the term "property' means anything of value 
whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, public or private."  The district court did not instruct the 
jury on the meaning of the term "knowingly" or how it was to be construed in the 
context of the remaining statutory language.  Mr. Morris contends that in order to 
prove that he knowingly defaced the vehicle, the State had to prove that when he 
jumped on the car, he knew he would damage it, intended to damage it, or was 
aware that he would damage it.  He 
asserts the State presented no evidence to show any of those things; rather, the 
State's evidence showed only that he was "goofing around," and the defacement 
was the unintended result of his horseplay.  Given the absence of any proof that he 
knew his act would deface the vehicle or that he had any intent at all to damage 
it, Mr. Morris contends the conviction cannot stand.

 
 
[¶9]      The State 
responds that the evidence showed Mr. Morris knowingly jumped on the vehicle, 
and that was all the evidence required to support a conviction under the 
statute.  The State contends it did 
not have to show that Mr. Morris was aware of the extent of the damage his 
actions would cause, and the jury reasonably inferred from the evidence that he 
knowingly defaced the property.

 
 
[¶10]   In addressing Mr. Morris' 
sufficiency of the evidence claim, it is necessary to interpret the property 
destruction statute.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law.  
Rogers v. State, 2008 WY 90, 
¶ 5, 189 P.3d 265, 266 (Wyo. 2008).  
If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we follow its plain 
meaning.  Id.  If it is ambiguous, we attempt to 
discern legislative intent by applying principles of statutory 
construction.  Id. 

 
 
[¶11]   As quoted above, § 6-3-201(a) 
provides that a person is guilty of property destruction or defacement if he 
"knowingly defaces, injures or destroys property."  We have said that the word "knowingly" 
does not have a technical meaning under the law separate from its ordinary 
meaning.  Butz, ¶ 20, 167 P.3d  at 655.  We further have said that the ordinary 
meaning of "knowingly" is "with awareness, deliberateness, or intention" as 
distinguished from inadvertently or involuntarily.  Id.  Applying the ordinary meaning of the 
word to the language contained in the statute, it is clear that Mr. Morris 
violated § 6-3-201(a) if, with awareness, deliberateness or intention, he 
defaced the vehicle; it likewise is clear that he did not violate the provision 
if he inadvertently or involuntarily defaced the vehicle.

 
 
[¶12]   During the trial, the State 
presented C.P.'s testimony that when she left her car in the McDonald's parking 
lot on June 20, 2007, there was one dent on the driver's side from when someone 
previously backed into her; otherwise, it was in good condition.  When she saw her car later that 
night:

 
 
[T]he 
roof was caved in and the quarter panel was kicked in.  And there was boot prints and handprints 
all over it.  It looked like 
somebody had slid down the front.

.

It 
looked like somebody had crawled on it, onto the trunk, sat on it with all of 
their weight, and then slid down the front.  It was just caved in 
completely.

 
 
C.P. 
testified that when she left her car in the parking lot that night, there were 
trucks parked in the lot and Mr. Morris was there with some of his friends.  Mr. Stone testified that he was in the 
McDonald's parking lot and saw Mr. Morris run from his brother's girlfriend and 
slide across the roof of the car.  
He testified they were goofing around; Mr. Morris was running from the 
girl " cuz he stole her soda.  And 
he slid across the top of the car."  
He testified he heard metal buckling as Mr. Morris slid across the 
roof.

 
 
[¶13]   Accepting this evidence and all 
reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it as true, and without 
considering conflicting evidence presented by Mr. Morris or substituting our 
judgment for that of the jury, we hold the jury reasonably could have concluded 
that the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Morris knowingly 
defaced, injured, or destroyed property belonging to C.P. without her 
consent.  The State presented 
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

 
 

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Morris contends that the 
district court committed fundamental error requiring reversal when it failed to 
instruct the jury as to the meaning of the term "knowingly."  He cites cases such as Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, 152 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2007) and Miller v. State, 
904 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1995) in which this Court has held that a jury must be 
instructed on every essential element of the offense charged.  Absent an instruction informing the jury as to the circumstances under 
which it could find that he knowingly destroyed or defaced the vehicle, he 
asserts his conviction must be reversed.  
The State contends the word "knowingly" does not have a technical meaning 
so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury would not understand it; 
therefore, the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the 
meaning of the word.

