Case Title: Black v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 010123

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Whiting, S.J. *
 
BARRY ELTON BLACK 
 
v.  Record No. 010123 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
RICHARD J. ELLIOTT 
 
v.  Record No. 003014  
  OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 2, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
JONATHAN O’MARA 
 
v.  Record No. 010038 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether Code § 18.2-423, 
which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group of persons, impermissibly 
infringes upon constitutionally protected speech.  The case of 
Black v. Commonwealth involves a Ku Klux Klan rally on private 
property with the permission of the owner, where a cross was 
burned as a part of the ceremony.  The companion cases of 
O’Mara v. Commonwealth and Elliott v. Commonwealth involve the 
attempted burning of a cross in the backyard of the home of 
                     
* Justice Keenan did not participate in the hearing and 
decision of this case. 
James S. Jubilee (“Jubilee”), an African-American, without 
permission.  We conclude that, despite the laudable intentions 
of the General Assembly to combat bigotry and racism, the 
selectivity of its statutory proscription is facially 
unconstitutional because it prohibits otherwise permitted 
speech solely on the basis of its content, and the statute is 
overbroad. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
The prosecutions of Richard J. Elliott (“Elliott”) and 
Jonathan O’Mara (“O’Mara”) arose from a single incident in the 
City of Virginia Beach.  On May 2, 1998, Elliott and O’Mara 
attended a party at the home of David Targee (“Targee”).  
Elliott told several people at the party that his neighbor, 
Jubilee, had complained about the discharge of firearms in 
Elliott’s backyard.  In response, Elliott suggested they burn 
a cross in Jubilee’s yard.  
 
Elliott, O’Mara, and Targee hastily constructed a crude 
wooden cross in Targee’s garage.  While transporting the cross 
to the Jubilee home, Elliott referred to Jubilee with a racial 
epithet confirming Jubilee’s race.  Upon arriving at Jubilee’s 
home, O’Mara put the cross in the ground and attempted to 
light it. 
 
In addition to the epithet, the record is replete with 
references to Jubilee’s race.  In the Commonwealth’s motion 
 
2
for joinder of defendants in the Elliott and O’Mara cases, it 
is stated: “Mr. James Jubilee is an African-American.”  A fire 
investigator with the City of Virginia Beach testified that 
Targee knew the Jubilees were black before he participated in 
the cross burning.  Throughout the O’Mara and Elliott 
prosecution, the Commonwealth referred to “burning a cross in 
a black family’s yard.”  The questions of counsel and argument 
to the court are replete with references to race and racism. 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, O’Mara pled guilty to  
attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross 
burning, and was sentenced to 90 days in jail and a $2500 fine 
on each charge, with part of the time and fines suspended.  
Under the plea agreement, O’Mara retained the right to appeal 
the constitutionality of Virginia’s cross burning statute. 
 
Elliott was also charged with attempted cross burning and 
conspiracy to commit cross burning.  Upon his plea of not 
guilty, a jury found him guilty of attempted cross burning, 
but not guilty of conspiracy.  Elliott was sentenced to 90 
days in jail and was fined $2500. 
 
O’Mara and Elliott appealed to the Court of Appeals, 
alleging that the Virginia cross burning statute violated the 
free speech clauses of both the United States and Virginia 
Constitutions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, 
holding that the statute “targets only expressive conduct 
 
3
undertaken with the intent to intimidate another, conduct 
clearly proscribable both as fighting words and a threat of 
violence.”  O’Mara v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 525, 536, 535 
S.E.2d 175, 181 (2000). 
 
In the third case reviewed, Barry Elton Black (“Black”) 
organized and led a Ku Klux Klan rally on August 22, 1998, in 
Carroll County.  Following speeches filled with racial, 
ethnic, and religious bigotry, a cross approximately 25 to 30 
feet tall was ignited. 
 
Black was indicted for violating Virginia’s cross burning 
statute.  He moved for dismissal of the indictment on the 
grounds that the statute was unconstitutional.  The trial 
court denied Black’s motion and, upon conviction by a jury, 
Black was sentenced to pay a fine of $2500. 
 
Black appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, “[f]or the reasons 
stated in O’Mara v. Commonwealth.”  Black v. Commonwealth, 
Rec. No. 1581-99-3, December 19, 2000, at 1. 
THE CROSS BURNING STATUTE 
 
Code § 18.2-423, the cross burning statute, provides 
that: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person 
or persons, with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group of 
persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a 
cross on the property of another, a 
 
4
highway or other public place.  Any person 
who shall violate any provision of this 
section shall be guilty of a Class 6 
felony. 
 
Any such burning of a cross shall be 
prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons. 
 
 
Black1 contends that the cross burning statute is 
unconstitutional because it engages in viewpoint and content 
discrimination and it fails to incorporate the standards 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), concerning incitement to, and 
likelihood of, imminent lawless action.  Additionally, Black 
contends that the provision of the statute permitting an 
inference of intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning 
a cross, which excuses the Commonwealth from its proof 
requirement for the establishment of a prima facie case, 
further aggravates viewpoint and content discrimination and 
violates the limitations prescribed in Brandenburg. 
 
The geometric configuration of a single vertical bar 
traversed by a single shorter horizontal bar has no unusual 
inherent properties.  But its symbolic meaning is powerful.  
For Christians, the symbol of the cross evokes remembrance of 
the crucifixion of Christ.  Unfortunately, such powerful 
                     
1 Because of the similar constitutional challenges 
presented in these consolidated cases, our references to 
Black’s contentions shall be inclusive of those mounted by 
O’Mara and Elliott. 
 
5
symbols are often subject to misappropriation.  As recognized 
by Justice Clarence Thomas in his concurring opinion in 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 770-71 (1995), the burning of a cross has acquired a 
specific meaning: 
 
 
There is little doubt that the Klan’s 
main objective is to establish a racist 
white government in the United States.  In 
Klan ceremony, the cross is a symbol of 
white supremacy and a tool for the 
intimidation and harassment of racial 
minorities, Catholics, Jews, Communists, 
and any other groups hated by the Klan.  
The cross is associated with the Klan not 
because of religious worship, but because 
of the Klan’s practice of cross 
burning. . . .  The Klan simply has 
appropriated one of the most sacred of 
religious symbols as a symbol of hate. 
 
 
In 1952, in direct response to Ku Klux Klan activities in 
Virginia,2 including incidents of cross burning, the General 
Assembly enacted the predecessor statute to the law at issue 
                     
2 See Police Aid Requested by Teacher: Cross is Burned in 
Negro’s Yard, Richmond News Leader, Jan. 21, 1949, at 19; 
Cross Fired Near Suffolk Stirs Probe: Burning Second in Past 
Week, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 23, 1949, § 2, at 1; Huge 
Cross is Burned on Hill Just South of Covington, Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, Apr. 14, 1950, at 6; Cross Burned at Manakin; 
Third in Area, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 26, 1951, at 4; 
Cross is Burned at Reedville Home, Richmond News Leader, Apr. 
14, 1951, at 1; ‘State Might Well Consider’ Restrictions on Ku 
Klux Klan, Governor Battle Comments, Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Feb. 6, 1952, at 7; Bill to Curb KKK Passed by the House, 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 8, 1952, at 5; Name Rider 
Approved by House: Measure Now Goes to Battle, Richmond News 
Leader, Feb. 23, 1952, at 1; Governor Backs Curb on Ku Klux  
Activities, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 10, 1952, § 2, at 1. 
 
