Case Title: Fails v. Virginia State Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021851

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
KENNETH HARRISON FAILS, II 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 021851 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
January 10, 2003 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
This appeal is from an order of the Virginia State Bar 
Disciplinary Board (the Disciplinary Board) revoking the license 
of Kenneth Harrison Fails, II (Fails), to practice law in 
Virginia.  Disposition of the appeal involves the interaction 
between Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(C)(6)(a)(i) of the Rules of Court 
(hereinafter, Rule 13(C)(6))1 and Code § 54.1-3915. 
 
Rule 13(C)(6) provides that a respondent in a proceeding 
before the Disciplinary Board shall be served with a Charge of 
Misconduct and with notice of the date fixed for hearing.  The 
respondent may, within twenty-one days after such notice, (i) 
"file his answer which shall be conclusively deemed to be a 
consent to the jurisdiction of the Board," or (ii) "file a 
demand that the proceeding before the Board be terminated and 
that further proceedings be conducted [by a three-judge court] 
pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 39 of Title 54.1 of the Code of 
                     
 
1 Since the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings below 
on May 6, 2002, Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13 has been revised effective 
September 18, 2002.  Rule 13(C)(6) is now Rule 
13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a).  We will refer in this opinion to the version 
of ¶ 13 in effect at the time of the proceedings below. 
Virginia, whereupon further proceedings before the Board shall 
be terminated and Bar Counsel shall file the complaint required 
by § 54.1-3935 of the Code.”2
 
Code § 54.1-3915 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
[T]he Supreme Court shall not promulgate . . . any rule or 
regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the 
jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of 
attorneys.[3]  In no case shall an attorney who demands to 
be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the 
violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this 
article be tried in any other manner. 
 
The record shows that by letter dated February 6, 2002, the 
Virginia State Bar served notice upon Fails of the certification 
by a district committee of charges of misconduct against him.  
The letter stated that, within twenty-one days of its date, 
Fails could (a) file an original and eight copies of an answer, 
or (b) demand that the charges against him be heard by a three-
judge court pursuant to Code § 54.1-3935.  The letter also 
advised that the matter was set for hearing before the 
Disciplinary Board on March 22, 2002. 
 
On March 6, 2002, Fails filed an answer to the 
certification, and on March 12, 2002, he moved for a continuance 
                     
 
2 The provision for a demand for a three-judge court is now 
found in Rule 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b). 
 
3 Paragraph 13 itself recognizes this limitation.  Rule 
13(K)(6) provides that "[n]othing contained in this Rule 13 
shall be so interpreted as to eliminate the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this Commonwealth to deal with the discipline of 
attorneys-at-law as provided by law."  This provision in 
slightly different language is now found in Rule 13(B)(1)(a). 
 
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of the hearing scheduled for March 22, 2002, in order to retain 
counsel.  After a pre-hearing conference call involving Fails, 
the chair of the Disciplinary Board, and the assistant bar 
counsel, an order was entered by the Disciplinary Board on March 
13, 2002, denying the motion for a continuance. 
 
Fails then on the same date demanded that he be tried by a 
three-judge court and that the proceeding before the 
Disciplinary Board be suspended.  Following a telephone 
conference call again involving Fails, the chair of the 
Disciplinary Board, and the assistant bar counsel, an order was 
entered by the Disciplinary Board on March 19, 2002, denying 
Fails' demand as untimely because the demand was made past the 
twenty-one day limitation of Rule 13(C)(6). 
 
On March 22, 2002, Fails appeared with counsel at the 
hearing before the Disciplinary Board and renewed his demand for 
a trial before a three-judge court.  When the Disciplinary Board 
refused the demand, Fails and his counsel excused themselves 
from the remainder of the proceedings.  The Disciplinary Board 
heard the evidence, found Fails guilty of misconduct, and 
revoked his license to practice law in Virginia.  Fails appeals 
as a matter of right from the Disciplinary Board's final order. 
 
Fails argues that when he demanded a trial before a three-
judge court, the Disciplinary Board lost subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the certification of charges against him.  
 
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Fails recognizes the authority of this Court under Code § 54.1-
3909 to prescribe "a code of ethics governing the professional 
conduct of attorneys" and to prescribe "procedures for 
disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys."  Fails 
says, however, that the General Assembly limited this authority 
by providing in Code § 54.1-3915 that this Court could devise no 
procedure that eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal 
with attorney discipline or that requires an attorney to be 
tried in any forum other than a three-judge court after a demand 
therefor.  Fails states that an interpretation of Rule 13(C)(6) 
that would require an attorney to elect trial by a three-judge 
court within twenty-one days of service of notice of misconduct 
would conflict with Code § 54.1-3915 in that it would eliminate 
the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of 
attorneys and force attorneys to be tried by a forum other than 
a three-judge court. 
 
