Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Wendy Alison Nora

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP002442-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2442-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wendy Alison Nora, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Cross-Appellant-
Respondent, 
     v. 
Wendy Alison Nora, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST NORA 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 28, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent, there were 
briefs filed by Wendy Alison Nora and Access Legal Services, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. There was an oral argument by Wendy 
Alison Nora.  
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant, there were 
briefs filed by Paul W. Schwarzenbart and Office of Lawyer 
Regulation, Madison. There was an oral argument by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2442-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wendy Alison Nora, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
     Complainant-Cross-Appellant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wendy Alison Nora, 
 
     Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Wendy Alison Nora appeals from 
various interlocutory orders and a final report issued by the 
referee, Attorney James Winiarski.  Attorney Nora challenges the 
conduct of the proceeding by the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) and Referee Winiarski, as well as the referee's findings 
of fact and his legal conclusions that she engaged in 
professional misconduct as alleged in Counts 2, 3, and 5 of the 
OLR's second amended complaint.  She also challenges his 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
2 
 
recommendation that this court should suspend her license to 
practice law in Wisconsin for a period of two years.   
¶2 
The OLR has filed a cross-appeal from the referee's 
legal conclusions that Counts 1 and 4 of its second amended 
complaint should be dismissed on due process grounds because 
those counts failed to specify which subsections of Supreme 
Court Rule (SCR) 20:3.1(a) Attorney Nora's conduct had violated.  
¶3 
We reject Attorney Nora's arguments on appeal and 
conclude that the OLR proved violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys on all five counts of the 
second amended complaint.  We do not agree with the referee's 
conclusion that Counts 1 and 4 should be dismissed on due 
process 
grounds 
because 
we 
determine 
that 
Attorney 
Nora 
forfeited any due process notice challenge by not raising it 
before the referee.  Had she raised the issue in a timely manner 
before the referee, the OLR could have amended its complaint to 
more fully specify the subsections at issue.  Moreover, the 
OLR's complaints did specify the particular actions by her that 
constituted violations of the rule.  Attorney Nora had notice of 
the allegations against her. 
¶4 
We further conclude that the appropriate level of 
discipline to impose upon Attorney Nora for her professional 
misconduct is a further two-year suspension of her license to 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
3 
 
practice law in this state.1  Given the nature of her misconduct 
at issue in this proceeding, we do not require her to pay any 
restitution.  We do, however, require that if Attorney Nora 
seeks the reinstatement of her license, her reinstatement 
petition must allege that she has made a good faith effort to 
pay all outstanding amounts that she personally owes as a result 
of sanction orders imposed by any court, and she must prove that 
good faith effort as one of the conditions of reinstatement. 
¶5 
Because the OLR has requested that we not impose the 
costs of this proceeding on Attorney Nora, we do not impose any 
costs. 
¶6 
Attorney Nora was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in June 1975.  She was also licensed to practice law 
in the state of Minnesota in 1985.  She most recently practiced 
law under the name Access Legal Services in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. 
¶7 
Attorney Nora has been the subject of professional 
discipline in this state on two prior occasions.  In 1993 this 
court suspended Attorney Nora's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin for 30 days, as discipline reciprocal to that imposed 
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.  In re Disciplinary 
                                                 
1 Attorney Nora's license to practice law in Wisconsin is 
currently suspended as discipline for professional misconduct in 
a 
previous 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Nora, 2018 WI 23, 380 Wis. 2d 311, 909 
N.W.2d 155 (Nora II).  Attorney Nora's license is also 
administratively suspended due to her failure to pay mandatory 
bar dues and her failure to file a trust account certification. 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
4 
 
Proceedings Against Nora, 173 Wis. 2d 660, 495 N.W.2d 99 (1993) 
(Nora I).  The misconduct that resulted in that suspension 
involved making misrepresentations concerning the reopening and 
capitalization of a bank, failing to adequately investigate the 
person who was to provide capital to the bank, improperly 
authorizing the issuance of cashier checks by the bank, bringing 
a frivolous claim against a bank, transferring assets of her 
Minnesota law partnership in an attempt to insulate those assets 
from collection, bringing litigation primarily as a delay 
tactic, and asserting a legal theory not justified by existing 
law.  Nora I, 173 Wis. 2d at 660-61; see also In re Disciplinary 
Action Against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990). 
¶8 
In 2018 this court suspended Attorney Nora's license 
to practice law in this state for a period of one year, 
effective April 30, 2018.  Nora II, 380 Wis. 2d 311, ¶42.  In 
that case this court determined that the OLR had proven four 
counts of professional misconduct arising out of her actions in 
defending a foreclosure action against her own property and in 
bringing three federal civil actions against the state court 
judge presiding over the foreclosure action and against opposing 
counsel in the foreclosure action.  Specifically, this court 
concluded that Attorney Nora had made a false statement of 
material fact to a tribunal, in violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).  
Id., ¶27.  We also determined that in each of the three federal 
actions, Attorney Nora had knowingly advanced claims that lacked 
a valid legal basis and had pursued the claims merely to harass 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
5 
 
or maliciously injure another.  Id., ¶¶29 and 30 (finding three 
violations of SCR 20:3.1(a)). 
 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS PROCEEDING 
¶9 
Some 
procedural 
facts 
about 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding are necessary for an understanding of certain legal 
conclusions by the referee and of certain issues on appeal.   
¶10 On November 30, 2015, the OLR filed its original 
complaint in this proceeding, which alleged five counts of 
professional misconduct by Attorney Nora arising out of two 
client representations.  Counts 1-3 arose out of Attorney Nora's 
actions connected to her representation of Sheila Spencer (the 
Spencer matter).  Count 1 alleged that Attorney Nora had 
violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:3.1(a) as follows: 
By removing a state court foreclosure matter to the 
federal court after four years of litigation when 
there was no colorable basis for federal jurisdiction, 
and, by filing a frivolous motion to reconsider the 
order remanding the matter back to the state court, 
[Attorney] Nora violated SCR 20:3.1(a). 
Count 2 alleged that by filing a frivolous appeal on behalf of 
both her client and herself personally when she was not a party 
to the litigation and by engaging in an ongoing pattern of 
conduct to harass other parties and judicial officers and to 
delay the proceedings, Attorney Nora violated SCR 20:3.2.  Count 
3 alleged that by engaging in an ongoing pattern of conduct to 
harass other parties and judicial officers and to delay the 
proceedings, Attorney Nora violated the Attorney's Oath in SCR 
40.15, which is enforced via SCR 20:8.4(g). 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 Counts 4-5 arose out of Attorney Nora's actions 
connected to her representation of Roger and Desa Rinaldi (the 
Rinaldi matter).  Count 4, like Count 1, alleged that Attorney 
Nora had violated SCR 20:3.1(a) in the Rinaldi matter as 
follows: 
. . . by filing a motion to intervene and a motion for 
relief from the Court's prior orders pursuant to 
F.R.C.P.2 60(b)(2), which motions were found to be 
frivolous, after the U.S. District Court had warned 
[Attorney] Nora that any further frivolous submissions 
would result in an award of sanctions, [Attorney] Nora 
violated SCR 20:3.1(a). 
Count 5 tracked Count 2 in that it alleged that by filing a 
motion to intervene personally and a motion for relief from the 
federal district court's prior order, both of which were found 
to be frivolous, Attorney Nora violated SCR 20:3.2. 
¶12 Attorney Nora filed combined motions to dismiss the 
original complaint on several grounds.  Before the referee 
decided these motions, the OLR filed a first amended complaint, 
which did not change any of the counts alleged against Attorney 
Nora, but simply corrected some factual allegations in the 
original complaint.  The referee's subsequent scheduling order 
provided that Attorney Nora's pending motions would apply to the 
first amended complaint and permitted Attorney Nora to file any 
additional motions regarding the first amended complaint within 
20 days.  Attorney Nora filed a "supplement" to her motions to 
dismiss, as well as a "notice of filing" of a proposed modified 
                                                 
2 This is a citation abbreviation for "Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure ___." 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
7 
 
amended complaint that excluded facts Attorney Nora contended 
were false. 
¶13 Attorney Nora's motions did not assert that either the 
original complaint or the first amended complaint violated her 
due process rights because Counts 1 and 4 of those complaints 
failed to specify the subsection of SCR 20:3.1(a) that Attorney 
Nora had violated.   
¶14 On April 16, 2016, the referee denied Attorney Nora's 
motions to dismiss the original and first amended complaint.  He 
gave Attorney Nora 20 days in which to file an answer to the 
first amended complaint. 
¶15 On May 20, 2016, Attorney Nora filed a "Corrected 
Motion to Dismiss and Answer."3  Attorney Nora asserts on appeal 
that in a subpart of this document responding to Count 4 of the 
first amended complaint (paragraph 90), she alleged that 
paragraph 90 of the first amended complaint failed to specify 
which subsection of SCR 20:3.1(a) she had violated in the 
Rinaldi matter.  She does not assert on appeal that she ever 
made a similar allegation regarding Count 1.  Further, her 
reference to paragraph 90 in this document never alleged that 
the OLR's failure to specify the subsection of SCR 20:3.1(a) 
constituted a due process violation. 
                                                 
