Case Title: Lamar Co., LLC v. Country Side Rest., Inc.

Citation: 2012 WI 46

Docket Number: 2010AP002023

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2023 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In re the Petition of Country Side Restaurant, 
Inc. for the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Winnebago County to Accept a Portion of an Award 
of Damages Made by the DOT on 10/09/08 for 
Property located at 1145 Abraham Lane, Oshkosh, 
WI: 
 
The Lamar Company, LLC, d/b/a Lamar Outdoor 
Advertising, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Country Side Restaurant, Inc., 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 334 Wis. 2d 809, 800 N.W. 2d 958 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 4, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Karen L. Seifert 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Thomas S. Hornig and Kraig A. Byron and von Briesen & 
Roper, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Thomas S. Hornig.  
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Hugh R. Braun and Nicholas R. Diulio and Godfrey, Braun & 
Frazier, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Hugh R. Braun.  
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kathleen M. Batha, 
assistant attorney general, for the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, and oral argument by Kathleen M. Batha.  
 
 
2012 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2023 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV1908) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Petition of Country Side Restaurant, 
Inc. for the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Winnebago County to Accept a Portion of an 
Award of Damages Made by the DOT on 10/09/08 
for Property located at 1145 Abraham Lane, 
Oshkosh, WI: 
 
The Lamar Company, LLC, d/b/a Lamar Outdoor 
Advertising, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Country Side Restaurant, Inc., 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 4, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Lamar Co., LLC v. 
Country Side Restaurant, Inc., No. 2010AP2023, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 2011), that affirmed an order by the 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
2 
 
Winnebago County Circuit Court1 disbursing to Country Side 
Restaurant, Inc. (Country Side) $120,000 on deposit with the 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Winnebago County. 
¶2 
Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation (DOT) acquired a 76,628 square foot 
parcel of land owned by Country Side, a portion of which Country 
Side leased to the Lamar Company, LLC (Lamar) for the purpose of 
constructing and maintaining a billboard.  As compensation for 
the taking, the DOT issued to Country Side and Lamar an award of 
damages totaling $2,000,000.  Country Side and Lamar agreed that 
all proceeds would be transferred to Country Side, save for 
$120,000 deposited with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Winnebago County for eventual distribution.  Thereafter, Lamar 
applied for and received from the DOT a relocation payment of 
$83,525.   
¶3 
Country Side and Lamar were unable to agree on a 
division of the $120,000.  Consequently, Lamar filed a claim for 
partition, seeking the full amount on deposit, plus interest.  
Country Side responded by petitioning the circuit court for an 
order disbursing to Country Side the full amount on deposit, 
plus interest. 
¶4 
The circuit court granted Country Side's petition and 
ordered the $120,000 to be disbursed to Country Side.  The 
circuit court determined that the DOT had already justly 
compensated Lamar for the value of its billboard and that Lamar 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Karen L. Seifert presided. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
3 
 
had lost its right to seek a share of the award of damages 
issued to Country Side and Lamar by failing to join in Country 
Side's appeal of the award.  The court of appeals affirmed, 
though on slightly different grounds. 
¶5 
We granted Lamar's petition for review and now reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
¶6 
We hold that Lamar has not lost its right to seek a 
share of the award of damages issued to Country Side and Lamar, 
and therefore, the circuit court improperly dismissed Lamar's 
claim for partition.  First, we conclude that Lamar did not lose 
its right to seek a share of the award of damages by failing to 
join in Country Side's appeal of the award.  Second, we conclude 
that Lamar did not lose its right to bring a claim for partition 
by accepting payment from the DOT for relocation expenses.  The 
DOT's payment for Lamar's relocation expenses is distinct from 
the DOT's award for the fair market value of the property taken.  
Lamar has a right to seek both. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶7 
In October 2008, as part of its plan to reconstruct 
Highway 41, the DOT acquired a 76,628 square foot parcel of land 
located in Oshkosh, Wisconsin and owned by Country Side.  
Country Side had leased a portion of its property to Lamar for 
the purpose of constructing and maintaining a billboard.  The 
ten-year lease commenced on April 1, 2006, and provided for an 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
4 
 
annual rent of $5,400, payable in monthly installments of $450.  
Lamar's billboard was permitted by the DOT.2   
¶8 
The DOT's jurisdictional offer3 was issued to both 
Country Side 
and 
Lamar and listed a purchase price of 
$2,000,000.  The purchase price was allocated as $1,934,900 for 
"Loss of land, including improvements and fixtures actually 
being acquired" and $65,100 for "Other: Sign."   
¶9 
In his June 12, 2008, report, the DOT's appraiser, 
James Norby (Norby), clarified that $65,100 was the value of the 
permitted sign site, as opposed to the value of the billboard 
structure: "The purpose of the permitted sign site valuation is 
to determine the contributing value of the permitted sign site.  
The billboard structure is owned by Lamar Companies.  Therefore, 
it is not included in this valuation.  The land occupied by the 
structure is owned by [Country Side]."   
                                                 
