Case Title: Stromberg v. Univ. of Maryland

Citation: 395 Md. 120

Docket Number: 6/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CAL02-26807
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 6
September Term, 2006
______________________________________
STROMBERG METAL WORKS, INC.
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 18, 2006
Although subdivided in its brief, the single issue presented by Stromberg Metal
Works, Inc. in this appeal is whether the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County abused
its discretion in denying Stromberg’s motion for an award of costs and attorneys’ fees under
Maryland Code, § 10-623(f) of the State Government Article (SG), which is part of the State
Public Information Act (PIA).  In an earlier proceeding, we held that Stromberg, which  had
filed multiple requests for documents under the PIA, was entitled to certain information that
respondent, the University of Maryland, had denied.  Stromberg v. University of Maryland,
382 Md. 151, 854 A.2d 1220 (2004) (Stromberg I).  
As the alleged prevailing party in that proceeding, Stromberg claims an entitlement
to recover costs and attorneys’ fees expended in the prosecution of that claim – $62,546.  The
Circuit Court disagreed and denied the motion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that
decision, and so shall we.
BACKGROUND
Most of the facts relevant to Stromberg’s request for information under the PIA, upon
which its motion for reimbursement of costs and attorneys’ fees is based, are set forth in our
earlier Opinion and need not be repeated in any detail.  Suffice it to say that Stromberg was
a sub-subcontractor in the renovation of the Student Union building on the College Park
campus of the University.  At some point, the project fell a year behind schedule and was
approximately $2 million over the then-current revised budget. The general contractor had
made a significant, but contested, claim against the University, and Stromberg expressed
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concern whether there would be sufficient funds available to complete the project.  On three
occasions, it requested various documents relating to the project, including certain monthly
reports prepared by an employee in the University’s Department of Architecture,
Engineering, and Construction who acted as the project manager.  We shall refer to those
reports as the AEC Reports.  The University turned over the requested documents –
thousands of them – including unredacted copies of the AEC Reports through December,
2001.
In August, 2002, Stromberg filed a supplemental request for additional documents,
including the AEC Reports for and after January, 2002.  Although the University turned over
the documents requested in the supplemental application, in contrast to its previous
responses, it redacted much of the information in the AEC Reports.  That led to a lawsuit
filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to enjoin the University from denying
access to that information.  In response to Stromberg’s complaint, the University averred that
the redacted information was lawfully shielded under SG §§ 10-615(1) and 10-618(b).
Section 10-615(1) requires a custodian to deny inspection of public records that are, by law,
confidential or privileged; § 10-618(b) permits a custodian to deny inspection of any part of
an interagency or intra-agency memorandum that would not be available to a private party
in litigation with the governmental unit.  As to both sections, the University claimed that the
redacted information was protected by some combination of an executive-deliberative
process privilege and, for purposes of § 10-618(b), constituted confidential commercial
1 As we pointed out in Stromberg I, 382 Md. at 154-55, 854 A.2d at 1222, the AEC
Report was in the form of two spread sheets, one dealing with all of the University’s
construction projects and another dealing with each project individually.  The second
document contained more information about that project than was included in the first. 
The individual report for the Student Union project included information with respect to
(1) the original funding authorization and budget for the project, (2) approved funding
and budget changes, (3) current funding and budget for each category of expense, (4)
amount of the budget encumbered to date, (5) estimated amount needed to complete the
project, (6) final cost forecast, (7) any budget variance, and (8) target and actual dates for
start of construction, substantial completion, and project completion.  The focus of the
appeal was on item (6) – the total forecasted cost of the project.
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information that would not be available to a civil litigant.  
The Circuit Court, agreeing with the University’s defenses, granted its motion for
summary judgment, and we issued a writ of certiorari on our own initiative, prior to any
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, to consider Stromberg’s appeal.  We observed,
preliminarily, that, although a great deal of information included in the AEC Reports had
been redacted, the focus of Stromberg’s appeal was on only one item of information – a
single dollar figure that constituted the project manager’s estimate of the total forecasted cost
of the project. 1  We therefore limited our consideration to that one item and found no basis
on which to disturb the Circuit Court’s ruling with respect to any of the other redacted
information.  As a further preliminary matter, we rejected Stromberg’s argument that the
University had asserted the executive-deliberative process privilege in an untimely manner
and had thereby waived its right to rely on that privilege.
