Case Title: Schaub v. Wilson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Schaub v. Wilson1998 WY 162969 P.2d 552Case Number: 96-159, 96-268Decided: 12/21/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Karen 
L. SCHAUB, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Michael A. WILSON, Appellee 
(Defendant). (Two cases)

 

Appeal from the District Court, Platte County, Barton 
R. Voigt, J.

 

Eric M. Alden, Wheatland, 
Wyoming, for Appellant.

Peter S. Dusbabek of 
Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio, Dusbabek & Parker, L.L.P., Ft. Collins, 
Colorado, for Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited conference; 
retired November 2, 1998.

 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 [¶1] The major issue to be resolved in this case 
addresses the scope of the hearing on damages conducted by the trial court 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) in a personal injury action after the entry of 
default pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(a). Collateral issues are raised concerning the 
burden of proof of pre-existing conditions and the validity of the findings of 
fact made by the trial court. After conducting the hearing on damages, the trial 
court ruled that Karen L. Schaub (Schaub) had failed to establish that her 
claimed damages were caused by the automobile collision, which was the subject 
of her action against Michael A. Wilson (Wilson), and the trial court denied any 
recovery to Schaub. The trial court also assessed costs against Schaub, and that 
ruling is the subject of a consolidated appeal. We hold that no error occurred 
in the determination of the trial court that the injuries for which damages were 
sought were not caused by the collision that led to the filing of this case, and 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to Wilson. 
The Judgment and Order in favor of Wilson and the Judgment that awarded the 
costs to Wilson are affirmed.

 

[¶2] In the primary appeal, 
Case No. 96-159, the following issues are set forth in the Appellant's Brief, 
filed on behalf of Schaub:

 

1. Does the Court's holding in McGarvin-Moberly apply 
to default cases against single defendants?

 

2. To what extent does an entry of default under Rule 
55(a) determine the issue of causation?

 

3. Did the trial Court misapply the burden of proof 
on pre-existing conditions?

 

          
4. Were the District Court's findings of fact clearly 
erroneous?

 

[¶3] In the Brief of 
Appellee in that case, the issues are stated in this way:

 

1. 
Was the Trial Court correct in determining that the issue before it was to 
determine the damage, if any, suffered by Mrs. Schaub as a result of the 
accident involving Mr. Wilson.

 

2. 
Was the Trial Court correct in determining that Mrs. Schaub had the burden to 
prove the damages [were] proximately caused as a result of the accident 
involving Mr. Wilson.

 

3. 
Was the Trial Court's factual finding that Mrs. Schaub had not met her burden of 
proof clearly erroneous.

 

[¶4] In the consolidated 
case, Case No. 96-268, the issue stated in the Appellant's Brief, filed on 
behalf of Schaub is:

 

1. 
Did the Trial Court err in awarding costs in favor of a defaulted defendant? In 
the Brief of Appellee, filed on behalf of Wilson in that case, the issue is 
restated as:

 

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in awarding 
costs for the Defendant Michael Wilson?

 

[¶5] On February 24, 1995, 
Schaub filed a Complaint alleging negligence on the part of Wilson in driving a 
motor vehicle so that it struck Schaub's vehicle from the rear. Schaub alleged 
as damages injuries to her neck and property damage to her vehicle. She sought 
to recover compensation for her injuries, medical bills, repairs to her vehicle, 
and costs. Service was perfected upon Wilson on February 26, 1995, and there 
followed negotiations of settlement between Schaub and Wilson's insurance 
carrier. Ultimately, counsel for Schaub wrote to the insurance company 
representative stating, "If I have not heard from you by May 5, 1995, I will 
proceed on the assumption that you are not going to respond." When no answer or 
other responsive pleading had been filed by May 8, 1995, Schaub sought and 
secured an entry of default pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(a).

