Case Title: Commonwealth v. Housewright

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11617

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11617 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LARRY HOUSEWRIGHT. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 7, 2014. - February 19, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Intimidation of Witness.  Firearms.  Assault by Means of a 
Dangerous Weapon.  Evidence, Testimony at prior proceeding, 
Previous testimony of unavailable witness, Unavailable 
witness, Photograph, Firearm.  Witness, Intimidation, 
Unavailability.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of 
witnesses.  Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the New Bedford Division 
of the District Court Department on May 17, 2010. 
 
 
After transfer to the Fall River Division of the District 
Court Department, the case was tried before Kevin J. Finnerty, 
J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Benjamin Evans, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  On May 11, 2010, the defendant, Larry 
Housewright, pointed a weapon at a second-story window where a 
witness in his friend's criminal case was standing, and fired as 
the truck in which he was a passenger drove away.  A District 
Court jury convicted the defendant of intimidating a witness, 
carrying a firearm without a license, discharging a firearm 
within 500 feet of a building, and assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon.  On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the 
judge abused his discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to 
present a witness's prior recorded testimony without sufficient 
proof of the witness's unavailability; (2) the judge abused his 
discretion in admitting two photographs of a handgun that looked 
like the unrecovered handgun fired by the defendant; and (3) the 
judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty because the evidence was insufficient to 
support the conviction of unlawful carrying of a firearm, where 
no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant's handgun was capable of discharging a bullet. 
Although we find no error in the admission of the 
photographs or in the denial of the motion for a required 
finding of not guilty, we conclude that the judge abused his 
discretion in determining that the Commonwealth's witness was 
unavailable to testify based solely on a doctor's four-sentence 
letter that listed her medical conditions and opined that the 
3 
 
stress of testifying in court "might" be detrimental to the 
witness's health.  Because the admission of the witness's prior 
recorded testimony without an adequate showing of the witness's 
unavailability violated the defendant's constitutional right to 
confront the witness, and because the error was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate the convictions and remand 
for a new trial. 
 
Background.  We briefly describe the evidence at trial, 
reserving discussion of the evidence that is relevant to the 
issues raised on appeal. 
 
In 2010, Doris Williams owned a two-family house in New 
Bedford, and lived in the first-floor apartment; Kim Sivertsen 
and Aaron Tobia lived together on the second floor.  In February 
of that year, Williams's grandson, Matthew Borges,1 was charged 
with breaking and entering the second-floor apartment.  On May 
5, Sivertsen and Tobia attended a pretrial conference in the 
case against Matthew, during which Matthew made threatening 
gestures aimed at them, such as drawing his finger across his 
neck, pointing his finger in the form of a gun, and hitting his 
fist against his other hand.  When Sivertsen left the court 
house, she saw a white truck with distinctive features pull up 
in front of the court house and pick up Matthew and his brother, 
                                                          
 
 
1 Because Matthew Borges and various witnesses share the 
same surname, we will refer to them by their first names. 
4 
 
Joshua Borges.  Because the truck's windows were tinted, she 
could not see the faces of any other people in the truck. 
On May 11, Sivertsen was returning to her apartment at 
approximately 3:15 P.M. when she saw the same white truck from 
the court house parked on the street outside her apartment, with 
a woman in the driver's seat and two passengers.  Sivertsen 
knocked on Williams's front door to ask if she was expecting 
anyone.  Williams, whose prior recorded testimony was presented 
at trial, stated that when she opened the door, she saw the 
defendant open the passenger side door and say, "Hi Grandma."  
Williams had known the defendant since he was a child; her 
grandson, Matthew, and the defendant were childhood friends, and 
the defendant always called her "Grandma."  She asked the 
defendant what he was doing in the neighborhood, and he 
responded, "I'm waiting for someone." 
Sivertsen testified that the defendant shouted that he was 
the one that picked up Matthew from the court house and that he 
was there to pick up "Mikey."2  The defendant then told 
Sivertsen, "Tell your boyfriend I have something for him," and 
pulled out a small, silver gun and showed it to her.  After 
Sivertsen said she was going to call 911, the truck began moving 
away, but as it was leaving, the defendant pointed the gun out 
of the passenger's side window and fired it at the second-floor 
                                                          
 
 
2 One of Doris Williams's grandchildren was named Michael. 
5 
 
window where Tobia was standing.  Williams had already reentered 
her home, and "didn't see anything" related to the shooting.3  
The police were unable to locate any shell casings, bullets, 
bullet holes, or other property damage. 
 
