Case Title: State v. Young

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2/18

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Steven Young, No. 2, September Term, 2018, Opinion by Adkins, J.  
 
PRESERVATION FOR APPELLATE REVIEW – MOTION IN LIMINE – 
AUTHENTICATION: The Court of Appeals held that, where a party merely references 
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6), the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, the 
party does not preserve an objection to the other party’s ability to authenticate the evidence 
if admitted under a different hearsay exception or exemption.  Therefore, the State’s 
objection to the admissibility of the prescription evidence was not preserved for review.   
 
PRESERVATION FOR APPELLATE REVIEW – MOTION IN LIMINE – 
OPORTUNITY FOR OBJECTION – MARYLAND RULES 8-131 AND 4-323: 
Maryland Rule 8-131 generally prevents appellate courts from reviewing issues not raised 
in the trial court.  But when a party has no opportunity to object before a ruling is made, 
Maryland Rule 4-323(c) provides that “the absence of an objection at that time does not 
constitute waiver of the objection.”  Here, the defendant had no opportunity to object to 
the trial court’s motion in limine ruling regarding the admissibility of prescription evidence.  
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s motion in limine ruling was preserved 
for review. 
 
EVIDENCE – EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE – HEARSAY – NON-HEARSAY 
“VERBAL ACTS” – PRESCRIPTIONS – POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED 
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES: Defendants charged with possession of controlled 
dangerous substances under Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol), §§ 5-601 and 5-602(2) 
of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”) are entitled to offer prescriptions to establish part of 
the affirmative defense for possession established by the statute, so long as the prescription 
can be authenticated.  Admission of the prescription to prove the operative fact of the 
prescription’s existence is not hearsay, but a legally operative verbal act.  Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals held that the prescriptions would have been admissible as non-hearsay if 
offered to establish the “prescription” prong of the affirmative defense.   
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.: 114169016 
Argued: September 6, 2018 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 2 
September Term, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
STEVEN YOUNG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
*Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: December 18, 2018 
 
*Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, she also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion. 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
2018-12-18 
09:32-05:00
“The true nature of the hearsay rule is nowhere better illustrated and emphasized 
than in those cases which fall outside the scope of its prohibition.”  6 John Henry Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1766, at 250 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).  Steven Young 
was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of possession and 
possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances.  Before trial, the State 
filed a motion to suppress introduction of any supposed prescriptions for controlled 
substances, which the Circuit Court granted on hearsay grounds.  We consider whether the 
alleged prescriptions are barred by the rule against hearsay, or if instead, they are non-
hearsay and admissible as a “verbal act.” 
BACKGROUND 
In May 2014, Detective Manuel Larbi (“Larbi”) and a team of officers executed a 
search warrant for 2580 Marbourne Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland.  Larbi observed 
Steven Young and another male in front of the house.  The officers handcuffed both 
individuals and entered the residence.  Once inside, the officers observed a third individual, 
Angela Grubber, later identified as Young’s wife.  After Larbi read Young his rights 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Young advised that he had controlled 
dangerous substances in the bedroom.  Larbi went into the bedroom and found 32 pills of 
methadone, 3.5 grams of heroin, seven Xanax pills, and “a digital scale containing a 
powder substance.”  In the kitchen cabinet, Larbi recovered 342 OxyContin pills, ten gel 
caps containing suspected heroin, and $1,498 in cash.   
Young was arrested and charged with illegal possession of controlled substances 
and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances.  Young filed a motion to 
2 
suppress evidence of these drugs, asserting that he “attempted to provide [prescriptions] to 
police during the incident, and explained that he [had] valid prescriptions for [m]ethadone, 
Xanax, and Percocet.”  Young also claimed he had “shown that his wife had valid 
prescriptions for [m]ethadone, Xanax, and Percocet.”  He did not attach copies of the 
prescriptions to the motion or otherwise provide specific information about them. 
 
Young’s trial in the Circuit Court began in January 2016.  Before jury selection, the 
parties met with the trial judge in chambers.  No record of the conversation was made.  
Upon returning to the courtroom, the prosecutor moved to exclude all evidence that Young 
had a prescription for the drugs seized.  The court granted this motion in limine, without 
providing Young an opportunity to respond: 
[PROSECUTOR]: And, Your Honor, the State’s second 
motion that we spoke in chambers is the exclusion.  State’s 
moving a motion in limine to exclude any prescription 
evidence as it is, number one, hearsay, and, number two, not 
admissible hearsay because it does not fall within the exception 
of [Maryland Rule] 803[(b)](6). 
 