 

[¶6] The next day, an Answer 
was filed by Wilson, and on May 18, 1995, Wilson presented a Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment.  In the decision 
letter with respect to setting aside the default, the trial judge reviewed the 
chronology of the case and considered the motion as one to set aside a default 
since no default judgment had been entered. The trial court ruled that Wilson 
had not shown good cause to set aside the default in that culpable conduct of 
Wilson led to the default and Wilson had not shown a meritorious defense. In the 
decision letter, the trial judge asked counsel to review McGarvin-Moberly Const. 
Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1995), for the analysis of the role of a 
defaulted defendant in the determination of damages. Subsequently, after what 
the trial court called a trial (presumably the hearing to determine the amount 
of damages provided in W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)), the trial court ruled that Schaub's 
injuries were not proximately caused by the collision, and found generally in 
favor of Wilson and against Schaub. The decision letter was followed by a 
Judgment and Order in favor of Wilson and requiring him to submit his Bill of 
Costs promptly.  Schaub appealed 
from the Judgment and Order. The trial court then entered a Judgment awarding 
costs to Wilson, and that was followed by a second appeal by Schaub, which has 
been consolidated with the initial appeal.

 

[¶7] We turn to the decision 
letter of the district court to summarize the facts as found by the trial judge 
and his rulings as to the issue of damages:

 

          
Background of the Case

 

This is a negligence action involving a minor traffic 
accident that occurred on July 19, 1991. The Plaintiff's vehicle was stopped at 
a yield sign, waiting to enter into an intersection when the Defendant's 
vehicle, approaching from behind at approximately five to ten miles per hour, 
bumped into the Plaintiff's vehicle. Neither vehicle was damaged. However, the 
Plaintiff suffers from certain neck injuries, which she alleges were made worse 
by the accident. She seeks recompense from the Plaintiff for medical bills, pain 
and suffering, lost wages, and homemaking expenses, past and 
future.

 

A 
procedural quirk in the case is the fact that default has been entered against 
the Defendant, which default the Court has refused to set aside. Consequently, 
the liability issue has been determined, and the only question before the Court 
is the amount of damages, if any, to be awarded.

 

                                              
Facts

 

The material facts of this case revolve around the 
Plaintiff's physical health and condition before and after the accident 
involving the Defendant. The Plaintiffs relevant medical history includes the 
following events:

 

1. 
In 1967, she was in a very serious motor vehicle roll-over accident. She was 
thrown through the windshield, and suffered head injuries, a concussion, a 
cervical spine fracture, shoulder blade fractures and collar bone 
fractures.

 

          
2. In 1972, she fell down a flight of stairs, fracturing an 
ankle.

 

3. In 1980, she was in another vehicle roll-over 
accident, from which she suffered bruised back muscles.

 

          
4. In 1981, she had arthroscopic knee surgery.

 

          
5. In 1982, she fell while roller skating, later experiencing back 
pain.

 

6. 
In 1982, she "turned to look at a child" and suffered a "burning sensation" in 
her neck, with pain radiating into her arm and into the area between her 
shoulder blades.

 

          
7. In 1983, she received medical treatment for continuing neck 
problems.

 

8. 
In 1986, she consulted Dr. Sherard for continuing neck pain, and was diagnosed 
as suffering from cervical spine disease, a chronic degenerative 
process.

 

9. 
In December, 1990, during a family dispute, she was thrown into a chair, which 
tipped over with her, causing her to suffer a hyper-extended neck. Resulting 
muscle spasms were treated with anti-inflammatory drugs, and when the pain did 
not subside, she began a course of physical therapy in March, 1991. She 
described "constant pain" resulting from this incident.

 

10. In March, 1991, she hurt her neck while cleaning 
her oven. She again complained to her physical therapist of severe neck 
pain.

 

11. In April, 1991, she tripped in her backyard, 
hitting her face on a fence and again suffering severe neck and back pain, for 
which she again sought physical therapy.

 

12. In July, 1991, she was involved in the 
above-described accident with the Defendant. She immediately complained of neck 
pain and went to the hospital emergency room. Cervical x-rays taken that day 
showed no signs of acute traumatic injury, but did show signs of chronic 
arthritic-type degenerative changes.

 

13. In March, 1992, she sought treatment from Dr. 
Shafer, a neurologist, for her persistent back, leg and rib 
pain.

 

14. In July, 1992, she was referred to Dr. Curnow and 
Dr. Southwell, who are orthopedic surgeons. Dr. Southwell performed a bi-level 
disc fusion. Specifically, he found bony spurs and a narrowed disc space at 
C5-6, and a herniated disc at C6-7.

