Case Title: Randy Lamar Schoenwetter v. Walter A. McNeil, etc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-955

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2271 
____________ 
 
RANDY LAMAR SCHOENWETTER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-955 
____________ 
 
RANDY SCHOENWETTER, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[July 1, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Randy Schoenwetter appeals a circuit court order denying his motion to 
vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death, filed pursuant 
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also petitions this Court for a writ 
 
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of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
Having considered the issues raised in the briefs and having heard oral argument, 
we now affirm the circuit court‘s order and deny the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellant‘s case was previously heard by this Court on direct appeal from 
his conviction and sentencing in the circuit court.  See Schoenwetter v. State, 931 
So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2006).  In our opinion affirming appellant‘s conviction and death 
sentences, we described the facts of the underlying offenses as follows: 
At the time of the crimes, the Friskey family consisted of five people: 
the father, Ronald; the mother, Haesun; and the three children, Chad 
(eighteen years old), Theresa (sixteen years old) and Virginia, (ten 
years old).  The defendant had known the Friskey family from 
childhood and attended the same karate school with the Friskey 
children.  He was friends with Chad until Chad left for the Air Force a 
few months before the crime.  Throughout his association with the 
family and before the crimes occurred, the defendant stayed overnight 
at the Friskey residence on a number of occasions. 
 
. . . . 
 
At approximately 3 a.m. on August 12, 2000, the defendant left 
his apartment, where he lived with his mother.  He rode his bicycle to 
the Krystal's Restaurant, where he was employed.  After staying at 
Krystal's for a short time, he left on his bicycle and rode to the Friskey 
residence.  According to the defendant's letter to the court confessing 
guilt, he decided to go to the Friskey residence so that he could force 
one of the Friskey daughters, Theresa, age sixteen, or Virginia, age 
ten, to have sex with him.  
 
 
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Schoenwetter arrived at the Friskey residence at approximately 
5 a.m.  He parked his bicycle on the back driveway of the residence 
and walked up to the back porch.  He used a box cutter to cut open the 
screen and enter the porch.  He then managed to push open the sliding 
glass door from the porch into the house just enough to slip through.  
There was a stick in the sliding door which only allowed the door to 
be opened twelve inches.  After entering the house, he walked directly 
into the kitchen and armed himself with a large serrated kitchen knife 
from one of the drawers.  He then walked down the hallway where the 
three bedrooms were located.  
 
The first door he approached was to Theresa's bedroom; it was 
locked.  He then peeked inside the bedroom on the opposite side of 
the hall and saw the parents asleep in their bed.  He knew, based upon 
his previous overnight visits to the Friskey home, that the parents 
were heavy sleepers.  He then entered Virginia's bedroom, which was 
directly across the hall from the parents‘ bedroom and next to 
Theresa's bedroom.  
 
During his taped confession, Schoenwetter said he entered 
Virginia‘s room and began looking around.  He said he never touched 
her body.  While he was in her room, Virginia woke up and began to 
shriek.  He put his hand over her mouth, threatened her with a knife, 
and told her to be quiet.  She continued to shriek, she then recognized 
him, and said his name, Randy.  He started to leave the room, but the 
mother came into the room and grabbed him.  The father came into 
the room and tackled him.  After struggling with the parents for a 
short time, he managed to break loose.  Instead of leaving the house, 
he decided to go back to Virginia's bed and kill her because she had 
recognized him and could identify him.  He stabbed her on her bed.  
After he stabbed her, the father tackled him.  He then struggled with 
both parents until he managed to break loose again.  The defendant 
then left the house the same way he came in, got on his bike, and rode 
home.  After he arrived home, he took a shower, placed his clothes, 
shoes, the box cutter, and the knife inside a blue plastic bag, placed 
the blue bag inside a trash bag containing trash from his apartment, 
and put the trash bag in the dumpster. 
 
Id. at 862-63.  Regarding the injuries suffered by the victims, we stated: 
 
 
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The forensic evidence revealed Ronald Friskey died as a result 
of multiple stab wounds, including a stab wound to the eyebrow, 
forehead, left upper back, left middle back, middle back close to the 
spine, right lower back, right side of the neck, and three wounds to the 
right side of the chest.  Ronald Friskey also had wounds on his right 
hand, which were consistent with defensive wounds.  The wounds to 
the right side of the neck and the left middle back were life-
threatening wounds, because they were very deep and caused extreme 
blood loss.  The wound to the left middle back penetrated Ronald 
Friskey's lung.  
 
It was determined that Virginia Friskey also died as a result of 
multiple stab wounds.  One stab wound was inflicted to each side of 
her chest.  The stab wound on the left was four inches deep and the 
one on the right was three inches deep.  She also had a wound on each 
hand which entered the back of the hand and came out to the front of 
the hand.  It appears that she was shielding her chest and that these 
wounds occurred at the same time as the chest wounds.  The wounds 
to her chest penetrated her heart and both lungs.  She also had wounds 
to her lip and to her lower jaw.  
 
Haesun Friskey was stabbed multiple times but survived.  She 
was in critical condition when she arrived at the hospital and had to 
undergo surgery to stop the bleeding in her liver and the bleeding on 
two parts of her arm.  She suffered from massive blood loss and 
received 100 units of blood during her hospital stay.  Dr. Emran 
Imani, the trauma surgeon who treated Haesun Friskey, testified that 
this was the equivalent of replacing her entire blood volume more 
than twenty times.  He described her survival as miraculous, stating 
that she was expected to die when she arrived at the hospital. 
 
Id. at 864. 
 
 
The morning after the incident, law enforcement officers encountered the 
appellant after following a trail of blood which led from the Friskey residence to 
the apartment complex where Schoenwetter lived with his mother.  Schoenwetter 
agreed to accompany two detectives to the police station for an interview, which 
 
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was videotaped.  Although he initially denied any involvement, Schoenwetter 
subsequently confessed to the crimes and gave a detailed statement to the officers.  
See id. at 863-64.  This statement was corroborated by blood DNA testing based 
on samples taken from Schoenwetter‘s clothes, Virginia Friskey‘s bedroom, and 
other items and locations.  The blood trail leading from the Friskey residence was 
determined to match Schoenwetter‘s blood DNA, which was also found on the 
handle of the knife used against the victims.  See id. at 864. 
Schoenwetter was indicted on August 29, 2000, for first-degree murder in 
the death of Virginia Friskey, first-degree murder in the death of Ronald Friskey, 
attempted first-degree murder of Haesun Friskey, and armed burglary of a 
dwelling.  See id. at 861.  On February 17, 2003, Schoenwetter wrote a letter to the 
trial judge confessing his guilt and indicating that he wished to change his plea 
from not guilty to guilty.  He also stated that his reason for entering the residence 
was to force one or both of the Friskey daughters to have sex with him.  A status 
hearing was held on February 26, 2003.  Against the advice of counsel to remain 
silent, and after a cautionary instruction by the trial judge, Schoenwetter admitted 
to the court that he had written the letter and expressed his desire to change his 
plea to guilty.  A guilty plea to all charges was entered on March 5, 2003. 
Penalty phase proceedings were held from September 15 through September 
25, 2003.  At the end of the proceedings, the jury recommended death for the 
 
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murder of Virginia Friskey by a vote of ten to two, and for the murder of Ronald 
Friskey by a vote of nine to three.  The court held a Spencer1 hearing on November 
7, 2003, and subsequently imposed a sentence of death for each first-degree 
murder charge and sentences of life in prison for the attempted murder and armed 
burglary charges.  The court found three aggravating circumstances to be 
applicable to both murders: (1) the defendant had been convicted of another capital 
offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to some person; (2) 
the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was committed while he 
was engaged in the commission of or the attempt to commit the crime of burglary; 
and (3) the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest.  As to the murder of Virginia Friskey, the court also found the 
aggravating circumstance that the victim was a person of less than twelve years of 
age.  As to the murder of Ronald Friskey, the court found that the crime was 
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC). 
The trial court considered and assigned weight to the following statutory 
mitigating circumstances: (1) lack of prior criminal history (little weight); (2) 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight);2 (3) lack of capacity to 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
2.  The ―extreme mental or emotional disturbance‖ circumstance was based 
on evidence that Schoenwetter suffers from Asperger‘s Syndrome and Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  Although the trial court found that this 
 
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conform conduct to the requirements of the law (little weight);3 and (4) the 
defendant‘s age (eighteen) at the time of the crime (little weight).  The court also 
considered and weighed eight of the nine nonstatutory mitigators proposed by 
Schoenwetter: (1) defendant accepted responsibility by pleading guilty (moderate 
weight); (2) defendant was bullied by his peers from an early age (little weight); 
(3) defendant was continuously employed as a teenager and helped his mother 
financially (no weight); (4) defendant will not pose a danger to the prison 
population if given life without parole (little weight); (5) defendant‘s ability to 
interact socially is impaired due to Asperger‘s Syndrome and ADHD (little 
weight); (6) defendant had a sexual preoccupation from the age of seven (little 
weight); (7) defendant had a developmental and emotional age of twelve to thirteen 
                                                                                                                                        
circumstance had been proven by the greater weight of the evidence, it noted that 
when the defendant was evaluated for competency during the penalty phase, the 
two court-appointed psychiatrists who conducted the evaluation each testified that 
symptoms of Asperger‘s Syndrome were not present or recognizable during the 
interviews they conducted with him.  The trial court subsequently assigned little 
weight to this factor, finding that Schoenwetter‘s alleged impairments did not 
explain the series of conscious decisions he made in committing the crimes, that 
his actions were intentional and deliberate, and not impulsive as suggested by the 
defense experts, and that they did not describe an individual whose ability to see 
options was impaired. 
 