Defense is trying to enter into evidence, number one, a 
prescription -- an alleged prescription of the defendant and, 
number two, a prescription by his wife, Angela Grubber, who 
is not going to testify today.  These are copies of alleged 
prescriptions.  They are not certified.  The doctor is not present.  
There’s no certification or authenticity and it’s excluded under 
[Maryland Rule] 803[(b)](6).  I do have a case, Bryant v. State, 
[129 Md. App. 690 (2000),] by the Court of Special Appeals 
where in a murder trial the defense tried to enter in a piece of 
paper that was the alleged toxicology report because it was 
murder.  And the Court said it’s hearsay, number one, even if 
the defendant took the stand -- 
 
THE COURT: Yeah.  I’m familiar with that law because I had 
the very same issues several times.  Okay.  That motion is 
granted. 
3 
 
Defense counsel did not respond, object, or make a proffer in response.  The case proceeded 
to trial.1   
During its case-in-chief, the State called Detective Larbi, who was accepted as an 
expert in the field of narcotics identification and packaging.  Larbi testified that, in his 
expert opinion, the substances, scale, and currency recovered were for distribution, not 
personal use.  The detective recalled that during one conversation, “Mr. Young also stated 
that he does sell from time to time,” and that aside from four pills that were recovered, 
Young took ownership of all the other drugs at the house.  Larbi also testified that Young 
never claimed to have a prescription for the drugs.   
The jury convicted Young of eight counts: possession of heroin, oxycodone, 
methadone, and alprazolam; and possession with intent to distribute heroin, oxycodone, 
methadone, and alprazolam.  After merging the possession charges, the trial judge 
sentenced Young to multiple years of imprisonment for the four counts of possession with 
intent to distribute.   
Young timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  See Young v. State, 234 Md. App. 720 (2017).  The intermediate appellate 
court held that “[v]alid prescriptions provide the basis of a statutory defense to the charges for 
possession of and possession with intent to distribute methadone, alprazolam, and oxycodone.  
Introducing them for such purpose, when properly authenticated, is not hearsay.”  Id. at 736.  
                                              
1 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City never ruled on Steven Young’s motion to 
suppress.  The Court of Special Appeals held this issue was not preserved, and Young does 
not challenge that holding here. 
4 
As a result, it reversed each of Young’s convictions, except for his two convictions for 
possession of heroin and possession with intent to distribute heroin.  See id. at 741.   
DISCUSSION  
1. Preservation 
We first address two preservation issues: (1) Young’s claim that the State failed to 
preserve the issue of whether he authenticated the alleged prescriptions; and (2) the State’s 
claim that Young failed to preserve his claim that the trial court erred in excluding the 
alleged prescriptions.   
Young’s Preservation Argument—Authentication 
Young argues that the State failed to raise the issue of authentication at trial and 
therefore cannot raise that issue on appeal.  He maintains that the State’s sole reference to 
authentication was in the context of its business records argument.  This reference is 
insufficient, Young continues, because the prescriptions are not hearsay, and no exception is 
needed to properly admit them.  Young further asserts that because he could self-authenticate 
the prescriptions, neither the physician nor her records custodian need testify.   
The State responds that the prosecutor raised the issue of authentication in five 
ways.  First, the prosecutor argued that there was no “authenticity”—meaning 
authentication.  Second, by referring to the “alleged prescriptions,” the prosecutor asserted 
that they were not genuine.  Third, the prosecutor argued that “there’s no certification,” 
meaning that the prescriptions were not admissible without a sponsoring witness who could 
establish that they were authentic.  Fourth, the prosecutor pointed out that “Young’s wife 
is not going to testify today” and “the doctor is not present,” meaning that Young was not 
5 
calling witnesses who could potentially sponsor and authenticate the prescriptions.  Finally, 
the prosecutor cited Bryant v. State, 129 Md. App. 690 (2000), in which the only issue on 
appeal was authentication.   
We reject the State’s arguments that it challenged authentication at trial because we 
do not ascribe the same meaning to the prosecutor’s statements.  Rather, the prosecutor 
clearly spelled out her reasons for excluding the prescription evidence, and they all clearly 
focused on challenging the prescriptions as inadmissible hearsay.  Specifically, the 
prosecutor made her motion in limine “to exclude any prescription evidence as it is, number 
one, hearsay, and number two, not admissible hearsay because it does not fall within the 
exception of [Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6)],” the business records exception.  Nor was the 
prosecutor’s citation to Bryant v. State supportive, as Bryant involved the question of 
whether “the trial court err[ed] in admitting the results of a toxicology report into evidence 
as a business record,” and the authentication issue wholly related to the document’s 
admission and authentication as a business record.  Finally, simply naming absent 
witnesses was not sufficient to preserve the State’s objection, because Young could 
potentially authenticate the prescriptions through his own testimony.  The trial court 
granted the motion in limine without giving the defense any chance to proffer or 
authenticate the alleged prescriptions.2 
                                              
2 We have no knowledge of what happened in the off-the-record chambers 
discussion between the trial judge and counsel. 
6 
State’s Waiver Argument—Exclusion of Prescriptions 
 
