Case Title: Brooks v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 333, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALAN T. BROOKS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 333, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 86002026DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: July 25, 2012 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 21, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 21st day of August 2012, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Alan T. Brooks, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s June 4, 2012 order adopting the Commissioner’s 
January 20, 2012 report, which recommended that Brooks’ fifth motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be 
denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
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the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that this appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in March 1987, Brooks was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Murder in the First Degree, 
Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of Kidnapping in the Second 
Degree, two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Attempted 
Robbery in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced to life in prison plus fifty-two 
years.  This Court affirmed Brooks’ convictions on direct appeal.3  Brooks 
subsequently filed four motions for postconviction relief in the Superior 
Court.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of all four of those 
motions.4 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his fifth 
motion for postconviction relief, Brooks claims that the Superior Court erred 
and abused its discretion by denying his postconviction motion due to the 
existence of a) sealed exculpatory Brady material reflecting a deal between 
the State and one of its witnesses; and b) affidavits recently acquired by him 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Skinner, et al. v. State, 575 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990). 
4 Brooks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 383, 1993, Veasey, C.J. (Jan. 7, 1994); Brooks v. State, 
Del. Supr., No. 450, 2001, Veasey, C.J. (Nov. 27, 2001); Brooks v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 
106 & 236, 2008, Holland, J. (Dec. 18, 2008); Brooks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 735, 2009, 
Ridgely, J. (Apr. 16, 2010). 
 
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that recant the inculpatory trial testimony of two witnesses for the State.  
Brooks also contends that the Superior Court should have conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on his claims and should have expanded the record to 
include the properly-notarized affidavits that he submitted after he filed his 
postconviction motion.  
 
(4) 
The Superior Court is required to apply the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61 prior to considering the substantive merits of claims 
made in postconviction proceedings.5  In this case, the Superior Court 
properly concluded that Brooks’ motion was time-barred.6  Moreover, as the 
Superior Court properly concluded, Brooks’ first claim was procedurally 
barred as previously adjudicated7 because it was raised, unsuccessfully, in 
his fourth postconviction motion.  Finally, in the absence of any evidence 
that reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice8 or 
that there was a miscarriage of justice due to a constitutional violation,9 the 
Superior Court properly applied Rule 61’s time and procedural bars and 
denied the claim.   
 
(5) 
Brooks’ second claim is that he merits relief in the form of a 
new trial because of recantation affidavits recently acquired by him.  This 
                                                 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
8 Id. 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
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Court has ruled that a motion for a new trial based upon a witness’s 
recantation is generally viewed with suspicion.10  Moreover, a new trial 
should be granted only where a) the court is reasonably well-satisfied that 
the trial testimony of a material witness was false; b) without the testimony, 
the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and c) the party against 
whom the testimony was given was taken by surprise when it was given and 
was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.11  
 
(6) 
In this case, the affidavits submitted by Brooks related to events 
that took place approximately twenty-five years ago and were signed by 
individuals who previously had provided contrary testimony under oath.  
The affidavits on their face raised questions, reflecting almost identical form 
and language.  The Superior Court had no reason to suspect that the 
testimony originally given was false and had every reason to view the 
newly-minted affidavits with suspicion.  Moreover, Brooks failed to 
demonstrate that, without the trial testimony, the jury might have reached a 
different conclusion and that he was surprised by the testimony given at trial.  
As such, we conclude that the Superior Court properly ruled that Brooks 
failed to satisfy the requirements of Blankenship.   
                                                 
10 Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433 (Del. 1982). 
11 Id. 
 
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(7) 
Finally, whether to hold an evidentiary hearing or to expand the 
record within the context of a postconviction motion are matters within the 
Superior Court’s discretion.12  We find no abuse of discretion with respect to 
the Superior Court’s denial of Brooks’ motion for an evidentiary hearing on 
his postconviction claims and its refusal to expand the record to include 
questionable affidavits that were not filed in proper form until Brooks’ 
postconviction motion already had been submitted for decision. 
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (1) and (h) (1) & (3).