Case Title: Chavers v. City of Mobile

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120103

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 9/27/13
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
____________________
1120103
____________________
Sandra Chavers
v.
City of Mobile
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-07-118)
BRYAN, Justice.
Sandra Chavers sued the City of Mobile ("the City")
seeking damages based on claims of negligent maintenance,
continuing 
trespass, 
continuing 
nuisance, 
and 
inverse
condemnation, all related to that part of the City's storm-
1120103
water-drainage system that abuts her property.  After the
Mobile Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of
the City, Chavers appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in
part, and we remand the case with directions.
Facts and Procedural History
Chavers's home is located on Seabreeze Road in Mobile. 
Seabreeze Road is the southern border of Chavers's property,
and there is an open concrete-lined drainage ditch along the
northern 
border 
of 
Chavers's 
property. 
 
A 
storm-water-drainage
system conveys storm-water runoff in an underground concrete
pipe that runs in an easterly direction along the southern
border of Chavers's property (along Seabreeze Road) to a
junction box near the southeast corner of Chavers's property. 
The storm-water runoff is then conveyed to the north in a
concrete pipe along an easement owned by the City to the open
concrete-lined drainage ditch that runs along the northern
border of Chavers's property.  Chavers's property naturally
slopes north from Seabreeze Road down to the concrete ditch. 
In a complaint filed in January 2007, Chavers contended
that as a result of the City's negligence the storm-water-
drainage system had failed, causing damage to her property. 
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1120103
As noted above, her request for damages was based on claims
against the City alleging negligent maintenance, continuing
nuisance, continuing trespass, and inverse condemnation. 
The City filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to
establish the proper measurement for damages based on the
allegations in Chavers's complaint.  The City argued that
Chavers could not pursue an inverse-condemnation claim, which
would allow Chavers to recover damages for a partial taking
that amounted to the difference between the fair-market value
of the entire property before the taking and fair-market value
of the property remaining after the taking,  because, it
1
alleged, she did not  suffer a permanent loss of value to the
property allegedly taken.  The City contended that the damage
alleged by Chavers was abatable, not permanent, and, thus,
that the measure of damages applicable to an abatable
condition should apply.  Although Chavers objected, the
circuit court, which treated the City's motion as one for a
See generally State v. Armstrong, 779 So. 2d 1211, 1214
1
(Ala. 2000)("When the condemning authority seeks to acquire
less than all of a parcel of property, the landowner is
entitled to 'the difference between the fair market value of
the entire property before the taking and the fair market
value of the remainder after the taking.'" (quoting Ala. Code
1975, § 18-1A-170(b))).
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1120103
summary judgment on Chavers's inverse-condemnation claim,
granted the City's motion and held that "on the issue of the
correct measure of damages, [Chavers] is not entitled to any
damages based on the alleged diminution in the value of [her]
property; rather, she is entitled to the cost to put the land
in the condition it was [in] at the time immediately preceding
the injury."  The circuit court purported to certify the
"summary judgment as suitable for interlocutory appeal"
pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., and Chavers petitioned
for permission to appeal, which this Court denied.
The City subsequently moved for a summary judgment on
Chavers's remaining claims, arguing that, because, it said,
her negligent-maintenance claim  must fail, her remaining
2
Chavers's negligent-maintenance claim arose under § 11-
2
47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in pertinent part:
"No city or town shall be liable for damages for
injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or
corporation ... unless the said injury or wrong was
done or suffered through the neglect or carelessness
or failure to remedy some defect in the streets,
alleys, public ways, or buildings after the same had
been called to the attention of the council or other
governing body or after the same had existed for
such an unreasonable length of time as to raise a
presumption of knowledge of such defect on the part
of the council or other governing body and whenever
the city or town shall be made liable for damages by
reason of the unauthorized or wrongful acts or
4
1120103
trespass and nuisance claims must also fail. See Royal Auto.,
Inc. v. City of Vestavia Hills, 995 So. 2d 154, 156 (Ala.
2008) (noting that, where the plaintiff's negligence claims
against Vestavia and Hoover failed, the plaintiff's nuisance
and trespass claims also necessarily failed); and Hilliard v.