 

15. In February, 1993, she had a second neck surgery 
because one of the bone fusions from the first surgery 
failed.

 

16. In September, 1993, while standing up from a 
booth at a restaurant, she struck her head on the light over the booth, which 
resulted in a "minor jar" and neck muscle spasms.

 

17. In August, 1994, while entering another 
restaurant, she tripped, "became airborne" and struck her head on a glass door 
hard enough to crack the glass. She was severely injured by this fall, again 
suffering neck pain, and eventually having lower back surgery (June, 1995) and 
ankle surgery (September, 1995).

 

18. Finally, Dr. Southwell testified that he has also 
treated the Plaintiff for bilateral tennis elbow and carpal tunnel 
syndrome.

 

It 
is significant that, in addition to these specific events, the Plaintiff 
repeatedly sought out and obtained medical treatment for chronic neck pain 
for many years before the accident with the 
Defendant.

 

                                              
Issues

 

[¶8] The question for the 
Court is what damage, if any, was suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the 
accident involving the Defendant.  
In the peculiar context of this case (the Plaintiff's considerable pre- 
and post-accident medical history), the specific issue becomes one of 
apportionment: can damages be apportioned among the Plaintiff's pre-existing 
condition, the accident, and post-accident events, and if so, what is the 
resulting apportionment?

 

                                            
Discussion

 

[¶9] Generally, a plaintiff 
in a negligence action must establish four elements of a cause of action: duty, 
breach, proximate cause, and damages. Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 
1995); Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Assn, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995); 
Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 894 (Wyo. 1995). 
In a case involving unliquidated damages, where default has been entered, the 
defendant may no longer contest liability, but may contest the issue of damages. 
Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996-997 (Wyo. 1993); Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶10] There are some 
situations where the damages issue is so intertwined with the fault issue that, 
despite a default, the defendant must be allowed to defend on the question of 
fault. Under the comparative negligence statute, for example, where a defendant 
is only liable for that portion of the damages for which he is at fault, a 
defaulted defendant must be allowed to defend the fault issue.  McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. v. Welden, 
897 P.2d 1310, 1313-1316 (Wyo. 1995). The Court is unaware of any reason or 
policy to distinguish that situation from the present situation, where the issue 
is the apportionment of damages among sequential events. In both cases, the 
purpose is to limit a defendant's liability to those damages for which he is 
actually responsible.

 

[¶11] Not surprisingly, the 
party seeking recovery of damages bears the burden of proof. Cottonwood Valley 
Ranch, Inc. v. Roberts, 874 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1994). Damages must be proven 
with a reasonable degree of certainty, and a court may not resort to speculation 
or conjecture in determining the proper amount of damages. Sannerud v. Brantz, 
879 P.2d 341, 345 (Wyo. 1994); Skane v. Star Valley Ranch Ass'n, 826 P.2d 266, 
269 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶12] In cases involving 
sequential potential causes of a plaintiff's damages, the first question is 
whether damages can be apportioned among the causes. If so, a defendant is 
liable only for that portion of the damages that he actually caused. If not, and 
it can be shown that he aggravated a pre-existing condition, the defendant is 
liable for the entire disability. Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 896-898 (Wyo. 
1989); Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 160-161 (Wyo. 1989); 
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1130-1131 (Wyo. 1978). On the other 
hand, in the case of a subsequent intervening cause where apportionment cannot 
be accomplished, the first defendant is not liable for any of the damages. 
Id.

 

[¶13] In the case now before 
the Court, the Plaintiff takes the position that the Defendant's negligence 
aggravated her preexisting condition, that damages cannot be apportioned, and 
that the Defendant is, therefore, fully liable. Further, the Plaintiff argues 
that she has fully recovered from any subsequent injuries, and that such 
injuries should not be considered in determining her future damages.  Before the issue of apportionment 
arises, however, the Plaintiff must have met her initial burden of proving that 
this accident was a proximate cause of the damages she seeks. Hashimoto, supra 
at 161. Stated conversely, a defendant is not liable at all for injury not 
proximately caused by his breach of duty. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 960 (Wyo. 1990). [Though not on point, Worker's Compensation law is 
similar, where a claimant with a pre-existing condition bears the burden of 
proving that his injuries were proximately caused by his work related injury. 
Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 968-969 (Wyo. 1996).]

