Case Title: State v. Hunter

Citation: 2011-Ohio-6524

Docket Number: 2007-2021

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-6524.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-6524 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HUNTER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-6524.] 
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Death penalty affirmed. 
[No. 2007-2021—Submitted October 18, 2011—Decided December 20, 2011.] 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, No. B-0600596. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal of right by defendant-appellant, Lamont Hunter.  A 
three-judge panel convicted Hunter for the aggravated murder and rape of three-
year-old Trustin Blue under R.C. 2903.01(C) and 2907.02(A)(1)(b).  The panel 
also convicted Hunter of child endangerment under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).  The 
panel sentenced Hunter to death based on two death-penalty specifications: R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) (aggravated murder while committing or attempting to commit 
rape) and 2929.04.(A)(9) (aggravated murder of a child under the age of 13). 
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, we affirm Hunter’s convictions and 
sentence of death. 
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The State’s Case 
{¶ 3} In late 2003, Hunter and Luzmilda Blue began a romantic 
relationship.  Hunter then started living with Luzmilda and her three boys, Tyree, 
Tyrell, and Trustin Blue, born September 12, 2002.  Hunter was not the biological 
father of any of these children.  Hunter and Luzmilda later became the parents of 
a girl, Trinity Hunter. 
{¶ 4} After Trustin was born, Luzmilda became sick, and Wilma Forte, a 
family friend, began taking care of Trustin.  Trustin had lived with Forte and her 
daughter, Amber White, five or six days a week until his death. 
{¶ 5} On January 30, 2004, Trustin was taken to the emergency room at 
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital because he was unable to bear weight on his left 
leg.  X-rays showed that Trustin had a broken leg.  Hunter told medical personnel 
that he had fallen on some steps while holding Trustin and had landed on him.  
Doctors accepted Hunter’s explanation that Trustin’s injuries were accidental. 
{¶ 6} On June 9, 2004, Luzmilda took Trustin to the emergency room after 
noticing that his lips and penis were swollen.  She also noticed other injuries on 
Trustin’s face and head.  Trustin had been left in Hunter’s care that day.  
Luzmilda had not noticed any of these injuries when she left the house earlier that 
morning. 
{¶ 7} Dr. Kathy Makoroff, the examining physician, determined that 
Trustin had a swollen upper and lower lip, an abrasion in one ear and a scratch on 
his ear canal, hair loss and bruising on one side of his head, and bruising on the 
tops of both ears. His penis was swollen, and had an abrasion at its base. 
{¶ 8} Dr. Makoroff could not rule out the possibility that a bug had gotten 
into a loose-fitting diaper and had caused the swelling.  But a bug bite would not 
have caused the bruising on the penis.  Moreover, x-rays showed that Trustin had 
suffered several fractures, in addition to the fracture from January.  These 
included an old and a new fracture on a hand and two fractures on a foot.  Dr. 
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Makoroff referred Trustin’s case to children services and law-enforcement 
authorities. 
{¶ 9} Tiffany Bradbury, an investigator with the Hamilton County Job and 
Family Services, interviewed Hunter about Trustin’s injuries.  Hunter stated that 
that he did not see any injuries on Trustin on June 9 and denied hurting him.  
Hunter said that when he was walking down the stairs with Trustin, he had 
tripped, and maybe Trustin had been injured. 
{¶ 10} Criminal charges were not brought against Hunter for Trustin’s 
injuries.  But Trustin was removed from his home in June 2004 and was placed 
with his aunt, Latoya Gresham.  Amber White obtained custody of Trustin six 
months later.  In June 2005, Trustin was returned to Luzmilda’s custody.  But 
after a week, Luzmilda took Trustin back to White’s home. 
{¶ 11} Beginning in 2003, White had noticed that Trustin was afraid of 
Hunter.  She stated that Trustin would start crying, shaking, and vomiting when 
Hunter came around.  Forte noticed similar behavior.  Forte testified that on one 
occasion, she was holding Trustin, and he started vomiting when Hunter passed 
them.  On January 17, 2006, two days before he was killed, Trustin told Forte that 
he was “scared of Lamont.  Lamont scared.  Lamont hurt Trustin.” 
{¶ 12} On January 17, 2006, Trustin was staying at White’s home.  That 
afternoon, Luzmilda picked up Trustin and took him to her home.  Before leaving, 
Forte gave Trustin a bath and dressed him.  Forte did not notice any injuries in 
Trustin’s anal area or elsewhere on his body. 
{¶ 13} At 9:00 a.m. on January 19, 2006, Forte spoke to Hunter and 
Trustin on the telephone for more than 15 minutes.  Hunter said that Trustin was 
fine and was watching a movie.  Trustin told Forte that he was watching the 
movie Jurassic Park.  Forte stated that Trustin’s voice sounded shaky, and he did 
not seem to be his normal, energetic self. 
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{¶ 14} Two hours later, Hunter called Luzmilda at work and told her that 
Trustin had been injured.  Luzmilda rushed home.  At 11:21 a.m., Luzmilda called 
911 and reported that her son had been hurt after falling down the stairs. 
{¶ 15} EMTs arriving at the scene found that Trustin had a low pulse rate 
and labored breathing and was paralyzed and nonresponsive.  Lieutenant Eric 
Prather, a Cincinnati fireman, asked Hunter how Trustin had been injured.  Hunter 
said that Trustin had fallen down the basement steps.  Hunter stated that he 
thought that Trustin had fallen when Trustin had tried to stop Tiffany from going 
down the steps. 
{¶ 16} Dr. Makoroff examined Trustin when he was taken to Children’s 
Hospital.  Hunter and Luzmilda told Dr. Makoroff that Trustin had been in his 
normal state of health that morning.  Hunter then explained that he was in the 
basement doing laundry with his nine-month-old daughter.  He heard some 
rumbling upstairs and saw Trustin tumbling down the basement steps, landing on 
the concrete floor.  Hunter said that Trustin had been unresponsive when he went 
to help him.  Hunter splashed water on Trustin’s face.  When Trustin did not 
respond, Hunter called Luzmilda at work. 
{¶ 17} Dr. Makoroff’s examination of Trustin showed that his injuries 
were not consistent with a fall down the stairs.  Trustin suffered a diffuse injury to 
his brain.  He had subdural hemorrhages on both sides of the brain that extended 
into the middle of the brain.  Swelling of his brain was so severe that it had started 
to herniate into the spinal column.  Further examination showed that Trustin had 
suffered a deep anal tear.  The injury was acute and could have been just hours 
old.  Dr. Makoroff testified that the bruising and lacerations were consistent with 
the insertion of an object into the anal cavity. 
{¶ 18} During the afternoon of January 19, 2006, Cincinnati police 
detectives Jane Noel and Jim Wiggington interviewed Hunter about Trustin’s 
injuries.  After waiving his Miranda rights, Hunter provided a videotaped 
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statement, most of which was played for the panel at trial.  In the video, Hunter 
addresses questions about Trustin’s 2004 injuries, as well as the ones that he had 
suffered that day. 
{¶ 19} Hunter told police that Luzmilda had left for work at 6:00 that 
morning.  Trustin, Terrell, and Tyree woke up at 8:00 a.m.  Terrell and Tyree, 
ages 8 and 11, left for school at 8:45 a.m.  Hunter said that Trustin had been 
acting fine when he awoke.  Trustin ate some breakfast and started watching 
Jurassic Park. 
{¶ 20} Hunter left Trustin in the living room, and he went with Trinity to 
the basement to do laundry.  Shortly thereafter, Hunter heard Trustin running 
upstairs.  Hunter thought that Trustin was excited about the dinosaurs in the 
movie and was rushing to tell him about them.  Hunter then heard Trustin 
tumbling down the basement stairs.  Hunter said that he heard every step that 
Trustin hit as he fell down the stairs.  Hunter turned around and saw Trustin at the 
bottom of the steps.  Trustin was folded over, and his leg was on the bottom step. 
{¶ 21} Hunter said that Trustin was limp and unresponsive.  He took 
Trustin upstairs and splashed water on his face.  He also attempted to revive 
Trustin.  Hunter then called Luzmilda and told her what happened.  She 
immediately came home and called 911. 
{¶ 22} As the interview progressed, Detective Wiggington told Hunter that 
the attending physician did not think that Trustin’s injuries were consistent with a 
fall down the steps.  Hunter replied that he did not have “an answer to that.”  
Hunter stated that what happened was simply an accident.  Hunter said that the 
only thing he could have done differently was to remain upstairs or shut the 
basement door when he did the laundry. 
{¶ 23} Hunter told investigators that nothing else happened to Trustin 
before the fall.  He stated that Trustin had been fine the previous evening and that 
Trustin had slept with his mother.  Hunter said that he would never hurt a child.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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He also stated that he did not injure Trustin by shaking him.  However, 
investigators did not ask Hunter about the anal tear during the interview, and 
nothing was mentioned about it. 
{¶ 24} On January 20, 2006, Barbara Mirlenbrink, a criminalist with the 
Cincinnati police department, went to Trustin’s home to collect evidence.  She 
found no evidence of blood or anything of evidentiary value on the basement 
stairs or elsewhere in the house.  Mirlenbrink stated that there were 11 carpeted 
steps leading from the kitchen to the basement floor.  The distance from the top of 
the stairs to the bottom of the steps was 11 feet, two inches.  She also examined 
the washer and dryer in the basement.  She found that the washer was empty, and 
clothing was on top of the dryer. 
{¶ 25} On January 27, 2006, Mirlenbrink returned to Trustin’s home and 
looked for sharp objects that might have been inserted into Trustin’s anus.  
Mirlenbrink collected two Tiki torches and a tire gauge.  Subsequent forensic 
testing of these items disclosed nothing of evidentiary value.  But Mirlenbrink 
stated that blood was found on the underwear that Trustin had been wearing. 
{¶ 26} On January 21, 2006, CT scans showed that Trustin was brain 
dead.  On January 22, 2006, Dr. Mona Stephens, the Hamilton County deputy 
coroner, conducted the autopsy on Trustin.  Her examination found two separate 
areas of broad impact on Trustin’s head.  The brain itself was very swollen and 
had a subarachnoid hemorrhage.  Trustin also suffered a serious neck injury.  Dr. 
Stephen stated that the cartilage had been pulled loose from the thoracic vertebra. 
{¶ 27} Dr. Stephens stated that the two distinct impact sites show that 
something had struck Trustin in the head or his body had been slammed against 
something.  She stated, “[I]f he were struck in the head, it would have to be a 
blow such that the neck would then travel in a sharp fashion and * * * [would 
require] a major amount of force.”  Alternatively, Dr. Stephens said that “if he 
were picked up and held by the torso or below and hit against something, that 
January Term, 2011 
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would be an easier injury to produce * * * because there is more movement 
associated with that to pop that disk loose from the spine bone.” 
{¶ 28} Dr. Stephens found a 1.9 centimeter long laceration of Trustin’s 
anus.  There was a hemorrhage along the rectum’s lining and a hemorrhage going 
into both sides of the pelvis.  There were also three areas of perforation of the 
rectal mucosa.  Dr. Stephens stated that these perforations “would be similar to 
what you could produce with something like a pencil, jammed with a pencil or 
something sharp like that, or could even be from an angled insertion of 
something.” 
{¶ 29} Dr. Stephens concluded, “[D]iffuse brain injury due to blunt 
impact/shaking injuries to the head [is] the cause of death.  The manner of death is 
homicide.”  She stated that Trustin’s injuries were not consistent with a fall down 
the steps.  Dr. Stephens also testified, “The only way I can conceive of this being 
partially caused by a fall down 11 carpeted steps is if he had fallen off the side of 
the stairs and landed on his head twice, and that still wouldn’t have explained the 
anal injuries.” 
The Defense Case 
{¶ 30} The defense presented no trial-phase witnesses.  However, the 
defense introduced two exhibits.  Defense exhibit #1 is the physician’s report, 
signed by Dr. Makoroff, that documented Trustin’s hospital care on January 19, 
2006.  Trial counsel used this report during his cross-examination of Dr. 
Makoroff. 
{¶ 31} Defense exhibit #2 is a medical study completed by M.G.F. 
Gilliland, entitled Interval Duration Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in 
Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children.  Trial counsel 
referred to this study during his cross-examination of Dr. Stephens. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Case History 
{¶ 32} On the day of the autopsy, Hunter was arrested.  A week later, he 
was indicted on three counts.  In Count One, Hunter was charged with the 
aggravated murder of Trustin, a child under the age of 13.  This count contained 
