Case Title: State v. Suriano

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000959-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP959-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jack M. Suriano, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 73, 879 N.W.2d 809 
(WI Ct. App. 2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 27, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Door 
 
JUDGE: 
D. T. Ehlers 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by BRADLEY, A. 
W., J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Colleen Marion, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Kevin 
M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief was 
Daniel 
P. 
Lennington, 
assistant 
attorney 
general, 
Misha 
Tseytlin, solicitor general and Brad D, Schimel, attorney 
general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, 
state public defender and Joseph N. Ehmann, regional attorney 
 
 
2 
manager, Wisconsin State Public Defender.  Oral argument by 
Joseph N. Ehmann. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 42
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP959-CR 
(L.C. No. 
13CM249) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jack M. Suriano, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 27, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We review whether Jack 
Suriano's actions, which caused three attorneys appointed by the 
State 
Public 
Defender 
to 
withdraw 
in 
rapid 
succession, 
constituted forfeiture of his right to counsel, and whether the 
right-to-counsel warnings and procedure this court recommended 
in State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), 
should be made mandatory.  We conclude that Suriano forfeited 
his constitutional right to counsel by repeatedly refusing to 
cooperate with his attorneys, constantly complaining about their 
performance, verbally abusing them, and triggering one lawyer's 
fear of a physical threat.  Suriano's dilatory and manipulative 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
2 
 
game-playing frustrated the progression of this case and 
interfered with the proper administration of justice.  We uphold 
the circuit court's1 determination that Suriano forfeited his 
right to counsel, and we affirm the court of appeals decision.2  
We see no reason to change the forfeiture standard this court 
set forth in Cummings and decline Suriano's request to modify 
it.  Instead, we reaffirm our holding that right-to-counsel 
warnings in forfeiture cases and the procedures suggested by the 
Cummings dissent are strongly recommended, but not required.  We 
affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In October 2013, Suriano obstructed the Door County 
Sheriff's Department and sanitation officials who came to his 
home with a warrant to take a soil sample from the property.  
Police arrested Suriano, and he was charged with obstructing an 
officer, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) (2013-14).3  Due to 
Suriano's indigence, the State Public Defender ("SPD") appointed 
Attorney Grant Erickson as his lawyer. 
¶3 
Less than one month later, Erickson filed a motion to 
withdraw telling the circuit court he and Suriano had "differing 
                                                 
1 The Honorable D. Todd Ehlers of Door County Circuit Court 
presided. 
2 State v. Suriano, No. 2015AP959-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
3 
 
opinions and objectives for the handling and resolution of this 
case."  At the hearing on the withdrawal motion, the circuit 
court asked Suriano if he opposed the motion.  Suriano answered:  
"Well, I think we need to have some testimony on that.  Maybe if 
I could put Grant on the stand and ask him a question or two.  
Get some information on the record here."  Suriano asked 
Erickson what Erickson's end goal was and how it differed from 
Suriano's end goal.  Erickson testified that, while his goal was 
to resolve the case, Suriano's goals included: 
 To take depositions of all the parties and explore all 
contractual relationships; 
 To prove his innocence; 
 "[T]o explore every legal or even nonlegal aspect of this 
case" to make things difficult and frustrate "the legal 
system"; 
 "To be an ass"; and 
 "[T]o make it difficult or frustrating for the court 
system to proceed" because Suriano believed he was 
improperly charged. 
After this testimony, the circuit court again asked Suriano if 
he opposed Erickson's motion.  Suriano did not directly answer 
the court's question; instead, he responded:  "Anybody would 
probably be better so --."  Interpreting this answer as a "no," 
the circuit court granted the motion but warned Suriano that it 
"did not anticipat[e]" changing the February 2014 pretrial and 
March 2014 trial dates that remained on the calendar. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
4 
 
¶4 
The 
SPD 
gave 
Suriano 
a 
second 
attorney, 
Linda 
Schaefer, who very quickly moved to withdraw, averring that "a 
significant conflict ha[d] developed" so she could "no longer 
effectively represent Mr. Suriano."  At the February 2014 
pretrial hearing, the circuit court addressed Schaefer's motion 
and asked Suriano if he wanted to comment on it.  Suriano said 
"No," and the circuit court granted the motion.  This second 
withdrawal clearly bothered the circuit court, prompting a 
warning for Suriano: 
[T]he other thing I would suggest, Mr. Suriano, you do 
is call the public defender's office.  You will now be 
on your third attorney appointed with the public 
defender's office.  I think they have a three strike 
rule. 
 