3.  This factor was also based on testimony regarding the diagnosis of 
Asperger‘s Syndrome and ADHD.  The trial court explained its decision to assign 
little weight to this factor by noting that ―the Defendant‘s course of conduct was 
not consistent with the symptoms of Asperger‘s Syndrome.  Furthermore, the 
Defendant managed to avoid breaking the law up until this point in his life, despite 
the fact that Asperger‘s Syndrome is a lifelong condition.‖ 
 
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at the time of the offense (not proven by the greater weight of the evidence);4 (8) 
defendant had a close loving relationship with his mother and his younger sister 
(no weight); (9) while in the tenth grade, defendant was physically and emotionally 
abused by his mother‘s boyfriend (little weight).  Finally, the court determined that 
each of the aggravating factors, standing alone, was sufficient to outweigh all of 
the mitigating circumstances combined. 
On direct appeal to this Court, Schoenwetter raised nine issues.  He argued 
that the trial court had erred in (1) denying his attorneys‘ pretrial motion to 
suppress the confession and fruits thereof; (2) admitting certain victim impact 
evidence and denying defense counsel‘s motion to withdraw; (3) allowing a 
medical examiner who did not perform the victims‘ autopsies to testify as to his 
opinion regarding the cause and manner of death; (4) denying his motion for 
mistrial based on the claim that the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury about 
the defendant‘s lack of a significant criminal history; (5) denying his motion to 
disqualify the trial judge; (6) admitting inflammatory photographs of the victims‘ 
wounds; and (7) finding improper aggravating circumstances, failing to consider 
relevant mitigating circumstances, and incorrectly finding that the aggravating 
                                          
 
 
4.  The court explained that although one defense expert, Dr. William 
Riebsame, had testified to this factor, Schoenwetter appeared to be ―mature beyond 
his years.‖  This determination was based on the agreement of all the experts who 
testified that Schoenwetter was very intelligent, with an IQ of approximately 130, 
as well as from the court‘s observations of his behavior. 
 
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factors outweighed the mitigating factors.  Schoenwetter also argued (8) that the 
standard jury instructions unconstitutionally placed the burden of proof on the 
defendant, and (9) that section 921.141, Florida Statutes, was unconstitutional for 
allowing the trial court to impose a death sentence without a unanimous jury 
verdict.  We rejected each claim and affirmed the judgment and sentences imposed 
by the trial court.  See Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 866-77.  Certiorari was denied 
by the United States Supreme Court on November 13, 2006.  See Schoenwetter v. 
Florida, 549 U.S. 1035 (2006). 
Schoenwetter filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 in the circuit court on October 30, 2007, raising 
six general claims.5  In its March 26, 2008, order on the motion, the circuit court 
                                          
 
 
5.  In Claim I of his motion to vacate, appellant argued that he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the pretrial phase.  This claim was based 
on (1) counsel‘s failure to object to the introduction into evidence of 
Schoenwetter‘s letter confessing his guilt to the court; (2) counsel‘s failure to 
object on Fifth Amendment grounds to the admission of statements made by 
Schoenwetter at the February 26 status hearing and March 5 plea proceeding; (3) 
counsel‘s failure to file a motion to suppress the letter under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.172 as statements made during an offer to plead guilty; and 
(4) counsel‘s failure to file a motion to suppress statements made in the letter and 
at the February 26 status hearing ―on additional grounds.‖ 
In Claim II, appellant argued that Florida‘s lethal injection procedure 
violates the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.   
In Claim III, appellant argued that because his plea of guilty was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, trial counsel was constitutionally defective for 
 
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granted an evidentiary hearing as to Schoenwetter‘s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the penalty phase but denied a hearing on the 
remaining claims.  More than a dozen witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing, 
including Schoenwetter‘s trial attorneys.  After the hearing, the circuit court 
entered an order denying relief on each claim. 
Schoenwetter now appeals the circuit court‘s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief.  Corresponding with the arguments raised in the motion filed 
below, he argues: (1) denial of the effective assistance of counsel during pretrial 
                                                                                                                                        
failing to move to withdraw the plea.  (Claim III was voluntarily withdrawn before 
the circuit court ruled on the motion.)   
In Claim IV, appellant argued that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the penalty phase.  He claimed that his attorneys had erred by (1) 
introducing evidence of child pornography, pedophilia, and Satanism into the 
proceedings; (2) failing to object to the State‘s remarks in opening argument 
relating to appellant‘s sexual interest in Theresa and Virginia Friskey; (3) failing to 
present all available mitigation evidence, specifically by (a) failing to present 
evidence of appellant‘s religious conversion and social background, (b) failing to 
call Laura Blankman, a private investigator hired by the defense for the purposes 
of developing mitigation evidence, and (c) failing to call experts who would have 
integrated appellant‘s social history with medical evidence that had been presented 
regarding appellant‘s mental health; (4) calling experts who gave conflicting 
testimony, failing to provide those experts with a video of appellant‘s police 
interrogation, and failing to discuss important points from their testimony during 
closing argument.   
In Claim V, appellant argued that his sentence of death is unconstitutional 
under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).   
Finally, under Claim VI, appellant argued that the cumulative effect of all 
the claims in his motion entitled him to relief. 
 
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proceedings; (2) the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on whether 
Florida‘s lethal injection procedure is unconstitutional and in failing to grant relief 
on the claim; (3) denial of the effective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase; (4) his death sentence is unconstitutional in light of Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005); and (5) the cumulative impact of all constitutional error renders 
the death sentence unconstitutional.  In an accompanying petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, Schoenwetter contends, first, that his death sentence is 
unconstitutional in light of the principles announced in Roper and in Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and second, that he was denied the effective 
assistance of appellate counsel. 
II. 
RULE 3.851 CLAIMS 
 
A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Pretrial Proceedings 
Appellant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective during pretrial 
proceedings for failing to move to exclude from the penalty phase: (a) statements 
made at the February 26, 2003, status hearing; (b) statements made at the March 5, 
2003, plea colloquy; and (c) his letter to the trial judge confessing guilt.  Appellant 
asserts that trial counsel should have moved to have these statements excluded 
under section 90.410, Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.172, which prohibit the use of statements made during the course of 
plea negotiations.  He also contends that counsel should have moved to suppress 
 
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the statements made at the status hearing and plea colloquy as having been 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Following the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
Where this Court has previously rejected a substantive claim on the merits, counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.  See 
Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992), receded from on other 
grounds by Deren v. State, 985 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 2008).  Because both 
prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court 
employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court‘s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 
circuit court‘s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 
771-72 (Fla. 2004). 
 
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1. 
Failure to Object to Statements as Made in Connection 
With an Offer to Plead Guilty 
 
Appellant first asserts that counsel was deficient for failing to object to the 
admission of both the confession letter and his in-court admissions made during 
pretrial proceedings on the grounds that they were made in connection with an 
offer to plead guilty.  Section 90.410, Florida Statutes, provides: 
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn; a plea of nolo 
contendere; or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime 
charged or any other crime is inadmissible in any civil or criminal 
proceeding.  Evidence of statements made in connection with any of 
the pleas or offers is inadmissible, except when such statements are 
offered in a prosecution under chapter 837. 
 
