Case Title: Caplan v. Town of Acton

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12274

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12274 
 
GEORGE CAPLAN & others1  vs.  TOWN OF ACTON. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 7, 2017. - March 9, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, "Anti-aid" amendment.  Massachusetts 
Community Preservation Act.  Historic Preservation.  
Church. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 7, 2016. 
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Leila R. 
Kern, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Douglas B. Mishkin, of the District of Columbia (Joshua 
Counts Cumby & Alex Luchenitser, of the District of Columbia, & 
Russell S. Chernin also present) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Nina L. Pickering-Cook (Arthur P. Kreiger also present) for 
the defendant. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Jim Conboy, G. Stodel Friedman, Daniel Gilfix, Maria 
Greene, Jesse Levine, Dave Lunger, Allen Nitschelm, Scott 
Smyers, William Alstrom, Jennifer Brown, William Brown, and 
David Caplan. 
 
2 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Daniel Mach, of the District of Columbia, Anthony M. 
Doniger, Kate R. Cook, & Sarah R. Wunsch for American Civil 
Liberties Union & another. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, David C. Kravitz, Assistant 
State Solicitor, & Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the Attorney General. 
 
Eric C. Rassbach, of the District of Columbia, Joseph C. 
Davis, of Louisiana, Daniel D. Benson, of Utah, & Mark L. Rienzi 
for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. 
 
Thomas A. Mullen for Massachusetts Municipal Law 
Association & another. 
 
Thaddeus A. Heuer & Andrew London for National Trust for 
Historic Preservation. 
 
Ryan P. McManus & M. Patrick Moore for Boston Preservation 
Alliance & others. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Article 18 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by arts. 46 and 103 of 
the Amendments, known as the "anti-aid amendment," prohibits in 
§ 2, cl. 2, the "grant, appropriation or use of public money . . 
. for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, 
religious denomination or society."  This case presents the 
question whether two grants of public funds to renovate an 
active church that has been identified as a "historic resource" 
under the Community Preservation Act (act), G. L. c. 44B, are 
categorically barred by the anti-aid amendment, or whether the 
constitutionality of such grants must be evaluated under the 
three-factor test we have applied under Commonwealth v. School 
Comm. of Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 675 (1981) (Springfield), 
to payments made to other private institutions.  Also presented 
 
3 
is the follow-up question:  if the three-factor test applies, do 
the grants satisfy its requirements? 
 
We conclude that the constitutionality of such grants must 
be evaluated under our three-factor test:  a judge must consider 
whether a motivating purpose of each grant is to aid the church, 
whether the grant will have the effect of substantially aiding 
the church, and whether the grant avoids the risks of the 
political and economic abuses that prompted the passage of the 
anti-aid amendment.  We also conclude that, in light of the 
history of the anti-aid amendment, a grant of public funds to an 
active church warrants careful scrutiny.  Because the judge 
applied this three-factor test incorrectly in denying the 
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit 
disbursement of these grants, we vacate the order denying the 
motion.  As to the grant to preserve the stained glass windows 
in the main church building, we remand the case to the Superior 
Court for entry of an order allowing the plaintiffs' motion for 
a preliminary injunction barring disbursement of the grant.  As 
to the grant to fund a "Master Plan" to preserve all three of 
the buildings belonging to the church, we remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed in support of the 
plaintiffs by the American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of 
Massachusetts.  We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed in 
 
 
4 
 
Background.  The Acton Congregational Church (church), an 
affiliate of the United Church of Christ, is an active church 
with a congregation of over 800 members.  It describes its 
mission thusly: 
"The mission of Acton Congregational Church . . . is to 
preach and teach the good news of the salvation that was 
secured for us at great cost through the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus.  The church encourages each 
individual to accept the gift of Christ and to respond to 
God's love by taking part in worship, ministry to one 
another, and the Christian nurture of people of all ages.  
With the guidance of the Holy Spirit, we are called as 
servants of Christ to live our faith in our daily lives and 
to reach out to people of this community and the world with 
love, care, and concern for both their physical and 
spiritual needs." 
 
 
The church stands in the Acton Centre Historic District 
(historic district), an area that has served as a center of town 
life since the establishment of the town of Acton (town) in 
1735.  The church owns and maintains three adjacent buildings in 
the historic district:  the main church building, the John 
Fletcher House, and the Abner Hosmer House.  The main church 
building was built in 1846.  Today, it is used for worship 
services and religious educational programs; it also houses a 
local day care center, meeting spaces for various community 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
support of the town of Acton (town) by the Attorney General; the 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty; the Massachusetts Municipal 
Law Association and Community Preservation Coalition; the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation; and the Boston 
Preservation Alliance, Historic Boston Incorporated, Historic 
New England, North Bennet Street School, and Preservation 
Massachusetts. 
 
5 
groups, and a thrift shop.  The two houses, also built in the 
mid-Nineteenth Century, originally were private residences but 
were later acquired by the church and are now rented to local 
families. 
 
The town is one of 172 municipalities in Massachusetts that 
have adopted the act, which establishes a mechanism for funding 
projects relating to open space, historic resources, and 
community housing.3  G. L. c. 44B.  In 2015, the church submitted 
two grant applications to the town's Community Preservation 
Committee (committee), which makes recommendations in accordance 
with the act to the town meeting regarding "the acquisition, 
preservation, rehabilitation and restoration of historic 
resources."4  G. L. c. 44B, § 5 (b) (2).  See G. L. c. 44B, § 7. 
 
The church's first application was for a $49,500 grant to 
fund a "Master Plan for Historic Preservation" for all three of 
                                                          
 
 
3 Municipalities that adopt the Community Preservation Act 
(act), G. L. c. 44B, must establish a local preservation fund, 
which is funded through a surcharge on local property taxes, id. 
at § 4, and through disbursements from a State-administered 
trust fund that is funded through a Statewide surcharge on all 
real estate transactions at the State's Registries of Deeds, id. 
at § 8.  See Community Preservation Coalition, CPA Trust Fund, 
http://www.communitypreservation.org/content/trustfund 
[https://perma.cc/Y7XF-VQRZ]. 
 
 
4 The act defines "historic resources" as "a building, 
structure, vessel, real property, document or artifact that is 
listed on the [S]tate register of historic places or has been 
determined by the local historic preservation commission to be 
significant in the history, archeology, architecture or culture 
of a city or town."  G. L. c. 44B, § 2. 
 
6 
its buildings (the Master Plan grant).  The church proposed to 
hire an architectural consultant to develop a plan for their 
renovation and preservation; the proposed work would include "a 
thorough assessment of the [c]hurch building envelope, including 
windows, doors, siding, roof, chimney, bell tower, skylights, 
and fire escapes."  The church noted "[s]pecific areas of 
concern" for the building, including its bell tower and brass 
chandelier. 
 
The church's second application was for a $51,237 grant to 
fund the restoration and preservation of the main church 
building's stained glass windows, which were installed in 1898 
(the stained glass grant).  According to the church's 
application, the "most prominent" of the windows depicts Jesus 
and a kneeling woman; another window features a cross and the 
hymnal phrase, "Rock of Ages Cleft for Me."  The proposed work 
would include replacing parts of the glass, sealing the glass, 
and installing new glazing so that the windows -- which 
currently have a "cloudy" exterior and "cannot be appreciated 
outside the church" -- will be given "complete transparency." 
 
The church explained in its applications that, due to 
declining membership and contributions, it lacked the funds 
necessary both to preserve its buildings and to fully serve the 
needs of its congregation without financial assistance from the 
town: 
 
7 
"As you may know, mainstream churches have not been growing 
for years, and the financial strain is significant.  [The 
church] has weathered the storm better than many churches, 
but the reality is that we have had to cut programs and 
personnel.  The cuts can further exacerbate the financial 
problem by not offering the congregation what draws them to 
their church.  With that in mind, the long list of 
maintenance and capital improvement projects get[s] delayed 
before we cut programs, but there are many things that 
we've had to fix." 
 
 
Consistent with the requirements of the act, the committee 
held a public hearing on the church's applications and voted 
unanimously to recommend the two grants.  The town approved them 
both at a town meeting. 
 
The town imposed several conditions on the grants.  First, 
it required that the church convey to the town a "historic 
preservation restriction" in the buildings that would be 
"perpetual to the extent permitted by law."  Second, it 
specified that no funds would be disbursed to the church except 
as reimbursements for specific expenses incurred in connection 
with the projects, and only after the town could verify, based 
on submitted invoices, that those expenses were "consistent with 
the project scope presented" in the church's applications. 
 
The plaintiffs, a group of town taxpayers, commenced this 
action in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 40, § 53, which 
permits taxpayers to act "as private attorneys general" to 
enforce laws designed to prevent abuse of public funds by local 
governments.  LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 332 (1999).  
 
8 
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the grants to 
the church violate the anti-aid amendment, and requested 
injunctive relief to prevent their disbursement.5 
 
In denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the judge relied on the three-factor test we first 
set forth in Springfield, 382 Mass. at 675.  We applied the test 
in that case to determine whether a statute that authorized the 
public funding of special education placements of public school 
students in private schools violated the anti-aid amendment.  
Id. at 667.  The three factors are:  "(1) whether the purpose of 
the challenged statute is to aid private schools; (2) whether 
the statute does in fact substantially aid such schools; and (3) 
whether the statute avoids the political and economic abuses 
which prompted the passage of [the anti-aid amendment]."  Id. at 
675.6  We cautioned that these factors "are not 'precise limits 
to the necessary constitutional inquiry,' but are instead 
guidelines to a proper analysis."  Id., quoting Colo v. 
                                                          
 
 
5 In their complaint, the plaintiffs also challenged the 
town's proposed $15,000 grant to South Acton Congregational 
Church, another active church located in Acton.  South Acton 
Congregational Church has since withdrawn its application for 
that grant; on appeal, the plaintiffs challenge only the grants 
to the Acton Congregational Church. 
 
 
6 The judge described these as "the three factors outlined 
in Helmes v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 873, 876 (1990)"; the court 
in Helmes quoted the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. School 
Comm. of Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 675 (1981) (Springfield). 
 
9 
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 558 (1979).  We also 
recognized that each factor was "interrelated," and that any 
conclusion "results from a balancing" of the factors as applied 
to the facts of each case.  Springfield, supra at 675. 
 
The judge here determined that the plaintiffs bore a heavy 
burden to overcome the presumption of the act's 
constitutionality because, although the plaintiffs were 
challenging the constitutionality of the grants to the church, 
those grants were awarded pursuant to the act.  Thus, as to the 
first factor, the judge determined that she must "examine the 
purpose of the [act]," and concluded that the purpose of the 
grants under the act was "to preserve historic resources, and 
not to aid the [c]hurch[]."  As to the third factor, the judge 
found that "[t]here is no credible evidence that the grants 
under the [act] are economically or politically abusive or 
unfair," noting that "[t]he application and approval procedures 
for grants under the [act] operate without regard to the 
applicant's makeup or purpose."  The judge concluded that, even 
if the plaintiffs were to satisfy the second factor, which she 
was "not convinced they can," they still had "no likelihood of 
success on the merits" because their failure to satisfy the 
first and third factors "preclud[ed] them from overcoming the 
presumption of constitutionality that favors the [act]." 
 
10 
 
The judge also granted the town's motion for a protective 
order to stay discovery until thirty days after entry of a 
decision on the preliminary injunction.  The plaintiffs appealed 
from the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction and 
the allowance of the protective order.  We granted their 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  In a taxpayer suit such as this, the taxpayers 
collectively are acting as a private attorney general seeking 
under G. L. c. 40, § 53, "to enforce laws relating to the 
expenditure of tax money by the local government."  LeClair, 430 
Mass. at 332.  In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the 
plaintiffs must show a likelihood of success on the merits and 
that the requested relief would be in the public interest; they 
need not demonstrate irreparable harm.  See id. at 331-332. 
The plaintiffs claim that the judge made two errors of law 
in her decision denying their motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  First, they argue that the judge erred by applying 
the three-factor test articulated in Springfield, contending 
that this test only applies where the challenged grant of public 
funds is to aid a private school or institution, and not where 
the challenged grant is to aid a church.  Second, they contend 
that, even if the three-factor test properly applies to public 
aid to churches, the judge misapplied the test.  To rule on 
 
11 
these claims of error, we must look first to the history and 
evolution of the anti-aid amendment. 
 