 

[¶14] Proximate cause means 
that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the act of 
negligence. Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo. 1994); Natural 
Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994). The existence of 
proximate cause is a question of fact. Daily, supra at 1043. In the instant 
case, the Plaintiff largely relies on the opinions of one or more of her doctors 
that the accident involving the defendant, at least in part, contributed to or 
caused her neck problems. The Court is convinced, however, from the totality of 
the circumstances, that the Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof in this 
regard. In particular, the following cannot be ignored:

 

1. The accident was very minor, with no vehicular 
damage - it was not even a "fender-bender."

 

2. 
The medical examination of the Plaintiff's neck at the hospital just after the 
accident revealed no acute injuries.

 

3. 
For years preceding the accident, and indeed, just prior to the accident, the 
Plaintiff had suffered from and was suffering from chronic cervical degenerative 
disease. She repeatedly sought out and tried various remedies, including 
anti-inflammatory drugs, physical therapy, exercise programs, spas, and 
chiropractic treatment.

 

4. 
The doctors testified that a herniated disc, such as was found at the C6-7 
location, does not necessarily result from acute trauma, but may just as readily 
result from chronic degenerative changes.

 

5. 
Dr. Southwell's opinion that the accident "caused" the neck injuries was based 
on an insufficient foundation.  
Specifically, his opinion was based in large part on the Plaintiffs 
self-reporting of the accident, and with a less-than-complete medical history. 
In particular, it does not appear that the physical circumstances of the 
accident - speed, direction, force, angle of impact, seat support, etc. - were 
considered by any of the doctors in reaching their respective opinions. An 
expert's opinion does not have to be accepted by the fact-finder. RYN, Inc. v. 
Platte County Memorial Hospital, 842 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Wyo. 1992). This is 
especially true where, as here, there are conflicting opinions. Matter of 
Thornberg, Wyoming Supreme Court Slip Opinion No. 95-121, March 26, 1996 [913 P.2d 863 (Wyo. 1996)].

 

                                            
Conclusion

 

[¶15] After the minor 
accident between the Plaintiff's vehicle and the Defendant's vehicle, the 
Plaintiff did complain of pain in her neck.  That is not enough to prove that the 
accident was the proximate cause, or even a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's 
injuries. If at the time of the accident, as the Plaintiff sat in her car at the 
intersection, she was at that moment suffering from an untreated broken leg, a 
bump from another vehicle might well have caused her pain. But the bump in that 
hypothetical case would no more have caused her broken leg than would the bump 
in our actual case have caused her neck problems.

 

[¶16] The Court will find 
generally for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff * * 
*.

 

(Emphasis in 
original.)

 

[¶17] Quite probably due to 
the approach taken by the trial court, Schaub devotes substantial argument to 
addressing the reasons why McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co., 897 P.2d 1310, as 
interpreted in Olsten Staffing Services, Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Services, Inc., 
921 P.2d 596 (Wyo. 1996), should not apply in this instance. Schaub argues 
earnestly that in the instance of a single tortfeasor in default, there is no 
justification for visiting the proximate cause element of the cause of action 
for negligence, and that the only question at the hearing on the default 
judgment is the amount of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. Schaub 
professes confusion between dictum in Olsten Staffing Services, Inc. and 
language in McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. that states that the element of 
proximate cause is adjudicated by the entry of default. Schaub, as support for 
her position, invokes the language of W.R.C.P. 8(d) that pleading averments, 
other than the amount of damages, are admitted if not denied in a responsive 
pleading, and the effect of the entry of default is to foreclose a responsive 
pleading by the defendant.

 

[¶18] Unfortunately, the 
world is seldom as simple and direct as we drafters of rules would like to 
assume. The focus of the debate in this case is whether our prior cases lead to 
a conclusion that only the amount of damages is in issue in the hearing 
conducted pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) (Schaub's position) or whether the fact 
of damage attributable to the event is in issue (the basis of the trial court's 
ruling). We cannot conceive of a way for a court to conduct the hearing provided 
for in W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)1 in light of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 
(Repl. 1988)2 without placing the fact of damage 
in issue.

