Case Title: Jones v. Mun. Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund

Citation: 2016 IL 119618

Docket Number: 119618, 119620, 119638, 119639, 119644

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2016 IL 119618 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
MARY J. JONES et al., Appellees, v. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES’ 
ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants. 
 
 
Docket Nos. 
 
119618, 119620, 119638, 119639, 119644 cons. 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
March 24, 2016 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Rita M. 
Novak, Judge, presiding. 
 
Judgment 
Affirmed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Mary Patricia Burns, Vincent D. Pinelli, Matthew M. Showel and 
Sarah A. Boeckman, of Burke Burns & Pinelli, LTD., and J. Timothy 
Eaton, John F. Kennedy, Cary E. Donham, Graham C. Grady, and 
Jonathan B. Amarilio, of Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, all of 
Chicago, for appellants. 
 
Stephen R. Patton, Corporation Counsel, Jane Elinor Notz, First 
Assistant Corporation Counsel, Benna Ruth Solomon, Deputy 
Corporation Counsel, and Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Chief Assistant 
Corporation Counsel, and Michael B. Slade, Douglas G. Smith, P.C., 
and R. Chris Heck, of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and Richard J. 
Prendergast and Michael T. Layden, all of Chicago, for intervenor 
appellant City of Chicago. 
 
Michael D. Freeborn, John T. Shapiro, Dylan Smith and Terrence J. 
Sheahan, of Freeborn & Peters LLP, and Clinton A. Krislov, all of 
Chicago, for appellees. 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity 
of this document 
Date: 2016.05.11 
08:50:08 -05'00'
 
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Justices 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, and Karmeier 
concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justices Freeman and Burke took no part in the decision. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The question presented in this consolidated appeal is whether Public Act 98-641 (eff. June 
9, 2014) (Act), which amends the Illinois Pension Code as it pertains to certain pension funds 
for employees of the city of Chicago, violates the pension protection clause of the Illinois 
Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5. On motions for summary judgment, the circuit 
court of Cook County declared the Act to be unconstitutional in its entirety and permanently 
enjoined its enforcement because it diminished pension benefits in violation of the pension 
protection clause. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Illinois has established various public pension systems, including four pensions for public 
employees of the city of Chicago (the City). These pension funds include the Municipal 
Employees’, Officers’, and Officials’ Annuity and Benefit Fund (MEABF) (40 ILCS 5/8-101 
et seq. (West 2012)); the Laborers’ and Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity and Benefit 
Fund (LABF) (40 ILCS 5/11-101 et seq. (West 2012)); the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit 
Fund (FABF) (40 ILCS 5/6-101 et seq. (West 2012)); and the Policemen’s Annuity and 
Benefit Fund (PABF) (40 ILCS 5/5-101 et seq. (West 2012)). 
¶ 4 
 
At issue in this appeal are the City pensions impacted by Public Act 98-641, which include 
MEABF and LABF (collectively the Funds). Participants in the MEABF include most civil 
servant employees of the City, as well as nonteacher employees of the Chicago public school 
system. 40 ILCS 5/8-107 (West 2012). Participants in the LABF include primarily labor 
service workers. 40 ILCS 5/11-110 (West 2012). These funds operate in a similar way to the 
state-funded retirement systems, in many respects. The City pension funds are all subject to the 
pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution, which provides: “Membership in any 
pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or 
any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the 
benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5. Also, the 
City pension funds provide traditional defined benefit plans under which members receive 
specified annuities upon retirement generally based upon the member’s salary, years of 
service, and age at retirement. 
¶ 5 
 
As with the state-funded pensions, prior to the enactment of Public Act 98-641, for 
employees hired prior to January 1, 2011, annuity payments under the Funds were subject to 
3% automatic annual increases beginning after the member’s first full year of retirement, and 
compounded annually. 40 ILCS 5/8-137, 8-137.1, 11-134.1, 11-134.3 (West 2012). For 
employees hired after January 1, 2011, the annuity adjustments were tied to the Consumer 
Price Index. 40 ILCS 5/1-160 (West 2012). 
 
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¶ 6 
 
The benefits under MEABF and LABF are funded from three sources: contributions from 
the City, contributions from the employees, and investment returns. Prior to Public Act 98-641, 
the employees contributed 8.5% of their salary toward their pension on an annual basis.1 40 
ILCS 5/8-137(b), 8-174(a), 8-182, 11-134.1, 11-170, 11-174 (West 2012). The City 
contributed an amount based on a fixed multiplier, 1 or 1.25 times the annual employee 
contributions (40 ILCS 5/8-173(a), 11-169 (West 2012)), which was historically paid largely 
from property tax proceeds. 
¶ 7 
 