See also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(i).6  In order to prove deficiency under Strickland, 
appellant must first show that trial counsel‘s failure to object on these grounds was 
outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards.  See Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  Clearly, ―[c]ounsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection.‖  Hitchcock 
v. State, 991 So. 2d 337, 361 (Fla. 2008).   
Under section 90.803(18)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), a statement that would 
otherwise be excluded as hearsay is admissible where that statement is offered 
                                          
 
 
6.  This rule was previously designated as Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.172(h), but became rule 3.172(i) following an amendment to the 
statute.  The text of the rule was unaltered by the amendment.  See In re 
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Procedure 3.170 & 3.172, 938 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 
2006). 
 
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against a party and is ―[t]he party‘s own statement in either an individual or a 
representative capacity.‖   Thus, unless excludable under another rule, the 
challenged statements are admissible as party admissions.  Reviewing the 
appellant‘s claim, the circuit court determined, first, that appellant‘s statements 
were admissible as party admissions under section 90.803(18), and second, that the 
statements were not made in connection with an offer to plead guilty.  We agree. 
Where a party admission is not clearly part of an attempt to negotiate a plea 
bargain, see Calabro v. State, 995 So. 2d 307, 313-14 (Fla. 2008), this Court has 
adopted a two-tier analysis for determining whether a statement falls within the 
exclusion under rule 3.172(i).  First, a court ―must determine ‗whether the accused 
exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the 
discussion.‘‖  Richardson v. State, 706 So. 2d 1349, 1353 (Fla. 1998) (quoting 
United States v. Robertson, 582 F. 2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978)).  Second, the 
court must discern ―whether the accused‘s expectation was reasonable given the 
totality of the circumstances.‖  Id. (quoting Robertson, 582 F. 2d at 1366).  ―In 
applying the first prong, the trial court must carefully distinguish between the 
accused‘s admissions and the accused's attempts to negotiate a plea bargain.  In 
other words, the trial court ‗must appreciate the tenor of the conversation.‘‖  Id. 
(quoting Robertson, 582 F. 2d at 1367). 
 
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Here, the record demonstrates that appellant was not attempting to negotiate 
a plea deal, but rather intended to confess his guilt to the court and enter a plea of 
guilty.  The status hearing and plea colloquy were called only after appellant 
mailed a letter confessing guilt to the trial judge.  In that letter, appellant began by 
stating that he wanted to change his plea from ―not guilty‖ to ―guilty.‖  After 
discussing the events surrounding the crimes and his motivations for committing 
the offenses, appellant concluded: ―As I said before, your Honor, I am guilty.  
Therefore, I would very much like my plea changed to the true plea of guilty.‖ 
At the status hearing held on February 26, 2003, the day after the letter was 
received by the judge, the prosecutor indicated that the State was not in a position 
to negotiate a plea deal: 
I will state for the record in open court, there [have] been efforts by 
his counsel to resolve this case with a plea but the problem with the 
facts in this case are such that the state is not in a position to make a 
plea offer and take away the sentencing possibilities in this case. 
 
Subsequently, appellant‘s trial counsel moved to have the letter sealed pending an 
evaluation of appellant‘s competency to proceed.  Trial counsel also stated that 
their advice to appellant was to maintain his silence.  Appellant replied: 
I‘m disregarding that advice.  The purpose that I wrote that letter is I 
wish to change my plea from not guilty to guilty.  Yes, I did it, indeed.  
Those are the facts that I wrote in that letter and it is the truth.  
Anything else to try to deny that would be a lie . . . . 
 
 
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The trial judge then adjourned the hearing until appellant‘s competency could be 
determined. 
 
At the follow-up hearing held on March 5, 2003, appellant‘s attorneys 
informed the court that their client wished to enter a plea against their advice.  
After confirming this with appellant, the court agreed to proceed immediately into 
a plea colloquy.  The prosecutor also agreed, stating: ―I see no reason not to go 
forward.  There is no plea agreement in this case so I would ask the court to 
determine whether or not he is prepared to accept a plea to the charges.‖  
(Emphasis added.)  After a break to permit appellant to consult with his attorneys, 
the trial judge began the plea proceeding: 
Q:   
Mr. Schoenwetter, there was an indictment issued by a grand 
jury on the 29th of August of the year 2000 which charged you 
with Count I, first-degree murder from a premeditated design.  
That particular charge, sir, is a mandatory life in prison with a 
possibility of receiving the death penalty, do you understand 
that, sir? 
 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q: 
That would be the maximum sentence as well as the minimum 
sentence.  The minimum sentence would be life in prison 
without the possibility of parole. 
 
In essence, sir, the only time you would ever leave prison is if 
you died in prison, do you understand that sir? 
 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
 
The court questioned appellant regarding the remaining counts in the indictment.  
It then asked: 
 
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Q: 
And do you understand, sir, that this is a plea straight up to the 
Court?  There is no plea agreement with the state attorney. 
 
 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
 
It is clear from the record that appellant was not attempting to negotiate a 
plea bargain.  See Richardson, 706 So. 2d at 1353; cf. Calabro, 995 So. 2d at 317 
(finding in-court admissions of guilt inadmissible in light of defendant‘s statement 
requesting ―some kind of plea agreement‖).  Appellant made no indication that he 
believed a lighter sentence would be obtained in exchange for his guilty plea.  
Appellant specifically stated during questioning at the plea colloquy that he 
understood his only sentencing options following the plea would be death or life in 
prison.  He was asked by the trial judge whether he understood that there was no 
plea agreement with the State Attorney, and he answered in the affirmative.  
Further, any such belief would have been unreasonable in light of the fact that the 
prosecutor had previously stated in open court that the State would not offer a plea 
deal.  Cf. Richardson, 706 So. 2d at 1354 (finding the defendant‘s expectation of a 
plea deal to have been reasonable in light of repeated offers by the State to grant a 
lower sentence in exchange for a confession).  Accordingly, we conclude counsel 
did not render ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the letter and in-court 
statements were inadmissible under rule 3.172(i). 
 
 
 
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2. 
Failure to Object Based on Miranda Violation 
Appellant also argues that his attorneys were deficient for failing to object to 
his in-court admissions on the grounds that he had not been read Miranda 
warnings.  Under Miranda and its progeny, suspects must be told prior to any 
custodial interrogation ―that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they 
say will be used against them in court, that they have a right to a lawyer‘s help, and 
that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be appointed to help them.‖  Traylor v. 
State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992) (footnote omitted).7  Appellant asserts that 
because he was in custody when he made the incriminating statements at the 
February and March hearings, he was entitled to these warnings.  He contends that 
trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to object on this basis 
during the penalty phase to the admission of these statements. 
When the circuit court rejected this claim in its order denying postconviction 
relief, it noted: ―[T]he Defendant has cited no case law which states that a 
Defendant is entitled to be read his Miranda rights prior to making statements at a 
court proceeding.  Nor has the Court through its own research found any case law 
which stands for this proposition.‖  Similarly, appellant has cited no precedent here 
which would require a defendant to be read Miranda warnings prior to testifying in 
                                          
 
 
7.  We have defined ―custody‖ as the restriction of a suspect‘s freedom of 
movement to a degree associated with formal arrest.  See Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 
2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999). 
 
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court.  Indeed, existing case law leans strongly against this claim.  In United States 
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court 
held that Miranda warnings are not required prior to testimony before a grand jury.  
The Court noted that Miranda was intended to correct the lack of procedural 
safeguards during custodial police interrogations, when an individual might be 
pressured into giving up his or her privilege against self-incrimination.  However, 
―the Miranda Court simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial 
interrogation as equivalents.‖  Id. at 579 (emphasis added).  The Court explained: 
―To extend these concepts to questioning before a grand jury inquiring into 
criminal activity under the guidance of a judge is an extravagant expansion never 
remotely contemplated by this Court in Miranda.‖  Id. at 580. 
 Here, appellant made the incriminating statements in open court, before a 
judge, after his attorneys advised him on the record to maintain his silence.  
Because Miranda warnings are only necessary prior to a custodial police 
interrogation, the absence of such warnings could not provide defense counsel with 
grounds for an objection.  Again, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing 
to make a meritless objection.  See Hitchcock, 991 So. 2d at 361.  We hold that 
counsel did not render ineffective assistance on the grounds asserted here. 
 