3 A few days before filing this motion and answer, Attorney 
Nora filed two other motions:  (1) a motion for damages pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 894.044 and (2) a motion to disqualify Attorney 
Paul Schwarzenbart from representing the OLR in this proceeding 
(allegedly due to his conflict of interest as a material witness 
to crimes supposedly committed in Nora II). 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
8 
 
¶16 On June 3, 2016, the OLR filed a motion seeking leave 
to file a second amended complaint.  The purpose of the second 
amended complaint was to correct two minor errors in the amended 
complaint, including the listing of the wrong circuit court case 
number for the foreclosure action against Sheila Spencer.   
¶17 On August 1, 2016, the referee issued another order 
that denied Attorney Nora's pending motions and granted the 
OLR's motion to file a second amended complaint.  The OLR 
subsequently filed a second amended complaint, as permitted.  
The second amended complaint did not change the nature of the 
counts alleged against Attorney Nora, nor the specific actions 
by 
her 
that 
allegedly 
violated 
the 
specified 
Rules 
of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys. 
¶18 Ultimately, after some further proceedings in the 
case, Attorney Nora filed a "notice of filing" of four different 
versions of a revised answer to the second amended complaint.  
Attorney Nora did not allege that the lack of specified 
subsections in Counts 1 and 4 violated her due process right to 
notice of the charges against her. 
¶19 After the referee granted a series of motions by 
Attorney Nora and her co-counsel to adjourn the evidentiary 
hearing, the referee conducted the disciplinary hearing in this 
matter over four days in March 2017. The referee issued a post-
hearing order directing the OLR to file a post-hearing brief 
within 45 days from the filing of the hearing transcript and 
Attorney Nora to file her post-hearing brief within 45 days 
after the OLR filed its brief.  After the referee granted 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
9 
 
another series of extension motions, the post-hearing briefing 
was completed in February 2018. Attorney Nora's post-hearing 
brief did not allege that the reference to SCR 20:3.1(a) rather 
than to one or more subsections of that rule violated her due 
process rights. 
¶20 While working on his report, the referee became 
concerned with whether the lack of specification in Counts 1 and 
4 of the applicable subsection(s) of SCR 20:3.1(a) violated 
Attorney Nora's due process rights.  He ordered the parties to 
submit supplemental post-hearing briefs on this issue, which 
they did. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING COUNTS 1-3 
¶21 The following facts were found by the referee in his 
report. 
¶22 In April 2009, FNMC filed a foreclosure action in the 
Wood County circuit court against Sheila Spencer.  FNMC v. 
Spencer, Wood County Case No. 2009CV283 (the Spencer Wood County 
Case).  Ms. Spencer was initially represented by another 
attorney.  That attorney was allowed to withdraw in April 2012, 
and Attorney Nora filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Ms. 
Spencer in May 2012.  Attorney Nora initially appeared at a May 
23, 2012 hearing that had been scheduled as a summary judgment 
hearing, and asked for a postponement of the hearing.  Judge 
Gregory Potter, who was presiding over the case, granted 
Attorney Nora's requested postponement and directed her to file 
a list of issues that she believed needed to be resolved by June 
29, 2012.   
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
10 
 
¶23 Attorney Nora did not file the list of issues as 
ordered.  On June 23, 2012, she filed a "Notice of Continuing 
Objection to Further Proceedings."  She filed an amended 
"Continuing Notice" on June 25, 2012.  In these "Continuing 
Notices," she alleged that Gray and Associates, S.C. (the Gray 
Firm) had made multiple fraudulent filings in the Spencer Wood 
County Case.  She also alleged that she had not been served with 
a copy of a proposed order that Judge Potter had signed on June 
12, 2012.  She claimed that the lack of service of the draft 
order was part of "an actual pattern and practice by Judge 
Potter and [the Gray Firm], acting in concert, to effectuate a 
fraudulent foreclosure against Sheila M. Spencer and her home."  
Attorney Nora claimed that Judge Potter's signing of the 
allegedly improper ex parte order meant that the "entire record 
of the proceedings must be reviewed in light of the apparent 
collaboration between Judge Potter and [the Gray Firm]."  
Attorney Nora further accused Judge Potter of "manipulat[ing]" 
both the record and the foreclosure action generally to assist 
the Gray Firm in depriving Ms. Spencer of a chance to defend 
against the foreclosure: 
The manipulation of the Transcript to remove some of 
the most damning evidence of bias . . . discloses a 
whole new issue:  that Judge Potter is complicit in 
the manipulation of the proceedings and of the record. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶24 On June 27, 2012, Attorney Nora filed an extension 
motion and an "Affidavit of Nonreceipt of Motion for Proposed 
Order and Final Order."  In the affidavit, Attorney Nora claimed 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
11 
 
that she had not received the order dated June 12, 2012, and 
that she had been shocked to find that the court had entered an 
order resulting from the May 23rd hearing without a motion for 
entry of such an order being served on her.  The affidavit 
further stated that the court's clerk had told Attorney Nora 
that someone from the Gray Firm had sent a letter and a proposed 
order to Judge Potter.  Attorney Nora did not contact the Gray 
Firm to obtain a copy of the letter to see if she had been 
copied on it; instead, she alleged in her affidavit that the 
letter and enclosed draft order had been an "ex parte 
communication with the Court."   
¶25 The very next day (June 28, 2012) Attorney Nora filed 
a motion to disqualify Judge Potter for "repeatedly engaging in 
or facilitating ex parte communications and entering ex parte 
orders."  In the motion Attorney Nora described the Spencer Wood 
County Case as a "mockery of justice" and as "misbegotten 
proceedings."  Attorney Nora acknowledged that she had received 
a copy of the Gray Firm's letter and draft order from her 
client.  The letter showed that a carbon copy had been sent to 
Attorney Nora.  The referee found that Attorney Nora could not 
explain how Judge Potter would have known that she did not 
receive a copy of the letter and draft order when she was shown 
on the letter as receiving a carbon copy.   
¶26 Attorney Nora did not stop with accusing Judge Potter 
of engaging in ex parte communications in this one instance; she 
alleged that Judge Potter and the Gray Firm had engaged in 
multiple instances of ex parte communications and ex parte 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
12 
 
orders prior to her appearance in the case,4 although Attorney 
Nora had no firsthand knowledge of the other instances she 
alleged.  Attorney Nora went so far as to assert that "[a] 
reasonable inference arises from these facts that Judge Gregory 
J. Potter has colluded with GRAY & ASSOCIATES, LLP to circumvent 
proper practice and procedure by engaging in and facilitating ex 
parte communications by which orders have been entered by the 
court."  (Emphasis added.)  Attorney Nora demanded that Judge 
Potter recuse himself immediately. 
¶27 At a hearing on August 8, 2012, Judge Potter denied 
Attorney Nora's recusal motion.  On August 13, 2012, Attorney 
Nora finally filed the list of issues that she had been ordered 
to file by June 29, 2012.  Her list of issues again repeated her 
allegation that Judge Potter and the Gray Firm had engaged in 
improper ex parte communications.   
¶28 On October 3, 2012, Attorney James Carrig first 
appeared for the plaintiff, which caused Attorney Nora to file a 
motion to strike his appearance.  Judge Potter held a hearing on 
Attorney Nora's motion and on whether PNC Bank should be 
substituted as the plaintiff in the action.  Following the 
hearing, Attorney Carrig filed a formal motion to "ratify the 
                                                 
4 An affidavit by an employee of the Gray Firm that was 
filed in this proceeding stated that on the date of one such 
alleged ex parte communication, Ms. Spencer had been served with 
a copy of the notice of motion and motion.  The court record 
shows that on the other occasions of alleged ex parte 
communications, the letters and enclosed documents were copied 
to Ms. Spencer.   
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
13 
 
action 
or 
substitute 
PNC 
Bank 
as 
the 
party 
plaintiff."  
Ultimately, the circuit court granted the motion to substitute 
PNC Bank and set a hearing date of March 18, 2013, for the 
hearing on the plaintiff's summary judgment motion (which had 
been pending since before Attorney Nora had joined the case). 
¶29 Attorney Nora responded to this development by filing 
a notice of removal of the action to the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on January 10, 2013.  
Attorney Nora alleged that the removal was proper under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1334, and 1349 (i.e., both diversity and 
federal question jurisdiction).  PNC Bank filed a motion for 
remand, which the district court, Judge Barbara Crabb presiding, 
granted.  Judge Crabb also granted an award of attorney fees and 
costs to PNC Bank (apparently against Ms. Spencer, but not 
Attorney Nora).   
¶30 On April 8, 2013, Attorney Nora filed a motion for 
reconsideration of Judge Crabb's remand order.  Attorney Nora 
claimed in this disciplinary proceeding that she had not sought 
reconsideration of the remand order, but only of the award of 
attorney fees and costs.  The referee found, however, that the 
reconsideration motion was not limited to addressing the award 
of costs and fees, noting that 41 of the 43 paragraphs in 
Attorney Nora's reconsideration motion asserted that Judge Crabb 
had erred in remanding the case back to state court.  Indeed, 
the prayer for relief in the reconsideration motion "request[ed] 
that the court reconsider the Order remanding this case to state 
court entered on March 25, 2013 for its clear errors of law in 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
14 
 
failing to acknowledge and exercise its original jurisdiction . 
. . ." 
¶31 Judge 
Crabb 
ultimately 
denied 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, 
holding 
that 
the 
district 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction to reconsider its remand order.  Judge Crabb also 
held that because Spencer had not had "an objectively reasonable 
argument supporting federal jurisdiction," it was appropriate to 
award PNC Bank the fees it had incurred in moving to remand the 
case.  In other words, Judge Crabb found the removal to be 
frivolous. 
 