6
in these cases.3  The cross burning statute was amended on 
several occasions, including an amendment expanding the sites 
where cross burning may not take place, and the addition of 
the inference of intent to intimidate from the mere act of 
burning a cross for the purposes of establishing a prima facie 
case under the statute.4
SELECTIVE REGULATION OF SPEECH BASED UPON CONTENT 
 
It is well established that non-verbal, symbolic 
expression is “speech,” and is as fully protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as more 
traditional means of communication.  See, e.g., Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of 
black arm bands by high school students as a protest against 
the war in Vietnam).  However pernicious the expression may 
be, “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.”  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
                     
3 Code §  18.1-365 stated in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to place 
or cause to be placed on the property of another in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia a burning or a flaming cross or any 
manner of exhibit in which a burning or flaming cross, real or 
simulated, is a whole or a part, without first obtaining 
written permission of the owner or occupier of the premises so 
to do. 
1952 Va. Acts ch. 483 § 2 at 777. 
 
7
397, 414 (1989).  Any question about the constitutional 
infirmity of such selective proscription of speech was 
resolved by the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 
The Virginia cross burning statute is analytically 
indistinguishable from the ordinance found unconstitutional in 
R.A.V.  R.A.V. involved the prosecution of a teenager who, 
with several other minors, allegedly assembled a crudely made 
cross and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black 
family.  Id. at 379.  The City of St. Paul prosecuted under 
its Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which provided: 
Whoever places on public or private 
property a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization or graffiti, including, 
but not limited to, a burning cross or 
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion or gender 
commits disorderly conduct and shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990).  The trial court 
held that the statute was unconstitutional, but the Minnesota 
Supreme Court reversed, construing the St. Paul ordinance as 
limited to conduct that amounts to “fighting words,” namely, 
“conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite 
immediate violence . . . .”  In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 
                                                                
4 See 1968 Va. Acts ch. 350 at 450; 1975 Va. Acts ch. 14 
 
8
N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).  Accepting the limited 
construction placed upon the statute by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, the United States Supreme Court held that, even if the 
expression reached by the ordinance was proscribable under the 
“fighting words” doctrine, the ordinance was “facially 
unconstitutional in that it prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted 
speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech 
addresses.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. 
 
Noting that “[t]he First Amendment generally prevents 
government from proscribing speech, or even expressive 
conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed,” the 
Court observed that “[c]ontent-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”  Id. at 382 (citations omitted).  
Exceptions to the rule include: obscenity (e.g., Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)), defamation (e.g.,  
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)), and “fighting 
words” (e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942)).  But simply because particular categories of speech 
may be regulated does not mean that such regulation may 
selectively discriminate on the basis of content.  As the 
Court in R.A.V. stated: 
And just as the power to proscribe 
particular speech on the basis of a 
noncontent element (e.g., noise) does not 
                                                                
at 90, ch. 15 at 174. 
 
9
entail the power to proscribe the same 
speech on the basis of a content element; 
so also, the power to proscribe it on the 
basis of one content element (e.g., 
obscenity) does not entail the power to 
proscribe it on the basis of other content 
elements. 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386. 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the Virginia statute is 
neutral because “Code § 18.2-423 applies equally to anyone who 
burns a cross for the purpose of intimidating anyone.”  The 
Commonwealth further dwells upon the phrase in R.A.V. which 
states that “threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment.”  505 U.S. at 388.  This quotation is incomplete 
and distorts the holding of R.A.V.  While a statute of neutral 
application proscribing intimidation or threats may be 
permissible, a statute punishing intimidation or threats based 
only upon racial, religious, or some other selective content-
focused category of otherwise protected speech violates the 
First Amendment.  Id.
 
Emphasizing the point, the Court in R.A.V., noted: 
Thus, the government may proscribe libel; 
but it may not make the further content 
discrimination of proscribing only libel  
critical of the government. 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384. 
 
We have long held, for example, that 
nonverbal expressive activity can be 
banned because of the action it entails, 
but not because of the ideas it expresses 
 
10
– so that burning a flag in violation of 
an ordinance against outdoor fires could 
be punishable, whereas burning a flag in 
violation of an ordinance against 
dishonoring the flag is not. 
Id. at 386. 
 
A State might choose to prohibit only that 
obscenity which is the most patently 
offensive in its prurience – i.e., that 
which involves the most lascivious 
displays of sexual activity.  But it may 
not prohibit, for example, only that 
obscenity which includes offensive 
political messages. 
Id. at 388. 
 
And the Federal Government can criminalize 
only those threats of violence that are 
directed against the President, see 18 
U.S.C. § 871 – since the reasons why 
threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment (protecting individuals from the 
fear of violence, from the disruption that 
fear engenders, and from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur) 
have special force when applied to the 
person of the President . . . .  But the 
Federal Government may not criminalize 
only those threats against the President 
that mention his policy on aid to inner 
cities. 
Id.
 
 
R.A.V. makes it abundantly clear that, while certain 
areas of speech and expressive conduct may be subject to 
proscription, regulation within these areas must not 
 
11
discriminate based upon the content of the message.5  In this 
case, the Commonwealth seeks to proscribe expressive conduct 
that is intimidating in nature, but selectively chooses only 
cross burning because of its distinctive message.  As the 
Court in R.A.V. succintly stated:  “the government may not 
regulate use based upon hostility – or favoritism –towards the 
underlying message expressed.”  Id. at 386. 
 
While not specifically stating that “race, color, creed, 
religion or gender” is the subject of proscription, the 
absence of such language in the Virginia statute does not mask 
                     
5 It is important to note that R.A.V. did not interpret the 
First Amendment to forbid “underinclusiveness.”  To the 
contrary, the Court held that: 
 
In our view, the First Amendment imposes 
not an “underinclusiveness” limitation but 
a “content discrimination” limitation upon 
a State’s prohibition of proscribable 
speech.  There is no problem whatever, for 
example, with a State’s prohibiting 
obscenity (and other forms of proscribable 
expression) only in certain media or 
markets, for although that prohibition 
would be “underinclusive,” it would not 
discriminate on the basis of content. 
 