 

[¶19] While Schaub argues 
that inconsistencies between the holdings in McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. and 
Olsten Staffing Services, Inc. demand clarification, we do not analyze this case 
in the same way. The thrust of both McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. and Olsten 
Staffing Services, Inc. must relate back to the language of Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109. In McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co., 897 P.2d  at 1314-15, we held that in 
order to have the opportunity to litigate damages under that statute, a 
defendant in default was entitled to participate fully in the case on the issue 
of damages. The facts of that case left little room to assume that any breach of 
a duty on the part of McGarvin-Moberly Const. Co. would not be a proximate cause 
of damage to the plaintiff. In Olsten Staffing Services, Inc., 921 P.2d  at 600, 
by way of dictum, the court indicated that full participation on the damage 
question would justify defending on the premise that no damages were caused by 
the duty and breach of duty. That is the approach that the trial court took in 
this case, and we see no prospect for honoring the statutory scheme for 
determining damages in such a case unless the single defendant has the same 
opportunity to defend on the issue of damages as the defendant in a multiple 
defendant case. It follows that the trial court correctly concluded that Wilson 
could, in defending the question of damages, assert that no damages were caused 
by the collision between the two vehicles.

 

[¶20] This analysis leads us 
back, not to the right to litigate proportionate fault, as to which Wilson must 
be foreclosed since no claim of Schaub's negligence is available to him, but to 
the application of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(ii), which charges the trial court 
with determining the total amount of damages. Pursuant to the provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109(d), Wilson is liable only for the proportion of the total dollar 
amount determined as damages in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed 
to him. We do not understand the statute to assume that damages can exist in a 
vacuum, but the damages the trial court is charged with determining must have 
been incurred in the event as to which recovery is sought. Even though Wilson is 
charged with one hundred percent of the fault, if no damages were caused by 
Wilson's fault, no recovery can be had.

 

[¶21] If Wilson has a right 
to litigate damages, and the law justifies that opportunity, then Wilson must 
enjoy the opportunity to challenge the proposition that the damages claimed were 
a product of this collision. That is the opportunity the trial court afforded to 
Wilson, and the issue was resolved in favor of Wilson by the determination of 
the trial court that no damages were incurred by Schaub as a result of this 
collision.

 

[¶22] Schaub urges the 
proposition that, in view of the default, the fact of the damages must be deemed 
admitted. We have, however, spoken directly to the necessity of proving damages 
in a default case in Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 892 (Wyo. 1984), where, 
relating punitive damages to unliquidated damages, we 
said:

 

We 
now hold that in the absence of evidence of a defendant's wealth or financial 
condition an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained. The Parkhursts argue 
that this should not be a fatal error in view of the default which Adel 
permitted. The burden, however, is upon those seeking more than mere nominal 
damages to prove their damages.  
Albin Elevator Company v. Pavlica, Wyo., 649 P.2d 187 (1982); Downing v. 
Stiles, Wyo., 635 P.2d 808 (1981); and National Bank of Lovell v. Moncur, Wyo., 
624 P.2d 765 (1981). The requirement of Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P., of a hearing 
with respect to damages which are not liquidated is consistent with the rule of 
those cases. The default permitted by a defendant does not concede the amount 
demanded for unliquidated damages. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 102 Ct.Cl. 
846, 65 S. Ct. 16, 89 L. Ed. 3 (1944), and other cases cited in 10 Wright, Miller 
and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2688, p. 450, n. 20 
(1983).

 

[¶23] We turn then to the 
contention of Schaub that the trial court misapplied the burden of proof on 
pre-existing conditions. The general proposition with respect to this issue was 
articulated in Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 161 (Wyo. 
1989):

 

Hashimoto has shown no reason for this court to 
abandon the general rule "that one injured by the negligence of another is 
entitled to recover the damages proximately caused by the act of the 
tort-feasor, and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish that the 
damages he seeks were proximately caused by the negligence of the 
defendant."

 

Bruckman [v. Pena, 29 Colo. App. 357], 487 P.2d [566] 
at 568 [(1971)]. See also Annotation, Proximate Cause: Liability of Tortfeasor 
for Injured Person's Subsequent Injury or Reinjury, 31 A.L.R.3d 1000, 1003-04 
(1970).