two death-penalty specifications.  Specification One charged Hunter with 
aggravated murder while committing or attempting to commit rape, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7).  Specification Two charged Hunter with the aggravated murder of 
a child under the age of 13, R.C. 2929.04(A)(9). 
{¶ 33} In Count Two, Hunter was charged with raping Trustin, and Count 
Three charged Hunter with child endangerment. 
{¶ 34} Hunter pleaded not guilty to all charges.  However, a three-judge 
panel found Hunter guilty of all charges and sentenced him to death.  Hunter was 
also sentenced to life in prison without parole for rape and eight years’ 
imprisonment for child endangerment.  The sentences on all counts were ordered 
to run consecutively. 
Issues on Appeal 
{¶ 35} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In proposition of law I, Hunter 
argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel during both 
phases of the trial. 
{¶ 36} Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the 
defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 
373, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 37} As an initial matter, Hunter argues that trial counsel’s performance 
must be judged by the standards set forth in the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in 
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Death Penalty Cases (Rev.Ed.2003).  The stated objective of the guidelines is to 
“set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order 
to ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible 
imposition or execution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction.”  Guideline 
1.1(A).  To this end, the ABA guidelines present a detailed prescription for the 
legal representation of capital defendants. 
{¶ 38} Despite this claim, Hunter has failed to specify the provisions of 
the ABA guidelines that trial counsel violated in representing him. 
{¶ 39} Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the ABA guidelines are 
“only guides” to what reasonableness means, not its definition.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  In Bobby v. Van Hook (2009), 
__U.S.__, 130 S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255, the Supreme Court reversed a Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that relied on the ABA guidelines to grant a 
capital defendant relief on the grounds that his lawyers had performed deficiently 
in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence.  The Supreme Court 
criticized the Sixth Circuit for treating the Guidelines “ not merely as evidence of 
what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but as inexorable commands with 
which all capital defense counsel ‘must fully comply.’ ”  Id. at 17, quoting Van 
Hook v. Anderson (C.A.6, 2009), 560 F.3d 523, 526.  The Supreme Court 
continued, “ ‘[W]hile States are free to impose whatever specific rules they see fit 
to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented, we have held that the 
Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make 
objectively reasonable choices.’ ”  Id., quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000), 528 
U.S. 470, 479, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985. 
{¶ 40} Accordingly, trial counsel’s performance is reviewed under the 
two-pronged Strickland standard.  We now address Hunter’s assertions of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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{¶ 41} 1. Pending charges against trial counsel.  Hunter argues that he 
was denied effective assistance of counsel because Clyde Bennett II, his retained 
counsel, was facing criminal charges in federal court while he represented Hunter. 
{¶ 42} On February 5, 2007, just prior to the beginning of trial, Hunter 
retained Bennett, an attorney with Dinsmore and Shohl in Cincinnati, as his new 
counsel, and his appointed counsel were dismissed.  Bennett represented Hunter 
during both phases of the trial. 
{¶ 43} Approximately two months after Hunter was sentenced to death, 
Bennett was convicted in federal court for the offense of unlawfully structuring 
financial transactions.  Subsequently, Bennett was sentenced to 24 months in 
prison and a $4,000 fine. 
{¶ 44} Nothing about Bennett’s pending charges was mentioned by any of 
the parties during Hunter’s trial.  Hunter also does not mention when he learned 
that Bennett was facing charges in federal court.  Nonetheless, Hunter asserts, 
“[W]e now know that * * * Bennett was desperate for cash, and not inclined to 
tell defendant-appellant’s family that he was distracted by his own issues, and 
unable to go forward effectively.” 
{¶ 45} Hunter argues that Bennett failed to get involved in his case from 
the onset of law enforcement’s focus on Hunter.  Hunter argues that this failure 
occurred because counsel was distracted by the charges pending against him.  
However, this ineffectiveness claim lacks merit because Bennett was not retained 
to represent Hunter until shortly before his scheduled trial date.  Thus, Bennett 
could not have become involved in assisting Hunter earlier.  In any event, 
Bennett’s legal problems relating to pending charges do not establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  See State v. Smith (Minn.1991), 476 N.W.2d 511, 516; 
State v. Williams (1989), 52 Ohio App.3d 19, 556 N.E.2d 221, paragraph two of 
the syllabus (“[p]ending criminal charges against an attorney are, without more, 
insufficient * * * to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel* * *”). 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 46} Likewise, Hunter’s assertions that counsel’s representation was 
tainted because Bennett was “desperate for cash” and was “not inclined” to 
disclose that he was distracted by his own issues are speculative.  Nothing in the 
record before us speaks to federal investigations of Bennett or to their alleged 
effect on Bennett’s representation of Hunter.  “A reviewing court cannot add 
matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s 
proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.”  State v. 
Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 500, paragraph one 
of the syllabus (reversing the judgment of a court of appeals that had considered, 
in an appeal from a postconviction proceeding, a transcript that had not been 
before the trial court in the proceeding that was appealed).  Thus, Hunter’s claims 
about his counsel’s motivation and actions provide no support for his present 
claims. 
{¶ 47} In sum, Hunter’s ineffectiveness claim fails to satisfy the two-
pronged Strickland standard.  Hunter has failed to demonstrate that counsel 
provided deficient performance because he was facing unrelated criminal charges 
in federal court.  Hunter has also failed to demonstrate that the result of his trial 
would have been different if trial counsel had not been facing these charges. 
{¶ 48} 2. Jury waiver.  Hunter claims that his counsel was ineffective 
because he advised Hunter to waive a jury trial without sharing with him 
“statistical data” discrediting the wisdom of this decision.  Hunter states that if his 
case had been tried before a jury, he would have had a fighting chance during 
both phases of the trial. 
{¶ 49} A jury waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  
Crim.R. 23; State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 
N.E.2d 927, ¶ 37.  If the record shows a jury waiver, the conviction will not be set 
aside except on a plain showing that the defendant’s waiver was not freely and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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intelligently made.  Id.  Moreover, a written waiver is presumptively voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent.  Id. 
{¶ 50} Nothing in the record suggests that Hunter’s jury waiver was 
involuntary.  Hunter submitted a signed jury waiver.  Before the trial court 
accepted his jury waiver, Hunter assured the court that his waiver was voluntarily 
made.  Trial counsel also informed the court, “[T]he issue of waiving the jury in 
this case has been discussed at length with defense counsel and Mr. Hunter, my 
client.  This is not the first day or the first time that this issue has been brought to 
his attention.  We have discussed this in detail for a week, so this is not a fly-by-
night decision, and it’s well thought out and something we thought about as a 
defendant and counsel.” 
{¶ 51} Nonetheless, Hunter argues that his waiver was not voluntary 
because, he says, virtually all experts agree that counsel’s advice to waive a jury 
in a capital case is presumptively malpractice.  Hunter contends that his waiver 
forfeited the advantage of a jury trial: that a single juror can block a death 
recommendation. 
{¶ 52} Hunter cites no authority in support of his claims that he bore an 
increased risk of being sentenced to death by a three-judge panel.  Moreover, any 
one of the three judges alone could have prevented the imposition of the death 
penalty.  See R.C. 2929.03(D)(3). 
{¶ 53} Additionally, trial counsel provided a reasonable explanation for 
proceeding with a three-judge panel rather than a jury.  During final argument, 
trial counsel argued: 
{¶ 54} “[T]his case was not tried to a jury because lay people in general 
don’t have the capacity to allow the law to transcend emotion, passion, rhetoric, 
provocation from horrific, egregious, heinous crime that actually was committed.  
But I believe that as jurists, officers of the court, has the ability to apply the law to 
the facts of this case, notwithstanding the horrific, heinous injury and death to a 
January Term, 2011 
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child.  And I submit, based on the evidence adduced at the trial of this matter, if 
you do that, he should be acquitted of aggravated murder and rape charges.” 
{¶ 55} The fact that Hunter voluntarily waived his right to a jury does not 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  Neither does trial counsel’s 
encouragement that Hunter seek a three-judge panel.  Under the circumstances, 
this appears to have been a reasonable tactical decision.  Indeed, trial counsel may 
have concluded that Hunter should proceed with a three-judge panel instead of a 
jury because of the horrific nature of the charges involving the death of a three-
year-old child.  Thus, Hunter has failed to establish that his counsel was 
ineffective. 
{¶ 56} 3. Requesting a continuance.  Hunter argues that his counsel was 
ineffective because counsel requested a continuance to prepare for the penalty-
phase proceedings. 
{¶ 57} On June 15, 2007, after the panel returned its verdict, Hunter’s trial 
counsel requested a continuance until July 19, 2007, to conduct the mitigation 
hearing.  That request was granted. 
{¶ 58} On July 3, 2007, trial counsel submitted a request for additional 
time to prepare for mitigation.  Trial counsel noted that “the previously hired 
mitigation specialist is no longer available and no longer works in this field.  The 
Defendant is currently conducting mitigation work on his own behalf.”  On July 
19, 2007, the panel granted a continuance until September 5, 2007. 
{¶ 59} Hunter fails to explain how counsel was ineffective because he 
requested a continuance to prepare for mitigation.  Hunter retained Bennett to 
represent him just before his trial was to begin.  Hunter should have known that 
trial counsel would need additional time to prepare for the penalty-phase 
proceedings should he be found guilty of the capital specifications.  Indeed, 
counsel would have provided ineffective assistance if he knew that he was 
unprepared and failed to request a continuance.  Hunter has also failed to explain 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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how he was prejudiced by counsel’s request.  Accordingly, this ineffectiveness 
claim also lacks merit. 
{¶ 60} 4. Failure to utilize a second counsel, a defense investigator, 
and expert witnesses.  Hunter argues that his retained counsel violated the 
principle of “team defense.”  First, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective by 
failing to proceed to trial without the assistance of a second lawyer. 
{¶ 61} Sup.R. 20(II)(A), “Appointment of counsel for indigent defendants 
in capital cases,” provides that “at least” two attorneys (with death-penalty 
qualifications and experience) shall be appointed by the court to represent an 
indigent defendant charged with capital murder.1  However, Sup.R. 20(I)(B) states 
that these rules apply “only in cases where the defendant is indigent and counsel 
is not privately retained by or for the defendant.”  Sup.R. 20(I)(C) also provides: 
“If the defendant engages one privately retained attorney, the court shall not 
appoint a second attorney pursuant to this rule.” 
{¶ 62} Hunter chose to retain private counsel.  When that decision was 
made, Hunter told the court that he was satisfied that Bennett was now his 
counsel.  Hunter also acknowledged that his two appointed counsel would no 
longer represent him after he retained Bennett. 
{¶ 63} Hunter has the burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674; State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62.  
Hunter has failed to meet this burden.  His generalized claim fails to specify how 
Bennett’s trial performance was deficient because of his failure to use the 
assistance of second counsel.  Hunter also fails to explain how he was prejudiced 
by such absence.  Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
                                                          
