Case Title: State v. Kucharski

Citation: 2015 WI 64

Docket Number: 2013AP000557-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP557-CR    
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Corey R. Kucharski, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 622, 848 N.W.2d 903) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jean A. DiMotto 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Matthew  
S. Pinix, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Matthew S. Pinix. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melinda A. Swartz, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers.
 
1 
2015 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2013AP557-CR    
(L.C. No. 
2010CF652) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Corey R. Kucharski,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This is a double-murder case 
that centers on the evidence presented on the question of the 
defendant's mental responsibility.  The circuit court1 found the 
defendant responsible.  The court of appeals, in a split 
decision,2 
granted 
the 
defendant 
a 
new 
trial 
under 
its 
discretionary authority to reverse convictions in cases where 
"it appears from the record that . . . it is probable that 
                                                 
1 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Jean 
DiMotto presiding. 
2 State v. Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
2
justice has for any reason miscarried[.]"3  We now reverse the 
grant of a new trial because we conclude that the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion, and we remand to 
the court of appeals for the resolution of the remainder of the 
claims raised on appeal.  
¶2 
Corey Kucharski was charged with two counts of 
intentional homicide for the murders of his parents, which he 
later said he committed in obedience to voices he heard.  He 
pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (an NGI 
plea).  He pleaded no contest to the guilt phase of the trial, 
and waived a jury trial on the responsibility phase.4     
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 (2013-14) states 
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶¶33-34, 39, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 
850 N.W.2d 42, states 
A bifurcated criminal trial consists of two phases: 
(1) the guilt phase; and (2) the responsibility phase. 
When a criminal defendant pleads not guilty and not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the jury 
hears evidence relating to the defendant's guilt in 
the first phase of the trial, and if the jury finds 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
3
¶3 
During the trial, one doctor, Dr. Rawski, testified as 
the sole witness for the defense; his and other doctors' reports 
and materials were entered into evidence.  Dr. Rawski testified 
that it was his opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that Kucharski's symptoms of schizophrenia were so 
severe on the night he killed his parents that he lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or conform his conduct to the law.  A second doctor who 
examined him for the defense, Dr. Pankiewicz, was also of the 
opinion that at the time of the crime, Kucharski was not 
mentally responsible.  A third expert who examined Kucharski at 
the State's request, Dr. Jurek, did not come to any different 
conclusion.  At trial, the State presented no witnesses; it did 
not dispute that Kucharski was mentally ill but argued that 
                                                                                                                                                             
the defendant guilty, the trial proceeds to the second 
phase. Wis. Stat. § 971.165(1)(a). In the second 
phase, the jury considers whether the defendant had a 
mental disease or defect at the time of the crime and 
whether, "as a result of mental disease or defect the 
person 
lacked 
substantial 
capacity 
either 
to  
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or 
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of 
law." Wis. Stat. § 971.15(1).   
The responsibility phase described above has evolved 
over time and has now become close to a civil trial.  
  
. . . [T]he defendant has the burden of proof to show 
mental disease or defect by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence, the same burden imposed for most 
issues in civil trials.   
If the NGI plea were tried to a jury, the verdict would 
have to be agreed to by at least five sixths of the jurors.  
See Wis. Stat. § 971.165(2). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
4
undisputed evidence of Kucharski's actions showed that he did 
have substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of what 
he did and to conform his conduct to the law.   
¶4 
The circuit court agreed with the State, citing 
evidence 
such 
as 
Kucharski's 
statements 
about 
expecting 
punishment for the crime and his decision not to commit suicide 
or engage in a shootout with police despite reporting that he 
had heard voices telling him to do so.  In light of that 
evidence, the circuit court found that Kucharski had not met his 
burden on the issue of responsibility.5  He was convicted and 
sentenced to consecutive life sentences. 
¶5 
Though Kucharski raised several claims on appeal, the 
court of appeals' analysis focused solely on granting his motion 
for a new trial under Wis. Stat. § 752.35, the discretionary 
reversal statute. For purposes of interpreting that statute, 
justice has miscarried if "there is a substantial probability 
that a new trial would produce a different result."6  We have 
held that "only in exceptional cases" is it appropriate for a 
reviewing court to exercise its discretion to grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice.7  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.15(3) (stating that the burden on 
defendant in NGI trial is to prove "to a reasonable certainty by 
the greater weight of the credible evidence" that he is not 
responsible). 
6 State v. Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶31, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 
617 N.W.2d 175. 
7 State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶114, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 
700 N.W.2d 98, State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 
826 N.W.2d 60, Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶87, 235 Wis. 2d 
325, 611 N.W.2d 659.  
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
5
¶6 
The court of appeals held that there was a substantial 
probability of a different outcome at a new trial "because 
[Kucharski] met his burden"8 of proving by the greater weight of 
the credible evidence that he was not mentally responsible for 
the murders.  It found that the evidence in his favor "certainly 
comprised 'the greater weight of the credible evidence.'"9  The 
dissent would have affirmed the circuit court, citing the well-
established proposition that "the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of the evidence and the determination of whether the 
defendant has met his burden" are questions that "are the 
province of the trial court alone."10   
¶7 
The State argues that the trial court appropriately 
weighed the evidence in a way that is consistent with prior case 
law such as State v. Sarinske,11 which holds that a trier of fact 
is not required to accept the opinion of an expert, even if 
uncontradicted.  The State argues that the court of appeals 
"wholly ignore[d] this requirement and instead substitute[d] its 
                                                 
8 State v. Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, ¶35, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014). 
9 Id. 
10 Id., ¶45. 
11 State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 48, 280 N.W.2d 725 
(1979). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
6
judgment for that of the fact-finder . . . ."12  Kucharski argues 
that "[t]he very nature of the test for miscarriage of justice 
necessitates substitution of the appellate court's judgment for 
that of the factfinder" and that in fact an appellate court 
should have "unfettered discretion to review the record without 
deference to the factfinder's conclusions."   
¶8 
We 
uphold 
discretionary 
rulings 
unless 
they 
are 
reached under an incorrect view of the facts or the law. In 
State v. D'Acquisto13 we stated, 
The appropriate standard of review for assessing the 
propriety of the court of appeals' [discretionary 
ruling] is that this court will uphold the court's 
discretion if its decision is made on appropriate 
facts and the correct law and thus is one which a 
court 
reasonably 
could 
have 
reached. 
If 
it 
is 
demonstrated 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
made 
a 
discretionary order, . . .  based upon a mistaken view 
of the law, we will ordinarily reverse that order. 
In this case, that is what happened.14  The reason given by the 
court of appeals in this case for invoking the rarely used power 
of discretionary reversal was that the defendant had "met his 
                                                 