2 By order dated October 25, 2011, we granted the DOT's 
motion to take judicial notice of Lamar's permit. 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3) (2009-10).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Notice to the property owner of a jurisdictional offer is a 
jurisdictional requisite for the condemnor to proceed in 
condemnation.  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(4).  Pursuant to § 32.05(3), 
notice of a jurisdictional offer has eight necessary components, 
including, inter alia, a brief statement of the nature of the 
project for which the property is intended to be acquired, a 
description of the property and the interest therein sought to 
be taken, the proposed date of occupancy, and the amount of 
compensation offered. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
5 
 
¶10 The valuation of the permitted sign site was completed 
by Ronald Borree (Borree), also of the DOT, and attached to 
Norby's report as an addendum.  Borree valued the permitted sign 
site at $65,000 and valued the billboard structure at $65,079. 
¶11 On October 15, 2008, the DOT issued to Country Side 
and Lamar an award of damages4 totaling $2,000,000.  By a single 
check dated October 9, 2008, the DOT paid to Country Side and 
Lamar $1,985,785.51, or $2,000,000 less $14,214.49 in prorated 
taxes.5 
¶12 On November 7, 2008, Country Side petitioned the 
circuit court to accept deposit of $120,000 for the benefit of 
Country Side and Lamar, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d).  
Counsel for Country Side averred that Country Side and Lamar had 
agreed to transfer to Country Side all but $120,000 of the award 
of damages.  The parties requested the circuit court to accept 
deposit of the remaining $120,000 for eventual distribution by 
court order. 
¶13 The circuit court granted Country Side's petition and 
ordered the $120,000 to be deposited with the clerk.  
¶14 On 
December 
5, 
2008, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(11), Country Side appealed to the circuit court, 
challenging the adequacy of the $2,000,000 award of damages.6 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7). 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d). 
6 Country Side's appeal under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11), which 
has since been dismissed, is not before us. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
6 
 
¶15 Lamar did not join in Country Side's appeal.  However, 
by letter dated July 16, 2009, counsel for Lamar submitted to 
the DOT, inter alia, a completed "Relocation Claim – Application 
and Release" Form DT1527 (Form DT1527) and a "Payment Schedule 
Summary Worksheet" (Worksheet), claiming $83,525 in relocation 
expenses associated with its billboard.7  By signing Form DT1527, 
Lamar "agree[d] to accept the amounts as payment in full for the 
items claimed, and release the [DOT] and any public body, board 
or commission acting in its behalf, from any and all claims for 
damages arising through this project, for the listed items for 
which an amount is claimed."  As detailed by the Worksheet, the 
claimed amount of $83,525 consisted of $75,175 for the in-place 
value of the billboard, i.e. the cost to build the billboard 
new; $2,500 for relocation expenses; and $5,850 for take-down 
cost.  The Worksheet was signed by representatives from both 
Lamar and the DOT and contained the following release: "The 
reimbursement stated on this worksheet has been reviewed and 
agreed to by both parties.  The sign owner or representative, by 
signing this document, waives any right to future claims for 
damage or loss involving this sign."   
¶16 Sometime thereafter, Lamar's counsel contacted the DOT 
to inquire about recovering the value of its billboard.  In a 
letter dated September 22, 2009, the DOT, through Assistant 
                                                 
7 By order dated January 24, 2012, we granted the DOT's 
motion to take judicial notice of the July 16, 2009, letter from 
Lamar's counsel to the DOT and the attached Form DT1527 and 
Worksheet. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
7 
 
Attorney General Kathleen M. Batha (Attorney Batha), responded 
by advising Lamar that only the value of the sign site, not the 
value 
of 
the 
structure 
itself, 
was 
included 
within 
the 
$2,000,000 award of damages:  
The $2 million payment to Country Side and Lamar 
covers all interests in the value of the sign site.  
For example, if you have a claim for leasehold value 
or 
permit 
value, 
etc., 
you 
will 
need 
to 
seek 
satisfaction from Country Side.  The sign structure 
itself is treated as a tenant's fixture which is not 
included in the payment that has been made.   
Attorney Batha noted, however, that Lamar was entitled to 
"moving expenses or depreciated reproduction cost under [Wis. 
Admin. Code COMM § 202.64 (Mar. 1997)]."8  Enclosed with Attorney 
Batha's letter was a copy of Form DT1527. 
¶17 Country Side and Lamar were unable to agree on a 
division of the $120,000 on deposit with the clerk of the 
circuit court.  Consequently, on November 4, 2009, Lamar filed a 
claim for partition under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(9)(a)3. and 
820.01, seeking the full amount on deposit, plus interest.  
Lamar contended that it was entitled to the fair market value of 
its billboard and the bundle of rights that accompany it. 
¶18 In response, on November 10, 2009, Country Side 
petitioned the circuit court for disbursement of the $120,000 to 
Country Side.  In support of its petition, Country Side argued 
that the $65,100 allocated to the sign in the jurisdictional 
offer was the value of the permitted sign site which was owned 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the March 1997 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
8 
 