Williams's son, Stephen Borges, who was Matthew's uncle, 
was in the cellar of Williams's apartment at the time of the 
incident.  From the cellar, he heard "a gunfire go off," which 
caused him to run outside.  He saw the white truck leave and 
recognized someone who "hung around with Matthew."  He got into 
his own vehicle and followed the white truck until it parked, 
where he saw Matthew and the defendant get out.  A day or two 
after the incident, Stephen returned to the area where the white 
truck parked and saw it again.  He recorded the license plate 
number and later gave that number, the name of the defendant, 
and the location of the white truck to Williams. 
 
On May 12, Sivertsen provided Detective William Sauvé with 
a physical description of the assailant, which he used to 
assemble a six-photograph sequential array that included the 
defendant.  When Sivertsen viewed the array, she did not 
identify the defendant and said she was eighty per cent certain 
                                                          
 
3 Williams initially testified at the prior recorded 
hearing, "He only fired once.  And he aimed for the second 
floor."  But she then clarified that she did not actually see 
the shot.  She only "heard it."  It was Aaron Tobia who told her 
that the sound was gunfire and that "the guy pointed [the gun] 
up to the window." 
6 
 
that one of the other photographs depicted the perpetrator.4  
Tobia viewed the same set of photographs and, despite stating he 
was ninety per cent confident, chose not to make an 
identification.5 
 
A couple days later, Williams went to the police station 
with her daughter, Laurie Borges, to view the photographic 
array.6  They viewed the array together, and Williams picked a 
photograph of the defendant, saying it looked like the 
assailant, but she was not positive because the person in the 
photograph had a beard, but she remembered the defendant best 
without facial hair.  Detective Sauvé then printed an older 
photograph of the defendant, where he did not have facial hair, 
and displayed it to Williams and Laurie, who both said that it 
showed the defendant. 
                                                          
 
 
4 At trial, when showed the photographic array again (in 
simultaneous form), Kim Sivertsen could not identify which 
photograph she originally thought showed the perpetrator, but 
she identified the defendant in court as the man in the 
passenger seat and stated that she was one hundred per cent 
confident in her identification.  She explained that the 
defendant's large stature is his most identifying feature, which 
is not well depicted in a photograph. 
 
 
5 At trial, Tobia identified the defendant in-court and 
explained that he had been unable to be fully confident in 
making an identification without seeing the person in front of 
him, as photographs only show the face, and the perpetrator was 
a big person. 
 
 
6 Laurie Borges was not an eyewitness to the events on May 
11, 2010. 
7 
 
 
While meeting with Detective Sauvé, Williams also provided 
the information that she received from her son, Stephen:  the 
white truck's license plate number, the defendant's name, and 
the location where her son found the white truck.  Detective 
Sauvé found the white truck at the location, obtained an arrest 
warrant, and arrested the defendant.  At the time of the arrest, 
the defendant was living with his girlfriend, Melissa Gomes, at 
the address where both Stephen and Detective Sauvé had observed 
the truck. 
 
At trial, the defendant, through the testimony of his 
cousin, Eliot Spooner, presented an alibi that he was being 
driven to St. Luke's Hospital when the shooting occurred.  
Spooner testified that the defendant and he were working at a 
farm in Rochester on May 11, and at approximately 2:45 P.M., 
Spooner injured his finger while splitting wood.  Spooner and 
the defendant called Gomes, who picked them up at around 3:15 
P.M. to drive them to the hospital.  They arrived at the 
hospital at approximately 3:50 P.M.  At the hospital, the 
defendant stayed with Spooner for at least one-half hour to one 
hour while Spooner waited to see the doctor. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Prior recorded testimony.  On the first 
day of trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to admit 
Williams's prior testimony from the defendant's pretrial 
detention hearing, conducted pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, on 
8 
 