12 The State also argues that this court should "tighten the 
requirements for granting a new trial on mental responsibility 
under the miscarriage-of-justice prong of § 752.35" by adding a 
requirement that "error, counsel's misfeasance, or some form of 
unfairness infected the defendant's trial."  We are confident 
that the existing rules are adequate and decline the invitation 
to write additional requirements into the statute. 
13 State v. D'Acquisto, 124 Wis. 2d 758, 762, 370 N.W.2d 781 
(1985) (citations omitted). 
14 Even under this deferential standard, it is not incorrect 
for this court to reverse a ruling based on mistake of law.  It 
would not be proper to leave undisturbed, under the guise of a 
deferential standard of review, a mistaken application of the 
law. See Dissent, ¶3. 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
7
burden," which is going too far for a reviewing court on a 
question of fact.  Further, the sole reason given for the 
discretionary reversal was that improperly reached conclusion.  
The 
framework 
for 
reviewing 
evidentiary 
challenges 
must 
recognize 
"established 
rules 
of 
jurisprudence 
designed 
to 
protect the sanctity of findings of fact . . . ."15  It is thus 
error for a reviewing court to set aside findings of fact 
without evaluating them under the proper standard of review.   
¶9 
The proper standard of review for appellate review of 
whether a party has met his burden on the matter of mental 
responsibility is uncontroversial and well established in both 
Wisconsin law and federal law: whether a person has met his or 
her burden on the question of mental responsibility is a 
question of fact, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of 
review.16 
                                                 
15 State v. Hintz, 200 Wis. 636, 642, 229 N.W. 54 (1930). 
16 Wisconsin cases that support this proposition include 
State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 660, 370 N.W.2d 240 (1985); 
State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 48, 280 N.W.2d 725, (1979); 
Pautz v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 469, 476, 219 N.W.2d 327 (1974); Kemp 
v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 125, 137, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973); State v. 
Bergenthal, 47 Wis. 2d 668, 685, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1970);; State v. 
Ryan, 2000 WI App 47, ¶16, 233 Wis. 2d 273, 610 N.W.2d 229; and 
State v. Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶3, 238 Wis.2d 301, 617 
N.W.2d 175.. 
Federal cases that have stated this standard include United 
States v. Waagner, 319 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1993); and United 
States v. Smeaton, 762 F.2d 796, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1985).  A law 
review 
article 
summarizing 
the 
development 
of 
appellate 
standards for review of federal insanity defense cases described 
two of the key cases as follows: 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
8
¶10 The court of appeals' holding reveals its error: it 
simply performs a new weighing of the evidence and then states 
outright that Kucharski "met his burden" and that the evidence 
"certainly 
comprised" 
the 
required 
burden 
of 
proof--
determinations that are unquestionably issues of fact, not law.  
By way of illustration, in State v. Hintz,17 a case that 
considered 
a 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
challenge 
and 
discretionary reversal, we acknowledged, as we remanded for a 
new trial, that the ultimate question of whether the evidentiary 
burden was met would be one for the trier of fact and not for 
the reviewing court: Noting that "it is the function of the 
[trier of fact] to resolve this doubt," we remanded so that "the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In United States v. Barton in 1993, the Fifth Circuit 
addressed whether the Jackson sufficiency of the 
evidence standard applied in situations when insanity 
is an affirmative defense, and the defendant, rather 
than the prosecution, has the burden of proof. 
 . . . After recognizing the implications of shifting 
the burden of proof to the defendant, the court noted 
that slight modification to the sufficiency of the 
evidence standard was necessary. Accordingly, the 
Barton court stated that it "should reject the jury 
verdict only if no reasonable trier of fact could have 
failed to find that the defendant's criminal insanity 
at the time of the offense was established by clear 
and convincing evidence."  . . .  
As in Jackson, the Barton court noted that appellate 
courts are not to supplant the role of the jury as 
fact finders when reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a conviction. 
Kevin Thompson, Criminal Appellate Procedure——Insanity Defense——
the Proper Standard of Appellate Review When Reviewing A Jury 
Decision on Sanity, State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002), 
70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1213, 1224-25 (2003). 
17 Hintz, 200 Wis. at 642.  
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
9
question of defendant's guilt should be passed upon by another 
jury . . . ."18   
¶11 Applying the proper standard of review and not 
disturbing the factual findings of the circuit court concerning 
the burden of proof because they are not clearly erroneous, we 
conclude that the court of appeals erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  In this case the only reason given by the court of 
appeals for the new trial in the interest of justice was that 
court's improper de novo weighing of the evidence.  When the 
evidence is reviewed under the proper standard, there is not a 
probability of a different result on retrial such that a new 
trial in the interest of justice is warranted.  
¶12 We therefore reverse the grant of a new trial under 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35 and remand to the court of appeals for the 
resolution of Kucharski's remaining unaddressed claims.19   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶13 Kucharski called 911 after midnight on a February 
night in 2010 to request a coroner. He told the 911 operator 
that his parents were dead, named the gun he had used to kill 
them, and was clear in communicating that there was no need to 
send medical assistance.  When police arrived, he surrendered 
                                                 
18 Id.  
19 Kucharski argued at the court of appeals that the trial 
court erred in its application of  Wis. Stat. § 971.15, that the 
trial court’s conclusions regarding mental responsibility lack 
support in the record, and that he was entitled to a new trial 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. 
Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶31, n.2 
(Wis. App., May 6, 2014). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
10
without incident.  Police found Kucharski's father and mother in 
the home, dead of multiple gunshot wounds. 
¶14 Once in police custody, Kucharski invoked his right to 
counsel when asked specifics about the shootings.  When he was 
questioned 
by 
detectives, 
after 
he 
received 
his 
Miranda 
warnings, Kucharski stated, "[A]s far as the statement about 
most of what happened that evening and I'd rather have a lawyer 
here for that."  When the detective reiterated his right to do 
that, Kucharski stated, "If you want to ask me any questions 
about my background or any, any other questions, fine. . . . I 
know you want to talk about the evening but I still rather have 
somebody here before I start answering questions about that 
night."20   
¶15 He willingly talked to investigators without counsel 
present about his history, prior drug use, alcohol use, and his 
experience of hearing voices, which he said began five years 
earlier after a period of extensive drug use. He said he 
                                                 
