Case Title: Heidi Frisch v. Ronald J. Henrichs

Citation: 2007 WI 102

Docket Number: 2005AP000534

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 102 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP534 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
 
Heidi Frisch, f/k/a Heidi Henrichs, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Ronald J. Henrichs, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 64 
Reported at: 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 N.W.2d 139 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Ralph M. Ramirez 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, Jr., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Thomas L. Frenn, Kelly M. Dodd, and Petrie & Stocking S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Kelly M. Dodd.  
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by Richard 
J. Podell, Barbara J. Stippich, and Richard J. Podell & 
Associates, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Richard J. 
Podell. 
 
 
2007 WI 102
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP534   
(L.C. No. 
1992FA893) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Heidi Frisch, f/k/a Heidi Henrichs, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald J. Henrichs, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, reversing a judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Ralph M. Ramirez, Judge.  
Frisch v. Henrichs, 2006 WI App 64, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 
N.W.2d 139.  We are asked to address whether the circuit court 
may use its remedial contempt power to craft a remedy where a 
party has consistently failed to provide tax returns and income 
information in a timely manner as required under statute, a 
No.  2005AP000534   
2 
 
divorce judgment, and a court order, but does produce the 
information before the contempt hearing.   
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, which 
found Ronald J. Henrichs (Ronald) in contempt for failing to 
produce tax information on an annual basis to his former wife 
Heidi Frisch, f/k/a Heidi Henrichs (Heidi), and for failing to 
timely report substantial changes in his income, as required 
under statute, their divorce judgment, a November 1995 court 
order, and a stipulation entered into between Ronald and Heidi.  
The circuit court also held that the stipulation between the 
parties, which set a ceiling on the amount of Ronald's child 
support obligations for four years, was not in the best 
interests of the parties' children and was contrary to public 
policy.  The circuit court ordered Ronald to pay Heidi $100,000 
as compensation for Ronald's contemptuous conduct and also 
ordered Ronald to pay $32,000 of Heidi's attorney fees on 
grounds that he had engaged in overtrial.1   
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
circuit court improperly employed remedial contempt because 
Ronald's contempt was no longer continuing at the time of the 
contempt hearing.  The court of appeals noted that Ronald had 
provided Heidi with all the tax information before the contempt 
hearing; therefore, the contempt was no longer continuing and 
                                                 
1 Overtrial is a family law doctrine "that may be invoked 
when one party's unreasonable approach to litigation causes the 
other party to incur extra and unnecessary fees."  Zhang v. Yu, 
2001 WI App 267, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 913, 637 N.W.2d 754.   
No.  2005AP000534   
3 
 
the circuit court was not authorized under Wis. Stat. ch. 785 to 
employ remedial contempt.  The court of appeals also held that 
the stipulation between Ronald and Heidi was not contrary to 
public policy.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's order that Ronald pay $100,000 to Heidi and also 
reversed the $32,000 overtrial award.   
¶4 
We reverse the court of appeals and hold that the 
circuit court properly employed remedial contempt in this case.  
Ronald's contempt was continuing at the time of the contempt 
hearing because, although he had provided Heidi with complete 
tax and income information at the time of the hearing, his 
failure to produce the information in a timely manner, as 
required, permitted him to evade exposure to the possibility of 
a modification of his child support obligation and thereby 
deprived Heidi and their children of their traditional remedies 
under statutory law.  The timely provision of information was an 
essential element of the court's order.  Because Ronald could 
not and did not turn back time when he produced the required 
information too late to be acted on, his contempt was and is 
continuing 
within 
the 
legislative 
directive 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m).2  This continuing contempt in relation 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) gave the circuit court authority to 
fashion an alternative purge condition of $100,000 to allow 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP000534   
4 
 
Ronald to purge himself of his continuing contempt.3  We also 
conclude 
that 
the 
stipulation 
between 
the 
parties 
was 
unenforceable because it was not in the best interests of the 
children and therefore contrary to public policy.   
¶5 
We therefore reverse the court of appeals and affirm 
the circuit court, which ordered Ronald to pay Heidi a sum of 
$100,000 for loss suffered as a result of Ronald's contempt and 
$32,000 in attorney fees for Ronald's overtrial. 
BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Ronald and Heidi divorced in 1993 after ten years of 
marriage.  On August 16, 1993, Waukesha County Circuit Court 
Judge James Kieffer entered a judgment of divorce, which 
incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement.  The 
agreement awarded the parties joint legal custody of two minor 
children but gave primary physical placement to Heidi.  In 
addition, it required Ronald to pay Heidi $600 per month in 
child support.  Ronald represented that he would be able to pay 
this amount despite an annual income of only $11,000.  A 
provision 
of 
the 
divorce 
judgment 
referenced 
Wis. Stat. § 767.263 (1993-94), which required child support 
obligors to report all substantial changes in income within 10 
days to the clerk of court.4  The agreement also provided that as 
long as Ronald had an obligation to pay support, he was to 
                                                 
3 Satisfaction of an alternative purge condition terminates 
the continuing contempt of court.   
4 The current statute (2005-06) requires notification to the 
county child support agency.     
No.  2005AP000534   
5 
 
provide Heidi with a copy of his Form 1040 tax return, together 
with all schedules. 
¶7 
 Eleven months after the divorce was final, Ronald 
obtained a $165,000 residential mortgage based on a sworn 
statement to the lender that his monthly income was $5852.03 (or 
roughly $70,225 per year).  On January 24, 1995, Heidi moved for 
an increase in child support pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.32, 
for a finding of contempt based on Ronald’s alleged failure to 
provide copies of his income tax returns, and for an award of 
costs and attorney fees.  After several other motions were 
filed, Heidi’s contempt motion was dismissed.  
¶8 
A hearing on the motion for increased child support 
was held on November 14, 1995.  Ronald testified that the income 
figures on his loan application were false and that his annual 
income was truly about $30,000.  The court found, however, that 
Ronald had fraudulently misrepresented his income, and it set a 
revised child support award of $1463 per month retroactive to 
February 1, 1995.5  This amount represented 25 percent of what 
Ronald 
purported 
to 
be 
his 
annual 
income 
on 
the 
loan 
application.6  In addition, to monitor the situation, the court 
ordered Ronald to provide Heidi with copies of his annual 
personal and corporate tax returns by May 12 of each year as 
                                                 
5 The award was made retroactive to February 1, 1995, which 
was within days after Ronald was served with Heidi's motion.  
6 The court noted that the task of figuring out Ronald's 
exact income was "a very troubled proceeding."  Without any 
credible evidence of Ronald's income, the court imputed to 
Ronald an annual earning of $70,225.  
No.  2005AP000534   
6 
 
long as he had an ongoing child support obligation.  Finally, 
the court found that Ronald had engaged in overtrial and ordered 
him to pay $5000 in attorney fees.  This finding was followed by 
further litigation, including a motion by Ronald to reduce his 
child support obligation and a motion by Heidi to hold Ronald in 
contempt for his failure to pay child support.  
¶9 
On October 29, 1996, the parties entered into a 
stipulation modifying child support to $1050 per month and 
imposing a four-year moratorium on litigation.  The parties 
stipulated 
that 
neither 
Ronald 
nor 
Heidi 
would 
seek 
a 
modification of the child support order before January 1, 2001, 
due to a change in economic circumstances, specifically income 
fluctuations.7  The stipulation reiterated Ronald’s continuing 
obligation to provide Heidi with copies of his tax returns.  
¶10 At the hearing on the proposed stipulation, Heidi’s 
attorney noted that each of the parties had been assisted by 
counsel and certified public accountants in negotiating and 
drafting the stipulation.  Under questioning by the court, both 
parties represented that they had discussed the stipulation with 
their attorneys, understood the provisions, had no questions, 
and believed the stipulation to be in their children’s best 
interests.  Heidi's counsel noted that counsel for both parties 
explained that Wisconsin public policy discourages agreements 
that bar parents from seeking child support modifications.  The 
                                                 
7 The parties could come to court due to a change in 
unforeseen circumstances, such as death of a child, and for the 
purpose of enforcing court orders.  
No.  2005AP000534   
7 
 
court also explained to the parties that they could enter into 
the stipulation but that the court could not order the same.  
The parties said they understood, and the court approved the 
stipulation. 
¶11 Except for a February 1999 stipulation modifying child 
support as a result of a change in dependent health and dental 
insurance, the parties remained out of court as agreed.  After 
the moratorium’s expiration date of January 1, 2001, Ronald 
filed motions on May 22, 2002, one to obtain primary placement 
of the parties’ son, and a second to reduce his required child 
support payments to Heidi because the parties' daughter was 
vacating Heidi's residence.  The court commissioner granted 
Ronald's motion to reduce his child support obligation on July 
19, 2002, conditioned on the fact that the parties' daughter 
would reside with Ronald or reside in an apartment paid for by 
Ronald.  The court commissioner reduced the amount of Ronald's 
monthly child support obligation to $691.89, effective August 
10, 2002. 
¶12 In August 2002 Heidi brought a pro se contempt motion 
against Ronald for his continuing failure to provide copies of 
his tax returns since 1996 and for dishonesty in reporting his 
income.8  At a September 24, 2002, hearing on the motion, the 
court dismissed Heidi’s contempt motion on the basis that Heidi 
had received the requested income tax returns from Ronald.  At 
                                                 
