Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF METZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106807

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF METZ  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF METZ 2011 OK 26 Case Number: 106807 Decided: 04/05/2011 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. In the Matter of the Estate of William Edward Metz, Deceased, Shirley Glass Romine; Donna S. Hacker, formerly McCoy; Suzanne Suddath; Brad McCoy and Mandi Latimer, Appellees, v. David J. Pense, Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS DIVISION II ¶0 Decedent's legatees objected to the final accounting and inventory of the estate with respect to a jointly held bank account naming decedent's nephew as survivor. The District Court, Rogers County, Honorable Sheila A. Condren, held that the decedent did not intend to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in nephew, and that the bank account was property of the estate. Nephew appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We reverse and hold that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship was created by the granting clause contained in the share account signature card and properly vested in nephew upon decedent's death. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED. Larry Ernest Rahmeier, Scarth & Rahmeier, Claremore, for Appellees. Mark H. Ramsey, Taylor, Burrage, Foster, Mallett, Downs & Ramsey, Claremore, for Appellant. COLBERT, V.C.J. ¶1 The decedent established a joint bank account naming his nephew as the other joint tenant, with the understanding that his nephew would not exercise dominion or control over the account without the decedent's permission until the decedent's death. The decisive issue on appeal is whether the decedent intended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in nephew. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In March 1997, William Metz (Decedent) established a bank account at the Tulsa Teachers Credit Union (TTCU). Decedent named his nephew, David Pense (Appellant), as a joint tenant on the account with right of survivorship. The duly executed share account signature card (Contract) provides: THE UNDERSIGNED hereby agree with the other, and with the Tulsa Teachers Credit Union; that all sums heretofore deposited by them, or either of them, shall be as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, and payable to either during the lifetime of both or to the survivor(s) after the death of one of them; and payment thereof shall discharge said Credit Union from liability to either, or the heirs, personal representatives or assigns of either. The right or authority of the Credit Union under this agreement shall not be changed or terminated by said owners, or any of them except by written notice to said Credit Union which shall affect transactions theretofore, made. /s/ W.E. Metz /s/ David J. Pense The parties agreed verbally that Appellant would not exercise any control over the account until Decedent's death, unless Decedent agreed. For the duration of Decedent's lifetime, Appellant neither contributed nor withdrew money from the account. ¶3 Decedent died testate in March 2007. His will bequeathed a specified percentage of his estate to relatives, including Appellant. Other beneficiaries of Decedent's will included Decedent's stepchildren and step-grandchildren, Shirley Glass Romine, Donna S. Hacker, Suzanne Suddath, Brad McCoy and Mandi Latimer, Appellees (Legatees). Legatees objected to the final accounting and inventory of the estate proposed by Decedent's personal representative, alleging that Decedent had intended the money in the TTCU account to revert to his estate at his death. Neither party disputes Decedent's competency. Both parties agree Decedent remained in full control of his affairs until his death. Further, Decedent took no affirmative steps to sever the joint tenancy or change the Contract. ¶4 The district court found that Decedent had created a joint tenancy in the TTCU account with Appellant, but that he had intended the money in the account to be used for his medical expenses during his life, and to be property of his Estate after his death. At Legatees' request, the district court imposed a constructive trust on the account, and ordered Appellant to return the proceeds to the Estate for distribution pursuant to Decedent's will. Appellant appealed from the Order Confirming Final Account. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate record supported the district court's decision, but found that the imposition of a resulting trust was more appropriate in this case. Appellant sought certiorari, which was previously granted. Because the record before this Court demonstrates that Decedent intended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in Appellant, we reverse. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 Before determining whether certain property is a probate asset, a district court must determine in whom the title is vested. Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 1 (2001). ANALYSIS ¶6 This Court recognized the common-law doctrine of joint tenancies with right of survivorship prior to its statutory enactment. In re Pugh's Estate, A joint interest is one owned by several persons in either real or personal property in equal shares, being a joint title created by a single instrument, will or transfer when expressly declared in the instrument, will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or as between husband and wife a tenancy by entirety or joint tenancy as the grantor may elect, or when granting or devising to executors or trustees as joint tenants. A tenancy by entirety can only be created between husband and wife. Such joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety may be created by transfer to persons as joint tenants or tenants by entirety from an owner or a joint owner to himself and one or more persons, or from tenants in common to themselves, or by coparceners Where a deed, transfer or conveyance grants an estate in joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety in the granting clause thereof, the granting clause shall control over the habendum clause containing language inconsistent to the granting clause. In the event of the death of a joint tenant or tenant by entirety, leaving estate subject to probate, a certified copy of letters testamentary or of administration shall constitute prima facie evidence of such death. The provisions of this act shall apply to all estates in joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety in either real or personal property heretofore or hereafter created. Nothing herein contained shall prevent execution, levy and sale of the interest of the judgment debtor in such estates and such sale shall constitute a severance. Okla. Stat. tit. 60, § 74 (2001)(footnote added). While the statute does not expressly employ the term "survivorship," this Court has historically held that the Legislature intended this well-defined common law term as a characteristic of joint tenancies, because the common law may not be abrogated by implication. See Draughon v. Wright, ¶7 In the case of two joint tenants, the concept of joint tenancy with right of survivorship permits each owner to alienate and hold his share at the same time he "and the other or others hold the entire property as by a single ownership." Shackelton v. Sherrard, ¶8 It is well-settled law that a joint tenancy, in either real or personal property, "creates a present estate which, absent severance during the life of the joint tenants, assures the surviving tenant absolute ownership of the whole subject matter of the joint tenancy." Toma, ¶9 Historically, this Court has recognized two categories of joint tenancies with right of survivorship: those created by written instrument expressly declaring the relationship as prescribed by section 74; and those not created with words of joint tenancy or survivorship but, nonetheless, the party initiating the relationship "intentionally and intelligently created essential elements of joint ownership and survivorship." Raney v. Diehl, ¶10 Generally, single instruments containing an express written declaration to create a joint tenancy encompass "the element of intent and leave no question as to creation of the relationship." Id., ¶ 17, 482 P.2d at 590 In fact, utilizing an instrument that expressly incorporates the words "as joint tenants with right of survivorship," or similar language, demonstrates the conveying party's intent. The effect of such language "overcome[s] statutory or common law presumptions of tenancies in common." In re Estate of Ingram, ¶11 In this matter, the district court and the Court of Civil Appeals' reasoning tracked the analysis applicable to the latter category. In so doing, the district court heard extensive testimony on the parties' intent, examined their conduct, and ultimately gave little weight to the single instrument that embodied the parties' intent. It is that slippery-slope analysis in which this Court declines to engage because it is perfectly clear that the instant case concerns the first category. ¶12 Appellant argues that, as the surviving joint tenant, he was vested with the sole title to the TTCU account upon Decedent's death. Conversely, Legatees contend that Appellant is merely a "gatekeeper" of the account funds, and that Decedent never intended the beneficial interest to vest in Appellant. Rather, Legatees allege, Decedent's true intent was to have the survivorship interest in the account equally distributed among the legatees named in Decedent's will upon Decedent's death. In the alternative, Legatees press a strained construction of the contractual language "heretofore," and contend that this term limits the joint tenancy only to the sums deposited at the account's creation. We cannot agree. ¶13 In the absence of fraud, accident, mistake or absurdity, the clear and explicit language embodied in the written instrument governs in determining the parties' true intent. Johnson v. Butler, ¶14 From the four corners of the Contract, the intent of the parties' is patently clear and unequivocal. Decedent created in Appellant a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in accordance with the statute. The granting clause expressly declared "that all sums heretofore deposited by . . . either of them shall be as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, . . . and payable . . . to the survivor after the death of one of them . . .." A joint tenancy may only be severed during the lifetime of the tenant. Toma, CONCLUSION ¶15 Appellant, as the surviving joint tenant, is the owner of the account. This Court finds no merit in Legatees' contention that Decedent intended the survivorship interest in the bank account be distributed equally among the beneficiaries named in Decedent's will. Accordingly, the district court order finding no joint tenancy ownership in the bank account is reversed. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED. CONCUR: Taylor, C.J.; Colbert, V.C.J.; Kauger, Watt, Combs, Gurich, JJ. DISSENT: Winchester, Edmondson, Reif, JJ. FOOT