In examining the defenses asserted by the University with respect to the one item, it
was clear that there was a paucity of Maryland law directly bearing on the executive-
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deliberative process and confidential commercial information issues, and, to resolve those
issues, we had to borrow from and analyze decisions interpreting the Federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).  In the end, we held that the one item of information at issue – the
composite dollar figure estimate on each of the monthly AEC Reports – was not protected
by either the executive-deliberative process privilege stated in § 10-615(1) or the interagency
or intra-agency memorandum exclusion in §10-618(b).  
We concluded that the executive-deliberative process privilege was limited, in this
context, to the deliberative process of the highest Executive officials, and that neither the
project manager in the University’s Department of Architecture, Engineering, and
Construction, nor the supervisor to whom the AEC Reports were submitted qualified as such.
We also determined that the redacted number in question was almost entirely factual in
nature and had no real deliberative quality to it and that it did not constitute confidential
commercial information because (1) it was not the kind of time-sensitive information to
which that exception is often applied, and (2) the number itself, being a composite figure
embodying the project manager’s estimates of a variety of factors, including all of the
significant pending claims, none of which were individually discernible from the aggregate
number, would not reveal anyone’s confidential views as to the validity or value of any of
the constituent claims or, indeed, as to the future status of the project.  Our ultimate judgment
was to remand for an order directing the University to permit inspection of that one redacted
number on the AEC Reports but to affirm the Circuit Court’s decision in all other respects.
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Upon remand, the University promptly complied with our mandate.  This proceeding
commenced when Stromberg filed a motion for an award of over $62,000 in counsel fees and
costs incurred in pursuing the action to enjoin the University from denying access to the
redacted information.  It argued that it had prevailed in its quest for the information, that the
public benefitted from the release of the information which, Stromberg contended,
“addressed the general public’s interest and concern over the fiscal management on a public
construction project that was spiraling out of control,” and that the University’s redactions
“were not reasonably based on the law.”
In response, the University essentially conceded that Stromberg had substantially
prevailed in its action and was therefore eligible for an award of counsel fees and costs.  It
averred, however, that, in deciding whether an award should be made, the court needed to
consider whether there was any public benefit to the suit, the nature of Stromberg’s interest
in the released information, and whether the University had a reasonable basis in law for
withholding the information.  In that regard, the University denied that there was any public
benefit derived from Stromberg’s suit and maintained, conversely, that the action to obtain
the redacted information was solely for Stromberg’s pecuniary benefit, in that it was then a
participant in a multi-million dollar claim against the University.  Finally, the University
insisted that, although this Court required that the redacted information be supplied, the
University had a reasonable basis in law for initially withholding it.
After considering the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to
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Stromberg’s motion and the arguments of the parties, the court denied the motion, concluding
in a brief memorandum and order that, although Stromberg did substantially prevail in its
action:
“1. There is no benefit to the public apart from what the Plaintiff
derived from this suit;
2. The nature of the Complainant’s interest in the released
information is private and pecuniary; and
3. The agency’s withholding of the information had a reasonable
basis in the law.”
The Court of Special Appeals, in Stromberg’s appeal from that decision, agreed with
the Circuit Court’s findings and therefore affirmed.  Stromberg v. Univ. of Maryland, 166
Md. App. 190, 897 A.2d 1085 (2005).  The intermediate appellate court found that no
evidence had been presented to the Circuit Court “to demonstrate that the disclosure of the
cost of the subject project would generate considerable benefit to the public and outweigh
appellant’s personal and commercial interest or the University’s reasonable basis for
withholding the information.”  Id. at 205, 897 A.2d at 1094.
DISCUSSION
Stromberg does not dispute that its eligibility for an award of counsel fees and costs
proceeds solely from SG § 10-623(f), which provides:
“If the court determines that the complainant has substantially
prevailed, the court may assess against a defendant
governmental unit reasonable counsel fees and other litigation
2 Section 552(a)(4)(E) provides that “[t]he court may assess against the United
States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case
under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.”  We have
recognized, more generally, that the purpose of the Maryland PIA is “virtually identical”
to that of the Federal FOIA and that, except where there may be some relevant differences
in the two statutes, we may, and should, look to persuasive interpretations of the Federal
Act.  See Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford Co., 299 Md. 493, 506, 474 A.2d 880, 887
(1984); Fioretti v. Board of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 76, 716 A.2d 258, 263
(1998); Police Patrol v. Prince George’s County, 378 Md. 702, 722, n.8, 838 A.2d 1191,
1203, n.8 (2003).