8 At this point, the case had been transferred to Judge 
Ralph Ramirez, who presided over all subsequent proceedings. 
No.  2005AP000534   
8 
 
the hearing, Heidi also orally requested an increase in child 
support.  The court directed Heidi to file a written motion 
relating to this request.  The court set a hearing date for 
January 8, 2003, and ordered that Ronald's motion for change of 
placement be heard at that time.   
¶13 On October 28, 2002, before the scheduled hearing of 
January 8, 2003, Heidi obtained counsel and immediately filed an 
amended motion seeking, among other things, the following: (1) 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07 relief from the court commissioner's July 
2002 order reducing Ronald's child support obligation; (2) 
increased child support retroactive to May 2002; and (3) an 
award of attorney fees and expenses based on a claim that 
Ronald's motion to modify child support and his motion to modify 
placement were frivolous.  
¶14 In support of the motion, Heidi alleged that Ronald 
had 
provided 
incomplete 
tax 
returns 
and 
fraudulently 
misrepresented 
his 
actual 
income 
with 
the 
intention 
of 
defrauding Heidi of child support to which she was entitled.  
Specifically, Heidi alleged that until July 2, 2002, Ronald had 
failed to provide personal and corporate tax returns required by 
the 1996 stipulation.  After Heidi sought to have Ronald held in 
contempt for his failure to provide the tax information, Ronald 
provided Heidi with what he alleged were his personal and 
corporate tax returns at a July 2, 2002, hearing.  Heidi alleged 
that after the hearing, she learned that Ronald had provided 
only partial returns for the years 2000 and 2001 and that these 
returns did not include all schedules.  Heidi alleged that 
No.  2005AP000534   
9 
 
Ronald had still not provided her with complete personal and 
corporate tax returns for 1996 to 2001.  Based on the returns 
she had received, Heidi alleged that Ronald earned more income 
than he had disclosed.   
¶15 After this motion was filed and before the scheduled 
hearing date of January 8, 2003, Heidi filed a flurry of 
requests for depositions and written discovery, followed by 
Ronald's motions to avoid and limit such discovery, and a motion 
for a protective order.  Specifically, Heidi filed a notice of 
deposition and subpoena duces tecum on Ronald, demanding that 
Ronald submit to an oral examination and produce numerous 
documents, including the following: (1) copies of his complete 
personal 
state 
and 
federal 
income 
tax 
returns 
with 
W-2 
statements and all schedules for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001; 
(2) copies of his complete corporate state and federal income 
tax returns with all schedules and attachments for the years 
1999, 2000, and 2001; (3) copies of all corporate monthly 
balance sheets and monthly general ledgers for the years 1998, 
1999, 2000, and 2001; and numerous other financial documents, 
such as copies of all stocks, bonds, mutual funds or similar 
assets, 
and 
copies 
of 
trust 
documents, 
life 
insurance 
statements, and so forth.  Ronald thereafter filed a motion for 
protective order, as Ronald alleged, to protect himself from the 
undue burden of obtaining the "irrelevant and voluminous 
documents" requested by Heidi.  The court, however, ordered 
Ronald to submit to a deposition.  Heidi later alleged that at 
this 
deposition 
Ronald 
"provided 
really 
no 
information 
No.  2005AP000534   
10 
 
pertaining to his income [and] produced very little information 
pertaining to his assets."  
¶16 At the January 8, 2003, hearing, the court was 
presented with a stipulation and order modifying placement of 
the parties' minor son with Ronald.9  The court approved the 
stipulation.  Since Ronald now had primary placement of both 
children, the court ordered Ronald to cease paying child support 
to Heidi.  The court held open the issue of Heidi's child 
support obligations to Ronald.  At the hearing, the court also 
addressed Heidi's motion for a retroactive increase in child 
support.  At that hearing, Heidi broadened her earlier request 
for an increase in child support by orally requesting an 
increase in child support retroactive to 1996, not just to May 
2002.  Testimony was taken at this hearing, but the court 
adjourned the hearing to a later date.   
¶17 On May 20, 2003, the court addressed Heidi’s request 
for relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 as well as her motion to 
increase 
child 
support. 
 
However, 
the 
motions 
remained 
unresolved, and the matter was again continued.  After this 
hearing, Ronald moved to dismiss Heidi’s motion to retroactively 
modify child support and also moved to limit the time frame of 
evidence relating to his income to the time period subsequent to 
Heidi's motion dated October 28, 2002.  
                                                 
9 An emergency court order in November 2002 transferred 
temporary placement of the parties’ minor son to Ronald.  
No.  2005AP000534   
11 
 
¶18 Later in October 2003 Heidi filed another contempt 
motion against Ronald for his failure to provide notice that his 
income had substantially increased and for failure to provide 
copies of his tax returns.  Specifically, Heidi alleged that 
Ronald violated the terms of the judgment of divorce by failing 
to notify the clerk that his income had substantially increased.  
In addition, Heidi alleged that Ronald breached the 1996 
stipulation and violated the November 14, 1995, court order, 
which required Ronald to provide Heidi with his completed and 
filed personal and corporate tax returns annually.  Heidi 
attested that she asked Ronald for his tax information every 
year, but he continually refused to provide it.   
¶19 The next hearing was on October 22, 2003, where the 
court denied Ronald’s motion to limit the scope of evidence as 
to his income.  The court also deferred action on Heidi’s motion 
to retroactively modify child support, and set a hearing on the 
support and contempt issues for November 6, 2003.  At the 
November 6 hearing, however, the court held these issues in 
abeyance.  The court instead addressed whether it should uphold 
the 1996 joint stipulation.  The court found that the parties 
had entered into the stipulation freely and voluntarily, and 
that the purpose of the stipulation was to bring to an end the 
contentious legal proceedings.  However, the court asked the 
parties to submit briefs addressing whether the agreement 
violated public policy.  The matter was therefore continued to 
November 25, 2003.   
No.  2005AP000534   
12 
 
¶20 At the November 25 hearing, the court found no fraud 
or intentional misrepresentation in the formation of the 1996 
stipulation.  However, the court did find that Ronald had 
engaged in a substantial amount of misrepresentation, fraud, and 
game-playing as to what constitutes income since entering into 
the stipulation.  The court concluded that the stipulation was 
not contrary to public policy and would be upheld because it 
represented the parties’ intentions.  The court did find, 
however, 
that 
Ronald 
failed 
to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
1996 
stipulation by failing to supply Heidi with the necessary tax 
information.  The court concluded that it was Ronald's lack of 
cooperation that led the parties to court.  The court stated 
that Ronald had engaged in overtrial and had been in contempt of 
court for not supplying the information.  Therefore, the court 
concluded that there would need to be an offset of Heidi's child 
support obligations but that it was unsure of what that would 
be.  
¶21 At the next hearing on April 7, 2004, the court 
reversed its prior ruling upholding the stipulation.  The court 
observed that the stipulation was freely and voluntarily entered 
into but that it was not fair and equitable in light of later-
revealed circumstances.  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
the stipulation was not in the children’s best interests and had 
denied them support.  The court declared the stipulation to be 
against public policy and asked the parties to brief the issue 
of what remedy would be appropriate.  
No.  2005AP000534   
13 
 
¶22 At a June 15, 2004, hearing, Heidi argued that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m), which provides that a court "may not" 
revise the amount of child support, is phrased permissively and 
allows the court discretion to retroactively modify support.  
Additionally, Heidi argued that under Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m), 
Ronald’s failure to disclose his assets should have allowed a 
Wis. Stat. ch. 785 contempt proceeding, which would have granted 
the court authority and broad discretion to create a monetary 
sanction in an amount relating to what Heidi claimed Ronald owed 
for child support.  
¶23 The court reaffirmed its holding that the stipulation 
was contrary to public policy.  The court concluded that Ronald 
had not in any way complied with the requirement to provide 
Heidi with tax information during the relevant time period.  
Furthermore, the court held that Ronald breached his obligation 
to notify the court and Heidi of his changes in income.  The 
court determined that if child support had been based on 
Ronald’s true income, he would have paid approximately $222,000 
more in support since October 1, 1996, up until October 31, 
No.  2005AP000534   
14 
 
2002.10 
 
The 
court 
concluded 
that 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) it did not have the authority to modify 
Ronald's support obligation retroactively.  However, the court 
stated that it did have the authority to sanction him for 
contempt and to compensate Heidi for losses suffered as a result 
of that contempt.  The court held that Ronald had engaged in 
overtrial and that he was in contempt of court for not supplying 
income information as ordered.  The court ordered a $100,000 
sanction against Ronald to compensate Heidi and the children for 
losses suffered as a consequence of his contempt.  The court 
further ordered Heidi to pay 17 percent of her gross income as 
child support for the parties’ son, but suspended the obligation 
at least until after the court addressed Heidi’s overtrial 
claim. 
                                                 
10 This amount was based on Heidi's calculations, which 
imputed to Ronald additional income that was available for child 
support purposes beyond the figures that were reported as gross 
income on Ronald's tax returns.  Although Ronald had an 
accountant who testified to the errors in Heidi's calculations, 
the court found that Heidi's calculations were credible.  The 
court noted that Ronald's accountant was qualified and had an 
extensive background in accounting.  However, the court found 
that Ronald's accountant "was incorrect in his assessment of 
income available to [Ronald] and what was personally available 
to him."  The court noted that the accountant did not take into 
account that "the accountant version and the income tax version 
of what someone could be taxed on are not necessarily the same 
as to what . . . could be available for imputing income for 
child 
support 
purposes." 
 