Talk 
to 
them 
about 
that. . . . [W]hen 
individuals go through three attorneys, they don't 
appoint an attorney any longer so maybe you need to 
call them and talk to them about that also, sir, 
because, as I said, you are now going to be on your 
third attorney with the public defender's office. 
When discussing the existing trial date, Suriano asked the 
circuit court to send communications directly to him "rather 
than sending it to someone who won't share it with me," but the 
court explained that "all correspondence and communication from 
the Court goes through your attorney, not to you directly." 
¶5 
The SPD appointed Raj Kumar Singh as Suriano's third 
attorney.  At an April 2014 status conference, Singh told the 
circuit court: 
 Suriano insisted Singh remind the court Suriano refused 
to enter his own plea at his initial appearance and 
instead stood "mute"; 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
5 
 
 Suriano wanted the case dismissed; 
 Great "discord" already existed between Suriano and Singh 
on "the law that relates to this case"; and 
 Suriano 
was 
completely 
dissatisfied 
with 
Singh's 
"performance so far as his lawyer," causing Singh to 
think Suriano "really wants to represent himself." 
Then, Singh asked the circuit court to question "Suriano 
directly about whether or not he wants me to continue as his 
lawyer."  Singh requested the circuit court's help to make sure 
Suriano understood: 
That if he wants anybody, whoever it is, let's say 
it's me to represent him as an attorney, then he's 
reserving three things for himself:  How to plead; 
whether or not to waive his right to a jury.  Now then 
there is more to that than that, but that's his part.  
And whether or not to testify in his own defense or 
remain silent.  He needs to understand, other than 
those three things, all of the other decisions are 
left to the attorney, if you agree.  And with that 
understanding, does he want to have an attorney 
representing him and, specifically does he want me 
because I have reason to doubt that he does want me 
and I have reason to doubt that he wants an actual 
attorney in general. 
¶6 
The circuit court then asked Singh about the SPD's 
"three-strike" rule——that is, whether the SPD would appoint 
another attorney when a defendant has already had three SPD-
appointed attorneys who withdrew.4  Singh responded he could not 
                                                 
4 The Wisconsin State Public Defender, appearing as amicus, 
said the SPD does not practice a "three-strike" rule.  SPD 
amicus counsel explained that indigent defendants do not have a 
constitutional right to a successor counsel, but Wisconsin rules 
do allow one substitute appointment regardless of the reason 
when it "is the only such request made by the person" and the 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
6 
 
speak for the SPD, but he had "grave doubts" about whether the 
SPD would appoint a fourth attorney if Suriano fired Singh.  
Singh said everyone should "assume that if I end up off the case 
he's going to have to either represent himself [or] get a lawyer 
on the economy."  The court then specifically asked Suriano if 
he wanted Singh to continue as his lawyer.  Suriano did not 
directly answer the court's question; instead, he rattled off a 
series of complaints about Singh, claimed he had not "received 
any value" from the SPD, and contended that, although his case 
should be "very easy to win on dismissal," none of his lawyers 
would pursue it. 
¶7 
Suriano proceeded to ask the circuit court how he 
could get a court-appointed attorney.  The court explained how 
the fees and billing work with a court-appointed attorney, but 
told Suriano it would not appoint an attorney if Suriano was 
eligible for a SPD appointment.  The circuit court again warned 
Suriano that, if he dismissed three SPD-appointed lawyers, the 
SPD would not give him another one. 
                                                                                                                                                             
"change in counsel will not delay the disposition of the case or 
otherwise be contrary to the interests of justice."  See Wis. 
Admin. Code § PD 2.04(1)(May 2010).  SPD will continue to try to 
appoint counsel beyond the scope of the rule, but it faces 
challenges when making fourth, fifth, and sixth appointments for 
defendants.  The record here nonetheless reflects that the SPD 
refused to appoint Suriano a fourth attorney, and the denial 
letter did not give a reason for the decision.  At oral 
argument, SPD amicus counsel suggested that the denial was 
linked to the circuit court's forfeiture finding, but nothing in 
the record confirms that inference. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
7 
 
¶8 
Suriano asked whether the circuit court would appoint 
counsel if he ended up "getting dumped by the public defender's 
office."  The court cautioned:  "I will take up your petition 
when it's filed.  I'm not saying I will grant it or I won't 
grant it.  I'm just telling you that's the procedure and that's 
how the case gets billed."  Then the court again asked Suriano 
if he wanted "to get rid" of Singh as his attorney.  Suriano 
again refused to answer the question directly with a yes or no.  
Instead, he:  (1) criticized Singh's representation as not 
benefitting him; (2) said he "hesitate[ed] to go around firing 
people, especially because there might be consequences"; and 
(3) suggested Singh withdraw because that might make Suriano 
look better to the SPD.  Attorney Singh explained he was not 
filing a motion to withdraw but wanted to make a record on the 
issues that arose since his appointment: 
 He was unable to speak to Suriano by phone, as Suriano 
claimed he did not have a phone; 
 Suriano refused to meet in person with him on several 
occasions; 
 He had sent many letters to Suriano and received many 
emails from Suriano, although he told Suriano it is not 
his practice to confer with clients by email; 
 Suriano finally accepted that the law does not allow for 
depositions in his case, but Suriano made Singh prove 
this by showing him a copy of the statute instead of 
taking his lawyer's word; 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
8 
 
 Singh saw no merit in the motion to suppress Suriano 
wanted to file; and 
 Suriano did not want a trial and wanted the charge 
dismissed. 
¶9 
After a brief back and forth with the circuit court in 
which Suriano insisted that it was his attorney who wished to 
withdraw, the court stopped the exchange:  "I'm done going 
around in circles here this afternoon.  We're moving forward 
with this case.  It's now going on seven months old.  It needs 
to be scheduled and resolved one way or another."  Singh then 
told the court Suriano forbade him from filing a motion to 
withdraw without Suriano's preapproval, Suriano wanted to make 
all the lawyering decisions, and Suriano just wanted Singh "to 
be his clerk typist."  Singh urged the court to insist Suriano 
"make a decision right now does he want to represent himself or 
does he want [Singh] to represent him."  When the court asked 
him once again, Suriano talked around the issue and suggested 
the court schedule another hearing rather than the trial.  The 
court then allowed Singh to try to get a direct answer from 
Suriano by asking, "Mr. Suriano, would you like me to go forward 
as your attorney on this case knowing what I have informed you 
over the past weeks of our relationship?  Yes or no, please."  
Suriano refused to answer yes or no, responding, "I haven't 
considered all of that."  The court ruled Suriano's refusal to 
answer meant Singh would remain as his lawyer.  The court 
scheduled the jury trial for June 2014. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
9 
 