 
 
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B. 
Constitutionality of Florida’s Lethal Injection Procedures 
Appellant next claims that the lower court erred in denying his request for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Florida‘s current lethal injection 
procedure violates the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  
See U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  In the circuit court‘s order denying an evidentiary 
hearing, the court ruled that because the constitutionality of Florida‘s death penalty 
procedure involved a pure question of law which did not require the court to make 
any factual determinations, no hearing was necessary.  Subsequently, in its order 
denying the motion, the court summarily rejected the underlying claim, noting that 
―[t]he Supreme Court of Florida has held on numerous occasions that the Florida 
procedure for implementing lethal injection does not violate the constitutional 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.‖ 
 
On an initial rule 3.581 motion, an evidentiary hearing must be held 
whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual 
determination.  See Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696, 700-01 (Fla. 2009) (citing 
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 
491 n.2 (Fla. 2000)).  ―To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised 
in an initial postconviction motion, the record must conclusively demonstrate that 
the defendant is not entitled to relief.‖  Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 700.  When no 
evidentiary hearing has been held by the lower court, this Court must accept the 
 
- 21 - 
movant‘s factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the 
record.  Id. (citing Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989)).  
Because a court‘s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 
motion is ultimately based on the written materials before the court, its ruling is 
tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.  See Davis v. 
State, 26 So. 3d 519, 526 (Fla. 2009) (citing State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 
(Fla. 2003)). 
Appellant‘s motion for postconviction relief was filed prior to this Court‘s 
decision in Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007), and prior to the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).  
In his motion, appellant argued that because Lightbourne was still pending, the 
constitutionality of lethal injection remained unresolved.  Subsequently, in 
Lightbourne, this Court rejected the claim that Florida‘s current lethal injection 
procedure violates the Eighth Amendment.  We explained that in order for a 
punishment to be ―cruel and unusual,‖ it must involve ―torture or a lingering 
death‖ or the ―infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain.‖  Lightbourne, 969 So. 
2d at 349 (quoting Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997)).  ―[P]unishment is 
not cruel or unusual if a state‘s protocol does not expose the prisoner to ‗more than 
a negligible risk of being subjected to cruel and wanton infliction of pain.‘‖   Id. 
(quoting Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 667 (Fla. 2000)).  Further, ―an inmate‘s 
 
- 22 - 
speculative list of horribles that could happen is insufficient to demonstrate more 
than a negligible risk.‖  Id.  We similarly upheld this State‘s lethal injection 
protocols in Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 225 (Fla. 2007). 
Appellant also requested in his motion that the circuit court stay proceedings 
until the United States Supreme Court had reached a decision in the then-pending 
Baze litigation.  In Baze, a majority of the Supreme Court determined that 
Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure was constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment, although the Court did not reach a consensus regarding the particular 
standard for evaluating the constitutionality of state execution protocols in future 
cases.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 41.  In Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 
2008), we determined that our previous holdings in Lightbourne and Schwab did 
not conflict with the plurality‘s narrow holding in Baze.  See Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that when the Supreme Court issues a 
decision and no rationale receives the vote of a majority of the justices, the holding 
of the Court is the ―position taken by those members who concurred in the 
judgment on the narrowest grounds‖).  Further, in Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2839 (2009), we found that ―Florida‘s current lethal-
injection protocol passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered 
by the Baze Court (and would easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by 
justices Thomas and Scalia).‖  Id. at 200.  Since then, this Court has repeatedly and 
 
- 23 - 
summarily rejected constitutional challenges to Florida‘s lethal injection 
procedures.  See, e.g., Davis, 26 So. 3d at 526; Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 919 
(Fla. 2009); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008). 
 
Rule 3.851 mandates an evidentiary hearing only ―on claims listed by the 
defendant as requiring a factual determination.‖  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(i).  
Appellant‘s challenge was based specifically on the issues that arose out of the 
execution of Florida inmate Angel Diaz and on the revised lethal injection 
protocols subsequently implemented by the Florida Department of Corrections.  To 
the extent appellant asserts that the failure to grant an evidentiary hearing violated 
his due process right to an individual analysis of the facts of his case, we note that 
we reviewed the facts surrounding the Diaz execution as well as the revised lethal 
injection protocols in extensive detail in Lightbourne.  See 969 So. 2d at 343-49.8  
Appellant therefore failed to raise any challenge to Florida‘s lethal injection 
protocols that had not previously been considered by this Court.  Accordingly, 
nothing in his claim required a factual determination.  For this reason, and in light 
                                          
 
 
8.  Appellant also cites the failed execution of Ohio inmate Romell Broom, 
asserting that such an occurrence could ―easily‖ happen in this case.  However, 
there is no discussion of the specific procedures being challenged and no claim that 
there has been any change to Florida‘s lethal injection protocols that would require 
this Court to abandon its existing precedent.  As we explained in Lightbourne, a 
defendant‘s ―speculative list of horribles‖ is insufficient to establish a challenge to 
a state‘s death penalty protocols under the Eighth Amendment.  See Lightbourne, 
969 So. 2d at 349. 
 
- 24 - 
of our consistent and summary rejection of challenges of this nature, we conclude 
that the circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
 
C. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Penalty Phase 
 
Appellant next claims that, during the penalty phase proceedings, his court-
appointed counsel made numerous errors that constituted deficiency under 
Strickland.  As discussed above, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel a claimant must show: (1) that his counsel‘s performance was deficient, 
i.e., unreasonable under prevailing professional standards; and (2) that the 
claimant‘s case was prejudiced by the deficiency.  See Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 
461, 467 (Fla. 2003).  To meet this second prong, the claimant must show ―a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.‖  Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965-66 
(Fla. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).  ―A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‖  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455-56 
(2009). 
During the penalty phase, the defense‘s case focused largely on proving 
mental health mitigation.  Three experts, Dr. William Riebsame, Dr. Nona Currie 
Prichard, and Dr. Joseph Wu, testified extensively regarding their examinations of 
the defendant.  Dr. Riebsame explained to the jury that Asperger‘s Syndrome is a 
 
- 25 - 
neurological disorder which reflects an abnormal brain pathology.  He testified that 
individuals diagnosed with the condition have impaired social skills and often find 
it difficult to get along with others.  Asperger‘s patients also tend to develop an 
extreme, all-encompassing preoccupation with some area of interest.  According to 
Dr. Riebsame, ―They begin to identify with that particular topic, become very well 
informed about that topic, and their life centers around that particular topic.‖  Dr. 
Riebsame stated that, in appellant‘s case, appellant had become focused on 
sexuality at an unusually early age, engaging in such behavior as dialing 900 phone 
lines at the age of ten or eleven and viewing pornographic and satanic websites, 
including child pornography, at an early teenage age.9  In Dr. Riebsame‘s 
evaluation, it was appellant‘s obsession with witchcraft, Satanism, and sexuality 
which caused him to enter the Friskey home on the night of the offenses.  He 
expressed his opinion that appellant was under an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the homicides. 
                                          
 
 
9.  After Dr. Riebsame‘s testimony, defense counsel called Commander 
Bobby Mutter of the Titusville Police Department as a partial rebuttal witness to 
counter the assertion that appellant was interested in child pornography, as 
opposed to adult pornography.  Commander Mutter testified concerning an 
incident in which appellant‘s mother brought to the police a CD-ROM containing 
what she believed might be child pornography that her son had downloaded from 
the Internet.  Commander Mutter informed the jury that he and another investigator 
reviewed the images, but determined that the women depicted therein were all 
eighteen years of age or older.  No further action was taken by the police on the 
matter. 
 
- 26 - 
Dr. Prichard also described the symptoms of Asperger‘s Syndrome.  Like 
Dr. Riebsame, she testified that individuals with the condition have a difficult time 
getting along with others socially.  This was due, she explained, to their inability to 
perceive or understand others‘ emotions.  She testified that individuals with this 
condition also exhibit an uncommon lack of flexibility in making decisions.  
Whereas most individuals are capable of reassessing a course of conduct as it 
progresses, Dr. Prichard stated, Asperger‘s patients are impaired in their ability to 
recognize and act on available alternatives.  In appellant‘s case, she testified that 
his Asperger‘s Syndrome made it difficult for him to appreciate on an emotional 
level how his conduct affected the Friskey family, or to abandon his plan to assault 
the Friskey daughters once he entered the house.  This deficiency caused him to 
panic when he was recognized by Virginia Friskey, which resulted in appellant 
lashing out at the girl and her parents.  In Dr. Prichard‘s opinion, appellant‘s ability 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. 
Dr. Wu, a medical doctor admitted as an expert in psychiatry, neuroscience 
and PET scan imaging, testified that appellant‘s PET scan indicated the presence of 
abnormalities within appellant‘s frontal lobe and temporal cortex.  He explained 
that these results are consistent with those of individuals diagnosed with 
Asperger‘s Syndrome.  Dr. Wu also testified that without therapy and medication, 
 
- 27 - 
individuals with such conditions tend to be inflexible and rigid in their thinking 
and have substantial difficulty with impulse control. 
Some testimony was presented regarding appellant‘s social background.  
Deborah Roberts, appellant‘s mother, testified that appellant‘s biological father, 
Reece Ingram, was physically abusive to her while she was pregnant with 
appellant, that she was malnourished during much of her pregnancy, and that she 
received poor prenatal care.  She separated from Ingram when appellant was 
approximately one year old and they were later divorced.  Roberts testified that 
once appellant started school he had difficulty making friends and was picked on 
by other children.  He also had difficulty sitting still and paying attention, and for a 
time was placed on Ritalin.  Appellant‘s performance in school improved, but the 
Ritalin was discontinued when appellant was in the seventh grade.  Roberts 
eventually married Thomas Schoenwetter, who adopted appellant, and with whom 
Roberts later had a daughter.  After Roberts and Schoenwetter divorced, Roberts 
moved with appellant to another city to live with a boyfriend whom Roberts met 
on the Internet.  However, the boyfriend became physically abusive toward 
appellant, and Roberts and appellant moved away after a year.  Roberts testified 
that appellant began attending adult education classes after the tenth grade and that 
he had almost completed his coursework at the time of his arrest. 
 