 
 
[¶15]   A trial court's failure to instruct 
on an element of a crime is not fundamental error requiring reversal, but rather 
a trial error.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, 
¶ 18, 193 P.3d 266, 272 (Wyo. 2008), abrogating Seymore.  When a defendant objects at trial to the 
failure to instruct, the harmless error standard governs this Court's review; 
when no trial objection was made, we review for plain error.  Id.  Because Mr. Morris did not object to the 
district court's jury instructions or offer an instruction of his own defining 
the word "knowingly," we review his claim for plain error.  Under the plain error standard, Mr. 
Morris must show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, the 
violation clearly appears in the record, and it resulted in denial of a 
substantial right to his material prejudice.  Granzer, ¶ 19, 193 P.3d  at 
272.

 
 
[¶16]   We previously have held in the 
context of other criminal statutes that the term "knowingly" does not have a 
technical meaning under the law separate from its ordinary meaning so as to 
require an instruction defining it.  
In Butz, ¶ 19, 167 P.3d  
at 655, we held no plain error occurred when the district court did not instruct 
the jury on the meaning of "knowingly and willfully" in the context of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(b) (LexisNexis 2009), the child endangerment statute.  In Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 24, 
29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo. 2001), we held no error, plain or otherwise, occurred when 
the district court failed to instruct the jury on the meaning of "knowingly" in 
the context of the indecent liberties statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 
(LexisNexis 2001).  From these 
cases, it would seem clear that the district court's failure to instruct on the 
meaning of the word "knowingly" was not plain error.

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Morris argues, however, that 
the mental state required to commit the offense charged is an essential element 
of the crime.  He cites cases in 
which we have said that the test for whether the jury has been instructed on the 
necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the instruction "leaves no 
doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been 
committed."  Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 940 
(Wyo. 1997); Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1995).  He 
asserts that the jury instruction in his case left doubt as to whether the jury 
had to find that he knew he was jumping on the car or, instead, knew that in 
jumping on the car, he would cause damage.

 
 
[¶18]   Whether or not Mr. Morris' argument 
would have merit in a different context, it does not establish plain error 
because it does not show that the district court violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.  In light 
of our precedent holding that the word "knowingly" is not a technical term 
requiring an instruction on its meaning, and the lack of any established rule 
requiring an instruction on the meaning of "knowingly," Mr. Morris cannot 
establish plain error.

 
 

3.            
Allowing 
Prosecutor to Define "Knowingly"

 
 
[¶19]   During closing argument, the 
prosecutor stated as follows:

 
 
What 
does the State have to show other than who did it?  That is that he knowingly defaced the 
property of another person.  Now, we 
don't have an instruction on knowingly.  
The reason for that is there's not really a pattern instruction.  But Black's Law Dictionary has defined 
it and it has told us that it is a person who knew what he was about to do and 
with that knowledge, proceeded to do it.  
So we're not talking about somebody who's unconscious or somebody who 
didn't realize what his actions would have resulted in.  Somebody who intentionally acted in a 
manner that he did with knowledge of what he was doing.  So he didn't have to intend to cause 
damage.  He didn't have [to] intend 
to be malicious.  He didn't have to 
intend to be mean.  He had to know 
that he was stepping on a car and that is it.  He knew what he was 
doing.

 
 
Mr. 
Morris asserts that it was plain error for the prosecutor to instruct the jury 
that, according to the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "knowingly," the 
State had to prove only that he knowingly jumped on the car in order to meet its 
burden of proving that he "knowingly" defaced it.  He cites cases in which courts have held 
that it is the trial court's duty to instruct the jury on matters of law and 
improper for counsel to do so.  He 
also contends the prosecutor committed plain error because the statement was 
inaccurate in two respects:  First, 
Black's Law Dictionary does not define "knowingly" the way the prosecutor stated 
and, second, the plain language of § 6-3-201(a) required the State to prove that 
he jumped on the car knowing it would cause damage.  Our ultimate conclusion that the verdict 
might have been different but for the prosecutor's misstatement may seem 
inconsistent with our holding that sufficient evidence supported the 
conviction.  However, in the 
discussion above we concluded only that "knowingly" did not require further 
definition for the jury to comprehend its meaning.  The issue of whether the quoted argument 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct requires an entirely different 
analysis.  In considering the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we looked only at the evidence the State presented 
and did not consider the impact of closing arguments. Accepting the State's 
evidence as true, we concluded the jury reasonably could have inferred Mr. 
Morris was aware the vehicle would sustain damage if he jumped on it.  In considering the prosecutorial 
misconduct issue, however, we evaluated all of the evidence presented in light 
of the prosecutor's closing argument.  
Evaluated from that perspective, we will conclude that a reasonable 
probability exists that the jury convicted Mr. Morris because it believed 
evidence that he acted inadvertently required a finding of guilt.  That proposition is not correct as a 
matter of law.