Citing 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
DWD 
§ 40.02(3), (13), and (14), the court noted that, for the 
purposes of computing income available for child support, other 
factors must be considered, such as corporate income and 
shareholder loans. 
No.  2005AP000534   
15 
 
¶24 On November 12, 2004, the court conducted a hearing on 
Heidi’s claim of overtrial by Ronald.  The court found that 
approximately $32,000 of Heidi’s attorney fees and expenses were 
reasonably attributable to Ronald’s overtrial of the matter.  
The court ordered Ronald to pay this additional amount to Heidi 
and suspended her new child support obligation until Ronald had 
paid the contempt sanction and overtrial award to Heidi.  Ronald 
appealed the circuit court’s decision.  
¶25 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
contempt order, stating that it lacked "the necessary hallmarks 
of remedial contempt."  Frisch, 290 Wis. 2d 739, ¶2.  The court 
also reversed the circuit court’s overtrial award and remanded 
the case to determine the appropriate commencement date for 
Heidi’s support payments.  Id., ¶3. 
¶26 In reaching its decision, the court of appeals focused 
on whether remedial contempt was properly employed.  Id., ¶30.  
The court concluded that remedial contempt was not properly 
employed because remedial sanctions may be imposed only to 
terminate a continuing contempt of court.  Id.  The court noted 
that the contempt in this case was Ronald's failure to provide 
copies of his tax returns.  Id.  However, because the copies 
were produced prior to any pronouncement of contempt, the 
contempt was no longer continuing.  Id.  In addition, the court 
stated that any remedial contempt order must be purgeable and 
that there was no purgeable condition in this case.  Id. 
¶27 The court found additional fault with the $100,000 
contempt sanction.  The court held that, contrary to the circuit 
No.  2005AP000534   
16 
 
court's conclusion, the stipulation was not void as a matter of 
public policy.11  Id., ¶25 n.6.  Therefore, the $100,000 contempt 
sanction was improper because there was no loss or injury 
resulting from Ronald's contempt during 1996-2001.  During that 
period Heidi was barred from seeking a change in support based 
upon Ronald's increased income.12  Id., ¶31.  
                                                 
11 The circuit court also held that there was no fraud in 
the inducement of the 1996 stipulation, citing the legal and tax 
assistance as factors in showing that Heidi entered into the 
stipulation freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.  
12 The court of appeals declined to address the question of 
whether Heidi was entitled to relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07. 
Frisch v. Henrichs, 2006 WI App 64, ¶35, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 
N.W.2d 139.  Heidi had previously argued that the court could 
sidestep a Wis. Stat. § 806.07 analysis, and the circuit court 
had granted relief under contempt and not § 806.07.  Id., ¶34.  
In addition, Ronald argued that § 806.07 did not apply. Id., 
¶35.  Therefore, the court declined to consider this issue.  Id.  
Because we find that remedial contempt was properly employed, we 
also do not address whether Heidi was entitled to relief under 
§ 806.07. 
The court of appeals also addressed Ronald's argument that 
the circuit court misused its discretion when it adopted Heidi's 
proposed 
findings 
and judgment that contained substantial 
findings, conclusions of law, and judgment provisions not 
originally ordered by the court.  Id., ¶38.  The court held that 
its reversal of the contempt and overtrial provisions of the 
judgment rendered that issue moot.  Id., ¶39.  Because this 
issue was not raised on appeal, we do not address it.   
No.  2005AP000534   
17 
 
¶28 Finally, the court of appeals reversed the overtrial 
award of $32,000 because it was premised on the circuit court’s 
contempt finding, which was reversed.  Id., ¶37. We granted 
Heidi's petition for review of the court of appeals decision.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶29 This case presents the issue of whether the circuit 
court had authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 785 to order payment 
for loss suffered as a result of contemptuous conduct——
specifically the untimely production of financial information 
and the failure to report substantial changes in income——as a 
purge condition for contempt of court.  In a broader sense, this 
issue requires the court to determine whether the circuit court 
had authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 785 to employ remedial 
contempt under these circumstances.  Such an issue, which 
requires the interpretation and application of a statute, is a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court also addressed Ronald's argument concerning the 
proper commencement date of Heidi's child support obligations 
and 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
expressly 
suspended 
the 
obligations until Heidi received payment in full from Ronald.  
Id., ¶40.  Because the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's use of contempt, it also reversed the suspension of 
Heidi's child support obligations.  Id., ¶41.  Because we affirm 
the circuit court's use of contempt, we also affirm the 
suspension of Heidi's child support obligations.  Because the 
issue was not raised on appeal, we do not address the propriety 
of Heidi's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment that were adopted by the circuit court and which 
suspended Heidi's obligations until Ronald paid her in full.   
No.  2005AP000534   
18 
 
question of law that we review de novo.13  See Evans v. Luebke, 
2003 WI App 207, ¶16, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 671 N.W.2d 304; Shepard 
v. Circuit Court for Outagamie County, 189 Wis. 2d 279, 286, 525 
N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶30 This case also requires us to review the 1996 
stipulation agreement between the parties.  The construction of 
a written contract is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 173, 571 N.W.2d 425 
(1997). 
ANALYSIS 
¶31 In this case, the circuit court found Ronald in 
contempt for failing to timely provide copies of his tax returns 
to 
Heidi, 
as 
required 
under 
the 
1995 
order, 
the 
1996 
stipulation, and under Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m).  In addition, 
the court found that Ronald did not report substantial changes 
in 
income, 
as 
required 
under 
the 
divorce 
judgment 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 767.263 
(1993-94).  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.27(2m) 
specifically provides that "[a] party who fails to furnish the 
information as required by the court under this subsection may 
be proceeded against for contempt of court under ch. 785."14  
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
13 The issue in this case concerns the authority of the 
court to order remedial contempt.  It should not be confused 
with the issue of whether the circuit court's finding of 
contempt was proper.  Such an issue is reviewed under an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  See City of Wis. 
Dells 
v. 
Dells 
Fireworks, 
Inc., 
197 
Wis. 2d 1, 
23, 
539 
N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1995).   
14 Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) provides: 
No.  2005AP000534   
19 
 
¶32 "A court's power to use contempt stems from the 
inherent authority of the court.  The power may, however, within 
limitations, be regulated by the legislature."  Griffin v. 
Reeve, 
141 
Wis. 2d 699, 
706 
n.4, 
416 
N.W.2d 612 
(1987).  
"Despite the fact that the power exists independently of 
statute, this court ruled [in 1880], that when the procedures 
and penalties of contempt are prescribed by statute, the statute 
controls."  Douglas County v. Edwards, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 88, 403 
N.W.2d 438 (1987) (citing State ex rel. Lanning v. Lonsdale, 48 
Wis. 348, 367, 4 N.W. 390 (1880)).  This formulation necessarily 
presents 
questions 
of 
whether 
the 
legislature 
has 
fully 
prescribed the procedures and penalties of contempt and, if it 
has, whether the limitations imposed impair the inherent 
authority of the court.  The legislature may regulate and limit 
the contempt power "so long as the contempt power is not 
rendered ineffectual."  Note (Wis. Stat. § 785.02), § 11, ch. 
257, Laws of 1979, at 1355.   
                                                                                                                                                             
In every action in which the court has ordered a 
party to pay child or family support under this 
chapter, including an action to revise a judgment or 
order under s. 767.32, the court shall require the 
parties annually to exchange financial information.  A 
party who fails to furnish the information as required 
by the court under this subsection may be proceeded 
against for contempt of court under ch. 785.  If the 
court finds that a party has failed to furnish the 
information required under this subsection, the court 
may award to the party bringing the action costs and, 
notwithstanding 
s. 
814.04(1), 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees.   
Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) (emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP000534   
20 
 
¶33 The 
legislature 
has 
regulated 
contempt 
in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 785.  Contempt of court is defined as intentional 
misconduct or disobedience towards the authority of a court, and 
includes 
failure 
to 
produce 
a 
record 
or 
document. 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(1)(a), (b), and (d).  Contempt may be 
punished either by a punitive sanction or a remedial sanction.15  
Wis. Stat. § 785.02. 
¶34 A punitive sanction is "imposed to punish a past 
contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of 
the court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2).  "A court issuing a 
punitive sanction is not specifically concerned with the private 
interests of a litigant."  Diane K.J. v. James L.J., 196 Wis. 2d 
964, 969, 539 N.W.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1995).  A punitive sanction 
requires that a district attorney, attorney general, or special 
prosecutor formally prosecute the matter by filing a complaint 
and following the procedures set out in the criminal code. 
Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(b).  
¶35 A remedial sanction, on the other hand, is civil and 
is "imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt 
of court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added).16  Remedial 
                                                 
15 The 
prior 
statutory 
distinction 
between 
civil 
and 
criminal contempt has been abolished.  See Note (Introduction to 
Wis. Stat. ch. 785), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1354.  The 
contempt statute now draws a distinction based on the purpose of 
the sanction sought to be imposed.  Id.   
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 758.01(3) defines "remedial sanction."  
"'Remedial sanction' means a sanction imposed for the purpose of 
terminating a continuing contempt of court." 
No.  2005AP000534   
21 
 
contempt is concerned with the private interests of the litigant 
and is "designed to force one party to accede to another's 
demand."  See State v. King, 82 Wis.2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80 
(1978).  A person aggrieved by another person's contempt may 
file a motion for imposition of a remedial sanction for the 
contempt, and the court may impose an authorized sanction. 
Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a). 
 
