Case Title: Commonwealth v. Denson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11251

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11251 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC DENSON. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 13, 2021. - February 10, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Identification, Hearsay, 
Prior inconsistent statement.  Witness, Expert.  
Identification.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Identification of defendant in courtroom, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 9, 2010. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Peter 
A. Velis, J., and the cases were tried before him; and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on January 30, 2019, was heard by Mark D. 
Mason, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On November 1, 2011, a jury convicted the 
defendant, Eric Denson, of murder in the first degree on the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
2 
 
cruelty after he stabbed Conor Reynolds (victim) in the neck.  
The defendant also was convicted of one count of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon against a second person.1  
The judge sentenced the defendant on the murder conviction to a 
term of life in State prison, to be served from and after his 
sentence for assault and battery, which was a term of from one 
and one-half years to one and one-half years and a day.  This 
appeal followed. 
 
After the appeal was docketed in this court, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel,2 which we remanded to the Superior Court.  Following 
an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the 
motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied the motion.  
The defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial was consolidated with his direct appeal. 
On appeal, the defendant raises five principal arguments.  
First, he argues that the trial judge erred in excluding the 
 
 
1 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi on 
an additional count of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon. 
 
 
2 In his motion for a new trial, the defendant also raised a 
number of alleged improper remarks in the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  He does not appeal from the denial of the motion on 
the grounds of the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks, except 
to the extent that he argues that the prosecutor improperly 
relied on the hearsay statement "Eric be buggin'," as discussed 
in part 5, infra. 
3 
 
testimony of the defendant's expert on eyewitness 
identification, Dr. Steven Penrod (eyewitness expert).  Second, 
he argues that the trial judge erroneously permitted an 
eyewitness to identify the defendant in court, where the witness 
had failed to do so out of court.  Third, the defendant argues 
that the admission in evidence of the statement "Eric be 
buggin,'" as part of a witness's prior inconsistent statement, 
violated the rules of evidence pertaining to hearsay and the 
defendant's State and Federal constitutional rights.  Fourth, 
the defendant maintains that the prosecutor, in his closing 
argument, improperly relied on the statement "Eric be buggin'" 
not for impeachment purposes but as substantive evidence.  
Fifth, the defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective 
for (1) calling an expert on forensics and criminalistics, Dr. 
Edward Bernstine (forensics expert), who was vulnerable to 
impeachment based on certain deficiencies in his prior work at 
the State police crime laboratory (crime lab), and (2) failing 
to pursue an alternative theory to explain the presence of blood 
in the back seat of a vehicle in which the defendant rode on the 
night of the stabbing.  Finally, the defendant argues that he is 
entitled to relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), because 
the weight of the evidence did not establish that the defendant 
was the assailant or, if it did, that he acted with deliberate 
premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, and because his 
4 
 
age and immaturity should be considered to mitigate his sentence 
to murder in the second degree or manslaughter. 
For the reasons stated infra, we conclude that there has 
been no reversible error.  After considering each of the 
defendant's arguments and conducting a thorough review of the 
record, we also conclude that there is no reason to exercise our 
authority under § 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce the 
verdict.  We therefore affirm the defendant's convictions and 
the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the 
jury could have found, reserving certain details for our 
discussion of the legal issues. 
On the night of March 13, 2010, the victim and a number of 
friends from his high school attended a birthday party at a 
nightclub (club) in Springfield.  The defendant also was present 
and was seen by a friend of his at the party wearing a black 
leather jacket and a black and red baseball hat.  The club had 
two doors, one closer to the street with a black mailbox on it 
(mailbox door) and one further from the street which was being 
used as the primary entrance to the club (main entry door). 
Shortly before 11 P.M., the victim, his girlfriend, and 
several of their friends were standing in the rear of the club, 
close to where the mailbox door was located.  A physical 
altercation broke out between members of the victim's group and 
5 
 