¶10 One month later, Singh filed a motion to withdraw, 
titled, 
"Defendant's 
Motion 
for 
an 
Order 
of 
Attorney's 
Withdrawal."  He explained to the circuit court that Suriano 
emailed the SPD Director of Appointments and accused Singh of 
being a liar and refusing to communicate, investigate, seek 
discovery, or prosecute a motion to suppress.  Suriano's email 
included disparaging remarks and accusations against Singh, 
ending with:  "I have not received legitimate representation.  I 
need a real attorney."  In an email directly to Singh, Suriano 
leveled a similar attack.  Singh told the court: 
He will not cooperate with me at all.  He wants to 
micromanage what I do.  He wants to basically have me 
be, figuratively speaking, the fingers on his hand, 
and I've tried to explain to him that's simply not 
acceptable.  It's not acceptable to anybody within the 
practice of law.  I can't do that.  I have to be like 
a medical doctor.  I have to take full responsibility 
for what I do.  I have repeatedly explained to 
Mr. Suriano that he has -- if he wishes to be 
represented, if that's the case, then he has three 
decisions and only three that are kept within his 
purview:  How to plead, whether or not to testify in 
his own defense, and whether or not to try to [or] 
waive jury.  Other than that, he is allowing the 
attorney to make all other decisions and he has 
absolutely expressed to me his -- his rejection of 
that.5 
                                                 
5 SPD asks that we remind circuit courts that attorney 
withdrawal motions should not be granted simply based on 
disagreement about legal strategy; instead, circuit courts 
should advise defendants which legal choices belong to the 
defendant and which ones counsel controls.  Although we agree 
this 
procedure 
may 
be 
beneficial, 
we 
recognize 
that 
circumstances in some cases might prevent a circuit court from 
doing so.  We do encourage circuit courts, where circumstances 
allow, to instruct SPD-appointed lawyers and their clients about 
the choices for which each is responsible and that disagreement 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
10 
 
¶11 When the circuit court asked Suriano if he "opposed 
[Singh's] . . . request to be allowed to withdraw," Suriano 
again refused to answer yes or no, saying only:  "I'm opposed to 
the technicalities."  Bothered that Singh labeled the motion 
"[d]efendant's motion for order to withdraw as if I'm firing 
him," Suriano told the court that if Singh "put up a clean 
motion to withdraw, I won't object."  In other words, Suriano 
wanted Singh to withdraw rather than making it look like Suriano 
fired him.  Suriano then launched into a complaint about Singh 
that covers three transcript pages.  He did not deny sending the 
attacking emails; indeed, he told the court he would say it all 
over again because "[i]t's all true."  Singh advised the court:  
"[T]he hostility and anger that this man has shown to me is such 
that I will not meet with him at any location that does not have 
screening with a metal detector.  I will not do it." 
¶12 After Suriano continued complaining about Singh's 
representation, the prosecutor added:  "I believe an ample basis 
both because of the number of attorneys and the reasons on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
on legal strategy alone may be insufficient for withdrawal.  
Specifically, defendants retain "the ultimate authority to make 
certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether 
to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, 
or take an appeal."  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983).  All other tactical decisions, "including the objections 
to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance" 
are "of practical necessity" controlled by counsel because 
"[t]he adversary process could not function effectively if every 
tactical decision required client approval."  See Gonzales v. 
United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008)(quoting Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988)). 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
11 
 
record given by two out of the four[6] attorneys that have 
represented Mr. Suriano representing Mr. Suriano's behavior that 
if you grant the motion to withdraw I think you should also find 
the defendant has forfeited his right to public representation 
and that he either goes alone or goes out and hires his own 
lawyer." 
¶13 Finding the relationship irretrievably broken, the 
circuit court granted Singh's motion to withdraw.  The circuit 
court then gave Suriano an opportunity to be heard on the 
State's request that the court find forfeiture.  Suriano argued 
he wanted an attorney to represent him and a forfeiture finding 
would "be a real prejudice."  He talked about how each of his 
SPD-appointed lawyers had failed him and how he wanted his 
motion to suppress reinstated.  The circuit court engaged 
Suriano in a colloquy about his education and learned Suriano 
had two college degrees——geology and chemistry——and was one 
credit short of a graduate degree. 
¶14 Determining Suriano forfeited his right to counsel, 
the circuit court advised him: 
[I]f you want to go out and hire an attorney or you 
want to contact the state public defender's office and 
see if they will appoint another attorney for you, 
that is absolutely your right, sir.  When I'm saying 
                                                 
