Case Title: Com. v. McElhenny

Citation: 329 Pa. Super. 240, 478 A.2d 447

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
329 Pa. Superior Ct. 240 (1984) 478 A.2d 447 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William McELHENNY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued December 9, 1983. Filed May 25, 1984. Reargument Denied August 7, 1984. *242 Gilbert B. Abramson, Philadelphia, for appellant. Ronald Eisenberg, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ. BROSKY, Judge: This appeal is taken from judgment of sentence imposed for conviction of third degree murder. The only issue raised which will be addressed here is whether the admission at trial of evidence which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed violates the ex post facto clauses of the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and of these United States.[1] We find that there is no such violation and, accordingly, affirm.[2] The evidence in question here is a tape recording of a telephone call made by appellant to the police emergency number. Appellant made some incriminating statements during this call which were automatically recorded. At the time the recording was made it was legally made but could not be used as evidence in court. The then effective statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5702(c)(1)(ii), required that appellant give his written consent to the tape coming into evidence. Before *243 this case came to trial that statute was repealed and a new one took its place under which this evidence was admissible.[3] The tape recording was then admitted into evidence at trial. Appellant contends that the admission at trial of this evidence which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed violates the ex post facto clauses of the Federal and State constitutions. The United States Constitution provides that "No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law . . ." U.S. Const. Article 1, § 10. The basic definition of the ex post facto clause was laid down in 1798 in the landmark case of Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386 at 390, 1 L. Ed. 648 at 650 (1798). The parameters set in Calder have been followed and amplified in the case law of the succeeding 18 decades. One portion of Calder is relevant to the issue before this Court. Id. Under this standard the ex post facto clause was not violated sub judice. The law in question here did, indeed, alter the legal rules of evidence so that different testimony was admissible. A cursory reading of the above quotation might, on that basis, lead to the conclusion that appellant here should prevail. But a more careful reading results in the opposite holding. The law before us did not fit the rest of the quoted requirement. It did not alter the evidence necessary to convict the offender. That is, it did not *244 change the legal definition of the crime; it did not change the prohibited behavior or what the state had to show to prove the commission of the crime. That must be the focus of our enquiry and it did not occur here. It is understandable that a mere alteration in the admissibility of a piece of evidence does not violate the ex post facto clause when one realizes that "[i]t attempts to preserve for persons the right to fair warning that their conduct will give rise to criminal penalties." Commonwealth v. Hoetzel, 284 Pa.Super. 623 at 630, 426 A.2d 669 at 672. The fact that the tape recording later became admissible in no way deprived appellant of notice that killing his wife would "give rise to criminal penalties." In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262 (1884), the United States Supreme Court addressed a situation with significant similarities to the one before us. In Hopt a category of witness a convicted felon who was incompetent to testify at the time the crime was committed, became competent by the time of trial. The issue treated in Hopt was whether the changed status of a witness violated the ex post facto clause. The first Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, held that there was no violation. Hopt v. Utah, supra at 589-90, 4 S. Ct. at 210, 28 L. Ed. at 268-9. The issue in Hopt is, admittedly, different from the one before us; we are concerned with previously inadmissible evidence and Hopt dealt with a previously incompetent witness. Nonetheless, the rationale given in Hopt sheds light, a century later, on our issue. Quite obviously, it does so to appellant's detriment. Fourteen years later Justice Harlan again authored an opinion of interest here. That case, Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204 (1898), is on point with the case before us. Thompson involved evidence which was not admissible at the time the crime was committed nor at petitioner's first trial. A statutory change subsequently made the evidence a handwriting comparison admissible. It was used in the second trial and an ex post facto violation was alleged. That claim was rejected in language which echoed that in Hopt. Thompson v. Missouri, supra at 386-88, 18 S. Ct. at 924-5, 43 L. Ed. at 207-8. The rule of Thompson disposes of appellant's Federal constitutional claim against him. The Pennsylvania Constitution similarly mandates that "No ex post facto law . . . shall be passed." Pa. Const. Article 1, § 17. The provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution can, of course, be interpreted to provide a broader protection than a similar provision in the Federal Constitution. We do not choose to do so here for two reasons. First, the courts of this Commonwealth have, generally, interpreted the Pennsylvania clause coterminously with the Federal clause. See Myers v. Lohr, 72 Pa.Super. 472 at 474 (1919); Commonwealth v. Hoetzel, supra 284 Pa.Super. at 630, 426 A.2d at 672 (1981). Second, and more importantly, we find the interpretations of the Federal provision in this context consonant with our concept of justice. Those interpretations, detailed above, fully protect appellant from the mischiefs which the Pennsylvania provision was designed to prevent. Consequently, the disposition of appellant's claim under the U.S. Constitution applies equally to his claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution.[4] Judgment of sentence affirmed. POPOVICH, J., concurs in the result. [1] Five other issues are also raised by appellant. They have been properly disposed of by the trial court on well-settled principles of law, and do not merit publication. The ex post facto issue, while also correctly treated by the trial court, is not covered in the published opinions of this Commonwealth and consequently appears here. [2] Appellant raises a related issue within his ex post facto argument regarding the competency of the suppression court to rule upon the suppression issue on the basis of the new statute and regarding the alleged waiver by the Commonwealth of this ground. We do not treat these arguments on their merits because they are themselves waived through their absence in the post-verdict motions. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31 at 33, n. 1, 331 A.2d 213 at 214, n. 1 (1975). [3] Under the new law, 18 P.C.S. §§ 5704(3), 5717(b), recordings of telephone calls to police emergency communications systems are admissible. [4] As has been seen, while there is precedent on the point in question vis-a-vis the U.S. Constitution, this particular issue has not been the subject of treatment under the Constitution of this Commonwealth. It is that gap which we fill here.