students from another high school.  The victim, who was not 
involved, approached the group and attempted to break up the 
fight.  An adult chaperone approached and told the victim and 
his friends that they would have to leave if they did not stop 
fighting.  At the same time, a second adult chaperone brought an 
unidentified young man to the main entry door and told the owner 
of the club, who was standing there, that the young man was a 
troublemaker.  The club owner removed him from the club through 
the main entry door. 
As the victim and his girlfriend continued to speak to the 
first chaperone, a second young man wearing a black leather 
jacket and a red baseball hat, with dark skin, suddenly 
approached the victim, "got in his face," and told him to back 
up.  Before the victim could respond, the second young man put 
his left hand on the victim's right shoulder and stabbed the 
victim in the neck with a knife.  As the assailant brought the 
knife away from the victim, it nicked the arm of another member 
of the victim's group, causing him to bleed. 
The club owner, returning to the area of the fight after 
having just ejected the "troublemaker" through the main entry 
door, saw the second young man holding a knife up to the 
victim's throat.  From behind, the club owner pulled the 
assailant away from the victim and carried him to the mailbox 
door.  The assailant wriggled out of the club owner's grasp and 
6 
 
fell almost in the threshold of the doorway.  The assailant got 
up and walked away from the club toward a nearby convenience 
store and gasoline station (gas station). 
Two young women who knew the defendant personally, Ashely 
Hudson and Harmony Alvarado, were standing outside the club when 
they saw the defendant get thrown out.  Hudson testified that 
that she saw the defendant get tackled out of the mailbox door.3  
Alvarado observed another person come up to the defendant.  
Using the defendant's nickname, "E," the person yelled, "What 
the fuck are you doing, E?  Run."  The two men then ran together 
in the direction of the gas station. 
As the club owner was removing the assailant from the club, 
Michael Shea, a friend of the victim, followed and left the club 
after the assailant was ejected.  Hudson testified that she did 
not see anyone else being thrown out of the club between the 
time when the defendant exited and the time when Shea came 
outside.  Two other friends of the victim followed close behind 
Shea.  As they ran outside, one of them asked who had stabbed 
the victim, and the club owner pointed at the person in the red 
hat, whom Shea was chasing.  The two young men ran with Shea to 
the edge of the gas station property.  Shea yelled for the 
person that he was chasing to come back.  The person turned 
 
 
3 Alvarado testified that the defendant was thrown out of 
the main entry door. 
7 
 
around, asked why they were chasing him, and made a threatening 
gesture.4  At that point, the pursuit ended, and Shea and the 
other two friends of the victim returned to the club. 
Meanwhile, the defendant's cousin and a friend left the 
parking lot of the gas station in a sport utility vehicle (SUV) 
that belonged to the cousin's sister.  Both men recognized the 
defendant.  There was another man with the defendant whom 
neither the cousin nor his friend recognized.  At the same time 
as he saw the defendant, the cousin noticed a commotion in the 
parking lot of the club and saw younger individuals who appeared 
to be running from the club.  The cousin drove back into the gas 
station parking lot, where the defendant got into the SUV using 
the rear passenger door and sat behind the front passenger's 
seat.  The person with the defendant said something to the 
effect of "Get him out of here" or "Bring him home." 
The victim, shortly after being stabbed, made his way out 
of the club to the parking lot through the mailbox door, aided 
by his girlfriend.  A witness who had been inside the club 
testified that after the assailant was thrown out of the mailbox 
door, the victim left through the same door seconds later.  
Outside the club, the victim had difficulty breathing and was 
unable to remain standing.  He leaned against a vehicle, and his 
 
