Case Title: Basolo v. Basolo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Basolo v. Basolo1995 WY 194907 P.2d 348Case Number: 94-265Decided: 11/30/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Steven Carlo BASOLO,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Dulcinda Ann 
BASOLO,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Rhonda Sigrist 
Woodard of Burke, Woodard & Bishop, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
Appellant.

William L. 
Miller of Miller and Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for Appellee.

Cheryl Ranck 
Schwartz of Ranck & Schwartz, Jackson, Guardian Ad Litem.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      A bitter dispute 
over custody of an only child was exacerbated by geographical separation of the 
parties' residences. Appellant claims the district court abused its discretion 
and seeks reversal of orders on visitation and payment of attorney fees. 
Skillful appellate advocacy, however, cannot gainsay the misbehavior of 
appellant which virtually compelled the district court's decisions. With the 
caveat that courts must strive to maintain neutrality, detachment, and the 
appearance of same, we affirm.

I.          
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, Steven 
Basolo (Basolo), posits the following issues:

I.          
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in severely restricting Mr. 
Basolo's visitation with his daughter and denying Mr. Basolo and his daughter 
the ability to maintain a close father/daughter relationship?

II.          
Did the trial court err in allowing its ruling regarding visitation to be 
affected by the gender of the noncustodial parent?

III.         Was 
it error for the trial court to permit the guardian ad litem to report to the 
court in a manner which made her a witness who utilized hearsay and was not 
subject to cross-examination?

IV.        Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Basolo to pay a substantial 
portion of his wife's attorneys fees and 75% of the guardian ad litem fees when 
there was no evidence presented to indicate he had a greater financial ability 
to pay?

[¶3]      Appellee, 
Dulcinda Basolo, a/k/a Dulcinda Gose (Gose), joined each of Basolo's issues, 
restating them as follows:

I.          
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its award of visitation to 
Mr. Basolo?

II.          
Did the trial court err in allowing its ruling regarding visitation to be 
affected by the gender of the noncustodial parent? 

III.         Was 
it prejudicial for the trial court to permit the guardian ad litem to report to 
the court in a narrative manner?

IV.        Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Basolo to pay a portion of 
his wife's attorneys fees and the guardian ad litem fee?

II.         
FACTS

[¶4]      As a teenager, 
Basolo spent his summers in Wyoming working on his father's ranch near Gillette, 
Wyoming. In 1968, on such a trip, he met a "cute blonde," who eventually became 
his wife and adversary.

[¶5]      Following high 
school graduation, Gose entered into a lengthy relationship/partnership with a 
film maker in Los Angeles, California. Meanwhile, Basolo tried to stay in touch, 
usually having to settle for a friendly telephone chat with Gose's mother.1 Finally, on October 13, 1989, 
Basolo and Gose were married and Natalie Duval Basolo (Natalie) was born on 
September 26, 1991. Even prior to their marriage, both recognized that the 
relationship was "hit and miss," prone to bitter and sometimes violent 
disputes.

[¶6]      Natalie's advent 
did little to cool the parties' conflicts. In August of 1992, Basolo filed for 
divorce in California. Early in October of 1992, Gose induced Basolo to abandon 
the divorce because dismissal would "be good for Natalie."

[¶7]      The surcease, if 
any, was short-lived. In October of 1992, Basolo fled to his parents' home in 
north California and, in early December, Gose and Natalie left southern 
California and moved in with Gose's parents outside Lander, Wyoming.

[¶8]      Unwelcome at the 
home of Gose's parents, Basolo later made two strife-torn visits to Lander, 
entertaining Gose and Natalie in his motel room. During Christmas of 1992, a 
night-long battle during which the parties literally threw a Bible at each other 
climaxed when a barefooted Gose, otherwise in a state of dishabille, chased 
Basolo out into the snow-covered morning, necessitating police 
intervention.

[¶9]      In April of 1993, 
Gose informed Basolo that she had filed for divorce in Wyoming and asked him to 
accept service. Although he knew that Natalie was still nursing, Basolo chose to 
take the child and leave the jurisdiction rather than accept service of Gose's 
complaint for divorce.2

[¶10]   After leaving Wyoming with Natalie, 
Basolo's whereabouts became something of an enduring mystery. He says he 
remained with his parents in California except for two weeks with his sister and 
friends in Santa Cruz, California. However, on April 26, 1993, Basolo's father 
wrote Gose's counsel to disclaim his son's presence.

[¶11]   Wherever he was, Basolo slowed down 
long enough to file another complaint for divorce on April 14, 1993, listing his 
father's address in California as his place of residence. During that time, 
Basolo left numerous telephone answering machine messages for Gose, berating her 
family with vile accusations.