Attorney 
Nora 
filed 
a 
second 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, which rehashed the same arguments and included 
a statement that the federal district court "is wrong."  The 
second reconsideration motion was also denied.  Judge Crabb 
awarded PNC Bank its costs and fees in opposing the two 
reconsideration motions.  Although the referee's findings do not 
say so explicitly, it appears that the district court entered 
judgment for the fees and costs against Ms. Spencer, not against 
Attorney Nora.  The total of the cost judgment was $4,928.47 in 
favor of PNC Bank. 
¶32 Attorney Nora filed a notice of appeal from Judge 
Crabb's 
orders 
granting 
remand 
and 
denying 
her 
two 
reconsideration motions.  In the notice of appeal and in an 
amended notice, Attorney Nora identified herself as a defendant-
appellant "individually and in her capacity as counsel for 
Sheila M. Spencer."  The referee found that Attorney Nora had 
not filed any document seeking to be made a party to the case 
before she filed her initial and amended notices of appeal.  He 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
15 
 
also explicitly found that "[Attorney] Nora knew that remand 
orders were not appealable under Title 28 of the United States 
Code." 
¶33 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit issued an order directing Attorney Nora and her client 
to file a memorandum explaining why the appeal should not be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  In her memorandum, Attorney 
Nora claimed that she had "the right and indeed the obligation 
to appear in her individual name and capacity as an aggrieved 
party" because she was the "target" of the sanctions imposed by 
the district court and she was "ethically obligated to indemnify 
Spencer for the cost and fee judgment."  Nora also included a 
statement that "Judge Crabb has engaged in a campaign of libel 
against Nora which will be addressed in the appropriate fora."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶34 Before the Seventh Circuit could rule, however, 
Attorney Nora filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Ms. 
Spencer, which delayed briefing on the Spencer appeal for a 
little less than five months.  Ultimately, on August 13, 2014, 
the Seventh Circuit issued a decision dismissing the appeal 
filed by Attorney Nora, concluding that there had been "no 
objectively 
reasonable 
basis 
for 
federal 
jurisdiction 
or 
removal" and that the appeal had been frivolous.5  The Seventh 
                                                 
5 The Seventh Circuit ultimately awarded PNC Bank over 
$25,000 in attorney fees and costs in responding to the 
frivolous appeal. 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
16 
 
Circuit ordered Attorney Nora to show cause why she should not 
be sanctioned for pursuing a frivolous appeal. 
¶35 Attorney Nora filed an initial response to the Seventh 
Circuit's order to show cause just two days later.  In her 
initial response, she claimed that the Seventh Circuit's 
decision contained "numerous factual findings for which there is 
no evidence in the record, for which judicial notice was not 
properly taken and which are offered to be proved to be clearly 
erroneous."  Attorney Nora also rehashed her arguments regarding 
removal and repeated her claim that Judge Crabb had libeled her 
by removing the seal from her medical records in a completely 
unrelated case.  Indeed, Attorney Nora claimed that Judge Crabb 
was in contempt of a Seventh Circuit order by removing the seal.6 
¶36 The Seventh Circuit ordered Attorney Nora to file "one 
proper response" to four questions listed in the order.  Instead 
of complying with the Seventh Circuit's order, Attorney Nora 
filed a petition for rehearing en banc, in which she again 
repeated all of the removal/remand arguments she had made 
before.  The Seventh Circuit denied the petition.  Attorney Nora 
then moved for a stay so she could file a certiorari petition in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, but she never actually filed the 
certiorari petition. 
                                                 
6 The referee found from a copy of Judge Crabb's decision in 
the other case, which was admitted into evidence in this 
proceeding, that the basis for the ruling was that Attorney Nora 
had failed to file the documents under seal pursuant to an 
existing protective order and had not moved to seal them.  
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
17 
 
¶37 Despite the Seventh Circuit's directive to file "one 
response," on September 14, 2014, Attorney Nora filed a document 
entitled "Partial Response to Order to Show Cause."  In that 
document, she denied that she had accused Judge Potter and his 
court reporter of "fraudulently manipulating transcripts."  She 
also included a number of accusations against the Seventh 
Circuit and lower courts in the circuit.  Specifically, she 
stated, "The bias of this panel and many of the judges in this 
circuit against homeowners' rights to be heard and defend their 
homes is apparent in every disputed sentence of the 'findings' 
in the panel's decision."  (Emphasis added.)  She also asserted 
that a number of the statements in the Seventh Circuit's 
decision were "false," including that she had accused Judge 
Potter, opposing counsel, and the court clerk of colluding to 
conceal the contents of an order, that she had accused the court 
reporter of intentionally manipulating a hearing transcript at 
Judge Potter's direction, and that she had demanded that Judge 
Potter recuse himself.  On October 17, 2014, Attorney Nora filed 
a motion for a continuance of the show cause hearing allegedly 
due to medical reasons.  The Seventh Circuit denied Attorney 
Nora's motion for a continuance, but it allowed her to appear 
for the hearing by speakerphone.  Although she had asserted an 
inability to appear due to medical reasons, Attorney Nora 
appeared in person for the October 28, 2014 show cause hearing.  
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit imposed a $2,500 sanction on 
Attorney Nora for frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings.  
In its sanction order, the Seventh Circuit stated that Attorney 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
18 
 
Nora had failed to comply with its order to limit herself to 
"one proper response" to the court's order to show cause.  It 
also described Attorney Nora's petition for rehearing en banc as 
"rehashing her frivolous appellate arguments."   It stated that 
Attorney Nora had engaged in "conduct unbecoming a member of the 
court's bar."  It explained the basis for its sanction as 
follows: 
Nora has repeatedly acted with needless antagonism 
toward opposing counsel and judicial officers.  In her 
responses to our order to show cause, she has refused 
to back down from her accusations of libel against 
Judge 
Crabb 
and 
"actionable 
civil 
fraud 
and 
racketeering" against opposing counsel.  She denies 
accusing 
the 
state 
court 
judge 
of 
altering 
transcripts, but the record belies her denial; she not 
only made the accusation but moved for substitution of 
the judge on that basis.  She also now derides "this 
panel and many of the judges in this circuit" as being 
biased "against homeowners' rights to be heard and 
defend their homes."  This bandying about of serious 
accusations 
without 
basis 
in 
law 
or 
fact 
is 
unacceptable and warrants sanctions. 
¶38 On March 10, 2014, when the Spencer foreclosure action 
was again pending in the Wood County circuit court, Attorney 
Nora filed a second motion to disqualify Judge Potter, which he 
again denied.  Judge Potter subsequently granted PNC Bank's 
summary judgment motion, entered a judgment of foreclosure, and 
dismissed Spencer's counterclaim.  The circuit court confirmed 
the sheriff's sale of the foreclosed property.  Attorney Nora 
filed appeals from both the judgment of foreclosure and from the 
order confirming the sale.  In May 2016 the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of foreclosure and the confirmation order. 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
19 
 
¶39 The 
OLR 
alleged 
three 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
Attorney 
Nora's 
actions 
in 
representing Ms. Spencer, most of which addressed Attorney 
Nora's conduct in federal court.  In Count 1 the OLR alleged 
that Attorney Nora had violated SCR 20:3.1(a) by taking two 
actions:  (1) removing the foreclosure action to federal court 
without a colorable basis for federal jurisdiction, and (2) 
filing a frivolous motion to reconsider Judge Crabb's remand 
order.7  The referee concluded that this count should be 
dismissed because Attorney Nora was deprived of due process when 
the OLR's complaints failed to give her adequate notice of the 
misconduct with which she was charged by failing to specify the 
subsection of SCR 20:3.1(a) that she had violated.8 
¶40 With respect to Count 2, the referee concluded that 
the OLR had proven that Attorney Nora had violated SCR 20:3.29 by 
filing a frivolous appeal on behalf of her client and herself 
when she was not a party to the litigation and by engaging in an 
ongoing pattern of conduct to harass other parties and judicial 
officers and to delay the proceedings. 
                                                 