 
 
[¶20]   The State responds that the 
prosecutor's recitation of the law dictionary definition of the term "knowingly" 
did not amount to an instruction on the law, there is no clear rule of law 
prohibiting such argument, and Mr. Morris has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by the statement.  The 
State asserts that the prosecutor used the dictionary definition merely as a 
rhetorical device to convey the plain and ordinary meaning of 
"knowingly."

 
 
[¶21]   Because no objection was made at 
trial, we review for plain error, requiring Mr. Morris to demonstrate that the 
record clearly reflects that the prosecutor made the statement, the statement 
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and Mr. Morris was denied a 
substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Evenson v. State, 177 P.3d 819, 823 
(Wyo. 2008).  We will reverse if 
there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the appellant if the error had not occurred.  Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct 
are evaluated within the context of the entire record and the argument as a 
whole.  Id.

 
 
[¶22]   It is clear from the record that 
the prosecutor made the statement giving rise to Mr. Morris' claim.  Therefore, Mr. Morris has shown the 
first prong of plain error.  As we 
have discussed, the plain language of § 6-3-201 required the State to prove that 
Mr. Morris knowingly, that is, with awareness, deliberateness or intention, 
defaced the vehicle.  Evidence that 
Mr. Morris inadvertently defaced the vehicle would not have been sufficient to 
support a conviction under the statute.  
We agree with Mr. Morris that the prosecutor misstated the law when she 
told the jury that all the State had to show was that he jumped on the car, and 
that it did not have to show that he intended to damage it.  Giving the words their plain meaning, 
the statute required proof that Mr. Morris deliberately damaged the vehicle or 
intended that result.  Mr. Morris 
has demonstrated the second requirement for plain error.

 
 
[¶23]   Evaluating the statement within the 
context of the entire record, we further conclude that Mr. Morris has 
demonstrated that he was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced 
him.  Considering the State's 
evidence -- Mr. Morris was goofing around and stole a girl's soda; she chased 
him and he ran from her, sliding across the roof of C.P.'s car in the process -- 
there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to Mr. Morris, but for the prosecutor's misstatement to the 
jury.  Had the prosecutor not told 
the jury that all the State had to prove was that Mr. Morris jumped on the 
vehicle, and that it did not have to prove he intended to cause damage, there is 
a reasonable probability that it would have concluded from the State's evidence 
that his act was inadvertent and he was not guilty of property destruction.  Mr. Morris has demonstrated that plain 
error resulted from the prosecutor's misstatement, and for that reason his 
conviction must be reversed.

 
 

 
 
[¶24]   Our conclusion that Mr. Morris' 
conviction must be reversed also requires that we reverse the underlying 
sentence.  Nonetheless, we will 
comment briefly on this matter as it may arise again on reversal.  Mr. Morris' claim is that the district 
court erred in ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $1,400.00, the 
estimated value of the vehicle before the damage.  He contends that the amount did not 
account for the fact that C.P. continued to drive the car and it retained value 
after the damage.  The State 
responds that the vehicle's fair market value was the appropriate measure for 
the restitution award.

 
 
[¶25]   A sentencing court has statutory 
authority to "fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for 
actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b) (LexisNexis 
2009).  "Pecuniary damages" are 
defined in pertinent part as "all damages which a victim could recover against 
the defendant in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event[.]" Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009).  We review factual challenges to district 
court orders awarding restitution for abuse of discretion.  Glover v. State, 2007 WY 169, ¶ 5, 
169 P.3d 553, 555 (Wyo. 2007).  An 
order awarding restitution should be supported by sufficient evidence to afford 
a reasonable basis for estimating the loss.  Id.