Remedial 
sanctions 
may 
include 
imprisonment, forfeitures, and "[p]ayment of a sum of money 
sufficient to compensate a party for a loss or injury suffered 
by 
the 
party 
as 
the 
result 
of 
a 
contempt 
of 
court." 
Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a), (b), and (c).   
¶36 This case involves the circuit court's use of remedial 
contempt, not punitive contempt.  The contempt motion against 
Ronald was brought by Heidi, not by a prosecutor.  Neither party 
contends that punitive contempt is present.  Therefore, we 
determine whether remedial contempt was properly employed in 
this case.   
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 785.01(3) allows a court to impose a 
remedial sanction for the purpose of terminating a continuing 
contempt of court.  The parties dispute whether remedial 
contempt was properly employed in this case because they dispute 
whether Ronald's contempt was continuing at the time the circuit 
court found Ronald in contempt.  Ronald defines his contempt as 
his failure to provide tax returns and income information on a 
timely basis, and he alleges that he provided the tax returns 
and income information before the contempt hearing.  Therefore, 
he argues, his contempt was no longer continuing at the time of 
No.  2005AP000534   
22 
 
the hearing, and the circuit court erred when it ordered payment 
of $100,000 as a sanction.   
¶38 Heidi 
argues 
that 
Ronald's 
contempt 
was 
still 
continuing at the time of the contempt hearing because, although 
Ronald finally produced the tax returns and other income 
information, he failed to produce them in a timely manner as 
required.  She argued that it was impossible in 2003 to produce 
information in 1996.  Because Ronald was never able to turn back 
time to produce the documents in a timely manner, Ronald's 
contempt was and is continuing.   
¶39 To 
determine 
the 
proper 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3), we apply its plain meaning and interpret 
the statute to avoid unreasonable and absurd results.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-
46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We may read this statute 
in pari materia with related statutes to aid in a correct 
interpretation.  Perra v. Menomonee Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 
215, ¶9, 239 Wis. 2d 26, 619 N.W.2d 123. 
¶40 Although 
Chapter 785 is a separate freestanding 
chapter, it frequently works in tandem with Chapter 767 (Actions 
Affecting the Family).  The 2005-06 Wisconsin Statutes contain 
at least 11 references in Chapter 767 to contempt under Chapter 
785.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 767.117(3); 767.401(1)(e); 767.43(5); 
767.471(5)(b)2.b.; 
767.513(2m)(c); 
767.54; 
767.553(5)(b); 
767.57(1h); 767.75(6)(a) and (b); 767.77(3)(b); and 767.78(2).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.54 is the renumbered and amended former 
Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) (2003-04).  The chapter contains other 
No.  2005AP000534   
23 
 
references to "contempt" but does not tie them to Chapter 785.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 767.215(2)(h), (i), (j); 767.407(6); 
767.501(2)(c); 767.55(2)(am). 
¶41 Some of the references in Chapter 767 to Chapter 785 
deal with contempt that can be easily purged.  For instance, 
Wis. Stat. § 767.401(1)(a) (2005-06) permits the court to order 
the parties in a divorce "to attend a program specified by the 
court concerning the effects on a child of a dissolution of the 
marriage."  A party who fails to attend such a program as 
ordered "may be proceeded against under ch. 785 for contempt of 
court."  Wis. Stat. § 767.401(1)(e).  When the party attends the 
program ordered, the contempt is purged. 
¶42 On the other hand, there are sections of the chapter 
that deal with contempt that can no longer be purged by 
compliance with an order.  For instance, Wis. Stat. § 767.43(5) 
(2005-06) provides: "(5) Interference With Visitation Rights.  
Any person who interferes with visitation rights under sub. (1) 
or (3) may be proceeded against for contempt of court under ch. 
785, except that a court may impose only the remedial sanctions 
specified in s. 785.04(1)(a) and (e) against that person." 
¶43 If a parent were to interfere with another parent's 
established 
visitation 
rights 
on 
an 
especially 
important 
occasion, the contempt could not be purged by permitting the 
child to resume visitation after the important occasion had 
passed.  A monetary sanction would be the only practical remedy 
to purge the contempt.  Even a change in visitation rights could 
not change the past interference. 
No.  2005AP000534   
24 
 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.27(2m) (2003-04) is especially 
relevant in this case.  It provides: 
In every action in which the court has ordered a 
party to pay child or family support under this 
chapter, including an action to revise a judgment or 
order under s. 767.32, the court shall require the 
parties annually to exchange financial information. A 
party who fails to furnish the information as required 
by the court under this subsection may be proceeded 
against for contempt of court under ch. 785. If the 
court finds that a party has failed to furnish the 
information required under this subsection, the court 
may award to the party bringing the action costs and, 
notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), reasonable attorney 
fees. 
¶45 This statute specifically states that "A party who 
fails 
to 
furnish 
the 
information 
as 
required 
by 
the 
court . . . may be proceeded against for contempt of court under 
ch. 785."  Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) (emphasis added). 
¶46 In this case, in 1995, the circuit court required that 
Ronald "by May 12th of every year commencing in 1996 . . . as 
long as Ron has child support obligations . . . produce his 
completed 
and 
filed 
personal 
and 
corporate 
tax 
returns . . . [for submission] to Ms. Frisch."  The fact is, 
Ronald did not comply with the May 12 annual deadlines as 
required, and he is no longer able to comply with the time 
element of the court's order. 
¶47 Although Ronald did produce all the required documents 
before the circuit court found him in contempt, his contempt was 
continuing under Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) because his production 
of documents came too late to undo the problems he had created 
No.  2005AP000534   
25 
 
by failing to produce documents on time.17  Producing documents 
was only part of the court's order.  Producing documents on 
time, for all the years in which child support was due, was an 
equal part of the order.  Failure to timely produce income 
information "as required" was really the essence of Ronald's 
contempt because it shielded him from exposure to regular, 
contemporary court-ordered modifications of child support.  If 
Ronald had supplied the information timely, he would likely have 
been paying more support than he did.  By his repeated failures, 
Ronald deprived Heidi of the information necessary to seek the 
periodic modification of support she was entitled to request 
under the law, and he deprived the court of its authority to 
timely modify its child support order.  The contempt was 
continuing because Ronald's failure to comply with the court 
order deprived Heidi of her ability to utilize traditional 
remedies in the law.  Thus, we cannot agree with the court of 
appeals that when Ronald turned over the tax documents, "any 
prior contempt was no longer ongoing."  See Frisch, 290 
Wis. 2d 739, ¶30.   
¶48 The court of appeals found that remedial contempt was 
improper in this case because it lacked "one indispensable 
feature of remedial contempt," that it be purgeable.  Id.   
¶49 In 
light 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m), 
this 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) 
is 
too 
limited.  
                                                 
17 As Charles Dickens wrote, "Nothing can undo [the past]; 
nothing can make it otherwise than as it was."  Charles Dickens, 
David Copperfield 432 (Dodd, Mead & Co., 1943) (1850). 
No.  2005AP000534   
26 
 
Wisconsin law has been modernized, and a purge condition in the 
mid-1970s is not the same as a purge condition today.   
¶50 Chapter 295 of the 1977 statutes contained four 
sections on "Contempts in Civil Actions."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 295.02 (1977) regarding "Sanctions," read in part: 
 
Every court of record may, in the exercise of its 
equitable powers, enforce the rights or remedies of a 
party to an action or proceeding by imposing on any 
person found in contempt under s. 295.01 the following 
sanctions: 
 
(1)(a) If an actual loss or injury has been 
produced to any party by the misconduct of the 
contemnor . . . the court may order the defendant to 
pay such party a sum sufficient to compensate the 
party for losses, costs, and expenses. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
(2)(a) If the misconduct proved consists of an 
omission to perform some act or duty which is yet  in 
the power of a party to perform in part or in 
full . . . the party . . . may be imprisoned until the 
party . . . performs such act or duty and pays the 
costs and expenses of the proceedings. 
 
. . . .  
 
(4) A person imprisoned shall be released upon 
purging by compliance with the court's order. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶51 The 1979 legislature revised the law.  It repealed 
Chapter 295 and created Chapter 785, and it abolished the 
distinction between civil and criminal contempt: 
 
The approach adopted here is the one proposed in 
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 
183, 247 (1971).  Under this approach, the statute 
does not attempt to draw a distinction between civil 
and criminal contempt.  Rather the distinction is 
No.  2005AP000534   
27 
 
drawn between the purpose of the sanction sought to be 
imposed, and the procedures to be followed depend upon 
the sanction sought.  This approach, the council 
believes, will eliminate most of the confusion that 
has previously existed in the law of contempt, provide 
a clear and certain basis for determining which 
sanction to seek, and specify the procedures to be 
followed depending upon the sanction sought. 
Note (Introduction to Wis. Stat. ch. 785), § 11, ch. 257, Laws 
of 1979, at 1354. 
 
¶52 As noted above, a remedial sanction is now defined as 
"a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing 
contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3).  The Judicial 
Council explained remedial sentences in these terms: 
 
Traditionally, a remedial sanction was the type 
of sanction imposed for civil contempt.  The purpose 
of the sanction was remedial in that it was designed 
to force a person into complying with an order of the 
court and terminating a present contempt of court.  
That concept is continued here, even though without 
the civil contempt designation.  The definition makes 
it clear that a remedial sanction is appropriate only 
when the contempt is continuing, and cannot be imposed 
if for any reason the contempt has ceased, even as a 
result of the settlement of the case.  This is 
consistent with prior law. 
Note (2) (Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, 
at 1355. 
 
¶53 Hence, the real question today is whether the contempt 
is continuing.  If the contempt is continuing, the court has 
been given specific authority in Wis. Stat. § 785.04 to impose: 
 
(a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to 
compensate a party for a loss or injury suffered by 
the party as the result of a contempt of court.18 
                                                 
18 Compare Wis. Stat. § 295.02(1)(a)(1977).  See ¶50 above. 
No.  2005AP000534   
28 
 
 
(b) Imprisonment if the contempt of court is a 
type included in s. 785.01(1)(b), (bm), (c) or (d).  
The imprisonment may extend only so long as the person 
is committing the contempt of court or 6 months, 
whichever is the shorter period.   
 