 
1 These are the Rules of Superintendence currently in effect.  The Rules of Superintendence in 
effect in 2007 have been renumbered but were not changed substantively. 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
{¶ 64} Second, Hunter argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to 
proceed with an independent defense investigator during both phases of trial.  The 
record shows that appointed counsel hired Martha Phillips, a mitigation specialist, 
and Dr. Cyma Khalily, a psychiatrist, to consider Hunter’s circumstances, and 
Robert Cantou, M.D., to review Trustin’s medical records.  The court authorized 
their fees.  Retained counsel also requested a mitigation expert.  Subsequently, 
retained counsel obtained two continuances to prepare for mitigation.  During the 
first requested continuance, retained counsel mentioned that on July 19 (the date 
of the scheduled mitigation hearing), “there will be a mitigation (sic) Martha 
Phillips.”  In requesting the later continuance, counsel noted that the mitigation 
specialist “is no longer available and no longer works in this field.  The Defendant 
is currently conducting mitigation work on his own behalf.” 
{¶ 65} Hunter cites nothing in the record to show that retained counsel 
conducted an inadequate investigation.  The record does not show the extent of 
counsel’s investigation or whether he relied on work completed by the experts 
hired by appointed counsel.  We “cannot infer a defense failure to investigate 
from a silent record.”  State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 
N.E.2d 263, ¶ 244.  Moreover, trial counsel called many family members and 
others during the penalty phase who provided detailed information about Hunter’s 
background and family life.  Thus, the record fails to support this ineffectiveness 
claim. 
{¶ 66} Finally, Hunter argues that his counsel was ineffective by relying 
exclusively on his cross-examination skills to undermine the testimony of the 
state’s expert witnesses.  “As an initial matter, the failure to call an expert and 
instead rely on cross-examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”  State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436, 613 N.E.2d 225, 
citing State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407.  
Hunter’s argument that defense experts were necessary to impeach the testimony 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of the state’s experts is purely speculative.  Hunter fails to identify the expert 
witnesses who should have been called or what they would have said.  Thus, trial 
counsel’s decision to rely on cross-examination appears to have been a legitimate 
“tactical decision.”  See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 
N.E.2d 836, ¶ 97.  We also reject this claim. 
{¶ 67} 5. Failure to call a psychologist or psychiatrist.  Hunter argues 
that his counsel was ineffective by failing to employ a psychologist or 
psychiatrist.  Hunter asserts that at a minimum, counsel should have had him 
evaluated to determine his potential for future dangerousness if given a life 
sentence.  Hunter contends that studies indicate that it is highly unlikely that a 
rapist and killer of a young child would ever show aggression against other 
inmates or guards. 
{¶ 68} As previously discussed, appointed counsel obtained the services of 
a psychiatrist.  The record does not indicate the extent of the psychiatrist’s 
evaluation of the defendant or retained counsel’s use of such assistance.  Again, 
we cannot infer counsel’s failure to investigate from a silent record; the burden of 
demonstrating ineffective assistance is on Hunter.  See State v. Were, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 244.  Thus, Hunter has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel was deficient.  Moreover, Hunter has failed to show that 
counsel was deficient by failing to present testimony that he lacked the potential 
for future dangerousness. There is no evidence to suggest that the psychiatrist 
would have reached that conclusion.  See State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 
2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 118. 
{¶ 69} 6. Failure to present affirmative defense during penalty phase 
and other instances of deficient performance.  First, Hunter argues that trial 
counsel provided deficient performance by failing to develop an affirmative 
defense for sparing his life.  This claim lacks merit. 
January Term, 2011 
17 
 