[¶12]   Gose tracked her husband to 
California where she hired a private detective and an attorney to help her find 
her daughter. Within a month, a California court ordered custody restored to 
Gose and declined jurisdiction in favor of the district court for Fremont 
County, Wyoming, finding:

That on or about April 
12, 1993, the Petitioner/Father to this action, upon learning that a dissolution 
action was pending in the State of Wyoming, without the consent of 
Respondent/Mother, wrongfully removed, by abduction, the minor child of this 
marriage from the State of Wyoming, and then concealed said child from the 
Respondent/Mother, in direct violation of * * * provisions of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act * * *.

 

Mother and child 
were reunited on May 17, 1993 and returned to Wyoming where they have since 
remained.

[¶13]   Following Basolo's peremptory 
disqualification of the original district court judge, the district court 
appointed a guardian ad litem for Natalie. The district court ordered limited, 
supervised visitation, and enjoined both parties from "[i]ntentionally 
communicating with the other party * * * in a coarse or offensive manner, with 
intent to annoy or alarm the other party."

[¶14]   The record does not clarify why 
trial was delayed until June of 1994. Basolo, however, substituted counsel at 
the end of August, 1993 and jettisoned his first psychologist, delaying 
completion of his psychological evaluation until April of 1994. In the meantime, 
Basolo found means to circumvent the restraining order by enlisting family 
members.

[¶15]   In February of 1994, although 
Natalie was two and one-half years old and incapable of reading, a card 
addressed to her from Basolo's parents included the following 
message:

You look so sad and don't 
look very happy. Maybe I should come back there and see if you are O.K. since 
your Mom or Grandparents (Gose) never let us know how you are. I think that is a 
very immature, selfish and greedy position they are taking, but then they will 
have to live with themselves. Someday, you will understand * * *.

[¶16]   Two weeks later, Basolo's sister 
sent a letter directly to Gose, which included the following 
passage:

I suppose that when one 
is the concubine to a media mogul like Michael with whom you lived with for so 
long, that one looses touch with the real world, and I sincerely hope that you 
don't impress upon Natalie to live the same lifestyle that you have chosen . . . 
using men for money and whatever else.

Be a woman, for the first 
time in your life and rise above your stupidity and hatred . . . if for nothing 
else . . . for the benefit of Natalie Basolo.

[¶17]   On March 21, 1994, Basolo sent 
gifts to Natalie with a note which included the following language:

In the last 10 months 
your cruel mother has used you as a weapon to hurt me. * * *

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

Someday when you get old 
enough to learn the truth you will realize how cruel your mother was to you and 
your daddy as it is very well documented.

Basolo explained 
the allusion to documentation as indicative of his plan to retain copies of all 
the foregoing for Natalie's review when she could read.

[¶18]   Given their dysfunctional 
relationship, it is interesting that each party was able to locate a 
psychologist willing to vouch for the relative mental stability and parenting 
skills of their client. Both psychologists, however, endorsed the proposition 
that "the final determinant is the history of the person's 
behavior."

[¶19]   Citing the most influential 
factors, the district court awarded primary custody of Natalie to Gose, 
affording Basolo an initially restrictive but progressively more expansive 
visitation schedule. The district court also ordered that Basolo's "file" of 
materials derogatory to Gose be destroyed, that Basolo pay $411.00 per month as 
child support, reimburse Gose's trial attorney fees of $7,000.00, and pay 
seventy-five percent of the guardian ad litem's fee.

[¶20]   After hearing his motion to amend 
(or, in the alternative, for a new trial), the district court reduced Basolo's 
child support obligation to $125.06 per month and his responsibility for Gose's 
trial attorney fees to $4,000.00.

III.        SCOPE AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶21]   Visitation awards will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 1993). Similarly, child support, apportionment of counsel fees, 
and allocation of costs are all committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court. Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 441 (Wyo. 1993); Marquiss v. 
Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 46 (Wyo. 1992). 

[¶22]   "`Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria[.]'" Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). Abuse of discretion is not found unless 
the district court acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances of the case or commits an error of law. Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶23]   Assessment of the circumstances of 
this case, in the context of alleged abuse of discretion, is tantamount to an 
evaluation of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the decision of the 
district court. In review of the evidence, we accept the successful party's 
submissions, granting them every favorable inference fairly to be drawn and 
leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party. Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994).

IV.       
DISCUSSION

A. 
VISITATION

[¶24]   Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (1994) 
provides, inter alia:

If the court finds that 
both parents have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child, 
the court may order any arrangement that encourages parents to share in the 
rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have 
separated or dissolved their marriage.