(c) A forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each 
day the contempt of court continues. 
 
(d) An order to ensure compliance with the prior 
order of the court. 
 
(e) A sanction other than the sanction specified 
in pars. (a) to (d) if it expressly finds that those 
sanctions 
would 
be 
ineffectual 
to 
terminate 
a 
continuing contempt of court. 
¶54 Under the circumstances in the present case, an order 
under paragraph (d) to ensure compliance with the prior order of 
the court is not possible.  It would be like trying to remedy 
the interference with an important visitation that cannot be 
rescheduled.  Paragraphs (b) and (c) are helpful only to enforce 
an alternative purge condition.  Hence, the court is forced to 
turn to paragraph (a) or paragraph (e) to provide relief to the 
party injured by contempt. 
¶55 This 
court 
has 
put 
its 
imprimatur 
on 
a 
broad 
interpretation of remedial contempt in two important cases.   
¶56 The first is Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 416 
N.W.2d 612 (1987).  In that case the court was confronted with a 
contemnor who had failed to pay child support before a child 
reached the age of 18.  Once his child reached the age of 
majority, the contemnor insisted that the circuit court lost its 
jurisdiction to impose contempt.  This court rejected all the 
contemnor's arguments that the contempt was no longer ongoing.  
It said: 
No.  2005AP000534   
29 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
contempt 
proceeding . . . is . . . to coerce Mr. Reeve into 
complying with an existing court order. . . . [T]he 
force of the order does not expire until the parent 
complies.  A parent's failure to pay child support 
after the child reaches majority is a continuing 
disobedience of a court order.  The contempt is not 
past; it is ongoing.   
Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 708.19   
 
¶57 More significant for this case, however, is the fact 
that the Griffin court proceeded to judgment after the contemnor 
had "paid the amount due under the support order."  Id. at 700.  
Rejecting any notion that the contempt was not continuing or had 
been purged by the contemnor's payment, this court remanded the 
case so that the circuit court could consider attorney fees, 
reasonable court costs, and court-assessed interest.  Id. at 
700, 709.   
¶58 The 
second case, with broader ramifications for 
contempt law, is Larsen v. Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d 679, 685, 478 
N.W.2d 18 (1992).  In Larsen, we stated that "[i]t is within the 
circuit court's inherent authority to grant purge conditions 
which allow contemnors to purge their contempt outside of 
complying with the court order which led to the contempt."  A 
unanimous Larsen court explained:  
                                                 
19 In Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 704-05, 416 
N.W.2d 612 (1987), the court alluded to the pervasive problems 
of failure to pay child support.  It was impressed that several 
provisions 
of 
Chapter 
767 
(Family 
Law) 
namely, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 767.29(1), 767.30(3)(b), and 767.305 (1985-86), 
pointed specifically to Chapter 785, the new contempt chapter, 
as a means of enforcing orders to pay child support.   
No.  2005AP000534   
30 
 
At one time, the statutes required that civil 
contempt situations be purgeable. See sec. 295.02(4), 
Stats. 1975.  The current statutes do not contain such 
a requirement other than the provision that a person 
may be imprisoned for civil contempt "only so long as 
the person is committing the contempt of court or 6 
months, whichever is the shorter period." Section 
785.04(1)(b), Stats. 
Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d at 685 n.1 (emphasis added).    
 
¶59 The elimination of an explicit purge condition in part 
of the statutes does not free a court from providing a contemnor 
with the "keys to the jail house door," State ex rel. V.J.H. v. 
C.A.B., 163 Wis. 2d 833, 843, 472 N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1991), 
but it does liberate the court from being paralyzed by semantics 
about the meaning of "purge condition" and "sanction." 
 
¶60 Chapter 785 has been consistently interpreted to allow 
the circuit court to establish an alternate purge condition to 
purge a party's contempt.  See Benn v. Benn, 230 Wis. 2d 301, 
311, 602 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1999); Diane K.J., 196 Wis. 2d at 
969; V.J.H., 163 Wis. 2d at 845 (quoting State ex rel. Larsen v. 
Larsen, 159 Wis. 2d 672, 676, 465 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1990), 
aff'd, 165 Wis. 2d 679, 478 N.W.2d 18 (1992)).  An alternative 
"purge 
condition" 
may 
be 
the 
sanction 
authorized 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a) or (e), or it may be the "key to the 
jail house door" if the sanction imposed is imprisonment under 
Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(b).  "With a remedial sanction . . . the 
contemnor's ability to avoid the sanction, through compliance 
with the original order or satisfaction of the purge condition, 
obviates the need for due process."  Diane K.J., 196 Wis. 2d at 
970.  Neither a "sanction" nor an "alternative purge condition" 
No.  2005AP000534   
31 
 
may be imposed if there is not a "continuing" contempt that 
requires a remedy.  Satisfaction of an alternative purge 
condition terminates the continuing contempt of court. 
¶61 In this case, the circuit court termed the $100,000 
payment a remedial sanction.  The $100,000 payment may also be 
construed as an alternative purge condition.   
¶62 The circumstances make this case unusual in that full 
compliance with the court's order is impossible, and partial 
compliance with the court's order is ineffectual.  Because Heidi 
and her children have already lost their traditional remedy, 
they cannot be made whole.  Unless the court is able to fashion 
an alternative purge condition to compensate Heidi and the 
children for their loss, both Heidi and the court have been 
defeated.   
¶63 The contempt statute allows the purge condition and 
the sanction to be the same. We acknowledge that in most 
circumstances, 
"[t]he 
purge 
condition 
contrasts 
with 
the 
sanction because it is a means for the contemnor to avoid the 
sanction by atoning for his or her past failure to obey the 
court's order."  V.J.H., 163 Wis. 2d at 845.  However, when 
dealing with payment to compensate a party for a loss suffered 
as a result of contempt, it is possible for there to be a purge 
condition without a sanction or, in the alternative, for the 
purge condition to be the same as the sanction. 
¶64 When a court decides to provide a purge condition 
outside of compliance with the original court order, several 
requirements must be met.  "[T]he purge condition should serve 
No.  2005AP000534   
32 
 
remedial aims, the contemnor should be able to fulfill the 
proposed purge, and the condition should be reasonably related 
to the cause or nature of the contempt."  Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d at 
685.   
¶65 These requirements are satisfied in this case.  First, 
the purge condition serves remedial aims because it seeks to 
compensate Heidi for loss suffered as a result of Ronald's 
contempt of court.  Second, Ronald is capable of fulfilling the 
proposed purge.20  Third, the purge condition is reasonably 
related to the cause or nature of the contempt so long as the 
1996 stipulation is not enforceable.   
¶66 If the 1996 stipulation were enforceable, it would be 
less evident whether the $100,000 purge condition is reasonably 
                                                 
20 Ronald does not challenge the circuit court's findings 
that he has the ability to pay.  The circuit court implicitly 
found that Ronald has the ability to pay stating, "[Ronald] has 
a substantial amount of holdings.  It was reported that he owned 
lake property, recreational equipment . . . but he is a man of 
some means, despite the representations he's made."  
Later at the hearing on overtrial, the circuit court 
reaffirmed its finding that Ronald was a man of some means.  It 
stated: 
Now, if I'm asked whether Mr. Henrichs has the ability 
to pay this amount [the overtrial award], previous 
testimony was very clear that I recall that there was 
at least a $125,000 loan from the corporation to Mr. 
Henrichs that had no . . . plan for repayment.  I 
recall a vacation home in northern Wisconsin, with 
boats and other recreational equipment. . . . I think 
a substantial record has been made that he has ample 
funds available to him and has accumulated such funds 
over a long period of time and has invested in real 
estate and recreational . . . equipment[,] . . . he's 
got the money to pay it.   
No.  2005AP000534   
33 
 
related to the cause of the contempt.  As the court of appeals 
noted, if the 1996 stipulation is enforceable, Heidi was barred 
from seeking a change in support for four years based upon any 
increase in Ronald's income.  See Frisch, 290 Wis. 2d 739, ¶31.  
If the 1996 stipulation were enforceable, Heidi would have 
suffered minimal or no loss or injury as the result of Ronald's 
contempt.21  
¶67 We hold, however, that the 1996 stipulation, which set 
a ceiling on child support and prevented modification in the 
level of child support, is not enforceable and offends public 
policy.  See Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 692, 462 
N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "a divorce stipulation 
that waives or sets a ceiling on child support and prevents 
modification of child support offends public policy"), petition 
for rev. denied, 465 N.W.2d 656 (1991).   
¶68 A stipulation will be upheld if the parties entered 
into it freely and knowingly, and if "the overall settlement is 
fair and equitable and not illegal or against public policy."  
See Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d 587, 596, 348 N.W.2d 498 
(1984).  In this case, the circuit court found that the parties 
entered into the stipulation freely and knowingly; however, the 
circuit court concluded that the stipulation was against public 
                                                 
21 If the 1996 stipulation were enforceable, Heidi would 
have suffered minimal loss because she could have sought 
modification of child support for the period of time after the 
stipulation's moratorium on January 1, 2001, until she lost 
placement of both children in November 2002.   
No.  2005AP000534   
34 
 
policy and not in the best interests of the children.  We agree 
and therefore conclude that the stipulation is unenforceable. 
¶69 The stipulation in this case is similar to the 
stipulation in Ondrasek.  In that case, the divorce stipulation 
established periodic payments from the husband to the wife, 
including spousal support, mortgage and contribution for real 
estate taxes, and child support.  Ondrasek, 158 Wis. 2d  at 692-
93.  The divorce stipulation provided that if the young son were 
to reside with the husband, the periodic payments would be 
reduced by $5000 per year.  Id. at 693.  In addition, neither 
party would have the right to have the amount of the periodic 
payments increased or decreased.22  Id.   
¶70 When the son came to live with the wife, the wife 
filed an order to show cause why the husband should not be 
required to pay child support.  Id. at 694.  The circuit court 
held that the wife was estopped from seeking child support 
payments because she had waived child support as long as she was 
receiving periodic payments.  Id.  The circuit court found the 
stipulation was enforceable and not against public policy.  Id.   
¶71 On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the 
stipulation allowed for two interpretations: either the wife 
completely waived child support as long as she received periodic 
                                                 