May 21 and 24, 2010.  The Commonwealth argued that Williams was 
unavailable due to illness and that her testimony fell within 
the hearsay exception for prior recorded testimony of an 
unavailable declarant.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1) (2014) 
(hearsay exception, if declarant is unavailable, for testimony 
given at another trial or hearing, where party against whom 
testimony is offered had opportunity and similar motive to 
develop testimony by direct, cross-, or redirect examination). 
 
a.  Unavailability due to illness or infirmity.  To show 
that Williams was unavailable to testify at trial, the 
Commonwealth relied on her returned summons, which noted that 
she would not be able to attend the trial because she was "under 
doctor's care," and on a letter from her doctor, which declared: 
"Doris Williams is a 74 year old patient under my care for:  
cardiomyopathy, coronary artery disease, peripheral 
vascular disease, arthritis and angina.  It is my medical 
opinion that the stress of testifying in court might be 
detrimental to her health.  I urge you to exclude her from 
your witness list." 
 
The letter also provided the doctor's office telephone number 
"[i]f you require additional information." 
 
The defendant objected to the admission of Williams's prior 
testimony on various grounds, including the insufficiency of the 
doctor's letter to establish unavailability.  The judge 
overruled the objection and allowed the motion to admit 
Williams's prior recorded testimony, noting that "if she's under 
9 
 
a physical infirmity that puts her health at risk for 
testifying, I think that would be a sufficient basis to find her 
unavailable." 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the admission of 
Williams's prior testimony violated his right to confront the 
witness under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.7  We address initially the defendant's claim that the 
Commonwealth did not sufficiently prove that the witness was 
unavailable.8 
 
"In [Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57-59 (2004)], 
the United States Supreme Court held that testimonial out-of-
court statements made by a declarant who is not a witness at 
trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify 
                                                          
 
7 The defendant does not argue that the right of 
confrontation under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights affords greater protection than the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, so we do not discuss these 
provisions separately.  See Commonwealth v. Arrington, 455 Mass. 
437, 440 n.4 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 
Mass. 56, 57 n.1 (2006) ("Although art. 12 has been interpreted 
to provide a criminal defendant more protection than the Sixth 
Amendment in certain circumstances, . . . 'in cases like this 
one involving the hearsay rule and its exceptions, we have 
always held that the protection provided by art. 12 is 
coextensive with the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment'" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
 
8 We only address the meaning of unavailability in criminal 
cases where the Commonwealth is the proponent of the evidence, 
thereby implicating the defendant's right of confrontation. 
10 
 
and the defendant has had an adequate prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant."  Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 
53, 60 (2009).  The Sixth Amendment establishes "a rule of 
necessity, i.e., that the prosecution either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant."  Commonwealth 
v. Roberio, 440 Mass. 245, 247 (2003). 
 
Because there is no definition of the word "unavailability" 
in our statutes or rules, "[w]e therefore review those cases in 
which this particular exception to the hearsay rule has been 
applied."  Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 380 (1977).  
Although we declared in Commonwealth v. McKenna, 158 Mass. 207, 
210 (1893), that a witness cannot be unavailable because of 
illness, we have since held that "a classic case of 
unavailability" was shown where a witness was "hospitalized 
suddenly for kidney stone surgery on the second day of . . . 
trial" and the witness's doctor stated by letter that the 
witness would not be released from the hospital until the day 
the evidence was expected to (and did) close and would not be 
available to testify until seven days later.  Roberio, 440 Mass. 
at 249-250.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(a)(4) (2014) (witness may 
be unavailable "because of . . . then-existing physical or 
mental illness or infirmity").  However, we have yet to provide 
trial judges with a framework to analyze whether a witness is 
unavailable because of illness or infirmity.  We do so now. 
11 
 