7 The operative language of Count 1 is set forth in 
paragraph 10 above.   
8 The referee acknowledged that if this court concluded that 
there was no due process violation, the OLR had proven by clear, 
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the conduct described 
in Count 1 had violated all three subsections of SCR 20:3.1(a).  
Indeed, the referee said that the evidence of violations of all 
three subsections was "overwhelming." 
9 SCR 20:3.2 provides that "[a] lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of 
the client."   
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
20 
 
¶41 The referee also determined that the OLR had proven a 
violation of the Attorney's Oath in SCR 40.15, which is 
enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(g).10  
¶42 The 
referee 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Nora 
had 
used 
accusations of misconduct against others as merely a standard 
part of the defense of a foreclosure action, specifically to 
delay the action so that the client could remain in the home for 
as long as possible.  He noted that in its sanction decision, 
the Seventh Circuit had found that Attorney Nora had made 
arguments with no reasonable expectation of success and merely 
for the purposes of delay, harassment, and "sheer obstinacy."  
The 
referee 
similarly 
concluded 
that 
in 
the 
Spencer 
representation, "[i]t is clear from the very beginning of her 
entrance into that case her goal was to delay a judgment of 
foreclosure as long as possible."  The referee found that 
Attorney Nora knew that her attacks against Judge Potter and 
court personnel would "buy her more time" because the court 
would have to resolve her allegations of misconduct before it 
could return to the merits of the case. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING COUNTS 4-5 
¶43 Counts 4-5 relate to Attorney Nora's representation of 
the Rinaldis.  They had been the defendants in a foreclosure 
action brought by HSBC Bank (HSBC) in the Kenosha County circuit 
court (Case No. 2009CV353 or the foreclosure action).  Attorney 
                                                 
10 SCR 
20:8.4(g) 
provides 
that 
"[i]t 
is 
professional 
misconduct to: . . . (g) violate the attorney's oath; . . . ." 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
21 
 
Nora was not involved in that foreclosure action.  HSBC was able 
to obtain a judgment of foreclosure and a dismissal of the 
Rinaldis' counterclaims.  Ultimately, however, HSBC agreed to a 
vacation of the judgment and dismissal of the case when the 
Rinaldis entered into a loan modification agreement. 
¶44 In June 2011, after the dismissal of the foreclosure 
action, the Rinaldis filed a civil action against, inter alia, 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and the Gray Firm.  (Kenosha County Case 
No. 2011CV1477)  The defendants filed motions to dismiss in 
response to the complaint.  Attorney Nora appeared in Case No. 
2011CV1477 at the end of August 2011.  Approximately one week 
after filing her notice of appearance, Attorney Nora filed a 
motion to dismiss Case No. 2011CV1477 without prejudice. 
¶45 The circuit court, however, did not have a chance to 
rule on the pending motion to dismiss because on October 14, 
2011, Attorney Nora filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of the 
Rinaldis in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin.  HSBC filed a notice of claim regarding 
the note and mortgage (and presumably the loan modification 
agreement) signed by the Rinaldis.  Attorney Nora filed an 
objection to the bank's proof of claim and then filed an 
adversary action against, inter alia, HSBC, Wells Fargo, the 
Gray Firm (and certain of its lawyers), and the Litchfield Cavo 
law firm (and one of its lawyers who had appeared for Wells 
Fargo in Case No. 2011CV1477).  In the objection, Attorney Nora 
alleged that the note lacked consideration, that two assignments 
of the mortgage were null and void, that a third assignment of 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
22 
 
the mortgage was a forgery, and that HSBC was not the owner or 
holder of the note.  In the adversary action, Attorney Nora 
alleged claims of common law fraud, abuse of legal process, 
violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
violations of the federal Racketeering and Corrupt Practices 
Act, 
breach 
of 
contract, 
and 
tortious 
interference 
with 
prospective economic opportunity. 
¶46 United States Bankruptcy Judge Susan Kelley rejected 
the Rinaldis' objection to HSBC's proof of claim, including 
Attorney Nora's claim that the bank had produced a forged 
endorsement of the note and mortgage.  Judge Kelley also 
recommended that the district court dismiss the claims alleged 
in the adversary action.  Judge Kelley characterized some of the 
claims asserted by Attorney Nora in both the objection and the 
adversary proceeding as "frivolous" and "preposterous." 
¶47 Attorney Nora filed (1) an appeal from Judge Kelley's 
decision rejecting the objection to HSBC's proof of claim and 
(2) an objection to Judge Kelley's recommendation to the 
district court to dismiss the adversary proceeding.  The appeal 
and objection were consolidated before United States District 
Court Judge J.P. Stadtmueller. 
¶48 Judge Stadtmueller issued a decision on October 31, 
2013, in which he affirmed Judge Kelley's dismissal of the 
objection to HSBC's proof of claim and adopted Judge Kelley's 
proposed findings and conclusions regarding the dismissal of the 
adversary proceeding.  Judge Stadtmueller further held that 
Attorney Nora had failed to comply with the Federal Rules of 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
23 
 
Bankruptcy Procedure regarding appeals.  He stated that the 
Rinaldis had "failed to provide a cogent statement of the issues 
on 
appeal" 
and 
had 
provided 
briefs 
"that 
are 
largely 
unintelligible" 
and 
that 
were 
"an 
unfocused, 
stream-of-
consciousness-style recitation of general grievances the debtors 
have asserted in various forms since the origination of this 
litigation in state court."  He further held that any issues 
regarding the assignment of the mortgage did not affect HSBC's 
rights as holder of the Rinaldis' note.  He described the claims 
in the adversary proceeding as "generally meritless" and 
expressed concern that the Rinaldis were simply attempting to 
stay the foreclosure of their home, meaning that their claim of 
abuse of process would apply more to them than to the lender and 
the other defendants.  Finally, Judge Stadtmueller warned the 
Rinaldis (and Attorney Nora) "that they will find themselves in 
very deep trouble if additional meritless filings find their way 
to this Court (seeing as this Court has already had the 
responsibility of dealing with their all-but-frivolous filings 
in Case No. 12-CV-1065) and may very well result in significant 
sanctions." 
¶49 Attorney Nora filed a motion to amend the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment entered by Judge 
Stadtmueller.  Her motion alleged the same kind of arguments 
that she had previously made in her filings to both the 
bankruptcy court and the district court, including that the 
mortgage had been fraudulently assigned by Wells Fargo.  On 
December 13, 2013, Judge Stadtmueller issued an order denying 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
24 
 
the motion, which stated that the Rinaldis had failed to 
identify any manifest error of law or fact that would entitle 
them to relief under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(e) and which 
explicitly warned them (and Attorney Nora) that "any further 
frivolous submissions will result in an award of appropriate 
sanctions against the Rinaldis' attorney." 
¶50 On December 23, 2013, Attorney Nora filed a notice of 
appeal from the orders issued by Judge Stadtmueller.  On 
February 11, 2014, she filed a motion to withdraw as the 
Rinaldis' counsel in all three of the applicable federal courts 
(bankruptcy court, district court, and court of appeals).  Judge 
Kelley heard the motion to withdraw on March 4, 2014, along with 
a motion by the U.S. Trustee to dismiss the bankruptcy 
proceeding due to the Rinaldis' failure to make payments.  Judge 
Kelley 
dismissed 
the 
bankruptcy 
proceeding, 
but 
retained 
jurisdiction over the sanction motion filed by the defendants in 
the adversary proceeding.  Judge Kelley also denied Attorney 
Nora's motion for reconsideration of her opinion that dismissal 
of the bankruptcy proceeding would moot the appeal Attorney Nora 
had filed on behalf of the Rinaldis.  In that motion for 
reconsideration, Attorney Nora essentially sought to dismiss the 
adversary proceeding. 
¶51 On April 2, 2014, Attorney Nora filed a motion to 
intervene 
personally 
in 
the 
Rinaldi 
case 
before 
Judge 
Stadtmueller.  On that same date, Attorney Nora filed a joint 
motion on behalf of herself and the Rinaldis for relief under 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b) from Judge Stadtmueller's prior orders.  
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
25 
 