The State argues that Young failed to preserve his claim that the trial court erred in 
excluding the alleged prescriptions.  It contends that where a prosecutor has presented two 
independently dispositive reasons why the trial court should not take an action, and the 
court relies on those reasons, it is incumbent on a defendant to object or demonstrate why 
the prosecutor’s arguments are not dispositive.   
Young responds that the trial court was on notice of his position based on the crimes 
charged and his motion to suppress.  Further, he contends that the court’s ruling makes 
clear it was aware that he intended to introduce the prescriptions into evidence.  As to the 
State’s remaining argument, Young asserts that he did not have an opportunity to object to 
the ruling—the court granted the motion to exclude before the State finished its argument, 
and the court moved to the next motion without giving Young a chance to respond.   
Under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), an appellate court will not decide an issue “unless 
it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . . .”  
To preserve an issue for appeal, Maryland Rule 4-323(a) requires a party to “object[] to the 
admission of evidence . . . at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the 
grounds for objection become apparent,” or the objection is waived.  Maryland Rule 4-
323(c) tempers strict application of this requirement, making clear that a proffer is not the 
only way a party may preserve an issue for appeal.  The party need only “make[] known to 
the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of 
the court.”  Md. Rule 4-323(c).  Moreover, “[i]f a party has no opportunity to object to a 
7 
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection at that time does not 
constitute a waiver of the objection.”  Id.   
Based on the record below—Young’s motion to suppress, the prosecutor’s reference 
to the discussion in chambers, the prosecutor’s motion in limine, and the judge’s 
subsequent ruling—we are satisfied that the judge had sufficient notice of Young’s 
intention to introduce the prescriptions into evidence, and that the judge’s ruling excluding 
them was intended to be the “final word on the matter . . . .”  See Prout v. State, 311 Md. 
348, 357 (1988) (applying current Rule 4-323(c)).  Additionally, although Young did not 
respond or object to the State’s motion in limine, he had “no opportunity” to do so.  Md. 
Rule 5-323(c).  Before the prosecutor finished making her argument, the trial judge cut her 
off midsentence and granted her motion.  For these reasons, we hold that Young’s objection 
to the trial court’s motion in limine ruling is preserved for review. 
2. Hearsay 
The State also argues that the alleged prescriptions are inadmissible hearsay because 
they would be introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  The State presents two 
iterations of this theory.  First, it reasons, the prescriptions go directly to the truth of the 
matter asserted.  The State construes the word “prescription” in Md. Code (2002, 2012 
Repl. Vol), § 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”)3 to mean “valid prescription,” 
which necessarily means that it was also “from an authorized provider” and that the 
                                              
3 The parties also contest whether prescriptions are admissible non-hearsay evidence 
under Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”).  We 
address this issue separately later.   
8 
provider was “operating in the course of professional practice.”  When a doctor writes a 
prescription, the State contends, she is essentially asserting that “she has the authority to 
issue a prescription to the patient in order to obtain a controlled substance,” or that the 
patient is permitted to possess the controlled substance.  Second, citing Stoddard v. State, 
389 Md. 681 (2005), the State avers that even if the prescriptions do not explicitly state the 
information described above, they should still be excluded as hearsay because they are 
“implied assertions” inherent in the admission of the prescription.   
Young counters that the prescriptions were not offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted within them.  Rather, he says he sought to introduce the prescriptions as 
the basis for the statutory defense that he “legally possessed certain of the controlled 
substances.”  He argues that a prescription is a “legally operative document” and that CR 
§ 5-601 “only applies to drugs not obtained by valid prescription and does not require that 
the prescription be appropriate for the patient’s medical condition” or that the patient in 
fact suffer from a given medical condition.  Instead, says Young, legitimacy and 
authorization are authentication questions “irrelevant to the hearsay analysis.”  For these 
reasons, he argues, the trial court erred in ruling that the prescriptions were hearsay.4 
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is generally reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.  See Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 158 (1998).  Yet, appellate review of 
whether a statement is hearsay is conducted without deference to the trial court.  See 
                                              