Thereafter, Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-2-113(q) mandates only that the details of visitation, including 
costs, be specifically provided for.

[¶25]   Basolo accuses the district court 
of interfering with his father/daughter relationship as a form of punishment for 
his removal of Natalie from Wyoming in 1993 and his "intensity in asserting his 
desire to have contact with Natalie." Clearly, such punitive motives are 
unacceptable in structuring visitation orders. Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 
723 (Wyo. 1963). However, the argument errs in supposing primacy of parental 
rights over the best interests of the child and ultimately fails due to Basolo's 
inability to recognize or further his own daughter's best interests.

[¶26]   Courts are, of course, obliged to 
accept restrictions upon conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the 
layman. Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, commentary. Peevishness is 
among those luxuries available to the common man, but unworthy of our courts. 
Here, the district court succumbed to temptation, manifesting irritation with 
Basolo in several instances, including the following directive:

And there's a likelihood, 
Mr. Basolo, that I could be in this job for another 16 years, and if it comes to 
my attention during that 16 years that you have violated my order in this 
regard, I will have the law enforcement agencies of the State of Wyoming hunt 
you to the ends of this earth and I will personally see to it that you are 
prosecuted for criminal contempt of Court on a felony basis in front of a jury 
so that you can be sentenced to the penitentiary of the State of Wyoming if you 
violate my order. Do you understand that, Mr. Basolo?

The district 
court later tempered its remarks, noting that the reference to criminal contempt 
was extreme, but was occasioned by the irrational and irresponsible behavior of 
Basolo during the course of the proceedings.

[¶27]   The apparent anger of the district 
court obliges our inquiry as to whether, in the context of restrictive 
visitation provisions, it bespeaks of

such a condition of the 
mind which sways judgment and renders the judge unable to exercise his functions 
impartially in a given case or which is inconsistent with a state of mind fully 
open to the conviction which evidence might produce.

Cline v. Sawyer, 
600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1979). Of course, the mere fact of restricted visitation 
does not necessarily indicate motive to punish or bias. Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 616 (Wyo. 1993). Rather, our threshold inquiry remains whether the evidence 
presented fairly supports the decision of the district court. 

[¶28]   Basolo has a fundamental, 
constitutional right to associate with his daughter. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 
421 (Wyo. 1985). In the wreckage of any marriage, though, vindication of 
parental rights shall not be lavished at the expense of the "paramount purpose" 
of serving the welfare and best interests of the child. Laughton v. Laughton, 71 
Wyo. 506, 529, 259 P.2d 1093, 1103 (1953). Recognition that parental rights are 
fundamental does not alter the cardinal rule that when the rights of a parent 
and the rights of a child collide, it is the rights of the parent which must 
yield. Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 (Wyo. 1984); Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 
Wyo. 206, 222, 248 P. 1, 5 (1926).

[¶29]   Basolo does not contest the award 
of custody to Gose. Having awarded custody, the district court had a legitimate 
concern for stability:

An order awarding custody 
to one parent fixes that parent as the primary nurturer of the child and the one 
with whom the child shall reside. Once such an order is entered, considerations 
of stability in child placement become of central importance.

Gurney v. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 54 (Wyo. 1995). Recognizing the paramount import of 
stability to Natalie, the district court listed those factors affecting her best 
interests, including: character of the parties; residence, employment and 
stability of the parties; potential for flight; likelihood of non-present party 
being maligned; and ability to obey court orders. The foregoing criteria provide 
an objective basis for determining the fairness and propriety of the visitation 
order in terms of evidentiary support:

1. Character of the 
Parties:

a.         
Except for her participation in extended mutual combat with Basolo, the 
record shows Gose to be a fit parent.

b.         While 
briefly in the state for court proceedings, Basolo took time to obtain a fishing 
license by falsely swearing to Wyoming residency.3 In direct contravention of Wyo. 
Stat. § 31-7-106(c) (1994), Basolo possesses both California and Wyoming 
driver's licenses. His second divorce complaint claims residence with his 
parents, although he was asked to leave the family home and is allegedly 
unwelcome there. He defrayed some of his personal legal expenses by 
appropriating approximately $2,500.00 committed to his safekeeping as a memorial 
fund for a deceased colleague.

Gose's sister, Adele, 
died of cancer in 1991. While holding Natalie in California, Basolo left 
messages calling the Gose family "sickies" who "killed" Adele. Later, while 
assaulting Gose's father, Basolo repeated his accusations concerning Adele's 
death.