4 Shea testified that the person had his hands in his 
pockets and looked as if he were going to take his hands out. 
8 
 
girlfriend helped him to the ground and tried to get him to 
talk.  Police officers who responded to the scene provided the 
victim with first aid until an ambulance arrived.  The victim 
was transported to a local hospital, where he was pronounced 
dead. 
After the victim was transported to the hospital, police 
secured the scene and began collecting evidence.  Many witnesses 
described the assailant as a Black man, about five feet, seven 
inches to five feet, nine inches tall, slim to average build, 
aged about sixteen to twenty years old, wearing a dark colored 
or black jacket, a red or black baseball hat, and a grey or 
black sweatshirt under the jacket. 
Still photographs taken from surveillance footage at the 
gas station showed two Black men, one on either side of the 
gasoline pumps.  The man on the left side of the photographs was 
wearing a red baseball hat, a black jacket, dark pants, and 
white tennis shoes.  Witnesses identified the person on the left 
side of the gas station photograph as the assailant or as the 
person who walked, ran, or was chased from the club to the gas 
station just after the stabbing.  Witnesses who knew the 
defendant personally were shown the gas station surveillance 
video recording, and each identified the person in the red hat 
and black jacket as the defendant. 
9 
 
During a later examination of the SUV, photographs were 
taken of the interior, and a reddish-brown stain that tested 
positive for human blood was located in the back seat.  A later 
test revealed that the blood on the back seat likely had come 
from the victim.  A blood sample taken from the rear interior 
door handle also was tested, and the victim could not be 
excluded as a contributor. 
 
2.  Procedural background.  The defendant was indicted in 
April 2010.  Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all 
evidence of identifications made by thirteen witnesses, arguing 
that the identification procedures used by investigators were 
unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive.  In support of his 
motions to suppress, the defendant sought to admit the testimony 
of an expert on the inaccuracy of eyewitness identification.  
The judge hearing the motion, who later was the trial judge, 
held a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to determine whether the 
eyewitness expert would be permitted to testify at the 
suppression hearing.  See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 
Mass. 15 (1994).  The judge declined to allow the eyewitness 
expert to testify at the hearing, finding that the studies on 
which he relied did not relate to the type of identifications 
made in this case, but left open the possibility that he could 
testify at trial.  Then, after a week-long evidentiary hearing, 
10 
 
the judge allowed the defendant's motions to suppress as to 
three of the witnesses and denied the motions with respect to 
the other ten witnesses. 
 
During the trial, the judge conducted a voir dire of the 
eyewitness expert, as discussed in further detail infra.  The 
judge prohibited the defendant from calling the eyewitness 
expert.  The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that his 
counsel had made strategic decisions on the assumption that the 
eyewitness expert would testify.  The judge denied the motion.  
The defendant also sought a stay of proceedings to allow him to 
seek interlocutory review of the judge's decision pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, which the judge denied. 
At trial, lead counsel for the defendant (trial counsel) 
called the forensics expert to comment on purported deficiencies 
in the police investigation and to call into question whether 
the blood found by investigators was deposited in the rear seat 
of the SUV by those investigators.  After the Commonwealth 
cross-examined the forensics expert based on negative 
performance reviews that he had received for improperly handling 
samples during his time with the crime lab, trial counsel's co-
counsel (co-counsel) moved for a mistrial.  The motion was 
denied. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  When considering a 
direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree 
11 
 
along with an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new 
trial, we review the entire case pursuant to § 33E.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 159-160 (2020); 
Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 768 (2018).  In so doing, 
we review "preserved issues according to their constitutional or 
common-law standard and analyze any unraised, unpreserved, or 
unargued errors, and other errors we discover after a 
comprehensive review of the entire record, for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Upton, supra at 160, 
citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 821 (2017), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018). 
 
2.  Expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification.  
The defendant argues that the judge erroneously excluded the 
eyewitness expert's testimony at trial.5  The defendant also 
invites us to recognize a presumption, in light of growing 
recognition of the potential inaccuracy of eyewitness 
identifications, that expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification should be admitted.  "We review the exclusion of 
expert testimony under an abuse of discretion standard and 
consider whether the judge made a 'clear error of judgment in 
 