- 28 - 
At the evidentiary hearing on the appellant‘s rule 3.851 motion, appellant‘s 
attorneys, Assistant Public Defenders J. Randall Moore and George McCarthy, 
testified that their trial strategy was to use the diagnosis of Asperger‘s Syndrome 
and ADHD to their advantage during the penalty phase.  Moore explained that 
because of appellant‘s confession letter, the jury was going to be aware that 
appellant had entered the Friskey house with the intention of sexually assaulting 
one or both of the minor females in the house, the younger of whom was only ten 
years old.  In their view, it was necessary to explain this conduct in a manner that 
could be viewed as mitigating.  Moore and McCarthy hoped the jury would come 
to understand appellant‘s obsessions with Satanism and pornography as inherently 
linked to his previously undiagnosed Asperger‘s Syndrome.  Their strategy was to 
present these obsessions as something appellant could not control, and to argue to 
the jury that appellant was under the influence of an irresistible compulsion on the 
night he committed the offenses. 
 
Appellant strongly disagreed with his attorneys‘ choice of trial strategy.  
Several witnesses testified at the postconviction hearing that appellant had 
developed an interest in Christianity while awaiting trial and that he had become 
active with the prison ministry.  According to his trial attorneys, appellant wanted 
them to refrain from calling many of the witnesses they intended to present during 
the penalty phase and to rely exclusively on his religious conversion as mitigation.  
 
- 29 - 
After deliberation, they concluded that this line of testimony would not be 
beneficial to appellant‘s case, and no such witnesses were presented to the jury on 
this topic.  This decision, as well as appellant‘s desire that his attorneys not object 
to the admission of certain victim impact evidence, caused friction between 
appellant and his attorneys, which resulted in defense counsel filing a motion to 
withdraw.  On direct appeal, we determined that the trial court‘s denial of this 
motion was proper.  See Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 870. 
 
Appellant now challenges several aspects of his attorneys‘ defense.  He 
argues that Moore and McCarthy (1) failed to object to improper remarks during 
the State‘s opening argument; (2) presented witnesses that portrayed appellant in a 
negative light; (3) failed to call potential witnesses who could have aided the 
defense; (4) presented conflicting and unprepared expert witnesses; and (5) failed 
to sufficiently emphasize mitigating issues during closing argument. 
In conducting our review, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel‘s 
performance was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  ―A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the 
time.‖  Id. at 689.  The defendant carries the burden to ―overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‗might be considered sound 
 
- 30 - 
trial strategy.‖  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  
―[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if 
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.‖  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 
2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). 
 
 
1. 
Failure to Object to State’s Opening 
In his first claim of penalty phase deficiency, appellant argues that his 
attorneys should have objected to a comment made by the State during opening 
argument.  In that statement, the Assistant State Attorney described appellant‘s 
friendship with Chad Friskey, the son of victims Ronald and Haesun Friskey.  He 
informed the jury that appellant had stayed overnight at the Friskey residence on 
several occasions and was therefore familiar with the layout of the house.  He then 
stated: ―This relationship that the defendant had with Chad Friskey also gave him 
an opportunity to become acquainted with Chad‘s two younger sisters, Theresa and 
Virginia Friskey.  The defendant came to see them as targets of his sexual desires 
and sexual fantasies.‖  Appellant argues that this statement improperly presented 
the aggravating factor of sexual battery to which his attorneys should have 
objected.   
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, one of appellant‘s trial attorneys 
was asked why he chose not to object to this comment by the State.  He explained 
 
- 31 - 
that evidence of appellant‘s sexual interest in the Friskey daughters was almost 
certainly going to be admitted at trial through various witnesses, including the 
psychologists, and potentially through Chad Friskey, who was then listed as a 
witness.  We find that counsel‘s decision not to object was reasonable.  We 
explained in Jones v. State, 949 So. 2d 1021, 1032 (Fla. 2006), that the purpose of 
an opening argument is for counsel to inform the jury ―what he in good faith 
expected to be established by the evidence presented at trial.‖  Because the defense 
attorneys anticipated that evidence supporting the State‘s comments would be 
presented at trial, they reasonably concluded that they had no grounds on which to 
object.  See Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 550 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that trial 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to comments that are 
proper).  Accordingly, we find that their failure to object to this comment by the 
State was not deficient under Strickland.  Further, because evidence of appellant‘s 
interest in the Friskey daughters was in fact presented to the jury, we find that 
Schoenwetter cannot establish prejudice sufficient to undermine our confidence in 
the outcome. 
 
2. 
 Introduction of Damaging Evidence 
Appellant next objects to his attorneys‘ decision to call as witnesses Dr. 
Riebsame and Commander Mutter, who, appellant asserts, brought evidence of 
child pornography, pedophilia and Satanism into the proceedings.  Appellant 
 
- 32 - 
argues that this testimony had a detrimental impact on the minds of the jury due to 
strong public feelings on these matters, prejudicing his case for life in prison.  We 
hold that trial counsel‘s performance was not deficient. 
Reasonable decisions regarding trial strategy, made after deliberation by a 
claimant‘s trial attorneys in which available alternatives have been considered and 
rejected, do not constitute deficient performance under Strickland.  See Occhicone, 
768 So. 2d at 1048.  Here, the record demonstrates that appellant‘s attorneys made 
a strategic decision to call Dr. Riebsame as a witness based on their belief that his 
testimony would be more beneficial than harmful.  After deliberation, they 
concluded that, while parts of Dr. Riebsame‘s testimony may have been 
unfavorable toward appellant, his testimony was needed to establish as a mitigating 
circumstance that appellant was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
at the time of the offense.  The attorneys were aware that a portion of this 
testimony would be harmful, as evidenced by their effort to mitigate any potential 
negative effect by calling Commander Mutter as a partial rebuttal witness. 
We find that these decisions were reasonable.  The most negative portion of 
Dr. Riebsame‘s testimony—appellant‘s interest in underage females—was almost 
certainly going to be (and in fact was) admitted as evidence as a result of the letter 
appellant had written to the trial judge.  Rather than improperly emphasizing this 
evidence, appellant‘s attorneys attempted to explain appellant‘s own statements in 
 
- 33 - 
a manner the jury could potentially view as mitigating.  Accordingly, we reject 
appellant‘s claim that the presentation of these witnesses constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
3. 
Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence 
Third, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
sufficiently investigate and present evidence of his religious faith and social 
background.   Comparable arguments were raised in the recent case of Jones v. 
State, 998 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2008).  There, the appellant argued that trial counsel 
had been ineffective in failing to present mitigation evidence by ―(1) failing to hire 
a mental health expert and failing to present mental health mitigation; and (2) 
failing to call witnesses who would have testified about Jones's childhood.‖  Id. at 
582.  After reciting the general deficiency/prejudice Strickland standard, we 
explained: 
In these circumstances, to determine whether counsel was 
ineffective, a court must examine not only counsel's alleged failure to 
investigate and present possibly mitigating evidence, but the reasons 
for doing so.  See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S. Ct. 
2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003) (―[S]trategic choices made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options 
are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less 
than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation.‖) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91); Rose v. 
State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1996) (stating that in evaluating the 
competence of counsel ―the actual performance of counsel in 
preparation for and during the penalty phase proceedings, as well as 
the reasons advanced therefore,‖ must be considered).  Moreover, 
 
- 34 - 
here, Jones must prove his counsel's performance actually ―deprived 
[him] of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.‖  Rutherford v. State, 
727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998). 
 
Jones, 998 So. 2d at 582. 
 