{¶ 70} Trial counsel presented extensive mitigating evidence during the 
penalty phase.  Five family members and two others testified about Hunter’s 
background and family life.  Leevell Hunter, the defendant’s father, indicated that 
Hunter had had an alcohol-abuse problem and had been involved with drugs.  The 
witnesses also expressed their hope that Hunter would receive a life sentence and 
explained that a death sentence would have a horrible impact on the family.  In 
addition, Hunter presented a detailed, unsworn statement.  Finally, trial counsel’s 
final argument raised residual doubt as an issue and set forth all the mitigating 
factors favoring a life sentence. 
{¶ 71} As previously discussed, nothing in the record shows that trial 
counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation.  Appointed counsel obtained a 
mitigation specialist and a psychiatrist to evaluate Hunter and a doctor to review 
Trustin’s medical records.  Retained counsel also obtained two continuances to 
prepare for the penalty phase. Beyond that, the record does not show the extent of 
counsel’s investigation.  Thus, based on the record before this court, Hunter has 
failed to demonstrate that trial counsel performed inadequately in preparing for 
mitigation. 
{¶ 72} Hunter cites Dickerson v. Bagley (C.A.6, 2006), 453 F.3d 690, and 
Poindexter v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2006), 454 F.3d 564, in arguing that his counsel’s 
performance was inadequate.  Dickerson held that counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to conduct a complete and thorough mitigation investigation.  
Id. at 699.  The court determined that counsel did not learn or prove facts about 
the defendant’s family, educational, social, or medical history or discover that the 
defendant had an IQ of 77, making him borderline mentally retarded.  Id. at 691-
692 and 695.  The court found that it was much more likely that the sentencer 
would have seriously contemplated a life sentence based on reduced culpability if 
it had been presented this evidence.  Id. at 699. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 73} Unlike in Dickerson, nothing in the record shows that trial counsel 
completed an inadequate investigation into Hunter’s background and mental state 
in preparing for his mitigation hearing.  Thus, Hunter’s reliance on Dickerson is 
misplaced. 
{¶ 74} Poindexter is also inapposite.  Poindexter held that trial counsel 
was ineffective by failing to conduct “virtually any investigation.”  Poindexter, 
454 F.3d at 578.  The court found that counsel had failed to request funds to hire a 
psychological or psychiatric expert to evaluate the defendant even though he 
exhibited odd behavior.  Id. at 579.  Counsel had also failed to interview key 
family members and friends who could have described the defendant’s 
upbringing.  Id.  The court also noted that defense counsel did not begin to 
prepare for mitigation until five days before the penalty phase began.  Id.  
Poindexter held that counsel’s failures were prejudicial because the jury was not 
presented with a full picture of the defendant’s troubled childhood and could not 
therefore accurately assess his moral culpability.  Id. 
{¶ 75} Again, Hunter has presented nothing to show that his counsel failed 
to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation.  Indeed, the record shows that a 
psychiatrist was employed, and seven witnesses testified on Hunter’s behalf. 
{¶ 76} Second, Hunter argues that trial counsel provided deficient 
performance by failing to object to “other acts” evidence, even though appointed 
counsel had filed a pretrial motion to exclude such evidence under Evid.R. 
404(B).  Initially, Hunter complains about counsel’s failure to object to evidence 
about his convictions for selling drugs. 
{¶ 77} At the penalty phase, trial counsel asked Leevell Hunter the 
following question: 
{¶ 78} “Q:  Okay.  What involvement, if any, did Lamont have with drugs, 
if you know? 
January Term, 2011 
19 
 
{¶ 79} “A:  I kind of had an idea that he was using, but I didn’t never 
confront him * * *.” 
{¶ 80} During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Levell about 
Hunter’s criminal record for selling drugs: 
{¶ 81} “Q:  You said at some point that you had had an idea that your son 
was using drugs? 
{¶ 82} “A:  Yes. 
{¶ 83} “Q:  And in fact he went to the penitentiary two different times for 
drugs; isn’t that correct? 
{¶ 84} “A:  Yes.  Not for use, for selling. 
{¶ 85} “Q:  For selling? 
{¶ 86} “A:  Yeah. 
{¶ 87} “Q:  So at some point you had more than an idea that he 
was involved with drugs because he was convicted of two different 
felonies and went to prison two different times? 
{¶ 88} “A:  Yes, for not using for himself, for selling.” 
{¶ 89} Trial counsel elicited testimony from Leevell that opened the door 
to cross-examination about Leevell’s knowledge of Hunter’s drug convictions.  
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this line of cross-
examination, because the defense may have lacked a basis for objecting. 
{¶ 90} Moreover, trial counsel may have made a tactical decision not to 
object to such questioning.  See State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 530, 
684 N.E.2d 47.  Trial counsel used testimony about Hunter’s drug involvement as 
a mitigating factor for the panel’s consideration.  During final argument, trial 
counsel argued that Hunter’s involvement with “alcohol and drugs * * * is a 
mitigating factor and * * * sort of explains * * * his conduct for which he was 
convicted” and supports the imposition of a life sentence.  Thus, trial counsel may 
have reasonably decided not to object to testimony about his drug convictions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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because it highlighted the seriousness of his drug involvement.  See State v. 
Gowdy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 387, 396-397, 727 N.E.2d 579. 
{¶ 91} Even if trial counsel’s questioning reflected deficient performance, 
Hunter has failed to establish prejudice under the Strickland test.  Testimony 
about the two drug convictions was of minor significance, given the compelling 
evidence of the aggravated murder and rape charges that Hunter was found guilty 
of committing.  Moreover, it is presumed that the three-judge panel “considered 
only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment.”  
State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151, 44 O.O.2d 132, 239 N.E.2d 65. 
{¶ 92} Hunter also complains that his counsel opened the door to 
testimony about domestic violence.  During direct examination, Tamara Kay 
Mitchell, Hunter’s ex-wife, testified that Hunter is not an abusive person and was 
never abusive towards children.  But Mitchell acknowledged that she had had a 
domestic-violence case with Hunter 15 years ago.  She explained, “I mean, we 
were young.  Things happen.  He’s not an abusive person though.” 
{¶ 93} On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mitchell further 
questions about Hunter’s domestic violence.  She stated, “[W]e had three 
incidents where things happened and they got out of control and, yes, the police 
were called.  As far as him being violent, no.” 
{¶ 94} Trial counsel was not ineffective by eliciting testimony about 
Hunter’s history of domestic violence with Mitchell.  Mitchell’s testimony that 
Hunter did not abuse children was important mitigating evidence.  Counsel could 
legitimately decide to present such testimony, even though derogatory 
information about Hunter was also disclosed as a result.  See State v. Elmore, 111 
Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 117. 
{¶ 95} Third, Hunter argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
object to unrecorded sidebar discussions  Appointed and retained counsel 
requested that all sidebars be recorded, and the motions was granted “as to 
January Term, 2011 
21 
 