 
5 In light of our conclusion that there was no error in the 
exclusion of the eyewitness expert's testimony, we do not reach 
the defendant's further argument that any purported error 
violated his constitutional right to present his theory of 
defense. 
12 
 
weighing' the relevant factors 'such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'"  Commonwealth v. 
German, 483 Mass. 553, 569 (2019), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 
470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 
423 Mass. 180, 182 (1996). 
During the voir dire at trial, the eyewitness expert 
testified that studies have demonstrated that witness confidence 
is the primary factor that appears to influence a jury's 
assessment of the accuracy of an eyewitness identification.  He 
acknowledged that these studies dealt with facial 
identifications, as opposed to clothing-based identifications.  
He also described studies on the effects of various factors -- 
including viewing conditions, stress, exposure time, and race -- 
on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.  He testified 
specifically regarding a study on the effects of "clothing bias" 
as it relates to how clothing affects the ability of witnesses 
to identify individuals in facial arrays.  He also addressed 
studies on the accuracy of facial identifications from 
surveillance video footage. 
In granting the Commonwealth's motion to preclude the 
eyewitness expert's testimony, the judge found that the studies 
that the eyewitness expert highlighted were only "remotely 
related" to the case because they were not specific to 
identifications based on clothing, as necessary to assess the 
13 
 
accuracy of the identifications here.  In addition, the judge 
concluded that the consistency among the various identifications 
and the corroborating evidence in the case "obviate[d] the 
necessity for this jury to be any[] further enlightened . . . 
regarding mistaken identification testimony."  Finally, the 
judge determined, in part based on his familiarity with the jury 
up to that point in the trial and in light of the instructions 
that would be given, that the jury would be capable of 
evaluating the eyewitness testimony and considering the defense 
of misidentification. 
The eyewitness expert's testimony supports the judge's 
finding that the studies relied on were not sufficiently related 
to the facts of the case to be relevant, and we have no reason 
to doubt the judge's additional reliance on his own observations 
of the jury's attentiveness.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 
Mass. 40, 47 (2009) (in sleeping juror case, judge entitled to 
rely on personal observations of jury as to question of juror 
attentiveness); Commonwealth v. Lawton, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 
543-544 (2012) (same).  We further note that, while the judge 
did not have the benefit of our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 379 (2015) (recommending revised jury 
instruction on eyewitness identification), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 
(2018), or of the Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices 
14 
 
(July 25, 2013),6 his instructions to the jury nevertheless 
surpassed what was legally sufficient to address some of the 
specific issues that the defendant sought to raise through the 
eyewitness expert's testimony.  The judge instructed the jury at 
length on the factors identified in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (1979), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 (1995).  He 
then went beyond those factors to instruct the jury on honest 
but mistaken identification, erroneous perception, witness 
forgetfulness, and witness confusion.  See Gomes, supra at 379-
380 (appendix containing provisional instruction addressing, 
inter alia, research on mistaken identification and fallibility 
of witness memory).  The judge then instructed the jury that, in 
addition to assessing the truthfulness of each eyewitness's 
testimony, they must decide whether their testimony regarding 
identification was "accurate in fact."  In light of these 
instructions and the judge's assessment of the evidence and the 
proceedings, we discern no abuse of discretion in his exclusion 
of the eyewitness expert's testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Kent 
K., 427 Mass. 754, 762 (1998) (in first-degree murder case, 
judge did not abuse discretion in excluding expert testimony on 
reliability of eyewitness identification on grounds that 
 
 
6 Available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/supreme-judicial-
court-study-group-on-eyewitness-evidence-report-and-
recommendations-to-the/download [https://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN]. 
15 
 
proffered testimony was "somewhat elementary, basic, and 
parallel[ed] to a great extent the instructions the jurors 
receive from judges in criminal cases"). 
We decline the defendant's invitation to create a 
presumption of admissibility for expert testimony on the 
potential inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications.  Contrary to 
the defendant's assertion in his brief, this court has not 
suggested that such testimony should be admissible as of right 
in all cases.  See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 359, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 845 (1997) ("We have long recognized 
that 'a principle concerning eyewitness identifications may 
become so generally accepted that, rather than have expert 
testimony on the point, a standard jury instruction stating that 
principle would be appropriate'" [emphasis added]); Commonwealth 
v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 153-156 (2004) (Cordy, J., 
concurring) (suggesting only that, in light of growing 
scientific consensus, expert testimony on cross-racial 
identification "should generally be admissible" where witness 
and person identified are strangers to one another).  Because, 
as the case before us demonstrates, the nature and relevance of 
such testimony may vary based on the facts of each case, the 
best course is to entrust to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge the decision whether to admit this testimony. 
16 
 
