Case Title: Boston Police Department v. Civil Service Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12653

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12653 
 
BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT  vs.  CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & 
another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 1, 2019. - October 30, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Civil Service, Police, Appointment, Testing, Decision of Civil 
Service Commission, Findings by commission, Judicial 
review.  Labor, Police, Civil service, Judicial review.  
Municipal Corporations, Police.  Police, Hiring.  Public 
Employment, Police.  Administrative Law, Judicial review, 
Substantial evidence.  Practice, Civil, Review of 
administrative action. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 30, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael F. Neuner for Michael Gannon. 
 
Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for Civil Service 
Commission. 
 
Helen G. Litsas for the plaintiff. 
                     
 
1 Michael Gannon. 
2 
 
 
James S. Timmins, for Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Lisa J. Pirozzolo, Arjun K. Jaikumar, Julia A. Harvey, 
Julia Prochazka, & Oren Sellstrom, for Massachusetts Association 
of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The Boston police department (department) 
requires applicants for officer positions to be screened for 
drug use via a hair sample test.  The department bypassed 
Michael Gannon for employment in 2013 because his hair sample 
tested positive for cocaine use in 2010.  Gannon, who denied 
ever having used cocaine, appealed from the bypass to the Civil 
Service Commission (commission).  After a hearing, the 
commission concluded that given the documented concerns 
regarding the reliability of the hair drug test generally, and 
the credible evidence from Gannon himself, the department had 
not demonstrated reasonable justification for the bypass.  The 
department sought review of the commission's decision before a 
judge of the Superior Court, who overturned the decision and 
entered judgment for the department.  Gannon and the commission 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
We note at the outset that the commission owes substantial 
deference to the department's decision making, particularly when 
it comes to hiring police officers.  See Cambridge v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304-305 (1997).  And we do 
3 
 
not question the appropriateness of the department's concern 
about a candidate's drug use.  See O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of 
Boston, 408 Mass. 324, 328 (1990).  But where a candidate 
challenges the department's decision to bypass him due to a 
positive drug test purportedly demonstrating that he recently 
had used cocaine and that he had exercised poor judgment by 
taking the test knowing he might fail it, the issue for the 
commission was not whether there was a substantial risk that the 
candidate had used illegal narcotics, but whether the department 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
candidate in fact had used illegal narcotics.  After a full 
evidentiary hearing, the commission determined that the 
department had not met its burden. 
Our task is to review the commission's decision to ensure 
that it is supported by substantial evidence and contains no 
error of law.  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  Upon review, we reverse 
the judge's order allowing the department's motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, and affirm the commission's decision.2 
 
Background.  We summarize the relevant facts found by the 
commission and supported by substantial evidence, supplemented 
with facts contained in the administrative record and consistent 
                     
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association and the 
Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers. 
4 
 
with the commission's findings.  We reserve some facts for later 
discussion of specific issues. 
 
1.  Gannon's applications to the department.3  Gannon 
initially became associated with the department in 2006 when he 
applied to become a department cadet, with the goal of becoming 
a Boston police officer.  Gannon was a cadet from January 2007 
until June 2009, when the cadet program was discontinued.  As a 
cadet applicant, and later as a cadet, Gannon submitted hair 
samples for drug testing in 2006, 2007, and 2008; the results 
were negative on each occasion. 
As part of Gannon's initial application to become a police 
officer with the department, he took and passed the civil 
service examination (examination) for police officer candidates 
in April 2009.4  He also submitted a hair sample for a 
                     
 
3 As discussed further infra, in addition to the instant 
appeal, Gannon commenced two additional appeals with the Civil 
Service Commission (commission), one before the instant appeal 
and one after.  The first was withdrawn, and the other is 
pending. 
 
 
4 Police officer candidates are subject to the State's civil 
service law, which, with some exceptions not applicable here, 
requires applicants to take and pass the civil service 
examination (examination) in order to be hired into positions in 
State agencies and municipalities.  See G. L. c. 31, § 58.  See 
generally Note, The Massachusetts Civil Service Law:  Is It 
Necessary to Destroy the Current System in Order to Save It?, 40 
New Eng. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (2006).  The examination, developed 
by the human resources division (division), varies depending 
upon the position sought.  See G. L. c. 31, § 16.  "The goal of 
the examination requirement is to ensure that employees are 
5 
 
preemployment hair drug test in March 2010, which tested 
positive for cocaine.5  At the hearing before the commission, 
Gannon testified that when he learned of the positive test 
result approximately one month later on April 20, 2010, he "was 
just completely shocked" and "couldn't believe it."  He further 
testified that he had "never in [his] entire life used cocaine 
in any way, shape or form, whether it be shot, sniffed, smoked, 
never," that his friends do not take drugs, and that "there's no 
possible way" that he touched cocaine or snorted it even once.  
The day after Gannon learned of the test result, he provided a 
second hair sample for testing by the same laboratory.  Although 
the result was not zero, it was below the level considered to be 
                     
appointed or promoted on the basis of their abilities, 
knowledge, and skills -- in other words, on the basis of merit -
- and are not selected arbitrarily or for improper reasons, such 
as political or personal connections."  Sherman v. Randolph, 472 
Mass. 802, 804 (2015), citing G. L. c. 31, § 1. 
 
5 Gannon's drug test result was 12.2 nanograms (ng) of 
cocaine per ten milligrams (mg) of hair, which exceeded the 
"cutoff" concentration level of five ng per ten mg set by the 
company to which the department outsources its drug testing, 
Psychemedics Corporation (Psychemedics).  Gannon's results also 
indicated that his hair contained 0.8 ng of benzoylecgonine per 
ten mg of hair.  Benzoylecgonine is the primary metabolite for 
cocaine.  According to the report generated by Psychemedics, the 
presence of both the metabolite and cocaine above the cutoff 
level "establishes that the subject has ingested [c]ocaine." 
6 
 
"presumptively positive."  He was not selected as an officer in 
2010.6 
Gannon took and passed the examination again in April 2011.  
In June 2012, the department sought to fill between 
approximately sixty and seventy police officer vacancies.  The 
human resources division (division) of the Commonwealth provided 
the department with a certification list that included Gannon's 
name (certification no. 202869).7  In August 2012, Gannon 
submitted a hair sample to be screened for controlled 
substances; the result was negative. 
In January 2013, the department sent Gannon a letter 
notifying him that he was "in a group of applicants who were all 
tied with the same score and [he was] one of the applicants not 
selected."  Of those selected from certification no. 202869, one 
candidate was tied with Gannon on the list, two were ranked 
                     
6 When the department did not choose Gannon from a pool of 
eligible applicants, he appealed to the commission; however, he 
subsequently withdrew that appeal. 
 
7 The division creates eligibility lists that rank 
candidates in order of their examination scores.  G. L. c. 31, 
§ 25.  When the department has an open position, the division 
provides a "certification list" of eligible candidates from 
which the department is expected to fill the position.  Although 
the department may bypass a higher-ranked candidate to choose 
another person on the list, it must have a reasonable 
justification for doing so.  See G. L. c. 31, § 27.  Candidates 
who have been bypassed may appeal from the decision to the 
commission.  G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b). 
7 
 
below Gannon, and one candidate did not appear on the list at 
all.  The notice did not mention a failed drug test or a bypass.  
However, at the hearing, the department's position was that 
Gannon was not appointed at that time because he had tested 
positive for cocaine in 2010.  Gannon commenced the instant 
appeal with the commission, challenging the department's 
decision.8 
2.  The hair drug test.  The department outsources the 
testing of hair samples for illegal narcotic use to Psychemedics 
Corporation (Psychemedics), a company that has licensed 
laboratories in approximately twenty-two States.  The bulk of 
Psychemedics's work consists of testing hair samples for the 
presence of controlled substances such as cocaine, opiates, 
amphetamines, and marijuana. 
a.  The testing procedure.  The department's expert, Dr. 
Thomas Cairns, the senior scientific advisor for Psychemedics at 
the time of the hearing,9 testified as to the proprietary 
procedure Psychemedics uses to test hair for illegal narcotics.  
The first step involves an initial screening or "presumptive 
                     
8 In August 2013, Gannon appealed from a third instance in 
which he was not selected for employment by the department.  
That appeal currently is pending. 
 
9 Dr. Thomas Cairns also testified on behalf of the 
department in Matter of Boston Police Dep't Drug Testing 
Appeals, 26 Mass. Civ. Serv. Rep. 73 (2013) (Drug Testing 
Appeals), discussed infra. 
8 
 
test" of the hair sample by radioimmunoassay (RIA), which can 
detect the presence of controlled substances.  If the RIA 
detects narcotics at or above the "cutoff" concentration level 
of five nanograms (ng) of cocaine per ten milligrams (mg) of 
hair, a confirmatory test is performed on a second part of the 
submitted sample.10 
As part of the confirmatory test, the hair sample is 
subjected to five separate washes with a phosphate buffer 
solution in an attempt to remove any traces of narcotics in the 
sample from potential external or "environmental" contamination, 
as compared to narcotics that are ingested and present in the 
hair follicle.  The liquid from the fifth wash is tested using 
RIA to determine whether external contaminants are present in 
the solution.  According to Cairns, a fifth wash that tests 
negative for controlled substances means that any external 
contaminants initially present have been removed from the hair 
sample.  Following the washing procedure, the hair sample is 
examined by way of liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry/mass 
                     
10 If the sample is below the cutoff concentration level, it 
is deemed presumptively negative for controlled substances.  
Although this does not mean that the RIA test was unable to 
detect any amount of controlled substance in the hair sample, 
the purpose of a cutoff level is to differentiate between a 
brief period of exposure to a particular controlled substance 
and a more prolonged exposure. 
9 
 
spectrometry (LC/MS/MS)11 for the presence of controlled 
substances.  If the result is above the cutoff level of five ng 
per ten mg, Psychemedics reports it as a "final positive 
confirmed," meaning it was positive for controlled substance(s). 
Psychemedics sends positive LC/MS/MS test results to 
Concentra Health Services, Inc. (Concentra), an independent 
company, for review.  Concentra assigns a medical review officer 
(MRO) who reviews the results and contacts the applicant to 
determine whether there is an explanation for the positive drug 
result (aside from ingesting a controlled substance).  If the 
applicant fails to provide such an explanation, the MRO then 
issues a report notifying the department of the applicant's 
positive drug test result. 
b.  Reliability concerns regarding Psychemedics's hair drug 
test.  As detailed infra, Gannon presented expert testimony and 
scientific studies calling into question whether Psychemedics's 
hair drug testing procedure could prove reliably that a subject 
had ingested cocaine rather than having been environmentally 
exposed to it.  Questions center around RIA testing as well as 
the effectiveness of any washing procedure to remove external 
                     