 
Where the Commonwealth claims that its witness is 
unavailable because of illness or infirmity and that it wishes 
to offer in evidence the prior recorded testimony of that 
witness, the Commonwealth bears the burden of showing that there 
is an unacceptable risk that the witness's health would be 
significantly jeopardized if the witness were required to 
testify in court on the scheduled date.  To meet this burden, 
the Commonwealth must provide the judge with reliable, up-to-
date information sufficient to permit the judge to make an 
independent finding.  See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass. 
733, 744-745 (1992) (second motion judge could not rely on first 
motion judge's unavailability determination made eight months 
before trial).  See also Burns v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 935, 
942-943 (7th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor should have provided more 
current information where latest unavailability hearing was held 
three months before trial).  If reliable, an unsworn letter from 
a physician may be adequate, but only if it provides sufficient 
detail about the witness's current medical condition to allow 
the judge to evaluate the risk that would be posed if the 
witness were to testify in court -- a conclusory assertion is 
not enough.  See United States v. Gabrion, 648 F.3d 307, 340 
(6th Cir. 2011) (doctor's note was sufficient, because it "was 
specific as to the nature of each [witness's] illness and very 
clear in [the doctor's] opinion that the [witnesses'] health 
12 
 
would be jeopardized if they were forced to testify at the 
trial"); United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2002) (doctor's note was sufficient where there was "no reason 
to doubt the reliability of the evidence concerning [the 
witness's] infirmity"). 
 
A judge, in his or her discretion, may require more 
information than is contained in a doctor's letter regarding the 
witness's medical condition, and may direct the means to obtain 
that additional information, such as a supplemental letter or 
affidavit, a call to the physician over speaker telephone in the 
presence of the attorneys, a deposition of the physician, or a 
court hearing.  See United States v. Donaldson, 978 F.2d 381, 
393 (7th Cir. 1992) (trial judge "held a hearing the day [the 
witness] was to testify to determine her availability"); Parrott 
v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 1983) (parties deposed 
witness's psychiatrist).  In determining whether the risk that 
the witness's health would be jeopardized is unacceptable, a 
judge should consider the probability that the witness's 
appearance will cause an adverse health consequence, the 
severity of the adverse health consequence, such as whether it 
would be life-threatening, the importance of the testimony in 
the context of the case, and the extent to which the live trial 
13 
 
testimony would likely differ from the prior recorded testimony.9  
See United States v. Faison, 679 F.2d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(trial judge must consider witness's importance to case, nature 
and extent of cross-examination in earlier testimony, nature of 
illness, probable duration of illness, and any special 
circumstances counselling against delay).  See also Ecker v. 
Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1995) (judges should consider 
"Faison factors" to determine unavailability). 
 
Where a judge finds that that there is an unacceptable risk 
that the witness's health would be jeopardized if the witness 
were required to testify in court on the scheduled date, the 
judge should then consider whether the risk would be acceptable 
if the trial were continued to a future date.  See Faison, supra 
at 296 (trial judge should consider possibility of adjourning 
trial for reasonable period to afford witness enough time to 
recover from illness).  Where a continuance would change the 
risk calculus, the judge should determine whether, considering 
all the circumstances, a continuance would serve the interests 
of justice, taking into account the burden of such a continuance 
on the court, the parties, the other witnesses, and the victims.  
See id. at 297 n.4.  Thus, a witness is unavailable if there is 
                                                          
 
 
9 As to this last factor, the prior recorded testimony will 
generally be similar to live trial testimony where it was 
recorded in an earlier trial in the same case, and less similar 
where it was recorded at a pretrial hearing, such as a detention 
hearing, as it was in this case. 
14 
 
an unacceptable risk that the witness's health would be 
jeopardized by testifying in court on the scheduled date and 
either (1) a continuance would not reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level, or (2) a continuance would make the risk 
acceptable but would not serve the interests of justice. 
 
In addition, before determining whether to admit prior 
recorded testimony of an unavailable witness, the judge should 
consider whether there would be an unacceptable risk that the 
witness's health would be jeopardized if the witness's testimony 
were obtained through a deposition at a suitable out-of-court 
location, such as an attorney's office, the witness's home, or a 
health facility.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 35 (g), 378 Mass. 906 
(1979) (deposition admissible as substantive evidence where 
deponent is unable to testify at trial "because of . . . 
physical or mental illness or infirmity").  See also United 
States v. Keithan, 751 F.2d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding no 
abuse of discretion in admission of videotaped depositions at 
trial where one witness was "eighty-seven years old at the time 
of trial and suffered from a back condition which prevented him 
from walking" and second witness was "eighty-three years old and 
suffered from a heart condition which confined her to her 
home").  If the witness is unavailable, a deposition may be 
admissible in evidence and, especially if videotaped, may be the 
best alternative to the witness being at trial.  See United 
15 
 