The motion to intervene and the motion for relief under Rule 
60(b) repeated the same arguments Attorney Nora had been making 
in her prior filings on behalf of the Rinaldis.  The 
intervention motion also asserted that Attorney Nora had a right 
to intervene personally to defend against the sanction motion 
filed by the defendants in the adversary proceeding. 
¶52 On April 9, 2014, Judge Stadtmueller issued an order 
granting Attorney Nora's motion to withdraw and denying the 
motions to intervene and for relief under Rule 60(b).  Judge 
Stadtmueller also sanctioned Attorney Nora for filing the latter 
two motions: 
Last, as to Ms. Nora's motion to intervene and for 
Rule 60(b) relief, the Court notes that it has no 
choice but to impose sanctions against Ms. Nora.  In 
the Court's last order, it noted that "[w]ith this 
order, the Court hereby makes clear that any further 
frivolous submissions will result in an award of 
appropriate sanctions against the Rinaldis' attorney."  
(Docket #37 at 3 (emphasis in original)).  Despite 
that extremely clear warning, Ms. Nora filed the 
frivolous motions in question.  Therefore, the Court 
will enter a sanctions award against her, using its 
inherent authority to do so under Chambers v. Nasco, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).  The Court will direct that 
Ms. Nora pay to the Clerk of the Court $1,000.00 for 
deposit into the Eastern District of Wisconsin Pro 
Bono fund.  And let the Court be clear:  any further 
frivolous filings will result in even higher sanctions 
against Ms. Nora. 
¶53 The Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Stadtmueller's 
orders.  It stated that to the extent the adversary claims were 
not moot, it affirmed the orders dismissing the adversary 
proceeding for the reasons stated by the district court.  It 
also relied on an exception to the mootness doctrine that 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
26 
 
mootness should not be allowed where the losing party causes an 
appeal to become moot in order to avoid the preclusive effect of 
an unfavorable ruling.  It characterized Attorney Nora's attempt 
to dismiss as a "type of gamesmanship" intended to deprive the 
sound decisions of the bankruptcy court and the district court 
of preclusive effect.  Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
sanction 
award 
against 
Attorney 
Nora, 
stating 
that 
her 
obligations to her clients did not excuse her disregard of the 
district court's clear and repeated warnings against continued 
submission of frivolous and needlessly argumentative filings. 
¶54 Like Count 1, Count 4 alleged that certain actions 
taken by Attorney Nora (specifically the filing of frivolous 
motions to intervene personally and for relief from prior court 
orders under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2)) in the Rinaldi matter 
had violated SCR 20:3.1(a).  As with Count 1, the referee 
recommended that this court dismiss Count 4 on the ground that 
the lack of specification of the particular subsection of SCR 
20:3.1(a) in the second amended complaint violated Attorney 
Nora's due process rights. 
¶55 With respect to Count 5, the referee concluded that 
the OLR had sufficiently proven that Attorney Nora had violated 
SCR 20:3.2 by filing a frivolous motion to intervene and a 
frivolous motion for relief under Rule 60(b) in the district 
court, after that court had warned her that further frivolous 
submissions would result in an award of sanctions. 
REFEREE'S RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DISCIPLINE 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
27 
 
¶56 The OLR sought a one-year suspension of Attorney 
Nora's license to practice law in Wisconsin, comparing her 
misconduct to the misconduct found to have been committed by 
Attorney Joseph Sommers.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sommers, 2012 WI 33, 339 Wis. 2d 580, 811 N.W.2d 387 
(Sommers I); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers, 
2014 WI 103, 358 Wis. 2d 248, 851 N.W.2d 458 (Sommers II).  The 
referee 
found 
this 
comparison 
to 
be 
unhelpful 
because 
"[Attorney] Nora's misconduct in this case is on a level all of 
its own."  Unlike in the Sommers cases, Attorney Nora's 
misconduct was not limited to one particular case, court, or 
judge.  The referee said that "[i]t is clear that [Attorney] 
Nora 
generally 
practices 
law 
in 
a 
highly 
offensive 
and 
disrespectful fashion" and that she intentionally acts in an 
offensive, disrespectful, and difficult manner in order to delay 
the foreclosure proceedings against her clients, which she views 
as doing her job for them. 
¶57 The referee stated that Attorney Nora had shown no 
remorse for her conduct.  To the contrary, she believes that her 
tactics are appropriate in defending against foreclosures at all 
costs.  The referee twice stated that Attorney Nora sees herself 
as a hero for actions in defending against foreclosures, which 
the courts fail to appreciate.  She does not understand the 
difference 
between 
a 
vigorous 
and 
zealous 
defense 
and 
professional misconduct.  As an example, the referee pointed to 
the "many false accusations" that Attorney Nora made against 
Judge Potter, which she had failed to substantiate.  The referee 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
28 
 
further stated that, based on his observation of Attorney Nora 
during this disciplinary proceeding, he believed that, if given 
the chance, Attorney Nora would continue to engage in the type 
of misconduct at issue in this proceeding.  He noted that the 
misconduct in the prior disciplinary cases against her was 
similar to the misconduct found in this proceeding.  In sum, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Nora "represents a serious and 
ongoing threat to the public, the judges before which she 
appears, opposing counsel, and the legal profession."  He 
therefore recommended that the court suspend Attorney Nora's 
license for a period of two years.  He also recommended that the 
reinstatement of her license be conditioned "on good faith 
efforts by her to pay the tremendous costs incurred by the OLR 
and the lawyers of Wisconsin in this disciplinary proceeding." 
ATTORNEY NORA'S APPEAL 
¶58 When we review a referee's report, we will affirm a 
referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶59 Attorney Nora's opening brief on her appeal lists 18 
separate issues (some with multiple subparts) that she would 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
29 
 
like this court to address.11  A number of those issues or sub-
issues, however, are not sufficiently developed in Attorney 
Nora's brief, and we will not address them in this decision.  
Parsons v. Associated Banc-Corp., 2017 WI 37, ¶39 n.8, 374 Wis. 
2d 513, 893 N.W.2d 212. 
¶60 The first group of arguments on appeal by Attorney 
Nora allege due process violations.  She objects initially to 
the fact that the OLR included 174 proposed findings of fact 
with citations to the record in its post-hearing brief, arguing 
that these statements were "new factual allegations" and that 
the inclusion of them deprived her of due process before the 
referee. 
¶61 Attorney 
Nora 
contends 
that 
these 
"new 
factual 
allegations" were improper because the OLR did not obtain a 
                                                 
11 With each of her three appellate briefs, Attorney Nora 
filed a set of requests asking this court to take judicial 
notice of certain documents under Wis. Stat. § 901.01(4) and 
901.02(2)(b).  The documents at issue, copies of which Attorney 
Nora appended to her requests, appear to be, for the most part, 
filings from various underlying court proceedings.  The OLR did 
not object to this court taking judicial notice of the existence 
and contents of the documents.  Accordingly, we take judicial 
notice of the existence and of the contents of the requested 
documents.  We do not take judicial notice of the truth of any 
statements included in those documents.  In addition, we do not 
take judicial notice of the Rinaldis' Chapter 13 Plan in their 
bankruptcy proceeding because no such document was found as 
Exhibit F to Attorney Nora's April 2, 2019 second set of 
requests for judicial notice in support of her reply brief.  We 
also do not take judicial notice of the List of Nonpriority 
Unsecured Claims from Attorney Nora's personal bankruptcy 
proceeding that was attached as Exhibit G to her April 2, 2019 
second set of requests for judicial notice.  That document is 
not relevant to Attorney Nora's reply brief. 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
30 
 
"cause-to-proceed" determination as to most of those facts from 
a panel of the preliminary review committee (the PRC) under SCR 
22.11(2) before the evidentiary hearing in this proceeding.  
Attorney Nora apparently relies on the language in that rule 
which states that "[t]he complaint shall set forth only those 
facts and misconduct allegations for which the preliminary 
review panel determined there was cause to proceed . . . ."  
Attorney Nora reads this clause literally to mean that each 
allegation 
of 
fact 
in 
a 
disciplinary 
complaint 
must 
be 
specifically approved by the PRC.  She then attempts to extend 
the language to require PRC approval of proposed findings of 
fact in a post-hearing submission.  She does not offer any case 
law support for such an interpretation, nor does she analyze how 
this language from SCR 22.11(2) fits within the structure of the 
disciplinary process described in SCR ch. 22. 
¶62 Attorney Nora's argument is misplaced.  The procedural 
provisions in SCR ch. 22 regarding the presentation of a matter 
to a panel of the PRC do not require or even contemplate that 
the 
PRC 
will 
make 
any 
factual 
determinations 
about 
the 
information submitted by the OLR's director.  The director is 
required to submit to the PRC panel the OLR's "investigative 
reports, including all relevant exculpatory and inculpatory 
information obtained and appendices and exhibits, if any."  SCR 
22.06(1). 
 
The 
PRC 
panel 
does 
not 
make 
credibility 
determinations or decide what the specific facts regarding the 
matter are.  What it does do is determine, given the inculpatory 
and exculpatory information presented to it, whether there is 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
31 
 
sufficient plausible evidence for the OLR to proceed with a 
formal disciplinary claim against the respondent attorney.  The 
PRC panel does not review a proposed complaint and approve or 
disapprove specific factual allegations in a complaint.  
¶63 Indeed, a finding of cause to proceed by a PRC panel 
does not automatically lead to the filing of a disciplinary 
complaint.  A finding of cause to proceed merely authorizes the 
OLR director to "decide on the appropriate discipline or other 
disposition to seek in the matter."  SCR 22.08(2).  In some 
cases the director will determine that the appropriate next step 
is to file a formal complaint in this court asking it to impose 
discipline against the respondent attorney.  SCR 22.08(2)(c).  
In other words, the formal complaint can be drafted and filed 
after the PRC panel has completed its work.  In other cases, 
however, the director is authorized to obtain the respondent 
attorney's agreement to a consensual reprimand or to divert the 
matter 
to 
an 
alternative 
to 
discipline 
program. 
 