 
11 A liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry/mass 
spectrometry test is "a molecular fingerprinting technology 
which provides unambiguous identification of both the drug and 
its metabolites."  However, as discussed infra, it does not 
identify the way in which the drug and its metabolites have been 
incorporated into the hair. 
10 
 
contaminants from hair samples in preparation for a confirmatory 
test. 
First, RIA testing is prone to produce false positives.  
RIA testing involves incubating an antibody with the hair sample 
and radioactive material.  The receptors of the antibody attract 
the radioactive material and the controlled substance for which 
the sample is being tested, e.g., cocaine.  When analyzed, the 
antibody receptors that do not have radioactive material bonded 
to them are presumed to have bonded with the controlled 
substance that the antibody was designed to attract.  However, 
the antibody used in RIA testing to detect cocaine also attracts 
substances that have similar chemical structures to cocaine, 
including local anesthetics used by dentists like lidocaine.  
Thus, there exists the potential for "cross reactivity," which 
gives rise to an RIA test reporting a false level of cocaine in 
the sample.  This is why a confirmatory test must be performed 
using the more accurate LC/MS/MS test. 
Second, it is unclear whether any washing procedure 
designed to remove external contaminants from a hair sample, 
including the washing procedure used by Psychemedics, can do so 
effectively.  This is because external contaminants may become 
absorbed into the hair, and once absorbed, are resistant to 
removal.  The ways in which substances, including controlled 
substances, can incorporate into the hair follicle vary and are 
11 
 
not fully understood.  Stout, Ropero-Miller, Baylor, & Mitchell, 
External Contamination of Hair with Cocaine:  Evaluation of 
External Cocaine Contamination and Development of Performance-
Testing Materials, 30 J. Analytical Toxicology 490, 490 (2006) 
(Stout study).  See generally Ropero-Miller & Stout, Analysis of 
Cocaine Analytes in Human Hair II:  Evaluation of Different Hair 
Color and Ethnicity Types, Report to United States Department of 
Justice, Document No. 234628 (Mar. 31, 2010).  In addition to 
ingestion, they include "blood exchange at the hair follicle; 
exposure to sweat and sebaceous secretions; transdermal 
diffusion of drug from the skin; and also . . . exposure to the 
external environment, including drug residues, contaminated 
surfaces, and vaporized drug."12  Stout study, supra at 490-491. 
Thus, even after a hair sample is "aggressively washed" and 
the liquid from the final wash tests negative for controlled 
substances, meaning that the external portion of the hair sample 
is no longer environmentally contaminated, a subsequent test of 
the hair sample using LC/MS/MS may not be a reliable measure of 
                     
12 "Each of these mechanisms is affected by the chemical and 
physiological composition of the hair matrix."  Stout, Ropero-
Miller, Baylor, & Mitchell, External Contamination of Hair with 
Cocaine:  Evaluation of External Cocaine Contamination and 
Development of Performance-Testing Materials, 30 J. Analytical 
Toxicology 490, 491 (2006) (Stout study). 
12 
 
whether the subject ingested drugs.13  That is, although the 
LC/MS/MS confirmatory test can identify the type of drug present 
in the hair sample, it cannot determine the way the drug became 
incorporated into the hair follicle.14 
                     
 
13 The Stout study found that thirty-eight percent of the 
390 hair samples "decontaminated" by certain washing procedures, 
including the procedure employed by Psychemedics, still 
contained cocaine above the cutoff levels when using the 
benzoylecgonine criteria.  Stout study, supra at 498.  It also 
found that "the literature indicates that aggressive washing 
techniques can remove [cocaine] from hair [one hour] after it 
has been applied to the hair . . . .  However, beyond an hour, 
one group reported wash procedures were unable to remove all of 
the [cocaine] in the hair up to [ten] weeks post-application."  
Id. at 491. 
 
Although the dissent points to a "one hundred percent 
success rate" with respect to samples subjected to the 
Psychemedics protocols, this statistic must be viewed in 
context.  Post at note 6.  Of the 585 total hair samples 
examined, only ten underwent the additional criterion used by 
Psychemedics (i.e., the mathematical equation not at issue 
here).  See Stout study, supra at 499.  The more targeted 
Ropero-Miller study, which examined thirty-seven samples 
undergoing the full Psychemedics procedure (washing procedure 
and wash criterion) also failed to provide a clear, 
uncontroverted result in Psychemedics's favor.  See Ropero-
Miller & Stout, Analysis of Cocaine Analytes in Human Hair II:  
Evaluation of Different Hair Color and Ethnicity Types, Report 
to United States Department of Justice, Document No. 234628, at 
1012-1013, 1016, 1094 (Mar. 31, 2010) (Ropero-Miller study).  
That study showed that the Psychemedics procedure managed to 
eliminate all false positives so long as the samples were tested 
shortly after contamination -- that is, because of the unstable 
nature of the metabolites, the success rate using the 
benzoylecgonine criteria fell to eighty-one percent over time 
(or seven false positives of the thirty-seven total samples).  
See id. at 1018, 1034, 1036, 1082, 1091. 
 
14 The uncertainty surrounding environmental contamination 
is "further confounded by evidence that incorporation rates of 
13 
 
 
3.  Procedural posture.  The commission allowed Gannon's 
appeal, concluding that the hair drug test used was not 
sufficiently reliable to be the sole reason for the bypass and, 
thus, that the department failed to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that its decision to bypass Gannon was reasonably 
justified.  The division was ordered to place Gannon's name at 
the top of the then-current or future certifications for police 
officer positions within the department until he was selected or 
bypassed.  The department commenced an action in the Superior 
Court, seeking judicial review of the commission's decision 
pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 44, and moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974).  A judge in the Superior Court allowed the department's 
motion and reversed the commission's decision.  Gannon and the 
commission appealed to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
                     
drugs vary in hair with different melanin and protein content."  
Stout study, supra at 491, 498.  For example, one study 
involving "in vitro surface contamination" with "cocaine and 
subsequent laboratory decontamination" on "hair of different 
color (e.g., light, dark) and ethnic origin (e.g., Caucasian, 
African American)" concluded that while decontamination methods 
employed resulted in fewer positive results, positive results 
were not entirely eliminated.  Ropero-Miller study, supra at ii-
iv.  "The possibility that differences in hair color may cause 
one individual to be more likely to test positive for a drug 
than another, despite both having ingested or having been 
exposed to the same amount of a drug, greatly concerns 
policymakers and forensic practitioners."  Id. at ii. 
14 
 
Standard of review.  When a candidate for an appointment 
appeals from a bypass pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b), the 
commission's responsibility is to determine, "on the basis of 
the evidence before it, whether the appointing authority 
sustained its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that there was reasonable justification for the 
[bypass]."  Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 241 
(2006).  Reasonable justification means "done upon adequate 
reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when 
weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by 
correct rules of law."  Id., quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v.  
Judge of First Dist. Court of E. Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 
(1928).  It was the department's burden to establish such 
reasonable justification by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Brackett, supra.  Although, as mentioned supra, the commission 
owes significant deference to the department's personnel 
decisions, especially with regard to hiring police officers, 
Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, the commission nevertheless 
is bound to reverse a bypass decision when the department fails 
to meet its burden of proof of demonstrating reasonable 
justification for the bypass by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
Like the Superior Court, we review the commission's 
decision under G. L. c. 31, § 44.  Massachusetts Ass'n of 
Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 263-
15 
 
264 (2001) (Abban).  The commission's decision will be upheld 
unless it is "unsupported by substantial evidence[,] . . . 
arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).15  
Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 1 (6).  As we "give due weight to the experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, 
as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it," 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), the department bears a "heavy burden" of 
establishing that the commission's decision was incorrect.  
Abban, supra. 
 
Discussion.  The department contends that, in finding that 
the bypass was not reasonably justified, the commission made an 
error of law and failed to support its decision with substantial 
evidence.  The dissent additionally takes issue with the 
commission's failure to defer to the department.  We examine 
each point in turn. 
 
1.  Error of law.  The department claims that the 
commission erred by relying on Matter of Boston Police Dep't 
Drug Testing Appeals, 26 Mass. Civ. Serv. Rep. 73 (2013) (Drug 
                     
15 We note that although the dissent acknowledges the 
correct standard of review, as discussed infra, it erroneously 
analyzes the commission's decision on a de novo basis. 
16 
 
Testing Appeals), a previous commission decision that reviewed 
the reliability of Psychemedics's hair drug testing as applied 
to tenured employees.  As a result, the department argues, the 
commission required the department to meet a higher standard 
than necessary to justify the bypass, and failed to defer 
properly to the department's exercise of discretion. 
In Drug Testing Appeals, a lengthy decision that included a 
comprehensive discussion of Psychemedics's drug testing 
procedure, the commission determined that the test was not 
sufficiently reliable alone to provide just cause for 
terminating a tenured department employee.16  Id. at 106, 107.  
The department contends that the commission erroneously found 
that the Drug Testing Appeals case controlled the result in this 
case because the standard for terminating a tenured employee, 
"just cause," is higher than the standard applied to bypass 
decisions, i.e., "reasonable justification."  The department 
goes on to argue that because the commission concluded that, in 
                     
 
16 The commission in Drug Testing Appeals concluded that 
"[a] reported positive test result . . . is not necessarily 
conclusive of ingestion and, depending on the preponderance of 
evidence in a particular case, may or may not justify 
termination or other appropriate discipline of a tenured 
[department] officer."  Thompson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. 462, 465 (2016).  However, the commission also 
concluded that "hair testing is an appropriate tool to enforce 
the department's substance abuse policy and that hair test 
results could be used as some evidence of drug use" (emphasis 
added).  Id. at 465-466. 
17 
 
the circumstances of this case, the hair drug test is not reason 
enough to bypass Gannon, the commission is holding the 
department to the "just cause" standard rather than the less 
rigorous "reasonable justification" standard. 
This argument fails because the commission did not rely 
upon Drug Testing Appeals in its decision at issue here.  
Instead, the commission simply noted that the testimony 
presented at the hearing was "similar in substance to the 
supporting and opposing expert views offered in [Drug Testing 
Appeals]."  The commission then went on to state that, "given 
the commonality of issues and evidence in the two cases, [the 
commission found] no reason to disturb the precedent established 
in [Drug Testing Appeals] regarding the reliability of hair drug 
tests" (emphasis added).  Thus, contrary to the department's 
contention, the commission did not apply the "just cause" 
standard instead of the "reasonable justification" standard 
here.  Rather, the commission merely pointed out that 
Psychemedics's hair drug test procedure was not sufficiently 
reliable on its own to meet either standard.17  We see nothing in 
                     
17 The department refers repeatedly in its brief to a "sole 
basis" test, which the department claims applies only to 
termination decisions, and which the commission erroneously 
extended to bypass decisions in this case.  Of course, whenever 
the department proffers only one reason for either a termination 
or a bypass decision, the commission must evaluate that "sole 
basis" to determine whether it is sufficient for just cause in 
18 
 
the commission's decision indicating that it applied the "just 
cause" standard in this case. 
 
