Case Title: The People v. Teofilo Diaz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 97  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Teofilo Diaz,
            Appellant.
Erica Horwitz, for appellant.
Shulamit Rosenblum Nemec, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
The primary issue in this case is whether a defendant
seeking to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense is
required to provide notice pursuant to CPL 250.10 if the intent
is to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the affirmative
defense.  We left this question open in People v Smith (1 NY3d
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610 [2004]) and now conclude that CPL 250.10's procedures apply
under these circumstances.
On June 4, 2000, about three weeks after defendant
Teofilo Diaz had completed a prison term for an assault on Felipa
Santana, his former girlfriend, he went to Santana's apartment in
violation of an order of protection and strangled her to death in
front of their six-year-old daughter.  According to defendant, he
went "crazy" after Santana told him that their three-year-old son
had been fathered by another man.  After the killing, defendant
fled to Florida where he was apprehended more than a year later. 
Upon his return to New York, he was charged with two counts of
murder in the second degree, two counts of criminal contempt in
the first degree, two counts of criminal contempt in the second
degree and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.
Immediately before jury selection, defendant informed
the court and the prosecutor that he planned to assert an extreme
emotional disturbance defense to the second-degree murder charge. 
The People objected, contending that defendant's failure to file
and serve a written notice as required by CPL 250.10 (2)
precluded the presentation of such a defense.  Defendant
countered that notice was unnecessary because he intended to rely
solely on his own testimony rather than presenting expert
psychiatric testimony.  The trial court allowed defendant to file
a late notice under CPL 250.10 (2) in the interest of justice and
also granted an adjournment to permit the People time to have
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No. 97
1  After the trial court granted the People's application to
have Dr. Berger examine him, defendant opted to present his own
expert at trial.
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their designated psychiatrist examine defendant.
After the People's psychiatrist, Dr. Berger, prepared
his written report (see CPL 250.10 [4]), defendant moved to
preclude Dr. Berger from testifying as to his opinions that
defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense was a recent
fabrication and that defendant was likely the biological father
of the child, questioning defendant's claim that the victim had
made a contrary revelation the night of the murder.  The People
responded that Dr. Berger should be allowed to explain his
reasoning in reaching his professional opinion that Santana's
killing was not triggered by extreme emotional disturbance.  The
trial court denied defendant's motion and ruled that, although
Dr. Berger could not testify regarding defendant's general
credibility, he could explain his perceptions of defendant's
truthfulness as they related to defendant's defense.
At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf and
presented the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him.1 
Defendant's expert declined to express an opinion as to whether
defendant strangled Santana as a result of extreme emotional
disturbance but said it was possible.  On rebuttal, Dr. Berger
testified consistently with his written report explaining that,
for a variety of reasons, he did not believe that defendant
killed Santana while under the influence of extreme emotional
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disturbance.
At the conclusion of testimony, defendant moved for a
mistrial, arguing that Dr. Berger's testimony regarding
defendant's credibility deprived him of a fair trial.  In denying
the motion, the court noted that defendant failed to raise any
objections during Dr. Berger's testimony and that, before Dr.
Berger's testimony, defense counsel had similarly asked
defendant's expert whether it was likely that the victim had told
defendant that he was not the boy's father.  The jury convicted
defendant of second-degree murder, endangering the welfare of a
child and two counts of first-degree criminal contempt.  The
Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction (62 AD3d 157
[2d Dept 2009]) and a Judge of this Court granted defendant leave
to appeal (12 NY3d 924 [2009]).
The affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance serves to reduce the degree of criminal culpability
for acts that would otherwise constitute murder.  A defendant who
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the homicide was
committed while "under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse" will be guilty of first-degree manslaughter rather than
second-degree murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]; see also Penal
Law § 125.20 [2]).  The defense must be supported by proof that
the defendant "suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the
level of insanity at the time of the homicide, typically
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manifested by a loss of self-control" (People v Roche, 98 NY2d
70, 75 [2002]).  It requires evidence "of a subjective element,
that defendant acted under an extreme emotional disturbance, and
an objective element, that there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse for the emotional disturbance" (People v Smith, 1 NY3d
610, 612 [2004]).
Under CPL 250.10 (2), a defendant is precluded from
raising any defense predicated on a mental infirmity, including
extreme emotional disturbance, if the defendant fails to file and
serve a timely notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence. 
The trial court possesses broad discretion, however, to grant
permission to submit a late notice in the interest of justice at
any time prior to the close of evidence (see CPL 250.10 [2]). 