As we explained in In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 11 (hereinafter 
referred to as Heaton), the public pensions, including the City pensions, have been historically 
inadequate to cover the benefits owed to members. The specific concerns over funding 
deficiencies in the City pension funds have been well documented. As reported in 1949, “every 
fund in Illinois suffers at this time an actuarial insolvency.” Report of the Illinois Public 
Employees Pension Laws Commission of 1949, 10 (1949). In 1969, the Illinois Pension Laws 
Commission explained: 
“The inadequacy of the provisions for financing the employer’s share of the cost 
contained in the pension laws enacted many years ago has resulted in large unfunded 
accrued liabilities. The revenue provisions have not been sufficiently flexible to meet 
the increasing costs occasioned by salary increases and additions to membership. The 
method of financing the employer’s obligation by means of fixed tax levies or arbitrary 
state appropriations is outmoded and fails to provide revenues sufficient to meet not 
only the accruing service cost but also interest on the accrued liability.” Report of the 
Illinois Pension Laws Commission of 1969, 106 (1969). 
¶ 8 
 
These concerns over the ongoing funding deficiencies led to the adoption of the pension 
protection clause in 1970. At the constitutional convention, Delegate Kinney raised specific 
issues relevant to the City pensions. She particularly noted the concerns related to the proposed 
adoption of home rule powers for municipalities, including that the municipalities might 
abandon their pension obligations, leaving civil servants unprotected. 4 Record of 
Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2926 (statements of Delegate Kinney). 
¶ 9 
 
“The solution proposed by the drafters and ultimately approved by the people of Illinois 
was to protect the benefits of membership in public pension systems not by dictating specific 
funding levels, but by safeguarding the benefits themselves.” Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 15. 
The drafters intended that, by guaranteeing pension benefits, the General Assembly would 
“take the necessary steps to fund the pension obligations.” 4 Record of Proceedings, Sixth 
Illinois Constitutional Convention 2925 (statements of Delegate Green). 
¶ 10 
 
Despite the warnings that the funding mechanism was not sufficient to cover the projected 
future benefits, and the adoption of the pension protection clause, the method of funding 
remained static with respect to the MEABF and the LABF. The Pension Code continued to set 
City contribution levels at a fixed multiple of employee contributions. This contribution level 
had no relationship to the obligations that the funds were accruing. Annual actuarial valuations 
of the Funds continued to show that the actuarially required contributions needed to fund the 
benefits were not being met. 
                                                 
 
1This percentage includes contributions for the age and service annuity, widow’s annuity, and the 
contributions toward the compounded annual annuity increases. 
 
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¶ 11 
 
For example, in the 2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, the MEABF Board 
reported that instead of a multiple of 1.25 times the employee contributions received, the most 
recent actuarial valuation “shows that an employer contribution multiple of 2.97 is needed to 
adequately finance the Plan.” Municipal Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 
2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 9, available at http:www.meabf.org 
/assets/pdfs/pubs/ 2007CAFR.pdf. The MEABF Board also noted that the “statutory employer 
contributions have been less than the Annual Required Contribution (ARC) for the past five 
years and are again expected to be less than the ARC for 2008.” Id. at 64. The method of 
funding also failed to account for downturns in the economy which affected the performance 
of the Funds’ investments. Thus, the City pension funds continued to remain vulnerable, 
ultimately carrying significant unfunded liabilities. 
¶ 12 
 
It was undisputed that if the funds remained on the same trajectory they would continue to 
pay out more in benefits than they received in contributions and investment returns, leading to 
a path of insolvency. It is now projected that without reforms, the MEABF and LABF will be 
insolvent in about 10 and 13 years, respectively. 
¶ 13 
 
Against this backdrop, as with the state-funded pensions, the General Assembly enacted 
several legislative strategies to deal with the underfunded City pensions. In 2011, the Pension 
Code was amended to require, starting in 2015, that the City contribute amounts sufficient to 
enable the Chicago police and firefighter pension funds to reach 90% actuarial funding by 
2040. See Pub. Act 96-1495, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).2 No such legislation was passed with 
respect to the MEABF and the LABF at that time. Instead, in 2014, the General Assembly 
ultimately enacted Public Act 98-641, the legislation at issue in this case. 
¶ 14 
 
Introduced as Senate Bill 1922, Public Act 98-641 was intended to “address an immediate 
funding crisis that threatens the solvency and sustainability of the public pension systems *** 
serving employees of the City of Chicago.” Pub. Act 98-641, § 1 (eff. June 9, 2014). The 
General Assembly expressly found that the financial crisis could not be addressed by increased 
funding alone, without also increasing employee contribution rates and reducing the annual 
adjustments for current and future retirees. Id. 
¶ 15 
 
Under the Act, the City’s funding contribution progressively increases leading to 
actuarially based payments beginning in 2021 to bring the funds to 90% funding levels by 
2055. 40 ILCS 5/8-173(a-5), 11-169(a-5) (West 2014). However, for the first five years, from 
2016 to 2020, the City would continue to contribute under the current multiplier framework, 
with an increased rate each year. Id. 
¶ 16 
 