 
3.  Admissibility of in-court identification.  During the 
investigation, Shea identified the person that he chased as the 
individual appearing on the left side of a still image taken 
from the gas station surveillance video recording.  Police 
presented Shea with a photographic array containing the 
defendant's photograph, and he identified someone else as 
looking like the person he chased out of the club.  At trial, 
over the defendant's objection, Shea identified the defendant as 
the person he chased out of the club.  After Shea testified, the 
defendant moved for a mistrial. 
The defendant argues that, because Shea failed to identify 
the defendant as the assailant in the out-of-court photographic 
array, his doing so in court was akin to a showup identification 
in its suggestiveness.  See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 
255, 262-263, 265 (2014) (in-court identification after witness 
failed to identify defendant during pretrial identification 
procedures admissible only for "good reason").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241-242 (2014) (first-
time in-court identifications admissible only for "good 
reason").  The defendant acknowledges that Collins and Crayton, 
decided after his trial, apply only prospectively, and appears 
to concede that, as in those cases, the admission of the 
challenged testimony here was correct under our case law as it 
existed at the time of trial.  See Collins, supra at 261-262, 
17 
 
266; Crayton, supra at 238, 241-242.  He asks us to exercise our 
authority under § 33E to give him the benefit of those cases.  
Even if we were to do so, we would not disturb the defendant's 
convictions, as the defendant suffered no prejudice from the 
admission of Shea's in-court identification.  See Commonwealth 
v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 624 (2017) (where defendant preserved 
issue through contemporaneous objection at trial, "we review to 
determine whether the error, if any, prejudiced the 
defendant[]"). 
Here, the evidence establishing that the defendant was the 
assailant was strong.  Hudson, who knew the defendant 
personally, testified that, while she was standing outside, she 
saw the defendant being thrown out of the club through the 
mailbox door.  She did not see anyone else being removed between 
the time when the defendant exited and the time when Shea came 
outside.  Multiple witnesses testified that the club owner 
ejected the assailant through the mailbox door and that the 
victim exited through the same door moments later.  Blood 
spatter on the mailbox door and the testimony of witnesses 
inside the club confirmed that the victim and, therefore, the 
assailant, both had exited through the mailbox door.  In 
addition, the club owner testified that, before the stabbing 
occurred, he ousted the person identified as a troublemaker via 
the main entry door, not the mailbox door.  The evidence also 
18 
 
showed that Shea chased the assailant as he fled to the gas 
station and suggested that the defendant was being chased when 
his cousin saw him approaching the gas station.  This evidence, 
combined with the blood found on the door handle and in the rear 
seat of the SUV, presented a strong case that the defendant was 
the assailant.  Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor 
explicitly relied on the identifications of the defendant by 
individuals who knew him, not individuals, like Shea, who did 
not know him and who testified only to their observations of the 
assailant. 
In light of the evidence at trial and the prosecutor's 
closing argument, the impact of Shea's in-court identification 
of the defendant likely had a minimal effect on the jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994) (error not 
prejudicial where it "did not influence the jury or had but very 
slight effect" [citation omitted]).  There was no error in its 
admission under our precedent at the time of trial, but even if 
we were to apply the rules later announced in Collins and 
Crayton, there was no prejudice. 
4.  Hearsay.  The evening after the stabbing, Brian Failey, 
a friend of the defendant who was at the club on the night of 
the stabbing, gave a statement to a police officer.  At trial, 
Failey first testified that he did not remember hearing anything 
yelled when people began to scatter.  After he was asked to read 
19 
 