When notice is given under CPL 250.10 (2), the People may apply
for an order directing the defendant to submit to an examination
by a psychiatrist selected by the People (see CPL 250.10 [3]).
On this appeal, defendant claims that lay testimony
does not constitute "psychiatric evidence" within the meaning of
CPL 250.10 and, therefore, the trial court erroneously required
defendant to provide notice and submit to an examination by the
People's psychiatrist given that he intended to present an
extreme emotional disturbance defense through his own testimony. 
The People assert that any mental health evidence offered in
support of extreme emotional disturbance, including lay
testimony, triggers the notice requirement, which provides an
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opportunity for the prosecution to prepare its case in response
to the defense and may require that defendant submit to an
examination.
"Psychiatric evidence" is statutorily defined as
"[e]vidence of mental disease or defect" to be offered in
connection with the defenses of lack of criminal responsibility
by reason of mental disease or defect (i.e., insanity), extreme
emotional disturbance or any other defense (CPL 250.10 [1] [a],
[b], [c]).  Prior to 1982, the definition of psychiatric evidence
was linked to insanity because CPL 250.10 formerly applied only
where a defendant intended to rely on the insanity defense.  But
the Legislature expanded the statute in 1982 to mandate notice of
a defendant's intention to present psychiatric evidence in
support of extreme emotional disturbance as well as any other
defense (see L 1982, ch 558, § 9).  Although the Legislature
retained the phrase "mental disease or defect" -- language
traditionally identified with the insanity defense -- in the
definitions associated with the added defenses (see CPL 250.10
[1] [b], [c]), it is clear that this phrase broadly encompasses
any mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity (see
People v Almonor, 93 NY2d 571, 578 n 2 [1999]; People v Berk, 88
NY2d 257, 263 [1996], cert denied 519 US 859 [1996]).
The statutory notice provision is grounded on
principles of fairness and is intended "to prevent disadvantage
to the prosecution as a result of surprise" (Berk, 88 NY2d at 263
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[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).  As we have
previously explained, it "was designed to allow the prosecution
an opportunity to acquire relevant information from any source --
not merely from an independent examination of the defendant -- to
counter the defense" (id. at 264).
In Berk, we rejected the contention that psychiatric
evidence is limited to evidence obtained by means of a
psychiatric examination of the defendant for purposes of CPL
250.10.  The defendant in that case asserted that he was not
obligated to comply with CPL 250.10 because his expert witness, a
forensic psychologist, had not examined him and would only
testify about a "fight or flight syndrome" and the relationship
between memory loss and traumatic events in support of the
extreme emotional disturbance defense.  In upholding preclusion
of the expert's testimony for failure to submit a timely notice,
we stated that the defendant's "restrictive reading of the
statute . . . [was] not supported by the plain language or the
purpose of CPL 250.10" (id. at 262).  We observed that, inasmuch
as the notice provision was intended "to allow the People an
opportunity to obtain any mental health evidence necessary to
refute a defense of mental infirmity, it follows that it applies
to any mental health evidence to be offered by the defendant in
connection with such a defense" (id. at 265 [emphasis in
original]).
Although Berk involved expert testimony, its reasoning
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applies equally to lay testimony proffered in connection with a
mental infirmity defense.  The aims of CPL 250.10's notice
requirement -- preventing unfair surprise and allowing the People
an opportunity to obtain evidence from any source, expert or
otherwise -- are implicated whether a defendant seeks to
establish a mental infirmity through expert or lay testimony,
whether by the defendant or other persons, such as witnesses to
the events related to the crimes charged.  Consequently, for
purposes of the notice provision, psychiatric evidence, which we
have broadly construed to encompass "any" mental health evidence
offered by a defendant, includes lay testimony.
In reaching this result, we are not unmindful that the
sanction of preclusion of a defense for failure to comply with
the prior notice provision bears on a defendant's constitutional
rights to present a defense and call witnesses (see Ronson v
Commissioner of Correction, 604 F2d 176, 178 [2d Cir 1979]). 