1.  The history and evolution of the anti-aid amendment.  
Our original Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1780, provided in 
art. 3 for the direct public support of religion, continuing the 
Colonial practice of using tax revenues to support the "public 
Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality[,]" see 
Colo, 378 Mass. at 556 n.10, which essentially meant support of 
the Congregational Church.  See T.J. Curry, The First Freedoms, 
Church and State in America to the Passage of the First 
Amendment, 163-164, 174-175 (1986) (Curry); S.E. Morison, A 
History of the Constitution of Massachusetts 24 & n.1 (1917) 
(Morison).7 
 
Even before it was mandated by the Declaration of Rights in 
1780, the "quasi-religious establishment" of the Congregational 
Church had provoked heated conflict.  Id. at 24.  See generally 
                                                          
 
7 Article 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
originally provided, in relevant part, that "the [L]egislature 
shall . . . authorize and require[] the several towns, parishes, 
precincts, and other bodies politic . . . to make suitable 
provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the 
public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of 
public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality."  
Because Congregationalists were the overwhelming majority of the 
population in Massachusetts at the time, art. 3 functioned as a 
de facto general assessment in favor of the Congregational 
Church.  See T.J. Curry, The First Freedoms, Church and State in 
America to the Passage of the First Amendment, 163-164 (1986); 
S.E. Morison, A History of the Constitution of Massachusetts 24 
& n.1 (1917). 
 
12 
1 W.G. McLoughlin, New England Dissent 1630-1833, The Baptists 
and the Separation of Church and State, 547-568 (1971) 
(McLoughlin).  During the American Revolution, Baptists 
protested the religious assessments with acts of civil 
disobedience; in retaliation, mobs attacked them on the pretext 
that they were Tories.  See Curry, supra at 163.  When the 
Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, 
forty-five towns rejected art. 3, most of them because it 
provided public support to the Congregational Church.  See id. 
at 167-169; McLoughlin, supra at 626-631.  After art. 3 was 
enacted, the Baptists challenged the religious assessments in 
court, and other denominations followed.  See McLoughlin, supra 
at 636-659. 
 
After decades of "lawsuits, bad feeling, and petty 
persecution," Morison, supra at 24, the Massachusetts 
Constitution was amended in 1833 with art. 11 of the Amendments 
enacted to substitute for art. 3.  Article 11 guarantees the 
equal protection of "all religious sects and denominations" -- 
not just the Christian denominations protected under art. 3 -- 
and effectively ended religious assessments.  The next year, the 
Legislature enacted a statute providing that "no citizen shall 
be assessed or liable to pay any tax for the support of public 
worship . . . to any parish or religious society whatever, other 
 
13 
than to that of which he is a member."  St. 1834, c. 183, § 8.  
See Morison, supra at 38-39. 
 
But the issue of public support for religious institutions 
was far from resolved by art. 11.  It was raised again in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1853, which adopted art. 18 of the 
Amendments to prevent the appropriation of public funds to 
sectarian schools.8  See 3 Debates and Proceedings in the State 
Convention 1853, at 613-626 (1853) (Debates of 1853); Morison, 
supra at 59.  The debates from the Convention indicate that art. 
18 did not arise in response to any actual funding of sectarian 
schools in Massachusetts, but from fear of the sectarian 
conflict that would result if such funding were to occur.  See 
Debates of 1853, supra at 615, 618-620.9 
                                                          
 
 
8 Article 18 of the Amendments, as adopted by the 1853 
Convention and ratified in 1855, provides: 
 
"All moneys raised by taxation in the towns and cities for 
the support of public schools, and all moneys which may be 
appropriated by the State for the support of common 
schools, shall be applied to, and expended in, no other 
schools than those which are conducted according to law, 
under the order and superintendence of the authorities of 
the town or city in which the money is to be expended; and 
such moneys shall never be appropriated to any religious 
sect for the maintenance exclusively of its own schools." 
 
 
9 As one opponent to art. 18 stated, "[T]here has been 
nothing sectarian heretofore in the division of the public 
moneys."  3 Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention 
1853, at 614 (1853) (Debates of 1853).  Another delegate added, 
"Nobody asserts that such is the case; but somebody imagines 
that such a state of things may arise in the future; that 
 
 
14 
 
The delegates worried that competing claims from various 
denominations would quickly deplete public funds for education.  
In the words of one delegate:  "[I]f we take the position that a 
part of this fund may be given to one denomination, another may 
come in and claim the same privilege, and another, and another, 
until the fund is completely exhausted . . . ."  Id. at 620.  
But the delegates were equally fearful of the political 
controversies that were bound to ensue.  See id. at 619, 624.  
One delegate warned that making public funds available to 
religious institutions would be like throwing "a firebrand into 
. . . town meetings."  Id. at 624.  The "object" of art. 18, he 
explained, was "to extinguish [that] firebrand, so that it shall 
not be possible to rekindle it."  Id.  Having seen until 1833 
how public financial support for churches could provoke such 
animosity between citizens, the delegates were eager to remove 
the controversial issue of religion from politics.  See id. at 
624-625. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sectarian schools are going to be established; that some new 
sect may outvote the Protestants, and claim the school 
fund. . . . We contend that it is all right now, but we are 
afraid of something ahead."  Id. at 615-616.  A supporter of 
art. 18 acknowledged that "no efforts have been made to 
establish sectarian schools," but pointed out that "other States 
have been afflicted" with such developments and that "it would 
be well to consider whether, in this State, . . . it is not our 
best policy to guard against it in time."  Id. at 619. 
 
15 
 
In fact, religious tensions were on the rise in 1853, as 
Massachusetts faced a massive influx of immigrants, most of them 
driven here from Ireland by the famine caused by a potato blight 
that devastated the nation's harvest.  See generally O. Handlin, 
Boston's Immigrants, A Study in Acculturation, 25-53 (rev. ed. 
1979).  In 1841, about 10,000 Irish immigrants arrived in 
Boston; in 1846, that number had risen to more than 65,000.  Id. 
at 242.  By 1850, more than one-fourth of Boston residents were 
Irish.  Id. at 243.  Hostility toward Irish Catholics grew among 
those who felt threatened by the combined forces of mass 
immigration, urbanization, and industrialization.  See Haynes, 
The Causes of Know-Nothing Success in Massachusetts, 3 Am. Hist. 
Rev. 67, 70-76 (1897) (Haynes).  Rumors spread about a "papal 
plot" to spread Catholic influence throughout the government and 
in particular the public school system.  See Holt, The Politics 
of Impatience:  The Origins of Know Nothingism, 60 J. Am. Hist. 
309, 323-324 (1973).  These anti-Catholic sentiments were well 
known to the framers of art. 18.  Indeed, some delegates 
believed (and historians today agree) that art. 18 was itself 
targeted specifically against Catholic schools.10  See Debates of 
                                                          
 
 
10 In the words of one delegate:  "Every-body knows [art. 
18] appears to be aimed at one class of our citizens, one 
denomination of religion.  Nobody has intimated any apprehension 
that money would be used for the benefit of Protestant 
sectarianism. . . . [Article 18 has been] discussed[] in 
 
 
16 
1853, supra at 615-617; J.R. Mulkern, The Know-Nothing Party in 
Massachusetts, The Rise and Fall of a People's Movement, 42 
(1990) (Mulkern); Shapiro, The Conservative Dilemma, The 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1953, 33 New Eng. Q. 
207, 224 (1960).  See also Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 
281 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150 (2006). 
 
It bears noting that art. 18, along with all the amendments 
adopted by the 1853 Convention, failed to be ratified by the 
people in 1853.  Morison, supra at 63.  However, in 1854, the 
Know-Nothing Party, running on an anti-foreign and in particular 
an anti-Catholic platform, won a surprising political victory in 
Massachusetts that secured both the governorship and control of 
the Legislature.  See Haynes, supra at 67-68.  Article 18 was 
revived by the Know-Nothing government, Mulkern, supra at 94, 
105-106, and ratified by special election in 1855, Morison, 
supra at 64. 
 
However, the adoption of art. 18 did not end the 
controversy over public support for religious institutions.  
Public dissatisfaction with art. 18 grew when, due to its 
"rather uncertain language," private religious schools and 
hospitals continued to receive public funding.  Bloom v. School 
Comm. of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 39 (1978).  See Loring, A 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
relation to the support of Catholic schools . . . ."  Debates of 
1853, supra at 615. 
 
17 
Short Account of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 
1917-1919, 6 New Eng. Q. 1, 10 (1933).  In 1913, the Legislature 
requested this court's opinion on whether art. 18 "adequately 
prohibit[ed]" the appropriation of public funds "for maintaining 
or aiding any church, religious denomination or religious 
society, or any institution, school, society or undertaking 
which is wholly or in part under sectarian or ecclesiastical 
control."  Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 599-560 
(1913).  The Justices were in agreement that art. 18 prohibited 
appropriations to primary and secondary schools under sectarian 
control, but not to schools of higher education.  Id. at 601.  
The Justices were divided, however, on whether art. 18 allowed 
appropriations to a church or religious denomination; four 
Justices were "of opinion that such an appropriation is 
prohibited by the Constitution and its Amendments," while three 
Justices "incline[d] to the opposite conclusion."  Id. 
 
Faced with this uncertainty, delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1917 sought "to tighten the 
prohibition of public support for religious education" and "to 
protect State and municipal treasuries from the growing pressure 
of interest groups in search of private appropriations."  
Springfield, 382 Mass. at 673.  The result was art. 46 of the 
Amendments, a substantially revised version of art. 18 that was 
"sweeping in its terms."  Bloom, 376 Mass. at 39.  Article 46 
 
18 
broadened the prohibition on the use of public funds to 
encompass not only private religious schools but all private 
institutions, whether secular or religious, and, in the last 
clause of § 2, specifically prohibited the "grant, appropriation 
or use of public money . . . for the purpose of founding, 
maintaining or aiding any church, religious denomination or 
society."11 
 
By its terms, the revised anti-aid amendment applied to all 
institutions not under public control.  Its proponents 
                                                          
 
 
11 As amended by art. 46 of the Amendments in 1917, art. 18, 
§ 2, provided: 
 
"All moneys raised by taxation in the towns and cities for 
the support of public schools, and all moneys which may be 
appropriated by the [C]ommonwealth for the support of 
common schools shall be applied to, and expended in, no 
other schools than those which are conducted according to 
law, under the order and superintendence of the authorities 
of the town or city in which the money is expended; and no 
grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or 
loan of public credit shall be made or authorized by the 
[C]ommonwealth or any political division thereof for the 
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any other school 
or institution of learning, whether under public control or 
otherwise, wherein any denominational doctrine is 
inculcated, or any other school, or any college, infirmary, 
hospital, institution, or educational, charitable or 
religious undertaking which is not publicly owned and under 
the exclusive control, order and superintendence of public 
officers or public agents authorized by the [C]ommonwealth 
or federal authority or both, [with exceptions not relevant 
here]; and no such grant, appropriation or use of public 
money or property or loan of public credit shall be made or 
authorized for the purpose of founding, maintaining or 
aiding any church, religious denomination or society." 
 