his statement to the officer, he testified that it did not 
reflect accurately what he told the officer.  Failey testified 
that he had told the officer that, when he was leaving the club 
after the stabbing, he had heard a woman say, "He be buggin'."  
When the officer asked Failey if he was referring to the 
defendant, Failey said that he was not.  The officer then asked 
whether Failey could have heard the defendant's nickname "E" 
instead of "he," and Failey responded that that he did not know.  
Failey agreed that the record of his statement to the officer 
said, "Eric be buggin'," but denied that he said that to the 
officer.  Failey never directly testified that he heard someone 
say, "Eric be buggin'." 
The defendant argues that the statement "Eric be buggin'" 
was admitted improperly because it was hearsay and did not 
satisfy the requirements of the excited utterance exception.  He 
also argues that its admission violated his rights under the due 
process and confrontation clauses of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and under art. 12 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because the statement 
was testimonial hearsay.  At trial, the defendant sought to 
preclude the Commonwealth from introducing the statement, 
objected numerous times to the prosecutor's questions, and moved 
for a mistrial during the questioning.  The issue thus was 
preserved, and we "review to determine whether the introduction 
20 
 
of the [statement] was error and, if so, whether it was 
prejudicial."  Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 186 (2019) 
(out-of-court statements properly admitted). 
Because Failey initially did not remember hearing anything 
yelled and then claimed that the written statement did not 
reflect accurately what he told the officer, the substance of 
the statement to the officer, including the statement "Eric be 
buggin'," was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement for 
impeachment purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 
66 (1984).  Thus, the statement "Eric be buggin'" was not 
admitted for its truth and was not hearsay.  See Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 581 (2019) ("Testimony reporting a prior 
out-of-court statement that tends to contradict the declarant's 
testimony is admissible for the purposes of impeachment" 
[alterations, quotations, and citation omitted]).  The judge 
therefore did not err in admitting the statement "Eric be 
buggin'" as part of Failey's prior inconsistent statement.  For 
these reasons, we need not address the defendant's arguments 
regarding whether the statement qualified as an excited 
utterance or whether it was testimonial. 
5.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor, in his closing argument, relied on the statement 
"Eric be buggin'" not for impeachment purposes, see part 4, 
supra, but as substantive evidence that the defendant's demeanor 
21 
 
or behavior underwent a change at the time of the stabbing.  The 
defendant objected to the challenged portion of the prosecutor's 
closing argument at trial, so we review for prejudicial error.  
See Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 417 (2020). 
"We consider remarks made during closing in the context of 
the whole argument, the evidence admitted at trial, and the 
judge's instructions to the jury" [quotations and citation 
omitted].  Andre, 484 Mass. at 417-418.  Although the prosecutor 
referred to the inconsistency in Shea's statement to the police, 
the thrust of the relevant portion of the argument, set forth in 
the margin,7 was that the statement "Eric be buggin'" indicated 
that the defendant had done something that caused people in the 
club to scatter.  The prosecutor therefore improperly employed 
the statement for its truth.  See Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 431 
 
7 The prosecutor remarked: 
 
"[H]ow [the defendant] was acting in the bar was described 
to you by his friend Brian Failey[,] and Brian Failey said, 
'I saw Mr. Denson by the dance floor.  Yeah, he's a 
generally quieter guy, came up to me said hello.' . . . 
 
"That all changed when Brian Failey heard something yelled, 
and he heard right at the time people started to scatter, 
'Eric, be buggin'.'  And, of course, he told you, 'Well, I 
might have said, "He be buggin'"; I might have said, "E be 
buggin'." I might have said Eric, He, E, or some variation 
that the police must have manipulated.'  But in his 
statement to the police that he looked at before he signed, 
given soon after the event, he said '[W]hat caused the 
people to scatter after Eric was shaking my hand and being 
a good guy was, "Eric, be buggin',"' and then all of a 
sudden it's crazy."  (Emphasis added.) 
22 
 
Mass. 265, 277-278 (2000) (prosecutor's substantive use of 
evidence admitted for limited purpose improper).  Nevertheless, 
in the context of the entire argument, all of the evidence 
presented at trial, and the judge's instructions to the jury 
that closing arguments are not evidence and that prior 
inconsistent statements of a witness may be considered only in 
evaluating the credibility of the witness, see Andre, supra, we 
conclude that the prosecutor's improper remarks "did not 
influence the jury or had but very slight effect" (citation 
omitted), Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353. 
 