substantive issues.”  Nonetheless, counsel failed to object to two sidebar 
conferences held off the record.  The trial court afterwards stated on the record 
that both sidebars addressed only scheduling issues.  Thus, Hunter cannot 
demonstrate that counsel’s failure to object was prejudicial, since the unrecorded 
proceedings did not deal with substantial and important legal matters.  See State v. 
Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 136. 
{¶ 96} Finally, Hunter argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing 
to force Dr. Stephens, the deputy coroner, and Dr. Makoroff, a pediatrician, to set 
forth their credentials.  Yet the record shows that both of these witnesses 
discussed their credentials before testifying.  Dr. Stephens set forth her 
educational background and work experience and described her duties as a 
pathologist.  Similarly, Dr. Makoroff discussed her educational background, 
mentioned her work experience, and described her duties. 
{¶ 97} 7. Failure to seek a negotiated plea for a lesser sentence.  Hunter 
argues that his counsel had an affirmative duty to seek a negotiated plea for a 
sentence other than death.  But the record does not reflect whether trial counsel 
attempted to negotiate such an agreement.  Accordingly, Hunter has not met his 
burden of demonstrating that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
{¶ 98} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition I. 
{¶ 99} Lack of capitally certified counsel.  In proposition of law II, 
Hunter argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his 
counsel was not certified under Rule 20 of the Rules of Superintendence for the 
Courts of Ohio. 
{¶ 100} Sup.R. 20 requires that counsel appointed to represent indigent 
defendants in capital cases have certain qualifications.  Hunter argues that trial 
counsel was ineffective because there is no indication that he was certified under 
this rule.  But Hunter chose to retain private counsel, and Rule 20 certification 
does not apply and was not required.  Sup.R.20(I)(B).  In State v. Keith, 79 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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St.3d at 534, 684 N.E.2d 47, this court held that it would not “impose a rule that 
creates a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel has been 
retained by or for a defendant and is not qualified under C.P.Sup.R. 65.”2  See 
also State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, 
¶ 142.  Accordingly we overrule proposition II. 
{¶ 101} Failure to call mitigation expert.  In proposition of law III, 
Hunter argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to call the defense 
mitigation expert as a penalty-phase witness. 
{¶ 102} Hunter’s appointed counsel hired Martha Phillips as the defense 
mitigation specialist.  At the completion of the guilt-phase proceedings, Hunter’s 
retained counsel obtained a continuance until July 19, 2007, to prepare for the 
penalty-phase proceedings.  Trial counsel stated, “On the 19th there will be a 
mitigation [sic] Martha Phillips.” 
{¶ 103} On July 3, 2007, trial counsel requested an additional continuance 
for more preparation time.  Counsel stated, “[T]he Defendant’s previously hired 
mitigation specialist is no longer available and no longer works in this field.  The 
Defendant is currently conducting mitigation work on his own behalf.”  A 
continuance was granted until September 5, 2007.  On that date, the penalty-phase 
proceedings were conducted, and seven witnesses testified on behalf of the 
defendant. 
{¶ 104} An attorney who fails to conduct a reasonable investigation into a 
defendant’s history and background provides ineffective assistance.  State v. 
Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 60, citing 
Wiggins v. Smith (2003), 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471.  
However, Hunter has the burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674; State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62. 
                                                          
 
2 Sup.R. 20 was formerly C.P.Sup.R. 65. 
January Term, 2011 
23 
 
{¶ 105} It appears that Martha Phillips was not called as a defense witness 
because she discontinued working as the mitigation specialist.  Nothing shows 
what testimony Phillips would have provided if she had been called as a witness.  
Thus, Hunter has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was deficient by not 
calling her as a witness.  See State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 
880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 350. 
{¶ 106} Trial counsel was fully capable of conducting a satisfactory 
investigation into Hunter’s history and background after Phillips became 
unavailable.  Hunter cites nothing in the record to show that his counsel 
conducted a less than  adequate investigation.  Moreover, trial counsel would have 
had access to mitigating evidence that the defense collected before he was 
retained. 
{¶ 107} Based on the foregoing, proposition III is rejected. 
{¶ 108} Other-acts evidence.  In proposition of law IV, Hunter argues that 
the admission of evidence that he had previously abused Trustin was improper 
“other acts” evidence. 
{¶ 109} Over defense objection, Dr. Makoroff testified that on January 30, 
2004, she treated Trustin in the emergency room for a broken tibia.  Hunter 
informed medical personnel that the injury had occurred when he was holding 
Trustin and fell on the steps.  Hunter provided a similar explanation in his taped 
statement on January 19, 2006.  Additionally, Wilma Forte testified that Hunter 
had told her that Trustin was injured when Hunter “was carrying [Trustin] up the 
steps, and he stepped on a toy and fell with Trustin.” 
{¶ 110} Over objection, Dr. Makoroff also testified that on June 9, 2004, 
she had treated Trustin in the emergency room for swollen lips, a scratch in his 
ear canal, bruising on both sides of his ears, a swollen penis, and an abrasion at 
the base of his penis.  X-rays also showed that Trustin had multiple fractures on a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
hand and a foot.  Dr. Makoroff stated, “[M]y impression was that this was a case 
of definite child abuse.” 
{¶ 111} Over objection, Tiffany Bradbury testified that on June 9, 2004, 
she interviewed Hunter about Trustin’s injuries.  Hunter denied that he had hurt 
Trustin.  Hunter said that he had been caring for Trustin after Luzmilda left home 
that morning.  Hunter stated that he had tripped while he was walking downstairs 
with Trustin, and “maybe” Trustin had been injured then. 
{¶ 112} Defense counsel argued that evidence about the January and June 
2004 incidents was inadmissible, because it was irrelevant and prejudicial.  But 
the panel overruled the defense objections and admitted the evidence under 
Evid.R. 404(B).  It did, however, exclude evidence of Hunter’s criminal record. 
{¶ 113} Under Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove” a defendant’s criminal propensity.  “It may, 
however, be admissible * * * [to show] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  “The admission or 
exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  
State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 114} The panel did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
January and June 2004 incidents.  The January and June 2004 incidents were 
relevant in rebutting Hunter’s claim that Trustin died in an accidental fall.  See 
State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 159, 67 O.O.2d 174, 311 N.E.2d 526.  
The earlier incidents were eerily similar to the episode underlying the charged 
offense.  Hunter claimed that Trustin had been injured in an accidental fall on the 
two occasions that he had been brought to the emergency room in 2004.  Such 
evidence was particularly relevant because it showed that Hunter’s claim that 
Trustin died during an accidental fall was probably untrue.  Based on this 
evidence, the panel could reasonably infer that Hunter acted purposefully in 
January Term, 2011 
25 
 
killing Trustin.  See State v. Banks (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 206, 212, 604 N.E.2d 
219; State v. Patton (Jan. 21, 1992), 12th Dist. No. CA91-06-102, 1992 WL 9534, 
*5; see also Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, Vol. I 
(Rev.Ed.2001), 16-22, Section 5:06. 
{¶ 115} Finally, the fact that the 2004 acts differ in some detail from the 
charged offenses does not affect the admissibility of the other-acts evidence.  
Such differences go to weight, not admissibility.  See State v. Jamison (1990), 49 
Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 552 N.E.2d 180. 
{¶ 116} Based on the foregoing, proposition IV is overruled. 
{¶ 117} Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.  In proposition 
of law VIII, Hunter argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
the counts and specifications.  In proposition of law IX, Hunter argues that the 
verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶ 118} A claim of insufficient evidence invokes a due process concern 
and raises the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 
verdict as a matter of law.  State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 
678 N.E.2d 541.  In reviewing such a challenge, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979), 433 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  “[T]he weight to be given 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the 
facts.”  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d, 
212, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 119} A claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence involves a different test.  “ ‘The court, reviewing the entire record, 
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury 
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.  The discretionary power to 
grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the 
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”  Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 
387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 
20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717. 
{¶ 120} Hunter’s sufficiency claims lack merit.  Wilma Forte’s and Amber 
White’s testimony, Hunter’s statements to investigators and other individuals, 
medical testimony, and the autopsy results were sufficient to establish Hunter’s 
guilt.  The evidence shows that on the morning of January 19, 2006, Trustin died 
from severe head injuries while he was under Hunter’s care and supervision.  His 
girlfriend, Luzmilda, had left earlier that morning to go to work.  Later that 
morning, Forte had talked to Trustin on the phone, and he had said that he was 
fine and was watching a movie.  Two hours later, Hunter called Luzmilda and told 
her that Trustin had been injured. 
{¶ 121} EMTs arriving at the home found that Trustin was paralyzed and 
unresponsive and rushed him to the hospital.  Hunter told medical personnel and 
investigators that Trustin was injured when he accidentally fell down the 
basement stairs.  Yet Dr. Makoroff testified that Trustin had suffered severe brain 
injuries that were inconsistent with a fall down 11 carpeted stairs.  Examination 
also showed that Trustin had a deep anal tear that could have been just hours old. 
{¶ 122} Following Trustin’s death, Dr. Stephens conducted the autopsy 
and determined that his cause of death was a “diffuse brain injury due to blunt 
impact/shaking injuries to the head.”  Trustin suffered two separate areas of broad 
impact on the head.  Dr. Stephens testified that the two impact sites show that 
either something struck Trustin in the head or his body had been struck against 
something.  Dr. Stephens also found a 1.9-centimeter-long laceration of the anus 
January Term, 2011 
27 
 