City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 893 (Ala. 1991) ("[T]he
viability of a negligence action against a municipality ...
determines the success or failure of a nuisance action based
upon the same facts." (citing § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975)). 
The City argued (1) that Chavers failed to provide substantial
evidence that she had suffered any damage during the time
frame permitted by § 11-47-23, Ala. Code 1975;  (2) that
3
Chavers had failed to provide substantial evidence of a
negligence, carelessness, or unskillfulness of any
person 
or 
corporation, 
then 
such 
person 
or
corporation shall be liable to an action on the same
account by the party so injured."
Section 11-47-23 provides: 
3
"All claims against the municipality (except
bonds and interest coupons and claims for damages)
shall be presented to the clerk for payment within
two years from the accrual of said claim or shall be
barred.  Claims for damages growing out of torts
shall be presented within six months from the
accrual thereof or shall be barred."
(Emphasis added.)
5
1120103
negligence claim under § 11-47-190; and (3) that Chavers could
not present substantial evidence that her damage was
proximately caused by the actions of the City.  In support of
its motion, the City attached excerpts from the depositions of
Chavers and Kenneth Underwood, Chavers's expert, as well as a
geotechnical study of Chavers's property and Chavers's notice
of claim filed with the City pursuant to § 11-47-23.  Chavers
responded and attached, among other things, a report written
by Underwood and the deposition testimony of Kenneth Hires and
James Foster, employees of the City. 
Chavers testified that she began noticing "sinkholes"
along the back of her property, near the open concrete-lined
drainage ditch, in the mid 1990s.  According to Chavers, she
talked to the City about the problem, and the City sent people
to inspect her property, but no one from the City took any
action.  On March 21, 2006, Chavers filed a sworn statement of
claim with the City, pursuant to § 11-47-23.  In her sworn
statement, Chavers alleged that she suffered damage on a daily
and ongoing basis as a result of the City's failure to
maintain its storm-water-drainage system.
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1120103
Chavers's theory of recovery is based on a report
completed by Underwood after he visited her property in March
2008.  In the report, Underwood stated that the open concrete-
lined ditch along the northern border of Chavers's property
had "failed" because the concrete was severely cracked with
bare soil exposed in many locations.  He also stated that the
underground concrete pipe and junction boxes along Seabreeze
Road had also "failed" in many locations.  According to
Underwood, the failure of the drainage system along Seabreeze
Road allowed for the exfiltration of storm water into the
soil, meaning that the storm water flowed out of the
underground pipe and junction box and into the soil.  The
exfiltrated 
storm 
water 
then 
naturally 
flowed 
down-gradient 
to
the north until it was intercepted by the failed open
concrete-lined drainage ditch along the northern border of
Chavers's property.  Because the open concrete-lined ditch 
had
failed, it allowed for the infiltration of groundwater into
the ditch and allowed for fine-grained soils to be transported
into the ditch with the groundwater.  Underwood stated that
this loss of soil had resulted in numerous large sinkholes on
the northern border of Chavers's property, immediately
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1120103
adjacent to the open concrete-lined ditch, with smaller
sinkholes at other locations on Chavers's property. 
Kenneth Hires, an employee of the City's engineering
department, testified that he went to Chavers's residence and
placed dye on her property.   The dye eventually made its way
4
"under land" into the open concrete-lined ditch on the
northern border of Chavers's property. Hires testified that
when he visited Chavers's property, he noted that the open
concrete-lined ditch was old; that there was 
aggregate showing
on the surface that should have been covered by concrete; that
there were cracks at the joints; and that there were
"openings" in some places.  He also testified that there were
"voids" between the edge of the open concrete-lined ditch and
the back edge of Chavers's property.  He testified that those
voids were caused by surface water from Chavers's property and
her neighbor's property that had flowed "down contour" until
it found the weakest point in which to wash into the open
concrete-lined ditch.  During that visit, Hires 
concluded that
the concrete pipe that ran along the eastern border of
In her response to the City's summary-judgment motion,
4
Chavers stated that Hires placed dye on her property in 2005. 
The City does not dispute that factual allegation on appeal.