6.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  As he did in his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant argues that trial counsel 
was ineffective in deciding to call the forensics expert and in 
failing to present an alternative explanation for how blood came 
to be present in the back seat of the vehicle. 
"Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, we do not evaluate his ineffective assistance claim 
under the traditional standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)."  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 
Mass. 46, 62 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 
463, 472 (2018), and Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 
192-193 (2017).  "Instead, we apply the more favorable standard 
of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and review his claim to determine 
whether there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
23 
 
justice."  Ayala, supra, citing Seino, supra.  "Under this 
review, we first ask whether defense counsel committed an error 
in the course of the trial."  Ayala, supra, citing Seino, supra.  
"If there was an error, we ask whether it was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.  Ayala, supra, citing Seino, 
supra at 472-473. 
"Where the claimed ineffectiveness is the result of a 
strategic or tactical decision of trial counsel, the decision 
must have been 'manifestly unreasonable' to be considered an 
error."  Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62, quoting Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 
193.  In order to determine whether a decision is manifestly 
unreasonable, we must evaluate the "decision at the time it was 
made" (citation omitted).  Ayala, supra.  "When, as here, the 
motion judge did not preside at trial, . . . we regard ourselves 
in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial 
record."  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 845 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  We 
address each of the defendant's arguments in turn. 
a.  Calling the forensics expert.  At the evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, trial counsel 
testified that the decision to call the forensics expert was 
based on his impressive credentials in the field of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, including his former 
employment with the crime lab, and on the recommendation of 
24 
 
other defense attorneys who had tried cases involving DNA 
evidence.  Trial counsel testified that he was aware of the 
forensics expert's "baggage," but believed that it was not 
relevant to his scientific knowledge or competence to testify 
regarding bloodstain analysis, and that it would not outweigh 
the benefit of his testimony. 
At trial, the forensics expert provided meaningful 
criticism of the methods used to investigate and document the 
evidence of blood in the club and in the rear seat of the SUV.  
Specifically, he testified that the shape of the bloodstain in 
the back seat of the SUV was not consistent with a transfer 
stain because it lacked directionality or feathering that would 
have indicated transfer through rubbing.  This testimony fit 
with the over-all defense strategy of suggesting that the 
Commonwealth could not prove how the blood was deposited in the 
SUV, that it could not have come from the defendant, and that 
investigators may have contaminated scene. 
Despite the defendant's efforts on appeal to characterize 
the prosecutor's cross-examination of the forensics expert as 
devastating to his case, the trial transcript reveals that its 
scope and effect were fairly minor.  At the beginning of cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked the forensics expert about 
negative performance reviews that he had received during his 
time with the crime lab.  The forensics expert admitted that he 
25 
 
had received negative reviews that addressed his ability to 
process crime scenes without causing contamination.  On redirect 
examination, trial counsel made an effort to rehabilitate the 
forensics expert's credibility by bringing out the details of 
the three incidents that were the subjects of the negative 
reviews and highlighting that the incidents were dissimilar to 
the investigation in the defendant's case. 
The record thus does not support the defendant's argument 
that trial counsel's decision to call the forensics expert was 
manifestly unreasonable when made.  See Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62.  
That co-counsel, as the defendant emphasizes, disagreed with the 
decision does not alter our conclusion.  Co-counsel admitted at 
trial that the decision was "[p]urely strategic."  An 
unsuccessful defense strategy does not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel, even if different strategies were 
available or conceivable.  See Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 
266, 272 (1991) ("where tactical or strategic decisions of the 
defendant's counsel are at issue, we . . . avoid characterizing 
as unreasonable a defense that was merely unsuccessful").  The 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim therefore fails on this 
basis. 
b.  Secondary transfer of blood.  The defendant also argues 
that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to pursue 
an alternative theory of defense, namely, that the defendant was 
26 
 