 
19 
recognized that, in the fight over public funds, private 
institutions of all kinds -- whether religious or not -- were 
equally likely to compete.  See 1 Debates in the Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention, 1917-1918, at 62-70, 163-168 (1919) 
(Debates of 1917-1918).  As one of the amendment's chief 
supporters explained during the debates:  "[I]f you let the bars 
down everything else will come in."  Id. at 118.  The decision 
to appropriate funds to one private institution would lead to "a 
thousand other[s]" asking for the same.  Id.  The anti-aid 
amendment was intended to keep those bars up, protecting public 
funds from religious and secular institutions alike.12 
 
Still, the delegates to the Convention voiced many concerns 
that were specific to religious institutions, as reflected in 
the last clause of § 2 of the revised anti-aid amendment.  As we 
have summarized in the past: 
"Proponents of [the anti-aid amendment] urged that liberty 
of conscience was infringed whenever a citizen was taxed to 
support the religious institutions of others; that the 
churches would benefit in independence and dignity by not 
relying on governmental support; and, more generally or 
colloquially, that to promote civic harmony the irritating 
question of religion should be removed from politics as far 
                                                          
 
 
12 Several efforts were made during the 1917 Convention to 
modify the wording of art. 46, to permit funding of nonsectarian 
private schools and secular institutions such as museums and 
libraries.  These efforts were rejected.  See R.L. Bridgman, The 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917, at 26-29 
(1923); Shattuck, Martin Lomasney in the Constitutional 
Convention of 1917-1919, 71 Proceedings of the Mass. Hist. Soc'y 
299, 303 (1959). 
 
20 
as possible, and with it the unseemly and potentially 
dangerous scramble of religious institutions for public 
funds in ever-increasing amounts." 
 
Bloom, 376 Mass. at 39, citing Debates of 1917-1918, supra at 
68, 74-79, 161-164. 
 
The anti-aid amendment that emerged from the 1917 
Convention is the amendment -- with some revisions adopted in 
1974, not relevant here13 -- that applies today.  It currently 
provides: 
"No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property 
or loan of credit shall be made or authorized by the 
[C]ommonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the 
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any infirmary, 
hospital, institution, primary or secondary school, or 
charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly 
owned and under the exclusive control, order and 
supervision of public officers or public agents authorized 
by the [C]ommonwealth or federal authority or both, [with 
exceptions not relevant here]; and no such grant, 
appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of 
public credit shall be made or authorized for the purpose 
of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, religious 
denomination or society."14 
 
Art. 18, § 2, as amended by arts. 46 and 103. 
                                                          
 
 
13 Article 18 was further amended by art. 103 of the 
Amendments in 1974 to eliminate the opening clause of the 
previous version and to allow grants-in-aid to private 
institutions of higher education and their students.  See Bloom 
v. School Comm. of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 40-41 & n.11 
(1978). 
 
 
14 Section 1 of art. 18, as amended by art. 46, also added 
during the 1917 Convention, provides that "[n]o law shall be 
passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion." 
 
21 
 
2.  Does the three-factor test in Springfield apply to 
public aid to churches?  Section 2 of the anti-aid amendment 
contains two clauses:  the first clause prohibits the grant of 
public funds "for the purpose of founding, maintaining or 
aiding" any institution that is not publicly owned or under 
exclusive public control, including schools and hospitals; the 
second clause prohibits the grant of public funds "for the 
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, religious 
denomination or society."  Art. 18, § 2, as amended by arts. 46 
and 103.  The plaintiffs contend that the three-factor test in 
Springfield applies only where the challenged grant of public 
funds is to a private school or institution under the first 
clause, and should not be applied where the challenged grant is 
to an active house of worship under the second clause, as in 
this case.  Rather, the plaintiffs argue that the second clause 
requires an "unequivocal and unqualified" ban on the grant of 
public funds to churches.  We disagree. 
 
This is the first time that we have been asked to consider 
the constitutionality of a grant of public funds to a church 
under the second clause of the anti-aid amendment.  All of our 
prior decisions under the anti-aid amendment since its revision 
in 1917 have considered the actual or contemplated grant of 
public funds or assistance to private schools or institutions 
under the first clause.  See Helmes v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 
 
22 
873, 874 (1990) (funding for repair of memorial battleship); 
Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 327 
(1982) (Essex) (transportation for private school students); 
Springfield, 382 Mass. at 665, 666 (funding for special 
education programs in private schools); Colo, 378 Mass. at 551 
(payment of legislative chaplains' salaries); Bloom, 376 Mass. 
at 36 (textbooks for private school students).  See also Opinion 
of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1201, 1202 (1987) (tax deduction for 
expenditures on tuition, textbooks, and school transportation); 
Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 846, 847-848 (1970) (vouchers 
for private school students); Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 
836, 837-838 (1970) (reimbursement of private schools for 
secular educational services). 
 
In Springfield, 382 Mass. at 675, we declared that "there 
are no simple tests or precise lines by which we can determine 
the constitutionality" of grants challenged under the first 
clause of the anti-aid amendment.  Instead, we devised the 
three-part test as "guidelines to a proper analysis," id., 
quoting Colo, 378 Mass. at 558, focusing on the purpose of the 
grant, the extent to which the grant aids the private 
institution, and whether the grant "avoids the political and 
economic abuses" that led to the passage of the anti-aid 
amendment, all of which must be carefully balanced in 
determining its constitutionality.  Springfield, supra at 675. 
 
23 
 
This rejection of "simple tests [and] precise lines" is 
equally appropriate when evaluating the constitutionality of a 
grant of public funds under the second clause of the anti-aid 
amendment.  Id.  The operative language in each clause is 
identical:  both provide that no "grant, appropriation, or use 
of public money . . . shall be made or authorized" "for the 
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding" one of the 
enumerated private institutions.  Art. 18, § 2, as amended by 
arts. 46 and 103.  In both clauses, the specific reference to 
"purpose" demands an inquiry into both the making of a grant and 
its purpose.15  Where the language of the two clauses is 
essentially the same, our interpretive framework is 
appropriately also the same.  See, e.g., Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, 
AFL-CIO v. Secretary of Admin., 413 Mass. 377, 384 (1992)  
("Words occurring in different places in the Constitution and 
its amendments ordinarily should be given the same meaning 
unless manifestly used in different senses" [citation omitted]); 
Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 820, 823 (1981) (interpreting 
                                                          
 
 
15 The most recent revisions to the anti-aid amendment 
support this reading.  In 1974, the opening clause of art. 18, 
§ 2 -- which contained broad language against the expenditure of 
public funds, unmodified by the phrase "for the purpose of" -- 
was eliminated, suggesting that under the current amendment an 
investigation into purpose is required.  See Springfield, 382 
Mass. at 679. 
 
24 
word "items" in §§ 3 and 5 of art. 63 of Amendments to have same 
meaning). 
 
Moreover, even if we did not look to our interpretation of 
the first clause for guidance, we could not read the second 
clause as an absolute ban on grants to churches, because the 
second clause by its own terms calls for a case-by-case 
analysis.  The words of the second clause are not:  "No grants 
shall be made to any church."  Rather, the second clause 
prohibits only grants that are made "for the purpose of 
founding, maintaining or aiding any church," and we cannot know 
that every grant to a church will be for that purpose.  The 
categorical prohibition urged by the plaintiffs therefore 
invites the danger of overbreadth -- and of hubris.  We do not 
presume that we have the wisdom or imagination to contemplate 
every possible grant of public funds to a "church, religious 
denomination or society" and be certain that all of them, 
regardless of purpose, effect, or historical context, would be 
barred by the anti-aid amendment. 
 
A categorical prohibition also invites the risk of 
infringing on the free exercise of religion, a right guaranteed 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"); art. 2 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("no subject shall be 
 
25 
hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or 
estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most 
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his 
religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb 
the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious 
worship"); and the anti-aid amendment itself.  See art. 18, § 1, 
as amended by art. 46 ("No law shall be passed prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion"). 
 
This was the risk addressed in Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017) (Trinity 
Lutheran), where a church in Missouri was denied a public grant 
to resurface its playground.  In contrast with the Massachusetts 
anti-aid amendment, the Missouri Constitution imposes a 
categorical prohibition on any grant of public funds "in aid of 
any church, sect[,] or denomination of religion."16  Id.  As a 
result, when a church preschool and day care center applied for 
a grant under a general government program to purchase a new 
playground surface made from recycled tires, the State's 
                                                          
 
 
16  Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution, provides:  
"That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, 
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or 
denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, 
minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference 
shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any 
church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious 
faith or worship."  See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 
Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017) (Trinity Lutheran). 
 
26 
Department of Public Resources rejected its application, based 
on "a strict and express policy of denying grants to any 
applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other 
religious entity."  Id.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the department's policy of excluding a church from a 
government program "solely because it is a church," id. at 2025, 
"imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that must be 
subjected to the 'most rigorous' scrutiny," id. at 2024, quoting 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993).17 
 
We do not interpret the Massachusetts anti-aid amendment to 
impose a categorical ban on the grant of public funds to a 
church "solely because it is a church."  Trinity Lutheran, 137 
S. Ct. at 2025.  Rather, under our three-factor test, whether a 
church can receive such a grant depends on the grant's purpose, 
effect, and the risk that its award might trigger the risks that 
prompted the passage of the anti-aid amendment.  Such an 
                                                          
 
 
17 Chief Justice Roberts sought to limit the reach of the 
Court's opinion by stating in a footnote:  "This case involves 
express discrimination based on religious identity with respect 
to playground surfacing.  We do not address religious uses of 
funding or other forms of discrimination."  Trinity Lutheran, 
137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3.  Because two Justices joined the opinion 
except as to that footnote and one Justice concurred only in the 
judgment, the footnote failed to command a majority of the 
Court.  Id. at 2017.  See id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part); id. at 2025-2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part); id. 
at 2026-2027 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
27 
analysis would surely not bar the grant of public funds to a 
church preschool to provide a safer surface for its playground.  
Cf. Essex, 387 Mass. at 333-334 (State funding to provide 
transportation to students attending private schools did not 
violate anti-aid amendment because it was "a general program to 
help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, 
safely . . . to and from . . . schools" [citation omitted]).18 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the judge did not err in 
declining to interpret the second clause of the anti-aid 
amendment as a categorical prohibition on the grant of public 
funds to churches. 
 
3.  Application of the three-factor test.  The plaintiffs 
contend that, even if the constitutionality of the grant should 
be determined under the three-factor test, the judge erred as a 
matter of law in her application of that test.  We agree, and 
discern two distinct errors of law. 
                                                          
 
 
18 Despite our refusal to interpret the anti-aid amendment 
as a categorical ban on grants to churches, the dissent warns 
that our decision raises potential issues under the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment.  See post at    .  We disagree.  
"'[R]igorous' scrutiny" is required under the free exercise 
clause where a State policy "expressly requires [an applicant 
for public funds] to renounce its religious character in order 
to participate in an otherwise generally available public 
benefit program" (emphasis added; citation omitted).  Trinity 
Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.  As we will make clear, our three-
factor analysis under the anti-aid amendment imposes no such 
requirement.  The fact that an applicant is an active church is 
a relevant but by no means disqualifying consideration under our 
anti-aid amendment. 
 
28 
 
First, in determining whether the grants at issue would 
violate the anti-aid amendment, the judge focused primarily on 
the constitutionality of the act itself rather than on the 
constitutionality of the award of the two grants at issue.19  
Analysis of the act's constitutionality would have been 
appropriate if the act itself authorized the appropriation of 
public funds to a church or other private institution within the 
scope of the anti-aid amendment.  See, e.g., Helmes, 406 Mass. 
at 875, 877-878 (applying three-factor test to statute 
authorizing expenditure of public funds for repair of World War 
II battleship under control of charitable corporation); 
Springfield, 382 Mass. at 668, 675-683 (applying three-factor 
test to statute authorizing school committees to contract with 
private schools to provide special needs education where public 
schools could not meet special needs).20 
                                                          
 
 
19  The judge stated, "This court is directed to examine the 
purpose of the [act], under which the challenged grants are to 
be conferred upon the [c]hurch[] . . . ."  She found that "the 
purpose of the grants to the [c]hurch[] under the [act] is to 
preserve historic resources, and not to aid the [c]hurch[]." 
 
 
20 The statute at issue in Springfield was G. L. c. 71B, 
which authorizes school committees to enter into contracts with 
private schools, agencies, or institutions to provide special 
education to children whose needs cannot be met in the public 
school system.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 668.  The Commonwealth 
sued the Springfield school committee, seeking to compel the 
school committee to enter into such contracts; in response, the 
school committee contended that any such contracts would violate 
art. 18, as amended by arts. 46 and 103, thus placing the 
 
 
29 
 
Here, however, the act simply establishes a procedure for 
municipalities to make discretionary grants to projects relating 
to open space, historic resources, and community housing.  See 
G. L. c. 44B, §§ 5, 7.  Nothing in the act itself specifically 
authorizes the expenditure of funds to assist churches or 
religious institutions. 
 