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1120103
Chavers's property and the open concrete-lined ditch on the
northern border of Chavers's property should be repaired.  It
is undisputed that the repairs recommended by Hires were not
performed by the City until September 2008, after Chavers had
filed a notice of claim with the City and after she had sued
the City.
In 2009, the City commissioned Aquaterra Engineering,
LLC, to perform a geotechnical investigation to 
determine soil
and groundwater conditions on Chavers's property.  In a report
dated January 14, 2010, Aquaterra noted that groundwater was
identified in several places on Chavers's property at a level
five to seven feet below the surface.  In his deposition
testimony, Underwood agreed that there was groundwater below
the surface of the land throughout the area around Chavers's
property.  Underwood testified that the level of the
groundwater varied based on the time and season of the year,
and that the groundwater on the property was separate from the
City's drainage system, i.e., that groundwater was present
regardless of the City's drainage system. 
Underwood further testified that the exfiltration of the
water from the cracks in the underground pipes on the southern
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1120103
border of Chavers's property occurred when the storm water in
the underground pipe was at a level that was above the
groundwater level on the outside of the pipe.  In order to
determine whether the level of the water in the underground
pipe exceeded the level of the groundwater outside of the
pipe, the pipes would have to be monitored.  Underwood
admitted that he did not monitor the pipes to confirm that the
level of storm water in the pipe exceeded the level of the
groundwater outside of the pipe.  He further testified that
any water below the surface of Chavers's property would follow
the same down-gradient path to the open concrete-lined ditch
to the north of Chavers's property, whether it was groundwater
or groundwater combined with exfiltrated storm water from the
City's 
underground 
drainage 
pipes. 
 
Thus, 
Underwood 
testified,
even 
if 
the 
City's 
storm-water-drainage 
system 
along 
Seabreeze
Road did not leak at all, the groundwater would still move
down-gradient to the north toward the open concrete-lined
ditch.
According to Underwood, the "terrible condition" of the
open concrete-lined ditch was an "invitation there to lower
ground water, to draw the ground water down and increase the
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1120103
ground water gradient from the front of the property to the
rear."  Underwood stated that the result was sinkholes, which
he described as areas where the ground surface had dropped
several feet in some locations.  Underwood stated that there
was pressure on the groundwater and, as it flowed through the
sandy soil on Chavers's property, it had the capability of
moving the sandy soil.  Underwood further stated that, even if
there had been no infiltration or exfiltration of water as a
result of broken pipes along the southern border of Chavers's
property, the sinkholes still would have developed over time
because the sandy soil would have moved into the open
concrete-lined ditch, causing the subsidence of soils at
various locations on Chavers's property. 
In addition to the sinkholes on Chavers's property,
Underwood also testified that he saw photographs of the inside
of Chavers's house and noticed cracks in the walls that, he
said, indicated uneven settling of her house.  Regarding the
cause of the cracks and uneven settling in Chavers's house,
the following exchange occurred:
"Q: Is there any way of knowing whether that
uneven settling is a result of any drainage issues
surrounding [Chavers's] property?
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1120103
"A [Underwood]: I don't know how you would
really separate the two issues, whether it was
natural settling or whether the natural settling was
exacerbated by a soil loss.
"But certainly we've had soil loss all through
her property, and I would –- I would think it's a
very strong possibility that some of the cracking
and uneven settling was a result of the loss of soil
beneath her house.
"Q: Would it be fair to say it's just impossible
to know one way or the other whether the drainage
system had any effect on the cracking in her house
or not?
"A [Underwood]: For me to make a statement that
it is impossible to know, I would defer to someone
who has spent a career in soils engineering and to
see –- get their opinion on that."
James Foster, an engineer for the City who visited
Chavers's property after repairs had been made to the City's
drainage system, testified that the damage he saw on Chavers's
property was limited to an area within 10 feet of the open
concrete-lined ditch and the two drainage easements on
Chavers's property. Foster testified that the damage he
observed was not caused by the piping of soil but by erosion
of the soil at the open concrete-lined ditch. Foster agreed
with Underwood's determination that fine-grained sandy soil
had been transported into the ditch as the open concrete-lined
ditch had failed and allowed infiltration of groundwater into
12
1120103
the ditch. But he disagreed that the damage could be described
as "sinkholes" as opposed to "erosion."