6 This opinion makes an occasional reference to a fourth 
SPD-appointed 
lawyer 
who 
attended 
Suriano's 
first 
court 
appearance.  This attorney's involvement was limited and 
occurred even before the SPD made an official appointment; thus, 
our analysis focuses on the three attorneys who were officially 
appointed and who formally withdrew from representing Suriano. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
12 
 
you forfeited your right to have an attorney, that 
doesn't mean you can't get an attorney, but I'm 
finding your actions have made it clear that you will 
not cooperate with any attorney. 
The court went on to say it had not in "32 years of experience" 
ever heard an attorney refer to a client on the record "as an 
ass." 
¶15 The circuit court found Suriano "clearly" had a 
problem getting along "with any attorney."  It warned him that 
the June 2014 trial was "not coming off the calendar" and he 
would be representing himself if he did not "get a new attorney" 
before the trial.  In no uncertain terms, the court warned 
Suriano it was done playing his game:  "Yes.  It's a game, Mr. 
Suriano, and I'm done playing it.  This case is moving forward.  
It's going to be tried on June 4th."  Suriano said he wanted to 
pursue a court-appointed attorney if the SPD would not give him 
another one.  The circuit court told him he could get a form 
from the court clerk to petition for an appointment, but the 
court would "take up" his petition "when and if it is filed" and 
only if the SPD said he was ineligible for another appointment. 
¶16 The 
SPD 
denied 
Suriano's 
request 
for 
a 
fourth 
attorney, and Suriano looked for an attorney willing to take his 
case under a court appointment.  At a hearing in late May 2014, 
days before the trial date, Suriano asked the circuit court to 
appoint Eric Wimberger, even though Wimberger was not available 
for the June 4th trial date.  The circuit court refused the 
request, explaining that it made it "very clear" it was "not 
moving the trial date."  After the circuit court denied 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
13 
 
Suriano's suppression motion, it reminded him the jury trial 
would occur June 4th and he should "be ready to proceed."  When 
Suriano asked the court if it would still appoint a lawyer for 
him if he could find someone to make the trial date, the court 
answered: 
No.  You have to hire an attorney.  I've already 
found you have forfeited your right to have an 
attorney.  If you hire an attorney yourself, you can 
do so, but I am not appointing one on your behalf. 
[]Because by your own actions you've now lost the 
right to have a public defender which would be at no 
expense to you, and I've already made a clear record 
regarding that.  So no.  If you find somebody else 
that's available to take this on June 4th and you file 
another petition for Court-appointed counsel, I'm 
denying your request for Court-appointed counsel.  
You've forfeited your right to have an attorney 
through those means. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶17 A week later, two days before trial, Suriano again 
asked the circuit court to appoint counsel.  The circuit court 
explained its basis for again denying the request: 
 The circuit court made it "very clear" when Suriano was 
still represented by SPD-appointed lawyers that Suriano 
was "starting to get dangerously close to a situation 
where [he was] not going to be eligible any longer for 
public defender representation." 
 That's exactly what happened. 
 Although the court did not blame Suriano entirely, it 
found he was "an active participant in why those 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
14 
 
situations [with his three SPD-appointed lawyers] went 
haywire." 
 As a result, Suriano did not qualify for an SPD-appointed 
attorney and he did not qualify for court-appointed 
counsel. 
Although the circuit court told Suriano his actions caused him 
to forfeit his right to appointed counsel, it indicated Suriano 
could still hire a private, paid attorney, so long as the 
attorney would be ready for the June 4th trial. 
¶18 Suriano then re-argued the suppression motion that had 
been denied a week earlier until the circuit court stopped him 
for repeating the same points over and over.  Suriano then asked 
the court if he could call more witnesses to testify on the 
suppression motion.  The court refused the request, but Suriano 
persisted, saying he had "completely new evidence."  The court 
responded, "No. No.", and told Suriano, "We're not going to 
continue to go round and round regarding this." 
¶19 Suriano represented himself at the one-day trial, and 
the jury found him guilty of obstruction.  The circuit court 
sentenced him to a $100 fine, plus costs, and 10 days in jail, 
which would be "permanently stay[ed]" if Suriano paid the fine 
within 60 days.  Suriano appealed with the help of a newly-
appointed SPD-appellate lawyer, and his sentence has been stayed 
pending appeal.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, and 
we granted Suriano's petition for review. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
15 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 Whether Suriano forfeited his constitutional right to 
counsel is a question of constitutional fact, which presents a 
"mixed question of law and fact."  See State v. Martwick, 2000 
WI 5, ¶¶16-17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  We review 
historical and evidentiary facts under a clearly erroneous 
standard, but the ultimate determination as to whether a 
constitutional right was violated is a question of law we review 
independently.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Legal Principles 
¶21 Suriano is guaranteed the right to counsel by the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 345 (1963), and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, see Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d at 748.  "The scope, extent, and, thus, interpretation 
of the right to the assistance of counsel is identical under the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution."  
State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 202-03, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997).  Indigent defendants who cannot afford to pay for an 
attorney, however, do not have a right to an attorney of their 
own choice or the right to successive appointments.  See United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006).  A defendant 
who acts in a voluntary and deliberate way that frustrates "the 
orderly and efficient progression of the case" forfeits his 
right to counsel.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752, 753 n.15.  
"[T]he Sixth Amendment does not bestow upon a defendant absolute 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
16 
 