22 The stipulation provided three exceptions: (1) the wife 
remarries and one or more children reside with her; (2) the 
wife's other income exceeds a certain amount; and (3) the 
husband becomes unable to work and his income falls below a 
certain amount.  Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 693 n.2, 
462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No.  2005AP000534   
35 
 
payments, or the wife agreed to a child support ceiling of $5000 
annually and waived any opportunity to modify the ceiling while 
she received periodic payments.  Id.  The court held that under 
either interpretation, the stipulation violated public policy 
because the wife could not seek modification of child support 
obligations and, therefore, the child's best interests were not 
adequately protected.  Id. 
¶72 In holding that the stipulation was against public 
policy, the court stressed that "[t]he paramount goal of the 
child support statute is to promote the best interests of the 
child and to avoid financial hardship for children of divorced 
parents."  Id. at 695 (citation omitted).  Therefore, "the 
child's best interests transcend an agreement or stipulation of 
the parties."  Id.  The court noted that the legislature has 
established this public policy in protecting the best interests 
of the child.  Id.  To illustrate, Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1) 
requires the circuit court to order necessary and reasonable 
child support when overseeing the dissolution of a marriage, and 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1) allows the circuit court to retain 
jurisdiction to modify a divorce judgment providing for child 
support.  Id.  In addition, although the circuit court is 
prohibited from modifying a waiver of spousal maintenance or a 
final division of property under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1), the 
legislature did not create the same prohibition for child 
support.  Id. 
¶73 The court noted that "if a waiver or 'ceiling' of the 
entire child support obligation is deemed unmodifiable, the 
No.  2005AP000534   
36 
 
needs of a child could be left unsatisfied."  Id. at 696.  The 
court concluded with the following: 
Even if the stipulation was fair when it was created, 
making a child support provision unmodifiable does not 
necessarily make the stipulation fair in the future.  
Provisions preventing future determination of the best 
interests 
of 
the 
child 
may 
leave 
the 
child 
inadequately 
protected. 
 
Unforeseen 
changed 
circumstances may require support beyond the amount of 
waived or stipulated child support. 
 
Thus, the statutory goal of providing for the 
best interest of the child would be defeated if a 
party 
is 
precluded 
from 
seeking 
child 
support 
necessary for the best interests of the child.  The 
public policy of protecting children requires that 
there be an opportunity to determine whether a change 
in circumstances warrants a modification of child 
support.   
Id. at 696-97. 
¶74 We agree with the court of appeals' reasoning in 
Ondrasek.  In this case, the 1996 stipulation is unenforceable 
and against public policy because it set a ceiling on the amount 
of child support for four years of $1050 per month, and 
prevented Heidi from seeking a modification in child support, 
even if Ronald’s income increased.  The stipulation in this case 
and in Ondrasek are distinguishable from the stipulation in 
Honore v. Honore, 149 Wis. 2d 512, 439 N.W.2d 827 (Ct. App. 
1989), which set a floor on the amount of child support 
obligations for a limited period of time.23   
                                                 
23 Stipulating to a minimum amount for a limited period of 
time does not violate public policy because it ensures that a 
certain amount of child support is received, which is in the 
best interests of the children.   
No.  2005AP000534   
37 
 
¶75 In holding the 1996 stipulation contrary to public 
policy, we are sensitive to the importance and prevalence of 
stipulations in helping families going through difficult and 
litigious divorces and curbing disagreements among the parties.  
The ability to contract is fundamental to our legal system and 
may aid parties in settling their divorces more amicably.  But 
the child's best interests are paramount. 
¶76 A stipulation that sets a ceiling and bars any change 
in the maximum amount of child support defeats the statutory 
goal of providing for the child's best interests because parents 
are precluded from seeking a modification of an amount necessary 
for the child's best interests.  
¶77 Therefore, because the stipulation was unenforceable 
and contrary to public policy, Heidi did suffer a loss as a 
result of Ronald's contempt because she could have sought 
modification of child support if she had known that Ronald's 
income had increased.  As a result of Ronald's contempt and his 
failure to timely produce his tax returns, he evaded exposure to 
the possibility of child support modification.  The circuit 
court concluded that if Ronald had been subject to child support 
obligations based on his true income, he would have paid an 
additional $222,000.  The $100,000 purge condition is clearly 
related to Ronald's failure to timely produce his tax and income 
documents.   
¶78 Contrary to Ronald's argument, the $100,000 purge 
condition is not an impermissible retroactive increase in child 
No.  2005AP000534   
38 
 
support 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m).24 
 
First, 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) prohibits retroactive increases in child 
support 
based 
on 
proceedings 
initiated 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1). 
 
Proceedings 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1) concern modification of child support 
based on a finding of substantial change in circumstances.  The 
circuit court did not proceed under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1); 
rather, the circuit court proceeded with the case under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 785 as a contempt proceeding and based on 
Ronald's 
contemptuous conduct of intentionally failing to 
provide Heidi with tax information.   
¶79 Second, 
the 
$100,000 
purge 
condition 
was 
not 
calculated based on forgone child support.  The circuit court 
explicitly refused to order retroactive child support stating, 
"I cannot go back and recalculate.  I can sanction him and 
compensate a party for a loss suffered as a result of contempt 
of court."  The court then questioned the appropriate amount to 
award as a result of Ronald's contempt.  The court had earlier 
                                                 
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32(1m) provides: 
In an action under sub. (1) to revise a judgment 
or order with respect to child support, maintenance 
payments or family support payments, the court may not 
revise the amount of child support, maintenance 
payments or family support payments due, or an amount 
of arrearages in child support, maintenance payments 
or family support payments that has accrued, prior to 
the date that notice of the action is given to the 
respondent, except to correct previous errors in 
calculations.   
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m). 
No.  2005AP000534   
39 
 
considered that Heidi had "been the victim of fraud, blatant 
fraud," that Heidi had "assumed a disproportionate share of the 
child support obligations[,]" and that, if not for Ronald's 
contemptuous conduct, Heidi could have "saved money, she could 
have invested money, . . . she could have saved money for the 
benefit of the children, [and] could have invested in a college 
fund for them."  The court later concluded that it needed to 
sanction Ronald because if it did not do so, it would be 
allowing Ronald to "have his cake and eat it too" and would be 
rewarding Ronald for denying "his children the standard of 
living that was due and owing the children."  Thus, the $100,000 
purge condition is related to Heidi's and the children's loss 
suffered as a result of Ronald's contempt and is not an 
impermissible retroactive increase in child support.   
¶80 Ronald also argues that Heidi had the burden to file a 
contempt motion in 1996-2001 in order to enforce compliance with 
the 1995 order and 1996 stipulation, and, because she did not do 
so, she should be estopped from doing so in 2003.  We disagree 
that Heidi had the burden to file a contempt motion in 1996-
2001.  Ronald had the burden to comply with the 1995 order, and 
he 
risked 
being 
found 
in 
contempt 
for 
violating 
it.  
Furthermore, this is not a case where Heidi was silent until 
2003 and did not make Ronald aware of her desire for the tax 
information.  Rather, Heidi alleged that she made repeated 
requests to Ronald during 1996-2001 for the information.  
No.  2005AP000534   
40 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶81 We reverse the court of appeals and hold that the 
circuit court properly employed remedial contempt in this case.  
Ronald's contempt was continuing at the time of the contempt 
hearing because, although he had provided Heidi with complete 
tax and income information at the time of the hearing, his 
failure to produce the information in a timely manner, as 
required, permitted him to evade exposure to the possibility of 
a modification of his child support obligation and thereby 
deprived Heidi and their children of their traditional remedies 
under statutory law.  The timely provision of information was an 
essential element of the court's order.  Because Ronald could 
not and did not turn back time when he produced the required 
information too late to be acted on, his contempt was and is 
continuing 
within 
the 
legislative 
directive 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m).  This continuing contempt in relation 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) gave the circuit court authority to 
fashion an alternative purge condition of $100,000 to allow 
Ronald to purge himself of his continuing contempt.25  We also 
conclude 
that 
the 
stipulation 
between 
the 
parties 
was 
unenforceable because it was not in the best interests of the 
children and therefore contrary to public policy.   
¶82 Our holding promotes the intent behind the contempt 
statute, which is to provide the court with a mechanism, or 
                                                 
25 Satisfaction of an alternative purge condition terminates 
the continuing contempt of court.   
No.  2005AP000534   
41 
 
toolbox, to effect compliance with court orders.  See Griffin, 
141 Wis. 2d at 708.  Without such a tool, a parent could avoid 
his or her child support obligations by failing to provide 
court-ordered financial information for years and then complying 
at the last moment. 
¶83 We therefore reverse the court of appeals and affirm 
the circuit court, which ordered Ronald to pay Heidi a sum of 
$100,000 for loss suffered as a result of Ronald's contempt and 
$32,000 in attorney fees for Ronald's overtrial.26 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
                                                 