by Country Side and in which Lamar had no interest.  By 
contrast, Country Side alleged, Lamar owned and was entitled to 
compensation only for the billboard itself.  Country Side 
maintained that Lamar had already been compensated for the value 
of the billboard, plus relocation expenses, through Lamar's 
receipt of $83,525. 
¶19 The circuit court agreed and ordered the $120,000 to 
be disbursed to Country Side, thereby dismissing Lamar's claim 
for partition.  Noting that Lamar did not join in Country Side's 
appeal of the award of damages, the circuit court determined 
that any right to the value of the permitted sign site belonged 
to Country Side.  According to the circuit court, Lamar had 
already "made [its] deal with the DOT" for the value of the 
billboard and the costs of removal and relocation.  
¶20 Lamar appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, 
though on slightly different grounds.  Lamar, No. 2010AP2023, 
unpublished slip op.  Citing this court's decision in Vivid, 
Inc. v. Fiedler, 219 Wis. 2d 764, 580 N.W.2d 644 (1998), the 
court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 84.30(8)9 provides 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 84.30(8), "Agreed Price," provides:  
Compensation required under subs. (6) and (7) 
shall be paid to the person entitled thereto.  If the 
department and the owner reach agreement on the amount 
of compensation payable to such owner in respect to 
any removal or relocation, the department may pay such 
compensation to the owner and thereby require or 
terminate the owner's rights or interests by purchase.  
If the department and the owner do not reach agreement 
as to such amount of compensation, the department or 
owner 
may 
institute 
an 
action 
to 
have 
such 
compensation determined under s. 32.05. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
9 
 
the exclusive remedy for the taking of Lamar's property.  Lamar, 
No. 2010AP2023, unpublished slip op., ¶¶9-15.  The court of 
appeals determined that by signing the Worksheet, Lamar reached 
an agreement with the DOT on the amount of compensation payable 
to Lamar pursuant to § 84.30(8) and thus lost its right to bring 
future claims for compensation under Wis. Stat. § 32.05.  Id., 
¶¶12-15. 
¶21 Lamar petitioned this court for review, and the DOT 
moved for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of 
Lamar's petition for review.  By order dated October 25, 2011, 
we granted both the DOT's motion and Lamar's petition for 
review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 The principal issue before us is whether the circuit 
court properly granted Country Side's petition for disbursement 
of the $120,000 to Country Side and thus properly dismissed 
Lamar's claim for partition under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(9)(a)3. 
and 820.01.  In order to resolve that issue, we must determine 
whether Lamar lost its right to seek a share of the award of 
damages issued to Country Side and Lamar either by failing to 
join in Country Side's appeal of the award, as the circuit court 
concluded, or by signing the Worksheet, as the court of appeals 
concluded. 
 
Resolution 
of 
these 
questions 
involves 
the 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05 and 84.30.  
Statutory interpretation and application are questions of law 
that we review de novo while benefitting from the analyses of 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
10 
 
the court of appeals and circuit court.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. 
Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶24, 339 Wis. 2d 125, __ N.W.2d __. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶23 We conclude that Lamar has not lost its right to seek 
a share of the award of damages issued to Country Side and 
Lamar, and therefore, the circuit court improperly dismissed 
Lamar's claim for partition under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(9)(a)3. 
and 820.01.  We begin in Part A by providing the framework for 
determining just compensation when, as here, the government 
acquires real property jointly held by the owner of a permitted 
billboard and the owner of the underlying land.  In Part B, we 
apply that framework more particularly to the instant case. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
11 
 
A 
¶24 Pursuant to both the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution, private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation.  U.S. 
Const. amend. V;10 Wis. Const. art. I, § 13.11  In this case, it 
is undisputed that the DOT took for public use a parcel of land 
owned by Country Side and was thus required to provide just 
compensation therefor.  It is further undisputed that since 
April 1, 2006, Country Side had leased a portion of its property 
to Lamar for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a 
billboard and that such billboard was permitted.12  Under 
Wisconsin law, a lessee of more than one year is considered a 
joint owner of the leased property.  See Redevelopment Auth. of 
Green Bay v. Bee Frank, Inc., 120 Wis. 2d 402, 410-11, 355 
N.W.2d 240 (1984); Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 94 
                                                 