2.  Substantial evidence.  In order to determine whether 
the commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence, 
we must begin by identifying the department's purported reason 
for bypassing Gannon.  The commission found that the 
department's policy is to not "consider any candidates after 
they have tested positive for drugs of abuse," as Gannon had in 
2010.  According to hearing testimony from the department's 
director of human resources, this policy is a result of two 
considerations:  (1) that the department is "looking for 
[officers] that don't have a history with drugs," and (2) that 
individuals who choose to go forward with a drug test when they 
know they might test positive for drugs demonstrate "poor 
judgment."  Based on this policy, the department's reason for 
bypassing Gannon was that he had, in fact, used cocaine prior to 
his 2010 drug screen, and nevertheless decided to go forward 
with a hair test he should have known he might fail.  For the 
reasons described infra, the commission concluded that the 
department had failed to demonstrate Gannon's prior drug use by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  Implicitly, the commission 
                     
the former context, or reasonable justification in the latter.  
Thus, any so-called "sole basis" test would be employed in 
either situation.  We therefore decline to adopt the 
department's nomenclature and reasoning in this regard. 
19 
 
likewise concluded that the department had failed to demonstrate 
Gannon's "poor judgment" by a preponderance of the evidence, as 
an individual who had not used drugs would have no reason to 
avoid submitting a hair sample for testing.  We hold that this 
conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, that is, "such 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion."  G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6). 
We begin with Gannon's hair drug test results.  The hair 
sample collected in March 2010 was put through a presumptive 
test using RIA; the result was positive for cocaine.  The sample 
was then subjected to LC/MS/MS confirmatory testing, prior to 
which it was washed pursuant to Psychemedics's washing 
procedure.  The liquid from the fifth and final wash was tested 
using RIA and was found to be negative for controlled 
substances; that is, the external portion of the hair sample was 
cleansed of all environmental contaminants.  The subsequent 
LC/MS/MS test showed that the sample contained 12.2 ng of 
cocaine per ten mg of hair, which is more than double the cutoff 
level of five ng per ten mg of hair set by Psychemedics.  
Accordingly, the sample was reported positive for cocaine.  The 
second hair sample that Gannon provided approximately one month 
later, in April 2010, was subjected only to the presumptive test 
using RIA, as that sample tested just below the presumptive 
positive cutoff level of five ng per ten mg. 
20 
 
Because Gannon failed to provide an alternative explanation 
for the positive March 2010 test result, the department presumed 
that the test result reliably proved that Gannon had ingested 
cocaine.  However, the commission had conflicting evidence 
before it that placed the hair drug test's reliability in 
question.  On the one hand, the department presented expert 
testimony from a representative of Psychemedics that the test 
was reliable;18 on the other, Gannon presented expert testimony19 
and scientific studies demonstrating that the reliability of the 
test has been credibly challenged in the scientific community. 
In addition to the conflicting evidence regarding the 
reliability of the hair drug test generally, the commission had 
before it, and credited, Gannon's "ardent[], repeated[] and 
credibl[e]" statements denying that he had ever used cocaine.20  
The commission further noted evidence that corroborated Gannon's 
denials, which included the fact that he did not seek to explain 
                     
18 The commission noted that the department's expert from 
Psychemedics, Cairns, had "an added interest [in the outcome of 
the case] in that hair drug testing is how he earns an income 
and Psychemedics performed all five . . . of the hair drug tests 
[Gannon] has taken." 
 
 
19 The commission noted that Gannon's expert, Dr. David 
Benjamin, "has the same interest as most expert professionals 
involved in litigation." 
 
 
20 Gannon's parents also testified that to their knowledge 
Gannon has never ingested cocaine.  His mother testified that 
she was "shocked" when told about the positive drug test, and 
Gannon's father was convinced the test was wrong. 
21 
 
away the positive test as being a result of external 
contamination; instead, he testified that he could not think of 
how he ever would have come in contact with cocaine.  The 
commission also considered the fact that Gannon sought to be 
retested as soon as he learned of the positive result, noting 
that someone who ingested cocaine multiple times per week likely 
would seek to delay a retest.  Finally, the commission took note 
of Gannon's other hair drug tests on record, dating from 2006 to 
2012, all of which were performed by Psychemedics, and all of 
which, except for the March 2010 test, were reported negative 
(i.e., below Psychemedics's set cutoff level) for illegal drug 
use.21 
                     
21 Separate and apart from reliability concerns about the 
test generally, the commission indicated that it had difficulty 
assessing the reliability of Gannon's test results specifically 
because the documentation was either irregular or lacking.  With 
regard to the documents provided on the positive test result, 
the commission noted anomalies in the two nonidentical MRO test 
reports submitted as exhibits.  The record provides no 
explanation for the existence of two nonidentical MRO reports 
for the same test result, but the director of the department's 
occupational health services unit (director) testified that the 
inconsistencies were of concern.  Although both reports 
indicated that Gannon tested positive for cocaine, neither 
provided the actual test result numbers.  Moreover, although one 
of the reports listed five ng per ten mg as the cutoff level for 
both the screen and confirmatory tests, the other left the 
confirmatory cutoff value blank.  The director testified that if 
no value is provided for a drug under the "confirm" column, it 
is presumed that the hair sample was not subject to a 
confirmatory test and therefore did not exceed the cutoff level 
for that drug under the "screen" test.  However, the director 
presented testimony that the missing "confirm" cutoff level on 
22 
 
In determining that the department did not demonstrate 
reasonable justification for Gannon's bypass, the commission 
weighed the evidence presented by the department that Gannon 
ingested cocaine against the evidence that Gannon provided that 
he did not.22  Given the credible concerns in the scientific 
community regarding the hair drug test, as well as Gannon's 
credible testimony, there was substantial evidence, i.e., that 
which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion," G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6), for that determination.23 
                     
one of the MRO reports "look[ed] to be an administrative 
problem." 
 
Further, although there was a litigation package available 
to review for the positive drug test, there was a dearth of 
records for the drug tests that Gannon had passed.  The 
department provided what appeared to be a complete set of 
records for the March 2010 positive test result, which included 
the summary of procedures, signed chain of custody records for 
each point in the process, screen data sheets signed by 
Psychemedics personnel, and graphs of the test results.  In 
contrast, there was no more than a one-page test result for 2006 
and 2007, and for 2008 and 2012 the department provided the one-
page test results and unsigned screen data sheets.  Although the 
department reported that the lack of records was due to the 
Psychemedics record retention schedule, as the commission 
pointed out, that policy does not account for the failure to 
provide a complete package for the 2012 test.  The commission 
specifically found that "[n]ot having the same information for 
each test precludes further assessment of the hair drug test's 
reliability." 
 
22 We note that although Gannon presented evidence at the 
hearing, the department had the burden of proof. 
 
 
23 We emphasize that it is our duty to determine only 
whether substantial evidence existed for the commission's 
23 
 
3.  Deference.  The dissent takes issue with the fact that 
the commission failed to defer to the department's hiring 
decision, contending that the commission instead substituted its 
own standard of risk of drug use by police officer candidates 
for that of the department.  Post at    .  In doing so, the 
dissent strays from our long-standing administrative law 
jurisprudence, committing two major errors.  First, rather than 
simply making a determination whether the commission's decision 
was supported by substantial evidence, the dissent instead 
weighs the evidence itself, engages in its own fact finding, and 
substitutes its own judgment for that of the commission.  
Second, by relying on Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. 182, 188 (2010), the dissent erroneously suggests that 
when facts are in dispute regarding a candidate's conduct, the 
department need only provide a "sufficient quantum of evidence 
to substantiate its legitimate concerns" regarding that 
candidate to justify a bypass decision rather than providing 
reasonable justification by a preponderance of the evidence as 
required by G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b). 
                     
decision, not to determine whether we would have reached a 
different conclusion.  See Labor Relations Comm'n v. University 
Hosp., Inc., 359 Mass. 516, 521 (1971).  Indeed, given the 
conflicting evidence on both sides, had the commission concluded 
that the test was reliable enough by itself to be the sole 
grounds for the bypass in this case, there likely would have 
been substantial evidence for that decision as well. 
24 
 
To begin, the dissent errs by viewing the case through the 
lens of the commission rather than that of a reviewing court.  
In concluding that the commission improperly weighed the 
evidence presented to it, post at    , rather than leaving the 
commission to its task of making credibility determinations and 
factual findings, the dissent makes its own.24  See School Comm. 
of Brockton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 423 
Mass. 7, 15 (1996) ("The commission, and not the court, is the 
sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence before 
it"). 
In finding that the commission came to the wrong conclusion 
regarding the Psychemedics hair drug test, the dissent relies 
                     
24 Ironically, the dissent contends that the commission 
erred by substituting its judgment for that of the department.  
Post at    .  We disagree.  The commission was tasked with 
determining whether "the department's action comports with 
'[b]asic merit principles.'"  Police Dep't of Boston v. 
Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688 (2012), quoting G. L. c. 31, § 1.  
That is, the commission's role was to determine whether the 
department had proved reasonable justification for the bypass by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  On that front no deference is 
owed to the department.  See Zachs v. Department of Pub. Utils., 
406 Mass. 217, 224 (1989) ("The weight of the evidence is for 
the [agency] to decide").  Had the commission found 
Psychemedics's hair drug test to be sufficiently reliable to 
prove that Gannon had ingested cocaine, but nevertheless 
overturned the bypass, we would reverse the decision as an 
improper substitution of the commission's judgment for that of 
the department.  See Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 43 Mass. 
App. Ct. 300, 305 (1997) (commission substituted its judgment 
for that of city where it weighed undisputed evidence and 
reached different employment decision). 
25 
 
principally upon the fact that the result of the confirmatory 
LC/MS/MS test of the sample was more than twice Psychemedics's 
positive cutoff level, contending that this result, together 
with Gannon's failure to provide an explanation for it, is 
sufficient proof of Gannon's ingestion of cocaine to justify the 
bypass.25  The dissent makes much of the fact that the liquid 
from the fifth wash of Gannon's March 2010 hair sample was 
negative, which presumably means that any external contaminants 
had been removed from the outside of the sample.  However, the 
dissent ignores the evidence that the commission had before it, 
including testimony from Cairns, the expert from Psychemedics, 
that external contaminants can seep into the hair follicle, 
which, as the other evidence presented pointed out, see Stout 
study, supra at 499, makes such contaminants resistant to 
removal by any existing washing procedure employed.26   
                     
25 As noted supra, it is the department that shoulders the 
burden of proof at the hearing before the commission.  The fact 
that Gannon did not provide an explanation for what the 
commission concluded was an insufficiently reliable positive 
drug test result does not imbue the test with reliability or 
otherwise provide credible evidence of Gannon's drug use. 
 