SCR 
22.08(2)(a)-(b). 
¶64 That the OLR is not bound to obtain approval of every 
factual allegation in a complaint or every proposed finding of 
fact in a post-hearing brief is demonstrated by the fact that 
SCR 22.11(5) authorizes the OLR to amend a complaint "as 
provided in the rules of civil procedure."  If Attorney Nora's 
view were correct, that subsection would also need to state that 
a complaint may be amended only if a PRC panel first approves 
the amended allegations.  The rule does not, however, contain 
any such requirement. 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
32 
 
¶65 In any event, in this case a PRC panel made a cause-
to-proceed determination as to the five misconduct claims that 
appear in all three versions of the OLR's complaint.  The 
amendments in both the first amended complaint and the second 
amended complaint did not add entirely new instances of conduct 
or new misconduct claims; they simply corrected some mistakes in 
the factual allegations.  Such amendments are clearly permitted 
under SCR 22.11(5) and do not require a second (or third) 
approval by a PRC panel under SCR 22.11(2).  Similarly, once a 
PRC panel has found cause to proceed on claims that are 
subsequently included in a formal complaint, there is no 
requirement in SCR 22.11 that the OLR obtain further approval of 
any particular summary of facts from the evidence introduced in 
the case or in any particular set of proposed findings of fact.  
To the extent that the OLR was able to flesh out the factual 
allegations of its second amended complaint by presenting 
evidence at the evidentiary hearing, that is entirely consistent 
with due process.  Indeed, that is the normal course of 
proceedings in all civil and criminal cases.  Accordingly, the 
OLR's inclusion of proposed findings of fact in its post-hearing 
brief did not violate SCR 22.11(2).  
¶66 Attorney Nora also argues that the inclusion of the 
174 allegedly "new" factual allegations in the OLR's post-
hearing brief violated her due process rights under In re 
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968).  In that matter, however, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process 
for 
the 
Ohio 
disciplinary 
authorities 
(the 
local 
bar 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
33 
 
association) to amend their disciplinary complaint during the 
disciplinary hearing and after the respondent attorney had 
testified in order to allege 
an entirely new claim of 
misconduct.12  Id. at 550-51.  That holding has no bearing on 
this proceeding because the OLR never attempted to allege an 
entirely new claim of misconduct in its amended complaints or in 
its post-hearing brief.  The five counts in the OLR's original 
complaint identified what conduct by Attorney Nora violated 
which rules of professional conduct.  Those five claims remained 
the same in each of the OLR's amended complaints.  The referee's 
conclusions of law likewise determine that the same conduct by 
Attorney Nora violated the same rules that the OLR identified in 
its complaints.  There is no due process violation under Ruffalo 
in this proceeding. 
¶67 Similarly, Attorney Nora alleges that the 174 "new 
factual allegations" in the OLR's post-hearing brief constituted 
a due process violation under this court's decision in State v. 
Hersh, 73 Wis. 2d 390, 243 N.W.2d 178 (1976).  In that case, 
this court found no due process violation where, under a 
previous attorney disciplinary regime, the Board of State Bar 
Commissioners was allowed to amend a complaint against a 
respondent attorney to conform the complaint to the evidence 
upon approval by a sufficient number of members of the board and 
                                                 
12 The appeal in Ruffalo actually arose out of a decision by 
the Sixth Circuit to disbar Attorney Ruffalo from practicing in 
that court, but the Sixth Circuit essentially relied on the Ohio 
state disciplinary proceeding in reaching its decision.  In re 
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 545, 547 (1968).   
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
34 
 
an adjournment of the disciplinary hearing occurred.  Attorney 
Nora points to a statement in that decision that a respondent 
attorney's due process rights in a disciplinary proceeding 
"encompasses only [the attorney's] right to prior notice of 
charges, [the attorney's] right to prepare to defend these 
charges, and [the attorney's] right to a full hearing on these 
charges."  Id. at 398.  We find no violation of these rights 
arising out of the OLR's submission of proposed findings of fact 
in a post-hearing brief.  Attorney Nora fails to demonstrate 
that those proposed findings of fact materially changed the 
nature of the allegations against her or the ethical rules which 
she was alleged to have violated.  The five counts in each of 
the 
OLR's 
three 
complaints, 
which 
remained 
consistent, 
adequately advised Attorney Nora which of her actions had 
violated 
which 
rules 
of 
professional 
conduct. 
 
She 
had 
sufficient notice of the charges to be able to prepare to defend 
against those claims.  She was accorded a four-day hearing at 
which to question the OLR's witnesses and to present her own 
testimony and exhibits.  Her due process rights were duly 
protected. 
¶68 Attorney Nora briefly alleges that her due process 
right to prepare and present a defense was also violated by 
various rulings by the referee.  These allegations are not 
sufficiently developed to warrant specific responses.  Even if 
we were to address them on the merits, we see no due process 
violations as a result of the referee's orders.  Attorney Nora 
had a sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery, to name 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
35 
 
witnesses, and to prepare and present a defense.  Her failure to 
avail herself of some of those opportunities does not mean that 
her due process rights were violated. 
¶69 The second group of arguments in Attorney Nora's 
appeal is styled as a broad challenge to the referee's factual 
findings.  Her arguments, however, challenge the referee's legal 
conclusions that she violated SCR 20:3.2 in Counts 2 and 5 as 
much as she challenges any particular factual findings.  She 
argues that under SCR 20:3.2, the referee erred in concluding 
that she had improperly delayed both the Spencer matter and the 
Rinaldi matter.  She contends that a lawyer can violate that 
rule only if the lawyer's actions had no substantial purpose 
other than to delay.  Since she alleges that she acted in good 
faith in taking the actions she took, there could be no 
conclusion of improper delay.  Moreover, she argues that her 
conduct did not actually result in delay of either the Spencer 
matter or the Rinaldi matter. 
¶70 Attorney Nora points to an American Bar Association 
comment to Model Rule 3.2 that the question under this rule is 
whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the 
course of action at issue as having some substantial purpose 
other than delay.  What Attorney Nora misses is that this 
comment demonstrates that the pertinent question under the rule 
is one of the lawyer's purpose or intent in pursuing the 
action(s) at issue.  Determining a person's intent requires a 
referee to make an inference from the lawyer's actions and 
statements under the circumstances.  See Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
36 
 
2008 WI App 67, ¶26, 312 Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359 (quoting 
Pfeifer v. World Serv. Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 567, 569, 360 
N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1984)).  Here, the referee drew factual 
inferences from the facts presented that Attorney Nora's purpose 
in taking a number of specified actions was to delay the Spencer 
matter and the Rinaldi matter.  To the extent that she 
challenges these factual inferences on appeal, Attorney Nora 
must show that the referee's inferences were clearly erroneous 
(i.e., that each inference was against the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence).  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. 
Co. of Wisconsin, 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 
615.  
¶71 Attorney Nora does not meet that high burden.  There 
was ample evidence with respect to both the Spencer matter and 
the Rinaldi matter to support the referee's determination that 
Attorney Nora's purpose was to place whatever road blocks she 
could construct in the path of concluding the various pieces of 
litigation.   
¶72 In the Spencer matter, Attorney Nora made a host of 
accusations against Judge Potter, claiming that he and his court 
staff had engaged in multiple ex parte communications with 
opposing counsel, that he had conducted "secret proceedings," 
and that he had been "collaborating" with opposing counsel and 
had been "complicit in the manipulation of the proceedings and 
of the record."  United States District Court Judge Crabb 
determined that Attorney Nora's subsequent attempt to remove the 
case to federal court was not objectively reasonable.  Instead 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
37 
 