20 Dr. Rawski, the doctor who testified at the trial, 
acknowledged on direct examination that Kucharski  
clearly . . . recognized the illegality of homicide 
and recognized that there would be, in his term, 
quote, repercussions, unquote, that he did not expect 
to have to deal with when planning his – the 
executions because he expected to have been killed by 
police afterwards and – and engaging in a shootout 
with them. His – His decision to invoke his right [to 
counsel] is based on his knowledge that he would be in 
legal trouble, that he was arrested by police and that 
he was criminally charged. He was not so out of touch 
with reality that he didn't know he was in jail or 
that he didn't know he was arrested or that he didn't 
know what he had actually done.  
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
11
continued hearing the voices after he stopped using drugs. The 
voices he heard told him to do specific things and berated him 
for certain mistakes. He also disclosed that he had experienced 
other auditory distortions such as hearing another person's 
voice while a person was speaking to him. He drank heavily, 
which he said was an effort to quiet the voices.21 He had held 
jobs in prior years both in Wisconsin and in other states.  In 
2005 he had returned to his parents' Milwaukee home, where he 
spent his time increasingly isolated, drinking daily and 
amassing a gun collection. He sought disability benefits for a 
medical condition but gave no indication at that time that he 
was experiencing mental health problems.  He was never treated 
for mental health issues and never told anyone that he was 
experiencing them.   
¶16 At 
trial, 
Dr. 
Rawski 
testified 
that 
Kucharski's 
account of the evening was that he had been present at an 
argument between his parents in the early evening.  Afterward, 
he recalled, he had heard voices saying, "[J]ust [expletive] 
kill them, give them what they want . . . ."  At that point, he 
                                                 
21 Dr. Rawski's written report, which is in the record, also 
contained Kucharski's account of the evening of the murders.  He 
stated that he had been drinking beginning in the afternoon but 
did not specify the number of drinks he had.  He did not 
consider himself intoxicated after he awoke from a nap.  In 
testimony, Dr. Rawski noted that Kucharski "was not assessed to 
be intoxicated by alcohol by the police afterwards."  It was Dr. 
Rawski's conclusion that "[t]his is a planned – executed set of 
executions in a[n] organized fashion driven by motive, driven by 
– by delusion and hallucinations, in my opinion, not by 
disinhibition and behavior by alcohol dependence."  The circuit 
court made no contrary findings regarding the role of alcohol or 
drug use in Kucharski's health or in the homicides.   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
12
had gone to his bedroom to sleep.  He had awakened a couple of 
hours later and had heard a clear voice telling him to "end it" 
—— to kill his parents and die while engaging in a shootout with 
police when they arrived.  At that point, he had gone downstairs 
and confronted his father in the kitchen and shot him.  He had 
stepped into another room and shot his mother, apparently as she 
was coming toward him.  Kucharski's father was shot 10 times; 
his mother was shot four times.  He had waited a couple of hours 
before placing the 911 call.  He stated that in the past his 
father had stated that if he had a medical emergency, he wished 
for Kucharski to delay an hour before calling 911 so that there 
would be no possibility of resuscitation.  He stated he did so 
in this instance in keeping with his father's wishes.   
¶17 Kucharski was charged with two counts of first-degree 
intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon.22  He 
entered an NGI plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.15.   
¶18 Kucharski waived his right to trial on the issue of 
guilt, instead pleading no contest.  The issue of mental 
responsibility was tried to the court after he waived his right 
to a jury.  The three doctors who examined him all concluded in 
their reports that, as a result of his schizophrenia, Kucharski 
"lacked 
substantial 
capacity 
either 
to 
appreciate 
the 
wrongfulness of his . . . conduct or conform his . . . conduct 
                                                 
22 The statutes defining first degree intentional homicide 
by use of a dangerous weapon are Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 
939.50(3)(a), and 939.63(1)(b). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
13
to the requirements of law," that he satisfied both requirements 
of the test, and that he was therefore not mentally responsible. 
¶19 The circuit court found that Kucharski had failed to 
meet his burden of proving that he was not responsible.  The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Kucharski 
did 
suffer 
from 
schizophrenia; however, it also concluded that the experts' 
opinions that he was not mentally responsible were speculative 
and insufficient to overcome other evidence from which it could 
be inferred that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct 
and had the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law. 
¶20 As 
to 
the 
question 
concerning 
his 
ability 
to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, the circuit court 
stated, "[T]here are indications, very near the point in time 
that the Defendant committed these crimes, that he understood 
they were wrongful, illegal."  For example, the court said, he 
had expressed the knowledge that he needed a lawyer and would be 
"rotting in jail" for the killings. 
¶21 As to the issue of whether he could conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law, the circuit court stated 
that Kucharski had heard  
command voices about killing himself, and he did not 
follow through with that before or after he killed his 
parents. . . . [Y]et he doesn't respond to the command 
voice, especially the derogatory one that he was the 
cause of the fight, and he should kill himself and so 
on, whether directly, or through a shootout with the 
police. 
 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
14
The 
court 
subsequently 
stated, 
"I'm 
finding 
him 
legally 
responsible because I'm not persuaded beyond a level scale. 
 . . . It's 
not 
tipping, 
even 
slightly, 
that 
he 
lacked 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law."  The 
circuit court observed that "the basis of [the experts'] 
opinions . . . is that they're speculating about what happened. 
¶22 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed, 
and 
the 
State 
petitioned for review, which we granted. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 "This court does not normally review a discretionary 
decision of the court of appeals.  However, when [it] do[es] 
review a discretionary act of the Court of Appeals, [it] 
review[s] the decision as [it] would any other exercise of 
discretion."23  "[A] court erroneously exercises its discretion 
when it fails to set forth its reasoning and the facts of record 
do not support its decision.  Further, a court erroneously 
exercises its discretion when it proceeds under a mistaken view 
of the law."24  "This court has held that it is an erroneous 
exercise of discretion for the court of appeals  . . .  to 
shortcut 
[established] 
procedures . . .  
when 
there 
is 
no 
                                                 