and three areas of perforation of the rectal mucosa.  Dr. Stephens stated that the 
perforations were caused by the insertion of a sharp object into the rectal area. 
{¶ 123} Evidence was also introduced showing that Trustin had previously 
been hurt while under Hunter’s care and supervision.  In January 2004, Trustin 
had been taken to the emergency room with a broken tibia.  Hunter claimed that 
these injuries were caused when he was holding Trustin and fell on the stairs.  In 
June 2004, Trustin was taken to the emergency room again.  An examination 
showed that Trustin had multiple fractures on a hand and a foot, a swollen and 
bruised penis, and other injuries.  Hunter told an investigator that these injuries 
might have been caused by a fall down the steps. 
{¶ 124} White testified that beginning in 2003, she noticed that Trustin 
acted fearful when Hunter was around him.  Forte noticed similar behavior.  Forte 
also testified that on January 17, 2006, Trustin told her that he was “scared of 
Lamont.  Lamont scared.  Lamont hurt Trustin.” 
{¶ 125} Hunter claims that there is little evidence to show that he 
purposefully caused Trustin’s death with prior calculation and design.  However, 
the three-judge panel found Hunter guilty as the principal offender in the 
commission of aggravated murder.  He was not found guilty on the theory that he 
had been an aider or abettor who had committed the murder with prior calculation 
and design. 
{¶ 126} Finally, Hunter claims that he was found guilty because he was 
the only adult present and that there are other plausible explanations for Trustin’s 
death.  Hunter repeatedly told medical personnel and investigators that Trustin 
had been injured when he accidentally fell down the stairs.  But Dr. Makoroff’s 
testimony and the autopsy results refute this claim. 
{¶ 127} Moreover, there is no plausible explanation for Trustin’s anal tear 
except that Hunter caused these injuries near the time of Trustin’s death.  Dr. 
Makoroff’s examination of Trustin showed that he had “acute bleedings meaning 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
some fresh blood” in his anal area.  Dr. Makoroff testified that it “certainly could 
have just been hours old because it just kept bleeding as we manipulated it.”  Dr. 
Makoroff also testified that the anal tear would have been painful.  Yet Forte had 
talked to Trustin shortly before his death, and Trustin did not complain about 
being hurt.  Blood was also found on the underwear that Trustin was wearing on 
the morning that he was killed. 
{¶ 128} Despite some discrepancies, the panel accepted the testimony of 
the state’s witnesses.  Furthermore, a review of the entire record shows that the 
testimony was neither inherently unreliable nor unbelievable.  We find that 
witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, and medical evidence provided 
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunter is guilty of all 
counts and specifications. 
{¶ 129} With respect to Hunter’s manifest-weight challenges, this is not 
an “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 
conviction.’ ”  Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin, 
20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717.  We find that the panel 
neither lost its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in convicting Hunter of all 
counts and specifications. 
{¶ 130} Based on the foregoing, we reject propositions VIII and IX. 
{¶ 131} Denial of multiple defense motions and objections.  In 
proposition of law VII, Hunter argues that the three-judge panel erred in denying 
multiple defense motions and that the cumulative effect of these denials 
constituted reversible error. 
{¶ 132} State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 31 OBR 390, 509 
N.E.2d 1256, paragraph two of the syllabus, recognized the doctrine of 
cumulative error.  Under this doctrine, a conviction will be reversed when the 
cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial even 
though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not individually 
January Term, 2011 
29 
 
constitute cause for reversal.  Id. at 196-197.  See also State v. Garner (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623.  But the doctrine of cumulative error is not 
applicable to the present case, because there were no multiple errors. 
{¶ 133} Hunter’s claim that the panel erred in denying various defense 
motions also lacks merit.  First, Hunter argues that the trial court erred in denying 
a defense request for disclosure of the state’s rebuttal witnesses. 
{¶ 134} “The criterion for determining whether the state should have 
provided the name of a witness called for rebuttal is whether the state reasonably 
should have anticipated that it was likely to call the witness, whether during its 
case in chief or in rebuttal.”  State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 423, 
613 N.E.2d 212. 
{¶ 135} Following the defense motion for the names of rebuttal witnesses, 
the state responded that it was unable to provide this information without knowing 
what the defense might raise at trial that could necessitate the calling of witnesses 
on rebuttal.  The panel denied the defense motion because the state did not know 
who its rebuttal witnesses might be.  Based on Lorraine, the trial court did not err 
in denying the defense request.  Moreover, the state called no rebuttal witnesses. 
{¶ 136} Second, Hunter argues that the panel erred in denying the defense 
motion to seal the prosecutor’s file, because the state might have withheld 
discoverable evidence that made a difference in counsel’s trial preparation.  But 
this court has consistently rejected the argument that the trial court was required 
to seal the prosecutor’s file because the prosecutor may have withheld exculpatory 
evidence.  Such a claim is purely speculative.  See State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 64; State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 
285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 60.  Accordingly, the panel did not err 
in denying this motion. 
{¶ 137} Third, Hunter argues that the panel erred in denying the defense 
motion to prohibit the introduction of victim-impact evidence.  Appointed counsel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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filed a motion in limine to prohibit victim-impact evidence during both phases of 
the trial.  The motion was denied. 
{¶ 138} Victim-impact evidence is admissible in certain circumstances.  
For example, it is admissible when it is related to the facts attendant to the 
offense.  See State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 440, 650 N.E.2d 
878.  Victim-impact testimony has also been permitted in limited situations in 
capital cases when the testimony is not overly emotional or directed to the penalty 
to be imposed.  See State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 
N.E.2d 596, ¶ 237. 
{¶ 139} Hunter fails to identify any victim-impact evidence that was 
improperly presented during his trial.  Accordingly, we find no error in denying 
these defense motions. 
{¶ 140} Fourth, Hunter argues that the panel erred in denying defense 
motions for a transcript of the grand jury testimony and disclosure of the names of 
the grand jury witnesses. 
{¶ 141} “Grand jury proceedings are secret, and an accused is not entitled 
to inspect grand jury transcripts either before or during trial unless the ends of 
justice require it and there is a showing by the defense that a particularized need 
for disclosure exists which outweighs the need for secrecy.”  State v. Greer 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 20 O.O.3d 157, 420 N.E.2d 982, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  A particularized need is established “when the circumstances reveal a 
probability that the failure to provide the grand jury testimony will deny the 
defendant a fair trial.”  State v. Sellards (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 173, 17 OBR 
410, 478 N.E.2d 781.  Determining whether a particularized need exists is a 
matter within the trial court’s discretion.  Greer, 66 Ohio St.2d at 148. 
{¶ 142} Hunter claims that he established a particularized need because he 
was unable to fully confront his accusers without disclosure of their grand jury 
testimony.  But Hunter’s claim that the grand jury testimony might have 
January Term, 2011 
31 
 
contained material evidence or might have aided his cross-examination does not 
establish a particularized need.  See State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 337, 
638 N.E.2d 1023 (rejecting claim that grand jury testimony might have aided 
cross-examination by revealing contradictions).  Thus, the panel did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the defense motions for grand jury testimony and the 
disclosure of the names of grand jury witnesses. 
{¶ 143} Fifth, Hunter argues that several other defense motions were also 
improperly denied.  Initially, Hunter complains that the panel erred in denying the 
defense motion to argue last during the penalty-phase closing arguments.  But the 
panel committed no error in denying this motion.  See State v. Rogers (1985), 17 
Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph six of the syllabus (state 
has the right to open and close arguments to the jury during penalty phase). 
{¶ 144} Hunter also argues that the panel erred in denying a defense 
motion to prohibit the state from referencing the nature and circumstances of the 
offense as a matter to be considered in mitigation until first raised by the defense.  
But no error occurred in denying this motion.  See State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 183; State v. Noling, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 101. 
{¶ 145} Next, Hunter argues that the panel erred in denying defense 
motions to dismiss the capital specifications because of constitutional and 
international law violations.  But, as discussed below in proposition of law V, no 
error occurred in denying these motions. 
{¶ 146} Additionally, Hunter argues that the trial court erred in denying 
the defense motion to suppress his police statement, because it was obtained in 
violation of his constitutional rights.  However, Hunter was properly advised of 
his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived his rights before talking to police.  See 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 147} During the suppression hearing, Detective Noel testified that she 
and Detective Wiggington advised Hunter of his Miranda rights before 
questioning him about what happened to Trustin.  A notification-of-rights form 
was used to advise Hunter of his Miranda rights.  Noel testified that Hunter read 
each of his rights aloud and then explained what those rights meant.  Hunter then 
talked to police. 
{¶ 148} Detective Noel also testified that Hunter had appeared mentally 
alert, was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the interview, 
and told investigators that he had completed his GED.  Thus, the totality of the 
circumstances supports the trial court’s findings that Hunter was properly advised 
of his Miranda warnings and voluntarily waived them before talking to the police.  
See State v. Lather, 110 Ohio St.3d 270, 2006-Ohio-4477, 853 N.E.2d 279, ¶ 10-
13. 
{¶ 149} Finally, Hunter argues that the panel erred in denying any and all 
oral defense motions and objections made at trial.  He also challenges all rulings 
granting the state’s motions and objections.  Hunter sets forth a list of these 
objectionable rulings but fails to provide any explanation to support his argument 
that they were erroneous.  Nothing shows that these rulings were improper.  Thus, 
we also reject this argument. 
{¶ 150} Based on the foregoing, proposition VII is overruled. 
{¶ 151} Noncapital sentencing.  In proposition of law VI, Hunter argues 
that the three-judge panel erred in sentencing him to consecutive sentences for his 
noncapital offenses in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. 
{¶ 152} The panel sentenced Hunter to life without parole for rape in 
Count Two and eight years for child endangerment in Count Three.  The panel 
stated:  “And for the record, the sentence[s] on all counts are to run consecutively 
to each other, and all sentences imposed are the maximum as provided by law as 
of the date of the commission of the offense.”  But Hunter’s failure to object to 
January Term, 2011 
33 
 