2. Residence, Employment 
and Stability:

a.         Since 
returning to Wyoming in December of 1992, Gose has lived with her parents in the 
home they own outside Lander. She has been employed part-time at a Lander print 
shop since February of 1993. Her home was portrayed as stable and 
nurturing.

b.         
Basolo claims to live part-time with a girlfriend and part-time with his 
parents, although his father writes that he is unwelcome at the family home. The 
vagaries associated with sending a four-year-old child on a thousand mile 
journey for visitation are only aggravated by an extremely unsettled environment 
at the end of the line.

When the parties 
separated, Basolo took extended sales trips "literally to the Canadian border." 
During the second half of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, he engaged in no 
gainful employment. In April of 1994, he became self-employed, providing 
massages for people in their homes or offices.

3. Potential for 
Flight:

a.         Gose 
has remained in Lander since December of 1992 and has worked continuously for 
one employer since February of 1993.

b.         Upon 
learning of Gose's divorce complaint, Basolo "wrongfully abducted" Natalie. With 
no permanent residence and sporadic employment, few forces are apparent which 
would likely preclude another such frolic. 

4. Derogation of Absent 
Parent:

a.         
Basolo's propensity to malign Gose and her family inspire trepidation. 
Accusatory phone messages and assaultive behavior resonate with elements of the 
crime of stalking. See Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Cum.Supp. 1995). Great discomfiture 
is caused by Basolo's intent to save records of vituperative communications for 
indoctrination of Natalie against her mother. Although the district court 
ordered Basolo to destroy his "hate" file, he viewed such activity as acceptable 
enough to boast of it during the trial proceedings.

5. Compliance with Court 
Orders:

a.         
Rather than utilizing "self-help," Gose submitted herself to the 
jurisdiction of a California court in her efforts to regain custody of 
Natalie.

b.         
Beginning with his removal of Natalie from Wyoming, Basolo has repeatedly 
demonstrated a knack for hiding substantive non-compliance with process under 
the sheep's clothing of apparent technical compliance. He made an end run around 
the district court's restraining orders by disguising hate-filled messages to 
Gose as letters to the child, who is not yet literate, and enlisting his family 
to do the same. His assault and battery upon Gose's father in the presence of 
the child belie his claim that he has never violated an order involving the 
child. That such insolence remains unabated is well documented by his 
post-decree letter to the clerk of court, asserting the decree to be part of the 
district court's "sinister plan[.]"

[¶30]   The evidence reveals Basolo as less 
than honest, forthright or forgiving. His protestations of love for Natalie are 
unavailing in the face of his hate-filled dealings with Natalie's mother and her 
family. Abuse of discretion occurs "`when a material factor deserving 
significant weight is ignored,'" but all such factors bearing upon Natalie's 
visitation augur against Basolo. Little v. Kobos By and Through Kobos, 877 P.2d 752, 754-55 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 
1993)).

[¶31]   Commission of visitation 
arrangements to the sound discretion of the district courts evinces the shared 
belief of the legislature and this court that there is no one preferred schedule 
given the great variety of fact patterns which present themselves. The hardship 
of a visitation schedule on one parent will not, without more, be viewed as an 
abuse of discretion, particularly where the parties are separated by great 
geographical distances. Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890-91 (Wyo. 1990). In 
this case, an initially restrictive visitation schedule becomes increasingly 
liberal, affording California visitation within two and one-half years. At best, 
Basolo presented a checkered image to the district court, and we cannot discern 
any abuse of that court's discretion in its provisions for 
visitation.

B. GENDER 
PREFERENCE

[¶32]   In announcing its decision, the 
district court found that Basolo "acted irrationally, immaturely, impulsively, 
and * * * caused a lot of people some serious concerns * * * poisoning [his] 
child's mind about her mother and the grandparents on her mother's side[.]" In 
granting visitation, the district court noted personal experiences suggesting it 
would be detrimental to Natalie to be gone from her mother for six months at a 
time. Without contesting the custody award, Basolo attacks the district court's 
comments as indicative of a gender bias which renders the visitation order an 
abuse of discretion.

[¶33]   Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) provides 
"no award of custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent." 
See Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 348-49 (Wyo. 1986). Invocation of the 
"tender years doctrine" of maternal preference in custody awards is a mistake of 
law, requiring reversal. Here, however, the argument is attenuated as we are 
asked only to consider the district court's comments as indicative only of 
unlawful bias as to visitation.

[¶34]   Acquiescence in the custody 
determination reduces Basolo's gender bias argument from a question of law to 
one of "sufficiency of the evidence." Having found overwhelming evidence in 
support of the visitation order, we hold the district court's gender preference 
comments to be regrettable but harmless error.