Additionally, if the City fails to timely pay the required contributions, the Funds may 
certify the delinquent amounts to the Comptroller. Beginning in 2016, the Comptroller “must 
*** deduct and deposit into the Fund[s] the certified amounts or a portion of those amounts” 
specified from the grants of state funds to the City. 40 ILCS 5/8-173(a-10), 11-169(a-10) 
(West 2014). If the City fails to make its contributions to the Funds, the Act provides a 
mechanism by which the retirement boards of these Funds may initiate mandamus proceedings 
in the circuit court. 40 ILCS 5/8-173.1(a), 11-169.1(a) (West 2014). The court may order a 
                                                 
 
2An actuarial funding percentage is the value of plan assets, divided by plan liabilities. Thus, a 
funding percentage of 90% would mean a fund has $0.90 for each $1 of fund liability. 
 
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reasonable payment schedule “without significantly imperiling the public health, safety, or 
welfare.” 40 ILCS 5/8-173.1(b), 11-169.1(b) (West 2014). 
¶ 17 
 
The Act also increases the required employee contributions for members of the Funds. 
Instead of contributing 8.5% of their salary, the Act increases member contributions by .5% 
each year from 2015 to 2019, when the contribution reaches 11% of their salary. The 
contribution then remains fixed at 11% unless the funds reach a 90% funding ratio, at which 
point member contributions would decrease to 9.75% so long as the fund maintains the 90% 
ratio. If the funds fall below that mark, the employee contribution increases again to 11% of 
their salaries. 40 ILCS 5/8-174, 11-170 (West 2014). 
¶ 18 
 
Similar to Public Act 98-599, which was found unconstitutional in Heaton, the Act 
includes a comprehensive set of provisions designed to reduce annuity benefits for members of 
MEABF and LABF. The Act replaces the former provisions under which retirees receive flat 
3% annual increases with a new system which limits the amount of annual increases. The 
increase is now equal to the lesser of three percent or half the annual unadjusted percentage 
increase in the Consumer Price Index. 40 ILCS 5/8-137(b-5)(3), 11-134.1(b-5)(3) (West 
2014). The Act additionally removes the compounding component and instead of an annual 
increase, eliminates the increases entirely in specific years and postpones the time when a 
retiree begins receiving the initial increase.3 40 ILCS 5/8-137(b-5)(1), (2), 11-134.1(b-5)(1), 
(2) (West 2014). 
¶ 19 
 
After the Act was signed into law, two separate lawsuits challenging its constitutionality 
were filed in the circuit court of Cook County in December 2014: Jones v. MEABF, No. 2014 
CH 20027 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.), and Johnson v. MEABF, No. 2014 CH 20668 (Cir. Ct. Cook 
Co.). The Jones plaintiffs include 14 individual participants in the MEABF, some of whom are 
current employees and others who are retirees currently receiving an annuity, as well as four 
labor unions whose members are participants in the MEABF. 4 The defendants include 
MEABF and its board of trustees. The Johnson plaintiffs include one current employee 
participant in the MEABF, three retiree participants currently receiving annuities from the 
LABF, and the Municipal Employees Society of Chicago. The defendants include MEABF 
and LABF. 
¶ 20 
 
Both complaints sought a declaration that Public Act 98-641 is unconstitutional in 
violation of the pension protection clause because it diminishes pension benefits and sought to 
enjoin its enforcement. The City and the State were permitted to intervene in both cases to 
defend the constitutionality of the Act. Thereafter, the City filed an affirmative defense that the 
Act represented a valid exercise of the City’s reserved sovereign powers to modify contractual 
rights and obligations. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, this court filed its 
decision in Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, invalidating Public Act 98-599 as a violation of the 
pension protection clause. In light of this court’s ruling, the City advised the circuit court that it 
would not proceed with its reserved sovereign powers affirmative defense. 
                                                 
 
3For retirees with an annual annuity of less than $22,000, the increase may not be less than 1% in 
non-suspended years and is equal to 1% in suspended years. 40 ILCS 5/8-137(b-5)(4), 8-137.1(b-5)(3) 
(West 2014). 
 
4These unions include the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
Council 31, Chicago Teachers Union Local 1, IFT-AFT, Teamsters Local 700, and the Illinois Nurses 
Association. 
 