rights and . . . a defendant can forfeit Sixth Amendment rights 
through his or her own disruptive and defiant behavior."  Id. at 
757 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970)) 
(upholding forfeiture of right to be present at trial where 
defendant's behavior interfered with process of justice). 
B.  State v. Cummings' Waiver-Forfeiture Framework 
¶22 In 1996, this court declared the standard to use in 
forfeiture of trial counsel cases.  See Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 
751-52.  Addressing forfeiture, this court acknowledged two 
situations where a defendant loses his right to counsel:  (1) a 
defendant may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 
his right to counsel; and (2) a defendant may forfeit his right 
to counsel.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752. 
¶23 In a waiver situation, the circuit court must hold a 
hearing and engage in a colloquy with the defendant to ensure 
the defendant:  "(1) made a deliberate choice to proceed without 
counsel, (2) was aware of the difficulties and disadvantages of 
self-representation, (3) was aware of the seriousness of the 
charge or charges against him, and (4) was aware of the general 
range of penalties that could have been imposed on him."  
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.  The circuit court must also 
determine whether a defendant is competent to represent himself.  
Id. at 212. 
¶24 Forfeiture requires very different procedures covering 
a variety of scenarios where a defendant's conduct results in 
the involuntary loss of counsel by operation of law.  See 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-58.  "[T]he triggering event for 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
17 
 
forfeiture is when the 'court becomes convinced that the orderly 
and efficient progression of the case [is] being frustrated.'" 
Id. at 753 n.15 (quoted source and ellipsis omitted).  Scenarios 
triggering forfeiture include:  (1) a defendant's manipulative 
and disruptive behavior; (2) withdrawal of multiple attorneys 
based on a defendant's consistent refusal to cooperate with any 
of 
them 
and 
constant 
complaints 
about 
the 
attorneys' 
performance; (3) a defendant whose attitude is defiant and whose 
choices repeatedly result in delay, interfering with the process 
of justice, see id. at 752-57, and (4) physical or verbal abuse 
directed at counsel or the court.  See United States v. Leggett, 
162 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 1998) (defendant's physical attack on 
counsel constituted forfeiture); United States v. McLeod, 53 
F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (verbal abuse and threats to sue 
counsel constituted forfeiture).  When those situations arise, a 
defendant loses his right to counsel by "operation of law"——not 
by express verbal consent but because the defendant's voluntary 
and deliberate actions told the circuit court he would make it 
"impossible" for any attorney to be able to represent him.  
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 753-54. 
¶25 Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet 
spoken on the issue presented here, numerous state and federal 
courts have addressed issues involving waiver or forfeiture of 
the right to counsel.  See, e.g., Tennessee v. Carruthers, 
35 S.W.3d 516, 546-49 & n.26 (Tenn. 2000) (collecting cases).  
Some of those courts follow the same approach as this court in 
Cummings, limiting discussion to waiver or forfeiture.  See, 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
18 
 
e.g., Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(upholding forfeiture of counsel; concluding the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
allows 
both 
waiver 
and 
forfeiture 
of 
constitutional rights); Leggett, 162 F.3d at 251. 
¶26 Other courts have added a third category called 
"waiver by conduct" to cover the "hybrid situation" between 
forfeiture and express waiver.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-1103 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Maine 
v. Nisbet, 2016 ME 36, ¶¶24-36, 134 A.3d 840, 851-53 (adopting 
Goldberg approach).  The Third Circuit in United States v. 
Goldberg determined loss-of-counsel cases fall into three 
categories: 
(1) 
Express Waiver.  This involves the typical situation 
where a defendant wants to exercise the right to self-
representation.  It requires a knowing, intelligent 
and 
voluntary 
waiver 
of 
the 
right 
to 
counsel, 
including a colloquy with the defendant, warnings to 
the defendant of the risks associated with self-
representation, and a determination that the defendant 
is competent to represent himself.  Id. at 1099-1100. 
(2) 
Forfeiture. 
 
This 
covers 
circumstances 
where 
a 
defendant's behavior, such as abusing or threatening 
counsel or demanding that counsel "engage in unethical 
conduct," results in loss of counsel without warnings, 
"regardless of the defendant's knowledge" that he is 
losing the right to counsel and "irrespective of 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
19 
 
whether the defendant intended to relinquish the 
right."  Id. at 1100. 
(3) 
Waiver by conduct.  This covers a "hybrid situation" 
between forfeiture and express waiver.  It arises 
where the defendant engages in dilatory behavior but 
does not expressly waive his right to counsel.  In 
these situations, the Goldberg court held defendants 
must be warned that they will lose the right to 
counsel unless their dilatory behavior stops, and the 
warning must include the risks of proceeding pro se.  
If the defendant's bad behavior continues, it "may be 
treated as an implied request to proceed pro se, and 
thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel."  Id. at 
1100-1101. 
The Goldberg court discussed concerns about recognizing the 
differences between forfeiture and waiver by conduct because 
these two categories overlap.  Id. at 1101-1102. 
¶27 Suriano urges this court to adopt the three-tiered 
approach used in Goldberg.  We decline this request.  Since 
1995, when Goldberg was decided, many state supreme courts have 
adopted the three-tiered approach.  See, e.g., Bultron v. State, 
897 A.2d 758, 763-65 (Del. 2006); Nisbet, 134 A.3d 840, ¶¶24-36; 
State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009).  Those courts, 
however, had not previously decided to review forfeiture 
situations 
under 
a 
two-tiered 
"express 
waiver—forfeiture" 
framework like this court did in Cummings.  This court, 
moreover, chose the two-tiered framework even though Goldberg 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
20 
 