After conducting a hearing, the circuit court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the City on Chavers's remaining
claims.  In its judgment, the circuit court stated:
"After 
considering 
all 
the 
evidence 
set 
forth 
in
the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant, with all reasonable inferences drawn in
[Chavers]'s behalf, the [c]ourt determines that
[Chavers] has not sufficiently carried her burden of
presenting substantial evidence establishing that
the City's negligence caused damage to [Chavers]'s
property.
"The [c]ourt 
can 
find 
no 
evidence 
presented that
establishes a defect in the City's drainage system
or that any of the alleged damage was the proximate
cause [sic] of the City's negligence. [Chavers]'s
expert, Mr. Underwood, gave sworn testimony of the
'possibility' that the City's drainage system caused
portions of [Chavers]'s land to erode, which led to
sinkholes and other damage to her property. 
However, the mere possibility that a defective
drainage system is the source of [Chavers]'s
problems is not enough to hold the City liable for
negligence.  Furthermore, [Chavers] offers no
evidence that a portion of the City's drainage
system was actually defective.  The [c]ourt will not
infer that the City was negligent based on the
evidence in the record."
Chavers filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the
circuit court denied, and Chavers appealed.  On appeal,
Chavers argues that the City failed to meet its burden of
13
1120103
showing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and
that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
"'A motion for summary judgment is granted only
when the evidence demonstrates that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.' Reichert v.
City of Mobile, 776 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 2000). To
defeat a properly supported motion for a summary
judgment, 
the 
nonmoving 
party 
must 
present
substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact. 'Substantial evidence' is 'evidence
of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons
in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably
infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved.' West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). Our review
of a summary judgment is de novo, and we review a
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, applying 'the same standard as that
of the trial court in determining whether the
evidence before the court made out a genuine issue
of material fact.' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.
2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988); System Dynamics Int'l, Inc.
v. Boykin, 683 So. 2d 419, 420 (Ala. 1996)."
Locke v. City of Mobile, 851 So. 2d 446, 448 (Ala. 2002).
Discussion
Chavers argues that the circuit court erred in entering
a summary judgment in favor of the City because, she says, the
City failed to make a prima facie showing that there was no
genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to a
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judgment as a matter of law.  In Locke, the plaintiff alleged
that the City had negligently maintained its storm-water-
drainage system, which had allegedly caused flooding on the
plaintiff's property. Id. at 447.  A summary judgment was
entered for the City, and this Court stated:
"In order to prevail on its motion for a summary
judgment, the City was not required to prove that
the flooding was not a result of its negligent
maintenance. See Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769
So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999).
"'"If the burden of proof at trial is
on the nonmovant, the movant may satisfy
the Rule 56[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] burden of
production 
either 
by 
submitting 
affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element
in the nonmovant's claim or, assuming
discovery 
has 
been 
completed, 
by
demonstrating to the trial court that the
nonmovant's evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element of the
nonmovant's claim."'
"Id. (quoting Justice Houston's special concurrence
in Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 691 (Ala.
1989), overruling Berner and adopting Justice
Houston's special concurrence in Berner as the
accurate statement of the law) (emphasis omitted).
The City, as previously noted, submitted excerpts
from the depositions of [the plaintiff] and her
engineering expert that sufficiently discharged its
burden by demonstrating the insufficiency of [the
plaintiff]'s evidence on the essential element of
her claim –- negligent maintenance as the proximate
cause of the flooding. The burden then shifted to
[the plaintiff] to present substantial evidence
indicating that the flooding was proximately caused
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by the City's negligent maintenance. Reichert [v.
City of Mobile], 776 So. 2d [761,] 765-66 [(Ala.
2000)]. The issue on appeal is whether [the
plaintiff] presented substantial evidence showing
that the City's alleged negligent failure to
maintain the drainage system in her neighborhood
proximately caused the flooding of her property."
851 So. 2d at 448-49.
In the present case, the City attempted to show that
Chavers's evidence was insufficient to prove that the City's
alleged negligent maintenance of its drainage system was the
proximate cause of the damage to her house and yard.  To
support its motion, the City presented, among other things,
the deposition testimony of Underwood, Chavers's expert. 