States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 446, 456 (7th Cir. 2009) 
("videotapes allowed the jury to fully experience [the 
witness's] testimony, to view her demeanor, to hear her voice 
and to determine her credibility").10 
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth must make "a good faith 
effort to . . . produce the witness at trial."  Commonwealth v. 
Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 832 (2004).  See Commonwealth v. Ross, 426 
Mass. 555, 557-558 (1998) ("The Commonwealth must exercise 
substantial diligence in order to meet its burden of showing a 
witness's unavailability").  The "good faith effort" requirement 
is most commonly at issue where unavailability stems from an 
inability to locate and procure the witness from outside the 
jurisdiction.11  But the requirement applies to all cases of 
                                                          
 
 
10 Where the witness had previously testified at a trial in 
the same case, we leave to the discretion of the trial judge 
whether, in view of the precarious health of the witness or the 
witness's present mental condition, the deposition would be 
preferable to the prior recorded testimony.  Moreover, a judge 
also retains discretion to determine the form of the deposition.  
Although a videotaped deposition is generally preferable, 
because personal observation of a witness "aids immeasurably" a 
jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility, see Commonwealth 
v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 548 (1988), it is not a perfect 
substitute for live testimony.  See id. at 550 ("we cannot 
conclude that reducing the life-size picture of trial testimony 
to the image on a television screen affords to a jury the 
equivalent of personal observation"). 
 
 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 832-833 
(2004) (good faith demonstrated by enlisting authorities in 
Puerto Rico to search for witness one week prior to trial); 
Commonwealth v. Florek, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 414, 415-416 (2000) 
(failure to show good faith where Commonwealth knew witness's 
16 
 
unavailability where there is some possibility that the witness 
may be produced.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) 
(good faith requirement may apply where there is remote 
possibility that affirmative measures might produce witness).  
Where a witness is unavailable due to illness or infirmity, the 
"good faith effort" required of the Commonwealth is to promptly 
inform the court and the defendant of the unavailability of the 
witness once the Commonwealth learns of it, so that they have an 
adequate opportunity to learn more about the witness's medical 
condition and to explore the alternative of a continuance or a 
deposition.  Where the unavailability of the witness is not made 
known until the first day of trial, the defendant has little 
opportunity to investigate the witness's medical condition to 
challenge the prosecutor's claim of unavailability.  At that 
juncture, ordering a continuance or scheduling a deposition 
might be impracticable, effectively denying the defendant the 
possibility of these alternatives. 
 
Here, Williams received a summons on October 18, 2011, and 
returned it with a notation that she would not be able to 
testify at trial because she was under a doctor's care.  
Williams also provided the Commonwealth the doctor's letter 
dated October 24.  Yet, the Commonwealth did not file its motion 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Kentucky address but did little more than send summons to 
produce witness). 
17 
 
in limine, or otherwise alert the court or the defendant of the 
witness's unavailability until November 15, the first day of 
trial.12  By not promptly informing either the defendant or the 
judge of the witness's unavailability after receipt of the 
doctor's letter, the Commonwealth limited their opportunity to 
obtain further information about the witness's medical 
condition; all that reasonably was available was the option 
invited by the doctor to telephone him for additional 
information.  This option was not pursued, and the judge rested 
his ruling solely on the doctor's letter. 
 
Because the letter did not provide a sufficient factual 
basis to support the judge's finding of unavailability, we 
conclude that the judge abused his discretion in making such a 
finding on the letter alone.  The doctor's medical opinion "that 
the stress of testifying in court might be detrimental to her 
health" offered no guidance as to the likelihood that testifying 
would have an adverse health consequence or as to the severity 
of the health consequence.  The letter listed the witness's 
various medical conditions but provided no guidance as to their 
stage, severity, duration, or symptoms, or as to the limitations 
they impose on everyday activity.  Nor did the letter provide 
                                                          
 
 