26 The dissent suggests that the studies presented to the 
commission do not show that Psychemedics's hair drug testing 
procedure is unreliable because the studies relied on "hair 
samples that had been directly contaminated by extremely large 
amounts of cocaine relative to the amounts used in the 
Psychemedics testing."  Post at    .  However, we are not aware 
of any studies provided to the commission that correlate the 
amount of cocaine applied to hair samples with the amount of or 
26 
 
The dissent also finds significant that, according to 
Cairns, the result of Gannon's April 2010 retest, which was just 
under the cutoff level for a presumptively positive test result, 
was consistent with Gannon having used cocaine twenty-five days 
earlier, thus bolstering the reliability of the positive March 
2010 test.27  This position fails to account for the evidence 
presented that RIA testing often produces false positives due to 
"cross reactivity."  Thus, an RIA test that presumably has 
detected cocaine in a preliminary test of a hair sample may have 
detected a different substance with a similar chemical structure 
instead.  In short, although the test result could be seen as 
consistent with cocaine use, the opposite view is also 
reasonable. 
 
The dissent contends that the commission's conclusion was 
"based on overwhelmingly improbable inferences."  Post at    .  
In doing so, the dissent discounts any of the evidence in the 
record that conflicts with its view of the facts.28  For example, 
                     
rate at which the cocaine is incorporated into the hair 
follicle. 
 
27 The dissent characterizes this portion of Cairns's 
testimony as uncontradicted, post at    ; however, as explained 
supra, there is no dispute that RIA is known to produce false 
positives.  This information, as well as Gannon's testimony that 
he had not ingested cocaine, are two pieces of evidence that 
clearly contradict Cairns on this point. 
28 The dissent also references facts and studies that were 
not before the commission when it made its decision in the 
27 
 
because Gannon's denials of cocaine use contradict the positive 
results of the hair drug test, the dissent does not credit them 
at all, even though the fact finder, i.e., the commission, found 
Gannon's testimony to be credible.  See School Comm. of 
Brockton, 423 Mass. at 15.  Even if this court would have come 
to a different conclusion on the evidence presented on a de novo 
review, fact finding is the role of the commission and not the 
reviewing court.  See Labor Relations Comm'n v. University 
Hosp., Inc., 359 Mass. 516, 521 (1971) ("A court may not 
displace an administrative board's choice between two fairly 
conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have 
made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo").  
Our limited task is to determine whether there was substantial 
evidence for the decision that the commission actually made, not 
the one that the dissent thinks the commission should have made. 
As discussed in detail supra, there was substantial 
evidence in the record documenting the concerns raised in the 
                     
instant case, including information regarding the current use of 
the test by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Post at note 
12.  Information outside the administrative record cannot be 
considered in our review of the commission's decision.  See 
G. L. c. 30A, § 11 (4) ("All evidence, including any records, 
investigation reports, and documents in the possession of the 
agency of which it desires to avail itself as evidence in making 
a decision, shall be offered and made a part of the record in 
the proceeding, and no other factual information or evidence 
shall be considered . . ."). 
28 
 
scientific community regarding the reliability of the test and 
the effectiveness of the washing procedure to remove external 
contaminants, and the questions about the ways in which 
controlled substances can incorporate into a hair follicle.  
These concerns, combined with the other evidence presented, 
provided "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion."29  G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6). 
Finally, the dissent claims that an appointing authority 
can demonstrate reasonable justification by presenting a 
"sufficient quantum of evidence" to substantiate its "legitimate 
concerns" about the risk of an applicant's misconduct.  Post 
at    ,    , quoting Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188.  We 
agree that a police department should have the discretion to 
determine whether it is willing to risk hiring an applicant who 
has engaged in prior misconduct (including one who has done so 
and subsequently lied about it).  However, where, as here, the 
alleged misconduct is disputed, an appointing authority is 
entitled to such discretion only if it demonstrates that the 
                     
 
29 The dissent presumes that we have adopted the 
commission's conclusion with regard to the reliability of 
Psychemedics's hair drug test.  See, e.g., post 
at    ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    .  In fact, we take no position 
on the test's degree of accuracy in detecting cocaine ingestion.  
Rather, we review the record only to determine whether the 
commission's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and 
is not otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or an error of law, 
"giv[ing] due weight to [the commission's] experience and 
knowledge."  Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 795-796 (2015). 
29 
 
misconduct occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 305; G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b). 
In Cambridge, supra at 305, the Appeals Court held that 
where an applicant has engaged in past misconduct, it is for the 
appointing authority, not the commission, to determine whether 
the appointing authority is willing to risk hiring the 
applicant.  However, the misconduct in Cambridge was undisputed 
by the applicant.  Here, in contrast, the question whether 
Gannon engaged in past misconduct was the single issue brought 
before the commission.  Because the failed drug test was the 
department's proof that Gannon ingested cocaine and was the sole 
reason for the bypass, it was the department's burden to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the test reliably 
demonstrated that Gannon had ingested cocaine.  To the extent 
that the dissent suggests that there are occasions when an 
appointing authority need not demonstrate reasonable 
justification by a preponderance of the evidence as required by 
G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b), we disagree. 
In Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, the Appeals Court 
concluded that the commission erred as a matter of law when it 
required the city to prove that the candidate committed the 
misconduct for which he was fired from a previous job.  In so 
doing, the Appeals Court articulated a different standard of 
proof to be applied in cases where an applicant's misconduct is 
30 
 
in dispute, i.e., an appointing authority need only demonstrate 
"a sufficient quantum of evidence to substantiate its legitimate 
concerns."  Id. at 188.  See G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b).30  It is error 
to apply any standard other than a preponderance of the evidence 
in this context.  See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 
411 Mass. 451, 465 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Hawkesworth, 
405 Mass. 664, 669 n.5 (1989) ("an appellate court 'carefully 
scrutinizes the record, but does not change the standard of 
review'"). 
Citing to Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 305, the court in 
Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, further suggested that to 
require an appointing authority to prove a candidate's alleged 
misconduct "would force the city to bear undue risks."  However, 
the "risk" discussed in Cambridge pertained to risk that the 
candidate might engage in future misconduct, not risk that the 
candidate engaged in past misconduct. 
For these reasons, the department may not rely on 
demonstrating a "sufficient quantum of evidence" to substantiate 
its "legitimate concerns" about the risk of a candidate's 
misconduct.  Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188.  Instead, it 
                     
30 We express no opinion as to whether, given the facts in 
Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182 (2010), the 
city could have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it had reasonable justification for bypassing the applicant in 
that case. 
31 
 
must, as required by G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b), demonstrate 
reasonable justification for the bypass by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Conclusion.  This case is not about whether drug use 
provides reasonable justification for the department to bypass 
an applicant for a position as a police officer.  The commission 
made a determination that, by itself, the Psychemedics hair drug 
test was not enough to sustain the department's burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Gannon ingested 
cocaine.  Having fully examined the administrative record, and 
having taken into account both the supporting evidence as well 
as that which "fairly detracts from the supporting evidence's 
weight," Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Social Servs., 
430 Mass. 385, 390 (1999), we conclude that the commission's 
determination was supported by substantial evidence.  We further 
conclude that the commission employed the correct standard and 
that its decision contains no error of law.  We therefore 
decline to disturb it. 
The Superior Court's order allowing the department's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order affirming 
the commission's decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
KAFKER, J. (dissenting).  Scientific testing unequivocally 
established that Michael Gannon had 12.2 nanograms (ng) of 
cocaine in his hair, an amount more than double the number 
necessary for a positive drug test result and the equivalent, 
according to uncontradicted testimony by the Boston police 
department's (department's) expert, of doing a line of cocaine 
for ten weekends in a row.  Thus, the only issue in Gannon's 
appeal from his bypass to the Civil Service Commission 
(commission) was whether he ingested this amount of cocaine or 
whether, without his knowledge, the cocaine somehow got into his 
hair externally through environmental contamination. 
The scientific evidence and expert testimony is not, as the 
court concludes, "fairly conflicting" on the issue of ingestion 
versus environmental contamination.  Ante at    , quoting Labor 
Relations Comm'n v. University Hosp., Inc., 359 Mass. 516, 521 
(1971).  There was no scientific evidence whatsoever in the 
studies or elsewhere in the record plausibly supporting Gannon's 
alibi that his hair somehow had been externally contaminated 
with such a large amount of cocaine without his knowing it.  By 
contrast, there was substantial scientific evidence ignored or 
downplayed by the commission and the court establishing 
ingestion, including, but not limited to, the magnitude of the 
12.2 ng test result and the absolute zero reading for the 
decontamination wash of Gannon's positive hair sample, 
2 
 
 
indicating an absence of external contamination.  A close 
reading of the scientific studies and the testimony of Gannon's 
expert also reveals that the concerns raised about the 
unreliability of hair drug testing relied on by the commission 
and apparently adopted by the court did not apply to the 
decontamination methods or cutoff criteria used by the 
Psychemedics Corporation (Psychemedics) testing laboratory in 
the instant case.  In fact, the studies established the high 
degree of reliability of the testing procedures at issue.  In 
sum, there was substantial evidence of ingestion in the instant 
case. 
Deference is also due to the department's determination of 
the standards for a tolerable risk of hiring a police officer 
candidate who may have engaged in illegal drug use and lying, as 
compliance with the law and honesty are among the most essential 
characteristics of a police officer.  The department need not 
assume an "undue risk[]" of hiring a police officer candidate 
who has taken illegal drugs and lied about it.  See Beverly v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 190 (2010).  In 
particular, the department was entitled to rely on a test (such 
as the one used here) that reasonably and reliably identified a 
high probability of illegal drug use by a police officer 
candidate and hence created an undue risk of hiring that 
candidate.  Even if that test was not flawless, neither the 
3 
 