4 Alternatively, even if the prescriptions were hearsay, Young claims that they fall 
under the “statements made for the purposes of medical treatment” exception.   
9 
Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 (2005) (trial court has no discretion to admit hearsay in 
the absence of a provision providing for its admissibility). 
Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  Md. Rule 5-
801(c).  There are two threshold questions when a hearsay objection is raised: “(1) whether 
the declaration at issue is a ‘statement,’ and (2) whether it is offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted.  If the declaration is not a statement, or if it is not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and it will not be excluded under the hearsay rule.”  
Stoddard, 389 Md. at 688–89.  Maryland Rule 5-801(a) defines a “statement” as “(1) an 
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person 
as an assertion.”  The parties do not contest that a prescription is an out-of-court 
statement—a written assertion.  They focus instead on whether the prescriptions are offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted.   
It is hornbook law that out-of-court statements are generally not admissible to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.  Yet, they can be admitted if the statements are “relevant 
and proffered not to establish the truth of the matter asserted therein, but simply to establish 
that the statement was made[.]”  Lunsford v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 280 Md. 
665, 670 (1977) (citations omitted).  This depends on whether the “fact asserted in the out-
of-court statement [must be] sincerely and accurately stated[] in order for the out-of-court 
statement to help to prove what it is offered to prove[.]”  6A Lynn McLain, Maryland 
Evidence State and Federal § 801:7, at 235 (3d ed. 2013).   
10 
In most state and federal courts, this hearsay analysis is cabined to intentional 
assertions.  This is significant because, in other jurisdictions, if the assertion was 
unintentional or merely implicit, then it cannot be hearsay.  Maryland departs from this 
general rule.  This departure is best explained by Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681 (2005), 
the seminal Maryland case on implied assertion.  The primary question in Stoddard was 
whether out-of-court statements are hearsay when offered to prove the truth of a factual 
proposition that was only implicitly—often unintentionally—communicated by the 
declarant.  See id. at 689.   
In Stoddard, the defendant, Erik Stoddard, was convicted of second-degree murder 
and child abuse resulting in the death of three-year-old Calen DiRubbo (“Calen”).  Id. at 
683.  Stoddard was the only adult supervising Calen, her older brother, and her cousin, 
Jasmine Pritchett (“Jasmine”), for at least part of the time leading up to Calen’s death.  Id. 
at 684.  The central issue involved the testimony of Jasmine’s mother, Jennifer Pritchett.  
Id.  Over defense counsel’s objection, the court admitted the mother’s testimony that 
Jasmine asked her “if [Stoddard] was going to get her.”  Id. at 685.  The prosecutor offered 
this as evidence that Jasmine witnessed Stoddard commit the murder.  Id. at 683.   
 
On appeal, Stoddard argued that Jasmine’s utterance was hearsay because it was 
both a statement and offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  Id. at 687–88.  First, the 
Court determined that an implied assertion is, in fact, a statement, even though 
unintentionally made.  To justify this, we compared the Maryland Rules to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  See id. at 693–96.  Most courts have adopted the Committee note to 
the Federal Rules, which provides that “nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.”  
11 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(a).  Yet, we have not.  Instead, we observed the “Committee note to Md. 
Rule 5-801 departs substantially from its federal counterpart.  Rather than restricting the 
definition of ‘assertion,’ the note does not attempt to define ‘assertion’ . . . .”  Stoddard, 
389 Md. at 696.  From this, we explained, “[i]t is clear that in adopting the Maryland Rule, 
this Court did not intend to adopt the federal Advisory Committee’s view that ‘nothing is 
an assertion unless intended to be one,’” but rather intended to leave it to the development 
of case law.  Id.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that a verbal or written statement, even 
if unintentional, is still a statement under Maryland law.   
 
The Stoddard Court proceeded to evaluate whether Jasmine’s question was offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted within it, turning to the wellspring of implied assertion 
doctrine, Wright v. Doe d. Tatham (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488; 7 Ad. & E. 313.  In Wright, 
a testator left his estate to his steward, Wright.  The testator’s heir at law, Tatham, filed suit 
to set aside the will, arguing that the testator was mentally incompetent at the time he made 
the will.  Id. at 493; 7 Ad. & E. at 324.  In response, Wright introduced several letters 
addressed to the testator, not for their truth, but so the court could infer from their content 
that the writers believed the testator was competent.  Id. at 493–94; 7 Ad. & E. at 325.  
None of the individuals who wrote the letters testified at trial.   
 
The English court ruled that the letters were hearsay, id. at 500; 7 Ad. & E. at 341, 
and we adopted its reasoning.  First, the letters could not have been admitted for the truth 
of their literal content, because their content was not relevant to the proceeding.  The letters 
were only valuable inasmuch as the “tone and content impl[ied] a belief in [the testator’s] 
competence[.]”  Stoddard, 389 Md. at 692.  “Thus, as offered, these letters express[ed] the 
12 
proposition that [the testator] [was] competent[.]”  Id.  A letter stating as much would 
clearly be hearsay.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the implied assertion doctrine 
excludes such evidence as hearsay “where a declarant’s out-of-court words imply a belief 
in the truth of X, . . . [and are] offered to prove that X is true.”  Id.  
Like in Wright, Jasmine’s statement would not have been relevant were it offered 
for the literal truth of the question, “Is [Stoddard] going to get me?”  Id. at 689.  Nor was 
Jasmine’s ability to speak the words otherwise relevant.  See id.  Rather, her question was 
only relevant if offered for its implicit meaning: “that, by asking it, Jasmine may have 
revealed, by implication, a belief that she had witnessed [Stoddard] assaulting Calen.”  Id.  
Even if a declarant possesses no intent to assert anything, “[i]t ‘is a non sequitur to conclude 
from this, as the Advisory Committee [did], that the remaining dangers of perception, 
memory, and ambiguity are automatically minimized with this assurance of sincerity.’”  Id. 
at 699 (citations omitted).  The State offered the question to prove the truth of the implied 
factual proposition that Jasmine had in fact witnessed Stoddard assaulting Calen.  “[W]here 
the probative value of words, as offered, depends on the declarant having communicated a 
factual proposition, the words constitute an ‘assertion’ of that proposition,” and are offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, or implied.  Id. at 703–04.  Accordingly, Jasmine’s 
unintentional assertion was hearsay and should have been excluded.   
13 
Since Stoddard, we have consistently resisted an overbroad interpretation of its 
holding.  In its companion case, authored by the same judge5 and published on the same 
date, the Court upheld a trial court’s decision to exclude a medical bill as hearsay, but gave 
cautionary advice for future cases.  See Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1 (2005).  There, a 
sheriff’s deputy conducted a valid search of a residence.  See id. at 3–4.  When the officer 
entered, the defendant (“Bernadyn”) was in the living room with a marijuana pipe and 
marijuana stems and seeds.  Id. at 4.  While in the residence, the officer seized a medical 
bill addressed to “Michael Bernadyn, Jr., 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 
21040”—the address searched.  Id.  
 