26 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
overtrial award based on its conclusion that the overtrial award 
was premised on the circuit court's contempt finding against 
Ronald.  Frisch, 290 Wis. 2d 739, ¶37.  However, because we 
affirm the circuit court's contempt finding against Ronald, we 
also reinstate the $32,000 overtrial award.   
 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶84 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I concur in 
the mandate.  The circuit court got it right.  I write 
separately because the majority opinion does violence to the law 
of remedial contempt when application of accepted principles of 
contempt law will do.  In my view, the majority opinion distorts 
beyond recognition the meaning of "continuing contempt" under 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) by holding that a failure to meet a 
deadline constitutes a "continuing contempt" of court.   
¶85 The majority reads the circuit court's order of 
contempt as being based solely on the failure of Ronald Henrichs 
(Ronald) to provide annual income tax returns for the years 
covered by the parties' stipulation.1  However, the circuit 
court's findings indicate its order of contempt was based not 
only on Ronald's past failure to provide these returns, but also 
                                                 
1 This certainly was a reason for the circuit court's 
finding of contempt.  Another reason is given in the court's 
January 19, 2005, written decision, which states that the 
contempt was ordered "also for (Ronald) failing to notify the 
court and Heidi [Frisch] of substantial changes in his income as 
ordered and as required by statute section 767.27."  And both of 
these reasons come under the broader heading of Ronald's long-
standing efforts to conceal his income from Heidi and the 
circuit court, as indicated by numerous findings and conclusions 
of the circuit court.  See infra, ¶¶102-107.  The argument that 
the contempt order was made in response to Ronald's repeated and 
continuing efforts to conceal his income was made by Heidi in 
her briefs to this court and the court of appeals. 
The court of appeals' opinion improperly forces the circuit 
court's multiple findings regarding the broad nature of Ronald's 
contempt under the narrow heading of failing to provide income 
tax information from 1996-2001, stating as follows:  "Ronald's 
contempt was his failure to furnish accurate income information 
by way of timely produced copies of tax returns."  Frisch v. 
Henrichs, 2006 WI App 64, ¶30, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 N.W.2d 139 
(emphasis added).  This was not the ruling of the circuit court.     
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
2 
 
on his on-going efforts to conceal his income and financial 
holdings, which continued up though the conclusion of the 
proceedings before the circuit court.  Because the circuit 
court's 
findings 
show 
that 
Ronald's 
contempt 
was 
truly 
"continuing," 
a 
straightforward 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) 
is 
all 
that 
is 
required, 
and 
the 
majority's tortured interpretation of "continuing contempt" is 
wholly unnecessary.   
I 
¶86 The procedural history of this case is long and 
complex and need not be related in detail again here.  For 
purposes of this concurrence, I adopt the facts as set forth in 
the majority's opinion, and I supplement those facts with 
additional findings of the circuit court as described below.  I 
provide only those facts that are relevant to the reasons for 
the circuit court's order of contempt. 
¶87 At hearings before the circuit court on January 8, 
2003, and May 20, 2003, regarding Heidi Frisch's (Heidi) motion 
to compel discovery, Ronald testified about income he received 
and assets he owned, as well as his status as president and 
treasurer of Henrichs Builders, Inc.  References made at the May 
20 proceeding indicate that Ronald's attorney had provided 
supplemental income information to Heidi, including previously 
withheld W-2s.  The circuit court made numerous findings 
subsequent 
to 
receiving 
and 
considering 
this 
additional 
information that are relevant to the contempt finding it 
ultimately rendered.  
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
3 
 
¶88 On January 19, 2005, the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, Honorable Ralph Ramirez, issued its written findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgment that formalized the 
findings and conclusions of the court issued during motion 
hearings dating from July 2002 to June 2004.  The written 
findings note that in August 2002 Heidi brought a pro se motion 
seeking to hold Ronald in contempt for his continuing failure to 
provide evidence of his income by annual tax returns.  See also 
majority op., ¶12.  Finding number 13 states that at a September 
24, 2002, hearing on Heidi's motion, Ronald provided only 
"partial personal tax returns and some of the tax returns 
relating to one of his corporations."  (Emphasis added.)  
¶89 The circuit court's findings note that Heidi moved to 
vacate a child support order and Ronald responded by moving to 
modify placement of the couple's minor son.  In a November 25, 
2003, oral ruling on these motions based upon testimony it 
received at hearings on January 8, 2003, May 20, 2003, and 
November 6, 2003,2 the circuit court made the following finding, 
later memorialized in the court's January 19, 2005, findings:  
                                                 
2 At the November 6, 2003, hearing the circuit court found 
that Ronald was "constantly evasive [and] nonresponsive" in his 
testimony.  The court also made findings with regard to Ronald's 
efforts to conceal income in his business:  "[T]he Court's going 
to find that his credibility is highly questionable, and that 
there's been ample evidence to indicate that he has used 
corporate income, testimony was received" about a recreational 
property held by Ronald's construction company.  The circuit 
court found that "the assertion that the property . . . is used 
for business purposes is not just suspect, but totally devoid of 
any credibility." 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
4 
 
There 
has 
been 
substantial 
misrepresentation 
on 
Ronald's part since the Stipulation was entered.  
Ronald has been substantially evasive and not truthful 
in regard to his income, his income available to him 
and the assets available to him for imputing income 
and his gross income which includes the undistributed 
income of the corporation.  
¶90 At the November 25, 2003 hearing, the court found that 
since the 1996 stipulation,  
[s]ubstantial information has been set out on the 
record that . . . given the machinations of [Ronald], 
the 
establishment 
of 
the 
holding 
company, 
the 
payments, loan payments and supplying of a lake home, 
a vacation home and other toys through the company, 
that [Ronald] was hiding substantial assets in the 
course of doing business. 
The circuit court then stated it was "convinced that [Ronald] 
has played a game for a long time in regards to what his actual 
income and cash available to him is."  The circuit court 
declared that while it did not believe that the 1996 stipulation 
was obtained by fraud, it was "convinced that there has been 
substantial——a substantial amount of misrepresentation and fraud 
on the part of [Ronald] since that time . . . ."  Later in the 
same hearing, the circuit court reiterated that "there was a 
substantial 
amount 
of 
misrepresentation 
by 
[Ronald] . . . established on the record."  The court indicated 
that it was convinced that Ronald's accountant, Mr. Nyholm, was 
"incorrect" in his "assessment of income available to [Ronald] 
and what was personally available to him."  The court was 
convinced "that [Ronald] has been substantially evasive and not 
truthful in regards to his income, his income available to him 
and the assets available for imputing income and his gross 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
5 
 
income, 
which 
includes 
the 
undistributed 
income 
of 
the 
corporation."3   
 
¶91 The circuit court's written findings of fact show that 
at a June 15, 2004, hearing the court found that Ronald "has not 
in any way complied with the requirement to provide income 
information," and "is in contempt of court for not supplying his 
income information as ordered."  The findings further state that  
Ronald grossly and inappropriately hid his income and 
took affirmative actions to make certain that it was 
not available for the computation of child support.  
Ronald avoided reporting income for the purpose of 
avoiding child support to the children, not to Ms. 
Frisch but to the children, that he made deliberate 
and intentional efforts to hide his income.   
The transcript of the June 15, 2004, hearing contains additional 
findings of the circuit court.  With regard to Ronald's 
credibility, 
the 
circuit 
court 
stated 
it 
was 
"extremely 
negatively 
impacted 
by 
the 
testimony 
of 
[Ronald]," 
and 
reiterated 
its 
prior 
findings 
that 
Ronald's 
"testimony 
concerning his income lacked credibility."  It further stated:  
[I]f I look at the criteria for assessing credibility, 
the in——the demeanor of a person, the ability to 
recall things, the way that a person presents him or 
herself, 
the 
ability 
and 
opportunity 
to 
know 
something, [Ronald] failed on many, many, many of 
those counts.   
 
He had a selective memory, was evasive, not able 
to give straight answers.  And that plays into the 
fact that throughout the course of these proceedings 
                                                 
3 At the October 22, 2003 hearing, the judge observed 
"[t]hat [Ronald's] demeanor throughout the course of these 
proceedings . . . and his response to direct questions has been 
previously evasive, elusive, nonresponsive and tested both the 
Court and the person to whom is asking the questions."  
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
6 
 
and during the course of testimony when I heard about 
depositions as well, any information from [Ronald] is 
suspect.  It's 4:16 on a lovely summer day.  If 
[Ronald] told me it was daylight and sunny out, I'd 
have to check my watch and I'd have to look out the 
window. 
 
¶92 At the June 15, 2004, hearing the court stated that it 
was "asked to find [Ronald] in contempt for his failure to 
provide income information," and that it was "asked to take some 
action as to dealing with the alleged failure to do so, and it's 
been established definitively in this Court's mind that [Ronald] 
misrepresented his income . . . ."  The circuit court discussed 
Ronald's income for the years of the stipulation, 1996-2001, and 
for 2002 as well.  The circuit court referred to a recreational 
property owned by Ronald's closely-held corporation, and a loan 
paid by the corporation to Ronald.  The circuit court then found 
that Ronald "grossly and inappropriately hid his income and took 
affirmative actions to make certain that it wasn't available for 
the computation of child support."  
 
¶93 The circuit court also found at the June 15, 2004, 
hearing that Ronald "did not provide basic W-2 income or tax 
filing information appropriately as required previously, that he 
did not as obligated report changes in income or truthfully 
report income 
for 
the entire amount of time from 1996 
on . . . ."   
 