the troublemaker thrown out of the club shortly before the 
stabbing and that the blood on his clothing, which then was 
transferred to the vehicle, was the result of his coming into 
contact with other people in the parking lot of the club as they 
left the club after the stabbing.  Trial counsel instead argued 
that the defendant was not the assailant but was inside the club 
and close enough to the stabbing to be spattered with blood as 
the victim coughed after being stabbed, just as other bystanders 
were.  The defendant claims that this strategy left him without 
an effective defense. 
The defendant overstates the strength of the evidence 
supporting his proffered theory of secondary transfer.  The 
evidence showed that the troublemaker and the assailant were 
thrown out of different doors of the club; a witness who knew 
the defendant saw him get tackled out of the mailbox door; once 
he was outside, the defendant headed toward the gas station; 
Shea followed the assailant out of the mailbox door almost 
immediately and chased him in the direction of the gas station; 
and the victim and other people with blood on them left the club 
soon after, through the mailbox door.  Only one witness, 
Alvarado, insisted that the defendant was thrown out of the main 
entry door and that he "hung around for a while" afterward.  
Critically, she did not testify that he came into contact with 
anyone at any time in the parking lot of the club, and there was 
27 
 
no other evidence to that effect.  In addition, Alvarado's 
credibility was drawn into question by her admission that the 
defendant was her friend and that she was not happy to be 
testifying. 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, trial counsel's 
strategy did not leave him without an effective defense.  Trial 
counsel testified that he did not pursue a secondary transfer 
theory because he did not think that the evidence supported it.  
He testified that the strategy that he did pursue was 
advantageous in establishing how blood came to be on the 
defendant's clothing, whereas a theory presenting him as the 
earlier-expelled troublemaker would have put him too far from 
the stabbing to plausibly have gotten blood on himself.  Based 
on our review of the record and the weight of the evidence, we 
conclude that trial counsel's over-all strategy and his decision 
not to pursue a defense theory based on secondary transfer were 
not manifestly unreasonable.  See Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62.  For 
this reason as well, the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel fails. 
7.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant asks 
us to exercise our authority under § 33E to reduce his 
conviction or order a new trial.  The defendant argues three 
specific grounds for relief under § 33E.  We discuss each in 
turn. 
28 
 
First, the defendant argues that the weight of the evidence 
did not support the conclusion that he was the assailant.  As we 
already have noted, the evidence identifying the defendant as 
the assailant was compelling.  See part 3, supra.  The 
defendant's argument therefore fails. 
Second, the defendant claims that the weight of the 
evidence did not support the verdict on either theory of murder 
in the first degree presented, deliberate premeditation or 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  As the defendant acknowledges, 
"[n]o particular length of time of reflection is required to 
find deliberate premeditation; a decision to kill may be formed 
in a few seconds."  Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 419 
(2011).  The evidence showed that the defendant was not involved 
in the initial altercation, which had ended by the time he 
approached the victim, and that he used one hand to hold the 
victim by the shoulder and the other to stab him in the neck.  
The weight of the evidence thus supported the defendant's 
conviction on the theory of deliberate premeditation.  In light 
of this conclusion, we need not reach the question whether the 
weight of the evidence supported the defendant's conviction on 
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.8 
 
 
8 The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on each theory separately and unanimously. 
29 
 
Finally, the defendant asks us to consider his youth and 
immaturity in mitigation of his sentence.  As the defendant 
states in his brief that he was twenty years old at the time of 
the stabbing and there is nothing in the record that indicates 
that a reduction in the verdict on this basis is warranted, we 
decline to do so. 
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that 
there is no other reason to exercise our authority under § 33E 
to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict of 
murder in the first degree. 
Judgments affirmed. 
Order denying motion for a 
  new trial affirmed.