Case Title: STEEN v GRENZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 12959

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO . 129 59 IN THE S U P R E M E C O U R T OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 ARTHUR STEEN, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - R O S E GRENZ and CHRIS GRENZ, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r f c t , Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Roland V. Colgrove and John M. Kline, Miles City, Montana Roland V.Colgrove argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondent : Lucas, Jardine and Monaghan, Miles City, Montana Thomas Monaghan argued, Miles City, Montana Filed : Submitted: June 12, 1975 Decided : -'-I 9 1975 Clerk Mr. Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the district court, Custer County, to defendants Rose and Chris Grenz. Plaintiff Arthur Steen brought the original action to recover damages for an injury allegedly suffered to his wrist while entering a restaurant owned by defendants. Plaintiff, at approximately 1:30 a.m., April 10, 1969, ate dinner at the 600 Cafe owned by defendants. After paying for the meal he left through the restaurant's front door and went down the side street, heading towards his home. He stopped at the restaurant's side entrance to give his wife,who worked at the restauranG a message to call him early that morning because he had to get to work earlier than usual that day. He stated that as he started up the stairs he stumbled over some debris on the steps, fell forward, and his hand broke the glass in the door seriously lacerating his wrist. Steen filed a complaint alleging defendants were negligent in allowing the debris to accumulate around the door steps, especially in light of the fact defendants were aware the public used the side entrance to enter their restaurant. Depositions were taken and after all discovery was com- pleted defendants moved for a summary judgment. In support, they argued plaintiff was a licensee at the time he attempted to enter the restaurant's side entrance, there was no showing of willful or wanton negligence on the part of defendants, and that that is the only duty owed by the landowner to a licensee. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. Four issues are presented for review: 1 . Should this Court abandon the licensee, invitee, trespasser distinction? 2. Were defendants g u i l t y of a c t i v e negligence and t k r e - fore l i a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f f o r the damages he suffered i n s p i t e of t h e licensee relationship? 3. Was p l a i n t i f f a licensee a t the time t h e accident occurred? 4 , Did defendants, a s abutting owners, owe t h e duty t o those using the sidewalk t o use and keep t h e i r premises so a s not t o render the sidewalk unsafe f o r ordinary t r a f f i c ? F i r s t , p l a i n t i f f argues t h i s Court should abandon t h e licensee, invitee, trespasser d i s t i n c t i o n s i n favor of the reason- able negligence theory. W e a r e not persuaded. The d i s t i n c t i o n s between i n v i t e e , licensee, and trespasser have been consistently applied i n ~ o n t a n a ' s case law and we find no compelling reason t o change those d i s t i n c t i o n s a t t h i s time. Second, p l a i n t i f f argues there was active negligence on the p a r t of defendants i n allowing debris t o c o l l e c t on t h e steps of t h e i r restaurant. Further, t h a t such a c t i v e negligence i s an exception t o the r u l e t h a t a landowner owes a licensee only the duty t o r e f r a i n from wanton and w i l l f u l negligence. W e find t h a t argument t o be nothing more than a hybrid of p l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t argument t h a t t h i s Court should abandon t h e distinctions between licensee, i n v i t e e and trespassers. Again, we cannot see any necessity t o abandon t h i s principle of law which has been the r u l i n g law of Montana f o r many years. Third, p l a i n t i f f alludes t o the f a c t t h a t a t the time he was entering the r e s t a u r a n t ' s side entrance he was not a licensee. W e cannot agree with any argument t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s not a licensee a t the time he attempted t o enter t h e entrance i n question. He was entering f o r h i s own benefit, t h a t is, t o give h i s wife a message t o phone him. The long standing law of Montana is t h a t when a person enters another person's property f o r h i s own pleasure, con- venience o r benefit, he i s a licensee and t h e owner of the property has a duty t o the licensee t o r e f r a i n from w i l l f u l and wanton negligence. Jonosky v. Northern Pac. Ry.Co., 57 Mont, 63, 187 P. 1014. Having determined p l a i n t i f f was a licensee a t t h e time he attempted t o enter the r e s t a u r a n t ' s side entrance; having re- viewed t h e f a c t s ; and, having reviewed a l l discovery materials f i l e d by both parties we can find no testimony which would tend t o show w i l l f u l and wanton negligence on the part of defendants. Since there i s no issue of material f a c t and there has been no showing of w i l l f u l and wanton negligence, summary judgment i n favor of defendants was proper, unless an exception t o the above s t a t e d r u l e would invoke l i a b i l i t y on the defendants. P l a i n t i f f ' s fourth issue argues t h a t defendants, a s abutting owners, owe the duty t o those using the sidewalk t o use and keep t h e i r premises so a s not t o render the sidewalk unsafe f o r ordinary t r a f f i c . P l a i n t i f f argues t h a t by constructing concrete steps on the sidewalk on the side of t h e i r restaurant t o be used f o r the purpose of entering it, defendants have a duty t o t h e public t o keep the steps f r e e of obstructions and by not doing so they a r e l i a b l e to anyone injured by such negligence. In Montana, the sidewalk i s owned by the c i t y . Mitchell v. Thomas, 91 Mont. 370, 8 P.2d 639. The general r u l e i s t h a t an abutting owner i s not l i a b l e f o r the condition of t h e sidewalk i n front of h i s premises, and he owes no duty tothe traveling public t o keep the sidewalk i n front of h i s premises f r e e from obstructions. Childers v. Deschamps, 87 Mont. 505, 290 P. 261. Exceptions t o t h i s r u l e a r e coal holes, meter boxes, and other devices of similar character located i n the sidewalk which benefit the abutting owner a n d m e located where the general public i s l i k e l y t o walk. In those cases, it becomes the duty of the abutting owner t o keep such devices i n good repair. Headley v. Hammond Building, Inc., 97 Mont. 243, 33 P.2d 574. Steps used only f o r the purpose of ingress and egress of defendants' restau- r a n t do not come within the exception t o the general r u l e . There- fore, p l a i n t i f f ' s contention t h a t defendants owed a duty t o him to keep the steps free of obstruction is without merit. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Justice u We Concur: .................................... Chief Justice Justices. \