For this reason, the constitutionality of the act itself 
was not challenged by the plaintiffs, and is not at issue in 
this case.  What was challenged, and is at issue, is the 
constitutionality of specific discretionary grants made pursuant 
to the act.  Therefore, "the familiar principle of statutory 
construction that affords a statute a presumption of 
constitutionality validity," Springfield, 382 Mass. at 674, does 
not apply to the constitutional analysis of these grants, and 
the judge erred in applying that presumption.  The grants 
themselves enjoy no such presumption of constitutionality. 
 
Second, the judge's focus on the constitutionality of the 
act rather than of the grants also rendered erroneous her 
analysis of the first and third factors.21  As to the first 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
constitutionality of the statute at issue.  Springfield, supra 
at 666. 
 
 
21 The judge did not make a finding regarding the second 
factor of the Springfield test -- that is, whether the grants 
would "substantially aid" the church.  See Springfield, 382 
Mass. at 675. 
 
30 
factor, the judge relied on the language of the test as it was 
applied to the statutes at issue in Springfield and Helmes, and 
therefore considered whether the legislative purpose of the act 
was to aid churches.  The judge instead should have considered 
whether the primary purpose of the committee in recommending the 
grants was to aid this particular church rather than to serve 
the proper purpose of historic preservation. 
 
Accordingly, we now apply the three-factor test to the 
proposed grants themselves.  On this record, we conclude that 
the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their 
claim with respect to the stained glass grant, but that further 
discovery is needed to evaluate their claim as to the Master 
Plan grant. 
 
a.  Purpose.  The first factor to be considered is whether 
the proposed grants are "for the purpose of founding, 
maintaining or aiding [a] church."  Art. 18, § 2, as amended by 
arts. 46 and 103.  In ascertaining the purpose of a challenged 
grant, our cases concerning aid to private schools are 
instructive.  In Springfield, 382 Mass. at 678, we upheld the 
constitutionality of a statute that funded special education 
programs in private schools for children whose needs could not 
adequately be met in public schools, finding that its "primary 
purpose" was "to benefit public schools and individual 
children."  We saw no evidence of any "hidden legislative 
 
31 
purpose" to aid the private schools themselves.  Id. at 677.  
See Essex, 387 Mass. at 331 (statute authorizing provision of 
transportation to private school students held constitutional 
based on "avowed purpose" to benefit children and lack of any 
"hidden purpose to maintain private schools").  In contrast, in 
Bloom, 376 Mass. at 42, we declared unconstitutional a statute 
requiring public school committees to lend textbooks to children 
attending private schools because we could infer from this 
statutory scheme no other purpose than to aid private schools 
"in carrying out their essential function."  We determined that 
it made no difference under the anti-aid amendment that the 
textbooks were to be lent to the students rather than to the 
private schools they attended.  Id. at 47.  What mattered was 
that the statute made use of public money or property for the 
purpose of "maintaining or aiding" the private schools.  Id. at 
42. 
 
Here, historic preservation is the stated purpose of the 
committee in awarding these grants to the church.  That stated 
purpose is consistent with the town's decision to make the 
grants contingent on a historic preservation restriction in the 
three buildings.  Such a restriction would limit the church's 
ability to make changes to the buildings in the future, thereby 
ensuring that the historic value of those buildings is not 
diminished over time.  Thus, the plaintiffs' burden under the 
 
32 
first factor is to demonstrate a "hidden . . . purpose" to aid 
this particular church.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 677.22 
 
We conclude that the record before us is insufficient to 
determine whether such a hidden purpose existed.  The plaintiffs 
here sought to depose a person, to be designated by the town 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 (b) (6), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001), to testify regarding the town's "[c]onsideration 
and approval of the applications for the [c]hurch [g]rants," and 
the communications among town officials, employees, and 
committee members regarding the applications, but the judge 
denied the plaintiffs this discovery for purposes of the motion 
                                                          
 
 
22 We recognize that the decision to award a grant of public 
funds, like other kinds of decisions, can have more than one 
motivating purpose.  See, e.g., Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 666 
(2000), overruled on another ground by Stonehill College v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549 
(2004) (recognizing that certain employment discrimination cases 
are "mixed-motive" cases where discriminatory motive is one of 
several factors motivating employer's decision).  Although in 
Springfield, 382 Mass. at 678, we focused on "the primary 
purpose" (emphasis added) of the challenged aid, we later 
acknowledged, in Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1201, 1208 
(1987), that public aid may have more than one motivating 
purpose (aiding private schools was "one of the primary purposes 
. . . if not [the] only purpose" of challenged statute).  In 
such cases, the inquiry becomes whether one of those motivating 
purposes is impermissible under the anti-aid amendment.  We 
stress, however, that the purpose of a challenged grant is only 
one factor to be considered in our three-factor test, and need 
not be dispositive by itself.  Thus, whether an impermissible 
purpose is the sole motivating purpose behind the grant, or only 
one purpose among many, may be considered in determining the 
weight to accord that factor. 
 
33 
for preliminary injunction when she granted the town's motion 
for a protective order.  Where the anti-aid amendment itself 
focuses on the "purpose" of a grant to a church, and where the 
first factor to be considered under our test is the purpose of 
the grant, a plaintiff is entitled to reasonable discovery to 
ascertain whether there is a hidden purpose that motivated the 
issuance of the grant.  Discovery, however, should not be any 
broader or any more intrusive than it needs to be.  For the 
purpose of ascertaining the purpose of the grants, discovery 
should be limited to the testimony of the rule 30 (b) (6) 
witness and writings reflecting the oral and written 
communications regarding the committee's decision-making process 
in recommending the grants; there is no need in this case to 
probe the private intentions of town meeting members.  We leave 
it to the judge in her discretion to determine more precisely 
the appropriate scope of discovery. 
 
b.  Substantial aid.  The second factor to be considered is 
whether the effect of the grants is to substantially aid a 
church.  Our precedents make clear that a grant of public funds 
does not violate the anti-aid amendment if the assistance it 
provides to a private institution is merely "minimal," Essex, 
387 Mass. at 332, or "remote," Bloom, 376 Mass. at 47.  The aid 
must provide "substantial assistance" to the church to risk 
violation of the anti-aid amendment.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 
 
34 
680.  In evaluating this factor, we look to both the amount of 
aid provided and "the degree to which the aid assists [the 
church] in carrying out [its] essential function."  Opinion of 
the Justices, 401 Mass. at 1208. 
 
In particular, we have focused on whether the aid that is 
provided contains certain "limiting features" designed to 
restrict its effect.  Id. at 1207.  In Springfield, we approved 
the funding of the special education programs with the important 
limitation that there would be no reimbursement for children 
whose parents had unilaterally enrolled them in private school; 
public funding was strictly limited to expenses that the private 
schools would not otherwise have incurred.  See Springfield, 382 
Mass. at 677.  This limiting feature worked to cabin the effect 
of the public funding, guaranteeing that it would not "aid the 
private school[s] in carrying out [their] essential function."  
Id. at 681. 
 
We see no such guarantee here.  As an initial matter, we 
note that the proposed grants are "neither minimal nor 
insignificant" in amount.  Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. at 
1208.  The total cost of the comprehensive assessment 
contemplated under the Master Plan will be $55,000, to which the 
Master Plan grant will contribute $49,500, while the total cost 
of restoring the stained glass windows will be $56,930, to which 
the stained glass grant will contribute $51,237. 
 
35 
 
 More worrisome is the extent to which these grants will 
assist the church in its "essential enterprise" as an active 
house of worship.  Bloom, 376 Mass. at 47.  The church was 
candid in its grant applications, explaining that -- faced with 
declining membership and contributions -- it would need the 
town's "help" in order to preserve its buildings while also 
"offering the congregation what draws them to their church."  
This is not a case like in Springfield, where it was possible to 
limit the public funding to a narrow, specific purpose.  The 
reimbursement there was for expenses that the schools would not 
otherwise have incurred; it did nothing to "lessen[] the 
financial burden" of the schools or those who chose to attend 
those schools.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 683.  Here, in 
contrast, the grants would help defray planning and restoration 
costs that the church would otherwise have to shoulder on its 
own, allowing the money saved to be used to support its core 
religious activities.  As the church indicated in its grant 
applications, budgetary constraints have led it to make 
difficult choices between "capital improvement projects" on the 
one hand and "programs and personnel" on the other.  These 
grants would allow the church to have both, in effect 
"underwrit[ing]" its essential function as an active house of 
worship.  Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. at 1209. 
 
36 
 
On this record, we therefore conclude that the effect of 
these grants is to substantially aid the church. 
 
c.  Risks.  The third and last factor that must be 
considered is whether the grants avoid the risks that prompted 
the passage of the anti-aid amendment.  In evaluating the third 
factor, the judge erred in focusing on whether there was 
"credible evidence that the grants under the [act] are 
economically or politically abusive or unfair," and, finding no 
such evidence, concluding that there was "no political or 
economic abuse which the anti-aid amendment was enacted to 
prevent."  Instead, the judge should have focused on whether the 
grants to the church avoid the risks of the political and 
economic abuses that "prompted the passage" of the anti-aid 
amendment.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 675. 
 
We recognize that our articulation of this third factor in 
prior cases has provided less than clear guidance.  The third 
factor, as first set forth in Springfield, focused on "whether 
the [grant] avoids the political and economic abuses which 
prompted the passage of [the anti-aid amendment]."  Id.  But in 
Springfield, we did not provide the historical background that 
identified these "political and economic abuses," and therefore 
failed to recognize, as we do here, that the amendment was 
proposed in 1853 not to abolish an existing practice of funding 
religious institutions -- no one at the Convention alleged the 
 
37 
existence of such a practice -- but instead as a preemptive 
measure to avoid the risks associated with the public financial 
support of religious institutions.  These risks, as we noted in 
Bloom, 376 Mass. at 39, also prompted the revision of the anti-
aid amendment in 1917, and are worth repeating here:  first, the 
risk that "liberty of conscience" would be infringed "whenever a 
citizen was taxed to support the religious institutions of 
others"; second, the risk that public funding would result in 
improper government entanglement with religion, undermining the 
"independence and dignity" of churches; and third, the risk that 
the public support of religious institutions would threaten 
"civic harmony," making the divisive "question of religion" a 
political question.  Id. 
 
In Helmes, 406 Mass. at 878, our most recent case applying 
the three-factor test, we redefined the third factor in light of 
the circumstances of that case to consider "whether there is any 
use of public money that aids a charitable undertaking in a way 
that is abusive or unfair, economically or politically."  
Because nothing in the record indicated any such abuse or 
unfairness, we concluded that the appropriation was 
constitutional; there was no evidence that any private person 
would benefit from it, that the funds would be distributed to a 
noncharitable use, or that its charitable objective -- 
preserving a World War II battleship and educating the public -- 
 
38 
was not generally accepted.  Id. at 877-878.  We did not 
consider in Helmes whether the appropriation of funds presented 
any of the risks that the framers of the anti-aid amendment 
sought to avoid, perhaps because it was so clear that these 
risks were not presented where the challenged funding was for 
the repair of a memorial battleship. 
 
Here, where the grant of public funds is for the renovation 
of an active house of worship, it is imperative, in considering 
the third factor, to focus on whether these specific grants 
avoid the risks of the political and economic abuses that 
"prompted the passage" of the anti-aid amendment, which we 
identified in Bloom and have described in this opinion.  On the 
record before us, we conclude that these risks are significant. 
 