Over a defense hearsay objection, the trial court allowed the deputy to testify that 
he had seized the medical bill from 2024 Morgan Street.  Id.  Counsel appealed to this 
Court.  Id. at 7.  Although we upheld the judge’s decision to exclude the bill, we found it 
significant that the “State did not argue simply that an item bearing Bernadyn’s name was 
found in the house and that Bernadyn probably resided at the house.”  Id. at 11.  Instead, 
the State argued that the bill itself was “a piece of evidence that shows who lives there.”  
Id.  According to the State’s proffered use, the bill was an implied assertion offered for the 
truth of the statement that the doctor’s office who sent the bill was asserting that Bernadyn 
lived at the address.  In highlighting this distinction, the Court curtailed Stoddard’s impact 
                                              
5 Judge Irma Raker, the author of Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681 (2005), and 
Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1 (2005), also wrote for the Majority in the current case, sitting 
by designation on the Court of Special Appeals.   
14 
with its seeming approval of an alternate theory favoring admission—offering the 
statement as “merely probative circumstantial evidence.”   
We continued to limit Stoddard in Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372 (2010).  There we 
resolved the issue of whether circumstantial evidence probative of a fact that does not rely 
on the declarant’s implied assertion can be admissible—picking up directly where 
Bernadyn left off.  Id. at 374.  Garner involved a phone call to the defendant’s number by 
someone who asked: “Yo, can I get a 40?,” which referred to $40 worth of cocaine.  Id. at 
376.  An officer answered the phone, heard the unidentified caller make the request, and 
then later repeated the statement at trial.  Id. at 376–77.  Of course, Garner objected—
claiming the testimony was hearsay, and arguing it was an implied assertion and 
inadmissible under Stoddard and Bernadyn.  Id. at 381.   
This Court held that the question, “Yo, can I get a 40?,” was not hearsay, because it 
was a verbal act and should have been admitted into evidence.  See id. at 388 (“[T]he rule 
against hearsay does not operate to exclude evidence of [a] ‘verbal act’ that established a 
consequential fact[.]”).  As Judge Joseph Murphy pointed out, “neither Stoddard nor 
Bernadyn presented the issue of whether the ‘verbal part of an act’” or an out-of-court 
statement “that constitutes circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s state of mind” are 
subject to exclusion as hearsay.  Id. at 381.  Accordingly, we characterized the statement 
in two different ways.  First, we said that it was admissible as a “verbal part of an act”—in 
that case, an offer.  We explained that “[t]he making of a wager or the purchase of a drug, 
legally or illegally, is a form of contract.”  Id. at 382 (citing Little v. State, 204 Md. 518, 
522–23 (1954)).  Therefore, the anonymous caller’s statement had legal significance (i.e., 
15 
to prove the existence of a contract), regardless of whether the matter asserted was true.  
Alternatively, the Court concluded that the statements were non-hearsay circumstantial 
evidence of declarant’s state of mind.  Id. at 381–82.  Under either rationale, the 
“telephoned words of the would-be bettor” were not hearsay.   
We rejected the argument that the telephoned statements were an implied assertion, 
even though assertions may be implicit within them.  “While there may be an ‘implied 
assertion’ in almost any question, . . . the only assertion implied in the anonymous caller’s 
question was the assertion that the caller had the funds to purchase the drugs . . . .”  Id. at 
388.  We declined to adopt the dissenting view of then-Chief Judge Bell, who would have 
interpreted the implied assertion as hearsay—a statement that Garner was selling drugs.  
See id. at 414 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).  Instead, we reinforced Stoddard’s boundaries.   
Garner demonstrates that the Stoddard holding does not foreclose legally operative 
verbal acts from being admitted as non-hearsay, even if they contain an implied assertion.  
Professor Lynn McClain, in her treatise, Maryland Evidence State and Federal, 
summarizes the verbal acts doctrine as follows:  
The substantive law gives certain types of out-of-court 
statements immediate legal consequences.  Such statements are 
termed “verbal acts” and are nonhearsay, because they have 
relevance even if the declarant was insincere or inaccurate.  
Most categories of verbal acts are necessary to the creation of 
certain types of claims, charges, and defenses. 
 