10 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)), provides that 
private property shall not "be taken for public use, without 
just compensation." 
11 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that "[t]he property of no person shall be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor."  See also 260 N. 
12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶43, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 
N.W.2d 372; E-L Enters., Inc. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶21, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 785 N.W.2d 409. 
12 See supra note 2. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 375, 387-88, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980).  Consequently, for 
purposes of condemnation law, "[i]t is well settled that a 
lessee has a property interest; and, when that interest is 
completely taken by a condemning authority, the lessee is 
entitled to compensation."  Id., 94 Wis. 2d at 400; see also 
City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the 
U.S. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Milwaukee, 2009 WI 84, ¶36, 319 
Wis. 2d 553, 768 N.W.2d 749.  Moreover, this court has already 
determined that a billboard permit, which confers a right or 
privilege to erect and operate a billboard on a designated piece 
of land, constitutes an interest in real property.  Adams 
Outdoor Adver., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶¶3, 64, 
294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803; see also Jill S. Gelineau, 
Valuation of Billboards in Condemnation, 19 Prac. Real Est. 
Law., July 2003, at 23, 25 (explaining that a billboard owner's 
property interest may include three elements: a leased or fee 
interest in the land; an ownership interest in the billboard 
itself; and an interest in the permit that makes the billboard 
legal).  Accordingly, in this case, there is no question that 
Lamar is entitled to just compensation: its property interest, 
derived from both its lease and permit, was completely taken by 
the DOT by virtue of the DOT's acquisition of the land on which 
Lamar's billboard was located.   
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 outlines the rules governing 
the determination of just compensation.  In the case of a total 
taking, like in this case, "the condemnor shall pay the fair 
market value of the property taken and shall be liable for the 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
13 
 
items in s. 32.19 if shown to exist."  § 32.09(5)(a); see also 
260 N. 12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶46, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 
808 N.W.2d 372; Vivid, 219 Wis. 2d at 780 (lead op.).  Included 
within the additional items payable under Wis. Stat. § 32.19 are 
relocation 
payments. 
 
§ 32.19(3). 
 
As 
indicated 
by 
the 
legislature's use of the conjunctive word "and" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(5)(a), the condemnor's payment of the fair market value 
of the property taken is distinct from the condemnor's liability 
for relocation payments under Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3).  See also 
City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 1037 n.6, 473 
N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991).  If relocation expenses are shown to 
exist, the property owner is entitled to both the fair market 
value of the property taken and relocation payments.  We discuss 
these in turn. 
1. Fair Market Value of the Property Taken 
¶26 Fair market value is defined as "the amount for which 
the property could be sold in the market on a sale by an owner 
willing, but not compelled, to sell, and to a purchaser willing 
and able, but not obliged, to buy."  260 N. 12th St., 338 
Wis. 2d 34, ¶47 (internal quotations omitted).  The formula is 
no different when determining the value of a billboard: "'Fair 
market value, as in any other type of case, is ordinarily 
measured as the price that the aggregate asset——the lease, 
permit and sign——would bring in the marketplace in a voluntary 
sale 
to 
a 
knowledgeable 
buyer, 
considering 
all 
relevant 
factors.'"  Vivid, 219 Wis. 2d at 780 (lead op.) (quoting 8A 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
14 
 
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.04[1], at 23-47 (3d ed. 1997)); 
see also Adams Outdoor Adver., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶88. 
¶27 As this court has recognized, the value of a billboard 
is derived largely from the billboard's location.  Adams Outdoor 
Adver., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶85; Vivid, 219 Wis. 2d at 781 (lead 
op.); 
see 
also 
Gelineau, 
supra, 
at 
27 
(observing 
that 
"[l]ocation is of prime importance to all real estate assets," 
which is "equally true of the interests in outdoor advertising 
signboards").  Indeed, "a billboard along a heavily traveled 
interstate highway can command a much greater price for the 
display of advertising than a billboard in a residential 
neighborhood."  Adams Outdoor Adver., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶85.  The 
value of the location, in turn, drives the value of the 
leasehold; simply stated, "[t]he better the location, the higher 
the 
rent." 
 