¶94 Later, at a hearing on November 12, 2004, the circuit 
court stated that the "issue has been from Day One the 
allegations on the part of——from [Heidi] alleging that [Ronald] 
had in essence hid funds or had made representations that were 
untruthful in regards to funds available to him, income 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
7 
 
available for the purpose of paying child support.  And, again, 
I have made an extensive record in the past as to my findings."  
The court further concluded that "[Ronald] was dishonest and 
that his income was quite a bit more substantial than he 
reported to [Heidi] for purposes of paying child support.  And 
as 
a 
result 
of 
that, 
there 
was 
an 
enormous 
amount 
that . . . [Heidi] was denied on behalf of the minor children as 
support."   
 
¶95 The 
circuit 
court's 
January 
19, 
2005, 
formal 
conclusions of law state that  
Ronald has engaged in overtrial with respect to his 
efforts to evade an accurate calculation of his income 
and he is in contempt for failing to provide tax 
returns as ordered and also for failing to notify the 
court and Heidi of substantial changes in his income 
as ordered and as required by statute section 767.27. 
The circuit court also concluded that its order imposing a 
monetary penalty on Ronald was a "contempt sanction" that was 
"required as a remedy for Ronald['s] contemptuous, deliberate 
and willful failure to provide the court and the petitioner with 
truthful information about his actual income."   
II 
 
¶96 The majority opinion's statement of the standard of 
our review is legally correct, as far as it goes.  I agree that 
the question of whether a circuit court has the authority to 
issue a contempt order in a given case is a question of law that 
we review de novo.  See majority op., ¶29.    
¶97 However, 
as 
the 
analysis 
below 
concludes, 
the 
authority of the circuit court to make a contempt order is not 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
8 
 
at issue under the facts as found by the circuit court.  Because 
I conclude that the circuit court had authority to issue an 
order of contempt in this case, I review the circuit court's 
order to determine whether it properly exercised its discretion 
in issuing the order.  See City of Wisconsin Dells v. Dells 
Fireworks, Inc., 197 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 539 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
III 
 
¶98 Chapter 785 of the Wisconsin Statutes codifies the 
power of a court to issue orders of contempt.  The chapter 
defines 
"contempt 
of 
court" 
as 
"[m]isconduct . . . which 
interferes with a court proceeding or with the administration of 
justice, or which impairs the respect due the court," and 
includes "[d]isobedience, resistance or obstruction of the 
authority, process or order of a court," and "[r]efusal to 
produce 
a 
record, 
document 
or 
other 
object."  
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(1)(a), (b) and (d).   
¶99 A "'[r]emedial sanction' means a sanction imposed for 
the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court."  
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3).  The court of appeals' decision below 
correctly stated that "[a] remedial, or civil, sanction . . . is 
imposed to ensure compliance with court orders for the purpose 
of terminating a continuing contempt of court."  Frisch v. 
Henrichs, 2006 WI App 64, ¶27, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 N.W.2d 139; 
see also In the Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 179, 327 
N.W.2d 682 (1983).  
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
9 
 
 
¶100 The majority opinion includes a thorough discussion of 
the legal background of Chapter 785, with which I have no 
quarrel.  See majority op., ¶¶31-37.  The problems with the 
majority's analysis begin with its narrow focus on Ronald's 
failure to provide copies of income tax returns for the period 
covered by the stipulation, 1996-2001.  Based on this narrow 
focus, the majority attempts to shoehorn the concept of 
"continuing contempt" under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) to fit its 
view of the facts.  To this end, the majority concludes as 
follows:  "Although Ronald did produce all the required 
documents before the circuit court found him in contempt, his 
contempt was continuing under Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) because 
his production of documents came too late to undo the problems 
he had created by failing to produce documents on time."  
Majority op., ¶47.  Thus, the majority concludes a person who 
misses a deadline for submitting a document is in "continuing 
contempt," even after he or she submits the requested document.  
The majority reasons:  "The contempt was continuing because 
Ronald's failure to comply with the court order deprived Heidi 
of her ability to utilize traditional remedies in the law.  
Thus, we cannot agree with the court of appeals that when Ronald 
turned over the tax documents, 'any prior contempt was no longer 
ongoing.'"  Majority op., ¶47 (citing Frisch, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 
¶30).   
 
¶101 If the contempt order in this case were issued merely 
because Ronald failed to provide copies of income tax documents 
for the period covered by the stipulation, I would agree with 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
10 
 
the court of appeals' analysis of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3).  Under 
such a circumstance, once the tax documents for the years 1996-
2001 were turned over, the contempt would no longer be 
"continuing." 
 
The 
majority's 
contrary 
definition 
of 
"continuing" invents a new legal fiction to reach a desired 
outcome.  As a result, another law, the law of unintended 
consequences, is likely to impact future cases involving 
contempt orders issued under § 785.01(3).  
 
¶102 However, the factual findings of the circuit court 
demonstrate that the order of contempt was not based exclusively 
on Ronald's failure to provide income tax documents for the 
years 1996-2001.  Both the court of appeals and the majority are 
locked in to a narrow and incorrect view of the factual basis 
for the circuit court's order that impacts their respective 
analyses.   
¶103 The circuit court's findings show that the contempt 
order was based on findings that Ronald had hid and was hiding 
relevant information from Heidi and the court about his income.  
Ronald's failure to provide income tax documents for the years 
1996-2001 as required by the stipulation was an important part 
of this pattern of deception.  However, it was but one example 
of his efforts to conceal financial information from Heidi and 
the court, the "game playing" the circuit court found Ronald 
engaged in up to the date of the order of contempt. 
¶104 The circuit court's January 19, 2005, written order 
and several bench rulings are replete with findings that Ronald 
had concealed information about his income from Heidi and the 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
11 
 
circuit court both during the period of the stipulation and 
after.  At the November 25, 2003, hearing, the circuit court 
found substantial misrepresentation on Ronald's part since the 
stipulation had been entered.  The circuit court found Ronald to 
be "substantially evasive and not truthful in regard to his 
income, his income available to him and the assets available to 
him for imputing income and his gross income, which includes the 
undistributed income of the corporation."  These deceptions are 
clearly separate from Ronald's failure to provide income tax 
documents during the period of the stipulation. 
¶105 At the same hearing, the circuit court then stated it 
was "convinced that [Ronald] has played a game for a long time 
in regards to what his actual income and cash available to him 
is."  We note the verb tense of these statements indicates the 
court found Ronald's evasiveness to be on-going as of the 
November 25, 2003 hearing. 
¶106 In the context of seeking to ascertain Ronald's actual 
income, the court made numerous findings regarding Ronald's 
credibility and truthfulness.  At various times, the court found 
Ronald to be "constantly evasive," "not truthful" and "lack[ing] 
credibility."  At the June 15, 2004, hearing the circuit court 
found 
Ronald's 
"testimony 
concerning 
his 
income 
lacked 
credibility."  It gave the following assessment of Ronald, not 
in the context of his failure to provide income tax documents to 
Heidi during the period of the stipulation, but for his 
continuing evasiveness in the proceeding before the court:  
[I]f I look at the criteria for assessing credibility, 
the in——the demeanor of a person, the ability to 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
12 
 
recall things, the way that a person presents him or 
herself, 
the 
ability 
and 
opportunity 
to 
know 
something, [Ronald] failed on many, many, many of 
those counts.   
 
He had a selective memory, was evasive, not able 
to give straight answers.  And that plays into the 
fact that throughout the course of these proceedings 
and during the course of testimony when I heard about 
depositions as well, any information from [Ronald] is 
suspect.  It's 4:16 on a lovely summer day.  If 
[Ronald] told me it was daylight and sunny out, I'd 
have to check my watch and I'd have to look out the 
window. 
¶107 A review of the circuit court's ample findings 
demonstrates that the circuit court did not base its order of 
contempt on the failure to provide income tax documents from 
1996-2001, but for a pattern of evasiveness (of which failure to 
provide said documents was a part) that continued into the 
proceedings 
before 
Judge 
Ramirez. 
 
The 
circuit 
court's 
January 19, 2005, conclusions of law demonstrate that the 
circuit court itself viewed the basis for the order of contempt 
in this manner.  The court concluded Ronald had engaged in 
"overtrial with respect to his efforts to evade an accurate 
calculation of his income."  The circuit court also concluded 
that its order imposing a monetary penalty on Ronald was a 
"contempt 
sanction" 
that 
was 
"required 
as 
a 
remedy 
for 
Ronald['s] contemptuous, 
deliberate 
and 
willful 
failure 
to 
provide the court and the petitioner with truthful information 
about his actual income." 
¶108 Because the circuit court's order of contempt was 
based on its findings that Ronald was in continuing contempt for 
failure to provide truthful information to Heidi and the court 
No.  2005AP534.lbb 
 
13 
 
about his actual income, and not just for the failure to provide 
Heidi with income tax documents during the period of the 
stipulation, 
I 
conclude 
that 
this 
case 
involves 
a 
straightforward application of a circuit court's authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01 to issue a remedial contempt order.  I 
further conclude that the circuit court here applied the correct 
legal standard and reached a reasonable result, and would 
therefore affirm its entry of a contempt order as a proper 
exercise of its discretion.  See Landwehr v. Landwehr, 2006 WI 
64, ¶7, 291 Wis. 2d 49, 715 N.W.2d 180.   
¶109 For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶110 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurring opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP534.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶111 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Members 
of the court obviously disagree in interpreting the record.  I 
would retain jurisdiction of the cause and remand the matter to 
the circuit court to advise this court whether, as a matter of 
fact, Ronald Henrichs provided all the information the circuit 
court required.  I would also ask the parties to brief whether 
the circuit court had the power to enter the order it did 
(regardless 
of 
whether 
Ronald 
Henrichs 
provided 
all 
the 
information) under Wis. Stat. § 805.03 without resort to 
remedial contempt. 
¶112 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
     
 
No.  2005AP534.ssa 
 
 
 
1