12 The record does not reflect when the prosecutor received 
the doctor's letter or the returned summons, but the 
Commonwealth at oral argument did not challenge the contention 
that the prosecutor learned of the witness's unavailability well 
before the judge or the defendant was advised of it. 
18 
 
any guidance whether the health risks would be obviated or 
significantly lessened if she were to testify through a 
deposition.  Especially where Williams offered important 
identification testimony and where her prior recorded testimony 
was taken at a pretrial detention hearing rather than an earlier 
trial, more detailed information than was provided in this 
letter is required to support a finding of unavailability.  
Although we rest our conclusion on the insufficiency of the 
doctor's letter, our conclusion is strengthened by the 
Commonwealth's failure to make the "good faith effort" of 
providing timely notice to the court and the defendant of its 
claim of unavailability. 
 
Having found that the defendant was denied his 
constitutional right of confrontation by the insufficiency of 
the evidence that Williams was unavailable to testify, we 
consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 431-432 
(2008).  We conclude it was not.  In determining whether an 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the "essential 
question" is whether the error had, or might have had, an effect 
on the jury and whether the error contributed to or might have 
contributed to the jury's verdicts.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 
456 Mass. 350, 360 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 
Mass. 539, 549 (1990). 
19 
 
 
Here, Williams's prior recorded testimony contained 
important statements of identification.  Stephen identified the 
defendant, but only as the person getting out of the truck with 
Matthew after he followed the truck out of the neighborhood.  
Williams was the only witness who recognized the defendant at 
the scene of the crime, and later identified him at an out-of-
court identification procedure.  Neither Sivertsen nor Tobia -- 
the two eyewitnesses to the crime -- could identify the 
defendant at the pretrial identification procedure.  Williams's 
identification carried evidentiary weight because she knew the 
defendant well and, at the scene of the crime, he called her by 
the name he always called her, "Grandma."  Had her prior 
recorded testimony been excluded, the jury would also not have 
heard Detective Sauvé's testimony regarding Williams's 
identification of the defendant at the identification procedure, 
because a witness's pretrial identification is admissible for 
substantive purposes only where "the identifying witness 
testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination."  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 130 (2012).  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C) (2014).  Thus, we conclude that the 
erroneous admission of her testimony was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we must vacate the defendant's 
convictions and remand for a new trial. 
20 
 
b.  Reasonable opportunity and similar motivation.  The 
defendant also claims that, even if Williams were unavailable, 
her prior recorded testimony should not have been admitted 
because the defendant did not have a reasonable opportunity or 
similar motivation to cross-examine the witness at the pretrial 
detention hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Arrington, 455 Mass. 
437, 442 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 
633, 638 (1986) (prior testimony must have been given "in a 
proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues" as 
current proceeding, with "reasonable opportunity and similar 
motivation" for cross-examination).  Because Williams may be 
found unavailable on retrial, we address this claim of error. 
"A defendant has an adequate prior opportunity to cross-
examine an unavailable witness when (1) the declarant was under 
oath at the prior proceeding . . . ; (2) the defendant was 
represented by counsel at the prior proceeding . . . ; (3) the 
prior proceeding was conducted before a judicial tribunal, 
equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings . . . ; 
and (4) the prior proceeding was addressed to substantially the 
same issues as in the current proceeding, and the defendant had 
[a] reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior 
occasion for cross-examination of the declarant" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Hurley, 455 Mass. at 60.  The defendant 
contends that he did not have "reasonable opportunity and 
21 
 
similar motivation" to cross-examine Williams at the pretrial 
detention hearing for two reasons:  first, his attorney could 
not explore any potential inconsistencies between the 
testimonies of Williams and Stephen, where the police did not 
know that Stephen was a witness at the time of the hearing; and 
second, his attorney's primary goal on cross-examination at that 
hearing was to show that the defendant would not "endanger the 
safety of any other person or the community," G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, rather than to challenge the witness's identification or 
credibility.13 
The "reasonable opportunity" requirement was satisfied 
here, because the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness regarding her testimony on direct 
examination; defense counsel does not need to have had the same 
opportunity to question the witness about the testimony of other 
witnesses.  See Hurley, supra at 62-63, quoting Roberio, 440 
Mass. at 251 ("what is essential is that the 'trier of fact 
[have] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statement'").  Nor does a "reasonable opportunity" mean 
                                                          