 

This general proposition is 
supported directly or by analogy in Cottonwood Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Roberts, 
874 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1994) and Adel, 681 P.2d  at 892 (and the cases there 
cited). The trial court committed no error in assigning to Schaub the duty to 
prove the damages attributable to the collision with her vehicle by Wilson's 
vehicle, including a requirement for apportionment.

 

[¶24] The last issue 
asserted in the main appeal by Schaub is a contention that the findings of the 
trial court are not supported by sufficient evidence. We have spoken to the 
standard that we apply with respect to findings of fact by the trial 
court:

 

This Court presumes that the trial court's findings 
of fact are correct and will not disturb those findings on appeal unless they 
are inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. Narans v. Paulsen, 803 P.2d 358, 360 (Wyo. 1990). The 
question is not whether we would have reached the same result but is whether 
sufficient evidence supported the trial court's conclusion. 
Id.

 

Frost Const. Co. v. Lobo, 
Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998). This same proposition appears in other 
earlier cases:

 

Our standard of review when faced with a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is well known. We presume that the 
findings of the district court are correct and will not disturb them unless they 
are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. E.g., 
Ferguson v. Reed, 822 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Wyo. 1991). When reviewing the evidence, 
we accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true, giving it all favorable 
inferences and leaving out all evidence in conflict therewith. E.g., Town of 
Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc., 806 P.2d 281, 284 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

Hill v. Zimmerer, 839 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

The standard of review applied by this Court when the 
sufficiency of the evidence is at issue is well settled. We assume that the 
evidence of the prevailing party is true, leaving out of consideration the 
evidence presented by the other party in conflict therewith, and giving every 
favorable inference to the evidence of the successful party that may fairly and 
reasonably be drawn from it. Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1987); 
M & M Welding, Inc. v. Pavlicek, 713 P.2d 236 (Wyo. 1986). The findings of 
the trial court are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed by this 
Court unless they are clearly erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. - 
Lander, 750 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 1988); Pancratz Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo. 1986).

 

O's Gold Seed Co. v. United 
Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 1988). A perusal 
of the record in this case discloses a history of injuries to Schaub going back 
to 1967 when she was thrown through the windshield of a car in an automobile 
accident. The history continues with a fall down the stairs in 1972; another 
automobile accident in 1980; a roller skating fall in 1982; a fall when a 
rocking chair went backwards in 1990; a fall in her yard in 1991; striking her 
head on a lamp in a restaurant after the collision with Wilson; and a fall into 
a pane-glass door at a restaurant in which she actually became airborne, again 
after the collision with Wilson. The record is replete with information about 
treatment over the years, specifically addressing pain in her neck and the 
muscles in her neck. Treating physicians were not able to identify any specific 
trauma following the collision with Wilson, although they did observe evidence 
of prior injuries and arthritic changes. Schaub relied at trial primarily upon 
the testimony of Dr. Richard B. Southwell to support a claim that disc 
herniation at the C6-7 level was a result of the accident with 
Wilson.

 

[¶25] The record 
demonstrates that Dr. South well had not been informed of many important facts 
relating to her history of neck injury, and our law is to the effect that a 
court is not bound to accept expert opinion, particularly if it appears to have 
been in some respect uninformed. See RYN, Inc. v. Platte County Memorial Hosp. 
Bd. of Trustees, 842 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Wyo. 1992) and Matter of Krause, 803 P.2d 81, 83 (Wyo. 1990). Our examination of this record leads us to the ineluctable 
conclusion that the sufficiency of the evidence to support a determination that 
Schaub had not been injured in this collision is beyond the caviling of Schaub. 
When that proposition is addressed in the context of the failure of Schaub to 
sustain her burden of proof, the record is manifestly 
adequate.

 

[¶26] We turn then to the 
matter of costs raised in the consolidated case. The trial court awarded costs 
to Wilson in the amount of $1,759.85, itemized as:

 

          
Service of Process                 
            
$ 120.00 

Expert Witnesses                  
            
1,514.85 

Reporter Fees           
                        
50.00 

Exhibits Received in Evidence        
75.00

         
                                                               
--------- 

TOTAL                                                
$1,759.85

 

In her appeal, Schaub does 
not contest the amounts awarded by the trial court. Instead, her theory is that 
she was the prevailing party because she was entitled to at least nominal 
damages by virtue of the default, and, consequently, neither Wyo. Stat. § 
1-14-126 (Repl. 1988) nor W.R.C.P. 54(d) affords authority to the trial court to 
award costs to Wilson.

