Case Title: State v. Bates

Citation: 348 N.C. 29

Docket Number: 145A91-3

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 145A91-3
FILED: 3 APRIL 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOSEPH EARL BATES
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b)
to review an order entered 13 June 1997 by Morgan (Melzer A.,
Jr.), J., in Superior Court, Yadkin County, granting defendant’s
motion for discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  Heard in the
Supreme Court 16 December 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Barry S.
McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State-appellant.
Walter K. Burton and David K. Williams, Jr., for
defendant-appellee.
FRYE, Justice.
On 21 June 1996, the General Assembly ratified “An Act
to Expedite the Postconviction Process in North Carolina.”  Ch.
719, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 389, 397.  Among other things, the Act
amended N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415 to add this new subsection:
(f)  In the case of a defendant who has
been convicted of a capital offense and
sentenced to death, the defendant’s prior
trial or appellate counsel shall make
available to the capital defendant’s counsel
their complete files relating to the case of
the defendant.  The State, to the extent
allowed by law, shall make available to the
capital defendant’s counsel the complete
files of all law enforcement and
prosecutorial agencies involved in the
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investigation of the crimes committed or the
prosecution of the defendant.  If the State
has a reasonable belief that allowing
inspection of any portion of the files by
counsel for the capital defendant would not
be in the interest of justice, the State may
submit for inspection by the court those
portions of the files so identified.  If upon
examination of the files, the court finds
that the files could not assist the capital
defendant in investigating, preparing, or
presenting a motion for appropriate relief,
the court in its discretion may allow the
State to withhold that portion of the files.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) (1997).
The sole question presented here is the extent of
disclosure of prosecution and law enforcement investigative files
mandated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  We emphasize at the outset
that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) applies only to the post-conviction
process and only to defendants who have been convicted of a
capital crime and sentenced to death.
Defendant, Joseph Earl Bates, was indicted on
29 October 1990 for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Edwin
Jenkins.  He was tried capitally in February 1991, found guilty
on one count of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree
kidnapping, and sentenced to death for the murder conviction.  On
appeal, this Court found error and ordered a new trial.  State v.
Bates, 333 N.C. 523, 428 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 984,
126 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1993).  Defendant was retried capitally in
October 1994 and was found guilty on one count of first-degree
kidnapping and one count of first-degree murder on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. 
The jury again recommended, and the trial court imposed, a
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sentence of death.  On appeal, this Court found no error.  State
v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 473 S.E.2d 269 (1996), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997).  For the purpose of reviewing
the issue presented here, it is unnecessary to further recite the
circumstances of the crimes or the evidence presented at
defendant’s two trials.
On 10 April 1997, Judge Melzer A. Morgan appointed
defendant’s present counsel to represent defendant in post-
conviction proceedings.  On 1 May 1997, defendant’s counsel filed
a motion for discovery of all investigative and prosecution files
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f); Article I, Sections 19 and 23
of the North Carolina Constitution; and the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  The
State filed a response in opposition to this motion, arguing that
the qualifying language in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), “to the extent
allowed by law,” manifested a legislative intent to require 
disclosure, upon request, only of evidence favorable to a
defendant and did not require the disclosure of all investigative
files.  The State also argued that this language shielded from
discovery the work product of the attorney for the State and his
agents.
Following a hearing on defendant’s motion and arguments
by the parties, Judge Morgan entered an order on 13 June 1997
that contained the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law:
1)  That the North Carolina General
Assembly recently enacted revisions to the
post conviction review process in this state,
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part of which revision included the addition
of paragraph (f) to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415.  The
provisions of subsection (f) became effective
June 21, 1996, and apply to this case.
2)  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) provides for
broader discovery for a capital defendant’s
counsel in the post conviction review process
than previously existed, specifically
including the discovery of the complete files
of all law enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies involved in the investigation of the
crimes committed or the prosecution of the
defendant.