introduced its three-tiered approach to loss-of-counsel cases 
the year before we decided Cummings.  This court could have 
adopted the three-tiered Goldberg approach but it did not do so.  
Rather, this court addressed loss-of-counsel issues as either 
forfeiture or express waiver.  See Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-
58. 
¶28 We acknowledge the substantial body of case law on 
this issue since our decision in Cummings, but we remain 
unconvinced that a switch to Goldberg's three-tiered approach is 
warranted.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, authored by then-Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor, analyzed the issue under the traditional two-tiered 
approach, and although the decision referred to Goldberg, see 
Gilchrist 260 F.3d at 98-99, it made no reference to the three-
tiered approach or the hybrid category of waiver by conduct.  
Gilchrist held: 
Having thus established that Supreme Court precedent 
recognizes a distinction between waiver and forfeiture 
of constitutional rights, and that there is no Supreme 
Court holding either that an indigent defendant may 
not forfeit (as opposed to waive) his right to counsel 
through misconduct nor a general Supreme Court holding 
that a defendant may not forfeit a constitutional 
right, we conclude that the state court rulings [that 
the defendant forfeited his right to counsel] were not 
'contrary to' clearly established federal law as 
determined by the Supreme Court. 
Id. 260 F.3d at 97.  The Second Circuit's analysis convinces us 
we got it right in Cummings. 
¶29 Significant to our conclusion is the absence of any 
United States Supreme Court case addressing this issue.  The 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
21 
 
approach this court adopted in 1996 has not been rejected by the 
Supreme Court and is sound in principle.  Wisconsin courts have 
followed this approach for over twenty years; it has provided a 
workable test and clear guidance for circuit courts, lawyers, 
and litigants; and we have not been presented with any 
justification to abandon that existing law.  See Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶94-
100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (discussing the principles 
of stare decisis).  "It is not a sufficient reason for this 
court to overrule its precedent that a large majority of other 
jurisdictions, with no binding authority on this court, have 
reached opposing conclusions."  Id., ¶100.  The Cummings 
approach using only forfeiture and express waiver protects a 
defendant's right to be represented by counsel and the right to 
choose self-representation, but it also facilitates the circuit 
courts' duty to administer justice in an orderly, timely, and 
dignified manner.  We reaffirm our holding in Cummings utilizing 
the two-tiered, loss-of-counsel analysis. 
C.  Applying the Cummings Test to Suriano 
¶30 Applying Cummings here, we conclude Suriano forfeited 
his right to counsel.  Suriano's case falls into the forfeiture 
category because there is no dispute he did not expressly waive 
his right to counsel.  A defendant forfeits his or her right to 
counsel "when the 'court becomes convinced that the orderly and 
efficient progression of the case [is] being frustrated,'" 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 753 n.15 (quoted source and ellipsis 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
22 
 
omitted), by the defendant's voluntary and deliberate choices, 
id. at 752. 
¶31 The record supports the circuit court's finding that 
Suriano made it clear he would not cooperate with any attorney.  
His actions caused three SPD lawyers to withdraw in rapid 
succession.  One of those lawyers specifically testified that 
Suriano was trying to frustrate the progress of the case and 
cause delay because Suriano believed the case should be 
dismissed.  Another one of his lawyers felt so threatened by 
Suriano that he would not meet with him unless he could be sure 
Suriano did not have a weapon.  Suriano verbally abused at least 
one of his lawyers, admitted in open court that he did so, and 
declared he would do it again because the disparaging verbal 
assaults were all "true."  The circuit court found Suriano was 
playing games and manipulating the case to delay the trial.  
Suriano did not say he wanted to represent himself, but his 
repeated dilatory tactics and abusive behavior expressed loudly 
and clearly that he would make it impossible for any attorney to 
represent him.  This is sufficient to satisfy the forfeiture 
standard and supports the circuit court's finding of forfeiture 
in this case.  Suriano's voluntary and deliberate choices 
frustrated the orderly and efficient progression of this case.7 
¶32 We also reject Suriano's contention that a defendant 
cannot forfeit the right to counsel unless the defendant's 
                                                 
7 There is no argument that the choices Suriano made were 
involuntary or not deliberate. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
23 
 
actions were done with an intent or purpose to delay.  Tying the 
frustration of the orderly and efficient progression to a 
defendant's motivation or purpose for engaging in dilatory 
tactics would not provide a workable standard, as circuit courts 
cannot read the minds of the defendants who appear before them.  
Defendants choosing dilatory tactics do not often disclose the 
true purpose behind such conduct.  Circuit courts can, however, 
observe a defendant's voluntary and deliberately dilatory 
actions and determine that those actions resulted in a delay and 
reached the level of frustrating the orderly and efficient 
progression of the case.  Moreover, a defendant who subjects 
counsel to physical or verbal abuse or refuses to cooperate with 
a succession of appointed attorneys may not be acting with 
intent 
to 
delay 
proceedings; 
nevertheless, 
such 
behavior 
frustrates the orderly and efficient progression of the case, 
and 
it 
is 
this 
resulting 
obstruction 
of 
the 
proper 
administration of justice that triggers forfeiture, regardless 
of whether delay was the defendant's objective.  Accordingly, we 
overrule the contrary language in State v. Coleman, 2002 WI App 
100, ¶18, 253 Wis. 2d 693, 644 N.W.2d 283, and any other case 
requiring proof of intentional, purposeful delay.8 
                                                 