McLain, supra, § 801:9, at 240 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).  See also 
Wigmore, supra, § 1770, at 259 (“Where the utterance of specific words is itself a part of 
the details of the issue under the substantive law and the pleadings, their utterances may 
16 
be proved without violation of the hearsay rule, because they are not offered to evidence 
the truth of the matter that may be asserted therein.”) (emphasis in original).   
Garner is hardly the first Maryland decision to apply the verbal acts doctrine.  The 
Court of Special Appeals has recognized that verbal acts are non-hearsay when introduced 
as an element of a claim or defense.  In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422 (1992), the State 
sought to introduce testimony from the victim’s mother reporting her son’s statement that 
Defendant was, inter alia, “trying to hit him with a sickle” and “was tired of the arguing 
[with Defendant] and . . . was just ready to go.”  Id. at 430.  The State argued that these 
statements established the victim’s fear and tendency to avoid conflict, which were relevant 
to rebut the Defendant’s battered spouse syndrome defense and establish the State’s murder 
and manslaughter charges.  Id.  The Court recognized that verbal acts are admissible when 
they establish the basis of a claim or defense.  But in this circumstance, “[n]either fear nor 
conflict avoidance . . . [had] any legal significance in establishing the elements of murder 
or manslaughter,” nor were they “relevant in rebutting evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome or self-defense or hot-blooded provocation.”  Id. at 433.  Hence, these statements 
were not admissible as verbal acts.  Id. at 434.   
Maryland courts have applied the verbal acts doctrine in various other 
circumstances, as well.  See, e.g., Hyatt v. Romero, 190 Md. 500, 505 (1948) (lease is 
admissible to prove the terms of a tenancy implied by law); Carozza v. Williams, 190 Md. 
143, 150 (1948) (“‘Rejection’ of unsatisfactory materials . . . and other statements 
accompanying, and relating to, the performance of duties . . . are not hearsay but are verbal 
acts . . . .”); Heil v. Zahn, 187 Md. 603, 607–08 (1947) (in suit against the executor of an 
17 
estate, decedent’s will was admissible because it was “not offered as testimony from the 
testator that he did not owe the amount claimed but merely to show the fact that by his will 
he made a bequest to the plaintiff-appellant”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Needle, 171 Md. 517, 
518–19 (1937) (although a proof of loss cannot be offered to show the fact or the extent of 
the plaintiff’s loss or disability, it is one of the “necessary elements” in an insurance case 
that is admissible to show that proofs of loss or proofs of disability or death have been 
submitted to the insurer); Catalano v. Bopst, 166 Md. 91, 100–01 (1934) (letter 
memorializing terms of contract admissible to establish parties’ intent as to the meaning of 
ambiguous word in breach of contract action); Fair v. State, 198 Md. App. 1, 37 (2011) 
(“[T]reating the writing on the check as a verbal part of the act of issuing the check, we are 
persuaded that the check was merely circumstantial non-assertive crime scene evidence.”). 
To review, the State argues that the prescription evidence, had it been admitted, 
would have been offered for the truth of the matter explicitly or implicitly asserted by it.  
Young believes the evidence could have been offered for a non-hearsay purpose, such as a 
verbal act.  Given how events unfolded in the trial court, we lack a substantial amount of 
relevant information regarding the prescriptions.  We do not know what specific 
information was included in the supposed prescriptions.  Nor do we know the exact purpose 
for which they would have been offered.  As we discussed, Young was not afforded an 
opportunity to object, let alone proffer his means of authentication or an explanation on the 
record regarding how he planned to use the prescription evidence.  For these reasons, we 
need only decide whether the prescriptions could have conceivably been admitted for a 
non-hearsay purpose.   
18 
Young was charged under CR § 5-601(a)(1), which provides that a person may not 
“possess or administer to another a controlled dangerous substance, unless obtained 
directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of 
professional practice[.]”  Thus, the subsection creates a statutory defense for possession, 
so long as the substance is obtained: (1) directly or by prescription or order; (2) from an 
authorized provider; and (3) from a provider acting in the course of professional practice.  
A prescription is a necessary element of the statutory defense under CR § 5-601(a).  As 
discussed above, evidence offered for the limited purpose of establishing an element of a 
claim or defense can be a verbal act, and not hearsay.   
Relying in part on legislative history, the State contends that the word 
“prescription,” as used in the statute, means “valid prescription.”  It points out that CR § 5-
601 was derived from former Art. 27, § 287, which once included reference to “valid” 
prescriptions.  See Revisor’s Notes; 2002 Md. Laws ch. 26 at 423.  The reference to “valid” 
prescriptions was ultimately deleted because it was “implicit in the reference to a 
‘prescription’ from an authorized provider.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, the State 
insists, to introduce a prescription is to necessarily assert that the individual suffers from a 
condition for which he needs the prescription or that the doctor is authorized to provide it.  
We disagree.  The Revisor’s Notes only demonstrate that the “authorized provider” prong 
of the statutory defense—one of three prongs discussed above—implies validity.  But the 
prescription would not necessarily have been introduced to satisfy this element of the 
defense.  We explain. 
19 
The Garner rationale is instructive.  If the “making of a wager or purchase of a 
drug, legally or illegally, is a form of contract,” and admissible non-hearsay, Garner, 414 
Md. at 382 (emphasis added), so too is a paper entitling an individual to legally purchase 
the drugs.  The prescriptions could be admitted as a verbal act demonstrating something, 
similar to a contract or lease, that is “necessary to the creation of certain types of claims, 
charges, and defenses,” McLain, supra, § 801:9, at 240, not the truth of the matter asserted.   
We have recognized that many statements can have both hearsay and non-hearsay 
uses.  We conclude that introducing the alleged prescriptions to establish a statutory 
defense is a verbal act because the statute creates legal rights, and the fact of prescription 
is relevant regardless of whether its particular components are “true.”  Cf. United States v. 
Davis, 596 F.3d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It would make no sense to ask whether the 
money order was true.  [The money order] [‘]is, by its nature, neither true nor false and 
thus cannot be offered for its truth.’” (internal citation omitted)).  But this does not mean 
that Young has successfully or convincingly established his affirmative defense.  The 
ultimate question of whether the prescription is from an authorized provider acting in the 
course of professional practice remains a question of fact for the jury to resolve.  But 
offering a prescription to prove the operative fact of the prescription’s existence would not 
20 
have been hearsay.6  And that is all we must decide regarding the possession charges.7  
Because the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine, we shall affirm the Court of 
Special Appeals and remand for a new trial on the specified possession charges, as we 
explain infra. 
But the State perseveres, pointing out that Young was also charged under CR § 5-
602 for possession with intent to distribute.  It explains that, while CR § 5-601 specifically 
applies only to drugs not obtained by prescription, CR § 5-602 contains no such enumerated 
limitation.  This section provides that, “except as otherwise provided” in Title 5, “a person 
may not (1) distribute or dispense a controlled dangerous substance; or (2) possess a 
                                              