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¶ 21 
 
The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The State adopted the 
City’s motion. Defendants argued that the Act does not diminish or impair benefits because it 
results in a “net benefit” for the Funds’ participants and will save the Funds from an otherwise 
inevitable insolvency. The City additionally maintained that any payment of benefits owed 
prior to the Act was not the obligation of any government entity but, rather, was the obligation 
solely of the Funds themselves and that under the Pension Code “participants’ benefits [were] 
limited to sums on hand in the funds.” Therefore, under the Act, the pension funds will be 
saved from insolvency and put on a path to full actuarial funding, making the Funds’ 
participants “better off” than without the Act. Additionally, defendants argued that the 
modification of benefits under the Act is permissible as the product of a bargained-for 
exchange between the City and the labor unions. 
¶ 22 
 
On July 24, 2015, the circuit court issued its thorough ruling, declaring the Act 
unconstitutional. In rendering its opinion, the court found that the Act diminished pension 
benefits in violation of the pension protection clause in the same manner as the recent 
legislation struck down in Heaton. The court rejected the “net benefit” argument as “contrary 
to the pension protection clause, its purpose, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it.” The 
court reasoned that the argument rested on a misapprehension of the scope of the protections in 
the pension protection clause, disregarded settled distinctions between pension benefits and 
funding choices, and failed to account for the fact that the so-called “net benefits” are subject to 
legislative repeal at any time. 
¶ 23 
 
The court additionally rejected defendants’ assertion that the Act was a valid bargained-for 
exchange, finding that (1) the unions were not acting as agents in a collective bargaining 
process, (2) the unions could not have represented the retired members while at the same time 
acting as representatives of the active employees, and (3) nothing in the process that led to the 
enactment of the Act barred the individual plaintiffs from asserting their constitutional rights 
or operated as a waiver of those rights. Lastly, the court held that the unconstitutional 
provisions of the Act could not be severed and that the Act was therefore unenforceable in its 
entirety. 
¶ 24 
 
The circuit court subsequently made the express written findings under Illinois Supreme 
Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006), required when a statute is declared unconstitutional. The 
City and the Funds then appealed directly to this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011), and the State joined the City’s appeal. This court subsequently 
granted the City’s motion to consolidate the appeals. 
 
¶ 25 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 26 
 
These consolidated appeals are procedurally before us as a result of the circuit court’s 
ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2014). 
When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they mutually agree that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that only a question of law is involved. Gurba v. 
Community High School District No. 155, 2015 IL 118332, ¶ 10. Thus, our review is de novo. 
Id. 
¶ 27 
 
The sole question of law presented for our review is whether Public Act 98-641 violates the 
pension protection clause set forth in article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5). That section provides: “Membership in any pension or 
 
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retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which 
shall not be diminished or impaired.” Id. 
¶ 28 
 
This court has twice recently construed the plain language of this clause in Kanerva v. 
Weems, 2014 IL 115811, and Heaton, 2015 IL 118585. We have considered its object and 
purpose, and reaffirmed the scope of its protections, consistent with earlier holdings from this 
court and the appellate court since the pension protection clause was adopted in 1970. 
¶ 29 
 
As we have explained, under the clause, a public employee’s membership in a pension 
system is an enforceable contractual relationship, and the employee has a constitutionally 
protected right to the benefits of that contractual relationship. Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 46. 
Those constitutional protections attach at the time an individual begins employment and 
becomes a member of the public pension system. Id. Thus, under its plain and unambiguous 
language, the clause prohibits the General Assembly from unilaterally reducing or eliminating 
the pension benefits conferred by membership in the pension system. Id. ¶ 46 & n.12. 
¶ 30 
 
Having reaffirmed these constitutional principles, this court explained in Heaton that the 
provisions in Public Act 98-599 designed to reduce annuity benefits, including the provisions 
which jettisoned the benefits related to the annual annuity increases, diminished “the value of 
retirement annuities” for current members. Id. ¶ 47; id. ¶ 27 (specifically referencing Public 
Act 98-599, the replacement of the “flat 3% annual increases to [retirees’] annuities” with a 
“variable formula” and elimination of “at least one and up to five annual annuity increases”). 
This court held that those provisions “contravene the clear requirements of article XIII, section 
5.” Id. ¶ 47. We explained that “there is simply no way that the annuity reduction provisions in 
Public Act 98-599 can be reconciled with the rights and protections established by the people 
of Illinois when they ratified the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and its pension protection 
clause.” Id. Accordingly, we concluded that the General Assembly overstepped the scope of its 
legislative power, and we declared those provisions invalid. Id. 
¶ 31 
 
The provisions in Public Act 98-641 have the same impact. They reduce the value of 
annual annuity increases, eliminate them entirely for certain years, postpone the time at which 
they begin, and completely eliminate the compounding component. The Act expressly states 
that these changes “apply regardless of whether the employee was in active service on or after 
the effective date of this amendatory Act.” 40 ILCS 5/8-174(a), 11-170(a) (West 2014). These 
modifications to pension benefits unquestionably diminish the value of the retirement 
annuities the members of MEABF and LABF were promised when they joined the pension 
system. Accordingly, based on the plain language of the Act, these annuity reducing provisions 
contravene the pension protection clause’s absolute prohibition against diminishment of 
pension benefits and exceed the General Assembly’s authority.5 
¶ 32 
 
We are cognizant that in enacting Public Act 98-641, the General Assembly expressly 
relied on the exigent circumstances of a fiscal crisis that threatens the Funds’ solvency to 
justify its diminishment of benefits in the interest of the greater public welfare. We do not 
dispute the accuracy of those findings. However, we thoroughly considered and rejected this 
                                                 
 
5Notably, under the new provisions, not only are the benefits of current employees and retirees 
diminished, the current employees are now required to contribute more to obtain the reduced benefits. 
However, we need not consider the additional impact of these increased contributions in this case. 
 