23 Raz v. Brown, 2003 WI 29, ¶14, 260 Wis. 2d 614, 660 
N.W.2d 647. 
24 State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶20, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 
N.W.2d 784, abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel. Coleman 
v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900 
(citations omitted).   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
15
apparent reason for doing so."25    Reversals in the interest of 
justice should be granted only in exceptional cases.26 
¶24 "The credibility of the witnesses is properly the 
function of the jury or the trier of fact, in [cases where the 
right to a jury is waived,] the trial judge. It is only when the 
evidence that the trier of fact has relied upon is inherently or 
patently incredible that the appellate court will substitute its 
judgment for that of the fact finder, who has the great 
advantage of being present at the trial."27   
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A.  REVERSAL UNDER WIS. STAT. 752.35 WAS ERROR BECAUSE 
REVERSAL WAS BASED ON AN IMPROPER WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE 
WITHOUT APPLYING THE CORRECT STANDARD 
¶25 Two of the remedies that can be sought by a defendant 
following conviction are an outright reversal of a conviction 
and a reversal and remand.  An outright reversal can be based on 
various grounds, including a conclusion that the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law; this results in no retrial.28  A 
reversal and remand for a new trial may be granted for various 
reasons, including when it is probable that justice has 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶114, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 
700 N.W.2d 98, State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 
826 N.W.2d 60. 
 
27 Gauthier v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 412, 416, 137 N.W.2d 101 
(1965). 
28 State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶40, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 
N.W.2d 203.   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
16
miscarried and justice requires that the evidence be presented 
to a new trier of fact for a verdict.29  
¶26 We focus on the reason given by the court of appeals 
that it was probable that there would be a different outcome on 
retrial.  It was clearly a reweighing of the evidence.  The 
court of appeals stated:  
We agree with Kucharski that there is a substantial 
probability that a new trial would produce a different 
result because he met his burden under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.15(3). See Murdock, 238 Wis. 2d 301, ¶31.  The 
evidence showing that Kucharski lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law was, as we will discuss more fully below, 
very strong, and certainly comprised "the greater 
weight of the credible evidence."30 
 
¶27 It is well established that factual findings are 
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.31  It is also well 
established that "[t]he question of whether an accused has or 
has not met this burden [of proving that the accused was not 
mentally responsible for a crime] is one of fact, not one of law 
                                                 
29 Hintz, 200 Wis. at 642 ("Whatever doubts we may entertain 
concerning the justice of this verdict, our power to disturb it 
is limited by established rules of jurisprudence designed to 
protect the sanctity of findings of fact, a function which 
constituted society has committed to the jury.") 
30 State v. Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶35 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014) (emphasis added). 
31 State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶22, 346 Wis. 2d 289,  827 
N.W.2d 610 ("We will uphold a circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.")   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
17
for this court on appeal."32  When the proper framework is 
applied to an evaluation of the factual findings, the findings 
here must be upheld because there is no basis for saying that 
the findings are clearly erroneous.   
¶28 There are four points the court of appeals identified 
as the basis for its conclusion.  
¶29 The first point was that "there is no dispute that 
Kucharski was in fact suffering from schizophrenia when he 
killed his parents."33  The circuit court found that to be proved 
and identified the real focus of the case, stating,  
I don't think there's even a doubt, much less a 
reasonable doubt, that Mr. Kucharski suffered from a 
mental illness at the time that he committed these 
crimes, and the name of that mental illness is 
schizophrenia.  The close call is whether he lacked 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law 
or to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.    
The court later repeated, "There's no question that he suffered 
from schizophrenia at the time that he engaged in that planned, 
purposeful, intentional behavior to shoot his parents to death."  
While this fact is listed as a reason for the court of appeals' 
reversal, the issue of an existing mental illness was not the 
basis of the circuit court's original finding of fact in support 
of conviction, and the conclusion that Kucharski suffered from 
mental illness was not an obstacle to the circuit court's 
decision.  
                                                 
32 State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 47-48, 280 N.W.2d 725 
(1979) (emphasis added). 
33 Id., ¶36.   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
18
¶30 The second point was that "the expert testimony was 
uncontroverted."34  It is certainly accurate to state that the 
doctors who examined Kucharski came to the opinion that the 
schizophrenia rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the law.  But the 
opinions of experts are not dispositive.  The trier of fact 
retains the sole responsibility for determining whether the 
defendant has met his burden.  Further, we have explicitly 
stated that an expert's opinion, "even if uncontradicted need 
not be accepted by the [trier of fact]."35  This is especially 
true 
where 
"the 
defense 
doctors 
relied 
substantially 
on 
information provided by [the defendant]."36  That is precisely 
the situation in Kucharski's case.  As Dr. Rawski, the 
testifying doctor, acknowledged, he had conducted a three-and-a-
half-hour meeting with Kucharski, but he was missing much of the 
context he normally relies on for an NGI opinion: 
In my NGI evaluation we have some glaring absences of 
information that we typically rely upon[,] one of 
which is the statements of the victim or witnesses and 
there are none in this particular situation. Secondly 
– I mean there are – there are victims but there are 
no statements from them about the incident. 
Secondly we do not have a – a history of psychiatric 
evaluations over the course of time indicating the 
presence of mental illness and the supporting details 
that we look for to examine comparable contexts for 
similar behavior and symptoms as well, so that's 
absent as well, and so the evaluation and the NGI 
                                                 
34 Id., ¶37. 
35 Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d at 47-48.   
36 Id. at 49.   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
19
opinion, one way or another, is going to be primarily 
based largely upon the evidence such as the jail 
observations 
afterwards, 
the 
police 
observations 
afterwards, the random statements by neighbors who did 
not know Mr. Kucharski very well because of his very 
isolated 
lifestyle 
and 
based 
upon 
the 
limited 
information from that disability report. 
¶31 Sarinske also involved a mental responsibility trial.  
Although the State in that case did put on an expert witness who 
contradicted the defense witnesses, Sarinske stated that a trier 
of fact may reject the opinions of an expert, even when there is 
no testimony to the contrary, when the basis of the expert's 
opinion is information substantially derived from the defendant. 
As Sarinske stated: 
[T]he jury is free to disbelieve the defense witnesses 
entirely, and even if the State declines . . . to 
present any experts in rebuttal, the accused may fail 
to satisfy his burden of affirmatively proving that he 
was suffering from mental disease.  Because the 
defense doctors relied substantially on information 
provided by [the defendant], the basis of their 
opinion and their diagnoses could be questioned by the 
jury on this ground alone.37   
 