 
commission nor this court is a super personnel agency for the 
Commonwealth entitled to substitute its own standards of risk of 
hiring a police officer candidate who has engaged in drug use, 
and its own testing protocols.  Yet that is exactly what the 
court and the commission have done here.  In so doing, they 
place an undue risk of an officer candidate's drug use and lying 
on the department and the public that the department serves.  
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
1.  Discussion.  a.  Deference to appointing authority.  An 
appointing authority bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it had a "reasonable 
justification" for a hiring bypass decision that is consistent 
with "[b]asic merit principles."  Police Dep't of Boston v. 
Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688 (2012), quoting G. L. c. 31, § 1.  
In determining whether the justifications that an authority 
offers for a bypass are reasonable, the commission must 
"properly weigh[] those justifications against the fundamental 
purpose of the civil service system, . . . [which is] to ensure 
decision-making in accordance with basic merit principles."  
Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. 
Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 264 (2001) (MAMLEO).  Those purposes are 
to "guard against political considerations, favoritism, and 
bias"; the commission is not, however, to "substitute its 
judgment about a valid exercise of discretion based on merit or 
4 
 
 
policy considerations by an appointing authority."  Cambridge v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997).  Rather, 
in these cases, "the commission owes substantial deference to 
the appointing authority's exercise of judgment in determining 
whether there was 'reasonable justification.'"  Sherman v. 
Randolph, 472 Mass. 802, 810 (2015), quoting Beverly, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 188.  This exercise of "deference is especially 
appropriate with respect to the hiring of police officers."  
Sherman, supra, quoting Beverly, supra. 
The department is understandably greatly concerned about 
illegal drug use and lying by police officers.  See Boston v. 
Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass. 813, 823 (2005) 
("strong . . . public policy . . . that police officers be 
truthful and obey the law in the performance of their official 
duties"); O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 408 Mass. 324, 
328 (1990) ("drug use by police officers" is "inimical to public 
safety" and "cannot be reconciled with respect for the law").  
See also Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 
802-803 (2004) (upholding appointing authority's suspension of 
police officer for violating "important standards of conduct" by 
being untruthful).  The department cannot perform its law 
enforcement mission if police officers disobey the law or lie.  
The department is therefore entitled to protect itself and the 
public against such risks.  It may therefore set reasonable 
5 
 
 
standards of tolerable risk of illegal drug use and lying by its 
police officer candidates.  It certainly need not accept a high 
risk of drug use by a police officer candidate.  See Beverly, 78 
Mass. App. Ct. at 190.  Great deference is also due to those 
decisions, given the grave consequences of hiring law 
enforcement officers who defy the law and lie.  See Sherman, 472 
Mass. at 810, quoting Beverly, supra at 188. 
At issue in the instant case is the policy the department 
has adopted to identify, and protect against, such risks.  The 
department has a policy that it will not hire an officer 
candidate who reports positive for drug use after failing a 
preemployment drug test and not providing any alternative 
explanation to a medical review officer.1  There are no 
allegations in this case that this policy has "overtones of 
                     
 
1 The department sent Gannon a letter in February 2014 
stating that it had bypassed him in 2013 for two "reasons":  (1) 
the Psychemedics test result of March 2010 that "indicate[d] 
[Gannon] tested positive for the use of cocaine"; and (2) 
"confirm[ation]" of the test result by Gannon's inability to 
provide an alternate explanation to the medical review officer 
for the positive test result.  Although Gannon's appeal from his 
2013 bypass is still pending before the commission, the 
commission and the parties proceeded on the basis that his 2012 
bypass also "was based on his March 27, 2010 positive hair drug 
test result."  The court ignores the second reason for Gannon's 
bypass and does not explain why a candidate's inability to 
explain a negative drug test result is not the sort of 
"information" on which an appointing authority may rely.  
Sherman v. Randolph, 472 Mass. 802, 813 n.18 (2015) ("An 
appointing authority may use any information it has obtained 
through an independent, impartial, and reasonably thorough 
review as the basis of its decision to bypass a candidate"). 
6 
 
 
political control" or implicates "objectives unrelated to merit 
standards or neutrally applied public policy."  Cambridge, 43 
Mass. App. Ct at 304.  The only question is whether failure of 
such test provides a reasonable justification for bypassing the 
selection of a police officer candidate because it provides a 
"sufficient quantum of evidence" to support the police 
department's "legitimate concerns" about drug use and lying by a 
police officer candidate.  Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188. 
Several police officer cases are instructive in analyzing 
this question.  In Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 184-186, a 
police department bypassed a reserve police officer candidate 
after concluding that the candidate had improperly accessed 
voicemail accounts at his previous job (from which, 
consequently, he had been fired).  The department conducted an 
investigation that considered interviews with the candidate, 
surveillance photographs from the previous employer, and a 
report from an information technology specialist analyzing data 
related to the employer's voicemail accounts.  Id.  The 
commission overturned the bypass because it found that the 
department's evidence was "inconclusive" and that the 
candidate's denial of accessing the voicemails was "credible."  
Id. at 191-192.  The Appeals Court reversed:  it held that the 
commission erred when it focused on "whether the city had proved 
that [the candidate] in fact engaged in the misconduct."  Id. at 
7 
 
 
190.  Rather, it concluded that, so long as the appointing 
authority "conducted an impartial and reasonably thorough review 
that confirmed that there appeared to be a credible basis for 
the allegations," the existence of a "factual contest over 
whether [the candidate had] ever engaged in the misconduct" did 
not deprive the authority of reasonable justification for its 
bypass.  Id. at 188-189.2  A reasonable justification for the 
bypass included an "undue risk[]" that the misconduct had 
occurred.  Id. at 190. 
The process and substantive standards for bypassing a 
police officer candidate were also considered in Kavaleski, 463 
Mass. at 695.  There, we found that the police department lacked 
reasonable justification for the bypass.  The particular issue 
in Kavaleski was whether the department had sufficient evidence 
to bypass a police officer candidate on the basis of a report 
from an examining psychiatrist.  Id. at 682-684.  We explained 
                     
2 Although this court has cited Beverly v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182 (2010), with approval, see 
Sherman, 472 Mass. at 813 n.18, and I believe its reasoning is 
sound, the court today decides that the dissent "erroneously 
suggests that when facts are in dispute regarding a candidate's 
conduct" a high risk of misconduct is not enough; rather, the 
misconduct must be proved.  Ante at    .  If the court is 
overruling Beverly, and holding that a police department must 
assume a high risk of drug use and lying by its police officer 
candidates, it should say so expressly.  Regardless, here, there 
was substantial evidence that Gannon repeatedly ingested cocaine 
and lied about it, and a lack of substantial evidence for 
external contamination. 
8 
 
 
that, although it is certainly legitimate for the department to 
bypass a candidate determined to have certain psychological 
conditions, id. at 695 n.23, the psychiatrist in this case had 
made "substantially subjective determinations" that were 
"insufficiently factually supported" and lacked any apparent 
connection to the duties of a police officer (for example, the 
observation that the candidate had "messy hair"), id. at 693, 
695.  The commission legitimately found these determinations 
indicative of "some bias or some other improper consideration."  
Id. at 693.  We affirmed the commission's decision that the 
bypass was invalid.  
A third informative case involving a police officer 
position is Sherman, 472 Mass. at 803.  There, we upheld a 
bypass decision where the appointing authority had used a 
somewhat subjective and hence "flawed" interviewing process, but 
a review of the entire administrative record revealed that there 
was no indication that the bypass was motivated by reasons 
incompatible with basic merit principles.  Id. 
In the instant case, the commission and the court depart 
from the reasoning of these cases.  The department here has a 
compelling justification not to tolerate a high risk of illegal 
drug use by police officer candidates.  As explained in detail 
infra, it also has developed a reasonable and reliable means of 
identifying a high risk of drug use by a police officer 
9 
 
 
candidate.  The application of the test, and the bypassing of 
police officer candidates that fail the test, is also fully 
consistent with merit principles.  There is nothing about it to 
suggest improper considerations.  In these circumstances, the 
department has a reasonable justification for the bypass.  When 
the entire record is examined, it is also clear that the 
department has proved by a preponderance of evidence its 
reasonable justification for the bypass, thereby satisfying the 
substantial evidence test. 
 
b.  Substantial evidence.  i.  Standard of review.  As the 
court correctly acknowledges, ante at    , substantial evidence 
review requires us to "examine[] the entire administrative 
record and take[] into account whatever in the record would 
fairly detract from the supporting evidence's weight" (citation 
omitted).  MAMLEO, 434 Mass. at 265.  Accord Andrews v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 446 Mass. 611, 616 (2006); Cobble v. Commissioner 
of the Dep't of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 390 (1999), citing 
New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 
466 (1981).  "We have frequently stated that substantial 
evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. . . .  A finding of the 
[commission] must[, however,] be set aside if the evidence 
points to no felt or appreciable probability of the conclusion 
or points to an overwhelming probability of the contrary."  
10 
 
 
(Quotations and citations omitted.)  New Boston Garden Corp., 
supra.  As the court fails to recognize, "we are not required to 
affirm the [commission] merely on a finding that the record 
contains evidence from which a rational mind might draw the 
desired inference."  Id.  Rather, a commission decision requires 
"reversal by a reviewing court . . . 'if the cumulative weight 
of the evidence tends substantially toward opposite 
inferences.'"  Mendonca v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
757, 766 (2014), quoting Cobble, supra at 391.  That is exactly 
what has occurred here.3 
 
ii.  Substantial evidence ignored by the commission.  I 
begin with a discussion of the critical facts ignored, 
minimized, or misunderstood by the commission.  These include 
the significance of the magnitude of the positive reading, the 
absolutely negative test of the wash, and the details of the 
                     
3 The court suggests that I am engaging in a de novo review.  
Ante at note 15.  To the contrary, I am following the 
substantial evidence test as defined by this court's past 
decisions.  The court, by contrast, does not examine the entire 
record, nor does it recognize the utter improbability of 
environmental contamination explaining the test results in the 
instant case.  Finally, the court suggests that I do not 
properly defer to the agency's expertise and technical 
competence regarding the scientific evidence in this case.  Id. 
at    .  However, the commission does not have any expertise in 
the science of hair testing or for that matter science in 
general.  Its expertise relates to the application of the merit 
principles discussed supra -- the identification of political 
patronage, favoritism, bias, and arbitrary decision-making.  The 
commission is well outside its area of expertise here. 
11 
 
 
results of the follow-up test performed on a sample collected 
twenty-five days after the original sample.  The 12.2 ng 
spectrometry result of Gannon's hair sample was more than double 
the amount required for a positive result and a presumption of 
ingestion.  Most importantly, there is no scientific evidence or 
plausible explanation that external contamination could cause 
such a high result without Gannon's knowledge.  See New Boston 
Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 472-473 (agency finding must have 
basis in record).  This is particularly true in combination with 
the absolutely negative test of the wash, indicating that there 
was no environmental contamination to begin with or that any 
that was present was successfully washed off. 
 