Vivid, 
219 
Wis. 2d at 
804 
(Bradley, 
J., 
concurring).13  Likewise, because a billboard permit is valid 
only for a designated location and thus terminates once the 
billboard is moved, the primary value of a billboard permit 
appertains to the value of the designated location.  Adams 
Outdoor Adver., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶85; see also Gelineau, supra, 
at 27 ("A billboard permit only provides for a specific 
location, and relocation requires a new permit for the different 
location.  Moreover, billboard value is site-specific.  The same 
                                                 
13 Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in Vivid, Inc. v. 
Fiedler, 219 Wis. 2d 764, 580 N.W.2d 644 (1998), constitutes the 
majority opinion with respect to the methods of valuing 
billboards. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
15 
 
sign structure will have much more value next to a major highway 
as compared to a site a few miles from the highway."). 
¶28 When, as here, the property condemned is held by 
multiple owners, the condemnor is generally required to value 
the property according to the "unit rule."  See City of 
Milwaukee Post No. 2874, 319 Wis. 2d 553, ¶¶39-41; Spiegelberg 
v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶15, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  
Pursuant to the unit rule, the condemnor "provides compensation 
by paying the value of an undivided interest in the property 
rather than by paying the value of each owner's partial 
interest."  City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874, 319 Wis. 2d 553, 
¶39.  In other words, the condemnor "determines the fair market 
value as if only one person owned the property."  Id.  When that 
value is determined, the condemnor makes a single payment which 
is then apportioned among the multiple owners.  Id.; see also 
Maxey, 94 Wis. 2d at 401 ("[C]ondemnation awards should be based 
on the value of the property as a whole as if there were only 
one owner, and it is only after there is a determination of the 
taken property's total value that it is apportioned among the 
various interests in the property.").  In Wisconsin, acceptance 
of the unit rule is "beyond question."  Green Bay Broad. Co. v. 
Redevelopment Auth. of Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 342 
N.W.2d 27 
(1983). 
 
The unit rule helps to ensure that 
compensation is just both to the owners of the property taken 
and to the public that must pay the bill:  
The 
unit 
rule 
is 
designed 
to 
protect 
the 
interests of the condemnor and not to protect the 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
16 
 
interests 
of 
a 
condemnee. 
 
The 
condemnees, 
irrespective 
of 
their 
interests, 
are 
indeed 
constitutionally entitled to just compensation, but 
contracts between the owners of different interests in 
the land should not be permitted to result in a total 
sum which is in excess of the whole value of the 
undivided fee. 
Id.; see also City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874, 319 Wis. 2d 553, 
¶50. 
2. Relocation Payments 
¶29 The legislature has expressly declared that it is in 
the public interest to fairly compensate those persons displaced 
by any public project by paying for not only the property 
acquired but also other losses described in Wis. Stat. § 32.19.  
See § 32.19(1).  Relocation expenses are among the losses 
described in § 32.19.  See § 32.19(3).  Section 32.19(3) 
provides, in pertinent part:  
Any condemnor which proceeds with the acquisition 
of real and personal property for purposes of any 
project for which the power of condemnation may be 
exercised, or undertakes a program or project that 
causes a person to be a displaced person, shall make 
fair and reasonable relocation payments to displaced 
persons, business concerns and farm operations . . . . 
Relocation payments under § 32.19(3) are required for the 
following: the actual and reasonable expenses of moving the 
displaced person and his or her family, business or farm 
operation, including his or her personal property; the actual 
direct losses of tangible personal property as a result of 
moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation; the actual 
reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business or 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
17 
 
farm operation; and the actual reasonable expenses necessary to 
reestablish a business or farm operation.  § 32.19(3)(a). 
¶30 The standards for providing relocation payments under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3) are outlined more specifically in Wis. 
Admin. Code Ch. COMM 202.14  Wisconsin Admin. Code COMM § 202.001 
reiterates that relocation payments are distinct from payment 
for property acquired: "Payments required by this chapter do not 
affect any right to seek compensation specified in ss. 32.01 
through 32.18 and 32.28, Stats."  In addition, relevant to this 
case, Chapter COMM 202 includes a section specific to outdoor 
advertising signs.  Wisconsin Admin. Code COMM § 202.64(1) 
expressly provides that the displacing agency "shall pay a 
person displaced from an outdoor advertising sign for actual 
moving and related expense, direct loss of tangible personal 
property, and the actual expense in searching for a replacement 
site . . . ."   
B 
¶31 The above framework is consistent with the DOT's 
conduct throughout this case.  That Lamar had an interest in the 
property taken and was thus entitled to just compensation was 
                                                 