First, these grants risk infringing on taxpayers' liberty 
of conscience -- a risk that was specifically contemplated by 
the framers of the anti-aid amendment.  As one delegate to the 
Convention of 1917 stated, "Religious liberty [requires] that 
. . . the State cannot compel a man to pay his good money in 
taxation for the support of a religion, or of the schools and 
institutions of a religion, in which he does not believe."  
Debates of 1917-1918, supra at 77.  The self-described mission 
of the church here is "to preach and teach the good news of the 
salvation that was secured . . . through the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus."  The proposed grants would be used to 
 
39 
renovate the main church building, where the church conducts its 
worship services, and its stained glass windows, which feature 
explicit religious imagery and language.  For town residents who 
do not subscribe to the church's beliefs, the grants present a 
risk that their liberty of conscience will be infringed, 
especially where their tax dollars are spent to preserve the 
church's worship space and its stained glass windows. 
 
Second, these grants also present a risk of government 
entanglement with religion.  See Bloom, 376 Mass. at 39, 47.  To 
ensure that the grants are used for historic preservation, the 
town has imposed on the church the condition that it execute a 
historic preservation restriction, which -- if the restrictions 
accompanying the town's prior grants under the act are any 
indication -- would significantly limit the church's ability to 
make future alterations to its buildings, including its worship 
space and its stained glass windows, without the town's 
approval.23  We have held in other contexts that where the State 
exercises control over the design features of a church, it 
infringes on the free exercise of religion guaranteed under the 
                                                          
 
 
23 The record in this case includes two historic 
preservation restrictions executed in relation to past grants 
that the town has awarded under the act.  These restrictions 
prohibit the owners from, inter alia, making changes to the 
exterior of their properties "without the prior express written 
approval of the [t]own," which can be "withheld or conditioned 
in the [t]own's sole and absolute discretion." 
 
40 
Massachusetts Constitution.  In The Society of Jesus of New 
England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 409 Mass. 38, 42 (1990) 
(Society of Jesus), we concluded that the designation of a 
church interior as a landmark, thereby making all renovations 
subject to government approval, infringed on "the right freely 
to design interior spaces for religious worship," in violation 
of art. 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The 
historic preservation restriction contemplated here presents a 
comparable risk of "intrusion . . . , reaching into the church's 
actual worship space."  Id. 
 
The town contends that these grants would result in no such 
intrusion, and are distinguishable from the landmark designation 
in Society of Jesus, because they relate only to the exterior of 
the church's buildings.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 40C, § 7 ("The 
[historic district] commission shall not consider interior 
arrangements or architectural features not subject to public 
view").  In Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 39 n.2, we expressly 
did not decide whether a landmark designation of a church 
exterior would also infringe on the free exercise of religion.  
We need not decide that issue here because, even if we were to 
recognize the distinction between the interior and exterior of a 
church and conclude that restrictions on the renovation of a 
church exterior would not burden the free exercise of religion, 
 
41 
such restrictions would still pose a risk of government 
entanglement in religious matters. 
 
In Society of Jesus, we reasoned that "[t]he configuration 
of the church interior is so freighted with religious meaning 
that it must be considered part and parcel of . . . religious 
worship."  Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 42.  Since then we 
have recognized that the exterior features of a religious 
structure can also be expressive of religious beliefs.  In 
Martin v. The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 142 (2001), 
we held that a church steeple should be exempted from local 
height restrictions as a "religious" use of land, noting that 
"churches have long built steeples to 'express elevation toward 
the infinite'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 152.  See P. Tillich, 
On Art and Architecture 212 (1989) ("the one great symbol of the 
church building is the building itself").  We warned, "It is not 
for judges to determine whether the inclusion of a particular 
architectural feature is 'necessary' for a particular religion," 
Martin, supra at 150, or "to determine what is or is not a 
matter of religious doctrine."  Id. at 152.  The Master Plan 
grant at issue here contemplates a comprehensive assessment of 
the entire church building, which would include elements both 
exterior and interior; it is not for judges or, for that matter, 
a community preservation committee to determine whether this 
 
42 
assessment will affect elements that touch on matters of 
religious doctrine. 
 
The stained glass window is illustrative of the fragility 
of the interior-exterior distinction, and of the extent to which 
historic preservation of the building is interwoven with 
religious doctrine.  Although it is an "exterior" feature, in 
that it is open to public view, see G. L. c. 40C, § 5, its 
inclusion in a church building is as much a religious choice as 
an aesthetic one -- especially where, as here, the windows have 
an expressly religious message.  See V.C. Raguin, Stained Glass, 
From its Origins to the Present, 10-13 (2003). 
 
Third, the challenged grants also risk threatening "civic 
harmony," by making the "question of religion" a political one.  
Bloom, 376 Mass. at 39.  As centuries of experience have shown, 
government support of churches has always and inevitably been a 
politically divisive issue in Massachusetts.  Although the act 
provides for a rigorous process for the allocation of funds, the 
decision to award a grant lies with the committee and, 
ultimately, with the town meeting members.  Those who first 
proposed the anti-aid amendment in 1853 were wary of throwing "a 
firebrand into . . . town meetings."  Debates of 1853, supra at 
624.  Grants for the renovation of churches -- using funds that 
could potentially have been dedicated to open space, soccer 
fields, low-income housing, or other historic preservation 
 
43 
projects, including projects for the renovation of houses of 
worship of other religious denominations -- pose an inevitable 
risk of making "the irritating question of religion" a 
politically divisive one in a community, the more so where those 
grants are for the renovation of a worship space or of a stained 
glass window with explicit religious imagery.  Bloom, supra at 
39. 
 
We do not suggest that fair consideration of the risks that 
prompted the passage of the anti-aid amendment means that every 
historic preservation grant for a church building will be 
unconstitutional.  We only caution that any such grant to an 
active church warrants careful scrutiny under the three-factor 
Springfield test.  The third factor is by no means a dispositive 
factor, only an important one.  Indeed, we can imagine various 
circumstances where such grants would survive careful scrutiny, 
including, for instance, where historical events of great 
significance occurred in the church, or where the grants are 
limited to preserving church property with a primarily secular 
purpose.  Cf. Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. v. Board of 
Assessors of Attleboro, 476 Mass. 690, 700-702 (2017) (shrine 
property leased for battered women's shelter and used as 
wildlife sanctuary not subject to religious worship exemption, 
because "dominant purpose" not connected to religious worship 
 
44 
and instruction).  The use of public funds for such preservation 
efforts poses little risk of political division.24 
 
In this case, having weighed and balanced the three 
factors, we conclude that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed 
on the merits of their claim with respect to the stained glass 
grant.  Although the record before us does not allow us to 
                                                          
 
 
24 The dissent takes issue with the emphasis that we place 
on the third factor in cases like these, where the public grant 
is to an active church.  The dissent contends that our analysis 
is inconsistent with this court's anti-aid amendment cases, 
relying on our statement, first made in Bloom, 376 Mass. at 45, 
that "[o]ur anti-aid amendment marks no difference between 
'aids,' whether religious or secular" (citation omitted). See 
post at    .  But the dissent takes this statement out of 
context.  What we meant in Bloom (and in the other cases the 
dissent cites) was that, unlike the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment, which requires an inquiry into whether the aid 
has a religious or secular purpose, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612 (1971), our anti-aid amendment does not make that 
distinction.  See Bloom, 376 Mass. at 45 & n.20.  See also 
Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1201, 1203 n.4 (1987); 
Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 332 n.3 
(1982); Springfield, 382 Mass. at 674 n.14.  The only purpose 
that is forbidden under the anti-aid amendment is "the purpose 
of founding, maintaining or aiding" a private institution.  Art. 
18, § 2, as amended by arts. 46 and 103.  Thus, in Bloom, 376 
Mass. at 45, it did not matter whether the textbooks that were 
lent were of a religious or secular nature; what mattered was 
that the purpose of the loan was to aid private schools.  See 
id. at 41-42.  This does not mean that we do not distinguish 
between different kinds of "aids" in evaluating whether that aid 
poses the risks that prompted the anti-aid amendment; after all, 
aid to support a church poses risks quite different from those 
arising from aid to support a World War II battleship.  Cf. 
Helmes, 406 Mass. at 873.  We reiterate that the anti-aid 
amendment is not a categorical ban on aid to churches.  However, 
the fact that a grant recipient is an active church is relevant 
to our analysis of the potential risks under the third factor, 
to which we cannot (and need not) be blind. 
 
45 
ascertain whether there is a motivating purpose behind this 
grant other than historic preservation, its effect is to 
substantially aid the church in its essential function and, 
given the explicit religious imagery of the stained glass, it 
fails to avoid the very risks that the framers of the anti-aid 
amendment hoped to avoid.  Thus, even if further discovery were 
to reveal that the sole motivating purpose of this grant was in 
fact to preserve historic resources, and not to aid this 
particular church, the other factors in our analysis -- 
especially the third factor, to which we accord special weight -
- still compel the conclusion that the stained glass grant runs 
afoul of the anti-aid amendment.  Because the plaintiffs are 
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, and a 
preliminary injunction would "promote[] the public interest" 
reflected in the anti-aid amendment, LeClair, 430 Mass. at 332, 
the plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction barring 
the disbursement of the stained glass grant. 
 
With respect to the Master Plan grant, we conclude that 
further discovery is needed before a determination should be 
made as to whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the 
merits of their claim.  This is in part because, unlike the 
stained glass grant, the Master Plan grant is far broader in its 
scope, including not only plans for the renovation of worship 
space but also plans for the renovation of the Fletcher and 
 
46 
Hosmer Houses, which are both private residences.  Accordingly, 
analysis of the grant under the third factor must be more fact-
intensive; restoration of the main church building will 
implicate risks different from those arising from the 
restoration of the adjoining residences.  And where the analysis 
of the third factor is more complex, and the potential judicial 
options more diverse,25 the discovery that might shed light on 
whether there was a hidden purpose apart from historic 
preservation becomes more important to the over-all decision. 
 
We therefore remand the issue to the Superior Court for a 
determination whether the Master Plan grant, in full or in part, 
should survive the careful scrutiny required under the third 
factor.  Such a determination should not be made until the 
plaintiffs have had reasonable discovery regarding the purpose 
of the committee in awarding this grant.  We reiterate that the 
scope of such discovery should be limited at this time to the 
testimony of the rule 30 (b) (6) witness and writings reflecting 
the oral and written communications regarding the committee's 
decision-making process in recommending the grants and that 
there is no need to probe the private intentions of town meeting 
                                                          
 
25 For example, the judge may deny the preliminary 
injunction as to the part of the Master Plan grant allocated to 
the renovation of the Fletcher and Hosmer Houses, and allow it 
as to the part allocated to the renovation of the church's 
worship space. 
 
47 
members.  We leave it to the judge to determine more precisely 
its appropriate scope. 
 
Conclusion.  The orders denying the plaintiffs' motion for 
a preliminary injunction and granting the town's motion for a 
protective order to stay discovery are vacated.  The case is 
remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order allowing 
the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction barring 
disbursement of the stained glass grant and, as to the Master 
Plan grant, for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J. (concurring, with whom Gaziano, J., joins).  I 
write separately to emphasize that our analysis of the anti-aid 
amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution is tightly 
constrained by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  The grants at issue here are provided 
pursuant to a generally available public benefit program 
designed to promote community conservation including the 
protection of the Commonwealth's historic buildings.  The United 
States Supreme Court has warned that only a very narrow category 
of exclusions are allowed by the free exercise clause from such 
generally available public benefit programs.  Because I believe 
the preliminary injunction against the stained glass grant is 
consistent with this very narrow permitted exclusion, and the 
Master Plan grant requires further analysis to decide both the 
anti-aid and First Amendment questions, I concur in the judgment 
of the court. 
 