 
 
13 To determine whether a defendant is so dangerous "that no 
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any 
other person or the community," a judge may consider, among 
other issues, "the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by 
the defendant if released, and the defendant's family ties, 
employment record, history of mental illness, record of 
convictions, and reputation."  Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 
53, 61 (2009), quoting G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3), (5). 
22 
 
that defense counsel must have obtained the same discovery at 
the time of the prior hearing as counsel has at the time of 
trial.  See Hurley, supra at 62, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 
474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) ("A defendant is not entitled under the 
confrontation clause to a cross-examination that is 'effective 
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 
wish'"). 
Although "there may be circumstances in which a defense 
counsel's motive to cross-examine a declarant at a pretrial 
detention hearing may differ from her motive to cross-examine at 
trial, such as where the defense counsel did not challenge the 
declarant's accuracy or credibility at cross-examination in the 
prior hearing and focused solely on challenging the defendant's 
dangerousness," Hurley, supra at 63 n.9, those are not the 
circumstances of this case.  The defendant's cross-examination 
of Williams focused primarily on challenging the reliability of 
her identification of the defendant and distinguishing what 
Williams actually saw from what she learned from other 
witnesses.  Defense counsel elicited Williams's admission that 
she did not see anybody fire the gun, that her information about 
who fired the gun or that a gun was fired at all came from other 
witnesses, and that she could not be sure whether the bearded 
man shown in the photographic array was the same person she 
identified in the single photograph.  Although the cross-
23 
 
examination also established that the defendant had never 
threatened Williams, and that she had never heard that he had 
engaged in violent behavior, the primary focus of the cross-
examination was not to demonstrate that the defendant was not 
dangerous.  Nor could it reasonably have been the primary focus, 
where Williams only knew the defendant as her grandson's 
childhood friend and had not seen him for one and one-half years 
prior to the incident.  Therefore, we conclude that if Williams 
is determined to be unavailable, redacted portions of her 
pretrial testimony would be admissible on retrial.14 
 
2.  Admission of photographs of similar firearm.  At trial, 
Tobia testified that the firearm in the defendant's possession 
was a silver-colored Derringer, stating that he recognized it as 
such because his father is an avid hunter who owns a few 
Derringers and that he has "handled" Derringers.  The 
                                                          
 
 
14 Because the issue may arise on retrial, we emphasize that 
Williams's pretrial testimony should not be admitted in its 
entirety.  Some of her prior testimony contained hearsay that is 
admissible at a pretrial detention hearing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, see Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 34 (2010), 
but would not be admissible at trial unless it fell within a 
hearsay exception.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 
464-465 (2014) (some of witness's prior recorded testimony, 
conveying what her husband had said, "constitute[d] classic 
'totem pole' or 'layered' hearsay" and would not be admissible).  
Moreover, some of her testimony at the pretrial detention 
hearing vouched for the truthfulness of Sivertsen and Tobia, and 
should not be admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 469 Mass. 
641, 646 (2014) ("No witness, neither a lay witness nor an 
expert, may offer an opinion regarding the credibility of 
another witness"). 
24 
 
Commonwealth presented two photographs to Tobia that he said 
depicted a Derringer, although not the Derringer Tobia actually 
saw on May 11.  Even though both the prosecutor and defense 
counsel pointed out that the photographs did not show the actual 
gun used, the defendant objected to the admission of the 
photographs in evidence and argues on appeal that the judge 
abused his discretion in admitting them.  In the event the issue 
is raised again on retrial, we conclude that it was not an abuse 
of discretion for the judge to admit the exemplar photographs. 
 