14 Effective July 1, 2011, the legislature eliminated the 
Department of Commerce and transferred its functions to various 
other state agencies.  See 2011 Wis. Act 32.  Relevant to this 
case, the Department of Commerce's functions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19 were transferred to the Department of Administration.  
See id., §§ 923-932.  As a result, in December 2011, pursuant to 
its authority under Wis. Stat. § 13.92(4)(b)1., the Legislative 
Reference Bureau renumbered Wis. Admin. Code Ch. COMM 202 as 
Wis. Admin. Code Ch. ADM 92.  See 672 Wis. Admin. Reg. 31 (Dec. 
31, 2011). 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
18 
 
recognized by the DOT through its jurisdictional offer and award 
of damages.  The DOT issued a single jurisdictional offer of 
$2,000,000 
to 
both 
Country 
Side 
and 
Lamar, 
expressly 
acknowledging that both Country Side and Lamar "own an interest" 
in the parcel of real property being acquired.  Likewise, the 
DOT issued a single award of damages of $2,000,000 to both 
Country Side and Lamar,15 expressly acknowledging that both 
                                                 
15 In its brief in response to the DOT's amicus curiae 
brief, Country Side raises for the first time the issue of 
whether Lamar has standing in this case, given the fact that 
"Lamar Advertising of Milwaukee" was the entity named in the 
award of damages.  As a general rule, we will not consider for 
the first time on appeal an issue not raised in the circuit 
court, particularly when, as here, the issue is undeveloped and 
involves questions of fact not brought to the circuit court's 
attention.  See Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 
N.W.2d 140 (1980). 
In that same brief, relying on Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3) and 
(7), Country Side also argues for the first time that Lamar does 
not have a right to the award of damages because only those 
parties with an interest "of record" have a right to be named in 
the jurisdictional offer and award of damages, and Lamar's lease 
was never recorded.  We disagree.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(3) provides, in relevant part, that 
the "[c]ondemnor shall send to the owner, or one of the owners 
of 
record, . . . a 
notice [of the jurisdictional offer]."  
(Emphasis added.)  The plain language of § 32.05(3) indicates 
that 
the 
condemnor 
is 
required 
to 
send 
notice 
of 
the 
jurisdictional offer to either "the owner" of the property "or 
one of the owners of record."  In other words, § 32.05(3) "does 
not require that service of jurisdictional offer and notice of 
hearing must be made only on an 'owner of record.'  Service on 
the 'owner of record' is merely one of two alternatives."  Area 
Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., Dist. No. 2 v. 
Saltz, 57 Wis. 2d 524, 204 N.W.2d 909 (1973). 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
19 
 
Country Side and Lamar "have an interest" in the parcel of real 
property being acquired.  Finally, the DOT issued a single 
check, naming both Country Side and Lamar as payees, for the 
amount of the award less prorated taxes.  The DOT's single 
payment was consistent with the unit rule.  See City of 
Milwaukee Post No. 2874, 319 Wis. 2d 553, ¶39; Spiegelberg, 291 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶15.  That is, the DOT determined the fair market 
value of the entire property taken as if there were only one 
owner and made a single payment for that amount, anticipating 
that the payment would then be apportioned between Country Side 
and Lamar.  See City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874, 319 
Wis. 2d 553, ¶39; Maxey, 94 Wis. 2d at 401.  Attorney Batha 
stated it succinctly in her letter to Lamar, informing Lamar 
that "[t]he $2 million payment to Country Side and Lamar covers 
all interests in the value of the sign site," and "if [Lamar] 
ha[s] a claim for leasehold value or permit value, etc., [then] 
[Lamar] will need to seek satisfaction from Country Side." 
                                                                                                                                                             
Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(a) provides, in relevant 
part, that the award of damages "shall name all persons having 
an interest of record in the property taken and may name the 
other persons."  (Emphasis added.)  While the plain language of 
§ 32.05(7)(a) requires the condemnor to name in the award of 
damages "all persons having an interest of record," it also 
gives the condemnor the option of naming in the award of damages 
"the other persons," i.e. those persons who do not have "an 
interest of record." 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
20 
 
¶32 Country Side and Lamar agreed to transfer to Country 
Side all but $120,000 of the award of damages.16  That remaining 
$120,000 is the focus of this case. 
¶33 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
denied that Lamar had an interest in the property taken and was 
thus entitled to just compensation.  Instead, albeit for 
different reasons, both courts concluded that Country Side was 
entitled to the full $120,000 on the grounds that Lamar lost its 
right to seek a share of the award of damages.  The circuit 
court determined that Lamar lost its right to seek a share of 
the award of damages by failing to join in Country Side's appeal 
of the award.  The court of appeals determined, and Country Side 
agrees,17 that Lamar lost its right to bring a claim for 
partition under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(9)(a)3. and 820.01 by 
                                                 