1.  The First Amendment background to this case.  Today's 
decision takes us into one of the most confusing and contested 
areas of State and Federal constitutional law.  The United 
States Supreme Court has emphasized that there is a "tension" 
between the religion clauses of the United States Constitution -
- that is, what is prohibited by the establishment clause and 
what is required by the free exercise clause of the First 
 
 
2 
Amendment.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).  The 
Court has also stated that there is "play in the joints" between 
the dictates of the two religion provisions in the United States 
Constitution -- allowing limited State action therein -- without 
defining precisely how much play.  See Trinity Lutheran Church 
of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017) 
(Trinity Lutheran).  The Supreme Court's jurisprudence also has 
been continually evolving, particularly in its definition of the 
neutrality the two first amendment provisions requires in regard 
to religion.1 
All of this is further complicated by State constitutional 
anti-aid provisions providing greater protections against the 
establishment of religion than the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment.  These State constitutional anti-aid provisions 
                                                          
 
1 The evolution was summarized by Justice Souter in Mitchell 
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 882-883 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting): 
 
"In sum, 'neutrality' originally entered this field of 
jurisprudence as a conclusory term, a label for the 
required relationship between the government and religion 
as a state of equipoise between government as ally and 
government as adversary.  Reexamining Everson [v. Board of 
Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947),]'s paradigm cases to 
derive a prescriptive guideline, we first determined that 
'neutral' aid was secular, nonideological, or unrelated to 
religious education.  Our subsequent reexamination of 
[multiple Supreme Court cases] . . . recast neutrality as a 
concept of 'evenhandedness.'" 
 
Evenhandedness in this context means an evenhanded treatment of 
religious and nonreligious institutions. 
 
 
3 
present additional legal constraints, and State grants are 
permissible only if they do not run afoul of the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment. 
There is no clear path yet through this difficult 
intersection of the religion clauses of the State and Federal 
Constitutions.  Most instructive, for our purposes, however, are 
the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements in Trinity 
Lutheran and Locke.  These two cases analyzed grants arising 
from generally available public benefit programs, like the one 
before us.  See Trinity Lutheran, supra at 2017; Locke, supra at 
715.  Both cases involved exclusions required by anti-aid 
provisions in State Constitutions.  See Trinity Lutheran, supra 
at 2017 (Missouri Constitution, art. 1, § 7); Locke, supra at 
722 (Washington Constitution, art. 1, § 11). 
In Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025, the Supreme Court 
held that the exclusion of a church school and day care facility 
from a generally available public benefit program funding rubber 
playground surfaces "solely" on account of a church's religious 
identity violated the free exercise clause.  The Court held that 
it had "repeatedly confirmed" that it will not approve such 
exclusions, giving as an example its 1947 decision upholding 
against Federal establishment clause challenges a New Jersey law 
allowing a local school district to pay for public, private, and 
 
 
4 
parochial school transportation costs.  Id. at 2019-2020, citing 
Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
In Locke, however, the Supreme Court held that a State 
anti-aid amendment exclusion of scholarships to pursue degrees 
in devotional theology from an otherwise inclusive student aid 
program did not violate the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.  Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.  In so holding, the Court 
stressed that it could "think of few areas in which a State's 
antiestablishment interests come more into play" than using 
"taxpayer funds to support church leaders."  Id. at 722. "The 
claimant in Locke sought funding for an 'essentially religious 
endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling.'"  Trinity Lutheran, 
137 S. Ct. at 2023, quoting Locke, supra at 721-722.  To 
contrast, the Court in Trinity Lutheran stated, "nothing of the 
sort can be said about a program to use recycled tires to 
resurface playgrounds."  Trinity Lutheran, supra.  In his 
concurrence in Trinity Lutheran, Justice Breyer also emphasized 
that he would "find relevant, and would emphasize, the 
particular nature of the 'public benefit' . . . at issue."  Id. 
at 2026 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 
Together, Trinity Lutheran and Locke define a very narrow 
category of exclusions from generally available public benefit 
programs that can be required by State anti-aid amendments 
without violating the free exercise clause of the First 
 
 
5 
Amendment.  To be excluded from a generally available public 
benefit program, the funding must be sought for an "essentially 
religious endeavor" raising important state constitutional 
antiestablishment concerns.  Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 
2023, quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 721-722.  With these 
overarching First Amendment principles in mind, I turn to the 
grants at issue, and art. 18 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by arts. 46 and 103 of 
the Amendments, the anti-aid amendment. 
 
2.  The Community Preservation Act grant and the anti-aid 
amendment.  As explained by the court, the town of Acton (town) 
is one of 172 municipalities in Massachusetts that have adopted 
the Community Preservation Act (act), which establishes 
processes and procedures for funding projects related to open 
space, historic resources, and community housing.  See ante at    
.   Here, the church's "Evangelical Church Stained Glass Window 
Preservation" application initially requested $41,000 from the 
town's Community Preservation Committee (committee) to repair 
the church's stained glass windows.  Eventually $51,237 was 
awarded for the windows.  The proposed repairs included a three-
foot, six-inch by ten-foot, six-inch "Christ window" depicting 
Jesus with a woman kneeling and praying, altar windows, and a 
window containing a cross and the hymnal phrase "Rock of Ages 
 
 
6 
Cleft for Me."2  The church was requesting that the town pay for 
ninety per cent of the costs.  The stained glass windows were 
"installed in memorial to honor prominent members of the church" 
in 1898. 
 
The church also sought $49,500 to hire an architect to do a 
structural review and prepare a master plan for historic 
preservation of the church, and two neighboring buildings owned 
by the church, the John Fletcher House and the Abner Hosmer 
House.  The church was again requesting that the town pay ninety 
per cent of the costs.  The main church dates back to 1846 with 
a renovation in 1898.  The houses were built circa 1855 and 
1846.  The grant was sought to "hire an architectural consultant 
to thoroughly investigate each of the [three] historic buildings 
to identify all the needs of each building in order to protect 
and preserve these historic assets for future generations."  For 
the church itself, this would include "a thorough assessment of 
the [c]hurch building envelope, including windows, doors, 
siding, roof, chimney, bell tower, skylights, and fire escapes, 
with a focus on protecting the building from the elements."  
                                                          
 
2 The windows are described as a "treasure, yet they are in 
need of care.  The exterior plexiglass is no longer doing its 
job.  Not only is it cloudy, so that the beauty of the glass 
cannot be appreciated outside of the church, but it is no longer 
weathertight. . . . The proposed work would remove the old 
plastic covers, repair the existing wood damage, replace missing 
or broken pieces . . . to stabilize and protect the eight 
primary stained glass windows." 
 
 
7 
Similarly, "the rental houses will be evaluated for the building 
envelope, mechanical, electrical and plumbing systems, and 
safety systems.  This work will focus on building structural 
integrity."  The grant was requested because "each [of the 
buildings] shows the signs of 170+ years of wear." 
 
In its application for both grants, the church explained 
that "mainstream churches have not been growing for years, and 
the financial strain is significant . . . we have had to cut 
programs and personnel.  The cuts can further exacerbate the 
financial problem[s] by not offering the congregation what draws 
them to their church." 
Pursuant to the requirements of the act, the committee held 
a public hearing and voted unanimously to recommend the grants.  
The town meeting approved both grants.  The annual town meeting 
warrant explained that the church and the other two buildings 
were located in the Acton Centre Historic District.  The warrant 
explained that the "work will protect the stained glass windows, 
an integral part of the church's historical significance."  The 
warrant also explained that the master plan would evaluate and 
identify critical needs and set restoration and rehabilitation 
priorities to preserve the three historic buildings.  It also 
stated that the "preservation project must comply with the 
Standards for Rehabilitation stated in the United States 
Secretary of the Interior's Standards for the Treatment of 
 
 
8 
Historic Properties codified in 36 C.F.R. Part 68."  Historic 
preservation restrictions were imposed on the buildings with the 
restriction being "perpetual to the extent permitted by law."  
The plaintiffs, who are town taxpayers, challenged the grants, 
claiming they violate the anti-aid amendment. 
 
3.  Application of the anti-aid amendment and the First 
Amendment to the stained glass grant.  I agree with the court 
that the three factor anti-aid amendment analysis set forth in 
Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 675 
(1981) (Springfield), applies, including where the grant is 
being given to a church as well as a nonreligious private 
charity.  I also agree that a categorical ban would violate the 
First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. 
In analyzing the first factor, I conclude that we must 
consider the purpose of both the statute and the grant.  This is 
necessitated, in part, by the Supreme Court's First Amendment 
jurisprudence and its focus on whether the grant is authorized 
pursuant to a generally available public benefit program.  Here, 
the purpose of the statute itself is unquestionably to provide 
generally available public benefits for the purpose of 
conservation, including historic preservation.  There is no 
suggestion or argument that an "examination of the statutory 
scheme . . . [will reveal] any 'technique of circumvention'" 
designed to avoid the requirements of the anti-aid amendment.  
 
 
9 
Springfield, 382 Mass. at 677, quoting Bloom v. School Comm. of 
Springfield, 376 Mass 35, 47 (1978).  See Bloom, supra at 44 
("[W]e note, first, that the Supreme Court has been regularly 
unreceptive to schemes of circumvention which resemble that 
attempted by the present legislation").  Indeed the statute is 
straightforward and serves important conservation purposes as 
eloquently explained by the dissent.  See post at    . 
The court, however, draws a distinction between the 
purposes of the statute and those of the grants, and emphasizes 
that we must probe further to discern the primary or motivating 
purposes of the grantors as well as any hidden purposes, and 
this additional inquiry requires a remand for the Master Plan 
grant.  See ante at    .  At least for a determination whether a 
preliminary injunction should issue regarding the stained glass 
grant, I conclude that we have a sufficient record that 
conservation is the primary purpose of the grants.  I do not 
detect any indicia of a scheme or technique of circumvention.  
The purpose, as reflected in the town warrant, appear to be 
described straightforwardly and factually. 
In my opinion, the most complicated aspect of the purpose 
inquiry is not discerning the subjective intentions of the 
grantors but the difficulty of separating conservation from 
religious purposes when the grant is being given to preserve a 
religious component of a church building.  Even if the purpose 
 
 
10 
of the grantors is conservation, and not the promotion of 
religion, it is obvious to anyone voting on the grants that both 
purposes would be served.  I think that is particularly true for 
the stained glass grant where the windows convey an express 
sectarian religious message.3  Ultimately, however, the purpose 
                                                          
 
3 Unlike in the stained glass grant, there are other grants 
to churches where the secular and religious purposes may be more 
easily separable.  The Old North Church, located in the North 
End neighborhood of Boston, is a good example.  Funding the 
repair and restoration of glass windows are at issue for both 
houses of worship, but any similarity ends there.  In 2002, the 
Old North Foundation applied for, and later received, a Save 
America's Treasure grant to preserve, among other things, the 
Old North Church's historic window.   See Authority of the 
Department of the Interior to Provide Historic Preservation 
Grants to Historic Religious Properties Such as the Old North 
Church, 27 Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel for 2003, 
United States Department of Justice, 91, 96, 99 (2013) (Old 
North Church opinion), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/477026 
/download [https://perma.cc/XUT2-L54E]. Famously, in the Old 
North Church's steeple hung two lit lanterns to indicate that 
the British army was leaving Boston by boat to capture the 
stores of arms and ammunition located in Concord.  See 
http://oldnorth.com/historic-site/the-events-of-april-18-1775/ 
[https://perma.cc/9AGF-KL9Z].  See also H.W. Longfellow, Paul 
Revere's Ride (1860) ("He said to his friend, -- 'If the British 
march By land or sea from the town to-night, Hang a lantern 
aloft in the belfry-arch Of the North-Church-tower, as a signal-
light, -- One if by land, and two if by sea; And I on the 
opposite shore will be'"). 
 
For the grant to the Old North Church, the historical 
purpose is manifestly evident and is described by the National 
Park Service as "one of America's most cherished landmarks."  
Old North Church opinion at 97.  The Old North Church windows 
also contained no overt religious message as do the stained 
glass windows in the town of Acton.  Furthermore, for the Old 
North Church, rigorous auditing requirements were also in place 
to ensure that the grant funded only the historic aspects of the 
 
 
 
11 
inquiry is just one factor in a multifactor test and it is meant 
to be instructive, not dispositive.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 
675.  I find the other two factors, particularly the third, 
conclusive of the anti-aid amendment analysis and critical to 
the First Amendment interpretation as well. 
 