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justification in Heaton. We explained that there was “no possible basis for interpreting the 
provision to mean that its protections can be overridden if the General Assembly deems it 
appropriate.” Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 75. To do so would require that we “ignore the plain 
language of the constitution and rewrite it to include ‘restrictions and limitations that the 
drafters did not express and the citizens of Illinois did not approve.’ [Citation.]” Id. We held 
that to accept the position “that reducing retirement benefits is justified by economic 
circumstances would require that we allow the legislature to do the very thing the pension 
protection clause was designed to prevent it from doing.” Id. 
¶ 33 
 
Notwithstanding our holding in Heaton, that the annuity reducing provisions plainly 
violated the pension protection clause, and that exigent circumstances cannot serve as a basis 
for the General Assembly to unilaterally override those constitutional protections, defendants 
contend that Public Act 98-641 survives constitutional infirmity for two reasons: (1) the Act, 
when read as a whole, does not diminish or impair pension benefits but, instead, saves them in 
a manner that confers a “net benefit” or “offsetting benefit” to members; and (2) the Act was 
the result of a bargained-for exchange supported by consideration. 
 
¶ 34 
 
 
 
 
I. “Net Benefit” 
¶ 35 
 
Defendants argue that the Act provides an offsetting benefit to members because it rescues 
the Funds from insolvency and guarantees that the pensions will be paid, by imposing an 
enhanced statutory funding obligation on the City, by moving to a new method of actuarial 
based funding, and by providing statutory enforcement mechanisms. Distilled to its essence, 
defendants’ argument is that the Act’s new promise of financial stability offsets the 
diminishment of benefits, thereby conferring a benefit when viewed as a whole. 
¶ 36 
 
The argument starts from the flawed premise that the provisions of the Act that enhance the 
City’s funding obligation or change the method of funding to fully fund the pensions are 
“benefits” entitled to constitutional protection. This notion conflicts with settled precedent. As 
we explained in Kanerva, the benefits protected by the pension protection clause include those 
benefits that are “attendant to membership in the State’s retirement systems” (2014 IL 115811, 
¶ 41), including “subsidized health care, disability and life insurance coverage, eligibility to 
receive a retirement annuity and survivor benefits.” Id. ¶ 39. Legislative funding choices, 
however, remain outside the protections of article XIII, section 5, as consistently explained by 
this court over the past 40 years in People ex rel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg, 
60 Ill. 2d 266 (1975), McNamee v. State, 173 Ill. 2d 433 (1996), and People ex rel. Sklodowski 
v. State, 182 Ill. 2d 220 (1998). 
¶ 37 
 
In each of those cases, the plaintiffs argued that certain statutory pension funding schemes 
or appropriations of pension funding were to be treated as enforceable contractual rights 
protected by the pension protection clause and created a binding funding obligation. The 
plaintiffs asserted that the failure to adhere to those funding provisions diminished or impaired 
their contract rights under the pension clause. Lindberg, 60 Ill. 2d at 271; McNamee, 173 Ill. 2d 
at 436-37; Sklodowski, 182 Ill. 2d at 229. Particularly, in McNamee, the plaintiffs claimed that 
amendments to the statutory scheme “violated their constitutionally protected right to the 
‘benefit’ of a more secure fund created by the prior funding method.” McNamee, 173 Ill. 2d at 
439. Notably, in both McNamee and Sklodowski, the State responded, relying on this court’s 
precedent, that the “pension protection clause creates enforceable contractual rights only to 
 
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receive benefits, not control funding” (Sklodowski, 182 Ill. 2d at 229), and “does not 
encompass how those benefits are funded” (McNamee, 173 Ill. 2d at 439). 
¶ 38 
 
This court agreed with the State and rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. After an exhaustive 
review of the constitutional convention debates regarding the purpose of the clause, we 
explained that “[t]he framers of our constitution simply did not intend that [the pension 
protection clause] control the manner in which the state and local governments fund their 
pension obligations.” McNamee, 173 Ill. 2d at 446. Rather, “the purpose of the amendment was 
to clarify and strengthen the right of state and municipal employees to receive their pension 
benefits, but not to control funding.” Id. at 440. We held that the clause “creates an enforceable 
contractual relationship that protects only the right to receive benefits.” Id. at 446. Thus, 
consistent with Lindberg, McNamee and Sklodowski, passing a funding statute that aims to 
provide full funding by increasing the multiplier used to determine the City’s contribution, or 
by changing the method of funding to an actuarially based funding requirement to ensure the 
Funds reach 90% funding by 2055 and beyond does not create a “benefit” protected by the 
pension protection clause. 
¶ 39 
 