the imposition of his consecutive sentences has forfeited this issue absent plain 
error.  See State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, 
¶ 377. 
{¶ 153} The panel had the authority to impose consecutive sentences on 
Hunter.  See State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-Ohio-3478, 912 N.E.2d 
582, ¶ 35.  Moreover, the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case does 
not implicate Sixth Amendment considerations such as those recently addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Ice (2009), 555 U.S. 160, 129 
S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed. 2d 517. 
{¶ 154} Nor does the panel’s imposition of consecutive sentences violate 
Hunter’s constitutional right to be safe from cruel and unusual punishment.  In 
State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 1, 
this court held that the imposition of the aggregate 134-year prison term on a 
defendant did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 9, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution.  Hairston stated, “Where none of the individual sentences 
imposed on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, 
an aggregate prison term resulting from consecutive imposition of those sentences 
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 155} Although Hairston was a noncapital case, the same principal 
would apply to Hunter’s noncapital sentencing.  None of the individual sentences 
imposed on Hunter were grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses.  
They were within the statutory range for each offense.  Accordingly, the 
aggregate prison term resulting from the consecutive imposition of those 
sentences was not unconstitutional.  Proposition VI is rejected. 
{¶ 156} Constitutionality.  In proposition of law V, Hunter challenges the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statutes.  This claim is summarily 
rejected.  See State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 606-608, 734 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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345; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 125, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 
383; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 157} Hunter also argues that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes violate 
international law and agreements to which the United States is a party.  We have 
rejected similar arguments.  See State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 69, 752 
N.E.2d 904. 
{¶ 158} Cumulative error.  In proposition of law X, Hunter makes the 
generalized claim that the cumulative effect of errors in his trial necessitates 
reversal of his conviction and death sentence.  But Hunter received a fair trial and 
a fair sentencing determination, and no errors occurred that prejudiced his 
substantial rights.  See State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 
N.E.2d 48, ¶ 177.  Proposition X is rejected. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 159} Having considered Hunter’s propositions of law, we must now 
independently review Hunter’s death sentence for appropriateness and 
proportionality as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires. 
{¶ 160} Aggravating circumstances.  Hunter was charged with and 
convicted of the capital specifications of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and 2929.04(A)(9).  
The evidence at trial establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunter murdered 
Trustin Blue while committing or attempting to commit rape, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  
Hunter was also properly convicted of murder of a child under the age of 13, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(9). 
{¶ 161} Mitigating evidence.  Against these aggravating circumstances, 
we are called upon to weigh the mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B).  
Hunter presented seven mitigation witnesses and offered an unsworn statement, 
which his attorney read into the record. 
January Term, 2011 
35 
 
{¶ 162} Harriet Elizabeth Hunter, the defendant’s mother, testified that 
Hunter was born and raised in Cincinnati.  Hunter had a normal childhood and 
was “just like any other kid.”  Hunter attended Withrow High School.  Hunter was 
a very supportive son and helped his parents by performing chores and other work 
around their home.  Harriet had a good relationship with Hunter and characterized 
him as a “loving son and a caring son.” 
{¶ 163} Harriet was aware that Hunter was involved in drug use, but she 
did not know the type of drugs he was using.  She indicated that Hunter’s drug 
use was not prevalent and did not have an impact upon his conduct.  But Harriet 
knew that Hunter was an alcoholic and drank a lot with her husband. 
{¶ 164} Hunter has four biological children.  Harriet stated, “He was a 
good father to his kids.”  He “worked, took care of them and did things with 
them.”  Hunter also had a good relationship with his brothers and sisters and all 
his nieces and nephews.  He spent time with his nieces and nephews by taking 
them to shows and going fishing.  Hunter’s support benefitted the children 
because “[i]f they needed anything they would come to him.” 
{¶ 165} Harriet stated that Hunter was devoted to his children and his 
extended family: “[H]e loved us.”  She also stated, “[The family] loved him.  All 
of us loved him.  The children love him to death.”  Harriet also testified that she 
has never seen Hunter lose his temper, become violent, or abuse a child. 
{¶ 166} Although Harriet was not around Trustin very often, she discussed 
Hunter’s relationship with Trustin.  Harriet testified that “at first Trustin cried 
when he was around him, but they had a good relationship.  They would give each 
other high fives and stuff like that.  * * *  He could talk to him and Trustin would 
talk to him.” 
{¶ 167} Harriet has talked to Hunter since the charges were brought in this 
case.  She believes that Hunter can be rehabilitated and become a law-abiding and 
productive citizen.  Harriet stated that Hunter is “so sorry that Trustin had died.”  
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Finally, Harriet testified that Hunter’s execution would have a “[t]errible” impact 
on her. 
{¶ 168} Leevell Hunter, the defendant’s father, described Hunter as a 
“typical little boy” when he was growing up.  Leevell stated that Hunter was not a 
problem as a child and was very dependable.  He helped his parents by 
performing chores, cutting the grass, and doing other things around the house. 
{¶ 169} Leevell suspected that Hunter was using drugs but never 
confronted him about it.  Leevell and Hunter drank alcohol together.  Leevell 
stated, “We used to swap 12 packs, me and him, and booze on the side, Jack 
Daniels.” 
{¶ 170} Leevell stated that Trustin had come to their home a few times.  
He described Hunter’s involvement with Trustin: “Whatever he need was [sic] he 
took care of him.  He didn’t deny him of it and he would get food of mine that I 
had around the kitchen and in the basement * * * and Lamont would give it to 
him.”  Leevell has never known Hunter to be violent or threatening. 
{¶ 171} Leevell has talked with Hunter about what happened to Trustin 
since the charges were brought.  Leevell said, “I think he [Hunter] is like I am, 
sorry it happened.  Not that he was involved in it, but it happened and he was 
around when it happened.” 
{¶ 172} Leevell loves his son and does not want to see him executed.  If 
Hunter were sentenced to death, Leevell stated,  “[i]t would hurt me deeply.” 
{¶ 173} During cross-examination, Leevell acknowledged that Hunter had 
been convicted twice for selling drugs.  Leevell was also aware that Hunter had 
been convicted of domestic violence against Tamara Mitchell. 
{¶ 174} Theresa Tomlin and Hunter had had a romantic relationship 
between 1987 and 1989.  They had one daughter, Ashley Hunter.  During their 
relationship, Hunter was around Tomlin’s two-year-old son from a previous 
January Term, 2011 
37 
 