Id. at 387.  Of course, the subjects of the proscription 
expressly stated in the St. Paul ordinance were symbols and 
words, including a burning cross or a Nazi swastika, evoking 
“anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender.”  As the Court noted, 
excluded from proscription was identical behavior with a 
different subject, such as “political affiliation, union 
membership, or homosexuality.”  Id. at 391.  The infirmity 
addressed in R.A.V., as in the cases before this Court, was 
 
12
the motivating purpose behind the statutory prohibition of 
cross burning.  The United States Supreme Court dealt with a 
similar question in the “flag burning” cases.  In Texas v. 
Johnson, Johnson was prosecuted under a statute making it 
unlawful to intentionally or knowingly desecrate the United 
States flag.  “Desecrate” was defined as “deface, damage, or 
otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows 
will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or 
discover his action.”  491 U.S. at 400 (quoting Texas Penal 
Code Ann. § 42.09 (1989)).  After the Supreme Court declared 
the Texas statute unconstitutional, Congress enacted the Flag 
Protection Act of 1989.  In subsequent litigation concerning 
the Act, the government maintained that the absence of 
language in the Act focusing upon the content of the actor’s 
symbolic speech cured any constitutional problems.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310, 315 (1990)(internal quotations omitted), stating that, 
“[a]lthough the [statute] contains no explicit content-based 
limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is 
nevertheless clear that the Government’s asserted interest is 
related to the suppression of free expression.” 
                                                                
not “underinclusiveness;” rather, it was the selective 
discrimination in the ordinance based upon content. 
 
13
 
Similarly, considering the historical and current context 
of cross burning, and the statute’s reliance on such context 
for the provision of an inference of intent to intimidate from 
the mere act of burning a cross, it is clear that the 
Commonwealth’s interest in enacting the cross burning statute 
is related to the suppression of free expression as well. 
 
The virulent symbolism of cross burning has been 
discussed in so many judicial opinions that its subject and 
content as symbolic speech has been universally acknowledged.  
For example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina declared a 
statute6 with operative language similar to ours 
unconstitutional and observed: “a burning cross historically 
conveys ideas capable of eliciting powerful responses from 
those engaging in the conduct and those receiving the 
message.”  State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C. 1993).  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also declared a statute7 with 
                     
6 S.C.CODE ANN. §  16-7-120 (1985) provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to place or cause to be 
placed in a public place in the State a burning or flaming 
cross or any manner of exhibit in which a burning or flaming 
cross, real or simulated, is the whole or a part or to place 
or cause to be placed on the property of another in the State 
a burning or flaming cross or any manner of exhibit in which a 
burning or flaming cross, real or simulated, is the whole or a 
part, without first obtaining written permission of the owner 
or occupier of the premises so to do. 
 
7 MD. ANN. CODE art.27, § 10A (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.) 
provided in pertinent part: 
 
14
operative language similar to ours unconstitutional and 
observed: 
Those who openly burn crosses do so fully 
cognizant of the controversial racial and 
religious messages which such acts impart.  
Historically, the Ku Klux Klan burned 
crosses to express hostility towards 
blacks and other groups it disfavored, and 
it is that idea which contemporary cross 
burners aim to perpetuate. 
 
State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 757 (Md. 1993). 
 
The historical context for the passage of the Virginia 
cross burning statute is uncontrovertible.  In an atmosphere 
of racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, the General 
Assembly acted to combat a particular form of intimidating 
symbolic speech – the burning of a cross.  It did not 
proscribe the burning of a circle or a square because no 
animating message is contained in such an act. 
 
Initially, the cross burning proscription extended only 
to acts on property of another without permission.  In 1968, 
the limitation concerning situs was removed, and in 1975, the 
addition of language establishing prima facie evidence of 
intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross 
reaffirmed the legislative context of the statute.  During 
                                                                
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to burn or 
cause to be burned any cross or other religious symbol upon 
any private or public property within this State without the 
express consent of the owner of such property and without 
 
15
oral argument, the Commonwealth maintained that the portion of 
the statute proscribing the burning of a cross had nothing to 
do with the motivation of the actor.  When asked how the 
Commonwealth could justify the inference of intimidation 
provided in the last sentence of the statute, the Commonwealth 
relied upon the historical context of cross burning.  The 
Commonwealth cannot have it both ways. 
“SECONDARY EFFECTS” 
 
As described above, the R.A.V. analysis begins with 
categories of speech that may be subject to regulation and 
holds that such regulation may not selectively discriminate on 
the basis of content.  However, the Court in R.A.V. recognized 
that some selective regulation of constitutionally protected 
speech may be permissible if it is based upon the “secondary 
effects” of speech rather than its content.  See Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  In Renton, the 
ordinance under review proscribed the location of an adult 
motion picture theater within 1,000 feet of any residential 
zone, single– or multiple–family dwelling, church, park, or 
school.  Because the ordinance did not ban adult theaters 
entirely, the Court held that the ordinance is “properly 
                                                                
first giving notice to the fire department which services the 
area in which such burning is to take place. 
 
16
analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”  
Id. at 46. 
 
The analysis used by the Court focused upon whether the 
regulation was directed at the content of the protected speech 
or at a legitimate area of government concern.  Determining 
that the dominant motive of the ordinance was “to prevent 
crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property 
values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of 
[the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the 
quality of urban life,’ the Court upheld the ordinance.  Id. 
at 48.  The Court held that the regulation in Renton was 
“aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion 
picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such 
theaters on the surrounding community.”  Id. at 47.  By 
contrast, the legislative history of the Virginia cross 
burning statute, the meaning afforded the expressive conduct, 
and the provision of prima facia evidence of intent to 
intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross, make it 
abundantly clear that Code § 18.2-423 is aimed at regulating 
content, not “secondary effects.” 
OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS 
 
As discussed herein, the majority opinion in R.A.V. holds 
that certain categories of speech may be regulated, but the 
government may not discriminate in its proscription within 
 
17
these categories on the basis of content.  The concurring 
opinions in R.A.V. preferred a more traditional analysis 
confined to the question whether the ordinance suffered from 
overbreadth.  As Justice White noted, St. Paul’s ordinance was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because: 
Although the ordinance as construed 
reaches categories of speech that are 
constitutionally unprotected, it also 
criminalizes a substantial amount of 
expression that -- however repugnant -- is 
shielded by the First Amendment.         
Id. at 413 (J. White, concurring).  The Commonwealth’s cross 
burning statute is similarly defective. 
 