Furthermore, we reject the proposition that Public Act 98-641 evinces a legislative intent to 
establish an enforceable contractual right to full actuarial funding that would be protected 
against impairment by subsequent legislation. To address this argument, we begin with the 
understanding that “the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make 
laws that establish the policy of the state.” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985). These policies are “inherently subject to 
revision and repeal.” Id. Otherwise, “ ‘the essential powers of a legislative body’ ” would be 
drastically limited. A.B.A.T.E. of Illinois, Inc. v. Quinn, 2011 IL 110611, ¶ 34 (quoting 
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 466); see also Envirite Corp. v. Illinois 
Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 215 (1994) (“There is no vested right in the 
continuance of a law. The legislature has an ongoing right to amend a statute.”); Choose Life 
Illinois, Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 858 n.4 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It is axiomatic that one 
legislature cannot bind a future legislature.”). 
¶ 40 
 
Based on these principles, it is presumed “that laws do not create private contractual or 
vested rights, but merely declare a policy to be pursued until the legislature ordains otherwise.” 
Sklodowski, 182 Ill. 2d at 231-32 (citing Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 
54, 104 (1990)). The presumption that a statute does not create contractual obligations is not 
overcome “absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself 
contractually,” and that intention must be “clearly and unequivocally expressed.” National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 465-66. 
¶ 41 
 
Despite the City’s reliance on the General Assembly’s stated purpose in enacting the 
legislation to save the Funds from insolvency and the inclusion of enforcement mechanisms, 
nothing in the Act’s funding provisions expressly provides for an enforceable contractual right 
to an “actuarial funding guarantee.” Indeed, the language in the enforcement provisions is 
qualified in many respects. 40 ILCS 5/8-173.1, 11-169.1 (West 2014). For example, the Act 
provides that the Funds may bring a mandamus action at their discretion if the City fails to 
make its required annual contributions and limits any repayment plans to those that do not 
“significantly imperil[ ] the public health, safety, or welfare.” 40 ILCS 5/8-173.1(b), 
11-169.1(b) (West 2014). Nothing in that language supports a legislative intent to establish 
 
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clearly and unequivocally an enforceable contractual right of the members of the Fund to an 
“actuarial funding guarantee.” Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the statutory funding 
provisions are not a “benefit” that can be “offset” against an unconstitutional diminishment of 
pension benefits. 
¶ 42 
 
Finally, and most importantly, we reject the City’s assertion that the funding provisions in 
the Act must be regarded as a “benefit” because they replace an illusory set of unfunded 
statutory promises. The City maintains that prior to the Act, members of the Funds only had a 
right to the money available in their respective funds upon retirement. The City’s argument 
rests on section 22-403 of the Pension Code, which provides that “[a]ny pension payable under 
any law hereinbefore referred to shall not be construed to be a legal obligation or debt of the 
State, or *** city ***, but shall be held to be solely an obligation of such pension fund.” 40 
ILCS 5/22-403 (West 2012). 
¶ 43 
 
The City’s contention, if adopted by this court, would be inconsistent with the plain 
meaning of the pension protection clause, would undermine our holding in Heaton, and would 
lead to an absurd and unjust result. Rather, as we have explained, the Illinois Constitution 
mandates that members of the Funds have “a legally enforceable right to receive the benefits 
they have been promised”—not merely to receive whatever happens to remain in the Funds. 
Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 46; Lindberg, 60 Ill. 2d at 271 (holding that the pension protection 
clause was a guarantee that members of the pension system would receive pension payments 
when they became due at retirement). The whole purpose of establishing the clause was “to 
eliminate any uncertainty as to whether state and local governments were obligated to pay 
pension benefits to their employees.” Sklodowski, 182 Ill. 2d at 228-29. The clause was 
“intended to force the funding of the pensions indirectly, by putting the state and municipal 
governments on notice that they are responsible for those benefits.” McNamee, 173 Ill. 2d at 
442. How the benefits would be financed “was a matter left to the other branches of 
government.” Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 16. Thus, the General Assembly and the City have 
been on notice since the ratification of the 1970 Constitution that the benefits of membership 
must be paid in full and that they must be paid without diminishing or impairing them. 
¶ 44 
 
Since members of the Funds already have “a legally enforceable right to receive the 
benefits they have been promised” (id. ¶ 46), the clause already guarantees that pension 
participants will receive the money due them at the time of their retirement. By offering a 
purported “offsetting benefit” of actuarially sound funding and solvency in the Funds, the 
legislation merely offers participants in those funds what is already guaranteed to 
them—payment of the pension benefits in place when they joined the fund. To put it simply, in 
10 years, the members of the Funds will be no less entitled to the benefits they were promised. 
Thus, the “guaranty” that the benefits due will be paid is merely an offer to do something 
already constitutionally mandated by the pension protection clause. Since participants already 
enjoy that legal protection, we reject the notion that the promise of solvency can be “netted” 
against the unconstitutional diminishment of benefits. 
¶ 45 
 