of accepting the district court's ruling, Attorney Nora twice 
moved for reconsideration of Judge Crabb's remand order, 
resulting in Judge Crabb finding that her reconsideration 
requests were without basis and awarding costs and fees to the 
opposing party.  Attorney Nora then prolonged the federal 
proceedings by filing an appeal that the Seventh Circuit found 
to be frivolous, ultimately resulting in an award of sanctions 
against her. 
¶73 In the Rinaldi matter, Attorney Nora attempted to drag 
out the matter by raising objections and arguments that the 
federal bankruptcy judge characterized as frivolous.   She then 
attempted to intervene personally and to move for relief under 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b).  The federal district court again 
determined that Attorney Nora's motions had been frivolous and 
imposed sanctions.  On appeal the Seventh Circuit characterized 
Attorney Nora's actions as "gamesmanship" that it would not 
permit, and it affirmed the imposition of sanctions due to 
Attorney Nora's frivolous filings.  The referee's inferences of 
a purpose of delay by Attorney Nora in both matters were not 
clearly erroneous. 
¶74 Although it too falls within the portion of her 
argument regarding a lack of evidence to support the referee's 
factual findings, Attorney Nora's argument regarding Count 3 
(violation of the attorney's oath) is also more legal in nature 
than an allegation that the referee's factual findings were 
clearly erroneous.  She contends that her actions on behalf of 
Ms. Spencer arose from her constitutionally protected obligation 
No. 
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as a lawyer to seek redress from the courts on behalf of her 
client.  As this court already explained in Nora II, however, a 
lawyer's fight for a client's cause, however noble the lawyer 
might believe it to be, must be conducted within the ethical 
rules.  Nora, 380 Wis. 2d 311, ¶41.  Attorney Nora has not 
demonstrated any error in the referee's factual findings about 
Attorney Nora's specific actions in the Spencer matter or in the 
referee's determination that her actions constituted an ongoing 
pattern of conduct to harass other parties and judicial officers 
and to delay the proceedings.  The Seventh Circuit's description 
of her conduct, quoted in paragraph 37 above, supports the 
referee's findings in this regard.  The referee's factual 
findings and his inference that Attorney Nora's actions were 
intended to harass and to delay are not clearly erroneous.  A 
determination that Attorney Nora exceeded the bounds of ethical 
advocacy by her conduct does not violate her or her clients' 
constitutional rights to petition the judicial branch of 
government for redress.  
¶75 Attorney Nora includes a number of other general 
allegations that the referee erred in his evidentiary rulings, 
misapplied burdens of proof, and made unsupported findings in 
the discussion section of his report.  These allegations are 
insufficiently developed, and we need not address them here.   
¶76 Having 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Nora's 
appellate 
arguments are without merit, we accept the referee's factual 
findings and agree with his legal conclusions that the OLR 
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proved the ethical violations alleged in Counts 2, 3, and 5 of 
its second amended complaint. 
OLR'S CROSS-APPEAL 
¶77 We now turn to the OLR's cross-appeal of the dismissal 
of Counts 1 and 4 on the ground that the versions of the OLR's 
complaint failed to provide adequate notice as to which 
subsection of SCR 20:3.1(a) her conduct had violated.  First, we 
start from the observation that from its original complaint 
through to its second amended complaint, the OLR identified the 
specific actions by Attorney Nora that it alleged violated SCR 
20:3.1(a).  In the Spencer matter, the alleged misconduct was 
removing the foreclosure action against Ms. Spencer to the 
federal court with no colorable basis for federal jurisdiction 
and then filing frivolous motions for reconsideration of the 
federal district court's remand order.  In the Rinaldi matter, 
the alleged misconduct was filing in the federal district court 
a frivolous motion to intervene personally and a frivolous 
motion for relief from prior orders under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
60(b).   
¶78 Attorney Nora therefore knew the basis for those 
counts from the very beginning of the proceeding.  She litigated 
against those counts before the referee for more than two years, 
through motions to dismiss, through pretrial motions, through a 
four-day evidentiary hearing, and through the filing of a post-
hearing brief.  While in one early filing she did note that 
Count 4 of the complaint (specifically, paragraph 90) did not 
identify the subsections of SCR 20:3.1(a), she never alleged 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
40 
 
that the failure to identify the subsections of SCR 20:3.1(a) 
constituted a violation of her due process right to notice of 
the misconduct charges against her.  Through the filing of her 
post-hearing brief, she never alleged that she was unable to 
defend against Count 1 and 4 because the OLR's complaints had 
not specified which subsection of SCR 20:3.1(a) her actions had 
violated.  Had the referee not raised the issue sua sponte after 
the parties had concluded their post-hearing briefs, the 
litigation of the case before the referee would have concluded 
with no such claim having been made. 
¶79 Under these facts, we conclude that Attorney Nora 
forfeited any argument that Counts 1 and 4 of the OLR's 
complaints violated her due process rights.  The issue raised by 
the referee is a question of notice in pleading.  A respondent 
party cannot ignore an alleged defect in pleading all the way 
through the final evidentiary hearing (or trial) of a case and 
through 
post-hearing 
briefing, 
and 
then 
allege 
that 
the 
complainant's claim must be dismissed because it failed to 
provide adequate notice of the claim against the respondent.  
Permitting respondents to obtain dismissal of claims under those 
circumstances would endorse "gotcha" tactics and would undermine 
the orderly conduct of a disciplinary proceeding or any other 
civil action.  The prejudice of such a ruling is evident here.  
Because the alleged error by the OLR was one of pleading, it 
could have been easily remedied through the filing of an amended 
complaint if Attorney Nora had alleged a due process violation 
at any point during the actual litigation of the case.  By 
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2015AP2442-D   
 
41 
 
litigating the case through the evidentiary hearing, she 
prevented the OLR from having an opportunity to remedy any 
alleged deficiency in its complaint.  Moreover, the fact that 
she actually defended against Counts 1 and 4 at the evidentiary 
hearing undercuts an assertion that she lacked sufficient notice 
to prepare a defense on those counts. 
¶80 In addition, the fact that the referee ultimately 
raised the issue does not affect this analysis.  Attorney Nora's 
failure to raise the issue through the evidentiary hearing and 
post-hearing briefing still meant that her conduct in litigating 
the case through the evidentiary hearing prevented the OLR from 
amending those counts and obtaining a decision on their merits, 
whether or not the referee subsequently raised the issue.  The 
referee's raising of the issue after the evidentiary hearing was 
complete still prevented the OLR from correcting an alleged 
pleading deficiency.  Accordingly, we conclude that under these 
circumstances Counts 1 and 4 should not be dismissed based on a 
claimed due process violation that was clearly forfeited by 
Attorney Nora. 
¶81 The referee concluded that, if this court rejected his 
recommended dismissal of Counts 1 and 4 on due process grounds, 
the OLR did prove in each of those two counts that Attorney Nora 
had violated SCR 20:3.1(a) by clear, satisfactory and convincing 
evidence.  We agree with those conclusions. 
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE 
¶82 Having determined that Attorney Nora engaged in 
professional misconduct as alleged in all five counts of the 
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amended complaint, we turn to the issue of the appropriate level 
of discipline.  In assessing what is the proper level of 
discipline to impose, we consider various factors, including:  
"(1) the seriousness, nature and extent of the misconduct; (2) 
the level of discipline needed to protect the public, the 
courts, and the legal system from repetition of the attorney's 
misconduct; (3) the need to impress upon the attorney the 
seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the need to deter other 
attorneys 
from 
committing 
similar 
misconduct." 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶40, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718. 
¶83 It cannot reasonably be disputed that Attorney Nora's 
misconduct 
is 
serious. 
 
Although 
she 
criticizes 
as 
"inflammatory" the referee's description of the tactics she 
used, we view them as fair comments on Attorney Nora's actions.  
Quite simply, she has repeatedly abused the legal system to 
pursue her agenda of delaying foreclosure actions by any means 
possible.   
¶84 This is not an isolated incident of a lawyer allowing 
the lawyer's zeal in the heat of battle to overcome the lawyer's 
better judgment.  This is now the third time that Attorney Nora 
is being disciplined for similar conduct.  In just Nora II and 
this case, she has been found to have filed frivolous claims or 
taken frivolous positions in five separate actions.  Clearly, 
there is a lengthy pattern of similar misconduct.  She has been 
sanctioned multiple times in multiple courts for her frivolous 
filings.   
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43 
 
¶85 Her misconduct does pose a real threat to the 
administration of justice.  Not only has she improperly used the 
tools of the legal system to delay the completion of civil 
actions, she has repeatedly attacked the other participants in 
those actions (judges, lawyers, and litigants) with claims of 
unethical or even criminal conduct.  She alleged that Judge 
Potter had abandoned his role as a neutral magistrate to 
manipulate the record and to collude with opposing counsel to 
reach a corrupt result.  She accused Judge Crabb of engaging in 
a personal campaign of libel against her.  She accused the 
judges of the Seventh Circuit of being biased against the rights 
of homeowners.  Not only was she unwilling to accept the rulings 
of these judicial officers and therefore repeatedly challenged 
their rulings after the fact, she labeled those judges who did 
not accede to her tactics as being biased and unethical.  
Lawyers do not have to agree with a judge's rulings, but the 
legal system cannot function properly and maintain the necessary 
respect in the eyes of the public if lawyers baselessly attack 
the integrity of the individuals who preside in our courts.  
¶86 The referee found that Attorney Nora had not expressed 
any real remorse for her conduct throughout the proceedings 
before him.  Rather, her conduct in litigating this case 
demonstrated that she continued to believe her win-at-all-costs 
approach in foreclosure cases was justified.  He found that if 
she again held a valid license to practice law, she would not 
hesitate to use the same improper tactics.  In part, he reached 
this conclusion because he believed that there was little chance 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
44 
 
that Attorney Nora will ever understand why her actions were 
wrong and what damage her misconduct had caused.    Further, his 
belief was supported by the fact that during this disciplinary 
proceeding, Attorney Nora had reached into the same playbook, 
accusing the investigators and attorneys acting on behalf of the 
OLR of being biased and having engaged in serious professional 
misconduct, even in criminal activities.   
¶87 During oral argument before this court, Attorney Nora 
did acknowledge, to a limited degree, that she had crossed an 
ethical line.  She admitted that she had been overzealous at 
times and had shown an offensive personality in some of her 
filings, but she indicated that her fault had been in the 
incorrect manner in which she had articulated her positions.  
Attorney Nora did not show that she accepted and admitted that 
the actual positions and actions she took were improper, even 
though multiple courts had found multiple filings submitted by 
her to be frivolous and had imposed sanctions on her.   
¶88 Clearly, given her arguments to this court, Attorney 
Nora retains the same zeal for her cause of fighting against 
residential property lenders and mortgage holders.  While we 
recognize that she has now made some show of acknowledging a 
limited responsibility for her conduct, we share the referee's 
concern that Attorney Nora has not grasped or accepted the 
extent of her misconduct and that, at this point, she would be 
highly likely to repeat that misconduct if she held a valid 
license to practice law.  We therefore conclude that a 
substantial period of suspension is necessary to impress upon 
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2015AP2442-D   
 