 

[¶27] The general rule is 
set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 1-14-124 (1997): "Costs shall be allowed to the 
plaintiff upon a judgment in his favor in an action for the recovery of money 
only or for the recovery of specific real or personal property, unless otherwise 
provided by law."  The law providing 
otherwise states, in pertinent part, that "[i]n other actions the court may 
award and tax costs and apportion them between the parties on the same or 
adverse sides as it deems right and equitable." Wyo. Stat. § 1-14-126. Our court 
rule is consistent with the statute, and provides:

 

(1) Costs Other Than Attorney's Fees. Except when 
express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs 
other than attorney's fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs; but costs against the State of Wyoming, its 
officers or agencies, shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by 
law.

 

W.R.C.P. 54(d). Under these 
statutory and rule provisions, an award of costs is a matter within the 
discretion of the trial court. In Abraham v. Andrews Trucking Co., 893 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Wyo. 1995), we said:

 

The award of costs pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(d) rests 
within the sound discretion of the district court. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 168 (Wyo. 1989). "Abuse of discretion occurs when a 
court exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an error of law." Combs v. 
Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993).

 

Earlier decisions of this 
court support the proposition that an award of costs is a matter within the 
discretion of the trial court.  
E.g., Snodgrass v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 903 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Wyo. 
1995); Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 216 (Wyo. 1995); Big-O Tires, Inc. v. 
Santini, 838 P.2d 1169, 1176 (Wyo. 1992); Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 93 
(Wyo. 1990); and Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1105 (Wyo. 
1989).

 

[¶28] Schaub argues that the 
abuse of discretion in this instance is in the failure to recognize her as the 
prevailing party. We addressed the definition of a prevailing party in the 
context of an offer of judgment in Crawford v. Amadio, 932 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Wyo. 
1997), where we said:

 

Amadio relied upon Stamp v. Hagerman, 181 Mich. App. 
332, 448 N.W.2d 849, 851 (1989). In Stamp, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
addressed the question of awarding costs to a plaintiff as a prevailing party 
when the "adjusted verdict" was less than the "average offer" to stipulate to a 
judgment. The court said:

 

"[A] party should not be deemed the prevailing party 
for purposes of taxing costs unless the party improves his or her position by 
the litigation.* * * [W]e agree that a showing of improved position is a minimal 
standard for taxing costs. To hold otherwise would encourage unnecessary 
litigation."

 

Stamp, 448 N.W.2d  at 851.

 

In this case, Schaub did not 
improve her position in the litigation. On the other hand, Wilson did improve 
his position substantially over the result indicated by the entry of default. 
Under the circumstances, Wilson must be regarded as the prevailing party in this 
instance. Like the trial court, we cannot resist quoting from the Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Motion for Award of Costs:

 

It 
is certainly a very unusual situation where a Defendant defaulted on a case, 
admitted liability, admitted that an award of some damages is appropriate and 
still been awarded a judgment including costs.

 

While this case may be 
unusual, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in 
awarding costs to Wilson under the circumstances.

 

[¶29] The trial court is 
affirmed in all respects.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1 
W.R.C.P. 55(b) provides, in pertinent part:

 

          
(b) Judgment. - Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows:

 

(2) By 
the Court. - In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered 
against a minor or an incompetent person unless represented in the action by a 
guardian, guardian ad litem, trustee, conservator, or other such representative 
who has appeared therein. If the party against whom a judgment by default is 
sought has appeared in the action the party (or, if appearing by representative, 
the party's representative) shall be served with written notice of the 
application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing on such 
application. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it 
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an 
investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order 
such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of 
trial by jury to the parties when and as required by any 
statute.

 

          

2 Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109 provided:

 

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory, negligence of the said 
person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed 
to the person recovering.

 

          
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party 
shall:

 

          
(i) If a jury trial:

 

(A) 
Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount 
of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not 
a party; and

 

          
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the 
percentage of fault.

 

(ii) If 
a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, 
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor whether or not a party.

 

(c) The 
court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this 
section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person recovering 
and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under 
subsection (d) of this section.

 

(d) Each 
defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount 
determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the 
percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or 
(ii) of this section.