Underwood testified that the cracks in the walls of Chavers's
house were an indication of uneven settling and that there was
"a very strong possibility that some of the cracking and
uneven settling was a result of the loss of soil beneath
[Chavers's] house," which he attributed to the failed
underground pipes along the southern border of Chavers's
property and the failed open concrete-lined ditch along the
northern border of Chavers's property.  However, Underwood
testified that he would defer to someone who had spent their
career in soils engineering to determine whether it was
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possible to know if the City's drainage system had any effect
on the cracking in and uneven settling of Chavers's house.
Chavers does not challenge the circuit court's summary
judgment to the extent that the circuit court determined that
Underwood's testimony was insufficient to support a finding
that the City's drainage system, particularly the City's
negligent maintenance of the drainage system, was the
proximate cause of the cracking and uneven settling of her
house. Accordingly, that argument is waived, and, insofar as
Chavers's complaint requests damages for the cracking and
uneven settling of her house, the summary judgment in favor of
the City is affirmed. See Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v.
Heilman, 876 So. 2d 1111, 1124 n.8 (Ala. 2003) ("An argument
not made on appeal is abandoned or waived." (citing Bettis v.
Thorton, 662 So. 2d 256, 257 (Ala. 1995))).  
Instead, Chavers argues that substantial evidence was
presented showing that the deteriorated condition of the open
concrete-lined ditch, specifically the City's negligent
maintenance of that ditch, caused several large sinkholes on
her property.  Chavers cites the testimony of Underwood, who
stated that the terrible condition of the open concrete-lined
17
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drainage ditch on the northern border of Chavers's property
caused the sinkholes on Chavers's property by allowing water
and soil to infiltrate the drainage ditch, which resulted in
a loss of soil from Chavers's property.  Although Underwood
testified that this loss would have occurred regardless of
whether the underground pipes on the southern border of
Chavers's property leaked, his testimony also indicated that
even the natural groundwater under Chavers's property moving
down-gradient to the open concrete-lined ditch carried sandy
soil with it, which infiltrated the open concrete-lined ditch
as a result of the terrible condition of the ditch, thereby
causing a loss of soil and sinkholes on Chavers's property. 
Therefore, even if the drainage system on the southern border
of Chavers's property was not defective, there 
was 
substantial
evidence to support Chavers's claim that the defects in the
open concrete-lined ditch had allowed the infiltration of
groundwater and sandy soil because of its deteriorated
condition and was the proximate cause of the sinkholes on her
property.  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in granting
the City's summary-judgment motion insofar as Chavers's
complaint requested damages based on the sinkholes on her
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property caused by the City's alleged negligent maintenance 
of
its drainage system.
The City argues that the summary judgment can be affirmed
on the ground that Chavers's evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate that she had suffered damage during the six months
preceding the filing of her claim pursuant to § 11-47-23, Ala.
Code 1975, the municipal nonclaim statute. In Baugus v. City
of Florence, 985 So. 2d 413 (Ala. 2007), several landowners
who owned real property adjacent to a landfill operated by the
City of Florence sued the City of Florence seeking damages for
nuisance, trespass, and strict liability.  The 
landowners 
also
asserted 
an 
inverse-condemnation 
claim, 
alleging 
that 
the 
City
of Florence's placement and monitoring of methane-measuring
pipes on their properties constituted a taking and/or damage
to their properties.  The landowners filed a claim with the
City of Florence pursuant to § 11-47-23 on March 19, 2002,
seeking damages for injuries caused by the City of Florence's
operation of the landfill, the migration of methane from the
landfill onto their properties, and the monitoring of methane
levels on their properties.  The circuit court granted the
City of Florence's motion for a summary judgment on each
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claim.  On appeal, the City of Florence argued that the
landowners' tort claims based on the presence of methane were
time-barred because methane had been detected on the
landowners' property no later than 1994. This Court noted that
it was undisputed that methane continued to be present on the
landowners' property and that "the issue as to the bar of
limitations turns on whether the continuing emission of
methane gas within the period on and after September 19, 2001,
[six months before the landowners filed notice of claim
pursuant to § 11-47-23,] constituted a violation of a legal
duty owed the landowners by the City [of Florence]." 985 So.