16 Country Side petitioned, and the circuit court agreed, to 
accept 
deposit 
of 
the 
$120,000 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(7)(d).  We point out, however, that § 32.05(7)(d) was 
not the appropriate vehicle for Country Side's petition.  
Section 32.05(7)(d) sets forth the manner in which the condemnor 
may issue a check for the amount of the award of damages, less 
outstanding delinquent tax liens and less prorated taxes.  
Section 32.05(7)(d) provides that a check "shall at the option 
of the condemnor be mailed by certified mail to the owner or one 
of the owners of record or be deposited with the clerk of the 
circuit court of the county for the benefit of the persons named 
in the award."  (Emphasis added.)  In this case, the DOT 
evidently chose the first option.  In any case, § 32.05(7)(d) 
speaks only to the condemnor's, not the owner's, ability to 
deposit the check with the clerk of the circuit court. 
17 In its briefing before this court, Country Side concedes 
that Lamar did not lose its right to seek a share of the award 
of damages by failing to join in Country Side's appeal of the 
award. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
21 
 
signing the Worksheet and thereby reaching an agreement with the 
DOT on the amount of compensation payable to Lamar pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30(8).  We conclude that both the circuit court 
and court of appeals erred. 
¶34 First, we conclude that Lamar did not lose its right 
to seek a share of the award of damages by failing to join in 
Country Side's appeal of the award.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(11), Country Side elected to appeal directly to the 
circuit court, challenging the adequacy of the $2,000,000 award 
of damages.  To be sure, Lamar had the option to join in Country 
Side's appeal.  Section 32.05(11) plainly states: "Where one 
party in interest has appealed from the award, no other party in 
interest who has been served with notice of such appeal may take 
a separate appeal but may join in the appeal by serving notice 
upon the condemnor and the appellant of that party's election to 
do so."  (Emphasis added.)  At the same time, however, 
§ 32.05(11) expressly provides that "[t]he appeal shall not 
affect parties who have not joined in the appeal as herein 
provided."  In other words, § 32.05(11) makes clear that a party 
in interest does not lose any rights by not joining in another 
party's appeal. 
¶35 In fact, Wis. Stat. § 32.05 provides a roadmap for 
cases in the very posture of Country Side and Lamar's——those 
involving multiple parties in interest, when one or more did not 
join in an appeal under § 32.05(11).  Section 32.05(11) directs 
that subsection (9)(a) "shall govern" in cases involving 
multiple ownership or interests in lands taken.  Section 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
22 
 
32.05(9)(a)1., in turn, makes clear that the unit rule still 
applies in cases where all parties in interest have not joined 
in an appeal:  
Where all parties having an interest in the 
property taken do not join in an appeal, such fact 
shall not change the requirement that a finding of 
fair market value of the entire property taken and 
damages, if any, to the entire property taken, shall 
be made in determining compensation. 
In such cases, § 32.05(9)(a)1. then instructs that the separate 
property interests "shall, in cases of dispute, be resolved by a 
separate partition action as set forth herein."  Finally, 
§ 32.05(9)(a)3. explains the procedure for a separate partition 
action, providing that when the parties in interest fail to 
agree on the division of an award of damages, "any of such 
owners or parties of interest may petition the circuit court for 
the county wherein the property is located for partition of the 
award moneys as provided in s. 820.01."18 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 820.01, which governs the filing of a 
complaint and the trial in an action for partition of personal 
property, states the following:  
When any of the owners of personal property in 
common shall desire to have a division and they are 
unable to agree upon the same an action may be 
commenced for that purpose.  Such action shall be 
tried by the court and if in its opinion a division of 
such property can be had without a sale thereof 
judgment shall be given accordingly and the property 
shall be divided, in accordance with the interest of 
the parties therein, and each owner shall be vested 
with the full title of the share awarded to the owner 
by the judgment in severalty.  The court may appoint a 
receiver, enter an interlocutory or final judgment in 
order to do complete justice. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
23 
 