6 Other jurisdictions have also held that prescription evidence does not violate the 
rule against hearsay.  See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(“[I]n this case, the government did not intend to show that any particular item contained 
in the script was true.  To the contrary, the purpose was to show that the information in the 
document was false; to wit, that Dillon knew little about the services supposedly rendered 
pursuant to various agreements he had made.”); United States v. Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 
1284 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted) (“In our view, the prescriptions were not admitted 
to prove the truth of the assertions they contained, and are, therefore, not hearsay.  They 
were not offered to prove Dr. Bashien’s or any of his patients’ addresses.  Nor were they 
offered to prove the doctor believed that the patient needed the drug prescribed, which is 
an assertion probably intended by the doctor when he wrote the prescriptions.  They were 
offered in evidence to show they were used to obtain drugs.”); Franks v. State, 724 S.W.2d 
918, 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (“Appellant correctly asserts that since the prescriptions 
were offered in order to show their existence and not to prove the truth of any matters 
asserted therein, the admission of the prescriptions would not violate the hearsay rule.”).  
We view these cases as instructive, although we note that the Franks court did not articulate 
the non-hearsay purpose for which the prescriptions could be offered; and the D.C. Circuit 
follows the majority rule that nothing is an assertion unless it is intended to be one, see 
United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579–80 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   
 
7 Young also argues that, even if the prescriptions were hearsay, they would still be 
admissible under the “statements made for the purposes of medical treatment” exception.  
Because we hold that it was possible for Young to introduce the prescriptions for a non-
hearsay purpose, we need not reach this argument.   
21 
controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity reasonably to indicate under all 
circumstances an intent to distribute or dispense a controlled dangerous substance.”   
The State characterizes the argument to admit the alleged prescriptions under § 5-
602 as even weaker than the argument to admit them under § 5-601, because prescriptions 
are not mentioned in § 5-602.  Instead, it asserts the prescriptions are “at most” a “factor” 
in the possession with intent to distribute analysis—along with several other factors.  In 
other words, says the State, the mere fact of having a prescription does not mean that the 
individual is not also illegally distributing the drug, even if legally possessed.   
Like the Court of Special Appeals, we can quickly dispatch with this argument.  
Young was charged with possession with intent to distribute, under § 5-602(2), not with 
distributing and dispensing a controlled substance, under § 5-602(1).  Under § 5-602(2), 
an individual may not “possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity” to 
indicate an intent to distribute.  We interpret § 5-602’s prefatory language—“Except as 
otherwise provided in [Title 5]”—to incorporate the possession defense of § 5-601(a)(1), 
which is also in the Criminal Law Article, Title 5.  Thus, the same statutory defense 
available for possession charges under § 5-601 is available for possession with intent 
charges under § 5-602(2), and a prescription is admissible to establish the fact of its own 
existence as an element of that statutory defense.   
Finally, we note that when evidence is offered for a limited purpose, such as a 
legally operative verbal act or circumstantial non-assertive evidence, a limiting instruction 
is likely appropriate.  “If the proponent of a statement claims to offer the evidence for a 
purpose other than its truth, but also offers the statement to prove the truth of a matter 
22 
asserted therein, the court should either exclude the evidence or make clear that the 
evidence is admitted for a limited purpose.”  Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 15.  Thus, depending 
on the reason proffered to admit the prescriptions, a limiting instruction is likely advisable.   
3. Authentication—Guidance for Remand 
Young was never given the opportunity to authenticate the alleged prescriptions 
because the trial judge—treating the prescriptions as hearsay—granted the State’s motion 
in limine.  This was error.  The question then becomes what is the proper remedy in this 
case?  During the off-the-record conference in chambers, defense counsel may have told 
the trial judge how he intended to introduce the prescriptions.  Counsel may have further 
explained how he intended to prove that the prescriptions were from an authorized provider 
or that the provider was acting in the course of professional practice.  Or maybe he said 
nothing at all.  Absent a record of this conversation, however, we are unwilling to assume 
that Young admitted that he did not have any method to authenticate the prescriptions.  He 
should have been given an opportunity to proffer his authentication method.  For this 
reason, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case for a new trial on the 
charges for which Young alleged he had a prescription. 
Although the State failed to preserve the issue of authentication, it will surely do so 
on remand.  For guidance, we offer the following.  “The requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  Md. Rule 5-
901(a).  Testimony from the prescribing doctor is one way to authenticate (or rebut) an 
alleged prescription, but we wish to make clear that it is not the only way.  As we explained 
23 
in Sublet v. State, “[t]he most straightforward approach to authenticating a writing is to ask 
an individual with personal knowledge about the document whether the matter was what it 
purported to be.”  442 Md. 632, 658 (2015) (citing Matthews v. J.B. Colt Co., 145 Md. 667, 
672 (1924) (testimony of witness that he saw defendant sign contract was sufficient to 
warrant its admission)).  There are potentially various people with “personal knowledge” 
about the prescription, depending on the specific reason it is introduced.  “Familiarity with 
the purported author’s signature also has been a basis for authentication, provided that such 
familiarity was proven prior to authentication.”  Id. (citing Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill 77, 77 
(Md. 1849) (“A witness who has seen a party write, or who has corresponded with him, is 
qualified to speak with respect to the genuineness of his signature.”)). 
“In other circumstances, comparison to a known exemplar may be accomplished 
through expert testimony or within the confines of the jury room.”  Id. at 658–59 (citing 
Hoover v. Hoover, 187 Md. 646, 650 (1947) (“A bank official, whose business it was to 
know handwriting, testified as an expert that in his opinion the writing on the disputed note, 
and the admitted writing of [the alleged author] on the autographed note, were the same.”); 
Haile v. Dinnis, 184 Md. 144, 153–54 (1944) (jury permitted to compare records against 
previously admitted exemplars to determine if they were authentic)).  “In the absence of 
known exemplars, authentication of a writing also could be obtained were the contents or 
subject matter of the writing to ‘contain circumstantial evidence indicating the identity of 
its author’ by, for example, containing information known only to a chosen few.”  Id. 
(citing 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 
901.04[3][a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2015)). 
24 
These are the principles that should guide a court facing a defendant’s proffer of a 
prescription as a statutory defense according to CR § 5-601(a).  The defendant, in such 
instance, must make some prima facie showing that he received the alleged prescriptions 
from a physician who prescribed them in the ordinary course of business.  It is conceivable 
that the defendant could do so via his own testimony.  Pertinent testimony from the 
prescribing physician or the physician’s custodian of records would obviously suffice.  
Absent some valid authentication, the prescriptions are inadmissible on remand.   
CONCLUSION  
 
We hold that the issue of whether Young’s alleged prescriptions were properly 
authenticated was not raised in or decided by the trial court, and thus it is not preserved for 
review.  Next, under the facts of this case, the trial judge had sufficient notice that Young 
intended to introduce the prescriptions into evidence, and the judge’s ruling was intended 
to be the “final word on the matter.”  Accordingly, Young had no opportunity to object and 
we treat the issue as preserved under Md. Rule 4-323(c).  Finally, we hold that evidence of 
a valid prescription can fall under the category of “verbal acts”—admissible, not for the 
truth of the matter asserted, but as the basis of a statutory defense under CR §§ 5-601(a) 
and 602(2). 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.