Fails maintains that Code § 54.1-3915 neither provides any 
time or procedural constraints upon an attorney's demand to be 
tried by a three-judge court nor permits this Court to place 
constraints upon such a demand.  Therefore, Fails says, Rule 
13(C)(6) is void and the Disciplinary Board's order of 
revocation is void as well. 
 
Finally, Fails insists that he did not waive his right to a 
three-judge trial by filing an answer with the clerk of the 
 
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Disciplinary System.  Fails says the provision of Rule 13(C)(6) 
that the filing of an answer "shall be conclusively deemed to be 
a consent to the jurisdiction of the Board" is "in opposition to 
the statutory mandate that an attorney who demands to be tried 
for disciplinary charges before a court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be tried before no other forum." 
 
We disagree with Fails.  On the jurisdictional question, as 
the State Bar asserts and Fails acknowledges, we have treated 
Rule 13(C)(6) "as a limit or restriction only on 'territorial' 
jurisdiction or venue and not on subject matter jurisdiction."  
See Smolka v. Second District Committee of the Virginia State 
Bar, 224 Va. 161, 165-66, 295 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1982); see also 
Stith v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 222, 224, 355 S.E.2d 310, 
311-12 (1987).  Fails has not convinced us that we should treat 
the Rule differently here, and we reject his argument that when 
he demanded trial before a three-judge court, the Disciplinary 
Board lost subject matter jurisdiction to hear the certification 
of charges against him. 
 
On the question whether Rule 13(C)(6) conflicts with Code 
§ 54.1-3915, we find no conflict.  The message of Rule 13(C)(6) 
is clear: if an attorney does not wish to be tried by the 
Disciplinary Board, he or she should not file an answer to a 
certification of misconduct within twenty-one days.  Instead, 
the attorney should file within that time a demand for trial by 
 
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a three-judge court.  This simple procedural step neither 
eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the 
discipline of attorneys nor denies the right of an attorney to 
trial by a three-judge court. 
 
In fact, Rule 13(C)(6) complements Code § 54.1-3915.  The 
Code section is silent on how and when an attorney must make a 
demand for trial by a three-judge court, and nothing in the 
statute forbids this Court from supplying the how and when.  
Rule 13(C)(6) fills the void in the statute with a reasonable 
requirement that puts the disciplinary authorities and the 
attorney on notice that they need not prepare for a hearing 
before the Disciplinary Board but before a three-judge court.  
Yet the key to the courthouse all along is in the attorney's own 
hands.  He or she alone is free to make the choice whether to be 
tried by the Disciplinary Board or a three-judge court. 
 
On the question of waiver, we find nothing whatsoever in 
Code § 54.1-3915 even suggesting that the right to be tried by a 
three-judge court may not be waived.  By way of analogy, a party 
charged with crime may waive, among other constitutional rights, 
the right to demand counsel or the right to demand trial by 
jury.  Surely, therefore, an attorney charged with misconduct 
may waive the less-important statutory right to be tried by a 
three-judge court.  Indeed, in Wright v. Virginia State Bar, 233 
Va. 491, 357 S.E.2d 518 (1987), we said that the ”failure [of an 
 
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attorney charged with misconduct] to make a timely demand for a 
three-judge court constitute[s] a conclusive waiver of the right 
to subsequently file such demand."  Id. at 497, 357 S.E.2d at 
520 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Smolka, supra, after 
interpreting the use of "jurisdiction" as establishing venue, we 
said that it "is implicit in [Rule 13(C)(6)]" that, 
"[o]rdinarily, venue is waived if the defendant does not make a 
timely objection," 224 Va. at 165, 295 S.E.2d at 269, and that 
"[b]ecause Smolka filed his answer, he waived his privilege to 
assert lack of venue," id. at 166, 295 S.E.2d at 269.  And in 
Stith, supra, we said that "[v]enue is waived if timely 
objection is not made."  233 Va. at 224, 355 S.E.2d at 312. 
 
Fails neither mentions Wright nor attempts to distinguish 
it.  He says Smolka and Stith are distinguishable on the ground 
that the attorneys in those cases failed to invoke their 
statutory right to a three-judge court prior to the conclusion 
of the hearings before the Disciplinary Board while he, Fails, 
invoked his right to a three-judge court twice prior to the 
commencement of his hearing before the Board.  This is a 
distinction without a difference.  Fails was still late under 
the twenty-one day limitation of Rule 13(C)(6) in filing his 
demand for a three-judge court, so the difference between this 
case and Smolka and Stith is in degree of tardiness only and not 
in substance. 
 
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For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the Disciplinary 
Board's order revoking Fails' license to practice law in this 
Commonwealth, effective March 22, 2002. 
Affirmed. 
 
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