The commission questions the reliability of this negative 
test of the wash based on the possibility of false positives; 
this confuses scientific apples with scientific oranges for the 
reasons explained infra.  Finally, the follow-up test performed 
on a hair sample collected twenty-five days later was negative, 
as the commission reported, but barely below the amount for a 
positive test, which the commission ignored.  The issue is 
whether such information, all of which is uncontested or 
supported by substantial evidence, provided a "sufficient 
quantum of evidence to substantiate [the department's] 
legitimate concerns" about the risk of Gannon's illegal drug use 
and truthfulness.  Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188.  If this 
12 
 
 
is the case, the commission's decision was in error, as 
deference is due to the department's decision-making regarding 
whether to tolerate an "undue risk[]" of drug use by police 
officer candidates.  Id. at 190. 
 
A.  Gannon's elevated test result provides substantial 
evidence of ingestion.  In the instant case, after 
radioimmunoassay (RIA) testing determined one portion of 
Gannon's hair sample was presumptively positive for cocaine, 
another portion of the sample was washed in a phosphate buffer,4 
the wash was tested by RIA, and a final spectrometry test on the 
washed, liquefied sampled returned a result of 12.2 ng of 
cocaine per ten milligrams (mg) of hair.  The "cutoff" level, 
presumptive of ingestion, was five ng per ten mg of hair.  Ante 
at    .5  The 0.8 ng of the benzoylecgonine (BE) metabolite 
                     
 
4 The court fails to account fully for the proven 
differences between phosphate and other washes.  This is a 
significant fact because studies have found the phosphate-
washing procedure to be far more effective than other 
procedures, including methanol washes.  See generally Ropero-
Miller & Stout, Analysis of Cocaine Analytes in Human Hair II:  
Evaluation of Different Hair Color and Ethnicity Types, Report 
to United States Department of Justice, Document No. 234628 
(Mar. 31, 2011) (2011 study). 
 
 
5 According to Psychemedics's senior scientific advisor, Dr. 
Thomas Cairns, the cutoff is set "conservative[ly]" to 
distinguish a drug user from someone who has been 
environmentally exposed to cocaine.  Although Gannon's expert 
testified that "each laboratory could set its own individual 
criteria for cutoff levels," the commission found in Matter of 
Boston Police Dep't Drug Testing Appeals, 26 Mass. Civ. Serv. 
13 
 
 
detected in the sample also satisfies the BE "criterion" 
required for a sample to be reported positive.6  According to the 
department's expert, Dr. Thomas Cairns, a biochemist and 
toxicologist who was a senior scientific advisor at Psychemedics 
and had published widely on hair drug testing, a test result of 
this amount of cocaine would suggest that Gannon likely had 
"ingested cocaine on multiple occasions during the [seventy-
                     
Rep. 73, 106, 108 (2013) (DTA), that there is a "general 
agreement" in the drug testing industry that the Psychemedics 
cutoff level is the "absolute minimum level for presumption [of] 
ingestion." 
 
 
6 A metabolite is a derivative substance produced when 
cocaine is metabolized in the body.  DTA, 26 Mass. Civ. Serv. 
Rep. at 81.  The court mentions that testing determined that 
Gannon's hair sample contained the benzoylecgonine (BE) 
metabolite, ante at note 5, but does not state that Psychemedics 
required a certain amount of BE to be present for a result to be 
reported as positive, ante at    .  This is significant because 
laboratories' criteria for reporting a result as positive for 
ingestion may involve different cocaine metabolites, such as BE, 
cocaethylene, and norcocaine.  See, e.g., 2011 study, supra at 
69-70.  The court's conclusion that there are "credible concerns 
in the scientific community regarding the hair drug test" 
performed in this case, ante at    , is significantly weakened by 
its reliance on portions of studies (or expert testimony based 
on those studies) that relate to reporting criteria involving 
these other metabolites and not the BE criteria used in the 
instant case.  See notes 10 and 11, infra (2006 scientific study 
in record found Psychemedics's washing procedures and protocols 
had one hundred percent success rate with respect to BE criteria 
and 2011 study found at least eighty-one percent success ratio 
with respect to BE criteria, with lack of clarity in positive 
results for remaining nineteen percent related to whether 
phosphate or methanol washes were used); note 13, infra 
(Gannon's expert relied on portions of these studies involving 
other metabolite criteria). 
14 
 
 
five] days prior to the date of collection" of his hair sample, 
indeed, "probably a line of cocaine every weekend."  The 
testimony about the amount of cocaine, as opposed to its source, 
was not contradicted. 
Test results that are "positive at levels well above the 
cutoff level" are probative of ingestion as opposed to external 
contamination, as the commission recognized in its earlier case.  
See Thompson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 462, 469-
470 (2016) (upholding termination decision of commission with 
respect to four officers based in part on evidence that their 
Psychemedics hair drug test results for cocaine were "positive 
at levels well above the cutoff level").  See also Matter of 
Goldin v. Kelly, 77 A.D.3d 475, 476 (N.Y. 2010) (substantial 
evidence supported termination of police officer who lacked 
persuasive explanation for why positive hair drug test results 
were four times "level [of cocaine] that might indicate 
inadvertent use").7  In sum, the amount of cocaine detected is 
                     
 
7 The initial test results of the four terminated officers 
in Thompson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 462 (2016) 
were all more than double the cutoff of five nanograms (ng) of 
cocaine (10.1 ng, 10.7 ng, 11.6 ng, 13.7 ng); by contrast, five 
of the six officers whose appeals were granted had initial test 
results of less than double the cutoff.  See DTA, 26 Mass. Civ. 
Serv. Rep. at 96-101.  For example, one validly terminated 
officer had two tests at elevated levels (around thirteen ng 
cocaine per ten mg of hair) and provided no "evidence of 
specific exposure that would explain these elevated levels."  
Id. at 109.  Because Thompson involved tenured officers, the 
15 
 
 
highly significant as to whether the cocaine is the product of 
ingestion or unknown environmental contamination.  The 
commission did not engage (nor does the court engage) with the 
inherent improbability that such an elevated level of cocaine 
would somehow get into the hair of a member of the general 
population through environmental contamination without their 
knowing it.  See New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 466.  
Finally, the court ignores the requirement of the substantial 
evidence test that the commission's decision may be reversed 
when there is an "overwhelming probability of the contrary" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  See Cobble, 430 Mass. at 393 n.8 (in 
conducting substantial evidence test, reviewing court may 
disregard "overly speculative" testimony). 
 
B.  There is no evidence suggesting such a high test result 
could be the product of environmental contamination, or that the 
particular tests employed here could not reasonably and reliably 
distinguish between ingestion and environmental contamination in 
these circumstances.  A major basis for the commission's and the 
court's conclusion that the department lacked reasonable 
justification for Gannon's bypass was the concern that the 
testing cannot reliably determine whether this elevated result 
                     
officers were entitled to take a "safety net" follow-up test, 
which, for three of the four officers, remained positive; here, 
as discussed infra, Gannon's independent follow-up test was just 
barely negative, which is hardly exculpatory. 
16 
 
 
was caused by ingested cocaine or external contamination, i.e., 
that Psychemedics testing "can result in false positives."  
Indeed, the court concludes that there are "concerns raised in 
the scientific community regarding the reliability of the test 
and the effectiveness of the washing procedure to remove 
external contaminants" and thus suggests that the possibilities 
of ingestion versus external contamination were "two fairly 
conflicting views" regarding which a reviewing court must defer 
to the agency.  Ante at    .  For the reasons discussed infra, I 
believe the court's assertion does not fully or accurately 
characterize the scientific evidence before the commission. 
The concern with whether hair drug testing removes external 
contamination has been found to be most relevant with respect to 
individuals who may be exposed to cocaine in their job.  See 
note 8, infra.  Of course, at the time he submitted his hair 
sample, Gannon was a police officer candidate, not a police 
officer potentially exposed to cocaine through his work 
environment. 
Furthermore, neither of the studies on which the commission 
relied suggests that Gannon's 12.2 ng test result could have 
resulted from contamination of cocaine in the general 
environment.  (The two studies are Stout, Ropero-Miller, Baylor, 
& Mitchell, External Contamination of Hair with Cocaine:  
Evaluation of External Cocaine Contamination and Development of 
17 
 
 
Performance-Testing Materials, 30 J. Analytical Toxicology 490 
[2006] [2006 study], and Ropero-Miller & Stout, Analysis of 
Cocaine Analytes in Human Hair II:  Evaluation of Different Hair 
Color and Ethnicity Types, Report to United States Department of 
Justice, Document No. 234628 [Mar. 31, 2011] [2011 study].)  To 
the contrary, the 2011 study concluded that, for members of the 
general population, "it is unlikely that widespread 
contamination of hair is an issue."8  2011 study, supra at 76.  
This conclusion is not contradicted by the testimony of Gannon's 
expert that external contamination from cocaine could occur from 
handling paper money, buying a quart of milk, or getting a 
                     
 
8 The 2011 study concluded that environmental contamination 
is unlikely to be an issue beyond "individuals who may have 
exposure to high drug concentrations because of their jobs" or 
individuals who frequent "locations where use or handling of 
[cocaine] has occurred."  2011 study, supra at 20, 76.  The 
study therefore recommended to the Department of Justice that 
future Federal hair testing guidelines use an extended 
decontamination wash procedure and a mathematical wash criterion 
(i.e., the procedures used in the instant case) because the 
"federal workplace drug-testing program includes individuals who 
may have exposure to high drug concentrations because of their 
jobs" (emphasis added).  Id. at 76.  Although the court 
selectively quotes from Stout, Ropero-Miller, Baylor, & 
Mitchell, External Contamination of Hair with Cocaine:  
Evaluation of External Cocaine Contamination and Development of 
Performance-Testing Materials, 30 J. Analytical Toxicology 490 
(2006) (2006 study) to support the general proposition that 
externally applied cocaine can be absorbed into hair, ante 
at    , this study nowhere addressed the issue of which 
environments are most likely to have external cocaine and in 
what quantities, and consequently in no way contradicts the 
conclusion of the 2011 study by the same authors that such 
contamination would not likely occur in significant amounts 
outside of occupational or illicit contexts. 
18 
 
 
haircut.  The expert did not offer any evidence about the 
quantities of cocaine present in these environments.  In fact, 
the 2011 study observed that a study regarding the "potential 
surface contamination of currency" with cocaine did "not provide 
sufficient evidence about . . . potential surface exposure 
amounts."  Id. at 18.  Indeed, as the commission found in Matter 
of Boston Police Dep't Drug Testing Appeals, 26 Mass. Civ. Serv. 
Rep. 73, 90 (2013), studies "tend[] to suggest that external 
contamination of hair by the transfer of cocaine found in the 
general environment occurs relatively infrequently." 
Furthermore, even assuming that Gannon had been exposed to 
an elevated amount of cocaine without his knowing it, neither of 
the two studies suggests that such a high amount of cocaine was 
likely to be present following Psychemedics's washing protocols.  
As mentioned, these studies did not attempt to study general 
environmental contamination; rather, they examined the efficacy 
of certain washing procedures and protocols with respect to hair 
samples that had been directly contaminated by extremely large 
amounts of cocaine relative to the amounts used in the 
Psychemedics testing.9  Most significantly, they found that the 
                     