 
 
a. 
Evidence of Appellant’s Religious Faith 
Appellant first asserts that his trial attorneys were deficient for failing to 
present penalty phase testimony regarding the religious conversion he underwent 
while awaiting trial.  As discussed above, appellant was in conflict with his 
attorneys over whether such evidence should have been presented.  He argues that 
his counsel should have called as a witness Chaplain Victor Dodzweit and that had 
counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, they could have discovered and 
called other witnesses who were familiar with appellant‘s involvement with the 
prison ministry.  The failure to call these witnesses, he asserts, deprived the jury of 
significant mitigating evidence. 
During the evidentiary hearing on appellant‘s motion for postconviction 
relief, Moore and McCarthy each testified that after discussing the issue with 
appellant, they became wary as to how such testimony might be perceived by the 
jury.  According to Moore, appellant had come to believe that ―because he was 
saved, he had been forgiven for all of his sins, including what he did to the Friskey 
family and he was no longer bothered by it.‖  They also met with Chaplain 
Dodzweit, who at the time of appellant‘s initial imprisonment was conducting 
 
- 35 - 
Bible studies and individual counseling at the Brevard County Jail.  Dodzweit told 
Moore and McCarthy much the same thing as appellant: that appellant had been 
saved and that God had forgiven him for his crimes.  Moore testified that he and 
McCarthy were both ―stunned‖ after speaking with Dodzweit: 
We thought he would be Exhibit A in proving lack of remorse, 
because it didn‘t seem to have any impact at all on Mr. Schoenwetter, 
what he had done.  We thought, not only would that come out if Mr. 
Schoenwetter testified, but it would also come out in spades if 
Reverend Dodzweit testified.  We thought it would be very harmful 
and show a true lack of remorse. 
 
When asked whether such testimony could have been presented in a nondamaging 
manner, Moore replied: 
No, we went round and round about it.  We decided that, in the end, 
the harm outweighed the good.  The harm outweighed the benefit.  
My -- nothing personal to Mr. Schoenwetter, but my perception of 
him was that he would become very, well, self righteous, I guess, in 
his newly found religion and that would be very offensive to the jury. 
 
Accordingly, no testimony on the specific issue of appellant‘s religious faith was 
presented to the jury.  However, Dodzweit was in fact called to testify before the 
trial judge at the Spencer hearing, where he discussed his association with 
appellant and expressed his belief that appellant would act as a positive influence 
on other inmates in a prison environment. 
 The United States Supreme Court has explained that ―strategic choices 
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 
virtually unchallengeable.‖  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521.  In the present case, trial 
 
- 36 - 
counsel considered the available evidence and made a reasoned decision not to 
present Dodzweit as a witness or to present evidence of appellant‘s religious 
conversion to the jury.  As the circuit court concluded:  
It was reasonable for [trial counsel] to believe that the jury might be 
offended if they heard testimony that the Defendant was now at peace 
with himself after he killed two people and seriously injured a third.  
Although this testimony could have presented some mitigating 
evidence, it was reasonable for Moore and McCarthy to believe the 
harm would outweigh the good. 
 
We agree and conclude that counsel‘s performance was not deficient.  See Gore, 
846 So. 2d at 470 (―[W]hen an attorney has made a tactical decision not to present 
mitigating evidence after a full investigation, counsel is not ineffective.  Moreover, 
an attorney‘s reasoned decision not to present evidence of dubious mitigating value 
does not constitute ineffective assistance.‖) (citation omitted). 
While the extent to which Moore and McCarthy investigated appellant‘s 
additional witnesses is unclear from the record,10 their failure to interview these 
witnesses should be found ―reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
                                          
 
 
10.  In addition to Victor Dodzweit, appellant presented four witnesses 
familiar with his religious conversion—David Musalo, Richard Dean, Thomas 
Wood, and Frederick Shelor—at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Musalo, 
Dean, and Wood each testified that they were volunteers or employees of the 
prison ministry at the time of appellant‘s incarceration.  Shelor was a fellow 
inmate, also involved in the prison ministry.  All four testified that they were never 
contacted or interviewed by appellant‘s defense counsel.  When asked about these 
individuals during his own postconviction testimony, Randall Moore responded 
that he was familiar with their names, but could not recall their precise roles in the 
defense investigation. 
 
- 37 - 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.‖  Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 521.  ―[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that 
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel‘s 
failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.‖  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  Both defense attorneys discussed the issue with 
appellant and his chaplain and determined that it would have been impossible to 
present this line of testimony in a nonprejudicial manner.  Therefore, we find their 
decision not to spend more time investigating the issue to have been a reasonable 
strategic choice, particularly in light of the extensive mental health mitigation that 
was actually developed.  We conclude that they did not render ineffective 
assistance on these grounds. 
 
 
b. 
Evidence of Appellant’s Social Background 
Appellant also claims that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to present more evidence of his social background.  Appellant asserts that 
counsel should have called as witnesses his biological father, Reece Ingram, his 
paternal grandmother, Nettie Connor, and Laura Blankman, an investigator hired 
by the defense.  Each of these individuals testified at the postconviction evidentiary 
hearing.  After reviewing their postconviction testimony, we find that counsel was 
not deficient in failing to present these witnesses and that appellant‘s case was not 
prejudiced by their absence during the penalty phase. 
 
- 38 - 
Reece Ingram, appellant‘s biological father, testified that he was arrested 
and sent to prison for five and one-half years for assault and robbery when 
appellant was approximately eighteen months old and that he was divorced from 
appellant‘s mother while still in prison.  Ingram also testified that he visited his son 
in jail shortly after appellant‘s arrest.  Prior to that visit, Ingram had not seen 
appellant since he was seven or eight years old.  Ingram stated that he would have 
been willing to testify at the penalty phase, but asserted that he had never been 
contacted by the Public Defender‘s office. 
Nettie Connor, Ingram‘s mother and appellant‘s paternal grandmother, 
testified that appellant‘s mother, Deborah Roberts, had not permitted her to have a 
relationship with appellant and that she had only seen him on four occasions.  She 
stated that she spoke by telephone with someone from the Public Defender‘s office 
prior to appellant‘s trial, but was not asked to testify.  Connor expressed the 
opinion that had appellant been permitted to have a relationship with her and her 
family, he would not have been in trouble with the law. 
Laura Blankman testified that she was a professional investigator 
specializing in death penalty mitigation.  She explained that she was hired by the 
defense to investigate appellant‘s family history.  At the time she began her 
investigation, funding had only been obtained for thirty hours of work, although 
she stated that a complete investigation often took 400 hours.  Much of her allotted 
 
- 39 - 
time was spent interviewing appellant and his mother.  Blankman discussed in 
detail Roberts‘ familial history of abuse, particularly by Roberts‘ father, with 
whom Roberts and appellant lived until appellant was approximately four years 
old.  She also learned about appellant‘s difficult childhood.  Blankman testified 
that she felt more investigation was needed, particularly regarding appellant‘s 
paternal family, but that no additional funding could be obtained.  However, 
Blankman continued to be involved in the case.  She ultimately contributed 
approximately 100 hours toward the investigation, and even attended a portion of 
appellant‘s trial, where she sat at the defense table. 
During the evidentiary hearing, appellant‘s attorneys testified that they were 
unable to locate Ingram while preparing their case for mitigation.  They mailed a 
letter requesting Ingram‘s assistance to addresses previously associated with him 
but received no response.  Moore testified that he spoke with Connor but found 
that she would not provide any information that could be used to contact her son.  
According to Moore, Connor indicated that Ingram would not cooperate with their 
investigation.  Regarding Laura Blankman, Moore testified that she had been hired 
specifically to locate Ingram or any other members of appellant‘s paternal family.  
When her efforts proved unsuccessful, Moore and McCarthy determined that she 
could do nothing further and that there was no remaining need for her services.  
Ultimately, they concluded that any information pertaining to appellant‘s paternal 
 
- 40 - 
family would be of limited use given that appellant had little contact with that side 
of his family during childhood. 
We conclude that appellant‘s attorneys were not deficient within the 
meaning of Strickland.  The record reveals that Moore and McCarthy made strong 
efforts to locate appellant‘s paternal family, which included contacting Connor by 
letter and by telephone, mailing letters to Ingram, and hiring Laura Blankman.  The 
investigation was only discontinued when they determined it would not be 
beneficial to appellant‘s defense.  Based on the information gathered from Connor 
and Blankman, we find that this decision to limit the investigation was an entirely 
reasonable professional judgment.  See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521. 
Further, we find that the failure to call these witnesses does not satisfy the 
Strickland requirement of prejudice.  With regard to the absence of Reece Ingram 
and Nettie Connor, the circuit court explained: 
The only additional information that these witnesses would have 
provided was that Deborah Roberts, the Defendant‘s mother, 
prevented the Defendant from having any contact with his biological 
father or his paternal family members.  However, it is questionable 
whether the Defendant would have been better off having a 
relationship with Ingram considering that the evidence showed that 
Ingram physically abused the Defendant‘s mother while she was 
pregnant with him and then went to prison for aggravated assault and 
burglary.  Had this testimony been presented at the penalty phase, it is 
unlikely that the jury would have given it much weight. 
 