"Where for whatever reasons original items of physical 
evidence cannot be produced, substitutes similar to the 
originals have often been received as exhibits, in criminal as 
well as civil trials, to illustrate and corroborate testimony in 
which the originals figured:  the admission of such [exemplars] 
is well understood to rest in the discretion of the court."  
Commonwealth v. Luna, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 93 (1998).  Where it 
is made clear at trial that photographs simply depict a similar-
looking firearm and do not depict the actual firearm used in the 
incident, it is not an abuse of discretion to admit the exemplar 
photographs.  See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 373 Mass. 1, 7 (1977) 
(no abuse of discretion where "prosecution made it clear by 
questions that the model was not the murder weapon but was 
merely illustrative"); Commonwealth v. Souza, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 
436, 444-445 (1993) (spiked wristband "similar but perhaps not 
25 
 
identical" to one used in crime was admissible where questioning 
made clear that witness could not say that exemplar wristband 
was actual wristband used in attack).  Although the judge did 
not give a limiting instruction to remind the jury that the 
photographs were only exemplars, see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 
398 Mass. 535, 542 n.6 (1986), such an instruction is not 
mandatory and was not necessary where the status of the 
photographs as exemplars was made clear from the testimony.15  
See Luna, supra at 94 (absence of limiting instruction was not 
error where fact "[t]hat the exhibit was only a stand-in was 
stated repeatedly . . . could not have been lost on the jury"). 
 
3.  Sufficiency of evidence for conviction of unlawful 
carrying of a firearm.  At the close of the Commonwealth's 
evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, the judge 
denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty as to the charge of unlawful carrying of a firearm, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  On appeal, the defendant 
contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, 
because to be a "firearm," as defined under G. L. c. 140, § 121, 
the weapon must be capable of discharging a shot or bullet.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sampson, 383 Mass. 750, 753 (1981) (firearm must 
be "[1] a weapon, [2] capable of discharging a shot or bullet, 
                                                          
 
 
15 The judge declared that he intended to give a limiting 
instruction on the exemplars but did not do so.  There was no 
objection to the absence of a limiting instruction. 
26 
 
and [3] under a certain length").16  We address this issue even 
though we have vacated the convictions because, if the defendant 
is correct, he would be entitled to a judgment of acquittal and 
not merely a new trial. 
 
We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun the 
defendant displayed was capable of discharging a bullet, even 
where there was no gun found, no casings or bullets recovered, 
no ballistics evidence, and no expert testimony.  As earlier 
noted, Tobia testified that he saw the defendant point a gun at 
him, which he knew to be a Derringer from his experience with 
firearms.  He saw the defendant struggle with the gun after it 
misfired, break it open to extract two shells, load it again, 
and fire it at him.  When the gun fired, Tobia "saw the flash 
come out of the barrel of the gun," and heard a "big, bang 
noise," which sounded "exactly the same" as the gunshots he had 
heard when he went shooting with his father.17  From the 
                                                          
 
 
16 The Commonwealth need not show that the gun was actually 
capable of discharging a bullet at the time of the incident; it 
need only show that the gun was capable of doing so with a 
"relatively slight repair, replacement, or adjustment."  
Commonwealth v. Bartholomew, 326 Mass. 218, 220 (1950).  See 
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. 821, 828 (2012). 
 
 
17 Sivertsen also testified to seeing a small, silver gun 
and hearing a "loud bang like a gun noise."  Stephen Borges 
testified that from the apartment cellar he heard "a gunfire go 
27 
 
witnesses' testimony, a reasonable jury could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant loaded and then fired a 
weapon that looked like a gun, sounded like a gun, and flashed 
like a gun.  With this evidence, a reasonable jury did not need 
expert testimony to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun 
was capable of discharging a bullet and, consequently, was a 
"firearm" that was unlawfully carried by the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 809-810 (1985) (expert 
testimony unnecessary to prove gun was capable of discharge 
where defendant threatened victim with gun and said, "Don't get 
killed over anybody else's money"); Commonwealth v. Stallions, 9 
Mass. App. Ct. 23, 25-26 (1980) (jury could determine whether 
revolver was capable of discharging bullet without any evidence 
that revolver had been tested and found operable). 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the judge erred by allowing 
the Commonwealth to introduce prior recorded testimony without 
sufficient proof of the witness's unavailability.  Because the 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate the 
judgments of conviction and remand the case for a new trial 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
off," and that he could discern that the sound was gunfire 
because he was "brought up around guns" and could distinguish 
between a gunshot and fireworks.  Moreover, the across-the-
street neighbor, Paul Sarmento, testified to hearing a sound 
like a truck backfiring -- "a pow sound."