 
9 Specifically, the 2006 study applied fifteen milligrams 
(mg) of cocaine solution to the hair samples while the 2011 
study applied around eight mg of powdered cocaine to the 
samples.  (A milligram is equivalent to 1 million nanograms.)  
Although the court does not attach significance to these large 
19 
 
 
Psychemedics procedures were highly effective with respect to 
the BE criteria used in the instant case.  Specifically, the 
2006 study found that the Psychemedics decontamination 
procedures and an application of the "wash criterion" was one 
hundred percent successful with respect to the BE criteria used 
in the instant case.10  The 2011 study found these procedures and 
                     
quantities, ante at note 26, the 2011 study expressly noted 
criticisms that the "quantity of [cocaine] used in [the study] 
is unrealistic because it is not clearly understood how much 
[cocaine] may be on a surface that is touched by law enforcement 
or others.  Some research with methamphetamine cook houses 
suggests that high surface contamination may be possible.  
Although this quantity of [cocaine] we used may be too large for 
some scenarios, it may be too small to be representative of 
other scenarios."  2011 study, supra at 75. 
 
 
10 The court cites the 2006 study to support its claim that 
it is "unclear" whether Psychemedics's washing procedures could 
"effectively" remove externally present cocaine from a hair 
sample.  Ante at    .  This study examined whether hair samples 
that had been directly contaminated with cocaine would be 
reported as positive by various cutoff criteria, including the 
BE criteria at issue in the instant case.  In total, 585 samples 
were analyzed.  There were 195 samples that were not 
decontaminated at all.  The other 390 samples were 
decontaminated by one of four different washing procedures.  Of 
these 390 samples, 148, or thirty-eight percent, remained 
positive by the BE criteria following decontamination.  The 
court mentions the thirty-eight percent figure, ante at note 13, 
but in fact only sixty-seven of these 148 positive samples had 
been subjected to the Psychemedics washing procedure.  The study 
does not state the over-all success rate of the Psychemedics 
washing procedures. 
 
Furthermore, this figure does not include the wash 
criterion used in the instant case (i.e., multiplication of any 
cocaine in the final wash by five and subtraction from the 
spectrometry result of the washed sample).  "To investigate the 
utility of a 'Wash Criterion,' [the study's authors] selected 
20 
 
 
the wash criterion had at least an eighty-one percent success 
rate, even when the hair was directly doused with large amounts 
of cocaine.11  This study recommended to the Department of 
Justice that the Psychemedics protocol, due to its high degree 
                     
[sixty-five] samples (across the study period) from those 
decontaminated by the [Psychemedics washing] procedure."  2006 
study, supra at 499.  Before application of the wash criterion, 
ten of the selected samples were positive according to the BE 
criteria.  Following application of the wash criterion, none of 
the samples was positive.  Thus, the limited data produced by 
the study found the Psychemedics washing procedures and 
protocols to have a one hundred percent success rate with 
respect to the BE criteria used in the instant case -- a fact 
entirely overlooked by the commission. 
 
Finally, the court's reference, ante at note 13, to the 
results of a 2001 study mentioned in the 2006 study does not 
provide evidence for the court's assertion.  That study is not 
in the record, but according to the 2006 study, there were 
"differences in the wash procedures" between the Psychemedics 
procedures and those used by the 2001 study. 
 
 
11 The 2011 study found that, with respect to samples washed 
several hours after contamination and evaluated using the BE 
criteria, the Psychemedics phosphate-washing procedures and wash 
criterion eliminated one hundred percent of false positive 
calls.  This study further found that, with respect to samples 
decontaminated at the end of the eight-week study period, the 
washing procedures eliminated at least eighty-one percent of 
false positive calls with respect to the BE criteria.  I say "at 
least" because it is unclear from the study how many methanol-
washed samples, as opposed to phosphate-washed samples, were 
included in the eighty-one percent figure, so the actual success 
rate with the phosphate wash may have been higher.  Regardless, 
this is still a high level of reliability. 
 
21 
 
 
of efficacy, should be incorporated into Federal hair testing 
guidelines to protect against environmental contamination.12 
The record further reveals that Gannon's expert had 
performed no hair testing of his own and his opinion about the 
unreliability of Gannon's test result was largely based on these 
studies, in particular the 2006 study.13  Therefore, contrary to 
                     
 
12 The commission quoted with approval a passage from DTA, 
26 Mass. Civ. Serv. Rep. at 106-107, that pointed to "criticism 
from sources such as the [Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)] 
Laboratory" as one reason why hair drug testing was an 
unreliable methodology.  Yet the commission ignored evidence in 
the record that the FBI had resumed hair drug testing after 
sending analysts to the Psychemedics laboratory to study its 
procedures.  Although not necessary to my analysis, as I 
conclude there is substantial other evidence to support the 
reliability of the test and the reasonableness of the bypass 
decision, I note that (1) the FBI has stated that it never 
suspended hair testing with respect to "hair samples collected 
from subjects that have no legitimate reason to have cocaine 
exposure, such as in child endangerment investigations," LeBeau 
& Montgomery, The authors' reply, 34 J. Analytical Toxicology 
355, 355-356 (2010); and (2) on the basis of a 2014 study 
applying the "wash criterion" developed by Cairns, the FBI 
changed its position and concluded that it would conduct hair 
drug testing even in cases where there was a potential for the 
donor to have been externally contaminated, see Montgomery, 
LeBeau, & Morris-Kukoski, Letter to the Editor:  New Hair 
Testing Conclusions, 41 J. Analytical Toxicology 161, 161 
(2016); Morris-Kukoski, Montgomery, & Hammer, Analysis of 
Extensively Washed Hair from Cocaine Users and Drug Chemists to 
Establish New Reporting Criteria, 38 J. Analytical Toxicology 
628 (2014). 
 
 
13 Gannon's expert, Dr. David Benjamin, testified that, 
although he had not personally performed hair testing, he had 
"extensive" experience with the same "testing procedures" (i.e., 
RIA and mass spectrometry) used in urine testing for drugs.  On 
cross-examination, he testified that his opinion about the 
unreliability of all hair drug testing was based on "testing" 
22 
 
 
the court's assertion, ante at    , Gannon's expert's testimony 
hardly provides an adequate basis for the possibility that the 
test result was unreliable due to the general inability of hair 
drug testing to remove all external contaminants.  See Cobble, 
430 Mass. at 393 n.8 ("under the substantial evidence test, we 
may disregard supporting testimony that cannot reasonably form 
                     
(apparently referring to his familiarity with these testing 
procedures) and the 2006 study: 
 
Q.:  "And I believe you testified that there's no 
scientifically-accepted method of decontamination of hair 
samples; is that correct?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And what is that based on?" 
 
A.:  "That's based on testing and also the article that you 
showed me from Peter Stout in RTI [(i.e., the 2006 study)].  
He says the same thing." 
 
 
Benjamin also filed an affidavit discussing the 2006 and 
2011 studies in which he "conclude[d] with reasonable scientific 
certainty that hair testing is unreliable because 
decontaminating the external portion of the hair follicle to 
insure removal of environmentally adsorbed cocaine cannot be 
demonstrated at a level that would insure reliable testing and 
reporting of the presence of cocaine within the hair follicle, 
as a result of distribution through the blood, secondary to 
actual ingestion of cocaine."  However, in this affidavit, 
Benjamin acknowledged that the 2006 study had found that the 
Psychemedics procedures (following application of the wash 
criterion) successfully had decontaminated all the samples 
pursuant to the BE criteria. 
 
 
The expert also opined that the test was unreliable because 
RIA had been used to test the wash and hence the result could 
have been a "false negative"; however, there was no record 
evidence supporting the possibility that RIA in fact was likely 
to produce a false negative.  See infra. 
23 
 
 
the basis of impartial, reasoned judgment," for example, because 
it is "too indefinite" and "overly speculative").  This 
conclusion was instead based on overwhelmingly improbable 
inferences.  See New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 466. 
C.  Negative RIA test of washing fluid.  The test of the 
washing fluid in which Gannon's hair sample was decontaminated 
provides further confirmation that his final test result 
reflects drug ingestion rather than environmental contamination.  
The purpose of the multiple washes is to remove environmental 
contamination.  As both experts testified, a negative test on 
the wash confirms the efficacy of the washing procedures; 
presumably, it also indicates that the sample was never 
contaminated in the first place, i.e., that there was nothing to 
wash off.  Here, an RIA test performed on the wash registered an 
"absolute zero" for cocaine, and a spectrometry test on the 
washed hair sample detected 12.2 ng of cocaine.  These two test 
results are thus highly significant:  as Cairns testified 
without contradiction, to account for contamination from 
"external sources" Psychemedics employs a five-stage "wash 
procedure that we call aggressive" that is validated by an 
absence of cocaine in the final wash.  See note 16, infra.14 
                     
 
14 As mentioned, see note 13, supra, Benjamin's criticisms 
of the reliability of hair drug testing were largely based on 
the 2006 study.  But when asked if he was "aware of how many 
24 
 
 
 
Not only did Cairns testify that an absence of cocaine in 
the final wash validates the efficacy of the washing procedures, 
but Gannon's expert, Dr. David Benjamin, himself appeared to 
offer testimony supporting the conclusion that a washing 
reliably determined to be negative, combined with a positive 
mass spectrometry test result on the washed hair sample, was  
evidence of drug ingestion and not a product of external 
contamination:  he testified that he would "accept the results" 
of a test in which the washing fluid tested negative for cocaine 
because such a result suggests a "greater likelihood" of 
ingestion.15  In sum, the negative result of the wash 
corroborated the reliability of Psychemedics's test results:  it 
was credible evidence that the procedures had removed all the 
external contaminants (or that there were no contaminants to 
begin with), and hence of cocaine ingestion.16  Again, the 
                     
total washes Psychemedics conducts," he responded, "Gee, I 
really don't know the total of it, no." 
 