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costs that the complainant reasonably incurred.”
That provision was not part of the original enactment of the PIA in 1970.  The only
sanction then provided was a $100 criminal fine imposable on “any person who willfully and
knowingly” violated a provision of the statute.  The availability of judicial review and other
civil remedies, including the allowance of counsel fees and costs against the governmental
entity (rather than against “any person”) came in 1978.  What is now SG § 10-623(f) was
obviously patterned after the analogous provision in FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), which
Congress added to FOIA in 1974.2  
Both SG § 10-623 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) require as a condition of eligibility for
an award of fees and expenses that the complainant have “substantially prevailed” in its
judicial action seeking the information and both make clear that, even if that condition is met,
the making and amount of an award remains discretionary with the court.  As we observed
in Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 96, 721 A.2d 196, 206-07 (1998), however,
neither statute sets forth any particular criteria to guide the court in the exercise of its
3 S. 2543 provided, in relevant part, that “[i]n exercising its discretion under this
paragraph, the court shall consider the benefit to the public, if any, deriving from the case,
the commercial benefit to the complainant and the nature of his interest in the records
sought, and whether the Government’s withholding of the records had a reasonable basis
in law.”
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discretion.  Following the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals in Kline v. Fuller, 64 Md.
App. 375, 386, 496 A.2d 325, 331 (1985), we concluded that a court must consider at least
three factors:
“(1) the benefit to the public, if any, derived from the suit;
 (2) the nature of the complainant’s interest in the released
information; and
  (3) whether the agency’s withholding of the information had a
reasonable basis in law.”
Those factors emanated from the views expressed by Congress when it enacted §
552(a)(4)(E).  A rather detailed account of the legislative history of that provision is set forth
in Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704 (D.C.Cir. 1977) and Cuneo
v. Rumsfield, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and although we need not recount that history
in full, some of it is particularly relevant.  Section 552(a)(4)(E) was the product of a
compromise between S. 2543 and H.R. 12471.  The Senate Bill actually contained those
factors, although the second one identified in Kirwan was separated into two.3  The Senate
Judiciary Committee explained in its Report on the bill (Report No. 93-854, 93rd Congress,
2d Session, to accompany S. 2543, May 16, 1974) that:
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(1) Under the first criterion – public benefit – “a court would ordinarily award
fees, for example, where a newsman was seeking information to be used in a publication or
a public interest group was seeking information to further a project benefitting the general
public, but it would not award fees if a business was using the FOIA to obtain data relating
to a competitor or as a substitute for discovery in private litigation with the government.”
Id. at 19.
(2) Under the second criterion – commercial benefit to the complainant – a
court would usually allow recovery where the complainant was indigent or a nonprofit public
interest group but would not allow recovery “if it was a large corporate interest (or a
representative of such an interest).”  Id.
(3) Under the third criterion – the nature of the complainant’s interest in the
records – a court would generally award fees “if the complainant’s interest in the information
sought was scholarly or journalistic or public-interest oriented, but would not do so if his
interest was of a frivolous or purely commercial nature.” Id.
(4) Under the fourth criterion – reasonableness of the non-disclosure – “a court
would not award fees where the government’s withholding had a colorable basis in law but
would ordinarily award them if the withholding appeared to be merely to avoid
embarrassment or to frustrate the requester.”  Id.
Summarizing the interplay of these criteria, the Senate Judiciary Committee cogently
observed:
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“[T]here will seldom be an award of attorneys’ fees when the
suit is to advance the private commercial interests of the
complainant.  In these cases there is usually no need to award
attorneys’ fees to insure that the action will be brought.  The
private self-interest motive of, and often pecuniary benefit to,
the complainant will be sufficient to insure the vindication of the
rights given in the FOIA.  The court should not ordinarily award
fees under this situation unless the government officials have
been recalcitrant in their opposition to a valid claim or have
been otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior.”
Id.