¶32 The source of virtually all of the reports and 
interviews came down to Kucharski's own version of events and 
perspective.  The evidence of mental health issues that preceded 
the murders included the defendant's own account that he had 
begun hearing voices about five years earlier and several pages 
of handwritten notes found in his room that he said were his 
attempts over a period of a year to document the comments the 
voices made.  Dr. Rawski described the notes as "very bizarre 
                                                 
37 Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
20
and inexplicable."  Therefore, under Sarinske, the fact that the 
expert reports were uncontroverted is not dispositive.  The 
circuit court had no obligation in its role as the trier of fact 
to accept the conclusion of the experts who relied on Kucharski 
for their reports. 
¶33 The third point was that "there was a complete lack of 
evidence of alternative explanations for Kucharski's behavior."38   
The court of appeals cited to State v. Murdock, apparently for 
the implied proposition that absent  a rational explanation for 
behavior, it may be inferred that the explanation is that the 
person lacked capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or conform it to the law.39  However, it cites to no 
                                                 
38 State v. Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip 
op. ¶40 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014).   
39  Murdock, 238 Wis. 2d 301, ¶44, made its statement in the 
context of setting forth the facts in that case: 
The 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
presents 
no 
explanation 
for 
why Murdock would 
stab 
Grams 
approximately twenty times in order to steal his car, 
but then park the car in front of the Smiths' house, 
drag Grams out of the back of the car and leave him in 
the Smiths' front yard. Although Murdock demanded 
money from the Smiths, tried to prevent Shirley Smith 
from calling the police, and fled to the basement when 
the police came in the house after him, viewed as a 
whole, his behavior does not appear as purposeful as 
the State contends. After demanding money from the 
Smiths, Murdock "went berserk stabbing" them. When the 
first police officer arrived, Murdock was sitting on 
the 
Smiths' 
front 
steps 
near 
Grams's 
dead 
body. Murdock did not try to flee, but instead stood 
up and sat back down on the steps, and went in and out 
of the house several times. He even opened the door to 
the Smiths' house so that the police could come 
inside. 
 (emphasis added).   
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
21
authority for the proposition that a rational explanation must 
be offered for a criminal act.  Indeed, that approach would 
appear to shift the burden of proof on an NGI plea to the State.  
As the circuit court noted, 
I think both Dr. Pankiewicz and Dr. Rawski opined that 
they 
could 
not 
find 
evidence 
of 
a 
rational, 
alternative motive for the Defendant's behavior. I 
don't disagree with that. I think shooting your 
parents to death with a gun, is conduct that we might 
not find quote unquote rational. 
 
¶34 The fourth point was that the court of appeals 
"conclude[d] that evidence that Kucharski appeared to understand 
the legality of his actions and did not commit suicide as the 
voices directed does not mean that he was generally able to 
control his behavior or appreciate its wrongfulness at the time 
of the shooting."40  This is the crux of the court of appeals' 
reasoning, and it is a bare reweighing of what the evidence 
means, which is not permitted by a reviewing court.    
¶35 Kucharski argues that "[t]he very nature of a test for 
a miscarriage of justice necessitates substitution of the 
appellate court's judgment for that of the factfinder." That is 
not correct.   
¶36 To agree would allow any sufficiency of the evidence 
claim to be converted to an interest of justice claim, thereby 
evading the stringent standard for reviewing findings by the 
trier of fact.  That is contrary to the law.  It would also be 
an inappropriate use of the power to grant discretionary 
                                                 
40 State v. Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip 
op. ¶41 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014). 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
22
reversals. Put a different way, a reversal in the interest of 
justice is not intended to put the reviewing court in the shoes 
of the trier of fact in a way that is otherwise not permitted.  
It is not permitted to review factual findings without employing 
the correct standard of review.41  The reviewing court in such a 
case may go only so far as to say that it is "probable" that 
justice has miscarried and that it concludes that "the question 
of defendant's guilt should be passed upon by another jury 
. . . . "42  
                                                 
41 The approach Kucharski argues for, that an appellate 
court should have "unfettered discretion to review the record 
without deference to the factfinder's conclusions," is in 
conflict with the proper standard of review; it would turn 
appellate 
courts 
into 
simple 
do-overs. 
 
However, 
it 
is 
inaccurate to say that appellate courts are precluded by that 
standard of review from evaluating the evidence.  It is, in 
fact, the kind of evaluating of evidence that appellate courts 
routinely do when they are reviewing questions of fact.  
Contrary to the dissent's assertions, we apply settled law on 
questions of fact and appellate standards of review here and 
make no new law. 
42 Hintz, 200 Wis. 636, 637.  The court of appeals 
imprecisely characterized the conclusion of this court in regard 
to the Kemp case when it stated, "The supreme court reversed 
Kemp's conviction, concluding that he lacked the capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law."  State v. Kucharski, 
2014 WI App 71, ¶42, 354 Wis. 2d 622, 848 N.W.2d 903 (emphasis 
added).  That is not correct.  In Kemp v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 125, 
137, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973), this court stopped short of making 
that factual finding and merely remanded for a finding on that 
question to be made by a second trier of fact.  Kemp, 61 Wis. 2d 
at 137 ("We believe the weight of the testimony is such that 
justice has probably miscarried and that it is probable a new 
trial will result in a contrary finding.") 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
23
¶37 The court of appeals considered the facts of this case 
comparable to those of Kemp v. State,43 in which the defendant, a 
Vietnam veteran who had been treated extensively for war-related 
mental health problems, was granted a new trial after being 
convicted of shooting and killing his wife.  The court of 
appeals said that "Kemp supports our decision to reverse 
. . . . "  We disagree.  In that case, there was evidence of 
pervasive and debilitating mental illness that had resulted in 
inpatient and outpatient treatment of the defendant over a 
period of years prior to the shooting.44  There was testimony 
from neighbors about the absence of any indication that Kemp 
would have intentionally killed her.45  The court of appeals also 
noted that in this case, unlike in Kemp, there were no experts 
who concluded Kucharski was mentally responsible for the 
killings; therefore, it concluded that reversal in this case was 
even more justified than in Kemp, where the experts consulted 
had come to varying conclusions.   
¶38 Where a defendant seeks to mitigate punishment for a 
crime on the basis of mental disease or defect, it is highly 
relevant to consider the kind of external corroborating evidence 
that existed prior to the charged offense.  In Kemp this court 
recognized this when it noted, "The record clearly reveals that 
this is not a case where the question of the defendant's mental 
                                                 