It is not simply the prospect of conviction under the 
statute that renders it overbroad.  The enhanced probability 
of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of 
protected speech sufficiently to render the statute overbroad.  
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 
(1988).  Threat of prosecution under a criminal statute “tends 
to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.”  North 
Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710 
(4th Cir. 1999).  Self-censorship, “a harm that can be 
realized even without an active prosecution,” inhibits free 
speech.  Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 
F.3d 376, 382 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
 
18
 
Code § 18.2-423 provides in part that “any such burning 
of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons.”  Assuming that the 
act is done “on the property of another, a highway or other 
public place,”8 the act of burning a cross alone, with no 
evidence of intent to intimidate, will nonetheless suffice for 
arrest and prosecution and will insulate the Commonwealth from 
a motion to strike the evidence at the end of its case-in-
chief.  That the trier of fact ultimately finds the actor not 
guilty of the offense is little consolation after arrest and 
prosecution for speech or expressive conduct that is otherwise 
protected.  Arrest for, and prosecution of, otherwise 
protected speech, with no evidence of a critical element of 
the offense other than a statutorily supplied inference, 
chills free expression.  Code § 18.2-423 sweeps within its 
ambit for arrest and prosecution, both protected and 
unprotected speech.  As such it is overbroad. 
BRANDENBURG ISSUES 
 
In R.A.V., the Court acknowledged that the narrow 
construction placed upon the ordinance limited its application 
to “fighting words,” a proper category of proscription.  
                     
8  
The Virginia statute prohibits cross-burning “on the 
property of another, a highway or other public place.”  
Remarkably, it sweeps within its prohibition the act “on the 
property of another” with or without permission. 
 
19
Nonetheless, the ordinance was declared unconstitutional 
because of its selective application to only certain 
expressions of fighting words.  Virginia’s cross burning 
statute suffers from the same infirmity.  Because we hold that 
the statute impermissibly proscribes otherwise protected 
speech on the basis of content, and because the statute is 
overbroad, it is unnecessary to address the remaining 
challenges under Brandenburg.9
CONCLUSION 
 
Under our system of government, people have the right to 
use symbols to communicate.  They may patriotically wave the 
flag or burn it in protest; they may reverently worship the 
cross or burn it as an expression of bigotry.  Neutrally 
expressed statutes prohibiting vandalism, assault, and 
trespass may have vitality for the prosecution of particularly 
offensive conduct.  While reasonable prohibitions upon time, 
place, and manner of speech, and statutes of neutral 
application may be enforced, government may not regulate 
speech based on hostility –or favoritism –towards the 
underlying message expressed. 
                     
9 Additionally, because we resolve these questions under 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is 
unnecessary to address Elliott’s and O’Mara’s additional 
argument that Article I, § 12 of the Virginia Constitution is 
also violated. 
 
20
 
A statute selectively addressed to the content of 
symbolic speech is not permitted under the First Amendment.  
Additionally, a statute that sweeps within its ambit both 
protected and unprotected speech is overbroad.  Accordingly, 
we hold that Code § 18.2-423 violates the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  The convictions in each of 
these appeals will be vacated and the indictments will be 
dismissed. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE WHITING joins, 
concurring. 
 
In the words of the dissent, I, too, “stand second to 
none in my devotion to the First Amendment’s mandate that most 
forms of speech are protected, irrespective of how repugnant 
and offensive the message uttered or conveyed may be to 
others.”  However, in contrast to the dissent, I cannot be 
dissuaded from that devotion, and believe that the “fair 
application of our jurisprudence” must include a fair and 
proper application of the First Amendment.  Therefore, I fully 
agree with the majority opinion.  I write separately to 
address certain inferences and conclusions drawn by the 
dissent. 
 
Relying on the definition of the term “intimidation” set 
forth in Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 
 
21
665, 670 (1985) (“intimidation . . . means putting a victim in 
fear of bodily harm”), the dissent concludes that Code § 18.2-
423 proscribes only conduct that constitutes “true threats.”  
Expanding on that definition, the dissent then states that the 
purpose of Code § 18.2-423 is “to proscribe physical acts 
intended to inflict bodily harm upon the victims of such 
acts.”  The dissent’s attempt to equate an intent to 
intimidate with a “true threat” or a physical act intended to 
inflict bodily harm has no legal basis and misconstrues the 
decision in Sutton. 
 
The issue in that case was whether there was sufficient 
evidence to prove that the defendant engaged in sexual 
intercourse with the victim against her will by intimidation.  
228 Va. at 662, 324 S.E.2d at 669.  Noting that the General 
Assembly had expanded the scope of the statute proscribing 
rape to include “a prohibition against sexual intercourse with 
a woman against her will by threat or intimidation,” as well 
as by force, the Court explained that “[t]here is a difference 
between threat and intimidation[,]” and that “[i]ntimidation 
may occur without threats.”  Id. at 663, 324 S.E.2d at 669-70.  
Thus, our established jurisprudence does not support the 
proposition that Code § 18.2-423 proscribes only conduct that 
constitutes “true threats.”  An act performed with the  intent 
to intimidate, i.e., to place an individual in fear of bodily 
 
22
harm, does not rise to the same level as a threat (defined in 
Sutton as “expression of an intention to do bodily harm,” 228 
Va. at 663, 324 S.E.2d at 670), or a physical act intended to 
inflict bodily harm. 
For the same reason, Code § 18.2-423 does not satisfy the 
principle enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 
(1969), that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”  Although reprehensible and offensive, the act of 
burning a cross with the intent to intimidate is not 
necessarily speech aimed at “producing imminent lawless 
action.”  Id.  That proposition is borne out by the fact that 
the cross burning for which Barry Elton Black was convicted 
occurred on private property with the permission of the owner. 
Even if the dissent were correct that Code § 18.2-423 
proscribes only conduct that constitutes “true threats,” the 
General Assembly cannot engage in content discrimination by 
selectively prohibiting only those “true threats” that convey 
a particular message.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 388 (1992).  Unfortunately, that is what the General 
Assembly has done in Code § 18.2-423 by confining the 
 
23
proscription in that statute to the act of burning a cross.  
The constitutional infirmity is not, as suggested by the 
dissent, cured by the fact that the statute does not prohibit 
all acts of burning a cross.  The statute’s content-based 
discrimination still exists. 
 
Finally, the dissent’s statement that the majority has 
concluded that the Constitution of the United States prevents 
the General Assembly from enacting a statute that prohibits 
persons from burning a cross “in a manner that intentionally 
places citizens in fear of bodily harm” misinterprets the 
holding in the majority opinion.  I believe that a more 
accurate characterization of the majority’s conclusion is that 
the General Assembly may, in a statute of neutral application, 
proscribe expressive conduct performed with the intent to 
intimidate another individual, but that the General Assembly 
may not selectively prohibit only certain acts of intimidation 
based upon the content of the underlying message. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE 
KOONTZ join, dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent.  The majority opinion invalidates a statute 
that for almost 50 years has protected our citizens from being 
placed in fear of bodily harm by the burning of a cross.  The 
majority concludes that the Constitution of the United States 
 
24
prohibits the General Assembly from enacting this statute.  I 
find no such prohibition in either the Constitution of 
Virginia or the Constitution of the United States.  Without 
question, the framers of the First Amendment never 
contemplated that a court would construe that Amendment so 
that it would permit a person to burn a cross in a manner that 
intentionally places citizens in fear of bodily harm. 
 
I am concerned about the fair application of our 
jurisprudence to every citizen and the proper interpretation 
of our Federal and State Constitutions.  These same concerns 
for fairness and the safety of our citizens were the very 
basis for the General Assembly's decision to enact Code 
§ 18.2-423 almost 50 years ago. 
 
