Case Title: DUANE ALLEN ERWIN V. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; and CHERRIN B. GODAK

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0250

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUANE ALLEN ERWIN V. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; and CHERRIN B. GODAK2010 WY 117237 P.3d 409Case Number: S-09-0250Decided: 08/18/2010
 
 
            
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2010

DUANE ALLEN 
ERWIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; and CHERRIN B. GODAK,

 
 
Appellees

(Respondents).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Duane A. Erwin, pro 
se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Elizabeth Bartels Lance, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at 
time of expedited conference.

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, Duane 
Allen Erwin, challenges the district court's order denying his petition to set 
aside a Montana divorce decree.  We 
find no error and affirm.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
Did the district 
court err in denying Appellant's petition to declare the Montana divorce decree 
invalid?1

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Most of the facts 
appear to be undisputed.  Appellant 
and Mother married on September 14, 1989, in Big Horn County, Wyoming.  The marriage produced three 
children.  The oldest child is no 
longer a minor, the second child turned eighteen on June 6, 2010, and their 
third child is deceased.  Mother 
moved to Montana on September 23, 1993.  While living in Montana, she filed for 
divorce on December 15, 1993.  
Appellant was personally served with the divorce complaint on December 
21, 1993, in Wyoming.  He did not 
answer the complaint and default was entered by the Montana district court.  The Montana district court issued a 
divorce decree on March 1, 1994, dissolving the marriage.  The decree required Appellant to pay 
child support in the amount of $216.00 per month.  Mother was awarded custody of the 
children and Appellant was granted supervised visitation.

[¶4]        
In the course of the 
next several years, Mother and the children returned to Wyoming and Appellant 
moved to Minnesota.  On February 10, 
2005, Mother, through the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS), 
registered the Montana divorce decree in Minnesota for the purpose of enforcing 
the child support provisions of the decree.  On February 25, 2005, Appellant 
requested a hearing in Minnesota to contest the validity and enforcement of the 
Montana decree.  On June 13, 2005, 
the district court in Minnesota held a hearing and issued a written order 
denying Appellant's motion.  Ten 
months later, Appellant again requested a hearing on the validity of the Montana 
divorce decree.  The Minnesota 
district court denied Appellant's request.  Appellant did not appeal either 
order.

 
 

[¶5]        
On March 3, 2009, 
Appellant initiated this action, in the Fourth Judicial District of Wyoming, 
again challenging the validity of the Montana decree.  The petition included three motions: a 
motion for vacation of invalid court order; a motion for collateral impeachment 
of invalid court order; and a motion for injunction of the use of invalid court 
order.  The named respondents in the 
petition were Mother and the Wyoming Department of Family Services.  

 
 

[¶6]        
The district court 
held a hearing on all motions July 22, 2009.   The hearing was not reported.  Appellant prepared a statement of 
evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03 and an Order Approving Statement of Evidence 
as Modified by the Court was entered.  
The statement of evidence reflects that Appellant read a prepared opening 
statement.  In response to a 
question from the district court, Appellant confirmed that the issue was 
"whether Montana had the jurisdiction to render the decree."  Appellant contended the decree was 
invalid because Mother had not been a resident of Montana for the requisite 
number of days required by Montana statute.  Mother was placed under oath and 
testified that she signed her affidavit for the Montana divorce on December 15, 
1993.  Appellant declined to ask 
Mother any questions.  DFS did not 
present any other evidence.  
Appellant did not testify and advised the court that "all of his evidence 
was included in the pleadings."  The 
district court issued a written order denying Appellant's petition on August 28, 
2009.  Appellant timely 
appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
In his petition, 
Appellant attached documents regarding attempted enforcement of the Montana 
decree, in the state of Minnesota.  
Those documents establish that the Montana decree was filed with the 
District Court, Seventh Judicial District in Stearns County, Minnesota pursuant 
to the Minnesota Enforcement of Support Act.   Appellant was provided with notice of 
that filing and advised that he could contest the validity of the underlying 
order, but that, if he failed to do so, the order "will be confirmed and will 
preclude you from further contesting the order(s) with respect to any matter 
that could have been asserted at the time of registration."  Appellant responded by filing a request 
"to contest the validity" of the Foreign Order of Support.2  A hearing on Appellant's challenge of 
the Montana decree was held on June 13, 2005.  Appellant was present at that 
hearing.  Following the hearing, the 
Minnesota district court entered an order denying Appellant's motion.  The Order states: "[Appellant's] motion 
contesting the validity and enforcement of the registration of the Foreign Order 
of Support is DENIED." 