3)  That if the State has a reasonable
belief that allowing inspection of any
portion of the State’s files by counsel for
the capital defendant would not be in the
interest of justice the State may submit for
inspection by the court those portions of the
files so identified for the court’s review,
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).
4)  The defendant is entitled to have
made available to his present counsel the
complete files of all law enforcement and
prosecutorial agencies involved in the
investigation of the crimes committed or the
prosecution of the defendant, including but
not limited to any files in possession of the
Forsyth County Sheriff’s Department, the
Yadkin County Sheriff’s Department, the
Iredell County Sheriff’s Department, the
State Bureau of Investigation, and any other
law enforcement or investigative agencies
involved in the investigation into the death
and alleged kidnapping of Charles Jenkins,
irrespective of the prosecutorial district
involved, including the District Attorney’s
files regarding the prosecutions of Joseph
Earl Bates’ codefendants Hal “Tink” Eddleman
(who was prosecuted by the District Attorney
for the 23rd Prosecutorial District for his
involvement in the events which led to the
conviction of Joseph Earl Bates in the
present matter) and Gary Shavers, who was
prosecuted in Iredell County.
The order decreed that a full and complete copy of the above-
referenced files would be made available at the office of the
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Yadkin County Clerk of Superior Court for inspection by
defendant’s counsel, subject to in camera review of those
portions of the files for which the State reasonably believes
that inspection by defendant would not be in the interest of
justice.
The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari on
18 June 1997 for review of the discovery order entered by Judge
Morgan.  This Court allowed the State’s petition on 27 June 1997.
The State presents to this Court two challenges to
Judge Morgan’s order for discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f):
that the trial court erred by ordering the State to produce its
work product and that, in the absence of service upon the
individual agencies involved, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to order such discovery.  We address these
challenges seriatim.
The State asserts that its work product is not subject
to disclosure pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) because the
General Assembly, by including the phrase “to the extent allowed
by law,” meant to retain the established common law and statutory
rules against the production of work product.  Although the plain
language of the statute refers to the “complete files,” the State
contends that it is not required to disclose materials that are
privileged or otherwise protected by law, specifically work
product.  The State further argues that there is no exception to
the policy objectives of the work-product doctrine for capital
cases and that disclosure of the State’s complete files in post-
conviction would have a chilling effect on the preparation of
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capital cases.  Finally, the State contends that the process of
preparing and producing the files for inspection would be onerous
and time-consuming.  After carefully examining the statute and
considering each of the State’s arguments, we conclude that the
language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) is clear and unambiguous and
that Judge Morgan’s order must be affirmed in its entirety.
While no right of discovery in criminal cases existed
at common law, see State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147, 153, 393 S.E.2d
801, 806 (1990), limited rights of pretrial discovery for both
the defendant and the State exist under the United States
Constitution, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963), and by statute, N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-901 to -910 (1997). 
The work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege against
discovery that applies in criminal as well as civil cases.  See
State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 126, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977);
see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-39, 45 L. Ed.
2d 141, 152-54 (1975).  In codifying pretrial discovery rules,
the General Assembly explicitly protected “reports, memoranda, or
other internal documents made by the prosecutor, law-enforcement
officers, or other persons acting on behalf of the State in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case.” 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-904(a).  In other words, pretrial discovery
statutes do not require the State to produce its work product or
investigative files.  See, e.g., State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1,
23, 473 S.E.2d 310, 321 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137
L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997).  However, the statute at issue in the
instant case was enacted to address the specific circumstance of
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a capitally sentenced defendant in post-conviction proceedings. 
Case law applying the work-product privilege to pretrial
discovery and statutes governing pretrial discovery in criminal
cases do not control the interpretation or application of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).
It is well settled that the meaning of any legislative
enactment is controlled by the intent of the legislature and that
legislative purpose is to be first ascertained from the plain
language of the statute.  See Electric Supply Co. of Durham v.
Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991);
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388
S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990); State ex rel. Hunt v. N. C. Reinsurance
Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981).  “When
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be
given effect and its clear meaning may not be evaded . . . under
the guise of construction.”  State ex rel. Utilities Comm’n v.
Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451, 465, 232 S.E.2d 184, 192 (1977).
The statute at issue here provides that “[t]he State,
to the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the capital
defendant’s counsel the complete files of all law enforcement and
prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the
crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1415(f) (emphasis added).  The statute contains no express
provision for withholding work product.  On the contrary, the
statute mandates that the State “shall make available . . . the
complete files” of prosecution and law enforcement agencies. 
However, the State contends that the phrase “to the extent
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allowed by law” must protect work product from disclosure at
post-conviction.  Thus, we will address each of the State’s
specific arguments for this position.
A statute must be construed, if possible, so as to give
meaning to all its provisions.  See Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City
of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981). 
The State argues that to give full effect to all parts of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), the phrase “to the extent allowed by law”
must limit the required disclosure so as to exclude materials
traditionally protected by the work-product doctrine.  We agree
that this language is intended as some limitation on the
information which the State is required to make available to the
capital defendant in post-conviction proceedings.  However, we
read this phrase as allowing the State to exclude from its
“complete files” only specific types of information which the
State is elsewhere prohibited by law from disclosing.  For
example, N.C.G.S. § 7A-675 prohibits the disclosure without court
order of confidential juvenile court records.  Nothing in
existing law prohibits disclosure to a defendant of the State’s
complete files, including work-product materials.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-904(b) (“Nothing in this section prohibits a prosecutor from
making voluntary disclosures in the interest of justice.”);
Hardy, 293 N.C. at 124, 235 S.E.2d at 840 (holding that N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-904(a) does not bar discovery of prosecution witnesses’
statements at trial).
The only mechanism by which the State may withhold any
portion of its complete files, apart from information which it is
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not allowed by law to disclose, is contained within N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f) itself.  If the State has a reasonable belief that
inspection of any part of its files by the capital defendant
would not be in the interest of justice, the State may submit
those portions of the files for inspection by the court.  The
court may allow the State to withhold those portions of its files
upon a finding that the material could not assist the capital
defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for
appropriate relief.  This mechanism permits the State the
opportunity to protect certain sensitive information, but it
carves out no special exception for work product.  As Judge
Morgan correctly stated in his order, “N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f)
provides for broader discovery for a capital defendant’s counsel
in the post conviction review process than previously existed.” 
Such a change is well within the General Assembly’s authority.
The State contends that “the general rule that the work
product or investigative files of the district attorney, law
enforcement agencies, or others assisting in the preparation of
the case are not open to discovery,” Heatwole, 344 N.C. at 23,
473 S.E.2d at 321, applies with equal force in capital cases.  We
do not disagree that the general rule protecting work product
from pretrial discovery contains no exception for capital cases. 
However, the State’s contention is inapposite to the specific
issue before us.  The superior court in this case entered an
order in post-conviction proceedings pursuant to the specific
provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), which mandate in explicit
language that the prosecution and investigative files of the
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State shall be made available to counsel for a defendant who has
been sentenced to death.  Because the clear language of this
statute demands disclosure in post-conviction proceedings, the
“general rule” governing pretrial discovery is not applicable.
We must also reject the State’s final policy arguments
for granting some work-product protection within the scope of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  The State contends that the burden of
organizing and producing work product in a capital case would be
onerous and time-consuming and, thus, would frustrate the goal of
expediting post-conviction review.  This argument is
unpersuasive, as we can imagine equally time-consuming efforts to
remove all work-product materials from prosecution and law
enforcement files prior to making them available to defendant’s
counsel.  Moreover, allowing the State to unilaterally purge its
files of work-product materials would render meaningless the
provisions in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) for in camera review by the
court.