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her the seriousness of her misconduct and to protect the public, 
the courts, and the legal system from a repetition of that 
misconduct. 
¶89 The 
referee 
commented 
that 
Attorney 
Nora's 
professional misconduct "is at a level all of its own, not 
previously seen in any Wisconsin disciplinary cases."  That 
observation 
seems, 
in 
our 
view, 
to 
be 
somewhat 
of 
an 
overstatement.  For example, we revoked the license of Attorney 
Alan Eisenberg when he not only commenced and continued a 
frivolous claim to harass an opposing party, but repeatedly made 
misrepresentations to damage the reputation of an opposing party 
and to gain leverage in a pending divorce action.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2010 WI 11, 322 Wis. 
2d 518, 778 N.W.2d 645.  While Attorney Nora's misconduct does 
share some similar traits with Attorney Eisenberg's misconduct, 
his prior disciplinary history and the culpability of his 
actions exceed those of Attorney Nora.  We therefore do not 
believe that a revocation of her license is necessary or 
appropriate. 
¶90 On the other hand, we agree with the referee that the 
OLR's initial analogy to the suspensions imposed on Attorney 
John Widule and Attorney Joseph Sommers is inadequate.  The 
Sommers I case, in which we imposed a 30-day suspension involved 
unusual mitigating factors and is particularly inapt, both 
factually and legally.  The Widule case,13 in which we imposed a 
                                                 
13 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 
34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
46 
 
six-month suspension did involve similar conduct in commencing 
and continuing a frivolous action, but that matter is also 
factually distinguishable.  Attorney Widule's misconduct was 
limited to one client representation and he had no prior record 
of receiving public discipline.  This is now the third 
disciplinary proceeding against Attorney Nora, and it involves 
the fourth and fifth actions in which Attorney Nora took 
frivolous positions.  Attorney Nora's professional misconduct 
warrants a significantly higher level of discipline than the 
six-month suspension we imposed on Attorney Widule. 
¶91 In addition, this court has generally followed a 
practice of imposing progressive discipline.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Netzer, 2014 WI 7, ¶49, 352 Wis. 2d 310, 841 
N.W.2d 820 ("This court has long adhered to the concept of 
progressive discipline in attorney regulatory cases."); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 
296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501 (". . . we have frequently 
followed the concept of progressive discipline, especially in 
cases involving a pattern of similar misconduct.").  The 
misconduct in this case is similar in nature to the misconduct 
found in Nora II, where we imposed a one-year suspension.  A 
longer suspension is appropriate here. 
¶92 Having considered all of the factors discussed above, 
we conclude that a two-year suspension of Attorney Nora's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin is necessary to impress 
upon her the seriousness of her misconduct and to protect the 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
47 
 
courts and the legal 
system from a repetition of that 
misconduct. 
¶93 In 
his 
report 
the 
referee 
commented 
that 
he 
recommended a two-year suspension, "consecutive to any current 
suspensions."  His report, however, was issued while Attorney 
Nora was serving the one-year suspension imposed in Nora II.  If 
this case had concluded while that one-year suspension remained 
in effect, it would have been logical to begin the current 
suspension following the completion of the prior suspension.   
¶94 Generally, disciplinary suspensions imposed by this 
court are prospective—i.e., they commence at the time that the 
suspension is imposed or within a few weeks thereafter.  
Commencing the two-year suspension imposed in this proceeding as 
of April 30, 2019, when the one-year suspension from Nora II 
expired, 
would 
make 
the 
current 
suspension 
retroactive.  
"Generally, a retroactive suspension is disfavored in the 
absence of some compelling circumstance."  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Woods, 2011 WI 46, ¶2, 334 Wis. 2d 324, 800 
N.W.2d 
875 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
We 
find 
no 
compelling 
circumstance here that would warrant beginning the current two-
year suspension more than one year ago. 
¶95 We do, however, recognize that the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the attendant matters that have consumed the court over the 
last several months have impacted the timing of this decision.  
We therefore conclude that it is appropriate to make the two-
year suspension effective as of April 1, 2020.  
No. 
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48 
 
¶96 The referee also recommended that this court condition 
the reinstatement of Attorney Nora's license on "good faith 
efforts by her to pay the tremendous costs incurred by the OLR 
and the lawyers of Wisconsin in this disciplinary proceeding."  
We do not impose this condition.  First, such a condition would 
ordinarily be unnecessary because a lawyer's reinstatement 
petition from a suspension of six months or more must show that 
the lawyer has fully complied with the terms of the suspension 
order, which would ordinarily include a requirement that the 
lawyer pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.  See SCR 
22.29(4)(c).  Further, the condition is not necessary in this 
case because, as discussed below, we are not ordering Attorney 
Nora to pay the costs of this proceeding pursuant to the OLR's 
request. 
¶97 We do, however, determine that it is necessary and 
appropriate to impose a different condition on any reinstatement 
proceeding that Attorney Nora may initiate.  A number of courts 
have imposed monetary sanctions on her individually as a result 
of her filing frivolous documents.  Paying those monetary 
sanctions is an appropriate way for Attorney Nora to demonstrate 
that 
she 
has 
accepted 
responsibility 
for 
her 
actions.  
Consequently, we require as a condition of reinstatement that 
any reinstatement petition filed by Attorney Nora (1) identify 
each monetary sanction amount that has been imposed on her by 
any court and that is outstanding as of the date of this 
decision and (2) allege that she has made a good faith effort to 
pay all such sanction amounts.  She must then prove during the 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
49 
 
reinstatement proceedings before the referee that she has made a 
good faith effort to pay all of the sanction amounts identified 
in her petition.  The failure of Attorney Nora to meet these 
conditions will be sufficient grounds for the dismissal of her 
reinstatement petition.  
¶98 The OLR does not request any restitution award.  
Attorney Nora's misconduct at issue did not involve her 
retaining 
funds 
that 
should 
be 
delivered 
to 
others.  
Consequently, we do not include restitution in our order. 
¶99 Finally, we turn to the issue of costs.  Attorney Nora 
filed an objection to the OLR's statement of costs and to the 
referee's recommendation regarding costs, based in part on the 
fact that the OLR did not provide an itemization initially with 
its statement of costs and the referee submitted his cost 
recommendation before Attorney Nora filed her objection.  After 
oral argument, we issued an order that directed the OLR to file 
a supplemental statement of appellate costs with an attached 
full itemization of costs and that permitted Attorney Nora to 
file a new, comprehensive objection.   
¶100 One of Attorney Nora's objections to a cost award was 
that she has been pursuing a personal bankruptcy proceeding in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota 
(the Minnesota bankruptcy court).  On June 15, 2020, the OLR 
filed a Revised Recommendation Regarding Costs.  It noted that 
the Minnesota bankruptcy court had recently issued a discharge 
in bankruptcy to Attorney Nora.  It requested that the court not 
No. 
2015AP2442-D   
 
50 
 
order Attorney Nora to pay the costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
¶101 Under the particular circumstances of this matter and 
in light of the OLR's request, we will not require Attorney Nora 
to pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding.14   
¶102 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Wendy Alison Nora to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 
years, effective April 1, 2020. 
¶103 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that as a condition of 
reinstatement, any petition seeking reinstatement from the 
license suspension imposed in this proceeding must (1) identify 
each monetary sanction amount that has been imposed on her 
individually by any court and that is outstanding as of the date 
of this decision and (2) allege that she has made a good faith 
effort to pay all such sanction amounts.  In addition, Attorney 
Nora must prove during the reinstatement proceedings before the 
referee that she has made a good faith effort to pay all of the 
sanction amounts identified in her petition. 
¶104 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no costs shall be imposed 
upon Wendy Alison Nora in this proceeding. 
¶105 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
administrative 
suspension of Wendy Alison Nora's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin, due to her failure to pay mandatory bar dues and her 
failure to file a trust account certification, will remain in 
                                                 
14 The OLR's supplemental statement of costs indicated that 
the costs of this proceeding were $94,997.97. 
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2015AP2442-D   
 
51 
 
effect until each reason for the administrative suspension has 
been rectified pursuant to SCR 22.28(1). 
¶106 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wendy Alison Nora shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶107 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement from the 
suspension imposed herein.  See SCR 22.28(3). 
 
 
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2015AP2442-D   
 
 
 
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