 
 

[¶8]        
On April 28, 2006, 
Appellant filed another request in Minnesota for a hearing stating that he 
wished to "request a hearing to contest the validity of [a] Foreign Order of 
Support."  A hearing was held on 
July 6, 2006.  Appellant was present 
at that hearing.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Minnesota district court entered an order denying 
Appellant's request for a hearing.  
The order states, in pertinent part:

 
 
FINDINGS OF 
FACT

 
 

1.    
On February 10, 2005, 
[Mother] registered a foreign Order of Support with this District Court, Seventh 
Judicial District in Stearns County.

 
 

2.    
On February 25, 2005, 
[Appellant] requested a hearing to contest the validity of the 
Order.

 
 

3.    
A hearing was held on 
[Appellant's] motion on June 13, 2005, in front of the Honorable Elizabeth 
Hayden, Judge of District Court, in the County of Stearns, and she issued an 
Order denying [Appellant's] motion contesting the validity and enforcement of 
the registration the same day.

 
 

4.    
On April 28, 2006, 
[Appellant] requested another hearing to contest the validity of the Foreign 
Support Order.

 
 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW

 
 

1.    
A party seeking to 
contest the validity or enforcement of a registered order in Minnesota shall 
request a hearing within 20 days after notice of registration.  Minn. Stat. § 518C.606(a).  [Appellant] filed such a request within 
20 days of the notice of registration.  
A hearing was held, and the Court issued an Order denying [Appellant's] 
request.  Now before this Court is 
[Appellant's] second request for a hearing, which he filed outside of the 20 day 
time period.  The Court has already 
dealt with this issue and issued an order.  
Consequently, [Appellant] is not entitled to a 
hearing.

 
 
Appellant did not 
appeal this order.

 
 

[¶9]        
This Court may affirm 
a district court's decision on any proper legal grounds supported by the 
record.  Olsen v. Kilpatrick, 2007 WY 103, ¶ 10, 
161 P.3d 504, 507 (Wyo. 2007).  In 
the order denying Appellant's petition, the Wyoming district court found that 
Appellant had "previously attacked the [Montana] Order subsequently registered 
in Minnesota and was unsuccessful."  
It did not, however, explicitly address whether Appellant's challenge to 
the validity of the Montana decree was barred as a result of the Minnesota 
litigation.  DFS asserts Appellant 
is precluded from further challenging the validity of the Montana decree by 
application of the doctrine of res judicata.  We agree that Appellant cannot challenge 
the validity of the decree.  
However, we arrive at this conclusion through the application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata.  

 
 

[¶10]     
We have previously 
recognized that:

 
 

The 
doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue 
preclusion) incorporate a universal legal principle of common-law jurisprudence 
to the effect that "a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and 
directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be 
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their 
privies." 

 
 

Wyoming 
Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007 
WY 112, ¶ 17, 162 P.3d 515, 522 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
            
Collateral estoppel and res judicata are analogous, but not synonymous. 
 Although they share a common 
interest in finality, the doctrines themselves are different.  Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997).  We recently reiterated their differences: 

 
 
            
In Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶¶ 15-20, 25 P.3d 511, [517-18] (Wyo. 2001), we 
extensively recognized that res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but 
distinct concepts.

 
 
            
Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or 
causes of action.  Slavens v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 1993).  Four factors are examined to determine 
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; (2) 
identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the 
subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference 
to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  Id.  Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of 
previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four similar factors: 
(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the 
issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication 
resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel 
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.  Id.  

 
 

Polo 
Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 15, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 1255, [1259] (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
            
Collateral estoppel is issue preclusion, while res judicata is claim 
preclusion.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, 
[517] (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Pokorny 
v. Salas, 
2003 WY 159, ¶¶ 12, 13, 81 P.3d 171, 175 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis omitted).  Application 
of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata involves questions of 
law that we review de novo.  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2007 WY 10, ¶ 23, 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

[¶11]     
Appellant 
asserts the doctrine of res judicata does not bar his petition because the 
parties in this proceeding are not identical to the parties in the Minnesota 
proceeding.  DFS maintains that the 
"only difference between the two actions is the appearance of an attorney on 
behalf of Stearns County Human Services in the Minnesota action and an attorney 
on behalf of the State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, in the Wyoming 
action."  We need not determine that 
issue because relitigation of the validity of the Montana divorce decree is 
barred by collateral estoppel.

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
issue decided by the Minnesota district court was identical to the issue 
Appellant presented to the Wyoming district court.  The Minnesota district court held a 
hearing on Appellant's motion and denied Appellant's petition on the 
merits.  Appellant was a party at 
both proceedings and had a full opportunity to contest the validity of the 
Montana decree.  Because the 
collateral estoppel requirements have been satisfied, Appellant is precluded 
from relitigating the validity of the Montana decree.  

 

[¶13]     
In 
light of our determination that Appellant's petition is barred, we need not 
address the merits of Appellant's challenge to the Montana decree based on lack 
of jurisdiction.  We note, however, 
that Appellant's challenge is primarily focused upon his contention that Mother 
was not domiciled in Montana for 90 days prior to the filing of the complaint 
for divorce.  That contention 
appears to be based upon a 2003 version of a Montana statute that was not in 
effect when the divorce petition was filed.3  The statute in effect when the petition 
for divorce was filed and granted required only that the petitioner be domiciled 
in Montana "for 90 days next preceding the making of the findings."  Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-104(1)(a) 
(LexisNexis 1992).  The facts appear 
to be undisputed that Mother met that jurisdictional hurdle.  She moved to Montana on September 23, 
1993.  She filed her petition on 
December 15, 1993, and the divorce decree was entered on March 1, 1994.  

 
 

[¶14]     
Lastly, 
Appellant asks this Court whether he "should 
have a right to a hearing or a cause of action against [Mother] for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress purposefully directed at 
[him]."  This 
issue is not properly before the Court.  
Appellant's initial petition did not assert a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  He subsequently filed a "Supplemental 
Pleading" which included a "Motion for leave to 
proceed in civil action against [Mother] for damages."  There is no certificate of service 
attached to the supplemental pleading and no indication that the pleading was 
ever served upon Appellees.  
Appellee's Answer to Petition and Counterclaim did not address any of 
Appellant's contentions from the "Supplemental Pleading."  The order setting the hearing 
specifically provided that "all pending motions . . . are set for hearing on the 
22nd day of July, 2009[.]"  
Appellant's motion on damages was not brought to the attention of the 
district court, and he presented no evidence or argument pertaining to that 
issue.  

 
 

[¶15]     
As 
we have previously stated: 

 
 
We 
strongly adhere to the rule forbidding us to "consider for the first time on 
appeal issues that were neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court," 
except for those issues which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in 
nature.  [Oatts] v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 
1991).  We follow this rule because 
"it is unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial court for reasons that were not 
presented to it, whether it be legal theories or issues never formally raised in 
the pleadings nor argued to the trial court."

 
 

Hronek 
v. Saint Joseph's Children's Home, 
866 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446-47 (Wyo. 1993)). 

 
 

[¶16]     
Affirmed.

[¶17]     
FOOTNOTES

1Appellant presents 
eight issues which he states as follows:

1.     
The 
District Court ruling to sustain the void suit, Montana 03DR93-1131, citing an 
irrelevant statute as the cogent authority, is an erroneous conclusion of 
law.

 
 

2.     
Whether 
The District Court erred by not making an attempt to analyze the controlling 
statutes, of the acknowledged jurisdictional question presented, regarding the 
validity of the void decree.

 
 

3.     
Whether 
the District court erred in holding that Montana Decree 03DR93-1131 was validly 
entered under the Montana statutes in place at the time.

 
 

4.     
Whether 
the District Court erred in ruling [Appellant] did not demonstrate the 
registration of the void decree was improper.

 
 

5.     
Whether 
the District Court acted beyond the scope of authority in ruling the void decree 
Montana 03 DR93-1131 valid.

 
 

6.     
Whether 
the District Court erred in holding that further inquiries into the validity of 
the void decree should be brought up in Montana.

 
 

7.     
Whether 
the District Court actions, to uphold the invalid decree, citing an erroneous 
conclusion of law, choosing not to analyze the statutes of the acknowledged 
jurisdictional question, and disregarding the controlling statute of significant 
weight, constitute abuses of discretion by the District 
Court.

 
 

8.     
Whether 
[Appellant] should have a right to a hearing or a cause of action against 
[Mother], for the intentional infliction of emotional distress purposefully 
directed at [Appellant].

2The Foreign Order of 
Support is the Montana divorce decree providing for child support 
payments.

3Mont. 
Code Ann. § 40-4-104(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2003) provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
Dissolution 
of marriagelegal separation.

 
 
(1)  The 
district court shall enter a decree of dissolution of marriage 
if:

 
 

(a)    
the 
court finds that one of the parties, at the time the action was commenced, was 
domiciled in this state, as provided in 25-2-118, 
or was stationed in this state while a member of the armed services and that the 
domicile or military presence has been maintained for 90 days preceding the filing 
of the action[.]

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶18]