I stand second to none in my devotion to the First 
Amendment's mandate that most forms of speech are protected, 
irrespective of how repugnant and offensive the message 
uttered or conveyed may be to others.  However, contrary to 
the view adopted by the majority in these appeals, the First 
Amendment does not permit a person to burn a cross in a manner 
that intentionally places another person in fear of bodily 
harm. 
I. 
A. 
 
25
 
Barry Elton Black was indicted by a Carroll County grand 
jury for the burning of a cross with the intent to intimidate 
in violation of Code § 18.2-423.  At the conclusion of a 
trial, the jury found him guilty as charged in the indictment 
and fixed his punishment at $2,500.  Black appealed the 
circuit court's judgment confirming the jury's verdict to the 
Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction.  Black v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1581-99-3 (December 19, 2000). 
 
The following evidence was presented during Black's 
trial.  On August 22, 1998, H. Warren Manning, the Sheriff of 
Carroll County, received a report that members of the Ku Klux 
Klan intended to conduct a rally in Carroll County that 
evening.  Later, Sheriff Manning drove his police car to the 
site of the rally, where three men dressed in white robes and 
hats approached him.  Sergeant Richard C. Clark, Jr., met 
Sheriff Manning at the site of the rally. 
 
Approximately 45 minutes later, after the rally started, 
Sheriff Manning observed the Klan members burn a cross that 
was approximately 25 to 30 feet tall.  Sheriff Manning 
approached Black and inquired, "who [is] responsible for 
burning the cross?"  Black responded that he was responsible 
for burning the cross, and he was placed under arrest. 
 
26
 
The rally was conducted on property owned by Annabell 
Sechrist.  She was present during the rally, and she had given 
the Ku Klux Klan permission to burn the cross on her property. 
 
Rebecca Sechrist, a Caucasian female, lived on property 
adjacent to the property where the rally occurred.  Sechrist 
observed the rally from her home.  In response to the 
question, "[w]hat statements did you hear?", she testified:  
"They . . . talked a lot about blacks - and I don't call [ ] 
the word they called it . . . it started with an N and I 
don't, I don't use that word, I'm sorry – but they talked real 
bad about the blacks and the Mexicans and they talked about 
how, one . . . guy got up and said that he would love to take 
a .30/.30 and just random shoot the blacks and talked about 
how they would like to send the blacks and the Mexicans back 
from where they come from and talked about President Clinton 
and Hillary Clinton and about the government funding money for 
the, for the people that can't afford housing and stuff and 
. . . how their tax paying goes to keep the black people up 
and stuff like that." 
 
Sechrist testified that she was "scared" as a result of 
the rally.  She stated:  "I was scared our home would get 
burned or something would happen to it.  We've got two . . . 
kids and I was afraid that something would happen to them."  
 
27
In response to a question by defendant's counsel, Sechrist 
testified:  "I think they were trying to scare me." 
B. 
 
Jonathan Stephen O'Mara was indicted by a grand jury in 
the City of Virginia Beach for attempting to burn a cross with 
the intent of intimidating a person or group of persons in 
violation of Code § 18.2-423 and conspiracy to burn a cross in 
violation of Code § 18.2-423.  O'Mara entered a guilty plea 
that reserved his right to file an appeal challenging the 
constitutionality of Code § 18.2-423. 
 
The court fixed O'Mara's punishment at incarceration in 
the jail for a term of 90 days and imposed a fine of $2,500 on 
each of the charges.  O'Mara appealed the judgment to the 
Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions.  O'Mara v. 
Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 525, 535 S.E.2d 175 (2000). 
 
O'Mara entered into a stipulation of facts with the 
Commonwealth, which was made a part of the record in the 
circuit court.  The stipulation states:  "On May 2, 1998, 
David Targee had approximately fifteen individuals, including 
Jonathan O'Mara and Richard Elliott, at his residence in 
Virginia Beach.  They were all consuming alcohol.  Elliott 
complained to Targee and O'Mara about his neighbor and about 
how he wanted to 'get back' at him.  It was suggested (not by 
O'Mara) that they burn a cross in Elliott's neighbor's yard.  
 
28
O'Mara and Targee agreed, and they all went to Targee's garage 
where a cross was built.  They all got in Targee's truck and 
drove to Munden Point Road in Virginia Beach.  Targee was 
driving, with O'Mara in the front passenger seat and Elliott 
in the back seat.  Once there, Elliott handed the cross to 
O'Mara, who also grabbed a can of lighter fluid and went 
outside and placed the cross in the yard of Elliott's 
neighbor.  He then poured lighter fluid on the cross, set it 
on fire, and ran back to the car.  Targee drove them back to 
his house.  The next morning, Elliott's neighbor, James 
Jubilee, came out of his house and observed the partially 
burned cross in his yard.  He broke the cross and placed [it] 
in the garage.  He later called the police." 
C. 
 
A grand jury in the City of Virginia Beach indicted 
Richard J. Elliott for attempting to burn a cross on the 
property of James S. Jubilee with the intent of intimidating 
any person or group of persons in violation of Code § 18.2-423 
and conspiracy to burn a cross in violation of Code § 18.2-
423.  At the conclusion of a trial, the jury found Elliott 
guilty of attempted cross burning with the intent to 
intimidate and fixed his punishment at 90 days incarceration 
in jail and a fine of $2,500.  Elliott appealed the circuit 
 
29
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his 
conviction.  See O'Mara, 33 Va. App. 525, 535 S.E.2d 175. 
 
The following evidence was adduced at the trial.  James 
Jubilee resided at 2044 Munden Point Road in Virginia Beach.  
One day, Mr. Jubilee told his next door neighbor, Mrs. 
Elliott, that he was concerned because persons were 
discharging firearms in her backyard.  Mrs. Elliott responded 
that her husband maintained a firing range in the rear of her 
yard. 
 
On May 2, 1998, David Targee had a party at his home 
where he entertained Jonathan O'Mara, Richard Elliott, and 
others.  Richard Elliott, who had consumed alcoholic 
beverages, mentioned that "his neighbors were complaining 
about him shooting in his backyard . . . .  He wanted to get 
back at them for doing it." 
 
Later that evening, Targee, Elliott, and O'Mara went to 
Targee's parents' garage and constructed a wooden cross.  
After they had constructed the cross, they traveled by car to 
Mr. Jubilee's home where O'Mara placed the cross in the yard 
and ignited it.  The next morning between 8:15 and 8:30, Mr. 
Jubilee saw the cross, which contained "burn spots."  He 
picked it up and broke it. 
 
Jennifer Luning, O'Mara's former "girlfriend," testified 
that O'Mara admitted that he, Targee, and Richard Elliott had 
 
30
burned the cross.  "He had said that before they actually went 
out and did it that there was a conversation taking place 
about Richard had been complaining or the neighbors had been 
complaining about shooting [guns] in the backyard." 
 