The second prong of the anti-aid test analyzes whether the 
grants substantially assist religion.  The stained glass grant 
is "neither minimal nor insignificant" to the church.  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1201, 1208 (1987).  
Approximately $50,000 is being provided and the town is funding 
ninety per cent of the total cost.  Without the assistance of 
the committee's grants, the church indicated that the financial 
strain and required cuts could "exacerbate the financial 
problem[s] by not offering the congregation what draws them to 
their church."4 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
church and not its religious endeavors.  Old North Church 
opinion at 103. 
 
 
4 The Old North Church is again a good comparison.  Great 
efforts were made to avoid religious assistance.  See Old North 
Foundation Awarded $317,000 Grant Under Save America's Treasure 
Program, National Park Service, Press Release (May 27, 2003) 
(Park Service Press Release), https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/news 
/release.htm?id=395 [https://perma.cc/9MAN-6NGV].  The Old North 
Foundation, a secular, nonprofit organization, was the entity 
approved for the grant.  See Mission Statement, Old North 
Foundation of Boston, Inc., http://oldnorth.com/historic-
site/foundation/ [https://perma.cc/B45N-79Y5]; Park Service 
Press Release, supra.  Furthermore, as a matching-grant program, 
the Old North Foundation contributed a substantial amount to the 
 
 
 
12 
 
Most important in my view is the third prong.  Awarding 
public monies paid by taxes directly to a church to repair 
stained glass windows with an express religious message raises 
core concerns about separation of church and State that prompted 
the passage of the anti-aid amendment.  I agree with the court 
that those concerns include (1) infringement on liberty of 
conscience caused by taxing citizens to support the religious 
beliefs and institutions of others; (2) improper government 
entanglement with religion, thereby diminishing the independence 
and integrity of both church and State; and (3) unnecessary 
divisiveness in the polity caused by making the funding of 
religious institutions a political question.  See ante at    . 
 
All three of these risks are present here.  Tax dollars are 
paying for the stained glass windows that have an express 
sectarian religious message.  A historic preservation 
restriction of perpetual duration is being imposed on the 
windows and perhaps other parts of the church, thereby entwining 
an active church building with state government.  See The 
Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 409 
Mass. 38, 42 (1990) (designation of church interior as landmark 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
project.  See National Park Service, Matching Share Requirements 
at 1, https://www.nps.gov/preservation-grants/manual/Matching_ 
Share_Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA45-3SQF] ("The 
Federal grant is meant to stimulate nonfederal donations-not to 
pay for all the work by itself"). 
 
 
13 
infringed on "right freely to design interior spaces for 
religious worship").  See also Martin v. The Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 153 (2001) ("no municipal concern was 
served by controlling the steeple height of churches"); 
Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations:  
A Problem Best Avoided, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1353, 1365 (2003) 
("With government money come government rules, regulations, 
audits, monitoring, interference, and control -- all of which 
inherently threaten religious autonomy").  Town meeting members 
were being asked to vote on a grant to maintain religious 
aspects of the church of their neighbors and now they are suing 
each other.  Should another house of worship in the town be 
denied a grant after this one has been awarded, it will likely 
bring about further controversy and division.  No more discovery 
is required to know that this grant goes to core concerns of the 
anti-aid amendment.5  In sum, the balancing of the three factors 
shows that the plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of 
success in establishing that the stained glass grant violates 
the anti-aid amendment. 
                                                          
 
5 Again, this case is unlike the Old North Church.  Any 
risks or tensions there are substantially assuaged by the 
building's undeniable significance in the Commonwealth's and the 
country's history and because of the separability of the 
historic restoration work from the religious mission. 
 
 
14 
 
As the church and the free exercise rights of its members 
are also implicated, they must be considered as well.  As 
explained above, to be excluded from a generally available 
public benefit program, the funding must be sought for an 
"essentially religious endeavor" raising important State 
constitutional antiestablishment concerns.  See Locke, 540 U.S. 
at 721.  I conclude that paying for stained glass windows with 
an express sectarian religious message and mission fits within 
the very narrow exception allowed by Locke. 
 
The benefits are vastly different from the nonreligious 
rubberized playground services or school transportation costs, 
or the police and fire or other obviously nonreligious types of 
assistance that have been found not to raise establishment 
clause or anti-aid concerns.  See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 
at 2026-2027 (Breyer, J., concurring).  See also Everson, 330 
U.S. at 17-18 (describing services "so separate and so 
indisputably marked off from the religious function").  Although 
"nothing [religious] . . . can be said about a program to use 
recycled tires to resurface playgrounds," the opposite is true 
for stained glass windows.  See Trinity Lutheran, supra at 2023.  
They are an important part of the church's religious message and 
mission.  V.C. Raguin, Stained Glass, From its Origins to the 
Present, 13 (2003) ("stained glass became . . . an intimation of 
God's very nature, and important as a contemplative aid"); Lupu 
 
 
15 
& Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to House of Worship:  A 
Case Study in The Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 
1139, 1175 (2002) ("[Stained glass] windows often present 
religious themes . . . and help to shape the worship experience 
through the play of light and imagery").  See Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793, 820 (2000) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (aid cannot be 
"impermissibly religious in nature").  Additionally, as 
explained above, the stained glass grant here raises core State 
constitutional anti-aid concerns.  Like excluding State 
scholarships to pay for a divinity degree in Locke, there are 
"few areas in which a State's antiestablishment interests come 
more into play" than paying for stained glass windows with 
sectarian religious symbolism.  Locke, 540 U.S. at 722. 
 
For the religion clauses in the State and Federal 
Constitutions, there is "no simple and clear measure which by 
precise application can readily and invariably demark the 
permissible from the impermissible."  School Dist. of Abington 
Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring).  See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("the Court has found no single 
mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional 
line in every case").  Although line drawing in this intensely 
contested area of constitutional law is difficult, I believe 
 
 
16 
that the use of taxpayer dollars to pay for stained glass 
windows with a religious message crosses that line. 
 
I therefore conclude that on this record the plaintiffs 
have demonstrated the necessary likelihood of success that the 
stained glass grant violates the State's anti-aid amendment 
without running afoul of the free exercise clause. 
 
4.  Remand on the Master Plan grant.  I also agree with the 
court that a remand is required on the Master Plan grant, 
although I place less emphasis than the court on a search for 
"hidden" purposes.  I conclude that a fuller factual record is 
required on the inner workings of the grant itself before it can 
be determined whether the Master Plan grant violates the anti-
aid amendment, and if so, whether exclusion of such a grant from 
a generally available public benefit program would violate the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment. 
 
It is important to emphasize up front just how narrow the 
exclusion is for generally available public benefit programs.  
See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.  The exclusion involves essentially 
religious endeavors, such as paying for ministry training or 
stained glass windows with sectarian symbols or messages.  The 
Master Plan grant is to pay an architect to perform a structural 
review of three 170 year old buildings of historic importance to 
the town.  Only one of those buildings is a church.  The focus 
of the architect's work appears to be on preserving the 
 
 
17 
structural integrity of the old buildings, not repairing or 
maintaining particular parts of the church that convey an 
express religious message.6  It is unclear to me how much of this 
work goes beyond the "building envelope."  These buildings are 
also a part of the historic district of the town and serve 
important nonreligious as well as religious purposes in the town 
and the Commonwealth, as the dissent explains.  See post at    .  
Additionally it is not clear from the record what historic 
preservation restriction will result from this grant.  Will the 
grant to pay for an architect to provide for a structural review 
of the three buildings give the town a restriction regarding 
construction on all of these buildings?  Or would such a 
restriction only apply if a grant is provided for subsequent 
work on the buildings?  A fuller factual record is necessary on 
this point as well as others. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  In sum, I conclude that the stained glass 
grant not only violates the anti-aid amendment but also fits 
within the very narrow exclusion from a generally available 
                                                          
 
 
6 I recognize that this distinction may be subtle and even 
elusive as a house of worship contains many different religious 
symbols, but as the Supreme Court has emphasized, line drawing 
may be difficult but necessary in this area.  See School Dist. 
of Abington Twp., Pa v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305-306 (1963) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring).  See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).  See generally 
Lupu & Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to House of Worship:  
A Case Study in The Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 
1139, 1174 (2002). 
 
 
18 
public benefit program authorized by the Supreme Court pursuant 
to the First Amendment.  I further conclude that on remand the 
legal status of the Master Plan grant under both the anti-aid 
amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment 
must be determined. 
 
 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (dissenting).  I respectfully dissent.  
Separation of church and State is a vital constitutional 
requirement under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
the United States Constitution and an enduring principle of the 
Commonwealth.  As the court recounts, Massachusetts has an 
interesting and complex history in this regard.  Nevertheless, I 
would affirm the order denying the motion for an injunction to 
block the town's use of the Community Preservation Act (act) to 
preserve the historic façade of the Acton Congregational Church, 
which is located in the town center. 
I agree with the majority that grants of public funds to 
active religious institutions pursuant to the act are not 
categorically barred by the anti-aid amendment, and that such 
grants are instead subject to the three-factor test this court 
first articulated in Commonwealth v. School Comm. of 
Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 675 (1981) (Springfield).  As the 
court points out, this test requires that we consider (1) 
whether the purpose of the challenged grant is to aid a private 
charity; (2) whether the grant does in fact substantially aid a 
private charity; and (3) whether the grant avoids the political 
and economic abuses that prompted the passage of the anti-aid 
 
 
2 
amendment.1  I do not think that the motion judge misapplied 
those three factors here. 
I am also concerned with the court's admonition that grants 
of community preservation funds to active religious institutions 
warrant particularly "careful scrutiny."  Such an analysis is 
belied by the plain text of the anti-aid amendment, as well as 
this court's cases interpreting the amendment, which dictate 
that we do not treat religious and secular entities differently 
under the amendment.  The court's focus on a grant applicant's 
status as an active house of worship also implicates the most 
                                                          
 
 
1 With respect to the first factor set out in Commonwealth 
v. School Comm. of Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 675 (1981) 
(Springfield), consideration of a grant's "purpose", I disagree 
with the court that a court's primary focus here is on whether 
"one" of a grantor's motivating purposes is impermissible.  See 
ante at     n.22.  Our "purpose" inquiry is limited to the 
intent of the grantor, without consideration of an applicant's 
motives for seeking grant funds.  See, e.g., Boston Edison Co. 
v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 62-63 (1977) (where 
the legislature has provided specific standards, "the purpose of 
the applicants in proposing the project is wholly irrelevant").  
And as Springfield and subsequent cases make clear, that inquiry 
requires that we consider what "the" purpose of the grant is, 
see, e.g., Springfield, 382 Mass. at 675 -- not, as the court 
states, whether "one purpose among many" might be impermissible.  
In instances where there may be more than one purpose for a 
grant, a court must consider and balance all such purposes in 
order to determine what "the" predominant or "primary" purpose 
of the grant is.  Id. at 678 ("The statute's purpose is, 
primarily, to help specified children with special needs obtain 
the education which is theirs by right").  I am therefore not 
convinced that the plaintiffs' potential discovery of some 
"hidden purpose" to aid the church tips the scale in their favor 
under this factor, where the clear predominant purpose of these 
grants is historic preservation. 
 