 
 
[¶26]  The only evidence presented at trial 
concerning the vehicle's value was that C.P. paid $1,200.00 for it two years 
earlier when it had approximately 140,000 miles on it.  The State requested restitution in the 
amount of $1,400.00 based upon the 2007 Kelly Blue Book value for a car of the 
same year, make and model in fair condition.  Although evidence of the Blue Book value 
was not presented at trial, defense counsel conceded at the sentencing hearing 
that he did not object to the $1,400.00 request contained in the pre-sentence 
investigation (PSI).  He argued, 
however, that restitution based upon the vehicle's fair market value did not 
account for the fact that C.P. still had the vehicle and was driving it.  It is not clear from the record whether 
the district court ordered Mr. Morris to pay the $1,400.00 because defense 
counsel did not object to the PSI on that basis or because it concluded the fair 
market value was the appropriate measure of restitution.

 
 
[¶27]   From our review of the hearing 
transcript, we conclude that defense counsel did not waive the issue by his 
failure to object to the PSI because he sufficiently placed it before the 
sentencing court by challenging the appropriateness of the amount at the 
sentencing hearing.  Compare Chippewa v. State, 2006 WY 11, ¶ 7, 
126 P.3d 129, 131 (Wyo. 2006), holding that the defendant waived the right to 
contest a restitution award when he voluntarily accepted the restitution amount 
as part of his plea agreement and failed to present specific argument 
challenging the appropriateness of the amount at the sentencing 
hearing.

 
 
[¶28]   The determination of "actual 
pecuniary damage" within the meaning of § 7-9-101(a)(iii) is usually a fairly 
simple and direct calculation based upon fair market value, or some other 
similar test.  Bush v. State, 2003 WY 156, ¶ 14, 
79 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Wyo. 2003).  In 
the context of a civil action, we said that when property is not entirely 
destroyed, but partially damaged, the proper measure of damages is its value 
before the damage less its value after the damage.  Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 715 Wyo. 
1985).  See also, City of Kemmerer v. Wagner, 866 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wyo. 1993) (reminding the parties that when the injury to real 
property is of a permanent character, or cannot be repaired except at great 
expense, the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the 
property before and after the injury).

 
 
[¶29]   Should this same issue arise in any 
proceedings upon remand, the district court must take into account the 
prevailing law summarized above.

 
 
[¶30]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 
[¶31]   I concur in the disposition of 
Issue 2.  I perceive no error in the 
jury instructions.

 
 
[¶32]   I also agree that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain Morris' conviction.  
I disagree, however, with the majority opinion's reasoning on this 
issue.  I believe the majority 
opinion blurs the distinction between general intent and specific intent 
crimes.  This Court has consistently 
ruled that criminal statutes that include the mental element "knowingly" are 
general intent crimes.  See, e.g., Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 14, 167 P.3d 650, 654 (Wyo. 2007) ("knowingly and willfully" exposing a child to 
methamphetamine, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405 (LexisNexis 2007)); King v. State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 23, 40 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2002) ("intentionally and knowingly" causing bodily injury to a 
peace officer, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2007)).  We have also held that criminal statutes 
describing a particular act without reference to intent to do a further act or 
achieve a future consequence describe general intent crimes.  See Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183, 1185-86 
(Wyo. 1992); Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642 (Wyo. 1983).  By its plain 
language, § 6-3-201 is a general intent crime.  The State, therefore, was simply 
required to prove that Morris intentionally jumped on the car, not that he 
intended to cause damage to it.  The 
evidence clearly supports that conclusion.

 
 
[¶33]   Because I believe § 6-3-201 is a 
general intent crime, I cannot agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that 
the quoted portion of the prosecutor's closing argument constitutes reversible 
error.  In my opinion, the 
prosecutor's comments correctly reflect Wyoming law on general intent 
crimes.  In any event, the comments 
of the prosecutor certainly do not go so far as to invite the jury to convict 
Morris if it found his conduct was inadvertent, as the majority opinion 
suggests.

 
 
[¶34]   For the above reasons, I must 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion's ultimate disposition in this 
case.  Morris' conviction should be 
upheld and the matter of restitution should be addressed on the 
merits.