Edwin Coyner, a fire investigator for the City of 
Virginia Beach, testified that he interviewed Targee several 
times.  Targee informed Coyner that "Richard Elliott had 
complained about his neighbors because the neighbors had 
complained about him shooting in the backyard."  
II. 
A. 
 
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States provides in part:  "Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech."  Article I, § 12 of the 
Constitution of Virginia states: 
"That the freedoms of speech and of the press are 
among the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never 
be restrained except by despotic governments; that 
any citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right; that the General Assembly 
shall not pass any law abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press, nor the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for the redress of grievances." 
 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action in 
violation of the First Amendment.  The freedom of speech 
guaranteed by Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia 
 
31
is co-extensive with the protections guaranteed by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
 
Code § 18.2-423 states: 
 
"It shall be unlawful for any person or 
persons, with the intent of intimidating any person 
or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, 
a cross on the property of another, a highway or 
other public place.  Any person who shall violate 
any provision of this section shall be guilty of a 
Class 6 felony. 
 
"Any such burning of a cross shall be prima 
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person 
or group of persons." 
 
B. 
 
We have held, since the birth of this Commonwealth, that 
"the judiciary may and ought to adjudge a law unconstitutional 
and void, if it be plainly repugnant to the letter of the 
Constitution, or the fundamental principles thereof."  Kamper 
v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 40 (1793).  However, 
clearly engrained within our jurisprudence is the principle 
that this Court  
"can declare an act of the general assembly void 
only when such act clearly and plainly violates the 
[C]onstitution, and in such manner as to leave no 
doubt or hesitation on our minds. 
 
"This rule has been repeatedly declared by this 
court. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
The presumption always is that the legislature 
has judged correctly of its constitutional powers, 
and the contrary must be clearly demonstrated before 
a co-ordinate branch of the government can be called 
 
32
upon to interfere between the people and their 
immediate representatives." 
 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 951, 953 (1875).  
Indeed, we have repeatedly held that "[e]very act of the 
legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the courts 
are powerless to declare an act invalid, except where it 
appears beyond doubt that it contravenes some provision of the 
State or Federal Constitution.  If we doubt we must sustain 
its constitutionality."  Tobacco Growers Co-Operative Assoc. 
v. Danville Warehouse Co., 144 Va. 456, 469, 132 S.E. 482, 486 
(1926).  We restated this fundamental principle in Harrison v. 
Day, 200 Va. 764, 770, 107 S.E.2d 594, 598 (1959): 
"When the constitutionality of an act is challenged, 
a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party 
making the challenge.  All laws are presumed to be 
constitutional and this presumption is one of the 
strongest known to the law.  As we said in Almond v. 
Day, 199 Va. 1, 6, 97 S.E.2d 824[, 828 (1957)]:  
'. . . It is only where an act is plainly repugnant 
to some constitutional provision that the courts can 
declare it null and void.  If there be a reasonable 
doubt whether the act violates the fundamental law, 
that doubt must be resolved in favor of the act.' "  
 
Accord Jefferson Green Unit Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Gwinn, 262 
Va. 449, 459, 551 S.E.2d 339, 344 (2001); Motley v. Virginia 
State Bar, 260 Va. 243, 247, 536 S.E.2d 97, 99 (2000); Finn v. 
Virginia Retirement System, 259 Va. 144, 153, 524 S.E.2d 125, 
130 (2000); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, 257 Va. 1, 
9, 509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999); Mumpower v. Housing Authority, 
 
33
176 Va. 426, 443, 11 S.E.2d 732, 738 (1940); Antoni v. Wright, 
63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 833, 882 (1872); Auditor of Public Accounts 
v. Graham, 5 Va. (1 Call) 475, 476 (1798).  For some 
inexplicable reason, the majority ignores this fundamental 
principle. 
C. 
 
Black, O'Mara, and Elliott (the defendants), relying 
principally upon R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992), argue that Code § 18.2-423 violates their right to 
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 12 of the 
Constitution of Virginia and that the Court of Appeals erred 
by holding that the statute comported with these 
constitutional provisions.  I disagree with the defendants. 
 
Initially, I observe that Code § 18.2-423, by its express 
terms, does not proscribe every act of burning a cross.  
Rather, Code § 18.2-423 only proscribes the act of burning a 
cross when such act is performed "with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group of persons" and the act is 
committed "on the property of another, a highway or other 
public place."  In the context of our criminal statutes, 
specifically Code § 18.2-61, we have defined intimidation as 
acts which put the victim "in fear of bodily harm.  Such fear 
must arise from the willful conduct of the accused, rather 
 
34
than from some mere temperamental timidity of the victim; 
however, the fear of the victim need not be so great as to 
result in terror, panic, or hysteria."  Sutton v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985). 
 
Thus, applying the clear and unambiguous language in Code 
§ 18.2-423 in conjunction with our established definition of 
intimidation, which the majority ignores, I conclude that Code 
§ 18.2-423 only proscribes conduct which constitutes "true 
threats."  And, I note that the United States Supreme Court, 
in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969), approved 
the facial constitutionality of a federal criminal statute 
that prohibited someone from threatening the life of the 
President of the United States.  It is well established that 
true threats of violence can be proscribed by statute without 
infringing upon the First Amendment. 
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 
(1994); Nat'l Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, ___ 
F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir. 2001); Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 
782 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 115 
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Nosair v. United States, 
528 U.S. 982 (1999); United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 
122-23 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 
825 (8th Cir. 1994).  However, I must continue this inquiry 
regarding the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-423 because in 
 
35
R.A.V., supra, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
imposes certain limitations upon the regulation of speech and 
expressive conduct, including true threats. 
 
In R.A.V., the Supreme Court considered whether an 
ordinance was facially invalid under the First Amendment.  In 
R.A.V., the defendant, along with several other teenagers, 
made a wooden cross and burned it in a yard owned by a black 
family.  The defendant was convicted of violating the 
following ordinance: 
 
"Whoever places on public or private property a 
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or 
graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning 
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct 
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 
 
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was facially 
unconstitutional because it prohibited otherwise permitted 
speech solely on the basis of the content of the speech, even 
though the Minnesota Supreme Court had concluded that the 
ordinance only prohibited unprotected "fighting words."  
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-81. 
 
The Supreme Court observed, however, that certain "areas 
of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be 
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) – not that they are 
 
36
categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, 
so that they may be made the vehicles for content 
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable 
content.  Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may 
not make the further content discrimination of proscribing 
only libel critical of the government."  Id. at 383-84. 
 