 
3 
recent United States Supreme Court decision in this area, 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 
2012, 2024 (2017) (Trinity Lutheran).  Trinity Lutheran holds 
that a State cannot condition participation in a generally-
available public benefit program on an applicant's "renounc[ing] 
its religious character."2  Id.  Finally, I write to underscore 
the importance of preserving our State's historic buildings, 
which embody the Commonwealth's rich past and offer those in the 
present a number of public benefits.  Historic churches and 
meeting houses are, like secular historic buildings, an 
indispensable part of our historic landscape, and warrant the 
same degree of preservation. 
As I understand the judge's decision, she examined the 
purpose of the grant and found that the taxpayers did not 
satisfy the first Springfield factor in their challenge.  She 
stated in her decision that the taxpayers "failed to demonstrate 
                                                          
 
 
2 Were I to interpret the principles of separation of church 
and State without concern for our own precedent or the Supreme 
Court's decisions, I may well find myself in agreement with 
Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2041 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("History shows that the Religion 
Clauses separate the public treasury from religious coffers as 
one measure to secure the kind of freedom of conscience that 
benefits both religion and government.  If this separation means 
anything, it means that the government cannot, or at the very 
least need not, tax its citizens and turn that money over to 
houses of worship").  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 
639, 686-717 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
 
4 
that the purpose of the grants is to aid the [c]hurch[]."  And 
in the judge's discussion of this factor, she correctly stated 
that a court's inquiry does not depend on "the stated purpose of 
the recipients."  Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment 
Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 62-63 (1977) (where Legislature has 
provided specific standards, "the purpose of the applicants in 
proposing the project is wholly irrelevant").3  At the hearing on 
the request for a preliminary injunction, the parties emphasized 
the grant, not the act itself, and the judge noted in her 
decision that under Helmes she was to consider the purpose of 
the grants.  Helmes v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 873, 877 (1990).  
When the judge set out the factors, she identified each one as 
concerning the grants, not the act. 
Turning to the grants themselves, it is readily apparent 
that they have a public purpose of historic preservation and 
require a recipient to convey a preservation restriction as an 
express condition of the grant.  G. L. c. 44B, § 12 (a).  See 
G. L. c. 184, § 31 (defining preservation restriction).  The 
public receives a real property interest in exchange for the 
                                                          
 
 
3 The Community Preservation Act (act) sets forth neutral 
criteria for the grants and a detailed procedural process under 
which those grants are considered.  G. L. c. 44B, §§ 3-7.  Under 
the act, the town's Community Preservation Committee gathers 
information, consults with municipal boards, holds public 
hearings, and makes recommendations for the acquisition, 
preservation, rehabilitation, and restoration of historic 
resources. 
 
 
5 
grant.  Moreover, the town enjoys "every presumption in favor of 
the honesty and sufficiency of the motives actuating public 
officers in actions ostensibly taken for the general welfare."  
LaPointe v. License Bd. of Worcester, 389 Mass. 454, 459 (1983).4  
There is nothing in the record that suggests any irregularity in 
the grant process in this case.  To the contrary, the town and 
its Community Preservation Committee (committee) complied with 
all of the rigorous requirements of the act for these grants.  
After a public hearing, the committee voted unanimously to 
recommend the projects to the town meeting, based in part on 
"the significance of the historical resource[s]" that were to be 
preserved.  Following additional favorable recommendations by 
the town's board of selectmen and its finance committee, 
residents at the town meeting voted to approve the grants for 
these projects in April, 2016.  These grants received full 
scrutiny and endorsement by the residents of the town at 
multiple levels of town government. 
                                                          
 
 
4 In its brief, the town represents that the grants under 
the act "in this case are entirely consistent with previous 
funding by the town, other Massachusetts municipalities and the 
State itself.  Over time, the town has approved fourteen other 
similar [projects under the act] (i.e., windows, roofs, and 
master planning) to preserve historic resources, including six 
owned by the town, five owned by private nonprofits, one owned 
by a church, and two owned by other private recipients." 
 
 
6 
The judge found that the first and third prongs of the test 
had been satisfied by the town.5  With regard to the second 
factor, the judge assumed for the purposes of the analysis that 
the taxpayers would be able to show that the grants in fact 
substantially aided the church and she then conducted the 
balancing test, concluding that the grants did not run afoul of 
the anti-aid amendment.6  She did not ignore the second factor; 
rather, the judge balanced the various factors, which are 
"cumulative and interrelated," Springfield, 382 Mass. at 675, in 
                                                          
 
 
5 It is worth noting that between 2003 and 2014, the 
Massachusetts Historical Commission approved funding for thirty-
eight projects involving active religious institutions through 
its Massachusetts Preservation Project Fund (16.5 per cent of 
all approved projects), including Vilna Shul in the Beacon Hill 
area of Boston, Trinity Church in Boston, and Saint George Greek 
Orthodox Cathedral in Springfield.  There has been no evidence 
of the risks with which the court is concerned. 
 
 
6 Although there is no question that the grants must not 
"substantially aid" the church, the grants do not aid the 
"essential function" of the church within the meaning of the 
anti-aid amendment.  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 680, 681.  The 
grants are expressly limited to reimbursement of expenses 
incurred by the church on the projects and cannot be used to 
"for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding" the 
church's mission, see art. 18 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by arts. 46 and 103 of 
the Amendments, or any purpose other than historical 
preservation.  Springfield, supra (close monitoring of public 
funds prevents aid from becoming aid for entity's essential 
function).  There appears to be no case that has held that a 
grant to a private organization necessarily constitutes 
"substantial aid" where the grant serves other important public 
purposes.  See Helmes v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 873, 876-877 
(1990); Springfield, supra at 675; Bloom v. School Comm. of 
Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 47 (1978). 
 
 
7 
reaching her conclusion that the town had not violated the anti-
aid amendment by issuing the preservation grant.7 
The anti-aid amendment itself makes no distinction between 
secular and religious recipients of public funds; rather, as the 
court acknowledges, "the operative language in the amendment's 
two clauses is identical."  Ante at    .  Indeed, as this 
court's anti-aid amendment cases repeatedly state, the amendment 
"marks no difference between 'aids,' whether religious or 
secular."  Springfield, 382 Mass. at 674, n.14, quoting Bloom v. 
School Comm. of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 45 (1978).  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1201, 1203 n.4 (1987); 
Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass 326, 332 n.3 
(1982).  In my view, we cannot treat a religious institution 
differently from a secular private institution if we are to 
respect the text of the amendment and our own precedent.  
Applying that principle to this case, I conclude that the 
                                                          
 
 
7 We have recognized that an incidental benefit to an entity 
is inevitable.  In fact, in Helmes, we observed that a 
battleship would not be able to continue as a war memorial and 
likely would be forfeited to the Navy.  Helmes, 406 Mass. at 
877.  See Springfield, 382 Mass. at 679-681 (secondary and 
indirect benefits to private schools do not qualify as 
"substantial aid" under anti-aid amendment).  See also Attorney 
Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 332 (1982) ("The 
fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, 
coincides with the personal desires of individuals most directly 
affected is certainly an inadequate reason . . . to say that a 
legislature has erroneously appraised the public need" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
 
8 
application of the three-factor Springfield test to religious 
institutions should be no more rigorous than the application of 
the test to any other grant under the act to any other secular 
private or charitable organization.8 
In addition, although this case primarily concerns the 
State anti-aid amendment, our decision must also be mindful of 
applicable Federal constitutional provisions, such as the 
religion clauses of First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  In Trinity Lutheran, decided this past June, the 
Supreme Court struck down a State's policy of denying public 
grants to religiously-affiliated applicants as a violation of 
the free exercise clause.  Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.  
The policy at issue there was based on a State constitutional 
provision requiring "[t]hat no money shall ever be taken from 
the public treasury, directly, or indirectly, in aid of any 
church."  Id. at 2017.  The court distinguishes Trinity Lutheran 
                                                          
 
 
8 In addition to their argument concerning the risks posed 
by public support of religious institutions, the taxpayers voice 
other concerns that are not insubstantial.  They claim that (1) 
the grant to the church violates their liberty of conscience if 
the grant is for a church they do not want to support; (2) the 
grant threatens the independence of religious institutions, 
making them "supplicants" for governmental aid that may bring 
intrusive governmental inquiries; and (3) the grant may be 
politically divisive and engender "religious biases" in grant 
making.  Of course, taxpayers could make similar objections to 
grants provided to secular recipients.  These are the concerns 
that the three-factor test in Springfield is designed to 
address. 
 
 
9 
from the present case by stating that, unlike the State 
constitutional provision there, Massachusetts's anti-aid 
amendment is not a categorical ban on religious institutions 
applying for and receiving public grants.  In my opinion, 
however, Trinity Lutheran carries broader implications. 
The Supreme Court further observed that a State policy 
requiring an applicant for public funds "to renounce its 
religious character in order to participate in an otherwise 
generally available public benefit program is," absent "a 
[S]tate interest 'of the highest order,'" "odious to our 
Constitution" (citation omitted). Id. at 2024-2025.  As I read 
the court's analysis in this case, a historic religious building 
with an active congregation is at a distinct disadvantage when 
seeking funds under the act -- at least for purposes of a 
court's anti-aid scrutiny of that building's grant application -
- compared to historic religious buildings that are no longer 
active.  The historic religious building would then be 
confronted with the "odious" choice of "having to disavow its 
religious character" in order to participate in the 
Commonwealth's community preservation program.  Id. at 2022. 
Finally, I write to emphasize the importance of preserving 
our State's historic structures, in light of the significant 
cultural, aesthetic, and economic benefits such preservation 
bestows on the Commonwealth's cities and towns.  The citizens 
 
 
10 
and the Legislature have determined that historic preservation 
is important so that future generations may appreciate the 
history of the Commonwealth.  This determination has been 
expressed through the creation of a variety of historic 
districts and historical commissions, as well as State laws and 
regulations governing historic preservation.9  We have likewise 
recognized this interest.  See, e.g., Helmes, 406 Mass. at 877 
(public money appropriated to nonprofit "to rehabilitate [a 
World War II] battleship, to preserve it as a memorial to 
citizens of the Commonwealth" served public purpose); Opinion of 
the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 780 (1955) ("There has been 
substantial recognition by the courts of the public interest in 
the preservation of historic buildings, places, and districts"). 
"[S]tructures with special historic, cultural, or 
architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all," 
as they "represent the lessons of the past and embody precious 
features of our heritage."  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978).  Likewise, the careful 
craftsmanship of these buildings -- too often a feature of the 
past -- "serve as examples of quality for today," id., and 
                                                          
 
 
9 For example, the Massachusetts Historical Commission was 
created by the Legislature in 1963, see St. 1963, c. 697, § 1, 
to identify, evaluate, and protect important historical and 
archaeological assets of the Commonwealth, G. L. c. 9, §§ 26-
27D, including establishing and maintaining the State Register 
of Historic Places, G. L. c. 9, § 26C. 
 
 
11 
improve the aesthetics of our neighborhoods.  Indeed, the 
building that this court occupies is a testament to that, having 
been placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1974, 
and undergoing a magnificent renovation and restoration 
completed in 2005.  Historic preservation also offers distinct 
economic advantages, by increasing property values, encouraging 
tourism, and generating local business.  See, e.g., H.S. 
Edwards, The Guide for Future Preservation in Historic Districts 
Using a Creative Approach: Charleston, South Carolina's 
Contextual Approach to Historic Preservation, 20 U. Fla. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 221, 223-225 (2009). 
Churches, an undeniable part of the Commonwealth's historic 
landscape, achieve these same cultural, aesthetic, and economic 
benefits,10 and likewise warrant preservation.  During 
Massachusetts's early history, civic and religious life were in 
many ways one in the same.  The meeting house -- perhaps the 
most iconic feature of a "quintessential New England town" -- 
served as the center of gravity for both public administration 
and religious worship.  See, e.g., Witte, How to Govern a City 
                                                          
 
 
10 According to one study conducted in 1996, the average 
historic religious place in an urban environment generates over 
$1.7 million annually in economic impact.  Sacred Places, The 
Economic Halo Effect of Historic Sacred Places, at 4, 19 
(undated), http://www.sacredplaces.org/uploads/files 
/16879092466251061-economic-halo-effect-of-historic-sacred-
places.pdf [ https://perma.cc/LEH3-5G88]. 
 
 
12 
on a Hill:  The Early Puritan Contribution to American 
Constitutionalism, 39 Emory Law J. 41, 57 (1990) ("Church 
meetinghouses and chapels were used not only to conduct 
religious services, but also to host town assemblies, political 
rallies, and public auctions . . .").  Colonial laws often 
required homes to be constructed within one mile of the meeting 
house.  See, e.g., N.B. Shurtleff, ed., 1 Records of the 
Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 
157 (1853) (reflecting 1635 order of General Court that, in 
certain towns, no "dwelling howse" was to be "above halfe a myle 
from the meeting house" without legislative permission).  
Especially for buildings of such historic significance -- the 
institutional center of life in colonial Massachusetts -- we 
should be careful not to impose undue restrictions on their 
access to needed preservation funds.