8 State v. Coleman, 2002 WI App 100, ¶18, 253 Wis. 2d 693, 
644 N.W.2d 283, held:  "[F]orfeiture cannot occur simply because 
the effect of the defendant's conduct is to frustrate the 
orderly and efficient progression of the case.  The defendant 
must also have the purpose of causing that effect."  We overrule 
the language requiring proof of the defendant's purpose or 
motivation.  The standard set forth in State v. Cummings and 
reaffirmed here is that forfeiture occurs when the circuit court 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
24 
 
D.  Right-to-Counsel Warnings and Procedure in Forfeiture Cases 
¶33 Suriano also requests that this court make mandatory 
the right-to-counsel warnings and procedure recommended in 
Cummings.  We reject this request.  In Cummings, the dissent 
advocated for mandatory right-to-counsel warnings plus specific 
procedural steps in all forfeiture cases.  See Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d at 764 (Geske, J., dissenting).9  The Cummings majority 
                                                                                                                                                             
becomes convinced that the defendant's voluntary and deliberate 
conduct frustrated the orderly and efficient progression of the 
case.  See State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 753 n.15, 546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996). 
Our opinion does not foreclose a circuit court from using a 
defendant's specific intent or purpose "to frustrate the orderly 
and efficient progression of the case" in its analysis, as the 
circuit court implicitly did in this case. Proof of the 
defendant's actual motivation underlying his or her behavior, 
however, is not required to meet the forfeiture standard.  The 
Cummings' 
standard 
is 
satisfied 
when 
the 
'court 
becomes 
convinced that the orderly and efficient progression of the case 
[is] being frustrated,'" Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 753 n.15 
(quoted source and ellipsis omitted), by the defendant's 
voluntary and deliberate choices.  The effect of the defendant's 
voluntary and deliberate actions, even absent any express intent 
to delay, controls. 
9 The Cummings dissent advocated for the following warnings 
and procedure in all forfeiture cases: 
(1) 
[E]xplicit 
warnings 
that, 
if 
the 
defendant 
persists in "X" [specific conduct], the court will 
find that the right to counsel has been forfeited and 
will require the defendant to proceed to trial pro se; 
(2) a colloquy indicating that the defendant has been 
made aware of the difficulties and dangers inherent in 
self-representation; (3) a clear ruling when the court 
deems the right to counsel to have been forfeited; 
(4) factual findings to support the court's ruling; 
and (5) appointment of standby counsel. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
25 
 
opinion recommended these warnings and procedures but did not 
require them.  Id. at 756 n.18.  We reaffirm our holding on 
right-to-counsel warnings and procedure in forfeiture cases.  
Forfeiture 
cases, 
by 
their 
very 
definition, 
involve 
a 
manipulative, disruptive, and potentially violent or abusive 
defendant.  Although we continue to recommend that circuit 
courts give these warnings and follow these procedures whenever 
the circumstances allow, we recognize the challenges our circuit 
courts face on a daily basis may not always permit strict 
compliance.  In forfeiture cases, loss of the right to counsel 
occurs by operation of law without the need to ensure a 
defendant knows he is losing his right and regardless of whether 
he intends to do so.  See Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752; Leggett, 
162 F.3d at 250; State v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008).10  This is precisely why no warnings are required. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 We reaffirm our decision in Cummings applying a two-
tiered forfeiture—express waiver framework.  We continue to 
apply the Cummings standard governing forfeiture of counsel 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 764 (Geske, J., dissenting). 
10 Although Suriano did not receive the full panoply of 
warnings and procedures specifically recommended in Cummings, 
forfeiture did not come without any warning at all.  The circuit 
court repeatedly warned Suriano that he would not be provided 
with an endless supply of SPD lawyers.  Suriano heard at the 
April 2014 hearing that if Singh withdrew, the SPD would not 
appoint a fourth attorney, and the circuit court forcefully 
warned Suriano that the June 2014 trial date would not be 
adjourned. 
No.  2015AP959-CR 
 
26 
 
cases, and we emphasize that the warnings and procedures it 
suggests remain recommendations only.  Applying the Cummings 
standard to this case, we hold that Suriano forfeited his 
constitutional right to counsel by engaging in voluntary and 
deliberate conduct, which frustrated the progression of his case 
and interfered with the proper administration of justice.  The 
record supports the circuit court's findings that Suriano 
repeatedly refused to cooperate with his attorneys, engaged in 
recurrent dilatory tactics to manipulate and cause delay, and 
verbally abused counsel, even causing one of his lawyers to view 
Suriano as a physical threat.  The circuit court's finding of 
forfeiture meets the Cummings standard and we agree with the 
court of appeals' decision affirming it. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP959.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  "The right 
to the assistance of counsel is necessary to ensure that a 
criminal defendant receives a fair trial, that all defendants 
stand equal before the law, and ultimately that justice is 
served."1   
¶36 The instant case addresses the assertion that the 
circuit court denied Suriano's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2 
¶37 To protect an accused's right to counsel, to avoid 
after-the-fact legal disputes regarding whether an accused 
relinquished (that is, forfeited or waived)3 the right to 
counsel, and to promote certainty and judicial efficiency, I 
would mandate an in-court, on-the-record colloquy by the circuit 
court with the accused in all cases pertaining to relinquishment 
of the fundamental right to counsel.  The colloquy is set forth 
in 
Justice 
Geske's 
dissent 
in 
State 
v. 
Cummings, 
199 
Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996).4   
                                                 