43 Kemp, 61 Wis. 2d at 137. 
44 Id. at 134. 
45 Id. 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
24
condition was asserted for the first time after the act or the 
commencement of a criminal prosecution under circumstances that 
might suggest the defense is a self-serving afterthought to 
avoid legal responsibility."46     
¶39 Kucharski's, in contrast, is exactly that type of 
case.  The expert reports dismissed concerns that Kucharski was 
malingering, but, contrary to the court of appeals' implication, 
those opinions are not dispositive.  The trier of fact was not 
bound to accept those conclusions in light of evidence such as 
Kucharski's 
extraordinarily 
careful 
statements 
to 
law 
enforcement, from which contrary inferences could be drawn.   
¶40 It is clear from Kemp that the court placed great 
weight on the evidence of the prior corroborated mental health 
problems.  This single distinguishing fact is enough to make it 
unreasonable to view Kemp as supportive of a reversal on these 
facts. 
¶41 Kemp is instructive in that it also illustrates the 
principle that other claims of error must be addressed before 
moving to a consideration of whether a case is so exceptional it 
warrants reversal in the interest of justice.47  Before beginning 
its analysis of the interest of justice claim, the court 
addressed one claimed evidentiary error and then noted, "The 
defendant has asserted other procedural errors. We have reviewed 
                                                 
46 Id. at 137. 
47 Where there is no identified error in the circuit court, 
a defendant will have a more difficult time showing reversal is 
warranted in the interest of justice. 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
25
them and find no error."48 As noted above, reversals under Wis. 
Stat. § 752.35 are rare and reserved for exceptional cases.49     
¶42 In 
Avery, 
this 
court 
further 
noted 
that 
a 
determination that a case was the exceptional case that 
warranted such a reversal must be supported by an analysis 
setting forth the reasons for the determination.50     
¶43 We have similarly held that taking "shortcuts" where a 
particular analysis is prescribed will be deemed error: "This 
court has held that it is an erroneous exercise of discretion 
for the court of appeals  . . .  to shortcut [established] 
procedures . . . when there is no apparent reason for doing 
so."51  In an exceptional case, after all other claims are 
weighed and determined to be unsuccessful, a reviewing court may 
determine that reversal is nevertheless appropriate under Wis. 
Stat. § 752.35.   
     
B. THE FACT-FINDING OF THE TRIER OF FACT THAT KUCHARSKI DID 
NOT MEET HIS BURDEN IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
¶44 A reviewing court upholds the findings of fact by a 
trier 
of 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
The 
determination of whether a party has met his or her burden is a 
                                                 
48 Kemp, 61 Wis. 2d at 136.   
49  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114;  Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 
407, ¶38; Morden, 235 Wis. 2d 325, ¶87. 
50  Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶59 (holding that "the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion when it failed to 
properly analyze whether this was an exceptional case that 
entitled Avery to a new trial in the interest of justice.") 
51 Id. 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
26
matter of fact, not law.52  Therefore, unless it is clearly 
erroneous, the court of appeals is obligated to uphold the 
finding that Kucharski did not meet his burden of showing by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence that he was not mentally 
responsible for the crimes. 
¶45 We agree with the court of appeals' dissent in this 
case: 
The trial court gave reasoned explanations for its 
findings on the second prong of mental responsibility. 
It found that Kucharski was able to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct, quoting the experts that 
Kucharski thought killing his parents was the right 
thing to do and quoting Dr. Rawski as saying Kucharski 
knew right after the shooting that he needed a lawyer. 
And the trial court found that Kucharski failed to 
meet his burden of showing that he lacked the 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
rules of law because he obeyed part of what the voices 
commanded and chose not to obey other parts . . . .  
The trial court drew proper inferences from the 
evidence and found those inferences more reliable than 
the doctors' opinions as to the second prong of mental 
responsibility. The trial court explained that it 
distrusted the self-report basis for the doctors' 
opinions. . . .  
In questioning the basis for the experts' opinion, the 
trial court was engaging in the same evidence weighing 
process that the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved in 
Sarinske.53  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶46 Applying the proper standard of review and not 
disturbing the factual findings of the circuit court concerning 
                                                 
52 Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d at 48. 
53 State v. Kucharski, No. 2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip 
op. ¶¶47-49 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014). 
 
No. 2013AP557-CR 
 
 
 
27
the burden of proof because they are not clearly erroneous, we 
conclude that the court of appeals erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  In this case the only reason offered by the court 
of appeals for the new trial in the interest of justice was that 
court's improper de novo weighing of the evidence concerning the 
burden of proof on the NGI plea of the defendant.  When the 
evidence is reviewed under the proper standard, there is not a 
probability of a different result on retrial such that a new 
trial in the interest of justice is warranted.  
¶47 We therefore reverse the grant of a new trial under 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35 and remand to the court of appeals for the 
resolution of Kucharski's remaining unaddressed claims. 
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded. 
 
