Case Title: State ex rel. Hughes v. Conrad

Citation: 1998-Ohio-297

Docket Number: 19972561

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. HUGHES, APPELLEE, v. CONRAD, ADMR.; AMCAST INDUSTRIAL 
CORPORATION, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hughes v. Conrad (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 540.] 
Workers’ compensation — Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 97-2561 — Submitted August 19, 1998 — Decided November 10, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD10-1352. 
__________________ 
 
Koltak & Gibson, L.L.P., Ronald J. Koltak and Peter J. Gibson, for 
appellee. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Charles D. Smith and Matthew J. Arnold, for 
appellant. 
__________________ 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed consistent with the opinion 
of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I would issue a limited writ ordering 
the Industrial Commission to reconsider its 1991 order and the claimant’s 
eligibility for permanent total disability (“PTD”) benefits in light of evidence that 
the claimant was employed during his incarceration. 
 
The 1991 order suspended the claimant’s PTD benefits, pursuant to a 1986 
amendment to R.C. 4123.54, based on his incarceration.  However, at the time of 
the hearing in 1991, the record contained an interoffice communication to the 
warden in the institution where the claimant was incarcerated, dated June 25, 
 
2
1991, stating that the claimant had been employed in the institution since 
December 1987.  The commission failed to acknowledge this evidence in its order. 
 
Although this court subsequently found in State ex rel. Brown v. Indus. 
Comm. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 45, 623 N.E.2d 55, that the suspension of PTD 
benefits on the basis of incarceration alone was contrary to law where the injury 
predated the 1986 amendment to R.C. 4123.54, it does not follow, if there is 
evidence that the claimant is employed while incarcerated, that the PTD award 
cannot be suspended or terminated on that basis.  There is justification for a 
change or modification of a prior PTD finding if there is evidence produced, 
subsequent to the original PTD finding, that the claimant is capable of sustained 
remunerative employment.  Here, I believe that the fact of incarceration is 
irrelevant if the evidence supports a finding that the claimant is presently 
employed and, therefore, capable of sustained remunerative employment. 
 
Therefore, I would order the commission to rehear the employer’s motion to 
suspend PTD benefits, and to investigate and seek additional evidence, if 
necessary, as to the permanent total disability of Hughes.  The commission should 
determine whether Hughes’s activities as a clerk in the institution constitute a 
sufficient change of circumstances to modify the original finding of PTD.  See 
State ex rel. Grissom v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 311, 312-313, 681 
N.E.2d 434, 435-436 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.