With regard to Laura Blankman, much of the testimony she could have presented 
during the penalty phase was in fact introduced into evidence through the 
 
- 41 - 
testimony of Deborah Roberts.  Specifically, Roberts testified that she was 
physically abused by appellant‘s father while pregnant and that appellant was 
abused by her later boyfriend.  The absence of Ingram, Connor, and Blankman as 
witnesses does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 
 
c. 
Failure to Integrate Social and Medical Evidence 
We next address appellant‘s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call an additional mental health expert who could relate evidence of 
appellant‘s religious conversion to the mental health testimony presented by other 
experts.  Appellant relies primarily on the testimony of Dr. Henry Dee, who was 
admitted as an expert in the field of forensic psychology and neuropsychology at 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing. 
Dr. Dee reviewed the reports and testimony of the medical experts who 
testified during the penalty phase, as well as other documents relating to 
appellant‘s crime and conviction.  Dr. Dee testified that based on his own testing, 
he believed appellant suffered from frontal lobe damage.  He also interviewed 
appellant and his relatives and learned that appellant had moved frequently as a 
child.  Dr. Dee testified that this would have been particularly difficult for a child 
with Asperger‘s Syndrome and ADHD, and would have impaired appellant‘s 
ability to develop social skills as a child.  He also testified that individuals with 
 
- 42 - 
appellant‘s conditions have difficulty expressing remorse because they lack 
empathetic understanding of others.  He noted that in letters written following 
appellant‘s religious conversion, appellant had frequently expressed remorse for 
his crimes. 
 
We find that the absence of this testimony did not prejudice appellant‘s case 
under Strickland.  Similar testimony was presented by other expert witnesses 
during the penalty phase.  Dr. Wu testified regarding appellant‘s frontal lobe 
damage, and Dr. Riebsame and Dr. Prichard both explained how appellant‘s 
ADHD and Asperger‘s Syndrome would have affected his behavior at the time of 
the offenses.  Appellant‘s mother testified regarding his difficult childhood.  
Further, the three mitigating factors to which Dr. Dee testified—extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, inability to conform conduct to the requirements of the law, 
and the defendant‘s age—were all considered by the trial court in its sentencing 
order.  Dr. Dee‘s testimony that appellant expressed remorse in his letters was at 
least partially considered when the trial court weighed the nonstatutory mitigator 
that ―the defendant accepted responsibility by pleading guilty.‖  Schoenwetter, 931 
So. 2d at 865 n.4.  In light of these considerations, we find that appellant has failed 
to demonstrate prejudice such that our confidence in the outcome of the 
proceedings is undermined.  See Valle, 778 So. 2d at 965-66; see also Strickland, 
 
- 43 - 
466 U.S. at 694.  Accordingly, we reject appellant‘s claim of ineffectiveness on 
this issue. 
 
4. 
Deficiency in Presenting Expert Witnesses 
Fourth, appellant asserts that trial counsel was deficient for presenting 
unprepared and inconsistent expert witnesses.  Appellant first argues that his 
attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by calling expert witnesses, Dr. Prichard 
and Dr. Riebsame, who testified to conflicting mitigating circumstances.  Second, 
appellant claims his attorneys were deficient for failing to provide these experts 
with copies of appellant‘s videotaped police interview.  We find both claims to be 
without merit.   
We first find that the expert testimony was complementary rather than 
conflicting.  Dr. Riebsame testified that appellant, based on his PET scan, 
Asperger‘s Syndrome, and the circumstances of the offense, was under an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense.  Dr. Prichard, in her 
testimony, explained that appellant, due to his Asperger‘s Syndrome, was 
inflexible in his ability to act on options and select available alternatives once he 
had begun a course of action.  She expressed her opinion that appellant‘s capacity 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  
With regard to the deficient performance prong of appellant‘s Strickland claim, it 
was not unreasonable for the trial attorneys to have concluded that the testimony of 
 
- 44 - 
two experts would be more beneficial than one.  With regard to the prejudice 
prong, the experts did not contradict each other.  Rather, they each testified to a 
separate statutory mitigating factor based on the effects of Asperger‘s Syndrome 
and ADHD.  Because the trial court in fact considered and weighed both of these 
factors as mitigation, see Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 865, the experts‘ testimony 
seems to have helped rather than harmed the defense. 
Second, appellant‘s attorneys were not deficient for failing to provide Dr. 
Riebsame and Dr. Prichard with copies of the videotaped police interview, nor do 
we find that our confidence in the outcome of the proceedings is undermined by 
this oversight.  Both experts testified extensively regarding their professional 
qualifications, both had access to a wide range of personal materials relating to 
appellant‘s background, and both conducted interviews and psychological testing 
with appellant himself.  In light of this testimony, it is unlikely that the jury would 
have concluded the experts were unprepared because they had not viewed a 
videotape of the defendant‘s initial confession.  Further, Dr. Riebsame was recalled 
after being given the opportunity to view the video and testified that it had no 
impact on his initial testimony.  Dr. Prichard admitted that she had not viewed the 
tape, but was then asked whether certain behaviors would indicate Asperger‘s 
Syndrome.  She responded that they would.  This exchange took place after the 
jury had already viewed the tape themselves.  Later, on redirect examination, Dr. 
 
- 45 - 
Prichard stated that she had read the interrogating officers‘ accounts of appellant‘s 
confession.  She then testified that the substance of his confession did not change 
her opinion as to how appellant‘s mental impairments would have affected his 
actions at the time of the crime. 
5. 
Deficient Closing Argument 
Finally, appellant argues that during closing argument, his trial counsel 
failed to stress the importance of appellant‘s lack of impulse control, instead 
focusing on appellant‘s preoccupation with Satanism and sexuality.  Appellant 
asserts that counsel should have relied more heavily on the testimony of Dr. Wu 
concerning the results of appellant‘s PET scan.  He argues that this deficiency 
deprived the jury of the understanding that his lack of impulse control was related 
to frontal lobe damage.  Appellant argues that emphasizing this information in 
closing would have provided greater support for the two statutory mental health 
mitigating circumstances weighed by the jury. 
After reviewing the record, we find that the appellant‘s characterization of 
his counsel‘s closing statement is inaccurate.  The closing argument for the defense 
was delivered by George McCarthy, who in fact argued that appellant‘s lack of 
impulse control and his inability to view options and reassess his course of conduct 
was what led him to commit the crime.  McCarthy discussed the testimony of Dr. 
Wu and the results of the PET scan.  He informed the jury that the PET scan 
 
- 46 - 
provided physical evidence of appellant‘s neurological disorders and requested that 
the jury give this evidence great weight as a mitigating factor.  After discussing 
appellant‘s obsessions with sex and video games, during which he described the 
testimony of appellant‘s friends and family, McCarthy again tied the evidence to 
appellant‘s diagnosis of Asperger‘s Syndrome and lack of impulse control.  
Therefore, in contradiction to appellant‘s argument here, it is clear that trial 
counsel did not fail to discuss appellant‘s mental health mitigation during the 
closing argument.  Appellant‘s claim of deficiency on these grounds is therefore 
rejected. 
 