C. PARTICIPATION OF 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM

[¶35]   Vague accusations of wrongdoing on 
the part of Natalie's guardian ad litem quickly degenerate into a recitation of 
that evidence to which Basolo feels the guardian ad litem should have been more 
attentive. Such efforts to reargue the facts discount our deference to the 
finder of fact, even in the more extreme circumstance of termination of parental 
rights. In Interest of JLG, 762 P.2d 42, 43 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶36]   A guardian ad litem is appointed to 
act in the interest of a minor. Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. 
No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 985 (Wyo. 1991). In soliciting the input of the guardian 
ad litem, the district court followed the procedure we have 
commended:

[B]y accepting the 
presentation and argument of the guardian ad litem favorable to one side or the 
other as the guardian ad litem believes is in the best interest of the 
child.

Matter of 
Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 517 (Wyo. 1982). While such presentations 
preferably occur in open court, where both sides may participate, the filing of 
a written report is also acceptable. Matter of Parental Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 357 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶37]   The guardian ad litem reported that 
Basolo came into town like a ton of bricks, offering to cater meals and provide 
massages for the guardian ad litem and her office staff. After assuring the 
guardian ad litem that he would leave town so as to avoid contact with Gose 
(which the district court had enjoined), Basolo assaulted Gose's father. 
Whatever impression he was trying to make, Basolo left the guardian ad litem 
feeling "uncomfortable with him being near me and my family."

[¶38]   Essentially, Basolo's problem with 
the guardian ad litem is that he made no better impression upon her than he did 
upon the district court. Even those who criticize the best interests of the 
child standard as indeterminate recognize the value of the guardian ad litem's 
subjective impressions to a court's decisions concerning custody and 
visitation. Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: 
Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 1523, 
1554-56 (1994).

[¶39]   Basolo's speculation concerning ex 
parte communications between the guardian ad litem and the district court is 
unavailing in the absence of any record of same, let alone any indication of 
prejudice. Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1991). Although he 
acknowledges the need to demonstrate plain error with respect to the guardian ad 
litem, Basolo's charges of hearsay and denial of cross-examination are 
unsupported by specific record references, violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law, or demonstration of material prejudice to his case. Matter of 
Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d  at 518. As such, none of his attacks upon the 
work of the guardian ad litem afford a basis upon which to reverse the decision 
of the district court.

D. ATTORNEY AND GUARDIAN 
AD LITEM FEES

[¶40]   The district court ordered Basolo 
to pay $4,000.00 of Gose's legal fees and seventy-five percent of the fees for 
the guardian ad litem. Basolo argues that these orders evince a punitive intent. 
He argues that his earning power is not that much more than Gose's, making the 
district court's orders for payment of fees an abuse of discretion.

[¶41]   The parties stipulated that their 
differences engendered legal fees in the amount of $7,000.00 each. Basolo 
accepts the district court's finding that his current net earnings of $500.00 
per month belie the fact that he "is capable of earning a net income of 
considerably more than he has in the past." Without record support, he asserts 
that his seventy-five percent share of the bill of the guardian ad litem amounts 
to $2,548.00.

[¶42]   Neither party endeavors to 
ascertain the exact cost to Gose occasioned by Basolo's wrongful abduction of 
Natalie. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the atmosphere 
created by that abduction led directly to the district court's appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, to which Basolo failed to interpose any 
objection.

As an appellate court, we 
consider that our power to disturb a property settlement fixed by a trial judge 
is limited indeed. There must be a clear abuse of discretion before we will 
upset or adjust such a settlement. We consider "abuse of discretion," to be such 
an abuse as shocks the conscience of the court. It must appear so unfair and 
inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide it.

Paul v. Paul, 
616 P.2d 707, 714 (Wyo. 1980). Citing the foregoing case, we have held that 
payment of attorneys' fees is a part of the property division and, thus, within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1162 
(Wyo. 1982). That Basolo views the district court's imposition of payment 
responsibility as burdensome can hardly be called shocking news. He has, 
however, made no showing which would approach the sort of abuse of discretion 
necessary for us to step in and micro-manage the apportionment of 
fees.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶43]   We affirm the amended decree in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

1           
Just how vituperative he became is exemplified by Basolo's later 
accusations that Gose's mother (so long his friend and only contact with Gose) 
was "insane," that she had "tortured" Gose and her older sister, and had, in 
fact, killed the older sister (who died of cancer in 1991).

2           
The complaint was accompanied by a temporary restraining order 
prohibiting Natalie's removal from the jurisdiction.

3           
Basolo minimized this as a sin of omission: "I signed it and did not read 
the fine print."