The Supreme Court explained: 
 
"When the basis for the content discrimination 
consists entirely of the very reason the entire 
class of speech at issue is proscribable, no 
significant danger of idea or viewpoint 
discrimination exists.  Such a reason, having been 
adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the 
entire class of speech from First Amendment 
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis 
of distinction within the class.  To illustrate:  a 
State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity 
which is the most patently offensive in its 
prurience – i.e., that which involves the most 
lascivious displays of sexual activity.  But it may 
not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which 
includes offensive political messages.  See Kucharek 
v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1041 (1991).  And the Federal 
Government can criminalize only those threats of 
violence that are directed against the President, 
see 18 U.S.C. § 871 – since the reasons why threats 
of violence are outside the First Amendment 
(protecting individuals from the fear of violence, 
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from 
the possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur) have special force when applied to the person 
of the President.  See Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705, 707 (1969). . . .  But the Federal 
Government may not criminalize only those threats 
against the President that mention his policy on aid 
to inner cities.  And to take a final example . . . 
a State may choose to regulate price advertising in 
one industry, but not in others, because the risk of 
fraud . . . is in its view greater there. . . .  But 
 
37
a State may not prohibit only that commercial 
advertising that depicts men in a demeaning 
fashion." 
 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388-89. 
 
The Supreme Court also articulated a second basis which 
would permit some degree of content-based discrimination. 
 
"Another valid basis for according differential 
treatment to even a content-defined subclass of 
proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to 
be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of 
the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified 
without reference to the content of the . . . 
speech.'  Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 48 (1986) . . . .  A State could, for 
example, permit all obscene live performances except 
those involving minors.  Moreover, since words can 
in some circumstances violate laws directed not 
against speech, but against conduct . . . a 
particular content-based subcategory of a 
proscribable class of speech can be swept up 
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed 
at conduct, rather than speech. . . .  Where the 
government does not target conduct on the basis of 
its expressive content, acts are not shielded from 
regulation merely because they express a 
discriminatory idea or philosophy. 
 
"These bases for distinction refute the 
proposition that the selectivity of the restriction 
is 'even arguably "conditioned upon the sovereign's 
agreement with what a speaker may intend to say." '  
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 
(1981) . . . .  There may be other such bases as 
well.  Indeed, to validate such selectivity (where 
totally proscribable speech is at issue), it may not 
even be necessary to identify any particular 
'neutral' basis, so long as the nature of the 
content discrimination is such that there is no 
realistic possibility that official suppression of 
ideas is afoot. . . .  Save for that limitation, the 
regulation of 'fighting words,' like the regulation 
of noisy speech, may address some offensive 
instances and leave other, equally offensive, 
instances alone." 
 
38
 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90. 
 
In invalidating the City of St. Paul's ordinance, the 
Supreme Court stated that  
"[a]lthough the phrase in the ordinance 'arouses 
anger, alarm or resentment in others,' has been 
limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
construction to reach only those symbols or displays 
that amount to 'fighting words,' the remaining, 
unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance 
applies only to 'fighting words' that insult, or 
provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender.'  Displays containing 
abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, 
are permissible unless they are addressed to one of 
the specified disfavored topics.  Those who wish to 
use 'fighting words' in connection with other ideas 
– to express hostility, for example, on the basis of 
political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality – are not covered.  The First 
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special 
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on 
disfavored subjects."  
 
Id. at 391. 
 
Continuing, the Supreme Court explained: 
 
"What we have here, it must be emphasized, is 
not a prohibition of fighting words that are 
directed at certain persons or groups (which would 
be facially valid if it met the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause); but rather, a prohibition 
of fighting words that contain . . . messages of 
'bias-motivated' hatred and, in particular, as 
applied to this case, messages 'based on virulent 
notions of racial supremacy.' " 
 
Id. at 392 (citation omitted). 
 
Contrary to the majority's opinion, Code § 18.2-423 does 
not suffer from the defects contained in the ordinance at 
 
39
issue in R.A.V.  As previously stated, Code § 18.2-423 does 
not prohibit every act of burning of a cross.  Rather, the 
statute only prohibits the burning of a cross when such act is 
performed with the intent to intimidate.  And, consistent with 
our jurisprudence, the word "intimidate" means to place one in 
fear of bodily harm.  Unlike the City of St. Paul's ordinance, 
which targeted cross burning on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender, Code § 18.2-423 does not contain 
those limitations.  The conduct proscribed in the Virginia 
statute applies to any individual who burns a cross for any 
reason provided the cross is burned with the intent to 
intimidate.  That point is best illustrated in O'Mara and 
Elliott because these defendants burned a cross because they 
were angry that their neighbor had complained about the 
presence of a firearm shooting range in the Elliotts' yard, 
not because of any racial animus. 
 
Additionally, the Supreme Court pointed out in R.A.V. 
that a valid basis for according differential treatment even 
to a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is when 
the subclass happens to be associated with particular 
secondary effects of the speech so that the regulation is 
justified without reference to the content of the speech.  The 
ordinance that the Supreme Court invalidated in R.A.V. 
targeted any cross burning that "one knows or has reasonable 
 
40
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment."  505 U.S. 
at 380. 
 
By contrast, from its clear and unambiguous language, the 
purpose of the Virginia statute, Code § 18.2-423, is not to 
suppress repugnant ideas, but rather to proscribe physical 
acts intended to inflict bodily harm upon the victims of such 
acts.  Simply stated, the Virginia statute proscribes acts of 
intimidation, but it does not prohibit persons from expressing 
their views, irrespective of how repugnant or offensive those 
views may be to others.  The Virginia statute does not 
prohibit the burning of a cross so long as that act is 
committed without an intent to place a person in fear of 
bodily harm.  See also In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 
646, 647-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (statute proscribing the act 
of "burn[ing] a cross on the private property of another for 
the purpose of terrorizing the owner or occupant or in 
reckless disregard of that risk" is not impermissible content-
based prohibition on speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 220, 225-27 (Wash. 
1993) (statute proscribing cross burning that places another 
person in reasonable fear of harm to his person or property 
does not violate the First Amendment). 
 
I recognize that the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in 
State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511 (S.C. 1993), invalidated a 
 
41
statute that prohibited the burning of a cross on the basis 
that it contravened the First Amendment.  The South Carolina 
statute, however, was significantly different from the 
Virginia statute.  The South Carolina statute stated:  "It 
shall be unlawful for any person to place or cause to be 
placed in a public place in the State a burning or flaming 
cross or any manner of exhibit in which a burning or flaming 
cross, real or simulated, is the whole or a part . . . without 
first obtaining written permission of the owner or occupier of 
the premises so to do."  Id. at 514. 
 
Unlike Code § 18.2-423, which proscribes the burning of a 
cross with the intent of intimidating and, thus, prohibits 
real threats, the South Carolina statute contained no similar 
limitation.  The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded 
that its statute was enacted "in order to protect individuals 
and society as a whole from the reprehensible messages often 
sought to be symbolicly expressed by a burning cross."  
Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d at 514.  As I have already explained, 
Virginia's statute does not suffer from this constitutional 
defect.  Thus, the differences between the Virginia statute 
and the South Carolina statute are real and significant.  Yet, 
the majority ignores the differences between Code § 18.2-423 
and the South Carolina statute. 
 