15 Benjamin testified:  "[I]deally, in order to be able to 
accept the results of the testing of the hair, I have to have a 
negative test for the washings.  If the washings are positive, 
it could mean that there was external contamination . . . .  If 
the washing is negative and you know that you've removed the 
cocaine from the outside of the hair, then there's a greater 
likelihood that if you got a positive test on the hair follicle 
that it came from inside the hair, because you've cleaned the 
outside of the hair." 
 
 
16 The court provides no record evidence that there was 
substantial evidence for Benjamin's theory about the "false 
negative" that Gannon argued below and that the commission 
25 
 
 
commission did not engage (nor does the court engage) with the 
inherent improbability that the wash of a sample initially 
containing this large amount of cocaine -- supposedly from 
environmental contamination -- would be reported absolutely 
negative by Psychemedics's washing protocols and procedures.  
See New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 466. 
Instead, the commission, and apparently the court, 
discounts the reliability of the wash results based on 
                     
relied on when dismissing the significance of the negative wash.  
The court's main response to the absence of cocaine in the final 
wash is to cite to the 2006 study for the general proposition 
that no decontamination procedure is entirely successful at 
removing external contaminants.  Ante at    .  As discussed in 
note 10, supra, the court does not seem to recognize that this 
study found Psychemedics's washing procedures and protocols to 
be entirely successful with respect to the BE criteria used in 
the instant case, as conceded by Gannon's expert. 
 
 
The court also claims that Cairns's own testimony supports 
the proposition that he believed Psychemedics's procedures to be 
ineffective at removing all external contaminants that may 
penetrate the hair.  Ante at    .  This is not an accurate 
representation of the record.  Cairns's testimony was that the 
Psychemedics wash procedure is "aggressive" specifically to 
address this possibility: 
 
"External sources such as the donor's own sweat from their 
sweat pores on their head would not only just coat the 
outside of the hair but could penetrate a little bit.  
That's the reason we employ a wash procedure that we call 
aggressive.  It's five washes and a long time . . . .  By 
the third wash, [external contamination is] usually gone 
. . . .  [B]y the fifth wash, I doubt you'd find any 
[external contamination] left in the wash." 
 
26 
 
 
Benjamin's testimony about the possibility of false positives.17  
Benjamin explained that RIA targets a particular substance with 
antibodies designed to bind with the molecular structure of that 
substance; and this creates the potential for "cross reactivity" 
whereby the antibody detects a substance (such as a dental 
anesthetic) with a similar chemical structure.  Ante at    .  He 
concluded that Psychemedics's testing of the wash by RIA and not 
                     
17 The portion of Benjamin's testimony relied on by the 
commission was based on the tendency of RIA to produce false 
positives: 
 
Q.:  "Is RIA testing of the wash a reliable way to test the 
wash?" 
 
A.:  "It is not." 
 
Q.:  "Is mass spectrography [sic] reliable?" 
 
A.:  "The combination of gas chromatography and mass 
spectrometry is what should have been used to definitively 
illustrate that that washing was negative." 
 
Q.:  "And is that based on partially, in fact, that there's 
such a high false positive when an RIA testing is done?" 
 
A.:  "It is indeed."  (Emphases added.) 
 
Benjamin frequently remarked on the tendency of RIA to produce 
false positives; only once did he state that RIA could produce a 
false negative, and when asked to provide a basis for this 
opinion, he cited evidence about RIA producing false positives.  
His "inconsistent testimony" that a method prone to false 
positives somehow produced a false negative cannot "reasonably 
form the basis of impartial, reasoned judgment," and may 
permissibly be disregarded.  See Mendonca v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
86 Mass. App. Ct. 757, 765 (2014), quoting Cobble, 430 Mass. at 
393 n.8. 
 
27 
 
 
mass spectrometry therefore created an "issue of reliability" 
given that "RIA has a high degree of false positives associated 
with it."18 
The fundamental problem with this analysis is its confusion 
of false positives with false negatives.  Proof that RIA may 
over-identify substances as cocaine provides no support for the 
proposition that RIA testing will produce false negatives.19  
These are different scientific problems, requiring different 
scientific proofs.  Although it would have provided further 
confirmation to use the more accurate spectrometry test to 
determine whether the wash was negative, the issue with RIA 
testing, as the commission itself recognized, is not false 
negatives but "false positives."  Consequently, I cannot find an 
"impartial, reasoned" basis in the record for the commission's 
                     
 
18 When asked "what portion of [the laboratory data package] 
do you rely to suggest that the test is unreliable," Benjamin 
identified "[p]age 3 that is titled 'Summary of Procedures and 
Results.'"  That page stated that Gannon's hair sample was first 
determined by RIA to be a "presumptive positive for [c]ocaine."  
The sample was then "washed to decontaminate the sample, and the 
wash analyzed by RIA to demonstrate that decontamination 
procedures were effective."  Finally, the sample was subjected 
to mass spectrometry to determine the amount of cocaine it 
contained.  Crucially, this page did not state that the testing 
of the wash resulted in a negative result for cocaine. 
 
 
19 Asked why Psychemedics did not test the wash with mass 
spectrometry, Cairns stated that RIA is "very sensitive" at 
detecting cocaine, specifically that it "is accurate and 
sensitive to .1 nanograms, and .1 nanograms is the lowest level 
the RIA can detect." 
28 
 
 
conclusion, based on this testimony, that the spectrometry 
method, rather than RIA, must be used to definitively illustrate 
that the washing was negative.  Cobble, 430 Mass. at 393 n.8.  
See New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 472-473. 
 
D.  "Negative" follow-up test.  Finally, the commission 
nowhere acknowledged that Gannon's April 2010 follow-up test, 
based on a hair sample collected twenty-five days after the 
original one, contained cocaine at a level just barely below the 
five ng cutoff level and thus is consistent with the earlier, 
positive result.  The commission simply describes this test as 
"negative."  This is technically correct, as it was very 
slightly below the cutoff, yet there was uncontradicted 
testimony from Cairns that the lower amount of cocaine was 
consistent with abstention from drug use between the time of the 
first and second test and thus that "in [his] opinion," this 
test "reinforces the evidence of the first sample."20  The 
                     
 
20 Gannon independently submitted a new hair sample to 
Psychemedics for testing; this sample was two centimeters long 
and hence provided a "look-back" period of forty-five days 
(i.e., a shorter "look-back" period than the earlier, 3.2 
centimeter hair sample).  The "hair analysis drug test results" 
produced in connection with the follow-up test state that the 
test was "negative" for cocaine, with a "'[n]egative' result" 
defined as one where the "drug was not detected in an amount 
that meets or exceeds the cutoff."  On the basis of the "quality 
control form" associated with the follow-up tests, however, 
Cairns testified that the test "barely missed being called a 
presumptive positive" and "reinforces the evidence of the first 
sample." 
29 
 
 
commission erroneously stated that it may disregard expert 
opinions; an agency must provide a basis in the record, however, 
if it rejects uncontradicted expert testimony on a subject 
beyond common knowledge and experience.  See Kavaleski, 463 
Mass. at 694, citing Robinson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal 
Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 639-640 (1985); Robinson, supra at 
640 (in absence of findings, reviewing court cannot determine 
whether agency applied correct principles of law to burden of 
proof standard).  That being said, I do not place significant 
weight on this error, as I recognize that RIA testing presents 
the risk of false positives, and the amount of cocaine detected 
here is consistent with that possibility.  However, the 
commission and the court do not come to terms with the 
uncontradicted testimony establishing that the follow-up test 
results are also consistent with prior drug use.  Ante at note 
28.  For that reason, they are not -- as Gannon argued and the 
commission and court seem to suggest -- exculpatory.21 
                     
 
21 Contrary to the court's assertion, ante at    , I do not 
neglect the fact that the commission found Gannon's denial 
credible.  Such a finding is not enough to warrant deference to 
the commission when the cumulative weight of credible evidence 
in the entire record clearly supports the conclusion that the 
department's bypass decision was based on a reasonable risk 
calculation about the likelihood of Gannon's cocaine ingestion, 
and thus that the decision did not violate basic merit 
principles.  See Beverly, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188-189 
(existence of "factual contest over whether [police officer 
30 
 
 
 
2.  Conclusion.  Our deference to the commission does not 
require "abdication."  NSTAR Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. 
Utils., 462 Mass. 381, 386 (2012), and cases cited.  Accord 
Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 
Mass. 506, 512 (2019) ("deference does not suggest abdication").  
In particular, it is appropriate for a reviewing court to 
overturn a judgment of the commission when it has "improperly 
substituted its judgment for that of the appointing authority." 
Falmouth, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 803.  See Police Dep't of Boston 
v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 413 (2000) ("commission's 
decision impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the 
appointing authority"); Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 305 
("impermissible substitution by the commission of its judgment 
for that of the appointing authority about the importance, to 
her fitness to be a police officer, of [candidate's] criminal 
                     
candidate had] ever engaged in the misconduct" did not deprive 
appointing authority of reasonable justification for bypass). 
 
 
As an additional "factor" in its analysis, the commission 
noted that there were two medical review reports in the record, 
the latter of which had left the amount of cocaine required for 
the confirmation cutoff blank.  However, there is no dispute 
that Gannon's test had been subjected to confirmatory testing.  
Unlike the court, ante at note 21, I do not see how the medical 
review reports generated by Concentra Health Services, Inc., 
reasonably could have any bearing on the reliability of the 
Psychemedics tests at issue here.  Nor do I see how negative 
tests that Gannon took in the past (the results of which Gannon 
obviously does not challenge) are relevant to assessing the 
accuracy of the test conducted in 2010. 
31 
 
 
record balanced against her work record").  See also Falmouth v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 827 (2006) ("commission's 
decision improperly substituted its judgment for that of the 
appointing authority in reducing [police officer's] suspension 
to sixty days from 180 days").  As discussed, the department has 
a legitimate, indeed a compelling, concern about drug use and 
lying by its police officer candidates and need not accept a 
high risk of such drug use.  The test it employed to detect such 
a high risk was also reasonably reliable, and consistent with 
merit principles.  There was also no evidence of improper 
considerations in the instant case.  Finally, any finding to the 
effect that the 12.2 ng positive test of the hair, in 
combination with the absolute zero negative test of the wash, 
was the product of environmental contamination and not ingestion 
was most improbable.  New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 466.  
Accordingly, I would hold that the decision of the Superior 
Court should be affirmed, and hence respectfully dissent from 
the court's opinion.