1 
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  (dissenting).  I agree with the 
majority that a reviewing court's discretionary power of 
reversal should be sparingly exercised.  Majority op., ¶¶5, 42.  
I part ways with the majority's analysis, however, because it 
formulates a new rule that arbitrarily limits our powers.  The 
majority declares that a reviewing court cannot base a decision 
to reverse in the interest of justice on a reassessment of the 
evidence.  Id., ¶¶10, 26.   
¶49 Its 
decision 
to 
limit 
a 
reviewing 
court's 
discretionary powers in this manner is extraordinary.  It 
conflicts with the expressed purpose of the discretionary 
reversal statute and contradicts decades of precedent.  Because 
this court's discretionary powers of reversal are coterminous 
with the powers of the court of appeals, the majority inexorably 
limits the discretionary powers of both.   
 ¶50 The 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
is 
a 
core 
judicial 
function.  The court of appeals' decision to reverse in the 
interest of justice is an exercise of discretion entitled to a 
deferential standard of review.  Even if we may disagree with 
the result, this court "will uphold the discretion of a court 
[it is] reviewing if the decision made on appropriate facts and 
the correct law is one which a court reasonably could have 
reached."  McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 334 N.W.2d 903 
(1983). 
¶51 I conclude that the court of appeals decision to 
reverse in the interest of justice should be upheld.  Because 
the court of appeals' discretionary decision was based on 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
appropriate facts and the correct law, and was a decision that a 
court could reasonably reach, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶52 The majority errs by creating a new rule that limits 
the discretion of reviewing courts: a reviewing court's decision 
to reverse in the interest of justice cannot be based on a 
reassessment of the evidence.  See Majority op., ¶34.  This 
arbitrary limit on a reviewing court's discretion conflicts with 
the expressed purpose of the discretionary reversal statute.   
¶53 For over a century, appellate courts in Wisconsin have 
had the power to reverse judgments in the interest of justice.  
Since its initial codification in 1913, this power has been 
broadly stated: 
In any action or proceeding brought to the supreme 
court by appeal or writ of error, if it shall appear 
to 
that 
court 
from 
the 
record, 
that 
the 
real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the supreme court may in its discretion reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of the 
question 
whether 
proper 
motions, 
objections, 
or 
exceptions appear in the record or not, and may also, 
in the case of reversal, direct the entry of the 
proper judgment or remit the case to the trial court 
for a new trial, and direct the making of such 
amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of such 
procedure . . . as shall be deemed necessary to 
accomplish the ends of justice. 
Wis. Stat. § 2405m (1913).  The statute's enactment was part of 
a movement to simplify the law so that technicalities would not 
be permitted to thwart justice.  See Marvin B. Rosenberry, J., 
Recent Progress in Judicial Administration and Procedure in 
Wisconsin, 5 Marq. L. Rev. 3, 4-5, 9 (1920). 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶54 The statute has subsequently gone through slight 
revisions and has been renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 751.06.   The 
substance, however, is substantially the same: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06.   
¶55 When the court of appeals was created in 1978, the 
legislature enacted a nearly identical statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35, granting the same power of discretionary reversal to 
the court of appeals.1  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 
399-400, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988).  Because Wis. Stat. § 751.06 and 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35  provides: 
Discretionary reversal. In an appeal to the court 
of appeals, if it appears from the record that the 
real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it 
is 
probable 
that 
justice 
has 
for 
any 
reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35 share the same language, this court has 
determined that "the power of reversal under these statutes is 
identical."  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 456 N.W.2d 797 
(1990); see also State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38 n.17, 345 Wis. 
2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60 ("The discretionary reversal power of this 
court and the court of appeals is coterminous.").   
¶56 The language used in Wis. Stat. §§ 752.35 and 751.06 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
the 
discretionary 
reversal power of reviewing courts to cover a broad range of 
situations.   For example, they both permit reversal when "it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 751.06, 752.35 (emphasis added).  Further, under the 
statutes, neither court's ability to reverse in the interest of 
justice is limited to proper motions or objections appearing in 
the record.  Id.  "[The statutes'] very breadth, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, indicates that they are meant to 
provide courts with the opportunity to exercise their discretion 
without constraint."  Monica Mark, A Fearless Search for the 
Truth No Longer: State v. Henley and Its Destructive Impact on 
New Trials in the Interest of Justice, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 1367, 
1386. 
¶57  This 
court 
has 
explained 
that 
"[t]his 
broad 
discretion enables [the court of appeals] to achieve justice in 
individual cases."  Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 21; see also State 
v. Mathis, 39 Wis. 2d 453, 458, 159 N.W.2d 729 (1968) ("The 
statute is intended as an emergency exit for the probably 
innocent.").  Considering that "[t]he function of the judiciary 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
is the administration of justice," In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 
518, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975), the breadth of the discretionary 
reversal statute is appropriate.   
¶58 By determining that appellate discretion does not 
extend 
to 
a 
reassessment 
of 
the 
evidence, 
the 
majority 
erroneously constricts the discretionary power of reviewing 
courts.  It removes a swath of cases from review, opening the 
door for the potential of an unaddressed and unreviewable 
miscarriage of justice.  The majority's determination to limit 
reviewing courts' discretion runs counter to the broad language 
of the statute and its expressed purpose "to accomplish the ends 
of justice."  Wis. Stat. § 752.35. 
¶59 The majority opinion is further flawed because it 
contradicts decades of Wisconsin precedent permitting reviewing 
courts to reverse in the interest of justice when the evidence 
raises great doubts about whether the state has met its burden, 
suggesting that justice has miscarried.  See State v. Fricke, 
215 Wis. 661, 667, 255 N.W. 724 (1934) ("Occasionally when such 
grave doubts exist in our minds regarding guilt of a defendant 
as to make us conscientiously believe that justice probably has 
miscarried, we exercise the authority specifically given to us 
by section 251.09 [subsequently renumbered as Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06], and reverse the judgment for a new trial."). 
¶60 This court has oft recognized that reviewing courts 
may reassess the evidence when considering whether justice has 
miscarried.  For example, in Hintz, 200 Wis. 636, 229 N.W.2d 54 
(1930) the court's decision to reverse in the interest of 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
justice was based on an assessment of the evidence.  In that 
case, the court reviewed a conviction for obtaining money under 
false pretense.  It observed that an essential element of the 
charge was the intent to defraud.  The court recited the 
evidence 
relating 
to 
intent, 
which 
strongly 
favored 
the 
defendant, and acknowledged that weighing this sort of evidence 
is typically a jury function.  Id. at 641.  However, the court's 
analysis did not stop there.  After stating that the "evidence 
leaves the question of defendant's intent to defraud in the 
greatest of doubt," the court concluded that "[w]hile it is the 
function of the jury to resolve this doubt, it seems probable to 
us that justice has miscarried by the verdict rendered.  Under 