To the extent that section 22-403 of the Pension Code purports to establish that MEABF 
and LABF members only have a right to amounts the Funds have on hand by virtue of the 
legislatively prescribed funding choices, that section cannot overcome the constitutional 
guarantee. Id. ¶ 80 (“[A]ll [legislative] acts, contrary [to] or in violation of the constitutional 
charter, are void.”). Section 22-403 was originally enacted in 1945 (see 1945 Ill. Laws 1670 
 
- 11 - 
 
(§ 3)), prior to the 1970 Illinois Constitution and, thus, prior to the establishment of a 
contractual relationship between employer and employee. See Arnold v. Board of Trustees of 
the County Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 84 Ill. 2d 57, 60-61 (1981) (at that time, the 
retirement annuity provided to members of most pension funds was not characterized as 
contractual in nature). Thus, by declaring a contractual relationship rather than a gratuitous 
one, the pension clause established a legal obligation to pay pension benefits to the employees 
where previously there had been none. Sklodowski, 182 Ill. 2d at 228. 
¶ 46 
 
Section 9 of the Transition Schedule of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
“The rights and duties of all public bodies shall remain as if this Constitution had 
not been adopted with the exception of such changes as are contained in this 
Constitution. All laws, *** not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this 
Constitution shall remain in force, until they shall expire by their own limitation or 
shall be altered or repealed pursuant to this Constitution.” Ill. Const. 1970, Transition 
Schedule § 9. 
Thus, to the extent that section 22-403 is inconsistent with the mandate in the pension 
protection clause, it did not survive ratification of the Illinois Constitution. See, e.g., Kanellos 
v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166-67 (1972) (referendum provision in pre-1970 statute 
invalid under section 9 where it conflicted with home rule powers granted under the 1970 
Constitution). 
¶ 47 
 
Ultimately, the City’s “offsetting benefit” theory rests on the proposition that what it 
deems as “modest” diminishments are necessary to prevent insolvency in the future. Although 
we recognize that fiscal soundness is important, the General Assembly may not utilize an 
unconstitutional method to achieve that end. Maddux v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill. 2d 508, 528 
(2009) (“If a statute is unconstitutional, courts are obligated to declare it invalid” and “[t]his 
duty cannot be evaded or neglected, no matter how desirable or beneficial the legislation may 
appear to be.”). To allow such a construct to justify diminishing benefits would be merely an 
end run around the reserved sovereign powers argument, as explained in Heaton. The City’s 
theory would allow the legislature “through its funding decisions, [to] create the very 
emergency conditions used to justify its suspension of the rights conferred and protected by the 
constitution.” Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 85. This is the very circumstance that the pension 
protection clause was intended to foreclose. To be clear, the constitution removed the option of 
unilaterally diminishing benefits as a means of attaining pension stability. Whether members 
of the Funds may be “better off” under the new terms of the Act despite the unconstitutional 
diminishment of their benefits, as defendants contend, is not for the General Assembly to 
decide unilaterally. The fundamental point here is that determination must be made, if at all, 
according to contract principles by mutual assent of the members and not by legislative 
dictates. 
 
¶ 48 
 
 
 
 
II. Bargained-for Exchange 
¶ 49 
 
The City next contends that the Act was not a product of unilateral action but, instead, 
codified a bargained-for exchange made between the City and the unions representing the 
Funds’ participants. The City maintains that the legislation was the result of negotiations 
between the City and its unions, over several years. In support, the City presented the affidavit 
 
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of Matthew Brandon, the Secretary/Treasurer and Chief of Staff of Service Employees 
International Union Local 73 (SEIU). 
¶ 50 
 
Brandon stated that “a working group drawn from the 31 MEABF and LABF member 
unions was formulated to participate in negotiations with city representatives pertaining to the 
terms of such legislation.” Over a period of about two and a half years, representatives of the 
City “met with this working group to discuss developing a mutually beneficial solution to the 
pension crises.” As a result of the negotiations, the City representatives and the unions’ 
working group arrived at a proposal, which was presented to the legislature. 
¶ 51 
 
Brandon asserted that before the proposed legislation was presented to the General 
Assembly, elected representatives from the 31 unions met to determine whether the unions 
could reach a consensus to support the terms of the proposed legislation. As a result of the 
meeting, 28 of the 31 unions represented at the meeting voted in favor of the proposed 
legislation. Following the vote, union representatives met with legislators to confirm their 
support for the proposed legislation. 
¶ 52 
 