relationship.  Tomlin stated that Hunter was very good with her son and never 
abused him.  She stated that Hunter “treated [her] kid just like he was his own.” 
{¶ 175} Tomlin has remained “friends” with Hunter.  She states that he is 
a very “loving and caring person.”  Tomlin stated that Hunter has “always been 
great with [their] daughter.  He is always there for her any time she needs 
anything and also with his ex-wife’s kids he is always there for them.”  He 
provides them with advice and counsel, takes them to family functions, and takes 
them out to eat. 
{¶ 176} Tomlin describes Hunter as a “great father.”  Tomlin would not 
“think twice” about allowing Hunter to be around her own children in an 
unsupervised fashion, because he is very caring and “would never hurt” a child.  
Tomlin testified that she has never observed any sign that Hunter might have 
abused her children. 
{¶ 177} Tomlin had an opportunity to observe Hunter with Trustin.  
Tomlin stated, “Trustin seems [sic] fine when we were around.  He didn’t seem to 
be scared or anything.” 
{¶ 178} Hunter and Ashley continue to have a beneficial relationship.  If 
Hunter received the death sentence, Tomlin stated, “[i]t would kill [Ashley].  It 
would absolutely kill her.”  Tomlin added that a death sentence would have the 
same impact on her. 
{¶ 179} Tamara Kay Mitchell and Hunter were married from 1996 to 
1999.  They had one son, Lamont Jr., and raised two other children together.  
Mitchell stated that Hunter has had a great relationship with all her children.  She 
said, “I have three children and out of those three children Lamont is the best 
father that they have.  I mean, he’s the only father really that they know and I 
wouldn’t trade him for the world.”  Mitchell stated that Hunter paid the bills and 
took care of her and her children.  Mitchell also testified that Hunter has never 
been abusive towards her children. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 180} Mitchell described Hunter as “fun, caring, thoughtful, [and would] 
help anybody any time, any situation.”  Mitchell acknowledged that Hunter had a 
domestic-violence case that involved her.  Mitchell stated that had occurred 15 
years earlier when they “were young.  Things happen.  He’s not an abusive person 
though.” 
{¶ 181} Mitchell observed Hunter and Trustin interact.  She stated, “At the 
times that I observed Trustin with Lamont everything was fine.  I used to keep 
Trustin so Lamont could get him.  * * *  And when they were picked up Lamont 
was the one that would pick him up.  There was no issue.” 
{¶ 182} During cross-examination, Mitchell provided further information 
about the domestic-violence incidents.  She stated, “[W]e had three incidents 
where things happened and they got out of control and, yes, the police were 
called.  As far as him being violent, no.  * * *  A push or shove, but nothing 
where I had to go the hospital to be treated for.” 
{¶ 183} Debra Barnes, the defendant’s oldest sister, testified that Hunter 
had been a happy child and got along well with everyone in the family.  However, 
there were problems in the family that had an impact on Hunter.  Hunter’s father 
was an alcoholic, his parents had arguments, and sometimes there was “hitting.” 
{¶ 184} Barnes also testified that Hunter had been a construction worker 
and worked for a company for several years.  Hunter was about to start a seal 
coating business around the time of Trustin’s death. 
{¶ 185} She has also observed Hunter interact with his daughter Trinity 
and said that he is a “great dad.”  Hunter has also been a great father with his 
other children and helped them with their homework.  Similarly, Hunter has been 
very good with Barnes’s children. 
{¶ 186} Barnes has developed a really close relationship with Hunter over 
the last couple of years.  She expressed her love for Hunter and stated that his 
January Term, 2011 
39 
 
death would be “totally * * * devastating[.]  * * * [Their] family would fall 
apart.” 
{¶ 187} Mariah Brown, the defendant’s 16-year-old stepdaughter, has 
known Hunter since she was seven-and-a-half months old.  She testified that 
Hunter has been a good stepfather:  “He used to take me to school, do my hair, 
help me with my school projects, he was there for each play I was in, helped me 
pick my high schools.”  Hunter never abused her in any way.  Brown testified that 
if Hunter were sentenced to death, “[i]t would kill” her. 
{¶ 188} Ashley Hunter, the defendant’s 18-year-old daughter, testified that 
Hunter has been an important part of her life.  She said, “He is everything to me.  
Like I don’t know or I wouldn’t know how to act if he wasn’t around.  I talk to 
him about going to college and everything and he’s my support.”  Ashley had a 
loving and nurturing relationship with her father.  She stated that if he were 
sentenced to death, “[t]hat would kill a part of me.”  She added, “Like I wouldn’t 
be the same person.” 
{¶ 189} Hunter’s unsworn statement.  Trial counsel read Hunter’s 
unsworn statement to the panel.  He wrote: 
{¶ 190} “Contrary to the charges, I am a loving father to my children, son 
to my parents, and brothers [sic] to my siblings.  I’m a taxpaying citizen of this 
community. 
{¶ 191} “I have made mistakes in the past in an attempt to find my way in 
life.  I’m not a saint, but I’m not a monster either.  I feel I have paid for my 
mistakes in the past as for my criminal record.  I sold and used drugs back then, 
but that was then.  I have learned from my mistakes and have utilized them as a 
stepping stone to better myself as a person. 
{¶ 192} “I have accomplished a few personal goals in my life that I’m 
proud of.  I’m a part owner of my company.  I learned a skill and trade in seal 
coating.  I worked for a company called * * * ABC Oak Pavement Services for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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five years.  I took the training and skills I learned from that company and applied 
them to my own ambition * * * to become partners in a law-abiding, productive 
business. 
{¶ 193} “* * * 
{¶ 194} “Unfortunately, this tragic incident happened in my life and my 
family life has not been the same.  I am truly saddened and remorseful for this 
tragic incident.  Again, I am truly saddened and remorseful for this tragic incident. 
{¶ 195} “My life will never be the same.  Trustin’s life is no longer with 
us physically.  I love Trustin and I will always love him.  To me he was my son 
and he will always hold that place in my heart. 
{¶ 196} “My story did not come to light at trial.  I was a great father to my 
children.  I have four biological children:  Ashley, 18, Lamont, 14, Alida, 12 and 
Trinity, 2.  I have also raised two other children that are not my biological 
children.  I was also a father to Trustin, Terrell and Tryee.  Their mother, 
Luzmilda, knew I was there for all three of them and knew that the bond that I 
formed with them was a natural bond. 
{¶ 197} “I am a God-fearing man, and I was fortunate enough to have my 
parents in my life, so I feel that every child deserves a mother and a father, and 
that’s why I have been there for my children and the children of other men. 
{¶ 198} “I would never harm a child.  I don’t believe in physically 
punishing kids.  I have disciplined my children in the past, but my discipline has 
never been extreme and/or abusive. 
{¶ 199} “I never once laid my hands on Trustin in any harmful way.  What 
happened on January 19th, 2006 was unfortunate. 
{¶ 200} “I pray that this letter gives edification and clarity of who Lamont 
Hunter really is as compared to being Lamont that was depicted and displayed by 
the media, particularly [the] Cincinnati Enquirer.” 
 
 
January Term, 2011 
41 
 
Sentence evaluation 
{¶ 201} We find nothing mitigating in the nature and circumstances of the 
offense.  Hunter raped and murdered his girlfriend’s three-year-old son while she 
was at work.  Trustin died from massive head injuries and had been tortured.  
These facts establish a senseless, horrific crime that lacks any mitigating features. 
{¶ 202} The statutory mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B) include 
(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong provocation); 
(B)(3) (mental disease or defect); (B)(4) (youth of the offender; Hunter was 37 
years old at the time of the offense); (B)(5) (lack of a significant criminal record); 
(B)(6) (accomplice only); and (B)(7) (any other relevant factors).  We find that 
none of these statutory factors are applicable except (B)(7). 
{¶ 203} Under the catchall R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) provision, we give some 
weight to the evidence of the love and support that Hunter shares with his parents, 
his brothers and sisters, his ex-wife, Tamara Mitchell, and his former girlfriend, 
Theresa Tomlin.  In addition, we give weight to evidence that Hunter loves and 
cares for his children. 
{¶ 204} Testimony was also presented indicating that Hunter has a history 
of drug and alcohol abuse.  However, we give little weight to this testimony, 
because there is no evidence of any connection between Hunter’s drug and 
alcohol abuse and the offenses in this case. 
{¶ 205} Hunter also expressed remorse and sorrow for Trustin’s death in 
his unsworn statement.  But Hunter also said, “I never once laid my hands on 
Trustin in any harmful way.  What happened on January 19th, 2006 was 
unfortunate.”  Thus, Hunter continues to deny any responsibility for Trustin’s 
murder.  Hunter’s denials negate any mitigating weight that we might otherwise 
give for his expressions of sorrow.  See State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 
2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 266; State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2005-Ohio-1507, 824 N.E.2d 959, ¶ 178.  The evidence does not suggest any 
other (B)(7) mitigating factors. 
{¶ 206} Based on our independent weighing of the evidence, we find that 
the aggravating factors of Hunter’s murdering Trustin Blue while committing or 
attempting to commit rape under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and of murdering a child 
who was younger than 13 under 2929.04(A)(9) clearly outweigh any mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  We also find that the penalty imposed in this 
case is both appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences 
imposed for other child-murders under R.C. 2929.04(A)(9).  See State v. 
Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 119 (12-
year-old victim); State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 
1185, ¶ 196 (six-year-old victim); and State v. Smith, 97 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-
Ohio-6659, 780 N.E.2d 221, ¶ 79 (six-month-old victim). 
{¶ 207} We also find that the death penalty is appropriate and 
proportionate when compared to death sentences approved for other rape-
murders.  See State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 170-171, 694 N.E.2d 
932; State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 391, 404, 686 N.E.2d 1112; and 
State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 106, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 208} We affirm Hunter’s convictions and sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman Jr., Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Bruce K. Hust and Herbert E. Freeman, for appellant. 
______________________