¶36 The procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9)(a)1. 
and 3. is precisely the procedure followed by Lamar in this 
case.  Country Side elected to appeal from the award of damages 
under § 32.05(11); Lamar opted not to join in Country Side's 
appeal; and when Country Side and Lamar failed to reach an 
agreement on the division of the $120,000 that remained of the 
award, Lamar petitioned the circuit court for partition of the 
money, pursuant to §§ 32.05(9)(a)3. and 820.01.  To put it 
simply, nothing more could have been expected of Lamar. 
¶37 Second, 
contrary 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination, we conclude that Lamar did not lose its right to 
bring a claim for partition under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(9)(a)3. 
and 820.01 by signing the Worksheet.  As the DOT explains in its 
amicus curiae brief, the Worksheet and Form DT1527 document the 
relocation payment that Lamar received from the DOT.  Form 
DT1527 indicates that Lamar applied for and received from the 
DOT a relocation payment of $83,525.  As detailed by the 
Worksheet, the $83,525 consisted of $75,175 for the cost to 
build the billboard new; $2,500 for relocation expenses; and 
$5,850 for take-down cost.  In other words, $83,525 was the cost 
that Lamar incurred in having to remove its billboard and 
rebuild it onto another site, i.e., Lamar's actual moving 
expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3)(a) and Wis. Admin. Code 
COMM § 202.64(1).  As we explained in detail above, the DOT's 
$83,525 payment for Lamar's relocation expenses is distinct from 
the DOT's $2,000,000 award for the fair market value of the 
property taken.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 32.09(5)(a), 32.19(1); Wis. 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
24 
 
Admin. Code COMM § 202.001.  Lamar has a right to seek not only 
payment for relocation expenses but also its share of the award 
for the fair market value of the property taken.   
¶38 It is true, as the court of appeals pointed out, that 
the Worksheet contains general release language.  In particular, 
the Worksheet provides that Lamar, "by signing this document, 
waives any right to future claims for damage or loss involving 
this sign."  However, as the DOT explains, the Worksheet must be 
understood in conjunction with Form DT1527, a document submitted 
with and incorporated by the Worksheet.  Form DT1527, also 
signed by Lamar, contains the following, more specific statement 
of release: "[Lamar] agree[s] to accept the amounts as payment 
in full for the items claimed, and release the [DOT] and any 
public body, board or commission acting in its behalf, from any 
and all claims for damages arising through this project, for the 
listed items for which an amount is claimed."  (Emphasis added.)  
That language is clear: by signing Form DT1527, Lamar agreed to 
accept $83,525 as payment in full for the items claimed and to 
release the DOT and any public body acting on the DOT's behalf 
from 
any 
further 
claims 
for 
the 
listed 
items. 
 
As 
aforementioned, the listed items were detailed in the Worksheet 
and related only to Lamar's actual moving expenses.   
¶39 Finally, the court of appeals and Country Side's 
reliance on Wis. Stat. § 84.30(8) is misplaced.  The court of 
appeals concluded that § 84.30(8) provides the exclusive remedy 
for the taking of Lamar's property.  Lamar, No. 2010AP2023, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶9-15.  According to the court of 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
25 
 
appeals, by signing the Worksheet, Lamar reached an agreement 
with the DOT on the amount of compensation payable to Lamar 
pursuant to § 84.30(8) and thus lost its right to bring future 
claims for compensation under Wis. Stat. § 32.05.  See id., 
¶¶12-15.  However, as this court held in Vivid, § 84.30 "is the 
exclusive remedy for determining just compensation for removed 
signs that meet the criteria of § 84.30(6)."  219 Wis. 2d at 776 
(lead op.) (emphasis added); see also id. at 797 (Bradley, J., 
concurring).  Section 84.30(6) provides, in relevant part, that 
the DOT "shall pay just compensation upon the removal or 
relocation on or after March 18, 1972, of any of the following 
signs 
which 
are 
not 
then 
in 
conformity 
with 
this 
section . . . ."  Pursuant to § 84.30(5)(a), "[s]igns outside of 
business areas which are lawfully in existence on March 18, 1972 
but which do not conform to the requirements herein are declared 
nonconforming . . . ."  The billboards at issue in Vivid were 
nonconforming and therefore met the criteria of § 84.30(6).  219 
Wis. 2d at 777 (lead op.).  By contrast, Lamar's billboard in 
the instant case was conforming.  The billboard was permitted 
and thus recognized by the DOT as "conform[ing] to the 
requirements of Section 84.30 of the Wis. Statutes and to other 
Administrative 
Rules 
and 
Laws 
currently 
applicable 
and 
effective." 
 
Because 
Lamar's 
billboard 
was 
conforming, 
§ 84.30(8) is simply not implicated in this case.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶40 We hold that Lamar has not lost its right to seek a 
share of the award of damages issued to Country Side and Lamar, 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
26 
 
and therefore, the circuit court improperly dismissed Lamar's 
claim for partition.  First, we conclude that Lamar did not lose 
its right to seek a share of the award of damages by failing to 
join in Country Side's appeal of the award.  Second, we conclude 
that Lamar did not lose its right to bring a claim for partition 
by accepting payment from the DOT for relocation expenses.  The 
DOT's payment for Lamar's relocation expenses is distinct from 
the DOT's award for the fair market value of the property taken.  
Lamar has a right to seek both. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No. 
2010AP2023   
 
 
 
1