1 State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 201, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997).   
2 An accused also has the right to self-representation.  
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 202.   
3 The presumption is that the right to counsel is not 
waived.  "It has been pointed out that courts indulge every 
reasonable 
presumption 
against 
waiver 
of 
fundamental 
constitutional right and that we do not presume acquiescence in 
the loss of fundamental rights."  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 For an in-court procedure similar to that proposed by 
Justice Geske, see Wis JI——Criminal SM 30. 
No.  2015AP959.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶38 The 
majority 
opinion 
"strongly 
recommends" 
this 
procedure.  See majority op., ¶¶1, 34.  I would require it.   
¶39 I would require the circuit court record to reflect 
that the circuit court made the accused aware of the seriousness 
of the charges he or she faces, the potential penalties that may 
be imposed upon a finding of guilt, and the difficulties and 
disadvantages of self-representation.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 
763 (Geske, J., dissenting).   
¶40 In Cummings, Justice Geske sets forth the colloquy in 
which the circuit court shall:  
(1) [Provide] explicit warnings that, if the defendant 
persists in [specific conduct], the court will find 
that the right to counsel has been forfeited . . . . ; 
(2) [Engage in] a colloquy indicating that the 
defendant has been made aware of the difficulties and 
dangers inherent in self-representation; 
(3) [Make] a clear ruling when the court deems the 
right to counsel to have been forfeited; [and] 
(4) [Make] factual findings to support the court's 
ruling . . . . 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 764 (Geske, J., dissenting).5 
¶41 This procedure puts an accused on notice that his or 
her conduct will lead to a relinquishment of the right to 
                                                 
5 As a fifth point, Justice Geske addressed the appointment 
of standby counsel if the defendant forfeits his or her right to 
counsel.  "Standby counsel serves not only to safeguard a 
defendant's constitutionally protected rights but also to 
advance the court's objectives of judicial efficiency by 
assisting the accused in overcoming routine procedural and 
evidentiary obstacles."  State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 
764-65, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996) (Geske, J., dissenting). 
No.  2015AP959.ssa 
 
3 
 
counsel, ensures an accused's right to a fair trial, and 
discharges the circuit court's "special obligation[] of judicial 
responsibility 
that 
[it] 
faces 
when 
dealing 
with 
an 
unrepresented [criminal] defendant."6 
¶42 Although 
forfeiture 
of 
the 
right 
to 
counsel, 
constructive waiver of the right to counsel, and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel are different doctrines of law, 
the application of these doctrines may blend and overlap in 
certain circumstances.  There does not seem to be any reason 
(except perhaps in an emergency situation not presented in the 
instant case) why the same procedural safeguards should not be 
imposed in all cases involving the relinquishment of the right 
to counsel.         
¶43 I joined Justice Geske's dissent in Cummings, and I am 
even more persuaded by it now than then.   
¶44 When this court decided Cummings, the case law did not 
require a colloquy in which a circuit court explored with the 
accused whether the accused was voluntarily waiving, as opposed 
to constructively waiving or forfeiting, the right to counsel.  
                                                 
6 Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 762, (Geske, J., dissenting); see 
also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938): 
The 
constitutional 
right 
of 
an 
accused 
to 
be 
represented 
by 
counsel 
invokes, 
of 
itself, 
the 
protection of a trial court, in which the accused——
whose life or liberty is at stake——is without counsel.  
This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining 
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver 
by the accused.   
No.  2015AP959.ssa 
 
4 
 
See State v. Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 601, 292 N.W.2d 601 
(1980).   
¶45 Pickens has been "overruled" since Cummings to the 
extent that "we mandate the use of a colloquy in every case 
where a defendant seeks to proceed pro se to prove knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel."  State v. Klessig, 
211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).   
¶46 The Klessig court explained that the circuit court's 
conducting an examination of the accused "is the clearest and 
most efficient means of insuring" that the waiver of the right 
to counsel was valid, and preserves and documents the accused's 
waiver for purposes of review.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.  
"Thus," wrote the court in Klessig, "a properly conducted 
colloquy serves the dual purposes of ensuring that a defendant 
is not deprived of his constitutional rights and of efficiently 
guarding our scarce judicial resources."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 206.   
¶47 The colloquy required by Klessig is substantially 
similar to that set forth in the Cummings dissent.  The circuit 
courts are therefore familiar with and already use the colloquy 
in voluntary waiver of counsel cases.  Requiring the colloquy in 
all cases involving the relinquishment of counsel is not too 
much of a burden on the circuit courts and might even be viewed 
as a simplification of process.   
¶48 On the basis of the record in the instant case I 
cannot conclude that Suriano validly relinquished his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.      
No.  2015AP959.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶49 Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2015AP959.ssa 
 
 
 
1