42
 
I also observe that the Maryland Court of Appeals, in 
State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 755 (Md. 1993), held that a 
Maryland statute violated the First Amendment because it 
required those who wished to burn crosses or religious symbols 
to "secure the permission of the property owner where the 
burning is to occur and [to] notify the local fire department 
before engaging in the burning."  That statute stated in part:   
 
"It shall be unlawful for any person or persons 
to burn or cause to be burned any cross or other 
religious symbol upon any private or public property 
within this State without the express consent of the 
owner of such property and without first giving 
notice to the fire department which services the 
area in which such burning is to take place." 
 
Id. at 755.  Unlike the Virginia statute, the Maryland statute 
did not proscribe burning a cross with the intent of 
intimidating, but rather, is content-based regulation of 
expression.  The Maryland Supreme Court found "no way to 
justify the cross burning statute without referring to the 
substance of speech it regulates, because the statute does not 
protect property owners or the community from unwanted fires 
any more than the law already protected those groups before 
the statute's enactment."  Id. at 755.  Yet, the majority 
ignores these significant distinctions. 
III. 
 
Defendant Black argues that Code § 18.2-423 "does not 
incorporate the requirements that the speech at issue be 
 
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directed to the incitement of imminent lawless action, and 
likely to produce such action, and as such is unconstitutional 
under the standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio, and the Brandenburg 
standard was not satisfied here."  I disagree with the 
defendant.  The Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) simply has no application here. 
 
The Supreme Court considered the following facts in 
Brandenburg.  Brandenburg, "a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, 
was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for 
'advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of 
crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as 
a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' and 
for 'voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or 
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the 
doctrines of criminal syndicalism.' "  Id. at 444-45 
(alteration in original). 
 
Brandenburg placed a telephone call to a reporter on the 
staff of a television station and invited the reporter to 
attend a Ku Klux Klan rally that would be held at a certain 
farm.  "[T]he reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting 
and filmed the events.  Portions of the films were later 
broadcast on the local station and on a national network."  
Id. at 445.  The prosecutor relied upon the films and 
testimony identifying the defendant as the person who 
 
44
communicated with the reporter and who spoke at the rally.  
The prosecutor "also introduced into evidence several articles 
appearing in the film, including a pistol, a rifle, a shotgun, 
ammunition, a Bible, and a red hood worn by the speaker in the 
films."  The only persons present at the rally other than the 
participants were the newsmen who made the film.  Id. at 445-
46. 
 
The Supreme Court pointed out that "the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State 
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action."  Id. at 447.  Continuing, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated that  
"the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral 
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to 
force and violence, is not the same as preparing a 
group for violent action and steeling it to such 
action. . . .  A statute which fails to draw this 
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our 
Constitution has immunized from governmental 
control." 
 
Id. at 448. 
 
The Supreme Court invalidated the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism Act because neither the indictment nor the trial 
court's instructions to the jury "refined the statute's bald 
 
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definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not 
distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action."  
Id. at 448-49. 
 
In stark contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brandenburg, we are not concerned here with abstract teaching 
regarding the moral propriety or even moral necessity of 
violence as a means for accomplishing political reform.  
Rather, the subject of this case is Code § 18.2-423, a statute 
which proscribes the burning of a cross with the intent to 
intimidate, which we have held means to place the victim in 
fear of bodily harm.  And, I note that the jury at defendant 
Black's trial was specifically instructed that 
 
"[i]ntimidate, as used in the term 'with the 
intent to intimidate' means a motivation to 
intentionally put a person or group of persons in 
fear of bodily harm.  Such fear must arise from the 
willful conduct of the accused, rather than from 
some mere temperamental timidity of the victim; 
however, the fear of the victim need not be so great 
as to result in terror, panic, or hysteria." 
 
 
I have already observed, in response to defendant's 
counsel's questions at trial, Rebecca Sechrist testified that 
she was afraid that her "home would get burned or something 
would happen to it."  Moreover, defendant Black has never 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that his acts placed 
Sechrist in fear of bodily harm. 
 
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IV. 
 
Defendant Black argues that "[t]he provision of Code 
§ 18.2-423 providing that the burning of a cross shall be 
prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate permits a jury 
to find intimidation from the mere act of cross-burning alone, 
in contravention of the First Amendment."  I disagree. 
 
Code § 18.2-423 creates a statutory inference, and we 
have stated that an "inference merely applies to the rational 
potency or probative value of an evidentiary fact to which the 
fact finder may attach whatever force or weight it deems 
best."  Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 526 n.1, 369 S.E.2d 
397, 399 n.1 (1988).  Additionally, "inferences are never 
allowed to stand against ascertained and established facts."  
Ragland v. Rutledge, 234 Va. 216, 219, 361 S.E.2d 133, 135  
(1987) (citing Southern Ry. v. Mays, 192 Va. 68, 76, 63 S.E.2d 
720, 725, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 836 (1951)). 
 
This statutory inference is a factor that the jury may 
accept or reject in determining whether a defendant burned a 
cross with the intent to intimidate a victim.  This inference 
alone, however, is clearly insufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant burned a cross with the 
intent to intimidate.  And, this statutory inference does not, 
and cannot, absolve the Commonwealth of its burden to prove 
each element of Code § 18.2-423 beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
47
 
Moreover, the jury in Black's trial was specifically 
instructed as follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
 
 
"THE COURT INSTRUCTS THE JURY THAT: 
 
 
"The burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove 
by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt every 
material and necessary element of the offense 
charged.  It is not sufficient that the jury believe 
the defendant's guilt probable, or more probable 
than his innocence.  Suspicion or probability of 
guilt, however strong, will not authorize a 
conviction.  The evidence must prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury shall not 
speculate or go outside the evidence to consider 
what they think might have taken place, but you are 
to confine your consideration to the evidence 
introduced by the Commonwealth and the defense and 
unless you believe that the guilt of Barry Elton 
Black has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt as 
to every material and necessary element of the 
offense charged against him, then you shall find him 
not guilty." 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
 
 
"THE COURT INSTRUCTS THE JURY THAT: 
 
 
"The defendant is charged with the crime of 
placing a burning cross in a public place with the 
intent to intimidate.  The Commonwealth must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements of that crime: 
 
"(1) That the defendant burned or caused to be 
burned a cross in a public place; and  
 
"(2) That he did so with the intent to 
intimidate any person or group of persons. 
 
"If you find from the evidence that the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
each of the above elements of the offense as 
charged, then you shall find the defendant guilty, 
 
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but you shall not fix the punishment until your 
verdict has been returned and further evidence has 
been heard by you. 
 
"If you find that the Commonwealth has failed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either or both of 
the elements of the offense, then you shall find the 
defendant not guilty." 
 
As these jury instructions indicate, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove each and every element of its case, 
including the requirement of intimidation, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgments 
of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
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