The affidavit presented by Brandon also refers to “an affiliated committee comprised of 
and established for the benefit of SEIU retirees” and states that he apprised the committee 
members of the “status and progress of the negotiations” and that he informed the committee of 
the “final terms” of the bill and that no committee members voiced an objection to the 
proposed negotiated terms. The legislation was promoted as the “product of arms-length 
negotiations between the City of Chicago and the duly elected representatives of the unions 
that advocated on behalf of the union members and retirees.” 
¶ 53 
 
Even taking as true the facts advanced to support the City’s claim, we hold that as a matter 
of law, members of the Funds did not bargain away their constitutional rights in this process. 
To be sure, ordinary contract principles allow for the modification of pension benefits in a 
bargained-for exchange for consideration. Buddell v. Board of Trustees, State University 
Retirement System, 118 Ill. 2d 99, 104-05 (1987) (pension rights can be modified “in 
accordance with usual contract principles”). As we explained in Heaton, the pension 
protection clause was not intended to prohibit the legislature from providing “additional 
benefits” and requiring additional employee contributions or other consideration in exchange. 
Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 46 n.12. Likewise, nothing prohibits an employee from knowingly 
and voluntarily agreeing to modify pension benefits from an employer in exchange for valid 
consideration from the employer. Kraus v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 72 
Ill. App. 3d 833, 849 (1979); see also York v. Central Illinois Mutual Relief Ass’n, 340 Ill. 595, 
602 (1930) (“one party to a contract cannot by his own acts release or alter its obligations. The 
intention must be mutual.”). 
¶ 54 
 
In the context of the collective bargaining process for public employees, employees 
designate a particular union as their exclusive agent for collective bargaining negotiations. See 
5 ILCS 315/6 (West 2014). The cases that defendants rely upon to support a bargained-for 
exchange argument involved agreements reached through the collective bargaining process. 
See Ballentine v. Koch, 674 N.E.2d 292, 296 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996) (“[B]ecause plaintiffs 
designated the PBA as their agent for the collective bargaining negotiations at issue here and 
were thus bound by its actions taken on their behalf during the negotiation process [citation], 
the PBA’s waiver of the constitutional protections of [New York’s pension protection clause] 
is valid as to plaintiffs ***.”); Schacht v. City of New York, 346 N.E.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. Ct. 
 
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App. 1976) (“Plaintiff, having designated the union to be her agent for collective bargaining 
purposes, is bound by agreements made by that union on her behalf.”).  
¶ 55 
 
In this case, it is undisputed that the unions were not acting as authorized agents within a 
collective bargaining process. Thus, we need not resolve whether the vote taken by union 
representatives as expressed in the Brandon affidavit bound members of the Funds in a 
collective bargaining process. Rather, we agree with the trial court that “these negotiations 
were no different than legislative advocacy on behalf of any interest group supporting 
collective interests to a lawmaking body.” The individual members of the Funds have done 
nothing that could be said to have unequivocally assented to the new terms or to have 
“bargained away” their constitutional rights. Accordingly, nothing in the legislative process 
that led to the enactment of the Act constituted a waiver of the Funds members’ constitutional 
rights under the pension protection clause. 
 
¶ 56 
 
 
 
 
III. Severability 
¶ 57 
 
Finally, we must consider whether the invalid provisions may be severed from the 
remaining provisions of the statute, which is a question of legislative intent. Heaton, 2015 IL 
118585, ¶ 91. We look first to the statute’s own severability provision, which creates a 
rebuttable presumption of legislative intent. Id. ¶ 95. To rebut the presumption, the court must 
determine whether the legislature would have passed the law without the invalid parts. Id. We 
consider “whether the legislative purpose in passing the act is significantly undercut or altered 
by the elimination of those invalid sections.” Id. 
¶ 58 
 
Applying these principles to the present case, the Act’s severability provision specifies 
certain sections of the Act that are declared “mutually dependent and inseverable.” Pub. Act 
98-641, § 93 (eff. June 9, 2014). These sections include the provisions pertaining to the annual 
annuity increases, which we have found to be unconstitutional, as well as the provisions 
pertaining to the City’s financing obligations and the enforcement mechanisms. With respect 
to these sections, the severability clause provides, “If any of those provisions is held invalid 
other than as applied to a particular person or circumstance, then all of those provisions are 
invalid.” Id. 
¶ 59 
 
The circuit court found that this expression of legislative intent was confirmed by the 
General Assembly’s express findings along with the representations made by legislative 
proponents that the legislation intended to tie the reduction in employee benefits to the funding 
and enforcement provisions of the Act “as part of a unified package.” Accordingly, the circuit 
court held that “the General Assembly would not have enacted Public Act 98-641 without the 
invalid provisions.” The parties do not dispute the circuit court’s conclusion, and we agree 
with the circuit court’s assessment that the Act is unenforceable in its entirety. 
 
¶ 60 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 61 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court declaring Public Act 
98-641 to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement is affirmed. 
 
¶ 62 
 
Affirmed.