The House Bill did not include any criteria to guide the court’s discretion, and, on that
matter, the Senate-House Conference Committee accepted the House version and excluded
the criteria from the bill.  The Conference Committee was careful to note in its Report,
however, that, by not including those criteria, the conferees did not intend to make an award
of attorneys’ fees automatic or preclude the courts from “tak[ing] into consideration such
criteria” in exercising discretion.  It pointed out, rather, that “the existing body of law on the
award of attorney fees recognize such factors” and that “a statement of the criteria may be
too delimiting and is unnecessary.”  House of Representatives Report No. 93-1380, 93rd
Congress, 2d Session, to accompany H.R. 12471, Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference, at 10.
The Federal courts, in applying § 552(a)(4)(E), have routinely recognized and given
effect to the four criteria that had been included in the Senate Bill, often citing as persuasive
authority the Senate Judiciary Committee Report.  See, for example, Education/Instruccion,
Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 649 F.2d 4 (1 st Cir. 1981); Chamberlain v.
4 As we pointed out in Stromberg I, Stromberg complained initially about virtually
all of the many redactions made by the University in the AEC Reports but, in its appeal
from the Circuit Court’s summary judgment, essentially abandoned its complaint as to
everything but the one composite number. As a result, we affirmed the Circuit Court’s
ruling that Stromberg was not entitled to any of that other information.  The only victory
won by Stromberg was as to the composite number.  Whether Stromberg, in fact,
substantially prevailed in its action is not at all clear.
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Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 842 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842, 100 S. Ct. 82, 62 L.
Ed.2d 54 (1979); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996);
Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 600 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1979); Long v.
U.S. I.R.S., 596 F.2d 362, 370 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917, 100 S. Ct. 1851,
64 L. Ed.2d 271 (1980); Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 80 F.3d 1500,
1504 (10th Cir. 1996); Nationwide Building Maintenance, Inc., supra, 559 F.2d at 710-13;
Weisberg v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Muffoletto v.
Sessions, 760 F. Supp. 268 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). So have we.  See Kirwan, supra, 352 Md. 74,
721 A.2d 196.
Because the University has essentially conceded (or, at least, does not contest) that
Stromberg substantially prevailed in the earlier proceeding, we shall not disturb the Circuit
Court’s finding to that effect.4  The question, then, is whether the Circuit Court failed to give
correct consideration to the relevant factors and thereby abused its discretion in denying an
award.
Public Benefit
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The first factor is whether any public benefit was derived from Stromberg’s limited
success.  The Circuit Court held that there was “no public benefit.”  Stromberg urges that
such a finding is erroneous as a matter of law, because there is always some public benefit
from judicial enforcement of the PIA, from requiring government agencies to comply with
the law.  In its conception, every judicial victory would place the applicant at least on first
base and more likely on second.  
It is true, of course, in a very general way, that the public is ordinarily benefitted
whenever a government agency is required by a court to follow the law, but, as most courts
have made clear, that is not the focus of provisions like § 552(a)(4)(E) of FOIA or SG § 10-
623(f).  See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1978); Fenster v.
Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Aviation Data Service v. F.A.A., 687 F.2d
1319, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 1982); Simon v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D.D.C.
1984); Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, Inc. v. Castle, 631 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (D.D.C.
1986).  The Blue court explained that, although doubtless true that the successful FOIA
plaintiff necessarily acts in some degree for the benefit of the public by bringing the
Government into compliance with FOIA and securing to the public the benefits presumed
to flow from public disclosure of government information, the Senate Report’s reference to
disclosure to the press and public interest organizations in its discussion of that criterion,
“strongly suggest[ed] that in weighing this factor a court should take into account the degree
of dissemination and likely public impact that might be expected from a particular
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disclosure.”  Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, supra, 570 F.2d at 533 (emphasis added).  Thus, the
court continued, “this factor rather speaks for an award where the complainant’s victory is
likely to add to the fund of information that citizens may use in making vital political
choices.”  Id. at 534.  The Fenster court followed that approach as well.
Notwithstanding the Senate Judiciary Committee’s reference to requests made by
news and public interest organizations, we do not believe that the public interest criterion
was intended to be, or should be, limited to requests made by those kinds of bodies.  The
focus of this criterion, which, of course, is not itself determinative but must be balanced
against the others, should rather be on the nature of the information requested and, to some
extent, although this implicates the third criterion as well, what use the requester intends to
and does make of it.
