Case Title: Rebarchak v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 589, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GLEN S. REBARCHAK, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 589, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0109006842 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 15, 2003 
Decided:  May 16, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 16th day of May 2003, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it 
appears to the Court as follows: 
1. 
Appellant, Glen S. Rebarchak, appeals his Superior Court jury 
conviction for driving under the influence in violation of the provisions of 21 Del. 
C. § 4177(a), and his felony sentence as a fourth offender under 21 Del. C. § 
4177(d)(4).  Rebarchak argues that the trial judge erred by precluding his argument 
regarding the margin of error of the Intoxilyzer 5000.  Rebarchak also argues that 
the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to grant a mistrial when the police 
officer’s testimony contradicted a pretrial ruling.  We find no merit to Rebarchak’s 
arguments and affirm.     
 
2
2. 
The State filed a Motion in Limine to preclude the defense from 
arguing the margin of error of the Intoxilyzer 5000.  The trial judge, after hearing 
argument, ruleD that “it would be improper to argue that the result of the alcohol 
concentration is within [an] acceptable margin of error . . . permitted by the statute, 
4177(g), [and] that [therefore] the reading is inaccurate.  That cannot be 
questioned.”1        
3. 
As rewritten in 1999, 21 Del. C. § 4177(g) states:  
For purposes of a conviction premised upon subsection (a) of this 
section, or any proceeding pursuant to this Code in which an issue is 
whether a person was driving a vehicle while under the influence, 
evidence establishing the presence and concentration of alcohol or 
drugs in the person’s blood, breath or urine shall be relevant and 
admissible.  Such evidence may include the results from tests of 
samples of the person’s blood, breath or urine taken within 4 hours 
after the time of driving or at some later time.  In any proceeding, the 
resulting alcohol or drug concentration when a test, as defined in 
subsection (c)(2) of this section, is performed shall be deemed to be 
the actual alcohol or drug concentration in the person’s blood breath 
or urine without regard to any margin of error or tolerance factor 
inherent in such tests. 
 
The Delaware General Assembly added the last sentence of this statutory provision 
referring to “any margin of error or tolerance factor” when it amended the 
Delaware DUI statute in 1999.2 
 
4. 
On February 27, 2002, the New Castle County Superior Court 
construed the 1999 amendments to the Delaware DUI statute and stated that “[t]he 
                                                 
1 Appendix to Appellant’s Op. Br. at 21. 
2 72 Del. Laws, c. 36. 
 
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clear language of the statute also provides that laboratory test results measuring 
alcohol concentration in a person’s blood, breath or urine ‘shall be deemed to be 
deemed to be the actual alcohol or drug concentration … without regard to any 
margin of error or tolerance factor inherent in such tests.’”3  In Disabatino, the 
defendant appealed her Court of Common Pleas DUI conviction to the Superior 
Court and argued that “because her BAC result was .10, and the Intoxilyzer 5000 
had a five percent margin of error, her actual BAC could have been between .095 
and .105.  Therefore she reasoned, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that her BAC was .10 or greater.”4  The trial judge held that argument had no 
merit because 21 Del. C. § 4177 makes no allowance for a margin of error with the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 test.5  
 
5. 
We conclude that Disabatino v. State is a correct statement of the law.  
21 Del. C. § 4177 precludes an argument that the Intoxilyzer 5000 has a margin of 
error that could create a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of a defendant’s test 
result.  Therefore, the trial judge correctly ruled that Rebarchak could not present a 
margin of error argument regardless of the accuracy of the breathalyzer. 
4. 
The defense then moved before trial to preclude any reference by the 
State to the administration or result of the portable breath test given to the 
                                                 
3 Disabatino v. State, 808 A.2d 1216, 1223 (Del. Super. 2002), aff’d, 2002 WL 31546525 (Del. 
Supr.) (ORDER) (emphasis in original). 
4 Id. at 1124. 
5 Id. 
 
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defendant.  The trial judge granted the motion.  Nevertheless, the prosecutor asked 
the officer if he conducted any field sobriety tests and the officer referred to the 
PBT in his response.  The defense objected and requested a mistrial.  The trial 
judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard any reference to the PBT.  The 
defense renewed the request for a mistrial following a guilty verdict.  The trial 
judge denied the request. 
 
5. 
Under the four-part analysis of Taylor v. State,6 there is no manifest 
injustice resulting from this testimony.  The officer did not state the result of the 
PBT and the trial judge immediately cautioned the jury to disregard the statement.7  
Furthermore, any arguable error is harmless because there was sufficient evidence 
other than the incautiously solicited evidence of the PBT to establish the 
defendant’s guilt. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
6 Taylor v. State, 690 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1997) (The first consideration is the nature, 
persistency, and frequency of the witness' outburst; the second consideration is whether the 
witness' outburst created a likelihood that the jury would be misled or prejudiced; the third factor 
to be considered is the closeness of the case; and the final consideration is the curative or 
mitigating action taken by the trial judge). 
7 Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 66 (Del. 1993) (As a general rule, a curative instruction is 
usually sufficient to remedy any prejudice which might result from inadmissible evidence 
admitted through oversight).