2d at 419.  We stated: "When a claim is based on negligent
maintenance, each occurrence or recurrence of the injury
constitutes a new cause of action." Id. (citing City of
Clanton v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 470, 473, 17 So. 2d 669, 672
(1944)).  We concluded that, because the landowners' claims
arose 
"from the continuous migration of methane onto their
properties as a result of the [City of Florence's]
maintenance and ongoing operation of the landfill
for a public purpose subsequent to its closure[,]
[t]he 
landowners' 
tort 
claims 
of 
nuisance,
negligence, and trespass accrue each time the [City
of Florence's] maintenance and ongoing operation of
the landfill cause methane to migrate onto the
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1120103
landowners' property and, thus, those claims are not
time-barred. ... However, any claims that accrued
before September 19, 2001, six months before the
landowners informed the City [of Florence] of their
intent to sue the City [of Florence], are barred by
the municipal nonclaim statute."
985 So. 2d at 421.
 In the present case, Chavers alleged in her sworn
statement of claim filed in March 2006, which was attached to
the City's summary-judgment motion, that she was suffering
damage on a daily and ongoing basis as a result of the City's
negligent maintenance of its drainage system.  In her response
to the City's summary-judgment motion, Chavers alleged that
the City had a continuing duty to adequately maintain the open
concrete-lined drainage ditch; the City did not dispute that
allegation. See generally Kennedy v. City of Montgomery, 423
So. 2d 187, 188 (Ala. 1982) ("Once the authority to construct
or maintain a drainage system is exercised, a duty of care
exists, and a municipality may be liable for damages
proximately caused by its negligence.").  Because Chavers's
claims are based on the continuous migration of water and soil
into the failed open concrete-lined drainage ditch as a result
of the City's negligent maintenance of that ditch, we conclude
that Chavers's evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine
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issue of material fact as to whether she incurred damage
during the six months preceding the filing of the notice of
claim pursuant to § 11-47-23.  However, consistent with our
decision in Baugus, we conclude that any of Chavers's claims
for damage that accrued before September 21, 2006 –- six
months before she filed her notice of claim on March 21, 2006
-- are barred by § 11-47-23.
The City also argues that it was entitled to a summary
judgment on Chavers's negligent-maintenance claim under § 11-
47-190.  Pursuant to that statute, Chavers must show that the
alleged damage to her property was based on the 
"neglect or carelessness or failure to remedy some
defect in the streets, alleys, public ways, or
buildings after the same had been called to the
attention of the council or other governing body or
after the same had existed for such an unreasonable
length of time as to raise a presumption of
knowledge of such defect on the part of the council
or other governing body ...."
§ 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975.
The record contains evidence indicating that Chavers
repeatedly notified the City of damage to her property, that
Hires came to her home after she complained to the City, that
Hires noted that the open concrete-lined ditch was in poor
condition at that time, that Hires placed dye on her property,
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1120103
and that Hires was aware that the dye made its way underground
into the open concrete-lined ditch.  After that visit, Hires
recommended that repairs be made to certain aspects of the
City's drainage system, including the open concrete-lined
ditch.  The record indicates that those repairs were not made
until well after Chavers had filed a notice of claim and had
sued the City.  This evidence is sufficient to withstand a
motion for a summary judgment based on the City's bare
allegation that there was no evidence to support a claim under
§ 11-47-190.
Chavers has not raised any arguments on appeal concerning
the circuit court's adjudication of her inverse-condemnation
claim. Accordingly, the circuit court's summary judgment 
as 
to
that claim is affirmed. See Avis Rent A Car Sys., 876 So. 2d
at 1124 n.8.
Conclusion
We affirm the summary judgment as to the inverse-
condemnation claim and as to the negligent-maintenance,
nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested
damages based on the cracking and uneven settling of her
house.  We reverse the summary judgment as to the negligent-
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maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers
requested damages for sinkholes allegedly caused by 
the 
City's
negligent maintenance of the open concrete-lined ditch.  We
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Murdock, and Main, JJ., concur.
24