Although no constitutional issue is raised in this case --
defendant was permitted to advance an extreme emotional
disturbance defense despite the lack of timely notice -- trial
courts must be vigilant in weighing a defendant's constitutional
rights "against the resultant prejudice to the People from the
belated notice" (Berk, 88 NY2d at 266).  We also recognize that
the degree of prejudice to the prosecution will vary in different
cases and that it may be less significant where a defendant plans
to rely on lay testimony alone in support of a mental infirmity
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defense.  Trial courts enjoy wide discretion in considering late
notice, as occurred here, and can adjourn proceedings to give the
People time to gather rebuttal evidence or, depending on the
circumstances and the nature of defendant's proof, permit the
trial to proceed without a continuance.  Of course, a defendant
can choose to testify in his own defense to explain his actions
without triggering the notice requirement of CPL 250.10 (2), but
he would not be entitled to a jury instruction on extreme
emotional disturbance pursuant to Penal Law § 125.25 (1) (a).
Given that we concur that defendant's intention to
raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense based on his own
testimony required notice, CPL 250.10 (3) authorized the trial
judge to compel defendant to submit to an examination by the
People's psychiatrist.  Although a trial court retains discretion
to deny such an application, we perceive no abuse of discretion
in the examination order, particularly since the court ruled that
Dr. Berger would only be permitted to testify on rebuttal after
defendant had presented his extreme emotional disturbance
evidence.
Defendant also contends that he was deprived of his
right to a fair trial because Dr. Berger's testimony relating to
various credibility issues usurped the jury's function to
determine the reliability of the witnesses.  Initially, defendant
only partially preserved his challenge to Dr. Berger's testimony
because his motion in limine sought to restrict Dr. Berger from
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No. 97
2  For example, Dr. Berger stated that he had "published in
the area of lying," making him "an expert in evaluating issues of
credibility."  Although defendant failed to raise an objection,
the trial judge sua sponte issued a curative instruction,
informing the jury that Dr. Berger could not "say that someone is
lying" and that it was for the jury alone to decide whether
defendant "is telling you the truth or not about anything that he
says."  At another point, Dr. Berger analogized the probability
that Santana told defendant that he was not the younger child's
father to the moon being made of cheese.  Again, defendant raised
no objection.
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expressing his opinion that defendant had created an extreme
emotional disturbance defense after the fact or that it was
likely that defendant was the boy's biological father. 
Defendant's mistrial motion, made after Dr. Berger had completed
his testimony, raised essentially the same points.  But defendant
failed to make any objections during Dr. Berger's testimony, even
when the testimony exceeded the scope of the court's ruling. 
Consequently, many of the troubling aspects of Dr. Berger's
testimony regarding defendant's credibility are unpreserved for
review.2
As to the preserved challenges, although we agree with
defendant that portions of Dr. Berger's detailed testimony
"exceeded the foundation necessary to establish the basis for the
expert's opinion and invaded the province of the jury to
determine defendant's credibility" (People v Braun, 199 AD2d 993
[4th Dept 1993], lv denied 83 NY2d 849 [1994]), we conclude that
the error was harmless because the evidence of defendant's guilt
was overwhelming.  Defendant, who admittedly strangled Santana
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with a shoelace, had recently been released from prison in
connection with a prior assault on her, providing him with a
motive for revenge.  A former inmate who knew defendant in prison
corroborated the revenge motive, stating that defendant was
fixated on Santana and told him that he was going to choke her to
death "because that's what she deserves."  This witness had
contacted authorities independently after reading about Santana's
death in a newspaper and testified voluntarily, without a
cooperation agreement.
Additionally, defendant's calculated behavior both
during and after the homicide does not tend to support his
assertion that he acted under an extreme emotional disturbance. 
Defendant's young daughter, who awoke to her mother's screams,
testified that defendant interrupted the assault to hit her
across the face when she asked him why he was beating her mother. 
After dealing with his daughter, defendant resumed his attack on
Santana.  The daughter also recounted that, after her mother fell
to the floor, defendant ordered the children to pack up and she
saw him take a stereo, compact discs and other items from the
apartment, some of which defendant tried to sell to a cab driver. 
After attempting to leave the two children with a relative,
defendant returned to the crime scene to make certain that
Santana was dead before fleeing to Florida.  Even assuming
Santana informed defendant that he was not the boy's father, his
claim that he reasonably experienced extreme emotional
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disturbance based on that purported revelation was undercut by
the fact that he had no contact with that child prior to the day
of the killing.
Furthermore, the trial court sua sponte issued three
curative instructions to the jury during Dr. Berger's testimony
making clear that credibility determinations were solely within
their province.  The court offered to issue further instructions
following the close of evidence, which defendant declined.  On
this record, there is no significant probability that, but for
the errors relating to Dr. Berger's testimony that we have
addressed, the jury would have acquitted him of murder (see
People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided June 8, 2010