D. 
Roper v. Simmons 
Next, appellant raises several claims of error based on the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons.  First, he argues that in light of 
the evolving standards of decency relied on by the Court in Roper, his execution 
would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  Second, he argues that based on Roper and this Court‘s decision in 
Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 (Fla. 1998) (explaining that the age-related 
statutory mitigator becomes weightier the closer the defendant is to the age where 
the death penalty is constitutionally barred), the trial court erred in not affording 
more weight to his age-related statutory mitigating circumstance.  Third, appellant 
 
- 47 - 
argues that death would be a disproportionate punishment based on his age, 
immaturity, mental defects, and related mitigating circumstances. 
With regard to appellant‘s argument that his death sentence is 
unconstitutional under Roper, we have consistently rejected such claims in cases 
where the defendant was not below eighteen years of age at the time of the 
criminal offense.  We held in Hill v. State, 21 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006), that 
―Roper only prohibits the execution of those defendants whose chronological age 
is below eighteen.‖  See also Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976, 992 (Fla. 2007) 
(denying relief based on Roper where appellant was eighteen years and three 
months old at the time of the offense and suffered from low-level intellectual 
functioning and mental and emotional impairments).  In this case, appellant‘s age 
was eighteen years and nine months at the time of the offense.  Therefore, Roper 
does not render his sentence of death unconstitutional. 
Appellant also argues that the trial court should have assigned more than 
―little weight‖ to his age-related mitigating circumstance based on Roper.  We find 
this claim to be procedurally barred.  This Court has held that ―[p]roceedings under 
rule 3.850 are not to be used as a second appeal; nor is it appropriate to use a 
different argument to relitigate the same issue.  Likewise, issues that could have 
been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are not cognizable through collateral 
attack.‖  Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 1994) (citation 
 
- 48 - 
omitted).   In appellant‘s direct appeal, we considered the weight assigned to the 
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: 
The defendant . . . takes issue with the weight that was given to 
the four statutory mitigating circumstances, which were given little 
weight, and with the weight given to two of the nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.  Although Schoenwetter maintains these 
mitigating factors were not accorded the proper weight, he has failed 
to even argue, much less demonstrate, why the weight given by the 
trial judge was not appropriate under the facts of this case.  The 
weight given to these mitigators lies within the discretion of the trial 
court, and there has been no showing that the trial court abused its 
discretion.  Therefore, we find no error in the trial court‘s 
consideration of these mitigating factors. 
 
Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 875 (footnote omitted).   As to appellant‘s specific 
argument that Roper dictates a different result, Roper was decided well before 
appellant‘s direct appeal was heard by this Court.  Appellant had the opportunity to 
raise these arguments but failed to do so.  Thus, the issue is not cognizable through 
collateral attack.  See Torres-Arboleda, 636 So. 2d at 1323. 
Third, appellant argues that this Court should reweigh the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances surrounding his death sentence in light of the United 
States Supreme Court‘s decision in Roper.  We addressed the proportionality of 
appellant‘s sentence on direct appeal and determined that death was a 
proportionate punishment in light of the totality of the circumstances of the 
offense, and in light of the circumstances of similar cases in which death sentences 
have been imposed.  See Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 875-76.  Again, because this 
 
- 49 - 
issue was raised and decided on direct appeal, appellant is procedurally barred 
from raising the issue here.  See Torres-Arboleda, 636 So. 2d at 1323. 
 
E. 
Cumulative Error 
In his last claim under Rule 3.851, appellant argues that the cumulative 
effect of the errors asserted above require this Court to vacate his sentence.  Claims 
of cumulative error do not warrant relief where each individual claim of error is 
―either meritless, procedurally barred, or [does] not meet the Strickland standard 
for ineffective assistance of counsel.‖  Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 
2005); see Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 2010); Reese, 14 So. 3d at 920; 
Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005).  Because we find that each 
individual claim of error fails on at least one of these three grounds, we reject the 
claim of cumulative error. 
III. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
A. 
Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia 
Finally, we review the two claims raised in appellant‘s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  As the first of his claims, appellant argues that his sentence of 
death is unconstitutional due to evolving standards of decency cited by the United 
States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia.  This Court has 
held that ―[h]abeas corpus is not to be used for additional appeals of issues that 
could have been, should have been, or were raised on appeal or in other 
 
- 50 - 
postconviction motions.‖  Mills v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1990).  In 
Mills, we rejected the petitioner‘s habeas claims, noting that most had been raised 
either on direct appeal or in the petitioner‘s postconviction motion.  See id.  In this 
case, appellant has already raised Roper in his rule 3.851 motion.  Because every 
argument raised in this portion of appellant‘s habeas petition either could have 
been or in fact was raised in his motion filed pursuant to rule 3.851, this claim is 
rejected as procedurally barred. 
 
Additionally, even if this claim were not barred for procedural reasons, 
appellant would not be entitled to relief on the merits under either Roper or Atkins.  
As explained above, Roper only prohibits the execution of defendants whose 
chronological age was below eighteen at the time of their capital offense.  See 
Reese, 14 So. 3d at 920.  Because appellant was eighteen years and nine months of 
age at the time of his offense, Roper does not render his death sentence 
unconstitutional. 
Likewise, appellant is not entitled to relief under Atkins.  In that case, the 
United States Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to execute an 
individual who suffers from mental retardation.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.  
Under Florida law, mental retardation is defined as ―significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive 
behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.‖  Jones v. 
 
- 51 - 
State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007) (quoting § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005)); 
see also Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1008 n.9 (Fla. 2009).  To assert a valid claim 
under Atkins, a defendant must establish that he or she has an IQ of 70 or below.  
Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009); Jones, 966 So. 2d at 329; Zack v. 
State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005).  We have held on several occasions that 
other mental defects are not entitled to the same consideration as mental 
retardation.  See, e.g., Reese, 14 So. 3d at 920 (rejecting Atkins claim where 
postconviction testimony indicated that the defendant was under a ―severe 
emotional disturbance‖ at the time of the offense); Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 
852, 867 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim where the defendant suffered from mental 
and psychological disorders such as organic brain damage, frontal lobe damage, 
micrographia, and stuttering, on grounds that these conditions were different from 
mental retardation); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007) 
(declining to extend Atkins to the mentally ill). 
Here, appellant has made no assertion that he suffers from mental 
retardation.  Instead, his claim is based on diagnoses of Asperger‘s Syndrome, 
ADHD, and frontal lobe damage.  While these conditions may be considered as 
mitigating circumstances at sentencing—and, indeed, were considered as 
mitigation by the trial court—mere mental illness does not serve as a bar to 
execution under Atkins.  See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1152 (Fla. 2006).  
 
- 52 - 
Further, the evidence presented during the penalty phase and postconviction 
proceedings indicate that appellant‘s IQ is significantly higher than 70.  The trial 
court noted in its sentencing order that the experts who testified at the penalty 
phase had agreed that appellant‘s IQ was approximately 130.  Dr. Dee, appellant‘s 
postconviction mental health expert, testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
appellant had received a score of 123 on a more recent IQ test. 
 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Pursuant to appellant‘s second claim, we review whether his appellate 
counsel was constitutionally deficient under Strickland.  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately presented in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  
Consistent with Strickland, to grant habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel this Court must determine, 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 
1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a claim, 
―[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act 
upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  Freeman, 
 
- 53 - 
761 So. 2d at 1069.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not 
be used to camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in 
a postconviction motion.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 
2000).  ―If a legal issue ‗would in all probability have been found to be without 
merit‘ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel 
to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel‘s performance 
ineffective.‖  Id. (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
Here, it is argued that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to properly 
present the issue of a conflict between appellant and his trial counsel.  We find this 
claim to be without merit.  Due to conflicts with their client, trial counsel filed a 
motion to withdraw during the penalty phase.  The trial court denied the motion 
and the issue was raised on direct appeal.  We concluded: 
The trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw.  This 
record does not demonstrate that the attorney-client relationship had 
deteriorated to the point where counsel could no longer give effective 
aid in the fair representation of the defense.  See Wilson v. State, 753 
So. 2d 683, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).  General loss of confidence or 
trust standing alone will not support withdrawal of counsel.  See 
Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. 1986).  
 
Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 870.   
We find that appellant has failed to demonstrate any ―specific, serious 
omission‖ on the part of appellate counsel.  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069.  
Although appellant raises testimony adduced at the postconviction evidentiary 
 
- 54 - 
hearing demonstrating friction between himself and his trial attorneys, none differs 
in substance from the evidence presented on direct appeal.11  Accordingly, we hold 
that appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of 
appellant‘s motion for postconviction relief.  We also deny appellant‘s petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
John M. Griesbaum, Judge – Case No. 05-2000-CF-041829-AX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
                                          
 
 
11.  The only new evidence presented is taken from the postconviction 
testimony of Randall Moore.  Moore was asked whether appellant pled guilty 
because he felt that he should be punished for his crime.  Moore responded: ―I 
don‘t know what his thinking was.‖  Reviewing the transcript, this statement 
appears to be an expression of frustration rather than an admission that he was 
unable to give effective counsel to the defendant.  Laura Blankman also testified 
that appellant‘s relationship with his attorneys was strained.  As we explained on 
direct appeal, evidence of this kind is insufficient to support withdrawal of counsel.  
See Schoenwetter, 931 So. 2d at 870 (citing Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 868 
(Fla. 1986)). 
 
- 55 - 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and James L. Driscoll, Jr., 
Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent