Case Title: Ex Parte Flexible Products Co.

Citation: 915 So. 2d 34

Docket Number: 1040450

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
915 So. 2d 34 (2005)
Ex parte FLEXIBLE PRODUCTS COMPANY et al.
In re Randy Wade Bice et al.
v.
Micon Products International, Inc., et al.
Robert W. Acklin, Jr., et al.
v.
Micon Products International, Inc., et al.
Richard G. Abernathy et al.
v.
Micon Products International, Inc., et al.
1040450.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 3, 2005.
*36 Daniel J. Reynolds, Jr., Bessemer; and Alfred F. Smith, Jr., of Bainbridge, Mims, Rogers & Smith, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Flexible Products Company.
C.C. Torbert, Jr., Fournier J. Gale, and H. Thomas Wells, Jr., of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Dow Chemical Company.
R. Marcus Givhan and Mary Brunson Whatley of Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, LLP, Birmingham; and Michael R. Borasky of Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for petitioner Bayer MaterialScience, LLC.
Warren B. Lightfoot and Wynn M. Shuford of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, for petitioner BASF.
John W. Dodson and Jinny M. Ray of Ferguson, Frost & Dodson, L.L.P., Birmingham, for petitioners Earth Support Services d/b/a Micon, Inc., and Micon Products International, Inc.
David A. Lee and Alex Wyatt of Parsons, Lee & Juliano, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Sub-Technical.
Donald D. Lusk and Leslie A. Caldwell, Birmingham, for petitioner Green Mountain International, Inc.
James M. Smith of Stockham & Stockham, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner RHH Foam Systems, Inc.
R. Larry Bradford of Bradford & Donahue, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioners Supply, Inc., and Industrial Mining Supply.
Donald W. Stewart, Anniston, for respondents.
Matthew C. McDonald and Kirkland E. Reid of Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, L.L.C., Mobile, for amicus curiae Alabama Civil Justice Reform Committee, in support of the petitioners.
Deborah A. Smith of Christian & Small, LLP, Birmingham; Robert A. Bartlett and Nicholas G. Walker of McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; Herbert L. Fenster of McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP, Washington, D.C.; and Robin S. Conrad, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, in support of the petitioners.
David R. Boyd, Michael L. Edwards, H. Hampton Boles, Steven R. Casey, and Ed R. Haden of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, for amici curiae Business Council of Alabama and Alabama Coal Association, in support of the petitioners.
Robert A. Huffaker of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for amicus curiae American Chemistry Council, in support of the petitioners.
HARWOOD, Justice.
This petition for a writ of mandamus arises from a number of actions in which *37 1,675 plaintiffs, all individuals who claim that they were injured by exposure to isocyanate[1] while employed as coal miners, have sued 11 defendants, including Flexible Products Company and Micon Products International, Inc., all of which are involved in the manufacture, use, and distribution of isocyanate. The defendants seek an order from this Court requiring the trial court to set aside its case-management order ("CMO"), which consolidates the underlying actions and sets out various guidelines for litigating those actions in the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court, or, in the alternative, requiring the trial court to modify its CMO so that the trials of the actions are consolidated according to terms the defendants deem appropriate. The defendants also challenge the trial court's determination that venue for all of the plaintiffs is proper in Jefferson County and seek an order requiring the transfer of certain of the actions to Tuscaloosa County. Finally, the defendants challenge that aspect of the CMO that envisions the appointment of a special master to try the plaintiffs' individual claims in groups of 25.
The underlying cases began with three actions brought by the plaintiffs: Bice v. Micon, Inc. (CV-01-1194), filed in September 2001; Abernathy v. Micon, Inc. (CV-01-1341), filed in October 2001; and Acklin v. Micon, Inc. (CV-02-1518), filed in October 2002. In all three cases, the plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence, wantonness, outrage, failure to warn, violation of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("the AEMLD"), misrepresentation, concealment, breach of warranties, and conspiracy. On August 24, 2004, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate the three cases pursuant to Rule 42, Ala.R.Civ.P., and on November 17, 2004, the trial court issued the CMO addressing the motion to consolidate. In pertinent part, the CMO states:
The CMO further designates a master file as a repository for all pleadings and schedules a regular status conference every four weeks to oversee the litigation and to provide the parties with regular opportunities for filing additional motions as necessary. Under the heading, "5. Refinement of Issues," the CMO states:
Finally, in section 8, the CMO provides:
The CMO also provided for the selection of lead counsel by the lawyers for the defendants, and the CMO set out a scheduling order of completion dates for various aspects of the litigation of the common-issues trial. All of the plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel. Finally, the CMO sets out schedules for the trials of the 25-member groups noted in the CMO following the trial of common issues.
The defendants assert that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to set aside the CMO, which they say the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering. This Court reviews the defendants' petition under the following standard:
Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala.1998).
The trial court's authority to manage its cases through consolidation is governed by Rule 42(a), Ala.R.Civ.P.:
We have said that "[c]ircuit judges have broad powers under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure . . . to order actions consolidated." State v. Reynolds, 887 So. 2d 848, 854 (Ala.2004). A trial court's authority to consolidate actions is clearly within its discretion.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. James, 646 So. 2d 669, 674 (Ala.1994). See also State v. Reynolds, supra; Callahan v. Weiland, 291 Ala. 183, 279 So. 2d 451 (1973); and Teague v. Motes, 57 Ala.App. 609, 330 So. 2d 434 (Ala.Civ.App.1976).
In Ex parte Monsanto Co., 794 So. 2d 350 (Ala.2001), this Court addressed an analogous case in which the defendants challenged, by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus, the trial court's consolidation of the claims of property damage and personal injury of some 2,700 plaintiffs arising from the defendants' use of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"). In that case, the defendants sought a case-management order from the trial court analogous to the case-management order entered by a federal district court that was entertaining similar claims against the defendants by various plaintiffs.[2] The defendants also sought, alternatively, a severance of all the plaintiffs' claims or a "benchmark" trial as a means of resolving the litigation. The trial court had declined their requested relief on the ground that it was in the process of conducting pretrial conferences. We noted the standard governing the availability of a writ of mandamus as a means to compel the exercise of the trial court's discretion as follows: "`In cases involving the exercise of discretion by an inferior court, [the writ of] mandamus may issue to compel the exercise of that discretion. It may not, however, issue to control or review the exercise of discretion, except in a case of abuse.'" 794 So. 2d  at 351-52 (quoting Ex parte Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Ala.1989)).
In this case, the defendants first argue that the trial court exceeded its discretion in consolidating the actions at issue because, they say, there are no true "common issues." The defendants assert that each of the 1,675 plaintiffs presents a unique set of circumstances that can be addressed only by a trial unique to that plaintiff. They argue that the plaintiffs' claims are based on different working conditions and locations, different degrees of exposure to isocyanate, and different injuries allegedly caused by that exposure. The defendants also assert that their differing involvement with the chemical, whether as manufacturer, distributor, or user, argues against any conclusion that these cases present common issues.
The plaintiffs reply that the trial court correctly ascertained the potential of common issues arising from the fact that all of the plaintiffs were employed as coal miners and all allege that they suffered injury from exposure to isocyanate as a result of their employment. The plaintiffs contend that issues common to all of the plaintiffs' claims include the extent of the danger to human health resulting from exposure to isocyanate, whether the defendants had knowledge of any dangers presented by isocyanate, whether the defendants concealed any danger, whether the defendants gave adequate warning of any dangers, and whether the defendants conspired to conceal any dangers resulting from exposure to the chemical.
At this point in the litigation, however, the phase set out in the CMO for permitting identification of common issues has not taken place. Thus, we are presented with a situation in which the defendants can establish that the trial court has exceeded its discretion only by showing that no common issue exists. That is, because before a writ of mandamus will *41 issue the petitioner must establish a "clear legal right" to relief, mandamus relief is not available in situations where such rights have not vested.
Ex parte Vance, 900 So. 2d 394, 398-99 (Ala.2004).
Further, we have recognized that consolidation can provide an appropriate means for resolving cases involving multiple claims and defendants. In Monsanto, supra, this Court denied the defendants' petition for mandamus relief and approved the trial court's "plan of action . . . to hear, at one proceeding, the evidence relating to liability issues as to all claims and then, if the liability issue was decided adversely to [the defendants], to try each individual plaintiff's causation and damages issues." 794 So. 2d  at 357. We stated:
794 So. 2d  at 357. Thus, in circumstances analogous to the instant situation, this Court has approved using a case-management order and consolidating actions as a means for effectively dealing with a large number of claims arising in a "toxic tort" context.
However, the defendants assert that, because of the particular circumstances of the underlying actions, the consolidation of those actions under the CMO will deny them the opportunity for a fair trial. Specifically, the defendants argue that because each plaintiff's claim is factually unique, the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering the CMO requiring consolidation. They also assert that consolidation will prejudice them because, they say, it will be practically unworkable and will cause undue expense and juror confusion. The defendants' emphasis on the factual circumstances of the particular case of each individual plaintiff does not compel the conclusion that there is no common issue, or issues, suitable for resolution through a consolidated trial. In addition to Monsanto, we note that many courts in similar situations involving exposure to allegedly dangerous substances have recognized the utility and validity of consolidation as a tool for avoiding needlessly duplicative trials. For example, in Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. James, supra, this Court rejected the defendant's argument that the consolidation of the plaintiffs' claims for damages arising from their alleged exposure to asbestos resulted in confusion of the jury. The Court stated:
646 So. 2d  at 674. We note that other jurisdictions have also recognized the value of consolidation when the underlying claims arise from exposure to dangerous substances. See, e.g., In re New York Asbestos Litigation, 149 F.R.D. 490 (S.D.N.Y.1993), aff'd, 72 F.3d 1003 (2d Cir.1995), vacated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1031, 116 S. Ct. 2576, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1091 (1996); ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 121 Md.App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998), abrogated on other grounds, John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 800 A.2d 727 (2002); West Virginia ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. MacQueen, 198 W.Va. 1, 479 S.E.2d 300 (1996).
We conclude that the defendants have not shown that there is no possibility that the plaintiffs' claims present common issues, and we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, consolidation in itself is not prejudicial to the defendants as a matter of law. In fact, the trial court's statement of the possibly common issues  "the dangers to human health posed by isocyanate exposure, Defendants' knowledge regarding those dangers, the adequacy of Defendants' warnings and Defendants' misrepresentation regarding the safety and their concealments of the known dangers of their products"  lists aspects of the case that potentially meet the commonality requirement. See, e.g., University Fed. Credit Union v. Grayson, 878 So. 2d 280 (Ala.2003)(discussing whether alleged misrepresentations in claims brought by the plaintiffs had sufficient commonality to support inclusion in a class for class certification under Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P.). For example, if, after the trial of common issues, it is determined that exposure to isocyanate is not harmful to humans, then such a determination would effectively conclude this litigation.
Moreover, we reject the argument presented by the defendants that the propriety of the CMO rests upon a determination of whether any common issues "predominate" over the other issues in the actions to be consolidated. A weighing of the relative dominance of the particular issues presented by actions to be consolidated (an exercise that would be speculative in actions such as this where the common issues have yet to be framed) is not required by Rule 42. Such a weighing exercise would also fly in the face of the trial court's discretionary authority to manage its cases. Monsanto and Owens-Corning, supra. Although the facts of the instant actions potentially present common issues, some of which could dispose of the litigation entirely if found adversely to the plaintiffs, and therefore be said to "predominate," such as whether exposure to isocyanate is harmful, the appropriate standard for assessing the propriety of the a trial court's consolidation is whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering consolidation. Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Monsanto; and Owens-Corning, supra.
*43 Further, we do not regard cases discussing the improper joinder of plaintiffs' claims, e.g., Crossfield Products Corp. v. Irby, 910 So. 2d 498 (Miss.2005), and Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31 (Miss.2004), cases brought to our attention by the defendants, as persuasive authority inimical to the trial court's consolidation of various claims and issues in these actions. Permissive joinder of parties, governed by Rule 20, Ala. R. Civ. P., implicates different requirements than consolidation under Rule 42, most notably that joinder is appropriate only where the plaintiffs present claims "arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. . . ."
However, in shaping the common issues under the CMO, the trial court must be cognizant of the considerations that are necessary to avoid prejudice to all of the parties. An instructive discussion of such considerations was presented by the Supreme Court of Texas in In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203 (Tex.2004). In that case, the court considered a petition for a writ of mandamus sought by nine defendants challenging the trial court's consolidation of the claims of 20 of 454 plaintiffs against approximately 55 defendants. The plaintiffs had formerly worked at a company's manufacturing plant in McAllen, Texas. All the plaintiffs were represented by the same counsel, and all alleged injuries were caused by exposure to a combination of chemicals and products, a so-called "toxic soup," during their work at the plant. The defendants were various manufacturers and suppliers of the chemicals that allegedly harmed the plaintiffs. The court in Van Waters discussed the factors influencing its review of the consolidation as follows:
145 S.W.3d  at 207-08.
In Van Waters, the court analyzed the Maryland factors and determined that the defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its consolidation order because the unrelated claims of the plaintiffs, based upon exposure to different chemicals in different combinations that resulted in different injuries, was so likely to confuse the jury as to prejudice the defendants' rights. The court stated:
145 S.W.3d  at 211 (footnote omitted).
We note that the instant case is substantially different from the situation in Van Waters, most significantly because the CMO here presents a trial of issues common to all the actions rather than a trial of *45 the entire cases of a group of plaintiffs. Thus, the CMO avoids many of the concerns noted in Van Waters by having separate trials for individual plaintiffs on the issues of causation and damages. In addition, the plaintiffs' claims in these actions arise from exposure to a particular chemical, isocyanate, rather than a "toxic soup," and the plaintiffs share the same occupation. And, of course, the court in Van Waters was considering the propriety of common issues that had already been identified and assessed by the trial court as appropriate for consolidated disposition, rather than considering what common issues might be selected by the trial court, as is the situation in the cases before us.
The defendants also assert that the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering the CMO because, they say, the CMO contravenes Alabama's doctrine of collateral estoppel and prevents them from asserting particular defenses. Specifically, the defendants argue that the CMO constitutes an "end run" around the requirement of mutual parties for collateral estoppel, permitting instead nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel concerning the plaintiffs' allegations of the defendants' negligence per se.
Collateral estoppel is an equitable defense interposed against a party attempting to relitigate an issue that has been resolved in an earlier case involving the same parties. This Court has stated:
Martin v. Reed, 480 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Ala.1985). Although the federal courts have held that mutuality  the requirement that the parties in both actions are the same  is no longer a prerequisite, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979), Alabama continues to require that a party may be barred from relitigating an issue, such as duty or breach, only if that issue has previously been found adversely to that same party. Smith v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 653 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala.1995). See also Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059, 1077 (Ala.2004).
However, it should be noted that in Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala.1994), this Court questioned the necessity for the so-called rule of "mutuality of estoppel." In that case, Jones, the executrix of an estate, brought a legal-malpractice action against Blanton, the attorney who had represented the estate in a will contest and who had entered into a settlement with the parties contesting the will. The trial court granted Blanton's motion for a summary judgment, and Jones appealed. The Court described the circumstances of the case as follows:
644 So. 2d  at 884-85.
In addressing Blanton's argument concerning collateral estoppel, the Court stated:
644 So. 2d  at 887 (emphasis omitted). Although the Court in Blanton appeared to consider dispensing with the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, it determined that doing so was unnecessary in light of its determination that Jones's claim under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act was barred by the lapse of the applicable limitations period.
Since Blanton, the Court has decided the case of Biles v. Sullivan, 793 So. 2d 708 (Ala.2000). The Sullivans, the plaintiffs in Biles, had earlier sued the Mazak Corporation alleging various claims of fraud. The jury found in favor of Mazak and a judgment in its favor was entered accordingly. Thereafter, the Sullivans discovered that Biles, a partner in the law firm of Wilkins, Bankester, Biles & Wynne, P.A., who had been hired by Mazak's counsel as a jury consultant, was the brother-in-law of the jury foreman. When the jury was being struck, the trial court had asked Biles if he was "connected with this case," and Biles had answered in the negative. The trial court subsequently granted the Sullivans a new trial on the basis of their Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, "but concluded that Biles had not engaged in any improper conduct." 793 So. 2d  at 710. The Sullivans then sued Biles, his law firm, and others, asserting claims of fraud arising from Biles's statement during the trial against Mazak. Biles and his firm defended the claim by asserting collateral estoppel predicated on the trial court's determination *48 in the Rule 60(b) proceeding in the case against Mazak that Biles had not engaged in any improper conduct. This Court's opinion, written by Justice England and concurred in by Chief Justice Hooper and Justices Maddox, Houston, and Brown, held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to bar the Sullivans' claims against Biles and his law firm, along with the other defendants in the second action, because "[t]he parties involved" in the Rule 60(b) proceeding "are the same parties that Sullivan named in the complaint in the [second] action." 793 So. 2d  at 713. Justice Houston wrote a special concurrence, noting that a violation of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct could not support the Sullivans' claims under Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C., 521 So. 2d 22 (Ala.1988). In part, Justice Johnstone joined Justice Houston's special concurrence, but noted:
793 So. 2d  at 714. Thus, the Court determined implicitly that the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel was not an impediment to application of collateral estoppel in favor of Biles and his firm, given that they had been "involved" in the Rule 60(b) proceeding.
Moreover, this Court has otherwise recognized that the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel may be satisfied by less than a perfect identity of the parties in the first and second actions, as when particular parties are in privity. In Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So. 2d 158 (Ala.2001), a case in which the Court noted a long series of lawsuits arising from earlier business transactions between the parties that had preceded the controversy then before it, the Court considered Merrill Lynch's defense of collateral estoppel arising from a prior action involving Leon C. Baker and Merrill Lynch in which the trial court had determined that Baker, the sole shareholder of Leon C. Baker, P.C., was the owner of a brokerage account in the name of Leon C. Baker, P.C. When Leon C. Baker, P.C., asserted a claim in arbitration against Merrill Lynch for damages based on allegations of improper transfers to the account, Merrill Lynch sought an injunction in the trial court barring the arbitration claim on the ground of collateral estoppel. The trial court granted Merrill Lynch's relief, and Leon C. Baker, P.C., appealed. Thus, the Court considered whether the defense of collateral estoppel applied in light of the fact that Leon C. Baker, P.C., had not been a party to the first lawsuit. The Court stated:
821 So. 2d  at 165. The Court determined that Baker and Leon C. Baker, P.C., were "in privity" so that doctrine of mutuality of estoppel was satisfied.[4]
In the instant action, the CMO sets up a plan by which a trial court will conduct a common-issues trial pitting the 27 plaintiffs in the original Bice case against all the defendants. These plaintiffs potentially would present evidence "as to liability and [factual] causation," while later plaintiffs would have the burden merely to demonstrate "specific [proximate] causation and damages." Any determination at the common-issues trial as to liability or factual causation would then bind all the defendants, and according to the defendants, would bind them regardless of whether any of the 1,648 remaining plaintiffs could demonstrate that that plaintiff's situation aligns with that of a plaintiff involved in the common-issues trial.
Here again we must reiterate that the common-issues trial is not as "binding" as it appears at first blush. Despite the implication that it will be binding to the later trials, the schedule for these trials indicates that the defendants will be afforded a pretrial opportunity to challenge whether the issues determined at the common-issues trial to be common are truly common with respect to the plaintiffs in the later trials. The CMO sets out a scheduling order that, each month, simultaneously designates 25 additional plaintiffs and lifts the stay on discovery as to those 25 plaintiffs. The defendants are then entitled to conduct broad discovery with respect to each plaintiff and to file "dispositive motions" with the trial court.
Nevertheless, at section 3, "Consolidation," the trial court stated:
Subsequent provisions of the CMO establish a procedure for identifying at a later date "the issues appropriate for aggregate determination." See, e.g., section 5, "Refinement of Issues." Obviously, in light of the subsequent provisions, the language of section 3, which, on its face, consolidates the cases for trial without limitation, sweeps too broadly. While this result may be nothing other than syntactical oversight, we issue the writ to the extent necessary to require the trial court to modify the CMO so as to make clear that the consolidation for trial contemplated by section 3 is subject to the limitations provided for elsewhere in the CMO and is dependent upon findings that warrant consolidation for trial in subsequent proceedings. At this initial stage of the litigation, subject to the aforementioned modification, the CMO appears to comport with the purpose of consolidation as a device to manage the cases more effectively.
Teague v. Motes, 57 Ala.App. 609, 613, 330 So. 2d 434, 438 (Ala.Civ.App.1976). See also Herren v. Beck, 231 Ala. 328, 164 So. 904 (1935), and Ex parte Green, 221 Ala. 415, 129 So. 69 (1930), holding generally that consolidation of actions does not destroy the identity of those actions, but rather provides a means of avoiding repetitious litigation. Consequently, the defendants have not shown that they will be deprived of the opportunity to fully litigate every issue in the consolidated cases or that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will deprive them of that opportunity. We will not, therefore, issue mandamus relief on the possibility that such a situation might arise. Ex parte Vance, supra.
The defendants also assert that a common-issues trial will deprive them of any effective right to appeal. Although we might simply note that this argument is also based upon speculation as to what may occur in the future and thus mandamus relief is inappropriate, the opportunity to seek mandamus relief would be available with respect to issues upon which the defendants could show a clear legal right to relief. Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins., supra. Further, the remedy of appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., could also be available as to issues meeting the criteria of that rule. We conclude that the possibility that the circumstances under which the defendants would be able to appeal would not be those circumstances they would prefer does not support this Court's interfering at this stage with the trial court's discretion in managing its cases.
The defendants also argue that the trial court exceeded its discretion in issuing the CMO because, they say, the trial court erred in determining that venue in Jefferson County was proper under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-7(c). That statute provides, in pertinent part:
We must determine whether the defendants have shown a clear legal right to mandamus relief requiring the trial court to modify its CMO, at least to the extent of transferring the cases of those plaintiffs as to whom venue is not otherwise proper in Jefferson County.
Ex parte Nelson, 448 So. 2d 339, 340 (Ala.1984). See also Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059 (Ala.2004), and Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532 (Ala.2001). Our standard of review for a challenge to the trial court's denial of a motion for a change of venue is whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion. Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307 (Ala.2003).
In Unum, we addressed the effect of § 6-3-7(c) in the context of an action filed by numerous insureds to compel their insurer to arbitrate their claims that they were fraudulently induced to purchase salary-replacement policies by the insurer and its agents ("Unum"). Among other issues, Unum challenged the propriety of the trial court's order ruling that venue in Bullock County was proper with respect to the claims brought by more than 400 of the insureds in the Wright case.
Unum, 897 So. 2d  at 1079-80.
In this case, we must consider whether the defendants have shown that the trial court exceeded its discretion in holding that venue in Jefferson County was proper under § 6-3-7(c). We note that each plaintiff asserts that he or she was harmed as a result of the same occurrence or transaction,[5] i.e., exposure to isocyanate while employed as a coal miner, and each plaintiff asserts a separate, "several" claim for damages based on personal injury as a result of that occurrence. With *53 respect to "predominance," the issues tentatively identified at this point apply to critical elements of each plaintiff's claim; the plaintiffs' failure to meet the proof requirements of these common issues will likely end this litigation.[6]
Nevertheless, because the CMO defers to a later date the refinement of the common issues, a determination as to the propriety of venue as to plaintiffs Daniel R. Boyd, Debra C. Butler, and Bryan M. Kelley, all of whom testified that their only isocyanate exposure occurred outside of the Bessemer division of Jefferson County, is premature. Consequently, as to these plaintiffs, the trial court's holding that venue is proper in the Bessemer division of Jefferson County is premature; therefore, in so holding the trial court exceeded its discretion, and we grant the petition and instruct the trial court to vacate that part of the CMO that holds that the venue as to the plaintiffs Boyd, Butler, and Kelley is proper in the Bessemer division of Jefferson County.
Finally, the defendants assert that in the CMO the trial court exceeded its discretion by providing for a special master to conduct trials on issues specific to each individual plaintiff. The defendants assert, without reference to any binding authority, that the designation of a special master in the CMO is an impermissible delegation of judicial authority under Rule 53(e), Ala.R.Civ.P.[7] The plaintiffs assert that the appointment of a special master in the context of the CMO is within the trial court's authority under Rule 53(c), which states:
However, that subsection of Rule 53 is preceded by Rule 53(b), which states:
Further, Rule 53(e)(3) states:
We construe these subsections in pari materia. See, e.g., Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 624 So. 2d 582 (Ala.1993)(discussing the court's duty to construe statutory provisions consistently with each other so as to give coherence to the statute as a whole). Under such a construction, Rule 53 does not envision that a trial court could appoint a special master with the authority to conduct a jury trial. Moreover, we cannot conclude that Rule 53, a rule of procedure, is sufficiently broad to vest the trial court with authority to appoint a special master with the same authority as is "exclusively vested" in the judicial system. Ala. Const.1901, Amend. No. 328, § 6.01.
This Court has stated:
Opinion of the Justices No. 187, 280 Ala. 653, 658, 197 So. 2d 456, 461 (1967). Further, the courts of this State have recognized that judicial functions, such as declaring a mistrial, Parham v. State, 47 Ala.App. 76, 250 So. 2d 613, 617 (Ala.Crim.App.1971), or striking jurors, Russaw v. State, 572 So. 2d 1288 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), may not be delegated in the absence of specific statutory authority. To the extent that the CMO would appoint a special master who would conduct jury trials with respect to the claims of the specified 25-member plaintiff groups with the same authority as that constitutionally vested in the trial court, such an appointment would be an improper delegation of judicial power and would exceed the trial court's discretion.[8] Because we do not necessarily *55 understand that the CMO contemplates that the special master will preside over jury trials, as opposed to handling functions otherwise assignable to a special master under Rule 53, mandamus relief on this point would be premature.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
WOODALL, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  Isocyanate is the term used by the parties for diphenylmethane diisocyanate, also described, in its various chemical forms, as MDI and PMDI. MDI is used in the manufacture of polyurethane elastomers such as rollers, packing, rubber vibration insulators, synthetic leather, spandex fibers, and rubber shoe soles. PMDI is used to make rigid and flexible foam, foundry resin sand binders, and heat insulating material. The isocyanate products at issue in this case were used as sealants and stabilizers for walls and ceilings in coal mines.
[2]  The scheduling order of the federal district court in Owens v. Monsanto Co. (CV-96-P-0440-E) is attached as an appendix to this Court's opinion in Monsanto.
[3]  As noted by the court in Ethyl, the "Maryland factors" were first articulated in an unreported decision of a federal district court, In re All Asbestos Cases Pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (D.Md. Dec. 16, 1983) (en banc).
[4]  We also note that in Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316 (Ala.1985), while addressing the claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the Court stated:

"In order for one suit to bar subsequent litigation, the parties must have been substantially the same in both cases. This means that the parties in both cases must be either the same, or in privity of estate, blood, or law with the original parties. Clark v. Whitfield, 213 Ala. 441, 444, 105 So. 200, 203 (1925)."
477 So. 2d  at 319.
[5]  The parties cite no authority in this State directly defining the phrase "transaction or occurrence," and we have independently found none. However, the broad definition used by the federal courts in analyzing challenges to permissive joinder under Rule 20, Fed.R.Civ.P., substantially identical to Rule 20, Ala. R. Civ. P., is helpful:

"The first requirement for joinder is that the claims must `aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). `"Transaction" is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.' Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir.1969). `[L]anguage in a number of decisions suggests that the courts are inclined to find that claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence when the likelihood of overlapping proof and duplication in testimony indicates that separate trials would result in delay, inconvenience, and added expense to the parties and to the court.' 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1653."
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Barrett, 220 F.R.D. 630, 631-32 (D.Kan.2004). See also Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D.Miss.2003); and Advamtel, LLC v. AT & T Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D.Va.2000)(noting generally that the "transaction or occurrence" test rule is designed to permit all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be tried in single proceeding).
[6]  "Predominance" is most frequently defined in the context of class-action certifications. "`The predominance requirement is met if there is a common nucleus of operative facts relevant to the dispute and those common questions represent a significant aspect of the case which can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.' Heartland Communications, Inc. [v. Sprint Corp.], 161 F.R.D. [111] at 117 [(D.Kan.1995)]; see Cheminova America Corp. v. Corker, 779 So. 2d 1175, 1181 (Ala.2000)." Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So. 2d 1111, 1120 (Ala.2003). "Common issues of fact and law predominate if they `ha[ve] a direct impact on every class member's effort to establish liability and on every class member's entitlement to injunctive and monetary relief.' Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 699 (N.D.Ga.2001)." Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir.2004).
[7]  The defendants do refer to Trammell v. State, 785 So. 2d 398 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), but that case discusses the invalid appointment of a special circuit judge under §§ 12-1-14 and 12-17-22, Ala.Code 1975; that judge was disqualified from deciding the case because he was not a resident of the county in which he conducted the proceedings at issue.
[8]  We note that this holding that the trial court cannot appoint a special master to serve in that role does not necessarily forestall the possibility of a special judge who would have the authority to conduct jury trials of the claims of the 25-member plaintiff groups, but such a special judge would have to be vested with his or her authority pursuant to statute, such as Ala.Code 1975, §§ 12-1-14, 12-1-14.1, or 12-1-14.2.