The record here indicates that there was public interest in the delays and cost overruns
with respect to the Student Union renovation project.  Stories appeared in the public press
and in the University’s student newspaper regarding the matter, and one or more articles
noted this Court’s decision in Stromberg I.  There is nothing in the record, however, to show
that Stromberg, or anyone else, ever disseminated, or intended to disseminate, either to the
news media or otherwise to the public generally, the composite numbers in the AEC Reports
that Stromberg was ultimately successful in obtaining, or that any segment of the public,
other than Stromberg, ever indicated any interest in learning of or using those numbers for
any public purpose.  On this record, therefore, it seems apparent that Stromberg wanted and
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used the information entirely for its own purpose and that there really was no public benefit
from the actual disclosure of the AEC numbers beyond the general public benefit presumably
accruing from any disclosure required by a court.
Commercial Benefit to Stromberg
Nature of Stromberg’s Interest in the Information
As we did in Kirwan, we shall consider these two factors together, because they are
usually related and are clearly related in this case.  These factors – in a way a “flip side” of
the first – emanate directly from the very purpose and function of the fee-shifting provision.
As was noted in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 2543, such a provision was
seen by witnesses as “crucial to effectuating the original congressional intent that judicial
review be available to reverse agency refusals to adhere strictly to the Act’s mandates” – that
“[t]oo often, the barriers presented by court costs and attorneys’ fees are insurmountable for
the average person requesting information, allowing the government to escape compliance
with the law.”  Senate Report No. 93-854, supra, at 17.  As the Senate pointed out, however,
fee-shifting will seldom be warranted “when the suit is to advance the private commercial
interests of the complainant,” because the self-interest of the complainant in that setting will
suffice “to insure the vindication of the rights given in the FOIA.”  Id. at 19.  As one court
observed, “the public should not be required to finance the investigation of a FOIA plaintiff
who makes the request with an eye toward prosecuting some litigation to his own benefit.”
Education-Instruccion, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 87 F.R.D. 112, 116
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(D. Mass. 1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 4 (1 st Cir. 1981).
As we have just indicated, on the record in this case, it is beyond legitimate dispute
that Stromberg sought and used the information in the AEC Reports for its own pecuniary
benefit, to assure itself that there would be sufficient funds to complete the project and pay
its invoices for the work it performed.  At no time, ever, did Stromberg indicate any interest
in the public dissemination of the information, in order to add to the “fund of knowledge”
regarding the project.  These factors thus weigh heavily against a fee-award.
Reasonableness of Initial Non-Disclosure
Stromberg’s argument that the University had no reasonable basis in law for denying
inspection of the redacted information rests essentially on the fact that we rejected the
University’s defenses and directed that the information be supplied.  Because we held that
the information was not protected by executive-deliberative privilege and was not
confidential commercial information, the University, in Stromberg’s view, had no colorable
basis for denying inspection.  We do not agree.
Although this Court had discussed the Constitutionally-derived principle of executive
privilege in earlier cases, it was necessary for us to borrow heavily from Federal cases
interpreting FOIA to resolve the more precise question of whether the redacted information
on the AEC Reports was properly shielded under SG § 10-615(1) or § 10-618(b).  There were
no clear precedential rulings from this Court prior to our Opinion in Stromberg I.  
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As we have observed, the University had turned over thousands of documents to
Stromberg, including, on earlier occasions, unredacted AEC Reports.  There is no indication
of any intent on the University’s part to obstruct or frustrate Stromberg or to withhold
information for which there was any public clamor.  Rather, guided by the advice of the
Attorney General’s Office, the University concluded, in response to the supplemental request,
that certain information included in the AEC Reports was lawfully subject to shield.  It is also
of some significance, in judging the reasonableness of the University’s position, that the
Circuit Court had agreed with that position and entered summary judgment in the
University’s favor.  Although none of these factors, individually, is conclusive or even
paramount, when considered together they strongly support a determination that the
University’s redaction, though ultimately held to be wrong, was not unreasonable.
Upon these findings and a balance of the relevant factors, we conclude that the Circuit
Court did not err or in any way abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an award of
costs and attorneys’ fees and that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals must be
affirmed.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.