The State also argues that permitting disclosure of
work product at the post-conviction phase of a capital case would
have a chilling effect on the preparation of capital cases.  We
note that the essence of the work-product privilege in criminal
cases is that the “interests of society and the accused in
obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt
or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough
preparation and presentation of each side of the case.”  Nobles,
422 U.S. at 238, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 153.  The State asserts that the
policy concerns for protecting work product are equally relevant
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in the post-conviction setting.  However, as we have stated
above, the clear and unambiguous meaning of N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f) contemplates disclosure of the complete files, and
this argument by the State only challenges the wisdom of the
enactment.  This Court, even if persuaded by the State’s
concerns, may not substitute its judgment for that of the General
Assembly and craft a work-product exception into this statute
where the Legislative Branch has clearly mandated disclosure of
the complete files.  Moreover, the interest of the State in
protecting its work product once the case has reached post-
conviction review is diminished.
Viewing subsection (f) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415 in light
of other amendments enacted as part of “An Act to Expedite the
Postconviction Process in North Carolina,” we discern an intent
on the part of the General Assembly to expedite the post-
conviction process in capital cases while ensuring thorough and
complete review.  In addition to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), we note
several newly enacted provisions which apply only to capital
cases.  For example, the Act sets a 120 day time limitation for
filing a post-conviction motion for appropriate relief in capital
cases, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a); gives priority of review to
capital cases in both direct appeal and post-conviction
proceedings, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1441 (1997); requires appointment of
two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for
indigent capital defendants, N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(c) (Supp. 1997);
and requires the State to file an answer to defendant’s motion
for appropriate relief in capital cases within sixty days,
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N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(2) (1997).  The broad post-conviction
discovery required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) logically fits into
this statutory scheme by providing early and full disclosure to
counsel for capital defendants so that they may raise all
potential claims in a single motion for appropriate relief.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the post-
conviction disclosure contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) for
capitally sentenced defendants does not provide an express or
implied protection for work product of the prosecutor or law
enforcement agencies.  We hold that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f)
requires the State to make available to counsel for a capital
defendant in post-conviction proceedings the complete files of
all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the
investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the
defendant, subject only to the specific withholding mechanism
contained within that statute and specific prohibitions against
disclosure contained in other law.
The State also challenges Judge Morgan’s order on the
grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to order discovery
from  independent constitutional agencies not represented by the
district attorney.  The State’s position is that the various
sheriffs’ departments and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
were not served with defendant’s motion for discovery or
otherwise notified of the hearing on the motion, thus denying
them notice and an opportunity to be heard in order to defend
their respective positions.  Service of defendant’s motion upon
the district attorney and the Attorney General is insufficient to
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confer jurisdiction over these independent constitutional
agencies, so the State contends.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) requires “the State” to make the
complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies
available to the capital defendant’s counsel.  It does not
further describe the procedure by which this is to be
accomplished.  We note, however, that, under our constitution,
the district attorneys are responsible for the prosecution of
criminal cases “on behalf of the State.”  N.C. Const. art. IV, § 
18.  For purposes of disclosing exculpatory evidence pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland, the State’s liability is “not limited to
information in the actual possession of the prosecutor and
certainly extends to any in the possession of state agencies
subject to judicial control.”  Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305,
1314 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
437, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 508 (1995) (“[T]he individual prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.”).
The disclosure requirement of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f)
was enacted by the General Assembly in order to assist counsel
for the capitally sentenced defendant in investigating,
preparing, and presenting a motion for appropriate relief.  We
note that, in a capital case, a motion for appropriate relief
must be served on both the district attorney for the district
where the defendant was indicted and the Attorney General. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(1).  In this case, defendant served the
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District Attorney for the Twenty-Third Judicial District and the
Attorney General with his motion for discovery of investigative
and prosecution files.  As a matter of practicality it may be
advisable, in some circumstances, to serve each entity which
holds material subject to disclosure under N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f).  However, we can find no statutory requirement for
doing so, nor has the State presented any compelling reason to
justify individual service in this case.  We hold that the
superior court did not lack jurisdiction for its discovery order.
For the reasons stated herein, the order of the
superior court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.