such circumstances it is within our power to order a new trial."  
Id. at 642.  Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and 
remanded the cause for a new trial.  Id. 
¶61 Similarly, in Hughes v. State, 219 Wis. 9, 261 N.W. 
670 (1935), the court's determination that justice had been 
miscarried was based on its review of the evidence.  There, 
although the court observed that sufficient evidence had been 
presented to raise a jury question, it expressed doubts 
regarding the witness's version of events:  "the story of the 
complaining witness is inherently improbable."  Id. at 11-12.  
It further described the story presented as "doubtful" and 
indicated that the circumstances added to its "misgivings."  Id.  
Due to its uneasiness with the evidence presented, the court 
ordered a new trial in the interest of justice: 
While 
none 
of 
the 
evidence 
heretofore 
reviewed 
destroys as a matter of law the credibility of the 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
state's witness, we are satisfied that there are so 
many circumstances casting doubt upon the story of 
complaining 
witnesses, 
and 
that 
the 
evidence 
so 
strongly preponderates against her story, that there 
is good ground to conclude that justice has probably 
miscarried.  In view of this conclusion, we deem it 
proper, in the exercise of authority conferred by sec. 
251.09 Stats. [subsequently renumbered as Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06], to order a new trial. 
Id. at 13.   
¶62 The cases described above are but a sample of the many 
decisions granting reversal in the interest of justice based 
solely on a reassessment of the evidence.  See, e.g., Kemp v. 
State, 61 Wis. 2d 125, 137, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973) (granting new 
trial in the interest of justice because evidence as a whole 
predominated on Kemp's side); Combs v. Peters, 23 Wis. 2d 629, 
129 N.W.2d 174 (1964) (given the evidence of record tending to 
show that the defendant was the offending driver, court 
determined that the jury finding to the contrary was probably a 
miscarriage of justice, reversed the judgment, and remanded for 
a new trial); Schuh v. State, 221 Wis. 180, 183, 266 N.W. 234 
(1936) 
(reversing 
in 
the 
interest 
of 
justice 
where 
the 
circumstances under which the alleged act took place were 
"inherently improbable"); Jacobson v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 309-
10, 237 N.W. 142 (1931) (determining that "it is probable that 
justice has been miscarried" when the evidence in a bastardy 
case "indicate[d] very strongly" that the defendant was not the 
child's father);  Paladino v. State, 187 Wis. 605, 606, 205 N.W. 
320 (1925) (determining that despite the lack of errors, the 
case against defendant was very "doubtful" and defendant should 
have the opportunity to present the case to another jury); State 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
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v. Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶¶40, 45, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 
N.W.2d 175 (ordering new trial in the interest of justice 
because, considering the evidence presented at trial, there was 
a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a 
different result).  
¶63  Although the majority does acknowledge Kemp and 
attempts to distinguish it on the facts, it misses that Kemp did 
the very thing that the majority now states is prohibited: it 
reversed in the interest of justice based on a reassessment of 
the evidence.  The failure to address this aspect of Kemp, as 
well as numerous other cases taking the approach that it now 
disavows, greatly undermines the majority opinion. 
II 
¶64 In contrast to the majority, I conclude that the court 
of appeals' decision to reverse in the interest of justice 
should be upheld.  Its decision to reverse in the interest of 
justice is an exercise of discretion entitled to a deferential 
standard of review.  This court "will uphold the discretion of a 
court [it is] reviewing if the decision made on appropriate 
facts and the correct law is one which a court reasonably could 
have reached."  McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d at 370.  Here, the court 
of appeals' discretionary decision was based on appropriate 
facts and the correct law, and was a decision that a court could 
reasonably reach. 
¶65 The court of appeals' decision accurately recited the 
following facts of this case.  State v. Kucharski, No. 
2013AP557-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014).  
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Kucharski, charged with two counts of first degree intentional 
homicide, pled not guilty by reason of mental defect.  Id., ¶3.  
He asserted that he began having hallucinations and hearing 
voices in 2005.  Id., ¶6.  Shortly thereafter, he moved in with 
his parents and became very isolated.  Id., ¶¶6-7.  The voices 
continued, making derogatory remarks and commanding Kucharski to 
do things.  Id., ¶8.  In 2009, he began keeping a journal to 
help him sort out what the voices meant.  Id., ¶11.  By 2010, 
this journal consisted of 40-50 pages of notes and diagrams.  
Id.   
¶66 On the day he killed his parents, the voices told 
Kucharski to "simply end it."  Id., ¶12.  He intended to follow 
their directives by killing his parents and then killing himself 
in a shoot-out with the police.  Id., ¶13.  However, by the time 
the police arrived, he forgot to have the shootout.  Id., ¶14. 
¶67 Kucharski presented the reports of two psychiatrists 
to support his defense.  Both opined that he was suffering from 
schizophrenia at the time he killed his parents.  Id., ¶15.  One 
determined 
that 
Kucharski 
lacked 
substantial 
capacity 
to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.  Id.  Similarly, the 
other determined that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his actions and to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law.  Id.   
¶68 The psychiatrists based their opinions on interviews 
with Kucharski, his actions on the day of the incident, 
recordings of his 911 call shortly after the incident, his 
responses on the SIRS-II test (which is used to detect feigning 
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
or exaggeration of mental illness), his journal, clinical 
observations by a psychologist, and information from police 
reports.  Id., ¶¶17-25.  Kucharski also presented the report of 
a psychologist, who indicated that he would not have a different 
conclusion regarding Kucharski's mental responsibility.  Id., 
¶15.   
¶69 After reciting the above facts, the court of appeals 
correctly described the governing law for this case, Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35, which permits the court of appeals to reverse in the 
interest of justice when "it is probable that justice has for 
any reason miscarried."  Id., ¶32.  It acknowledged that it may 
conclude that justice has miscarried if there is a substantial 
probability of a different result on retrial.  Id., ¶33.  It 
also acknowledged that it may exercise its discretion only in 
exceptional cases.  Id.   
¶70 Reasonably applying this law to the facts of the case, 
the court of appeals determined that the evidence "'predominates 
quite heavily on the side of the defendant on the issue of his 
mental responsibility,' and that, consequently, 'justice has 
miscarried and . . . a new trial will probably bring a different 
result.'"  Id., ¶44 (quoting Kemp, 61 Wis. 2d at 138).  It 
observed that Kucharski was suffering from schizophrenia when he 
killed his parents; the expert evidence supporting his defense 
was uncontroverted; and there was a complete lack of evidence of 
alternative explanations for Kucharski's behavior.  Id., ¶¶36-
41.  
No.  2013AP557-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶71  The court of appeals' analysis is consistent with a 
long line of cases permitting courts to reverse in the interest 
of justice based on a reassessment of the evidence.  See supra, 
¶¶12-15. 
 
This 
court 
should 
be 
hesitant 
to 
cabin 
that 
discretion.   
¶72 Rather than creating a new rule of law that limits the 
discretionary powers of reviewing courts, I would apply well 
established existing precedent and give deference to the court 
of appeals discretionary decision.  Because the court of 
appeals' exercise of its discretion was based on appropriate 
facts and the correct law, and was a decision that a reasonable 
court could make, it was not erroneously exercised and should be 
upheld.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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